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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED 

PUBLISH 

FIT~ ED 

STATES COURT OF APPEALSUniW<l t4tate:&urt of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT AUG 1 7.199'. 

JULIUS J. JONES, Jr., 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. No. 93-1230 

MARVIN T. RUNYON, Postmaster General, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 91-B-1598) 

Barry Douglas Roseman, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Wendy M. Keats (R. Andrew German, Chief Counsel, and Robert 

Sindermann, Jr., United States Postal Service, Washington, D.C.; 

Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, James R. Allison, 

United States Attorney, and Robert S. Greenspan, Department of 

Justice, Washington, D.C., with her on the brief), Department of 

Justice, Washington, D.C., for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before BRORBY and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and BROWN,* Senior 

United States District Judge. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior United States District 

Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 93-1230 Document: 01019290216 Date Filed: 08/17/1994 Page: 1 
We are asked to determine the statute of limitations 

applicable to federal employees challenging an adverse decision of 

the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) under the Age 

Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 633a. Mr. 

Julius Jones, Jr. appeals the dismissal of his age discrimination 

claim after the district court determined the claim was filed 

outside a thirty-day limitations period imposed similarly on Title 

VII claims. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

On November 7, 1986, the United States Postal Service denied 

Mr. Jones the position of ad hoc EEO counselor. Mr. Jones 

previously worked as an advocate and counselor regarding equal 

employment opportunities during his long tenure with the Postal 

Service. Because he believes the denial of this position 

evidences discrimination on the basis of race, gender, and age, 

and shows unlawful retaliation for his past protests against 

alleged unlawful employment practices, he filed an administrative 

complaint on December 8, 1986. The EEOC issued Mr. Jones a final 

administrative decision of no discrimination, dated August 28, 

1990. He then filed a pro se complaint in the United States 

District Court for the District of Colorado on September 28, 1990, 

but that complaint was later dismissed without prejudice for 

failure to properly serve the Postmaster General and the United 

States under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4) and (5). Jones v. Frank, No. 

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90-B-1743 (D. Colo. Aug. 16, 1991) (bench ruling), aff'd, 973 F.2d 

872 (lOth Cir. 1992). 

On September 16, 1991, almost five years after the alleged 

discriminatory act and over one year after the final decision of 

the EEOC, Mr. Jones refiled his discrimination complaint in 

district court. The Postmaster General moved to dismiss the 

action as time-barred. The district court granted this motion, 

holding the thirty-day limitation period then applicable to 

federal employees filing suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e16(c),l applied to bar all of Mr. Jones's claims.2 Jones v. 

Frank, 819 F. Supp. 923 (D. Colo. 1993). As to the age 

discrimination claim, the district court adopted the same 

limitations period as found in Title VII's federal employment 

provisions. "[B]orrowing [Title VII] section 2000e-16's 

limitation period is appropriate because section 2000e-16 was 

'actually designed to accommodate a balance of interests very 

similar to that at stake' here and is in fact, an analogy' to 

[ADEA] section 633a." Id. at 925 (quoting DelCostello v. 

1 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended the federal employee 

limitations period in Title VII actions from thirty days to ninety 

days. P.L. 102-166, tit. I § 114, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (1991). 

2 The district court also held the pendency of the prior 

complaint, dismissed without prejudice, did not toll the 

limitations period. Jones, 819 F. Supp. at 926. Mr. Jones 

expressly does not appeal that holding. Apt. Opening Br. at 4 

n.l. Also, as Appellant rightly points out, his second complaint 

was filed over a year from the EEOC decision, so the new ninetyday period is of no consequence unless tolling applies. Because 

he chooses not to appeal the district court's tolling decision, he 

further does not assert the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should be 

applied retroactively to his case. 

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Appellate Case: 93-1230 Document: 01019290216 Date Filed: 08/17/1994 Page: 3 
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169 (1983)). Mr. 

Jones does not appeal the dismissal of his non-age based 

discrimination claims. His appeal of the age discrimination claim 

contends his complaint was timely if considered under the six-year 

statute of limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). 

DISCUSSION 

Statutory limitations on suits against the government involve 

the government's waiver of sovereign immunity. See Irwin v. 

Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 94 (1990); United 

States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 841 (1986). As such, a rule more 

favorable to litigants against the government than to litigants 

against private employers seems unlikely. See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 

96 (refusing to extend the doctrine of equitable tolling in a 

federal sector Title VII action beyond general principles 

applicable to private employer actions). Because of congressional 

silence as to the appropriate limitations period for ADEA claims 

against the federal government, we are asked to choose between two 

statutory limitations periods. We choose the one most likely to 

reflect Congress's balancing of the unique interests of a federal 

employer with the concerns of discrimination in government 

employment. 

The ADEA provides a federal employee two alternative routes 

for pursuing an age discrimination claim. An employee may bring 

the action directly to federal district court in the first 

instance, so long as the employee gives the EEOC notice of intent 

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Appellate Case: 93-1230 Document: 01019290216 Date Filed: 08/17/1994 Page: 4 
to sue within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act and then 

waits thirty days before filing the action. 29 U.S.C. § 633a(d); 

Stevens v. Department of Treasury, 500 U.S. 1, 7 (1991). 

Conversely, an employee may invoke the EEOC's administrative 

process and then file a civil action in federal district court if 

unsatisfied with administrative remedies. 29 U.S.C. §§ 633a(b)-

(c) • Mr. Jones attempted this route. The ADEA, however, is 

silent on how long action may be filed in district court after a 

final agency decision. 

Although declining to fill that silence, the Supreme Court 

explained the proper analysis is to "assume, as we have before, 

that Congress intended to impose an appropriate period borrowed 

either from a state statute or from an analogous federal one." 

Stevens, 500 U.S. at 7 (citing Agency Holding Cor,p. v. MalleyDuff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 146-48 (1987)). As this is a 

question of first impression for this circuit, we note the Courts 

of Appeals are divided on whether to "borrow" an analogous 

limitations period from Title VII, Long v. Frank, 22 F.3d 54 (2d 

Cir. 1994); Lave~ v. Marsh, 918 F.2d 1022 (1st Cir. 1990), or 

from the general ltmitations period for nontort actions against 

the federal government, Lubniewski v. Lehman, 891 F.2d 216 (9th 

Cir. 1989) .3 We rule out the applicability of state statutes. To 

3 The Second Circuit's decision in Long expressly rejected, as 

dicta, statements made in its prior decision of Bornholdt v. 

Brady, 869 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1989). Bornholdt did not answer 

whether the general six-year limitations period applied to § 633a, 

but expressed strong reservations against applying the thirty-day 

limitation of Title VII. Id. at 64-67. The Ninth Circuit, in its 

Lubniewski decision, relied almost verbatim on Bornholdt. We are 

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adopt varying state rules would burden administrative efforts of 

the EEOC and prove an "unsatisfactory vehicle[] for the 

enforcement of federal law." DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 161; see 

Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977) (declining 

to apply state limitations period to Title VII enforcement suits 

brought by EEOC); Barnett v. United Air Lines, Inc., 738 F.2d 358 

(lOth Cir.) (declining to apply state limitations to hybrid breach 

of contract/duty of fair representation claim brought under 

Railway Labor Act), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1087 (1984). 

In borrowing a statute, a reasonable source is a "statute of 

limitations actually designed to accommodate a balance of 

interests very similar to that at stake here -- a statute that is, 

in fact, an analogy to the present lawsuit." DelCostello, 462 

U.S. at 169; see Lavery, 918 F.2d at 1025. If another federal 

statute exists that clearly reflects the interests Congress 

intended to protect in the silent statute, we will apply it. 

Barnett, 738 F.2d at 363. 

Here, as the district court noted, the limitations period for 

federal employee actions under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e16(c),4 is more analogous to ADEA than the general limitations 

left, therefore, without a completely untarnished argument in 

favor of the general six-year limitation period. 

4 

Civil action by employee or applicant for employment for 

redress of grievances; time for bringing of action; head 

of department, agency, or unit as defendant 

(c) Within thirty days of receipt of notice of 

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.p~riod for nontort actions against the federal government, 28 

u.s.c. § 2401(a) .5 This conclusion is borne out by our similar 

analysis of other limitations periods in Title VII and the ADEA. 

"Since the ADEA and Title VII share a common purpose, the 

elimination of discrimination in the workplace," since the 

language of § 633a(a) & (b) is "almost in haec verba" with 

§ 2000e-16(a) & (b), and since the legislative history of the ADEA 

section indicates Title VII was its source, we conclude the two 

limitations periods are analogous. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. 

Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979) (comparing Title VII and ADEA 

private sector limitations in deferral states); Smith v. Oral 

Roberts Evangelistic Ass'n, 731 F.2d 684, 688 (lOth Cir. 1984) 

(same) . The first two sections of ADEA § 633a were "patterned 

after" similar sections in Title VII § 2000e-16. Lehman v. 

Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 163-64 (1981) (citing remarks of Senator 

Bentsen, principal sponsor of ADEA § 633a, 118 Cong. Rec. 24,397 

final action taken by the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission upon an appeal from a 

decision or order of [a federal employer] on a 

complaint of discrimination based on race, color, 

religion, sex or national origin, ... an employee 

or applicant tor employment, if aggrieved by the 

final disposition of his complaint, ... may file a 

civil action [in federal district court] .... 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1972), amended by Act of Nov. 21, 1991, 

42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-16(c) (West Supp. 1994). 

5 

T~e for commencing action against United States 

(a) Every civil action commenced against the 

United States shall be barred unless the complaint 

is filed within six years after the right of action 

first accrues •... 

28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). 

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Appellate Case: 93-1230 Document: 01019290216 Date Filed: 08/17/1994 Page: 7 
(1972)). In offering the first two sections to the Senate, 

Senator Bentsen stated "[t]he measures used to protect Federal 

employees [from age discrimination] would be substantially similar 

to those incorporated" in the recently amended Title VII 

protections for federal employees. 118 Cong. Rec. 24,397 (1972); 

see Lehman, 453 U.S. at 167 n.15. 

Mr. Jones responds Congress could not have intended § 633a to 

follow Title VII because a Senate committee rejected a version of 

§ 633a(c) drafted identical to Title VII § 2000e-16(c). See 

Lubniewski, 891 F.2d at 220-21. When Senator Bentsen introduced 

the substantive provisions for federal employee age discrimination 

claims, he proposed § 633a(c) would give an employee only one 

route to federal court: a civil action filed within thirty days 

of a final agency decision. 118 Cong. Rec. 15,894-95 (1972) 

(introducing amendment to S. 1861). The committee version of the 

bill deleted this proposal, without explanation, and drafted 

§ 633a(c) in its current codified fashion. 118 Cong. Rec. 23,955-

56 (1972) .6 Also instituted with the committe version was the 

addition of a second route allowing a federal employee to directly 

file a claim in federal court. 29 U.S.C.§ 633a(d). 

We follow the views of the Second and First Circuits who 

considered this legislative past and rejected its import as to 

6 Section 15(c) of the bill, now codified as 29 U.S.C. § 633a(c), 

states: "Any persons aggrieved may bring a civil action in any 

court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief 

as will effectuate the purposes of this Act." 

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Appellate Case: 93-1230 Document: 01019290216 Date Filed: 08/17/1994 Page: 8 
.legislative intent. "In the absence of an eJq>lanation for the 

omission, we cannot ascribe to it the deliberate purpose of 

precluding [a] reference to the most closely analogous 

statute, for, in doing so we are just as likely to defeat 

Congress's intent as to effectuate it • II Long, 22 F.3d at 57. "We 

are not free to ascribe deliberateness to Congress' omission in 

the absence of any evidence whatsoever that the provision was 

explicitly debated and rejected. [Citation omitted.] We simply 

do not know why Congress left out the thirty-day limitations 

provision before passing the amendment." Lavery, 918 F.2d at 

1026. Instead of giving federal employees a single route to 

federal court, Congress gave them two. Although the committee 

modified § 633a(c), it retained the other source for 

administrative review, § 633a(b), as a twin of Title VII§ 2000e16(b). We do not find Congress intended, in drafting provisions 

that allow for two routes, to ignore in the administrative route a 

limitations period found in an analogous anti-discrimination 

statute. 

Finally, we address the Postmaster General's contention that 

administrative regulations support the borrowing of Title VII's 

limitations period. The EEOC submitted a new part 1614 of its 

regulations, effective after the date of Mr. Jones's complaint, to 

specifically deal with administrative complaints and appeals by 

federal employees. 57 Fed. Reg. 12,634 {Apr. 10, i992) (effective 

Oct. 1, 1992). A new rule applies the same limitations periods of 

Title VII to federal sector claims under the ADEA. 29 C.P.R. 

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§ 1614.408(c) (1993). This rule takes the opposite view of 

previous EEOC regulations, however. Previous EEOC rules specified 

the limitation period for filing civil actions after a final 

agency decision, 29 C.F.R. § 1613.281 (1991), but expressly 

excluded applying this limitation to age discrimination 

complaints, 29 C.F.R. § 1613.514 (1991) .7 

An agency's interpretation of an ambiguous provision within 

the statute it is authorized to implement is entitled to judicial 

deference. See Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 

, 111 S. Ct. 2524, 2534 (1991) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S- 837, 866 

(1984)). Such deference is considerably less eligible when the 

agency's position is inconsistent with a previously held position, 

however. See Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 113 S. Ct. 2151, 

2161 (1993); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 

(1976); cf. Valley c~ of Utah, Inc. v. Babbit, 24 F.3d 1263, 

1267-68 (10th Cir. 1994) ("Such deference does not obtain 

where the agency's interpretation of its regulations is 

inconsistent with its prior administrative interpretations."). 

Solely because EEOC's current regulations are consistent with our 

7 We also recognize this prior position is reflected in the 

notice sent by EEOC to Mr. Jones purportedly explaining his right 

to file a civil action. The relevant portion of the notice reads: 

As to any claim based on the Age Discrimination in 

Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 633a), you MAY have up 

to six years after the right of action first accrued. 

See Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 u.s. 156 (1981); 29 u.s.c. 

633a(f); and 28 U.S.C. 2401(a). 

(Emphasis in original.) 

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.interpretation of the analogy between Title VII and the ADEA, we 

find them persuasive. 

CONCLUSION 

We hold the district court properly applied the analogous 

limitations period of Title VII, 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-16(c), to Mr. 

Jones's ADEA claim, 29 U.S.C. § 633a. Mr. Jones had thirty days 

from receipt of the final EEOC decision to file a complaint in 

federal district court. Accordingly, the judgment of the district 

court is AFFIRMED. 

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