Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02747/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02747-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LOIS RIDDICK,

Plaintiff,

v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner of

Social Security,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 04-2747 CW

ORDER GRANTING IN

PART PLAINTIFF'S

ATTORNEY'S MOTION

FOR ATTORNEYS'

FEES

Plaintiff's counsel, Tony Arjo, moves, under 42 U.S.C.

§ 406(b), for an award of $12,000 in attorneys' fees. Defendant

Jo Anne B. Barnhart, the Commissioner of Social Security, responds,

stating that she does not object to Mr. Arjo's petition. Plaintiff

Lois Riddick, however, objects and argues that Mr. Arjo did not

earn the entire fee. Mr. Arjo did not file a reply. The matter

was decided on the papers. Having considered all of the papers

filed by the parties, the Court grants Mr. Arjo's fee request in

part.

Case 4:04-cv-02747-CW Document 24 Filed 10/11/06 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff applied for Social Security disability benefits in

2001. Her claim was denied. On July 6, 2004, she signed a fee

agreement with Mr. Arjo. The fee agreement states that, if the

Social Security Administration or federal court decides her claim

favorably, she will pay Mr. Arjo twenty-five percent of the pastdue benefits resulting from her claim. Two days later, Plaintiff

filed this action. Because the administrative file and audio tape

of Plaintiff's previous hearing could not be located, the Court

remanded Plaintiff's case for reconstruction of the file and

another hearing; the Court retained jurisdiction. 

Upon remand, an Administrative Law Judge found that Plaintiff

was disabled as of January 4, 2003. The Social Security

Administration calculated Plaintiff's past-due benefits to be

$52,163 and withheld $13,040.75, twenty-five percent of the pastdue benefits, for payment of any approved attorneys' fees. The

Court entered a final judgment affirming the decision.

On July 28, 2006, Mr. Arjo filed a motion seeking $12,000 in

attorneys' fees. Included with his motion is the fee agreement he

and Plaintiff signed and his time log for this case. According to

the time log, Mr. Arjo spent 18.6 hours on this case, including

half an hour on an Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) fee petition.

 Defendant responded, stating that, given the procedural and

substantive history of the case, and the results achieved, she did

not object to counsel's petition. She noted, however, that if the

Court awarded Mr. Arjo the full requested $12,000, it should order

him to refund to Plaintiff the $2,957.40 in EAJA fees and costs

Case 4:04-cv-02747-CW Document 24 Filed 10/11/06 Page 2 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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that Defendant agreed to pay him. 

Plaintiff also responded, contending that Mr. Arjo did not

earn the entire fee and asked the Court not to award him the full

amount he requested. Plaintiff stated that she did the majority of

the work in reconstructing her file and in getting her benefits. 

Among the documents Plaintiff submitted to verify her efforts is a

letter from her doctor, stating that Plaintiff, unlike other

patients, did a "tremendous amount of the work involved in her

case." 

DISCUSSION

Title 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) provides:

Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant 

. . . who was represented before the court by an attorney, 

the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a

reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25

percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the

claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.

The attorneys' fees are payable from funds the Social Security

Administration withholds from a claimant's past-due benefits for

work performed by the claimant's counsel. As noted above, here,

the Social Security Administration withheld $13,040.75.

In Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 803 (2002), the United

States Supreme Court noted that virtually every attorney

representing a client in a Social Security benefits dispute

includes in his or her retainer agreement a provision calling for a

fee equal to twenty-five percent of the past-due benefits. This

case is no exception. Gisbrecht instructs that it is the

responsibility of the district courts to conduct an "independent

check" to ensure that the twenty-five percent contingency fee

Case 4:04-cv-02747-CW Document 24 Filed 10/11/06 Page 3 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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yields "reasonable results in particular cases." Id. And,

"because section 406(b) requires an affirmative judicial finding

that the fee allowed is 'reasonable,' the attorney bears the burden

of persuasion that the statutory requirement has been satisfied." 

Id. at n.17. If the court finds that the amount pursuant to the

contingency agreement is not reasonable, it can reduce the

attorney's recovery to an amount that is reasonable. Id. at 808. 

Gisbrecht provides two specific examples of situations where a

reduction of fees is in order: if the attorney is responsible for

delay and if the benefits are large in comparison to the amount of

time counsel spent on the case. Id.

Mr. Arjo argues that the $12,000 he seeks is reasonable

because his requested fee is less than $13,040.75, twenty-five

percent of Plaintiff's past-due benefits, and because it reflects

the contingent nature of the case and the accompanying risk he took

in representing Plaintiff. He notes that he was not responsible

for any delay in this case and states that the requested fee is not

unreasonable in light of the time spent on the case and the

results, which include Plaintiff receiving ongoing monthly

disability benefits and Medicare medical insurance. 

But, as noted above, Mr. Arjo submitted a time log showing

that he spent 18.6 hours on this case. His request for $12,000

represents an hourly rate of $645.16. Mr. Arjo fails to show that

this is reasonable. To award Mr. Arjo the $12,000 he requests

would be a windfall. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808 ("reviewing court

should disallow 'windfall for lawyers'") (quoting Rodriquez v.

Bowen, 865 F.2d 739, 747 (6th Cir. 1989)). Under Gisbrecht, the

Case 4:04-cv-02747-CW Document 24 Filed 10/11/06 Page 4 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Court can award Plaintiff's counsel only a reasonable fee, not a

windfall. Therefore, the Court reduces Mr. Arjo's fee to $6,000,

plus the EAJA fees and costs that Defendant has agreed to pay him. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Attorney's Motion for

Attorneys' Fees Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Docket No. 15) is GRANTED

IN PART. The Court finds that $6,000 is a reasonable amount, under

42 U.S.C. § 406(b), for the time Plaintiff's counsel expended and

that he does not have to refund the EAJA fees to Plaintiff. The

remaining $7,040.75 of the $13,040.75 that was withheld, however,

shall be returned to Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 10/11/06 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:04-cv-02747-CW Document 24 Filed 10/11/06 Page 5 of 5