Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00674/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00674-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

Even though Plaintiff filed his action on the Court’s §

1983 complaint form, the Court is liberally construing his

Complaint and treating it as a Bivens action. A Bivens action,

which is brought against federal actors, is the federal

counterpart to a § 1983 action. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named

Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392, 91

S.Ct. 1999, 2002 (1971). 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

RODERICK D. WILLIAMS, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 05-00674-BH-B

JUDGE CALLIE V.S. GRANADE, :

et al.,

:

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, a federal prison inmate proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis, filed the instant Bivens action.1 This action has

been referred to the undersigned for appropriate action pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.2(c)(4). After careful

consideration, it is recommended that this action be dismissed with

prejudice, prior to service of process, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(I) and (ii), because Plaintiff’s claims are either

frivolous or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.

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The Court takes judicial notice of its records in

Plaintiff’s criminal action, United States of America v. Roderick

D. Williams, CR 04-0197-CG-C. ITT Rayonier, Inc. v. United

States, 651 F.2d 343, 345 n.2 (5th Cir. July 20, 1981).

2

I. Nature of Proceedings. 

A. Complaint (Doc. 1) as Amended (Docs. 15 & 17).

Plaintiff’s Complaint arises from his convictions in this

Court for conspiracy with intent to distribute marijuana and for

conspiracy with intent to distribute methamphetamine on April 28,

2005. Each conviction resulted in an imprisonment sentence of 97

months, with a supervised release term of three years, which are to

be served concurrently, and a $200 special assessment.2 Plaintiff

names as Defendants Callie V.S. Granade, Chief District Judge of

the United States District Court for the Southern District of

Alabama; Deborah Griffin, Assistant United States Attorney for the

Southern District of Alabama; Gregory Hughes, Plaintiff’s appointed

defense counsel; and Richard Horne, Plaintiff’s appointed defense

counsel.

The gist of Plaintiff’s Complaint is that although he was

indicted on the two above charges and went to trial on the two

charges, Judge Granade added two other charges to the verdict form

and instructed the jury that they should consider these added

charges. Plaintiff contends this is a violation of his

constitutional right to be tried only on indicted charges.

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Defendant Griffin is alleged to have been aware that the Judge

Granade constructively “amended” the indictment and then attempted

to cover it up. Plaintiff then makes a conclusory allegation that

Griffin engaged in misconduct and participated in the “amending” of

the indictment. 

Furthermore, Plaintiff contends that his trial counsel,

Defendant Hughes, allowed the judge to constructively “amend” the

indictment without offering an objection. According to Plaintiff,

Defendant Hughes advised him that the judge in a federal court may

add a charge to the verdict form, even if it is greater than the

charged offense. Additionally, Plaintiff contends that Defendant

Horne, who was hired after Plaintiff’s trial and after Defendant

Hughes, told Plaintiff that he received correct advice and

discouraged him from appealing because he could receive a life

sentence. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Horne shared this same

information with Plaintiff’s family and faxed to Plaintiff’s wife

and mother a copy of Plaintiff’s pre-sentence report in an attempt

to have them convince Plaintiff to change his mind. Plaintiff

further contends that “[t]he courts has (sic) also attempted to

cover this violation by excluding these charges from [his] presentence investigation report as well as docket report.” 

In his request for relief, Plaintiff seeks $40 million and

immediate release and dismissal of all charges. Plaintiff

acknowledges that his convictions and sentences have not been

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invalidated.

B. Criminal Proceedings Against Plaintiff.

The records of this Court reflect that on October 27, 2004, a

superseding indictment was returned against Plaintiff for

conspiracy with intent to distribute marijuana and for conspiracy

with intent to distribute methamphetamine. (CR 04-0197-CG-C, Doc.

8). Defendant Hughes was appointed to represent Plaintiff on

February 28, 2005, replacing prior counsel. (Doc. 55). Defendant

Griffin prosecuted Plaintiff. See, e.g. Docs. 8, 70. Plaintiff was

convicted of these charges on April 28, 2005 by a jury.

Plaintiff’s co-defendant, Jeffery Demon Jones, was charged with two

additional counts, conspiracy with intent to distribute cocaine and

drug money laundering. (Doc. 8). Jones, the co-defendant, pleaded

guilty on December 16, 2004. (Doc. 28). 

Prior to the commencement of Plaintiff’s trial, Griffin, on

behalf of the Government, filed the United States’ Notice Re

Uncharged Misconduct, Rule 16(a)(1)(E) Testimony, and Giglio

Material (Doc. 70), wherein she advised that the United States

planned to ask the Court to submit a special verdict to the jury

for the purpose of determining the quantities of cocaine, ICE (pure

methamphetamine), methamphetamine, and marijuana. Cocaine and ICE

were included because Plaintiff was also allegedly selling these

drugs during the time frame of the conduct giving rise to his

indictments. (Id.). On April 28, 2005, Plaintiff was found guilty

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by the jury of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute, 50

kilograms or more, but less than 100 kilograms, of marijuana and of

conspiring to possess with intent to distribute, 50 grams or more,

but less than 500 grams, of a mixture and a substance containing

methamphetamine. (Doc. 86). Because the jury found Plaintiff

guilty of the foregoing indicted charges, it was asked to determine

if Plaintiff also possessed with intent to distribute crystal

meth/ICE and/or cocaine and, if so, to determine the amount. The

jury found that Plaintiff possessed 36 grams of crystal meth/ICE.

(Id.). The jury also found that Plaintiff did not possess with the

intent to distribute cocaine. (Id.). 

On May 9, 2005, Defendant Hughes moved to withdraw from

Plaintiff’s case because Plaintiff was being represented by an

Atlanta attorney. (Doc. 103). Defendant Hughes’ Motion was

granted. (Doc. 104). Shortly, thereafter, Defendant Horne appeared

for Plaintiff as retained counsel. (Doc. 108). On September 14,

2005, Plaintiff was sentenced. (Doc. 137).

Proceeding pro se, Plaintiff filed Notices of Appeal. (Docs.

138 - 140). Shortly thereafter, Defendant Horne filed a Motion to

Withdraw as Counsel for Plaintiff based on letters that he received

from Plaintiff dismissing him. (Doc. 142). Defendant’s Horne’s

Motion was granted, and Plaintiff was appointed new counsel. (Docs.

143, 147 & 166). A Certificate of Readiness concerning the record

on appeal was entered by the District Court on October 31, 2005.

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The predecessor to this section is 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). 

Even though Congress made many substantive changes to § 1915(d)

when it enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2)(B), the frivolity and the

failure to state a claim analysis contained in Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827 (1989), was unaltered. 

Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,

534 U.S. 1044 (2001); Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 866 n.4

(6th Cir. 2000). However, dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B) is now

mandatory. Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1348-49.

6

(Doc. 163). Presently, Plaintiff’s direct appeal is pending before

the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 

II. Standards of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court

is reviewing Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B).3 Under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(I), a claim may be dismissed

as “frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact."

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831-32

(1989). A claim is frivolous as a matter of law where, inter alia,

the defendants are immune from suit, id. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833,

the claim seeks to enforce a right which clearly does not exist,

id., or there is an affirmative defense that would defeat the

claim, such as the statute of limitations, Clark v. Georgia Pardons

& Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 640 n.2 (11th Cir. 1990). Judges are

accorded “not only the authority to dismiss [as frivolous] a claim

based on indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual

power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and

dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly

baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833. A

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The Court does not decide whether the present action would

also be precluded by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct.

2364 (1994), because Plaintiff’s claims are recommended for

dismissal for other reasons. However, the Court notes that Heck

held that a claim for damages in a § 1983 action that would have

the effect of undermining an outstanding conviction or sentence

if the Court were to rule favorably on the claim is prohibited

until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated. Id. at

486-87, 114 S.Ct. at 2372-73 (“We hold that, in order to recover

damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose

unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid,

(footnote omitted), a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal

authorized to make such determination, or called into question by

7

complaint may be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted “only if

it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts

that could be proved consistent with the allegations.” Hishon v.

King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232 (1984)

(citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102

(1957)); see Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir.

1997) (noting that § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)’s language tracks the

language of Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)).

III. Discussion.

A. Claims Against Judge Granade.

In this action, Plaintiff challenges his outstanding

convictions and sentences. A challenge to a conviction or sentence

in a Bivens action comes within the purview of the decision in Heck

v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994).4 See Abella v.

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a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a

conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not

cognizable under § 1983.”). 

In the event Plaintiff decides to continue his efforts to

invalidate his conviction or sentence in a non-habeas action, he

should be mindful of the rule from Heck. This is so because

Plaintiff will earn a “strike” for any action or appeal that is

dismissed under § 1915(e)(2)(B) or § 1915A. After the

accumulation of three “strikes,” Plaintiff will be required to

pay the entire $350.00 filing fee at the time of filing of an

action unless he can show that he is “under imminent danger of

serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

8

Rubino, 63 F.3d 1063, 1065-66 & n.4 (11th Cir. 1995)(applying Heck

to a Bivens action). However, the Eleventh Circuit has indicated

that absolute immunity is a threshold issue that should be decided

“before dismissal on ripeness grounds under Heck.” Id. at 1065

n.3. 

“[T]he immunities provided federal officials in Bivens actions

are coextensive with those provided state officials in § 1983

actions.” Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1241 (11th Cir. 2000);

accord Abella, 63 F.3d at 1065 (observing that pursuant to Butz v.

Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 500, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2907 (1978), a federal

official enjoys the same immunity in a Bivens action that a similar

state official has for an identical violation under § 1983); Van

Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431, 1436 (10th Cir. 1986) (finding

that federal district and circuit judges were entitled to absolute

judicial immunity); Patterson v. Aiken, 628 F. Supp. 1068, 1071

(N.D. Ga.) (granting federal judges absolute judicial immunity in

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a Bivens action), aff’d, 784 F.2d 403 (11th Cir. 1986); Page v.

Grady, 788 F. Supp. 1207, 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (granting a federal

district judge absolute immunity for signing a seizure warrant and

for conducting a trial on drug distribution charges). 

In a Bivens action, a judge is entitled to absolute judicial

immunity from damages for those acts taken while she was acting in

her judicial capacity unless she acted in the “‘clear absence of

all jurisdiction.’” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98

S.Ct. 1099, 1104-05 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335,

13 Wall. 335, 351, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871)); Simmons v. Conger, 86 F.3d

1080, 1084-85 (11th Cir. 1996) (same). A judge is entitled to this

immunity even though her acts were in error, were malicious, or

were in excess of her jurisdiction. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356, 98

S.Ct. at 1104. A federal judge’s absolute immunity includes

immunity from claims for injunctive relief. Bolin, 225 F.3d at

1242. 

It is clear that Plaintiff’s contact with Judge Granade was in

her judicial capacity. Plaintiff’s criminal case was before Judge

Granade when she allegedly added two more charges to the verdict

form and instructed the jury that they should consider these two

additional charges. Instructing the jury after having conducted a

criminal trial is a typical judicial function for Judge Granade to

have performed. Thus, the first portion of the Stump immunity

test, which requires that the judge be acting in her judicial

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capacity, is satisfied. Simmons, 86 F.3d at 1085. 

The second part of the Stump test inquires into whether Judge

Granade acted in the “‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’”

Simmons, 86 F.3d at 1085 (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 357, 98 S.Ct.

at 1105). While Plaintiff asserts that “the defendants” did act

“in complete absence of all jurisdiction”, he does not provide any

explanation or facts. (Doc. 15). Moreover, it is clear that

“[t]he judicial power [of the United States] shall extend to all

Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws

of the United States and treaties. . . .” U.S. CONST. ART. III, §

2. Thus, the undersigned finds that when Judge Granade conducted

Plaintiff’s trial for violations of the criminal laws of the United

States and sentenced Plaintiff, upon his conviction, for said

violations, Judge Granade was acting within her jurisdiction.

Although Plaintiff contends that an error was committed in

“amending” the verdict form to include unindicted charges and that

the matter should have been handled differently, an error by a

judge in a ruling or in the handling of a case does not divest a

judge of jurisdiction over an action before her. See Stump, 435

U.S. at 363-64, 98 S.Ct. at 1108-09 (holding that judicial immunity

extends to judicial acts that may contain error). Because both

prongs of the Stump test are satisfied, Judge Granade is entitled

to absolute judicial immunity from Plaintiff’s claims.

Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s claims against

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Judge Granade are frivolous as a matter of law, and thus recommends

that they be dismissed. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at

1833.

 B. Claims Against Assistant United States Attorney 

Griffin.

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Griffin, as the prosecutor,

presented evidence to the grand jury to indict him, and was aware

that Judge Granade constructively “amended” the indictment and

attempted to cover it up. Plaintiff asserts in a conclusory

fashion, without any supporting facts, that Defendant Griffin

engaged in misconduct, participated in the constructive “amending”

of his indictment, and executed an illegal conviction/sentence.

A prosecutor is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity

from damages in a § 1983 action for acts or omissions associated

with the judicial process, in particular, those taken in initiating

a prosecution and in presenting the government’s case. Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31, 96 S.Ct. 984 (1976); Wahl v.

McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 1985); Fullman v. Graddick,

739 F.2d 553, 558-59 (11th Cir. 1984). This immunity is also

available to a federal prosecutor in a Bivens action. Bolin, 225

F.3d at 1242; Allen v. Thompson, 815 F.2d 1433, 1434 (11th Cir.

1987). 

Plaintiff has specifically alleged that he was indicted by

Defendant Griffin. The other allegations against her are nebulous.

That is, Plaintiff does not connect them to any specific facts in

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his criminal case. However, based on a review of the docket in his

criminal case, the undersigned notes that Defendant Griffin did

file a motion bringing to the Court’s attention the allegation that

Plaintiff was selling methamphetamine/ICE and cocaine at the same

time he was engaged in the conduct that warranted the indictment.

(Doc. 70). Based at least in part on this information, it appears

that the verdict form was “amended.” Notwithstanding this

information obtained from the Court’s record, the Court cannot

address Plaintiff’s other allegations directed to Defendant Griffin

because they are unsupported by any facts. Therefore, these

unsupported allegations are subject to dismissal for failure to

state a claim. Fullman, 735 F.2d at 556-57 (holding that vague and

conclusory allegations are subject to dismissal).

In recognizing that the § 1983 statute provides no immunities,

the Supreme Court looks to common law and the functions being

performed to determine if the prosecutor is to be accorded absolute

immunity for her actions. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342, 106

S.Ct. 1092, 1096-97 (1986). The act of seeking an indictment is

the first step in the process of seeking a conviction. Id. at 343,

106 S.Ct. at 1097. To expose a prosecutor to liability at this

initial phase could hinder her exercise of independent judgment at

subsequent phases of the prosecution because this potential for

liability would affect the later decisions she makes in the

prosecution. Id. A prosecutor seeking an indictment is therefore

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protected with absolute immunity in order not to “impair the

performance of a central actor in the judicial process.” Id.;

accord Mastroianni v. Bowers, 173 F.3d 1363, 1366 (11th Cir. 1999)

(holding that the prosecutor’s potential for liability occurs

before the commencement of the grand jury proceedings); cf. Burns

v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 490 n.6, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 1941 n.6 (1991)

(“There is widespread agreement among the Court of Appeals that

prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for

their conduct before grand juries.”). 

Defendant Griffin’s actions of obtaining a superseding

indictment against Plaintiff and of bringing information to the

Court’s attention upon which the Court subsequently acts are

clearly actions that are intimately associated with the judicial

process. Thus, absolute prosecutorial immunity extends to cover

Plaintiff’s damages claims against Defendant Griffin. Tellier v.

Petrillo, 133 F.3d 907, 1997 WL 829873, at **1 (2d Cir.)

(unpublished) (prosecutors were entitled to absolute prosecutorial

immunity when they obtained a superseding indictment because they

were acting as advocates), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1098 (1998).

Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s damages claims

against Defendant Griffin are frivolous as a matter of law, 

Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833, and therefore

recommends their dismissal.

C. Claims Against Criminal Defense Counsel Hughes and 

Horne.

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Plaintiff claims that Defendant Hughes did not object to Judge

Granade “amending” the verdict form and that Defendant Horne told

Plaintiff that he had received correct advice and discouraged him

from appealing because he could receive a life sentence. Defendant

Horne shared this same information with Plaintiff’s family, and

faxed a copy of Plaintiff’s pre-sentence report to Plaintiff’s wife

and mother in an attempt to have them encourage Plaintiff to change

his mind. 

In order to state a Bivens claim, the defendant must have

acted under color of law. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392, 91 S.Ct. at

2002. Cf. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908,

1913 (1981) (in order to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff

must establish “the conduct complained of was committed by a person

acting under color of state law”) , overruled on other grounds by

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31, 106 S.Ct. 662, 664

(1986). In a § 1983 action, court-appointed, criminal defense

counsel does not act under color of state law in the absence of a

conspiracy. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S.Ct.

445, 453 (1981). In Polk County, the Supreme Court reasoned that

“[e]xcept for the source of payment, [the] relationship [between

criminal defendant and appointed defense counsel is] identical to

that existing between any other lawyer and client.” Id. at 318,

102 S.Ct. at 449. The Polk County Court concluded that “[t]his

[relationship] is essentially a private function, traditionally

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filled by retained counsel, for which state office and authority

are not needed.” Id. at 319, 102 S.Ct. at 450 (footnote omitted).

The Court determined that court-appointed, criminal defense counsel

carried out the traditional functions of a lawyer representing a

criminal defendant and therefore did not act under color of state

law. Id. at 325, 102 S.Ct. at 453. Thus, the Court ruled that the

§ 1983 complaint must be dismissed against criminal defense counsel

for lack of state action. Id.

Therefore, “[i]f a public defender does not act under color of

state law in representing an indigent defendant in a state criminal

proceeding, it follows that a public defender does not act under

color of federal law in performing the identical functions as a

lawyer to an indigent defendant in a federal criminal proceeding.”

Cox v. Hellerstein, 685 F.2d 1098, 1099 (9th Cir. 1982).

“[A]ttorneys are not transformed into federal officials for

purposes of a Bivens action merely because they are appointed by a

federal court pursuant to federal law.” Christian v. Crawford, 907

F.2d 808, 810 (8th Cir. 1990); see Bryant v. Fienberg, 2006 WL

2924744, at *2(E.D. Mich. Oct. 10, 2006) (unpublished) (holding a

retained attorney in a federal criminal action does not under color

of law in a Bivens action); Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256, 1264

(5th Cir.) (holding that retained counsel does not act under color

of state law in a § 1983 action), overruled on other grounds by

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5

The Eleventh Circuit in Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661

F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), adopted as binding

precedent the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered

prior to October 1, 1981.

16

Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1979).5

In this action, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the required

under-color-of-law element for a Bivens claim against Defendants

Hughes and Horne. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389, 91 S.Ct. at 2001.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted against them. Furthermore, considering the

nature of his claims and of this action, the undersigned finds that

Plaintiff’s claims against criminal defense counsel are frivolous,

and therefore recommends the dismissal of those claims.

D. Request for Release and Dismissal of Charges.

In addition to damages, Plaintiff requests his immediate

release and dismissal of all charges. These requests are in the

nature of habeas relief. However, habeas relief is not available

in a Bivens action. Abella, 63 F.3d at 1066 (a claim that

challenges a conviction or sentence and seeks an immediate or

speedier release is not cognizable in a Bivens action). The

exclusive remedy for an inmate contesting the fact or duration of

confinement and seeking his immediate or speedier release is habeas

corpus. Id. Therefore, these requests for relief are frivolous.

IV. Conclusion.

Based upon the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that

this action be dismissed with prejudice, prior to service of

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process, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(I) and (ii)

because Plaintiff’s claims are either frivolous or fail to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

DONE this 9th day of August 2007.

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything

in it must, within ten days of the date of service of this document, file

specific written objections with the clerk of court. Failure to do so

will bar a de novo determination by the district judge of anything in the

recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual findings

of the magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); Lewis v. Smith,

855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988). The procedure for challenging the

findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge is set out in more

detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides, in part, that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate

judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing a “Statement of Objection

to Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation” within ten days after

being served with a copy of the recommendation, unless a

different time is established by order. The statement of

objection shall specify those portions of the recommendation

to which objection is made and the basis for the objection.

The objecting party shall submit to the district judge, at the

time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the

party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s recommendation

should be reviewed de novo and a different disposition made.

It is insufficient to submit only a copy of the original brief

submitted to the magistrate judge, although a copy of the

original brief may be submitted or referred to and

incorporated into the brief in support of the objection.

Failure to submit a brief in support of the objection may be

deemed an abandonment of the objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court

of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment can be appealed.

2. Opposing party’s response to the objection. Any opposing party may

submit a brief opposing the objection within ten (10) days of being

served with a copy of the statement of objection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72;

SD ALA LR 72.4(b). 

3. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded). Pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the magistrate judge finds

that the tapes and original records in this action are adequate for

purposes of review. Any party planning to object to this recommendation,

but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial

determination that transcription is necessary is required before the

United States will pay the cost of the transcript.

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