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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH SEP 2 5 1990 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALJ.OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

PHILLIP WAYNE BAILEY, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JACK COWLEY; ATTORNEY GENERAL 

of the State of Oklahoma, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

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No. 89-5100 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 88-C-1028-B) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Phillip Wayne Bailey, prose. 

Robert H. Henry, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Diane L. Slayton, 

Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 

Respondents-Appellees. 

Before LOGAN, SEYMOUR, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

Appellate Case: 89-5100 Document: 01019846018 Date Filed: 09/25/1990 Page: 1 
assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

Petitioner appeals from the district court's order of May 16, 

: 19·8-9 ,-,. "<!enying· hi'S .. petition ... for, .. a , .wr.it .of. 1habeas. .. c.orpus . filed 

pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 2254. Petitioner is incarcerated in 

Oklahoma as a result of his conviction of several drug offenses in 

1984. His petition alleged that his 1984 sentences were enhanced 

by reason of two 1973 convictions for second degree burglary 

which, the petition contended, were invalid. The petition sought 

to ·have· the 1973 ·eonvi:ctions vacated. 

On appeal, respondents argue that because petitioner listed 

the 1973 convictions as the judgments under attack in his habeas 

petition, petitioner is not "in custody" for purposes of federal 

jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. § 2254. See Maleng v. Cook, 109 

S. Ct. 1923, 1925 (1989) (per curiam) (section 2254 requires that 

at time petition is filed, petitioner be "in custody" under 

conviction or sentence under attack). Like the Court in Maleng, 

however, we may liberally construe petitioner's petition as 

asserting a challenge to the 1984 sentences, as enhanced by the 

allegedly invalid prior convictions. at 1926-27. 

Therefore, we have jurisdiction to consider the petition. 1 

1 We realize that by construing the petition as attacking the 

1984 sentences, we may have added an aspect to petitioner's claims 

that was not presented to the state courts in petitioner's prior 

actions and, therefore, was not exhausted. Since we conclude that 

petitioner's challenges to the validity of his 1973 convictions 

are unavailing, however, we do not believe that "the interests of 

comity and federalism will be better served" by requiring 

additional state and district court proceedings to consider what 

(footnote continued on next page) 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-5100 Document: 01019846018 Date Filed: 09/25/1990 Page: 2 
As an initial matter, we note that when petitioner sought 

post-conviction relief in the state courts on the grounds asserted 

below, the state courts refused to consider the claims on the 

merits due to petitioner's procedural default. Respondents did 

not raise petitioner's procedural default as a defense below, 

however, nor have they raised it on appeal. Therefore, we will 

deem the defense waived and will proceed to consider the petition 

on the merits. See United States ex rel. Bonner v. DeRobertis, 

798 F.2d 1062, 1066 (7th Cir. 1986); Boykins v. Wainwright, 737 

F.2d 1539, 1545 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1059 

(1985); Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 863-64 (9th Cir. 1982), 

cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1212 (1983); Washington v. Watkins, 655 

F.2d 1346, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949 

(1982). 

The first issue we must address is whether petitioner's 

attorney for the 1973 criminal proceedings rendered ineffective 

legal assistance by failing to investigate the validity of 

petitioner's 1971 conviction and by advising petitioner to plead 

guilty to the second degree burglary charges in return for the 

prosecution's promise not to use the 1971 conviction against 

petitioner, either to impeach his credibility or to enhance his 

punishment. 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

effect the alleged invalidity of the 1973 convictions would 

on the 1984 sentences. See Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 

134 (1987). 

3 

have 

133, 

Appellate Case: 89-5100 Document: 01019846018 Date Filed: 09/25/1990 Page: 3 
In accordance with Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

687 (1984), "[t]o prove ineffective assistance of counsel, the 

defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient and 

that this deficient performance prejudiced his defense." Laycock 

v. New Mexico, 880 F.2d 1184, 1187 (10th Cir. 1989). Our .review 

·-·, _,,,_;, ......... : . is de novo. Id. 

In the context of a guilty plea, the defendant can satisfy 

the first prong of the Strickland test if he 

proves that counsel's "advice was not within the wide 

range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal 

cases." The proper standard for measuring attorney 

performance is reasonably effective assistance. The 

second prong is met if [the defendant] shows that there · -is a· rea:sonab:le· ·· ,·probabi1i1::y e,. that, but, ,f0r, ... counselt.s. 

errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have 

insisted on going to trial. The defendant must overcome 

the "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls 

within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance." 

Id. (citations omitted). 

We conclude that the petitioner's counsel in 1973 could not 

reasonably be expected to investigate or challenge the validity of 

petitioner's 1971 conviction. Petitioner contended below that his 

1971 conviction was invalid because he was only seventeen in 1971 

but was tried as an adult pursuant to Okla. Stat. tit. 

10 § llOl(a) (Supp. 1969) (repealed 1972), which was held to be 

unconstitutional in Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1972). 

Petitioner admitted, however, that he did not inform his counsel 

of the facts that might suggest that Lamb would apply to the prior 

conviction, i.e., that he was only seventeen when he was convicted 

in 1971. Moreover, the Lamb decision specifically stated that it 

was not to be applied retroactively, id. at 20, which remained the 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-5100 Document: 01019846018 Date Filed: 09/25/1990 Page: 4 
law until 1974, when this court required retroactive application 

of Lamb. Radcliff v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 1093, 1096 (10th Cir. 

1974) (en bane), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 939 (1975). Because of 

the court's ruling in Lamb, petitioner's earlier conviction was 

:; ;-;:-ne:fther~ .:vu-id i;.nor.xvoidable .. in,,.1-9.7 3·.,H.,SO.~is. .. oounsel .. did .:not; .. ,giV.E'.!, him 

any misleading advice. We conclude that petitioner's counsel's 

conduct did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness 

considering all the circumstances. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

688. 

Petitioner's second issue on appeal is whether his guilty 

plea· was·· rende'red,:·involu-nta,i;.y,,.beaause ·he·;ent.ared .. the ,.plea~ •. solely 

on the advice of his counsel under fear that the prosecution would 

use a prior conviction against him that was subsequently 

invalidated as unconstitutional. Petitioner alleged that if he 

had known the 1971 conviction was invalid, he would have insisted 

on going to trial on the burglary charges. 

"Whether a plea is voluntary is a question of federal law 

subject to de novo review." Laycock, 880 F.2d at 1186. The 

standard for voluntariness of guilty pleas is that adopted by the 

Supreme Court in Brady v. United States: 

"'[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the 

direct consequences, including the actual value of any 

commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his 

own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or 

promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable 

promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their 

nature improper as having no proper relationship to the 

prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes).'" 

397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 

F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en bane) (quoting Shelton v. 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-5100 Document: 01019846018 Date Filed: 09/25/1990 Page: 5 
United States, 242 F.2d 101, 115 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd on other 

grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)). 

Since petitioner's attorney rendered effective legal 

assistance, petitioner's reliance on his attorney's advice did not 

· · · · v.··render ,, 0:h:ts--. -p.1ea~cwnv.0·1unua~y: .. ,;.1,',,See...,.McMa.nn"¥, .. ~ .Richardson., .. 3.9.7. u .•. S . ., ... 

759, 774 (1970) ("Although [the defendant] might have pleaded 

differently had later decided cases then been the law, he is bound 

by his plea and his conviction unless he can allege and prove 

serious derelictions on the part of counsel sufficient to show 

that his plea was not, after all, a knowing and intelligent 

act.'");. ·un±ted-·States·· 1ex -·rel. ·cMonahan v~ ,MoMann, .. 432. R .. .2d 778, 7.79 

(2d Cir. 1970) (guilty plea made on advice of counsel under fear 

of prosecution's use of prior conviction is subject to collateral 

attack only if failure to raise claim in state court that prior 

conviction was void was due to ineffective assistance of counsel). 

Neither did the prosecution act improperly. In general, a 

guilty plea is not rendered involuntary by the fact that the 

defendant entered it to avoid the consequences of the 

prosecution's use of a prior conviction. See Holscher v. Wood, 

632 F.2d 710, 711 (8th Cir. 1980). Therefore, since petitioner's 

1971 conviction was not void or voidable in 1973, the prosecution 

did not act wrongfully in using that conviction as a bargaining 

'tool. 

Finally, if petitioner had not pleaded guilty but had gone to 

trial on the 1973 charges and been convicted, and the prosecution 

had used his 1971 conviction to impeach his credibility or enhance 

his sentence, this court would have set aside the 1973 conviction 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-5100 Document: 01019846018 Date Filed: 09/25/1990 Page: 6 
as unconstitutional, pursuant to Rutledge v. Sunderland, 671 F.2d 

377 (10th Cir. 1982). 

In Rutledge, this court held that the prosecution's use of 

the defendant's 1971 conviction, which was subsequently held to be 

·:-i:nval·id,~·,-under ,,,I.amb,-' .. ···to ,·,,impeach. ·.'.the ,,..,de:fenda:nt.-.and-enha.:nce .. h,is 

punishment under the Oklahoma recidivist statute rendered his 

recidivist conviction and sentence invalid. Id. at 381. "We are 

convinced ... that at least where the unconstitutional former 

convictions are used as the foundation for a recidivist 

conviction, a defendant such as Rutledge wrongly 'suffers anew' 

from ·the : equal ·:.prot-ection .· violation. 11 

omitted). 

Id ... .at .382 (.citation 

However, a conviction based on a guilty plea differs from a 

conviction based on a guilty verdict in two important respects. 

First, "[c]entral to the plea and the foundation for entering 

judgment against the defendant is the defendant's admission in 

open court that he committed the acts charged in the indictment." 

Brady, 397 U.S. at 748. Thus, in distinguishing between a 

conviction which is invalid because obtained after a trial in 

which the defendant's coerced confession is introduced into 

evidence and a conviction which is valid although obtained after 

the defendant pleads guilty to avoid the prosecution's use of a 

coerced confession, the Supreme Court said: 

A conviction after trial in which a coerced confession 

is introduced rests in part on the coerced confession, a 

constitutionally unacceptable basis for conviction. It 

is that conviction and the confession on which it rests 

that the defendant later attacks in collateral 

proceedings. The defendant who pleads guilty is in a 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-5100 Document: 01019846018 Date Filed: 09/25/1990 Page: 7 
counseled 

the crime 

not the 

offered in 

offered in 

different posture. He is convicted on his 

admission in open court that he committed 

charged against him. The prior confession is 

basis for the judgment, has never been 

evidence at a trial, and may never be 

evidence. 

McMann, 397 U.S. at 773. 

, ,,, ·Second,··· when ·,,a,-.de.:fiend:ant-. .pleads. ;guilty,,. he .JI1akea . .a .... deci.sion 

based on a calculated risk that the consequences that will flow 

from entering the guilty plea will be more favorable than those 

that would flow from going to trial. This inherent uncertainty 

does not make the plea involuntary. See Johnson v. United States, 

539 F.2d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 

(1977). 

One of the risks a defendant assumes when he pleads guilty is 

that the consequences he seeks to avoid will not be later 

nullified by a change in the law. In Brady, the Supreme Court 

upheld the guilty plea of a defendant who wanted to avoid the 

possible imposition of the death penalty, which the Court later 

held could not be applied under like circumstances. 397 U.S. at 

751, 756. The fact that the possible imposition of the death 

penalty constituted a "but for" cause of the plea did not render 

the plea involuntary. Id. at 750. Likewise, the plea was not 

entered unintelligently just because it was based on counsel's 

advice that the defendant could receive the death penalty, even 

though a later change in the law rendered the advice inaccurate. 

Id. at 756. See also McMann, 397 U.S. at 774 ("It is no 

denigration of the right to trial to hold that when the defendant 

waives his state court remedies and admits his guilt, he does so 

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Appellate Case: 89-5100 Document: 01019846018 Date Filed: 09/25/1990 Page: 8 
under the law then existing; further, he assumes the risk of 

ordinary error in either his or his attorney's assessment of the 

law and facts."). 

The state court's docket sheet reflects that petitioner 

pleaded . guilty to ,the, ,amended charge, i.e., .to Burglary II rather 

than Burglary II AFCF (after conviction of a felony). 

Furthermore, the record shows that page two of the information, 

concerning petitioner's prior conviction in 1971, was deleted, and 

that petitioner's sentence was not enhanced by that prior 

conviction. Therefore, the prior conviction was not used to 

impeach ·petitioner's · oredibili ty . or. enhance .,his .punishment, and 

the fact that it was used in the plea bargaining does not affect 

the validity of his plea. See Morse v. Texas, 691 F.2d 770, 773 

(5th Cir. 1982). 

In addition, when petitioner chose to plead guilty while 

believing himself to be innocent, he took a calculated risk that 

he would fare better by pleading guilty than by going to trial. 

The fact that his assessment of the risk was based on a faulty 

premise, that his 1971 conviction would continue to be valid, did 

not render his plea either involuntary or unintelligent. See 

Brady, 397 U.S. at 756-57. Therefore, the district court 

correctly denied petitioner's request for habeas relief. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

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