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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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J 

BERNIE 

v. 

STATE 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

F 1 LED 

lJ~ited States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Cir'.l!i~ 

l~OV 2 ~ 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

SMITH, ) 

) 

Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

) 

) No. 89-2072 

) (D.C. No. 87-1543 JB) 

OF NEW MEXICO, Luna County, ) (D. N.M.) 

) 

Respondent-Appellee. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, LOGAN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

The parties waived oral argument and after examining the 

briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously 

that oral argument would not materially assist the determination 

of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Petitioner Bernie Smith appeals the dismissal of his habeas 

corpus petition by the United States District Court for the 

District of New Mexico. Following his 1983 trial, petitioner was 

convicted of first degree murder, conspiracy to tamper with 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-2072 Document: 010110051376 Date Filed: 11/28/1990 Page: 1 
✓ evidence, and tampering with evidence in connection with the death 

of Ralph Pierro, his then-wife's ex-husband. Petitioner's former 

wife, Wanda Pierro Smith, was called upon to testify at his trial, 

but refused, invoking her fifth amendment right against 

lf . . . t· 1 se -incrimina ion. 

During the process of petitioner's appeal to the New Mexico 

Supreme Court, Wanda Smith, in an affidavit, stated that she alone 

was responsible for Pierre's death. Based on this exculpatory 

statement, petitioner filed various motions with the state supreme 

court for remand, requesting a new trial. The supreme court 

granted his motion. After a hearing on remand, the trial court 

denied his request for a new trial. 

Resuming his appeal before the New Mexico Supreme Court, 

petitioner argued that: 

1) the denial of a new trial was an abuse of discretion; 

2) excluding a witness's hearsay testimony at trial was an 

abuse of discretion; and 

3) excluding evidence of threats made to a prospective 

witness was reversible error. 

The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed both the denial of new trial 

and petitioner's conviction, based on its review of the trial 

court's findings. 

was denied. 

Petitioner's subsequent motion for rehearing 

1 Although she had been tried separately for Pierre's murder 

and convicted of involuntary manslaughter, additional charges were 

still pending against her at the time of petitioner's trial. 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-2072 Document: 010110051376 Date Filed: 11/28/1990 Page: 2 
In late 1987, petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition with 

the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, 

contending that the three claims outlined above constituted a 

denial of due process. A magistrate, in proposed findings, found 

that petitioner had exhausted his state remedies as required by 28 

u.s.c. S 2254(b), but that he had failed to present his claims "in 

a manner that would have fairly alerted the state court to the 

federal bases of his claims," Rec. Vol. I, Doc. 26 at 2, and, 

thus, had procedurally defaulted. The magistrate further found 

that petitioner had not established cause for his default and that 

his case was not an appropriate one for the waiver of cause, as 

discussed in Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986). The district 

court adopted the magistrate's findings in an order dated February 

23, 1989, dismissing the habeas corpus petition with prejudice. 

This court has jurisdiction over this appeal by virtue of 28 

u.s.c. S 2253. Petitioner's application for a certificate of 

probable cause was granted by an order from this court dated 

August 15, 1989. We review the district court's ruling on 

exhaustion and procedural bar de novo, as legal conclusions. 

Martin v. Kaiser, 907 F.2d 931, 933 (10th Cir. 1990). On federal 

habeas review, state court findings of fact are presumed correct. 

28 U.S.C. S 2254(d); Valdez v. Winans, 738 F.2d 1087, 1089 (10th 

Cir. 1984)(citing Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591 (1982) and Sumner 

v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981)). 

We hold that petitioner did present his claims in a manner 

sufficient to alert the New Mexico Supreme Court to the federal 

aspects of his arguments. The government contends that he failed 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-2072 Document: 010110051376 Date Filed: 11/28/1990 Page: 3 
to identify the federal nature of his claims, either by reference 

to his federal due process rights or by citing adequate federal 

authority. However, "a failure to invoke talismanic language 

..• should not be the basis for a finding of nonexhaustion." 

Nichols v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 1250, 1252 (10th Cir.)(discussing 

Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4 (1982) and Picard v. Connor, 404 

U.S. 270 (1971)), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3169 (1989). The 

exhaustion requirement is satisfied once the substance of the 

petitioner's claims have been fairly presented to the highest 

state court. Picard, 404 U.S. at 276. 

This case closely resembles Nichols v. Sullivan, where we 

noted: "[t]he thrust of (the) appeal to the New Mexico Supreme 

Court was that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his 

request for a mistrial because (certain testimony) rendered his 

trial unfair, especially when viewed in the context of the trial 

as a whole." Nichols, 867 F.2d at 1252. Similarly, in this case, 

petitioner argued that he had received an unfair trial as a result 

of the state trial court's evidentiary rulings and that the denial 

of a new trial in light of his ex-wife's exculpatory statement was 

likewise unfair. The fairness of trial is a fundamental concern 

of due process, id. at 1253. 

There is no question that petitioner presented the same facts 

and factual arguments before both state and federal courts. In 

his state appeal, he referred to his due process rights and cited 

federal authority, including a citation to Jackson v. Virginia, 

443 U.S. 307 (1979). In his habeas petition, he characterized his 

claims as denials of due process. As in Nichols, "we do not 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-2072 Document: 010110051376 Date Filed: 11/28/1990 Page: 4 
believe this label change ... creates a fundamentally new 

argument which the state courts did not have an opportunity to 

consider." Id. at 1253. See also Tamapua v. Shimada, 796 F.2d 

261, 263 (9th Cir. 1986)(argument before state appellate court on 

sufficiency of evidence, a fundamental concern of due process, 

satisfied fair presentation standard); Daye v. Attorney Gen. of 

N.Y., 696 F.2d 186, 193 (2d Cir. 1982)(complaints about an unfair 

trial together with underlying facts may implicate due process). 

In sum, the "thrust" of petitioner's state appeal, coupled 

with his references to federal authority, albeit sparse, convince 

us that the New Mexico Supreme Court had a fair opportunity to 

consider and address the substance of his federal habeas claims. 

On the basis of this holding, petitioner has exhausted his 

claims at the state level. Accordingly, we need not address the 

parties' arguments concerning procedural bar and cause and 

prejudice arising out of the argument that petitioner failed to 

adequately identify the federal nature of his claims. We reach 

the merits because we can affirm on any grounds that find support 

in the record. Bath v. National Ass'n of Intercollegiate 

Athletics, 843 F.2d 1315, 1317 (10th Cir. 1988). 

We first address the claim that denial of a new trial, in 

light of Wanda Smith's exculpatory statement, denied petitioner 

his due process rights. On remand, the trial court conducted a 

hearing and concluded that a new trial would not be proper, basing 

its conclusion on two findings: 1) that the information in Wanda 

Smith's affidavit was not new evidence and 2) that her statement 

was "so contradictory that it would be impossible to determine 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-2072 Document: 010110051376 Date Filed: 11/28/1990 Page: 5 
when she might be telling the truth." Rec. Vol. I, Doc. 12, 

Exhibit S. The New Mexico Supreme Court extensively analyzed the 

trial court's finding that Wanda Smith's exculpatory statement, 

and it affirmed on the basis of the second finding. 

Presuming the correctness of the state courts' finding that 

Wanda Smith's testimony was not credible, we review de novo the 

ruling that a new trial was not warranted. However, the purpose 

of our review is "to ensure that [the petitioner] was afforded the 

protections of due ~rocess, not to exercise supervisory powers 

over the New Mexico state courts." Nichols, 867 F.2d at 1253. We 

conclude that the state court credibility finding properly 

supported a determination that the proffered evidence would 

probably not change the result if a new trial were granted. 2 

Therefore, the ruling did not amount to a denial of petitioner's 

due process rights. 

We next address the claim that the state courts' ruling 

excluding Karen Eaton's proposed hearsay testimony denied 

petitioner a fair trial. Eaton's proposed testimony consisted of 

a statement Wanda Smith made to her regarding Pierre's death. 

Petitioner offered Eaton's testimony as a statement against 

interest, an exception allowing hearsay testimony under New Mexico 

evidentiary rule SCRA 1986, ll-804(b)(4). Our function in 

reviewing this claim is not to rule on the propriety of the state 

court's interpretation of its evidentiary rules, but only to 

2 Therefore, we need not address the trial court's finding that 

Wanda Smith's statement was not new evidence. 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-2072 Document: 010110051376 Date Filed: 11/28/1990 Page: 6 
determine whether the ruling rose to the level of a due process 

deprivation. Tucker v. Makowski, 883 F.2d 877, 881 (10th Cir. 

1989)(citing Brinlee v. Crisp. 608 F.2d 839, 850 (10th Cir. 1979), 

cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1047 (1980)). We hold that it did not. In 

evaluating reliability determinations regarding hearsay 

statements, we presume the factual findings of the state courts 

are correct, Myatt v. Hannigan, 910 F.2d 680, 685 (10th Cir. 

1990), but review the determination of reliability de novo as a 

mixed question of law and fact. Id. The court found that Wanda 

Smith's statement was not against her penal interest, as it tended 

to exculpate not only petitioner but herself as well. If the 

statement were against her penal interest, 3 the court found that 

it nonetheless lacked the corroboration required by Rule 

804(b)(4). Based on these findings, the exclusion of Eaton's 

hearsay testimony was not a deprivation of petitioner's due 

process rights. 

The third claim is procedurally barred. A procedural bar 

occurs when a state court refuses to address the merits of a claim 

before it because the appellant failed to comply with a state 

procedural rule, and the noncompliance with that rule bars state 

appellate review. Shafer v. Stratton, 906 F.2d 506, 509 (10th 

Cir. 1990)(citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)), 

petition for cert. filed, Sept. 24, 1990. Absent a showing of 

cause and prejudice, procedural bar also precludes federal habeas 

3 Petitioner argues that she could be exposed to perjury 

charges, since her affidavit contradicts her testimony at her own 

trial for the murder of Ralph Pierro. 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-2072 Document: 010110051376 Date Filed: 11/28/1990 Page: 7 
l 

corpus review. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976). The 

New Mexico Supreme Court refused to address petitioner's claim 

concerning the trial court's exclusion of proposed testimony 

regarding alleged threats made to Karen Eaton because petitioner 

failed to raise this issue in his docketing statement as required 

by New Mexico procedural law. In order to excuse default, 

petitioner must show cause and allege prejudice resulting 

specifically from the default. He did not do this, therefore, 

review is precluded upon habeas corpus. Nieto v. Sullivan, 879 

F.2d 743, 746 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 373 (1989). 

Even considering the merits, it is highly improbable that 

excluding evidence of alleged threats made against a proposed 

witness who did not testify could so infect a trial with error 

that it would violate a defendant's due process rights. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of New Mexico is AFFIRMED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

8 

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