Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01705/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01705-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEROY HAWKINS, JR. ,

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., 

Defendants.

CASE No. 1:09-cv-01705-LJO-MJS (PC)

 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

TO:

1) GRANT IN PART PLAINTIFF’S 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 

(ECF No. 62)

2) FIND PLAINTIFF’S CROSS-MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF 

No. 60) TO BE UNTIMELY

3) DENY DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF No. 58)

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN 

(14) DAYS 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The action proceeds against 

Defendant Bacher, whom Plaintiff alleges violated his First Amendment right of access to 

the courts. (ECF No. 25.) Bacher was served and has appeared in the action. (ECF No. 

30.)

On January 20, 2015, Defendant moved filed a motion for summary judgment. 

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(ECF No. 58.) Plaintiff filed an opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment on 

February 10, 2015. (ECF No. 60.) Defendant filed a reply in support of her motion for 

summary judgment and an opposition to Plaintiff’s cross motion on March 27, 2015. 

(ECF No. 69.) Plaintiff filed a reply in support of his cross-motion for summary judgment 

on April 3, 2015. (ECF No. 70.)

In addition, Plaintiff requested the Court to take judicial notice of four documents: 

1) a copy of AO 241, the standardized federal habeas corpus petition/form for persons in 

state custody; 2) a copy of MC-275, the standardized habeas corpus petition/form for pro 

se litigants in California; 3) excerpts from the Clark Remedial Plan; and 4) Defendants’ 

responses to Plaintiff’s interrogatories. (ECF no. 62.)

II. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence “permits a court to take judicial notice 

of adjudicative facts not subject to reasonable dispute.” United States v. Chapel, 41 F.3d 

1338, 1342 (9th Cir.1994). “Adjudicative facts are simply the facts of the particular case.” 

Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. Evid. 201. “A court may also take judicial notice of 

undisputed matters of public record.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-689 

(9th Cir. 2001); accord Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). A court may 

take judicial notice of a public record not for the truth of the facts recited therein, but for 

the existence of the document. Lee, at 690. However, judicial notice “must be 

approached cautiously because it dispenses ‘with traditional methods of proof’ and 

removes the fact noticed from the province of the jury.” Rezentes v. Sears, Roebuck & 

Co., 729 F.Supp.2d 1197, 1206 (D.Hawai’I 2010) (citations omitted). Accordingly, judicial 

notice is appropriate only when the matter is established “beyond reasonable 

controversy,” Lee, 250 F.3d at 690; Fed. R.Evid. 201. 

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Three of the four documents are appropriate items to be judicially noticed. The 

first two documents are standardized habeas petitions – AO 241 is published by the

Administrative Office of the United States Courts and MC-275 is approved by the Judicial 

Council of California. They are public records, and they are relevant to Plaintiff’s 

argument in opposition to summary judgment. The Court therefore takes judicial notice 

of them. The excerpt of the Clark remedial plan is also a public record, and relevant to 

Plaintiff’s argument. It appears identical to the relevant portions of the Clark plan 

Defendants submitted as an exhibit to their motion for summary judgment. The Court 

takes judicial notice of it as well. 

By contrast, the fourth document, containing Defendant’s responses to 

interrogatories, is not a matter of public record and its contents are not facts beyond the 

scope of reasonable controversy. Discovery documents are not generally appropriate 

candidates for judicial notice. See, e.g., Kaur v. Singh, No. 2:13-cv-00089 2014 WL 

2208114, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 28, 2014); Boisvert v. Li, No. 13-cv-01590 2014 WL 

279915, at *4(N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2014). However, the interrogatory responses are

sworn, relevant, unobjected to, and constitute admissible evidence. The Court will 

consider them.

Accordingly, the Court will recommend that Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice be 

granted as to the standardized habeas petitions and the excerpts of the Clark remedial 

plan, but denied as to the responses to interrogatories.

III. CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment, included in 

his opposition to summary judgment, is untimely because it was filed after the dispositive 

motion deadline. (ECF No. 69, at 6-7.) Plaintiff contends that his cross-motion can still be 

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considered under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f), which permits the Court to grant “judgment 

independent of the motion” in favor of any party on grounds not raised by either. (ECF 

No. 70, at 8). 

Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment was untimely filed, and will not be 

addressed here as such. However, the Court will consider the points and authorities 

raised therein as part and parcel of Plaintiff’s opposition with which it was filed.. 

IV. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Legal Standard

Any party may move for summary judgment, and the Court shall grant summary 

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Wash. 

Mut. Inc. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Each party’s position, 

whether it be that a fact is disputed or undisputed, must be supported by (1) citing to 

particular parts of materials in the record, including but not limited to depositions, 

documents, declarations, or discovery; or (2) showing that the materials cited do not 

establish the presence or absence of a genuine dispute or that the opposing party 

cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The 

Court may consider other materials in the record not cited to by the parties, but it is not 

required to do so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 

237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001).

Plaintiff bears the burden of proof at trial, and to prevail on summary judgment, he 

must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for 

him. Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). Defendants 

do not bear the burden of proof at trial and, in moving for summary judgment, they need 

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only prove an absence of evidence to support Plaintiff’s case. In re Oracle Corp. 

Securities Litigation, 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010).

In judging the evidence at the summary judgment stage, the Court may not make 

credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence, Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984, 

and it must draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and 

determine whether a genuine issue of material fact precludes entry of judgment, Comite 

de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 

2011). However, “conclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is 

insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment.” Angle v. 

Miller, 673 F.3d 1122, 1134 n.6 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984).

B. Factual Summary

The Court finds that the following facts are undisputed:

Plaintiff is developmentally disabled and functionally illiterate. At the time of the 

events giving rise to this lawsuit, he was incarcerated at the Substance Abuse Treatment 

Facility (SATF) at Corcoran. There, he participated in the Developmental Disability 

Program (DDP). Defendant Bacher worked as a Library Technical Assistant (LTA) for the 

DDP program. As an LTA, Defendant was responsible for helping inmates with cognitive 

and adaptive disabilities to obtain equal access to the library, law library, and related 

services. She was also responsible for ensuring that inmates in the DDP program gain 

access to the courts to the best of their abilities.

Defendant is not an attorney, and she has not had any professional legal training

or formal legal education. However, she has gained some on-the-job understanding of 

legal issues facing inmates. At times relevant here, when an inmate in the DDP program 

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asked for help accessing the courts, she would “scribe1” a letter to the court advising 

that the inmate was developmentally disabled and wanted to file an action. She refused 

to provide any other guidance or assistance in filing his action and did not generally 

follow up to determine what action the court took in response.

In January 2009, Plaintiff asked for Defendant’s help in researching and drafting a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus because he did not believe the imposition of a life 

sentence was fair in his case. Defendant responded by offering to “scribe” a letter to the 

court asking for help with Plaintiff’s legal work. Plaintiff accepted the offer, and 

Defendant wrote the letter for him. Defendant did not provide any additional help to 

Plaintiff in filing his habeas corpus petition.

C. Parties’ Arguments

1. Defendant’s Arguments

Defendant argues that her ability to assist Plaintiff in obtaining habeas relief was 

limited to scribing a letter asking the court to provide Plaintiff assistance in filing his 

petition. She claims that any additional assistance, including legal research or filling out 

a habeas corpus form, would violate Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3405, which prohibits 

employees from assisting “an inmate or parolee in the preparation of any legal 

document... except as specifically authorized by the warden, superintendent or regional 

parole administrator,” and amount to the unauthorized practice of law. She also argues 

that assisting plaintiff more extensively would expose her to discipline for being overfamiliar with an inmate. 

In the alternative, she argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity because 

the right of an illiterate inmate to help in preparing forms was not then clearly 

 

1 Defendant defines “scribing” to mean “writ[ing] down exactly what the inmate says.” (ECF No. 62-4, at 5.)

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established.

Defendant also points out that Plaintiff has not pleaded facts meeting the threepart test for establishing injury under Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996). He has 

not shown that he had a (1) non-frivolous legal attack on his conviction or sentence; (2) 

was frustrated or impeded by Defendant; (3) or suffered an actual injury as a result. See

id.

Defendant further argues that Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment is 

procedurally deficient because it was 1) filed several weeks after the dispositive motion 

deadline and 2) was not accompanied by a statement of Undisputed Facts citing to the 

evidence Plaintiff relied upon to establish those facts.

2. Plaintiff’s Arguments

Plaintiff argues that prisoners typically file habeas petitions, whether state or 

federal, using standardized forms provided to the prison by the federal judiciary or 

California Judicial Council. These standardized forms discourage legal analysis and 

case citations, and merely require the inmate to state the facts he or she believes entitle 

him or her to relief. Plaintiff contends that Defendant could have assisted plaintiff in 

“scribing” and submitting such a form without running afoul of California’s prohibitions 

against the unauthorized practice of law. In fact, Plaintiff contends that Cal. Code. Regs. 

tit. 15, § 3160, which requires staff to “assist illiterate inmates or those physically 

incapable of preparing forms adopted under rules of the United States courts and the 

Judicial Council of California for petitions for habeas corpus... if such an inmate requires 

assistance,” authorizes precisely this type of assistance. 

Plaintiff also disputes that the right of illiterate inmates to help in preparing and 

filing petitions was not established at the time.

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Plaintiff contends that he has in fact established injury– he argues that he wanted 

to challenge the length of his sentence pursuant to California’s three-strikes law, and 

that because his third strike – for drug possession – was a non-violent, non-sexual 

offense, such a challenge would not be frivolous in light of recent Ninth Circuit 

precedent. He also contends that Defendant’s conduct effectively prevented him from 

filing any habeas petition at all.

D. Discussion

1. Legal Standard – Access to the Courts

Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. 

Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996); Phillips v. Hust , 588 F.3d 652, 655 (9th Cir. 2009). 

This right “requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of 

meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate 

assistance from persons trained in the law.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977); 

see also Madrid v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 1999). The importance of access 

to the courts is “fundamental” where a prisoner is seeking habeas relief: courts are not 

required to “appoint counsel for prisoners who indicate, without more, that they wish to 

seek post-conviction relief,” so an inmate presenting an initial claim for habeas or postconviction relief claim must rely on “such help as he can obtain within the prison walls or 

within the prison system.” Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485, 488 (1969). If, because 

of illiteracy or mental deficiency, an inmate is unable to prepare his petition on his own, 

he is “in effect, denied access to the courts unless such help is available.” Id., 393 U.S. 

at 488, 496; accord Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356 (concluding that when “even an illiterate or 

non-English-speaking inmate shows that... the presentation of [an actionable] claim is 

currently being prevented, because this capability of filing suit has not been provided he 

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demonstrates that the State has failed to furnish... adequate assistance from persons 

trained in the law”)

While it is true that the right of access to the courts “guarantees no particular 

methodology,” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356-57, the courts have, over the years, provided 

many examples of the ways in which prisons can assist prisoners in presenting their 

claims to the courts. The Lewis court, for instance, suggested that prisons could provide 

“libraries with some minimal access to legal advice and a system of court-provided 

forms... that asked the inmates to provide only the facts and not to attempt any legal 

analysis.” 518 U.S. at 352. Courts have agreed that jailhouse lawyers, inmate law 

clerks, senior law students, paralegals, and volunteer attorneys may satisfy Bounds’ 

mandate of “assistance of those trained in the law.” Gluth, 951 F.3d at 1511-1512

(approving training program for legal assistants); see also Lindquist v. Idaho St. Bd. of 

Corr., 776 F.2d 851, 857 (9th Cir. 1985)(approving minimal training program for inmate 

law clerks); Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 395-396 (6th Cir. 1999)(finding that 

plaintiff had made requisite showing that he needed a jailhouse lawyer in order to bring 

his claims).

To bring a claim, the plaintiff must have suffered an actual injury by being shut out 

of court. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002); Lewis at 351; Phillips, 588 

F.3d at 655. Thus, the inmate must identify a “nonfrivolous, arguable underlying claim.” 

Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415. In addition, “the injury requirement is not satisfied by just 

any type of frustrated legal claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354. Inmates do not enjoy a 

constitutionally protected right “to transform themselves into litigating engines capable of 

filing everything from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims.” Id. at 355. 

Rather, the type of legal claim protected is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas 

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petitions, and civil rights actions such as those brought under section 1983 to vindicate 

basic constitutional rights. Id. at 354 (quotations and citations omitted). “Impairment of 

any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) 

consequences of conviction and incarceration.” Id. at 355.

2. Analysis

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court finds 

that Plaintiff’s allegations, taken as true, are sufficient to establish that his right of access 

to the courts required Defendant to do more than “scribe” a letter informing the court that 

Plaintiff had a disability, that Defendant failed to do more, and that Plaintiff suffered 

actual injury as a result. The undisputed facts here do not indicate that Defendant was 

entitled to qualified immunity for failing to provide more meaningful assistance. 

Therefore the Court recommends denial of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

a. Plaintiff’s Right to Access the Courts Required Defendant to do More 

than Draft a Letter to the Court Informing it of Plaintiff’s Disability.

Since Bounds, the right of access to the courts has required “prison authorities to 

assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers with adequate law 

libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 346 

(citing Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828)(emphasis added). Where an inmate is illiterate or for 

security reasons does not have access to the library, the courts have recognized that the 

mere existence of a law library will not meet the inmate’s right of access, and that the 

inmate will require more active assistance from trained staff. See, e.g., Cornett v. 

Donovan, 51 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 1995); Gluth v. Kangas, 951 F.2d 1504, 1508 (9th 

Cir. 1991); Koershner v. Warden, 508 F.Supp.2d 849, 856 (D. Nev. 2007). At a 

minimum, all inmates, literate or illiterate, are entitled to the help necessary to file legal 

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claims and to present their grievances to the courts. Madrid v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 990, 

995 (9th Cir. 1999)(citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 360). However, merely dispatching a letter 

to the court to inform it of an inmate’s “inability, either mental or physical, to prepare a 

habeas application on his own behalf” falls “far short” of this low standard. Johnson, 393 

U.S. at 489. Indeed, it is undisputed here that Defendant’s letter did not enable Plaintiff 

to “present his grievances to the court.”

Contrary to Defendant’s assertions, California regulations did not prohibit 

Defendant from helping Plaintiff to fill in and file a habeas petition. The limitation in Cal. 

Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3405 on employees helping inmates to prepare legal documents is 

not absolute. First, it specifies that an employee may help any inmate with such 

preparation if “specifically authorized by the warden” or superintendent. Defendant has 

not provided evidence regarding whether such authorization was or was not provided by 

the warden at CSATF. Second, there is an exception where an inmate is illiterate or 

physically incapable of preparing the form himself. Cal. Code. Regs., tit. 15, § 3160. 

Section 3160 requires staff to help illiterate or physically incapable inmates if they 

request assistance. Under accepted canons of statutory interpretation, the court must 

“make every effort not to interpret a provision in a manner that renders other provisions 

of the same statute inconsistent, meaningless, or superfluous.” In re HP Inkjet Printer 

Litig., 716 F.3d 1173, 1184 (9th Cir. 2013)(citations omitted); accord United States v. 

Neal, 776 F.3d 645, 652 (9th Cir. 2015). Here, construing § 3405 as a blanket 

prohibition against helping any inmate in preparing forms forms would render § 3160 

meaningless, as well as create a bewildering gap in protection of the right to access the 

courts for inmates unable to complete forms on their own. 

In addition, such a sweeping interpretation of the scope of § 3405 would counter 

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longstanding California law specifically holding that illiterate and uneducated inmates 

have a constitutional right to be assisted in the preparation of applications for relief. 

Brown v. Pitchess, 531 P.2d 772, 776 (Cal. 1975); In re Harrell, 470 P.2d 640, 644 (Cal. 

1970)(noting that CDCR rules forbidding mutual legal assistance among prisoners were 

modified following Johnson to make an exception for staff to provide “assistance to 

inmates, who are illiterate or otherwise physically incapable, in the preparation of forms 

adopted under rules of the United States Courts and by the Judicial Council of California 

for petitions for Habeas Corpus”). 

Neither the Armstrong nor the Clark Remedial Plan suggests that prison staff may 

not assist inmates in preparing habeas petitions. In fact, the Clark Remedial Plan 

(CRP), specifically states that “support services” for developmentally disabled inmates 

can include staff assistance in “completing any forms or documents necessary to secure 

any rights or benefits available to nondisabled inmates.” CRP, at 8, 47 (“services may 

include: provision of forms – including assistance in reading and scribing them... and 

submission of forms/documentation to the court”). While the Armstrong Remedial Plan 

states that facilitating an inmate’s “equal access to the court” can include providing a 

letter “to the court identifying the nature and severity of the inmate’s disability and 

limitation(s),” nothing before the Court indicates that this is the only permissible means 

for staff to assist disabled inmates in presenting their claims.

Defendant’s assertion that assisting Plaintiff in filling out a state or federal habeas 

form would have required her to engage in the unauthorized practice of law similarly 

lacks merit. Helping Plaintiff complete a habeas petition would not have required her to 

conduct legal research, much less engage in unethical advocacy. Neither MC-275, the 

standardized habeas petition that unrepresented prisoners must file in California under

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Cal. R. Ct. 8.380(a), nor AO 241, the standardized federal habeas petition for 

unrepresented inmates, requires the inmate to conduct legal research. In fact, both 

forms instruct the inmate that legal research is not necessary. (ECF No. 61-1, at 2; ECF 

No. 62-2, at 4.) Similarly, both forms instruct the inmate to focus on the facts of his 

underlying criminal case, and the facts that he believes give rise to a valid claim for 

habeas relief. Assisting Plaintiff in “scribing” such facts would have been well within the 

duties required of Defendant as LTA, which included “provid[ing] reading and scribing 

law library services as needed” and “provid[ing] reasonable access to forms.” (ECF no. 

58-8, at 2.)

b. Plaintiff was Denied Access to the Court.

Both parties acknowledge that Plaintiff is illiterate and developmentally disabled. 

He is not capable of reading or filling out a habeas petition on his own. He told 

Defendant, who, as an LTA for the DDP program, was charged with assisting 

developmentally disabled inmates in gaining access to the courts, that he wanted help 

completing a habeas petition in order to challenge his sentence. Defendant told Plaintiff 

that the only assistance she could give him was to draft a letter to the court describing 

his disability. She concedes that she did not follow up on this letter, and generally had 

little idea about whether or by what means such letters ever resulted in inmates 

obtaining further assistance in filing claims. (ECF No. 63, at 6-7.) Because Defendant 

did not provide additional help to Plaintiff or even indicate that additional help was 

possible, Plaintiff did not file a habeas petition.

c. Plaintiff Suffered Actual Injury.

Lewis requires an inmate claiming violation of his right to access the courts to 

“demonstrate that a nonfrivolous legal claim had been frustrated or was being impeded.” 

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518 U.S. at 353. A plaintiff need not show that he would have succeeded on the merits 

had he been able to litigate his claim, but merely that his claim was “arguable.” 

Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415. Plaintiff’s allegations, taken as true, are sufficient to 

establish that he suffered injury under Lewis and Christopher. Plaintiff alleges that he 

sought review of his third strike for possession, a non-violent offense, which resulted in 

the imposition of a life sentence. (ECF No. 70, at 6.) He further alleges that recent Ninth 

Circuit precedent would have made such a claim viable. For summary judgment 

purposes, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately alleged injury.

d. Defendant Has Not Shown Entitlement to Qualified Immunity.

“A state officer is not protected by qualified immunity where he or she has violated 

a clearly established constitutional right.” Phillips, 588 F.3d at 657. “The relevant, 

dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it 

would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was not unlawful in the situation 

he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).

The right at issue in access to courts cases is whether an inmate has “meaningful 

access to the courts.” Phillips, 588 F.3d at 657 (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351). Although 

the Lewis court made clear that there was “no particular methodology” to ensuring 

meaningful access, 518 U.S. at 356, this Court concludes a reasonable officer in 

Defendant’s position would know that more was required to provide meaningful access 

to the courts than sending a letter to the court. Longstanding Supreme Court precedent 

indicates that a state’s practice of sending such letters to the Court was inadequate to 

satisfy illiterate inmates’ constitutional rights. Johnson, 393 U.S. at 488-489. Additional

California and Supreme Court precedent indicates that the right of access to the courts 

specifically includes assistance with preparing and filing petitions for habeas relief. 

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Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828; Brown, 531 P.2d at 776; In re Harrell, 470 P.2d at 644. 

Meanwhile, the remedial plan under which Defendant’s position was created (in 

response to inadequacies in disabled inmates’ ability to access the courts) indicated that 

among the services staff were to provide to disabled inmates was help completing forms 

and documents, giving rise to the inference that such services are considered

“meaningful.” Finally, Defendant’s own deposition testimony suggests she was aware 

that her letter-writing was not meaningful: she stated, “To my knowledge, I’ve seen two 

or three people get help out of hundreds of letters I’ve sent.” (ECF No. 63, at 6.) Based 

on the foregoing, the Court is unable to find that Plaintiff’s constitutional entitlement to 

more assistance than a letter describing his disability was not clearly established at the 

time that Defendant refused to provide additional help. Therefore, Defendant is not 

entitled to qualified immunity.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court finds that Defendant has not met her burden of showing an absence of 

an issue of triable fact. Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS 

that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 58) be DENIED. In addition, 

the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice (ECF No. 62) be 

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and that Plaintiff’s cross-motion for 

summary judgment (ECF No. 60) be DISREGARDED as untimely.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 

fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, any 

party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a 

document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

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Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen 

(14) days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. 

Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 

F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 21, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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