Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02449/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02449-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK PISZCZEK,

Petitioner,

 vs.

ANTHONY P. KANE, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 05-2449 PJH (PR)

ORDER GRANTING

RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO

DISMISS

This is a habeas case brought pro se by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that the petition is barred by the

statute of limitations, that there is no liberty interest in parole in California, and that the

petition and attachments show that there was no due process violation. Petitioner has filed

an opposition which addresses only the liberty interest ground, and respondent has filed a

reply. The motion is ready for decision. 

DISCUSSION

Respondent’s contention that this petition is barred by the statute of limitations is

dispositive of the motion and the case.

The statute of limitations is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitions filed by

prisoners challenging non-capital state convictions or sentences must be filed within one

year of the latest of the date on which: (A) the judgment became final after the conclusion

of direct review or the time passed for seeking direct review; (B) an impediment to filing an

application created by unconstitutional state action was removed, if such action prevented

petitioner from filing; (C) the constitutional right asserted was recognized by the Supreme

Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactive to

cases on collateral review; or (D) the factual predicate of the claim could have been

Case 4:05-cv-02449-PJH Document 9 Filed 03/14/07 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Time during

which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is

pending is excluded from the one-year time limit. Id. § 2244(d)(2). 

When the petition is directed to a denial of parole, as here, the date the statute of

limitations begins to run is determined under subsection (D) of 2244(d)(1), i.e., it is the date

when the factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of

due diligence, and in parole cases that usually will be the date the parole denial became

final. See Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1079 (9th Cir. 2003) (limitations period began

to run when BPT denied prisoner's administrative appeal challenging the BPT's decision

that he was unsuitable for parole). 

Respondent contends the denial of parole became final on April 21, 2003, which is

the date labeled “final date of decision” on page fifty-eight of the transcript of the Board’s

hearing and decision which is attached to the petition. Petitioner does not dispute this, of

course, because he has not opposed the motion to dismiss as to this ground. The court

therefore concludes that the statute of limitations began to run on April 21, 2003, and that

the federal petition was due on April 21, 2004. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243,

1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (adopting “anniversary method;” absent any tolling, the expiration date

of the limitation period will be the same date as the triggering event but in the following

year). 

Petitioner did not file his first state habeas petition directed to this parole denial until

September 13, 2004, long after expiration of the statute of limitations. He thus is not

entitled to statutory tolling for the time his state collateral review proceedings were pending. 

See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[S]ection 2244(d) does not

permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was

filed”). As he has not opposed the motion to dismiss as to this ground, obviously he has

not presented any other basis for avoiding the limitations bar. The motion to dismiss will be

granted.

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Case 4:05-cv-02449-PJH Document 9 Filed 03/14/07 Page 2 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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CONCLUSION

Respondent’s motion to dismiss (document number 5 on the docket) is GRANTED. 

The petition is DISMISSED. The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 14, 2007. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\PJH\HC.05\PISZCHEK449.MDSMSS 

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