Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03139/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03139-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLEMENT BROWN,

Petitioner,

 vs.

JILL BROWN, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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No. C 05-3139 JSW (PR)

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

DISMISS PETITION 

(Docket nos. 4, 6, 10)

Petitioner, a state prisoner incarcerated at San Quentin State Prison in San

Quentin, California, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging

the California Board of Prison Terms’ (“BPT”) decision to deny him parole during

parole suitability proceedings. This matter comes before the Court on consideration of

Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition (docket no. 4). 

According to the petition, Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder in

Orange County Superior Court in 1985 and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of

twenty-six years-to-life in state prison. In this habeas action, Petitioner does not

challenge his conviction, but instead challenges the execution of his sentence. Petitioner

contends that the denial of parole by the BPT at his December 1, 2004, parole suitability

hearing violated his federal constitutional right to due process. 

Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition on August 2, 2005 (docket no. 1). On

March 23, 2006, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that

recent California Supreme Court authority interpreting California’s parole scheme

Case 3:05-cv-03139-JSW Document 11 Filed 01/17/07 Page 1 of 5
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establishes that Petitioner has no federally protected liberty interest in parole and,

therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction over the matter (docket no. 4). Petitioner has filed

an opposition to the motion to dismiss (docket no. 5) and Respondent has filed a reply to

the opposition (docket no. 7).

The Ninth Circuit recently rejected Respondent's arguments that no liberty interest

exists with regard to parole and made clear that "California inmates continue to have a

liberty interest in parole after In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005)." Sass v.

California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1125 (9th Cir. 2006). It also made clear

that the "some evidence" standard identified in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445

(1985), is clearly established federal law in the parole context for AEDPA purposes. 

Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29. As such, Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition is

DENIED (docket no. 4). 

Petitioner has also filed several motions seeking an evidentiary hearing (docket

no. 6) and expansion of the record (docket no. 10) with regard to his claims. Essentially,

Petitioner seeks the “decision pages of all BPT hearings held for term to life inmates held

in 2000-2004” (docket no. 6 at 1). Respondent has filed an opposition to the motion for

an evidentiary hearing (docket no. 8). In support of these requests, Petitioner asserts that

he has provided over two hundred declarations in support of his contention that the

“Board has adopted a pattern and practice of arbitrary and standardless determinations.”

Id. at 2. In his motion for expansion of the record, Petitioner asserts that he requested an

evidentiary hearing in state court (docket no. 10 at 1). He asserts that the Board

“invariably characterizes murders as being especially cruel, callous or egregious and uses

the crime to deny parole.” Id.

In opposition to Petitioner’s motion for an evidentiary hearing, Respondent argues

that the request is premature, as the motion to dismiss was pending and was potentially

dispositive of the case (docket no. 5). However, this argument is now moot. Respondent

further argues that the request was premature prior to the filing of an answer and

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traverse, at which point the Court would be able to determine if an evidentiary hearing is

necessary. Respondent also argues that Petitioner failed to seek an evidentiary hearing in

state court. However, the opposition was filed before Petitioner’s second motion, where

he alleges that he sought such a hearing in state court.

A habeas petitioner, unlike the usual civil litigant in federal court, is not entitled to

discovery as a matter of ordinary course. See Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904

(1997). However, Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, 28

U.S.C. § 2254, provides that a “party shall be entitled to invoke the processes of

discovery available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if, and to the extent that,

the judge in the exercise of his discretion and for good cause shown grants leave to do so,

but not otherwise.” Before deciding whether a petitioner is entitled to discovery under

Rule 6(a) the court must first identify the essential elements of the underlying claim. See

Bracy, 520 U.S. at 904 (difficulties of proof aside, petitioner's allegation of judicial bias,

if proved, would violate due process clause). The court must then determine whether the

petitioner has shown “good cause” for appropriate discovery to prove his claim. See id. 

Good cause for discovery under Rule 6(a) is shown “‘where specific allegations

before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully

developed, be able to demonstrate that he is . . . entitled to relief . . .’” Id. at 908-09

(quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 299 (1969)); Pham v. Terhune, 400 F.3d 740,

743 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit has also described this standard as being that

discovery must be allowed when it is “essential” for the petitioner to “develop fully” his

or her underlying claim. Pham, 400 F. 3d at 743 (quoting Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002,

1009 ( 9th Cir. 1997)). For example, in Bracy, the Supreme Court found that the

petitioner established good cause for discovery where he provided specific allegations

lending support to his claim that the trial judge was actually biased in his case. 520 U.S.

at 909; see also Pham, 400 F.3d at 743 (good cause when petitioner contended that lab

notes might show a mistake which would be exculpatory); McDaniel v. United States

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District Court (Jones), 127 F.3d 886, 888 (9th Cir. 1997) (good cause for discovery

found where petitioner's claims did not appear purely speculative or without any basis in

record, each claim included factual allegations and statement of exhaustion, and

materials sought through discovery were not available from petitioner's appellate

counsel, who had destroyed entire file); Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 109-10 (9th Cir.

1997) (good cause found where petitioner identified specific material he needed to argue

effectively that trial lawyer had rendered ineffective assistance, particularly where there

was never any hearing on ineffective assistance claim at state court level). 

Petitioner’s motion fails to show how the materials he seeks are relevant to this

Court’s determination of the issues raised in the petition. Specifically, Petitioner has not

identified how other decisions of the Board finding certain crimes committed by others to

be especially cruel or egregious are relevant to establishing that Petitioner’s case was

decided by a biased decision-maker, unless Petitioner can show that it is somehow biased

to designate the actual crime committed by others that way. The Board decisions do not

provide sufficient information regarding the crimes to establish that and would,

therefore, be duplicative of the declarations before the Court and not otherwise relevant

to the Court’s determination in Petitioner’s case. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to

allege good cause for discovery of the materials he seeks and the motion is DENIED

without prejudice (docket nos. 6, 10). 

In order to expedite these proceedings, the Court's previous order to show

cause is reinstated as follows:

1. Respondent shall file with the court and serve on petitioner, within 60 days

of the issuance of this order, an answer conforming in all respects to Rule 5 of the Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases, showing cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not

be issued. Respondent shall file with the answer and serve on petitioner a copy of all

portions of the state trial record that have been transcribed previously and that are

relevant to a determination of the issues presented by the petition. 

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2. If Petitioner wishes to respond to the answer, he shall do so by filing a

traverse with the court and serving it on respondent within 30 days of his receipt of the

answer. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 17, 2007 JEFFREY S. WHITE

United States District Judge

Case 3:05-cv-03139-JSW Document 11 Filed 01/17/07 Page 5 of 5