Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01692/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01692-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

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ALBERT ESTRADA, CASE NO. 14cv1692-DMS (KSC) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED 

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

RE: DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

MARTEL, Warden, 

Res ondent. 

On July 17,2014, Alberto Estrada ("Petitioner"), a state prisoner proceedingpro 

17 se and in forma pauperis, filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition") 

18 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [Doc. 1] The petitioner raises two claims of ineffective 

19 assistance of counsel ("lAC"): claim one alleges lAC by appellate counsel, and claim 

20 two alleges lAC by trial counsel during plea negotiations. Id. at 28,37. 

21 This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge 

22 Dana M. Sabraw pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b), and Civil 

23 Local Rules n.l(d) and HC.2 of the United States District Court for the Southern 

24 District of California. Based on the moving and opposing papers, and for the reasons 

25 outlined below, this Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DENIED. 

26 II 

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28 II 

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Case 3:14-cv-01692-DMS-KSC Document 20 Filed 08/31/15 Page 1 of 27
1 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

2 On June 24, 2009, a complaint was filed charging Albert Estrada with multiple 

3 counts of kidnaping, robbery, burglary, carj acking, display of a firearm, and possession 

4 of a firearm by a felon. [Lodg. 1, Vol. 1, pp. 1-7] The charges arose from three discrete 

5 armed robberies that prosecutors alleged occurred in June 2009: one on the morning 

6 ofJune 12,2009, and two on the morning ofJune 20, 2009. See Section IL infra. The 

7 petitioner proceeded to trial on June 28, 2011, on an amended information alleging a 

8 total of 13 criminal counts. [Lodg. 1, Vol. 1, pp. 24-25] 

9 After six days of trial, on July 8, 2011, the jury convicted Mr. Estrada of the 

10 following crimes: counts one and two, kidnaping for robbery on or about June 20, 

11 2009; counts three, four, and five, robbery on or about June 20, 2009; count six, 

12 burglary on or about June 20,2009; count seven, carjacking on or about June 20, 2009; 

13 count eight, robbery on or about June 12,2009; counts ten and eleven, child abuse on 

14 or aboutJune 12,2009. [Lodg. 1, pp. 132-42] As to counts one through seven, the jury 

15 found true allegations that Mr. Estrada personally used a firearm. Id. As to counts 

16 eight, ten, and eleven, the jury similarly found true allegations that Mr. Estrada was 

17 armed with a firearm. Id. The jury acquitted Mr. Estrada of count twelve, felon in 

18 possession of a firearm. Id. at 142. The jury could not reach a verdict on count nine, 

19 burglary on or about June 12, 2009, and that count was dismissed by the Court at 

20 sentencing. See id. at 20-21,500; [Lodg. 3, Vol. 10, p. 2756]. 

21 On September 9,2011, the trial court sentenced Mr. Estrada to an indeterminate 

22 term of life with the possibility of parole on the kidnaping counts, and a consecutive 

23 determinate prison term of 3 3 years four months for the remaining counts and firearms 

24 enhancements. 1 [Lodg. 1, pp. 437-49, 500-02]; [Lodg. 3, Vol. 10, pp. 2757-58] 

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27 1 The California Court of Appeal characterized the petitioner's sentence as "an 

indeterminate prison term of34 years to life for counts 1 and 2 and the related firearms 

28 enhancement" and "a consecutive determinate prison term of33 years four months for 

the remaining counts and firearms enhancements." [Lodg. 7, p. 2] 

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1 Through counsel, the petitioner filed an appeal on March 22,2012. [Lodg. 4] 

2 The petitioner raised six distinct arguments challenging his trial, conviction and 

3 sentencing. Id. The state opposed each of the grounds for appeal. [Lodg. 5] In an 

4 unpublished, 27-page written opinion, the California Court of Appeal agreed with the 

5 petitioner that the trial court should have stayed his sentences for counts three and four, 

6 and ordered the trial court to modify the abstract of judgment accordingly.2 [Lodg. 7, 

7 p. 3] The appellate court affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Id. The Supreme 

8 Court denied the petitioner's petition for review on March 27,2013. [Lodg. 11] 

9 The petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus before the San 

10 Diego Superior Court on November 18, 2013, raising a single claim of ineffective 

11 assistance of appellate counsel. [Lodg. 12] The Superior Court denied his petition in 

12 a 9-page written opinion dated January 13,2014. [Lodg. 13] The petitioner filed a 

13 petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal on February 4, 

14 2014, again raising the single claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 

15 [Lodg. 14] The California Court of Appeal denied the petition in a two-page written 

16 order two weeks later. [Lodg. 15] On April 4, 2014, the petitioner filed a petition for 

17 writ of habeas corpus before the California Supreme Court. [Lodg. 16] There, for the 

18 first time, the petitioner argued ineffective assistance of trial counsel during plea 

19 negotiations in addition to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. /d. The 

20 California Supreme Court denied his petition without comment on June 25, 2014. 

21 [Lodg. 17] 

22 The instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus was timely filed in this 

23 Court on July 17,2014. [Doc. 1] The petitioner raises the same two claims that he 

24 presented to the California Supreme Court: ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, 

25 and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Id. The respondent filed a response on 

26 October 16,2014, opposing the petition in its entirety. [Doc. 12] After careful review 

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2 This modification did not alter the length of petitioner's sentence. 

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1 of the complete trial and appellate records and the moving and opposing papers, this 

2 Court recommends that the District Court DENY the petition. 

3 II. STATEMENT OF TRIAL FACTS 

4 The Court of Appeal's unpublished opinion sets forth a comprehensive factual 

5 background summarizing the testimony of the state's witnesses at trial. [Lodg. 7, pp. 

6 3-10] Title 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(I) creates a statutory presumption thatthe state court's 

7 findings of facts were correct, and the petitioner bears the burden of disproving these 

8 facts by clear and convincing evidence. Tilcockv. Budge, 538 F.3d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 

9 2008). This Court has conducted an independent review of the trial record and 

10 confirmed that the Court of Appeal's factual findings comport with the record. The 

11 Court of Appeal found: 

12 Crimes against Jose Villanueva and Carlos Espinoza (Counts 1-4) 

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At around 9:00 a.m. on June 20, 2009, Carlos Espinoza went to his 

friend Jose Villanueva's apartment. The two men were standing outside 

talking in the alley behind the apartment building when a Hispanic man 

approached them and pointed a black revolver at Villanueva's head. The 

man was approximately 5 feet 2 inches tall and weighed approximately 120 

to 125 pounds. He was between 25 to 30 years old and had a bit of facial 

hair. He also had a tattoo on his neck. He wore blue jeans, a gray hooded 

sweatshirt and dark sunglasses. He had a black, knit beanie in his back 

pocket. 

The man took their cell phones and told them to tum around. He 

threatened to shoot them if they turned back around or looked at him. He 

then directed them to move approximately 85 feet to the recessed entryway 

of an apartment building across the alley. The area where he moved them 

was more secluded than the area where they had first been standing. He told 

them to open the building's entry gate quickly or he was going to "f-k" 

them. Villanueva turned back to look at the man and the man threatened to 

"shoot his head off." Villanueva tried to open the gate, but it was locked. At 

that point, Espinoza and Villanueva felt trapped because the man stood 

behind them with a gun, there was a locked gate in front of them, a fence to 

the left of them, and the window and door of an apartment to the right of 

them. 

When Villanueva could not open the gate, the man started to hit the 

window of the apartment. A young man peeked out of the window. The 

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young man then whistled and his neighbors started coming out from their 

apartments. At that point, the man with the gun ran away. 

Crimes Against Nava, Zavala & Cuevas (Counts 5-7) 

The same morning, Jose Zavala went to pick up his cousin from his 

aunt Maria Nava's house, which was approximately seven miles or a 10-

minute drive from the Villanueva's apartment building. His cousin, his 

cousin's wife, and his cousin's young son lived with Nava. Nava's brother, 

Valentin Cuevas, was also visiting Nava that morning. While Zavala waited 

on the couch with Cuevas for his cousin to get ready, some church members 

stopped by for five to eight minutes and left. 

Almost immediately afterwards, someone knocked on the door. 

Thinking the church members had returned, Nava opened the door. A 25- to 

35-year-old Hispanic man stood at the door. He wore a gray hooded 

sweatshirt, blue jeans and white shoes. She asked him what he needed, but 

he did not answer. Instead, he took a revolver out of his pants, put it to her 

abdomen, and told her to go back into the house. The man backed her into a 

corner in the dining room. Thinking the gun was a toy, Nava grabbed it. She 

discovered it was cold and heavy and determined it was real. She and the 

man struggled over the gun. She released it as he pushed her hard into a wall. 

He then demanded money and she told him she did not have any because she 

had paid the rent. 

Zavala did not have a good view of the area where Nava and the man 

were, but he heard the ruckus. When he got up to see what was wrong, the 

man swung around and pointed the gun, a black steel .38-caliber revolver, 

at him and Cuevas. 

The man told Zavala to sit back down, which he did, and told Nava to 

come out of the dining room and sit next to Zavala and Cuevas, which she 

did. The man then demanded money. Nava went to the backyard where her 

daughter-in-law was, got $20 dollars from her and gave it to the man. 

Meanwhile, Zavala and Cuevas dug in their pockets. Cuevas also gave the 

man $20. To get the man out of the house, Zavala took his keys out of his 

pocket, placed them on the coffee table, falsely stated his wallet was between 

the seats of his vehicle and told the man he could go get it. The man took the 

keys, left the house, got into Zavala's vehicle and drove away. 

Zavala called 911. He told a 911 operator a very thin Hispanic man in 

his early twenties walked into the house with what appeared to be a black .39 

revolver and demanded money. The man wore a gray sweater, gray pants, 

dark sunglasses, and a sports team ball cap. 

Nava similarly told a 911 operator the man was a short, skinny, darkcomplected Hispanic in his early to late 20's. He wore a dark gray, hooded 

shirt and gray denim pants. She told a police officer the robber was a 

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Hispanic male, in his middle to late 20's, with brown eyes and dark skin. He 

was about 5 feet 6 inches tall, about 160 pounds, and wore a gray hooded 

zipper jacket and baggy blue jeans. 

San Diego Police Officers Daniel Stanley and Adam Shrom (sic) were 

patrolling the area and responded to the call from a few blocks away. They 

heard a dispatch stating the suspect took a vehicle and they spotted it 

approaching them. When the suspect saw them, he pulled over, got out of 

the vehicle, and walked into a parking lot. He was wearing blue jeans, 

white tennis shoes, and a gray hooded sweatshirt. He had on a blue 

baseball cap underneath the sweatshirt. 

Officers Stanley and Shrom stopped and got out of their patrol car. 

Shrom ordered the suspect to stop, but the suspect immediately ran through 

the parking lot and jumped some fences. As he ran, he removed his 

clothing. Shrom went into a nearby alley to try to intercept him. 

Stanley got back into the patrol car, drove around the block, and started 

coordinating with other officers to set up a perimeter to contain the suspect. 

Stanley noticed Estrada sitting on a front porch wearing nothing but a 

pair of jeans. He stopped his patrol car. He asked Estrada where the suspect 

went. Estrada pointed west and said the suspect had jumped a fence. 

As Stanley continued his investigation, a police dispatcher provided an 

updated description of the suspect, which matched Estrada. Stanley 

looked for Estrada. He found him across the street on another porch 

pretending to be asleep and took him into custody. 

Estrada had a puncture wound on his left hand and his jeans were torn, 

both consistent with him having jumped a chain-linked fence. In addition 

there was a trail of clothing leading from the area where the suspect 

abandoned the stolen vehicle to the location where Stanley first encountered 

Estrada, including a black glove, a black-and-orange glove, a blue bandana, 

a black bandana, a blue long-sleeve T-shirt, a gray hooded sweatshirt, black 

sunglasses, a blue ball cap, and a black ski mask. There were two $20 bills 

in the pocket ofthe sweatshirt and a loaded .38 caliber revolver in the stolen 

vehicle. 

DNA testing showed Estrada was the predominate contributor to the 

DNA mixture on the sweatshirt, T-shirt, blue bandana, and black glove and 

a possible major contributor to the DNA mixture found on the ski mask, 

black bandana, and black-and-orange glove. He was a possible minor 

contributor to the DNA mixture found on the ball cap. There was insufficient 

DNA found on the gun and the sunglasses to reach any conclusions. 

Nava identified Estrada as the robber at a curbside lineup and at the 

preliminary hearing. She also identified the gray sweatshirt officers 

found as the gray jacket the robber was wearing. Cuevas also identified 

Estrada at a curbside lineup. 

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A church member was leaving a home when she saw a man run from 

an alley and jump a wire fence. The man fell down, got back up, removed 

his gray sweatshirt, and continued running. The church member next saw 

the man sitting on the front porch of the house next door to the one she had 

been visiting. He did not have a shirt on. She continued walking. When she 

later turned around, she saw he had on a white tank top and was talking to a 

police officer. The man then walked across the street. 

At a subsequent curbside lineup, the church member identified the man 

as Estrada. She did not attempt to identify Estrada at trial, indicating she did 

not think she would recognize him because it had been a long time and she 

had never seen the man before or after the incident. Her minor nephew, who 

had been visiting homes with her, also identified the man as Estrada at the 

curbside lineup, but did not attempt to identify the man at trial for the same 

reasons as his aunt. 

Crimes Against the L. Famill (Counts 8,9, 10, & 11) 

Mr. L. is self-employed as a tow truck driver and mechanic. His home 

address, home phone number, and cell phone number appear on the side of 

his tow truck. On June 12, 2009, he received a cell phone call from a 

restricted number. The female caller requested towing assistance for her 

car, which she said was parked in front of a department store at a 

shopping center. Mr. L. went to the shopping center, which was a 15-minute 

drive from his house. He left his wife and two young foster daughters at 

home. When he arrived at the shopping center, he searched for the woman for 

approximately 10 minutes, but did not find her. 

After Mr. L left his home, a tall Hispanic man approximately 28 years 

old knocked on the door of the home and asked for a business card. When 

Mrs. L. opened the door to give him a card, he pushed his way into the home. 

He pointed a black gun at her chest and told her he would not kill her if she 

sat down. She sat down and grabbed one of her foster daughters. The other 

daughter was in an upstairs bathroom. 

At that point, another young Hispanic man came into the house. He 

was short, between 4 feet 9 inches and 5 feet 2 inches tall, and wore a mask 

covering his entire face except his eyes. He asked if anyone else was in the 

house. To protect her other foster daughter, Mrs. L.lied and told him no one 

else was there. However, around that time, her other foster daughter came 

downstairs and ran to her. 

27 3 The L.s are long-time foster parents. We have omitted their identifying 

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in this case. 

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As the taller man stood about four feet from her pointing a gun at her 

and her foster daughters, the masked man searched the house. He demanded 

"the black box," which Mrs. L. assumed meant he wanted a safe. She told 

him that she only had a file cabinet, not a black box. He searched her room 

and took her jewelry box. He started aggressively demanding money, so she 

gave him $900 she kept in the filing cabinet. One of her foster daughters also 

offered to give him a gold necklace her biological mother had given her 

on her birthday. He then went upstairs into her son's room and took her son's 

jewelry as well as handcuffs, a flashlight, and a camera her son used for his 

security job. When the masked man came downstairs with her son's 

belongings, he demanded Mrs. L's car keys. However, the taller man with the 

gun vetoed the idea of taking a car because doing so would make them 

easier to follow and catch. The two men then left. They told her not to call 

the police or they would kill her. 

Mrs. L. called her husband and told him what happened. He realized 

the call for service was made to lure him out of the house. He rushed home 

and found her and their foster children frightened and crying. He 

immediately called 911. His wife had been afraid to call because of the 

robbers' threat to kill her. During the call, he handed the phone to his wife. 

She told the 911 operator both men were dressed entirely in black. One of the 

men was tall, in his late 20's, with a medium build. He wore sunglasses and 

carried a small, black gun. The other one was short, thin and wore a mask 

over his face. 

Vanessa Gonzalez testified Estrada came to her home early in the 

morning on June 12 and asked her for a ride to a house. She took him there. 

He went inside and returned with a cell phone. At his behest, she told the 

person on the other end of the call that her car had broken down and she 

needed a tow. After that, she returned the cell phone to Estrada and went 

home. She saw Estrada again the next day at a friend's house. He had a 

folded wad of money with him. He threw a $20 bill at her and told her 

to buy herself something. Sometime before the crimes at the L.s' home, she 

saw Estrada with a revolver. 

The subscriber of the cell phone used to contact Mr. L. was Miriam 

Macareno. Macareno gave the cell phone to her cousin, Y ouset Patino, 

who was Estrada's girlfriend. According to Patino's preliminary hearing 

testimony, which was read to the jury because she was unavailable to testity 

at trial, Estrada came to her house one morning and borrowed the cell phone. 

He took the phone to a car with a female occupant. He returned the phone to 

Patino about 10 minutes later. Estrada left about five minutes after that. The 

driving time from Patino's home to the L.s' home was approximately five 

minutes .. 

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1 III. AEDPA'S STANDARD OF REVIEW 

2 Federal habeas corpus relief is available only to those who are in custody in 

3 violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The 

4 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDP A") imposes a "highly 

5 deferential standard" for evaluating state-court rulings on federal habeas review, and 

6 "demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt" Woodford v. 

7 Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19,24 (2002) (citations omitted). "By its terms § 2254(d) bars 

8 relitigation of any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court, subject only to the 

9 exceptions in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2)." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 

10 (2011). Under AEDP A, a federal habeas petition shall not be granted with respect to 

11 any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the 

12 adjudication ofthe claim: 1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

13 unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

14 Supreme Court of the United States; or 2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

15 unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

16 court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(I)-(2). 

17 A state court's decision may be found to be "contrary to" clearly established 

18 Supreme Court precedent if: 1) the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that 

19 reached by the Supreme Court on a question oflaw, or 2) if the state court confronts 

20 a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court 

21 precedent and arrives at a different result Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 

22 (2000). A state court's decision may be found to be "an unreasonable application" of 

23 clearly established federal law if that state court correctly identifies the governing legal 

24 rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case. Id. at 407-

25 08. Relief under the "unreasonable application" clause of § 2254(d)(I) is only 

26 available "if, and only if, it is so obvious that a clearly established rule applies to a 

27 given set of facts that there could be no fairminded disagreement on the question." 

28 White v. Woodall, _ U.S. _, 134 S. Ct 1697, 1706-07 (2014) (citation omitted). 

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1 III. PETITIONER'S CLAIMS ARE EXHAUSTED 

2 As an initial matter, this Court must determine whether the petitioner's 

3 constitutional claims have been exhausted in the state court. The exhaustion of 

4 available state judicial remedies is a prerequisite to obtaining federal habeas corpus 

5 relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). "Mixed petitions" containing both exhausted and 

6 unexhausted claims must be dismissed, leaving the petitioner with the choice of 

7 returning to state court to exhaust his claims or amending or resubmitting the habeas 

8 petition to present only exhausted claims to the district court. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 

9 509, 510 (1982). If any of the petitioner's claims are not exhausted, this Court must 

10 consider whether state remedies remain available such that the prisoner would benefit 

11 from the opportunity to fully exhaust his claims in state court. See Johnson v. Zenon, 

12 88 F.3d 828,831 (9th Cir. 1996). 

13 "A petitioner has satisfied the exhaustion requirement if: (1) he has 'fairly 

14 presented' his federal claim to the highest state court with jurisdiction to consider it... 

15 or (2) he demonstrates that no state remedy remains available." Johnson, 88 F.3d at 

16 829 (citations omitted). A claim can be exhausted even if it is presented only to the 

17 California Supreme Court, bypassing the lower state courts, if it is addressed on the 

18 merits by the state supreme court. Wilson v. Knowles, 638 F.3d 1213, 1214 n.l (9th Cir. 

19 2011); Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002) ("exhaustion does not 

20 require repeated assertions if a federal claim is actually considered at least once on the 

21 merits by the highest state court"). 

22 Courts may presume that an unexplained denial of an original habeas proceeding 

23 by the California Supreme Court is an adjudication on the merits ofthe claim contained 

24 therein and is entitled to deference under AEDP A unless "there is reason to think some 

25 other explanation for the state court's decision is likely." Harrington v. Richter, 562 

26 U.S. 86, 99-100 (2011).4 When a state court reaches a decision on the merits but 

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28 4 The Ninth Circuit summarized the facts of Harrington as follows: "[A] state 

habeas petitioner had raised an lAC claim before the California Supreme Court. The 

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1 provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, "although we independently review 

2 the record, we still defer to the state court's ultimate decision." Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 

3 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). 

4 Here, the petitioner first presented his claim of ineffective assistance of trial 

5 counsel to the California Supreme Court, bypassing the lower courts. Though the 

6 California Supreme Court denied the petitioner's habeas petition in a one-line summary 

7 decision, nothing in the record rebuts the presumption that this denial was made on the 

8 merits of all the claims contained therein. The petitioner's state court petition appears 

9 to have been timely filed and procedurally proper. Accordingly, this Court finds that 

10 the petitioner has fully exhausted both of his constitutional claims and deference to the 

11 state court's decision under ADEP A is appropriate. Where, as here, a state court denies 

12 a claim on its merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, "we 

13 independently review the record, [but] we still defer to the state court's ultimate 

14 decision." Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). 

15 IV. THE STRICKLAND STANDARD 

16 The petitioner has raised two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel ("lAC"). 

17 The standard of review for a claim of lAC is well established under Strickland v. 

18 Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and "[s]urmounting Strickland's high bar is never 

19 an easy task." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356,371 (2010). To prevail, a defendant 

20 must show two things: first, that counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall short 

21 of the guarantee of "counsel" under the Sixth Amendment; and second, that counsel's 

22 errors were so prejudicial as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Strickland, 446 

23 U.S. at 687. The Strickland standard is "highly deferential" to counsel; the Supreme 

24 Court recognized that "[i]t is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's 

25 assistance after conviction or adverse sentence." Id. at 689. The Court further held 

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27 court denied the claim in a one-sentence summary order. The U.S. Supreme Court held 

28 that this was an adjudication on the merits, notwithstanding the lack of explanation." 

James v. Ryan, 733 F.3d 911,914 (9th Cir. 2013). 

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1 that "a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the 

2 wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. 

3 The standard of review for a claim of ineffective assistance raised in a federal 

4 habeas petition is even more deferential. Here, the petitioner's claim has already been 

5 evaluated and rejected once by the state court. This Court, therefore, is not called upon 

6 to determine anew whether trial counsel was ineffective. Rather, the only question 

7 before this Court is whether the state court's denial of the petitioner's claim was 

8 "unreasonable." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). A state court's 

9 decision is reasonable as long as "fairminded jurists could disagree" on the correctness 

10 of the decision. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652,664 (2004). 

11 As the Supreme Court explained in Harrington, a federal court's review of a 

12 state court's denial of an ineffective assistance claim receives double deference: "The 

13 standards created by Strickland and § 2254( d) are both 'highly deferential,' and when 

14 the two apply in tandem, review is 'doubly' so." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105, citing 

15 Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). "Federal habeas courts must guard 

16 against the danger of equating unreasonableness under Strickland with 

17 unreasonableness under § 2254( d). When § 2254( d) applies, the question is not 

18 whether counsel's actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any 

19 reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard." !d. 

20 V. PETITIONER HAS NOT SHOWN lAC ON APPEAL 

21 A. Legal Standard 

22 All of the issues raised in the petitioner's first claim relate to ineffective 

23 assistance of appellate counsel in state court proceedings. "The due process clause of 

24 the fourteenth amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to th effective 

25 assistance of counsel on his first appeal as of right." Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 

26 1431 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). The Strickland standards apply to claims of 

27 ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Moormann v. Ryan, 628 F.3d 1102, 1106 

28 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). In the appellate context, to succeed on a claim of 

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1 lAC, the petitioner must show a) that counsel was ineffective, meaning that counsel 

2 acted unreasonably in failing to discover and brief a merit-worthy issue; and b) 

3 prejudice, meaning a reasonable probability that but for appellate counsel's failure to 

4 raise the issue, the petitioner would have prevailed in his appeaL Smith v. Robbins, 528 

5 U.S. 259, 285-86 (2000). 

6 When, as here, appellate counsel raises certain issues on appeal and not others, 

7 the Court must evaluate the reasonableness of counsel's conduct by looking to the 

8 merits of the omitted claims. Moormann, 628 F.3d at 11 07. "[A ]ppellate counsel's 

9 failure to raise issues on direct appeal does not constitute ineffective assistance when 

10 appeal would not have provided grounds for reversaL" Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 

11 832,840 (9th Cir. 2001). If appellate counsel decides to omit only those claims that 

12 have no likelihood of success, he is not ineffective. See Pollard v. White, 119 F.3d 

13 1430, 1435 (9th Cir. 1997) ("A hallmark of effective appellate counsel is the ability to 

14 weed out claims that have no likelihood of success, instead of throwing in a kitchen 

15 sink full of arguments with the hope that some argument will persuade the court.") 

16 (citation omitted). 

17 Furthermore, the performance component need not be addressed first. "If it is 

18 easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient 

19 prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed." 

20 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Accordingly, for those claims in which petitioner cannot 

21 demonstrate prejudice, this Court need not even evaluate appellate counsel's 

22 effectiveness in failing to raise the issue. 

23 The petitioner contends that five distinct issues should have been raised by his 

24 counsel on appeaL This Court will address each of these sub-claims in tut;n. 

25 II 

26 II 

27 II 

28 II 

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1 B. Admission of Pre-Trial Testimony of Youset Patino 

2 1. Factual Background 

3 Youset Patino, the petitioner's ex-girlfriend, testified as a witness for the 

4 prosecution at the petitioner's preliminary hearing on October 20,2014. [Lodg. 2, pp. 

5 47-54] She testified that on a morning in June of2009, the petitioner borrowed her cell 

6 phone and took it to a car where another female was seated. Id. at 50-51. He returned 

7 the cell phone to her approximately 10 minutes later. Id. at 51. Detective Estrella 

8 testified at the preliminary hearing that a cell phone was used to call Mr. Lozado to 

9 request vehicle towing services on the morning of the robbery. She testified that the 

10 call in question was placed from Ms. Patino's cell phone. Id. at 74-75. 

11 Prior to the trial, Ms. Patino moved to Mexico. Detective Takeda testified 

12 during an evidentiary hearing on motions in limine that he spoke with Ms. Patino by 

13 telephone on March 10,2011. [Lodg. 3, VoL 3, p. 648] He learned that she was in 

14 Mexico, but that she was cooperative and willing to return to the United States to 

15 testify. !d. After preparing paperwork for Ms. Patino's return to the United States, 

16 Detective Takeda called her on May 9, 2011, but was unable to reach her. !d. at 649. 

17 Detective Takeda spoke to Ms. Patino's family two or three times, but was 

18 unsuccessful in locating Ms. Patino. Id. On cross-examination, Detective Takeda 

19 admitted that he had not personally gone to Mexico to find Ms. Patino because his 

20 office would not authorize the travel for safety reasons. Id. at 658. He further testified 

21 that even ifhe had served her with a subpoena to testify, that subpoena would not be 

22 legally enforceable in Mexico. Id. at 653. 

23 Before trial, the D.A. moved to introduce Ms. Patino's testimony from the 

24 preliminary hearing on the grounds that she was an unavailable witness. Over defense 

25 counsel's objections, the trial judge made a factual finding of due diligence and ruled 

26 that the testimony would be admitted. [Lodg. 3, VoL 3, p. 661] Ms. Patino's 

27 preliminary hearing testimony was read to the jury at triaL [Lodg. 3, VoL 5, p. 1350] 

28 

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1 Today, the petitioner argues that appellate counsel's failure to raise the issue on 

2 direct appeal constitutes lAC because the trial court's ruling violated his Sixth 

3 Amendment rights of confrontation. [Doc. 1, pp. 29-30] For the following reasons, this 

4 Court recommends that the claim of appellate lAC be denied. 

5 2. Discussion 

6 The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to confront and 

7 cross-examine the witnesses against him. The Sixth Amendment permits, however, 

8 introduction ofa witness's prior sworn testimony when that witness is a) unavailable 

9 to testify, and b) the defendant has had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. 

10 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004). This rule is codified in the 

11 California Evidence Code § 1291 (a)(2). 

12 Mindful of the "doubly deferential" standard of review ofIAC claims under 

13 AEDP A, this Court finds that the California Supreme Court did not act unreasonably 

14 when it denied the petitioner's appellate lAC claim. The petitioner has not 

15 demonstrated a reasonable probability that this argument would have succeeded on 

16 direct appeal, as the facts demonstrate that Ms. Patino was unavailable and that the 

17 petitioner had a sufficient opportunity to cross-examine her at the preliminary hearing. 

18 A. Ms. Patino Was Unavailable 

19 A witness who is not present at trial is only "unavailable" in the constitutional 

20 sense if the prosecution has made a "good faith effort" to secure his or her presence at 

21 trial. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968). This rule is codified in California 

22 Evidence Code § 240( a)( 5). "The lengths to which the prosecution must go to produce 

23 a witness is a question of reasonableness." People v. Herrera, 232 P.3d 710,716 (Cal. 

24 2010) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980)). 

25 In this case, the prosecution met its burden of showing reasonable diligence in 

26 its attempts to secure Ms. Patino's presence at trial. The prosecution had attempted to 

27 contact her multiple times at her last known address in Mexico. They had asked her 

28 family members for more information about her current whereabouts. Even if the 

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1 D.A. 's investigator had gone into Mexico, he testified that he had no legal authority to 

2 compel her attendance at trial. The California Supreme Court has held that similar 

3 unsuccessful efforts to secure a witness's appearance satisfy the constitutional "good 

4 faith" and "due diligence" requirements, such that the witness's prior testimony may 

5 be introduced at a criminal trial. See Herrera, 232 P.3d at 721-22. 

6 B. The Petitioner Had the Opportunity for Prior Cross-Examination 

7 "Generally speaking, the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for 

8 effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, 

9 and to whatever extent, the defense might wish." Delawarev. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 

10 20 (1985) (emphasis in original). The California Supreme Court has explained, "it is 

11 the opportunity and motive to cross-examine that matters, not the actual cross12 examination," People v. Smith, 68 P.3d 302, 323 (Cal. 2003), and "the admission of 

13 preliminary hearing testimony under Evidence Code section 1291 does not offend the 

14 confrontation clause of the federal Constitution simply because the defendant did not 

15 conduct a particular form of cross-examination that in hindsight might have been more 

16 effective." People v. Samayoa, 938 P.2d 2, 40 (Cal. 1997). 

17 After reviewing the preliminary hearing transcript, this Court agrees with the 

18 trial court that the petitioner had the full and fair opportunity to cross-examine Ms. 

19 Patino. His counsel asked Ms. Patino multiple questions about her relationship with 

20 the petitioner. [Lodg. 2, p. 53] He questioned Ms. Patino about the name that she 

21 provided to the police when they first interviewed her. Id. at 54. He questioned her 

22 about the cell phone she turned over the police. !d. This line of questioning probed 

23 possible witness bias, honesty, and potential criminal exposure. Though with hindsight 

24 the petitioner may now wish that his counsel questioned Ms. Patino differently, this 

25 Court not called upon to second-guess counsel's assistance after the fact. Rather, this 

26 Court is bound by Strickland's highly-deferential standard: "a court must indulge in a 

27 strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 

28 professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, 

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1 under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial 

2 strategy_" See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (citation omitted). 

3 C. Severance of Charges 

4 Prior to trial, the petitioner through counsel moved in limine to sever counts 

5 arising from the three separate robbery incidents under California Penal Code § 954. 

6 [Lodg. 1, Vol. 1, pp. 117-20] The trial court denied the motion, finding that the all 

7 counts stemmed from the same class of offenses, that there was cross-admissibility of 

8 the evidence, and that the petitioner had not shown prejudice from joining the counts 

9 at trial. [Lodg. 3, Vol. 3, p. 645] The petitioner alleges that his appellate counsel was 

10 ineffective for failing to raise this argument on direct appeal. [Doc. 1, pp. 30-33] 

11 California Penal Code § 954 permits the joinder of two or more different 

12 offenses that are connected in their commission or of the same class of crimes. 

13 "[B]ecause consolidation or joinder of charged offenses ordinarily promotes efficiency, 

14 that is the course of action preferred by the law." Alcala v. Sup. Ct., 185 P.3d 708, 720 

15 (Cal. 2008). A trial court's denial of a motion for severance of charged offenses is only 

16 reversed upon appeal if"the trial court's ruling falls outside the bounds of reason." Id. 

17 (citations omitted). Additionally, "[t]he state's interest in joinder gives the court 

18 broader discretion in ruling on a motion for severance than it has in ruling on 

19 admissibility of evidence." Id. 

20 Here, the trial court's ruling was not outside the bounds of reason. The charged 

21 offenses fell within the same class of assaultive offenses (kidnaping, robbery). The 

22 crimes also shared common elements of substantial importance, including the use of 

23 a firearm and black ski mask. Furthermore, even if the trial court erred in denying the 

24 motion to sever, the petitioner cannot show that his conviction would have been 

25 reversed on appeal. It is an established principle of California law that even though 

26 two cases are erroneously consolidated for trial, the court will not reverse the judgment 

27 on appeal unless there is such a miscarriage of justice as would violate constitutional 

28 provisions. People v. Renier, 306 P.2d 917,920 (Cal. 1957). A careful examination 

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1 of the trial record in this case convinces this Court that the evidence against the 

2 petitioner on charges arising from each ofthe three incidents was so overwhelming that 

3 the consolidation of charges for trial could not have resulted in substantial prejudice 

4 to him. See id. 

5 "If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 

6 sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed." 

7 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Because the petitioner cannot show a probability of 

8 success of this issue on appeal, this Court finds that the California Supreme Court's 

9 decision was reasonable. 

10 D. Motion to Dismiss the Information For lAC at Preliminary Hearing 

11 Before trial, the petitioner moved under California Penal Code § 995 to dismiss 

12 the information (or, in the alternative, for a new preliminary hearing) based on 

13 counsel's ineffectiveness at the preliminary hearing. [Lodg. 1, Vol. 1, pp. 51-70] The 

14 trial court denied the motion, finding that the petitioner had not shown lAC or 

15 prejudice. [Lodg. 3, Vol. 3, p. 638] Today, the petitioner argues that appellate counsel's 

16 failure to raise the denial of the § 995 motion on direct appeal constitutes lAC. 

17 However, for reasons explained below, the petitioner cannot show a reasonable 

18 probability of success on direct appeal, and thus cannot show that the California 

19 Supreme Court's decision was unreasonable. 

20 A criminal defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel and other 

21 "substantial rights" at his or her preliminary hearing. Harris v. Sup. Ct., 225 Cal. App. 

22 4th 1129, 1144 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014). When a defendant is denied a substantial right at 

23 the preliminary hearing, the ensuring commitment is illegal, entitling the defendant to 

24 dismissal ofthe information on a timely motion. People v. Pompa-Ortiz, 612 P.2d 941, 

25 943 (Cal. 1980). Accordingly, "[s]etting aside the information is the required remedy 

26 when the defendant is denied the assistance of counsel [] at the preliminary hearing." 

27 Harris, 225 Cal. App. 4th at 1145. 

28 

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1 On direct appeal of a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss under § 995, the 

2 standard of review is abuse of discretion. Miller v. Sup. Ct., 101 Cal. App. 4th 728, 740 

3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). The appellate court "must draw every legitimate inference in 

4 favor of the magistrate's ruling and cannot substitute our judgment on the credibility 

5 of witnesses or the weight of the evidence." Id. (citations omitted). "A reviewing court 

6 cannot disturb an exercise of discretion unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or patently 

7 absurd." Id. (citations omitted). 

8 lfthe standard of review for lAC claims under AEDPA is "doubly deferential," 

9 see Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105, then the standard of review for this particular claim 

lOis quadruply so. This Court must apply AEDP A deference to an lAC claim within an 

11 lAC claim, where the Court of Appeal would have reviewed the trial court's decision 

12 for abuse of discretion. "Surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task," 

13 Padilla v. Kentucky,S 59 U. S. 356, 371 (2010), and here, where fourlayers of deference 

14 work in tandem, the bar is set higher than ever. 

15 The petitioner fails to establish lAC or prejudice under the Strickland standard. 

16 This Court has previously discussed the performance of counsel with respect to the 

17 preliminary examination of Ms. Youset Patino. Section V.B, supra. After reviewing 

18 the preliminary hearing transcript in its entirety, this Court finds that counsel's 

19 representation fell within the "wide range of reasonable professional assistance." 466 

20 U.S. at 689. During the preliminary hearing, counsel cross-examined 8 of the state's 

21 10 witnesses. Counsel focused his cross examination on several key points, including 

22 witnesses' observations and the problems of identification. [Lodg. 2, passim] He 

23 elicited the favorable fact that a child present during the purported home invasion 

24 robbery on June 20, 2009, did not even notice that a robbery was taking place. Id. at 

25 28-29. Counsel impeached several of the witnesses' perception of the events by 

26 challenging the lighting conditions, the witnesses' vantage point, and their feelings of 

27 fear or nervousness. !d. at 10, 15,27,35,46,53. Furthermore, the petitioner has not 

28 shown prejudice because the petitioner has not shown that but for the errors of counsel, 

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1 the outcome ofthe preliminary hearing would have been different. To the contrary, as 

2 noted above, this Court finds that the evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing 

3 overwhelmingly supported the trial court's finding that there was probable cause to 

4 hold the defendant to answer for the alleged charges. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 872. 

5 This Court has reviewed the transcripts of the petitioner's Marsden hearings5 

6 and is aware of the petitioner's concerns regarding his representation by Mr. Herrera. 

7 The Court sympathizes with the petitioner and understands his frustrations at some of 

8 the allegations of Mr. Herrera's conduct. However, this Court's review of the instant 

9 petition is limited by the highly deferential standards of AEDP A and clearly established 

10 federal law. Under those standards, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he is 

11 entitled to federal habeas relief. 

12 E. Failure to Federalize 

13 The petitioner argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 

14 "federalize" two claims in his direct appeal by citing to "a federal constitutional 

15 deprivation." [Doc. 1, pp. 34-35] It appears that the petitioner is arguing that his 

16 appellate counsel should have rendered specific assistance with drafting or framing 

17 claims of constitutional violations for his state or federal habeas corpus petitions. 

18 As properly noted by the California Superior Court in its denial of the 

19 petitioner's habeas petition, however, a criminal defendant has no constitutional right 

20 to counsel in habeas corpus proceedings, and consequently, no right to effective 

21 assistance of counsel. [Lodg. 13, p. 8]; Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th 

22 Cir. 2002); Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1431-32 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[The] right to 

23 effective assistance of appellate counsel is derived entirely from the ... rightto appellate 

24 counsel, and the former cannot exist where the latter is absent."). 

25 

26 

27 5 Under California law, a "Marsden hearing" is a hearing in which a defendant 

requests appointment of new counsel often for reasons of alleg~d ineffective 

28 assistance. Seffi Peoplev. Marsden, 465 F.2d 44 (Cal. 1970); Schell v_ Witek, 218 F.3d 

1017,1021 W Cir.2000). 

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1 Because the petitioner had no right to effective assistance of counsel in drafting 

2 claims for his habeas corpus petitions, appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing 

3 to do so. This claim should be denied. 

4 F. Cumulative Error 

5 The petitioner argues that the sum of the above errors violated his rights to 

6 counsel and due process. [Doc. 1, p. 36] Federal courts have recognized that the 

7 combined efforts of discrete trial errors can sometimes warrant federal habeas relief, 

8 even when none of them individually does. Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922,927 (9th 

9 Cir. 2007)( citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 401 U.S. 284 (1973)); Alcala v. Woodford, 

10 334 F.3d 862, 882-83 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a cumulative prejudice claim 

11 necessarily presupposes that the Court will find that substantial error occurred in 

12 connection with at least two subclaims. See Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500,524 (9th Cir. 

13 2011) ("Because we conclude that no error of constitutional magnitude occurred, no 

14 cumulative prejudice is possible.") (citation omitted). If the District Court adopts the 

15 recommendations herein to reject the petitioner's claim of appellate lAC in its entirety, 

16 "there is no single constitutional error in this case, [so that] there is nothing to 

17 accumulate to a level of constitutional violation." Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 

18 957 (9th Cir. 2002). This claim should be denied. 

19 G. Conclusion 

20 Cognizant of the extremely deferential standard of AEDP A on lAC claims, this 

21 Court finds that the petitioner has not demonstrated that the California Supreme 

22 Court's denial of his claims was unreasonable. Accordingly, this Court recommends 

23 that the petitioner's appellate lAC claim be DENIED in its entirety. 

24 VI. PETITIONER HAS NOT SHOWN lAC OF TRIAL COUNSEL 

25 A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During Plea Negotiations 

26 The petitioner argues that he was deprived of the ineffective assistance of 

27 counsel during plea negotiations. [Doc. 1, pp. 37-51] Specifically, he argues that he 

28 

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1 suffered from a "conflict of interest,,6 with "multiple public defenders" that interfered 

2 with his ability to make informed decisions aboutthe prosecutor's 19-year and 15-year 

3 plea deal offers. Id. at 37. The petitioner asserts that his counsel failed to build a 

4 meaningful relationship of trust and failed to communicate information about the 

5 petitioner's case during the course of plea negotiations. Id. The petitioner asserts that 

6 but for counsel's inadequacies, it is "likely" that he would have accepted the 19-year 

7 plea deal. Id. 

8 A. Background 

9 By way of background, the petitioner was represented by multiple attorneys from 

10 at least two public offices throughout his case. He raised three unsuccessful Marsden 

11 motions. The petitioner's first appointed attorney stepped down from the case on an 

12 unknown date when he was reassigned to juvenile hall. [Doc. 1, Ex. A, pp. 65-66] His 

13 second, Arturo Herrera (who represented the petitioner at the preliminary hearing on 

14 October 27, 2009), was terminated from the deputy public defender's office on an 

15 unknown date. Id. at 65. A third attorney, also from the deputy public defender's 

16 office, assumed representation on December 23, 2009. Id. at 63. 

17 On January 12,2010, the petitioner raised his first Marsden motion against his 

18 third counsel of record from the deputy public defender's office. [Doc. 1, Ex. A, pp. 60-

19 69] The Court noted that the D.A. had made the petitioner a guilty plea offer of 19 

20 years that day. Id. at 63. The petitioner requested new counsel because his attorney 

21 was not "cooperating" with him by getting him an offer for less time or "programs.,,7 

22 Id. at 62. Counsel explained that he had advised the petitioner that this was not the 

23 type of case on which the D.A.'s office would offer straight probation or a suspended 

24 

25 6 "A conflict of interest exists when the attorney owes duties to someone whose 

26 interests in the proceeding are adverse to those of his or her client." People v. 

Mroczka, 627 P.2d 835 (1983). What the petitioner alleges is a conflict of opinion 

27 between himself and his lawyer, not a formal "conflict of interest." 

28 7 This Court construes the petitioner's use ofthe term "programs" to mean noncustodial alternative sentences, such as drug and alcohol or mental health programs. 

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1 sentence. Id. at 65. He further conveyed to the court that he had informed the 

2 petitioner of the D.A.'s 19-year plea offer, the strengths and weaknesses of the 

3 petitioner's case, and the potential life sentencing exposure on the charges. Id. at 64-

4 65. The court denied the Marsden motion, finding that the petitioner had failed to 

5 demonstrate a conflict of interest. Id. at 66. 

6 In approximately September of20 1 0, the petitioner's case was re-assigned to the 

7 alternate public defender's office for unknown reasons. See [Doc. 1, Ex. B, p. 76]. On 

8 March 2, 2011, the petitioner raised his second Marsden motion. Id. at 70-84. He was 

9 represented by a very seasoned supervisor from the alternate public defender's office. 

10 Id. at 79. The petitioner complained that counsel had not filed various motions and law 

11 suits that he had requested, and that he did not trust the advice of his attorney, who was 

12 recommending that he take a deal. Id. at 72-76. Counsel explained that from the 

13 beginning, the petitioner had said he wanted to settle his case. Id. at 76. Accordingly, 

14 counsel focused his efforts on negotiating a deal, because "any offer is off the table" 

15 if he filed motions. Id. at 78-79. Counsel informed the court that he had been able to 

16 negotiate for a more favorable guilty plea offer of 15 years and 8 months, which he 

17 conveyed to and discussed with the petitioner. Id. at 79. The petitioner rejected the 

18 deal, feeling that it was still too much time. Id. at 79. Counsel represented in the 

19 Marsden hearing that he communicated regularly with the petitioner through video20 conferences, phone calls and emails, and had informed him of his potential maximum 

21 exposure and on the case. Id. at 76. Counsel denied that there was any irreconcilable 

22 conflict between the petitioner and his office, but offered to assign a new trial attorney 

23 to the case so that the petitioner could have a fresh start with someone else. Id. at 80. 

24 The court ultimately denied the petitioner's Marsden motion. Id. at 83. 

25 On April 6, 2011, a trial attorney from the alternate public defender's office was 

26 assigned to the case. [Lodg. 1, Vol. 1, p. 52] He represented the petitioner through trial 

27 and sentencing. The petitioner raised his third and final unsuccessful Marsden motion 

28 on the day before trial, June 27, 2011. [Doc. 1, Ex. C, pp. 86-100] 

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1 B. Legal Standard 

2 Strickland's standards apply to claims of ineffective assistance involving 

3 counsel's advice during the plea bargaining process. Missouri v. Frye, _ U.S. _, 132 

4 S.Ct. 1399, 1407-08 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, _ US. _, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 

5 (2012). "During plea negotiations, defendants are entitled to the effective assistance 

6 of competent counseL" Lafler, 132 S.Ct. at 1384 (citation omitted). As a general rule, 

7 "defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to 

8 accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused." Frye, 132 

9 S. Ct. at 1408. Trial counsel must also "advise a client to enter a plea bargain when it 

lOis clearly in the client's best interest." United States v. Leonti, 326 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th 

11 Cir.2003). 

12 "A defendant has the right to make a reasonably informed decision whether to 

13 accept a plea offer." Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851,880 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation 

14 omitted). Trial counsel must give the defendant sufficient information regarding a plea 

15 offer to enable him to make an intelligent decision. Id. at 881. "Counsel cannot be 

16 required to accurately predict what the jury or court might find," however, and 

17 "[counsel is] not constitutionally defective because he lacked a crystal balL" Id. The 

18 relevant question is not whether "counsel's advice [was] right or wrong, but.. whether 

19 that advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal 

20 cases." McMann v. Richardson, 397 US. 759,771 (1970). 

21 In order to show prejudice in the context of plea offers, "a defendant must show 

22 the outcome of the plea process would have been different with competent advice." 

23 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384. In cases where trial counsel's allegedly defective advice 

24 caused the defendant to reject a plea offer and proceed to trial, prejudice is 

25 demonstrated where: 

26 

27 

28 

[B]ut for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability 

that the plea offer would have been presented to the court (i.e., that the 

defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution would not 

have withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances), that the court 

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1 

2 

3 

would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or 

both, under the offer's terms would have been less severe than under the 

judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed. 

Id. at l385. 

4 

5 C. Analysis 

6 

After reviewing the complete trial record, this Court finds no grounds for relief. 

The petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim of ineffective 

7 

8 assistance of counsel during plea negotiations because he has failed to demonstrate that 

9 

his trial counsel's advice fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. It is 

10 uncontested that petitioner's counsel did in fact convey to him the prosecution's offers 

11 and advised him to accept those offers. The petitioner's chief complaints appear to be 

12 a) that he was "passed from counsel to counsel" and denied "the right to establish trust 

13 through a meaningful attorney client relationship," and b) that his attorneys did not 

14 keep him informed of important matters in his case, such as the prosecution's theory, 

15 the witnesses and evidence against him, and potential defenses. /d. at 38. 

16 

With respect to the petitioner's first complaint, the Sixth Amendment does not 

17 guarantee a "meaningful relationship" between an accused and his counsel. Morris v. 

18 S/appy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983). "No court could possibly guarantee that a defendant 

19 will develop [that] kind of rapport with his attorney - privately retained or provided by 

20 the public .... " Id. at l3. While the Court is sympathetic to the difficulties the petitioner 

21 experienced, any meaningful relationship is a two-way street, and the Court finds 

22 indicia in the trial record that the petitioner bears some responsibility for the 

breakdown in trust between himself and counsel. The Court's opinion is informed, for 

23 

24 example, by comments made by the petitioner's family at his sentencing hearing,8 an 

incident where the petitioner flung a small cup of water at his counsel during a 

25 

26 

27 

28 8 The petitioner's sister Elizabeth argued in mitigation that her brother "doesn't 

know how to communicate nor express his feelings." [Lodg. 3, Vol. 10, p. 2745] 

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1 Marsden hearing,9 and the trial judge's comments that he was initially concerned that 

2 the defendant would not behave himself at trial.lO 

3 Furthermore, other than the petitioner's broad assertion that his counsel failed 

4 to keep him informed, there is no evidence that any counsel failed to provide the 

5 petitioner with any important information as to his case. To the contrary, counsel 

6 credibly testified at the Marsden hearings that they conveyed plea offers to the 

7 petitioner, informed him of his maximum sentencing exposure, discussed the 

8 prosecution's evidence and the strengthens and weaknesses of the case, and advised 

9 him to take a plea deal. See [Doc. 1, pp. 60-100] The petitioner's trial counsel testified 

10 that he talked to the petitioner about the prosecution's case and possible defenses prior 

11 to trial. Id. at 96. The trial court found counsel's Marsden testimony credible and 

12 discredited the contrary statements of the petitioner. E.g. [Doc. 1, Ex. C, p. 99] ("The 

13 Court: For the record, I don't believe [counsel] did that. I believe you're lying about 

14 that."). Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his counsel was 

15 ineffective, and he has also failed to show prejudice, as he has not demonstrated that 

16 "but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability" that he 

17 would have accepted a deal and received a better outcome at sentencing. See Lafler, 

18 132 S. Ct. at 1384. 

19 In conclusion, mindful of AEDPA's doubly deferential standard of review ofa 

20 state court's denial ofIAC claims, this Court finds that the California Supreme Court 

21 acted reasonably when it denied the petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance oftrial 

22 counsel during plea negotiations. The Court recommends that the District Court 

23 DENY the petitioner's second claim. 

24 II 

25 

26 9 See [Doc. 1, p. 98] 

10 At sentencing, the trial judge stated: "Mr. Estrada, I have to tell you, too, I 

27 thought you conducted yourself very well during the trial. I was a little worried at the 

28 beginning of the trial that you were going to be angry and aggressive .... " [Lodg. 3, Vol. 

10, p. 2747] 

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1 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

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VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 

Malgistrate Judge 

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