Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00199/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00199-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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1 

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

 

EUGENE BELL, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO.: 2:13cv199-WC 

 ) 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ) 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

I. INTRODUCTION

 Plaintiff, Eugene Bell, applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental 

security income. His application was denied at the initial administrative level. Plaintiff 

then requested and received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). 

Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a decision in which the ALJ found Plaintiff not 

disabled at any time through the date of the decision. Plaintiff appealed that decision to 

the Appeals Council. At that point, the ALJ’s decision was remanded back upon an 

unopposed motion. Following a second hearing, the ALJ rendered another unfavorable 

decision, and the Appeals Counsel rejected Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s 

decision. The ALJ’s decision consequently became the final decision of the 

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Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”).1 See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 

129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). The case is now before the court for review under 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), both parties have consented to the conduct of all 

proceedings and entry of a final judgment by the undersigned United States Magistrate 

Judge. Pl.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. 8); Def.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. 9). 

Based on the court’s review of the record and the briefs of the parties, the court 

AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to disability benefits when 

the person is unable to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to 

result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months. 

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).2

 To make this determination, the Commissioner employs a five-step, sequential 

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2011). 

(1) Is the person presently unemployed? 

 

1

 Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-

296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to Social 

Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security. 

2

 A “physical or mental impairment” is one resulting from anatomical, physiological, or psychological 

abnormalities that are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic 

techniques. 

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(2) Is the person’s impairment severe? 

(3) Does the person’s impairment meet or equal one of the specific 

impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 [the Listing of 

Impairments]? 

(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation? 

(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy? 

An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next 

question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative 

answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of 

“not disabled.” 

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).3

 The burden of proof rests on a claimant through Step 4. See Phillips v. Barnhart, 

357 F.3d 1232, 1237-39 (11th Cir. 2004). A claimant establishes a prima facie case of 

qualifying disability once they have carried the burden of proof from Step 1 through Step 

4. At Step 5, the burden shifts to the Commissioner, who must then show there are a 

significant number of jobs in the national economy the claimant can perform. Id. 

 To perform the fourth and fifth steps, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s 

Residual Functional Capacity (RFC). Id. at 1238-39. RFC is what the claimant is still 

able to do despite his impairments and is based on all relevant medical and other 

evidence. Id. It also can contain both exertional and nonexertional limitations. Id. at 

1242-43. At the fifth step, the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and 

work experience to determine if there are jobs available in the national economy the 

claimant can perform. Id. at 1239. To do this, the ALJ can either use the Medical 

 

3 McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1986), is a supplemental security income case (SSI). The 

same sequence applies to disability insurance benefits. Cases arising under Title II are appropriately cited 

as authority in Title XVI cases. See, e.g., Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1981). 

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Vocational Guidelines4 (grids) or call a vocational expert (VE). Id. at 1239-40. 

 The grids allow the ALJ to consider factors such as age, confinement to sedentary 

or light work, inability to speak English, educational deficiencies, and lack of job 

experience. Each factor can independently limit the number of jobs realistically available 

to an individual. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240. Combinations of these factors yield a 

statutorily-required finding of “Disabled” or “Not Disabled.” Id. 

 The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. This court 

must find the Commissioner’s decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial 

evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). 

“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see also Crawford v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Even if the evidence 

preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings, [a reviewing court] must affirm if the 

decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.”). A reviewing court may not look 

only to those parts of the record which support the decision of the ALJ, but instead must 

view the record in its entirety and take account of evidence which detracts from the 

evidence relied on by the ALJ. Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1986). 

[The court must] . . . scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the 

reasonableness of the [Commissioner’s] . . . factual findings. . . . No 

 

4 See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 2. 

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similar presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner’s] . . . legal 

conclusions, including determination of the proper standards to be applied 

in evaluating claims. 

Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987). 

III. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 

 Plaintiff is forty-eight years old and has a GED. Tr. 285. Following the 

administrative hearing, and employing the five-step process, the ALJ found Plaintiff “has 

not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 31, 2006, the alleged onset date.” 

(Step 1) Tr. 282. At Step 2, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffers from the following 

severe impairments: “right ankle crush injury, mild bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, 

polyarthropathy, plantar fasciitis of the left foot, and mild depression.” Tr. 283. The ALJ 

then found that Plaintiff “does not have an impairment or combination of impairments 

that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments.” (Step 3) Id. 

Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has 

the [RFC] to perform less than the full range of light work . . . . 

Specifically, he can stand and walk no longer than 30 minutes at a time and 

no more than 2 hours total in an 8-hour day. He has no restriction on 

sitting. He cannot operate foot controls; climb ladders, scaffolds, or ropes; 

or work around unprotected height and dangerous equipment. He can no 

more than occasionally climb stairs or ramps, bend, stoop, kneel, crouch, 

and crawl. He can no more than frequently handle and finger. He cannot 

perform complex or detailed job instructions. He cannot work in crowds. 

He can have no more than occasional contact with the public. He is not 

limited to minimal changes in work settings and routines. 

Tr. 284-8. The ALJ then concluded that Plaintiff “is unable to perform any past relevant 

work.” (Step 4) Tr. 289. At Step 5, the ALJ found that, “[c]onsidering the claimant’s 

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age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity,” and after consulting 

with the VE, “there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that 

the claimant can perform.” Tr. 290. The ALJ identified the following occupations as 

examples: “office helper,” “mail clerk nonpostal,” and “packer.” Id. Accordingly, the 

ALJ determined that Plaintiff “has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social 

Security Act, from May 31, 2006, through the date of this decision.” Id.

IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

 Plaintiff presents two issues for this court’s consideration in review of the ALJ’s 

decision: (1) whether the Commissioner’s decision should be reversed because the ALJ 

failed to accord adequate weight to the opinion of Mr. Bell’s treating physician, Dr. 

Davis; and (2) whether the Commissioner’s decision should be reversed because the ALJ 

failed to specify the weight, if any, assigned to the medical opinions used to support her 

RFC. Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 11) at 6. The court will address each argument below. 

V. DISCUSSION 

A. Weight Accorded to the Treating Physician’s Opinion 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to accord adequate weight to the opinion of Dr. 

Stephen Davis. Dr. Davis was Plaintiff’s treating physician, and Plaintiff argues that his 

opinion should have been given substantial weight. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the 

ALJ failed to “apply the rules outlined by the regulations or Eleventh Circuit case law in 

evaluating the opinion of a treating physician.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 11) at 9. Plaintiff 

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properly cites to the applicable standard, that a treating physician’s opinion should 

receive controlling weight “unless there is good cause.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc 11) at 7 (citing 

Sabo v. Chater, 955 F. Supp. 1456, 1462 (M.D. Fla. 1996)). Indeed, the ALJ did not give 

Dr. Davis’s opinions controlling weight based on the inconsistency of the doctor’s 

records and inconsistency with objective medical evidence in the record. See Tr. 288-89. 

 Normally an ALJ must give the opinion of a treating physician “substantial or 

considerable weight unless ‘good cause’ is shown to the contrary.” See Phillips, 357 

F.3d at 1240. “‘[G]ood cause’ exists when the: (1) treating physician’s opinion was not 

bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating 

physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical 

records.” Id. at 1240-41. Further, “[t]he ALJ must clearly articulate the reasons for 

giving less weight to the opinion of a treating physician, and the failure to do so is 

reversible error.” Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997); see also 

MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding the ALJ “must 

specify what weight is given to a treating physician’s opinion and any reason for giving it 

no weight”). 

 Here, the ALJ articulated “good cause” for the rejection of Dr. Davis’s opinion—

that the opinion was inconsistent with his own medical records and that the evidence 

supports a contrary finding. In fact, the decision explicitly states, “I have accorded Dr. 

Davis’ opinion little weight because it is inconsistent with his own medical records and 

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the evidence supports a contrary finding.” Tr. 288. The ALJ then went on to highlight 

the inconsistencies. The ALJ noted that “Dr. Davis’s opinion that claimant could not 

stand and walk even one hour during an 8-hour day” was belied by Dr. Davis’s treatment 

notes that Plaintiff “stood at least three days a week at work in July 2007,” and 

“remain[ed] on his feet ‘all day’ in September of 2007.” Tr. 289. The ALJ also 

expressed that “Dr. Davis did not prescribe an assistive device for ambulation, which is 

not consistent with a standing/walking limitation of the severity [Dr. Davis] assessed.” 

Id. The ALJ also found Dr. Davis’s opinion that “physical activity, including standing 

and walking, would exacerbate [Plaintiff]’s pain to the point bed rest would be 

necessary,” to be inconsistent with Plaintiff’s work activity. Id. Additionally, the ALJ 

pointed to the inconsistent opinion of Dr. Davis that Plaintiff “has substantial limitations 

of his gross and fine manipulation; however, his office treatment notes do not reflect 

treatment for or complaints of symptoms related to [Plaintiff]’s upper extremities.” Id. 

Lastly, the ALJ stated, “I also note that the internal inconsistencies in Dr. Davis’ report 

regarding [Plaintiff]’s maximum ability to lift and carry [50 pounds frequently and 100 

pounds occasionally] and his limitations in fine manipulation indicate that Dr. Davis did 

not carefully consider his opinion.” Id. 

 Plaintiff asserts that “[t]he statement by the ALJ that Dr. Davis’s assessment is 

inconsistent with his own medical records is clearly inaccurate.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 11) at 

11. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that “[b]ased upon the extensive history of complaints 

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of chronic foot pain, as well as Dr. Davis’ professional opinion that [Plaintiff]’s foot 

condition is not expected to improve, it would not be unreasonable for Dr. Davis to 

completely restrict Plaintiff from standing on his feet.” Id. Based on the inconsistencies 

discussed above, the court disagrees. The ALJ articulated good cause and the court finds 

that the determination is supported by substantial evidence. 

 Plaintiff also argues that it was “error for the ALJ to dismiss the treating 

physician’s opinion . . . without specifically considering and discussing the factors listed 

in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 11) at 12. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that, 

“[g]iven the extensive history of treatment between Dr. Davis and [Plaintiff],” the ALJ 

was required to “properly consider[] the factors” prior to assigning little weight to Dr. 

Davis’s opinion. Id. The court notes that § 404.1527(d), entitled “Medical source 

opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner,” does not list factors that must be 

considered when an ALJ does not accord a treating physician’s opinion controlling 

weight. Rather, it appears Plaintiff intended to cite to § 404.1527(c), which does include 

such factors, which include the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of 

examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, supportability of the 

opinion, consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, and the specialization of 

the treating source. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). 

 Plaintiff has not presented any law that requires the ALJ to expressly discuss each 

of these factors individually. Further, the ALJ did expressly discuss the inconsistencies 

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of the opinion with the record as a whole, as discussed above. Tr. 288-289. It is also 

clear from the decision that the ALJ did consider, at least to some extent, the length of the 

treatment relationship, frequency of examination, and nature and extent of the treatment 

relationship, as the ALJ’s decision summarized multiple occasions on which Plaintiff 

presented to Dr. Davis for examination or treatment. Tr. 285-89. Regardless, as 

discussed above, the ALJ’s rejection was in accord with the requirements articulated by 

this circuit. 

 The court has reviewed Dr. Davis’s opinion and agrees with the ALJ’s 

determination to accord it little weight. The opinion appears to be unsupported by the 

other medical record of evidence and inconsistent with the doctor’s treatment notes. 

Accordingly, the court finds no error. 

B. Weight Accorded to the Opinions of Other Physicians 

 Plaintiff argues that “[t]he ALJ failed to state with specificity what weight, if any, 

was assigned to the opinions she relied upon in support of her RFC.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 11) 

at 12. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ only discredited the opinion of Dr. 

Davis and neglected to discuss the weight she assigned to the opinions of State Agency 

Consultant Susan Davis, Dr. David Alford, Dr. J.W. Johnson, Dr. In Young Soh, Dr. 

Stacy Goode, and Dr. Vijay Vyas. Id. at 13. 

 “There is no requirement in the Social Security regulations or rulings that the ALJ 

assign any weight to non-medical sources, only that the evidence be considered.” Reed v. 

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Astrue, 2009 WL 3571699 at *3 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 26, 2009) (unpublished). State Agency 

Consultant Susan Davis was not a physician; she was a state agency reviewing staff 

member, so there is no requirement that the ALJ explain any weight assigned to her 

opinion. All that is necessary is that the ALJ’s decision be clear enough to allow a 

reviewing court to determine whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence. 

Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (“there is no rigid requirement 

that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision, so long as the 

ALJ’s decision” enables the reviewing court to determine the ALJ considered the 

evidence). Ms. Davis’s opinion was based on a review of Plaintiff’s records, which 

included Plaintiff’s statements regarding his own symptoms. The ALJ considered and 

discussed Plaintiff’s statements of his symptoms and found them to be not credible. See

Tr. 286. Therefore, the court is able to determine that, although the ALJ did not 

explicitly discuss Ms. Davis’s opinion, the ALJ adequately considered the information 

contained within it. 

 As to doctors Alford, Johnson, Soh, Goode, and Vyas, Defendant argues that 

“Plaintiff does not show any of the above physicians actually gave ‘medical opinions’ 

concerning [Plaintiff’s] condition” and, therefore, do not need to be addressed by the 

ALJ. Def.’s Br. (Doc. 12) at 8. The court finds this argument to be unpersuasive. 

In Winschel v. Commissioner of Social Security, 631 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 

2011), the Eleventh Circuit held that whenever a physician offers a 

statement reflecting judgments about the nature and severity of a claimant’s 

impairments, including symptoms, diagnosis, and prognosis, what the 

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claimant can still do despite his or her impairments, and the claimant’s 

physical and mental restrictions, the statement is an opinion requiring the 

ALJ to state with particularity the weight given to it and the reasons 

therefor. Id. at 1179 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a) (2), 416.927(a)(2); 

Sharfarz, 825 F.2d at 279). 

Thompson v. Colvin, 3:11-CV-1048-J-TEM, 2013 WL 1278083, *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 

2013) (emphasis added). As further discussed below, it is clear from a review of the 

record that these doctors did offer statements reflecting judgments about Plaintiff’s 

symptoms and diagnosis. 

 “An ALJ’s failure to state with particularity the weight given different medical 

opinions is reversible error.” Caldwell v. Barnhart, 261 F. App’x 188, 190 (11th Cir. 

2008) (citing Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)). 

“[H]owever, [when] an incorrect application of the regulations results in harmless error 

because the correct application would not contradict the ALJ’s ultimate findings, the 

ALJ’s decision will stand.” Caldwell, 261 F. App’x at 190. Courts have generally found 

that an ALJ’s failure to state what weight is accorded a particular piece of medical 

opinion evidence is harmless when the ALJ has relied upon other opinion evidence that is 

consistent with the omitted evidence or the omitted opinion is consistent with the ALJ’s 

ultimate findings. See, e.g., id. at 191; Wright v. Barnhart, 153 F. App’x 678, 684 (11th 

Cir. 2005). 

 A review of the medical evidence in this case demonstrates that any limitations 

placed by the doctors are consistent with the ALJ’s findings that Plaintiff can perform a 

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limited range of light work with some limitations. As to the medical opinions of Dr. 

Alford, Plaintiff states that “[t]reatment notes from Dr. [] Alford in 2006 diagnose 

[Plaintiff] with highly comminuted displaced calcaneus fracture of the right ankle, with 

fracture blisters.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 11) at 13 (citing Tr. 222). The fact that Plaintiff had a 

badly broken ankle was discussed throughout the ALJ’s decision. Indeed, the ALJ 

referred to the broken ankle as a “right ankle crush injury” and discussed the progress and 

effects of Plaintiff’s ankle injury no less than ten times throughout the decision, even 

finding Plaintiff’s right ankle crush injury to be a severe impairment. (Tr. 283-89). As to 

the medical opinions of Dr. Johnson, Plaintiff states that “Dr. [] Johnson opined 

[Plaintiff] has a marked limitation of motion in his right ankle and also suffers from 

chronic pain syndrome.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 11) at 13 (citing Tr. 484, 486, 488, 490). The 

ALJ repeatedly discussed that Plaintiff had varying limitations in his right ankle’s range 

of motion and that Plaintiff’s ankle causes him pain. In fact, the ALJ explicitly stated 

Plaintiff “exhibited marked limitation of motion in his right ankle.” (Tr. 287).5

 As to the 

medical opinions of Dr. Soh, Plaintiff states that Dr. Soh “assessed [Plaintiff] as having 

osteoarthritis of the finger and knee joints, as well as demineralization of the right tarsal 

bones secondary to disuse of the right foot.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 11) at 13 (citing Tr. 497). 

The ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s arthritis throughout the opinion, finding it to be a severe 

 

5

 Plaintiff also states that “Dr. Johnson also noted [Plaintiff] complained of weakness of both legs and 

thighs, present for years, and [Plaintiff] was concerned something was wrong with the muscles in his 

legs.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 11) at 13 (citing Tr. 492). Plaintiff’s concern that something may be wrong with 

himself is not a medical opinion. Therefore, the ALJ was not required to discuss this assertion, and the 

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impairment. (Tr. 283). Additionally, the ALJ explicitly stated “an X-ray of [Plaintiff’s] 

foot showed demineralization of the tarsal and metatarsal bones.” (Tr. 287). The court 

also notes that the RFC limited Plaintiff’s standing and walking because of his ankle 

injury and limited Plaintiff’s handling and fingering. Therefore, because the ALJ relied 

upon other opinion evidence that was consistent with the opinions of doctors Alford, 

Johnson, and Soh, and all of the opinions are consistent with the ALJ’s ultimate findings, 

any error is harmless. Caldwell, 261 F. App’x at 191. 

 Plaintiff also argues error for the ALJ’s alleged failure to give weight to the 

opinions of doctors Goode and Vyas. The court notes three issues with this argument. 

First, Plaintiff fails to point the court to a single medical opinion by either of these 

physicians that would contradict the ALJ’s findings. Second, a review of doctors Goode 

and Vyas medical opinions contained in the administrative record reflect opinions 

consistent with the other opinion evidence discussed by the ALJ and consistent with the 

ALJ’s ultimate findings. Third, the ALJ, at least to some extent, clearly did consider the 

opinions of doctors Goode and Vyas, as evidenced by the ALJ’s statement that “the 

treatment notes of [Dr.] Goode[ ] and [Dr.] Vyas[ ] are not completely legible,” but 

neither doctor found Plaintiff to be in need of a referral to treatment from a mental health 

specialist. Tr. 285-86. 

 

failure to do so was not error. Reed, 2009 WL 3571699 at *3. 

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 Plaintiff fails to point to any medical opinion that contradicts the ALJ’s findings as 

to the ALJ’s RFC determination. Accordingly, to the extent the ALJ’s failure to state 

what weight she gave to the medical opinions was error, it was harmless. 

VI. CONCLUSION 

 The court has carefully and independently reviewed the record and concludes that, 

for the reasons given above, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. A 

separate judgment will issue. 

Done this 4th day of April, 2014. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 WALLACE CAPEL, JR. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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