Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-01256/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-01256-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MAHMOUD ELSAYED, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DAVID MCALEE, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-01256-JST 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: ECF No. 10

Before the Court is Defendants McAlee’s and the City of Palo Alto’s motion to dismiss for 

failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following

reasons, the Court grants the motion. 

I. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of: (1) Mahmoud Abdelfatah 

Elsayeda’s arrest warrant, (2) Janet Billups’ declaration, and (3) the City of Palo Alto’s Notice of 

Rejection. ECF No. 11 at 2. “The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to 

reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; 

or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably 

be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).

The Court may take judicial notice of an arrest warrant if the plaintiff does not contest the 

existence or authenticity of the warrant itself. Bunkley v. Verber, No. 17-CV-05797-WHO, 2018 

WL 1242168, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2018). While Plaintiffs contest whether the warrant was 

supported by probable cause, they do not contest its existence or authenticity. See ECF No. 14 at 

8. Therefore, the Court takes judicial notice of the arrest warrant. ECF No. 11-1. The Court also

takes judicial notice of Janet Billups’ declaration that she is a claims investigator for the City who 

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searched city records for claims concerning Elsayed’s March 2, 2016 arrest and found none aside 

from the claim rejected by the City on September 28, 2016. ECF No. 11-2 at 2; see Martin v. 

Hedgpeth, No. C 12-3193 CRB (PR), 2014 WL 3884287, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2014) (“The 

Court takes judicial notice that an authorized custodian of records . . . conducted a search . . . and 

found that plaintiff never filed a claim related to his instant causes of action against defendants.”). 

Finally, the Court takes judicial notice of the City’s notice of rejection for Elsayed’s government 

claim because it is a matter of public record not subject to reasonable dispute. ECF No. 11-3; Lee 

v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001).

II. BACKGROUND1

The plaintiffs in this action are Mahmoud Elsayed (“Elsayed”), his wife Nanette Dumas 

(“Dumas”), and Mashallah Elsayed (“Mashallah”), their developmentally disabled adult daughter. 

ECF No. 9 (“FAC”) ¶¶ 5–6. Plaintiffs live in Santa Clara County, California. Id. ¶ 4. Elsayed is 

of Arabic ethnic origin and a Muslim. Id. ¶ 8. The defendants in this action are David McAlee 

(“McAlee”) and the City of Palo Alto (“City”). Id. ¶¶ 9, 11. McAlee is a police officer for the 

City. Id.

Pursuant to an arrest warrant, McAlee entered Plaintiffs’ home on March 2, 2016 and 

arrested Elsayed. Id. ¶ 14; ECF No. 11-1. The criminal charges against Elsayed were eventually 

dismissed and “the Santa Clara County Superior Court found [] Elsayed was factually innocent of 

all alleged crimes.” FAC ¶ 23. 

Plaintiffs bring the following claims: (1) violation of Elsayed’s Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights through arrest without probable cause under Section 1983, violation of all 

Plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights through unlawful entry under Section 1983, 

and violation of all Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights through familial interference under 

Section 1983; (2) violation of Elsayed’s Fourteenth Amendment rights through discrimination 

under Section 1983; (3) violation of all Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process 

rights under Section 1983; (4) Monell liability for “an official policy” or breach of duty to provide 

 

1 For the purposes of deciding this motion, the Court accepts as true the FAC’s allegations. 

Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).

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“adequate and/or reasonable training” under Section 1983; and (5) violation of California Civil 

Code § 51.7 on the basis of Elsayed’s and Mashallah’s “status.” Id. ¶¶ 4-46. Plaintiffs bring their 

first three claims against McAlee, their Monell claim against the City, and their Section 51.7 claim 

against all Defendants. Id.

III. JURISDICTION

The Court has jurisdiction over this case because the complaint brings claims under the 

federal law contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over 

Plaintiffs’ state claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

IV. PROPOSED SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

In their opposition, Plaintiffs request leave to file their proposed and attached second 

amended complaint (“SAC”). ECF No. 14 at 7; ECF No. 15-1. “[N]ew allegations contained 

in . . . [an] opposition motion . . . are irrelevant for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes. In determining the 

propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the complaint to a plaintiff’s 

moving papers, such as a memorandum in opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss.” 

Schneider v. California Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). The Court will not consider Plaintiffs’ SAC in ruling on the instant motion. 

“If Plaintiffs wish to amend their pleadings, they must first file a motion for leave to 

amend.” Grant v. Unigard Indem. Co., No. CV14-00198 BJR, 2015 WL 11233201, at *4 (W.D. 

Wash. Mar. 13, 2015); Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1) (“A request for a court order must be made by 

motion”). “Because no motion has been filed, any comments the court might make regarding the 

propriety or advisability of amending the complaint would be totally gratuitous and without any 

legal basis or effect.” Moeller v. Taco Bell Corp., 966 F. Supp. 2d 899, 908 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 

The Court will not rule on the request contained in Plaintiffs’ opposition.

V. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter that, when accepted as true, states a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

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misconduct alleged.” Id. While this standard is not a probability requirement, “[w]here a 

complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the 

line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). In determining whether a plaintiff met this plausibility standard, the Court 

accepts all factual allegations as true and construes the pleadings in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005).

VI. DISCUSSION

A. Arrest without Probable Cause, Unlawful Entry, Excessive Force, and 

Familial Interference

Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he arrest of . . . Elsayed was wrongful [and] without probable 

cause,” but state no additional facts. FAC ¶ 15. This bare assertion does not set forth “facts to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 

(2007). Additionally, Elsayed was arrested pursuant to a warrant. See ECF No. 11-1. There is “a 

presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting the . . . warrant.” Franks v. 

Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978). “[I]n an action for unlawful arrest pursuant to a facially 

valid warrant, a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity unless no officer of reasonable 

competence would have requested the warrant.” Case v. Kitsap Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 249 F.3d 

921, 926 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs agree and concede that 

“[t]he [FAC] did not specifically address the problems associated with the warrant.” ECF No. 14 

at 7–8. The FAC fails to state a claim with respect to arrest without probable cause.

Plaintiffs’ claim for unlawful entry also fails in light of the presumptively valid warrant. 

See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980) (“[F]or Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest 

warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a 

dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.”); see 

also United States v. Gooch, 506 F.3d 1156, 1158 (9th Cir. 2007). Plaintiffs do not address this 

argument, and their concession that the FAC did not address the warrant also applies to this 

argument. ECF No. 14 at 8. As a result, the FAC fails to state a claim for unlawful entry. 

The FAC also fails to state a claim for excessive force. Plaintiffs allege “the manner 

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by . . . which the Defendants . . . carried out the arrest was done with excessive/unreasonable force 

or was unreasonable.” FAC ¶ 17. This is a legal conclusion, devoid of “factual content,” and 

insufficient to carry Plaintiffs’ burden at the pleading stage. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiffs do 

not contest this deficiency. ECF No. 14 at 9. The Court dismisses the claim. 

Finally, Plaintiffs’ claim for familial interference fails to state a claim because it is 

predicated upon the unconstitutionality of Elsayed’s arrest. See FAC ¶ 18. Where a familial 

interference claim is “directly related to all the other constitutional claims . . . , the other claims 

form an integral part of the claim relating to familial interference” and failure of the other claims 

precludes liability for familial interference. Gausvik v. Perez, 392 F.3d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 

2004). Again, Plaintiffs accept this deficiency. ECF No. 14 at 11. Because the FAC fails to state 

a claim for arrest without probable cause, it necessarily fails to state a claim for familial 

interference.

B. Discrimination

“To state a claim for violation of Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, a 

plaintiff must allege that the individual defendants, acting under color of state law ‘acted in a 

discriminatory manner and that the discrimination was intentional.’” Harris v. Clearlake Police 

Dep’t, No. 12-0864-YGR, 2012 WL 3042942, at *8 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2012) (citing Reese v. 

Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2000)). Plaintiffs assert that 

“Defendants’ wrongful acts . . . were committed, taken, and based on . . . Elsayed’s status as an 

Arab-American and a Muslim and constituted unlawful and unconstitutional discrimination.” 

FAC ¶ 28. While these allegations identify Elsayed as part of a protected class, they fail to

explain how Elsayed was treated differently based on his membership in a protected class, they do 

not allege that any wrongful acts were committed with discriminatory intent, and they do not point 

to any factual matter that would show discrimination. Plaintiffs do not dispute that the FAC fails 

to allege sufficient factual matter. ECF No. 14 at 14. The Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ 

discrimination claim. 

C. Substantive Due Process

Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ claims for false arrest and excessive force arise under the 

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Fourth Amendment, not the Fourteenth. ECF No. 10 at 15. Plaintiffs concede that, “[t]o the 

extent that this [] argument is intended to be limited only to [] Elsayed’s claims, and not those of [] 

Dumas[sic] or Mashallah[sic], then the Plaintiffs do not quarrel with that assertion.” ECF No. 14 

at 12. 

Plaintiffs argue that Dumas and Mashallah retain substantive due process claims under the 

Fourteenth Amendment as innocent bystanders to Defendants’ misconduct towards Elsayed. Id. 

The parties agree the standard governing Dumas’ and Mashallah’s claim is the “deliberate 

indifference” standard utilizing the “shocks the conscience” test. See ECF No. 14 at 12; ECF No. 

10 at 13–15; Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that where actual 

deliberation is practical, “deliberate indifference” may suffice to “shock the conscience” for a due 

process violation). The FAC states simply that the “decision to arrest . . . Elsayed at his home and 

the manner in which the arrest was carried out” was a wrongful act. FAC ¶ 18. Since Dumas’ and 

Mashallah’s claims relate directly to Elsayed’s claims for excessive force and discrimination, and 

the FAC fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for that conduct, it also fails to state a claim 

showing the arrest “shock[ed] the conscience.” Wilkinson, 610 F.3d at 554. The Court dismisses

Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim. 

D. Monell Liability

Under Monell, a government entity is not liable under Section 1983 unless a “policy or 

custom” of the entity was a moving force behind the alleged constitutional violation. Monell v. 

Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).

In order to establish liability for governmental entities under Monell, a plaintiff 

must prove “(1) that [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which [s]he 

was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to 

deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and, (4) that the policy 

is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.”

Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 

40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997)). Generally, a plaintiff may establish 

Monell liability by showing one of three things: (1) an unconstitutional policy or custom behind 

the violation of rights, (2) a deliberately indifferent omission, such as failure to train, or (3) a final 

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policymaker’s involvement in, or ratification of, the conduct underlying the violation. Clouthier v. 

County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1249-50 (9th. Cir. 2010), overruled on other grounds by 

Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016).

Plaintiffs allege that the City “expressly created, promulgated, adopted, and/or 

implemented an official policy or policies which intentionally and illegally resulted in police 

investigation and arrest practices and procedures resulting in arrests without probable cause and/or 

discrimination against suspects.” FAC ¶ 34. This is insufficient to state a claim under Monell

because it is a bare recitation of the legal standard and Plaintiffs must state facts which allege a 

specific policy or custom that violated their constitutional rights. See Sternberg v. Town of 

Danville, No. 15-cv-01878-SI, 2015 WL 9024340, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2015) (alleging “the 

existence of . . . a pattern or practice” only “recites the elements of a Monell claim and is plainly 

insufficient”).

Failure to train government employees may constitute a sufficient policy under Monell if 

the failure constitutes “deliberate indifference,” or “reflects a ‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’ choice” 

by the government entity. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989) (citation omitted). 

“A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily necessary to 

demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 

U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs allege that the City breached its 

duty to provide “adequate and/or reasonable training for their law enforcement officers . . . so that 

they would be able to investigate alleged crimes and/or make arrests properly and legally, 

supported by probable cause, and without bias or prejudice.” FAC ¶ 35. Plaintiffs also allege that 

this conduct “amounted to deliberate indifference.” Id. ¶ 38. This is a bare recitation of the legal 

standard, which fails to offer sufficient factual matter as to why the City’s failure to train 

amounted to “deliberate indifference.” See City of Canton, 389 U.S. at 390 n.10. Plaintiffs also

fail to state a claim under the “failure to train” line of Monell cases.

E. California Civil Code Section 51.7

Before bringing a suit against a public entity in California, a plaintiff must first file a claim 

with that entity. Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.4. If the public entity rejects the claim and gives notice, 

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the plaintiff must bring suit “not later than six months after the date such notice is personally 

delivered or deposited in the mail.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.6(a)(1). A plaintiff bringing an action 

in court must allege compliance with the California Tort Claims Act in her complaint. AIDS 

Healthcare Found. v. Los Angeles Cty., No. CV1210400PAAGRX, 2013 WL 12134048, at *9 

(C.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2013). And contrary to Plaintiffs’ arguments, the California Tort Claims Act 

applies to Section 51.7 claims. See Castenada v. City of Napa, Cal., No. C-95-4094 MHP, 1996 

WL 241818, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 1996) (“Since Section 51.7 is not enumerated and does not 

contain its own exemption provision, it is properly concluded that the claims procedure laid out in 

Section 900 et seq. of the Act applies.”).2

Plaintiffs do not plead compliance with the California Tort Claims Act, nor can they. ECF 

No. 10 at 18. The City mailed a notice rejecting Plaintiffs’ government claim on September 28, 

2016. ECF No. 11-3 at 1. Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on February 26, 2018, well past 

the six month period allowed by the California Tort Claims Act. ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs’ Section 

51.7 claim is dismissed with prejudice. See Kim v. City of Belmont, No. 17-CV-02563-JST, 2018 

WL 500269, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2018).

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims and Monell claim are dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiffs’ 

Section 51.7 claim is dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs may amend their complaint within 30 

/ / /

 

2 Plaintiffs argue that the Government Tort Claims Act does not apply to claims brought under 

Section 51.7. ECF No. 14 at 16. To support their argument, Plaintiffs cite a single case from the 

Eastern District of California, Devlyn v. Lassen Mun. Util. Dist., 737 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1123 (E.D. 

Cal. 2010). That case has not been persuasive within its own district. See Davis v. Kissinger, No. 

2:04-CV-0878-TLN-DAD, 2014 WL 5486525, at *2–3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2014) (declining to 

follow Devlyn and finding that a majority of courts ruling on the issue apply the Tort Claims Act 

to Section 51.7 claims). Plaintiffs’ assertion is also outweighed by substantial authority to the 

contrary in this district. See, e.g., Imperial v. Ramsey, No. 08-05644 CW, 2010 WL 2765540, at 

*3 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2010); Spears v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, No. C 06-4968 VRW, 2008 

WL 2812022, at *12 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2008); Castenada, 1996 WL 241818 at *6. The Court 

rejects Plaintiffs’ argument. 

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days solely for the purpose of curing the deficiencies identified in this order. Amendment for any 

other reason requires a motion for leave to amend. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 2, 2018

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

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