Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02865/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02865-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 422
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158
Cause of Action: 28:0158 Notice of Appeal re Bankruptcy Matter (BAP)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In re:

RALBERT RALLINGTON BROOKSHAMILTON,

Debtor

RALBERT RALLINGTON BROOKSHAMILTON,

Appellant,

 v

CITY OF OAKLAND,

Appellee.

 /

No C 05-2865 VRW

Bankr No 03-44829 LTJ

 ORDER

On August 25, 2005, the court ordered briefing on two

questions raised in connection with the interlocutory appeal of

appellant Ralbert Rallington Brooks-Hamilton from a July 7, 2005

order of the bankruptcy court. In response, appellee City of

Oakland filed a brief addressing (1) whether the bankruptcy court’s

July 7, 2005 order was a final, appealable order under 28 USC §

158(a) and (2) the merits of the appellant’s motion for preliminary

relief. The City also lodged with the court the transcript of the

July 7, 2005 hearing in the bankruptcy court.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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In reply, appellant filed a nineteen-page document that

appears to be a combination reply brief addressing the merits of his

request for preliminary injunctive relief (but not the

jurisdictional question on which the court requested briefing) and

amended complaint purporting to allege causes of action styled

“quiet title,” “equitable estoppel” and “civil rights violation.”

I

On July 13, 2005, appellant filed a notice of appeal with

this court (Doc # 1), seeking to appeal a minute order of the

bankruptcy court entered July 7, 2005 by which the bankruptcy court

approved the sale of a warehouse located at 880 27th Street in

Oakland, California (the “warehouse”) that formed part of the

Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate. At the same time, appellant filed a

motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc # 3) seeking to stay

proceedings in the bankruptcy court. 

Appellant’s primary allegation is that he was deprived of

due process in connection with the sale of the warehouse. In

specific, his papers recite the events of July 7 as follows:

On 7 July there was a hearing at the Bankruptcy

Court based on a motion filed by the Bankruptcy

Trustee, by and through his attorney to approve

the sale of real property of the DEBTOR/APPELLANT,

to wit, his warehouse.

At said time and place, and in the presence of

Judge Leslie Tchaikovsky, DEBTOR/APPELLANT

informed the Judge that he was prepared to pay the

sum equal to the sum of $538,000 that was offered

to the Trustee accepted by the Appellee City of

Oakland.

The Judge refused to consider the DEBTOR/APPELLANT

offer thus, denying his equal protection due

process under the law. 
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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3

Appellant’s Request for Preliminary Injunction (Doc # 3) at 2. 

The bankruptcy court's minute order from July 7, 2005, as

pertinent to the matters before this court, states: 

2) Trustee's motion granted to approve sale of

warehouse free and clear of liens of the claim of

interest of the trust based on a bona fide dispute,

and the court permits the trustee to conduct the

sale subject to overbids. 3) Trustee's motion to

approve agreement with City of Oakland and

settlement of pre-petition claims is approved. 4)

There will be 2 overbid procedures: one as to the

warehouse, and the second one as to claims. 5) The

auction sale of warehouse conducted in the

courtroom. The successful overbidder is Mr Ken

Sherman at $590,000. And Mr Yao Guang Qiu as back

up offer at $585,000. The sale, with terms as

stated by Ms Khatiblou on the record, is approved by

the court. Ms Khatiblou to submit a proposed order.

Bankr Doc # 162. 

On July 22, 2005, the bankruptcy court entered a written

order on the motions heard July 7. The order recited that

purchasers Ken Sherman and San Manh were found to be purchasing the

warehouse property in good faith, and authorized the trustee "to

execute any and all documents, and take any and all actions

necessary to complete the sale approved by this order." Bankr Doc #

180.

In the interim, on July 18 and 20, the trustee filed

papers in support of a supplemental motion heard on shortened time

to sell the warehouse free and clear of liens. The motion,

according to the trustee’s papers, was prompted by “information

discovered by the Trustee after the hearing on the Sale Motion.” 

Bankr Doc # 171, ¶ 7. The trustee’s papers recited that on July 12,

apppellant had filed an action to quiet title to the warehouse in

superior court. (The City of Oakland later removed that action to

the bankruptcy court on August 8. Bankr Doc #192.) 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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4

On July 28, 2005, in anticipation of a hearing on the

trustee’s motion in the bankruptcy court the next day, appellant

filed papers in this court requesting a stay of “any further action

by the Bankruptcy Court” pending adjudication of his appeal. Doc #

5. 

On July 29, 2005, the bankruptcy court held a hearing on

the trustee’s supplemental motion to sell the warehouse free and

clear of grant deeds recorded post-petition purporting to convey the

property to appellant’s children. According to the minutes of that

hearing, the bankruptcy court granted the motion to sell the

warehouse free and clear of “recordation of 2 grant deeds ercorded

post-petition.” 

On August 4, 2005, appellant filed more papers seeking a

preliminary injunction and stay of proceedings in the bankruptcy

court, reciting that at the hearing on July 29, the bankruptcy court

had granted the trustee’s motion to sell the warehouse free and

clear of liens. Doc # 6. Those papers mentioned appellant’s action

to quiet title in superior court pertaining to the warehouse and

were accompanied by a notice of lis pendens. 

On August 8, 2005, the bankruptcy court entered a written

order authorizing the trustee to sell the warehouse free of two

specifically described grant deeds – one a “grant deed gift” in

favor of “B.H. & Associates Unincorporated Bus. Org. Family Holding

Trust,” the other a “California grant deed” recorded in favor of the

“Brooks Hamilton Unincorporated Family Business Pure Trust

Organization Holding Trust, Ralbert Brooks Hamilton as Trustee.” 

Bankr doc # 193. The latter was recorded against the property on

July 8, 2005, the day after the hearing at which the bankruptcy

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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5

court conducted the auction sale of the warehouse. The bankruptcy

court entered no further orders pertaining to the warehouse after

August 8. 

On August 9, 2005, the City of Oakland appeared in this

action in this court, filing an affidavit and request for judicial

notice in opposition to appellant’s motion for a preliminary

injunction. Doc ## 8, 9. In response to the court’s August 25

order requesting further briefing,the parties submitted the papers

described on page 1 of this order.

II

First, the court must determine whether it has

jurisdiction over this appeal and motion. District courts have

jurisdiction to hear appeals from “final judgments, orders and

decrees” and from certain interlocutory orders. 28 USC § 158(a). 

As the Ninth Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel pointed

out in In re Belli, 268 BR 851, 855 (9th Cir BAP 2001), determining

finality in the bankruptcy context is not always straightforward: 

Applying the concept of finality under 28 USC §

158(a)(1) for appeals “as of right” has bedeviled

courts because the idiosyncracies of bankruptcy

sometimes make it difficult to discern whether

orders entered in bankruptcy cases are final in

the classic sense of ending litigation on the

merits and leaving nothing for the court to do but

execute the judgment. 

The Ninth Circuit has stated that, in assessing the appealability of

a district court’s order on an appeal from a bankruptcy court,

“[b]ecause of the unique nature of bankruptcy proceedings, we apply

a pragmatic approach to determining finality.” In re Saxman, 325

F3d 1168 1171 (9th Cir 2003). 

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United States District Court

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6

Appellant filed his notice of appeal following entry of a

minute order by the bankruptcy court. Appellee City of Oakland

cites Ingram v Acands, Inc, 977 F2d 1332, 1339 (9th Cir 1992), which 

discusses at length the factors to be considered by the appellate

court in determining whether a minute order is appealable. These

include consideration of various forms of minute orders, with or

without written orders following them. More closely on point is In

re Sperna, 173 BR 654, 657 (9th Cir BAP 1994), which holds that if a

minute entry fully adjudicates the issues and clearly evidences

court's intent that that order be court's final act, the minute

entry will be treated as a final order for purposes of appeal in a

bankruptcy case. If a minute order clearly contemplates further

action by the court, a notice of appeal may be treated as a request

to file an interlocutory appeal. Id at 658. 

Rule 8003 of the Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure

governs requests to file interlocutory appeals. The would-be

appellant must file a motion setting forth: (1) a statement of the

facts necessary to an understanding of the questions to be presented

by the appeal; (2) a statement of those questions and of the relief

sought; (3) a statement of the reasons why an appeal should be

granted; and (4) a copy of the judgment, order, or decree complained

of and of any opinion or memorandum relating thereto. If a notice

of appeal is filed without a motion, the district court may either

grant leave to appeal or may direct the filing of a motion for leave

to appeal. 

The Ninth Circuit has held in the bankruptcy context that

a premature appeal from an order of a district court exercising

appellate jurisdiction over a bankruptcy matter could be “cured” by

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United States District Court

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entry of a final judgment on the merits, which transformed an

interlocutory appeal into an appealable final order. In re Eastport

Associates, 935 F2d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir 1991). The avoidance of

piecemeal review is the foremost guiding principle in determining

finality in the bankruptcy context. Id. The factors considered in

determining finality include: (1) the need to avoid piecemeal

litigation; (2) judicial efficiency; (3) systemic interest in

preserving the bankruptcy court’s role as factfinder; and (4)

whether further delay would cause either party irreparable harm. In

re Saxman, 325 F3d at 1171. 

Applying these principles to the somewhat tangled

procedural history of this appeal to date, the court holds: (1) the

July 7 minute order was not an appealable, final order; (2)

appellant’s notice of appeal was premature, although the court was

not required to dismiss the appeal but rather could properly treat

it as a motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal; (3) the

bankruptcy court’s entry of two subsequent written orders apparently

disposing of all issues pertaining to the warehouse “cured” the

prematurity of appellant’s notice of appeal; and (4) the court may

now exercise jurisdiction over appellant’s appeal and motion for

preliminary relief. 

III

The court next addresses appellant’s request for

preliminary injunctive relief. Appellant has requested a stay under

Rule 8005 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure as well as a

preliminary injunction. 

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United States District Court

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8

Rule 8005 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure

provides that “[a] motion for a stay of the judgment, order, or

decree of a bankruptcy judge * * * or for other relief pending

appeal must ordinarily be presented to the bankruptcy judge in the

first instance. * * * A motion for such relief, or for modification

or termination of relief granted by a bankruptcy judge, may be made

to the district court or the bankruptcy appellate panel, but the

motion shall show why the relief, modification, or termination was

not obtained by the bankruptcy judge.” Appellant did not comply with

the procedural prerequisites for requesting a stay under Rule 8005.

As a practical matter, there is little difference between

the standards for issuing a stay under Rule 8005 and the standards

for a preliminary injunction: a strong likelihood of success on the

merits combined with the possibility of irreparable injury if the

stay is denied or, in an alternative formulation, serious legal

questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in

favor of the moving party. See, e g, In re Pacific Gas and Electric

Co, 2002 WL 32071634 (N D Cal 2002). The court’s August 25 order

stated: “Appellant’s papers do not address the standard for

preliminary injunctive relief under either standard. Without more,

the request for injunctive relief and/or a stay will be denied.” 

Doc # 10. 

Appellant’s reply papers assert that the “irreparable”

harm that will ensue if this court does not intervene is the sale of

the warehouse, which he describes as a “very un-replaceable asset,”

at “only 1/3 its real market value.” Doc # 12 at 3. Financial harm

is not “irreparable” because a remedy is available in the form of

money damages in the event the matter is adjudicated in appellant’s

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United States District Court

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favor. Furthermore, a commercial warehouse is hardly a unique

property; warehouses are plentiful in number. Appellant offers no

explanation for his assertion that the warehouse cannot be replaced. 

Appellant asserts that he is likely to prevail on the

merits, but offers no substance in support of this assertion. He

states that the bankruptcy court has been “very bias and

intimidating though-out the case and warned/threatened to fine the

Debtor if he continues to defend himself in her court. Debtor has

loss any and every motion, including the sanctioning, fining and the

disbarring of his counsel.” Id. These recitations do not buttress

appellant’s assertion that he is likely to prevail on the merits of

his appeal to this court. Moreover, the court has reviewed the

transcript of the July 7 hearing (lodged with the court September 1,

2005) and finds that it does not bear out appellant’s contention

that he attempted to bid on or otherwise buy the warehouse from the

bankruptcy estate. Rather, appellant submitted objections to the

sale along the lines that the warehouse was not part of the

bankruptcy estate because he had conveyed it to his children. These

objections were overruled and the sale went forward in favor of bona

fide purchasers. 

Appellant has not met his burden for obtaining preliminary

injunctive relief. His motions for such relief are therefore

DENIED.

The court now orders as follows:

1. Appellant's request for preliminary injunctive relief

is DENIED.

2. If appellant wishes to pursue his appeal of the

bankruptcy court's orders, he shall perfect his appeal as provided

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by Rule 8006 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and he

shall file his brief within thirty (30) days of the date of this

order. The remaining briefing shall be in accordance with the

briefing schedule set forth in Bankruptcy Local Rule 8007-1(b). The

parties are hereby advised that if appellant does not perfect his

appeal and/or file his brief within the time provided, the court

will construe said inaction as abandonment of the appeal and will

dismiss the appeal on its own motion. 

3. Appellant is advised that his attempt to assert causes

of action against the City of Oakland and the purchasers of the

warehouse through his papers filed in these appellate proceedings is

improper. The court will therefore disregard the pleadings

contained within appellant’s reply brief submitted in support of his

motion for preliminary relief; the purported defendants will not be

required to answer the allegations. The purported causes of action

must be brought, if at all, by means of a separate lawsuit. 

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge