Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01519/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01519-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BYRON THREAT,

Petitioner, 

v.

SHAWN HATTON, Warden,

Respondent. 

Case No.: 17cv1519-JAH-MDD

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED 

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

RE: MOTION TO DISMISS 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS

[ECF No. 4]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States

District Judge John A. Houston pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and

Local Civil Rule 72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of California.

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS

Respondents’ motion to dismiss Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus be GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Federal Proceedings

On July 27, 2017, Byron Threat (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner, filed a 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the United States District Court for 

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the Southern District of California. (ECF No. 1). Petitioner argues that his 

first-degree murder conviction is unconstitutional because the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), 

mandates that California’s murder statutes be stricken as 

unconstitutionally vague. (Id.). 

On September 29, 2017, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the 

Petition. (ECF No. 4). On November 13, 2017, Petitioner filed an opposition 

to the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 6).

B. State Proceedings

On July 25, 2003, Petitioner pleaded guilty to first-degree murder (Cal. 

Penal Code § 187(a)), admitting a strike prior (Cal. Penal Code §§ 667(b)1(i), 

1170.12, 668), and a prior serious felony conviction, Cal Penal Code §§ 

667(a)(1), 668. (ECF No. 5-1 at 12).1 On September 8, 2003, the San Diego 

County Superior Court sentenced Petitioner to fifty-five-years-to-life. (Id. at 

27; ECF No. 1 at 1). Petitioner appealed, and on July 12, 2004, the California 

Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction. (ECF No. 5-7). Petitioner did not 

make any further direct appeals to the California Supreme Court or the 

United States Supreme Court. (Id.). 

On April 17, 2009, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the Superior 

Court. (ECF No. 5-10 at 3). On June 8, 2009, the Superior Court denied the 

petition. (Id.). 

On July 20, 2016, Petitioner filed a second habeas petition in the 

Superior Court. (ECF No. 5-9). On September 19, 2016, the Superior Court 

denied that petition. (ECF No. 5-10). 

 

1 Pincites refer to the automatically-generated CM/ECF pagination, not the 

pagination in the native document. 

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On January 3, 2017, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California 

Court of Appeal and the appellate court denied the petition on January 9, 

2017. (ECF Nos. 5-11, 5-12). The California Supreme Court denied the 

petition on April 12, 2017. (ECF Nos. 5-13, 5-14). 

II. SCOPE OF REVIEW

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) provides the scope of review for federal 

habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district 

court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in 

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 

court only on the grounds that he is in custody in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

III. DISCUSSION

Respondent argues that dismissal is appropriate because Petitioner’s 

claim is barred by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 

1996 (“AEDPA”) one-year statute of limitations. (ECF No. 4-1 at 4-8). 

Petitioner opposes Respondent’s motion to dismiss, reiterating that his 

petition is timely under Johnson. (ECF No. 6 at 1).

A. Timeliness

Respondent argues that the Petition is time-barred because it was filed 

over ten years after Petitioner’s judgment became final and he is not entitled 

to a later start date or sufficient tolling. (ECF No. 4-1 at 4). Specifically, 

Respondent asserts that Johnson is not retroactively applicable to Petitioner. 

(Id. at 5). 

As amended by AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) provides a one-year 

limitations period for a state prisoner to file a federal petition for writ of 

habeas corpus, pursuant to the judgment of the State court. The limitation 

period runs from the latest of:

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(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws 

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented 

from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of 

due diligence.

28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(A)-(D) (West 2006). AEDPA applies to all § 2254 

habeas corpus petitions filed after April 24, 1996. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 

259, 267 n.3 (2000). Where a state prisoner sought direct review of a 

conviction in the state’s intermediate appellate court, but not in the state’s 

highest court, the one-year limitations period begins to run forty days after 

the intermediate court entered judgment. See Cal. R. Ct, 8.366(b)(1); Cal. R. 

Ct. 8.500(e)(1). 

On July 12, 2004, the California Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s 

conviction. (ECF No. 5-6). Petitioner did not appeal to the California 

Supreme Court and his conviction became final on August 21, 2004, forty 

days after the Court of Appeal entered judgment. (See id.); Cal. R. Ct. 

8.366(b)(1); Cal. R. Ct. 8.500(e)(1). The instant action was not filed until July 

27, 2017—almost thirteen years after the statute of limitations expired. 

(ECF No. 1). Because Petitioner did not file his federal habeas petition 

within the one-year statute of limitations, the Petition is untimely, unless 

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Petitioner is entitled to a later start date or to sufficient tolling.

1. Later Start Date Pursuant to Johnson

Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to a later start date of the AEDPA 

statute of limitations because Johnson enunciated a new rule of 

constitutional law that applies retroactively to Petitioner. (ECF No. 1 at 6-8). 

Respondent contends that the Johnson decision does not support Petitioner’s 

claim that the Supreme Court established a new constitutional rule 

applicable to California’s murder statute. (ECF No. 4-1 at 5). 

In Johnson, the Supreme Court found the residual clause of the Armed 

Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) unconstitutionally vague. Johnson, 135 S.Ct. 

at 2563. The ACCA’s residual clause qualifies any crime that “involves 

conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” as 

a violent felony. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). The Supreme Court, in finding the 

residual clause violates Due Process rights, found that the clause “produces 

more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause 

tolerates” and noted its own inability to craft appropriate standards and 

apply the clause. Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2557.

Petitioner suggests that the residual clause found at Cal. Penal Code § 

189 is just as vague as the unconstitutional residual clause of the ACCA. 

Although § 189 may contain a residual clause, Johnson does not render all 

such clauses unconstitutionally vague. In fact, other residual clauses that 

are even more similar to the one contained in the ACCA–like California’s 

definition of a second-degree felony murder (i.e., unlawful killing in the 

course of the commission of a felony that is “inherently dangerous to human 

life”)–are unaffected by Johnson. See Renteria v. Asunsion, 2016 WL 336558, 

at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec 16, 2016). As the district court in Renteria noted: 

“Although a superficial similarity may exist between the phrases ‘a serious 

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potential risk of physical injury’ and an act ‘inherently dangerous to human 

life,’ the Johnson Court did not rest its ruling solely on the lack of precision of 

the words ‘a serious potential risk of physical injury.’” Id.

Instead, “the [Johnson] Court found that a number of factors, acting in 

combination, rendered the residual clause constitutionally infirm,” and the 

Johnson decision itself was “narrow and based on the confluence of nine 

years of difficulty interpreting the provision, the remaining language of the 

statute, and the language of the residual clause itself.” Id. (citing Johnson, 

135 S. Ct. at 2560).

Accordingly, Johnson does not represent the Supreme Court’s 

recognition of a new rule of constitutional law applicable to Petitioner, and he 

is not entitled to a later start date of the AEDPA statute of limitations. See 

Adame v. Hatton, No. EDCV 16-2671-JAK-(KES), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

14968, *8-10 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2017) (“Petitioner’s state prison sentence was 

not enhanced under the ACCA’s residual clause, nor was his conviction based 

on any state analogue of that federal criminal statute. Thus, Johnson did not 

create a new due process right applicable to Petitioner.”).

2. Statutory Tolling

AEDPA’s limitations period is subject to statutory tolling for periods of 

time, prior to the expiration of the limitations period, in which there is a 

properly filed application for post-conviction relief pending in the state court. 

Tillema v. Long, 253 F.3d 494, 498 (9th Cir. 2001) (overruled on other 

grounds by Dixon v. Baker, 847 F.3d 714 (9th Cir. 2017)); see 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(2). An application for post-conviction relief is pending until final 

resolution is reached in the state court. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219-

220 (2002). In California, a state habeas petition remains pending between a 

lower court’s denial of the petition and the filing of a habeas petition in a 

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higher state court, as long as that period of time is “reasonable.” Evans v, 

Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 191-92 (2006). The Supreme Court has ruled that a six 

month delay between the denial of a state habeas petition in a lower court 

and the filing of a state habeas petition in a higher court is unreasonable. Id. 

at 201. 

For the instant Petition to be timely, Petitioner would need to toll the 

statute of limitations for 4,724 days.2 Assuming without deciding that all 

state habeas petitions are entitled to statutory tolling, and even if the Court 

adds six months (180 days) of tolling for each petition that did not proceed to 

the California Supreme Court–which would be more time than tolerated by 

the Supreme Court–the Petition would only receive 499 days of statutory 

tolling. Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition on April 17, 2009, and 

the San Diego County Superior Court denied the petition fifty-two days later 

on June 8, 2009. (ECF No. 5-10 at 3). Including six months to file in a higher 

state court, the petition was pending for 232 days. On July 20, 2016, 

Petitioner filed a second state habeas petition, which the California Supreme 

Court denied 267 days later on April 12, 2017. (ECF Nos. 5-9, 5-14). Thus, 

Petitioner had state habeas petitions pending for 499 days.3 Because 

Petitioner would need 4,724 days of statutory tolling, the instant Petition is 

untimely by 4,225 days.

Further, Petitioner’s state habeas petitions occurred in two distinct 

rounds. See California Courts; (ECF Nos. 5-9). “[W]hile the one-year 

 

2 There are 4,724 days between the expiration of the AEDPA statute of 

limitations on August 21, 2004 and the filing date of the instant petition on 

July 27, 2017.

3 The Court added the time each state petition was pending to reach 499 days 

(232+267=499).

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limitations period is tolled during the intervals between filings in the same 

round of habeas pleading (gap-tolling), it is not tolled between the end of one 

round and the beginning of another.” Renteria, 2016 WL 7336558, at *4 

(quoting Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007)). 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to tolling for time between the rounds 

of his state petitions. See id. As such, Petitioner is not entitled to enough 

statutory tolling to make his Petition timely and, unless Petitioner can 

establish an entitlement to equitable tolling, the instant Petition is timebarred.

3. Equitable Tolling

Under certain circumstances, AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations 

period may be equitably tolled. Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. 

Dist. of Cal., 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997) (overruled on other grounds 

by Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 163 F.3d 530 (9th 

Cir. 1998)). A litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of 

establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, 

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances beyond the prisoner’s control 

have made it impossible for him to file a timely petition. Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). Here, Petitioner did not provide any 

arguments or evidence to satisfy the elements required for equitable tolling 

and nothing in the record indicates that he is entitled to equitable tolling. 

Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling and the instant 

Petition is time-barred. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the 

District Court issue an Order: (1) Approving and Adopting this Report and 

Recommendation; (2) GRANTING Respondents’ motion to dismiss 

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Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report 

must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than 

February 12, 2018. The document should be captioned “Objections to 

Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objection shall be 

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than February 19, 

2018. The parties are advised that the failure to file objections within the 

specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the 

Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 22, 2018

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