Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01675/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01675-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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3:18-CV-01675-JLS (JMA)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC CHATMAN,

CDCR #BD-5474,

Plaintiff,

vs.

MOBIL GAS STATION, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-CV-01675-JLS (JMA)

ORDER: (1) DENYING MOTION 

TO PROCEED IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS AS BARRED BY 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g), AND 

(2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR 

FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE 

REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)

(ECF Nos. 1, 2)

Eric Chatman (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Salinas Valley State Prison in 

Soledad, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a nine-page Complaint alleging 

personal injury, general negligence, and intentional tort on a form provided by the Judicial 

Council of California, against a Mobil gas station in Oceanside, Mobil Corporation, a 

Porsche “shop,” Walmart, the City of National City, and “Escondido Transit.” See ECF 

No. 1 (“Compl.”). While far from clear, it appears that Plaintiff seeks to hold these parties

liable for injuries he claims to suffered on or near their places of business in 1993, 1998, 

and “around 2016–2017,” when he was “assaulted” by a Mobil clerk, “a ton of enemy 

soldiers,” and “hit by a transit bus.” Id. at 3, 5–8. Plaintiff seeks hundreds of millions of 

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dollars in “lump sum” damages, and asks to be awarded ownership interests in several of 

the corporate entities he has named as Defendants. Id. at 5.

Plaintiff did not pay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the time 

he filed his Complaint; instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2). He has since filed several letters addressed 

to the Court in which he repeats his claims of heroism, and expresses his thanks. See ECF 

Nos. 4, 6, 10. Plaintiff’s letters were accepted for filing in light of his pro se status and 

despite Local Civil Rule 83.9, which clearly prohibits such ex parte communications. See

ECF Nos. 3, 5, 9.

I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

A. Standard of Review

“All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa Cnty.

Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like Plaintiff, however, “face 

an additional hurdle.” Id. In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount of a 

filing fee,” in “monthly installments” or “increments” as provided by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(3)(b), Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. 

Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) 

amended Section 1915 to preclude the privilege to proceed IFP:

if [a] prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while 

incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or 

appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the 

grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under 

imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ 

provision.” Andrews v. King (“Andrews”), 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005).

“Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” 

Id.; see also Andrews v. Cervantes (“Cervantes”), 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful suits may 

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entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes rule”). The objective of the PLRA 

is to further “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation in federal 

court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). “[S]ection 1915(g)’s cap 

on prior dismissed claims applies to claims dismissed both before and after the statute’s 

effective date.” Id. at 1311.

“Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which 

were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim,” 

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the district court 

styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without 

prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008); 

see also El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that when 

court “review[s] a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style of the 

dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is whether 

the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim.’”) 

(quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)).

Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, he is prohibited by Section 1915(g) 

from pursuing any other IFP civil action or appeal in federal court unless he alleges he is 

facing “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 

493 F.3d at 1051-52 (noting Section 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] 

a plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ 

at the time of filing”).

B. Application to Plaintiff

The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint, as well as his letters, and finds they 

fail to contain any “plausible allegations” to suggest he “faced ‘imminent danger of serious 

physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g)). Instead, as described above, Plaintiff seeks to sue a gas station, a municipality, 

and several corporate entities in Southern California based on what appear to be farfetched 

allegations of having incurred injuries while he was heroically “protecting them” from

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“enemy soldiers” on unspecified occasions, some dating back to 1993. See Compl. at 5–

8; ECF No. 4 at 1; see also Holz v. McFadden, ED CV 07-1410-DSF (PJW), 2010 WL 

3069745, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2010) (finding “imminent danger” exception to 

Section 1915(g) inapplicable where prisoner implausibly claimed the FBI and BOP were 

“going to kill him”); Sierra v. Woodford, No. 1:07 cv 00149 LJO GSA (PC), 2010 WL 

1657493, at *3 (E.D. Cal. April 23, 2010) (finding “long, narrative, rambling statements 

regarding a cycle of violence, and vague references to motives to harm” insufficient to 

show Plaintiff faced an “ongoing danger” as required by Cervantes); In re Gonzalez, Nos. 

C 07-2373 MHP (pr) et al., 2008 WL 666465, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. March 6, 2008) (finding 

prisoner with a “delusional tale” of having a “special genetic structure” and being 

“irradiated . . . by radioactive smoke” by “government scientists” did not plausibly allege 

“imminent danger of serious physical injury”).

Further, Plaintiff fails to plead any basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction, and 

his suit is patently frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) (requiring sua sponte dismissal 

of prisoner complaints, or any portions of them, which are “frivolous, malicious, or fail[] 

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted”); Coleman v. Tollefson, __ U.S. __, 135 

S. Ct. 1759, 1764 (2015). “The purpose of § 1915A is to ‘ensure that the targets of frivolous 

or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.”’ Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 

903, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citation omitted); O’Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 

617 (9th Cir. 1990) (a complaint “is frivolous if it has no arguable basis in fact or law”); 

see also Pistor v. Garcia, 791 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2015) (lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction requires dismissal “sua sponte if necessary”) (citations omitted); Arbaugh v. 

Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006) (“Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties 

or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss 

the action.”).

And while Defendants typically carry the burden to show that a prisoner is not 

entitled to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “in some instances, the district court 

docket may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one of the criteria 

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under Section 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id. at 1120.

Such is the case here.

A court may take judicial notice of its own records, see Molus v. Swan, Civil Case 

No. 3:05-cv-00452-MMA-WMc, 2009 WL 160937, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (citing 

United States v. Author Servs., 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Gerritsen v. 

Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2015), and “may take 

notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, 

if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 

1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th 

Cir. 2002)); see also United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, 

Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992).

Thus, this Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff Eric Chatman, identified as CDCR 

Inmate #BD-5474, has had four prior prisoner civil actions dismissed in this district alone 

on the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted: 

1) Order Granting Motion to Proceed IFP and Dismissing Civil Action for 

Failing to State a Claim Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 

Without Leave to Amend, Chatman v. Toyota of Escondido, et al., Civil 

Case No. 3:17-CV-01853-BAS (JLB) (S.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2017), ECF

No. 18 (“Strike One”);

2) Order Granting Motion to Proceed IFP and Dismissing Civil Action for 

Failing to State a Claim Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 

Without Leave to Amend, Chatman v. Cush Acura, et al., Civil Case 

No. 3:17-CV-01852-WQH (JLB) (S.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2017), ECF No. 

20 (“Strike Two”);

3) Order Denying Motion to Proceed IFP and Dismissing Civil Action for 

Failing to State a Claim Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 

Without Leave to Amend, Chatman v. Super 8 Motel, et al., Civil Case 

No. 3:17-CV-02517-DMS (JMA) (S.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2018), ECF No. 

6 (“Strike Three”); and 

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4) Order Granting Motion to Proceed IFP and Dismissing Civil Action for 

Failing to State a Claim Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 

Without Leave to Amend, Chatman v. Super 8 Motel Co., et al., Civil 

Case No. 3:18-CV-00213-BAS (NLS) (S.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2018), ECF

No. 6 (“Strike Four”).1

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated more than three

“strikes” pursuant to Section 1915(g) and fails to make a plausible allegation that he faced 

imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed his Complaint, he is not 

entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP in this action. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055; 

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 

“does not prevent all prisoners from accessing the courts; it only precludes prisoners with 

a history of abusing the legal system from continuing to abuse it while enjoying IFP 

status”); see also Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[C]ourt 

permission to proceed IFP is itself a matter of privilege and not right.”).

II. CONCLUSION AND ORDERS

For the reasons set forth above, the Court:

(1) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) as barred by 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g);

(2) DISMISSES this action without prejudice based on Plaintiff’s failure to pay 

the full statutory and administrative $400 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a);

/ / /

 

1 Plaintiff has also been denied leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) in several subsequent 

cases: Chatman v. Cush Honda, et al., Civil Case No. 3:18-CV-00414-JLS (KSC) (S.D. Cal. March 26, 

2018), ECF No. 5; Chatman v. Super 8 Motel Corp., et al., Civil Case No. 3:18-CV-00436-CAB (RBB)

(S.D. Cal. March 19, 2018), ECF No. 6; Chatman v. Liquor Store, et al., Civil Case No. 3:18-CV-00563-

GPC (JMA) (S.D. Cal. May 14, 2018), ECF No. 8; Chatman v. Ferrari Newport, et al., Civil Case No. 

3:18-CV-00655-CAB (MDD) (S.D. Cal. May 15, 2018), ECF No. 6; Chatman v. Beverly Hills 

Lamborghini, et al., Civil Case No. 3:18-CV-00668-DMS (JMA) (S.D. Cal. April 16, 2018), ECF No. 3; 

Chatman v. Citibank Corp., et al., Civil Case No. 3:18-CV-00748-LAB (AGS) (S.D. Cal. April 23, 2018),

ECF No. 3; and Chatman v. Chatman, Civil Case No. 3:18-CV-00835-CAB (PCL) (S.D. Cal. June 4, 

2018), ECF No. 5.

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3) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would be frivolous and,

therefore, would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See 

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 

550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal 

would not be frivolous); and

4) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close the file.2

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 17, 2018

 

2

 Because Plaintiff has demonstrated a proclivity to write letters to the Court in this and in most of his 

previous cases in violation of the Court’s Local Rules prohibiting ex parte communication, he is again

cautioned that Civil Local Rule 83.9 provides that “attorneys or parties to any action must refrain from 

writing letters to the judge,” and that “[p]ro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that 

govern other litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Consequently, any additional 

ex parte letters Plaintiff attempts to file in this matter will be summarily rejected based on Local Rule 

83.9, and because this Order terminates his case.

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