Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00867/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00867-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICK COLLINS, an individual; and 

VETERANS 360, a California 

Corporation,

Plaintiffs,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-00867-H-MSB

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ 

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 

INJUNCTION

[Doc. No. 16.]

On May 9, 2019, Plaintiffs Rick Collins and Veterans 360 (“Plaintiffs”), filed a 

complaint against Defendant United States Department of Veterans Affairs (“Defendant”)

asserting claims for trademark infringement. (Doc. No. 1.) On December 2, 2019, 

Plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction to enjoin Defendant from using 

“Vet360,” “Veteran360,” or “any other reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable 

imitation of plaintiffs’ registered trademark[s].” (Doc. No. 16.) On December 30, 2019, 

Defendant filed an opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion (Doc. No. 17), and Plaintiffs filed a 

reply on January 6, 2020. (Doc. No. 18.) The Court held a hearing on the motion on 

January 13, 2020. Glenn W. Trost and Don Wenskay appeared for Plaintiffs and Scott 

Bolden and Rebecca G. Church appeared for Defendant. For the reasons below, the Court 

denies Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction without prejudice.

Background

Plaintiff Rick Collins is a veteran who founded a non-profit organization, Veterans 

360, in 2012. The organization provides counseling, advocacy, and mentorship to active 

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duty personnel, veterans, and their families. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 5.) When forming this 

organization, Mr. Collins created the trademarks “Veterans 360” and “Vets 360” for use 

by his organization in providing support services to veterans. (Id. at ¶¶ 7–8.) Mr. Collins 

registered the “Veterans 360” mark on July 5, 2016 with the U.S. Patent and Trademark 

Office (“PTO”), Registration No. 4,991,432. (Doc. No. 16-6.) On January 15, 2019, Mr. 

Collins registered the “Vets 360” mark with the PTO, Registration No. 5,654,087. (Doc. 

No. 16-7.)

In April 2018, Defendant United States Department of Veteran Affairs rolled out a 

web-based platform to provide veteran’s services, naming the platform “Veteran 360” and 

“Vet 360.” (Id. ¶ 9; Doc. No. 17 at 6.) On May 26, 2018, Plaintiffs wrote a letter to 

Defendant to notify Defendant that it was infringing Plaintiffs’ marks. (Doc. No. 16-8.) 

On June 26, 2018, Plaintiffs wrote a second letter to Defendant, informing Defendant of 

the alleged infringement. (Doc. No. 16-9.) On May 9, 2019, Plaintiffs filed the present 

action before this Court, alleging that Defendant ignored Plaintiffs’ letters and continues 

to infringe their mark. (Doc. No. 1.)

Discussion

I. Legal Standards

A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” 

Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). “[P]laintiffs 

seeking a preliminary injunction face a difficult task in proving that they are entitled 

to this extraordinary remedy.” Earth Island Inst. v. Carlton, 626 F.3d 462, 469 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction “must 

establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable

harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and 

that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.

II. Analysis

The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., “creates a comprehensive framework for 

regulating the use of trademarks and protecting them against infringement, dilution, and 

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unfair competition.” Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257, 263 (9th Cir. 2018)

(quoting Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 

1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 2010)). To show trademark infringement, Plaintiffs must prove: (1) 

that they have “a valid, protectable trademark” and (2) the “defendant’s use of the mark is 

likely to cause confusion.” Id. (quoting S. Cal. Darts Ass’n v. Zaffina, 762 F.3d 921, 929 

(9th Cir. 2014)). Under the Lanham Act, the owner of a trademark used in commerce may 

register the mark with the PTO, and registration is prima facie evidence of the mark’s 

validity and the owner’s exclusive right to use the mark in connection with the goods and 

services specified in the registration. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b). To determine whether another 

party’s use of a mark is likely to cause confusion, the Court considers eight factors:

(1) the strength of the mark; (2) the proximity of the goods; (3) the similarity 

of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) the marketing channels 

used; (6) the type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the 

purchaser; (7) the defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and (8) the 

likelihood of expansion of the product lines.

Gordon, 909 F.3d at 264 n.6 (internal citations omitted). Evidence that use of the marks 

“has already led to confusion is persuasive proof that future confusion is likely.” La Quinta 

Worldwide LLC v. Q.R.T.M., S.A. de C.V., 762 F.3d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 

AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 352 (9th Cir. 1979)).

A. Irreparable Harm

Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s alleged infringement constitutes irreparable harm 

because it harms Plaintiffs’ ability to control their business reputation. (Doc. No. 16 at 8–

9.) Defendant contends that Plaintiffs do not demonstrate irreparable harm because they 

have not offered objective evidence showing injury and because Plaintiffs did not diligently 

seek a preliminary injunction. (Doc. No. 17 at 5–7.) The Court commends Plaintiffs for 

their organization and the public services they provide. But at this stage of the litigation,

the Court agrees that Plaintiffs have not offered sufficient evidence of irreparable harm.

A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that she is likely to 

suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. To show 

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irreparable harm, a party must demonstrate that “legal remedies, such as money damages, 

are inadequate . . . .” Herb Reed Enterprises, LLC v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 

1239, 1250 (9th Cir. 2013).

1

“Purely economic harms are generally not irreparable, as 

money lost may be recovered later, in the ordinary course of litigation.” Idaho v. Coeur 

d’Alene Tribe, 794 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Los Angeles Memorial 

Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 634 F2d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 1980) (denying a preliminary 

injunction because lost revenues, diminution of property value, and loss of substantial 

goodwill are all “monetary injuries which could be remedied by a damage award”). In a 

trademark suit, “loss of control over business reputation and damage to goodwill could 

constitute irreparable harm.” Herb Reed Enterprises, 736 F.3d at 1250. But a party must 

demonstrate such loss through “concrete evidence in the record.” Adidas Am., Inc. v. 

Skechers USA, Inc., 890 F.3d 747, 756 (9th Cir. 2018). The mere possibility of irreparable 

harm is insufficient. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 

2011); see also Goldie’s Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court of State of Cal., 739 F.2d 466, 

472 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury.”). 

Plaintiffs provide important services to veterans in the community. But at this time 

in the litigation, Plaintiffs have not provided sufficient evidence that they will suffer 

irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs offer declarations from three 

veterans testifying that Defendant’s use of the mark caused them confusion. (Doc. Nos.

16-3, Reed Decl.; 16-4, Marks Decl.; 16-5, Tor Decl.) But evidence of confusion is not 

evidence of irreparable injury. Herb Reed Enterprises, 736 F.3d at 1250 (“This evidence, 

however, simply underscores customer confusion, not irreparable harm.”). Thus, the three 

veterans’ declarations do not offer evidence of harm to Plaintiffs’ reputation or goodwill 

sufficient to establish irreparable injury. For example, none of these three witnesses state 

that they gained a negative impression of Plaintiffs’ organization or would refuse to use 

 

1 Additionally, courts in the Ninth Circuit no longer presume irreparable harm if a party shows a 

likelihood of success on the merits of a trademark infringement claim. Herb Reed Enterprises, LLC v. 

Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1249–51 (9th Cir. 2013).

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Plaintiffs’ services as a result of the confusion. (Doc. Nos. 16-3, Reed Decl.; 16-4, Marks 

Decl.; 16-5, Tor Decl.) 

Plaintiffs also offer the declaration of Mr. Collins, the founder of the Veterans 360 

non-profit organization and one of the Plaintiffs in this case. Mr. Collins states that 

Defendant’s use of the allegedly infringing mark is harmful because of the poor reputation 

that Defendant has in the veteran community. (Doc. No. 16-1, Collins Decl. ¶¶ 7–9.) He 

asserts that Defendant’s infringement causes veterans and service providers to believe that 

Plaintiffs are working with Defendant, which “makes those veterans and service-providers 

less likely to seek help from” Plaintiffs. (Doc. No. 16-1, Collins Decl. ¶ 9.) But Mr. 

Collins’s statement that veterans and service providers are “less likely” to seek Plaintiffs’ 

services is conclusory, and he provides no concrete evidence to support his assertion. See

Am. Passage Media Corp. v. Cass Commc’ns, Inc., 750 F.2d 1470, 1473 (9th Cir. 1985)

(no showing of irreparable harm where declarations from the plaintiff’s own executives 

were “conclusory and without sufficient support in facts” and “[n]one of the advertisers 

say[] that [they] will discontinue business with [plaintiff]”). While declarations can 

provide evidence of lost goodwill sufficient to merit a preliminary injunction, they 

generally do so when supporting the claims of lost goodwill with reference to actual 

complaints arising from the alleged incidents of infringement. See Disney Enterprises, Inc. 

v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 865 (9th Cir. 2017) (sufficient evidence of irreparable 

harm where declaration by the company’s vice president stated that defendant’s conduct 

would damage the company’s goodwill with licensees and that licensees had in fact “raised 

concerns” about unlicensed services like those of the defendant); Life Alert Emergency 

Response, Inc. v. LifeWatch, Inc., 601 F. App’x 469, 473–74 (9th Cir. 2015) (sufficient 

evidence of irreparable injury where employee submitted “declaration reporting numerous 

and persistent complaints from would-be customers”). Mr. Collins’s declaration does not 

offer such evidence here. 

Additionally, in the hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction, Defendant 

represented that it had ceased any future use of the marks “Veterans 360” or “Vets 360.”

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Defendant further stated that it had rebranded its web platform to “Veterans Profile” and 

that Defendant was in the process of phasing out its past uses of Plaintiffs’ marks consistent 

with Defendant’s duties under applicable federal records laws.2 (See also Doc. No. 16-10 

at 1) (representing that Defendant “will have transitioned away” from use of Plaintiffs’

marks by December 31, 2019.) Since a preliminary injunction is “a device for preserving 

the status quo and preventing the irreparable loss of rights before judgment,” Sierra OnLine, Inc. v. Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984), the fact that 

Defendant is no longer using Plaintiffs’ marks further supports the finding that Plaintiffs 

would not suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not offered sufficient evidence of the irreparable harm 

necessary to merit the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction. Since Plaintiffs

have failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, the Court need not address Defendant’s 

remaining arguments or the remaining factors necessary for injunctive relief. See Amylin 

Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 456 F. App’x 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2011).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary 

injunction without prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 13, 2020

 

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 

2 Defendant’s discontinued use of Plaintiffs’ marks raises the possibility that the motion for a 

preliminary injunction might be moot. See Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013). However, 

a defendant “cannot automatically moot a case simply by ending its unlawful conduct once sued.” Id. 

Rather, “a defendant claiming that its voluntary compliance moots a case bears the formidable burden of 

showing that it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to 

recur.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 

(2000). Since Defendant makes no argument that its behavior “could not reasonably be expected to recur,” 

the Court has no basis to consider the case moot.

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