Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02264/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02264-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 240
Nature of Suit: Torts to Land
Cause of Action: 28:2271 Federal Tort Claims Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JUDITH A. WHYTE,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

VETERANS AFFAIRS, et al.,

 Defendants.

CIV. S-02-2264 DFL PAN PS

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

—NFN—

Plaintiff commenced this suit October 16, 2002, against the

U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, five members of the Villa

San Juan Homeowners Association, Riverside Property Management,

and several individuals alleging undisclosed pre-existing defects

in the condominium she purchased from the Department of Veterans

Affairs. Defendant Shaw, the selling agent and only remaining

defendant, answered the complaint November 15, 2002. 

On January 22, 2003, this court dismissed plaintiff’s claims

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against the Homeowners Association and its board members, and

against the Riverside Property Management and its manager,

Celeste Cummings. On July 11, this court directed plaintiff to

serve process upon the United States and defendant Osborne. 

Plaintiff did not respond and this court recommended dismissal of

these defendants, which was ordered by Judge Garcia on January

12, 2004. Thereafter, plaintiff served the United States and

filed the return of service on February 11, 2004. Pursuant to an

order to show cause issued May 10, this court on June 29 ordered

plaintiff to pay $350 sanctions for serving a complaint

containing claims she knew had been dismissed. Plaintiff paid

the sanction on July 14. 

On March 15, 2005, this court ordered plaintiff to file a

joint status report prepared in cooperation with remaining

defendant Shaw. Plaintiff was warned that failure to comply with

the court’s order may result in a recommendation of dismissal. 

The 30-day period for filing the joint status report 

expired April 14. Plaintiff neither filed a report nor otherwise

communicated with this court until May 10, when she filed a

motion for summary judgment against Shaw asserting simply that

Shaw’s answer should be construed as a motion to dismiss

conceding all allegations of the complaint.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) allows dismissal for “failure of the

plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order

of court . . . .” A federal district court has the inherent

power to dismiss a case sua sponte under Rule 41(b). Link v.

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Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-32 (1962). Dismissal is also

authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f) (dismissal appropriate “[i]f

a party . . . fails to obey a scheduling order or pretrial

order”); and E. D. Cal. L. R. 11-110 (“Failure of . . . a party

to comply with these Rules or with any order of the Court may be

grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions

authorized by statute or Rule or within the inherent power of the

court”).

Plaintiff’s pro se status does not derogate this authority. 

“Any individual representing himself or herself without an

attorney is bound by the Federal Rules of Civil or Criminal

Procedure and by these Local Rules. Failure to comply therewith

may be ground for dismissal, judgment by default, or any other

sanction appropriate under these Rules.” E. D. Cal. L. R. 83-

183. 

Dismissal, however, is a harsh penalty and should only be

imposed in extreme circumstances. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963

F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992). In determining whether to

dismiss a case under Rule 41(b), district courts must weigh five

factors: “(1) the public interest in expeditious resolution of

litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its docket; (3) the

risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy

favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the

availability of less drastic sanctions.” Malone v. United States

Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (failure to

comply with court order); Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421,

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1423 (9th Cir. 1986) (failure to prosecute). Dismissal is proper

when at least four factors support dismissal or where at least

three factors “strongly” support dismissal. See Hernandez v.

City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The first two factors weigh strongly in favor of dismissal. 

Plaintiff’s previous failures in complying with this court’s

directives, her failure to file a joint status report, and her

untimely and entirely meritless motion for summary judgment

indicate plaintiff would continue to disobey judicial

instructions (e.g., a scheduling order) if given the opportunity. 

Plaintiff’s actions have impeded, and by all indications would

continue to impede, ordered resolution of this case. 

Dismissal is also strongly warranted under the third factor. 

Plaintiff’s failure to cooperate and dilatory conduct prejudice

Shaw. Despite Shaw’s timely answer in this matter, the case has

languished for two and one-half years. “Unreasonable delay

creates a presumption of injury to the defense.” Henderson, 779

F.2d at 1423. 

The fourth factor generally weighs against dismissal based

on the strong public policy favoring resolution of claims on

their merits. Dahl v. City of Huntington Beach, 84 F.3d 363, 366

(9th Cir. 1996). In this case, however, plaintiff’s own actions

have defeated resolution of her claims on whatever unlikely merit

they may have considering the infirmity of her claims against

other defendants. See Valley Engineers, Inc., v. Electrical

Engineering, 158 F.3d 1051, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 1998). Thus, this

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factor is outweighed by the factors supporting dismissal. 

The fifth factor, availability of less drastic sanctions,

also weighs strongly in favor of dismissal. The court accorded

plaintiff the opportunity to continue prosecuting her case, which

she ignored. Monetary sanctions are infeasible; excluding claims

or disallowing evidence are similarly inappropriate. 

Accordingly, I recommend plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment be denied and this action be dismissed pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 41(b). 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the

Honorable David F. Levi, the United States District Judge

assigned to this case. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Written

objections may be filed within ten days after being served with

these findings and recommendations. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

Recommendations.” The failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: May 18, 2005. 

 /s/ Peter A. Nowinski 

 PETER A. NOWINSKI

 Magistrate Judge

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