Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_03-cv-00297/USCOURTS-azd-4_03-cv-00297-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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1

 This case was originally referred to Magistrate Judge Carruth. (Doc. No. 5.) 

Upon Judge Carruth's retirement, the case was re-referred to Magistrate Judge Guerin.

(Doc. No. 37.) 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Astrid L. Dobek, et al.

Plaintiffs,

vs.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., a Delaware

Corporation,

Defendant. ___________________________________

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No. CV03-297- TUC-FRZ (JCG)

REPORT 

& RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Defendant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.'s ("Walmart")

Motion for Summary Judgment on Loss of Consortium Claims of Astrid Dobek's

Children filed on January 26, 2007. (Doc. No. 81.) Defendant moves for summary

judgment on a loss of consortium claim filed by Plaintiffs John Luke Dobek, Alisa

Haverty and Bonnie Haverty ("Plaintiffs"). Plaintiffs filed a response on March 5,

2007 (Doc. No. 84) and Defendant timely replied. (Doc. No.88.) 

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice in this Court, the matter was referred to

Magistrate Judge Guerin for a report and recommendation.1

 On May 2, 2007, a

hearing on the Motion was held before Judge Guerin. The Magistrate Judge

recommends that the District Court, after its independent review of the record, enter

an order denying Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

Case 4:03-cv-00297-FRZ Document 99 Filed 05/16/07 Page 1 of 9
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2

 Defendant's Separate Statement of Facts in Support of Its Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 82) is abbreviated herein as "DSOF," the portion of Plaintiff's

Amended Separate Statement of Facts in Support of Opposition to Defendant's Motion

for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 95) that responds to Defendant's Statement of Facts is

abbreviated herein as "PSOF" and the portion of Plaintiff's Amended Separate Statement

of Facts in Support of Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

No. 95) that alleges additional facts is abbreviated herein as "PSSOF."

3

 On April 26, 2007, Defendant filed a Motion to Strike unsigned affidavits from

Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts. (Doc. No. 93.) Plaintiffs filed a response to the Motion to

Strike; Defendant did not file a reply. By separate order, this Court denied in part and

granted in part Defendant's Motion to Strike. The affidavits contested by the Motion to

Strike are not relied upon in this Report and Recommendation. 

Page 2 of 9

Factual and Procedural Background

Astrid Dobek, the Plaintiffs' mother, was injured when a wooden pallet struck

her leg while she was shopping in Wal-Mart on November 21, 2001. (DSOF 1; PSOF

1.)2

 Plaintiffs allege that she now suffers from Reflex Sympathetic Dystrophy

(Complex Regional Pain Syndrome) of her right lower extremity. (PSSOF 12.) The

condition has spread from her right lower extremity to her left, and she has become

progressively less functional since the accident occurred. (PSSOF 17.) 

On June 6, 2003, Astrid Dobek filed a cause of action against Defendant in

federal court. (Doc. No. 1.) On December 11, 2006, the Court granted a stipulation

by the parties for Astrid Dobek to amend her complaint to add her children as

plaintiffs. (Doc. No. 76.) Plaintiff filed her amended complaint on December 11,

2006. (Doc. No. 77.) On January 26, 2007, Defendant moved for summary judgment

on Plaintiffs' loss of consortium claim.3

Summary Judgment Standard

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence and

all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing

the motion. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Eisenberg

v. Insurance Co. of North America, 815 F.2d 1285, 1289 (9th Cir. 1987). 

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Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings and supporting documents

“show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Material facts are those “that might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A genuine

issue exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the nonmoving party.” Id. 

 A party moving for summary judgment initially must demonstrate the absence

of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The moving party

merely needs to point out to the Court the absence of evidence supporting its

opponent’s claim; it does not need to disprove its opponent’s claim. Id.; see also Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c).

If a moving party has made this showing, the nonmoving party “may not rest

upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading, but . . . must set

forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e). See also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53

F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995). The nonmoving party may not “replace conclusory

allegations of the complaint or answer with conclusory allegations of an affidavit.”

Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990). 

Discussion

 There are no disputed issues of material fact for purposes of this Motion.

The parties dispute whether Plaintiffs can make the threshold showing necessary to

state a claim for parental loss of consortium and, more specifically, the parties dispute

what the law requires to establish the claim. Defendant contends that Plaintiffs must

prove that the parent-child relationship has been destroyed or nearly destroyed.

Plaintiffs assert that the correct standard is a lower standard - whether the parent's

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4

 The Court has diversity jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1332, and therefore the Court applies the substantive law of Arizona, the forum state. 

See Medical Laboratory Management Consultants v. American Broadcasting, 306 F.3d

806, 812 (9th Cir. 2002).

Page 4 of 9

injuries are severe enough to cause a "significant interference" in the parent-child

relationship. Both parties agree that only after a plaintiff satisfies the judge that the

plaintiff's injuries meet the threshold standard, is the claim submitted to the trier of

fact to determine the degree of interference and the amount recoverable. 

1. The Applicable Standard

This Court agrees with the Plaintiffs' reading of the applicable law4

 and

concludes that, under Arizona law, a cause of action for parental loss of consortium

exists when a parent suffers a severe, permanent, and disabling injury that

substantially interferes with the parent's capacity to interact with his children in a

normally gratifying way. Pierce v. Casas Adobes Baptist Church, 162 Ariz. 269, 272,

782 P.2d 1162, 1165 (1989) (citing Villareal v. State, Dept. of Transp., 160 Ariz. 474,

480, 774 P.2d 213, 219 (1989)). Evidence of a significant interference in the

parent-child relationship must exist; however, the injury need not be the functional

equivalent of death or even be categorized as "catastrophic." Id. 

Defendant argues that the Court cannot consider the legal standard set forth in

Pierce because Pierce applies only to filial loss of consortium claims, ie. claims by

parents for loss of a child's consortium. According to Defendant, Villareal sets forth

a separate and "extremely high threshold" for claims brought by children for loss of

a parent's consortium: the parent's mental or physical impairment must be so

overwhelming and severe that the parent-child relationship is destroyed or nearly

destroyed. See Villareal, 160 Ariz. at 480, 774 P.2d at 219. The Court finds this

argument unpersuasive and concludes that Arizona case law does not support the

distinction suggested by Defendant. Villareal does set forth the standard urged by the

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Defendant. Villareal, however, is part of an evolving line of cases analyzing the loss

of consortium cause of action in Arizona. 

Villareal was the first Arizona Supreme Court case to recognize a cause of

action by a child for loss of a parent's consortium. In Villareal, the court noted that

the Arizona courts had been chipping away at its previous 1954 decision holding that

neither a wife nor a minor child had a separate cause of action for damages resulting

from the negligent injury of the husband and father. 160 Ariz. at 477, 774 P.2d at 216

(citing Jeune v. Del E. Webb Constr. Co., 77 Ariz. 226, 269 P.2d 723 (1954)). In

overruling Jeune, the court stated, "When we find that the common law or 'judgemade law' is unjust or out of step with the times, we have no reluctance to change it."

Id. (citations omitted). The court noted that the court of appeals had recognized a

cause of action for parents' loss of an injured minor child's consortium, id. (citing

Ruben v. Ely, 146 Ariz. 390, 705 P.2d 1360 (Ct.App.1985) and that the Supreme

Court had extended that ruling by allowing parents to recover for loss of an adult

child's consortium. Id. (citing Frank v. Superior Court, 150 Ariz. 228, 722 P.2d 955

(1986). In recognizing a child's claim for loss of consortium of his parent, the

Villareal Court specifically recognized the value of a child's relationship with a

parent, and stated: 

We believe that children have a right to enjoy a mutually beneficial

relationship with their parents. The loss of a parent's love, care,

companionship and guidance can severely impact a child's development

and have a major influence on a child's welfare and personality

throughout life. Because every individual's character and disposition

impact on society, it is of highest importance to the child and society

that we protect the right to receive the benefits derived from the

parental relationship.

160 Ariz. at 478, 774 P.2d at 217. 

Just months after the Villareal decision, the Arizona Supreme Court, in an

opinion authored by the same Justice who wrote Villareal, issued its ruling in Pierce,

which considered "plaintiff's petition for review regarding the test that must be

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5

Before announcing the standard for loss of consortium claims, the Pierce court

noted that Reben, Frank, and Villareal, had all involved a severe and permanent injury

that had reduced the individual's ability to exchange love, affection, companionship,

comfort, care and society. The court specifically noted that other jurisdictions had also

recognized loss of consortium claims in situations where the injuries did not so severely

damage the parent-child relationship. 162 Ariz. at 272, 782 P.2d at 1165 (citations

omitted). Notably, in this discussion, the Pierce court did not distinguish loss of

consortium claims brought by parents from those brought by children. 

Page 6 of 9

satisfied before parents may maintain a cause of action for loss of a child's

consortium." Pierce, 162 Ariz. at 270, 782 P.2d at 1163. The Pierce decision

regarded claims for loss of consortium by a parent as analogous to claims for loss of

consortium by children. In setting forth the legal standard for a loss of consortium

claim by a parent, the Pierce court specifically referenced Villareal; the Pierce court

stated that it was operating "within the guidelines established in Reben, Frank, and

Villareal," and in fact cited specifically and exclusively to Villareal in holding that

"parents may maintain a cause of action for loss of their child's consortium when the

child suffers a severe, permanent, and disabling injury that substantially interferes

with the child's capacity to interact with his parents in a normally gratifying way."

162 Ariz. at 272, 782 P.2d at 1165.5

 

In setting forth the standard by which to judge loss of consortium claims, the

court concluded that although evidence of a significant interference in the parent-child

relationship must exist, the injury need not be catastrophic to permit recovery. Id. 

The court held: "[P]arents may maintain a cause of action for loss of their child's

consortium when the child suffers a severe, permanent and disabling injury rendering

the child unable to exchange love, affection, care, comfort, companionship and

society in a normally gratifying way." 162 Ariz. at 273, 782 P.2d at 1166.

Thus, it appears that Arizona courts treat loss of consortium claims as one body

of law, regardless of whether the plaintiff is a child or a parent. See Barnes v. Outlaw,

192 Ariz. 283, 284-85, 964 P.2d 484, 485-86 (1998) (noting that the focus of the loss

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6

 The Court is aware of only two Arizona cases addressing whether injuries are

"sufficiently severe" enough to withstand a motion for summary judgment on a loss of

consortium claim – Miller v. Westcor Ltd. Partnership 171 Ariz. 387, 395, 831 P.2d

386, 394 (App. 1991) and Barnes v. Outlaw, 192 Ariz. 283, 284-85, 964 P.2d 484,

485-86 (1998) – and the parties did not provide any legal citation on this issue. 

Plaintiffs did not analogize Astrid Dobek's injuries to the injuries in other Arizona

loss of consortium cases, and in its moving papers, Defendant only analyzed Astrid

Dobek's injuries under the legal standard set forth in Villareal. 

Page 7 of 9

of consortium cause of action has shifted over time from a property right in the

services of another to the intangible values of a relationship, such as companionship

and affection, and summarizing the evolution from Jeune to Villareal). There does

not appear to be any basis in the Arizona court's holdings or reasoning for concluding

that children claiming the lost consortium of a parent must satisfy a different and more

stringent legal standard than parents claiming the lost consortium of a child. As set

forth in Villareal and Pierce, the policies underlying the recognition of parental loss

of consortium claims do not permit such a distinction. The parent-child relationship

is acknowledged to be "mutually" valuable, whether the loss in that relationship be

to the parent or to the child. Accordingly, this Court concludes that under Arizona

law, Plaintiffs' loss of consortium claims should be considered in light of the standard

set forth in Pierce. Under that standard, in order to survive summary judgment,

Plaintiffs must demonstrate that Astrid Dobek's injuries are "sufficiently severe"

enough to warrant a cause of action for loss of consortium.

2. Astrid Dobek's injuries are "sufficiently severe" enough for Plaintiffs'

to survive summary judgment

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the Court

finds that Astrid Dobek's injuries are "sufficiently severe" enough for the jury to

determine whether Plaintiffs are entitled to prevail on their loss of consortium claim.6

Plaintiffs presented evidence that Astrid Dobek suffers a severe, permanent and

disabling injury. Astrid requires significant help from her children and others in order

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to carry out the activities of daily living such as yard work, cleaning, grocery

shopping, running errands, cooking, etc. (PSSOF 5, 8, 9, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 50.)

When her condition is "flared" she cannot tolerate performing any activities of daily

living and instead must spend the day in bed. (PSSOF 42, 44.) She uses a motorized

wheelchair in order to get out of the house and accomplish certain tasks. (PSSOF 19.)

She can no longer engage in sporting activities with her children, go for walks or

hikes, or go to shopping malls as often or for as long as she did in the past. (PSSOF

2, 3, 6, 7.) Her physical limitations have reduced the quantity and quality of her time

with her children. 

Astrid Dobek's condition has caused her significant pain and she has become

"profoundly" depressed. (PSSOF 24.) See Miller v. Westcor Ltd. Partnership 171

Ariz. 387, 395, 831 P.2d 386, 394 (App. 1991) (holding that parents were entitled to

take loss of consortium claim to the jury where their severely-burned daughter "will

experience self-image problems [and b]ecause of her self-image problems . . . may not

develop the intellectual and social potential of a person without severe burns). Her

medications affect her ability to perform activities of daily living and are known to

have consciousness-clouding side effects. (PSSOF 52, 53, 54, 55, 56.) She suffers

from a diminished cognitive ability and memory problems. (PSSOF 52-54.) She

feels that she is a burden to her children and of little use to them. (PSSOF 34, 48.) In

July, 2006, Astrid Dobek attempted suicide. (PSSOF 48.) See Barnes, 192 Ariz. at

286, 964 P.2d at 487 (holding that defendants were not entitled to judgment as a

matter of law on plaintiff's loss of consortium claim stemming from her spouse's

purely emotional injuries). 

Recommendation

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends the District

Court, after its independent review of the record, enter an order DENYING Defendant

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Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.'s ("Walmart") Motion for Summary Judgment on Loss of

Consortium Claims of Astrid Dobek's Children filed on January 26, 2007 (Doc. No.

81).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written objections

within 10 days of being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. Any

objections filed should use the following case number: CV03-297- TUC-FRZ. If

objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived.

DATED this 15th day of May, 2007.

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