Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_15-cv-00235/USCOURTS-alnd-2_15-cv-00235-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SHEILA SANDERS,

 Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

 Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case Number: 2:15-cv-00235-JHE

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

Plaintiff Sheila Sanders (“Sanders”) seeks review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), § 

205(g) of the Social Security Act, of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security 

Administration (“Commissioner”), denying her application for a period of disability and 

disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). (Doc. 1). Sanders timely pursued and exhausted her 

administrative remedies. This case is therefore ripe for review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The 

undersigned has carefully considered the record and, for the reasons stated below, the 

Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.

I. Factual and Procedural History

Sanders filed her application for a period of disability and DIB in June 2011, alleging she 

became unable to work beginning May 13, 2009. (Tr. 141). Sanders was a forty-eight year old 

female on May 1, 2013, her date of hearing. (Tr. 27). Sanders has at least a high school 

education and past relevant work as a materials handler. (Tr. 16, 62-63, 181-184). The Agency 

 

1

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 73, the parties have voluntarily consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge 

conduct any and all proceedings, including trial and the entry of final judgment. (Doc. 10).

FILED

 2016 Sep-23 PM 02:38

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:15-cv-00235-JHE Document 14 Filed 09/23/16 Page 1 of 12
2

initially denied Sanders’ application, and Sanders requested a hearing where she appeared in 

May 2013. (Tr. 31-51). After the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denied 

Sanders’ claim on August 1, 2013. (Tr. 9-18). Sanders sought review by the Appeals Council, 

but it declined her request on December 9, 2014. (Tr. 1-4). On that date, the ALJ’s decision 

became the final decision of the Commissioner. On July 16, 2015, Sanders initiated this action. 

(See doc. 11).

II. Standard of Review2

The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is narrowly circumscribed. The 

function of this Court is to determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by 

substantial evidence and whether proper legal standards were applied. Richardson v. Perales, 

402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). This Court 

must “scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and 

supported by substantial evidence.” Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 

1983). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. It is “more than a scintilla, but less than a 

preponderance.” Id.

This Court must uphold factual findings supported by substantial evidence. However, it 

reviews the ALJ’s legal conclusions de novo because no presumption of validity attaches to the 

ALJ’s determination of the proper legal standards to be applied. Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 

531 (11th Cir. 1993). If the court finds an error in the ALJ’s application of the law, or if the ALJ 

 

2

In general, the legal standards applied are the same whether a claimant seeks DIB or 

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). However, separate, parallel statutes and regulations 

exist for DIB and SSI claims. Therefore, citations in this opinion should be considered to refer to 

the appropriate parallel provision as context dictates. The same applies to citations for statutes or 

regulations found in quoted court decisions. 

Case 2:15-cv-00235-JHE Document 14 Filed 09/23/16 Page 2 of 12
3

fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning for determining the proper legal analysis has 

been conducted, it must reverse the ALJ’s decision. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-

46 (11th Cir. 1991). 

III. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

To qualify for disability benefits and establish his or her entitlement for a period of 

disability, a claimant must be disabled as defined by the Social Security Act and the Regulations 

promulgated thereunder.3The Regulations define “disabled” as “the inability to do any 

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to 

last for a continuous period of not less than twelve (12) months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). To 

establish entitlement to disability benefits, a claimant must provide evidence of a “physical or 

mental impairment” which “must result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological 

abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic 

techniques.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508.

The Regulations provide a five-step process for determining whether a claimant is 

disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v). The Commissioner must determine in sequence:

(1) whether the claimant is currently employed;

(2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; 

(3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals an impairment listed

by the [Commissioner];

(4) whether the claimant can perform his or her past work; and

(5) whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the national

economy.

Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing to the formerly applicable C.F.R. 

section), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 562-63 (7th Cir. 1999); 

 

3

The “Regulations” promulgated under the Social Security Act are listed in 20 C.F.R. 

Parts 400 to 499. 

Case 2:15-cv-00235-JHE Document 14 Filed 09/23/16 Page 3 of 12
4

accord McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). “Once the claimant has 

satisfied steps One and Two, she will automatically be found disabled if she suffers from a listed 

impairment. If the claimant does not have a listed impairment but cannot perform her work, the 

burden shifts to the [Commissioner] to show that the claimant can perform some other job.” 

Pope, 998 F.2d at 477; accord Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995). The 

Commissioner must further show such work exists in the national economy in significant 

numbers. Id.

IV. Findings of the Administrative Law Judge

After consideration of the entire record and application of the sequential evaluation 

process, the ALJ made the following findings:

At Step One, the ALJ found Sanders last met the insured status requirements of the Social 

Security Act on December 31, 2014 (her date last insured or “DLI”), and that Sanders had not 

engaged in substantial gainful activity from her alleged onset date of May 13, 2009, through her 

DLI. (Tr. 11). At Step Two, the ALJ found Sanders has the following severe impairments: 

hypertension; chronic kidney disease, stage 2; obesity; lumbar and cervical degenerative disc 

disease; cervical radiculopathy; headaches; and right foot plantar fasciitis (20 CFR 404.1520(c) 

and 416.920(c)). (Tr. 11). At Step Three, the ALJ found Sanders did not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 

C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 12).

Before proceeding to Step Four, the ALJ determined Sanders’ residual functioning 

capacity (“RFC”), which is the most a claimant can do despite her impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1545(a)(1). The ALJ determined that, through her DLI, Sanders had the RFC to perform 

sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(a), except Sanders can push and pull with the 

Case 2:15-cv-00235-JHE Document 14 Filed 09/23/16 Page 4 of 12
5

upper and lower extremities bilaterally frequently; can frequently climb ramps and stairs and 

balance; can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; can occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and 

crawl; can frequently reach overhead on the left side; can handle and finger frequently 

bilaterally; can have occasional exposure to extreme heat and cold, and should have no more 

than occasional exposure to unprotected heights and hazardous, moving machinery. (Tr. 12-16).

At Step Four, the ALJ determined, through the date last insured, Sanders is unable to perform 

any past relevant work. (Tr. 16). At Step Five, the ALJ determined, based on Sanders’s age, 

education, work experience, and RFC, jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy 

Sanders could perform, including cashier, surveillance system monitor, and document preparer. 

(Tr. 17). Therefore, the ALJ determined Sanders has not been under a disability and denied 

Sanders’s claim. (Tr. 18).

V. Analysis

Although the court may only reverse a finding of the Commissioner if it is not supported 

by substantial evidence or if improper legal standards were applied, “[t]his does not relieve the 

court of its responsibility to scrutinize the record in its entirety to ascertain whether substantial 

evidence supports each essential administrative finding.” Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 

838 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Strickland v. Harris, 615 F.2d 1103, 1106 (5th Cir. 1980)). The 

court, however, “abstains from reweighing the evidence or substituting its own judgment for that 

of the [Commissioner].” Id. (citation omitted).

Sanders contends the ALJ did not properly assess the credibility of her testimony

consistent with the Eleventh Circuit Pain Standard. (Doc. 11 at 5). When a claimant attempts to 

establish disability based on subjective complaints, including pain, she must provide evidence of 

an underlying medical condition and either objective medical evidence confirming the severity of 

Case 2:15-cv-00235-JHE Document 14 Filed 09/23/16 Page 5 of 12
6

the alleged symptoms or that the medical condition could be reasonably expected to give rise to 

the alleged symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929; SSR 96-7p, 1996-374186. If the 

claimant establishes she has an impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce her 

alleged symptoms, then the intensity and persistence of her alleged symptoms and their effect on 

her work must be evaluated. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(1), 416.929(c)(1). 

When evaluating the credibility of a claimant’s statements regarding the intensity, 

persistence, or limiting effects of her symptoms, the ALJ considers all evidence, objective and 

subjective. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929; SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 364186 at * 4-5. The 

ALJ may consider the nature of a claimant’s symptoms, the effectiveness of medication, a 

claimant’s method of treatment, a claimant’s activities, and any conflicts between a claimant’s 

statements and the rest of the evidence. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), (4), 416.929(c)(3), (4); 

SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 364186 at * 4-8. If an ALJ discredits a claimant’s subjective complaints, 

“he must articulate explicit and adequate reasons for doing so.” Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002). “[I]f a credibility determination is inadequate, a remand 

to the agency for further consideration is the proper remedy.” Carpenter v. Astrue, No. 8:10-

CV-290-T-TGW, 2011 WL 767652 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 2011). See also Lawton v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 431 F. App’x 830, 835 (11th Cir. 2011) (retreating from MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 

F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986), based on the prior precedent rule, and remanding to the 

agency). After considering the evidence presented, the ALJ found Sanders’s impairments could 

cause the alleged symptoms; however, the ALJ found her statements were not credible. 

(Tr. 13-16).

Sanders takes issue with the ALJ’s determination her complaints of debilitating back pain 

were not credible, his interpretation of her daily activities, and his finding she made inconsistent 

Case 2:15-cv-00235-JHE Document 14 Filed 09/23/16 Page 6 of 12
7

statements relating to her disability. (Doc. 11 at 7-10).

Sanders begins by citing the ALJ’s conclusions that low back pain and lumbar and 

cervical radiculopathy limited her ability to reach, handle, and finger and prevented her from 

doing anything beyond sedentary work, and describes those conclusions as “basically f[inding] 

the Plaintiff’s medical history is inconsistent with her allegations of disability.” (Id. at 6). She 

then cites her “longitudinal history of complaints of and treatment for her chronic moderately 

severe back pain” and summarizes that history, concluding “[t]he ALJ erred in refusing to 

properly credit the objective medical evidence and treatment notes when finding the Plaintiff was 

capable of sedentary work.” (Id. at 6-8). However, while a longitudinal history will “generally 

lend support to an individual’s allegations,” SSR 96-7P, 1996 WL 374186 at *7 (S.S.A. July 2, 

1996), it is certainly not dispositive of the issue, especially where there is also substantial 

evidence in the record undermining credibility. Similarly, although the existence of objective 

medical diagnoses can support her complaints, they are not themselves indicative of disabling 

pain or inability to work. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1213 n.6 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he 

mere existence of these impairments does not reveal the extent to which they limit her ability to 

work or undermine the ALJ’s determination in that regard”). The ALJ looked at all of the same 

objective evidence Sanders cites and, considering the other subjective evidence in light of the 

evidence regarding credibility, concluded she was limited to sedentary work with other specific 

limitations, instead of totally disabled. (Tr. 14-15).4 Sanders cannot establish error merely by 

citing the same evidence and stating a different conclusion.

Next, contrary to Sanders’s implication, the ALJ can rely on inconsistencies between 

 

4

The medical evidence also supports a finding of obesity, which the ALJ considered in 

his decision and noted can exacerbate subjective complaints of pain. (Tr. 14). The ALJ 

explicitly considered her obesity in limiting her work to the sedentary level of exertion. (Id.).

Case 2:15-cv-00235-JHE Document 14 Filed 09/23/16 Page 7 of 12
8

Sanders’s reported activities of daily living and her complaints of disabling pain as evidence of 

her lack of credibility. See Hughes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F. App’x 11, 14-16 (11th Cir. 

2012) (finding the ALJ’s credibility articulation adequate based in part on the contrast between 

her statements of extreme limitation and her less limited activities of daily living). Sanders’s 

contrary citations do not indicate otherwise. In Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436 (11th Cir. 

1997), the court found the “everyday activities of short duration” did not disqualify the claimant 

from disability and were not “inconsistent with the limitations recommended by [the claimant]’s 

treating physicians.” Id. at 1441. Nothing in Lewis prevents an ALJ from finding such 

inconsistencies between the everyday activities and limitations suggested by the claimant or her 

doctors. See Hughes, 486 F. App’x at 14-16. But see Horton v. Barnhart, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 

1047 (N.D. Ala. 2006) (reversing the ALJ after noting his reliance on the claimant’s activities 

but failure to acknowledge her limiting descriptions of them). While the discrepancies are not 

dispositive of disability, their inconsistency with subjective statements may indicate Sanders’s 

pain is not as limiting as she has alleged.

The question is whether the cited activities are truly inconsistent with the claimed 

disability. In a short paragraph, the ALJ noted Sanders’s reports of daily activities at the hearing 

and in her function report. (Tr. 15-16). In that evidence, Sanders reported she was able to cook 

simple meals (between two and eighteen minutes at a time), shop for groceries for an hour or two

twice a month, drive, fold and put away laundry once a month, take care of her personal care and 

hygiene (with help from one of her daughters getting dressed), and care for her disabled daughter 

with cerebral palsy (with help from the other daughter). (Tr. 53-54, 56, 174-76). It is not clear 

how these are inconsistent with her claims of needing to rest for six hours during the day or 

regularly (but not constantly) having extreme pain that would prevent her from maintaining 

Case 2:15-cv-00235-JHE Document 14 Filed 09/23/16 Page 8 of 12
9

employment. The cited evidence does not support the ALJ’s finding of inconsistency. See

Horton, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 1047.

However, the ALJ did not err by voicing his concern over Sanders’s inconsistent 

statements about her back condition. The ALJ may consider any conflicts or inconsistencies 

between a claimant’s testimony and the rest of the evidence. See 20 C.F.R. §404.1529(c)(4), 

416.929(c)(4). During an examination with Dr. William Meador, Sanders stated she was using a 

wheelchair for six months after the 2008 fall to complete daily activities. (Tr. 16, 260). 

However, in 2008, Sanders denied any ambulatory problems to Dr. Vrocher after the work place 

fall. (Tr. 198). When questioned about it at her ALJ hearing, Sanders retracted the wheelchair 

statement and testified she used only a motorized cart while grocery shopping. (Tr. 16, 55). 

Sanders contends the ALJ did not properly consider her “clear explanation” of the discrepancy, 

(doc. 11 at 10), but the ALJ explicitly considered her explanation and found that, even if the 

inconsistent information were not intentionally misleading, it suggested “that the information 

provided by the claimant generally may not be entirely reliable,” (tr. 16). The ALJ properly 

considered Sanders’s inconsistent statements and her explanation when determining her 

credibility.

Regardless, even though Sanders’s challenges to the ALJ’s decision do not establish 

grounds for reversal or remand, the Court must still consider whether there is substantial 

evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusions.5 The undersigned finds there is.

First, the ALJ found the records did not support Sanders’s allegations of debilitating 

 

5

Sanders also briefly states the ALJ “failed to fully and fairly develop the record, but she

does not further develop the argument beyond that single sentence. (Doc. 11 at 10). It is unclear 

what issue is underdeveloped or where there are unfair holes in the record. Having offered no 

argument to clarify the issue, she has abandoned this claim. See Hutchinson v. Astrue, 408 F. 

App’x 324, 326 n.1 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Davis v. Jones, 506 F.3d 1325, 1330 n.8 (11th Cir. 

2007)).

Case 2:15-cv-00235-JHE Document 14 Filed 09/23/16 Page 9 of 12
10

headaches four times a month. (Tr. 15). Although he acknowledged she had complained of 

headaches to her doctors, he noted it was “off and on since approximately 2007,” they were 

treated with over-the-counter medication, and, despite alleging her headaches were a nine out of 

ten on the pain scale four times a month, she did not mention them to Dr. Meador during her 

disability examination. (Id.) (citing tr. 227-63).

Regarding her back pain, the evidence shows the claimant initially complained of lower 

back pain after a work-related fall in January of 2008. (Tr. 14, 198-199). A magnetic resonance 

imaging (MRI) revealed a large right-sided L5-S1 disc herniation, and Sanders received epidural 

pain blocks to treat the pain. (Tr. 209-212). In February 2009, Sanders was involved in a motor 

vehicle accident. (Tr. 14-15, 217). Sanders’s x-rays showed no fracture and normal alignment

and soft tissues. (Tr. 14-15, 218). In April 2009, Sanders obtained an MRI revealing suspicions 

of a small disc herniation at C5-C6 with very minimal disc bulging noted at C4-C5 and C6-C7. 

(Tr. 14, 226). In October 2009, Sanders visited the emergency room with a complaint of fever. 

(Tr. 247). Dr. Mosier found that Sanders had lower back pain, yet Sanders had a full range of 

motion and straight leg raises were normal. (Tr. 247-49). In February 2010, Sanders visited 

Dr. Martin Bohnenkamp for a check-up but made no mention of her back condition. (Tr. 245). 

In October 2011, in connection with Sanders’s application for disability, she submitted to 

a physical examination. (Tr. 15, 259-63). Sanders complained of spurs in her neck and lower 

back pain. (Tr. 15, 259). She had normal muscle strength except for a 4/5 in her right 

quadriceps. (Tr. 15, 262). She had tenderness to palpation the lumbar spine and positive straight 

leg raise on her right leg with tingling in her right foot. (Tr. 262). Sanders was diagnosed with 

low back pain, lumbar radiculopathy, and cervical radiculopathy by the attending physician, Dr. 

Meador. (Tr. 263). Because of Sanders’s cervical radiculopathy, the ALJ recognized limitations 

Case 2:15-cv-00235-JHE Document 14 Filed 09/23/16 Page 10 of 12
11

in Sanders’s ability to reach, handle, and finger in her residual functional capacity. (Tr. 15). The 

ALJ also acknowledged the consistency in Sanders’s complaints and found Sanders exertion to 

be limited to the sedentary level. (Id.). 

With respect to Sanders’s hypertension, she was diagnosed in 2007 and has been taking 

medicine for it since. (Tr. 234, 237, 242). While taking her medicine, Sanders’s hypertension is 

well controlled. (Tr. 239, 242, 245). As a result, the ALJ found Sanders capable of having 

occasional exposure to unprotected heights and hazardous, moving machinery but can never 

climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. (Tr. 14). 

In relation to Sanders chronic kidney disease, the evidence demonstrates Sanders’s had 

stage four kidney disease in February of 2010. (Tr. 30, 245). However, by February of 2011, 

Sanders’s kidney disease digressed to stage three. (Tr. 30, 227). Furthermore, in November of 

2012, Sanders’s kidney disease was stated to be stage two and “stable.” (Tr. 30, 239, 242, 

265-67). At the hearing, Sanders only complained the kidney disease made her tired and need to 

go the bathroom more often. (Tr. 40). The ALJ considered these impairments in finding

Sanders capable of sedentary level exertion. (Tr. 14).

Considering the record as a whole, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings. 

VI. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, and upon careful consideration of the administrative 

record and memoranda of the parties, the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

denying Sanders’s claim for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits is 

AFFIRMED and this action DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Case 2:15-cv-00235-JHE Document 14 Filed 09/23/16 Page 11 of 12
12

DONE this 23rd day of September, 2016.

_______________________________

JOHN H. ENGLAND, III

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:15-cv-00235-JHE Document 14 Filed 09/23/16 Page 12 of 12