Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03738/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03738-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 15-3738 

KEVIN W. CULP, et al., 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v.

LISA MADIGAN, in her official capacity as Attorney General of 

Illinois, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Central District of Illinois. 

No. 3:14-CV-03320 — Sue E. Myerscough, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 22, 2016 — DECIDED OCTOBER 20, 2016 

____________________ 

 Before BAUER, POSNER, and MANION, Circuit Judges. 

 POSNER, Circuit Judge. Illinois’ Concealed Carry Act, 430 

ILCS 66/1 et seq., authorizes an Illinois resident to carry, on 

his person or next to him in a car, a loaded or unloaded firearm as long as it is fully or partially concealed and he (or 

she) meets the qualifications set forth in the Act. We held in 

Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012), that the Second Amendment entitles qualified persons to carry guns 

Case: 15-3738 Document: 39 Filed: 10/20/2016 Pages: 22
2 No. 15-3738 

outside the home; just a few months ago we said that “the 

constitutional right to ‘keep and bear’ arms means that states 

must permit law-abiding and mentally healthy persons to 

carry loaded weapons in public.” Berron v. Illinois Concealed 

Carry Licensing Review Bd., 825 F.3d 843, 845 (2016). But 

“qualified,” “law-abiding,” and “mentally healthy” are significant limitations on the right of concealed carry. 

 The qualifications in the Act are numerous but to decide 

this case we need consider only a few of them: that the applicant for a concealed-carry license not present a clear and 

present danger to himself or others or a threat to public safety and not in the last five years have been a patient in a mental hospital, or been convicted of a misdemeanor involving 

the use or threat of physical force or violence, or been in a 

residential or court-ordered drug or alcohol treatment program, or have committed two or more violations involving 

driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or be subject 

to a legal proceeding that could lead to being disqualified to 

possess a gun. 430 ILCS 66/25, 65/4(a)(2)(iv). 

 In compliance with Moore v. Madigan, supra, Illinois has 

authorized residents of Illinois who meet the criteria listed 

above to obtain concealed-carry licenses. But what about a 

nonresident of Illinois? Can he or she obtain a right to carry 

a concealed firearm in Illinois? Yes, but only if he resides in a 

state or territory that has “laws related to firearm ownership, 

possession, and carrying, that are substantially similar to the 

requirements to obtain” an Illinois concealed-carry license, 

and submits a notarized statement confirming that he is eligible under both federal law and the laws of his home state 

to own a gun and licensed by that state to carry a gun. 430 

ILCS 66/40(b), 66/40(c)(2). A state’s gun laws are deemed 

Case: 15-3738 Document: 39 Filed: 10/20/2016 Pages: 22
No. 15-3738 3 

“substantially similar” to Illinois’ if the state does the following four things: 

1. “regulates who may carry firearms, concealed or otherwise, in public;” 

2. “prohibits all who have involuntary mental health 

admissions, and those with voluntary admissions 

within the past 5 years, from carrying firearms, concealed or otherwise, in public;” 

3. “reports denied persons to NICS [National Instant 

Criminal Background Check System];” and 

4. “participates in reporting persons authorized to carry 

firearms, concealed or otherwise, in public through 

NLETs [National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System].” 

20 Ill. Admin. Code 1231.10. As we’ll see, these four requirements are not imposed in order to punish nonresidents 

because of where they live or because Illinois disapproves of 

other states’ gun regimes. The sole purpose is to protect Illinois residents. The Illinois State Police determines which 

states make the cut by conducting a fifty-state survey and 

posting the results on its website. 20 Ill. Admin. Code 

1231.110(b), (c). Currently only Hawaii, New Mexico, South 

Carolina, and Virginia qualify as “substantially similar” in 

the relevant respects to Illinois. Illinois State Police Firearm 

Services Bureau, “Frequently Asked Questions: How can I 

find out if my state’s laws are considered ‘substantially similar?,’” www.ispfsb.com/Public/Faq.aspx (visited Oct. 19, 

2016). 

Illinois recognizes certain exceptions for citizens of not 

“substantially similar” states. A person who has a firearm 

Case: 15-3738 Document: 39 Filed: 10/20/2016 Pages: 22
4 No. 15-3738 

license from his own state is allowed to carry a firearm in 

Illinois while hunting or at a firing range or on property 

whose owner permits him to carry a gun, 430 ILCS 65/2(a), 

(b), and if he has a concealed-carry license from his state he 

can transport a firearm in his car or other vehicle in Illinois 

as long as he doesn’t remove it from the vehicle. 430 ILCS 

66/40(e). 

 The plaintiffs in this case, nonresidents of Illinois each of 

whom has a concealed-carry license from his home state, 

travel to Illinois whether on business or for family or other 

reasons and want, while they are in Illinois, to be allowed to 

carry a firearm even if they are not within the exceptions to 

the restrictions on nonresident gun carrying just listed, but 

are not allowed to do so because they aren’t residents of 

states that have firearm laws substantially similar to Illinois’. 

They argue that Illinois’ refusal to issue concealed-carry licenses to them violates Article IV of, and the Second and 

Fourteenth Amendments to, the Constitution. The district 

judge declined to issue a preliminary injunction, precipitating this appeal. 

The plaintiffs’ claim to be allowed to carry concealed 

firearms when they are visiting Illinois would be compelling 

if the Illinois authorities could reliably determine whether in 

fact a nonresident applicant for an Illinois concealed-carry 

license had all the qualifications that Illinois, or states that 

have concealed-carry laws substantially similar to Illinois, 

require be met. But while the Illinois state police have ready 

access to information about Illinois residents (mainly about 

whether the applicant for a concealed-carry license has a 

criminal history or a history of mental illness) that is necessary to determine whether an applicant is eligible to obtain 

Case: 15-3738 Document: 39 Filed: 10/20/2016 Pages: 22
No. 15-3738 5 

such a license, they lack reliable access to the information 

they need about the qualifications of nonresident applicants 

other than residents of the four “substantially similar” states. 

 An uncontradicted affidavit from Jessica Trame, the 

chief of the Illinois Firearms Services Bureau, lists information sources that the Bureau relies on in determining 

whether an applicant for a concealed-carry license is eligible. 

They include records of drivers’ licenses and a computerized 

criminal history records system. There is also the federal database of criminal histories mentioned earlier (NLETS) that 

the police can access, but it is incomplete because many 

states submit incomplete information on their arrest and 

prosecution records to the database. And while the Illinois 

Bureau can request information from local jurisdictions (cities, counties, etc.) in other states, those jurisdictions charge 

for the information; and the Bureau claims without contradiction that it lacks the funds required to pay the charges (Illinois state agencies are notoriously underfunded). The Bureau has for example encountered significant difficulties in 

its efforts to obtain mental health information about residents of other states; many of those states don’t track such 

information. 

But it’s not just the initial application process that has Illinois concerned. Illinois needs reliable information in order 

to be able to monitor the holders of gun permits, which are 

good for five years. 430 ILCS 66/50, 66/35. So after issuing a 

concealed carry license Illinois checks its own databases daily and national ones quarterly for updates that might require 

a license to be revoked. But it is unable to obtain updates 

from states that don’t track or report the information. This 

Case: 15-3738 Document: 39 Filed: 10/20/2016 Pages: 22
6 No. 15-3738 

practical need explains all four of the requirements for “substantially similar” gun laws listed above.

 All this said, the plaintiffs do make some apt criticisms 

of the Illinois law. They point out for example that the concealed-carry license of an Illinois resident is not revoked or 

reassessed if he returns from a trip to, or a sojourn in, another state, even though the Illinois authorities will not know 

what he did in that state—whether for example he committed a crime or had a mental breakdown. And anyone who 

lives in Illinois or one of the four substantially similar states 

is eligible to obtain an Illinois concealed-carry license even if 

he had become a resident of such a state recently, having 

spent many years living in dissimilar and therefore nonapproved states, with Illinois (and, presumably, the substantially similar state as well) unable to obtain information 

about his possible criminal or mental problems in those 

states. 

 So the Illinois law regulating the concealed-carry rights 

of nonresidents is imperfect. But we cannot say that it is unreasonable, so imperfect as to justify the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Cf. Moore v. Madigan, supra, at 940. The 

critical problem presented by the plaintiffs’ demand—for 

which they offer no solution—is verification. A nonresident’s application for an Illinois concealed-carry license cannot be taken at face value. The assertions in it must be verified. And Illinois needs to receive reliable updates in order 

to confirm that license-holders remain qualified during the 

five-year term of the license. Yet its ability to verify is extremely limited unless the nonresident lives in one of the 

four states that have concealed-carry laws similar to Illinois’ 

law. A trial in this case may cast the facts in a different light, 

Case: 15-3738 Document: 39 Filed: 10/20/2016 Pages: 22
No. 15-3738 7 

but the plaintiffs have not made a case for a preliminary injunction. 

AFFIRMED

Case: 15-3738 Document: 39 Filed: 10/20/2016 Pages: 22
8 No. 15-3738

MANION, Circuit Judge, dissenting. Just four years ago, this 

court invalidated Illinois’ decades-old blanket ban on the carrying of firearms in public. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th 

Cir. 2012). We recognized that the Second Amendment requires states to “permit law-abiding and mentally healthy 

persons to carry loaded weapons in public.” Berron v. Ill. Concealed Carry Licensing Review Bd., 825 F.3d 843, 845 (7th Cir. 

2016). It was only in response to our decision in Moore that

Illinois finally became the last state in the nation to enact a 

concealed-carry law.

Although Illinois now reluctantly allows its residents to 

carry concealed weapons with a license, it still significantly 

restricts the rights of nonresidents to do so. State law prevents 

the residents of 45 states from even applying for an Illinois 

concealed-carry license because the Department of State Police has not classified their states’ public-carry qualifications 

as “substantially similar” to those Illinois imposes. These 

nonresidents, including the plaintiffs in this case, have no opportunity to prove that they meet Illinois’ requirements. 

Based solely on their states of residence, they are deprived of 

any opportunity to exercise their Second Amendment rights 

in Illinois.

When a state law infringes on the fundamental Second 

Amendment right to keep and bear arms for self-defense, it 

must satisfy heightened scrutiny. Our precedents instruct that 

to sustain such a law, a state must present “an extremely 

strong public-interest justification and a close fit between the 

government’s means and its end.” Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 

F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011). Illinois has not done so here. As 

explained below, the state’s chosen method to regulate nonCase: 15-3738 Document: 39 Filed: 10/20/2016 Pages: 22
No. 15-3738 9

resident concealed-carry license applications is not sufficiently tailored to its goal of properly vetting out-of-state applicants’ criminal and mental histories. Therefore, the ban violates the Second Amendment.

Nevertheless, the court holds that the plaintiffs are not entitled to preliminary relief because the application ban is not 

“unreasonable.” The court’s application of rational-basis review to the nonresident application ban is directly contrary to 

Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent. Under the 

proper standard of review, the plaintiffs are certain to succeed 

on the merits of their Second Amendment claim.1 I would reverse the district court’s judgment and remand with instructions to issue a preliminary injunction. I respectfully dissent.

I. Background

Illinois law requires the Department of State Police to issue 

a concealed-carry license to each Illinois resident who applies 

and meets certain qualifications. 430 ILCS 66/25. The Department must also issue a license to some nonresidents who meet 

all of these qualifications other than Illinois residency. 430 

ILCS 66/40(b). Under the statute, the Department may only 

process applications from residents of states “with laws related to firearm ownership, possession, and carrying, that are 

substantially similar to the requirements to obtain a license 

 

1 The parties indicated at oral argument that the record before us now 

is the same one that is before the district court for the pending summary 

judgment motion. Therefore, there is no need to hedge on the plaintiffs’ 

likelihood of success at this stage. The result will not change should this 

case return on appeal from the grant of the state’s motion for summary 

judgment. That is why I would hold that the plaintiffs are certain to succeed on the merits.

Case: 15-3738 Document: 39 Filed: 10/20/2016 Pages: 22
10 No. 15-3738

under [Illinois law].” Id. The definition of “substantially similar” is left to the Department’s discretion.

Department regulations define “substantially similar” 

states as those that do all of the following: (1) regulate who 

may carry firearms in public; (2) prohibit all who have had 

involuntary mental health admissions, and those who have 

had voluntary admissions in the past five years, from carrying 

firearms; (3) report denied persons to the National Instant 

Criminal Background Check System; and (4) participate in reporting those authorized to carry through the National Law 

Enforcement Telecommunications System. Ill. Admin. Code 

1231.10. The Department periodically sends a survey to each 

state to determine whether it meets these criteria. At present, 

the Department has identified only Hawaii, New Mexico, Virginia, and South Carolina as “substantially similar” states.2

The law therefore operates as a total ban on concealed-carry 

license applications from residents of the other 45 states.

The individual plaintiffs are law-abiding nonresidents 

who hold concealed-carry licenses in their resident states. 

Some are even certified Illinois concealed-carry instructors. 

They wish to apply to carry firearms in Illinois. The plaintiffs 

contend that the ban on applications from their states violates 

the Second Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, the Due 

Process Clause, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 

 2 The Department sent the surveys that identified the four currently 

approved states in 2013. At that time, seven states did not respond at all 

to Illinois’ survey. Illinois indicated at oral argument that it recently sent 

another survey and that the Department is currently analyzing the results. 

The list of approved states is subject to change based upon the results of 

this most recent survey.

Case: 15-3738 Document: 39 Filed: 10/20/2016 Pages: 22
No. 15-3738 11

Article IV. The district court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction, and the plaintiffs timely appealed.

II. Discussion

A. Preliminary Injunction Standard

To determine whether the plaintiffs are entitled to preliminary relief, this court applies a two-part “sliding scale” test. 

As a threshold matter, the movants must establish (1) some 

probability of success on the merits; (2) lack of an adequate 

remedy at law; and (3) irreparable harm in the absence of an 

injunction. Stuller, Inc. v. Steak N Shake Enters., Inc., 695 F.3d 

676, 678 (7th Cir. 2012). If they clear that hurdle, the district 

court then must balance the harms that both parties would 

suffer in the event of an adverse decision. In this analysis, it 

must consider the public interest in granting or denying an 

injunction and weigh the threshold factors against each other,

depending on how strongly each factor points in favor of each 

party. See id. We generally review the district court’s legal 

analysis de novo and its balancing of the factors for abuse of 

discretion. Id. However, “a decision to deny a preliminary injunction that is premised on an error of law is entitled to no 

deference and must be reversed.” United Air Lines, Inc. v. Int’l 

Ass’n of Machinist & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, 243 F.3d 349, 

361 (7th Cir. 2001).

Case: 15-3738 Document: 39 Filed: 10/20/2016 Pages: 22
12 No. 15-3738

B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

At this stage, the principal issue is whether the plaintiffs 

are likely to succeed on the merits of their Second Amendment claim.3 The “sliding-scale” nature of the preliminary injunction inquiry means that the plaintiffs’ precise chances of 

success are highly relevant to whether an injunction should 

issue. A movant with just a slight chance of success must 

make a much greater showing of harm than one who is certain 

to prevail. See Storck USA, L.P. v. Farley Candy Co., 14 F.3d 311, 

314 (7th Cir. 1994).

As with any constitutional case, the strength of the plaintiffs’ Second Amendment claim depends upon two things: (1) 

which standard of means-ends scrutiny applies to the claim; 

and (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the challenged law under the chosen scrutiny. I will address these in 

turn.

1. Proper Standard of Review

The Supreme Court has recognized that “the Second 

Amendment secures a pre-existing natural right to keep and 

bear arms.” Ezell, 651 F.3d at 700 (citing District of Columbia v. 

Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595, 599–600 (2008)). “[I]ndividual selfdefense is ‘the central component’ of the Second Amendment 

right,” which is fundamental and therefore enforceable 

against the states. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 

767–68 (2010) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 599). We have held 

that the right to bear arms for self-defense “is as important 

outside the home as inside.” Moore, 702 F.3d at 942. Illinois 

 3 Because I conclude that the plaintiffs’ Second Amendment claim is 

certain to succeed on the merits, I do not address their remaining constitutional challenges to the Illinois statute.

Case: 15-3738 Document: 39 Filed: 10/20/2016 Pages: 22
No. 15-3738 13

recognizes that holding and correctly concedes that the nonresident application ban implicates the Second Amendment. 

The dispute centers on the proper standard of review.

In Heller, the Supreme Court did not resolve this question 

for all future Second Amendment claims. However, it made it 

abundantly clear that rational-basis review is inappropriate 

where a law affects Second Amendment rights. Heller, 554 

U.S. at 628–29 & n.27 (“If all that was required to overcome 

the right to keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no 

effect.”). Because of Heller and McDonald, this court is by default “left to choose an appropriate standard of review from 

among the heightened standards of scrutiny the [Supreme] 

Court applies to governmental actions alleged to infringe 

enumerated constitutional rights.” Ezell, 651 F.3d at 703.

Our precedents instruct that this critical choice should depend on two factors: “how close the law comes to the core of 

the Second Amendment right and the severity of the law’s 

burden on that right.” Id. Since Heller rules out rational-basis 

review, we must apply either intermediate scrutiny, strict

scrutiny, or another form of heightened scrutiny in between 

those standards. Intermediate scrutiny generally requires the 

government to show that the challenged law is “substantially 

related to an important government objective” United States v. 

Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc), while under 

strict scrutiny the government must prove that the law is 

“necessary to serve a compelling state interest” and “narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” Milwaukee Deputy 

Sheriffs’ Ass’n v. Clarke, 588 F.3d 523, 530 (7th Cir. 2009).

Case: 15-3738 Document: 39 Filed: 10/20/2016 Pages: 22
14 No. 15-3738

Three recent Second Amendment cases are particularly

relevant to the standard of review question. First, in Skoien, 

we considered the constitutionality of the federal ban on the 

possession of firearms by those convicted of misdemeanor 

domestic violence. There, rather than enter “deeply into the 

‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire,” the en banc court simply accepted the government’s concession that intermediate scrutiny applied to the ban. Id. at 641–42. It held that “logic and 

data establish a substantial relationship” between the statute 

and the goal of “preventing armed mayhem.” Id. at 642. 

In Ezell, the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction 

against Chicago’s ban on firing ranges. We described the firing-range ban as “a serious encroachment on the right to 

maintain proficiency in firearm use, an important corollary to 

the meaningful exercise of the core right to possess firearms 

for self-defense.” Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708. Critically, unlike the 

criminal defendant in Skoien, the Ezell plaintiffs were “the 

‘law-abiding, responsible citizens’ whose Second Amendment rights are entitled to full solicitude under Heller.” Id. Because Chicago’s law reached close to the core of the Second 

Amendment and curtailed the rights of law-abiding citizens, 

we required “a more rigorous showing than that applied in 

Skoien ... if not quite ‘strict scrutiny.’” Id. Under this standard, 

the city had to demonstrate “a strong public interest justification for its ban” and “a close fit between the range ban and 

the actual public interest it serves.” Id. at 708–09. Chicago 

failed to carry that burden, significantly because it could not 

show that its public safety interest could not be “addressed 

through sensible zoning and other appropriately tailored regulations.” Id. at 709.

Case: 15-3738 Document: 39 Filed: 10/20/2016 Pages: 22
No. 15-3738 15

Finally, we have Moore. In that case, we applied Ezell-like 

scrutiny to invalidate Illinois’ blanket ban on the public carrying of firearms. Moore, 702 F.3d at 940 (categorizing the level 

of scrutiny as “a stronger showing” than required in Skoien). 

We explained that, because the ban on concealed-carry curtailed “the gun rights of the entire law-abiding population of 

Illinois,” as opposed to a small group of people convicted of 

domestic violence, intermediate scrutiny was insufficient. Id.

As we put it then, “so substantial a curtailment of the right of 

armed self-defense requires a greater showing of justification 

than merely that the public might benefit on balance from such 

a curtailment, though there is no proof it would.” Id. Like Chicago’s firing range ban, Illinois’ total prohibition on concealed-carry could not withstand such scrutiny. See id. at 939 

(“If the mere possibility that allowing guns to be carried in 

public would increase the crime or death rates sufficed to justify a ban, Heller would have been decided the other way, for 

that possibility was as great in the District of Columbia as it is 

in Illinois.”).

These cases establish the basic principles that govern the 

present dispute. Whenever a law infringes on the right to bear 

arms for self-defense, that law must be at least substantially 

related to an important government interest. And a law that

curtails the fundamental right of law-abiding citizens to carry 

a weapon for self-defense must pass even more exacting (although not quite strict) scrutiny. Defenders of such a law must 

show a “close fit” between the law and a strong public interest. Ezell, 651 F.3d 708–09. That “close fit” is functionally 

equivalent to the “narrow tailoring” requirement for contentneutral speech restrictions to which strict scrutiny is inapplicable. See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2534 (2014); 

see also Ezell, 651 F.3d at 706–08 (discussing the adaptation of 

Case: 15-3738 Document: 39 Filed: 10/20/2016 Pages: 22
16 No. 15-3738

First Amendment precedent to Second Amendment cases). 

As in First Amendment cases, the tailoring requirement prevents government from striking the wrong balance between 

efficiency and the exercise of an enumerated constitutional 

right. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2534.

Just as in Ezell and Moore, the plaintiffs in this case are precisely the type of law-abiding citizens “whose Second 

Amendment rights are entitled to full solicitude under Heller.” Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708. What is more, the nonresident application ban functions as a categorical prohibition of applications from the majority of Americans. It is therefore a severe 

burden on the recognized Second Amendment right. Indeed, 

Illinois’ application ban has the potential to affect even more 

people than did the sweeping restrictions we invalidated in 

Moore and Ezell. Therefore, it must satisfy the same exacting 

scrutiny that we applied in those cases.

In sum, “a ban as broad as Illinois’ can’t be upheld merely 

on the ground that it’s not irrational.” Moore, 702 F.3d at 939. 

The court’s cursory application of rational-basis review is directly contrary to Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent. As a result, the court adds confusion to our case law and 

allows the states impermissible latitude to violate the Second 

Amendment rights of law-abiding Americans.

2. Application of Ezell Scrutiny

Having established the appropriate standard of review, I 

now turn to its application in this case. Illinois submits that 

the prohibition of so many nonresident applications is necessary because the state can properly vet only applicants from 

Illinois and the four Department-approved states. Illinois says 

Case: 15-3738 Document: 39 Filed: 10/20/2016 Pages: 22
No. 15-3738 17

that it cannot afford to pay to access information, such as applicants’ criminal records, from jurisdictions that do not report to the national databases Illinois uses to look up those 

records. Moreover, some states do not track mental health information at all. According to Illinois, it cannot obtain mental 

health records for potential applicants from many states and 

thus cannot evaluate whether applicants from these states are 

qualified under Illinois law to carry a firearm.

The plaintiffs do not challenge Illinois’ power to maintain 

a licensing scheme with some conditions on the right to carry 

a firearm in public. See Berron, 825 F.3d at 847. Nor do they 

challenge the conditions themselves. On the contrary, they 

want the opportunity to comply with those conditions. They seek 

the opportunity to be treated the same way Illinois treats its 

own residents and those of the four Department-approved 

states. The current statutory scheme deprives them of that opportunity.

Since the court erroneously subjects the application ban 

only to rationality review, it fails to answer the dispositive 

question. Namely, is the ban is sufficiently tailored to Illinois’ 

interest in vetting applicants to pass Ezell scrutiny? I would 

hold that it is not. The court seemingly admits that the law is 

significantly underinclusive (because it regulates too few people to be effective in addressing the stated goal) and overinclusive (because it regulates too many people that do not fall 

under its public interest justification). These features, which 

the court concedes make the law “imperfect,” suffice to 

demonstrate that the required close fit between means and 

ends is lacking. Cf. Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 

221, 232 (1987) (holding that regulations fail narrow-tailoring 

Case: 15-3738 Document: 39 Filed: 10/20/2016 Pages: 22
18 No. 15-3738

analysis when they are both overinclusive and underinclusive).

The nonresident application ban is significantly underinclusive in two principal ways. First, as the court correctly 

notes, “the concealed-carry license of an Illinois resident is not 

revoked or reassessed if he returns from a trip to ... another 

state, even though the Illinois authorities will not know what 

he did in that state—whether for example he committed a 

crime or had a mental breakdown.” Maj. Op. at 6. Second, a 

potential applicant who moves to one of the four approved 

states becomes immediately eligible to apply for an Illinois 

concealed-carry license. This is true “even if he had become a 

resident of such a state recently, having spent many years living in dissimilar and therefore non-approved states, with Illinois (and, presumably, the substantially similar state as well) 

unable to obtain information about his possible criminal or 

mental problems in those states.” Id. As broad as the application ban is, it does not allow Illinois to vet potential licenseholders or future applicants in two quite plausible situations. 

This severely undercuts Illinois’ justification for maintaining 

it.4 See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 

417–18 (1993) (ban on news racks containing “commercial 

handbills” lacked the required “reasonable fit” between the 

government’s asserted end and the means chosen because it 

was woefully underinclusive).

 4 Moreover, Illinois law already permits nonresidents who hold firearm licenses from their resident states to possess a gun in various other 

ways in Illinois. See Maj. Op. at 3–4. The fact that Illinois trusts nonresidents to bring guns into the state to use on firing ranges or simply to carry 

in a vehicle undermines its policy rationale for restricting these same people from applying to carry a concealed weapon.

Case: 15-3738 Document: 39 Filed: 10/20/2016 Pages: 22
No. 15-3738 19

The ban is also overinclusive. While a categorical application ban no doubt prevents many disqualified people from 

obtaining an Illinois concealed-carry license,5 it also prohibits 

many who would meet Illinois’ qualifications from applying 

for a license. The plaintiffs in this case are exemplary. All are 

responsible gun owners with significant firearm training, no 

criminal or mental histories, and valid concealed-carry licenses from other states. Plaintiffs Kevin Culp, Douglas Zylstra, and Paul Heslin are Illinois-certified concealed-carry instructors who hold carry licenses in multiple states. Alaw that 

prevents an Illinois-licensed concealed-carry instructor from 

even applying for a license to carry in that state sweeps up far 

too many people to be appropriately tailored under any exacting standard of scrutiny.

Once more, it is important to emphasize that the plaintiffs 

seek only the right to apply for a concealed-carry license. 

Should they prevail, they would gain only the ability to seek 

a license on the same basis as residents of Illinois and the four 

Department-approved states. While such a process may impose an additional burden, Illinois has not shown that it 

 

5 While I do not doubt the statute’s effectiveness at preventing these 

people from obtaining a license, whether it actually prevents gun violence 

is another matter altogether. In Moore, we properly recognized that “[t]he 

available data about permit holders ... imply that they are at fairly low 

risk of misusing guns, consistent with the relatively low arrest rates observed to date for permit holders.” Moore, 702 F.3d at 937–38 (quoting 

Philip J. Cook, et al., Gun Control After Heller: Threats and Sideshows from a 

Social Welfare Perspective, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1041, 1082 (2009)). There is no 

indication that this is any less true for concealed-carry license holders in 

one state who wish to apply for a license in another state. To put it plainly, 

it is unlikely that someone wanting to commit a gun crime in Illinois will 

first avail himself of the licensing process for out-of-state residents. 

Case: 15-3738 Document: 39 Filed: 10/20/2016 Pages: 22
20 No. 15-3738

would be impossible, or even impractical, for these out-ofstate applicants to provide verified records that satisfy Illinois’ requirements. For instance, nonresidents could attempt 

to shoulder the burden of paying for criminal record searches 

in their resident state and providing the relevant records to 

Illinois. Prospective applicants could also seek certification 

that they satisfy Illinois’ mental health requirement. In many 

cases, such certification would provide Illinois with more information than it can obtain about its own residents’ out-ofstate sojourns, which they admittedly cannot track.6 Potential 

applicants should at least be given that chance.

In sum, the absolute denial of nonresidents’ right to apply 

for an Illinois concealed-carry license lacks the required close 

fit to the state’s asserted interest in properly vetting applicants. It is woefully overinclusive and underinclusive relative 

to that aim. Therefore, 430 ILCS 66/40(b) violates the plaintiffs’ 

Second Amendment rights. I would hold that the plaintiffs 

are certain to succeed on the merits.

C. Remaining Preliminary Injunction Factors

Because I would hold that the plaintiffs are certain to succeed, I must proceed to the remaining preliminary injunction 

factors. In addition to demonstrating some probability of success on the merits, the plaintiffs must establish that they 

 6 For example, there is no reason that Illinois cannot require nonresident applicants to submit their health records as proof that they have not 

been treated for a mental illness. The state could also require an affidavit 

from a treating physician certifying an applicant’s lack of mental admissions. This information would be far more valuable to Illinois than the 

simple fact that an applicant has a Hawaii concealed-carry license. After 

all, there is no guarantee that Hawaii was aware of its applicants’ mental 

health admissions in other states before granting licenses. 

Case: 15-3738 Document: 39 Filed: 10/20/2016 Pages: 22
No. 15-3738 21

would be “irreparably harmed if [they do] not receive preliminary relief, and that money damages and/or an injunction ordered at final judgment would not rectify that harm.” Abbott 

Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 16 (7th Cir. 1992). The 

district court properly found that the plaintiffs satisfy all of 

the threshold requirements here. See Ezell, 651 F.3d at 697–99 

(holding that irreparable harm is presumed in Second 

Amendment cases and that damages could not compensate 

for a violation). I need not belabor these points.

More critical is the district court’s balancing of the harms. 

Although the district court correctly concluded that the plaintiffs met all the threshold requirements for an injunction, it

still denied their motion based on its conclusion that issuance 

of an injunction would harm the state more than a failure to 

issue one would harm the plaintiffs. The district court reasoned that the state would be harmed by its inability to conduct background checks on newly eligible applicants, while 

the plaintiffs could carry guns into Illinois for various other 

purposes and retained the right to concealed-carry in their 

resident states even in the absence of an injunction.

Because it was premised on an error of law, the district 

court’s balancing of the factors is due no deference. United Air 

Lines, 243 F.3d at 361. Since the district court erred by applying 

only intermediate scrutiny to the plaintiffs’ Second Amendment claim, it erroneously concluded that the plaintiffs’ claim 

was “neither strong nor weak.” Had it applied the proper 

standard of review and held that the plaintiffs are certain to 

succeed, the district court would have required a much 

weaker showing of harm before it issued the injunction. Storck 

Case: 15-3738 Document: 39 Filed: 10/20/2016 Pages: 22
22 No. 15-3738

USA, 14 F.3d at 314 (“[T]he greater the movant’s chance of success on the merits, the less strong a showing must it make that 

the balance of harms is in its favor.”).

Given the plaintiffs’ certainty of success, I would hold that 

the balance of harms tips in their favor. Simply permitting 

law-abiding citizens who have concealed-carry licenses in 

other states to apply for an Illinois license will not irreparably 

harm the state. Illinois may still deny those who do not meet 

its stringent criteria, so an injunction will not result in a flood 

of new concealed-carry license-holders. Meanwhile, the 

plaintiffs suffer irreparable harm each day they cannot avail 

themselves of Illinois’ concealed-carry licensing scheme. See 

Ezell, 651 F.3d at 699 (“If they’re right [on the merits], then the 

range ban was unconstitutional when enacted and violates 

their Second Amendment rights every day it remains on the 

books.”). The fact that they can still possess firearms in other 

limited ways in Illinois and exercise the right to carry a firearm in their home states is irrelevant. Id. at 697-98. The application ban prevents them from taking the first step towards 

exercising their fundamental constitutional rights in Illinois.

III. Conclusion

Today’s decision will have a profound and unfortunate 

impact on the scope of Second Amendment rights in our circuit. The court’s decision has unnecessarily muddied the waters and cast significant doubt upon our holdings in Ezell and 

Moore. Rather than create confusion, we should reaffirm that 

state laws affecting the fundamental right to carry a firearm 

for self-defense are subject to exacting scrutiny. Under this 

standard, the plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction. I respectfully dissent.

Case: 15-3738 Document: 39 Filed: 10/20/2016 Pages: 22