Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-00007/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-00007-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 28:794 Rehabilitation Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MATTHEW BONZANI, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ROBERT A. McDONALD, Secretary of 

Veterans Affairs; and SCOTT HUNDAHL, 

M.D., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:11-cv-07-EFB 

ORDER AND FINDINGS OF FACT AND 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

 This matter proceeded to a hybrid bench and jury trial on October 20, 2015, through 

October 24, 2015, and October 27, 2015, through October 30, 2015, on plaintiff Matthew 

Bonzani’s claims under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) against defendants Robert A. 

McDonald, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs (the “Secretary”), and Scott Hundahl, and plaintiff’s 

claim under section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act against the Secretary.1

 Plaintiff was 

represented by attorneys Joanne DeLong and Mark Wasser; defendants were represented by 

Assistant United States Attorneys Lynn Ernce and Alyson Berg. 

 Plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim against the Secretary was tried to the jury. Although it 

was previously determined that plaintiff’s FMLA claim against defendant Hundahl would also be 

tried to a jury, the parties subsequently stipulated to have one element of that claim, i.e., the issue 

 1

 This action was reassigned to the undersigned based on the consent of the parties. See

ECF No. 18; see also E.D. Cal. L.R. 305; 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 

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of whether Hundahl was an “employer” for purposes of liability under the FMLA, resolved by the 

court. Plaintiff’s FMLA claim against the Secretary was also tried to the court. All other issues 

proceeded in a jury trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Secretary on plaintiff’s 

Rehabilitation Act claim.2 ECF No. 177. However, the jury found in favor of plaintiff on the 

FMLA claim against Hundahl. ECF No. 178. It found that defendant Hundahl interfered with 

plaintiff’s rights under the FMLA and that plaintiff had sustained damages in the amount of 

$675,238. After the jury returned its verdict, defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law 

and for a new trial on plaintiff’s claims under the FMLA.3

 Having carefully reviewed the evidence and the arguments of the parties presented at trial 

and in their written submissions, the court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions 

of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 on the FMLA claim against the Secretary 

and the employer status issue as to the FMLA claim against Dr. Hundahl. 

Further, for the reasons stated below, defendants’ motions are denied. 

I. Procedural History 

 Plaintiff Matthew Bonzani, M.D., is a former anesthesiologist at the Sacramento VA 

Medical Center in Sacramento, California.4 On December 31, 2010, he filed a complaint against 

 2

 At the completion of plaintiff’s case-in-chief, the court took under submission the 

Secretary’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on the Rehabilitation Act claim. In light of 

the jury’s verdict in favor of the Secretary on that claim, the motion is now moot. 

3

 Defendants also moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The motions are 

redundant. Rule 50 was amended in 1991 to abandon the terminology of motions for “directed 

verdict” and “judgment notwithstanding the verdict.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, Advisory Committee 

Notes, 1991 Amendment. Motions denominated as such are now treated as motions for judgment 

as a matter of law. Id. Such a motion may be bought under Rule 50(a) at any time after the 

plaintiff rests but before the case is submitted to the jury. If such a motion was properly 

presented under Rule 50(a), the motion may be renewed under Rule 50(b) after a verdict is 

returned. Defendants presented a Rule 50(a) motion and the court addresses the renewed motion 

herein under Rule 50(b). The motion for judgment as a matter of law made after the jury has 

returned a verdict is reviewed under the same standard as the motion for judgment as a matter of 

law made at the close of all evidence. See Fernandez v. City of San Francisco, No. C-93-2597, 

1996 WL 162993, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 1996) (citing The Jeanery, Inc. v. James Jeans, Inc., 

849 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1988)).

4

 That medical facility is located at the site of the former Mather Air Force base and was 

referred to by several witnesses as “VA Mather” or simply “Mather.” 

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defendants Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary of Veterans Affairs (the “Secretary”),5 Scott Hundahl, 

M.D., a doctor at the Sacramento VA Medical Center. The complaint asserted claims under the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (“Rehabilitation Act”), and the Family 

Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), and 5 U.S.C. § 2302. Compl., ECF No. 1. On September 26, 

2011, the court granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 

12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). ECF No. 28. Plaintiff’s Section 504 Rehabilitation Act claim as to all 

defendants was dismissed without leave to amend. His Section 501 Rehabilitation Act claim 

against defendant Dr. Hundahl was also dismissed without leave to amend. Plaintiff’s attempt to 

state a claim under § 2615(a)(2) or § 2615(b) of the FMLA also failed and any such claim was 

dismissed with leave to amend. His claim under 5 U.S.C. § 2302 as to all defendants was 

dismissed without leave to amend. Id. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim under 

§ 2615(a)(1) of the FMLA was denied. Id. 

Because plaintiff did not file an amended complaint, his remaining claims were: (1) a 

Section 501 Rehabilitation Act claim against the Secretary, and (2) a claim under § 2615(a)(1) of 

the FMLA against all defendants. ECF No. 32 at 2. On December 14, 2012, defendants moved 

for summary judgment on all claims. ECF No. 42. That motion was denied (ECF No. 63) and 

the matter proceeded to trial on the remaining claims. 

II. Factual Background 

 The evidence and testimony presented at trial demonstrated the following. 

 Plaintiff served in the United States Air Force from July 1, 1986, to February 12, 2007. 

He testified that upon graduation from the Air Force Academy in 1990, he trained to become a 

combat pilot and eventually took part in combat operations during the Gulf War. After 

completing two tours, he returned home and was stationed in North Carolina. He attended 

///// 

///// 

 5

 Eric Shinseki was the Secretary of Veterans Affairs at the time this action was initiated. 

Robert McDonald is the current Secretary of Veterans Affairs and was substituted as the proper 

defendant pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). 

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medical school, completed a residency in anesthesiology, and eventually served in the Air Force 

as an anesthesiologist.6 

 Due to a variety of medical impairments, plaintiff was medically discharged from the Air 

Force in early 2007. He subsequently sought and was offered a position at the VA medical center 

in Sacramento. His employment commenced with the VA on March 18, 2007, and although his 

employment was extended, he was initially appointed for a one-year term not to exceed March 

18, 2008. Defs.’ Ex. K. 

 At the time plaintiff started working for the VA, there was no permanent Chief of 

Anesthesiology. After a few months on the job, he expressed to Dr. Hundahl, the Chief of 

Surgical Services and plaintiff’s immediate supervisor, an interest in taking on the role of Chief. 

Dr. Hundahl thought it was a good idea. Plaintiff started acting as Chief on an informal basis in 

September 2007, and officially became the Chief of Anesthesiology on November 11, 2007. 

 In March 2008 plaintiff’s term appointment was extended for another one-year term. The 

renewal process, which plaintiff described as “pretty automatic,” involved little more than signing 

and submitting documents. On April 24, 2008, plaintiff received a letter signed by five members 

of the anesthesia department that, while expressing appreciation for him taking on the role as 

Chief, highlighted problems that needed to be addressed. Defs.’ Ex. B. The crux of the letter 

addressed a recurrent problem at the facility: an inadequate number of anesthesiologists and the 

resulting scheduling conflicts and associated problems that created. The group requested that 

plaintiff attempt to obtain more staff to assist the anesthesiologists, make schedules and work 

assignments well in advance, appoint an interim Chief for when plaintiff was absent, create a 

schedule that realistically accounts for the number of cases that could be completed each day, and 

create a calendar of the anesthesiologists’ daily staffing so the group could anticipate how many 

anesthesiologists are expected to work each day and in which operating room they were assigned 

to work. Id. 

///// 

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 Plaintiff testified that while participating in pilot training exercises he sustained an 

injury that ultimately ended his career as a pilot and he decided to pursue a career in medicine. 

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 On September 10, 2008, four members of the anesthesia department sent plaintiff a 

follow-up letter. Defs.’ Ex. C. This letter expressed concern that the issues previously raised 

were not adequately addressed. Id. Specifically, the group felt that plaintiff had not made a 

strong effort to pursue additional support staff, had not made staffing and call schedules well in 

advance, did not effectively communicate with the appointed interim Chief, and failed to enforce 

certain rules. Id.

 As indicated from these letters, the anesthesia group struggled with related issues of 

staffing and scheduling problems. The anesthesia department was authorized to employ six 

anesthesiologists. However, the VA experienced difficulty recruiting and maintaining qualified 

anesthesiologists and therefore the six positions were not always filled. Plaintiff specifically 

testified that during the majority of his tenure with the VA his department was understaffed. 

 The lack of staffing created significant problems with how the VA’s operating rooms 

functioned.7 Typically, the Sacramento VA facility would try to run four operating rooms. This 

required five anesthesiologists to smoothly run all four rooms; one working in each room and one 

“floater” to relieve the other anesthesiologists for breaks or lunch, or to respond to emergencies, 

as needed. In the event one anesthesiologist was out on vacation or ill, there was little room for 

flexibility (even assuming all six positions were staffed). If one of the scheduled 

anesthesiologists called in sick at the last minute, the VA would experience severe difficulties 

running all four operating rooms and on several such occasions surgeries had to be cancelled. If 

the group had prior notice that they were going to be short-staffed, plaintiff, as Chief of 

Anesthesiology, could arrange for a fee basis physician8 to fill in for the absent physician. 

However, fee basis physicians are expensive, and it can be difficult to obtain these physicians, 

especially without adequate notice. 

///// 

 7

 This was a theme expressed in the testimony of several witnesses. As discussed below, 

the testimony in general presented an overarching problem of too few anesthesiologists being 

asked to handle more cases than the existing staff levels could service. 

8

 Fee basis physicians, also called locum tenens, are physicians that work as independent 

contractors. These physicians fill in as needed and are not employees of the VA. 

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 The problems with staffing and scheduling were exacerbated after April 28, 2009. While 

working in one of the operating rooms on that date, plaintiff reached underneath the operating 

table to check the patient’s Foley catheter bag, when his knee suddenly gave out. It was 

subsequently determined that he suffered a meniscal tear, which would require surgery. After 

applying for workers’ compensation benefits, plaintiff was evaluated by a physician who 

recommended plaintiff be limited to light work, which excluded working in an operating room. 

However, given the severe staffing issues, plaintiff continued to perform his duties despite this 

recommendation. 

 On May 5, 2009, plaintiff sent Dr. Hundahl an email stating that he had sustained an 

injury to his knee at work the prior week and that he would likely need surgery. Pl.’s Ex. 91. 

Plaintiff sent a follow-up email on May 19, 2009, apprising Dr. Hundahl that plaintiff had been 

experiencing greater pain in his knee, which necessitated pain medication. Pl.’s Ex. 92. Plaintiff 

stated that he was still waiting to see an orthopedic surgeon, but the process had been delayed 

because his case involved a workers’ compensation claim. Id. He further indicated that he did 

not believe he would be able to continue working in the operating room due to pain and the need 

to take pain medication. Id. On May 21, 2009, plaintiff sent a third email to Dr. Hundahl, this 

one stating that plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim had been approved and that he was in the 

process of making arrangements to take leave. Pl.’s Ex. 93. Dr. Hundahl did not respond to any 

of these emails. 

 Plaintiff subsequently took FMLA leave to have surgery on his knee, which was 

performed on June 2, 2009. While out on FMLA leave, but prior to having surgery, plaintiff 

emailed Dr. Hundahl to confirm his surgery date and address staffing issues. Plaintiff stated that 

the anesthesia department would be extremely short-staffed due to one physician being out on 

annual leave9

 for a planned vacation, another physician being out with pneumonia, and plaintiff 

unable to work due to his knee injury. Joint Ex. J-19. There was also no response to this email. 

 9

 Annual leave and vacation leave were used interchangeably to describe leave taken for 

vacation, as oppose to sick leave. 

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However, on June 16, 2009, Dr. Hundahl sent an email to all anesthesia staff. Pl.’s Ex. 95. In 

this email, Dr. Hundahl expressed concerns about scheduling and physicians taking leave. 

Specifically, Dr. Hundahl stated that the anesthesiologists were not properly entering their leave 

requests into VistA, the system utilized by the VA for formally requesting leave. Id. 

 For an anesthesiologist to take leave, he or she was required to submit a formal request 

through VistA. Plaintiff had a leave calendar in his office for the anesthesia group’s use, but the 

official calendar was located in Dr. Hundahl’s office.10 See Defs.’ Ex. S. Although plaintiff was 

the Chief of Anesthesiology, and was ultimately responsible for de-conflicting the leave calendar, 

i.e. making sure an appropriate number of anesthesiologists were available and scheduled to cover 

the operating rooms, he was not permitted to approve leave. All leave requests were required to 

be submitted though VistA. Dr. Hundahl insisted that he approve all such requests. Despite this 

fact, Dr. Hundahl’s June 16, 2009 email noted that there were “problem days” in August, as two 

anesthesiologist were scheduled to be out on leave on August 17 and 24, in violation of the VA’s 

policy that only one anesthesiologist be out on annual leave at a time. Id. 

 After taking a few weeks to recover, plaintiff returned to work on July 13, 2009. Upon his 

return Dr. Hundahl stopped by plaintiff’s office to discuss problems that occurred in plaintiff’s 

absence, including the failure to de-conflict the leave calendar. Plaintiff testified that during their 

conversation Dr. Hundahl was yelling and pounded his fists against plaintiff’s desk.11 Dr. 

Hundahl was upset about anesthesiologists calling in sick and surgeries having to be canceled 

because there were not enough anesthesiologists to run the operating rooms. 

 Plaintiff also testified that upon his return, his relationship with Dr. Hundahl changed 

significantly. Dr. Hundahl no longer addressed plaintiff on a first name basis, and started 

referring to plaintiff as Dr. Bonzani. Plaintiff also experienced difficulty arranging informal 

///// 

 10 The official calendar was originally in plaintiff’s office, but was moved to Dr. 

Hundahl’s office on June 16, 2009, two weeks after plaintiff’s knee surgery. 

11 Dr. Hundahl disputed yelling at plaintiff, but did state it was possible that he raised his 

voice. 

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meetings with Hundahl, and overall there was a fundamental breakdown of communication 

between the two. 

 On August 21, 2009, Dr. Hundahl had a meeting with the anesthesia group concerning the 

VA’s leave policy. At this meeting, at least one member of the group requested that the VA 

abandon its policy that a request for annual leave be submitted 30-days in advance, or that at least 

in certain situations employees be permitted to submit a request for leave on shortened notice. 

The request was denied. Defs.’ Ex. M at 2. Plaintiff testified, however, that the group discussed 

the possibility of allowing anesthesiologists to use annual leave on short notice when the VA 

would not be running all four operating rooms. Under such circumstances, the VA would not 

need all five or six anesthesiologists to work. 

 Just prior to that meeting, on August 17, 2009, plaintiff received a court order directing 

him to appear for mediation ten days later on August 27, 2009, in relation to a child custody 

dispute. See Pl.’s Ex. 25. Upon receipt of the order, plaintiff submitted a request to take annual 

leave on August 27, 2009. A little over a week later, on August 25, 2009, he also submitted a 

request to take annual leave on August 26, 2009. According to plaintiff, he was feeling under the 

weather at the time, and decided to submit a request for annual leave instead of calling in sick 

because it was his understanding that the VA would only be running two operating rooms on 

August 26. Accordingly, plaintiff believed his presence would not be needed on August 26 and 

27. Both requests for leave were denied by Dr. Hundahl based on plaintiff’s failure to submit the 

requests 30-days in advance as required by the VA’s leave policy. 

 Plaintiff returned to work the following Monday, August 31, 2009, and met with Dr. 

Hundahl. According to plaintiff, Dr. Hundahl yelled at him and told him that he was Absent 

Without Leave (“AWOL”) on August 26 and 27. Plaintiff received a formal Written Counseling, 

notifying him that he was AWOL for two days because he “failed to schedule his leave 30 days in 

advance, and [he] failed to obtain permission from [his] supervisor, Dr. Hundahl, for the absence 

as required.” Joint Ex. J-7. The AWOL for August 27, 2009 was subsequently rescinded upon a 

sufficient showing that plaintiff’s absence was required to participate in court-ordered mediation. 

Joint Ex. J-9. 

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 On September 29, 2009, Dr. Hundahl sent an email to Dr. William Cahill, the Chief of 

Staff, and Dr. Brian O’Neill, the Director of Health Care System.12 Pl.’s Ex. 102. In the email 

Dr. Hundahl stated, “As you know, I will not be renewing Dr. Bonzani’s 1 year NTE contract 

(expiring in March, 2010).” Id. Significantly, in response, Dr. O’Neill stated, “What does it 

mean that you won’t be renewing Bonzani’s 1 year contract? You mean he is losing his job.” Id. 

Dr. Hundahl responded in the affirmative, and further stated that Dr. Cahill “is aware of some of 

the issues. Suffice it to say that we’ve experienced some serious performance issues and 

reliability issues.” Dr. O’Neill’s responded, “All I care about is that we don’t end up with an 

expensive law suit that can be avoided. It seems so uncomplicated not to extend an appointment, 

but often, if used selectively, it can be regarded as an adverse action, then you need supporting 

documents.” Id. 

 On December 1, 2009, without any knowledge of the September 29 email, plaintiff 

provided a letter to Dr. Hundahl in which plaintiff stated that he wanted to step down as Chief of 

Anesthesia effective January 1, 2010. Joint Ex. J-1. He further stated that it was his “desire to 

serve the VA as a staff anesthesiologist as I was originally hired to do.” Id. 

 On January 6, 2010, plaintiff had a meeting with Dr. Hundahl and Carol Ross, Dr. 

Hundahl’s administrative assistant. At this meeting plaintiff was given a memo acknowledging 

receipt of his December 1, 2009 letter. Joint Ex. J-2. The memo also stated that plaintiff would 

be permitted to step down as Chief even though VA policy ordinarily required that a replacement 

be obtained first. It also notified plaintiff that he was being fired. Specifically, it stated that his 

one-year employment with the VA was set to expire on March 18, 2010, and that his employment 

contract would not be renewed. 

 After the January 6 meeting word spread of the decision to not renew plaintiff’s 

employment. In response to the decision, Dr. Jon Baker, a thoracic surgeon employed by the VA, 

drafted and circulated a petition to retain plaintiff. Pl.’s Ex. 8. The petition explained that the 

VA was already very short-staffed of anesthesiologists, and the operating rooms were not able to 

 12 Dr. O’Neill was the Director of the Health Care System from 2006 to 2013. 

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run at full capacity due to the existing shortage. It further stated that “We need Dr. Bonzani, a 

competent board certified anesthesiologist, who is a known commodity at the VA.”13 Id. 

 Despite the support shown by several of his peers, the decision to not renew plaintiff’s 

employment stood and plaintiff’s employment ended on March 18, 2010. 

III. Discussion 

 A. FMLA Claim Against the Secretary 

 As noted, the plaintiff’s claim against the Secretary under the FMLA was tried to the 

court. In addition to the facts recited above, the court enters the following findings of fact and 

conclusions of law as to that claim.14

“The FMLA creates two interrelated substantive rights: first, the employee has a right to 

use a certain amount of leave for protected reasons, and second, the employee has a right to return 

to his or her job or an equivalent job after using protected leave.” Bachelder v. Am. W. 

Airlines, 259 F.3d 1112, 1122 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612(a), 2614(a)). Congress 

has made it unlawful for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny an employee’s exercise 

or attempt to exercise those rights. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). 

 The Department of Labor’s FMLA implementing regulations provide that “‘[i]nterfering 

with’ the exercise of an employee’s rights [under 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)] would include, for 

example, not only refusing to authorize FMLA leave, but discouraging an employee from using 

such leave,” and that § 2615(a)(1)’s prohibition on “interference” also prohibits an employer from 

discriminating or retaliating against an employee for having exercised or attempted to exercise 

FMLA rights. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b), (c). Such discrimination or retaliation includes “us[ing] 

the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions, such as hiring, promotions 

or disciplinary actions . . . .” Id. § 825.220(c); see also Xin Liu v. Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125, 

1133 (9th Cir. 2003) (providing that “any violation . . . of the DOL regulations constitute[s] 

interference with an employee’s rights under the FMLA.”); Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1122 

 13 Plaintiff’s competency as an anesthesiologist is not disputed. 

14 Most of these facts also apply to the separate analysis below as to defendant Hundahl’s 

motion to vacate the jury verdict. 

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(“[e]mployers cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions, 

such as hiring, promotions or disciplinary actions; nor can FMLA leave be counted under ‘no 

fault’ attendance policies”). 

 To prevail on his FMLA claim, plaintiff was required to establish the following elements 

by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) he was eligible for FMLA leave; (2) his employer was 

covered by the FMLA; (3) he was entitled to FMLA leave; (4) he provided sufficient notice of his 

intent to take leave; and (5) his employer used his taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in 

not renewing his employment. Sanders v. Newport, 657 F.3d 772, 778 (9th Cir. 2011); see also 

Xin Liu, 347 F.3d at 1132-1133. 

 It is undisputed that plaintiff injured his knee on April 28, 2009, that he took medical 

leave beginning in May 2009, had surgery on his knee in June 2009, and returned from medical 

leave on July 13, 2009. ECF No. 118 at 3, ¶¶ 16-20. The parties also agree that plaintiff’s use of 

leave for that period was protected by the FMLA and that the Secretary was an “employer” under 

the FMLA. Id. However, they disputed at trial whether plaintiff’s use of the FMLA protected 

leave was used as a negative factor in the decision not to renew plaintiff’s employment. 

 Defendants argued that plaintiff’s employment was not renewed because he failed to 

follow VA policies when he failed to report for work on August 26, 2009, that he mismanaged 

anesthesia resources and vacation schedules, and that he was an ineffective leader. While there 

were undoubtedly serious staffing shortages that led to a number of problems at the facility, these 

proffered justifications for terminating plaintiff’s employment are not supported by the evidence 

presented at trial. 

 Defendants placed heavy emphasis on plaintiff being found AWOL on August 26, 

arguing that being AWOL is not protected by the FMLA. In fact, plaintiff was charged with two 

consecutive AWOLs; one for August 26, the other for August 27. The evidence shows that rather 

than making a careful inquiry into either, Dr. Hundahl readily seized the opportunity to charge 

plaintiff with the serious accusation of failing to report for surgeries on days that he was supposed 

to be there. The facts surrounding the two AWOL charges call into question whether either was 

genuine. 

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Taking the first (the August 27 AWOL), as soon as plaintiff learned that a court-ordered 

mediation had been scheduled, he submitted a request for leave in VistA. Although the VA’s 

leave policy generally required requests for annual leave to be submitted 30 days in advance, 

employees were expressly entitled to use annual leave for court-ordered appearances. Here, 

plaintiff requested leave to attend a court-ordered mediation for which he received less than 30 

days’ notice. Notwithstanding the VA’s policy for court ordered appearances, Dr. Hundahl 

denied the request because it was not submitted 30 days prior. When plaintiff was absent from 

work, he was found to be AWOL. That AWOL finding was subsequently rescinded because 

plaintiff’s absence was required by a court order, but this rescission did not occur until January 

22, 2010, long after plaintiff had been notified that his employment would not be renewed. Thus, 

while defendants insist that the January 2010 rescission of the AWOL charge shows that 

plaintiff’s use of leave on August 27, 2009 was neither considered nor used as a negative factor in 

terminating plaintiff’s employment, that conclusion is a non-sequitur. Dr. Hundahl 

communicated his decision to fire plaintiff on September 29, 2009, when Dr. Hundahl wrote to 

Dr. Cahill that he would not be renewing plaintiff’s contract. Pl.’s Ex. 102. Dr. Hundahl had 

clearly made up his mind by September 29 to terminate plaintiff’s employment. Whatever Dr. 

Hundahl’s motivation was on that date, it could not have been influenced or mitigated by an event 

that occurred the following January. To suggest otherwise detracts from the overall credibility of 

the various reasons articulated for firing plaintiff, which is the very relevance of the August 27 

AWOL charge. 

Having eliminated the AWOL charge for August 27 as a reason, the defense pointed to the 

absence on August 26. Plaintiff testified that on August 25 he was not feeling well. According to 

plaintiff, it was his understanding that the VA was scheduled to run only two operating rooms the 

following day. He therefore decided to submit a request for annual leave based on his 

understanding that the other members of his group would be able to cover the scheduled cases. 

Plaintiff testified that he felt worse when he woke up on August 26. He called the VA at 6:00 

a.m. that morning and spoke to Dr. Janet Donald, also an anesthesiologist. Plaintiff stated that he 

was told that the VA was only running two operating rooms, so he decided to stay home sick. 

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Plaintiff subsequently submitted to Dr. Hundahl medical notes from two different physicians. 

The first note was dated September 1, 2009, and stated that the physician had evaluated plaintiff 

on that day and that plaintiff was not able to work from September 1 through his return on 

September 3, 2009. Pl.’s Ex. 44. The second note was not dated but stated that plaintiff was 

examined on August 26, 2009, and that he was unable to work from August 26 until September 2. 

Pl.’s Ex. 45. Plaintiff testified that he did not obtain the second doctor’s note at the time of the 

examination, but he requested it later following the tension he had observed at work from his 

having taken leave.

 Defendants argue that the fact that plaintiff first submitted a request for annual leave and 

then called in sick the morning of August 26 shows he was not truthful in his claim of being sick. 

But the fact remains he was examined by a physician on August 26, and that physician certified 

that plaintiff was not able to work starting on August 26, through September 2. Id. There is no 

evidence to support any assertion that the certifying physician falsely stated plaintiff’s condition. 

The evidence demonstrates and the court finds that plaintiff was absent from work on that day 

due to illness. Further, testimony at trial established that VA employees were permitted to take 

leave when they were sick, and that such leave did not require 30 days’ notice. 

 Defendants argue that even assuming plaintiff was ill on the morning of August 26, 

charging him with being AWOL was nonetheless appropriate because he failed to inform the 

appropriate supervisor that he would be out sick. Dr. Cahill testified that plaintiff was required to 

call Paz Sarao, the surgical services timekeeper. But according to Dr. Cahill, Ms. Sarao’s shift 

did not begin until 8:00 a.m. and plaintiff was scheduled to be at the hospital to participate in 

surgery at 7:00 a.m. Calling Ms. Sarao at 8:00 a.m. offers nothing in the way of practical 

assistance to those needing to know prior to 7:00 a.m. that Dr. Bonzani would not be among the 

available anesthesiologists to cover any surgeries scheduled for 7:00 a.m. But there was an 

informal practice available that would. Plaintiff testified that although there may have been some 

formal policy that employees call Ms. Sarao, it was common practice for employees who were ill 

to call the hospital between 6:00 a.m. and 7:00 a.m. and notify the individual answering the phone 

that the employee would be out sick. Plaintiff testified that he followed this practice and told Dr. 

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Donald15 that he would be out that day and argued that notifying the wrong individual that you 

would be staying home sick hardly justifies the termination of plaintiff’s employment. 

In light of all of the testimony and documentary evidence, the court simply cannot credit 

the explanation that Dr. Bonzani’s employment as an anesthesiologist was not renewed because 

he did not call Ms. Sarao the morning of August 26 or that he was otherwise considered AWOL 

that day. Regardless of formalities as to whom one should call, the court credits plaintiff’s 

testimony that he was sick and his testimony that he called Dr. Donald before 7:00 a.m. so that 

surgery teams would know that plaintiff would not be available to administer anesthesia that day. 

 Immediately charging Dr. Bonzani with being AWOL for being out sick on August 26, 

also stands in contrast to how sick leave by others, who had not been on extended leave for 

surgery, were accommodated. Plaintiff cites Dr. Wang’s use of sick leave as an example. Dr. 

Wang, a member of his anesthesia group, left work to go to the dentist without notifying a 

supervisor or, according to her supervisor, Bonzani, without submitting a request for leave. 

Whereas plaintiff was promptly charged with being AWOL, Dr. Wang was not charged as 

AWOL. Dr. Hundahl indicated that Dr. Wang’s sick leave request was submitted in the VistA 

system based on a dental emergency. However, plaintiff submitted a request for leave, albeit for 

annual leave, and called in sick the morning of August 26. While minor differences can be 

identified as to the two instances, the salient distinguishing feature appears to be the sudden 

deterioration of the working relationship between Hundahl and Bonzani after Bonzani’s extended 

absence for surgery. This breakdown of the relationship coincided with Hundahl’s confrontations 

with Bonzani over his use of leave and suggests that the motive for the difference in treatment 

was the frustration over the extended absence for surgery. Following his protracted absence, the 

working relationship was troubled, at best. The perfunctory AWOL charges16 shortly after taking 

 15 Defendants argue that Dr. Donald, who testified at trial, was never asked by plaintiff’s 

counsel about plaintiff calling her that morning. But neither did defense counsel ask that 

question. Thus, the only testimony at trial on the matter was plaintiff’s testimony that he did call 

her and the court credits that testimony. 

16 It does not appear that Dr. Hundahl fully investigated the circumstances of plaintiff’s 

leave on August 26 and 27. The written counseling was issued on August 31, 2009, the first 

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leave for surgery, the disparity in treatment and the proximity to the heated exchange upon 

plaintiff’s return from surgery suggests that the August 26 AWOL was issued to support the soon 

to be announced decision by Dr. Hundahl’s to terminate plaintiff’s employment. Indeed, the 

written counseling was issued within one month of Dr. Hundahl’s email stating that he would not 

be renewing plaintiff’s employment. See Joint Ex. J-7; Pl.’s Ex. 102. 

The testimony plainly established that after plaintiff’s absence from work for the surgery 

on his knee there was a paradigm change in his relationship with Dr. Hundahl, to the point that it 

was nearly nonexistent. Both confirmed that their meeting upon plaintiff’s return to work on July 

13, 2009 was heated and confrontational. Plaintiff described Dr. Hundahl as yelling and 

pounding his fist. Dr. Hundahl said that he pounded his fist not out of anger but because he did 

not have plaintiff’s attention. Hundahl Tr., ECF No. 186 at 8. Either way, Dr. Hundahl conceded 

his frustration and that he might have raised his voice. Thereafter, communication became 

strained and ineffective. The use of leave on August 26 might have further fueled Dr. Hundahl’s 

frustration but the testimony does not credibly establish that plaintiff’s absence on August 26 and 

not his absence from June 2, to July 13, 2009, when he took leave for surgery and recovery, was 

the principal reason for not renewing Dr. Bonzani’s employment as an anesthesiologist. 

 Further, it simply is not credible that an anesthesiologists would be let go over the 

inconsequential policy deviations for taking sick leave identified by Hundahl. The witnesses 

uniformly testified that there was a critical need for anesthesiologists at the Sacramento VA 

Medical Center. The shortage was cited numerous times as causing surgeries to be cancelled on 

the very day they had been scheduled17 and creating a need to hire contract doctors at a very 

expensive rate.18 It is simply not credible that the incident on August 26 was the reason that a 

 

business day following plaintiff’s absence and it appears that Hundahl already poised to use 

plaintiff’s absence as an opportunity to find plaintiff in violation of VA policy, particularly when 

viewed in light of the proximity of that counseling to plaintiff’s return from FMLA leave. 

17 Indeed, there was testimony that surgeries were cancelled on the day Dr. Wang had to 

leave for a dental emergency. Pl. Tr., ECF No. 190 at 5-6. 

18 Dr. O’Neill testified that although the facility was approved for six anesthesiologists 

during the relevant time, there were times when less than six were actually working there. 

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doctor who the defense concedes was qualified and performed well as a staff anesthesiologist was 

terminated. As discussed below, the need for such anesthesiologists was simply too great for that 

incident to explain the termination. 

 Neither can the court credit the assertion that plaintiff’s employment was terminated 

because he failed to adequately de-conflict the leave calendar. Plaintiff met with Dr. Hundahl 

immediately after returning from leave for his surgery. As noted, Dr. Hundahl was emphatic over 

his frustration that surgeries had to be canceled due to anesthesiologist being out on leave and 

calling in sick. Further, there is no dispute that as the Chief of Anesthesiology, one of plaintiff’s 

duties was to de-conflict the leave schedule for the section. But there is also ample evidence that 

the conflict in leave schedules and the need to cancel surgeries due to a shortage of Sacramento 

VA anesthesiologist did not begin or end with Dr. Bonzani. Dr. Baker pointedly testified that 

almost every VA is short of anesthesia providers (Baker Tr., ECF No. 191 at 5), that the 

Sacramento facility was always short of anesthesiologists, and still is (id. at 6). Thus, while this 

task may not have been adequately performed by plaintiff prior to taking leave and consequently 

there were insufficient anesthesiologists to cover all the operating cases, it apparently has not 

been properly performed by anyone and likely cannot be with the short staffing levels at this 

facility. Thus, while the court cannot fault Dr. Hundahl’s frustration over surgeries being 

 

O’Neill Tr., ECF No. 189 at 4-6. Dr. Hundahl also acknowledged that the Sacramento VA 

facility was thin-staffed and if two anesthesiologists are out and another gets sick it would create 

an extremely difficult problem. Hundahl Tr., ECF No. 186 at 18. On some occasions, surgeries 

had to be cancelled with enormous disruption to patients and their families (id. at 8-9) and on 

other occasions a contract or fee-based anesthesiologists who are difficult to acquire would have 

to be hired at a much higher cost to the VA. Id. at 9, 28, 30, 44. Although Dr. Hundahl attributed 

problems of understaffing to what he viewed as plaintiff’s poor management, he acknowledged 

that other members of the surgery staff considered the Sacramento VA to be short-staffed. Id. at 

60. An eye surgeon had complained that one of his patients was canceled three times and another 

surgeon complained that he had 15 patients cancelled. Id. at 32; Joint Ex. J-8. Dr. Hundahl also 

acknowledged that there was a widespread perception in the anesthesia department that it was 

short-staffed. ECF No. 186 at 33. Dr. Baker, a thoracic surgeon, testified that the VA is 

chronically short of anesthesiologist and in order to run operating rooms it uses costly locum 

tenems (contract doctors) to try to fill spots. Significantly, he added that as of the time of trial the 

Sacramento VA is still short of anesthesiologists and still has to cancel surgeries. Barker Tr., 

ECF No. 191 at 6. 

 

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cancelled due to anesthesiologists being out on leave,19 the FMLA does not permit using Dr. 

Bonzani’s absence to have surgery as a negative factor in a decision to end his employment. It is 

clear to the court that this is precisely what occurred here. 

The evidence could not have demonstrated any more clearly that the VA has suffered 

from staffing shortages. This problem was necessarily exacerbated by plaintiff’s absence due to 

his unforeseen injury. Undoubtedly, this frustrated Dr. Hundahl. With plaintiff out on FMLA 

leave, all other anesthesiologists would have been required to work every day for the VA to run 

four operating rooms with a floater. Over an extended time, as occurred with plaintiff’s medical 

absence, that is simply not practical. If one anesthesiologist was out on annual leave, and another 

called in sick, the VA would not have been able to run its four operating rooms with plaintiff out 

on FMLA leave. Under such circumstances, the VA is left to find fee basis anesthesiologist or 

face canceling surgeries. As Dr. Hundahl testified, it was difficult to get a fee basis 

anesthesiologist with less than 30-days’ notice. Thus, cases were cancelled. 

 But placing responsibility for all of these consequences at the feet of plaintiff to explain 

the termination of his employment simply contradicts the evidence and testimony at trial. Despite 

having been given the title Chief of Anesthesiology, he lacked the authority to approve leave 

requests submitted by members of his department. Dr. Hundahl, not plaintiff, controlled leave 

approval. All leave requests had to be submitted through VistA for Dr. Hundahl’s approval. 

Thus, if two anesthesiologists were out on annual leave on the same day, it would be because Dr. 

Hundahl approved both of their requests for leave. Thus, cases were canceled for reasons beyond 

plaintiff’s control. While defendants want to make plaintiff responsible for authority exercised by 

others, he simply lacked the authority to approve leave and had no control over other 

anesthesiologists calling in sick. Although plaintiff’s extended absence undoubtedly adversely 

impacted the VA’s ability to perform scheduled cases, he was entitled to take leave under the 

FMLA to recover from his injury. 

 19 The court is convinced that Dr. Hundahl’s primary consideration was providing needed 

medical care to patients. His motives are not questioned in that regard. The problem arises with 

how to deal with inadequate staffing when an employee must be gone for medical reasons. 

Alternative solutions must be found other than punishing an employee for using protected leave. 

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 Lastly, defendants argued that plaintiff’s employment was not renewed because he was an 

ineffective leader. This explanation for terminating his employment as an anesthesiologists is 

dubious. When plaintiff was hired at the VA in March 2007, the anesthesia department did not 

have a Chief of Anesthesia. Six months later, the VA had still not been able to hire someone to 

fill the position, and no other members of the anesthesia department wanted the challenge. 

Plaintiff, however, volunteered to take on the role—perhaps naively. There is no doubt that the 

anesthesia department continued to experience multiple issues during plaintiff’s first year as 

Chief. This fact is evident from the April 24, 2008, and September 10, 2008 letters in which the 

other members of the anesthesia group voiced their concerns to plaintiff. See Defs.’ Exs. B, C. 

Defendants rely on the two letters and a failure to inventory Pyxis machines, which are 

medication dispensing machines. 

 As for the Pyxis machines, each operating room contained one machine which was 

required to be inventoried weekly by the anesthesia department.20 As this task was not being 

performed by his group, plaintiff took on the responsibility to personally conduct the weekly 

inventory. There was considerable dispute at trial over whether the Pyxis machines were being 

properly inventoried during the time plaintiff was Chief. Kelly Moore, the VA Northern 

California Health Care System Compliance Officer, testified that the anesthesia department was 

not conducting the weekly inventories.21 She further stated that she brought the issue to 

plaintiff’s attention and attempted to obtain inventory logs, but no inventory logs were ever 

produced. Dr. Cahill and Dr. Hundahl also testified that there were issues with the machines not 

being properly inventoried. Dr. Cahill specifically testified that the problem with the Pyxis 

inventories was one of the considerations in the decision to terminate plaintiff’s employment. 

Plaintiff, however, testified that while the machines may not have been inventoried on the same 

day each week, the weekly inventories were generally being performed. 

///// 

 20 This was in addition to the daily inventories conducted by pharmacy personnel. 

21 Ms. Moore was hired by the VA to implement a controlled substance inspection 

program. This program required, among other things, weekly inventory of the Pryxis machine. 

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 The court finds plaintiff’s testimony on this issue credible. Although Dr. Cahill testified 

at the trial that the Pyxis inventories were not being conducted, the court finds the contrary 

version Dr. Cahill provided in his September 5, 2012 deposition testimony more credible. Dr. 

Cahill testified in his deposition that the inventories were generally being completed. Of 

particular significance, he explained that the anesthesia group was not always getting credit 

because the inventories were sometimes being completed a day or two behind the day the 

monitoring group expected the inventory to be completed. He also stated that in his “mind, if 

[plaintiff] is doing it every week on Wednesday, and the monitor is expecting it every week on 

Tuesday, the issue - - you know, if the issues is doing it weekly, [plaintiff is] doing it weekly.” 

He further stated that aside from two gaps (one 12 days and the other 10 days) the inventories 

were regularly being conducted, and that “this is considerably better than data I’ve seen from 

parts of our hospital where we know we’re missing.” This testimony discredits the assertion that 

plaintiff was fired because he was not doing his job as it relates to the Pyxis inventories. Indeed, 

Dr. Cahill’s deposition testimony corroborates plaintiff’s testimony at trial and the court finds that 

plaintiff was generally completing the weekly Pyxis inventories even if, as Dr. Cahill explained, it 

was completed on Wednesdays and the monitor was expecting it on Tuesdays. 

 Defendants’ reliance on the two letters from the anesthesia group is also unconvincing. 

The letters were dated April 24 and September 10, 2008, respectively. Defs.’ Exs. B and C. 

Plaintiff testified that he met with Dr. Hundahl after he received the letters to discuss the issues 

raised. Significantly, plaintiff had not yet left for extended leave to have his surgery. According 

to plaintiff, Dr. Hundahl did not seem overly concerned by the issued raised in the letters. While 

defendant disputes this, Dr. Hundahl’s written appraisals of plaintiff’s performance during this 

period of time is revealing on this point. 

Plaintiff received three performance evaluations during his tenure with the VA. The first 

evaluation covered plaintiff’s job performance from March 18, 2007, his first day with the VA, 

through September 30, 2007, the last day of the fiscal year. Pl.’s Ex. 2. The evaluation covered 

five categories with each scored by five rating options (unsatisfactory, low satisfactory, 

satisfactory, high satisfactory, and outstanding). Plaintiff was rated as outstanding in three 

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categories and high satisfactory in two categories, with an overall rating of outstanding. Id. The 

rating official for the evaluation was Dr. Hundahl, and his rating was approved by Dr. David 

Siegel, the then Acting Chief of Staff. Id. 

 Plaintiff’s received a second performance evaluation, this one covering his performance 

between March 18, 2007, and September 30, 2008, the time frame in which the two letters were 

received. Pl.’s Ex. 54. This form again rated plaintiff’s performance in five different categories, 

but with only three rating options available for each category (exceptional, fully successful, and 

less than fully successful). The overall rating level, however, had five rating options 

(outstanding, excellent, fully successful, minimally satisfactory, unsatisfactory). Plaintiff 

received a rating of fully successful in four categories and an exceptional in the remaining 

category. Despite the concerns raised by the members of the anesthesia department, plaintiff’s 

overall rating was fully successful.22 Dr. Hundahl was the rating official that completed the form, 

and Dr. Cahill approved the rating. 

 The third and final performance evaluation covered plaintiff’s performance from October 

1, 2008 to September 30, 2009, the time period during which plaintiff took FMLA leave.23 Joint 

Ex. J-5. Plaintiff again received ratings of fully successful in four out of five categories, but this 

time he was rated as being less than fully successful in the category entitled “HDPM Additional 

Core Competencies,” a category plaintiff was previously rated as fully successful. This category 

evaluated technical competence, creative thinking, flexibility/adaptability and personal mastery. 

Id. at 4. The narrative explaining the basis for the rating of “less than fully successful” provided 

that plaintiff had experienced issues with other members of his group and that although 

“anesthesiology resources have on occasion been limited, he has not managed and de-conflicted 

leave requests well or maximized the resources available; this resulted in some excess use of 

(expensive) fee-basis anesthesiology provides.” Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff’s overall rating was 

 22 While it can be argued that fully successful is less than the ideal, the ratings hardly 

suggest an impending decision to fire an anesthesiologist for poor performance or that poor 

performance and not the extended absence on leave to have surgery accounts for the decision at 

issue here. 

23 The second and third evaluations utilized the same evaluation form. 

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minimally satisfactory. Id. at 2. Dr. Hundahl was again the rating official for this review, with 

Dr. Cahill as the approval officer. Id. at 3. 

 In addition to performance evaluations, plaintiff also received performance pay (i.e., 

bonuses) during his tenure at the VA. For the period of March 2007 through September 2008, 

plaintiff was awarded $10,787 in performance pay, which was 90 percent of the maximum 

$13,500 he could receive for his 7 months of work. Joint Ex. J-15. For the period of October 

2007 through September 2008, plaintiff was awarded $15,000, the maximum allowed. Joint Ex. 

J-16. However, for the period of October 2008 through September 2009, plaintiff only received 

$8,250.10 in performance pay. Joint Ex. J-17. Dr. Hundahl was the recommending official on 

each performance pay evaluation. 

 Taking this documentation in combination, the evidence shows that during the time period 

in which the anesthesia department raised concerns about plaintiff’s performance as Chief, Dr. 

Hundahl rated plaintiff as fully successful and concluded that plaintiff was entitled to the 

maximum amount of performance pay. However, the rating which covered the time period 

during which plaintiff took FMLA leave evaluated plaintiff as minimally satisfactory and plaintiff 

received a reduced performance pay amount. The question posed is why, in light of the FMLA 

protection of the leave plaintiff took. The letters simply do not answer that question. Hundahl 

renewed plaintiff’s contract for an additional year on March 18, 2009, many months after the two 

letters were written in 2008. It strains credulity to suggest, in hindsight, that the letters motivated 

the decision not to renew plaintiff’s employment. 

 Further undermining defendants’ explanation is the fact that plaintiff was no longer Chief 

at the time that his employment was terminated. He submitted his resignation of the Chief duties 

and his request to remain as a staff anesthesiologist on December 1, 2009, a request that Dr. 

Hundahl granted. At the time the request was granted, there was a vacant staff anesthesiologist 

position. If, as the defense concedes, Dr. Bonzani was a qualified and competent 

anesthesiologist, Dr. Hundahl could have retained plaintiff as a staff anesthesiologist and still 

maintain the ability to recruit and hire a new Chief of Anesthesiology. Regardless of leadership 

concerns, there certainly was a need for retaining a staff anesthesiologist. 

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Indeed, the need at the Sacramento VA was pronounced. Although it was approved for 

six anesthesiologists, it often experienced difficulty recruiting and maintaining six to fill these 

positions. The shortage of anesthesiologists was explained quite pointedly by Dr. Baker. Dr. 

Baker was so concerned about keeping an adequate number of anesthesiologists that he circulated 

a petition to retain plaintiff. The petition was signed by 31 individuals, including three 

anesthesiologists. Pl.’s Ex. 8. The two members of the anesthesia department that did not sign 

the form were Dr. Batista and Dr. Donald. Dr. Donald testified that she declined to sign the 

petition, not because she thought plaintiff’s employment should have been terminated, but 

because she was concerned with the repercussions she would potentially face for signing it. Dr. 

Donald stated that she believed plaintiff to be a good anesthesiologist. Dr. Batista testified that 

she no longer wanted to work with plaintiff, but confirmed that he was a competent 

anesthesiologist. 

 Thus, whatever can be said of plaintiff’s short tenure as Chief, there was a historical and 

recurrent difficulty of obtaining and keeping anesthesiologists. The result was scheduling 

conflicts and surgeries being cancelled, before, during and after plaintiff’s tenure as Chief, but 

most severely during plaintiffs extended absence on FMLA leave. In spite of the need for 

anesthesiologists, plaintiff’s employment contract was not renewed. Further, it was not renewed 

in spite of an available staff position and defendants’ concession that plaintiff was a competent 

anesthesiologist.24 Accordingly, it is difficult to comprehend how any shortcomings plaintiff 

displayed as a chief supported the decision to end his employment as an anesthesiologist. 

///// 

 24 Defendants argue that the issue is the non-renewal of plaintiff’s employment as chief, 

not his employment as a staff anesthesiologist. There was some testimony at trial indicating that 

the formal paperwork needed to transfer plaintiff from his chief position to a staff anesthesiology 

position was never processed, which defendants relied upon to argue that on paper he was chief at 

the time his employment ended. The failure to process the paperwork does not alter the reality in 

the workplace. Dr. Hundahl accepted plaintiff’s resignation as chief and granted the request to 

stay on as a staff anesthesiologist. Joint Ex. J-2. Dr. Hundahl directed Carol Ross to ensure 

plaintiff was converted to a staff anesthesiologist position. Pl.’s Ex. 26. Any technical error in 

processing the paperwork does not undermine the fact that plaintiff was working as a staff 

anesthesiologist at the time his employment ended. 

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 Lastly, plaintiff specifically testified that at the January 6, 2010 meeting Dr. Hundahl 

stated to him: “you’re good when you’re here, but you were gone too long. You take too much 

sick leave. We can’t do surgeries without fucking anesthesiologists.” Although Dr. Hundahl 

disputes making this statement, the court finds plaintiff to be more credible and therefore gives 

greater weight to his version of the January 6 meeting.25

 Based on the foregoing, the court finds from a preponderance of the evidence that 

plaintiff’s taking of leave to have surgery, leave that is protected by the FMLA, was the primary 

basis for not renewing his employment contract with the VA. Accordingly, the Secretary 

interfered with plaintiff’s rights under the FMLA. 

 B. FMLA Claim Against Defendant Hundahl 

The court ruled on a pretrial motion that plaintiff could proceed on a claim under the 

FMLA against Dr. Hundahl in his individual capacity. Bonzani v. Shinseki, 895 F. Supp. 2d 

1003, 1010 (E.D. Cal. 2012). As noted above, plaintiff’s FMLA claim against Dr. Hundahl--

although predicated on essentially the same facts as addressed above--was tried to the court. 

However, one element of the claim, the factual question of whether Dr. Hundahl acted as an 

“employer” for purposes of the FMLA was tried to the court.26 If Dr. Hundahl did in fact act as 

an employer for purposes of the statute, the remaining factual issues were for the jury to resolve. 

The question of Hundahl’s status involves a pragmatic determination of the extent to which he 

controlled the decision to end plaintiff’s employment. That turns on facts intertwined with the 

merits of the jury issues and therefore the trial proceeded as a hybrid bench and jury trial. In 

 25 Other items of evidence raised concerns over Hundahl’s candor as to this issue. For 

example, his email dated January 12, 2010, responding to Dr. Baker’s petition and concern over 

plaintiff losing his job, states: “before making up your mind, you might want to get some of the 

facts. You were absent for much of Dr. B’s problematic period. You are unaware of the two 

adverse letters to him signed by all the other anesthesiologist.” Pl.’s Ex. 106. As noted, prior to 

Bonzani’s absence for surgery, Dr. Hundahl gave plaintiff a favorable review and found that he 

was entitled to the maximum performance pay subsequent to receipt of these letters. More 

significantly, he extended plaintiff’s employment contract for an additional year on March 18, 

2009. 

26 Both parties waived jury on the issue of whether defendant Hundahl was an 

“employer” for purposes of the FMLA and requested that the issue be tried to the court. ECF No. 

118 at 16; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(a). 

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addition to the factual findings above, which are incorporated herein, the court now enters 

findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the issue of whether Hundahl acted as an employer 

for purposes of the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a). 

 1. Dr. Hundahl’s Status as an Employer Under the FMLA 

 The court applies a four-factor “economic reality” test to determine whether an individual 

is an employer under the FLSA.27 In the Ninth Circuit that test considers: “Whether the alleged 

employer (1) had the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled 

employee work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of 

payment, and (4) maintained employment records.” Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1001–02, 

2012 (9th Cir. 1999). Thus, an individual officer, director, or supervisor may be held liable as an 

employer under the FLSA where the evidence supports a determination that the individual 

exercised economic and operational control over the employment relationship. Id. at 1012 (CEO 

and COO properly deemed employers under the FLSA where they had a significant ownership 

interest as well as operational control of significant aspects of the company’s day-to-day 

functions, the power to hire and fire employees, the power to determine salaries, and 

responsibility for maintaining employment records); Boucher v. Shaw, 572 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (finding that a defendant responsible for handling labor and employment matters, who 

also held 30% ownership over a company, was an “employer” under the FLSA); Biggs v. Wilson, 

1 F.3d 1537, 1538 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that a state’s failure to issue state employees’ 

paychecks until after a state budget was passed by the legislature and signed by the Governor 

demonstrated the “economic reality” of being a state employee, and was therefore a violation of 

the FLSA); Chao v. Hotel Oasis, Inc., 493 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 2007) (corporation’s president 

personally liable where he had ultimate control over business’ day-to-day operations and was the 

corporate officer principally in charge of directing employment practices); Ulin v. ALAEA–72, 

 27 In deciding defendants’ prior motions to dismiss the complaint and for summary 

judgment, the court relied on the similarity between the FMLA’s and the FLSA’s definition of 

employer in holding that a supervisory can be held liable under the FMLA. Bonzani v. Shinseki

895 F. Supp. 2d at 1009-10. The court therefore employs the standard utilized under the FLSA to 

determine whether Dr. Hundahl had sufficient control to be an employer under the FMLA. 

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Inc., 2011 WL 723617, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2011) (finding an individual personally liable 

as an employer under the FLSA when the individual “was responsible for posting, calculating, 

measuring, estimating, recording, or otherwise determining the hours worked by Plaintiff, and 

wages paid him,” and “authorized and issued payments to Plaintiff, supervised Plaintiff’s work, 

and was responsible for recruiting, hiring, firing, disciplining, assigning jobs and setting wages 

for Plaintiff”); Solis v. Best Miracle, 709 F. Supp. 2d 843, 847 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (finding that a 

manager who had the authority to hire and fire employees, instructed employees to falsify their 

time cards, maintained employment records, filled out time and wage sheets, signed paychecks, 

and “paid all the bills” was an “employer” under the FLSA). 

 Dr. Hundahl maintains that he did not act as an “employer” for purposes of the FMLA 

because he lacked sufficient control over plaintiff’s employment. As discussed below, however, 

Dr. Hundahl himself has expressed conflicting views on this question. Central to his position at 

trial is his contention that he only had the authority to make recommendations—as opposed to a 

final decision—regarding changes to plaintiff’s employment. He testified that the Chief of Staff 

must then concur in the recommendation, which is then submitted to the Chief of Human 

Resources for a final decision. Although other defense witnesses supported this assertion of how 

the decision should have been made, it does not accurately state what, in fact, occurred in 

deciding to terminate Dr. Bonzani’s employment. 

 It may well be the case that Dr. Hundahl’s role in theory was supposed to be one of 

making a recommendation, but the four-factor “economic reality” test looks to what actually 

occurred. In turn, this test requires the court to determine who actually controlled the choice of 

whether to keep or terminate plaintiff as an anesthesiologist.28 The court finds by a 

 28 As with the FLSA, the focus under this test is on who actually controlled the conditions 

regulated by the statute. See, e.g., Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d at 1012 (focusing on whether 

the defendant exercised operational control); Chao v. Hotel Oasis, Inc., 493 F.3d at 34 (focusing 

on control of day-to-day operations); Ulin v. ALAEA–72, Inc., 2011 WL 723617, at *11 (focusing 

on control over recruiting, hiring, firing, disciplining, assigning jobs, determining hours worked 

and setting wages). Whereas the FLSA regulates, among other things, wage and hours, the 

FMLA prohibits making the use of protected leave a negative factor in an employee’s continued 

employment. Thus, the concern here is who, in fact, controlled whether Dr. Bonzani should be 

disciplined and/or terminated for his use of leave. 

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preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Hundahl, in fact, controlled that choice. Indeed, his 

decision surprised Dr. O’Neill, the Director of Health Care System and Dr. Cahill’s supervisor, 

who had virtually no role in analyzing or deciding the matter other than to state that all he cared 

about was not ending up in a costly lawsuit. 

At trial, Dr. Hundahl characterized his role as merely making a recommendation. This 

stands in stark contrast to the announcement in his email to Drs. Cahill and O’Neill of his 

decision not to renew the employment contract. Dr. Hundahl was confronted at trial with his 

earlier deposition testimony in which he was asked in open ended fashion “[w]ho decided to 

extend Dr. Bonzani’s appointment?” Dr. Hundahl succinctly replied “[i]t would have been me.” 

Only when pressed on whether he was the only person to make that decision did he then recharacterize the decision as a recommendation. ECF No. 185 at 15. But re-labelling the choice 

as a recommendation for purposes of deflecting responsibility does not alter the reality of what 

occurred. Dr. Hundahl informed Drs. Cahill and O’Neill that he, Hundahl, would not be 

renewing plaintiff’s employment. Lest there be any doubt as to who was making the decision, Dr. 

O’Neill asked whether that meant plaintiff was losing his job. That is a response indicative of the 

practical finality of Hundahl’s choice, not a response that the choice was being treated as a 

recommendation that would be considered and either accepted or rejected. Although Dr. O’Neill 

counseled caution to avoid litigation, he did not treat the decision as a recommendation.29 There 

was no evidence presented that any official other than Hundahl actually controlled the decisionmaking process and ultimate choice whether to end plaintiff’s employment. It was Hundahl who 

took account of plaintiff’s performance, approved or disapproved his absence from work, 

analyzed whether to keep him as a staff anesthesiologist, and more importantly, actually exercised 

control over the choice to be made. In light of his overall demeanor and manner of testifying and 

 

29 If their management communications can in any way be taken seriously, there is simply 

no other way to interpret the email correspondence in which Hundahl stated “As you know, I will 

not be renewing Dr. Bonzani’s 1 year NTE contract (expiring in March, 2010)” and O’Neill 

responded “What does it mean that you won’t be renewing Bonzani’s 1 year contract? You mean 

he is losing his job.” Pl.’s Ex. 102. 

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taken in the context of all the other evidence, the court cannot credit the attempt to explain away 

Hundahl’s responsibility for the decision that he made. In short, if plaintiff’s use of protected 

leave motivated or otherwise was used as a negative factor in the decision to end plaintiff’s 

employment, the choice to terminate his employment was that of Dr. Hundahl. 

Dr. Hundahl also exercised operational control more generally. There were other 

instances in Dr. Hundahl’s testimony in which he unguardedly described decisions that he plainly 

controlled. For example, Hundahl testified that he made the earlier decision to extend plaintiff’s 

employment for one year. After catching his misstep, his demeanor changed and he qualified his 

characterization of the decision as a recommendation. When cross-examined about the August 26 

AWOL, Dr. Hundahl stated “I could have fired him (referring to plaintiff) after that first AWOL. 

I did not.” Significantly, Dr. Hundahl testified that although he discussed with HR personnel 

whether to immediately terminate plaintiff’s employment after the AWOL, he specifically “made 

a decision to retain him, and [he] thought that was a fair decision.”30 While the decision may or 

may not have been fair, the issue at this point is who controlled the decision. The court finds 

from all of the evidence and testimony that it was Dr. Hundahl who controlled and actually made 

the decision. 

Dr. Hundahl’s pretrial view of his role as the person making such decisions was shared by 

others. Dr. Baker explained that he provided Dr. Hundahl a copy of the petition to keep plaintiff 

 30 The testimony was as follows: 

Q: So if an AWOL is a severe infraction, why would you 

have let him work out the remainder of his contract? 

A: I could have fired him after that first AWOL. I did 

not. 

Q: Did you even think about it? 

A: Our HR staff discussed that with me. I made a 

decision to retain him, and I thought that was a fair 

decision. 

ECF No. 186 at 70 (emphasis added). 

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because he believed Hundahl was the person with the power to hire and fire employees. While 

the perception of other doctors in the surgery department is not dispositive on this issue, the fact 

that others shared Dr. Hundahl’s perception of his own authority at the time he terminated 

plaintiff supports the finding that, notwithstanding a theoretical mechanism for how termination 

decisions would be made, the practice in reality is that Dr. Hundahl made the decision to end Dr. 

Bonzani’s employment with the VA. 

In making this finding the court has weighed carefully the testimony as to what apparently 

was supposed to occur with other testimony as to what really happened. That testimony, together 

with the clear contemporaneous email documentation of Hundahl’s decision, shows that in reality 

Hundahl made the decision. Again, the test focuses on the reality of what in fact occurred, not a 

theoretical procedure that was not actually followed. When questioned at trial about Hundahl 

informing them of his decision, Drs. Cahill and O’Neill each attempted to mitigate the effect of 

the September 29 email by adding that everyone understood that Dr. Hundahl was simply making 

a preliminary recommendation.31 While that post hoc characterization of the process may 

describe how it was supposed to operate, it is not what occurred here. Considering Hundahl’s 

plain language used contemporaneously with his statement of the decision itself in his email 

informing Cahill and O’Neill, his other testimony and the demeanor and manner of his testimony, 

and in light of the testimony of the other witnesses, the court finds Dr. Hundahl’s disclaimer at 

trial--denying that he made the actual decision--is not credible. Hundahl’s pretrial statements 

clearly indicated that he was the individual who decided to terminate plaintiff’s employment. 

 The court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that while the decision not to renew 

plaintiff’s employment may have been followed by paperwork through Human Resources to 

implement Hundahl’s decision, in practice the actual control over whether to terminate plaintiff’s 

employment was exercised by Dr. Hundahl. 

 Hundahl also exercised authority over plaintiff’s work schedule. Any request for leave 

had to be submitted through VistA for Dr. Hundahl’s approval. Although the official leave 

 31 The attempt at trial by these defense witnesses to retreat from the damaging effect of 

the September 29 email correspondence simply diminished their credibility on this point. 

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calendar was originally maintained in Dr. Bonzani’s office, Dr. Hundahl had it moved to his 

office. See Pl.’s Ex. 95. Moreover, approval from Dr. Hundahl was needed before any cases 

could be cancelled due to any staffing issue. Thus, despite plaintiff being the Chief of 

Anesthesiology, Dr. Hundahl exercised authority over his work schedule. 

 Although Hundahl did not have the authority to set plaintiff’s base salary (salaries for 

doctors and nurses were set by a professional standards board), to the extent anyone could 

exercise control over plaintiff’s compensation apart from the base salary, it was Hundahl. As 

noted above, Dr. Hundahl controlled the decision as to the amount of performance pay plaintiff 

would receive each year. Again, while Dr. Hundahl maintained at trial that he only made 

recommendations regarding plaintiff’s performance pay, the court finds, contrary to that 

testimony, Dr. Hundahl actually controlled the decision.32 

 Little, if any, evidence was presented as to whether Dr. Hundahl was responsible for 

maintaining employment records. Nevertheless, assuming he was not, the court finds from a 

preponderance of the evidence that on balance the several factors articulated in Lambert

demonstrate that Dr. Hundahl maintained sufficient control over the day-to-day operations of 

plaintiff’s employment to be considered an “employer” for purposes of liability under FMLA. 

 2. The Jury’s Verdict on The FMLA Claim Against Hundahl 

 Having resolved the issue of “employer” status under the FMLA, the court turns to the 

jury’s finding in favor of plaintiff as to the claim against Hundahl. The parties do not dispute that 

plaintiff was entitled to the leave that he took and that doing so was protected by the FMLA. 

They agreed that the issues for the jury were whether Dr. Hundahl used plaintiff’s protected leave 

as a negative factor in not renewing his employment and, if so, the question of damages.33 The 

jury returned a verdict finding that plaintiff had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that 

 32 No evidence or examples were presented showing that Hundahl’s determinations in 

that regard were, in practice, limited by a higher level of review. Rather, it appears from the 

evidence that these decisions were simply implemented without further analysis or weighing of 

the various factors that would be considered in making those decisions. 

33 However, the defendants’ dispute whether the loss of pension benefits is an item of 

damages rather than a question of equitable relief. 

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defendant Hundahl used plaintiff’s medical leave as a negative factor in the decision not to renew 

plaintiff’s appointment. ECF No. 178. The jury further found that Hundahl failed to prove that 

he would have taken the same action even if he had not considered plaintiff’s medical leave. Id. 

The jury also found that plaintiff sustained damages in the amount of $675,238 based on Dr. 

Hundahl’s interference with plaintiff’s use of FMLA leave. Id. 

 Hundahl argues that any award for the loss of FERS benefits should be characterized as 

front pay, as opposed to back pay, and therefore the determination as to any loss is an issue that 

must be decided by the court.

 3. Front Pay vs. Back Pay34

 Hundahl characterizes the jury’s award of $675,238 in damages as front pay and argues it 

must be vacated because front pay must be determined by the court, not the jury. Secondly, 

Hundahl argues that an award of front pay is unduly speculative and would result in an 

impermissible windfall to plaintiff. Neither argument has merit. 

 “An employer who violates the [FMLA] is liable for damages equal to the amount of any 

lost wages and other employment-related compensation, as well as any actual damages sustained 

as a result of the violation. . . .” Bachelder v. America West Airline, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1130 

(9th Cir. 2001). A plaintiff may recover damages in the form of back pay and front pay for an 

interference claim under the FMLA. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2617; Traxler v. Multnomah County, 596 

F.3d 1007, 1011-1012 (9th Cir. 2010). The back pay provision of the FMLA authorizes damages 

equal to “wages, salary, employment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost . . . by reason 

of the violation. . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i). Back pay should generally be computed 

“from the date of the discriminatory act until the date of final judgment.” Thorne v. City of El 

Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 1986). 

 “In cases in which reinstatement is not viable . . . courts have ordered front pay as a 

substitute for reinstatement.” Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 846 

(2001). In the court’s discretion it can be awarded in cases where an appropriate position is not 

 34 The discussion and findings in this section that relate to the determination of plaintiff’s 

loss applies to the FMLA claim against the Secretary as well as Hundahl. 

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immediately available without displacing an incumbent, or continuing hostility or irreconcilable 

breakdown of working relationships renders the remedy of reinstatement non-viable. Id. But 

front pay is only appropriate where the court determines that reinstatement is inappropriate, such 

as when “the employer-employee relationship has been so damaged by animosity that 

reinstatement is impractical.” Traxler, 596 F.3d at 1012. “In other words, a front pay . . . award 

is the monetary equivalent of the equitable remedy of reinstatement.” Id. (quotations omitted). 

 Here, plaintiff does not seek reinstatement. Nor does he seek an award for the loss of 

future salary in lieu of reinstatement. He seeks compensation for the monetary loss of pension 

benefits for which he otherwise would have vested had he been allowed to continue working two 

more years until vesting in the FERS retirement plan. In summary, his expert witness calculated 

the present day value of FERS benefits he otherwise would have been entitled to receive had he 

completed those two years of federal service and then left for the private sector. As discussed 

below, there was an evidentiary basis for the jury to credit plaintiff’s testimony that he would 

have done so, and to further credit his expert’s testimony that had plaintiff done so--and become 

vested in FERS--the present value of the benefits he would have received is $675,238. The point 

missed by Hundahl is that had plaintiff been allowed to work the two additional years he would 

have vested as of a date before the trial, not some date in the future.35 In short, reinstatement is 

not an issue and neither is the question of front pay. 

 Neither is there merit to defendant’s argument that courts routinely categorize such 

damages as front pay. The question is not settled. Defendant Hundahl cites to Miller v. Raytheon 

Co., 716 F.3d 138, 146-147 (5th Cir. 2013), a case which addressed the award of enhanced 

benefits that would have vested at age 55. The plaintiff therein attained age 55 a few months 

 35 Had plaintiff’s employment not been terminated, his FERS benefits would have vested 

in March 2012, prior to this case going to trial. A back pay award that includes associated 

compensation that otherwise would have been received (such as service credits and contributions) 

is retrospective, not prospective. Although plaintiff does not ask for back pay, he does seek 

compensation for the value of the back benefits that would have accrued. Calculating the value of 

the loss of vesting in the pension based on credited service through March 2012, adjusted to its 

present day value, does not convert it into a monetary award in lieu of reinstatement. It is 

calculation of the same value he would receive with no order for reinstatement. 

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before trial. The Fifth Circuit viewed the question of whether the plaintiff would have stayed 

with the company until age 55 to qualify for the enhancement as a forward-looking determination 

and characterized the award as front pay, thus disqualifying it from consideration in determining 

any liquidated damages award. Id at 146. But the court in Miller expressly cautioned: 

As we did in Bourdais [v. New Orleans City, 485 F.3d 294], at 301 

n. 9., we decline to set out an inflexible rule on the treatment of 

“pension benefits” as damages or front pay under ADEA. The term 

is ambiguous. In some cases, it refers to employer contributions to 

a 401(k) plan; in others, to the right to receive certain benefits in the 

future; in others, the accrual of seniority entitlements to enhanced 

payments. Compare e.g., Sharkey v. Lasmo (AUL Ltd.), 214 F.3d 

371, 374–75 (2d Cir. 2000) (“pension credits” in form of “service 

and salary credits” coextensive with back pay award should be 

treated as back pay). 

716 F.3d at 147, n.3. Bourdais states that “[w]hether a plaintiff’s delayed accumulation of 

pension benefits should be considered back pay or front pay appears to be an unresolved issue in 

this Circuit.”36 The court noted that neither party briefed the issue and it was therefore waived. 

Thus, the panel concluded “[w]e do not disrupt the district court’s classification of this award as 

front pay but note that the issue remains undecided.” In contrast, the Second Circuit case cited in 

Miller, Sharkey v. Lasmo (AUL Ltd.), states “[w]e agree with Sharkey that awards for lost pension 

benefits are compensation for past economic loss—not a form of ‘prospective relief,’ as the 

district court found.” 214 F.3d at 374-75. Sharkey argued that he was entitled to service and 

salary credits for the same period as the jury awarded back pay. The Second Circuit agreed. It 

distinguished two kinds of relief that may be awarded to compensate a prevailing plaintiff for lost 

 36 Defendant Hundahl’s other cited authorities fail to support the broad proposition he 

argues here. Skalka v. Fernalk Envtl. Restoration Mgt. Corp., 178 F.3d 414, 425 (6th Cir. 1999), 

cited by defendant provides little assistance. As the court stated, the plaintiffs therein did not 

attempt to defend the inclusion of the pension benefits in the back pay award and there is no 

analysis as to whether plaintiff would have vested during the time period plaintiff was eligible for 

back pay compensation. Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 829 F.2d 367, 370 (3d Cir. 1987), also cited 

by plaintiff does not analyze the question here but simply answers the different question of 

whether benefits could be awarded as front pay. Likewise, Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co. did 

not decide the question raised here but simply affirmed a denial of front pay. See 870 F.2d 1198, 

1212 (7th Cir. 1989) (“If, before trial, he received benefits, in the form of severance pay or lumpsum pension payments, which more than offset his loss of future earnings, he suffered no 

economic injury from his discharge.”). 

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pension benefits. “First, the plaintiff’s lost service and salary credits may be restored to his 

pension plan.”37 Id. at 375 (citing Banks v. Travelers Cos., 180 F.3d 358, 365 (2d Cir. 1999) and 

Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1036 (2d Cir. 1980)). The court added that: 

This is the post-trial, equitable relief that Sharkey seeks. However, 

as we recognized in Banks, it is also possible to award money 

damages to compensate the plaintiff for the value of the pension 

benefits that were lost. This form of legal relief is proper for a jury 

to award. See Banks, 180 F.3d at 365 (“Had [plaintiff] actually 

requested money damages for lost pension benefits, the district 

court might well have been right to deem that form of relief legal 

. . . . ”). 

214 F.3d at 375 (emphasis added). This is precisely the form of money damages sought by 

Bonzani and awarded by the jury here. 

 Here, the jury necessarily credited plaintiff’s testimony that he would have remained with 

the VA at least through March 2012 before leaving for the private sector had Hundahl not 

terminated plaintiff’s employment earlier.38 It also expressly found that the defendant had not 

established that he would have taken the same action without using plaintiff’s medical leave as a 

negative factor in the termination decision. ECF No. 178. This trial commenced October 20, 

2015, and the jury returned its verdict in favor of plaintiff on the FMLA claim on October 30, 

2015. The jury’s award to plaintiff of damages for the value of the pension benefits lost does not 

require a monetary award of additional future salary and pension contributions for some number 

of years as an equivalent of the equitable remedy of reinstatement. Rather, the jury credited the 

testimony of plaintiff’s expert, Mr. Davis, and awarded the money damages for the lost pension 

benefits, reduced to present value, that plaintiff would have been entitled to had he not been 

 37 Defendant concedes that this is one possible remedy. ECF No. 182 at 6 (“At most, 

back pay might consist of FERS contributions that the VA would have made into his retirement 

account had he stayed at the VA long enough to vest in FERS [less plaintiff’s share of required 

contributions].”) 

38 This was simply a matter of the jury determining whether it is credible that Dr. 

Bonzani, but for Hundahl’s action, would have remained with the VA the two additional years to 

vest and then go on to private practice. It concluded that it is. Having so decided, and having 

credited Mr. Davis by adopting his damage figure of $675,238, the loss calculation was rather 

straight forward using the two additional years Bonzani would have worked at the VA. 

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terminated prior to March of 2012. Thus, the award simply credits plaintiff for the two years of 

past service and salary credits through that date and compensates him for the lost value. 

 Even if defendant were correct that the question should have been decided by the court 

under a front pay analysis rather than awarded as damages by the jury, plaintiff’s loss would 

nonetheless be compensable. As previously noted, front pay is only available where 

reinstatement is not viable. Traxler, 596 F.3d at 1012; see also Gotthardt v. National R.R. 

Passenger Corp, 191 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[R]einstatement, when it is feasible, is 

the preferred remedy in a discrimination suit.”). Here, reinstatement is not feasible. Plaintiff 

returned from his FMLA leave to a hostile work environment. Soon after his return he was 

confronted by Dr. Hundahl, who was either “raising his voice” or “yelling” and pounding his fist 

about the problems the VA had experienced while plaintiff was out on leave. Following 

plaintiff’s leave there was also a breakdown of any effective communication between them. Dr. 

Hundahl was plaintiff’s supervisor and the lack of effective communication precluded 

reinstatement as a realistic option. 

 Reinstatement as an anesthesiologist at another location in the Northern California VA 

system is also not feasible. Dr. Cahill specifically testified that after plaintiff was notified his 

employment would not be renewed, other options for retaining him were explored, including 

whether he could work at the VA in Martinez, California, but those options were not feasible. 

Cahill Tr., ECF No. 192 at 4-7. Accordingly, the court finds that reinstatement is not a viable 

option and front pay could be considered as an alternative form of compensation, had it been 

necessary. 

 Hundahl also argues that compensation for the pension loss inappropriate for the 

additional reason that an award of FERS benefits is too speculative and is contrary to evidence at 

trial. ECF No. at 180 at 15. He argues that it is speculative whether plaintiff would have 

remained on staff at the VA for two additional years had his employment not been terminated, 

despite plaintiff’s testimony that he had every intention of doing so. Id. But “by its nature, a 

front pay award requires a certain amount of speculation by the Court.” Nehara v. California, 

2013 WL 1876122, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 3, 2013) (citing Traxler v. Multnomah Cnty., 596 F.3d 

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at 1011 and Downey v. Strain, 510 F.3d 534, 544 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Front pay can only be 

calculated through intelligent guesswork, and we recognize its speculative character by according 

wide latitude in its determination to the district courts.”)). Here, the crux of Hundahl’s 

“speculative” argument relates more to the credibility of Dr. Bonzani’s testimony about his career 

plans than the estimations and calculations that must be made assuming his testimony is credited. 

 As noted, plaintiff served in the Air Force from July 1, 1986, to February 12, 2007. Upon 

leaving the Air Force in 2007 he sought and obtained employment with the VA as an 

anesthesiologist. He credibly testified that one reason he sought employment with the VA was so 

he could transfer over his military retirement into FERS.39 He also stated that he did not have a 

plan for how long he intended to work at the VA, but he wanted to stay at least until his 

retirement vested. Although there was some evidence that plaintiff looked for other employment 

opportunities in the private sector in 2008 and 2009, he clearly indicated in his December 1, 2009 

letter to Dr. Hundahl that it was his “desire to serve the VA as a staff anesthesiologist . . . .” Joint 

Ex. J-1. Thus, while Hundahl disparages plaintiff’s testimony, the evidence supports Dr. 

Bonzani’s assertion that he wanted to remain employed as a staff anesthesiologist for at least two 

additional one-year terms, thereby acquiring the requisite number of years to vest in FERS, and 

that he would have done so had Dr. Hundahl not terminated his employment. Like the jury, the 

court finds credible plaintiff’s testimony in that regard. 

 As did the jury, the court further finds that absent the decision by Dr. Hundahl to end Dr. 

Bonzani’s employment due to his use of protected leave, the VA otherwise would not have 

unilaterally terminated plaintiff’s employment. Testimony at trial consistently established that 

the VA experienced difficulty recruiting and maintaining anesthesiologists.40 That very staffing 

problem prompted Dr. Baker to circulate the petition to retain plaintiff as a staff 

 39 The evidence presented at trial conclusively demonstrated that five total years of civil 

service with the federal government was needed for plaintiff’s interest in FERS to vest. 

40 As noted, Hundahl does not dispute that plaintiff was a competent anesthesiologist. 

ECF No. 118 at 3. 

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anesthesiologist.41 The court was impressed with Dr. Baker’s testimony, and in particular his 

primary concern of being able to treat his patients who were in need of surgery. Dr. Baker was 

not friends with Dr. Bonzani (Baker Tr., ECF No. 191 at 9) and had no interest in the dispute at 

issue in this case other than being able to provide treatment for his patients. He made clear that 

the petition was circulated not out of concern over plaintiff or Hundahl but instead out of a 

concern for the mission of the VA to provide needed medical care to veterans. He testified 

pointedly and credibly that he drafted the petition because he needed competent anesthesiologists 

to perform on his cases, and he had previously had problems with surgeries being canceled due to 

insufficient staffing of anesthesiologists.42 Setting aside the rift that had developed between Dr. 

Hundahl and plaintiff following plaintiff’s extended absence for his knee surgery, there is every 

reason to conclude that plaintiff would have worked at the VA as an anesthesiologist the two 

additional years needed for his FERS benefits to vest. See Blum v. Witco Chemical Corp., 829 

F.2d at 367 (finding reasonable the assumption that the plaintiff would have continued to work 

for eight years until he reached retirement age). 

 Hundahl further argues that front pay is inappropriate because plaintiff had already fully 

mitigated his damages. ECF No. 180 at 16. Defendant asserts that any loss of FERS vesting is 

offset by plaintiff immediately finding employment at a substantially higher salary. According to 

defendant’s calculation, his higher salary in non-government employment will outpace his 

earnings and benefits that he would have received had he remained at the VA. Id. In short, 

Hundahl argues that plaintiff sustained no loss because he was better off financially working in 

the private sector than working at the VA. The argument is premised on acceptance of 

defendants’ expert’s opinion, and rejection of plaintiff’s expert’s opinion. The jury rejected that 

 41 Dr. Baker’s January 12, 2010 email to Dr. Hundahl informing him of the petition 

states: “Dr. Bonzani is a competent anesthesiologist, Mather is very short staffed on working 

anesthesiologist. To let a Veteran, and good provider go does not make sense to any of the 

Surgeons or Nurses.” Pl.’s Ex. 105. 

42 Dr. Baker testified: “I wanted an anesthesiologist that could put my patients together – 

to put my patients to sleep safely so that they could get their operations. So if it’s something 

about they [Drs. Hundahl and Bonzani] can’t get along with each other or something else, it 

doesn’t matter to me. If he will do his job, I want him to be there.” Baker Tr., ECF No. 191 at 7. 

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argument and so does the court. 

Defendants’ expert, Richard Barnes, a forensic accountant, opined that plaintiff did not 

sustain any financial damages as a result of leaving the VA because his earning capacity 

increased working in the private sector. Mr. Barnes compared the projected earnings plaintiff 

would have received had he remained with the VA for his entire career, including the FERS 

benefits he would have received upon retirement, with his projected earnings from working in the 

private sector. 

 He testified that plaintiff was projected to earn between $50,000 to $60,000 more a year 

working in the private sector, and that if plaintiff worked until he was 68 years old and lived to be 

between 76 and 79,43 plaintiff would still earn $200,000 to $400,000 more in the private sector 

than had he remained at the VA. Accordingly, it was his opinion that plaintiff did not sustain any 

damages as a result of his employment not being renewed. 

Mr. Barnes’s projection disregards the alternative that plaintiff, instead of being fired, 

would have remained in government service with the VA for the two additional years he needed 

to combine with his military service in order to vest in a FERS pension before moving to the 

private sector. This point was addressed by plaintiff’s expert, Conrad Davis, also a forensic 

accountant. 

Mr. Davis pointed out that plaintiff was let go from the VA two years before he vested. 

Davis Tr., ECF No. 193 at 4. Had plaintiff not been terminated, Mr. Davis projected what 

plaintiff’s VA earnings would have been for two additional years, and then calculated what his 

FERS pension would have been had plaintiff been able to complete that service and vest in FERS 

prior to leaving for the private sector.44 Mr. Davis concluded that plaintiff sustained a loss 

 43 Vocational expert witness Gary Nibbelink testified that plaintiff’s work life expectancy 

is 68.5 years and life expectancy is 78.4 years. Plaintiff’s expert witness determined that 

plaintiff’s life expectancy was 76 years. 

44 As discussed below, although Hundahl disputes this method as speculative, there 

plainly is evidence to substantiate the assumption used that plaintiff would have continued 

working at the Mather VA facility for at least two more years. 

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equivalent to the value of the FERS benefits he would have received had he worked the two 

additional years needed to vest, less any mitigation. Mr. Davis ultimately concluded that the 

discounted present value of plaintiff’s FERS benefits totaled $657,238.45 This number was based 

on the total amount of FERS benefits that, but for his termination two years before vesting, 

plaintiff would have received from the time he reached age 60 through the date of his life 

expectancy, minus monies he would have to pay to buy back military service credit to be eligible 

for FERS46 and mitigating earnings he received from employment in the private sector between 

the date he left the VA and when his benefits would have vested. 

Using this methodology was a major point of contention between the parties. Unlike Mr. 

Barnes, Mr. Davis determined that it was unnecessary to subtract any mitigating earnings plaintiff 

may have received after his interest in FERS had vested. Mr. Davis explained that once 

plaintiff’s interest in FERS had vested, he would be entitled to receive those benefits regardless of 

whether he remained with the VA. Upon vesting, he could switch to the private sector, or even 

leave the practice of medicine. It simply would not matter; he would still be entitled to receive 

the FERS benefits based on service credits for the two additional years in question. As Mr. Davis 

articulated it: 

The short of it is that what Dr. Bonzani lost was the FERS pension 

at the time of vesting. Once he was vested – so that would have 

been two more years -- really he could do anything, and it wouldn't 

change my number. So the important part was I only had to make 

the assumption that he would have stayed two more years with the 

 45 Mr. Barnes testified that this figure was not accurate because Mr. Davis relied on 

erroneous assumptions. For example, in calculating plaintiff’s FERS benefits, Mr. Davis 

assumed that plaintiff’s salary for 2012 would have increased by 4.6 percent from the prior year. 

Testimony at trial indicated that there was no increase in salary for anesthesiologists in 2012. 

Although Mr. Barnes testified that such an assumption impacted Mr. Davis’s calculation, 

defendants did not produce any evidence specifically indicating the degree to which the 

assumption impacted Mr. Davis’s conclusion that plaintiff’s FERS benefits totaled $657,238 or 

elicit testimony as to how that figure should be adjusted, if at all, to account for the 2012. Thus, 

the court declines to do so.

 46 For plaintiff to be eligible for a FERS benefit, he would have to work two additional 

years and buy back a percentage of his military earnings and pay back approximately $6,700 he 

cashed out of FERS when he left the VA. Mr. Davis’s calculation accounted for the need to pay 

back these funds in order to receive FERS benefits. 

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VA and after that no more assumptions. So that was fairly certain 

to me. 

Davis Tr., ECF No. 193 at 4. 

 After careful consideration of the testimony in light of all the other evidence in the record, 

the court finds Mr. Davis’s opinion more persuasive. Plaintiff testified that he did not have a plan 

regarding how long he intended to stay at the VA. But he was clear that he intended to stay with 

the VA at least until his FERS benefits vested. That was a motivating factor in taking the job. 

There was also testimony indicating that he expressed some interest in employment in the private 

sector and it is not unreasonable that he would have done so after vesting in FERS. The evidence 

also conclusively showed that the VA had difficulty attracting and maintaining anesthesiologists. 

Thus, it is entirely reasonable to project that plaintiff would eventually leave the VA for private 

practice, but not before he had vested in FERS. 

Mr. Barnes’s opinion is predicated on an assumption that discounts plaintiff’s plans in that 

regard. The court credits plaintiff’s testimony and, according finds Mr. Davis’s assumption to be 

more credible than that of Mr. Barnes. Although he did not address it, Mr. Barnes’ reliance on a 

straight comparison of the earnings between the VA and the private sector also fails to account 

for testimony that temporary appointments, such as plaintiff’s, could only be renewed for up to 

six years. After that, the VA would have to request and receive approval to have a permanent 

position created. While there was no evidence presented regarding the difficulty involved in 

obtaining a permanent position, this is simply one more hurdle to plaintiff spending his remaining 

workdays at the VA. Mr. Barnes’ assumption is simply contrary to the credible testimony by 

plaintiff as to his motivation for going to work with the VA after leaving his military service and 

his desire to at some point leave for private practice. Thus, the court finds it inappropriate to rely 

on a straight comparison of the earnings between the VA and the private sector when the 

evidence indicates that plaintiff would have left the VA sometime after his FERS benefits vested. 

 Defendants argues that compensating Bonzani for the loss of FERS benefits would 

amount to a windfall because “there is nothing to prevent plaintiff from taking the FERS benefits 

front pay award now, then obtaining federal employment, working for two more years, buying 

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back his military time and repaying his FERS refund, and vesting in FERS.” ECF No. 180 at 18. 

Defendants presented no evidence regarding the likelihood of future employment with the federal 

government. Further, the chances of plaintiff resuming employment with the VA are remote at 

best. As defendants elsewhere argue, plaintiff had explored the possibility of employment at a 

private hospital and after his employment with the VA was terminated he secured a job in the 

private sector at a substantially higher salary.47 Indeed, there was testimony that the salary 

differential is a significant reason why the VA has difficulty recruiting anesthesiologists. 

Finally, plaintiff was terminated from his employment under less than amiable circumstances. 

He subsequently filed this suit against his former employer and the litigation has at times been 

acrimonious. No evidence was presented regarding the future availability of other federal 

positions for an anesthesiologist and the likelihood that plaintiff would accept it. While some 

assumptions are required to calculate plaintiff’s loss from being terminated two years prior to 

vesting in a FERS benefit, the court declines defendants’ invitation to engage in sheer speculation 

over whether plaintiff would ever in the future return to federal service, and if so, how the 

administrators of the FERS would account for the award made in this litigation. 

 For the reasons stated above, whether it is characterized as front pay or simply damages, 

the court finds, as did the jury, that plaintiff sustained a loss in the amount of $675,238 based on 

defendants’ interference with plaintiff’s FMLA rights. 

IV. Defendants’ Motions 

 After trial, defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial on 

plaintiff’s FMLA claims. As explained below, both motions are denied. 

 Judgment as a matter of law should be granted if “a reasonable jury would not have a 

legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). 

///// 

///// 

 47 Much of defendants’ argument that plaintiff has no damages was premised on the 

assertion that plaintiff is better off financially in the private sector. That was the very theme of 

Barnes’ testimony. 

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The court must not disrupt a jury’s verdict that “is supported by substantial evidence, which is 

evidence adequate to support the jury’s conclusion, even if it is also possible to draw a contrary 

conclusion.” Pavao v. Pagay, 307 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The motion “may be made at any time before the case is submitted to the jury.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 50(a)(2). If the court does not grant the motion, “the court is considered to have submitted 

the matter to the jury subject to the court’s later deciding the legal questions raised by the 

motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). However, regardless of timing, judgment as a matter of law is 

not proper unless “the evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion and the conclusion is 

contrary to that reached by the jury.” Ostad v. Or. Health Sci. Univ., 327 F.3d 876, 881 (9th Cir. 

2003). 

 Similarly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 59 permits granting a new trial if the 

jury’s verdict is clearly contrary to the evidence. Rule 59 provides that a “court may, on motion, 

grant a new trial on all or some of the issues . . . after a jury trial . . . .” However, the court “may 

grant a new trial only if the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, and may not grant 

it simply because the court would have arrived at a different verdict.” Pavao, 307 F.3d at 918. 

Generally, “[c]ourts do not grant new trials unless it is reasonably clear that prejudicial error has 

crept into the record or that substantial justice has not been done, and the burden of showing 

harmful error rests on the party seeking the new trial.” 11 Wright & Miller, et al., Federal 

Practice & Procedure § 2803 (3d ed. 2015). A court should, however, grant a new trial where 

necessary “to prevent a miscarriage of justice.” Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 

(9th Cir. 2007). The denial of a motion for a new trial may be reversed only “if the record 

contains no evidence in support of the verdict” or the court “has made a mistake of law.” 

 Defendants have met neither standard here. Rather, as addressed extensively above, the 

weight of the evidence supports the finding that plaintiff’s taking of FMLA leave was a negative 

factor in the decision to not renew his employment with the VA. The weight of the evidence 

further supports the calculation of loss sustained from that FMLA violation. Accordingly, there is 

no basis for disturbing the jury’s verdict and defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of law 

and for a new trial are denied. 

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V. Liquidated Damages 

 Plaintiff also seeks liquidated damages.48 ECF No. 118 at 7. Absent a showing by the 

defendants that such damages should not be awarded, they are required by the statute. “The 

FMLA is unambiguous that once it is determined that an employer violated the statute, liquidated 

damages will be awarded unless the employer proves both ‘good faith’ and ‘reasonable grounds 

for believing that [its action] was not a violation’ of the FMLA.” Traxler, 596 F.3d 1015 

(emphasis added) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(iii)). It is the employer’s burden of 

demonstrating that liquidated damages are inappropriate. Id.

As previously discussed, the court is convinced that Dr. Hundahl’s primary consideration 

in executing his duties as Chief of Surgical Services was providing needed medical care to 

veterans. That motivation itself is commendable. But while his overall goal was commendable, 

his actions at issue here were not. Based on all the evidence presented at trial, the court cannot 

find that the decision to terminate plaintiff’s employment was made in good faith and that 

defendants had a reasonable ground for believing that terminating plaintiff’s employment was not 

a violation of the FMLA. There is no dispute that plaintiff was entitled to take leave for surgery, 

and the evidence presented at trial clearly demonstrated that he was fired for taking this protected 

leave. The court is firmly convinced that the frustrations and ultimate breakdown of the working 

relationship with and termination of plaintiff was the direct result of plaintiff having been absent 

for an extended period while he had surgery.49 Although plaintiff’s absence may have hindered 

the VA’s ability to provide patient care, he was nevertheless entitled to the leave and could not be 

terminated for exercising his rights under the FMLA. Yet he was terminated knowing that the 

absence was to have surgery. As another court has characterized the matter, while it is true that 

 48 “The FMLA contains a ‘liquidated damages’ provision, subjecting an employer who 

violates the Act to double damages unless the employer can provide that its employment action 

was taken in ‘good faith’ and that it had ‘reasonable grounds for believing that [its action] was not 

a violation.” Taxler, 569 F.3d at 1015 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(iii)). 

49 The single paragraph of defendants’ brief addressing this question argues that 

defendants acted in good faith because the termination “had nothing to do with [plaintiff’s] 

medical leave . . . .” ECF No. 141 at 22. For all of the reasons listed above, the jury found, and 

the court now finds that it did. 

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Dr. Hundahl may not have specifically intended to violate Dr. Bonzani’s FMLA rights, 

“[d]efendant was clearly willfully indifferent to [p]laintiff’s FMLA rights.” Gresslett v. Central 

Arizona Water Conservation District, 2015 WL 1505774, *3 (D. Ariz. March 31, 2015). Such 

circumstances do not permit a finding that defendants acted in good faith and had reasonable 

grounds for believing that their conduct did not violate the FMLA. 

Accordingly, liquidated damages are appropriate and are awarded in the statutory 

authorized amount of $675,238. 

VI. Conclusion 

 Defendant conceded that plaintiff was eligible for FMLA leave, that the Secretary was an 

“employer” under the FMLA, and that plaintiff was entitled to the leave he took between May 

and July 2009 to have surgery on his knee. Furthermore, plaintiff has proven by a preponderance 

of the evidence that Dr. Hundahl was the person who made the decision to end plaintiff’s 

employment because of his use for protected leave and therefore constituted an employer for 

purposes of liability under the FMLA. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment in his favor on his FMLA claims against defendants, 

jointly and severally, in the amount of $1,350,476, which represents $675,238 in actual damages 

and a like amount in liquidated damages; 

2. The Secretary’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff’s Rehabilitation 

Act claim is denied as moot; 

3. Defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff’s FMLA claims and 

for a new trial are denied; and 

4. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close the case. 

DATED: August 13, 2015. 

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