Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01942/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01942-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

SC

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Christopher Lamar Cleveland, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Pinal County Superior Court, et al., 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 12-1942-PHX-DGC (SPL)

ORDER

Plaintiff Christopher Lamar Cleveland, who is confined in the Pinal County Jail in

Florence, Arizona, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. Plaintiff also filed a motion for appointment

of counsel and a motion to submit addresses to the U.S. Marshal for service. (Doc. 6, 7.)

The Court will dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim and this action. The Court

will also deny Plaintiff’s motions.

I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee

Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

The Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $17.06. The remainder of the fee will be

collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income each time the amount

in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate

Order requiring the appropriate government agency to collect and forward the fees according

to the statutory formula. 

Case 2:12-cv-01942-DGC--SPL Document 8 Filed 10/16/12 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 8 does not demand detailed

factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual

allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there

are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 1951.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed that courts

must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th

Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

94 (2007) (per curiam)).

If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other facts,

a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal of the

Case 2:12-cv-01942-DGC--SPL Document 8 Filed 10/16/12 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 See http://apps.supremecourt.az.gov/publicaccess/caselookup.aspx (last visited Oct.

4, 2012).

2

 See http://apps.supremecourt.az.gov/publicaccess/minutes.aspx, minute entry filed

July 11, 2012 (last visited Oct. 4, 2012). 

- 3 -

action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The Court

should not, however, advise the litigant how to cure the defects. This type of advice “would

undermine district judges’ role as impartial decisionmakers.” Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225,

231 (2004); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 n.13 (declining to decide whether the court was

required to inform a litigant of deficiencies). Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed for

failure to state a claim without leave to amend because the defects cannot be amended to

state a claim.

III. Complaint

Plaintiff alleges three counts for violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights and

various federal statutes. Plaintiff sues the Pinal County Superior Court, the State Bar of

Arizona, Assistant Pinal County Public Defender Paula M. Cook, and Deputy Pinal County

Attorney Jason R. Holmberg. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and injunctive relief.

Plaintiff is charged in Pinal County Superior Court, case# CR201200144, with failing

to file a sex offender notice.1

 Plaintiff is or was represented by Assistant Public Defender

Cook and is being prosecuted by Deputy County Attorney Holmberg.2

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following facts: on January 24, 2012, prosecutor

Holmberg filed a notice of hearing to have Plaintiff transported for an initial appearance or

preliminary hearing, although Plaintiff was not then in custody. Holmberg also wrongly

indicated that Plaintiff was then represented by counsel. On February 14, 2012, another

attorney appeared on Holmberg’s behalf, but neither Plaintiff nor his attorney were present.

The court issued a bench warrant and Plaintiff was arrested on February 17 and appointed

counsel. 

At some point, Plaintiff received a copy of his criminal history report. He contends

that it contained several discrepancies, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Plaintiff informed

Case 2:12-cv-01942-DGC--SPL Document 8 Filed 10/16/12 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

Cook of the discrepancies, but she failed to inform the court. The Pinal County Superior

Court thereafter knowingly certified a false report. 

Plaintiff contends that prosecution against him was instituted without first obtaining

and verifying that Plaintiff was subject to a California court order requiring him to register.

He asserts that Cook’s belated request for Plaintiff’s California court records reflects as much

and that the Pinal County Superior Court and Holmberg lack jurisdiction over him in

connection with the charge. 

Attachments to the Complaint reflect that Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Arizona

State Bar concerning the above allegations. The State Bar responded by telling Plaintiff that

the facts and legal issues raised by him could only be addressed by a court and that the State

Bar was not the appropriate venue.

IV. Failure to State a Claim

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting that (1) the

conduct about which he complains was committed by a person acting under the color of state

law and (2) the conduct deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right. Wood v.

Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989). In addition, to state a valid constitutional

claim, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of

a particular defendant and he must allege an affirmative link between the injury and the

conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976).

A. Pinal County Superior Court

Plaintiff sues the Pinal County Superior Court. “A state court is not a ‘person’ for

purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and hence is not subject to lawsuit under that statute.”

Mumford v. Basinski, 105 F.3d 264, 267 (6th Cir. 1997); see Ray v. New Jersey, 219 Fed.

Appx. 121, 124 (3d Cir. 2007) (New Jersey Superior Court was not a “person” under

§ 1983); Johnson v. Supreme Court of Ill., 165 F.3d 1140, 1140-41 (7th Cir. 1999) (state

supreme court was not a “person” subject to suit); Mumford v. Zieba, 4 F.3d 429, 435 (6th

Cir. 1997) (citing Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 418 (6th Cir. 1988)); Clark v. Clark, 984

F.2d 272, 273 (8th Cir. 1993); Marcello v. Maine, 464 F. Supp.2d 38, 43-44 (D. Me. 2006);

Case 2:12-cv-01942-DGC--SPL Document 8 Filed 10/16/12 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

Rothstein v. Montana Supreme Court, 638 F.Supp. 1311, 1312 (D. Mont. 1986); O’Connor

v. State of Nev., 507 F.Supp. 546, (D. Nev. 1981), aff’d 686 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1982) (per

curiam); Louis v. Supreme Court of Nevada, 490 F.Supp. 1174, 1180 (D.Nev. 1980) (as a

state is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983, neither is the state’s supreme court a

“person” under the statute). Because the Pinal County Superior Court is not a “person” for

purposes of § 1983, it will be dismissed as an improper Defendant. 

B. State Bar of Arizona

Plaintiff also sues the State Bar of Arizona. Under the Eleventh Amendment to the

Constitution of the United States, neither a state nor its agencies may be sued in federal court

without the state’s consent. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100

(1984); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). A state bar operates as the

investigative arm of its state supreme court, and thus, is an agency of the state; as an agency

of the state, the Eleventh Amendment renders state bars immune from suit in a federal court.

Gilchrist v. Arizona Supreme Court, 10 Fed. Appx. 468, 470 (9th Cir. 2001); see O’Connor

v. State of Nev., 686 F.2d 749, 750 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). Accordingly, the State Bar

of Arizona will be dismissed based on immunity.

C. Cook

Plaintiff sues Assistant County Public Defender Cook, who represents Plaintiff in his

state criminal proceedings. A prerequisite for any relief under § 1983 are allegations to

support that a defendant acted under color of state law. The “under color of state law”

component is the equivalent of the “state action” requirement under the Constitution. Lugar

v. Edmondson Oil Co, Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 928 (1982); Jensen v. Lane County, 222 F.3d 570,

574 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982); West v.

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988)). “Acting under color of state law is ‘a jurisdictional requisite

for a §1983 action.’” Gritchen v. Collier, 254 F.3d 807, 812 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting West,

487 U.S. at 46). Whether an attorney representing a criminal defendant is privately retained,

a public defender, or court-appointed counsel, he or she does not act under color of state law.

See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-18 (1981); Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada,

Case 2:12-cv-01942-DGC--SPL Document 8 Filed 10/16/12 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Because Plaintiff sues Cook solely based on

her representation of him as a defense attorney, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Cook

under § 1983 and she will be dismissed. 

D. Holmberg

Plaintiff sues Deputy County Attorney Holmberg. A prosecutor is absolutely immune

from liability under § 1983 for conduct in “initiating a prosecution and in presenting the

State’s case” insofar as that conduct is “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the

criminal process.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 270 (1993) (citing Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991) (quoting

Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-431); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 1986). That

is, “[a] prosecutor is protected by absolute immunity from liability for damages under § 1983

‘when performing the traditional functions of an advocate.’” Genzler v. Longanbach, 410

F.3d 630, 636 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 131 (1997)).

Absolute immunity extends to a prosecutor “eliciting false or defamatory testimony from

witnesses” or for making false or defamatory statements during and related to judicial

proceedings. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 270 (citations omitted). “However, ‘the actions of a

prosecutor are not absolutely immune merely because they are performed by a prosecutor.’”

Genzler, 410 F.3d at 636 (quoting Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273). Rather, prosecutorial immunity

depends on “‘the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who

performed it.’” Id. (quoting Kalina, 522 U.S. at 127). A prosecutor is only entitled to

qualified immunity, rather than absolute immunity, when he performs administrative or

investigative functions. Id.

Plaintiff sues Holmberg based solely on his prosecution of Plaintiff. Holmberg is

entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for those acts. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state

a claim against Holmberg and he will be dismissed. 

V. Conclusion

Plaintiff seeks relief under § 1983 against improper Defendants or for actions which

are not under color of state law or are entitled to absolute immunity. Because Plaintiff cannot

Case 2:12-cv-01942-DGC--SPL Document 8 Filed 10/16/12 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

amend his compliant to state a claim against any of the Defendants, his Complaint and this

action will be dismissed without leave to amend and his motions will be denied as moot. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis is granted. (Doc. 2.)

(2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government agency,

Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $17.06.

(3) The Complaint and this action are dismissed for failure to state a claim without

leave to amend pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and the Clerk of Court must enter

judgment accordingly. (Doc. 1.)

(4) Plaintiff’s motions for appointment of counsel and to submit addresses to the

U.S. Marshal are denied as moot. (Doc. 6, 7.) 

(5) The Clerk of Court must make an entry on the docket stating that the dismissal

for failure to state a claim may count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

(6) The docket shall reflect that the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(3) and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(3)(A), that any appeal of this

decision would not be taken in good faith.

DATED this 16th day of October, 2012.

Case 2:12-cv-01942-DGC--SPL Document 8 Filed 10/16/12 Page 7 of 7