Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02746/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02746-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRIAN F. ROGERS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF SAN DIEGO; SAN 

DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT; 

DAVID NISLEIT, in his official 

capacity as San Diego Police 

Chief; A TO Z TOWING, INC., 

doing business as Road One, Inc. 

et al.,

Defendant.

Case No.: 18cv2746-WQH-MDD

ORDER

HAYES, Judge:

On December 6, 2018, Plaintiff Brian Rogers initiated this action by filing a 

Complaint alleging causes of action for violation of the U.S. Constitution and the California 

Constitution, and a cause of action for state tort claims. (ECF No. 1). The same day, 

Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2). 

I. APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

All parties instituting a civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, other than a petition for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 4.5. An action may proceed despite 

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a party’s failure to pay only if the party is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 

1999). “To proceed in forma pauperis is a privilege not a right.” Smart v. Heinze, 347 

F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965).

The application and declaration filed by Plaintiff states that he is unable to pay the 

costs of these proceedings. Plaintiff is unemployed and has no monthly income. After 

review of Plaintiff’s application and declaration, the Court concludes that Plaintiff cannot 

afford to pay the costs of these proceedings and is eligible to proceed in forma pauperis 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

II. INITIAL SCREENING

A complaint filed by any person proceeding in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a) is also subject to mandatory review and sua sponte dismissal to the extent it “is 

frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the 

targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford 

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

The standard used to evaluate whether a complaint states a claim is a liberal one, 

particularly when the action has been filed pro se. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 

(1976). However, even a “liberal interpretation . . . may not supply elements of the claim 

that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 

268 (9th Cir. 1982). “[P]ro se litigants are bound by the rules of procedure.” Ghazali v. 

Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995). “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff 

has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the 

same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” 

Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint 

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to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief 

[is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, 

the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility 

standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

A. Allegations of the Complaint

Plaintiff alleges that San Diego Police Department ordered A to Z Towing to tow 

his vehicle without notice or a hearing, and that his car was towed, damaged, and 

impounded. Plaintiff alleges that his vehicle’s license plates were stolen, and that a set of

replacement plates were on the vehicle when it was towed. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 4). Plaintiff 

alleges that the replacement plates were not entered in the DMV system, and that the 

vehicle was considered unregistered, because the vehicle failed a smog check. Id. ¶¶ 4, 53. 

Plaintiff alleges that he “did not receive notice or an opportunity to be heard before or after 

SDPD ordered his car towed.” Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff alleges that he retrieved his vehicle after 

paying certain fees, and that A to Z Towing “would have attempted to sell the vehicle at 

auction if he failed to pay the tow charges after 30 days.” Id. ¶¶ 14, 60–62. 

Plaintiff alleges that California Vehicle Code § 14602.6(a) allows an officer to 

remove or seize vehicles upon discovering the owner’s driving privileges are restricted. Id.

¶ 33. Plaintiff alleges that SDPD telephoned the towing company “to tow the vehicle for

false tags and/or expired tags.” Id. ¶ 57. Plaintiff alleges that “City of San Diego and 

SDPD maintain[] a policy of not providing pre-tow notice to vehicle owners.” Id. ¶ 66. 

Plaintiff alleges that “[i]n March 2018, SPPD Sargent Kevin Moyna claimed that he would 

attempt to resolve this matter through Internal Affairs and the Community Review Board,” 

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that Plaintiff “has not heard from him since this date,” and that “SDPD Sergeant Patti 

Clayton, Tow Administrator (Traffic Division) and SDPD Sergeant Ruben Guiterrez have 

continued to ignore this problem.” Id. ¶¶ 69–70. Plaintiff alleges that “San Diego Police 

Department and City of San Diego decision, which summarily ‘find[s] the tow and storage 

valid,’ does not make findings that connect the evidence presented to the ultimate 

decision.” Id. ¶ 73. Plaintiff alleges that SDPD violates due process “[b]y not making 

available the evidence relied on at any tow hearing, not presenting the officer who ordered 

the tow for examination, and not considering Mr. Roger’s constitutional claims, ability to 

pay, inability to pass a state-sponsored smog check, or any other evidence when

determining the validity of the tow, SDPD denies vehicle owners a meaningful opportunity 

to be heard,” “at a pre or post tow hearing.” Id. ¶¶ 82, 93.

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brings claims against the City of San Diego; the San 

Diego Police Department; David Nisleit, in his official capacity as San Diego Police Chief; 

and A to Z Towing Inc., d/b/a Road One, Inc. Plaintiff claims violations of his state and 

federal constitutional due process and equal protection rights, as well as his right to be free 

of unreasonable searches and seizures. Plaintiff further brings a claim for “Conversion and 

Trespass Chattels.” (ECF No. 1 at 19). 

B. David Nisleit, San Diego Police Chief

Plaintiff seeks to sue San Diego Police Chief David Nisleit, alleging he “is 

responsible for managing SDPD affairs and its vehicle tows in compliance with the law.” 

(ECF No. 1 ¶ 12). Plaintiff states, “Respondent is sued in his official capacity as the 

municipal officer responsible for ensuring that the SDPD and its agents act in conformity 

with federal and state law.” Id. 

Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted, however,

because he sets forth no individualized allegations of wrongdoing by Nisleit, and instead 

seeks to hold him vicariously liable for the actions of other unnamed police department 

personnel. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 

1983 suits,” § 1983 plaintiffs “must plead that each Government-official defendant, though 

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the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); see also Jones v. 

Community Redevelopment Agency of City of Los Angeles, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 

1984) (even pro se plaintiff must “allege with at least some degree of particularity overt 

acts which defendants engaged in” in order to state a claim). “The inquiry into causation 

must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual 

defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.”

Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 

370 – 71 (1976)).

A plaintiff may only “hold supervisors individually liable in [§] 1983 suits when 

culpable action, or inaction, is directly attributed to them.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207. More 

specifically, a supervisor “causes” a constitutional deprivation if he (1) personally 

participates in or directs a subordinate’s constitutional violation; or (2) the constitutional 

deprivation can otherwise be “directly attributed” to the supervisor’s own culpable action 

or inaction, even though the supervisor was not “physically present when the [plaintiff’s] 

injury occurred.” Id. at 1206–07; see also Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th 

Cir. 2013) (supervisor may be held liable under Section 1983 only if there is “a sufficient 

causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional 

violation”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff does not offer any specific “factual content” that might allow the Court to 

“draw the reasonable inference” that Nisleit personally participated in any unconstitutional 

conduct directed at Plaintiff. The Court finds his Complaint, as currently pleaded, contains 

allegations which fail to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 568. For this reason, Plaintiff’s claims against Nisleit must be dismissed sua sponte. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126–27.

C. A to Z Towing

Plaintiff seeks to sue A to Z Towing based on its contract to provide towing services 

with the City of San Diego. 

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“A private individual may be liable under § 1983 if she conspired or entered 

joint action with a state actor.” Establishing liability for a conspiracy between 

a private actor and a state actor is no different from establishing liability for a 

conspiracy between two state actors. The plaintiff must show “an agreement 

or meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights.”

Crowe v. Cty. of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 440 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Franklin v. Fox, 

312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2002); see Gilreath v. Bach, No. EDCV170694DOCJEM, 2017 

WL 5593017, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 

EDCV170694DOCJEM, 2017 WL 5564545 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2017) (“The only facts 

alleged demonstrate that Brothers was a private towing company and Morales was a tow 

truck driver who were called to the scene to tow Plaintiff’s impounded vehicle. There is 

absolutely nothing to demonstrate the degree of cooperative action and interdependence 

necessary to establish joint action.”); see also Clement v. City of Glendale, 518 F.3d 1090, 

1097 (9th Cir. 2008) (accepting tow company’s good faith defense when “[t]he tow was 

authorized by the police department, conducted under close police supervision and 

appeared to be permissible under both local ordinance and state law. . . . The . . .

constitutional violation arose from the inactions of the police rather than from any act or 

omission by the towing company.”). But see Goichman v. Rheuban Motors, 682 F.2d 1320, 

1322 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[A] private towing company acting at the behest of a police officer 

and pursuant to a statutory scheme designed solely to accomplish the state’s purpose of 

enforcing its traffic laws, acts under color of state law for purposes of section 1983.”).

In this case, Plaintiff alleges that A to Z Towing “is the exclusive provider of all 

tow-related services for the City and County of San Diego.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 14). Plaintiff 

alleges A to Z Towing towed his vehicle without notice, damaging his vehicle in the 

process, based on instructions from the San Diego Police Department. Id. ¶¶ 57–59. These 

allegations do not rise to the level of conduct in violation of § 1983 by A to Z Towing. 

In addition, Plaintiff must have filed the Complaint before the statute of limitations 

expired. Section 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations. Federal courts apply 

the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See Owens v. Okure, 

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488 U.S. 235, 240–41 (1989) (“Because § 1983 claims are best characterized as personal 

injury actions . . . a State’s personal injury statute of limitations should be applied to all § 

1983 claims.”) (quotation omitted); see also Butler v. Nat’l Cmty. Renaissance of Cal., 766 

F.3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 2014). California’s statute of limitations for personal injury 

actions is two years. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1. Accrual of a § 1983 claim is a question 

of federal law. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). Accrual occurs “when the 

plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action . . . that is, when the plaintiff can file 

suit and obtain relief.” Id. (quotation omitted); see also Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 486 

F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting the statute of limitations period began to run when 

Plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury that forms the basis of his action). 

Plaintiff alleges his vehicle was towed by A to Z Towing on August 6, 2015. (ECF No. 1 

¶ 55). Plaintiff alleges that he retrieved his vehicle after paying certain fees, and that A to 

Z Towing “would have attempted to sell the vehicle at auction if he failed to pay the tow 

charges after 30 days.” (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 14, 60–62). Plaintiff alleges no conduct by A to Z 

Towing occurring after August 6, 2015. Plaintiff alleges no facts to support the inference 

that he did not know or have reason to know of his claimed injuries by the time he paid the 

charges and retrieved his vehicle. For these reasons, Plaintiff’s claims against A to Z 

Towing must be dismissed sua sponte. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Lopez, 203 F.3d 

at 1126–27.

D. Fourth Amendment

Plaintiff alleges that his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and 

seizure were violated by the towing of his vehicle on August 6, 2015. The Fourth 

Amendment applies when the government interferes with the possessory interest in the 

vehicle. See Brewster v. Beck, 859 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 2017). As above, the statute 

of limitations applicable to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim is two years, beginning to 

run upon the occurrence of the allegedly unconstitutional seizure. See McIntosh v. L.A. 

Cty., No. LACV153856JFWJCG, 2016 WL 715771, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2016) (“This 

period begins to run when the plaintiff first learns of the injury giving rise to his claims. . . 

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. [In] particular, where a plaintiff alleges illegal search and seizure, ‘the cause of action can 

reasonably be deemed to have accrued when the wrongful act occurs.’”) (first citing Bagley 

v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 761–62 (9th Cir. 1991), then quoting Venegas v. 

Wagner, 704 F.2d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 1983)). In this case, Plaintiff alleges that he 

retrieved his vehicle after paying certain fees, and that A to Z Towing “would have 

attempted to sell the vehicle at auction if he failed to pay the tow charges after 30 days.” 

(ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 14, 60–62). The statute of limitations for any Fourth Amendment claims as 

to the towing of Plaintiff’s vehicle expired before the Complaint was filed on December 6, 

2018. For this reason, Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims as to all Defendants must be 

dismissed sua sponte. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126–27. 

E. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

Plaintiff seeks to sue the City of San Diego and the San Diego Police Department 

for injuries resulting from allegedly unconstitutional policies related to the towing of his 

vehicle. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action against any person who, under the 

color of state law, deprives any citizen of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 

the Constitution and laws of the United States. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 

(1992).1 “[A] local governmental body cannot be found liable under § 1983 on a 

respondeat superior theory; liability may be imposed only if the plaintiff establishes that 

his injuries were inflicted pursuant to an official county policy or custom.” Thompson v. 

City of L.A., 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 

 

1 Plaintiff alleges violations of his due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth 

Amendment of the United States Constitution, and violation of his rights against unreasonable search and 

seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments do not themselves give rise to a cause of action. Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City of L.A., 973 F.2d 

704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Plaintiff has no cause of action directly under the United States Constitution.”).

To the extent Plaintiff seeks relief under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, he 

fails to state a claim by alleging that he could not afford to pay for smog check repairs. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 85–

86; see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973) (concluding wealth 

discrimination does not invoke strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause).

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436 U.S. 658, 690–94 (1978). To hold a municipality or a police department liable for the 

actions of its officers, a plaintiff must demonstrate a constitutional deprivation, and that 

the deprivation was caused pursuant to a municipality or police department custom or 

policy. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Munger v. Glasgow Police Dep’t, 227 F.3d 1082, 1087 

(9th Cir. 2000); see also Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 869 (9th Cir. 2005)

(“In order for a municipality to be liable for a section 1983 violation the action alleged to 

be unconstitutional must implement a policy officially adopted by the municipality.”) 

(quoting Scofield v. City of Hillsborough, 862 F.2d 759, 765 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

Procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a hearing

be given to the owner before a vehicle is towed. Scofield, 862 F.2d at 762. “[D]ue process 

does not require that a pre-towing notice be given to the owner of a vehicle which has been 

unregistered for more than one year from the date on which it is found parked on a public 

street” pursuant to the California Vehicle Code. Id. at 764. The Court of Appeals has held 

that pre-tow notice is required for unregistered vehicles when a valid planned nonoperation certificate has been filed with the Department of Motor Vehicles. Clement, 518 

F.3d at 1094–95, 1096. In Miranda, the Court of Appeals granted summary judgment in 

favor of the municipal defendants, on a due process claim for failure to provide an adequate 

post-tow hearing, stating:

Based on Plaintiffs’ statement of facts and all reasonable inferences thereon, 

there is no evidence that the lack of response to Plaintiffs’ letter was the result 

of a policy officially adopted by Defendants. In addition, construing 

[Plaintiff’s] statement that he “spoke with a woman about the tow” in the most 

favorable light, it does not provide a basis for liability under section 1983. 

Because a denial of a hearing would be directly contrary to the City’s official 

policy, any comment by the woman was not sufficient to establish the 

existence of a policy contrary to the City’s written policy.

429 F.3d at 869.

In this case, Plaintiff alleges that his vehicle was not properly registered. Plaintiff 

does not allege that a valid certificate of non-operation was filed with the Department of 

Motor Vehicles at the time of towing. Plaintiff does not state a claim for violation of due 

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process on the grounds that he did not receive a pre-towing notice or hearing. See Clement, 

518 F.3d 1090 (“A tow [without prior notice] may also be appropriate where there are no 

current registration stickers and police can’t be sure that the owner won’t move or hide the 

vehicle, rather than pay the fine for illegal parking.”).

Plaintiff alleges that he had no meaningful opportunity to be heard after his vehicle 

was towed because SDPD did not “mak[e] available the evidence relied on at any tow 

hearing,” “present[] the officer who ordered the tow for examination,” or “consider[] Mr. 

Roger’s constitutional claims, ability to pay, inability to pass a state-sponsored smog check, 

or any other evidence when determining the validity of the tow.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 82). 

Plaintiff further alleges that several SDPD officers failed to follow up with him. Plaintiff’s 

allegations fail to support the inference that the City or SDPD do not provide a post-tow 

hearing as a matter of official policy. Plaintiff’s allegations fail support the inference that 

such hearings were inadequate as a matter of official policy. See Miranda, 429 F.3d at 869 

(“Because a denial of a hearing would be directly contrary to the City’s official policy, any 

comment by the woman was not sufficient to establish the existence of a policy contrary to 

the City’s written policy.”). Plaintiff’s allegations do not support the inference that he was 

deprived of a post-towing hearing in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims as to all 

Defendants must be dismissed sua sponte. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Lopez, 203 

F.3d at 1126–27. 

F. Jurisdiction Over State Law Claims

Plaintiff asserts that this Court has jurisdiction based on federal question jurisdiction 

over § 1983 claims. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 17).2

The federal supplemental jurisdiction statute provides: 

[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the 

district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that 

 

2 Plaintiff and Defendants are alleged to be citizens of California. (ECF No 1. ¶¶ 2, 3, 11, 21). The Court 

does not have diversity jurisdiction over this action.

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are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they 

form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States 

Constitution. 

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). “The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over a claim under subsection (a) if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over 

which it has original jurisdiction[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). 

Having dismissed the only federal claim asserted by Plaintiff against Defendants, 

the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law 

claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). See San Pedro Hotel Co., Inc. v. City of L.A., 159 

F.3d 470, 478 & n.12 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding district court declining to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction and requiring no further explanation by district courts acting in 

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)); Satey v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 521 F.3d 1087, 

1091 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The decision whether to continue to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over state law claims after all federal claims have been dismissed lies within 

the district court’s discretion.”) (quoting Foster v. Wilson, 504 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 

2007)).

III. CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis 

is GRANTED. (ECF No. 2).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED 

without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. If no motion 

for leave to file a first amended complaint is filed within thirty (30) days of this order, the 

case will be closed. 

Dated: January 8, 2019

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