Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-03772/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-03772-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

John Frederic Garmon,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

Peralta Community College District,

et al., 

 Defendant(s).

_____________________________/

No. C 04-3772 WDB

ORDER TO PROVIDE

CLARIFICATION OR RESPONSE

RE ISSUES

By Monday, April 17, 2006, at 4:00 p.m., the parties must file with the Court,

deliver to chambers, and serve on opposing counsel their responses to all of the

following:

1. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint does not differentiate among the

defendants with respect to most claims. It is the Court's view that plaintiff's claims

for race discrimination, gender discrimination, retaliation, and intentional infliction

of emotional distress challenge conduct by Peralta Community College District and

by the Peralta Community College District Board of Trustees and do not assert claims

against Mr. Moore as an individual. Plaintiff must state whether the Court's

understanding is accurate. If plaintiff intends to assert a claim for race

discrimination, gender discrimination, retaliation, or intentional infliction of

Case 4:04-cv-03772-WDB Document 84 Filed 04/13/06 Page 1 of 4
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emotional distress against Mr. Moore in his individual capacity, plaintiff must set

forth the bases for any such claims.

2. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint asserts that Mr. Moore's

allegedlydefamatorystatements were "unauthorized" by the other defendants but also

makes the inconsistent statements that the other defendants knew about and ratified

those statements and that the defendants "conspired" to defame plaintiff. Plaintiff

must state whether his claim for defamation is made only against Mr. Moore, as an

individual, or whether plaintiff also intends to assert a claim for defamation against

Peralta and/or the Board. If plaintiff intends to assert a claim for defamation against

Peralta and/or the Board plaintiff must set forth the bases for such a claim.

3. It is not obvious to the Court that any of the conduct identified in

Plaintiff's Basis for Going Forward with His Intentional Infliction of Emotional

Distress Claims, filed Aril 6, 2006, is "outrageous" even under a generous reading of

plaintiff's proffer. The Court is strongly inclined to the view that under controlling

authorities employment decisions such as 'firing' are not classified as "extreme and

outrageous" even if motivated by unlawful considerations such as discrimination or

retaliation unless the alleged manner in which the decision is implemented or the

manner in which it is communicated to plaintiff arguably warrants the label

"outrageous." As we read it, plaintiff's proffer does not allege conduct that satisfies

that standard.

Plaintiff must respond to defendants' Motion to Dismiss Claim for[Intentional]

Infliction of Emotional Distress, filed April 13, 2006. 

4. The parties' proposed jury instructions include definitions of the term

"adverse employment action," in the context of the race and gender discrimination

and retaliation claims. It is our understanding that defendants do not dispute that

their decision not to renew Mr. Garmon's contract to serve as President of Vista

constitutes, as a matter of legal definition, an "adverse employment action."

Case 4:04-cv-03772-WDB Document 84 Filed 04/13/06 Page 2 of 4
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Accordingly, the Court will not instruct the jury about the definitions of "adverse

employment action." Where the instructions would direct the jury to decide that

element, the Court will refer directly to the fact that plaintiff's contract was not

renewed. If defendants contend that the decision not to renew plaintiff's contract does

not qualify as an "adverse employment action" they must inform the Court.

5. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an

employee for opposing race discrimination. However, the employee mustreasonably

believe that the challenged employment practices are discriminatory. It is the Court's

understanding that defendants do not contend that Mr. Garmon's belief that the

challenged employment practices were discriminatory was "unreasonable."

Accordingly, the first element of the jury instructions for plaintiff's retaliation claim

will direct the jury to determine whether Mr. Garmon proved that he "opposed

conduct by defendants that he believed was discriminatory." Unless defendants

advise the Court that they have a basis for contending that Mr. Garmon's belief was

not "reasonable," the Court will not use the phrase "reasonably believed."

6. There is no right to have a jury determine the amount of back pay or

front pay under Title VII. These remedies constitute equitable relief awarded by the

Court. E.g., Lutz v. Glendale Union High School, 403 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir.

2005). The parties may, however, consent to have these issues determined by the jury

-- in which case its "verdict has the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter

of right." F.R.C.P. 39(c). If the parties do not consent, and if the findings by the jury

give rise to an occasion for determining back pay and/or front pay, the Court will

conduct an evidentiary hearing after the trial to determine these issues. The parties

must state whether they wish to consent to have the jury decide the appropriate

amount of back pay and/or front pay in the event that the jury's verdict makes such

remedies available.

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7. Apparently in response to this Court's order directing plaintiff to notify

the Court whether he wants to proceed with his claim "under 42 U.S.C. §1983"

(alleging retaliation for exercising First Amendment rights), plaintiff filed his

dismissal without prejudice of his "section 1981 claims." Does the Court accurately

infer that plaintiff meant to dismiss his §1983 claim and that the reference to §1981

was an error? As the Court reads plaintiff Second Amended Complaint, plaintiff has

not asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1981.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 13, 2006 /s/ Wayne D. Brazil 

WAYNE D. BRAZIL

United States Magistrate Judge

Copies to:

Parties, WDB

stats

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