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Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

——— 

Argued February 18, 2005 Decided May 10, 2004 

No. 04-5189 

AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, 

APPELLANT

v. 

STEVEN L. JOHNSON, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR,

AND UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 

APPELLEES

——— 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 02cv02349) 

——— 

 William K. Rawson argued the cause for appellant. With 

him on the brief was Claudia M. O'Brien. 

 John E. Arbab, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were 

Ellen J. Durkee and Eileen T. McDonough, Attorneys, and 

Laurel M. Celeste, Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency. 

USCA Case #04-5189 Document #893026 Filed: 05/10/2005 Page 1 of 12
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 Before: EDWARDS and ROGERS, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

 Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

WILLIAMS. 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge: Section 313 of the 

Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act 

(“EPCRA” or the “Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 11023, 100 Stat. 1613, 

1741 (Oct. 17, 1986), is captioned “Toxic chemical release 

forms.” The Act calls for the creation of a Toxic Release 

Inventory List (“TRI”). EPA acknowledged in the district 

court that “Congress intended that the TRI would contain only 

toxic chemicals.” EPA Memorandum in Support of CrossMotion for Summary Judgment at 20 (June 6, 2003) (“EPA’s 

Summary Judgment Memorandum”) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Congress used the phrase “toxic chemical” 38 times 

in § 313. A naïve observer might think that the section’s sole 

subject is toxic chemicals. He would be right. A naïve 

observer might also think it obvious that that was so. He 

would be wrong. 

In 1996, the American Chemical Council petitioned EPA 

to delete methyl ethyl ketone (“MEK”) from the TRI, see 

Methyl Ethyl Ketone; Toxic Chemical Release Reporting; 

Community Right-To-Know, 63 Fed. Reg. 15195, 15196 

(March 30, 1998) (“MEK Petition Denial”), arguing 

principally that MEK is not a toxic chemical as that term is 

used in the Act. Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 96. EPA denied the 

petition, MEK Petition Denial, 63 Fed. Reg. at 15195, 15199, 

and the court below granted EPA’s motion for summary 

judgment, holding that the decision not to delist MEK was 

reasonable, based on a permissible construction of the statute, 

and neither arbitrary nor capricious. See American Chemistry 

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Council v. Whitman, 309 F. Supp. 2d 111, 116 (D.D.C. 

2004). We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. 

Huls America Inc. v. Browner, 83 F.3d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir. 

1996). Because we find EPA’s decision is based on an 

impermissible construction of the statute, we vacate the 

decision of the district court and remand so that the district 

court can direct EPA to delist MEK. 

* * * 

MEK is a clear, colorless, low-boiling, highly volatile, 

and highly flammable liquid. MEK Petition Denial, 63 Fed. 

Reg. at 15196. A highly effective solvent, it is released in the 

United States in substantial quantities—with nearly 80 million 

pounds released into the air in 1994, and another 100,000 and 

50,000 pounds into water and onto land, respectively. See id. 

at 15198. Although MEK can cause “chronic developmental 

toxicity at moderately high to high doses,” id. at 15198/1, it 

has “low acute and chronic (systemic) toxicity in that effects 

occur only at high doses,” id. at 15199/1. MEK was on the 

initial TRI list of 309 chemicals and 20 chemical categories 

specified by Congress, see 42 U.S.C. § 11023(c); 52 Fed. Reg. 

3479 (Feb. 4, 1987), which had consolidated two pre-existing 

state lists of hazardous chemicals, see 59 Fed. Reg. 1788, 

1788 (Jan. 12, 1994). 

The Emergency Protection and Community Right-ToKnow Act was intended to provide “communities with 

information on potential chemical hazards within their 

boundaries” and to facilitate awareness and planning for 

accidental releases. See Huls America, Inc., 83 F.3d at 446 

(citing H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 at 60). 

The Act establishes state emergency response commissions 

USCA Case #04-5189 Document #893026 Filed: 05/10/2005 Page 3 of 12
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and local emergency planning committees, 42 U.S.C. § 11001, 

and requires certain facilities that manufacture, process, or use 

chemicals on the TRI to provide an estimate of the amount of 

the chemical present at the facility and the annual quantity of 

the chemical entering the environment. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 11023(g)(1); see also 40 C.F.R. § 372.25 (reports required 

for listed chemical if a facility uses at least 10,000 pounds or 

manufactures or possesses at least 25,000 pounds annually). 

Such facilities report this information to EPA, which then 

makes the information available to the public. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 11023(h), (j). 

The Act provides for listing if 

(A) The chemical is known to cause or can reasonably be 

anticipated to cause significant adverse acute human 

health effects at concentration levels that are reasonably 

likely to exist beyond facility site boundaries as a result 

of continuous, or frequently recurring, releases. 

(B) The chemical is known to cause or can reasonably be 

anticipated to cause in humans— 

(i) cancer or teratogenic effects, or 

 (ii) serious or irreversible— 

 (I) reproductive dysfunctions, 

 (II) neurological disorders, 

 (III) heritable genetic mutations, or 

 (IV) other chronic health effects. 

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(C) The chemical is known to cause or can reasonably be 

anticipated to cause, because of— 

 (i) its toxicity, 

 (ii) its toxicity and persistence in the environment, or 

(iii) its toxicity and tendency to bioaccumulate in the 

environment, 

a significant adverse effect on the environment of 

sufficient seriousness, in the judgment of the 

Administrator, to warrant reporting under this section. 

§ 313(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 11023(d)(2). 

Any person may petition the Administrator to delete a 

chemical from the list, see 42 U.S.C. § 11023(e)(1), and the 

Administrator may delete a chemical if there isn’t sufficient 

evidence to establish any of the statutory criteria, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 11023(d)(3). Although § 11023(e)(1) mentions only 

subsections (A) and (B) of § 11023(d)(2), the parties 

apparently agree that it allows petitions to delist a chemical 

that fails to satisfy subsection (C), and we assume that to be 

the case for present purposes. 

In its petition to EPA, the Council argued that MEK 

doesn’t satisfy any of the three listing criteria, and EPA 

agreed as to the “acute human health effects” criterion of 

§ 313(d)(2)(A). But EPA found that MEK did meet the 

“chronic health effects” requirement of § 313(d)(2)(B), and 

the “significant adverse effect on the environment” 

requirement of § 313(d)(2)(C). In doing so EPA rested 

entirely on the proposition that MEK, as a volatile organic 

chemical (“VOC”), “contribute[s] to the formation of 

USCA Case #04-5189 Document #893026 Filed: 05/10/2005 Page 5 of 12
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tropospheric ozone[,] which is known to cause significant 

adverse effects to human health and the environment.” See 

MEK Petition Denial, 63 Fed. Reg. at 15199/2; see also 

Appellees’ Br. at 9 (“EPA’s decision was expressly based on 

MEK’s role as a precursor to ozone”). 

There is no dispute here either that ozone itself is a toxic 

chemical under the criteria of § 313(d)(2), or that MEK to 

some degree contributes to the creation of ozone. See 60 Fed. 

Reg. 31643 (June 16, 1995). That leaves the issue before 

us—whether this contribution to the creation of a concededly 

toxic chemical is adequate to support listing on the TRI. 

* * * 

 The Council’s principal contention is that the TRI is only 

intended to include “toxic” chemicals, meaning chemicals that 

cause harm through exposure to the chemical. See 

Appellant’s Br. at 22-23, 29-30. EPA responds that, properly 

interpreted, § 313(d)(2) provides for listing chemicals that 

result in harm not by exposure to the listed chemical, but by 

exposure to some downstream chemical that the listed 

chemical in some way fosters. In the context of 

§ 313(d)(2)(B), EPA speaks of “indirect causation” and 

“indirect effects.” For § 313(d)(2)(C), EPA speaks of 

“indirect toxicity.” But these are all linguistic variants on the 

same theme, rejecting the idea that the Act is confined to toxic 

chemicals in the ordinary sense of the term. 

 With respect to § 313(d)(2)(B), the chronic health effects 

criterion, EPA first suggests that the statute does not require 

that the listed chemical be toxic at all. Rather, EPA insists the 

section permits the listing of any chemical that is “known to 

cause or can reasonably be anticipated to cause” serious 

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chronic health effects, as EPA interprets that phrase. EPA 

views the phrase “cause or can reasonably be anticipated to 

cause” as ambiguous, and interprets it to incorporate “indirect 

effects.” It claims deference for this interpretation under 

Chevron U.S.A., Inc v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 

Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Before reaching the question of 

what notion of causation is permissible, however, we must 

address whether there is a prerequisite that a chemical be 

toxic, and if so, what that term means. 

 The agency attempts to make something of the fact that 

the term “toxicity” appears explicitly in § 313(d)(2)(C), but 

not in § 313(d)(2)(B). See Appellees’ Br. at 20-21. It is true 

of course, that when Congress “includes particular language in 

one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the 

same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts 

intentionally and purposely in the separate inclusion or 

exclusion.” Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 452 

(2002) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 

(1983)); Troy Corp. v. Browner, 120 F.3d 277, 286 (D.C. Cir. 

1997). But that principle has little purchase when, as here, the 

overall scope of a statute is clearly limited by a requirement 

that is not explicitly mentioned in every subsection. The basic 

question is whether the overall text, structure, and purpose of 

the statute allow EPA to list non-toxic chemicals. See Nat’l 

Rifle Ass’n of America v. Reno, 216 F.3d 122, 127 (D.C. Cir. 

2000). The answer is that they do not. 

 The term toxicity or toxic chemical is used 38 times in 

the statute, and while the frequency of usage says nothing 

about the term’s content, it does strongly suggest that the 

Toxics Release Inventory is intended to include chemicals and 

chemical compounds that are, in fact, toxic. Moreover, while 

EPA sometimes suggests that the only requirement for listing 

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under § 313(d)(2)(B) is that the chemical “cause or can 

reasonably be anticipated to cause” the stated harm, see MEK 

Petition Denial, 63 Fed. Reg. at 15199/3, there is at least some 

question whether EPA actually subscribes to this view. Even 

in this case EPA observed that “Congress intended that the 

TRI would contain only toxic chemicals.” See EPA’s 

Summary Judgment Memorandum at 20 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

 The overall structure of § 313(d)(2) conveys a similar 

impression. Each of the subsections seems to address a 

different form of toxicity. Section 313(d)(2)(A) corresponds 

roughly to the notion of acute toxicity, and § 313(d)(2)(B) to 

chronic toxicity. Congress was apparently focused on 

precisely this distinction. Subsection (B) originated in an 

amendment offered by its proponent explicitly to assure 

reporting for chemicals “which are not only acutely toxic, as 

[then] provided for in the bill, but also those chemicals that 

pose serious chronic health risks.” See 5 Legislative History 

of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 

1986 at 4193 (1990) (emphasis added) (explaining purpose); 

see also id. at 4353-54 (vote adopting amendment). As the 

proponent, Rep. Edgar, said, “[i]f we are monitoring 

emissions of chemicals that can cause death or sickness in 

hours, why not do the same for those which may lead to injury 

over longer exposure periods?” Id. at 4194 (emphasis added). 

Although the ultimately enacted language more closely 

resembles the Senate version of the legislation, the conference 

report evinces the same focus on toxicity in its acute and its 

chronic form. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-962, 1986 

U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3276, 3387 (Oct. 3, 1986) (“Subsection (d) of 

the conference agreement requires reporting on listed toxic

chemicals that cause, or reasonably can be anticipated to 

cause, significant adverse acute human health effects, various 

USCA Case #04-5189 Document #893026 Filed: 05/10/2005 Page 8 of 12
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chronic human health effects, and significant adverse effects 

on the environment.”) (emphasis added). Section 

313(d)(2)(C) extends coverage to chemicals that escape 

classification under (A) or (B) but nonetheless, through their 

toxicity (alone or in combination with persistence in the 

environment or tendency to bioaccumulate), have severe 

environmental effects. Each subsection obviously captures a 

different type of resulting harm. Read together, they plainly 

focus on toxic chemicals. 

 EPA argues that even if § 313(d)(2)(B) contains an 

implicit requirement of toxicity, that term should be 

understood differently from its use in ordinary parlance. See 

Appellees’ Br. at 22. This argument takes two forms. To start 

with, EPA urges that the term “toxic” should not be given its 

ordinary meaning because “toxic chemical” is defined in the 

statute’s formal definitions to mean “a substance on the list 

described in section 313(c)”—that is, a substance on the TRI, 

as revised by the Administrator. See § 329(10), 42 U.S.C. 

§ 11049(10); see also Appellees’ Br. at 22. There is no doubt 

that “[w]hen a statute includes an explicit definition, we must 

follow that definition, even if it varies from that term’s 

ordinary meaning.” Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 

(2000). But this argument is simply a repetition of the 

argument that § 313(d)(2)’s “cause or can reasonably be 

anticipated to cause” formula dispenses with any requirement 

of toxicity. 

More substantively, EPA argues that even if there is a 

requirement of toxicity, “EPA would not have been required 

to accept the Council’s proposed definition; for . . . there is no 

single, universally accepted definition of toxicity.” 

Appellees’ Br. at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted). EPA 

suggests that toxicity should be defined as “the potential to 

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cause harm to biological or living systems.” Id. at 33. The 

Council argues that a chemical is toxic if “it causes illness or 

injury when ingested, inhaled, or otherwise absorbed into the 

body.” Appellant’s Br. at 29. Virtually all definitions other 

than EPA’s litigating position closely approximate the 

Council’s idea, and contain either an implicit or explicit 

requirement of harm resulting from exposure. Compare 

Hawley’s Condensed Chemical Dictionary 1117 (13th ed. 

1997) (“ability of a substance to cause damage to living tissue, 

impairment of the central nervous system, severe illness or, in 

extreme cases, death when ingested, inhaled, or absorbed by 

the skin”) (emphasis added), with Webster’s New World 

Dictionary (3d college ed., 4th prtg. 1988) 1415, 1043 

(defining toxic as “of, affected, by, or caused by a toxin, or 

poison” and defining poison as “a substance causing illness or 

death when eaten, drunk, or absorbed even in relatively small 

quantities”) (emphasis added). EPA acknowledges that there 

“is arguably support for the ACC’s proposed definition.” 

Appellees’ Br. at 32. We think the case is a lot stronger than 

that. After all, EPA’s own Toxicology Handbook (3d prtg. 

1988) defines “toxicant” as a “harmful substance or agent that 

may injure an exposed organism.” J.A. 154 (emphasis added). 

Even in its decision here, EPA characterized as “fundamental” 

the question “whether, regardless of the number of intervening 

steps, there is a natural and continuous line, unbroken by any 

intervening causes, between exposure to the chemical and the 

toxic effect.” MEK Petition Denial, 63 Fed. Reg. at 15199/3 

(emphasis added). 

 EPA’s currently preferred definition of toxicity would 

apparently qualify materials that no scientist or educated lay 

person would term toxic. For example, the release of large 

volumes of any liquid, be it juice, milk, or gasoline, has “the 

potential to cause harm to biological or living systems”—for 

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example by causing death by drowning or crop destruction by 

flooding—but it would be nonsense to suggest that all liquids 

are “toxic chemicals” for purposes of listing on the TRI. And 

while EPA expressly disavows its intention to list all VOCs, 

MEK Petition Denial, 63 Fed. Reg. at 15199, the agency 

readily admits that under the view it advances here it would be 

free to list any and all VOCs because of their potential 

contribution to the formation of ozone, id. In fact, at oral 

argument, counsel for EPA conceded that EPA’s 

interpretation would allow water to be listed on the TRI. Oral 

Arg. at approx. 30:00-25. Congress does not generally hide 

elephants in mouseholes, American Trucking Association v. 

Whitman, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001), and we think it utterly 

improbable that by creating a list of several hundred toxic 

chemicals, with authority for add-ons, Congress intended to 

allow EPA to list all VOCs, orange juice, and water. EPA’s 

preferred definition is clearly inconsistent with the statute. 

To fit MEK under § 313(d)(2)(C), EPA offers additional 

arguments. See MEK Petition Denial, 63 Fed. Reg. at 15199. 

One is simply a replay of EPA’s strenuous effort to remove 

any limiting notion of toxicity from the statute, with MEK’s 

indirect contribution to ozone’s harms supposedly amounting 

to “toxicity.” EPA speaks of “indirect toxicity” in the context 

of § 313(d)(2)(C) and of “indirect effects” or “indirect 

causation” in the context of § 313(d)(2)(B). But this is merely 

an effort to fit the same square peg into different circular 

holes. EPA’s other variant depends on eliminating “its” from 

§ 313(d)(2)(C) (“because of its [MEK’s] toxicity”), so that 

MEK becomes a toxic chemical because of the toxicity of 

ozone, to whose creation MEK contributes. This ruthless 

surgery is equally unjustified. 

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 Although EPA argues that the statute should be liberally 

construed to effect the purpose of the statute, its own proposed 

removal of virtually any constraints on the discretion of the 

Administrator would hardly serve that purpose. Congress 

intended the Act to facilitate community information, 

awareness, and planning for the release of hazardous 

chemicals from nearby facilities. See Huls America, Inc., 83 

F.3d at 446. But the sort of community response seemingly 

anticipated—precautions against relatively local toxic 

releases—is hardly advanced by including a chemical that, 

when mixed with other chemicals thousands of feet above the 

point of release, tends to generate a third chemical, which in 

turn may result in adverse effects on humans and the 

environment in regions hundreds of miles from the initial time 

and place of the release. See EPA, Air Quality Criteria and 

Related Photochemical Oxidants ch. 3, 1-4, 36-37 (July 1996) 

(describing role of VOCs in creation of ozone). 

 In sum, we hold that §§ 313(d)(2)(B) and (C) allow only 

for the listing of toxic chemicals, substantially as the term 

toxic is used in ordinary parlance. At a minimum, the 

chemical must cause harm via exposure. Because EPA’s own 

analysis demonstrates that MEK fails this test, EPA’s denial 

of the Council’s petition to delist was improper. As a result, 

we vacate the decision of the district court and remand so that 

it can direct EPA to delete MEK from the TRI. 

 So ordered. 

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