Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00608/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00608-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAMON DEL RIO,

Petitioner,

v.

DANIEL PARAMO,

Respondent.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-608-GPC-BGS

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION [Doc. No. 12] 

AND GRANTING RESPONDENT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION 

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

[Doc. No. 8]

BACKGROUND

Ramon Del Rio, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on March 24, 2017. Doc. No. 1. Del Rio 

alleges that prison officials denied him due process by issuing him a Rules Violation Report 

(“RVR”) for not providing a urine sample for drug testing. Id. at 12. Del Rio asserts that 

the officers’ actions violated prison rules, and relatedly, his right to due process. Id. He 

explains that he could not provide a urine sample due to a medical condition. Id. As a 

remedy, Del Rio asks for expungement of the RVR and restoration of credits he lost as a 

result of the infraction. Id. 

On June 13, 2017, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Doc. No. 8. 

Respondent argues that (1) Del Rio’s petition does not invoke federal habeas corpus 

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jurisdiction, and (2) even if the Court were to construe the petition as a claim under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, Del Rio fails to raise a substantial federal question. Id. at 2-8. With respect 

to the first ground, Respondent explains that Del Rio’s petition does not invoke federal 

habeas jurisdiction because the relief sought will not necessarily affect the duration of his 

confinement. Id. at 3-4. Del Rio filed a response in opposition to motion to dismiss on 

August 16, 2017. Doc. No. 11.

On January 8, 2018, United States Magistrate Judge Bernard G. Skomal issued a 

report and recommendation (the “Report”) recommending this Court grant Respondent’s 

motion to dismiss. Doc. No. 12. Judge Skomal’s order instructed that objections to the 

Report must be filed by January 26, 2018. Id. at 9. Del Rio did not file any objections.

After careful consideration of the pleadings and relevant exhibits submitted and for 

the reasons set forth below, this Court ADOPTS the Report and GRANTS Respondent’s 

motion to dismiss. 

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) set forth this Court’s 

duties in connection with a report from a Magistrate Judge. The Court “may accept, reject 

or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and recommendations made by the magistrate

judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). This Court need not review de novo portions of the Report to 

which neither party objects. See Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n.13 (9th Cir. 

2005). Because Del Rio filed no objections to the Report, this Court may assume the 

correctness of Judge Skomal’s findings of fact and decide the motion on the applicable 

law. Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. Of Cal., 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974); 

Johnson v. Nelson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2001). 

II. Analysis 

a. Habeas Jurisdiction

Judge Skomal concluded that Del Rio cannot pursue his claims in a petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus. Doc. No. 12 at 6. A state prisoner cannot bring a habeas corpus 

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action if his claim is not at “the core of habeas corpus.” Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 

934 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487 (1973)). A

claim is at the core of habeas corpus if it “challenges the fact or duration of the conviction 

or sentence” and “necessarily lead[s] to immediate or earlier release for confinement.” Id.

at 934-35 (emphasis added). 

Del Rio is confined as a result of a California criminal judgment. Doc. No. 1. Since 

Del Rio brought the instant action under a habeas corpus claim, his claim must be at “the 

core of habeas corpus.” Doc. No. 1; Nettles, 830 F.3d at 934. In California, a prisoner is 

eligible for release if he is found suitable for parole and he has reached the minimum 

eligible parole date (MEPD). Nettles, 830 F.3d at 925. Del Rio reached his MEPD in 

1984. Prior to receiving his RVR, Del Rio was denied parole. In reaching that decision, 

the parole board explained, inter alia, that Del Rio had not assumed full responsibility for 

his criminal conduct and that he had a “statistically high risk to reoffend in the free 

community.” Lodg. 9:3. These considerations demonstrate that expungement of Del Rio’s 

RVR will not “necessarily” result in his earlier release of confinement because a prison 

rule violation is only one of many factors the parole board must consider in making its 

determination. Nettles, 830 F.3d at 934-35 (“Because the parole board has the authority to 

deny parole on the basis of any of the grounds presently available to it, the presence of a 

disciplinary infraction does not compel the denial of parole, nor does an absence of an 

infraction compel the grant of parole.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 

Indeed, “the panel could deny parole to [Del Rio] even if he succeeded in expunging [his] 

violation report.” Id. at 935.

Moreover, as Judge Skomal noted in the Report, because Del Rio’s MEPD has 

passed, a loss of credits due to the RVR will not lengthen his sentence. “These credits will 

not get [Del Rio] to his MEPD any faster because he reached it decades ago, and even if 

their restoration would have any impact on the outcome of his next parole hearing, it would 

be one among the many considerations before the Board noted above and not necessarily 

lead to an earlier release.” (Report, at 6.) 

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The Court concludes that, because the relief Del Rio seeks would not necessarily 

have an impact on the duration of his confinement, his petition lies outside the “core of 

habeas corpus.” Del Rio must assert his claims regarding the alleged improper RVR, “if

at all, under § 1983.” Nettles, 830 F.3d at 931 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

b. Conversion to § 1983

“Although [Del Rio]’s claims are not cognizable in habeas, [the Court] must still 

consider whether” the petition can be construed “as pleading a cause of action under 

§ 1983,” which entails determining whether the petition is “amenable to conversion on its

face.” Id. at 935–36. Judge Skomal found the Petition unamenable to conversion to a 

§ 1983 action, and this Court agrees.

As Judge Skomal notes, not only is the petition not amenable on its face because it 

does not allege any personal action by Respondent, see Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 

(9th Cir. 1988) (“The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties 

and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to 

have caused a constitutional deprivation.”), but also conversion under these circumstances 

could negatively impact Del Rio. If the Court were to convert the petition into a § 1983 

action and dismiss it on the merits, that would count as a strike against Del Rio under the 

Prisoner Litigation Reform Act’s three-strikes rule. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (barring, with 

a limited exception, a prisoner from bringing a civil action “if the prisoner has, on 3 or 

more prior occasions, . . . brought an action . . . that was dismissed on the grounds that it is 

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted”). The 

Court agrees with Judge Skomal’s recommendation that the petition is unamenable to 

conversion to a § 1983 action.

Having concluded that the petition is not amenable to a § 1983 action, the Court 

advises Petitioner that (1) the Court has not made a decision on the ultimate merit of 

his case, (2) Petitioner may refile this suit immediately under the proper legal label, 

subject to the normal rules (such as those prohibiting frivolous lawsuits), and (3) if 

Petitioner chooses to refile his suit under the proper legal label, certain consequences 

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will probably result, including consideration of the claim on the merits, which might 

result in dismissal and a “strike” against Petitioner under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See 

Glaus v. Anderson, 408 F.3d 382, 389–90 (7th Cir. 2005) (recommending that such 

warnings be given under these circumstances).

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. The findings and conclusions of Judge Skomal presented in the Report (Doc. No. 

12 are ADOPTED in their entirety;

2. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 8) is GRANTED;

3. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 1) is DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

Dated: February 22, 2018

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