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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 13-3766

JOHN MICHAEL WOODS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF BERWYN,*

Defendant-Appellee.

___________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 12-cv-1900 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 30, 2014 — DECIDED OCTOBER 15, 2015

____________________

Before KANNE, WILLIAMS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. When John Woods told a coworker at the Berwyn Fire Department that “he wanted to 

 * Although the caption originally reflected Ronald Hamilton as an 

appellee, we have removed him since the only counts in the complaint 

relating to Hamilton were not part of this appeal.

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kill somebody, all of them” and that his children were going 

to “go over there” and “tune them up,” referring to his 

coworkers and superiors, Fire Department Chief Denis 

O’Halloran looked into the statements and eventually recommended termination. A three-member panel for the 

Board of Fire and Police Commissioners conducted a hearing on O’Halloran’s recommendation. Woods was represented by counsel, who gave opening and closing statements, put on witnesses, cross-examined others, made and 

won objections, and presented exhibits. After the hearing, 

the Board voted to terminate Woods based largely on the 

testimony of the co-worker to whom Woods made the 

statement. Woods filed a complaint in federal court asserting 

discrimination and unlawful retaliation and attempted to 

proceed under a cat’s paw theory of liability, which applies 

in employment discrimination cases when a biased subordinate who lacks decision-making power uses the formal decision-maker as a dupe in a deliberate scheme to trigger a discriminatory employment action. Under Woods’s theory, 

O’Halloran was the discriminatory subordinate who used 

the formal decision-maker (the Board) to fire him. However, 

based on the full and independent evidentiary hearing and 

the Board’s almost complete reliance on the co-worker’s testimony, any discriminatory animus by O’Halloran cannot be 

the basis for the cat’s paw liability. Without that, Woods 

cannot make out a prima facie case, and we affirm the grant 

of summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Because we are reviewing a grant of summary judgment, 

we present the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in 

the light most favorable to Woods, the non-moving party. 

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No. 13-3766 3

Nichols v. Mich. City Plant Planning Dept., 755 F.3d 594, 599 

(7th Cir. 2014). Although our decision does not ultimately 

turn on the events that Woods alleges were discriminatory, 

we present them to give context to Woods’s case. 

In January 2010, Berwyn Fire Department Lieutenant 

John Woods sustained a back injury from carrying a 350-

pound heart attack victim. Woods was cleared to return to 

work in April, but did not return until June because of persistent pain. Before Woods’s return, Chief O’Halloran and 

Assistant Chief Frank Simek sent him two memoranda with 

instructions to complete the enclosed Family Medical Leave 

Act paperwork. Simek also visited Woods’s home and reiterated that the FMLA paperwork needed to be signed because it revolved “around [his] status as a fireman.” Fearing 

for his job’s safety, Woods signed the FMLA paperwork. 

Upon Woods’s return, O’Halloran informed Woods that 

he had three options: he could go on normal retirement, on 

duty-related disability, or on a nonduty-related disability. 

Woods said he was not interested in any of the options and, 

instead, successfully bid on a position as the Fire Department’s Training Officer. Woods later learned from his friend, 

Joe Lotito, that Chief O’Halloran had asked Lotito to put his 

own name on the bid list so that O’Halloran would not have 

to choose Woods. Woods nonetheless began work, but reported that the training he received was inadequate. Specifically, he asserted that he did not get assistance in planning, 

that prior lesson plans had been removed just before he 

started, and that he was constantly criticized for his work. 

One year later, in May 2011, Woods was participating in 

an arduous fire burn training exercise on a hot day and told 

O’Halloran he was “stoking the fire” to which O’Halloran 

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responded “Yeah, it’s a young man’s job, Mike.” Later that 

same month, Woods met with Assistant Chief Dick Swade 

and Deputy Chief Greg DiMenna who told Woods that they 

wanted him to retire or that he would be fired. In a separate 

conversation, Woods relayed to Deputy Chief Sam Molinaro 

that Woods wanted to remain at his job, but wanted the harassment to stop. 

In a meeting later that month with Chief O’Halloran, 

Woods said he wanted to leave the Training Officer’s position because he was being harassed and not given a fair opportunity to succeed. O’Halloran posted a bid sheet to find a 

replacement. If no one signed up, the position would automatically go to the lieutenant with the lowest seniority, 

Ronald Hamilton, a friend of Woods’s, who did not want the 

job. 

Woods and Hamilton had a conversation one week later 

on June 3. Although Woods claims the conversation focused 

on Hamilton’s displeasure with the possibility of being assigned as a Training Officer, Hamilton’s contemporaneous 

notes say: 

Sometime during our conversation [Woods] 

stated to me that at one time he wanted to kill 

somebody, all of them. He stated that his kids 

asked him for the addresses, and that they 

would go “over there” and “tune them up.” 

Mike also stated that with all the stress he is 

under that he was thinking of going back to the 

psychiatrist. He also said something on the 

lines of hurting himself. 

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No. 13-3766 5

Woods denies threatening harm to himself or anybody 

else. According to Woods, Hamilton began screaming at 

Woods, saying that Woods messed up his own life and now 

was messing up Hamilton’s life. 

Hamilton’s version of the conversation was relayed to, 

among others, O’Halloran, who asked that the Berwyn police conduct a well-being check on Woods. Four officers 

went to visit Woods, who denied making any threats, and 

reported that Woods was calm, polite, and in good spirits. 

They concluded Woods was not a threat to himself or others 

and left. 

O’Halloran ordered Woods to undergo a psychological 

evaluation conducted by O’Halloran’s own selected psychologist, Dr. Anthony DeJoseph, to determine whether 

Woods was homicidal or suicidal. The psychologist reported 

there was no way of making a definitive determination 

whether Woods made the statements to Hamilton, but that 

Woods was honest and forthcoming and was not at risk of

harming himself or others. O’Halloran disregarded Dr. 

DeJoseph’s report and conducted his own investigation, including an interrogation of Woods where Woods again denied making any threats. 

On July 21, 2011, O’Halloran issued a Statement of 

Charges against Woods and requested that the Berwyn 

Board of Fire and Police Commissioners terminate Woods’s 

employment. The Statement of Charges relayed the conversation between Woods and Hamilton in the factual section, 

and included charges for conduct unbecoming an officer, 

fighting/verbal abuse, violation of Illinois’s disorderly conduct law (720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/26-1(a)(1)), and false statements made during O’Halloran’s investigation. 

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At the hearing on the Statement of Charges, the Board 

heard testimony, opening and closing statements, viewed 

exhibits and ruled on objections. Woods was represented by 

counsel. One week later, the Board issued a one-page ruling—without reference to any facts or law—that Berwyn had 

met its burden of establishing by a preponderance of evidence that Woods was guilty of the charges against him and 

there was cause for discharge. After twenty-three years with 

the Department and at fifty-three years old, Woods was terminated. He challenged the administrative ruling in state 

court and, upon a remand for a more detailed opinion, the 

Board issued an eight-page opinion. That opinion has since 

been upheld as not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable by 

two courts. See Woods v. City of Berwyn, 11-ch-32916 (Cook 

Cnty. Cir. Ct. Oct. 4, 2013); Woods v. City of Berwyn, 13-3450 

(Ill. App. Ct. Oct. 29, 2014). 

Meanwhile, Woods filed the complaint relevant to this 

appeal in which he alleged, among other things, the four 

counts on appeal: (1) retaliation under the Family Medical 

Leave Act; (2) discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act; (3) discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act; and (4) retaliation under Illinois’s 

Workers’ Compensation Act. The district court granted 

summary judgment on all counts in favor of the City of 

Berwyn. Woods appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

Woods argues he has presented sufficient evidence to 

raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 

O’Halloran’s discriminatory animus could be imputed to the 

Board, thereby supporting a cat’s paw theory of liability. He 

also argues that he presented a genuine issue of material fact 

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No. 13-3766 7

as to whether the Department’s and O’Halloran’s decisions 

to fire him were pretextual. 

As noted, we construe all facts and reasonable inferences 

in the light most favorable to Woods, the non-movant. Nichols, 755 F.3d at 599. Summary judgment should be granted if 

there is a genuine issue of material fact. Id. However, we 

need not draw inferences that are supported by “only speculation and conjecture.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). A factual dispute is only “genuine” “if a reasonable jury could 

find for either party.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). 

Woods admits that he cannot show that the direct decision-maker, the Board, acted with discriminatory animus. 

Instead, he relies on the “cat’s paw” theory of liability. We 

were the first circuit to use the phrase “cat’s paw” when discussing a subordinate using her superior to commit a discriminatory act in the employment discrimination context. 

See Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990). As 

the Supreme Court noted, the phrase comes from one of Aesop’s Fables in which a monkey induces a cat, by flattery, to 

extract roasting chestnuts from the fire. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 

562 U.S. 411, 415 n.1 (2011). The duped cat burns its paws 

while getting the chestnuts, and the monkey takes them, 

leaving the cat with nothing. Id. In the employment discrimination context, the cat’s paw theory of liability applies when 

“a biased subordinate who lacks decision-making power uses the formal decision-maker as a dupe in a deliberate 

scheme to trigger a discriminatory employment action.” 

Matthews v. Waukesha Cnty., 759 F.3d 821, 828 (7th Cir. 2014)

(internal citations omitted); see also Staub, 562 U.S. at 419 

(applying cat’s paw theory to Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act). 

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In Staub, an appeal from one of our decisions, the Supreme Court adopted the cat’s paw theory of liability and 

held that it is based on tort-law concepts of proximate causation. 562 U.S. at 420. In that case, the alleged biased subordinate submitted a disciplinary warning for Staub’s purported 

violation of a company rule, which Staub alleged was false 

and motivated by discriminatory animus. Id. at 413–15. Two 

other co-workers stated that Staub was unreliable and, based 

on that information and a review of Staub’s personnel file, a 

supervisor fired him. Id. While we found there was no liability since the subordinate was not the “singular influence” in 

the firing, the Supreme Court reversed our decision. Id. at 

415–16, 422–23. The decision in Staub changed the law in this 

circuit. Here, we do not attempt to outline a universal 

framework for post-Staub cases. The application of Staub

principles in this case is limited to these facts.

The Court stated that under a cat’s paw theory there 

must be “some direct relation between the injury asserted 

and the injurious conduct alleged” that is neither “too remote, purely contingent, or indirect.” Id. at 419 . The ultimate decision-maker’s exercise of judgment alone does not 

render the subordinate’s discriminatory animus “remote” or 

“purely contingent,” but instead creates an additional proximate cause. Id. In other words, just because someone else 

has to make the ultimate termination decision does not remove the subordinate’s discriminatory animus as a proximate cause. 

However, the Court noted there are acts that can change 

the subordinate’s discriminatory animus from a proximate 

cause to a cause that is too remote to support cat’s paw liability. As the Court said, even if there is an independent invesCase: 13-3766 Document: 41 Filed: 10/15/2015 Pages: 14
No. 13-3766 9

tigation, “the supervisor’s biased report may remain a causal 

factor if the independent investigation takes it into account 

without determining that the adverse action was, apart from the 

supervisor's recommendation, entirely justified.” Id. at 421 (emphasis added). If the ultimate decision-maker does determine whether the adverse action is entirely justified apart 

from the supervisor’s recommendation, then the subordinate’s purported bias might not subject the employer to liability. This is consistent with our previous holdings that “the 

chain of causation can be broken if the unbiased decisionmaker conducts a meaningful and independent investigation 

of the information being supplied by the biased employee.” 

Schandelmeier-Bartels v. Chi. Park Dist., 634 F.3d 372, 383 (7th 

Cir. 2011). To hold otherwise would be to rule that whenever

a discriminatory subordinate makes an allegation or institutes a charge and the plaintiff-employee is fired, there are 

no steps the ultimate decision-maker could ever take to 

break that chain of proximate causation. That cannot be so. 

Cf. Polland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1181 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting argument that “any time a biased employee ... sets in 

motion the process that leads to an adverse employment action, the employer would be liable, even if the employer then

conducted an entirely independent inquiry and decisionmaking process insulated from the animus of the biased employee”).

Woods takes the position that because O’Halloran recommended his termination and issued the Statement of 

Charges, the Board’s full-scale hearing into those Charges 

still does not insulate the Department’s decision because the 

Charges set the wheels in motion for his termination. However, Woods’s position is contrary to the Court’s statement 

that a determination apart from the biased subordinate’s 

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recommendation can break the chain of causation. Staub, 562 

U.S. at 420–21. Here, the Board’s formal and adversarial procedures and the evidence that the Board relied on to support 

its decision to terminate Woods broke the chain of causation. 

The Board conducted a full trial with attorneys, opening 

statement and closing arguments, direct and crossexamination of witnesses, including Woods, objections and 

the introduction of evidence. The hearing included decisions 

made by the Board that went Woods’s way and others that 

did not. Indeed, the Board did not just take the Statement of 

Charges at face value, thereby delegating its fact-finding to 

the potentially biased O’Halloran. Rather, the Board conducted its own fact-finding proceeding. These facts weigh in 

favor of finding that the Board’s hearing broke the causal 

chain. See Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, 147 F.3d

718, 725 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that the school board’s hearing consisting of testimony from the plaintiff and fifteen other witnesses and a review of other documentary and video 

evidence was an independent investigation sufficient to 

break causation). Nonetheless, this hearing procedure does 

not automatically negate the influence of the potentially biased O’Halloran. See Staub, 562 U.S. at 420–21.

We note that because the unbiased decision-maker could 

possibly rely on facts provided by the biased supervisor, a 

formal adversarial procedure does not automatically break 

the chain of causation. See Staub, 562 U.S. at 420–21. But, if 

the employer’s procedure “results in an adverse actions for 

reasons unrelated to the supervisor’s original biased action 

..., then the employer will not be liable. Id. at 42. In this case, 

the hearing broke the chain of causation because the record 

shows that the Board did not rely on the facts presented by 

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No. 13-3766 11

the presumably biased O’Halloran. Instead, the Board relied 

on testimony from Hamilton, who did not harbor any discriminatory animus. The Board found in its eight-page opinion “Lt. Hamilton’s testimony about his conversation with 

Lt. Woods on June 3, 2011” was credible based on Hamilton’s 

“demeanor while testifying” and that Hamilton “had no motive or basis for lying and that his actions immediately following his conversation with Lt. Woods were consistent with 

his testimony.” All of the citations for the Board’s findings 

regarding the conversation are to Hamilton’s testimony, and 

it found that the threats were cause for termination. 

O’Halloran did not even testify as to the contents of the conversation, nor could he since he was not present during the 

conversation. In other words, the Board made its determination without relying on any of O’Halloran’s statements or 

actions. This shows the Board was not an unwitting dupe 

and did not rely on O’Halloran to reach its decision. 

O’Halloran might have instituted the action, but once the 

Board began its hearing, it determined that the “adverse 

employment action was, apart from the supervisor’s recommendation, entirely justified.” Staub, 562 U.S. at 421. Had the 

Board relied on O’Halloran’s statements or failed to independently determine whether the conversation with Hamilton happened, this might be a different case. But that is not 

what happened here since the Board did conduct an independent hearing and therefore broke the chain of causation. 

See, e.g., Staub, 562 U.S. at 421(“[I]f the employer’s investigation results in an adverse action for reasons unrelated to the 

supervisor’s original biased action ... then the employer will 

not be liable.”) Lobato v. N.M. Env’t Dept., 733 F.3d 1283, 1294 

(10th Cir. 2013) (“[I]f the employer independently verifies 

the facts and does not rely on the biased source—then there 

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is no subordinate bias liability” (internal citation omitted)); 

Romans v. Mich. Dep’t of Human Servs., 668 F.3d 826, 836-37 

(6th Cir. 2012) (finding no liability where office conducted 

independent investigation including seven witness interviews and found a violation of four work rules—only one 

relying on the biased party’s report—each of which would 

have supported termination); cf. McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 649 F.3d 171, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2011) (affirming jury verdict in favor of employee when record of disciplinary hearing failed to show employee could call witnesses on his behalf or cross-examine biased supervisor, and also failed to 

show the content of the testimony of the other witnesses 

aside from biased party). 

Woods further argues the Board was not independent 

and, in fact, did O’Halloran’s bidding and so any appearance 

of impartiality was phony. He points to statements by

O’Halloran that only O’Halloran could fire him, that 

O’Halloran ran the Department rather than the Board, and 

the fact that O’Halloran was “not aware of” and could not 

“recall any” occurrences when the Board rejected any proposed discipline in the past ten years. However, Woods’s 

theory is not sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact that 

the Board just rubber-stamped O’Halloran’s recommendation in this case. First, it is clear from its practice that the 

Board did have the ultimate firing power; otherwise the 

hearing would not have been necessary. Second, 

O’Halloran’s statement about the Board’s previous adoption 

of management’s recommendations related to all members of 

management, not just his own, and represented under five 

recommendations over ten years. We decline to infer that, 

based on that few recommendations over that period, the 

Board rubber-stamps all of O’Halloran’s recommendations. 

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No. 13-3766 13

We would be more inclined to accept this theory if there was 

any evidence that the Board did not conduct full hearings in 

those cases, that those decisions were without merit, or that 

they relied entirely on the Statement of Charges without any 

other support. Cf. Schandelmeier-Bartels, 634 F.3d at 381 (finding that a jury could conclude that the employer’s investigation was irrelevant because biased employee was the sole 

source of nearly all pertinent information relied upon in the 

decision to terminate the plaintiff). Without more, we cannot 

infer that the Board rubber-stamps every recommendation 

made by management. But most importantly, for the reasons 

discussed, Woods has failed to present a genuine issue of 

material fact that the Board was rubber-stamping 

O’Halloran’s recommendation in this case. 

Our conclusion is further supported by the absence of a 

similarly situated individual. To be a sufficiently similar 

comparator, the individual ordinarily should have dealt 

with the same supervisor, been subject to the same standards, and engaged in similar conduct of comparable seriousness. Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 847 (7th Cir. 2012). 

Woods failed to propose the name of any firefighters who 

engaged in conduct that involved serious threats or violence

like Woods, who were brought before the Board, and were 

not terminated by the board upon hearing evidence of such 

conduct.

Finally, Woods argues that with all reasonable inferences 

and the evidence looked at in the light most favorable to 

him, he did not make the statements Hamilton attributes to 

him. Though that could be true, we do not need to determine whether or not Woods made those statements to find 

that the independent hearing broke the chain of causation 

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between O’Halloran and the termination decision. It is sufficient under the cat’s paw theory that the Board found 

Woods made those statements and that the Board was not 

subject to O’Halloran’s control. Because Woods cannot prevail under his cat’s paw theory, and he advocates no other 

theory of liability, his claims must fail.1

III. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district 

court. 

 1 Because Woods failed to establish a prima facie case of liability, we 

do not need to address his arguments on the issue of pretext. See Harper 

v. C.R. England, Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 311 (7th Cir. 2012).

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