Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00316/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00316-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ALFONSO BLACKMON, a/k/a, :

YAHYA R. EL’AMIN, a/k/a, 

JOHN THOMPKINS, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 05-00316-BH-B

SHERIFF JIMMY JOHNSON, et al., :

Defendants. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, a Baldwin County Corrections Center inmate 

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Complaint under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. This action was referred to the undersigned for

appropriate action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local

Rule 72.2(c)(4). Based upon a review of Plaintiff’s claims against

Defendant Jackie Calhoun, it is recommended that these claims be

dismissed, prior to service of process, as frivolous pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(I).

I. Nature of Proceedings.

A. Posture of Action.

Plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

while incarcerated at the Baldwin County Corrections Center. The

Court’s initial screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint resulted in the

dismissal of Defendants who were Baldwin County Commissioners,

namely, Allen Perdue, Jonathan Armstrong, Frank Burt, Jr., George

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Price, Mary Frances Stewart, Charles A. Browdy, and Joe T. Faust,

because the claims against them were frivolous. (Docs. 8, 14, 15).

In addition, Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory

relief were dismissed based on the abstention principles of Younger

v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746 (1971), and the damages claims

were stayed until the criminal proceedings against Plaintiff

concluded. (Id.) On December 20, 2005, Plaintiff was sentenced to

time served and five years’ probation on the 1995 charges of

possession of a forged instrument, second degree; theft of

property, third degree; and theft of services. (Doc. 22 at 25-26)

B. Complaint (Doc. 1).

Plaintiff contends that he was arrested on the abovereferenced 1995 charges in June, 1996 as a result of warrants

issued by Defendant Jackie Calhoun, the former Circuit Court Clerk

of Baldwin County, Alabama. According to Plaintiff, the warrants

were not valid for a myriad of reasons, namely: (1) they were not

renewed every two years as required; (2) they were dismissed ten

years ago; (3) the Alabama courts lost jurisdiction in this matter

in 1998 and 1999 when valid warrants and indictments were not

presented for final disposition within 180 days as required by the

Detainers Act; and (4) the warrants were not valid because they

were issued in 1996 by the court clerk who was not a judge.

Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages for each day of illegal

detention and for loss of his salaries, commissions, and car;

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punitive damages; and “declaratory” damages, all totaling

$4,290,000.00.

At the time Plaintiff filed the Complaint, he indicated that

he was a pre-trial detainee. (Doc. 1 at 13). The form complaint,

which Plaintiff submitted, included the following question, “If

this present lawsuit concerns your criminal conviction or sentence,

state whether your conviction has been: reversed, expunged,

invalidated, writ of habeas corpus granted.” In response to this

question, Plaintiff provided “yes” responses except for the part of

the question inquiring as to whether his conviction had been

reversed. With respect to this part of the question, Plaintiff

responded “no”. Because Plaintiff’s responses and some of his

other filings have been less than clear, he was directed to clarify

and detail the legal history of the warrants that he contends are

improper. (Doc. 20). In response to the Court’s Order, Plaintiff

submitted a document titled “Response and Legal History” (Doc. 22).

C. Claims Against Defendant Jackie Calhoun.

Plaintiff has identified numerous Baldwin County, Alabama,

officials as having allegedly violated his civil rights or

conspiring to violate his civil rights under the Constitutions of

the United States and Alabama and the Alabama Rules of Criminal

Procedure. One of the listed Defendants is Jackie Calhoun.

According to Plaintiff, Calhoun, in her individual capacity,

allegedly issued an alias arrest warrant for Plaintiff without

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The predecessor to this section is 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Even

though Congress made many substantive changes to § 1915(d) when

it enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2)(B), the frivolity and the

failure to state a claim analysis contained in Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827 (1989), was unaltered. 

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leave of court or a judge’s or magistrate’s order and, in her

official capacity, she allegedly committed “illegal acts,

violations of state and federal laws, . . . under the cloak of

official duties.” (Doc. 1 at 5-6). Plaintiff further relates that

Calhoun was later terminated for embezzling “[his] court payments,

stocks, and cash.” (Id. at 4). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges

that in June, 1996, he was arrested on the 1995 charges, posted

bail in June or July, 1996, and subsequently made court

appearances, which resulted in the dismissal of the charges in

October, 1996. (Id. at 8). Plaintiff contends that the arrest

warrants issued by Defendant Calhoun resulted in Plaintiff’s arrest

on April 28, 2005. (Id.) Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that

Calhoun failed to return to him, as promised, the stock

certificates and money that he provided, in lieu of bail in 1996.

(Id.) Plaintiff contends that Calhoun’s actions violated his

rights under the Fourth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments and

state law. (Id.)

II. Standards of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court

is reviewing the Complaint (Doc. 1) under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B).1 Under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(I), a claim may be dismissed

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Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,

534 U.S. 1044 (2001); Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 866 n.4

(6th Cir. 2000). However, dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B) is now

mandatory. Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1348-49.

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as “frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.”

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831-32

(1989). A claim is frivolous as a matter of law where, inter alia,

the defendants are immune from suit, id. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833,

or the claim seeks to enforce a right that clearly does not exist.

Id. Judges are accorded “not only the authority to dismiss [as

frivolous] a claim based on indisputably meritless legal theory,

but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s

factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual

contentions are clearly baseless.” Id. Moreover, a complaint may

be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Mitchell v.

Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)(noting that §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)’s language tracks the language of Fed.R.Civ.P.

12(b)(6)). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted, the allegations must show

plausibility. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1966

(2007). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to

relief above the speculative level[.]” Id. at 1965. That is, the

allegations must be a “‘plain statement’ possess[ing] enough heft

to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 1966

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(second brackets in original). “[L]abels and conclusions and a

formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements” are

insufficient for grounds for entitlement to relief. Id. at 1959.

However, when a successful affirmative defense, such as a statute

of limitations, appears on the face of a complaint, dismissal for

failure to state a claim is also warranted. Jones v. Bock, 127

S.Ct. 910, 920-21 (2007).

III. Discussion.

A. Claim Against Defendant Calhoun Based on Arrest 

Warrant.

As indicated supra, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant

Calhoun arise from her issuance of arrest warrants for him in 1996

and her alleged failure to return stock certificates and money when

the charges against Plaintiff were dismissed in October, 1996.

(Doc. 1 at 8). The undersigned observes, based upon a searching

review of Plaintiff’s Complaint, and other filings, that the Court

is unable to discern any other claims that Plaintiff is attempting

to assert against Defendant Calhoun because there are no other

allegations directly connected to her. See Zatler v. Wainwright,

802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986) (a causal connection between a

defendant’s actions, orders, customs, or policies and a deprivation

of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights must be established in

order to state a claim under § 1983). 

The Court will now explore whether there are any grounds which

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preclude Plaintiff from proceeding on his claim against Defendant

Calhoun at this time. This inquiry does not require the Court to

rule on the substantive aspects of Plaintiff’s claim. A liberal

construction of Plaintiff’s warrant claims reveals that the claim

appears to be in the nature of a malicious prosecution claim

because Plaintiff is complaining about his illegal detention as a

result of the warrants. Wallace v. Kato, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 1096

(2007) (“[F]alse imprisonment consists of detention without legal

process [and] ends once the victim becomes held pursuant to such

process-when, for example, he is bound over by a magistrate or

arraigned on charges. . . . Thereafter, unlawful detention forms

part of the damages for the ‘entirely distinct’ tort of malicious

prosecution which remedies detention accompanied . . . by wrongful

institution of legal process.”); Joyce v. Adams, 2007 WL 2781196,

at *3 (S.D. Ga. 2007) (“[T]his Circuit has held that a Fourth

Amendment unreasonable seizure claim is most closely analogous to

the common law tort of malicious prosecution when the seizure

involves obtaining an arrest warrant or is otherwise pursuant to

legal process. . . . An arrest warrant constitutes legal

process[.]” ). 

A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim is governed by the United

States Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,

486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2372-73 (1994). In Heck, a prisoner filed

a § 1983 damages action against the prosecutors and investigator in

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his criminal case for their actions which resulted in his

conviction. The Supreme Court analogized the plaintiff’s claim to

a common-law cause of action for malicious prosecution, which has

as a required element that the accused prove the termination of the

prior criminal proceeding in his favor. 512 U.S. at 484, 114 S.Ct.

at 2371. The Heck Court opined:

We think the hoary principle that civil tort

actions are not appropriate vehicles for

challenging the validity of outstanding

criminal judgments applies to § 1983 damages

actions that necessarily require the plaintiff

to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or

confinement, just as it had always applied to

actions for malicious prosecution (footnote

omitted). 

We hold that, in order to recover damages

for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by

actions whose unlawfulness would render a

conviction or sentence invalid, (footnote

omitted), a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that

the conviction or sentence has been reversed

on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,

declared invalid by a state tribunal

authorized to make such determination, or

called into question by a federal court’s

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. A claim for damages bearing that

relationship to a conviction or sentence that

has not been so invalidated is not cognizable

under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner

seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district

court must consider whether a judgment in

favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply

the invalidity of his conviction or sentence;

if it would, the complaint must be dismissed

unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the

conviction or sentence has already been

invalidated. But if the district court

determines that the plaintiff’s action, even

if successful, will not demonstrate the

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invalidity of any outstanding criminal

judgment against the plaintiff, the action

should be allowed to proceed (footnote

omitted), in the absence of some other bar to

the suit (footnote omitted).

Id. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. at 2372-73. 

Accordingly, if a ruling in Plaintiff’s favor on his claim

that Defendant Calhoun improperly issued the warrants would have

the effect of invalidating Plaintiff’s convictions, then Plaintiff

must demonstrate that his convictions have been invalidated in

order to avoid dismissal of his claim under Heck. On the other

hand, if a favorable ruling on Plaintiff’s § 1983 damages claim

will not have the effect of invalidating his convictions, then his

claim may proceed unless there exists another ground that

necessitates the dismissal of his claim. Id. at 487 n.7, 114 S.Ct.

at 2373 n.7. 

In the present case, Plaintiff indicates that his convictions

have not been invalidated. (Doc. 22 at 25). Therefore, if a

favorable ruling on Plaintiff’s damages claim based on the warrants

would undermine his convictions, his claim is frivolous and is due

to be dismissed with prejudice. See Abella v. Rubino, 63 F.3d

1063, 1065 (11th Cir. 1995) (dismissing claim barred by Heck with

prejudice). This Court need not decide if Plaintiff’s claim, based

on the warrants, is precluded by Heck because the record reflects

that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the applicable statute of

limitations. 

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The Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim concerning Defendant

Calhoun’s issuance of the warrant accrued when Plaintiff was

initially arrested in June, 1996 on the warrants. (Doc. 1; Doc. 22

at 5-6). Under federal law, “[accrual occurs] when the plaintiff

has ‘a complete and present cause of action’” . . . “‘that is, when

plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.’” Wallace, 127 S.Ct. at

1097 (quotations omitted). “The cause of action accrues even though

the full extent of the injury is not then known or predictable.”

Id. Under the circumstances of this case, Plaintiff could have

filed an action almost immediately after his arrest on the ground

that a judge or magistrate did not sign the warrants, and if not

then, he clearly could have filed after the charges were dismissed

in October, 1996. Thus, his cause of action against Defendant

Calhoun was complete at either of those times even though all of

the alleged damages may not been known at that time.

Because a § 1983 action is described as a constitutional tort

action, for statute of limitations purposes, a state’s statute of

limitations for personal injury actions is utilized to determine

the appropriate statute of limitations for § 1983 actions.

Wallace, 127 S.Ct. at 1094. In Alabama, the statute of limitations

for a § 1983 action is two years. Lufkin v. McCallum, 956 F.2d

1104, 1106, 1108 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 917 (1992);

ALA. CODE § 6-2-38(l). A review of the record reflects that this

action was filed on May 31, 2005. (Doc. 1). Because Plaintiff’s

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claim accrued either when he was arrested in June, 1996, or when

the warrants were dismissed in October, 1996, Plaintiff’s warrant

claim against Defendant Calhoun most assuredly arose two years

before the filing of this action. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s warrant

claim against Defendant Calhoun is barred by the two-year statute

of limitations and is therefore due to be dismissed as frivolous.

B. Claim Against Defendant Calhoun for a Deprivation of 

Property Without Due Process of Law.

Turning to Plaintiff’s other claim against Defendant Calhoun,

that she failed to return the stock certificates and money he gave

in 1996 in lieu of bail, and that she embezzled them, (Doc. 1 at

4), the record reveals that this claim is due to be dismissed as

well.

Plaintiff’s claim, as described in his complaint, is best

characterized as a claim for deprivation of property without due

process of law. In Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194

(1984), the United States Supreme Court held that the deprivation

of property by persons acting under color of state law does not

constitute a deprivation without due process of law when a

predeprivation hearing is impractical and there is available an

adequate postdeprivation remedy at the time of the deprivation.

Id. at 532-33, 104 S.Ct. at 3203-04. The Hudson Court reasoned

that impracticality occurs when the loss of property occurs as a

result of a "random, unauthorized act by a state employee," id. at

532, 104 S.Ct. at 3203 (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527,

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541, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1916 (1981), overruled on other grounds

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662 (1986)), because

it is impossible for the State to know beforehand of the

deprivation, negligent or intentional, and to provide a

predeprivation hearing prior to the loss, id. at 533, 104 S.Ct. at

3203. Some postdeprivation remedies that have satisfied due

process are administrative procedures, Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543-44,

101 S.Ct. at 1917, or ordinary state tort litigation procedures,

Hudson, 468 U.S. at 535-36, 104 S.Ct. at 3204. 

Turning to the substantive aspects of the claim before the

Court, the undersigned observes that it is undisputed that

Defendant Calhoun, as a circuit clerk, was a state employee. ALA.

CODE § 12-1-15(a)(any employee of the judicial branch except for

probate and municipal court judges and employees are entitled to

the same employee benefits as other state employees); see ALA. CODE

§§ 12-5-17 & 18. An examination of Plaintiff’s claim indicates

that a predeprivation hearing would have been impractical at the

time Plaintiff’s stock certificates and money were allegedly taken.

Based on Plaintiff’s allegations, the deprivation occurred not as

an outcome of some established procedure, but as a result of a

random, unauthorized act. Therefore, in order for Plaintiff’s due

process claim to be reviewable in this Court, Plaintiff must

establish that there was no adequate postdeprivation procedure

available to him at the time of the deprivation. See Tinney v.

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Shores, 77 F.3d 378, 382 n.1 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding that

plaintiffs’ claim failed when they argued the violation was

complete at the time of the deprivation because they failed to

address the availability of an adequate postdeprivation remedy).

 However, in the present action, Plaintiff cannot establish

that he did not have an adequate postdeprivation remedy available

to him at the time of the deprivation. Claims for the loss of

property incurred at the hands of Alabama state agencies or

departments may be presented for compensation to the Alabama Board

of Adjustment pursuant to Alabama Code §§ 41-9-60, et seq.

Moreover, a state employee may be personally liable to an inmate in

an ordinary tort action. Milton v. Espey, 356 So. 2d 1201 (Ala.

1978); ALA. CODE § 6-5-262 (1975).

Because Defendant Calhoun is a state officer, Plaintiff had

available to him at the time of the deprivation an adequate

postdeprivation remedy that would have compensated him for his

loss, i.e., presenting a claim to the Alabama Board of Adjustment

or filing an action in state court. It is not necessary that the

postdeprivation remedy be available to Plaintiff at the present

time to determine whether the deprivation was with or without due

process. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543-44, 101 S.Ct. at 1917. It

is only required that an adequate postdeprivation remedy be

available to him when the deprivation occurred. Id. Because an

adequate postdeprivation remedy was available to Plaintiff at the

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In light of the undersigned’s recommendation of dismissal, a

discussion of absolute immunity defense which may be available to

Defendant Calhoun on the warrant claim has been omitted.

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time of his loss, the deprivation of Plaintiff’s property does not

violate due process. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim against

Defendant Calhoun for a deprivation of property without due process

of law is frivolous and should therefore be dismissed.

IV. Conclusion.

For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that Defendant

Jackie Calhoun be dismissed from this action because the claims

against her are frivolous as contemplated by 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(I).2

The attached sheet contains important information regarding

objections to the Report and Recommendation

DONE this 7th day of May, 2008. 

 

 /S/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything

in it must, within ten days of the date of service of this document, file

specific written objections with the clerk of court. Failure to do so

will bar a de novo determination by the district judge of anything in the

recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual findings

of the magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)©); Lewis v. Smith,

855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988). The procedure for challenging the

findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge is set out in more

detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides, in part, that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate

judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing a “Statement of Objection

to Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation” within ten days after

being served with a copy of the recommendation, unless a

different time is established by order. The statement of

objection shall specify those portions of the recommendation

to which objection is made and the basis for the objection.

The objecting party shall submit to the district judge, at the

time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the

party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s recommendation

should be reviewed de novo and a different disposition made.

It is insufficient to submit only a copy of the original brief

submitted to the magistrate judge, although a copy of the

original brief may be submitted or referred to and

incorporated into the brief in support of the objection.

Failure to submit a brief in support of the objection may be

deemed an abandonment of the objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court

of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment can be appealed.

2. Opposing party’s response to the objection. Any opposing party may

submit a brief opposing the objection within ten (10) days of being

served with a copy of the statement of objection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72;

SD ALA LR 72.4(b). 

3. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded). Pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the magistrate judge finds

that the tapes and original records in this action are adequate for

purposes of review. Any party planning to object to this recommendation,

but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial

determination that transcription is necessary is required before the

United States will pay the cost of the transcript.

 /S/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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