Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01871/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01871-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 05cv1871 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RANDAL RUIZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. LAGUNA, et al.,

Defendants.

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No. 05-1871-WQH(LSP)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS TO

DISMISS AND TO STRIKE 

(12-1, 12-2)

Randal Ruiz (hereinafter “Plaintiff”), a state prisoner

proceeding pro se, has filed a Complaint under the Civil Rights

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss

the Complaint, a Motion to Strike, and Supplemental Briefing Re:

Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. Plaintiff has filed an

Opposition to Defendants’ Motion. Defendants have filed a Reply

to Plaintiff’s Opposition. The Court, having reviewed

Plaintiff’s Complaint and Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss the Complaint, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss and to

Strike, Defendants’ Supplemental Briefing, and the documents

lodged therewith, finds that the Defendants are partially

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 1 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 05cv1871 

entitled to the relief requested and recommends that the Motions

to Dismiss and to Strike be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

I.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

The Court has distilled Plaintiff’s factual allegations

significantly. The following are the relevant facts that the

Court understands Plaintiff to raise in both his original

Complaint and his Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

Plaintiff is incarcerated at R.J. Donovan Correctional

Facility. Plaintiff alleges that on March 4, 2005 he presented

his Petition for Review, exhibits, and a Complaint to Defendant

Laguna for photocopying. (Complaint at 3). Defendant Laguna

denied Plaintiff the photocopies. According to Plaintiff, the

law library clerk informed Plaintiff that the copy machine was

broken and the library could only photocopy documents for inmates

with verifiable court deadlines. (Complaint at 3). Without a

verifiable deadline, the library would send the documents to

another location to be copied. Defendant Laguna corroborated

these statements. (Complaint at 3).

However, according to Plaintiff, the copies were needed

immediately, as Plaintiff had a March 6, 2005 filing deadline for

his Petition for Review to the California Supreme Court. 

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Laguna already knew of this filing

deadline, as Laguna was present on February 22, 2005 when

Plaintiff discussed the filing deadline with the senior

librarian, Mrs. Peterson. (Complaint at 3). Plaintiff further

alleges that he reminded Defendant Laguna of the filing deadline

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 2 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 05cv1871 

after Laguna denied the photocopies. However, Defendant Laguna

insisted that Plaintiff did not have an impending deadline and

denied Plaintiff the photocopies. (Complaint at 3). 

Plaintiff contends that this denial of photocopies was

intentional. (Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 5). 

According to Plaintiff, forms documenting the deadline for

Plaintiff’s Petition for Review were already on file with the law

library, and Plaintiff directed Defendant Laguna’s attention to

these documents. (Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at

3). This, coupled with Defendant Laguna’s presence during

Plaintiff’s previous conversation with Mrs. Peterson, provided

Defendant Laguna with adequate notice of the deadline. 

(Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 3) Defendant

Laguna even discussed prison photocopy policies with Plaintiff,

stating that he was not competent to assess the validity of

Plaintiff’s purported filing deadline and thus did not have

authority to grant Plaintiff emergency photocopies. (Complaint

at 3). 

Plaintiff contends that, in spite of this knowledge of

Plaintiff’s filing deadline, Defendant purposefully, and with

“discriminatory intent,” denied him the photocopies he needed. 

(Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 5). Defendant

Laguna further evidenced this “discriminatory intent” by granting

two “similarly situated” African-American inmates photocopies

during the same morning session at the law library. (Opposition

to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 4). 

In an effort to meet the filing deadline after this

initial, allegedly intentional denial, Plaintiff alleges that he

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 3 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 A “CDC602" is a form used to request emergency copies.

4 05cv1871 

served a CDC602 on Defendant Seibel March 5, 2005, requesting

emergency photocopies.1 Defendant Seibel requested Plaintiff’s

court order so as to verify the emergency. (Complaint at 3). 

Plaintiff returned to his cell to retrieve the court order, but

was required to stay in his cell due to a “modified program.” As

a result, Plaintiff contends that since he could not present the

court order to Defendant Seibel, Defendant Seibel could not

provide the needed photocopies and remedy Defendant Laguna’s

allegedly errant earlier action. (Complaint at 3-4). Plaintiff

noted that during this “modified program,” other prisoners were

able to leave the unit. Plaintiff contends that Defendants

Clardy, Melvin, and Armoskos also contributed to the

circumstances by not adequately resolving Plaintiff’s grievance. 

(Complaint at 4). Plaintiff alleges that without the requisite

photocopies, he could not meet the March 6, 2005 filing deadline

set for his Petition for Review. As a result, Plaintiff filed a

Motion Seeking Permission to File a Late Petition. However, on

March 25, 2005, the California Supreme Court denied this motion. 

(Complaint at 4).

Plaintiff also alleges that on August 31, 2005, he

submitted a Consumer Complaint to Defendant Laguna for

photocopying. (Complaint at 4). When Plaintiff returned on

September 1, 2005 to collect the photocopies he was informed that

they were lost, along with the original. The original and the

copies were never returned to Plaintiff. The original Consumer

Complaint concerned the theft of Plaintiff’s magazines by either

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 4 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Since Plaintiff has not alleged that pursuit and redress of this

consumer claim has been completely forestalled by negligent state action

(i.e. no filing deadlines have been missed), this specific denial of

photocopies is not at issue in this case and will not be addressed. 

3

Nor does Plaintiff claim that the denial of photocopies has permanently

deprived him access to the courts for this particular claim. As a result,

the Court will also not address this particular denial of photocopies.

4

Plaintiff, however, does not relate this deadline to any particular

procedurally barred action. Without actual and complete denial of access

to the courts, the Court will not consider the constitutionality of this

alleged deprivation.

5 05cv1871 

inmates or staff. (Complaint at 4-5).2

Plaintiff further contends that he submitted a complaint

pertaining to a separate matter, Ruiz v. Pasadena, CV-03-4455-

FMC-(CW), for photocopying. This complaint had a filing deadline

of September 9, 2005. (Complaint at 5). According to Plaintiff,

he did not receive the copies or original in a timely manner, and

missed the filing deadline. The original was never returned to

Plaintiff and he did not receive the copies until September 13,

2005, four days after the complaint was due. (Complaint at 5). 

In his Complaint, however, Plaintiff does not specify when he

provided this material for photocopying.3

On July 19, 2005, Plaintiff was placed in segregation. In

segregation, Plaintiff could not obtain paper, envelopes, postage

stamps, or legal resources of any kind. Plaintiff claims that,

as a result of this deprivation, he missed a July 28, 2005 court

deadline.4 (Complaint at 5).

Currently Defendants Manny and Laguna insist on sending 

documents to the Central Library to be photocopied. According to

Plaintiff, this causes delay and risks theft, loss, and privacy

invasion. (Complaint at 5).

II.

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 5 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 05cv1871 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 28, 2005, Plaintiff filed a Complaint pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that (1) the actions of the

Defendants deprived him of his right of access to the courts

(Complaint at 3), (2) Plaintiff’s placement in “segregation”

caused him to miss a court date of July 28, 2005, depriving him

of access to the courts (Complaint at 5), (3) Plaintiff is now

“afraid” to entrust his court documents to the prison staff due

to fear of delay in filing, compromised confidentiality, and

possible retaliation (Complaint at 5), and (4) “segregation” in

general is a calculated, unconstitutional scheme predicated on

preventing an individual from exercising his First Amendment

Rights (Complaint at 9). Plaintiff sued all Defendants both as

individuals and in their official capacity. (Complaint at 2).

On April 7, 2006, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss

Complaint and a Motion to Strike pursuant to Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure 12(b)and 12(b)(6). Defendants argue that the

Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint because (1) all named

Defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity when sued in their

official capacity, (2) Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), (3)

Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, and (4) Plaintiff cannot establish that he suffered any

actual injury as a result of Defendants’ conduct. In addition,

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages

must be stricken because Plaintiff failed to allege any facts

demonstrating either evil motive or recklessness as required by

Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 6 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 05cv1871 

On June 1, 2006, Defendants filed a Supplemental Briefing

Re: Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. The Supplemental Briefing

urged the Court to grant the Motion to Dismiss because Plaintiff

failed to respond to the Motion. Defendants also attached a

conformed copy of the April 13, 2005 ruling of the California

Supreme Court in Plaintiff’s criminal appeal to illustrate that

Plaintiff has not suffered an injury.

On June 13, 2006, the Court granted Plaintiff’s

Emergency Motion for Extension of Time, allowing Plaintiff to

file a late Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

On July 31, 2006, Plaintiff filed a late Opposition to

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, arguing that,

contrary to Defendants’ assertion, (1) Plaintiff need not submit

evidence and affidavits in support of his complaint, (2)

Defendant Laguna, after hearing Plaintiff’s statements and seeing

Plaintiff’s documents, knew of Plaintiff’s March 6, 2005 filing

deadline for his Petition for Review and intentionally denied

Plaintiff the necessary photocopies, and (3) Plaintiff exhausted

his administrative remedies prior to filing the complaint.

On August 8, 2006 Defendants filed a Reply to Plaintiff’s

Opposition to the Motion To Dismiss the Complaint arguing (1)

Plaintiff cannot use inmate appeals that pre-dated the alleged

injury to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, (2) the issues

raised in the pre-existing appeals are stale and factually

unrelated to the allegations contained in the Complaint, and as a

result, fail to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, and (3)

Plaintiff cannot add new allegations to his original Complaint

through the use of an opposition, he must instead seek leave of

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 7 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8 05cv1871 

the court to amend his Complaint. 

 III.

 PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

Defendants move to dismiss and strike on six separate

grounds. They argue (1) that sovereign immunity shields each

defendant from potential liability for any action undertaken in

their official capacity, (2) Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies prior to filing his Complaint, as

required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), (3) Plaintiff failed to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted, (4) Plaintiff did not

sustain an actual injury, (5) Plaintiff asserted a frivolous

underlying cause of action and was not denied access to the

courts, and (6) based on the facts alleged, Plaintiff’s prayer

for punitive damages is not appropriate in this instance and

should be stricken. Each point is discussed below. 

A. Sovereign Immunity

Defendants Laguna, Seibel, Armoskos, Clardy, and Melvin

argue that any complaint against them in their official capacity

must be dismissed due to the protection afforded by sovereign

immunity. They contend that the Eleventh Amendment “immunizes

states from private damage actions brought in federal court.” 

Henry v. County of Shasta, 132 F.3d 512, 517 (9th Cir. 1997). 

This protection extends to individuals and thus bars any suit for

damages against a state official in his official capacity. 

Regents of the University of California v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429

(1997); Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir.

1999). 

Yet, contrary to this precedent, Plaintiff seeks monetary

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 8 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9 05cv1871 

relief in his Complaint and specifies that these damages are

sought against all Defendants in their official capacities. As a

result, Defendants contend that this Court lacks jurisdiction to

hear the claims.

B. Rule of Exhaustion

(1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and to Strike

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) requires a prisoner to completely

exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing a 1983

action. Defendants argue that Plaintiff ignored this requirement

and failed to exhaust the administrative review process set out

in Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations prior to filing

this complaint. According to Defendants, to exhaust

administrative remedies, a California inmate must complete four

steps: (1) attempted informal resolution, (2) first formal level

appeal, (3) second formal level appeal, and (4) third, or

director’s, level appeal. Cal. Code Regs. 15 § 3084.5. Under

this scheme, the administrative process is exhausted only after

the inmate receives a decision from the Director. Cal. Dep’t of

Corrections Operations Manual, § 54100.11 (“Levels of Review”); 

Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F.Supp. 1235, 1237-38 (S.D. Cal. 1997). 

Defendants emphasize that Plaintiff did not provide the

relevant identification numbers for any previously filed inmate

appeals, nor did he provide the results of those appeals, as

requested by the form complaint. Plaintiff instead flatly

asserted compliance with the exhaustion rule. 

According to Defendants, this likely results from

Plaintiff’s failure to actually exhaust his administrative

remedies. Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal, log no. RJD-05-465

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 9 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 05cv1871 

on March 23, 2005, relating to library access. This appeal was

denied at the informal level, partially granted at the first

formal level of review, and then denied at the second formal

level of review. However, according to the declaration of J.T.

Stovall, this appeal was never advanced to the third, or

director’s level of review. (Decl. of J.T. Stovall at 3; see

also Decl. of N. Grannis at 3) 

Defendants further fault Plaintiff for not adequately

explaining why he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies,

even though the form complaint explicitly requests an

explanation. 

Thus, Defendants contend that since Plaintiff failed to

complete this exhaustion process prior to filing suit, and since

Plaintiff did not allege that his ability to exhaust the process

was thwarted by prison officials, his Complaint should be

dismissed. Barry, 985 F.Supp. at 1237-38; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

(2) Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

In his Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,

Plaintiff counters Defendants’ insistence that he provide

evidence of any previously exhausted prisoner appeals. Plaintiff

argues that he does not have the burden of producing this

evidence for the Court. He cites May v. Baldwin, 849 F.2d 409,

412-13 (9th Cir. 1988) to support his contention that courts

should not weigh competing evidence when addressing a motion to

dismiss. Instead, they should accepted any unrefuted allegations

as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to

the Plaintiff.

Plaintiff also argues that, contrary to Defendants’

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 10 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

The inmate appeal also contains a completely unrelated allegation

regarding an unwarranted denial of “canteen”.

11 05cv1871 

assertions, he did in fact exhaust his administrative remedies by

advancing a separate inmate appeal, RJD 04-1037, to the Third

Level of Review on May 25, 2005. This appeal contained

allegations of “trust account fraud” at the first level of

review. At the second level of review, Plaintiff added the

assertion that the confidentiality of his legal work was

compromised by the design of the prison law library.5

Although the foregoing appeal was already pending when the

presently complained-of injury occurred, and as a result does not

technically satisfy the specific exhaustion requirements of 

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), Plaintiff argues that it addresses

substantially similar issues to those raised in the Complaint

pending before this Court, and instead satisfies the general

purpose of the statute. Plaintiff contends that any

investigation triggered by appeal no. RJD 04-1037 would logically

address the same denial of access claims raised in both the

present Complaint, and the inmate appeal (RJD 05-465) that

Defendants argue was not advanced past the second level of

review. As a result of this overlap, any further pursuit of RJD

05-465 would have proven futile.

(3) Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss the Complaint

Defendants counter that Plaintiff is barred from using

inmate appeal RJD-04-1037 to satisfy the exhaustion requirement

as the appeal was already pending when the alleged injury

occurred. As elucidated in Ornelas v. Giurbino, 358 F. Supp. 2d

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 11 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12 05cv1871 

955, 960 (S.D. Cal. 2005), an inmate may not rely on a preexisting inmate appeal to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. 

Defendants argue that to allow the usage of such preexisting appeals to satisfy the exhaustion requirement would defy

logic. The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to curtail

frivolous lawsuits by providing administrators and Defendants

with adequate notice of prison problems prior to any filing of

suit. This affords prison administrators the opportunity to

remedy legitimate problems and affords potential Defendants the

opportunity to amend problematic behavior, without the resourceconsuming involvement of the court system. Yet if an inmate

appeal predates the alleged injury, this notice will not be

provided to prison administrators, defeating the overriding

purpose of the exhaustion requirement. 

Defendants also counter that even if inmate appeal RJD-04-

1037 is not barred as a result of predating the alleged injury,

it should be barred because the allegations contained in this

appeal do not relate to the charges brought in Plaintiff’s

original complaint.

As stated above, in inmate appeal RJD-04-1037, Plaintiff

complained of “trust account fraud” at the first level of review. 

At the second level of review, Plaintiff added the claims that

the confidentiality of his legal work was compromised by the

unfortunate interior design of the prison law library and that he

was being denied canteen. 

Defendants contend that these allegations are completely

unrelated to the denial of access to the courts claims raised in

Plaintiff’s original Complaint. In the Complaint, Plaintiff

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 12 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13 05cv1871 

alleges that he was constitutionally injured when he was denied

photocopies and subsequently missed a filing deadline. Inmate

appeal RJD-04-1037 makes no mention of any denial of photocopies. 

As a result, prison administrators were not on notice regarding

the problem when this appeal was filed, and could not remedy the

situation. To allow such unrelated claims to satisfy the

exhaustion requirement would undermine the purposes of the

exhaustion requirement - namely the curtailment of frivolous

suits and the expedient remedy of problematic prison conditions.

C. Failure to State a Claim

(1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and to Strike

In their Motion to Dismiss and to Strike, Defendants

contend that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted, as Plaintiff does not advance a

cognizable legal theory, or fails to plead sufficient facts to

support a cognizable theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus, Defendants move

to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b)(6).

Defendants argue that the Fourteenth Amendment was only

intended to prevent “deliberate” or “intentional” abuse of

government power. Defendants rely largely on Daniels v.

Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) for this proposition. Citing

Daniels as support, Defendants posit that negligence alone does 

not constitute a deprivation within the meaning of the Fourteenth

Amendment. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot show that any named

Defendant acted deliberately to deprive Plaintiff of life,

liberty, or property. According to Defendants (apparently

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 13 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14 05cv1871 

relying on Daniels), deliberate state action, or specific intent

is required to sustain a due process claim under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. 

Regarding Defendant Laguna, Defendants argue that

Plaintiffs averments fail to state that Laguna was aware of

Plaintiff’s deadline and acted purposefully to deny him access to

the courts. According to Defendants, Plaintiff did not allege

that Defendant Laguna actually participated in the February 22,

2005 conversation between Plaintiff and the librarian regarding

the filing deadline. Plaintiff merely avers that Defendant

Laguna was present when the conversation took place. Defendants

argue that this alone does not suffice to establish the requisite

knowledge base for a deliberate deprivation of constitutional

rights.

Defendants further contend that Plaintiff’s Complaint is

not sufficiently clear to establish that the March 4, 2005 events

put Defendant Laguna on notice regarding Plaintiff’s filing

deadline. Defendants argue that during that encounter, Defendant

Laguna only confirmed that the copy machine was broken. 

Defendant Laguna did not make a determination as to whether

Plaintiff had a filing deadline, nor did Plaintiff present

Defendant Laguna with any documentation detailing his filing

deadline. Thus, according to Defendants, Plaintiff’s averments

fail to establish that Defendant Laguna was aware of Plaintiff’s

deadline and acted deliberately to prevent him from meeting it. 

Since “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official

participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to

withstand a motion to dismiss,” Defendants argue that the Court

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 14 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15 05cv1871 

should dismiss the complaint as it pertains to Defendant Laguna. 

Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Regarding Defendant Seibel, Defendants argue that

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to establish that Defendant Seibel

had the requisite mens rea to effect a constitutional violation. 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s March 5, 2005 request for

emergency photocopies coupled with his voicing of concern

regarding the deadline did not sufficiently put Defendant Seibel

on notice regarding the deadline. In fact, Defendants claim that

“nowhere in his allegations does Plaintiff ever demonstrate how

Lt. Seibel ever became aware of his court deadline.” According

to Defendants, Plaintiff could only have provided proper notice

of his deadline by displaying written proof of his emergency. 

Defendants argue that without this proper notice, Plaintiff

cannot show that Defendant Seibel acted intentionally to deprive

Plaintiff of his right of access to the courts. Defendants

further argue that Plaintiff’s allegations do not even suffice to

establish negligence on Defendant Seibel’s behalf and, as a

result, the Court should dismiss the 1983 claim for relief.

Defendants also contend that the complaints against

Defendants Armoskos, Clardy, and Melvin should be dismissed. 

Plaintiff predicates their liability solely on his allegation

that they did not resolve his grievance in a satisfactory manner. 

Yet prisoners are not constitutionally entitled to a specific

grievance procedure. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860

(9th Cir. 2003)(“Ramirez’s claimed loss of a liberty interest in

the processing of his appeals does not satisfy this standard,

because inmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 15 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16 05cv1871 

specific grievance procedure.”); Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494,

497 (8th Cir. 1993)(holding that inmate grievance procedure is

not protected by Fourteenth Amendment and thus, failure to

process inmate’s grievance does not give rise to section 1983

claim).

Thus, Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not have a

constitutional right to have his grievance considered, and as a

result, any failure by Armoskos, Clardy, and Melvin to adequately

process his grievance is not actionable under section 1983. 

Therefore, the complaints against Defendants Armoskos, Clardy,

and Melvin should be dismissed.

Defendants further contend that, in general, none of the

conduct alleged by Plaintiff amounts to negligence, much less

intentional harm, requiring dismissal of the complaint. 

Defendants read Daniels, supra, and Davidson v. Cannon 474 U.S.

at 347-48 as requiring Plaintiff to allege more than a mere

failure to exercise due care when asserting any section 1983

claim. According to Defendants, they were at most negligent

under the facts alleged, and this negligence should not carry

section 1983 liability.

(2) Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

As discussed in the “Factual Allegations” section above,

Plaintiff counters that Defendant Laguna intentionally deprived

him access to the courts, thus alleging a sufficiently culpable

mens rea to satisfy the requirements posited by Defendants. 

Plaintiff argues that he directed Defendant Laguna’s attention to

forms documenting Plaintiff’s impending court deadline that were

already on file with the law library. According to Plaintiff,

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 16 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17 05cv1871 

this, coupled with the fact that Defendant Laguna was present for

a conversation between Plaintiff and the librarian, Mrs.

Peterson, regarding the filing deadline provided Defendant Laguna

with adequate notice of the deadline. Plaintiff contends that,

in spite of this knowledge of the filing deadline, Defendant

Laguna purposefully and with “discriminatory intent,” denied him

the needed photocopies. Defendant Laguna further evidenced this

discriminatory intent by granting two other “similarly situated”

African-American inmates photocopies during the same library

session.

(3) Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss

 Defendants counter that Plaintiff’s allegations are still

insufficient to establish a cognizable claim of denial of access

to the courts. They assert that an Opposition to Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss is not the proper vehicle for Plaintiff to add

new allegations of culpable intent/motive on the behalf of

Defendant Laguna, and thus, the allegations must be excluded. 

Plaintiff instead must seek leave of the Court to amend his

original complaint. Defendants contend that without the

inclusion of this culpable mens rea Plaintiff has not stated a

cognizable claim of denial of access to the courts.

D. Plaintiff did not Sustain an Actual Injury

Defendants argue that even if Defendants did deny Plaintiff

access to the courts, in violation of the Constitution, Plaintiff

cannot succeed in a §1983 claim because he did not suffer an

“actual injury” as a result of their denial. Lewis v. Casey 518

U.S. 343, 348 (1996). As cited by Defendants, the Supreme Court

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 17 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18 05cv1871 

defines “actual injury” in this context as “actual prejudice with

respect to contemplated or existing litigation.” Id.

In their Motion to Dismiss and to Strike, Defendants

concede that after Plaintiff was denied photocopies, he was

unable to file a timely Petition for Review. As a result, on

March 14, 2005, the California Supreme Court denied the Petition

for Review. However, on April 13, 2005, the California Supreme

Court denied a second Petition for Review, on the merits and

without prejudice, pending the outcome of other decisions. 

Defendants argue that since the California Supreme Court reviewed

a second Petition for Review in the same case and denied it on

the merits, Plaintiff has not suffered an actual injury. Even if

there was a denial of photocopies, it did not prevent Plaintiff

from having his arguments addressed by the California Supreme

Court. 

E. No Nonfrivolous Underlying Cause of Action Asserted in

Complaint

Defendants contend that Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S.

403 (2002) requires plaintiffs asserting an access-to-courts

claim to allege (1) a nonfrivolous underlying cause of action,

adequately described in the complaint (“the foiled claim”) and

(2) the actions by officials that caused the denial of access to

the courts. Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415. “[T]he underlying

cause of action, whether anticipated or lost, is an element that

must be described in the complaint, just as much as allegations

must describe the official acts frustrating the litigation.” Id. 

As a result, the initial foiled claim must be described well

enough to apply the “nonfrivolous” test, and to show that the

“arguable” nature of the claim is “more than hope.” Id. at 416.

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 18 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19 05cv1871 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to set forth the

nature of the appeal that was foiled by the prison officials’

actions. As a result, the complaint should be dismissed for

failing to meet the standard set forth in Christopher.

F. Plaintiff’s Prayer for Punitive Damages

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive

damages must be stricken. A motion to strike pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P., Rule 12(f) may be used to strike a prayer for relief

when the damages sought are not recoverable as a matter of law. 

Tapley v. Lockwood Green Engineers, Inc., 502 F.2d 559, 560 (8th

Cir. 1974); Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F.Supp. 1450, 1479 n.34

(N.D. Cal. 1996). Defendants contend that the allegations in

Plaintiff’s Complaint do not suffice to establish a claim for

punitive damages.

Defendants concede that punitive damages may be awarded in

a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against a state official, in his

individual capacity. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983). Yet the

official’s conduct must be “shown to be motivated by evil motive

or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference

to the federally protected rights of others.” Id. at 56. This

“threshold applies even when the underlying standard of liability

for compensatory damages is one of recklessness.” Id.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not met this threshold. 

According to Defendants, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged

that any of the named Defendants acted with the “evil motive or

intent” or with the “reckless or callous indifference to the

federally protected rights of others” necessary to justify

Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages. Defendants thus contend

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 19 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20 05cv1871 

that even if the action is allowed to proceed, Plaintiff’s claim

for punitive damages should be stricken as a matter of law

because he has failed to allege any facts entitling him to

recover the damages.

 IV.

 LEGAL STANDARDS

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), tests the legal

sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. A claim can be

dismissed only if it “appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle

him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957);

Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1974). The court

must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint, as

well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, and must

construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. See N.L. Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896,

898 (9th Cir. 1986); Parks School of Business, Inc. v. Symington,

51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). The court looks not at

whether the plaintiff will “ultimately prevail but whether the

claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” 

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 

A complaint “need not include evidentiary detail” but it

“must nonetheless allege a factual predicate concrete enough to

warrant further proceedings.” United States ex rel Karvelas v.

Melrose-Wakefield Hospital, 360 F.3d 220, 240 (1st Cri. 2004);

citing DM Research, Inc. v. College of American Pathologists, 170

F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 1999)(internal quotation marks and other

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 20 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21 05cv1871 

citations omitted). “Bald assertions, subjective

characterizations, and legal conclusions” alone do not suffice to

“justify dragging a defendant past the pleading threshold.” DM

Research, Inc., 170 F.3d at 55 (internal citations omitted). As

a result, the 9th Circuit has stated that “a liberal

interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply

essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled. 

Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in

civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion

to dismiss.” Bruns v. NCUA, 122 F.3d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997);

citing Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.

1982). Thus, even in the absence of a heightened pleading

requirement, Plaintiff must still propound sufficient factual

allegations to gain entitlement to proceed.

 However, claims that a Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies prior to filing his Complaint are

addressed under a different legal standard. Pursuant to Wyatt v.

Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2003), the proper vehicle for

challenging a prisoner’s complaint for his failure to comply with

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement is to file “an

unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion rather than a motion for summary

judgment.” Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. When addressing this

unenumerated 12(b) motion, the Court is not compelled to accept

all of Plaintiff’s allegations as true. “In deciding a motion to

dismiss for failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies, the court

may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of

fact.” Id. at 1119-20. 

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 21 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Only legislators, judges, and prosecutors receive absolute immunity when

acting in their official capacity. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367

(1951); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424

U.S. 409 (1976).

7

Similarly, this qualified immunity is afforded to governors and police

officers. See, e.g. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Pierson v.

Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).

22 05cv1871 

 V.

 DISCUSSION

A. Sovereign Immunity

 Generally, the Eleventh Amendment provides that states are

immune from “private damage actions brought in federal court.” 

Henry v. County of Shasta, 132 F.3d 512, 517 (9th Cir. 1997). As

a result, actions against a state official acting in his official

capacity are also barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Regents of

the University of California v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997);

Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1999).

However, this Eleventh Amendment immunity is not absolute

for state prison officials.6 State prison officials only receive

a qualified immunity.7 Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561

(1978). The Scheuer Court described the variable extent of the

qualified immunity:

[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is

available to officers of the executive branch of the

government, the variation being dependant upon the

scope of discretion and responsibilities of the

office and all the circumstances as they reasonably

appeared at the time of the action on which

liability is sought to be based. It is the

existence of reasonable grounds for the belief

formed at the time and in light of all the

circumstances, coupled with a good-faith belief,

that affords a basis for qualified immunity of

executive officers for acts performed in the course

of official conduct.

Scheuer 416 U.S. at 247-48.

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 22 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23 05cv1871 

However, qualified immunity is not available if the

official “knew or reasonably should have known that the action he

took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate

the constitutional right of the [individual] affected, or if he

took the action with the malicious intention to cause a

deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury.” Wood v.

Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 , 321 (1975). Thus, under the rule

established in Wood, the qualified sovereign immunity defense

will not succeed if (1) “the constitutional right allegedly

infringed by them was clearly established at the time of their

challenged conduct” (2) Defendants knew or should have known of

the established constitutional right, and (3) Defendants knew or

should have known that their conduct violated the established

constitutional right. Procunier 434 U.S. at 562.

The seminal case of Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977)

establishes that the fundamental constitutional right of access

to the courts includes the obligation of prison officials to

assist prisoners in filing meaningful legal papers, in order to

allow for meaningful court access. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828. The

Bounds Court noted, in discussing the degree of assistance

required by the prison officials, that “it is indisputable that

indigent inmates must be provided at state expense with paper and

pen to draft legal documents, with notarial services to

authenticate them, and with stamps to mail them.” Id. at 824-25. 

The Bounds Court emphasized that, as it pertains to 42 U.S.C. §

1983 actions, this duty of prison officials is not to be taken

lightly, as “civil rights actions are of ‘fundamental

importance...in our constitutional scheme’ because they directly

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 23 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24 05cv1871 

protect our most valued rights.” Id. at 826, quoting Johnson v.

Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.

539, 579 (1974). Affirmative assistance is necessary as the

prisoner petitions “are the first line of defense against

constitutional violations.” Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828.

In recognition of the importance of meaningful prisoner

access to the courts, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the

necessity of providing prisoners photocopies of their court

documents. Allen v. Sakai, 40 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 1994). In

Allen, the prisoner alleged that he was denied meaningful access

to the courts when prison officials refused to photocopy his

court papers, despite his willingness to pay for the copies. Id.

at 1005. Since the prisoner was unable to file two additional

copies along with his petition for post conviction relief, the

Court returned the petition, unfiled. Id.

The Allen Court held that (1) it was established that

prisoners had a constitutional right of meaningful access to the

courts, (2) prison officials knew prisoners had this right (as

established by Bounds several years prior), and (3) prison

officials should have known that denying a prisoner photocopies

deprives a prisoner of this right as, “it does not require

sophisticated ‘legal scholarship’ to know that a plaintiff’s

access to the courts could be hindered seriously by an inability

to make multiple, accurate photocopies of legal documents.” Id.

at 1005; citing Ward v. County of San Diego, 791 F.2d 1329, 1332

(9th Cir. 1986) cert. denied 483 U.S. 1020 (1987)(public

officials not charged with “the kind of legal scholarship

normally associated with law professors and academicians,” but

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 24 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

25 05cv1871 

with knowledge of a reasonable person). As a result, the state

officials in Allen did not receive qualified sovereign immunity. 

See also, Jones v. Franzen, 697 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1983)(inmate

states valid claim against prison officials if he shows prison’s

photocopy policy impeded court access); Johnson v. Parke, 642

F.2d 377, 380 (10th Cir. 1981)(denial of photocopies

unconstitutional to the extent it actually infringed upon

inmate’s right of access to the courts).

As in Allen, Defendants here refused to copy Plaintiff’s

court papers. They knew Defendant was willing to pay for them,

as he had presented them with a CDC Form 193, an Inmate Trust

Withdrawal. (Complaint at 3). Further, they knew of the filing

deadline. The law library had documentation of the filing

deadline, Defendant Laguna was present for an earlier

conversation that Plaintiff had with the senior librarian

regarding the filing deadline, and Plaintiff explicitly told both

Defendant Laguna and Defendant Seibel of the filing deadline. 

Since Bounds was decided in 1977, it is long established

that (1) Plaintiff has a constitutional right of access to the

courts. Further, as acknowledged in Allen, (2) prison officials

are charged with knowledge of this right. Finally, just as in

Allen, it (3) does not take “sophisticated legal scholarship” on

the behalf of the prison officials to realize that in denying

Plaintiff the photocopies necessary to file his Petition,

especially when he had an impending deadline, they prevented his

meaningful access to the courts. Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations,

if accepted as true, aver a sufficient factual predicate to

establish that Defendants should have known that their conduct

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 25 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

26 05cv1871 

violated a known, established, constitutional right. As a result,

Defendants are not entitled to sovereign immunity. In addition,

specifically regarding Defendant Laguna, Plaintiff further

alleged that he acted intentionally to deny Plaintiff his

constitutional right of access to the courts. The Court must

likewise accept this allegation as true. Thus, this court

recommends that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, on the grounds

that all Defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity, be

DENIED.

B. Rule of Exhaustion

The rule requiring a prisoner to exhaust administrative

remedies before filing suit is set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a):

No action shall be brought with respect to prison

conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any

other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any

jail, prison, or other correctional facility until

such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.

Compliance with § 1997e(a) is mandatory:

Once within the discretion of the district court,

exhausting in cases covered by § 19973e(a) is now

mandatory. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739

(2001). All “available” remedies must now be

exhausted; those remedies need not meet federal

standards, nor must they be “plain, speedy, and

effective...” [W]e hold that the PLRA’s exhaustion

requirement applies to all inmate suits brought

about prison life, whether they involve general

circumstances or particular episodes, and whether

they allege excessive force or some other wrong. 

Peter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002); see also Bennett v.

King, 293 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 2002); McKinney v. Carey, 311

F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002).

The Court does not have discretion to dispense with this

administrative exhaustion requirement. Booth, 532 U.S. at 739. 

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 26 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

27 05cv1871 

The Supreme Court has “stress[ed] the point...that [it] will not

read futility or other exceptions into statutory exhaustion

requirements where Congress has provided otherwise.” Id. at 741

n.6. Congress enacted the PLRA “to curtail frivolous prisoners’

suits and to minimize the costs - which are borne by taxpayers -

associated with those suits.” Madrid v. Gomez, 190 F. 3d 990,

996 (9th Cir. 1999). As a result, prisoners must exhaust

administrative remedies prior to filing suit, regardless of the

ultimate remedy sought. Booth, 532 U.S. at 740; see also Terrell

v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1018-19 (9th Cir. 1990)(dismissing

entire action where Bivens plaintiff failed to exhaust injunctive

claim in suit also seeking damages)

Defendants contend that the Court should dismiss

Plaintiff’s Complaint because he did not exhaust the four step

review process provided by Title 15 of Cal. Code Regs. § 3084.5.

prior to filing suit. In positing this argument, Defendants

emphasize that Plaintiff merely flatly asserted compliance with

the exhaustion requirement without providing any evidence of this

exhaustion. 

Normally, when addressing a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,

this court must accept such material allegations by a Plaintiff

as true. See N.L. Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898

(9th Cir. 1986); Parks School of Business, Inc. v. Symington, 51

F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). However, when specifically

addressing the 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) exhaustion requirement,

pursuant to a non-enumerated 12(b) motion, this Court may look

beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact. Wyatt

v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 27 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

28 05cv1871 

Yet even though this Court may look beyond the pleadings

and address factual disputes, Plaintiff still does not have the

burden of providing conclusive evidence of exhaustion. When

alleging failure to exhaust, “defendants have the burden of

raising and proving the absence of exhaustion.” Wyatt, 315 F.3d

at 1119. Defendants must prove that relief remained available,

either at unexhausted levels of the grievance process or through

awaiting the results of relief already granted. Brown v. Valoff,

422 F.3d 926, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2005). Defendants have not

provided sufficient proof that relief remained available.

Defendants did provide statements of prison officials J.T.

Stovall and N. Grannis, as recommended in Brown, alleging

Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust. Brown, 422 F.3d at 937. 

According to these statements, Plaintiff never advanced inmate

appeal RJD-05-465 to the Third, or Director’s Level of Review. 

Thus, they contend, relief remained available.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) clearly requires full exhaustion of

the administrative process prior to filing suit. In the

California prison system, this will normally require appeal to

the Third, or Director’s Level of Review. Yet this is not always

the case. A Plaintiff need not continue, for example, when it is

certain that further appeals will not produce any corrective

action by the prison officials. Brown, 422 F.3d at 936. 

Once the prison system has provided a remedy for an issue

raised in an inmate appeal, prison officials, in the interest of

conserving resources, will likely cease any further

investigations into that particular issue. Id. Further appeal,

at this point, would prove pointless and futile, and certainly

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 28 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

In inmate appeal RJD-05-465, Plaintiff complained that on March 4, 2005,

he presented a petition for emergency photocopies to Defendant Laguna at

the law library. Even though Plaintiff had an impending March 6, 2005

deadline for the court documents he needed to be copied, Defendant Laguna

failed to provide Plaintiff with the requested photocopies. Defendant

Laguna stated that he was not competent to assess the validity of

Plaintiff’s alleged March 6, 2005 deadline. This appeal, relating to

court access, was denied at the Informal Level of Review, partially

granted at the First Formal Level of Review, and denied at the Second

Formal Level of Review. According to the declarations of prison

administrators, this appeal was never advanced to the Third, or Director’s

Level of Review. (Decl. Of Stovall at 3; see also, Decl. Of Grannis at 3).

 

29 05cv1871 

would not produce any additional corrective action. Id. “Once

an agency has granted some relief and explained that no other

relief is available, “the administrative process has not been

obstructed. It has been exhausted.” Id., citing Jasch v.

Potter, 302 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002).

In Brown, for example, the petitioner’s appeal was

partially granted at the Second Level of Review. Id. at 937. 

The partial grant stated, in pertinent part: “Your appeal is

partially granted at the second level of review, in that your

appeal will be investigated by the Office of Internal Affairs, at

which time you will be personally interviewed.” Id. The court

weighed heavily the wording of this partial grant in holding that

the complaint process was exhausted for the purpose of 

§1997e(a). The wording of the partial grant suggested “that no

further relief would be available through the appeals process.” 

Id. After Brown received this partial grant, it would have been

pointless and illogical for him to have pursued any further

appeals regarding this particular issue.

Plaintiff’s administrative appeal, RJD-05-4658, was

likewise partially granted at the First Formal Level of Review. 

Thus, the content of the memoranda accompanying this grant

becomes crucial. If the partial grant was worded in a manner

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 29 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30 05cv1871 

similar to that in Brown, then any further appeal of the issue

that was granted (and presumably remedied) would prove futile as

it certainly would not produce any corrective action beyond that

already granted. In such an instance, Plaintiff would have

exhausted the appeals process (as it pertains to that particular

issue) for the purposes of § 1997e(a).

Defendants do not supply the content of the memorandum

accompanying this grant. They merely assert that it related to

library access and that Plaintiff ultimately proceeded to the

second level of review, ceasing his appeals following a denial at

that level. They contend that this evidences a failure to

exhaust the appeals process. 

Plaintiff did proceed to the Second Level of Review, but

this does not, as Defendants argue, lead to the natural and

automatic conclusion that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his denialof-access claims. Without further information, the Court does

not know if Plaintiff was pursuing the same issue that was

granted relief at the First Formal Level (which is illogical and

unlikely as he had already triumphed on that particular element

of the claim), or was pursuing one or all of the other, distinct

elements of appeal RJD-05-465 that were denied at the First

Formal Level (which is a more likely scenario). 

As a result, the minimal evidence presented does not

effectively refute the possibility that Plaintiff’s denial-ofaccess claim was partially granted, and thus exhausted, at the

First Level of Review. Plaintiff could merely have been pursuing

separate, unrelated elements of RJD-05-465 at the Second Level of

Review. Therefore, the Court must find the exhaustion

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 30 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

31 05cv1871 

requirement, as it pertains to Plaintiff’s access to the courts

claim, satisfied by appeal RJD-05-465.

As a result, the Court need not consider inmate appeal RJD04-1037, first mentioned in Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss, when analyzing Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 

Defendants correctly contend that appeal RJD-04-1037, in and of

itself, would not suffice to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. 

Plaintiff generated the appeal prior to the alleged injury. 

Absent flawless and supernatural prognostication, Plaintiff could

not possibly have described the events in inmate appeal RJD-04-

1037 that caused his alleged injury. Further, the events that

are described in appeal RJD-04-1037 are wholly unrelated to the

issues raised in Plaintiff’s complaint and involve entirely

different parties. “Trust account fraud,” confidentiality, and

lack of canteen have nothing to do with a denial of photocopies. 

To allow an appeal that was already pending at the time of

injury, and that contained unrelated factual allegations, would

completely defeat the purpose of the exhaustion requirement. 

Prison administrators cannot remedy problems of which they are

not aware. 

Yet even ignoring this stale, unrelated appeal (RJD-04-

1037), Plaintiff’s claim that he exhausted his administrative

remedies through inmate appeal RJD-05-465 has not been

effectively rebutted. As a result, this court recommends that

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, on the grounds that Plaintiff did

not exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit, be

DENIED.

C. Failure to State a Claim

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 31 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

32 05cv1871 

Defendants rely largely on Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.

327 (1986) in arguing that Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon

which relief could be grounded. They insist that, pursuant to

Daniels, Plaintiff must show that Defendants acted deliberately

to deprive him of life, liberty, or property if he is to sustain

a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This argument however, misreads

the holding in Daniels and attempts to insert a mens rea

requirement into 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In fact, Daniels itself acknowledges that 42 U.S.C. §1983

does not have an express mens rea requirement. In Daniels, the

Supreme Court adhered to its earlier conclusion that §1983

“contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that

necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional

right.” Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330. A §1983 Plaintiff must simply

show a violation of a constitutional right. Id. The claim

arises at the moment a state official violates the Constitution. 

Id. Sometimes this will require more than a showing of

negligence (as in personal injury cases like Daniels), other

times it will not (as in an access-to-courts case). It depends

entirely on the right that is alleged to have been violated. Id. 

“[T]he plaintiff must still prove a violation of the underlying

constitutional right; and depending on the right, mere negligent

conduct may not be enough to state a claim.” Id. (emphasis

added).

Daniels is distinct from Plaintiff’s case. The two cases

involve alleged violations of very different constitutional

rights. Daniels involved the Due Process Clause, Plaintiff’s

Complaint pertains to the fundamental right of access to the

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 32 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

33 05cv1871 

courts.

In Daniels, the prisoner slipped on a pillow negligently

left in a staircase by a correctional deputy. Id. at 328. The

prisoner fell, injured himself, and sought to recover damages

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. The prisoner argued that the

correctional deputy’s negligence deprived the prisoner of his

liberty interest in being free from bodily injury. Id.

The Supreme Court held that this personal injury, resulting

from the correctional deputy’s negligence, does not implicate the

Due Process clause. Id. at 328. The Due Process clause was

intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of

the powers of government.” Id. at 331; quoting Hurtado v.

California, 110 U.S. 516, 527(1884). A lack of due care,

resulting in an unfortunate injury, does not involve an abuse of

government power. Only when an individual is physically injured

by a state actor’s deliberate (or possibly, reckless) conduct is

there a concern that a government position of power is being

abused. A negligent accident simply does not give rise to a

constitutional violation. “Our Constitution deals with the large

concerns of the governors and the governed, but it does not

purport to supplant traditional tort law in laying down rules of

conduct to regulate liability for injuries that attend living

together in society.” Id. at 332.

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege a physical injury, as

a result of government official’s action, that could potentially

implicate the Due Process Clause. Plaintiff asserts a distinct

and separate constitutional violation. Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants abused their power by denying him access to the

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 33 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9 The State initially provided one solitary library for prisoner

research. This was deemed “severely inadequate” by the district

court. In response, the State proposed a plan establishing seven

libraries across the State and smaller libraries in the women’s

facilities. Each library would keep a collection of lawbooks,

provide typewriters, allow use of copy machines, and train inmates

as research assistants and typists to aid fellow prisoners. Even in

light of this affirmative State effort to provide access, the plan

was still deemed unconstitutional as the women did not receive equal

access. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 818-19. 

34 05cv1871 

courts, a fundamental right protected by the Constitution. 

Regardless of the mens rea or motive of the state official,

any deprivation of meaningful access to the courts violates the

Constitution - provided an actual injury results. Bounds, 430

U.S. at 828. This right of access is fundamental. Id. The

Plaintiff does not need to show intent. When the Ninth Circuit

examines a denial of access case for failure to state a claim, it

(1) determines whether the claim specifically alleges inadequate

law libraries or access to legal knowledge. If the claim does

not involve such a specific allegation the Court then (2)

determines whether an actual injury resulted from a denial of

access. Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 1989). At

no point in the analysis does the Court determine whether the

prison official acted deliberately, intentionally, or even

recklessly.

Imposing Defendants’ mens rea requirements on denial-ofaccess cases would undermine and derogate the fundamental right

of access to the courts by preventing most valid suits. Bounds,

for example, the seminal denial of access case that cemented the

right of meaningful access to the courts, would have instead died

in the pleading stages. In Bounds, initially a 42 U.S.C. § 1983

action, the State did provide the prisoners with legal research

facilities.9 The State thus made a proactive effort to aid

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 34 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10 This axiom while widely accepted, is not absolute. Some courts, when

faced with “special circumstances,” have treated opposition briefs

as de facto amendments or supplements to the complaint’s

allegations. See, e.g. Elias Bros. Restaurants, Inc. V. Acorn

Enters., Inc., 831 F.Supp. 920, 922 n.3 (D.Mass. 1993); Buccino v.

Continental Assurance Co., 578 F.Supp. 1518, 1524 n. 5 (S.D.N.Y.

35 05cv1871 

prisoner access. Given this proactive effort, one could not

realistically claim that State officials deliberately deprived

prisoners of any meaningful access to the courts. Yet even given

this lack of culpable intent, the Court still deemed the

facilities provided constitutionally inadequate. 

Thus, the degree of culpable mens rea that a potential 

§1983 Plaintiff must establish is entirely dependent on the

constitutional right involved. The Supreme Court has yet to

require that a denial-of-access be deliberate to be actionable. 

As discussed earlier, Daniels did not involve a deprivation of

meaningful access. Daniels involved a physical injury that was

allegedly cause by government action. As a result, Daniels is

not controlling precedent for denial-of-access claims. Neither

the Supreme Court nor Ninth Circuit have appended a mens rea

requirement to their denial-of-access criteria. 

The Court notes that in Plaintiff’s Opposition to

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff did allege that

Defendant Laguna intentionally denied him the requested

photocopies. Yet, as Defendants correctly indicate in their

Reply to Defendant’s Opposition, a Plaintiff seeking to propound

new factual allegations must usually seek leave of the court to

amend the original complaint. As the 7th Circuit stated: “It is

axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended by the briefs in

opposition to a motion to dismiss.” Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford

Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 1984).10 Thus, this Court

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 35 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1983). Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s admonition that courts

should construe the allegations of a pro se plaintiff, “however

inartfully pleaded,” liberally, this court could possibly find that

the “special circumstances” posed by Plaintiff’s incarceration,

coupled with his alleged difficulty in accessing the courts, justify

treating his opposition brief as a de facto amendment or supplement

to the original complaint. Haines v. Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). 

36 05cv1871 

will base its decision regarding Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

solely on the factual allegations raised in the original

complaint. 

Unlike an un-enumerated 12(b) motion to dismiss (used when

specifically alleging that 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion

requirement has not been satisfied), for the purposes of a

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss this Court must accept the material

allegations contained in Plaintiff’s initial Complaint as true. 

According to this Complaint, both Defendant Laguna and Defendant

Seibel knew Plaintiff needed photocopies for an impending court

deadline. Defendant Laguna initially received notice of the

deadline from a February 22, 2005 conversation at which Defendant

Laguna was present. Defendant Laguna was also notified of the

deadline on March 4, 2005 when Plaintiff sought photocopies of

the Petition for Review. According to Plaintiff, Defendant

Laguna insisted that Plaintiff did not have a filing deadline. 

Thus, it is reasonable to infer that a conversation took place,

between Plaintiff and Defendant Laguna, regarding the possibility

of an impending filing deadline. As a result, Defendant Laguna

cannot rightly claim that he did not know that his actions at

least risked denying Plaintiff access to the courts.

According to the Complaint, Defendant Seibel also had

notice of the filing deadline. Plaintiff served him with a form

requesting emergency copies. The service of this form notified

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 36 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

37 05cv1871 

Defendant Seibel of the impending deadline. Defendant Seibel

even asked for a court order to verify the deadline. Thus,

Defendant Seibel cannot rightly claim that he did not have any

notice of the impending deadline. He also cannot claim that he

was not aware that his actions risked depriving Plaintiff of

access to the courts.

Yet even though both Defendants were on notice regarding

the filing deadline, they denied Plaintiff the photocopies,

ultimately causing him to miss the deadline. This denied

Plaintiff meaningful access to the courts in a manner recognized

by Allen, 40 F.3d at 1005. As explained above, Plaintiff did not

need to establish that the Defendants acted deliberately. Under

Sands, Plaintiff is only required to establish that Defendants

actions deprived him meaningful access to the courts and that he

was actually injured. Thus, as it pertains to Defendants Laguna

and Seibel, Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be

granted.

Regarding Defendants Clardy, Melvin, and Armoskos, however,

Plaintiff merely alleges that these appeal reviewers “acquiesced

Laguna’s action.” (Complaint at 4 of 9). The Court construes

this language as a complaint that they did not resolve

Plaintiff’s grievance in a satisfactory manner. Such a complaint

does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted as “bald

assertions, subjective characterizations, and legal conclusions”

alone do not suffice to “justify dragging a defendant past the

pleading threshold.” DM Research, Inc., 170 F.3d at 55 (internal

citations omitted). Plaintiff’s allegations as they pertain to

Defendants Clardy, Melvin, and Armoskos are “vague and conclusory

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 37 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

38 05cv1871 

allegations of official participation in civil rights

violations.” Bruns v. NCUA, 122 F.3d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997);

citing Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.

1982). These vague and conclusory allegations “are not

sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

Further, in the Ninth Circuit, inmates are not entitled to

a “specific prison grievance procedure.” Ramirez, 334 F.3d at

860. As a result, the Defendants’ unsatisfactory handling of

Plaintiff’s grievance, without more, cannot constitute a

constitutional violation. There is a clear distinction between a

constitutional denial-of-access perpetrated by one officer and a

general complaint regarding the process by which grievances are

handled - a process that is not constitutionally mandated. 

Without a specific constitutional violation, Defendants cannot be

liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, as it pertains to

Defendants Clardy, Melvin, and Armoskos, Plaintiff has not stated

a claim upon which relief can be granted.

This Court thus recommends that Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss, as it pertains to Defendants Laguna and Seibel, be

DENIED as Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be

granted. This Court further recommends that Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss, as it pertains to Defendants Clardy, Melvin, and

Armoskos be GRANTED as Plaintiff has failed to state an

actionable claim.

D. Plaintiff Did Not Sustain an Actual Injury

Pursuant to the standard enunciated in Sands, 886 F.2d at

1171, Plaintiff must have suffered an actual injury as a result

of his denial of access to pursue a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 38 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

 The entirety of the opinion reads: “Petition for review denied without

prejudice to any relief to which defendant might be entitled after this

court determines in People v. Black, S126182, and People v. Towne, S125677, the effect of Blakely v. Washington (2004) __U.S.__, 124 S.Ct.

2531, on California law.” People v. Ruiz, S131852 (2005). As a result,

the Court is unable to ascertain which claims were denied on the merits.

39 05cv1871 

(unless Plaintiff alleges inadequate law libraries or inadequate

access to legal knowledge). 

On March 14, 2005, the California Supreme Court denied

Plaintiff’s first Petition for Review as untimely. On April 13,

2005, the California Supreme Court denied a second Petition for

Review on the merits and without prejudice.

Defendants argue that since the Supreme Court denied the

second Petition for Review on the merits, Plaintiff did not

suffer an actual injury. Even though he was denied adequate

photocopies and thus missed the deadline for his first Petition

for Review, Plaintiff still had his day in court when the

California Supreme Court addressed the merits of his second

Petition for Review.

However, this argument hinges on the assumption that the

same issues were raised in the first (denied as untimely)

Petition for Review and second Petition for Review. Defendants

have not provided any such proof.11 If Plaintiff raised different

claims in each Petition for Review, then the foreclosure of his

first set of claims constitutes an actual injury. In such a

situation, Plaintiff would have been denied his day in court, as

it pertains to those particular claims, by the actions of state

officials.

As a result, this Court recommends that Defendants Motion

to Dismiss, on the grounds that Plaintiff did not sustain an

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 39 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

40 05cv1871 

actual injury, be DENIED.

E. No Nonfrivolous Underlying Cause of Action Asserted in

Complaint

Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002) requires

plaintiffs asserting an access-to-courts claim to allege: (1) the

underlying cause of action, adequately described in the

complaint, that was foiled by the state officials; and (2) the

actions by officials that caused the denial of access to the

courts. Id. at 415.

Plaintiff has not provided any details regarding the claim

that was foiled by his denial of access to the courts. Without

an adequate description of the claim, this Court cannot determine

whether or not the claim was frivolous. Nor can this Court

determine whether the “arguable” nature of the underlying claim

was “more than hope” as required by Christopher. Id. at 416.

As a result, this Court recommends that Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to assert a nonfrivolous underlying cause of action be GRANTED, WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND.

F. Plaintiff’s Prayer for Punitive Damages

Punitive damages may be awarded against a state official in

his individual capacity (under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) when the

official’s “conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or

intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to

the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461

U.S. 30, 56 (1983). This heightened threshold applies “even when

the underlying standard of liability for compensatory damages is

one of recklessness.” Id.

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 40 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

41 05cv1871 

Defendants claim that nothing in Plaintiff’s Complaint

shows that the state officials acted with “evil motive or intent”

or with “reckless or callous indifference to the federally

protected rights of others” as required by Smith v. Wade. Yet

Plaintiff alleges that both Defendants Seibel and Laguna knew of

his filing deadline and still refused to make photocopies for

him. The right of meaningful access to the courts is fundamental

and well established. See Bounds, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). The

Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that photocopies are necessary for

meaningful access. Allen, 40 F.3d 1001. 

Thus, from the pleadings it is certainly possible that

Defendants Laguna and Seibel were acting with evil intent or

reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional

rights. A direct refusal to affirmatively assist Plaintiff, in

light of their knowledge regarding the deadline could possibly

constitute “reckless or callous indifference.” Yet while a

distinct possibility, based on the pleadings alone, this Court

cannot conclusively determine that Defendants acted recklessly or

callously. As a result, this Court recommends that Defendants’

Motion to Strike, on the grounds that Plaintiff’s Prayer for

Punitive Damages must be stricken, be GRANTED, WITH LEAVE TO

AMEND 

 

 VI.

 CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, it is recommended that the

Court:

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 41 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

42 05cv1871 

1. DENY Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that

Defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity where they

are sued in their official capacity.

2. DENY Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that

Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

3. a. DENY Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for failure to

state a claim as it pertains to Defendants Laguna and

Seibel.

 b. GRANT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for failure to

state a claim as it pertains to Defendants Armoskos,

Clardy, and Melvin.

4. DENY Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that

Plaintiff cannot establish that he suffered actual injury

as a result of Defendants’ conduct.

5. GRANT, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to assert a

non-frivolous underlying claim.

6. DENY Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s prayer

for punitive damages.

Additionally it is recommended that Plaintiff be granted

leave to amend his Complaint to address the deficiencies set

forth in this Report and Recommendation. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the United

States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than January 31, 2007, any

party to this action may file written objections with the Court

and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 42 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

43 05cv1871 

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections

shall be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later

than February 12, 2007. The parties are advised that failure to

file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v.

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 10, 2007

Hon. Leo S. Papas

U.S. Magistrate Judge

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 43 of 44
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

44 05cv1871 

Case 3:05-cv-01871-WQH-LSP Document 34 Filed 01/10/07 Page 44 of 44