Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00479/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00479-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHERLESTON HUTCHERSON,

CDCR #G-57575,

Plaintiff,

vs.

DANIEL PARAMO, et al.

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-00479-GPC-JLB

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

[ECF No. 2]

AND

2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)

CHERLESTON HUTCHERSON (“Plaintiff”) is currently incarcerated at 

California State Prison in Corcoran, California (“CSP-COR”). He is proceeding pro se, 

and has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Compl, ECF No. 

1. 

Plaintiff claims that the Warden of Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility 

(“RJD”) in San Diego, California, and two RJD Administrative Segregation Property 

Officers (Alvarez and Neal) lost and/or damaged “bits and pieces of a total of 5 boxes” of 

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his personal property, including “invaluable” photos when they “transpacked” and 

shipped them from RJD to CSP-COR sometime between February and April 2017. See

Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2-3. He seeks an examination of his property receipts, and an 

unspecified amount of damages for the mental anguish he suffered from the loss. Id. at 3. 

Plaintiff did not prepaid the $400 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at 

the time of filing; instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”)

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 2). 

I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 

proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” 

Bruce v. Samuels, __ S. Ct. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 

F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately 

dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th 

Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

 

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 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of his CDCR Inmate 

Statement Report recording his balances and deposits over the 6-month period preceding 

the filing of his Complaint. See ECF No. 2 at 3; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. CAL. CIVLR

3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. This Report shows Plaintiff has had no money in his 

trust account for the 6-months preceding the filing of this action, and that he had a zero 

balance at the time of filing. See ECF No. 2 at 3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing 

that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing 

a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no 

means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 

281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing 

dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of 

funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2), but 

declines to “exact” any initial filing fee because his trust account statement shows he “has 

no means to pay it,” Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629, and directs the Secretary of the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) to collect the entire $350 

balance of the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and forward them to the Clerk of 

the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1).

///

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II. Screening of Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)) (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 

banc)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or 

malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 

903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 

680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). A complaint is “frivolous” if it “lacks an arguable basis either 

in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

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“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

As noted above, Plaintiff claims RJD officials either lost or damaged his personal 

property when they packed and transferred it from RJD to CSP-COR sometime between 

February and April 2017. See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2-3.

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting 

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. 

Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) 

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) 

that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. 

Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

D. Property Deprivation Claims

Plaintiff claims Defendants were employed as correctional officials at RJD, and in 

that capacity, lost and/or damaged his personal property while packing and shipping it to 

him at CSP-COR. See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2-3. Therefore, he alleges facts sufficient to 

show Defendants acted under color of state law. However, he fails to further allege facts 

sufficient to support a constitutional violation. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.

While Plaintiff does not cite the constitutional source for his property deprivation 

claims, it is clear he does not have a Fourth Amendment right to be free from the search 

or seizure of his personal property. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 536 (1984); Taylor 

v. Knapp, 871 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1989). “[T]he fourth amendment does not protect 

an inmate from the seizure and destruction of his property.” Taylor, 871 F.2d at 806. 

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Instead, a prisoner’s redress for the seizure of his personal property, if any, is through the 

Fourteenth Amendment. Id.; see also Sanchez v. Cty. of Kern, No. 1:16-CV-00153-LJOMJS PC, 2016 WL 1461515, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2016).

“The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects persons against 

deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural 

protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 

U.S. 209, 221 (2005); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Prisoners have a 

protected interest in their personal property, Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 

1974), but the procedural component of the Due Process Clause is not violated by a 

random, unauthorized deprivation of property if the state provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533 (1984); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 

816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 810-895).

Here, Plaintiff simply alleges RJD officials were responsible for transferring his 

personal property and that property was either partially lost or destroyed. See Compl., 

ECF No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff’s has no due process claim based on Defendants’ unauthorized 

deprivation of his personal property—whether intentional or negligent—however, since a 

meaningful state post-deprivation remedy for his loss is available. See Hudson, 468 U.S. 

at 533. California’s tort claim process provides that adequate post-deprivation remedy. 

Barnett, 31 F.3d at 816-17 (“[A] negligent or intentional deprivation of a prisoner’s 

property fails to state a claim under section 1983 if the state has an adequate post 

deprivation remedy.”); see also Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1120 (S.D. 

Cal. 2007); Kemp v. Skolnik, No. 2:09-CV-02002-PMP, 2012 WL 366946, at *6 (D. Nev. 

Feb. 3, 2012) (finding prisoner’s alleged loss or destruction of newspaper, magazines, 

and books failed to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim pursuant to Hudson and noting 

that “[i]f Plaintiff wishes to recoup the value of the alleged lost materials, he will have to 

file a claim in small claims court in state court.”).

For these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege any plausible 

claim for relief, and therefore, it must be dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d 

at 1004. The Court further denies leave to amend based on futility. See Hartmann v. Cal. 

Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013) (setting forth the standard 

of review and explaining that “[a] district court may deny leave to amend when 

amendment would be futile”); see also Everett v. Brazelton, 588 F. App’x 688 (9th Cir. 

2014) (affirming dismissal of California prisoner’s Due Process claims based on lost 

property because amendment as to those claims “would have been futile.”) (citing 

Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533; Barnett, 31 F.3d at 861-17).

III. Conclusion and Orders

For the reasons discussed, the Court:

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2).

2. DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing 

monthly payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the 

preceding month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each 

time the amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4. DISMISSES this civil action for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) and denies leave to amend as futile. Rosati 

v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (leave to amend is not required if it is 

“absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by 

amendment.”) (internal citations omitted).

5. CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would be frivolous and 

therefore, would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See 

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Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 

550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if 

appeal would not be frivolous); and

6. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 6, 2018

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