Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00421/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00421-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

BONITA C. GIBBS, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 1:15-00421-N

)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Bonita C. Gibbs brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) 

and 1383(c)(3), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security denying her applications for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and 

supplemental security income (“SSI”). The parties have consented to the exercise of 

jurisdiction by, and this case has been ordered referred to, the undersigned United 

States Magistrate Judge for all proceedings in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(c). See Docs. 15, 16. Oral argument was waived in this action. See Docs. 14, 17.

Upon consideration of the administrative record (“R.”) (Doc. 10), Plaintiff’s 

Brief (Doc. 11), and the Commissioner’s Brief (Doc. 12), the Court has determined 

that the Commissioner’s decision denying Plaintiff benefits should be AFFIRMED.1

I. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed applications for SSI and DIB on June 18, 2012 (see R. 145-158), 

alleging a disability onset date of May 30, 2012. See R. 145, 152. Her application was

 1 Any appeal taken from this memorandum opinion and order and simultaneously entered separate 

judgment may be made directly to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. See Doc. 15.

Case 1:15-cv-00421-N Document 18 Filed 09/16/16 Page 1 of 13
initially denied. See R. 81-85. Hearings were conducted before Administrative Law 

Judge Linda J. Helm (“the ALJ”) on December 5, 2013. See R. 26-58. On February 6, 

2014, the ALJ issued the decision, now before this Court, finding Plaintiff not 

disabled. R. 8-25. The Appeals Council issued a decision declining to review the 

ALJ’s determination on July 27, 2015 (see R. 1-4), rendering the Commissioner’s 

decision final for purposes of judicial review. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.981. Claimant

timely filed a complaint in this Court on August 19, 2015. See Doc. 1.

II. Factual Background

Plaintiff is a resident of Mobile, Alabama, born November 6, 1979. R. 152. She 

was 34 at the time of the hearing before the ALJ. R. 26, 152. She completed high 

school and took some college courses. R. 32. Her past relevant work experience 

includes positions as a customer service representative, a fast food worker, a 

dispatcher, an embalmer apprentice, a sales clerk, a data entry clerk, a customer 

service representative supervisor, and a fast food service manager. R. 19. She has 

not performed substantial gainful activity since before the alleged onset date of May 

30, 2012. R. 13. Plaintiff suffers from a number of medical issues, including obesity, 

degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine with sciatica, chronic depressive 

personality disorder, knee pain, migraine headaches, and arthralgia. R. 13. She has 

been treated by several medical professionals, including William Bose, M.D. and 

Tamekia Cunningham, C.R.N.P. R. 16-18. At the time of her July 18, 2013,

examination, Plaintiff was taking a number of medications, including Celexa, 

Tramadol, and muscle relaxers. R. 17-18.

Case 1:15-cv-00421-N Document 18 Filed 09/16/16 Page 2 of 13
III. Claims on Appeal

On appeal to this Court, Plaintiff asserts that the Commissioner’s decision to 

deny benefits is in error (i.e., not supported by substantial evidence) on the following 

grounds:

1. The ALJ reversibly erred in failing to assign controlling weight to 

the opinion of the Plaintiff’s treating physician, James Devaney, 

M.D. Dr. Devaney’s opinion is well-supported, is consistent with the 

other substantial evidence of record, and should have been assigned 

controlling weight.

2. The ALJ reversibly erred in violation of Social Security Ruling 96-6p 

by failing to give weight to the opinion of consultative examiner, 

Alan Sherman, M.D., because it is consistent with the medical 

evidence of record.

3. The ALJ committed reversible error in violation of 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1413(d) in failing to assign the opinion of Tamekia 

Cunningham, a certified registered nurse practitioner, adequate 

weight as that of an “other source.”

4. The ALJ committed reversible error in acting as both judge and 

physician by arbitrarily substituting her own medical opinion, 

without any supporting medical opinions or substantial evidence, 

for the opinion of a medical professional, in violation of Marbury v. 

Sullivan and Social Security Ruling 96-6p.

Case 1:15-cv-00421-N Document 18 Filed 09/16/16 Page 3 of 13
Doc. 11 at 1-2.

IV. Standard of Review

In all Social Security cases, a plaintiff (sometimes referred to as a claimant) 

bears the burden of proving that he or she is unable to perform his or her previous 

work. Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986). In evaluating whether 

that burden has been met, and thus a claimant has proven that he or she is disabled, 

the examiner (most often an ALJ) must consider the following four factors: (1) 

objective medical facts and clinical findings; (2) diagnoses of examining physicians; 

(3) evidence of pain; and (4) the plaintiff’s age, education, and work history (see id); 

and, in turn,

uses a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether the 

claimant is disabled, which considers: (1) whether the claimant is 

engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant 

has a severe impairment; (3) if so, whether the severe impairment 

meets or equals an impairment in the Listing of Impairments in the 

regulations; (4) if not, whether the claimant has the [residual functional 

capacity, or] RFC[,] to perform her past relevant work; and (5) if not, 

whether, in light of the claimant’s RFC, age, education and work 

experience, there are other jobs the claimant can perform.

Watkins v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 457 Fed. Appx. 868, 870 (11th Cir. 2012) (per 

curiam) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), (c)-(f), 416.920(a)(4), (c)-(f); Phillips v. 

Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2004)).

If a plaintiff proves that he or she cannot do his or her past relevant work, it 

then becomes the Commissioner’s burden to prove that the plaintiff is 

capable—given his or her age, education, and work history—of engaging in another 

kind of substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. Id.; 

Case 1:15-cv-00421-N Document 18 Filed 09/16/16 Page 4 of 13
Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999); Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 

836 (11th Cir. 1985). Finally, but importantly, although “the [plaintiff] bears the 

burden of demonstrating the inability to return to [his or] her past relevant work, 

the Commissioner of Social Security has an obligation to develop a full and fair 

record.” Shnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).

The task for this Court is to determine whether the Commissioner’s decision 

to deny a plaintiff benefits is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial 

evidence is defined as more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance, and 

means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion. Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983) 

(citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). “In determining whether 

substantial evidence exists, [a court] must view the record as a whole, taking into 

account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the [Commissioner’s] decision.” 

Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). Courts are precluded, however, 

from “deciding the facts anew or re-weighing the evidence.” Davison v. Astrue, 370 

Fed. App’x 995, 996 (11th Cir. Apr. 1, 2010) (per curiam) (citing Dyer v. Barnhart, 

395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005)). “Even if the evidence preponderates against 

the Commissioner’s findings, [a court] must affirm if the decision reached is 

supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (citing Crawford v. Commissioner of Soc.

Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004)) (emphasis added).

Case 1:15-cv-00421-N Document 18 Filed 09/16/16 Page 5 of 13
V. Analysis

A. The ALJ did not err in failing to assign controlling weight to the 

opinion of the treating physician.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ reversibly erred in failing to assign controlling 

weight to the opinion of the Plaintiff’s treating physician, James Devaney, M.D., 

whose opinion was “well-supported” and “consistent with the other substantial 

evidence of record.” Doc. 11 at 2. The opinion of a treating physician, such as Dr. 

Devaney, “must be given controlling weight” if his medical opinion is “well-supported 

and not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record . . .” SSR 

96-2p, 1996 WL 374188 (July 2, 1996). The ALJ must weigh all medical opinions 

before it according to specific factors:

Unless we [the Social Security Administration] give a treating source’s 

opinion controlling weight under paragraph (c)(2) of this section, we 

will consider all of the following factors in deciding the weight we give 

to any medical opinion.

(1) Examining relationship . . . 

(2) Treatment relationship . . . 

(3) Supportability . . . 

(4) Consistency . . . 

(5) Specialization . . . 

(6) Other factors. When we consider how much weight to give to 

a medical opinion, we will also consider any factors you or 

others bring to our attention, or of which we are aware, which 

tend to support or contradict the opinion . . .

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). The ALJ “must clearly articulate the reasons for giving less 

weight to the opinion of the treating physician, and the failure to do so is reversible 

error.” MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1997). 

The opinion of a treating physician “ ‘must be given substantial or 

considerable weight unless “good cause” is shown to the contrary.’ ” Phillips, 357 

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F.3d at 1240 citing Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997). “ ‘[G]ood 

cause’ exists when the: (1) treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the 

evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician’s 

opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctors own medical records.” Id. at 

1241. “When electing to disregard the opinion of a treating physician, the ALJ must 

clearly articulate its reasons.” Id.

In the present case, the ALJ disregarded the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating 

physician by stating that

[t]he opinion of James DeVaney, M.D., in the Alabama Parking 

Privileges Form is given little weight because it is not consistent with 

the objective CT spine and lumbar spine X-ray evidence from May 2012 

showing generally normal findings, the claimant’s treatment 

examination findings, or the overall conservative treatment despite the 

claimant’s continued pain complaints (Exhibit 8F).

R. 18. The CT scan in question showed no adverse findings. R. 16. The ALJ’s 

determination explicitly states how the treating physician’s opinion was not 

bolstered by the objective evidence of the case, in accordance with Phillips. Id. 

compare 357 F.3d at 1241. This constitutes “good cause” necessary for discounting 

the opinion of a treating physician. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240 citing Lewis, 125 F.3d 

at 1440. Where the ALJ’s evaluation of the treating physician’s opinion is consistent 

with Eleventh Circuit precedent, this Court cannot “decid[e] the facts anew or 

re-weigh[] the evidence.” Davison, 370 Fed. App’x at 996. Accordingly, this 

assignment of error is OVERRULED.

Case 1:15-cv-00421-N Document 18 Filed 09/16/16 Page 7 of 13
B. The ALJ did not err in violation of SSR 96-6p by failing to give weight 

to the opinion of consultative examiner, Alan Sherman, M.D.

Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ committed error “by failing to give 

adequate weight to the opinion of consultative examiner, Alan Sherman, M.D., on 

the grounds it is consistent with the medical evidence of record.” Doc. 11 at 7. The 

weight given to such consultative examiners is governed in part by Social Security 

Ruling 96-6p, which states that

. . . the opinions of physicians or psychologists who do not have a 

treatment relationship with the individual are weighed by stricter 

standards, based to a greater degree on medical evidence, 

qualifications, and explanations for the opinions, than are required of 

treating sources.

For this reason, the opinions of State agency medical and psychological 

consultants and other program physicians and psychologists can be 

given weight only insofar as they are supported by evidence in the case 

record, considering such factors as the supportability of the opinion in 

the evidence including any evidence received at the [ALJ] and Appeals 

Council levels that was not before the State agency, the consistency of 

the opinion with the record as a whole, including other medical 

opinions, and any explanation for the opinion provided by the State 

agency medical or psychological consultant or other program physician 

or psychologist. The adjudicator must also consider all other factors 

that could have a bearing on the weight to which an opinion is entitled, 

including any specialization of the State agency medical or 

psychological consultant.

SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180 (July 2, 1996). The ALJ gave “little weight” to Dr. 

Sherman’s opinion, finding it was

not consistent with the objective CT spine and lumbar spine X-ray 

evidence from May 2012 showing generally normal findings, claimant’s 

treatment examination findings, or the overall conservative treatment 

received by claimant (Exhibit 5F).

R. 17-18. Again, the CT scan in question showed no adverse findings. R. 16. The ALJ 

Case 1:15-cv-00421-N Document 18 Filed 09/16/16 Page 8 of 13
is obligated to “evaluate every medical opinion [she] receives.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1527(c), 416.927(c). The ALJ 

Consider[s] all of the following factors in deciding the weight we give to 

any medical opinion.

(1) Examining relationship . . . 

(2) Treatment relationship . . . 

(3) Supportability . . .

(4) Consistency . . .

(5) Specialization . . .

(6) Other factors . . .

Id. In this case, the ALJ discounted Dr. Sherman’s opinion based on its 

inconsistency with other available medical data, consistent with federal regulations. 

Id. compare R. 17-18. Such comparison is supported by “substantial evidence” (e.g.

the CT scan) as envisioned by Bloodsworth, under which substantial evidence is 

“more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” 703 F.2d at 1239 citing

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 

838-40 (11th Cir. 1982)2; Oldham v. Schweiker, 660 F.2d 1078, 1083 (5th Cir. 1981); 

Fruge v. Harris, 631 F.2d 1211, 1213 (5th Cir. 1978). Accordingly, the second 

assignment of error is OVERRULED.

C. The ALJ did not err in violation of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1413(d) in failing to 

assign the opinion of Tamekia Cunningham adequate weight as that 

of an “other source.”

Claimant contends that the ALJ erred by failing to assign adequate weight, as 

an “other source,” to the opinion of Tamekia Cunningham, a certified registered 

nurse practitioner. Doc. 11 at 9. Administrative regulations state that

 2 The Eleventh Circuit has adopted as binding all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior 

to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

Case 1:15-cv-00421-N Document 18 Filed 09/16/16 Page 9 of 13
[i]n addition to evidence from the acceptable medical sources . . . [the 

ALJ] may also use evidence from other sources to show the severity of 

[Claimant’s] impairment(s) and how it affects [Claimant’s] ability to 

work. Other sources include, but are not limited to—

(1) Medical sources not listed in paragraph (a) of this section (for 

example, nurse-practitioners, physicians’ assistants, 

naturopaths, chiropractors, audiologists, and therapists) . . .

20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d); see also SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939 (Aug. 9, 2006). 

“Opinions from ‘other medical sources’ may reflect the source’s judgment about . . . 

symptoms, diagnosis, and prognosis, what the individual can still do despite the 

impairment(s), and physical and mental restrictions.” SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 

2329939 (Aug. 9, 2006). The same factors used for evaluating an acceptable medical 

source opinion may be used to evaluate an opinion from an unacceptable medical 

source. Id. citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c), 416.927(c). Additionally,

[t]he fact that a medical opinion is from an “acceptable medical source” 

is a factor that may justify giving that opinion greater weight than an 

opinion from a medical source who is not an “acceptable medical source” 

because . . . “acceptable medical sources” are the most qualified health 

care professionals.

SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939 (Aug. 9, 2006). Acceptable medical sources for 

establishing impairments are

(1) licensed physicians . . .

(2) licensed or certified psychologists . . .

(3) licensed optometrists . . .

(4) licensed podiatrists . . . and

(5) qualified speech-language pathologists . . . 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a).

In evaluating Ms. Cunningham’s opinion, the ALJ gives the opinion “little 

weight,” saying that

Case 1:15-cv-00421-N Document 18 Filed 09/16/16 Page 10 of 13
[f]irst, she is not an acceptable medical source. Second, her opinion as to 

the claimant’s ability to be gainfully employed is one reserved to the 

Commissioner. Third, her opinion is inconsistent with the claimant’s 

longitudinal treatment record, the MRI and X-ray evidence showing 

generally normal findings, and the conservative treatment for the 

claimant’s pain complaints.

R. 18. The ALJ correctly identified that the opinion did not come from an acceptable 

medical source and included that factor in her weight determination pursuant to 

Social Security Ruling 06-03p. R. 18 compare SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939 (Aug. 9, 

2006) and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a). The ALJ gave it “little weight,” rather than “no 

weight,” meaning that she gave it some consideration, even though it did not come 

from an acceptable medical source. See R.18. The ALJ also correctly stated that the 

source’s determination that the Claimant could not be gainfully employed was not a 

proper matter for the opinion of an “other source.” R. 18 compare SSR 06-03p, 2006 

WL 232 9939 (Aug. 9, 2006). Finally, the ALJ considered the opinion for its 

consistency with other medical evidence, pursuant to Social Ruling 06-03p and 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c) and 416.927(c). Since the ALJ properly considered the opinion 

of Ms. Cunningham pursuant to all relevant federal regulations and administrative 

rulings, this assignment of error is OVERRULED.

D. The ALJ did not err in violation of Marbury v. Sullivan and SSR 96-6p 

by substituting her own medical opinion for that of a medical professional.

Plaintiff finally contends that the ALJ substituted her own medical opinion 

for that of the opinions of the medical professionals which were before her in this 

matter. Doc. 11 at 11. Specifically, the Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s RFC 

determination is not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 13. The ALJ “has the 

Case 1:15-cv-00421-N Document 18 Filed 09/16/16 Page 11 of 13
obligation to consider all relevant medical evidence and cannot simply cherry-pick 

facts that support a finding of non-disability while ignoring evidence that points to a 

disability finding.” Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 2010). In fact, the 

ALJ “abuses his discretion when he substitutes his own uninformed medical 

evaluations for those a Claimant’s treating physician. Marbury v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 

837, 840-41 (11th Cir. 1992) (Johnson, J., concurring). Social Security Ruling 96-8p 

requires that the ALJ include in her RFC assessment “a discussion of why reported 

symptom-related functional limitations and restrictions can or cannot reasonably be 

accepted as consistent with the medical and other evidence. SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 

374184 (July 2, 1996).

The Plaintiff does not point to any medical opinion or test result which the 

ALJ did not give any consideration to. In making the RFC finding, the ALJ 

“considered all symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be 

accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence . . . ” R. 16. The ALJ 

carefully considered and weighed the medical opinions of Alan Sherman, M.D.; 

William Bose, M.D.; and James DeVaney, M.D. R. 17-18. She also considered the 

opinion of Tamekia Cunningham, C.R.N.P., as well as CT scan, lumbar X-ray, and 

MRI of the Plaintiff’s spine. R. 16-18. As required by the Eleventh Circuit, the 

evidence relied upon by the ALJ in making the RFC determination is “more than a 

scintilla” and is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as 

adequate to support [the ALJ’s] conclusion.” See Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F. 2d 1520, 

1529 (11th Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted). In the last analysis, the record 

Case 1:15-cv-00421-N Document 18 Filed 09/16/16 Page 12 of 13
evidence does not support Plaintiff’s assignments of error. Rather, the record as a 

whole reflects that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.

VI. Conclusion

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security denying Plaintiff benefits is AFFIRMED.

DONE and ORDERED this the 16th day of September 2016.

/s/ Katherine P. Nelson

KATHERINE P. NELSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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