Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01633/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01633-25/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 740
Nature of Suit: Railway Labor Act
Cause of Action: 45:151 Railway Labor Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Don Addington; John Bostic; Mark

Burman; Afshin Iranpour; Roger Velez;

Steve Wargocki,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

US Airline Pilots Association; US

Airways, Inc.,

Defendants. __________________________________

Don Addington; John Bostic; Mark

Burman; Afshin Iranpour; Roger Velez;

Steve Wargocki, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Steven Bradford; Paul Diorio; Robert

Frear; Mark King; Douglas Mowery; John

Stephan, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-08-01633-PHX-NVW

(consolidated)

ORDER

CV-08-01728-PHX-NVW

Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from the Judgment

Dismissing for Lack of Ripeness (Doc. 645), the Response, and the Reply. The Court

heard oral argument on the Motion on October 12, 2010.

Case 2:08-cv-01633-NVW Document 663 Filed 10/14/10 Page 1 of 5
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I. Background

On July 17, 2009, the Court ordered partial judgment and a permanent injunction

in this matter. (Doc. 594.) The Court retained jurisdiction to enforce, modify, or dissolve

the permanent injunction and jurisdiction to adjudicate the named Plaintiffs’

unadjudicated claims for damages and any claims for attorney fees. (Id.) On July 23,

2009, USAPA filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit from

the partial judgment and permanent injunction, findings of fact and conclusions of law,

and related orders. (Doc. 595.) On June 4, 2010, the Court of Appeals held that

Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of the duty of fair representation was not ripe and remanded

the case with directions that the action be dismissed. (Doc. 647-1.) On August 6, 2010,

Plaintiffs moved for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) from the judgment mandated by the

Court of Appeals. (Doc. 645.) On August 10, 2010, the mandate from the Court of

Appeals issued. (Doc. 647.) On August 13, 2010, pursuant to the mandate, the Court

vacated the partial judgment and permanent injunction and ordered entry of judgment

dismissing this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 650).

In their Rule 60(b) motion, Plaintiffs seek “relief from the judgment mandated by

the Ninth Circuit, dismissing this case for lack of ripeness,” because US Airways filed a

declaratory action related to Plaintiffs’ claims in this action. (Doc. 645.) 

II. Jurisdiction

Plaintiffs filed their Rule 60(b) motion after the Court of Appeals issued its

opinion ordering remand of this action, but before the mandate issued. The filing of a

notice of appeal generally divests the district court of subject matter jurisdiction over

those aspects of the case involved in the appeal. Stein v. Wood, 127 F.3d 1187, 1189 (9th

Cir. 1997); see also Gould v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 790 F.2d 769, 772 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Although the general rule has exceptions, it seeks to avoid confusion and serve judicial

economy:

The rationale for this general rule is that it avoids the confusion and waste

of time that might flow from putting the same issues before two courts at

the same time. This general rule is thus a rule of judicial economy. It does

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not rest on a statute and should not be employed to defeat its purposes nor

to induce needless paper shuffling.

Stein, 127 F.3d at 1189 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

For consideration of a Rule 60(b) motion during an appeal, the proper procedure is

to ask the district court whether it wishes to entertain the motion, or to grant it, and then

move the appellate court to remand the case. Gould, 790 F.2d at 772. However, once the

appellate mandate has issued, the Ninth Circuit does not require leave of the appellate

court for district court consideration of a Rule 60(b) motion. Id. at 773 (relying on

Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17, 17, 97 S. Ct. 31, 31 (1976) (per curiam)). 

By deciding the motion after the mandate has issued, the Court is not acting outside of its

jurisdiction to decide the Rule 60(b) motion without leave of the Court of Appeals.

III. The Mandate Precludes the Rule 60(b) Relief Sought.

A district court must comply with a mandate from the Court of Appeals as to all

matters expressly or impliedly decided by the appellate court:

When a case has been decided by an appellate court and remanded, the

court to which it is remanded must proceed in accordance with the mandate

and such law of the case as was established by the appellate court. 

Although this doctrine is not totally inflexible, this court has held that a

mandate is controlling as to all matters within its compass, while leaving

any issue not expressly or impliedly disposed of on appeal available for

consideration by the trial court on remand.

Firth v. United States, 554 F.2d 990, 993-94 (9th Cir. 1977) (citations and footnote

omitted). Further:

When a case has been decided by this court on appeal and remanded to the

District Court, every question which was before this court and disposed of

by its decree is finally settled and determined. The District Court is bound

by the decree and must carry it into execution according to the mandate. It

cannot alter it, examine it except for purposes of execution, or give any

further or other relief or review it for apparent error with respect to any

question decided on appeal, and can only enter a judgment or decree in

strict compliance with the opinion and mandate . . . (The District Court) is

without power to do anything which is contrary to either the letter or spirit

of the mandate construed in the light of the opinion of this court deciding

the case.

Id. at 994 n.3 (quoting Thornton v. Carter, 109 F.2d 316, 319-20 (8th Cir. 1940)).

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Plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b) motion expressly asks the Court to vacate the judgment

mandated by the Court of Appeals on the very issue disposed of by the Court of Appeals. 

The Court of Appeals held:

We conclude that this case presents contingencies that could prevent

effectuation of USAPA’s proposal and the accompanying injury. . . .

Because these contingencies make the claim speculative, the issues are not

yet fit for judicial decision.

We also conclude that withholding judicial consideration does not

work a direct and immediate hardship on the West Pilots. . . . That the

court cannot fashion a remedy that will alleviate Plaintiffs’ harm suggests

that the case is not ripe.

. . . .

Although we do not hold that a DFR claim based on a union’s

promotion of a policy is never ripe until that policy is effectuated, we

conclude that, in this case, there is too much uncertainty standing in the way

of effectuation of Plaintiffs’ harm to warrant judicial intervention at this

stage. . . . 

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Plaintiffs’ DFR claim is not

ripe; therefore, the case is REMANDED to the district court with directions

that the action be DISMISSED. No costs to either side.

(Doc. 647-1.) Vacating the order of dismissal based on ripeness would violate the

unconditional mandate for dismissal for lack of ripeness.

Cases finding ripeness on appeal based on circumstances that occurred after the

district court’s initial decision do not apply here where the alleged change in

circumstances occurred after the appellate decision, which ordered dismissal and left

nothing to be decided by the district court. See, e.g., Regional Rail Reorganization Act

Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 139-40, 95 S. Ct. 335, 356-57 (1974); Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes v.

Bd. of Oil & Gas Conservation, 792 F.2d 782, 788 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1986). It is true that a

court assesses ripeness based on the facts as they exist at the “present moment,” Western

Radio Servs. Co. v. Qwest Corp., 530 F.3d 1186, 1205 (9th Cir. 2008). That principle

applied to the ripeness decisions made in this action, and it would apply to any future

action Plaintiffs may bring. But it does not empower the Court to revive an action that

the Court of Appeals ordered to be dismissed.

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This ruling requires no exegesis of the Court of Appeals’ opinion for its

precedential force, and this Court makes none. It is enough that this Court has been

directed to dismiss this case for lack of ripeness.

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from the Judgment

Dismissing for Lack of Ripeness (Doc. 645) is denied.

The Court has also reviewed Plaintiffs' Motion to File Supplemental Briefing

(Doc. 659) and Defendant USAPA's response. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion to File Supplemental Briefing

(Doc. 659) is granted.

The Clerk shall file Plaintiffs' Lodged Supplemental Briefing on the Issue of Strict

Compliance with Local Rules (Doc. 660). 

DATED this 13th day of October, 2010.

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