Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01572/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01572-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 690
Nature of Suit: Other Forfeiture and Penalty Suits
Cause of Action: 28:1341 Complaint for Forfeiture

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff,

v.

One M119 105mm Howitzer, Serial

Number S793,

Defendant. 

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No. CV-11-1572-PHX-SMM

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff United States of America’s Motion for Summary

Judgment. (Doc. 35.) Claimant Damage, LLC, has responded (Doc. 46), Plaintiff has replied

(Doc. 49), and the matter is fully briefed. The Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff seeks civil in rem forfeiture of Defendant property known as One M119

105mm Howitzer, Serial Number S793 (hereinafter, “the Howitzer”), pursuant to 26 U.S.C.

§ 5872(a). 

Between May 2008 and September 2008, Special Agent Sander of the Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”) discovered a number of online

advertisements at www.arizonashooting.com for the sale of firearms, and traced them back

to Robert A. Bigando. (Doc. 36 ¶ 6.) One advertisement by Bigando, posted September 13,

2008, was for the Howitzer. (Id.) The ad read as follows:

The gun is NATO M1191A1 105mm. It is currently in demilled

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status. It was rescued from a military contractor using the gun

as a test piece for some sort of service. I am not sure exactly

what they did. I used the term rescued lightly because it took

them a whole lot of motivation ($) to let it go. Its an extremely

rare piece, well in civilian hands at least. I know of no others.

The gun needs some work but nothing impossible. We are

hoping to be operational by December. At that point it will be

live, functioning, registered, and most importantly transferable

piece. Bob.

(Id.) [sic.]

ATF checked with the Federal Licensing Center and learned that Bigando did not

have a federal firearms license for the Howitzer. (Id. ¶ 8.) On October 30, 2008, ATF agents

executed a federal search warrant and seized the Howitzer from Bigando’s residence. (Doc.

35 at 2.) Bigando was subsequently indicted by a Federal grand jury in this district, charging

him with two felony counts of unlawful possession of an unregistered firearm and one

misdemeanor count of contempt of court for possessing firearms in violation of an order of

probation issued in a prior criminal case. (Id.) Bigando pled guilty to the misdemeanor

charge and agreed to forfeit his interest in the Howitzer. (Id.)

On the date the Howitzer was seized, ATF Firearms Enforcement Officer Kenneth

Mason conducted an on-site physical inspection of the Howitzer. (Doc. 37 at 16.) In his

report issued November 10, 2008, Officer Mason reported that the Howitzer had been

modified in the following ways: its breech block had been removed, its feed gate had been

welded in place, and several holes had been torch-cut into its hydro-pneumatic recoil system.

(Id. at 17.) Officer Mason concluded that these modifications were insufficient to destroy

the receiver and remove the Howitzer from the provisions of the National Firearms Act

(“NFA”). (Id.) 

The ATF began administrative proceedings for forfeiture of the Howitzer on

November 2, 2009. (Id.) On November 20, 2009, Tanner Hunsaker, president of Claimant

Damage LLC, filed a Seized Asset Claim Form with the ATF, asserting that Claimant owns

full interest in the Howitzer and seeking its return. (Id.) Thereafter, Plaintiff brought this

in rem forfeiture proceeding against the Howitzer pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 5872. (Doc. 1.)

Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment. (Doc. 35.)

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LEGAL STANDARD

I. Motion for Summary Judgment

A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents,

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, “show[] that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Jesinger v.

Nev. Fed. Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994). Substantive law determines

which facts are material. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also

Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit

under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson,

477 U.S. at 248. The dispute must also be genuine, that is, the evidence must be “such that

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.; see Jesinger, 24 F.3d

at 1130.

A principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of factually

unsupported claims.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. Summary judgment is appropriate

against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof

at trial.” Id. at 322; see also Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir.

1994). The moving party need not disprove matters on which the opponent has the burden

of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. The party opposing summary judgment

need not produce evidence “in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid

summary judgment.” Id. at 324. However, the nonmovant must set out specific facts

showing a genuine dispute for trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-88 (1986); Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044,

1049 (9th Cir. 1995).

II. National Firearms Act

Property involved in a violation of the NFA is subject to seizure and forfeiture by the

United States. 26 U.S.C. § 5872(a). The NFA provides that prior to transfer of any NFA

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firearm, the transferor shall register the firearm to the transferee with the National Firearms

Registration and Transfer Record (“NFRTR”). 26 U.S.C. § 5841(b)-(c). In addition, the

NFA makes it unlawful for a person “to receive or possess a firearm transferred to him in

violation of the provisions of this chapter,” or “to receive or possess a firearm which is not

registered to him in the [NFRTR].” 26 U.S.C. § 5861. 

“Firearms” under the NFA include “destructive devices,” pertinently defined as:

(2) any type of weapon by whatever name known which will, or

which may be readily converted to, expel a projectile by the

action of an explosive or other propellant, the barrel or barrels

of which have a bore of more than one-half inch in diameter . .

.; and 

(3) any combination of parts either designed or intended for use

in converting any device into a destructive device as defined in

subparagraphs (1) and (2) and from which a destructive device

may be readily assembled. . . . 

26 U.S.C.A. § 5845(f).

The customs laws, 19 U.S.C. § 1602-1631, establish the relative burdens of parties in

a forfeiture action under 26 U.S.C. § 5872(a). United States v. TRW Rifle 7.62X51mm

Caliber, One Model 14 Serial 593006, 447 F.3d 686, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing United

States v. One TRW, Model M14, 7.62 Caliber Rifle, 441 F.3d 416, 418-19 (6th Cir. 2006)).

Section 1615 provides that in forfeiture suits where the property is claimed by any person,

the burden of proof shall lie upon such claimant, provided that the government first

establishes probable cause for the institution of the forfeiture action. Id. See also United

States v. One 56-Foot Yacht Named Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276, 1281 (9th Cir. 1983); One

TRW, 441 F.3d at 419. 

The standard for probable cause in forfeiture proceedings resembles that required to

support a search warrant. United States v. One 1978 Piper Cherokee Aircraft, 91 F.3d 1204,

1208 (9th Cir. 1996), (citing United States v. $191,910.00 in U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d 1051,

1071 (9th Cir. 1994)). The determination of probable cause is based upon a totality of the

circumstances test, and the government’s evidence must be more than that which gives rise

to a mere suspicion, although it need not rise to the level of prima facie proof. Id. Moreover,

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an “unrebutted showing of probable cause is sufficient by itself to warrant a judgment of

forfeiture.” United States v. $5,644,540.00 in U.S. Currency, 799 F.2d 1357, 1362 (9th Cir.

1986).

Under Section 1615, the claimant’s burden may be met in one of two ways: “first, [the

claimant] may refute the government’s showing of probable cause, and second, [the claimant]

may come forward with affirmative evidence and prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that the [property subject to the forfeiture proceeding] was not used for the illegal purpose

as alleged.” Id., citing Tahuna, 702 F.2d at 1281.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that judgment in its

favor is appropriate as a matter of law. According to Plaintiff, the undisputed facts show that

the Howitzer is subject to forfeiture as property used in violation of law, because: (1) the

Howitzer is a destructive device as defined by 26 U.S.C. §§ 5845(f)(2) and/or 5845(f)(3) ;

and (2) it was transferred without proper registration in the NFRTR in violation of the NFA

transfer and registration requirements.

It is undisputed that a functioning howitzer cannon would qualify as a destructive

device under 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f)(2), because it is “a weapon . . . which will . . . expel a

projectile by the action of an explosive or other propellant, the barrel or barrels of which

have a bore of more than one-half inch in diameter.” (The barrel of a howitzer has a bore

that is approximately 4.139 inches in diameter. (Doc. 35 at 10.)) It is also undisputed that

the Howitzer at issue here was transferred to Bigando and Claimant without prior approval

by the ATF, and that Bigando and Claimant possessed it without registering it in the NFRTR.

Thus, the central remaining disputed issue in this case is whether the Howitzer in its current

modified condition qualifies as a destructive device under 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f), because it

may be either “readily converted to expel a projectile,” or “readily assembled” into a

destructive device.

Claimant contends first that Plaintiff lacked probable cause to institute forfeiture,

based on the argument that the Howitzer is not a destructive device under 26 U.S.C. §§

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5845(f)(2) or (3). (Doc. 46 at 6.) According to Claimant, the Howitzer fails to fall under

these provisions because it cannot be “readily” converted to expel a projectile, nor “readily”

assembled into a destructive device. (Id.)

The Court must first address Claimant’s argument that Plaintiff lacked probable cause

to institute forfeiture proceedings against the Howitzer. The Court finds Claimant’s

argument on this point to be without merit. In October 2008, ATF Agent Sander discovered

the online posting by Bigando describing the Howitzer and stating Bigando’s intention to

work on the cannon and make it a “live, functioning” weapon by December 2008. ATF

investigation revealed that Bigando did not have a license for the Howitzer, and that

Bigando’s probation terms prohibited him from possessing firearms. 

Thereafter, ATF Officer Mason conducted an on-site inspection of the Howitzer and

reported that although it had been modified in some ways, these modifications were

insufficient to destroy the gun’s receiver and remove it from the provisions of the NFA. (Id.)

On this basis, Plaintiff began forfeiture proceedings in November of 2008. The government

relied on Officer Mason’s report that the Howitzer was readily restorable, and was acting on

more than mere suspicion of illegal activity. The government thus had probable cause under

the totality of the circumstances to believe that the Howitzer was a destructive device under

the terms of the NFA, and that it was unlawfully possessed by Bigando and therefore subject

to forfeiture. Accordingly, the burden in this forfeiture action now shifts to Claimant to

establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Howitzer is not subject to forfeiture.

Claimant argues that the Howitzer is not subject to forfeiture, based on the same

argument that the Howitzer is not a destructive device because it cannot be readily made to

fire. Plaintiff counters that the Howitzer does fall under the definition – despite its current

modifications which prevent firing – because it can be readily restored to fireable condition.

(Doc. 35 at 13.) Claimant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that

the Howitzer is not subject to forfeiture. Therefore, the precise question before the Court is

whether Claimant can establish the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact which

supports its claim that the Howitzer cannot readily be made to fire.

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1

 The Court notes the discrepancy between Mr. Dockery’s assertion that the breech

block is welded into place versus Officer Mason’s report that the breech block has been

removed and the feed gate welded into place. Similarly, Claimant’s expert La France reports

that the breech block has been completely removed, while expert Riker implies that the

breech block is welded in place on the Howitzer. The Court assumes this to be the result of

a variation in terminology between the experts – in any event, the Court here must make all

inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and Officer Mason’s report corroborates the

claim that the breech block has been removed.

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Claimant relies on the reports of several expert witnesses, including: (1) Kevin

Dockery, (2) Tim La France; and (3) Mike Riker. Dockery is a former member of the U.S.

Army and a specialist in military ordnance. (Doc. 38 at 2-3.) Dockery examined

photographs of the Howitzer and reports that it is not readily restorable. (Id. at 10-22.)

Dockery asserts, and Plaintiff’s expert Vasquez agrees, that the “primary component” of the

Howitzer is the cannon, “which is made up of the cannon tube, muzzle break and breech

mechanism.” (Doc. 38 at 11.) The remaining components of the Howitzer are the

recuperator assembly (which returns the cannon back to position after firing), the equilibrator

(which prevents the weapon from tipping when fired), and the recoil system. (Id.) 

Dockery states that the Howitzer has been modified to prevent firing in that the barrel

is welded shut, and the breech block is firmly welded into place1

 with “deep and thorough”

welds. (Id. at 21.) Most importantly, Dockery reports that the barrel could not be made to

fire without extensive, difficult repairs:

The barrel alone would require the services of a major machine

shop in order to make it at all functional. This reconstruction

would require the use of a very large lathe, on the order of that

used in a ship yard or major manufacturing center. A lathe

would have to hold and turn a piece weighing approximate [sic]

1,000 pounds as well as have 108 inch bed length and 20 inch

turning capability. This would be at a minimum in order to

restore the barrel.

(Id.) 

Claimant’s expert La France, a weapon-smith, reports that the Howitzer’s breech

block has been completely removed, which is “the critical piece to both lock the round [of

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2

 Relying on Vasquez’s report, and the report of ATF Agent Sander, Plaintiff also

argues that the Howitzer necessarily qualifies as a destructive device under 26 U.S.C. §

5845(f)(2) because it was not demilitarized in accordance with the approved and

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ammunition] in place and actually fire the weapon.” (Doc. 40 at 10-11.) La France therefore

concludes that the Howitzer will not “ever fire again unless [it is] completely refurbished

with replacement parts, very extensive time and labor input, and with access to very

specialized machining facilities.” (Id. at 11.)

Claimant’s expert Riker, a specialist in military armament including cannons, also

performed a visual inspection of the Howitzer. (Id. at 14.) Riker asserts that the condition

of the barrel is unknown, and could only be determined through further inspection after

removing the tampion from the barrel and removing the breech block. (Id. at 13.) Riker

claims that if greater damage to the barrel were discovered through this inspection, “cost and

time of restoration would rise exponentially.” (Id.) Furthermore, Riker states that “rebuild

of the breach [sic] block assembly and the fire control will be extremely time consuming and

difficult,” and “[w]ithout these parts it will be impossible to fire the howitzer.” (Id.) Thus,

Riker concludes that the Howitzer could not be restored without approximately 625 manhours of labor and a minimum of approximately $47,000. (Id. at 14.)

In support of its argument that the Howitzer can indeed be readily converted to fire,

Plaintiff cites to the report of Richard Vasquez, Assistant Branch Chief for the ATF Firearms

Technology Branch (“FTB”). (Doc. 39 at 6.) Vasquez reviewed Dockery’s report, and

disputes Dockery’s conclusion that the Howitzer cannot be readily restored. (Doc. 39 at 7-

10; Doc. 40 at 3.) Vasquez asserts that Dockery’s report is wrong because although the

aiming and recoil-prevention systems are necessary to the safe firing of the gun, the weapon

could readily be restored to the extent that it could fire at least a single shot. (Doc. 40 at 2-3.)

According to Vasquez, the welds on the breech mechanism and barrel are superficial and

could easily be removed. (Doc. 40 at 2-3) Vasquez thus concludes that restoration of the

Howitzer to a condition in which it could fire a shot would require only the removal of these

welds, work that would take “between a few hours to two days.” (Id. at 3.)2

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recommended means of demilitarizing a howitzer, as set forth by the ATF. (Doc. 35 at 10-

11.) This argument is without merit, however, because the ATF’s recommended method for

demilitarizing a howitzer is not the only means by which the Howitzer at issue here could be

rendered incapable of being “readily” made to fire, which is the legal standard this Court

must apply under Section 5845(f).

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Here, the Court finds that Claimant has established a genuine issue of material fact

for trial. To proceed to trial, Claimant must show the existence of an actual dispute over a

material fact by which it could meet its burden of showing by a preponderance of the

evidence that the Howitzer did not fall under the NFA. Vasquez’s report asserts that only

relatively superficial work would be required to allow the Howitzer to fire at least a single

shot (albeit with perhaps catastrophic results). However, Claimants’ expert reports present

evidence in direct conflict that contention. 

As set forth above, Claimant’s experts report that extensive time and money, as well

as specialized skill and equipment, would be necessary to restore the barrel and breech block

of the Howitzer, two of the components that Plaintiff’s expert concurs are essential to the

firing of the weapon. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that a firearm need not be a duplicate

of the original or even meet the original specifications to qualify as being “restored.” See

One TRW, 441 F.3d at 424 (“[T]he definition of “restore” does not preclude an object from

being considered ‘restored’ without returning it to a condition in which it previously

existed.”). However, Plaintiff incorrectly argues that all of Claimant’s experts speak only

to the amount of work that would be required to restore the Howitzer to its full, original,

safely fireable condition. While it is true that much of the reports concern what repairs

would be required to non-essential systems, nevertheless Claimant presents evidence

bringing into dispute the factual question of whether the Howitzer could be readily made to

fire even a single shot.

Therefore, Claimant has established the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact

for trial, and summary judgment is not appropriate.

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CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

(Doc. 35.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED setting the Final Pretrial Conference for May 1, 2013

at 2:00 p.m. The deadline for the parties to file dispositive motions has passed. This matter

appearing ready for trial, a Final Pretrial Conference shall be held in Courtroom 605, Sandra

Day O’Connor U.S. Federal Courthouse, 401 W. Washington St., Phoenix, Arizona 85003.

The attorneys who will be responsible for the trial of the case shall attend the Final Pretrial

Conference. Counsel shall bring their calendars so that trial scheduling can be discussed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, if this case shall be tried to a jury, the attorneys

who will be responsible for the trial of the lawsuit shall prepare and sign a Proposed Pretrial

Order and submit it to the Court on Friday, April 5, 2013.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the content of the Proposed Pretrial Order shall

include, but not be limited to, that prescribed in the Form of Pretrial Order attached hereto.

Statements made shall not be in the form of a question, but should be a concise narrative

statement of each party’s contention as to each uncontested and contested issue.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c) that

the Court will not allow the parties to offer any exhibits, witnesses, or other information that

were not previously disclosed in accordance with the provisions of this Order and/or the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and/or not listed in the Proposed Pretrial Order, except for

good cause. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the parties to exchange drafts of the

Proposed Pretrial Order no later than seven (7) days before the submission deadline.

IT IS FURTHER April 5, 2013. Each motion in limine shall include the legal basis

supporting it. Responses to motions in limine are due Friday, April 12, 2013. No replies

will be permitted. The attorneys for all parties shall come to the Final Pretrial Conference

prepared to address the merits of all such motions.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the parties to complete the following tasks

by the time of the filing of the Proposed Pretrial Order if they intend to try the case before

a jury:

(1) The parties shall jointly file a description of the case to be read to the jury.

(2) The parties shall jointly file a proposed set of voir dire questions. The voir

dire questions shall be drafted in a neutral manner. To the extent possible, the parties

shall stipulate to the proposed voir dire questions. If the parties have any

disagreement about a particular question, the party or parties objecting shall state the

reason for their objection below the question.

(3) The parties shall file a proposed set of stipulated jury instructions. The

instructions shall be accompanied by citations to legal authority. If a party believes

that a proposed instruction is a correct statement of the law, but the facts will not

warrant the giving of the instructions, the party shall so state. The party who believes

that the facts will not warrant the particular instruction shall provide an alternative

instruction with appropriate citations to legal authority.

(4) Each party shall submit a form of verdict to be given to the jury at the end of

the trial.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the parties to submit their proposed joint

statement of the case, joint voir dire questions, stipulated jury instructions, and verdict forms.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if the case will be tried to the Court, rather than

to a jury, instead of filing a Proposed Pretrial Order, each party shall submit proposed

findings of fact and conclusions of law by the same date the Proposed Pretrial Order is due.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall keep the Court apprised of the

possibility of settlement and should settlement be reached, the parties shall file a Notice of

Settlement with the Clerk of the Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Court views compliance with the provisions

of this Order as critical to its case management responsibilities and the responsibilities of the

parties under Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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DATED this 12th day of March, 2013.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

,

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV -PHX-SMM

PROPOSED PRETRIAL FORM OF

ORDER

Pursuant to the Scheduling Order, the following is the joint Proposed Final Pretrial

Order to be considered at the Final Pretrial Conference set for

___________________________, _________ .

A. COUNSEL FOR THE PARTIES

(Include mailing address, office phone and fax numbers).

Plaintiff(s):

Defendant(s):

B. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.

Cite the statute(s) which gives this Court jurisdiction.

(e.g., Jurisdiction in this case is based on diversity of citizenship under Title 28

U.S.C. §1332.)

Jurisdiction (is/is not) disputed.

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(If jurisdiction is disputed, the party contesting jurisdiction shall set forth with

specificity the bases for the objection.)

C. NATURE OF ACTION.

Provide a concise statement of the type of case, the cause of the action, and the

relief sought.

(e.g., - This is a products liability case wherein the plaintiff seeks damages for

personal injuries sustained when he fell from the driver's seat of a forklift. The

plaintiff contends that the forklift was defectively designed and manufactured by

the defendant and that the defects were a producing cause of his injuries 

and damages.)

D. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES.

With respect to each count of the complaint, counterclaim or cross-claim, and to

any defense, affirmative defense, or the rebuttal of a presumption where the

burden of proof has shifted, the party having the burden of proof shall list the

elements or standards that must be proved in order for the party to prevail on that

claim or defense. Citation to relevant legal authority is required.

(e.g., In order to prevail on this products liability case, the plaintiff must prove

the following elements . . . .

In order to defeat this products liability claim based on the statute of repose, the

defendant must prove the following elements . . . .)

E. STIPULATIONS AND UNCONTESTED FACTS

1. The following facts are admitted by the parties and require no proof:

2. The following facts, although not admitted, will not be contested at trial by

evidence to the contrary:

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F. CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT AND LAW

1. The following are the issues of fact to be tried and decided: (Each issue of fact

must be stated separately and in specific terms. Each parties’ contention as to

each issue must be set forth with respect to each and every issue of fact). E.g.,

Issue # 1: Whether Plaintiff used due care.

 Plaintiff Contends: Plaintiff looked both ways before stepping into the 

 street . . . .

 Defendant Contends: Plaintiff was chasing a ball and darted out into the

 street without looking . . . .

2. The following are the issues of law to be tried and determined: (Each issue of

law must be stated separately and in specific terms. Each parties' contention as

to each issue must be set forth with respect to each and every issue of law). E.g.,

Issue # 1: Whether Plaintiff's suit is barred by the doctrine of laches.

 Plaintiff Contends: . . .

 Defendant Contends: . . .

G. LIST OF WITNESSES.

A jointly prepared list of witnesses and their respective addresses, identifying

each as either plaintiff’s or defendant’s, and indicating whether a fact or expert

witness, must accompany this proposed order. If a witness’ address is unknown,

it should be so stated. A brief statement as to the testimony of each witness must

also be included. Additionally, the parties shall designate which witnesses (1)

shall be called at trial, (2) may be called at trial, and (3) are unlikely to be called

at trial.

Additionally, the parties shall include the following text in this portion of the

Proposed Pretrial Order:

The parties understand that the Court has put them on notice that they are

responsible for ensuring that the witnesses they want to put on the stand to testify

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are subpoenaed to testify, regardless of whether the intended witness is listed as

a witness for the plaintiff(s) or the defendant(s). Simply because a party lists a

witness does not mean that the witness will be called. Therefore, a party should

not rely on the listing of a witness by the opposing party as an indication that the

witness will be called. To the extent possible, the parties shall stipulate to the

witnesses who will be called to testify.

H. LIST OF EXHIBITS.

1. The following exhibits are admissible in evidence and may be marked in

evidence by the Clerk:

a. Plaintiff’s Exhibits:

b. Defendant’s Exhibits:

2. As to the following exhibits, the parties have reached the following

stipulations:

a. Plaintiff’s Exhibits:

b. Defendant’s Exhibits:

3. As to the following exhibits, the party against whom the exhibit is to be

offered objects to the admission of the exhibit and offers the objection stated

beneath:

a. Plaintiff’s Exhibits:

(E.g., City Hospital records of Plaintiff from March 6, 1985 through March 22,

1985. Defendant objects for lack of foundation because . . . . (the objection must

specify why there is a lack of foundation)).

b. Defendant’s Exhibits:

(E.g., Payroll records of Plaintiff’s employer which evidences payment of

Plaintiff’s salary during hospitalization and recovery. Plaintiff objects on the

ground of relevance and materiality because (the objection must specify why

there is a relevancy or materiality problem)).

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I. DEPOSITIONS TO BE OFFERED.

The parties shall list the depositions to be used at trial. The portions to be read

at trial shall be identified by page and line number. Counsel should note

objections to deposition testimony by writing the objection in the margins of that

portion of the text of the deposition to which the objection is made. Moreover,

these objections shall be explained in this portion of the Proposed Pretrial Order.

As is the Court's practice at trial, it is not sufficient for an objecting party to

simply state perfunctory grounds for an objection (e.g., “hearsay” or “lack of

foundation”) contained in the Proposed Pretrial Order. Each party must explain

the basis for each perfunctory objection (e.g., why it is hearsay, why it lacks

foundation, why it is irrelevant).

J. MOTIONS IN LIMINE. Motions in limine shall be served, filed, and responded

to in accordance with the instructions contained in the Order Setting Final Pretrial

Conference.

K. LIST OF ANY PENDING MOTIONS

L. PROBABLE LENGTH OF TRIAL

M. JURY DEMAND - A jury trial (has) (has not) been requested. If a jury trial was

requested, (indicate the appropriate selection):

1. the parties stipulate the request was timely and properly made;

2. the (Plaintiff or Defendant) contends the request was untimely made because:

(explain why request was untimely); or

3. the (Plaintiff or Defendant contends that although the request for trial by jury

was timely, the request is improper as a matter of law because: (indicate the legal

basis why a jury trial would be improper).

For a Bench Trial

N-1. PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW shall

be filed and served by each party in accordance with the instructions contained

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in the Order Setting Final Pretrial Conference.

For a Jury Trial

N-2.STIPULATED JURY INSTRUCTIONS, PROPOSED VOIR DIRE

QUESTIONS, AND PROPOSED FORMS OF VERDICT shall be filed in

accordance with the instructions contained in the Order Setting Final Pretrial

Conference.

O. CERTIFICATIONS. The undersigned counsel for each of the parties in this

action do hereby certify and acknowledge the following:

1. All discovery has been completed.

2. The identity of each witness has been disclosed to opposing counsel.

3. Each exhibit listed herein (a) is in existence; (b) is numbered; and (c) has been

disclosed and shown to opposing counsel.

4. The parties have complied in all respects with the mandates of the Court's Rule

16 Order and Order Setting Final Pretrial Conference.

5. [Unless otherwise previously ordered to the contrary], the parties have made

all of the disclosures required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:

__________________________________ _________________________________

Attorney for Plaintiff Attorney for Defendant

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that this Proposed Pretrial Order jointly submitted by the parties

is hereby APPROVED and is thereby ADOPTED as the official Pretrial Order of this Court.

DATED this ______ day of ______________________, _________. 

 

 _________________________

 Stephen M. McNamee Senior United States District Judge

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