Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00880/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00880-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:1402 Medical Malpractice

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DRUSILLA LOWERY and STEVE 

LOWERY, 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

CLAYTON REINHARDT, D.O., SHASTA 

COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTER, 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 

SERVICES and UNITED STATES OF 

AMERICA, 

 Defendants. 

______________________________/

No. Civ. S-07-0880 RRB DAD 

Memorandum of Opinion

and Order

 Plaintiffs Drusilla Lowrey (“Drusilla”) and Steve Lowery 

(collectively “Plaintiffs”) brought an action against Drusilla’s 

former physician Clayton Reinhardt (“Dr. Reinhardt”), Shasta 

Community Health Center (“SCHC”), Department of Health and Human 

Services (“DHHS”) and the United States of America (“United 

States”) alleging injuries arising out of sexual relations 

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between Drusilla and Dr. Reinhardt.1 The United States now moves 

to dismiss or for summary judgment for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. SCHC and Dr. Reinhardt (collectively 

“Defendants”) oppose the motion. Plaintiffs also oppose the 

motion in part.2

 Docket at 27. For the reasons stated below, 

the court GRANTS the motion.3

I. BACKGROUND 

Dr. Reinhardt, D.O.,4

 is a licensed physician who was 

employed by SCHC, a federally-funded healthcare facility, at the 

time of the alleged sexual relations giving rise to this action. 

Compl. ¶¶ 3, 4, 6. Dr. Reinhardt treated, diagnosed and 

prescribed medicine to Drusilla for various conditions, 

 

1

 The United States is a defendant under the Federal Tort 

Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671 et seq., because the SCHC, 

as a recipient of federal funds, is an employee of the United 

States pursuant to the Federally Supported Health Centers 

Assistance Act. See 42 § U.S.C. 233(g)-(n). 

2

 Plaintiffs oppose the motion insofar as the United States 

seeks a determination that Dr. Reinhardt was not acting within 

the scope of his employment during the sexual relations giving 

rise to this action. Docket at 27. 

3

 Inasmuch as the Court concludes the parties have submitted 

memoranda thoroughly discussing the law and evidence in support 

of their positions, it further concludes oral argument is 

neither necessary nor warranted with regard to the instant 

matter. See Mahon v. Credit Bureau of Placer County, Inc., 171 

F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999)(explaining that if the parties 

provided the district court with complete memoranda of the law 

and evidence in support of their positions, ordinarily oral 

argument would not be required). 

4

 Doctor of Osteopathic Medicine. 

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including Lupus, Fibromyalgia, Irritable Bowel Syndrome, 

Depression, Reynaud’s Phenomenon, Gastritis and Osteopenia. Id.

¶ 3. 

In September 2005, Dr. Reinhardt kissed Drusilla and 

touched her breasts during an appointment at SCHC. Compl. ¶ 9. 

In late October or early September 2005, while at SCHC, 

Dr. Reinhardt invited Drusilla to meet him at a hotel. Id.

¶ 10. At the hotel, Dr. Reinhardt provided Drusilla with 

alcohol and prescription medicines, including Chloral Hydrate 

syrup, Oxycodone, Provigil, Lunesta, Bentyl, Axert and Mobic. 

Id. During this encounter, Dr. Reinhardt and Drusilla engaged 

in sexual intercourse. Id. In November and December 2005, 

Dr. Reinhardt and Drusilla met again on two separate occasions 

at hotels and engaged in sexual intercourse. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. 

During these encounters, Dr. Reinhardt also provided Drusilla 

with alcohol and prescription medicines. Id. Plaintiffs allege 

that Dr. Reinhardt supplied Drusilla with alcohol and 

prescription medicines to induce/encourage her to engage in 

sexual relations with him. Id. ¶¶ 10-11, 27. 

In December 2005, Lynne G. Pappas, a physician at SCHC, 

informed Drusilla that Dr. Reinhardt had told her about his 

sexual relationship with Drusilla. Compl. ¶ 35. On 

December 29, 2005, SCHC informed Drusilla that it would no 

longer provide her with medical services and that she should 

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seek medical care elsewhere. Id. ¶ 36. On May 9, 2007, 

Plaintiffs filed the instant action alleging the following 

claims for relief: (1) medical malpractice; (2) negligence per 

se; (3) breach of fiduciary duty; (4) intentional infliction of 

emotional distress; (5) sexual harassment; (6) respondeat 

superior; and (7) loss of consortium. Compl. On August 6, 

2007, SCHC received a letter from the United States Department 

of Justice for the Eastern District of California (“Attorney 

General’s Office”), as designee of the Attorney General, denying 

SCHC’s request for immunity and certification under the Federal 

Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2678 (“FTCA”), pursuant 

to the Federally Supported Health Care Centers Assistance Act, 

42 U.S.C. §§ 233(a)(g)-(n) (“FSHCAA”), for the lawsuit filed by 

Plaintiffs. Decl. of Michael V. Ubaldi (“Ubaldi”), Exh. A. The 

letter informed SCHC that it was not entitled to immunity under 

the FTCA pursuant to the FSHCAA because the injuries suffered by 

Drusilla (as set forth in the complaint) did not result from Dr. 

Reinhardt’s performance of medical, surgical, dental or related 

functions while he was acting within the scope of his 

employment. Id. On October 15, 2007, the SCHC sought 

reconsideration of this determination. Decl. of Ubaldi, Exh. B. 

On December 17, 2007, the Attorney General’s Office affirmed its 

earlier denial of immunity and certification under the FTCA. 

Decl. of Ubaldi, Exh. C. 

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On January 3, 2008, the United States brought a motion to 

dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) or for summary 

judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Docket at 20. 

On January 18, 2007, SCHC filed a motion to certify seeking 

review of the Attorney General’s denial of its request for 

immunity and certification under the FTCA pursuant to the 

FSHCAA. Docket at 23. Specifically, SCHC seeks a determination 

that it is entitled to immunity because the injuries alleged in 

the complaint resulted from Dr. Reinhardt’s performance of 

medical or related functions while he was acting within the 

scope of his employment. Id. The United States opposes the 

motion. Docket at 34.5

II. DISCUSSION 

The United States argues that dismissal for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction is appropriate because the FTCA does not 

provide a waiver of its sovereign immunity for the torts alleged 

in the complaint, and therefore it is not a proper party to this 

action. More particularly, the United States argues that 

dismissal is appropriate because the alleged injuries were not 

the result of Dr. Reinhardt’s performance of medical or related 

 

5

 Because resolving the question of whether Dr. Reinhardt 

acted within the scope of his employment for purposes of FTCA 

immunity is determinative of whether certification and immunity 

were properly denied, the court need not separately address 

Plaintiffs’ motion to review the Attorney General’s denial of 

certification and immunity under § 233. 

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functions while he was acting within the scope of his 

employment. 

A. Legal Standards 

1. Rule 12(b)(1) 

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12 (b)(1) allows a party to 

challenge a federal court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter 

of the complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). “A federal court is 

presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case unless the 

contrary affirmatively appears.” A-Z Intern. v. Phillips, 323 

F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). A complaint will be dismissed if, looking at the 

complaint as a whole, it appears to lack federal jurisdiction 

either “facially” or “factually.” Thornhill Publishing Co., 

Inc. v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 

1979). When the complaint is challenged for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction on its face, all material allegations in the 

complaint will be taken as true and construed in the light most 

favorable to plaintiff. See NL Indus. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 

898 (9th Cir. 1986). When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion attacks the 

existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, no presumption 

of truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s allegations. Thornhill 

Publ’g Co., 594 F.2d at 733. “[T]he district court is not 

restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may review any 

evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual 

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disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction.” McCarthy v. 

United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988). Once the 

moving party makes a factual attack on jurisdiction by 

submitting affidavits or any other evidence properly before the 

court, the opposing party must then submit affidavits or any 

other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing 

subject matter jurisdiction. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 

373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). A court may resolve 

factual disputes in determining the existence of jurisdiction 

without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. See

Trentacosta v. Frontier Pacific Aircraft Indus., 813 F.2d 1553, 

1558 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Thornhill Publ’g Co., 594 F.2d at 

733.). The burden of proof on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is on the 

party asserting jurisdiction. Thornhill Publ’g Co., 594 F.2d at 

733. 

 Jurisdictional dismissals in cases premised on federalquestion jurisdiction are exceptional, and are only permitted 

“‘where the alleged claim under the constitution or federal 

statutes clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for 

the purpose of obtaining federal jurisdiction or where such 

claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.’” Roberts v. 

Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987); Safe Air for 

Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. The district court should only rely 

on Rule 12(b)(1) if the facts necessary to sustain jurisdiction 

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do not implicate the merits of plaintiff’s cause of action. 

Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. Put another way, a 

jurisdictional finding of genuinely disputed facts is 

inappropriate when the jurisdictional issue and substantive 

issues are so intertwined that the question of jurisdiction is 

dependent on the resolution of factual issues going to the 

merits’ of an action. Id.6 “The question of jurisdiction and 

the merits of an action are intertwined where ‘a statute 

provides the basis for both the subject matter jurisdiction of 

the federal court and the plaintiff’s substantive claim for 

relief.’” See Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039-40. When 

the question of jurisdiction and the merits of the action are so 

intertwined that the question of jurisdiction is dependent on 

the resolution of factual issues going to the merits, the court 

should view the motion as one for summary judgment, not for 

dismissal. Id. at 1040; see Augustine v. United States, 704 

F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983) (in ruling on a jurisdictional 

motion involving factual issues which also go to the merits, the 

trial court employs the summary judgment standard, as a 

 

6

 Where jurisdiction is intertwined with the merits, courts 

assume the truth of the allegations in the complaint unless 

controverted by undisputed facts in the record. Warren v. Fox 

Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The court, however, does not assume the truth of legal 

conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual 

allegations. Roberts, 812 F.2d at 1177. 

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resolution of the jurisdictional facts which is akin to a 

decision on the merits).7 

2. Rule 56(c) 

 Rule 56(b) permits a party whom a claim has been asserted 

to “move at any time, with or without supporting affidavits, for 

summary judgment on all or part of the claim.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(b). Summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 

is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden of 

demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the 

moving party meets its burden, the burden then shifts to the 

non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and by his or her 

own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See id. 

at 324 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 

56(e)); Miller v. Glenn Miller Productions, Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 

 

7

 Because the question of whether this court has subject 

matter jurisdiction is properly raised by a Rule 12(b)(1) motion 

to dismiss, the court need not address whether dismissal is 

appropriate pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 

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987 (9th Cir. 2006). This burden requires more than a simple 

showing that there is some “metaphysical doubt as to the 

material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The mere existence of a 

scintilla of evidence is likewise insufficient to create a 

genuine factual dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 252 (1986). “If the nonmoving party fails to produce 

enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, the 

moving party wins the motion for summary judgment.” Nissan Fire 

& Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1103 

(9th Cir. 2000). “But if the nonmoving party produces enough 

evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, the 

nonmoving party defeats the motion.” Id.

 On a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable doubt as 

to the existence of a genuine issue of fact should be resolved 

against the moving party. Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432 

(9th Cir. 1976). The inferences drawn from the underlying facts 

must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing 

the motion. Valadingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1137 (9th 

Cir. 1989). Where different ultimate inferences may be drawn, 

summary judgment is inappropriate. Sankovich v. Insurance Co. 

of North America, 638 F.2d 136, 140 (9th Cir. 1981). 

// 

// 

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B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

 Except when waived, the United States has sovereign 

immunity from suit. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 

586 (1941); see United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 

(1983) (“It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued 

without its consent and that the existence of consent is a 

prerequisite for jurisdiction.”). The United States must 

expressly and unambiguously waive its sovereign immunity before 

it may be subject to suit. See United States v. Idaho ex rel 

Director, Idaho Dep’t of Water Resources, 508 U.S. 1, 6 (1993). 

The FTCA is the sole and exclusive statutory waiver of sovereign 

immunity of the United States for actions alleging tortious 

conduct. DSI Corp. v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 594 F.2d 

177, 180 (9th Cir. 1979). Any waiver of that immunity must be 

strictly construed in favor of the United States. See United 

States v. Nordic Vill. Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1992). If a 

claim does not fall squarely within the strict terms of a waiver 

of sovereign immunity, a district court is without subject 

matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Mundy v. United States, 983 

F.2d 950, 952 (9th Cir. 1993). 

 The FTCA provides a waiver of the United States 

government’s sovereign immunity for tort claims arising out of 

the conduct of government employees acting within the scope of 

their employment. Adams v. U.S., 420 F.3d 1049, 1051 (9th Cir. 

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2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)); Pelletier v. Federal Home 

Loan Bank of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 865, 876 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(under the FTCA, an individual who has suffered an injury 

cognizable in tort as a result of the conduct of a federal 

employee may bring suit against the United States if that 

employee was “acting within the scope of his office or 

employment.”).8 Under the FTCA, federal employees are immune 

from personal liability only when acting “‘within the scope of 

their official duties and the conduct is discretionary in 

nature.’” Adams, 420 F.3d at 1052 (emphasis in original). FTCA 

immunity issue should be decided at an early stage of the 

litigation via a motion for summary judgment, unless disputed 

issues of fact exist relevant to immunity. Arthur v. U.S. By 

and Through Veterans Admin., 45 F.3d 292, 295 (9th Cir. 1995). 

If disputed issues of fact exist, summary judgment will not be 

appropriate until the district court has held an evidentiary 

hearing and resolved the disputes by formal findings. Id. 

 

8

 The FTCA provides that the United States can be sued for 

personal injury resulting from: “[The] negligent or wrongful act 

or omission of any employee of the Government while acting 

within the scope of his office or employment, under 

circumstances where the United States, if a private person, 

would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of 

the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1346(b)(1). 

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The FTCA provides the exclusive remedy for claims arising 

against individuals deemed to be employees of the United States 

Public Health Service (“PHS”) and acting within the scope of 

their employment at the time of the incident giving rise to the 

claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq. Under the Public Health 

Services Act, entities like SCHC, that receive federal funding 

under the PHS, and certain employees, including full-time 

physicians, are deemed to be federal employees for purposes of 

certain tort actions, including medical malpractice claims. 

Metcalf v. West Suburban Hosp., 912 F. Supp. 382, 383 (N.D. Ill. 

1996). Any such claims are considered to be claims under the 

FTCA for which there is exclusive federal jurisdiction. Id.

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 233); see Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 

107 (2d Cir. 2000) (Section 233(a) of the Public Health Service 

Act makes the FTCA the exclusive remedy for specified actions 

against Public Health Service members).9

 Section 233 provides 

in relevant part: “[t]he remedy against the United States . . . 

for damage for personal injury, including death, resulting from 

 

9

 The purpose of § 233(a) is to protect commissioned 

officers or employees of the Public Health Service from being 

subject to suit while performing medical and similar functions 

by requiring that such lawsuits be brought against the United 

States instead. Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 108. Individuals deemed to 

be employees of the United States Public Health Service are 

entitled to immunity if they were acting within the scope of 

their employment at the time of the incident giving rise to the 

claim under § 233(a). See id. at 109. 

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the performance of medical, surgical, dental, or related 

functions . . . by any commissioned officer or employee of the 

Public Health Service while acting within the scope of his 

office or employment, shall be exclusive of any other civil 

action or proceeding by reason of the same subject-matter 

against the officer or employee (or his estate) whose act or 

omission gave rise to the claim. 42 U.S.C. § 233(a). Because 

the remedy provided by the FTCA against the United States is 

exclusive, the United States must be substituted in place of the 

health service parties if the conditions of certification set 

forth in the relevant statutes are met. See 42 U.S.C. § 233(c) 

(“Upon a certification by the Attorney General that the 

defendant was acting in the scope of his employment at the time 

of the incident out of which the suit arose . . . the proceeding 

[shall be] deemed a tort action brought against the United 

States.”); 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) (providing that, for federal 

tort claims, “[u]pon certification by the Attorney General that 

the defendant employee was acting within the scope of his office 

or employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim 

arose . . . the United States shall be substituted as the party 

defendant”).10 

 

10 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) provides in relevant part: “The 

remedy against the United States provided by [the Federal Tort 

Claims Act] for injury or loss of property, or personal injury 

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 The question whether a federal employee whose allegedly 

tortious conduct is the subject of a lawsuit under the FTCA was 

“acting within the scope of his office or employment” at the 

time of the injury is to be answered according to the principles 

of respondeat superior of the state in which the alleged tort 

occurred. Pelletier, 968 F.2d at 876. “Under California law, 

the determinative factor in establishing vicarious liability 

under the doctrine of respondeat superior is not whether the 

employee’s act was authorized, but whether the act was committed 

in the course of carrying out the employer’s business.” Id. 

“Vicarious liability thus may attach for unauthorized, or even 

 

or death arising or resulting from the negligent or wrongful act 

or omission of any employee of the Government while acting 

within the scope of his or her office or employment is exclusive 

of any other civil action or proceeding for money damages by 

reason of the same subject matter against the employee whose act 

or omission gave rise to the claim or against the estate of such 

employee.” If the Attorney General certifies that a United 

States employee was acting within the scope of his employment at 

the time of the event giving rise to the civil claim, the United 

States shall be substituted as the party defendant. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) & (2). If the Attorney General refuses to 

certify scope of office or employment under this section, the 

employee may at any time before trial petition the court to find 

and certify that the employee was acting within the scope of his 

office or employment. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(c)(3). The only defense 

against substitution of the United States as the defendant for 

individual defendants is if the individuals acted outside the 

scope of their employment. Meridian Int’l Logistics, Inc. v. 

United States, 939 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1991). If the 

district court determines that the employee was not acting 

within the scope of his office or employment, the action or 

proceeding shall be remanded to the State court. 28 U.S.C. § 

2679(c)(3).

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prohibited, conduct, if the risk of that conduct is one that may 

fairly be regarded as typical of or broadly incidental to the 

enterprise undertaken by the employer. Id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted). “By contrast, vicarious liability does not 

attach if the employee ‘has substantially deviated from his 

duties for personal purposes.’ ” Id. The plaintiff bears the 

burden of establishing that the employee’s action for which 

vicarious liability is sought to be imposed was committed within 

the scope of the employment. Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, 

Inc., 145 Cal.App.4th 790, 812 (2006). 

 An employer “will not be held liable for an assault or 

other intentional tort that did not have a causal nexus to the 

employee’s work.” Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial 

Hospital, 12 Cal.4th 291, 297 (1995). “The nexus required for 

respondeat superior liability-that the tort be engendered by or 

arise from the work-is to be distinguished from ‘but for’ 

causation. That the employment brought tortfeasor and victim 

together in time and place is not enough.” Id. at 298 (footnote 

omitted). The required nexus is “the same for intentional and 

negligent torts.” Id. In order for respondeat superior 

liability to attach, the incident leading to injury must be an 

“outgrowth” of the employment; the risk of tortious injury must 

be “inherent in the working environment” or “typical” of or 

“broadly incidental” to the enterprise the employer has 

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undertaken. Id. Put another way, the tort must be foreseeable 

from the employee’s duties. Id. at 299.11 That is, respondeat 

superior liability should apply only to the types of injuries 

that “as a practical matter are sure to occur in the conduct of 

the employer’s enterprise.” Id.12 Respondeat superior will not 

apply to an employee’s malicious or tortious conduct if the 

employee substantially deviates from the employment duties for 

personal purposes. Delfino, 145 Cal.App.4th at 812.13 Thus, if 

an employee’s tort is personal in nature, mere presence at the 

place of employment and attendance to occupational duties prior 

 

11 Foreseeability “merely means that in the context of the 

particular enterprise an employee’s conduct is not so unusual or 

startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss 

resulting from it among other costs of the employer’s business.” 

Lisa M., 12 Cal.4th at 299 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

12 “Respondeat superior liability does not attach simply 

because employment brought the employee and victim together at a 

certain time and place. The employee’s activities must be 

inherent in, typical of or created by the work so that it is a 

foreseeable risk of the particular employment.” Tognazzini v. 

San Luis Coastal Unified School Dist., 86 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1057 

(2001) (citation omitted). 

13 “Notwithstanding the generally broad view given to scope 

of employment determinations, the law is clear that an employer 

. . . will not be held vicariously liable for an employee’s 

malicious or tortious conduct if the employee substantially

deviates from the employment duties for personal purposes. 

Thus, if the employee inflicts an injury out of personal malice, 

not engendered by the employment, or acts out of personal malice 

unconnected with the employment, or if the misconduct is not an 

outgrowth of the employment, the employee is not acting within 

the scope of employment. Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa 

Clara, 11 Cal.4th 992, 1004-05 (1995) (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). 

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or subsequent to the offense will not give rise to a cause of 

action against the employer under the doctrine of respondeat 

superior. Id. at 813. In such cases, the losses do not 

foreseeably result from the conduct of the employer’s enterprise 

and so are not fairly attributable to the employer as a cost of 

doing business. Id.14 “Whether a tort was committed within the 

scope of employment is ordinarily a question of fact; it becomes 

a question of law, however, where the undisputed facts would not 

support an inference that the employee was acting within the 

scope of his employment.” John R. v. Oakland Unified School 

Dist., 48 Cal.3d 438, 447 (1989).15

 

14 In Lisa M., the California Supreme Court concluded that a 

hospital was not vicariously liable for an ultrasound imaging 

technician’s sexual molestation of a female patient during a 

medical examination under the doctrine of respondeat superior. 

Lisa M., 12 Cal.4th at 294. There, while the Court determined 

that the injurious event was causally related to the 

technician’s employment, in that it would not have occurred but 

for his employment which gave him the opportunity to meet and be 

alone with the plaintiff, it concluded that the sexual battery 

was not “engendered by,” an “outgrowth” of, “ ‘typical of or 

broadly incidental to,’ ” or “a general foreseeable consequence 

of” the hospital’s enterprise. Id. at 299-300. The assault was 

not motivated or triggered by anything in the employment 

activity, id. at 301, nor was it a generally foreseeable 

consequence of the technician’s authorized physical contact with 

a patient. Id. at 302-03. 

15 Here, neither Defendants nor the United States has 

pointed to factual disputes that would prevent the court from 

deciding the applicability of respondeat superior as a matter of 

law or determine whether Dr. Reinhardt is eligible for immunity 

under § 233(a). 

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 In the present case, the court concludes, as matter of law, 

that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the 

instant action because Dr. Reinhardt was not acting within the 

scope of his employment during the sexual relations giving rise 

to this suit. Dr. Reinhardt’s alleged sexual relations with 

Drusilla were not an “outgrowth” of his employment,16 nor was the 

risk of sexual relations with patients “inherent” in his working 

environment” or “typical” of or “broadly incidental” to the 

enterprise of SCHC. Dr. Reinhardt’s actions, if they occurred 

as Drusilla contends, were taken solely for personal 

gratification, were unconnected to his employment, were not 

incidental to his duties as a physician, and were a substantial 

deviation from his duties as a physician for personal purposes. 

Moreover, Dr. Reinhardt’s actions were not a generally 

foreseeable consequence of SCHC’s enterprise insofar as 

Drusilla’s alleged injuries were not, as a practical matter, 

sure to occur in the conduct of the SCHC’s enterprise such that 

her injuries are fairly attributable to SCHC as a cost of doing 

business. In other words, because the alleged sexual misconduct 

 

16 The incident leading to Drusilla’s alleged injuries was 

only an “outgrowth” of Dr. Reinhardt’s employment insofar as 

Dr. Reinhardt’s employment brought him in contact with Drusilla. 

This, without more, is insufficient for respondeat superior 

liability to attach. See Lisa M., 12 Cal.4th at 298 (holding 

that, the fact “[t]hat the employment brought tortfeasor and 

victim together in time and place is not enough.”). 

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was personal in nature (not motivated or triggered by anything 

in the employment activity), and was unusual and startling in 

the context of a medical professional’s duties, it would be 

unfair to include the loss resulting from such conduct among the 

other costs of SCHC’s business. Sexual relations with a patient 

are not a generally foreseeable consequence of a physicians 

authorized physical contact with a patient. Accordingly, 

because Dr. Reinhardt was not acting within the scope of his 

employment during the alleged sexual relations giving rise to 

this suit, government liability is not triggered under the FTCA 

pursuant to the FSHCAA, and therefore dismissal for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction is appropriate. 

To the extent that Defendants maintain that Dr. Reinhardt 

was acting within the scope of his employment based on the 

concept of “transference phenomenon”, the court disagrees. 

While cases have held that health care professionals acted 

within scope of their employment to trigger government liability 

under the FTCA on a theory of respondeat superior when a sexual 

relationship was initiated with patients during the course of 

mental health counseling, see e.g., Simmons v. U.S., 805 F.2d 

1363 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that health service counselor was 

acting within scope of his employment in providing mental health 

counseling to patient when he wrongfully engaged her in a sexual 

relationship, and thus government was liable to patient under 

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FTCA on theory of respondeat superior); Benavidez v. U.S., 177 

F.3d 927 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that allegations that 

psychologist negligently manipulated therapeutic relationship so 

as to engage in sexual contact and drug and alcohol abuse with 

teen-aged patient stated claim for professional negligence or 

malpractice for purposes of FTCA), the court finds these cases 

inapposite. Both Simmons and Benavidez are distinguishable 

because those cases, unlike here, involved the concept of 

“transference phenomenon”17 and the manipulation of the 

 

17 In Simmons, the court explained the “transference 

phenomenon” as follows: “[t]ransference is the term used by 

psychiatrists and psychologists to denote a patient's emotional 

reaction to a therapist and is ‘generally applied to the 

projection of feelings, thoughts and wishes onto the analyst, 

who has come to represent some person from the patient’s past.’ 

Transference ‘is perhaps regarded as the most significant 

concept in psychoanalytical therapy, and one of the most 

important discoveries of Freud.’” Simmons, 805 F.2d at 1364; 

see also Benavidez, 177 F.3d at 930 (“[t]he ‘transference 

phenomenon’ refers to the tendency of patients to become 

emotionally dependent upon, and trusting of, their psychologist 

or psychiatrist.” “[T]ransference ‘is one of the most 

significant concepts in psychoanalytic therapy,’ and accounts 

for the ‘strong dependency of the patient upon the therapist’ 

”). “Transference is crucial to the therapeutic process because 

the patient ‘unconsciously attributes to the psychiatrist or 

analyst those feelings which he may have repressed towards his 

own parents. . . . [I]t is through the creation, experiencing 

and resolution of these feelings that [the patient] becomes 

well.’ ” Simmons, 805 F.2d at 1365 (citations omitted). “ 

‘Inappropriate emotions, both hostile and loving, directed 

toward the physician are recognized by the psychiatrist as 

constituting . . . the transference. The psychiatrist looks for 

manifestations of the transference, and is prepared to handle it 

as it develops.’ ” Id. (citations omitted). “ ‘Understanding of 

transference forms a basic part of the psychoanalytic 

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therapeutic relationship for the purpose of instigating a sexual 

relationship.18 In this case, while it is undisputed that Dr. 

Reinhardt provided care and treatment to Drusilla for depression 

and anxiety, including the prescription of medications for these 

conditions, there is no evidence that Dr. Reinhardt engaged in 

sexual relations with Drusilla through manipulation of the 

therapeutic relationship, i.e., induced her to engage in sexual 

relations under the guise of psychiatric therapy or mental 

 

technique.’ The proper therapeutic response is 

countertransference, a reaction which avoids emotional 

involvement and assists the patient in overcoming problems.” 

Id. (citations omitted). “Although [transference] occurs in 

other professional relationships, ‘it is only in psychotherapy 

that the management of this [transference] effect is so 

critical-legally as well as therapeutically.’ No other 

professional relationship ‘offer[s] a course of treatment and 

counseling predicated upon handling the transference 

phenomenon.’ In order to manage the transference phenomenon 

properly a therapist must avoid emotional involvement with a 

patient who transfers feelings of affection to him.” Benavidez, 

177 F.3d at 930 (citations omitted).

18 In Benavidez, the gravamen of the complaint was that 

under the guise of providing counseling, a therapist violated 

professionally acceptable procedures and induced an emotionally 

depressed and suicidal teenager, already prone to alcohol and 

drug abuse, to indulge in the use of such substances and to 

engage in sexual conduct. Benavidez, 177 F.3d at 932. There, 

the court held that the allegations in the Complaint were 

sufficient to support a claim for professional negligence or 

malpractice because such allegations fall outside the 

intentional tort exception to the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign 

immunity. Id. Similarly, Simmons involved a therapist who 

induced a vulnerable patient to engage in a sexual relationship 

under the guise of providing mental health counseling by 

encouraging the patient to act on her professed feelings of 

attraction to him. See Simmons v. U.S., 805 F.2d 1363.

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health counseling. Defendants do not cite any authority 

supporting the proposition that sexual relations between a 

physician and patient arising out the treatment and prescription 

of medication for anxiety and depression is akin to therapistpatient sexual relations cases involving the “transference 

phenomenon.”19 As such, Simmons and Benavidez do not compel a 

finding that Dr. Reinhardt was acting within the scope of his 

employment during the alleged sexual relations giving rise to 

this suit. 

 For these reasons, the court concludes that neither 

Dr. Reinhardt nor SCHC (under a respondeat liability theory) is 

entitled to immunity under the FTCA pursuant to the FSHCAA 

because Dr. Reinhardt was not acting within the scope of his 

 

19 Indeed, both Simmons and Benavidez noted that a 

distinction exists between a therapist engaging in sexual 

contact with his emotionally distraught patient under the guise 

of therapy, and sexual relations between physicians and patients 

in general. See Simmons, 805 F.2d at 1365-66 (observing that 

while courts have “uniformly regarded mishandling of 

transference as malpractice or gross negligence,” they “do not 

routinely impose liability upon physicians in general for sexual 

contact with patients.”); Benavidez, 177 F.3d at 931 n.6 

(“courts do not routinely impose liability upon physicians in 

general for sexual contact with patients.”). In Simmons, the 

court explained that “[t]he crucial factor in the therapistpatient relationship which leads to the imposition of legal 

liability for conduct which arguably is no more exploitative of 

a patient than sexual involvement of a lawyer with a client, a 

priest or minister with a parishioner, or a gynecologist with a 

patient is that lawyers, ministers and gynecologists do not 

offer a course of treatment and counseling predicated upon 

handling the transference phenomenon.” Simmons, 805 F.2d at 

1366. 

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employment during the alleged sexual relations giving rise to 

this suit. Accordingly, the United States is not a proper party 

to this action under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and 

therefore dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is 

appropriate. 

C. Supplemental Jurisdiction 

Where the district court dismisses all federal claims for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the merits, it has no 

discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction to adjudicate the 

remaining state law claims. Herman Family Revocable Trust v. 

Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 2001). Upon dismissal 

of the United States for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 

there remains no underlying original federal subject matter 

jurisdiction. As such, there can be no jurisdiction over the 

remaining state law claims and therefore those claims are 

dismissed without prejudice. See Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d at 805 

(“If the federal claim is dismissed for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction, a district court has no discretion to retain the 

supplemental claims for adjudication. The dismissal means that 

there never was a valid claim within the court’s original 

jurisdiction to which the state claims may be supplemental. 

Therefore, the district court has no discretion to exceed the 

scope of its Article III power, and must dismiss the state law 

claims without prejudice.”). 

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III. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons stated above, the court GRANTS the motion. 

Because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this 

action, Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims are dismissed 

without prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

ENTERED this 26th day of February, 2008. 

s/RALPH R. BEISTLINE 

 United States District Judge 

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