Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03393/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03393-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Steven Patrick Jernigan, 

 Petitioner, 

 -vsJohnny Tucker, et al., 

 Respondents.

CV 05–3393–PHX–NVW (CRP) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 

 Pending before the Court is Petitioner's pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ("Petition"). (Docket 1). Respondent filed an Answer 

("Answer") to the Petition on March 29, 2006, with exhibits A through M attached. 

 Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to 

Magistrate Judge Pyle for a Report and Recommendation. The Magistrate Judge 

recommends that the District Court, after its independent review of the record, enter an 

order denying the Petition. (Docket 1). 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 On May 23, 2003, Petitioner Steven Jernigan ("Jernigan") was indicted in 

Maricopa County for one count of knowingly possessing equipment or chemicals for the 

manufacture of methamphetamine, a dangerous drug (Count 1, a class 3 felony), and one 

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count of knowingly possessing methamphetamine, a dangerous drug (Count 2, a class 4 

felony). (Respondent's Exhibit A). The state alleged that Jernigan had three prior felony 

convictions for sentence enhancement purposes pursuant to A.R.S. §13-604. (Exhibit B.) 

 On September 3, 2003, Jernigan, his counsel, and the State entered into a plea 

agreement wherein Jernigan agreed to plead guilty to Count 1. In exchange, the State 

dismissed Count 2. (Respondent's Exhibit C, at 1-2.) The plea agreement set forth the 

statutory range of 4.5 to 13 years of imprisonment, a presumptive sentence of 6.5 years, 

and a provision that Jernigan's term is "not to exceed 8.5" years. (Id.) Jernigan admitted 

one prior felony conviction and avowed no more than six prior felony convictions; the 

State agreed not to allege any other prior felony convictions. (Id.) 

 On October 8, 2003, the trial court entered judgment of conviction and imposed an 

aggravated term of 8.5 years of imprisonment. The trial judge cited "defendant's six prior 

felony convictions, considering that a good number of these are crimes of victims, it's 

apparent that the defendant is a hopeless drug addict with little or no prospect of 

rehabilitation. So long as he remains in the community, he's a threat to the community. 

These are aggravating factors." (Petitioner's Exhibit 4, at 7-8). 

 On November 7, 2003, Jernigan filed a notice of post-conviction relief. 

(Respondent's Exhibit D.) On April 2, 2004, Jernigan's appointed counsel filed a notice 

that she had reviewed the record, could find no colorable claims to raise, and requested 

that Jernigan be afforded the opportunity to file a pro-se petition for post-conviction 

relief. (Respondent's Exhibit E.) Jernigan did so on April 22, 2004; none of the claims in 

the petition are raised in the pending petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Respondent's 

Exhibit F.) On July 22, 2004, the trial court rejected all claims except for one: the court 

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reduced the fine from $1800 to $1000, to comply with the amount agreed to in the plea 

agreement. (Respondent's Exhibit G) 

 On July 19, 2004, Jernigan's counsel filed a pleading entitled: "Notice that Pro Per 

Rule 32 Defendant Received a Sentence Above the Presumptive, Possibly in Violation of 

Blakely v. Washington1

." (Respondent's Exhibit H). On November 29, 2004 the trial 

court rejected the Blakely claim on the grounds that Defendant's sentence "was 

aggravated based upon Defendant's multiple prior felony convictions, an aggravating 

factor excluded by Blakely." (Respondent's Exhibit J, at 1.) On or about December 17, 

2004, Jernigan submitted a petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals, raising 

only the Blakely claim. (Respondent's Exhibit K.) On September 1, 2005, the court of 

appeals denied review without comment. (Respondent's Exhibit M.) 

 On October 25, 2005, Jernigan filed the pending petition for writ of habeas corpus, 

claiming that his aggravated term of imprisonment over the presumptive violated his 

Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in violation of Blakely. 

DISCUSSION 

Standard of Review 

 The writ of habeas corpus is available to "a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §2254(a). The District 

Courts' standard of review is described as follows: 

 An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody 

 pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any 

________________________ 

1 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004). 

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 claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the 

 adjudication of the claim-- 

 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

 application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

 Court of the United States; or 

 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

 facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

 28 U.S.C. §2254(d). 

Timeliness 

 A one year period of limitation shall apply to an application for writ of habeas 

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1). The running of this one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions for 

state convictions is tolled during any period when "a properly filed application for state 

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim 

is pending" in any state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Thus the statute of 

limitations is tolled during the pendency of a state court action for post-conviction relief. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Exhaustion 

 An application for writ of habeas corpus shall not be granted unless the applicant 

has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, there is an absence of 

available State corrective process, or circumstances exist that render such process 

ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). This 

requirement of exhaustion is designed to give the State an initial opportunity to pass upon 

and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 

270, 275 (1971). 

 Generally, a prisoner may satisfy the exhaustion requirement by one of two 

methods. First, a petitioner may actually exhaust his claims by providing the state court 

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with an opportunity to review the facts and legal theories in a procedurally appropriate 

manner. In order to actually exhaust his claims, a petitioner must fairly present the 

federal claims to the state courts; this means that a petitioner must present the state courts 

with the same claim he urges upon the federal courts. Id. at 275-76. A state court must 

be alerted to the fact that a petitioner is asserting a claim under the United States 

Constitution. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995). It is not enough to present 

the state court with only the facts necessary to state a claim of relief, nor to make a 

general appeal to a constitutional guarantee as broad as due process. Gray v. Netherland, 

518 U.S. 152, 163 (1996). Mere similarity between claims of state and federal error is 

also insufficient to establish exhaustion. Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 

2000)(citing Hivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999)). A petitioner must 

make the federal basis of a claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of 

federal courts, even if the federal basis is "self-evident," or the underlying claim would be 

decided under state law on the same considerations that would control resolution of the 

claim on federal grounds. Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000), as 

modified by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001)(quoting Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 

(9th Cir. 1999)). 

 A second form of exhaustion, "technical exhaustion," can be demonstrated by 

showing either that a state court found a claim defaulted on procedural ground, or, if the 

claim was never presented in any forum, that no state remedies remain available to the 

petitioner. The exhaustion requirement refers only to remedies still available at the time 

of the federal petition. This means no state remedies are available, as when a petitioner 

has failed to present his claims in state court and can no longer raise them through any 

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state procedure. Gray, 518 U.S. at 161-62; O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 

(1999). The procedural bar which gives rise to exhaustion provides an independent and 

adequate state-law ground for the conviction and sentence. It thus prevents federal 

habeas corpus review of the claim, unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause and 

prejudice for failing to raise the claims in earlier proceedings. Gray, 518 U.S. at 162. 

 If a claim has never been presented to the state court, a federal habeas corpus court 

may determine whether state remedies remain available. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 

255, 269-70 (1989); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989). 

 Rule 32.1 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a defendant to seek 

post-conviction relief on the ground that his conviction was in violation of the 

Constitution of the United States. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a). Arizona Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 32, however, governs when a petitioner may seek relief in post-conviction 

proceedings and raise federal constitutional challenges to their convictions or sentences 

in state court. Under Rule 32.2, relief is barred on any claim which could have been 

raised in a prior Rule 32 petition for post-conviction relief, with the exception of certain 

claims which fall under sub-sections (d) through (h) of Rule 32.1, and which were 

justifiably omitted from a prior petition.2

________________________ 

2

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence imposed has expired; 

 e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such facts probably would have changed the verdict or 

sentence. Newly discovered material facts exist if: 

 (1) The newly discovered material facts were discovered after the trial. 

 (2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing the newly discovered material facts. 

 (3) The newly discovered material facts are not merely cumulative or used solely for impeachment, unless the 

impeachment evidence substantially undermines testimony which was of critical significance at trial such that the 

evidence probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. 

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction relief of-right or notice of appeal within the prescribed 

time was without fault on the defendant's part; or 

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if determined to apply to defendant's case would probably 

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 Furthermore, Rule 32.4(a) requires that a petition for post-conviction relief must 

be filed within 90 days of the entry of judgment and sentence, or 30 days after the 

issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is later. See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.4(a). Again, the exceptions to this requirement are claims asserted under 

sub-sections (d) through (h) of Rule 32.1. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a). 

 So a procedural default for purposes of federal habeas review occurs when a state 

court invokes the procedural bars of Rule 32.2 and 32.4, Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure. These bars reject a petitioner's attempt to revive an unexhausted federal claim 

in state court. The rejection establishes an adequate and independent state ground barring 

the petitioner from raising these claims in state proceedings, thus creating the procedural 

default for federal habeas review. 

ANALYSIS 

1) Timeliness 

 A review of the petition suggests it was timely filed. Respondents concede the 

petition is timely. This Court recommends that the District Court find the petition is 

timely filed. 

2) Exhaustion 

 This Court must consider whether Petitioner raised the claim as a federal claim 

before the trial court and the court of appeals. Respondents do not claim that other state 

options remain open. A review of the petition suggests that Jernigan's state options have 

________________________ 

( ... continued) 

overturn the defendant's conviction or sentence; or 

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be 

sufficient to establish that no reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant guilty of the underlying offense 

beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the court would not have imposed the death penalty. 

17 A.R.S. Rules Crim.Proc., Rule 32.1 (2000).

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been exhausted. In this case, Petitioner raised the Blakely issue less than thirty days after 

the Supreme Court filed it Opinion, and he pursued that claim to an appellate 

determination in state court. This Court recommends that the District Court find that 

Jernigan has filed the pending petition after he exhausted the remedies available in the 

courts of the State 

3) Blakely-Violation in Considering Disallowed Factors 

 Next, this Court must consider whether the sentencing judge took into account 

Blakely-disallowed factors to arrive at an aggravated sentence. That is, did the judge, 

under the standard of review of §2254 cases, apply Blakely in an unreasonable manner or 

in a manner that was contrary to clearly established federal law? 

 In Blakely v. Washington, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed its earlier ruling that 

"[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 

beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 

beyond a reasonable doubt." 542 U.S. 296 (2004). The Arizona Supreme Court has 

applied Blakely to Arizona's sentencing scheme. It has "held that the 'statutory maximum' 

for purposes of Apprendi and Blakely is the presumptive sentence established for the 

defendant's crime." State v. Brown, 129 P.3d 947, 951 (Ariz. 2006). Furthermore, the 

Arizona Supreme Court has held: 

 Under A.R.S. §13-702, the existence of a single aggravating factor exposes a 

 defendant to an aggravated sentence. Therefore, once a jury finds or a defendant 

 admits a single aggravating factor, the Sixth Amendment permits the sentencing 

 judge to find and consider additional factors relevant to the imposition of a 

 sentence up to the maximum prescribed in that statute. 

State v. Martinez, 115 P.3d 618, 625 (Ariz. 2005). Hence, in Arizona, if a judge 

increases a sentence above the presumptive, she needs only to find and use one BlakelyCase 2:05-cv-03393-NVW Document 13 Filed 12/11/06 Page 8 of 11
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allowed factor, like a prior conviction admitted to by a defendant. 

 First, in Jernigan's case, the presumptive was 6.5 years and the maximum under 

the plea agreement was 8.5 years. The sentencing judge clearly increased Jernigan's 

sentence past the statutory maximum, arriving at an aggravated sentence and triggering 

Blakely concerns. State v. Brown, 129 P.3d at 951. 

 Second, in his Rule 32 order, the trial judge rejected Jernigan's Blakely claim, 

writing: 

 Any fact that increases a penalty beyond the statutory maximum must be 

 submitted to a jury "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction." Blakely v. 

 Washington . . . Defendant's sentence was aggravated based upon Defendant's 

 multiple prior felony convictions, an aggravating factor excluded by Blakely. 

 (Respondent's Exhibit J, at 1) 

Here the trial judge only considered prior convictions as past aggravating factors. So this 

order does not suggest the judge acted in an unreasonable manner or a manner that was 

contrary to clearly established federal law. 

 Third, Jernigan and his Rule 32 counsel point to the transcript of the sentencing 

and the trial judge's comments as a possible Blakely violation. In that transcript, the State 

informs the judge about Jernigan's numerous past felonies, their drug-related nature, and 

Jernigan's continued involvement in the drug-subculture. The trial judge states: 

 [F]rom the Defendant's six prior felony convictions, considering that a good 

 number of these are crimes of victims, it's apparent that the defendant is a 

 hopeless drug addict with little or no prospect of rehabilitation. So long as he 

 remains in the community, he's a threat to the community. These are aggravating 

 factors... 

 (Petitioner's Exhibit 4, at 1) 

The trial judge has clearly named at least one prior conviction as an aggravating factor. 

Jernigan has admitted at least one prior conviction in his plea agreement, and has avowed 

that he has no more than six prior felony convictions. (Respondent's Exhibit C, at 1-2). 

Hence under Martinez above, when Jernigan admitted the single aggravating factor, he 

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exposed himself to an aggravated sentence. No sentence or clause in the sentencing 

transcript points to anything other than his prior convictions and their drug-related nature. 

Once one conviction has been established, the judge is free to impose the maximum 

sentence of 8.5 years within the plea agreement. 

 The sentencing transcript does not suggest the judge acted in an unreasonable 

manner or a manner that was contrary to clearly established federal law. The most 

significant and relevant consideration raised by the prior felony convictions is the 

likelihood a defendant will re-offend when he is released. The court's comments, while 

perhaps harsh, merely reflect a common sense conclusion from defendant's extensive 

criminal history that he is likely to re-offend. Considerations of evidence beyond the fact 

of the prior convictions were not utilized or required. Even under Blakely, these 

convictions need not be presented to a jury before the court can rely on them in 

sentencing. Since the sentencing judge considered only Blakely-exempt factors to arrive 

at an aggravated sentence, there was no Blakely violation and Jernigan's petition must 

fail. 

4) Retroactivity 

 Finally, this Court must consider whether this case presents an issue of the 

retroactive application of Blakely. Despite the State's contention that Blakely does not 

apply retroactively, Jernigan is not asking this court for a retroactive application of 

Blakely, nor arguing that the state court failed to apply Blakely. As the state court did 

address the Blakely issue, there is no issue here about whether or not Jernigan should get 

the benefit of Blakely retroactively. The only issue is whether or not the law was applied 

correctly. As stated above, the trial judge did apply Blakely correctly so Jernigan's 

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petition fails on its merits. 

RECOMMENDATION 

 This Court recommends that the District Court, after its independent review of the 

record, dismiss this action with prejudice. 

 Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written 

objections within 10 days of being served with a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If 

objections are filed, the parties should use the following number: CV 05-3393-PHXNVW. 

 The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation to the attorneys for the Plaintiff and for the Defendant. 

 Dated this 11th day of December, 2006. 

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