Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01314/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01314-120/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 29:206 Collect Unpaid Wages

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE TACO BELL WAGE AND HOUR 

ACTIONS

Case No. 1:07-cv-01314-SAB

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS‟ 

RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS 

A MATTER OF LAW, PLAINTIFFS‟ 

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER 

OF LAW OR MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL, 

AND GRANTING PLAINTIFFS‟ MOTION 

TO AMEND THE JUDGMENT

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF 

THE UNDERPAID MEAL PREMIUM 

CLASS AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS ON 

THE UCL CLAIM; AND JUDGMENT IS 

ENTERED IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS 

AND AGAINST THE LATE MEAL PERIOD

CLASS AND REST PERIOD CLASS ON 

THE UCL CLAIMS

(ECF Nos. 747, 748, 749, 755, 757, 758, 759, 

766, 767, 768)

Before the Court is Plaintiffs‟ motion for judgment as a matter of law or motion for a new 

trial and motion to amend the judgment and Defendants Taco Bell Corp. and Taco Bell of 

America, Inc.‟s motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure 50(b). Oral argument on the motions was heard on June 15, 2016. Matthew 

Theriault, Monica Balderrama, Andrew Sokolowski, and Stuart Chandler were present and 

Jerusalem Beligan appeared telephonically for the Class; and Tracey Kennedy, Nora Stiles, 

Case 1:07-cv-01314-SAB Document 778 Filed 07/15/16 Page 1 of 31
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Morgan Forsey, and John Makarewich appeared for Defendants. Having considered the moving, 

opposition and reply papers, the declarations and exhibits attached thereto, arguments presented 

at the June 15, 2016 hearing, as well as the Court‟s file and the evidence presented during the 

trial of this matter, the Court issues the following order.

I.

BACKGROUND

A. Trial

A jury trial was held in this action beginning on February 22, 2016, on the claims of three 

classes which had been certified in this action: the Late Meal Period Class, the Underpaid Meal 

Period Class, and the Rest Period Class. The parties agreed to have the Court decide Plaintiffs‟ 

claims under California‟s Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”). On March 9, 2016, the jury 

returned a verdict. At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence, Defendants moved for 

judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The jury found that the Late Meal Period Class had proved that Defendants had a 

standardized or uniform policy that did not provide meal periods that began before the end of the 

fifth hour an employee worked for the relevant time period. But the Class did not prove that 

during the relevant time period class members were non-exempt employees who worked for a 

corporate Taco Bell Corporate restaurant and worked shifts longer than six hours without being 

provided a meal period that began before the end of the fifth hour of work. 

Similarly, the jury found that the Rest Period Class had proved that Defendants had a 

standardized or uniform company-wide policy that did not authorize and permit a second ten 

minute or a net twenty minute rest period when an employee worked more than six hours and 

less than seven hours. But the Class did not prove that during the relevant time period class 

members were non-exempt employees who worked for a corporate Taco Bell Corporate 

restaurant and worked shifts longer than six hours but less than seven hours without being 

authorized and permitted to take a second ten minute or net twenty minute rest period. 

The jury found that the Underpaid Meal Premium Class had proved that from September 

7, 2003 through November 12, 2007, Defendant had a standardized or uniform company-wide 

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policy that underpaid meal premiums for missed or short meal periods and that during this time 

period the class members were non-exempt employees who worked for a Taco Bell Corporate 

restaurant and missed or received short meal periods and were paid a meal premium payment of 

less than one full hour of compensation. The jury awarded damages in the amount of 

$495,913.66 to the Underpaid Meal Premium Class. 

On March 11, 2016, the Court heard oral argument on Defendants‟ Rule 50(a) motion. 

On March 14, 2016, an order was filed denying Defendants‟ Rule 50(a) motion. On March 16 

and 17, 2016, a bench trial was conducted on Plaintiffs‟ PAGA claim. Plaintiffs‟ claim for

PAGA penalties was denied on April 8, 2016, and judgment was entered. 

On May 6, 2016, Defendants filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law 

pursuant to Rule 50(b). On May 9, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a motion for judgment as a matter of 

law or a motion for a new trial, a motion to amend the judgment, a motion for deferral of ruling 

on their motion for attorney fees, and a motion for attorney fees.1 On May 13, 2016, Plaintiffs 

filed a revised declaration in support of the motion for attorney fees. On May 25, 2016, 

Plaintiffs filed a notice of supplemental authority relating to Plaintiffs‟ motion for judgment as a 

matter of law and motion for new trial. On June 1, 2016, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to 

Defendants‟ motion for judgment as a matter of law; and Defendants filed an opposition to 

Plaintiffs‟ motion to amend the judgment, and an opposition to Plaintiffs‟ motion for judgment 

as a matter of law. On June 8, 2016, Defendants filed a reply in support of their motion for 

judgment as a matter of law, and Plaintiffs filed a reply to the opposition to the motion to amend 

judgment and motion for judgment as a matter of law and new trial. 

B. Factual History

This is a consolidated action comprised of six underlying lawsuits. The first action was 

filed on September 7, 2007. After other putative class actions were filed against Taco Bell, the 

cases were consolidated on June 9, 2009, and thereafter. This action proceeded to trial on the 

Third Amended Consolidated Complaint (the “TACC”) and Taco Bell‟s Answer to the TACC. 

Plaintiffs asserted employment-related individual and class action claims against their 

 

1

Plaintiffs‟ motion regarding attorney fees shall be addressed by separate order. 

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former employer Defendant Taco Bell. Prior to trial all the individual claims were settled. This 

action proceeded to trial on the three classes which were certified and defined as follows at the 

time of trial:

• All persons who work or worked as a non-exempt, hourly-paid employee at a 

corporate-owned Taco Bell restaurant in California from September 7, 2003, until 

July 1, 2013, who worked for a period of time in excess of six hours and who 

worked for periods longer than five hours without a meal period of not less than 

thirty minutes as reflected in Defendants‟ employees‟ time records. 

• All persons who work or worked as a non-exempt, hourly-paid employee at a 

corporate-owned Taco Bell restaurant in California from September 7, 2003, until 

December 24, 2014, who worked for a period of time in excess of six hours and 

less than seven hours without at least two rest periods of not less than ten minutes, 

as reflected in Defendants‟ employees‟ time records.

• All persons who work or worked as a non-exempt, hourly-paid employee at a 

corporate-owned Taco Bell restaurant in California who, between September 7, 

2003 until November 12, 2007, received at least one 30-minute automatic 

adjustment on Taco Bell‟s Time and Attendance System as reflected in 

Defendants‟ employees‟ time records. 

Plaintiff Hardiman also sought penalties under PAGA for the certified claims stated

above.

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs judgment as a matter of law. 

Rule 50(a) provides that “[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the 

court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for 

the party on that issue, the court may: (A) resolve the issue against the party; and (B) grant a 

motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party on a claim or defense that, under the 

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controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). The motion must be made before the action is submitted to the jury and 

“must specify the judgment sought and the law and facts that entitle the movant to the 

judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2).

Rule 50(b) provides that a party may bring a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of 

law after trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). A Rule 50(b) motion is not a freestanding motion, but is a 

renewed motion under Rule 50(a). E.E.O.C. v. Go Daddy Software, Inc., 581 F.3d 951, 961 (9th 

Cir. 2009). Since a Rule 50(b) motion is a renewed motion, it is limited to the grounds asserted 

in the pre-deliberation Rule 50(a) motion. Id. “A party cannot raise arguments in its post-trial 

motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) that it did not raise in its pre-verdict 

Rule 50(a) motion.” Freund v. Nycomed Amersham, 347 F.3d 752, 761 (9th Cir. 2003). 

In considering a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court cannot make 

credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Go Daddy Software, Inc., 581 F.3d at 961. 

The court “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . and 

draw all reasonable inferences in that party‟s favor.” Id. at 961 (quoting Josephs v. Pac. Bell, 

443 F.3d 1050, 1062 (9th Cir.2006)). “The test applied is whether the evidence permits only one 

reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to the jury‟s verdict.” Go Daddy 

Software, Inc., 581 F.3d at 961 (quoting Josephs, 443 F.3d at 1062).

A renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law is properly granted “if the evidence, 

construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, permits only one reasonable 

conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to the jury‟s verdict.” Escriba v. Foster Poultry 

Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236, 1242 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Pavao v. Pagay, 307 F.3d 915, 918 

(9th Cir.2002)). The jury‟s verdict must be upheld if there is substantial evidence that is 

adequate to support the findings of the jury, even where contrary findings are also possible. 

Escriba, 743 F.3d at 1242.

B. Motion for New Trial

Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the court may grant a 

motion for a new trial on some or all issues “after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new 

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trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

59(a)(1)(A). Historically, the grounds that have been recognized to grant a new trial include, but 

are not limited to, claims “that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, that the damages 

are excessive, or that, for other reasons, the trial was not fair to the party moving.” Molski v. 

M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Montgomery Ward & Co. v. 

Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251 (1940)). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[t]he trial court may grant 

a new trial only if the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, is based upon false 

or perjurious evidence, or to prevent a miscarriage of justice.” Molski, 481 F.3d at 729 (quoting 

Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., 212 F.3d 493, 510 n. 15 (9th Cir.2000)). 

Therefore, in considering the Rule 59 motion brought by the party against whom a verdict has 

been returned, the district court must weigh the evidence as the court saw it, “and set aside the 

verdict of the jury, even though supported by substantial evidence, where, in [the court‟s] 

conscientious opinion, the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence.” Molski, 481 

F.3d at 729.

C. Motion to Amend Judgment 

Pursuant to Rule 59(e) a party may move to alter or amend the judgment within 28 days 

after entry of the judgment. The specific grounds for amendment of judgment are not set forth in 

Rule 59(e) and the district court has considerable discretion in granting or denying the motion. 

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011). “[A] Rule 59(e) motion is an 

„extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of 

judicial resources.‟ ” Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 21, 

(2014) (quoting Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)). “In 

general, there are four basic grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) motion may be granted: (1) if such 

motion is necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment rests; (2) if 

such motion is necessary to present newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; (3) if 

such motion is necessary to prevent manifest injustice; or (4) if the amendment is justified by an 

intervening change in controlling law.” Allstate Ins. Co., 634 F.3d at 1111.

/ / /

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III.

ANALYSIS

A. Defendants’ Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs failed to present any evidence that would allow the 

jury to perform the legally required damages calculation for the Underpaid Meal Premium Class;

and therefore, Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Defendants argue that to 

prove damages for a violation of Labor Code section 226.7(c), Plaintiffs were required to 

establish: 1) the identities of the affected Class Members; 2) the Class Members‟ regular rate of 

pay at the time of the meal period violations; and 3) that under payment occurred. Defendants 

argue that this evidence was not presented at trial. Plaintiffs argue that there is substantial 

evidence to support the jury‟s verdict.

Defendants argue that the only documents introduced at trial are the payroll verification 

reports (“PVRs”) and Plaintiffs did not secure expert analysis of these documents because it 

would be too expensive. Defendants contend that since Plaintiffs did not introduce any analysis 

of these records, the jury was left to analyze these 9 million pages of documents that were not 

organized by date, employee name, employee number and were not electronically searchable. 

Further, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs did not introduce any pay records for the Underpaid 

Meal Premium Class or any other records indicating an actual payment of a meal premium to 

members of the Underpaid Meal Premium Class. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs did not 

produce any evidence of the class members‟ regular rate of compensation making it impossible 

for the jury to determine damages. Finally, Defendants argue that the jury improperly relied on 

argument of counsel in determining the number of violations.

Pursuant to California law, if an employer fails to provide meal periods or rest periods in 

compliance with California law, “the employer shall pay the employee one additional hour of 

pay at the employee‟s regular rate of compensation for each workday that the meal or rest or 

recovery period is not provided.” Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7(c). Courts have long held that “the 

necessity for an individual determination of damages does not weigh against class certification. 

The community of interest requirement recognizes that „ultimately each class member will be 

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required in some manner to establish his individual damages.” Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 115

Cal.App.4th 715, 742 (2004), as modified on denial of reh‟g (Mar. 9, 2004) (collecting cases). 

Defendants‟ argument here is that the individual members of the class did not establish their 

damages because Plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence to identify the class members who 

received auto pay, and additionally, there was no evidence by which the jury could determine the 

employee‟s regular rate of compensation. 

In deciding a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court must affirm the judgment 

if there is substantial evidence to support the verdict. Landes Const. Co. v. Royal Bank of 

Canada, 833 F.2d 1365, 1371 (9th Cir. 1987). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as 

reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion even if it is possible to draw 

two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence.” Landes Const. Co., 833 F.2d at 1371.

Defendants argued at the June 15, 2016 hearing that there was no evidence presented to 

connect any class member with an autopay and the hourly rate for the violation. Defendants 

contend that the jury was required to be presented with the individual class member‟s rate of pay 

at the time of the violation to comply with the statutory scheme for damages. Defendants argue 

that the damage amount returned by the jury was speculation. Plaintiffs responded that the raw 

punch records and PVRs contain all the information the jury needed to calculate damages in this 

action. Plaintiffs argue that the experts‟ testimony regarding the punch data was sufficient for 

the jury to identify the rate of pay in the punch data. For example, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. 

Walker testified that his review of the punch data showed a very small percentage of records that 

did not include the rate of pay.2 

As Defendants concede, the PVRs were admitted into evidence and show which

individual class members were entitled to the half-hour of premium pay during the relevant time 

period. While Defendants argue in their reply brief that the PVR does not demonstrate that the 

employee actually received autopay or was legally entitled to it, the jury could reasonably find 

that where the payroll system identified an employee who had a short or missed meal period, the 

 

2 The Court notes that this appears to be contrary to Plaintiffs‟ argument during trial that they were entitled to a 

“reasonable and just inference” instruction because the raw punch data did not include accurate records of the 

employees‟ rate of pay.

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employee was entitled to the payment and that if the missed or short meal period was 

documented on the PVR autopay issued for the employee. 

At trial, Plaintiffs proffered expert testimony by Mr. O‟Brien. Mr. O‟Brien testified that 

he analyzed the raw punch data to determine the number of meal periods that did not begin 

before the end of the fifth hour of work when an employee worked more than six hours, shifts 

where the employee worked more than six hours but less than seven without having at least two 

rest periods before the beginning of the seventh hour, and shifts where there was a partial 

payment due to the fact that the shifts were not qualifying shifts for the purpose of meal breaks. 

(Trial Testimony of Michael Dennis O‟Brien 31:3-17, ECF No. 710.) 

Mr. O‟Brien testified that the number of employees who were affected by alleged meal 

period violations in this action is 28,691. (ECF No. 710 at 31:6-12; 52:5-15; 124:21-19.) The 

time period for these violations was September 2003 through July 1, 2013. (ECF No. 710 at 

31:17-22; 53:1-11.) This number represents the number of employees that worked shifts in 

excess of six hours and did not have a thirty minute lunch that commenced prior to the start of 

the fifth hour of work. (ECF No. 710 at 31:23-32:3; 35:1-21; 52:5-15.) Mr. O‟Brien also 

counted meal breaks that were shorter than 30 minutes. (Id. at 39:16-25.) For this time period 

there were 1,761,329 shifts in which a thirty minute meal period was not recorded prior to the 

end of the fifth hour of work. (Id. at 62:12-17.) 

Mr. O‟Brien testified that he also counted the number of times that a full meal period was 

not recorded that started before the end of the fifth hour of work from September 7, 2003 through 

November 12, 2007. (ECF No. 68:15-19.) There were approximately 795,550 incidents. (ECF 

No. 710 at 68:15-69:19.) The raw punch data did not indicate whether any employee received 

autopay. (ECF No. 710 at 117:19-25.)

Defendants‟ expert, Dr. Walker, also testified at trial. Dr. Walker testified that he 

identified 2,511,475 shifts or 38 percent of all shifts at least six hours long that did not have a 

meal period that commenced before the end of the fifth hour of work. (ECF No. 711 at 30:21-

14.) This number includes shifts that had a timely paid meal period. (ECF No. 711 at 32:21-5.) 

There were 888,694 shifts that were worked by managers and would have to be deducted from 

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the total. (ECF No. 711 at 35:12-21.) Dr. Walker found 377,355 shifts that had paid meal 

breaks. (ECF No. 40:14-41:3.) Between the years of 2003 and 2007, Dr. Walker found 134,819 

missing meal breaks in the raw punch data. (ECF No. 45:1-46:17.) This included meal breaks of 

less than 30 minutes. (ECF No. 47:13-20.) 

The jury returned a verdict finding in favor of the Underpaid Meal Premium Class. (ECF 

No. 696 at 3.) The jury found that from September 7, 2003 through November 12, 2007, 

134,419 class members were underpaid for a missed or short meal period. (Id.) The Court finds 

that substantial evidence in the record supports the jury‟s finding as to the number of violations. 

While Defendants argue that the jury improperly relied on opposing counsel‟s closing argument, 

there was evidence introduced during the trial that corrections were made to the raw punch data 

before payroll was issued. Therefore, the number of violations reflected in the raw punch data 

would be higher than the actual number of autopay that was generated. The jury could have 

reasonably found that Dr. Walker‟s estimate of the number of violations was high and made a 

deduction to account for corrections made during the process of generating payroll. 

Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs presented no evidence by which the jury could 

determine the individual employees or the hourly rates for the specific employees that received 

autopay. The jury is not required to know the identity of the individual class members, but just 

to be able to determine the number of violations and the amount of damages to the class.

In California, “the law tolerates more uncertainty with respect to damages than to the 

existence of liability.” Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat. Assn., 59 Cal.4th 1, 40 (2014). “Uncertainty of 

the fact whether any damages were sustained is fatal to recovery, but uncertainty as to the 

amount is not.” Duran, 59 Cal.4th at 40 (quoting Bruckman v. Parliament Escrow Corp., 190 

Cal.App.3d 1051, 1061 (1987)). Here, the raw punch data included the hourly rates of 

employees. Further, the jury was presented with evidence of the minimum hourly wage during 

the relevant time period. 

The Court finds that there is sufficient evidence to support the jury‟s verdict. LakesideScott v. Multnomah Cty., 556 F.3d 797, 803 (9th Cir. 2009) (judgment as a matter of law is 

appropriate when the jury could have only relied on speculation to reach its verdict). 

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Defendants‟ renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law is denied. 

B Plaintiffs’ Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

Plaintiffs request judgment as a matter of law on behalf of the Late Meal Period and Rest 

Period Classes. Plaintiffs argue that under California law they are entitled to judgment as the 

jury found that Defendants had a policy that did not provide timely meal and rest periods; and 

therefore, the verdict is inconsistent. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs‟ motion is untimely and is 

seeking reconsideration of prior orders of the Court. 

1. Plaintiff‟s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law is Timely

Initially, the Court shall address Defendants‟ argument that Plaintiffs‟ motions are

untimely. As relevant here, a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law must be filed no 

later than 28 days after the entry of judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). The judgment here was 

signed on April 8, 2016, and was entered on the docket on April 11, 2016. (ECF No. 744.) 

Without citing any legal authority addressing the issue, Defendants are arguing that the 28 days 

began to run on the date the judgment was signed and the current motions are therefore untimely. 

A judgment or order is entered “when it is entered in compliance with Rules 58 and 79(a) 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Ingram v. ACandS, Inc., 977 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir. 

1992) (quoting Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)). “Rule 58 requires that every judgment be set forth on a 

separate document, and Rule 79(a) details the civil docketing procedure to be followed by the 

district court clerk when entering the judgment.” Beaudry Motor Co. v. Abko Properties, Inc., 

780 F.2d 751, 754 (9th Cir. 1986). The date of judgment is the date on which the Clerk of the 

Court entered the judgment in the docket. Cedar Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Fid. Gas Co., 238 F.2d 

298, 301 (9th Cir. 1956); see also Nat‟l Sav. Bank of Albany v. Jefferson Bank, 127 F.R.D. 218, 

223 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (“an order is „entered‟ not when it is signed by the judge, nor when it is 

„filed‟ (i.e., file stamped), but rather when it is actually recorded on the docket sheet”). The 

judgment in this action was entered on the docket sheet on April 11, 2016, and Plaintiffs had 

twenty-eight days to file the instant motion. Plaintiffs‟ motions are timely filed.

2. The Verdict is Not Inconsistent

While generally a Rule 50(a) motion is required to bring a motion under Rule 50(b), 

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“[w]hen a special verdict does not support a judgment a reviewing court may make an exception 

to the Rule 50(b) requirement of a motion for directed verdict as a prerequisite to a motion for 

[judgment as a matter of law].” Pierce v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 823 F.2d 1366, 1369 (9th Cir. 

1987). Plaintiffs argue that this exception applies here because under Brinker Restaurant Corp. 

v. Super. Ct., 53 Cal.4th 1004 (2012), liability is established by the finding that Defendants had a 

policy that violated California law. Therefore, Plaintiffs contend that the jury‟s finding that they 

did not prove that by a preponderance of the evidence that, during the time period from 

September 7, 2003 through July 1, 2013, Late Meal Period Class members were non-exempt 

employees who worked for a Taco Bell Corporate restaurant and worked shifts longer than six 

hours without being provided a meal period that began before the end of the fifth hour of work or 

that, during the time period from September 7, 2003 through December 24, 2014, Rest Period 

Class members were non-exempt employees who worked for a Taco Bell Corporate restaurant 

and worked shifts longer than six hours but less than seven hours without being authorized and 

permitted to take a second ten minute or net twenty minute rest period is inconsistent.

As relevant here, to prevail on a claim for failure to provide rest breaks, a plaintiff must 

prove that he worked more than six hours without being provided one twenty minute rest period 

or two ten minute rest periods. Brinker, 53 Cal.4th at 1028-1030. To prevail on the claim for 

failure to provide meal periods, a plaintiff must prove that he worked more than five hours per 

day without being provided a meal period of not less than thirty minutes that began before the 

end of the fifth hour of work. Cal. Lab. Code § 512(a). 

In Brinker, the California Superior Court considered the issue of class certification. 

Brinker Rest. Corp., 53 Cal.4th at 1017. The court stated:

In reversing class certification, the Court of Appeal concluded that because rest 

breaks can be waived—as all parties agree— “any showing on a class basis that 

plaintiffs or other members of the proposed class missed rest breaks or took 

shortened rest breaks would not necessarily establish, without further 

individualized proof, that Brinker violated” the Labor Code and Wage Order No. 

5. This was error. An employer is required to authorize and permit the amount of 

rest break time called for under the wage order for its industry. If it does not—if, 

for example, it adopts a uniform policy authorizing and permitting only one rest 

break for employees working a seven-hour shift when two are required—it has 

violated the wage order and is liable. No issue of waiver ever arises for a rest 

break that was required by law but never authorized; if a break is not authorized, 

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an employee has no opportunity to decline to take it. As Hohnbaum pleaded and 

presented substantial evidence of a uniform rest break policy authorizing breaks 

only for each full four hours worked, the trial court‟s certification of a rest break 

subclass should not have been disturbed.

Brinker Rest. Corp., 53 Cal.4th at 1033. Based upon this language, Plaintiffs have consistently 

argued that they only need to show a policy exists to prove liability in this action. 

The Court does not find Brinker to so hold. Notably, Brinker only dealt with whether 

class certification was appropriate and extending the position that a policy alone is sufficient to 

establish liability without any showing that the plaintiffs were subjected to the policy is not a 

reasonable application of the law. See Campbell v. Vitran Express Inc., No. 

CV1105029RGKSSX, 2016 WL 873009, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2016) (to determine liability 

based solely on a facially defective policy “would be logically absurd and legally erroneous”). 

Plaintiffs ignore the language that the uniform policy must be consistently applied. See

Brinker, 53 Cal.4th at 1033. The issue of waiver addressed in Brinker does not arise if the policy 

is not applied to the class. Further, Plaintiffs‟ position eliminates the requirement that Plaintiffs 

show causation. Plaintiffs point to no case holding that at trial the class is not required to prove 

that the policy was applied to them and caused an injury. 

As discussed in Faulkinbury v. Boyd & Associates, Inc., 216 Cal.App.4th 220 (2013), at 

class certification, the court “must focus on the policy itself and address the issue as to whether 

the legality of the policy can be resolved on a class wide basis.” Id. at 232. The court is 

determining whether the claim is amendable to class wide treatment. Id. at 233. “Claims 

alleging that a uniform policy consistently applied to a group of employees is in violation of the 

wage and hour laws are of the sort routinely, and properly, found suitable for class treatment.” 

Id. (quoting Brinker, 53 Cal.4th at 1033). Similarly, all the cases cited by Plaintiffs address class 

certification. See Bradley v. Networkers Int‟l, LLC, 211 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1145, 150 (2012), as 

modified on denial of reh‟g (Jan. 8, 2013) (“when an employer has not authorized and not 

provided legally-required meal and/or rest breaks, the employer has violated the law and the fact 

that an employee may have actually taken a break or was able to eat food during the work day 

does not show that individual issues will predominate in the litigation”); Benton v. Telecom 

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Network Specialists, Inc., 220 Cal.App.4th 701, 729 (2013) (“Under Brinker, TNS would 

become liable to the class upon a determination that its uniform lack of a meal and rest policy 

violated the applicable wage order. The mere fact that some technicians may have taken breaks 

(or declined to take breaks) based on information they received from other sources (i.e., the 

staffing companies) does not show that individual issues will predominate in the litigation.” 

(internal citations and punctuation omitted); Brewer v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., No. 11-CV-3587 

YGR, 2015 WL 9460198, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2015) (“In deciding whether a class is 

properly certified, it would be error for the Court to focus on whether some individuals were able 

to take breaks or chose to forego breaks. Whether some individuals were able to take breaks, or 

voluntarily chose not to take a break that was offered, are matters of individual damages.”). 

None of these cases support Plaintiffs‟ position that they are not required to prove that 

they were employees of Defendants who were subjected to the policy to prevail at trial. 

Plaintiffs are correct that whether or not some employees were permitted to take breaks does not 

defeat liability. However, the issue addressed by Questions No. 2 and 10 on the verdict form is 

not whether some employees were permitted to take breaks, but whether Plaintiffs‟ proved they 

were employees of Defendants who worked the requisite number of hours and were not provided 

with a rest or meal period. The jury found that Plaintiffs did not prove this element by a 

preponderance of the evidence and, as the Court discussed in the Order Denying Plaintiffs‟ 

Request for Private Attorney General Act Penalties which is discussed below at III.C.1, 

Defendants submitted sufficient evidence for the jury to make such a finding. (ECF No. 742 at 

6:3-8:6.) 

The Court finds that Plaintiffs must not only prove that there was an illegal policy, but 

also that the policy was uniformly applied to the class. See Campbell, 2016 WL 873009, at *5 

(“Plaintiffs must still prove at trial that the policy‟s application deprived workers of their meal 

and rest breaks.”). For this reason, the Court finds that the verdict was not inconsistent. 

Plaintiffs‟ motion for judgment as a matter of law is denied.

C. Plaintiff’s Motion for A New Trial

Plaintiffs also move for a new trial on the ground that the jury‟s verdict is against the 

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clear weight of the evidence. Defendants respond that there is no reason to disturb the jury‟s 

verdict. The Court shall address each of Plaintiffs‟ stated reasons to grant a new trial.

The existence of substantial evidence to support the verdict does not prevent the court 

from granting a new trial where the court finds the verdict is against the clear weight of the 

evidence. Landes Const. Co., 833 F.2d at 1371. In deciding a motion for new trial the court may 

weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of witness. Id. The court need not view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Id. “Doubts about the correctness of 

the verdict are not sufficient grounds for a new trial: the trial court must have a firm conviction 

that the jury has made a mistake.” Id. at 1372.

1. Verdict on Late Meal Period and Rest Period Claims

Plaintiffs allege that the evidence at trial demonstrates that Defendants‟ meal and rest 

period policy was uniformly applied to all non-exempt restaurant employees. Plaintiffs contend 

that the jury‟s verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence. Defendants counter that the 

Court has already addressed Plaintiffs‟ argument and determined they did not carry their burden 

of proof at trial when ruling against Plaintiffs‟ request for PAGA penalties. Defendants contend 

that the evidence presented at trial supports the jury‟s verdict. 

In ruling on Plaintiffs‟ request for PAGA penalties, the Court considered Plaintiffs‟ 

argument that the jury erred by failing to find liability for the Late Meal Period and Rest Period

classes.

[T]o the extent that this Court could do so, it would not find differently than the 

jury on these claims. During the trial of this matter, Plaintiffs presented some 

witness testimony, and some evidence regarding payroll verification reports and 

pay stubs. While Plaintiffs presented witness testimony in support of their claims, 

the named Plaintiffs had credibility issues. Both Plaintiff Medlock and Plaintiff 

Hardiman had been terminated from employment with Taco Bell for lying on 

their employment applications. Trial Testimony of Sandrika Medlock 42:15-17, 

ECF No. 708; Trial Testimony of Lisa Hardiman 8:2-17, ECF No. 709. Mr. 

Arriola, another previous employee testified that he was able to remember not 

receiving a timely meal period or second rest periods when he worked for Taco 

Bell over seven years ago, but when asked when he took his lunch a week prior to 

the hearing his estimate was based on his normal practice. Reporter‟s Transcript 

of Proceedings 1346:1-24, ECF No. 724.

Dr. Walker testified that review of the raw punch data showed that the named 

class members did not tend to have recorded late meal periods. Trial Testimony 

of Jonathan Walker 206:12-212:3. Testimony was presented that employees 

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worked for both corporate and franchise Taco Bells, and some employees were

subject to on duty meal period agreements and might not punch out for meal 

periods.

Plaintiffs‟ case focused on the raw time punch data to prove that employees 

received late meal periods or were not provided with a second rest period. The 

evidence presented at trial showed that the raw punch data was not the accurate 

reflection of the employee‟s time worked. The evidence showed that there were 

manual changes made to correct the raw punch data at the restaurant level. 

Reporter‟s Transcript of Proceedings 314:10-315:16, ECF No. 720. Defendants 

proffered evidence that sometimes employees forgot to punch out and had their 

manager manually enter meal period information. There could also have been 

times when the system was not available so rest and meal periods had to be 

entered manually into the payroll system. Additionally, some employees received 

on duty meal periods and did not punch out for meal periods.

There was testimony that for each pay period, employees were provided with a 

payroll verification report which listed their hours and the meal and rest breaks 

provided. The employee was to review the data for accuracy and then sign the 

report. It was this data from the payroll verification report that was used to issue 

payroll checks. Finally, Taco Bell presented evidence that meal and rest period 

schedules were provided for shifts and the employees were provided breaks every 

two hours.

Similar to the jury, the Court finds that the evidence presented by Plaintiffs did 

not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there were non-exempt 

employees who worked for a Taco Bell Corporate restaurant and either worked 

shifts longer than six but less than seven hours without being authorized and 

permitted to take a second ten minute or net twenty minute rest period or worked 

longer than six hours without being provided a meal period that began before the 

end of the fifth hour of work during the class period.

(ECF No. 742 at 6:25-:8:6.)

While Plaintiffs cite to evidence to support their claims, both side submitted conflicting 

evidence to support their position regarding whether Defendants violated California Labor law. 

It was for the jury to consider this evidence to determine if Plaintiffs proved their claims by a 

preponderance of the evidence. The Court does not have a firm conviction that the jury made a 

mistake. Landes Const. Co., 833 F.2d at 1371. The Court finds that the jury‟s finding that 

Plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proof for the Late Meal Period and Rest Period classes 

was not against the clear weight of the evidence. 

2. Willful Finding

Plaintiffs next argue that the clear weight of the evidence demonstrates that Defendants 

willfully failed to comply with the Labor Code for the purposes of Labor Code Section 203. 

Defendants counter that the Plaintiffs had to show more than a failure to pay wages on 

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termination and failed to meet their burden at trial. 

Labor Code section 203 provides that “[i]f an employer willfully fails to pay, without 

abatement or reduction, in accordance with Sections 201, 201.3, 201.5, 201.9, 202, and 205.5, 

any wages of an employee who is discharged or who quits, the wages of the employee shall 

continue as a penalty from the due date thereof at the same rate until paid or until an action 

therefor is commenced; but the wages shall not continue for more than 30 days.” Therefore, 

penalties are only triggered if the failure to pay was willful. “As used in section 203, “willful” 

merely means that the employer intentionally failed or refused to perform an act which was 

required to be done. Barnhill v. Robert Saunders & Co., 125 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7 (1981). 

Plaintiffs contend that the jury‟s finding that Defendants owed the Underpaid Meal 

Premium Class $495,913.66 in premium payments shows that this amount was required to be 

paid to the employees. Plaintiffs quote this Court‟s order addressing Defendants‟ argument that 

there was a good faith dispute as to whether wages were due. (See ECF No. 687 at 4:4-26.) 

Plaintiffs argue there was no good faith dispute that the wages were due and that Defendants 

failure to pay the premium payments prior to the trial of this action establishes that the conduct 

was willful. However, it was for the jury to determine whether the conduct of Defendants was 

willful. 

“A willful failure to pay wages within the meaning of Labor Code Section 203 occurs 

when an employer intentionally fails to pay wages to an employee when those wages are due.” 

Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 163 Cal. App. 4th 1157, 1201 (2008). The jury was instructed that 

“ „willfully‟ means that the employer intentionally failed or refused to pay the wages.” (ECF No. 

694 at 49.) 

During the June 15, 2016 hearing, Plaintiffs argued that the failure to comply with the 

law itself proves the act was willful and not a good faith mistake. Defendants responded that 

section 203 is not a strict liability statute. Plaintiffs cite to Davis v. Morris, 37 Cal.App.2d 269, 

274, (1940), for the proposition that all that is required to find willfulness is that the action 

occurred and was within the defendants control. While Plaintiffs argue that Davis does not 

require intent, the opinion states, “In civil cases, the word „willful,‟ as ordinarily used in courts 

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of law, does not necessarily imply anything blamable, or any malice or wrong toward the other 

party, or perverseness or moral delinquency, but merely that the thing done or omitted to be done 

was done or omitted intentionally. It amounts to nothing more than this: That the person knows 

what he is doing, intends to do what he is doing, and is a free agent.” Davis, 37 Cal.App.2d at 

274 (emphasis added). Contrary to Plaintiffs argument, willfulness has an element of intent to 

commit the act. 

In this instance, evidence was presented at trial that Defendants‟ payroll system 

automatically paid one-half hour of premium pay when it detected a missed or short meal period. 

As the Court has previously found in addressing the failure to pay one hour of compensation in 

Plaintiffs‟ motion for PAGA penalties, “Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that Defendants 

had been provided with notice that their policy of paying one-half hour of premium pay violated 

California law prior to this lawsuit being filed.” (ECF No. 742 at 11:8-10.) The Court noted that 

Defendants changed their autopay policy within several months of receiving notice of this action. 

(Id. at 12:13-22.) The evidence presented to the jury is susceptible of the interpretation that 

Defendants were attempting to comply with California law by paying one-half hour of premium 

pay and were unaware that their policy of paying only one half hour of premium pay was not 

lawful and corrected the policy once it was brought to their attention by the filing of this lawsuit. 

Plaintiffs additionally argue that willfulness is demonstrated because Defendants did not 

pay all wages due upon separation. The Court construes the argument to be that employees who 

were paid one half-hour of pay and were owed an additional half-hour of premium pay when 

they separated from employment were not paid that additional half hour of pay. Defendants 

respond that Plaintiffs presented no evidence that any employee who left employment was not 

paid all wages due on termination.

Plaintiffs point to no evidence presented during the trial of this action to show that any 

employee separated from employment, was owed an additional half-hour of autopay, and was 

not paid the amount due after this lawsuit was filed. The Court has reviewed the transcript of the 

trial and finds that only two of the witnesses testified to receiving autopay: Plaintiff Medlock 

who was terminated in May 2007, and Plaintiff Hardiman who was also terminated sometime in

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2007. (ECF No. 721 at 505:7-9; ECF No. 725 at 1513:19-20.) This action was filed in 

September 2007, and it was after this time that Defendants changed their policy to pay one full 

hour of premium pay for a missed or late meal period. The jury could reasonably have found 

that both Plaintiffs Medlock and Hardiman were terminated prior to Defendants being noticed by 

this lawsuit that their autopay policy violated state law. Therefore, the jury could reasonably 

assume that the failure to pay Plaintiffs Medlock and Hardiman any additional autopay that 

might have been due on separation was not intentional for the same reasons discussed above. To 

the extent that there was expert testimony that employees separated from employment, there was 

no evidence presented to show that any employee who received autopay separated from 

employment after this action was filed and was not paid wages due upon separation. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the jury‟s finding that Defendants‟ conduct was not 

willful was not against the clear weight of the evidence.3 

3. Inconsistent Verdicts

Plaintiffs‟ argument that the jury verdict was inconsistent has been addressed in III.B. 

The questions asked in Questions 1 and 2 and 9 and 10 of the verdict form are not substantially 

similar. Questions 1 and 9 asked whether Defendants had a standardized or uniform companywide policy. Questions 2 and 10 asked whether the class members had proved that during the 

relevant time period they were employees of Defendant and had been subjected to the alleged 

violations. The Court finds that the verdict was not inconsistent nor did requiring Plaintiffs to 

prove that they were employees of Defendants during the relevant time period who sustained 

damage due to the policy increase Plaintiffs‟ burden at trial. 

4. Preclusion of Dr. Walker‟s Testimony

Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to a new trial due to the Court‟s sustaining 

Defendants‟ objection to Dr. Walker‟s testimony regarding damages. Plaintiffs contend that Dr. 

Walker misrepresented the damages analysis he performed for Defendants in this action. 

However, Dr. Walker consistently in his expert report and during the evidentiary hearing stated 

 

3

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants did not show that they paid any employees the wages owed at the time of their 

separation. However, at trial the burden is on Plaintiffs to prove their claims by a preponderance of the evidence. 

Defendants have no burden of proof at trial.

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that using the raw punch data was not a reliable basis on which to assess damages in this action. 

While Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Walker‟s testimony cannot be believed because he performed his 

analysis based on the raw punch data rather than the PVRs, his testimony was that this data was 

used because that was the data that Plaintiffs were relying on. This is consistent with his 

testimony that he was not hired to perform a damage analysis but to rebut the damages analysis 

that would be provided by Plaintiffs‟ expert. 

Further, the Court is not persuaded by Plaintiffs‟ argument that Dr. Walker backtracked 

from his damage report only when it would be helpful to Defendants nor does the Court find that 

Dr. Walker‟s testimony was contrived. Defendants have consistently argued that Plaintiffs 

cannot prove damages based upon the raw punch data because the raw punch data is not a 

payroll record. Dr. Walker‟s testimony has consistently been used to challenge the veracity of 

Plaintiffs‟ expert because Plaintiffs‟ expert used an improper methodology which is consistent 

with Dr. Walker‟s testimony during the evidentiary hearing. 

Plaintiffs argue that they should have been able to introduce the opinion of Dr. Walker, 

however, as discussed in the order sustaining the objection to Dr. Walker‟s testimony, 

Dr. Walker testified that raw punch data is not a reliable basis to calculate 

damages for failure to provide rest breaks or meal periods and something he 

would not do nor use to form his expert opinion. Dr. Walker testified that the 

calculation that he did was not a damage estimate, and throughout his report he 

asserted that the analysis was not accurate. Dr. Walker testified that he would not 

offer an opinion based on the premise that the raw punch data established 

violations because the raw punch data is clearly not accurate.

While damage calculations were provided in his report, they are the opposite of 

his expert opinion. None of the damage figures included in his report reflect an 

accurate opinion by him of damages in this action. Dr. Walker testified that it is 

very clear from his expert report that one cannot ascertain damages reliably based 

on the raw punch data. Dr. Walker opined that one could get a more accurate 

damages figure by relying on payroll verification reports, but even if the payroll 

verification reports were used, he would not put his name on any damages 

estimate because he could not determine whether there were missing rest or meal 

periods from looking at any of the records in this action.

(ECF No. 669 at 4:7-20.)

Plaintiffs argue that since the Court allowed the experts to proffer testimony regarding 

the raw punch data to establish violations, the Court found the raw punch data sufficient to 

provide an expert opinion under Rule 702. However, the Court found that while Plaintiffs‟ 

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counsel sought to offer Dr. Walker‟s opinion regarding damages, “it is clear from the testimony 

of Dr. Walker and his Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 26(a)(2)(B) report that his opinion is that the raw 

punch data is not an accurate and reliable basis to determine if the violations alleged in this 

action occurred.” (Id. at 6:1-4.) Testimony during the evidentiary hearing established the 

damage calculations are not Dr. Walker‟s opinion because they do not meet the standards for 

expert testimony. (Id. at 6:17-18.) The estimates “were based upon the flawed procedure 

developed by Plaintiffs‟ expert, and an economist would not rely on the data provided to 

determine damages in this type of action.” (Id. at 6:18-20.) Dr. Walker set forth the reasons that 

the estimate was not based on reliable data: raw punch data could not be used to determine 

damages, many of the records in the raw punch data did not contain hourly rates, and some fields 

contained numbers too large to be an hourly rate. (Id. at 6:21-25.) The Court found that “the 

information sought to be elicited from the expert during this trial is not his opinion based on 

sufficient facts or data, nor does Dr. Walker believe that it is the product of reliable principles 

and methods. For these reasons, the opinion on damages does not meet the threshold 

requirements of admissibility under Rule 702.” (Id. at 7:4-8.) The Court also found that the 

evidence should be excluded under Rules 401, 402 and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 

(Id. at 8:14-15.) 

To the extent that the damage estimates have some relevance in this action, Dr. 

Walker will testify that they are not based on reliable data, do not reflect his 

opinion as to the damages in this action, and were not developed in a manner 

consistent with his training as an economist. Allowing this evidence to be 

presented to the jury through Dr. Walker and then having Dr. Walker testify to the 

unreliability of the evidence provides a substantial risk of confusing the issues and 

misleading the jury. For this reason, the Court finds that the probative value of the 

evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of confusing the issues and 

misleading the jury. Therefore the evidence is also excluded pursuant to Rule 403.

(Id. at 8:23-9:4.)

Plaintiffs‟ motion for a new trial based on the exclusion of the testimony of Dr. Walker is 

denied.

5. Damages Jury Instruction

Plaintiffs contend that the Court gave an erroneous jury instruction. Plaintiffs argue that 

the Court erred by failing to inform the jury that Plaintiffs could prove damages by just and 

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reasonable inferences and that they could determine damages by using the minimum wage. 

First, in their moving papers, Plaintiffs argue that the Court erred by stating that the 

PVRs contain the employees‟ rate of pay. Having reviewed the PVRs, the Court was incorrect as 

the PVRS do not contain rates of pay; however, Plaintiffs have not shown that Defendants failed 

to keep accurate pay records. Testimony was presented during the trial regarding Defendants‟ 

payroll system: Veronica Luna (ECF No. 720 at 300-334), Mary Scoggan (ECF No. 723 at 1005-

1034), and the deposition testimony of David Kruer (ECF No. 723 at 1045-1058).

Taco Bell restaurants‟ cash registers contain software for employees to punch in and out. 

(Id. at 301:22-302:14.) Taco Bell required employees to punch in and out at the start of the shift, 

during breaks and meal periods, and at the end of the shift. (Id. at 307:7-308:3; 1009:25-

1010:15.) The data stored in the cash registers was called “raw punch data.” (Id. at 308:2-14; 

1028:12-22.) This data gets transferred from the cash register to the back office system. (Id. at 

331:20-25.) 

At the end of the night, the store manager would poll the registers to the back office to 

review before they closed. (Id. at 308:16-309:18; 1030:16-22.) The raw punch data shows the 

employee punches without any modifications. (Id. at 308:19-22.) The back office reporting 

system, which was called TACO, was a computer in the manager‟s office which kept track of 

time and attendance. (Id. at 310:16-311:4; 331:8-14.) The system kept track of the punch data 

and would generate reports which the managers reviewed on a nightly basis. (Id. at 311:6-22.) 

The manager was to confirm that everything was entered correctly into the back office system 

and had the ability to make adjustments to correct mistakes; for example, if an employee forgot 

to clock in or out for a break, the manager could make the adjustment before the information was 

transmitted to the corporate computer. (Id. at 313:12-23.) The manager was able to correct the 

time that punches were made and to add punches that had not been input by the employee. (Id.

at 314:9-23.) At the end of the night, the data from the TACO system was automatically polled 

to the corporate server. (Id. at 319:4-14.) So there were two different sets of data; the raw punch 

data that tells when keys were pushed, and the data from the TACO system that contains any 

corrections made to the raw punch data. (Id. at 314:24-315:10; 319:16-25; ECF No. 723 at 

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1031:19-1033:2.) Changes could only be made to the punch data within the pay period and only 

by managers. (ECF No. 720 at 321:23-322:5.) After the pay period, hours could only be added 

to the employee‟s time. (Id. at 323:5-21.)

The data transmitted from the TACO system was used to create PVRs. (Id. at 332:7-20; 

337:10-19.) PVRs had codes such as “A” for automatic which meant that data was polled into 

the back office with no interaction or interjection from anyone. (ECF No. 720 at 329:6-22.) An 

“M” designated a manual adjustment to the data. (Id. at 330:2-3.) At the end of the pay period,

the back of house system ran to collect the applicable time keeping data, calculated the hours 

worked and different types of hours worked, and sent the summary data in a file that was loaded 

into the PeopleSoft for payroll purposes. (ECF No. 723 at 1031:3-7; 1052:24-1053:5; 1055:23-

1056:20.) The data used to pay employees was received, stored, and maintained within 

Defendants‟ corporate systems. (Id. at 1049:2-11; 1054:10-13.)

Plaintiffs do not claim that the time punch data and PVRS were not maintained; but that 

the records were not accurate because the PVRs do not include the hourly rates of all employees. 

In Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946), the court addressed a situation in 

which the employer failed to keep accurate records and held that where “the employer‟s records 

are inaccurate or inadequate and the employee cannot offer convincing substitutes. . .an 

employee has carried out his burden if he proves that he has in fact performed work for which he 

was improperly compensated and if he produces sufficient evidence to show the amount and 

extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.” 328 U.S. at 687-88. Based 

upon the evidence presented at trial, Defendants maintain employee time and payroll records. 

The situation addressed in Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. is not presented here where Defendants 

maintain adequate records, but Plaintiffs chose not to use them at trial. Plaintiffs‟ decision to 

rely solely on the raw punch data and not analyze the PVRs or payroll information in this action 

does not demonstrate that Defendants did not keep accurate records. 

During the June 15, 2016 hearing, Plaintiffs argued that the situation presented here is 

“eerily similar” to that confronted by the court in Villalpando v. Excel Direct, Inc., No. 12-cv04137-JCS and 13—3091-JCS, 2016 WL 1598663 (N.D. Cal. April 21, 2016). In Villalpando, 

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the plaintiffs were a group of delivery drivers who were classified as independent contractors. 

Id. at *1. A class was certified and prior to trial the parties brought motions in limine. Id. The 

plaintiffs‟ supplemental expert report stated that the defendants had produced a large volume of 

banker boxes which contained a variety of business records and the plaintiffs had been able to 

identify the vast majority of documents. Id. at *4. However, the timesheets were produced in a 

manner that made them difficult to collect. Id. There were large caches of daily timesheets that 

had been copied in their entirety. Id. But, other daily timesheets were attached to driver‟s 

manifests and other related documents and were not copied because it would be cost prohibitive 

to separate and isolate the daily timesheets, therefore, the expert‟s analysis might not reflect all 

the available daily timesheets in the defendant‟s possession. Id.

The Villalpando court considered the Supreme Court‟s holding in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. 

Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1047 (2016), which reiterated the principle of Mt. Clemens. Id. at 

*6. The Tyson court recognized that in many cases a representative sample could be the only 

practicable means to collect and present relevant data to establish a defendant‟s liability. Id. Use 

of such sampling is permissible in a donning and doffing class action because it could have been 

used in each employee‟s individual action. Id. While individual minds may differ as to whether

the average time calculated by the expert is probative as to the actual time actually worked by the 

individual employees, that question “is the near-exclusive province of the jury.” Id. 

In considering the defendants‟ motion to preclude the “just and reasonable inference” 

instruction, the Villalpando court found that the plaintiffs had identified numerous inadequacies 

in the records produced by the defendant: “paper manifests and [timesheets] were not organized 

in any particular manner, were mixed up with other, irrelevant documents, and are sometimes

illegible; the paper manifests also do not provide accurate timekeeping records to the extent they 

consist only of lists of delivery windows and appear to omit time spent loading and unloading 

merchandise at the warehouse; and most troubling, there is no way to know whether these paper 

records are complete and [defendant] does not even attempt to establish that they are.” Id. at *9. 

The court found that defendant had not demonstrated that it maintained adequate records; and 

therefore, the plaintiffs were entitled to prove their claims by reasonable inference. Id. 

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The Court disagrees with Plaintiffs‟ assertion that Villalpando and this case are “eerily 

similar.” While there are a large number of documents that were not produced in any order due 

to the number of stores involved and the time period at issue in this action,

4

the other factors 

considered by the Villapandol court are not present here. The PVRs here are documents created 

by the payroll system and reflect a two week pay period; they are not daily timesheets kept by 

the employees as in Villalpandol. There is no dispute that the documents were kept by 

individual stores and provided in the manner in which they are normally maintained. The PVRs 

were not mixed in with other documents, but were produced in groups. There is no allegation

that the paper records are not complete so that the plaintiffs did not have access to complete 

records. Further, the evidence at trial demonstrated that the Class Members signed each PVR 

attesting that it is an accurate reflection of the time worked. Also, Defendants maintained the 

raw punch data, which as Plaintiffs argued during the June 15 hearing, Dr. Walker testified 

showed a very small percentage of records that did not include the rate of pay. Plaintiffs

presented no evidence that rates of pay were not kept by Defendants. Plaintiffs did not show that 

Defendants failed to keep accurate time records, and therefore, they were not entitled to a “just 

and reasonable inference” instruction.

For the claims asserted in this action the damages are prescribed by statute. Premium pay 

is “one additional hour of pay at the employee‟s regular rate of compensation.” Cal. Lab. Code § 

226.7(c). The instructions given to the jury tracked the statutory language. For the reasons 

stated in the order denying Plaintiffs‟ motion to amend the damages instruction and those 

discussed herein, the Court finds no error in failing to provide Plaintiffs‟ proposed instructions

on the minimum wage. (ECF No. 690.)

Moreover, the Court finds that any error in providing an instruction regarding the 

minimum wage in this instance would be harmless. “[A]n error in instructing the jury in a civil 

case does not require reversal if it is more probably than not harmless.” Larez v. Holcomb, 16 

F.3d 1513, 1516-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Benigni v. Hemet, 879 F.2d 473, 479 (9th 

 

4 Defense counsel represented at the hearing that the PVRs in this action are from more than 220 corporate stores 

over a period of 9 years. 

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Cir.1988)). Here, the jury was provided with the minimum wage rates for the relevant time 

periods and was able to determine damages for the only class for which the jury found that

Plaintiffs had proved their claim.

5

 

6. Brinker Jury Instruction

Plaintiffs contend that the Court erred by failing to instruct the jury that “where the 

employer adopts a standardized or uniform policy authorizing and permitting fewer rest periods 

than required by law, [the] employer has violated California law.” For the reasons set forth in 

III.B, the Court finds no error. The instructions provided were an accurate statement of the 

Defendants‟ requirement to provide meal and rest periods. Plaintiffs are not entitled to an award 

of damages unless they also prove that they were employees during the relevant time period who 

were injured by the unlawful policy. 

7. Erroneous Verdict Form

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that a new trial is warranted because the verdict form was 

erroneous. As discussed in III.C.3, the Court finds that the verdict form was not inconsistent. 

For the first time, Plaintiffs raise the issue that Questions No. 2 and 10 ask four questions in one. 

However, Plaintiffs did not object to the manner in which these questions were presented during 

trial and the Court finds that the issue was waived. Grosvenor Properties Ltd. v. Southmark 

Corp., 896 F.2d 1149, 1151 (9th Cir. 1990) (objection to jury instruction is waived where it is not 

raised prior to the withdrawal of the jury). 

D. Motion to Amend the Judgment

Plaintiffs argue that pursuant to Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the 

Court is required to make findings regarding the Late Meal Period and Rest Period classes‟ claim 

that Defendants violated California‟s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”). Defendants argue that 

Plaintiffs are seeking to have the Court reject the jury‟s verdict to find them liable on claims for 

which the jury found Plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proof.

Rule 52 provides that for „an action tried on the facts without a jury or with an advisory 

 

5

Further, any such error would be harmless as applied to the Rest Period and Late Meal Period Classes as the 

plaintiffs did not prove the class claims by a preponderance of the evidence and damages did become an issue to be 

decided by the jury.

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jury, the court must find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately. The 

findings and conclusions may be stated on the record after the close of the evidence or may 

appear in an opinion or a memorandum of decision filed by the court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1). 

An action brought under the UCL is equitable in nature. Bradstreet v. Wong, 161 

Cal.App.4th 1440, 1458 (2008) abrogated on other grounds by Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal.4th 35 

(2010). Where the equitable claims before the court are based upon the same underlying facts as 

the legal claims, the Seventh Amendment requires the trial judge to follow the jury‟s implicit or 

explicit factual determinations in deciding the legal claim. Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 885 

F.2d 498, 507 (9th Cir. 1989), as amended on denial of reh‟g and reh‟g en banc (Sept. 19, 1989). 

Here, the UCL claims before the Court are based on the same underlying facts that were decided 

by the jury. Therefore, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the Court adopts the findings 

embedded in the jury‟s verdict.6 (ECF No. 696.) 

Plaintiffs argue that pursuant to Safeway, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

238 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1159 (2015), review denied (Oct. 21, 2015), their UCL theory of liability 

is different than the question considered by the jury. In Safeway, the appellate court considered 

whether the trial court properly certified a meal break class for the purposes of a UCL claim. 

238 Cal.App.4th at 1144. On appeal, the defendants argued that the trial court erred in certifying 

the meal period class, including the viability of the theory of recovery under the UCL. Id. at 

1145, 1146. 

Generally, the UCL defines “unfair competition” broadly to include “any 

unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” “By proscribing „any 

unlawful‟ business practice, „[the UCL] “borrows” violations of other laws and 

treats them as unlawful practices‟ that the unfair competition law makes 

independently actionable. [¶] However, the law does more than just borrow. The 

statutory language referring to “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent” practice 

(italics added) makes clear that a practice may be deemed unfair even if not 

specifically proscribed by some other law. Under the UCL, damages cannot be 

recovered, and plaintiffs are generally limited to restitution and injunctive relief.

Id. at 1147 (internal citations omitted). 

The plaintiffs in Safeway sought to certify a class contending that defendants‟ policy of 

 

6 Additionally, the Court would not find differently than the jury based upon the evidence presented during the trial 

of this matter. 

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not paying meal break premiums to employees was an unlawful and unfair business practice 

under the UCL. Id. at 1150. Defendants contended that the underlying policy of not 

automatically paying meal break premiums was not an unlawful policy and where the underlying 

statutory claim failed, the UCL claim also failed. Id. at 1151. Plaintiffs replied that the 

underlying claim was that defendants had an unlawful practice of not paying premium wages and 

this was an unlawful and unfair business practice. Id. at 1152.

The propriety of a UCL class action hinges on whether the theory of recovery 

advanced by the proponents of certification is, as an analytical matter, likely to 

prove amenable to class treatment. Ordinarily, class treatment of a claim is 

appropriate if the facts necessary to establish liability are capable of common 

proof, including the so-called fact of damage, that is, the existence of harm 

establishing an entitlement to damages. If the defendant‟s liability can be 

determined by facts common to all members of the class, a class may be certified 

even though class members must individually establish the amount of their 

restitution. Nonetheless, class treatment is not appropriate if every member of the 

alleged class would be required to litigate numerous and substantial questions 

determining his individual right to recover following the class judgment on

common issues.

Id. at 1154 (internal punctuation and citations omitted). 

In Safeway, the trial court found that “the propriety of class treatment required more than 

the presentation of evidence that during the pertinent period, petitioners never paid meal break 

premium wages: that conduct subjected petitioners to liability suitable for class treatment only if 

they had a “system-wide” practice of failing to pay meal break premium wages “when required.” 

Id. at 1154. The appellate court found that a UCL claim could be predicated on the employer‟s 

failure to pay premium wages when required. Id. at 1156. The court also stated that to 

demonstrate the propriety of class treatment, the class members were obligated to show that the 

practice caused harm that was capable of common proof. Id. at 1159. The appellate court found 

that the class members had shown “the existence of the practice and the fact of damage were 

matters suitable for class treatment. [Class members‟] evidence supports the reasonable 

inference that in the context of a class action, they could establish that petitioners engaged in the 

alleged practice, that is, they never paid meal break premium wages, even though a significant 

number of employees accrued them.” Id. at 1159. The court found that the trial court did not err 

in certifying the UCL claims for class treatment. Id. at 1163.

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Plaintiffs in this action did not move to separately certify claims under the UCL. The 

only claims certified in this action are those which were presented to the jury. To the extent that 

Plaintiffs argue other claims were raised by the complaint, as relevant to the claims remaining in 

this action, the tenth cause of action in the third amended complaint alleges that Defendants 

violated the UCL by the “policy and practice of requiring non-exempt or hourly-paid employees, 

including Plaintiffs and the other class members, to work through their meal and rest periods 

without paying them proper compensation” which “violates California Labor Code sections 

226.7 and 512(a).” (ECF No. 522 at ¶ 123.) To prevail under the UCL, Plaintiffs have to prove 

that Defendants violated California Labor Law for the Class claims.

As to the rest period claim, this is the specific claim that the jury was asked to decide and 

the jury found Plaintiffs‟ had not proved by a preponderance of the evidence. As to the meal 

period claim, the Late Meal Period Class was not based on working through meal periods 

without getting paid. The Late Meal Period claim was based solely on the timing of the break. 

For this class it was irrelevant if the employee received a meal period. All that was required to 

prove a violation for the class was that the class members had not received a timely meal period. 

The only claim at trial alleging that Plaintiffs were not provided with a meal period was the 

Underpaid Meal Premium Class and the jury found for Plaintiffs and awarded damages. Further, 

as Safeway discussed, the class members were obligated to show that the practice caused harm. 

Safeway, 238 Cal.App.4th at 1159. The jury found that the Late Meal Period and Rest Period 

Classes had not met their burden of proof to show they were injured by the policy.

Plaintiffs attempt to restate the claims in this action as a failure to pay premium 

payments, but as Safeway held, failure to pay premium payments subjects an employer to 

liability suitable for class treatment only if they had a “system-wide” practice of failing to pay 

meal break premium wages “when required.” Id. at 1154. To the extent that Plaintiffs allege the 

evidence at trial showed that there were employees who did not receive a timely meal period or a 

second rest period, this action is not proceeding on the claims of individual employees, but on 

the claims of the class. Here, Plaintiffs failed to prove that the Late Meal Period or Rest Period 

classes were injured by the policies at issue. Since Plaintiffs did not prove that there was a 

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system-wide policy that injured the class they are not entitled judgment on the UCL claims. 

“In essence, an action based on Business and Professions Code section 17200 to redress 

an unlawful business practice „borrows‟ violations of other laws and treats these violations, when 

committed pursuant to business activity, as unlawful practices independently actionable under 

section 17200 et seq. and subject to the distinct remedies provided thereunder.” Farmers Ins. 

Exch. v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 377, 383 (1992). The Late Meal Period and Rest Period 

Classes have failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they were subjected to a 

standardized or uniform policy that caused them injury. Since the Late Meal Period and Rest 

Period Classes have not prevailed on their claims, the Late Meal Period and Rest Period Classes 

are not entitled to judgment for violation of the UCL. 

The jury found that the Underpaid Meal Premium Class had proved that Defendants 

violated Labor Code section 226.7 by paying one-half hour premium payment for a missed or 

short meal period when they were required to pay a full hour premium payment. Therefore, the 

Underpaid Meal Premium Class is entitled to judgment for violation of the UCL. The Court 

finds that the damages awarded to the Underpaid Meal Premium Class are all the restitution 

owed under the UCL to the class. No additional damages shall be awarded to the Underpaid 

Meal Premium class for the UCL claim.

Judgment is entered in favor of the Underpaid Meal Premium Class and against 

Defendants for the UCL claim. Judgment is entered in favor of Defendants and against the Late 

Meal Period and Rest Period Class for the UCL claims./ / /

/ / /

/ / / 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / / 

/ / /

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IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendants‟ renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, filed May 6, 2016, 

is DENIED;

2. Plaintiff‟s motion for judgment as a matter of law or alternately motion for a new 

trial, filed May 9, 2016, is DENIED;

3. Plaintiffs‟ motion to amend the judgment, filed May 9, 2016, is GRANTED; and

4. Judgment is entered in favor of the Underpaid Meal Premium Class and against 

Defendants on the UCL claim; and

5. Judgment is entered in favor of Defendants and against the Late Meal Period and 

Rest Period Class on the UCL claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 15, 2016 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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