Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02046/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02046-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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 As noted below, Plaintiff has had accumulated at least three strikes pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b) for cases dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim. See

Jenkins v. Veliz, No. CV 95-0142-TUC-RMB (D. Ariz. June 21, 1995) (doc. 13); Jenkins

v. Veliz, CV 95-0711-TUC-RMB (SLV) (D. Ariz. December 19, 1995) (doc. 3); Jenkins v.

Bohland, CV 06-938-PHX-SRB (DKD) (D. Ariz. July 17, 2006) (doc. 12); Jenkins v.

Marlowe, CV 06-0160-TUC-DCB (D. Ariz. Oct. 17, 2006) (doc. 5).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Junies A. Jenkins,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Susan R. Bolton, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 11-2046-PHX-RCB (DKD) 

ORDER

Plaintiff Junies A. Jenkins, an inmate in the Arizona Department of Corrections

(ADC), filed a complaint in Maricopa County Superior Court, matter No. CV2011-014660,

alleging claims pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388

(1971), and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.1

 (Doc. 1.) On October 20, 2011, the United States

removed the Complaint to federal court on behalf of U.S. District Court Judges Bolton,

Teilborg, Bury, and Rosenblatt, who were each named as Defendants. (Id.) Defendants

Bolton, Teilborg, Bury, and Rosenblatt filed an Answer. (Doc. 5.) They have also filed a

motion to dismiss. (Doc. 12.) Plaintiff has filed several notices. (Doc. 6-11.) The Court

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will dismiss the Complaint and this action without leave to amend and deny the motion to

dismiss as moot.

I. Removal to Federal Court was Proper

A defendant may remove any civil action brought in state court over which the federal

court would have original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §1441(a). That is, a civil action that could

have originally been brought in federal court may be removed from state to federal court.

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). A federal court has original

jurisdiction “of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

The Complaint in this case facially supports that subject matter jurisdiction exists in

federal court because Plaintiff alleges violations of his federal constitutional rights against

federal employees. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1442. Further, Defendants removed the action from

state court within 30 days after the case became removable. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). The Court

concludes that this case was properly removed.

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does not

demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id.

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“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual

allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there

are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 1951.

But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts

must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th

Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent standards

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

94 (2007) (per curiam)).

If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other facts,

a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal of the

action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). In this case,

the Court concludes that deficiencies in the Complaint can not be cured by the allegation of

other facts. Accordingly, the Complaint and this action will be dismissed without leave to

amend.

III. Complaint

The gist of Plaintiff’s Complaint in this case is that he has been denied “a fair

adjudication of the legality of [his] conviction and sentence” and that Defendants Bolton,

Teilborg, Bury, and Rosenblatt conspired to interfere with Plaintiff’s ability to obtain relief

from his conviction and sentence. (Doc. 1, Complaint at 11.) Plaintiff sues Bolton, Teilborg,

Bury and Rosenblatt as well as Catherine Bohland, an Assistant Arizona Attorney General

who represented two defendants in one of Plaintiff’s prior cases, Jenkins v. Clemenshaw, No.

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2

 Although this case was initially assigned to Judge Bilby, it was reassigned to Judge

Whaley following Judge Bilby’s death.

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CV04-2771-PHX-SRB. 

Background

Plaintiff was convicted by a jury of child molestation and attempted child molestation

in Pima County Superior Court in 1987 and was sentenced to 28 years in prison, case#

CR0019898. See State v. Jenkins, No. 2 CA-CR 2010-0119-PR, 2010 WL 2803623, at *1

(Ariz. Ct. App. July 16, 2010). His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal in 1988. Id.

(citing State v. Jenkins, No. 2 CA-CR 87-0605 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 1988)). Plaintiff has

filed numerous state court challenges to his conviction and sentence, including complaints

of judicial misconduct. See id.; see also State v. Jenkins, No. 2 CA-CR 2009-0200-PR, 2009

WL 4345271, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 1, 2009) (citing cases). 

Except as otherwise indicated, Plaintiff alleges the following in his Complaint: he

submitted his first petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 1994, which was assigned to District

Judge Bilby, Jenkins v. Crist, No. CV93-0294-TUC-RMB. On March 3, 1994, Judge Bilby

dismissed the petition, apparently because it contained exhausted and unexhausted claims,

i.e., it was a mixed petition. (Doc. 1, Complaint at 17.) Plaintiff did not appeal. (Id.)

Rather, Plaintiff filed a civil rights case, Jenkins v. Veliz, No. CV95-0142-TUC-RMB, in

which he raised claims against Deputy Pima County Attorney Joelyn Marlowe, Pima County

Superior Court Judge Gilbert Veliz, and others involved in his state criminal proceedings.

On July 17, 1995, Judge Bilby dismissed the action but granted Plaintiff’s motion to file an

amended petition as an original petition in a new habeas case. CV95-0142, doc. 17. The

amended petition was filed as an original petition in Jenkins v. Crist, No. CV95-0459-TUCRHW.2

 After amending the petition in that case, an answer was ordered and, on August 17,

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3

 Plaintiff alleges that he “missed” the amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 enacted in

1996 pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which would

have overturned his conviction and sentence. (Doc. 1, Complaint at 19.) Under AEDPA, a

petitioner may not file a second or successive § 2254 petition in the district court unless the

petitioner has obtained a certification from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals authorizing

the district court to consider the second or subsequent § 2254 petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

A habeas petition is “‘second or successive’ if it raises claims that were or could have been

adjudicated on their merits in an earlier petition.” Cooper v. Calderon, 274 F.3d 1270, 1273

(9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). It does not appear that Plaintiff has ever sought authorization

from the Ninth Circuit to file a second or successive petition.

4

 Plaintiff commenced a second civil rights case, Jenkins v. Shaw, No. CV95-1824-

PHX-WPC, in which the defendant was served and subsequently granted summary judgment.

See CV95-1854, doc. 66. 

5

 Plaintiff acknowledges that he did not understand the ruling, but he did not file a

motion for reconsideration or clarification. (Doc. 1, Complaint at 18; see docket, CV95-

0711.) 

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1999, Judge Whaley denied habeas relief with prejudice.3 CV95-0459, doc. 44. Plaintiff

appealed but was denied a certificate of appealability by Judge Whaley and the Ninth Circuit.

Id., doc. 46, 47. 

While Plaintiff’s habeas case, CV95-0459, was pending, Plaintiff commenced a new

civil rights cases, Jenkins v. Veliz, No. CV95-0711-TUC-RMB, in which Plaintiff sued Pima

County Superior Court Judge Veliz, who apparently presided at Plaintiff’s criminal trial.4

On December 18, 1995, Judge Bilby dismissed the case pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey and

judgment was entered.5

 See CV95-0711, doc. 3, 4. Plaintiff did not appeal. Id.

In 2004, Plaintiff commenced a civil rights action against prison officials. See Jenkins

v. Clemenshaw, No. CV04-2771-PHX-SRB. Service of an amended complaint, and response

to Plaintiff’s claim that prison officials had failed to protect him from an assault by other

inmates, was ordered on various defendants. See id., doc. 23. Two of those defendants were

represented by Arizona Assistant Attorney General Catherine Bohland. Id. Judge Bolton

denied a motion to dismiss filed by Bohland on behalf of her clients, id., doc. 48, but on

January 26, 2007, Judge Bolton granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Id., doc.

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6

 Plaintiff in part claims that Judge Bolton issued rulings favorable to him until

Attorney Bohland stated in a motion that Plaintiff had been convicted of child molestation.

(Id. at 27-28.) Bohland described Plaintiff’s conviction in her motion to dismiss for failure

to exhaust. Judge Bolton denied that motion. CV04-2771, doc. 25 at 2. Thus, the record

does not reflect or support that Judge Bolton ruled adversely to Plaintiff as a consequence

of learning of his crime of conviction. 

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95. Paintiff appealed. Id., doc. 96. Judge Bolton certified that the appeal was not taken in

good faith because Plaintiff had failed to present any evidence of deliberate indifference to

his safety in opposition to summary judgment. Id., doc. 99. On review, the Ninth Circuit

agreed that Plaintiff’s appeal was not taken in good faith and that he was not entitled to

proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, but granted Plaintiff time to pay the filing fee. Id.,

doc. 10. Plaintiff’s appeal was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Id., doc. 103.

In 2006, Plaintiff commenced another civil rights action against Deputy Pima County

Attorney Marlowe, Judge Veliz, criminal defense counsel Ralph Malanga, and others

involved in his criminal case. See Jenkins v. Marlowe, No. CV06-0160-TUC-DCB. On

October 17, 2006, Judge Bury dismissed Plaintiff’s amended complaint for failure to state

a legally cognizable claim for relief without leave to amend. Id., doc. 5. Plaintiff filed

motions for reconsideration, which were denied. Id., doc. 8-11, 13. Plaintiff timely appealed

the denial of reconsideration. Id., doc. 14, 17. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of

reconsideration. Id., doc. 20. 

 In the current case, Plaintiff seeks relief from the judgment entered in CV95-0459

denying his petition for habeas corpus. He also seeks relief from the judgments entered in

CV95-0711, CV06-0160, CV09-0301, and CV04-2771. With respect to CV06-0160 and

CV09-301, Plaintiff asserts that Judge Bury denied relief due to personal bias, prejudice, and

discrimination based on Plaintiff’s “alleged sexual preference.” (Doc. 1, Complaint at 23-24,

25.) Plaintiff makes similar assertions against Judge Bolton in connection with CV04-2771.6

(Id. at 25-29.) 

Plaintiff also purports to seek to consolidate six of his closed cases: Jenkins v.

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7

 Judge Teilborg dismissed CV06-1820, doc. 3, based on Plaintiff’s accumulation of

three strikes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) without alleging an imminent risk of serious

physical harm. 

8

 Plaintiff seeks sanctions against Judge Teilborg for “instigat[ing] the “§ 1915(g) plot

to deprive [him] of his . . . right of access to the court, by and through informing Judge S.R.

Bolton of Judge D.C. Bury’s alleged two (2) ‘strikes’ in writing, and suggested she make

good use of them in the future.” (Id. at 31.)

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Bohland, No. CV06-0938-PHX-SRB; Jenkins v. Arizona Dep’t of Corr., No. CV06-1820-

PHX-SRB; Jenkins v. Schriro, No. CV08-1674-PHX-SRB; Jenkins v. Bolton, No. CV08-

2103-PHX-PGR; Jenkins v. U.S. of America, No. CV09-0533-PHX-SRB; and Jenkins v.

State of Arizona, No. CV09-1204-PHX-SRB. The five cases assigned to Judge Bolton were

dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) because Plaintiff had

accumulated three strikes and did not allege an imminent risk of serious physical harm.7

Judge Rosenblatt dismissed the sixth case, in which Plaintiff sued Judges Bolton and

Teilborg and Attorney Bohland, also pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). Plaintiff denies the

validity of the strikes assessed against him and contends that the dismissals are somehow

suspect, which he claims permits consolidation of these closed cases into a new open action.

(Doc. 1, Complaint at 30.) He contends that Judges Bury, Rosenblatt, and Bolton have

abused their authority and obstructed justice.8

 (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that he is seeking relief

for violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights based on the Defendants’ alleged

failures to equally and impartially apply state law to his situation and violation of his Eighth

Amendment rights based on threats to his safety during his incarceration, which was at issue

in CV04-2771. (Id. at 11, 32.) Plaintiff also appears to assert state law claims against the

Defendants. Plaintiff seeks declaratory, injunctive, compensatory, and punitive relief. 

III. Failure to State a Federal Claim Against the Federal Defendants 

Plaintiff in part asserts claims against the federal Defendants pursuant to Bivens and

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9

 Plaintiff also refers to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Person Act of 1980 or

CRIPA. “CRIPA authorizes the United States Attorney General to institute civil actions

against states, as well as various state entities, officials, and employees, for violating the

constitutional rights of individuals residing in or confined to an institution within that state

[but] CRIPA does not authorize a private right of action.” Boyd v. Stern, No. CV06-360,

2007 WL 1292148, at *8 (W.D. Wash. May 2, 2007) (citing McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d

780, 782, n.3 (9th Cir. 1986) and Cooper v. Sumner, 672 F.Supp. 1361, 1367 (D. Nev.

1987)); see McRorie, 795 F.2d at 782, n.3 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997j); O’Haire v. Napa State

Hosp., No. C07-0002, 2009 WL 2447752, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2009); Laing v.

Kulongoski, No. CV08-1274, 2009 WL 1067044, at *1 (D. Or. Apr. 20, 2009) (citing

McRorie). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed to the extent that he asserts

a claim under CRIPA.

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42 U.S.C. § 1985.9 To state a claim under Bivens, a plaintiff must allege that persons acting

under color of federal law violated his constitutional rights. Martin v. Sias, 88 F.3d 774, 775

(9th Cir. 1996) (citing Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir. 1991)). Thus, an

action under Bivens is identical to one brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 except for the

replacement of a state actor under § 1983 by a federal actor under Bivens. Id. However, a

Bivens claim may only be maintained against officials acting under color of federal law in

their individual capacities. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994) (federal agencies

are not proper defendants in a Bivens action); Myers v. U.S. Marshals Serv., No.

CV10-2662, 2011 WL 671998, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2011). Sovereign immunity

prevents Bivens-type actions against the United States, its agencies, or its employees in their

official capacities. Arnsberg v. United States, 757 F.2d 971, 980 (9th Cir. 1984); Holloman

v. Watt, 708 F.2d 1399, 1401-02 (9th Cir. 1983). 

Plaintiff’s Bivens claims against Judges Bolton, Bury, Teilborg, and Rosenblatt will

be dismissed for two reasons. First, Plaintiff may not collaterally challenge orders or

judgments entered in a previous case by bringing a new action. Rather, an appeal or other

relief must be sought in the original case. 28 U.S.C. § 1291; see Bell v. Eastman Kodak Co.,

214 F.3d 798, 801 (7th Cir. 2000) (“A collateral attack on a final judgment is not a

permissible substitute for appealing the judgment within the time, standardly 30 days, for

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appealing the judgment of a federal district court.”); Mitchell v. City of Los Angeles, 753

F.2d 86, 87 (9th Cir. 1984) (failure to appeal order dismissing earlier case may not be

collaterally attacked); see also Fleury v. Clayton, 847 F.2d 1229, 1233 (7th Cir. 1988) (“The

Due Process Clause does not authorize collateral attacks on civil judgments[.]”). 

Second, Judges Bolton, Bury, Teilborg, and Rosenblatt are absolutely immune from

suit for judicial acts such as rulings in Plaintiff’s cases. As the Ninth Circuit has explained:

Anglo-American common law has long recognized judicial immunity, a

“sweeping form of immunity” for acts performed by judges that relate to the

“judicial process.” Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98

L.Ed.2d 555 (1988); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n. 20, 96 S.Ct.

984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). This absolute immunity insulates judges from

charges of erroneous acts or irregular action, even when it is alleged that such

action was driven by malicious or corrupt motives, Forrester, 484 U.S. at

227-28, 108 S.Ct. 538, or when the exercise of judicial authority is “flawed by

the commission of grave procedural errors.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.

349, 359, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978). Judicial immunity

discourages collateral attacks on final judgments through civil suits, and thus

promotes the use of “appellate procedures as the standard system for

correcting judicial error.” Forrester, 484 U.S. at 225, 108 S.Ct. 538. “Most

judicial mistakes or wrongs are open to correction through ordinary

mechanisms of review.” Id.

In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added); FutureSource LLC v.

Reuters Ltd., 312 F.3d 281, 286 (7th Cir. 2002); Evans v. Pugrud, No. CV-08-36-BU-RFCCSO, 2008 WL 2595010 at *2 (D. Mont. May 23, 2008) (“[j]udicial immunity applies not

only to lawsuits for damages, but also to lawsuits seeking declaratory, injunctive, and other

forms of equitable relief.”). Because the only basis for relief pursuant to Bivens asserted by

Plaintiff against these Defendants are their rulings in his previous cases, these Defendants

are entitled to absolute judicial immunity as to any Bivens claim against them. 

Plaintiff also purports to seek relief against the federal Defendants pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1985. As with a Bivens claim, sovereign immunity bars suits against federal

officers acting in their official capacity for alleged conspiracy to interfere with civil rights

or failure to prevent deprivation of civil rights. See Davis v. United States, 204 F.3d 723,

726 (7th Cir. 2000). In addition, as with Bivens, the federal Defendants are entitled to

absolute judicial immunity as to such claims, which are predicated solely their on judicial

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10 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that (1) the

conduct about which he complains was committed by a person acting under the color of state

law and (2) the conduct deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right. Wood v.

Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989). In addition, to state a valid constitutional

claim, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of

a particular defendant, and he must allege an affirmative link between the injury and the

conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). To state a

claim under § 1985 for obstruction of justice or conspiracy to deprive a person of equal

protection, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that he suffered discrimination based upon

his race. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971); Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d

1014, 1028 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff does not allege any facts to support discrimination or

a conspiracy against him motivated by his race. Instead, he alleges discrimination against

“alleged convicted sex-offenders.” (Doc. 1, Complaint at 8.) Convicted sex offenders do not

constitute a suspect class. Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 700 (9th Cir. 2006); see also

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1999) (indigent inmates are not a suspect

class).

11 CV06-0938 was initially assigned to Judge Teilborg and subsequently reassigned

to Judge Bolton pursuant to Rule 3.4(b) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

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acts. Van Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431, 1435-36 (10th Cir. 1986), accord Yandal v.

City of Mayfield, No. 1:10CVP92, 2010 WL 4638864, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 5, 2010); see

Boruski v. Stewart, 381 F. Supp. 529, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Smallwood v. United States, 358

F.Supp. 398. 403-404 (E.D. Mo. 1973). For the reasons discussed, Plaintiff’s federal claims

against the federal Defendants will be dismissed. 

IV. Federal Claims Against Bohland

Plaintiff asserts violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 against Attorney Bohland.10

However, he fails to state a claim against her under either section. 

Plaintiff has repeatedly sued Bohland based on her representation, as an assistant

attorney general, of clients in CV04-2771. See Jenkins v. Valiz, No. CV10-0746-PHX-SRB,

doc. 1 at 13, 15-16; Jenkins v. State of Arizona, No. CV09-1204-PHX-SRB, doc. 3 at 2A,

5; Jenkins v. Schriro, CV08-2103-PHX-PGR, doc. 1; Jenkins v. Bohland, No. CV06-00938-

PHX-SRB, doc. 1 at 2, 3.11 Specifically, Plaintiff has sued Bohland based on a statement

included in a motion to dismiss filed by her in CV04-2771: “Jenkins is a convicted felon

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serving a twenty-three (23) [sic] year sentence for Molestation of a Child, a class 2 repetitive

felony and dangerous crime against a child.” CV04-2771, doc. 25 at 2. Plaintiff may not

collaterally attack conduct of a prior case in a subsequent action. Rather, an appeal or other

relief must be sought in the original case. 28 U.S.C. § 1291; see Bell, 214 F.3d at 801;

Mitchell, 753 F.2d at 87; see also Fleury, 847 F.2d at 1233. Because Plaintiff predicates his

federal claims against Bohland on her representation of defendants in one of Plaintiff’s prior

cases, he fails to state a federal claim against her. 

V. Failure to State a State Law Claim

Plaintiff also asserts state law claims for exploitation of a vulnerable adult, apparently

referring to himself, in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (ARS) §§ 46-455 and 14-5101.

Section 14-5101 provides definitions for terms used in Chapter 5 of Title 14, which concerns

the protection of persons under disability and subject to protective proceedings or

guardianships. See ARS § 14-5102. Plaintiff does not allege that he is or has ever been

subject to protective proceedings or a guardianship, nor does he allege that any Defendant

has had any involvement in such proceedings concerning him.

Section 46-455 is part of Chapter 4 of Title 46, which concerns adult protective

services. Section 46-455 makes it a class 5 felony for a person who provides care to a

vulnerable adult to endanger the vulnerable adult’s life and provides a private cause of action

against any person or enterprise that has been employed to provide care to a vulnerable adult.

ARS § 46-455(a), (b). Plaintiff does not allege that any of the Defendants was employed to

provide care to him, assuming that he is or was a vulnerable adult within the meaning of the

statute. As discussed herein, the federal Defendants presided over various of Plaintiff’s prior

lawsuits and Bohland defended state employees in one of the lawsuits. Those facts do not

give rise to a state law claim under ARS § 46-455. 

VI. Dismissal without Leave to Amend

Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim or to even allege facts that could plausibly

give rise to a claim for violation of his federal rights in his Complaint, the Complaint will be

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dismissed without leave to amend. As discussed above, Plaintiff cannot amend his

Complaint to state a claim against the federal Defendants, who are each entitled to absolute

judicial immunity with respect to their rulings in Plaintiff’s previous cases. Plaintiff also

cannot state a claim against Bohland in this action concerning statements included in a

motion she filed on behalf of her clients, whom Plaintiff sued in a prior case. Accordingly,

Plaintiff will also be denied leave to amend as to Bohland. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) The Complaint and this action are dismissed for failure to state a claim without

leave to amend. (Doc. 1.) 

(2) Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied as moot. (Doc. 12.)

(3) The Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly.

(4) The docket shall reflect that the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(3) and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(3)(A), that any appeal of this

decision would not be taken in good faith.

DATED this 8th day of December, 2011.

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