Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00457/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00457-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 31:3729 False Claims Act

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28 * This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex rel. )

MARY HENDOW and JULIE ALBERTSON, ) 2:03-cv-0457-GEB-DAD

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX, )

)

Defendant. )

)

Defendant moves to have language included in the Order filed

August 17, 2007 (“Order”) which would authorize Defendant to pursue an

interlocutory appeal of that Order in this qui tam action. The

Relators oppose the motion.

An order may be certified for interlocutory appeal when it

“involves a controlling question of law as to which there is

substantial ground for difference of opinion and [] an immediate

appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination

of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

Case 2:03-cv-00457-GEB-DAD Document 148 Filed 01/08/08 Page 1 of 3
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Defendant argues the Order conflicts with the Ninth

Circuit’s decision in United States ex rel. Barajas v. United States,

258 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), and the Sixth Circuit’s decision in

United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 342 F.3d 634

(6th Cir. 2003). The Order states in pertinent part: “Since the

[settlement agreement negotiated between Defendant and the Department

of Education (“Settlement Agreement”)] did not constitute an

‘election’ of an ‘alternate remedy’ by the ‘Government’ within the

meaning of the [False Claims Act (“FCA”)], the Relators’ action is not

moot.” (Order at 3:23-4:1.) At issue is whether the Settlement

Agreement effectively settled the FCA claims in the pending action. 

The Relators in the pending action point to language in the

Settlement Agreement which explicitly excluded the pending FCA claims

from the settlement. (Relators’ Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Interloc.

App. at 8.) Therefore, Defendant has not shown that the Order

conflicts with either Barajas or Bledsoe. In Barajas, the government

declined to intervene, but the Air Force subsequently entered into a

settlement agreement “for precisely the same problem” involved in that

qui tam action. Barajas, 258 F.3d at 1011. Barajas concluded that

“[u]nder the circumstances . . . construing [the settlement] as an

‘alternate remedy’ under the FCA [was] inconsistent with both the

plain language and the purpose of the statute.” Id. at 1013-14. 

Additionally, in Bledsoe the court held that the settlement in that

qui tam action concerned “the same FCA claims,” and therefore

constituted an “‘alternate remedy’ for purposes of 31 U.S.C. 

§ 3730(c)(5).” Bledsoe, 342 F.3d at 649.

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Since Defendant has not shown that the Order involves a

controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground

for difference of opinion, the motion is denied. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 7, 2008

 GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 2:03-cv-00457-GEB-DAD Document 148 Filed 01/08/08 Page 3 of 3