Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-03341/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-03341-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KYLE AVERY,

Plaintiff,

v.

MARC ELIA, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:11-cv-03341 JAM JFM (PC)

ORDER AND FINDINGS & 

RECOMMENDATIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Kyle Avery is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this 

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter was referred to a United States 

Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. This matter is before 

the court on the motion of defendants Carter, Elia, Konrade, and Virga to dismiss pursuant to Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), filed on February 15, 2013. ECF No. 27. On April 18, 2013, defendant 

Beard joined in the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 34), and on April 29, 2013, defendant Jones 

joined in the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 36). In response to defendants’ motion to dismiss, 

plaintiff has filed, on March 18, 2013, a motion to amend his complaint (ECF No. 31) and 

subsequently on May 2, 2013, a motion styled as a motion to deny defendant Beard’s joinder and 

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defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 38).1 In his motion, plaintiff contends that defendants’ 

motion to dismiss should be denied pending the court’s ruling on his outstanding motion to 

amend. ECF No. 38. For the reasons set forth, infra, the court finds the allegations in plaintiff’s 

operative first amended complaint are sufficient and will recommend that defendants’ motion to 

dismiss be denied. For that reason the court will also deny plaintiff’s motion to amend his 

complaint as unnecessary.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility in San Diego, 

California. Plaintiff was housed at California State Prison-Sacramento during the period when 

the alleged violations occurred, and when he filed this action. ECF Nos. 1 and 25 at 5. 

Plaintiff filed his original complaint on December 16, 2011. ECF No. 1. On March 19, 

2012, the court found that plaintiff’s complaint stated a cognizable claim for relief and deemed 

service appropriate for defendants Carter, Elia, Goekee, Konrade, and Virga. ECF No. 4. On 

July 31, 2012, defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). ECF No. 

19. On September 28, 2012, plaintiff filed a motion to amend his complaint. On October 17, 

2012, the court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss without prejudice and granted plaintiff’s 

motion to amend his complaint. ECF No. 22.

On November 1, 2012, plaintiff filed a document styled as a motion for designation of 

class action, a motion to appoint counsel, and a request for class status. ECF No. 23. Plaintiff 

attached his amended complaint to this document. Id. at 2-41. In his first amended complaint, 

plaintiff alleges violations of his rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment 

and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ECF No. 25. In short, plaintiff 

alleges defendants made him extinguish a controlled fire while he and other Wiccan inmates were 

in the middle of a religious ceremony, and that they were no longer allowed to use the fire pit for 

that religious purpose. Id. at 26-27. Plaintiff also alleges he was initially given the right to 

possess an “altar box designed to religious specifications” for his Wiccan practices, but that this 

 

1 On April 19, 2013, plaintiff filed a motion styled as a motion to compel court reply (ECF No. 

35), seeking an order on his motion to amend. That motion is mooted by this order.

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altar was later confiscated and destroyed. Id. at 31-33. Plaintiff argues the deprivation of a fire 

pit and a religious altar resulted in a violation of his First Amendment rights. Id. at 27, 33. 

Plaintiff further alleges defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying him the 

right to use a fire pit for religious purposes while authorizing the use of a fire pit for Native 

Americans. Id. at 35-36. Finally, plaintiff seeks to have Wiccans recognized by California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) policy in the same manner Native 

Americans are recognized. Id. at 30. 

On January 18, 2013, the court denied plaintiff’s motion for designation of class counsel 

and request for the appointment of counsel. ECF No. 24 at 2. The court dismissed Bill Goekee 

as a defendant in the case pursuant to plaintiff’s representations that he was no longer bringing 

claims against him. Id. The court found that the first amended complaint stated a cognizable 

claim for relief and ordered defendants Elia, Virga, Konrade, and Carter to respond. Id. The 

court deemed service appropriate for three new defendants: Sgt. Jones, Correctional Officer 

Huggins and the CDCR Secretary Dr. Jeffrey Beard. Id.

Defendants Carter, Elia, Konrade, Virga, Beard and Jones (collectively “defendants”) 

move to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint on four grounds: (1) plaintiff fails to state a Free Exercise 

Clause claim; (2) plaintiff fails to state an Equal Protection Clause claim, (3) plaintiff is not 

entitled to injunctive relief or punitive damages; and (4) defendants are entitled to qualified 

immunity. ECF No. 27 at 1. As noted above, plaintiff has moved to amend his complaint and has 

requested that defendants’ motion to dismiss be denied pending ruling on the motion to amend. 

ECF No. 31. Plaintiff has not otherwise opposed the motion to dismiss on the merits. 

III. ANALYSIS

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures provides for motions to dismiss for 

“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In 

considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court must accept as true 

the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S. Ct. 2197 

(2007), and construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 

416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint 

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must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must 

contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007). However, “[s]pecific facts are not 

necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘“give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim 

is and the grounds upon which it rests.”’” Erickson, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S. Ct. at 2200 (quoting Bell 

Atlantic at 554, in turn quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. See

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 

should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 

support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 

U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 

1981).

Moreover, “[n]otice pleading requires the plaintiff to set forth in his complaint claims for 

relief, not causes of action, statutes or legal theories.” Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). “‘This simplified notice pleading standard relies on 

liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to 

dispose of unmeritorious claims.’” Alvarez, 518 F.3d at 1157 (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema 

N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002)). “A complaint need not identify the statutory or constitutional 

source of the claim raised in order to survive a motion to dismiss.” Id.

A. First Amendment - Free Exercise Clause Claim

Defendants argue that plaintiff fails to “allege that the denial of the use of a fire pit or the 

confiscation of [his] religious altar substantially burdened his religious practice.” ECF No. 27-1 

at 5. For the reasons discussed below, the court finds defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s 

Free Exercise claim should be denied. 

“To prevail on [his] Free Exercise claim, Plaintiff[] must allege facts plausibly showing 

that the government denied [him] ‘a reasonable opportunity of pursuing [his] faith comparable to 

the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts.’” 

Hartmann v. California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 707 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 

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2103) (quoting Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (per curiam)).

With regard to the use of a fire pit, plaintiff alleges in his first amended complaint that he 

was provided a religious lodge area on natural ground because, among other reasons, Wiccans 

require “a soiled area in which to dig a fire pit for control burning at rituals & ceremonies 

[relevant] to the Wiccan or individual practitioners doctrines or personal religious practices and 

observations.” ECF No. 25 at 9. Plaintiff alleges that his religious practice uses a fire pit for 

ceremonies. Id. at 11. Plaintiff also alleges that Native Americans “are being provided fire wood 

each month to place in their sweat lodge fire and sweat ceremonies,” and that Wiccans have “an 

equal stake in [their] religious practices of utilizing a fire pit for religious ceremonies.” ECF No. 

25 at 11. Regarding the use of a religious altar, plaintiff describes the altar as religious in nature, 

and explains that the altar was released to him so that his Wiccan practices were not “contingent 

on a [C]hristian or [C]atholic worship [schedule] which is not how Wiccans practice.” Id. at 14. 

Plaintiff further alleges that “[a]n [altar] is a religiously rooted tool identified in the Wiccan 

doctrine and plaintiff held it as religiously valuable to” him. Id. at 33. Finally, plaintiff alleges 

that the loss of the altar posed a “significant hardship in the loss of a [consecrated] spiritual item 

of value hard to replace.” Id. at 34.

Plaintiff is not required to specifically allege the denial “substantially burdened” his 

practice by using precise legal theory language. Alvarez, 518 F.3d at 1157. Viewed in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff, the allegations are sufficient to give rise to an inference that the 

use of the fire pit and religious altar were tied to plaintiff’s religious faith, and that by not having 

these items plaintiff was deprived a “reasonable opportunity of pursing his faith comparable to 

the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts.” Cruz, 

405 U.S. at 322; Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1122-23. Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient “to raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554. Therefore, the court finds 

that the first amended complaint states a cognizable claim for a violation of the Free Exercise 

Clause of the First Amendment against defendants.

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B. Fourteenth Amendment - Equal Protection Clause Claim

Defendants argue that plaintiff fails to state an Equal Protection Clause claim because “he 

does not allege that fire played an equally important or similar role in Wiccan and Native 

American religious services[,] [and] does not explain the role fire plays in Wiccan religious 

ceremonies or why its use was necessary.” ECF No. 27-1 at 5-6. Defendants further argue that 

plaintiff fails to allege they acted “intentionally and with a discriminatory intent when they 

allegedly denied Wiccans a fire pit.” Id. at 6. For the reasons discussed below, the court finds 

defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim should be denied. 

As discussed above, “an inmate who is an adherent of a minority religion must be 

afforded ‘a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity afforded 

fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts.’” Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 

563, 568 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322). “To prevail on an Equal Protection 

claim brought under § 1983, Plaintiff[] must allege facts plausibly showing that the defendants 

acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against [him] based upon membership in a 

protected class.” Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1123 (quotations and citations omitted).

Here, plaintiff asserts he is a member of the Wiccan religion. In his operative first 

amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that Wiccans require “a soiled area in which to dig a fire pit 

for control burning at rituals & ceremonies [relevant] to the Wiccan . . . doctrines or personal 

religious practices and observations.” ECF No. 25 at 9. Plaintiff further alleges that “[t]he 

burning of a [hearth] fire [is] . . . rooted in religious doctrine.” Id. at 26. Viewed in the light most 

favorable to plaintiff, these allegations are sufficient to give rise to an inference that fire plays an 

important role in Wiccan religious practices. As noted above, plaintiff alleges that Native 

Americans “are being provided fire wood each month to place in their sweat lodge fire and sweat 

ceremonies,” and that Wiccans have “an equal stake in [their] religious practices of utilizing a fire 

pit for religious ceremonies.” ECF No. 25 at 11. Finally, the court finds plaintiff sufficiently 

alleged facts showing that “defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against” 

him. Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1123. Plaintiff specifically refers to defendant Elia’s actions as 

“[discriminating] against Wiccans right to fire usage” and he alleges that “it was not ever 

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previously nor to this day established that there was a clearly established penal reason and the 

order was clearly evident as being discriminatory in nature.” Id. at 12, 27.

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that fire plays a significant role 

in his religious practice in the same manner it does for Native American practices, and that 

defendants acted with discriminatory intent to state a cognizable claim for a violation of the Equal 

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against defendants. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz, 534 

U.S. at 515 (to survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case, as “Rule 

8(a) establishes a pleading standard without regard to whether a claim will succeed on the 

merits”). Whether defendants acted intentionally and whether their actions were reasonably 

related to legitimate penological concerns are issues more appropriately addressed through 

discovery and summary judgment motions. Alvarez, 518 F.3d at 1157.

C. Plaintiff’s Request for Injunctive Relief or Punitive Damages

Plaintiff seeks both injunctive relief and punitive damages in this action. ECF No. 25 at 

30. Defendants contend that because plaintiff has been transferred from California State PrisonSacramento he lacks standing to seek injunctive relief. ECF No. 27-1 at 7. The requirements for 

standing to sue are well-established. A party who seeks to establish standing must show (1) a 

concrete and imminent “injury in fact,” (2) a causal connection between the defendants and the 

alleged injury, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. 

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). A party’s standing to bring a claim 

is determined at the time an action is filed. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 569 n.4. Plainly, plaintiff was 

housed at California State Prison-Sacramento when he filed his original complaint on December 

16, 2011. ECF No. 1. Furthermore, plaintiff was directly affected by the actions set forth in the 

operative first amended complaint. Therefore, the court finds plaintiff has standing and 

defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief on these grounds should be 

denied.

2

 

 

2 Defendants have not argued plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief has become moot as a result 

of his transfer from California State Prison-Sacramento following the filing of his complaint. 

However, defendants would not succeed on this argument, either. Plaintiff was not transferred 

from California State Prison-Sacramento until approximately April 2012. ECF No. 9. Generally, 

when a prisoner is transferred from a prison, his claim for injunctive or declaratory relief becomes 

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Defendants also argue that plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages should be dismissed. 

They contend that plaintiff’s “allegations show that Defendants had reasonable, non-malicious 

reasons for their actions,” and are therefore “insufficient to show that Defendants acted with 

reckless or callous indifference” so that plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages is not proper. ECF 

No. 27-1 at 8. 

In Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 38 (1983), the Supreme Court rejected the argument that 

actual malicious intent “should be required . . . [in a § 1983 action] because the threshold for 

punitive damages should always be higher than that for liability in the first instance.” The 

Supreme Court turned to the common law standard for assessing punitive damages, which 

authorized “[p]unitive damages . . . for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil 

motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others.” Smith, 461 U.S. at 46-47. Punitive 

damages may be available even in circumstances where the plaintiff is unable to show 

compensable injury. Id. at 55 n.21; Davis v. Mason Co., 927 F.2d 1473, 1485 (9th Cir. 1991).

Here, plaintiff alleges defendants Virga and Elia willfully discriminated against him. ECF 

No. 25 at 13, 27. Plaintiff alleges defendant Konrade knew the religious altar belonged to 

plaintiff when he gave orders to have it removed from the facility, and then later refused to return 

 

moot as to conditions at that particular facility. Nelson v. Heiss, 271 F.3d 891, 897 (9th Cir. 

2001); see also Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1995). However, plaintiff “may sue 

for injunctive relief to the extent he claims systemic discrimination against” Wiccans throughout 

the CDCR. Rupe v. Cate, 688 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2010); see also Hartmann, 707 

F.3d at 1127 (“a plaintiff need only identify the law or policy challenged as a constitutional 

violation and name the official within the entity who can appropriately respond to injunctive 

relief”). Here, plaintiff alleges that the CDCR has failed to create a policy for Wiccans similar to 

one created for Native Americans, and that defendant CDCR Secretary Beard “has authority to 

enforce any rights this court declares plaintiff is entitled to.” ECF No. 25 at 8, 30. Plaintiff seeks 

“to incorporate in Agency Policies Equal Provisions [and] Protections of Land Sanctity [and] 

sweat style fire pits for Pagan Earth based religious groups as is already [i]ndoctrinated into 

policy in 15 CCR and [Department] Operations Manual[] for Native Americans.” ECF No. 25 at 

8; see, e.g., 15 Cal. Code. Reg. § 3000 (“Sweat Lodge means a native American Indian 

ceremonial hut”); CDCR Department Operations Manual section 101060.9.1 (providing 

guidelines regarding Native American sweat lodge ceremonies, including permitted sacred items); 

Fed. R. Evid. 201 (a court may take judicial notice of a fact not subject to reasonable dispute 

because the fact is capable of accurate and ready determination from sources whose accuracy 

cannot reasonably be questioned). The alleged failure to include provisions for the Wiccan 

religion in the California Code of Regulations and the CDCR Department Operations Manual

forms the basis of plaintiff’s claim against defendant CDCR Secretary Beard. ECF No. 25 at 8, 

11, 29-30. Because plaintiff is still incarcerated in a prison run by the CDCR, his claim based on 

this alleged failure to create a policy that provides for Wiccan practitioners is not moot. Rupe, 

688 F.Supp.2d at 1043.

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it to plaintiff. Id. at 17. Plaintiff alleges defendants’ actions are retaliatory in nature “to a point it 

appears aimed at plaintiff’s advocacy” of the Wiccan religion. Id. at 31. Finally, plaintiff alleges 

defendants’ actions were meant to “antagonize” him. Id. at 32. Based on the facts alleged, the 

court finds a jury could conclude that defendants were “motivated by evil motive or intent” or 

acted with “reckless or callous indifference” to plaintiff’s first amendment rights when they 

denied him access to a fire pit and a religious altar. Smith, 461 U.S. at 56. Thus, defendants’ 

motion to dismiss plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages should be denied.

D. Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiff’s Free Exercise 

Clause claim because the constitutional right of Wiccans to maintain a fire pit was not clearly 

established at the relevant time, and plaintiff did not have a constitutional right to possess an altar. 

ECF No. 27-1 at 9-10. 

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability 

where “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 

which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) 

(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “Qualified immunity balances two 

important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power 

irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they 

perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. Because qualified immunity is “an 

immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,” it must be resolved at the “earliest 

possible stage in litigation.” Id. at 231-32.

To determine if an official is entitled to qualified immunity the court determines (1) if the 

facts as alleged state a violation of a constitutional right and (2) if the right is clearly established 

so that a reasonable official would have known that his conduct was unlawful. Ashcroft v. alKidd, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011). A negative answer to either question 

means immunity from suit is appropriate. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. District courts are 

“permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified 

immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at 

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hand.” Id. Here, the prongs of the qualified immunity analysis will be addressed in the order 

they are listed above.

As to the first prong, the court has determined, for the reasons stated above, that plaintiff’s 

allegations are sufficient to establish the existence of a violation of his rights under the Free 

Exercise Clause. 

Therefore, whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity turns on whether the 

constitutional right was clearly established such that defendants would have known that their 

conduct was unlawful. “For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours must be 

sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer would understand that what he is doing violates that 

right.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002). “Because the focus is on whether the officer 

had fair notice that her conduct was unlawful, reasonableness is judged against the backdrop of 

the law at the time of the conduct. If the law at the time did not clearly establish that the officer’s 

conduct would violate the Constitution, the officer should not be subject to liability or, indeed, 

even the burdens of litigation.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004). This part of the 

inquiry “‘must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general 

proposition.’” Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). 

“This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action 

in question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law 

the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (citation 

omitted). “If the only reasonable conclusion from binding authority were that the disputed right 

existed, even if no case had specifically so declared, prison officials would be on notice of the 

right and would not be qualifiedly immune if they acted to offend it.” Blueford v. Prunty, 108 

F.3d 251, 255 (9th Cir. 1997). In other words, “‘[c]losely analogous preexisting case law is not 

required to show that a right was clearly established.’” Sorrels v. McKee, 290 F.3d 965, 970 (9th 

Cir. 2002) (quoting White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1238 (9th Cir. 2000)). “Specificity only 

requires that the unlawfulness be apparent under preexisting law,” Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 

898, 906 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted), and prison personnel “can still be on notice that their 

conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances,” Hope, 536 U.S. at 741. 

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“[T]he right allegedly violated must be defined at the appropriate level of specificity 

before a court can determine if it was clearly established.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 

(1999). Here, plaintiff alleges defendants burdened the practice of his religion by preventing him 

from using a fire pit and a religious altar, which he believes are mandated by his faith. ECF No. 

25 at 27, 33. It was clearly established at the time of the alleged violations that prison officials 

may not substantially burden inmates’ right to the free exercise of religion without some 

legitimate penological justification.3 See Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 883-84 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(“Inmates retain the protections afforded by the First Amendment, ‘including its directive that no 

law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.’”) (quoting O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 

342, 348 (1987)); see also Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322. Defendants argue that they are entitled to 

qualified immunity because a case addressing the specific nature of plaintiff’s claim - that is 

whether a Wiccan inmate’s constitutional rights are violated when he is denied access to a fire pit 

and a religious altar - does not exist. However, the analysis does not end here. Defendants’ 

actions are not automatically protected because their actions have not previously been held 

unlawful. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640; see also Sorrels, 290 F.3d at 970. Rather, defendants’ 

alleged unlawfulness can be apparent “in the light of pre-existing law.” Id. At the time of the 

alleged conduct, case law existed to put defendants on notice that their alleged actions violated 

established law, despite the fact that the circumstances in this particular action are to some degree 

novel, Hope, 536 U.S. at 741. See Shakur, 514 F.3d at 885 (finding a prison’s refusal to provide 

a Muslim inmate with a kosher meat diet implicated the free exercise clause); Warsoldier v. 

Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding Native American inmate’s religion was 

burdened by a grooming policy); Jackson v. Lewis, 163 F.3d 606 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished 

 

3 Defendants argue, in the alternative, that if the constitutional right was clearly established, then 

their actions were reasonable. However, the question to be addressed in the second prong of the 

qualified immunity analysis is not whether the clearly established right was validly restricted. 

Rather, this prong is met with a finding that the constitutional right was clearly established such 

that defendants would have known that their conduct was unlawful. The court need not and will 

not determine whether defendants’ restriction on plaintiff’s religious rights were “reasonably 

related to legitimate penological interests” because an analysis of the applicable Turner factors at 

this stage of the litigation is premature. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987) (setting 

forth four factors when determining if a restriction that infringes on an inmate’s rights is 

reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); see also Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 

1205, n.7 (9th Cir. 2010). That issue remains to be resolved in further proceedings.

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op.) (while finding summary judgment appropriate because a Wiccan inmate failed to provide 

evidence that tarot cards were central to the Wiccan religion or required for its observance, the 

Ninth Circuit also noted the prison “made a good faith accommodation of [the inmate’s] religious 

needs by permitting Wiccans to possess” various religious items); see also Prison Legal News v. 

Cook, 238 F.3d 1145, 1152 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Although unpublished decisions carry no 

precedential weight, Department Officials may have relied on these decisions to inform their 

views on whether the regulation was valid and whether enforcing it would be lawful.”).

In this case, the facts alleged by plaintiff, if proved, could establish a violation of 

plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. Furthermore, the contours of those constitutional rights were 

sufficiently clear such that defendants had “fair warning” that their alleged conduct was 

unconstitutional. Hope, 536 U.S. at 739, 41. Therefore, the court finds defendants are not 

entitled to dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s March 18, 2013, motion to amend his complaint (ECF No. 31) is denied as 

unnecessary;

2. Plaintiff’s April 19, 2013, motion to compel court reply (ECF No. 35) is denied as 

moot; 

3. Plaintiff’s May 2, 2013, motion to deny defendant Beard’s joinder in defendants’ 

motion to dismiss (ECF No. 38) is denied as moot; and

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ February 15, 2013, motion to dismiss (ECF No. 27) be denied;

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

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parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: August 14, 2013

aver3341.mtd

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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