Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00585/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00585-16/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Tort Action

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

HARRISON ORR, individually,

 Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, a 

public entity; STATE OF 

CALIFORNIA, a public entity; 

CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL 

OFFICERS BRAME, PLUMB, and 

DOES 1-10 individually,

 Defendants.

CIV. NO. 2:14-585 WBS EFB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Harrison Orr brought this civil rights action 

against defendants California Highway Patrol (“CHP”), Officer Jay 

Brame, and Officer Terrence Plumb, arising out of plaintiff’s 

arrest on August 3, 2013. Plaintiff alleged the officers 

unlawfully arrested him and used excessive force against him in 

violation of state and federal law. After a 10-day trial, the 

jury found for plaintiff only on certain claims against Plumb and 

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awarded plaintiff $125,000. Plaintiff now seeks attorney’s fees 

and expenses under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and California Civil Code § 

52.1(h).

I. Factual Background

As shown by the evidence at trial, Brame pulled 

plaintiff over on the morning of August 3, 2013 because he 

suspected him of driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. 

At the time, plaintiff was a 76-year-old man with slurred speech 

and difficulties balancing as a result of a brain stem stroke he 

suffered in 2006. Plaintiff’s disabilities caused him to fail 

several sobriety tests. As a further measure, Plumb arrived at 

the scene with a breathalyzer testing device. Plaintiff blew a 

0.0, indicating he had not been drinking. Plaintiff testified 

that he repeatedly told the officers he had suffered from a 

stroke that affected his balance, while the officers insisted at 

trial that plaintiff used the word “neurological condition.” The 

officers believed plaintiff was under the influence of drugs and 

arrested him.

Although plaintiff was initially cooperative, he 

refused to be handcuffed. In an attempt to handcuff plaintiff, 

the officers grabbed him from either side, Plumb punched 

plaintiff in his stomach, and the officers took plaintiff to the 

ground. Brame then transported plaintiff to the CHP office, 

where it was determined he was not under the influence of drugs. 

Plaintiff was then booked for resisting arrest in violation of 

California Penal Code section 148 and remained in custody at the 

county jail until approximate 1:00 a.m.

The jury did not find Brame or the CHP liable on any of 

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plaintiff’s claims. It returned a verdict against Plumb on the 

following claims: (1) unlawful arrest for the offense of 

resisting arrest in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California 

state law; (2) use of excessive force in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 and California state law; and (3) interference with civil 

rights in violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ.

Code § 52.1. The jury awarded plaintiff $125,000 in compensatory 

damages, but found that Plumb’s conduct did not merit an award of 

punitive damages. 

II. Attorney’s Fees

Section 1988 permits the court, in its discretion, to 

award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in an 

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). A 

“prevailing party” is one who succeeds on any significant issue 

in the litigation, resulting in a “material alteration of the 

legal relationship of the parties.” Tex. State Teacher’s Ass’n 

v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93 (1989). The 

Bane Act also provides for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees 

to a prevailing plaintiff. See Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(h). While 

Plumb does not dispute that plaintiff is the prevailing party or 

that he is entitled to attorney’s fees under § 1988 and 

subsection 52.1(h), he disputes the size of the fee award 

plaintiff requests. 

Courts typically determine the amount of a fee award 

under § 1988 in two stages. First, courts apply the “‘lodestar’ 

method to determine what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s 

fee.” Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 

2013) (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit “‘presum[es]’ that 

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the district court accounts for the following factors in the 

lodestar computation: ‘(1) the novelty and complexity of the 

issues, (2) the special skill and experience of counsel, (3) the 

quality of representation, (4) the results obtained, and (5) the 

contingent nature of the fee agreement.’” Id. at 1209 n.11 

(quoting Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 & n.9 

(9th Cir. 1996)). 

“After making that computation, the district 

court then assesses whether it is necessary to adjust the 

presumptively reasonable lodestar figure on the basis of the Kerr

factors that are not already subsumed in the initial lodestar 

calculation.” Morales, 96 F.3d at 363-64.1 The Ninth Circuit 

has emphasized that a district court’s application of the Kerr

factors should reflect the extent to which those factors “bear on 

the reasonableness of a fee award.” Id. at 361. “[I]f the 

district court has ‘taken [any of the Kerr factors] into account 

in either the reasonable hours component or the reasonable rate 

 

1 Those factors include:

(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and 

difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill 

requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) 

the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due 

to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) 

whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time 

limitations imposed by the client or the 

circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results 

obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability 

of the attorneys, (10) the “undesirability” of the 

case, (11) the nature and length of the professional 

relationship with the client, and (12) awards in 

similar cases.

Kerr v. Screen Guild Extras, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 

1975). 

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component of the lodestar calculation,’ then it should not again 

reduce the lodestar” based on those factors. Gonzalez, 729 F.3d 

at 1209 n.11 (quoting Morales, 96 F.3d at 363 & n.9). 

In determining the size of an appropriate fee award, 

the Supreme Court has emphasized that courts need not “achieve 

auditing perfection” or “become green-eyeshade accountants.” Fox 

v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, ---, 131 S.Ct. 2205, 2217 (2011). Rather, 

because the “essential goal of shifting fees . . . is to do rough 

justice,” the court may “use estimates” or “take into account 

[its] overall sense of a suit” to determine a reasonable 

attorney’s fee. Id.

A. Lodestar Calculation

1. Reasonable Hourly Rate

“In addition to computing a reasonable number of hours, 

the district court must determine a reasonable hourly rate to use 

for attorneys and paralegals in computing the lodestar amount.” 

Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1205 (citation omitted). A reasonable 

hourly rate is not defined “by reference to the rates actually 

charged by the prevailing party.” Chalmers v. City of Los 

Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986). Rather, reasonable 

fees must be calculated based on the prevailing market rates 

charged by “attorneys in the relevant community engaged in 

‘equally complex Federal litigation.’” Prison Legal News v. 

Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d 446, 455 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Blum 

v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984)); see also Van Skike v. 

Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 557 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (“The Supreme Court has consistently held that 

reasonable fees ‘are to be calculated according to the prevailing 

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market rates in the relevant community.’” (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. 

at 895)). 

“Generally, when determining a reasonable hourly rate, 

the relevant community is the forum in which the district court 

sits.” Prison Legal News, 608 F.3d at 454 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). It is appropriate to rely on rates outside the 

local forum only where “local counsel was unavailable, either 

because they are unwilling or unable to perform because they lack 

the degree of experience, expertise, or specialization required 

to handle properly the case.” Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 

500 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 

1405 (9th Cir. 1992)). Although plaintiff’s counsel practice 

primarily in the San Francisco Bay Area, they concede they are 

entitled only to local, Sacramento rates. 

Plaintiff’s counsel seek hourly rates of $550 for 

Haddad and Sherwin, $360 for Guertin, and $300 for Altomare and 

Helm for attorney work and $150 for work done by paralegals or by 

attorneys at a paralegal rate. Plumb contends that reasonable 

hourly rates in Sacramento would be $400 for Haddad and Sherwin, 

$175 for Guertin, $150 for Helm and Altomare for attorney work, 

and $75 for work done by paralegals or at a paralegal rate. 

Haddad has over 23 years of experience as a civil 

rights lawyer and has tried more than 20 cases, including 12 

police misconduct cases. (Haddad Decl. ¶¶ 3-16 (Docket No. 

181).) Sherwin has 19 years of experience as a civil rights 

lawyer and has tried 14 cases. (Sherwin Decl. ¶¶ 23-48 (Docket 

No. 184).) Both are highly regarded civil rights attorneys. 

(See Merin Decl. ¶¶ 12-13 (Docket No. 186); Katz Decl. ¶ 19

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(Docket No. 185); Burton Decl. ¶¶ 12-13 (Docket No. 188); Burris 

Decl. ¶ 14 (Docket No. 181-6).) 

This court found in 2014 that $400 per hour was the 

prevailing market rate for attorney John Burris, who at the time 

had “nearly thirty-five years of legal experience and [] a record 

of high-profile representations in civil rights matters.” 

Deocampo v. Potts, No. Civ. 2:06-1283 WBS, 2014 WL 788429, at *9 

(E.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2014). The year before that, judges in this 

district similarly found that $400 was the market rate for

lawyers with similar expertise and experience. See, e.g., Lehr 

v. City of Sacramento, No. Civ. 2:07-01565 MCE GGH, 2013 WL 

1326546, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2013) (awarding $400 per hour 

to Mark Merin, a “highly qualified civil rights attorney with 

over 40 years of relevant litigation experience”); Knox v. 

Chiang, No. Civ. 2:05-02198 MCE CKD, 2013 WL 2434606, at *7 (E.D. 

Cal. June 5, 2013) (finding that “the prevailing hourly rate for 

experienced civil rights attorneys practicing in the Sacramento 

area does not exceed $400,” but awarding $450 per hour in light 

of the complexity of the case and counsel’s success in arguing 

the case before the Supreme Court).2 

 

2 In 2009, Judge Mendez found that a blended rate of $375 

was the appropriate market rate for Haddad and Sherwin. Beecham 

v. City of W. Sacramento, No. Civ. S:07-1115 JAM EFB, 2009 WL 

3824793, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2009); cf. Jones v. County of 

Sacramento, Civ. No. 2:09-1025 DAD, 2011 WL 3584332, at *8 (E.D. 

Cal. Aug. 12, 2011) (finding that an hourly rate of $350 for a 

civil rights attorney with thirty-five years of litigation 

experience was “in line with those prevailing in the Sacramento 

market”). 

Starting with the rate of $375 per hour from Beecham, 

plaintiff’s counsel inflate the rate by 7% per year to arrive at 

their requested rates. Although counsel presented evidence that 

the mean rate of fees in Sacramento increased by 16% between 2010 

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Mark Merin, a Sacramento civil rights attorney with 45

years of experience, indicates that plaintiff’s counsel’s 

requested rates are “well within the range of rates charged by 

and awarded to similarly experienced and qualified attorneys in 

the Sacramento area litigating hard-fought jury trials in federal 

court.” (Merin Decl. ¶¶ 5, 21.) Merin’s declaration does not, 

however, indicate that the rates charged in the cases he is 

comparing to this one are of similar complexity. Although § 1983 

cases can raise complex issues, this case raised fairly 

straightforward excessive force and unlawful arrest claims. The 

court would have found it more helpful if Merin had indicated the 

rate he would have requested in t`his case. In 2013, Merin 

requested an hourly rate of $550 in an arguably more complex 

civil rights case challenging the city’s “anti-camping” 

 

and 2012, (Pearl Decl. ¶ 12, Ex. F (Docket No. 183)), there is no 

evidence of such an increase in the succeeding years. Plumb has 

also put forth evidence showing that a civil rights attorney with 

comparable skill had not increased her $300 hourly rate from 2005 

to 2011. (Compare Pass Decl. Ex. B-2 ¶ 9, with Moreno v. City of 

Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2008)). Nor can a 

general rate of increase for all Sacramento attorneys be assumed 

to apply to every practice area. The court is more persuaded by 

the rates currently charged and awarded. 

Plaintiff’s counsel also rely on the “2013 Ty Metrix,” 

which surveyed 35 partners and 43 associates in Sacramento to 

determine a market rate. This metrix, which does not appear to 

evaluate the experience, expertise, and practice areas of each 

lawyer is not helpful in determining the prevailing market rate 

in the community for this case. Moreover, while the copy 

plaintiff provided to the court is incomplete, it appears it may 

be similar or the same as the “CEB and Datacert | TyMetrix,” 

which this court has previously rejected in another civil rights 

case because it “is specifically designed for lawyers who work 

for ‘corporate clients.’” Johnson v. Wayside Prop., Inc., No. 

Civ. 2:13-1610 WBS AC, 2014 WL 6634324, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 

2014). 

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ordinance, but the court found that $400 was the prevailing 

market rate. Lehr, 2013 WL 1326546, at *1, *5, *7. 

Stewart Katz, a Sacramento civil rights attorney with 

37 years of experience also submitted a declaration in favor of 

plaintiff’s motion. (Katz Decl. ¶ 2.) Based on Katz’s civil 

rights experience and the court’s observations of him during a 

recent trial, the courts finds that he is of comparable skill and 

expertise as Haddad and Sherwin. Katz did not, however, indicate 

what rate he would have requested for this case or that he 

believes Haddad and Sherwin’s requested rates are consistent with 

the prevailing market rates for similar cases tried in this 

court. In 2011, Katz requested and received an hourly rate of 

$350 in a similarly complex excessive force case. See Jones v. 

City of Sacramento, Civ. No. S-09-1025 DAD, 2011 WL 3584332, at 

*6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2011).

The court is therefore not persuaded that the 

prevailing hourly rate of $400 for attorneys with comparable 

skill and experience litigating a case of this complexity in 

Sacramento has changed from what it was in 2014. See Deocampo, 

2014 WL 788429, at *9. That rate applied to the attorney in 

Deocampo, who had 35 years of experience and thus more experience 

than Haddad and Sherwin, who have 23 and 19 years of experience, 

respectively. Nor is this an exceptional case meriting a higher 

fee as in Knox, which “presented novel and complex issues” that 

plaintiff’s counsel successfully litigated in the Supreme Court. 

See 2013 WL 2434606, at *3, *8. Accordingly, the court finds 

that a reasonable hourly rate for Haddad and Sherwin is $400. 

Guertin is a sixth-year associate; Altomare is a thirdCase 2:14-cv-00585-WBS-EFB Document 203 Filed 12/22/15 Page 9 of 37
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year associate; and Helm is a second-year associate. (Sherwin 

Decl. ¶¶ 6-8.) The market rate for associates with comparable 

experience ranges “between $150 and $175 per hour.” Joe Hand 

Promotions, Inc. v. Albright, No. Civ. 2:11-2260 WBS CMK, 2013 WL 

4094403, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2013) (citations omitted); see 

also, e.g., Deocampo, 2014 WL 788429, at *9 (finding that the 

reasonable hourly rate for an associate with 7 years of 

experience, including 3 years of experience in civil rights 

litigation, was $175); Broad. Music Inc. v. Antigua Cantina & 

Grill, LLC, Civ. No. 2:12-1196 KJM DAD, 2013 WL 2244641, at *1 

(E.D. Cal. May 21, 2013) (awarding an hourly rate of $175 for an 

associate with 6 years of experience in a “routine copyright 

infringement case”). The court therefore finds that reasonable 

hourly rates are $175 for Guertin and $150 for Altomare and Helm. 

Finally, courts in this district have generally found 

that $75 is an appropriate hourly rate for paralegals. See, 

e.g., Albright, 2013 WL 4094403, at *3 (awarding an hourly rate 

of $75 for paralegals); Friedman v. Cal. State Emps. Ass’n, No. 

Civ. 2:00-101 WBS DAD, 2010 WL 2880148, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 

2010) (noting that “the paralegal rate favored in this district 

is $75 per hour” (citations omitted)). The court will therefore 

apply an hourly rate of $75 for the time expended by plaintiff’s 

paralegals or attorney time billed at a paralegal rate.

2. Hours Reasonably Expended

Under the lodestar method, “a district court must start 

by determining how many hours were reasonably expended on the 

litigation, and then multiply those hours by the prevailing local 

rate for an attorney of the skill required to perform the 

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litigation.” Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 

(9th Cir. 2008). In determining an appropriate fee award, “the 

district court should exclude hours ‘that are excessive, 

redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.’” McCown v. City of 

Fontana, 565 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hensley v. 

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). 

That standard is qualified by the Ninth Circuit’s 

admonition that, as a general rule, “the court should defer to 

the winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to how much time he 

was required to spend on the case.” Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112; 

see also E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., Civ. No. 00-2255 DLJ, 

2007 WL 4170514, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2007) (“[T]he court 

will not second-guess reasonable attorney conduct of a litigation 

strategy for the case.”). This principle particularly applies to 

plaintiffs’ attorneys in civil rights cases because, as here, 

such attorneys often work on a contingency basis and thus have

little incentive to expend unnecessary hours. See, e.g., Moreno, 

534 F.3d at 1112 (“It would be the highly unusual civil rights 

case where [a] plaintiff’s lawyer engages in churning.”); 

Blackwell v. Foley, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 

(“[I]f anything, an attorney working on contingency is less 

likely to expend unnecessary hours because the payoff is too 

uncertain.”). 

Here, plaintiff’s counsel submitted billing statements

reflecting a total of 1,539 hours, which is broken down to 493 

hours by Haddad, 301.7 hours by Sherwin, 284.5 hours by Guertin, 

326.6 hours by Helm, 7.2 hours by Altomare, and 126 hours by 

paralegals. Plumb objects that the total hours requested is 

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unreasonable and the court will address each of his arguments in 

turn. 

a. Objections to Discrete Tasks

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff filed a lengthy motion for summary judgment, 

(Docket Nos. 50-54), which the court denied in its entirety after 

finding numerous disputed issues of material fact, (Docket No. 

79). The court generally agrees with Plumb that plaintiff’s 

counsel could not have anticipated a strong probability of 

success on that motion because of the numerous factual disputes 

and reasonableness standard governing most of plaintiff’s claims. 

An experienced attorney could likely predict that plaintiff’s 

claims were not the types of claims a court can usually resolve 

as a matter of law at summary judgment. In Katz’s declaration 

that plaintiff submitted, Katz similarly noted that he “might not 

have brought the plaintiff’s motion for summary adjudication.” 

(Katz Decl. ¶ 14.) Katz recognized, however, that the motion 

“may have contributed to the overall result whether or not in 

isolation [it] was a motion on which plaintiff was likely to 

prevail.” (Id.) Sherwin also explains that much of the work to 

prepare plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment would have been 

necessary to oppose defendants’ motion for summary judgment and 

also “substituted for” trial preparation work. (Supp. Sherwin 

Decl. ¶ 7 (Docket No. 200).)3

 

3 Plaintiff’s counsel also explains that the summary 

judgment motions “gave all parties insight into what issues the 

Court deemed important at trial and what evidence it expected the 

parties to produce on those issues.” (Pl.’s Reply at 11:27-12:2

(Docket No. 189).) Suffice to say, it is not sufficient reason

to file a motion that lacks merit simply to gain insight from the 

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The court’s denial of plaintiff’s summary judgment 

motion, in itself, does not preclude plaintiff from recovering

those fees if plaintiff was reasonable in filing the motion.4 

Although the court questions whether the decision to seek summary 

judgment was reasonable in light of the facts and claims in this 

case, it generally agrees with counsel that much of the work 

would have been done to oppose defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment and prepare for trial. Of the 69.6 hours expended on 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, Helm billed 40.2 hours. 

In light of these considerations, the court will deduct 20 hours 

from Helm’s billings to account for work done exclusively to 

advance the summary judgment motion. 

 2. Mock Jury Trial

Plaintiff’s counsel expended a total of 31.9 hours for 

the time of four attorneys and 8.8 hours of paralegal time to 

present the case to a mock jury. The Ninth Circuit has held that 

“hours spent on a moot court trial run, and on consultations 

regarding a jury project related to the case,” may be “included 

in a fee award as long as the number of hours spent was 

reasonable.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 

896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990). While the mock jury valued 

 

court. 

4 The inquiry here is only whether it was reasonable for 

plaintiff to expend time in pursuit of summary judgment. The 

court will address a reduction to the lodestar based on 

plaintiff’s limited success in the litigation after considering 

all of Plumb’s objections to the hours expended on discrete 

tasks. See Morales, 96 F.3d at 363-64 & n.9. Moreover, a denial 

of summary judgment merely means the case has to go to the jury 

and is thus not the same type of “limited success” as a final 

judgment in favor of a defendant. 

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plaintiff’s case significantly higher than the actual jury did, 

the court does not find that the time counsel expended to perform 

a mock trial was unreasonable and therefore will not deduct any 

of that time. 

3. Dr. Chan

Plumb next objects to the 8.8 hours of attorney time 

expended in attempt to secure plaintiff’s treating physician’s 

testimony at trial. Sherwin has adequately explained why the 

time expended was reasonable, (see Supp. Sherwin Decl. ¶ 9), and 

the court will not reduce any of those hours. 

4. Post-Verdict Jury Consultant and 

Settlement Strategizing

Plumb also objects to the 1.8 hours of attorney time 

spent after trial to develop a settlement strategy. Although 

defendants may have remained unwilling to settle the case, 

plaintiff’s counsel were entirely reasonable in expending this 

limited amount of time to assess their settlement position, which 

could have avoided the expenditure of this court’s resources to 

decide this very motion and the resources of the appellate court 

on the pending appeal. The court will not reduce this time. 

5. Associates’ Presence at Hearings

Plumb next objects to the .9 hours Guertin billed and 

4.9 hours Helm billed in connection with the pretrial conference 

and the 15.9 hours Guertin billed to attend trial because those 

associates did not appear or participate. Sherwin explains that 

they have “already redacted extensive time from each associate’s 

time records for the pretrial conference and trial,” and she

adequately accounts for this billed time by the associates based 

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on the work they prepared in anticipation of the pretrial 

conference and trial. (See Supp. Sherwin Decl. ¶¶ 13, 16.)

Moreover, defendants staffed this case with multiple 

attorneys and courts have recognized that staffing multiple 

attorneys on a single task may improve a party’s chance of 

success in litigation. See, e.g., PSM Holding Corp. v. Nat’l 

Farm Fin. Corp., 743 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1157 (C.D. Cal. 2010) 

(“[D]ivision of responsibility may make it necessary for more 

than one attorney to attend activities such as depositions and 

hearings. Multiple attorneys may be essential for planning 

strategy, eliciting testimony or evaluating facts or law.”

(citation omitted)); cf. United States v. City & County of San 

Francisco, 748 F. Supp. 1416, 1421 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (noting that 

“the presence of several attorneys at strategy sessions for 

complex civil rights class actions may be crucial to the case”). 

The court therefore will not deduct this time. 

6. Documents Not Filed with the Court 

Plumb next objects to the time expended to prepare a 

stipulated protective order (0.8 hours), a jury questionnaire 

(3.5 hours), and a cost bill (4.8 hours) because these documents 

were never filed with the court. Sherwin has explained the 

reasonableness of the limited time expended to prepare a form 

protective order, which the parties ultimately did not use. (See

Supp. Sherwin Decl. ¶ 17.) She has also represented that all of 

the time expended to prepare the cost bill was used in the 

present motion for expenses. (See id. ¶ 18.) The court will 

therefore not deduct this time. 

The court will deduct the 3.5 hours Guertin spent to 

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prepare a jury questionnaire because it was unreasonable to 

expend this time before inquiring whether the court would even 

consider submitting a questionnaire to the jury and counsel has 

not indicated that the questionnaire was useful during jury 

selection for any other reason. 

7. Attendance at Depositions

Lastly, Plumb requests that the court reduce the hours 

billed by various attorneys by 75% for the time they expended 

attending depositions without conducting or defending the 

deposition and the depositions associates participated in when 

their participation was not “critical.” 

Although the Ninth Circuit has instructed courts to 

“examine with skepticism claims that several lawyers were needed 

to perform a task,” it has also emphasized that staffing multiple 

lawyers on a single task is not by itself evidence of excessive 

billing. Democratic Party of Wash. State v. Reed, 388 F.3d 1281, 

1286 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1113 

(emphasizing that “[f]indings of duplicative work should not just 

become a shortcut for reducing a fee award without identifying 

just why the requested fee was excessive”). 

“[D]ivision of responsibility may make it necessary for 

more than one attorney to attend activities such as depositions 

and hearings. Multiple attorneys may be essential for planning 

strategy, eliciting testimony or evaluating facts or law.” PSM 

Holding Corp., 743 F. Supp. 2d at 1157. Absent any specific 

evidence that staffing multiple attorneys on particular tasks was 

excessive, the court will not reduce the billed hours on that

basis alone. See Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1114 (noting that the 

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“district court may not set the fee based on speculation as to 

how other firms would have staffed the case”). Moreover, Sherwin 

has described in detail the associate time that was redacted and 

explained that a significant amount of time Helm expended was 

billed at a paralegal rate. (See Supp. Sherwin Decl. ¶¶ 13-15.) 

The court therefore will not reduce this time. 

b. Limited Success

The Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have emphasized 

that “the extent of a plaintiff’s success is a crucial factor for 

determining the proper amount of an award of attorney’s fees 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440; see also

McCown, 565 F.3d at 1103 (holding that attorney’s fees “must be 

adjusted downward where the plaintiff has obtained limited 

success on his pleaded claims, and the result does not confer a 

meaningful public benefit”). 

Plumb argues that the lodestar award should be reduced 

by 50% to account for plaintiff’s limited success at trial. 

Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that a 1.3 multiplier 

enhancement is merited based on plaintiff’s “excellent” results 

and the risk counsel undertook in taking this case on a 

contingency. 

Plaintiff pursued numerous claims in this case: (1)

§ 1983 excessive force claims against Brame and Plumb; (2) § 1983 

unreasonable seizure claim against Brame and Plumb challenging

the arrests for driving under the influence of drugs and 

resisting arrest; (3) Bane Act claim for interference with 

plaintiff’s enjoyment of his rights against Brame and Plumb; (4) 

interference with plaintiff’s right to be free from violence or 

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intimidation, Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7, against Brame and Plumb; (5) 

battery by a police officer against Brame and Plumb; (6) 

negligence against Brame and Plumb;

5 (7) Elder Abuse, Cal Welfare 

& Insts. Code § 15610.07, against Brame and Plumb; (8) false 

arrest against Brame and Plumb challenging the arrests for 

driving under the influence of drugs and resisting arrest; (9) 

violation of the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) against 

the CHP; and (10) violation of the Rehabilitation Act against the 

CHP. After the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, 

the court entered judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff’s 

section 51.7 and elder abuse claims and found that genuine 

disputes of material fact necessitated a trial on the remaining 

claims. Cf. McCown, 565 F.3d at 1103 (holding that “the fact 

that eight of [plaintiff’s] nine claims were dismissed at summary 

judgment ‘figures into the calculation’ of attorney’s fees”). 

At trial, plaintiff prevailed only against Plumb on his 

§ 1983 claims for excessive force and false arrest for resisting 

arrest, Bane Act claim, battery claim, and state law false arrest 

claim for resisting arrest. Brame and the CHP prevailed on all 

claims against them. In determining the reasonable fee, a 

reduction to account for plaintiff’s lack of success against two 

of the three defendants and lack of success on plaintiff’s § 1983 

false arrest claim based on the arrest for driving under the 

influence of drugs is appropriate. See Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 

1158, 1169-70 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Plaintiff initially sued several 

defendants, but prevailed against only one: Carson City. A 

 

5 Plaintiff abandoned his negligence claim before trial.

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discretionary reduction to reflect that kind of limited success 

is appropriate.”).

The Supreme Court has identified “two questions [that] 

must be addressed” when determining a reasonable fee in light of 

a plaintiff’s limited success. Hensley, 461 F.3d at 434. First, 

the court must determine whether “the plaintiff fail[ed] to 

prevail on claims that were unrelated to the claims on which he 

succeeded[.]” Id. “[C]laims are unrelated if the successful and 

unsuccessful claims are distinctly different both legally and

factually; claims are related, however, if they involve a common 

core of facts or are based on related legal theories.” Dang v. 

Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 813 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted) 

(alteration in original). If the successful claims did not arise 

out of the “same ‘course of conduct,’ . . . the hours expended on 

the unsuccessful claims should not be included in the fee award.” 

Id. (citation omitted). 

In McCown, officers allegedly used excessive force 

during the course of an arrest and the plaintiff brought § 1983 

claims against the officers challenging their use of force and 

the arrest, as well as a Monell claim against the city. 565 F.3d 

at 1101. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding 

that the claims were all related because even though the claims

were based on “different legal theories against different 

defendants,” the claims all “arose from a common core of facts, 

namely, [the plaintiff’s] arrest.” Id. at 1103; see also Webb, 

330 F.3d at 1169 (affirming the district court’s finding that 

claims pursuing “numerous legal theories against several 

defendants” were related because “all his claims arose out of a 

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common core of facts and a common course of conduct: Plaintiff’s 

arrest, detention, and prosecution”). 

Similar to McCown, all of plaintiff’s claims arose out 

of a single incident in which Brame and Plumb used force in the 

process of arresting plaintiff. Plaintiff’s unsuccessful 

Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims against the CHP were based on 

that same incident. Because plaintiff’s claims arose out of a 

“common core of facts,” Dang, 422 F.3d at 813, the court may “not 

attempt to divide the request for attorney’s fees on a claim-byclaim basis.” McCown, 565 F.3d at 1103. “Instead, the court 

must proceed to the second part of the analysis and focus on the 

significance of the overall relief obtained by [plaintiff] in 

relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” 

Id. (citation omitted). 

When successful and unsuccessful claims are related, 

“attorney’s fees awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 must be adjusted 

downward where the plaintiff has obtained limited success on his 

pleaded claims, and the result does not confer a meaningful 

public benefit.” McCown, 565 F.3d at 1103. In assessing the 

reasonableness of the overall fee in light of a plaintiff’s 

limited success, the court “is obligated to give primary 

consideration to the amount of damages awarded as compared to the 

amount sought.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992) 

(quoting Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 585 (1986) (Powell, 

J., concurring)). “Although the Supreme Court has disavowed a 

test of strict proportionality, it also suggested that a 

comparison of damages awarded to damages sought is required.” 

McCown, 565 F.3d at 1104; see also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435 n.11 

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(rejecting “a mathematical approach comparing the total number of 

issues in the case with those actually prevailed upon”). 

During closing arguments in this case, plaintiff’s 

counsel presented a thorough and forceful argument as to the 

damages they believed the jury should award plaintiff. Counsel 

began by addressing punitive damages and emphasized the purpose 

of punitive damages and why they believed the jury should award 

punitive damages against both officers. After explaining why the 

conduct at issue necessitated an award of punitive damages, 

counsel recommended that the jury award “$250,000 in punitive 

damages against each officer.” (Tr. Vol. 8 at 1471:1-2 (Docket 

No. 175).) 

Counsel then returned to compensatory damages and 

reviewed the evidence in great detail as to the injuries 

plaintiff suffered and how the incident severely affected his 

life and caused him to endure “the most severe pain he has ever 

had in his life.” (Id. at 1481:17-18; see generally id. at 

1471:6-1485:11.) Counsel then recommended that the jury award 

plaintiff $750,000 in compensatory damages against Brame and 

Plumb based on plaintiff’s federal and state false arrest and 

excessive force claims. (See id. at 1484:11-17.)6 Counsel 

 

6 The transcript does not reflect the amount of 

compensatory damages counsel suggested the jury award against the 

individual officers because counsel wrote it on a sample verdict 

form and said, “here is what we recommend as being respectful for 

the loss that Harry has suffered.” (Id. at 1484:15-16.) Because 

the court does not independently recall what counsel wrote on the 

sample verdict form, the court relied on Plumb’s representation 

that plaintiff asked for a total of $1.75 million in compensatory 

and punitive damages to arrive at the requested amount of 

$750,000.00. Plaintiff did not dispute this amount in his Reply 

brief. 

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further recommended that the jury award $500,000 against the CHP 

based on plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims. (Id. at 

1485:10-11.) 

At the close of their argument, counsel had asked the 

jury to award plaintiff a total of $1.75 million against three 

defendants. There can be little debate that the jury rejected 

this request. In the end, the jury awarded only $125,000 in 

compensatory damages against one defendant on certain claims. 

This award is only slightly more than 7% of the damages plaintiff 

sought. The jury also entirely rejected plaintiff’s claim that 

the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him for driving 

under the influence of drugs, which was a significant theory of 

his case. 

Courts in this district have imposed reductions 

generally ranging from 35% to 75% when a plaintiff has recovered 

significantly less in damages than originally sought and did not 

recover any punitive damages. See, e.g., Jones v. McGill, Civ. 

No. 1:08-396 LJO DLB, 2009 WL 1862457, at *4-5 (E.D. Cal. June 

29, 2009) (reducing attorney’s fees in excessive force case over 

75% when the plaintiff sought $15.2 million in damages against 

eight defendants but recovered only $9,900 against one 

defendant); Beecham, 2009 WL 3824793, at *5 (reducing fee award 

by 50% when plaintiffs obtained only $33,400 in damages out of 

the $1.8 million they sought). 

In Deocampo, this court reduced the fee award by 

only 25%. 2014 WL 788429, at *1. In that case, however, the 

plaintiff requested only $300,000 in compensatory damages and the 

jury awarded $50,000 and found that two of the officers’ conduct 

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was malicious, oppressive, or in reckless disregard of 

plaintiff’s rights. Id. at *11. Similarly, in Jones v. County 

of Sacramento, the court reduced the fee award by only 25% when 

the jury awarded $31,000 of the almost $1.5 million requested, 

but found that the officers’ conduct was malicious, oppressive or 

in reckless disregard of plaintiff’s rights and “the amount of 

damages awarded to plaintiff . . . may well have had more to do 

with the jury finding plaintiff to be an unsympathetic figure who 

was significantly emotionally damaged prior to th[e] incident.” 

2011 WL 3584332, at *19. 

Because the jury did not find that Plumb’s conduct was 

malicious, oppressive, or in reckless disregard of plaintiff’s 

rights, this case is distinguishable from the 25% reduction in 

Deocampo and Jones. In contrasting the $1.75 million in 

compensatory and punitive damages plaintiff sought against three 

defendants and the $125,000 in only compensatory damages the jury 

awarded against one defendant, the court finds that a significant 

reduction in fees is necessary to account for plaintiff’s limited 

success. 

At the same time, “in determining a reasonable 

fee award [], the district court should consider not only the 

monetary results but also the significant nonmonetary results 

[the plaintiff] achieved for himself and other members of 

society.” McCown, 565 F.3d at 1105 (quoting Morales, 96 F.3d at 

365). The court must assess “whether, and to what extent, [the 

plaintiff’s] suit benefitted the public,” including “whether the 

plaintiff has affected a change in policy or a deterrent to 

widespread civil rights violations.” Id. 1105. “The public 

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benefit of a suit must have enough of an impact to justify a 

fully compensatory fee award despite limited success on damages 

claims.” Id. 

For example, in Wilcox v. City of Reno, the Ninth 

Circuit emphasized that the significant public benefit from the 

plaintiff’s case merited an award of fees even though the 

plaintiff recovered only nominal damages. 42 F.3d 550, 556 (9th 

Cir. 1994). In that case, the “jury determined a city policy to 

be unconstitutional, and further determined that the policy 

caused injury to [plaintiff].” Id. The Ninth Circuit described 

these results as “admirable” and found that the “litigation 

likely precipitated both the disciplining of [the defendant 

officer] and the change in [the city’s] policy.” Id. The court 

concluded that the “judgment . . . will benefit the City and its 

residents by preventing the police department from reverting to 

its old policy or a similar policy some time in the future.” Id.

at 556-57.

Here, on the other hand, plaintiff did not pursue a 

Monell claim or prevail on his Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims 

against the CHP and thereby did not achieve any change in CHP 

policy. Although counsel credits plaintiff’s case as having 

exposed the CHP’s alleged “ticket quota,” plaintiff’s case never 

challenged or sought to remedy any alleged quota. Plaintiff’s 

limited verdict does not require the CHP to alter its conduct in 

any way. 

The jury also awarded plaintiff only compensatory 

damages, which the court instructed are limited to “the amount of 

money that will reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintiff 

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for any injury you find was caused by one or both individual 

defendants.” (Jury Instruction No. 15.) The jury was instructed 

and counsel emphatically argued that the purpose of punitive 

damages was to deter future violations. Counsel explained that 

one reason “we’re allowed to bring civil rights cases like this” 

is to “punish people who violate our most cherished fundamental 

constitutional rights, and to make an example of those people, 

which deters other officers from engaging in similar misconduct 

in the future.” (Tr. Vol. 8 at 1467:18-25.) In finding that 

neither officer’s conduct was malicious, oppressive, or in 

reckless disregard of plaintiff’s rights, the jury rejected 

plaintiff’s request for punitive damages and counsel’s argument 

that such an award was necessary to deter future violations. 

Absent an award of punitive damages, the jury did not award any 

amount of damages to deter future constitutional violations. 

While a limited award of compensatory damages against 

one officer cannot legally be said to deter future violations, 

one would think that any award of compensatory damages against an 

individual officer would deter future violations because officers 

and their departments would want to avoid similar financial 

losses in the future. The Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have

in fact recognized the deterrent value of successful § 1983 

litigation. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at 

Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 727 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring) 

(“Section 1983 . . . [l]ike other tort causes of action, [] is 

designed to provide compensation for injuries arising from the 

violation of legal duties, and thereby, of course, to deter 

future violations.” (internal citation omitted)); Mendez v. City

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of San Bernardino, 540 F.3d 1109, 1128 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled 

by other grounds by, Arizona v. ASARCO LLC, 773 F.3d 1050 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (“Successful suits act as a deterrent to law 

enforcement and ‘serve[ ] the public purpose of helping to 

protect [the plaintiff] and persons like him from being subjected 

to similar unlawful treatment in the future.’”).

Empirical studies, however, are calling into question 

whether successful § 1983 actions are actually deterring future 

constitutional violations. For example, Professor Joanna 

Schwartz recently examined 44 of the “largest law enforcement 

agencies across the country” and 37 “small and mid-sized 

agencies” and found that “police officers are virtually always 

indemnified,” with the government agencies paying “approximately 

99.98% of the dollars that plaintiffs recovered in lawsuits 

alleging civil rights violations by law enforcement,” including 

awards of punitive damages and “even when indemnification was 

prohibited by law or policy.” Joanna C. Schwartz, Police 

Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 885, 885 (2014). Professor 

Schwartz concluded that while indemnification furthers § 1983’s 

goal of compensating injured plaintiffs, it frustrates § 1983’s 

goal of deterring future violations because indemnification 

limits the impact of compensatory and punitive damages awards on 

individual officers” and the “available evidence suggests that 

the threat of being sued does not significantly influence officer 

behavior.” Id. at 953. Professor Schwartz further found that 

“governments do not appear to be collecting enough information 

about lawsuits to make educated decisions about whether or how to 

reduce the police activities that prompt these suits.” Id. at 

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956.

These findings suggest that a court should not simply 

assume that any award of compensatory damages against only an 

individual officer will deter any future violations. The court 

must evaluate the circumstances of each particular case to assess 

whether it seems possible that the verdict will truly deter 

future violations. Here, given the lack of change to any CHP 

policy, the jury’s rejection of punitive damages, the CHP’s and 

Brame’s complete success, all defendants’ success on the false 

arrest claim based on driving under the influence, and the

relatively small compensatory award against one officer, the 

court is not persuaded that the verdict in this case will 

meaningfully deter future violations by other officers. While 

vindicating one individual’s constitutional rights is incredibly 

important and this case pursued significant legal rights, the 

court does not find that plaintiff’s limited success in this case 

provides a tangible benefit to the public that renders the full 

fee counsel seeks--or any enhancement to that fee--reasonable. 

c. Risk of Contingency 

“Unlike federal law, California law allows for a 

multiplier of the lodestar to compensate for the risk of 

contingent representation.” Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 751 

F.3d 1096, 1112 (9th Cir. 2014). The Ninth Circuit has “held

that when a plaintiff succeeds on both federal and state claims 

that support a fee award, the state-law multiplier is available.” 

Id. Under California law, a contingency enhancement “is intended 

to approximate market-level compensation for such services, which 

typically includes a premium for the risk of nonpayment or delay 

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in payment of attorney fees.” Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 

1122, 1138 (2001). “[T]he trial court is not required to include 

a fee enhancement to the basic lodestar figure for contingent 

risk, exceptional skill, or other factors, although it retains 

discretion to do so in the appropriate case.” Id.

Plaintiff’s counsel took this case on contingency and 

therefore bore a risk of not receiving payment and incurring

significant costs if defendants prevailed. As Katz explained, 

given plaintiff’s age and medical conditions, counsel also faced 

a risk that plaintiff might die before final judgment. (Katz 

Decl. ¶ 16.) 

It is doubtful, however, that the risk counsel 

perceived from taking this case was as great as they now suggest. 

In an interview about their practice in June 2014, Sherwin told 

the reporter, “We screen probably a few hundred cases before we 

take a case. Because we don’t get paid unless we win and we pay 

all the litigation costs, we have to be very, very selective.” 

(Haddad Decl. Ex. A (Docket No. 181-1).) An attorney with a feepaying client may elect to take an extremely risky case knowing 

that he will still be paid. Here, however, counsel’s screening 

of cases and the overall facts of this case do not suggest that 

they perceived a great risk in taking this case that merits a 

significant multiplier to account for the contingency. 

3. Conclusion

Overall, the court finds that a significant reduction 

is merited based on plaintiff’s limited success and the lack of a 

tangible public benefit from the verdict. The court will off-set 

this reduction only slightly to account for an enhancement under 

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California law for the contingent nature of this case. 

Accordingly, the court will reduce the lodestar amount by 45%, 

which is calculated as follows: 

Haddad: 493 x $400 = $ 197,200

Sherwin: 301.7 x $280 = $ 120,680

Guertin: 281 x $175 = $ 49,175

Helm: 306.6 x $150 = $ 45,990

Altomare 7.2 x $150 = $ 1,080

Paralegals 126 x $ 75 = $ 9,450

TOTAL $ 423,575

Less 45% Reduction $-190,608.80

LODESTAR CALCULATION: = $ 232,966.30

B. Adjustment to the Lodestar

Once the court has computed the lodestar, there is a 

“‘strong presumption’ that the lodestar is the reasonable fee.” 

Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 

City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992)). The 

Ninth Circuit has emphasized, however, that the district court 

must consider “whether it is necessary to adjust the 

presumptively reasonable lodestar figure on the basis of the Kerr

factors that are not already subsumed in the initial lodestar 

calculation.” Morales, 96 F.3d at 363-64 (citations omitted). 

“The court should consider the factors established by Kerr, but 

need not discuss each factor.” Eiden v. Thrifty Payless Inc., 

407 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1168 n.4 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (Shubb, J.) 

(citing Sapper v. Lenco Blade, Inc., 704 F.2d 1069, 1073 (9th 

Cir. 1983)). 

Plaintiff’s counsel seek an enhancement based on “the 

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extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other 

employment by the attorneys.” Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 

49 (1977); see also Kerr, 526 F.2d at 670 (identifying “the 

preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance 

of the case”). Counsel specifically represent that this case 

required their law firm to “turn[] away at least 2 potential 

clients over the past year who were prepared to retain [their] 

firm on an hourly basis at market rates to be negotiated.” 

(Haddad Decl. ¶ 41.) While this factor may weigh slightly in 

counsel’s favor, the court finds that compensating them a 

reasonable fee for their work adequately accounts for any other 

loss of income and thus the inability to take other clients does 

not merit a multiplier. 

Nor does the court find that the “undesirability” of 

this case merits an enhancement. While plaintiff’s counsel may 

be correct in arguing that police misconduct cases generally are 

“difficult to win,” one of the central difficulties often arises 

from the fact that the plaintiff’s own criminal conduct led to 

the challenged encounter with the police. Here, plaintiff was a 

disabled veteran who had not engaged in any criminal activity at 

the time of the stop. The minor driving infractions leading to 

the stop weighed strongly in plaintiff’s favor when assessing the 

objective reasonableness of Plumb’s use of force and likely made 

plaintiff more sympathetic in the eyes of the jury. Cf. Wilcox, 

42 F.3d at 557 (highlighting plaintiff’s “overall success” in 

light of the fact that plaintiff’s counsel “persevered despite 

the fact that their client was unsympathetic: The video of the 

incident--a central piece of evidence at trial--showed Wilcox 

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drunk, verbally abusive, and uncooperative” and “the jury was 

informed that Wilcox, just prior to his arrest, had broken a 

glass or a beer bottle on a woman’s face, and had also been 

convicted of several felonies and was incarcerated at the time of 

the trial”). 

Accordingly, the court finds that the lodestar 

calculation is reasonable and none of the remaining Kerr factors 

merit a reduction or enhancement of the lodestar. 

C. Fees on Fees

In addition to fees awarded for success in the 

litigation, a prevailing party under § 1988 is also entitled to 

recover fees for work performed in preparing the motion for 

attorney’s fees itself. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 

F.3d 973, 980 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In statutory fee cases, federal 

courts, including our own, have uniformly held that time spent in 

establishing the entitlement to and amount of the fee is 

compensable.” (citing In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d 655, 

659-60 (9th Cir. 1985)). “Attorney’s fees requests for work 

litigating attorney’s fees are treated the same as for work done 

on the merits of a case.” Winterstein v. Stryker Corp. Grp. Life 

Ins. Plan, 262 Fed. App’x 841, 843 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 

Thompson v. Gomez, 45 F.3d 1365, 1367-68 (9th Cir. 1995)); see 

also Camacho, 523 F.3d at 982-83 (emphasizing that district 

courts must apply the lodestar approach when awarding fees on 

fees).

Here, plaintiff seeks $84,865 in attorneys’ fees for 

work done to prepare his motion for attorney’s fees and reply in 

support of it. Most of these fees account for the 74.8 hours 

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attorney Richard Pearl spent on the fee motion at a rate of $700 

per hour. Haddad indicates he spent 28 hours on the fee motion 

and Sherwin indicates she spent 31.1 hours on the fee motion. 

Pearl is an outside counsel retained to work 

exclusively on the fee motion and Plumb objects to his retention 

and recovery of any fees. Pearl has 46 years of experience and 

has previously prepared over 140 fee applicants for attorneys, 

including working with Haddad and Sherwin on previous fee 

motions. (Pearl Decl. ¶ 5.a.) Plaintiff’s counsel also explain 

that they have less experience with the legal issues governing 

fee motions and were committed to other cases when the work on 

the fee motion needed to be completed. 

Plumb has not cited any authority precluding an 

attorney from retaining separate counsel to work on the fee 

motion. A fee motion, however, is less complex and novel than 

most civil rights cases and there is no reason that plaintiff’s 

counsel would have been unable to handle the issues raised in the 

motion without the assistance of an attorney who specializes in 

fee motions. Nor does it appear that Pearl’s involvement in the 

fee motion increased the amount of fees plaintiff’s counsel 

recovered. In fact, when compared to the original award counsel 

requested, their success in this motion, like the trial, was 

substantially limited. Nonetheless, because Haddad and Sherwin 

could have performed all the work necessary to seek their fees, 

the counsel they retained so that they could work on other 

matters should not receive a greater fee than Haddad and Sherwin 

would have received if they performed the work themselves. The 

court therefore finds that Pearl is entitled to reimbursement for 

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his work on the fee motion at a rate of $400 per hour. 

In addition to the 74.8 hours Pearl claims he worked on 

this motion, Haddad expended 28 hours and Sherwin expended 31.1

hours preparing the fee motion. This totals 133.9 hours on the 

fee motion alone. When Haddad and Sherwin have submitted 

numerous fee declarations, including some with declarations very 

similar to the ones submitted in this case, 133.9 hours is beyond

excessive. Moreover, while the Ninth Circuit has recognized that 

civil rights attorneys working on a contingency have little 

motive to expend unnecessary hours, Blackwell, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 

1080, their payday is essentially guaranteed by the time the fee 

motion comes around. The court cannot help but question whether 

the fact that Plumb was now required to foot the bill might have 

encouraged counsel to spend more time than necessary on the fee 

motion. The Supreme Court has also recognized that “[a] request 

for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major 

litigation.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437.

The court will therefore deduct 50 hours from Pearl’s 

time, 4 hours from Haddad’s time, and 4 hours from Sherwin’s 

time. This provides a total of 75.9 hours of attorney time on 

the fee motion, which the court believes is more than adequate to 

provide counsel with a reasonable fee for work on this motion. 

The fee award for plaintiff’s fee motion therefore totals 

$30,360. 

III. Expenses

“Under § 1988, the prevailing party may recover as part 

of the award of attorney’s fees those out-of-pocket expenses that 

would normally be charged to a fee paying client.” Dang, 422 

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F.3d at 814 (citations omitted). “Such out-of-pocket expenses 

are recoverable when reasonable.” Id. Here, plaintiff seeks 

costs in the amount of $40,928.51. 

Most of Plumb’s objections to plaintiff’s requested 

expenses rely on the statutory limitations of costs taxed under 

28 U.S.C. § 1920.7 Reasonable expenses under § 1988, however,

“are greater than taxable costs” and thus plaintiff is not 

limited to costs recoverable under § 1920. Harris v. Marhoefer, 

24 F.3d 16, 20 (9th Cir. 1994); see, e.g., Kalitta Air L.L.C. v. 

Cent. Tx. Airborne Sys. Inc., 741 F.3d 955, 958-59 (9th Cir. 

2013) (discussing the limitations of taxable costs under § 1920). 

Plumb also objects to various expenses that courts have 

routinely granted under § 1988. See Harris, 24 F.3d at 19-20

(affirming an award of expenses under § 1998 that included 

expenses for “service of summons and complaint, service of trial 

subpoenas, fee for defense expert at deposition, postage, 

investigator, copying costs, hotel bills, meals, messenger 

service and employment record reproduction”); Int’l Woodworkers 

 

7 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) and Local Rule 

292(f) govern the taxation of costs to losing parties, subject to 

limits set under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920 

(enumerating taxable costs). Plaintiff is seeking expenses under 

§ 1988, not the more limited costs under § 1920. See Grove v. 

Wells Fargo Fin. Cal., Inc., 606 F.3d 577, 580 (9th Cir. 2010)

(“We rejected the defendant’s argument that costs should be 

limited to those available under § 1920, explaining that the 

defendant ‘fails to see that . . . travel expenses were not 

granted as costs under section 1920, but rather as out-of-pocket 

expenses, compensable under section 1988.’” (quoting Davis v. 

Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1488 (9th Cir. 1991))). 

That plaintiff did not file a Bill of Costs does not

preclude plaintiff from seeking expenses under § 1988. See

Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 19-20 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting 

a similar argument).

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of Am., AFL-CIO, Local 3-98 v. Donovan, 792 F.2d 762, 767 (9th 

Cir. 1985) (“[C]osts for telephone calls, postage, air courier 

and attorney travel . . . are ordinarily billed to a client [and] 

are routine under all other fee statutes.”); POM Wonderful LLC v. 

Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., No. Civ. 09-565 DDP RZx, 2012 WL 

4936470, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2012) (allowing prevailing 

defendant to recover costs incurred for trial presentation 

expenses); Miller v. Schmitz, No. Civ. 1:12-00137 LJO SAB, 2014 

WL 642729, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2014) (awarding costs for 

court costs, service fees, deposition transcript expenses, copy 

expenses, [] witness fees, . . . costs for an investigator, [and] 

hotel expenses incurred in connection with a deposition”); 

Mitchell Eng’g v. City & County of San Francisco, No. Civ. 08-

04022 SI, 2011 WL 1431511, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2011) 

(awarding transcript costs); cf. United Steelworkers of Am. v. 

Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990) (“We see no 

reason why [] hours [expended on a moot court trial run] cannot 

be included in a fee award as long as the number of hours spent 

was reasonable.”).

There are several expenses, however, that the court 

finds unreasonable. First, because counsel’s office is located 

in Oakland, plaintiff included hotel expenses during trial. 

While it seems to be generally accepted to charge a client to 

stay overnight in Sacramento during trial even when the 

attorney’s office is in the Bay Area, it is not reasonable to 

also charge the client for the attorney to stay in Sacramento 

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over the weekend. The court will therefore deduct $869.048 from 

plaintiff’s expenses. The court also finds that the expense of 

$225.54 for a meal with plaintiff’s expert over the weekend is 

not reasonable. The court will also exclude $161.50 for office 

supplies, such as post-it notes, sharpie pens, and a video cord 

adaptor. (Docket No. 184-9 at 20; Docket No. 184-11 at 25-27); 

cf. Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei, 491 U.S. 274, 287 (1989) (“The 

safeguard against the billing at a profit of secretarial services 

and paper clips is the discipline of the market.”). Lastly, the 

court will not include the requested expense of $1,437 for trial 

transcripts as plaintiff incurred that expense in connection with 

the pending appeal and it is yet to be determined which party 

will prevail on appeal. 

Similar to attorney’s fees, “the district court may

reduce costs to reflect limited success on the merits, but that 

it is not required to do so if such costs are sufficiently 

related to the plaintiffs’ successful [] claim.” Cummings v. 

Connell, 316 F.3d 886, 899 (9th Cir. 2003).9 Although all of 

plaintiff’s claims arose from a single incident, the trial 

definitely would not have lasted as long as it did if plaintiff 

 

8 From the numerous bills plaintiff submitted, it is 

difficult to confirm that plaintiff billed for the weekends and, 

if so, the exact amount. Because Plumb objected to this expense

and plaintiff did not respond to or dispute Plumb’s

representation, the court deducted $107 per night for the rooms, 

$12.84 per night for taxes, and $25.00 per day for parking.

9 Although it is not clear from the Ninth Circuit’s 

decision, the district court in Cummings had awarded costs under 

§ 1988. See Cummings, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 1089. The Ninth 

Circuit’s indication on remand that “the district court may

reduce costs to reflect limited success on the merits” thus 

applied to expenses awarded under § 1988. 

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had not pursued his unsuccessful claims against Brame and the CHP

or challenged the arrest for driving under the influence. In 

light of this limited success, the court finds that a 25% 

reduction to plaintiff’s expenses is appropriate. Accordingly, 

the court will permit plaintiff to recover $28,676.57 in 

expenses.

In sum, the court will award $292,002.87 in attorney’s 

fees and expenses, calculated as follows:

Lodestar: $ 232,966.30

Fees on Fees $ 30,360.00 

Expenses: $ 28,676.57

TOTAL AWARD: $ 292,002.87

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for 

attorney’s fees and costs be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED in 

the amount of $292,002.87.

Dated: December 21, 2015

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