Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05056/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05056-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TIMOTHY JAMES RODRIGUEZ, )

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Petitioner, )

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vs. )

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EDWARD S. ALAMEIDA, )

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Respondent. )

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No. CV-F-03-5056 REC/WMW HC

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND

DIRECTING CLERK TO ENTER

JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENT

On January 12, 2006, the United States Magistrate Judge

recommended that the court deny petitioner’s petition for writ of

habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

After applying for and receiving an extension of time,

petitioner timely filed objections to the recommendation.

The court has reviewed the record herein de novo and concurs

with the recommendation. However, the court expands on the

Magistrate Judge’s denial of petitioner’s claim that the

application of California’s Three Strikes Law to him constituted

a violation of the Ex Post Facto clause.

Case 1:03-cv-05056-REC-WMW Document 38 Filed 03/23/06 Page 1 of 4
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It is apparent that petitioner’s ex post facto claim is

based on the change in the definition of “serious felony” in

California Penal Code § 1192.7(c)(18) effected by the passage of

Proposition 21 and effective on March 8, 2000, which effective

date was after the date petitioner committed the crime for which

he is now imprisoned. Prior to March 8, 2000, Section

1192.7(c)(18) included as a “serious felony” 

Burglary of an inhabited dwelling house,

vessel, as defined in the Harbors and

Navigation Code, which is inhabited and

designed for habitation, floating home, as

defined in subdivision (d) of Section

18075.55 of the Health and Safety Code,

trailer coach, as defined by the Vehicle

Code, or the inhabited portion of any other

building.

One of the strikes used against petitioner was his conviction on

September 2, 1992 of violation of California Penal Code § 459. 

California Penal Code § 459 provides:

Every person who enters any house, room,

apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, store,

mill, barn, stable, outhouse or other

building, tent, vessel, as defined in Section

21 of the Harbors and Navigation Code,

floating home, as defined in subdivision (d)

of Section 18075.55 of the Health and Safety

Code, railroad car, locked or sealed cargo

container, whether or not mounted on a

vehicle, trailer coach, as defined in Section

635 of the Vehicle Code, any house car, as

defined in Section 362 of the Vehicle Code,

inhabited camper, as defined in Section 243

of the Vehicle Code, vehicle as defined by

the Vehicle Code, when the doors are locked,

aircraft as defined by Section 21012 of the

Public Utilities Code, or mine or any

underground portion thereof, with intent to

commit grand or petit larceny or any felony

is guilty of burglary. As used in this

chapter, ‘inhabited’ means currently being

Case 1:03-cv-05056-REC-WMW Document 38 Filed 03/23/06 Page 2 of 4
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used for dwelling purposes, whether occupied

or not. A house, trailer, vessel designed

for habitation, or portion of a building is

currently being used for dwelling purposes

if, at the time of the burglary, it was not

occupied solely because a natural or other

disaster caused the occupants to leave the

premises.

Proposition 21, effective March 8, 2000, changed the definition

of serious felony in Penal Code § 1192.7(c)(18) to “any burglary

of the first degree”. California Penal Code § 460 provides in

pertinent part:

(a) Every burglary of an inhabited dwelling

house, vessel, as defined in the Harbors and

Navigation Code, which is inhabited and

designed for habitation, floating home, as

defined in subdivision (d) of Section

18075.55 of the Health and Safety Code, or

trailer coach, as defined by the Vehicle

Code, or the inhabited portion of any other

building, is burglary of the first degree.

(b) All other kinds of burglary are of the

second degree.

Petitioner makes no showing of the circumstances underlying his

conviction in 1992 of violation of Penal Code § 459. 

Consequently, the court concurs with the Magistrate Judge that

petitioner has not made a sufficient showing for the court to

determine whether or not the application of a strike for his

conviction of Section 459 constitutes a violation of the Ex Post

Facto clause.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 is denied; and 

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2. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment for respondent.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 22, 2006 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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