Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02047/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02047-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

ADAM G. KELLY, by and through

his Guardian Ad Litem PAULETTE

M. GRANDINETTI; RAPHELIA B.

GRANDINETTI,

NO. CIV. S-05-02047 FCD KJM

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

NORTH HIGHLANDS RECREATION &

PARK DISTRICT; CHRISTINE

BAGLEY; MARY WALL; HEATHER

HORNBACK; CHUCK BERNARDI; KAY

F. DAHILL; TRAVIS BILL; JOANNA

MCVAY; DIANE RICHARDS; ROBERT

LITTLE; ALAN MATRE; DOES 1

through 20,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter comes before the court on defendants’ North

Highland Recreation & Park District (“District”), Travis Bill

(“Bill”), Joanna McVay (“McVay”), Diane Richards (“Richards”),

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Defendants assert that Christine Bagley, Mary Wall, 1

Heather Hornback, and Chuck Bernardi have not been served with

plaintiffs’ complaint and are therefore, not a part of the

motion. (Defs.’ Mot. at 2 n.2). 

All further references to a “Rule” are to the Federal 2

Rules of Civil Procedure.

Because oral argument will not be of material 3

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

The facts of this case are taken from plaintiffs’ 4

allegations in the complaint. 

2

Robert Little (“Little”), Alan Matre (“Matre”) and Kay Dahill’s1

(“Dahill”) (collectively “defendants”) motion to dismiss

plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons set forth below, 2 3

defendants’ motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

BACKGROUND4

Plaintiff Adam G. Kelly was thirteen years old at the time

of the events in question. (Pls.’ Compl. at 5.) Plaintiff

Ralphelia B. Grandinetti is Adam’s foster mother and legal

guardian. (Id.) Adam is a “special needs” foster child who has

the mentality of a child of six to eight years of age and who

also has epilepsy and some physical abnormalities. (Id.) Adam

was a member of defendant North Highlands Recreation & Park

District’s (“District”) swim team, the “Highlander Dolphins Swim

Team.” (Id.) 

On June 14, 2004, Adam was participating in his scheduled

swimming practice. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendant

Christine Bagley (“Bagley”), a swim coach for the team, placed or

forced Adam to sit on a hot metal folding chair in direct sun in

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approximately 100 degree weather as some sort of discipline. 

Adam was forced to remain on the hot metal chair for

approximately 35-45 minutes while Bagley yelled at Adam only

inches from his face. (Id. at 5-6). When Adam complained that

the hot metal chair was hurting him and got up from the chair,

Bagley yelled at Adam that he had to remain in the chair or

physically forced Adam back into the chair. (Id. at 6). 

Defendants Mary Wall and Heather Hornback both witnessed the

interaction between Bagley and Adam, but took no action. (Id.) 

Adam’s foster mother, Ralphelia Grandinetti (“Grandinetti”)

personally witnessed portions of the interaction between Adam and

Bagley, but was prohibited from entering the pool area. (Id. at

11). As a result of these events, Adam became seriously ill and

was treated at the Mercy San Juan Hospital Emergency Room that

evening and into the next morning. (Id. at 6). 

Plaintiffs allege that Bagley had been terminated from her

previous job at the McKinley Park Pool for “abuse” or other

improper conduct and that the individual defendants were aware of

this fact prior to or after hiring Bagley. (Id. at 12). 

Plaintiffs also allege that “the acts of the defendants, and each

of them, were done at the direction and with the knowledge,

approval, and/or ratification, of the remaining defendants.” 

(Id. at 5).

Plaintiffs further allege that defendants did not make

reasonable accommodations or modifications in their policies,

practices, or procedures to avoid discrimination on the basis of

disability, but instead, imposed corporeal punishment upon Adam. 

(Id. at 9). As a result, Adam was ostracized, harassed,

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threatened, and/or retaliated against for publicizing,

complaining about, and seeking disciplinary action for the June

14 events. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that the conduct of

defendants was motivated, at least in part, by the race,

ethnicity, and/or national origin of Adam’s foster mother,

Ralphelia Grandinetti, who is Mexican/Hispanic-Italian. (Id. at

10).

Plaintiffs brought this action in Sacramento County Superior

Court against the District and the individual defendants for

assault, battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of

emotional distress, and negligence under California state law. 

Plaintiffs allege disability discrimination under state and

federal law and racial, ethnic, or national origin discrimination

under state and federal law. Plaintiffs seek both compensatory

and punitive damages. (Id. at 3). 

Defendants removed the action to this court on October 11,

2005. Defendants filed this motion to dismiss all of plaintiffs’

state and federal claims. Defendants also move to strike all

claims for punitive damages. 

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff

need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id. 

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Given that the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader, the court may not dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would

entitle him or her to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45

(1957); NL Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th

 Cir. 1986).

Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to assume that plaintiff

“can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendant[]

ha[s] violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been

alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Calif., Inc. v. Cal.

State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). Moreover,

the court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in

the form of factual allegations.” United States ex rel. Chunie

v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986).

ANALYSIS

A. No Statutory Enactment Establishing Liability

Defendant District argues that plaintiffs’ complaint fails

to specifically identify the statutory enactment establishing

liability for the state law causes of action alleged in

plaintiffs’ first, second, third, sixth, and seventh claims for

relief. (Defs.’ Mot. at 4). In California, governmental tort

liability must be based on statute. Cal. Gov. Code § 815

(“Except as otherwise provided by state, . . . a public entity is

not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an

act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any

other person.”); Thomas v. City of Richmond, 9 Cal. 4th 1154,

1157 (1995); Washington v. County of Contra Costa, 38 Cal. App.

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4th 890, 895-96 (1995). A plaintiff asserting liability against

a public entity “must specifically allege the applicable statute

or regulation.” See Thomas, 9 Cal. 4th at 1157; Washington, 38

Cal. App. 4th at 896 (discussing the need for specificity in the

context of suits brought under § 815.6). “In order to recover

plaintiffs have to show that there is some specific statutory

mandate that was violated by the County, which violation was a

proximate cause of the [harm].” Washington, 38 Cal. App. 4th at

896 (emphasis in original); see also Searcy v. Hemet Unified Sch.

Dist., 177 Cal. App. 3d 792, 802 (1968) (“Since the duty of a

governmental agency can only be created by statute or enactment,

the statute or enactment claimed to establish the duty must at

the very least be identified.”).

Plaintiffs have not identified any statutes giving rise to

public entity liability for defendant District. Without such

identification, plaintiffs’ complaint fails to establish public

entity liability against defendant District. Therefore,

defendant District’s motion is GRANTED with leave to amend.

B. State Law Immunity

Defendants McVay, Richards, Little, Matre, and Dahill

(“board defendants”) are board members for defendant District. 

(Compl. at 5). Board defendants argue that various governmental

immunities apply, shielding them from liability. Specifically,

Board defendants argue that (1) they cannot be held vicariously

liable for any torts of their subordinates pursuant to Cal. Gov.

Code §§ 820.8-820.9; and (2) they are entitled to discretionary

immunity pursuant to Cal. Gov’t Code § 820.2.

/////

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1. California Government Code Sections 820.8 and 820.9

Board defendants argue that their motion to dismiss should

be granted because they cannot be held vicariously liable for the

acts of others pursuant to §§ 820.8-820.9 of the Government Code. 

Section 820.8 provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by

statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury caused by

the act or omission of another person.” Section 820.9 provides

that “members of governing boards of other local public entities

. . . are not vicariously liable for injuries caused by the act

or omission of the public entity or advisory body.” To the

extent that plaintiffs allege that board defendants are liable

for the tortious conduct of others or for injuries caused by the

public entity or board, board defendants are immune under the

California Government Code. 

Plaintiffs argue that the complaint sufficiently states a

claim against board defendants because it alleges that “[t]he

acts of the defendants, and each of them, were done at the

direction and with the knowledge, approval, and/or ratification

of the remaining defendants.” (Compl. at 5). Plaintiffs contend

that this allegation constitutes a claim for direct liability of

the board defendants, not vicarious liability. Neither § 820.8

or § 820.9 exonerates board defendants from liability for injury

caused by their own wrongful conduct. Therefore, plaintiffs

allege that each board defendant is liable for their own tortious

conduct, not for the conduct of other defendants. 

On a motion to dismiss, the court must examine the

allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom. See Fed.

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R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). In this case, although far from

illuminating, plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to give

board defendants notice of the claims against them and the

grounds upon which they are based. See Leatherman v. Tarrant

County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.

163, 168 (1993). Plaintiffs allege that board defendants

directed the allegedly tortious actions of other named defendants

and that board defendants also knew, approved, and/or ratified

this conduct. Under a liberal notice pleading standard, these

allegations, in conjunction with the facts alleged against other

named defendants, are sufficient to state a claim against board

defendants. Further, plaintiffs’ assertions allege wrongful acts

committed by board defendants, and therefore, are outside the

scope of §§ 820.8-820.9. Therefore, board defendants’ motion to

dismiss based upon statutory immunity from vicarious liability

under §§ 820.8-820.9 is DENIED.

2. California Government Code Section 820.2

Board defendants argue that their motion to dismiss should

be granted because they are protected by state law discretionary

immunity pursuant to § 820.2 of the Government Code. Section

820.2 provides immunity to a public employee for injuries

resulting from “his act or omission where the act or omission was

the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him,

whether or not such discretion be abused.” Cal. Gov’t Code §

820.2 (West 2005). Generally, “a discretionary act is one which

requires the exercise of judgment or choice.” Kemmerer v. County

of Fresno, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1426, 1437 (1988). However,

California courts have not set forth a definitive rule which

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resolve every case. Id. Rather, the California Supreme Court

has adopted an analysis that relies on the “policy considerations

relevant to the purpose of granting immunity to the governmental

agency whose employees act in discretionary capacities.” Id.

(internal citations omitted).

Immunity is reserved for those basic policy decisions

which have been expressly committed to coordinate

branches of government, and as to which judicial

interference would thus be ‘unseemly.’ Such areas of

quasi-legislative policy-making are sufficiently

sensitive to call for judicial abstention from

interference that might even in the first instance

affect the coordinate body’s decision-making process.

 

Barner v. Leeds, 24 Cal. 4th 676, 685 (2000). “Immunity applies

only to deliberate and considered policy decisions in which a

conscious balancing of risks and advantages took place.” 

Caldwell v. Montoya, 10 Cal. 4th 972, 981 (1995) (internal

quotation omitted). 

Plaintiffs’ first, second, third, and sixth claims for

relief allege intentional torts against board defendants. The

allegation that plaintiffs provide in the complaint to support

these claims is that “[t]he acts of the defendants, and each of

them, were done at the direction and with the knowledge,

approval, and/or ratification of the remaining defendants.” 

(Compl. at 5). Under the liberal notice pleading standard, this

allegation is sufficient to give board defendants notice of the

basis of the claims against them. However, this broad allegation

provides insufficient information in order to determine whether

discretionary immunity applies. 

At this stage of the litigation, based upon the allegations

in the complaint, the court cannot determine whether the alleged

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direction, approval, or ratification by board defendants were

basic policy decisions entitled to immunity under § 820.2, or

whether the alleged actions were direct discrimination against

the plaintiffs by board defendants. In the latter circumstance,

board defendants would not be entitled to discretionary immunity

under § 820.2. See Massey v. Banning Unified Sch. Dist., 256 F.

Supp. 2d 1090, 1097 (C.D. Cal. 2003). Because the court cannot

find that state discretionary immunity under § 820.2 applies to

board defendants in regards to plaintiffs’ first, second, third,

and sixth claims for relief, board defendants’ motion to dismiss

is DENIED.

Plaintiffs’ seventh claim for relief alleges that board

defendants were negligent in their “failure or refusal to

terminate or otherwise punish or discipline” the defendants

involved in the June 14, 2004 incident. (Compl. at 12). The

decision whether or not to initiate disciplinary proceedings and

what discipline to impose is a discretionary decision. See

Kemmerer, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1438. “The decision involves the

exercise of analysis and judgment as to what is just and proper

under the circumstances and is not a purely ministerial act.” 

Id.; see also Caldwell, 10 Cal. 4th at 983 (“The board’s

collective determination whether to . . . fire a person . . .

must be considered a basic policy decision, immune from civil

damages actions.”).

Further, a fair reading of the complaint reveals allegations

that the Board made an actual, conscious, and considered

collective policy decision. See id. at 984. Plaintiffs allege

that board defendants “failed or refused to take any meaningful

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action” against the named defendants despite knowledge of the

incident and the receipt of numerous statements of witnesses and

complaints. (Compl. at 12). The complaint asserts that board

defendants purposefully refused to discipline the other

defendants involved in the incident. However, “claims of

improper evaluation cannot divest a discretionary policy decision

of its immunity.” Caldwell, 10 Cal. 4th at 984. Because board

defendants had discretion regarding the implementation of

disciplinary action, and because the complaint alleges that board

defendants made a purposeful decision not to discipline the

defendants involved in the incident, board defendants are

entitled to immunity pursuant to § 820.2.

Plaintiffs’ seventh claims for relief also alleges that

board defendants were negligent “in the hiring, training, and

supervision” of defendants involved in the June 14 incident. 

Specifically, plaintiffs point to board defendants’ hiring of

Bagley because she “had been terminated from her previous job . .

. for ‘abuse’ or other improper conduct.” (Compl. at 12). A

board’s decision to hire a person is a basic policy decision

entitled to immunity. See Caldwell, 10 Cal. 4th at 983. 

Further, the complaint alleges that board defendants were aware

that Bagley had been terminated from her previous job for “abuse”

or other misconduct “prior to and/or after hiring” her. (Compl.

at 12). A fair reading of this allegation asserts that board

defendants made a purposeful decision to hire defendant Bagley

with knowledge of the relevant risks. Therefore, board

defendants are entitled to immunity pursuant to 820.2. 

/////

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However, to the extent that plaintiffs may raise claims 5

in an amended complaint that board defendants failed to perform

any mandatory duties, § 820.2 does not apply. Under this

section, board defendants are not immune from claims that allege

breach of a mandatory duty. 

12

Defendant’s motion is GRANTED with prejudice for any state tort

claims arising out of allegations regarding these decisions.5

C. Failure to State a Claim 

Plaintiffs’ claim of negligence against board defendants

alleges the “failure to prevent or stop the June 14, 2004 abuse”

of plaintiff Adam Kelly. (Compl. at 12). Plaintiffs have not

pled facts sufficient to support a claim against the board

defendants in this regard. Plaintiffs do not allege that board

defendants were present during the June 14 incident or in any

position to prevent or stop the alleged abuse. Therefore, there

is no cognizable claim based upon this allegation. Board

defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED with leave to amend.

D. Individual Liability for Discrimination

All individual defendants argue that plaintiffs’ fourth and

fifth claims, which allege discrimination on the basis of

disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”) and California law and for discrimination on the basis of

race, ethnicity, or national origin in violation of their civil

rights, should be dismissed where there is no individual

liability imposed by statute. 

1. Discrimination on the Basis of Disability

Defendants argue that individual employees are not liable

for discrimination under the ADA. Plaintiffs bring their claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 12132 which provides that:

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No qualified individual with a disability shall, by

reason of such disability, be excluded from

participation in or denied the benefits of the

services, programs, or activities of a public entity,

or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.

A potential defendant under the statute is any “public entity”

which includes, among others, “any department, agency, special

purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State . . . or

local government.” Id. Individuals are not proper defendants

under Title II of the ADA. See Walker v. Snyder, 213 F.3d 344,

346 (7th Cir. 2000); Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999,

1005 n. 8 (8th Cir. 1999); Becker v. Odoc, 170 F. Supp. 2d 1061,

1066 (D. Or. 2001). However, individuals may be sued in their

official capacities under the ADA because suing an individual in

his official capacity is in essence the same as suing the entity

itself. Becker, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 1066 (citing Kentucky v.

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)). 

Because the complaint does not clearly state the capacity in

which plaintiffs are suing defendants, the court will interpret

the complaint as asserting liability against the defendants in

both their individual and official capacities. See Romano v.

Bible, 169 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing ShoshoneBannock Tribes v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 1278, 1284 (9th

Cir. 1994); Cerrato v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 26

F.3d 968, 973 n. 16 (9th Cir. 1994)). To the extent that

plaintiffs allege claims against defendants in their personal

capacities, defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED with

prejudice. To the extent the plaintiffs allege claims against

defendants in their official capacities, defendants’ motion to

dismiss is DENIED.

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Defendants contend that plaintiffs’ fourth claim for 6

relief does not mention retaliation. This statement belies that

contention. While plaintiffs’ complaint is in many other aspects

insufficient to put defendants on notice of the claims against

them, plaintiffs’ allegations based upon the retaliation

provisions of the ADA are sufficient to put defendants on notice

of the claims against them as well as the factual basis for that

claim. Therefore, the allegations satisfy the liberal notice

pleading standard. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8.

14

Plaintiffs assert that their claims against individual

defendants are also based upon the retaliation provision of the

ADA. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that “both Adam and other

family members and/or relatives were ostracized, harassed,

threatened, and/or retaliated against” for “publicizing,

complaining about, and/or seeking appropriate disciplinary and or

other action” for Adam’s alleged mistreatment motivated by his

disability. (Compl. at 9). Section 12203(a) of the ADA 6

provides that:

No person shall discriminate against any individual

because such individual has opposed any act or practice

made unlawful by this chapter or because such

individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or

participated in any manner in an investigation,

proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.

Defendants contend that individuals are not proper

defendants for retaliation claims brought under the ADA. 

Plaintiffs contend that the “plain language” of the retaliation

provision extends liability to any person, including persons or

entities not otherwise liable under the ADA. While the Ninth

Circuit has not addressed this issue, other circuit courts as

well as several district courts within the Ninth Circuit have

dealt with analogous cases. See e.g., Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d

462 (4th Cir. 1999); Hiller v. Brown, 177 F.3d 542 (6th Cir.

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1999); Van Hulle v. Pacific Telesis Corp., 124 F. Supp. 2d 642

(N.D. Cal. 2000); Stern v. Cal. State Archives, 982 F. Supp. 690

(E.D. Cal. 1997); Ostrach v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 957 F.

Supp. 196 (E.D. Cal. 1997).

In Ostrach, the plaintiff filed a claim of retaliatory

discharge against his employer, his supervisor, and other

employees. 957 F. Supp. at 197. The court held that because

there was no binding Ninth Circuit precedent, the issue of

individual liability for retaliation claims was a matter of

statutory construction. Id. at 200. The court stated that

unlike § 12112 which refers to liability of an “employer,” §

12203 refers to liability of a “person.” Id. Therefore, the

court held that the plaintiff could sue the individual defendants

under the anti-retaliation provision of the ADA. Id.

However, virtually all other courts have disagreed with

Ostrach, holding that individuals are not liable under the

retaliation provision. See Baird, 192 F.3d 462; Hiler 177 F.3d

542; Van Hulle, 124 F. Supp. 2d 642; Stern, 982 F. Supp. 690. 

These courts have held that in light of the overall structure of

the ADA, Congress did not intend to create individual liability

under the retaliation provision. Id. 

The focus of the analysis by almost all courts that have

addressed this issue is the availability of remedies to the

plaintiff from individual defendants. See Van Hulle, 124 F.

Supp. 2d at 646 (public accommodations context); Stern, 982 F.

Supp. at 693 (employment context) (“[T]he question should be,

what remedies did Congress provide an aggrieved person for

workplace retaliation.”). Where Congress has explicitly provided

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Title VI is not applicable because plaintiffs’ claims 7

do not involve a school district or a school district’s programs. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000d.

16

remedies, there is no need to imply remedies. Stern, 982 F.

Supp. at 694 (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public School,

503 U.S. 60 (1992)). 

There is no need to imply remedies in this case because

Congress expressly provides remedies for public services

retaliation claims. Subsection 12203(c) of the ADA outlines the

remedies available to an aggrieved person by referring the

individual to the remedial sections of the appropriate

subchapter. Where, as in this case, the plaintiff alleges

retaliation in the context of public services, the remedies

available are outlined in section 12133. See 42 U.S.C. §

12203(c). Section 12133, in turn, refers such claims to the

remedial provisions of section 505 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 

29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The remedial provisions of section 505 of

the Rehabilitation Act provide that the remedies are those found

in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, or those found in Title VI of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. 29 U.S.C. § 7

794(a). Title VII does not provide a remedy against individual

defendants. See Greenlaw v. Garrett, 59 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir.

1995); Stern, 982 F. Supp. at 693. Therefore, because there is

no remedy under the ADA for claims brought against individual

defendants in the public services context, individual defendants

cannot be held liable for retaliation in violation of the ADA.

As discussed above, the court interprets the complaint as

asserting liability against the defendants in both their

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individual and official capacities. To the extent that

plaintiffs allege claims against defendants in their personal

capacities, defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED with

prejudice. To the extent the plaintiffs allege claims against

defendants in their official capacities, defendants’ motion to

dismiss is DENIED. 

Plaintiffs’ fourth claim for relief also asserts liability

under California law. However, plaintiffs’ complaint does not

contain any statutory provisions upon which they base their

claim. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a

pleading provide “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a); see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (“[A]ll the

Rules require is ‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that

will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim

is and the grounds upon which it rests.”). The purpose of Rule 8

“is that the adversary party or parties have sufficient notice to

prepare their defense and the court is sufficiently informed to

determine the issue presented.” Philadelphia Dressed Beef Co. v.

Wilson & Co., 19 F.R.D. 198, 201 (E.D. Pa. 1956). Because the

court cannot discern the basis for plaintiffs’ state law claims

based upon disability discrimination, pursuant to Rule 8(a), the

court dismisses plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state the

basis for their claims with leave to amend.

2. Discrimination on the Basis of Race, Ethnicity, or

National Origin

Plaintiffs’ fifth claim for relief alleges that the conduct

of defendants was motivated by the race, ethnicity, and/or

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national origin of plaintiff Ralphelia Grandinetti in violation

of the civil rights of plaintiffs. The claim presents a

cognizable factual basis for claim of discrimination. However,

the court cannot discern the basis for plaintiffs’ claims. It is

unclear whether plaintiffs assert violations of state law,

federal law, or both; it is also unclear what statutory basis

plaintiffs rely upon in bringing these claims. Because the court

cannot discern the basis upon which plaintiffs bring their fifth

claim for relief, pursuant to Rule 8(a), the court dismisses

plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state the basis for their

claims with leave to amend. 

E. Punitive Damages

Both sides agree that punitive damages are not available

against a public employee in his official capacity pursuant to

Government Code § 818. Cal. Gov’t Code § 818 (West 2005). 

However, defendants argue that because the alleged conduct of the

individual defendants occurred while they were acting as

employees or agents of the District, a public entity, Government

Code § 818 also prohibits a claim of punitive damages against the

individual defendants. This section does not preclude a claim of

punitive damages against public employees sued in their

individual capacities. See Gallo v. Board of Regents of the

University of California, 916 F. Supp. 1005, 1009-10 (S.D. Cal.

1995); Runyon v. Superior Court of Riverside County, 187 Cal.

App. 3d 878. 881 (1986). “A public employee may be liable for

punitive damages like a private person but unlike a public entity

which is specifically immune.” Runyon, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 881. 

/////

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Plaintiffs may not amend their complaint where the 8

court has granted defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice

because amendment of these claims would be futile.

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Therefore, defendants’ motion to strike plaintiffs’ claim for

punitive damages against the individual defendants is DENIED.

F. Leave to Amend

Plaintiffs seek leave to amend their complaint to cure any

material defects as well as to add claims of civil rights

violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to Rule 15(a),

“leave [to amend] is to be freely given when justice so

requires.” “[L]eave to amend should be granted unless amendment

would cause prejudice to the opposing party, is sought in bad

faith, is futile, or creates undue delay.” Martinez v. Newport

Beach, 125 F.3d 777, 785 (9th Cir. 1997). There is no indication

that plaintiffs’ amendment would prejudice the opposing party, is

sought in bad faith, is futile, or would create undue delay.8

Therefore, plaintiffs are granted leave to amend their complaint.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motions are GRANTED

in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiffs are granted fifteen (15)

days from the date of this order to file a first amended

complaint in accordance with this order. Defendants are granted

thirty (30) days from the date of service of plaintiffs’ first

amended complaint to file a response thereto.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 18, 2006 

 /s/Frank C. Damrell, Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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