Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_24-cv-00306/USCOURTS-azd-2_24-cv-00306-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kevin A. Osborn,

Petitioner,

v. 

Ryan Thornell, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-24-00306-PHX-ROS (JZB) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, SENIOR UNITED STATES 

DISTRICT JUDGE:

Petitioner Kevin A. Osborn (“Petitioner”), presently incarcerated in the Arizona 

State Prison Complex in Buckeye, Arizona, has filed an amended pro se Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 4.)

I. Summary of Conclusion.

Petitioner’s motion is his second petition for a writ of habeas corpus. It is timely, 

and the Court recommends it be found not second or successive within the meaning of 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). Petitioner presents six claims arguing that imprisonment past his 

Earned Release Credit (“ERC”) date is unlawful. But Petitioner committed his crimes in 

1991, and the statute in effect at that time allowed the Director of the Department of 

Corrections discretion to deny Petitioner release on his ERC date. Because the Ninth 

Circuit has found that discretion does not violate due process, Petitioner is not entitled to 

relief on his claims. Petitioner has not reached his sentence end date of May 3, 2026, so the

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Court recommends the petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

II. Factual and Procedural Background.

A. Facts.

Petitioner was convicted at a jury trial of two counts of manslaughter on June 12, 

1997, in the Maricopa County Superior Court, and sentenced to two consecutive 15-year 

terms of imprisonment (“Count 1” and “Count 2”) in the Arizona Department of 

Corrections, Rehabilitation, and Reentry (“ADCRR”) on August 22, 1997. (Doc. 4: 1-2; 

Doc. 22: Ex. A at 5-6.) The commission date of each offense is December 7, 1991. (Doc. 

20-1 at 6.) 

B. Procedural Background.

1. Petitioner’s third motion for Post-Conviction Relief.

After filing a direct appeal of his conviction on the merits that was denied (doc. 4 at 

2-3) and two motions for Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”) not relevant here (id. at 4), 

Petitioner filed a petition for PCR in the Maricopa County Superior Court on March 10, 

2010, which was denied (id. at 5; Doc. 22 at 4, Ex. B. at 14). That motion alleged, inter 

alia, that ADCRR was denying him ERCs on his sentence for Count 1.1(Id.) Petitioner 

appealed that denial to the Arizona Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Superior Court’s 

decision on December 20, 2011. (Doc. 22, Ex. B: 100-05.) 

2. Petitioner’s first petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus.

Petitioner then filed his first petition for a writ of habeas corpus with this Court 

almost nine years later, on December 17, 2020. In that petition — Osborn v. Shinn, CV20-02344 — Petitioner alleged four grounds: (1) unconstitutional detention as violations 

of procedural due process under the 5th and 14th amendments; (2) unconstitutional 

detention as violations of substantive due process under the 5th and 14th amendments; (3) 

unconstitutional detention as violation of equal protection under the 14th amendment; and 

1 ERCs are earned by prisoners pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1604.07 and may reduce 

the time prisoners spend in prison, but not the legal duration of the sentence. A prisoner 

who has accrued ERCs may be released prior to the expiration date of a sentence. ERCs 

may be revoked at the discretion of the ADCRR. See generally Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-

1604.07.

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(4) challenging the Arizona ERC statute — A.R.S. § 41-1604.07 — as unconstitutionally 

vague under the 5th and 14th Amendments. (Doc. 22, Ex. B: 15-17.) The basis for these 

grounds alleged by Petitioner was the same as his third motion for PCR: that ADCRR was 

unconstitutionally denying him ERCs on his sentence for Count 1. This Court denied the 

petition with prejudice on August 19, 2021, as untimely. (Doc. 22, Ex. E: 144-49; CV-20-

02344 Doc. 16.) See also Osborn v. Shinn, 2021 WL 2939822 (D. Ariz. 2021), report and 

recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 3709852 (D. Ariz. Aug. 20, 2021).

3. Petitioner’s fourth motion for Post-Conviction Relief.

As noted by Respondents, Petitioner’s earliest possible ERC date on Count 2 was 

August 3, 2022.2(Doc. 22, Ex. I at 4, ¶ 25.) The ADCRR revoked some ERCs due to 

Petitioner’s disciplinary infractions, pushing the ERC date back to May 4, 2023. (Id. at ¶ 

27.) After reviewing Petitioner’s file in preparation for his ERC date, the Director of the 

ADCRR refused to apply ERCs to Petitioner’s sentence and denied the ERC date on July 

15, 2022. (Id. at ¶ 38; Doc. 4, Ex. 5 at 39.) Petitioner then filed a Notice for PCR (“NPCR”) 

with the Maricopa County Superior Court on June 1, 2023. (Doc. 22, Ex. F.)3 The NPCR

was dismissed by the Superior Court “[w]ithout requiring a response from the State or any 

further briefing” on June 22, 2023. (Doc. 22 at 5; Doc. 22, Ex. G.) Petitioner then filed for 

review with the Arizona Court of Appeals, which was denied on February 6, 2024. See 

State v. Osborn, 2024 WL 455272 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2024); (Doc. 22, Ex. H.).

4. Petitioner’s second petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus.

The instant motion is Petitioner’s second habeas petition, filed with this Court on 

February 14, 2024 (doc. 1) and amended on February 22, 2024. (Doc. 4.) It raises six 

grounds, all alleging that because ADCRR denied ERCs on Count 2, Petitioner is suffering

2 An “ERC date” is the date a prisoner would be released from custody if any 

accrued ERCs are applied to the sentence. 

3

In Arizona, a Notice for PCR is distinct from a formal Petition for PCR. The Notice 

is a preliminary matter, filed before any Petition for PCR. “A Notice Requesting PostConviction Relief informs the trial court of a possible need to appoint an attorney for the 

defendant as provided in Rule 32.5. The Notice Requesting Post-Conviction Relief also 

assists the court in deciding whether to summarily dismiss the proceeding as untimely or 

precluded.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4, Comment to Rule 32.4(A).

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unconstitutional detention (1) as a violation of substantive due process under the 14th 

Amendment; (2) as a violation of procedural due process under the 14th Amendment; (3) 

as violation of equal protection under the 14th Amendment; and (4) cruel and unusual 

punishment in violation of the 8th Amendment. Petitioner also alleges that (5) the State of 

Arizona and ADCRR are violating the 5th and 14th Amendment prohibitions against 

double jeopardy; and (6) challenges the Arizona ERC statute as unconstitutionally vague

under the 5th and 14th Amendments. (Doc. 4 at 6-11.)

III. Issues

A. Timeliness.

1. Issue and Legal Standard.

Federal law establishes a one-year period of limitation that “shall apply to an 

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of 

a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (“[t]he limitation period shall run from the latest of-

- (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or 

the expiration of the time for seeking such review. . . .”).

2. Analysis.

Here, Petitioner filed the instant petition for habeas relief eight days after his petition 

for review was denied by the Arizona Court of Appeals. It does not appear that Petitioner 

appealed that denial to the Arizona Supreme Court. Thus, Petitioner’s one-year limitation 

to file a timely petition ends on February 5, 2025. Respondents agree the petition is timely. 

(Doc. 22 at 12.) Accordingly, this Court recommends that the petition be found timely. 

B. Successiveness

Petitioner’s first habeas petition raised four grounds, all relating to the denial of 

ERCs on Count 1. Here, Petitioner raises six grounds, all relating to the denial of ERCs on

Count 2. Grounds (1), (2), (3), and (6) of Petitioner’s second petition are identical to the 

four from his first petition, and Grounds (4) and (5) are new grounds. 

1. Issue and Legal Standard. 

“A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under 

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section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(b)(1). See also Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 661 (2001) (“If the prisoner asserts a 

claim that he has already presented in a previous federal habeas petition, the claim must be 

dismissed in all cases.”). 

Accordingly, this Court must determine if the claims presented here in Petitioner’s 

second habeas petition were presented in his first habeas petition. If they are, this Court 

must dismiss them, and Petitioner must file a motion “in the appropriate court of appeals 

for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(b)(3)(A). 

“Not every petition filed after an initial petition has been adjudicated is considered 

second or successive. The Supreme Court has identified two situations where a second-intime petition is not analyzed under the rules governing second or successive petitions.”

Brown v. Atchley, 76 F.4th 862, 866 (9th Cir. 2023). 

First, the limitations on second or successive petitions imposed by section 2244(b) 

apply only to petitions relating to specific judgments. “[T]he phrase ‘second or successive’

must be interpreted with respect to the judgment challenged.” Magwood v. Patterson, 561 

U.S. 320, 333 (2010). Therefore “a habeas petition is second or successive only if it 

challenges the same judgment as the prior petition.” Brown, 76 F.4th at 866. 

Second, a claim can challenge the same judgment as a prior petition but not be 

second or successive if it raises a claim that was not ripe in the prior petition. See Panetti 

v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 947 (2007) (“In the usual case, a petition filed second in time 

and not otherwise permitted by the terms of § 2244 will not survive AEDPA’s ‘second or 

successive’ bar. There are, however, exceptions.”). “[A] petitioner does not run afoul of 

the abuse of the writ doctrine by raising a new claim in a successive petition that could not 

have been raised in a prior petition.” Brown, 76 F.4th at 867 (citing Stewart v. MartinezVillareal, 523 U.S. 637, 645 (1998)).

2. Analysis.

Here, Petitioner’s first petition challenged ADCRR’s denial of ERCs on Count 1 in 

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2010. Petitioner’s second petition challenges ADCRR’s denial of ERCs on Count 2 in 

2022. Though these denials dealt with similar issues, they are distinct in that they dealt 

with distinct criminal counts and prison terms. These are different decisions or judgments, 

thus rendering them not second or successive. 

Additionally, ADCRR’s denial of ERCs on Petitioner’s Count 2 did not occur until

2022, 12 years after the denial of ERCs on Count 1 in 2010. Petitioner could not have 

challenged the denial of ERCs on Count 2 in his first petition 12 years earlier. His claim in 

his second petition was not ripe until those ERCs were officially denied in 2022. “A 

prisoner whose conviction and sentence were tested long ago may still file petitions relating 

to denial of parole, revocation of a suspended sentence, and the like because such claims 

were not ripe for adjudication at the conclusion of the prisoner’s first federal habeas 

proceeding.” U.S. v. Buenrostro, 638 F.3d 720, 725 (9th Cir. 2011). See also Hill v. State 

of Alaska, 297 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] prisoner’s first petition challenging the 

calculation of release date should not be deemed successive if the prisoner did not have an 

opportunity to challenge the state’s conduct in a prior petition.”) (citing Crouch v. Norris, 

251 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2001); In re Cain, 137 F.3d 234, 235 (5th Cir.1998) (per curiam)).

Because Petitioner challenges a different ruling in his second petition than in his 

first, and because the claims presented in his second petition were not ripe at the time of 

his first, his petition should not be found second or successive.

C. Exhaustion.

Before a federal court may grant a habeas corpus petition, remedies in state courts 

for all its claims must be exhausted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).

4 See also Rose v. Lundy, 

455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982) (“[W]e hold that a district court must dismiss habeas petitions 

containing both unexhausted and exhausted claims.”); Olvera v. Guirbino, 371 F.3d 569, 

572 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A district court may not consider a claim in a § 2254 habeas petition 

4

“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that-- (A) 

the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State. . . .” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(b)(1).

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until the petitioner has properly exhausted all available remedies that the state provides.”).

“The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to ensure that state courts are the principal 

forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions.” Bell v. Lewis, 462 F. 

App’x 692, 693 (9th Cir. 2011). To exhaust a claim, the petitioner must present the claim 

to the state courts, to give the State the opportunity to correct alleged violations of the 

petitioner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (“[E]xhaustion 

of state remedies requires that petitioners ‘fairly presen[t]’ federal claims to the state courts 

in order to give the State the ‘“opportunity to pass upon and correct” alleged violations of 

its prisoners’ federal rights.’”) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). To be 

properly exhausted, the claim must be “fairly presented” to the highest court in a state court 

system, even if that court’s review is discretionary. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 

838, 845-47 (1999) (“[S]tate prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to 

resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established 

appellate review process.”); James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077, n.3 (9th Cir. 2000). For

non-capital cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court” test is satisfied if the petitioner 

presented their habeas claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals in their direct appeal or a 

properly filed state action for post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 

1010 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[E]xcept in habeas petitions in life-sentence or capital cases, claims 

of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona 

Court of Appeals has ruled on them.”); Date v. Schriro, 619 F. Supp. 2d 736, 763 (D. Ariz. 

2008) (“[T]he ‘highest court’ requirement is satisfied by fair presentation to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals.”). The burden is on the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted 

each claim. See Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981).

Here, Petitioner filed the NPCR and checked the box that stated: “The Defendant 

continues to be in custody after the sentence expires.” (Doc. 22-1 at 154.) Petitioner did 

not discuss ERCs but instead wrote that “I am currently in custody when I should be free 

due to sentence miscalculation.” (Id.) The Superior Court dismissed the notice without 

briefing. The court noted that “[t]he record reflects that Defendant was sentenced to an 

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aggregate 30-year term with 475 days of pre-sentence incarceration credit on August 22, 

1997. He fails to show that the ADOCRR has held him beyond the expiration of that time 

or has miscalculated his expiration dates.” (Doc. 22, Ex. G at 157.) The Superior Court’s 

order did not mention ERCs, nor isthere any indication that the denial of ERCs was briefed.

(Id.) The Arizona Court of Appeals merely noted that “[a]bsent an abuse of discretion or 

error of law, this court will not disturb a superior court’s ruling on a petition for post 

conviction relief[]” and stated “[w]e find the petitioner has not established an abuse of 

discretion.” (Doc. 22-1 at 160.) Therefore, it does not appear that Petitioner raised his ERC 

claim, so he has not exhausted all remedies in state court. 

However, a procedural default is not a jurisdictional matter. See Trest v. Cain, 522 

U.S. 87, 89 (1997) (“[T]his Court has made clear that in the habeas context, a procedural 

default, that is, a critical failure to comply with state procedural law, is not a jurisdictional 

matter.”) Therefore, a federal habeas court may bypass the question of procedural default 

to deny a claim on the merits. See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997)

(“Judicial economy might counsel giving [substantive questions] priority, for example, if 

it were easily resolvable against the habeas petitioner, whereas the procedural-bar issue 

involved complicated issues of state law.”) (internal reference omitted). See also Franklin 

v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Procedural bar issues are not 

infrequently more complex than the merits issues presented by the [habeas petition], so it 

may well make sense in some instances to proceed to the merits if the result will be the 

same.”); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“An application for writ of habeas corpus may be denied 

on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available 

in the courts of the State.”).

In his Reply, Petitioner asserts it is unfair to dismiss the petition for lack of 

exhaustion when the NPCR has “no areas for exposition of a claim or instruction for further 

supplementation.” (Doc. 28 at 4.) Petitioner’s point is not without merit. Accordingly, the 

Court exercises its discretion to review Petitioner’s Grounds on the merits.

D. Claims on the Merits.

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1. Legal Standards.

This Court can only grant relief if Petitioner demonstrates the adjudication of his

claim either “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 

United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d).

Regarding ERCs, “the Constitution itself does not guarantee good-time credit for 

satisfactory behavior while in prison.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974); see 

also Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220 (2011) (“There is no right under the Federal 

Constitution to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence, and the 

States are under no duty to offer parole to their prisoners.”). In regulating prisoner conduct, 

States may create liberty interests that implicate the Due Process Clause. See Sandin v. 

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483–84 (1995) (“[W]e recognize that States may under certain 

circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause.”);

McFarland v. Cassady, 779 F.2d 1426, 1428 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[L]iberty interests protected 

by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution may be created by state law.”). But “[a]s the 

Arizona Court of Appeals made clear in Crumrine, Arizona’s release credit scheme5

confers considerable discretion on the Department of Corrections, thus eliminating any 

state created liberty interest and distinguishing it from Wolff.” White v. Schriro, 2007 WL 

2410335, at *7 (D. Ariz. 2007), aff’d, 377 F. App’x 618 (9th Cir. 2010) (referencing 

Crumrine v. Stewart, 24 P.3d 1281 (2001) and Wolff, 418 U.S. 539).

“When, however, a State creates a liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires 

fair procedures for its vindication—and federal courts will review the application of those 

constitutionally required procedures.” Swarthout, 562 U.S. at 220. “[T]he requirements of 

due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary 

5 Petitioner White committed his offenses “between approximately July, 1992 and 

April, 1993” and was subject to the same ERC statute that is relevant to Petitioner. White, 

2007 WL 2410335, at *1.

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board to revoke good time credits.” Superintendent, Massachusetts Corr. Inst., Walpole v. 

Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). “[T]he relevant question is whether there is any evidence 

in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board. We 

decline to adopt a more stringent evidentiary standard as a constitutional requirement.” Id. 

at 455–56 (internal citations omitted). 

2. Grounds One and Two – Denial of Due Process.

In Grounds One and Two, Petitioner challenges the denial of ERCs on Count 2 of 

his sentence as a violation of substantive and procedural due process. But Petitioner did 

not have a liberty interest in ERCs under the applicable state statute in 19916, so he was 

not denied due process. The 1991 statute granted the Director of the ADCRR the 

discretionary authority to not release an inmate who acquired ERCs. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 

41–1604.07(D) (1991) (“The director, according to rules promulgated by the department, 

may authorize the release of any prisoner who has earned release credits which, when 

added to the time served by the prisoner, equal the sentence imposed by the court which 

shall be the prisoner’s earned release credit date.”) (emphasis added). The due process 

guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment “apply only when a constitutionally protected 

liberty or property interest is at stake.” Tellis v. Godinez, 5 F.3d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1993).

Because state law allowed the Director discretion to not release a prisoner who earned 

ERCs, Petitioner’s claim does not create a federal liberty interest and he is not entitled to 

relief. See Crumrine, 24 P.3d at 12847; White v. Schriro, No. CV-05-3212-PHX-FJM, 2007 

6 The offense date for Petitioner’s offenses is December 7, 1991. (Doc. 22-1 at 6.)

7

“Before 1986, the mandatory language of Arizona’s earned release credit statutes 

gave prisoners a liberty interest in release credits enforceable through the Due Process 

Clause. McFarland v. Cassady, 779 F.2d 1426, 1428 (9th Cir.1986). Thereafter, apparently 

in response to McFarland, the legislature enacted subsection D, making the release 

discretionary, and added the language in subsection B, stating that the earned release credits 

do not reduce a sentence. 1986 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 200, § 2. And Division One of this 

court has determined that, under the 1986 version of the statute, even after a prisoner has 

reached his earned release credit date and has not forfeited any of his release credits, the 

Director, in his discretion, may refuse to release him. Sanchez v. Ryan, 178 Ariz. 88, 91, 

870 P.2d 1184, 1187 (App.1993). Thus, although [the prisoner] is entitled to accrue earned 

release credits under subsection A, application of the credits is discretionary under 

subsection D. Therefore, [the prisoner] did not have an enforceable liberty interest in the 

application of his earned release credits.”

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WL 2410335 (D. Ariz. Aug. 21, 2007) (denying petitioner’s request for application of 

ERCs under § 41–1604.07 because the “petitioner began serving a ten year sentence for 

offenses committed between approximately July, 1992, and April, 1993” and “[t]he statutes 

in effect at the time of his offenses conferred wide discretion upon the director of [ADOC] 

in determining whether credits should actually be applied”) (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41–

1604.07(D) (1991)). The Ninth Circuit affirmed this ruling and found “the Arizona superior 

court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law as determined by the 

Supreme Court by concluding that White had failed to demonstrate that he had a liberty 

interest in the application of these credits.” White v. Schriro, 377 Fed. Appx. 618 (9th Cir. 

2010) (unpublished); see also Murray v. Ryan, 2019 WL 9406452, at *3 (D. Ariz. 2019)

(denying habeas relief because “when Murray committed his crimes in 1989, Arizona state 

law did not provide a liberty interest in earned-release credits” under the statute in effect 

at the time).

Even if there was a liberty interest in earning ERCs, the petition would still fail 

because there is no evidence the ADCRR failed to comply with procedural requirements 

as laid out in Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. As mentioned earlier, “the relevant question is whether 

there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the 

disciplinary board.” Id. Here, Petitioner’s ERCs were revoked on Count 2 “after a 

comprehensive review of [his] file” pursuant to ADCRR DO 1002 ¶ 8.12.1.4, 

encompassing “a variety of factors” such as “the extent and nature of the inmate’s 

disciplinary history; the inmate’s custody classification; participation in any rehabilitative

programming; input [from] interested parties – including the victim(s) and prosecuting 

agency; [and] input from any COIII(s), COIV(s), or other ADCRR staff who have had 

personal contact with the inmate . . . .” (Doc. 22, Ex. I at 5-6.) “As of summer 2022, Osborn 

had received 20 major disciplinary tickets and 30 minor disciplinary tickets.” (Id.) ADCRR 

avows that “the reasons for Osborn’s denial were consistent” with the factors mentioned. 

(Id.) As there is evidence in the record that supports the conclusion reached by the ADCRR, 

Petitioner fails to establish he is entitled to relief on this claim. See Davis v. Shinn, 2021 

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WL 6503702, at *3 (D. Ariz. 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 

159171 (D. Ariz. 2022) (holding petitioner “fails to show a fundamental miscarriage of 

justice will occur absent consideration of his claims[]” in case alleging unconstitutional 

denial of ERCs); Green v. Ryan, 2016 WL 7206701, at *4 (D. Ariz. 2016), report and 

recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 7178707 (D. Ariz. 2016) (finding “Petitioner’s due 

process rights were not abridged as claimed by Petitioner” in a case alleging 

unconstitutional denial of ERCs).

3. Ground Three – Equal Protection Violation.

In Ground Three, Petitioner argues the decision to deny him ERCs based on his 

“criminal history” violates his right to equal protection. (Doc. 4 at 8.) He asserts his 

criminal history “is quite benign compared to those of similarly situated inmates who are 

continuously released by ADOC and it’s officials.” (Id.) The Equal Protection Clause 

requires that similarly situated persons be treated alike. U.S. Const., amend. XIV. To prove 

an equal protection violation, Petitioner “must show that the [government] acted with an 

intent or purpose to discriminate against [him] based upon membership in a protected 

class.” Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 2005). Although 

prisoners are “not a suspect class,” Glauner v. Miller, 184 F.3d 1053, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999), 

Petitioner can assert he has been intentionally singled out. See Village of Willowbrook v. 

Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (“Our cases have recognized successful equal protection 

claims brought by a ‘class of one,’ where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally 

treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the 

difference in treatment.”).

Here, Petitioner fails to demonstrate he has been intentionally treated differently 

from similarly situated inmates. Petitioner asserts that “by contrast, ADOC has constantly 

released ‘new code’ prisoners with ‘rap sheets’ and criminal histories magnitudes longer 

and entirely more severe than” his. (Doc. 4 at 25.) But “new code” prisoners are not 

similarly situated to Petitioner because the code is different. See 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 

255, § 87 (effective Jan. 1, 1994) (deleting “[t]he director ... may authorize the release of 

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any prisoner who has [sufficient] earned release credits” and replacing it with “[a] prisoner 

who has reached his earned release date shall be released”) (emphasis added). Also, other 

petitioners/defendants who committed offenses under Petitioner’s code were not released. 

See White, Murray, and Sanchez. Petitioner also presents nothing more than a bare 

allegation of disparate treatment without identifying similarly situated defendants who 

were released under the code in effect at Petitioner’s sentencing. “Conclusory allegations 

which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.”

James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994). Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this 

claim.

4. Ground Four – Cruel and Unusual Punishment.

In Ground Four, Petitioner argues that “incarceration beyond any legitimate release 

date is cruel and unusual punishment.” (Doc. 4 at 9.) The Eighth Amendment prohibits 

“extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime.” Ewing v. California, 

538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003) (cleaned up). For purposes of federal habeas corpus review, only a 

grossly disproportionate sentence has been found to be amenable to review under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(1); see Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003) (reviewing habeas ruling 

that petitioner’s sentence was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of” the 

“clearly established gross disproportionality principle”). 

Here, Petitioner is not contesting the sentences in his case. He has not argued that 

his sentences were disproportionate to his crimes. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to 

habeas relief on his Eighth Amendment claim.8

5. Grounds Five and Six – Double Jeopardy and Ambiguous Laws.

In Ground Five, Petitioner argues a “violation of the double jeopardy clause”

because his “sentence was set by the legislature9[and] included the earning of ERC days, 

8 Petitioner has not been incarcerated beyond his release date. Petitioner’s sentence 

end date is May 3, 2026 (doc. 22-1 at 164), a calculation Petitioner does not dispute.

9 As noted above, the Arizona legislature conferred discretion to ADCRR to release 

inmates who earned ERC credits, and later rescinded the discretion. See 1993 Ariz. Sess. 

Laws ch. 255, § 87 (effective Jan. 1, 1994) (deleting “[t]he director ... may authorize the 

release of any prisoner who has [sufficient] earned release credits” and replacing it with 

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and ADOC has now increased Petitioner’s sentences by magnitudes.” (Doc. 4 at 10.) The 

core of Petitioner’s argument is that “ADOC has unilaterally created [an] additional 

punishment” by nullifying “of all his earned time on his second sentence.” (Id.)

The Double Jeopardy Clause “protects against successive prosecutions for the same 

offense after acquittal or conviction and against multiple criminal punishments for the same 

offense.” Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 727-28 (1998). But Petitioner is not arguing 

he was subject to successive convictions or punishments. Instead, he argues that the denial 

of his conditional release violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. Petitioner’s claim fails. 

“There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally 

released before the expiration of a valid sentence.” Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska 

Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Petitioner’s citation to Barber v. 

Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 476 (2010) is unavailing because the Court in Barber affirmed the 

bureau of prison’s time calculation method and did not address the issue of double 

jeopardy. 

In Ground Six, Petitioner argues that several prison officials “avowed to Petitioner 

that he would be released on the ‘ERC date’ of his second sentence.” (Doc. 4 at 11.) He 

asserts the ERC statute must be vague and ambiguous if none of those officials knew his 

proper release date. (Id.) He asserts the “rule of lenity should be applied in his favor.” (Id.) 

The rule of lenity is a rule of statutory construction that “applies primarily to the 

interpretation of criminal statutes.” Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 

563 U.S. 1, 16 (2011). It “only applies if, after considering text, structure, history, and 

purpose, there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute that the Court 

must simply guess as to what Congress intended.” Maracich v. Spears, 570 U.S. 48, 76 

(2013). Where “the statutory language is unambiguous, the rule of lenity ... is inapplicable.”

Beecham v. U.S., 511 U.S. 368, 374 (1994).

Here, the statute in question is not ambiguous. As noted above, the 1991 statute 

granted the Director of the ADCRR the discretionary authority to not release an inmate 

“[a] prisoner who has reached his earned release date shall be released”).

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who acquired ERCs. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41–1604.07(D) (1991). The court in Crumrine

assumed the change was an intentional response to McFarland, 779 F.2d at 1428 

(recognizing that a liberty interest is created by good time credit statutes that use mandatory 

language). Petitioner was one of many defendants sentenced under a statute in effect in 

1991 that permitted ADCRR the discretion to refuse release of inmates who accrued ERCs. 

The result may be unfortunate for Petitioner, but the discretion is not ambiguous.

Petitioner also asserts that officials advised him he “would be released on his ERC 

release date.” (Doc. 4 at 21.) As noted by Petitioner, many “new code” inmates were 

released on their ERC release date. (Id. at 25.) Even if numerous officials advised him he 

would be released on his ERC date, the statutory authority to approve his release 

unambiguously resided with the Director of the Department of Corrections. Petitioner is 

not entitled to relief on this claim.

E. Conclusion

Petitioner presents six Grounds in the instant petition for habeas corpus relief, but 

he fails to demonstrate he is entitled to relief. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Amended Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (doc. 4) be DENIED and DISMISSED with 

prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition 

is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the ruling 

debatable, and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

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U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

Dated this 26th day of July, 2024.

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

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