Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_09-cv-01162/USCOURTS-almd-2_09-cv-01162-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

KIMBERLY GRAY CHESTER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:09cv1162-WC

)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Kimberly Gray Chester applied for disability insurance benefits pursuant to

Title II of the Social Security Act (Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433. Plaintiff’s application was

denied at the initial administrative level. Plaintiff then requested and received a hearing

before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Following the hearing, the ALJ also denied the

claim. The Appeals Council rejected a subsequent request for review. The ALJ’s decision

consequently became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

(Commissioner). See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). The case is

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now before the Court for review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c),

both parties have consented to the conduct of all proceedings and entry of a final judgment

Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. 1

No. 103-296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to

Social Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security.

Case 2:09-cv-01162-WC Document 17 Filed 11/02/10 Page 1 of 9
by the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. Pl.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. #11);

Def.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. #12). Based on the Court’s review of the record and the

briefs of the parties, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to disability benefits when the

person is unable to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result

in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period

of not less than 12 months.

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

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To make this determination, the Commissioner employs a five-step, sequential

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2006).

(1) Is the person presently unemployed?

(2) Is the person’s impairment severe?

(3) Does the person’s impairment meet or equal one of the specific

impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1? [the Listing of

Impairments]

(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation?

(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy?

An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next

question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative

answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of “not

disabled.”

A “physical or mental impairment” is one resulting from anatomical, 2

physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable

clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.

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McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).

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The burden of proof rests on a claimant through Step 4. See Phillips v. Barnhart, 357

F.3d 1232, 1237-39 (11th Cir. 2004). A claimant establishes a prima facie case of qualifying

disability once they have carried the burden of proof from Step 1 through Step 4. At Step 5,

the burden shifts to the Commissioner, who must then show there are a significant number

of jobs in the national economy the claimant can perform. Id.

To perform the fourth and fifth steps, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s Residual

Functional Capacity (RFC). Id. at 1238-39. RFC is what the claimant is still able to do

despite his impairments and is based on all relevant medical and other evidence. Id. It also

can contain both exertional and nonexertional limitations. Id. at 1242-43. At the fifth step,

the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience to determine if

there are jobs available in the national economy the claimant can perform. Id. at 1239. To

do this, the ALJ can either use the Medical Vocational Guidelines (grids) or call a vocational

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expert (VE). Id. at 1239-40.

The grids allow the ALJ to consider factors such as age, confinement to sedentary or

light work, inability to speak English, educational deficiencies, and lack of job experience.

Each factor can independently limit the number of jobs realistically available to an

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1986), is a supplemental security 3

income case (SSI). The same sequence applies to disability insurance benefits. Cases arising

under Title II are appropriately cited as authority in Title XVI cases. See, e.g., Ware v.

Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1981).

See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 2. 4

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individual. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240. Combinations of these factors yield a statutorilyrequired finding of “Disabled” or “Not Disabled.” Id.

The Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. This Court must

find the Commissioner’s decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42

U.S.C. § 405(g); Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). “Substantial

evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such relevant evidence

as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v.

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see also Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d

1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Even if the evidence preponderates against the

Commissioner’s findings, [a reviewing court] must affirm if the decision reached is

supported by substantial evidence.”). A reviewing court may not look only to those parts of

the record which support the decision of the ALJ, but instead must view the record in its

entirety and take account of evidence which detracts from the evidence relied on by the ALJ.

Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1986).

[The court must] . . . scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the

reasonableness of the [Commissioner’s] . . . factual findings. . . . No similar

presumption of validity attachesto the [Commissioner’s] . . . legal conclusions,

including determination of the proper standards to be applied in evaluating

claims.

Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987).

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III. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff was forty-three years old at the time of the hearing before the ALJ, and had

at least a high school education (Tr. 21). Plaintiff’s past relevant work experience was as a

X-ray technician. Id. At Step 1, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial

gainful activity since the alleged onset date (Tr. 12). At Step 2, the ALJ found that Plaintiff

suffers from the following severe impairments: history of alcohol abuse; degenerative disc

disease of the lumbar and cervical spine; history of migraine headaches; depression; and

sleep apnea. Id. However, the ALJ determined that neither Plaintiff’s impairments, nor a

combination of her impairments, meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments(Tr.

13). Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform unskilled light work,

with several limitations (Tr. 14). At Step 4, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to perform

past relevant work (Tr. 21). Next, the ALJ found that, given Plaintiff’s age, education, work

experience, and RFC, and after consulting with a vocational expert, “there are jobs that exist

in significant numbers in the national economy that claimant can perform,” including:

restaurant hostess; blood donor assistant; children’s attendant; or bench assembler of small

parts (Step 5) (Tr. 22). Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not been under

a disability during the relevant time period. Id.

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IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM

Plaintiff presents one claim for this court’s review: “[w]hether the ALJ erred by

failing to properly apply the pain standard to Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling pain.” Pl.’s

Brief (Doc. #14) at 6. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly apply the

standard for evaluating pain as set forth by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

See id. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has articulated its pain standard,

governing the evaluation of a claimant’s subjective testimony about pain, as follows:

In order to establish a disability based on testimony of pain and other

symptoms, the claimant must satisfy two parts of a three-part test showing: (1)

evidence of an underlying medical condition; and (2) either (a) objective

medical evidence confirming the severity of the alleged pain; or (b) that the

objectively determined medical condition can reasonably be expected to give

rise to the claimed pain.

Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002).

Plaintiff arguesthat the ALJfailed to properly apply this pain standard, because, while

the ALJ “found that the evidence of record satisfied the first prong of the three part pain

standard, [the ALJ determined] that neither part two nor part three were met.” Pl.’s Brief

(Doc. #14) at 7. In support of this argument, Plaintiff quotes the ALJ’s opinion, which states:

After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the

claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected

to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’sstatements concerning

the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not

credible to the extent that they are inconsistent with the residual functional

capacity assessment.

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Id. (quoting ALJ’s Opinion (Tr. 13)). As is evident from the ALJ’s quote, the ALJ did apply

the three part pain standard and determined that Plaintiff met the standard. Thus, Plaintiff’s

argument is without merit.

Once an ALJ determines that the pain standard is met, the ALJ then turns to the

question of whether a claimant’s testimony of the disabling nature of the pain is credible.

See Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995). The ALJ detailed this process in

the opinion. Tr. 15. As is made clear from the above quote, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s

complaints to be incredible. This court reviews that decision to determine whether it was

supported by substantial evidence.

After stating that Plaintiff met the gateway test to consider subjective complaints of

pain, the ALJ clearly articulated reasons for finding that Plaintiff’s statements concerning

pain were not credible, based on: (1) the conservative nature of the treatment for Plaintiff’s

degenerative disk disease (epidural injections and prescriptions for Lortab and Flexeril); (2)

Plaintiff’s testimony that she only experiences migraines once and month and can control

them, if she catches them early, by lying down and taking medication; (3) Plaintiff’s

discontinuing C-PAP treatments for sleep apnea with Dr. DeWitt in September of 2005 and

her testimony that she had not used her C-PAP lately; (4) Dr. Brantley’s diagnosis that

Plaintiff’s depression was in almost full remission; (5) Plaintiff’s testimony thatshe had been

clean and sober since may of 2008; (6) the assessments of doctors Brantley, McKeown, and

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Colley; (7) Plaintiff’s current work as a restaurant hostess for twenty to thirty hours per

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week, in which she stands for four to five hours per day and lifts no more than ten pounds;

and (8) Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her daily activities. Tr. 20-21. The ALJ also stated

that:

The claimant’s credibility is further undermined by the lack of objective

diagnostic testing to support her allegations of debilitating pain. X-rays of the

cervical spine revealed only mild subluxation at C4-5 without complication.

X-rays of the lumbar spine were normal. Moreover, while an MRI of the

cervical spine revealed evidence of possible herniation at C5-6, it was

specifically noted that this resulted in no significant problems.

Tr. 21. It is with this statement that Plaintiff takes particular umbrage.

Plaintiff argues that this statement is “inaccurate at best” and that “[t]he record

includes repeated references to the herniated disc in the claimant’s neck.” Pl.’s Brief (Doc.

#14) at 9. However, Plaintiff fails to point this court to any “repeated references” in the

record that supports her claims of disabling pain related to her medical condition.

Conversely, the ALJ pointed to several instances in the medical record evidence where

Plaintiff’s X-rays and MRI revealed mild or normal conditions. See Tr. 16-20. As stated

above, Plaintiff has already shown evidence of an underlying medical condition that could

reasonably be expected to produce disabling pain. Accordingly, she must show that she does

indeed suffer from that pain. The evidence she produced was subjective testimony, which

 The ALJ also specifically rejected the opinion of Dr. Leuschke based on its 5

inconsistency with Dr. Leuschke’s treatment notes, as well as Plaintiff’s work activity and

testimony of daily living. Tr. 20. Plaintiff does not challenge this aspect of the ALJ’s opinion. 

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the ALJ rejected. The medical evidence, along with the other evidence listed above, provide

substantial support to the ALJ’s decision to find Plaintiff’s complaints of pain to be

incredible. The question is not whether or not Plaintiff suffered pain. Rather, whether she

suffered disabling pain.

Plaintiff is unable to provide credible evidence that supports her argument that, due

to disabling pain, she could not perform work consistent with the RFC, and this court finds

no error in the ALJ’s determination.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court has carefully and independently reviewed the record and concludes the

decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence and is, therefore,

AFFIRMED. A separate judgment will issue.

DONE this 2nd day of November, 2010.

/s/ Wallace Capel, Jr.

WALLACE CAPEL, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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