Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03836/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03836-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Latricia Flowers-Carter, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. 

Braun Corporation,

Defendant.

No. CV-18-03836-PHX-DWL

ORDER 

On May 11, 2020, the Court issued a 30-page order that granted in part, and denied 

in part, Plaintiffs’ motion to compel Braun to produce six categories of discovery material

and to sanction Braun for discovery misconduct. (Doc. 165.) Among other things, this 

order (1) recounted the many discovery disputes that have arisen throughout the course of 

this case (id. at 10-18); (2) held that Plaintiffs’ motion to compel “could be denied outright” 

because Plaintiffs failed to submit a meet-and-confer certification, as required by Rule 

37(a)(1) and LRCiv 7.2(j) (id. at 18-20); (3) stated that the Court would, in its discretion, 

overlook Plaintiffs’ non-compliance as to two of the categories at issue—certain emails 

withheld by Braun based on the “common interest doctrine” and other documents withheld 

by Braun based on the attorney-client privilege—because it was clear, based on earlier 

hearings, that the parties had exhausted their meet-and-confer efforts regarding those 

documents (id. at 20-21); (4) granted Plaintiffs’ motion to compel as to the first category, 

because Braun had not established the applicability of the common interest doctrine (id. at 

21-24); (5) denied Plaintiffs’ motion to compel as to the second category (id. at 24-26); 

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and (6) authorized Plaintiffs, as a sanction for Braun’s shifting disclosures concerning a 

key issue (the vehicle replacement offer), to depose an additional witness at Braun’s 

expense (id. at 26-30).

Both sides have now filed what are effectively motions for partial reconsideration

of the May 11, 2020 order. (Docs. 166, 168.)1 For the following reasons, both motions 

will be denied. 

I. Braun’s Motion for Clarification (Doc. 166)

As noted, one of the categories of discovery material addressed in the May 11, 2020 

order was a set of 17 emails—all communications between agents of Braun and agents of 

non-party United Access (“UA”)—that Braun had refused to produce pursuant to the 

common interest doctrine. All 17 emails were identified by Braun on a document entitled 

“Common Interest Privilege Log.” (Doc. 166-1.) In response to Plaintiffs’ motion to 

compel, Braun broadly asserted that all of the emails identified on this log were immune 

from disclosure because they constituted “Braun’s communications with UA” that “were 

made for the limited purpose of facilitating the rendition of legal services relating to UA’s 

response to Plaintiffs’ Subpoena for Braun’s documents.” (Doc. 154 at 15.) In the May 

11, 2020 order, the Court concluded that Braun’s invocation of the common interest 

doctrine “fails for the threshold reason that it has not demonstrated that the UA 

representatives with whom its lawyers were communicating were themselves lawyers or 

represented by lawyers at the time of the communication,” which “is a prerequisite to the 

application of the doctrine.” (Doc. 165 at 23.) 

On May 20, 2020, Braun filed a “motion for clarification.” (Doc. 166.) Specifically, 

Braun seeks to advance an alternative reason why it should be allowed to continue 

withholding one of the 17 emails. That email was identified on the “Common Interest 

Privilege Log” as an August 15, 2019 email from Braun’s outside counsel to five other 

Braun representatives (in-house counsel and outside counsel) and one UA employee, Rich 

1 Plaintiffs have also filed a motion to reopen discovery for the purpose of pursuing 

two additional depositions. (Doc. 171.) That motion is not yet fully briefed, so it would 

be premature to address it now.

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Venhaus. (Doc. 166-1 at 3 [“Tab 4”].) Braun argues it should be allowed to continue 

withholding that email because, although an employee of UA was “inadvertently copied” 

onto the recipient line, the email was intended to be sent only to other Braun employees 

and agents and is therefore protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work-product 

doctrine. (Doc. 166 at 2 n.2 [“Braun’s counsel . . . inadvertently copied a United Access 

employee on this email, but the contents of [the] communication expressly state that he 

intended to exclude United Access for the purpose of maintaining the attorney client 

privilege.”].)

On May 21, 2020, the Court issued an order calling for additional briefing. (Doc. 

167.) Among other things, this order questioned whether Braun’s claim of inadvertent 

disclosure was consistent with the position that Braun had taken when attempting to defend 

the applicability of the common interest doctrine. (Id. at 2 [“Braun has not explained why 

it offered one factual description of the August 15, 2019 email in its response to the motion 

to compel (i.e., an email intentionally sent to UA in an attempt to promote the parties’ 

common legal interest) yet now seeks to offer an entirely different and contradictory 

description of the email in its motion for clarification (i.e., an email accidentally sent to 

UA due to an ‘inadvertent’ typing error by Braun’s counsel). This abrupt change is 

disturbing.”].)

On May 27, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a response to Braun’s motion. (Doc. 169.) 

Plaintiffs contend that (1) Braun waived any claim of privilege by disclosing the email to 

a third party (from UA) and then failing to undertake any effort to claw back the inadvertent 

disclosure; (2) by rejecting Braun’s arguments concerning the applicability of the common 

interest doctrine, the Court necessarily also found that the email wasn’t privileged; and (3) 

because Braun’s “new argument was available to it at the time it briefed its response to 

Plaintiffs’ motion,” Braun “cannot assert it now through its mislabeled motion for 

reconsideration.” (Id.)

On June 5, 2020, Braun filed a reply. (Doc. 173.) Braun begins by arguing that it 

has not waived or forfeited its privilege claim because (1) it specifically denoted, in its 

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“Common Interest Privilege Log,” that it believed the August 15, 2019 was covered by the 

attorney-client privilege, and (2) although it didn’t brief the applicability of the privilege 

in its response to the motion to compel, there was no reason to do so—Plaintiffs’ motion 

only challenged the applicability of the common interest doctrine. (Id. at 1-3.) Braun also 

attempts to address the concern set forth in the Court’s May 21, 2020 order, arguing that it 

has not taken inconsistent positions because it “did not specifically address Item No. 4 in 

its Response” to the motion to compel and thus “did not specifically describe Item No. 4 

as ‘intentionally sent to UA . . . to promote the parties’ common legal interests.’” (Id. at 

2-3.) Next, under the heading “Inadvertent disclosure does not automatically waive 

privilege,” Braun argues it did not “purposely intend[] to waive the privilege” because “it 

never intended to send the email to a third party beyond the reach of the privilege 

relationship. Braun did not claw back the email, as Braun reasonably believed the email 

was privileged pursuant to the attorney–client privilege and common-interest doctrine.” 

(Id. at 3-4.) Finally, Braun argues that the May 11, 2020 ruling concerning the 

inapplicability of the common interest doctrine has no bearing on the distinct issue of 

whether the August 15, 2019 email is privileged. (Id. at 4-5.)

Braun’s motion will be denied for two independent reasons. First, although Braun 

attempts to characterize its motion as a request for clarification, it is no such thing. Instead, 

Braun is attempting to obtain reconsideration of the May 11, 2020 order, which required it 

to produce the August 15, 2019 email to Plaintiffs, by advancing a new legal theory as to 

why it should be allowed to withhold that email. This is improper. Reconsideration is an 

“extraordinary remedy” that “should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, 

unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear 

error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. 

Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (quotation omitted). 

Thus, a motion for reconsideration “may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence 

for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Id. 

See also LRCiv 7.2(g)(1) (“The Court will ordinarily deny a motion for reconsideration of 

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an Order absent a showing of manifest error or a showing of new facts or legal authority 

that could not have been brought to its attention earlier with reasonable diligence.”). Here, 

Braun had a reasonable opportunity to raise its attorney-client privilege and work-product 

arguments during the motion-to-compel briefing process—it could have raised those 

arguments as an alternative reason why Plaintiffs’ motion to compel should be denied. Its 

failure to do so means it cannot attempt to belatedly raise those arguments through the 

guise of a “motion for clarification.” 

Second, the Court continues to be troubled by Braun’s lack of consistency. In its 

response to the motion to compel, Braun argued that all 17 emails identified on its 

“Common Interest Privilege Log” were covered by the common interest doctrine. (Doc. 

154 at 14-16.) In support of this claim, Braun argued that the common interest doctrine 

applies when already-privileged communications “are exchanged with another party to 

‘facilitate the rendition of legal services’ to each party” (id. at 15) and suggested that the 

17 emails qualified under that test because they “were made for the limited purpose of 

facilitating the rendition of legal services relating to UA’s response to Plaintiffs’ Subpoena 

for Braun’s documents” and represented “the entities’ attempts to develop a joint legal 

strategy” (id. at 15-16). The only reasonable interpretation of those statements is as a 

representation by Braun that all 17 emails were intentionally sent to UA in an attempt to 

develop a joint legal strategy. This is inconsistent with the argument raised in Braun’s 

motion for clarification—that “Braun’s counsel . . . inadvertently copied a United Access 

employee on [the August 15, 2019] email.” (Doc. 166 at 2 n.2.)

Braun contends it isn’t taking inconsistent positions because it didn’t “specifically 

address” the August 15, 2019 email in its response to the motion to compel—and, thus, 

didn’t make any specific representations as to whether that particular email had been 

intentionally sent to UA. (Doc. 173 at 2-3.) But Braun stated in its response to the motion 

to compel that all of the withheld emails were covered by the common interest doctrine 

because they had been intentionally sent to UA. This assertion necessarily encompassed 

the August 15, 2019 email and is thus inconsistent with Braun’s new claim of an 

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inadvertent disclosure.

Finally, the factual assertions in Braun’s reply raise even more concerns about 

inconsistency. Braun states in its reply that it “never intended to send the email to a third 

party beyond the reach of the privilege relationship” and thus “did not claw back the email 

. . . [because it] reasonably believed the email was privileged pursuant to the attorney–

client privilege and common-interest doctrine.” (Doc. 173 at 3-4.) This doesn’t sound like 

a claim of inadvertent disclosure (which is what Braun claimed in its motion, see Doc. 166 

at 2 n.2)—it sounds like a claim of intentional disclosure to UA based on a 

misunderstanding of the legal consequences of that disclosure. 

For all of these reasons, the motion for clarification will be denied.

II. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 168)

As noted, Plaintiffs failed to submit a meet-and-confer certification in support of 

their motion to compel. Under Rule 37(a)(1) and LRCiv 7.2(j), the Court could have denied 

the motion to compel in its entirety based on this omission, but the Court chose in its 

discretion to overlook the omission as to two of the six categories of documents. (Doc. 

165 at 18-21.)

On May 26, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration. (Doc. 168.) 

Plaintiffs argue that, because the Court has already chosen to “graciously overlook[] 

Plaintiffs’ misstep regarding their certificate of conference,” and because the record 

contains evidence that they adequately met-and-conferred with Braun concerning three 

additional categories (Braun’s work-product invocation, the Pacifica documents, and 

Braun’s failure to produce a knowledgeable 30(b)(6) witness), the Court should reach the 

merits of those categories, too. (Id. at 2-3.)

Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration will be denied. First, the Court only chose to 

overlook Plaintiffs’ non-compliance with Rule 37(a)(1) and LRCiv 7.2(j) as to the common 

interest doctrine and the attorney-client privilege because both of those issues had been 

addressed during earlier court hearings. (Doc. 165 at 20, emphasis added [“[I]t’s clear that 

at least some of the issues raised in the motion to compel have been the subject of earlier 

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meet-and-confer efforts, given that they were discussed (but not definitively resolved) 

during earlier discovery hearings. Accordingly, the Court will exercise its discretion to 

overlook Plaintiffs’ non-compliance with Rule 37(a)(1) and LRCiv 7.2(j) as to some, but 

not all, of the discovery disputes at issue.”].) Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration doesn’t 

purport to establish that the other categories of discovery material were addressed during 

earlier court hearings—instead, Plaintiffs seek to prove the adequacy of their meet-andconfer efforts as to those categories by attaching a transcript of an out-of-court conversation 

between counsel that occurred on January 31, 2020. (Doc. 168 at 2, citing Doc. 164-1.) 

This transcript doesn’t establish that the Court committed any error in the May 11, 2020 

order, let alone the sort of “clear error” (see Kona Enterprises, 229 F.3d at 890) or 

“manifest error” (see LRCiv 7.2(g)(1)) necessary to trigger reconsideration.

Second, and in a related vein, this isn’t the first time Plaintiffs have cited the January 

31, 2020 transcript as proof of their meet-and-confer efforts—it was also enclosed as an 

attachment to their reply in support of their motion to compel. (Doc. 164-1.) In fact, 

Plaintiffs specifically argued in their reply that the “in person meeting on January 31, 2020, 

during which the parties expressly discussed Defendant’s common interest privilege 

objection, Defendant’s work product objection, and the issue of other similar Pacifica 

complaints,” was proof that “Plaintiffs have exhausted their meet and confer duties.” (Doc. 

164 at 1-2.) Thus, the motion for reconsideration effectively amounts to an attempt by 

Plaintiffs to re-urge the same argument they asserted in their reply. This is improper. See

LRCiv 7.2(g)(1) (“No motion for reconsideration of an Order may repeat any oral or 

written argument made by the movant in support of or in opposition to the motion that 

resulted in the Order.”).2 

Third, as for Plaintiffs’ assertion that the May 11, 2020 order “did not address 

Plaintiffs’ request for production of knowledgeable Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses” and “omitted 

this request entirely” (Doc. 168 at 3), this assertion is inaccurate. 

2 Additionally, to the extent Plaintiffs sought to proffer the January 31, 2020 

transcript as proof of the adequacy of their meet-and-confer efforts, they were required to 

submit it as an attachment to their motion to compel, as opposed to submitting it for the 

first time as an attachment to their reply.

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In Part II of their motion to compel and for sanctions, Plaintiffs sought to compel 

the production of six categories of documents. (Doc. 157 at 2-14.) That section of the 

motion contains no mention of Braun’s 30(b)(6) witness. (Id.) The only mention of the 

30(b)(6) witness comes in Part III, in which Plaintiffs requested the imposition of Rule 37 

sanctions against Braun “for its discovery practices.” (Doc. 157 at 14-17.) In the text of 

Part III, Plaintiffs focused on Braun’s conflicting disclosures and deposition testimony 

concerning which Braun employee had authorized Elaine Haschel to convey a replacement 

offer to Plaintiffs. (Id.) Additionally, in a footnote, Plaintiffs made a fleeting reference to 

the fact that Braun’s 30(b)(6) witness was unknowledgable as to “the alleged terms of the 

alleged replacement and repurchase offers.” (Id. at 16 n.7.) The specific sanction Plaintiffs 

requested in Part III was an order precluding Braun from presenting any evidence that it 

had conveyed a replacement offer (id. at 14), but Plaintiffs also stated, in the final sentence 

of their motion, that “[i]n the alternative, Defendant should be ordered to produce Johnston, 

McMahon and a 30(b)(6) witness on the unanswered topics for depositions, and at its cost.” 

(Id. at 18.) 

In the May 11, 2020 order, the Court concluded that “Plaintiffs are entitled to some 

relief, but not the dramatic relief sought in their motion (i.e., an evidence-preclusion 

sanction that would effectively direct a verdict in their favor on liability).” (Doc. 165 at 

29.) Because “the only discovery order that Braun has arguably violated is the order 

requiring the identification of witnesses—McMahon should have been identified as a 

witness, given his role in the replacement-authorization process,” the Court ordered Braun 

to produce McMahon as a witness and further ordered Braun to pay for the cost of the 

deposition. (Id. at 29-30.) Finally, in a footnote, the Court acknowledged but rejected 

Plaintiffs’ request to depose additional Braun witnesses: “Plaintiffs also contend, in their 

alternative request, that they should be allowed to depose Johnston and another Braun 

30(b)(6) witness at Braun’s expense. The Court disagrees. Braun’s updated MIDP 

disclosure identifies McMahon, but not Johnston, as providing the authorization.” (Id. at 

30 n.12.)

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As this summary demonstrates, the Court did not “entirely omit” any discussion of 

Plaintiffs’ request to depose a 30(b)(6) witness at Braun’s expense. (Doc. 168 at 3.) In 

fact, the Court specifically acknowledged that request but rejected it. 

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:

(1) Braun’s motion for clarification (Doc. 166) is denied.

(2) Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration (Doc. 168) is denied.

Dated this 10th day of June, 2020.

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