Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00699/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00699-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

OCCUPY TUCSON, an unincorporated

political organization; SAMUEL AGGER,

a single man residing in the City of

Tucson; CRAIG BARBER, a single man

residing in the City of Tucson; LEESA

WORLEY, a single woman residing in the

City of Tucson; KARLAREITH TERRY,

a single woman residing in the City of

Tucson; KASEE DWYER, a single

woman residing in the City of Tucson;

GARY BRANSON, a married man

residing in the City of Tucson; and,

WILLIAM WARFIELD, a single man

residing in the City of Tucson, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

THE CITY OF TUCSON, a municipal

corporation of the State of Arizona;

TUCSON POLICE DEPARTMENT, a

legal entity of the City of Tucson;

ROBERT “BOB” WALKUP, in his

official capacity as Mayor of the City of

Tucson; members of the Tucson City

Council in their respective official

capacities; RICHARD MIRANDA, in his

official capacity as Acting Tucson City

Manager; MICHAEL RANKIN, in his

official capacity as Tucson City Attorney;

FRED GREY in his official capacity as

director of City of Tucson Parks and

Recreation Department; and ROBERTO

VILLASEÑOR, in his official capacity as

Chief of the T, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-11-699-TUC-CKJ

ORDER 

Case 4:11-cv-00699-CKJ Document 6 Filed 11/08/11 Page 1 of 4
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1

Although Plaintiffs’ motion cites Tucson City Code Section 12, this chapter relates to

Elections. The Court construes this request as relating to Chapter 21, Parks and Recreation.

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Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining

Order and Preliminary Injunction [Doc. 2]. In their motion Plaintiffs request the Court to

enjoin “enforcing the provisions of Section 12 of the Tucson City Code, and/or law or

ordinance to prohibit the same from picketing, protesting, speaking, leafleting, assembling,

or otherwise peacefully engaging in expressive activity protected by the First Amendment

to the United States Constitution and Article 2 § 5 of the Arizona Constitution in Armory

Park, Viente de Agosto Park or any public land in the City of Tucson.”1

 Pls.’ Mot. for TRO

and Prelim. Inj. [Doc. 2] at 2.

I. ANALYSIS

Whether to grant or deny a motion for a temporary restraining order is within the

Court’s discretion. See Miss Universe, Inc. v. Flesher, 605 F.2d 1130, 1132-33 (9th Cir.

1979). “The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is identical to the standard

for issuing a preliminary injunction.” Whitman v. Hawaiian Tug & Barge

Corporation/Young Bros., Ltd. Salaried Pension Plan, 27 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1228 (D. Haw.

1998); See New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox. Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1347 n. 2, 98 S.Ct.

359, 361, 54 L.Ed.2d 439 (1977); Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 650

F.2d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 1982). A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic

remedy and will not be granted absent a clear showing of likely success in the underlying

claim and likely irreparable injury. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972, 117 S.Ct.

1865, 1867, 138 L.Ed.2d 162 (1997) (per curiam); Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989,

993-94 (9th Cir. 2005); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 1995); Fed. R. Civ. P.

65. To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show “that he is likely to

succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in

the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129

Case 4:11-cv-00699-CKJ Document 6 Filed 11/08/11 Page 2 of 4
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S. Ct. 365, 374, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008); Sammartano v. First Judicial District Court, 303

F.3d 959, 973 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that a party can establish irreparable harm by

demonstrating the existence of a colorable First Amendment claim). The moving party has

the burden of proof on each element of the test. Environmental Council of Sacramento v.

Slater, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1027 (E.D. Cal. 2000). “[T]he test for granting a preliminary

injunction is ‘a continuum in which the required showing of harm varies inversely with the

required showing of meritoriousness.” Sammartano, 303 F.3d at 973-4.

Additionally, the function of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo

pending a determination on the merits. Chalk v. U.S. Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701, 704 (9th Cir.

1988). As such, there is heightened scrutiny where the movant seeks to alter rather than

maintain the status quo. Dahl v. HEM Pharms. Corp., 7 F.3d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1993)

(holding that mandatory, as opposed to prohibitory, injunctions are “subject to a heightened

scrutiny and should not be issued unless the facts and law clearly favor the moving party.”).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that this type of mandatory injunctive relief is

disfavored, and should be denied unless the facts and law clearly favor the movant.

Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 1979). There is also heightened

scrutiny where the injunction would provide substantially all the relief the movant may

recover after a full trial on the merits. Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir.

2001).

A. Temporary Restraining Order

A Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) is unwarranted in this case. Although the

record reflects that Plaintiffs’ counsel spoke with Defendant Michael Rankin about the plan

to file the Complaint [Doc. 1] in this matter, it is devoid of any reasons why Defendants

should not be given notice and an opportunity to respond to the allegations at issue. See

Compl., Exh. 2, Decl. of Attorney Paul Gattone in Support of Pls.’ Mot. for TRO/Prelim. Inj.

[Doc. 1]; Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1) (“The court may issue a temporary restraining order

without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if . . . specific facts in

an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss,

Case 4:11-cv-00699-CKJ Document 6 Filed 11/08/11 Page 3 of 4
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or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and

. . . the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons

why it should not be required.”). Plaintiffs activities began October 15, 2011. Compl. [Doc.

1] at ¶ 26. On November 3, 2011, Plaintiffs were directed to leave Armory Park, and reestablished their activities at Viente De Agosto Park. Id. at ¶ 27. Tucson Police Department

(“TPD”) officers have cited protesters for violations of the Tucson City Code since Plaintiffs’

occupation commenced. Id. at ¶ 26. The ongoing activities of Plaintiffs and TPD’s response

has remained unchanged. Plaintiffs filings with this Court fail to demonstrate a clear

showing of likely success on the merits and likely irreparable injury. See Winter, 555 U.S.

at 20, 129 S. Ct. at 374; Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 972, 117 S.Ct. at 1867; Am. Trucking Ass’n

v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009); Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 993-94;

Pratt, 65 F.3d at 805 (9th Cir. 1995); Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. Plaintiffs’ counsel failed to certify

in his affidavit why notice should not be given to Defendants or why it should not be

required. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request for a TRO is DENIED.

B. Preliminary Injunction

Counsel has failed to meet the necessary procedural requirements for a preliminary

injunction. Preliminary injunctive relief can not be granted unless and until Plaintiffs

properly serve Defendants with the documents that have initiated this case, and Defendants

have had an opportunity to respond. As such, Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction

is DENIED without prejudice.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary

Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction [Doc. 2] is DENIED.

DATED this 8th day of November, 2011.

Case 4:11-cv-00699-CKJ Document 6 Filed 11/08/11 Page 4 of 4