Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-03052/USCOURTS-ca10-91-03052-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

---

FILED 

United State& Coμrt qf Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth C1rcu1t 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT AUG 19 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

CLARENCE E. FERGUSON, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

STEVEN J. DAVIES; THE ATTORNEY 

GENERAL OF THE STATE OF KANSAS, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 91-3052 

(D. C. No. 88-3432-S) 

( D. Kan. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

Mr. Ferguson, a state prisoner, filed his prose application 

for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenged his state 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-3052 Document: 010110132095 Date Filed: 08/19/1991 Page: 1 
convictions of two counts of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated 

rape, sodomy, and three counts of aggravated robbery. The 

district court denied relief and Mr. Ferguson appeals prose. 

Mr. Ferguson filed a direct appeal and the Kansas Supreme 

Court affirmed the convictions. State v. Ferguson, Washington, & 

Tucker, 618 P.2d 1186 (Kan. 1980). Thereafter, Mr. Ferguson 

unsuccessfully pursued state post-conviction relief. 

Mr. Ferguson and his two co-defendants engaged in a single, 

sordid escapade, the facts of which may be found in the Kansas 

Supreme Court opinion. 

In his pro se habeas corpus action, Mr. Ferguson alleged: 

(1) he should have had a separate trial from his co-defendants; 

(2) the testimony of the prosecutor should have been allowed as it 

would have been exculpatory; (3) the trial court erred in failing 

to give an accomplice instruction; (4) the trial court should not 

have permitted the state to endorse late witnesses; (5) the trial 

court should have granted a mistrial because of the late 

witnesses; (6) the two counts of aggravated kidnapping should be 

reversed as a matter of law as there was insufficient evidence; 

(7) there was insufficient evidence to sustain the rape 

convictions; (8) the sodomy charge was unconstitutional; and (9) 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel and of his separate 

appellate counsel. 

-2 -

Appellate Case: 91-3052 Document: 010110132095 Date Filed: 08/19/1991 Page: 2 
The district court analyzed these contentions in its elevenpage order and denied relief. 

Mr. Ferguson appeals pro se raising essentially the same 

arguments. Mr. Ferguson is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis. 

While close, we grant a certificate of probable cause. We are not 

persuaded any constitutional error exists. 

We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court for 

substantially the same reasons contained in the district court's 

Order of January 11, 1991, a copy of which is attached. 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

Circuit Judge 

-3-

Appellate Case: 91-3052 Document: 010110132095 Date Filed: 08/19/1991 Page: 3 
♦ 

AO 72A 

(Rev. 8/82) 

~~?":ERr:o ON THE DOCKET' 

-:A:\C: . I/ I Ll.q I 

r'ILED 

U.S. Dl s·T'H1 CT COURT 

01'.?T :;':.'T C'F t.,'di SAS 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT c~~ i 3 59 PM '91 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS R/.i: \~H. 

CLARENCE E. FERGUSON, 

v. 

STEVEN DAVIES, et al., 

) 

) 

Petitioner, ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Respondents. ) 

s Y L_:t_ntv.i.ke~ . [ ? u TY 

CASE NO. 88-3432-S 

______________________ ) 

0 R D E R 

I 

This matter is before the court on petitioner's 

application for a writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§2254. Petitioner challenges his conviction for aggravated 

kidnapping, aggravated rape, sodomy and aggravated robbery. 

Respondents filed two answers in this case. In their first 

response, they raised only the claim that petitioner had failed to 

exhaust state remedies. Petitioner filed a traverse. The court 

determined that petitioner had sufficiently exhausted his state 

remedies, and allowed respondents ten days to file a secod answer 

to address the merits of petitioner's allegations. Respondents 

filed their answer and the court granted petitioner ten days to file 

a second traverse. Petitioner has not filed a second traverse. 

Before considering the merit of petitioner's claims, the 

court notes that federal habeas review of alleged errors in a state 

criminal proceeding is limited to review for violations of federal 

constitutional or statutory law. Claims based on violation of state 

law are not cognizable under §2254. Davis v. Reynolds, 890 F.2d 

( ( /) 

Appellate Case: 91-3052 Document: 010110132095 Date Filed: 08/19/1991 Page: 4 
AO 72A 

(Rev. 8/82) 

1105, 1109, n.3 (10th Cir. 1989). Legal error alone is not enough 

to warrant federal habeas relief. Absent a claimed impropriety 

denying a specific constitutional right, a habeas claim based on 

state procedural violations must be established by proof the trial 

was rendered fundamentally unfair by the alleged error. Mahorney 

v. Wallman, 917 F.2d 469 (10th Cir. 1990); Tucker v. Makowski, 883 

F . 2 d 8 7 7 , 8 81 ( 10th Cir . 19 8 9 ) . Even if constitutional error is 

demonstrated, the error must not be harmless. Mahorney, 917 F.2d 

at 474. The court has reviewed the complete record in making the 

following findings and order. 

I 

Abuse of writ 

The State claims this is a successive petition which 

should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254, Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Proceedings, Rule 9(b). Under this rule, a successive 

petition may be dismissed if no new or additional grounds are raised 

and there was a prior determination of the grounds on the merits. 

Or, if new and different grounds are alleged, petitioner's failure 

to assert such grounds in the earlier petition is construed as an 

abuse of the writ. See Coleman v. Saffle, 869 F.2d 1377, 1380-81 

(10th Cir. 1989) cert. denied U.S. -' 110 s.ct. 1835 

(1990) (abuse of writ rules addressed). 

The State points to petitioner's earlier federal habeas 

petition (87-3280) which the court dismissed without prejudice for 

failure to exhaust state remedies. Petitioner thereafter attempted 

to file an appeal from the denial of his state motion for postconviction relief under K.S.A. 60-1507. The appeal was dismissed 

2 

Appellate Case: 91-3052 Document: 010110132095 Date Filed: 08/19/1991 Page: 5 
AO 72A 

(Rev. 8/82) 

for lack of jurisdiction because it was untimely filed. Petitioner 

then filed his present habeas petition, raising the same grounds as 

in the earlier petition. 

The present petition does not fit squarely within the 

scope of Rule 9. Petitioner's first petition was not determined on 

the merits. The present petition also does not raise a new or 

additional ground, so there is no need for the petitioner to justify 

why such a claim was not raised in the earlier petition. The 

State's attempt to have petitioner justify why he failed to properly 

pursue his state appeal from the denial of the 1507 motion confuses 

the two separate situations anticipated under the rule. See I 

Coleman, 869 F. 2d at 1380 (distinction made between successive 

petitions and petitions in which new or additional grounds raised). 

The court does not find dismissal is warranted under Rule 9. 

The State also claims petitioner's dismissed state appeal 

is without legal effect, and therefore, the current petition must 

be dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies. The State 

essentially seeks to treat the dismissal without prejudice of 

petitioner's earlier habeas petition as establishing his failure to 

exhaust state remedies as the law of the case. The court declines 

to adopt this position, and treats the State's argument as an 

attempt to have the court reconsider its order dated November 26, 

1990, in which the court found petitioner had substantially 

exhausted state remedies on all claims raised in this petition. The 

court reaffirms its finding that petitioner sufficiently exhausted 

state remedies. 

3 

Appellate Case: 91-3052 Document: 010110132095 Date Filed: 08/19/1991 Page: 6 
AO 72A 

(Rev. 8/82) 

Severance of cases 

Petitioner sought to separate his trial from that of his 

co-defendants. Petitioner's motion for severance was based on his 

desire to introduce a co-defendant's statement which was exculpatory 

to petitioner and on his claim of antagonistic defenses among the 

co-defendants. The state court denied the pre-trial motion, finding 

for the purposes of severance that the statement was hearsay 

evidence which could not be admitted even in a separate trial, and 

that the alibi defenses were not antagonistic or in conflict. 

Petitioner renewed his motion several times, including when another 

co-defendant pleaded guilty and testified for the state. The trial I 

court denied all requests for a separate trial. 

Kansas law makes j oinder or severance of defendants a 

matter within the discretion of the trial court. K.S.A. 22-3204; 

see United States v. Bridwell, 583 F.2d 1135 (10th Cir. 1978). The 

Kansas Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the trial 

court's refusal to sever. Absent a federal question affecting the 

validity of the conviction, a petitioner's claim of state court 

error in ruling on a motion for severance is not a cognizable claim 

under §2254. See Bond v. Oklahoma, 546 F.2d 1369, 1377 (10th Cir. 

197 6) . The court finds the trial court acted within its broad 

discretion in denying petitioner's motion to sever, and that no 

error of constitutional dimension resulted. 

The court finds the record does not support a finding of 

constitutional error. And, given the weal th of testimony introduced 

against petitioner by the victims, petitioner was not denied a 

constitutionally fair trial. 

4 

Appellate Case: 91-3052 Document: 010110132095 Date Filed: 08/19/1991 Page: 7 
AO 72A 

(Rev. 8/82) 

Admission of evidence 

This claim is based on petitioner's attempt to introduce 

his co-defendant's statement, discussed above, which was made to 

Vern Miller. The admissibility of evidence in a state criminal 

trial is a matter of state law and alleged errors are properly 

presented to a state court on appeal rather than to a federal habeas 

court. See Nichols v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 1250, 1253 (10th Cir.) 

cert. denied sub nom. Nichols v. Tansy, _U.S._, 109 s.ct. 3169 

(1989). The trial court found the co-defendant's statements would 

be inadmissible hearsay evidence as long as the declarant continued I 

to assert Fifth Amendment rights, and that no exception to the 

hearsay rule applied to indicate the statement was reliable. See 

Martinez v. Sullivan, 881 F.2d 921, 928 (10th Cir. 1989), cert 

denied u.s. _, 110 s.ct. 740 (1990). 

Absent fundamental unfairness cons ti tu ting a denial of due 

process, errors in the admissibility of evidence are not grounds for 

habeas corpus relief. Martin v. Kaiser, 907 F.2d 931, 936 (10th 

Cir. 1990). Here, the trial court's ruling that the evidence was 

inadmissible was not error under state law. Even if Miller's 

testimony could have been admitted, the court finds the trial 

court's ruling did not render the criminal proceeding fundamentally 

unfair such that petitioner's constitutional right to due process 

was violated. At best, the co-defendant's statement would have 

bolstered petitioner's alibi defense, but the evidence establishing 

petitioner's presence at the scene of the crime was conclusive 

enough to convince a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable 

5 

Appellate Case: 91-3052 Document: 010110132095 Date Filed: 08/19/1991 Page: 8 
AO 72A 

(Rev. 8/82) 

doubt of petitioner's involvement in the criminal activity. See 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 s.ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 

reh. denied, 444 U.S. 890 (1979); Soap v. Carter, 632 F.2d 872 (10th 

Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 939 (1981). 

Accomplice instruction 

Generally, matters concerning the giving of jury 

instructions are considered questions of state law and not proper 

subjects of federal habeas corpus review under 28 U.S. c. §2254. 

Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 97 S.Ct. 1730, 52 L.Ed.2d 203 

(1977). A due process claim arises only if the jury instruction is I 

so prejudicial as to constitute a denial of fundamental fairness and 

due process. The question to be resolved is "whether the 

ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the 

resulting conviction violates due process, and not merely whether 

the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even universally 

condemned." Id., at 154 (Citation omitted). Additionally, if the 

correctness of an instruction is challenged only under state law, 

then the claim is not cognizable under 28 u.s.c. §2254. Engle v. 

Isaac, 456 u.s. 107, 102 s.ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783, reh. denied 456 

U.S. 1001 (1982). 

(N.D.Ind. 1983). 

See Fleener v. Duckworth, 559 F.Supp. 1322 

Here, petitioner essentially argues that state law and 

fundamental fairness required an accomplice instruction to caution 

the jury against the unsupported testimony of an accomplice. The 

argument is not persuasive where, as in this case, the accomplice 

testimony was significantly supported by the victims' testimony. 

6 

Appellate Case: 91-3052 Document: 010110132095 Date Filed: 08/19/1991 Page: 9 
AO 72A 

(Rev. 8/82) 

The court finds no constitutional error in the trial court's failure 

to give the requested cautionary instruction. 

Late endorsement of witnesses 

In this case, the State moved to endorse witnesses late 

in the trial because a co-defendant decided to plead guilty and 

testify for the state. Two witnesses who could corroborate the codefendant's testimony also were endorsed at the same time. The 

trial court, however, made sure that all defendants were provided 

with statements by the two corroborating witnesses and that they 

were allowed to interview the witnesses before the witnesses took I 

the stand. 

The late endorsement of a witness is allowed under state 

law and within the discretion of the trial court. K.S.A. 22-

3201(6). The state trial and appellate court found no prejudice to 

petitioner in the late endorsement. Although petitioner's alibi 

defense was weakened by the testimony of these later endorsed 

witnesses, petitioner's alibi defense already had been refuted by 

the victims identifying petitioner as participating in the criminal 

activities. The court finds the late endorsement of witnesses was 

not an abuse of the trial court's discretion and did not violate 

petitioner's constitutional rights. 

Motion for mistrial 

As a continuation of the previous issue, petitioner claims 

the trial court denied him a fair trial when the witnesses were 

endorsed so late in the proceeding. 

7 

Appellate Case: 91-3052 Document: 010110132095 Date Filed: 08/19/1991 Page: 10 
AO 72A 

(Rev. 8/82) 

Under state law, the declaration of a mistrial is within 

the trial court's discretion. K.S.A. 22-3423. Under the facts, the 

trial court's refusal to declare a mistrial was not an abuse of 

discretion and did not result in constitutional error. Having 

determined that the late endorsement of the witnesses did not render 

the trial fundamentally unfair, it necessarily follows that the 

proceeding was not rendered fundamentally unfair by the trial 

court's refusal to grant a mistrial. 

Kidnapping offense 

Petitioner argues the "taking" element of kidnapping, I 

K.S.A. 21-3420, was not satisfied by the victims being dragged out 

of the shop and into a back yard area. Petitioner's argument, 

however, is based on the state's interpretation of its law, and 

therefore, is not a cognizable claim in a federal habeas corpus 

action. See Davis v. Reynolds, 890 F.2d 1105, 1109, n.3 (10th Cir. 

1989). Federal courts are bound by a state court's interpretation 

of its state statute unless it is inconsistent with fundamental 

principles of justice. Smith v. Atkins, 565 F.Supp. 721, 739-40 

(D.Kan. 1983). The Kansas Supreme Court found the elements of the 

offense satisfied under the facts of this case. See state v. Buggs, 

219 Kan. 203, 547 P.2d 720, 730-31 (1976) ("taking" element of 

kidnapping discussed). 

Petitioner also claims the jury instructions shifted the 

burden to him to disprove an intent to kidnap. This claim is not 

supported by the record. Instruction #12, given to the jury, read: 

8 

Appellate Case: 91-3052 Document: 010110132095 Date Filed: 08/19/1991 Page: 11 
AO 72A 

(Rev. 8/82) 

"The intent with which an act is committed, being but 

the mental state of the person committing it, direct proof 

of such intent is not required, but it may be proved by 

any competent evidence, direct or circumstantial. Such 

intent, however, must be established by the weight of 

evidence required by these instructions." 

Instruction #11 directed the jury that they must find the petitioner 

guilty if they had no reasonable doubt as to the truth of any of the 

claims made by the State. The court finds instruction #12 did not 

impermissibly instruct the jury that petitioner had to prove his 

lack of criminal intent. I 

Sufficiency of evidence of rape 

Petitioner broadly maintains there was not sufficient 

evidence to support a conviction of rape under counts 5 and 9. Each 

count sets forth a charge of rape against a separate victim. 

Petitioner challenges the sufficiency of the evidence proving an 

element of the offense, specifically, that there had been sexual 

intercourse with the victims. 

In considering the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

a state conviction, a federal habeas court must consider the record 

and decide whether no rational trier of fact could have found proof 

of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. 307. A 

judgment by a state appellate court rejecting a challenge to 

evidentiary sufficiency is entitled to deference by a federal court. 

Id. The federal court must view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution and presume the trier of fact resolved 

9 

Appellate Case: 91-3052 Document: 010110132095 Date Filed: 08/19/1991 Page: 12 
.. 

AO 72A 

(Rev. 8/82) 

all factual conflicts in favor of the prosecution. Id. 

See Cordoba v. Hanrahan, 910 F.2d 691 (10th Cir. 1990}, cert. 

denied, U.S. _, 111 S . Ct. 5 8 5 ( 19 9 0) . 

The court finds the testimony of the second rape victim, 

who also observed the first victim being raped, provided enough 

evidence that sexual intercourse occurred such that a rational trier 

of fact could find petitioner guilty of rape beyond a reasonable 

doubt. 

Charge in information 

Petitioner contends the charge of aggravated sodomy in the 

information was defective but it is difficult to determine what I 

particular defect is being alleged. Even so, the sufficiency of an 

indictment or information is not a matter for federal habeas relief 

unless the information is so deficient that the convicting court 

lacked jurisdiction. Heath v. Jones, 863 F.2d 815 {11th Cir. 1989); 

Uresti v. Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir. 1987). Under the Sixth 

and Fourteenth Amendments, petitioner is entitled to fair notice of 

the criminal charges against him, and claims of due process 

violations in not providing such fair notice are cognizable in 

habeas corpus actions. See Hunter v. State of N.M., 916 F.2d 595, 

598 (10th Cir. 1990); Franklin v. White, 803 F.2d 416 (8th Cir. 

1986), cert. denied 481 U.S. 1020 (1987). 

In this case, the court finds no constitutional error in 

the charge of aggravated sodomy in the information. The charge 

adequately established the state court's jurisdiction and 

sufficiently informed petitioner of the offense. 

10 

Appellate Case: 91-3052 Document: 010110132095 Date Filed: 08/19/1991 Page: 13 
• I 

DES:CH 

AO 72A 

(Rev. 8/82) 

Assistance of counsel 

Petitioner claims he was denied his Fifth Amendment right 

to counsel. He contends his trial attorney was ineffective for not 

recognizing or pursuing the issues raised in this application. He 

also contends his attorney on direct appeal failed to adequately 

investigate and present all potential issues. Petitioner's claims 

are not persuasive. There is a strong presumption of professional 

competency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 s.ct. 2052, 

80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Given the overwhelming evidence of 

petitioner's guilt in this case, petitioner clearly is unable to 

show the prejudice required under Strickland, that but for his 

I 

counsels' performance, there was a reasonable probability the result 

would have been different. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the petition is dismissed and 

all relief denied. 

The clerk of the court is directed to transmit copies of 

this Memorandum and Order to petitioner and to the Office of the 

Attorney General for the State of Kansas. 

DATED: This / / day of January, 1991 at Topeka, Kansas. 

unitedStatesDistiJudge DALEE. 

~ SAFFELS ~ 

11 

Appellate Case: 91-3052 Document: 010110132095 Date Filed: 08/19/1991 Page: 14