Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00099/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00099-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gaylene Dudley, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social

Security Administration 

Defendants. 

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CV 12-00099-PHX-MHB

ORDER

On January 17, 2012, Plaintiff Gaylene Dudley (hereinafter, “Dudley”) filed a

Complaint seeking judicial review of the Decision of the Appeals Council for the Social

Security Administration (“Appeals Council”) denying a Request for Review of an

Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision, dated May 9, 2011, denying Dudley’s request

for disability benefits, and the upholding of that denial on November 18, 2011, following

receipt of additional evidence. (Doc. 1.) Pending before the Court is Defendant Michael J.

Astrue’s, Commissioner of Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”), Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc.18.) On April 5, 2012, Dudley filed

a Response. (Doc. 20.) After considering the arguments raised by the parties in their

briefing, the Court now issues the following ruling. 

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Case 2:12-cv-00099-MHB Document 21 Filed 07/31/12 Page 1 of 8
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1

 Dudley contends that the evidence was originally submitted to the Appeals Council

on December 16, 2010, but that it was not considered at any stage of the review, and that the

evidence was resubmitted on July 27, 2011. (Doc. 20, at 1-2.) Dudley provides no evidence

to support these assertions, and the record of the Appeals Council does not support these

assertions. (Doc. 19-1, at 3.)

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BACKGROUND

On March 18, 2010, an ALJ issued a decision denying Dudley’s application for

Widow’s Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405. (Doc.

19-1 at 8-15.) Dudley requested the Appeals Council review the decision, and on May 9,

2011, the Appeals Council sent, by mail addressed to Dudley, notice that it denied Dudley’s

request for review and of the right to commence a civil action within sixty (60) days from the

date of receipt. (Doc. 19-1 at 22-24.) On October 14, 2011, Claimant submitted new

evidence and contentions to the Appeals Council. (Doc. 19-1 at 3.)1

 On November 18, 2011,

the Appeals Council notified Dudley that, construing Dudley’s submission as a request to

reopen, it had found no basis to reopen and change the March 18, 2010 decision of the

Commissioner. (Doc. 19-1at 28-29.) The Appeals Council also advised Dudley that under

“our rules, [Dudley] [did] not have the right to court review of [the] denial of [Dudley]’s

request for reopening.” (Id.) On January 17, 2012, Dudley filed an action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 405 seeking judicial review of the denial of Dudley’s Social Security benefits

application. (Doc. 20 at 2.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize a motion to dismiss for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Federal courts are of limited jurisdiction,

possessing power authorized by the Constitution and statute. U.S. v. Marks, 530 F.3d 799,

810 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)).

When jurisdiction ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of

announcing the fact and dismissing the cause. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment,

Case 2:12-cv-00099-MHB Document 21 Filed 07/31/12 Page 2 of 8
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 “Mailing” is construed as the date of receipt of the notice, which is presumed to

occur five days after the date of notice unless there is a reasonable showing to the contrary.

20 C.F.R. § 422.210 (c); Vernon v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1987).

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523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998). Thus, dismissal of a complaint for lack ofsubject matter jurisdiction

is proper if the if the court does not have the power to grant relief. U.S. v. Bravo-Diaz, 312

F.3d 995, 997 (9th Cir. 2002).

DISCUSSION

1. Untimely Complaint

The Commissioner argues in its Motion to Dismiss that Dudley failed to file suit

seeking judicial review of the “final decision” of the Commissioner within the 60-day time

period set forth in section 205 (g) and (h) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

The Commissioner also asserts that no circumstances exist to justify equitable tolling of the

60-day time period. In response, Dudley argues that the 60-day limitations period did not

commence until November 18, 2011, the date the Appeals Council denied her request to

reopen, and the date on which Dudley claims her administrative remedies were exhausted,

and “final decision”of the Commissioner obtained. 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and (h) govern judicial review of the Commissioner’s

administrative decision, which read in relevant part:

(g) Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security made after hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount

in controversy, may obtain review of such decision by a civil action commenced

within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within

such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow.2

(h) The findings and decisions of the Commissioner after a hearing shall be

binding upon all individuals who were parties to such hearing. No findings of

facts or decision of the Commissioner shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal,

or governmental agency except as herein provided. No action against the United

States, the Commissioner, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought

under section 1331 or 1346 of Title 28 to recover on any claim arising out of this

subchapter.

42 U.S.C.§ 405 (g)-(h) (2010).

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Section 405 (g) and (h) operate as a statute of limitations establishing the time

period in which a claimant may appeal a final decision of the Commissioner. Heckler,

811 F.2d at 1277. The time limit set forth in Section 405(g) must be strictly construed.

Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 479 (1986). See Fletcher v. Apfel, 210 F.3d

510 (5th Cir. 2000)(affirming summary judgment in favor of commissioner for filing suit

one day past the deadline). 

Here, the Appeals Council sent notice to Dudley on May 9, 2011 of its denial of

Dudley’s request to review the Commissioner’s March 18, 2010 decision denying

benefits. That notice also informed Dudley of the right to commence a civil action for

judicial review within 60 days of the date of receipt. The last day, therefore, that Dudley

could have filed a civil action pursuant to section 405 (g) was July 8, 2011. Dudley filed

suit on January 17, 2012, over six months after the deadline. 

Dudley argues that November 18, 2011 is the date on which her administrative

remedies were exhausted, the Commissioner’s decision became “final,” and the 60-day

filing period began to toll. Dudley claims that additional evidence of disability, she

alleges was submitted on December 16, 2010, was erroneously overlooked by the

Appeals Council in their determination to deny Dudley’s request of review of

Commissioner’s March 18, 2010 decision. Additionally, Dudley states that because the

evidence was not considered by the Appeals Council, a final decision was not reached

until all administrative remedies were exhausted to correct this error. Dudley cites

Kildare v. Saenz, 325 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) to support her argument that a final

decision was not obtained until all administrative remedies were exhausted. 

In Kildare, the court identified that “a final decision has two elements: (1)

presentment of the claim to the Commissioner, and (2) complete exhaustion of

administrative remedies.” Id. at 1082. Additionally, Dudley cites Bowen, 476 U.S. at

484, for the its finding that exhaustion is important to prevent interference with an

agency and its processes, allow an agency the opportunity to correct any errors, and

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compile a record which is adequate for judicial review. Id. The Court is not persuaded

that the November 18, 2010 decision by the Appeals Counsel operates as the date

Dudley’s administrative remedies were exhausted.

First, Dudley fails to support her assertions that (1) additional evidence of

disability was in fact submitted to the Appeals Council on December 16, 2010, or (2) if

it had been received, that the Appeals Council incorrectly considered the evidence in its

decision to deny Dudley’s Social Security benefits claim. The record reflects that the

only additional evidence of disability submitted by Dudley was received by the Appeals

Council after its initial decision, on October 14, 2011. In the absence of support of

Dudley’s claims, the Court finds that all administrative remedies were exhausted on May

9, 2011, the point the Appeals Council denied Dudley’s request for review of

Commissioner’s March 18, 2010 decision.

 Furthermore, the Appeals Counsel’s decision to deny the reopening of the

Commissioner’s decision does not constitute a new final decision. See, e.g., Banta v.

Sullivan, 925 F.2d 343 (9th Cir. 1991); Triplett v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1985).

Allowing claimants to extend their time for filing in district court “simply by submitting

additional materials which the Appeals Council considers when determining whether to

reopen a case would frustrate Congress’ intent ‘to limit judicial review to the original

decision denying benefits [and thereby] forestall repetitive or belated litigation of stale

eligibility claims.’” Banta, 925 F.2d at 345 (quoting Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99,

108 (1977)). Since the letter sent on November 18, 2011 does not constitute a new final

decision of the Commissioner, the 60-day filing period began to run on May 9, 2011.

The Court– finding that Commissioner’s decision became final on May, 9, 2011–

determines that the deadline for Dudley to commence a civil action was July 8, 2011,

and that therefore, her Complaint, filed on January 17, 2012, should be dismissed as

untimely.

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2. Equitable Tolling

The Commissioner asserts that no circumstances exist to justify equitable tolling

of the 60-day filing time period set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g) beyond July 8, 2011.

In response, Dudley argues that the 60-day time period was tolled until Dudley

exhausted all administrative remedies. Specifically, Dudley contends that all

administrative remedies were not exhausted until November 18, 2011, essentially

reiterating her claims above.

The 60-day limitations period set forth in 42 U.S.C. §405 (g) may be extended

by (1) the Commissioner of the Social Security pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1482 and

§ §404.1411 or (2) the courts applying equitable tolling principles. Johnson v. Shalala,

2 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Bowen, 476 U.S. at 481). In this instance, Dudley

argues the 60-day filing time period should be tolled under the second prong, the court’s

application of equitable tolling principles. 

Traditional equitable tolling principles are sparingly applied in situations “where

the claimant actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during

the statutory time period, or where the complainant has been induced or tricked by his

adversary’s misconduct in allowing the filing deadline to pass.” Irwin v. Department of

Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990); See also Bowen, 476 U.S. at 481-82 (equitably

tolling the filing period where confidential internal policy prevented claimants from

knowing the basis of their claim); Vernon, 811 F.2d at 1275, 1278 (equitably tolling the

filing period where Plaintiff allegedly was told by an employee of the Social Security

Administration that the deadline would be extended). Principles of equitable tolling do

not extend to “what is at best a garden variety claim of excusable neglect.” Irwin, 498

U.S. at 96. 

Dudley’s argument that the filing period should be tolled until November 18,

2011, fails, as she can not establish that the Appeals Council committed an error in

considering evidence of Dudley’s disability. In the event that Dudley could demonstrate

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the Appeals Council committed an error, Dudley fails to establish the pursuit of

administrative remediesto correct the error prevented Dudley from filing the suit within

the 60-day time period. Further, Dudley asserts in her Response that the additional

evidence was also submitted to the Appeals Council on July 27, 2011. She provides no

support for this assertion, and in any event, even if she did, the submission would have

exceeded the last day to file a civil action by 18 days. Dudley’s October 14, 2011

submission occurred 159 days after receiving notice of the Appeals Council’s final

decision. Dudley’s actions fail to establish an “active pursuit of judicial remedies within

the statutory period.”

Additionally, unlike the Claimant in Bowen, who missed the filing deadline due

to secretive internal agency policies, Dudley was well informed of the time period in

which Dudley had to further proceed with the Social Security claim. The record shows

that on May 9, 2011, Dudley received notice of Commissioner’s final decision and of

the right to seek judicial review of said final decision within 60 days. 

Moreover, unlike the Claimant in Vernon, who missed the filing deadline after

being misinformed by an employee of the Social Security Administration, Dudley does

not establish that her civil suit was untimely filed because she was mislead by an

employee of the Social Security Administration. Furthermore, the record does not

indicate that Dudley relied upon actions or words of any member of the Social Security

Administration which subsequently caused Dudley to file the suit past the deadline. In

the absence of such misconduct or misinformation, equitable tolling principals cannot

be applied. 

The Court determines that the circumstances set forth in Bowen and Vernon are

distinguishable from the instant matter. Accordingly, Dudley has failed to establish a

circumstance to justify equitably tolling the filing period beyond July 13, 2011. Thus,

the Court will grant Commissioner’s Motion to Dismiss for Dudley’s failure to timely

file civil suit pursuant to section 205 (g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

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CONCLUSION

The Court – finding that Dudley’s Complaint seeking judicial review is untimely,

and that Dudley has failed establish a circumstance to justify tolling the 60-day

limitations period– lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this matter and will grant the

Commissioner’s Motion to Dismiss.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Commissioner’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, (Doc.18), is granted. 

DATED this 31st day of July, 2012.

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