Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-01022/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-01022-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The factual background of this action has been discussed in prior orders and will not be

repeated here.

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*E-FILED 11/21/06*

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ADVANTE INTERNATIONAL CORP. et al., 

Plaintiffs,

 v.

MINTEL LEARNING TECHNOLOGY, et al.,

Defendants. /

NO. C 05-01022 JW (RS)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

MOTION TO COMPEL AND

DENYING MOTION FOR

PROTECTIVE ORDER

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is a motion to compel brought by defendant Mintel Learning Technology

and a related motion for a protective order brought by plaintiff Advante International Corp. on

shortened time. The matters having been fully briefed and argued, Mintel’s motion to compel will

be granted in part and denied in part, and Advante’s motion for a protective order will be denied. 

DISCUSSION1

A. Hard Drive Inspection

Mintel’s motion includes what is, in essence, its third attempt to obtain a right to image the

hard drives of Advante’s servers for the purposes of discovering relevant documents. By orders

filed June 29, 2006, and July 21, 2006, the Court rejected Mintel’s contentions that it had made a

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showing that such discovery was warranted. The Court’s prior rejection of Mintel’s requests was

two pronged: First, despite the vehemence and invective with which Mintel argued its belief that

wrongdoing had occurred, Mintel failed to establish a reasonable basis to depart from ordinary

discovery procedures in this action. Second, as the Court stressed in its order dated June 29, 2006,

Mintel appeared to have little understanding that even in a case where imaging of an opposing

party’s hard drives might be warranted, such an inspection would not be permitted absent “an

examination protocol that would protect the other party’s legitimate privacy and other interests.” 

Mintel has now shown that serious questions exist both as to the reliability and the

completeness of materials produced in discovery by Advante. Among other things, there is evidence

that copies of emails were altered at some point in time in a manner that arguably served to

downplay or even conceal a relationship between Advante and James Liu, and the extent to which

Liu may have worked with Advante to develop the products at issue in this action. Advante does not

deny that materially-different versions of these emails exist; instead it argues that since it has now

produced the relevant “native” files, both parties can investigate and nothing remains to be

compelled. Mintel has adequately shown, however, that sufficient questions exist, not only with

respect to these emails but also with respect to other discrepancies in Advante’s discovery responses,

such that a forensic examination of Advante’s hard drives is warranted.

What Mintel has not shown, however, is that it would be appropriate to allow its retained

expert to conduct such an examination, until and unless the parties reach a stipulation as to the

examination protocol. The “double blind” procedure suggested by Mintel, and its offer to allow

Advante to have an expert present, may be steps in the right direction. Nevertheless, Mintel is not

entitled to set the conditions of the inspection unilaterally nor to select the person who will perform

it. Additionally, whatever documents or data may be recovered in the inspection, whether existing

documents, recovered deleted documents, or other information, should all be produced first to

counsel for Advante for its review as to relevance, responsiveness, and privilege, prior to any

disclosure to Mintel or its counsel. See, e.g., inspection protocol discussed in Playboy Enterprises,

Inc. v. Welles, 60 F.Supp.2d 1050, 1054-55 (S.D. Cal. 1999). Accordingly, counsel for the parties

shall meet and confer within 5 business days of the date of this order to attempt to agree on a

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 Although a forensic examination of the hard drives will be permitted because Mintel has

shown questions exist that can best be answered by such an examination, Mintel has not established

that “perjury,” “evidence spoliation,” or other intentional wrongdoing necessarily has taken place,

and this order should not be seen as an adjudication of Mintel’s accusations in that regard. 

Moreover, there is nothing in the record at this point to support Mintel’s charge of intentional

wrongdoing by Advante’s counsel. 

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protocol for the imaging and the subsequent production of responsive documents. If the parties

cannot agree that the inspection can be carried out by Mintel’s expert under observation by an expert

retained by Advante, then the parties shall attempt to agree on a procedure for selecting a neutral

third party to conduct the inspection.

No later than December 1, 2006, the parties shall file a joint letter brief setting forth what

agreements they may have reached and what disagreements may remain as to an inspection

protocol.2

If the parties have not reached an agreement as to the identity or identities of one or more experts

who will conduct the inspection, then by December 8, 2006, each party shall propose the names of

up to three experts, and shall provide the Court with information regarding their qualifications and

the fees they will charge to complete the work.

 B. Scope of Discovery

Mintel’s motion to compel seeks the following:

1. The word and user database of English Builder;

2. The binary files for English Builder;

3. ID and password for Vanteus Online, an Advante’s service parallel to English Builder;

4. Documents related to the contents and source code of Vanteus Online;

5. Sound files in the .swf format;

6. Contents in the folder “usivy,” “images,” “mintel,” “English Learn System”;

7. Native electronic files downloaded from Advante’s hard drives, produced in their original 

folders and subfolders;

8. Privilege and relevancy logs for documents withheld by counsel from its download;

9. Redacted portion of log files sent from counsel for EZ Publishing to Advante.

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 Mintel cites, in particular, Request No. 19 (“All documents referring or relating to

www.usivy.com”); No. 26 (“All documents referring or relating to all the websites that

Advante/Zhang/Wei have used since March 16, 2002, to market, describe, or otherwise refer or

relate to any products or services provided by Avante/Zhang/Wei”); No. 33 (“All documents

referring or relating to all persons involved in developing the computer software supporting or

interfacing with the Learning Program”); and No. 36 (“All documents referring or relating to the

Learning Program.”)

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As a threshold issue, Advante contends that even though Mintel has demanded these specific

items in “informal requests,” it has failed to serve specific document requests that require such

materials to be produced. Mintel responds that all of these categories are subsumed within its

formal document requests.3

 A party propounding discovery requests is often faced with the

dilemma that if it uses broad language or insists upon a broad interpretation of its requests, the

requests will be objectionable as overbroad or unduly burdensome, but it may not be able to make

more specific requests until some responses have been received that lead to a better understanding of

what kinds of documents or other information likely exist. Even where a responding party in good

faith does not interpret a particular request as requiring the production of certain specific kinds of

documents, one purpose of the “meet and confer” process is to allow the parties to reach a more

refined understanding of what is being requested in light of what may actually exist. Whether, in a

particular instance, the propounding party should be required to serve formal “follow up” discovery

or whether it should be permitted to use the meet and confer process to obtain specific material

arguably within the scope of the original requests depends on the circumstances. Although it is a

close call on the record presented here, the documents sought in this motion are within the scope of

materials requested under a reasonable reading of Mintel’s formal document requests.

Advante’s more substantive objection to the discovery in dispute arises from its contention

that Mintel has improperly expanded the scope of what it claims was its trade secret that Advante

allegedly misappropriated. Early in this litigation, Mintel responded to an interrogatory seeking

identification of the trade secrets in dispute by stating, in relevant part, that its trade secret consisted

of “the entire source code and all algorithms of Mintel’s Memory Engine Product.” That

interrogatory response was the product of prior motion practice in which Advante had challenged the

adequacy of Mintel’s specification of its trade secret. Believing that Mintel might later wish to

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 As noted in the prior order, the Court has not concluded that application of section

2019.210 is mandatory in federal court proceedings, but the statute provides an appropriate guide in

the absence of specific provisions in the federal rules governing trade secret discovery. Prior to July

1, 2005, the section was numbered as 2019, subsection (d). 

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narrow the scope of its trade secret claim, the Court specifically cautioned that “you can’t simply

supplement six months from now and say, Oh we didn’t mean that our entire source code was a trade

secret.”

On the day of the discovery cut off, Mintel served an amended interrogatory response that,

rather than narrowing its claim, appears to broaden it substantially. The amended response reads, in

relevant part, “[t]he entire Worldbuilder software, including source code, user and word database,

graphics files, algorithms, incorporation and arrangement of third party source code and materials,

and sound files.” Mintel insists that the amended response was served only to clarify, not to expand

its claim, and that over the course of this litigation the parties have always understood Mintel’s

original reference to “source code” and “algorithms” was intended to include other functional

elements of its software such as sound files and databases, even if such items are not “source code”

in a technical sense of the term.

Whether or not Mintel will be permitted to recover under any of its legal theories for any

misappropriation of elements other than source code or algorithms is a question for another day. For

purposes of these discovery motions, the issue is whether Advante should be compelled to produce

materials that are not strictly “source code” or “algorithms,” even disregarding Mintel’s attempt to

“clarify” its trade secret designation. As Advante points out, a trade secret designation under

California Civil Code 2019.2104

 serves to, among other things, “assist[] the court in framing the

appropriate scope of discovery and in determining whether plaintiff’s discovery requests fall within

that scope.” Computer Economics, Inc. v. Gartner Group Inc., 50 F.Supp.2d 980, 985 (S.D. Cal.

l999). Thus, [t]he trade secret designation mandated by section 2019.210 is not itself a pleading but

it functions like one in a trade secret case because it limits the scope of discovery in much the same

way as the allegations of a complaint limit discovery in other types of civil actions.” Advanced

Modular Sputtering, Inc. v. Superior Court, 132 Cal.App.4th 826, 835 (2005). Advante is also

correct that the mere presence in a complaint of claims made on theories other than trade secret

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 Possession of identical files, of course would not necessarily establish any copying, much

less improper copying, as other explanations for similarities could exist. Determining what did or

did not occur is the point of the discovery process.

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misappropriation will not necessarily support discovery that goes beyond what would be allowed on

the trade secret claim itself. Id. at 834-835 (“Where, as here, every cause of action is factually

dependent on the misappropriation allegation, discovery can commence only after the allegedly

misappropriated trade secrets have been identified with reasonable particularity, as required by

section 2019.210.”); see also Neothermia Corp. v. Rubicor Medical, Inc. 345 F.Supp.2d 1042, 1043

(N.D. Cal. 2004) (applying section to action with no express trade secret misappropriation claim.)

Nevertheless, Advante’s contention that it need not produce materials beyond source code

and algorithms relies on an overly restrictive view of the function of the trade secret designation. 

Even though the designation “functions like” a pleading, the touchstone remains relevance as

defined in Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “Relevant information need not be

admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of

admissible evidence.” Here, even assuming Mintel will not be able to pursue a claim for

misappropriation of anything other than the source code or algorithms, if Advante in fact possesses

sound files, databases, or other program elements that appear to have been copied directly from

Mintel, that could be probative on the issue of whether Advante engaged in any actionable

misappropriation.5

Additionally, regardless of the precise scope of the affirmative claims Mintel may be able to

pursue in this action, Advante’s own complaint herein avers that Mintel had publicly charged

Advante with intentionally copying “Mintel’s database, vocabulary and sound files . . . .” First

Amended Complaint, ¶ 17. The discovery Mintel now seeks is therefore relevant for purposes of

discovery under Advante’s pleading as well. Accordingly, this portion of Mintel’s motion will be

granted, and Advante’s corresponding motion for a protective order will be denied.

C. Depositions

Mintel seeks to compel depositions of Brad Bonnington and David Tran, information

systems employees of Advante’s counsel, who were involved in counsel’s prior efforts to assure this

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 At the hearing, Mintel appeared to concede that deposing Bonnington and Tran would be

superfluous upon inspection of the hard drives.

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Court that all responsive documents were being produced. Mintel’s argument that it may depose the

individuals because attorney-client privilege and work product protection has been waived is

misplaced. There is no reason to believe that either individual possesses knowledge relevant to the

claims and defenses in this action. Mintel is seeking “discovery about discovery,” rather than

information reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 26 (b) (1). Particularly in light of the conclusion that a forensic examination of the drives will be

permitted, there is no basis to depose Bonnington or Tran, and that portion of Mintel’s motion is

hereby denied.6 

The only other deposition still in dispute in this motion is that of Dr. Zou, an individual who

apparently participated in the development of Advante’s products. Advante represents that Dr. Zou

is not an employee, is currently in China, and that Advante lacks the power to compel him to attend

a deposition. Mintel has made no showing to the contrary, so that portion of Mintel’s motion will

also be denied.

D. Interrogatory Responses

Advante has agreed to supplement its response to Interrogatory No. 6 and asserts that it has

no further information with which it could supplement its response to Interrogatory No. 17. 

Although Mintel’s reply brief accuses Advante of having taking inconsistent positions that it does

not find credible, Mintel appears to concede that nothing remains to be compelled with respect to

these interrogatory responses.

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CONCLUSION

Mintel’s motion to compel is granted to the extent set forth above and is otherwise denied. 

Advante’s motion for a protective order is denied. The parties are directed to meet and confer

regarding a protocol for inspecting the hard drives and shall file a joint letter brief regarding that

issue no later than December 1, 2006. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 21, 2006 

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States Magistrate Judge

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT NOTICE OF THIS ORDER HAS BEEN GIVEN TO:

Chien-Ju Alice Chen achen@Fenwick.Com, dyoungman@fenwick.com

Rodger R. Cole rcole@fenwick.com, vpieretti@fenwick.com

Songmee L. Connolly SConnolly@Fenwick.com, lrubinstein@fenwick.com

J. James Li lij@howrey.com, schantellk@howrey.com; ew@howrey.com

Ryan Jared Marton rmarton@fenwick.com,

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel who have not

registered for e-filing under the Court's CM/ECF program. 

Dated: 11/21/06 Chambers of Judge Richard Seeborg

By: /s/ BAK 

Case 5:05-cv-01022-JW Document 209 Filed 11/21/06 Page 9 of 9