Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_17-cv-02470/USCOURTS-azd-2_17-cv-02470-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

---

1 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF NEVADA 

* * * 

CHARITY MITCHELL, 

Plaintiff,

 v. 

AMERICAN / US AIRWAYS AIRLINE, 

Defendant.

Case No. 2:15-cv-01921-JAD-PAL

SCREENING ORDER - AND - REPORT OF FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

(Second Am. Compl. – ECF No. 9) 

 This matter is before the court on a screening of Plaintiff Charity Mitchell’s Second 

Amended Complaint (ECF No. 9). The Second Amended Complaint is referred to the undersigned 

for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and LR IB 1-3 and 1-4 of the Local 

Rules of Practice. 

I. BACKGROUND

Ms. Mitchell is proceeding in this action pro se. This case arises from her allegations that 

her former employer violated her rights by retaliating against her and terminating her employment. 

She commenced the case on July 18, 2015, by filing an Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma 

Pauperis (ECF No. 1) and proposed complaint. However, the court determined that Mitchell had 

sufficient assets to prepay the costs and fees of this action and she was ineligible for in forma 

pauperis (“IFP”) status. Report of Findings & Recommendation (ECF No. 4); see also Order 

(ECF No. 7) (adopting recommendation and denying IFP application); Receipt of Payment (ECF 

No. 6). In a separate order, the court reviewed her Amended Complaint (ECF No. 2) and noted 

that she may be attempting to allege violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 2000e et seq. However, the Amended Complaint failed to provide a statement of Mitchell’s 

allegations or claims for relief or comply with LR IA 10-2. See Screening Order (ECF No. 5). 

Thus, the court dismissed the Amended Complaint with leave to amend within 30 days. Mitchell 

timely filed her Second Amended Complaint, which the court will now review. 

Case 2:17-cv-02470-DGC Document 10 Filed 03/16/17 Page 1 of 6
2 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

II. SCREENING THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

The court must screen the complaint and any amended complaints filed prior to a 

responsive pleading pursuant to § 1915(e). Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000). 

If the complaint states a valid claim for relief, the court will direct the clerk of the court to issue 

summons to the defendant(s) and the plaintiff must then serve the summons and complaint within 

90 days. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). A properly pled complaint must provide “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); accord

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The simplified pleading standard set 

forth in Rule 8(a) applies to all civil actions with limited exceptions. Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 

1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008). Although Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it 

demands “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 

of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 

286 (1986)). Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported only by conclusory 

allegations do not suffice. Id. at 679–80. Where the claims in the complaint have not crossed the 

line from plausible to conceivable, the complaint should be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 

Allegations in a pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleading 

drafted by lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010). However, pro se litigants “should not be treated more favorably than 

parties with attorneys of record,” Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986); rather, 

they must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 

F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995). 

A. Ms. Mitchell’s Amended Factual Allegations and Claims for Relief 

The Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 9) names as a defendant, her former employer, 

U.S. Airways/American Airlines (the “Airline”), along with individual defendants Doug Parker, 

Steve Olson, and Ron Rhoderick. Ms. Mitchell alleges claims under the Americans with 

Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112–12117 (“ADA”) for discrimination and retaliation 

based on her disability of an open wound. Because of union rules and downsizing of the Airline’s 

Las Vegas operations, Mitchell alleges that in February 2010 employees were required to transfer 

Case 2:17-cv-02470-DGC Document 10 Filed 03/16/17 Page 2 of 6
3 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to any open base or end their employment. Id. at 7. Thus, she moved to Charlotte, North Carolina. 

In December 2010, openings were available at the Phoenix location, which was closer to her 

permanent home in Las Vegas. She chose to transfer from Charlotte to Phoenix. 

Upon her arrival in Phoenix, she was experiencing a couple of medical issues that did not 

interfere with her employment. However, in Phoenix she experienced resistance and retaliation. 

Id. Ms. Mitchell contends she was given notice in January 2011 that her employment would be in 

jeopardy if she continued at the Phoenix location. In July 2012, she filed a complaint with the 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Id. at 9. The director of passenger 

service, Ron Rhoderick, subsequently informed her that he was aware of the EEOC filing and he 

would never allow her to sue the Airline. Id. Mitchell further alleges that the Airline’s CEO, Doug 

Parker ignored her requests for assistance and a one-on-one conversation. She experienced 

continued discipline and harassment until her termination in March 2013. Ms. Mitchell received 

a right to sue letter from the EEOC on July 18, 2015, and timely commenced this action. In her 

prayer for relief, Mitchell seeks reinstatement of her employment, original seniority date, and all 

back pay and raises. 

For the reasons discussed below, the court finds that the Second Amended Complaint states 

colorable ADA discrimination and retaliation claims against the Airline. 

B. Analysis 

The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112–12117, makes 

it unlawful for covered entities, including private employers, to “discriminate against a qualified 

individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, 

advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, 

conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a); see also Sutton v. United Air 

Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 477 (1999); Puckett v. Park Place Entm’t Corp., 332 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 

1352 (D. Nev. 2004). 

To state a discrimination claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must allege that he or she: (1) is 

a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) is qualified, with or without reasonable 

accommodation, to perform the essential job functions; and (3) suffered an adverse employment 

Case 2:17-cv-02470-DGC Document 10 Filed 03/16/17 Page 3 of 6
4 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

action because of the disability. Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 1237 

(9th Cir. 2012). Here, Ms. Mitchell alleges that she was disabled based on an open wound. 2nd 

Am. Compl. (ECF No. 9) at 8. She contends she experienced a couple of medical issues that did 

not interfere with her employment. Id. at 7. She alleges that defendants discriminated against her 

based on her open wound. Id. at 8. Mitchell has stated a colorable ADA discrimination claim. 

To state a colorable ADA retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) involvement in a 

protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action and (3) a causal link between the two.” 

Alvarado v. Cajun Operating Co., 588 F.3d 1261, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Coons v. Sec’y of 

U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 887 (9th Cir. 2004)). Here, Ms. Mitchell alleges that she 

filed a report with the Airline regarding an aircraft on fire, requested assistance from Parker, and 

filed a complaint with the EEOC. 2nd Am. Compl. (ECF No. 9) at 9. She contends that she was 

disciplined, harassed, and ultimately terminated. Id. at 7. She further alleges that Rhoderick told 

her he was aware of her EEOC complaint and he would never allow her to sue the Airline. Id. at 

9. Mitchell has satisfied the pleading requirements for an ADA retaliation claim against the Airline 

at this early stage in the action. 

However, the individual defendants Parker, Olson, and Rhoderick are not proper parties to 

an ADA action. The Ninth Circuit has held that individuals cannot be held liable for damages 

under the ADA. See Walsh v. Nev. Dept. Of Human Resources, 471 F.3d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 

2006) (holding that individuals cannot be held liable for ADA claims). As such, the court will 

recommend that the individuals be dismissed from this action. 

Accordingly, 

 IT IS ORDERED: 

1. Plaintiff Charity Mitchell’s ADA discrimination and retaliation claims shall proceed 

against Defendant U.S. Airways/American Airlines. 

2. The Clerk of the Court shall issue summons to Defendant U.S. Airways/American 

Airlines. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

Case 2:17-cv-02470-DGC Document 10 Filed 03/16/17 Page 4 of 6
5 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3. Ms. Mitchell is advised to carefully review Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure in order to properly serve Defendant. Pursuant to Rule 4(m), she must 

complete service by June 14, 2017. 

4. From this point forward, Ms. Mitchell shall serve upon Defendant or, if appearance has 

been entered by counsel, upon the attorney, a copy of every pleading, motion, or other 

document filed with the Clerk of the Court pursuant to LR IC 1-1 and 4-1 of the Local 

Rules of Practice. In accordance with LR IC 4-1(d), the parties shall include with each 

filing a certificate of service stating that a true and correct copy of the document was 

served on an opposing party or counsel for an opposing party and indicating how 

service was accomplished. The court may disregard any paper received by a district 

judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk of the Court, and any 

paper received by a district judge, magistrate judge, or the Clerk of the Court that fails 

to include a certificate of service. 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendants Doug Parker, Steve Olson, and Ron Rhoderick 

be DISMISSED from this action. 

Dated this 16th day of March, 2017. 

 

 PEGGY A. LEEN 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

NOTICE

This Report of Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned district judge 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and is not immediately appealable to the Court of Appeals for 

the Ninth Circuit. Any notice of appeal to the Ninth Circuit should not be filed until entry of the 

district court’s judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). Pursuant to LR IB 3-2(a) of the Local Rules 

of Practice, any party wishing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations of 

shall file and serve specific written objections, together with points and authorities in support of 

those objections, within 14 days of the date of service. See also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. 

Case 2:17-cv-02470-DGC Document 10 Filed 03/16/17 Page 5 of 6
6 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Civ. P. 6, 72. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Report of 

Findings and Recommendation,” and it is subject to the page limitations found in LR 7-3(b). The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the district 

court’s acceptance of this Report of Findings and Recommendation without further review. United 

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). In addition, failure to file timely 

objections to any factual determinations by a magistrate judge may be considered a waiver of a 

party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to 

the recommendation. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72. 

Case 2:17-cv-02470-DGC Document 10 Filed 03/16/17 Page 6 of 6