Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02264/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02264-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 15:1640 Truth in Lending

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Although Christopher Atkins is also a named plaintiff in this action, Sueginh Atkins

is the sole borrower on the note and deed of trust. Mr. Atkins appears to have no interest in

the subject property. In the document entitled “Judicial & Administrative Notice” (doc. 19),

Mr. Atkins purports to be appointed as Ms. Atkins’ “attorney,” to manage her interests in the

property. Mr. Atkins has no authority to represent her in this case. Only lawyers may

represent others in court. 

WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Sueginh W. Atkins; Christopher E. Atkins,

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B.; Capital One,

N.A.; Mortgage Electronic Registration

Systems, Inc., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-09-2264-PHX-FJM

ORDER

On September 19, 2005, plaintiff Sueginh Atkins executed a promissory note

evidencing a loan in the amount of $528,853 secured by a deed of trust encumbering real

property located at 10316 South 17th Drive, Phoenix, Arizona.1

 The deed of trust identifies

Chevy Chase Bank as the lender and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.

(“MERS”) as the beneficiary. 

Case 2:09-cv-02264-FJM Document 21 Filed 03/05/10 Page 1 of 4
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Beginning in April 2009, Ms. Atkins is alleged to have defaulted on her repayment

obligations under the note and deed of trust. On August 11, 2009, MERS, as beneficiary

under the deed of trust, substituted Cal-Western Reconveyance Corporation (“Cal-Western”)

as successor trustee, and in turn Cal-Western recorded a notice of trustee’s sale with the

Maricopa County recorder. In response, Ms. Atkins filed this action, broadly asserting

claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, the Truth in Lending

Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2607, and

seeking a temporary restraining order to enjoin the non-judicial foreclosure proceedings. We

now have before us plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction (doc. 5), defendants’

response (doc. 16), and plaintiffs’ reply (doc. 19).

A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that (1) she is likely to

succeed on the merits of her claims, (2) that she is likely to suffer irreparable injury in the

absence of preliminary relief, (3) that the balance of equities tips in her favor, and (4) that

an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 129 S. Ct. 365,

374 (2008). Defendants concede the issue of plaintiff’s irreparable injury but contend that

plaintiff has no likelihood of success on the merits of her claims, and therefore she is not

entitled to injunctive relief. 

Plaintiff’s complaint centers on her argument that there is “no legal evidence on the

record that would support assertions or conclusions that Defendant has or acquired legal

standing as a holder in due course for adequate value.” Complaint ¶ 2. Atkins argues that

neither MERS nor Cal-Western have legal standing to invoke the power of sale under the

deed of trust. She contends that until defendants produce the original note securing the

mortgage, they are without authority to foreclose on the property. 

Plaintiff is unlikely to succeed on the merits of her claims. First, she does not dispute

that she is in default on her payment obligations under the note and deed of trust. Under the

deed of trust provisions, as well as A.R.S. § 33-807(A), the trustee is authorized to invoke

the power of sale “after a breach or default in performance of the contract or contracts, for

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which the trust property is conveyed as security, or a breach or default of the trust deed.”

A.R.S. § 33-807(A). 

The named lender and trustee on the deed of trust is Chevy Chase Bank. Response,

exhibit 2 (hereinafter “deed of trust”). Defendants allege that in August 2009, Chevy Chase

Bank merged with Capital One. Response, exhibit 3. MERS is the named beneficiary under

the deed of trust. On August 11, 2009, it substituted Cal-Western as trustee under the deed

of trust for purposes of exercising the power of sale. The deed of trust expressly provides

that MERS, as beneficiary and nominee for the lender, is authorized to exercise the right to

foreclosure. Deed of trust at 3. 

Plaintiff presents nothing that calls into question defendants’ authority under the deed

of trust to exercise the power of sale. The document itself confers that authority. Therefore,

plaintiff is unlikely to prevail on her claim that defendants are without authority to invoke

the power of sale. 

Plaintiff also presents no authority (and we have found none) that would require

defendants to produce the original note before exercising their right to foreclose. Courts

have consistently rejected this “show me the note” argument to avoid a foreclosure. See

Mansour v. Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1181 (D. Ariz. 2009)

and cases cited therein.

Finally, plaintiff’s complaint contains only general allegations of statutory violations

with no specific factual allegations supporting the claims. To survive a motion to dismiss,

a plaintiff must provide more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). “[A]

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell

Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. at 1974). Plaintiff’s conclusory complaint falls short

of alleging sufficient facts to state a claim and is therefore likely subject to dismissal under

Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P. 

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In sum, we conclude that plaintiff has little likelihood of success on the merits of her

claims. As such, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that she is entitled to injunctive relief.

Therefore, IT IS ORDERED GRANTING plaintiffs’ motion for extension of time

(doc. 18). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary

injunctive relief (doc. 5). 

We urge plaintiffs to seek the advice of counsel. If they do not have one, they may

wish to contact the Lawyer Referral Service of the Maricopa County Bar Association at 602-

257-4434. 

DATED this 5th day of March, 2010.

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