Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-05761/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-05761-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 18:1964 Racketeering (RICO) Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

GREG STEVEN ELOFSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

STEPHANIE BIVENS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-05761-BLF 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 

MOTION FOR RECUSAL UNDER 28 

U.S.C. § 455

[Re: ECF 145]

Plaintiff Greg Elofson has filed a “Motion for Recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455,” requesting 

that the undersigned disqualify herself from this case. See Motion for Recusal, ECF 145. 

Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED for the reasons discussed below.

Plaintiff brings his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), which provides that: “Any justice, 

judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which 

his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). That provision “require[s] 

recusal only if the bias or prejudice stems from an extrajudicial source and not from conduct or 

rulings made during the course of the proceeding.” Toth v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 862 F.2d 

1381, 1388 (9th Cir. 1988). The judge as to whom disqualification is sought properly may 

determine that the motion is legally insufficient rather than referring the motion to another judge 

for disposition. Id.

Plaintiff’s motion is based on a statement made by the undersigned during the September 

8, 2016 hearing on six motions to dismiss. See Motion for Recusal at 2. Specifically, Plaintiff 

asserts that the undersigned stated that she would “never overturn a state court decision.” Id. 

Case 5:15-cv-05761-BLF Document 147 Filed 09/12/16 Page 1 of 2
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

Plaintiff claims that the statement requires recusal because “the overturning of probate court 

judgments made in Maricopa County, Arizona” is “[a]bsolutely core” to his case. Id. 

The statement to which Plaintiff refers was made in the context of explaining that, in the 

undersigned’s view, any of Plaintiff’s claims seeking to void the Arizona courts’ orders, including 

orders relating to the conservatorship of Plaintiffs’ father, would be barred by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine.1 The statement, which was made during the course of a judicial proceeding and which 

reflects the undersigned’s view of the law, does not provide a basis for recusal under § 455(a), as it 

does not demonstrate “bias or prejudice stem[ming] from an extrajudicial source and not from 

conduct or rulings made during the course of the proceeding.” Toth, 862 F.2d at 1388.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for recusal is DENIED.2 

Dated: September 12, 2016

 ______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

 

1

See Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. 

Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923).

2

The Court observes that Plaintiff may have misconstrued the Court’s comments at the hearing 

regarding his academic and professional qualifications. Plaintiff has provided a recital of those 

qualifications in his motion brief, apparently in an effort to reassure the Court regarding his 

abilities and motivations. The Court’s comments at the hearing were intended as an 

acknowledgement of Plaintiff’s remarkable academic achievements and exhaustive legal research 

in this case. The concerns expressed by the Court at the hearing were not directed to Plaintiff’s 

abilities or motivations, but rather to the legal sufficiency of his allegations. 

Case 5:15-cv-05761-BLF Document 147 Filed 09/12/16 Page 2 of 2