Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01724/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01724-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TUTUILA F. TUVALU, 

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-04-1724 DFL KJM P

vs.

JEANNE WOODFORD, et al., ORDER AND

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prison inmate proceeding pro se with a civil rights action under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has filed motions for access to technology services, for the appointment

of counsel, for the appointment of an expert witness and to compel disclosure of public records,

for the issuance of subpoenas and to compel discovery. In addition, he has filed a motion for a

preliminary injunction.

I. Motion For Injunctive Relief (Docket No. 58)

Plaintiff seeks an injunction, restraining defendants “from denial of approval of

plaintiff and family access to overnight family visitation.” As he does in his complaint, plaintiff

challenges the denial of family visits flowing from his status as a life prisoner without a parole

date, complains that he cannot get a parole date without becoming an informer, and argues that 

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his relationship with his daughter is somehow different than other inmate family connections

because he fathered the child during a family visit.

A. Standards

The legal principles applicable to a request for injunctive relief are well

established. To prevail, the moving party must show either a likelihood of success on the merits

and the possibility of irreparable injury, or that serious questions are raised and the balance of

hardships tips sharply in the movant’s favor. See Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122

F.3d 692, 700 (9th Cir. 1997); Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 762 F.2d 1374,

1376 (9th Cir. 1985). The two formulations represent two points on a sliding scale with the focal

point being the degree of irreparable injury shown. Oakland Tribune, 762 F.2d at 1376. “Under

any formulation of the test, plaintiff must demonstrate that there exists a significant threat of

irreparable injury.” Id. In the absence of a significant showing of possible irreparable harm, the

court need not reach the issue of likelihood of success on the merits. Id. Speculative injury does

not constitute irreparable harm. See Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674

(9th Cir. 1988); Goldie’s Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court, 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984). A

presently existing actual threat must be shown, although the injury need not be certain to occur. 

See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969); FDIC V.

Garner, 125 F.3d 1272, 1279-80 (9th Cir. 1997); Caribbean Marine Servs. Co., 844 F.2d at 674.

When a party seeks an injunction against a state agency, “a strong factual record is

necessary.” Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504, 508 (9th Cir. 1992). Moreover,

when a party seeks an injunction that would require affirmative conduct, the facts and law must

clearly favor the moving party before relief is warranted. Dahl v. HEM Parmaceuticals Corp., 7

F.3d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1993); Cupolo v. Bay Area Rapid Transit, 5 F.Supp.2d 1078, 1085

(N.D. Cal. 1997). 

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B. Validity of the Regulation

While it is true that a parent has a fundamental interest in maintaining his

relationship with his children, Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 685 (9th Cir. 2001), the

parent’s incarceration places substantial restrictions on his rights of association, even with his

family. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003); Wirsching v. Colorado, 360 F.3d 1191,

1199 (10th Cir. 2004). A court must “accord substantial deference to the professional judgment

of prison administrators” and consider four factors: whether the regulation has a rational

connection to a legitimate governmental interest, whether alternative means are open to the

inmate to exercise the right, what impact an accommodation would have on guards and other

inmates and prison resources, and whether there are alternatives to the regulation. Overton, 539

U.S. at 132; Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987). The burden is on the inmate to

disprove the validity of the challenged regulation. Overton, 539 U.S. at 132. 

Plaintiff argues that his liberty interest in maintaining his parental relationship

with the child he fathered during a family visit and the harm to that bond caused by the denial of

family visits is a sufficient basis for the issuance of injunctive relief.

1. Connection To Legitimate Governmental Interests

As one California Court of Appeal has described it, the changes in the regulations

governing family visits, including the elimination of family visits for inmates serving life

sentences who do not have parole dates, were prompted by concerns “for institutional security

and public safety” and perhaps for “accountability for serious offenders.” Pro-Family Advocates

v. Gomez, 46 Cal.App.4th 1674, 1684 (1996). The court went on to note that 

[m]aintaining institutional security is a legitimate interest for

prison officials to take into account when promulgating regulations

about family visits that take place in an unsupervised setting.

Id. at 1686. Plaintiff himself echoes some of these rationales and adds that the changes in

regulations were based on the recognition that family visitation is a privilege based on trust and

“that trust must be earned. . . .” Mot. at 4.

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Plaintiff attacks these reasons because they fail to take into account “the private

interests of [the] child.” Id. However, in considering the validity of these regulations, the child’s

rights are not relevant. Cf. Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395, 1399 (8th Cir. 1990) (rejecting

prisoner’s claim that his wife’s rights must be considered when evaluating prison regulations

restricting inmate procreation).

He also argues, at considerable length, that the only way for a life prisoner to gain

the trust of prison officials is to become an informer, but if plaintiff did so, he would be

endangering himself and his family. Id. at 11. This qualification does not appear in the

regulations, which provide in part:

Family visits shall not be permitted for inmates who are in any of

the following categories: sentenced to life without the possibility of

parole; sentenced to life, without a parole date established by the

Board of Prison Terms; designated Close A or Close B custody;

designated a condemned inmate; assigned to a reception center;

assigned to an administrative segregation unit; assigned to a

security housing unit; designated “C” status; guilty of one or more

Division A or Division B offense(s) within the last 12 months; or

guilty of narcotics distribution while incarcerated in state prison.

15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3177(b)(2).

Finally, plaintiff suggests that his own institutional record shows he would not use

the unsupervised family visit to secure alcohol or drugs and that he is not otherwise a danger. 

Mot. at 3-4. However, this court must examine the relationship between the governmental

interest and the regulation, rather than focus on the specific characteristics of the inmate subject

to the regulation. See Overton, 539 U.S at 134.

Plaintiff has not disproved a relationship between institutional security and a

regulation that prevents those with serious criminal records from enjoying unsupervised visits

with family members.

2. Alternative Means

Plaintiff argues that maintaining his parental relationship through expensive

monitored collect calls, letters subject to inspection, and regular visits with no privacy is next to

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impossible. Mot. at 19. However, as the Supreme Court has recognized, “[a]lternatives to

visitation need not be ideal; . . . they need only be available”; letters and calls are sufficient

alternatives to restricted visits as a means of maintaining relationships. Id. at 135.

3. Impact On Guards, Other Inmates, Allocation Of Resources

Plaintiff suggests that the facilities and staff are already available because other

inmates are involved in the family visit program. Mot. at 20. As the Overton court recognized,

retooling a visitation program might cause a “reallocation of the prison system’s financial

resources . . . .” Id. at 135. Plaintiff has offered nothing but his speculation that there will be no

significant impact on prison resources.

4. Alternatives To The Restrictions

Plaintiff has not “pointed to some obvious regulatory alternative that fully

accommodates the asserted right while not imposing more than a de minimus cost to the valid

penological goal.” Id. at 136. Indeed, he suggests that the only way to maintain his parental

relationship is through family visits.

C. Procedural Due Process

Plaintiff suggests he will succeed in the underlying action because his liberty

interest in family visits was abridged without adequate procedural protections. A liberty interest

arises from one of two sources: the due process clause or the laws of the state. Kentucky

Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). The federal courts have

routinely found no liberty interest in visits with “a particular visitor,” id. at 461; in contact

visitation, Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1113 (9th Cir. 1986); in conjugal visitation,

Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 1994); or in family visitation. Cooper v.

Garcia, 55 F.Supp.2d 1090, 1098 (S.D. Cal. 1999). Moreover, the California Supreme Court has

interpreted its own laws on prison visitation and found no state-created right to family visitation. 

In re Cummings, 30 Cal.3d 870, 873 (1982) (prison authorities “may ban overnight visits with

inmates altogether”). Accordingly, plaintiff has not shown the sort of likelihood of success on

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 Defendants also discuss the merits of plaintiff’s underlying action, which does not 1

assist the court in resolving plaintiff’s discovery-related request.

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the merits that would justify the issuance of an injunction.

Although plaintiff’s interest in maintaining his parental relationship with his

daughter is understandable, this court cannot rewrite prison policy in ruling on a motion for

injunctive relief. 

II. Access To Technology Services (Docket Nos. 64 & 66)

The gravamen of plaintiff’s complaint is that his right to maintain a parental

relationship with his daughter, who was conceived during a family visit, has been damaged by

the combination of CDCR’s policy, which denies family visits to prisoners serving life terms

unless they have parole dates, and the purported “no parole” policy followed by successive

governors. He seeks supervised access to the internet, assistance from a staff member conversant

with on-line research, and the authority to print material relevant to the alleged no parole policy. 

He relies on California Code of Civil Procedure § 2017.730, which appears to authorize

electronic discovery in certain categories of cases. That statute is inapplicable to this action.

Defendants have opposed this motion, arguing that granting the request would

require the defendants to bear the costs of plaintiff’s litigation. The federal courts uniformly 1

have held that even an indigent, imprisoned litigant must bear his own costs of litigation. Tabron

v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 159 (3d Cir. 1993) (no statutory authority for payment of costs of

deposition transcript for indigent); Tedder v. Odle, 890 F.2d 210, 211-12 (9th Cir. 1989) (no

authority for court to pay witness fees for indigent); Rivera v. DiSabato, 962 F.Supp. 38, 40

(D.N.J. 1997) (court cannot compel opposing party to provide deposition transcript to indigent

defendant; “plaintiff’s obligation, even as an indigent litigant, to finance his own litigation

expenses cannot be arbitrarily thrust upon defendants”).

If plaintiff’s claim is interpreted as seeking access to additional research

capabilities rather than for discovery, it is nevertheless unavailing. An inmate has a

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constitutionally protected right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 820-21

(1977). This right encompasses more than access to an adequate law library: it includes access

to “paper and pen to draft legal documents . . . and stamps to mail them,” id. at 824-25, and to

photocopying services necessary to prepare the required number of copies. Gentry v. Duckworth,

65 F.3d 555, 558 (7th Cir. 1995); Gluth v. Kangas, 951 F.2d 1504, 1510 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Plaintiff has cited and the court has not found any case suggesting that an inmate’s right of access

to the courts includes the right of access to the internet for research. The motion will be denied.

III Motion For The Appointment Of Counsel (Docket No. 84). 

The United States Supreme Court has ruled that district courts lack authority to

require counsel to represent indigent prisoners in § 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist.

Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In certain exceptional circumstances, the court may request the

voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d

1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). In

the present case, the court does not find the required exceptional circumstances. Plaintiff’s

request for the appointment of counsel will therefore be denied.

IV. Request For Appointment Of Expert Witness/Disclosure Of Public Records (Docket No. 85)

Plaintiff seeks the appointment of a family psychologist as an expert witness to

testify about the harm caused by the denial of private visits between parents and children, or, in

the alternative, an order compelling defense counsel to produce various documents relating to the

public hearing on Assembly Bill 212, so he can identify the psychologist who testified against

this proposal to eliminate family visits for inmates altogether.

The appointment of an independent expert witness under Federal Rule of

Evidence 706 is within a court’s discretion. Walker v. American Home Shield Long Term

Disability Plan, 180 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 1999). Appointment may be appropriate when

“scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the

evidence or decide a fact in issue. . . .” Ledford v. Sullivan, 105 F.3d 354, 358-59 (7th Cir. 

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1997). It appears that plaintiff is not seeking an independent expert, but rather one who will

advocate for his position. The expenditure of public funds on behalf of an indigent litigant is

proper only when authorized by Congress. Tedder v. Odel, 890 F.2d at 211-12. The in forma

pauperis statute does not authorize the expenditure of public funds for expert witnesses. Boring

v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468, 474 (3d Cir. 1987) (no provision to pay fees for expert witnesses);

28 U.S.C. § 1915. However, even if plaintiff is seeking the appointment of an independent

expert, the court would decline to exercise its discretion to appoint one; it does not take any

specialized knowledge to evaluate the stress on plaintiff’s parental relationship caused by his

incarceration and the resulting lack of privacy. 

Plaintiff asks the court to compel defense counsel to produce various documents

relating to the hearing on Assembly Bill 212, so that he may identify and contact the psychologist

who testified in opposition to the bill. Plaintiff says he learned of this through a newsletter for

prisoners; it appears he has not taken the expedient step of contacting the publishers of the

newsletter for information on the psychologist. 

IV. Requests For The Issuance Of Subpoenas (Docket Nos. 63 & 88)

Plaintiff has requested that he be provided with twenty-six subpoenas duces tecum

forms so he may seek documents from California prisons housing life prisoners identifying life

prisoners approved for family visitation after the 1996 change in policy. Plaintiff asks for

additional forms so he may subpoena live video footage of defendant Wilson promoting his “no

parole” policy from television stations. 

 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(a)(2)(C), a subpoena may direct a

non-party to an action to produce documents or other tangible objects for inspection. However, a

party’s ability to use a subpoena duces tecum is circumscribed by the relevance standards of

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), Transcor, Inc. v. Furney Charters, Inc., 212 F.R.D. 588,

591 (D. Kan. 2003), and by the court’s duty to ensure that a subpoena does not impose “undue

burden or expense on a person subject to that subpoena.” United States v. Columbia

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Broadcasting System, Inc., 666 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1982) (court may award costs of compliance

with subpoena to non-party); Cantaline v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 103 F.R.D. 447, 450 (S.D.

Fla. 1984) (same); Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(1). One court has found it appropriate to require an

indigent plaintiff to “demonstrate that he has made provision for the costs of such discovery”

before it would direct the Clerk to provide him with the forms for subpoenas duces tecum. 

Badman v. Stark, 139 F.R.D. 601, 605 (M.D. Pa. 1991). 

To comply with plaintiff’s requests, it appears that any television station subject to

the subpoena would have to search its archives for specific footage and then incur the costs of

reproducing the material in a format accessible to plaintiff. This would be no small task,

requiring the diversion of personnel and considerable cost to accomplish. Moreover, although

the relevance standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) “has been construed broadly

to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could

bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case,” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S.

340, 351 (1978), what plaintiff seeks does not fall within the broad compass of relevance:

defendant Wilson’s public pronouncements have little relation to the procedural due process and

equal protection claims of the amended complaint. 

Plaintiff’s proposed requests to the prison wardens are similarly burdensome:

compliance would mean a search through a large volume of records and the attendant costs of

reproducing those records. Moreover, if, as plaintiff alleges, lifers who have earned family visits

have done so through “snitching,” there might be significant safety and privacy interests

counseling against disclosure. 

V. Motions To Compel Answers To Initial Disclosure (Docket Nos. 87 & 108)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(E)(iii), an action brought by an

inmate proceeding pro se is exempt from the required disclosures of Rule 26(a). 

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VI. Motions to Compel Responses To Requests For Admission

As identified below, plaintiff has filed motions to compel defendants Woodford,

Runnels, Roe, Wilson, Gomez, Terhune and Sandoval to respond to a variety of his requests for

admission.

Although requests for admission under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36 are

governed by the same relevance standards set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b),

such requests are not, strictly speaking, discovery devices. Workman v. Chinchinian, 807

F.Supp. 634, 647 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (Rule 26 relevance standards apply); Misco, Inc. v. United

States Steel Corporation, 784 F.2d 198, 205 (6th Cir. 1986) (not a discovery device). Because

admissions are designed to limit factual issues in the case,

the requesting party bears the burden of setting forth its requests

simply, directly, not vaguely or ambiguously, and in such a manner

that they can be answered with a simple admit or deny without an

explanation, and in certain instances, permit a qualification or

explanation for purposes of clarification. . . . To facilitate clear and

succinct responses, the facts stated within the request must be

singularly, specifically, and carefully detailed.

Henry v. Champlain Enterprises, Inc., 212 F.R.D. 73, 77 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (citations omitted). 

Moreover, requests for admission should not contain “compound, conjunctive, or disjunctive . . .

statements.” U.S. ex rel. Englund v. Los Angeles County, 235 F.R.D. 675, 684 (E.D. Cal. 2006). 

However, 

[w]hen the purpose and significance of a request are reasonably

clear, courts do not permit denials based on an overly-technical

reading of the request.

Id. Finally, requests for admission should not be used to establish “facts which are obviously in

dispute,” Lakehead Pipe Line Co. v. American Home Assur. Co., 177 F.R.D. 454, 458 (D. Minn.

1997), to “demand that the other party admit the truth of a legal conclusion,” even if the

conclusion is “attached to operative facts,” or to ask the party to admit facts of which he or she

has no special knowledge. Disability Rights Council v. Wash. Metro. Area, 234 F.R.D. 1, 3

(D.C. Cir. 2006). 

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A. Defendant Woodford (Docket No. 91)

Defendant Woodford has responded to requests fourteen, twenty-one, twentyseven and thirty. Based on plaintiff’s indication that a page was “missing” with regard to

responses to requests eight through twelve, these responses apparently were inadvertently

omitted from what was served on plaintiff; counsel will be directed to ensure these are provided

to plaintiff.

Many of plaintiff’s requests for admission are not “relevant to the subject matter

involved in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1). In requests five, seven and eight, petitioner asks

about inmates in protective custody, which is not relevant to the due process and equal protection

claims in the lawsuit. Request thirty-two asks Woodlford to admit that she prefers to have the

court “fix this problem,” which also is not relevant. 

In request four, plaintiff asks Woodford to speculate about the “common practice”

of officials of the Department of Corrections, which hardly calls for a simple response. 

Requests one, three, six, thirteen, fifteen and seventeen are compound. 

Request two, asking Woodford to admit she was aware of the policy that required

an inmate to earn the trust of officials before being given a family visit, and request sixteen,

which asks Woodford to admit it is unreasonable to expect a lifer to be an informant in order to

qualify for family visits, involve issues that are “obviously in dispute.”

Requests eighteen and nineteen ask Woodford to admit she was aware of the

parole policies of former governors Wilson and Davis; what defendant Woodford knew about

such policies is not relevant nor something about which she would have special knowledge. 

Requests twenty, twenty-two, twenty-four through twenty-six, twenty-eight and 

twenty-nine call for legal conclusions. Request twenty-three is vague. 

Defendant Woodford’s response to request thirty-one is inadequate; the motion to

compel is granted as to this request only. 

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B. Defendant Runnels (Docket No. 92)

Plaintiff does not dispute defendant Runnels’s responses to requests six, seven,

twelve, twenty-two, twenty-three and twenty-five. 

Requests one through three concern inmates in protective custody, a subject not

relevant to the subject matter of the suit. Requests eighteen and nineteen ask for defendant

Runnels’ awareness of gubernatorial parole policy; although the policy may be relevant, plaintiff

has not suggested how Runnels’s awareness might be similarly relevant. 

Request nine seeks housing information for a life term inmate who received one

family visit, which is again not relevant. Plaintiff argues that this might lead to further discovery,

but as noted above, a request for admission is not a discovery device. 

Defendant Runnels responded to request four by admitting it and to request five

by attaching the emergency statement (as well as other documents), and responded to request

eleven by denying it. Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with the responses is not an appropriate basis for

a motion to compel. Usery v. Brandel, 87 F.R.D. 670, 685 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (dissatisfaction

with the answers is not a sufficient reason to compel further discovery). 

In request eight, plaintiff asked Runnels to admit that a named inmate was a life

prisoner without an established parole date; Runnels did so admit and provided additional

information. Plaintiff’s claim in the motion to compel is that Runnels did not make inquiry about

other life prisoners who might have received family visits. Defendant cannot use the motion to

compel to obtain a response to a request for admission that he did not make. 

Although plaintiff argues that Runnels should not be allowed to rely on privilege

in responding to request ten, Rule 26(b)(1) specifically recognizes privilege as an appropriate

justification for a refusal to answer. Moreover, the informer’s privilege applies in civil, as well

as criminal proceedings. Holman v. Cayce, 873 F.2d 944, 946 (6th Cir. 1989); Cate v. Reynolds,

138 F.R.D. 95, 99 (E.D. Tenn. 1991) (prison informant). 

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Requests thirteen, fifteen and seventeen ask defendant Runnels to admit, in

essence, that informers were rewarded with family visits even though they were not otherwise

eligible for them; whether such a policy exists is disputed in this litigation. Similarly, requests

twenty and twenty-one ask for admissions concerning the rationality of denying family visits to

life prisoners without parole dates; this, too, is at issue in this case. 

Requests fourteen and twenty-four ask for a legal conclusion, while request

sixteen asks a question that cannot be answered with a simple “admit or deny.” 

C. Defendant Terhune (Docket No. 112)

Plaintiff does not contest defendant Terhune’s answers to requests one through

seven or nineteen. 

Requests eight through fourteen, twenty-six and twenty-seven concern housing for

release of and violence against inmates and housing for gang members who had been in

protective custody; as noted above, this is not relevant to this suit. Moreover, it appears that

plaintiff is seeking to use these requests as a discovery device, which is not permissible. 

Request fifteen asks defendant to admit that it is dangerous to be an informant in

prison; this is not susceptible of a simple “admit or deny.” 

Requests sixteen and seventeen involve the alleged policy requiring a life inmate

to earn officials’ trust before being granted family visits; that such a policy exists is disputed in

this action. 

Requests eighteen, twenty-two, twenty-eight and twenty-nine ask defendant

Terhune for a legal conclusion divorced from the facts of this case. 

Defendant Terhune has appropriately responded to request twenty; plaintiff’s

dissatisfaction with the response does not support the motion to compel. 

Request twenty-one asks Terhune to admit he could have sought legal advice in

ruling on plaintiff’s grievance; this is not relevant, as defendant Terhune’s response to a

grievance is not at issue in this action. 

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 Defendant Terhune’s responses to requests twenty-three through twenty-five are

insufficient, for although Terhune claims he lacks sufficient knowledge to respond, he has not

stated that he has made reasonable inquiry, as required by Rule 36 (a). Englund, 235 F.R.D. at

684. He will be permitted to file amended responses.

Requests thirty through thirty-two concern facts “which are obviously in dispute.” 

D. Defendant Wilson (Docket No. 114)

Many of plaintiff’s requests for admission put to defendant Wilson seem to be

interrogatories in disguise, which is an improper use of Rule 36 requests. Misco, Inc., 784 F.2d

at 205. Many others are simply not relevant to the subject of this lawsuit and seemed designed to

harass defendant Wilson, which is also improper. Wigler v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 108

F.R.D. 204, 206-07 (D. Md. 1985).

Requests one through thirteen and sixteen, eighteen, nineteen, twenty-two,

twenty-three, twenty-five through twenty-seven and forty are not relevant to this litigation. 

Requests seventeen, twenty and twenty-eight through thirty ask defendant Wilson

to admit to legal conclusions. 

Request twenty-one is too vague to be answered with a simple admit or deny.

Requests thirty-two through thirty-six, thirty-nine and forty-one concern facts

“obviously in dispute.” 

Requests thirty-seven and thirty-eight ask defendant Wilson to speculate as to the

state of mind of parole officials and institutional officials and are therefore improper.

Requests fourteen, fifteen, twenty-four and thirty-one are appropriate; defendant

Wilson will be given an opportunity to provide amended responses. 

E. Defendant Roe (Docket No. 111) 

Plaintiff does not challenge defendant Roe’s response to requests one through

four, nineteen and twenty-five.

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Defendant Roe fully responded to request five; plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with the

answer is not a reason to compel further discovery. 

Requests six, seven, eight through eighteen, twenty-two, twenty-six and twentyseven seek information that is not relevant; moreover, plaintiff’s claim that the information

requested in numbers six and seven should be disclosed “in the interest of the general public”

shows he is using these requests for admission as a discovery device, which is improper.

Requests twenty, twenty-four, twenty-eight and twenty-nine ask defendant Roe to

admit to a legal conclusion unconnected to this litigation, as there is no allegation that plaintiff

was denied family visits because he was not deemed a parent or was denied parole because he

lacked strong family ties. 

Requests twenty-one and twenty-three ask defendant Roe to admit facts obviously 

in dispute in this litigation. 

G. Defendant Gomez (Docket No. 112)

Plaintiff has no objection to the responses to requests seven, nine, ten, nineteen

through twenty-four and twenty-eight through thirty.

Request one, asking defendant Gomez to admit he was aware that defendant

Wilson publicly advocated revoking family visiting is not relevant. Requests eight, eleven

through eighteen, twenty-five and twenty-six are not relevant.

Requests three, five, six and thirty-two ask for a legal conclusion.

Request four is compound. 

Defendant Gomez responded to requests twenty-seven and thirty-four; plaintiff’s

dissatisfaction with these answers is not a basis for a motion to compel. 

Requests thirty-one and thirty-three are in dispute in this litigation. 

Defendant Gomez has said that he lacks sufficient knowledge to respond to

requests thirty-five and thirty-six, but has not stated that he has made reasonable inquiry, as

required by Rule 36(a). He will be given an opportunity to provide an amended response. 

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H. Defendant Sandoval (Docket No. 109)

Defendant argues that the motion to compel was filed after the cut-off date for

such motions as established by the scheduling order of April 12, 2006. This order was issued

before defendant Sandoval was served, however, and established motion dates based on the

group of defendants served earlier. It would be inequitable to enforce the deadlines against

defendant Sandoval, who did not answer the complaint until August 2, 2006. Nevertheless,

plaintiff’s motion to compel is without merit.

Requests one, eight, nine, sixteen, twenty-four, twenty-five, twenty-seven and

thirty-eight through forty-two are not relevant and appear to be designed for discovery purposes,

which is improper. 

Plaintiff claims that the answers to requests thirteen and fourteen contradict each

other and therefore are in bad faith; he is incorrect. In response to request thirteen, defendant

Sandoval denied that he was aware of all parole-related decisions when he was Secretary of the

Adult and Youth Authority; in response to request fourteen, he said he was unable to admit or

deny he was aware of any revocations of parole dates previously approved by former Governor

Wilson unless the particular parole decision was identified. Because the request did not provide

the proper context, the failure to admit or deny was proper. 

Defendant Sandoval properly responded to request seventeen. 

Plaintiff has reformulated request twenty-six, which was vague, and asks for a

response to the request as recast; this is not proper. 

Requests twenty-nine, thirty-four and thirty-five ask for legal conclusions.

Request thirty-six, which asks defendant Sandoval to admit or deny an opinion

about reasonable state parole policy, hardly calls for a simple admit or deny. 

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VII. Motions To Compel Answers To Interrogatories

A. Defendant Woodford (Docket No. 90)

Plaintiff does not object to defendant Woodford’s responses to interrogatories

eight and nine.

Interrogatories one and two are incomprehensible and defendant Woodford was

under no obligation to attempt to discern their meaning so as to supply an answer. Rucker v.

Wabash Railroad Company, 418 F.2d 146, 154 (7th Cir. 1969). 

Interrogatory three bears on issues in the case and should be answered. 

Interrogatories four through six, relating to housing of gang members and others

removed from general population and reintegrating such prisoners into general population do not

relate to or do not appear to lead to information that may bear on “any issue that is or may be in

the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. at 351. 

Defendant Woodford’s response to interrogatory seven is responsive; plaintiff’s

dissatisfaction with the answer does not render it unresponsive. 

B. Defendant Gomez (Docket No. 115) 

Interrogatories one, three and four are not designed to lead to information that

bears on any issue in the case. 

 Defendant Gomez’s answer to interrogatory two is not complete, for it attaches

only the written emergency statement supporting the change in family visiting policy, which

includes the statement that “family visiting is a privilege that must be earned; because it is

unsupervised, it is a privilege based on trust, and that trust must also be earned.” See Gomez

Interrogator Responses, Attach. A at 2216. The interrogatory asked for information about public

explanations, if any, of this provision.

Interrogatory five seeks information on defendant Wilson’s participation in the

process leading to the modification of the family visit program; interrogatory eight asks for

information about the establishment of the alleged “no parole policy.” Defendant Gomez

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objected on the ground that the request sought privileged official information; plaintiff argues

that state evidentiary privileges do not apply in federal court. 

The federal courts recognize a privilege for the deliberative process if the

document or information sought was generated or covers the period before the adoption of an

agency’s policy or decision and the document or information sought is deliberative in nature,

containing opinions, recommendations or advice about agency policies. Federal Trade

Commission v. Warner Communications, 742 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1984). This privilege

covers the information sought in interrogatories five and eight. 

Interrogatory six is not covered by the deliberative process privilege, for it asks

for the names of people attending the meetings. Nevertheless, it is not likely to lead to the

discovery of relevant evidence: questions to these participants about the formulation of policy at

those meetings would call for privileged information.

Although defendant Gomez has answered interrogatory seven, the question was

directed to the purpose behind the original family visitation policy, not the policy as changed in

1996. He will be directed to respond to this interrogatory. Similarly, Gomez’s objection to

interrogatory nine is not appropriate and he is directed to respond to this one as well. 

Despite plaintiff’s characterization, defendant Gomez answered interrogatory ten;

interrogatory eleven is incomprehensible. 

C. Defendant Runnels (Docket No. 92) 

Defense counsel notes he has provided a complete copy of defendant Runnels’

replies to the interrogatories as an exhibit to the motion for summary judgment; plaintiff’s

objection that pages three and four were missing has thus been mooted.

Plaintiff objects to the response to interrogatory one because a portion of the

response is not supported by the documents offered in support of it. Specifically, defendant

Runnels explains the resolution of the grievance plaintiff filed about family visits and notes that

“a classification committee had noted on December 16, 2001, that Tuvalu had a disciplinary

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offense that barred contact visits at that time.” The Director’s Level Appeal Decision, attached

to the interrogatories, says only that plaintiff had been convicted of a disciplinary offense, but

does not include the caveat that he was thereby prevented from having contact visits. The answer

should be amended to reflect this.

Plaintiff also appears to ask the court to direct CDCR to change the Director’s

Level Appeal to show that by the time the appeal was decided, he had a job and was no longer on

the waiting list as noted in the document. The court will not direct defendants to change the

document in question. 

VIII. Scheduling Order

In light of the pending motion for summary judgment, the remaining dates in the

scheduling order of April 12, 2006, are hereby vacated, to be reset, if necessary, following the

resolution of that motion. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. The motions for access to technology services (Docket Nos. 64 & 66) are

denied.

2. The motion for the appointment of counsel (Docket No. 84) is denied.

3. The motion for appointment of an expert witness and the disclosure of public

records (Docket No. 85) is denied. 

4. The requests for the issuance of subpoenas (Docket Nos. 63 & 88) are denied.

5. The motions to compel initial disclosures (Docket Nos. 87 & 108) are denied.

6. The motion to compel defendant Woodford to respond to request for admission

(Docket No. 91) is granted as to requests eight through twelve and thirty-one and denied in all

other respects. The amended response is due within thirty days of the date of this order. 

7. The motion to compel defendant Runnels to respond to requests for admission

(Docket No. 92) is denied. 

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8. The motion to compel defendant Terhune to respond to requests for admission

(Docket No. 112) is granted as to requests twenty-three through twenty-five but denied in all

other respects. Amended answers are due within thirty days of the date of this order. 

9. The motion to compel defendant Wilson to respond to requests for admission

(Docket No. 114) is granted as to requests fourteen, fifteen, twenty-four and thirty-one and

denied in all other respects. Amended answers are due within thirty days of the date of this

order. 

10. The motion to compel defendant Roe to respond to requests for admission

(Docket No. 111) is denied. 

11. The motion to compel defendant Gomez to respond to requests for admission

(Docket No. 113) is granted as to requests thirty-five and thirty-six only and is denied in all other

respects. Amended answers are due within thirty days of the date of this order. 

12. The motion to compel defendant Sandoval to respond to requests for

admission (Docket No. 109) is denied.

13. The motion to compel defendant Woodford to answer interrogatories (Docket

No. 90) is granted as to interrogatory three and denied in all other respects. Amended answers

are due within thirty days of the date of this order.

14. The motion to compel defendant Gomez to answer interrogatories (Docket

No. 115) is granted as to interrogatories two, seven and nine and denied in all other respects. 

Amended answers are due within thirty days of the date of this order.

15. The motion to compel defendant Runnels to answer interrogatories (Docket

No. 92) is granted only as to the answer to interrogatory two itself, but not as to the documents

supporting that answer. The amended answer is due within thirty days of the date of this order.

16. The dates for pretrial statements, pretrial conference and trial in the

scheduling order of April 12, 2006 are hereby vacated. 

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IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief

(Docket No. 58) be denied. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: November 2, 2006.

______________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

2

tuva1724.mots

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