Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00890/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00890-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Albert D. Serpa, Jr.,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-13-0890-PHX-NVW (JFM)

Report & Recommendation On Petition 

For Writ Of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at 

Winslow, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 on May 1, 2013 (Doc. 1). On August 26, 2013, Respondents filed their Response 

(Doc. 9). Petitioner has not filed a reply, and the time to do so has expired.

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On July 24, 2005, police were called to an apartment complex in Phoenix, 

Arizona. An investigation revealed that a verbal altercation had occurred between 

Petitioner and the deceased victim. A bystander called to someone in a nearby

apartment, who brought down a weapon, pointed it or fired it at a passenger of the 

victim. Petitioner then took the weapon and shot the decedent. Petitioner shot the second 

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victim, when she tried to protect the decedent. Petitioner then again shot and kicked the 

decedent, who was nonresponsive when police arrived and eventually died of his 

wounds. Petitioner, who was on probation at the time, fled the scene. (Exhibit JJ, R.T. 

12/1/09.) 

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On August 3, 2005, Petitioner was indicted in Maricopa County Superior Court 

on charges of First Degree Murder, Aggravated Assault, Endangerment, Weapons 

Misconduct, and Hindering Prosecution. (Exhibit A, Indictment.) (Exhibits to the 

Answer, Doc. 9, are referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.”) The prosecution subsequently 

filed: (1) a notice of intent to seek the death penalty (Exhibit B); (2) allegations of 

historical priors (Exhibit C) and allegations of aggravating circumstances (Exhibit D).

Appointed counsel for Petitioner, the Public Defender’s office, filed a series of 

motions, including: (1) to extend the time to challenge the grand jury proceedings 

(Exhibit E); and (2) for disclosure of various records (Exhibit F and G). Counsel filed a 

Notice of Defenses (Exhibit H), identifying self-defense, lack of specific intent, no 

criminal intent, insufficiency of evidence, and defense of others. 

Eventually, however, counsel moved to withdraw based upon a conflict of interest 

because the “Public Defender has previously represented the deceased...[and] acquired 

confidential information that would assist Mr. Serpa.” (Exhibit I.) The Public Defender 

was permitted to withdraw, and two new counsel were appointed. (Exhibit J, M.E. 

9/20/05; Exhibit K, Order 9/6/05; Exhibit L, M.E. 10/14/05.) Six months later, lead 

counsel filed a motion asserting a conflict of interest, and eventually private counsel was 

appointed. (Exhibit M, M.E. 5/25/06; Exhibit N, M.E. 6/19/06; Exhibit O, Notice.)

After an interregnum of over three years, with various motions, hearings, etc. 

(Exhibit OO, Trial Docket), new counsel filed a Notice (Exhibit O) of mitigating 

circumstances to be presented at sentencing, including Petitioner’s age, mental illness, 

brain impairment, substance abuse, dysfunctional family, physical abuse, sexual abuse, 

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emotional abuse, family neglect, and social dysfunction. Counsel also moved for 

determination of probable cause as to the capital and non-capital aggravating 

circumstances. An evidentiary hearing was held, and eventually the trial court found 

probable cause to support some of the alleged aggravating actors, and the state withdrew 

others. (Exhibit P, M.E. 12/01/09; Exhibit Q, M.E. 12/16/09.)

A case management conference was held on January 8, 2010, whereat Petitioner 

rejected a proffered plea agreement mandating a sentence of natural life, and the matter 

was set for hearing on the state’s Motion to Preclude Defendant’s Mitigation. (Exhibit 

R, M.E. 1/8/10; Exhibit CC, PCR Resp. at 3.) A second conference was held on January 

19, 2010, and Petitioner entered into a written Plea Agreement (Exhibit S), wherein 

Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to all charges, with stipulated consecutive sentences of 

life in prison, with the possibility of release after 25 years, 15 years, 2.76 years, and 7.25 

years. The sentences were to be concurrent to those in a separate prosecution. Petitioner 

entered his plea on January 19, 2010, the plea was accepted, and the matter set for 

sentencing. (Exhibit T, M.E. 1/19/10.) 

On January 27, 2010, Petitioner was sentenced in accordance with the plea 

agreement, resulting in a minimum prison term of 50 years. (Exhibit U, Sentence.) 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

As a pleading defendant, Petitioner had no right to file a direct appeal. See 

Summersv. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 716-717 (9th Cir. 2007). Petitioner did not file a direct 

appeal. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 2; Exhibit OO, Trial Docket.) 

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On March 18, 2010, Petitioner filed pro per a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief 

(Exhibit V). Counsel was appointed, and various transcripts ordered. (Exhibit W, M.E. 

3/19/10.) Counsel subsequently filed a Notice of inability to find a tenable issue for 

review (Exhibit X), and Petitioner was granted an extension of time to file a pro per

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petition, with counsel directed to remain in an advisory capacity. (Exhibit Y, M.E. 

8/26/10.) 

Petitioner filed an original Petition (Exhibit Z) consisting of a check marked form, 

which the PCR court found insufficient, granting Petitioner leave to file an amended 

petition. (Exhibit AA, M.E. 10/7/10.) Petitioner then filed his Amended Petition 

(Exhibit BB) asserting ineffective assistance of counsel based upon: (a) counsel’s 

previous representation of the victim’s mother; and (b) advice that Petitioner would 

receive the death penalty if he proceeded to trial, and should therefore accept the plea 

offer. Petitioner asserted his claims under “Strickland v. Washington” (id. at 5) and 

“Brady v. U.S.” (id. at 6).

The PCR court rejected the claims of ineffective assistance, finding nothing to 

support the allegation of a conflict of interest, and that “counsel for the defendant did an 

excellent job on behalf of the petitioner.” (Exhibit DD, M.E. 4/14/11.)

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review by the Arizona Court of Appeals (Exhibit 

EE), arguing that the first degree murder conviction was based upon insufficient 

evidence, trial counsel had a conflict of interest because he previously represented the 

victim’s mother, and trial counsel was ineffective in advising Petitioner on the guilty 

plea. Petitioner made no reference to any federal law or constitutional provisions. 

Petitioner did assert that counsel’s actions violated “his constitutional right of due 

process under the law.” (Id. at 3.) The state responded arguing that under the standards 

of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 671 (1984), Petitioner had failed to show 

ineffective assistance of counsel. (Exhibit FF, PCR Response.) 

The Arizona Court of Appeals denied the petition on its merits, concluding that: 

(1) the claims of conflict of interest and ineffective assistance were unsupported; (2) 

Petitioner had not alleged any prejudice from any defective advice; and (3) Petitioner 

failed to provide citations to the record or legal authority, and thus his petition was 

defective. (Exhibit HH, Mem. Dec. 5/21/12.) No further review was sought (Petition, 

Doc. 1 at 5; Exhibit II, Mandate 8/17/12.) 

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E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 1, 2013 (Doc. 1). Petitioner’s 

Petition asserts three grounds for relief:

(1) ineffective assistance of counsel in advising Petitioner on his guilty plea;

(2) ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of a conflict of interest; and

(3) sentence imposed in violation of state law as a result of denial of a mitigation 

hearing.

Response - On August 26, 2013, Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”) 

(Doc. 9). Respondents argue: 

(1) Ground Three is a state law claim not cognizable on habeas review;

(2) Grounds One and Two were procedurally barred by the Arizona Court of 

Appeals on an independent and adequate state grounds, e.g. failure to reference the 

record or authorities; 

(3) Ground Three is procedurally defaulted;

(4) Grounds One and Two are without merit.

Reply – Petitioner has not filed a reply. The service order provided: “Petitioner 

may file a reply within 30 days from the date of service of the answer.” The Answer was 

served on August 26, 2013. (Doc. 9 at 31.) Thus, the time to reply has expired.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. EXHAUSTION, PROCEDURAL DEFAULT & PROCEDURAL BAR

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims are either procedurally defaulted or 

were procedurally barred on an independent and adequate state ground, and thus are 

barred from federal habeas review. Petitioner asserts in his Petition that he presented the 

issues raised in his each of his grounds for relief to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his 

first PCR proceeding. (Petition, Doc.1 at 6, 7, 9.) 

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1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if 

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 

(1981) (per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been 

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on 

the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 

650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must 

first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for 

post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th 

Cir. 1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before bringing a 

habeas petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing 

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 

1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 

489 U.S. 1059 (1989). “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, ‘claims 

of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona 

Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 

2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

Effect of Life Sentence - Here, Petitioner received a life sentence. It is true that 

the Swoopes decision refers to there being no right of appeal to the Arizona Supreme 

Court "except in capital cases or when a life sentence is imposed." Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 

1009. The decision concludes that "except in habeas petitions in life-sentence or capital 

cases, claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas 

once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them. Id. at 1010. 

In reaching that decision, however, the Ninth Circuit was faced with a habeas 

petitioner whose appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals was denied in 1988, prior to the 

1989 amendments eliminating life-sentences from the exceptions to Arizona Court of 

Appeals jurisdiction. See State v. Swoopes, 155 Ariz. 432, 747 P.2d 593 (App. 1988). 

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Similarly, the Ninth Circuit was required to draw on decisions applying the pre-1989 

amendments law. In State v. Sandon, 161 Ariz. 157, 777 P.2d 220 (1989), the Arizona 

Supreme Court considered the review rights of a defendant whose appeal was denied in 

1986. Sandon, 161 Ariz. at 157, 777 P.2d at 220. Although the Sandon court noted the 

adoption of the 1989 amendments in a footnote, they were not applying that law. Id. at 

158 n. 1, 777 P.2d at 221 n.1. 

Similarly, the decision in State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 684 P.2d 154 (1984), 

also relied on in Swoopes, predated the 1989 amendments. Indeed, the only Arizona 

decision relied upon in Swoopes and made after the 1989 amendments was Moreno v. 

Gonzalez, 192 Ariz. 131, 962 P.2d 205 (1998). Moreno did not, however rely upon 

Ariz.Rev.Stat. §§ 12-120.21 or 13-4031, or specifically discuss the death/life sentence 

limitation. Rather, Moreno focused on the "nature and scope of discretionary review by 

petition for review," Moreno, 192 Ariz. at 134, 962 P.2d at 133, and was concerned with 

whether such discretionary review was an "appeal" within the meaning of the exceptions 

to Arizona's timeliness bar for claims not presented on "appeal" for good cause. 

Moreover, the import of Sandon was the Arizona Supreme Court's apparent desire 

to stop the flood of "large numbers of prisoner petitions seeking to exhaust state 

remedies." Sandon, 161 Ariz. at 157, 777 P.2d at 220. The Sandon court concluded 

that "‘[o]nce the defendant has been given the appeal to which he has a right, state 

remedies have been exhausted." Id. at 158, 777 P.2d at 221, quoting Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 

at 585, 684 P.2d at 157. Thus, their recitation of the death/life sentence limitation is not 

properly read as the limit of their holding, but as a reiteration of the pre-1989 holding of 

Shattuck. Thus Sandon may only be reasonably read as an attempt by the Arizona 

Supreme Court to remove their discretionary review from the cycle of review required 

for exhaustion of state remedies. While a given respondent may desire to require its 

Arizona prisoner to file a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court, it is not 

the respondents' desire, however, but that of the Arizona court that is controlling. 

Finally, Swoopes itself did not hinge on any reading of Ariz.Rev.Stat. §§ 12-

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120.21 or 13-4031 themselves, but upon the question "whether Arizona has identified 

discretionary Supreme Court review ‘as outside the standard review process and has 

plainly said that it need not be sought for purpose of exhaustion.' " Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 

1010, quoting O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 849 119 S.Ct. 1728, 1735 (1999). 

The only basis for identifying that discretionary review as being tied to death/life 

sentences was the language of Shattuck and Sandon, and their reliance upon the then 

applicable pre-1989 versions of Ariz.Rev.Stat. § § 12-120.21 and 13-4031. 

Thus, until this issue is resolved by the Ninth Circuit, the Arizona District Courts 

are faced with either applying the exact language of Swoopes, or applying the principle 

of Swoopes to the facts as they exist in this case. The latter holds truer to the function of 

a trial court in attempting to apply appellate court precedent. 

Using the techniques developed at common law, a court confronted 

with apparently controlling authority must parse the precedent in 

light of the facts presented and the rule announced. Insofar as there 

may be factual differences between the current case and the earlier 

one, the court must determine whether those differences are material 

to the application of the rule or allow the precedent to be 

distinguished on a principled basis. 

Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1172 (9th Cir. 2001). 

In O'Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that " ‘the creation of a discretionary 

review system does not, without more, make review' in a state supreme court 

‘unavailable.'" Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1009, quoting O'Sullivan, 119 S.Ct. at 1734. The 

reasoning of Swoopes is based upon the determination that the Arizona Supreme Court 

has instructed that discretionary review by that court is not part of the standard review 

process in Arizona and that it need not be sought for the purposes of exhaustion, and the 

Ninth Circuit's conclusion that this instruction is the something "more" referred to in 

O'Sullivan. Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010. 

Under the version of Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 12-120.21 applicable to Petitioner, review 

by the Arizona Supreme Court is discretionary. Thus, that review is "unavailable" 

within the meaning of Swoopes and O'Sullivan, and utilization of that review is not 

necessary for Petitioner to exhaust his state remedies, despite his life sentence. See 

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Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925 (D. Ariz. 2007) (reaching same conclusion). 

2. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. 

Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to 

properly exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are 

now no longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally 

defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice 

of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a “miscarriage of 

justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims 

to the state courts. Respondents rely upon Arizona’s preclusion bar, set out in Ariz. R. 

Crim. Proc. 32.2(a) and time limit bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. (Answer, Doc. 

9 at 21.) 

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a 

direct appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. Accordingly, 

direct appeal is no longer available for review of Petitioner’s unexhausted claims.

 Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief – Under Arizona’s waiver and timeliness 

bars, Petitioner can no longer seek review by a subsequent PCR Petition. 

Waiver Bar - Under the rules applicable to Arizona's post-conviction process, a 

claim may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief that "has been 

waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(a)(3). Under this rule, some claims may be deemed waived if the State simply 

shows "that the defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous 

collateral proceeding." Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002) 

(quoting Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, Comments). For others of "sufficient constitutional 

magnitude," the State "must show that the defendant personally, ''knowingly, voluntarily 

and intelligently' [did] not raise' the ground or denial of a right." Id. That requirement is 

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limited to those constitutional rights “that can only be waived by a defendant 

personally.” State v. Swoopes 216 Ariz. 390, 399, 166 P.3d 945, 954 (App.Div. 2, 2007). 

Indeed, in coming to its prescription in Stewart v. Smith, the Arizona Supreme Court 

identified: (1) waiver of the right to counsel, (2) waiver of the right to a jury trial, and (3) 

waiver of the right to a twelve-person jury under the Arizona Constitution, as among 

those rights which require a personal waiver. 202 Ariz. at 450, 46 P.3d at 1071.1 Claims 

based upon ineffective assistance of counsel are determined by looking at “the nature of 

the right allegedly affected by counsel’s ineffective performance. Id.

Here, none of Petitioner’s claims are of the sort requiring a personal waiver, and 

Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance similarly have at their core the kinds of 

claims not within the types identified as requiring a personal waiver.

Timeliness Bar - Even if not barred by preclusion, Petitioner would now be barred 

from raising his claims by Arizona’s time bars. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that 

petitions for post-conviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed 

“within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after 

the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See 

State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive 

petition, and noting that first petition of pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for 

purposes of the rule). That time has long since passed.

Exceptions - Rules 32.2 and 32.4(a) do not bar dilatory claims if they fall within 

the category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2(b) (exceptions to preclusion bar); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (exceptions to 

timeliness bar). Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to 

 

1

Some other types of claims addressed by the Arizona Courts in resolving the 

type of waiver required include: right to be present at non-critical stages (waived by 

omission), Swoopes, 216Ariz. at 403, 166 P.3d at 958; improper withdrawal of plea offer 

(waived by omission), State v. Spinosa, 200 Ariz. 503, 29 P.3d 278 (App. 2001); double 

jeopardy (waived by omission), State v. Stokes, 2007 WL 5596552 (App. 10/16/07); 

illegal sentence (waived by omission), State v. Brashier, 2009 WL 794501 (App. 2009); 

judge conflict of interest (waived by omission), State v. Westmiller, 2008 WL 2651659 

(App. 2008).

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his claims. Nor does it appears that such exceptions would apply. The rule defines the 

excepted claims as follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence 

imposed has expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such 

facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly 

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were 

discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing 

the newly discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not 

merely cumulative or used solely for impeachment, unless the 

impeachment evidence substantially undermines testimony which 

was of critical significance at trial such that the evidence probably 

would have changed the verdict or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction 

relief of-right or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was 

without fault on the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if 

determined to apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the 

defendant's conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing 

evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 

establish that no reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant 

guilty of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that 

the court would not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona 

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Where a 

claim is based on "newly discovered evidence" that has previously been presented to the 

state courts, the evidence is no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no 

application. Here, Petitioner has long ago asserted the facts underlying his claims. 

Paragraph (f) has no application where the petitioner filed a timely notice of postconviction relief. Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a 

change in the law since his last PCR proceeding. Finally, paragraph (h), concerning 

claims of actual innocence, has no application to Petitioner’s procedural claims. 

Therefore, none of the exceptions apply, and Arizona’s time and waiver bars 

would prevent Petitioner from returning to state court. Thus, Petitioner’s claims that 

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were not fairly presented are all now procedurally defaulted.

3. Procedural Bar on Independent and Adequate State Grounds

Related to the concept of procedural default is the principle of barring claims 

actually disposed of by the state courts on state grounds. “[A]bsent showings of ‘cause’ 

and ‘prejudice,’ federal habeas relief will be unavailable when (1) ‘a state court [has] 

declined to address a prisoner's federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a 

state procedural requirement,’ and (2) ‘the state judgment rests on independent and 

adequate state procedural grounds.’ ” Walker v. Martin, - - - U.S. - - -, 131 S.Ct. 1120, 

1127 (2011). 

In Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573 (9th Cir.2003), the Ninth Circuit addressed 

the burden of proving the independence and adequacy of a state procedural bar.

Once the state has adequately pled the existence of an independent 

and adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative defense, the 

burden to place that defense in issue shifts to the petitioner. The 

petitioner may satisfy this burden by asserting specific factual 

allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, 

including citation to authority demonstrating inconsistent 

application of the rule. Once having done so, however, the ultimate 

burden is the state's. 

Id. at 584-585. 

4. Application to Petitioner’s Claims

Grounds One and Two – Respondents argue that Grounds One and Two were 

procedurally barred by the application of the Arizona Court of Appeals rules concerning 

the necessary contents of a petition for review. However, a procedural bar can only be 

applied to a claim which is presented. 

Petitioner’s Claim Not Presented and Not Procedurally Barred - Here, Petitioner 

asserted the facts underlying his Grounds One and Two to both the PCR court and the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. And, in making the argument to the PCR court, Petitioner 

explicitly relied on Strickland, the landmark federal case on ineffective assistance of 

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counsel. However, in arguing his Petition for Review, Petitioner did not cite any federal 

law or constitutional provisions. At most, he made a vague reference to “his 

constitutional right of due process under the law.” (Exhibit EE, PFR at 3.) Petitioner 

did not delineate whether this assertion arose under the Federal constitution or the 

Arizona Constitution, both of which contain due process guarantees. See U.S.C. Const., 

Amend. 14; and Ariz. Rev. Stat., Const. Art. 2 § 4 (“No person shall be deprived of life, 

liberty, or property without due process of law.”)

A claim has been fairly presented to the state's highest court if petitioner has 

described both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is 

based. Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). While the 

petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the federal constitution,” Picard v. Connor, 

404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971), it is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the 

federal claim were before the state courts. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per 

curiam). Nor is it sufficient to make vague references to constitutional rights without 

delineating the source of those rights, or that a “somewhat similar state law claim was 

made.” Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)(per curiam). 

Moreover, a simple reference to ineffective assistance of counsel is not sufficient 

to fairly present a federal claim under the Sixth Amendment. Lyons v. Crawford, 232 

F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir.2000), as amended, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir.2001). See also 

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 33 (discussing sufficiency of mere reference to 

"ineffective assistance"). Further, the Arizona right to effective counsel is not equivalent 

to the federal right. See e.g. State v. Krum, 182 Ariz. 108, 110, 893 P.2d 759, 761 (.App. 

Div. 1 1995), overturned on statutory grounds, 183 Ariz. 288, 903 P.2d 596 (1995) 

(finding right to effective counsel in PCR proceeding, notwithstanding federal law’s 

denial of right to PCR counsel). “[R]aising a state claim that is merely similar to a 

federal claim does not exhaust state remedies.” Fields v. Waddington, 401 F.3d 1018, 

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1022 (9th Cir. 2005).2

It is true that Petitioner cited federal law to the PCR court. That was insufficient 

to alert the Arizona Court of Appeals to the federal nature of his claim. “We 

consequently hold that ordinarily a state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a 

state court if that court must read beyond a petition or a brief (or a similar document) that 

does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim in order to find material, such as a 

lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004).

It is also true that the State cited federal law in responding to the Petition for 

Review. (See Exhibit CC, PCR Response.) However, the undersigned is unaware of any 

authority permitting a response to delineate the nature or scope of a claim in a petition, 

or to otherwise qualify as a fair presentation.

A state court's actual consideration of a claim satisfies exhaustion. See Sandstrom 

v. Butterworth, 738 F.2d 1200, 1206 (11th Cir.1984) ("[t]here is no better evidence of 

exhaustion than a state court's actual consideration of the relevant constitutional issue"); 

see also Walton v. Caspari, 916 F.2d 1352, 1356-57 (8th Cir.1990) (state court's sua 

sponte consideration of an issue satisfies exhaustion). Here, the Arizona Court of 

Appeals did not explicitly resolve Petitioner’s claim as a federal one. That court did not 

cite any federal cases or constitutional provisions (although the Arizona cases it did cite 

include references to federal law. (See e.g. Exhibit HH, Mem. Dec. at 3 (quoting State v. 

Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, ¶ 21, 146 P.3d 63, 68 (2006) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

687)).)

Because the undersigned cannot find that Petitioner presented his federal claim, 

nor that the Arizona Court of Appeals construed the claim as a federal one, the 

undersigned must conclude that the procedural bar applied by the Arizona Court of 

 

2 Moreover, even if Arizona treated its right to effective counsel identically to the federal 

right, that would not cause Petitioner’s claims to be fairly presented. “The United States 

Supreme Court has left open the question whether the invocation of a state constitutional 

provision is adequate to raise a federal claim under the corresponding federal 

constitutional clause when the state courts treat both claims in an identical manner.” 

Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 914 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 

27 (2004) and Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, at 366 (1995).) 

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Appeals was to a state law claim, not to the federal claim Plaintiff now urges.

If Presented, then Procedurally Barred – On the other hand, if Petitioner’s 

reference to due process were deemed sufficient to fairly present a federal claim, or if 

the Arizona Court of Appeals should be understood as having construed Petitioner’s 

claim as arising under federal law, then the undersigned must conclude that it was 

procedurally barred.

As pointed out by Respondents, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that 

Petitioner’s Petition for Review was procedurally deficient under Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure 31.13(c)(1)(vi) and 32.9. The former requires that an appellant’s 

brief include:

An argument which shall contain the contentions of the appellant 

with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, with 

citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on. 

The argument may include a summary. With respect to each 

contention raised on appeal, the proper standard of review on appeal 

shall be identified, with citations to relevant authority, at the outset 

of the discussion of that contention. Citation of authorities shall be 

to the volume and page number of the official reports and also when 

possible to the unofficial reports.

Ariz. R. Crim. Proc. 31.13(c)(1)(vi). Rule 32.9 mandates that the Petition contain “[t]he 

reasons why the petition should be granted” and (in the case of of-right first petitions 

such as Petitioner’s) “specific references to the record.” 

These rules are independent of any consideration of the merits of the claim or 

federal law. Petitioner points to no reason to conclude the rules are inadequate. 

Respondents argue that they are regularly and consistently applied. Petitioner fails to 

meet his burden of countering that argument. See Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 584-

585 (9th Cir.2003).

Accordingly, if it could be concluded that these claims were fairly presented to 

the Arizona Court of Appeals as federal claims, then this Court would have to conclude 

that they were procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, and are 

thus barred from federal habeas review.

Ground Three – Petitioner’s Ground Three argues that his sentence was imposed 

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in violation of state sentencing law because he was afforded no mitigation hearing. 

Respondents argue this claim was never presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals, and 

is now procedurally defaulted. 

The undersigned finds no reference to such a claim (whether founded on state law 

or federal law) in Petitioner’s Petition for Review to the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

Consequently, this Court must find that the claim was not fairly presented, Petitioner’s 

state remedies on it were not properly exhausted, and, for the reasons discussed 

hereinabove, that it is now procedurally defaulted.

Summary re Exhaustion, Etc. – Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned 

concludes that: (1) Grounds One and Two were not fairly presented, and are procedurally 

defaulted, and if fairly presented were procedurally barred on an independent and 

adequate state ground; (2) Ground Three was not fairly presented and is procedurally 

defaulted.

B. CAUSE AND PREJUDICE, & ACTUAL INNOCENCE

Cause and Prejudice - If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a 

claim, or it has been procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he 

may not obtain federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and 

prejudice” sufficient to excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). 

"Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (1991). "Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can 

occur, the Supreme Court 'has not given the term "cause" precise content.'" Harmon v. 

Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. 

denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that cause 

should ordinarily turn on some objective factor external to petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 

reasonably available to counsel, or that "some interference by 

officials", made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause 

under this standard. 

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Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted). 

Petitioner has not replied, and has not asserted in his Petition any cause to excuse 

his procedural defaults or procedural bars, which he only alleged were raised in this first 

PCR proceeding. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6, 7, 9.) The undersigned finds no basis for a

finding of cause.

Both "cause" and "prejudice" must be shown to excuse a procedural default, 

although a court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to 

establish cause. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 

F.2d 1119, 1123 n. 10 (9th Cir.1991). Petitioner has filed to establish cause for his 

procedural default. Accordingly, this Court need not examine the merits of Petitioner's 

claims or the purported "prejudice" to find an absence of cause and prejudice. 

Actual Innocence - The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion 

intended to be flexible and yielding to exceptional circumstances, to avoid a 

“miscarriage of justice.” Hughes v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 

(9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, failure to establish cause may be excused “in an 

extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the 

conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 

(1986) (emphasis added). Although not explicitly limited to actual innocence claims, the 

Supreme Court has not yet recognized a "miscarriage of justice" exception to exhaustion 

outside of actual innocence. See Hertz & Lieberman, Federal Habeas Corpus Pract. & 

Proc., §26.4 at 1229, n. 6 (4th ed. 2002 Cumm. Supp.). The Ninth Circuit has expressly 

limited it to claims of actual innocence. Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 

2008). 

A petitioner asserting his actual innocence of the underlying crime must show "it 

is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of 

the new evidence" presented in his habeas petition. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 

(1995). A showing that a reasonable doubt exists in the light of the new evidence is not 

sufficient. Rather, the petitioner must show that no reasonable juror would have found 

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the defendant guilty. Id. at 329. This standard is referred to as the “Schlup gateway.” 

Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002). “In cases where the 

Government has forgone more serious charges in the course of plea bargaining, 

petitioner’s showing of actual innocence must also extend to those charges.” Bousley v. 

U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 624 (1998). 

Here, Petitioner makes no assertion of actual innocence to excuse his procedural 

defaults or procedural bars. The undersigned knows of no basis for such a finding.

Petitioner did argue to the Arizona Court of Appeals that there was insufficient 

evidence to support his conviction. (See Exhibit EE.) However, a finding of "actual 

innocence" is not to be based upon a finding that insufficient evidence to support the 

charge was presented at trial, but rather upon affirmative evidence of innocence. See 

U.S. v. Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2003) (lack of proof of FDIC insurance in a bank 

robbery case, without evidence that insurance did not exist, not sufficient to establish 

actual innocence). 

Accordingly Petitioner’s procedurally defaulted and procedurally barred claims 

must be dismissed. 

C. OTHER DEFENSES

Respondents also argue that Grounds One and Two are without merit and Ground 

Three fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because it is founded upon 

state law. Because the undersigned finds the claims plainly procedurally defaulted or 

procedurally barred, the undersigned does not address these additional defenses.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the Adistrict court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising Aout of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

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proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner=s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(ACOA”) is whether the applicant has Amade a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.”28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). AWhere a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court=s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). AWhen the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. Under the 

reasoning set forth herein, the undersigned finds that “jurists of reason” would not “find 

it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.”

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus, filed May 1, 2013 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

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IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that to the extent that the Court adopts 

this Report & Recommendation, a certificate of appealability should be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: December 18, 2013

13-0890r RR 13 12 05 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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