Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01319/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01319-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIE HEAROD,

CDCR #T-09568,

Civil No. 07-1319 H (JMA)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, IMPOSING NO INITIAL PARTIAL

FILING FEE AND GARNISHING

$350 BALANCE FROM

PRISONER’S TRUST ACCOUNT

[Doc. No. 4]; AND

(3) DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO

STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) &

1915A(b)(1)

vs.

GIURBINO, Warden; CHARLES PICKETT,

M.D.; JOHN PARSON, M.D.; JEANNE

WOODFORD, Director of the Department of

Corrections; SYLVIA GARCIA, Warden; P.

CHAN, M.D.; and DOES 1-30,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, Willie Hearod, a state inmate currently incarcerated at California Mens Colony

located in San Luis Obispo, California and proceeding pro se, initially filed a civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Plaintiff did not prepay the $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he

filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No.

Case 3:07-cv-01319-H-JMA Document 5 Filed 09/21/07 Page 1 of 6
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1

 A review of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint indicates that Plaintiff has failed to comply

with S.D.CAL.CIVLR 15.1. Plaintiff attached several exhibits to his original Complaint which he refers

to in his First Amended Complaint. However, Plaintiff failed to attach these exhibits to his First

Amended Complaint. The Local Rule provides, in part, that “all amended pleadings shall contain

copies of all exhibits referred to in such amended pleadings.” Id.

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4]. Before the Court had the opportunity to screen Plaintiff’s Complaint, he filed a First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on August 27, 2007.1

 

I. Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 4]

Effective April 9, 2006, all parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a

district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a

filing fee of $350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure

to prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, prisoners

granted leave to proceed IFP remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless

of whether their action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v.

Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a

prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account

statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113,

1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court must assess an initial

payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or

(b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater,

unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The

institution having custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20%

of the preceding month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and

forward those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(2).

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The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit which complies with 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(1), and that he has attached a certified copy of his trust account statement pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D.CAL.CIVLR 3.2. Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. Plaintiff’s trust

account statement shows that he has no available funds from which to pay filing fees at this time.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from

bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the

prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281

F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal

of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to

him when payment is ordered.”). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed

IFP [Doc. No. 4] and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However,

the entire $350 balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk

of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

III. Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A

A. Standard

The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding

IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused

of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these

provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any IFP or prisoner complaint, or any portion

thereof, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or which seeks damages from

defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203

F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443,

446 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A).

Before amendment by the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte

dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. An action is

frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

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324 (1989). However 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A now mandate that the court reviewing

an IFP or prisoner’s suit make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before effecting service of

the Complaint by the U.S. Marshal pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). Id. at 1127 (“[S]ection

1915(e) not only permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint

that fails to state a claim.”); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). In addition, the Court’s

duty to liberally construe a pro se’s pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept.,

839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992).

Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person

acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived

the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the

United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122

(2004); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). 

Plaintiff names as Defendants, Giurbino, the Warden for Centinela State Prison, Charles

Pickett, Chief Medical Officer (“CMO”), and Jeanne Woodford, former Director of the

Department of Corrections, and Sylvia Garcia, former Warden for Calipatria State Prison. There

are no factual allegations contained in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint pertaining to these

Defendants outside their roles as supervisors. However, there is no respondeat superior liability

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993). Instead,

“[t]he inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities

of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional

deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423

U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)). In order to avoid the respondeat superior bar, Plaintiff must allege

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personal acts by each individual Defendant which have a direct causal connection to the

constitutional violation at issue. See Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 483 (9th Cir. 1986);

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). As a supervisor, a Defendant may only be

held liable for the allegedly unconstitutional violations of his subordinates if Plaintiff alleges

specific facts which show: (1) how or to what extent this supervisor personally participated in

or directed Defendants’ actions, and (2) in either acting or failing to act, the supervisor was an

actual and proximate cause of the deprivation of his constitutional rights. Johnson v. Duffy, 588

F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). As currently pleaded, however, Plaintiff’s First Amended

Complaint in no way sets forth facts which might be liberally construed to support an

individualized constitutional claim against Giurbino, Pickett, Garcia or Woodford. Accordingly,

the claims against these Defendants are dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983

relief can be granted.

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a section 1983 claim upon

which relief may be granted, and is therefore subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). Because it is not altogether certain that Plaintiff would be unable

to allege any additional facts, however, the Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to

amend his pleading in light of the standards set forth above. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31.

IV. Conclusion and Order

 Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 4] is

GRANTED. 

2. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee

owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty

percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court

each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

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3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on James Tilton,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502,

Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45)

days leave from the date this Order is “Filed” in which to file a First Amended Complaint which

cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be

complete in itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1.

Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed

to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, if

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, it may

be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter be counted as a “strike” under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996). 

5. The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a Court approved form § 1983 complaint

to Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 21, 2007 _________________________________________ HON. MARILYN L. HUFF

 United States District Judge 

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