Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-02541/USCOURTS-azd-2_23-cv-02541-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Alex Smith,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Airbnb Incorporated,

Defendant.

No. CV-23-02541-PHX-SMM

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second 

Amended Complaint for Failure to State a Claim. (Doc. 25). For the following reasons, 

the Court will grant the motion. Further, the Court will not grant leave to amend as it 

finds the deficiencies to be uncurable. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Alex Smith, runs a business promoting the listing of clients on leading 

travel portals, including the platform of Defendant, Airbnb Incorporated. On July 8, 

2021, Plaintiff registered with GoDaddy.com the domain <airbnbseo.com>, for the 

business use described. Defendant is a community marketplace for people to list, 

discover, and book accommodations around the world. Defendant has rights in 

the AIRBNB mark through its registration with the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office ("USPTO") See, e.g., AIRBNB, Registration No. 3,890,025); (Doc. 25) at exhibit 

1.

The dispute between Plaintiff and Defendant begun on October 30, 2023, when 

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Defendant initiated a Uniform-Name Resolution Policy (UDRP) proceeding to recover 

the domain <airbnbseo.com> from Plaintiff. The UDPR is a process, established by the 

Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”)

1

for the resolution of 

disputes regarding the registration of internet domain names. GoDaddy, the domain 

register for <airbnbseo.com> has implemented the UDPR. Uniform Domain Name 

Dispute Resolution Policy, GODADDY, https://www.godaddy.com/legal/agreements/

domain-name-dispute-resolution-policy. 

In accordance with the UDRP, the dispute was heard by FORUM, an alternative 

dispute resolution body that has been administering domain name disputes since 1999. At 

the Forum hearing, the assigned panelist found that the disputed domain name is 

confusingly similar to Plaintiff’s mark, Defendant established prior rights in the 

distinctive AIRBNB mark, Plaintiff has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the 

domain name, and that Plaintiff registered and used the domain name in bad faith. The 

panelist ordered GoDaddy to transfer the domain name from Plaintiff to Defendant. HoHyun Nahm, Decision, Airbnb, Inc. v. Alex Smith, ADR FORUM, https://www.adr

forum.com/DomainDecisions/2068708.htm.

Plaintiff then timely filed suit in this court to halt the ordered domain transfer. 

Plaintiff has amended his Complaint twice. Specifically, Plaintiff brings a claim of action 

under Arizona state law for unjust enrichment, several claims asserting a declaration that 

his registration of the domain does not violate the Anti-Cybersquatting and Consumer 

Protection Act (“ACPA”) or otherwise infringe upon Airbnb’s rights, and requests

temporary and permanent injunctive relief stopping the domain transfer. Plaintiff also 

raises First Amendment and doctrine of laches concerns in the Complaint. However, such 

concerns seem to largely be copied and pasted into the Complaint without integration into

his causes of action. 

1

ICANN is a nonprofit organization responsible for coordinating the maintenance and 

procedures of several databases related to the namespaces and numerical spaces of the 

Internet. Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, a California 

Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation, ICANN, https://www.icann.org/en/governance/ 

documents/bylaws-for-internet-corporation-for-assigned-names-and-numbers-acalifornia-nonprofit-public-benefit-corporation-icann-17-11-2023-en.

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

A pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The pleading must “put defendants

fairly on notice of the claims against them.” McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th

Cir. 1991). While Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, “a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

Motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “can be based

on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a

cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

1990). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court will “accept the factual allegations of 

the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” AE 

ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012).

III. ANALYSIS

A. ACPA Claims

Plaintiff’s claims in counts two, five, and six can be boiled down to a claim for 

relief from the allegedly incorrect decision of the UDPR panel that ordered the transfer of 

the domain name to Defendant. The claims are asserted under the Anticybersquatting 

Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”). Pub. L. No. 106-113, §§ 3001-10, 113 Stat. 1501 

(1999). The ACPA amended the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., which “protects 

the use of trademarks in interstate and foreign commerce.” Shenzhen Big Mouth Techs. 

Co. v. Factory Direct Wholesale, LLC, No. 21-CV-09545-RS, 2022 WL 1016666, at *3 

(N.D. Cal. 2022). The ACPA is codified in scattered sections of Title 15 of the United 

States Code, including 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(2)(D) and 1125(d). See Mira Holdings, Inc. v. 

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Regents of Univ. of Cal., No. 618CV190ORL37GJK, 2018 WL 8244597, at *3 n.1 (M.D. 

Fla. 2018).

A primary purpose of the ACPA is “to provide clarity in the law for trademark 

owners by prohibiting the bad-faith and abusive registration of distinctive marks as 

Internet domain names with the intent to profit from the goodwill associated with such 

marks – a practice commonly referred to as ‘cybersquatting.’” S. Rep. No. 106-140, at 4 

(1999). To balance the rights given to trademark owners against cybersquatters, the 

ACPA also provides some protection to domain name registrants against “overreaching 

trademark owners.” Id. at 11; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(2)(D)(iv)-(v). 

One such protection is the “reverse domain name hijacking provision” of the 

ACPA, found in 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v).2 See Strong Coll. Students Moving Inc. v. 

Coll. Hunks Hauling Junk Franchising LLC, No. CV-12-01156-PHX-DJH, 2015 WL 

12602438, at * 6 (D. Ariz. May 15, 2015). This statute provides that:

A domain name registrant whose domain name has been suspended,

disabled, or transferred under a policy described under clause (ii)(II) may, 

upon notice to the mark owner, file a civil action to establish that the 

registration or use of the domain name by such registrant is not unlawful 

under this chapter. The court may grant injunctive relief to the domain 

name registrant, including the reactivation of the domain name or transfer 

of the domain name to the domain name registrant.

15 U.S.C. § 1142(D)(v). Therefore, the Court is asked to determine whether Plaintiff has 

plausibly plead that the use of the disputed domain name did not violate the ACPA. To 

show that his conduct is not unlawful under § 1125(d)(1), Plaintiff must “prove either (1) 

they did not register, traffic, or use a domain name that is identical or confusingly similar 

to a distinctive mark, or (2) they did not have a bad faith intent to profit from that mark.” 

2 As the Fourth Circuit stated in Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento De 

Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617, 625 n. 1 (4th Cir. 2003):

If a domain-name registrant cybersquats in violation of the ACPA, he 

“hijacks” the domain name from a trademark owner who ordinarily would 

be expected to have the right to use the domain name involving his 

trademark. But when a trademark owner overreaches in exercising rights 

under the ACPA, he “reverse hijacks” the domain name from the domainname registrant. Thus, § 1114(2)(D)(v), enacted to protect domain-name 

registrants against overreaching trademark owners, may be referred to as 

the “reverse domain name hijacking” provision.

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Strong Coll. Students Moving, 2015 WL 12602438, at *8 (citing § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i)-(ii)); 

see also Mira Holdings, 2018 WL 8244597, at *3 (“If the registrant ‘has a bad faith intent 

to profit’ from an owner's mark and registers a domain name that ‘is identical or 

confusingly similar’ to a mark distinctive at the time the registrant registered the domain 

name, such is considered unlawful under the ACPA.”): GoPets Ltd. v. Hise, 657 F.3d 

1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2011) (“To prevail on its ACPA claim, [a party] must show (1) 

registration of a domain name, (2) that was ‘identical or confusingly similar to’ a mark 

that was distinctive at the time of registration, and (3) ‘bad faith intent’ at the time of 

registration.”) (quoting § 1125(d)(1)); Lahoti v. VeriCheck, Inc., 586 F.3d 1190, 1197-

1202 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that distinctiveness and bad faith are required to sustain an 

ACPA claim).

First, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to plead a claim that plausibly alleges 

that Plaintiff did not register, traffic, or use a domain name that is identical or confusingly 

similar to a distinctive mark. As an initial matter, its undisputed that Plaintiff registered 

the disputed domain name, as evident by Plaintiff’s own admissions. See (Doc. 17) at ¶ 6.

Additionally, Defendants’ mark is distinctive, as evidenced by its registration with the 

USPTO. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (stating that PTO registration is “prima facie evidence 

of the validity of the registered mark”); see also, Lahoti, 586 F.3d at 1199 (stating that 

registration alone may be sufficient to find a mark to be distinctive.).

As Defendant’s mark is distinctive, the question turns to whether the disputed 

domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the mark. “In determining whether 

there is confusing similarity under the ACPA, courts compare the [ ] mark with the name 

of the website.” Super-Krete Int'l v. Sadleir, 712 F.Supp. 2d 1023, 1031 (C.D. Cal. 2010).

The Court finds that the question is answered in the affirmative, as the disputed domain 

name, <airbnbseo.com> incorporates Defendant’s mark, AIRBNB. The fact that the 

disputed domain name adds the acronym “SEO” to the end, which stands for “search 

engine optimization,” does not change the fact that the disputed domain name is 

confusingly similar to Defendant’s mark. Yuga Labs, Inc. v. Ripps, No. CV 22-4355-

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JFW(JEMX), 2023 WL 3316748, at * 6 (C.D. Cal. 2023); See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. 

Purdy, 382 F.3d 774, 783 (8th Cir. 2004) (affirming district court's finding that domains 

“mywashingtonpost.com,” “mymcdonalds.com,” and “drinkcoke.org” were confusingly 

similar to the Washington Post, McDonald's, and Coke marks); see also, Haas 

Automation v. Denny, 2013 WL 6502876, at * 3 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (finding confusing 

similarity where domain names all contained the plaintiff's mark ‘haas’ “plus some 

additional term or terms,” such as haasplus.com, haasmillparts.com).

Next, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to plead a claim that plausibly alleges 

that Plaintiff did not have a bad faith intent to profit from the use of Defendants’ mark. 

Plaintiff advances several theories as to why his complaint adequately alleges a lack of 

bad faith: nominative fair use, statutory fair use, the bad faith factors set forth in 15 

U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B), and the ACPA’s safe harbor provision found in 15 U.S.C. § 

1125(d)(1)(B)(ii). Each theory advanced by Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege a lack of bad 

faith. 

First, Plaintiff asserts that the nominative fair use defense protects his use of the 

disputed domain name. This argument fails as a matter of law, as nominative fair use 

“does not bear on whether the disputed domain names run afoul of the ACPA.” Haas 

Automation, Inc, 2013 WL 6502876 at *6. 

Second, Plaintiff asserts that statutory fair use prevents a finding of bad faith under

15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4). This defense against a finding of bad faith is available when “the 

use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as 

a mark ... of a term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith 

only to describe the goods.” 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4). This defense fails on its face, as 

Plaintiff asserts a property right in the disputed domain name. See, e.g., (Doc. 17) at ¶ 28, 

31, 33, and 73. 

Next, Plaintiff argues that the ACPA bad faith factors do not indicate a lack of bad 

faith. Under this analysis, courts consider nine nonexclusive factors in determining 

whether bad faith intent to profit exists. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)-(ix). “Courts need 

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not march through the nine factors seriatim because their use is merely permissive and 

the most important grounds for finding bad faith are the unique circumstances of the 

case.” IFIXITUSA LLC v. iFixit Corp., No. CV-21-00887-PHX-DGC, 2022 WL 

2117845, at * 4 (D. Ariz. 2022) (quotations omitted). The factors are as follows:

1) whether the registrant owns any independent trademark or other 

intellectual property rights in the domain name; 2) whether the domain 

name comprises the registrant’s legal name or a name commonly associated 

with that person; 3) whether the registrant used the domain name to offer 

bona fide goods or services; 4) whether the registrant made bona fide 

noncommercial or fair use of the mark on the website to which the domain 

name resolves; 5) whether the registrant intended to divert customers from 

the mark owner’s website for commercial gain or with the intent to dilute 

the mark or create a likelihood of confusion; 6) the registrant’s offer to 

transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain name for financial gain; 7) the 

registrant’s use of material and misleading false contact information for the 

domain name; 8) the registrant’s registration or acquisition of multiple 

infringing domain names; and 9) whether the mark incorporated in the 

domain name is distinctive or famous.

See 15 U.S.C. §1125(d)(1)(B).

Using these factors, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s own statements in his Second 

Amended Complaint show bad faith by Plaintiff. First, Plaintiff does not at any point 

plausibly allege that he owns an intellectual property interest in the domain name, past 

the conclusory statement that he “has legal right to use” the domain name. (Doc. 17) at ¶ 

54. The Court disregards such conclusory statements in ruling on a motion to dismiss. 

Further, Plaintiff states that while his company served the broader travel industry, he 

specifically leveraged Defendant’s brand to “communicate[ ] the nature of his service in 

an industry where online visibility is paramount.” (Doc. 17) at ¶ 30. This further shows 

Plaintiff’s own admission as to the distinctiveness and fame of Defendant’s mark and his 

attempt to use such distinctiveness and fame for his own commercial purposes. Finally, 

Courts have consistently found an intent to divert for commercial gain when a party 

registers a domain name with a minor variation to an existing trademark. See GoPets v. 

Hise, 657 F.3d 1024, 1033 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that “it is clear that [domain 

registrant] intended the Additional Domains [including , and among others] ‘to divert 

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consumers from the mark owner’s online location to a site accessible under [these] 

domain name[s] ... by creating a likelihood of confusion.’”); See also, Super-Krete Int’lr, 

712 F. Supp. 2d at 1033 (finding bad faith where “Defendants only interest in the domain 

name [ ] is to divert customers who may have been searching for Plaintiff’s mark to their 

own commercial website”). Based on Plaintiff’s own omissions, the Court finds that 

Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege a lack of bad faith based on the enumerated ACPA 

bad faith factors. 

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ACPA safe harbor provision, codified at 15 

U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii), prevents a finding of bad faith. The safe harbor provisions 

provides that even when the previously stated factors show bad faith, bad faith will not be 

found when “the court determines that the person believed and had reasonable grounds to 

believe that the use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise lawful.” 15 U.S.C. § 

1125(d)(1)(B)(ii). 

The Court does not find the safe harbor to plausibly protect Plaintiff. The safe 

harbor “protects uses such as parody and comment[ ] and use by persons ignorant of 

another's superior right to the mark.” DSPT Int’l, Inc. v. Nahum, 624 F.3d 1213, 1220 

(9th Cir. 2010). Neither are implicated in this case, as the Plaintiff has not plead a use of 

the domain for parody or comment purposes, nor could Plaintiff plausibly allege that he 

was ignorant of Defendant’s superior right to the mark. Plaintiff, by his own admission, 

used Defendant’s mark to associate with the industry of which Defendant is apart, 

thereby recognizing the superior right of Defendant. Also to note, courts are instructed to 

make sparing use of the safe harbor in negating a party’s bad faith. Lahoti, 586 F.3d at

1202. The Court does not find such rare circumstances to be present in this case. 

Therefore, as the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that his 

use of the disputed domain name did not violate the ACPA, the Court will grant the 

motion to dismiss with respect to the counts centering on the ACPA. The Court will not 

grant leave to amend, as it does not find the “pleading could not possibly be cured by the 

allegation of other facts.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations 

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omitted).

B. Unjust Enrichment Claim

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s claim alleging unjust enrichment must be 

dismissed. “Unjust enrichment occurs when one party has and retains money or benefits 

that in justice and equity belong to another.” Trustmark Ins. Co. v. Bank One, Arizona, 

NA, 48 P.3d 485, 491 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002), as corrected (2002) (citing City of Sierra 

Vista v. Cochise Enter., Inc., 697 P.2d 1125, 1131 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984)). To state a 

claim for unjust enrichment, a Plaintiff must plead (1) an enrichment; (2) an 

impoverishment; (3) a connection between the enrichment and the impoverishment; (4) 

the absence of justification for the enrichment and the impoverishment; (5) the absence of 

a legal remedy. Id.

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has not plausibly plead that Defendant has received 

any unjustified benefit at Plaintiff’s expense. First, the Defendant argues that the domain 

transfer will not occur until the conclusion of the suit, therefore there has been no benefit 

to Defendant. Secondly, the transfer would be in accordance with the UDPR which is, by 

its definition, justified. Plaintiff asserts that the benefit conferred would be the cost 

incurred by Plaintiff to register the domain name. Further, Plaintiff argues that an unjust 

enrichment claim does not require a wrongdoing by the Defendant. 

The Court finds that Plaintiff has not plausibly plead a claim for unjust 

enrichment. As the Court finds above, the Plaintiff has not plead a claim that plausibly 

asserts that the transfer of the domain is not justified under the law. Since a claim for 

unjust enrichment requires a showing that there is an “absence of justification for the 

enrichment,” Plaintiff does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The 

Court will grant the motion to dismiss as to the unjust enrichment claim. The Court 

further does not grant leave to amend, as the count is barred by law. 

C. Remaining Claims 

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s remaining causes of action do not state cognizable 

claims. The claims for temporary injunctive relief and permanent injunctive relief appear 

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to be brought incorrectly as independent claims of action, rather than the relief Plaintiff 

requests this Court to grant. 

Plaintiff additionally includes in his Complaint statements of law discussing the 

First Amendment and the equitable doctrine of laches. The Court does not find such legal 

contentions to have been properly plead to connect to a theory of recovery for Plaintiff, 

and even if they had been, the Court does not find that the Plaintiff has plausibly alleged 

a violation of his First Amendment rights, or applicability of the doctrine of laches. 

D. Conclusion

For the preceding reasons, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. The 

Court will not grant leave to amend, as the Court finds that the claims are either barred by 

law or are uncurable by further amendments. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 25)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing Plaintiff’s Second Amended 

Complaint, with prejudice. (Doc. 17).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to terminate this 

action. 

Dated this 18th day of December, 2024.

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