Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_12-cv-02136/USCOURTS-alnd-2_12-cv-02136-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

PATRICK NOAH NORMAN, 

Plaintiff,

vs. CASE NO.: CV-12-J-2136-S

TRACEY C. NORMAN, et al., 

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case comes before the court on the defendant Sams’ and defendants Neill

and Rector’s motions for summary judgment, evidentiary submissions and

memoranda of law (docs. 119-123). By Exhibit A to the Scheduling Order dated

March 5, 2013 (doc. 79), the parties were informed of time limits for responding to

dispositive motions. Pursuant to that Order, the plaintiff had until January 24, 2014,

to respond to the outstanding motions, but to date no such response has been

received. Although TraceyC. Norman is also a named defendant, all parties concede

she cannot be located.

1

Before delving into the merits of this case, which the court notes is a domestic

dispute which has found its way to federal court, the court first addresses the filing

See plaintiff depo. II, at 23. Mail sent by the court and addressed to her last known 1

address has been returned as well. 

FILED

 2014 Feb-04 PM 02:44

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:12-cv-02136-IPJ Document 125 Filed 02/04/14 Page 1 of 22
of this action under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as well as the

concept of judicial estoppel.

Specifically, under the relevant portions of Rule 11, an attorney certifiesto the

court that, in presenting a pleading, to the best of his or her personal knowledge such

pleading is not “being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause

unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation” and that “the factual

contentions have evidentiary support.” Rule 11 (b)(1) and (3), Fed.R.Civ.Pro. The

court has reason to question whether the filing of the complaint and amended

complaint in this action violated this Rule. 

In relation to filing a bankruptcy action, the doctrine of judicial estoppel

“protect[s] the integrity of the judicial process by prohibiting parties from changing

positions according to the exigencies of the moment.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532

U.S. 742, 749, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001). The Eleventh Circuit lists

two “primary factors” for parties to establish when invoking the doctrine: “‘First, it

must be shown that the allegedly inconsistent positions were made under oath in a

prior proceeding. Second, such inconsistencies must be shown to have been

calculated to make a mockery of the judicial system.’” Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,

595 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11 Cir.2010) (quoting Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291

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F.3d 1282, 1285 (11 Cir.2002)). The court again questions the filing of the

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2

Case 2:12-cv-02136-IPJ Document 125 Filed 02/04/14 Page 2 of 22
complaint and amended complaint given the plaintiff’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The factual background necessary for disposition of this action is as follows:

Plaintiff married defendant Tracey Norman in January 2010. Doc. 123-2. 

They spent several years prior to this time and numerous months after that having

each other arrested on claims of domestic violence and obtaining Protection From

Abuse Orders against each other. See e.g., doc. 122-4, at 12; doc. 123-2, at 4, 8, 13,

14, 19-21, 35-39, 52-55. In May 2010 Tracey either left or was thrown out by

plaintiff. Doc. 123-2 at 42. She immediately moved in with and began a relationship

with Michael Wilkerson. She and plaintiff’s harassment of each other continued. See

e.g., doc. 123-2, at 41-42; plaintiff’s amended complaint (doc. 61), ¶¶ 30-33. On July

20, 2010, plaintiff went to the Hoover Police to bring a charge against defendant

Tracey Norman for a March 2010 knife fight between them in which they were both

injured. Plaintiff depo. at 63-68; see also Incident Report, submitted as doc. 122-4. 

This report in July was the first time plaintiff met Detective Sams, an officer in the

Family Services Unit for the City of Hoover. Sams’ depo. at 8; Plaintiff depo. at 63-

68.

Meanwhile, based on hearsay transcriptions of alleged text messages which

plaintiff asserts were left on Michael Wilkerson’s phone for Tracey Norman by

3

Case 2:12-cv-02136-IPJ Document 125 Filed 02/04/14 Page 3 of 22
defendant Sams, plaintiff became convinced that at some unknown point in time

Tracey Norman was having an inappropriate relationship with Detective Sams. See

doc. 123-2, at 47, plaintiff depo. at 23-24, 36-37. In turn, based on this alleged

inappropriate relationship, and disregarding that the plaintiff and TraceyNorman had

already engaged in a stream of allegations and arrests against each other, plaintiff

somehow became sure that Tracey Norman and Detective Sams conspired to violate

his civil rights by having him arrested, even though the relevant arrest warrants were

issued by counties and cities in which Detective Sams did not work. Plaintiff depo.

2

at 38-44. Plaintiff took these allegations to Sams’ supervisor, Captain Janie Neill,

and when she did not respond as plaintiff thought she should, he went to Niell’s

supervisor, Captain D. Gregg Rector. Declaration of Neill, ¶¶ 10-12; declaraion of

Rector, ¶¶ 10-15. Because neither defendant Neill nor Rector acted on plaintiff’s

unsubstantiated, loosely constructed allegations of conspiracy and wrongdoing

between Detective Sams and Tracey Norman, the plaintiff sues them for deliberate

indifference to the violation of his civil rights by Detective Sams. See Amended

For example, the plaintiff had a warrant for his arrest issued by the City of Prattville, 2

based on allegations of harassing communications by defendant Tracey Norman. Plaintiff depo.

at 171. In fact, the plaintiff pleads that after “Detective Sams failed attempt to arrest Mr.

Norman and have him held and transported to Prattville, Mr. Norman voluntarily traveled to

Prattville and turned himself in....” Amended complaint, ¶ 42. That case was dismissed. Doc.

123-2 at 57. In February 2011, an arrest warrant was issued for plaintiff for criminal trespass by

the City of Montgomery based on allegations by Tracey Norman. Doc. 123-2 at 67-70.

4

Case 2:12-cv-02136-IPJ Document 125 Filed 02/04/14 Page 4 of 22
Complaint, Count XVIII, ¶ 138.

The majority of plaintiff’s claims are against defendant Tracey Norman. The

Amended Complaint contains the following claims:

COUNT I: Malicious Prosecution and /or Abuse of Process #1– against

Tracey Norman only3

COUNT II: Assault and Battery #1 – against Tracey Norman only.4

COUNT III: Assault and Battery #2 – against Tracey Norman only.5

COUNT IV: Malicious Prosecution and/or Abuse of Process #2 –

against Tracey Norman only.6

COUNT V: Malicious Prosecution and/or Abuse of Process #3 –

against Tracey Norman only, or possibly Tracey Norman and Detective

Sams.7

COUNT VI: Violation of the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act

#1: Against Tracey Norman and Detective Sams. 

8

This asserts an arrest on February 24, 2010, by the City of Hoover police. 3

This claim arises from an incident where the happy couple appeared at the emergency 4

room both sporting knife wounds. Hospital personnel contacted Hoover police department, and

records reflect both Mr. and Mrs. Norman declined to press charges against the other. This

report was made by a nurse at the hospital and recorded by Officer Harris. Both plaintiff and

Tracey Norman are listed as victims in this report. See doc. 122-4. The evidence supports a

finding that the knife fight occurred in March 2010, not 2012 as alleged in the Amended

Complaint. See doc. 122-4, at 7. 

This claim alleges Tracey Norman attacked the plaintiff “manually” and poured hot 5

coffee on him on May 28, 2012. As plaintiff testified he threw Tracey Norman out of his

apartment on May 28, 2010, the court believes that may have been the actual date of this event. 

This concerns a June 29, 2010, City of Hoover arrest. 6

Plaintiff asserts that on August 2, 2010, Detective Sams helped Tracey Norman obtain a 7

Petition for Protection from Abuse against plaintiff in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County,

which Detective Sams then personally served on plaintiff. See doc. 123-2 at 13-21.

This Count also concerns the August 2, 2010, Protection from Abuse Petition. However, 8

this is not a viable stand alone cause of action. See Plus Int'l, Inc. v. Pace, 689 So.2d 160, 162

(Ala.Civ.App.1996) (The ALAA does not create a cause of action but, rather, is “a tool to be

5

Case 2:12-cv-02136-IPJ Document 125 Filed 02/04/14 Page 5 of 22
COUNT VII: Malicious Prosecution and/or Abuse of Process #4:

Against Tracey Norman and Detective Sams. 

9

COUNT VIII: False Imprisonment – Against Detective Sams only.

10

COUNT IX: Trespass and Conversion – Against defendants Sams and

Tracey Norman.

11

COUNT X: Malicious Prosecution and/or Abuse of Process #5: Against

Tracey Norman and Detective Sams.12

COUNT XI: Malicious Prosecution and/or Abuse of Process #6: Against

Tracey Norman.

13

COUNT XII: Malicious Prosecution and/or Abuse of Process #7:

used by the court to sanction parties who bring frivolous litigation.”). Additionally, the plaintiff

may only recover costs and reasonable attorney’s fees should a court find the underlying claim

was without substantial justification. See Ala.Code. § 12-19-272 (a). 

This claim concerns defendant Tracey Norman claiming plaintiff violated an already 9

existing Protection from Abuse Order in Elmore County in August 2010. 

This claim too arises from the Elmore County Protection from Abuse violation, for 10

which Detective Sams allegedly served plaintiff with the Elmore County warrant for his arrest on

August 10, 2010. See doc. 122-5. However, the evidence demonstrates another officer actually

took the plaintiff into custody. Doc. 122-6 (reflecting “Burns” was the arresting officer). 

Although plaintiff alleges these events occurred August 10, 2012, the evidence demonstrates the

actual events took place 2010. 

The plaintiff alleges that Tracey Norman broke into his residence on August 10, 2010, 11

to steal his property, including his dog and his Rolex, and that Detective Sams conspired with

Tracey to enable Tracey to execute this break-in by having the plaintiff arrested. The Normans

were still married to each other at this time. Although plaintiff alleges these events occurred

August 10, 2012, the evidence demonstrates the actual events took place 2010. 

In this claim, plaintiff asserts that Tracey Norman made false statements to the City of 12

Prattville police on September 24, 2010, and that somehow Detective Sams had something

unspecified to do with these false statements. 

Plaintiff alleges that on October 7, 2011, Tracey Norman maliciously filed a divorce

13

case against the plaintiff in Jefferson County, although plaintiff had already filed for divorce

against her in the Bessemer division of Jefferson County. The plaintiff alleges the malicious

divorce case was dismissed on April 29, 2011, and the divorce action he filed is still pending (as

of January 2013). See Amended complaint, ¶¶ 93-95. 

6

Case 2:12-cv-02136-IPJ Document 125 Filed 02/04/14 Page 6 of 22
Against Tracey Norman and Detective Sams.14

COUNT XIII: Malicious Prosecution and/or Abuse of Process #8:

Against Tracey Norman and Detective Sams.15

COUNT XIV: Violation of the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act

#2: Against Tracey Norman and Detective Sams. 

16

COUNT XV: False Arrest pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – against

defendant Sams.17

Count XVI: Brady Violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – against

Detective Sams.18

Count XVII: Previously dismissed by the court.

Count XVIII: Deliberate Indifference Through Custom by Defendants

Neill and Rector.

19

This Count complains that defendant Tracey Norman falsely accused plaintiff of 14

criminal trespass to the City of Montgomery police and that somehow Detective Sams

participated in this February 15, 2011, complaint. 

This claim asserts that defendant Tracey Norman falsely filed a Petition for Protection 15

from Abuse in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County on February 16, 2011, and that

somehow Detective Sams participated in this. Amended Complaint, ¶ 103 

This Count also concerns the August 2, 2010, Jefferson County Protection from Abuse 16

Petition. This Count appears wholly duplicative and indistinguishable from Count VI. In fact,

Count XIV is a verbatim restatement of Count VI.

The plaintiff returns to the events of August 10, 2010, which he was taken into custody 17

by someone other than defendant Sams, on an arrest warrant which issued from Elmore County,

and claims not only did Detective Sams arrest him, but further that Sams did so to give Tracey

Norman an opportunity to burglarize plaintiff’s home, all of which violated his rights to be free

from unlawful seizure under the 4 and 14 Amendments. th th

Assuming that Sams had a romantic relationship with defendant Tracey Norman, and 18

assuming that the same is somehow exculpatory evidence which Sams had a duty to and failed to

disclose (although plaintiff does not allege to whom the relationship should have been disclosed),

the plaintiff also fails to allege in which criminal action against him this may have been

exculpatory evidence. 

The plaintiff alleges that defendants Neill and Rector, as supervisors, have created an

19

atmosphere of tolerance of willful, wanton and improper behavior of Hoover officers. Amended

complaint, ¶ 136. Plaintiff alleges that Neill and Rector failed to train or discipline officers

reported for misconduct, failed to implement policies for reporting allegations of misconduct,

7

Case 2:12-cv-02136-IPJ Document 125 Filed 02/04/14 Page 7 of 22
Meanwhile, during which this sordid sequence of events unfolded, the plaintiff 

filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy on February 23, 2011. See In re Patrick N. Norman,

Case No. 11-00942-TOM7, (submitted as doc. 122-9). In Schedule B of that filing,

under “Other contingent and unliquidated claims of every nature, including tax

refunds, counterclaims ofthe debtor, and rights to set off claims. Give estimated value

of each,” the plaintiff checked “None.” Id. at 11. He also represented himself as

unmarried at the time the petition was filed. Id., at 40. These documents were all

signed under penalty of perjury. Id., at 24, 45. Plaintiff was discharged from

bankruptcy on May 31, 2011. 

The court finds that at the time of filing his bankruptcy, the facts underlying

plaintiff’s claims here were fully developed. Lacking from the evidence before the

court is any allegation that the plaintiff ever amended his Chapter 7 petition, moved

to reopen his Bankruptcy case, or took any other action to notify the BankruptcyCourt

that he had this action. 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

A moving party is entitled to summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of

material fact, leaving final judgment to be decided as a matter of law. See Federal Rule

failed to supervise to prevent misconduct, failed to discipline, and failed to train officers

concerning citizens’ constitutional rights. The court believes this claim may be intended to be

brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

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of Civil Procedure 56; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.

574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56 (1986). An issue is “material” if it is a legal

element of the claim under the applicable substantive law which might affect the

outcome of the case. It is “genuine” if the record taken as a whole could lead a

rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121

F.3d 642, 646 (11 Cir.1997). th

The facts, and any reasonable inferencestherefrom, are to be viewed in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party, with any doubt resolved in the nonmovant's

favor. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1609

(1970). Once met by the moving party, however, the burden shifts to the non-moving

party to come forward with evidence to establish each element essential to that party's

case sufficient to sustain a jury verdict. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986); Earley v. Champion Int'l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077,

1080 (11 Cir.1990). th

A party opposing a properly submitted motion for summary judgment may not

rest upon mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but must set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Eberhardt v. Waters, 901 F.2d 1578,

1580 (11 Cir.1990). In addition, the non-moving party's evidence on rebuttal must

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be significantly probative and not based on mere assertion or be merely colorable. See

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Rule 56(e); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505,

2511 (1986). Speculation does not create a genuine issue of fact. Cordoba v.

Dillard's, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11 Cir.2005). th

The court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff

and may not make credibility determinations nor weigh the parties' evidence. 

Frederick v. Sprint/United Management Co., 246 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11 Cir.2001); th

Stewart v. Booker T. Washington Insurance, 232 F.3d 844, 848 (11 Cir.2000). th

LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Chapter 7 Bankruptcy

The law is well established that the case pending before this court was, at the

time of filing his bankruptcy, a contingent or unliquidated claim, despite plaintiff’s

statement under oath to that court that he had no such claims. Eleventh Circuit law is

also well-established that debtors have a continuing duty to disclose such changes. 

In fact, full and honest disclosure in bankruptcy proceedings is “‘crucial’ to the

system’s ‘effective functioning.’” Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 595 F.3d 1269,

1274 (11 Cir.2010) (quoting Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1285

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(11 Cir.2002)). Further, “a pending lawsuitseeking monetary compensation qualifies

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as an asset.” Id. (quoting Parker v. Wendy’s International, Inc., 368 F.3d 1268 (11th

Cir.2004). The “property of the bankruptcy estate includes all potential causes of

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action that exist at the time petitioner files for bankruptcy.” Barger v. City of

Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11 Cir.2003) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)). 

th

Generally speaking, a pre-petition cause of action isthe property of the Chapter

7 bankruptcy estate, and only the trustee in bankruptcy has standing to pursue it.”

Parker, 365 F.3d at 1272 (citing Barger v. City of Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289, 1292

(11 Cir.2003)). “Once an asset becomes part of the bankruptcy estate, all rights held th

by the debtor in the asset are extinguished unless the asset is abandoned back to the

debtor pursuant to § 554 of the Bankruptcy code.” Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 554).

In the facts before this case, plaintiff’s claims became an asset ofthe bankruptcy

estate when he filed his bankruptcy petition. When this action was filed in the Circuit

Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, on May 7, 2012, this case remained an asset of

the bankruptcy estate. Thus, plaintiff has no standing to bring the instant claims.

Parker, 365 F.3d at 1272. See also Witko, 374 F.3d at 1042 (“pre-petition causes of

action are part of the bankruptcy estate...).” Even if the plaintiff had standing to

pursue his claim here, the court would be remiss in not finding the plaintiff judicially

estopped frombringing the same. Because the events underlying the plaintiff’s claims

in this court had already occurred at the time he filed his bankruptcy petition, allowing

the claims to proceed here effectively condones the actions of any plaintiff savvy

enough, upon accrual of a claim, to hurriedly bring a Chapter 7 petition, receive a

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discharge, and then bring a lawsuit based on the already accrued action, thus

protecting any potential recovery from creditors. This court cannot allow such an

abuse of the system. 

Because the court finds that plaintiff has no right to pursue this action because

it is the property of the bankruptcy estate, and because the court also finds that the

plaintiff has maintained inconsistent positions in this court and the bankruptcy court,

this action is due to be dismissed with prejudice. However, thisis not the sole grounds

on which this action should be dismissed. 

B. Rule 11 and Frivolous Litigation

The court finds that given plaintiff’s deposition testimony, in conjunction with

all pleadings filed to date, plaintiff’s counsel violated Rule 11 in allowing this case to

proceed, especially after her client testified by deposition. In essence, every allegation

in the plaintiff’s complaint is premised on the existence of an “inappropriate

relationship” between defendant Tracey Norman and defendant Sams. However,

plaintiff and defendant Tracey Norman’s pattern of having each other arrested predates not only any feasible contact defendant Sams’ had with defendant Tracey

Norman, but also pre-dates their marriage. While still married to each other, Tracey

Norman is alleged to have moved in with non-party Michael Wilkerson, who,

according to plaintiff, became suspicious of this alleged inappropriate relationship

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between defendant Tracey Norman and defendant Sams, and took his suspicions – for

whatever reason – to plaintiff, and from which plaintiff then uses his wife’s

boyfriend’s unsubstantiated allegations to file a lawsuit claiming violations of his

rights by defendants Sams, Neill and Rector, based on this multi-year pattern he and

his wife had of having each other arrested. 

Rule 11 sanctions are warranted when a party files an action that: (1) has no

reasonable factual basis; (2) has no reasonable chance of success based on the legal

theory used, or that cannot be advanced as a reasonable basis to change existing law;

or (3) isfiled in bad faith for an improper purpose. Anderson v. Smithfield Foods, Inc.,

353 F.3d 912, 915 (11th Cir.2003). In determining whether to impose sanctions, the

district court determines “whether the party's claims are objectively frivolous-in view

of the facts or law-and then, if they are, whether the person who signed the pleadings

should have been aware that they were frivolous; that is, whether he would have been

aware had he made a reasonable inquiry.” Worldwide Primates, Inc. v. McGreal, 87

F.3d 1252, 1254 (11 Cir.1996). th

Because the defendants did not seek Rule 11 sanctions in their motions for

summary judgment, and because this court cannot sua sponte grant summaryjudgment

on a ground not raised in the defendants’ pleadings, the court notes only that to pursue

a cause of action long after the evidence demonstrates a complete and total lack of

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basis for doing so violates both the letter and the spirit of Rule 11. Had plaintiff’s

counsel made a reasonable inquiry into the evidentiary basis for the plaintiff’s claims,

counsel would have realized the same were frivolous.

C. § 1983 and Claims of Deliberate Indifference

Defendants Rector and Neill are named solely in Count XVIII of the Amended

Complaint, which claims these defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the

plaintiff’s rights. 

The plaintiff alleges that defendants Neill and Rector, as supervisors, created

an atmosphere of tolerance of willful, wanton and improper behavior of Hoover

officers. Amended complaint, ¶ 136. Plaintiff alleges that Neill and Rector failed to

train or discipline officers reported for misconduct, failed to implement policies for

reporting allegations of misconduct, failed to supervise to prevent misconduct, failed

to discipline, and failed to train officers concerning citizens' constitutional rights. The

court believes this claim may be intended to be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

although no mention of a specific Constitutional right which was violated is made by

the plaintiff within this Count. 

Lacking from the plaintiff is any evidence at all to support these claims. The

evidence submitted demonstrates that plaintiff complained to Neill that Sams was in

an inappropriate relationship with plaintiff’s wife, while recognizing that the

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plaintiff’s wife was already in a relationship with someone other than plaintiff and

Sams at the relevant time. Rather than bring defendant Neill any evidence of this, the

plaintiff went to defendant Rector with the same complaints of the wrongdoing by

defendant Sams. See e.g., declaration of Neill (doc. 120); declaration of Rector (doc.

121). Defendant Rector also asked plaintiff to bring him evidence of the alleged

relationship, and plaintiff failed to do so. Declaration of Rector, ¶ 12; plaintiff depo.

II at 55. 

Deliberate indifference exists when a government official “(1) had subjective

knowledge of a risk of serious harm; and (2) disregarded that risk; (3) by conduct that

is more than mere negligence.” West v. Tillman, 496 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11 Cir.2007)

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(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). “[D]eliberate indifference requires

that the indifference be a deliberate choice, which is an exacting standard.” Liese v.

Indian River Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 344 (11 Cir.2012) (internal citations

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and quotation marks omitted). In order to demonstrate deliberate indifference for

purposes of failure to train or failure to supervise, the plaintiff must provide some

evidence of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees. Connick v.

Thompson, – U.S. –, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011). 

An unsubstantiated allegation of one officer’s conduct does not impart actual

or constructive notice to policymakers that an omission in their training program

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caused city employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights. Connick, 131 S.Ct. at

1360, citing Board of Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410. See also

Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288, 1293 (11 Cir.2009) (to th

establish deliberate indifference, the “plaintiff must present some evidence that the

municipality knew of a need to train and/or supervise in a particular area and the

municipality made a deliberate choice not to take any action.”). 

Viewing the facts before this court in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,

and without judging credibility, at best the court finds the plaintiff has an

unsubstantiated belief that defendant Sams engaged in an inappropriate relationship

with plaintiff’s wife and based on that relationship, conspired with plaintiff’s wife to

violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights. In order to hold Sams’ supervisors liable for

these perceived violations, the plaintiffmust establish a causal connection between the

actions of the supervisors and the alleged deprivation. This causal connection can be

established when a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on

notice of the need for improved training or supervision, and the official fails to take

corrective action. Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436, 1443 (11

th

Cir.1985); citing Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227, 1241 (11 Cir.1985), Sims v. th

Adams, 537 F.2d 829, 832 (5 Cir.1976). No evidence of widespread abuse has been th

produced by the plaintiff, nor has the plaintiff even made such an allegation. Rather,

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Case 2:12-cv-02136-IPJ Document 125 Filed 02/04/14 Page 16 of 22
the plaintiff has made allegations concerning one officer’s conduct. “[E]mployees’

actions do not imply municipal liability absent an official policy or custom, and a

single incident does not support an inference of such a policy.” Barr v. Gee, 437

Fed.Appx. 865, 875 (11 Cir.2011), citing McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d at 1290-91

th

(11 Cir.2004). th

Having considered the foregoing, and being ofthe opinion defendants Neill and

Rectors’ motion for summary judgment is due to be granted, the court shall so rule by

separate Order.

D. Count XV – § 1983 against defendant Sams, False Arrest

Although the plaintiff alleges in Count XV of the Amended Complaint that

Detective Sams “personally served and arrested Mr. Norman on a warrant that he knew

to be obtained without probable cause...” (Amended Complaint, ¶ 114), the court finds

the evidence submitted does not support any such finding. Rather, the evidence

supports a finding that Detective Sams was present when plaintiff was arrested on

August 10, 2010. See e.g., plaintiff depo. at 105-106; and arrest report (doc. 122-6),

(reflecting “Burns” was the arresting officer). 

Even if Sams wasthe arresting officer, and even if he assisted defendant Tracey

Norman in bringing the Elmore County charge and subsequent arrest warrant, this 20

The plaintiff was found not guilty in this case. Doc. 123-2, at 30. 20

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Case 2:12-cv-02136-IPJ Document 125 Filed 02/04/14 Page 17 of 22
claim is wholly resolved by Smith v. Gonzalez, 670 F.2d 522 (5 Cir.), cert. denied,

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459 U.S. 1005, 103 S.Ct. 361, 74 L.Ed.2d 397 (1982). In Smith, the Court held that

“[w]here an arrest is made under authority of a properly issued warrant, the arrest is

simply not a false arrest. Id., 670 F.2d at 526, citing Rodriguez v. Ritchey, 556 F.2d

1185 (5th Cir. 1977). See also Simon v. U.S., 644 F.2d 490, 496 (5 Cir.1981) (“A[n]

th

... officer does not violate the Constitution when he executes a warrant valid on its

face...”). Rather, the independent decision by a judge to issue the warrant breaks any

causal chain between the officer and any constitutional violation. LeSavage v. White,

755 F.2d 814, 819, n.5 (11 Cir.1985). See also Maas v. Moran, 2013 WL 4456154, th

*5 (S.D.Miss.2013) (same); Daniel v. Grimmett, 2010 WL 1375632, *2

(N.D.Miss.2010) (“The Fifth Circuit has further held, ‘a warrant is valid even though

the court, through lack of information or otherwise, has issued it for the arrest of a

person in fact innocent of the offense alleged.’) (quoting Rodriguez v. Ritchey, 556

F.2d 1185, 1191 (5th Cir.1977)).

Having considered the foregoing, and being of the opinion defendant Sams’

motion for summary judgment on Count XV of the plaintiff’s amended complaint is

due to be granted, the court shall so rule by separate Order.

E. Count XVI – § 1983 against defendant Sams, “Brady Violations”

In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963),

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the Supreme Court held that due process requiresthe prosecution to turn over evidence

favorable to the accused and material to his guilt or punishment. The amended

complaint before this court assertsthat defendant Sams violated plaintiff’s due process

rights as established by Brady in not disclosing the alleged “romantic relationship with

Mrs. Norman...” Amended Complaint, ¶ 119. A Brady violation of a defendant's due

process rights occurs where the prosecution suppresses material evidence favorable

to the defendant. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196. The Eleventh Circuit has

held that “regardless of request, favorable, exculpatory or impeachment evidence is

material, and constitutional error results from its suppression by the government, if

there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense,

the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Scheer, 168

F.3d 445, 451 (11 Cir.1999) (quotation omitted). In order to show a reasonable th

probability that the result would have been different, a defendant must show that the

government’s evidentiary suppression undermined confidence in the outcome of the

trial. Id. at 452.

Lacking from the plaintiff’s pleadings is any basis to find that defendant Sams,

as a Hoover police officer, had any duty under Brady. The evidence before this court 

clearly demonstrates that Tracey Norman had plaintiff arrested in multiple counties,

both before and after any allegation is made concerning defendant Sams involvement. 

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Thus, disclosure of the alleged relationship between Sams and Tracey Norman simply

could not impact the outcome of the majority of the proceedings, and plaintiff makes

no attempt to even identify what proceeding might have ended differently had the

alleged tryst been disclosed. Furthermore, viewing the plaintiff’s allegations in the

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light most favorable to him, the plaintiff already had his “evidence” of the alleged

affair at the time of the court actions in question. Thus, he could have presented such

evidence. 

Finding no viable claim stated in count XVI of the plaintiff’s amended

complaint, the court shall grant defendant Sams’ motion for summary judgment on this

count. 

F. State Law Claims

The plaintiff brings a myriad of state law claims against defendant Tracey

Norman and defendant Sams. In light of the dismissal of the § 1983 claims, there are

no federal causes of action in this lawsuit. Rather, all that remains are state law

Additionally, even if the plaintiff’s claim stated a viable cause of action under Brady,

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and assuming the plaintiff could prove “that the prosecution knowingly made false statements or

introduced or allowed trial testimony that it knew or should have known was false” the remedy

is a new trial “if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected

the judgment of the jury.” Smith v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections, 572 F.3d 1327, 1333 (11th

Cir.2009) (citations omitted). 

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claims. Where, like here, subject matter jurisdiction is predicated exclusively on

federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and where diversity of

citizenship is plainly absent, the decision of whether to continue to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims rests in the court’s discretion. See

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2); Shotz v. City of Plantation, Fla., 344 F.3d 1161, 1185 (11

th

Cir.2003) (in deciding how to exercise § 1367(c) discretion, court should consider

principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity); Palmer v. Hospital

Authority of Randolph County, 22 F.3d 1559, 1569 (11 Cir.1994) (similar). The th

Eleventh Circuit has “encouraged district courtsto dismiss any remaining state claims

when, as here, the federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial.” Raney v. Allstate

Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (11 Cir.2004). th

The court shall therefore dismiss the remaining state law claims for refiling in

an more appropriate forum, should the plaintiff wish to proceed with the same to the

extent that plaintiff’s Chapter VII bankruptcy does not bar the same. 

CONCLUSION

In consideration of all of the foregoing, the court shall grant defendants Neill

and Rectors’ motion for summary judgment (doc. 119) on Count XVIII of the

plaintiff’s amended complaint, finding no genuine issue of material fact remains and

that these defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law.

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The court shall further grant defendant Sams motion for summary judgment

(doc. 123) on Counts XV and XVI of the plaintiff’s amended complaint, finding no

genuine issue of material fact remains and that these defendants are entitled to

judgment in their favor as a matter of law.

The court shall dismiss all remaining counts of the plaintiff’s complaint, asthey

arise solely under state law and the court declines to exercise judgment over the same. 

DONE and ORDERED this the 4 day of February, 2014.

th

 

INGE PRYTZ JOHNSON

SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE 

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