Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-01667/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-01667-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUSS BOHLKE and ISC, INC.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C-06-1667 MMC

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS; VACATING

HEARING

(Docket No. 10)

Before the Court is the motion filed July 11, 2006 by defendants State of California,

Business, Transportation and Housing Agency of the State of California, and Department of

Motor Vehicles of the State of California, seeking dismissal, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of the seventh cause of action asserted against them

by plaintiffs Russ Bohlke and ISC, Inc. Plaintiffs have filed opposition to the motion;

defendants have filed a reply. Having reviewed the papers filed in support of and in

opposition to the motion, the Court finds the matter appropriate for decision without oral

argument, see Civil L.R. 7-1(b), VACATES the August 18, 2006 hearing, and rules as

follows.

BACKGROUND

The instant action is a purported class action on behalf of a class consisting of “all

persons in California with mobility, visual, auditory, and other physical disabilities who have

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been denied the right to full and equal access to, and use and enjoyment of[,] their local

and convenient DMV stations and to their driving privileges due to” assertedly

discriminatory policies and barriers. (See Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) ¶ 11.) 

Plaintiffs assert causes of action for violation of (1) Title II of the Americans With Disabilities

Act of 1990 (“ADA”); (2) § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; (3) “California’s disabled

access statutes,” including California Government Code §§ 4450 et seq., California Health

& Safety Code §§ 19955 et seq., and California Vehicle Code §§ 14100 et seq., (4)

California Government Code §§ 4450 et seq.; (5) California Civil Code §§ 54, 54.1, and 55;

(6) California Civil Code §§ 54(c) and 54.1(d); (7) California Civil Code § 51 (“Unruh Act”),

and (8) California Government Code § 11135.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) cannot be granted unless “it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would

entitle him to relief.” See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Dismissal can be

based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged

under a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699

(9th Cir. 1990).

Generally, a district court, in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, may not consider any

material beyond the pleadings. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner And Co.,

Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n. 19 (9th Cir. 1990). Material that is properly submitted as part

of the complaint, however, may be considered. See id. Documents whose contents are

alleged in the complaint, and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not

physically attached to the pleading, also may be considered. See Branch v. Tunnell, 14

F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994). In addition, the Court may consider any document “the

authenticity of which is not contested, and upon which the plaintiff’s complaint necessarily

relies,” regardless of whether the document is referred to in the complaint. See Parrino v.

FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1998). Finally, the Court may consider matters that

are subject to judicial notice. See Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, Inc., 798 F.2d

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 Pursuant to California Civil Code § 52(a), “[w]hoever” violates the Unruh Act “is

liable for each and every offense for the actual damages, and any amount that may be

determined by a jury, or a court sitting without a jury, up to a maximum of three times the

amount of actual damage but in no case less than four thousand dollars ($4,000), and any

attorney's fees that may be determined by the court in addition thereto.” See Cal. Civ. Code

§ 52(a).

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 By adopting § 51(f), “the California Legislature intended to incorporate into the

Unruh Act . . . only those provisions of the ADA germane to the original scope” of the Unruh

Act. See Bass v. County of Butte, Nos. 04-16705, 04-17286, slip op. at 9705 (9th Cir. Aug.

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1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986).

In analyzing a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true all material

allegations in the complaint, and construe them in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. See NL Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). 

The Court may disregard factual allegations if such allegations are contradicted by the facts

established by reference to exhibits attached to the complaint. See Durning v. First Boston

Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). Conclusory allegations, unsupported by the

facts alleged, need not be accepted as true. See Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115,

1121 (9th Cir. 1992). 

DISCUSSION

As noted, defendants move to dismiss only the seventh cause of action, pursuant to

which plaintiffs seek relief pursuant to the Unruh Act. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that each

asserted violation of the ADA is also a violation of the Unruh Act, pursuant to California

Civil Code § 51(f). (See SAC ¶ 85.) Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs’ Unruh Act claim

on the ground the State of California and its agencies are not “business establishments”

and, consequently, are not subject to liability under the Unruh Act.

The Unruh Act provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of [California] are

free and equal, and no matter what their . . . disability . . . are entitled to the full and equal

accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business

establishments of every kind whatsoever.” See Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b).1

 In 1992, the

Unruh Act was amended to provide that “a violation of the right of any individual under the

[ADA] shall also constitute a violation” of the Unruh Act. See Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f).2 The

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28 15, 2006) (rejecting argument that § 51(f) incorporates ADA’s employment discrimination

provisions into Unruh Act).

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Unruh Act “works to ensure that all persons receive the full accommodations of any

business within California, regardless of the person's disabilities.” See Chabner v. United

of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 1042, 1050 (9th Cir.2000).

 The Unruh Act amended an earlier California statute that prohibited arbitrary

discrimination in “public accommodations.” See Isbister v. Boys Club of Santa Cruz, Inc.,

40 Cal. 3d 72, 78 (1985). The Unruh Act expanded the reach of the prior statute “from

common carriers and places of public accommodation and recreation, e.g., railroads,

hotels, restaurants, theaters, and the like, to include ‘all business establishments of every

kind whatsoever.’” See id. (emphasis and citation omitted). “By its use of the emphatic

words ‘all’ and ‘of every kind whatsoever,’ the Legislature intended that the phrase

‘business establishments’ be interpreted in the broadest sense reasonably possible.” See

id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).

Although California courts have avoided setting forth a rigid test for determining

whether an entity is a “business establishment,” the California Supreme Court has provided

some general guidance. In Burks v. Poppy Construction Company, 57 Cal. 2d 463 (1962),

the California Supreme Court explained that the definition of “business,” within the meaning

of the Unruh Act, “embraces everything about which one can be employed, and it is often

synonymous with ‘calling, occupation, or trade, engaged in for the purpose of making a

livelihood or gain,’” and that an “establishment” includes “not only a fixed location,” but also

“a permanent commercial force or organization or a permanent settled position (as in life or

business).” See id. at 468 (holding construction company to be “business establishment”). 

Subsequently, in O’Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass’n., 33 Cal. 3d 790 (1983), the

California Supreme Court held that non-profit organizations could be “business

establishments” within the meaning of the Unruh Act, noting that “hospitals are often

nonprofit organizations and they are clearly business establishments to the extent that they

employ a vast array of persons, care for an extensive physical plant and charge substantial

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fees to those who use the facilities.” See id. at 796 (finding non-profit condominium owners

association had sufficient “businesslike attributes” to fall within Unruh Act’s definition of

“business establishments”). In Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club, 10 Cal. 4th 594

(1995), the Supreme Court held that although private social clubs generally fall outside the

scope of the Unruh Act, the club at issue therein was a “business establishment” because it

“derive[d] a significant amount of revenue, as well as indirect benefit, from the use of its

facilities, and the purchase of goods and services on its premises, by persons who are not

members of the club.” See id. at 599 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court held that

the Unruh Act “firmly established the right of all persons to nondiscriminatory treatment by

establishments that engage in business transactions with the public.” See id. at 618. More

recently, in Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America, 17 Cal. 4th 670

(1998), the Supreme Court explained that an entity may be a business establishment for

some purposes but not others. See id. at 700 (holding Unruh Act had no application to Boy

Scouts’ membership policies because “[u]nlike those involved in Warfield, the business

transactions with nonmembers engaged in by the Boy Scouts do not involve the sale of

access to the basic activities or services offered by the organization”; noting “we have no

doubt that the [Unruh Act] would apply to, and would prohibit discrimination in, the actual

business transactions with nonmembers engaged in by the Boy Scouts in its retail stores

and elsewhere”).

The parties have cited no controlling authority on the issue of whether the state and

its agencies ever may be considered to be operating a “business establishment” within the

meaning of the Unruh Act, and the conclusions reached by district courts have differed 

depending on the particular state function at issue. For example, state prisons have been

held not to be “business establishments” within the meaning of the Unruh Act “because

prisoners are not engaged in a calling, occupation or trade for purposes of making a

livelihood or gain” but, rather, “are incarcerated by the state because of crimes which they

have committed.” See Taormina v. California Department of Corrections, 946 F. Supp.

829, 833-34 (S.D. Cal. 1996); Gaston v. Colio, 883 F. Supp. 508, 510 (S.D. Cal 1995).

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 Sacramento Municipal Utility District v. County of Solano, 54 Cal. App. 4th 1163

(1997), cited by defendants, is distinguishable. There, the Court of Appeal, relying on the

“well-settled rule of statutory construction that absent express language to the contrary,

government entities are excluded from the operation of general statutory provisions which

implicate the exercise of sovereign powers,” held a county lacked authority to tax a

municipal power plant under a tax code provision authorizing counties to tax “every kind of

lawful business conducted in the county.” See id. at 1167. Defendants submit no authority,

however, suggesting the “exercise of sovereign powers” is implicated by the Unruh Act’s

prohibition against discrimination against disabled persons. Where “no impairment of

sovereign powers would result, the reason underlying the rule of construction ceases to

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Relying on Taormina, a California Court of Appeal has held, without discussion, that the

state Department of Insurance does not act as a “business establishment” within the

meaning of the Unruh Act when it adopts regulations. See Spanish Speaking Citizens’

Foundation, Inc. v. Low, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1179, 1240 (2000). In none of the abovereferenced opinions did the court hold, however, that the state and its agencies can never

be liable under the Unruh Act. Indeed, district courts have held that public schools are

“business establishments” within the meaning of the Unruh Act; as one court noted, “[t]he

original version of the bill which became the Unruh Act extended its antidiscriminatory

provisions to ‘all public or private groups, organizations, associations, business

establishments, schools, and public facilities” and “[l]ater versions dropped all the specific

enumerations except ‘business establishments’ but added to the latter phrase the modifying

words ‘of every kind whatsoever.’” See Sullivan v. Vallejo City Unified School District, 731

F. Supp. 947, 952 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (emphases added); see also Nicole M. v. Martinez

Unified School District, 964 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (following Sullivan).

This Court finds the DMV qualifies as a business establishment for the purposes of

the Unruh Act. Unlike state prisons, the DMV’s services are available to members of the

public, who voluntarily visit the DMV for the purposes of obtaining drivers’ licenses and

related services. Indeed, the daily business transactions between the DMV and members

of the public place the DMV squarely within the definition of a business establishment. 

See, e.g., Warfield, 10 Cal. 4th at 618 (noting Unruh Act “firmly established the right of all

persons to nondiscriminatory treatment by establishments that engage in business

transactions with the public”). Defendants submit no authority to the contrary.3

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exist and the Legislature may properly be held to have intended that the statute apply to

governmental bodies even though it used general statutory language only.” See Churchill

v. Parnell, 170 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 1098 (1985) (internal quotation and citations omitted).

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby DENIES defendants’ motion to

dismiss.

This order terminates Docket No. 10.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 15, 2006 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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