Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00103/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00103-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MATTHEW LLOYD CHANDLER,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 14cv103-GPC(BGS)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION 

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

FOR HABEAS CORPUS 

vs.

STU SHERMAN, Warden,

Respondent.

On January 15, 2014, Petitioner Matthew Lloyd Chandler (“Petitioner”), a state

prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner seeks judicial review of his conviction

in San Diego County Superior Court Case No. SCD227785 for assault with a deadly

weapon and burglary as well as weapons enhancements. (Dkt. No. 1.) Respondent filed

an Answer on March 11, 2014 (Dkt. No. 8), and Petitioner filed his Traverse on June

23, 2014. (Dkt. No. 17.) On September 16, 2014, Magistrate Judge Bernard G. Skomal

issued a Report and Recommendation (“Report”) that this Court deny the petition.

(Dkt. No. 18.) On October 20, 2014, Petitioner filed objections (“Objections”) to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report. (Dkt. No. 19.)

After careful consideration of the pleadings and relevant exhibits submitted by

the parties, this Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s Objections, ADOPTS the Magistrate

Judge’s Report in its entirety, and DENIES the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 28, 2010, Petitioner was charged with two counts of assault with a

deadly weapon by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (counts one and

two), in violation of California Penal Code (“Penal Code”) section 245(a)(1); two

counts of burglary (counts three and five), in violation of Penal Code section 459; one

count of making a criminal threat (count four), in violation of Penal Code section 422;

and one count of grand theft of personal property (count six), in violation of Penal

Code section 487(a). (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment No. 2, vol. 1, part 2 at 104-09.) As to

counts one and two, the amended information also alleged Petitioner had personally

used a deadly weapon, within the meaning of Penal Code section 1192.7(c)(23), and

asto counts three and four, the amended information alleged Petitioner had personally

used a deadly weapon, within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022(b)(1). (Id.) In

addition, the amended information alleged Petitioner had suffered thirteen prior felony

convictions which rendered him ineligible for probation, within the meaning of Penal

Code section 1203(e)(4), eight prior convictions for which he had served a prison

sentence, within the meaning of Penal Code sections 667.5(b) and 668, one serious

felony prior conviction, within the meaning of Penal Code sections 667(a)(1), 668 and

1192.7(c), and one prior “strike” conviction, within the meaning of PenalCode sections

667(b) through (i), 1170.12, and 668. (Id.) 

Following a jury trial, a jury found Petitioner guilty of counts one, three, and

five, and not guilty of counts two, four, and six. (Id.) Petitioner admitted he had

suffered the prior convictions as alleged. (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment No. 1, vol. 4 at

200-06.) He wassentenced to fourteen years and four months in state prison. (Dkt. No.

9, Lodgment No. 2, vol. 1, part 2 at 112.) 

On July 7, 2011, counsel for Petitioner filed a direct appeal of his conviction in

the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One. (Dkt. No. 9,

Lodgment No. 3.) While that appeal was pending, on October 27, 2011, Petitioner filed

a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the San Diego Superior Court, which the court

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denied on December 12, 2011 because it lacked jurisdiction due to the pending appeal.

(Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment No. 3.) On January 9, 2012, Petitioner then filed a document he

entitled “Supplemental Brief”, and on May 21, 2012 he filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus in the state appellate court. (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment Nos. 5, 6.) On June

5, 2012, the state appellate court consolidated the direct appeal and the habeas corpus

petition. (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment Nos. 8-9.) On October 30, 2012, the Court of Appeal

ultimately affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and denied the petition for writ of habeas

corpus in an unpublished written opinion. (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment No. 11.) Petitioner

then filed a Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court, which wassummarily

denied on January 16, 2013. (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment Nos. 12-13.)

On January 10, 2013, Petitioner filed another Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

in the San Diego Superior Court. (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment No. 14.) On February 14,

2013, the Superior Court denied the petition in a written opinion. (Dkt. No. 9,

Lodgment No. 15.) In March 2013, Petitioner then filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus in the California Court of Appeal. (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment No. 16.) On March

28, 2013, the Court of Appeal denied the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in a

written, unpublished opinion. (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment No.17.) 

On January 15, 2014, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court. (Dkt. No. 1.) Respondent filed an Answer

on March 11, 2014. (Dkt. No. 8.) Petitioner filed a Traverse on June 23, 2014. (Dkt.

No. 17.) On September 16, 2014, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report recommending

that this Court deny the petition. (Dkt. No. 18.) Petitioner filed Objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report on October 20, 2014. (Dkt. No. 19.)

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to

be correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The following facts are taken from the

California Court of Appeal opinion decided on October 30, 2012. 

A. The People’s Case

1. “Other crimes” evidence (Evid. Code § 1101(b))

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Over pretrial objection, the prosecution presented evidence

under Evidence Code section 1101(b) (discussed more fully, post) that

Chandler committed theft in early 2009 at a Vons store.

2. May 18, 2010 burglary and grand theft of personal property (counts

5 & 6)

Earl Hochdanner testified that at around 9:00 p.m. on May 18,

he was working as a shift supervisor at a CVS store. Hochdanner

walked into the storage area in the back of the store through a swinging

door on which there was a sign reading, "Employees OnlyBeyond This

Point." Hochdanner saw Chandler standing in the open doorway of the

restricted liquor cage, which is a large wooden cage wrapped in

chicken wire with a locked wooden door where cigarettes, liquor, and

electronics were stored. The liquor cage door had a hinge that made the

door shut automatically. The door handle locked automatically and,

although the door could be opened from the inside without a key, a key

was needed to open the door from the outside. Hochdanner observed

that the liquor cage light was on and the door was open. The liquor

cage door had been locked earlier and the light had been turned off.

When Chandler saw Hochdanner, Chandler first tried to close

the liquor cage door, but then opened it back up again. Hochdanner

testified that Chandler was wearing a large black backpack that

"looked full." Hochdanner asked Chandler what he was doing in the

liquor cage. Chandler replied that he waslooking for the bathroom and

that someone told him the bathroom was in the back. Hochdanner

thought Chandler's statement was false because a store employee

would have told Chandler the bathrooms were located in the pharmacy

area.

Hochdanner then asked Chandler what he had taken, and

Chandler responded that he had not taken anything. When Hochdanner

asked whether he could look in Chandler's backpack, Chandler said,

"Fuck no." Hochdanner asked Chandler to leave the store and then

walked him out of the store and watched him leave.

Hochdanner testified he went back to the liquor cage to see if

anything was missing and then told his manager he had caught

someone in the liquor cage. Hochdanner's manager reminded him that

an inventory had just been taken of the items in the liquor cage.

Hochdanner checked the cigarettes and determined that 30 cartons of

cigarettes, totaling about $1,500, were missing.

Hochdanner inspected the liquor cage to try to determine how

Chandler had opened the door and found that the chicken wire had

been clipped next to the door frame about a foot and a half below the

level of the door handle. The clipped wires looked like they had been

pulled apart. Hochdanner put his arm through the hole in the chicken

wire and was able to reach the door handle and open the door.

Hochdanner indicated that the store was equipped with a video

surveillance system, but the only camera in the rear area of the store

behind the swinging doors was by the receiving door “about 100 or

200" feet away from the liquor cage and so nothing that happened

inside the cage would have been video recorded. Hochdanner testified

that “[w]e had video of the suspect walking in the store and walking

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out of the store with me.” A video clip showing Chandler in the store

that night was played for the jury.

3. June 3, 2010: Assault with a deadly weapon (counts 1 & 2),

burglary (count 3), and making a criminal threat (count 4)

David Beeler testified that at around 4:50 p.m. on June 3, he was

working as the assistant manager at the same CVS store. He went into

the back storage room, opened the liquor cage with his key, turned on

the light, and saw Chandler lying on his stomach inside the liquor cage.

Beeler saw a few cartons of cigarettes and a beer on the floor next to

a backpack, about a foot away from Chandler. As Beeler was standing

in the doorway holding the door open, Chandler reached for the

backpack and stood up.

Chandler told Beeler, “I don't have anything,” and opened the

backpack. Beeler recognized Chandler from a photograph of Chandler

taken at the store entrance on the night of the prior incident. The store

manager had shown the photograph to Beeler and told him to “keep an

eye out.”

As Beeler was standing in the liquor cage doorway, Chandler

walked toward him to get out of the cage, saying, “You ain't got me.

You don’t got anything on me. You can’t do anything.” Beeler put his

hand out to stop Chandler from leaving and said, “Wait a minute. Wait,

wait, wait. You’re the guy from last time.” Chandler then reached into

the front right pocket of his pants, pulled out a standard box cutter

knife, and swung it at Beeler’s neck. Beeler testified that the box cutter

came within about three inches of his neck. Beeler fell back “in shock”

out of the liquor cage doorway, and Chandler walked out of the liquor

cage and out through storage room doors into the store.

Beeler stated he followed behind Chandler and tried to call 911

from his cell phone but was flustered and misdialed a couple of times.

As they passed the photo lab counter, Beeler, who was about 10 feet

behind Chandler, yelled out to the photo clerk, Christina Liebelt, that

Chandler tried to stab him and for her to call 911. Beeler testified he

had a hard time speaking when he spoke to her, and she thought he was

joking. Chandler, who became angry, stopped walking and said

something like “I ain’t got nothing on you” and then continued walking

with Beeler again following him. Beeler testified that asthey exited the

store through the front entrance, Chandler told him, “You ain’t nothing

to me. I’ll kill you. No problem.” Chandler walked across a parking lot

toward a bus stop with Beeler following him. Before they reached the

bus stop, Chandler turned around, took the box cutter out of his pocket

again, and told Beeler something to the effect that he had no problem

killing Beeler, and Beeler was nothing to him. Beeler testified that

Chandler threatened him with the box cutter he had used in the liquor

cage, but this time it only came within about a foot and a half of

Beeler’s neck.

David Salo, a CVS cashier, testified he was working at the

courtesy booth in the front of the store that day when he saw Beeler

and Chandler walk past his register. According to Salo, Beeler and

Chandler were “in a heated conversation” and a “confrontation ofsome

type” appeared to be going on. Chandler was trying to get out of the

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store and was aggressively pushing Beeler. Salo testified that Beeler

“was trying to delay [Chandler] until the police got there.” Chandler

told Beeler in a threatening way, “Get out of my way,” and Beeler said,

“No, you're not going.” Salo also heard Chandler make some

threatening comment like “I'll hurt you.” Chandler was gripping

something in his hand, which Salo thought was a box cutter. 

Salo followed Beeler and Chandler after they left the store, but

he did not see Chandler brandish a weapon toward Beeler. Salo saw

Beeler come back. Salo then got into his truck and followed Chandler.

Salo stopped a police officer and gave information about the incident. 

At around 5:00 p.m. that day, after being flagged down by a

CVS employee in the vicinity of the CVS store, San Diego Police

Officer Kristopher Spencer found Chandler a couple of blocks away.

After Chandler started to walk away, Officer Spencer and another

officer drew their service weapons and ordered Chandler to stop and

get down to the ground. Officer Spencer took Chandler into custody

“as a detention” because he fit the description of the suspect. Chandler

had a plain black backpack with shoulder straps, which Officer

Spencer impounded.

Officer Spencer searched the immediate area and in some small

hedges about 15 feet from where Chandler dropped to the ground, the

officers found a box cutter with an angled retractable blade and a pair

of wire cutters, which were also impounded.

B. The Defense Case

Chandler did not testify. Christina Liebelt, the CVS employee

who was working in the photo lab of the store on June 3, testified for

the defense. She testified that during the incident on that date Beeler

told her to call 911. Initially, she thought Beeler was kidding “because

he has a dry sense of humor” and makes jokes. Beeler again asked her

to call 911 and said something like “[h]e tried to kill me” or “[h]e tried

to cut me.” This prompted Liebelt to call 911. Liebelt testified she

recognized Chandler from a picture she had seen of him. She stated she

did not hear Chandler, who was trying to leave the store, make any

threats.

San Diego Police Officer Daniel Vaquero testified that he

investigated the June 3 incident and interviewed Beeler. Officer

Vaquero testified he did not collect any video from the store because

“there was no video of the assault in the back cage or in the middle of

the store.” When asked whether a second alleged attack took place near

Liebelt’s photo counter, Officer Vaquero replied, “I didn't say that it

happened during [sic] the photo counter, sir.” At the defense counsel's

request, Officer Vaquero refreshed his memory by reading the report

he prepared and the indicated that Beeler had told him the second

attack took place near the photo counter.

On cross-examination, Officer Vaquero stated that Beeler was

upset, red, and shaking when the officer talked to him, and he had to

console Beeler by saying, “It's ok. You're okay. You're not hurt, and I

know this is hard, but it’s good that you're reporting it.”

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(Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment No. 11 at 4-10.)

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review of Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation

The district court’s duties in connection with a Report of a magistrate judge are

set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The district

judge must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which

objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings

or recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The district

court need not review de novo those portions of a Report to which neither party

objects. See Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n. 13 (9th Cir. 2005); United States

v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121-22 (9thCir. 2003) (en banc). When no objections

are filed, the Court may assume the correctness of the Magistrate Judge’s findings of

fact and decide the motion on the applicable law. Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Court, 501

F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Nelson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217 (S.D.

Cal. 2001). 

II. Legal Standard

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),

it is a necessary prerequisite to federal habeas relief that a prisoner satisfy the AEDPA

standard of review set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard states that “[an]

application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of the State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim unless” the

claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

III. Analysis

Petitioner raises five claims in his Petition. First, he argues the state court trial

judge improperly excluded evidence of Beeler’s employment records and the CVS

employee manual. Second, Petitioner claims the state trial judge improperly permitted

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the prosecution to introduce evidence of “other crimes” he had committed. Third,

Petitioner contendsthe prosecutor committed misconduct. Fourth, Petitioner claims his

multiple appointed counsels were ineffective. Lastly, Petitioner argues that the

cumulative effect of all of the errorsthat occurred at his trial rendered it fundamentally

unfair. (Dkt. No. 1, Pet. at 6-38.) 

A. Improper Exclusion of Evidence by the Trial Court

In his first claim, Petitioner contends the state court trial judge prejudicially

abused his discretion and deprived him of his constitutional right to present a defense

by excluding, under California Evidence Code section 352, evidence of (1) Beeler’s

employment records regarding his November 2010 termination from another CVS

store; and (2) CVS’s policymanual on how employees should handle shoplifters, which

Petitioner claims would have demonstrated that Beeler was the aggressor and that his

testimony was fabricated so that he could keep his job. (Dkt. No. 1, Pet. at 6-15.)

Respondent contends that the claim does not state a federal question, and, in the

alternative, that the state court’s resolution of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law. (Dkt. No. 8 at 29.)

Petitioner raised this claim in the petition for review that he filed in the

California Supreme Court. (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment No. 12 at 16-17.) The California

Supreme Court denied the petition without citation of authority. (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment

No. 13.) Accordingly, this Court must “look through” to the opinion of the Court of

Appeal as the basis for its analysis. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06

(1991). 

The Court of Appeal ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

excluding evidence regarding the termination of Beeler’s employment at CVS, six

months after the June 3 incident evidence, based on a different incident, as irrelevant

under the relevance standard under California Evidence Code section 350 and 210.

(Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment No. 11 at 17.) The court explained that the incident was so

dissimilar in nature to the June 3 incident and that Petitioner failed to show that this

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evidence had any tendency to prove or disprove that Beeler was the aggressor or was

angry during the June 3 incident. (Id. at 17-18.) As to the CVS policy manual, the

Court of Appeal stated that while it may have “had a modicum of relevancy on the

issue of Beeler’s credibility”, the error was not prejudicial and did not rise to the level

of constitutional error. (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment No. 11 at 18-19.) Because the court

concluded that the alleged error did not rise to the level of constitutional error, it

applied the harmless error standard set forth in People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836

(1956). (Id. at 22.) The Court of Appeal concluded the Petitioner failed to meet the

burden of showing it is reasonably probable he would have received a more favorable

result had the excluded evidence been admitted. (Id.) 

In the Report, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Petitioner is not entitled to

relief because he alleged state law errorsrelating to the exclusion of information about

Beeler’s employment records and the CVS employee manual. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(a); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (federal habeas relief is not

available for alleged violations ofstate law). The Magistrate Judge also concluded that

to the extent Petitioner alleges a constitutional violation, his claim fails. 

Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s Report arguing that clearly

established federal law provides that the right to present evidence and witnesses is

essential to due process and guaranteed by the Compulsory Clause of the Sixth

Amendment. (Id.) Petitioner claims that the state court’s exclusion of defense evidence

rendered the proceedingsso fundamentally unfair asto violate his right to due process.

(Dkt. No. 19 at 4.) Petitioner contends that Beeler’s firing was a major part of

Petitioner’s defense. (Id.) He also argues that the trial court’s error was prejudicial and

that the exclusion of the CVS manual had a substantial and injurious effect on the

jury’s verdict. (Id.) 

Generally, state court evidentiary rulings are not cognizable on habeas review. 

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67. To the extent Petitioner alleges a state law error on an

evidentiary ruling, it is without merit. See id. 

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The United States Constitution guarantees criminal defendants “a meaningful

opportunity to present a complete defense.” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690

(1986) (can be rooted in due process clause, compulsory process or confrontation

clause). However, there is no requirement that a “defendant must be allowed to put on

any evidence he chooses.” LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1266 (9th Cir. 1998).

Under the Constitution, well established rules of evidence permit trial judges to

exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by other factors. Moses v. Payne,

555 F.3d 742, 758 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319,

326 (2006)). A trial court is granted substantial latitude to define rules for the exclusion

of evidence and to apply those rules to criminal defendants. United States v. Scheffer,

523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998). State law rules excluding evidence from criminal trials do

not abridge a criminal defendant’s right to present a defense unlessthey are “arbitrary”

or “disproportionate to the purposestheywere designed to serve” and “infringe[s] upon

a weighty interest of the accused.” Id. at 308; see Holmes, 547 U.S. at 326. The

exclusion of defense evidence is error only if it renders the state proceeding so

fundamentally unfair as to violate due process. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67. 

AEDPA established a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court

rulings.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (internal quotations omitted). 

The Ninth Circuit has noted that the Supreme Court has not “squarely addressed” the

specific issue of a trial court’s discretionary determination to exclude evidence and the

right to present a complete defense. Brown v. Horell, 644 F.3d 969, 983 (2011) (no

“controlling legal standard” for evaluating discretionary decision to exclude evidence

at issue); Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 758 (9th Cir. 2009) (no Supreme Court

precedent exists concerning discretionary decisions to exclude evidence so exclusion

of expert witness testimony was not contrary to clearly established federal law).

Therefore, since the issue has never been addressed by the Supreme Court, there is no

clearly established Federal law for purposes of review under AEDPA and a petitioner

cannot show that the state court’s ruling was either contrary to or an unreasonable

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application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. See Brown, 644 F.3d at

983; Moses, 555 F.3d at 758, 760; see also Johnson v. Soto, No. 2:12cv2887 MCE

DAD P, 2015 WL 1565356, at *40 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2014); Duarte v. Soto, No. SACV

13-1231-R(JEM), 2015 WL 366125, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2015). Similarly, in this

case, Petitioner’s claim regarding the improper exclusion of evidence by the state trial

court cannot be said to be contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly

established Supreme Court precedent. See Brown, 644 F.3d at 983; Moses, 555 F.3d

at 758. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

Alternatively, even if the Court considered the claim, it is without merit. The

Ninth Circuit has identified five factors that should be considered to evaluate whether

exclusion of defense evidence violates the constitution: “(1) the probative value of the

excluded evidence on the central issue; (2) its reliability; (3) whether it is capable of

evaluation by the trier of fact; (4) whether it is the sole evidence on the issue or merely

cumulative; and (5) whether it constitutes a major part of the attempted defense.”

Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 530 (9th Cir. 1990). The importance of the evidence

must then be balanced against the state interest in exclusion. Id. To outweigh the state’s

strong interest in administration of its trials, the circumstances of the exclusion must

be “unusually compelling.” Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1453 (9th Cir. 1983). The

court must give due weight to the substantial state interest in preserving orderly trials,

judicial efficiency, and excluding unreliable or prejudicial evidence. Id.

1. Beeler’s Termination 

The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court acted within its broad

discretion when it excluded as irrelevant the evidence regarding Beeler’s termination,

five months after the incident, based on an incident at a different CVS store. (Dkt. No.

9, Lodgment 11 at 17-18.) The court stated thatsuch evidence has no tendency to prove

whether Beeler was the aggressor or was angry during the June 3 incident. (Id. at 18.)

Moreover, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court demonstrated that

Petitioner had a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense and that

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Petitioner failed to meet his burden of showing it is reasonably probable that he would

have received a more favorable result had the excluded evidence been admitted. (Dkt.

No. 9, Lodgment 11 at 20-22.) The court reasoned that the exclusion of evidence at

issue “did not prevent Chandler from presenting other evidence challenging Beeler’s

credibility and supporting his defense that Beeler was not a credible prosecution

witness, and thatBeeler was angry and the initial aggressor during the June 3 incident.”

(Id.) 

At trial, defense counsel sought to admit evidence that Beeler was fired from

another CVS store around five months after the incident involving Petitioner on June

3. (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment 2, vol. 1, part 1 at 31). He sought to show that Beeler was the

aggressor, violated CVS policy and was not credible. Beeler wasfired from CVS after

a customer who complained about service asked for Beeler’s identification and he took

it off and threw it down on the counter in front of her, telling her that she was not

welcome in the store. (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment 1, vol. 3 at 28.) Defense counsel asked

to conduct an Evidence Code section 402 hearing to determine if Beeler had touched

the customer during the altercation. Counsel argued such evidence would support

Petitioner’s claim that Beeler touched Petitioner and physically blocked him from

exiting the store. (Id. at 43.) The following day, defense counsel asked the trial court

for guidance on whether the circumstances of Beeler’s termination from CVS would

become relevant, depending on Beeler’s testimony. (Id. at 90.) The court reiterated its

position that the circumstancesregardingBeeler’s CVS termination were irrelevant, but

also added that if Beeler were to testify in contradiction to the facts surrounding his

termination, the evidence might come in as impeachment. (Id. at 91-92.) 

The first Tinsley factor, whether the excluded evidence was probative on the

central issue, does not weigh in favor of Petitioner. To prove that Petitioner committed

burglary, the prosecution had to show that he entered the CVS store with the intent of

committing theft. See Cal. Penal Code § 459; (Dkt No. 9, Lodgment No. 2, vol. 1, part

1 at 78.) To prove that Petitioner committed an assault with a deadly weapon, the

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prosecution had to prove that he willfully committed an act with a deadly weapon other

than a firearm, which by its nature would directly and probably result in the application

of force to a person, and he had the present ability to apply force with a the deadly

weapon. (Dkt No. 9, Lodgment No. 2, vol. 1, part 1 at 82.) Thus, the central issue in

this case with regard to the burglary charge was intent. For the assault charges, the

central issue was Beeler’s credibility, since Petitioner asserted that Beeler was the

aggressor and that an assault occurred in the liquor cage. The fact that Beeler was fired

from CVS five months after his incident with Petitioner was not probative of either

Petitioner’s intent or Beeler’s credibility. Therefore, this first factor weighs against

Petitioner. See Tinsley, 895 F.2d at 530. Factors two and three, however, weigh in

favor of Petitioner, as evidence of Beeler’s termination by CVS was both reliable and

capable of evaluation by the jury. See id. 

The fourth Tinsley factor, asto whether excluded evidence wasthe sole evidence

or merely cumulative, is not applicable since the firing of Beeler five months after the

incident with Petitioner had no relevance either to Petitioner’s intent to commit theft

or Beeler’s credibility. See id. Furthermore, Petitioner’s defense counsel thoroughly

cross examined Beeler about his actions toward Petitioner and even impeached Beeler

on several inconsistencies. (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment No. 1, vol. 2 at 225-60, 266-69.) On

direct examination, defense counsel asked Liebelt, a CVS employee who was working

at the CVS photo booth on the day of the incident, to describe what she observed

during the incident between Petitioner and Beeler. (Id.) Liebelt testified thatBeeler was

walking in front of Petitioner, with his hands up to block Petitioner from leaving the

store. (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment 1, vol. 4 at 378.) David Salo, another CVS employee, also

testified that Beeler got around Petitioner so that he could block Petitioner fromgetting

out of the store. (Id. at 291.) Based on the evidence challenging Beeler’s credibility, the

jury acquitted Petitioner of counts two and four, the assault with a deadly weapon and

criminal threat charges. 

Last, with regards to the fifth Tinsley factor, Beeler’s firing did not constitute a

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major part of Petitioner’s defense. Petitioner sought to convince the jury that he had no

intentions of burglarizing the CVS store and that he did not threaten or assault Beeler

with the box cutter. Beeler’s termination from CVS five months later may have had

probative value in regards to Beeler’s temper, yet it did not shed significant light on

Petitioner’s defense.

For the forgoing reasons, the Tinsley factors weigh against the admission of

Beeler’s employment records and their exclusion did not violate Petitioner’s due

process rights.

2. The CVS Employee Manual

Petitioner also sought to admit evidence that Beeler’s actions violated the CVS

employee manual when he followed Petitioner out of the store. Petitioner contendsthat

the CVS employee manual is relevant to his defense because itshowed that Beeler lied

about the incident with Petitioner so that he could keep his job. 

The CVS employee manual states that an employee must not “pursue or chase

a fleeing shoplifter” and pursuit “beyond the entrance/exit of a store will not be

tolerated, and may result in disciplinary action up to and including termination.” (Dkt.

No. 9, Lodgment 2 vol. 1 at 34.) Petitioner asserts that the CVS employee manual

would have impeached Beeler’s credibility as to what happened in the liquor cage and

whether Beeler lied about Petitioner assaulting or threatening him, and the state

appellate court noted that “the evidence of the CVS policy manual may have had a

modicum of relevancy on the issue of Beeler’s credibility.” (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment 11

at 17.) However, the state appellate court also found that the trial court’s error did not

deprive Petitioner of his ability to present a defense. (Id.) The Court of Appeal

concluded that the trial court’s exclusion of evidence at issue did not prevent

Petitioner from presenting other evidence that, just as effectively, challenged Beeler’s

credibility and supported his defense thatBeeler was not a credible prosecution witness

and that he was the initial aggressor during his June 3 incident with Petitioner. (Id. at

19.)

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As to the first Tinsley factor, the CVS policy manual had no probative value on

the central issue of Petitioner’s intent to burglarize CVS. On the other hand, however,

the manual had some probative value on the central issue of Petitioner’s defense to the

other charges, such as Beeler’s credibility. Petitioner argued that Beeler had lied to

Officer Vaquero following the incident, when he told him that Petitioner attacked him

for a second time while inside of the store. (Lodgment No. 1, vol. 2 at 243.) During

cross examination of Beeler, defense counsel reminded him that following the incident

he told the responding police officer Petitioner had attacked him once while he was

inside the liquor cage, and a second time when he was near the photo counter inside of

the store. (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment 1 vol. 3 at 35.) Beeler also had said that he did not go

past the CVS exit door, and specifically did not go to the parking lot. (Id. at 172.)

Contradicting himself, Beeler later testified at trial that the second attack took place in

the parking lot. (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment 1 vol. 3, at 214-17.) Therefore, the first Tinsley

factor is satisfied. See Tinsley, 895 F.2d at 530. The second and third Tinsley factors

are also satisfied because this evidence was reliable and capable of being evaluated by

the jury. Id. 

Applying the fourth Tinsley factor, however, the CVS employee manual was not

the sole evidence on the question of Beeler’s credibility. Defense counsel was given

sufficient opportunity to thoroughly cross examine Beeler about his initial statements

to the responding police officer and point out the inconsistencies in those statements

with Beeler’s testimony at trial. (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment No. 1, vol. 3 at 223-60,

266-69.) Defense counsel also questioned the responding police officer, Vaquero,

about Beeler’s initial statements following the incident, and Vaquero testified that

Beeler had told him that the second attack took place inside of the CVS store near the

photo booth. (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment No. 1, vol. 4 at 365.) Specifically, when asked if

Beeler had told him that the second attack took place near the photo counter inside of

the store, Vaquero responded in the affirmative. (Id.) When defense counsel asked

Vaquero if Beeler had told him “that he was afraid for his life and he stopped following

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[Petitioner] as he exited the front door, as [Petitioner] exited the front door,” Vaquero

responded in the affirmative. (Id. at 371.) 

Furthermore, although Beeler testified at trial that he did not touch Petitioner or

try to physically prevent him from exiting the store, Liebelt testified that Beeler put his

hands up in front of Petitioner to block him from leaving, as Petitioner walked towards

the store’s exit. (Dkt No. 9, Lodgment 1, vol. 4 at 378.) This contradicts Beeler’s

statement that Petitioner had threatened to kill him as they exited the store. (Dkt. No.

9, Lodgment No. 1, vol. 3 at 214.) David Salo, another CVS employee, also testified

that Beeler got around Petitioner so that he could block Petitioner from getting out of

the store. (Id. at 291.) At closing, defense counsel argued vigorously that Beeler was

lying about the incident with Petitioner, attempting to look like the victim when he was

in fact the aggressor. (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment No. 1, vol. 4 at 471-82.) For these reasons,

the fourth Tinsley factor weighs against Petitioner. See Tinsley, 895 F.2d at 530.

Lastly, regarding the fifth Tinsley factor, although Beeler’s credibility

constituted a major part of Petitioner’s defense, the CVS employee manual was a minor

part of that defense. Id. The record of the trial court demonstrated that the

inconsistencies between Beeler’s initial statements to police and his testimony at trial,

along with Liebolt, Vaquero, and Salo’s testimonies, show that Petitioner was able to

discredit Beeler without needing to use the CVS employee manual. In fact, the CVS

manual would have only further impeached Beeler’s credibility. Therefore, on the

whole, because the CVS employee manual did not constitute a major part of Petitioner's

defense, the fifth Tinsley factor weighs against Petitioner. 

While the Tinsley factors may weigh in favor of Petitioner, the Court must next

look at whether the exclusion of the CVS manual had a “substantial and injurious effect

or influence on the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623, 637

(1993). As discussed above, the defense was able to impeach Beeler’s credibility

which is reflected in the jury’s verdict where they acquitted Petitioner of assaulting

Beeler with a deadly weapon in the CVS parking lot and issuing a criminal threat to

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Beeler. Any further evidence to impeach Beeler’s credibility would not have altered

the jury’s verdict. For the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes that the state court’s

denial of Petitioner’s first claim did not render Petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair.

See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67. 

B. Admission of “Other Crimes” Evidence

In his second claim, Petitioner alleges the trial court improperly permitted the

prosecution to introduce evidence of another uncharged crime concerning a 2009 theft

incident at Vons. (Dkt. No. 1 at 16-25.) Petitioner argues that the “other crimes”

evidence was more prejudicial than probative and deprived him of his right to due

process and a fair trial. (Id.) Respondent contends that this claim does not state a

federal question and that the court of appeal found no error in the admission of the

evidence under California law. (Dkt. No. 8 at 37.) 

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision, finding that the court did

not abuse its discretion under California Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352. (Dkt.

No. 9, Lodgment 11 at 30.) The court reasoned that Petitioner failed to meet his burden

of showing that the probative value of the evidence of the 2009 theft incident was

substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission would create danger of

undue prejudice. (Id.) The court noted that substantial evidence showed that the May

18 and June 3 incidents at CVS shared a number of distinctive similarities with the

2009 Vons theft such as Petitioner targeted commercial retail businesses, used a large

bag in a remote area of the store, and had intent to commit theft. (Id.) The CVS incident

also occurred near the 2009 Vons theft, within a year’s time period. (Id.) The court

concluded that these similarities were sufficient to support the trial court’s decision to

admit the other crimes evidence of the 2009 theft, and that the prior incidents proved

the specific intent elements of the burglary and grand theft offenses. (Id.) 

In the Report, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Petitioner was not entitled to

federal habeas corpus relief for this claim because the challenged evidence did not

prejudice Petitioner’s trial to the degree of making it fundamentally unfair. (Dkt. No.

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18 at 21.) The Magistrate Judge also concluded thatsince there is no clearly established

Supreme Court Law on whether evidence of other crimes is admissible or violates due

process, the state court’s ruling cannot be said to be contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established Supreme Court law. (Id.)

Petitioner objects to the Report alleging that the jury did not follow the court’s

instructions concerning the other crimes evidence, and that the admission of the other

crimes violated his due process rights and rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. 

(Dkt. No. 19 at 6-7.) Petitioner also claims that the previous uncharged crimes did not

resemble the chargesin the present case, because he was charged with stealing different

items. (Id. at 6.) 

Petitioner’s claim concerns the admission of evidence which is an issue of state

law and cannot be subject to relief in a federal habeas petition. See Estelle, 502 U.S.

at 67-68 (“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court

determinations on state-law questions.”). 

Moreover, Petitioner’s constitutional claim concerning the admission of other

crimes evidence cannot be subject to AEDPA because there is no clearly established

Supreme Court law on thisissue. Where there is no clearly established Supreme Court

law, a state court’s denial of a claim cannot be said to be contrary or an unreasonable

application of clearly established Supreme Court law. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70,

75, 76-77 (2006). The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that the Supreme Court has not

addressed the issue of whether admission of irrelevant or overly prejudicial evidence

renders a trial fundamentally unfair. Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th

Cir. 2009) (even though the trial court’s admission of evidence resulted in a trial that

was fundamentally unfair and would warrant issuance of the writ under Ninth Circuit

precedent, issuance of writ was not possible since Supreme Court had not made a clear

ruling that admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due

process violation sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ). Therefore, even if the

evidence was improperly admitted, the claim would not be grounds for relief. See id. 

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Moreover, the “Supreme Court has never expressly held that it violates due process to

admit other crimes evidence for the purpose of showing conduct in conformity

therewith, or that it violates due process to admit other crimes evidence for other

purposes without [a limiting instruction].” Garceau v. Woodford, 275 F.3d 769, 774

(9th Cir. 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 538 U.S. 202(2003); Alberni v. McDaniel, 458

F.3d 860, 863-64 (9th Cir. 2006). In fact, the Supreme Court expressly declined to

decide the issue of whether the admission of prior crimes evidence to show propensity

to commit a charged crime violates the Due Process clause. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 75 n.

5. “[W]hen the Supreme Court has expressly reserved consideration of an issue, as it

has here, the petitioner cannot rely on circuit authority to demonstrate that the right he

or she seeks to vindicate is clearly established.” Alberni, 458 F.3d at 864; Saleh v.

Fleming, 262 F. App’x 802, 804 (9th Cir. 2008) (no AEDPA relief because Supreme

Court has expressly reserved consideration of the issue); Munoz v. Gonzales, 596 F.

App’x 588, 589 (9th Cir. 2015); Carrillo v. McDonald, No. 1:12cv1203-JLT, 2015 WL

1746550, at *33-34 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2015). Accordingly, AEDPA relief is not

available on this claim. 

C. Prosecutorial Misconduct

In his third claim, Petitioner contends the prosecutor at trial committed

misconduct by its “failure to disclose Brady evidence in possession of investigative

agencies” and “knowingly allowing exculpatory evidence to be destroyed in bad faith

and misrepresentation.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 26.) Specifically, Petitioner alleges the

prosecutor knew that the store surveillance video contained exculpatory evidence,

misrepresented the existence and contents of such video, and failed to preserve that

evidence. (Id. at 26-32.) Respondent argues that there is no authority for the

proposition that the prosecution must go out and obtain evidence on behalf of a

defendant, and that the Due Process Clause only requires law enforcement to preserve

exculpatory evidence that is already in their possession. (Dkt. No. 8 at 46.) Respondent

also argues that Petitioner has failed to show that the police acted in bad faith in

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allegedly destroying the evidence that had exculpatory value.

In the Report, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Petitioner did not establish

that the video surveillance had any exculpatory value that was apparent before the

evidence was destroyed, nor did he establish that the failure to preserve the surveillance

tape was due to bad faith on the part of the police. (Dkt. No. 18 at 27.) Petitioner

objected to the Magistrate Judge’s Report, claiming as he did in his petition, that the

prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in the possession of state

investigative agencies and knowingly allowed exculpatory evidence to be destroyed

in bad faith. (Dkt. No. 19 at 8.) 

First, the Magistrate Judge noted that it is not clear that this claim is exhausted. 

Petitioner did not raise this specific claim in the petition for review that he filed in the

California Supreme Court. In the petition for review, Petitioner merely states,

“[P]etitioner asserted 23 claims in his habeas corpus petition . . . [and] adopts the

statement presented in the Court of Appeal’s decision for purposes of this petition.”

(Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment 12 at 34.) Respondent did not argue that this claim is

unexhausted. 

AEDPA providesthat a writ of habeas corpus may be denied where the applicant

failed “to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(2). A federal court may deny an unexhausted claim on the merits where “it is

perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even a colorable federal claim.”

Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 135 (1987); Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F. 3d 614, 624

(2005) (holding that the Ninth Circuit adopts the Granberry standard). Since

Petitioner’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct does not raise a colorable federal claim,

the Court addresses the merits of the claim. 

When it is clear that the state court has not decided an issue, review by the

federal court is de novo. Rompilla v. Beard, 434 U.S. 374, 390 (2005); see also Lewis

v. Mayle, 391 F.3d 989, 996 (9th Cir. 2004); Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099,

1109 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[w]hen it is clear, however, that the state court has not decided

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an issue, we review that question de novo”). 

Petitioner alleges that the prosecution failed to disclose Brady evidence in

possession of investigative agencies. Respondent denies it was in possession of the

video and denies that it failed to disclose Brady evidence. A prosecutor’s failure to

disclose favorable evidence to an accused “violates due process where the evidence is

material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of

the prosecution.” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). To establish that the

government’s failure to turn over evidence violatesBrady, Petitioner must demonstrate

(1) the evidence was suppressed by the government either willfully or inadvertently; 

(2) the evidence was favorable to the accused because it was either exculpatory or

impeaching; and (3) prejudice resulted from the failure to disclose. See Strickler v.

Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280-81 (1999). In addition, Trombetta held that the

government’s bad faith destruction of, or failure to preserve, potentially exculpatory

evidence violates due process. California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984). In

addition, under Trombetta, the evidence must be of a nature that the defendant would

be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. Id. 

Petitioner has not shown that the prosecution suppressed or failed to disclose the

existence of the June 3rd CVS surveillance tape. While the prosecution made efforts

to obtain the video, they were informed that no tape existed as it wastaped over. (Dkt.

No. 9, Lodgment No. 1, vol. 3 at 68-69.) On June 3rd, Police Officer Vaquero viewed

the video and reported that he did not see any video of the defendant entering or exiting

the store and that the video only shows the cash registers and the entryway. (Id. at 63.) 

Since there was nothing of significant on the video, he wrote, “None” on the police

report. (Id. at 65.) While a factual dispute was raised as to whether the video shows

defendant entering and exiting, (id. at 64-65), the CVS surveillance tape did not contain

any exculpatory evidence since the surveillance tape did not capture the liquor case

area where the assault occurred and only captured the checkstands, the customer

service booth, the two entrances to the store and two views of the sales floor. 

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(Lodgment No. 1, vol. 2 at 159-60.) 

As to the June 3 incident, Petitioner was convicted of assaulting Beeler with a

deadly weapon in the liquor cage area and burglarizing the CVS store, and both charges

alleged that Petitioner personally used a deadly weapon. (Dkt No. 9, Lodgment No. 2

at 9-11.) Petitioner was acquitted of the second assault on Beeler outside of the CVS

store and for making a criminal threat. (Id. at 214-19.) The video surveillance of the

May 18 incident at the same store shows the angles from the video surveillance

cameras inside of CVS were limited to the check stands, the two entrances to the store,

the customer service booth, and two views of the sales floor. (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment

No. 1, vol. 3 at 145-46.) Thus, the record establishes that there was no video

surveillance of the liquor cage area where Petitioner’s assault on Beeler occurred.

Therefore, any available video surveillance could not have aided Petitioner’s defense

regarding the assault. With regards to the burglary charge, the Respondent was

required to prove that Petitioner entered the CVS store with an intent to commit theft,

yet Petitioner’s Objection fails to address how the surveillance video would have shed

light on his intent. (See Dkt. No. 19 at 8-14.) Thus, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate

that the prosecution withheld evidence that was exculpatory. 

Next, Petitioner argues that the prosecution knowingly allowed exculpatory

evidence to be destroyed in bad faith. First, since the prosecution or the police never

had the video in their possession, then Trombetta is inapplicable. See Miller v.

Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 1989) (Trombetta did not impose a duty to

obtain evidence but to preserve evidence that is in possession of the police). 

Furthermore, Petitioner has failed to meet the requirement of Trombetta, by showing

that he was unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonable means. See

Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489. As the Court of Appeals noted, “defense counsel

repeatedly attacked Beeler’s credibility and his account of the incident . . .

[Petitioner’s] counsel pointedly argued to the jury that ‘Beeler is not credible.’” (Dkt.

No. 9, Lodgment No. 11 at 21.) Evidence shows that the video, if it existed, would not

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have been able to assist Petitioner in his defense any more than that of the testimony

of prosecution and defense witnesses, Salo and Liebolt. Salo testified that he saw

something in Petitioner’s hand, which he thought was a box cutter, while Petitioner and

Beeler were walking towards the store exit. (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment No. 1, vol. 3 at

283.) Another police officer, Kristopher Spencer, also testified that on June 3 he

searched the area immediate to where he found Petitioner, and found a “five- to

six-inch metal gray box cutter and a pair of wire cutters.” (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment No.

1, vol. 4 at 33.) The box cutter waslocated about twenty feet from where Petitioner was

detained. (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment No. 2, vol. 1 Part 2 at 37.) 

For the forgoing reasons, Petitioner has not established that the video

surveillance tapes of the June 3 incident were material to his defense. Petitioner was

able to obtain comparable evidence, through eye witness testimony, to both impeach

Beeler’s testimony and show that Beeler was aggressive towards him. Petitioner has

failed to establish a Brady or Trombetta violation and is not entitled to relief as to this

claim. 

D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his fourth claim, Petitioner contends his multiple appointed lawyers were

ineffective by failing to conduct a reasonable pre-trial investigation of obtaining the

June 3 CVS video surveillance tape, and that his trial counsel had a conflict of interest

because Petitioner’s previous attorneys worked with the Alternate Public Defenders

Office. (Dkt. No. 1 at 33-37.) Petitioner also claims that trial counsel failed to object

to the prosecutor presenting perjured testimony by Beeler. (Id.) Respondent argues that

the California Court of Appeal rejected this claim because it failed to set forth a prima

facie claim for relief. (Dkt. No. 8 at 51.) Respondent also contends that Petitioner

makesthe unproven assumption that the store video surveillance for the June 3 incident

was in fact exculpatory. (Id. at 53.) 

The Report concluded that Petitioner is not entitled to relief because he failed

to raise a colorable federal claim. (Dkt. 18 at 27.) The Report also concluded that

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Petitioner failed to show he was prejudiced by his counsels’ failure to obtain the video

surveillance tape and failed to show that the trial court’s outcome would have been

different, but for the errors of his counsels. (Dkt No. 18 at 29.) The Magistrate Judge

also concluded that Petitioner’s conflict of interest claim was merely conclusory, as

Petitioner failed to state what investigation, apartfromobtaining the video surveillance

tape, that his previous counsels should have performed, and how possible evidence of

that would assist him in his defense. (Dkt. No. 19 at 29.) 

Petitioner objected to the Magistrate Judge’s report stating that his court

appointed counsel fell well below an objective standard ofreasonableness because they

failed to secure the video surveillance tape, which denied Petitioner a fair trial. (Dkt.

No. 19 at 15.) 

It is not clear to this Court that Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel

claims are exhausted, as he did not explicitly raise them in a petition for review that he

filed in the California Supreme Court. (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment 16 at 28.) However,

Respondent does not contend the claim is unexhausted. (See Dkt. No. 8 at 36-42.)

Regardless, the Court may deny the petition if it is “perfectly clear that the applicant

does not raise even a colorable federal claim.” Cassett, 406 F.3d at 624.

A petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must first show that

counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard ofreasonableness. Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). The proper measure of attorney performance

depends on the reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, considering all of

the circumstances. Id. The purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth

Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal representation, but rather to “ensure

that criminal defendants receive a fair trial.” Id. at 689. A convicted defendant must

meet the two-pronged Strickland test, showing: (1) counsel’s performance was

deficient and made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as “counsel”

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment; and (2) the deficient performance

prejudiced the defense, and counsel’s errors were so serious asto deprive the defendant

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of a fair trial, whose result is reliable. Id. at 687. The defendant must show that but for

the unprofessional errors of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the result of

the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694. If the defendant makes an

insufficient showing on one prong of the Strickland test, the Court need not further

address the second prong. Id. at 697.

1. Failure to Obtain the June 3 CVS Video Surveillance Tape

In Petitioner’s objection, he recites the same arguments raised in his Petition.

(Dkt. No. 19 at 15-20; Dkt. No. 1 at 33-37.) Even if Petitioner’s counsel should have

obtained the CVS video surveillance tape, Petitioner has not shown that his counsel’s

failure to obtain the video surveillance tape fromthe June 3 incident wasso seriousthat

he was deprived a fair trial. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The Magistrate Judge

correctly concluded that the record shows that CVS did not have video cameras

recording the liquor cage area where the incident took place, and the videos would not

have exonerated him of the June 3 burglary charge. 

Furthermore, as previously mentioned, Petitioner was not prejudiced because he

was able to use the testimony of eyewitnesses Liebolt, Salo, and even Beeler, to prove

his point that Beeler was also the aggressor. Thus, there was nothing new from the

video surveillance tapes that would have aided Petitioner’s defense that eyewitness

testimonydid not alreadymention. Petitioner’s trial counsel, Gaylord Stewart, provided

Petitioner a rigorous defense, by thoroughly cross examining Beeler and Salo, and

impeaching Beeler on his inconsistencies. Stewart also direct examined Liebolt, who

explained what she observed. As a result of these testimonies, Petitioner was acquitted

of assault with a deadly weapon and criminal threat charges. Regarding the weapons

enhancements, there was other evidence, such as Salo’s testimony and the testimony

of officer Spencer, who found a box cutter close to where Petitioner was arrested,

supporting the jury’s conclusion that Petitioner was armed with a box cutter during the

June 3 incident. (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment No. 1, vol. 4 at 33.) Therefore, Petitioner has

not shown that there was a reasonable probability that the result would have been

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different. 

2. Conflict of Interest

Petitioner also argues that his trial counsel, Stewart, had a conflict ofinterest that

compromised his defense because he worked with Petitioner’s previous appointed

attorneys. (Dkt. No. 1 at 36.) Petitioner claims that this conflict of interest has

compromised his defense in that his counsel failed to argue that Petitioner’s previous

attorneys did not properly conduct a pre-trial investigation. (Id.)

As the Magistrate properly noted, Petitioner’s claim is conclusory. He does not

provide any evidence to support his contention that there was a conflict of interest

between his counsel and previous appointed attorneys. It is well established that

conclusory allegations, unsupported by a statement of specific facts, do not warrant

habeas corpus relief. James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994). Therefore,

Petitioner is not entitled to relief as to this allegation.

3. Failure to Object to Prosecutorial Misconduct

Third, Petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel by his counsel’s failure

to object to the prosecution’s use of the “perjured testimony” of Beeler. (Dkt. No. 1 at

33-37.) A prosecutor commits misconduct when (1) she presents evidence that was

“actually false” (2) she knew or should have known that the testimony was actually

false, and (3) the false testimony was material. United States v. Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d

886, 889 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Napue v. People of the State of Illinois, 360 U.S. 264,

269-71 (1959)). A prosecutor “can never guarantee that a witness will not commit

perjury. Her duty is to refrain from knowingly presenting perjured testimony.” United

States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 766 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Endicott,

869 F.2d 452, 455 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

When there are two conflicting versions of an incident that are presented to the jury,

it is within the province of the jury to resolve the disputed testimony. United States v.

Awkward, 597 F.2d 667, 671 (9th Cir. 1979). 

Here, the alleged perjured testimony of Beeler is a conflicting version of event 

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between Beeler’s memory of what happened, and the testimony of eyewitnesses,

Liebolt and Salo. The prosecutor did not present evidence that was “actually false”

because she was relying on Beeler’s testimony. Petitioner has not shown that the

prosecutor knew or should have known that the testimony was actually false. The

record shows that details in Beeler’s testimony changed, from the date of the incident

in his statement to Officer Vaquero, to the testimony he gave at the preliminary

hearing. (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment 1, vol. 3 at 21-22.) However, althoughBeeler presented

conflicting versions of what happened between him and Petitioner, it was the jury’s

responsibility to resolve the disputed testimony. See Awkward, 597 F.2d at 671. 

Petitioner’s argument that his trial counsel should have objected to the

prosecutor’s use of the perjured testimony of Beeler is without merit because the

record showsthat trial counsel impeached Beeler’s credibility by pointing out Beeler’s

change in testimony. (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment 1, vol. 3 at 21-22.) 

Therefore, Petitioner has failed to show either that his trial counsel’s

performance was deficient or even if there was error, that the errors deprived him of a

fair trial. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The record shows that Petitioner’s counsel

presented a rigorous defense by impeaching Beeler’s testimony, and professionally and

competently defended Petitioner at trial. For these reasons, Petitioner is not entitled to

relief under this claim.

E. Cumulative Error

In his fifth claim, Petitioner contends the cumulative effect of the errors

committed at his trial denied him the right to a fair trial. (Dkt. No. 1 at 38.) Respondent

counters that because the California Court of Appeal found only one error but that it

was harmless nonetheless, there is nothing to accumulate. (Dkt. No. 8 at 54.) The Court

of Appeal agreed with Respondent, concluding that Petitioner failed to meet his burden

of showing any cumulative errors or prejudice sufficient to reverse any of his

convictions. (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment 11 at 37.) The Magistrate Judge concluded that any

error did not rise to the level of a Constitutional violation of Petitioner’s rights. (Dkt

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No. 18 at 32.) Petitioner objected to the Magistrate's Report, repeating the exact same

arguments in his petition. (Dkt. No. 19 at 21; Dkt. No. 1 at 38.)

The Supreme Court has clearly established that the effect of a combination of

multiple trial court errors violates due process “where it renders the resulting criminal

trial fundamentally unfair.” Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing

Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973)). The cumulative effect of multiple

errors can violate due process where no single error rises to the level of constitutional

violation. Parle, 505 F.3d at 927. Cumulative error warrants habeas relief only when

the errors have “so infected the trial with unfairness asto make the resulting conviction

a denial of due process.” Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). Such

“infection” takes place when the combined effect of errors had a “substantial and

injurious effect or influence on the jury's verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

Here, the Court of Appeal only assumed error on Petitioner’s claim concerning

the exclusion of the CVS manual but concluded that the error was harmless. Moreover,

this Court denied Petitioner’s relief on his unexhausted claims. Therefore, Petitioner

did not suffer the effect of multiple trial court errors, and thus, there are no errors to

aggregate. Although Petitioner argues that “the combined effect of errors prevented

[him] from challenging Beeler’s credibility in a case that hinged on the jury’s

assessment of credibility,” the record states otherwise. (Dkt. No 1 at 38; Dkt. No. 19

at 21.) As noted above, the record points to many instances where Petitioner’s defense

counsel impeached Beeler’s testimony, both through cross examination of Beeler and

Salo, and direct examination of Liebolt. In fact, as a result of these testimonies,

Beeler’s credibility was impeached and Petitioner was acquitted of assault with a

deadly weapon and criminal threat charges. (Dkt. No. 9, Lodgment 2, vol. 1 part 2 at

105-09.) Accordingly, Petitioner’s right to due process was not violated and he is not

entitled to relief for his cumulative error claim. 

IV. Certificate of Appealability

Under AEDPA, a state prisoner seeking to appeal a district court’s denial of a

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habeas petition must obtain a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). 

The district court may issue a certificate of appealability if the petitioner has made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To

satisfy this standard, a petitioner must show that “reasonable jurists would find the

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). In this case, Petitioner has not made a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the Court DENIES a

certificate of appealability.

CONCLUSION

Based on the above, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s objections and

ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation in its entirety and DENIES the Petition for

Writ for Habeas Corpus. The Court also DENIES a certificate of appealability. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 3, 2015

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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