Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-01692/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-01692-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAUL DANIEL LINAREZRODRIGUEZ, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

KORY L. HONEA, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:22-cv-1692 KJM KJN P

ORDER

Plaintiff is a Butte County Jail inmate, proceeding pro se. This action was referred to this 

court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 302. Defendants Perez and Foster 

(hereafter “moving defendants”) moved to dismiss plaintiff’s second amended complaint.1

 

As set forth below, the undersigned grants moving defendants’ motion to dismiss with 

leave to amend. 

Motion to Dismiss

Legal Standards Governing Motion to Dismiss 

 Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures provides for motions to dismiss for 

“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In 

1

 Service of process on defendant Rayome was delayed due to difficulties in locating him. 

Defendant Rayome filed an answer on October 20, 2023. 

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considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court 

must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 

(2007), and construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jenkins v. 

McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 

1999). Still, to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a pro se complaint must contain more 

than “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). In other words, 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 

upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678. 

“As a general rule, ‘a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in 

ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.’” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 

2001) (quoting Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994)). Otherwise, the motion is 

treated as one for summary judgment. Id. There are exceptions for material which is properly 

submitted as part of the complaint and “matters of public record” which may be judicially 

noticed. Id. at 688-89. “If the documents are not physically attached to the complaint, they may 

be considered if the documents’ ‘authenticity . . . is not contested’ and ‘the plaintiff’s complaint 

necessarily relies’ on them.” Id. at 688 (quoting Parrino v. FHD, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 705-06 (9th 

Cir. 1998). 

 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears 

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would 

entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). In general, pro se 

pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 

404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The court has an obligation to construe such pleadings liberally. Bretz 

v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). However, the court’s liberal 

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interpretation of a pro se complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not 

pled. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

The Civil Rights Act

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the violation of a federal 

constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the violation was committed by a person acting under 

the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 

930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). An individual defendant is not liable on a civil rights claim unless the 

facts establish the defendant’s personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a causal 

connection between the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the alleged constitutional deprivation. 

See Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 

(9th Cir. 1978). 

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint 

 Plaintiff claims that the delay of prompt medical care and treatment on April 16, 2022, led 

to blood in his urine on April 17, 2022, as well as pain. (ECF No. 10 at 6.) Plaintiff states that 

the pain and suffering he endured demonstrates a serious medical need for which defendant 

Rayome is responsible. On April 18, 2022, defendant Rayome prescribed ibuprofen. On April 

19, 2022, plaintiff advised Correctional Officer Perez, Sgt. Foster and Tower Officer John Doe 

that plaintiff was in pain and urinating dark blood, “and no one responded.” (ECF No. 10 at 6.) 

On April 20, 2022, plaintiff informed Officer Ramirez of plaintiff’s pain and blood, pressed the 

emergency button and went “man down.” Plaintiff was seen at Oroville Hospital on April 20, 

2022; Dr. Irwin informed plaintiff he should not be taking ibuprofen because it is an 

inflammatory. Plaintiff’s back right side kidney was inflamed, and multiple cysts were found in 

both his kidneys. On April 22, 2022, the pain became unbearable; at 6:30 p.m. plaintiff informed 

Officer Graves and tower officer Jane Doe that plaintiff was urinating blood clots. At 8:00 p.m. 

Nurse Daniella came by and said she could not give plaintiff anything. The pain was so bad 

plaintiff threw up blood and saliva; he pressed the emergency button and was seen by Nurse 

Daniella with Officer Nava present. Plaintiff’s vitals were checked but he was sent back to his

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cell. On April 23, 2022, the pain continued, and plaintiff alerted Officers Severin and Englehart 

and the tower officer. “[T]his continued on and off with various symptoms.” (ECF No. 10 at 6.) 

Plaintiff was injured by having an inflamed kidney, his kidney function dropped to 53%, 

“confirmed kidney failure by the negligence of officers and inadequate medical staff, feeling 

nerve damage, sleep deprivation, etc.” (Id.) Plaintiff seeks money damages.

Legal Standards: Medical Claims

Because plaintiff is a pretrial detainee, his claim of inadequate medical care arises under 

the Fourteenth Amendment and is evaluated under an objective deliberate indifference standard. 

See Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Castro v. Cnty. of 

Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc)). The elements of such a claim are: 

“(i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the 

plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious 

harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even 

though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk 

involved -- making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking 

such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries.” Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125 (citing 

Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071). 

 “With respect to the third element, the defendant’s conduct must be objectively 

unreasonable, a test that will necessarily ‘turn[ ] on the facts and circumstances of each particular 

case.’” Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125 (quoting Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071 (quoted sources omitted)). 

 Moreover, a defendant’s “mere lack of due care” is insufficient to state a Fourteenth 

Amendment claim. Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071 (citations omitted). “Thus, the plaintiff must ‘prove 

more than negligence but less than subjective intent -- something akin to reckless disregard.’” 

Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125 (citing Castro, 833 F.3d at 1070). Therefore, gross negligence, a 

difference in medical opinion, medical malpractice, or misdiagnosis does not establish a 

constitutional violation. Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990); Thompson 

v. Worch, 6 F. App’x 614, 616 (9th Cir. 2001); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 

1989); and DiMarzio v. Jacobs, 162 F. App’x 774, *1 (9th Cir. 1989). 

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Finally, the delay of, or interference with, medical treatment for a serious medical need, 

however, can amount to deliberate indifference. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 

2006) (citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other 

grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)). The inmate 

must show harm resulting from the delay. Id.

 Initial Argument Unavailing 

 Initially, moving defendants argue that plaintiff’s pleading should be dismissed because 

plaintiff failed to specifically identify under what theory he brought his claims, instead simply 

relying on the Fourteenth Amendment. The undersigned disagrees. When a plaintiff appears pro 

se, a court must liberally construe the pleadings. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); 

Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). The rule of liberal construction is 

“particularly important” in civil rights cases. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 

2010); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). Given plaintiff’s factual 

allegations, plaintiff claims he was denied medical care in violation of the Fourteenth 

Amendment, as identified in this court’s screening order. The undersigned finds plaintiff’s 

allegations sufficient to identify the governing legal theory. 

The Parties’ Positions

 Moving defendants argue as follows. Plaintiff’s allegations as to Perez and Foster are 

insufficient to demonstrate that either defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the 

conditions of confinement which put plaintiff at a substantial risk of serious harm or that they 

acted with deliberate indifference to such risk. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that on April 19, 

2022, either defendant was aware that allowing plaintiff to remain in his cell, where he had ready 

access to an emergency intercom button, placed him at a substantial risk of serious harm. Instead, 

plaintiff states that any alleged failure to respond to his report amounted to no more than mere 

negligence. (ECF No. 29 at 2, citing ECF No. 10 at ¶ 4 (Pl.’s Am. Complt.). Plaintiff was seen at 

the hospital the next day and summoned a nurse on two separate occasions by pressing the button 

in his cell. (ECF No. 23-1 at 9.) Because plaintiff has been granted multiple opportunities to 

amend, moving defendants ask that the motion be granted without leave to amend. 

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 In his opposition, plaintiff contends he has the right to be seen immediately if a serious 

medical concern arises such as the pain he endured “on and off through [his] ordeal.”2 (ECF No. 

28 at 1, citing the Butte County Jail Information Handbook.) Plaintiff claims he alerted medical 

personnel and officers on multiple occasions, and due to defendant Rayome’s medical opinion 

that plaintiff must have a kidney stone, plaintiff was not properly medically evaluated. Plaintiff 

states that had he been immediately taken on April 19, 2022, to medical and Oroville Hospital he 

would have known he had polycystic kidney disease. (ECF No. 28 at 2.) Plaintiff holds Officer 

Perez, Sgt. Foster and Ryan Rayome accountable for their lack of action that resulted in plaintiff’s 

kidney damage and failure. (Id.) 

 In reply, defendants argue that plaintiff again failed to set forth facts suggesting either 

defendant Foster or Perez “made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions of 

[plaintiff’s] confinement which put him at a substantial risk of serious harm, or that they acted 

with deliberate indifference.” (ECF No. 29 at 2.) Rather, plaintiff contends it was defendant 

Rayome’s alleged improper diagnosis and treatment of his condition which caused his alleged 

injuries. Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that either defendant was aware that allowing plaintiff to 

remain in his cell, where he had access to an emergency intercom button, put plaintiff at a 

substantial risk of suffering serious harm. Instead, plaintiff conceded that any alleged failure to 

respond amounted to mere negligence. (ECF No. 29 at 2, citing ECF No. 10 at 5 ¶ 4.) Finally, 

plaintiff failed to plead facts demonstrating that moving defendants’ alleged conduct caused 

plaintiff’s claimed injuries. Rather, plaintiff repeatedly alleges that defendant Rayome’s alleged 

misdiagnosis and treatment caused plaintiff’s injuries. (ECF No. 29 at 3.) 

Discussion

Admittedly, plaintiff’s specific allegations as to defendants Foster and Perez are sparse; 

the sole allegation as to such defendants is that on April 19, 2022, plaintiff advised defendants 

2

 Plaintiff included exhibits with his opposition. (ECF No. 28 at 5-14.) However, as noted 

above, because the undersigned is addressing a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court only 

considers the second amended complaint. Lee, 250 F.3d at 688. Plaintiff is not required to 

append exhibits to a complaint and did not append any exhibit to his second amended complaint 

(ECF No. 10). 

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Officer Perez and Sgt. Foster that plaintiff was in pain and urinating dark blood and “no one 

responded.” (ECF No. 10 at 6.) However, liberally construed, plaintiff alleges that the moving 

defendants ignored his claims of pain and that he was urinating dark blood. As a result of 

defendants ignoring him, plaintiff suffered pain, at least until he saw the doctor the next day. 

Liberally construed, it appears the Tylenol wasn’t working to address plaintiff’s pain. 

That said, plaintiff provides no specific facts as to how he informed each defendant, 

including whether he described the nature of his pain, and whether he asked each defendant to 

summon medical help. While he claims, “no one responded,” plaintiff fails to make clear how he 

knew both defendants heard plaintiff or how he concluded, if he did, that each defendant 

purposefully ignored plaintiff. In addition, plaintiff alleges no facts demonstrating that plaintiff 

was at substantial risk of harm at the time he informed these defendants, or that either defendant 

was aware of such risk, particularly given plaintiff’s allegations that he had an emergency call 

button in his cell which he subsequently used to summon medical care, as well as the fact that he 

was seen at the hospital the next day. The record makes clear that on April 19, 2022, none of the 

defendants were aware that plaintiff was suffering from a kidney disease. See Allison v. Gomez, 

20 F. App’x 615, 615-16 (9th Cir. 2001) (granting defendant doctor summary judgment because 

“no triable issue existed that any delay in transferring Allison, who suffered hypertension and 

polycystic kidney disease, to the California Medical Facility caused Allison injury”). 

In his opposition, plaintiff now claims that had he been immediately taken to medical and 

Oroville Hospital on April 19, 2022, he would have known he had polycystic kidney disease.3 

But plaintiff fails to identify the immediate risk of substantial harm he faced in light of moving 

defendants’ alleged failure to respond on April 19, 2022. And plaintiff’s pleading does not 

3

 According to the Mayo Clinic, “[p]olycystic kidney disease (“PKD”) is an inherited disorder in 

which clusters of cysts develop primarily within your kidneys, causing your kidneys to enlarge 

and lose function over time. Cysts are noncancerous round sacs containing fluid. The cysts vary 

in size, and they can grow very large. Having many cysts or large cysts can damage your 

kidneys. . . . [¶] [¶] It’s not uncommon for people to have polycystic kidney disease for years 

without knowing it.” Polycystic kidney disease, Mayo Clinic, 

https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/polycystic-kidney-disease/symptoms-causes/syc20352820 (accessed Oct. 25, 2023). 

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specifically tie the allegations to such risk of immediate harm. Indeed, as pointed out by 

defendants, plaintiff specifically claims that he was injured by the “negligence of officers and 

inadequate medical staff.” (ECF No. 10 at 5.) However, a defendant’s negligence or “mere lack 

of due care” is insufficient to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim. Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071 

(citations omitted). “Thus, the plaintiff must ‘prove more than negligence but less than subjective 

intent -- something akin to reckless disregard.’” Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125 (citing Castro, 833 

F.3d at 1070). Therefore, even gross negligence does not establish a constitutional violation. 

Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990); Thompson v. Worch, 6 F. App’x 

614, 616 (9th Cir. 2001); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989); and DiMarzio v. 

Jacobs, 162 F. App’x 774, *1 (9th Cir. 1989). 

While detailed factual allegations are not required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements 

of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft, 556 

U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In light of the 

above, the moving defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted with leave to amend. 

Qualified Immunity

Moving defendants also claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity. 

Determining whether officials receive qualified immunity involves two inquiries: (1) 

whether “taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury,” the facts alleged 

show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right; and (2) if so, whether the right was 

“‘clearly established’ at the time of the violation.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655-56 (2014) 

(per curiam) (brackets omitted) (citations omitted). To determine whether a constitutional right 

has been clearly established, we must “survey the legal landscape and examine those cases that 

are most like the instant case.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 917 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). The contours of the right “must be sufficiently clear that a 

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Hope v. Pelzer, 

536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (citation omitted). 

Moving defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff 

fails to state potentially colorable Fourteenth Amendment claims, and also argue that it is not 

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clearly established that their conduct violated the Constitution. Because defendants’ motion to 

dismiss is granted with leave to amend, defendants’ argument for qualified immunity is 

premature.

Leave to Amend

 Defendants seek dismissal without leave to amend. However, the Ninth Circuit has held 

that a district court should grant leave to amend unless it determines that the pleading could not 

possibly be cured by the allegations of other facts. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 

2000). Because plaintiff may be able to cure the pleading defects discussed above, dismissal is 

granted with leave to amend. Plaintiff is granted leave to file a third amended complaint as to 

moving defendants Foster and Perez, and plaintiff should include his claims as to defendant 

Rayome, who filed an answer on October 20, 2023. 

 Any third amended complaint must show the federal court has jurisdiction, the action is 

brought in the right place, and plaintiff is entitled to relief if plaintiff’s allegations are true. It 

must contain a request for particular relief. 

 In the third amended complaint, plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting 

Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 570). 

A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility 

standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for 

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. 

Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a

defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and 

plausibility of entitlement to relief.

Ashcroft, 566 U.S. at 678 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Although legal conclusions 

can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations, and are 

not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. 

In other words, plaintiff should allege facts addressing each element of his Fourteenth 

Amendment claim as to each defendant: “(i) the defendant made an intentional decision with 

respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the 

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plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable 

available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances 

would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved -- making the consequences of the 

defendant’s conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the 

plaintiff’s injuries.” Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125 

Any third amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior 

pleading. Local Rule 15-220; see Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff 

files a third amended complaint, all prior pleadings are superseded. 

Plaintiff should take care to include his claims as to defendant Rayome. 

No Obligation to Respond 

All parties are relieved of their obligation to respond to plaintiff’s third amended 

complaint until further order of the court. 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. The motion to dismiss (ECF No. 23) filed by defendants Foster and Perez is granted; 

2. Plaintiff is granted leave to file a third amended complaint; and

 3. Within thirty days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall file a third amended 

complaint as to defendants Foster and Perez and shall renew his claims as to defendant Rayome. 

These three defendants are relieved of their obligation to respond to plaintiff’s amended pleading 

pending further order of court. 

 4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff the form for filing a civil rights 

complaint by a prisoner. 

Dated: October 30, 2023 

 

/lina1692.mtd.12b6

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