Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-01621/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-01621-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GUADALUPE LOPEZ,

Petitioner,

 vs.

JOSEPH McGRATH, Warden,

Respondent. 

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No C 04-1621 JSW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Guadalupe Lopez, a prisoner of the State of California, has filed a pro se

petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Per order filed

on September 7, 2004, this Court found that the petition, liberally construed,

stated three cognizable claims under § 2254 and ordered Respondent to show

cause. Respondent filed an answer. Petitioner has not filed a traverse. This

order denies the petition for writ of habeas corpus on the merits.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 23, 2001, the Santa Clara District Attorney filed an

information charging Petitioner with three counts of attempted murder, Cal. Penal

Code §§ 187, 189, 664, two counts of assault with a deadly weapon, Cal. Penal

Code § 245, one count of child endangerment, Cal. Penal Code § 273a(a), and

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one count of making criminal threats, Cal. Penal Code § 422. The information

alleged that the first and second attempted murders were premeditated, Cal. Penal

Code § 189, and that Petitioner caused great bodily injury by discharging a

firearm, Cal. Penal Code § 12022.53(d), during the commission of the first count

of attempted murder. The information also alleged that all the attempted murders

and assaults involved various firearm and bodily injury enhancements.

The following day, pursuant to a plea bargain dismissing the

premeditation allegations and two enhancements, including the Cal. Penal Code §

12022.53(d) enhancement for inflicting great bodily injury by discharging a

firearm, Petitioner pled guilty to all counts and remaining enhancements. 

Petitioner subsequently moved to withdraw his guilty pleas. Petitioner also

moved for substitute counsel under People v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118 (Cal. 1970). 

After conducting a hearing, the court denied both motions on January 15, 2002. 

The next day, the court sentenced Petitioner to 34 years and eight months in

prison.

Petitioner filed a direct appeal and a habeas corpus petition with the

California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District. On June 27, 2003, the court

affirmed his conviction and denied his habeas petition. Petitioner then filed

petitions for review of the direct appeal and habeas petition with the California

Supreme Court. On September 24, 2003, the court denied both petitions. 

Petitioner filed the instant matter on April 26, 2004.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The California Court of Appeal summarized the factual background of the

case as follows:

For over 10 years, defendant exposed Maria Villalobos, his

“common law wife” and the mother of his three children, to

alcohol-fueled arguments; threats to kill her if she left him; assaults

with such weapons as his hands, a hunting knife, a handgun, a

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table, and a glass; a game of Russian roulette with a loaded 9

millimeter handgun; an attempt to commit suicide with a sniper

rifle which Villalobos took away from him; and boasts that he was

a professional killer, had murdered people in Seattle, and had killed

someone in a martial arts class. He capped this treatment on April

15, 2000, by attacking Villalobos after a birthday party for their

12-year-old son Luis Emmanuel because there was no beer left.

Defendant wanted to go to Villalobos's sister Jovita's nearby

apartment to find more beer and Villalobos did not want him to

drink anymore. She asked him to stay home which upset defendant

because she was trying to tell him what to do. He grabbed her and

pushed her against the wall, put his hands around her neck and said

he should kill her, hit her over the head with a clock, broke a

wooden chair and swung one of the pieces around as if he were

practicing karate, held the piece against Villalobos's neck and

stated, “I should just get rid of you.”

Jovita heard the commotion and went to the couple's

apartment where she got into an argument with defendant for

telling him and Villalobos to stop fighting. When Jovita returned to

her own apartment, Luis Emmanuel followed her to apologize for

defendant's behavior. Minutes later, defendant arrived at Jovita's

apartment with a gun. He let himself into the apartment and

demanded that Jovita return his son. Jovita refused and told

defendant he was too drunk. Defendant pulled the pistol out of his

waistband, pointed it at Jovita's head and threatened to kill her. She

tried unsuccessfully to knock the gun out of his hand as he fired

and he shot her in the head. Defendant then turned to Dolores

Zamora who was present in the apartment, pointed the gun at her

and said, “I also got some for you.” Jovita hit him in the arm as he

fired at Zamora causing the bullet to hit the ceiling.

Villalobos heard screaming and gunfire at Jovita's

apartment. When she entered the apartment, she felt someone grab

her waist and push her toward the door. She was shot. The bullet

entered her left hip, pierced her bladder, and exited her right leg.

Zamora called the police, but defendant grabbed the telephone,

pushed her away, and told the operator that nothing had happened

and everything was fine.

People v. Lopez, 2003 WL 21481036, at 2 (Cal. Ct. App. June 27, 2003)

(footnotes omitted).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

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the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A district court may grant a petition

challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was

“adjudicated on the merits” in state court only if the state court’s adjudication of

the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

a state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the

Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the ‘unreasonable application’

clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if a state court identifies the

correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams,

529 U.S. at 413. As summarized by the Ninth Circuit: “A state court’s decision

can involve an ‘unreasonable application’ of federal law if it either 1) correctly

identifies the governing rule but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that

is objectively unreasonable, or 2) extends or fails to extend a clearly established

legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable.” Van

Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000) overruled on other

grounds; Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-73 (2003) (citing Williams, 529

U.S. at 405-07). 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

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applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 411; accord

Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 436 (2004) (per curiam) (challenge to state

court’s application of governing federal law must not only be erroneous, but

objectively unreasonable); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per

curiam) (“unreasonable” application of law is not equivalent to “incorrect”

application of law). In deciding whether a state court’s decision is contrary to, or

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, a federal court

looks to the decision of the highest state court to address the merits of the

Petitioner’s claim in a reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663,

669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). Where the state court gives no reasoned explanation of

its decision on a Petitioner’s federal claim and there is no reasoned lower court

decision on the claim, a federal habeas court should conduct an independent

review of the record. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

2003). 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings of the Supreme Court as of the time of the

state court decision. Williams 529 U.S. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062,

1069 (9th Cir. 2003). While the circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for

the purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court’s holdings are

binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be “reasonably” applied. 

Id.

In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Petitioner asserts three claims:

(1) he was deprived of due process because the trial court failed to appoint new

counsel when trial counsel stated his belief that there was no legal basis for

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moving to withdraw Petitioner’s guilty pleas; (2) he was deprived of effective

assistance of counsel because trial counsel gave him incorrect advice regarding

the probable consequences of going to trial; and (3) he was deprived of due

process because the trial court failed to provide him with an interpreter when he

pled guilty.

DISCUSSION

1. Failure to Appoint New Counsel

Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his due process rights when it

failed to appoint new counsel after defense counsel stated his belief that there

was no legal basis for Petitioner to withdraw his guilty pleas, despite Petitioner’s

arguments to the contrary. In the months following his October 24, 2001 guilty

pleas, Petitioner “dispatched five separate handwritten letters to the court” 

announcing several complaints Petitioner had about defense counsel and also

requesting that the court withdraw his guilty plea. Lopez, 2003 WL 21481036, at

3. On January 15, 2002, the trial court held a hearing on Petitioner’s complaints

about defense counsel, his request for new counsel, and his desire to withdraw

his pleas (a “Marsden hearing,” see Marsden, 2 Cal.3d at 118). Id. at 4. During

the hearing, defense counsel stated that, upon review, he still did not believe that

Petitioner had a legal basis to withdraw his guilty pleas. Reporter’s Transcript

on Appeal (“RT”), 32 (Resp’t. Ex. C). The trial court denied Petitioner’s motion

to withdraw his pleas and his request for new counsel. Lopez, 2003 WL

21481036, at 4. 

On appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court did not adequately

consider his motions at the Marsden hearing. Id. at 7. Petitioner further alleged

that the trial court’s failure to provide new counsel who would comply with his

requests, i.e., move to withdraw his guilty plea, constituted a deprivation of

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effective assistance of counsel. Id. The California Court of Appeal disagreed. 

Id. The court explained:

The court held a hearing on defendant's complaints against

counsel, made a detailed inquiry into the basis for defendant's

complaints against counsel, and decided they were unfounded. The

court determined in its discretion that there was no need to appoint

substitute counsel to represent defendant because there was no

basis for the motion to withdraw the pleas. A defense attorney is

not constitutionally ineffective, and no deprivation befalls a

defendant, if counsel does not move to withdraw the plea due to a

good faith belief that there was no merit to the motion. (People v.

Brown (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 207, 215, 224 Cal.Rptr. 476.)

Defendant was unhappy that he pled guilty because he was

innocent. The trial court had a copy of the change of plea transcript

in which defendant unequivocally admitted guilt, and the court

elicited from Davis an explanation of the weaknesses of the case

against defendant which established the evidence against defendant

was overwhelming. Defendant said he did not premeditate and

deliberate whether to try to kill his wife. He did not plead guilty to

a charge that required premeditation and deliberation. Since there

was no showing of mistake, duress, or other overreaching factor

that deprived defendant of his exercise of free will in entering the

pleas, there were no grounds for him to withdraw the pleas. The

court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for

a new attorney and did not fail to adequately consider defendant's

motion to withdraw the pleas.

Id.

A. Legal Standard

The denial of a motion to substitute counsel implicates a defendant's Sixth

Amendment right to counsel and is properly considered in federal habeas. Bland

v. California Dep't of Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled

on other grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that when a defendant voices a seemingly substantial

complaint about counsel, the trial judge should make a thorough inquiry into the

reasons for the defendant's dissatisfaction. Id. at 1475-76; United States v.

Robinson, 913 F.2d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 1990); Hudson v. Rushen, 686 F.2d 826,

829 (9th Cir. 1982). The inquiry need only be as comprehensive as the

circumstances reasonably would permit, however. King v. Rowland, 977 F.2d

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1354, 1357 (9th Cir. 1992) (record may demonstrate that extensive inquiry was

not necessary). 

The ultimate inquiry in a federal habeas proceeding is whether the

petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated. Schell, 218 F.3d at

1024-25 (overruling earlier circuit precedent that had stated that habeas court's

inquiry was whether the state court's denial of the motion was an abuse of

discretion). That is, the habeas court considers whether the trial court's denial of

or failure to rule on the motion "actually violated [petitioner's] constitutional

rights in that the conflict between [petitioner] and his attorney had become so

great that it resulted in a total lack of communication or other significant

impediment that resulted in turn in an attorney-client relationship that fell short of

that required by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 1026.

B. Analysis

The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim that the

trial court violated his due process rights when it declined to provide him with

substitute counsel upon his request was not contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, or was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

After Petitioner lodged several “seemingly substantial complaint[s]”

against defense counsel in his letters to the trial court, the court conducted a

Marsden hearing. See Schell, 218 F.3d at 1475-76; Robinson, 913 F.2d at 716;

Hudson, 686 F.2d at 829. At the hearing, Petitioner reiterated his desire to

withdraw his guilty pleas and his belief that defense counsel was not being helpful

in this regard. RT 31-32. At the trial court’s request, defense counsel responded

to each of Petitioner’s complaints about his conduct, including Petitioner’s

concerns about defense counsel’s failure to request a motion to withdraw

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1

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA")

requires a district court to presume correct any determination of a factual issue

made by a state court unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness

by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner fails to

present any evidence whatsoever to rebut the presumption that the trial court’s

factual findings in the Marsden hearing were correct.

2

 Trial counsel’s failure to move to withdraw Petitioner’s plea would

certainly not rise to the level of a Strickland violation. See Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Put simply, trial counsel cannot have

been ineffective for failing to raise a meritless motion. See Juan H. v. Allen, 408

F.3d 1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2005); Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir.

1996); see, e.g., Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d at 346 (failure to file suppression

motion not ineffective assistance where counsel investigated filing motion and no

reasonable possibility evidence would have been suppressed).

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Petitioner’s plea. Id. at 42-53. Having made a “thorough inquiry into the reasons

for [Petitioner’s] dissatisfaction,” the trial court found that Petitioner’s claims

were unfounded, specifically that there was no need to appoint substitute counsel

because Petitioner had no valid legal basis to move to withdraw his guilty plea. 

Id. at 53. See Schell, 218 F.3d at 1475-76; Robinson, 913 F.2d at 716; Hudson,

686 F.2d at 829.

Nothing in the facts established at the Marsden hearing supports

Petitioner’s argument that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated

when the trial court declined to substitute counsel.1

 See Schell, 218 F.3d at 1024-

25. Defense counsel’s decision not to move to withdraw Petitioner’s guilty plea

was not the result of a “lack of communication or other significant impediment”

in the attorney client relationship” that would give rise to a valid Sixth

Amendment claim. See Id. at 1026. To the contrary, defense counsel did not

move to withdraw Petitioner’s guilty plea because he believed, quite reasonably,

that such a motion would be meritless.2

 Accordingly the court was under no

obligation to grant Petitioner’s request for substitute counsel.

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Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim regarding

defense counsel’s failure to move to withdraw his guilty plea because the

California Court of Appeal’s rejection of the claim was not contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable determination of, clearly established Supreme Court

precedent, or an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d).

2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner next claims that he was deprived of effective assistance of

counsel because his trial counsel gave him incorrect advice regarding the probable

consequences of going to trial. As discussed above, at the Marsden hearing

defense counsel responded to Petitioner’s complaints about his conduct. In part, 

defense counsel “explained to the court his analysis of the weaknesses in

[Petitioner’s] case.” Lopez, 2003 WL 21481036, at 4. Specifically, defense

counsel testified that the “inconsistencies” in Ms. Villalobos’ testimony “were . . .

going to be problematic at trial.” RT at 36. Defense counsel cited allegations by

Ms. Villalobos that Petitioner “had engaged in a nine-year pattern of domestic

violence and abuse”; allegations which defense counsel believed would likely be

admissible under Evidence Code section 1109 and could support a jury finding of

premeditation. Id. at 36-37. Given these weaknesses, defense counsel stated at

the hearing that the best outcome for Petitioner after trial would be “to have

lessers of [Penal Code section] 245s, felony assaults.” Id at 37. It was at this

point in defense counsel’s analysis at the hearing that he made the following

statement which Petitioner now alleges caused his plea to be involuntarily

entered: 

Unfortunately, in regards to the 25-to-life gun enhancement

that attached to Count 1 [attempted premeditated and deliberated

murder of Maria Villalobos], that still would attach to an assault

with a deadly weapon charge. It still would put us in indeterminate

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3 The firearm use enhancement applies only to assault with a firearm on a

peace officer or firefighter. See Cal. Penal Code § 12022.53.

11

and still would have had [defendant], had he received [Penal Code

section] 245s instead of attempted murder, would have had him

doing indeterminate sentence with the determinate portion being in

the area of not more than what he is currently receiving. So the

after-trial result-I thought for him what was probably his best result

was still going to result in an indeterminate to life sentence. And the

People's offer on the day of trial to strike the life enhancement

allowed [defendant] the opportunity to guarantee himself a

determinate sentence. 

Id. However, counsel’s statement was in error because the 25-to-life gun

enhancement does not, in fact, attach to an assault with a deadly weapon charge.3

If Petitioner had only been convicted of “245s,” assault with a deadly weapon, his

sentence would have been determinate as he would not have been subject to that

enhancement.

On appeal, Petitioner argued that “the misadvice defense counsel gave at

the motion to withdraw the plea deprived [Petitioner] of competent representation

based on his lack of understanding of the consequences of his guilty plea and his

innocence of attempted murder.” Lopez, 2003 WL 21481036, at 4. Although

Petitioner contends that the plea was invalid based on counsel’s misadvice,

Petitioner attached to his habeas petition in the state appellate court a declaration

from defense counsel which affirmatively stated that he did not misadvise

Petitioner prior to the hearing:

During the Marsden hearing, I misspoke when I implied that

a 25-Life commitment attached to a conviction for Penal Code

section 245 . . . I intended to say that a conviction of

unpremeditated murder would result in a life term . . . I did not

advise Mr. Lopez, prior to the entry of his plea, that the 25-Life

enhancement would attach to a Penal Code section 245 conviction.

Decl. of Kipp Davis in Support of State Habeas Petition, Exhibit E. The California

Court of Appeal found no evidence that defense counsel told Petitioner before the

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entry of the pleas that a life sentence would attach to a charge of assault with a

deadly weapon. The court further found that, prior to defense counsel’s

misstatement at the Marsden hearing, Petitioner had not pointed out this mistake in

his letters to the court or his verbal statements to the court. Based largely on these

findings, the California Court of Appeal concluded that Petitioner :

[D]id not establish that the misadvice that Davis gave at the

motion to withdraw the pleas was the basis for defendant's decision

to enter the pleas in the first place. The advisement that defendant

was given in court, on the record, was correct. Defendant's responses

to the court that he had not been pressured to enter the pleas, that he

understood what he was doing, and that he gave up his trial rights

freely and voluntarily were unequivocal. At the hearing on the

Marsden motion, defendant had the opportunity to explain the basis

of his dissatisfaction with Davis. The court required Davis to

respond minutely to defendant's complaints. Davis had investigated

the case, considered the contradictions in the statements Villalobos

gave to the police, at preliminary hearing, and thereafter, and

adequately forecast their effect on the jury. His advisement to plead

guilty was well-grounded in reality. The single mistake he made

after the pleas were entered had no bearing on the decision whether

to enter the pleas.

Lopez, 2003 WL 2148103, at 6. The court accordingly rejected Petitioner’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 

A. Legal Standard

A defendant who enters a guilty plea on the advice of counsel may

generally only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by

showing that the advice he received from counsel was not within the range of

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474

U.S. 52, 56 (1985); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); United States

v. Signori, 844 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988).

A defendant must satisfy the two-part standard of Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687, i.e., that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient

performance prejudiced his defense, and establish the prejudice requirement by

showing that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he

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would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. See Hill,

474 U.S. at 57-59; Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 864-65 (9th Cir. 1986).

A defendant generally cannot establish prejudice under Hill if he received

significant benefits from his plea agreement. Counsel may commit serious errors,

but as long as counsel succeeds in substantially reducing the sentence defendant

would have likely received had he gone to trial, there is no prejudice. See United

States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840, 845-47 (9th Cir. 1996) (counsel’s failure to

assert viable defense to charge that results in probation does not prejudice

defendant when conviction on another, more serious charge is valid and other,

valid charges are dismissed). A mere inaccurate prediction regarding the potential

sentence is insufficient to establish ineffective assistance; petitioner must establish

a “‘gross mischaracterization of the likely outcome’ of a plea bargain ‘combined

with . . . erroneous advice on the probable effects of going to trial.’”

Sophanthavong v. Palmateer, 378 F.3d 859, 868 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing United

States v. Keller, 902 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1990)); see also Weaver v.

Palmateer, 455 F.3d 958, 966-69 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding no reasonable prejudice

from counsel’s advice regarding petitioner’s likely sentence from pleading guilty

because the state court record showed that petitioner had a strong desire to avoid

trial, and that counsel had not advised petitioner as to what sentence he would

actually receive).

B. Analysis

The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Petitioner’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claim was not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, nor was it based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In order to

assert a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Petitioner would first

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have to establish that defense counsel’s mistake occurred prior to Petitioner’s

guilty plea, i.e., that Petitioner relied on counsel’s mistaken advice when he pled

guilty. Petitioner fails to meet this burden. Based on the evidence presented, the

California Court of Appeal made the factual findings that defense counsel made a

“single mistake” by misspeaking about his advice to Petitioner at the Marsden

hearing after the pleas had already been entered, and that this mistake “had no

bearing on [Petitioner’s] decision whether to enter the pleas.” Lopez, 2003 WL

21481036, at 6. This Court must presume the California Court of Appeal’s factual

determinations in this regard is correct unless Petitioner rebuts the state court’s

findings by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner

has not provided this Court with any evidence whatsoever, much less clear and

convincing evidence, to rebut the California Court of Appeal’s factual findings. 

To the contrary, the declaration by defense counsel submitted on Petitioner’s

appeal that he did not misadvise Petitioner supports the California Court of

Appeal’s factual findings on this point. Because Petitioner has not established any

support for the argument that he relied on defense counsel’s mistake when he pled

guilty, Petitioner’s claim fails.

Even if Petitioner established that defense counsel’s performance was

deficient, in that defense counsel committed a “serious error,” he would not be

able to establish prejudice because defense counsel succeeded in substantially

reducing the sentence Petitioner would have likely received had he gone to trial by

means of the plea bargain. See Baramdyka, 95 F.3d at 845-47. Petitioner does not

challenge what defense counsel identified in the Marsden hearing as “weaknesses”

in his case, such as Ms. Villalobos’ allegations as discussed above. RT at 36. 

Recognition of these weaknesses led defense counsel to conclude, quite

reasonably, that if Petitioner went to trial, a jury would likely reach “a compromise

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verdict of attempted murder without premeditation and deliberation . . . that . . .

would still result in an indeterminate life commitment because of the 12022.53(d)

firearm enhancement.” Exhibit E. 

By advising Petitioner to accept the plea bargain, which guaranteed a

determinate sentence, defense counsel clearly “reduced the sentence Petitioner

would have likely received had he gone to trial,” i.e., an indeterminate life

commitment. It cannot be said that defense counsel rendered ineffective

assistance. Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim because the California Court of Appeal’s rejection of

the claim was not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable determination of,

clearly established Supreme Court precedent, or involved an unreasonable

determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

3. Failure to Provide an Interpreter 

Petitioner claims that he was deprived of due process because the trial court

failed to provide him with an interpreter when he pled guilty. Petitioner notes that

he was “assisted by an interpreter at virtually every other hearing in [t]his case,”

except at the change of plea hearing when he pled guilty. Pet. at 6. Petitioner

claims that his need for an interpreter at this hearing was “particularly acute”

because “sentencing was complicated.” Id. at 7. By being “denied” an interpreter

at this “crucial” juncture, Petitioner claims that the court violated his rights under

the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Id.

A. Legal Standard

Due process requires that a guilty plea be both knowing and voluntary

because it constitutes the waiver of three constitutional rights: the right to a jury

trial, the right to confront one's accusers, and the privilege against selfincrimination. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969). It does not,

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however, require a state court to enumerate all the rights a defendant waives when

he enters a guilty plea as long as the record indicates that the plea was entered

voluntarily and understandingly. See Rodriguez v. Ricketts, 798 F.2d 1250, 1254

(9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1057 (1987); Wilkins v. Erickson, 505 F.2d

761, 763 (9th Cir. 1974). A habeas petitioner bears the burden of establishing that

his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20,

29-30 (1992), 31-34.

The long-standing test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is

"'whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the

alternative courses of action open to the defendant.'" Id. at 29 (quoting North

Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)). This requires a review of the

circumstances surrounding the plea. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749

(1970). Of particular importance is that defendant enter a guilty plea with

sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences, id. at

748, and that he understand the law in relation to the facts, McCarthy v. United

States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969). A guilty plea not made voluntarily and

intelligently violates due process. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242.

A defendant cannot withdraw his guilty plea by claiming he did not

understand English well enough when the record proves otherwise. See United

States v. Nostratis, 321 F.3d 1206, 1208-11 (9th Cir. 2003) (refusing to allow

withdrawal of a guilty plea under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B) where defendant

claimed he did not understand English well enough to comprehend his plea

agreement, but the record showed that defendant used English in court

proceedings, did not use an interpreter to communicate with counsel, there was a

two-year delay in making the motion, and the motion was made only after

defendant learned his likely sentence). 

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//

B. Analysis

There are no indications that Petitioner’s acceptance of his plea was not

knowing and voluntary. To the contrary, at the change of Plea hearing, Petitioner,

speaking English without the aid of a translator, repeatedly demonstrated a

comprehension of his plea agreement. For example, when the prosecutor

explained the proposed changes in the plea bargain, the court asked Petitioner:

THE COURT: Do you understand [the proposed changes]?

[PETITIONER]: Yes, I understand, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Now, you have had enough time to talk to your lawyer about

this?

[PETITIONER]: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand what you are charged with here?

[PETITIONER]: I understand.

THE COURT: Did you talk to your lawyer about the ways in which you

could defend yourself against the charges?

[PETITIONER]: Yes, I did.

THE COURT: Now, you understand that you have to go to state prison on

this case. That’s obvious; right? So you are not going to get any probation.

[PETITIONER]: Yes, Your Honor

THE COURT: Upon your release from state prison, you will be on parole

for . . . up to three years. If you violate parole, you can receive additional time in

state prison. You also have what’s known as a prison prior.

Do you understand that?

[PETITIONER]: Yes, Your Honor.

RT at 8-9. After going over some more specifics of Petitioner’s plea agreement, 

the court inquired as to how much education Petitioner had. Id. at 12. Petitioner

responded that he had three months of schooling in Mexico in his entire life. Id. 

To once again ensure that Petitioner, lacking any significant education, nonetheless

understood the terms of the plea agreement, the court proceeded :

THE COURT: But you understand everything we are talking about; is that

correct?

[PETITIONER]: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: If there is something you don’t understand or you have a

question, you just let me know, and you can talk to your lawyer or ask a question.

Do you understand that?

[PETITIONER]: Yes, Your Honor.

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Id. Notably, after Petitioner pled guilty on all counts, the court declared that “the

change of plea transcript shows that [Petitioner] understand[s] English very well.” 

Id. at 51.

Further reference to the record in this case reinforces the notion that

Petitioner understood English “very well,” and certainly well enough to

comprehend the plea agreement. For instance, the five letters that Petitioner wrote

to the court lodging complaints against defense counsel were all written after

Petitioner pled guilty and, significantly, all written in English . See Nostratis, 321

F.3d at 1211-12 (use of English in court proceedings undermines Petitioner’s

argument that he did not understand English well enough to comprehend his plea

agreement). Additionally, defense counsel at the Marsden hearing made the

following statement: “For the record . . . all of my discussions with Mr. Lopez

have been conducted in English and I have not sensed that he lacked any

understanding . . . I have not had any problems communicating with him in

English.” RT at 41. See Nostratis, 321 F.3d at 1211-12 (absence of interpreter in

communications with counsel undermines Petitioner’s argument that he did not

understand English well enough to comprehend his plea agreement). Petitioner is

not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

CONCLUSION

After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, the court is 

that the petition for writ of habeas corpus must be DENIED. The clerk shall enter

judgment in favor of respondent and close the file.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 24, 2007

_______________________

JEFFREY S. WHITE

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LOPEZ,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MCGRATH et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV04-01621 JSW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on July 24, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing

said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Guadalupe Lopez T-40872

CMC East, cell #2383

P.O. Box 8101

San Luis Obispo, CA 93409-8101

Ryan Blake McCarroll

California Attorney General’s Office

455 Golden Gate Avenue, suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102

Dated: July 24, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Jennifer Ottolini, Deputy Clerk

Case 3:04-cv-01621-JSW Document 11 Filed 07/24/07 Page 19 of 19