Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02582/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02582-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 340
Nature of Suit: Marine Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 46:30104 Marine Personal Injury - Jones Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM J. CANNON,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

Case No.: 15-CV-2582-CAB-BLM

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[Doc. Nos. 98, 111]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Third Party Plaintiff,

v.

AUSTAL USA, LLC,

Third Party Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on separate motions for summary judgment filed by 

Third Party Defendant Austal USA, LLC (“Austal”) [Doc. No. 98] and Defendant/Third 

Party Plaintiff United States of America [Doc. No. 111]. The motions have been fully 

briefed, no party has requested oral argument, and the Court deems the motions suitable 

for submission without a hearing. For the following reasons, both motions are granted.

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I. Procedural History

Plaintiff William J. Cannon filed his original complaint on November 17, 2015, 

naming both Austal and the United States as defendants. One week later, Cannon filed a 

first amended complaint (the “FAC”) asserting the same claims. [Doc. No. 5.] The FAC 

alleges that Cannon was injured onboard the USS Coronado (the “Coronado”), a public 

vessel of the United States, in navigable waters near Mobile, Alabama, and seeks damages 

under various admiralty laws. The FAC alleges that Cannon was a seaman pursuant to the 

Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, and asserts claims against both Austal and the United States

for negligence, maintenance and cure, and the unseaworthiness of the Coronado. [Id. at ¶¶ 

8, 15-17, 18-20, 21-25.] In the alternative, Cannon asserts a separate claim against the 

United States for negligence under § 905(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers 

Compensation Act (“LHWCA”), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901, et seq. [Id. at ¶¶ 26-27.] 

On December 29, 2015, Cannon voluntarily dismissed his claims against Austal. 

[Doc. No. 17.] On January 22, 2016, the United States filed a third party complaint 

(“TPC”) against Austal pursuant to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(c). [Doc. No. 

22.] The TPC alleges that Cannon was working with Austal employees at the time of his 

alleged injury and it was the acts and/or omissions of the Austal employees that caused 

Cannon’s injuries. [Id. at ¶ 11.] The TPC also asserts that although the United States was 

the owner of the Coronado, Cannon’s injury was proximately caused by Austal’s 

negligence, breach of duty, breach of statute and/or regulation with respect to safe working 

conditions. [Id. at ¶¶ 3, 14.] The TPC demands judgment in favor of Cannon and against 

Austal directly, meaning that Austal is required to defend against Cannon’s claim as well 

as the United States’s claim, and that this lawsuit proceeds as if Cannon had sued both the 

United States and Austal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(c); Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Sw. Marine, 194 

F.3d 1009, 1018 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that Rule 14(c) “creates a ‘direct relationship’

between the plaintiff and the third-party defendant).

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II. Factual Background

Austal is a shipbuilder with a shipyard in Mobile, Alabama. Cannon began working

for Austal at the Mobile shipyard in August 2011. He started as a “Vessel Watch Stander,” 

and was later promoted to “Test & Activation Specialist I,” which was the title he held at 

the time of the alleged incident at issue in this case. [Doc. No. 98-3 at 37.] During his 

time at Austal, Cannon worked a total of 10,478.47 hours. [Id. at 37-38.] At most, 509.85 

of these working hours (4.87%) occurred upon a vessel that was at sea, and all of this time 

was in support of sea trials of vessels being constructed by Austal. [Id. at 38.] The 

remainder of Cannon’s working hours were spent on land at Austal’s shipyard or aboard 

ships at various stages of construction that were moored to piers at the shipyard. [Id.]

Austal constructed the Coronado, a “Littoral Combat Ship” also referred to as LCS4, for the United States Navy. According to Cannon, from the date he was hired through 

November 25, 2013 (the date of the alleged accident here), Austal assigned him only to the 

Coronado. [Doc. No. 39-2.] Cannon declares that during that time, eighty-five percent of 

his working hours were “aboard the LCS 4 while upon the navigable waters of the United 

States.” [Id.] According to Cannon, the Coronado was “capable of navigation” for eighty 

percent of the two years leading up to the alleged accident. [Id.] His job responsibilities 

consisted of working “upon the various systems of the ship to perfect their operation after 

the systems were finished construction by craft.” [Id.]

The last sea trials for the Coronado ended on August 23, 2013. [Doc. No. 111-16 at 

2-3; 111-18 at 1.]1 On September 27, 2013, the Coronado was delivered to the Navy at the 

 

1

In his opposition, Plaintiff argues that the Court should not consider the declarations of Captain John 

Kochendorfer [Doc. No. 111-22] and Lowell Redd [Doc. No. 111-16]. Kochendorfer was the 

commanding officer of the Coronado on November 25, 2013, and his declaration simply describes the 

operational status of the Coronado on that date and states that Korchendorfer is unaware of any incident 

that Cannon alleges occurred on the Coronado on that date. The United States disclosed Korchendorfer 

in its initial disclosures, but Cannon argues that his declaration should be excluded because the United 

States opposed Cannon’s motion to take Kochendorfer’s deposition, which Magistrate Judge Major 

ultimately denied. Cannon, however, only argued that he wanted to depose Kochendorfer concerning 

accident reporting procedures and to learn about vessel safety, standards and procedures. [Doc. No. 92 at 

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Austal shipyard. [Doc. No. 112-15.] However, with the exception of two days in 

December, from September 27, 2013 through January 6, 2014, the Coronado remained 

pierside at Austal’s shipyard in Mobile while Austal and other contractors completed work 

on open trial cards, which noted deficiencies or incomplete parts of the vessel. [Doc. No. 

98-3 at 38; 98-1 at 3.]

The FAC alleges that Cannon was injured onboard the Coronado on November 25, 

2013. According to Cannon’s deposition testimony, while Cannon was leaving the ship, a 

Naval commander asked Cannon and “an Austal guy” to help two Navy men move a ramp

or lift. [Doc. No. 98-2 at 45.] In Cannon’s words:

[W]e all four grabbed each corner . . . and we kind of looked at each other and 

“one, two, three, lift.” And as we began to lift, one of the Navy guys slipped, 

his grip slipped. When his grip slipped, the ramp then tilted to the left – well, 

to the right. And that Navy guy lost his grip, which then had all the weight 

on me and on . . . the back part of the lift.

[Id. at 45.] This incident allegedly injured Cannon’s back. In his opposition briefs, Cannon 

does not cite any testimony from any of the other individuals allegedly involved in the 

incident. The only eyewitness testimony is from a former Austal safety officer who, when 

questioned about her affidavit describing the incident as having occurred on November 25, 

2013, admitted that she did not work on November 25, 2013, and conceded that the incident 

 

7.] Kochendorfer’s declaration does not address any of these issues. Moreover, the declaration is largely 

cumulative of other evidence included with the United States’s motion for summary judgment. In any 

event, while the Court finds no grounds to exclude the declaration, the Court did not need to rely on 

Kochendorfer’s declaration to grant the United States’s summary judgment motion.

 Redd, meanwhile, works for the Navy at the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Gulf Coast (“SSGC”). The 

United States offers his declaration solely as evidence that the last sea trials for the Coronado were 

completed on August 23, 2013. Cannon argues that Redd’s declaration should be excluded because he 

was not disclosed in the United States’s initial disclosures. The United States, however, points out that 

they had no reason to disclose Redd because they did not know that Plaintiff’s deposition testimony would 

make the date of the sea trials relevant. Ultimately, because Plaintiff does not contest that the sea trials 

concluded on August 23, 2013, and because, if the case were to get that far, there would be plenty of time 

for Plaintiff to depose Redd before trial, Plaintiff’s request that Redd’s declaration be excluded is denied.

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could have occurred several months earlier. [Doc. No. 111-3.] The United States and 

Austal both dispute that any incident actually occurred on November 25, 2013 or at all.

III. Legal Standards on Motions for Summary Judgment

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the court shall grant summary judgment 

“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P 56(a). To avoid summary 

judgment, disputes must be both 1) material, meaning concerning facts that are relevant 

and necessary and that might affect the outcome of the action under governing law, and 2) 

genuine, meaning the evidence must be such that a reasonable judge or jury could return a 

verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986); Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g & Contracting Co., 200 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 

2000) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). “Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts 

will not preclude a grant of summary judgment.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. 

Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). 

The initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact falls 

on the moving party. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “In order to 

carry its burden of production, the moving party must either produce evidence negating an 

essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving 

party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of 

persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 

1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). “If . . . a moving party carries its burden of production, the 

nonmoving party must produce evidence to support its claim or defense.” Id. at 1103. “If 

the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material 

fact, the moving party wins the motion for summary judgment.” Id.

When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court must view all inferences 

drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “Credibility 

determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from 

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the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, [when] he [or she] is ruling on a motion 

for summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. That this admiralty case would be 

tried before a judge instead of a jury does not alter this summary judgment standard. 

Griffeth v. Utah Power & Light Co., 226 F.2d 661, 669 (9th Cir. 1955) (“The federal 

Constitution gives a right of jury trial in a contested issue in a law action. This right is 

positive and should not be whittled away by decision of contested issues by the judge at 

hearings in camera before trial. The summary judgment rule does not confer this power 

even in a nonjury case. The remedy can be invoked only when complete absence of genuine 

fact issue appears on the face of the record.”) (emphasis added).

IV. Admiralty Jurisdiction

“A federal court’s authority to hear cases in admiralty flows initially from the 

Constitution, which ‘extend[s]’ federal judicial power ‘to all Cases of admiralty and 

maritime Jurisdiction.’” Jerome B. Grubhart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 

U.S. 527, 531 (1995) (quoting U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2). “Congress has embodied that 

power in a statute giving federal district courts ‘original jurisdiction . . . of . . . [a]ny civil 

case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction. . . .’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1)). 

“A party seeking to invoke federal admiralty jurisdiction over a tort claim must 

satisfy both a location test and a connection test.” In re Mission Bay Jet Sports, LLC, 570 

F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The tort must occur 

on navigable waters and bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). Austal argues admiralty jurisdiction is lacking because

the connection test is not satisfied insofar as construction of a ship is not traditional 

maritime activity. The Court is not persuaded. As the Ninth Circuit explained:

The “connection” or “nexus” test raises two issues. A court, first, must assess 

the general features of the type of incident involved to determine whether the 

incident has a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce. Second, 

a court must determine whether the general character of the activity giving 

rise to the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime 

activity. 

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Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “[T]he disruption prong does not turn 

on what happened in this particular case but on whether the general features of the incident 

have a potentially disruptive effect.” Id. at 1129 (emphasis in original); see also Grubhart, 

513 U.S. at 538 (noting that disruption prong goes “to the potential effects, not to the 

particular facts of the incident”) (internal quotation marks omitted). A court must look at 

the “general features” of the incident to determine whether it has a potentially disruptive 

impact on maritime commerce. Grubhart, 513 U.S. at 539. 

As for the second prong of the connection test, the question is “whether a tortfeasor’s 

activity, commercial or noncommercial, on navigable waters is so closely related to activity 

traditionally subject to admiralty law that the reasons for applying special admiralty rules 

would apply in the suit at hand.” Id. at 539-40. “The test turns on the comparison of 

traditional maritime activity to the arguably maritime character of the tortfeasor’s activity 

in a given case.” Id. at 542. Although there is no per se rule, it will ordinarily be the case 

that “every tort involving a vessel on navigable waters falls within the scope of admiralty 

jurisdiction.” Id. Even storing boats at a marina on navigable waters suffices. Id. at 540 

(citing Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 367 (1990)). 

Applying these standards, there is little question that admiralty jurisdiction applies 

here. The alleged incident occurred on a ship that had been delivered to the United States 

Navy which, as Austal admits, was capable of self-propulsion [Doc. No. 98 at 15], while 

the ship was docked on navigable waters. Whether the Coronado was complete pursuant 

to the terms of the construction contract with the United States is irrelevant to the question 

of admiralty jurisdiction. Moreover, the circumstances surrounding the alleged tort had 

nothing to do with the construction of the Coronado. Indeed, two of the other three 

individuals allegedly involved were in the Navy and did not work for Austal. Based on 

these facts, there is little question that the alleged tort here was connected to maritime 

activity. Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that it has admiralty jurisdiction over Cannon’s 

claims.

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V. Austal’s Motion for Summary Judgment

“The Jones Act provides a cause of action to any ‘seaman’ who suffers personal 

injuries in the course of his employment.” Cabral v. Healy Tibbits Builders, Inc., 128 F.3d 

1289, 1291 (9th Cir. 1997).

2

 Although Austal and the United States dispute that Cannon 

was injured in the course of his employment, Austal’s motion for summary judgment 

focuses primarily on whether Cannon was a “seaman,” which is a prerequisite for his Jones 

Act negligence claim as well as his maintenance and cure and unseaworthiness claims. See 

Hall v. Diamond M. Co., 732 F.2d 1246, 1248 (5th Cir. 1984) (“Only seamen are entitled 

to the benefits of maintenance and cure. The standard for determining seaman status for 

purposes of maintenance and cure is the same as that established for determining status 

under the Jones Act.”); Knight v. Longaker, No. C 05-03481 SBA, 2007 WL 1864870, at 

*11 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 28, 2007) (“The Ninth Circuit has held that claims for unseaworthiness 

and for maintenance and cure depend on Defendant’s qualifying as a ‘seaman’ under the 

Jones Act.”) (citing Scheuring v. Traylor Bros., Inc., 476 F.3d 781, 784 n.3 (9th Cir.

2007)).3 

Although courts have struggled with the definition of “seaman,” one basic principle 

is that “seamen do not include land-based workers.” Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 

358 (1995) (quoting McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 348 (1991)). Further, 

“[l]and-based maritime workers do not become seamen because they happen to be working 

on board a vessel when they are injured. . . .” Id. at 361. Instead, “the injured party must

 

2 The complete text of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 30104, provides: “A seaman injured in the course of 

employment or, if the seaman dies from the injury, the personal representative of the seaman may elect to 

bring a civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury, against the employer. Laws of the United States 

regulating recovery for personal injury to, or death of, a railway employee apply to an action under this 

section.”

3 Cf. In re Marine Asbestos Cases, 265 F.3d 861, 868 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that “to recover for an 

injury caused by an unseaworthy condition, a seaman must establish that: (1) the seaman’s work was in 

the ship’s service and that the warranty of seaworthiness therefore applies; (2) the seaman was injured 

by a piece of equipment not reasonably fit for its intended use; and (3) the piece of equipment was part 

of the ship’s equipment or an appurtenant appliance.”) (emphasis added).

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[] have status as a member of the vessel for it is seamen, not others who may work on the 

vessel to whom Congress extended the protection of the Jones Act.” Id. at 362-63 (internal 

citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Wilander, 498 U.S. at 355 (“The key to 

seaman status is employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation.”). 

Notwithstanding the foregoing, a maritime employee need not work only on board a vessel 

to qualify as a seaman. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 363. “[T]he Jones Act remedy may be 

available to maritime workers who are employed by a shipyard and who spend a portion 

of their time working on shore but spend the rest of their time at sea.” Id. at 364. “It is not 

the employee’s particular job that is determinative, but the employee’s connection to a 

vessel.” Wilander, 498 U.S. at 354. 

In Chandris, the Supreme Court attempted to bring some clarity to the determination 

of whether an employee was a seaman under the Jones Act by creating a two-part test. 

First, “an employee’s duties must contribute to the function of the vessel or to the 

accomplishment of its mission.” Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368 (quoting Wilander, 498 U.S. 

at 355) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). Second, “a seaman must have a 

connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such vessels) that is 

substantial in terms of both its duration and nature.” Id. Despite outlining this two-part 

test, the Supreme Court also cautioned that when determining Jones Act coverage, “it [is] 

preferable to focus upon the essence of what it means to be a seaman and to eschew the 

temptation to create detailed tests to effectuate the congressional purpose, tests that tend to 

become ends in and of themselves.” Id. at 369. “[T]he ultimate inquiry is whether the 

worker in question is a member of the vessel’s crew or simply a land-based employee who 

happens to be working on the vessel at a given time.” Id. at 370.

In its motion for summary judgment, Austal argues only that Cannon does not satisfy 

the second part of this test because he did not have a connection to the Coronado that was 

substantial in duration and nature. This second requirement “was designed to separate seabased maritime workers from land-based employees ‘who have only a transitory or 

sporadic connection to a vessel in navigation, and therefore whose employment does not 

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regularly expose them to the perils of the sea.’” Cabral, 128 F.3d at 1292 (quoting 

Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368)). Thus:

For the substantial connection requirement to serve its purpose, the inquiry 

into the nature of the employee’s connection to the vessel must concentrate 

on whether the employee’s duties take him to sea. This will give substance to 

the inquiry both as to the duration and nature of the employee’s connection to 

the vessel and be helpful in distinguishing land-based from sea-based 

employees.

Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 555 (1997). In sum, “[Harbor Tug] and 

[Chandris] dictate that when [determining] whether the nature of [Cannon’s] connection 

to [the Coronado] is substantial, [the] focus [is] on whether [Cannon’s] duties were 

primarily sea-based activities.” Cabral, 128 F.3d at 1293. Although “it will often be 

inappropriate to take [the seaman] question from the jury . . . ‘summary judgment or a 

directed verdict is mandated where the facts and the law will reasonably support only one 

conclusion.’” Harbor Tug, 520 U.S. at 554 (quoting Wilander, 498 U.S. at 356).

Here, the undisputed evidence shows that Cannon was a land-based worker whose 

duties rarely took him out to sea. Even assuming the truth of his declaration that he worked 

exclusively on construction of the Coronado in the years preceding the alleged accident 

and that he spent eighty-five percent of his working hours on the Coronado itself while the 

ship was on navigable waters, Cannon offers no evidence that he was aboard the Coronado

when it was anywhere but moored to the shipyard where Cannon worked. To the contrary, 

Austal’s undisputed evidence demonstrates that less than five percent of Cannon’s total 

working hours over the course of the five years he worked for Austal was spent on ships 

actually at sea, and all of those hours were in support of sea trials of newly built ships. 

[Doc. No. 98-3 at 37-38.]; cf. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 371 (noting a rule of thumb that “[a]

worker who spends less than about 30 percent of his time in the service of a vessel in 

navigation should not qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act.”). 

That the Coronado was complete to the point where it could float on navigable 

waters and was self-propelling is irrelevant because there is no evidence that could lead to 

the conclusion that Cannon was a member of the Coronado’s crew. Cf. Harbor Tug, 520 

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U.S. at 558 (noting that the plaintiff’s actual duty did not include any seagoing activity and 

that he was not going to sail with the vessel once he completed his painting work on it). 

While the Coronado may have been docked on navigable waters for the majority of 

Cannon’s employment, Cannon spent hardly any time on the Coronado while it was “in 

navigation.” Thus, all of the evidence points to one conclusion: Cannon was a land-based 

employee of a shipbulder who happened to be assigned to the construction of the 

Coronado. See Cabral, 128 F.3d at 1293 (holding that no reasonable jury could find that 

the plaintiff could meet the substantial connection test because all of the evidence led to 

the conclusion that the plaintiff “was a land-based crane operator who happened to be

assigned to a project which required him to work aboard the” barge on which he was 

injured).

In short, no reasonable fact-finder could find that Cannon was a member of the crew 

of the Coronado or that he was anything other than a land-based employee of Austal. 

Therefore, he was not a seaman for Jones Act purposes. Likewise, “[b]ecause Plaintiff 

does not qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act, [he] does not qualify as a seaman for the 

purpose of [his] seaworthiness claim or [his] demand for maintenance and cure.” Knight, 

2007 WL 1864870, at *4. Accordingly, Austal is entitled to summary judgment on these 

claims. Wilander, 498 U.S. at 356. 

VI. The United States’s Motion for Summary Judgment

The finding that Cannon is not a seaman is fatal to his Jones Act, maintenance and 

cure, and unseaworthiness claims against the United States as well. This leaves only his 

his claim for negligence under Section 905(b) of the LHWCA, which is only against the 

United States, as the owner of the Coronado, because as the Ninth Circuit has explained:

Pursuant to § 905(a), an employee may not recover in tort for the negligence 

of his employer; rather, he is entitled to statutory payments. However, §

905(b) allows an employee to recover for the negligence of a vessel owner: 

“In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the 

negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to 

recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action against such vessel . 

. . .” 

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Scheuring, 476 F.3d at 787-88 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 905(b); emphasis in original). The 

LHWCA “excludes from its coverage a master or member of a crew of any vessel,” who 

“are the seamen entitled to sue for damages under the Jones Act. In other words, the 

LHWCA and the Jones Act are mutually exclusive.” Harbor Tug, 520 U.S. at 553 (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Sw Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, 502 U.S. 81, 

88 (1991)) (“[T]he Jones Act and the LHWCA are mutually exclusive for the very reason 

that the LHWCA specifically precludes from its provisions any employee who is ‘a master 

or member of a crew of any vessel.’”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

“Thus, the Jones Act and the LHWCA are complementary regimes that work in tandem: 

The Jones Act provides tort remedies to sea-based maritime workers, while the LHWCA 

provides workers’ compensation to land-based maritime employees.” Stewart v. Dutra 

Const. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 488 (2005).

In addition to the foregoing, however, to maintain any of his claims against the 

United States (including the LHWCA claim) Cannon must establish the the United States 

has waived its sovereign immunity. “As a general rule, ‘[t]he United States, as sovereign, 

is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued, . . . and the terms of its consent to be 

sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.’” Am. Cargo Transp., 

Inc. v. United States, 625 F.3d 1176, 1180–81 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hercules, Inc. v. 

United States, 516 U.S. 417, 422 (1996)). Along these lines, Cannon brings his claims 

against the United States pursuant to the Suits in Admiralty Act (“SIAA”), and the Public 

Vessels Act (the “PVA”). The SIAA:

waives sovereign immunity for the United States in cases where “a civil action 

in admiralty could be maintained” against a private person in the same 

situation. 46 U.S.C. § 30903(a). That is, if a vessel is owned by the United 

States, and someone is harmed by the vessel or one of its employees, and the 

harm is one for which, if the vessel were privately owned, the harmed 

individual could have sued its owner in admiralty, then the person can bring—

indeed, must bring—that admiralty claim against the United States. Id.; see 

Dearborn v. Mar Ship Operations, Inc., 113 F.3d 995, 996 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(through the SIAA, United States is subject to “the same liability . . . as is 

imposed by the admiralty law on the private shipowner”). This makes the 

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SIAA “the maritime analog to the FTCA.” Huber v. United States, 838 F.2d 

398, 400 (9th Cir. 1988). In plain terms, the SIAA applies when (1) a vessel 

is owned by the United States or operated on its behalf, and (2) there is a 

remedy cognizable in admiralty for the injury. See Williams v. Central Gulf 

Lines, 874 F.2d 1058, 1061–62 (5th Cir. 1989) (framing SIAA inquiry in two 

parts: first, whether the vessel is owned by United States or an agent, and 

second, whether the claim stated is a “traditional admiralty claim”). The SIAA 

provides no cause of action; it just waives sovereign immunity where an 

admiralty remedy is available. Dearborn, 113 F.3d at 996 n. 1.

Ali v. Rogers, 780 F.3d 1229, 1233 (9th Cir. 2015). “The SIAA has a two-year statute of 

limitations.” Id. (citing 46 U.S.C. § 30905). 

The PVA, meanwhile:

applies to “civil action[s] in personam in admiralty . . . for damages caused by 

a public vessel of the United States.” 46 U.S.C. § 31102(a)(1). Claims under 

the PVA have certain limitations that SIAA claims do not, but none that are 

relevant here. More importantly, the PVA makes all claims subject to the 

SIAA, including its statute of limitations and its exclusivity provision, except 

to the extent to which the two are inconsistent. 46 U.S.C. § 31103; see also 

Dearborn, 113 F.3d at 996–97 (noting that the SIAA’s exclusivity rule is 

incorporated by reference into the PVA). . . . [T]he PVA includes claims 

arising out of the conduct of employees on a public vessel, not merely direct 

physical damages. See Tobar v. United States, 639 F.3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 

2011). And despite expansive revisions to the SIAA, the Supreme Court 

continues to rule that any suit for damages caused by a public vessel falls 

under the PVA; under Tobar and predecessor cases, those damages will 

include contract damages. Id. Any other admiralty claim against a federallyowned vessel will fall under the SIAA. United States v. United Cont'l Tuna 

Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 181, 96 S.Ct. 1319, 47 L.Ed.2d 653 (1976).

Id. at 1234. The differences between the SIAA and PVA are irrelevant here because there 

is no dispute that regardless of which one provides the basis for the United States’s waiver 

of sovereign immunity, Cannon’s claims against the United States are subject to the 

SIAA’s two year statute of limitations.

The United States’s main argument in its motion for summary judgment is that 

Cannon’s claims against the United States are time-barred based on the SIAA’s two-year 

statute of limitations. At his deposition, Cannon testified that the incident that caused his 

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injury occurred within a day or two of the Coronado’s sea trials [Doc. No. 111-2 at 8-9]. 

The United States offers evidence that the sea trials ended on August 23, 2013 [Doc. No. 

1116-16]. According to the United States, because the original complaint was not filed 

until November 17, 2015, which is more than two years after August 25, 2013 (two days 

after the sea trials ended), Cannon’s claims are time-barred.

In his opposition, Cannon does not dispute that the last sea trials for the Coronado

ended on August 23, 2013. Nor does he make any effort to explain his deposition 

testimony. Indeed, he ignores his testimony altogether. Instead, Cannon points to evidence 

that he contends demonstrates that the incident occurred on November 25, 2013, including: 

(1) Cannon’s declaration; (2) an entry in a “First Aid Log” that no one knows who wrote; 

and (3) an incident report completed by Cannon. None of these constitute admissible 

evidence that create a triable issue of fact that could lead a reasonable fact-finder to 

conclude that the incident alleged in the FAC occurred on November 25, 2013.

Cannon’s Declaration

With his opposition to the United States’ summary judgment motion, Cannon 

submitted a declaration that does not acknowledge his deposition testimony and states only 

that his “accident, which is the subject of this action, occurred on the date that the 

Incident/Near Miss Report No. 131125-642-A001 was completed.” [Doc. No. 124-4.] Yet

the declaration does not otherwise indicate when the referenced report was completed, and 

the incident report, which Cannon filled out himself, does not state when it was completed. 

Regardless, even assuming that Cannon’s declaration is a convoluted way for him to 

declare that the accident in question here occurred on November 25, 2013, “‘[t]he general 

rule in the Ninth Circuit is that a party cannot create an issue of fact by an affidavit 

contradicting his prior deposition testimony.’” Van Asdale v. Int’l Game Tech., 577 F.3d 

989, 998 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266 (9th 

Cir.1991)). As the Ninth Circuit explained:

This sham affidavit rule prevents “a party who has been examined at length 

on deposition” from “rais[ing] an issue of fact simply by submitting an 

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affidavit contradicting his own prior testimony,” which “would greatly 

diminish the utility of summary judgment as a procedure for screening out 

sham issues of fact.” Kennedy, 952 F.2d at 266 (internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also Van Asdale, 577 F.3d at 998 (stating that some form of the 

sham affidavit rule is necessary to maintain the principle that summary 

judgment is an integral part of the federal rules). But the sham affidavit rule 

“‘should be applied with caution’” because it is in tension with the principle 

that the court is not to make credibility determinations when granting or 

denying summary judgment. Id. (quoting Sch. Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 

F.3d 1255, 1264 (9th Cir.1993)). In order to trigger the sham affidavit rule, 

the district court must make a factual determination that the contradiction is a 

sham, and the “inconsistency between a party’s deposition testimony and 

subsequent affidavit must be clear and unambiguous to justify striking the 

affidavit.” Id. at 998–99.

Yeager v. Bowlin, 693 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Here, when deposed about the date of the incident at his deposition, Cannon 

unequivocally stated that it occurred within a day or two of the Coronado’s sea trials, and 

he does not dispute that those trials ended on August 23, 2013. His declaration, meanwhile, 

presumably intends to state that the incident occurred on November 25, 2013. However, 

Cannon’s declaration does not include any explanation or clarification of his deposition 

testimony; it simply contradicts it. Thus, it is impossible to reconcile Cannon’s declaration 

with his deposition testimony. The contradiction between Cannon’s declaration and his 

deposition testimony is clear and unambiguous and renders his declaration a sham. 

Accordingly, Cannon’s statement in his declaration that the accident occurred on 

November 25, 2013 (assuming that is even what he intended to say) is not sufficient to 

create an issue of fact to overcome summary judgment on the ground that his claims are 

time-barred.

First Aid Log

The first aid log on which Cannon relies is a handwritten entry on a chart listing a 

date of “11-25-13,” an “in” time of 3:03, and the following under the column for 

“description of injury”: “Lower back pain right side, buddy lifting ramp with 3 other 

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people, proper lifting technique used.” [Doc. No. 124-2 at 47.] The United States argues 

in its reply that this log is inadmissible hearsay. The United States is correct.

The log is an out of court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted—that 

the incident occurred on November 25, 2013. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record 

as to who completed the log, when it was completed, and for what purpose it was 

completed, and no grounds to conclude that an exception to the hearsay rule applies. 

Further, even if it were admissible, the log says nothing about the date of the alleged 

accident. At most, it only indicates that Cannon appeared at a first aid area on November 

25, 2013, due to back pain. Such back pain could have been caused by an accident that 

occurred in August. Accordingly, the log is inadmissible hearsay that in any event does 

not contradict Cannon’s deposition testimony or create an issue of fact concerning the date 

of the accident.

Incident Report

Like the first aid log, the incident report is also inadmissible hearsay to the extent 

Cannon offers it as proof that the incident occurred on November 25, 2013. There is no 

evidence of when Cannon completed the report. That Cannon filled out the form at some 

point and wrote November 25, 2013, as the date of the incident is inadmissible hearsay and 

does not create an issue of fact to overcome summary judgment.

Other Evidence

None of the other evidence cited in Cannon’s opposition is sufficient to create an 

issue of fact as to the date of the incident. Cannon cites testimony from Karl Otto, the first 

lieutenant in the operations department and leading chief petty officer aboard the Coronado

[Doc. No. 124-6 at 2], but Cannon does not identify any testimony indicating that Otto had 

any knowledge of Cannon’s alleged accident despite working on the Coronado on 

November 25, 2013. To the contrary, Otto testified that on November 25, 2013, he had 

already stowed the ramp extensions that Cannon alleges led to his injury. [Doc. No. 111-

6 at 14-15.]

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The opposition brief also cites to deposition testimony from Cannon’s supervisor, 

Conrad Harris, concerning Cannon reporting the incident to Harris. Harris, however, 

testified that he recalls Cannon reporting the incident to him in the “early fall,” and earlier 

than November 25, 2013. [Doc. No. 129-19 at 8.] This testimony is consistent with 

Cannon’s deposition testimony that the accident occurred in August 2015. It does not 

support Cannon’s argument that the accident occurred on November 25, 2013.

Cannon also cites to testimony from Danny Wilson about a conversation Wilson had 

with Mike Gunter. Putting aside that the testimony is inadmissible hearsay to the extent 

Cannon seeks to offer it for the truth of what Gunter told Wilson, none of the testimony 

Cannon cites relates to the date of the accident. Moreover, with its motion, the United 

States submitted a declaration from Gunter that he did not recall Cannon suffering an injury 

on the Coronado on November 25, 2013, or at any other time. [Doc. No. 111-29.] Thus, 

even if it were admissible, Wilson’s testimony about his conversation with Gunter also 

does not support Cannon’s argument that the incident occurred on November 25, 2013.

* * *

In sum, Cannon testified at his deposition that the incident occurred within a day or 

two of sea trials that ended on August 23, 2013. Despite his claim that his injury occurred 

while lifting a ramp with three other men, Cannon does not cite to any testimony from these 

men supporting his claim that this incident occurred at all, let alone about the date of the 

incident. The only person identified by Cannon who allegedly witnessed the injury 

admitted in her deposition that she did not work on November 25, 2013, and conceded that 

it was possible that the Coronado had returned from sea trials a few days before the 

incident. [Doc. No. 111-3 at 15.] Meanwhile, Cannon’s supervisor Harris, to whom 

Cannon reported the injury, testified that he recalls it happening in early fall and before 

November 25, 2013. [Doc. No. 129-19 at 8.] Aside from the Cannon’s sham declaration, 

there is no testimony (via declaration or deposition) of anyone who stated they witnessed 

the incident occur on November 25, 2013, or even that Cannon told them that his injury 

occurred on that date. Nor is there any other admissible evidence that would support a 

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finding that the incident occurred on November 25, 2013. In light of the foregoing, the 

undisputed evidence demonstrates that to the extent Cannon suffered an injury while 

moving a ramp extension aboard the Coronado, that injury occurred in August 2013, and 

not on November 25, 2013. 

The FAC explicitly seeks damages for an injury Cannon suffered aboard the 

Coronado on November 25, 2013. The complete lack of evidence that Cannon suffered an 

injury aboard the Coronado on November 25, 2013 is fatal to all of Cannon’s claims 

because the FAC only asserts claims arising out of an injury that allegedly occurred on 

November 25, 2013. Any injuries Cannon suffered in August 2013 are simply not a part 

of this lawsuit. Further, to the extent Cannon was injured aboard the Coronado in August 

2013, any admiralty claim against the United States arising out of such injury is barred by 

the SIAA’s two year statute of limitations. Accordingly, the United States is entitled to 

summary judgment on all of Cannon’s claims.

VII. Disposition

In light of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

1. Austal’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 98] is GRANTED;

2. The United States’ motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 111] is GRANTED;

3. The pending motions in limine [Doc. Nos. 108-110, 131, 132] are DENIED AS 

MOOT; and,

4. The Clerk of Court is instructed to enter JUDGMENT in favor of Austal and the 

United States and against Plaintiff, and to CLOSE this case.

It is SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 24, 2017

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