Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00882/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00882-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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1/ All further references to documents on the Court’s docket are to documents in the 09-CV882-BTM(WVG) matter.

1 09CV882, 09CV898, 09CV1141

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARYL LOWRY;

Plaintiff,

v.

HERITAGE SECURITY, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________

AND RELATED CASES.

 

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Civil Nos. 09-CV-882-BTM(WVG)

 09-CV-898-BTM(WVG)

 09-CV-1141-BTM(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON

DEFENDANT HERITAGE SECURITY’S

MOTION FOR TERMINATING

SANCTIONS

Defendant Heritage Security Services (“Heritage”), moves the

Court to impose terminating sanctions against Plaintiff for his

obstructive conduct and discovery abuses in the three cases he filed

against Heritage and non-moving Defendant, Metropolitan Transit

System. (882 Case: Doc. No. 88; 898 Case: Doc. No. 65; 1141 Case:

Doc. No. 76.)1/ Heritage’s motion is based on the history of this

case, Plaintiff’s violation of a court order, and Plaintiff’s lie

that allowed him to successfully avoid being deposed. After

considering all of the above, and after holding a hearing, the

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undersigned RECOMMENDS that Heritage’s motion be GRANTED and that

all three cases against Heritage be DISMISSED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. General Background

Filed in April and May of 2009, Plaintiff’s cases follow

separate run-ins with security personnel aboard and around the San

Diego Trolley. According to Plaintiff, Heritage’s employees

violated his civil rights when they unjustly detained, arrested, or

searched him without cause. Plaintiff also alleges the unreasonable

use of force to secure his detentions and arrests. As a result,

Plaintiff claims he suffered serious injuries, including a “busted”

face, which required medical care.

For their part, Defendants claim that security personnel

encountered Plaintiff aboard or around the San Diego Trolley after

he drew their attention by either exhibiting the signs of being

under the influence of alcoholic beverages, refusing to produce

proof that he had paid his trolley fare, or by creating disturbances

aboard the trolley or on trolley property. They claim Plaintiff was

consistently belligerent, refused to cooperate, escalated his

disruptive behavior, resisted arrest, and actively attacked security

officers after being contacted.

All three cases were transferred to the undersigned’s

caseload on December 11, 2009. With all three cases now over two

years old, the fact discovery cut-off expired on June 10, 2011,

without any request for extension of discovery. (See Doc. No. 69 at

2.)

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28 2/ Although counsel represents that an active TRO against Plaintiff exists, the TRO does

not appear under Plaintiff’s name in the San Diego County Sheriff’s public database. See

https://apps.sdsheriff.net/tro/tro.aspx (last visited July 5, 2011).

3 09CV882, 09CV898, 09CV1141

B. Procedural Background

1. October 18, 2010: Early Neutral Evaluation Conference

On October 18, 2010, the undersigned convened an Early

Neutral Evaluation Conference. Fearing for their safety, counsel

for Defendants requested that the Court have security present during

the ENE. Plaintiff had apparently left several aggressive voicemail

messages for counsel, and they had felt so threatened that they had

sought a restraining order against Plaintiff.2/ The Court took the

extraordinary measure of having two United States Marshals Deputies

present for the duration of the ENE. In person, the undersigned

observed that Plaintiff was at times visibly agitated and belligerent and expressed at various times that he was “pissed” and

proclaimed: “I ain’t afraid of no one. I won’t let anyone touch

me,” referring to his confrontation with trolley security.

Additionally, Plaintiff directed his aggression towards defense

counsel personally, calling them liars. It was clear to the

undersigned that Plaintiff held an intense emotional stake in his

cases, had difficulty controlling his emotions, and intensely

disliked Defendants and their counsel. As a result, the undersigned

believed Plaintiff would benefit if he retained counsel and strongly

encouraged him to consider doing so. Before concluding the ENE, the

undersigned advised Plaintiff to conduct himself civilly and

explained that the Court would grant him some leeway, but would not

ignore the rules simply because he was proceeding pro se. Plaintiff

said he understood.

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4 09CV882, 09CV898, 09CV1141

2. December 10, 2010: Case Management Conference

On December 10, 2010, the undersigned convened a telephonic

case management conference and quickly realized that Plaintiff could

not control himself over the telephone. Perhaps because he was

outside the presence of the Court, Plaintiff often went on emotionfueled rants about his injuries and what he perceived as delay

tactics by counsel for Defendants. He routinely interrupted the

undersigned, asserted that Defendants were trying to take advantage

of him, and asserted that he would not back down. He also expressed

that he was seeking representation.

3. January 6, 2011: Status Hearing

On January 6, 2011, the undersigned held a status hearing to

allow Plaintiff the opportunity to air his grievances, as he had

called the undersigned’s chambers three times after the CMC and

expressed dissatisfaction with the judicial process and Defendants.

On December 28, 2010, Plaintiff called chambers, spoke with

the undersigned’s law clerk, and stated he was going to “cheat”

despite the undersigned telling him he could not do so, was going to

appeal Judge Moskowitz’s dismissal of his state forgery claim, and

proclaimed: “To hell with what the judge says. I’m coming after

them [Defendants].”

On Thursday, December 30, 2010, at 7:15 p.m., Plaintiff left

a message on chambers voicemail, stated he may have to leave the

state for family reasons, and stated he wanted to meet with the

Court on Monday, January 3, 2011, to discuss his cases. Plaintiff

expressed impatience at the pace of the litigation and stated: “We

have to do something. I’m not going out like a sucker. . . . When

I do come back, I’m gonna hit ‘em double.” Friday, December 31,

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2011, was an observed court holiday and the chambers staff did not

return Plaintiff’s phone call as a result.

On Sunday, January 2, 2011, Plaintiff left a markedly more

agitated message on chambers voicemail and expressed his strong

displeasure that his first message was not returned. He stated:

“I’m not appreciating everything that’s going down and what’s going

down.” He demanded to speak directly to the undersigned and

proclaimed: “I’m standing up for my rights. I’m a veteran and I’m

pissed. I’m very, very, very upset. I don’t like the tactics

they’re trying to pull. I don’t like what the federal courts are

trying to pull. And like I said, I will go to the media.” The

overall tone of this message was threatening, not only towards

Defendants but also towards the Court itself.

In response to Plaintiff’s hostile messages, the Court

convened a status hearing on January 6, 2011, at 8:00 a.m., despite

the fact that the undersigned had the “criminal duty” responsibilities during that week and civil matters are generally not heard as

a result. The Court held the hearing on the record, ordered

Plaintiff’s personal appearance to avoid another disruptive

telephone conference, and allowed counsel for Defendants to appear

telephonically. The Court again took the extraordinary measure of

having United States Marshals personnel present in the courtroom

during a civil proceeding.

Before the Court, Plaintiff was more subdued but nonetheless

expressed his dissatisfaction with what he perceived as stall

tactics and gamesmanship by Defendants. This perception was based

on his belief that he had an ironclad case and his resulting

displeasure that Defendants refused to immediately pay him all of

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the money he demanded. Essentially, Plaintiff was frustrated that

Defendants would not simply capitulate to his demands and actually

wanted to litigate the case. He interpreted all of this as a sign

that they intended to unnecessarily prolong the case. In response,

the Court explained that Defendants had the right to litigate the

cases, just as Plaintiff did, and explained that the scheduling

order was standard and was not a result of Defendants’ desire to

drag the case out. The undersigned further admonished Plaintiff

about the aggressive and threatening nature of his communications

with the Court, advised him that such behavior was not acceptable,

and generally cautioned him that sanctions may be forthcoming for

continued unacceptable behavior. The undersigned also advised

Plaintiff against engaging in further substantive ex parte communications with the Court.

4. March 25, 2011: Discovery Hearing

On March 25, 2011, the undersigned convened a discovery

hearing after Plaintiff apparently refused to answer several special

interrogatories. The Court also learned that Plaintiff continued to

engage in unacceptably aggressive and threatening behavior towards

defense counsel. Specifically, Plaintiff continued to leave

threatening voicemail messages for counsel, including the following

transcribed message from March 16, 2011:

Hey Sam Sherman. How dumb do you think I am? Man

you’re stupid, do you know what? Okay, now I want to

see all the citations I signed. There was only one.

So like I say, and one I didn’t sign, and I never did

sign it, because it started with a J, which was Jerrod

Gresset forged my signature, so I didn’t sign nothing.

So you know what, here’s the deal, I’m gonna fuck you

just for that man. You’re through, okay? Your season

is over with man, I’m telling you. This is fun. I

love this shit. Oh man, this is great. You’re an

idiot man, but it’s gonna be fun. I’m gonna fuck you

for this. I’m going to the library right now and type

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3/ All page number references to documents on the Court’s docket refer to the CM/ECF

pagination, not the document’s native pagination.

7 09CV882, 09CV898, 09CV1141

this shit up, ask for a motion for summary judgment,

and I’m gonna demand [word emphasized] that the judge

give me that summary judgment. Therefore, I take over

the company. Fuck you and the horse you rode in on,

okay. Later.

(Doc. No. 75 at 4.)3/ The Court read this transcribed message to

Plaintiff, who confirmed its accuracy: “Yeah. I was pissed. I was

upset, very upset, because of what they’re trying to do -- motion to

bring people into my life and invade my private life. I don’t like

that. That’s what they’re trying to do. They want to find out my

address, where I live at -“ (Doc. No 83 at 9:11-15.)

After recounting Plaintiff’s continued behavior, the Court

verbally admonished him that continued obstreperous or obstructive

conduct could result in sanctions, including a recommendation that

his cases be terminated. The Court then ordered Plaintiff to

respond to certain special interrogatories with guidance on how he

could answer them.

After the hearing, the undersigned issued a written order

that reiterated the verbal orders above and again specifically, and

in detail, admonished Plaintiff that sanctions could issue. (Doc.

No. 75.) Specifically, Plaintiff was admonished in no uncertain

terms that case-dispositive sanctions could be recommended and

imposed if he continued his unacceptable behavior, failed to

prosecute, or further delayed his three cases. (Id. at 4-6.)

C. Other Examples of Plaintiff’s Behavior

The Court also has had the opportunity to witness Plaintiff’s

general conduct and attitude towards Defendants and their counsel by

examining the various correspondences and discovery responses he has

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4/ For the sake of readability, the undersigned will refrain from the use of “[sic]” when

directly quoting Plaintiff’s writings. All direct quotations appear as written.

8 09CV882, 09CV898, 09CV1141

sent them. Overall, Plaintiff employs a hostile, argumentative tone

and engages in personal attacks, even in his discovery responses.

Sometimes Plaintiff sprinkles barbs and jabs in with responsive

answers, and other times his responses are completely non-responsive. In sum, his writings in general resist cooperation and seek

to make the litigation process as difficult for Defendants as he

possibly can. The following are some illustrative examples:4/

• Find the numbers yourself-lawyers[.] (Doc. No. 88-4 at

16.)

• No, never convicted of a felony, have you, what you are

trying to do is get into my life in which by law has

nothing to do with any of the cases at all, it called

invasion of privacy. (Id.)

• I wasn’t working at that time but, looking for work,

this is bull your going to pay no matter what. (Id. at

20.)

• I stated all facts in the complaints so read that, I’m

not typing this over again period. (Id.)

• U.C.S.D.-phone number is in the book. (Id. at 30.)

• This letter is in response to the special interrogatories that I answered I think fairly enough and this is

just one of your delay tactics will it’s not going to

work. All the questioned were answered your going to

have to work on your part to get the rest. But this is

what you will get from me. (Id. at 37.)

• You will see both papers from U.C.S.D. and Scripps

Hospital (09cv1141) you better come with an offer before

the 15th of March or if I have to wait until July 27th

at 2:00pm it doubles, if we go to trial it triples, and

if you are really as dumb as I think you are and appeal

it quadruples and I can and will do it just try me.

(Id.)

• [I]f your stupid enough to go to trial I’m going to

hammer you under [Section] 1983. (Id.)

• No you have all the forms that are there do some work,

I’m done doing your work for you. (Id. at 55.)

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9 09CV882, 09CV898, 09CV1141

• Look I’ve lost sight in my right eye to the point where

I’m going blind so you better get up off your asses and

get this over with. (Id.)

Moreover, the following examples appear in Plaintiff’s

opposition to the instant motion and reflect the type of

nonsensical, irrelevant rants he engages in:

• You have nothing, Heritage Security attorney are trying

to bring back the case over two years and they don’t

have proof that I was drunk in public or that a crime

was ever committed, and it’s coming back to bit you in

the ass. (Doc. No. 94 at 3.)

• Also this is a racial matter now in which that I’m a

strong willed black man without the major Dollars they

think they can do what they want, but it is not so they

are trying to pay off the SDPD and the state courts

with there money because or so-called campaign contributions to the city attorney’s office or have the city

attorney office due favors for Higgs, Fletcher, Mack

you will see [J]udge Gallo and [J]udge Moskowitz from

this called drunk in public case with no M number or

date when this event accurred one hand washes the

other, how desperate and crooked Higgs, Fletcher, Mack

are. (Id. (emphasis in original).)

• I’m going to sue the San Diego City Attorney’s Office

and also the law firm of Higgs, Fletcher, Mack and for

discriminatory acts against me and also have Sam

Sherman disbarred watch how I do this and watch how I

tear apart Higgs, Fletcher, Mack they don’t have any

blacks working for them at all. They discriminate

against our race in ways watch. Fletcher, Higgs, and

Mack tried to already come at me before with bogus

stuff and there trying again and this time there going

down there mad because there getting their butts hand

to them and they did not expect this, SURPRISE. (Doc.

No. 94-1 at 7 (emphasis in original).)

D. Developments Since The March 25, 2011, Hearing

Two developments since the March 25, 2011, hearing form the

basis for Heritage’s motion: (1) Plaintiff’s continued refusal to

respond to interrogatories despite a court order and (2) Plaintiff’s

lie about being represented by counsel to successfully avoid being

deposed. Each will briefly be set forth immediately below, but

discussed more fully in Section II.

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1. Refusal to Respond to Interrogatories

At the March 25, 2011, discovery hearing, the undersigned

ordered Plaintiff to supplement his interrogatory responses to (1)

provide his home address, (2) identify his lost wages damages and

how he calculated them, and (3) identify any witnesses or state that

he does not know the identity of any witnesses. (Doc. No. 75 at

1:25-2:2.) Plaintiff continues to refuse to provide Heritage his

home address, but partially responded to the last two interrogatories. As to the damages interrogatory, Plaintiff identified his

damages but did not identify how he calculated them. As for the

witness interrogatory, without stating that he does not know the

identity of any witnesses, he states that he could not see any

witnesses because he was face-down on the ground as the security

officers took him into custody.

As explained below, Plaintiff’s answer to the latter two

interrogatories appear acceptable given Plaintiff’s pro se status.

However, the undersigned views Plaintiff’s continued refusal to

provide his home address a violation of a direct court order and a

deprivation of Heritage’s ability to investigate Plaintiff’s claims

and defend itself.

2. Plaintiff Lied to Avoid Deposition

In early 2011, Plaintiff foreshadowed that he would avoid

being deposed. In the concluding paragraph of a February 27, 2011,

letter that supplemented discovery responses, he wrote: “This is

all your getting from me move on I don’t have to give you anything

else unless you ask for a deposition in person in which your not

going to get, just tell owner of heritage security to give it up or

I going to take his company.” (Doc. No. 88-4 at 56.) Then, when

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5/ The correct spelling of this attorney’s last name is actually “Spears.”

11 09CV882, 09CV898, 09CV1141

the time for his deposition finally arrived, Plaintiff appeared

alone on April 28, 2011, and stated he had found legal counsel who

had advised him to not answer any questions. Plaintiff identified

his counsel as “Alan Speers.”5/ Based on this representation,

Defendants, who had arranged for the presence of both a stenographer

and a videographer, immediately ceased the deposition in order to

avoid continued contact with a represented party and memorialized

these events on the record:

The time is now 10:10, and Mr. Lowry has appeared

at the deposition. He indicates he will not go forward

with the deposition, that he’s retained an attorney.

The attorney’s name is Alan Speers, S-p-e-e-r-s, with

the Law Offices of Alan Speers.

I’ve tried to contact Mr. Speers and left a

message for him on his cell phone. Apparently, Mr.

Speers has indicated to Mr. Lowry that he’s not to say

anything at this deposition, so he does not intend to.

So the deposition will not go forward, and we will

renotice the deposition through Mr. Speers.

I’ll just point out that there has not been a

substitution of attorneys filed in this case nor has

Mr. Speers tried to contact my office to advise that

he’s now serving as counsel of record to Mr. Lowry.

(Ex. K to Motion, Transcript of Deposition, Doc. No. 88-4 at 70-71.)

Counsel then asked Plaintiff whether he was going to say anything,

and Plaintiff silently shook his head. (Id. at 71.)

After the failed deposition, counsel was able to speak with

Mr. Spears, who “emphatically denied he represented Plaintiff and

denied advising Plaintiff not to testify.” (Motion, Doc. No. 88-1

at 4.) Mr. Spears graciously appeared at the June 20, 2011,

sanctions hearing and provided on-the-record testimony about his

actual conversation with Plaintiff.

Mr. Spears testified that he first met Plaintiff as he ate an

omelet at a Denny’s restaurant in National City at 4:00 a.m. on

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6/ Easter Sunday fell on April 24, 2011, this year.

12 09CV882, 09CV898, 09CV1141

Easter Sunday.6/ Their conversation initially centered on their

common experience in the military, and Mr. Spears eventually told

Plaintiff that he was an attorney. Plaintiff informed Mr. Spears

that he had to attend a deposition in the coming week and had been

having difficulty finding an attorney to represent him. Plaintiff

asked whether Mr. Spears was willing to represent him, and Mr.

Spears responded that he would evaluate Plaintiff’s case and would

then determine if he would represent him. Mr. Spears gave Plaintiff

a personal contact card and instructed him to drop off any paperwork

he had at Mr. Spears’s office for review.

At the sanctions hearing, the Court questioned Mr. Spears

about meeting Plaintiff and what he specifically conveyed to

Plaintiff. With respect to Plaintiff’s representation that Mr.

Spears represented him, the Court engaged Mr. Spears in the

following questioning:

THE COURT: Mr. Lowry represented -- and you touched

on this already but let me ask you specifically – Mr.

Lowry represented at the deposition that he had

retained an attorney or hired an attorney or is now

represented by an attorney or words to that effect.

During your brief meeting with Mr. Lowry at the

Denny’s on Easter Sunday, did you at any time represent to Mr. Lowry that you were now his attorney,

retained or otherwise?

MR. SPEARS: Absolutely not, your Honor. . . . .

THE COURT: Did you say anything -- looking back in

your mind’s eye, did you say or do anything that

could have conveyed the impression to Mr. Lowry that

you are now his attorney and had entered into an

attorney-client relationship with him?

MR. SPEARS: Absolutely not, your Honor. I told him

I wouldn’t do anything until I had a chance to look

over the pleadings. He said he’d make an entire copy

of his file. He’d bring it by the office. I told

him if he did that, I would be happy to take a look

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at it, discuss it with my law partner, and set him up

for an appointment.

(Transcript of Hearing, Doc. No. 98 at 21:21-22:19.)

With respect to the Plaintiff’s representation that Mr.

Spears instructed him not to answer deposition questions, Mr. Spears

testified: 

Mr. Spears: . . . . I never told him not to testify at

a deposition. I’ve been a member of the bar of this

court since a long time ago, and I knew -- I know better

than to tell a person not to testify at a scheduled

deposition, your Honor.

. . . .

THE COURT: Mr. Lowry also had indicated that on April

28th, the day of the deposition, that he was instructed

not to answer any questions. Did you represent -- you

already talked about this a moment ago, but did you

specifically tell him that he was not to answer any

questions at the deposition?

MR. SPEARS: Absolutely not, your Honor.

THE COURT: Did you even discuss the deposition and what

he should or shouldn’t do there?

MR. SPEARS: No, your Honor, other than the fact that I

told him that he might want to consider -- he said, “I

have a deposition next week,” or whenever the deposition

was set. I said, “Well, you might want to consider

asking the other side for a continuance.” That was all

that I said in relation to the deposition.

THE COURT: Is there anything -- again, asking you to

look back, is there anything that you said or did that

could have conveyed the message that Mr. Lowry should not

have and shouldn’t answer any questions when he arrived

at the deposition?

MR. SPEARS: Absolutely not, your Honor.

(Id. at 20:4-8; 23:9-24:4.) Mr. Spears also testified that

Plaintiff did not appear confused about what Mr. Spears meant by

“asking the other side for a continuance” and did not ask any

follow-up questions about how he could go about doing so. (Id. at

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27:22-28:9.) In fact, Mr. Spears believed Plaintiff knew what this

meant: “Mr. Lowry spontaneously told me that he was an experienced

paralegal and that he had been conducting this litigation in pro

per, and he seemed, what little bit I did speak with him, fairly

conversant in some legal terms, so I didn’t get into [how to seek a

continuance] with him.” (Id. at 28:1-5.)

After Mr. Spears’s testimony, the undersigned questioned

Plaintiff about the representations he had made to Heritage’s

counsel at the deposition and the basis for his statements:

THE COURT: And did you believe that Mr. Spears was your

attorney after that 10- or 15-minute conversation?

MR. LOWRY: In a way -- in a way --

THE COURT: Let me finish the question before you

respond, all right? Did you believe that Mr. Spears was

your attorney? He represented you?

MR. LOWRY: In a way, I thought that he, you know, he

expressed interest. He expressed interest, you know. Me

thinking -- I just wanted help.

THE COURT: I understand that, but did you think that he

was your attorney as of that day?

MR. LOWRY: I don’t know. I can’t say. I don’t know.

He talked like he could, but I don’t know. I just –- you

know, it was 4:00 o’clock in the morning.

THE COURT: All right. Now, did Mr. Spears tell you not

to answer questions at your deposition?

MR. LOWRY: No, he didn’t tell me, and he told me like

this that I could take the time, yeah, to push it back.

I’m -- I wasn’t trying to do anything illegal by that.

THE COURT: I’m not asking you that.

MR. LOWRY: Yeah, but --

THE COURT: But did you contact the attorneys for

Heritage or MTS and ask for a delay in the deposition?

MR. LOWRY: No, I didn’t. No.

THE COURT: And when you got to the deposition, did you

ask for a delay at that point?

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MR. LOWRY: I -- to retain counsel.

THE COURT: No. No.

MR. LOWRY: To retain counsel.

THE COURT: Well, from what I’ve read, you told them that

you were not going to answer any questions because your

attorney told you not to answer questions.

MR. LOWRY: I stated -- well, yeah, I did state it like

that, but I should have stated it another way. Like I

told you, I’m not the most experienced person in the

world.

THE COURT: Yeah, but the truth is the truth.

MR. LOWRY: Yeah.

THE COURT: You don’t have to be experienced to tell the

truth.

MR. LOWRY: Yeah. Well, that’s what I stated, and, like

I say, I wasn’t trying to delay anything. They can ask

any questions they want, but the questions that I stated

in my complaints are the truth, and that’s all I have to

state right there. . . . .

THE COURT: But you -- but you lied to the attorneys for

Heritage --

MR. LOWRY: I didn’t lie to them.

THE COURT: -- saying that you had an attorney, and your

attorney told you not to answer questions at the deposition.

MR. LOWRY: I did not lie to them about that. No, I

didn’t. They might have misconstrued it, but I didn’t

lie about it. I --

THE COURT: What did you tell them, then?

MR. LOWRY: Okay. What I told them that I found out, you

know, that I don’t have to answer any of the questions

that I -- any of the questions at the deposition. They

even stated -- they even stated that, you know, I can

leave at any time of the deposition if the questions were

too hard or whatever or, you know, the questions you feel

that are used as trick questions, but MTS was conducting

this. Now, I’m not trying to hide nothing. I ain’t got

nothing to hide. I have nothing to hide at all, and as

far as the deposition is going -- was to go, I wasn’t

ready. I wasn’t ready for it. Mentally -- no. Mentally

I wasn’t ready. And I should have said continuance, used

a different word. I’m not trying to delay everything.

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That’s what they’re saying -- I’m trying to delay the

process. No, I’m not. What they tried to do was spy on

me.

THE COURT: I’m not asking you about that.

MR. LOWRY: No, but I’m just saying that.

THE COURT: Mr. Lowry, I’m asking you about the deposition.

MR. LOWRY: Yeah, but I wasn’t trying to delay the

process, and I didn’t, you know, as far as lie to them,

no. I just --

THE COURT: But you did tell them --

MR. LOWRY: -- they -- I did show them the card, who I

talked to.

THE COURT: So you told them that you had an attorney,

his name was Alan Spears, and he told you not to answer

any questions. That’s what you said. Is that right or

wrong?

MR. LOWRY: He didn’t tell me as far as answering no

questions. He didn’t say that.

THE COURT: I’m not asking you what he told you. I’m

asking you what you told the attorneys at the deposition.

MR. LOWRY: What I told the attorneys at the deposition

is that I’m trying to retain counsel. That’s all. With

counsel -- I’m allowed to have counsel . . . .

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LOWRY: But, no, hold on. I didn’t lie about

anything. I didn’t. I’m trying to retain him. And I

think that’s fair. . . . .

. . . .

MR. LOWRY: That’s all I was trying to do, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, did you tell them that you were trying

to retain counsel or that you in fact had retained

counsel and that his name was Alan Spears, and that Alan

Spears told you not to answer any questions?

MR. LOWRY: Alan Spears stated that “you really don’t

have to answer anything. You’re trying to retain

counsel. You can put it off.” I should have said that,

your Honor. I should have said that, yes. I should have

said it. I should have said it, but --

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THE COURT: All right, Mr. Lowry.

MR. LOWRY: -- I’m just trying to put it off. That’s

all. I’m not trying to, you know, like I say, deceive

the Court or deceive them at all. At all.

(Id. at 39:19-44:6 (emphasis added).)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court may impose broad discovery sanctions for failure to

obey a court order that compels discovery, up to and including

“dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v).

Dismissal and default are appropriate only when circumstances

evidence willful disobedience of court orders or bad faith conduct.

Fjelstad v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 762 F.2d 1334, 1337 (9th Cir.

1985). “‘[D]isobedient conduct not shown to be outside the control

of the litigant’ is all that is required to demonstrate willfulness,

bad faith, or fault.” Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 948

(9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Fjelstad, 762 F.2d at 1341). The Court may

consider the party’s motivations, and can consider his “dilatory and

obstructive conduct” in the case and other related cases. See Smith

v. Smith, 145 F.3d 335, 344 (5th Cir. 1998).

In addition to a finding of willfulness or bad faith, the

Ninth Circuit has provided the following five nonexclusive factors

that the sanctioning court may use to determine whether casedispositive sanctions are just:

(1) [T]he public’s interest in expeditious resolution of 

 litigation;

(2) the court’s need to manage its dockets;

(3) the risk of prejudice to the party seeking sanctions;

(4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their

 merits; and

(5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.

Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 482 F.3d

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1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2007). Because “factors 1 and 2 support

sanctions and 4 cuts against case-dispositive sanctions, . . .

[factors] 3 and 5, prejudice and availability of less drastic

sanctions, are decisive.” Valley Eng’rs v. Electric Eng’g Co., 158

F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1998). Further, “factor 5 involves

consideration of three subparts: whether the court explicitly

discussed alternative sanctions, whether it tried them, and whether

it warned the recalcitrant party about the possibility of dismissal.” Id. “[W]hat is most critical for case-dispositive

sanctions, regarding risk of prejudice and of less drastic sanctions, is whether the discovery violations ‘threaten to interfere

with the rightful decision of the case.’” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Since the March 25, 2011, discovery hearing, Plaintiff

continued to engage in unacceptable conduct, and Heritage continues

to incur costs and attorneys’ fees in an attempt to defend itself.

As a result, Heritage’s pursuit to defend itself has become

exceedingly and unreasonably difficult thanks to Plaintiff’s active

efforts to delay and obstruct the litigation process. Plaintiff

violated a court order and actively lied about being represented by

counsel to avoid being deposed. Moreover, Plaintiff lied to the

undersigned in open court at the sanctions hearing. These acts,

Plaintiff’s previous conduct, the inefficacy of the Court’s warnings

and orders, and the anticipated inefficacy of lesser sanctions all

combine to inform the undersigned’s strong belief that the only

sanction that is practically available to the Court is to dismiss

Plaintiff’s cases against Heritage.

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A. Plaintiff Has Acted With Willful Disobedience and Bad Faith

Heritage bases its motion on (1) Plaintiff’s willful

disobedience of the Court’s March 25, 2011, order that he respond to

certain interrogatories and (2) his bad faith conduct in connection

with his deposition. The undersigned addresses each in turn.

1. Willful Disobedience of Court Order

On March 25, 2011, the Court ordered Plaintiff to provide

supplemental responses to the three special interrogatories below.

Although it appears Plaintiff technically failed to fully respond to

two of the three interrogatories, the undersigned is most concerned

about Plaintiff’s refusal to provide Heritage his residence address.

a. Request for Identification of Witnesses

Special Interrogatory 14 in the 09-CV-898-BTM(WVG) case asks

that Plaintiff “state the name, address, and telephone number of

all” witnesses. (Ex. B, Doc. No 88-4 at 11.) Plaintiff’s original

and pre-hearing supplemental responses were essentially vague

references to people who were generally in the area when he and

security personnel clashed.

At the March 25, 2011 discovery hearing, the Court asked

Plaintiff whether he knew the names of any persons who potentially

witnessed the events in his amended complaints. He stated that he

could not identify any witnesses. The Court instructed him to

supplement his response and to merely state that he did not know who

the witnesses were. It was clear to all that he could not identify

any witnesses. Plaintiff’s subsequent supplemental response, though

more verbose and confusing than necessary, essentially followed the

Court’s direction and more or less responded that he did not know

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who the witnesses were. (Ex. I, Doc. No. 88-4 at 64.) Heritage now

claims that this supplemental response is incomplete.

Technically, Heritage is correct. Plaintiff did not

expressly state that he did not know who the witnesses were, as the

Court instructed him to do. Rather, he states that he could not see

any witnesses, which necessarily implies he cannot identify them.

The undersigned is not concerned with Plaintiff’s response to this

interrogatory because it is abundantly clear to everyone that

Plaintiff cannot identify any witnesses. He stated as much on the

record at the March 25, 2011, discovery hearing. As a result, the

undersigned does not view Plaintiff’s response to this interrogatory

as a material violation--though it is a technical violation--of the

discovery order.

b. Request for Amount and Calculation of Damages

Special Interrogatory 18 in the 09-CV-898-BTM(WVG) case asks

Plaintiff to “state the amount of lost income” he claims and explain

“how that amount was calculated.” (Ex. B, Doc. No 88-4 at 12.)

Plaintiff originally defiantly refused to respond: “The amount that

was calculated should not matter Heritage Security will be taught a

valuable lesson this millions of dollars no matter what.” (Doc. No.

88-4 at 20.) He then supplemented his response but still provided

no specifics. (Doc. No. 88-4 at 38, 56.)

At the discovery hearing, the undersigned provided Plaintiff

the following guidance on how to respond: “You’re getting a little

closer to what we’re talking about here, but what we’re talking

about is, tell me how much you lost, $1,000, $2,000, [$]100,000 -

whatever it is.” (Doc. No. 83 at 27.) Plaintiff was also instructed to explain how he calculated his claimed lost wages. (Id.)

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After the hearing, Plaintiff provided the following supplemental

response on March 28, 2011:

I would have made $15.00hr as a forklift operator but for

some reason be on my control they do back round checks

and come to find out Heritage and Metropolitan Transit at

the time I was fighting the first case was trying to find

work at the same time some how the company found out that

I was still fighting the first case, but add the hospital

bill along with what I could have made six to eight weeks

over $7,000.00 along with the hospital bill which totaled

over $5,000.00. This is my answer to interrogatory 18

(09cv0989) but in punitive and compensatory damages it

will run to millions.

(Ex. I, Doc. No. 88-4 at 64.) From this response, the Court gathers

that Plaintiff claims a total of $2,000 ($7,000 total loss minus

$5,000 hospital bill) in lost wages that he would have earned over

the course of six to eight weeks as a forklift operator making

$15.00 per hour. Given that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, this

response is sufficiently responsive and complies with the Court’s

order. Although Plaintiff does not provide the method he used to

arrive at the $2,000 figure, reverse calculation of that number is

possible based on the other information he provides. Because it

appears Plaintiff did his best to provide an answer, the undersigned

does not believe Plaintiff’s supplemental response is a willful

violation of a court order.

c. Request For Plaintiff’s Residence Address

Special Interrogatory 4 propounded in the 09-CV-1141-BTM(WVG)

case simply asks Plaintiff to state his “present residential

address.” (Doc. No 88-4 at 5.) This interrogatory is routinely

propounded in civil cases, but Plaintiff has refused to answer it

because he does not wish to be investigated or surveiled. The

undersigned deems Plaintiff’s continued refusal to answer this

interrogatory a direct violation of a court order.

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At the March 25, 2011, discovery hearing, the Court accepted

Heritage’s proffered reason for this interrogatory’s relevance and

ordered Plaintiff, both verbally and in writing, to respond. (Doc.

No. 75 at 2:1-2; Doc. No. 83 at 32:1-8.)

On March 28, 2011, Plaintiff served the following supplemental response:

This is the answers for the Interrogatories that I’ve already

I’m staying with friends who have let me use there motor home

to stay and they don’t want know one snooping around there

house or asking questions about me so I’ve given you the best

that I could, I’m not violating there right to privacy at

all, you wanted to know where I was staying and the motor

home is very nice, that’s all you can get from me right now.

I will not jeopardize my friendship for this attorney. This

is my answer to interrogatory No. 4 (09cv1141).

(Ex. I to Motion, Doc. No. 88-4 at 63-64.) This answer followed

multiple meet and confer efforts by Heritage, multiple supplemental

responses, a hearing, and the Court’s direct order that Plaintiff

provide his address. In the March 25, 2011, hearing, Plaintiff

stated he understood that he was to provide Defendants his residence

address. (Doc. No. 83 at 32.)

At the sanctions hearing, Plaintiff explained why he refused

to prove his home address, as the Court ordered him to do:

I gave them an address. I stayed with my friend in his

motorhome, but I did not want to get his family involved in

and them trying to follow me around. That’s what they

basically wanted to do, and it’s an invasion of privacy,

especially my friend’s family. He has kids.

(Doc. No. 98 at 31:8-13.) However, Plaintiff did not provide

Heritage an address; merely stating that one lives in a motor home

somewhere fails to disclose the precise location of the motor home.

In response, Heritage provided the following explanation for the

necessity of Plaintiff’s home address:

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Mr. Lowry’s going to be able to say, “Well, I make

claims for continuing eye injuries, continuing vision

problems,” and we can’t conduct any sub rosa to see

if that’s true or not, to see what sort of activities

Mr. Lowry’s engaging in. Meanwhile, we have medical

records that indicate in fact the doctors can’t

explain how Mr. Lowry has these subjective complaints

of eye injuries and how his eye injuries haven’t

fully healed.

(Id. at 49:18-25.) In other words, Heritage needs an avenue to

investigate Plaintiff’s unsubstantiated and medically inexplicable

persisting injuries. Heritage’s explanation for why it needs

Plaintiff’s address is more than reasonable and is precisely why the

undersigned originally ordered Plaintiff to disclose his address.

Plaintiff has invoked an unspecified blanket right to privacy on his

own behalf and on behalf of the family with whom he lives. However,

Heritage has no interest whatsoever in the host family--only

Plaintiff. Any privacy interest Plaintiff has in his own residence

address is not absolute, as Plaintiff wishes, and in this case is

overwhelmed by Heritage’s compelling reasons: relevance grounds,

Plaintiff’s unexplained injuries, and Heritage’s right to garner

information to defend itself in the three cases that Plaintiff

himself brought. See generally Ragge v. MCA/Universal, 165 F.R.D.

601, 604-05 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (discussing balancing of interests).

Unlike the other interrogatories at issue, the undersigned

does not consider trivial Plaintiff’s past and continued refusal to

answer this interrogatory. Defendants are entitled to investigate

Plaintiff himself in order to develop defense strategy, including

potential information for impeachment purposes. Without Plaintiff’s

residence address, Heritage is deprived of an entire avenue of

litigation strategy that could lead to the discovery of admissible

evidence or develop information that could assist in their defense.

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7/ The Court does not share Plaintiff’s concern that his safety may be at jeopardy if he

discloses his address. Defendants and their counsel have not given the Court any reason

to believe that Plaintiff’s physical well-being is in jeopardy.

8/ The Court asked Plaintiff whether he specifically received the March 25, 2011,

sanctions warning order. Plaintiff initially emphatically stated that he had received it,

but then went on to theatrically read the order the Court provided him, equivocate whether

he had received it, and respond out loud to the order as he read it.

24 09CV882, 09CV898, 09CV1141

Plaintiff’s staunch refusal to provide this information, in light of

Plaintiff’s alleged eye injuries, thus constitutes a partial

deprivation of Heritage’s right to defend itself.7/ Plaintiff’s

desire not to be surveiled is utterly immaterial. After bringing

three cases against Heritage, he cannot now cabin, without any valid

legal basis, Heritage’s ability to defend itself whenever the urge

strikes him.

Plaintiff’s refusal to provide his residence address

apparently also has created other practical problems, as his current

mailing address on the Court’s docket is a P.O. Box in National

City, CA. However, Heritage’s counsel recently declared that his

office had served Plaintiff with a copy of their opposition to his

summary judgment motion, but that it was returned as “unclaimed.”

(Doc. No. 92 at 1-2, 20.) Heritage re-served its opposition on June

2, 2011, to ensure that Plaintiff has a fair opportunity to reply.

Had Heritage known Plaintiff’s residence address, they simply could

have mailed the opposition to that address. However, despite

Plaintiff’s reassurance that his P.O. Box remains a valid mailing

address, both the Court and Heritage are now left to wonder whether

he will receive future orders, notices, or other paperwork critical

to his cases.8/

The undersigned deems Plaintiff’s continued refusal to

provide his residence address, despite his understanding that he was

ordered to provide it, a direct and willful violation of a court

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order. No ambiguity existed in the Court’s order that he was to

provide his “present address, where [he went] every day to live.”

(Doc. No. 83 at 32.) Plaintiff expressed no confusion about the

Court’s order and stated three times that he understood what he

needed to do. (Doc. No. 83 at 32 (“Okay,” “I got you,” and “No

problem.”).) Given that he fully understood the Court’s order, the

undersigned can interpret Plaintiff’s defiant supplemental response

above only to mean that he has chosen not to comply.

2. Bad Faith Conduct

Heritage also argues that Plaintiff’s conduct in successfully

avoiding deposition constitutes bad faith conduct. Heritage argues

that the events recounted above lead to the conclusion that

“Plaintiff lied about retaining counsel simply to avoid testifying

at his deposition. This deceptive tactic was designed to delay,

disrupt and stifle discovery. If this litigation is allowed to

proceed, Plaintiff will certainly continue to evade discovery[,]

making it impossible for Heritage to defend itself.” (Doc. No. 88-1

at 4.) The undersigned finds that the weight of evidence overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that Plaintiff lied and acted in bad

faith to avoid deposition and frustrate Heritage’s pursuit of the

truth.

Plaintiff’s testimony at the sanctions hearing reveals at

best that he was not mentally prepared for the deposition and at

worst that this was yet another intentional ploy to obstruct

Defendants’ legitimate efforts at obtaining discovery. (Doc. No. 98

at 42:8-10.) He admitted that he did not have any basis to believe

that Mr. Spears actually represented him. (Id. at 39:22-40:7 (“I

don’t know. I can’t say. I don’t know. He talked like he could,

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but I don’t know. I just –- you know, it was 4:00 o’clock in the

morning.”).) Plaintiff’s equivocal testimony, juxtaposed with Mr.

Spears’s credible testimony, leaves no doubt in the undersigned’s

mind that Plaintiff did not mistakenly believe that Mr. Spears

represented him, especially since Mr. Spears told Plaintiff that he

would first review Plaintiff’s files and then discuss representation. (Doc. No. 98 at 23:18-23.) Despite lacking a valid basis to

believe Mr. Spears represented him, Plaintiff appeared at deposition

and told counsel that he was then represented by counsel and that

counsel had advised him not to answer any deposition questions.

There is no doubt that Plaintiff did this, and Plaintiff did not

object whatsoever at the deposition when counsel stated on the

record “that [Plaintiff has] retained an attorney. The attorney’s

name is Alan Speers . . . with the Law Offices of Alan Speers. . .

. . Apparently, Mr. Speers has indicated to Mr. Lowry that he’s not

to say anything at this deposition, so he does not intend to.”

(Doc. No. 88-4 at 70-71.) Nonetheless, Plaintiff appeared before

the Court and lied directly to the Court twice about what he told

counsel on that day: “What I told them that I found out, you know,

that I don’t have to answer any of the questions that I –- any of

the questions at the deposition,” and “What I told the attorneys at

the deposition is that I’m trying to retain counsel. That’s all.”

(Doc. No. 98 at 41:24-42:1; 43:8-10.) These blatant falsehoods are

directly contradicted by the deposition transcript as well as

counsel’s testimony at the sanctions hearing. (See id. at 56:23-

60:18 (testimony of attorney Robert Fitzpatrick).) Plaintiff

clearly said much more than he will admit even to the Court.

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Plaintiff also admitted that Mr. Spears in fact did not

advise him to not answer deposition questions. (Id. at 43:3-4 (“No,

he didn’t tell me, and he told me like this that I could take the

time, yeah, to push it back.”).) Although he concedes that he

should have asked for a continuance, (id. at 43:23-44:2), the fact

remains that the actual words he used conveyed a wildly different--

and untrue--message. Instead, without any basis in truth, he

represented that he was then-presently represented by an attorney

and that attorney had told him not to answer any questions. The

undersigned can come to no other conclusion other than Plaintiff in

fact knowingly lied to avoid being deposed because he was not

“mentally” prepared.

Based on the above, the undersigned finds overwhelming

evidence that Plaintiff engaged in bad faith conduct in order to

avoid being deposed. He lied both about being represented by

counsel and about counsel’s advice that he should say nothing at the

deposition. Even assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff was somehow

mistaken that Mr. Spears represented him, he could not possibly have

been mistaken about Mr. Spears’s alleged advice, as counsel stated

in no uncertain terms that he never advised Plaintiff to not answer

deposition questions. The undersigned completely accepts Mr.

Spears’s representation, as he in fact would not have had any legal

to give such advice. Moreover, at the sanctions hearing, Plaintiff

admitted that Mr. Spears did not advise him to avoid questioning.

Plaintiff’s intentionally deceitful conduct resulted in

unnecessary expense to Defendants, yet another delay of the

litigation process, and, more significantly, the frustration of

Heritage’s ability to engage in one of the most widely-used and

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9/ The undersigned acknowledges that these factors are not “a mechanical means of

determining what discovery sanction is just, . . . a series of conditions precedent before

the judge can do anything, [or] a script for making what the district judge does

appeal-proof,” but merely “a way for a district judge to think about what to do.” Valley

Eng’rs v. Elec. Eng’g Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1998). Nonetheless, these factors

demonstrate that dismissal is just under the circumstances here.

28 09CV882, 09CV898, 09CV1141

informative discovery tools used in litigation today. Based on the

foregoing, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s conduct was in bad

faith.

B. Terminating Sanctions Are Appropriate

After considering the five factors that bear on whether case

dispositive sanctions are just, the undersigned concludes that

dismissal is a just and appropriate sanction.9/

1. Public Interest in Expeditious Resolution of Litigation

This factor weighs in favor of dismissal, as Plaintiff’s past

and anticipated future conduct is the antithesis of expeditious

resolution. Plaintiff has unnecessarily undermined the smooth flow

of litigation, and the undersigned fully anticipates that he will

continue to do so in the future. Although Plaintiff routinely

professes that he desires to resolve these cases quickly, his own

actions have caused the opposite result. Plaintiff’s adamant belief

to the contrary notwithstanding, Defendants have done nothing to

delay these cases. Moreover, Plaintiff’s vision of a quick

resolution is simply that Heritage pays him all, or substantially

all, of the money he demands, which is in the multi-million dollar

range. Therefore, were Plaintiff’s cases allowed to proceed, the

public’s interest in expeditious resolution of cases will very

likely not be satisfied.

2. The Court’s Need To Manage Its Docket

The Court’s need to manage its docket is great, as the

Southern District of California is one of the busiest districts in

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the nation. Despite the Court’s impacted docket, Plaintiff’s

behavior has necessitated the Court’s direct intervention on

multiple occasions to referee disputes that ordinarily do not

materialize in the vast majority of civil cases on the Court’s

calendar. Further, Plaintiff’s numerous ex parte communications

with chambers have consumed additional Court resources. The

undersigned fully expects that Plaintiff’s three cases will continue

to require its active supervision. The undersigned is mindful that

Plaintiff is representing himself and that pro se litigants often

require extra attention and time. This is not a problem, and the

undersigned welcomes the opportunity to assist pro se litigants to

the extent that fairness, neutrality, and impartiality allow.

However, Plaintiff has taken advantage of the Court’s resources,

willingness to allow him leeway, and repeatedly has broken his

promises to conduct himself in a civil and courteous manner in his

dealing with the Court and counsel. His behavior has resulted in

several unnecessary court appearances and the issuance of orders, as

well as this extensive Report and Recommendation, that ordinarily do

not issue, even in other pro se cases. In the future, such a high

level of supervision will necessarily consume judicial resources

that could be devoted to other matters.

3. Prejudice to Other Parties From the Discovery Violations

“A defendant suffers prejudice if the plaintiff’s actions

impair the defendant’s ability to go to trial or threaten to

interfere with the rightful decision of the case.” Adriana Int’l

Corp. v. Lewis & Co., 913 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1990); see also

Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 1993). The

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foregoing quote succinctly and accurately reflects the prejudice

Heritage has suffered and will continue to suffer.

 Plaintiff’s home address is material to Heritage’s defenses

because it allows Heritage to explore an avenue of defense strategy

available to them. Parties routinely provide this information to

litigation opponents in response to the routine interrogatory

Heritage propounded. Plaintiff’s belief to the contrary notwithstanding, the request for his address is not extraordinary.

Heritage’s inability to pursue this avenue of investigation results

in its lessened ability to mount a complete defense, a result that

will prejudice the company. This is especially true here, where

Plaintiff’s complaints of persisting eye injuries, which bear

directly on his damages claim, are apparently medically unsupported

and unexplained.

Plaintiff’s overall conduct in this case also plays a role in

the undersigned’s analysis. Plaintiff has conducted himself

throughout this litigation in an aggressive, defiant manner that has

led to unnecessary delay of the litigation process and difficulty

for Heritage. He has cooperated only when he felt like doing so and

defied a court order because he disagrees with it. The net result

of his conduct is delay of the case and subversion of the truthfinding process, which will ultimately result in Heritage’s

inability to completely defend itself at trial. Discovery is a

crucial part of litigation and allows each party the opportunity to

obtain information and evidence to prove its case or defend itself.

But when one party obstructs the process to such a degree that

another party cannot engage in discovery, the prevented party

ultimately cannot fully defend itself.

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28 10/ Although the Court could order Plaintiff’s deposition, Plaintiff’s demonstrated

ability and willingness to lie and obstruct the process casts doubt over any testimony he

may provide.

31 09CV882, 09CV898, 09CV1141

In addition to Plaintiff’s conduct throughout this case, the

undersigned is also very troubled by Plaintiff’s deceptive actions

at his deposition in particular. Plaintiff both lied and prevented

Heritage from taking his deposition. If Heritage cannot depose

Plaintiff, it cannot pursue a critical litigation tool and cannot

muster evidence in its own defense as a result. Heritage’s

inability to do so not only prejudices the company, it does so in a

severe manner. More significantly, however, Plaintiff’s very act of

lying casts a pall of doubt over everything Plaintiff says and does

in the future and “threaten[s] to interfere with the rightful

decision of the case.” To compound his lie at deposition, Plaintiff

is also willing to lie to the Court. The litigation process is one

of truthfinding. When one party takes it upon himself to subvert

the truth, the outcome of the case is tainted by doubt and fairness

suffers.

Finally, it is abundantly clear that the Court’s orders have

little to no impact on Plaintiff’s behavior, and he will continue

his behavior into the future. Plaintiff has unnecessarily made the

discovery process excruciatingly difficult, if not impossible. Even

if Plaintiff sits for deposition, the Court is certain that he will

make every effort to disrupt the deposition, avoid answering

questions, respond with extreme aggression or argument, and to

generally disrupt Heritage’s pursuit of any information that could

even remotely help in its defense.10/ This strategy has been

Plaintiff’s modus operandi throughout this case, as evidenced by his

correspondences, discovery responses, and other conduct, and there

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11/ The root cause of this inability is, as the undersigned told Plaintiff at the October

2010 ENE, his intense emotions and detestation for Defendants and their counsel.

32 09CV882, 09CV898, 09CV1141

is absolutely no reason to believe he can constructively participate

in the future.11/ Moreover, Plaintiff will lie if he believes doing

so would benefit him.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals long ago saliently

explained the rationale for imposing terminating sanctions for a

plaintiff’s obstructive behavior during discovery. The Court wrote:

Appellants advance the argument that it was error for

the trial court to penalize them with . . . dismissal

without first ordering them to appear for their

scheduled depositions. Rule 37 sanctions are contemplated when there has been virtually total noncompliance with discovery. Yet, a direct order by the

Court . . . is not a necessary predicate to imposing

penalties under Rule 37(d). When it has been determined that a party has wilfully failed to comply with

the rules of discovery, it is within the discretion

of the trial court to dismiss the action. Litigants

may oppose discovery requests by seeking a protective

order from the court; they cannot be permitted to

frustrate discovery by refusing to comply with a

proper request. For courts to permit litigants to

disregard the responsibilities that attend the

conduct of litigation would be tantamount to “encouraging dilatory tactics.” The dismissal sanction,

although severe, is a necessary tool, both to punish

in the individual action and to deter future abuses

of the discovery process.

Al Barnett & Son, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 611 F.2d 32, 35-36

(3d Cir. 1979) (citations omitted). Without opposing discovery in

Court, Plaintiff has taken it upon himself to dictate how discovery

shall proceed, which interrogatories he wishes to answer and to what

extent he wishes to answer them, and how and when deposition shall

proceed–-or not. Plaintiff operates by his own rules, and the rules

by which Heritage is bound seem to matter little to him.

Not only has Heritage suffered serious prejudice to date, it

will continue to suffer severe prejudice into the future. Such

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prejudice will increase by leaps and bounds as the time for trial

nears and Heritage has not been able to garner information in its

defense.

4. Public Policy Favoring Disposition on The Merits

Although this factor ordinarily cuts against imposing casedispositive sanctions, the undersigned does not believe that this

important public policy would be fulfilled if Plaintiff’s cases are

allowed to continue. Plaintiff’s obstructive conduct will very

likely mean that a true adjudication on the merits may never be

achievable in the end.

5. Whether Less Drastic Sanctions Are Available

On March 25, 2011, the undersigned expressly notified

Plaintiff that case-dispositive sanctions could issue. (Doc. No.

75.) Plaintiff then proceeded to violate a court order, lie, and

evade deposition. The undersigned is certain that any sanction

short of termination of these cases will ultimately fail to reign in

Plaintiff’s conduct or compel him to conform his behavior. This

assessment is based on the undersigned’s observation of Plaintiff;

multiple unheeded warnings, both informally on the telephone and in

person and formally on the record and in written orders; his

continued failure to abide by the Court’s orders; and his active

obstruction of the litigation process. Stern warnings have not

worked, the possibility of lesser sanctions have not worked, and

monetary sanctions will be empty and ineffective because Plaintiff

has qualified to proceed in forma pauperis and does not have any

assets. (See Doc. Nos. 2, 3 (IFP motion and order granting

motion).)

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Moreover, issue and claim preclusion sanctions will also be

ineffective. Heritage will continue to suffer severe prejudice

short of precluding Plaintiff from presenting evidence in support of

all of the issues and claims in this case. This is because

Plaintiff has demonstrated a wholesale and routine propensity to

prevent Heritage from gathering evidence in general in its own

defense. This is not a case where a party violated one isolated

discovery order or refuses to produce just one document, the

punishment for which could be to preclude evidence on a discrete

issue or claim. When a party demonstrates a systematic practice of

obstructing an opposing party’s discovery efforts, selective issue

and claim preclusion will not ameliorate the overall prejudice the

aggrieved party suffers. Plaintiff’s continued obstructive conduct

will necessarily lead to the preclusion of a growing list of issues.

Based on experience and observation, the undersigned can come

to no other conclusion other than the futility of lesser sanctions

and that the only effective or practical solution here is dismissal.

C. This Case Compared to Other Cases

Although termination of a plaintiff’s case pursuant to Rule

37 is one of the most severe of sanctions, courts have imposed this

sanction where appropriate. In the context of depositions, most

cases impose this sanction for missing or avoiding several depositions. What sets the instant cases apart from the ones below is

Plaintiff’s active deceit to thwart deposition, as opposed to

passive avoidance.

In Pioche Mines Consol., Inc. v. Dolman, 333 F.2d 257 (9th

Cir. 1964), the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s entry of

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default against an individually-named defendant after he failed to

appear for several depositions and his counsel informed the court 

that he would not appear for deposition due to poor health. Dolman,

333 F.3d at 266-70. Although there was “doubt as to whether claimed

disability was genuine,” id. at 266, the district court’s entry of

default was not a result of any active deception, but was based,

inter alia, on the defendant’s passive acts of not appearing for

multiple depositions and indicating that he would submit to

deposition on his own terms. See id. at 267-69.

In Hall v. Johnston, 758 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1985), the Ninth

Circuit affirmed entry of default against a defendant who failed to

appear at two noticed depositions without any justification. The

sanctioned party had two opportunities to appear for two noticed

depositions, but failed to appear at both without justification.

Id. at 422. The sole basis for entry of default against the

sanctioned party was his failure to appear at two depositions. See

id. at 424-25. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s entry

of default. Id. at 425. Significantly, beyond missing two

depositions, there is no indication in Hall that the sanctioned

party had acted improperly or in bad faith at any other time during

the life of the case.

More recently, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, although by

unpublished memorandum disposition, a district court’s dismissal

based on “failure to prosecute where [the plaintiff] failed to

respond to discovery requests, attend her deposition, produce

initial disclosures, submit a Pretrial Order, attend the final

Pretrial Conference, or file an opposition to defendant’s Motion for

Terminating Sanctions.” Drumgoole v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 316 Fed.

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Appx. 606, 607 (9th Cir. 2009). All of the above conduct involved

passive behavior such as failing to attend deposition.

Finally, the Seventh Circuit also recently affirmed dismissal

of a pro se plaintiff’s case for his “refusal to sit for a deposition and otherwise comply with discovery,” which included failing to

produce documents. Oliva v. Trans Union, LLC, 123 Fed. Appx. 725,

727 (7th Cir. 2005). Again, this case involved a passive failure to

attend deposition or produce documents, rather than overt deceptive

conduct.

In contrast to the cases above, Heritage’s motion is based

on, inter alia, conduct at only one deposition rather than at

multiple depositions. However, the nature of Plaintiff’s conduct is

significantly more reprehensible, as he took the affirmative, active

step of lying in order to avoid deposition. The act of actively

lying is markedly more sinister than passive avoidance by failing to

appear. Even one demonstrated incident of lying establishes the

capacity and willingness to obstruct the truth finding process,

flouts the integrity of the process, and casts heavy doubt on its

fairness. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Natural Beverage Distribs.,

69 F.3d 337, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing deceit in the

context of the Court’s inherent authority to impose sanctions, not

under Rule 37; “It is well settled that dismissal is warranted

where, as here, a party has engaged deliberately in deceptive

practices that undermine the integrity of judicial proceedings:

‘courts have inherent power to dismiss an action when a party has

willfully deceived the court and engaged in conduct utterly

inconsistent with the orderly administration of justice.’”)

(citation omitted). Plaintiff also lied to the Court at an onCase 3:09-cv-00882-BTM-WVG Document 103 Filed 07/07/11 Page 36 of 38
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record hearing. The Court should not have to wait for more lies to

surface before being able to act. Simply put, Plaintiff’s conduct

in this case has been utterly inconsistent with the orderly

administration of justice, and this case is in line with the

aforementioned cases that have affirmed the imposition of terminating sanctions.

D. Heritage Should Bear Its Own Costs

Heritage seeks $2,467.50 in costs incurred from the failed

deposition. However, based on the balance of equities, the

undersigned recommends that costs not be awarded to Heritage.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that the Court

award Defendants “reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees”

“[i]nstead of or in addition to” terminating sanctions. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). The award of expenses under this rule are

mandatory unless Plaintiff can show that his conduct was “substantially justified” or if “other circumstances make an award of

expenses unjust.” Id. Based on the discussion above, Plaintiff

cannot show that his conduct was justified in any way, much less

substantially so. However, as explained below, other circumstances

render the award of costs unjust.

The practical reality here is that Plaintiff is proceeding in

forma pauperis and has no assets against which Heritage could

collect a costs award. (See Doc. Nos. 2, 3 (IFP motion and order

granting motion).) Further, given Plaintiff’s financial state, any

award against him would likely impose an unjust burden. The

undersigned is aware that Plaintiff may have to travel to the East

Coast for family reasons, and any award against him may prevent him

from doing so. On the other hand, Heritage, a business entity, can

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much more readily absorb its costs. To be sure, the undersigned

does not wish to trivialize the fact that Heritage incurred costs as

a direct result of Plaintiff’s egregious conduct, but the balance of

equities nonetheless favors Heritage bearing its own costs here.

V. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that

Heritage’s motion be GRANTED IN PART and Plaintiff’s claims in all

three cases against Heritage be dismissed. The undersigned further

RECOMMENDS that Heritage’s motion be DENIED IN PART and costs not be

awarded to Heritage.

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section

636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 8, 2011, any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” The parties

are advised that failure to file objections within the specified

time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.

1991).

DATED: July 7, 2011

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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