Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01114/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01114-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

BARD PERIPHERAL VASCULAR, INC., AND 

DAVID GOLDFARB, M.D., 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

AND

C.R. BARD, INC.,

Counterclaim Defendant-Appellee,

v.

W.L. GORE & ASSOCIATES, INC.,

Defendant-Appellant.

______________________ 

2014-1114

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

District of Arizona in No. 2:03-CV-00597-MHM, Judge 

Mary H. Murguia.

______________________ 

Decided: January 13, 2015

______________________ 

MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, of 

Washington, DC, argued for plaintiffs-appellees and 

counterclaim defendant-appellee. With him on the brief 

were JOHN C. O'QUINN, WILLIAM H. BURGESS, DENNIS J.

ABDELNOUR and LIAM P. HARDY; STEVEN C. CHERNY, of 

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2 BARD PERIPHERAL VASCULAR v. W.L. GORE & ASSOCIATES

New York, New York; and JOHN L. STRAND, Wolf, Greenfield & Sacks, P.C., of Boston, Massachusetts. 

JAMES W. PORADEK, Faegre Baker Daniels LLP, of 

Minneapolis, Minnesota, argued for defendant-appellant. 

With him on the brief were TIMOTHY E. GRIMSRUD; JARED 

B. BRIANT and LESLIE B. PRILL, of Denver, Colorado; and 

MICHAEL E. FLOREY and DEANNA REICHEL, Fish & Richardson P.C., of Minneapolis, Minnesota. 

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, NEWMAN and HUGHES, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Chief Judge PROST. 

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge HUGHES. 

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge NEWMAN. 

PROST, Chief Judge. 

W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. (“Gore”) appeals from the 

judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Arizona of willfulness in the infringement of

U.S. Patent No. 6,436,135 (“’135 patent”). For the reasons 

stated below, we affirm.

I 

This dispute began with the filing of the 1974 patent 

application from which the ’135 patent eventually issued—twenty-eight years later. The technology and 

patent claims that have been at issue are thoroughly 

discussed in this court’s previous decisions involving the 

’135 patent and underlying application. See Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 670 F.3d 

1171 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Bard I”); Cooper v. Goldfarb, 240 

F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Cooper II”); Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Cooper I”). 

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BARD PERIPHERAL VASCULAR v. W.L. GORE & ASSOCIATES 3

Briefly, the ’135 patent relates to prosthetic vascular 

grafts made of highly-expanded polytetrafluoroethylene 

(“ePTFE”). The ePTFE material is made of solid nodes of 

PTFE connected by thin PTFE fibrils. It is sold by Gore

under the brand name “Gore-Tex.” The patent generally 

covers a vascular graft formed by ePFTE that is thus 

homogeneously porous—a structure that allows uniform 

cell regrowth to establish a firm integration of the graft 

into the body. The different claims of the patent are 

directed to grafts made of ePTFE with varying internodal 

distances, which are also called fibril lengths.

In 2003, Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. (“BPV”) and 

Dr. David Goldfarb filed suit against Gore for infringement of the ’135 patent. A jury found the ’135 patent 

valid and that Gore willfully infringed, and, in December 

2010, the district court denied Gore’s motions for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) reversing the verdict. 

Gore appealed, and, in February 2012, the panel affirmed. 

Bard I, 670 F.3d at 1193. The en banc court denied 

review but granted rehearing “for the limited purpose of 

authorizing the panel to revise the portion of its opinion 

addressing willfulness.” Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. 

W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 476 F. App’x 747 (Fed. Cir. 

June 14, 2012) (en banc). The panel accordingly vacated 

the parts of its opinion discussing willfulness and allowing enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 

1003, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Bard II”). It held that as to 

the threshold determination of willfulness, “the objective 

determination of recklessness, even though predicated on 

underlying mixed questions of law and fact, is best decided by the judge as a question of law subject to de novo

review.” Id. at 1007. The panel remanded “so that the 

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trial court may apply the correct standard to the question 

of willfulness in the first instance.” Id. at 1008.1

On remand, the district court again found that, in 

view of Bard II, it was “clear to this Court, just as it was 

to the jury, that Defendant, as a ‘reasonable litigant,’ 

could not have ‘realistically expected’ its defenses to 

succeed.” Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & 

Assocs., Inc., No. 03-0597, 2013 WL 5670909, at *12 (D. 

Ariz. Oct. 17, 2013) (order denying JMOL on willful 

infringement) (“Bard III”). Gore appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

II

Gore argues that at the time of suit, neither BPV nor 

Goldfarb had standing to sue for infringement of the ’135 

patent. Gore thus seeks to vacate the district court’s 

judgment in its entirety and to have the case dismissed 

for lack of jurisdiction. The crux of Gore’s argument is 

that at the time the suit was filed, only C.R. Bard, Inc. 

(“Bard Inc.”) could have possessed standing to sue. We 

reject that argument.

In 1980, Goldfarb—who was the inventor and original 

assignee of the ’135 patent’s application—entered into a

license agreement with Bard Inc. involving the application and any patents that might issue. Gore argues that 

in that agreement, Goldfarb granted all substantial rights 

to the patent—thereby resulting in a virtual assignment

to Bard Inc. In 1996, Bard Inc. acquired IMPRA, which 

later became a wholly owned subsidiary, BPV, and in 

September, Bard Inc. transferred its interest in the 1980 

agreement to BPV. Gore argues that because there is no 

1 Gore sought to appeal the question of inventorship 

under 35 U.S.C. § 116 to the Supreme Court, which 

denied its petition for certiorari. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. 

v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 932 (2013).

 

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BARD PERIPHERAL VASCULAR v. W.L. GORE & ASSOCIATES 5

evidence of a written instrument effecting the transfer of 

the interest to BPV, BPV did not in fact acquire standing 

to sue for infringement. In sum, Gore contends that both 

plaintiffs lacked standing: Goldfarb, because he had 

virtually assigned his rights to Bard Inc., and BPV, 

because Bard Inc. had not properly transferred its rights.

Gore raised this argument on standing twice before at 

the district court—prior to its first appeal in this case. 

Gore first filed a pre-trial JMOL motion on standing, 

which the district court denied. Gore again raised the 

issue as a post-trial JMOL motion, which the district 

court again denied. The district court’s discussion of the 

standing issue and denial of Gore’s motion was contained 

in the same March 31, 2009 opinion and order denying 

Gore’s various other JMOL motions that Gore appealed to 

this court. In that appeal, although the issue was not 

raised in briefing, the panel confirmed that the district 

court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). Bard I, 

670 F.3d at 1178. 

Gore does not claim that there exists any material difference between the argument it raised before the district 

court then and that it now raises on this appeal. Indeed, 

in its first appeal, Gore conceded that the district court 

had jurisdiction. Brief for Appellant at 1, Bard I, 670 

F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 10-1542), 2010 WL 

4853331. Instead, Gore contends that we are not bound 

by the prior panel’s determination on standing, based on 

the fundamental principle that “[t]he question of standing 

is not subject to waiver” because “[t]he federal courts are 

under an independent obligation to examine their own 

jurisdiction.” See United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742 

(1995).

The “party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the 

burden of establishing” standing at any stage of the 

litigation. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 

561 (1992). In this case, Gore challenged the plaintiffs’ 

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standing at the district court. The district court determined that the plaintiffs met their burden and had established standing. On appeal, this court again confirmed 

that the plaintiffs had standing. Gore argues that because it did not brief the issue on appeal, and the prior 

panel did not discuss the issue of standing, the standing 

issue has yet to be resolved with finality.

As an initial matter, however, we have no reason to 

assume that the prior panel did not weigh standing. This 

was not a case in which a standing issue remained 

dormant in facts buried deep in the record, or which was 

not recognized by either party or the trial court. While 

Gore’s briefs in that appeal did not raise the standing 

issue, the district court’s opinion discussing Gore’s standing challenge were attached to the opening brief as required pursuant to Federal Circuit Rule 28(a)(12). Had 

the prior panel seen merit in Gore’s standing challenge, it 

could have asked for additional briefing, as this court has 

done in other cases. See, e.g., Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. 

Alumni Research Found., No. 13-1377 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 14, 

2013) (order requesting supplemental briefing on the 

issue of appellant’s standing) ECF No. 29. We are bound, 

therefore, by the prior panel’s determination that the 

plaintiffs had standing and that the district court had 

jurisdiction. See Gould, Inc. v. United States, 67 F.3d 925, 

930 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The law of the case is a judicially 

created doctrine, the purposes of which are to prevent the 

relitigation of issues that have been decided and to ensure 

that trial courts follow the decisions of appellate courts.”). 

To be sure, there are exceptional circumstances in 

which a panel may not adhere to the decision in a prior 

appeal in the same case, when “(1) the evidence in a 

subsequent trial is substantially different; (2) controlling 

authority has since made a contrary decision of the law 

applicable to the issues; or (3) the earlier ruling was 

clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.” 

Id. This is not such a case. Gore raises no new facts in 

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this appeal and seeks only to relitigate the same standing 

theory that the district court rejected before. Gore does 

not point to any change in the relevant law. This is also

not a case in which the district court made findings on 

remand that “undermine” the prior appellate affirmance 

of standing. Pub. Interest Research Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. 

Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 117 (3d Cir. 

1997). And, we see no clear error in the previous decision 

on standing that would warrant an extraordinary review 

at this stage.

Indeed, on the merits, this is an easy question. We 

review de novo the district court’s determination of a 

party’s standing, while reviewing any factual findings 

relevant to that determination for clear error. SanDisk 

Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1377 

(Fed. Cir. 2007). Gore’s argument hinges on the absence 

of a written instrument transferring to BPV what it 

contends was the virtual assignment from Goldfarb to 

Bard Inc. See Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d 

1245, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that a written instrument was needed to document the “transfer of proprietary rights” to support standing to sue for patent 

infringement); 35 U.S.C. § 261 (“Applications for patent, 

patents, or any interest therein, shall be assignable by 

law in an instrument in writing.”) (emphases added). 

However, BPV has never claimed that in 2003 it had all 

substantial rights to the ’135 patent.2 BPV’s position is

only that it was an exclusive licensee with the right to sue 

2 In 2007, Goldfarb assigned his remaining interests in the ’135 patent to BPV. Gore argues that this 

assignment was illusory since Goldfarb had already 

granted all substantial rights to Bard Inc. in 1980. We 

note that at most this transfer corroborates BPV’s position that the parties clearly understood that BPV was 

Goldfarb’s licensee at the time the suit was filed.

 

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for infringement. It is well established that the grant of a 

license does not need to be in writing. See Waymark Corp. 

v. Porta Sys. Corp., 334 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003)

(“Only assignments need be in writing under 35 U.S.C. 

§ 261. Licenses may be oral.”); Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley 

Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding 

that to be an exclusive licensee a party may rely on either 

an express or implied promise of exclusivity). In any 

event, in 1997 there was a memorialized transfer of the

exclusive license from Goldfarb and Bard Inc. to BPV’s 

predecessor. We agree with the district court that this 

1997 agreement between the parties settles BPV’s right to 

sue at the time of the complaint as Goldfarb’s exclusive 

licensee. Bard III, at 19-20.

BPV and Goldfarb thus readily meet their burden to 

establish standing. For Gore to prevail, it would have to 

establish each of the following propositions: (1) the 1980 

agreement that was styled as an “exclusive license” 

between Goldfarb and Bard Inc. was in fact a virtual 

assignment, and (2) Bard Inc.’s transfer of its rights to 

BPV under the agreement failed because it was not in

writing. We see no error in the district court’s wellreasoned analysis on the first point—inter alia, Goldfarb 

retained significant reversionary rights, there was a field 

of use restriction, and Goldfarb retained the right to share 

in damages. See id. at 15. There was no basis, therefore, 

to conclude that Goldfarb had transferred “all substantial 

rights” to Bard. See Abbott Labs. v. Diamedix Corp., 47 

F.3d 1128, 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding that even limited 

rights retained by the patentee made it a necessary party 

in any subsequent infringement suit). But even if Gore 

could get past those first shoals, it would founder at the 

second. Gore argues that since Bard represents that it 

transferred its entire interest in the 1980 agreement to 

BPV, if that interest were a virtual assignment, then the 

transfer would fail without a written agreement. But, 

there is no question that in 1997, there was a written 

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agreement between the parties affirming Bard’s transfer 

of its rights to BPV. Gore argues that our case law prevents such a retroactive agreement—but for support of 

this proposition, all Gore cites is precedent in which we 

considered agreements that were executed after the suit 

was filed, such as Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 

F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Here, by contrast, the 1997 

memorialization occurred years before the suit was filed. 

The 1997 agreement was not a nunc pro tunc written 

agreement that occurred after the complaint. Compare,

e.g., Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC, 625 F.3d 

1359, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Enzo APA & Son, Inc. v. 

Geapag A.G., 134 F.3d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Accordingly, the plaintiffs had standing at the time of the 

complaint, and the district court had jurisdiction pursuant § 1338(a). We turn, then, to Gore’s appeal on the 

merits.

III

To establish willful infringement, the patentee has 

the burden of showing “by clear and convincing evidence 

that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid 

patent.” In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 

(Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) cert denied 552 U.S. 1230 

(2008). “The state of mind of the accused infringer is not 

relevant to this objective inquiry.” Id. Only if the patentee establishes this “threshold objective standard” does the 

inquiry then move on to whether “this objectively-defined 

risk (determined by the record developed in the infringement proceeding) was either known or so obvious that it 

should have been known to the accused infringer.” Id. 

While this second prong of Seagate may be an issue of 

fact, the threshold determination of objective recklessness 

requires “objective assessment” of the accused infringer’s 

defenses. Bard II, 682 F.3d at 1006. In Bard II we held 

that objective recklessness, even though “predicated on 

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ed by the judge as a question of law subject to de novo

review.” Id. at 1007.3 Even when underlying factual 

issues were sent to the jury in the first instance—such as 

in this case—“the judge remains the final arbiter of 

whether the defense was reasonable.” Id. at 1008 (emphasis added).

Accordingly, under Bard II, we review de novo the 

district court’s determination whether Gore’s “position is 

susceptible to a reasonable conclusion of no infringement.” 

Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1310 

(Fed. Cir. 2011). Objective recklessness will not be found 

where the accused infringer has raised a “substantial 

question” as to the validity or noninfringement of the 

patent. Spine Solutions, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek 

USA, Inc., 620 F.3d 1305, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010); DePuy 

Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 

1314, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 

On remand, the district court evaluated several defenses raised by Gore and determined that none of them 

were objectively reasonable. On appeal, Gore appeals 

only its determination with respect to Gore’s inventorship

defense. This defense arises from the decades-long rec3 The district court’s opinion suggests that it rejected Gore’s argument because “substantial evidence” was 

contrary to a finding that Gore had a reasonable expectation of success in its defense. Bard III, at 11. Gore argues that this suggests that the district court 

inappropriately relied on findings of fact in determining 

the objective reasonableness of its defense. Gore’s position overstates the significance of the district court’s 

reference to “substantial evidence.” Rather, the district 

court correctly followed Bard II, reviewing the facts in the 

record produced in the litigation and evaluating whether, 

on the basis of those facts, Gore had raised a reasonable 

defense. See id. at 19.

 

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ord, which includes parallel examination of Gore’s and 

Goldfarb’s patent applications on vascular grafts made of 

ePTFE, an interference declared in 1983 between the 

applications, which we reviewed in Cooper I and Cooper 

II, as well as the infringement proceedings in this case

that were finally resolved—except as to the issue of 

willfulness—in Bard I. Gore’s argument is based on the 

fact that its employee, Peter Cooper, supplied the particular ePTFE tubing that Goldfarb used in making his 

successful vascular graft (the “2-73 RF” graft). In Gore’s 

view, Cooper furnished to Goldfarb “the embodiment of 

the invention before Goldfarb conceived the invention 

using that embodiment.” Bard III, at 7.

As an initial matter, we reject Gore’s argument that 

the mere fact a member of the previous panel dissented 

on this issue indicates that its position was reasonable. 

Gore does not point to any previous case in which we 

followed this principle. To the contrary, in Paper Converting Machine Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 785 F.2d 1013, 

1016 (Fed. Cir. 1986), for example, we noted that despite 

the existence of a dissenting opinion in a prior opinion 

affirming infringement, the same panel could still affirm 

willfulness in a later appeal. Otherwise, we would be

imposing a rule that any single judge’s dissent on the 

merits could preclude the determination of willful infringement.

Turning to the merits, Gore claimed that its employee, Peter Cooper, was a joint inventor of the ’135 patent. 

Therefore, Gore argued that the patent is invalid for nonjoinder of Cooper as a co-inventor. Gore now argues that 

even though it did not prevail, its argument was still 

reasonable in light of the facts in the record and the law 

of joint inventorship. 

Issued patents are presumed to correctly name the 

inventors; therefore, “[t]he burden of showing misjoinder 

or nonjoinder of inventors is a heavy one and must be 

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proved by clear and convincing evidence.” Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 106 F.3d 976, 980 (Fed. 

Cir. 1997) (quoting Garrett Corp. v. United States, 190 Ct. 

Cl. 858, 870 (1970)). By statute,

[i]nventors may apply for a patent jointly even 

though (1) they did not physically work together 

or at the same time, (2) each did not make the 

same type or amount of contribution, or (3) each 

did not make a contribution to the subject matter 

of every claim of the patent.

35 U.S.C. § 116(a). “Because conception is the touchstone 

of inventorship, each joint inventor must generally contribute to the conception of the invention.” Ethicon, Inc. 

v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 

1998). Conception is precisely defined as existing “when a 

definite and permanent idea of an operative invention, 

including every feature of the subject matter sought to be 

patented, is known.” Sewall v. Walters, 21 F.3d 411, 415 

(Fed. Cir. 1994). In other words, conception is only complete when the “idea is so clearly defined in the inventor’s 

mind that only ordinary skill would be necessary to 

reduce the invention to practice, without extensive research or experimentation.” Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. 

Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 

As to the required degree of contribution to conception, we have recognized that “[t]he determination of 

whether a person is a joint inventor is fact specific, and no 

bright-line standard will suffice in every case.” Fina Oil 

& Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 123 F.3d 1466, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 

1997). The underlying principle from our case law is that 

a joint inventor’s contribution must be “not insignificant 

in quality, when that contribution is measured against 

the dimension of the full invention.” Id. Of particular 

relevance to this case, we have held that if an individual 

supplies a component essential to an invention, that is an 

insufficiently significant contribution if the component 

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and the principles of its use were known in the prior art. 

Hess, 106 F.3d at 981; see also Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 

F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (explaining that a joint 

inventor is required to “do more than merely explain to 

the real inventors well-known concepts and/or the current 

state of the art”). Moreover, while joint inventors need 

not “physically” work together under § 116, “the statutory 

word ‘jointly’ is not mere surplusage.” Kimberly-Clark 

Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co., Inc., 973 F.2d 911, 

917 (Fed. Cir. 1992). We require that “inventors have 

some open line of communication during or in temporal 

proximity to their inventive efforts.” Eli Lilly & Co. v. 

Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 

Critically, “each inventor must contribute to the joint 

arrival at a definite and permanent idea of the invention 

as it will be used in practice.” Burroughs, 40 F.3d at 1229

(emphasis added); see also Vanderbilt Univ. v. ICOS 

Corp., 601 F.3d 1297, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[C]oinventors must collaborate and work together to collectively have a definite and permanent idea of the complete 

invention.”).

In sum, the two questions for objectively assessing 

Gore’s defense are (1) what constitutes the “definite and 

permanent idea” of the invention at issue and (2) whether 

Cooper and Goldfarb acted in concert to jointly arrive at 

that idea. With respect to these questions, the factual 

record and inferences from the record were raised in the 

interference proceeding that preceded the issuance of the 

’135 patent and this litigation—and were reviewed by this 

court in Cooper I and Cooper II. 

As to the first, we note that the invention at issue was 

not merely the use of ePTFE in vascular grafts. Rather, 

each claim of the ’135 patent includes, as its key limitation, specified dimensions of fibril length that are essential for a successful graft. See Cooper II, 240 F.3d at 1380 

(noting that the invention “relates to the fibril length of 

certain material used for vascular grafts”). While Cooper 

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identified ePTFE as a promising material for vascular 

grafts, many grafts that were made of ePTFE failed. 

Cooper I, 154 F.3d at 1325. Prior to the invention, Cooper 

and others in the art believed that pore size was the key 

parameter for success. Id. at 1324. We affirmed the 

Board’s finding that prior to Cooper’s providing the lot of 

ePTFE tubes that ultimately led to the successful 2-73 RF 

graft, “he had not yet recognized the importance of the 

fibril length required by the interference, i.e., he had not 

yet conceived the invention, and he was not aware of the 

fibril lengths of the material he was sending to Goldfarb.” 

Cooper II, 240 F.3d at 1381. What Cooper told Goldfarb 

was, more generally, that “he expected the material to be 

suitable as a vascular graft.” Id. at 1384. In other words, 

Cooper “had not conceived the fibril length limitation 

before he sent the material to Goldfarb.” Id. at 1385.

To be sure, in those prior appeals we held that Cooper 

“had conceived of the invention, including the fibril length 

limitation” before Goldfarb evaluated the 2-73 RF graft 

and reduced the invention to practice. Id. at 1384-85

(citing Cooper I, 154 F.3d at 1326). However, we agree 

with the district court that the record—established in 

proceedings prior to the litigation—shows that Cooper

had “minimal contact” with Goldfarb on the subject of the 

fibril length limitation:

Indeed, Cooper admits that, even after he conceived the importance of fibril length, he did not 

convey that information to Goldfarb. He also admits that he did not ask Goldfarb to use grafts 

with fibril lengths required by the interference 

count, or to determine the fibril lengths of successful grafts. While Cooper was not required to 

communicate his conception to Goldfarb, Cooper I, 

154 F.3d at 1332, 47 USPQ2d at 1905, his failure 

to convey any information or requests regarding 

fibril length prevents Goldfarb’s determination of 

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the fibril lengths of the material from inuring to 

his benefit.

Bard III, at 9 (quoting Cooper II, 240 F.3d at 1385). 

Based on the record established in Cooper I and II—that 

we reviewed—Cooper and Goldfarb independently conceived of the fibril length limitation. While Cooper I and 

II concerned inurement in the context of interference, 

they established that—barring Gore’s introduction of new 

evidence or theories—Cooper and Goldfarb did not collaborate, communicate, nor in any way jointly arrive at the 

recognition that fibril length was significant for graft 

success. Even if Cooper had achieved conception prior to 

Goldfarb, Cooper II definitively held that Goldfarb arrived 

at conception on his own, and, thus, his reduction to 

practice did not inure to Cooper. 240 F.3d at 1386.

This is an unusual case. Forty years have passed 

since Goldfarb filed for the patent at issue in this case. 

Gore tried to get a patent on the subject matter of the 

patent on which it was sued. The subsequent decades of 

prior proceedings shaped what defenses Gore could raise 

once it was sued for infringement. Once it failed and the 

’135 patent issued, Gore was left with an exceptionally 

circumscribed scope of reasonable defense. 

In the current proceedings, Gore relied on those facts

which showed that the invention was based on a material 

that Gore invented and that Cooper may have conceived 

of the invention prior to Goldfarb (though Goldfarb won 

the patent because he was the first to reduce it to practice). But even if it could have persuaded a jury—which it

did not—Gore could not have evaded the legal requirements of joint inventorship. Ultimately, to have stood a 

reasonable chance of prevailing on this issue, Gore needed 

to raise new evidence or theories that were not considered 

in Cooper I and II. However, as the prior panel noted, 

“Gore’s argument remains unchanged and there is still no 

evidence that Cooper either recognized or appreciated the 

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16 BARD PERIPHERAL VASCULAR v. W.L. GORE & ASSOCIATES

critical nature of the internodal distance and communicated that key requirement to Goldfarb before Goldfarb 

reduced the invention to practice.” Bard I, 670 F.3d at 

1182.4 Within the backdrop of the extensive proceedings 

prior to this litigation, therefore, we agree with the district court that Gore’s position was not susceptible to a 

reasonable conclusion that the patent was invalid on 

inventorship grounds.

IV 

For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the district 

court’s determination that the plaintiffs established

standing and that the ’135 patent was willfully infringed. 

AFFIRMED

4 Indeed, if anything, the evidence presented in the 

litigation further bolstered the plaintiffs’ position. For 

example, as the district court noted, shortly after Goldfarb filed his patent application in October 1974, Cooper 

admitted to entering Goldfarb’s laboratory without permission and took his histological slides. Bard III, at 10. 

Other evidence suggested that Cooper did so because 

Cooper still did not understand what parameters mattered for successful grafts. Id. at 10-11.

 

Case: 14-1114 Document: 58-2 Page: 16 Filed: 01/13/2015
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

BARD PERIPHERAL VASCULAR, INC., AND 

DAVID GOLDFARB, M.D., 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

AND

C.R. BARD, INC.,

Counterclaim Defendant-Appellee,

v.

W.L. GORE & ASSOCIATES, INC.,

Defendant-Appellant.

______________________ 

2014-1114

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

District of Arizona in No. 2:03-CV-00597-MHM, Judge 

Mary H. Murguia.

______________________ 

HUGHES, Circuit Judge, concurring.

I agree that when reviewed de novo, the evidence in 

this case shows that Gore’s defenses were not objectively 

reasonable. I write separately to reiterate my belief that 

the full court should review our willfulness jurisprudence

in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management Sys., Inc., 134 

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2 BARD PERIPHERAL VASCULAR v. W.L. GORE & ASSOCIATES

S. Ct. 1744 (2014) and Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON 

Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014). Those 

decisions call into question our two-part test for determining willfulness, In Re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 

(2007) (en banc), and our de novo standard for reviewing 

the district court’s willfulness determination, Bard 

Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 

F.3d 1003, 1006–07 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Bard II). See Halo 

Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1383 (Fed. 

Cir. 2014) (O’Malley, J., concurring). 

This case demonstrates why de novo review of willfulness is problematic. The panel is divided over the 

strength of Gore’s joint inventorship defense. Each side 

advances a sound argument about whether the evidence 

in this case raises a “substantial question” of joint inventorship. And the district court, likewise, provided a 

thorough and well-reasoned opinion. If one of these 

several reasonable opinions must ultimately govern, it 

should be the opinion of the district judge, whose assessment of litigation positions is informed by trial experience 

and who has “lived with the case over a prolonged period 

of time.” Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1748. 

A more deferential standard of review would be consistent with the standards for reviewing mixed questions 

of law and fact in other contexts. See, e.g., Highmark, 134 

S. Ct. at 1748–49 (holding abuse of discretion is the 

proper standard for reviewing award of attorney fees in 

patent cases, “[a]lthough questions of law may in some 

cases be relevant . . . .”); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 

552, 558 (1988) (holding abuse of discretion is the proper 

standard for reviewing determinations of whether a 

litigant’s position is “substantially justified” for purposes 

of fee-shifting under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 

although the determination frequently turns on a purely 

legal issue). It would also be consistent with the standard 

for reviewing a finding of willful copyright infringement. 

See Dolman v. Agee, 157 F.3d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 1998) 

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BARD PERIPHERAL VASCULAR v. W.L. GORE & ASSOCIATES 3

(“The district court’s finding of willful [copyright] infringement is reviewed for clear error.”). 

Case: 14-1114 Document: 58-2 Page: 19 Filed: 01/13/2015
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

BARD PERIPHERAL VASCULAR, INC., AND 

DAVID GOLDFARB, M.D., 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

AND

C.R. BARD, INC.,

Counterclaim Defendant-Appellee,

v.

W.L. GORE & ASSOCIATES, INC.,

Defendant-Appellant.

______________________ 

2014-1114

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

District of Arizona in No. 2:03-cv-00597-MHM, Judge 

Mary H. Murguia.

______________________ 

NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

This case returns to the Federal Circuit on appeal of a 

district court decision on remand from an en banc decision 

of this court. The issue is willful infringement and its 

consequences, which this en banc court remanded for de 

novo determination as a matter of law, vacating the 

judgment entered on the jury verdict.

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2 BARD PERIPHERAL VASCULAR v. W.L. GORE & ASSOCIATES

The en banc court changed the standard and procedure for determination of willful infringement and its 

consequences in order to bring reasonable national uniformity to application of this penalty. The court held that 

the objective reasonableness of a defense to infringement 

is a legal question to be determined by the judge, and is 

decided de novo on appeal. The court held that willful 

infringement is not a jury question, and vacated the 

judgment of willful infringement and punitive damages

that the district court had entered on the jury verdict.

On remand, the district court re-entered its prior 

judgment in its entirety, reciting the evidence that in its

view supported the judgment. Again here on appeal, my 

colleagues on this panel repeat the district court’s exercise, do not apply de novo standards of review, and do not 

apply the clear precedent which requires determination of 

whether Gore acted with “objective recklessness” In re 

Seagate Techs., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 

(en banc). Nor do my colleagues attempt to meet the 

court’s responsibility to impart reasonable consistency 

and objective standards to the penalty aspect of “willful” 

activity, although this was the reason why the en banc 

court established a system of de novo determination of 

this question of law applied to the facts of the particular 

case.

Precedent establishes that the objective prong of willful infringement “tends not to be met where an accused 

infringer relies on a reasonable defense to a charge of 

infringement.” Spine Solutions, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., 620 F.3d 1305, 1319–20 (Fed. Cir. 

2010). When there is a “substantial question of invalidity 

or unenforceability” of the patent, willful infringement

cannot arise, as a matter of law. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 

1371. The panel majority does not review the evidence 

and apply the law objectively; the court merely searches 

for and recites adverse evidence.

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BARD PERIPHERAL VASCULAR v. W.L. GORE & ASSOCIATES 3

The majority ignores that Gore’s employee Cooper 

was the first to conceive of the invention – by final ruling 

of the patent interference tribunal and this court; the 

majority ignores that the ’135 patent was pending for 

twenty-eight years, while Gore developed this Gore-Tex®

prosthetic product; the majority ignores that the district 

court refused to enjoin Gore’s provision of these prosthetic 

products after this litigation, citing the “potentially devastating public health consequences”1; the court does not 

mention the inequitable conduct that pervades Dr. Goldfarb’s actions in obtaining the patent, including confessed 

perjury of a key witness; the court does not mention the 

action for misappropriation of Gore’s trade secrets by 

Gore ex-employees who now testify against Gore; the 

court does not mention the solid support for the theory 

that there is at least joint invention.

I start with the history of this conflict, for it is relevant to both willful infringement and the award of punitive damages.

I. The Interference

The saga of Bard versus Gore started forty-one years 

ago, when Gore’s employee Peter Cooper, manager of the 

Gore plant in Flagstaff, Arizona, invited Dr. David Goldfarb at the Arizona Heart Institute to participate in an

ongoing study of Gore’s product, expanded polytetrafluoroethylene (“ePTFE”), for use as a vascular prosthesis, 

i.e., as a graft to repair and replace blood vessels.

Gore’s ePTFE polymer, (brand name Gore-Tex®), has

unique properties based on its microporous and fibrous 

structure, as well as the adaptability of that structure to 

various uses. Gore employees sought to develop new 

1 Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., No. 03-CV-0579-PHX-MHM, 2009 WL 920300, 

at *5 (D. Ariz. March 31, 2009).

 

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4 BARD PERIPHERAL VASCULAR v. W.L. GORE & ASSOCIATES

applications for ePTFE, and continued to modify its 

structure in studying new uses. Beginning around 1970,

Peter Cooper led the development of ePTFE vascular 

prosthetic grafts.

Cooper and other Gore employees collaborated with 

vascular surgeons in the United States and Japan, who 

surgically inserted Gore’s ePTFE vascular tubes of varying porous and fibrous structure into the arteries of dogs 

and sheep. Compatibility of ePTFE with human tissue 

and its effectiveness as mammalian grafts were demonstrated. In addition to scientific publications and the PTO 

interference record, details of this history may be found in 

this court’s opinions in the interference appeals, reported 

at Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 

(“Cooper I”) and Cooper v. Goldfarb, 240 F.3d 1378 (Fed. 

Cir. 2001) (“Cooper II”).

In 1973 Cooper, along with Gore employee Richard 

Mendenhall, contacted Dr. Goldfarb, who had recently 

arrived at the Arizona Heart Institute, and invited him to 

participate in the ePTFE vascular study. Cooper gave Dr. 

Goldfarb the reports of surgeons who had previously 

evaluated ePTFE tubes as vascular grafts, and gave him 

samples of the most effective ePTFE tubes based on the 

prior evaluations. A letter from Cooper to Dr. Goldfarb 

accompanying these samples stated that they “represent 

the latest attempt to achieve satisfactory patency rates in 

small artery prosthetics.” Cooper II, 240 F.3d at 1384.

Dr. Goldfarb tested the Gore samples by inserting 

them in blood vessels of dogs and inspecting their structure by microscope. On October 24, 1974 Dr. Goldfarb 

filed a patent application on the structure of the most 

effective of the samples he tested. Cooper had previously 

filed a patent application covering the same structure, 

and the PTO declared an interference between the Cooper 

and Goldfarb applications.

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BARD PERIPHERAL VASCULAR v. W.L. GORE & ASSOCIATES 5

In its interference decision, the PTO held that Cooper 

was the first to conceive the subject matter of the interference count, ruling that Cooper “had conceived all the 

limitations of the count” and “had established conception 

as of June 5, 1973.” Cooper I, 154 F.3d at 1328. However, 

the PTO also held that Goldfarb was the first to reduce 

the count to practice, declining to credit Cooper with the

prior reductions to practice by the surgeons to whom 

Cooper had previously provided ePTFE tubes and grafts 

for testing and evaluation. Although the record contains 

extensive evidence of these tests, reports, and continued 

collaboration, the PTO tribunal also did not permit 

Cooper to show diligence to his filing date, on the ground

that diligence had not been pleaded in the interference. 

Thus the PTO awarded priority to Goldfarb.

On appeal, this court affirmed the PTO ruling that

Cooper was the first to conceive the subject matter of the 

count. This court found error in the PTO’s refusal to 

consider whether Goldfarb’s work “inured” to Cooper’s 

benefit. The PTO had stated that the issue of inurement 

had not been raised at final hearing, but this court found 

that inurement had been raised “in several places in the 

final hearing brief,” Cooper I, 154 F.3d at 1332, and 

remanded to the PTO to consider inurement. On remand 

the PTO held that Goldfarb’s work did not inure to 

Cooper’s benefit, relying on affidavits of a Gore employee, 

Dan Detton, who later admitted to perjury.2 Cooper II,

240 F.3d at 1380–81.

2 Counsel: Is your testimony there knowingly false 

or truthful?

Mr. Detton: No, that was inaccurate testimony.

Counsel: Was it knowingly false?

Mr. Detton: Yes, it was.

Counsel: Perjury?

Mr. Detton: Yes, it was.

 

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6 BARD PERIPHERAL VASCULAR v. W.L. GORE & ASSOCIATES

The PTO awarded the patent to Dr. Goldfarb, and 

U.S. Patent No. 6,436,135 (“the ’135 patent”) issued on 

August 20, 2002. Meanwhile, during the twenty-eight

years of patent pendency, Gore developed ePTFE grafts

for a variety of prosthetic uses, and achieved medical and 

commercial success.

II. The Infringement Litigation

On March 28, 2003, Dr. Goldfarb and exclusive licensee Bard sued Gore for infringement of the ’135 patent. 

Although Gore attempted to raise several defenses of 

invalidity and enforceability, at trial and by motion, the 

district court and the jury were told repeatedly that the 

Federal Circuit had finally adjudged that Dr. Goldfarb 

was entitled to the patent.

The jury rendered a verdict of willful infringement, 

and assessed damages measured as Bard’s lost profits on 

Gore’s products for which Bard had a competing product. 

The jury also awarded a royalty to Bard at rates ranging 

from 10% to 18%, for Gore sales of ePTFE products for 

which there was no competing Bard product. These 

damages totaled $185,589,871.02. Then, based on the 

jury’s finding of willful infringement, the district court 

doubled the damages, and awarded Goldfarb and Bard 

their attorneys’ fees and costs. Bard Peripheral Vascular, 

Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (D. 

Ariz. 2010) (“Bard I”). A split panel of the court affirmed. 

Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 

Inc., 670 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Bard II”). Gore 

requested rehearing.

Trans. 1915:5–15, Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. 

W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., No. 03-CV-0579-PHX-MHM, (D. 

Ariz. Nov. 27, 2007), ECF No. 787. 

 

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III. Rehearing en banc

The Federal Circuit granted rehearing en banc on the 

issue of willful infringement and the award of punitive 

damages and attorneys’ fees. The en banc court vacated 

these district court rulings, stating that “the opinion of 

the court accompanying the judgment is modified, in 

accordance with the panel opinion accompanying this 

order.” Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & 

Assocs., Inc., 476 Fed. App’x 747, 748 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en 

banc) (“Bard III”). The court cited the need for consistency and reasonable predictability in resolving the pervasive 

issue of willful infringement, and ruled that willful infringement is “a question of law based on underlying 

mixed questions of law and fact and is subject to de novo 

review,” Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & 

Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Bard 

IV”).

The court remanded for de novo determination of willful infringement. The court explained that willful infringement contains objective and subjective components, 

and that the objective component requires proof of objective recklessness in the face of a high likelihood of infringing a patent known to be valid. Bard IV, 682 F.3d at 

1006. This objective component receives de novo review, 

as a matter of law.

The objective prong of willful infringement is not met 

when there is a reasonable defense to the charge of infringement. Spine Solutions, 620 F.3d at 1120; see also 

Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1382 

(Fed. Cir. 2014); Advanced Fiber Techs. (AFT) Trust v. J 

& L Fiber Servs., Inc., 674 F.3d 1365, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 

2012). Then, if a district court holds the objective defenses to be objectively unreasonable, the jury’s subjective 

findings can be reviewed. Bard IV, 682 F.3d at 1008.

After clarifying the legal principles, this court remanded to the district court for redetermination of willful

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8 BARD PERIPHERAL VASCULAR v. W.L. GORE & ASSOCIATES

infringement. The district court reviewed the issues and 

reinstated its prior judgment of willful infringement, 

double damages, and attorneys’ fees. The district court 

stated that the evidence supported the prior judgment. 

Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 

Inc., No. 03-0597, 2013 WL 5670909 (D. Ariz. Oct. 17, 

2013) (“Bard V”). Today’s majority now affirms.

IV. This Appeal

The panel majority, while mentioning that willful infringement is now a matter of law, does not undertake the 

required de novo review. Determination of a matter of 

law requires consideration of the positions of both sides, 

with due attention to the burdens and standards of proof. 

As stated in Seagate Techs., a ruling of willful infringement requires objective recklessness in the face of a high 

likelihood of infringing a patent known to be valid and 

enforceable. 

The question for the reviewing court is not whether 

the district court’s decision of law can be found supported 

by substantial evidence. The question of willful infringement is whether the accused infringer raised a substantial question of invalidity or unenforceability regarding 

the ’135 patent. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371. Willful 

infringement cannot lie “when a reasonable defense is 

raised,” Advanced Fiber, 674 F.3d at 1377, “[although] the 

record contains substantial evidence to support the jury's 

implicit finding” of validity and enforceability. Spine 

Solutions, 620 F.3d at 1319. The required showing of 

objective recklessness is not met, as a matter of law, when 

the patent is reasonably subject to challenge.

It cannot be disputed that Gore raised several substantial questions challenging the validity and enforceability of the ’135 patent. I have previously outlined some 

of the grounds on which the ’135 patent was vulnerable:

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BARD PERIPHERAL VASCULAR v. W.L. GORE & ASSOCIATES 9

(1) the ruling of the Patent and Trademark Office, affirmed by the Federal Circuit, that Gore's 

employee Cooper was the first to conceive of the 

invention that was patented by Goldfarb; (2) the 

fact that Cooper provided Goldfarb with the Gore–

Tex® tubes that Goldfarb patented; (3) the fact 

that Goldfarb tested the tubes in dogs at Cooper's 

request; (4) the fact that others had previously 

tested the Gore–Tex® tubes in dogs and sheep, 

and had reported and published the same results 

that Goldfarb later patented; (5) the fact that the 

Goldfarb application was pending for 28 years, 

leaving doubt as to the outcome in the Patent Office. It is not irrelevant that the eventual allowance of the Goldfarb application included the 

admitted perjured affidavit of Detton, an affidavit 

that Detton asked Goldfarb to withdraw, and was 

refused.

Bard III, 682 F.3d at 1009 (Newman, J., dissenting in 

part). These are all substantial questions of validity and

enforceability of the ’135 patent, weighing against reckless disregard. 

Gore also presented by motion seven grounds of unenforceability of the ’135 patent, quoted by the district court 

as follows: 

1. Plaintiffs and their attorneys failed to advise the Patent Office of Dr. Volder’s connections 

with Impra in his 1976 affidavit in which he expressed his opinion on the issue of obviousness as 

a presumably impartial person skilled in the art.

2. Plaintiffs and their attorneys failed to advise the Patent Office at any time prior to withdrawal of the rejection of Claims 1 to 10 of the 

Goldfarb patent application, that in 1978 Lenox 

Baker, M.D., withdrew and repudiated paragraph 

6 of his 1976 affidavit filed with the Patent Office.

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10 BARD PERIPHERAL VASCULAR v. W.L. GORE & ASSOCIATES

3. The filing of and reliance on two 1976 affidavits from D. Dan Detton, notwithstanding Mr. 

Detton’s repudiation of those affidavits before 

they were filed, and Plaintiffs’ subsequent failure 

to advise the Patent Office of Mr. Detton’s 1978 

repudiation of his 1976 affidavits.

4. Plaintiffs’ reliance on an error that the Patent Office made in connection with the Matsumoto publication in Surgery, in which the Patent 

Office Examiner mistakenly interpreted the wall 

thickness in that publication to be 1 millimeter 

(“mm”) rather than 0.5 mm.

5. Plaintiffs and their attorneys failed to provide information to the Patent Office about Dr. 

Volder’s work and his possible role as an inventor 

or co-inventor, including the failure to disclose the 

existence of and the subsequent destruction of the 

Volder notebook.

6. Plaintiffs and their attorneys failed to comply with the Patent Office order requiring production of material information from the Goldfarb v. 

Impra litigation.

7. Plaintiffs and their attorneys failed to advise the Patent Office Examiner of the existence of 

the Gore shipping log, which contained information about prior art vascular graft wall thicknesses that was inconsistent with the 1976 

affidavits of Harold Green and Mr. Detton, and 

inconsistent with the argument made by Dr. Goldfarb and Mr. Sutton in persuading the Patent Office Examiner to withdraw the November 1975 

rejection of Claims 1 to 10.

Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 

Inc., 573 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1173–74 (D. Ariz. 2008).

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BARD PERIPHERAL VASCULAR v. W.L. GORE & ASSOCIATES 11

Each asserted ground of inequitable conduct was 

summarily dismissed by the district court, which stated 

that, even if Dr. Goldfarb misrepresented or intentionally 

withheld information from the PTO and despite the 

admitted perjury, the false information was “not material 

to the prosecution of the ’135 patent.” Id. at 1215. That 

reasoning cannot be sustained.

In addition, Gore’s argument of incorrect inventorship, or at least joint invention, is quite viable, and raises

a substantial question of validity, which requires correct 

inventorship. Given the PTO’s findings that Cooper was 

the first to conceive the invention, and this court’s prior 

affirmance that Cooper conceived of the invention including the fibril length limitation before Goldfarb evaluated 

the 2-73 RF graft, see Cooper II, 240 F.3d at 1384–85 

(citing Cooper I, 154 F.3d at 1326), Goldfarb’s reduction to 

practice of the material that Cooper made and presented 

for patenting, at least raises a substantial question of 

“joint inventorship.” The statute is clear, and surely 

presents enough of a question that joint invention could 

be reasonably raised in defense:

Joint Inventors -- . . . Inventors may apply for a 

patent jointly even though (1) they did not physically work together or at the same time, (2) each 

did not make the same type or amount of contribution, or (3) each did not make a contribution to 

the subject matter of every claim of the patent.

35 U.S.C. §116(a) (2012).

The panel majority rules that Gore’s joint invention

defense fails because Gore cannot show “collaboration” 

between Cooper and Goldfarb as to every limitation in the 

claims. Joint invention does not require collaboration as 

to every limitation, as the statute makes clear. Moreover, 

when the PTO’s interference procedures are removed from 

the deferential review status they enjoyed in Cooper I and 

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12 BARD PERIPHERAL VASCULAR v. W.L. GORE & ASSOCIATES

Cooper II, the correctness of these rulings can reasonably 

be challenged in the infringement context. 

In all events, the question as it relates to willfulness

is whether the defense of invalidity could reasonably be 

raised, not whether it eventually succeeded. The flaws in 

the Goldfarb patent and the way it was obtained provided 

sufficiently reasonable defenses to both validity and 

enforceability. On the entirety of the premises and applying the correct legal standards, the judgment of willful 

infringement cannot stand.

V. Damages

Even when willful infringement is found, it does not 

follow that punitive damages must be imposed, or that 

the damages must be doubled. The public benefit of 

Gore’s product cannot be ignored. Punitive damages are 

intended to discourage bad behavior, not life-saving

medical devices. This en banc court specifically asked for 

review of the damages award as related to the willfulness 

determination. Such review gets short shrift from my 

colleagues, who simply ignore the en banc court’s admonition that the premises and consequences of “willful” action 

receive objective, nationally consistent, implementation.

“Precedent holds that a finding of willfulness authorizes, but does not require, enhanced damages.” Laitram 

Corp. v. NEC Corp, 115 F.3d 947, 955 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); 

Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 

1555, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (refusal to enhance damages 

despite the jury’s verdict of willful infringement); Modine 

Mfg. Co. v. Allen Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 538, 543 (Fed. Cir.

1990) (same); Delta–X v. Baker Hughes Prod. Tools, Inc.,

410, 413 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (considering whether the defendant made a substantial challenge to infringement). 

Extensive precedent supports judicial refusal to enhance damages when the case is close and the equities 

counsel moderation, not punishment. The award of 

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BARD PERIPHERAL VASCULAR v. W.L. GORE & ASSOCIATES 13

punitive damages depends on both the infringer’s degree

of culpability, and the injury that the infringement imposed on the patentee. Bard was awarded full recovery 

for its loss of business to the Gore product. The district 

court stated that “the Court is satisfied that a fair and full 

amount of compensatory money damages, when combined 

with a progressive compulsory license, will adequately 

compensate Plaintiffs’ injuries, such that the harsh and 

extraordinary remedy of injunction–with its potentially

devastating public health consequences—can be avoided.” 

Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 

Inc., No. 03-CV-0597, 2009 WL 920300, at *5 (D. Ariz. 

Mar. 31, 2009). 

The district court’s recognition of the public’s interest 

and medical benefits imparted by Gore’s product, and the 

court’s refusal to enjoin its provision, cannot be reconciled 

with the punitive doubling of damages. There was no 

showing, or even a charge, of intentional harm, as required for severe punishment as here meted out. See 

Restatement (Second) of Torts §500 (1965).

Thus, regardless of whether willfulness was a supportable ruling, the doubling of the damages award is 

untenable. From my colleagues’ contrary ruling, I respectfully dissent.

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