Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01088/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01088-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HENRY EUGENE HARRIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

DR. JUAN CALZETTA, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1: 13-cv-001088-MJS

 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION 

REQUESTING SETTLEMENT 

CONFERENCE AND MOTION FOR 

COURT-APPOINTED EXPERT WITNESS

 (ECF Nos. 58, 59)

 

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1 & 4.) The action 

proceeds on an Eighth Amendment medical indifference claim against Defendant 

Calzetta. (ECF No. 27.)

Presently pending before the Court are two motions filed by Plaintiff on February 

5, 2016: a motion requesting that a settlement conference be scheduled (ECF No. 58)

and a motion for a court-appointed expert witness (ECF No. 59). Defendant opposes the 

request for a settlement conference, but has not responded to Plaintiff’s second motion, 

and the time for filing an opposition has now expired. See E.D. Local Rule 230(l).

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I. MOTION FOR SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE

Plaintiff first asks the Court to schedule a settlement conference in order to 

attempt to resolve the issues pending in this case. (ECF No. 58.) Defendant has filed an 

opposition, asserting that such a conference will be futile as he has no intention of 

settling this case for any amount. In light of Defendant’s opposition, Plaintiff’s motion will 

be denied.

II. MOTION FOR COURT APPOINTED EXPERT WITNESS

Plaintiff next asks the Court to appoint an expert witness to establish the required 

standard of care for a medical professional under the facts asserted in this case and to 

show that the Defendant deviated from it.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, an expert witness may testify to help 

the trier of fact determine the evidence or a fact at issue. A court has full discretion to 

appoint an expert witness either by its own motion or by a party's motion. Fed. R. Evid. 

706(a); McKinney v. Anderson, 924 F.2d 1500, 1510-11 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on 

other grounds by Helling v. McKinney, 502 U.S. 903 (1991). Appointment of an expert 

witness may generally be appropriate when “scientific, technical, or other specialized 

knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or decide a fact in 

issue.” Levi v. Dir. of Corr., 2006 WL 845733, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18795, at *2 (E.D.

Cal. 2006) (citing Leford v. Sullivan, 105 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1997)). Here, it is 

unclear whether Plaintiff seeks appointment of an expert on his own behalf or 

appointment of a neutral expert pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 706. “Reasonably 

construed, [Rule 706] does not contemplate the appointment of, and compensation for, 

an expert to aid one of the parties.” Trimble v. City of Phoenix Police Dept., 2006 WL 

778697, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13061, at *6 (D. Ariz. 2006) (citation omitted). Accordingly, to 

the extent Plaintiff seeks appointment of an expert to help him present his case, this 

request is denied.

Plaintiff's request can also be reasonably construed as a request for appointment 

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of a neutral expert witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 706. Where a party has filed 

a motion for appointment of a neutral expert under Rule 706, the court must provide a 

reasoned explanation of its ruling on the motion. Gorton v. Todd, 793 F. Supp. 2d. 1171, 

1178 (E.D. Cal. 2011). Several factors guide the court's decision. First, and most 

importantly, the court must consider whether the opinion of a neutral expert will promote 

accurate fact finding. Id. at 1179. The court may also consider the ability of the indigent 

party to obtain an expert and the significance of the rights at stake in the case. Id. at 

1182-84. Expert witnesses should not be appointed where they are not necessary or 

significantly useful for the trier of fact to comprehend a material issue in a case. Id. at 

1181.

In the present case, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Dr. Juan Calzetta was 

deliberately indifferent to his medical needs when he improperly performed a fistula 

operation, causing serious damage, resultant pain and tremors, and loss of the full use 

of Plaintiff’s left hand. In order to prevail on his Eighth Amendment claim, the Court must 

assess whether Defendant acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious 

medical needs. 

The Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment also 

encompasses the government's obligation to provide adequate medical care to those 

whom it is punishing by incarceration. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). 

In order to establish a claim under the Eighth Amendment for inadequate medical care, a 

plaintiff must show that a specific defendant was deliberately indifferent to his serious 

medical needs. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 

106. “This includes both an objective standard – that the deprivation was serious enough 

to constitute cruel and unusual punishment – and a subjective standard –deliberate 

indifference.” Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

First, to meet the objective element of a deliberate indifference claim, “a prisoner 

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must demonstrate the existence of a serious medical need.” Colwell, 763 F.3d at 1066. 

“A medical need is serious if failure to treat it will result in significant injury or the 

'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (en banc), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 946 (2015) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Second, to meet the subjective element, a prisoner must “demonstrate that the 

prison official acted with deliberate indifference.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 

(9th Cir. 2004). Deliberate indifference may be manifest by the intentional denial, delay 

or interference with a plaintiff's medical care. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. The prison 

official, however, “must not only ‘be aware of facts from which the inference could be 

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person 'must also draw the 

inference.’” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 

(1994)). Thus, an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care, negligence, a 

mere delay in medical care (without more), or a difference of opinion over proper medical 

treatment, all are insufficient to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. See Estelle, 

429 U.S. at 105-07; Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1059-60; Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 

(9th Cir. 1989); Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th 

Cir. 1985). Moreover, the Eighth Amendment does not require optimal medical care or 

even medical care that comports with the community standard of medical care. “[A] 

complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical 

condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth 

Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely 

because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Accordingly, even “gross 

negligence” is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference. See Wood v. Housewright, 

900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990).

Insofar as Plaintiff seeks the appointment of an expert to opine on the proper 

standard of care his request will be denied because it appears in fact to be an attempt to 

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secure assistance for Plaintiff in trying to establish a necessary element of his case. 

Furthermore, the deliberate indifference analysis is subjective; expert testimony is not 

necessary to determine if Defendant acted with deliberate indifference. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for the appointment of an expert witness will be 

denied.

III. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s February 5, 2016, motion for a settlement conference (ECF No. 58) 

is DENIED; and

2. Plaintiff’s February 5, 2016, motion for a court-appointed expert witness (ECF 

No. 59) is also DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 26, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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