Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01716/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01716-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM NIBLE, CASE NO. CV-F-06-1716 OWW DLB P

Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT,

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

vs.

[Doc. 1]

KNOWLES, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in a civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the instant action on November 28, 2006 and was granted

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on March 1, 2007. 

I. Discussion

A. Screening Standard

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court

must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous

or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any

filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time

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if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the

claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984),

citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners

Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must

accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees,

425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve

all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

B. Summary of Plaintiff’s Complaint

The events at issue in the instant action allegedly occurred at Kern Valley State Prison. Plaintiff

names Warden Knowles, Appeals Coordinators B.Griewich and C. Pfeiffer and unnamed mail room

clerks as defendants. 

Plaintiff alleges that in June of 2006, unnamed mail room workers returned legal material that

he purchased to the sender without affording plaintiff any notice, explanation, or administrative review.

Plaintiff alleges that he learned of the return after the merchant returned the funds to his account.

Plaintiff alleges that he filed numerous grievances regarding the returned mail and the failure to receive

responses to the grievances. Plaintiff alleges that defendants Gricewich and Pfeiffer failed to properly

process his grievances. 

C. Section 1983 Claims

1. Incoming Mail

Prisoners have “First Amendment right to send and receive mail.” Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d

264, 265 (9 Cir. 1995). Prison regulations relating to the regulation of incoming mail are analyzed th

under the Turner reasonableness standard set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987).

Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1989). The regulation is valid if it is reasonably related

to legitimate penological interests. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. In determining the reasonableness of the

regulation, court must consider the following factors: (1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection

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between the regulation and the legitimate government interest put forward to justify it,” (2) “whether

there are alternative means of exercising the right,” (3) the impact that the “accommodation of the

asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates,” and (4) “the absence of ready

alternatives.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90.

Plaintiff alleges that his incoming mail was wrongly rejected by staff and returned to its sender.

Plaintiff may be able to state a cognizable claim for relief under section 1983 based on the rejection of

the book. However, plaintiff must first cure the linkage deficiency contained in his complaint with

regard to this claim, as discussed in the following three paragraphs. 

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to

be subjected, any citizen of the United States. . . to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution. . . shall be

liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other

proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the

defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v. Department

of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has

held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning

of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to

perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is

made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under

section 1983, plaintiff must link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that

demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s federal rights. 

To the extent that plaintiff is attempting to impose liability on the individual who rejected his

book, plaintiff must identify that individual. If plaintiff does not know the identity of the person who

rejected his book, he may name that person as a Doe. The inclusion of Doe defendants under these

circumstances is permissible, as plaintiff may amend the complaint pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure once the identity of defendants is known through discovery or other means.

Merritt v. Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 768 (9 Cir. 1989); see Swartz v. Gold Dust Casino, Inc., 91 th

F.R.D. 543, 547 (D. Nev. 1981). The United States Marshal, of course, cannot initiate service of process

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on a Doe defendant until plaintiff is able to provide the Marshal with the name and location of the

defendant.

To the extent that plaintiff is attempting to impose liability on a supervisor, such as Warden

Knowles, plaintiff is advised that under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory

personnel for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. When the named

defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between the defendant and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir.

1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To

state a claim for relief under section 1983 for supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege some facts

indicating that the defendant either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional

rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy

so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of

the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations

omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts indicating that Warden Knowles personally participated in the

alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or

promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional

rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black at 646. 

2. Grievances

Prisoners have no constitutional right to an inmate grievance system. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461

U.S. 238, 249 (1983). “[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any

substantive right upon the inmates.” Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993)(citing Azeez

v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982); see also Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir.

1988). “Hence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural protections

envisioned by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. at 10; Spencer v. Moore,

638 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986). Specifically, failure to process a grievance does not state a

constitutional violation. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. Thus, a prison official’s involvement and actions

in reviewing prisoner’s administrative appeal cannot serve as the basis for liability under a § 1983 action.

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Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. 

Plaintiff may not pursue claims for relief against defendants Gricewich and Pfeiffer under section

1983 for reviewing and denying his grievances. 

D. Conclusion

The court finds that plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any cognizable claims for relief against

the named defendants. The court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended

complaint.

Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in

itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the

original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended

complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended

complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be

sufficiently alleged.

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint, is dismissed, with leave to amend;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff shall file an

amended complaint; 

3. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form; and

4. If plaintiff failsto file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the court will

recommend that this action be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 3, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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