Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_01-cv-02253/USCOURTS-azd-2_01-cv-02253-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 31:3729 False Claims Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, ex rel. Patricia

Haight and In Defense of Animals, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Catholic Healthcare West, et al., 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-01-2253-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees (doc. 216) and

memorandum in support (doc. 220), plaintiffs’ response (doc. 226), and defendants’ reply

(doc. 228). We also have plaintiffs’ motion for review of clerk’s costs determination (doc.

229), and defendants’ response (doc. 230). 

Plaintiffs filed this action under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733,

claiming that defendants made false claims in connection with a grant application to fund

medical research involving the use of dogs. We granted summary judgment in favor of

defendants (doc. 214). Defendants now seek an award of $679,733.50 in attorneys’ fees and

related non-taxable expenses pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(4).

In qui tam cases, a court may award reasonable attorneys’ fees to a prevailing

defendant if the plaintiff’s claim was “clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought

Case 2:01-cv-02253-FJM Document 234 Filed 02/29/08 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

primarily for purposes of harassment.” Id. An action is “clearly frivolous” when “the result

is obvious or the [plaintiff’s] arguments of error are wholly without merit.” Pfingston v.

Ronan Eng’g Co., 284 F.3d 999, 1006 (citation omitted). An action is “clearly vexatious”

or “brought primarily for purposes of harassment” when the plaintiff “pursues the litigation

with an improper purpose, such as to annoy or embarrass the defendant.” Id. The award of

fees under § 3730(d)(4) is “reserved for rare and special circumstances.” Id. at 1006-07. 

We initially denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that plaintiffs had

sufficiently set forth legally viable claims in their complaint (doc. 58). In connection with

the motions for summary judgment, we determined only after an extensive review of the

evidence that the claims were without legal merit. We cannot engage in post hoc analysis

of those claims. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421-22, 98 S. Ct.

694, 700 (1978). Instead, we rely on the analysis set forth in our prior order (doc. 214) and

conclude that plaintiffs’ claims were not so lacking in legal merit as to be deemed frivolous.

Defendants argue that we must nevertheless grant fees because plaintiffs acted with

an improper motive in pursuing this case. They claim that Dr. Haight and In Defense of

Animals used this litigation to advance their social agenda of stopping the use of animals in

medical research. Defendants argue that this litigation was just another step in a long

harassment campaign, which included picketing outside their place of business; holding press

conferences and letter-writing campaigns in an effort to stop the research; and petitioning the

Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office to file animal cruelty charges against Dr. Berens. 

The purpose of the False Claims Act is to remedy fraud against the government, not

to provide a vehicle for relators to pursue their own agenda. The question of imposing

attorneys’ fees is problematic when a relator with an obvious social agenda asserts a facially

meritorious claim. The False Claims Act provides for attorneys fees to a prevailing

defendant when a plaintiff’s claims are “clearly frivolous” or “brought primarily for purposes

of harassment.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(4). Although these criteria are presented as alternative

grounds, they are nevertheless related in that evidence bearing on frivolousness will often be

probative of improper purpose. See Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358,

Case 2:01-cv-02253-FJM Document 234 Filed 02/29/08 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

1362 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing these factors in the context of Rule 11 sanctions). 

It is evident from plaintiffs’ pre-litigation activities that they acted to advance their

own social agenda. If evidence of an improper motive were our only consideration, our

inquiry would end. However, § 3730(d)(4) provides that not only must evidence exist that

plaintiffs were motivated by an improper purpose, but also that their claims were brought

“primarily” for that purpose. Having previously concluded that plaintiffs’ claims were not

frivolous, we cannot say that the promotion of plaintiffs’ social agenda was paramount over

asserting their non-frivolous claims that, if successful, could have earned them a sizable

award. Because there is no showing that plaintiffs’ claims were brought primarily for

purposes of harassment, we deny defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees and non-taxable

costs (doc. 216). 

The issue of costs under Rule 54 (d)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P., presents an entirely different

question. Rule 54(d)(1) provides that costs other than attorneys’ fees “should be allowed

to the prevailing party.” “The unsuccessful litigant can overcome this presumption [in favor

of the award of costs under Rule 54(d)] only by pointing to some impropriety on the part of

the prevailing party that would justify a denial of costs. . . . A district court therefore must

award costs unless the prevailing party is guilty of some fault, misconduct, or default worthy

of punishment.” U.S. ex rel. Lindenthal v. General Dynamics Corp., 61 F.3d 1402, 1414 (9th

Cir. 1995) (applying Rule 54(d) in a False Claims Act case) (citation omitted). 

Plaintiffs claim that a permissive award of costs would chill the exercise of rights by

qui tam litigants both in this case and other cases brought under the False Claims Act. Such

a blanket exclusion of costs in False Claims Act cases was rejected in Lindenthal. Id. at

1413-14. Because plaintiffs do not allege any impropriety or misconduct on the part of

defendants, or otherwise present valid reasons to disallow defendants’ costs, we deny

plaintiffs’ motion for review of costs (doc. 229), and allow costs in the amount taxed by the

clerk.

Case 2:01-cv-02253-FJM Document 234 Filed 02/29/08 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

IT IS ORDERED DENYING defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees and non-taxable

costs (doc. 216). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING plaintiffs’ motion for review

of costs (doc. 229). 

DATED this 29th day of February, 2008.

Case 2:01-cv-02253-FJM Document 234 Filed 02/29/08 Page 4 of 4