Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01630/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01630-30/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TIFFANY FENTERS, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

YOSEMITE CHEVRON, et al., )

)

)

Defendants. )

)

)

No. CV-F-05-1630 OWW/DLB

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION TO BE RELIEVED FROM

DEEMED ADMISSIONS (Doc. 216)

In opposing Defendants County of Merced, Gordon Spencer, and

Merle Wayne Hutton’s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff 

filed a motion to be relieved from deemed admissions.

On October 26, 2007, the County Defendants served Plaintiff

by mail with requests for admission. The requests for admission

were served on Plaintiff’s counsel, Kevin Little at 2115 Kern

Street, Suite 330, Fresno, California. Responses to the requests

for admission were due by November 26, 2007. On November 26,

2007, Mr. Little filed a Notice of Change of Address, listing his

new address as 2339 Kern Street, Suite 330, Fresno, California. 

1

Case 1:05-cv-01630-OWW -DLB Document 226 Filed 03/24/10 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

The County Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was filed on

December 21, 2007 and relied to some extent on the unanswered

requests for admission. Plaintiff filed responses to the

requests for admission on April 28, 2008. In the responses to

requests for admission, Plaintiff’s counsel avers that the

requests for admission, “although apparently propounded in late

October 2007, were not received during that time period, perhaps

because plaintiff’s counsel was then in the process of changing

offices.”

Rule 36(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that

the “matter is deemed admitted unless, within 30 days after

service of the request ... the party to whom the request is

directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written

answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by the party

....” “Failure to respond to requests for admission results in

automatic admission of the matters requested ... No motion to

establish the admissions is needed because Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 36(a) is self-executing.” Federal Trade Commission v.

Medicor LLC, 217 F.Supp.2d 1048, 1053 (C.D.Cal.2002). Rule

36(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:

A matter admitted under this rule is

conclusively established unless the court, on

motion, permits the admission to be withdrawn

or amended. Subject to Rule 16(c), the court

may permit withdrawal or amendment if it

would promote the presentation of the merits

of the action and if the court is not

persuaded that it would prejudice the

requesting party in maintaining or defending

the action on the merits. 

2

Case 1:05-cv-01630-OWW -DLB Document 226 Filed 03/24/10 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Plaintiff asserted in opposition to Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment based on the deemed admissions:

Plaintiff has timely responded to more than a

dozen discovery requests in this action

without any motions to compel being filed, so

there is no inference that her failure to

respond any earlier was in any way

intentional or sanctionable, much less to the

extent sought by the County Defendants.

Plaintiff’s contention that, because Defendants did not file a

motion to compel responses to the requests for admission, she

should be relieved of the deemed admissions, fails because of

self-executing provision in Rule 36(a). 

Plaintiff did not move to be relieved of the deemed

admissions until after the County Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment had been taken under submission by the Court for

resolution. In support of the motion to be relieved from the

deemed admissions, counsel for Plaintiff avers:

I was required to move with minimal notice

from my prior office in late October 2007,

and had vacated said premises before November

1, 2007. I do not ever recall seeing or

being aware of the subject admission requests

until they were presented as part of the

County defendants’ motion for summary

judgment. I suspect that the unopened

envelope containing the subject requests may

have been misplaced during my hasty move. 

However, I can assure the Court that I did

not intentionally refuse to timely respond to

said requests on plaintiff’s behalf.

“Rule 36(b) is permissive, not mandatory, with respect to

the withdrawal of admissions. Conlon v. United States, 474 F.3d

616, 621 (9 Cir.2007). ‘The first half of the test in Rule th

36(b) is satisfied when upholding the admissions would

3

Case 1:05-cv-01630-OWW -DLB Document 226 Filed 03/24/10 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

practically eliminate any presentation of the merits of the

case.’” Id. at 622. The party relying on the deemed admissions

has the burden of proving prejudice. Id. “The prejudice

contemplated by Rule 36(b) is ‘not simply that the party who

obtained the admission will now have to convince the factfinder

of its truth. Rather, it relates to the difficulty a person may

face in proving its case, e.g., caused by the unavailability of

key witnesses, because of the sudden need to obtain evidence’

with respect to the questions previously deemed admitted.” 

Hadley v. United States, 45 F.3d 1345, 1348 (9 Cir.1995). th

“Reliance on a deemed admission in preparing a summary judgment

motion does not constitute prejudice.” Conlon, id. at 624. 

However, even if the moving party satisfies the two-pronged test,

the Court retains discretion to deny the motion. Id. at 624-625. 

“[I]n deciding whether to exercise its discretion when the moving

party has met the two-pronged test of Rule 36(b), the district

court may consider other factors, including whether the moving

party can show good cause for the delay and whether the moving

party appears to have a strong case on the merits.” Id. at 625.

Here, the two-pronged test is satisfied. The deemed

admissions practically eliminate any presentation by Plaintiff of

the case on the merits. The County Defendants have not shown

prejudice as contemplated by Conlon. The County Defendants rely

on the deemed admissions in seeking summary judgment. Further,

the County Defendants rely on deposition testimony, declarations,

and other documentary evidence as well as the deemed admissions

4

Case 1:05-cv-01630-OWW -DLB Document 226 Filed 03/24/10 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

in seeking summary judgment. There is no showing that granting

Plaintiff’s motion to be relieved of the deemed admissions will

cause the County Defendants any difficulty in proving their case. 

Although Plaintiff’s counsel was careless in representing his

client by failing to insure that all papers received by him in

connection with this action were accounted for during the move of

his office, the Court concludes that he has shown cause for the

delay in responding to the deemed admissions. Further, no trial

date has been set in this action. 

Plaintiff’s motion to be relieved from the deemed admissions

is GRANTED. The Court disregards the County Defendants’

Statement of Undisputed Facts Nos. 70-75 in support of the motion

for summary judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 23, 2010 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

5

Case 1:05-cv-01630-OWW -DLB Document 226 Filed 03/24/10 Page 5 of 5