Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01465/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01465-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Christopher Lee Smith, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-1465-PHX-JAT (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG, SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Christopher Lee Smith filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus challenging his 

conviction in Maricopa County Superior Court for one count of second degree murder for 

the death of Trang Vo and three counts of aggravated assault. His habeas petition argues 

that his trial contained impermissible jury instructions and inadmissible evidence, and 

that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. As explained below, the Court 

recommends that Smith’s petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

BACKGROUND 

 Following a head-on collision, Smith was charged with three counts of assault and 

one count of second degree murder. (Doc. 9, Ex. A) Smith’s defense at trial was that he 

had been sleep-driving. (Doc. 9, Ex. V, ¶¶ 10-11) At the conclusion of an eight day trial 

in Maricopa County Superior Court, a jury found Smith guilty of one count of second 

degree murder and three counts of aggravated assault, all dangerous offenses. (Doc. 9, 

Ex. J; Doc. 16, Exs. NNN-DDDD) The Court sentenced Smith to a presumptive sentence 

Case 2:15-cv-01465-JAT Document 17 Filed 04/11/16 Page 1 of 9
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

of 16 years for murder to be followed by concurrent, presumptive sentences of 7.5 years 

for the aggravated assaults. (Doc. 9, Ex. O) 

 Direct Appeal. Smith, through counsel, timely appealed and argued that the jury 

instruction on the effect of alcohol use deprived him of due process by impermissibly 

shifting the burden of proof and was also impermissibly confusing. (Doc. 9, Ex. S) At 

the conclusion of briefing, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Smith’s convictions 

and sentences. (Doc. 9, Exs. T, U, V) Smith’s counsel declined continuing 

representation and Smith obtained new counsel. (Doc. 9, Exs. W, X) 

 Through his new counsel, Smith petitioned the Arizona Supreme Court for review 

and argued that his due process rights were violated by the jury instructions on voluntary 

intoxication and voluntary acts, the failure to instruct the jury on intervening cause, and 

the statutory definition of reckless murder. (Doc. 9, Ex. Y) The Arizona Supreme Court 

denied Smith’s petition for review. (Doc. 9, Ex. AA) 

 Post-Conviction Relief. Smith timely filed a notice of post-conviction relief in 

Maricopa County Superior Court. (Doc. 9, Ex. CC) Smith was appointed counsel who 

subsequently filed a Notice of Completion informing the Court that he was unable to 

raise any viable claims. (Doc. 9, Ex. DD, EE, FF) The Court granted Smith the 

opportunity to file a pro per Petition and he hired counsel to do so. (Doc. 9, Exs. GG, 

HH, II, JJ) His Petition argued that he had received ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

when his trial counsel did not properly interview witnesses, his trial counsel agreed to a 

prejudicial stipulation, and his trial counsel failed to prepare an expert witness. (Doc. 9, 

Ex. JJ) At the conclusion of briefing, on October 21, 2013, the Superior Court found that 

Smith did not present a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and 

denied his Petition. (Doc. 9, Exs. KK, LL, MM) 

 On October 24, 2013, shortly after the Superior Court denied his Petition, Smith 

signed two motions: a notice of intent to file a petition for review and a motion for an 

extension of time to do so. (Doc. 9, Exs. NN, OO at 2) Smith filed both motions in the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. (Id.) Both motions were marked as “Filed” by the Court of 

Case 2:15-cv-01465-JAT Document 17 Filed 04/11/16 Page 2 of 9
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Appeals on November 4, 2013, and also marked as “Filed” by the Maricopa County 

Superior Court on November 12, 2013. (Id.) 

 On January 6, 2014, Smith filed another motion for an extension of time to file his 

petition for review. (Doc. 9, Ex. PP) This motion is stamped as received by the Arizona 

Court of Appeals on January 10, 2014. (Id.) On January 15, 2014, the Clerk of the Court 

of Appeals forwarded a copy of this motion to the Clerk of the Maricopa County Superior 

Court, noting that the Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.9(c) requires the trial court 

to address extensions of time. (Doc. 9, Ex. OO at 1) Smith was copied on this letter. 

(Id.) The Superior Court marked Smith’s motion as “Filed” on January 17, 2014.1

 On January 29, 2014, Smith signed a Petition for Review and filed it in the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 9, Ex. QQ) The Court of Appeals marked it as “Filed” 

on February 3, 2014, and subsequently dismissed it as untimely. (Doc. 9, Exs. QQ, RR) 

Smith’s motion for reconsideration and his petition to the Arizona Supreme Court for 

review were both denied. (Doc. 9, Exs. SS, TT, UU, VV) 

 Subsequent Post-Conviction Relief. In October 2014, Smith filed a notice of postconviction relief in Maricopa County Superior Court arguing that he was entitled to postconviction relief because State v. Spencer, 235 Ariz. 496 (App. 2014), constituted a 

significant change in the law that would probably overturn his conviction or sentence.2

 

(Doc. 9, Ex. AAA) Without further briefing, the Superior Court found that Smith had not 

provided any legal analysis to support his conclusion and denied his Notice. (Doc. 9, Ex. 

BBB) Smith’s motion for reconsideration was denied. (Doc. 9, Exs. CCC, DDD) 

 

1

 On September 11, 2014, the Superior Court filed a minute entry directing the State to respond to Smith’s motion for an extension of time. (Doc. 9, Ex. XX) The 

State’s response argued that the issue was moot because the Arizona Supreme Court had already denied Smith’s petition for review. (Doc. 9, Ex. YY) The Superior Court then noted that its minute entry was in error because Smith’s motion had been directed to the 

Court of Appeals not the Superior Court. (Doc. 9, Ex. ZZ) 

2

 In Spencer, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that a defendant did not 

voluntarily consent to post-accident medical treatment and so the trial court should have 

granted her motion to suppress her warrantless medical blood draw. State v. Spencer, 235 Ariz. 496 (App. 2014). 

Case 2:15-cv-01465-JAT Document 17 Filed 04/11/16 Page 3 of 9
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 In February 2015, Smith filed another notice of post-conviction relief in Maricopa 

County Superior Court raising the same argument about the impact of new law. (Doc. 9, 

Ex. EEE) The Superior Court again dismissed his notice. (Doc. 9, Ex. FFF) In April 

2015, Smith filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 9, Ex. 

GGG) There is no information in the record to indicate that the Court of Appeals has 

issued a decision. (Doc. 9, Ex. HHH)

 Habeas Corpus. On December 12, 2014, Smith filed a document in this Court 

titled “Notice of Petition” which stated that he intended to file a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus. 2:14-CV-02678-JAT-DKD at Doc. 1. This notice was subsequently 

dismissed without prejudice. Id. at Docs. 5, 6. 

 On July 30, 2015, Smith filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this case. 

(Doc. 1) On August 19, 2015, he filed an Amended Petition which argues that his due 

process rights were violated by (1) the jury instruction on the effect of alcohol use, (2) the 

failure to instruct the jury on intervening cause, and (3) the jury instruction on second 

degree murder, and (4a) the admission of a historical DUI. Finally, Smith argues that his 

right to effective assistance of counsel was violated when (4b) a historical DUI was 

admitted into evidence, (5) trial counsel failed to interview witnesses, and (6) trial 

counsel failed to have an expert witness interview him personally. (Doc. 8) 

 Respondents argue that his Petition is untimely and, even if timely, Grounds 2 

through 63

 are technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted. In reply, Smith argues 

that he timely filed his request for additional time to file post-conviction relief and the 

Superior Court never ruled on any of those requests. (Doc. 14 at 3-6) Smith also argues 

that he has met the exhaustion requirement “because he’s identified Constitutional 

violations during state court proceedings.” (Id. at 9) 

 

3

 Respondents only argue that Grounds 2-6 are technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 9 at 26) Other than untimeliness, Respondents do not raise any other arguments about Ground One. 

Case 2:15-cv-01465-JAT Document 17 Filed 04/11/16 Page 4 of 9
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 The Court agrees that Smith’s Petition is untimely. However, even if it had been 

timely, Smith would not be entitled to habeas relief. Accordingly, the Court recommends 

that this Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

Smith is not entitled to relief.

 A state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief from a state court conviction is 

required to file the petition within one year of “the date on which the judgment became 

final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 

review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The period of limitations is statutorily tolled during 

the time in which a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other 

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending” in the State 

courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). An untimely petition is denied unless a petitioner can 

show that he is entitled to equitable tolling. To make such a showing, Smith needed to 

demonstrate both that he pursued his rights diligently and that some extraordinary 

circumstance prevented him from filing his petition. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 

649 (2010). 

 In his petition and his reply, Smith has not attempted to meet either prong of the 

equitable tolling test. Instead, he argued that he timely filed his requests for an extension 

of time to file his petition for review. (Doc. 14) Although he did make these requests, he 

filed them in the wrong court. Under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.9(c), Smith 

needed to file his requests in the Superior Court, not the Court of Appeals. The record 

does reflect that Smith’s requests were received by the Superior Court shortly after he 

mailed them to the Court of Appeals; the record does not reflect that his requests were 

ever ruled upon by the Superior Court. 

 Respondents argue that Smith’s one year clock began to run when he did not 

timely file a petition for review from the Superior Court’s denial of his post-conviction 

relief proceedings. Under the most generous version of Smith’s timeline, this argument 

appears persuasive: assuming that his one year clock began on November 26, 2013 (at the 

expiration of time to file his petition for review, or 35 days after the Superior Court’s 

Case 2:15-cv-01465-JAT Document 17 Filed 04/11/16 Page 5 of 9
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

denial on October 21, 2014), then he needed to file in this Court by November 26, 2014. 

His petition is untimely even assuming that his current petition relates back to the notice 

he filed on December 12, 2014. 

 But even if this Court found that Smith had timely filed habeas petition in this 

Court, or he was entitled to equitable tolling, he would still not be entitled to relief for 

any of his claims. 

 Unexhausted claims. A state prisoner must properly exhaust all state court 

remedies before this Court can grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Arizona prisoners properly exhaust state remedies 

by fairly presenting claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally appropriate 

manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 843-45 (1999); Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 

F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). To 

be fairly presented, a claim must include a statement of the operative facts and the 

specific federal legal theory. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2004); Gray v. 

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996); Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66. 

 Smith’s petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court is the first time that he 

argued that his due process rights were violated by the failure to instruct the jury on 

intervening cause (Ground 2), the jury instruction on second degree murder (Ground 3), 

and the admission of a historical DUI (Ground 4a). (Doc. 9, Ex. Y) Because these 

claims were not presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals, they were not exhausted in 

state court and, therefore, could not be reviewed by a habeas court. 

 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel claims. Even if Smith had requested and 

received extensions from the correct court so that his claims for ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel were properly before this court, he would not be entitled to relief. 

 The Court could only grant habeas relief if Smith demonstrated prejudice from the 

adjudication of a claim that either “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 

Case 2:15-cv-01465-JAT Document 17 Filed 04/11/16 Page 6 of 9
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on 

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C § 2254(d). Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 970, n.16 

(9th Cir. 2004); Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 977 (9th Cir. 2000). 

 Under clearly established Federal law on ineffective assistance of counsel 

(“IAC”), Smith would need to show that his trial counsel’s performance was both (a) 

objectively deficient and (b) caused him prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 687 (1984). This results in a “doubly deferential” review of counsel’s performance. 

Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011). The Court has discretion to determine 

which Strickland prong to analyze first. LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1270 (9th

Cir. 1998). A habeas court reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must 

determine “whether there is a reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s 

deferential standard, such that the state court’s rejection of the IAC claim was not an 

unreasonable application of Strickland. Relief is warranted only if no reasonable jurist 

could disagree that the state court erred.” Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 418, 465-66 (9th

Cir. 2014) (internal citations and quotations omitted). In other words, this Court’s 

“pivotal question is whether the state court’s application of the Strickland standard was 

unreasonable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). 

 The Superior Court reviewed Smith’s petition for post-conviction relief and 

concluded that he did not establish that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 

(Doc. 9, Ex. MM) Assuming the Arizona Court of Appeals would have agreed, this 

Court cannot say that this conclusion was an unreasonable application of the Strickland 

standard. The Court has reviewed trial counsel’s performance in this case and cannot say 

that it was objectively deficient and caused Smith prejudice. (Doc. 16, Exs. NNNDDDD) 

 First, Smith argued that his trial counsel should have conducted a more thorough 

interview of one of the State’s witnesses, his sister, in order to discover her history of 

traumatic brain injury and her history of malingering about family matters. (Doc. 9, Exs. 

Case 2:15-cv-01465-JAT Document 17 Filed 04/11/16 Page 7 of 9
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

JJ, LL) However, the Superior Court found that there was no error: Smith’s sister’s 

testimony was largely consistent with her husband’s testimony and defense counsel 

tracked down impeachment material that evening. (Doc. 9, Ex. MM; Doc. 16, Ex. UUU 

at 5-13) 

 Next, Smith argued that his trial counsel should have required his expert to 

interview him. However, as the Superior Court noted, at trial, Smith’s expert testified 

about the various reasons that a sleep study would not help him diagnose Smith and, 

instead, sleepwalking is usually diagnosed by interviews with family members. (Doc. 9, 

Ex. MM; Doc. 16, Ex. XXX at 23-26) In addition, the State’s expert did interview Smith 

and that interview did not result in favorable findings and so the failure to conduct an 

interview with Smith may have been a sound trial strategy. (Doc. 16, Ex. YYY at 48-50) 

 Finally, Smith argued that his trial counsel should not have stipulated to the 

admission of his prior DUI. (Doc. 9, Ex. JJ) This argument has misleading implications. 

Smith’s trial counsel challenged the State’s Motion in Limine to admit the prior DUI in a 

written motion and in oral argument. After the court ruled that the state could only 

mention the fact of the conviction, it appears that Smith’s trial counsel made the sound 

strategy choice to stipulate to the language that the State would use to comply with the 

court’s ruling. (Doc. 9, Ex. K at Ex. 1) This Court cannot say that this constitutes 

ineffective assistance of counsel. 

 Jury Instruction on Alcohol Use. The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that 

Smith’s jury instruction on alcohol use did not violate his due process rights. (Doc. 9, 

Ex. V) Assuming that this question had been timely presented to this Court for habeas 

review, “The only question for [habeas review] is ‘whether the ailing instruction by itself 

so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.’” Estelle v. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)). 

The Court has reviewed all of the transcripts in this matter, from pre-trial hearings and 

settlement conferences through sentencing and is confident that Smith’s due process 

rights were not violated. 

Case 2:15-cv-01465-JAT Document 17 Filed 04/11/16 Page 8 of 9
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Simply put, Smith would not be entitled to relief even if the Court of Appeals had 

accepted his petition for review from the Superior Court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief. 

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Christopher Lee Smith’s 

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the 

Amended Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not 

find the ruling debatable. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, 

the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure 

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may 

result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will 

be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Dated this 11th day of April, 2016. 

Case 2:15-cv-01465-JAT Document 17 Filed 04/11/16 Page 9 of 9