Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-00607/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-00607-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Max Richard Ogas, Jr. 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Sheraro, 

Respondent. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 07-607-PHX-SMM (JCG)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Max Richard Ogas, presently incarcerated at the Arizona State Prison

Complex, Central Arizona Correctional Facility, in Florence, AZ, has filed a Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this

Court, this matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Guerin for Report and Recommendation.

Before the Court are the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) (Doc. No. 1) and

Respondents’ Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”). (Doc. No. 11).

Petitioner replied on August 10, 2007. (Doc. No.14). The Magistrate Judge recommends

that the District Court dismiss the petition on the ground that it is time barred.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 27, 1996, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of first-degree murder, a

class one dangerous felony, one count of burglary in the second degree, and one count of

kidnapping. (Answer, Ex. B.) In the plea agreement, the parties stipulated to a sentence of

“life without the possibility of parole,” for the murder. (Id.) On April 1, 1996, the Coconino

Case 3:07-cv-00607-SMM Document 15 Filed 08/23/07 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 2 -

County Superior Court sentenced Petitioner to the aggravated term of 20 years’

imprisonment for the burglary, the presumptive term of 28 years’ imprisonment for the

kidnapping, and the stipulated term of life without possibility of parole for the first-degree

murder. (Answer, Ex. D.) 

Because Petitioner pled guilty to non-capital offenses, A.R.S. § 13-4033(B) prohibited

him from filing a direct appeal. On October 15, 2002, Petitioner filed a Notice of Petition

for Post-Conviction Relief in the trial court. (Answer, Ex. E.) Counsel was appointed to

represent Petitioner in his post-conviction proceedings. (Answer, Ex. F.) After courtappointed counsel indicated to the trial court that he could not find any colorable claims to

raise in post-conviction proceedings, the trial court permitted Petitioner to file a pro se

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. (Answer, Ex. F.) On January 13, 2004, Petitioner filed

a pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. (“Rule 32

Petition”). (Answer, Ex. G.) Petitioner presented seven claims in his Rule 32 Petition: (1)

Petitioner was misled into signing the plea agreement, (2) Petitioner’s plea agreement was

involuntary, (3) the plea agreement omitted a material factor that was relevant to Petitioner’s

decision-making process, (4) Petitioner was improperly induced into signing the plea

agreement because he was told he would receive the death penalty if he went to trial, (5)

Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel, (6) Petitioner should have received a

competency hearing prior to entering into the plea agreement, and (7) the trial court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction over Petitioner’s criminal case. (Answer, Ex. G.) 

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing regarding Petitioner’s Rule 32 Petition on

September 23, 2004. (Answer, Ex. P.) At the close of the hearing, the Court denied

Petitioner’s Rule 32 Petition. (Id.) 

On September 22, 2004, Petitioner moved for leave to supplement his Rule 32 Petition

with a claim that his sentence violated Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), filing the

proposed supplement on that same date. (Answer, Exs. N.) The court accepted Petitioner’s

Supplemental Rule 32 Petition on September 23, 2004. (Answer, Ex. Q.) On February 4,

Case 3:07-cv-00607-SMM Document 15 Filed 08/23/07 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 3 -

2005, the trial court denied the Supplemental Rule 32 Petition on the grounds that it was not

timely filed. (Answer, Ex. T.) 

On February 24, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona Court

of Appeals. (Answer, Ex. U.) The petition for review raised three claims: (1) Petitioner’s

plea was involuntary, (2) Petitioner received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and (3)

Petitioner’s sentence violated Blakely. (Id.) The Arizona Court of Appeals summarily

denied review on October 25, 2005. (Answer, Ex. X.) 

On December 23, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for review by the Arizona Supreme

Court. (Answer, Ex. Y.) The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied review on May 23,

2006.

On March 22, 2007, Petitioner filed his present federal habeas petition in this Court.

(Doc. No. 1.) In his Petition, Petitioner presented a single claim: that he received ineffective

assistance of trial counsel.

DISCUSSION

Respondents contend that Petitioner’s Petition must be dismissed because it is not

timely. (Answer, pgs. 4-8.) 

Federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners are governed by a

one-year statute of limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute of limitations

begins to run from the latest of: (1) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (2) the date

on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action; (3) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (4) the date on

which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Case 3:07-cv-00607-SMM Document 15 Filed 08/23/07 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 4 -

Of these possible starting dates, only the first is relevant to the present action.

Petitioner does not allege that he was unconstitutionally impeded from timely filing the

present federal Petition, nor does Petitioner allege that his Petition is predicated on a newlyrecognized constitutional right or newly-discovered evidence that could not have been

discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence.

Petitioner’s judgment became final on June 29, 1996, 90 days after his sentencing,

because that date signified the expiration of time for seeking post-conviction relief pursuant

to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. Rule

32.4 (“the notice [of post-conviction proceedings] must be filed within ninety days after the

entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the order and

mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.”); see also Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d

710, 716-17 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that Arizona's Rule 32 of-right proceeding for

plea-convicted defendants is a form of direct review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A)). Thus, Petitioner’s deadline to file his federal petition expired on June 29,

1997, the one-year anniversary of the expiration of Petitioner’s deadline to seek review of

his sentencing, absent any tolling periods. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th

Cir. 2001) (calculating the 1-year period using the “anniversary method” of Rule 6(a), Fed.

R. Civ. P.). 

The statute of limitations is tolled during the time that a properly filed application for

state post-conviction relief is pending. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (emphasis added).

Although Petitioner pursued post-conviction relief in state court beginning in 2002, those

proceedings did not toll the federal statute of limitations. Petitioner’s Rule 32 Petition and

his supplement thereto were not timely filed; therefore they were not “properly filed” and did

not toll the statute. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 408-09 (2005); Artuz v. Bennett,

531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000). Moreover, by the time Petitioner filed his first Notice of PostConviction Relief, the federal statute of limitations had long expired. Petitioner could not

“re-start” the federal time limit once it had run out. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d

Case 3:07-cv-00607-SMM Document 15 Filed 08/23/07 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 5 -

820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that we hold that section 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed). 

 Equitable tolling may be available even after the statute of limitations period has

expired if "extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file

a petition on time." Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th

Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds, Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct., 163 F.3d 530

(9th Cir. 1998)(en banc). Equitable tolling is appropriate only if extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time, and is unavailable

in most cases. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir.1999) and Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288). Petitioner argues

in his reply that he was unable to timely file the pending petition because he has been acting

pro se, lacks legal knowledge and was forced to rely on other inmates to prepare his legal

filings. A pro se litigant’s lack of legal knowledge does not constitute extraordinary

circumstances justifying equitable tolling. See Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir.

2006). Accordingly, the Petition is time-barred.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court enter

an order DISMISSING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

ten days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. If objections are

not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. The parties are advised that any objections

filed are to be identified with the following case number: No. CV 07-607-PHX-SMM.

The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of the Report and Recommendation to Petitioner

and counsel for Respondents.

DATED this 23rd day of August, 2007.

Case 3:07-cv-00607-SMM Document 15 Filed 08/23/07 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 6 -

Case 3:07-cv-00607-SMM Document 15 Filed 08/23/07 Page 6 of 6