Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00891/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00891-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERTO CHAIDEZ,

CDC #F-47646,

Civil No. 07-0891 LAB (JMA)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST

FOR REHEARING [Doc. No. 10];

(2) DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT AS FRIVOLOUS AND

FOR SEEKING MONETARY DAMAGES

AGAINST IMMUNE DEFENDANTS

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)

and 1915A(b); AND

(3) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST

FOR “INJUNCTION/STAY” AS MOOT

[Doc. No. 12]

vs.

A. JOHNSON, et al.

Defendants.

I. Procedural History

On May 15, 2007, Plaintiff, Roberto Chaidez, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at

the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility and proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights action

filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff did not prepay the $350 filing fee mandated by 28

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U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2]. 

On July 11, 2007, this Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP but sua sponte

dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim and for seeking monetary damages against

immune Defendants. See July 11, 2007 Order at 6-7. In his original Complaint, Plaintiff

alleged, among other things, that a San Diego Superior Court Judge, a San Diego Superior Court

Commissioner and a San Diego Deputy District Attorney all conspired to violate his

constitutional rights which led to being “illegally held as a hostage” in a California state prison.

(See orig. Compl. at 2-3.) This Court found that a majority of Plaintiff’s claims were barred by

the doctrine set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). See July 11, 2007

Order at 4-5. That is, a finding by this Court that Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated

during his criminal trial would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.”

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Accordingly, Plaintiff is barred from bringing this § 1983 action unless

or until he has invalidated the underlying conviction. Id. Plaintiff was unable to demonstrate

in his original Complaint that his underlying conviction had been invalidated.

Moreover, the Court informed Plaintiff that his claims against the prosecuting attorney

and the judges that had presided over his criminal trial must be dismissed on immunity grounds.

Prosecutors are immune from civil damage suits where claims are premised on their duties that

are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” See July 11, 2007

Order at 5-6 (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). Moreover, the claims

against San Diego Superior Court Judges were likewise immune from suits for money damages

where the acts are performed in their official capacity. Id. at 6 (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S.

9, 11-12 (1991)).

Despite these deficiencies of pleading, the Court permitted Plaintiff leave to file an

Amended Complaint and informed him that if the Amended Complaint, failed to “state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and may

hereafter be counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).” Id. at 7 (citing McHenry v.

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Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996)). On October 31, 2007, Plaintiff filed a First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”).

II. Plaintiff’s Request for Rehearing [Doc. No. 10]

Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint on October 31, 2007. Before the Court

conducted its sua sponte screening, Plaintiff filed a “Request for Rehearing” on December 7,

2007. While the relief he is seeking in this request is not entirely clear, Plaintiff appears to be

confused as to the timing of the filing of his First Amended Complaint. Pursuant to the Court’s

first screening Order regarding Plaintiff’s original Complaint, Plaintiff was to have filed a First

Amended Complaint by August 26, 2007. Instead, the Court received Plaintiff First Amended

Complaint on October 31, 2007. While prison officials may or may not have played a role in the

delay of the Court’s receipt of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff was not harmed

by the delay as the Court permitted the First Amended Complaint to be filed despite its

untimeliness. See Discrepancy Order dated October 31, 2007, Docket No. 6. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s Request for Rehearing is DENIED.

III. Sua Sponte Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) & § 1915A

As the Court stated in its previous Order, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)

obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like

Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or

adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole,

probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.”

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these provisions, the Court must sua sponte

dismiss any IFP or prisoner complaint, or any portion thereof, which is frivolous, malicious, fails

to state a claim, or which seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A; Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d

1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but

requires” the court to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a

claim); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A). 

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Before amendment by the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte

dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. An action is

frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

324 (1989). However, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A now mandate that the court

reviewing an IFP or prisoner’s suit make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before effecting

service of the Complaint by the U.S. Marshal pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). See Calhoun,

254 F.3d at 845; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127; see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601,

604-05 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that sua sponte screening pursuant to § 1915 should occur

“before service of process is made on the opposing parties”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d

1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”); Andrews, 398 F.3d at

1121. In addition, the Court has a duty to liberally construe a pro se’s pleadings, see KarimPanahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), which is “particularly

important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). In

giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the court may not

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of

the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

As currently pleaded, it is clear that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails to state a

cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 imposes two essential proof

requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person acting under color of state law committed the

conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or

immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983;

Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S. Ct. 2117, 2122 (2004); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d

1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). 

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Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is over fifty pages long and consists of a rambling

narrative in which he appears to allege there is a “secret conspiracy” to keep him in prison.

(FAC at 3.) Plaintiff also claims that he is being held “hostage” by the California Department

of Corrections and Rehabilitation. (Id. at 12.) In addition, Plaintiff claims that the San Diego

Superior Court Judge and Assistant District Attorney conspired to appoint a non-attorney as

Plaintiff’s appointed public defender in his criminal trial. (Id. at 35.) A complaint is frivolous

“where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325

(1989). Here, the Court finds Plaintiff’s claims to be frivolous under §1915(e)(2)(B) because

they lack even “an arguable basis either in law or in fact,” and appear “fanciful,” “fantastic,” or

“delusional.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, 328.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint must be

DISMISSED as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 

III. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

(1) Plaintiff’s Request for Rehearing is DENIED [Doc. No. 10]; and

(2) Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED as frivolous pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Because it does not appear “at all possible that the plaintiff can

correct the defect(s)” of his pleading, further leave to amend is DENIED as futile. See Cahill

v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996) (denial of a leave to amend is not an

abuse of discretion where further amendment would be futile).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

(3) Plaintiff’s Request for “Injunction/State” [Doc. No. 12] is DENIED as moot.

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 18, 2007

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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