Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01838/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01838-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARTEMIS LAMONT WHALUM,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 08-CV-1838 W (POR)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

(Doc. No. 37.)

vs.

JACOB CUTTINGS; CITY OF EL

CAJON; EL CAJON POLICE

DEPARTMENT,

Defendants.

On October 8, 2008, Plaintiff Artemis Lamont Whalum (“Plaintiff”), a state

prisoner proceeding pro se, commenced this action alleging various constitutional and

42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. (Doc. No. 1.) 

Defendants Jacob Cuttings, the City of El Cajon, and the El Cajon Police

Department’s (collectively, “Defendants”) have moved to dismiss the First Amended

Complaint (“FAC”). (Doc. No. 37.) The Court decides the matter on the papers

submitted and without oral argument. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(d.1). And for the

following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

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 Defendants’ request for judicial notice of Plaintiff’s state court appellate

proceedings is GRANTED pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. (Doc. No. 37-2.)

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I. BACKGROUND

On or about October 9, 2006, Plaintiff was arrested by Defendant Cuttings. (Doc.

No. 1 at 2.) During the course of that arrest, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Cuttings

used excessive force by firing two gunshots into Plaintiff. (Id.) The bullets injured

Plaintiff’s spine, right arm, ribs, and collapsed one of his lungs. (Id.) 

On December 4, 2007, Plaintiff was convicted by a jury of assault with a deadly

weapon on a police officer and two counts of resisting an executive officer by means of

threat and violence. Plaintiff was sentenced to seventeen years and four months in

prison. He is currently incarcerated at the High Desert State Prison, in Susanville, Ca.

On October 6, 2008, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal in state court. On October

8, 2008, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff claimed that the

excessive force used by Defendant Cuttings violated his Fourth Amendment right to be

free from unreasonable arrest and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of

law. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff further alleged that the violation of his constitutional rights was

caused by Defendant City of El Cajon’s policies and failures in regards to the training

and supervision of Defendant Cuttings. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff sought an award of attorneys’

fees and costs, in addition to twenty million dollars in damages. (Id. at 3.)

On September 16, 2009, this Court dismissed Plaintiff’s lawsuit, but granted

Plaintiff leave to file a FAC. (See Doc. Nos. 29, 34.) 

On October 1, 2009, the California Court of Appeal affirmed Plaintiff’s

conviction in a written decision. People v. Whalum, Fourth Appellate District, Division

One, Case No. D053834, 2009 WL 3154971. On January 13, 2010, Plaintiff’s petition

for review was denied by the California Supreme Court. People v. Whalum, Case No.

S177791.1

On February 22, 2010, Plaintiff filed his FAC. (Doc. No. 36.) And on March 12,

2010, Defendants moved to dismiss the action. (Doc. No. 37.) 

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

The court must dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

tests the complaint’s sufficiency. See North Star Int’l. v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n., 720

F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). All material allegations in the complaint, “even if

doubtful in fact,” are assumed to be true. Id. The court must assume the truth of all

factual allegations and must “construe them in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party.” Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 2002); see also

Walleri v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Seattle, 83 F.3d 1575, 1580 (9th Cir. 1996).

As the Supreme Court explained, “[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s

obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels

and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not

do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007). Instead, the

allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Id. at 1964–65. A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law

either for lack of a cognizable legal theory or for insufficient facts under a cognizable

theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984)

III. DISCUSSION

On February 22, 2010, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint. That

document is insufficient to maintain this lawsuit for at least two reasons. First, the

document filed as the FAC was duly titled as: (1) a First Amended Complaint, and (2)

as an Objection to Magistrate Judge Porter’s original Report and Recommendation.

Upon review, however, the document is purely an objection to Magistrate Judge Porter’s

Report. This Court has already adopted Magistrate Judge Porter’s well-reasoned analysis

and will not entertain an untimely discussion of that previous ruling.

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Second, the FAC is not legally cognizable. Despite this Court’s previous ruling,

Plaintiff still maintains that he did not pose a threat to Officer Cuttings during his arrest

and that any evidence to the contrary is untrue. (Doc. No. 36 at 2.) This allegation

directly challenges the jury’s findings and calls into question the lawfulness of his

California conviction. As such, Plaintiff’s lawsuit is barred unless he can “prove that the

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,

declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called

into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.”

Heck 512 U.S. at 486–487; see also Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689,695–698 (9th

Cir. 2004)(where the Ninth Circuit affirmed that in California the lawfulness of the

officer’s conduct is an essential element of the offense of resisting a peace officer and

that a Section 1983 action alleging excessive force can be barred by Heck.) The FAC

never mentions the status or outcome of any reviewing court, and thus, the Court must

dismiss Plaintiff’s lawsuit.

Moreover, the Court is now aware that Plaintiff is unable to make the required

showing under Heck. As mentioned above, this Court has taken judicial notice of the

California Court of Appeal decision that affirmed Plaintiff’s convictions for assault with

a deadly weapon on a police officer and two counts of resisting an executive officer by

means of threat and violence. And the California Supreme Court has denied Plaintiff’s

petition for review. Thus, the Court will not grant Plaintiff leave to file a Second

Amended Complaint. See Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int'l, 300 F.3d 1083, 1087-88 (9th

Cir.2002) (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing

without leave to amend where amendment would be futile).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s lawsuit must be DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO

AMEND. 

//

//

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IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss

WITH PREJUDICE. (Doc. No. 37.)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 2, 2010

Hon. Thomas J. Whelan

United States District Judge

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