Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00752/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00752-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GRANT DALE HURLBERT,

Petitioner,

v.

KAMALA HARRIS; KATHLEEN 

McKENNA, Deputy Attorney General; 

JEFFREY BEARD, Secretary of CDCR,

Respondents.

Case No.: 15-CV-0752-AJB-PCL

ORDER: 

(1) ADOPTING THE REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION, (Doc. No. 30); 

(2) DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS, (Doc. No. 1); 

AND

(3) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

On April 6, 2015, Grant Dale Hurlbert (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro 

se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

(Doc. No. 1.) The Petition challenges Petitioner’s state court conviction for first-degree 

burglary. On November 5, 2015, Respondent filed a response to the Petition. (Doc. No. 

19.) Petitioner filed a traverse on November 27, 2015. (Doc. No. 22.) 

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Magistrate Judge Peter C. Lewis issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) 

recommending the Petition be denied. (Doc. No. 30.) On June 20, 2016, Petitioner filed 

timely objections to the R&R. (Doc. No. 31.) Respondent did not reply. For the reasons set 

forth below, the Court ADOPTS the R&R, (Doc. No. 30), OVERRULES Petitioner’s 

objections, (Doc. No. 31), DENIES the Petition, (Doc. No. 1), and DECLINES to issue a 

certificate of appealability.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be 

correct; Petitioner may rebut this presumption, but only by clear and convincing evidence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35–36 (1992) (holding that 

findings of historical fact, including inferences properly drawn therefrom, are entitled to 

statutory presumption of correctness). The following facts are taken from the California 

Court of Appeal opinion: 

In May 2011, officers responded to a call reporting a stolen white Mercury 

Sable. Items left where the car was taken contained fingerprints matching 

those belonging to Hurlbert.

About a month later, officers responded to a call from a store about a 

suspicious person in the store who drove away in a white Mercury Sable. The 

license plate number of the Mercury matched that of the stolen vehicle.

As officers approached the store, they saw a white Mercury exit the parking 

lot of the store. As the Mercury approached, one of the officers turned his 

police vehicle into oncoming traffic in an attempt to [] stop the car. However, 

the Mercury drove around the officer’s vehicle, veered into the construction 

area and sped away. At that point, one of the officers saw the driver of the 

Mercury and identified him as Hurlbert.

Officer’s [sic] engaged their lights and sirens and chased Hurlbert for 

approximately one to two minutes until he stopped at a dead end. Hurlbert 

jumped out of the Mercury and hit the hood of one of the officer’s vehicles. 

One of the officers pulled out his gun, pointed it at Hurlbert and shouted, “Stop 

or I’ll shoot.” Hurlbert immediately took off running and hopped a nearby 

fence. After Hurlbert hopped the fence, one of the officers—before losing 

sight of him—saw Hurlbert empty his pockets and take off his black shirt and 

throw it on the ground. Hurlbert encountered and ran from at least two other 

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officers. Officers lost sight of Hurlbert after he ran up the driveway of a nearby 

residence.

Hurlbert walked onto the back deck of Wayne Tibbetts’s residence and 

attempted to speak with Tibbetts’s mother-in-law. However, she did not speak 

English and motioned for Hurlbert to go inside the house and speak to her 

daughter. Once inside the residence, Hurlbert spoke to Tibbetts’s wife. 

However, she also did not speak much English and, thus, called for her 

husband.

When Tibbetts came downstairs, Hurlbert told him, “There’s some people 

outside trying to hurt me.” Tibbetts responded, “Who, the police?” Hurlbert 

did not respond and continued calmly walking through the house. As Hurlbert 

approached the kitchen door, he turned back and looked over his shoulder at 

Tibbetts, paused for a few seconds and then exited the house.

Police found Hurlbert a short time later in Tibbetts’s yard under a tree and, 

although he was not wearing a shirt, a blue shirt was lying next to him on the 

ground. When officers contacted Hurlbert, he said, “Why are you doing this, 

I’m just . . . laying under a tree in my yard?” and “Why are you messing with 

me, this is my house . . . check my I.D.” Hurlbert also asked the officers, 

“[W]hat color shirt was the guy wearing that you are looking for, because I 

have a blue shirt.” When officers checked Hurlbert’s pockets, they found a 

wallet with an I.D. that belonged to Tibbetts and a set of car keys.

Approximately 45 minutes after the incident, Tibbetts noticed his wallet and 

keys that he had left in a basket on the counter by the kitchen door were 

missing. Tibbetts called the police. The officers responded and showed 

Tibbetts the T-shirt, wallet and keys found on or near Hurlbert. Tibbetts 

identified the items as belonging to him.

(Doc. No. 20-14 at 3–4.)

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In a second amended information, Petitioner was charged with first-degree burglary 

(Cal. Penal Code §§ 459, 460), evading an officer with reckless driving (Cal. Veh. Code § 

2800.2(a)), unlawful taking and driving of a vehicle (Cal. Veh. Code § 10851(a)), and 

resisting an officer (Cal. Penal Code § 148(a)(1)). (Doc. No. 20-9 at 31–32.) It was also 

alleged that Petitioner had previously been convicted of receiving a stolen vehicle (Cal. 

Penal Code § 496d). (Id. at 32.) Finally, it was alleged that Petitioner suffered one prison 

prior, as well as one prior serious felony conviction (Cal. Penal Code §§ 667(a)(1), 

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667.5(b), 668, 1192.7(c)). (Id. at 33.)

On April 27, 2012, following trial, a jury found Petitioner guilty of resisting an 

officer. (Id. at 157; Doc. No. 31 at 10.) The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the other 

three counts, and the trial court declared a mistrial as to those counts. (Doc. No. 20-9 at 

156; Doc. No. 20-14 at 5; Doc. No. 31 at 10.) Petitioner was retried on those three counts. 

(See Doc. No. 20-14 at 5.) On retrial, Petitioner represented himself. (Doc. No. 20-3 at 5.) 

On June 22, 2012, a jury found him guilty on the remaining three counts. (Doc. No. 20-10 

at 115–19.) The jury also found Petitioner had suffered one prior strike conviction, one 

prior serious or felony conviction, and had served two prison sentences. (Id. at 120–21.) 

The trial court sentenced Petitioner to seventeen years and four months in prison, including 

five years for the prior serious felony enhancement and one year for the prison prior 

enhancement. (Doc. No. 20-14 at 5.)

On March 5, 2013, Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeal, contending 

there was insufficient evidence to support the burglary conviction, thus rendering his 

conviction a violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process of law;

and his sentence was improper because it imposed two enhancements for the same prior 

conviction. (Doc. No. 20-11.) The appellate court agreed with the latter assertion, 

modifying Petitioner’s sentence. (Doc. No. 20-14 at 9.) In all other respects, however, the 

appellate court affirmed the trial court. (Id. at 10.) Petitioner then filed a petition for review 

with the California Supreme Court, again asserting there was insufficient evidence to 

support his burglary conviction. (Doc. No. 20-15.) On April 9, 2014, the California 

Supreme Court denied the petition without comment or citation. (Doc. No. 20-16.)

On April 6, 2015, Petitioner filed the instant Petition, in which he alleges three 

grounds for relief: (1) a due process violation for his conviction for first-degree burglary 

because the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to establish he had the requisite intent 

to steal upon entering the Tibbetts’ residence; (2) a due process violation because the 

prosecutor presented false evidence and withheld exculpatory evidence; and (3) appellate 

counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) for failing to raise before the 

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state appellate court the false evidence claim asserted in ground two of this Petition. (Doc. 

No. 1.) Though two of the grounds for relief appeared to be unexhausted, Magistrate Judge 

Lewis ordered Respondent to answer the Petition. (Doc. No. 15.) Respondent did so on 

November 5, 2015, arguing the California courts properly rejected ground one, ground two 

is vague and conclusory, and ground three fails because there is no showing of deficient 

performance or prejudice. (Doc. No. 19.) On November 27, 2015, Petitioner filed a 

traverse. (Doc. No. 22.)

On May 20, 2016, Magistrate Judge Lewis issued an R&R, which made the 

following findings: (1) there was sufficient evidence to support Petitioner’s burglary 

conviction, specifically, that he entered the Tibbetts’ residence with the requisite intent; (2) 

Petitioner’s claim that his due process rights were violated by the presentation of false 

evidence and the withholding of exculpatory evidence is without merit; (3) Petitioner has 

not established his Miranda rights were violated or he was prejudiced as a result; and (4) 

because ground two is meritless, appellate counsel’s failure to raise ground two before the 

California Court of Appeal did not render her assistance ineffective. (Doc. No. 30.)

Petitioner objected to the R&R on June 20, 2016. (Doc. No. 31.) While far from 

clear, the Court construes Petitioner’s arguments as repeating the same arguments already 

presented before Magistrate Judge Lewis and considered in the R&R: (1) insufficient 

evidence exists to support his burglary conviction, (see id. at 10); (2) he was prejudiced by 

the introduction of false evidence, (id. at 37–39); and (3) appellate counsel was ineffective 

for failing to argue to the state appellate court that his conviction was obtained through the 

use of false evidence, (id. at 4–5). Respondent did not reply to Petitioner’s objections.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

(“AEDPA”), applying a “‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,’ 

which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. 

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 

333 & n.7 (1997)). Federal habeas relief may be granted if the state court (1) applied a 

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rule different from the governing law provided by the United States Supreme Court; or

(2) correctly identified the governing legal principle, but unreasonably applied it to the 

facts of the case. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). 

The duties of the district court with respect to a magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation are set forth in Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court must “make a de novo determination of those 

portions of the report . . . to which objection is made” and “may accept, reject, or modify, 

in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980); 

United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617–18 (9th Cir. 1989).

As to portions of the report to which no objection is made, the Court may assume 

the correctness of the magistrate judge’s findings of fact and decide the motion on the 

applicable law. Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974); Johnson 

v. Nelson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2001). Under such circumstances, the 

Ninth Circuit has held that a failure to file objections only relieves the district court of its 

burden to give de novo review to factual findings; conclusions of law must still be reviewed 

de novo. See Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 2007).

DISCUSSION

I. Insufficient Evidence Claim 

Petitioner first asserts he was denied due process because the evidence adduced at 

trial was insufficient to establish that he had the specific intent to commit theft when he 

entered the Tibbetts’ residence. (Doc. No. 1 at 8–20.) In the R&R, Magistrate Judge Lewis 

found this claim had already been evaluated and rejected once by the state court. (Doc. No. 

30 at 7–10.) Therefore, his only task was to determine whether the state court’s denial of 

the claim was unreasonable under established federal law. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 

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U.S. 86, 100–01 (2011); Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274–75 (9th Cir. 2005).

1

A habeas petitioner challenging a state criminal conviction based on sufficiency of 

the evidence is entitled to relief “if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the 

trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979). The critical inquiry is whether any rational 

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime charged beyond a 

reasonable doubt when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution. Id. at 318–19. If the record contains facts that support conflicting inferences, 

the reviewing court must presume that the trier of fact resolved any conflicts in favor of 

the prosecution, and defer to that determination. Id. at 326. Under the AEDPA, courts apply 

the Jackson standard with an additional layer of deference. Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1274–75. 

Thus, when the last state court to consider a petitioner’s claim denies it without 

explanation, a petitioner is entitled to relief only if “there was no reasonable basis for the 

state court to deny relief.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 98.

In evaluating a sufficiency of the evidence claim, a reviewing federal court must 

look to the applicable state law defining the substantive elements of the crime. Chein v. 

Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16). Under 

California law, a defendant commits a burglary if he or she “enters a residence . . . ‘with 

intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony.’” People v. Ramirez, 39 Cal. 4th 398, 

463 (2006) (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 459). A defendant commits first-degree burglary if 

the dwelling is inhabited. Cal. Penal Code § 460(a). The intent required to commit a 

burglary must be present at the time of entry into the residence or a room within the 

 

1

It appears Magistrate Judge Lewis undertook the same analysis as that of the California 

Court of Appeal, finding the evidence “supports a reasonable inference that [Petitioner] 

intended to commit theft at the time he entered the residence” instead of inquiring whether 

denial of Petitioner’s claim was unreasonable. (Doc. No. 30 at 12.) However, the Court 

finds this error to be harmless, given that the inquiry undertaken by Magistrate Judge Lewis 

is a more lax standard for Petitioner to satisfy, and the Court ultimately agrees with 

Magistrate Judge Lewis’s conclusion that Petitioner has failed to satisfy his burden here.

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residence within which a crime is committed. People v. Sparks, 28 Cal. 4th 71, 87–88

(2002); People v. Holt, 15 Cal. 4th 619, 669 (1997).

Intent is rarely demonstrated by direct proof; accordingly, intent may be inferred 

from facts and circumstances shown through evidence. Holt, 15 Cal. 4th at 669–70. 

“[E]vidence such as theft of property from a dwelling may create a reasonable inference 

that there was intent to commit theft at the time of entry.” In re Leanna W., 120 Cal. App. 

4th 735, 741 (2004). Whether entry was accompanied by the requisite intent is a question 

of fact for the jury. People v. Hopkins, 149 Cal. App. 3d 36, 44 (1983).

Here, Petitioner was convicted of first-degree burglary. In support of the finding that 

sufficient evidence supported Petitioner’s conviction, both the California Court of Appeal 

and the R&R relied on the circumstantial evidence indicating that Petitioner attempted to 

conceal his identity during his flight from officers and when he was ultimately apprehended 

in the Tibbetts’ front yard. Specifically, the state appellate court found it telling that 

Petitioner removed his black shirt and emptied his pockets as he fled police. (Doc. No. 20-

14 at 6–7.) Then, when he was found, Petitioner spontaneously shouted, “[W]hat color shirt 

was the guy wearing that you are looking for, because I have a blue shirt.” (Id. at 7.) He 

also informed police that he was in his own yard and they should check his ID. (Id.) That 

blue shirt and ID, however, belonged to Tibbetts. (See id.) The state appellate court 

concluded this evidence “strongly supports the finding that [Petitioner] was attempting to 

change his identity in order to avoid capture and, as relevant to [the first-degree burglary 

conviction], that he entered the home of Tibbetts with the intent to steal items to conceal 

his identity and [] to continue to evade capture from the police.” (Id.) The R&R concludes 

similarly, and also notes that “the mere fact that evidence showed [Petitioner] stole the 

items from the Tibbetts’ home can support an inference that he had intent to steal when he 

entered the residence.” (Doc. No. 30 at 14 (citing Leanna W., 120 Cal. App. 4th at 741).)

Reviewing the record de novo, the Court finds the California Court of Appeal’s 

determination that the evidence at trial amply supports the jury’s conviction was not 

contrary to, or an objectively unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.

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From the evidence relied upon by both the state appellate court and Magistrate Judge 

Lewis, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner 

harbored the specific intent to commit a theft when he entered the Tibbetts’ residence. This 

is particularly so when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 

as the Court is obligated to do on habeas review. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19.

In his objections, Petitioner essentially argues the jury erred in believing the 

government’s evidence and not his. (Doc. No. 31 at 46, 48.) He does this in a variety of 

ways, including by asserting that the sheriff’s reports contained conflicting evidence, (id.

at 17, 41), arguing that the testifying officers were not credible, (id. at 17), and relying on 

his own statements and testimony that contradicted the officers’ version of events, (id. at 

18, 44). (See also id. at 27–33 (Petitioner’s evaluation of the events that transpired).) 

However, as the record reflects, Petitioner had the opportunity to tell, and did tell, his 

version of events to the jury. Petitioner testified that he removed the black shirt because he 

felt like he was having a heat stroke. (Doc. No. 20-6 at 58.) He explained that he 

approached Tibbetts’s mother-in-law to ask for water and that she ushered him inside.2(Id.

at 62–63.) He also stated he asked Tibbetts’s wife for water and help. (Id. at 63–64.) 

Petitioner then testified that Tibbetts “offered [Petitioner] his shirt” and “took it off his own 

back,” but Petitioner did not take it—or Tibbetts’s wallet and keys—from the residence.

(Id. at 65–66.) Rather, Petitioner testified that the sheriff’s deputies took those items from 

the residence and planted the evidence on Petitioner. (See id. at 69–73.) In light of the 

evidence contradicting Petitioner’s testimony, the jury was entitled to—and apparently

did—reject his version of events. (Doc. No. 20-4 at 57; Doc. No. 20-5 at 39–40, 80, 123, 

125, 129–30.) The Court will not second-guess that rejection on habeas review. Jackson, 

443 U.S. at 326 (requiring the reviewing court to presume the trier of fact resolved any 

 

2 Tibbetts’s mother-in-law’s tacit permission does not undermine the circumstantial 

evidence of Petitioner’s specific intent upon entering the residence. See People v. Frye, 18 

Cal. 4th 894, 954 (1998) (“The entry need not be a trespass to support a burglary 

conviction.”), disapproved on other grounds by People v. Doolin, 45 Cal. 4th 390 (2009).

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conflicting inferences in favor of the prosecution and to defer to that resolution).

In sum, the Court finds that Petitioner has failed to carry his “heavy burden” as to 

ground one. Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1274. The Court accordingly OVERRULES Petitioner’s 

objection, ADOPTS the R&R in relation to ground one, and DENIES the Petition as to 

Petitioner’s sufficiency of evidence claim.

3

II. False Evidence Claim

Petitioner asserts he was denied due process because his conviction was based on 

false evidence, specifically, that it was the sheriff’s deputies who removed Tibbetts’s wallet 

and keys from the residence and planted them in the yard with Petitioner. (Doc. No. 31 at 

17–20, 37.) In the R&R, Magistrate Judge Lewis concluded that despite Petitioner’s failure 

to exhaust this claim, it is clear Petitioner has failed to present a colorable claim because 

(1) the presentation of a conflicting version of events does not establish the use of false 

evidence; (2) Petitioner failed to identify what evidence was allegedly suppressed; and (3) 

Petitioner has failed to establish a Miranda violation or, even if Miranda was violated, that 

 

3 Petitioner makes additional arguments that warrant little discussion. First, Petitioner 

asserts the evidence is insufficient in part because there is no “actual[] physical evidence” 

of the crime. (Doc. No. 31 at 10.) Yet “[c]ircumstantial evidence and inferences drawn 

from it may be sufficient to sustain a conviction.” Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358

(9th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Lewis, 787 F.2d 1318, 1323 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Petitioner further asserts the California Court of Appeal erred in failing to review the 

sufficiency of the evidence de novo. (Doc. No. 31 at 39–40.) However, it is an 

uncontroversial statement of the law that an appellate court does not review findings of fact 

de novo, but rather affords deference to the trier of fact. See People v. Jennings, 50 Cal. 

4th 616, 638 (2010) (stating the appellate court “neither reweigh[s] the evidence nor 

reevaluate[s] the credibility of witnesses” when assessing whether substantial evidence 

exists to support a verdict). Finally, to the extent Petitioner takes issue with the California 

Supreme Court’s denial of his petition without comment or citation, (see Doc. No. 31 at 

43), the United States Supreme Court has recognized that summary denial is not 

inappropriate, see Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 187 (2011) (noting § 2254(d) 

“applies even where there has been a summary denial”). Under such circumstances, the 

federal courts are required to “look through” that decision to the last reasoned state court 

decision, here, the decision of the California Court of Appeal. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 

U.S. 797, 805–06 (1991).

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Petitioner was prejudiced by such violation given that he introduced the incriminating 

statements himself at trial. (Doc. No. 30 at 17–20.) In his objections, Petitioner reasserts 

only that his conviction was based upon the introduction of false evidence at trial and that 

forensic evidence was suppressed. (See Doc. No. 31 at 17, 29–33, 39–41.)4

“[I]t is established that a conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known 

to be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment.” 

Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959); see Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112

(1935). The same rule applies when the State, not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go 

uncorrected when it appears. Napue, 360 U.S. at 269. A claim under Mooney-Napue will 

succeed when “(1) the testimony (or evidence) was actually false, (2) the prosecution knew 

or should have known that the testimony was actually false, and (3) [] the false testimony 

was material.” United States v. Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 2003). In 

determining materiality, the Court looks at whether there is “any reasonable likelihood that 

the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.” Hayes v. Brown, 399 

F.3d 972, 984 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Belmontes v. Woodford, 350 F.3d 861, 881 (9th Cir.

2003)). In other words, the Court must ask “whether, despite the prosecution’s errors, the 

defendant ‘received . . . a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.’” Jackson v. 

Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 

434 (1995)).

Petitioner did not assert this claim before the state courts. Typically, a habeas 

petitioner must first exhaust available state judicial remedies prior to seeking relief in 

federal habeas corpus proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 

 

4 Petitioner raises additional grounds for prejudice he suffered during the trial: (1) 

Petitioner was forced to wear “county jail blues” in the jury’s presence; (2) Petitioner was 

shackled and unable to move around in the jury’s presence; (3) the trial judge “flashed a 

‘vacation shirt’” under his robe at the jury foreperson; and (4) Petitioner was not provided 

with the same technological equipment the prosecution used in presenting its case. (Doc. 

No. 31 at 11–13, 37–39, 46, 48–49.) These claims are not included in the instant Petition; 

accordingly, the Court need not address them here.

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(1982). However, “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, 

notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts

of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). Courts may only deny unexhausted claims on the 

merits if it is “perfectly clear” that the claim is not a “colorable federal claim.” Cassett v. 

Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 623–24 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 

135 (1987)). Unexhausted claims are reviewed de novo where there is no reasoned state 

court decision addressing that claim. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Having reviewed Petitioner’s argument and the record de novo, the Court agrees 

with Magistrate Judge Lewis that it is perfectly clear Petitioner’s false evidence claim is 

not colorable. First, Petitioner does not come forth with anything other than his own 

explanation for the events to establish that the sheriff’s deputies falsified evidence and their 

testimony. Simply showing that the prosecution presented the jury with a conflicting 

version of events does not meet Petitioner’s burden on this claim. See United States v. 

Geston, 299 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he evidence proffered by Geston does 

not establish that the government knew, or should have known, that Sims’ and Carr’s 

testimony was false. At most, two conflicting versions of the incident were presented to 

the jury. It was within the province of the jury to resolve the disputed testimony.” (citations 

omitted)).5

 

5 And the jury in Petitioner’s case did resolve this conflict—against Petitioner. At trial, 

Petitioner presented his version of events, the version proffered here, through his testimony 

and cross-examination of the sheriff’s deputies. (See Doc. No. 20-5 at 46, 130; Doc. No. 

20-6 at 69–73.) The Court will not question the jury’s credibility determination. See Bruce 

v. Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (“[a] jury’s credibility 

determinations are [] entitled to near-total deference”); United States v. Zuno-Arce, 44 F.3d 

1420, 1422–23 (9th Cir. 1995) (“If the jury believed Godoy and Lopez, the evidence 

sufficed to establish that Zuno-Arce attended and participated in the meetings as they said. 

As for whether they lied, or erred in their perceptions or recollections, the judge properly 

left these questions to the jury. Zuno-Arce’s attorneys cross-examined Godoy and Lopez 

thoroughly and well on the discrepancies in their recollections, and the recency of some of 

their recollections. The district court was not obligated to decide the credibility question 

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Second, even if Petitioner carried this initial burden, he has utterly failed to provide 

any evidence that the prosecution knew or should have known that the testimony was 

actually false. See Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 959 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Assuming 

for the sake of argument that Laufenburger’s testimony . . . was false, Murtishaw presents 

no evidence that the prosecution knew it was false.”). For these reasons, the Court agrees 

with Magistrate Judge Lewis’s assessment that Petitioner has failed to state even a 

colorable claim that the use of false evidence violated Petitioner’s due process rights.

Petitioner also asserts that exculpatory evidence was suppressed, namely, that the 

sheriff’s deputies refused to undertake fingerprint or DNA analysis of Tibbetts’s wallet. 

(Doc. No. 31 at 32.) Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), “the suppression 

by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process 

where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good 

faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Favorable evidence is “material” only if there is a 

reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the 

evidence been disclosed to the defense. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). 

“The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a 

different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, 

understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. A ‘reasonable probability’ 

of a different result is accordingly shown when the government’s evidentiary suppression 

‘undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.’” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 (quoting 

Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678).

Petitioner’s Brady claim must fail. The prosecution’s case did not hinge on forensic 

science. Rather, multiple witnesses testified that Tibbetts’s keys and wallet were found in

Petitioner’s pockets. (Doc. No. 20-4 at 57; Doc. No. 20-5 at 49–50.) Petitioner testified at 

length about his version of events, as well as cross-examined the prosecution’s witnesses 

 

and strike their testimony, because the determination of credibility is for the jury.”

(citations omitted)).

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in an attempt to undermine their credibility. (See Doc. No. 20-5 at 46, 130; Doc. No. 20-6 

at 69–73.) In light of the evidence that was presented at trial, the Court is not convinced 

that the failure to conduct forensic testing on the wallet undermines the confidence that can 

be placed on the jury’s verdict. Additionally, because the wallet was never submitted for 

testing, there were no reports for production to Petitioner. “The prosecution therefore did 

not ‘suppress’ any evidence for the simple reason that those reports did not exist.” Herring 

v. McEwen, No. SA CV 11-781 DMG (MRW), 2012 WL 960674, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 

2012). The Court thus OVERRULES Petitioner’s objection, ADOPTS the R&R in 

relation to ground two, and DENIES the Petition as to Petitioner’s false evidence claim.

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

Lastly, Petitioner argues appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the 

claims in ground two before the California Court of Appeal. (Doc. No. 1 at 47.) In the 

R&R, Magistrate Judge Lewis rejected this claim based on his determination that ground 

two is meritless. (Doc. No. 30 at 21–22.) Petitioner objects, reasserting the arguments 

presented in the Petition. (Doc. No. 31 at 4–5.)

In order to succeed on an IAC claim, a petitioner must establish two criteria: (1) 

counsel’s performance was so deficient as to fall short of the guarantee of counsel under 

the Sixth Amendment, and (2) counsel’s errors were so prejudicial that the petitioner was 

deprived of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also Smith 

v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (“The proper standard for evaluating [a] claim that 

appellate counsel was ineffective . . . is that enunciated in Strickland.” (citing Smith v. 

Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533–36 (1986))). This Strickland standard is highly deferential to 

counsel based upon the ease of second-guessing one’s counsel after an adverse conviction 

or sentence is entered. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. When analyzing an IAC claim, “a court 

must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance[.]” Id. This standard is heightened when raised in a 

federal habeas petition. Harrington, 562 U.S. 86 at 100–01.

Having reviewed this unexhausted claim de novo, Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167, the Court 

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agrees with Magistrate Judge Lewis that Petitioner’s IAC claim must fail. As explained in 

the previous section, ground two is plainly meritless. See supra Discussion Section II.

Given that conclusion, appellate counsel’s performance was not deficient, and the failure 

to assert the claim before the Court of Appeal clearly could not have prejudiced Petitioner. 

The Court therefore OVERRULES Petitioner’s objection, ADOPTS the R&R in relation 

to ground three, and DENIES the Petition as to Petitioner’s IAC claim.

IV. Certificate of Appealability

When a district court enters a final order adverse to the applicant in a habeas corpus 

proceeding, it must either issue or deny a certificate of appealability, which is required to 

appeal a final order in a habeas corpus proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate 

of appealability is appropriate only where the petitioner makes “a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003)

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)). Under this standard, the petitioner must demonstrate that 

reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition should have been resolved in a different 

manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed 

further. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483–84 (2000). Here, the Court finds that 

reasonable jurists could not debate the Court’s conclusion to deny the Petition and therefore 

DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s objections, (Doc. No. 

31), ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety, (Doc. No. 30), DENIES Petitioner’s petition for 

writ of habeas corpus, (Doc. No. 1), and DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 6, 2017

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