Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00250/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00250-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

David J. Sterling, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Craig Apker, Complex Warden,

Respondent. 

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No. CIV 10-250 TUC RCC (GEE)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

David J. Sterling, an inmate confined in the Federal Correctional Institution in Tucson,

AZ, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section

2241. Sterling alleges the following grounds for relief: (1) The United States Parole

Commission (USPC) and the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) are denying him parole by requiring him

to complete mental health treatment and denying him the opportunity to receive that treatment.

Moreover, the BOP is refusing to transfer him to a correctional institution in the Third Circuit

where he would receive mandatory parole; (2) the USPC abused its discretion by denying him

parole; and (3) the BOP erred when it restructured the running of his sentence for his § 924(c)

conviction. 

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to Magistrate

Judge Edmonds for a Report and Recommendation.

The petition should be denied. Claims 1 and 2 should be denied on the merits. Claim

3 should be dismissed as successive.

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SUMMARY OF THE CASE

Sterling pleaded guilty to four counts of armed bank robbery and one count of using a

weapon during a crime of violence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). (Respondent’s answer, p.

2.) He committed the robberies after having “escaped from Western State Hospital,

Washington, where he had been committed after pleading guilty to four counts of rape and one

count of assault.” (Petition, Ex. 6; Ex. 23.) He was given a life term for each rape, but the

sentence was suspended because Sterling “was found to be a sexual psychopath.” Id. 

On January 26, 1987, the trial court sentenced him to a 100-year term of incarceration

for the robberies and a consecutive 5-year term for the weapon’s charge. Id. The weapon’s

charge is not parole-eligible. 

At first, the BOP administered Sterling’s sentence as though his non parole-eligible

weapon’s charge was served first. After the Supreme Court decided U.S. v. Gonzalez, 520 U.S.

1, 117 S.Ct. 1032 (1997), the BOP changed its policy and recalculated Sterling’s sentence

running his robbery convictions first. Id. 

On March 15, 2000, the USPC conducted a parole hearing. (Respondent’s answer, p.

3.) The hearing officer determined that Sterling’s parole guideline range was 146-212 months.

(Petition, Exhibit 25.) Nevertheless, the hearing officer decided the guideline range was

inappropriate for the following reasons:

[A] decision above the guideline range is warranted based on the following

pertinent aggravating factors: You have a history as a sexual psychopath based

on convictions in 1996, 1982, and 1972 with victims who were very vulnerable

between the ages of 11 through 22. Also many of your crimes involved

threatening the victims with guns. During the course of your custody, you have

not received psychological counseling to address your sexual psychopathic

tendencies. Therefore, by not receiving treatment the likelihood of committing

these types of crimes in the future remain.

(Petition, Exhibit 25.) The officer continued the matter for a reconsideration hearing 15 years

hence, in March of 2015. (Respondent’s answer, p. 3.) When Sterling appealed, the National

Appeals Board modified the officer’s guideline range calculation to 146-208 months but

otherwise affirmed the decision of the hearing officer. Id.

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On December 12, 2000, Sterling filed his first Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

(Respondent’s answer, pp. 2-3.) He argued, among other things, that the USPC improperly

conditioned parole on his receiving mental health treatment, which they refused to make

available to him. Id., p. 3. On July 25, 2002, the District Court granted Sterling’s motion to

dismiss the petition without prejudice. (Respondent’s answer, Exhibit 3.)

The USPC conducted an interim hearing on March 2, 2003, at which time Sterling

argued he was entitled to a release date within his guideline range pursuant to Lyons v. Mendez,

303 F.3d 285 (3rd Cir. 2002). (Respondent’s answer, pp. 3-4.) The examiner declined to apply

Lyons because Sterling was not being held in the Third Circuit. Id., p. 4. Sterling appealed, but

the National Appeals Board affirmed on August 5, 2004. Id.

On April 15, 2003, Sterling filed his second Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus arguing

he was entitled to a parole release date within his guideline range. Id. The District Court

granted the petition, and the USPC issued a Notice of Action setting Sterling’s parole eligibility

date to June 13, 2003. Id., p. 4. The Tenth Circuit reversed, however, and the USPC issued

another Notice of Action vacating its prior ruling and reinstating Sterling’s 15-year

reconsideration date for March of 2015. Id., pp. 4-5.

On May 19, 2004, Sterling filed his third Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus arguing the

BOP erred when it recalculated the running of his 5-year non-parole-eligible offense and the

USPC acted arbitrarily when it calculated his parole eligibility. Id., p. 5. The District Court

denied the petition on November 20, 2007. (Respondent’s answer, Exhibit 6.)

In the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed on April 28, 2010, Sterling raises

the following claims:

(1) The United States Parole Commission (Commission) and the Bureau of

Prisons (BOP) are denying Petitioner parole solely because he is unable to obtain

mental health treatment which the Commission finds acceptable . . . Further, the

Commission has made Petitioner’s parole contingent on receiving unspecified

mental health treatment which the BOP refuses to make available, thereby

extending Petitioner’s term of imprisonment by 10 years. [Petitioner also

contends that he would be parole eligible in the Third Circuit, but the

Commission and the BOP refuse to transfer him there, which Petitioner contends

violates his right to a speedier release and] raises the specter of equal protection

of law. 

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(2) It is irrational, arbitrary and an abuse of discretion for the Commission to

grant Petitioner parole on one hand and deny parole on the other hand. Even more

irrational is that both were done on the same set of facts and circumstances.

[Petitioner claims that] it is extremely irrational, arbitrary and unreasonable for

the Commission to deny Petitioner parole and depart from the guidelines based

solely on Petitioner’s complete lack of treatment, . . . and at the same time parole

Petitioner on the same basis the parole was denied.

(3) The BOP has restructured Petitioner’s sentence for 924(c) in such a way that

extends Petitioner’s time to serve prior to parole.

(Doc 5, pp. 1-2.) 

The respondent filed an answer on July 23, 2010. The respondent concedes Sterling’s

claims are exhausted but argues the petition should be dismissed as successive or an abuse of

the writ. In the alternative, the respondent argues the petition should be denied on the merits.

In his first claim, Sterling maintains the USPC and the BOP “are denying Petitioner

parole solely because he is unable to obtain mental health treatment which the Commission

finds acceptable.” (Doc 5, pp. 1-2.) He argues the USPC and the BOP have conspired to

prevent him from obtaining this mental health treatment. 

This claim arises from the report issued by the USPC hearing officer following his parole

hearing on March 15, 2000. In that report, the officer concluded that a parole determination

within the guideline range was inappropriate in part because Sterling “has a history as a sexual

psychopath” and had not “received psychological counseling to address [his] sexual

psychopathic tendencies.” (Petition, Exhibit 25.) 

As an initial matter, the respondent argues this claim should be dismissed because it was

raised before in Sterling’s first petition for writ of habeas corpus. In general, the court need not

entertain any issue presented in a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the detention

of a federal prisoner if “the legality of such detention has been determined by a judge or court

of the United States on a prior application for a writ of habeas corpus. . . .” 28 U.S.C. §

2244(a). This general rule barring successive habeas petitions applies to petitions brought

pursuant to § 2241. Chambers v. U.S., 106 F.3d 472, 475 (2nd Cir. 1997); Johnson v. U.S., 2009

WL 1077389 (E.D.Cal. 2009). 

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Sterling raised this claim in his first 2241 petition. That petition, however, was not

decided on the merits. Instead, the district court dismissed the petition without prejudice on

Sterling’s motion. Because this claim was never resolved by any federal court, Sterling is not

precluded from raising it now. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a). The claim, however, should be denied

on the merits.

Sterling asserts the USPC and the BOP “are denying Petitioner parole solely because he

is unable to obtain mental health treatment which the Commission finds acceptable.” (Petition,

continuation 4(a)-5(a)) (emphasis added). Sterling is incorrect. The USPC departed from the

standard guideline range for a number of reasons: (1) Sterling’s history as a sexual psychopath

based on convictions in 1996, 1982, and 1972, (2) the vulnerable nature of his victims, (3) his

use of guns to threaten his victims, and (4) his failure to receive psychological counseling to

address his sexual psychopathic tendencies. (Petition, Exhibit 25.) Sterling’s failure to receive

mental health treatment was only one factor among many cited by the hearing officer.

Accordingly, he cannot show that his failure to receive mental health treatment alone resulted

in the officer’s adverse decision. Moreover, even if he could make this showing, Sterling

cannot show it was error for the USPC to include this factor in the parole determination.

“The scope of judicial review of the Commission’s parole decision, however, is

exceedingly narrow.” Walker v. U.S., 816 F.2d 1313, 1316 (9th Cir. 1987). “Judgments

involving a broad range of factors that the Commission takes into account in arriving at its

decision are committed to the Commission’s discretion and are unreviewable even for abuse of

discretion.” Id. “If the Commission’s decision involves the exercise of judgment among a

range of possible choices or options, it is unreviewable.” Id. (internal punctuation removed)

“But a decision that involves a plain violation of a matter which does not admit of discretion

and choice (such as the failure to follow certain statutory requirements) is reviewable.” Id.

“For instance, if the Commission has rendered a parole decision ‘notwithstanding’ or ‘above’

the guidelines, a court may consider whether the Commission failed to show ‘good cause’ for

doing so, but may only inquire whether that showing was arbitrary, irrational, unreasonable,

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irrelevant, or capricious.” Id. “Finally, a court may consider constitutional challenges and

determine whether the Commission’s action was so arbitrary as to violate due process.” Id.

The court will assume, without deciding, that a requirement conditioning Sterling’s

parole on mental health treatment that the BOP refuses to provide would be “arbitrary,

irrational, irrelevant, or capricious.” The BOP, however, did not impose such a requirement.

Sterling is currently incarcerated at USP Tucson, and has been there since November 4,

2008. (Respondent’s answer, Exhibit 7.) To date, he has had “numerous contacts with the

Psychology Department.” Id. He “has been offered and enrolled in treatment groups at USP

Tucson.” Id. There is no indication in the record that the treatment currently offered at USP

Tucson will be considered insufficient or inadequate at the next parole review hearing.

Accordingly, Sterling cannot show the BOP and USPC are currently failing to provide him with

adequate mental health services. 

In 2000, when this issue was first raised, Sterling was housed in the United States Prison,

Administrative Maximum, Florence, Colorado (ADX). (Respondent’s answer, Exhibit 2.,p.

1.) Sterling maintains the mental health treatment programs at that facility were inadequate to

address the concerns of the USPC. See (Petition, Exhibit 18.) Assuming he is correct in his

characterization of the treatment options available at ADX, the record does not indicate that

Sterling’s lack of access to quality treatment stemmed from the ill will of the USPC or the BOP.

ADX is a high security unit. (Petition, Exhibit 19.) The availability of treatment

programs there are restricted, not because of BOP caprice, but due to the increased level of

security maintained at that facility. See (Petition, Exhibits 18, 20.) Moreover, nothing in the

record supports the theory that Sterling was transferred to ADX for the purpose of limiting his

treatment options. On the contrary, the record indicates he was transferred to ADX because

the officials at the Wisconsin Department of Corrections, where he was located previously,

“indicated they could no longer guaranteed his safety within their system.” (Petition, Exhibit,

19.)

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Assuming without deciding that Sterling spent part of his incarceration in a facility that

lacked adequate mental health treatment options, he has not shown that this fact is part of some

kind of conspiracy between the USPC and the BOP to deny him parole. 

Sterling further argues he would be parole eligible in the Third Circuit, but the

Commission and the BOP refuse to transfer him there, which violates his right to a speedier

release and “raises the specter of equal protection of law.” (Petition, continuation, p. 4(a)-5(a).)

Sterling is incorrect.

Prisoners do not have a constitutional right to incarceration in any particular institution

or any particular state. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 244-48 (1983); Cleveland v.

Stokes, 2008 WL 1925202, 1 (N.D.Cal. 2008). They therefore have no constitutional right to

a prison transfer even if they believe transfer would be to their legal advantage. See Rizzo v.

Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir.1985).

The fact that prisoners in Arizona or Colorado (which are located in the Ninth and Tenth

Circuits respectively) do not benefit from legal decisions handed down by the Third Circuit is

a natural consequence of our system of independent federal circuits. See Castillo-Felix v. INS,

601 F.2d 459, 467 (9th Cir.1979), superceded by statute on other grounds recognized in Escobar

v. Holder, 567 F.3d 466, 472-73 (9th Cir. 2009); Fristoe v. Thompson, 144 F.3d 627, 630 (10th

Cir. 1998). Accordingly, the disparate treatment of prisoners housed in different federal circuits

does not constitute an equal protection violation. Id.

Sterling’s second claim is difficult to understand. He states “[i]t is irrational, arbitrary

and an abuse of discretion for the Commission to grant Petitioner parole on one hand and deny

parole on the other hand” and cites to his “Certificate of Parole, Exhibit 9.” See (Petition,

Exhibit 9.) It appears that Sterling is confused as to why his parole hearing was first continued

to March of 2015, then parole was set retroactively to June 13, 2003, and then his parole hearing

was again continued to March of 2015. 

Sterling’s parole release date has gone through a number of changes, but these changes

are not evidence of caprice. Instead, they reflect a concerted effort on the part of the USPC to

follow the courts’ directions.

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Sterling’s parole hearing was continued to March of 2015, after his parole hearing on

March 15, 2000. (Respondent’s answer, p. 3.) On April 15, 2003, however, Sterling filed his

second Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus arguing he was entitled to a parole release date

within his guideline range. Id. When the District Court granted the petition, the USPC issued

a Notice of Action setting Sterling’s parole eligibility date to June 13, 2003. Id., p. 4. The

Tenth Circuit, however, reversed the District Court, and the USPC issued another Notice of

Action vacating its prior ruling and reinstating Sterling’s 15-year reconsideration date for March

of 2015. Id., pp. 4-5.

Sterling is correct when he asserts his parole determination has been changed at various

times. These changes, however, were not made arbitrarily. They were done to conform to the

courts’ seesawing judgments.

In his third claim, Sterling argues the BOP erred when it restructured the running of his

5-year non-parole-eligible sentence for violating § 924(c). Sterling raised this issue in his third

petition. The District Court addressed the claim on the merits and denied relief. (Respondent’s

answer, Exhibit 5, pp. 23-24; Exhibit 6.) This claim should be dismissed as successive. See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(a). In the alternative, the claim should be denied on the merits.

In U.S. v. Gonzalez, 520 U.S. 1, 7-8, 117 S.Ct. 1032, 1036 (1997), the Supreme Court

considered the difficulties arising when a defendant is serving two consecutive federal

sentences, one of which is for violating § 924(c). The Court found that running the § 924(c)

sentence first would interfere with the authority of the trial court to run the second federal

sentence concurrent to an existing state sentence. Id. In accordance with the Court’s decision,

the BOP revised its standard policies and recalculated Sterling’s sentence running his robbery

convictions first. The BOP’s revision of Sterling’s sentence was dictated by Court’s decision

in Gonzales. It was not error.

RECOMMENDATION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review

of the record, enter an order denying the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Claims 1 and 2

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should be denied on the merits. Claim 3 should be dismissed as successive. In the alternative,

Claim 3 should be denied on the merits.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636 (b), any party may serve and file written objections within

14 days of being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. If objections are not

timely filed, they may be deemed waived. 

The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of this Report and Recommendation to the petitioner

and the respondent.

DATED this 7th day of January, 2011.

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