Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-23-10902/USCOURTS-ca11-23-10902-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-10902

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

LAWRENCE W. KONIECZKO, 

LAURIE F. KONIECZKO, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

ORANGE COUNTY GOVERNMENT, 

DOE FIREMAN #1, 

DOE FIREMAN #2, 

DOE DEPUTY #1, 

DOE DEPUTY #2, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

USCA11 Case: 23-10902 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 03/01/2024 Page: 1 of 9
2 Opinion of the Court 23-10902

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 6:22-cv-01451-PGB-DCI

____________________

Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Lawrence and Laurie Konieczko, proceeding pro se, appeal 

the district court’s dismissal without prejudice of their second 

amended complaint for failure to timely perfect service. The complaint listed various named and unnamed Orange County Florida 

officials as defendants and alleged that the county government was 

complicit in a criminal conspiracy that continues to be carried out 

against them. Liberally construing their brief on appeal, the 

Konieczkos also appeal the district court’s denial of their motion to 

disqualify the magistrate judge and district court judge, and the denial of their motion to vacate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

60(b). 

They argue that they did not have enough time to complete 

service because they were impeded by the criminals acting in conspiracy against them. They assert that, because the district court 

set January 16, 2023, as their deadline to complete service, which 

was a federal holiday, they had until January 17 to complete service. They contend that their case is due to be reassigned to a new 

magistrate judge and district court judge on remand, because the 

USCA11 Case: 23-10902 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 03/01/2024 Page: 2 of 9
23-10902 Opinion of the Court 3

judges below were biased and were named in the third amended 

complaint.

I.

We review a district court’s denial of a motion for judicial 

disqualification for an abuse of discretion. Giles v. Garwood, 853 

F.2d 876, 878 (11th Cir. 1988). “The abuse of discretion review requires us to affirm unless we find that the district court has made a 

clear error of judgment, or has applied the wrong legal standard.” 

Rance v. Rocksolid Granit USA, Inc., 583 F.3d 1284, 1286 (11th Cir. 

2009) (quotation marks omitted). “We can affirm for any reason 

supported by the record, even if the district court did not rely on 

that reason.” Wright v. City of St. Petersburg, Fla., 833 F.3d 1291, 1294 

(11th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks omitted).

Other than an initial amendment to a pleading made with 

21 days after service, “[i]n all other cases, a party may amend its 

pleading only with . . . the court’s leave. The court should freely 

give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1), (2).

A judge must “disqualify himself in any proceeding in which 

his impartiality might reasonably be questioned” or in any circumstances “[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a 

party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b)(1). Similarly, a judge 

must recuse himself if a party to the proceeding makes a timely and 

sufficient showing by affidavit that the judge “has a personal bias 

or prejudice either against [that party] or in favor of any adverse 

party.” Id. § 144. Disqualification is required only when the alleged 

USCA11 Case: 23-10902 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 03/01/2024 Page: 3 of 9
4 Opinion of the Court 23-10902

bias is personal, that is, stemming from an extra-judicial source. 

Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 780 (11th Cir. 1994). In Liteky v. 

United States, the Supreme Court explained that “judicial rulings 

alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality 

motion,” because “[i]n and of themselves . . . , [such rulings] cannot

possibly show reliance upon an extrajudicial source; and can only 

in the rarest circumstances evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism required . . . when no extrajudicial source is involved.” 

510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). 

“In certain circumstances there are criticisms of judicial conduct which are so personal and so probably productive of bias that 

the judge must disqualify himself to avoid being the judge in his 

own case. However, that does not mean that every attack on a 

judge disqualifies him from sitting.” In re Evergreen Sec., Ltd., 570 

F.3d 1257, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, courts “cannot assume that judges are so irascible and 

sensitive that they cannot fairly and impartially deal with resistance 

to their authority or with highly charged arguments about the 

soundness of their decisions.” Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 584 

(1964). Further, “a judge, having been assigned to a case, should 

not recuse himself on unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous 

speculation.” In re Moody, 755 F.3d 891, 895 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).

As an initial matter—to the extent the Konieczkos’ brief is 

liberally construed as appealing the denial of their motion requesting the dismissal or dismissal of the district court judge and 

USCA11 Case: 23-10902 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 03/01/2024 Page: 4 of 9
23-10902 Opinion of the Court 5

magistrate judge from their case—the Konieczkos base their arguments on adverse judicial rulings and highly tenuous speculation. 

Such arguments are not valid grounds for dismissal or recusal. Further, the Konieczkos did not have leave to file their proposed third 

amended complaint in which they attempted to name the judges 

as defendants in their lawsuit. Accordingly, the district court’s denial of relief in this respect is affirmed.

II.

“The sua sponte dismissal of a complaint for failure to serve 

under Rule 4(m) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Richardson 

v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010). We review for abuse 

of discretion a district court’s decision whether to grant an extension of time under Rule 4(m). See Lepone-Dempsey v. Carroll Cnty. 

Comm’rs, 476 F.3d 1277, 1280 (11th Cir. 2007). “[A]lthough we are 

to give liberal construction to the pleadings of pro se litigants, we 

nevertheless have required them to conform to procedural rules.” 

Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation 

marks omitted). 

When a court order establishes a deadline and states the 

deadline as a period of days or longer unit of time, but “does not 

specify a method of computing time . . . if the last day [of the period] is a . . . legal holiday, the period continues to run until the end 

of the next day that is not a . . . legal holiday.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6(a)(1)(C). Also, Rule 6(a)(3)(A) provides: “Unless the court orders 

otherwise, if the clerk’s office is inaccessible . . . on the last day for 

filing under Rule 6(a)(1), then the time for filing is extended to the 

USCA11 Case: 23-10902 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 03/01/2024 Page: 5 of 9
6 Opinion of the Court 23-10902

first accessible day that is not a . . . legal holiday.” Id. 6(a)(3)(A). 

Martin Luther King Jr.’s Birthday is a legal holiday. Id. 6(a)(6).

“[A]ny . . . state-created governmental organization that is 

subject to suit must be served by . . . delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to its chief executive officer . . . .” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2)(A). “[P]roof of service must be made to the 

court . . . by the server’s affidavit.” Id. (l)(1). 

“A plaintiff is responsible for serving the defendant with a 

summons and the complaint within the time allowed under Rule 

4(m).” Lepone-Dempsey, 476 F.3d at 1280-81 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 

4(c)(1)). Rule 4(m) states:

If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the 

complaint is filed, the court—on motion or its own 

after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action 

without prejudice against that defendant or order that 

service be made within a specified time. But if the 

plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court 

must extend the time for service for an appropriate 

period.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). “Good cause exists only when some outside 

factor, such as reliance on faulty advice, rather than inadvertence 

or negligence, prevented service.” Lepone-Dempsey, 476 F.3d at 

1281 (quotation marks omitted, alteration adopted). 

However, even “[a]bsent a showing of good cause, the district court has the discretion to extend the time for service of process.” Id. at 1282. Thus, “when a district court finds that a plaintiff 

fails to show good cause . . . , the district court must still consider 

USCA11 Case: 23-10902 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 03/01/2024 Page: 6 of 9
23-10902 Opinion of the Court 7

whether any other circumstances warrant an extension of time 

based on the facts of the case.” Id. “Only after considering whether 

any such factors exist may the district court exercise its discretion 

and either dismiss the case without prejudice or direct that service 

be effected within a specified time.” Id.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in sua sponte 

dismissing the case for failure to serve under Rule 4(m). Rather 

than stating the Konieczkos’ deadline for service as a period of time 

that would require the computation of days, the district court specifically provided that the “deadline to serve defendants . . . is extended to January 16, 2023.” Doc. 22 at 6. Thus, the Konieczkos 

were not entitled to an automatic next-day extension when their 

deadline fell on a holiday, because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

6(a)(1) applies only “[w]hen the period is stated in days or a longer 

unit of time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1). Also, the Konieczkos are not 

entitled to a next-day extension under Rule 6(a)(3) because that 

provision does not apply if the “court orders otherwise,” and the 

district court here did so, in ordering that the time was extended 

only to January 16, 2023, and ordering that “no further extensions 

will be granted, unless the Plaintiffs can show they were diligent in 

seeking to effect service of process.” Doc. 22 at 5. Moreover, even 

if January 17, 2023, were the appropriate deadline date, the Konieczkos’ handwritten receipt is not the required proof of service (i.e. 

an affidavit of the server). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(l)(1). And even if 

the Konieczkos did begin the process of serving on Friday, January 

13, 2023, by seeking a summons from the Clerk, they nevertheless 

waited until the very last minute before an already twice-extended 

USCA11 Case: 23-10902 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 03/01/2024 Page: 7 of 9
8 Opinion of the Court 23-10902

deadline. That does not show that service was ever actually accomplished, and, in any event, would not show the required due 

diligence. Further, the district court gave sufficient consideration 

to other factors that might warrant extending the deadline for service when it denied any further extension and dismissed the 

Konieczkos’ second amended complaint without prejudice for failure to perfect service. We note that the Konieczkos had already

received extensions on the deadline despite not showing good 

cause. Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.

III.

“We typically review a district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) 

motion for an abuse of discretion.” Farris v. United States, 333 F.3d 

1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003). 

Rule 60(b)(6) provides that a party may obtain relief from a 

final judgment for any reason that justifies relief. Id. 60(b)(6). A 

court may entertain an independent action to “set aside a judgment 

for fraud on the court” in limited circumstances, pursuant to Rule 

60(d)(1), (3). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(1), (3); see also Booker v. Dugger, 825 F.2d 281, 282 & n.1 (11th Cir. 1987) (interpreting the former 

“savings clause” of Rule 60(b), which is now located in Rule 60(d)).

Demonstrating fraud upon the court requires a showing of 

“an unconscionable plan or scheme,” and thus, “only the most 

egregious misconduct, such as bribery of a judge . . . , or the fabrication of evidence” will qualify. Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 

1332, 1338 (5th Cir. 1978) (quotation marks omitted). When committed by a judicial officer, fraud upon the court “defile[s] the court 

USCA11 Case: 23-10902 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 03/01/2024 Page: 8 of 9
23-10902 Opinion of the Court 9

itself,” or results in the court being incapable of resolving cases in 

its usual, impartial manner. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Gore, 761 F.2d 

1549, 1551 (11th Cir. 1985) (quotation marks omitted). 

The Konieczkos failed to demonstrate that they are entitled 

to vacatur of the district court’s order under Rule 60(b) because 

they fail to allege the kind of egregious misconduct that might justify relief under Rule 60. Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

USCA11 Case: 23-10902 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 03/01/2024 Page: 9 of 9