Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_04-cv-00881/USCOURTS-almd-2_04-cv-00881-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

ANN M. WEST, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:04cv0881-M

) [WO]

JO ANNE B. BARNHART )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Claimant Ann M. West [“West”] filed this action seeking review of a final decision

by the defendant [“Commissioner”] (Doc. # 1) pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act,

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2004). Upon review of the record and the briefs submitted by the

parties, the court concludes that the Commissioner’s decision should be affirmed.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

West, who is 63 years old and worked as a legal secretary for the Alabama Education

Association [“AEA”] from 1980 to 2001, contends that she became disabled on 15 June

2001, the day she retired (R. 64, 491-93). Although West alleges that she suffers from

depression as well as the long-term effects of chemotherapy for breast cancer, for which she

underwent a “left modified radical mastectomy” (R. 172), the primary cause of her allegedly

disabling condition is back pain (R. 29, 495-98). 

West’s back problems began in 1994 (R. 82), though her medical records do not

document treatment before April 1995, when Dr. Patrick Ryan [“Dr. Ryan”] diagnosed a

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herniated disk in her lumbar spine at the L4-5 level and a “broad disk bulge versus

herniation” in her lumbosacral spine at the L5-S1 level (R. 130-37; 148). Dr. Ryan

performed a laminectomy, but West continued to complain of and be treated for pain. As

part of that treatment, Dr. Roger Williams Kemp [“Dr. Kemp”] administered an epidural

injection (“Caudal RACZ”) and noted in a follow-up visit on 13 March 1996 that West’s

condition was “improving” (R. 249). 

West’s medical records indicate that she was not seen again until April 1998, when

Dr. Ryan referred her to Dr. Larry W. Epperson [“Dr. Epperson”] for continued “low back

pain, numbness and burning in the lower extremities” (R. 152). She described the pain

radiating to her right leg as feeling “like a ‘red hot poker.’” Id. Dr. Epperson ruled out

“lumbar disc disease with failed back syndrome” and determined that she suffered from,

simply, “chronic pain” (R. 153). An MRI revealed “narrowing of the L5-S1 intervetebral

space” and “[o]bvious anterior herniation of the L5-S1 intervertebral disc” (R. 154). 

Her next visit did not occur until October of that same year, when Dr. Kemp

diagnosed her with “failed back syndrome” and “right lumbar radiculitis” (R. 248). He again

performed an epidural injection, at which time he noted “epidural nerve root fibrosis” (R.

247). After a follow-up visit in March 1999, Dr. Kemp indicated that the injection was

successful, noting “complete resolution of central lumbar back pain and . . . complete

resolution of shooting pain in the right leg” (R. 244). An injection the following month

preceded a notation in June 1999 that her pain was improving but continuing, nonetheless,

while she was off her medications per her doctor’s order (R. 243). Dr. Kemp noted that her

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1The records do not distinguish between pain she might have been experiencing as the

result of her previous condition and pain, perhaps different in nature, that might be caused by the

cancer treatment. The plausibility of this possible distinction is evidenced by the fact that in July

2001, during a period of increased doctor visits for her back pain, West saw Dr. Thompson again

for what appears to be a final checkup, and he noted that she denied “any bone pain, joint pain or

back pain” (R. 338). 

3

radiculitis was stable. Id. At that point, West had been diagnosed with breast cancer (R.

155). 

In October 1999, West underwent surgery for her cancer and, thereafter, monthly

chemotherapy treatments through mid-May 2000 (R. 156, 172-3, 322, 326, 333-406). Notes

from Dr. Keith A. Thompson [“Dr. Thompson”], who supervised her chemotherapy, indicate

that West suffered from no complications other than some skin irritation. Id. Despite the

fact that West was not receiving treatment for her back pain during this time, Dr. Thompson

specifically noted that she denied “any bone pain, joint pain or back pain.” Id.1

In February 2001, approximately nine months after her final chemotherapy treatment,

West again sought help from Dr. Kemp, who then diagnosed her with bulging discs at L5-S1

and L3-4, the latter of which, he noted, was accompanied by “bilateral facet and ligamentous

hypertrophy . . . without spinal stenosis or foraminal encroachment” (R. 208). He also noted

that the scarring from her previous back surgery was “minimal.” Id. The next month, Dr.

Kemp assessed West’s condition as “failed back syndrome, right lumbar radiculitis and

lubmar degenerative disc disease” (R. 236), and in April, he administered an epidural steroid

injection (R. 186, 200). 

In June 2001, Dr. Kemp performed a “discography”, after which he diagnosed West

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with “L4-5 grade IV-V degenerative disk with annular fissure and central lateral bulge with

no pain re-creation” and L5-S1 grade V degenerative disk with foraminal stenosis and

spondylitis with no pain re-creation” (R. 186). A CT scan confirmed this diagnosis (R. 190),

but Dr. Kemp the next month noted, “Disabled - place in off work status” (R. 234). 

From the end of July through mid-August 2001, West underwent physical therapy (R.

215-32). An optimistic outlook from her physical therapist, Charles Michael Ellis [“Ellis”],

who predicted that she would be pain-free within four weeks (R. 224-25), proved unrealistic.

Upon discharging her from treatment, Ellis noted that West “was progressing slowly

secondary to still experiencing radicular signs and symptoms down the right lower extremity

and still having pain in the bilateral lower extremities as well as soreness in the bilateral

lower extremities” (R. 216). 

While in physical therapy, West did not pursue additional medical treatment. In

October 2001, she again saw Dr. Kemp with complaints of knee and back pain, with the latter

radiating into her legs (R. 233). He noted that her heels were numb and that she was

“disabled”. Id. He also provided an instruction to draft a letter stating that she “is not able

to perform the duties of as [sic] a admin. assist. She is permanently disabled secondary to

Breast Cancer [sic] and prev [sic] failed laminectomy” (R. 465). 

That same day, West was seen at Southern Orthopaedic Surgeons, which included the

following puzzling note in the record of her visit: “Ms. West is a 59 [year old female] with

history of a few weeks of left knee pain that’s worse with activity. She’s had no numbness

or tingling or radiating pain associated with this or is a chronic back pain patient” (R. 267)

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(emphasis added). She was diagnosed with left knee pain and pedal edema, and her x-rays

indicated “mild arthritis” in her left knee. Id. 

At her next doctor’s visit approximately five months later, in March 2002, Dr. Kemp

noted that West had been experiencing periodic pain averaging six and peaking at nine on

a 10-point scale (R. 460). Approximately two weeks later, he performed a “lumbar

diskography”, which led Dr. Kemp to diagnose “degenerative disk disease L5-S1, bilateral

lumbar radiculitis, L4-5 grade 5 degenerative disk with typical axial and left leg pain. L5-S1

grade 5 degenerative disk with axial pain only, loss of disk height and spondylosis without

significant foraminal stenosis” (R. 453). 

In May, he noted “marked improvement of [her] lumbar back pain,” which West had

estimated to be “50-60%” better (R. 448). This was followed by another discography in June

“for selective nerve root block and interdiscal steroid” (R. 447). In August, another

discography was scheduled, but the records do not reflect whether the procedure was

performed (R. 443). Finally, in August 2003, Dr. Kemp again saw West for back pain,

noting that the “pain has gotten worse since she ran out of Celebrex” (R. 440).

In March 2002, Dr. Lois Schulman [“Dr. Schulman”] performed a consultative

examination, during which she noted that West “had a normal range of motion but she had

a lot of pain getting up from the flexed position” (R. 409). After reviewing West’s medical

records and performing a physical examination, Dr. Schulman diagnosed her with “[l]ower

back pain, status post herniated discs as stated in the medical records, with radiculopathy on

examination” (R. 410). In her functional assessment based on an eight-hour workday, Dr.

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2As the court has already noted, West also claims to suffer from depression, but West

does not challenge any of the administrative findings regarding her alleged mental limitations

(Doc. # 16, p. 3); therefore, it is unnecessary to discuss these records, and the court simply

incorporates by reference the Commissioner’s relevant description and findings. 

3The ALJ held two hearings, the first of which compelled the him to order additional

psychological examinations and a subsequent hearing (R. 518-19). The second hearing

concerned only West’s alleged mental impairments, which, as noted in footnote two supra, are

only marginally relevant to the matter before the court. 

6

Schulman limited West to standing or walking four hours with “frequent” breaks; sitting for

four hours with “frequent” breaks; lifting or carrying no more than five pounds; and bending,

stooping, and crouching, “which she was able to do,” only when “absolutely necessary” (R.

410-11). She further noted that “[n]o assistive devices are necessary” and that West has no

manipulative, visual, communicative or environmental workplace limitations (R. 411). 

Notably, a state agency medical consultant, Dr. Van Hayne, disagreed with Dr.

Schulman’s assessment, finding that the limitations she suggested were excessive and

unsupported by the record (R. 412-21). According to the specialist, West can occasionally

lift or carry 20 pounds; frequently lift and/or carry 10 pounds; stand and/or walk

approximately 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; sit approximately 6 hours in an 8-hour

workday; frequently climb ramps and stairs but never ladders, ropes or scaffolds; and

frequently stoop, kneel and crouch but only occasionally crawl. Id.2

 

West’s application for benefits was denied initially (R. 34-38), and a hearing before

Administrative Law Judge Steven L. Carnes [“ALJ”] resulted in an unfavorable decision (R.

17-27).3 The Social Security Administration’s [“SSA”] Office of Hearings and Appeals

declined West’s request for review (R. 5-7) thereby making the ALJ’s opinion the final

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4

In Graham v. Apfel, 129 F. 3d at 1422, the Court of Appeals stated that:

Substantial evidence is described as more than a

scintilla, and means such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales,

402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d

842 (1971). 

7

decision of the Commissioner. West then filed this timely lawsuit. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court’s review of the Commissioner's decision is a limited one.

Reviewing courts “may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [their]

judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Miles v. Chater, 84 F. 3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir.

1996) (citing Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)). The court

must affirm the Commissioner’s decision “if it is supported by substantial evidence and the

correct legal standards were applied,” Kelley v. Apfel, 185 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing

Graham v. Apfel, 129 F. 3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997)).4 This is true despite the fact that

“[s]ubstantial evidence may even exist contrary to the findings of the ALJ.” Barron v.

Sullivan, 924 F.2d 227, 230 (11th Cir. 1991). “There is no presumption, however, that the

Commissioner followed the appropriate legal standards in deciding a claim for benefits or

that the legal conclusions reached were valid.” Miles, 84 F. 3d at 1400 (citations omitted).

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard for Determining Disability

An individual who files an application for Social Security disability benefits must

prove that he is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.912 (2004). The Act defines “disability” as

the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2004). 

The Social Security regulations provide a five-step sequential evaluation process for

determining if a claimant has proven that he is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. The ALJ

must evaluate the claimant’s case using this sequential evaluation process, Ambers v.

Heckler, 736 F.2d 1467, 1469 (11th Cir. 1984); Williams v. Barnhart, 186 F. Supp. 2d 1192,

1195 (M.D. Ala. 2002). The steps are as follows:

1. If the claimant is working or engaging in substantial gainful activity, he is not

disabled. If the claimant is not working or engaging in substantial gainful

activity, however, the court must consider whether the claimant has a severe

impairment.

2. If the claimant does not have a severe impairment, he is not disabled. A severe

impairment is defined as a condition that precludes one from performing basic

work-related activities. If the claimant has a severe impairment, the court must

then consider whether the impairment has lasted or is expected to last for more

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than 12 months.

3. If a claimant’s impairment has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous

period of 12 months or more and it is either included on or equivalent to an

impairments listed in Appendix I of the regulations, the claimant is disabled.

Otherwise, the ALJ must go on to step four of the evaluation sequence. 

4. If it is determined that the claimant can return to previous employment,

considering his residual functional capacity [“RFC”] and the physical and

mental demands of the work that he has done in the past, the claimant will not

be considered disabled. If it is determined that the claimant cannot return to

previous employment, the ALJ must continue to step 5 in the sequential

evaluation process.

5. If, upon considering the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and past work

experience, the ALJ determines that the impairments determined do not

preclude the claimant from performing a significant number of jobs that are

available in the national economy, the claimant will not be considered disabled

within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Therefore, she/he will not be

entitled to benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. and/or 42 U.S.C. §

1381. If, however, it is determined that there are not a significant number of

jobs the claimant can perform available in the national economy and the

impairment meets the duration requirement, the claimant will be considered

disabled.

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See §§ 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(a)-(f), 416.920(a)-(f) (2005). 

B. Application of the Standard: the ALJ’s Findings

After meticulously discussing the legal standards and evidence in the record, the ALJ

made the following findings:

1. The claimant met the insured status requirements of the

Social Security Act as of the alleged onset date. 

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since the alleged onset date.

3. The claimant has the following “severe” impairments:

status post herniated nucleus pulposus at L4-5; status

post laminectomy and discectomy; disc bulge at L5-S1;

lumbar radiculitis; status post mastectomy for carcinoma

of the left breast; failed back syndrome; degenerative

disc disease with spondylosis; and major depressive

disorder, recurrent, moderate.

4. The claimant’s impairments, considered individually and

in combination, do not meet or equal in severity any

impairment set forth at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,

Appendix 1.

5. The claimant’s assertions concerning the ability to work

are not credible.

6. The claimant retains the residual functional capacity to

perform the exertional demands of a restricted range of

sedentary work in that she can sit for up to 4 hours in an

8-hour day, stand/walk for up to 4 hours in an 8-hour

day, requires a sit/stand option, and has the following

abilities and restrictions: lift/carry no more than 5

pounds; continuously use hands for simple grasping,

pushing/pulling of arm controls and fine manipulation;

never use legs for pushing/pulling of leg controls;

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occasionally stoop, crouch, kneel, crawl, climb, and

balance; frequently reach; occasionally work around

unprotected heights, moving machinery, operate motor

vehicle equipment, exposure to marked extremes in

temperature and humidity; experiences a moderate

degree of pain; moderate limitations in the ability to

respond appropriately to supervisors; moderate

limitations in the ability to respond appropriately to coworkers; moderate limitation in the ability to respond

appropriately to supervisors; moderate limitation in the

ability to respond appropriately to customers or other

members of the general public; mild limitation in the

ability to use judgment in simple one or two step workrelated decisions; moderate limitation in the ability to use

judgment in detailed or complex work-related decisions;

moderate limitation in the ability to deal with changes in

a routine work setting; no limitation in the ability to

understand, remember, and carry out simple, one and

two-step instructions; mild limitation in the ability to

understand, remember, and carry out detailed or complex

instructions; moderate limitation in the ability to

maintain attention, concentration or pace for periods of

at least two hours; mild limitation in the ability to

maintain social functioning; and no limitation in the

ability to maintain activities of daily living. 

7. The claimant cannot perform any past relevant work. 

8. The claimant is vocationally classified as an individual of

advanced age at all times relevant hereto.

9. The claimant has a high school education. 

10. The claimant has acquired skills that will transfer to other

jobs within the residual functional capacity set out above.

11. If the claimant had the exertional capacity to perform the

full range of sedentary work, 20 C.F.R. 404.1569 and

Medical Vocational Rule 201.07, 20 C.F.R. Part 404,

Table No. 1 to Appendix 2 of Subpart P would direct a

conclusion that the claimant is “not disabled.”

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12. Although the claimant’s additional non-exertional

limitations do not allow up to perform [sic] the full range

of sedentary work, using the above-cited rule as a

framework for decision-making and the vocational

expert’s testimony, there are a significant number of jobs

in the regional or national economies which the claimant

could perform. Examples of such jobs are: General

Clerk, with 3,100 jobs regionally and 155,000 jobs

nationally; Receptionist, with 1,200 jobs regionally and

55,000 jobs nationally; and Cashier, with 4,500 jobs

regionally and 225,000 jobs nationally. 

13. The claimant is not disabled within the meaning of the

Social Security Act. 

(R. 26-27). Thus, West fails at step five because the ALJ determined that, based on her RFC,

age, education and work experience, West is capable of performing a “significant number

of jobs in the regional or national economies.” Id. 

West disagrees and argues, generally, that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by

substantial evidence. Specifically, West argues that the ALJ did not adequately weigh Dr.

Kemp’s opinion that West is disabled and that neither the ALJ’s RFC determination nor his

decision to discredit West’s subjective complaints is supported by the record (Doc. # 16).

For the reasons set forth infra, West’s arguments lack merit. 

C. Treating Physician’s Opinion

West first argues that “[t]he ALJ erred in evaluating Dr. Kemp’s opinion by failing

to discuss the medical evidence of record insofar as whether Dr. Kemp’s opinion, as to the

nature and severity of Ms. West’s impairments, should have been afforded controlling

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“Medical opinions are statements from physicians . . . that reflect judgments about the

nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis,

what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R.

§ 1527(a)(2) (2005) (emphasis added). Although Dr. Kemp noted the plaintiff’s subjective

complaints, he made no “judgments” regarding them. Nor did he offer any predictions as to the

progress of her condition or opinions regarding her capabilities or restrictions, aside from his

conclusion that she was disabled. Notably, his conclusion in this regard was based in part on

West’s cancer, but West’s records reveal no complications from her illness or treatment, and, as

West points out, Dr. Kemp is a pain specialist not an oncologist. 

6West’s argument that the ALJ should have recontacted Dr. Kemp for clarification of his

opinion that West is disabled is likewise without merit. As West herself notes, the regulations

require the Commissioner to recontact treating physicians when the medical evidence is

“inadequate for [the Commissioner] to determine whether [the claimant] is disabled.” 20 C.F.R.

13

weight” (Doc. # 16, p. 8). West does not indicate to which opinions she is referring, with the

notable exception of Dr. Kemp’s conclusory statement that West is disabled and unable to

perform the functions of her job, which West concedes is not entitled to controlling weight

(Doc. # 16, p. 8-9). See 20 C.F.R. § 1527(e)(1)-(3) (2005) (including “opinions that [the

claimant] is disabled” among those “issues reserved to the Commissioner” and stating that

those opinions are not entitled to “any special significance”); Sykes v. Apfel, No. Civ. A. 99-

0983-P-L, 2001 WL 102986 (S.D. Ala. 2001); Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-5p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,471

(July 2, 1996). 

Clearly, the ALJ’s decision, to the extent that it relates to West’s back condition, was

based primarily, if not exclusively, on Dr. Kemp’s treatment records, which were consistent

with other physicians’ records regarding West’s back problems. He thoroughly reviewed

all of Dr. Kemp’s records and adopted each of his diagnoses, which were essentially the only

medical opinions Dr. Kemp offered.5 Therefore, West’s argument is simply unfounded.6

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§ 404.1512(e)(1) (2005). Other than argue generally that the record does not support the ALJ’s

decision and point out a minor discrepancy in a note on one of Dr. Kemp’s medical records (R.

233) that is clarified in a later duplication (R. 465), West fails to demonstrate how the record is

insufficient, and she offers no evidence that medical records are missing. 

7West also argues that the ALJ ignored a limitation on West’s ability to work around

unprotected heights and hazardous machinery (Doc. # 16, p. 15). This limitation, imposed by a

non-examining medical consultant from a state agency, conflicts with Dr. Schulman’s opinion,

which stated, “There are no visual, communicative, or environmental workplace limitations” (R.

411). The opinion of a nonexamining physician is entitled to little weight when it is contradicted

by an examining physician’s opinion. Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279-80 (11th Cir.

1987). Therefore, the ALJ’s well-reasoned preference for Dr. Schulman’s opinion does not

constitute legal error.

14

D. The ALJ’s RFC Assessment

West argues that the ALJ erred by ignoring a limitation Dr. Schulman imposed on

West’s ability to “bend, stoop, and crouch”, which she said West could do “only when

absolutely necessary” (R. 410, 411). Giving great weight to Dr. Schulman’s opinion, the

ALJ concluded that she could perform these actions “occasionally” (R. 26), which West

herself defines as “from very little to up to one third of the time” (Doc. # 16, p. 14) (emphasis

added). Considering that an RFC represents the most, not the least, a claimant is capable of

doing, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a) (2005), the ALJ’s finding that West could “occasionally”

perform the acts in question simply does not conflict with Dr. Schulman’s limitation (R. 23).7

E. Application of the Pain Standard

West argues that the ALJ’s discrediting of her subjective complaints is not supported

by the recorded. Thus, although she does not refer to or describe the Eleventh Circuit’s twopart test for evaluating a claimant’s subjective complaints, her argument makes clear that she

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is challenging the ALJ’s application of the pain standard. 

The so-called pain standard requires evidence of an underlying medical condition and

either “objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising from

that condition or . . . that the objectively determined medical condition is of such a severity

that it can be reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain.” Holt v. Sullivan, 921

F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991). No weight need be given to subjective complaints that do

not satisfy the pain standard. See, e.g., Butler v. Barnhart, 347 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1123

(M.D. Ala. 2003). Nevertheless, the ALJ must provide “explicit and adequate” reasons for

discrediting the plaintiff’s complaints. Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir.

2002).

At the administrative hearing, West testified that she was in constant pain that she

described as more often than not a 9 1⁄2 on a 10-point scale (R. 495-96). Furthermore, her

right leg “feels like it has a red hot poker inside of it all the time” (R. 497). Nevertheless,

she stated that she could lift 10 pounds, stand a total of two hours, sit for a total of up to four

hours and walk a total of two hours in an eight hour work day (R. 500-501). On an average

day, West is awake from around 9:00 a.m. until 2:00 a.m. the following morning (R. 501-

02). She prepares breakfast and spends the day watching television (7-8 hours per day) or

reading “while sitting” (R. 501-04). 

After accurately discussing the SSA’s and Eleventh Circuit’s requirements for

evaluating subjective complaints, the ALJ offered the following as his reasons for

discrediting West’s complaints:

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8Contrary to the suggestion in West’s brief, the ALJ did not find that she does not

experience pain on a daily basis. In fact, his RFC and the hypothetical questions posed to the

vocational examiner at the hearings considered the fact that West experiences a moderate degree

of pain (R. 24, 514-16, 528-30). 

16

I find that the claimant’s testimony of disabling pain and

functional restrictions is disproportionate to the objective

medical evidence. The record does not contain objective signs

and findings that could reasonably be expected to produce the

degree and intensity of pain and limitations alleged. There are

no diagnostic studies to show abnormalities that could be

expected to produce such severe symptoms. The physical

findings in the record do not establish the existence of

neurological deficits, significant weight loss, muscle atrophy, or

other observable signs often indicative of protracted pain of the

intensity, frequency, and severity alleged.

Furthermore, despite the allegedly disabling pain and functional

limitations, the claimant’s own hearing testimony confirms that

she can perform some sedentary work activities

(R. 24). 

Thus, the ALJ provided explicit, logical reasons for finding that West’s complaints

were unsupported by the objective medical evidence and contrary to her own testimony

regarding her capabilities. His findings are reasonable and well-supported by the record.8

A thorough review of the record as well as West’s arguments lead unavoidably to the

conclusion that she is simply dissatisfied with the ALJ’s view of the facts. Although

reasonable minds may draw different conclusions, this court simply may not reinterpret the

record when, as in this case, the ALJ properly applied the law, thoroughly examined the

record, drew reasonable, well-supported conclusions, and fully explained his rationale. 

 

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IV. CONCLUSION

Therefore, it is hereby 

ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner be and is AFFIRMED.

DONE this 1st day of September, 2005.

/s/ Vanzetta Penn McPherson

VANZETTA PENN MCPHERSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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