Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-00719/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-00719-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1346 Tort Claim

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Patricia Foster, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

United States of America, 

Defendant.

No. CV-14-00719-TUC-RCC (DTF)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Pending before the Court are Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject 

Matter Jurisdiction and Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint. (Docs. 21, 26.) 

Defendant responded to the request to amend and replied on its motion to dismiss; 

Plaintiff responded to the motion to dismiss. (Docs. 27, 28, 31.) Pursuant to the Rules of 

Practice in this Court, the matter was assigned to Magistrate Judge Ferraro for a report 

and recommendation. The Magistrate recommends the District Court, after its 

independent review of the record, enter an order granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and granting Plaintiff’s request to amend. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff Patricia Foster sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act 

(FTCA). Foster alleges in her Complaint that, on November 19, 2011, George Frye 

recklessly and negligently operated a motor vehicle, which injured Foster who was riding 

as a passenger. She alleges that Frye was acting under the direction and supervision of the 

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Veterans Administration (VA) at the time, and that the United States is liable for the 

actions of Frye.

DISCUSSION 

 Defendant argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Frye was 

not an employee of the United States at the time of the accident. In response, Plaintiff 

seeks leave to amend her complaint. The Court will examine its jurisdiction over the 

original complaint as raised by the motion to dismiss and then evaluate the proposed 

amendment. 

 The United States can only be sued to the extent it has expressly waived its 

sovereign immunity. Kaiser v. Blue Cross of Cal., 347 F.3d 1107, 1117 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The FTCA provides jurisdiction in the district courts for injuries caused by a government 

employee “if a private person [ ] would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the 

law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). In 

resolving a motion based on subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(1), the Court may consider evidentiary submissions outside the 

pleadings. McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Motion to Dismiss 

 According to the evidence submitted by Defendant, from April 2011 to April 

2012, Frye was participating in the Compensated Work Therapy (CWT) program at the 

Southern Arizona VA Health Care System. (Doc. 21, Ex. 1.) CWT “is a vocational 

rehabilitation program. It contracts with private industry and the public sector to provide 

its participants with therapeutic and rehabilitative work at VA health care facilities.” (Id.) 

The Congressional authorization for the CWT program provides that the participants are 

not employees of the United States for any purpose. 38 U.S.C. § 1718(a). 

 Plaintiff does not dispute Defendant’s evidence. Plaintiff merely contends she had 

requested depositions that were not completed. (Doc. 26 at 2.) The parties agreed at the 

Rule 16 Conference to narrow discovery to subject matter jurisdiction for the first two 

and a half months. (Doc. 14.) The Court extended this deadline for an additional two 

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months, at Plaintiff’s request. (Docs. 24, 25.) Defendant documented its willingness to 

conduct depositions limited to subject matter jurisdiction, however, Plaintiff’s counsel 

failed to schedule the depositions. (Doc. 28, Exs. 2-6.) Plaintiff requested no discovery 

assistance from the Court. Because Plaintiff had the opportunity to obtain discovery on 

subject matter jurisdiction, her failure to submit any evidence is not a defense to 

Defendant’s submission. 

 The original complaint simply alleged Defendant was liable for the actions of 

Frye, apparently based on a respondeat superior theory. The uncontested evidence shows 

Frye was not an employee of the United States at the time of his alleged negligent 

actions. Therefore, this Court does not have jurisdiction over the original complaint under 

the FTCA and the motion to dismiss should be granted. See Prescott v. United States, 973 

F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1992) (plaintiff must point to “unequivocal waiver of immunity”) 

(quoting Holloman v. Watt, 708 F.2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1983)). 

Motion to Amend 

 Plaintiff argues that, even if Frye was not a federal employee, the United States is 

liable based upon negligent entrustment and negligent supervision/training theories. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff requests leave to amend her complaint to assert three claims. (Doc. 

26-2.) The United States responded that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over 

the proposed claims, therefore, the motion to amend should be denied as futile. 

 Motions to amend pleadings to add claims are governed by Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 15(a). While the decision to grant or deny a motion to amend is within the 

discretion of the district court, “Rule 15(a) declares that leave to amend ‘shall be freely 

given when justice so requires.’” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). In 

exercising its discretion, a court must be guided by the underlying purpose of Rule 15: to 

facilitate decision on the merits rather than on the pleadings or technicalities. Eldridge v. 

Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, Rule 15’s policy of favoring 

amendments to pleadings should be applied with “extreme liberality.” Id. The United 

States Supreme Court has established that motions to amend should be granted unless the 

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district court determines that there has been a showing of: (1) undue delay; (2) bad faith 

or dilatory motives on the part of the movant; (3) repeated failure to cure deficiencies by 

previous amendments; (4) undue prejudice to the opposing party; or (5) futility of the 

proposed amendment. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. 

 Claim 1 

 In Claim 1, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is liable for the actions of Frye as an 

agent of the United States, pursuant to respondeat superior. Because Defendant’s 

evidence that Frye was not an employee is uncontested, the FTCA does not apply. The 

Court lacks jurisdiction over this proposed claim. 

 Claim 2 

 In Claim 2, Plaintiff alleges that the United States permitted an incompetent 

driver, Frye, to use its vehicle and is liable for such negligent entrustment. Defendant 

argues that this claim is barred by the discretionary function exception. The FTCA 

precludes claims “based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 

perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of 

the Government.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). A government employee’s conduct fits within the 

exception if (1) the action is a matter of choice or judgment for the employee, and (2) the 

decision is grounded in economic, social or political policy. Berkovitz by Berkovitz v. 

United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-37 (1988). 

 A complaint, to survive a motion to dismiss, must allege facts capable of 

supporting a finding that “the challenged actions are not the kind of conduct that can be 

said to be grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime.” United States v. Gaubert, 499 

U.S. 315, 324-25 (1991); see Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1084 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(requiring the pleading of a claim that is facially outside the discretionary function 

exception). Proposed Claim 2 cannot survive because Plaintiff does not allege that a 

government employee took action that involved either no judgment or was not grounded 

in policy as required by the discretionary function exception. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 

332; Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d at 1084 (complaint must assert that an employee of the 

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United States’ actions allowed for no judgment). The proposed Claim 2 merely alleges 

the elements of negligent entrustment, which is facially insufficient to remove it from the 

discretionary function exception. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 334. 

 Although the proposed amendment is insufficient, the Court finds Plaintiff should 

be permitted to attempt an amendment of Claim 2 that will remove it from the 

discretionary function exception. In an attachment to one of its motion briefs, Defendant 

acknowledged that, at the time of the accident, CWT participants were not permitted to 

drive government vehicles. (Doc. 28, Ex. 1 at 2.) Additionally, Veterans Health 

Administration Handbook 1163.02 forbids CWT participants from driving government 

vehicles. VHA Handbook 1163.02 § 11(g).1

 If a statute, regulation or policy dictates an 

employee’s required action, the only allowed choice is to comply with the policy; 

therefore, the discretionary function exception cannot apply because the element of 

choice is not satisfied. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322. Because governing policy dictates 

that the discretionary function exception does not apply to the facts as alleged by 

Plaintiff, Plaintiff can amend to allege a facially valid claim under the FTCA. Defendant 

has not established that amendment as to Claim 2 would be futile. See Prescott, 973 F.2d 

at 702 (government bears the burden of proving the discretionary function exception). 

 Claim 3 

 In Claim 3, Plaintiff alleges the United States negligently permitted Frye to drive 

the vehicle without either proper training or supervision. Government policy prohibited 

Frye from driving the vehicle. Accordingly, Defendant cannot be liable for not training 

plaintiff to drive the vehicle. Defendant argues Plaintiff’s negligent supervision theory 

also fails because it falls “squarely within the discretionary function exception.” See 

Nurse v. United States, 226 F.3d 996, 1001 (9th Cir. 2000). Defendant’s argument seems 

logical because supervisory decisions generally require consideration of policy objectives 

and priorities. See Parker v. United States, 500 Fed. App’x 630, 632 (9th Cir. 2012). This 

was true in Nurse, where the defendants were alleged to have established policies and 

 1

 This handbook is available at: 

 http://www.va.gov/vhapublications/ViewPublication.asp?pub_ID=2427. 

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supervised in accordance with those policies. Id. at 1000. However, Nurse is inapposite to 

the instant facts. Government employee(s) supervising Frye are alleged to have permitted 

him to drive the vehicle, which was contrary to an established policy. The supervising 

government employee(s) had no discretion to violate a policy, hence the discretionary 

function exception cannot apply. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322; Nurse, 226 F.3d at 1002 

(recognizing that discretionary function exception does not apply when government 

actors had no discretion to act as they did). 

 The current proposed version of Claim 3 does not sufficiently remove the 

negligent supervision claim from the boundaries of the discretionary function exception. 

However, in light of the above discussion, Plaintiff could amend to allege a facially valid 

claim. Accordingly, Defendant’s assertion that it is futile to permit an amendment fails as 

to negligent supervision. See Prescott, 973 F.2d at 702 (government bears the burden of 

proving the discretionary function exception). 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court grant 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 21) and grant Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend (Doc. 

26), allowing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint alleging negligent entrustment and 

negligent supervision. 

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file 

written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and 

Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party’s objections within fourteen 

days. No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the district 

court. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. 

 Dated this 3rd day of February, 2015. 

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