Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00481/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00481-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed Question: Fed Communications Act of 1934

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 09cv481

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

J & J SPORTS PRODUCTIONS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 09cv481 DMS (JMA)

ORDER: (1) GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET

ASIDE DEFAULT; AND (2)

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

[Docs. 9 & 12] 

vs.

GUEST FOOD SERVICE CORP., et al.,

Defendant.

Presently before the Court are Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment and Defendant’s motion

to set aside default. For the following reasons, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to set aside

default. Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment is denied.

I.

BACKGROUND

On March 10, 2009, Plaintiff J & J Sports Productions, Inc., filed a complaint against

Defendant Miller of San Diego, Inc., erroneously sued as Guest Food Service Corporation, dba

Miller’s Field, aka Pizzaria Uno (“Defendant”), for violations of the Communications Act of 1934,

the Cable & Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, and California’s unfair

competition law. Plaintiff alleges it had exclusive rights to distribute “Unfinished Business: Manny

Pacquiao v. Juan Manuel Marquez II, (the “Program”), which was telecast nationwide on Saturday

Case 3:09-cv-00481-DMS-JMA Document 18 Filed 12/08/09 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 - 09cv481

March 15, 2008. (Pl. Comp. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant exhibited the Program at its commercial

establishment, in violation of Plaintiff’s exclusive rights. (Id. at ¶ 12.) Defendant did not answer the

complaint.

On May 6, 2009, the Clerk entered default against Defendant. On October 7, 2009, this Court

ordered a hearing to dismiss the action pursuant Local Rule 55.1, for Plaintiff’s failure to move for

default judgment within thirty (30) days of the entry of default. (Doc. 8.) On October 22, 2009,

Plaintiff moved for default judgment and the Court vacated the hearing. (Docs. 9 & 10.) On

November 10, 2009, Defendant filed a motion to set aside default.

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Entry of default can be set aside for good cause. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 55(c). The court examines

three factors when determining whether there is good cause: (1) whether the defendant’s culpable

conduct led to the default; (2) whether defendant has a meritorious defense; and (3) whether setting

aside the default will prejudice the plaintiff. TCI Group Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 696

(9th Cir. 2001); Franchise Holding II, LLC, v. Huntington Restaurants Group, Inc., 375 F.3d 922, 926

(9th Cir. 2004). A court can deny the motion if any of the three factors are met. Id. (citing American

Ass’n of Naturopathic Physicians v. Hayhurst, 227 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

The defaulting party bears the burden of showing the default should be set aside. Id. Motions

to set aside default should be liberally construed and decisions on the merits are preferred over default

judgments. Schwab v. Bullock's, Inc., 508 F.2d 353, 355 (9th Cir. 1974). A court’s discretion to set

aside a default is “especially broad” where no default judgment has been entered. O’Conner v.

Nevada, 27 F.3d 357, 364 (9th Cir. 1994).

B. Culpability

A defendant’s actionsmaybe culpablewhere he orshe acts “with a devious, deliberate, willful,

or bad faith failure to respond.” TCI Group, 244 F.3d at 698. Here, Defendant contacted his attorney

Case 3:09-cv-00481-DMS-JMA Document 18 Filed 12/08/09 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 The Court does not reach the issue of whether service was proper.

1

- 3 - 09cv481

Doug Reynolds upon receiving notice of the instant lawsuit. (Miller Decl., ¶ 4.) On May 8, 2009, 1

two days after the default was entered, Defendant followed up with Mr. Reynolds and learned that he

was attempting to resolve the case with Mr. Riley and that no answer was due in the action. (Id. at ¶

7.) On October 29, 2009, Defendant contacted Mr. Reynolds for an update on the case but received

no response. (Id. at ¶ 8.) On November 2, 2009, Defendant learned of the motion for default

judgment. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Defendant immediately tried to contact his attorney. Id. When Mr. Reynolds

failed to respond, Defendant sought new counsel. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Defendant retained new counsel on

November 4, 2009, and a motion to set aside default was filed within one week. (Id.)

Defendant’s actions were not culpable. He contacted his lawyer immediately and received

assurances that the matter was being handled. Defendant had previously worked with Mr. Reynolds

and had no reason to believe the case was not being handled appropriately. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Although

Defendant did not contact his lawyer for several months, he took action immediately upon learning

of the motion for default judgment. There is no evidence that Defendant acted in bad faith or willfully

delayed his response to prejudice Plaintiff.

C. Meritorious Defense

A party seeking to vacate entry of default must allege specific facts that would constitute a

defense, but the burden is not extraordinarily heavy. TCI Group, 244 F.3d at 700. Here, Defendant

alleges he purchased the rights to view the pay-per-view Program from Time Warner Cable and

Plaintiff provided Defendant’s Time Warner Cable bill showing that he paid $49.99 for the Program.

(Doc. 9-2, Ehx. 1.) This raises a question as to whether Defendant was authorized to broadcast the

Program, which would provide a defense to Plaintiff’s claims. 

D. Prejudice

Defendant argues there is no prejudice because the case is in its infancy and no discovery has

been propounded. Plaintiff disagrees but does not explain how it will be prejudiced. The Court notes

that default was entered in May, 2009, and Plaintiff did not move for default judgment until October,

2009. Further, Plaintiff did not move for default judgment until this Court ordered a hearing to dismiss

the case. Accordingly any prejudice to Plaintiff is minimal.

Case 3:09-cv-00481-DMS-JMA Document 18 Filed 12/08/09 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 09cv481

In light of the above facts, and the preference to hear cases on the merits, the Court grants

Defendant’s motion to set aside the default.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to set aside default is granted. Plaintiff’s

motion for default judgment is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 8, 2009

HON. DANA M. SABRAW

United States District Judge

Case 3:09-cv-00481-DMS-JMA Document 18 Filed 12/08/09 Page 4 of 4