Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_11-cv-03439/USCOURTS-alnd-5_11-cv-03439-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

ESTATE OF VINCENT L. )

ROWELL, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. ) Civil Action No. 5:11-CV-3439-RRA

)

WALKER BAPTIST MEDICAL )

CENTER, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This is an action “to vindicate the constitutional rights of . . . Vincent L.

Rowell,” who died in the Walker County Jail on October 6, 2009, allegedly as a result

of injuries received in the custody of law enforcement officers. Plaintiffs are Linda 1

Rowell and Victor Pickett, the parents of the decedent, and Horacia Pickett, the

personal representative of his estate. Their amended complaint asserts federal

constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several municipal, county, and

state law enforcement officers for violation of Mr. Rowell’s Fourth Amendment rights

to be free from unreasonable seizures and excessive force, and his Eighth Amendment

right to be protected from cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiffs also assert 2

 Doc. no. 29 (Amended Complaint), at 4. 1

Id. Just one example of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ numerous professional errors is provided by 2

their reliance upon the Eighth Amendment as the basis for claims that defendants were deliberately

indifferent to the serious medical needs of plaintiffs’ decedent, Vincent L. Rowell. 

FILED

 2013 Jan-30 AM 08:47

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:11-cv-03439-JHE Document 106 Filed 01/30/13 Page 1 of 29
supplemental state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) for negligence, wantonness,

and wrongful death. 

3

The action was commenced on September 22, 2011, and the original complaint

alleged that “Heracio Pickett, Cousin, is the personal representative of his estate,

which is pending in the Probate Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, Case No.

(Pending). He sues in that capacity.” In fact, a petition for letters of administration 4

of the Estate of Vincent L. Rowell, deceased, had not then been filed with the Probate

Judge of Jefferson County, and Horacia Pickett was not appointed personal

representative of the Estate until September 26, 2011: that is, four days after this

action was commenced; and, nine days before plaintiffs’ amended complaint was 5

That is an error because Mr. Rowell was a pretrial detainee. Consequently, the protections

of the Eighth Amendment did not apply to him; instead, that Amendment applies only to inmates

of state prisons and those persons incarcerated in county jails who have been convicted of and

sentenced for state offenses, but not yet transferred to a state prison. Stated somewhat differently,

the prohibitions of the Eighth Amendment and the caselaw gloss layered upon it do not protect

pretrial detainees. See Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1024 n.5 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc)

(citing Tittle v. Jefferson County Commission, 10 F.3d 1535, 1539 n.3 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc) (in

turn citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977)). 

The proper constitutional basis for claims of deliberate indifference to the serious medical

needs of a pretrial detainee is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Even so, the

Eleventh Circuit has said that “the standard for providing basic human needs to those incarcerated

or in detention is the same under both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Marsh, 268 F.3d

at 1024 n.5 (citing Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1573-74 (11th Cir.1985); Lancaster

v. Monroe County, 116 F.3d 1419, 1425 n.6 (11th Cir.1997) (minimum standard for providing

medical care to pretrial detainee under Fourteenth Amendment is same as minimum standard

required under Eighth Amendment for convicted prisoner)). 

 Doc. no. 29 (Amended Complaint), at 4. 3

 Doc. no. 1 (Original Complaint) ¶ 2, at 4 (emphasis supplied). Mr. Pickett’s given name 4

is inconsistently spelled in the record of this case as “Horacia,” “Horacio,” and “Heracia.”

See doc. no. 51(MemorandumBrief in Support of Defendant Deputy AlfredGrace’s Motion

5

2

Case 5:11-cv-03439-JHE Document 106 Filed 01/30/13 Page 2 of 29
filed on October 5, 2011. 

6

Further, plaintiffs’ amended complaint was docketed only one day prior to the

expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. See Ala. Code § 6-5-410(d) (1975)

(prescribing that wrongful death actions “must be commenced within two years from

and after the death of the testator or intestate”). 

The Magistrate Judge to whom this action was assigned concluded, on the basis

of the foregoing facts, that plaintiffs lacked “standing” on the date the action was filed

and, therefore, that this court did not possess subject matter jurisdiction. Upon 7

receiving the Magistrate Judge’s report recommending the dismissal of all claims, this

court reviewed the entire file and reached an independent conclusion sustaining

plaintiffs’ objections to the Magistrate’s report and recommendation. 

8

The case now is before this court a second time, on defendants’ motions to

reconsider the opinion rejecting the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to dismiss

this action for lack of “standing.” 

9

to Dismiss), Exhibit A (Docket Report from the Probate Court of Jefferson County, Alabama,

indicating that “Heracia Pickett” received Letters ofAdministration on Sept. 26, 2011). As observed

in note 2, supra, Mr. Pickett’s first name is spelled in various ways in the record of this case: e.g.,

as “Horacia,” “Horacio,” and “Heracia.” 

See doc. no. 29 (Amended Complaint). 

6

See doc. no. 68 (Report & Recommendation). 7

See doc. no. 94 (Opinion & Reasons). 8

The defendants’ original motion for reconsideration was filed by Police Chief T. J. Burnett, 9

Officer Clint McKinney, and Officer Greg Glover (collectively, the “Sumiton Defendants”). See

doc. no. 95 (Motion to Reconsider). The following defendants subsequently adopted and joined in

3

Case 5:11-cv-03439-JHE Document 106 Filed 01/30/13 Page 3 of 29
I. ISSUES FOR RECONSIDERATION

When rejecting the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation, this court

relied on the decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Hess v. Eddy, 689

F.2d 977 (11th Cir. 1982), abrogated on other grounds by Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S.

261 (1985). The facts of the Hess case were materially similar to the facts of the

present case, with one significant difference. In Hess, the real party in interest — the

duly appointed personal representative of the decedent’s estate — was not added as

a plaintiff to the action until after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. 

In contrast, in the present case, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding the

personal representative of the decedent’s estate the day before the expiration of the

statute of limitations. 

On the date that the Hess opinion was entered, the relevant portion of Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) provided that: 

No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the

name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been

allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action

by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such

ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the

the Sumiton defendants’ motion for reconsideration: Dr. David Wilson; John Mark Tirey, Sheriff

of Walker County; Trent McCluskey, Jail Administrator, Walker County; Deputy Jonathan Long; 

Deputy Rachael Harper; Lieutenant Richard DeJesus; Deputy Alfred Grace; and the Walker County

Commission. See doc. nos. 96 (Defendant Dr. David Wilson’s Adoption of and Joinder in the

Sumiton Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider), and 97 (Defendants Tirey, McCluskey, Long, Harper,

DeJesus, Grace, and Walker County Commission’s Adoption of and Joinder in the Sumiton

Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider). 

4

Case 5:11-cv-03439-JHE Document 106 Filed 01/30/13 Page 4 of 29
action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a). The Hess panel held that the “plain language” of Rule 17(a) 10

clearly provides that when an action is brought by someone other than

the real party in interest within the limitations period, and the real party

in interest joins or ratifies the action after the limitations period has run,

the amendment or ratification relates back to the time suit was originally

filed and the action need not be dismissed as time barred. 

Hess, 689 F.2d at 980 (emphasis supplied). The Hess panel emphasized that its

interpretation of the language of Rule 17(a) was consistent with Supreme Court

precedent, the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 amendments to Rule 17, the 11 12

The full text of this Rule, as it read on Oct. 21, 1982 — the date of the Eleventh Circuit’s

10

opinion in Hess v. Eddy — read as follows: 

(a) Real Party In Interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of

the real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an

express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the

benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may sue in his own name without

joining with him the party for whose benefit the action is brought; and when a statute

of the United States so provides, an action for the use or benefit of another shall be

brought in the name of the United States. No action shall be dismissed on the ground

that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable

time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action

by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification,

joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been

commenced in the name of the real party in interest. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a) (1982) (emphasis supplied). 

 In Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648, 650 (1953), the Supreme Court held that 11

where a wrongful death action is brought by a party not yet properly appointed as the

administrator of the decedent’s estate, and where proper appointment occurs only

after the applicable state limitations period has run, a federal court must allow the

appointment to “relate back” to the time of initial filing — even though the forum

state would not allow such a “relation back” and would hold the action time barred

in its own courts.

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commentary in trusted treatises, and the decisions of most of the courts that had 13

considered the issue. Id. at 980-81. Based upon those considerations, the Hess panel 14

held that 

Rule 17(a) sets forth a rule of procedure that is to be applied in the

federal courts. The Rule provides that when an action is brought by

someone other than the real party in interest, the suit need not be

dismissed if the real party in interest subsequently joins or ratifies the

action. The Rule further provides that such subsequent joinder or

ratification by the real party in interest relates back to the time the suit

was first filed. If the initial filing came within the applicable limitations

period, the suit is not time barred. Most importantly, the Rule is to be

applied even where the courts of the forum state have rejected the

“relation back” doctrine. For this reason, we must conclude that the

district court erred in applying Alabama law on the question of whether

the doctrine of “relation back” would apply in this case. This is a federal

civil rights action, brought in a federal court, and it is the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure that must apply. 

Hess, 689 F.2d at 981 (emphasis supplied) (discussing Levinson).

 The Advisory Committee stated in 1966 that the purposes of adding provisions to allow 12

for relation back when the real party in interest is substituted after the complaint is filed were to

“insure against forfeiture and injustice,” and to “codify in broad terms the salutary principle of”

Levinson. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 advisory committee’s note.

The Eleventh Circuit cited Moore’s Federal Practice & Wright and Miller’s Federal

13

Practice and Procedure, both of which emphasized that Rule 17 was designed to allow relation back

even when the applicable state law would not. Hess, 689 F.2d at 981 (citing 3A James Wm. Moore

et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 17.09 (2d ed. 1982); Charles Allen Wright & Arthur R. Miller,

6C Federal Practice & Procedure § 1541 (1971). 

The HessCourt cited Farbwerke Hoechst A.G. v. M/V “Don Nicky,” 589 F.2d 795, 797-98 14

(5th Cir. 1979), Wadsworth v. United States Postal Service, 511 F.2d 64, 65-67 (7th Cir. 1975),

Crowder v. Gordons Transports, Inc., 387 F.2d 413, 415 (8th Cir. 1967), Motta v. Resource

Shipping & Enter. Co., 499 F. Supp. 1365, 1369, 1374 (S.D. N.Y. 1980), de Vries v. Weinstein

International Corp., 80 F.R.D. 452, 458-59 (D. Miss. 1978), Unilever Ltd. v. M/T Stolt Boel, 77

F.R.D. 384 (S.D. N.Y. 1977), James v. Nashville Bridge Co., 74 F.R.D. 595, 596-97 (N.D. Miss.

1977), Caldwell v. Metcalfe, 458 F. Supp. 847, 848 (E.D. Tenn. 1977), and Honey v. George Hyman

Construction Co., 63 F.R.D. 443 (D. D.C. 1974). See Hess, 689 F.2d at 981 & 981 n.8. 

6

Case 5:11-cv-03439-JHE Document 106 Filed 01/30/13 Page 6 of 29
Hess, 689 F.2d at 981. Accordingly, the Hess panel held that the claims in that case

were not time-barred, because the administratrix had been properly substituted as the

real party in interest in accordance with Rule 17(a). Id. at 982. 

Based upon the holding in Hess, this court’s prior opinion reasoned that the

question of whether plaintiffs’ amended complaint related back to the date on which

the original complaint was filed is an issue that is governed by federal, and not state,

law. 

15

Defendants attempt to distinguish Hess by noting that, in 1991, Congress

amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), which governs the relation back of

pleadings, and that the Eleventh Circuit subsequently reexamined the issue in Saxton

v. ACF Industries, Inc., 254 F.3d 959 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc). On the basis of

those intervening events, defendants argue that the Hess opinion is no longer

controlling, and that the relation back of amended pleadings now is governed by state

law, and not federal law. Defendants believe that plaintiffs’ amended complaint was 16

a “nullity” under Alabama law, because there was nothing to which it could relate

back. Thus, defendants seek reconsideration of two discrete issues: 17

1. Whether, in light of the amendments to the Federal Rules of

 Doc. no. 94 (Opinion & Reasons), at 14. 15

 Doc. no. 95 (Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider), at 4. 16

Id. at 5. 17

7

Case 5:11-cv-03439-JHE Document 106 Filed 01/30/13 Page 7 of 29
Civil Procedure occurring after Hess v. Eddy, 689 F.2d 977 (11th Cir.

1982), and the Eleventh Circuit’s subsequent decision in Saxton v. ACF

Industries, Inc., 254 F.3d 959 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc), Alabama law

governing the relation back of amendments is controlling? 

2. Whether federal rules of procedure can be utilized to

retroactively cure a jurisdictional defect caused by Plaintiffs’ failure to

comply with the substantive requirements of Alabama’s wrongful death

statute which are incorporated into federal law by operation of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988? 

18

The brief submitted by plaintiffs’ attorneysin opposition to defendants’ motion

is utterly devoid of relevant argument or legal authority. “‘It is not a court’s task to 19

research legal arguments on a party’s behalf.’” Costa v. Sam’s East, Inc., No.

11-0297, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109833, *14 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 6, 2012) (quoting

Minemyer v. B-Roc Representatives, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 797, 809 (N.D. Ill. 2009)). 

Even so, this court has reviewed cases post-dating the 1991 amendments to Rule

Id. at 1-2. 18

See doc. no. 100 (Plaintiffs’ Response to All Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration and 19

Argument Therefor). For example, in defendants’ reply to plaintiffs’ brief in opposition to the

motion, defendants correctly observe that plaintiffs devote two paragraphs to advancing arguments

for the defense, without seeming to realize what they are doing. See doc. no. 102 (Reply to

Opposition to Motion to Reconsider) (quoting doc. no. 100, at 6-7). Moreover, plaintiffs’ brief is

replete with embarrassing spelling and grammatical errors to nearly the point of incoherence. 

Given the abysmal quality of plaintiffs’ pleadings over the course of this litigation, and given

the fact that the need to draft the present opinion was precipitated by plaintiffs’ failure to timely seek

appointment as decedent’s personal representatives, this court is disturbed to note that plaintiffs are

represented. In fact, plaintiffs have three attorneysin this action, two of whom (Antonio L. Thomas

and Melvin Robinson) are admitted to practice pro hac vice. 

Counsel are reminded that “permission to appear pro hac vice is [a] privilege, [the] granting

of which is within [the] sound discretion of [the] presiding judge,” and which can be revoked if they

continue to violate the professional standards of this District. D. H. Overymyer, Co. v. First

National Bank of Boston, 750 F.2d 31, 34 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing Thomas v. Cassidy, 249 F.2d 91

(4th Cir. 1957) (per curiam), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 958 (1958)) (alterations and emphasis supplied).

8

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15(c), and upon consideration of those authorities, defendants’ motion for

reconsideration will be denied. 

III. DISCUSSION PART A:

The Evolution of Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)

The language of that portion of Rule 17(a) upon which the decision in Hess v.

Eddy turned had been added by amendments that became effective on July 1, 1966,

more than sixteen years before the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion. The relevant language

remained the same for another quarter-century, until the amendments that because

effective on December 1, 2007, which were intended to be stylistic only. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 17 advisory committee’s note (2008) (“The language of Rule 17 has been

amended as part of the general restyling of the Civil Rules to make them more easily

understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These

changes are intended to be stylistic only.”). The text of the Rule was reorganized, and

the relevant language now is found in subsection (a)(3), which reads as follows: 

(3) Joinder of the Real Party in Interest. The court may not

dismiss an action for failure to prosecute in the name of the real party in

interest until, after an objection, a reasonable time has been allowed for

the real party in interest to ratify, join, or be substituted into the action.

After ratification, joinder, or substitution, the action proceeds as if it had

been originally commenced by the real party in interest. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(3) (2013). Clearly, there is no substantive distinction between

the relevant language of Rule 17 as it was written in 1982 and today. 

9

Case 5:11-cv-03439-JHE Document 106 Filed 01/30/13 Page 9 of 29
IV. DISCUSSION PART B:

The Evolution of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 has been amended seven times since its

inception: i.e., on July 1, 1963; July 1, 1966; August 1, 1987; December 1, 1991;

December 1, 1993; December 1, 2007; and December 1, 2009. The first substantive 20

change in the language of Rule 15(c) was worked by the amendments that became

effective on July 1, 1966. The subsection then read as follows: 

Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading

arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted

to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the

date of the original pleading. An amendment changing the party against

whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is

satisfied and, within the period provided by law for commencing the

action against him, the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has

received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be

prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or

should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the

proper party, the action would have been brought against him. 

Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 24 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) as

Note that the dates listed in text are the dates upon which the amendments became 20

effective. See, e.g., 6 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice

and Procedure – Civil § 1471, at 583 (2010). 

Prior to July 1, 1963, the effective date of the first amendment, Rule 15(c) read as follows:

“Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct,

transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the

amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.” See United States v. Johnson, 288 F.2d

40, 42 (5th Cir. 1961) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)). The 1963 amendments to Rule 15 did not

affect subpart (c). Therefore, during the period of July 1, 1963 to July 1, 1966, Rule 15(c) continued

to read as set out in the preceding sentence. See Staggers v. Otto Gerdau Co., 359 F.2d 292, 297

(2d Cir. 1966) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)). 

10

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amended July 1, 1966) (emphasis supplied). 

Rule 15(c) received a minor, apparently stylistic, amendment on August 1,

1987; and, from that date until December 1, 1991 the Rule read as follows: 

Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading

arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted

to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the

date of the original pleading. An amendment changing the party against

whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is

satisfied and, within the period provided by law for commencing the

action against the party to be brought in by amendment that party (1) has

received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not

be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or

should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the

proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.

Simmons v. South Central Skyworker’s, Inc., 936 F.2d 268, 270 (6th Cir. 1991)

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) as amended Aug. 1, 1987) (emphasis supplied). 

Rule 15(c) received a major amendment on December 1, 1991. From then until

December 1, 1993, the date of the next amendment, Rule 15(c) read as follows: 

An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the

original pleading when (1) relation back is permitted by the law that

provides the statute of limitations applicable to the action, or (2) the

claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the

conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth

in the original pleadings, or (3) the amendment changes the party or the

naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted if the foregoing

provision (2) is satisfied and, within the period provided by Rule 4(j) for

service of the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by

amendment (A) has received such notice of the institution of the action

that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the

11

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merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake

concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been

brought against the party. 

Worthington v. Wilson, 8 F.3d 1253, 1255 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(c) as amended Dec. 1, 1991) (emphasis supplied). The Advisory Committee Notes

on the 1991 amendments explain that the new paragraph (c)(1)

is intended to make it clear that the rule does not apply to preclude any

relation back that may be permitted under the applicable limitations law. 

Generally, the applicable limitations law will be state law. If federal

jurisdiction is based on the citizenship of the parties, the primary

reference is the law of the state in which the district court sits. Walker

v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 [64 L. Ed. 2d 659] (1980). If federal

jurisdiction is based on a federal question, the reference may be to the

law of the state governing relations between the parties. E.g., Board of

Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 [64 L. Ed. 2d 440] (1980). In some

circumstances, the controlling limitations law may be federal law. E.g.,

West v. Conrail, Inc., 481 U.S. 35, 107 S. Ct. 1538 [95 L. Ed. 2d 32]

(1987). Cf. Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 [94 L. Ed.

2d 1] (1987); Stewart Organization v. Ricoh, 487 U.S. 22, 108 S. Ct.

2239 [101 L. Ed. 2d 22] (1988). Whatever may be the controlling body

of limitations law, if that law affords a more forgiving principle of

relation back than the one provided in this rule, it should be available to

save the claim. Accord, Marshall v. Mulrenin, 508 F.2d 39 (1st Cir.

1974). If Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 106 S. Ct. 2379 [91 L. Ed.

2d 18] (1986) implies the contrary, this paragraph is intended to make a

material change in the rule.

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 15 advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendments (alterations in

original). 

Rule 15(c) received a minor amendment on December 1, 1993; and, from that

12

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date until December 1, 2007 — i.e., the period during which both Saxton v. ACF

Industries, Inc., 254 F.3d 959 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc), and Wilson v. Navistar

International Transport Corp., 193 F.3d 1212 (11th Cir. 1999), were decided — the

Rule read as follows: 

An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the

original pleading when

(1) relation back is permitted by the law that provides the

statute of limitations applicable to the action, or

(2) the claimor defense asserted in the amended pleading arose

out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or

attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, or

(3) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party

against whom a claim is asserted if the foregoing provision

(2) is satisfied and, within the period provided by Rule

4(m) for service of the summons and complaint, the party

to be brought in by amendment (A) has received such

notice of the institution of the action that the party will not

be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and

(B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake

concerning the identity of the proper party, the action

would have been brought against the party.

Oduok v. Phillips, 154 F. App’x 878, 880-81 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.

P. 15(c) as amended Dec. 1, 1993) (emphasis supplied). 

The 2007 amendments did not affect subpart (c). Thus, during the period from

December 1, 2007 to December 1, 2009, Rule 15(c) continued to read as set out in the

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preceding paragraph. See, e.g., Force v. City of Memphis, No. 95-6333,1996 U.S.

App. LEXIS 30233, *6 (6th Cir. Nov. 14, 1996) (Lively, J.) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(c) as amended Dec. 1, 2007). 

Rule 15(c) was most recently amended on December 1, 2009, and it presently

reads as follows: 

An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the

original pleading when: 

(A) the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations

allows relation back;

(B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of

the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out — or

attempted to be set out — in the original pleading; or

(C) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party

against whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is

satisfied and if, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for

serving the summons and complaint, the party to be brought

in by amendment:

(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be

prejudiced in defending on the merits; and

(ii) knew or should have known that the action would

have been brought against it, but for a mistake

concerning the proper party’s identity.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) as amended Dec. 1, 2009. 

V. DISCUSSION PART C:

Federal Law on Relation Back

14

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In the wake of the 1991 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c),

Eleventh Circuit authority on whether relation back is governed by federal or state law

has been unsettled. In Wilson v. Navistar International Transport Corp., 193 F.3d

1212 (11th Cir. 1999) — a diversity case in which the laws of Alabama provided the

substantive rules of decision — the plaintiffs filed an action for product liability

against multiple named and fictitious defendants. Id. at 1213. The district court

allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to substitute a defendant named

Fontaine Company for one of the timely pleaded fictitious defendants, but later

reversed itself after determining that “federal procedural law would not provide for

such a substitution by amendment.” Id. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit faced the

issue of whether relation back was governed by federal or state law, and relied in part

on Hess v. Eddy, 689 F.2d 977 (11th Cir. 1982), to hold that federal law applied:

Relation-back issues are procedural in nature and the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure apply. Glickstein v. Sun Bank/Miami, N.A., 922

F.2d 666, 671-72, n. 9 (11th Cir.1991), adopting Crowder v. Gordons

Transports, Inc., 387 F.2d 413, 416 (8th Cir.1967). In Crowder the

Eighth Circuit applied Erie principles and determined that the district

court’s application of state “relation-back” principles was improper

because the specific provisions of Rule 15(c) governed this federal

procedural question. See Crowder, 387 F.2d at 416 (the issue of relation

back is one of procedure and is controlled by the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.). See also Hess v. Eddy, 689 F.2d 977, 980 (11th Cir.), cert.

denied, 462 U.S. 1118, 103 S. Ct. 3085, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1347 (1982)

(holding that the district court “erred in applying Alabama’s ‘no

relation-back’ rule in the face of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

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[17(a)] that expressly authorizes and adopts the ‘relation-back’ doctrine”

in context of administration of estate and suit filed in federal court prior

to administratrix receiving official representative status).

The relation back of an amendment to correct a misnomer in

pleadings is procedural and governed by federal, not state, law. Welch

v. Louisiana Power & Light Company, 466 F.2d 1344, 1345 (5th

Cir.1972); Gifford v. Wichita Falls & So. Ry. Co., 224 F.2d 374 (5th

Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 895, 76 S. Ct. 153, 100 L. Ed. 787 (1955);

Grandey v. Pacific Indemnity Co., 217 F.2d 27 (5th Cir.1954); Barthel

v. Stamm, 145 F.2d 487 (5th Cir., 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 878, 65

S. Ct. 1026, 89 L. Ed. 1430 (1945). The Supreme Court has established

a strong presumption that the federal rules govern, rather than state law,

in cases involving arguably procedural matters. Hanna v. Plumer, 380

U.S. 460, 85 S. Ct. 1136, 14 L. Ed. 2d 8 (1965).

The form of notice contemplated by Rule 15(c) serves the major

purpose of state statutes of limitations — to ensure that defendants are

given adequate notice in time to prepare a defense. Welch, 466 F.2d at

1346. Application of state rules concerning relation back would disrupt

important federal policies favoring simplification and uniformity of

pleading and liberality of amendment. Id. Therefore, the district court

acted appropriately when it corrected itself and applied the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. 

Wilson, 193 F.3d at 1213-14 (alterations in original).

Two years later, the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, reexamined the issue of

whether relation back is governed by federal or state law in federal actions founded

on diversity of citizenship in Saxton v. ACF Industries, Inc., 254 F.3d 959 (11th Cir.

2001) (en banc). The plaintiffs in that case had sued numerous fictitious defendants

for an injury under Alabama’s general tort statute, but did not include ACF Industries

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as a defendant until the third amended complaint, which was filed after the expiration

of the two-year state-law statute of limitations. Id. at 962. When ACF moved for

summary judgment, the district court granted the motion, and decided that federal law

applied to bar relation back. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, and determined that

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1) incorporates state-law relation back rules

when state law provides the applicable statute of limitations.

We now reconsider whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

15(c)(1) allows federal courts to apply state law relation-back rules to

amendments in a diversity case where state law provides the applicable

statute of limitations. For the reasons outlined above, we find that both

the language of Rule 15(c)(1) and its accompanying advisory committee

notes indicate that Rule 15(c)(1) does incorporate state law relation-back

rules in such an instance. Therefore, we join the other circuits in holding

that Rule 15(c)(1) allows federal courts sitting in diversity to apply

relation-back rules of state law where, as here, state law provides the

statute of limitations for the action. See Arendt [v. Vetta Sports, Inc.], 99

F.3d [231,] 236 [(7th Cir. 1996)]; Lundy [v. Adamar of N.J., Inc.], 34

F.3d [1173,] 1184 [(3d Cir. 1994)]; McGregor [v. Louisiana State

University Board of Supervisors], 3 F.3d [850,] 863 n.22 [(5th Cir.

1993)]. To the extent that Wilson holds otherwise, it is overruled. 

Saxton, 254 F.3d at 963 (footnote omitted, alterations supplied). 

Defendants argue that Saxton serves to bar the application of federal law to

relation back in the case before this court because “Alabama law provides the statute

of limitations for all claims presented by Plaintiffs.” In Saxton, the court’s 21

Doc. no. 95, at 4. Although plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim arises under federal law, the “statute

21

of limitations for a § 1983 claim is generally the applicable state-law period for personal-injury

torts.” City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 124 (2005) (citing Wilson v. Garcia,

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jurisdiction was based upon the parties’ complete diversity of citizenship and the

requisite amount in controversy. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)(1). In contrast, this court

has statutory and federal question jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims that are asserted

through the remedial vehicle of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and supplemental jurisdiction over

plaintiffs’ state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Thus, in order to accept 22

defendants’ argument, this court would have to conclude that the 1991 amendments

to Rule 15(c), as well as the holding in Saxton, both require the application of state

law to relation back in the statutory, federal question, and supplemental jurisdiction

context. Such an interpretation contravenes the plain language of both Rule 15(c) and

the Saxton opinion, as well as common sense about civil procedure. 

471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985); Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989)). 

See, e.g., doc. no. 1, at 2 (“This Court has jurisdiction over these claims pursuant to 42 22

U.S.C. § 1983, as well as 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (a)(3) (civil rights)

and 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (supplemental jurisdiction).”). 

“Two jurisdictional statutes apply to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 litigation in federal court: 28 U.S.C.

§ 1343(a)(3), the jurisdictional counterpart of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the general

federal question statute.” Karen M. Blum & Kathryn R. Urbonya, Section 1983 Litigation, Federal

J u d i c i a l C e n t e r , 3 ( 1 9 9 8 ) ,

http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/Sect1983.pdf/$file/Sect1983.pdf.

28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (1993) provides as follows:

(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized

by law to be commenced by any person: . . . (3) To redress the deprivation, under

color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right,

privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act

of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the

jurisdiction of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1993) provides that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all

civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.”

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In 1991, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) was amended to state that “‘an

amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when

relation back is permitted by the law that provides the statute of limitations applicable

to the action.’” Saxton, 254 F.3d at 962 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)) (emphasis

supplied). By selecting the word “action,” as opposed to the term “claim,” Congress

appeared to instruct trial courts to examine the nature of the plaintiffs’ entire action

(i.e., whether the jurisdiction of the action is founded upon the diversity or federalquestion statutes), rather than the nature of the plaintiffs’ individual claims (i.e.,

whether those claims are subject to a statute of limitations under federal or state law). 

Although the current version of Rule 15(c)(1) does not contain a reference to either

an “action” or a “claim,” those changes were “intended to be stylistic only.”23

Further, the Advisory Committee Notes on the 1991 amendments to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) distinguished between actions in which the court’s

jurisdiction was based upon the diversity and federal question statutes, and preserved

the possibility of applying the federal law on relation back when “federal jurisdiction

is based on a federal question.” 

If federal jurisdiction is based on the citizenship of the parties, the

Advisory Committee Notes on the 2007 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23

15(c). In 2007, Rule 15(c)(1) was amended to state that “[a]n amendment to a pleading relates back

to the date of the original pleading when the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations

allows relation back.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(A).

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primary reference is the law of the state in which the district court sits. 

Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 [64 L. Ed. 2d 659] (1980). 

If federal jurisdiction is based on a federal question, the reference may

be to the law of the state governing relations between the parties. E.g.,

Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 [64 L. Ed. 2d 440] (1980). 

In some circumstances, the controlling limitations law may be federal

law. E.g., West v. Conrail, Inc., 481 U.S. 35, 107 S. Ct. 1538 [95 L. Ed.

2d 32] (1987). Cf. Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 [94

L. Ed. 2d 1] (1987); Stewart Organization v. Ricoh, 487 U.S. 22, 108 S.

Ct. 2239 [101 L. Ed. 2d 22] (1988). 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 advisory committee’s note (alterations in original, emphasis

supplied). 

Finally, when crafting its holding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)

includes state-law relation-back rules when state law provides the statute of

limitations, the Saxton court was careful to repeatedly include qualifying phrases,

limiting the Court’s holding only to those cases in which the court’s jurisdiction was

premised upon the diversity statute. 

We now reconsider whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

15(c)(1) allows federal courts to apply state law relation-back rules to

amendments in a diversity case where state law provides the applicable

statute of limitations. For the reasons outlined above, we find that both

the language of Rule 15(c)(1) and its accompanying advisory committee

notes indicate that Rule 15(c)(1) does incorporate state law relation-back

rules in such an instance. Therefore, we join the other circuits in holding

that Rule 15(c)(1) allows federal courts sitting in diversity to apply

relation-back rules of state law where, as here, state law provides the

statute of limitations for the action. See Arendt [v. Vetta Sports, Inc.], 99

F.3d [231,] 236 [(7th Cir. 1996)]; Lundy [v. Adamar of N.J., Inc.], 34

F.3d [1173,] 1184 [(3d Cir. 1994)]; McGregor [v. Louisiana State

20

Case 5:11-cv-03439-JHE Document 106 Filed 01/30/13 Page 20 of 29
University Board of Supervisors], 3 F.3d [850,] 863 n.22 [(5th Cir.

1993)]. To the extent that Wilson holds otherwise, it is overruled. 

Saxton, 254 F.3d at 963 (footnote omitted, emphasis and alterations supplied). 

A. Other Federal Authority on the Issue of Whether Relation Back is

Governed by Federal or State Law

In the factually similar case of Estate of Fortunato by Fortunato v. Handler,

969 F. Supp. 963 (W.D. Pa. 1996), which was decided after the 1991 amendments to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), a New Jersey district court continued to rely

on Hess v. Eddy, 689 F.2d 977 (11th Cir. 1982), and applied the federal law on

relation back. In Fortunato, the decedent was shot and killed by police during the

execution of a misdemeanor warrant for his arrest. 969 F. Supp. at 966. The plaintiff,

the decedent’s twin brother, filed a complaint as “personal representative” of the

estate, and asserted federal-law claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as

supplemental state-law claims for assault, battery, and intentional infliction of

emotional distress under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Id. at 966, 974. Although the complaint

was filed one day before the expiration of the state-law two-year statute of limitations

on the § 1983 claims, the plaintiff did not apply for or receive letters of administration

for the estate until after that limitations period had run. Id. at 966. When the state

actors moved to dismiss the complaint as untimely, the trial court held that their

“reliance on Pennsylvania case law is misguided . . . because federal procedural law,

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specifically Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a), governs the relation back issue in

this case.” Id. at 967.

“If there is a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure covering a particular

issue in dispute between the parties, such a rule governs in a federal

diversity action even if resort to state law would lead to a different

result.” In re Asbestos School Lit., 768 F. Supp. 146, 150 (E.D. Pa.

1991), citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 14 L. Ed. 2d 8, 85 S. Ct.

1136 (1965). Under Hanna v. Plumer, “the question of relation back is

procedural and therefore properly analyzed according to federal

practice.” Nelson v. County of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010, 1014 (3d Cir.

1995). See also Hess v. Eddy, 689 F.2d 977, 980 (11th Cir. 1982), cert.

denied, 462 U.S. 1118, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1347, 103 S. Ct. 3085 (district court

“erred in applying Alabama’s ‘no relation back’ rule in the face of a

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure [17(a)] that expressly authorizes and

adopts the ‘relation back’ doctrine” in context of administration of estate

and suit filed in federal court prior to administratrix receiving official

representative status); Brohan v. Volkswagen Mfg. Corp. of America, 97

F.R.D. 46, 49 (E.D. N.Y. 1983) (in similar context, Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule

17(a) applies by its plain language and, under Hanna v. Plumer,

overrides New York law to the contrary).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

specifically addresses the issue of substitution, ratification or joinder of

the real party in interest and the effect thereof on suits previously filed:

No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is

not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until

a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for

ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder

or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such

ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same

effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of

the real party in interest.

In analyzing Rule 17(a), the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh

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Circuit concluded that:

The plain language of the Rule clearly provides that

when an action is brought by someone other than the real

party in interest within the limitations period, and the real

party in interest joins or ratifies the action after the

limitations period has run, the amendment or ratification

relates back to the time suit was originally filed and the

action need not be dismissed as time barred.

Hess v. Eddy, 689 F.2d at 980.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a) “sets forth a rule of procedure that is to be

applied in federal courts . . . even where the courts of the forum state

have rejected the ‘relation back doctrine.’” Id. at 981. Thus, if “the

initial filing came within the applicable limitations period, the suit is not

time barred,” id., even if Pennsylvania law would not recognize the

relation back. See Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648, 97 L. Ed. 1319,

73 S. Ct. 914 (1953), relied upon in Hess, (in the case of a wrongful

death action brought by party not yet properly appointed as administrator

of decedent’s estate, and where the appointment occurs only after the

statute of limitations has run, a federal court must allow the appointment

to relate back to the time of the initial filing even if the forum state

would not allow the relation back and would hold the action time-barred

in its own courts).

Although Paul Fortunato was not appointed administrator of

decedent’s estate until February 7, 1995, his post-appointment

ratification of that suit has the same effect as if the action had initially

been commenced in the name of the real party in interest pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a). Accordingly, the Pennsylvania statute of

limitations does not bar plaintiff’s claim, which, because it related back

to the timely complaint filed when the administrator’s status was not yet

official, was timely filed within the two-year statutory period.

Estate of Fortunato, 969 F. Supp. at 966-68 (alterations in original). 

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Accordingly, it appears that after the 1991 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 15(c), federal law continues to govern relation back in federal question

cases. Thus, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) — both as it was worded

in 1982, when the Hess opinion was handed down, and today — plaintiffs’ amended

complaint relates back to the filing of their original complaint. 

Even so, given that Eleventh Circuit authority on whether relation back is

governed by federal or state law in federal court is presently unsettled, this court will

not end its analysis here, but will review the arguments for reconsideration, assuming

for the sake of discussion that Alabama law applies.

B. Alabama Law on Relation Back

Defendants correctly note that “Alabama’s wrongful death statute is the only

mechanism through which either of [plaintiffs’] claims survives,” and that the only

individual who can invoke that statute is the personal representative of the decedent’s

estate who was duly-appointed by the Probate Judge of Jefferson County, Alabama.24

However, defendants then argue that “Alabama law precludes the relation back of an

amended complaint to an original complaint which was filed in violation of

Alabama’s wrongful death law.” That argument directly contravenes the holding in 25

Doc. no. 95, at 6. Alabama Code § 6-5-410(a) states that a “personal representative may 24

commence an action” for wrongful death. Ala. Code § 6-5-410(a) (1975) (emphasis supplied).

Id. at 5 (citing Cadle Co. v. Chabani, 4 So. 3d 460, 463 (Ala. 2008); Downtown Nursing 25

Home, Inc. v. Pool, 375 So. 2d 465, 466 (Ala. 1979)).

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Ellis v. Hilburn, 688 So. 2d 236 (Ala. 1997), which permitted the relation back of an

amended complaint to an original complaint that was filed before the plaintiff became

the personal representative of the decedent’s estate.

In Ellis, the plaintiff’s husband was allegedly killed by the medical malpractice

of the defendant doctor. Ellis, 688 So. at 236. The plaintiff filed her original

complaint as her husband’s “next-of-kin.” Id. One day before the expiration of the

statute of limitations, the plaintiff was duly appointed as her husband’s personal

representative. Id. When the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds

of untimeliness, the trial court denied the motion, and allowed the plaintiff to amend

her complaint to state that she had been appointed as personal representative within

the statutory period. Id. at 237. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed, and

reasoned as follows: 

The determinative issue in this case is whether a wrongful death

complaint filed by one acting as “next-of-kin” of the deceased, but who

was not at the time the personal representative of the deceased’s estate,

can be amended after the expiration of the two-year wrongful death

limitations period to name the plaintiff as the personal representative,

where the “next-of-kin” who filed the original complaint has in fact been

appointed administratrix of the estate within the two-year limitations

period.

Dr. Ellis argues that Mrs. Hilburn did not file the action as the

administratrix within two years of her husband’s death, pointing out that

the Wrongful Death Statute requires, as a substantive part of the cause

of action, commencement of the action within two years of the death of

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the decedent. He relies on Downtown Nursing Home, Inc. v. Pool, 375

So. 2d 465 (Ala. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 930, 100 S. Ct. 1318, 63

L. Ed. 2d 763 (1980). Dr. Ellis argues that, because the complaint filed

in October 1994 was filed by Mrs. Hilburn as “next-of-kin” and not as

the administratrix, the complaint was a nullity and therefore could not be

amended or corrected. Therefore, he argues, the amended complaint

filed in January 1995 is also a nullity because, he contends, it has

nothing to relate back to under Rule 15(c), Ala. R. Civ. P. 

In Pool this Court addressed similar issues of (1) whether one who

is not an administrator of the estate may initially maintain a wrongful

death action and (2) whether an amendment can relate back, when filed

after the expiration of the two-year period, to substitute as the plaintiff

the administrator, who had been appointed administrator after the

two-year period had expired. In Pool,J.P. filed a complaint based on the

death of E.P., who had died on November 24, 1976. After the two-year

period had expired, J.P. sought to amend his complaint to substitute as

the plaintiff B.J., who had been appointed administrator of E.P.’s estate

on February 5, 1979, more than two years after E.P.’s death. This Court

held that because there had been no one authorized to file the action

before the expiration of the two years, the doctrine of relation-back had

no application.

In Pool, the administrator was not appointed until after the

limitations period had expired. In contrast, Mrs. Hilburn was appointed

administratrix before the limitations period expired. Dr. Ellis, looking 26

to Holyfield v. Moates, 565 So. 2d 186 (Ala. 1979), argues that Mrs.

Hilburn’s suing as next-of-kin was void ab initio and therefore could not

be ratified by her later being appointed administratrix. This Court stated

in Holyfield, 565 So. 2d at 187-89: 

This court notes that the defendants in this case cite the same authority (i.e., Pool, 375 So. 26

2d) to support the same argument (i.e., that “Alabama law precludes the relation back of an amended

complaint to an original complaint which was filed in violation of Alabama’s wrongful death law

and [that the complaint] is therefore a nullity”) as Dr. Hilburn did in Ellis. Compare doc. no. 95,

at 5 with Ellis, 688 So. at 238. As in Ellis, this court will reject defendants’ argument because one

of the plaintiffs, Heracia Pickett, was appointed as the decedent’s personal representative prior to

the expiration of the statute of limitations. See doc. nos. 29 and 51. 

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“In [Pool] and Brown v. Mounger, [541 So. 2d 463

(Ala. 1989)], we held that to bring a wrongful death action

pursuant to § 6-5-410 . . . the personal representative must

be a duly appointed executor or administrator, and that the

failure of the personal representative to be so appointed

rendered his acts void. . . .

“. . . .

“. . . That which is void provides no basis for

corrective action. That which is merely voidable is viable

until declared void and it will support both a waiver and an

amendment.”

However, Rule 17(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., suggests that so long as

capacity exists before the limitations period expires, the wife, after being

appointed administratrix within the limitations period, may then, as the

real party in interest, ratify the commencement of the action. Thus, with

respect to ratification, Rule 17(a) provides: 

“No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is

not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until

a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for

ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder

or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such

ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same

effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of

the real party in interest.”

In Holyfield, supra, this Court distinguished between acts that are

voidable and those that are void. It reversed the judgment of the trial

court and remanded to allow an amendment, filed after expiration of the

limitations period, to substitute the properly appointed personal

representative as the real party in interest. The Court held that the

amendment related back to the filing of the original complaint because

the acts of the prior, improperly appointed personal representative, who

as a nonresident of Alabama was disqualified, were not void, but merely

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voidable. The Court reasoned that the “holding is mandated by Rule

17(a), Ala. R. Civ. P.” 565 So. 2d at 189. In reaching this conclusion,

the Court looked to the reasoning of Hess v. Eddy, 689 F.2d 977 (11th

Cir. 1982), and, upon reviewing the Hess court’s interpretation of Rule

17, Fed. R. Civ. P., stated the following: 

“‘The plain language of the Rule clearly provides

that when an action is brought by someone other than the

real party in interest within the limitations period and the

real party in interest joins or ratifies the action after the

limitations period has run, the amendment or ratification

relates back to the time suit was originally filed and the

action need not be dismissed as time barred.’”

Holyfield, 565 So. 2d at 189 (emphasis in original). Earlier in the

Holyfield opinion, this Court reviewed its decision in Pool and, relying

on the Pool rationale, stated: “If the two-year period prescribed by the

statute has expired before the representative is ‘duly appointed,’ the heirs

of the decedent are barred from recovery.” Holyfield, 565 So. 2d at 187. 

Because the two-year period did not expire before Mrs. Hilburn was

“duly appointed” as administratrix, she established her capacity within

the limitations period and, thereby, ratified her claim. Holyfield; Rule

17(a). Her amendment, therefore, relates back to the date she filed her

complaint.

The motion to amend in this case is based upon Rule 17(a), not on

Rule 15(c). Pool did not discuss ratification pursuant to Rule 17(a), and

the holding in that case is based solely upon application of Rule 15(c)

(dealing with relation back of amendments). This Court in Holyfield,

however, recognized the distinction in its application of Rule 17(a). The

rationale of that case supports a finding of a ratification of the filing of

Mrs. Hilburn’s action by her appointment within the limitations period. 

Thus, we conclude that her amendment related back pursuant to Rule

15(c).

Ellis v. Hilburn, 688 So. 2d at 238-39 (alterations in original). 

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In sum, just as plaintiffs’ amended complaint relates back to the filing of their

original complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a), it also does so under

Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a).

VI. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For all of the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motions for reconsideration are

OVERRULED and DENIED, and the Clerk is directed to return this case to the

Magistrate Judge to whom it was assigned when filed for all further proceedings up

to and, if the parties consent, through trial. 

DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of January, 2013.

_________________________

United States District Judge

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