Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01191/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01191-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RANDAL RUIZ,

CDC# V-00678, Civil No. 06-CV-1191 JM (AJB)

Plaintiff,

ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA

PAUPERIS, ASSESSING NO

INITIAL PARTIAL FILING FEE

AND GARNISHING $350 BALANCE

FROM PRISONER’S TRUST

ACCOUNT [Doc. No. 7]; AND

(2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO

STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) 

AND § 1915A(b)(1).

[Doc. No. 7]

vs.

Cpt ESQUIBEL, et al.,

Defendants.

Randal Ruiz (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil

rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case has been referred to the Honorable

Anthony J. Battaglia, Magistrate Judge, pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, “Assignment of § 1983

Prisoner Civil Cases to United States Magistrate Judges” and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

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Case 3:06-cv-01191-JM-AJB Document 8 Filed 09/22/06 Page 1 of 8
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I. Motion to Proceed IFP

Effective April 9, 2006, all parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a

district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a

filing fee of $350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to

prepay the entire fee only if the party is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). Prisoners granted leave

to proceed IFP however, remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of

whether the action is ultimately dismissed for any reason. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a

prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account

statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). From the certified trust account

statement, the Court must assess an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits

in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the

past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). That institution having custody of the prisoner must

collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any month

in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and forward those payments to the Court until the

entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit which complies with 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(1), and that he has attached a certified copy of his trust account statement pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D.CAL.CIVLR 3.2. Plaintiff’s trust account statement shows that

he has insufficient funds from which to pay filing fees at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4)

(providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or

appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and

no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case

based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is

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 The fact that Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)

only permits him to commence this action without full prepayment of the $350 civil filing fee mandated

by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). Plaintiff’s obligation to pay the entire $350 fee pursuant to the installment

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) is unaffected by dismissal. See, e.g., Williams v. Roberts, 116 F.3d

1126, 1127 (5th Cir. 1997) (“plain language of the PLRA holds that ... fees be assessed at the moment

[of filing], regardless of whether the appeal [or complaint] is later dismissed”); McGore v.

Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997) (“The dismissal of a complaint under § 1915(e)(2)

or § 1915A does not negate a prisoner’s obligation to pay the filing fee in accordance with § 1915(b)(1)-

(2)”); accord In re Tyler, 110 F.3d 528, 529-30 (8th Cir. 1997); Thurman v. Gramley, 97 F.3d 185, 187

(7th Cir. 1996). 

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ordered.”). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 7] and

assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350

balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court

pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding

IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused

of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these

provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any IFP or prisoner complaint, or any portion

thereof, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or which seeks damages from

defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A; Calhoun v. Stahl, 254

F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited

to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires” the court to sua sponte dismiss an in forma

pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir.

2000) (§ 1915A).1

 

Before amendment by the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte

dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. An action is

frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

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324 (1989). However, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A now mandate that the court

reviewing an IFP or prisoner’s suit make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before effecting

service of the Complaint by the U.S. Marshal pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). See Calhoun,

254 F.3d at 845; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127; see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601,

604-05 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that sua sponte screening pursuant to § 1915 should occur

“before service of process is made on the opposing parties”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d

1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”); Andrews, 398 F.3d at

1121. In addition, the Court has a duty to liberally construe a pro se’s pleadings, see KarimPanahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), which is “particularly

important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). In

giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the court may not

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of

the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

B. Failure to State a Claim

As currently pleaded, it is clear that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a cognizable claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a

claimant: (1) that a person acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and

(2) that the conduct deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S.

637, 124 S. Ct. 2117, 2122 (2004); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985)

(en banc). 

C. Verbal Harassment claims

Plaintiff claims that he has been subjected to “involuntary radio harassment” and

“environmental verbal harassment” in violation of his civil rights. (Compl. at 5.) However,

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verbal harassment or verbal abuse by prison officials does not constitute a violation of the Eighth

Amendment. See Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996) (harassment does not

constitute an Eighth Amendment violation); Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th

Cir. 1987) (harassment in the form of vulgar language directed at an inmate is not cognizable

under § 1983); McDowell v. Jones, 990 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir. 1993) (verbal threats and name

calling are not actionable under § 1983). Moreover, it appears as though Plaintiff is claiming

that the “involuntary radio harassment” or “IVR” violates his civil rights because he is forced

to listen to music played by other inmates on their radios. The Court is not aware of any

constitutional right by an inmate to listen to the music of their choice. 

D. Respondeat Superior 

Plaintiff further claims that some of the Defendants are liable for the alleged harassment

under a theory of respondeat superior. (Compl. at 6.) However, there is no respondeat superior

liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993).

Instead, “[t]he inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and

responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused

a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo

v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)). In order to avoid the respondeat superior bar, Plaintiff

must allege personal acts by each individual Defendant which have a direct causal connection

to the constitutional violation at issue. See Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 483 (9th Cir.

1986); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). As a supervisor, a Defendant may

only be held liable for the allegedly unconstitutional violations of his subordinates if Plaintiff

alleges specific facts which show: (1) how or to what extent this supervisor personally

participated in or directed Defendants’ actions, and (2) in either acting or failing to act, the

supervisor was an actual and proximate cause of the deprivation of his constitutional rights.

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). As currently pleaded, however, Plaintiff’s

Complaint in no way sets forth facts which might be liberally construed to support an

individualized constitutional claim against any named Defendant.

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 The Ninth Circuit has specifically held that conspiracy claims are subject to this heightened

pleading standard since they require the plaintiff to show that the defendant agreed to join the

conspiracy. See Harris, 126 F.3d at 1195; Margolis, 140 F.3d at 853; Mendocino Envt’l Ctr. v.

Mendocino County, 14 F.3d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying identical standard to conspiracy claim

in Bivens action). Although the Ninth Circuit recently eliminated the application of a heightened

pleading standard to all cases where an improper motive is an element, it did not modify the requirement

in regard to allegations of conspiracy. See Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir.

2002).

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E. Conspiracy Claims

In his Complaint, Plaintiff claims that his “allegations are sufficient to support [a claim]

for conspiracy.” (Compl. at 9.) In order to allege a claim of conspiracy under § 1983, Plaintiff

must allege facts with sufficient particularity to show an agreement or a meeting of the minds

to violate his constitutional rights. Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 1998);

Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989). Thus, pleading a

conspiracy requires more than a conclusory allegation that Defendants conspired to deprive

Plaintiff’s civil rights. The Ninth Circuit applies a heightened pleading standard to conspiracy

claims under Section 1983 and has held that mere conclusory allegations of conspiracy (i.e. bare

allegations that a defendant “conspired” with another) are insufficient to state a claim.2

 See

Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 1997); Buckey v. County of Los Angeles, 968

F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992). Rather, “[t]o state a claim for a conspiracy to violate one’s

constitutional rights under section 1983, the plaintiff must state specific facts to support the

existence of the claimed conspiracy.” Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir.

1989); see also Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that

plaintiffs must allege facts which are “specific and concrete enough to enable the defendants to

prepare a response, and where appropriate, a motion for summary judgment based on qualified

immunity.”); Buckey, 968 F.2d at 794. A plaintiff can meet the heightened pleading standard

by alleging “which defendants conspired, how they conspired and how the conspiracy led to a

deprivation of his constitutional rights.” Harris, 126 F.3d at 1196. As currently pleaded,

however, Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims amount to no more than “vague and conclusory

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations,” therefore, they fail to state a claim.

See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d

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1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980) (conclusory allegations of conspiracy insufficient to support a claim

under section 1983 or 1985).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a section 1983 claim

upon which relief may be granted, and is therefore subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). The Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to amend

his pleading to cure the defects set forth above. Plaintiff is warned that if his amended complaint

fails to address the deficiencies of pleading noted above, it may be dismissed with prejudice and

without leave to amend.

III. Conclusion and Order

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 7]

is GRANTED.

2. The Acting Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,

or his designee, is ordered to collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the

filing fee owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the trust account in an amount

equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income credited to the account and

forward payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY

IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on James Tilton,

Acting Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite

502, Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) & 1915A(b)(1).

However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this Order is stamped

“Filed” in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading

noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the

superseded pleading. See S.D.CAL.CIVLR. 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not reCase 3:06-cv-01191-JM-AJB Document 8 Filed 09/22/06 Page 7 of 8
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alleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814

F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

 Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint still fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter be

counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79

(9th Cir. 1996).

5. The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a Form Amended § 1983 Complaint to

Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 22, 2006

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

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