Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-01640/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-01640-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:501 Copyright Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CALYX TECHNOLOGIES, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

ELLIE MAE, INC.,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 04-1640 SI

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

On August 19, 2005, the Court heard argument on defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment.

Havingconsidered the papers on file and the arguments ofthe parties, the motion is GRANTED forthe reasons

set out below. 

BACKGROUND

PlaintiffCalyx Technologies, Inc. designs,markets,sells and distributesloanoriginationsoftware (LOS)

for use by mortgage brokers and lenders. Calyx’s top-selling software program, Point, had a market share

above 65% in2002 and 2004. Defendant Ellie Mae also designs, markets, sells and distributes loan processing

software for use by mortgage brokers and lenders. Ellie Mae purchased two LOS providers, Genesis 2000

and Contour Software, in 2000-2001. Additionally, in Fall 2003, Ellie Mae introduced Encompass, a new

LOS program. 

Both Encompass and Point provide the user with a variety of forms necessary to processing a loan.

For example, the programs allow the user to input the customer’s personalinformation, such as name, address,

and phone number. The programs also contain functions that allow the customer to contrast the costs between

renting a property and purchasing one, or between various types of loans. These functions are all performed

based on the user’s input of customer data into the program.

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1 The eight Point screens at issue in this motion are: 1) “FHA Worksheet Pur”; 2) “VA Refi

Worksheet”; 3) “FHA 203k Maximum Mortgage Worksheet”; 4) “Good Faith Estimate”; 5) “Loan

Application”; 6) “HMDA”; 7) “Aggregate Escrow Account”; and 8) “Tracking: Trust Account.” The rulings

made hereafter relate only to these screens.

2

While the parties disagree over the motivation behind the creation of Encompass, it is clear that the

programperforms many ofthe same functions as Point and contains portions ofscreen images that look similar

to comparable Point images. As a result, Calyx filed suit in this Court, asserting causes of action against Ellie

Mae for 1) violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); 2) false advertising; 3) copyright infringement;

and 4) unfair competition under California Business and Professions Code § 17200.

Now before the Court is defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment. Defendant argues that it

is entitled to summary judgment for plaintiff’s copyright (Count 3) and trade dressinfringement(Count 1) claims

with respect to eight of the Point screens.1 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper “ifthe pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party bears

the initialburdenofdemonstrating the absence of a genuine issue ofmaterialfact. See CelotexCorp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party, however, has no burden to negate or disprove matters on which

the non-moving party will have the burden of proof at trial. The moving party need only point out to the Court

that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case. See id. at 325.

The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to “designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue fortrial.’” Id. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). To carry this burden, the non-moving party

must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita

Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “The mere existence of a

scintilla of evidence . . . will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for

the [non-moving party].” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). 

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the

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 Plaintiff also uses the term “screens” when discussing protectable material.

3

non-moving party, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. Id. at 255. “Credibility

determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury

functions, not those of a judge [when she] is ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Id.

DISCUSSION

1. Copyright

Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action is for copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501. Defendant

argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s copyright claim based on the “blank forms” doctrine

set out in Bibbero Systems, Inc. v. Colwell Systems, Inc., 893 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1990); based on the

doctrines of merger and scenes a faire; and based on plaintiff’s failure to satisfy the originality requirement. 

In order to prevail on its copyright claim, plaintiff must demonstrate ownership of a valid copyright in

the allegedly infringed work and copying ofprotected expression in the allegedly infringed work by defendant.

Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff registered

a copyright forthe screen images at issue in this motion. See Goldman Decl., Exs. 32-36 (obtaining copyright

for Point program, “screen displays” for Point, and “revised compilation of terms and revised and additional

text on screen displays”). “[A] certificate of copyright registration constitutes prima facie evidence of

copyrightability and shiftsthe burden to the defendant to demonstrate why the copyright is not valid.” Bibbero

Systems, 893 F.2d at 1106. Therefore, when defendant seeks summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff’s

screen images are not entitled to copyright protection, defendant bears the burden ofdemonstrating invalidity.

It should first be noted that the underlying computer source code forthe Point LOS is clearly protected

by copyright; the parties do not dispute this. However, it is also undisputed that defendant did not copy Point’s

source code to create the Encompass program. Therefore, the underlying source code is not at issue in this

case. 

It is somewhatmore difficult to determine what is at issue in this case. Plaintiff has not clearly identified

what elements of the Point program it claims are protected by copyright. Instead, plaintiff merely asserts that

the “screen displays” are protected.2 Plaintiff at one point refers to “text, calculators, password protectors,

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3

 Plaintiff, in its response to defendant’s First Set of Interrogatories, does not assert that the methods

of operation in the Encompass program infringe on its copyright. See Lambert Reply Decl., Ex. A at 3-5.

Instead, plaintiff asserts that the Encompass “screen displays” constitute specific instances ofinfringement. Id.

at 3.

4

descriptors, autopopulation, active field highlighting, [and]lock boxes” on the “screens.” Opp’n at 14. Plaintiff

later asserts that the screens are copyrightable because “the text, compilation, and software read by the

computer (automation) are designed to guide the mortgage professional in providing information necessary to

complete the loan origination process.” Opp’n at 16. 

Plaintiff thus creates a moving target by presenting various explanations for what portion of the Point

LOS is protected by copyright. In failing to articulate the scope of copyright protection for Point, plaintiff has

ignored Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994), which stated that: 

Because only those elements of a work that are protectable and used

without the author’s permission can be compared when it comes to the

ultimate question ofillicit copying, we use analytic dissection to determine

the scope of copyright protection before works are considered “as a

whole.”

Plaintiff contends that the analytic dissection requirement does not apply because Apple involved a licensing

agreement between the parties in the litigation, which this case does not. However, courts must make

distinctions between protectable and unprotectable material even in cases that do not involve license

agreements. See Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197, 207-208 (9th Cir. 1989).

Therefore, plaintiff should have described the scope of copyright protection it claims for the Point program in

its opposition to defendant’s motion. Because plaintiff did not, the Court will address this issue on its own.

If plaintiff asserts that features of Point such as calculators, password protectors, lock boxes,

autopopulation, and other methods of operation fall under the protection of copyright, the Court finds that no

such protection exists. Copyright protection does not apply to “any idea, procedure, process, system, method

of operation . . . regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such

work.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). The Copyright Office recognized this when it granted plaintiff a copyright for

“compilations of terms and text” and “screen displays.” The copyright makes no reference to methods of

operation or any of the features listed above.3 The protection of copyright does not apply to ideas and

processes, which fall under patent protection.

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This leaves plaintiff arguable copyright protection only for the “compilations of terms and text” found

on the “screen displays” of the Point software. Plaintiff asserts that Encompass, defendant’s LOS, infringes

on its copyright because severalofthe Encompass screen displays look very similar to Point’sscreen displays.

Plaintiff has provided numerous copies ofthe screen displays in both programs, allowing the Court to compare

the two programs. See Second Alcaraz Decl., Exs. 1-14. 

In reviewing the screen displays fromboth programs, it is apparent that the Encompass screen displays

selected by plaintiff closely resemble comparable Point screen displays. Compare Second AlcarazDecl., Ex.

1-D with Ex. 1-E (containing “Rent vs. Own” screens for both programs). The similarity lies in the structure

of the screen displays and the terms used for the various entries. The similarity is striking, but not exact:

Encompass does not use the same font, text color or background color as Point. Therefore, plaintiff asserts

a copyright claim against defendant on the theory that the structure and terms used in the Encompass LOS

screen displays infringe plaintiff’s copyright in Point.

The Court finds that plaintiff’s copyright claim must fail under Bibbero, which established a strict

interpretation of the “blank forms” doctrine for the Ninth Circuit. In Bibbero, plaintiff designed and marketed

“superbills” thatwere used by doctors to obtain reimbursement frominsurance companies. 893 F.3d at 1105.

The superbill contained boxes for patient information, clauses assigning insurance benefits to the doctor and

authorizing release of patient information, and two “lengthy” checklistsforthe doctor to display the diagnosis,

services performed, and the fee. Id. Plaintiff produced approximately 25 superbills in its catalog for various

specialties. 

Defendant produced a superbill that “was nearly identical to” plaintiff’s superbill. Id. at 1106. After

defendant’s superbill came to plaintiff’sattention, itfiledan application to register itssuperbill with the Copyright

Office, which was granted. Plaintiff also filed suit against defendant for copyright infringement. Id. The court

recognized that the copyright registration was prima facie evidence of copyrightability, but found that the

superbill was an uncopyrightable blank form. Id. The court stated that “[t]he purpose of the Bibbero’s

superbill is to record information. Until the superbill is filled out, it conveys no information about the patient,

the patient’s diagnosis, or the patient’s treatment.” Id. at 1107. 

As in Bibbero, plaintiff is claiming copyright protection for a series of forms created to allow the user

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4Advanz also provides a thorough description ofthe “blank forms” doctrine as interpreted by the Ninth

Circuit. 21 F.Supp.2d at 1186-1190.

5 Bucklew dealt “primarily to the copyright doctrines of merger and scenes a faire,” rather than the

blank forms question. 66 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1824. Additionally, the defendant in Bucklew copied plaintiff’sfont,

which was unavailable to defendant through any means aside from directly copying plaintiff’s, and included

tables from plaintiff’s spreadsheet that contained no functionin the program at issue. Id. at 1822. Neither of

these factors is present in this case.

6

to collect various pieces of information. Until the user inputs information, the form in this case contains no

information about the customer seeking a mortgage. In viewing the screen displays involved in this lawsuit,

each display contains numerous empty boxes designed specifically forthe user to input data. The forms do not

contain any text aside from labels to each of the empty boxes. In this respect, the forms in this case are very

similar to those in Bibbero. 

The Court recognizesthatBibbero has beencriticizedbycommentators and other circuits. See Advanz

BehavioralManagement Resources, Inc. v. Miraflor, 21 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1189 (C.D.Cal. 1998) (describing

criticism of Bibbero).4 However, this Court is bound by Ninth Circuit precedent, including Bibbero. Under

Bibbero, “the blank forms rule denies copyrightability to forms consisting entirely of spaces for the recording

ofinformation, whether labeled or unlabeled, that are not accompanied by text conveying information, such as

instructions regarding the use of forms.” Advanz, 21 F.Supp.2d at 1189. Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie

& Co., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d 1820 (7th Cir. 2003), on which plaintiff relies to support its argument that its screen

displays are copyrightable, is both factually distinguishable from this case and substantially inconsistent with

the analysis and holding in Bibbero.

5

Plaintiff suggests several reasons why the Bibbero doctrine does not apply, but none is persuasive. It

first notes that the forms at issue in this case are found on a computer screen, while the forms in Bibbero were

on paper. This distinction, however, does not appear to the Court to make any difference, and plaintiff does

not supply one. Plaintiff argues that the forms in its program have “text, calculators, password protection,

descriptors, autopopulation, active field highlighting,[and]lock boxes,” unlike Bibbero. However, as discussed

above, plaintiff cannot receive copyright protection for methods of operation. It is the “screen displays” that

plaintiff claims are copyrightable, not the functionality of the program. The structure and appearance of the

displays would be very similar if found on a computer screen or printed on paper. Therefore, this argument

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6

 Additionally, the court in Bibbero rejected the holding ofNorton Printing Co. v. Augustana Hospital,

155 U.S.P.Q. 133 (N.D.Ill. 1967), which found copyrightable a medical laboratory test form because the

format and arrangement used in the forms conveyed what information is deemed to be important.

7

is not persuasive.

Plaintiff argues that Bibbero does not apply because “the information that is found on each of the

screens guidesthe user to how to successfully complete – in Calyx’s view – that portion of the loan origination

process.” Opp’n at 15, quoting Cooley Decl. at ¶ 85. However, this argument was specifically rejected in

Bibbero: “All forms seek only certain information, and, by their selection, convey that the information sought

is important.” 893 F.2d at 1107.6 Finally, plaintiff argues that the screen displays are original creations

containing an artistic element. However, the court in Bibbero refused to consider the effort and creativity

required to create the forms in question. 893 F.2d at 1108 n. 2. 

The Court finds that the text and structure of plaintiff’s screen displays are not copyrightable under

Bibbero. Plaintiff does not allege that defendant copied its source code in creating Encompass. Plaintiff cannot

claim copyright protection for functions and methods of operation for the Point LOS, because they are

precluded under copyright law. Once these aspects ofplaintiff’s programare stripped away, what remains is

a series of forms used to collect information from a customer seeking a mortgage. The program provides no

relevant information about the customer until the relevant customer informationis input into the programby the

user. This is similar to the superbill in Bibbero, which collected information about medical patients. In

reviewing the screen displays presented by plaintiff, the predominant feature ofthe screens is the blank spaces

designed specifically for the user to input the relevant customer data. Although others may disagree with the

rationale of the “blank forms” rule, Bibbero is binding precedent on this Court. 

Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiff does not have a valid copyright forthe Point screen displays at

issue in this case and GRANTS defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s copyright claim. 

2. Trade dress

Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action is for violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §

1125(a), which provides a cause of action against any person who uses “any symbol or device . . . likely to

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cause confusion . . . as to the origin of his or her goods.” This provision protects words and symbols, as well

as the packaging and design of a product, which is known as “trade dress.” As defined by the Ninth Circuit,

trade dress “refers to the total image of a product and may include features such as size, shape, color, color

combinations, texture or graphics.” International Jensen, Inc. v. Metrosound U.S.A., Inc., 4 F.3d 819, 822

(9th Cir. 1993).

Plaintiff asserts that the screen designs provided in the Second Amended Complaint qualify as

protected trade dress. See Second Amended Complaint, Ex. 1. However, the images provided by plaintiff

in the SAC do not constitute the “totalimage”ofthe product, but rather are only portions ofthe screens viewed

by a user of Point or Encompass. See, e.g., Visnick Decl., Ex. B (showing full image created by Point and

Encompass programs). The exhibits to the SAC omit approximately one-fourth of the actual image on the

screen, which includes the logo and the word “Point” in the top left corner, and the toolbars above and below

the various forms. In addition, the Encompass screens contain two windows to the left of the forms at issue,

which were omitted in the SAC. All of these features, omitted in the SAC, differ greatly between Point and

Encompass.

Plaintiff argues that these portions of the screen image are not part of the “total image” for purposes

of trade dress because they are not the “most important screens.” Cooley Decl. at ¶¶ 109-128. Instead,

plaintiff argues that the images it included in the SAC are “crucial to the processing of a loan and on a useweighted basis are by far the most important screens in any LOS.” Id. However, plaintiff provides neither

authority nor convincing explanation for why these omitted portions of the LOS screens are not part of the

“totalimage” for purposes oftrade dress, since they are all visible during use of the LOS programs. The Court

findsthat everythingpresented by the Encompass and Point programs, when the screens at issue are displayed,

constitutes the “total image” for purposes of trade dress protection.

In order to recover fortrade dress infringement under the Lanham Act, plaintiff must demonstrate that:

1) the design ofthe Point screen displays is non-functional; 2) the design has acquired secondary meaning; and

3) there is a likelihood that the consuming public will confuse Encompass with Point. Disc Golf Association,

Inc. v. ChampionDiscs, Inc., 158 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 1998). Defendant argues that plaintiff has failed

to meet any of these requirements. The Court finds that defendant is entitled to summary judgment because

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plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion as to the source or origin of the products. 

Defendant asserts that once the screen displays are viewed as a whole, without eliminating the material

around the image of the form, Encompass can be easily distinguished from Point. Plaintiffresponds that there

is a strong likelihood of confusion or origin based on the similarity of the images, relying on the declaration of

Scott Cooley, plaintiff’s expert.

The Ninth Circuit has considered the following factors when determining the likelihood of confusion of

origin: 1) similarity of the conflicting designations; 2) relatedness of the two companies’ products; 3) strength

of Calyx’s trade dress; 4) marketing channels used; 5) degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers; 6)

Ellie Mae’s intent in selecting its mark; 7) evidence of actual confusion; and 8) likelihood of expansion in

product lines. Brookfield Communications v. West Coast, 174 F.3d 1036, 1055 (9th Cir. 1999). The

importance of these factors is case-specific. Id. 

It is clear thatCalyx and Ellie Mae sellproductsthatare very similar and use similar marketing channels.

Plaintiff contends that there is likelihood of confusion as to the source of Encompass and Point based on the

declaration ofScottCooley, plaintiff’sexpert. In support, plaintiff specifically cites the following testimony from

Cooley: 

I believe that users wonder why the two products are identical. Most

software applications in any field have a unique look and feel . . . . I

believe this creates confusion in our industry and it has allowed [Ellie Mae]

to take advantage ofCalyx’s years ofinputscreen refinement. By creating

screens that look more like Point, users are far more likely to try using

Encompass because they believe Encompass has the same favorable

qualities that users have come to expect from Point.

Cooley Decl. at ¶ 114.

However, Cooley provides no basis for his “belief” that users wonder why the two products are

identical. There is no citation to any specific facts in support of his assertion, which must be provided to

withstand a motion for summary judgment. See Guidroz-Brault v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 254

F.3d 825, 831 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Plaintiff does not present any evidence of actual confusion through consumer surveys, which could

clearly establish, without relying on speculative expert testimony, that actual confusion as to origin exists.

Plaintiff argues that it has demonstrated actualconfusion through Exhibits 28-30 of the Goldman Declaration.

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7

 Defendant objects to these documents as hearsay and lacking in foundation.

8

 Point’s log in screen also references Calyx. 

10

Even if these documents withstand evidentiary objection,7 they do not demonstrate actual confusion as to the

source of the screen displays at issue in this case. Additionally, exhibits 29 and 30 do not involve Encompass.

See Ex. 29 at 1 (“It actually doesn’t have any direct connection to Encompass”); Ex. 30 (discussingEllie Mae’s

ePass product, not Encompass). Therefore, plaintiff has not identified a customer thatwas confused as to the

source of the screen displays at issue in this case.

Finally, plaintiff argues that the Court should find a likelihood of confusion as to source based on the

similarity between the Point and Encompass screen displays at issue. It is clear that the portion of the displays

that contains the various forms is highly similar. However, as discussed above, the Court will not view the

forms in a vacuum. Instead, theymust be viewed as a part of a largerscreen image. This image contains each

program’s name and logo, which are not similar. The display also includes a tool bar at the top ofthe screen.

These tool bars are very different, as Point’s tool bar looks like a standard Windows tool bar, while the

Encompass toolbar consists oflarge tabs on the far left and right ofthe display. Encompass contains two large

windows on the left ofthe display. One window contains a log for various important dates in the loan process.

See Second Alcaraz Decl., Ex. 4-D. The other window contains various forms and other tools. Id. 

Not only do the images of the screen displays at issue contain marked differences, but the user of the

software must first venture through a variety of screens to reach the screen displays that form the basis for

plaintiff’s suit. See Visnick Decl. at 4-13. These necessary steps differ greatly, and clearly identify the

products as “Encompass” and “Point.”8 See Visnick Decl. at 5, 10. Therefore, in order to reach the allegedly

infringing screen displays, the user must first view a series of screen displays that differ greatly between

Encompass and Point and clearly designate their origin.

The Court finds that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion of origin, when the

screen displays are viewed in their entirety. Therefore, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion forsummary

judgment on plaintiff’s Lanham Act claim for failure to demonstrate likelihood of actual confusion, as to the

specific screens at issue in this motion.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS defendant’s motion

for partial summary judgment on plaintiff’s copyright and Lanham Act claims, as to the eight screens at issue

in this motion. [Docket #100.].

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 19, 2005

 SUSAN

ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CALYX TECHNOLOGIES, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

ELLIE MAE, INC.,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 04-1640 SI

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

On August 19, 2005, the Court heard argument on defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment.

Havingconsidered the papers on file and the arguments ofthe parties, the motion is GRANTED forthe reasons

set out below. 

BACKGROUND

PlaintiffCalyx Technologies, Inc. designs,markets,sells and distributesloanoriginationsoftware (LOS)

for use by mortgage brokers and lenders. Calyx’s top-selling software program, Point, had a market share

above 65% in2002 and 2004. Defendant Ellie Mae also designs, markets, sells and distributes loan processing

software for use by mortgage brokers and lenders. Ellie Mae purchased two LOS providers, Genesis 2000

and Contour Software, in 2000-2001. Additionally, in Fall 2003, Ellie Mae introduced Encompass, a new

LOS program. 

Both Encompass and Point provide the user with a variety of forms necessary to processing a loan.

For example, the programs allow the user to input the customer’s personalinformation, such as name, address,

and phone number. The programs also contain functions that allow the customer to contrast the costs between

renting a property and purchasing one, or between various types of loans. These functions are all performed

based on the user’s input of customer data into the program.

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1 The eight Point screens at issue in this motion are: 1) “FHA Worksheet Pur”; 2) “VA Refi

Worksheet”; 3) “FHA 203k Maximum Mortgage Worksheet”; 4) “Good Faith Estimate”; 5) “Loan

Application”; 6) “HMDA”; 7) “Aggregate Escrow Account”; and 8) “Tracking: Trust Account.” The rulings

made hereafter relate only to these screens.

2

While the parties disagree over the motivation behind the creation of Encompass, it is clear that the

programperforms many ofthe same functions as Point and contains portions ofscreen images that look similar

to comparable Point images. As a result, Calyx filed suit in this Court, asserting causes of action against Ellie

Mae for 1) violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); 2) false advertising; 3) copyright infringement;

and 4) unfair competition under California Business and Professions Code § 17200.

Now before the Court is defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment. Defendant argues that it

is entitled to summary judgment for plaintiff’s copyright (Count 3) and trade dressinfringement(Count 1) claims

with respect to eight of the Point screens.1 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper “ifthe pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party bears

the initialburdenofdemonstrating the absence of a genuine issue ofmaterialfact. See CelotexCorp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party, however, has no burden to negate or disprove matters on which

the non-moving party will have the burden of proof at trial. The moving party need only point out to the Court

that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case. See id. at 325.

The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to “designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue fortrial.’” Id. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). To carry this burden, the non-moving party

must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita

Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “The mere existence of a

scintilla of evidence . . . will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for

the [non-moving party].” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). 

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the

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 Plaintiff also uses the term “screens” when discussing protectable material.

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non-moving party, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. Id. at 255. “Credibility

determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury

functions, not those of a judge [when she] is ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Id.

DISCUSSION

1. Copyright

Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action is for copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501. Defendant

argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s copyright claim based on the “blank forms” doctrine

set out in Bibbero Systems, Inc. v. Colwell Systems, Inc., 893 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1990); based on the

doctrines of merger and scenes a faire; and based on plaintiff’s failure to satisfy the originality requirement. 

In order to prevail on its copyright claim, plaintiff must demonstrate ownership of a valid copyright in

the allegedly infringed work and copying ofprotected expression in the allegedly infringed work by defendant.

Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff registered

a copyright forthe screen images at issue in this motion. See Goldman Decl., Exs. 32-36 (obtaining copyright

for Point program, “screen displays” for Point, and “revised compilation of terms and revised and additional

text on screen displays”). “[A] certificate of copyright registration constitutes prima facie evidence of

copyrightability and shiftsthe burden to the defendant to demonstrate why the copyright is not valid.” Bibbero

Systems, 893 F.2d at 1106. Therefore, when defendant seeks summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff’s

screen images are not entitled to copyright protection, defendant bears the burden ofdemonstrating invalidity.

It should first be noted that the underlying computer source code forthe Point LOS is clearly protected

by copyright; the parties do not dispute this. However, it is also undisputed that defendant did not copy Point’s

source code to create the Encompass program. Therefore, the underlying source code is not at issue in this

case. 

It is somewhatmore difficult to determine what is at issue in this case. Plaintiff has not clearly identified

what elements of the Point program it claims are protected by copyright. Instead, plaintiff merely asserts that

the “screen displays” are protected.2 Plaintiff at one point refers to “text, calculators, password protectors,

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3

 Plaintiff, in its response to defendant’s First Set of Interrogatories, does not assert that the methods

of operation in the Encompass program infringe on its copyright. See Lambert Reply Decl., Ex. A at 3-5.

Instead, plaintiff asserts that the Encompass “screen displays” constitute specific instances ofinfringement. Id.

at 3.

4

descriptors, autopopulation, active field highlighting, [and]lock boxes” on the “screens.” Opp’n at 14. Plaintiff

later asserts that the screens are copyrightable because “the text, compilation, and software read by the

computer (automation) are designed to guide the mortgage professional in providing information necessary to

complete the loan origination process.” Opp’n at 16. 

Plaintiff thus creates a moving target by presenting various explanations for what portion of the Point

LOS is protected by copyright. In failing to articulate the scope of copyright protection for Point, plaintiff has

ignored Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994), which stated that: 

Because only those elements of a work that are protectable and used

without the author’s permission can be compared when it comes to the

ultimate question ofillicit copying, we use analytic dissection to determine

the scope of copyright protection before works are considered “as a

whole.”

Plaintiff contends that the analytic dissection requirement does not apply because Apple involved a licensing

agreement between the parties in the litigation, which this case does not. However, courts must make

distinctions between protectable and unprotectable material even in cases that do not involve license

agreements. See Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197, 207-208 (9th Cir. 1989).

Therefore, plaintiff should have described the scope of copyright protection it claims for the Point program in

its opposition to defendant’s motion. Because plaintiff did not, the Court will address this issue on its own.

If plaintiff asserts that features of Point such as calculators, password protectors, lock boxes,

autopopulation, and other methods of operation fall under the protection of copyright, the Court finds that no

such protection exists. Copyright protection does not apply to “any idea, procedure, process, system, method

of operation . . . regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such

work.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). The Copyright Office recognized this when it granted plaintiff a copyright for

“compilations of terms and text” and “screen displays.” The copyright makes no reference to methods of

operation or any of the features listed above.3 The protection of copyright does not apply to ideas and

processes, which fall under patent protection.

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This leaves plaintiff arguable copyright protection only for the “compilations of terms and text” found

on the “screen displays” of the Point software. Plaintiff asserts that Encompass, defendant’s LOS, infringes

on its copyright because severalofthe Encompass screen displays look very similar to Point’sscreen displays.

Plaintiff has provided numerous copies ofthe screen displays in both programs, allowing the Court to compare

the two programs. See Second Alcaraz Decl., Exs. 1-14. 

In reviewing the screen displays fromboth programs, it is apparent that the Encompass screen displays

selected by plaintiff closely resemble comparable Point screen displays. Compare Second AlcarazDecl., Ex.

1-D with Ex. 1-E (containing “Rent vs. Own” screens for both programs). The similarity lies in the structure

of the screen displays and the terms used for the various entries. The similarity is striking, but not exact:

Encompass does not use the same font, text color or background color as Point. Therefore, plaintiff asserts

a copyright claim against defendant on the theory that the structure and terms used in the Encompass LOS

screen displays infringe plaintiff’s copyright in Point.

The Court finds that plaintiff’s copyright claim must fail under Bibbero, which established a strict

interpretation of the “blank forms” doctrine for the Ninth Circuit. In Bibbero, plaintiff designed and marketed

“superbills” thatwere used by doctors to obtain reimbursement frominsurance companies. 893 F.3d at 1105.

The superbill contained boxes for patient information, clauses assigning insurance benefits to the doctor and

authorizing release of patient information, and two “lengthy” checklistsforthe doctor to display the diagnosis,

services performed, and the fee. Id. Plaintiff produced approximately 25 superbills in its catalog for various

specialties. 

Defendant produced a superbill that “was nearly identical to” plaintiff’s superbill. Id. at 1106. After

defendant’s superbill came to plaintiff’sattention, itfiledan application to register itssuperbill with the Copyright

Office, which was granted. Plaintiff also filed suit against defendant for copyright infringement. Id. The court

recognized that the copyright registration was prima facie evidence of copyrightability, but found that the

superbill was an uncopyrightable blank form. Id. The court stated that “[t]he purpose of the Bibbero’s

superbill is to record information. Until the superbill is filled out, it conveys no information about the patient,

the patient’s diagnosis, or the patient’s treatment.” Id. at 1107. 

As in Bibbero, plaintiff is claiming copyright protection for a series of forms created to allow the user

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4Advanz also provides a thorough description ofthe “blank forms” doctrine as interpreted by the Ninth

Circuit. 21 F.Supp.2d at 1186-1190.

5 Bucklew dealt “primarily to the copyright doctrines of merger and scenes a faire,” rather than the

blank forms question. 66 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1824. Additionally, the defendant in Bucklew copied plaintiff’sfont,

which was unavailable to defendant through any means aside from directly copying plaintiff’s, and included

tables from plaintiff’s spreadsheet that contained no functionin the program at issue. Id. at 1822. Neither of

these factors is present in this case.

6

to collect various pieces of information. Until the user inputs information, the form in this case contains no

information about the customer seeking a mortgage. In viewing the screen displays involved in this lawsuit,

each display contains numerous empty boxes designed specifically forthe user to input data. The forms do not

contain any text aside from labels to each of the empty boxes. In this respect, the forms in this case are very

similar to those in Bibbero. 

The Court recognizesthatBibbero has beencriticizedbycommentators and other circuits. See Advanz

BehavioralManagement Resources, Inc. v. Miraflor, 21 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1189 (C.D.Cal. 1998) (describing

criticism of Bibbero).4 However, this Court is bound by Ninth Circuit precedent, including Bibbero. Under

Bibbero, “the blank forms rule denies copyrightability to forms consisting entirely of spaces for the recording

ofinformation, whether labeled or unlabeled, that are not accompanied by text conveying information, such as

instructions regarding the use of forms.” Advanz, 21 F.Supp.2d at 1189. Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie

& Co., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d 1820 (7th Cir. 2003), on which plaintiff relies to support its argument that its screen

displays are copyrightable, is both factually distinguishable from this case and substantially inconsistent with

the analysis and holding in Bibbero.

5

Plaintiff suggests several reasons why the Bibbero doctrine does not apply, but none is persuasive. It

first notes that the forms at issue in this case are found on a computer screen, while the forms in Bibbero were

on paper. This distinction, however, does not appear to the Court to make any difference, and plaintiff does

not supply one. Plaintiff argues that the forms in its program have “text, calculators, password protection,

descriptors, autopopulation, active field highlighting,[and]lock boxes,” unlike Bibbero. However, as discussed

above, plaintiff cannot receive copyright protection for methods of operation. It is the “screen displays” that

plaintiff claims are copyrightable, not the functionality of the program. The structure and appearance of the

displays would be very similar if found on a computer screen or printed on paper. Therefore, this argument

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 Additionally, the court in Bibbero rejected the holding ofNorton Printing Co. v. Augustana Hospital,

155 U.S.P.Q. 133 (N.D.Ill. 1967), which found copyrightable a medical laboratory test form because the

format and arrangement used in the forms conveyed what information is deemed to be important.

7

is not persuasive.

Plaintiff argues that Bibbero does not apply because “the information that is found on each of the

screens guidesthe user to how to successfully complete – in Calyx’s view – that portion of the loan origination

process.” Opp’n at 15, quoting Cooley Decl. at ¶ 85. However, this argument was specifically rejected in

Bibbero: “All forms seek only certain information, and, by their selection, convey that the information sought

is important.” 893 F.2d at 1107.6 Finally, plaintiff argues that the screen displays are original creations

containing an artistic element. However, the court in Bibbero refused to consider the effort and creativity

required to create the forms in question. 893 F.2d at 1108 n. 2. 

The Court finds that the text and structure of plaintiff’s screen displays are not copyrightable under

Bibbero. Plaintiff does not allege that defendant copied its source code in creating Encompass. Plaintiff cannot

claim copyright protection for functions and methods of operation for the Point LOS, because they are

precluded under copyright law. Once these aspects ofplaintiff’s programare stripped away, what remains is

a series of forms used to collect information from a customer seeking a mortgage. The program provides no

relevant information about the customer until the relevant customer informationis input into the programby the

user. This is similar to the superbill in Bibbero, which collected information about medical patients. In

reviewing the screen displays presented by plaintiff, the predominant feature ofthe screens is the blank spaces

designed specifically for the user to input the relevant customer data. Although others may disagree with the

rationale of the “blank forms” rule, Bibbero is binding precedent on this Court. 

Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiff does not have a valid copyright forthe Point screen displays at

issue in this case and GRANTS defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s copyright claim. 

2. Trade dress

Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action is for violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §

1125(a), which provides a cause of action against any person who uses “any symbol or device . . . likely to

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cause confusion . . . as to the origin of his or her goods.” This provision protects words and symbols, as well

as the packaging and design of a product, which is known as “trade dress.” As defined by the Ninth Circuit,

trade dress “refers to the total image of a product and may include features such as size, shape, color, color

combinations, texture or graphics.” International Jensen, Inc. v. Metrosound U.S.A., Inc., 4 F.3d 819, 822

(9th Cir. 1993).

Plaintiff asserts that the screen designs provided in the Second Amended Complaint qualify as

protected trade dress. See Second Amended Complaint, Ex. 1. However, the images provided by plaintiff

in the SAC do not constitute the “totalimage”ofthe product, but rather are only portions ofthe screens viewed

by a user of Point or Encompass. See, e.g., Visnick Decl., Ex. B (showing full image created by Point and

Encompass programs). The exhibits to the SAC omit approximately one-fourth of the actual image on the

screen, which includes the logo and the word “Point” in the top left corner, and the toolbars above and below

the various forms. In addition, the Encompass screens contain two windows to the left of the forms at issue,

which were omitted in the SAC. All of these features, omitted in the SAC, differ greatly between Point and

Encompass.

Plaintiff argues that these portions of the screen image are not part of the “total image” for purposes

of trade dress because they are not the “most important screens.” Cooley Decl. at ¶¶ 109-128. Instead,

plaintiff argues that the images it included in the SAC are “crucial to the processing of a loan and on a useweighted basis are by far the most important screens in any LOS.” Id. However, plaintiff provides neither

authority nor convincing explanation for why these omitted portions of the LOS screens are not part of the

“totalimage” for purposes oftrade dress, since they are all visible during use of the LOS programs. The Court

findsthat everythingpresented by the Encompass and Point programs, when the screens at issue are displayed,

constitutes the “total image” for purposes of trade dress protection.

In order to recover fortrade dress infringement under the Lanham Act, plaintiff must demonstrate that:

1) the design ofthe Point screen displays is non-functional; 2) the design has acquired secondary meaning; and

3) there is a likelihood that the consuming public will confuse Encompass with Point. Disc Golf Association,

Inc. v. ChampionDiscs, Inc., 158 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 1998). Defendant argues that plaintiff has failed

to meet any of these requirements. The Court finds that defendant is entitled to summary judgment because

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plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion as to the source or origin of the products. 

Defendant asserts that once the screen displays are viewed as a whole, without eliminating the material

around the image of the form, Encompass can be easily distinguished from Point. Plaintiffresponds that there

is a strong likelihood of confusion or origin based on the similarity of the images, relying on the declaration of

Scott Cooley, plaintiff’s expert.

The Ninth Circuit has considered the following factors when determining the likelihood of confusion of

origin: 1) similarity of the conflicting designations; 2) relatedness of the two companies’ products; 3) strength

of Calyx’s trade dress; 4) marketing channels used; 5) degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers; 6)

Ellie Mae’s intent in selecting its mark; 7) evidence of actual confusion; and 8) likelihood of expansion in

product lines. Brookfield Communications v. West Coast, 174 F.3d 1036, 1055 (9th Cir. 1999). The

importance of these factors is case-specific. Id. 

It is clear thatCalyx and Ellie Mae sellproductsthatare very similar and use similar marketing channels.

Plaintiff contends that there is likelihood of confusion as to the source of Encompass and Point based on the

declaration ofScottCooley, plaintiff’sexpert. In support, plaintiff specifically cites the following testimony from

Cooley: 

I believe that users wonder why the two products are identical. Most

software applications in any field have a unique look and feel . . . . I

believe this creates confusion in our industry and it has allowed [Ellie Mae]

to take advantage ofCalyx’s years ofinputscreen refinement. By creating

screens that look more like Point, users are far more likely to try using

Encompass because they believe Encompass has the same favorable

qualities that users have come to expect from Point.

Cooley Decl. at ¶ 114.

However, Cooley provides no basis for his “belief” that users wonder why the two products are

identical. There is no citation to any specific facts in support of his assertion, which must be provided to

withstand a motion for summary judgment. See Guidroz-Brault v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 254

F.3d 825, 831 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Plaintiff does not present any evidence of actual confusion through consumer surveys, which could

clearly establish, without relying on speculative expert testimony, that actual confusion as to origin exists.

Plaintiff argues that it has demonstrated actualconfusion through Exhibits 28-30 of the Goldman Declaration.

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 Defendant objects to these documents as hearsay and lacking in foundation.

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 Point’s log in screen also references Calyx. 

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Even if these documents withstand evidentiary objection,7 they do not demonstrate actual confusion as to the

source of the screen displays at issue in this case. Additionally, exhibits 29 and 30 do not involve Encompass.

See Ex. 29 at 1 (“It actually doesn’t have any direct connection to Encompass”); Ex. 30 (discussingEllie Mae’s

ePass product, not Encompass). Therefore, plaintiff has not identified a customer thatwas confused as to the

source of the screen displays at issue in this case.

Finally, plaintiff argues that the Court should find a likelihood of confusion as to source based on the

similarity between the Point and Encompass screen displays at issue. It is clear that the portion of the displays

that contains the various forms is highly similar. However, as discussed above, the Court will not view the

forms in a vacuum. Instead, theymust be viewed as a part of a largerscreen image. This image contains each

program’s name and logo, which are not similar. The display also includes a tool bar at the top ofthe screen.

These tool bars are very different, as Point’s tool bar looks like a standard Windows tool bar, while the

Encompass toolbar consists oflarge tabs on the far left and right ofthe display. Encompass contains two large

windows on the left ofthe display. One window contains a log for various important dates in the loan process.

See Second Alcaraz Decl., Ex. 4-D. The other window contains various forms and other tools. Id. 

Not only do the images of the screen displays at issue contain marked differences, but the user of the

software must first venture through a variety of screens to reach the screen displays that form the basis for

plaintiff’s suit. See Visnick Decl. at 4-13. These necessary steps differ greatly, and clearly identify the

products as “Encompass” and “Point.”8 See Visnick Decl. at 5, 10. Therefore, in order to reach the allegedly

infringing screen displays, the user must first view a series of screen displays that differ greatly between

Encompass and Point and clearly designate their origin.

The Court finds that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion of origin, when the

screen displays are viewed in their entirety. Therefore, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion forsummary

judgment on plaintiff’s Lanham Act claim for failure to demonstrate likelihood of actual confusion, as to the

specific screens at issue in this motion.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS defendant’s motion

for partial summary judgment on plaintiff’s copyright and Lanham Act claims, as to the eight screens at issue

in this motion. [Docket #100.].

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 19, 2005

 SUSAN

ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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