Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01546/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01546-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rules 302 and 303. 

Pending before the Court is the petition, which was filed on 

September 25, 2013.

I. Screening the Petition

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing ' 2254 Cases in the United States 

District Courts (Habeas Rules) requires the Court to make a 

preliminary review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. The 

ANTHONY LAWS,

 Petitioner,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:13-cv-01546-BAM-HC

ORDER TO PETITIONER TO INFORM THE 

COURT RE: EXHAUSTION OF CLAIMS AND 

TO SUBMIT A COPY OF PETITIONS 

PENDING IN THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME 

COURT NO LATER THAN THIRTY (30) 

DAYS AFTER SERVICE OF THIS ORDER

ORDER TO PETITIONER TO WITHDRAW 

UNEXHAUSTED CLAIMS NO LATER THAN 

THIRTY (30) DAYS AFTER SERVICE OF 

THIS ORDER 

FILING DEADLINE: THIRTY (30) DAYS

Case 1:13-cv-01546-SKO Document 5 Filed 10/03/13 Page 1 of 9
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Court must summarily dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly appears 

from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is 

not entitled to relief in the district court....@ Habeas Rule 4; 

O=Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990); see also

Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990). Habeas Rule 

2(c) requires that a petition 1) specify all grounds of relief 

available to the Petitioner; 2) state the facts supporting each 

ground; and 3) state the relief requested. Notice pleading is not 

sufficient; rather, the petition must state facts that point to a 

real possibility of constitutional error. Rule 4, Advisory 

Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption; O=Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d at 420 

(quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.7 (1977)). 

Allegations in a petition that are vague, conclusory, or palpably 

incredible are subject to summary dismissal. Hendricks v. Vasquez, 

908 F.2d at 491.

Further, the Court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus either on its own motion under Habeas Rule 4, pursuant to the 

respondent's motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the petition 

has been filed. Advisory Committee Notes to Habeas Rule 8, 1976 

Adoption; see, Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 

2001).

 A petition for habeas corpus should not be dismissed without 

leave to amend unless it appears that no tenable claim for relief 

can be pleaded were such leave granted. Jarvis v. Nelson, 440 F.2d 

13, 14 (9th Cir. 1971).

II. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to challenge 

collaterally a conviction by a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

Case 1:13-cv-01546-SKO Document 5 Filed 10/03/13 Page 2 of 9
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must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(b)(1). The 

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives 

the state court the initial opportunity to correct the state's 

alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 

722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. 

Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by 

providing the highest state court with the necessary jurisdiction a 

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting 

it to the federal court, and demonstrating that no state remedy 

remains available. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1971); 

Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court 

will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair 

opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the 

highest state court with the claim's factual and legal basis. 

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (legal basis); Kenney v. 

Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992), superceded by statute as

stated in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (factual basis).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the 

state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 

(9th Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Hiivala v. 

Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 

1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). In Duncan, the United States Supreme 

Court reiterated the rule as follows:

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275...(1971),

we said that exhaustion of state remedies requires that

petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the

state courts in order to give the State the

"'opportunity to pass upon and correct= alleged

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violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some

internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are

to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be

alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting

claims under the United States Constitution. If a

habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary

ruling at a state court trial denied him the due

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,

he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state

court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule 

further in Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir. 2000), 

as amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th Cir. 

2001), stating: 

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly

presented" (and thus exhausted) his federal claims

in state court unless he specifically indicated to

that court that those claims were based on federal law.

See, Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir.

2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan,

this court has held that the petitioner must make the

federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing

federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is "self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding,

189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7... (1982), or the underlying

claim would be decided under state law on the same

considerations that would control resolution of the claim

on federal grounds, see, e.g., Hiivala v. Wood, 195 

F.3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon,

88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); Crotts, 73 F.3d 

at 865.

...

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert

the state court to the fact that the relevant claim is a

federal one without regard to how similar the state and

federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how

obvious the violation of federal law is.

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended 

by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th Cir. 2001).

Case 1:13-cv-01546-SKO Document 5 Filed 10/03/13 Page 4 of 9
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Where none of a petitioner=s claims has been presented to the 

highest state court as required by the exhaustion doctrine, the 

Court must dismiss the petition. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 

1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 481 (9th 

Cir. 2001). The authority of a court to hold a mixed petition in 

abeyance pending exhaustion of the unexhausted claims has not been 

extended to petitions that contain no exhausted claims. Raspberry, 

448 F.3d at 1154.

Here, Petitioner alleges that he is serving a three-year 

sentence imposed on December 7, 2010, in Kern County Superior Court 

case number SF015496A for a conviction of second degree robbery, a 

violation of Cal. Pen. Code § 212.5(c), pursuant to his plea of nolo 

contendere. (Pet., doc. 1, 1-2.) Petitioner raises the following 

claims in the petition: 1) Petitioner was denied the effective 

assistance of counsel on appeal in violation of his right to counsel 

under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as his rights to

due process and equal protection under the Federal Constitution and 

his appellate rights under “Anders,” when his appointed appellate 

counsel failed to raise any appealable issues, and specifically 

claims concerning a) trial counsel’s ineffective assistance in 

failing to present confidential medical evidence in connection with 

Petitioner’s effort to withdraw his plea, b) the trial court’s abuse 

of discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the plea, c) the 

involuntary, unintelligent, and unknowing entry of the illegal plea 

based on inadequate advice from trial counsel, d) the petitioner’s 

being under the influence of prescribed psychotropic medications at 

the time of entry of the plea in violation of the plea agreement,

and e) the entry of the plea under a misapprehension of law based on 

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the advice of trial counsel because the perpetrator of the robbery 

was never identified, and Petitioner did not understand that the 

identification should have been challenged and the prosecutor should 

have been required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Petitioner participated in the crime. (Id. at 6-9.) 

With respect to exhaustion of state court remedies, Petitioner 

states that he raised claims and sub-claims (1)(a) through (d) in

the California Supreme Court in case number S210698. (Id. at 8.)

Reference to the official website of the California Courts1 reflects 

that in that proceeding, a petition for writ of habeas corpus was 

denied on September 11, 2013. Thus, it appears that Petitioner had 

exhausted his state court remedies as to claims (1)(a) through (d).

However, with respect to claim or claims (1)(e), Petitioner 

states that he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on these 

claims and the invalidity and illegality of the making of the plea 

in the California Supreme Court in case number S213302, and 

Petitioner admits that the petition is still pending. (Id. at 9.) 

Reference to the official website of the California Courts reflects 

that in that proceeding, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus on September 11, 2013, and there has been no 

disposition of the case.

 

1

 The Court may take judicial notice of facts that are capable of accurate and 

ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned, including undisputed information posted on official websites. Fed. R. 

Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1993); 

Daniels-Hall v. National Education Association, 629 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2010). 

It is appropriate to take judicial notice of the docket sheet of a California 

court. White v Martel, 601 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 

332 (2010). The address of the official website of the California state courts is

http://www.courts.ca.gov/courts.htm.

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Thus, Petitioner has demonstrated that he has failed to exhaust 

state court remedies as to some of his claims. It is not entirely 

clear what claims remain pending in case number S213302 because 

Petitioner has not attached a copy of the petition filed in that 

action. Therefore, the Court cannot be sure what claims remain 

pending. Therefore, Petitioner will be directed to inform the Court 

precisely what claims remain pending before the California Supreme 

Court, and, if possible, to provide this Court with a copy of any 

petition filed in the California Supreme Court that remains pending 

and raises a claim that is also raised before this Court in this 

proceeding.

III. Dismissal of Unexhausted Claims in Mixed Petition

Where some claims in a habeas petition are exhausted and others 

are not (i.e., a “mixed” petition), the Court must dismiss the 

petition without prejudice to give Petitioner an opportunity to 

exhaust the claims if he can do so. Rose, 455 U.S. at 510, 521-22; 

Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Gordon), 107 F.3d 756, 760 

(9th Cir. 1997), en banc, cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 265 (1997); 

Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1273 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. 

denied, 117 S.Ct. 1794 (1997). However, before dismissing the 

petition, the Court must give a petitioner an opportunity to amend a 

mixed petition to delete the unexhausted claims and permit review of 

properly exhausted claims. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 520; Calderon 

v. United States Dist. Ct. (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 

1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 920 (1998); James v. Giles, 221 F.3d 

1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000).

The instant petition is a mixed petition containing exhausted 

and unexhausted claims. The Court must dismiss the petition without 

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prejudice unless Petitioner withdraws the unexhausted claims and 

proceeds with the exhausted claims in lieu of suffering dismissal.

IV. Disposition

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that: 

1) No later than thirty (30) days after the date of service of 

this order, Petitioner shall INFORM the Court what claims remain 

pending before the California Supreme Court and, if possible, shall 

SUBMIT to the Court copy of each petition for writ of habeas corpus 

that Petitioner has filed in the California Supreme Court in which 

any claims raised in the present proceeding are raised and remain 

pending before the California Supreme Court; and

2) Petitioner is GRANTED thirty (30) days after the date of 

service of this order in which to file a motion to withdraw the 

claims as to which state court remedies have not been exhausted; in 

the event that Petitioner does not file such a motion, the Court 

will assume that Petitioner desires to return to state court to 

exhaust the unexhausted claims and will therefore dismiss the entire 

petition without prejudice.2

 

2

 Petitioner is informed that a dismissal for failure to exhaust will not 

itself bar him from returning to federal court after exhausting his available 

state remedies. However, this does not mean that Petitioner will not be subject 

to the one-year statute of limitations imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Although 

the limitations period is tolled while a properly filed request for collateral 

review is pending in state court, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), it is not tolled for the 

time an application is pending in federal court, Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 

172 (2001). 

Petitioner is further informed that the Supreme Court has held in pertinent 

part:

[I]n the habeas corpus context it would be appropriate for an order

 order dismissing a mixed petition to instruct an applicant that upon

 his return to federal court he is to bring only exhausted claims.

 See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 41(a) and (b). Once the petitioner is made

 aware of the exhaustion requirement, no reason exists for him not to

 exhaust all potential claims before returning to federal court. The

 failure to comply with an order of the court is grounds for dismissal

 with prejudice. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 41(b). 

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Petitioner is forewarned that failure to follow this order will 

result in dismissal of the petition pursuant to Local Rule 110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 3, 2013 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 489 (2000).

 Therefore, Petitioner is forewarned that in the event he returns to federal 

court and files a mixed petition of exhausted and unexhausted claims, the petition 

may be dismissed with prejudice.

Case 1:13-cv-01546-SKO Document 5 Filed 10/03/13 Page 9 of 9