Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-04004/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-04004-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAWRENCE CELANO, RICHARD THESING,

and WILLIAM HEFFERON, individually and 

on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs, No. C 05-4004 PJH

v.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR CLASS

CERTIFICATION

MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., a 

Delaware corporation,

Defendant.

___________________________________/

Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification came on for hearing before this court on

February 21, 2007. Plaintiffs, Lawrence Celano, Richard Thesing, and William Hefferon

(“plaintiffs”) appeared through their counsel, Nance F. Becker and Kevin Knestrick. 

Defendant, Marriott International, Inc. (“defendant” or “Marriott”) appeared through its

counsel, Gregory F. Hurley and Gerald L. Maatman. Having read the parties’ papers and

carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause

appearing, the court hereby DENIES plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, for the reasons

stated at the hearing and as follows.

BACKGROUND

This is a proposed class action arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., the California Disabled Persons Act (“CDPA”), Cal.

Civil Code §§ 54 et seq., and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civil Code § 51. 

Plaintiffs allege that defendant’s failure to provide “accessible” or “single-rider” golf carts to

allow disabled persons to play golf at defendant’s courses violates these provisions. 

Plaintiffs seek a declaration that Marriott’s polices are unlawful and an injunction requiring

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defendant to provide single-rider carts at each of its golf facilities. They do not seek

damages.

Accessible golf carts are, according to plaintiffs, an “auxiliary aid” that golf courses

must provide under the ADA, which prohibits “a failure to make reasonable modifications in

policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such . .

. services . . . to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making

such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such . . . services . . . .” 

42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). Plaintiffs allege Marriott’s practices violate California law for

the same reasons. The CDPA provides that “[i]ndividuals with disabilities . . . have the

same right as the general public to the full and free use of . . . public facilities, and other

public places.” Cal. Civ. Code § 54(a). The Unruh Civil Rights Act protects the right of

California residents to “full and equal accommodations . . . in all business establishments of

every kind whatsoever.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b). A violation of Title III of the ADA is a

violation of both California statutes. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51(f), 54(c). 

Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this court on October 4, 2005 and amended

their complaint on October 18, 2006. All three named plaintiffs indicate that they require a

single-rider cart to play golf: Mr. Celano sustained a spinal cord injury while serving in the

United States Army and must use a wheelchair; Mr. Thesing suffers from a mobility

disability due to a driving accident and must use a wheelchair; and Mr. Hefferon has limited

use of the left side of his body due to a stroke. A single-rider cart is a specially designed

golf cart that allows individuals with mobility disabilities to hit the golf ball while sitting in the

cart. Most of these carts contain a swivel seat that rotates, allowing the individual to hit the

golf ball while seated. The carts also contain hand brakes and accelerators to allow

mobility-impaired users to drive them.

Marriott owns and operates hotels and resorts around the country, many of which

include golf courses. Plaintiffs state they have contacted several Marriott-owned golf

resorts expressing an interest in playing at the resort’s golf courses and requesting a

single-rider golf cart. Each plaintiff was told that Marriott does not maintain single-rider

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carts at its courses. Messrs. Celano and Thesing then wrote letters to Marriott complaining

about the lack of single-rider carts. In response, Marriott informed them that it was not

required by current ADA rules to maintain single-rider golf carts. While Marriott informed

plaintiffs that they could bring their own single-rider carts to its courses, plaintiffs claim this

is impractical because: 1) the carts are too difficult to load on and off of a trailer; and 2)

they cannot bring their own carts when traveling out of state.

Defendant contends that there are no existing laws requiring that a golf course

owner provide single-riders cart for disabled golfers, and that the United States Department

of Justice (“DOJ”) is still in the process of considering whether, and under what

circumstances, a golf course must provide such carts. The United States Access Board (a

federal agency devoted to accessibility for the disabled) issued revised accessibility

guidelines under the ADA on July 23, 2004 that address access in golf facilities, but do not

require that golf facilities provide single-rider carts. Defendant therefore contends that it

cannot be liable in the absence of the DOJ’s rulemaking. Plaintiffs concede that DOJ

regulations do not require Marriott to provide single-rider carts. They argue, however, that

Marriott violates the ADA and California law because defendant’s policies: 1) deny them the

opportunity to fully enjoy Marriott’s golfing accommodations; 2) deprive them of auxiliary

aides and services they need to play golf; and 3) constitute an arbitrary refusal to modify

their practices to ensure equal access to plaintiffs and potential class members. 

Plaintiffs now seek certification of a national class and a California subclass

representing individuals with mobility disabilities who require an accessible golf cart to

secure equal access to Marriott owned or operated golf courses. Plaintiffs’ motion for class

certification includes declarations from twenty-one potential class members, essentially

stating they are avid golfers and would play at Marriott courses were single-rider carts

available. 

//

//

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DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

In order for a class action to be certified, plaintiffs must prove that they meet the

requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b). As a threshold to class

certification, plaintiffs must satisfy four prerequisites under Rule 23(a). First, the class must

be so numerous that joinder of all members individually is “impracticable.” See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 23(a)(1). Second, there must be questions of law or fact common to the class. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Third, the claims or defenses of the class representative must be typical

of the claims or defenses of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). And fourth, the person

representing the class must be able to protect fairly and adequately the interests of all

members of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). The parties moving for class certification

bear the burden of establishing that the Rule 23(a) requirements are satisfied. Gen’l Tel.

Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982).

If all four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are satisfied, the court then determines whether

to certify the class under one of the three subsections of Rule 23(b), pursuant to which

named plaintiffs must establish that either 1) there is a risk of substantial prejudice from

separate actions; or 2) declaratory or injunctive relief benefitting the class as a whole would

be appropriate; or 3) common questions of law or fact common to the class predominate

and that a class action is superior to other methods available for adjudicating the

controversy at issue. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 

The court does not make a preliminary inquiry into the merits of plaintiffs’ claims in

determining whether to certify a class. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156,

177 (1974). It will, however, scrutinize plaintiffs’ legal causes of action to determine

whether they are suitable for resolution on a class wide basis. See, e.g., Moore v. Hughes

Helicopters, Inc. 708 F.2d 475, 480 (9th Cir. 1983). In doing so, the court must accept the

substantive allegations contained in plaintiffs’ complaints as true, but will consider matters

beyond the pleadings in order to ascertain whether the asserted claims or defenses are

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susceptible of resolution on a class wide basis. See McCarthy v. Kleindienst, 741 F.2d

1406, 1419 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

B. Plaintiffs’ Motion

1. Numerosity

FRCP 23(a)(1) requires that a class be so numerous that joinder of all members is

impracticable. In order to satisfy this requirement, plaintiffs need not state the “exact”

number of potential class members, nor is there a specific number that is required. See In

re Rubber Chems. Antitrust Litig., 232 F.R.D. 346, 350-51 (N.D. Cal. 2005). The

numerosity requirement ensures that the class action device is used only where it would be

inequitable and impracticable to require every member of the class to be joined individually. 

Schwarzer, Tashima & Wagstaffe, Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial (2006) § 10:258. 

However, “impracticable” does not mean “impossible.” Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931,

935 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Beer Distrib. Antitrust Litig., 188 F.R.D. 557, 561 (N.D. Cal. 1999).

Plaintiffs argue that the proposed class meets this requirement because there are

thousands of mobility-impaired individuals who enjoy playing seated golf. Plaintiffs submit

21 declarations from individuals who are mobility-impaired golfers (including the three

named plaintiffs) that state they would play at defendant’s golf courses if accessible carts

were available there. Essentially, these declarants would play, would like to play, or would

try to play at a Marriott golf course if accessible carts were available. See Baker Decl. ¶¶

13-15; Caywood Decl. ¶ 6; Celano Decl. ¶ 12; Christensen Decl. ¶ 8; Ebel Decl. ¶ 14; Flood

Decl. ¶ 8; Gerard Decl. ¶ 6; Gilmer Decl. ¶ 12; Halcomb Decl. ¶ 6; Hefferon Decl. ¶ 11; Hejl

Decl. ¶ 10; Hughes Decl. ¶ 7; McDonald Decl. ¶ 10; Moran Decl. ¶ 8; Nicholas Decl. ¶ 8;

Owen Decl. ¶ 9; Pagano Decl. ¶ 8; Schmonsees Decl. ¶ 9; Thesing Decl. ¶ ¶ 25, 27, 30;

Vincent Decl. ¶ 12, Yaksic Decl. ¶ 12. The declarants do not state that they would play

regularly at Marriott’s courses; rather, they indicate they would play Marriott’s courses in

addition to other courses, often when traveling to certain locations, such as Arizona or Palm

Springs. See id. 

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Plaintiffs also argue that potential class membership is much broader than the 21

declarants, citing census statistics and association data as support, including: 1) recent

census statistics showing that 25 million individuals have ambulatory disabilities, 2.7 of

those disabled individuals use a wheelchair, and 51.2 million people have disabilities

affecting their ability to perform a major activity; 2) Paralyzed Veterans Association (an

organization with over 20,000 members) statistics showing that 21% of its members are

interested in golf and 6% participate in golf; 3) Mobility Impaired Golf Association’s

estimation that two million people would be “ready to enter the game of golf if conditions

were more amenable”; and 4) National Golf Foundation’s statistic that 28 million people

(13.4% of adults) play golf. See Thesing Decl. ¶ 38, 39; Krieger Decl. ¶¶ 4, 9; Martin Decl.

¶ 3. Applying the percentage of adults who play golf to the number of adults who need

assistive devices to walk, plaintiffs conclude that there are 1.5 million disabled golfers. See

Thesing Decl. ¶ 39. Given the number of Marriott’s courses and the geographical diversity

of disabled golfers, plaintiffs contend that the proposed national class satisfies the

numerosity requirement. 

Defendant counters that a class of 21 members is, on its face, insufficient to certify a

class. Plaintiffs have not established how many mobility-impaired golfers actually

attempted to access one of Marriott’s courses and could not do so because of the lack of

accessible golf carts. The census figures and raw population data are overbroad and

insufficient to establish numerosity, according to defendant. Beyond this speculative data,

plaintiffs can only point to a handful of individuals who would be class members. 

The ultimate issue in evaluating this factor is whether the class is too large to make

joinder practicable, but courts generally find that the numerosity factor is satisfied if the

class comprises 40 or more members and will find that it has not been satisfied when the

class comprises 21 or fewer. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d

473, 483 (2d Cir. 1995); Ansari v. New York Univ., 179 F.R.D. 112, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 

While the potential class is likely geographically diverse because Marriott has courses

throughout the United States, and the class is not readily identifiable, plaintiffs have

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submitted declarations of only 21 individuals in support of numerosity. Assuming these

declarations establish that these individuals attempted to play at the Marriott and could not,

or wanted to play there but were deterred by the absence of single-rider carts, these facts

are still limited to these 21 individuals. This is insufficient for class certification, as it would

not be impracticable to join these individuals in suit.

Plaintiffs’ census data and statistics are too ambiguous and speculative to establish

numerosity. Plaintiffs first ask the court to infer from them that many mobility impaired

individuals who do not currently play golf, would like to. Then they ask the court to infer

that many of the mobility impaired individuals who would like to play golf would play at the

Marriott if carts were available, without providing any information about why this inference

should be made given that Marriott represents very the high-end of golf courses when

compared to public courses. More significantly, plaintiffs’ data provides no insight into how

many disabled people who would like to play golf, at Marriott courses, are deterred from

doing so because of the absence of single-rider carts. See Pickern v. Holiday Quality

Foods, Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 2002) (“once a plaintiff has actually become

aware of discriminatory conditions existing at a public accommodation, and is thereby

deterred from visiting or patronizing that accommodation, the plaintiff has suffered an

injury”).

 For example, while the Mobility Impaired Golf Association estimates that two million

people would play golf if “conditions were amenable,” the statistics fail to specify what

conditions would have to be changed to afford the accommodation needed by two million

disabled golfers with a wide range of disabilities. This statistic does not answer the

question whether a single-rider cart is needed by each of these two million would-be golfers

or whether such a cart would enable them to play. Plaintiffs’ own evidence indicates that

provision of single-rider carts would still not enable many mobility impaired individuals to

play golf, because they require “increased accessibility, independence, education, and

reduction of social-acceptance barriers” in order to play. See Martin Decl. ¶ 3. With no

information about the nature of these individuals’ impairments and whether the lack of

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single-rider carts is the only or main impediment to playing golf, the court has no means of

determining how many disabled players would golf at the Marriott were single-rider carts

provided. 

As previously noted, plaintiffs must show that they and potential class members both

would play at Marriott courses and were deterred from doing so because of the absence of

single-rider carts. The statistical and census information, unlike the proffered declarations,

at most shows that some disabled golfers would play golf if some accommodation were

made. It does not show, however, 1) whether they were deterred from playing golf, 2)

whether they were deterred from playing golf at Marriott specifically, or 3) whether they

were deterred from playing golf at the Marriott by the absence of single-rider carts as

opposed to some other accommodation not at issue here. 

Plaintiffs rely on Arnold v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 439, 448

(N.D. Cal. 1994) for the proposition that they may rely on census data here. In Arnold,

disabled persons who used wheelchairs or were semi-ambulatory brought suit under the

ADA and CDPA, alleging that United Artists movie theaters did not provide equal access to

disabled persons. See 158 F.R.D. at 443. The class was defined as disabled persons

denied adequate access to United Artist’s movie theater in Emeryville, California. Id. at

444. The court found that the numerosity requirement was satisfied based on data

indicating that: 1) there are 875,000 wheelchair and semi-ambulatory persons in California;

and 2) movies are an important form of recreation, especially for disabled persons who live

independently. Id. at 448. The present case is distinguishable for a number of reasons. 

First, data that movies are currently a form of recreation for disabled individuals is far less

speculative than the data here, which shows that disabled individuals would play golf if

accessibility, independence, education, and social-acceptance barriers were reduced. 

Second, movie-going is a more affordable and widespread activity than golf, and movie

theaters vary far less in terms of price and quality than do golf courses, and they are more

numerous and readily available than golf courses. 

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The court does not expect or require that plaintiffs show the number of potential

class members with certainty. But the court does expect that any common sense

inferences that plaintiffs urge the court to make, be based upon something other than rank

speculation untethered to real facts. Plaintiffs and their attorneys are active in disability

rights organizations like the Mobility Impaired Golf Association and the Paralyzed Veterans

Association. Yet there is no indication that the disabled membership of any of the

organizations referenced in plaintiffs’ papers have been polled on their interest and/or

attempts to play at Marriott courses. Absent that kind of information, plaintiffs fail to link

their population data to the alleged violation and injury at issue here. See, e.g., Green v.

Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp.,1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 292, *11-13 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15,

1998) (fact that four thousand single adult men and women reside in shelters on any given

day, along with some reports of assault and misconduct at shelters, does not establish

numerosity); Jeffries v. Pension Trust Fund, 172 F. Supp. 2d 389, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)

(while plaintiff alleged that a large number of union’s members were unemployed, it failed

to proffer evidence of how many laid-off members suffered the alleged injury; noting that

while the court may make “common sense assumptions to support a finding of numerosity,"

it may not “do so on the basis of pure speculation without any factual support”) (citations

omitted).

In view of the above, the court finds that plaintiffs have not satisfied the numerosity

requirement of FRCP 23(a)(1).

2. Commonality

The second requirement under Rule 23(a) is that there must be questions of law or

fact common to the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). The fact that there is some factual

variation among the class grievances will not defeat a class action – a common nucleus of

operative facts is usually enough to satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2). 

Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1017-18 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1051

(1993). This factor can be met by raising a single common issue that is central to the case. 

See Staton v. Boeing, 327 F.3d 938, 954-56 (9th Cir. 2003).

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Plaintiff argues that the key questions for decision – whether golf courses open to

the public must provide single-rider golf carts for their mobility-impaired players, and

whether Marriott is liable as an operator and owner of golf courses – are common to and

determinative of all class members’ claims. The court agrees. These are common

questions that all plaintiffs must address. The question of whether the ADA requires

Marriott to provide single-rider golf carts encompasses numerous legal questions common

to the class (such as whether Marriott is liable as an operator under the ADA and whether

providing accessible carts is a reasonable modification under the ADA), as well as factual

questions common to the class (such as whether providing single-rider carts would impose

an undue burden or cause damage to defendant’s golf courses). 

Plaintiffs’ failure to agree on the exact model or brand of cart required, the number of

carts required, and other remedial factors does not defeat commonality, as defendant

argues, because plaintiff has raised a common issue central to the case – the alleged

existence of the common discriminatory practice. See Staton, 327 F.3d at 954-56; Hanlon

v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998) (commonality can be satisfied either

by shared legal issue with divergent factual predicates or by common core of facts with

disparate legal remedies).

Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiffs have satisfied the commonality requirement

of FRCP 23(a)(2). 

3. Typicality

The third requirement under Rule 23(a) is that the claims or defenses of the class

representatives must be typical of the claims or defenses of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P.

23(a)(3). This does not require that claims of the representative party be identical to the

claims of class members. Schwarzer, Tashima & Wagstaffe, Federal Civil Procedure

Before Trial (2006) § 10:289. Rather, typicality focuses on the similarity between the

named plaintiffs’ legal and remedial theories and the legal and remedial theories of those

whom they purport to represent. Lightbourn v. County of El Paso, 118 F.3d 421, 426 (5th

Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1052 (1998). In practice, the commonality and typicality

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requirements of Rule 23 “tend to merge.” Gen’l Tel. Co. Of Southwest, 457 U.S. at 158

n.13.

Each named plaintiff claims he attempted to play at Marriott golf courses, but was

deterred from doing so because of Marriott’s policy of not providing single-rider golf carts. 

Proposed class members’ claims are based on the same legal theory. Defendant argues

that plaintiffs’ claims are not typical, because Mr. Hefferon is a country club member who

mostly plays at his country club course and has not played at the Marriott. However, Mr.

Hefferon stated that he has contacted Marriott courses, attempted to set up a tee time, but

was told they could not provide him with an accessible cart. See Hefferon Decl. ¶ 11. 

Because he tried to play at a Marriott course and was deterred from doing so, he has

standing to sue and makes the same claim that potential class members would have. See

Pickern, 293 F.3d at 1136-37 (plaintiff has suffered an injury under the ADA once plaintiff

has become aware of discriminatory conditions and is deterred from visiting that

accommodation). Named plaintiffs and proposed plaintiffs also request the same relief: 

declaratory and injunctive relief. Accordingly, the court finds the typicality requirement of

FRCP 23(a)(3) is satisfied. 

4. Adequacy

The fourth requirement under Rule 23(a) is adequacy of representation. The court

must find that named plaintiffs’ counsel is adequate, and that named plaintiffs can fairly and

adequately protect the interests of the class. Legal adequacy is determined by resolution

of two questions: 1) whether named plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts with

class members; and 2) whether named plaintiffs and their counsel will prosecute the action

vigorously on behalf of the class. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020. Generally, representation will

be found to be adequate when the attorneys representing the class are qualified and

competent, and the class representatives are not disqualified by interests antagonistic to

the remainder of the class. Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, 582 F.2d 507, 512 (9th Cir.

1978).

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Here, both requirements are met. There are no discernible conflicts of interest

between the named plaintiffs and the absent class members. Named plaintiffs allege that

all members of the proposed class would play at Marriott golf courses, but are deterred

from doing so because of Marriott’s policy of not providing single-rider golf carts; all suffer

similar injury as a consequence of the violation; and all seek the same general relief. 

While, as defendant argues, the named plaintiffs do not agree on the number of special

carts Marriott should be required to have or the brand of carts, they are familiar with the

basic elements of the case. They also seek the same basic remedy – that Marriott carry

some type of golf cart to accommodate disabled individuals who must sit in the cart while

golfing. Their interests are not antagonistic to the remainder of the class. See Lerwill, 582

F.2d at 512. 

Nor does defendant’s claim that plaintiffs are not proper representatives because

they do not seek money damages defeat a finding of adequacy. Plaintiffs’ decision not to

seek money damages is only relevant to the California subclass, as monetary damages are

not recoverable under Title III of the ADA. But even with regards to this subclass,

defendant has not demonstrated that monetary damages would likely be awarded in a case

like the present case. Nor would a judgment in this case bar others from pursuing

damages, as plaintiffs have never raised any damages issues. See Hiser v. Franklin, 94

F.3d 1287, 1291 (9th Cir. 1996) (“the general rule is that a class action suit seeking only

declaratory and injunctive relief does not bar subsequent individual damage claims by class

members, even if based on the same events”).

As for the second requirement, the evidence and history of the instant litigation

demonstrate that plaintiffs have retained skilled and experienced counsel to represent them

in their proceedings against defendant. Whether plaintiffs are wealthy enough to finance

the litigation is irrelevant. See, e.g., Moeller v. Taco Bell Corp., 220 F.R.D. 604, 612 (N.D.

Cal. 2004) (“to deny a class whenever plaintiff’s counsel advances significant funds to

plaintiffs of little or modest means would be to defeat the very purposes which class actions

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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were designed to achieve”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the court finds that the

adequacy requirement of FRCP 23(a)(4) is satisfied. 

However, having found that class certification must be denied on the basis of

plaintiffs’ failure to establish numerosity, the court does not reach the question whether the

requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) are met.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court hereby DENIES plaintiffs’ motion for class

certification.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 18, 2007 ______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

Case 4:05-cv-04004-PJH Document 162 Filed 04/18/07 Page 13 of 13