Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-05151/USCOURTS-caDC-05-05151-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 8, 2006 Decided July 11, 2006

No. 05-5151

WILLIAM A. DAVY, JR.,

APPELLANT

v.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv02134)

Daniel S. Alcorn argued the cause for the appellant. James

H. Lesar was on brief.

Charlotte A. Abel, Assistant United States Attorney, argued

the cause for the appellee. Kenneth L. Wainstein, United States

Attorney, and Michael J. Ryan, Assistant United States

Attorney, were on brief. R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant United

States Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: HENDERSON, ROGERS and GRIFFITH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

USCA Case #05-5151 Document #979542 Filed: 07/11/2006 Page 1 of 10
2

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: The

appellant, William Davy, Jr., filed a Freedom of Information Act

(FOIA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 552 et seq., request with the Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA or Agency), seeking certain

documents related to the Agency’s alleged role in the

assassination of President John F. Kennedy. After the CIA

failed to provide the requested documents, Davy instituted this

action against it. Thereafter, Davy and the CIA entered into a

Joint Stipulation, which established dates by which the CIA

would produce responsive documents. The district court

memorialized the stipulation in an order, which made the

deadlines judicially enforceable. The CIA complied with the

order and handed over documents to Davy. It then sought

summary judgment, which the district court granted. Davy

subsequently moved for attorney fees. The district court denied

Davy’s motion in a minute order. He appeals. We reverse the

district court’s minute order, concluding that Davy

“substantially prevailed” in this action. Because Davy is eligible

for fees, we remand to the district court to determine whether he

is entitled to fees under FOIA. 

I.

Davy, an author interested in the CIA’s alleged involvement

in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, submitted a

FOIA request to the CIA on December 13, 1993, seeking “all

records . . . pertaining to and/or captioned: Project

QKENCHANT and Project ZRCLIFF.” Letter from William A.

Davy, Jr., to FOIA/PA Unit, Central Intelligence Agency (Dec.

13, 1993), reprinted at Joint Appendix (JA) 18. Nearly six years

after Davy made his initial request—on November 22,

1999—the CIA informed him that it could “neither confirm nor

deny the existence or nonexistence of such records,” citing

FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3. Letter from Kathryn I. Dyer, Acting

Information and Privacy Coordinator, Central Intelligence

Agency, to William A. Davy, Jr. (Nov. 22, 1999), JA 23–24.

USCA Case #05-5151 Document #979542 Filed: 07/11/2006 Page 2 of 10
3

Davy appealed the denial of his request through the CIA’s

administrative appeals process. The CIA denied the appeal in a

letter dated June 20, 2000. 

Davy then sued the CIA, seeking the documents he

requested in his 1993 letter. Because the CIA claimed that the

suit was time-barred, Davy filed another FOIA request with the

CIA on November 16, 2000, in which he renewed his 1993

request and sought the production of additional information.

The CIA then moved to dismiss the suit. The district court

granted the motion but allowed Davy 90 days to amend his

complaint. Davy then sought leave to file his first amended

complaint, which the district court granted. The first amended

complaint sought the production of documents requested in the

2000 FOIA request. Thereafter, Davy and the CIA reached a

Joint Stipulation for the production of responsive documents.

The district court approved the Joint Stipulation and

memorialized it in a court order dated May 4, 2001. The order

provides that the “CIA will provide Plaintiff all responsive

documents, if any,” based on his 1993 and 2000 FOIA requests,

by certain dates. Davy v. CIA, No. 00-cv-2134 (D.D.C. filed

May 17, 2001). The CIA complied with the order.

The CIA then moved for summary judgment, arguing that

the scope of its search was sufficient. Davy responded by filing

a cross-motion for summary judgment, contending that the CIA

improperly restricted the scope of its search and failed to turn

over all responsive documents. Because Davy’s cross-motion

raised issues not addressed in the CIA’s motion, the CIA filed

a superseding motion for summary judgment. Davy did not

respond to the superseding motion for summary judgment and

the district court accordingly considered Davy’s cross-motion as

his response to the Agency’s superseding motion. The court

granted summary judgment to the CIA, deciding that the scope

of its search was reasonable and that the FOIA exemptions it

asserted were valid. See Davy v. CIA, No. 00-cv-2134 (D.D.C.

USCA Case #05-5151 Document #979542 Filed: 07/11/2006 Page 3 of 10
4

filed July 12, 2004). Davy then moved for attorney fees under

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E). The CIA opposed the motion, arguing

only that Davy was not eligible for fees because he was not a

prevailing party within the meaning of the United States

Supreme Court’s decision in Buckhannon Board and Care

Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human

Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001). See Mem. & P. & A. in Opp’n

to Pl.’s Mot. for Att’y’s Fees (Sept. 8, 2004). The district court

denied Davy’s motion in a minute order. 

II.

Davy appeals from the denial of his motion for attorney

fees. We review whether he was eligible for attorney fees—that

is, whether he “substantially prevailed”—de novo because it

rests on “ ‘an interpretation of the statutory terms that define

eligibility for an award.’ ” Edmonds v. FBI, 417 F.3d 1319,

1322 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of

Labor, 159 F.3d 597, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). 

FOIA permits a court to award reasonable attorney fees to

a plaintiff who has “substantially prevailed” in a FOIA action.

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E). In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court

interpreted the term “prevailing party” in the fee-shifting

provisions of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42

U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq., and the Americans With Disabilities Act

of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. Buckhannon rejected the

catalyst theory under which several circuit courts, including

ours, see, e.g., Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Dep’t of Agric.,

11 F.3d 211, 216 (D.C. Cir. 1993), had held that “a plaintiff is

a ‘prevailing party’ if it achieves the desired result because the

lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant’s

conduct,” Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601–02. Instead, the Court

held, a plaintiff is a prevailing party only if he has “received a

judgment on the merits” or secured a settlement agreement

enforced by a consent decree. Id. at 605. Thus, a defendant’s

“voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing

USCA Case #05-5151 Document #979542 Filed: 07/11/2006 Page 4 of 10
5

what the plaintiffs sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the

necessary judicial imprimatur on the change.” Id. (emphasis in

original).

We first considered whether the Buckhannon holding

applies to the FOIA fee-shifting provision in Oil, Chemical &

Atomic Workers International Union v. Department of Energy

(OCAW), 288 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Finding that the

“ ‘substantially prevail’ language in FOIA [is] the functional

equivalent of the ‘prevailing party’ language found in” the

statutes Buckhannon interpreted, we applied the Buckhannon

interpretation of “prevailing party” to FOIA’s attorney fee

provision, holding that “in order for plaintiffs in FOIA actions

to become eligible for an award of attorney fees, they must have

‘been awarded some relief by [a] court,’ either in a judgment on

the merits or in a court-ordered consent decree.” OCAW, 288

F.3d 455–57 (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603); see Union

of Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Employees v. INS, 336 F.3d

200, 206 (2d Cir. 2003) (same). 

In OCAW, the OCAW sued the United States Department

of Energy to obtain documents it alleged were improperly

withheld under FOIA. 288 F.3d at 453. The district court

ordered the agency to “complete its record review in 60 days.”

Id. at 458. After completing the search, the agency provided the

plaintiff with the responsive documents and the parties agreed

to dismiss the suit. Id. at 453. The plaintiff then sought attorney

fees, arguing that it had “substantially prevailed.” Id. at 453–54.

We held that the order requiring the agency to search the records

did not constitute court-ordered relief on the merits. Id. at

458–59. We highlighted the order’s interim nature, which was

procedural—conduct a search—as opposed to substantive—

produce documents. Id. at 458. We stated, “Before August 23,

the court had not ordered the Energy Department to turn over

any documents; after August 23, the Energy department still had

no obligation to do so.” Id. Accordingly, OCAW did not obtain

USCA Case #05-5151 Document #979542 Filed: 07/11/2006 Page 5 of 10
6

relief on the merits because it sought documents, not merely a

search therefor. Id. at 458–59. 

In Edmonds, supra, we considered the meaning of FOIA’s

“substantially prevailed” language. Edmonds sued the Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) seeking expedited processing of

her FOIA request as well as documents. Edmonds, 417 F.3d at

1320–21. The plaintiff sought and obtained partial summary

judgment on her expedited processing claim. The district court

ordered the FBI “to complete the expedited processing . . . and

provide plaintiff with all documents as to which no exemption

is being claimed” by a certain date. Id. at 1321 (emphasis

added). After complying with the order, the FBI sought

summary judgment, which motion the district court granted. Id.

Thereafter, Edmonds sought attorney fees and the district court

denied her motion. Id. We reversed, holding that she had

“substantially prevailed.” We differentiated OCAW on the

ground that Edmonds had obtained a court-order on the precise

relief she sought—expedited processing and the production of

responsive documents. Id. at 1323. 

Similarly, Davy “substantially prevailed” in this action

when the district court issued the May 4, 2001 order. First, the

order changed the “legal relationship between [the plaintiff] and

the defendant,” Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 (alteration in

original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and,

second, Davy was awarded some relief on the merits of his

claim. With respect to these factors, we see little difference

between Edmonds and Davy. The CIA characterizes the order

as requiring nothing more than a search for documents—and

thereby analogizes the case to OCAW—but the order’s wording

belies the Agency’s interpretation. The order provides Davy

with the precise relief his complaint sought—“mak[ing] the

requested information promptly available.” 1st Am. Compl. at

17, JA 12. It states that the CIA “will provide Plaintiff” with the

responsive documents “if any” by April 30, 2001, May 31, 2001,

USCA Case #05-5151 Document #979542 Filed: 07/11/2006 Page 6 of 10
7

or July 31, 2001, depending on the documents’ subject matter.

It is almost indistinguishable from the Edmonds order, which

required the FBI to “provide plaintiff with all documents as to

which no exemption is being claimed.” Edmonds, 417 F.3d at

1321. Here, before May 4, 2001, the CIA was not under any

judicial direction to produce documents by specific dates; the

May 4, 2001 order changed that by requiring the Agency to

produce all “responsive documents” by the specified dates. Like

the Edmonds order, the May 4, 2001 order was a “judicially

sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties”

because “timely production of nonexempt documents by the

[CIA] could no longer be described as a voluntary change in the

defendant’s conduct.” Id. at 1322–23 (internal quotations and

citations omitted). Once the district court issued the order, Davy

obtained an “enforceable judgment” on the merits of his

complaint. If the Agency failed to comply with the order, it

faced the sanction of contempt. See Edmonds, 417 F.3d at 1323.

We also reject the Agency’s argument that the May 4, 2001

order lacks the requisite “judicial imprimatur.” Buckhannon

tells us that “[i]n addition to judgments on the merits, . . .

settlement agreements enforced through a consent decree may

serve as the basis for an award of attorney’s fees.” 532 U.S. at

604. This is so even if the consent decree does not include an

admission of liability by the defendant because it is nonetheless

a “court-ordered ‘chang[e][in] the legal relationship between

[the plaintiff] and the defendant.’ ” Id. (quoting Tex. State

Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792

(1989)) (alterations in Buckhannon). That the order is styled

“order” as opposed to “consent decree” is of no consequence.

We are persuaded by the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Smyth ex

rel. Smyth v. Rivero, in which the court stated:

We doubt that the Supreme Court’s guidance in

Buckhannon was intended to be interpreted so

restrictively as to require that the words “consent

USCA Case #05-5151 Document #979542 Filed: 07/11/2006 Page 7 of 10
8

decree” be used explicitly. Where a settlement

agreement is embodied in a court order such that the

obligation to comply with its terms is court-ordered,

the court’s approval and the attendant judicial oversight (in the form of continuing jurisdiction to enforce

the agreement) may be equally apparent. We will

assume, then, that an order containing an agreement

reached by the parties may be functionally a consent

decree for purposes of the inquiry to which

Buckhannon directs us, even if not entitled as such.

282 F.3d 268, 281 (4th Cir. 2002). The order here is

functionally a settlement agreement enforced through a consent

decree. On its face, it (1) contains mandatory language (e.g., it

is “ORDERED nunc pro tunc that No later than April 30, 2001,

the CIA will . . .”); (2) is entitled an “ORDER”; and (3) bears

the district judge’s signature, not those of the parties’ counsel.

See Truesdell v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 290 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir.

2002). 

Because Davy “substantially prevailed” in his FOIA action,

he is eligible to attorney fees under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E).

That is not the end of the matter, however, because the court

must then consider whether he is “entitled” to attorney fees. See

Edmonds, 417 F.3d at 327. In determining whether a

“prevailing” FOIA plaintiff is entitled to fees, the district court

assesses four factors: “(1) the public benefit derived from the

case; (2) the commercial benefit to the plaintiff; (3) the nature

of the plaintiff's interest in the records; and (4) the

reasonableness of the agency’s withholding.” Tax Analysts v.

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 965 F.2d 1092, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

We review the district court’s determination for abuse of

discretion. Id. at 1094. Meaningful review requires us to

evaluate the district court’s rationale for its holding. See

Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 901 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1980)

(en banc) (“It is axiomatic that we cannot identify an

USCA Case #05-5151 Document #979542 Filed: 07/11/2006 Page 8 of 10
9

1

Davy also requested that we “remand the case to the District

Court so that the District Court can determine the amount by

which these fees should be increased in light of the additional

fees incurred on appeal.” Appellant’s Br. at 23. Because he did

not raise the question before us, we do not decide his entitlement

to attorney fees incurred on appeal. Accordingly, on remand he

may raise the issue before the district court for its consideration.

unreasonable award unless it is accompanied by a statement of

reasons.”). Here, the district court did not provide any

explanation and we are therefore unable to review its decision.

The parties urge us to decide whether Davy is entitled to

attorney fees.1 Mindful, however, that an “appellate court is not

well situated to assess the course of litigation and the quality of

counsel,” Williams v. First Gov’t Mortgage & Investors Corp.,

225 F.3d 738, 747 (D.C. Cir. 2000), we decline to do so. The

district court is better suited to make the initial determination.

See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983) (appellate

review of fee determination is to ensure district court“provide[d]

a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award”).

The district court, unlike the appellate court, “closely monitors

the litigation on a day-to-day basis,” Morgan v. District of

Columbia, 824 F.2d 1049, 1065–66 (D.C. Cir. 1987), by

“presid[ing] at numerous motions, discovery disputes, and

chambers conferences, as well as at the pretrial conference and

trial,” id. at 1066 (alteration in original) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted); see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. If the

district court fails to articulate the basis for its attorney fee

decision, we believe remand for adequate explanation of its

reasoning is in order. See Copeland, 641 F.2d at 901 n.39 (“[A]

remand may be necessary where the District Court awards a fee

without adequately articulating underlying reasons.”). 

USCA Case #05-5151 Document #979542 Filed: 07/11/2006 Page 9 of 10
10

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court

order and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

USCA Case #05-5151 Document #979542 Filed: 07/11/2006 Page 10 of 10