Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02261/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02261-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KYLE AVERY, 

CDCR #E-67897,

Civil No. 13cv2261 BTM (DHB)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

1) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AS TO PLAINTIFF’S

RETALIATION CLAIMS BASED

ON HIS FAILURE TO EXHAUST 

PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P. 56

AND 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)

(ECF No. 32)

AND

2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

UNIDENTIFIED AND UNSERVED

DOE DEFENDANTS PURSUANT 

TO FED.R.CIV.P. 4(m) 

 vs.

D. PARAMO; FRANK RUFFINO;

JEFFREY BEARD; J. LOZANO;

KATHLEEN L. DICKINSON; TERRI

McDONALD; KATHLEEN ALLISON;

M.D. STAINER; T.L. GONZALEZ;

ALBERT CHAMBERLIN; ALAN

KHAN; F. HADJADJ; G. BRADFORD;

K. POOL; RUTLEDGE; GARAY;

JONES; CARTER; HODGE;

ALLAMBY; BENYARD; and JOHN

DOES 1-10, CSP-RJDCF’s Religious

Review Committee,

Defendants.

Introduction

I.

Kyle Avery (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan

Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, is proceeding pro se, in this 

civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

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Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against a host of California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and RJD officials, based on allegations that

they have violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free exercise of

religion, equal protection, and to be free of retaliation. See Compl. at 42-54, 56-58,

59-64. Plaintiff further seeks injunctive relief under the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). See Compl. at 27, 55, 66-69. Specifically,

Plaintiff contends Defendants have denied him various religious accommodations,

including a fence-line, fresh herbs, and running water for use in and around

ceremonial cites, as well as a diet sufficient to permit fasting rituals, which he argues

are provided to inmates of other faiths. Id. at 28-41. Plaintiff further claims

Defendants have retaliated against him for his advocacy and use of the administrative

grievance process to protect his rights. Id. at 48-50, 59-64.

II. Procedural Background

On June 3, 2014, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1915(a), granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss

Defendant Khan, and directed the U.S. Marshal to effect service upon the remaining

Defendants. See June 3, 2014 Order (ECF No. 9). On June 16, 2014, Plaintiff filed an

additional Notice of Voluntary Dismissal as to Defendants Garay, Jones, and Hodge

pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 41(a)(1) (ECF No. 12).

On September 3, 2014, the remaining Defendants Allamby, Allison, Beard,

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Benyard, Bradford, Carter, Chamberlin, Dickinson, Gonzalez, Hadjadj, Lozano, Pool,

McDonald, Paramo, Ruffino, Rutledge, and Stainer filed a pre-Answer Motion for

Summary Judgment pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 56 based on Plaintiff’s alleged failure

 While Plaintiff’s Complaint also “includes space to supplement” ten 1

members of RJD’s Religious Review Committee (“RRC”) as John Doe Defendants,

see Compl. at 15, he has failed to identify those Does and has failed to execute

service upon them within the 120 days provided by FED.R.CIV.P. 4(m). Because the

Court gave notice to Plaintiff of his obligations in this regard in its June 13, 2014

Order, see ECF No. 9 at 7 n.3, and he has since failed to show good cause for his

failure to timely identify and serve these purported parties, they may be dismissed sua

sponte pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(m). See Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 975-

76 (9th Cir. 2013).

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to exhaust administrative remedies as his retaliation claims (ECF No. 32). Both the

2

Court and Defendants provided Plaintiff with notice of Defendants’ Motion and

advised him of his obligation to submit evidence in response pursuant to Rand v.

Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) and Marella v. Terhune,

568 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir. 2009) (ECF Nos. 32-2, 33). Plaintiff thereafter filed his

Motion in Objection (hereafter “Pl.’s Opp’n”) (ECF No. 34), to which Defendants

have filed their Reply (ECF No. 35).

Having carefully reviewed these submissions, including all evidence offered in

both support and in opposition to Defendants’ Motion, and having determined that no

oral argument is necessary pursuant to S.D. CAL. CIVLR 7.1.d.1, the Court hereby

GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P 56 as

to Plaintiff’s retaliation claims (ECF No. 32) for the reasons set out below.

III. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff alleges he is Pagan-Wiccan, and holds a “sincere religious belief” in

the “earth-based” religious practices of the Wiccan & Asatru faiths, including

“ceremonial magick.” See Compl., ECF No. 1, at 11,17, 20, 25, 26, 35, 36, 38-42. 

He divides his Complaint into five separate claims. 

First, Plaintiff claims Defendants Paramo, Ruffino, Lozano, Bradford, Hadjadj,

Beard, Pool, Dickinson, McDonald, Allison, Stainer, Gonzalez, and Chamberlin have

denied his First Amendment right to free exercise of his religion by refusing to

accommodate requests, made on behalf of himself, and other members of the

Pagan/Wiccan/Asatru population on RJD’s Facility C, for a fence perimeter, fire pit,

water line, and herb cultivation, which Plaintiff contends are required and “imperative

to honor the religious ceremonies and rituals” of their faith. Id. at 17-22, 28-32, 42-

44, (“Claim One”). 

 Defendants have also filed a Motion to Consolidate this case, Avery v. 2

Paramo, et al, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 13cv2261 BTM (DHB), with a later-filed, yet

similar civil action filed by Plaintiff in Avery v. Allamby, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case

No. 13cv3169 BTM (DHB) (ECF No. 37). The Court will consider that Motion in a

separate Order. 

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Second, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Paramo, Ruffino, Lozano, Beard, Pool,

Carter, Rutledge, and Benyard’s failure to provide the accommodations requested in 3

Claim One is “discriminatory” and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment because Native American inmates are provided similar

religious accommodations which Wiccans and Asatru practitioners are denied. Id. at 

20-22, 45-50 (“Claim Two”).

Third, Plaintiff contends Defendants Beard, Hadjadj, Ruffino, Bradford,

Paramo, Pool, and Lozano violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of his 4

religion by refusing to accommodate his religious fasting practices. Id. at 35-41, 51-

54. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges these Defendants have denied his requests for a

monthly supply of honey, nuts, dried fruit, trail mix and “non-yeast (or) ergot bread or

crackers,” which are “non-fermentable items [needed] to sustain [his] physical health”

during the “24 ... to 72 hours prior to ceremonies and magical practices of ritual

magick.” Id. at 35-36. Plaintiff claims that without these “specific accommodations,”

he has been “forced to abandon the tenets of his fasting religious practices or starve.”

Id. at 38, 51-54 (“Claim Three”).

Fourth, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief under RLUIPA as to “all Defendants”

in their official capacities, based on claims that their refusals to provide him with

“security in religious practices ... contingent ... upon the erection of a fence line,”

(Claim One) or to accommodate his requested religious dietary needs (Claim Three),

have “caused [him] to abandon” his sincerely held religious practices against his will.

See Compl. at 55 (“Claim Four”).

Fifth, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Beard, who is the Secretary of the CDCR,

has violated his First, Fourteenth, and RLUIPA rights by “delegating responsibility”

 Plaintiff originally included Defendants Khan, Jones, Garay, and Hodge in 3

this claim, but they have since been dismissed them as parties. See ECF Doc. Nos. 8,

9, 12.

 Defendant Khan was originally included in this claim, but Plaintiff has

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voluntarily dismissed him. See ECF Doc. Nos. 8, 9.

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to “create regulations and policy concerning religious accommodations and program

for inmates in CDCR’s jurisdiction,” to the Inmate Appeals Branch, Wardens

Advisory Group (“WAG”), and the Religious Review Committee (“RRC”), see

Compl. at 11, 13, and by “refusing to create” and/or include in Title 15 of the

California Code of Regulations, or the CDCR’s Operations Manual (“DOM”),

policies or language which would protect the free exercise and equal access rights of

Pagan/Wiccan/Asatru practices by explicitly including them in the “earth-based”

practices already recognized for Native American inmates. Id. at 56-58 (“Claim

Five”).

Finally, Plaintiff claims that he has acted as an “advocate” on his own and on

behalf of the “Wiccan & Asatru class” of inmates at RJD “at their request,” “via

exhaustion of administrative remedies,” and by pursuing “legal review by the courts”

since he arrived there on March 28, 2012. See Compl. at 59; Olson Decl. ¶ 5. He

claims Defendants Carter, Rutledge, Allamby, Paramo, Benyard, Ruffino, and others5

either retaliated against him directly by “interrogating” him and “threatening” him

with discipline in order to “intimidat[e]” or “discourage” him from filing group

inmate appeals, or by failing to properly train, supervise, or discipline their

subordinate staff for retaliating against him. See Compl. at 59-64 (“Claim Six”). 

Claims One, Two, and Four, in which Plaintiff alleges violations of RLUIPA,

his First Amendment right to free exercise, and his Fourteenth Amendment right to

equal protection in relation to his requests for a Pagan/Wiccan/Asatru fence

perimeter, fire pit, water line, and herb cultivation, all appear to have been properly

exhausted via Plaintiff’s CDCR 602 “Group Appeal,” RJD Log No. 12-1960, filed on

July 4, 2012, and denied at the third level of administrative review on June 14, 2013.

See Compl., ECF No. 1-1, Pl.’s Ex. 2 at 24-47.

 Plaintiff also includes Defendants Khan, Garay, Hodge, and Jones in his 5

retaliation claim, but all those parties have been voluntarily dismissed. See ECF Nos.

8, 9, 12.

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Claim Three, in which Plaintiff alleges violations of both RLUIPA and his First

Amendment right to free exercise in relation to his dietary fasting needs, appears to

have been properly exhausted via Plaintiff’s CDCR 602 Inmate/Parolee Appeal, RJD

Log No. 12-02497, filed on August 27, 2012, and also denied at the third level of

administrative review on June 14, 2013. See Compl., ECF No. 1-1, Pl.’s Ex. 1 at 1-23;

see also Briggs Decl., Ex. C, at 28-29, RJD Log No. 12-2460, Third Level Appeal

Decision dated June 5, 2013.

Claim Five, in which Plaintiff challenges Secretary Beard’s failure to enact or

promulgate state-wide policies which specifically include Pagan/Wiccan/Asatru

practices as within other “earth-based” religious programs specified within Title 15

and the DOM on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds, also appears to have been

properly exhausted via Plaintiff’s CDC 602 Inmate/Parolee Appeal, RJD Log No. 13-

01171, filed on March 25, 2013, and denied at the third level of administrative review

on August 8, 2013. See Compl., ECF No. 1-1, Pl.’s Ex. 3 at 48-56.

IV. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

While Defendants concede Plaintiff “has exhausted the prison appeals process

for his claims related to a fenced-in worship area and a supply of nuts and honey,”

they seek summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s claims of retaliation (“Claim Six”)

based on his failure to properly exhaust them before filing suit. See Defs.’ Mem. of

P&As in Supp. of Summ. J (ECF No. 32) at 6. 

A. Legal Standards

1. Statutory Exhaustion Requirement

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, “[n]o action shall be

brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other

Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility

until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a). This statutory exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about

prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002) (quotation marks omitted),

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regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner or the relief offered by the process.

Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001).

“Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other

critical procedural rules[.]” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). The Supreme

Court has also cautioned against reading futility or other exceptions into the statutory

exhaustion requirement. See Booth, 532 U.S. at 741 n.6. Moreover, because proper

exhaustion is necessary, a prisoner cannot satisfy the PLRA exhaustion requirement

by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or

appeal. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-93. Instead, “to properly exhaust administrative

remedies prisoners ‘must complete the administrative review process in accordance

with the applicable procedural rules,’[ ]-rules that are defined not by the PLRA, but

by the prison grievance process itself.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007)

(quoting Woodford, 548 U.S. at 88). See also Marella, 568 F.3d at 1027 (“The

California prison system’s requirements ‘define the boundaries of proper

exhaustion.’”) (quoting Jones, 549 U.S. at 218).

Because the failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, Defendants bear the

burden of raising and proving its absence. Jones, 549 U.S. at 216; Albino v. Baca,

747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). “In the rare event that a failure to

exhaust is clear from the face of the complaint, a defendant may move for dismissal

under Rule 12(b)(6).” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. Otherwise, Defendants must produce

evidence proving the Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust, and they are entitled to summary

judgment under Rule 56 only if the undisputed evidence, viewed in the light most

favorable Plaintiff, shows he failed to exhaust. Id.

2. Rule 56 Summary Judgment

Any party may move for summary judgment, and the Court must grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P.

56(a) (quotation marks omitted); Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166; Washington Mut. Inc. v.

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U.S., 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Each party’s position, whether it be that a

fact is disputed or undisputed, must be supported by: (1) citing to particular parts of

materials in the record, including but not limited to depositions, documents,

declarations, or discovery; or (2) showing that the materials cited do not establish the

presence or absence of a genuine dispute or that the opposing party cannot produce

admissible evidence to support the fact. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c)(1) (quotation marks

omitted). The Court may consider other materials in the record not cited to by the

parties, although it is not required to do so. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San

Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001); accord Simmons

v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010).

When Defendants seek summary judgment based on the Plaintiff’s failure to

exhaust specifically, they must first prove that there was an available administrative

remedy and that Plaintiff did not exhaust that available remedy. Williams v. Paramo,

775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172) (quotation

marks omitted). If they do, the burden of production then shifts to the Plaintiff “to

come forward with evidence showing that there is something in his particular case

that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively

unavailable to him.” Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191.

“If the undisputed evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prisoner

shows a failure to exhaust, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment under Rule

56.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. However, “[i]f material facts are disputed, summary

judgment should be denied, and the district judge rather than a jury should determine

the facts.” Id.

B. Discussion

In this case, no party disputes that the CDCR “has an administrative remedy”

for inmate grievances. See Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191. No party further disputes that

California’s administrative grievance procedure is initiated by submitting a CDCR

Form 602 “Inmate/Parolee Appeal” within thirty calendar days: (1) of the event or

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decision being appealed, (2) upon first having knowledge of the action or decision

being appealed, or (3) upon receiving an unsatisfactory departmental response to an

appeal filed. See CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15, §§ 3084.2(a), 3084.8(b)(1) (quotation

marks omitted); Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 2006); see also

Decl. of R. Briggs in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF No. 32-4) (hereafter

“Briggs Decl.”) at 2-3 ¶¶ 2-6. 

A California prisoner may appeal “any policy, decision, action, condition, or

omission by the department or its staff that [he] can demonstrate as having a material

adverse effect upon his ... health, safety, or welfare.” CAL CODE REGS., it. 15

§ 3084.1(a). Since January 28, 2011, and during the times alleged in Plaintiff’s

Complaint, Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations requires three formal levels

of appeal review. See Decl. of R. Olson in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF

No. 32-3) at 2 ¶ 2. 

Thus, in order to properly exhaust, Plaintiff must, within 30 calendar days of

the decision or action being appealed, or “upon first having knowledge of the action

or decision being appealed,” CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3084.8(b), “use a CDCR

Form 602 (Rev. 08/09), Inmate/Parolee Appeal, to describe the specific issue under

appeal and the relief requested.” Id. § 3084.2(a). The CDCR Form 602 “shall be

submitted to the appeals coordinator at the institution.” Id. § 3084.2(c), § 3084.7(a).

If the first level CDCR Form 602 appeal is “denied or not otherwise resolved to the

appellant’s satisfaction at the first level,” id. § 3084.7(b), Plaintiff must “within 30

calendar days ... upon receiving [the] unsatisfactory departmental response,” id. §

3084.8(b)(3), seek a second level of administrative review, which is “conducted by

the hiring authority or designee at a level no lower that Chief Deputy Warden, Deputy

Regional Parole Administrator, or the equivalent.” Id. § 3084.7(b), (d)(2). “The third

level is for review of appeals not resolved at the second level.” Id. § 3084.7(c). “The

third level review constitutes the decision of the Secretary of the CDCR on an appeal,

and shall be conducted by a designated representative under the supervision of the

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third level Appeals Chief or equivalent. The third level of review exhausts

administrative remedies,” id. § 3084.7(d)(3), “unless otherwise stated.” Id. § 6

3084.1(b); see also Olson Decl. ¶¶ 2-3. 

Therefore, the only question in this case is whether Defendants have carried

their burden under Rule 56 to show there is no material dispute as to whether Plaintiff

did, in fact, exhaust available administrative remedies as to the retaliation claims he

alleges in Claim Six of his Complaint against Defendants Carter, Rutledge, Allamby,

Benyard, Paramo, and Ruffino before filing suit as is required by CAL. CODE REGS.,

tit. 15 § 3084, et seq. See Compl. at 59-64; Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191. 

1. Defendants’ Evidence

In support of their Motion seeking summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s

retaliation claims, Defendants have submitted the sworn Declarations of R. Olson,

RJD’s Appeals Coordinator (ECF No. 32-3), and R. Briggs, the CDCR’s Acting

Chief of the Office of Inmate Appeals (ECF No. 32-4). Both Olson and Briggs attest

as to the content of the Inmate Appeals Office’s (“IAO”) business records and files

containing “any appeals, including staff complaints,” filed by Plaintiff from the time

of his transfer to RJD on March 28, 2012, and “all Third Level Inmate Appeals”

accepted “relating to allegations of retaliation by current Defendants in this action for

practicing his religion and advocating for his religious group by filing appeals.”

Olson Decl. ¶ 5; Briggs Decl. ¶ 8. Attached to Briggs’s Declaration are copies of ten

CDCR Form 602 Inmate grievances, filed by Plaintiff at RJD between October 1,

2012, and August 17, 2013, which he exhausted through the third level of

 For example, “[a] second level of review shall constitute the department’s 6

final action on appeals of disciplinary actions classified as ‘administrative’ as

described in section 3314, or minor disciplinary infractions documented on CDC

Form 128-A (rev. 4-74), Custodial Counseling Chrono, pursuant to section

3312(a)(2), and shall exhaust administrative remedy on these matters.” CAL. CODE

REGS., tit. 15 § 3084.7(b)(1).

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administrative review. See Briggs’ Decl. at 4-6, ¶ 9(a)-(j) & Exs. A-J. Defendants

7

offer these to show that while Plaintiff’s “religious appeals,” specifically those

“related to his requests for fenced-in worship area and a monthly supply of honey

nuts and fruit,” were properly exhausted, see Defs.’ Mem. of P&As’ in Supp. of

Summ. J. at 32, citing Briggs’ Decl., Ex. A (RJD Log No. 12-1960), Ex. C (RJD Log

No. 12-2460), and Ex. D (RJD Log No. 12-2497), none of these appeals, or any other

filed by Plaintiff through the third level of administrative review, included allegations

sufficient to put prison officials “on notice” that he was also claiming retaliation by

any Defendant still named as a party to this action. Id. at 14-17 (citing Griffin v.

Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2009)).

Both Olson and Briggs’s Declarations also include descriptions of more than a

dozen additional CDCR Form 602 grievances initiated by Plaintiff during the same

time, which were withdrawn, abandoned, “screened out,” “rejected,” “cancelled,” or

otherwise “not accepted” pursuant to CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3084.6. See Olson

Decl. ¶ 7(a)-(m); Briggs Decl. ¶ 10(a)-(f). Also attached to Olson’s Declaration are

copies of the only two of Plaintiff’s appeals which Olson attests did include

allegations of retaliation: RJD Log. No. 13-1816 and RJD Log No. 13-2820. See

Olson Decl. ¶ 6(m) & Ex. 1 at 15-37 ; id. ¶ 7(j) & Ex. 2 at 39-46. Both these appeals

were “screened out” or “withdrawn,” however. Id. Therefore, Defendants offer them

as proof that because neither was pursued through the third level of administrative

review, as required by CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3084.1(b) and § 3084.7(d)(3),

neither is sufficient to show Plaintiff “properly” exhausted his administrative

 These CDCR Form 602 Appeals were “accepted and processed,” see Briggs

7

Decl. ¶ 9(a)-(j), and designated RJD Log No. 12-1960, (id., Ex. A at 9-18); Log No.

12-2967, (id., Ex. B at 19-26); Log No. 12-2460, (id., Ex. C at 27-41); Log. No. 12-

2497, (id., Ex. D at 42-49); Log No. 13-1171, (id., Ex. E at 50-57); Log No. 13-0896,

(id., Ex. F at 58-68); Log No. 13-1165, (id., Ex. G at 69-76); Log No. 13-2005, (id.,

Ex. H at 77-87); Log No. 13-1198, (id., Ex. I at 88-95); Log No. 13-3017, (id., Ex. J

at 96-110). See also Briggs’s Decl. Ex. K at 111-115, Inmate/Parolee Appeals

Tracking System - Level III (“IATS”), for Kyle Avery, CDCR #E-67897.

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remedies as to any claims of retaliation. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 218 (quoting

Woodford, 548 U.S. at 88). 

2. Plaintiff’s Rebuttal Evidence

In his Opposition, Plaintiff does not rebut Defendants’ evidence or argue that

screened out CDCR 602 Appeal Log No. 13-1816 or Log No. 13-2820 were, in fact, 

sufficient to demonstrate proper exhaustion. See Pl.’s Opp’n (ECF No. 34). Nor does

Plaintiff claim or offer any of his own evidence to show that the grievance procedure

was rendered unavailable to him as to these incomplete appeals. See Williams, 775

F.3d at 1191-92. Instead, Plaintiff claims he exhausted his claims by giving “judicial

notice of retaliations to Defendants D. Paramo and CRM Ruffino” in a letter he

presented to them on April 5, 2013, which included claims of both past and

“anticipated” future interference by RJD custodial staff with his “intent to exercise

protected conduct and to advocate and litigate.” See Pl.’s Opp’n (ECF No. 34) Ex. 3

at 148-153. Plaintiff further claims two other CDCR 602 appeals, RJD Log No. 13-

2451, filed on August 6, 2013, and RJD Log. No. 13-3017, filed on September 22,

2013, are “in conjunction” also sufficient to show his retaliation claims were properly

exhausted. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 10 & Exs. 1 & 2.

a. Plaintiff’s Letter

First, to the extent Plaintiff contends an April 5, 2013 letter he wrote to

Defendants Paramo and Ruffino is sufficient to show proper exhaustion of his

retaliation claims, Article 8 of CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15, § 3084 through § 3084.9

provide otherwise. See § 3084.1 (“The appeal process is intended to provide a remedy

for inmates ... with identified grievances and to provide an administrative mechanism

for review of departmental policies, decisions, actions, conditions, or omissions that

have a material adverse effect on the welfare of inmates and parolees.”); Jones, 549

U.S. at 218 (“proper exhaustion” occurs when prisoners “‘complete the administrative

review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules’ ... that are defined

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not by [§ 1997e(a)], but by the prison grievance process itself.”) (quoting Woodford,

548 U.S. at 88).

Thus, Plaintiff’s April 5, 2015 letter to the Warden and other prison officials,

which he submits as Exhibit 3 to his Opposition (ECF No. 34, at 148-153), neither

excuses his failure to submit a CDCR Form 602 appeal as to the retaliation claims

alleged in his Complaint, nor does it relieve him from proceeding through all the

administrative steps required to properly exhaust those claims via California’s

grievance process. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 91, 93 (exhaustion under the PLRA

requires “compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules”);

Panaro v. City of North Las Vegas, 432 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2005) (participation

in internal affairs investigation did not suffice to exhaust administrative remedies);

Wilson v. Wann, No. CIV S-06-1629 GEB KJM P, 2008 WL 4166886, at *2 (E.D.

Cal. Sept. 8, 2008) (finding plaintiff’s letters to the Office of the Inspector General,

Office of Internal Affairs, and the Warden were insufficient to show exhaustion); see

also Lees v. Felker, 2009 WL 2824862, *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept.1, 2009) (noting that

plaintiff’s letter to warden was not an alternative method to the inmate grievance

process for exhausting administrative remedies); Macias v. Zenk, 495 F.3d 37, 44 (2d

Cir. 2007) (informal complaints did not exhaust); Singh v. Goord, 520 F. Supp. 2d

487, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (letter to warden did not exhaust).

b. RJD Log No. 13-2451 & RJD Log No. 13-3017

Next, Plaintiff argues that CDCR Form 602 Log No. 13-2451 and CDCR Form

602 Log No. 13-3017 are sufficient to show exhaustion of the retaliation claims

alleged in his Complaint under § 1997e(a) “because retaliation was mentioned” in

those appeals. See Pl.’s Opp’n (ECF No. 34) at 7-10. In their Reply, however,

Defendants claim neither of these appeals are sufficient to show proper exhaustion

because they describe “entirely different [acts of] retaliatory conduct” arising at

different times than the retaliatory acts Plaintiff asserts against Defendants Carter,

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Rutledge, Allamby, Paramo, Benyard, and Ruffino in his Complaint. See Defs.’ 8

Reply (ECF No. 35) at 2-7. The Court agrees.

In Claim Six of his Complaint, Plaintiff claims generally that he has been

“retaliated against by administrative staff, the chaplain[’]s staff, and the prison[’]s

custodial staff” “since his arrival at RJD,” in an “attempt to dis[]courage” his

religious advocacy. See Compl. at 59. He does give several “examples” of purported

acts of reprisal involving Defendants Carter, Rutledge, Allamby, and Ruffino, but he

mentions only one specific date: May 14, 2013. Id. at 60.

On May 14, 2013, Plaintiff claims Defendant Carter “removed [him] from his

housing unit,” cuffed him, and escorted him to the Facility C Program Office, where

he was placed in an “interrogation-type setting” before Muslim Chaplain Khan and

Defendants Rutledge and Allamby. Plaintiff describes the incident as “an intervention

team aimed at intimidation.” Id. at 60. Plaintiff contends he “was told his 602s and

advocacy for Wiccans & Asatru was not wanted and [he] was ordered to stop.” Id.

Plaintiff further claims Khan “threatened to write a disciplinary report against [him] if

he continued to advocate via 602s,” and told him “both the Asatru and Wiccans did

not desire to have [him] advocating for them,” and, in fact, the “Asatru inmates ...

wanted to assault [him].” Id. at 60, 62. Plaintiff contends he knew this was “false”

because “numerous Wiccans & Asatru inmates” had signed his “class” grievances,

id., at 60-61, and because if Plaintiff’s safety was threatened they would “have him

placed in Ad-Seg.” Id. at 62. 

Plaintiff further claims that “upon submitting” unspecified grievances,

Defendant Ruffino, RJD’s Community Resource Manager, on a “number of

individual” occasions, “contacted” unidentified “custody and chaplain staff to have

them threaten [Plaintiff] with disciplinary actions.” Id. at 48. Plaintiff claims

Ruffino’s actions as an “administrator designee” also “set the impression” with

 As noted above, Plaintiff’s Complaint also includes allegation of retaliation 8

by Defendants Kahn, Garay, Jones, and Hodge, but Plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed

those officials as parties in this matter. See ECF Nos. 8, 9, 12.

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custodial staff that other “retaliatory tactics were justified.” Id. Plaintiff also describes

Defendant Correctional Officer Carter as “always approaching him and other Pagan

inmates in a physically threatening and verbally aggressive fashion,” and that he

would “desecrate” Pagan religious grounds by “kicking rocks, spitting ..., dislodging

alter stones ... and destroy[ing] sacred arrangements” in what Plaintiff alleges was “an

attempt to retaliate against [their] free religious exercise observances and Plaintiff’s

advocacy for it.” Id. at 49. In addition, Plaintiff asserts Sergeant Rutledge “ke[pt]

telling Pagans ... Plaintiff [wa]s causing this or that problem” in an attempt to “create

division” and was “constantly reaffirming his staff[’s] confiscation of [Pagans’]

religious property,” in order to “create discomfort for ... Plaintiff who [was] trying to

get a better established basis for Pagan programming.” Id.

Thus, Plaintiff’s only specific claims of retaliation are alleged to have occurred

on May 14, 2013, in RJD’s Facility C Program Office, and involve current

Defendants Carter, Rutledge, and Allamby. See Compl. at 60-63. While his pleading

also contains global claims of harassment occurring on other unspecified occasions,

Plaintiff fails to tether those acts, or any other Defendant named in Claim Six, to any

particular instance of protected conduct. See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807-08

(9th Cir. 1995) (to state a claim for retaliation, Plaintiff must allege a specific link

between the claimed act of retaliation and the exercise of a constitutional right);

Compl. at 48-49, 64.

Nevertheless, Plaintiff contends he exhausted his retaliation claims by simply

asking that “it be stopped” in CDCR Form 602 Log No. 13-2451, which he filed on

August 6, 2013, and in CDCR Form 602 Log No. 13-3017, filed on September 22,

2013. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 9, 17. The Court will consider each in turn.

9

 Plaintiff also cites CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3084.2(a) to show that “the law

9

does not require [him] to name each person who retaliated in grievances.” See Pl.’s

Opp’n at 15, 17. While this was formerly true, see Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813,

824 (9th Cir. 2010), section 3084.2(a) was amended effective January 28, 2011 to

require that prisoners indeed “list all staff member(s) involved,” and “describe their

involvement in the issue” in their CDCR Form 602s. See CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15

§ 3084.2(a) (2014). 

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First, in CDCR Form 602 Log No. 13-2451, Plaintiff challenged the validity of

a CDCR 128-A Custodial Chrono, issued against him on August 1, 2013, by Lt. A.

Canada. See Pl.’s Opp’n (EC. No. 34), Ex. 1 at 24. In the CDCR 128-A, Canada

10

reported that Plaintiff had violated a “direct order by Correctional Lt. A. Allamby to

not engage in the transportation ... of the Wiccan religious artifacts to and from the

‘C’ Program - ‘C’ Chapel.” Id., Ex. 1 at 56. Canada issued the CDC 128-A to Plaintiff

as a “written warning that further violations to the direct orders given to him,”

“pursuant to the adjudication of Rules Violation Report (“RVR”) Log #FC-13-245,”

would “result in a more progressive disciplinary action [being] taken.” Id.

In his CDCR Form 602, Plaintiff requested that Canada’s “128-A custodial

chrono [be] vacated and completely removed from [his] C-File,” because the “items

[at] issue [were] [his] personal religious property,” that he had “authorization to

convey the religious property by checking them out as needed for [Wiccan] services

& or personal use,” and that neither Lt. Canada nor Allamby were “at liberty to

dictate” whether Plaintiff may act as “a legal lia[i]s[o]n” or “advocate for [him]self

and [his] Wiccan or Pagan class.” Id. at 25. Plaintiff cited both his “First Amendment

right,” and his “protected conduct right” as an “advocate for [his] class,” and

concluded by requesting “staff stop fishing for reasons to retaliate via RVR & 128s.”

Id.

On August 17, 2013, Correctional Lieutenant J. Clarke interviewed Plaintiff

regarding the claims he raised in CDCR Form 602 Log. No. 13-2451. G. Stratton, on

behalf of Defendant Warden Paramo, found that because Plaintiff had been found 11

guilty of falsifying state records by Lt. Allamby on May 28, 2013, as charged in

Rules Violation Report Log No. FC-13-245, and as a result had been “removed from

the position of Wiccan Representative/Liaison in charge of religious artifacts,”

 Canada is not named as a Defendant is this case and Plaintiff’s Complaint 10

includes no mention of him.

 Neither Clarke nor Stratton are named as Defendants in this case and

11

Plaintiff’s Complaint also includes no mention of them.

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Canada’s 128-A was “appropriate.” Therefore, Plaintiff’s CDCR Form 602 Appeal

Log. No. 13-2451 was denied at the second level of review. Id. at 53-55.

12

On August 20, 2013, Lieutenant J. Clarke issued Plaintiff another RVR, CDC

115 Log No. FC-13-446, this time charging him with disobeying orders in violation

of CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3005(b), in relation to the August 17, 2013 interview he

conducted regarding Canada’s CDC 128-A chrono and Plaintiff’s CDCR Form 602

Appeal Log No. 13-1451. See Pl.’s Opp’n (ECF No. 34), Ex. 2 at 105-112. Clarke

reported that during his August 17, 2013 interview, Plaintiff told him “he did not

recognize any CDCR staff’s authority to prevent him from obtaining” the religious or

“controlled” artifacts he had been “banned” from “obtaining, transporting or having

in his possession,” and therefore he “intended to keep on taking possession of them at

future times as he saw fit.” Id. at 105. Based on these statements, on September 1,

2013, Correctional Lieutenant Sosa found Plaintiff guilty of the disciplinary offense

of disobeying orders, assessed Plaintiff 30 days credit forfeiture, and referred him to

the UCC/ICC for placement into privilege/work group “C.” Id. at 108.

Second, Plaintiff filed CDCR 602 Log No. 13-3017 on September 22, 2013, 

challenging his guilt finding in CDC 115 Log No. FC-13-446. Id. at 100. In this

appeal, Plaintiff repeated his claims that he was entitled to possess his own

“personal” religious based on a “higher authority,” alleged there was insufficient

evidence to show he had disobeyed any orders, claimed he was denied due process,

 While the Second Level Appeal Decision in CDCR Form 602 RJD Log No.

12

13-2451 dated August 19, 2013, indicates that “this issue may be submitted for a

Director’s Level of Review if desired,” see Pl.’s Opp’n (ECF No. 34) Ex. 1 at 55,

Plaintiff does not allege to have appealed further, and he has not submitted a copy of

any Director’s Level Decision as to Log No. 13-2451. In his Declaration in Support

of Defendants’ Motion, however, Briggs avers that Plaintiff did attempt to further

appeal RJD Log No. 13-2451 on October 24, 2013, but it was “rejected or screened

out” on November 15, 2013, “because the issue was exhausted at the Second Level of

review.” See Briggs Decl. (ECF No. 32-4) ¶ 10(d) at 7; see also CAL. CODE REGS., tit.

15 § 3084.7(b)(1).

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and also claimed that “the basis of [Clarke’s] RVR [was] retaliatory in nature,” and

constituted a “reprisal[] for filing 602’s per 15 CCR § 3084.1(d).” Id. at 101.

Defendant Allamby interviewed Plaintiff at the second level of administrative

review of CDCR Form 602 Log No. 13-3017 on November 4, 2013. However, it was

RJD’s Chief Deputy Warden K.A. Seibel who found no evidence of any due process

violation “relative to RVR Log No. FC-13-466,” and who denied Plaintiff’s appeal at

the second level of administrative review. Id. at 102-04. On April 15, 2014, however,

Appeal Log No. 13-3107 was granted in part by Defendant Pool at the third level of

administrative review. Id. at 98-99. Specifically, RVR Log No. FC-13-446 was

ordered to be “reissued/reheard” in order to ensure RJD officials fully complied with

CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3320(l), which required the Senior Hearing Officer (Lt.

Sosa) to conclude the hearing by informing Plaintiff of the findings and disposition of

the charge. Id. at 99. At neither the second or third levels of administrative review did

any official address the claims of retaliation Plaintiff included in his CDCR Form 602

Log No. 13-3107; instead only Plaintiff’s due process claims were considered. See id.

at 98-112. 

3. Analysis

Based on the evidence as presented, no genuine material dispute exists as to

whether Plaintiff has properly exhausted all available administrative remedies as to

the retaliation claims alleged in Claim Six of his Complaint. Defendants have

produced sufficient evidence to show that he has not; and Plaintiff has failed to

“come forward with evidence” to show “that there is something in his particular case

that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively

unavailable to him.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172; Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191. 

Specifically, the Court finds that while Plaintiff points to both CDCR Log No.

13-2451 and CDCR Form 602 Log No. 13-3017 to show proof of exhaustion, those

grievances clearly involve alleged incidents of retaliation, first arising on August 1,

2013, and again on August 20, 2013, which even when considered in the light most

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favorable to Plaintiff, are simply not alleged to be part of the retaliation claims he

asserts in this suit. See Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166 (noting that if “undisputed evidence 13

viewed in the light most favorable to the prisoner shows a failure to exhaust, a

defendant is entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56.”); see also Rhodes v.

Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[A] prisoner must exhaust his

administrative remedies for the claims contained within his complaint before that

complaint is tendered to the district court.”) (emphasis added).

Moreover, while both of Plaintiff’s CDCR Form 602 Log Nos. 13-2451 and

13-3017 did include allegations of retaliation based on the exercise of Plaintiff’s First

Amendment rights, neither included sufficient detail to put the Defendants in this

case (Carter, Rutledge, Allamby, Paramo, Benyard, and Ruffino) “on notice” of

Plaintiff’s specific claims of retaliation against them, nor provided prison officials a

fair opportunity to address or resolve his retaliation claims against these Defendants

prior to court intervention. See e.g., McCollum v. Cal. Dept. of Corr. and

Rehabilitation, 647 F.3d 870, 876 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding Wiccan prisoner’s

grievance alleging religious discrimination in the form of unequal access to worship

places and sacred items was insufficient to put prison officials on notice of Plaintiff’s

separate challenge to the prison’s failure to establish a paid Wiccan chaplaincy). 

The level of detail in an administrative grievance necessary to properly exhaust

a claim is determined by the prison’s applicable grievance procedures. Jones, 549

U.S. at 218. The California Code of Regulations requires that Plaintiff’s CDCR Form

602s “list all staff members involved,” and “describe their involvement in the issue

under appeal,” including the “dates of the staff member’s involvement.” CAL. CODE

 The Court takes judicial notice, however, that RJD CDCR Form 602 Log

13

Nos. 13-2451 and 13-3017 do appear to exhaust Plaintiff’s claims of retaliation

against Lt. Allamby, as well as against two other RJD Lieutenants, Canada and

Clarke, who are not named as parties in this case, but who are all named as parties in

Plaintiff’s related suit, Avery v. Allamby, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 13-cv-3169-

BTM (DHB). See Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (A court

“‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal

judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’”) 

(quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)).

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REGS. tit. 15, § 3084.2(3). Further, he must “describe the specific issue under appeal

and the relief requested,” and “state all facts known and available to him.” Id.

3084.2(a), (a)(4). An appeal generally “suffices to exhaust a claim if it puts the 14

prison on adequate notice of the problem for which the prisoner seeks redress.” Sapp

v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 822-23 (9th Cir. 2010).

The primary purpose of a grievance is to notify the prison of a problem. Griffin,

557 F.3d at 1120 (quotation marks and citations omitted); accord Wilkerson v.

Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014); Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1211

(9th Cir. 2012). Thus, Plaintiff’s CDCR 602 Log. Nos. 13-2451 and 13-3017 would

suffice to satisfy § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement if Defendants Carter, Rutledge,

Allamby, Paramo, Benyard, and Ruffino were included in a list of staff members

involved, if they “describe[d] their involvement in the issue under appeal,” and if they

included the dates of each staff member’s involvement. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15,

§ 3084.2. Because the undisputed evidence in the record before the Court shows that

Log. Nos. 13-2451 and 13-3017 lacked any of those required details, Defendants

Carter, Rutledge, Allamby, Paramo, Benyard, and Ruffino could not have been

alerted to the nature of the wrong for which Plaintiff now seeks redress against them.

See Sapp, 623 F.3d at 824; Akhtar, 698 F.3d at 1211.

V. Conclusion and Order

Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that:

1) No genuine dispute exists to show Plaintiff properly exhausted the

retaliation claims alleged in Claim Six of his Complaint; therefore, Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment as to those claims is GRANTED pursuant to

FED.R.CIV.P. 56 and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (ECF No. 32);

 Before January 28, 2011, CDCR’s regulations merely required prisoner to 14

include a description of the problem and the action requested on the CDCR Form

602. See § 3084.2(a) (2010); Sapp, 623 F.3d at 824 (finding that at the time Sapp

filed his grievance, 15 CAL. CODE REGS., § 3084.2 did not require him to identify

prison officials by name in order to exhaust).

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2) Defendant John Does 1-10 are DISMISSED as parties in this matter sua

sponte pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(m); and

3) Defendants are ORDERED to file a responsive pleading to all claims

remaining in Plaintiff’s Complaint within the time provided by FED.R.CIV.P.

12(a)(4)(A).

DATED: August 18, 2015

BARRY TED MOSKOWITZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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