Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-01109/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-01109-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss; Denying Certificate of Appealability

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE MONSIVAIS,

Petitioner,

 vs.

WARDEN KNIPP,

Respondent. 

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No. C 14-1109 RMW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS; DENYING CERTIFICATE

OF APPEALABILITY

(Docket No. 16)

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his conviction and sentence imposed by the Superior

Court of Monterey County. The court issued an order to show cause. In lieu of an answer,

respondent has filed a motion to dismiss the petition as untimely. Although given an

opportunity, petitioner did not file an opposition. For the reasons stated below, the court

GRANTS respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner was sentenced to a term of 30 years to life plus a consecutive 54 years in state

prison after being convicted of two counts of premeditated attempted murder, two counts of

attempted murder of a public official, two counts of felony assault with a firearm on a peace

officer, and related offenses occurring during a 10-day crime spree. (MTD at 2, Ex. 1.) On

August 23, 2007, the California Court of Appeal affirmed. (Id., Ex. 1.) On November 28, 2007,

(),/('

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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss; Denying Certificate of Appealability

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the California Supreme Court denied review. (Id., Ex. 2.) Petitioner did not file any state habeas

petitions. 

Petitioner filed the underlying petition on March 3, 2014. See Saffold v. Newland, 250

F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2001) (pro se prisoner’s federal habeas petition is deemed filed when

prisoner delivers petition to prison authorities for mailing), vacated and remanded on other

grounds, Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002). 

II. DISCUSSION

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) became law on

April 24, 1996, and imposed for the first time a statute of limitations on petitions for a writ of

habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. Petitions filed by prisoners challenging non-capital state

convictions or sentences must be filed within one year of the latest of the date on which: (1) the

judgment became final after the conclusion of direct review or the time passed for seeking direct

review; (2) an impediment to filing an application created by unconstitutional state action was

removed, if such action prevented petitioner from filing; (3) the constitutional right asserted was

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactive to cases on collateral review; or (4) the factual predicate of the claim could

have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Time

during which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is

pending is excluded from the one-year time limit. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

“Direct review” includes the period within which a petitioner can file a petition for writ

of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, whether or not the petitioner actually files

such a petition. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, if a petitioner

fails to seek a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, the AEDPA’s one-year

limitations period begins to run on the date the ninety-day period defined by Supreme Court

Rule 13 expires. See Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002).

Here, petitioner’s conviction became final on February 26, 2008, ninety days after the

California Supreme Court denied his petition for review. See id. Thus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(A), the AEDPA’s one-year limitation period began to run the following day, and

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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss; Denying Certificate of Appealability

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expired one year later, on February 26, 2009. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th

Cir. 2001). Thus, the petition filed on March 3, 2014, it is untimely.

Once a petitioner is notified that his petition is subject to dismissal based on AEDPA’s

statute of limitations and the record indicates that the petition falls outside the one-year time

period, the petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the limitation period was

sufficiently tolled under statutory or equitable principles. See Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809,

814 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, petitioner was given notice that the petition was subject to dismissal,

and was provided an opportunity to respond. However, petitioner has not responded to the

motion, and thus he has not set forth any argument that he is entitled either statutory or equitable

tolling. In addition, the court is unaware of any basis for tolling in this case. Accordingly, the

federal habeas petition is untimely. 

III. CONCLUSION

Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition is GRANTED. The instant petition is

DISMISSED. The clerk shall terminate all pending motions and close the file.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

For the reasons set out in the discussion above, petitioner has not shown “that jurists of

reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Accordingly, a COA is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: _________________________ _________________________

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

Case 5:14-cv-01109-RMW Document 20 Filed 05/29/15 Page 3 of 4
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE MONSIVAIS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

KNIPP et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV14-01109 RMW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on May 29, 2015, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing

said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Jose Monsivais F-19006

Mule Creek State Prison

P.O. Box 409060

Ione, CA 95640

Dated: May 29, 2015

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Jackie Lynn Garcia, Deputy Clerk

Case 5:14-cv-01109-RMW Document 20 Filed 05/29/15 Page 4 of 4