Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00766/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00766-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Lyndall Dwaine Thompson,

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. CV-12-00766-TUC-DCB (BGM) 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

 Currently pending before the Court is Petitioner Lyndall Dwaine Thompson’s pro 

se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State 

Custody (Non-Death Penalty) (“Petition”) (Doc. 1). Respondents have filed an Answer 

to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 11). Petitioner filed his 

Traverse (Doc. 13). The Petition is ripe for adjudication. 

 Pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure,1

 this matter 

was referred to Magistrate Judge Macdonald for Report and Recommendation. The 

Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court deny the Petition (Doc. 1). 

 1

 Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. 

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

The Arizona Superior Court, Pima County stated the facts2

 as follows: 

The charges in the Petitioner’s case stem from the following incident. On 

June 29, 2007, the Petitioner and his brother Clark got into an argument 

which erupted into a fist fight. The Petitioner was carrying two handguns a 

.45 and a 9mm when the fight began. Before the fight ensued, the 

Petitioner removed the handguns from his person and tossed them aside or 

dropped them so that they could not be used during the fight. Clark pinned 

the Petitioner to the ground during the fight and was getting the better of 

the Petitioner when the Petitioner managed to escape from beneath Clark 

and run inside his trailer home. The Petitioner claimed that during the fight 

Clark repeatedly threatened to kill him and that after running inside, he 

feared that Clark now had access to the handguns which were still outside. 

Based on these fears the Petitioner retrieved his SKS rifle and he went back 

outside carrying the rifle. When the Petitioner emerged from the trailer 

with the SKS rifle he saw Clark nearby, walking in the other direction. The 

Petitioner then chambered a round of ammunition in the rifle and as he did 

so, he claimed that Clark turned abruptly to confront him once again. The 

Petitioner claimed that he could not see Clark’s hands because his view was 

blocked by a nearby parked vehicle. As Clark turned, he began 

approaching the Petitioner at a rapid pace. The Petitioner claims that at that 

point he shot Clark several times, emptying the magazine of the SKS. The 

Petitioner claimed he then threw down the rifle and ran back inside his 

trailer to retrieve his cellular phone before he fled on foot. 

The Petitioner fled to a nearby intersection where he flagged down a 

passing driver. The Petitioner called 911 and asked the driver to tell the 

911 operator that he had just shot his brother. Police arrived and took the 

Petitioner into custody. Deputies Almarez and Sutton and Sergeant James 

arrived at the scene of the shooting and conducted a search for any victims. 

The deputies cleared the Petitioner’s trailer and though they found no 

victims there, they did find a malfunctioned 9mm handgun with a live 

round of ammunition “stovepiped” in the ejection part of the weapon. The 

deputies then proceeded to clear the remainder of the property whereupon 

the discovered the Petitioner’s brother lying shot to death on a path between 

 2

 As these state court findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness and Petitioner 

has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the findings are erroneous, the Court 

hereby adopts these factual findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 

465, 473–74, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 1940, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007); Wainwright v. Witt, 469, U.S. 412, 

426, 105 S.Ct. 844, 853, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); Cf. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519, 102 S.Ct. 

1198, 1204, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). 

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the two trailer homes. There were several spent shell casings and a spent 

shotgun shell lying nearby. Deputy Sutton’s report states that an SKS rifle 

and a .45 caliber handgun were found next to each other near the north side 

of the Petitioner’s trailer home. Later, when Deputy Sutton was 

interviewed by Defense Counsel he claimed that he did not actually 

discover the weapons and that he could not remember if they were found on 

the ground, but that he believed they were found by a uniformed officer 

atop the engine compartment of a vehicle parked on the property. None of 

the reports from officers at the scene indicate whether the weapons were 

actually discovered atop the vehicle or whether they were placed there after 

being discovered on the ground. At trial, Detective Copeland testified that 

the weapons were discovered on the engine compartment of the vehicle by 

uniformed officers who initially responded to the scene. Detective Pruess 

also testified that the weapons were found on the vehicle. 

Meanwhile, the Petitioner was read his Miranda[

3

] rights and transported to 

the Green Valley substation for questioning. The Petitioner agreed to 

waive his right to remain silent based on the condition that the detectives 

answer any questions that he might have. The Petitioner made it clear that 

he would terminate the interview if the detectives failed to answer any of 

his questions. The detectives agreed to this arrangement. Specifically, the 

following exchange took place: 

 DETECTIVE COPELAND: (Reading Miranda rights) Do you 

understand these rights? 

 PETITIONER: I understand those rights and I’ll 

act as my own attorney. When I 

ask you a question, I’ll need your 

answer or we’ll stop the 

interview. Fair is fair. 

 DETECTIVE COPELAND: Okay. So, so you’re. 

 PETITIONER: You can ask me anything you 

want, I’m my own lawyer. I’ll 

represent myself. I’ll ask you 

anything I want, if you stop 

answering questions for me, then 

I’ll stop answering questions for 

you. 

 

[

3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).] 

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 DETECTIVE COPELAND: Okay. 

 PETITIONER: Fair is fair. 

 DETECTIVE COPELAND: Fair is fair. [Footnote omitted] 

During the interrogation, the Petitioner asked the detectives about his 

brother and the detectives led the Petitioner to believe that his brother was 

still alive and that one [of] the handguns he had discarded before the flight 

had been fired. The Petitioner made several incriminating statements 

which were used against him at trial. After the Petitioner was informed that 

his brother was dead, he terminated the interview and refused to answer any 

more questions. 

Answer (Doc. 11), In Chambers Ruling, Re: Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 8/3/2010 

(Exh. “E”) at 1–3. 

On July 10, 2007, a grand jury indicted the Petitioner on one count of first degree 

murder for the shooting death of his brother Clark Duval. Id., Exh. “E” at 1; see also

Answer (Doc. 11), Ct. App. Mem. Decision 9/24/2009 (Exh. “C”) at ¶ 1. On April 11, 

2008, a jury found Petitioner not-guilty of first degree murder, but found him guilty of 

the lesser-included offense of second degree murder, a class two felony. Answer (Doc. 

11), Exh. “C” at ¶ 1, Exh. “E” at 1. On July 14, 2008, Petitioner was sentenced to the 

presumptive term of sixteen years imprisonment. Id., Exh. “C” at ¶ 1, Exh. “E” at 1. 

A. Direct Appeal 

 On March 2, 2009, counsel for Petitioner filed an Anders4

 brief with the Arizona 

Court of Appeals.5

 Answer (Doc. 11), Appellant’s Opening Br. 3/2/2009 (Exh. “G”). 

 

4 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967). 

5

 The Arizona Court of Appeals has described the procedure of filing an Anders brief as follows: 

Under our procedure, when appointed counsel determines that a defendant's case 

discloses no arguable issues for appeal, counsel files an Anders brief. The brief 

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Subsequently, Petitioner filed two pro se supplemental appellate briefs. Answer (Doc. 

11), Appellant’s Pro Se Suppl. Br. 7/17/2009 (Exh. “I”) & Appellant’s Pro Se Suppl. Br. 

7/8/2009 (Exh. “M”). Petitioner initially alleged six (6) claims for relief, including that 

(1) “because of the ‘irreconcilable conflict and friction’ between him and his attorney of 

record, the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to replace trial counsel[;]” (2) 

“because he was prevented from participating in an effective and amicable manner with 

his trial counsel, he was deprived of the opportunity and right to put forth mitigating 

factors into the record of testimony and complete and full disclosure[;]” (3) because of 

the conflict between Petitioner and counsel “request after request for interview and 

investigation concerning family, friends, associates and witnesses went entirely unheeded 

or considered[,]” preventing Petitioner for establishing mitigating factors and “conditions 

of historical background and motives of conduct[;]” (4) prosecutorial misconduct by the 

State “because it engaged in presenting facts and various misstatements about Appellant 

during the trial and sentencing that were prejudicial[;]” (5) “all officers of the honorable 

court did not participate in or take action to insure or represent a profound attitude of 

 

contains a detailed factual and procedural history of the case, with citations to the 

record. See Scott, 187 Ariz. at 478 n. 4, 930 P.2d at 555 n. 4. Counsel submits the 

brief to the court and the defendant. The defendant is then given the opportunity 

to file a brief pro per. After receiving all briefing, the court reviews the entire 

record for reversible error. If any arguable issue presents itself, the court directs 

appointed counsel to brief the issue. Only after the court has ascertained that 

counsel has conscientiously performed his or her duty to review the record, and 

has itself reviewed the record for reversible error and found none, will the court 

allow counsel to withdraw. See State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584–85, 684 P.2d 

154, 156–57 (1984). We conclude that this procedure permits counsel to perform 

ethically, while simultaneously ensuring that an indigent defendant's 

constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and effective assistance of 

counsel are protected. 

State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537, 2 P.3d 89, 96 (Ct. App. 1999). 

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fairness[;]” and (6) based on the conflict between Petitioner and counsel “he was not 

given proper nor full and complete full disclosure of evidence[.]” Answer (Doc. 11), 

Exh. “M” at 2–3. The majority of Petitioner’s first supplemental brief focused on the 

trial court’s alleged failure to replace his attorney despite the “irreconcilable conflict” 

between them. See id., Exh. “M.” Petitioner’s second supplemental brief alleged that (1) 

“the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing attorney [sic] and Public Defender’s 

Office [sic] to withdraw wholly and completely and the court’s failure to acknowledge a 

gross conflict of interest and denial, summarily, of the Appellant’s due process[;]” (2) 

Petitioner was “denied his right to pre-trial and hearing that would put forth mitigating 

factors and circumstances reflecting his nature and associations surrounding all trial 

issues and alleged events . . . [including] knowledge of a right to preliminary hearings, to 

include mitigation hearings and hearing of discovery[;]” and (3) the “denial of due 

process did not allow [Petitioner] to present mitigating testimony for the record nor for 

the jury’s review.” Id., Exh. “I” at 3–4. The majority of Petitioner’s second 

supplemental brief focused on the alleged denial of a preliminary hearing. See id., Exh. 

“I.” 

 On September 24, 2009, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s 

convictions. See Answer (Doc. 11), Ariz. Ct. App. Mem. Decision 9/24/2009 (Exh. “C”). 

As an initial matter the appellate court “note[d] that most of the arguments Thompson has 

attempted to assert in his first supplemental brief appear to have been copied from the 

pleadings of other defendants.” Id., Exh. “C” at 3. The court went on to state that “[a]s 

such, they are generally unclear and unsupported by the record on appeal.” Id. “To the 

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extent Thompson intended to challenge Skitzki’s conduct at trial, his arguments 

constitute claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,” which the Arizona Court of 

Appeals recognized must be brought in a post-conviction relief proceeding pursuant to 

Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and that it therefore could not consider on 

appeal. Id., Exh. “C” at 4. The court further “reject[ed] Thompson’s argument that his 

due process rights were violated because he was charged by indictment following a grand 

jury proceeding rather than by information following a preliminary hearing.” Id., Exh. 

“C” at 5. In assessing this claim, the court of appeals recognized that “[i]n Arizona, a 

defendant may be charged by indictment, issued by a grand jury upon its finding that 

probable cause exists to believe the defendant committed the alleged offense, or by 

information, filed after a finding of probable cause is made by the court.” Answer (Doc. 

11), Exh. “C” at 5 (citing Ariz. Const. art. II, § 30; Ariz. R. Crim. P. 5.1, 13.1(c)). “The 

use of either procedure satisfies the requirements of due process.” Id., Exh. “C” at 5 

(citing State v. Neese, 126 Ariz. 499, 502–03, 616 P.2d 959, 962–63 (Ct. App. 1980)). 

 Petitioner did not seek review of this decision with the Arizona Supreme Court. 

Petition (Doc. 1) at 4. 

B. Initial Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding 

 On October 2, 2009, Petitioner filed his Notice of Intent to File for PostConviction Relief (“PCR”). Answer (Doc. 11), Not. of Intent to File for PCR 10/2/2009 

(Exh. “D”). On April 14, 2010, Petitioner filed his Petition for Post Conviction Relief. 

Answer (Doc. 11), Pet. for PCR (Exh. “L”). Petitioner claimed that his trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing “to file a motion to suppress the Defendant’s statement based on it 

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having been unconstitutionally obtained.” Id., Exh. “L” at 12. In furtherance of this 

argument, Petitioner alleged that he “agreed to answer questions only if the detectives 

promised to answer his questions” and that “but for the detective’s [sic] promise that the 

interview would proceed on a quid pro quo basis, the Defendant would have exercised 

his 5th Amendment right to remain silent.” Id., Exh. “L” at 13–14. Petitioner further 

argued that the detectives “breach” of their agreement, invalidated Petitioner’s Miranda6

waiver. Id., Exh. “L” at 20. Petitioner claimed that based upon the detectives’ alleged 

“breach,” counsel’s “failure to file a motion to suppress Defendant’s statement constitutes 

deficient performance[.]” Id., Exh. “L” at 15. Petitioner also claimed ineffective 

assistance of counsel, because trial counsel failed “to request additional disclosure to 

determine who actually located the weapons and the specific location where the weapons 

were found.” Answer (Doc. 11), Exh. “L” at 23. Petitioner asserted that “[a]bsent 

disclosure of that information, counsel should have moved in limine to prevent the State 

from soliciting testimony that the weapons were found on the vehicle[.]” Id. Finally, 

Petitioner argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to create a record specifying 

which portions of Defendant’s statement were redacted from the transcripts and compact 

discs that were “provided to the jury.” Id., Exh. “L” at 24–25. 

 On August 3, 2010, the trial court denied Petitioner’s post-conviction relief 

(“PCR”) petition. See Answer (Doc. 11), Exh. “E.” The trial court stated that “[i]n order 

for a petitioner to raise a colorable ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he must show 

that counsel’s performance fell below objectively reasonable standards, and that this poor 

 

6 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

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performance prejudiced him.” Id. at 4 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

687 (1984); State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 397, 694 P.2d 222, 227 (1985); State v. 

Jackson, 209 Ariz. 13, 14, 97 P.3d 113, 114 (2005)). In considering whether trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress Petitioner’s allegedly 

unconstitutionally obtained statements, the trial court first addressed the voluntariness of 

Petitioner’s statement. Answer (Doc. 11), Exh. “E” at 5–6. The trial court noted that the 

record showed “that the Petitioner conditioned his willingness to answer the detective’s 

[sic] questions on their assent to answer any questions he might have of them and the 

detectives agreed to this arrangement.” Id., Exh. “E” at 6. The trial court further noted 

that “the record also reveals that it was Petitioner who solicited this arrangement with the 

police.” Id. As such, the trial court found that the police did not promise a “benefit or 

leniency that would render the Petitioner’s statement involuntary.” Id. The trial court 

further found that trial counsel’s “failure to seek suppression of the Petitioner’s 

statements was a matter of trial strategy” and that trial counsel’s actions were reasonable. 

Id.

 The trial court analyzed Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel due 

to an alleged failure “to seek additional disclosure regarding the weapons evidence and 

failed to preclude testimony as to the exact location of the discovery of the weapons.” 

Answer (Doc. 11), Exh. “E” at 7. The trial court delineated counsel’s duty as follows: 

[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 

reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In 

any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be 

directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a 

heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments. 

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Id., Exh. “E” at 7 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984)) 

(alterations in original). Upon review of the record and the pleadings, the trial court 

found that all witnesses “consistently claimed and testified that the weapons were 

discovered atop the car.” Answer (Doc. 11), Exh. “E” at 8. As such, the trial court found 

counsel’s decision not to seek suppression was reasonable and a matter of trial strategy. 

Alternatively, the trial court noted that “even if Trial Counsel’s actions were 

unreasonable, the Petitioner ha[d] failed to demonstrate any prejudice[,] and [his] claim 

that the weapons testimony affected the outcome of his case [was] speculative.” Id.

 Regarding trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness for failing to make a record 

regarding the redaction of Petitioner’s derogatory statements about illegal aliens, the trial 

court stated that “[t]here is no Arizona authority to support the proposition that a hearing 

cannot be waived and the matter submitted by stipulation of counsel[.]” Answer (Doc. 

11), Exh. “E” at 8 (quoting State v. Contreras, 112 Ariz. 358, 359, 542 P.2d 17, 18 

(1975)). Furthermore, “in Arizona, courts encourage stipulations ‘to narrow the facts and 

promote judicial economy.’” Id., Exh. “E” at 8 (quoting State v. Allen, 223 Ariz. 125, ¶ 

11, 220 P.3d 245, 247 (2009). The trial court determined that even if trial counsel’s 

actions were unreasonable, “Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any prejudice and his 

claims are speculative.” Id., Exh. “E” at 9. As such, the trial court denied relief. 

 On August 16, 2010, Petitioner filed his Petition for Review to Arizona Court of 

appeals. See Pet. for Review to Ariz. Ct. App. 8/16/2010 (Doc. 1-4) at 11. On February 

8, 2011, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, but denied relief. Ariz. Ct. App. 

Mem. Decision 2/8/2011 (Doc. 1-4) at 33. The court of appeals considered Petitioner’s 

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claims of ineffective assistance of counsel due to (1) an alleged failure to move to 

suppress Thompson’s statements to police as involuntary, and (2) an alleged failure to 

move for additional disclosure regarding who had located the weapons and where they 

had been found. Id. at 34. The court of appeals further noted that “Thompson also 

claimed in his petition below that the ‘redaction of [his] statement was improper under 

the circumstances.’ He does not mention this argument on review and we therefore do 

not address it.” Id. at 34 n. 1. The court of appeals stated that “[i]n the context of an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim like the one before us, . . . a petitioner bears the 

burden to show counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced him—‘that counsel’s errors 

were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.’” 

Id. at 36 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). The court of appeals went on to “agree 

with the trial court that Thompson ha[d] not met that standard.” Id. Moreover the court 

of appeals also found that the trial court “correctly rejected Thompson’s other claims in a 

thorough and well-reasoned minute entry.” Id. As such it saw “no purpose in repeating 

or embellishing the court’s rulings on those claims . . ., and therefore adopt[ed] them.” 

Id. (citing State v. Whipple, 177 Ariz. 272, 274, 866 P.2d 1358, 1360 (Ct. App. 1993)). 

 On March 4, 2011, Petitioner sought review of the denial of his PCR petition by 

the Arizona Supreme Court. Pet. for Review to Ariz. Supreme Ct. 3/4/2011 (Doc. 1-4) at 

38. On June 8, 2011, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. Ariz. Supreme Ct. ME 

6/8/2011 (Doc. 1-4) at 54. 

C. Second Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding 

 On October 27, 2011, Petitioner filed his Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. Not. 

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of PCR 10/27/2011 (Doc. 1-4 at 60). Based upon newly discovered evidence, a 

significant change in the law, actual innocence, and that his failure to file a timely PCR 

notice was not his fault, Petitioner claimed (1) a Brady violation based upon the State’s 

alleged failure to disclose a complete transcript of Petitioner’s own statement to police; 

(2) the State’s alleged failure to disclose evidence “led directly to Extrinsic Collateral 

Fraud” in violation of his due process rights; (3) false evidence was used to obtain a 

conviction against him, as a result of the allegedly shortened version of the transcript of 

his police interview relied on by the State; (4) state court errors denied Petitioner a fair 

trial; (5) spoliation of evidence due to the alleged alteration of Petitioner’s interview 

transcript; (6) fraudulent concealment based upon the State’s alleged failure to disclose 

the complete transcript of Petitioner’s interview; (7) a fundamental miscarriage of justice 

based upon the alleged alteration of the transcript of Petitioner’s statement to police; and 

(8) that the jury instructions were inconsistent with S.B. 1449. Notice of PCR 

10/27/2011 (Doc. 1-4) at 60–87. 

 On January 6, 2012, the trial court denied Petitioner second PCR petition. In 

Chambers Ruling, Re: Pet. for PCR 1/6/2012 (Doc. 1-5) 23–26. The trial court analyzed 

Petitioner’s claims regarding alleged inconsistencies in the transcripts of his police 

interview under the standard of newly discovered evidence. Id. at 23. The trial court 

observed that “Petitioner’s argument is severely flawed[,]” noting that “Exhibit is A is in 

fact the Pima County Public Defender’s transcription of Thompson’s interview with 

police created on July 3, 2007[,] [which] was created, maintained, and possessed by 

Petitioner and his counsel since July 3, 2007.” Id. The trial court further noted that 

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“Exhibit B is in fact the Pima County Attorney’s transcription of the same interview, but 

was created on July 7, 2007 . . . [and] not within the sole possession of the State and . . . 

available to Petitioner at the time of trial.” Id. The Court found that “only the CD audio 

recording of the interview was admitted, not the transcript[,] [and] [t]he CD contains the 

accurate and unredacted statements made by Petitioner without the concern of conflicting 

transcripts.” Id. at 23–24. The trial court analyzed Petitioner’s claim regarding allegedly 

improper jury instructions as one for ineffective assistance of counsel. In Chambers 

Ruling, Re: Pet. for PCR 1/6/2012 (Doc. 1-5) at 25. The trial court found that “Petitioner 

ha[d] failed to identify the statute at issue which would require the alternate jury 

instruction[,] that a review of SB 1449 was unhelpful, and that in light of Petitioner’s 

admission to shooting the victim in this case, “[a] jury instruction defining assault as 

being without physical contact is irrelevant[.]” Id.

 On February 6, 2012, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review (Doc. 1-5) at 40–73. 

See also Answer (Doc. 11), Pet. for Review 2/6/2012 (Exh. “N”). Subsequently, on 

February 10, 2012, Petitioner filed a Notice of Filing Petition for Review. (Doc. 1-5) at 

28. On May 30, 2012, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, but denied relief. 

See Ariz. Ct. App. Mem. Decision (Doc. 1-5) at 76–80. Regarding the transcripts of 

Petitioner’s police interview, the court of appeals found that “only the audio recording of 

the statements was played for the jury; the redacted version of the state’s transcript was 

used during testimony[,] but was not admitted into evidence.” Id. at 78. The appellate 

court further found that “the transcript Thompson claimed the state had failed to disclose 

to him was actually the transcript prepared by the Public Defender’s office, exhibit A to 

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Thompson’s petition.” Id. Additionally, any redaction had occurred due to Petitioner’s 

desire not to have the jury “hear anything about his having individuals suspected of being 

undocumented immigrants at gunpoint on his property.” Id. Ultimately, both transcripts 

were marked as exhibits during trial, but not admitted. Id. at 78–79. The court of appeals 

found that Petitioner had “failed to establish the [trial] court abused its discretion when it 

summarily dismissed his notice/petition.” Ariz. Ct. App. Mem. Decision (Doc. 1-5) at 

79. The appellate court also found that the trial court properly addressed the timeliness of 

the State’s response to Petitioner’s second PCR petition. Id. As such, the Arizona Court 

of Appeals found that “[i]n all other respects, in its well-reasoned minute entry the trial 

court clearly identified and correctly resolved the claims Thompson had raised . . . [and] 

we adopt that ruling.” Id. at 79–80. 

 On September 13, 2012, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. Answer 

(Doc. 11), Ariz. Supreme Ct. ME 9/13/2012 (Exh. “K”). 

D. The Instant Habeas Proceeding 

 On October 18, 2012, Petitioner filed his Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a 

Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Non-Death Penalty) (Doc. 1). 

Petitioner claims eight (8) grounds for relief, with some issues including multiple 

subparts. First, Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to an alleged 

failure “to move to suppress petitioners [sic] unconstitutionally obtained statement this 

violated petitioners [sic] Right to Counsel and Right to Due Process of the Law[.]” 

Petition (Doc. 1) at 6. Petitioner further alleges that the trial court erred in not finding his 

statement to police to be coerced. Id. Second, Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of 

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trial counsel based on an alleged “fail[ure] to move for additional disclosure as to who 

found the SKS & .45 cal. weapons this precluded testimony as to the exact location of 

discovery of weapons.” Id. at 7. Petitioner further alleges that counsel “failed to conduct 

reasonable pre-trial investigation” in violation of his right to counsel and due process. Id. 

Third, Petitioner claims that “[t]he State failed to disclose ‘Brady” evidence (23) pages of 

Mr. Thompson’s statement in possession of Pima County Sheriff’s Office and 

investigative agencies which the State had access to . . . in violat[ion] [of] petitioners [sic] 

right to Due Process of the Law[.]” Id. at 8. Fourth, Petitioner asserts that “[t]he State 

failed to disclose evidence favorable to the accused as defense requested disclosure under 

Rule 15.1 & 15.1(b) . . . [in violation of] the petitioner’s Rights to Due Process of the 

Law[.]” Petition (Doc. 1) at 9. Fifth, Petitioner alleges that “[f]alse evidence [was] used 

to convict . . . [in violation of] petitioners [sic] right to a fair trial, [and] rights to due 

process of the law.” Id. at 10. As with Grounds Three and Four, this relates to the 

redacted transcription relied on by the State during trial. See id. at 8–10. Sixth, 

Petitioner claims that “State Court Errors Denied Defendant a Fair Trial as defendants 

[sic] conviction resulted from state court errors[.]” Id. at 11. This ground for relief 

includes “supporting facts” which appear to be either ways in which the trial court erred 

or possibly additional claims. See id. These include: (a) 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1021 & 

1622; (b) 18 U.S.C. § 1506; (c) Rules of Evidence 1002 & 106;7

 (d) Federal Rules of 

Criminal Procedure 26.2(f)(2); (e) twenty-three (23) “pages of the July 8, 2007 

 

7

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the Arizona Rules of Evidence, but comments that he is referring to the “[r]equirement of the 

original[.]” Petition (Doc. 1) at 11. 

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[transcript] required to be released the same time the [ninety-four] (94) pages were 

released[;]” (f) “the Court was supposed to do the redaction and seal the entire 

statement[;]” (g) “any part of the statement should be considered contemporaneously 

with it[;]” (h) “139, 140 & 141 was never as of yet released to petitioner[;]” (i) spoliation 

“because it was harmful to prosecution’s case[;]” (j) “Petitioner meets all (5) criteria of 

fraudulent concealment[;]” and (k) a reference to pages 9–18 of Petitioner’s October 27, 

2011 PCR petition. Petition (Doc. 1) at 11. Seventh, Petitioner alleges that “[t]he State 

denied the defense the right to reciprocal discovery . . . [in violation of] the petitioners 

[sic] rights to due process of the law[.]” Id. at 12. This again relates to the differing 

transcriptions of Petitioner’s statements to police. See id. Eighth, Petitioner alleges 

“[o]utside influences upon the jury raise the presumption of prejudice that imposes a 

heavy burden on the State to overcome by showing that these influences were harmless to 

the petitioner.” Id. at 13. Petitioner is referring to the redacted transcript relied on by the 

State during his trial and provided to the jury during its case in chief. See id. On January 

22, 2013, Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 11), and on February 7, 2013, Petitioner 

filed his Traverse (Doc. 13). 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

A. In General

 The federal courts shall “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in 

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground 

that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United 

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States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus 

by a person in state custody: 

shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim – (1) 

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398, 179 

L.Ed.2d 557 (2011). Correcting errors of state law is not the province of federal habeas 

corpus relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 

(1991). Ultimately, “[t]he statute’s design is to ‘further the principles of comity, finality, 

and federalism.’” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 945, 127 S.Ct. 2842, 2854, 168 

L.Ed.2d 662 (2007) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 

154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003)). Furthermore, this standard is difficult to meet and highly 

deferential “for evaluating state-court rulings, [and] which demands that state-court 

decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398 (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). 

 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 110 Stat. 

1214, mandates the standards for federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The 

“AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims 

have been adjudicated in state court.” Burt v. Titlow, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 10, 16, 187 

L.Ed.2d 348 (2013). Federal courts reviewing a petition for habeas corpus must 

“presume the correctness of state courts’ factual findings unless applicants rebut this 

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presumption with ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 

473–74, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 1940, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). 

Moreover, on habeas review, the federal courts must consider whether the state court’s 

determination was unreasonable, not merely incorrect. Id., 550 U.S. at 473, 127 S.Ct. at 

1939; Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 987 (9th Cir. 2013). Such a determination is 

unreasonable where a state court properly identifies the governing legal principles 

delineated by the Supreme Court, but when the court applies the principles to the facts 

before it, arrives at a different result. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 

770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 

L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); see also Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 905 (9th Cir. 2004). 

“AEDPA requires ‘a state prisoner [to] show that the state court’s ruling on the claim 

being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error . . . 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” Burt, 134 S.Ct. at 10 (quoting 

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103, 131 S.Ct. at 786–87) (alterations in original). 

B. Exhaustion of State Remedies 

 Prior to application for a writ of habeas corpus, a person in state custody must 

exhaust all of the remedies available in the State courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). This 

“provides a simple and clear instruction to potential litigants: before you bring any claims 

to federal court, be sure that you first have taken each one to state court.” Rose v. Lundy, 

455 U.S. 509, 520, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1204, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). As such, the 

exhaustion doctrine gives the State “the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged 

violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 

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1347, 1349, 158 L.Ed. 2d 64 (2004) (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, “[t]he 

exhaustion doctrine is principally designed to protect the state courts’ role in the 

enforcement of federal law and prevent disruption of state judicial proceedings.” Rose, 

455 U.S. at 518, 102 S.Ct. at 1203 (internal citations omitted). This upholds the doctrine 

of comity which “teaches that one court should defer action on causes properly within its 

jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already 

cognizant of the litigation, have had an opportunity to pass upon the matter.” Id. (quoting 

Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204, 70 S.Ct. 587, 590, 94 L.Ed. 761 (1950)). 

 Section 2254(c) provides that claims “shall not be deemed . . . exhausted” so long 

as the applicant “has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available 

procedure the question presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). “[O]nce the federal claim has 

been fairly presented to the state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied.” Picard 

v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971). The fair 

presentation requirement mandates that a state prisoner must alert the state court “to the 

presence of a federal claim” in his petition, simply labeling a claim “federal” or expecting 

the state court to read beyond the four corners of the petition is insufficient. Baldwin v. 

Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 33, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (rejecting 

petitioner’s assertion that his claim had been “fairly presented” because his brief in the 

state appeals court did not indicate that “he was complaining about a violation of federal 

law” and the justices having the opportunity to read a lower court decision addressing the 

federal claims was not fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(holding that petitioner failed to exhaust federal due process issue in state court because 

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petitioner presented claim in state court only on state grounds). Furthermore, in order to 

“fairly present” one’s claims, the prisoner must do so “in each appropriate state court.” 

Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29, 124 S.Ct. at 1349. “Generally, a petitioner satisfies the 

exhaustion requirement if he properly pursues a claim (1) throughout the entire direct 

appellate process of the state, or (2) throughout one entire judicial postconviction process 

available in the state.” Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 916 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 

Liebman & Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure, § 23.3b (9th ed. 

1998)). 

 In Arizona, however, for non-capital cases “review need not be sought before the 

Arizona Supreme Court in order to exhaust state remedies.” Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 

1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F.Supp.2d 925 (D. Ariz. 

2007); Moreno v. Gonzalez, 192 Ariz. 131, 962 P.2d 205 (1998). Additionally, the 

Supreme Court has further interpreted § 2254(c) to recognize that once the state courts 

have ruled upon a claim, it is not necessary for an applicant to seek collateral relief for 

the same issues already decided upon direct review. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 

350, 109 S.Ct. 1056, 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 380 (1989). 

C. Procedural Default 

 “A habeas petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the 

technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer ‘available’ 

to him.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2555, 115 L.Ed.2d 

650 (1991). Moreover, federal courts “will not review a question of federal law decided 

by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent 

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of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Id., 501 U.S. at 728, 111 

S.Ct. at 2254. This is true whether the state law basis is substantive or procedural. Id.

(citations omitted). Such claims are considered procedurally barred from review. See 

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). 

 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained the difference between exhaustion 

and procedural default as follows: 

The exhaustion doctrine applies when the state court has never been 

presented with an opportunity to consider a petitioner’s claims and that 

opportunity may still be available to the petitioner under state law. In 

contrast, the procedural default rule barring consideration of a federal claim 

applies only when a state court has been presented with the federal claim, 

but declined to reach the issue for procedural reasons, or if it is clear that 

the state court would hold the claim procedurally barred. Franklin v. 

Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). Thus, in some circumstances, a petitioner’s failure to 

exhaust a federal claim in state court may cause a procedural default. See 

Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 2002); Beaty v. Stewart, 

303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A claim is procedurally defaulted ‘if 

the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the 

petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the 

exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.’”) 

(quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 

115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991)). 

Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 621 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, a prisoner’s habeas 

petition may be precluded from federal review due to procedural default in two ways. 

First, where the petitioner presented his claims to the state court, which denied relief 

based on independent and adequate state grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 728, 111 S.Ct. 

at 2254. Federal courts are prohibited from review in such cases because they have “no 

power to review a state law determination that is sufficient to support the judgment, 

resolution of any independent federal ground for the decision could not affect the 

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judgment and would therefore be advisory.” Id. Second, where a “petitioner failed to 

exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present 

his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims 

procedurally barred.” Id. at 735 n.1, 111 S.Ct. at 2557 n.1 (citations omitted). Thus, the 

federal court “must consider whether the claim could be pursued by any presently 

available state remedy.” Cassett, 406 F.3d at 621 n.6 (quoting Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 

923, 931 (9th Cir. 1998)) (emphasis in original). 

 Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal 

courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and 

actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 

103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding 

barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice); see 

also Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 534, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 2666, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986) 

(recognizing “that a federal habeas court must evaluate appellate defaults under the same 

standards that apply when a defendant fails to preserve a claim at trial.”). “[T]he 

existence of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner 

can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to 

comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 

S.Ct. 2639, 2645, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 

1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally 

defaulting his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, [as such] there is no basis on 

which to address the merits of his claims.”). In addition to cause, a habeas petitioner 

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must show actual prejudice, meaning that he “must show not merely that the errors . . . 

created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial 

disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” Murray, 

477 U.S. at 494, 106 S.Ct. at 2648 (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted). 

Without a showing of both cause and prejudice, a habeas petitioner cannot overcome the 

procedural default and gain review by the federal courts. Id., 106 S.Ct. at 2649. 

 The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that “the cause and prejudice 

standard will be met in those cases where review of a state prisoner’s claim is necessary 

to correct ‘a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 

111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135, 102 

S.Ct. 1558, 1572–73, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982)). “The fundamental miscarriage of justice 

exception is available ‘only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional claim with 

a colorable showing of factual innocence.’” Herrara v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404, 113 

S.Ct. 853, 862, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993) (emphasis in original) (quoting Kuhlmann v. 

Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 2627, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986)). Thus, “‘actual 

innocence’ is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a 

habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered 

on the merits.” Herrara, 506 U.S. at 404, 113 S.Ct. at 862. Further, in order to 

demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a habeas petitioner must “establish by 

clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable 

factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(e)(2)(B). 

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 In Arizona, a petitioner’s claim may be procedurally defaulted where he has 

waived his right to present his claim to the state court “at trial, on appeal or in any 

previous collateral proceeding.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). “if an asserted claim is of 

sufficient constitutional magnitude, the state must show that the defendant ‘knowingly, 

voluntarily and intelligently’ waived the claim.” Id., 2002 cmt. Neither Rule 32.2. nor 

the Arizona Supreme Court has defined claims of “sufficient constitutional magnitude” 

requiring personal knowledge before waiver. See id.; see also Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 

446, 46 P.3d 1067 (2002). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that this 

assessment “often involves a fact-intensive inquiry” and the “Arizona state courts are 

better suited to make these determinations.” Cassett, 406 F.3d at 622. 

III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 

 As a threshold matter, the Court must consider whether Petitioner’s petition is 

barred by the statute of limitation. See White v. Klizkie, 281 F.3d 920, 921–22 (9th Cir. 

2002). The AEDPA mandates that a one-year statute of limitations applies to 

applications for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in state custody. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1). Section 2244(d)(1) provides that the limitations period shall run from the 

latest of: 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by 

the State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States 

is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 

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(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized 

by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on 

collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2005). “The time 

during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral 

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted 

toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Respondents do not dispute the timeliness of Thompson’s petition. The Court has 

independently reviewed the record and finds that the Petition (Doc. 1) is timely pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

IV. ANALYSIS 

A. Grounds One and Two: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

 For cases which have been fairly presented to the State court, the Supreme Court 

elucidated a two part test for determining whether a defendant could prevail on a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel sufficient to overturn his conviction. See Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). First, Petitioner must 

show that counsel’s performance was deficient. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. “This 

requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 

the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. Second, Petitioner 

must show that this performance prejudiced his defense. Id. Prejudice “requires showing 

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that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial whose 

result is reliable.” Id. Ultimately, whether or not counsel’s performance was effective 

hinges on its reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

688, 104 S.Ct. at 2065; see also State v. Carver, 160 Ariz. 167, 771 P.2d 1382 (1989) 

(adopting Strickland two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims). The Sixth 

Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance is not meant to “improve the quality of 

legal representation,” rather it is to ensure the fairness of trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. “Thus, ‘[t]he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness 

must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the 

adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.’” 

Cullen v. Pinholster, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011) (quoting 

Strickland, 466 at 686) (emphasis and alteration in original). 

 “The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly deferential,’ . 

. . and when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so[.]” Harrington v. Richter, 

562 U.S. 86, 105, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (citations omitted). 

Judging counsel’s performance must be made without the influence of hindsight. See 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. As such, “the defendant must overcome 

the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be 

considered sound trial strategy.’” Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 

S.Ct. 158, 164, 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955)). Without the requisite showing of either “deficient 

performance” or “sufficient prejudice,” Petitioner cannot prevail on his ineffectiveness 

claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700, 104 S.Ct. at 2071. “[T]he question is not whether 

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counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable 

argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Gentry v. Sinclair, 705 

F.3d 884, 899 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105, 131 S.Ct. at 788) 

(alterations in original). “The challenger’s burden is to show ‘that counsel made errors so 

serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the 

Sixth Amendment.’” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 104, 131 S.Ct. at 787 (quoting Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052). In the instant case, the Rule 32 court properly stated 

the Strickland rule, and this ruling was adopted by the Arizona Court of Appeals. In 

Chambers Ruling, Re: Pet. for PCR 8/4/2010 (Doc. 1-4) at 4; Ariz. Ct. App. Mem. 

Decision 2/8/2011 (Doc. 1-4) at 36; see also Answer (Doc. 11), Exh. “E.” Accordingly, 

this Court must determine whether the State courts’ conclusions were an unreasonable 

application thereof. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

1. Ground One: Failure to move to suppress Petitioner’s statements 

Petitioner claims that his “[t]rial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to 

suppress petitioners [sic] unconstitutionally obtained statement . . . [in violation of his] 

Right to Counsel and Rights to Due Process of the Law[.]” Petition (Doc. 1) at 6. 

Petitioner asserts that “[t]he trial court erred in finding the petitioners [sic] statement not 

to have been coersed [sic] to the extent that it induced the petitioner to waive his 

“Miranda Rights” because it was petitioner who solicited the agreement with police for 

Quid pro Quo exchange for information [.]” Id. The Rule 32 court stated that “[t]he 

admissibility of a defendant’s custodial statements is conditioned on warning the 

defendant of his Miranda rights, and obtaining the defendant’s voluntary and intelligent 

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waiver of those rights before any interrogation takes place.” In Chambers Ruling, Re: 

Pet. for PCR 8/4/2010 (Doc. 1-4) at 5 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 

(1966); Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608 (2004)). The court went onto determine 

the voluntariness of Petitioner’s confession, relying on Arizona state law. In Chambers 

Ruling, Re: Pet. for PCR 8/4/2010 (Doc. 1-4) at 6. Upon finding Petitioner’s statement to 

be voluntary, the Rule 32 court held that “Trial Counsel’s failure to seek suppression of 

the Petitioner’s statements was a matter of trial strategy and it does not find that 

Counsel’s actions were unreasonable.” Id. The Rule 32 court further found that even if a 

Miranda violation had occurred, that “there was an abundance of evidence adduced at 

trial [other than Petitioner’s statements] from which the jury might have concluded that 

the Petitioner was guilty[,]” and as such he could not show prejudice. Id. at 6–7. The 

Rule 32 court’s decision was adopted in total by the Arizona Court of Appeals. Ariz. Ct. 

App. Mem. Decision 2/8/2011 (Doc. 1-4) at 36. This Court is “not required to defer to 

the state court’s decision because the issue involves an alleged violation of the federal 

Constitution.” Brown v. Anderson, 164 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Estelle v. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991)). As such, the 

Court will consider Petitioner’s alleged Miranda violation. 

a. Miranda Waiver 

 “In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court recognized that custodial interrogations, by 

their very nature, generate ‘compelling pressures which work to undermine the 

individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so 

freely.’” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 420, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1140, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 

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(1985) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. at 1624). As such, in order “[t]o 

combat this inherent compulsion, and thereby protect the Fifth Amendment privilege 

against self-incrimination, Miranda imposed on the police an obligation to follow certain 

procedures in their dealings with the accused[,]” which include the familiar Miranda

warnings. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 420, 106 S.Ct. at 1140. “Miranda holds that ‘[t]he 

defendant may waive effectuation’ of the rights conveyed in the warnings provided the 

waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.’” Id., 475 U.S. at 421, 106 S.Ct. 

at 1140–41 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 1628). “The 

waiver inquiry ‘has two distinct dimensions’” waiver must be ‘voluntary in the sense that 

it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or 

deception,’ and ‘made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being 

abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.’” Berghuis v. Thompkins, 

560 U.S. 370, 382, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2260, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (quoting Burbine, 

475 U.S. at 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135). “Only if the ‘totality of the circumstances surrounding 

the interrogation’ reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of 

comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been 

waived.” Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421, 106 S.Ct. at 1141. 

 Here, it is undisputed that Petitioner was given Miranda warnings prior to any 

discussion with police officers. Petitioner alleges, however, that he “did not just simply 

waive his ‘Miranda Rights’ but obviously by the record request with the waiver to act as 

his own attorney or other word’s [sic] put in the position where police are not allowed to 

lie or create gamesmanship.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 7. At the beginning of the taped portion 

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of the interview, Detective Copeland read Petitioner his Miranda rights. Petition (Doc. 

1), Thompson Interview (Exh. “A”) at 2. As found by the Rule 32 court, Detective 

Copeland asked if Petitioner understood these rights, and the following exchange took 

place: 

THOMPSON: I understand those rights and I will act as my 

own attorney when I as you a question and you 

just answered it was documented. There I said 

it. 

DET. COPELAND: Okay. So, so you’re . . . 

THOMPSON: You can ask me anything you want, I am my 

own lawyer, I’ll represent myself, I ask you 

anything I want, if you stop answering 

questions for me then I’ll stop answering 

questions for you. 

COPELAND: Okay. 

Petition (Doc. 1), Exh. “A” at 2:3-22; see also Answer (Doc. 11), Exh. “E” at 1–3. 

Detective Copeland begins questioning Petitioner about where he lives, where he receives 

mail, and his telephone number. Petition (Doc. 1), Exh. “A” at 3. Petitioner asked about 

the status of his residence and dog, and Detective Copeland stated the information that he 

had. Id. Then Petitioner began discussing his brother, including the particulars of their 

familial relationship, his name, his residence. Id., Exh. “A” at 3–6. The interview then 

returned to Petitioner’s job status and more about his property. Id., Exh. “A” at 7–9. 

Petitioner complained of being cold, and asked for cigarettes. Id., Exh. “A” at 6:13-38, 

9:36-10:2. Before Petitioner began providing any information regarding the incident with 

his brother, the following occurred: 

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HESS:8 I’ve got to interrupt really quick and I’m sorry. I just 

want you to know Lyndall that just because we’re 

getting you a shirt and some cigarettes, there’s no 

promise, if you don’t want to talk and you want to 

stop. . . . 

THOMPSON: I want to talk. 

HESS: You do? 

THOMPSON: I don’t have any problem with this. I didn’t do 

anything wrong, I haven’t done anything right, but I 

defended myself with lethal force. 

HESS: I just want you to understand that we’re not here to go 

do talk so we’re gonna give you something to warm up 

and we’re going to give a cigarette. 

THOMPSON: (12:45) see what you guys are up to, you can 

see what I’m up to. 

HESS: Okay, we’re not up to anything, we want to know, if 

you want to talk, talk, but I, I’m not making you any 

promises. 

THOMPSON: I do want to talk. 

HESS: Okay. 

THOMPSON: I don’t need any promises. 

HESS: Okay, very well. 

THOMPSON: I understand the law completely. 

HESS: Okay, good. 

Petition (Doc. 1), Exh. “A” at 11:15-12:5. The record supports the state court’s finding 

that no quid pro quo promise related to Petitioner’s waiver existed. The totality of the 

 

8

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“Detectives Copeland & Hess.” Petition (Doc. 1), Exh. “A” at 1. “Q” identified himself 

as Detective Copeland on the tape. See id. “Q2” is identified as Detective Hess on the 

State’s transcript. See Petition (Doc. 1), Exh. “B” at 1. 

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circumstances demonstrates “both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of 

comprehension” that Petitioner voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his 

Miranda rights in speaking with Detectives Copeland and Hess. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 

421, 106 S.Ct. at 1141. Petitioner “did not invoke his right to remain silent and stop the 

questioning[;] [and] [u]nderstanding his rights in full, he waived his right to remain silent 

by making a voluntary statement to the police.” Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 389, 130 S.Ct. at 

2264. 

b. Strickland Error 

 “[T]he failure to file a suppression motion does not constitute per se ineffective 

assistance of counsel[.]” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 

2587, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). Moreover, “[c]ounsel’s competence . . . is presumed, . . . 

and the defendant must rebut this presumption by proving that his attorney’s 

representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that the 

challenged action was not sound strategy.” Id. at 384, 106 S.Ct. at 2588 (citations 

omitted). The Rule 32 court held that “Trial Counsel’s failure to seek suppression of the 

Petitioner’s statements was a matter of trial strategy and it does not find that Counsel’s 

actions were unreasonable.” In Chambers Ruling, Re: Pet. for PCR 8/4/2010 (Doc. 1-4) 

at 6. This decision was adopted in total by the Arizona Court of Appeals. Ariz. Ct. App. 

Mem. Decision 2/8/2011 (Doc. 1-4) at 36. In light of Petitioner’s clear and unequivocal 

waiver of his Miranda rights, this Court finds that the Arizona courts did not 

unreasonably apply clearly established Federal law or unreasonably determine the facts in 

light of the evidence presented. Therefore, Petitioner cannot meet his burden to show 

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“that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ 

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 104, 131 

S.Ct. at 787 (quotations omitted). As such, Petitioner cannot show either deficient 

performance or prejudice, and Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

regarding counsel’s alleged failure to move to suppress Petitioner’s statements must fail. 

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. 

2. Ground Two: Discovery Regarding Weapons 

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing “to move for 

additional disclosure as to who found the SKS & .45 cal[iber] weapons [because] this 

precluded testimony as to the exact location of discovery of weapons.” Petition (Doc. 1) 

at 7. Petitioner further alleges that “counsel failed to conduct reasonable pre-trial 

investigation . . . [in violation of his] Right to Counsel and Rights to Due Process of the 

Law[.]” Id. Petitioner additionally claims that he “has discovered after receipt of his 

entire case file Sgt. James actually found [the guns.]” Id.

The Rule 32 court stated that: 

The Court has reviewed the record and the pleadings and finds that Deputy 

Sutton’s statements in his report and his interview were consistent. The 

Deputy never claimed to have discovered the weapons and maintained that 

he believed they were discovered atop the car and not on the ground though 

he couldn’t remember with absolute certainty. Nonetheless, the other 

witnesses consistently claimed and testified that the weapons were 

discovered atop the car. For these reasons, the Court presumes that Trial 

Counsel elected not to explore the matter further and decided not to seek 

suppression of the witness testimony regarding the the [sic] location of the 

weapons as a matter of trial strategy. The Court finds that Trial Counsel’s 

actions were reasonable and it will not second-guess Trial Counsel’s 

tactical decisions. Moreover, even if Trial Counsel’s actions were 

unreasonable, the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any prejudice. The 

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Petitioner’s claim that the weapons testimony affected the outcome of his 

case is speculative. There is nothing in the record which indicates that the 

weapons testimony was dispositive or that suppression would have changed 

the outcome of the Petitioner’s case. 

Answer (Doc. 11), Exh. “E” at 6; In Chambers Ruling, Re: Petition for Post-Conviction 

Relief 8/3/2010 (Doc. 1-4) at 6. The court of appeals agreed that Petitioner had failed to 

meet his “burden to show counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced him—‘that 

counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 

result is reliable.’” Ariz. Ct. App. Mem. Decision 2/8/2011 (Doc. 1-4) at 35–36 (citing 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064). 

 Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that the Arizona courts did not 

unreasonably apply clearly established Federal law or unreasonably determine the facts in 

light of the evidence presented. Therefore, Petitioner cannot meet his burden to show 

prejudice. See Gulbrandson, 738 F.3d at 991. Regarding Plaintiff’s claim that Sgt. 

James found the weapons, there is no evidence, beyond Plaintiff’s bald assertion, before 

the Court regarding this claim. Furthermore, and as the Rule 32 court noted, irrespective 

of where the weapons were found, “Petitioner’s claim that the weapons testimony 

affected the outcome of his case is speculative.” Answer (Doc. 11), Exh. “E” at 6; In 

Chambers Ruling, Re: Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 8/3/2010 (Doc. 1-4) at 6. 

“Newly discovered evidence is a ground for habeas relief only when it bears on the 

constitutionality of an appellant's conviction and would probably produce an acquittal.” 

Spivey v. Rocha, 194 F.3d 971, 979 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Petitioner cannot 

meet his burden, and his ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding counsel’s 

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alleged failure to seek additional disclosure regarding the location of the guns and pretrial 

investigation into the same must fail. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. 

B. Grounds Three, Four, and Five: Brady Material 

 “[S]uppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon 

request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 

punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196–97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The 

Supreme Court of the United States has subsequently held that “the duty to disclose such 

evidence is applicable even though there has been no request by the accused[.]” Strickler 

v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 1948, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (citing 

United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49, L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)). As 

such, “[d]ue process imposes an ‘inescapable’ duty on the prosecutor ‘to disclose known, 

favorable evidence rising to a material level of importance.’” Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 

998, 1012 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 

131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995)). 

 A Brady violation results if “the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a 

reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different 

verdict.” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281, 119 S.Ct. at 1948. Such a violation has three 

elements: (1) “[t]he evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it 

is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching;” (2) “that evidence must have been 

suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently;” and (3) “prejudice must have 

ensued.” Id.

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1. Ground Three: Alleged Failure to Disclose Pima County Sheriff’s 

Office Transcription of Petitioner Interview 

 Petitioner alleges that “[t]he State failed to disclose ‘Brady’ evidence (23) pages of 

Mr. Thompson’s statement in possession of Pima County Sheriff’s Office and 

investigative agencies which the State had access to . . . [in violation of ] petitioners [sic] 

right to Due Process of the Law[.]” Petition (Doc. 1) at 8. Petitioner further describes 

the timeline of transcription of his interview with police by the Pima County Public 

Defender’s Office and the Pima County Sheriff’s Office, and details the discrepancies 

between the two transcripts. Id.; Pet.’s Addendum (Doc. 1-3) at 2–56; Pro Se Suppl. Br. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1-6) at 1–19. 

 The Rule 32 court found “Petitioner’s argument is severely flawed.” In Chambers 

Ruling, Re: Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 1/4/2012 (Doc. 1-5) at 25. Upon review, 

the court of appeals noted that “there was only one recording of Thompson’s statements 

to law enforcement officers; there were, however, two transcriptions, one prepared by the 

Pima County Sheriff’s office, which seems to have become the transcript used by the 

Pima County Attorney’s office (the state’s transcript”), and the other by the Pima County 

Public Defender’s office, which differed in nonmaterial ways.” Ariz. Ct. App. Mem. 

Decision 5/30/2012 (Doc. 1-5) at 77–78. Both the Rule 32 court and the court of appeals 

recognized that “only the audio recording of the statements was played for the jury; the 

redacted version of the state’s transcript was used during testimony but was not admitted 

into evidence.” Id. at 78. Moreover, “the transcript Thompson claimed the state had 

failed to disclose to him was actually the transcript prepared by the Public Defender’s 

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office[,] . . . [and] with respect to the redaction of portions of Thompson’s recorded 

statements, the prosecutor explained to the court during a bench conference on the second 

day of trial that Thompson did not want the jury to hear anything about his having held 

individuals suspected of being undocumented immigrants at gunpoint on his property.” 

Id. Additionally, both Detectives Hess and Copeland, who were involved in Petitioner’s 

interview, testified at trial regarding what occurred when the recorder had been stopped, 

as well as to the accuracy of the State’s transcription. Id. at 79. The court of appeals 

adopted the Rule 32 court’s determination that transcript’s “continued absence from trial 

would not have altered the verdict.” Id.; In Chambers Ruling, Re: Petition for PostConviction Relief 1/4/2012 (Doc. 1-5) at 26. The Rule 32 court, however, considered 

this claim under Arizona law regarding newly-discovered evidence, but did not directly 

address any alleged Brady violation. In such a situation, this Court is “not required to 

defer to the state court’s decision because the issue involves an alleged violation of the 

federal Constitution.” Brown v. Anderson, 164 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Estelle v. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991)). 

 In order for a Brady violation to occur, “[t]he evidence at issue must be favorable 

to the accused[.]” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281, 119 S.Ct. at 1948. Favorable evidence is 

defined as “[a]ny evidence that would tend to call the government’s case into doubt is 

favorable for Brady purposes.” Milke, 711 F.3d at 1011 (citing Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290, 

119 S.Ct. 1936). As an initial matter, contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, the transcript 

was not favorable to him. It contained the entirety of his confession to police. 

Furthermore, the transcript was produced by his counsel’s office. Trial counsel received 

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the recordings of Petitioner’s interview with police, and were able to create a 

transcription from the same. As such, the State did not fail to turn over evidence, and 

even if there was a failure, the material was not favorable to the defense. Accordingly, 

no Brady violation occurred, and Petitioner’s habeas claim regarding the same must fail. 

2. Count Four: State’s Alleged Failure to Disclose Evidence 

 Petitioner alleges that “[t]he State failed to disclose evidence favorable to the 

accused as defense requested disclosure under Rule 15.1 & 15.1(b) . . . [in violation of] 

petitioner’s Rights to Due Process of the Law[.]” Petition (Doc. 1) at 9. Petitioner again 

cites Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and 

discusses the differences between the two transcripts. Id. Respondents assert that this 

“claim is unexhausted because it was not made in the state court.” Answer (Doc. 11) at 

6. As such, Respondents argue that it is procedurally defaulted. Id. Contrary to 

Respondents’ position, however, Petitioner asserted this claim in his second PCR 

petition, and on appeal of the same. See Answer (Doc. 11), Not. of PCR 10/27/2011 

(Exh. “O”) at 4–23; see also Pet. for Review (Doc. 1-5) at 40–64. Petitioner intermingled 

this claim with his Brady claim and others. The Court finds that Petitioner did 

sufficiently raise this claim to the State court, and as discussed in Section IV.B.1., supra, 

the Arizona courts denied relief. Therefore, the Court finds Ground 4 is exhausted. The 

Court further finds that because “the relevant state court decision . . . fairly appear[s] to 

[be] . . . interwoven with [federal] law” it may properly address this ground for relief. 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2557, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 

(1991). 

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 “[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court 

determinations on state-law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S. 

Ct. 475, 480, 116 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1991). Therefore, “[i]n conducting habeas review, a 

federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, 

or treaties of the United States.” Id. at 68 (citations omitted). Petitioner appears to be 

relying on Rules 15.1(b) and 16, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, in part to support 

his Brady claim. Not. of PCR 10/27/2011 (Doc. 1-4) at 64–67. As discussed in Section 

IV.B.1., supra, Petitioner cannot meet the elements of a Brady violation. The addition of 

the State disclosure rules does nothing change this analysis. Therefore, the Court finds 

that Petitioner’s Ground 4 is denied. 

3. Count Five: False Evidence 

 Petitioner alleges that “[f]alse evidence [was] used to convict [him] . . . [in 

violation of his] right to a fair trial, [and] right to due process of the law.” Petition (Doc. 

1) at 10. Respondents claim that this “claim is unexhausted because it was not made in 

state court[.]” Answer (Doc. 11) at 6. The Court finds Respondents assertion incorrect. 

Petitioner raised this identical claim in his second PCR petition, stating that “False 

Evidence [was] used to convict[.]” Not. PCR 10/27/2011 (Doc. 1-4) at 68. As in the 

instant habeas petition, Petitioner cited Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 785, 17 

L.Ed.2d 660 (1967), in support of this argument. Id. This argument was also contained, 

albeit obliquely, within Petitioner’s appeal of his second PCR petition. Pet. for Review 

2/2/2012 (Doc. 1-5) at 40–64. Accordingly, the Court finds Count Five exhausted. 

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actually the transcript prepared by the Public Defender’s office[,] . . . [and] with respect 

to the redaction of portions of Thompson’s recorded statements, the prosecutor explained 

to the court during a bench conference on the second day of trial that Thompson did not 

want the jury to hear anything about his having held individuals suspected of being 

undocumented immigrants at gunpoint on his property.” Ariz. Ct. App. Mem. Decision 

5/30/2012 (Doc. 1-5) at 77–78. Additionally, both Detectives Hess and Copeland, who 

were involved in Petitioner’s interview, testified at trial regarding what occurred when 

the recorder had been stopped, as well as to the accuracy of the State’s transcription. Id.

at 79. 

 The Supreme Court of the United States has observed that “[a] state-court decision 

is ‘contrary to’ our clearly established precedents if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the 

governing law set forth in our cases’ or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially 

indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result 

different from our precedent.’” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S.Ct. 362, 365, 154 

L.Ed.2d 263 (2002) (citations omitted). The Court went on to note that “[a]voiding these 

pitfalls does not require citation of our cases—indeed, it does not even require awareness

of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision 

contradicts them.” Id. (emphasis in original). 

Petitioner’s reliance on Miller is misplaced, however. In that case “[t]he 

prosecution deliberately misrepresented the truth.” Miller, 386 U.S. at 6, 87 S.Ct. at 788. 

The Arizona courts found that the two transcripts were not materially different, were not 

admitted into evidence, and the CD containing the recording of Petitioner’s interview 

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with police was played for the jury. In Chambers Ruling, Re: Petition for PostConviction Relief 1/4/2012 (Doc. 1-5) at 25–26; Ariz. Ct. App. Mem. Decision 

5/30/2012 (Doc. 1-5) at 77–79. Accordingly, the state courts denied Petitioner’s PCR 

petition. In Chambers Ruling, Re: Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 1/4/2012 (Doc. 1-

5) at 27; Ariz. Ct. App. Mem. Decision 5/30/2012 (Doc. 1-5) at 80. The Court finds that 

this determination is neither “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of” clearly 

established Federal law, nor “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts[.]” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim is denied. 

C. Ground Six: Alleged State Court Errors 

 Petitioner alleges that “State Court Errors Denied Defendant a Fair Trial as 

defendants conviction resulted from state court errors.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 11 

(grammatical errors in original). Respondents assert that this “claim is unexhausted 

because it was not made in state court.” Answer (Doc. 11) at 7. Petitioner lists several 

alleged “errors,” some of which he alleged in the Arizona courts, others that he did not. 

The Court will address each of these in turn. 

1. Fraud, False Statements, and Perjury 

 Petitioner cites to Sections 1001, 1621, and 1622, Title 18 of the United States 

Code alleging the State courts erred under these statutes. Petition (Doc. 1) at 11. 

Petitioner asserts this claim in his Second PCR Petition. Not. of PCR 10/27/2011 (Doc. 

1-4) at 68–69, 75. Petitioner did not address this claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, 

however. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 

(2004) (in order to “fairly present” one’s claims, the prisoner must do so “in each 

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appropriate state court”). As such, the claim is unexhausted, and would now be 

precluded. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is procedurally 

defaulted. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2557 n. 1, 115 

L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (“petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which 

the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion 

requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred”). Where a habeas 

petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited 

from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and actual prejudice as a 

result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 

(1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding barred federal 

habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). Petitioner has not 

met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 

478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must show not 

merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his 

actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional 

dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also MartinezVillareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause 

“for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on which to 

address the merits of his claims.”). 

The Court notes that even if it were to excuse Petitioner’s procedural default, these 

sections of the United States Code are criminal statutes, and “[s]uch sections in no 

respect provide affirmative relief of the nature requested[.]” Peabody v. United States, 

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394 F.2d 175, 177 (9th Cir. 1968) (state prisoner seeking a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 vacation of 

sentence is not entitled to relief pursuant 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242); see also Cok v. 

Consentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Generally, a private citizen has no authority 

to initiate a federal criminal prosecution. . . . Only the United States as prosecutor can 

bring a complaint under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242[.]” Id. (citations omitted)). Petitioner is 

not entitled to habeas relief. 

2. Theft or Alteration of Record 

 Petitioner cites to Sections 1506, Title 18 of the United States Code alleging the 

State courts erred under this statute. Petition (Doc. 1) at 11. Petitioner asserts this claim 

in his Second PCR Petition. Not. of PCR 10/27/2011 (Doc. 1-4) at 68–69, 75–76. 

Petitioner did not address this claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, however. See 

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (in order 

to “fairly present” one’s claims, the prisoner must do so “in each appropriate state 

court”). As such, the claim is unexhausted, and would now be precluded. Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 32.2(a)(3). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted. Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2557 n. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) 

(“petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would 

be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now 

find the claims procedurally barred”). Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been 

procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless 

the petitioner can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 

288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise 

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claims in state appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless petitioner 

demonstrated cause and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show either 

cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 

91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created a 

possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, 

infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) 

(internal quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 

(9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his 

claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits of his 

claims.”). 

 The Court notes that even if it were to excuse Petitioner’s procedural default, this 

section of the United States Code is also a criminal statute, and “[s]uch sections in no 

respect provide affirmative relief of the nature requested[.]” Peabody v. United States, 

394 F.2d 175, 177 (9th Cir. 1968) (state prisoner seeking a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 vacation of 

sentence is not entitled to relief pursuant 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242); see also Cok v. 

Consentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Generally, a private citizen has no authority 

to initiate a federal criminal prosecution. . . . Only the United States as prosecutor can 

bring a complaint under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242[.]” Id. (citations omitted)). As such, 

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief. 

3. Federal Rules of Evidence 

 Petitioner cites to the Federal Rules of Evidence to support his claim that he was 

denied a fair trial. Petition (Doc. 1) at 11. Petitioner pointed to these same rules in his 

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Second PCR petition, and appeal from denial of the same. Not. of PCR 10/27/2011 (Doc. 

1-4) at 69–71; Pet. for Review 2/2/2012 (Doc. 1-5) at 61. The Court finds that this claim 

is exhausted. The Court further finds that Petitioner is not entitled to relief, because the 

Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in state court proceedings. See United States v. 

Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The Federal Rules of Evidence apply only to 

proceedings in federal court.”). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is denied. 

4. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 

 Petitioner cites to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to support his claim 

that he was denied a fair trial. Petition (Doc. 1) at 11. Petitioner pointed to these same 

rules in his Second PCR petition. Not. of PCR 10/27/2011 (Doc. 1-4) at 68–69, 72–73. 

Petitioner did not address this claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, however. See 

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (in order 

to “fairly present” one’s claims, the prisoner must do so “in each appropriate state 

court”). As such, the claim is unexhausted, and would now be precluded. Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 32.2(a)(3). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted. Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2557 n. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) 

(“petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would 

be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now 

find the claims procedurally barred”). Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been 

procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless 

the petitioner can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 

288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise 

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claims in state appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless petitioner 

demonstrated cause and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show either 

cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 

91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created a 

possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, 

infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) 

(internal quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 

(9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his 

claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits of his 

claims.”). 

 The Court notes that even if it were to excuse Petitioner’s procedural default, 

Petitioner is not entitled to relief, because the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not 

apply in state court proceedings. Fed. R. Crim. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in 

all criminal proceedings in the United States district courts, the United States courts of 

appeals, and the Supreme Court of the United States.”); see, e.g., United States ex rel. 

Gaugler v. Brierley, 477 F.2d 516, 523 (3d Cir. 1973) (The Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure “do not extend to prosecutions in state courts for violations of state criminal 

laws.”). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is denied. 

5. Simultaneous Release of Transcript Portions 

 Petitioner asserts that the two sections of the July 8, 2007 transcription of his 

interview with police were required to be disclosed at the same time. Petition (Doc. 1) at 

11. Petitioner did not present this claim to the State court, and it would now be 

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precluded. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). As such, Petitioner’s claim regarding an alleged 

right to simultaneous disclosure of the transcript is unexhausted, and as a result, 

procedurally defaulted. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 

2557 n. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (“petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the 

court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the 

exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred”). Where a 

habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are 

prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and actual 

prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 

L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding 

barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). 

Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. 

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner 

“must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they 

worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of 

constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also 

Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer 

any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . [ and as such] there is no basis on 

which to address the merits of his claims”). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is denied. 

6. Redaction and Sealing of Transcript 

 Petitioner asserts that “the Court was supposed to do the redaction and seal the 

entire statement.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 11. Petitioner did not present this claim to the 

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State court, and it would now be precluded. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). As such, 

Petitioner’s claim regarding an alleged right to redaction and sealing of the transcript is 

unexhausted, and as a result, procedurally defaulted. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 

722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2557 n. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (“petitioner failed to 

exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present 

his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims 

procedurally barred”). Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally 

defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner 

can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 

S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state 

appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause 

and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual 

prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 

(1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of 

prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his 

entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal 

quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 

1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . [ 

and as such] there is no basis on which to address the merits of his claims”). Therefore, 

Petitioner’s claim is denied. 

7. Contemporaneous Consideration 

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contemporaneously with it.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 11. Petitioner did not present this claim 

to the State court, and it would now be precluded. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). As such, 

Petitioner’s claim regarding an alleged right to contemporaneous consideration of his 

entire statement is unexhausted, and as a result, procedurally defaulted. Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2557 n. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) 

(“petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would 

be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now 

find the claims procedurally barred”). Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been 

procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless 

the petitioner can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 

288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise 

claims in state appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless petitioner 

demonstrated cause and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show either 

cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 

91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created a 

possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, 

infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) 

(internal quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 

(9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his 

claims[,] . . . [ and as such] there is no basis on which to address the merits of his 

claims”). 

To the extent that this claim can be construed as contained within Petitioner’s 

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general argument against the use of the redacted transcript, as presented in his second 

PCR petition, and appeal therefrom, such a claim must fail. The Arizona courts found 

that the two transcripts were not materially different, were not admitted into evidence, 

and the CD containing the recording of Petitioner’s interview with police was played for 

the jury. In Chambers Ruling, Re: Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 1/4/2012 (Doc. 1-

5) at 25–26; Ariz. Ct. App. Mem. Decision 5/30/2012 (Doc. 1-5) at 77–79. Accordingly, 

the state courts denied Petitioner’s PCR petition. In Chambers Ruling, Re: Petition for 

Post-Conviction Relief 1/4/2012 (Doc. 1-5) at 27; Ariz. Ct. App. Mem. Decision 

5/30/2012 (Doc. 1-5) at 80. The Court finds that this determination is neither “contrary 

to” or an “unreasonable application of” clearly established Federal law, nor “based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Therefore, Petitioner’s 

claim is denied. 

8. Release of Exhibits 139, 140, and 141 

 Petitioner asserts that Exhibits 139, 140 and 141 were never released to him. 

Petition (Doc. 1) at 11. This issue was never raised in an appellate or collateral 

proceeding before the state courts, and it would now be precluded. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.2(a)(3). As such, Petitioner’s claim regarding an alleged right to the release of certain 

exhibits is unexhausted, and as a result, procedurally defaulted. Coleman v. Thompson, 

501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2557 n. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (“petitioner 

failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to 

present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims 

procedurally barred”). Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally 

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defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner 

can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 

S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state 

appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause 

and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual 

prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 

(1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of 

prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his 

entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal 

quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 

1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . [ 

and as such] there is no basis on which to address the merits of his claims”). Therefore, 

Petitioner’s claim is denied. 

9. Spoliation 

 Petitioner asserts that spoliation of records occurred, depriving him of a fair trial. 

Petition (Doc. 1) at 11. Although Petitioner raised this issue in his second PCR petition, 

he failed to raise it in the appeal of the same. Not. of PCR 10/27/2011 (Doc. 1-4) at 71. 

As such, the claim is unexhausted, and would now be precluded. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.2(a)(3); see also Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 

L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (in order to “fairly present” one’s claims, the prisoner must do so “in 

each appropriate state court”). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted. 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2557 n. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 

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640 (1991) (“petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the 

petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion 

requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred”). Where a habeas 

petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited 

from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and actual prejudice as a 

result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 

(1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding barred federal 

habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). Petitioner has not 

met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 

478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must show not 

merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his 

actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional 

dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also MartinezVillareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause 

“for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on which to 

address the merits of his claims.”). Petitioner’s claim is denied. 

10.Fraudulent Concealment 

 Petitioner alleges that he meets “all (5) criteria of fraudulent concealment. 

Petition (Doc. 1) at 11. Although Petitioner raised this issue in his second PCR petition, 

he failed to raise it in the appeal of the same. Not. of PCR 10/27/2011 (Doc. 1-4) at 71–

72. As such, the claim is unexhausted, and would now be precluded. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.2(a)(3); see also Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 

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L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (in order to “fairly present” one’s claims, the prisoner must do so “in 

each appropriate state court”). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted. 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2557 n. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 

640 (1991) (“petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the 

petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion 

requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred”). Where a habeas 

petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited 

from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and actual prejudice as a 

result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 

(1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding barred federal 

habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). Petitioner has not 

met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 

478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must show not 

merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his 

actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional 

dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also MartinezVillareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause 

“for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on which to 

address the merits of his claims.”). Petitioner’s claim is denied. 

11.General Reference to Postconviction Relief Petition 

 Petitioner generally refers to his second PCR petition in support of his claim for 

the alleged denial of a fair trial. Petition (Doc. 1) at 11. “Judges are not like pigs, 

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hunting for truffles buried in briefs.” Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. 

Wu, 626 F.3d 483, 488 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). This Court has carefully 

considered each of Petitioner’s stated claims, and declines his apparent invitation to 

search for those which he may have missed. 

D. Ground Seven: Right to Reciprocal Discovery 

 Petitioner asserts that “[t]he State denied the defense the right to reciprocal 

discovery . . . [in violation of] the petitioners [sic] right to due process of the law[.]” 

Petition (Doc. 1). Respondents assert that this “claim is unexhausted because it was not 

made in state court.” Answer (Doc. 11) at 7. The Court agrees. Although Petitioner 

raised this issue in his second PCR petition, he failed to raise it in the appeal of the same. 

Not. of PCR 10/27/2011 (Doc. 1-4) at 74–77. As such, the claim is unexhausted, and 

would now be precluded. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3); see also Baldwin v. Reese, 541 

U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (in order to “fairly present” 

one’s claims, the prisoner must do so “in each appropriate state court”). Therefore, 

Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 

1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2557 n. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (“petitioner failed to exhaust state 

remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in 

order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally 

barred”). Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the 

federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause 

and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 

1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate 

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proceeding barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and 

prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) 

(Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, 

but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial 

with error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations 

omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as 

such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits of his claims.”). Petitioner’s claim 

is denied. 

E. Outside Influences on the Jury 

 Petitioner alleges that “[o]utside influences upon the jury raise the presumption of 

prejudice that imposes a heavy burden on the state to overcome by showing that these 

influences were harmless to the petitioner.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 13. Respondents assert 

that this “claim is unexhausted because it was not made in state court.” Answer (Doc. 

11) at 7. The Court agrees. Although Petitioner raised this issue in his second PCR 

petition, he failed to raise it in the appeal of the same. Not. of PCR 10/27/2011 (Doc. 1-

4) at 78–80. As such, the claim is unexhausted, and would now be precluded. Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3); see also Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1349, 

158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (in order to “fairly present” one’s claims, the prisoner must do so 

“in each appropriate state court”). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted. 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2557 n. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 

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640 (1991) (“petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the 

petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion 

requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred”). Where a habeas 

petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited 

from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and actual prejudice as a 

result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 

(1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding barred federal 

habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). Petitioner has not 

met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 

478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must show not 

merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his 

actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional 

dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also MartinezVillareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause 

“for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on which to 

address the merits of his claims.”). Petitioner’s claim is denied. 

F. Conclusion 

 In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Petitioner’s habeas claims are 

without merit, and the Petition (Doc. 1) shall be denied. 

V. RECOMMENDATION 

 For the reasons delineated above, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

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District Judge enter an order DENYING Petitioner’s Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for 

a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Non-Death Penalty) (Doc. 1); 

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after 

being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to 

another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). No replies shall be filed unless leave is granted from the District 

Court. If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV-12-

0766-TUC-DCB. 

 Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the 

Magistrate Judge may result in waiver of the right of review. The Clerk of the Court 

shall send a copy of this Report and Recommendation to all parties. 

 Dated this 31st day of July, 2015. 

Honorable Bruce G. Macdonald

United States Magistrate Judge 

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