Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00724/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-00724-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARCO RAMIREZ,

Petitioner,

 vs.

BEN CURRY, Warden.,

Respondent. /

No. C 05-0724 WHA (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

This is a habeas corpus case filed by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. The

petition is directed to denial of parole.

The court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. 

Respondent has filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of it,

and has lodged the record with the court. Petitioner has responded with a traverse. For the

reasons set forth below, the petition is DENIED.

DISCUSSION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the

basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's

adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

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determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of

law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000), while the second prong

applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340

(2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the

first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of”

Supreme Court authority, falls under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly identifies

the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but “unreasonably applies

that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The federal court on habeas

review may not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment

that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must be “objectively unreasonable” to support

granting the writ. See id. at 409. 

“Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and

convincing evidence to the contrary.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340. This presumption is not

altered by the fact that the finding was made by a state court of appeals, rather than by a state

trial court. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1981); Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082,

1087 (9th Cir.), amended, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). A petitioner must present clear and

convincing evidence to overcome § 2254(e)(1)'s presumption of correctness; conclusory

assertions will not do. Id.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual determination

will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the

evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; see also Torres

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v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000).

When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the

petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079, n. 2 (9th Cir.2000). 

B. ISSUES PRESENTED

Petitioner was convicted of attempted murder in 1993. He received a sentence of life

plus one year in prison. In 2002 he was denied parole; it is the parole decision he challenges

here. He alleges that he has exhausted these claims by way of state habeas petitions. As

grounds for federal habeas relief petitioner contends that (1) his due process rights were denied

when the Board denied parole for a second time based on the circumstances of his crime; (2) the

denial was not supported by sufficient evidence; and (3) his due process rights were violated by

the Board’s failure to comply with state law. 

Along with denying the validity of petitioner’s claims, respondent contends that

California prisoner have no liberty interest in parole and that if they do, the only due process

protections available are a right to be heard and a right to be informed of the basis for the denial

– that is, respondent contends there is no due process right to have the result supported by

sufficient evidence. Because these contentions go to whether petitioner has any due process

rights at all in connection with parole, and if he does, what those rights are, they will addressed

first.

1. RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state may “deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1. 

a. LIBERTY INTEREST

Respondent contends that California prisoners have no liberty interest in parole. 

Respondent is incorrect that Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), applies to parole decisions,

see Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 2003) (Sandin “does not affect the creation of

liberty interests in parole under Greenholtz and Allen.”), and, applying the correct analysis, the

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California parole statute does create a liberty interest protected by due process, see McQuillion

v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) (“California’s parole scheme gives rise to a

cognizable liberty interest in release on parole.”). Respondent’s claim to the contrary is without

merit. 

b. DUE-PROCESS PROTECTIONS 

Respondent contends that even if California prisoners do have a liberty interest in

parole, the due process protections to which they are entitled by clearly-established Supreme

Court authority are limited to notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a statement of reasons for

denial. That is, he contends there is no due process right to have the decision supported by

“some evidence.” This position, however, has been rejected by the Ninth Circuit, which has

held that the Supreme Court has clearly established that a parole board’s decision deprives a

prisoner of due process if the board’s decision is not supported by "some evidence in the

record", or is "otherwise arbitrary." Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 662 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying

"some evidence" standard used for disciplinary hearings as outlined in Superintendent v. Hill,

472 U.S. 445-455 (1985)); McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904 (same). The evidence underlying the

Board’s decision must also have "some indicia of reliability." McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904;

Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915. The some evidence standard identified in Hill is clearly established

federal law in the parole context for purposes of § 2254(d). See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-1129. 

2. PETITIONER’S CLAIMS

a. SECOND DENIAL OF REVIEW BASED ON CIRCUMSTANCES OF CRIME

In a line of relatively recent cases the Ninth Circuit has discussed the constitutionality of

denying parole when the only basis for denial is the circumstances of the offense. See Hayward

v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536, (9th Cir. 2008); Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 852-54 (9th Cir.

2007); Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 2006); Biggs v.

Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915-17 (9th Cir. 2003). 

In Biggs the court said that it might violate due process if the Board were to continue to

deny parole to a prisoner because of the facts of his or her offense and in the face of evidence of

rehabilitation. 334 F.3d at 916-17. No legal rationale for this statement was provided, and it

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1 The Supreme Court has clearly established that a parole board’s decision deprives a

prisoner of due process if the board’s decision is not supported by “some evidence in the

record,” or is “otherwise arbitrary.” Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123,

1129 (9th Cir. 2006) (adopting “some evidence” standard for disciplinary hearings outlined

in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985).

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was unclear whether the court was suggesting that the continued denial of parole would be a

new sort of due process violation or whether it was simply expressing the thought that with the

passage of time the nature of the offense could cease to be “some evidence” that the prisoner

would be a danger if paroled.1

 This ambiguity was helpfully cleared up in Irons, where the

court clearly treated a “some evidence” claim as different from a “Biggs claim.” Irons, 505

F.3d at 853-54. It appears, putting together the brief discussions in Biggs and Irons, that the

court meant that at some point denial of parole based on long-ago and unchangeable factors,

when overwhelmed with positive evidence of rehabilitation, would be fundamentally unfair and

violate due process. As the dissenters from denial of rehearing en banc in Irons point out, in the

Ninth Circuit what otherwise might be dictum is controlling authority if the issue was presented

and decided, even if not strictly “necessary” to the decision. Irons v. Carey, 506 F.3d 951, 952

(9th Cir. Nov. 6, 2007) (dissent from denial of rehearing en banc) (citing and discussing

Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744, 751 n. 8 (9th Cir.2005)). 

Depending on whether the discussion of dictum in the dissent from denial of rehearing

en banc in Irons is correct, it thus may be that the Ninth Circuit has recognized that due process

right, which for convenience will be referred to in this opinion as a “Biggs claim.” Here,

petitioner’s first issue is a “Biggs claim,” in that he contends that simply using the

circumstances of his offense as grounds for denial for the second time violates due process,

separate from his “some evidence” claim, which is issue two, below.

Petitioner has failed to establish the predicate for his Biggs claim. For one thing, a

second denial based on the circumstances of the crime does not amount to the repeated denials

which the Biggs court suggested might violate due process. For another, petitioner’s parole was

not denied solely because of the circumstances of his offense, but also because of his failure to

“upgrade vocationally” in prison and his failure to participate in sufficient therapy to give the

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Board confidence that he understood the cause and effects of his offense (exh. 2 at 58-70). And

finally, assuming for purposes of this discussion that Biggs and Irons recognized an abstract due

process right not to have parole repeatedly denied on the basis of the facts of one’s crime and in

the face of extensive evidence of rehabilitation, and also assuming arguendo that the right was

violated in petitioner’s case, petitioner still cannot obtain relief on this theory, because there is

no clearly-established United States Supreme Court authority recognizing a “Biggs claim.” The

state courts’ rulings therefore could not be contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly-established Supreme Court authority. 

b. “SOME EVIDENCE”

Petitioner contends that denial of parole was not supported by “some evidence”

and thus violated his due process rights. Ascertaining whether the some evidence standard is

met "does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the

credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether

there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary

board." Hill, 472 U.S. at 455; Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128. The some evidence standard is minimal,

and assures that "the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the disciplinary

board were without support or otherwise arbitrary." Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Hill, 472

U.S. at 457). 

Because this was only the second parole consideration hearing, and because at the time

of the hearing petitioner had served only nine years of his sentence of life with the possibility of

parole, the circumstances of the offense still were entitled to very considerable weight in

deciding if releasing him would endanger the community. Petitioner attempted to murder his

ex-girlfriend, who was going out with another man (exh. 2 at 9-11). He stabbed her repeatedly,

then walked away; when he realized she was still alive, he returned and stabbed her again

repeatedly, and taunted her by saying that her new boyfriend was leaving her to die (ibid.) 

When police arrived he refused to move away from the victim, preventing administration of aid

(id. at 11). These circumstances, considered in light of the relatively short time of

imprisonment, amounted to some evidence to support the conclusion that petitioner should not

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be paroled. 

In addition, there was evidence that petitioner had not upgraded vocationally in prison

and that he was in need of additional therapy (exh. 60-61). There thus was more than “some

evidence” to support the denial, and the state courts’ rejection of this claim was not contrary to,

nor an unreasonable application of, clearly-established Supreme Court authority. 

c. DUE PROCESS AND COMPLIANCE WITH STATE LAW

Petitioner also contends that the Board did not comply with state law in that it failed to

set a “uniform term” for him to serve, and that this failure to follow state law violated due

process. This contention is without merit, the California Supreme Court now having held that

the obligation to set a uniform term is triggered only when the Board finds that a prisoner is

suitable for parole. See In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1070-71 (Cal.), cert. denied, 126

S. Ct. 92 (2005); 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403(a) ("[t]he panel shall set a base term for each life

prisoner who is found suitable for parole"). For that reason, the rejection of this claim by the

state courts was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly-established Supreme

Court authority.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 24 , 2008. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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