Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03286/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03286-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Defendants do not move to dismiss Plaintiffs' second cause of

action for a First Amendment violation based on Defendants' banning

certain magazines, or the state law causes of action for negligence

(sixth cause of action) and for intentional tort (seventh cause of

action).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TODD ASHKER and DANNY TROXELL,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 05-03286 CW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO

DISMISS AND DENYING IT IN

PART AND DENYING IN PART

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO

AMEND COMPLAINT

(Docket Nos. 75, 89, 94,

98, and 103)

Plaintiffs Todd Ashker and Danny Troxell are state prisoners

incarcerated at Pelican Bay State Prison (PBSP). Plaintiffs filed

a civil rights complaint for damages, injunctive relief and

declaratory relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants move

to dismiss Plaintiffs' first, third, fourth and fifth causes of

action for failure to exhaust their administrative remedies.1

Plaintiffs oppose the motion. For the reasons discussed below, the

Court GRANTS in part Defendants' motion to dismiss and DENIES it in

part AND DENIES in part Plaintiffs' motion to amend their

complaint.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from Plaintiffs' First Amended

Complaint (FAC). Plaintiffs are incarcerated at the PBSP Special

Housing Unit (SHU). Ashker was sentenced to a six year prison term

Case 4:05-cv-03286-CW Document 140 Filed 06/14/07 Page 1 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

was formerly known as the California Department of Corrections.

2

for burglary in 1984. In 1990, he was convicted of second-degree

murder of another inmate at PBSP and was sentenced to a prison term

of twenty-one years to life. Ashker has been housed in the SHU at

PBSP since 1990. Troxell plead guilty to first-degree murder in

1979 and is serving a sentence of twenty-six years to life. 

Troxell has been housed in the SHU since 1989.

Plaintiffs were placed in the SHU because of their alleged

membership in or association with the Aryan Brotherhood (AB) prison

gang; they were each re-validated as gang members on July 8, 2003. 

Both deny that they are AB members or associates. Due to their

alleged gang associations, they are housed in the SHU on

"indeterminate" status. FAC at ¶¶ 6, 7, and 8. According to

Plaintiffs, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

(CDCR)2 policy is that Plaintiffs cannot be released from the SHU

unless they are paroled, they debrief or they are inactive in gang

activity for a period of six years. FAC at ¶ 13.

"Debriefing is the process by which a gang

coordinator/investigator determines whether an inmate/parolee

(subject) has dropped out of a gang." Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15,

§ 3378.1(a). "The object of the debriefing is to learn enough

about the subject and the subject's current gang to: (1) allow

staff to reasonably conclude that the subject has dropped out of

the gang, and (2) allow staff to reclassify the subject. . . " 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3378.1(b).

Plaintiffs filed the present action on August 11, 2005. This

Case 4:05-cv-03286-CW Document 140 Filed 06/14/07 Page 2 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

action raises claims, originally filed on May 19, 2004, that were

previously dismissed without prejudice in Ashker v. Schwarzenegger,

2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14625 (N.D. Cal.). Plaintiffs filed their

FAC on January 30, 2006. 

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Exhaustion

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), amended by the Prison Litigation

Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), provides, "No action shall be brought

with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any

other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or

other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as

are available are exhausted." This exhaustion requirement only

applies to cases filed after the PLRA's passage on April 26, 1996. 

Bennett v. King, 293 F.3d 1096, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 2002).

Exhaustion is mandatory and no longer left to the discretion

of the district court. Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2382

(2006) (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)). 

"Prisoners must now exhaust all 'available' remedies, not just

those that meet federal standards." Id. Even when the relief

sought, such as monetary damages, cannot be granted by the

administrative process, a prisoner must still exhaust

administrative remedies. Id. at 2382-83 (citing Booth, 532 U.S. at

734). 

The purposes of exhaustion are to provide the administrative

agency a full and fair "opportunity to correct its own mistakes

with respect to the programs it administers before being haled into

federal court," and to promote efficiency by encouraging claims to

Case 4:05-cv-03286-CW Document 140 Filed 06/14/07 Page 3 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

be settled at the administrative level or by providing a useful

record for subsequent judicial consideration. Woodford, 126 S. Ct.

at 2385. 

An action must be dismissed unless the prisoner exhausted his

or her available administrative remedies before he or she filed

suit, even if the prisoner fully exhausts while the suit is

pending. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002);

Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006) (where

administrative remedies are not exhausted before the prisoner sends

his complaint to the court it will be dismissed even if exhaustion

is completed by the time the complaint is actually filed). The

PLRA does not require dismissal of the entire complaint when a

prisoner has failed to exhaust some, but not all, of the claims

included in the complaint. Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 925-26

(2007) (rejecting "total exhaustion-dismissal" rule); Lira v.

Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2005).

The PLRA exhaustion requirement calls for "proper exhaustion"

of available administrative remedies. Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at

2387. "Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's

deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no

adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some

orderly structure on the course of its proceedings." Id. at 2386. 

Compliance with prison grievance procedures is all that is required

by the PLRA to "properly exhaust." Jones, 127 S. Ct. at 922-23. 

The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the

grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim to

claim, but it is the prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that

Case 4:05-cv-03286-CW Document 140 Filed 06/14/07 Page 4 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 If the court looks beyond the pleadings in deciding an

unenumerated motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust -- a

procedure closely analogous to summary judgment -- the prisoner

must have fair notice of his opportunity to develop the record. 

Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 n.14. Because Plaintiffs have filed many

documents supporting their opposition, the Court concludes that

they have had fair notice to develop the record.

5

define the boundaries of proper exhaustion. Id. at 923.

II. Affirmative Defense

Non-exhaustion under § 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense. 

Jones, 127 S. Ct. at 922-23; Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 810 (2003). Defendants have the

burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion, and

inmates are not required specifically to plead or demonstrate

exhaustion in their complaints. Jones, 127 S. Ct. at 921-22. 

A non-exhaustion claim should be raised in an unenumerated

Rule 12(b) motion rather than in a motion for summary judgment. 

Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. In deciding a motion to dismiss for

failure to exhaust non-judicial remedies, the court may look beyond

the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact. Id. at 1119-20.3

III. State Administrative Remedies

The State of California provides its inmates and parolees the

right to appeal administratively "any departmental decision,

action, condition or policy perceived by those individuals as

adversely affecting their welfare." Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15,

§ 3084.1(a). In order to exhaust available administrative remedies

within this system, a prisoner must proceed through several levels

of appeal: (1) informal resolution, (2) formal written appeal on a

CDCR 602 inmate appeal form, (3) second level appeal to the

Case 4:05-cv-03286-CW Document 140 Filed 06/14/07 Page 5 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

institution head or designee, and (4) third level appeal to the

Director of the CDCR. Id. § 3084.5; Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F. Supp.

1235, 1237 (S.D. Cal. 1997). This satisfies the administrative

remedies exhaustion requirement under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Id. at

1237-38.

DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' first, third, fourth

and fifth claims: (1) violation of First Amendment freedom to

associate; (3) violation of Fifth Amendment freedom against selfincrimination, arising from the CDCR's debriefing requirement; 

(4) violation of Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual

punishment, also arising from the debriefing requirement; and 

(5) (a) violation of the ex post facto clause of the United States

Constitution by transforming Plaintiffs' convictions with sentences

allowing for parole into sentences of life without the possibility

of parole, (b) violation of the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment based on lack of access to prison programs due

to Plaintiffs' SHU status, which prevents them from being granted

parole, (c) violation of the equal protection clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment because of different treatment of white SHU

inmates, (d) violation of procedural and substantive due process

under the Fourteenth Amendment based on the deprivation of their

liberty interest in being granted parole, and (e) violation of

procedural and substantive due process by denying release from the

SHU based on their inactive status in the AB, when no reliable

evidence is presented to demonstrate participation in recent

illegal gang activity.

Case 4:05-cv-03286-CW Document 140 Filed 06/14/07 Page 6 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

Defendants argue in their motion to dismiss that the Court

cannot decide the merits of these claims because Plaintiffs have

not satisfied the administrative exhaustion requirement. In

support of their argument for dismissal of the first, third, fourth

and fifth causes of action, Defendants submit declarations by

prison officials responsible for the administration and tracking of

inmate grievances. Defendants also submit copies of the grievances

filed by Plaintiffs that have been exhausted and the responses to

those grievances at the first, the second and the Director's levels

of review.

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants failed to establish that

Plaintiffs have not exhausted their available administrative

remedies as to the claims at issue. In support of their argument

that they have exhausted these claims, Plaintiffs submit copies of

a number of grievances they have filed.

I. Defendants' Evidence

Defendants provide the declaration of N. Grannis, Chief of

CDCR's Inmate Appeals Branch. Grannis states that the Inmate

Appeals Branch keeps an electronic record of each inmate appeal

that has proceeded through the final level of review, which is the

Director's Level, also referred to as the third level. Grannis

Dec. at ¶ 4. This electronic system was commenced in 1993. Id. A

search of the computerized system was conducted under Ashker's and

Troxell's names. Id. at ¶ 5. Attached Exhibits C and J are copies

of the computer printout of each appeal Ashker and Troxell,

respectively, filed beginning in the year 1997 that was accepted

for review at the Director's Level. Id. Attached Exhibits H and O

Case 4:05-cv-03286-CW Document 140 Filed 06/14/07 Page 7 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

are copies of the computer printout results of Ashker's and

Troxell's appeals that were screened out. Id. at ¶ 7. 

Based on my review of the inmate appeals listed in

Exhibits C and H, plaintiff ASHKER has not exhausted his

appeals at the Director's level related to grievances

for: (1) Gang debriefing, gang validation, or Fifth

Amendment right against self-incrimination as implicated

by the debriefing process, (2) parole policies of the SHU

inmates in an alleged "no parole policy" for SHU inmates;

(3) challenging the gang debriefing process as violating

the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual

punishment; (4) unequal treatment based on race; or (5)

violating the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution

for imposing a release date later than originally

sentenced.

. . .

Based on my review of the inmate appeals listed in

Exhibits J and O, plaintiff TROXELL has not exhausted his

appeals at the Director's level related to grievances

for: (1) Gang debriefing, gang validation, or Fifth

Amendment right against self-incrimination as implicated

by the debriefing process, (2) parole policies of the SHU

inmates in an alleged "no parole policy" for SHU inmates;

(3) challenging the gang debriefing process as violating

the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual

punishment; (4) unequal treatment based on race; 

(5) violating the Ex Post Facto Clause of the

Constitution for imposing a release date later than

originally sentenced; or (6) education, vocational, and

self-help programming in the Security Housing Unit.

Id. at ¶¶ 8 & 13.

Defendants also provide the declaration of D. Bradbury, the

PBSP appeals coordinator. Bradbury's duties include processing

inmate appeals, assigning appeals to the appropriate staff, and

monitoring and maintaining the computer database of inmate appeals. 

Bradbury Dec. at ¶ 1. Exhibit A, attached to Bradbury's

declaration, is a computer printout from the inmate appeals office

showing Ashker's appeals history. Id. at ¶ 4. Bradbury states he

found the following:

Case 4:05-cv-03286-CW Document 140 Filed 06/14/07 Page 8 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 9

Exhibit A shows that many of the inmate appeals were

never exhausted at the second level of the administrative

appeals process. A true and correct copy of the

following inmate appeals that were never exhausted at the

second level of the administrative appeals process is

attached as Exhibit B.

a. Inmate appeal bearing institutional log

number PBSP-C-03-2721 was received by the

inmate appeals office on October 10, 2003, and

the first level response was completed on

November 12, 2003. The appeal was not

submitted to the appeals office for the second

level of review.

Id. at ¶ 5.

Exhibit C, attached to Bradbury's declaration, is a computer

printout from the inmate appeals office showing Troxell's appeals

history. Id. at ¶ 7. Bradbury states he found the following:

Exhibit C shows that many of the inmate appeals were

never exhausted at the second level of the administrative

appeals process. A true and correct copy of the

following inmate appeals that were never exhausted at the

second level of the administrative appeals process is

attached as exhibit D.

a. Inmate appeal bearing institutional log

number PBSP-C-03-2720 was received by the

inmate appeals office on October 10, 2003, and

the first level response was completed on

November 12, 2003. The appeal was not

submitted to the appeals office for the second

level of review.

Bradbury Dec. ¶ 8. 

The inmate appeal bearing institutional log number PBSP-C-03-

2721 is Ashker's appeal of his claim that being housed in the SHU

for reasons other than a serious disciplinary action should not

preclude him from receiving the same privileges as a General

Population inmate. Id., Ex. B. The inmate appeal bearing

institutional log number PBSP-C-03-2720 is Troxell's appeal of his

claim to the same effect. Id., Ex. D.

Case 4:05-cv-03286-CW Document 140 Filed 06/14/07 Page 9 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

The Board of Parole Hearings was formerly known as the Board

of Prison Terms (BPT). 

10

Defendants also provide the declaration of their counsel, B.

Kenny. Attached as exhibits to the Kenny declaration are the

administrative appeals filed by Ashker and Troxell with the Board

of Parole Hearings (BPH)4

 relating to grievances from their parole

hearings. Kenny Dec., Ex. D. On January 13, 2004, Ashker

exhausted his remedies with the BPH regarding his appeal of the BPH

decision in which he contended that his ex post facto rights were

violated by a five year parole denial and that the BPH has a noparole policy for prisoners in indeterminate SHU status. Id.

Troxell's parole hearing was on July 10, 2001, and he filed his

appeal on October 29, 2003. Id. Because Troxell submitted his

appeal over ninety days after his parole hearing, the appeal was

dismissed as untimely. Id.

As noted above, Defendants bear the burden of proving that

Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.

The documents and declarations produced by Defendants establish

that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust the administrative appeals

process for the first, third and fourth causes of action and some

of the claims in the fifth cause of action. 

II. Exhaustion Analysis

A. Statute of Limitations

Respondents argue that the statute of limitations has run on

some of the causes of action in the complaint. The Court denies

without prejudice Defendants' motion to dismiss to the extent it is

based on the statute of limitations because they have not had an

Case 4:05-cv-03286-CW Document 140 Filed 06/14/07 Page 10 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 11

opportunity to address Plaintiffs' arguments regarding the

continuing violations doctrine or equitable tolling; Plaintiffs

made these arguments in their supplemental opposition to

Defendants' motion to dismiss. Defendants may reassert the statute

of limitations argument in their next motion to dismiss or their

motion for summary judgment.

B. Grievances Where Exhaustion is Disputed

The parties dispute whether several grievances submitted by

Plaintiffs have been exhausted. 

1. Ashker's Appeal 04-2600 

This appeal challenges denial of a grievance about CDCR's

procedures for establishing gang validation and inactive gang

status. Id., Ex. 4 at 2. Defendants argue that Ashker did not

file this appeal within fifteen working days of the event or the

decision being appealed as required by California Code of

Regulations, title 15, section 3084.6(c). For this reason, this

appeal was screened out at the third level. Ashker Dec., Ex. 4 at

10. Section 3084.6(c) states that an "appellant must submit the

appeal within 15 working days of the event or decision being

appealed, or of receiving an unacceptable lower level appeal

decision." Proper exhaustion of a grievance requires "compliance

with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules." 

Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2382. 

Ashker argues that the appeal was timely. He states that the 

the action from which he appealed was the PBSP Institutional

Classification Committee's (ICC) annual review of his indeterminate

SHU status. The ICC issued a "chrono" which stated that it

Case 4:05-cv-03286-CW Document 140 Filed 06/14/07 Page 11 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 12

retained Ashker's SHU/indeterminate status based on his validation

as a member of the AB. Ashker states that although the ICC's

decision was dated August 4, 2004, it wasn't until September 7,

2004 that he received the copy of the ICC "chrono" which advised

him of the committee's decision and of his right to appeal it. 

Ashker states that he filed his appeal on September 15, 2004,

within fifteen days of his receipt of notice of the ICC's decision. 

Ashker points out that Defendants processed the appeal as timely

through the first and second levels of review and denied it as

untimely only at the third level. Ashker contends that this was an

error in the third level review and, thus, the grievance is

exhausted.

Defendants do not respond the Ashker's argument. Because

there is a dispute of fact regarding the timeliness of this claim,

the Court denies Defendants' claim that this appeal was untimely. 

2. "Group" Appeal 04-0566

Plaintiffs argue that this was a group appeal submitted on

behalf of Ashker and Troxell. Ashker Dec. ¶ 51. Defendants argue

that Plaintiffs did not meet the criteria for a group appeal. 

California Code of Regulations, title 15, § 3084.2(f) provides that

a group appeal is acceptable when a group of inmates seeks to

appeal a decision, action or policy affecting all members of the

group. In that case, one appeal form can be filled out with the

name and departmental identification number of the inmate who

prepared the appeal. In addition, to qualify as a group appeal, "a

legible list of the participating inmates' names, signatures,

departmental identification numbers, and housing shall be attached

Case 4:05-cv-03286-CW Document 140 Filed 06/14/07 Page 12 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 13

to the appeal." Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(f)(1). 

Although the appeal begins, "This is an appeal on behalf of

Ashker and Troxell, B #76578 . . .," the appeal does not contain an

attached list of participating inmates' names and signatures as

required by § 3084.2(f)(1). Furthermore, Plaintiffs were put on

notice that Defendants considered this an appeal only on behalf of

Ashker because the First, Second and Third Level Reviewers'

Responses identify the inmate appealing as Ashker without any

mention of Troxell nor are there any references to the fact that it

is a group appeal. Therefore, Plaintiffs have not established that

Troxell is a party to this appeal.

3. "Group" Appeal 03-2721 

Defendants did not process this appeal on the grounds that one

inmate cannot appeal on behalf of another inmate pursuant to 

§ 3084.2(d) and that the appeal did not comply with the 

§ 3084.6(c) requirement that an appeal must be filed within fifteen

working days of the decision or action that is the subject of the

appeal. 

Section 3084.2(d) provides, "An inmate . . . shall not submit

an appeal on behalf of another inmate . . ., except as provided in

subsection (f)." As indicated above, § 3084.2(f) authorizes group

appeals when a decision, action or policy affects all members of

the group.

Plaintiffs responded to Defendants' refusal to process the

appeal by filing a statement that they were challenging the

director's policy mandating that an inmate housed in the SHU had to

become an informant to obtain release from the SHU. Plaintiffs

Case 4:05-cv-03286-CW Document 140 Filed 06/14/07 Page 13 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

No number is listed on this appeal.

14

stated that the director's policy affected both of them and

"contrary to your view, there is no specified time limit to file a

602 challenging a CDCR policy." Defendants repeated in their reply

that the appeal exceeded the fifteen working day time limit, that

one inmate cannot appeal on behalf of another, and that Plaintiffs

were attempting to appeal a policy which had been well-established

for many years. On January 14, 2004, Defendant Grannis returned

Plaintiffs' appeal to them on the ground that it had been rejected,

withdrawn or cancelled. Plaintiffs did not re-file their appeal at

the second and third levels of review.

Thus, appeal 03-2721 does not exhaust any of the claims at

issue. 

4. Ashker's Appeal 05-01551

Ashker claims that this appeal exhausted his challenge to

Defendants' policy of keeping inmates in the SHU unless they became

informants. Ashker Dec. ¶¶ 46, 53-54, Ex. 8. This appeal was

exhausted on December 13, 2005. The present complaint was filed on

August 11, 2005. Because a prisoner must have exhausted all of his

available remedies before filing suit, even if the prisoner fully

exhausts while the suit is pending, appeal 05-01551 does not

exhaust any of the present claims.

5. Troxell's Appeal, Troxell Dec., Ex. 25

Troxell claims that this appeal, filed on February 16, 2004, 

exhausted his claim based on his classification as an active gang

member. Troxell ¶ 9, Ex. 2. In this appeal, Troxell challenged a

Case 4:05-cv-03286-CW Document 140 Filed 06/14/07 Page 14 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

No number is listed on this appeal.

15

June 23, 2001 decision by the Institutional Gang Investigation Unit

(IGI) that he was an active gang member. This appeal was screened

out based on § 3084.6(c)'s requirement that appeals be filed within

fifteen working days of the event or decision at issue. As noted,

proper exhaustion of an appeal requires "compliance with an

agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules." Woodford,

126 S. Ct. at 2382. Thus, this appeal does not exhaust any of the

claims at issue.

6. Troxell's Appeal, Troxell Dec., Ex. 36

Troxell claims that this appeal, filed on November 8, 2004, 

exhausted his challenge to the inactive gang status classification

criteria used by the CDCR. Troxell Dec. ¶ 15, Ex. 3. Troxell

admits that he was informed that his appeal was beyond the fifteen

day time limit. Id. at ¶ 17. Again, because he did not comply

with section 3084.6(c), Troxell has not properly exhausted this

challenge.

7. Troxell's Appeal 05-01550

Troxell claims that this appeal exhausted his challenge to

Defendants' policy of subjecting him to indeterminate SHU status

due to his AB association. Troxell Dec. ¶ 20, Ex. 4. This

challenge was exhausted on December 15, 2005. Id., Ex. 4. The

present complaint was filed on August 11, 2005. Because a prisoner

must exhaust all of his available remedies before filing suit, even

if the prisoner fully exhausts while the suit is pending, appeal

05-01550 does not exhaust any of the present claims.

Case 4:05-cv-03286-CW Document 140 Filed 06/14/07 Page 15 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

No number is listed on this appeal.

8

Troxell states in his declaration that the BPH hearing on

January 10, 2006 is relevant and related to the claims in his

complaint. However, any claim regarding a January 10, 2006 hearing

would have to be timely exhausted and then sued on in federal

court. Troxell submits no evidence that he has exhausted this

appeal.

16

8. Troxell's Appeal, Troxell Dec., Ex. 57

Troxell claims that this appeal, submitted on October 29,

2003, exhausted his administrative remedies regarding his challenge

to the BPH July 10, 2001 decision denying him a parole date. 

Troxell Dec. ¶¶ 28-29, Ex. 5. However, this appeal was dismissed

as untimely because it was filed over two years after Troxell's

parole hearing; the appeal deadline is ninety days from the date of

the parole denial. Thus, Troxell's appeal in Troxell Dec., Ex. 5 

does not exhaust any of the claims at issue.8

C. Which Causes of Action are Exhausted

To determine which of Plaintiffs' causes of action are

exhausted, the Court compares the appeals that have been properly

exhausted with Plaintiffs' causes of action to determine whether

the exhausted appeals provided Defendants with a full and fair

opportunity to adjudicate the causes of action.

1. First Cause of Action: Right of Association

None of the appeals submitted by Plaintiffs addresses the

issue of the violation of their First Amendment right of

association. Therefore, the first cause of action is not exhausted

and must be dismissed. It is dismissed without prejudice to

refiling once it is properly exhausted.

Case 4:05-cv-03286-CW Document 140 Filed 06/14/07 Page 16 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 17

2. Third Cause of Action: Fifth Amendment, Self- 

 Incrimination and Procedural and Substantive Due 

 Process

(a) Self-Incrimination

Ashker contends that Appeal 04-00566 put Defendants on notice

that they are violating Plaintiffs' right against selfincrimination. Defendants argue that this appeal only challenged

the fact that, because Plaintiffs are housed in the SHU, they are

not provided access to vocational, recreational and educational

programs that are provided to the general prison population. 

Plaintiffs acknowledge that the original appeal addressed only

their lack of access to vocational, recreational and educational

programs, but argue that their appeal "evolved" as it was

processed.

After reviewing appeal 04-00566 in its entirety, the Court can

find only one reference that could have alerted Defendants to the

fact that Plaintiffs were raising a claim regarding their right

against self-incrimination. This is the statement, in the answer

to Defendants' denial of the first level appeal, that Plaintiffs

are faced with "a Hobson's choice of agreeing to become a

successful (CDC) informant (and thus being able to participate in

programs, etc. and thereby receive meaningful consideration for a

parole date), or doing life without parole in (SHU)." This

statement was insufficient to provide Defendants a full and fair

opportunity to adjudicate the constitutional issue of Plaintiffs'

right against self-incrimination. First, the issue was mentioned

only in terms of how it affected Plaintiffs' participation in

various programs. Second, this statement appeared only in one

Case 4:05-cv-03286-CW Document 140 Filed 06/14/07 Page 17 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 18

brief sentence in the middle of a very long response to Defendants'

denial of the original appeal. It was not apparent from this

sentence that Plaintiffs were raising it as a separate claim.

Therefore, the claim for violation of the privilege against

self-incrimination is not properly exhausted. It is dismissed

without prejudice to refiling once it is properly exhausted.

(b) Procedural and Substantive Due Process Based on 

 Refusal to Debrief

Plaintiffs argue that appeals 03-2721, Ashker's Ex. 7, and 

05-1551, Ashker's Ex. 8, exhaust the procedural and substantive due

process claims in the third cause of action. However, as indicated

above, appeal 03-2721 was rejected at the first level on the

grounds that it was untimely and that one inmate cannot appeal on

behalf of another. Plaintiffs did not take it to the second and

third levels. Thus it does not exhaust any of the claims at issue. 

Appeal 05-01551 was fully exhausted on December 13, 2005, but

this complaint had been filed on August 11, 2005. Because a

prisoner must have exhausted all available remedies before filing

suit, appeal 05-1551 does not exhaust any of the present claims. 

Because appeal 05-1551 may address Ashker's procedural and

substantive due process claims, these claims are dismissed without

prejudice to refiling in a new complaint.

C. Fourth Cause of Action: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Plaintiffs argue that appeals 04-0566 and 03-2721 exhaust this

claim. However, appeal 04-0566 did not address AShker's right

against cruel and unusual punishment; it addressed Ashker's

inability to participate in certain programs. Appeal 03-2721 was

Case 4:05-cv-03286-CW Document 140 Filed 06/14/07 Page 18 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 19

not processed at the first level on the grounds that it was

untimely and that one inmate cannot appeal on behalf of another. 

It was not taken to the second or third levels. Therefore, this

claim is not exhausted and is dismissed without prejudice to

refiling once it is exhausted. 

D. Fifth Cause of Action

1. Violation of Ex Post Facto Clause and Violation of 

 Liberty Interest in Not Being Granted Parole

The United States Constitution prohibits the federal

government and the States from passing any “ex post facto Law.” 

U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (federal government); Art. I, § 10,

cl. 1 (States). These clauses prohibit the government from

enacting laws with certain retroactive effects: any law that 

(1) makes criminal an act done before the passing of the law, which

was innocent when done; (2) aggravates a crime or makes it greater

than it was when it was committed; (3) inflicts a greater

punishment for the crime than the punishment authorized by law when

the crime was committed; or (4) alters the legal rules of evidence

and requires less or different testimony to convict the defendant

than was required at the time the crime was committed. See Stogner

v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 611-12 (2003); Carmell v. Texas, 529

U.S. 513, 519-538 (2000).

While there is "no constitutional or inherent right of a

convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration

of a valid sentence," Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal &

Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979), a State's statutory parole

scheme, if it uses mandatory language, may create a presumption

Case 4:05-cv-03286-CW Document 140 Filed 06/14/07 Page 19 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 20

that parole release will be granted when or unless certain

designated findings are made, and thereby give rise to a

constitutionally protected liberty interest, see Board of Pardons

v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 376-78 (1987) (Montana parole statute

providing that board "shall" release prisoner, subject to certain

restrictions, creates due process liberty interest in release on

parole). In such a case, a prisoner gains a legitimate expectation

in parole that cannot be denied without adequate procedural due

process protections. Id. at 373-81; Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-16. 

California’s parole scheme uses mandatory language and is

largely parallel to the schemes found in Allen and Greenholtz to

give rise to a protected liberty interest in release on parole:

The panel or board shall set a release date unless it

determines that the gravity of the current convicted

offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current

or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that

consideration of the public safety requires a more

lengthy period of incarceration for this individual, and

that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this

meeting.

Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). Accordingly, under the clearly

established framework of Allen and Greenholtz, “California’s parole

scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on

parole.” McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The scheme creates a presumption that parole release will be

granted unless the statutorily defined determinations are made. 

Id. This is true regardless of whether a parole release date has

ever been set for the inmate, because “[t]he liberty interest is

created, not upon the grant of a parole date, but upon the

incarceration of the inmate.” Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915-

Case 4:05-cv-03286-CW Document 140 Filed 06/14/07 Page 20 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

This does not mean that such a claim may not be brought in

habeas as well: “[W]hen prison inmates seek only equitable relief

in challenging aspects of their parole review that, so long as they

prevail, could potentially affect the duration of their

confinement, such relief is available under the federal habeas

statute.” Docken v. Chase, 393 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Habeas and § 1983 are not mutually exclusive in such a case. Id.

at 1031. 

21

16 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit recently made clear that

“California inmates continue to have a liberty interest in parole

after In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005).” Sass v.

California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1125 (9th Cir.

2006). 

Where an inmate challenges the constitutional validity of the

state procedures used to deny parole eligibility or parole

suitability, but seeks injunctive relief in the form of an earlier

eligibility review or parole hearing rather than earlier release,

the claim is cognizable under § 1983. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544

U.S. 74, 82 (2005);9 see also Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 824

(9th Cir. 1997) (if prisoner wins civil rights claim and is

entitled to parole eligibility hearing, this does not guarantee

parole or necessarily shorten his prison sentence). Challenges to

state parole eligibility decisions or procedures must be brought in

habeas if success will necessarily result in immediate or speedier

release. Anyanwutaku v. Moore, 151 F.3d 1053, 1055-56 (D.C. Cir.

1998). 

Ashker has properly exhausted an appeal to the BPH of a BPH

parole denial, Ashker Dec., Ex. 9; Kenny Dec., Ex. D, although

Troxell has not. In his appeal, Ashker claimed that the BPH's

decision violated the ex post facto clause. However, if Ashker is

Case 4:05-cv-03286-CW Document 140 Filed 06/14/07 Page 21 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 22

seeking an earlier release date, as it appears he is, the proper

procedure for challenging the denial of his appeal to the BPH is

through the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in

state court and presenting all the claims in the petition to the

highest state court. Thereafter, he may file a petition for writ

of habeas corpus in federal court under the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Therefore, the claim based upon the ex post facto clause and

the violation of a liberty interest based on parole denial is

denied without prejudice to filing in a habeas petition.

2. Violation of Procedural and Substantive Due Process

This claim alleges that Defendants deny Plaintiffs access to

programs required by the BPH thus the BPH does not give meaningful

consideration to Plaintiffs' parole requests. It is not properly

brought as a civil rights cause of action because Ashker seeks

earlier release on parole which, as discussed above in regard to

the ex post facto claim, must be sought in a habeas petition. 

Therefore, this claim is denied without prejudice to filing in a

habeas petition after exhaustion of state court remedies.

3. Violation of Equal Protection Based on Treating White 

 Inmates Differently than Other Races

The only appeal that mentioned an equal protection claim is

appeal 04-0566. In his response to Defendants' first level denial

of this appeal, Ashker requested that PBSP "halt the longstanding

practice of subjecting white (SHU) prisoners to more isolation

(from their social group –- other whites) than any other 'ethnic

groups' in (PBSP--SHU)."

Case 4:05-cv-03286-CW Document 140 Filed 06/14/07 Page 22 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10Defendants argue that appeal 04-0566 does not relate to any

claim in the complaint because none of the claims address gang

validation or inactive gang status. However, Ashker's due process

claims challenging the procedure used to determine an inmate's gang

status involves a determination of whether the inmate is an active

or inactive gang member. 

23

However, as discussed above, appeal 04-0566 only addressed the

lack of programming available to Ashker. Therefore, this appeal

did not exhaust the equal protection claim.

4. Violation of Due Process Based on AB Validation 

 Procedures

Ashker's appeals 01-2335 and 04-260010 and Troxell's appeal 88-

1657 exhaust the due process claims based on Defendants' AB

validation procedures. However, some allegations in this cause of

action address due process violations based on parole denial. To

the extent that this claim addresses the AB validation procedure,

it is exhausted and may proceed; to the extent it addresses the

denial of a parole release date, it is denied without prejudice to

filing as a habeas petition after exhaustion of state court

remedies.

E. Summary

The only claim addressed in Defendants' motion that has been

exhausted is Plaintiffs' claim that their due process rights are

violated by Defendants' procedure for validating them as active or

inactive gang members. The proper treatment of a mixed complaint,

i.e., a complaint with both exhausted and unexhausted claims, will

depend on the relatedness of the claims contained within. Lira v.

Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1175 (9th Cir. 2005). When a prisoner has

filed a mixed complaint and wishes to proceed with only the

Case 4:05-cv-03286-CW Document 140 Filed 06/14/07 Page 23 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 24

exhausted claims, the district court should dismiss the unexhausted

claims when they are not intertwined with the exhausted claims. 

Id. On the other hand, when a plaintiff’s mixed complaint includes

exhausted and unexhausted claims that are closely related and

difficult to untangle, dismissal of the defective complaint with

leave to amend to allege only fully exhausted claims is the proper

approach. Id. at 1176.

The Court will allow the four exhausted claims to proceed even

though many of the claims in the complaint have been dismissed for

failure to exhaust. 

In summary, the following causes of action may be prosecuted: 

(1) Plaintiffs' second cause of action for a First Amendment

violation premised on Defendants' not allowing Plaintiffs access to

certain magazines; (2) Plaintiffs' due process claim based on

Defendants' procedure for determining whether Plaintiffs are active

or inactive gang members; (3) Plaintiffs' sixth cause of action for

negligence and (4) Plaintiffs' seventh cause of action for an

intentional tort.

III. Second Amended Complaint

Plaintiffs move for leave to file a second amended complaint

(SAC) (Docket No. 94), to add Susan Fisher and Robert Harmon, BPH

commissioners who presided at Troxell's January 10, 2006 parole

hearing, as additional Defendants, and to add two claims: 

(1) violation of Plaintiffs' First Amendment right not to speak by

requiring them to become informants in order to be released from

the SHU; and (2) violation of Plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment right to

be free from cruel and unusual punishment in that prolonged

Case 4:05-cv-03286-CW Document 140 Filed 06/14/07 Page 24 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 25

isolation in the SHU adversely affects Plaintiffs' mental health. 

Defendants have not filed an opposition to Plaintiffs' motion to

file a SAC. 

In this Order, the Court has stated that Troxell may not bring

any claim based on his January 10, 2006 parole hearing because he

has submitted no evidence that this claim was exhausted. 

Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' motion to add Fisher and

Harmon as Defendants because there is no properly exhausted claim

against them.

The Court orders Defendants to file any opposition to

Plaintiffs' motion to add two additional claims no later than two

weeks from the date of this order. Plaintiffs may file a reply no

later than two weeks after Defendants' opposition is served on

Plaintiffs. Because there may be a statute of limitations issue

regarding the due process claim addressing Defendants' AB

validation procedure, Defendants are to provide further briefing on

the statute of limitations issue in their opposition to Plaintiffs'

motion to add two additional claims. Plaintiffs may file a reply

no later than two weeks after Defendants' opposition is served on

Plaintiffs.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons,

1. Defendants' motion to dismiss without prejudice the first,

third, fourth and a portion of the fifth cause of action in the FAC

(Docket no. 75) is GRANTED.

2. Defendants' motion to dismiss the due process claim in the

fifth cause of action based on the AB validation procedure is

Case 4:05-cv-03286-CW Document 140 Filed 06/14/07 Page 25 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 26

DENIED.

3. Plaintiffs' motion to file an SAC is DENIED in regard to

adding two new Defendants. Defendants may file an opposition to

the motion to file two new claims; the schedule for filing briefs

is stated above.

4. Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a memorandum of

points and authorities in excess of twenty-five pages (Docket no.

89) is GRANTED in light of Plaintiffs' pro se status. Plaintiffs'

motion to supplement their opposition to their motion to dismiss

(Docket no. 98) is GRANTED because Defendants raised new arguments

in their reply brief. Plaintiffs' motion to continue trial date

and associated discovery, motion and conference dates (Docket no.

103) is GRANTED. The trial and discovery dates are vacated. Ten

days after the Court rules on Plaintiffs' motion to add two new

claims to their complaint, Plaintiffs and Defendants shall submit

proposed schedules suggesting new dates for discovery, motions, a

pretrial conference, and trial.

5. This order terminates Docket Nos. 75, 89, 98, and 103.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 6/14/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:05-cv-03286-CW Document 140 Filed 06/14/07 Page 26 of 27
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 27

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ASHKER ET AL et al,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SCHWARZENEGGER ET AL et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV05-03286 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on June 14, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said copy(ies)

in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in

the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's

office.

Danny Troxell B-76578

Pelican Bay State Prison

P.O. Box 7500, C-8-101

Crescent City, CA 95531

J. Randall Andrada

Andrada & Associates

180 Grand Avenue

Suite 925

Oakland, CA 94612

Todd Ashker C-58191

Pelican Bay State Prison

P.O. Box 7500, D1-119

Crescent City, CA 95531

Dated: June 14, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:05-cv-03286-CW Document 140 Filed 06/14/07 Page 27 of 27