Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00707/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00707-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1125 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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In the formal notice of the motion, Defendant states that it seeks change in venue under 1

28 U.S.C. §1404. Doc. 17, Notice, at 1:27. In the briefing, Defendant cites to 28 U.S.C. §1406

exclusively, and makes arguments that are inapplicable to 28 U.S.C. §1404. The court will only

address change in venue under 28 U.S.C. §1406.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HONOR PLASTIC INDUSTRIAL CO.

LTD and P&P INTERNATIONAL INC.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

LOLLICUP USA, INC.,

Defendant.

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CIV-F-06-0707 AWI DLB

ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS

FOR IMPROPER VENUE OR, IN

THE ALTERNATIVE TO

TRANSFER VENUE

This case is before the court on Defendant’s motion for dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

Proc. 12(b)(3), improper venue, or, in the alternative for transfer under 28 U.S.C. §1406 to the 1

Central District of California. Doc. 17. Plaintiffs have filed a timely opposition. Doc. 21. No

reply was filed and the matter was taken under submission without oral argument. Doc. 29. 

I. History

Plaintiffs in the case are Honor Plastic Industrial Co., Ltd. (“Honor Plastic”) and P&P

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International, Inc. (“P&P”). Honor Plastic is a Taiwanese company that manufactures and

markets a variety of products. For the U.S. market, Honor Plastic marketed plastic cups and lids

with distinctive marks on them starting in 2004. The first mark to be used showed the word

“Honor” capitalized with cup silhouettes forming the middle of the “o”s and with curved arrows

above and below, forming a circle (“Silhouette Mark”). Honor Plastic filed an application with

the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office for this mark on June 30, 2004. The trademark

(Registration No. 2,976,261) was issued on July 26, 2005. The second mark used is identical to

the Silhouette Mark, but omits the cup silhouettes in the middle of the “o”s (“Honor Mark”). 

Honor Plastic file an application with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office for the Honor Mark

on August 15, 2005 (Application No. 78693049). The application is still under review.

Honor Plastic originally distributed products bearing the Silhouette Mark through CTT

International, Inc. and Bubble & Crepe in the U.S. On January 1, 2005, Honor Plastic signed or

endorsed a contract (“Original Agreement”) with Taijoint, Inc. (“Taijoint”), another Taiwan

company, for Taijoint to be Honor Plastic’s exclusive distributor in the U.S. Doc. 15, Ex. A. 

Defendant Lollicup USA, Inc. (“Lollicup”) is a U.S. subsidiary of Taijoint based in Los Angeles,

CA. Honor Plastic began distributing plastic cups and lids bearing the Honor Mark in addition to

the Sihouette Mark in 2005 through Lollicup. In the fall of 2005, Honor Plastic and Lollicup

sued and were sued by the Solo Cup Co. over the use of cup silhouettes. On June 8, 2006, Honor

Plastic entered into a settlement with the Solo Cup Co. whereby Honor Plastics agreed to

discontinue use of any cup silhouettes in its trademarks, essentially giving up the Silhouette Mark

while retaining the use of the Honor Mark. Doc. 22, Ex. B. Harris Declaration. On November

17, 2005, Honor Plastic and Taijoint entered into a nonexclusive distribution contract

(“Amended Agreement”) which superceded the Original Agreement. Doc. 15, Ex. B. The

relationship unraveled soon thereafter. 

Honor Plastic terminated the Amended Agreement with Taijoint and ultimately selected

P&P, based in Selma, CA, to be its new distributor in the U.S. Lollicup registered “Honor USA”

as a service mark (Registration No. 61,563) and the Honor Mark as a trademark (Registration

No. 00111367) with the State of California on January 4, 2006. In late May-early June, Lollicup

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sent letters to Honor Plastic, P&P, and Plast Techs Enterprises (“Plast Techs,” a P&P client)

demanding that they cease and desist from selling products bearing the Honor Mark. 

Lollicup filed suit against P&P and Plast Techs in the Los Angeles Superior Court on

various causes of action related to trademark infringement (“State Suit”). The complaint was

dated June 4, 2006 but was not filed with the clerk’s office until June 8, 2006. Meanwhile,

Honor Plastic and P&P filed the present suit against Lollicup for trademark infringement in

Fresno on June 6, 2006. The operative complaint is the First Amended Complaint Doc. 15. In

pertinent part, Plaintiffs allege trademark infringement under federal and California law and

interference with a contractual relationship under California law. They seek monetary damages,

declaratory relief, and to have Defendant’s California trademark and service mark registrations

cancelled.

II. Legal Standards

A.Venue

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) permits a defendant to move for dismissal of the

case on the basis of improper venue. Title 28 U.S.C. §1391 is the general code section governing

venue. “A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may,

except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in (1) a judicial district where any

defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a

substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part

of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any

defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.” 28

U.S.C. §1391(b). “[A] defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial

district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced. In a

State which has more than one judicial district and in which a defendant that is a corporation is

subject to personal jurisdiction at the time an action is commenced, such corporation shall be

deemed to reside in any district in that State within which its contacts would be sufficient to

subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State, and, if there is no such

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district, the corporation shall be deemed to reside in the district within which it has the most

significant contacts.” 28 U.S.C. §1391(c). 

“Plaintiff has the burden of proving that venue is proper in the district in which the suit

was initiated.” Hope v. Otis Elevator Co., 389 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1243 (E.D. Cal. 2005), citing

Airola v. King, 505 F. Supp. 30, 31 (D. Ariz. 1980); see also Piedmont Label Co. v. Sun Garden

Packing Co., 598 F.2d 491, 496 (9th Cir. 1979); Bohara v. Backus Hosp. Med. Ben. Plan, 390 F.

Supp. 2d 957, 960 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Flamingo Indus. (U.S.A.), Ltd. v. United States Postal Serv.,

2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17530, *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2004). In deciding a Fed. R. Civ. Proc.

12(b)(3) motion, a court may consider facts outside the pleadings and need not accept the

pleadings as true. Murphy v. Schneider Nat’l, Inc., 362 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2004). If there

are contested factual issues, the court is obligated to draw all reasonable inferences and resolve

the factual conflicts in favor of the non-moving party or hold a pre-trial evidentiary hearing on

the disputed facts. Murphy v. Schneider Nat’l, Inc., 362 F.3d 1133, 1138-9 (9th Cir. 2004). 

B. Personal Jurisdiction

In the absence of specific statutory provision, federal courts apply the personal

jurisdiction laws of the state in which they are situated. See T.M. Hylwa, M.D., Inc. v. Palka, 823

F.2d 310, 312 (9th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10, California’s long-arm

statute reaches as far as the Due Process Clause permits. “Since California’s jurisdictional

statute is coextensive with federal due process requirements, the jurisdictional inquiries under

state law and federal due process merge into one analysis.” Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d

617, 620 (9th Cir. 1991). “We are not bound by state cases, although they may be considered

persuasive authority.” Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Associates, Inc., 557 F.2d 1280,

1286 n.3 (9th Cir. 1977). “A state may exercise either general or specific jurisdiction over a

defendant. If a defendant’s activities within the forum state are ‘continuous and systematic’ or

‘substantial,’ the state has a sufficient relationship with the defendant to assert general

jurisdiction. If, however, a forum state cannot assert general jurisdiction over the defendant, it

may still assert specific jurisdiction depending on the quality and nature of the defendant's

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contacts with the forum state in relation to the cause of action.” Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416,

1420-21 (9th Cir. 1987). “To the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting

activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state. The

exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations; and, so far as those obligations arise out of

or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to

respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.”

International Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).

1. General Jurisdiction

A defendant whose contacts with a state are “substantial” or “continuous and systematic”

can be haled into court in that state in any action, even if the action is unrelated to those

contacts....The standard for establishing general jurisdiction is fairly high, and requires

that the defendant’s contacts be of the sort that approximate physical presence. Factors to

be taken into consideration are whether the defendant makes sales, solicits or engages in

business in the state, serves the state’s markets, designates an agent for service of process,

holds a license, or is incorporated there.

Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat. Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000), citing

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 (1984). In addition to

contacts in general, assertion of personal jurisdiction must be reasonable. Amoco Egypt Oil Co.

v. Leonis Navigation Co., 1 F.3d 848, 851 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993).

2. Specific Jurisdiction

For specific jurisdiction, there is a three part test: “1) the nonresident defendant must

have purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum by some

affirmative act or conduct; 2) plaintiff’s claim must arise out of or result from the defendant’s

forum-related activities; and 3) exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.” Roth v. Garcia

Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 620-21 (9th Cir. 1991). “When a court is exercising specific jurisdiction

over a defendant, arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum, the fair

warning that due process requires arises not at the time of the suit, but when the events that gave

rise to the suit occurred.” Steel v. United States, 813 F.2d 1545, 1549 (9th Cir. 1987), citations

omitted. [W]e consider the extent of the defendant’s contacts with the forum and the degree to

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which the plaintiff’s suit is related to those contacts. A strong showing on one axis will permit a

lesser showing on the other.” Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1210

(9th Cir. 2006).

“The purposeful availment standard requires more than foreseeability of causing injury in

another state. Rather, the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is that the

defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably

anticipate being haled into court there. The purposeful availment prong prevents defendants from

being haled into a jurisdiction through random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts.” Terracom v.

Valley Nat’l Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 560 (9th Cir. 1995). “[O]rdinarily use of the mails, telephone,

or other international communications simply do not qualify as purposeful activity invoking the

benefits and protection of the forum state.” Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1262 (9th Cir.

1985), citations omitted. The second prong requires that the contacts relied on for personal

jurisdiction actually relate to the cause of action. MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 243 F.

Supp. 2d 1073, 1085 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (“Contacts with a forum state are relevant for purposes of

specific jurisdiction only if they are sufficiently related to the cause of action.....Thus, if

Plaintiffs’ claims would have arisen notwithstanding certain contacts, those contacts are not

relevant to the jurisdictional analysis.”). “But for” causation is all that is required since “A

restrictive reading of the ‘arising out of’ requirement is not necessary in order to protect potential

defendants from unreasonable assertions of jurisdiction.” Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897

F.2d 377, 385 (9th Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). Once a court has

found purposeful availment, the reasonableness of jurisdiction is presumed. Sher v. Johnson, 911

F.2d 1357, 1364 (9th Cir. 1990). The burden is then shifted to the defendant to show “the

presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.” Burger King

Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985).

3. Reasonableness

Reasonableness is a requirement for both general and specific jurisdiction. “The Supreme

Court has bifurcated this due process determination into two inquiries, requiring, first, that the

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defendant have the requisite contacts with the forum state to render it subject to the forum’s

jurisdiction, and second, that the assertion of jurisdiction be reasonable.” Amoco Egypt Oil Co.

v. Leonis Navigation Co., 1 F.3d 848, 851 (9th Cir. 1993). In determining whether the exercise

of jurisdiction comports with “fair play and substantial justice,” and is therefore “reasonable,”

courts are to consider seven factors: 

(1) the extent of the defendants’ purposeful injection into the forum state’s affairs;

(2) the burden on the defendant of defending in the forum; (3) the extent of

conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant’s state; (4) the forum state’s interest

in adjudicating the dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the

controversy; (6) the importance of the forum to the plaintiff’s interest in

convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of an alternative forum. 

Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2002); FDIC v. British-American Ins.

Co., 828 F.2d 1439, 1442 (9th Cir. 1987).

Notwithstanding the formal general and specific jurisdiction requirements, the Ninth

Circuit has stated that a more “flexible approach” may be appropriate. “Jurisdiction may be

established with a lesser showing of minimum contacts if considerations of reasonableness

dictate. Under this analysis, there will be cases in which the defendant has not purposefully

directed its activities at the forum state, but has created sufficient contacts to allow the state to

exercise personal jurisdiction if such exercise is sufficiently reasonable.” Ochoa v. J.B. Martin &

Sons Farms, 287 F.3d 1182, 1189 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002). Overall, “Questions of personal

jurisdiction admit of no simple solutions and that ultimately due process issues of reasonableness

and fairness must be decided on a case-by-case basis.” Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo

Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 426 (9th Cir. 1977), quoting Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.,

342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952).

III. Discussion

Defendant seeks dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(3) or, in the alternative, transfer

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1406. Both requests are dependent upon a finding that venue is improper

in the Eastern District. To substantiate venue, Plaintiffs rely on 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) and (c),

claiming Defendant resides in the Eastern District and a substantial part of the events giving rise

to the claim occurred here. Doc. 21, Opposition, at 6:9-20. 

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A. Corporate Residence

Title 28 U.S.C. §1391(c) says any corporate defendant “shall be deemed to reside in any

judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is

commenced.” This effectively turns the venue question into a personal jurisdiction analysis,

treating the Eastern District of California as a state. Plaintiffs claim Defendant has sufficient

contacts with the Eastern District for both general and specific personal jurisdiction. Doc. 21,

Opposition, at 7:5-6. 

1. Asserted Facts

Defendant states that it “is not doing business in the Eastern District of California, has no

offices in the Eastern District of California, and has no employees in the Eastern District of

California.” Doc. 17, Brief, at 5:3-6. Plaintiffs have provided several declarations in opposition

that point out the following facts. 

Defendant’s attorney has sent out cease and desist letters to P&P and Plast Techs, saying 

Defendant “advertises and promotes disposable table ware, paper and plastic cups, and paper and

plastic plates, throughout California and the western United States, bearing [the Honor Mark].”

Doc. 22, Ex. B, May 25, 2006 Letter. In the State Suit, Defendant says its “services have been,

and are, extensively advertised, publicized, and sold throughout the State of California, including

Los Angeles County under its service mark. By virtue thereof, together with consumer

acceptance and recognition of the service mark ‘Honor,’ [Defendant’s] mark identifies

[Defendant’s] services only, and distinguishes them from those of others.” Doc. 22, Ex. A, State

Suit Complaint, at 3:6-11. 

Defendant’s website indicates there are twelve Lollicup Coffee & Tea stores (termed

“trademark licensees”) in the Sacramento area, though the company notes that they are

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http://www.lollicup.com/main.cfm?tm=storelocation.htm&side=store.cfm&id=storelocat

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ions&page=storelocation.cfm (August 18, 2006)

http://www.lollicup.com/main.cfm?tm=regional_dist.htm&side=store.cfm&id=regional 3

&page=regional_dist.cfm (August 18, 2006)

http://www.lollicupstore.com/0606/store-supplies-cups.html (August 18, 2006). The 4

U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Registration No. 2976261 mentioned refers to the Silhouette

Mark. 

http://www.lollicupstore.com/0606/hohotcupsili1.html (August 18, 2006) 5

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“independently owned an operated.” The licensed trademark or service mark appears to be 2

“Lollicup” and not “Honor.” These trademark licensees pay Defendant a fixed sum of $8,000 for

a two year term and an initial $2,000 training fee; there are no additional payments based on

revenues. Defendant does not determine the trademark licensees’ menus or direct that they

purchase Defendant’s products. The website also lists a regional distributor of Defendant’s

products in the Sacramento area (for wholesale of Defendant’s products), but notes “all regional

distributors are independent contractors.”3

The website is interactive and allows for online purchase of Defendant’s products. With

reference to cups, Defendant states “Honor USA® Inc. is a disposable plastic and paper cup

supplier....Honor USA® cups are compatible to known brands manufactured by other plastic cup

suppliers....Honor® is a registered logo, USPTO registration # 2976261.” Items bearing the 4

“Honor” logo are available for purchase. On August 4, 2006, Robert Stephenson (whose 5

relationship with Plaintiffs is uncertain) ordered “Honor” branded products online for delivery to

Fresno; the products were received August 8, 2006. Doc. 23, Ex. 3, Stephenson Declaration. 

Plaintiffs have not made any assertions regarding the overall volume of online sales to the

Eastern District. 

2. General Personal Jurisdiction

Plaintiffs cite to Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2003) for the

proposition that “an interactive web site that operates as a virtual store subjects the operator of

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that web site to personal jurisdiction in a district to where the web site is directed.” claiming that

it was “vacated on other grounds.” Doc. 21, Opposition, at 8:14-19. In that case, a three-judge

Ninth Circuit panel reversed a district court’s conclusion that there was no general jurisdiction

despite the fact that the defendant sold millions of dollars worth of products to California

residents through their website. Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1074 and

1080 (9th Cir. 2003). Examination of the subsequent history of the case shows that it was

vacated and taken en banc on April 29, 2004 with the admonition, “The three-judge panel

opinion shall not be cited as precedent by or to this court or any district court of the Ninth

Circuit, except to the extent adopted by the en banc court.” Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc.,

366 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2004). Subsequently, the parties notified the court of settlement on

September 1, 2004 which lead the en banc majority to find the appeal moot and specifically state

“we must await another opportunity to resolve the important issues of personal jurisdiction

originally raised by this appeal.” Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 398 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th

Cir. 2005). The dissent argued the court should reach the merits of the case, but agreed that the

three-judge panel decision “no longer has the force of law.” Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc.,

398 F.3d 1125, 1143 (9th Cir. 2005), dissent. The court must conclude the original decision in

Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2003) is not precedent and may not

be cited as binding authority. 

Regardless, the possibility that a significant volume of sales to a state’s residents through

a defendant’s website store can constitute the basis of general jurisdiction must be examined. 

“[T]he most reliable indicator of the nature and extent of defendant’s Internet contact with the

forum state will be the amount of sales generated in the state by or through the interactive

website. In addition, it may also be possible to determine how many times a website has been

accessed by residents or businesses located in a specific state.” Coastal Video Communs. Corp.

v. Staywell Corp., 59 F. Supp. 2d 562, 572 (E.D. Va. 1999). Plaintiffs have not provided any

documentation as to the level or number of Defendant’s online sales in the Eastern District. In

another case, online sales of $754.42 over a two year period were deemed insufficient. Io Group,

Inc. v. Pivotal, Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1458, 1462 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (“While defendants entered into

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contracts with several California corporations, received $ 754.42 from purchases made by

California residents, and used a server located in California, [plaintiff] has not alleged sufficient

facts to demonstrate that these contacts were either ‘substantial’ or ‘continuous and

systematic’”). As Plaintiffs have only demonstrated one sale for a total value of $70.50 (Doc. 23,

Stephenson Declaration), jurisdiction cannot be established solely on the basis of online sales.

In looking at the twelve Lollicup Coffee & Tea Stores, the court notes that they are not

traditional franchisees. These trademark licensees pay a fixed fee for the use of the “Lollicup”

name (approximately $48,000 per year total) but do not pay any proportion of their revenues to

Defendant (as would be expected from a more traditional franchisor-franchisee relationship). 

Having licensees in a state does not automatically give rise to general jurisdiction. Bancroft &

Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[The defendant]

continues to have license agreements with two television networks and a handful of California

vendors. These agreements constitute doing business with California, but do not constitute doing

business in California. This is because engaging in commerce with residents of the forum state is

not in and of itself the kind of activity that approximates physical presence within the state’s

borders”). The financial relationship with the regional distributor is unknown but it may be more

akin to that of a traditional franchise. While this type of relationship is significant, it does not

automatically give rise to general personal jurisdiction, especially when the franchisor’s website

notes that the franchisee is independently owned and operated. Rascon v. Checkcare Enters.,

2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56433, *6-7 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 

General jurisdiction only exists when a “defendant’s contacts be of the sort that

approximate physical presence.” Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat. Inc., 223 F.3d 1082,

1086 (9th Cir. 2000). The various contacts, collectively, do not rise to this standard.

3. Specific Personal Jurisdiction

Specific jurisdiction has three requirements: “1) the nonresident defendant must have

purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum by some

affirmative act or conduct; 2) plaintiff’s claim must arise out of or result from the defendant’s

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forum-related activities; and 3) exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.” Roth v. Garcia

Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 620-21 (9th Cir. 1991). For claims sounding in tort, “personal

jurisdiction can be predicated on (1) intentional actions (2) expressly aimed at the forum state (3)

causing harm, the brunt of which is suffered - and which the defendant knows is likely to be

suffered - in the forum state,” under the “effects test” of Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).

Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993)

Among Defendant’s Eastern District related activities, Defendant has sent a cease and

desist letter to P&P, which has its principal place of business in Selma, and has filed suit against

P&P for trademark infringement. The scenario is akin to that covered in Bancroft.

Until recently, NSI was the sole registrar of domain names in the United States, under an

exclusive contract with the U.S. government. [Plaintiff] alleges that sometime in late

1997, [defendant] sent a letter to NSI’s Virginia headquarters challenging [plaintiff’s] use

of the domain name masters.com. [Defendant] also sent a letter to [plaintiff] in California

demanding that [plaintiff] cease and desist its use of masters.com and transfer it

immediately to [defendant]. [Defendant’s] letter to NSI triggered NSI’s then-applicable

dispute resolution policy. Under this policy, [plaintiff] had three options: (1) voluntarily

transfer the masters.com domain name to [defendant]; (2) allow the domain name to be

placed “on hold,” meaning that it could not be used by either party; or (3) obtain a

declaratory judgment establishing its right to use the masters.com domain name. Rather

than give up its website, [plaintiff] chose the third option....we conclude that [plaintiff]

has demonstrated purposeful availment by [defendant] under the Calder effects test.

[Defendant] acted intentionally when it sent its letter to NSI. The letter was expressly

aimed at California because it individually targeted [plaintiff], a California corporation

doing business almost exclusively in California. Finally, the effects of the letter were

primarily felt, as [defendant] knew they would be, in California.

Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1084-8 (9th Cir. 2000). The

Ninth Circuit highlighted similar logic in approving of the Seventh Circuit decision in

Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club Ltd. Partnership, 34 F.3d 410

(7th Cir. 1994):

There, the Indianapolis Colts brought a trademark infringement action in the district court

in Indiana against the Canadian Football League’s new team, the “Baltimore CFL Colts.”

The Seventh Circuit held that the Baltimore CFL Colts team was subject to personal

jurisdiction in Indiana even though its only activity directed toward Indiana was the

broadcast of its games on nationwide cable television. Because the Indianapolis Colts

used their trademarks in Indiana, any infringement of those marks would create an injury

which would be felt mainly in Indiana, and this, coupled with the defendant’s “entry” into

the state by the television broadcasts, was sufficient for the exercise of personal

jurisdiction.

Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321-1322 (9th Cir. 1998). Defendant has

admitted to advertising, promoting, and selling products using the Honor and/or Silhouette Marks

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throughout California. As P&P is based in Selma, Defendant clearly knew that the injury would

particularly be felt in the Eastern District. 

Defendant has the burden of demonstrating that exercise of personal jurisdiction in the

Eastern District is unreasonable. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985). 

Defendant has made no such argument. Given the facts of the case, jurisdiction is eminently

reasonable as Defendant has essentially boasted of its business expansion throughout California. 

Given the relatively close distance between Fresno and Los Angeles, any burden in defending in

this forum is minimal. Indeed, the court notes that Defendant’s attorney in this case is the same

attorney representing Defendant in the state court proceeding. There is no conflict over state

sovereignty or competing interests between forums. Specific personal jurisdiction in the Eastern

District is proper. 

B. Substantial Part Of The Events Giving Rise To The Claim

Plaintiffs also argue, in the alternative, that venue is proper based on 28 U.S.C.

§1391(b)(2). As the court has found venue proper based on 28 U.S.C. §1391(b)(1), the

alternative argument need not be reached.

IV. Order

Defendant’s motion for dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(3), improper

venue, or, in the alternative for transfer under 28 U.S.C. §1406 to the Central District of

California is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 26, 2006 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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