Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00805/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00805-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FERNANDO ARANDA,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-07-0805 MCE DAD P

vs.

ELIZABETH MEYERS, et al., ORDER AND

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and has filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 

This proceeding was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge in accordance with Local Rule

72-302 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In light of these findings and recommendations, the in forma

pauperis application will be denied. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

I. Screening Requirement

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

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granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, , 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,

355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a

complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it

must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1965. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must

accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital

Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421

(1969).

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

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42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.

941 (1979). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel

in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

Cir. 1982).

II. Plaintiff’s Complaint

Plaintiff provides a lengthy and, at times, incomprehensible statement of his

claim. Essentially, it appears that plaintiff contends that defendant Meyer, a detective with the

Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, and unknown California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (CDCR) officers have conspired to “target” him by “observing and monitoring

plaintiff, creating the environment that caused the harm mentioned in this complaint[,] conduct

via electronic transmitters, speakers and video cameras installed throughout prison structure,

collaborating with prison inmates and correctional officers.” (Compl. at ¶2.) Plaintiff alleges

that defendants Harris, McKray, and Wong, all correctional officers at California State Prison -

Sacramento, are “accomplices of defendants [sic] monitoring and observing plaintiff.” (Id. at ¶

3.) Plaintiff contends that on July 27, 2006, inmate Menefield initiated an altercation with

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plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 4.) Plaintiff believes that Menefield was solicited by defendant McKray to

start the altercation. (Id.) Defendant Harris authored a rules violation report for mutual combat

even though he had not observed plaintiff fighting back when attacked by Menefield. (Id. at ¶ 5.) 

Plaintiff alleges that he was placed in administrative segregation housing and remained there for

90 days, awaiting bed space, before he was sent back into general population housing. (Id. at ¶

7.) Based on comments by other inmates that were communicated through the air vents and by

“electronic transmissions” into cells, plaintiff believes that inmate Menefield was attempting to

provoke plaintiff to fight and that Menefield did so because he was offered $10,000 by unknown

persons. (Id. at ¶¶ 9-10, 13.) Inmate Menefield subsequently admitted to an investigative

employee that he initiated the fight and that plaintiff did not fight back. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Following

a disciplinary hearing, plaintiff’s rule violation was dismissed “in the interest of justice.” (Id. at

¶12.) 

Plaintiff also contends that defendant L.A. sheriff detective Meyers was involved

in targeting him. (Id. at ¶13.) Based on a comment made by defendant Wong, plaintiff believes

that there is an ongoing conspiracy to charge plaintiff with rule violations. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Plaintiff

also believes that inmates are being solicited to attack him in his cell. (Id.) Accordingly, on

August 21, 2006, plaintiff submitted an inmate grievance requesting that he be single-celled. (Id.

at ¶ 16 and Ex. B.) At the second level of review, the appeal was granted and on November 2,

2006, the institutional classification committee directed that plaintiff be placed on single cell

status. (Id. at ¶18.) 

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages of five million dollars. (Id. at ¶ 22.) He also

seeks injunctive relief prohibiting defendants “from monitoring and observing plaintiff in civil

harassment and real threat [sic],” and prohibiting defendant Meyers “from entering California

State Prison - Sacramento in Represa . . . and Mule Creek State Prison . . . where threat persists.” 

(Id. at ¶ 23.) 

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III. Failure to State a Claim

The court finds that plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable conspiracy claim. To

establish the existence of a conspiracy, plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that there was an

agreement between defendants to violate his constitutional rights. See Woodrum v. Woodward

County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989); Fonda v. Gray, 707 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir. 1983). 

To state a cognizable conspiracy claim the complaint must allege facts demonstrating that each

participant in the alleged conspiracy shared the general conspiratorial objective. See Fonda, 707

F.2d at 438; see also Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, plaintiff has not

alleged facts demonstrating that the defendants “reached ‘a unity of purpose or a common design

and understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement.’” William Inglis & Sons

Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1055 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting

American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809-10 (1946)). Moreover, plaintiff’s

complaint fails to set forth allegations of fact demonstrating that the named defendants were

acting in furtherance of a conspiracy. 

Plaintiff’s complaint also fails to adequately allege facts demonstrating that the

defendants’ objective was to violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights. In this regard, it appears that

plaintiff is contending that there was a conspiracy to engage plaintiff in an altercation with

inmate Menefield. Plaintiff claims to believe that such a conspiracy exists based on comments

and banter by inmates plaintiff has overheard through the prison air vents and through electronic

transmissions. The court finds that plaintiff is “postulating events and circumstances of a wholly

fanciful kind.” Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 1984). Such allegations do

not state a cognizable constitutional claim. In addition, plaintiff has not alleged that he has

suffered an actual deprivation of his constitutional rights as a result of the alleged conspiracy. 

Woodrum, 866 F.2d at 1126. In fact, according to plaintiff’s own allegations the rule violation

report charging him with engaging in mutual combat was dismissed and plaintiff subsequently

has been granted single-cell status by prison officials. 

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Plaintiff is also not entitled to the injunctive relief he seeks. The court is unable to

issue a broad order denying a law enforcement officer access into a prison facility, or an order

prohibiting the correctional officer defendants from “monitoring and observing plaintiff.” 

(Compl. at ¶23.) Such injunctive relief is unrealistic in light of the nature of the duties performed

by law enforcement and correctional officers and is not warranted based upon the allegations of

plaintiff’s complaint. 

In addition to his conspiracy claim, plaintiff asserts that he is proceeding with a

state tort claim and requests that the court exercise “pendent jurisdiction.” (Compl. at ¶ 21.) The

district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim “if the district court

has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). See

also Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1154 (2000)

(citing Fang v. United States, 140 F.3d 1238, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998) and Voight v. Savell, 70 F.3d

1552, 1565 (9th Cir. 1995)). If the findings and recommendations are adopted, the federal claim

over which this court has original jurisdiction will be dismissed and thus the balance of relevant

factors points toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims. See

Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994); Imagineering, Inc. v.

Kiewit Pac. Co., 976 F.2d 1303, 1309 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, the undersigned will also

recommend that plaintiff’s state law claim be dismissed without prejudice to its refiling in state

court. 

IV. Plaintiff’s Other Requests

Plaintiff has requested the appointment of counsel. The United States Supreme

Court has ruled that district courts lack authority to require counsel to represent indigent

prisoners in § 1983 cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In

certain exceptional circumstances, the court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991);

Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). In the present case, the court

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does not find the required exceptional circumstances. Plaintiff’s request for the appointment of

counsel will therefore be denied.

Finally, plaintiff has filed a request for a preliminary injunction and temporary

restraining order which seeks the same relief as set forth in his complaint. In light of these

findings and recommendations, the request will be denied.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s April 30, 2007 application requesting leave to proceed in forma

pauperis, is denied;

2. Plaintiff’s November 15, 2007 request for the appointment of counsel is

denied; and

3. Plaintiff’s November 15, 2007 request for a preliminary injunction and

temporary restraining order, is denied.

Also, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim;

2. This action be dismissed; and

3. Plaintiff’s state law claim be dismissed without prejudice to its refiling in state

court. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the

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specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: December 5, 2007.

DAD:4

aran0805.56

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