Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01106/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01106-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN McMILLAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

TIM V. VIRGA, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-1106 CKD P

ORDER

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 and has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This 

proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. 

§1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. 

§§1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect 

the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. 

Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding 

month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will be forwarded by 

the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s account 

exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

Case 2:14-cv-01106-TLN-CKD Document 5 Filed 05/19/14 Page 1 of 6
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The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 

“naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 

of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 

upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 

at 1949. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, 

the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007), 

and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 

U.S. 232, 236 (1974).

I. Allegations

Plaintiff names as defendants the Warden of California State Prison-Sacramento and three 

prison officials who work on C-Yard. He alleges as follows: Defendant Dr. Ma “was aware . . . I 

had a steel rod, pins and screws in my right leg. I should have never been on a top bunk.” (ECF 

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No. 1 at 3.) Inmates are required to get off their bunks and stand at 4:00 p.m. every day. There 

are no steps or ladders to climb up or down from the top bunk. Plaintiff broke his knee “jumping 

down from a top bunk.” (ECF No. 1 at 3-4.)

II. Applicable Law

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] ... subjects, or causes 

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 

Constitution ... shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege facts showing each named 

defendant either exhibited some sort of “direct personal participation in the deprivation” or “set[ ] 

in motion a series of acts by others which the actor [knew] or reasonably should [have known] 

would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-744 

(9th Cir. 1978). There must be an actual causal link between the actions of the named defendants 

and the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 

691–92 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 

167 (9th Cir. 1980).

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment requires that 

prison officials take reasonable measures for the safety of inmates. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 

U.S. 825, 834 (1994). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two 

requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged is objectively, sufficiently serious, and (2) the 

official is subjectively, deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s safety. See id. “[O]nly those 

deprivations denying ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,’ are sufficiently grave 

to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) 

(citation omitted). “The inmate must then make a subjective showing that the deprivation 

occurred with deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or safety.” Patterson v. County of 

San Diego, 2010 WL 3957398 *3 (S.D. Cal., 2010) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).

To reach the “deliberate indifference” standard, a plaintiff must show “that the official 

was aware of a risk to the inmate’s health or safety and that the official deliberately disregarded 

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the risk.” Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 814 (9th Cir. 2009). An accident, although it may 

produce added anguish, is not on that basis alone to be characterized as wanton infliction of 

unnecessary pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 

III. Analysis 

Here, plaintiff fails to allege that any of the named defendants was directly responsible for 

causing him some constitutional deprivation. He does not allege that Dr. Ma had anything to do 

with his being assigned a top bunk, nor does he allege that the other defendants knew he should 

not be assigned a top bunk due to the condition of his leg. 

Thus plaintiff fails to allege a cognizable claim as to Warden Virga or any other 

defendant. Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their 

employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a 

supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must 

be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. 

Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). 

Moreover, many courts have held that the failure of prison officials to equip an inmate’s 

bunk with a ladder or similar safety features does not amount to the deprivation of “a minimal 

civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Hucker v. California Dept. of Corrections, 2010 WL 

4904747 *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2010) (dismissing deliberate indifference claim alleging unsafe 

upper bunks) (collecting cases). “In the absence of any allegation of knowledge or awareness on 

[a] defendant’s part that plaintiff was unable to negotiate the allegedly hazardous condition 

through the use of reasonable care, plaintiff’s claims sound more in the nature of a claim of 

negligence which is not actionable under Section 1983.” Id., citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835–36 

& n. 4. But see, e.g., Felix–Torres v. Graham, 687 F.Supp.2d. 38, 64 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (where 

there was in place a medical order that an inmate be assigned to a lower bunk, that order was 

known to the defendants, and the inmate was thereafter assigned to an upper bunk resulting in an 

injury to the inmate, the evidence suffices to raise a question of fact on the second prong of the

[deliberate indifference] claim.”).

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As it fails to state a cognizable claim, the complaint will be dismissed. However, plaintiff 

will be granted one opportunity to amend the complaint to state a claim. If plaintiff chooses to 

amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions complained of have resulted 

in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 

1980). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is involved. 

There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or 

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 

362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 

743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in 

civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 

1982). If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, he should set forth a “short and plain 

statement” of his claim and any related claims against the appropriate defendants.

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 

make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 

general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no 

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

IV. Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff has requested the appointment of counsel. The United States Supreme Court has 

ruled that district courts lack authority to require counsel to represent indigent prisoners in § 1983 

cases. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In certain exceptional 

circumstances, the court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(1). Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. Housewright, 900 

F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). In the present case, the court does not find the required 

exceptional circumstances. Plaintiff’s request for the appointment of counsel will therefore be 

denied.

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In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted.

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. All fees 

shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the Director of the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith.

3. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed. 

4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended 

complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended complaint must bear the docket number 

assigned this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint”; plaintiff must file an original and 

two copies of the amended complaint; failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with 

this order will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed.

5. Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel (ECF No. 3) is denied without prejudice to 

renewal at a later stage of the proceedings.

Dated: May 19, 2014

2 / mcmi1106.14.new

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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