Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01711/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01711-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PHILIP A. DENNEY,

NO. CIV.S-06-1711 LKK/GGH

Plaintiff,

v. O R D E R

DRUG ENFORCEMENT

ADMINISTRATION, et al

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, a California physician, has brought a First

Amendment challenge based upon the alleged undercover investigation

of his medical office by defendants. Plaintiff contends that

defendants, who include the DEA and various state and federal

officials, conducted a retaliatory investigation in response to his

speech concerning medical marijuana, in violation of the injunctive

order upheld in Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002).

Pending before the court is the federal defendants’ motion to

dismiss and motion for summary judgment, as well as plaintiff’s

application for a continuance under Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules

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of Civil Procedure. For the reasons set forth below, the court

denies the motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment with

respect to the First Amendment and equal protection claims, grants

the motions with respect to the remaining claims, and grants

plaintiff’s application for a continuance.

I. Facts

A. Plaintiff

Plaintiff Philip Denney is physician who has been licensed

to practice medicine in the State of California since 1977. 

First Am. Compl. (“Compl.”) ¶ 5. Since graduating medical

school at the University of Southern California, he has

practiced Family, Emergency, and Occupational Medicine. Id. He

has never been disciplined by the state medical board, nor has

he had his hospital privileges revoked, suspended, or

restricted. Id. In addition to other locations, Dr. Denney has

a medical office located in Redding, California, the site of the

activities at issue in this case. Id. 

Dr. Denney is an outspoken proponent of medical marijuana.

He has been qualified to testify as an expert witness regarding

the use of cannabis in at least seventeen counties in

California, has testified before the California Medical Board

regarding medicinal cannabis, and is a founding member of the

Society of Cannabis Clinicians. Id.

B. Undercover Visits to Plaintiff’s Office

On two occasions, defendants sent in either a confidential

source (“CS”) or undercover agent in order to obtain a medical

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marijuana recommendation from Dr. Denney. The government

asserts that the background to both visits was the investigation

of the Dixon Herbs marijuana dispensary in Redding. It claims

that as part of this investigation, the Redding Police

Department had previously sent confidential informants (“CIs”)

to attempt to buy marijuana from Dixon Herbs in September 2005. 

Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Fact (“SUF”) ¶¶ 4-5. One, who

had a medical marijuana recommendation, was successful, whereas

another, who did not have a recommendation, was not. Id.

On September 20, 2005, a CS for the DEA attempted to buy

marijuana from Dixon Herbs without a marijuana recommendation. 

Compl. ¶ 9. As with the Redding Police Department CI who did

not have a recommendation, the DEA CS was also turned away. Id.

He was, however, allegedly told to ask for someone by the name

of “Amber” at Dr. Denney’s office, who might be able to

facilitate a recommendation. SUF ¶ 7. 

1. September 21, 2005 Visit

The next day, on September 21, 2005, the CS went to Dr.

Denney’s office and asked if he could see the doctor. Compl. ¶

11. The receptionist asked for his/her medical records, which

the CS reported were unavailable because he/she had recently

moved from Mississippi and that the records had been destroyed

in Hurricane Katrina. Id. The receptionist went out of the

office and, it is claimed, looked at the CS’ vehicle to confirm

that it had Mississippi license plates, which it did. Id. 

Thereafter, Dr. Denney examined the CS, whose chief

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complaint was a pinched sciatic nerve that caused chronic pain. 

Id. Dr. Denney asked if he/she attempted other mainstream

prescription medications, and was told that he/she did, but that

these medications caused stomach problems. Id. Plaintiff then

indicated that the CS was a candidate for the medical use of

marijuana and explained that it was to be used only as

recommended, not as a recreational drug. Id. He then gave the

CS a written recommendation. Id. 

While the CS was inside, an investigator surveilled the

office from the street. Ex. G. Although fitting the CS with a

convert transmitter or monitoring device had apparently been

considered, the investigators decided against it because the

transaction was to take place within a doctor’s office. Id.

Before the CS entered the office, the investigators checked him

for contraband and money and established a prearranged meeting

point where they were to meet after he left plaintiff’s office. 

Id.

On September 27, 2005, the CS bought marijuana at Dixon

Herbs assertedly using the marijuana recommendation obtained

from plaintiff. SUF ¶ 10.

2. November 9, 2005 Visit

On November 9, 2005, defendants DEA Agent Dennis Hale, ATF

Agent Steven Decker, and Redding Police Officers Tracy Miller

and Eric Wallace conducted a briefing regarding the procurement

of a medical marijuana recommendation from plaintiff. Compl. ¶

12. Agent Decker was chosen to procure the marijuana

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recommendation and use it at Dixon Herbs because he was the only

conveniently available agent with an appropriate undercover

identity. SUF ¶ 16. The investigators then approached

plaintiff’s office and surveilled it while Agent Decker was

inside. SUF ¶ 18.

Using a false driver’s license, Agent Decker told

plaintiff’s receptionist that his name was Steven Hoffmaster. 

Compl. ¶ 18. When asked for prior medical records, he stated

that he had been to a hospital in Santa Clara but could not

recall which one. Id. The receptionist called several

hospitals in Santa Clara, but found no record of a Steven

Hoffmaster. Id. Agent Decker was told that the examination

could proceed while the receptionist tried to locate his prior

medical records. Id.

During the examination, Agent Decker told Dr. Denney that

he had been in a motorcycle accident, which caused him to have

daily pain in his neck. Compl. ¶ 15. Agent Decker then showed

plaintiff a scar on his neck, the product of the alleged

motorcycle accident. Id. After the examination, Dr. Denney

provided a written recommendation to Agent Decker approving of

the use of medical marijuana. Id.

On November 21, 2005, Agent Decker bought marijuana from

Dixon Herbs. SUF ¶ 23. On December 5, 2005, a state court

search warrant was executed at Ron Dixon’s residence, resulting

in the seizure of marijuana. SUF ¶ 24. On the same day, a

state court search warrant was executed at Dixon Herbs,

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resulting in the seizure of marijuana, scales, and three

firearms. SUF ¶ 25. Dixon and two associates were arrested. 

Id. The state court criminal action against Ron Dixon has

survived preliminary hearing and is set for trial. SUF ¶ 27. 

C. Procedural History

Although both sides in this case have exchanged mandatory

initial disclosures, no discovery has taken place. On February

1, 2007, the federal defendants filed a motion for protective

order, staying discovery until resolution of their pending

motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment. On February

13, plaintiff stipulated to the stay in discovery, and the

magistrate judge accordingly stayed all discovery until the

resolution of defendants' motions. In addition to its

opposition to the motion, plaintiff has filed an application for

a continuance under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), which

provides that “the court may refuse the application for judgment

or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained

or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had.” 

II. Standard

A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)

It is well established that the party seeking to invoke the

jurisdiction of the federal court has the burden of establishing

that jurisdiction exists. KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 299

U.S. 269, 278 (1936); Scott v. Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927 (9th

Cir. 1986). On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of

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Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the standards that must be applied

vary according to the nature of the jurisdictional challenge.

If the challenge to jurisdiction is a facial attack, i.e.,

the defendant contends that the allegations of jurisdiction

contained in the complaint are insufficient on their face to

demonstrate the existence of jurisdiction, the plaintiff is

entitled to safeguards similar to those applicable when a Rule

12(b)(6) motion is made. The factual allegations of the

complaint are presumed to be true, and the motion is granted

only if the plaintiff fails to allege an element necessary for

subject matter jurisdiction. See 2A J. Moore, J. Lucas & G.

Grotheer, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 12.07 (2d ed. 1987); see

also Eaton v. Dorchester Development, Inc., 692 F.2d 727, 731

(11th Cir. 1982); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th

Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); Mortensen v.

First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). 

A complaint will be dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction (1) if the case does not "arise under" any federal

law or the United States Constitution, (2) if there is no case

or controversy within the meaning of that constitutional term,

or (3) if the cause is not one described by any jurisdictional

statute. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962).

If the challenge to jurisdiction is made as a "speaking

motion" attacking the truth of the jurisdictional facts alleged

by the plaintiff, a different set of standards must be applied. 

Thornhill Pub. Co., Inc. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d

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730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). Where the jurisdictional issue is

separable from the merits of the case, the district court is

free to hear evidence regarding jurisdiction and to rule on that

issue prior to trial, resolving factual disputes where

necessary. Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th

Cir. 1983); Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733. "In such circumstances

'[n]o presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's

allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will

not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the

merits of jurisdictional claims.'" Augustine, 704 F.2d at 1077

(quoting Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733).

However, where the jurisdictional issue and substantive

issues are so intertwined that the question of

jurisdiction is dependent on the resolution of factual

issues going to the merits, the jurisdictional

determination should await a determination of the

relevant facts on either a motion going to the merits or

at trial.

Augustine, 704 F.2d at 1077 (citing Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733-

35; 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure

§ 1350, at 558 (1969 & Supp. 1987)). On a motion going to the

merits, the court must, of course, employ the standard

applicable to a motion for summary judgment. Farr v. United

States, 990 F.2d 451, 454 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,

510 U.S. 1023 (1993).

B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

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(1972). The court is bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the "well-pleaded"

allegations of the complaint. See Retail Clerks Intern. Ass'n,

Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6

(1963). Thus, the plaintiff need not necessarily plead a

particular fact if that fact is a reasonable inference from

facts properly alleged. See id.; see also Wheeldin v. Wheeler,

373 U.S. 647, 648 (1963) (inferring fact from allegations of

complaint).

In general, the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). The

court may not dismiss the complaint if there is a reasonably

founded hope that the plaintiff may show a set of facts

consistent with the allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 127 U.S. 1955, 1967-69 (2007). In spite of the

deference the court is bound to pay to the plaintiff's

allegations, however, it is not proper for the court to assume

that "the [plaintiff] can prove facts which [he or she] has not

alleged, or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in

ways that have not been alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors

of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,

526 (1983).

C. Summary Judgment Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated

that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

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law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress &

Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Secor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51

F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 1995).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of "the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any," which it believes demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[W]here

the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be

made in reliance solely on the 'pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file.'" Id. Indeed,

summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for

discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to that party's case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. "[A]

complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial." Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment

should be granted, "so long as whatever is before the district

court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary

judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied." Id. at

323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

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burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986); see also First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv.

Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); Secor Ltd., 51 F.3d at 853. 

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its

pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts

in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material,

in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11; see also First

Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289; Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 954

(9th Cir. 1998). The opposing party must demonstrate that the

fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect

the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Owens v. Local

No. 169, Ass’n of Western Pulp and Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347,

355 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific

Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987)), and

that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,

Anderson, 477 U.S. 248-49; see also Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g

& Contracting Co., 200 F.3d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir. 1999).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue

of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the

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claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to

resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." 

First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 290; see also T.W. Elec. Serv.,

809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to

'pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see

whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's

note on 1963 amendments); see also Int’l Union of Bricklayers &

Allied Craftsman Local Union No. 20 v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752

F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court

examines the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. 

Rule 56(c); see also In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090,

1093 (9th Cir. 1999). The evidence of the opposing party is to

be believed, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable

inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the

court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party, see

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold,

Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam)); see also

Headwaters Forest Def. v. County of Humboldt, 211 F.3d 1121,

1132 (9th Cir. 2000). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn

out of the air, and it is the opposing party's obligation to

produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be

drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp.

1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th

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Cir. 1987).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party

"must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as

a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'"

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

III. Analysis

Plaintiff alleges that the federal defendants (1) violated

his First Amendment rights, Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics

Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), (2) conspired to interfere with his

rights under the due process and equal protection clauses, 42

U.S.C. § 1985(3), and (3) failed to prevent the objectives of

this alleged conspiracy, 42 U.S.C. § 1986. He seeks damages as

well as injunctive and declaratory relief.

A. First Amendment Claim

1. Conant v. Walters

The crux of plaintiff’s First Amendment claim is that

defendants engaged in an investigation of his medical practice

as an act of retaliation for his speech concerning medical

marijuana. In Conant, the Ninth Circuit upheld a permanent

injunction enjoining the government from revoking a physician’s

license to prescribe controlled substances based solely on the

physician’s professional recommendation of the use of medical

marijuana, and, as particularly relevant here, from conducting

an investigation of a physician based on the same impermissible

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motive. 309 F.3d at 636.

Conant's holding is premised on the notion that a

physician’s candid discussion of the advantages and

disadvantages of medical marijuana with his or her patient is

speech protected by the First Amendment. See Rust v. Sullivan,

500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (noting that regulations on physician

speech may “impinge upon the doctor-patient relationship”). 

Conant held that punishing physicians for recommending medical

marijuana to their patients is a form of content discrimination

as well as viewpoint discrimination. Conant, 309 F.3d at 637

(“[T]he [government’s] policy does not merely prohibit the

discussion of marijuana; it condemns expression of a particular

viewpoint, i.e., that medical marijuana would likely help a

specific patient.”).

Conant rejected the government’s argument that the

injunction would protect criminal conduct. The court held that

a doctor’s mere anticipation that the patient would use his or

her recommendation to procure marijuana in violation of federal

law would not, without more, be sufficient to trigger aiding and

abetting liability. Id. at 635-36. The district court noted

earlier that there are lawful and legitimate responses to a

medical marijuana recommendation. The patient, armed with the

doctor’s recommendation, may urge the federal government to

change the law. Conant v. McCaffrey, 2000 WL 1281174 at *14

(N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2000) (noting that “many patients depend

upon discussions with their physicians as their primary and only

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 Alternately, the patient may lawfully procure marijuana with

the recommendation by enrolling in a federally-approved

experimental marijuana therapy program or traveling to a country

where marijuana is legal. Conant, 2000 WL 1281174 at *15.

2

 To be clear, however, plaintiff need not seek relief in the

Northern District of California, where the injunction was

originally issued. Although, as described above, the rule of

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source of sound medical information”).1

Conant further rejected the government’s argument that the

injunction against investigations of physicians would hamper law

enforcement efforts. “Because a doctor’s recommendation does

not itself constitute illegal conduct, the portion of the

injunction barring investigations solely on that basis does not

interfere with the federal government’s ability to enforce its

laws.” Conant, 309 F.3d at 636. Furthermore, the Conant

injunction does not bar investigations where the government has

a good faith belief that it has substantial evidence of criminal

conduct. Id.

Although Conant arose against the backdrop of a federal

policy of revoking the drug prescription licenses of doctors who

recommended marijuana, its holding, contrary to the federal

defendants’ portrayal, is not limited to license revocation. 

Rather, the district court also forbade any investigation of a

doctor solely on the basis that he or she recommended medical

marijuana. In other words, an investigation motivated by

disagreement with the doctor’s speech, even if not directly

connected to the ultimate objective of license revocation, is

nevertheless barred by the Conant injunction.2

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Conant forbids investigations motivated by retaliation, the facts

of this case are not identical to those in Conant for the simple

reason that this is not a license revocation case. Furthermore,

the parties between this case and Conant are not identical. Dr.

Denney has sued state officials in addition to federal officials,

and has named federal defendants not party to Conant (e.g., the

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives).

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2. Elements of Retaliatory Investigation Claim

In order to prove a retaliatory investigation claim,

plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) defendants possessed an

impermissible motive to interfere with his First Amendment

rights, (2) that defendants’ conduct would chill a physician of

ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities, and

(3) that the defendants would not have engaged in the conduct in

question but for the retaliatory motive. See Mendocino Envtl.

Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999);

Hartman v. Moore, 126 S. Ct. 1695, 1703 (2006). Although

defendants claim, as an initial matter, that plaintiff has not

even alleged that he was investigated, the complaint, fairly

read, encompasses such an allegation. Compl. ¶ 1 (“[D]efendants

have been accused by Plaintiff of implementing and enforcing an

investigative practice and policy which is designed to, and

resulted in, the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights,

as articulated in the case of Conant v. Ashcroft.”).

a. Motive

First, defendants maintain that the purpose of the

undercover visits was not to investigate plaintiff, but merely

to obtain written marijuana recommendations so that they could

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3

 For example, defendants argue that the surveillance was

conducted because of agency procedures requiring backup for agents

working undercover. See Hale Decl. ¶ 11. In addition, defendants

maintain that the funds were recorded to prevent the CS from

thinking that he or she could steal them. 

17

buy marijuana at Dixon Herbs and make a criminal case against

Ron Dixon. As support, they note that a Redding Police

Department CI who had previously attempted to enter Dixon Herbs

without a recommendation was barred from doing so. SUF ¶ 5. 

Furthermore, the DEA CS only went to plaintiff’s office after

being first turned away from Dixon Herbs and then referred to

plaintiff’s office. Compl. ¶¶ 9-10; SUF ¶ 7. 

In response, plaintiff argues that the visits to his office

bore all the traditional hallmarks of investigation. For

example, plaintiff notes that when the CI was in the medical

office, an agent was outside conducting surveillance. 

Furthermore, although a covert transmitter and monitoring device

was not used, it was at least considered. Additionally, the CI

was searched before and after the office visit, the police

report described the incident as a “controlled buy of a

marijuana prescription,” and recorded funds were used. Ex. G.

While there may have been other reasons for the defendants’

meticulous care in procuring a marijuana recommendation from

plaintiff and preserving an ostensible chain of custody,3 there

is at least a genuine dispute that defendants were investigating

plaintiff. This is true in spite of the declaration of Dennis

Hale, the federal case agent, which states that there has been

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no investigation of plaintiff. Decl. of Dennis Hale (“Hale

Decl.”) ¶ 28. The intent to inhibit speech, like the existence

of a conspiracy, can be demonstrated here through direct or

circumstantial evidence, Mendocino, 192 F.3d at 1301-02, and,

here, the circumstances at least permit the inference that

plaintiff was under investigation for his speech concerning

medical marijuana. 

This is so because, “[q]uestions involving a person’s state

of mind . . . are generally factual issues inappropriate for

resolution by summary judgment.” Braxton-Secret v. A.H. Robins

Co., 769 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Vucinich v.

Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 739 F.2d 1434, 1436 (9th

Cir. 1984) (“Summary judgment is generally inappropriate when

mental state is an issue, unless no reasonable inference

supports the adverse party's claim.”). Clearly, the motivation

of those ordering the investigation goes to their state of mind,

and thus is ordinarily inappropriate for resolution on summary

judgment.

This remains a factual dispute even if, as the federal

defendants argue, they had not heard of Dr. Denney until a man

at Dixon Herbs referred the CS to plaintiff’s office. Hale

Decl. ¶ 5. Although under such circumstances, it appears fairly

clear that Dr. Denney was not the target of the investigation

when it began, this does not foreclose the possibility that the

investigation expanded to include him once the CS was referred

by Dixon Herbs to plaintiff’s office. What matters, for

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purposes of making out a First Amendment violation, is that the

officials possessed a retaliatory animus at the time the CS and

undercover agent visited plaintiff’s office.

 Plaintiff has also pled and proven sufficient facts

regarding the existence of conspiratorial agreement at the

present juncture. As with the existence of retaliatory motive,

the existence of an agreement or meeting of the minds may be

inferred from circumstantial evidence. See Mendocino, 192 F.3d

at 1301. Here, plaintiff has identified the specific defendants

allegedly involved, the nature and time of the alleged

investigative activities (sending in a CS on September 21, 2005

and an undercover agent on November 9, 2005), and the manner in

which plaintiff was affected. This is a sufficient factual

allegation from which a fact-finder could infer the existence of

a conspiracy.

b. Chilling of Speech

Second, defendants argue that plaintiff has not pled nor

proven that a physician of ordinary firmness would be deterred

from speaking about medical marijuana in light of two undercover

visits. Defendants assert that “the physician has nothing to

fear so long as the physician is . . . not running a script mill

but engaging in the practice of medicine.” Defs.’ Mot. at 23

(internal quotes omitted).

This turns the holding of Conant on its head. Defendants’

argument, if carried to its logical conclusion, would mean that

the injunction in Conant was unnecessary. Because a physician’s

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recommendation of medical marijuana to a patient is not illegal,

they should also have nothing to fear from an investigation. 

The problem, however, is that a physician of ordinary firmness

who was only engaging in lawful speech concerning medical

marijuana could, in fact, be chilled by a federal investigation. 

As Judge Kozinski noted in his concurrence in Conant,

“[p]hysicians are particularly easily deterred by the threat of

governmental investigation and/or sanction from engaging in

conduct that is entirely lawful and medically appropriate,” in

part because an investigation may harm a physician’s reputation. 

309 F.3d at 640 n.2. Here, the question of whether or nor a

physician of ordinary firmness would be chilled by two

undercover visits is, at the least, an issue on which reasonable

minds could disagree.

c. Causation

Third, defendants argue that the element of causation is

lacking. Plaintiff must plead and prove that the challenged

investigative activities would not have been undertaken but for

the defendants’ retaliatory animus. See Hartman v. Moore, 126

S. Ct. 1695, 1703-04 (2006) (“[T]he causation is understood to

be but-for causation, without which the adverse action not have

been taken; we say that upon a prima facie showing of

retaliatory harm, the burden shifts to the defendant official to

demonstrate that even without the impetus to retaliate he would

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4

 The court declines to adopt the more stringent probable

cause standard urged by defendants. In Hartman, the Supreme Court

held that plaintiffs alleging retaliatory prosecution claims were

required to prove that the prosecutor lacked probable cause, rather

than merely that the retaliatory action would have been taken

absent a retaliatory motive. 126 S. Ct. at 1704-05. This is

because prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity, and the

defendant in a retaliatory prosecution case is typically a nonprosecutor, such as an inspector, who may have induced the

prosecution decision but did not make it himself. Due to this

attenuated chain, plaintiffs must prove the absence of probable

cause to bridge the gap between the official’s motive and the

prosecutor’s action.

Here, however, the problem of multi-layered causation does not

exist. The officials charged with having a retaliatory motive are

the same officials who conducted the investigation of Dr. Denney’s

office. Accordingly, the heightened probable cause standard is

inappropriate here. See Skoog v. County of Clackamas, 469 F.3d

1221, 1234 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Causation [] turns on [defendant’s]

actions alone and no ‘bridge’ between motive and action is

necessary. Thus, the rationale for requiring the pleading of no

probable cause in Hartman is absent here. This case presents an

ordinary ‘retaliation’ claim.”).

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have take the action complained of.”).4 Although previous Ninth

Circuit law suggested that plaintiffs need only prove that the

retaliatory animus was a “substantial or motivating factor,” see

Mendocino, 192 F.3d at 1300; Sloman v. Tadlock, 21 F.3d 1462,

1469 (9th Cir. 1994), it appears that Hartman has elevated the

requisite standard to but-for causation. 

Here, defendants maintain that they would have sent the

undercover visitors to plaintiff’s office even without the

alleged retaliatory motive. They note that they needed a

medical marijuana recommendation in order to purchase marijuana

from Dixon Herbs, and that it was Dixon Herbs who referred the

CS to plaintiff’s office. In short, defendants argue that there

is no chain of causation to connect the alleged unconstitutional

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5

 Defendants also suggest that it was impossible to forge the

recommendation because they had never seen one before, but have not

provided evidence on this issue. The declaration of Resident Agent

in Charge Scott Hoernke simply stated that “[t]he investigation

needed a genuine recommendation to gain entree into Dixon Herbs.”

Hoernke Decl. ¶ 8. 

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motive with the undercover visits.

Plaintiff responds that there were other methods of

investigation available that would not have abridged plaintiff’s

First Amendment rights. For example, plaintiff maintains that

defendants could have forged a medical marijuana recommendation,

just as law enforcement creates false identity documents for

undercover agents. Alternately, plaintiff suggests that law

enforcement could have openly enlisted plaintiff’s assistance

without fraud or deception. Plaintiff also argues that the

defendants’ assertion that they would have conducted their

investigation in the same way absent a retaliatory motive is

self-serving and therefore unreliable.

Given the present record before the court, and the absence

of any discovery, the court finds that discovery may reveal

sufficient factual disagreement to render summary judgment

inappropriate. Admittedly, the alternate investigative

techniques cited by plaintiff appear somewhat questionable. The

use of a forged marijuana recommendation could be exposed by a

confirmation phone call to Dr. Denney’s office.5 Nevertheless,

perhaps Dixon Herbs did not have a practice of verifying

recommendations, or perhaps the use of a forged recommendation

would have the superior investigative choice (taking into

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account all the advantages, disadvantages, and relative burdens

of using undercover visits versus using a forged recommendation)

but for a retaliatory motive.

Similarly, the open enlistment of plaintiff’s assistance

might have compromised the secrecy of the investigation. See

Hoernke Decl. ¶ 9 (describing the open solicitation of Dr.

Denney’s cooperation as “not a good suggestion”). Nevertheless,

plaintiff is entitled to develop an evidentiary basis to support

his claim that this was a superior investigative technique that

would have been selected but for defendants’ retaliatory motive. 

Additionally, even if defendants prove that obtaining a

recommendation from a doctor by the use of fraud was the

soundest path to obtaining a conviction against Dixon Herbs,

plaintiff might be able to prove that there was another doctor

that defendants should have used rather than plaintiff. These

are all issues that require discovery, and therefore preclude

summary judgment at the present stage of the proceedings.

3. Injunctive Relief

With regard to injunctive relief, defendants argue that

plaintiff lacks standing and has failed to satisfy the equitable

requirements for injunctive relief.

a. Standing

In order to meet constitutional standing requirements,

plaintiffs must prove (1) injury in fact, (2) causation, and (3)

redressability. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220

F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 2000). 

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With regard to injury in fact, plaintiff alleges two

interrelated but distinct harms. First, plaintiff alleges that

the undercover visits have chilled his speech and made him

fearful of discussing the medical benefits of marijuana with his

patients. Second, plaintiff alleges that the undercover visits

have made him suspicious of his patients, some of whom he has

turned away for fear that they were using false identification

provided by law enforcement. Defendants respond that whereas

criminal prosecution can threaten liberty, mere investigations

cannot. Furthermore, defendants argue that suspicion and

anxiety do not constitute cognizable injury, as they are “the

type of harm which necessarily accompanies many official

investigations.” Hunter v. SEC, 879 F. Supp. 494, 502 (E.D. Pa.

1995).

The court disagrees. If harm to a doctor’s ability to

“speak frankly and openly to patients,” Conant, 309 F.3d at 636,

was not a cognizable injury, the Conant injunction would never

have issued in the first instance. See also Cal. Pro-Life

Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 2003)

(finding, in the context of a pre-enforcement challenge, that

self-censorship can be a “constitutionally recognized injury”). 

With regard to causation and redressability, defendants

argue that because there were only two undercover visitors, and

neither were turned away, all of the individuals who plaintiff

turned away were necessarily private customers unconnected to

government. Accordingly, an injunctive order directed at the

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government would not affect the private pretenders. While

plausible on its face, what this argument ignores is that Dr.

Denney’s suspicions were roused only upon the defendants’

undercover visits and his discovery of the same. These visits

were the but for cause of his self-censorship, and an injunction

would clearly restore Dr. Denney’s confidence in his

relationships with his patients.

b. Equitable Requirements

Next, defendants argue that the requirements of permanent

injunctive relief have not been satisfied. “A plaintiff must

demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2)

that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are

inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering

the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a

remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest

would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.” eBay, Inc.

V. MercExchange, LLC, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).

Again, it appears that many of defendants’ arguments were

rejected, at least implicitly, by Conant. For example,

defendants argue that emotional distress caused by an

investigation is not irreparable harm, citing Evenson v. Ortega,

605 F. Supp. 1115, 1121 (D. Ariz. 1985), but the harms of an

investigation were sufficiently irreparable to justify the

injunction upheld in Conant. Damages would be an inadequate

remedy because they could not reassure Dr. Denney that similar

investigative tactics will not be used in the future. 

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Furthermore, the balancing of hardships has already been

undertaken, and the public interest taken into account, by the

Conant court’s upholding of the injunction.

4. Qualified Immunity

Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified

immunity. “Government officials performing discretionary

functions generally are shielded from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457

U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In analyzing claims involving qualified

immunity, courts engage in a two-part test. First, the court

must determine if, in the light most favorable to party

asserting injury, the official’s conduct violated a

constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201

(2001). Second, the court must determine whether that right was

clearly established. Id. at 202. If there were substantial

grounds for the official to have concluded that he had

legitimate justification under the law for acting as he did, the

plaintiff is not entitled to damages.

As set forth above, plaintiff has stated a claim for the

violation of a constitutional right. Furthermore, and contrary

to defendants’ assertion, the court need not “extend” Conant to

cover investigative acts; rather, the holding of Conant plainly

encompassed investigative acts that were motivated by

disagreement with a doctor’s speech and beliefs. The

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distinction that defendants attempt to draw between an

investigation prompted by DEA license revocation proceedings and

a criminal investigation is immaterial. The holding of Conant

(as opposed to a technical reading of its actual injunction)

forbade investigations generally, not those limited to a

particular setting. Accordingly, the defendants are not

entitled to qualified immunity.

B. Due Process

Plaintiff alleges that defendants have violated his right

to due process by depriving him of his right to free speech and

his liberty interests in his reputation and medical practice. 

The Due Process Clause guarantees two types of due process:

procedural and substantive. See Collins v. City of Harker

Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992). Procedural due process

provides Aa guarantee of fair procedure in connection with any

deprivation of life, liberty, or property@ by the government. 

Id. Substantive due process Aprotects individual liberty

against certain government actions regardless of the fairness of

the procedures used to implement them.@ Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). Specifically, the substantive component of the

Due Process Clause Aforbids the government from depriving a

person of life, liberty, or property in such a way that >shocks

the conscience= or >interferes with rights implicit in the

concept of ordered liberty.=@ Squaw Valley Dev. Co. v. Goldberg,

375 F.3d 936, 948 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Nunez v. City of Los

Angeles, 147 F.3d 867, 871 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting United

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States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)). Here, plaintiff

alleges that his substantive due process rights have been

violated. AAs a threshold matter, >to establish a substantive

due process claim a plaintiff must . . . show a government

deprivation of life, liberty, or property.=@ Squaw Valley, 375

F.3d at 948 (quoting Nunez, 147 F.3d at 871).

1. Plaintiff’s Interest in Free Speech

First, plaintiff alleges that defendants have violated his

right to due process by chilling his free speech. However, an

infringement of the right to free speech cannot provide the

basis for a violation of due process. The Supreme Court has

held that Awhere a particular amendment >provides an explicit

textual source of constitutional protection= against a particular

sort of government behavior, >that Amendment, not the more

generalized notion of Asubstantive due process,@ must be the

guide for analyzing these claims.=@ Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.

266, 273 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., for plurality) (quoting Graham

v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). Since the First Amendment

provides explicit protection for the right to free speech, which

plaintiff claims has been chilled, plaintiff may not

additionally base a due process claim on a violation of his

right to free speech.

2. Plaintiff’s Interest in his Reputation and Medical

Practice

Second, plaintiff alleges that defendants= undercover

investigation has injured his reputation and practice and,

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therefore, violated his right to due process. Reputation by

itself is not a liberty interest protected by the Fifth

Amendment. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233 (1991); Paul v.

Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1976). However, Athe right to hold

specific private employment and to follow a chosen profession

free from unreasonable governmental interference comes within

the >liberty= and >property= concepts of the Fifth Amendment.@

Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959). The liberty

guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment includes the right Ato engage

in any of the common occupations of life,@ Meyer v. Nebraska,

262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), as well as Asome generalized due

process right to choose one=s field of private employment,@

subject to reasonable government regulation. Connecticut v.

Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1999) (citing Dent v. West

Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889) (upholding a requirement of

licensing before a person can practice medicine); Truax v.

Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915) (invalidating on equal protection

grounds a state law requiring companies to employ 80% United

States citizens)). 

Generally, however, the liberty interest to hold specific

private employment has been afforded substantive due process

protection only when the government completely prohibits, rather

than briefly interrupts, a person from engaging in his chosen

profession. Gabbert, 526 U.S. at 292. Further, this right Ais

simply not infringed by the inevitable interruptions of our

daily routine as a result of legal process which all of us may

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experience from time to time.@ Id. In Gabbert, the Supreme

Court held that a lawyer=s AFourteenth Amendment right to

practice one=s calling is not violated by the execution of a

search warrant, whether calculated to annoy or even to prevent

consultation with a grand jury witness.@ Id. at 293. 

Following Gabbert, the Ninth Circuit held in Lowry v. Barnhart

that an Aindirect and incidental burden on professional practice

is far too removed from a complete prohibition to support a due

process claim.@ Lowry v. Barnhart, 329 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th

Cir. 2003) (footnote omitted). In Lowry, a lawyer claimed that

an administrative law judge was biased against him and the bias

violated his constitutional due process right to practice his

profession. Id. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that although the

judge=s Aalleged interference with Lowry's practice does not

share the brevity of the interference in Gabbert, . . . it is

similar in severity in that both fall far short of a complete

prohibition. Lowry doesn't claim that [the judge] barred him

from retaining clients or appearing at hearings. At worst, he

may have a harder time finding clients because of his losing

track record.@ Id.

In the case at bar, plaintiff alleges that defendants=

undercover investigation has injured his practice. 

Specifically, the complaint alleges that plaintiff Ahas become

suspicious of his patients, and has been forced to turn away

patients he fears may be using false identification provided by

law enforcement.@ Compl. & 21. As in Gabbert and Lowry, this

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appears to fall short of a complete prohibition. Plaintiff has

only alleged that he has had to turn away some patients, not

that he has been completely precluded from the practice of

medicine. Thus, it would appear that plaintiff has not

identified a liberty interest protected by substantive due

process. The court therefore dismisses plaintiff=s due process

claim.

C. Equal Protection

Plaintiff asserts a Fifth Amendment Equal Protection claim

based on chilling of his First Amendment right to free speech. 

A[While] the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection

clause, it does forbid discrimination that is >so unjustifiable

as to be violative of due process.=@ Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,

420 U.S. 636, 638 (1975) (quoting Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S.

163, 168 (1964); citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499

(1954)). The court analyzes a Fifth Amendment equal protection

claim in the same way it analyzes an equal protection claim

under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. 

There are two steps in analyzing an equal protection claim. 

First, plaintiff Amust show that the statute in question >results

in members of a certain group being treated differently from

other persons based on membership in that group.=@ Sagana v.

Tenorio, 384 F.3d 731, 740 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing United States

v. Lopez-Flores, 63 F.3d 1468, 1472 (9th Cir. 1995)). Second,

the court determines the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply

and evaluates the legitimacy of the discriminatory government

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action under that standard. Id. ALaws alleged to violate the

equal protection clause are generally subject to one of three

levels of >scrutiny= by courts: strict scrutiny, intermediate

scrutiny, or rational basis review. Laws are subject to strict

scrutiny when they discriminate against a suspect class, such as

a racial group, or when they discriminate based on any

classification but impact a fundamental right, such as the right

to vote.@ Tucson Woman=s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 543 (9th

Cir. 2004) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326

(2003); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964)). 

The First Amendment right to free speech is such a

fundamental right. Police Dep=t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S.

92, 101 & n.8 (1972). In Mosely, the Supreme Court held that

A[t]he Equal Protection Clause requires that statutes affecting

First Amendment interests be narrowly tailored to their

legitimate objectives.@ Id. at 101 (citing Williams v. Rhodes,

393 U.S. 23 (1968); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43

(1972)). The court held that an ordinance prohibiting picketing

on all but one subject was not narrowly tailored to prevent

disruption. Id. The court then noted, AIn a variety of

contexts we have said that >even though the governmental purpose

be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by

means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when

the end can be more narrowly achieved.= This standard, of

course, has been carefully applied when First Amendment

interests are involved.@ Id. at 101 n.8 (citations omitted). 

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Since the First Amendment right to free speech is a fundamental

right, the court applies strict scrutiny to laws impacting First

Amendment rights and discriminating based on any classification. 

See Tucson Woman=s Clinic, 379 F.3d at 543. Government actions

subject to strict scrutiny Awill be sustained only if they are

suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.@ See

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440

(1985).

In the case at bar, plaintiff alleges that defendants

discriminated against him based on his support for medical

marijuana and by conspiring to investigate him and infiltrate

his medical practice. While doctors who recommend marijuana do

not comprise a suspect class under equal protection, plaintiff

also alleges that defendants have infringed his fundamental

right to free speech. Since plaintiff has pled a claim that he

has been discriminated against in a way that impacts a

fundamental right, the court applies strict scrutiny to the

challenged government action. Government actions subject to

strict scrutiny “will be sustained only if they are suitably

tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” See City of

Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).

Defendants= stated purpose for Avisiting plaintiff was to

get written marijuana regulations acceptable to Dixon Herbs.” 

Defs.= Mot. at 29. Plaintiff argues that defendants= method of

obtaining a marijuana recommendation to gain access to Dixon

Herbs was not narrowly tailored because there were readily

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available Aalternative law enforcement techniques that could

have been implemented by defendants.@ Pl.=s Opp=n at 34. As

stated above, the alternative investigative techniques cited by

plaintiff appear somewhat questionable. However, there is at

least a reasonably founded hope that plaintiff may develop an

evidentiary basis to support his claim that alternate methods

could have been employed that would have had the same efficacy

in achieving the investigation’s stated purpose, and that would

not have compromised the safety or welfare of those involved.

D. § 1985(3)

Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated 42 U.S.C. '

1985(3) by conspiring to infiltrate his medical practice and

thereby deprive him of due process and equal protection of the

law. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. ' 1985(3), a plaintiff

must allege that defendants acted from Asome racial, or perhaps

otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus@ in

conspiring to deprive him of equal protection of the laws, or of

equal privileges and immunities under the laws. Griffin v.

Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971). The Ninth Circuit has

Aextended [section 1985(3)] beyond race only when the class in

question can show that there has been a governmental

determination that its members require and warrant special

federal assistance in protecting their civil rights.@ Schultz

v. Sundberg, 759 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 1985) (internal

quotation marks omitted). There are only two ways to show such

a governmental determination: Awe require either that the courts

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have designated the class in question a suspect or quasi-suspect

classification requiring more exacting scrutiny or that Congress

has indicated through legislation that the class required

special protection.@ Id. (citation omitted). 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants conspired to violate his

rights and the conspiracy Awas motivated [b]y a discriminatory

animus against physicians who support the medical use of

cannabis.@ Compl. & 29. Additionally, plaintiff argues that

the Conant injunction is a governmental determination that

physicians who support the medical use of cannabis require and

warrant special federal assistance in protecting their civil

rights. 

The Conant injunction, however, does not fall in one of the

categories the Ninth Circuit requires for a governmental

determination. It is not a designation by the courts that the

class is a suspect or quasi-suspect classification requiring

more exacting scrutiny. Nor is it an indication from Congress

through legislation that the class requires special protection. 

Without a governmental determination that physicians who support

the medical use of marijuana warrant special federal assistance

to protect their civil rights, plaintiff cannot make out an

essential element of a ' 1985(3) claim, that defendants acted

from a class-based discriminatory animus. See Schultz, 759 F.2d

at 718 (plaintiff failed to state a claim because there was no

governmental determination that a Atransitory coalition of state

representatives@ merited special protection); Sever v. Alaska

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Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1538 (9th Cir. 1992) (no governmental

determination for "individuals who wish to petition the

government"). The court dismisses plaintiff=s section 1985(3)

claim.

E. § 1986

ASection 1986 imposes liability on every person who knows

of an impending violation of section 1985 but neglects or

refuses to prevent the violation.@ Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles

Police Dep=t, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation

omitted). As the parties note, A[a] claim can be stated under

section 1986 only if the complaint contains a valid claim under

section 1985.@ Id. Since plaintiff has failed to state a claim

under section 1985(3), he has also failed to state a claim under

section 1986. Plaintiff=s section 1986 claim is dismissed.

IV. Conclusion

The motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment are

DENIED with respect to the First Amendment and equal protection

claims, and GRANTED with respect to the due process claim, the §

1985 claim, and the § 1986 claim. The application for a

continuance under Rule 56(f) is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 14, 2007.

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