Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca1-16-01727/USCOURTS-ca1-16-01727-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 16-1727 

GARY LEE SAMPSON, 

Petitioner, Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Respondent, Appellee. 

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO AND APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 

[Hon. Leo T. Sorokin, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Lynch, Selya, and Lipez, 

Circuit Judges. 

Paul Mogin, with whom William E. McDaniels, Jennifer G. Wicht, 

Williams & Connolly LLP, Michael Burt, Law Office of Michael Burt, 

Danalynn Recer, and Gulf Region Advocacy Center were on brief, for 

appellant. 

 Mark T. Quinlivan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, with whom Carmen 

M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee. 

August 4, 2016 

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LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Gary Lee Sampson pled guilty in 

September 2003 to two counts of the crime of carjacking resulting 

in death. In December 2003, following a penalty-phase trial, a 

jury sentenced Sampson to death under the Federal Death Penalty 

Act ("FDPA") for those crimes. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591–3599. His 

death sentence was later vacated due to jury taint, and his case 

returned to the district court for further proceedings. The 

government filed an amended notice that it sought the death 

penalty. That notice listed the factors that in its view justified 

the death penalty, largely tracking the original notice. Sampson 

challenged several aspects of that notice. 

Sampson now both petitions for a writ of mandamus, and 

appeals from an order by the district court denying his motion in 

limine to dismiss or strike two non-statutory aggravating factors 

the prosecution intends to present in a second penalty-phase 

proceeding under the FDPA.1 Those factors, which were also 

included in the original notice, are: (1) future dangerousness, 

and (2) obstruction of justice by means of murder to conceal the 

theft and attempted theft of victims' automobiles. The new 

penalty-phase trial is scheduled to start on September 14, 2016. 

We have expedited this appeal. 

 1 The term "appeal" hereinafter refers to Sampson's 

arguments before this court generally, including his arguments for 

granting mandamus and his arguments on the merits. 

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Sampson argues that because the jury in his first 

penalty-phase proceeding did not find unanimously that the 

government proved these two non-statutory aggravating factors 

beyond a reasonable doubt, their introduction at the new penaltyphase proceeding is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 

Constitution, including its collateral-estoppel component. Under 

Supreme Court precedent, Sampson's claims must be rejected. We 

affirm the district court's order. 

I. 

 The facts of the case are familiar from earlier opinions, 

and we recite only those relevant to this appeal. See United 

States v. Sampson (Sampson I), 486 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2007); United 

States v. Sampson (Sampson II), 820 F. Supp. 2d 151 (D. Mass. 

2011); United States v. Sampson (Sampson III), 820 F. Supp. 2d 202 

(D. Mass. 2011); United States v. Sampson (Sampson IV), 58 F. Supp. 

3d 136 (D. Mass. 2012); Sampson v. United States (Sampson V), 724 

F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 2013).2 

Sampson murdered three people over the course of a week 

in 2001. He murdered Philip McCloskey in Massachusetts on July 

24, 2001, and attempted to steal McCloskey's car; murdered Jonathan 

 2 This reproduces the sequence and labeling of Sampson 

decisions in Sampson V, 724 F.3d at 154, and adds Sampson V to 

that sequence. 

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Rizzo in Massachusetts and stole Rizzo's car on July 27; and 

murdered Robert Whitney in New Hampshire on July 30. 

On August 8, 2002, a grand jury, in a second superseding 

indictment, indicted Sampson on two counts of carjacking resulting 

in death. The government then filed a notice of intent to seek 

the death penalty, as required by the FDPA. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3593(a). 

Under the FDPA, after the government has filed a notice 

of intent to seek the death penalty, the criminal trial divides 

into two phases, one focused on guilt (the "guilt phase") and the 

other on sentencing (the "penalty phase"). See id. § 3593(b). If 

the defendant is convicted of a predicate capital offense in the 

guilt phase, the government then must prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt in the penalty phase that the defendant was at least 18 years 

old, committed one of four acts with the requisite mental state,3

and committed at least one of sixteen statutory aggravating 

factors. Id. §§ 3591(a), 3592(c), 3593(c)–(d). 

If the government satisfies these prerequisites and 

proves that the defendant is eligible for death, the jury must 

decide whether death is justified by weighing any proven mitigating 

factors with the proven aggravating factors, including both 

statutory and non-statutory aggravating factors. Id. § 3593(e). 

 3 Alternatively, the government may prove that the 

defendant engaged in espionage or treason. See id. § 3591(a)(1). 

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"The term 'non-statutory aggravating factor' is used to 'refer to 

any aggravating factor that is not specifically described in 18 

U.S.C. § 3592.'" Sampson I, 486 F.3d at 44 n.14 (quoting Jones v. 

United States, 527 U.S. 373, 378 n.2 (1999)). The jury must submit 

special findings on any aggravating factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d), 

and must find unanimously that the government has proven any 

aggravating factors, statutory or non-statutory, beyond a 

reasonable doubt, id. § 3593(c)–(d). 

Sampson pled guilty to both charges of carjacking 

resulting in death. The first penalty-phase hearing followed. At 

the close of the penalty phase, the jury found unanimously for the 

death penalty. For each count, the jury submitted a special 

verdict form that contained separate findings on each alleged 

statutory and non-statutory aggravating factor. The jury's 

special verdict form stated that it found unanimously that the 

government had proven two statutory aggravating factors and a 

number of non-statutory aggravating factors for each charge 

against Sampson. 

Pertinent to this appeal, the jury did not find 

unanimously that the government had proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt two alleged non-statutory aggravating factors, future 

dangerousness and murder to obstruct justice, for either charge.4 

 4 Specifically, for both Count 1 ("Carjacking Resulting in 

the Death of Philip McCloskey") and Count 2 ("Carjacking Resulting 

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That is, the unanimity requirement had not been met as to those 

two factors. It is from this circumstance that Sampson constructs 

his argument in this appeal. 

After being sentenced to death, Sampson appealed, and 

this panel affirmed. Sampson I, 486 F.3d at 52. Rehearing en 

banc was denied. United States v. Sampson, 497 F.3d 55, 56 (1st 

Cir. 2007). 

In 2009, Sampson petitioned for a new trial under 

28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court, finding that a juror had 

lied during the voir dire process in answering questions about her 

ability to be impartial, Sampson II, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 192–97, 

vacated Sampson's sentence, id. at 202. The government appealed, 

 

in the Death of Jonathan Rizzo"), the jury checked "1 or More 

Jurors Say No" on the special verdict form in response to the 

following two non-statutory aggravating factors (represented here 

by the Count 1 factors): 

Do each and every one of you find that the 

government has proven, beyond a reasonable 

doubt, that the defendant, Gary Sampson, 

murdered Philip McCloskey for the sole or 

primary purpose of preventing him from 

reporting the attempted theft of his 

automobile to authorities? 

Do each and every one of you find that the 

government has proven, beyond a reasonable 

doubt, that the defendant, Gary Sampson, is 

likely to commit criminal acts of violence in 

the future which would be a continuing and 

serious threat to the lives and safety of 

prison officials and inmates as demonstrated 

by his history of prison misconduct? 

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and we took jurisdiction and affirmed on the basis of juror 

misconduct. Sampson V, 724 F.3d at 170. 

We further held that the juror's lies during voir dire 

concealed significant evidence of bias that would have provided 

grounds to excuse her for cause. Id. at 168. We held that Sampson 

"was deprived of the right to an impartial jury and is entitled to 

a new penalty-phase hearing." Id. The case returned to the 

district court for further proceedings in 2013. 

In March 2014, the government filed an amended notice of 

intent to seek the death penalty. The amended notice again alleged 

for both counts of Sampson's conviction, inter alia, the two nonstatutory aggravating factors -- that (1) Sampson is "likely to 

commit criminal acts of violence in the future" and pose a danger 

to prison officials and inmates ("future dangerousness"); and (2) 

that Sampson murdered Philip McCloskey and Jonathan Rizzo "to 

prevent [the victims] from reporting the carjacking[s] to 

authorities" ("murder to obstruct justice") -- which the original 

sentencing jury found that the government failed to prove beyond 

a reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of all jurors. The amended 

notice also stated that the government would use new evidence from 

Sampson's conduct in prison from 2004 to the present in order to 

prove future dangerousness. 

On May 15, 2015, Sampson moved to dismiss or strike a 

number of the statutory and non-statutory aggravating factors from 

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the amended notice. He was partially successful. As to the issues 

on appeal, Sampson argued that the renewed allegations of the nonstatutory aggravating factors of future dangerousness and 

obstruction of justice violated the Double Jeopardy Clause's 

retrial and collateral-estoppel components. The government 

opposed the motion. 

The district court denied the motion to dismiss or strike 

the two non-statutory aggravating factors. It held that the Double 

Jeopardy Clause does not preclude alleging the non-statutory 

factors at the new penalty-phase hearing because the original 

penalty-phase jury's findings on those factors did not constitute 

an "acquittal." And it held that the factors are not barred by 

the collateral-estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause, 

because "the jury verdict was tainted by a juror who lied about 

her ability to be impartial," and because the jury's rejection of 

the factors was "not essential to the judgment of death." 

Sampson then moved for a certificate of appealability 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). The district court, citing Abney v. 

United States, 431 U.S. 651, 662, 659 (1977), reasoned that its 

rejection of Sampson's motion to dismiss or strike the two nonstatutory aggravating factors was a "pretrial order[] rejecting 

[a] claim[] of former jeopardy," and so was one of the "small class 

of cases that [are] beyond the confines of the final-judgment 

rule." The district court granted Sampson's motion and issued a 

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certificate of appealability on the following question: "Whether 

the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the government, at Sampson's new 

penalty phase hearing, from seeking to prove two non-statutory 

aggravating factors which the jury at Sampson's first penalty phase 

hearing found had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." 

Sampson then filed this timely appeal. 

II. 

Appellate Jurisdiction 

Before reaching the merits of Sampson's appeal, we must 

satisfy ourselves that we have jurisdiction to hear it. The 

government disputes that we have jurisdiction, but argues that we 

may skip that analysis in favor of a merits analysis. Sampson 

argues, among other things, that we should exercise the mandamus 

power available to us under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). 

We conclude that, whether or not we have statutory jurisdiction, 

we at least have and will exercise advisory mandamus jurisdiction. 

The All Writs Act provides that "all courts established 

by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in 

aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages 

and principles of law." Id. "[M]andamus must be used sparingly 

and only in extraordinary situations." In re Pearson, 990 F.2d 

653, 656 (1st Cir. 1993). There are two types of mandamus, 

supervisory and advisory. United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 769 

n.19 (1st Cir. 1994). "The former is used when an appellate court 

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issues the writ to correct an established trial court practice 

that significantly distorts proper procedure," id., whereas the 

latter is used in "cases . . . that present novel questions of 

great significance which, if not immediately addressed, are likely 

to recur and to evade effective review," United States v. Green, 

407 F.3d 434, 439 (1st Cir. 2005). "We typically exercise 

[advisory mandamus] to settle substantial questions of law when 

doing so would give needed guidance to lawyers, litigants, and 

lower courts." Sampson V, 724 F.3d at 159. 

 We exercised advisory mandamus jurisdiction in the prior 

appeal to address the juror misconduct issue. Id. at 159–61. It 

is appropriate to exercise advisory mandamus here. Sampson's 

appeal meets all of the stringent requirements for its "strong 

medicine." In re Sony BMG Music Entm't, 564 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 

2009). 

First, the issue, as framed, is novel.5 As Sampson 

notes, neither this court nor the Supreme Court has passed on the 

 5 See In re Justices of Superior Court Dep't of Mass. Trial 

Ct., 218 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 2000) (advisory mandamus appropriate 

because the "availability of pretrial federal habeas relief for 

'disinterested prosecutor' claims [was] an issue of first 

impression" implicating "greater issues of federalism"); Horn, 29 

F.3d at 770 (advisory mandamus appropriate for the question of 

whether sovereign immunity bars federal court's order of 

attorneys' fees and costs against government in criminal case 

because "[t]he issue presented ha[d] never before been squarely 

decided"); In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88, 90 (1st Cir. 

1990) (advisory mandamus warranted to decide "novel and important" 

question of press access to jury list (quoting In re Globe 

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precise type of double-jeopardy challenge presented in this 

appeal. Second, it is of high public importance. "Like the right 

to trial by jury, [the guarantee against double jeopardy] is 

clearly 'fundamental to the American scheme of justice.'" Benton 

v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 

391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)). Third, as we emphasized when we 

exercised advisory mandamus to affirm the district court's vacatur 

of Sampson's sentence for jury taint, an already significant legal 

question is even more so in the context of a capital case, because 

"death is [] different." Sampson V, 724 F.3d at 159 (alteration 

in original) (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977) 

(plurality opinion)). Fourth, exercising review now offers 

pragmatic benefits in this case. As Sampson notes, and as the 

district court observed, deferring review of the district court's 

rejection of his double-jeopardy challenge presents risks of a 

third penalty trial. Incurring the pain inflicted by a third trial 

is to be avoided, if not needed. 

 The government essentially concedes that the appeal 

raises novel questions of public importance, that exercising 

mandamus would offer significant pragmatic benefits, and that it 

"undoubtedly would provide needed guidance to the district court, 

the lawyers, and litigants in this case." The government rests 

 

Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d 47, 50 (1st Cir. 1984))). 

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its argument against advisory mandamus instead on an assertion 

that the issue raised in the appeal will not "almost certainly 

recur," Green, 407 F.3d at 440, and that it will not evade review. 

The government's point is that FDPA cases are extremely 

rare in this circuit -- Sampson's was the first FDPA conviction 

that we reviewed, see Sampson I, 486 F.3d at 176 -- and the 

particular issue in this appeal will arise even less frequently, 

making it implausible to consider the question in the appeal 

"systemically important," In re Sony, 564 F.3d at 4. This is too 

narrow a view of systemic importance. Federal courts often find 

error in capital cases. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 

2759 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Similar double-jeopardy 

challenges to subsidiary determinations by a sentencing jury in 

capital cases may well recur. 

The government argues that the question presented will 

not evade review because Sampson can raise it after his 

resentencing. But this misses the point. The double-jeopardy 

challenge here asserts that Sampson should not have to defend once 

more against the two non-statutory aggravating factors at issue. 

Postponing review of the double-jeopardy challenge until after the 

second penalty-phase proceeding will frustrate the appeal's 

central assertion: that Sampson should not have to defend against 

 6 This court also has pending the appeal in United States 

v. Tsarnaev (No. 16-6001), another death-penalty case. 

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these particular allegations again. The claim would evade review 

because one of the most important protections of the Double 

Jeopardy Clause would be lost. Abney, 431 U.S. at 662. 

Sampson's appeal satisfies the stringent requirements of 

advisory mandamus, and we take jurisdiction. 

III. 

Double Jeopardy and Collateral Estoppel 

Where, as here, an appeal raises "constitutional 

questions 'such as the district court's denial of a motion to 

dismiss . . . on the grounds of double jeopardy and collateral 

estoppel,'" our review is de novo. United States v. Lanoue, 137 

F.3d 656, 661 (1st Cir. 1998) (alteration in original) (quoting 

United States v. Aguilar-Aranceta, 957 F.2d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1992), 

overruled on other grounds by Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 

110 (2009)). 

Sampson argues that the government's re-allegation of 

the non-statutory aggravating factors of future dangerousness and 

murder to obstruct justice violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.7 

The Clause provides: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the 

same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. 

 7 Sampson also argued to the trial court that the future 

dangerousness factor was unconstitutionally unreliable and vague, 

and that the law of the case barred relitigating future 

dangerousness and murder to obstruct justice. Those issues are 

not before this court. 

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Const. amend. V. He contends that the jury's special verdict on 

the two non-statutory aggravating factors is an "acquittal" for 

double-jeopardy purposes, and also that the collateral-estoppel 

component of the Double Jeopardy Clause bars relitigating the two 

factors. Neither argument is persuasive. We address each in turn. 

A. The "Acquittal" Argument 

The Supreme Court has explained that "the touchstone for 

double-jeopardy protection in capital-sentencing proceedings is 

whether there has been an 'acquittal.'" Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 

537 U.S. 101, 109 (2003). In the context of aggravating 

circumstances at sentencing, the Court "reject[s] the . . . premise 

. . . that a capital sentencer's failure to find a particular 

aggravating circumstance alleged by the prosecution always 

constitutes an 'acquittal' of that circumstance for double 

jeopardy purposes." Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 155 (1986). 

Instead, an "acquittal" in the capital sentencing context turns on 

"whether the sentencer or reviewing court has 'decided that the 

prosecution has not proved its case' that the death penalty is 

appropriate." Id. (quoting Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 

443 (1981)); see also Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825, 833–34 (2009). 

If the decision being examined does not meet the standard of an 

acquittal, then the "clean slate" rule applies, Bullington, 451 

U.S. at 443, and the defendant "constitutionally may be subjected 

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to whatever punishment is lawful, subject only to the limitation 

that he receive credit for time served," id. at 442. 

The earlier penalty-phase jury's decision in Sampson's 

case is not an acquittal. Quite the opposite -- the jury found 

the death penalty justified, despite also finding that the 

government had not proven two non-statutory aggravating factors 

beyond a reasonable doubt to all members of the jury. 

The Supreme Court has been clear that the "concern with 

protecting the finality of acquittals is not implicated when . . . 

a defendant is sentenced to death, i.e., 'convicted.' There is no 

cause to shield such a defendant from further litigation; further 

litigation is the only hope he has." Poland, 476 U.S. at 156. In 

Bobby v. Bies, the Court likewise held that there was no acquittal 

for double-jeopardy purposes where the original jury imposed the 

death sentence despite the presence of the mitigating factor of 

mental retardation, and a new hearing on the defendant's mental 

capacity was held in light of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 

(2002). 556 U.S. at 833–34. And in Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 

the Court held that a deadlocked sentencing-jury verdict 

automatically resulting in a life sentence was not an "acquittal" 

of the death penalty for double-jeopardy purposes. 537 U.S. at 

109–110. The Court has been consistent in a variety of different 

factual circumstances. See also Bullington, 451 U.S. at 444–45 

(verdict of life imprisonment in sentencing proceeding that 

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"explicitly requires the jury to determine whether the prosecution 

has 'proved its case'" for death is an acquittal of the death 

penalty for double-jeopardy purposes). 

Double jeopardy clearly does not apply here. See Evans 

v. Michigan, 133 S. Ct. 1069, 1075 (2013) (contrasting substantive 

rulings that trigger double jeopardy, including rulings that go to 

insufficiency of evidence, or guilt and innocence, with procedural 

rulings "that 'are unrelated to factual guilt or innocence,'" such 

as "'a legal judgment that a defendant, although criminally 

culpable, may not be punished' because of some problem like an 

error with the indictment," and which do not trigger double 

jeopardy (quoting United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98 & n.11 

(1978))). Our vacation of Sampson's original death-penalty 

sentence on Sixth Amendment grounds based on juror misconduct does 

not change this analysis. That decision rested on the basis that 

a juror had improperly withheld material information to get on the 

jury, and "had nothing to do with either the sufficiency of the 

evidence or [Sampson's] guilt or innocence." United States v. 

Szpyt, 785 F.3d 31, 37–38 (1st Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. 

Ct. 800 (2016). Sampson was not acquitted, and the Double Jeopardy 

Clause is not triggered. 

Sampson tries to marshal quotes from case law at the 

periphery of double-jeopardy jurisprudence in an effort to 

construe the original penalty-phase jury's determinations on the 

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non-statutory aggravating factors as an "acquittal." In 

particular, he points to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 

(2000), and cases interpreting it, to suggest an "expanding" of 

"the concept of 'acquittal,'" and to argue that "non-statutory as 

well as statutory aggravating factors are constitutionally 

significant under the FDPA." Sampson cites various non-binding 

decisions from other courts, see, e.g., State v. Sawatzky, 125 

P.3d 722, 726 (Or. 2005) (en banc), as well as non-precedential 

dicta from a Supreme Court plurality opinion, Sattazahn, 537 U.S. 

at 110–12 (plurality opinion), that have reasoned from Apprendi to 

hold or suggest that double-jeopardy protections apply to jury 

determinations on sentencing enhancements even if there was never 

an acquittal on the death penalty. And he provides various cases 

discussing the relationship between the FDPA and Apprendi, as well 

as the FDPA and the Confrontation Clause, in an attempt to 

demonstrate the evolving "constitutional significance" of FDPA 

non-statutory aggravating factors. 

But Apprendi is not a double-jeopardy case; its holding 

concerns what must be submitted to, and found to be proven beyond 

a reasonable doubt by, a jury in the first instance. Apprendi, 

530 U.S. at 476. Here the jury in the first instance did properly 

find beyond a reasonable doubt that the death penalty should be 

imposed. 

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Our question is not what Apprendi requires of the 

FDPA, nor whether non-statutory aggravating factors are 

"constitutionally significant," but rather whether relitigating 

two non-statutory aggravating factors found not proven by an 

earlier penalty-phase jury is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 

The Supreme Court's cases squarely addressing the question of what 

is an "acquittal" for double-jeopardy purposes control the 

question, and they compel rejection of Sampson's argument.8 

Because neither the original penalty-phase jury's verdict nor the 

vacatur of Sampson's sentence constitutes an acquittal, doublejeopardy principles do not prevent the government from alleging 

again the two non-statutory aggravating factors. 

B. The Collateral-Estoppel Argument 

Sampson argues at greater length that collateral 

estoppel, which "is embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee 

against double jeopardy," Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 

(1970), bars the relitigation of the two non-statutory aggravating 

 8 Sampson argues that Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 

(2005), "indicates" that a lower court may depart from controlling 

Supreme Court precedent when it addresses "issues implicating the 

Eighth Amendment." Whatever Roper's implications for stare 

decisis in the Eighth Amendment capital punishment context -- an 

issue we do not address today -- we know of no support for such a 

proposition in the context of the Double Jeopardy Clause, and 

Sampson provides none. 

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factors.9 His argument again runs directly against Supreme Court 

precedent, and fares no better than his "acquittal" argument.10 

As the Supreme Court explained in Bies, issue 

preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, "bars successive 

litigation of 'an issue of fact or law' that 'is actually litigated 

and determined by a valid and final judgment, and . . . is essential 

to the judgment.'" 556 U.S. at 834 (alteration in original) 

(quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1980)). The Bies 

Court emphasized that "[a] determination ranks as necessary or 

essential only when the final outcome hinges on it." Id. at 835 

(citing 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & 

Procedure § 4421, at 543 (2d ed. 2002)). 

The Bies Court found that the issue for which collateral 

estoppel had been claimed -- evidence of the defendant's "mild to 

 9 One might wonder why, if a Fifth Amendment Double 

Jeopardy Clause argument that there was an acquittal on the merits 

fails, as a matter of logic there is still a double-jeopardy claim 

available to make. No party makes an issue of this and both accept 

the analytical structure presented by Sampson, so we have done so 

as well. We conclude that Bies, Sattazahn, and Poland resolve 

this question against Sampson. 

10 The district court rejected Sampson's collateralestoppel argument on two grounds. It held that, because the 

penalty-phase jury's verdict was vacated for juror bias, the 

penalty-phase verdict does not have any preclusive effect. And it 

held that collateral estoppel did not apply because "the rejection 

of [the non-statutory aggravating factors] was not essential to 

the judgment of death." Because we find the latter rationale 

sufficient to dispose of the issue, it is unnecessary to address 

the effect of the vacatur for jury bias on Sampson's collateralestoppel argument. 

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borderline mental retardation," which served as a mitigating 

factor in the original jury's sentencing deliberations, id. at 828 

-- failed to meet this standard, id. at 835. The defendant had 

been sentenced to death by the original jury, and that sentence 

was affirmed on review by the Ohio appellate courts, with the Ohio 

Supreme Court "observ[ing] that Bies' 'mild to borderline mental 

retardation merit[ed] some weight in mitigation,' but conclud[ing] 

that 'the aggravating circumstances outweigh[ed] the mitigating 

factors beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. at 828 (second and fourth 

alterations in original) (quoting State v. Bies, 658 N.E. 2d 754, 

761-62 (Ohio 1996)). 

The Bies Court reasoned that "it [was] clear that the 

[Ohio] courts' statements regarding Bies' mental capacity were not 

necessary to the judgments affirming his death sentence." Id. at 

835. The Court held that the Sixth Circuit, which found that 

collateral estoppel did apply to the issue of the defendant's 

retardation, erred by "conflat[ing] a determination necessary to 

the bottom-line judgment with a subsidiary finding that, standing 

alone, is not outcome determinative." Id. The Court concluded 

that "[i]ssue preclusion cannot transform Bies' loss at the 

sentencing phase into a partial victory." Id. The same is true 

here. 

The two non-statutory aggravating factors rejected by 

the first penalty-phase jury were not necessary to Sampson's death 

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sentence. Indeed, "[f]ar from being necessary to the judgment," 

the jury's failure to find unanimously that the government proved 

the two non-statutory aggravating factors beyond a reasonable 

doubt, like the retardation mitigating factor in Bies, "cuts 

against [the judgment] -- making [it] quintessentially the kind[] 

of ruling[] not eligible for issue-preclusion treatment." Id. 

(quoting Bies v. Bagley, 535 F.3d 520, 533 (6th Cir. 2008) (Sutton, 

J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)). And at least 

one other federal court has come to the same conclusion: that 

collateral estoppel does not bar the introduction at a second 

penalty-phase proceeding of non-statutory aggravating factors 

presented to, and not found proven by, an earlier penalty-phase 

jury. United States v. Stitt, 760 F. Supp. 2d 570, 584 (E.D. Va. 

2010). 

Sampson attempts unsuccessfully to distinguish Bies. He 

first observes that "the prior determination [in Bies] . . . was 

made by a court in an opinion" (emphasis omitted), whereas the 

prior determinations in this case "were made by a jury in special 

findings" (emphasis omitted). He contrasts the "spare statements" 

reviewed in Bies, 556 U.S. at 834, with the more elaborate process 

of the special findings at issue here. But the collateral-estoppel 

principle articulated in Bies makes no distinction between judgeand jury-made determinations, nor any distinction based on the 

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procedure for making the determination -- it focuses on whether 

the determination was necessary to the prior judgment. 

Sampson also argues that unlike here, where the issues 

being relitigated are legally identical to issues in the prior 

determination, the issue in the second proceeding in Bies -- 

whether, under the rule announced in Atkins, the defendant's 

retardation rendered him ineligible for the death penalty -- 

involved a legal principle that was new and different from the 

prior determination. He argues that the Court noted that novelty 

as another basis for not finding collateral estoppel. See Bies, 

556 U.S. at 836–37. But the Court made the observation that this 

would be an alternative ground to reject the collateral-estoppel 

argument "even if the core requirements for issue preclusion had 

been met," id. at 836; its essential point was that, as here, those 

core requirements were not present. 

All of Sampson's other purported distinctions11 share the 

same flaw. They do not affect the principle articulated in Bies 

 11 Sampson argues that here, unlike in Bies, there was 

"every incentive" to fully litigate the non-statutory aggravating 

factors; that the non-statutory factors must be proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt under the FDPA, unlike the Ohio mitigating factors 

at issue in Bies; that the appeal in Bies, unlike Sampson's, "was 

governed by the limitations on federal habeas review of state 

judgments"; and that Bies involved a "second run at vacating [the 

defendant's] death sentence," 556 U.S. at 834 (quoting Bagley, 535 

F.3d at 531 (Sutton, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 

banc)), and "not an effort by the State to retry him or to increase 

his punishment," id. The government correctly notes that none of 

these distinctions is material to the collateral-estoppel 

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that collateral estoppel requires a determination that is 

essential to the prior judgment. That principle dictates that we 

reject Sampson's collateral-estoppel argument. There is simply no 

way the two non-statutory aggravating factors at issue here were 

essential to the first jury's death sentence.12

Sampson further contends that a number of other 

decisions of federal courts provide alternative analyses that 

support his collateral-estoppel claim. They do not. He relies on 

language in this court's decision in United States v. BravoFernandez, 790 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 

1491 (2016), including that collateral-estoppel claims "must be 

set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye to all the 

circumstances of the proceedings," id. at 46 (quoting Ashe, 397 

U.S. at 444), and that "if a review of [the record of the prior 

proceeding] shows that a 'rational jury,' as a practical matter, 

decided adversely to the government an issue to be relitigated in 

the new prosecution, then the defendant gets the benefit of 

collateral estoppel," id. But that language comes from an inquiry 

 

principles articulated by the Bies Court and the Second Restatement 

of Judgments. 

12 The government admitted at oral argument that as a matter 

of logic its position is that a sentencing jury's determinations 

on non-statutory aggravating factors can never be essential to the 

judgment in an FDPA case, because non-statutory aggravating 

factors are neither necessary to nor sufficient for the imposition 

of the death penalty under the FDPA. 

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into the preclusive effect of acquittals on an attempt to prove 

various facts in a retrial of vacated convictions arising from the 

same split verdict. See id. at 43, 48. In other words, the 

determinations at issue in Bravo-Fernandez were potentially 

necessary to the prior judgment; the determinations that Sampson 

attacks could not have been. 

Sampson's reliance on Delap v. Dugger, 890 F.2d 285 (11th 

Cir. 1989), abrogated on other grounds by Floyd v. Sec'y, Fla. 

Dep't of Corr., 638 F. App'x 909, 924 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) 

(citing Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119–20 (2007), and Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631 (1993)) is equally misplaced. He 

argues that the case illustrates "that an impact on the express 

terms of a judgment is not an absolute prerequisite for collateral 

estoppel." This proposition is simply not so, and misconstrues 

Delap. Delap, in any event, does not control our decision. Delap 

was decided in 1989, 27 years ago, and well before Sattazahn and 

Bies, the Supreme Court cases that dictate our holding. 

Delap concerned a trial in which the prosecution pursued 

multiple theories of guilt on one count of murder. The defendant 

was convicted of murder on one theory (first-degree 

premeditation), and the trial judge found that there was 

insufficient evidence to convict the defendant on a theory that 

the murder was committed during a felony. 890 F.2d at 308–12. 

The Eleventh Circuit first held that the insufficiency-of-theCase: 16-1727 Document: 00117038657 Page: 24 Date Filed: 08/04/2016 Entry ID: 6022959
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evidence finding on the theory that there was a concomitant felony 

constituted an acquittal, because the finding "decide[d] that the 

prosecution has not proved its case." Id. at 313 (quoting 

Bullington, 451 U.S. at 443). It then asked whether the felony 

murder acquittal as to guilt "bar[red on retrial] a finding that 

the murder occurred during the commission of a felony so as to 

constitute an aggravating factor justifying imposition of the 

death penalty." Id. at 314. The court emphasized that "in this 

case Delap's acquittal of felony murder occurred during the 

guilt/innocence phase of his first trial." Id. at 318. It 

distinguished and said that it "need not address what collateral 

estoppel effect, if any, would result had the jury at the 

sentencing phase of Delap's first trial concluded that he had not 

committed murder during the course of a felony." Id. Sampson 

pled guilty, and his challenge concerns the collateral-estoppel 

effect of one sentencing-phase determination on another. Delap is 

inapposite. 

As we explained in Manganella v. Evanston Ins. Co., 700 

F.3d 585 (1st Cir. 2012), another case Sampson cites: "We do not 

ask whether the resolution of an issue was necessary to reach the 

same outcome; rather, the inquiry is whether the issue was 

necessary to the decision actually rendered." Id. at 594. By 

that standard, his argument fails: the non-statutory aggravating 

factors simply could not have been "necessary to the decision 

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actually rendered." Id.; see Bies, 556 U.S. at 835. Because the 

non-statutory aggravating factors were not necessary to the 

determination of his original death sentence, the government may 

relitigate them at the new penalty-phase proceeding. 

In the end, Sampson's argument is that there should be 

a more relaxed standard for collateral-estoppel claims in the 

context of capital sentencing. But the Supreme Court's scrupulous 

doctrinal reliance on the Second Restatement of Judgments in Bies, 

556 U.S. at 834, makes clear that the core requirements of 

collateral estoppel apply with full force in the capitalsentencing context. Sampson's argument fails to meet those 

requirements. 

Finally, Sampson makes a vague "Eighth Amendment values" 

argument trying to strengthen his collateral-estoppel position. 

He emphasizes the general principle that "[the Supreme] Court has 

demanded that factfinding procedures aspire to a heightened 

standard of reliability," Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 

(1986) (plurality opinion), and argues from it that "[r]eliability 

could only be impaired by allowing prosecutors multiple 

opportunities to pursue particular aggravating factors." The 

argument cannot save a double-jeopardy claim when the claim fails 

on its own terms. 

The district court correctly ruled that it would not 

strike the government's notice of intended use of the non-statutory 

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aggravating factors of future dangerousness and murder to obstruct 

justice because the earlier jury's findings were not an acquittal, 

nor were they essential to the jury's death sentence. The Double 

Jeopardy Clause does not bar the government from alleging those 

non-statutory aggravating factors again at Sampson's new penaltyphase proceeding. 

IV. 

The order of the district court is affirmed. 

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