Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03007/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03007-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Luis Gutierrez-Valencia,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Unknown Harris,

Defendant.

No. CV-18-03007-PHX-JAT (DMF)

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Luis Gutierrez-Valencia’s (“Plaintiff”) 

Objection (Doc. 97) to two pretrial orders of Magistrate Judge Deborah M. Fine (Docs. 93, 

94). The Court now rules on the Objection (Doc. 97).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant Unknown Harris (“Defendant”) 

alleging that Defendant violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. (Doc. 1).

Specifically, Plaintiff claims that he “had special needs orders” for, among other things, 

“tennis shoes, shower shoes, TENS unit machine, polarized and transition sunglasses[,] 

and prescription glasses” and that “Defendant Harris knew of Plaintiff’s chronic pain and 

suffering from multiple injuries and was awear [sic] of the prescribed treatment for the 

Plaintiff’s serious medical needs” yet Defendant denied Plaintiff the above-listed items 

Plaintiff claims he needs. (See Doc. 97 at 1). The Magistrate Judge ruled on the following 

motions: (1) Plaintiff’s Request to Exceed Limits on Discovery (Doc. 76), (2) Plaintiff’s 

Request for Copies of Witness Subpoenas and Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Doc. 77), 

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(3) Defendant Harris’ Motion to Compel (Docs. 78, 79, 80), (4) and Plaintiff’s Motion for 

an Order Compelling Discovery (Doc. 81). The Magistrate Judge denied each of Plaintiff’s 

motions and granted Defendant’s motion. (Doc. 94). 

Plaintiff seeks relief from the Magistrate Judge’s order (Doc. 94) under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 46. It appears Plaintiff is mistaken as Rule 46 provides no form of relief. 

Lagmay v. Nobriga, No. CV 15-00463 LEK/KJM, 2016 WL 2733101, at *1 (D. Haw. May 

10, 2016). Thus, the Court construes Plaintiff’s Objection (Doc. 97) as seeking relief under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

This Court may modify or set aside any part of a pretrial order issued by a magistrate 

judge that “is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72(a). The Court will overturn a magistrate judge’s decision only if it is the result of 

“clear error.” Maisonville v. F2 Am., Inc., 902 F.2d 746, 747 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations 

omitted). Under this standard of review, the Court “may not simply substitute its judgment 

for that of the deciding court.” Grimes v. City & County of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 

241 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). Instead, the Court must have a “definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 

(2001) (citation omitted). The burden of making this showing is on the objecting party. See 

Kinkeade v. Beard, No. 215CV01375TLNCDK, 2017 WL 2813037, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 

29, 2017).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff contends that the Magistrate Judge’s order (Doc. 94) erred in four ways. 

The Court will review each contention in turn.1

 

1 Plaintiff entitled his filing as “Objection to a Ruling or Order: of the Following and/or 

(Doc. 93, Doc. 94).” (Doc. 97). However, Plaintiff provided no analysis of any error in the 

Magistrate Judge’s order granting an extension of the dispositive motion deadline (Doc. 

93). As such, to the extent Plaintiff seeks review of the order granting an extension of the 

dispositive motion deadline (Doc. 93), it is denied as Plaintiff identified no error.

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a. Plaintiff’s Request to Exceed Limits on Discovery (Doc. 76)

Plaintiff first argues that the Magistrate Judge erred by denying Plaintiff’s Request 

to Exceed Limits on Discovery (Doc. 76). Plaintiff requested that the Magistrate Judge 

reopen discovery and permit Plaintiff to request more discovery beyond the limits set by 

the Court’s Scheduling Order (Doc. 25). (Doc. 76 at 1–2). Plaintiff’s main contention is 

that he does not know what interrogatories, admissions, and productions of documents to 

request because he does not have access to “medical records, e-mails[], and/or any other 

relevant documents” that he has requested but that Defendant has not yet produced. (Doc. 

97 at 2). Defendant has not yet produced these documents because “[t]here is a long line” 

of requested medical records and it is still evaluating which emails are relevant to 

Plaintiff’s discovery request. (See Doc. 88 at 2–3). However, Plaintiff presented a different 

rationale in the motion before the Magistrate Judge. (See Doc. 76). Plaintiff asserted 

Defendant was “able to receive a deposition for seven hours” and Plaintiff has complied 

with Defendant’s discovery while, in Plaintiff’s view, Defendant has not been cooperative 

with Plaintiff’s requests. (Id. at 1–2). In other words, Plaintiff appears to have argued to 

the Magistrate Judge that discovery has been unfair and thus he deserves relief in the form 

of an extension of the discovery deadline as well as the ability to seek discovery beyond 

the limits set by the Court’s Scheduling Order (Doc. 25).

Plaintiff has not shown that the Magistrate Judge’s denial of Plaintiff’s Request to 

Exceed Limits on Discovery (Doc. 76) was clearly erroneous or contrary to law. “A 

schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 16(b)(4). The decision of whether to reopen discovery is in the sound discretion of the 

Magistrate Judge. See Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th 

Cir. 2006). A decision denying a request to reopen discovery “will not be overturned in the 

absence of a clear abuse of discretion.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The Ninth Circuit has recognized that the Court must be allowed “to control its 

docket by enforcing a discovery termination date, even in the face of requested 

supplemental discovery that might have revealed highly probative evidence, when the 

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[party’s] prior discovery efforts were not diligent.” Id. “The use of orders establishing a 

firm discovery cutoff date is commonplace, and has impacts generally helpful to the orderly 

progress of litigation, so that the enforcement of such an order should come as a surprise 

to no one.” Id. A party’s failure to be “diligent in pursuing a discovery order before the 

discovery deadline expire[s]” is typically fatal to the party’s ability to show good cause. 

See Rogers v. Brauer Law Offices, PLC, No. CV-10-1693-PHX-LOA, 2011 WL 3665346, 

at *6 (D. Ariz. Aug. 22, 2011). A party must also show that it could not have conducted 

the discovery it will seek upon reopening of discovery within the original deadline. Taurus 

IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 559 F. Supp. 2d 947, 975–76 (W.D. Wis. 2008), rev’d

in part on other grounds, 726 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

Plaintiff has failed to show the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that he did not 

show good cause to reopen discovery. Plaintiff did not present, before the Magistrate 

Judge, the claim that he was unable to make timely discovery requests as a result of 

Defendant’s failure to produce certain discovery, and thus, the Court may decline to hear 

it. Kraft Ams., LP v. Oldcastle Precast, Inc., No. LACV1203681JAKEX, 2013 WL 

12125759, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2013). However, even if Plaintiff had raised this 

argument to the Magistrate Judge, Plaintiff has not shown that he diligently pursued an 

order compelling the discovery he sought before the deadline for discovery came. And, 

Plaintiff provides no excuse for failing to request an extension before the deadline 

terminated. Moreover, as the Magistrate Judge noted, (Doc. 94 at 2–3), Plaintiff failed to 

identify what discovery he would seek. Consequently, the Court cannot determine whether 

Plaintiff could have sought this discovery within the deadline for discovery. The Magistrate 

Judge did not err on this ground.

The Magistrate Judge also correctly rejected Defendant’s original argument in 

support of the motion (Doc. 76). The rationale underlying Plaintiff’s motion before the 

Magistrate Judge (Doc. 76) was grounded in the fact that Defendant was allowed to depose 

Plaintiff but “[D]efendant has shown an unwillingness to provide any material answers.” 

(Id. at 1). Plaintiff has not explained what discovery he would seek should discovery be 

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reopened, and thus, the Court cannot determine whether he would have been able to request 

that discovery before the deadline for discovery ran. And, Plaintiff has not shown that he 

acted diligently in pursuing a discovery order before the discovery deadline ran. Thus, the 

Magistrate Judge did not err in rejecting this argument either.

The Magistrate Judge did not err in denying Plaintiff’s motion to reopen discovery 

(Doc. 76). Therefore, Plaintiff’s objection to the Magistrate Judge’s denial of his motion 

to exceed the Scheduling Order’s (Doc. 25) discovery limits is moot as Plaintiff may not 

seek any discovery at this time. The Magistrate Judge’s decision (Doc. 94) is affirmed. 

b. Plaintiff’s Request for Subpoenas (Doc. 77)

Next, Plaintiff asserts that the Magistrate Judge erred in denying his request for 

copies of witness subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum for the “purpose of 

interrogatories/questions leading to information.” (Doc. 97 at 3–4; Doc. 94 at 3). The 

Magistrate Judge denied Plaintiff’s request because discovery closed over a month before 

Plaintiff’s request. (See Doc. 94 at 3). The Court affirms the Magistrate Judge’s decision

because, as noted, supra Section III.a, the Magistrate Judge did not err in denying the 

request to reopen discovery. To the extent Plaintiff is requesting subpoenas for trial 

witnesses, the Magistrate Judge’s determination that such a request is premature is also 

affirmed. (See Doc. 94 at 3).

c. Defendant’s Motion to Compel (Doc. 78, 79, 80)

Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in granting Defendant’s motion to 

compel (Doc. 78) Plaintiff’s mental health records and “diaries, notes, statements, and 

other documents supporting Plaintiff’s claims,” (Doc. 94 at 4–5). (Doc. 97 at 4–5). The 

Magistrate Judge granted Defendant’s motion to compel the mental health records (Doc. 

78) because Plaintiff put his mental health at issue when he filed a claim against Defendant 

seeking damages for emotional distress. (Doc. 94 at 4).

In short, Plaintiff asserts no relevant ground illustrating that the Magistrate Judge 

legally erred. Plaintiff contends that the fact that he is seeking damages for emotional 

distress does not entitle Defendant to his mental health records because he can engage in 

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“self help methods, which does not preclude nor n[e]gate emotional/mental distress 

according to many psychologist[s] or the DSM III.” (Doc. 97 at 4–5). This ground does not 

establish that the Magistrate Judge erred. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to show that the 

Magistrate Judge erred in requiring Plaintiff to disclose his mental health records to 

Defendant as a result of claiming emotional distress damages against Defendant. Plaintiff 

raised no argument supporting his claim that the Magistrate Judge erred by granting 

Defendant’s motion to compel diaries, notes, statements, and other documents supporting 

Plaintiff’s claims. Therefore, the Magistrate Judge’s decision granting Defendant’s motion 

to compel (Doc. 78) is affirmed.

d. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel (Doc. 81)

Plaintiff asserts that the Magistrate Judge erred in denying his motion to compel 

“sections of a medical technical manual, medical records, and emails,” (Doc. 94 at 5). (Doc. 

97 at 5; Doc. 81). The Magistrate Judge denied the motion (Doc. 81) because Plaintiff “did 

not confer in good faith before bringing his motion regarding the medical technical manual 

and the emails.” (Doc. 94 at 5). The Magistrate Judge also provided specific reasoning for 

denying the motion to compel (Doc. 81) as to each request. 

First, the Magistrate Judge noted that Defendant produced many sections of the 

medical technical manual and that other sections were not relevant to Plaintiff’s claim.

(Doc. 94 at 5–6). Plaintiff provides no explanation as to why any of the other sections of 

the medical technical manual are relevant to his claim. Therefore, Plaintiff has not met his 

burden of establishing error.

Second, the Magistrate Judge found that “there is no actual dispute to be resolved” 

as to the medical records as Defendant will produce a copy of them. (Doc. 94 at 6). There 

is a delay because Defendant asserts “[t]here is a long line of requests for medical records.” 

(Doc. 88 at 3). Plaintiff again identifies no specific error, and thus, has failed to meet his 

burden of establishing error.

Third, the Magistrate Judge found “there is no actual dispute to be resolved” 

regarding Plaintiff’s requests for emails to and from Defendant because Defendant is still 

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conducting a search for relevant emails and has not yet denied Plaintiff any discovery he 

requests. (Doc. 94 at 6–7). Again, Plaintiff offers no argument as to how the Magistrate 

Judge erred. 

Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge’s decision denying Plaintiff’s motion to compel 

(Doc. 81) is affirmed.

IV. DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS AGAINST CORIZON UTILIZATION 

MANAGEMENT UNIT JOHN AND JANE DOE

Finally, Plaintiff asks the Court to explain whether “a decision was made or is being 

made in regard to Corizon defendants, so Plaintiff may refile and/or act accordingly.” (Doc. 

97 at 5–6). It does not appear that Plaintiff seeks any type of relief but merely explanation. 

If Plaintiff is seeking relief from the Court’s order dismissing Corizon Utilization 

Management Unit John and Jane Doe, (see Doc. 67), it is denied as untimely and 

procedurally inappropriate.

The Court previously noted it would dismiss Corizon Utilization Management Unit

John and Jane Doe as parties on November 30, 2018 (Doc. 11), on March 14, 2019 

(Doc. 26), on May 15, 2019 (Doc. 38), on July 19, 2019 (Doc. 61), and on August 26, 2019 

(Doc. 67) because it is impossible for the United States Marshal to serve a summons and 

complaint upon anonymous defendants. The Court originally gave Plaintiff 120 days to 

cure by filing notices of substitution for all anonymous defendants with each defendant’s 

actual name, (Doc. 11 at 11), but he failed to do so. The Court extended this deadline many 

times, (Docs. 26, 38, 61, 67), and eventually gave Plaintiff until October 3, 2019—over six 

months after the original deadline—to file a notice of substitution for any anonymous 

defendant. (Doc. 67). Therefore, Plaintiff had nearly ten months to file notices of 

substitution with the actual names of the anonymous defendants, and the Court’s orders 

were not equivocal about what Plaintiff had to do. Plaintiff failed to do so, and the Court 

then dismissed the claims against these anonymous defendants, just as it said it would, on 

November 22, 2019. 

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V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Objection (Doc. 97) is OVERRULED and the 

Magistrate Judge’s order (Doc. 94) is AFFIRMED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, to the extent Plaintiff sought review in the 

Objection (Doc. 97) of the Magistrate Judge’s order granting an extension of the dispositive 

motion deadline (Doc. 93), it is OVERRULED and the Magistrate Judge’s order (Doc. 

93) is AFFIRMED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, to the extent Plaintiff seeks relief from this Court’s 

Order dismissing claims against Defendant Corizon Utilization Management Unit John and 

Jane Doe (Doc. 67), such relief is DENIED.

Dated this 22nd day of January, 2020.

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