Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-35224/USCOURTS-ca9-12-35224-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LEGAL VOICE, FKA Northwest

Women’s Law Center,

Non-Party-Appellant,

v.

STORMANS INC., DBA Ralph’s

Thriftway; RHONDA MESLER;

MARGO THELEN,

Plaintiffs-Appellees.

No. 12-35224

D.C. No.

3:07-cv-05374-

RBL

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 10, 2013—Seattle, Washington

Filed December 31, 2013

Before: A. Wallace Tashima, Susan P. Graber,

and Mary H. Murguia, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Tashima

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2 LEGAL VOICE V. STORMANS, INC.

SUMMARY*

Discovery

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of sanctions

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1), reversed the denial of costs

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B)(ii), and remanded in an

appeal related to a discovery dispute that arose in an action

challenging Washington’s rules that require pharmacies to

maintain a representative assortment of drugs for which there

is patient demand and to dispense prescription drugs and

drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration for

“restricted distribution,” unless one of several enumerated

exceptions applies. 

Plaintiffs served a subpoena duces tecum seeking

production on documents on the Law Center, a non-party that

had participated in the rule-making process and was among

the organizations that had reported incidences of pharmacists

refusing to dispense emergency contraception. The Law

Center raised various objections to the subpoena and

requested in the alternative that, if it were compelled to

produce any documents, that plaintiffs be required to

reimburse the costs of compliance pursuant to Rule

45(d)(2)(B)(ii). 

The panel first rejected plaintiffs’ assertion that it lacked

jurisdiction over the appeal because the Law Center did not

immediately appeal any of the three orders related to the

discovery dispute, but appealed only after final judgment was

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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LEGAL VOICE V. STORMANS, INC. 3

entered in the action. The panel held that a non-party may

appeal an interlocutory order within thirty days after entry of

final judgment to the same extent that a party may appeal

such an order.

The panel held that Rule 45(d)(2)(B)(ii) requires the

district court to shift a non-party’s costs of compliance with

a subpoena, if those costs are significant. Thus, rather than

considering whether compliance with a subpoena was unduly

burdensome, the district court should have considered only

whether that cost was significant. Applying the correct

standard, the panel concluded that the $20,000 expended by

the Law Center was “significant.” Accordingly, the panel

reversed the district court’s denial of costs and remanded for

a determination of the proper allocation of costs under Rule

45(d)(2)(B)(ii). 

The panel concluded that the district court did not abuse

its discretion in declining to impose sanctions under Rule

45(d)(1). The panel held that given that there was at least

some ambiguity in the meaning of the district court’s first two

discovery orders, the district court did not abuse its discretion

in finding that plaintiffs did not necessarily act in bad faith in

interpreting the orders in the way they did.

COUNSEL

Scott A. Smith (argued) and Daniel J. Gunter, Riddell

Williams P.S., Seattle, Washington, for Non-Party-Appellant.

Steven T. O’Ban (argued) and Kristen K. Waggoner, Ellis, Li

& McKinstry, PLLC, Seattle, Washington, for PlaintiffsAppellees.

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4 LEGAL VOICE V. STORMANS, INC.

OPINION

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge:

Legal Voice, f/k/a Northwest Women’s Law Center

(“Law Center”), appeals the district court’s denial of

sanctions and costs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

45(d) (“Rule 45(d)”).1 We must determine first whether we

have jurisdiction over this appeal and, if so, whether the

district court abused its discretion in denying the Law

Center’s requests for costs and sanctions. As to the first

question, we conclude that we have jurisdiction. As to the

merits, we affirm the district court’s denial of sanctions, but

reverse the district court’s denial of costs.

I.

This appeal relates to a discovery dispute that arose in this

action challenging Washington’s rules that require

pharmacies to maintain a representative assortment of drugs

for which there is patient demand and to dispense prescription

drugs and drugs approved by the Food and Drug

Administration for “restricted distribution,” unless one of

several enumerated exceptions applies. The Washington

State Board of Pharmacy (“Board”) promulgated the rules in

April 2007 in response to its concern that there was a lack of

clear authority regarding the destruction or confiscation of

lawful prescriptions. The Board became concerned with this

problem in early 2006 when it received reports of incidents

1 The 2013 amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

renumbered Rule 45. Rule 45(c), which was in effect when the district

court entered its orders and the parties argued this appeal, was renumbered

and now appears, without substantive change, as Rule 45(d).

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LEGAL VOICE V. STORMANS, INC. 5

across the country in which pharmacists had refused to

dispense emergency contraception, including one instance in

which a pharmacist ripped up a patient’s prescription. The

Law Center was among the organizations bringing these

reports to the Board’s attention. The Law Center was also a

member of a task force that participated in the rule-making

process. The task force held a series of meetings and

developed the draft text of the rules that were ultimately

approved by the Board and that are the subject of the

underlying action.

Stormans, Inc., doing business as Ralph’s Thriftway,

Rhonda Mesler, and Margo Thelen (“Plaintiffs”) filed suit

challenging the rules. In this action, Plaintiffs served a

subpoena duces tecum on the Law Center seeking production

of fourteen categories of documents. Among the requested

documents were any communications concerning the

challenged regulations between the Law Center and the

Board, the Washington State Human Rights Commission, the

Governor’s Office, and other advocacy groups. The

subpoena also sought internal Law Center communications

pertaining to the regulations, as well as general information

concerning the Law Center’s membership and employees. 

The Law Center objected to the subpoena on various grounds,

including that the requested documents were irrelevant,

protected by the First Amendment, and protected by the

attorney-client privilege. When Plaintiffs filed a motion to

compel, the Law Center raised these objections and requested

in the alternative that, if it were compelled to produce any

documents, Plaintiffs be required to reimburse the costs of

compliance pursuant to Rule 45(d)(2)(B)(ii). On October 28,

2008, the district court granted the motion to compel as to six

of the fourteen categories of documents and denied the

motion as to the remaining requests. The district court further

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6 LEGAL VOICE V. STORMANS, INC.

ordered that “[e]ach party will bear its own costs incurred in

connection with these motions.”

Plaintiffs and the Law Center thereafter disputed the

scope of the district court’s order. The Law Center asserted

that the compelled production was limited to actual

communications with government decision-makers, while

Plaintiffs asserted that the Law Center was required to

produce any documents, including internal documents,

“related to” such communications. The Law Center (and

other advocacy groups) then filed a motion for clarification. 

In that motion, the Law Center sought additional clarification

on the issue of costs. The district court issued a second order,

explaining that it had previously sought “to draw a distinction

between (A) actual communications betweenNon-Parties and

those persons or entities responsible for promulgating the

regulations that are the subject of this dispute and (B) internal

communications among Non-Parties, their members, allies

and affiliates related to why or how they communicated to

government decision-makers.” The district court stated that

it had intended to compel production of the former, but not

the latter. As to the issue of costs, in its order of November

24, 2008, the district court held that “[t]he scope of

production has been sufficiently limited by the Court such

that the cost of producing said documents should not be

overly burdensome.”

The district court’s efforts at providing clarification

proved futile; Plaintiffs and the Law Center continued to

dispute the scope of the required production. Plaintiffs filed

another motion to compel, seeking, inter alia, “information

related to mental impressions or internal communications

concerning actual communications . . . with governmental

agencies involved with rulemaking,” and “information related

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LEGAL VOICE V. STORMANS, INC. 7

to internal communications . . . related to ‘why or how to

communicate to governmental agencies.’” In opposing this

motion, the Law Center renewed its request for costs and

fees. In support of its opposition to the motion, the Law

Center filed the declaration of Lisa Stone, its Executive

Director, claiming that the Law Center had by then incurred

roughly $20,000 in expenses in complying with the subpoena. 

That this amount was expended in the Law Center’s

compliance efforts is unchallenged.

On March 3, 2009, the district court denied Plaintiffs’

second motion to compel. It referred to the previous

distinction it had drawn between external and internal

communications. The district court rejected the Law Center’s

renewed request for costs and fees without explanation,

stating only that it was denying “all motions or requests for

fees or sanctions.”

The Law Center did not immediately appeal any of the

three orders related to the discovery dispute. On March 22,

2012, thirty days after final judgment was entered in this

action, the Law Center filed a notice of appeal. The Law

Center appeals only the district court’s denial of costs and

sanctions under Rule 45(d).

II.

Plaintiffs contend that this court lacks jurisdiction over

the Law Center’s appeal because the Law Center, as a nonparty, was required to appeal within thirty days of the entry

of the respective orders denying costs and sanctions, making

the appeal filed after entry of final judgment untimely. We

disagree.

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8 LEGAL VOICE V. STORMANS, INC.

We have not addressed whether a non-party may appeal

a collateral order after final judgment, rather than only within

thirty days of the entry of the order. Although we have

previously considered our jurisdiction over non-party appeals

of interlocutoryorders, none of these cases addressed whether

a non-partymay await final judgment to appeal such an order. 

In United States v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,

666 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1982), for example, we addressed

whether the collateral order doctrine permitted non-party

witnesses to appeal an order denying their motion for

reimbursement before entry of final judgment. Id. at 365. 

We concluded that such an immediate appeal was

permissible. Id. Columbia Broadcasting, however, did not

address whether a non-partymay also appeal an interlocutory

discovery order after entry of final judgment.

SEC v. Capital Consultants LLC, 453 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir.

2006) (per curiam), similarly did not address the precise

question presented here. In Capital Consultants, we

considered whether we had jurisdiction over an appeal of an

interlocutory order, filed before entry of final judgment, that

was neither rendered final pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 54(b) nor appealable under the collateral order

doctrine. Id. at 1170–75. We concluded that we did not. 

Like Columbia Broadcasting, Capital Consultants said

nothing about whether a non-party may appeal a collateral or

interlocutory order after entry of final judgment. See also

David v. Hooker, 560 F.2d 412, 416–17 (9th Cir. 1977)

(holding that an order directing a non-party to pay attorney’s

fees as a sanction was immediately appealable, but not

addressing whether a non-party can appeal a collateral

discovery order after the entry of final judgment).

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LEGAL VOICE V. STORMANS, INC. 9

Whether a non-party may appeal an interlocutory order

after entry of final judgment is therefore an open question in

this circuit. We now hold that a non-party may appeal an

interlocutory order within thirty days after entry of final

judgment to the same extent that a party may appeal such an

order.

Several circumstances persuade us that a non-party may

appeal an interlocutory order after entry of final judgment. 

First, appeal after final judgment is the default rule under

28 U.S.C. § 1291 and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4. 

Thus, our decision today merely applies the general rule to

non-parties. Moreover, our prior cases have generally held

that even when parties may immediately appeal an

interlocutory order, they are not required to do so. Hook v.

Ariz. Dep’t of Corr., 107 F.3d 1397, 1401 (9th Cir. 1997) (“A

party does not lose the right to appeal an interlocutory order

by not immediately appealing and waiting for the final

judgment.”). In other words, had Plaintiffs wanted to appeal

the orders at issue in this case, they could have awaited final

judgment. Id. Plaintiffs’ proposed rule would therefore

allow parties either to appeal immediately upon entry of the

order or to await the entry of a final judgment, but would

require non-parties to appeal within thirty days of the entry of

the order or lose the right to appeal. We reject a rule with this

effect; all potential appellants should be in the same position

with regard to the timing of an appeal from the same order.2

Plaintiffs’ proposed rule also would promote piecemeal

appeals. In this case, such a rule would have required the

2

It would also remain an open question under Plaintiffs’ proposed rule

whether, if one party appeals after the entry of a final judgment, a nonparty may then file a cross-appeal from the same order.

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10 LEGAL VOICE V. STORMANS, INC.

Law Center to appeal each of the three separate orders

denying sanctions. Further, similar orders could have

followed as discovery continued. Indeed, it was unclear at

the time of the entry of each of these orders whether there

would be future discovery requests for which the district

court might order sanctions and/or costs. Accordingly,

Plaintiffs’ proposed rule would have required at least three

separate appeals, and possibly more. Obviously, a rule

requiring only non-parties immediately to appeal an

interlocutory discovery order of this nature promotes

inefficiency. See Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp.,

338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950) (recognizing “the inconvenience

and costs of piecemeal review” as one of the most important

considerations when determining whether an order can be

appealed).

Finally, Plaintiffs will suffer no prejudice if the Law

Center is permitted to appeal now. The record contains no

indication that Plaintiffs have in anyway relied on their belief

that the Law Center’s time for appeal had expired, nor do

Plaintiffs identify any substantive right that would be

prejudiced by permitting this appeal to proceed. Moreover,

the appeal of the discovery orders coincided with the State’s

appeal of the decision on the merits, so the Law Center’s

appeal after entry of judgment did not disturb the finality of

the case or draw out its conclusion.

For these reasons, we hold that a non-partymay appeal an

interlocutory order after the entry of final judgment to the

same extent a party can appeal such an order. We now turn

to the merits of the Law Center’s claims.

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LEGAL VOICE V. STORMANS, INC. 11

III.

Rule 45(d) provides two related avenues by which a

person subject to a subpoena may be protected from the costs

of compliance: sanctions under Rule 45(d)(1) and costshifting under Rule 45(d)(2)(B)(ii). The latter provision

applies to non-parties only, while the former applies to parties

and non-parties alike. With little explanation, the district

court decided neither to impose sanctions nor to shift costs. 

Reviewing the district court’s denial of discovery sanctions

and costs for abuse of discretion and its interpretation of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure de novo, we reverse the

district court’s denial of costs under Rule 45(d)(2)(B)(ii), but

affirm the denial of sanctions under Rule 45(d)(1).

A.

Rule 45(d)(2)(B)(ii) states that, when a court orders

compliance with a subpoena over an objection, “the order

must protect a person who is neither a party nor a party’s

officer from significant expense resulting from compliance.” 

The rule was amended in 1991, and we have not interpreted

the rule since its amendment. The leading Court of Appeals

decision to have analyzed the rule since the 1991 amendment

is Linder v. Calero-Portocarrero, 251 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir.

2001), which held that the amendment made cost shifting

mandatory in all instances in which a non-party incurs

significant expense from compliance with a subpoena. Id. at

182. It further noted that “the 1991 changes were intended

‘to enlarge the protections afforded persons who are required

to assist the court.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 advisory

committee’s note to the 1991 amendment). Based on this

analysis, the Linder court held that only two considerations

are relevant under the rule: “[1] whether the subpoena

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12 LEGAL VOICE V. STORMANS, INC.

imposes expenses on the non-party, and [2] whether those

expenses are ‘significant.’” Id. If these two requirements are

satisfied, “the court must protect the non-party by requiring

the party seeking discovery to bear at least enough of the

expense to render the remainder ‘non-significant.’” Id.

We agree with the D.C. Circuit’s analysis of the amended

rule and hold that Rule 45(d)(2)(B)(ii) requires the district

court to shift a non-party’s costs of compliance with a

subpoena, if those costs are significant. The plain language

of the rule dictates our conclusion. The rule states that the

district court’s order compelling compliance with a subpoena

“must protect a person who is neither a party nor a party’s

officer from significant expense resulting from compliance,”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added), and

provides no exceptions. This language leaves no room for

doubt that the rule is mandatory. Thus, when discovery is

ordered against a non-party, the only question before the

court in considering whether to shift costs is whether the

subpoena imposes significant expense on the non-party. If

so, the district court must order the party seeking discovery

to bear at least enough of the cost of compliance to render the

remainder “non-significant.” See Linder, 251 F.3d at 182.

Under this regime, we conclude that the district court

erred in its interpretation of Rule 45(d)(2)(B)(ii) by framing

the issue in terms of undue burden, rather than significant

expense. The district court denied costs and sanctions

because it found that “[t]he scope of production has been

sufficiently limited by the Court such that the cost of

producing said documents should not be overly burdensome.” 

(Emphasis added.) Rather than considering whether

compliance was unduly burdensome, the district court should

have considered only whether that cost was significant. 

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LEGAL VOICE V. STORMANS, INC. 13

Applying the correct standard, we have no trouble concluding

that $20,000 is “significant.” See Linder, 251 F.3d at 182

(noting that $9,000 may be sufficiently significant to justify

cost-shifting). Therefore, the district court was required to

shift enough of the cost of compliance to render the

remainder non-significant. Accordingly, we reverse the

district court’s denial of costs under Rule 45(d)(2)(B)(ii) and

remand for its determination of the proper allocation of costs.

B.

Unlike Rule 45(d)(2)(B)(ii), Rule 45(d)(1) is

discretionary.

3 Although our precedent on this issue is not

extensive, we have provided some guidance for when Rule

45(d)(1) sanctions are appropriate. See, e.g., Mount Hope

Church v. Bash Back!, 705 F.3d 418, 425 (9th Cir. 2012);

Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 814

(9th Cir. 2003). Merely losing a motion to compel does not

expose a party to Rule 45 sanctions. See Mount Hope

Church, 705 F.3d at 425–27. Similarly, while failure

narrowly to tailor a subpoena may be a ground for sanctions,

the district court need not impose sanctions every time it

finds a subpoena overbroad; such overbreadth may

sometimes result from normal advocacy, which we have said

should not give rise to sanctions. See id. at 426. A court

 

3

 Rule 45(d)(1), then labeled 45(c), provided in full:

A party or attorney responsible for issuing and

serving a subpoena must take reasonable steps to avoid

imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject

to the subpoena. The issuing court must enforce this

duty and impose an appropriate sanction – which may

include lost earnings and reasonable attorney’s fees –

on a party or attorney who fails to comply.

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14 LEGAL VOICE V. STORMANS, INC.

may, however, impose sanctions when a party issues a

subpoena in bad faith, for an improper purpose, or in a

manner inconsistent with existing law. See id. at 425, 428;

Mattel, 353 F.3d at 814.

Considering these factors, we conclude that the district

court did not abuse its discretion in declining to impose

sanctions under Rule 45(d)(1). Although the district court

denied the motion to compel as to eight of the fourteen

categories requested, we cannot say that the subpoena was so

facially overbroad that the district court’s denial of sanctions

was an abuse of discretion.

We are also not persuaded that Plaintiffs so clearly acted

in bad faith or with an improper motive that we may reverse

the denial of sanctions on this ground. We recognize that

Plaintiffs requested internal Law Center communications

“related to” communications with government decisionmakers after their first request was denied. Although this

may be an indication of vexatious conduct, a second attempt

to compel discoveryof internal communications after the first

request was denied is not so egregious as to compel a finding

of bad faith. Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ conduct may have been

reasonable, given that there was some ambiguity in the

district court’s first and second orders. The first order merely

listed without discussion the categories for which the motion

was granted, and these could reasonably have been read to

include internal documents related to communications with

government decision-makers. And although the second order

was more specific in compelling the production of only

external communications, there appears to have remained

some uncertainty regarding whether the order encompassed

internal documents that recounted communications with

government decision-makers. Given that there was at least

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LEGAL VOICE V. STORMANS, INC. 15

some ambiguity in the meaning of the district court’s first two

discovery orders, we cannot conclude that the district court

abused its discretion in finding that Plaintiffs did not

necessarily act in bad faith in interpreting the orders in the

way they did.

Finally, when considering Rule 45(d) sanctions, we have

put “more emphasis on the recipient’s burden than on the

issuer’s motives.” Mount Hope Church, 705 F.3d at 428–29. 

Given that we have already determined that some or all of the

costs of compliance must be shifted to Plaintiffs under Rule

45(d)(2)(B)(ii), the imposition of sanctions would be largely

duplicative, because the mandatory cost-shifting should

alleviate the significant burden suffered by the Law Center. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse

its discretion in denying sanctions under Rule 45(d)(1).

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s

denial of costs under Rule 45(d)(2)(B)(ii) and remand for

consideration of the proper allocation of costs; further, we

affirm the district court’s denial of sanctions under Rule

45(d)(1). Appellant shall recover of Plaintiffs-Appellees its

costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED and REMANDED

in part.

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