Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-03400/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-03400-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 448
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights - Education
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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Case No.: 13-CV-03400-LHK

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

GREGORY NICHOLAS STESHENKO,

Plaintiff,

v.

SUZANNE GAYRARD, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.:13-CV-03400-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE

Re: Dkt. No. 66

Plaintiff Gregory Nicholas Steshenko (“Plaintiff”) brings this action for age discrimination 

and retaliation based on not being admitted to three graduate programs at San Jose State 

University. Defendants Suzanne Gayrard and Tzvina Abramson (collectively, “Defendants”) move 

to dismiss Plaintiff’s due process claim in his Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF No. 66. Having considered the parties’ briefs, the relevant 

law, and the record in this case, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a 52-year-old unemployed electrical engineer seeking to re-enter the job market 

through professional re-training. Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”) ¶ 22. In addition to a Master of 

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Science degree in Electrical Engineering, Plaintiff earned a Bachelor of Science degree in 

Biochemistry and Molecular Biology from the University of California, Santa Cruz, in 2010. See 

id.

On November 23, 2012, Plaintiff applied to the Clinical Laboratory Scientist (“CLS”) 

Training Program at San Jose State University. Id. ¶ 28. The CLS Training Program is a one-year 

academic program combining theoretical training with an internship at a participating clinical 

laboratory. Id. ¶ 23. On January 25, 2013, Plaintiff was notified that his application was denied 

and that he would not be invited for an interview. Id. ¶ 30. According to Plaintiff, much younger 

applicants, in their 20s, with much more inferior academic credentials and work experience, were 

invited for interviews and subsequently admitted to the program. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he 

personally knew some of these applicants and observed how they “struggled” while taking the 

prerequisites for the program. Id. Plaintiff later raised these issues with the head of the CLS 

Training Program, Defendant Suzanne Gayrard. Id. However, Gayrard refused to explain the 

admission decision or to inform Plaintiff about the age statistics of the admitted applicants. Id.

Accordingly, Plaintiff concluded that he was discriminated against on the grounds of age. Id.

Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Education Office of Civil 

Rights (“USDOE”). Id. ¶ 31.

On February 3, 2013, Defendant Tzvia Abramson, the head of the Stem Cell Internships in 

Laboratory Based Learning (“SCILL”) Program, invited Plaintiff to apply to the SCILL Program.

Id. ¶ 32. The SCILL Program is a two-year Master of Science program with a year of theoretical 

training and a year of an internship at a participating research laboratory. Id. ¶ 24. On February 28, 

2013, Plaintiff applied to the SCILL Program. Id. ¶ 32. 

According to Plaintiff, after Abramson contacted Gayrard and learned about Plaintiff’s 

complaint to the USDOE, Defendants Abramson, Gayrard, and other university employees formed 

a conspiracy to retaliate against Plaintiff for his complaint. Specifically, the defendants 

“communicated and agreed that Plaintiff should not be invited for the SCILL admissions interview 

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because of his complaints and his expressed intention to sue.” Id. ¶ 33. On May 3, 2013, 

Abramson notified Plaintiff that he was not selected as “a finalist for this round,” but that Plaintiff 

was on a waiting list for Fall 2013. Id. ¶ 34. Abramson also stated that she would not provide any 

information about Plaintiff’s ranking on that waiting list. Id. However, according to Plaintiff, there 

was no such thing as a waiting list and the SCILL Program had been “struggling to find . . . 

minimally qualified students willing to apply.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that all of the admitted 

applicants to the SCILL Program were young, and “their academic credentials were much inferior 

to those of Plaintiff.” Id.

On June 10, 2013, Plaintiff notified Gayrard that Plaintiff would file a lawsuit against 

Gayrard. Id. ¶ 35. According to Plaintiff, “Defendants decided to retaliate further” by denying 

Plaintiff’s admission to graduate studies at San Jose State University’s Department of Biological 

Sciences. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that the CLS Training Program, the SCILL Program, and the participating 

laboratories “heavily discriminate on the grounds of age.” Id. ¶ 27. Plaintiff further alleges: “No 

persons of the protected age have ever been admitted to either of [the CLS Training or the SCILL] 

programs. The age discrimination is rampant.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges that he exhausted his administrative remedies with the USDOE on June 

29, 2013. Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff also alleges that he filed “several timely administrative claims with 

California State University Chancellor’s Office.” ECF No. 46 at 3. However, Plaintiff’s claims 

were denied. Id. ¶ 8.

On July 22, 2013, Plaintiff filed his original Complaint against Defendants. ECF No. 1. On 

October 22, 2013, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). ECF No. 12.

After the Court granted the parties’ motions to extend time to file a response to the motion to 

dismiss, on January 23, 2014, Plaintiff filed an opposition. ECF No. 26. On January 24, 2014, 

Plaintiff filed an addendum to his opposition. ECF No. 28. On January 31, 2014, Defendants filed 

a reply. ECF No. 29. The Court held a hearing on May 15, 2014. ECF No. 36. Plaintiff filed a 

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supplemental letter brief on May 16, 2014. ECF No. 35.

On May 20, 2014, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (“May 20, 2014 

Order”), ECF No. 42. In the order, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 

claims against the Board of Trustees; Plaintiff’s § 1983 retaliation claim against Gayrard and 

Abramson; and Plaintiff’s § 1985(3) claim against Gayrard and Abramson with leave to amend.

May 20, 2014 Order at 20. The Court also granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 

§ 1983 claim based on due process and equal protection violations against Gayrard and Abramson; 

Plaintiff’s Age Discrimination Act claim against Gayrard and Abramson; and Plaintiff’s Age 

Discrimination in Employment Act claim against Gayrard and Abramson with prejudice. Id.

Finally, the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state 

law claims and thus granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims—FEHA 

claim, Bane Act claims, and IIED claim. Id. at 18–20. 

On May 31, 2014, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Defendants.

ECF No. 45. On June 1, 2014, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

(“MTD”), ECF No. 49. On June 29, 2014, Plaintiff filed a response. ECF No. 51. On July 10, 

2014, Defendants filed a reply. ECF No. 53. 

On September 29, 2014, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss. ECF No. 60. The Court dismissed with prejudice all of Plaintiff’s claims against 

Defendant Board of Trustees with the exception of Plaintiff’s Age Discrimination Act claim. The 

Court granted leave to amend only with respect to Plaintiff’s due process claims against 

Defendants Abramson and Gayrard. As to the remainder of Plaintiff’s claims against the 

individual Defendants, the Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 

retaliation claim as related to the SCILL program, but dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff’s other 

claims. The Court also dismissed Defendants Rech, Sneary, Boothby, and Wilkinson, as Plaintiff 

had failed to secure Court approval or a stipulation to add new parties to the action. 

On October 13, 2014, Plaintiff filed his SAC. ECF No. 64. Defendant Board of Trustees 

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filed an answer on October 27, 2014. ECF No. 67. The individual Defendants filed the instant 

motion to dismiss that same day. ECF No. 66. Plaintiff filed an opposition on November 11, 2014, 

ECF No. 68, and Defendants filed their reply on November 18, 2014, ECF No. 69. 

On October 27, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration 

of the Court’s September 29, 2014 order dismissing Defendants Rech, Sneary, Boothby, and 

Wilkinson. ECF No. 65. The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration on December 17, 

2014. ECF No. 72. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include “a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A complaint 

that fails to meet this standard may be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6). The Supreme Court has held that Rule 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead “enough facts to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 

(2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability 

requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court 

“accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 

1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Moreover, pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally. Resnick v. 

Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[I]n general, courts must construe pro se pleadings 

liberally.”).

However, a court need not accept as true allegations contradicted by judicially noticeable 

facts, Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000), and the “[C]ourt may look 

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beyond the plaintiff’s complaint to matters of public record” without converting the Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion into one for summary judgment, Shaw v. Hahn, 56 F.3d 1128, 1129 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Nor is the court required to “‘assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in 

the form of factual allegations.’” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (per 

curiam) (quoting W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981)). Mere 

“conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to 

dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004); accord Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Furthermore, “a plaintiff may plead herself out of court” if she “plead[s] facts which establish that 

[s]he cannot prevail on h[er] . . . claim.” Weisbuch v. Cnty. of L.A., 119 F.3d 778, 783 n.1 (9th Cir. 

1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Leave to Amend

If the Court determines that the complaint should be dismissed, it must then decide 

whether to grant leave to amend. Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave 

to amend “should be freely granted when justice so requires,” bearing in mind that “the underlying 

purpose of Rule 15 . . . [is] to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or 

technicalities.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). When dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim, “a district court should 

grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that 

the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Id. at 1130 (quoting Doe 

v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). Furthermore, the Court “has a duty to ensure 

that pro se litigants do not lose their right to a hearing on the merits of their claim due to ignorance 

of technical procedural requirements.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 

Cir. 1990). Nonetheless, a court “may exercise its discretion to deny leave to amend due to ‘undue 

delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by 

amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party. . . , [and] futility of 

amendment.’” Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892–93 (9th Cir. 2010) 

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(alterations in original) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).

III. DISCUSSION

In the instant motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege facts 

showing a protected property or liberty interest, and that the Defendants are entitled to qualified 

immunity. The Court concludes that Plaintiff has once again failed to allege the existence of a 

protected property interest. As such, the Court does not reach Defendants’ qualified immunity 

defense. 

In the Court’s September 29, 2014 order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss, the Court dismissed without prejudice Plaintiff’s due process claim against the 

individual Defendants. Plaintiff alleged that his denial of admission to the SCILL and CLS

programs constituted a deprivation of a property interest. FAC ¶ 47. More specifically, the Court 

found that Plaintiff pled “no facts showing that University regulations, state law, or any other 

independent source created a legitimate claim of entitlement to admission to the programs.” Id. at 

20. While the Court found that Plaintiff had failed to allege a protected property interest, the Court

granted leave to amend as amendment would not necessarily be futile. ECF No. 60 at 20–21. 

The procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment apply 

only when a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest is at stake. See Johnson v. 

Rancho Santiago Comm. Coll. Dist., 623 F.3d 1011, 1029 (9th Cir. 2010) (“To succeed on a 

substantive or procedural due process claim, the plaintiffs must first establish that they were 

deprived of an interest protected by the Due Process Clause.”); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 

827–28 (9th Cir. 1997). In determining whether an interest triggers constitutional protection, the 

Court must “look not to the ‘weight’ but to the nature of the interest at state.” Bd. of Regents of St. 

Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570–71 (1972). “To have a property interest in a benefit, a person 

clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral 

expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Id. at 577; see 

also Merritt v. Mackey, 827 F.2d 1368, 1370–71 (9th Cir. 1987). “Protected property interests are 

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not created by the Constitution[, but r]ather . . . they are created and their dimensions are defined 

by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.” 

Johnson, 623 F.3d at 1030 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Once a court 

determines a protected interest is at stake, it applies the three-factor balancing test outlined in 

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976): (1) the private interest at stake; (2) the “risk of 

erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and probable value, if any, of . 

. . substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) the government’s interest. Id. at 335.

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has once more failed to allege facts showing that he has 

a protected property or liberty interest in admission to the SCILL and CLS programs. In his SAC, 

Plaintiff again alleges that the individual Defendants violated his due process rights under the 

Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff pleads that as a “long-term unemployed” individual, 

“professional retraining and re-entry of the workforce is a quest for his constitutionally guaranteed 

rights to ‘[l]ife, [l]iberty and the pursuit of [h]appiness.’” SAC ¶ 46. Plaintiff further alleges that 

California State University (“CSU”) received $5 billion dollars in funding from the American 

Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Workforce Investment Act, and Workforce Innovation and 

Opportunities Act. Id. ¶ 48. According to Plaintiff, “access to the professional retraining funded by 

these acts constitutes Plaintiff’s right and property.” SAC ¶¶ 48–49. As Defendants note, none of 

these statutes creates an entitlement to admission to the CLS or SCILL programs. See Motion at 5;

see also Johnson, 623 F.3d at 1030; Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361, 366–67 

(9th Cir. 1976) (“[T]here must exist rules or understandings which allow the claimant’s 

expectations to be characterized as a legitimate claim of entitlement to (the benefit).”) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

Other than Plaintiff’s allegation that CSU received federal funding, Plaintiff does not 

allege that the funding statutes imposed conditions or otherwise created any specific entitlement 

for Plaintiff to be admitted to the SCILL or CLS programs. Plaintiff identifies no specific 

provision of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Workforce Investment Act, or 

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Workforce Innovation and Opportunities Act1that supports his argument that he has a protected 

property or liberty interest. The claim that Congress “enacted the . . . acts that intend to retrain the 

unemployed,” is insufficient to show that Plaintiff has a legal entitlement to admission to the 

SCILL or CLS programs. Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, the mere existence of federal funding 

does not create a protected property interest. 

In opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiff cites California Education Code 

§ 66201. See Opp. at 2. Section 66201 provides:

It is the intent of the Legislature that each resident of California 

who has the capacity and motivation to benefit from higher 

education should have the opportunity to enroll in an institution of 

higher education. Once enrolled, each individual should have the 

opportunity to continue as long and as far as his or her capacity and 

motivation, as indicated by academic performance and commitment 

to educational advancement, will lead him or her to meet academic 

standards and institutional requirements.

The Legislature hereby reaffirms the commitment of the State of 

California to provide an appropriate place in California public 

higher education for every student who is willing and able to benefit 

from attendance.

According to Plaintiff, this statement of legislative intent is sufficient to create a legal entitlement 

to admission to the SCILL and CLS programs. As Defendants argue, however, § 66201, a 

provision of the Donahoe Higher Education Act, describes only the general policy goals related to 

higher education in California. That the state legislature intended that all residents “should have 

the opportunity to enroll in an institution of higher education,” does not create a legal entitlement 

to admission. “A reasonable expectation of entitlement is determined largely by the language of 

the statute and the extent to which the entitlement is couched in mandatory terms.” Wedges/Ledges 

of Cal., Inc. v. Phoenix, 24 F.3d 56, 62 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). A 

statement of legislative intent stating residents should have the opportunity to enroll in programs 

like SCILL or CLS does not involve “the use of the imperative,” or otherwise provide a 

 

1 Additionally, as Defendants correctly note, the Workforce Innovation and Opportunities Act was 

not enacted until 2014, and therefore subsequent to any of the events forming the basis of 

Plaintiff’s claims. See Motion at 6. 

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“significant substantive restriction on the [Defendants’] discretion.” Id. The Court therefore 

concludes that § 66201 does not create a property interest in admission to graduate studies 

programs. 

This conclusion is supported by § 66001 of the Donahoe Act, which provides that:

It is the intent of the Legislature to outline in statute the broad policy 

and programmatic goals of the master plan and clear, concise 

statewide goals and outcomes for effective implementation of the 

master plan, attuned to the public interest of the people and State of 

California, and to expect the system as a whole and the higher 

education segments to be accountable for attaining those goals. 

However, consistent with the spirit of the original master plan and 

the subsequent updates, it is the intent of the Legislature that the 

governing boards be given ample discretion in implementing 

policies and programs necessary to attain those goals.

Cal. Educ. Code § 66001 (emphasis added). Plaintiff may be correct that a “goal” of the Donahoe 

Act is to ensure that all residents of California have the opportunity to enroll in programs such as 

SCILL and CLS. The existence of a “goal,” however, especially in light of the “ample discretion”

left to the programs, is insufficient to create a property interest. See Wedges/Ledges, 24 F.3d at 62; 

see also Doyle v. City of Medford, 606 F.3d 667, 672–73 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A regulation granting 

broad discretion to a decision-maker does not create a property interest.”). As Defendants note, no 

court has interpreted § 66201 to impose a substantive restriction on the discretion of admissions 

bodies in making admissions decisions. At bottom, Plaintiff’s argument appears to be that every 

resident of California has a property interest in admission to graduate studies programs, but the 

Court finds no support for that claim in § 66201 or any other authority Plaintiff cites. 

The Court concludes that Plaintiff has once again failed to allege facts showing a protected 

property interest in admission to the SCILL or CLS programs. As showing a protected interest is a 

“necessary precondition” to a procedural due process claim, Plaintiff has failed to allege a due 

process claim. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 570–71; Rhee v. City of Los Angeles, 130 F. App’x 920, 921 

(9th Cir. 2005). Furthermore, as the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a procedural due 

process claim, the Court does not reach Defendants’ qualified immunity defense. 

Here, Plaintiff has been unable to identify any protected liberty or property interest in 

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admission to the SCILL or CLS programs despite multiple opportunities to amend his complaint. 

Consequently, the Court concludes that amendment would be futile. See Carvalho, 629 F.3d at

892–93. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim with prejudice. 

IV.CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS with prejudice Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s due process claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 25, 2015

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

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