Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-04700/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-04700-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

---

1

Case No. 19-CV-04700-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ANDREA M WILLIAMS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

APPLE, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-CV-04700-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART APPLE’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 15

Plaintiffs bring this putative class action against Defendant Apple, Inc. (“Apple”) and 

allege breach of contract, violations of California’s False Advertising Law (“FAL”), and violations 

of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”). ECF No. 1 (“Class Action Complaint” or 

“CAC”). Before the Court is Apple’s motion to dismiss. ECF No. 15. Having considered the 

submissions of the parties, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court GRANTS in part

and DENIES in part Apple’s motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Apple is a corporation incorporated under the laws of California and has its principal place 

of business in Cupertino, California. CAC ¶ 7. Apple provides cloud storage services to Apple 

Case 5:19-cv-04700-LHK Document 34 Filed 03/27/20 Page 1 of 26
2

Case No. 19-CV-04700-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

device users through iCloud, Apple’s cloud service. Id. ¶¶ 13-17. iCloud allows subscribers to 

“utilize certain Internet services, including storing your personal content (such as contacts, 

calendars, photos, notes, reminders, documents, app data, and iCloud email) and making it 

accessible on your compatible devices and computers, and certain location based services.” CAC, 

Ex. 1 at 1.

According to the CAC, “[o]wners of Apple devices are granted up to 5 GB of iCloud 

storage for free. If an Apple device user wishes to store more than 5 GB of data on the cloud 

through iCloud, then that user must subscribe to iCloud’s paid service.” CAC ¶ 20. The CAC

alleges that “[i]n order to subscribe to iCloud, a user must agree to the iCloud Terms of Service 

Agreement.” Id. ¶ 22. The relevant portion of the iCloud Terms of Service Agreement (“iCloud 

Agreement”) provides the following:

Apple is the provider of the Service, which permits you to utilize certain Internet 

services, including storing your personal content (such as contacts, calendars, photos, 

notes, reminders, documents, app data, and iCloud email) and making it accessible 

on your compatible devices and computers, and certain location based services, only 

under the terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement. iCloud is automatically 

enabled when you are running devices on iOS 9 or later and sign in with your Apple 

ID during device setup, unless you are upgrading the device and have previously 

chosen not to enable iCloud. You can disable iCloud in Settings. When iCloud is 

enabled, your content will be automatically sent to and stored by Apple, so you can 

later access that content or have content wirelessly pushed to your other iCloudenabled devices or computers. ¶

CAC, Ex. 1 at 1 (emphasis added). This language appears in a September 16, 2015 version of the 

iCloud Agreement and a September 17, 2018 version of the iCloud Agreement. CAC ¶ 23; CAC, 

Exs. 1-2.

Named Plaintiffs Andrea M. Williams and James Stewart bring the suit on behalf of a 

putative class of United States iCloud subscribers (excluding Apple, its employees, and its 

directors) who during the Class Period from August 20, 2015 to the present paid for an Apple

iCloud subscription (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). CAC ¶¶ 11-12, 38. Williams is a resident and 

citizen of Florida who “subscribed to Apple’s iCloud service, paid money to Apple for her iCloud 

subscription, and used iCloud to store her data on the cloud.” Id. ¶ 11. Stewart is a resident and 

citizen of California who “subscribed to Apple’s iCloud service, paid money to Apple for his 

Case 5:19-cv-04700-LHK Document 34 Filed 03/27/20 Page 2 of 26
3

Case No. 19-CV-04700-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

iCloud subscription, and used iCloud to store his data on the cloud.” Id. ¶ 12. The CAC does not 

allege the dates that Williams and Stewart entered into the iCloud Agreement with Apple. Id. 

¶¶ 11-12. Rather, the CAC only alleges that Williams and Stewart agreed to the iCloud 

Agreement sometime “[d]uring the Class Period” from August 20, 2015 to the present. Id.

The CAC alleges that Williams and Stewart were not informed by Apple that his or her 

data was being stored on “non-Apple remote servers and facilities” despite alleged assurances to 

the contrary. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that they “bargained for, agreed, and paid 

to have Apple—an entity they trusted—store their data.”1 Id. ¶ 32. According to the CAC, 

however, Apple’s representations were false and “Apple lacked the facilities needed to readily 

provide the cloud storage space being sold to class members through iCloud.” Id. ¶ 27. “Unable 

to provide the cloud storage space . . . , Apple breached its iCloud agreement with its subscribers 

and had these users’ data stored not by Apple on Apple facilities, but instead turned the users’ 

digital files to other entities, like Amazon and Microsoft[,] for them to store on their facilities.” 

Id. ¶ 28.

The CAC alleges that “[h]ad Apple disclosed that, contrary to its contractual 

representation, Apple was not the provider of the cloud storage,” putative class members “would 

not have subscribed to Apple’s iCloud service or would have not agreed to pay as much as [they] 

did for the service.” Id. ¶¶ 11-12. The CAC claims that other companies, such as Microsoft and

Google, offer cheaper cloud storage services than Apple and that Apple’s “price premium” harmed 

putative class members who would have otherwise utilized these cheaper cloud storage 

alternatives. Id. ¶¶ 34-37.

B. Procedural History

On August 12, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint against Apple on behalf of a 

1 Elsewhere, however, the CAC contradicts Plaintiffs’ allegation that they “bargained for” this

specific provision. Specifically, the iCloud Agreements that Plaintiffs attached to the CAC are 

simple form contracts that could not be modified and merely allowed Plaintiffs to click an 

“AGREE” button. CAC, Ex. 1 at 1; CAC, Ex. 2 at 1; ECF No. 19 at 23 (“Opp.”). Nowhere do the 

CAC or the iCloud Agreements allege or establish that the iCloud Agreements could be modified.

Case 5:19-cv-04700-LHK Document 34 Filed 03/27/20 Page 3 of 26
4

Case No. 19-CV-04700-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

putative class of United States iCloud subscribers (excluding Apple, its employees, and its 

directors) who during the Class Period from August 20, 2015 to the present paid for an Apple 

iCloud subscription. CAC ¶¶ 11-12, 38. Plaintiffs attached three exhibits to their CAC: a 

September 16, 2015 version of the iCloud Agreement, a September 17, 2018 version of the iCloud 

Agreement, and a version of the iCloud Agreement for subscribers in China. CAC, Exs. 1-3.

The CAC alleges three causes of action against Apple: (1) breach of contract, (2) violations 

of California’s False Advertising Law (“FAL”); and (3) violations of California’s Unfair 

Competition Law (“UCL”). Id. ¶¶ 45-66. Plaintiffs allege that Apple agreed to be the “provider 

of the [iCloud] Service” and to store putative class members’ content on Apple’s servers. Id.

¶¶ 46-47. According to Plaintiffs, however, Apple breached this promise because “storage was 

provided by non-Apple third parties with whom neither [Named] Plaintiffs nor class members had 

bargained.” Id. ¶¶ 47-49. Plaintiffs also ground their FAL and UCL claims on the allegation that 

Apple’s representation that “Apple was the provider of the iCloud cloud storage service and that 

class members’ data would be stored on the cloud by Apple were and are false and misleading.” 

Id. ¶¶ 56, 63-65. In addition to monetary damages, Plaintiffs request injunctive relief. Id. ¶¶ 60, 

66. Plaintiffs, however, do not allege whether they are currently paying for iCloud storage.

On October 4, 2019, Apple filed a motion to dismiss the CAC. ECF No. 15 (“Mot.”). On 

October 18, 2019, Plaintiffs filed an opposition. ECF No. 19 (“Opp.”). On October 25, 2019, 

Apple filed a reply. ECF No. 22 (“Reply”).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1)

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) tests whether the 

court has subject matter jurisdiction. Although lack of “statutory standing” requires dismissal for 

failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), lack of Article III standing requires dismissal for want 

of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). See Nw. Requirements Utilities v. F.E.R.C., 

798 F.3d 796, 808 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Unlike Article III standing, however, ‘statutory standing’ does 

not implicate our subject-matter jurisdiction.” (citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control 

Case 5:19-cv-04700-LHK Document 34 Filed 03/27/20 Page 4 of 26
5

Case No. 19-CV-04700-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128 n.4 (2014)); Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th 

Cir. 2011). A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be factual or facial. Safe Air for Everyone v. 

Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). 

“[I]n a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by 

themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. In resolving such an attack, unlike 

with a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court “may review evidence beyond the complaint 

without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Id. Moreover, 

the court “need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegations.” Id. Once the defendant 

has moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears 

the burden of establishing the court’s jurisdiction. See Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 

598 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010).

“In a facial attack,” on the other hand, “the challenger asserts that the allegations contained 

in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone, 

373 F.3d at 1039. The court “resolves a facial attack as it would a motion to dismiss under Rule 

12(b)(6): Accepting the plaintiff’s allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the 

plaintiff’s favor, the court determines whether the allegations are sufficient as a legal matter to 

invoke the court’s jurisdiction.” Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014).

B. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include “a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A complaint 

that fails to meet this standard may be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6). The United States Supreme Court has held that Rule 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead 

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility 

standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 

Case 5:19-cv-04700-LHK Document 34 Filed 03/27/20 Page 5 of 26
6

Case No. 19-CV-04700-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). For purposes of ruling 

on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and 

construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. 

Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). The Court, however, need not 

“assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual 

allegations.” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Additionally, mere “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted 

inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 

(9th Cir. 2004).

C. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 9(b)

Claims sounding in fraud are subject to the heightened pleading requirements of Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Under the federal rules, a plaintiff alleging fraud “must state with particularity the circumstances 

constituting fraud.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 

2009). To satisfy this heightened standard, the allegations must be “specific enough to give 

defendants notice of the particular misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud charged so 

that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.” 

Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1985). Thus, claims sounding in fraud must 

allege “an account of the time, place, and specific content of the false representations as well as 

the identities of the parties to the misrepresentations.” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 

(9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (internal quotations marks omitted). In other words, “[a]verments of 

fraud must be accompanied by ‘the who, what, when, where, and how’ of the misconduct 

charged.” Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). 

The plaintiff must also set forth “what is false or misleading about a statement, and why it is 

false.” Ebeid ex rel. U.S. v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

“When an entire complaint . . . is grounded in fraud and its allegations fail to satisfy the 

Case 5:19-cv-04700-LHK Document 34 Filed 03/27/20 Page 6 of 26
7

Case No. 19-CV-04700-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b), a district court may dismiss the complaint . . . .” 

Vess, 317 F.3d at 1107. A motion to dismiss a complaint “under Rule 9(b) for failure to plead 

with particularity is the functional equivalent of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for 

failure to state a claim.” Id.

D. Leave to Amend

If a court determines that a complaint should be dismissed, it must then decide whether to 

grant leave to amend. Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend 

“shall be freely given when justice so requires,” bearing in mind “the underlying purpose of Rule 

15 to facilitate decisions on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (alterations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). When dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim, “a district court should grant 

leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the 

pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Id. at 1130 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

Accordingly, leave to amend generally shall be denied only if allowing amendment would 

unduly prejudice the opposing party, cause undue delay, or be futile, or if the moving party has 

acted in bad faith. Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008). At 

the same time, a court is justified in denying leave to amend when a plaintiff “repeated[ly] fail[s] 

to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed.” See Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., 

LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892 (9th Cir. 2010). Indeed, a “district court’s discretion to deny leave to 

amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” Cafasso, U.S. 

ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks 

omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s Class Action Complaint (“CAC”) alleges three causes of action against Apple: 

(1) breach of contract, (2) violations of California’s False Advertising Law (“FAL”); and 

(3) violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”). Id. ¶¶ 45-66. Apple moves to 

Case 5:19-cv-04700-LHK Document 34 Filed 03/27/20 Page 7 of 26
8

Case No. 19-CV-04700-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

dismiss all three of Plaintiffs’ causes of action. Apple contends that the CAC must be dismissed 

because (1) Plaintiffs lack Article III standing; (2) Plaintiffs fail to adequately plead a breach of 

contract claim under California law; and (3) Plaintiffs fail to adequately plead FAL and UCL 

claims. Because the Court must first address jurisdictional concerns, the Court begins its analysis 

with Apple’s argument that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing. Friery v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. 

Dist., 448 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2006) (“As standing implicates Article III limitations on our 

power to decide a case, we must address it before proceeding to the merits.”). The Court then 

turns to Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim before concluding with the FAL and UCL claims.

A. Article III Standing

Apple first argues that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing because they have not alleged 

anything beyond a merely speculative injury. See Mot. at 8-11. “[A] suit brought by a plaintiff 

without Article III standing is not a ‘case or controversy,’ and an Article III federal court therefore 

lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the suit.” Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th 

Cir. 2004). “[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of [Article III] standing contains three 

elements:” (1) an injury in fact (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the 

defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Lujan v. 

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). “The party invoking federal jurisdiction 

bears the burden of establishing” Article III standing. Id. at 561. “At the pleading stage, general 

factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a motion to 

dismiss we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to 

support the claim.” Id. (quotation marks and internal alterations omitted). “In a class action, 

standing is satisfied if at least one named plaintiff meets the requirements.” Bates v. United 

Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).

Apple’s argument is best construed as a facial attack whereby “the allegations contained in 

a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone, 

373 F.3d at 1039. A court “resolves a facial attack as it would a motion to dismiss under Rule 

12(b)(6): Accepting the plaintiff’s allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the 

Case 5:19-cv-04700-LHK Document 34 Filed 03/27/20 Page 8 of 26
9

Case No. 19-CV-04700-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

plaintiff's favor, the court determines whether the allegations are sufficient as a legal matter to 

invoke the court’s jurisdiction.” Leite, 749 F.3d at 1121.

In terms of substance, Apple argues that Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged an injury in 

fact to recover either monetary damages or to pursue injunctive relief. See Mot. at 8-11. The 

Court begins its analysis with respect to Article III standing for monetary damages before 

addressing Article III standing for injunctive relief.

1. Article III for Monetary Damages

“To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a 

legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not 

conjectural or hypothetical.’” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016), as revised

(May 24, 2016) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). “For an injury to be ‘particularized,’ it must 

affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Additionally, 

“[a]n injury in fact must also be ‘concrete’ . . . that is, it must actually exist.” Id.

Apple’s argument that Plaintiffs have not established an injury in fact primarily relies on In 

re LinkedIn User Privacy Litig., 932 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2013), where LinkedIn users

brought a putative class action against LinkedIn based on allegations that LinkedIn failed to 

protect users’ passwords and information despite promises and assurances to do so. Id. at 1091. 

The plaintiffs argued that they had standing to sue because they did not receive the full benefit of 

their bargain for their paid premium LinkedIn memberships. Id. at 1093. The district court 

disagreed and held that the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged facts establishing Article III 

standing.

First, the district court concluded that plaintiffs lacked standing because the Plaintiffs paid 

consideration “not for a particular level of security, but actually for the advanced networking tools 

and capabilities to facilitate enhanced usage of LinkedIn’s services.” Id. at 1093. Second, the 

district court found that the plaintiffs did not have standing because they had not read and relied 

on the alleged misrepresentation. Id. Third, the district court found that the plaintiffs had not 

adequately alleged standing because the plaintiffs had not pleaded that their economic loss was 

Case 5:19-cv-04700-LHK Document 34 Filed 03/27/20 Page 9 of 26
10

Case No. 19-CV-04700-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

caused by LinkedIn’s failure to provide a certain level of security services. Id. at 1093-94. 

Finally, the district court determined that though the LinkedIn plaintiffs “t[ook] issue with the way 

in which LinkedIn performed the security services,” the plaintiffs had not alleged that any of their 

information was actually compromised and therefore, they had not alleged an injury in fact. Id. at 

1094.

Apple relies on these four factors to argue that Plaintiffs here also lack Article III standing. 

Mot. at 7-11. The Court disagrees. First, as to whether Plaintiffs paid consideration for Apple to 

store Plaintiffs’ data on Apple’s own servers, the Court notes that in the second round motion to 

dismiss order in the same case, the In re LinkedIn court held that because the named plaintiff 

“purchased her premium subscription in reliance on LinkedIn’s [contractual] misrepresentation 

and would not have done so but for the misrepresentation,” the amended complaint’s allegations 

were “sufficient to confer . . . standing under Article III.” In re LinkedIn User Privacy Litig., 2014 

WL 1323713, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2014) (“In re LinkedIn II”). Those allegations are similar 

to ones present in the instant case, and the same conclusion follows.

Specifically, the CAC alleges that Plaintiffs entered into the iCloud Agreement, paid for 

iCloud storage, and that the iCloud Agreement contained a contractual representation that 

Plaintiffs’ “content w[ould] be automatically sent to and stored by Apple.” CAC, Ex. 1 at 1. The

CAC also pleads that Apple breached the iCloud Agreement by “turn[ing] [Plaintiffs’] digital files 

to other entities, like Amazon and Microsoft[,] for them to store on their facilities.” CAC ¶ 28. 

This Court has previously recognized that such allegations are sufficient to confer standing. In re 

Yahoo! Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 2017 WL 3727318, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 

2017) (“The Court finds that Neff’s allegations are sufficient to allege ‘benefit of the bargain’

losses as a result of the Data Breaches, which courts in this district and elsewhere have found are 

sufficient to allege an injury in fact for purposes of Article III standing.” (citing In re LinkedIn II, 

2014 WL 1323713, at *6)). Therefore, the Court holds that the CAC sufficiently pleads that 

Plaintiffs paid consideration for Apple to store Plaintiff’s data, and as such, Plaintiffs have Article 

III standing. 

Case 5:19-cv-04700-LHK Document 34 Filed 03/27/20 Page 10 of 26
11

Case No. 19-CV-04700-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Second, Apple argues that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing because the CAC does not 

plead that Plaintiffs read or relied on the relevant contractual language. For FAL and UCL claims, 

“courts have held that actual reliance is required to demonstrate causation for purposes of Article 

III standing when the plaintiffs assert that their injury is the result of deceptive misrepresentations 

or omissions.” Phillips v. Apple Inc., 2016 WL 1579693, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2016) 

(collecting cases). The Court addresses whether the CAC adequately pleads reliance for Plaintiffs’ 

FAL and UCL claims later in this Order. See infra Part III.C.2. 

Apple does not clearly allege that reliance is required for Article III standing for Plaintiffs’ 

breach of contract claim. Unlike FAL and UCL claims, “[r]eliance is not an element of a breach 

of contract claim,” Rodman v. Safeway, 125 F. Supp. 3d 922, 933 n.9 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 

Nonetheless, Apple’s reliance argument is subsumed in the next paragraph’s discussion of 

causation.

Third, Apple contends that Plaintiffs’ “benefit of the bargain” economic loss was not 

caused by Apple’s decision not to store Plaintiffs’ data on Apple’s own servers. This argument 

largely overlaps with Apple’s other arguments regarding consideration, reliance, and damages, as 

these arguments involve whether Plaintiffs suffered any harm and whether that harm is fairly 

traceable to Apple’s alleged breach of the iCloud Agreement. Here, as discussed previously, the 

CAC adequately alleges that Apple promised that Plaintiffs’ “content w[ould] be automatically 

sent to and stored by Apple,” CAC, Ex. 1 at 1, but that Apple breached this provision by 

“turn[ing] the users’ digital files to other entities, like Amazon and Microsoft[,] for [Amazon and 

Microsoft] to store on their facilities.” CAC ¶ 28. At this stage, this is enough to plead Article III 

standing.

Fourth, Apple argues that Plaintiffs lack standing because Plaintiffs must “allege 

something more than overpaying . . . to plead Article III standing.” Mot. at 9 (quotation marks 

omitted). The Court disagrees. Generally, where plaintiffs plead that they were economically 

harmed because they did not receive the “benefit of the bargain,” plaintiffs have adequately 

alleged Article III standing. In re Yahoo! Inc., 2017 WL 3727318, at *17 (“The Court finds that 

Case 5:19-cv-04700-LHK Document 34 Filed 03/27/20 Page 11 of 26
12

Case No. 19-CV-04700-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Neff’s allegations are sufficient to allege ‘benefit of the bargain’ losses as a result of the Data 

Breaches, which courts in this district and elsewhere have found are sufficient to allege an injury 

in fact for purposes of Article III standing.” (citing In re LinkedIn II, 2014 WL 1323713, at *6)); 

see also In re LinkedIn, 932 F. Supp. 2d at 1093 (“Economic harm based on the ‘benefit of the 

bargain’ theory Plaintiff proffers has been recognized as a viable basis for standing.”). In this 

way, Apple’s reliance on In re LinkedIn is misplaced, as that decision stands for the more limited

proposition that when plaintiffs do not allege that the product they received was actually of lesser 

value or any different than what they bargained for, plaintiffs have not adequately pleaded an 

injury in fact. See id. at 1094 (“This [current case] is not the case where consumers paid for a 

product, and the product they received was different from the one as advertised on the product’s 

packaging.”).

Here, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that they overpaid for Apple iCloud. Plaintiffs allege 

that Apple misrepresented who owned the physical servers used to store Plaintiffs’ information 

and that “[h]ad Apple disclosed that, contrary to its contractual representation, Apple was not the 

provider of the cloud storage,” putative class members “would not have subscribed to Apple’s 

iCloud service or would have not agreed to pay as much as [they] did for the service.” CAC 

¶¶ 11-12. This is especially true, as the CAC asserts that other companies, such as Microsoft and 

Google, offered cheaper cloud storage services than Apple and that Apple’s “price premium” 

harmed putative class members who would have otherwise utilized these cheaper cloud storage 

alternatives. Id. ¶¶ 34-37. In this way, the instant case closely mirrors Chavez v. Blue Sky Natural 

Beverage Co., 340 Fed. App’x 359 (9th Cir. 2009).

In Chavez, the named plaintiff “brought [a] purported class action on behalf of himself and 

others similarly situated, contending that, in contrast with appellees’ representations, Blue Sky 

products are not manufactured or bottled in New Mexico.” Id. at 360. As a result, the named 

plaintiff contended that the defendant was liable pursuant to the FAL, the UCL, and other 

California consumer fraud and common law causes of action. Id. The named plaintiff alleged that 

he “purchased Blue Sky soda instead of other brands based on representations that Blue Sky was a 

Case 5:19-cv-04700-LHK Document 34 Filed 03/27/20 Page 12 of 26
13

Case No. 19-CV-04700-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

New Mexico company,” but later learned that “Blue Sky is not, in fact, bottled or produced in 

New Mexico, and, therefore, appellees misrepresented the origin and nature of their products.” Id.

at 361. “[M]ost importantly,” the named plaintiff “lost money as a result of appellees’ deception 

in that he did not receive what he paid for” because he would not have paid the “full value . . . had 

he known the truth about the geographic origin of the products.” Id. (quotation marks and internal 

alterations omitted). The Ninth Circuit concluded that these allegations were enough to plead an 

injury in fact and reversed the district court’s dismissal of the lawsuit. Id.

Chavez’s logic applies here with equal force. Just like in Chavez, where the defendant 

allegedly misrepresented the origin and nature of its products, id. at 361, in the instant case, 

Plaintiffs allege that Apple misrepresented the nature of Apple iCloud—namely that “users’ data 

[was] stored not by Apple on Apple facilities, but instead turned the users’ digital files to other 

entities, like Amazon and Microsoft[,] for them to store on their facilities.” CAC ¶ 28. Just like 

the plaintiffs in Chavez, Plaintiffs in the instant case allege that “[h]ad Apple disclosed that, 

contrary to its contractual representation, Apple was not the provider of the cloud storage,” 

putative class members “would not have subscribed to Apple’s iCloud service or would have not 

agreed to pay as much as [they] did for the service.” Id. ¶¶ 11-12. Therefore, this is the case 

“where consumers paid for a product, and the product they received was different from the one as 

advertised.” In re LinkedIn, 932 F. Supp. 2d at 1094. Thus, the Court rejects Apple’s fourth 

Article III standing argument.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged an injury in fact as to Plaintiffs’ breach of 

contract claim. As a result, the Court DENIES Apple’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ breach of 

contract claim on the basis that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing for monetary damages. In Part 

III.C.2 of this Order, the Court addresses Apple’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ FAL and UCL 

claims on the basis that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing for monetary damages. 

2. Article III Standing for Injunctive Relief

The Court now addresses whether Plaintiffs possess Article III standing for injunctive 

relief. To demonstrate constitutional standing for “injunctive relief, which is a prospective 

Case 5:19-cv-04700-LHK Document 34 Filed 03/27/20 Page 13 of 26
14

Case No. 19-CV-04700-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

remedy, the threat of injury must be ‘actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” 

Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956, 966 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Summer v. Earth 

Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009)). “In other words, the ‘threatened injury must be certainly 

impending to constitute injury in fact’ and ‘allegations of possible future injury are not sufficient.” 

Id. (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013)). “Past wrongs, though 

insufficient by themselves to grant standing, are ‘evidence bearing on whether there is a real and 

immediate threat of repeated injury.’” Id. (quoting City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)). 

“Where standing is premised entirely on the threat of repeated injury, a plaintiff must show ‘a 

sufficient likelihood that [s]he will again be wronged in a similar way.’” Id. (quoting Lyons, 461 

U.S. at 111).

The Court agrees with Apple that Plaintiffs have failed to allege the “real and immediate 

threat of repeated injury” necessary to demonstrate Article III standing to seek injunctive relief. 

See Davidson, 889 F.3d at 966 (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102). The Ninth Circuit has clearly 

stated that mere “allegations of possible future injury are not sufficient.” Id. at 967 (quoting 

Clapper 568 U.S. at 409). Here, Plaintiffs do not allege that they are currently paying for iCloud 

storage or that they actually intend or plan to purchase iCloud storage again in the future.

Plaintiffs respond that one paragraph in the CAC pleads an allegation “unambiguously 

stated in the present tense,” and Plaintiffs argue that this allegation demonstrates they have 

standing to pursue injunctive relief. Opp. at 5, 12 (citing CAC ¶ 60). Specifically, the CAC 

alleges that “Apple continues to make the same false and misleading statements with respect to its 

iCloud cloud storage service, such that, unless [Apple] is enjoined from doing so, Plaintiffs and 

class members will continue to be harmed because they will not know who is storing their data on 

the cloud.” CAC ¶ 60. 

This allegation is insufficient to meet Plaintiffs’ burden to establish standing to pursue 

injunctive relief. See Sciacca v. Apple, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 3d 787, 795 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“Once 

the defendant has moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the 

plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the Court's jurisdiction.” (citation omitted)). As the CAC 

Case 5:19-cv-04700-LHK Document 34 Filed 03/27/20 Page 14 of 26
15

Case No. 19-CV-04700-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

alleges elsewhere, “[o]wners of Apple devices are granted up to 5 GB of iCloud storage for free.” 

CAC ¶ 20. Simply pleading that Plaintiffs are storing their data on Apple’s iCloud is not enough 

to plead an injury in fact because Plaintiffs’ injury is not merely connected to storing data on the 

iCloud but to overpaying for the paid version of iCloud storage. Id. ¶¶ 11-12, 34-37. Without

alleging that Plaintiffs are currently paid iCloud subscribers—as opposed to merely utilizing the 

free five GB of iCloud storage, id. ¶ 20—Plaintiffs have not met their burden of establishing an 

injury that is “certainly impending.” Davidson, 889 F.3d at 966.

As a result, the Court GRANTS Apple’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive 

relief for lack of Article III standing. Because amendment would not be futile, cause undue delay, 

or unduly prejudice Apple, and because Plaintiffs have not acted in bad faith, the Court GRANTS 

Plaintiffs leave to amend. Leadsinger, 512 F.3d at 532.

B. Breach of Contract Claim

Apple’s second set of arguments pertain to Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim. Mot. at 11-

16. Under California law, the elements for a claim for breach of contract are “(1) the existence of 

the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and 

(4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.” eOnline Glob., Inc. v. Google LLC, 387 F. Supp. 3d 

980, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (quoting Oasis W. Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 51 Cal. 4th 811, 821, 

(2011) (citation omitted)). Apple contends that Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege the first, 

third, and fourth elements for a breach of contract claim. As discussed below, the Court disagrees.

1. The CAC Adequately Alleges the Existence of a Contract

Apple argues that Plaintiffs have failed “to allege sufficient information to identify the 

actual contract at issue, including the approximate date of the contract.” Mot. at 12. To be sure, 

the CAC does not allege when Named Plaintiffs Williams and Stewart entered into the iCloud 

Agreement with Apple. CAC ¶¶ 11-12. Rather, the CAC only pleads that Williams and Stewart

agreed to the iCloud Agreement sometime during the nearly five-year Class Period from August 

20, 2015 to the present. Id. Additionally, perhaps because the CAC does not allege when 

Williams and Stewart entered into the iCloud Agreement with Apple, the CAC does not plead 

Case 5:19-cv-04700-LHK Document 34 Filed 03/27/20 Page 15 of 26
16

Case No. 19-CV-04700-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

which specific version of the iCloud Agreement Williams and Stewart signed. Id. Instead, the 

CAC incorporates language from a September 16, 2015 version of the iCloud Agreement and a 

September 17, 2018 version of the iCloud Agreement. Id. ¶ 23; Id., Exs. 1-2. The CAC, however, 

does not allege that these particular versions of the iCloud Agreement were the ones that Williams 

or Stewart signed. Id. ¶¶ 11-12, 23.

Nonetheless, though the CAC fails to identify the specific version of the iCloud Agreement 

to which Williams and Stewart agreed and when Williams and Stewart signed the iCloud 

Agreement, this is not required to plead the existence of a contract under Rule 8. “Identifying the 

specific provision of the contract allegedly breached by the defendant does not require the plaintiff 

to attach the contract or recite the contract’s terms verbatim. Rather, the plaintiff must identify 

with specificity the contractual obligations allegedly breached by the defendant.” Kaar v. Wells 

Fargo Bank, N.A., 2016 WL 3068396, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2016) (quotation marks omitted). 

Here, Plaintiffs have identified the contractual language that was allegedly breached, and the CAC 

pleads that this language was identical across all versions of the iCloud Agreement during the 

Class Period. CAC ¶ 23. These allegations are sufficient to plead the existence of a contract.

Insofar as Apple argues that Plaintiffs’ failure to plead when Williams and Stewart entered 

into the iCloud Agreement prejudices Apple because it prevents Apple from raises a statute of 

limitations defense, Mot. at 12 n.3, this argument fails on the particular facts of the instant case. 

Specifically, Plaintiffs filed the CAC on August 12, 2019 and allege a Class Period beginning 

August 20, 2015. Under California law, the statute of limitations for breach of contract is four 

years. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 337(1). Therefore, any breach of contract claim that accrued on or 

after August 12, 2015 (and by extension, any breach of contract claim during the Class Period) is 

timely. Accordingly, Apple’s concern about a statute of limitations defense for the breach of 

contract claim is unfounded.

The Court therefore DENIES Apple’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ breach of contract 

claim on the basis that Plaintiffs did not allege the existence of a contract.

2. The CAC Adequately Alleges Apple’s Breach of the iCloud Agreement

Case 5:19-cv-04700-LHK Document 34 Filed 03/27/20 Page 16 of 26
17

Case No. 19-CV-04700-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Apple next argues that Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim should be dismissed because the 

CAC does not sufficiently plead that Apple breached the iCloud Agreement. Apple contends that 

the representation that “Apple is the provider of the [iCloud] Service” and that Plaintiffs’ “content 

will be automatically sent to and stored by Apple” can only be interpreted to mean that “Apple 

made iCloud available to Plaintiffs,” and Apple contends that it fulfilled these duties. Mot. at 14. 

As a result, according to Apple, there was no breach of the iCloud Agreement. Plaintiffs respond 

that the plain reading of this contractual provision compels the conclusion that Apple promised to 

store Plaintiffs’ files and data on Apple’s own servers. Opp. at 15. 

Under California law, a contract “must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual 

intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable 

and lawful.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1636. “Where contract language is clear and explicit and does not 

lead to absurd results, we ascertain intent from the written terms and go no further.” Ticor Title 

Ins. Co. v. Employer’s Ins. of Wausau, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1699, 1707 (1995). In such situations, 

“[a] court may resolve contractual claims on a motion to dismiss” because “the terms of the 

contract are unambiguous.” Alta Devices, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 343 F. Supp. 3d 868, 878-79 

(N.D. Cal. 2018) (citing Bedrosian v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 208 F.3d 220 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

However, what the parties intended by an ambiguous contract is a factual determination,

United States v. Plummer, 941 F.2d 799, 803 (9th Cir. 1991), and thus “[w]here the language 

‘leaves doubt as to the parties’ intent,’ the motion to dismiss must be denied.” Monaco v. Bear 

Stearns Residential Mortg. Corp., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1040 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting Consul 

Ltd. v. Solide Enteres., Inc., 802 F.2d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 1986)). “A contract provision will be 

considered ambiguous when it is capable of two or more reasonable interpretations.” Id. (citation 

omitted); see also Tanadgusix Corp. v. Huber, 404 F.3d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A contract is 

ambiguous if reasonable people could find its terms susceptible to more than one interpretation.”); 

In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“However, ‘[i]f a 

contract is capable of two different reasonable interpretations, the contract is ambiguous.’” 

(quoting Oceanside 84, Ltd. v. Fid. Fed. Bank, 56 Cal. App. 4th 1441, 1448 (1997))). 

Case 5:19-cv-04700-LHK Document 34 Filed 03/27/20 Page 17 of 26
18

Case No. 19-CV-04700-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Here, the Court holds that Apple and Plaintiffs have proffered reasonable interpretations of 

the disputed contractual provision. Again, the relevant contractual language provides as follows:

Apple is the provider of the Service, which permits you to utilize certain Internet 

services, including storing your personal content (such as contacts, calendars, photos, 

notes, reminders, documents, app data, and iCloud email) and making it accessible 

on your compatible devices and computers, and certain location based services, only 

under the terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement. iCloud is automatically 

enabled when you are running devices on iOS 9 or later and sign in with your Apple 

ID during device setup, unless you are upgrading the device and have previously 

chosen not to enable iCloud. You can disable iCloud in Settings. When iCloud is 

enabled, your content will be automatically sent to and stored by Apple, so you can 

later access that content or have content wirelessly pushed to your other iCloudenabled devices or computers. ¶

CAC, Ex. 1 at 1 (emphasis added); CAC ¶ 23.

Apple reads this language to mean only that “Apple has taken charge of subscribers’ data 

so that [subscribers’ data] can later be accessed or pushed to subscribers’ devices.” Mot. at 14. 

Given this interpretation, Apple contends that it did not breach any duty to store Plaintiffs’ data on 

Apple’s own servers. The Court agrees that the contractual language is certainly susceptible to 

Apple’s interpretation. 

At the same time, Plaintiffs argue that the “plain dictionary meaning” of “stored” is “to 

provide storage room for: HOLD,” and that therefore, Apple promised that it would be the entity 

providing storage room for users’ data on its own servers. Opp. at 15. The Court agrees that a 

reasonable person could interpret this language to mean that Apple itself would be the entity 

storing users’ data on Apple’s servers. Therefore, under Plaintiffs’ interpretation, Apple breached 

the iCloud Agreement by “turn[ing] the users’ digital files to other entities, like Amazon and 

Microsoft[,] for [Amazon and Microsoft] to store on their facilities.” CAC ¶ 28.

Given the fact that Apple and Plaintiffs both provide reasonable interpretations, the 

disputed contractual language is ambiguous, and “this ambiguity raises a question of fact as to the 

parties’ intent.” Microsoft Corp. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 2019 WL 3859035, at *6 (N.D. 

Cal. Aug. 16, 2019) (citing Tanadgusix Corp., 404 F.3d at 1205). “The parties may well argue at 

a later stage of litigation that the intent of the parties or properly admitted extrinsic evidence 

supports their respective interpretations of the contract,” but “[s]uch factually based arguments are 

Case 5:19-cv-04700-LHK Document 34 Filed 03/27/20 Page 18 of 26
19

Case No. 19-CV-04700-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

appropriate . . . at a later stage of litigation, not on the pleadings.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 

At this stage of the proceedings, “[w]here the language leaves doubt as to the parties’ intent, the 

motion to dismiss must be denied.” Monaco, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 1040 (quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, because Plaintiffs sufficiently plead a breach of the iCloud Agreement, the 

Court DENIES Apple’s motion to dismiss on this ground.

3. The CAC Adequately Alleges Resulting Damages

In Apple’s final argument regarding Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim, Apple contends 

that the CAC does not adequately allege resulting damages, the fourth element of a breach of 

contract claim. Apple’s motion to dismiss focuses primarily on the argument that Plaintiffs’ 

allegations are nothing more than “a request for restitution,” which “simply is not a measure of 

contract damages.” Mot. at 15-16. 

The CAC, however, does not make a claim for restitution, but rather seeks compensatory 

damages for Apple’s alleged breach of the iCloud Agreement. In particular, the CAC alleges that 

“[h]ad Apple disclosed that, contrary to its contractual representation, Apple was not the provider 

of the cloud storage,” putative class members “would not have subscribed to Apple’s iCloud 

service or would have not agreed to pay as much as [they] did for the service.” CAC ¶¶ 11-12. 

The CAC pleads that other companies, such as Microsoft and Google, offer cheaper cloud storage 

services than Apple and that Apple’s “price premium” harmed putative class members who would 

have otherwise utilized these cheaper cloud storage alternatives. Id. ¶¶ 34-37. At the motion to 

dismiss stage and pursuant to Rule 8’s pleading standards, these allegations are sufficient to allege 

resulting damages.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Apple’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ breach of contract 

claim on the basis that Plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege resulting damages.

C. FAL and UCL Claims

Apple’s final tranche of arguments concern Plaintiffs’ FAL and UCL claims. Plaintiffs

allege that Apple’s misrepresentations make Apple liable under the FAL and under the unlawful, 

unfair, and fraudulent prongs of the UCL. As an initial matter, when “‘plaintiffs’ unfair prong 

Case 5:19-cv-04700-LHK Document 34 Filed 03/27/20 Page 19 of 26
20

Case No. 19-CV-04700-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

claim[] overlap[s] entirely with their claims of fraud,’ the plaintiffs’ unfair prong claim cannot 

survive’” if the fraudulent prong claim fails. Ahern, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 561 (quoting In re 

Actimmune Mktg. Litig., 2009 WL 3740648, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2009), aff’d, 464 Fed. 

App’x 651 (9th Cir. 2011)). Here, Plaintiffs’ UCL unfair prong claim is premised on Apple’s 

allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations. See CAC ¶ 65 (alleging that “Apple’s misrepresentation 

as to which entity is providing the cloud storage of Plaintiffs’ and class members’ data” 

“independently amounts to an unfair business practice within the meaning of the UCL”). As such, 

Plaintiffs’ unfair prong claim overlaps entirely with Plaintiffs’ fraud claim, and Plaintiffs’ UCL 

unfair prong claim fails if Plaintiffs’ UCL fraudulent prong claim fails. Ahern, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 

561.

Apple contends that Plaintiffs’ FAL and UCL claims must be dismissed because (1) the 

CAC fails to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standards, (2) the CAC does not adequately 

plead reliance, (3) Plaintiffs’ FAL and UCL claims are duplicative of an adequate remedy at law, 

and (4) the CAC does not allege an actionable misrepresentation. Mot. at 16-21. The Court 

agrees with Apple that the CAC does not meet Rule 9(b)’s requirements as to Plaintiffs’ FAL 

claim and that the CAC does not adequately plead reliance as to Plaintiffs’ FAL and UCL claims. 

Therefore, the Court does not reach Apple’s remaining arguments.

1. The CAC Fails to Satisfy Rule 9(b)’s Heightened Pleading Standards for 

Plaintiffs’ FAL Claim

As an initial matter, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard 

applies to Plaintiffs’ FAL and UCL claims because these claims are based on Apple’s allegedly 

fraudulent course of conduct—namely, Apple’s alleged misrepresentations that Apple stored

users’ content when allegedly, Apple “instead turned the users’ digital files to other entities, like 

Amazon and Microsoft[,] for them to store on their facilities.” CAC ¶ 28; see Kearns, 567 F.3d at

1125 (“[W]e have specifically ruled that Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standards apply to 

claims for violations of the . . . UCL.”); Brazil v. Dole Food Co., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 2d 947, 963 

(N.D. Cal. 2013) (applying Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard to FAL claims for 

Case 5:19-cv-04700-LHK Document 34 Filed 03/27/20 Page 20 of 26
21

Case No. 19-CV-04700-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

misleading, deceptive, and untrue advertising); see also Vess, 317 F.3d at 1106 (stating that when 

a plaintiff “allege[s] a unified course of fraudulent conduct and rel[ies] entirely on that course of 

conduct as the basis of a claim . . . the claim is said to be ‘grounded in fraud’ . . . and the pleading 

of that claim as a whole must satisfy the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b)”). When FAL and 

UCL claims are premised on misleading representations, Rule 9(b) requires a plaintiff to allege

“the particular circumstances surrounding [the] representations” at issue. Kearns, 567 F.3d at 

1126. In other words, Rule 9(b) requires that plaintiffs plead with specificity “the who, what, 

when, where, and how of the misconduct charged.” Vess, 317 F.3d at1106 (quotation marks 

omitted).

In the instant case, the CAC does not allege when Williams and Stewart entered into the 

iCloud Agreement with Apple. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. Rather, the CAC only pleads that Williams and 

Stewart agreed to the iCloud Agreement sometime during the nearly five-year Class Period from 

August 20, 2015 to the present. Id. For the reasons stated below, the CAC’s failure to plead when 

Williams and Stewart entered into the iCloud Agreement fails to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s heightened

pleading standard for Plaintiffs’ FAL claim. 

“[T]he ‘when’ of Rule 9(b) is satisfied when a plaintiff pleads that he has purchased the 

product at issue during a specified class period . . . as long as there is no suggestion that a label 

changed or varied during that time.” Werdebaugh v. Blue Diamond Growers, 2013 WL 5487236, 

at *14 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2013) (collecting cases). Nonetheless, courts in this district have also 

held that when “some or all of plaintiff’s purchases may fall outside the statute of limitations,” it is 

“appropriate at this [motion to dismiss] stage to ensure that plaintiff at minimum has pled that his 

claims are timely.” Beasley v. Conagra Brands, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 3d 869, 882-83 (N.D. Cal. 

2019). The CAC “must plead when [Named Plaintiffs] [saw the alleged misrepresentation] with 

greater specificity in order that the Court may fairly evaluate the question of timeliness.” Beasley 

v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 3d 942, 956 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (quoting Beasley, 374 F. Supp. 3d 

at 882)

Here, the issue of timeliness does not apply to Plaintiffs’ UCL claims. Plaintiffs filed the 

Case 5:19-cv-04700-LHK Document 34 Filed 03/27/20 Page 21 of 26
22

Case No. 19-CV-04700-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

CAC on August 12, 2019 for a Class Period beginning on August 20, 2015, and the statute of 

limitations for UCL claims is four years. See Cal. Bus & Prof. Code § 17208 (four-year statute of 

limitations for UCL). Therefore, UCL claims that accrued after August 12, 2015 (and by 

extension, throughout the Class Period beginning on August 20, 2015) are timely. Accordingly, 

the Court DENIES Apple’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ UCL claims on Rule 9(b) grounds.

Timeliness, however, is problematic for Plaintiffs’ FAL claim. The statute of limitations 

for FAL claims is three years, Cal. Code Civ Proc. § 338(a) (three-year statute of limitations for 

FAL claims), and therefore, any claims predicated on violations of the FAL that accrued prior to 

August 12, 2016 are time-barred. The CAC, however, includes no allegations as to when 

Williams or Stewart viewed the alleged misrepresentations; whether their claims accrued before or 

after August 12, 2016; or whether the statute of limitations was tolled.

Thus, because Plaintiffs’ FAL claim may be time-barred as pleaded, Plaintiffs fail to 

satisfy Rule 9(b) as to their FAL claim. Plaintiffs must plead the FAL claim “with greater 

specificity in order that the Court may fairly evaluate the question of timeliness.” Beasley, 374 F. 

Supp. 3d at 882. As it stands, the CAC’s allegations “are insufficient to allow defendant to

‘defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.’” Id. (quoting 

Semegen, 780 F.2d at 731). 

As a result, the Court GRANTS Apple’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ FAL claim because 

Plaintiffs’ FAL claim fails to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard. However, the 

Court GRANTS Plaintiffs leave to amend because doing so would not be futile, cause undue 

delay, or unduly prejudice Apple, and Plaintiffs have not acted in bad faith. Leadsinger, 512 F.3d

at 532; see also Ahern, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 570 (requiring any amended complaint to state facts 

supporting allegations of tolling after defendant demonstrated, on a motion to dismiss, that the 

claim would be untimely unless the statute of limitations was tolled).

2. The CAC Does Not Adequately Plead Reliance for Plaintiffs’ FAL and UCL 

Claims

The Court finally addresses Apple’s argument that Plaintiffs do not sufficiently plead 

Case 5:19-cv-04700-LHK Document 34 Filed 03/27/20 Page 22 of 26
23

Case No. 19-CV-04700-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

reliance as necessary to establish FAL and UCL claims. “Plaintiffs alleging claims under the FAL

and UCL are required to plead and prove actual reliance on the misrepresentations or omissions at 

issue.” Great Pac. Sec. v. Barclays Capital, Inc., 743 Fed. App’x 780, 783 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing 

Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.4th 310, 326-27 (2011)). This is true of all of Plaintiffs’ 

UCL claims, regardless of whether they are brought under the unfair, unlawful, or fraudulent 

prong. Indeed, “California courts have held that when the ‘unfair competition’ underlying a 

plaintiff's UCL claim consists of a defendant's misrepresentation or omission, a plaintiff must have 

actually relied on the misrepresentation or omission, and suffered economic injury as a result of 

that reliance, to have standing to sue.” Backhaut v. Apple, 74 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1047 (N.D. Cal. 

2014) (citing In re Tobacco II, 46 Cal. 4th 298, 326 (2009)). “California courts have subsequently 

extended the actual reliance requirement to claims brought under the UCL’s unlawful prong to the 

extent the predicate unlawful conduct is based on misrepresentations,” and “the California 

Supreme Court suggested that the actual reliance requirement applies whenever the underlying 

misconduct in a UCL action is fraudulent conduct.” Id. at 1047-48 (citations omitted). 

To establish actual reliance, the plaintiff must allege that “the defendant’s 

misrepresentation or nondisclosure was an immediate cause of the plaintiff's injury-producing 

conduct.” Tobacco II, 46 Cal. 4th at 326 (internal quotation marks omitted). “A plaintiff may 

establish that the defendant’s misrepresentation is an immediate cause of the plaintiff's conduct by 

showing that in its absence the plaintiff in all reasonable probability would not have engaged in 

the injury-producing conduct.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, a plaintiff 

may show actual reliance by alleging that “had the omitted information been disclosed one would 

have been aware of it and behaved differently.” Mirkin v. Wasserman, 5 Cal 4th 1082, 1093 

(1993); see also Daniel v. Ford Motor Co., 806 F.3d 1217, 1225 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding that 

plaintiffs had sufficient evidence of reliance to survive summary judgment when plaintiffs offered 

“a plausible method of disclosure and . . . that they would have been aware of information 

disclosed using that method”). Although a plaintiff need not demonstrate that the defendant's 

misrepresentations were “the sole or even the predominant or decisive factor influencing his 

Case 5:19-cv-04700-LHK Document 34 Filed 03/27/20 Page 23 of 26
24

Case No. 19-CV-04700-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

conduct,” the misrepresentations must have “played a substantial part” in the plaintiff's decisionmaking. Tobacco II, 46 Cal. 4th at 326.

Indeed, “[t]o make the reliance showing, this Court has consistently held that plaintiffs in 

misrepresentation cases must allege that they actually read the challenged representations.” 

Perkins v. LinkedIn Corp., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1220 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (collecting cases); see also 

Woods v. Google, Inc., 2017 WL 4310765, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2017) (“To prevail on his 

UCL and FAL claims, [a plaintiff] must establish that he saw and relied on [a defendant’s 

misrepresentations . . . .” (citing Perkins, 53 F. Supp. 3d at 1219)). Additionally, to adequately 

plead reliance for alleged misrepresentations, Plaintiffs must satisfy Rule 9(b)’s heightened 

pleading standard and allege facts with particularity. See Haskins v. Symantec Corp., 654 Fed. 

App’x 338, 339 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Because Haskins’s complaint did not allege that she read and 

relied on a specific misrepresentation by Symantec, she failed to plead her fraud claims with 

particularity as required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).

Plaintiffs acknowledge that the CAC does not allege that Plaintiffs viewed Apple’s alleged 

misrepresentations regarding iCloud storage, but that “[r]ead in context,” the CAC nonetheless 

pleads reliance. Opp. at 4, 22-23. Plaintiffs proffer two arguments as to why the CAC sufficiently 

alleges reliance even though the CAC does not plead that Plaintiffs saw or read the relevant 

representations.

First, Plaintiffs make much of the fact that the CAC alleges that Plaintiffs bargained for 

Apple to be the provider of iCloud storage and to be the entity that stored users’ data. CAC ¶ 32 

(alleging that Plaintiffs “bargained for, agreed, and paid to have Apple . . . store their data”). This 

argument fails. Elsewhere, the CAC contradicts Plaintiffs’ allegation that they “bargained for” 

this specific provision. Specifically, the iCloud Agreements that Plaintiffs attached to the CAC 

are simple form contracts that could not be modified and merely allowed Plaintiffs to click an 

“AGREE” button. CAC, Ex. 1 at 1; CAC, Ex. 2 at 1; Opp. at 23. Nowhere do the CAC or the 

iCloud Agreements allege or establish that the iCloud Agreements could be modified. As a result, 

the Court holds that Plaintiffs’ allegation that they “bargained for” the provision in the iCloud 

Case 5:19-cv-04700-LHK Document 34 Filed 03/27/20 Page 24 of 26
25

Case No. 19-CV-04700-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

agreement containing the alleged misrepresentations does not adequately plead reliance with the 

particularity required by Rule 9(b). 

Second, Plaintiffs assert that they adequately plead reliance because they “affirmatively 

clicked the ‘AGREE’ [button] signifying their review and assent to the contract terms,” including 

Apple’s alleged misrepresentations regarding iCloud storage. This Court, however, has previously 

rejected this precise argument. See In re iPhone Application Litig., 6 F. Supp. 3d 1004, 1025 

(N.D. Cal. 2013) (“[T]he mere fact that Plaintiffs had to scroll through a screen and click on a box 

stating that they agreed with the Apple Privacy Policy in July 2010 does not establish, standing 

alone, that Plaintiffs actually read the alleged misrepresentations contained in that Privacy Policy, 

let alone that these misrepresentations subsequently formed the basis for Plaintiffs’

‘understanding’ regarding Apple’s privacy practices.”); Perkins, 53 F. Supp. 3d at 1220 (“[T]he

fact that some of the alleged misrepresentations appeared on screens that all users had to click 

through to register do not by themselves establish that any of the Plaintiffs actually read or relied 

on the misrepresentations in the absence of allegations that Plaintiffs read these statements.”); In 

re Yahoo! Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 2017 WL 3727318, at *28 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 

2017) (“Here, although all Plaintiffs had to click through Defendants’ Terms of Service in order to

create their accounts, . . . Plaintiffs do not allege that they ‘actually read’ Defendants’ Terms of 

Service, let alone that Plaintiffs ‘actually read’ the separate Privacy Policy containing the alleged 

misrepresentation at issue . . . . Thus, . . . Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged a UCL fraud 

claim based on misrepresentations in Defendants’ Privacy Policy because Plaintiffs have not 

adequately alleged that they ‘actually relied’ on Defendants’ misrepresentation contained within 

Defendants’ Privacy Policy.”).

As a result, the CAC does not properly allege, in compliance with Rule 9(b), that Plaintiffs 

read or relied upon Apple’s purported misrepresentations regarding iCloud storage. Therefore, the 

Court GRANTS Apple’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ FAL and UCL claims for failure to 

adequately plead reliance. Furthermore, because “courts have held that actual reliance is required 

to demonstrate causation for purposes of Article III standing when the plaintiffs assert that their 

Case 5:19-cv-04700-LHK Document 34 Filed 03/27/20 Page 25 of 26
26

Case No. 19-CV-04700-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART APPLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

injury is the result of deceptive misrepresentations or omissions” under the FAL and UCL, the 

Court also GRANTS Apple’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s FAL and UCL claims for lack of 

Article III standing. See Phillips, 2016 WL 1579693, at *6. The Court, however, GRANTS 

Plaintiffs leave to amend because doing so would not be futile, cause undue delay, or unduly 

prejudice Apple, and Plaintiffs have not acted in bad faith. Leadsinger, 512 F.3d at 532.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Apple’s motion 

to dismiss. Specifically, the Court GRANTS with leave to amend Apple’s motion to dismiss 

Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief and GRANTS with leave to amend Apple’s motion to 

dismiss Plaintiffs’ FAL and UCL claims. The Court DENIES Apple’s motion to dismiss 

Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim.

Plaintiffs shall file any amended complaint within 30 days of this Order. Failure to do so

or failure to cure deficiencies identified herein or in Apple’s motion to dismiss will result in 

dismissal of the deficient claims with prejudice. Plaintiffs may not add new causes of action or 

new parties without a stipulation or leave of the Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 27, 2020

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

Case 5:19-cv-04700-LHK Document 34 Filed 03/27/20 Page 26 of 26