Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02493/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02493-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ADAM JIMINEZ,

CDCR #F-29610,

Plaintiff,

vs.

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Employee,

Defendant.

Case No.: 15-cv-02493-BAS(KSC)

ORDER:

1) DENYING MOTIONS FOR 

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1)

[ECF Nos. 5, 7] 

AND 

2) SUA SPONTE GRANTING 

EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Adam Jiminez (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner currently incarcerated at California State 

Prison in Lancaster, California (“LAC”), is proceeding pro se in this civil rights action filed 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

On February 25, 2016, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis 

(“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), but dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a 

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claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b). (ECF No. 3.) Plaintiff was granted 

forty-five days leave, however, to amend his pleading. Id. at 10; see also Lopez v. Smith, 

203 F.3d 1122, 1130–31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[A] district court should grant leave 

to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the 

pleading could not possibly be cured.”). On April 4, 2016, and approximately one week 

later, on April 11, 2016, within the time permitted to amend, Plaintiff submitted two 

identical Motions for Appointment of Counsel (ECF Nos. 5, 7), but no Amended 

Complaint. 

I. Motion for Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff requests appointment of counsel because he is indigent, has limited access 

to the law library, and suffers from anxiety, depression, chronic joint pain, limited vision 

in his left eye, and irritable bowel syndrome. See Pl.’s Mot. ¶¶ 2–17, ECF Nos. 5, 7. 

Plaintiff further claims disabilities related to his 2013 diagnosis of Valley Fever prevent 

prolonged sitting or standing, and will significantly restrict his research and investigation. 

Id. ¶¶ 4, 14–15.

“There is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in a § 1983 action.” Rand v. 

Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 

1353 (9th Cir. 1981)); see also Hedges v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In re Hedges), 32 F.3d 

1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]here is no absolute right to counsel in civil proceedings.”). 

Thus, federal courts do not have the authority “to make coercive appointments of counsel.” 

Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989); see also United States 

v. $292,888.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Districts courts have discretion, however, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) to 

“request” that an attorney represent indigent civil litigants upon a showing of “exceptional 

circumstances.” See Agyeman v. Corrections Corp. of America, 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th 

Cir. 2004); Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. “A finding of the exceptional circumstances of the 

plaintiff seeking assistance requires at least an evaluation of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s 

success on the merits and an evaluation of the plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims ‘in 

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light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103 (quoting 

Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Terrell v. Brewer, 

935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991).

The Court agrees with Plaintiff’s assertion that his claims might be better prosecuted

were he represented by a licensed and trained attorney. See ECF Nos. 4, 7 at ¶¶ 5, 6. 

Indeed, any pro se litigant “would be better served with the assistance of counsel.” Rand, 

113 F.3d at 1525 (citing Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331). However, so long as a pro se litigant, 

like Plaintiff in this case, is able to articulate the factual basis of his claims against the 

relative complexity of the matter, the “exceptional circumstances” which might require the 

appointment of counsel do not exist. Id. (finding no abuse of discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e) when district court denied appointment of counsel despite fact that pro se prisoner 

“may well have fared better-particularly in the realms of discovery and the securing of 

expert testimony”). 

The Court finds that although Plaintiff’s original Complaint fell short of stating a 

claim upon which section 1983 relief can be granted, his pleading, as well as his current 

Motions for Appointment of Counsel, which are cogently argued and contain exhibits in 

support of his medical conditions, nevertheless demonstrate an ability to articulate facts 

and to collect evidentiary support for his purported claims. Therefore, neither the interests 

of justice nor exceptional circumstances warrant appointment of counsel at this time.1 See 

LaMere v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017. 

 

1 Plaintiff argues his case is “identical” to Allen v. Calderon, 408 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2005), 

a case in which the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of a pro se habeas petition because 

the district court failed to consider whether the appointment of counsel was required 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c) based on sworn allegations of mental incompetence before 

entering a judgment on the merits. Id. at 1152–53. Allen is both factually and legally 

distinguishable, however, because as nothing in Plaintiff’s pleadings or motions thus far 

suggest he “suffers from a mental illness [that] prevents him from being able to understand 

and respond to the court’s order[s],” id. at 1152, and the mandatory standard for 

appointment of counsel pursuant to Rule 8(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, 

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II. Extension of Time

Although the Court finds no exceptional circumstances support appointment of 

counsel in this matter, Plaintiff is still proceeding pro se, his Motions for Appointment of 

Counsel were timely filed, and they describe several physical difficulties and institutional

obstacles to his filing of an Amended Complaint within the forty-five days originally 

provided. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) (court 

has a “duty to ensure that pro se litigants do not lose their right to a hearing on the merits 

of their claim due to . . . technical procedural requirements”). In fact, the time originally 

granted to Plaintiff for amendment has already expired.

“‘Strict time limits . . . ought not to be insisted upon’ where restraints resulting from 

a pro se prisoner plaintiff’s incarceration prevent timely compliance with court deadlines.”

Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Tarantino v. Eggers, 380 

F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1967)); see also Bennett v. King, 205 F.3d 1188, 1189 (9th Cir. 

2000) (reversing district court’s dismissal of prisoner’s amended pro se complaint as 

untimely where mere thirty day delay was result of prison-wide lockdown). Accordingly, 

the Court will, on its own motion, and in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status and medical 

conditions, grant him additional time in which to file his Amended Complaint.

III. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons set forth above, the Court:

1) DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Motions for Appointment of 

Counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (ECF Nos. 5, 7); and

2) GRANTS Plaintiff an extension of time in which to re-open his case by filing

an Amended Complaint. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, should he elect to file one, must 

be received by the Court no later than Monday, June 6, 2016. Plaintiff is again cautioned 

that his pleading must be titled as his “Amended Complaint,” include Civil Case No. 15-

 

as applied in Allen, is different than the discretionary “exceptional circumstances” standard 

applicable under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Id. at 1153.

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cv-2493-BAS(KSC) in its caption, address all the deficiencies of pleading identified in the 

Court’s February 25, 2016, Order (ECF No. 3), and be complete in itself without reference 

to his original pleading. See Civ. L.R. 15.1. Defendants not named and any claim not realleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. 

Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading 

supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended 

pleading may be “considered waived if not repled”).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 19, 2016

Hon. Cynthia Bashant

United States District Judge

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