Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01576/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01576-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Sex Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HALEMA BUZAYAN, as an individual; No. 2:06-cv-01576-MCE-DAD

DR. JAMAL BUZAYAN, an individual;

NAJAT ABDALLA DARRAT, an 

individual; MOHAMED BUZAYAN, by 

and through DR. JAMAL BUZAYAN, as 

Guardian Ad Litem for a minor; 

YOUSEF BUZAYAN, by and through 

DR. JAMAL BUZAYAN, as Guardian Ad 

Litem for a minor; ALI BUZAYAN, 

by and through DR. JAMAL BUZAYAN, 

as Guardian Ad Litem for a minor,

Plaintiffs,

v. ORDER

THE CITY OF DAVIS; JAMES HYDE,

individually and in his capacity

as Chief of Police of the City of

Davis Police Department; STEVEN

PIERCE, individually and in his

official capacity with the City

of Davis Police Department; PHENG

LY, individually and in his

capacity as an officer of the

City of Davis Police Department;

BEN HARTZ, individually and in

his capacity as an officer of the

City of Davis Police Department;

DAVID HENDERSON, individually and

in his capacity as District

Attorney for the Yolo County

Office of the District Attorney;

PATRICIA FONG, individually and

in her capacity as Deputy

Case 2:06-cv-01576-MCE-DAD Document 126 Filed 05/02/08 Page 1 of 6
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 SLAPP is an acronym denoting a so-called “Strategic 1

Lawsuit Against Public Participation”.

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District Attorney for the Yolo

County Office of the District

Attorney and member of the Davis

Police Department Community

Advisory Board; DOUGLAS THORN,

individually and in his capacity

as counsel for Yolo County and

the City of Davis; 

Defendants.

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Defendants City of Davis, James Hyde, Steven Pierce, Pheng

Ly, Ben Hartz, Gina Anderson, David Henderson and Patricia Fong

(hereinafter collectively referred to as “Public Defendants”

unless otherwise indicated) have moved, pursuant to California

Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(c), for an award of certain

attorney’s fees incurred in connection with their Special Motion

to Strike, brought under §425.16(b) and granted in part by the

Court’s Memorandum and Order issued August 8, 2007.

The prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike a

claim arising from the defendant’s exercise of free speech on a

public issue, commonly referred to as an “anti-SLAPP motion”, is 1

entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs. See

Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1131 (2001). Fees and costs

recoverable in that regard encompass both those incurred for the

motion to strike itself and with respect to a subsequent

application for fees. Id. at 1140-41.

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The Public Defendants are correct in pointing out that to

qualify for fees as a “prevailing party” on an anti-SLAPP motion,

a defendant need not have his or her motion granted in its

entirety. Instead, a defendant whose motion is even partially

granted is entitled to fees as long as the motion’s result is not

“so insignificant that the party did not achieve any practical

benefit from filing the motion.” Mann v. Quality Old Time

Service, Inc., 139 Cal. App. 4th 328, 340 (2006).

In the present matter, the Public Defendants’ Special Motion

to Strike contained five separate anti-SLAPP requests directed to

Plaintiffs’ Causes of Action for right of privacy, defamation,

failure to protect private information, and intentional and

negligent infliction of emotional distress. Moreover, pled along

with the Special Motion to Strike were two separate dismissal

requests, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

directed to two other California-based causes of action, and a

Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike seeking to eliminate certain

paragraphs from the Complaint.

The Public Defendants were successful only in striking one

of Plaintiffs’ causes of action, for defamation, pursuant to

California’s anti-SLAPP statute. The rest of the free-speech

challenges were denied, as were Defendants’ various Rule 12(b)

requests. Of a total of nineteen causes of action contained in

Plaintiffs’ Complaint, only a single cause of action was

eliminated as a result of the Public Defendants’ Motion. In

addition, each of the parties seeking fees by way of the Motion

presently before the Court remains a defendant in the case.

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Nonetheless, in reliance on the Mann rule that even

partially successful defendants can seek to recoup their legal

fees, the Public Defendants now ask the Court to award $17,150.00

in attorney’s fees, plus additional fees incurred in bringing the

present fee application of $1,960.00, for total claimed fees of

some $19,110.00. This figure was derived from gross fees of

$38,143.00, less a ten percent reduction claimed by Public

Defendants to be consistent with the percentage of time devoted

to the Rule 12(b) motions. With respect to the remaining

$34,300.00 after applying that discount, the Public Defendants

argue that because the successfully challenged defamation claim

was a particularly significant issue they should be entitled to

both fifty percent of the net $34,300, along with the $1,960.00

in fees incurred for bringing this Motion.

The Court believes that Public Defendants’ request is

excessive given the fact that only one of nineteen claims was

eliminated as a result of their claim. While the deleted

defamation claim was undoubtedly important, the fact remains that

its deletion did not fundamentally alter the complexion of this

lawsuit, which remains just as fact-laden and populated by just

as many of the moving Public Defendants as were embroiled in the

litigation beforehand. The dispositive factor is not how much of

the briefing was devoted to the stricken defamation claim, as

Public Defendants appear to contend. 

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 Because oral argument was not of material assistance, the 2

Court ordered this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h).

 The Court believes that fees in bringing this motion 3

should be discounted to the same extent it concluded that the

Public Defendants failed to prevail on the underlying Motion to

Strike. See Schwarz v. Secretary of Health and Human Services,

73 F.3d 895, 909 (9th Cir. 1995), citing Comm’r, I.N.S. v. Jean,

496 U.S. 154, 163 n.10 (1990).

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Instead, the applicable law states plainly that a fee award to a

partially successful litigant in an anti-SLAPP motion, like

Public Defendants herein, must be “commensurate with the extent

to which the motion changed the nature and character of the

lawsuit in a practical way.” Mann, 139 Cal. App. 4th at 345.

While the Court agrees that Public Defendants’ victory was

not so “minimal and insignificant” to justify a refusal to deny

any fees whatsoever (see Morrow v. L.A. Unified School Dist., 149

Cal. App. 4th 1424, 1446 (2007)), and although it concludes that

Public Defendants do indeed qualify as a prevailing party in that

regard, the Court cannot agree to allocate a full fifty percent

(50%) of net fees as Public Defendants seek. Instead, under the

rationale of Mann, and given the posture of the case before and

after Public Defendants’ Special Motion to Strike was

adjudicated, a much lesser amount is indicated.

In granting this Motion in part, the Court finds that 2

twenty percent (20%) is the appropriate figure in that regard,

and consequently awards $6,860.00 ($34,300.00 x .20), and $392.00

as compensation for bringing this motion ($1,960.00 x .20), for 3

a total of $7,252.00. 

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Said sum shall be paid to counsel for Public Defendants not later

than thirty (30) days following the date of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 1, 2008

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:06-cv-01576-MCE-DAD Document 126 Filed 05/02/08 Page 6 of 6