Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02058/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02058-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael Francis Gallagher, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 13-02058 PHX GMS (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Charles L. Ryan, et al., ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW:

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on or about

September 16, 2013, which was docketed on October 9, 2013.

Respondents filed a Limited Answer to Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 9) on March 7, 2014. Petitioner

filed a reply to the answer to his petition on April 16, 2014.

See Doc. 12.

I Procedural History

An information issued July 2, 2003, charged Petitioner

with one count of aggravated robbery and one count of burglary

in the second degree, both classified as class 3 felonies. See

Answer, Exh. A. The state subsequently alleged that Petitioner

had three historical prior felony convictions and that he

committed the charged offenses while released from confinement

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on a prior conviction for armed robbery. Id., Exhs. B & C. On

November 20, 2003, a jury found Petitioner guilty as charged.

Id. Exh. D. 

At sentencing on December 19, 2003, the state trial

court found that Petitioner had three prior felony convictions

and sentenced him to consecutive aggravted terms of twenty years

incarceration on each count of conviction. Id., Exh. E. 

Petitioner took a timely appeal of his convictions and

sentences on January 8, 2004. Id., Exh. F. In his direct

appeal Petitioner asserted: (1) the trial court abused its

discretion in finding an adequate evidentiary foundation to

support the admission of several trial exhibits; (2) the trial

court abused its discretion in admitting the Department of

Corrections’ “prison packet” without sufficient evidentiary

foundation to establish Petitioner’s prior felony convictions;

and (3) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences.

Id., Exh. G. Petitioner also filed a supplemental opening

brief, raising an additional sentencing issue relating to

aggravating factors. Id., Exh. I.

In a decision issued February 1, 2005, the Arizona

Court of Appeals upheld Petitioner’s convictions but remanded

the case for re-sentencing upon finding that the imposition of

consecutive sentences “constituted fundamental error.” Id.,

Exh. K. 

On remand on July 1, 2005, the trial court re-sentenced

Petitioner to aggravated but concurrent terms of twenty years

imprisonment on each of the two counts of conviction. Id., Exh.

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N. Although Petitioner filed a notice of appeal from his

re-sentencing, he then submitted a motion to dismiss his appeal

on September 29, 2005. Id., Exhs. O & P. The Arizona Court of

Appeals dismissed the appeal on October 21, 2005. Id., Exh. Q.

Petitioner initiated a total of four state

post-conviction (“PCR”) proceedings pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure. Petitioner initiated his first

Rule 32 action on January 9, 2004, the day after Petitioner

filed his first notice of appeal in the Arizona Court of

Appeals. Id., Exhs. R & S. The trial court granted

Petitioner’s motion to dismiss the Rule 32 action on March 3,

2004. Id., Exh. V. 

Petitioner initiated a second Rule 32 proceeding on

July 14, 2005. Id., Exh. W. The trial court appointed counsel

for Petitioner, and also found that “the filing of the [PCR

notice] is timely as to the defendant’s re-sentencing only.”

Id., Exh. X. On January 3, 2006, Petitioner’s counsel filed a

“petition for leave to file delayed notice of post conviction

relief.” Id., Exh. Y. On May 2, 2006, the trial court denied

Petitioner’s petition for leave to file a delayed PCR petition.

Id., Exh. CC. Petitioner filed a petition for review in the

Arizona Court of Appeals, which denied review on April 26, 2007.

Id., Exhs. DD & EE. 

On March 19, 2008, Petitioner filed a third notice

pursuant to Rule 32. Id., Exh. HH. Petitioner asserted that he

was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel,

that the trial court should not have admitted evidence of his

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“alleged confession” and that he was entitled to a voluntariness

hearing, and that he “should’ve been given the presumptive term

[of imprisonment].” Id., Exh. II. In a decision issued April

11, 2008, the state trial court found that Petitioner’s postconviction petition was untimely pursuant to Rule 32.4(a),

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and that Petitioner was

“precluded from relief on these claims pursuant to Rule 32.2(a)

of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, because these claims

either could or should have been raised on appeal or in a prior

Rule 32 proceeding.” Id., Exh. JJ. 

Petitioner filed a “notice of appeal” on April 22,

2008. Id., Exh. KK. The Arizona Court of Appeals sent

Petitioner a letter explaining that his notice of appeal did not

comply with Rule 32.9(c) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure, and allowing Petitioner thirty days to re-file a

proper petition for review. Id., Exh. LL. On June 20, 2008,

the Arizona Court of Appeals dismissed the proceedings, noting

that Petitioner had not filed a compliant petition for review or

a request for an extension of time to do so. Id., Exh. MM. 

On June 13, 2008, Petitioner initiated a fourth Rule 32

proceeding, and also filed a motion to modify his sentences.

Id., Exh. PP. In this Rule 32 action Petitioner raised the same

three claims raised in his third Rule 32 action. On August 5,

2008, the state trial court dismissed this proceeding and denied

Petitioner’s motion to modify his sentences. Id., Exh. QQ. The

state trial court expressly found that the state post-conviction

action was untimely pursuant to Rule 32.4(a), Arizona Rules of

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Criminal Procedure and that Petitioner was “precluded from

relief on these claims pursuant to Rule 32.2.(a)” because “these

claims either could or should have been raised on appeal or in

a prior Rule 32 proceeding.” Id., Exh. QQ.

In his federal habeas action Petitioner contends he was

denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of

counsel because: his counsel “fail[ed] to challenge

identification by [a] witness”; his counsel failed to present

evidence of “physical incapability to commit the offense”;

Petitioner’s counsel failed to “challenge the prosecution’s

allegation placing [Petitioner] in the victim’s home”; his

counsel “fail[ed] to adequately challenge false testimony, thus

allowing the testimony at the Deserault hearing into evidence.”

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s habeas action is

not timely and that his claims are procedurally barred.

Respondents contend:

Petitioner’s claim raised in the instant

habeas petition is time barred because

AEDPA’s 1-year statute of limitations expired

on April 28, 2008––5 years, 4 months, and 19

days before Petitioner submitted the petition

to prison officials on September 16, 2013.

Furthermore, statutory tolling does not save

his petition and equitable tolling is not

warranted because no extraordinary

circumstances prevented Petitioner from

raising this claim in a federal habeas

petition filed on or before April 28, 2008.

II Analysis

A. Statute of limitations

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations found in the

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Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See, e.g., Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918,

920 (9th Cir. 2002). The one-year statute of limitations on

habeas petitions generally begins to run on “the date on which

the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A). The AEDPA provides that a petitioner is entitled

to statutory tolling of the statute of limitations during the

pendency of a “properly filed application for state

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See also

Artuz v. Bennet, 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361, 363-64 (2000);

Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 2008). 

The statute of limitations was tolled during the

pendency of Petitioner’s direct appeal, which resulted in a resentencing, and during the pendency of Petitioner’s properlyfiled, post-resentencing, second Rule 32 action. Petitioner’s

post-resentencing state action for habeas relief concluded on or

about May 26, 2007, when the time expired for seeking review by

the Arizona Supreme Court of the Court of Appeals’ decision

denying review of the trial court’s decision denying relief in

Petitioner’s post-resentencing (second) Rule 32 action.

Petitioner’s two subsequent Rule 32 actions did not statutorily

toll the statute of limitations because these two state-court

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proceedings were not “properly filed,” i.e., timely, pursuant to

the state’s procedural rules.

Accordingly, the statute of limitations began to run on

or about May 27, 2007, and expired on May 28, 2008, and

Petitioner’s federal habeas action filed September 16, 2013, was

more than five years too late. 

The one-year statute of limitations for filing a habeas

petition may be equitably tolled if extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control prevent the prisoner from filing on

time. See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2554, 2562

(2010); Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2010).

A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish two

elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814-15

(2005). See also Ford v. Gonzalez, 683 F.3d 1230, 1237 (9th

Cir. 2012); Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir.

2010); Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011-14 (9th

Cir. 2009). In Holland the Supreme Court eschewed a “mechanical

rule” for determining extraordinary circumstances, while

endorsing a flexible, “case-by-case” approach, drawing “upon

decisions made in other similar cases for guidance.” Bills, 628

F.3d at 1096-97.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined

equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a federal habeas

petition is available only if extraordinary circumstances beyond

the petitioner’s control make it impossible to file a petition

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on time. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048-49 (9th

Cir. 2010); Porter, 620 F.3d at 959; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d

at 1011-14 & n.4; Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1054-55 & n.4

(9th Cir. 2008); Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir.

2003), modified on other grounds by 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir.

2006). Equitable tolling is only appropriate when external

forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account

for the failure to file a timely habeas action. See Chaffer,

592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Equitable tolling

is also available if the petitioner establishes their actual

innocence of the crimes of conviction. See Lee v. Lampert, 653

F.3d 929, 933-34 (9th Cir. 2011).

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g.,

Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Jones v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784,

789 (7th Cir. 2006); Stead v. Head, 219 F.2d 1298, 1300 (11th

Cir. 2000). Equitable tolling is inappropriate in most cases

and “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.”

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002).

Petitioner must show that “the extraordinary circumstances were

the cause of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary

circumstances made it impossible to file a petition on time.”

Porter, 620 F.3d at 959. It is Petitioner’s burden to establish

that equitable tolling is warranted in his case. See, e.g.,

Porter, 620 F.3d at 959; Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004); Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034.

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Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was

ineffective and that the Arizona Supreme Court recently

concluded that ineffective assistance of counsel is a basis for

declaring a mistrial and to “bring the defendant back to trial.”

Petitioner also re-asserts that he is innocent of the crimes of

conviction and re-asserts why he believes his counsel’s

representation during trial was unconstitutionally ineffective.

Petitioner maintains that, but for his counsel’s errors, he

would not have been convicted. 

Petitioner has not stated an adequate basis for

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Compare

Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564; Porter, 620 F.3d at 961 (noting the

circumstances of cases determined before and after Holland). A

petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, and lack of

legal representation during the applicable filing period do not

constitute circumstances justifying equitable tolling because

such circumstances are not “extraordinary.” See, e.g., Chaffer,

592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011-14;

Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006);

Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004). The

vicissitudes of prison life are not “extraordinary”

circumstances that make it impossible to file a timely habeas

petition. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th

Cir. 2009).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a

petitioner is entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations

if they can establish that they are actually innocent of the

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crimes of conviction. See Lee, 653 F.3d at 934. The petitioner

must show “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror

would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” Id.

at 938. Petitioner has not made a showing of any new evidence,

but reasserts the factual claims made in his prior appeals with

regard to the circumstance of his arrest and why he believes he

was improperly identified by a witness. Accordingly, Petitioner

is not entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations based

on the theory of actual innocence.

Because the habeas action was not filed within the

statute of limitations and Petitioner has not stated a proper

basis for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, the

Court need not consider the merits of his claims.

III Conclusion

Petitioner did not file the habeas petition within one

year of the date his state conviction became final. Petitioner

has not established that he is entitled to equitable tolling of

the statute of limitations nor his actual innocence.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Gallagher’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District

Court’s judgment.

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Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response

to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

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DATED this 16th day of April, 2014.

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