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Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 

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' FI LED 

Ui--iited States Coutt of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JAN 8 b91 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

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) 

ROBERT L. BARR, individually ) 

and on behalf of each and all ) 

persons similarly situated who ) 

were wheat farmers in the State ) 

of Oklahoma and sold wheat on the ) 

open market and directly to one or) 

more of the Defendants from May 1, ) 

1972 until September 1, 1972, ) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

CONTINENTAL GRAIN COMPANY; 

GARNAC GRAIN COMPANY; CARGILL 

INCORPORATED; LOUIS DREYFUS 

CORPORATION; COOK INDUSTRIES, 

Defendant-Appellees, 

JAMES C. THOMAS, 

Movant-Appellant. 

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No. 87-1350 

& No. 87-1408 

(D.C. No. Civ-80-758-D) 

(W. D. Okla. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before BALDOCK, BARRETT, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

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INTRODUCTION 

This case involves appellant's claims for attorney's fees 

arising from a matter in which he sought and lost certification 

for a class action, and in which his client eventually fired him 

and settled independently. Although appellant raises a wide 

variety of issues on appeal, his arguments are ultimately 

unpersuasive and must fail. We accordingly affirm the judgment of 

the lower court. 

I. FACTS 

This case represents the last remnant of an action that was 

first commenced in 1972. At that time, a group of Southwestern 

farmers filed a class action antitrust suit against six grain 

companies involved in the sale of American wheat to the Soviet 

Union. This litigation, which came to be known as the Wheat I 

litigation, was finally dismissed in 1979 after the district court 

dismissed the claims of indirect sellers and denied the direct 

seller plaintiffs' request for class certification under Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 23. See Zinser v. Continental Grain Co., 660 F.2d 754 

(10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941 (1982) for a summary 

of the Wheat I litigation. 

The second phase of this action, known as the Wheat II 

litigation, began in June of 1980, when Robert Barr, a plaintiff 

in the earlier litigation, brought suit against the same six grain 

companies named in Wheat I. Barr was represented by attorney 

James Thomas, and though the suit was brought individually in 

Barr's name, it was the hope of Barr and Thomas that the suit 

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would be transformed into a class action on ehalf of those 

persons who had sold wheat directly to defendant grain companies. 

On June 12, 1981, the district court for the Western District 

of Oklahoma (Daugherty, J.) denied class certification. Thomas 

appealed the interlocutory order to the Tenth Circuit, and we 

dismissed the appeal, noting that orders denying class certification are not appealable until final judgment has been entered. 

Barr v. Palmby, Docket No. 81-1745 (10th Cir. 1981). However, we 

did advise Thomas that the orders could properly be appealed 

through certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) or 28 u.s.c. 

§1292(b). Thomas never sought such certification; instead he 

filed a petition for rehearing, which we denied on October 9, 

1981. 

Following the court's denial of class certification, the 

relationship between Thomas and his client Barr began to 

deteriorate. It soon became apparent that Thomas was more 

interested in pursuing the failed class action than the interests 

of his client. This manifested itself in a variety of actions, 

including Thomas' failure to inform Barr that the class claims had 

been dismissed. Thomas subsequently made unauthorized settlement 

offers to defendants that were directly contrary to Barr's 

explicit instructions. On June 20, 1983, Barr discharged Thomas 

and pursued settlement on his own. Thomas responded by moving to 

intervene personally as a plaintiff in order to protect his 

attorney's lien and to protect the interests of the asserted class 

members. These motions were rejected by the court, but not before 

Barr had reached a private settlement with defendants. The 

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district court issued a Final Judgment on November 23, 1983, approving the settlement and dismissing the claims of Barr and the 

putative class. On January 9, 1984, the district court formally 

rejected Thomas' motion to intervene, thus ending the Wheat II 

litigation. 

From this point forward, the only issue before the court was 

Thomas' motion for expenses and attorney's fees. On January 16, 

1987, after a nine-day mini-trial and extensive pre-trial 

discovery, the district court issued a 51-page opinion awarding 

Thomas one-sixth of the $125,000 settlement fund. The district 

court based this figure on the 1980 employment agreement between 

Thomas, Barr, and Myers Barr's primary attorney through the 

Wheat I litigation. According to that agreement, Thomas was 

entitled to one-half of any attorney's fees received in the Wheat 

1.1 litigation. The court considered the contract fee to be more 

than generous given the "gross misconduct" of Thomas. 

Thomas now appeals the order awarding limited attorney's 

fees, as well as the earlier orders denying class certification 

and intervention. We affirm the lower court's opinion. 

II. DISCUSSION OF ISSUES 

Thomas appeals from four orders issued by the district court: 

1) the June 21, 1981 order denying class certification under Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 23; 2) the November 23, 1983 Final Judgment; 3) the 

January 9, 1984 order denying Thomas' motion to intervene; and 4) 

the January 16, 1987 Memorandum Opinion awarding Thomas limited 

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attorney's fees. 1 He raises eight separate issues on appeal. We 

will consider each in turn. 

A. The District Court's Finding of Unethical Conduct. Thomas 

contends that the lower court erred in its legal and factual finding that he was unethical and guilty of gross misconduct in his 

representation of Barr. Memorandum Opinion, January 16, 1987. We 

conclude that there was ample evidence in the record to support 

such a finding. Specifically, we cite Thomas' failure to inform 

his client that the class action had been dismissed, R. Vol. 4 at 

68-71, and his solicitation of an unauthorized settlement that ran 

directly counter to his client's stated wishes. R. Vol. 3 at 35, 

R. Vol. 4 at 107-108. 

Although appellant maintains that the district court made its 

determination without considering the duties he owed to the other 

members of the putative class, the simple fact is that there was 

no class after June 21, 1981. As of that date, Thomas had only 

one client -- Barr -- and though it may have been appropriate for 

him to seek certification of the class through interlocutory 

appeal (which he did not do), it certainly was unethical to 

scuttle the settlement plans of his one actual client in favor of 

a client class that was not even a party to the suit. See Pearson 

v. Ecological Science Corp., 522 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. 

1 Thomas also seeks to perfect the appeal on behalf of other 

class members. However, the Notice of Appeal was in his name 

only, and his justiciable claims center around the issue of 

attorney's fees. As a result, Thomas lacks standing to assert 

claims for the other would-be class members. See Torres v. 

Oakland Scavenger Co.,_ U.S._, 108 S. Ct. 2405, 2407 ( 1 988). 

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denied sub. nom. Skydell v. Ecological Services Corp., 425 U.S. 

1508 (1976) (plaintiff not precluded from executing individual 

settlement where class action certification was denied). 

In any event, the court awarded Thomas fees on the contract in 

spite of its finding of attorney misconduct. For these reasons, 

appellant's claim fails. 

B. The Settlement and Dismissal of the Class Claims. Appellant 

next contends that the lower court erred in its holding that Barr 

had an absolute right to settle the case, and in dismissing the 

claims alleged by Thomas on behalf of the putative class. Final 

Judgment of Dismissal, November 23, 1983; see also Court Order, 

April 22, 1985. Without going to the merits of this issue, we 

conclude that this court does not have jurisdiction over these 

claims. The orders were not appealed in a timely fashion. 

Under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(l), Thomas had thirty days from 

the date of the entry of the lower court's final order in which to 

appeal from the order. Thomas waited until February 19, 1987 to 

file his Notice of Appeal, a delay of more than three years from 

the date of the lower court's final order (November 22, 1983). 

Thomas argues that the issue of his attorney's fees was so 

intertwined with the class certification issue that the November 

22, 1983 final order was not final. However, this argument must 

be rejected under the authority of Budnich v. Becton Dickinson & 

Co., 486 U.S. 196, 201-02 (1987), aff'g, 807 F.2d 155 (10th Cir. 

1986). In Budnich, the Court held that a trial court's denial of 

a motion for a new trial is a final order appealable under 28 

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U.S.C. §1291 -- even if the court retains jurisdiction in order to 

determine the appropriate attorney's fee award. Id. "Courts and 

litigants are best served by the bright-line rule, which accords 

with traditional understanding, that a decision on the merits is a 

'final decision' for purposes of §1291 whether or not there 

remains for adjudication a request for attorney's fees attributable to the case." Id. at 202-03. Therefore, the fact that the 

attorney's fee issue was still outstanding did not keep the 

November 23, 1983 order from being final. 

Moreover, even if April 22, 1985 -- the date the lower court 

affirmed Barr's right to settle -- is held to be the final order 

date, Thomas' Notice of Appeal still exceeded the thirty-day limit 

by almost two years. Thomas is thus time-barred from raising 

these claims on appeal. 

C. Denial of Motion to Intervene. Thomas asserts that the lower 

court erred in denying his motion to intervene, which he contends 

was necessary to protect the interests of absent class members as 

well as his attorney's lien. This claim is time-barred for the 

same reasons set forth above. Thomas should have brought his appeal within thirty days of the lower court's Final Judgment on 

November 23, 1983. Even if we were to measure the appeal from the 

court's formal ruling on intervention, dated January 9, 1983, 

Thomas was still out of time. He clearly should not have waited 

until after the resolution of the attorney's fee dispute more than 

three years later. 

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D. Denial of Class Certification. Thomas appeals the June 12, 

1981 order of the district court, asserting that the lower court 

erred when it denied certification to the class of direct sellers. 

This appeal is clearly untimely. Thomas should have either 1) 

pursued an interlocutory appeal via Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) or 28 

U.S.C. § 1292(b) or 2) filed an appeal within 30 days of the Final 

Judgment. Thomas, however, did not file his appeal until the 

district court issued its order on attorney's fees -- more than 

three years after the Final Judgment. Under the authority of 

Budnich, this appeal must be dismissed as untimely. 

E. The Granting of Thomas' Motion for Leave to Withdraw. Thomas 

similarly argues that the district court should not have granted 

his July 13, 1983 motion for leave to withdraw as Barr's attorney 

without first requiring Barr to satisfy Thomas' attorney's lien. 

However, as is clear from the case law, a motion to withdraw is 

addressed to the discretion of the court. Jenkins v. Weinshienk, 

670 F.2d 915 (10th Cir. 1982); Moore v. Telfon Communications 

Corp., 589 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1978). Unless Thomas can show an 

abuse of that discretion by the district court, the order will 

stand on appeal. 

We can find nothing in the record that would suggest such an 

abuse of discretion. On the contrary, it appears that the 

district court was wise to grant the motion as it did. 

Specifically, we note that the district court protected Thomas' 

interest at all times after the Final Judgment. The settlement 

fund achieved by agreement between Barr and the grain companies 

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was held in escrow by the district court for three years until the 

issue of attorney's fees was resolved by the court. The fact that 

Thomas did receive an award is testimony to the district court's 

proper handling of this matter. There clearly was no abuse of 

discretion. 

F. Recovery of Attorney's Fees From Defendants. Thomas next 

argues that the district court erred in holding that he was not 

entitled to recover attorney's fees from the defendant grain 

companies. According to Thomas, he was entitled to such fees 

under the Oklahoma attorney's lien statute. 5 Okl. Stat. sec. 6. 

We disagree. Like the district court, we find that the Oklahoma 

statute was designed to protect attorneys from collusive and 

secretive settlements which would defraud and cheat them of their 

rightful fees. Callahan v. Cowley & Riddle, 245 P. 48, 117 Okla. 

R. 58 (1926); Mathews v. Smith, 39 P.2d 48, 169 Okla. 518 (1934). 

We find nothing in the record to suggest that Thomas was the 

victim of a secret collusive settlement. To the contrary, Thomas 

was at all times notified, informed, and present at the settlement 

proceedings, which were supervised by the district court. 

It cannot be doubted that Barr, as the sole plaintiff in the 

case, was free to settle his claim with defendants. Walker v. 

Telex Corp., 583 P.2d 482 (Okla. 1978). The fact that Thomas was 

not satisfied with the ultimate terms of the settlement is not 

particularly relevant. The attorney's lien statute provides 

merely that an attorney should have a lien on the proceeds of any 

settlement or judgment won by his client. Based on the 1980 

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employment agreement entered into between Thomas and Barr, Thomas 

was entitled to one-sixth of any award resulting from the Wheat II 

litigation. This is precisely what he did receive under the 

January 16, 1987 order, and he was fully protected in his ability 

to collect this fee because the settlement payment was held in 

escrow until the attorney's fees claim was resolved. As a result, 

Thomas has no claim against the defendant grain companies. 

G. Statutory Attorney's Fees Under the Clayton Act. Thomas 

further claims that he was entitled to a statutory attorney's fee 

award under the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. §15. The district court 

rejected this claim, Court Order, February 24, 1984, and we affirm. It is by now well-recognized that a settling plaintiff is 

not entitled to recover attorney's fees from a defendant under the 

Clayton Act. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corporation, 495 F.2d 

448, 459 (2d Cir. 1973); Hew Corporation v. Tandy Corporation, 480 

F. Supp. 758, 760 (D. Mass. 1979). Moreover, it is worth noting 

that "[r]ecovery of attorney's fees under 15 U.S.C. §15 of course 

accrues to the plaintiff and not its attorneys." International 

Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. Western Airlines, 623 F.2d 1255, 1274 

(8th Cir. 1980). Since Thomas' motion to intervene as a plaintiff 

was rejected by the district court, it is doubtful that he even 

has standing to make this claim. Under either scenario, Thomas' 

claim for statutory attorney's fees does not withstand scrutiny. 

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H. Reimbursement of Attorney's Fees. Thomas finally contends 

that the lower court erred in applying an intolerable standard of 

proof in his claim for reimbursement of litigation expenses. We 

disagree. In Mares v. Credit Bureau of Raton, 801 F.2d 1197, 

1200-01 (10th Cir. 1986), this court stated that "[i]t remains 

counsel's burden to prove and establish the reasonableness of each 

dollar, each hour, above zero. In the process and especially in 

the end result, a district court must continue to be accorded wide 

latitude." Accordingly, the trial judge's award of reasonable 

expenses will be upheld unless it appears from the record that the 

trial judge abused that discretion. 

Although it cannot be doubted that Thomas expended many hours 

in the Wheat II litigation, that fact alone is not dispositive. 

We find that the district court's 51-page opinion more than 

adequately justified the award of reasonable expenses, and we accordingly affirm its judgment. 

III. APPELLEE'S CROSS-APPEAL 

Barr cross-appeals the district court's award of attorney's 

fees and reimbursement of expenses, asserting that an attorney is 

not entitled to compensation where he has been discharged for 

cause and there has been a finding of professional misconduct. We 

disagree and affirm the lower court's finding. 

Barr's cross ·appeal has its basis in the equitable doctrine 

of quantum meruit. However, the district court properly 

recognized that Thomas' claims for attorney's fees and expenses 

were not equitable claims but legal ones. Thomas' fees and 

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expenses were based on the 1980 contract between Thomas and Myers, 

Barr's principal attorney in the Wheat I litigation. Since the 

court found no evidence of a breach of that contract, the 

attorney's fee set forth by the court should stand. As noted by 

the Tenth Circuit in Cooper v. Singer, 719 F.2d 1496, 1504 (1983): 

"When a court reviews the reasonableness of a fee calculated by 

another court, or reached by voluntary agreement, it determines 

whether the fee falls in a range that is neither excessive or 

inadequate." We find that the fee upheld by the district court 

fit within this range, and we accordingly affirm. 

peal. 

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 

We affirm the district court on all the issues raised on apEntered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

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