Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-03722/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-03722-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331(a) Fed. Question: Real Property

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ARTHUR C. HAMILTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N. A., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-03722-BLF 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT AND 

PERMISSION TO REOPEN CASE

[RE: ECF 18]

Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff, Arthur Hamilton’s Motion for Relief from Judgment and 

Permission to Reopen Case. Motion, ECF 18. The Court construes Plaintiff’s motion as being filed 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) and hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s motion.

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff filed the instant action on June 26, 2019, accusing Defendants JP Morgan Chase 

Bank, N.A., Old Republic Default Management Services, and Shirley Franklin of fraudulently 

evicting Plaintiff from his home and taking possession of the property, all while making it look like 

“a simple trustee’s sale.” Compl. at 4, ECF 1. The complaint asserted four causes of action: (1) 

“Fraudulent Use of the Process”; (2) “Fraudulent Transfer, Fraudulent Conversion, and Violation 

of Antifraud Rule: 10b-5”; (3) “Fraudulent Alienation, Fraudulent Inducement”; and (4) “Intentional 

Infliction of Emotional Distress.” See id. at 7–8. 

On July 15, 2019, the Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint 

with prejudice because Plaintiff’s claims were barred by res judicata. ECF 16. Plaintiff had 

previously filed a separate action in this district involving the same parties, the same alleged facts, 

and the same causes of action—the only apparent difference being the signature date. Compare 

generally Compl. at ECF 1 with ECF 1 in Hamilton v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al., Case 

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United States District Court

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No. 5:18-cv-05164-BLF (“Hamilton I”). Plaintiff’s earlier-filed complaint was dismissed with 

prejudice on January 14, 2019. ECF 20 in Hamilton I. 

At the time the Court dismissed this case on July 15, 2019, none of the Defendants were 

served. One of the defendants, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N. A., was served over three weeks later,

on August 9, 2019. See ECF 17. On September 19, 2019, Plaintiff filed the present motion to be 

relieved from judgment and for permission to reopen the case. Motion, ECF 18. The Court does 

not anticipate a response from any of the Defendants to Plaintiff’s motion because two of the 

defendants were never served and JP Morgan Chase Bank, N. A. was only served after the case was 

dismissed with prejudice and therefore, was not required to answer.

II. DISCUSSION

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), a court may relieve a party from a final 

judgment for six reasons upon a showing of “(1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 

discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) a void judgment; (5) a satisfied or discharged judgment; or (6) 

‘extraordinary circumstance’ which would justify relief.” Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 

1442 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Mere dissatisfaction with the Court’s order, or 

belief that the Court is wrong in its decision, are not grounds for relief under Rule 60(b). Beckway 

v. DeShong, No. C07-5072 TEH, 2012 WL 1355744, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2012) (citing 

Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dunnahoo, 637 F. 2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1981)).

First, Plaintiff claims that “this case was prematurely closed due to [his] lack of 

understanding of proper rules and procedures.” Motion at 1. The Court construes this argument as 

one for mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1) and holds that Plaintiff is not 

entitled to relief under this theory. Plaintiff’s complaint in this case was not dismissed due to a

mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect on the part of Plaintiff—it was dismissed because it should 

have never been filed. “The doctrine of res judicata provides that ‘a final judgment on the merits 

bars further claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action.’” In re Schimmels, 

127 F.3d 875, 881 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1979)). 

Because Plaintiff had filed an identical complaint earlier, Plaintiff’s claims in this case were barred 

by res judicata at the time they were filed and “proper understanding of rules and procedures” would 

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not have saved them from dismissal.

Second, Plaintiff claims that a magistrate judge “extended his own grasp on this case with 

setting an inaccurate frame of reference” and complains that those “references were not vacated 

upon reassignment.” Motion at 1. The Court notes that this case was never assigned to a magistrate 

judge. The Court assumes that Plaintiff’s reference to a magistrate judge relates to his earlier-filed 

(and also dismissed) case and thus is entirely irrelevant to this action. See ECF 7 in Hamilton I. In 

any event, Hamilton I was dismissed because Plaintiff repeatedly refused to comply with the 

undersigned judge’s orders. ECF 20 in Hamilton I at 2.

Finally, Plaintiff makes conclusory assertions such as “this was never a frivolous case” and 

“delays and postponement have been defendant(s)’ only defense against irreconcilable facts.” 

Motion at 1. Such statements do not present any newly-discovered facts or evidence that would 

save Plaintiff’s claims under Rule 60(b). 

In sum, none of the Rule 60(b) reasons are present here. Plaintiff has not pointed to any 

extraordinary circumstances to justify relief. Plaintiff’s complaint was never a valid one because 

his claims were always barred by res judicata. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Judgment and Permission to 

Reopen Case is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 24, 2019

______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

Case 5:19-cv-03722-BLF Document 19 Filed 09/24/19 Page 3 of 3