Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06418/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06418-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FIL E·D 

Unit.ed States Court of Appeals Tenth Cir~Pit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 19 1991 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

STEVEN R. HICKS, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

CITY OF WATONGA, OKLAHOMA, a Municipal ) 

Corporation; R. B. BOB CHAPMAN, ) 

individually and in his official capa- ) 

city as Mayor of the City of Watonga, ) 

Oklahoma; PAT DESPAIN, individually and ) 

in her official capacity as City Clerk ) 

of the City of Watonga, Oklahoma; ) 

BRENDA DIFFEY, individually and in her ) 

official capacity as City Council Mem- ) 

ber of the City of Watonga, Oklahoma; ) 

CHARLES JOHNSON, individually and in his) 

official capacity as City Council Member) 

of the City of Watonga, Oklahoma; HERMAN) 

BROWN; PAT PATTERSON, individually and ) 

in his official capacity as City Council) 

Member of the City of Watonga, Oklahoma;) 

DUFF NORTON, individually and in his ) 

official capacity as City Member of the ) 

City of Watonga, Oklahoma; CHARLES ) 

SWANEGAN, individually and in his offi- ) 

cial capacity as City Council Member of ) 

the City of Watonga, Oklahoma; BILLY DON) 

PENDERGRAFT, individually and in his ) 

official capacity as City Council member) 

of the City of Watonga, Oklahoma; DONALD) 

H. JUSTICE, individually and in his ) 

official capacity as City Council member) 

of the City of Watonga, Oklahoma; LONNIE) 

RICKIE, individually and in his official) 

capacity as Chief of Police of the City ) 

of Watonga, Oklahoma, Police Department;) 

DALE GREEN, individually and in his ) 

official capacity as a member of the ) 

City Council and in his official capa- ) 

city as acting Mayor of the City of ) 

Watonga, Oklahoma; and DANIEL WEBBER, ) 

individually and in his official capa- ) 

city as City Attorney for the City of ) 

Watonga, Oklahoma, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellants. ) 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-6418 

Appellate Case: 89-6418 Document: 01019670306 Date Filed: 08/19/1991 Page: 1 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. CIV-89-964-W) 

Brently C. Olsson (Kent Fleming with him on the brief) of Huckaby, 

Fleming, Frailey, Chaffin & Darrah, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 

Defendants-Appellants. 

Charles E. Wetsel (Robert T. Frantz with him on the brief) of 

Wetsel & Frantz, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before McKAY and MOORE, Circuit Judges, and BROWN!, District 

Judge. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge. 

This is an action for damages under 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1988). 

The action arose out of the dismissal of Mr. Steven R. Hicks from 

his job as a police officer for the City of Watonga, Oklahoma. 

Mr. Hicks brought this action alleging that the appellants violated several of his constitutional rights. Mr. Hicks also 

brought various pendent state claims. The appellants moved for 

summary judgment claiming qualified immunity. The trial court 

found that the appellants are not immune, and denied their motion. 

This appeal followed. 

1 Honorable Wesley E. Brown, United States Senior District 

Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

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We now hold that summary judgment should have been granted 

for all appellants on Mr. Hicks' claim that he was deprived of a 

liberty interest without due process of law. We also hold that 

appellants Rickey, DeSpain, Baker, Justice, Chapman, Green, Brown, 

Pendergraft, Norton, Patterson, and Swanagan are immune from damages on Mr. Hicks' claim that he was deprived of a property interest without due process of law, and that they are immune from damages on Mr. Hicks' first amendment retaliatory discharge claims. 

We affirm, however, the district court's denial of qualified 

immunity for appellant Diffey on the property interest claim, and 

hold that Ms. Diffey is not immune on the first amendment claim. 

I. FACTS 

Mr. Hicks worked in the City of Watonga, Oklahoma, Police 

Department for ten years, from 1978 to 1988. He rose from the 

rank of Patrolman to Assistant Chief. Mr. Hicks states that his 

problems with the City began on October 2, 1987, when he issued 

citations to a City Councilwoman, Brenda Diffey, and her son. He 

cited Councilwoman Diffey's son for driving without a license and 

impounded the Diffeys' car. He then cited Councilwoman Diffey for 

allowing her son to drive without a license. Mr. Hicks alleges 

that Councilwoman Diffey made harassing comments to him regarding 

the citations. 

Apparently, Mr. Hicks revealed his intention to file a grievance against Councilwoman Diffey for making harassing comments, 

because on October 5, 1987, the Police Chief, Lonnie Rickey, 

informed Mr. Hicks that he had met with the Mayor, R. B. Chapman, 

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and the City Clerk, Pat Despain. Chief Rickey told Mr. Hicks that 

if Mr. Hicks proceeded to file his grievance against Councilwoman 

Diffey, Mr. Hicks' girlfriend would be fired from her job in City 

Clerk DeSpain's office. 

The appellants admit that this threat was made. Chief Rickey 

admitted in his deposition that it was his idea to make the 

threat, but that Mayor Chapman approved it and City Clerk Despain 

"didn't disapprove it." Deposition of Lonnie Rickey at 36. Mr. 

Hicks does not allege that any of the other appellants participated in this incident. Despite the threat, Mr. Hicks filed his 

grievance the next day, October 6, 1987. The threat to fire his 

girlfriend was never carried out. 

In the Spring of 19881 several months after he filed his 

grievance with the Citizens Action Committee, Mr. Hicks again 

raised the issue of his encounter with Councilwoman Diffey--this 

time before the City Council. Mr. Hicks attended a City Council 

meeting where, in addition to relating his grievance about 

Councilwoman Diffey, Mr. Hicks told the City Council that Chief 

Rickey had purchased police radars but hid the purchases by representing the transactions as repairs. The City Council issued a 

letter of reprimand to Chief Rickey because of that revelation. 

On May 3, Chief Rickey tendered his resignation. 

Early in 1988, Chief Rickey compiled notes listing infractions which Mr. Hicks had allegedly committed. In the spring of 

1988, Councilwoman Diffey asked the Watonga City Attorney, Dan 

Webber, to investigate the alleged infractions. Mayor Chapman 

authorized the investigation and City Attorney Webber proceeded, 

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hiring an outside investigator to determine whether there was any 

substance to the allegations. From the original list of twentyseven alleged infractions gleaned from Chief Rickey's notes, City 

Attorney Webber compiled a list of twenty-one alleged infractions 

which were, in his opinion, substantiated. 

On May 3, 1988, the Watonga City Council voted unanimously to 

suspend Mr. Hicks with pay pending a pre-disciplinary hearing. 

Councilwoman Diffey abstained from voting. The City Council members who voted were Dale Green, Herman Brown, Don Pendergraft, 

Duff Norton, Pat Patterson, and Charles Swanegan. On May 5, 1988, 

Mr. Hicks was notified of the suspension and of a pre-disciplinary 

hearing to be held on May 10. 

The hearing did not go forward on May 10. Instead, on that 

date the city provided Mr. Hicks with a list of witnesses who 

would testify concerning the allegations. Additionally, the City 

apparently had concerns about compliance with the notice provisions of the Oklahoma Open Meetings Act. The pre-disciplinary 

hearing was rescheduled for June 2, 1988. Sessions of the hearing 

were held on June 2, 9, 10, 20 and 27. In all, some twenty-eight 

hours of testimony were taken. At Mr. Hicks' request, the sessions were opened to the public. Mr. Hicks was represented by 

counsel. He was allowed to cross-examine witnesses and present 

witnesses on his own behalf. 

Chief Rickey took no part in the disciplinary proceedings 

after May 3. On that date he submitted his resignation, and on 

May 13 he was relieved of his duties as Police Chief. After he 

left the City's employ, Chief Rickey stated in his deposition that 

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he would not have recommended disciplinary proceedings, and that 

he acted at the behest of Mayor Chapman when he turned over his 

notes containing the allegations against Mr. Hicks. Chief Rickey 

further stated that he believed the disciplinary proceedings were 

instigated by Councilwoman Diffey, and that he believed Mayor 

Chapman and Councilwoman Diffey wanted Mr. Hicks' "head on a 

platter." Deposition of Lonnie Rickey at 69. 

It is unclear whether the entire City Council attended the 

lengthy pre-disciplinary hearing. Mr. Hicks' brief states only 

that Mayor Chapman "presided as the fact-finder." After the hearing, Mayor Chapman determined that all but seven of the twenty-one 

allegations were unsubstantiated. He ordered Mr. Hicks' reinstatement but placed a letter of reprimand in Mr. Hicks' file for 

the seven infractions. Those infractions were: (1) Mr. Hicks 

released confidential information from the personnel file of 

another officer without authorization; (2) Mr. Hicks was present 

at a private residence not on police business while on duty for an 

unwarranted period of time; (3) Mr. Hicks failed to follow procedure in recording mileage on his police unit; (4) Mr. Hicks failed 

to respond to a written memo of Chief Rickey as directed; (5) Mr. 

Hicks failed to properly supervise checkout of walkie-talkie 

equipment; (6) Mr. Hicks allowed a civilian to be present at the 

location of live ammunition and firearms training; and (7) Mr. 

Hicks threatened retaliatory conduct against a dispatcher. 

In July of 1988, Mr. Hicks gathered signatures on petitions 

to force a grand jury investigation of city officials' dealings 

with him. Also, at roughly the same time, Mr. Hicks appealed the 

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letter of reprimand. Although the city charter provided an intermediate appeal to the Police Review Board, with ultimate appeal to 

the City Council, the appeal went directly to the City Council. 

The City Council met in special session on August 22, 1988, to 

hear Mr. Hicks' appeal. At that time, Mr. Hicks and his counsel 

were again allowed to present arguments. The City Council voted 

unanimously to uphold the reprimand. Council members Green, 

Brown, Pendergraft, Diffey, Swanegan, Patterson, and Norton voted. 

During all of the above proceedings Mr. Hicks was a suspect 

in an open criminal investigation being conducted by the Blaine 

County Sheriff. The investigation concerned a missing file containing information about Mr. Hicks' previous criminal convictions 

and one other charge for child molestation. Because the convictions occurred when Mr. Hicks was a minor, they had been expunged. 

The other charge occurred when Mr. Hicks was an adult, but it was 

dismissed for lack of evidence. The file containing this information had been missing for approximately two years. Mr. Hicks 

alleges that Chief Rickey had full knowledge of this missing file 

for a long period of time but took no action. He also alleges 

that "other city officials" had prior knowledge of the missing 

file, but he does not specifically allege that the new police 

chief nor any of the other appellants had such knowledge. Brief 

of Appellee at 8-9. 

The new Police Chief, D. R. Baker, asked Mr. Hicks on 

October 3, 1988, to submit to a polygraph examination, with guarantees that the results would not be used against him criminally. 

At first Mr. Hicks agreed, and Chief Baker scheduled polygraph 

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examinations about the missing file for Mr. Hicks and two other 

persons. On October 27, Mr. Hicks informed Chief Baker that he 

would not take the polygraph exam. 

Also in October, Chief Baker reorganized the department, 

eliminating the post of Assistant Chief and the rank of Captain. 

The new system included two Watch Commanders; and Mr. Hicks, now 

ranked a Sergeant, was given one of those positions. Mr. Hicks 

was still directly beneath the Chief of Police in the chain of 

command. 

On November 22, Chief Baker suspended Mr. Hicks without pay 

for refusing to take the polygraph and notified him that if he 

continued to refuse, Chief Baker would move for Mr. Hicks' dismissal. Mr. Hicks continued to refuse and was dismissed on 

December 26. Mr. Hicks appealed Chief Baker's decision. The 

Police Review Board heard Mr. Hicks' appeal on January 6, 1989. 

Mr. Hicks' counsel appeared and argued, and City Attorney Webber 

appeared for the city. The Police Review Board voted unanimously 

to uphold the suspension and dismissal, but gave Mr. Hicks the 

option of becoming a probationary employee for 180 days, thereby 

waiving his right to due process if he were terminated during the 

probationary period. The members of the Police Review Board were 

Councilman Green, Councilman Don Justice, two City of Watonga 

police officers, and a citizen member who is an attorney. 

Mr. Hicks appealed the Police Review Board's decision to the City 

Council. The City Council heard his appeal on January 24, 1989. 

Again, Mr. Hicks' counsel argued, and City Attorney Webber argued 

for the City. The City Council voted unanimously to uphold the 

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action of the Police Review Board. Council members Green, Brown, 

Pendergraft, Diffey, Swanagan, Patterson, and Norton were present 

and voted. Councilman Justice was not present. 

Mr. Hicks then filed this action. He named as defendants 

everyone involved in the threat to fire his girlfriend and everyone involved in all disciplinary proceedings against him, except 

for the police and civilian members of the Police Review Board. 

He named another City Councilman, Charles Johnson, who had not 

been present at any of the meetings in which votes were taken 

regarding Mr. Hicks. He named each of these people in their individual and official capacities. He also named the City of 

Watonga. 

Mr. Hicks sued under 42 u.s.c. § 1983, seeking damages for 

his termination. He alleged that the appellants conspired to 

deprive him of liberty and property without due process, that his 

free speech rights were violated, and that he was fired for exercising his fifth amendment right not to incriminate himself. He 

also alleged RICO violations. He brought pendent claims for 

wrongful and retaliatory discharge, defamation, tortious interference with contractual relations, misuse of legal procedure, and 

interference with prospective advantage. Finally, he alleged that 

the City Council willfully violated the Oklahoma Open Meetings 

statute by failing to post proper notices before the Police Review 

Board meeting and failing to keep minutes of Review Board meetings 

and executive sessions. He claimed actual and punitive damages. 

The appellants filed various motions to dismiss, whereupon 

Mr. Hicks filed an amended complaint in which he dropped the RICO 

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claim and some of the state claims. The remaining state claims 

are wrongful and retaliatory discharge, tortious interference with 

contractual relations, and willful violation of the Oklahoma Open 

Meetings statute. 

Both sides filed motions for summary judgment, with the 

appellants claiming qualified immunity. The district court considered the motions to dismiss and the motions for summary judgment together. 

The district court held that Mr. Hicks had a property 

interest in his employment and was entitled to due process before 

deprivation of that interest. The court made no finding about Mr. 

Hicks' alleged liberty interest in his reputation, because the 

court had already found that he was entitled to due process. The 

court held that a genuine question of material fact existed as to 

whether Mr. Hicks had been subjected to a biased tribunal. The 

court cited the following circumstantial evidence as sufficient to 

raise the issue: 

Plaintiff alleges that because he issued a citation to a 

council member and later filed a formal grievance 

against ·the same council member, he was harassed and 

driven from his employment. Plaintiff presents both 

direct and circumstantial evidence regarding personal 

animosity toward the Plaintiff from said council member. 

Additionally, in Plaintiff's final appeal to the City 

Council, two of the five members of the Police Review 

Board were also the appellate reviewers as members of 

the City Council on the same issue. The final ruling 

was based on Plaintiff's failure to take a polygraph as 

a result of an internal investigation. Plaintiff presents evidence that no internal investigation took place 

or, at least, the internal investigation was not officially recorded. Plaintiff presents evidence that during intermediate incidents prior to his dismissal, 

Plaintiff was accused of minor and insubstantial 

allegations to satisfy a "witch hunt." Plaintiff also 

offers evidence indicating that the final complaint 

against the Plaintiff involved an incident which 

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occurred two years earlier. The Court does not pass any 

judgment regarding the credibility of said evidence, but 

rather takes said evidence in a light most favorable to 

the non-movant . . . . 

Hicks v. City of Watonga, Okla., No. CIV-89-964-W, slip op. at 3-4 

(Nov. 22, 1989). 

The district court found that no fifth amendment violation 

had occurred, but it made no finding in regard to Mr. Hicks' 

allegation that his free speech rights were violated. Finally, 

the court found that a fact question existed as to whether any 

alleged Open Meeting law violations were "willful," and denied 

summary judgment on that issue. 

The court granted summary judgment for City Attorney Webber 

on grounds of absolute immunity. It granted summary judgment for 

Councilman Johnson, who was absent from all relevant meetings. It 

dismissed the claim for punitive damages against the City of 

Watonga. The court denied the remaining appellants' claims of 

qualified immunity because Mr. Hicks had a well-established right 

to an unbiased tribunal, and, in the court's view, the actions of 

the remaining appellants were not objectively reasonable. The 

remaining individual appellants filed this interlocutory appeal 

from the denial of qualified immunity. 

When reviewing a summary judgment order, we apply the same 

standard employed by the trial court under Rule 56(c) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Osgood v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 

Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (10th Cir. 1988). "The moving party 

carries the burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that it is 

entitled to summary judgment, and the court must review the record 

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in the light most favorable to the opposing party." Ewing v. 

Amoco Oil Co., 823 F.2d 1432, 1437 (10th Cir. 1987). 

II. JURISDICTION 

As an initial matter, Mr. Hicks alleges that this court lacks 

jurisdiction because the appellants' notice of appeal is captioned 

"City of Watonga, Oklahoma, et al.," omitting the names of the 

individual appellants. 2 The docketing statement filed by appellants within the time for filing notice of appeal does, however, 

properly include the names of the individual appellants. 

This court recently held that the filing of a docketing 

statement within the time for filing notice of appeal could cure a 

notice of appeal which was defective with regard to the identity 

of the parties. Hubbert v. City of Moore, Okla., 923 F.2d 769, 

771-72 (10th Cir. 1991). Under this rule, we have jurisdiction 

over the present appeal. 

III. FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM 

The district court did not address Mr. Hicks' first amendment 

claims. However, because of our disposition of this case, we must 

reach a conclusion as to the validity of those claims. Mr. Hicks 

appears to allege that his first amendment rights were violated by 

(1) the threat to fire his girlfriend if he filed a grievance 

against Councilwoman Diffey, and (2) by his firing which, he 

alleges, was in retaliation, either for his "whistle blowing" 

2 The City of Watonga is not a party to this appeal. 

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activities or for the initial filing of a grievance. 

"It is clearly established that a State may not discharge an 

employee on a basis that infringes that employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of speech." Rankin v. 

McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383 (1987). Mr. Hicks' rights of free 

speech include the right to petition for redress of grievances. 

See Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491, 498 (10th Cir. 1990). 

Mr. Hicks alleges conclusorily that he was fired in retaliation 

for protected speech, but the facts as alleged either do not state 

a first amendment claim or are insufficient to withstand a motion 

for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity. 

Clearly, the threat to fire Mr. Hicks' girlfriend if he filed 

a grievance was improper. ·However, Mr. Hicks experienced no 

"chilling" of his right to file a grievance. Thus, the threat 

caused no first amendment injury. He exercised his right to file 

a grievance and no firing ever took place. 3 In fact, nothing else 

occurred for several months, until Mr. Hicks went to the City 

Council to complain again about Councilwoman Diffey and to "blow 

the whistle" on Chief Rickey. At roughly the same time, the City 

began investigating charges against Mr. Hicks. 

3 When the appellants pointed out in their motion for summary 

judgment that Mr. Hicks' girlfriend was never fired, Mr. Hicks 

admitted that fact, but continued, "[A]rguably she was constructively terminated based on stressful and intolerable working conditions resulting from the City of Watonga's actions against 

Officer Steve Hicks." Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion 

Opposing Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 2. However, 

Mr. Hicks gives no details of the alleged constructive discharge, 

nor did he submit any affidavit from the girlfriend. His submissions are insufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether 

there was constructive discharge. 

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In response to the charges against Mr. Hicks, the City conducted a lengthy investigation and hearings. Before the appeal 

process was completed, Mr. Hicks initiated the grand jury petition 

which, it appears, complained of the City's treatment of him up to 

that point, but not about any matter of public interest. In 

response to Mr. Hicks' charges against Chief Rickey, the City 

Council issued a letter of reprimand to Chief Rickey. Chief 

Rickey resigned and participated no further in anything having to 

do with Mr. Hicks. Thus, Mr. Hicks cannot credibly claim that the 

City Council was in league with Chief Rickey to retaliate against 

him for his whistleblowing activities. 

The new police chief, Baker, became interested in an open 

criminal case involving Mr~ Hicks. Mr. Hicks does not allege that 

Chief Baker was involved in any way in the previous actions taken 

against him. Nor does he allege that Chief Baker or the City 

Council had longstanding knowledge of the criminal investigation, 

and that they resurrected it only as a pretext to fire him. 

Rather, Mr. Hicks alleges only that the former Chief Rickey and 

"other" unnamed city officials had long known about it and had 

never previously acted upon it. Mr. Hicks' ultimate termination 

was a direct result of his refusal to take a polygraph examination. 

However, even if we assume that Mr. Hicks was eventually terminated in part because of his speech, he suffered no constitutional deprivation unless that speech was constitutionally protected. Mr. Hicks argues that his disclosure of Chief Rickey's 

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surreptitious purchase of radar units is a matter of public concern, and therefore is constitutionally protected. To determine 

whether Mr. Hicks' "whistle blowing" activities are constitutionally protected, the court must first determine whether the speech 

at issue may be "fairly characterized as constituting speech on a 

matter of public concern." Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 

(1983). If the speech does constitute a matter of public concern, 

the court must balance "the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of 

the public services it performs through its employees." Pickering 

v. Board of Educ. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will County, 

391 u.s. 563, 568 (1968). 

The Supreme Court has suggested that "bring[ing] to light 

actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust" is, 

indeed, a matter of public concern. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148. 

Hicks' revelation to the Council that Chief Rickey misrepresented 

radar purchases as repairs is a matter of public concern. However, the Pickering balance must still be performed; and Connick 

indicates that when a matter of public concern arises as part of 

an ongoing personal dispute, first amendment interests are only 

slight. 

Connick involved the firing of an assistant district 

attorney, Sheila Myers. Myers was an admittedly competent 

employee, but she became embroiled in a dispute with her supervisors because she was unwilling to accept a proposed transfer. As 

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part of the dispute, she prepared a questionnaire which she distributed to other employees. Myers was terminated for refusing to 

accept the transfer and was told that the circulation of the questionnaire constituted insubordination. Id. at 141. 

The questionnaire contained thirteen questions, twelve of 

which dealt with office policy, morale, and attitudes toward 

supervisors. One question asked, "Do you ever feel pressured to 

work in political campaigns on behalf of office supported candidates?" Id. at 155. The Court acknowledged that "the issue of 

whether assistant district attorneys are pressured to work in 

political campaigns is a matter of interest to the community upon 

which it is essential that public employees be able to speak out 

freely without fear of retaliatory dismissal." Id. at 149. When 

applying the Pickering balance, however, the Court stated, 

[T]he context in which the dispute arose is also significant. This is not a case where an employee, out of 

purely academic interest, circulated a questionnaire so 

as to obtain useful research. Myers acknowledges that 

it is no coincidence that the questionnaire followed 

upon the heels of the transfer notice .•.. 

Myers' questionnaire touched upon matters of public 

concern in only a most limited sense; her survey, in our 

view, is most accurately characterized as an employee 

grievance concerning internal office policy. The limited First Amendment interest involved here does not 

require that [her superior) tolerate action which he 

reasonably believed would disrupt the office, undermine 

his authority, and destroy close working relationships. 

Myers' discharge therefore did not offend the First 

Amendment. 

Id. at 153-54. See also McEvoy v. Shoemaker, 882 F.2d 463, 466 

(10th Cir. 1989) ("in analyzing whether speech constitutes a 

matter of public concern, the focus is on the motive of the 

speaker"); Callaway v. Hafeman, 832 F.2d 414, 417 (7th Cir. 1987) 

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(was employee's point to bring wrongdoing to light, or was the 

point to further some purely private interest?). Mr. Hicks' 

"whistle blowing" took place in the course of an extended personal 

grievance. Therefore, we hold that his first amendment interests 

were insufficient to outweigh the City's interest in responding to 

the charges against Mr. Hicks and that Mr. Hicks' termination did 

not offend the First Amendment. 

Mr. Hicks also makes a broader claim that his ultimate termination occurred, not because of the reasons stated by City 

officials, but because City officials wished to retaliate for 

Mr. Hicks' filing of a constitutionally protected grievance 

against Ms. Diffey fourteen months earlier. Realizing that retaliatory motive is easily and frequently alleged, but realizing also 

that insubstantial claims should be resolved on summary judgment, 

this court has set forth with some specificity the showing which a 

plaintiff must make in order to withstand a summary judgment 

motion on qualified immunity grounds in a retaliatory discharge 

case. Mr. Hicks has failed to make this showing for all 

appellants save one. We discuss this issue in more detail in the 

subsection dealing with qualified immunity. 

III. DUE PROCESS CLAIMS 

A. Deprivation of Liberty Interest 

Although the trial court did not reach the issue, the record 

is clear as a matter of law that Mr. Hicks has failed to state a 

claim for deprivation of a liberty interest without due process of 

law. Due process requires that an employee whose liberty interest 

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is threatened be accorded notice and a hearing. Board of Regents 

of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972). "The purpose 

of such notice and hearing is to provide the person an opportunity 

to clear his name. Once a person has cleared his name at a hearing, his employer, of course, may remain free to deny him future 

employment for other reasons." Id. at n.12. However, "[o]nly if 

the employer creates and disseminates a false and defamatory 

impression about the employee in connection with his termination 

is such a hearing required." Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 628 

(1977). No name-clearing hearing is required when the employee 

does not dispute the substantial truth of the charges against him. 

Id. at 627-28. 

The only charge leveled against Mr. Hicks "in connection with 

his termination" is that he refused to take a polygraph exam and 

was therefore guilty of insubordination. Mr. Hicks does not dispute that he refused to take the polygraph. Therefore, he was not 

entitled to a name clearing hearing as to that allegation. 

Furthermore, even if we assume that the earlier charges which 

resulted only in a letter of reprimand were somehow connected to 

his termination, those charges fall into the areas of poor work 

habits or failure to follow instructions. In order to state a 

constitutional claim, the charges must implicate "dishonesty or 

immorality" in order to deprive an employee of a liberty interest 

in his good name and reputation. See Melton v. City of Oklahoma 

City, 928 F.2d 920, 927 (10th Cir. 1991). This court has held 

that charges implicating only insubordination or poor work habits 

are not stigmatizing, and therefore do not violate a liberty 

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interest. See Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir. 

1988) (charges of neglect of duties and insubordination not stigmatizing); Sipes v. United States, 744 F.2d 1418, 1422 (10th Cir. 

1984) (charge of lack of reliability and engaging in "horseplay" 

not stigmatizing). Thus, the defendants are entitled to summary 

judgment on the liberty interest claim. 

B. Deprivation of Property Interest 

The appellants do not dispute that Mr. Hicks had a constitutionally protected property interest in his employment. 4 The 

Supreme Court has stated that a "tenured public employee is 

entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an 

explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to 

present his side of the story." Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. 

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985). The extensive hearings provided to Mr. Hicks, in which he was allowed to participate and was 

4 Mr. Hicks' argument that he had a constitutionally protected 

property interest in certain city procedures is unavailing. "A 

failure to comply with state or local procedural requirements does 

not necessarily constitute a denial of due process; the alleged 

violation must result in a procedure which itself falls short of 

standards derived from the Due Process Clause." Mangels v. Pena, 

789 F.2d 836, 838 (10th Cir. 1986). The failure to provide certain interim procedures which are cited by Mr. Hicks did not give 

rise to the constitutional claims which he presses here. 

Likewise, no property interest was infringed at Mr. Hicks' 

first round of hearings when he was suspended and then reprimanded. Mr. Hicks suffered no loss in pay because of the prehearing suspension. Suspension with pay does not raise due process concerns. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 544-45 (suggesting 

that suspension with pay may not raise due process concerns); 

Pitts v. Board of Educ. of U.S.D. 305, Salina, Kansas, 869 F.2d 

555, 556 (10th Cir. 1989) (suspension of public employee with pay 

does not infringe any measurable property interest). 

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represented by counsel, met this constitutional standard. However, "[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of 

due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual 

bias in the trial of cases." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 

(1955); Staton v. Mayes, 552 F.2d 908, 913 (10th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 434 U.S. 907 (1977). The question, then, is whether Mr. 

Hicks was afforded an unbiased tribunal. 

The Supreme Court has held that a person claiming bias on the 

part of an administrative tribunal "must overcome a presumption of 

honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators." Withrow 

v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). In a case applying the Withrow 

standard, this court stated, 

Due process is violated only when "the risk of unfairness is intolerably high" under the circumstances of a 

particular case. Because honesty and integrity are presumed on the part of a tribunal, there must be some substantial countervailing reason to conclude that a 

decisionmaker is actually biased with respect to factual 

issues being adjudicated. 

Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 838 (10th Cir. 1986) (quoting 

Withrow, 421 U.S. at 58) (citations omitted). 

The most recent Supreme Court decision applying the Withrow 

standard is Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville 

Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482 (1976). In Hortonville, the school 

board voted to discharge striking teachers. The teachers alleged 

that the school board members were biased because they had participated in unsuccessful contract negotiations with the teachers 

and because the board members had "manifested some personal bitterness toward the teachers, aroused by teachers criticism of the 

Board during the strike. 11 Id. at 491. 

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The Court rejected these arguments, stating that 

the teachers did not show . . • that the Board members 

had the kind of personal or financial stake in the decision that might create a conflict of interest, and there 

is nothing in the record to support charges of personal 

animosity •... 

. . . Mere familiarity with the facts of a case 

gained by an agency in the performance of its statutory 

role does not ... disqualify a decisionmaker. Nor is 

a decisionmaker disqualified simply because he has taken 

a position, even in public, on a policy issue related to 

the dispute, in the absence of a showing that he is not 

"capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on 

the basis of its own circumstances." 

Id. at 492-93 (quoting United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409. 421 

(1941)) (citations omitted). The Court then concluded, 

A showing that the Board was "involved" in the events 

preceding this decision, in light of the important 

interest in leaving with the Board the power given by 

the state legislature, is not enough to overcome the 

presumption of honesty and integrity in policymakers 

with decisionmaking power. Accordingly, we hold that 

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did 

not guarantee respondents that the decision to terminate 

their employment would be made or reviewed by a body 

other than the School Board. 

Id. at 496-97 (citation omitted). 

This court applied Hortonville in Staton v. Mayes, 552 F.2d 

908 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 907 (1977). Staton was 

brought by a school superintendent who had been dismissed by the 

school board. In Staton, three of the five school board members 

had made public statements prior to the termination hearing that 

they believed the superintendent should be replaced. Those three 

members then voted, after the hearing, to dismiss the superintendent for incompetence and willful neglect of duty. The other two 

members voted no. This court held that, in light of the public 

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statements made by the three, they should not have sat on the tribunal which removed him. 

In this case, Mr. Hicks presents direct or circumstantial 

evidence of bias only as to tribunal members Diffey and Chapman. 

Councilwoman Diffey abstained from voting on the suspension that 

followed the investigation which was initiated at her request, but 

she did vote to uphold the letter of reprimand and to uphold the 

termination. Mayor Chapman acted as factfinder at the hearing 

which resulted in the letter of reprimand, but he has no vote in 

Council matters unless the Council is equally divided. Okla. 

Stat. Ann. tit. 11 § 9-104 (West 1978). Therefore, he did not 

vote on either appeal because the votes against Mr. Hicks were 

unanimous. 

As to the other six councilmen who voted on Mr. Hicks' two 

appeals, he presents no evidence of bias except that they voted 

unanimously against him. Unlike Staton, this case contains no 

allegations that the other six councilmen ever made any comment 

regarding Mr. Hicks. As in Hortonville, Mr. Hicks presents no 

evidence that the majority of the tribunal members "had the kind 

of personal or financial stake in the decision that might create a 

conflict of interest, and there is nothing in the record to support charges of personal animosity." Hortonville, 426 U.S. at 

492. 

The circumstantial evidence relied upon by the district court 

is insufficient. The district court correctly points out that two 

members of the City Council were also members of the Police Review 

Board. However, the Supreme Court has held that involvement of 

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tribunal members in earlier proceedings in the same case does not 

overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity. Withrow v. 

Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) (no unconstitutional risk of bias when 

members of board of state medical examiners investigate and bring 

charges, then adjudicate those same charges). 

The remainder of the circumstantial evidence cited by the 

district court has to do with other city officials, not the majority of tribunal members. The new Police Chief, Baker, stated in 

his deposition that he conducted an internal investigation which 

led him to request that Mr. Hicks take a polygraph examination. 

The court points out that this internal investigation was not 

officially recorded. However, this fact has no relevance to the 

issue of whether the majority of tribunal members were biased. 

The court also notes that "minor and insubstantial allegations" 

were brought against Mr. Hicks by City Attorney Webber. However, 

the insubstantial allegations were dismissed by Mayor Chapman, and 

the tribunal members never voted on them. Finally, the court 

points out that the incident over which Mr. Hicks was eventually 

fired, the missing file, took place two years before Chief Baker 

decided to conduct an internal investigation. However, Mr. Hicks 

does not specifically allege that anyone other than former Police 

Chief Rickey knew about the missing file prior to the time the 

internal investigation was begun. 

In order to disqualify the majority of tribunal members in 

this case, we would have to indulge a presumption against them 

based purely on their votes. We would have to presume that they 

were incapable of exercising independent judgment because of their 

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association with Councilwoman Diffey, Mayor Chapman, and the other 

named City officials, so that they should have been constitutionally disqualified from sitting on Mr. Hicks' disciplinary appeals 

and should have provided Mr. Hicks with an alternative forum. 

Such a holding would mean that almost anytime an employee in 

a small bureaucracy--where everyone knows everyone else--clashes 

with his superiors, the body elected to make disciplinary decisions will be constitutionally disqualified from doing so. This 

contravenes the Supreme Court's clear desire to leave such decisions in the hands of the bodies duly elected to make them. See 

Hortonville, 426 U.S. at 495-96; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 11 § 9-118 

(West 1978) (vesting power to fire city employees in mayor, and 

power to hear appeals from those decisions in city council). 

Though only one member arguably should have been disqualified 

from the tribunal which ultimately deprived Mr. Hicks of his job, 

Mr. Hicks may still have a valid due process claim. "'Litigants 

are entitled to an impartial tribunal whether it consists of one 

man or twenty and there is no way which we know of whereby the 

influence of one upon the others can be quantitatively measured.'" 

Cinderella Career and Finishing Schools, Inc. v. F.T.C., 425 F.2d 

583, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (quoting Berkshire Employees Ass'n of 

Berkshire Knitting Mills v. NLRB, 121 F.2d 235, 239 (3d Cir. 

1941)). Thus, if Ms. Diffey is found to have been biased when she 

cast her vote on Mr. Hicks' dismissal, her presence will have 

tainted the tribunal and violated Mr. Hicks' due process rights. 

See,~, Antoniu v. SEC, 877 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. 

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denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990) (due process violated when commissioner who had made statements indicating prejudgment of case participated in SEC proceedings against securities violator). However, we still must answer the question of whether all the tribunal members in this case, even if it may be said that the presence 

of one biased member contaminates the tribunal, must stand trial 

for damages. We hold that they should not, and discuss our reasoning below. 

V. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 

We review the denial of a qualified immunity claim de novo. 

McEvoy, 882 F.2d at 465. "[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for 

civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 

reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 

U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 

As we have already stated, "[i]t is clearly established that 

a State may not discharge an employee on a basis that infringes 

that employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of 

speech." Rankin, 483 U.S. at 383. Mr. Hicks claimed that he was 

terminated in violation of his first amendment rights because the 

termination came in retaliation for the grievance he filed against 

appellant Diffey. The application of the Harlow "objective reasonableness" standard in a case where a plaintiff alleges impermissible motive or intent was discussed recently in Lewis v. City 

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of Ft. Collins, 903 F.2d 752 (10th Cir. 1990). In Lewis, we 

stated: 

Harlow crafted this "objective reasonableness" standard 

for determining the availability of the qualified 

immunity defense in order to "avoid excessive disruption 

of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment." However in some 

cases, the determination of the "objective" reasonableness of an official's conduct rests on establishing 

whether the defendant acted with an impermissible motive 

or intent--a highly "subjective" factual element •..• 

Where a defendant's subjective intent is an element 

of plaintiff's claim and the defendant movea for summary 

judgment based on qualified immunity, the defendant must 

make a prima facie showing of the "objective reasonableness" of the challenged conduct. In this regard, we 

have emphasized that the moving party has no burden to 

disprove any unsupported claims of his opponent, especially where, as here, "'the reasons for swiftly terminating insubstantial lawsuits are particularly strong.'" 

Once a showing of objective reasonableness is produced, "the plaintiff may avoid summary judgment only by 

pointing to specific evidence that the official's 

actions were improperly motivated." 

Id. at 755, 758 (citations omitted). 

In the present case, the decision to terminate was made by 

Chief Baker and ratified, first by the Police Review Board, and 

then by the City Council. The appellants have presented evidence 

that the termination was based solely upon Mr. Hicks' refusal to 

cooperate in the investigation into his missing personnel file. 

The appellants have therefore made a prima facie showing of the 

objective reasonableness of their actions. See id. at 758. 

Mr. Hicks has not come forward with any specific evidence that 

Chief Baker was improperly motivated when he terminated Mr. Hicks 

nor that, of the eleven people who subsequently ratified that 

decision, anyone except Ms. Diffey was improperly motivated. 

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\.• 

Mr. Hicks has done little more than repeat the conclusory allegations contained in his pleadings. See id. at 759. Therefore, 

summary judgment based on qualified immunity should be granted for 

all appellants except Ms. Diffey on that claim. 5 Mr. Hicks has 

met his burden of production at least with respect to Ms. Diffey, 

and we therefore may not grant summary judgment as to her. This 

holding is a very narrow one, however. We hold only that 

Mr. Hicks has raised a genuine question of material fact as to 

Ms. Diffey's possible improper motivation to terminate him. We do 

not reach the question of whether Mr. Hicks was actually damaged 

by Ms. Diffey's lone vote. 

The appellants are entitled to qualified immunity on the 

property interest claim unless they violated Mr. Hicks' clearly 

established right. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. A constitutional 

right is "clearly established" if "[t]he contours of the right 

[are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. 

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 

The district court held that, because the right to an 

unbiased tribunal is clearly established, the appellants cannot 

claim immunity in this case. However, while there is evidence 

that one voting member of the City Council, Ms. Diffey, harbored 

5 Mr. Hicks argues broadly and perfunctorily that he is 

entitled to further discovery. He has not particularized his 

argument, nor "explained how any specific documents or deposition 

will aid in rebutting defendants' showing of objective 

reasonableness." Lewis, 903 F.2d at 759. He may not defeat the 

appellants' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity 

grounds with vague, conclusory allegations that further discovery 

will enable him to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Id. 

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personal animosity toward Mr. Hicks, nothing points directly at 

the remaining individual councilmen who voted to uphold Mr. Hicks' 

termination. Without any evidence to the contrary, we must 

presume that each Councilman cast his vote honestly and with 

integrity. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47. 

We begin, therefore, with the proposition that each councilman, with the possible exception of Ms. Diffey, was constitutionally qualified to participate in and vote on the decision regarding Mr. Hicks' employment. The question then is: Was the law 

clearly established that, because one council member was arguably 

biased, the remainder of the council members, though qualified, 

must refrain from participating or face civil damages? The answer 

to that question is clearly no. In fact, the cases suggest that 

the established law is to the contrary. In cases in which some 

but not all members of an administrative tribunal were biased, the 

courts hold that the tribunal may reconvene without the biased 

members and vote anew. See Antoniu, 877 F.2d at 726; Cinderella 

Schools, 425 F.2d at 592; Berkshire Employees Ass'n of Berkshire 

Knitting Mills v. NLRB, 121 F.2d 235, 239 (3d Cir. 1941). Thus, 

it is the participation of the biased members, not the unbiased, 

which constitutes the constitutional wrong. A contrary holding 

would place on all administrative tribunal members a duty to 

ferret out possible bias among their colleagues, or to face civil 

damages regardless of their own fairness and integrity. Such a 

rule would disrupt the functioning of administrative tribunals. 

Our holding properly places on each tribunal member the duty to 

disqualify herself if she is biased in fact. 

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We hold that appellants Green, Brown, Pendergraft, Norton, 

Patterson, Justice, and Swanagan are qualifiedly immune from damages on the property interest claim because no clearly established 

law forbade them from participating in the tribunal. Mr. Hicks 

presented evidence of bias on the part of appellant Chapman, but 

Mayor Chapman did not vote on the appeal of Mr. Hicks' termination. There is no clearly established law that an arguably biased 

person may not be a non-voting participant in an administrative 

tribunal. See Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260, 267 (D.C. 

Cir. 1962) (biased commission member may participate in new hearing as a staff member, but may not vote). Thus, appellant Chapman 

is qualifiedly immune from damages. Appellant Baker did not participate in the allegedly biased tribunal, although he did initiate the charges and recommend that Mr. Hicks be terminated. 

There is no clearly established law that a city official may not 

initiate insubordination charges which will eventually be heard by 

an arguably tainted tribunal. Thus, appellant Baker is immune 

from damages. Appellants Despain and Rickey had no involvement 

in the allegedly biased tribunal. Appellant Rickey left the scene 

before the events which eventually led to Mr. Hicks' termination. 

Therefore, Mr. Hicks fails to state a due process claim against 

appellants Despain and Rickey. 

We affirm the district court's denial of qualified immunity 

for appellant Diffey on the property interest claim. We recognize 

that an administrative tribunal member is not disqualified because 

she has "ruled strongly against a party" in a prior hearing. NLRB 

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v. Donnelly Garment Co., 330 U.S. 219, 237 (1947). Nor is a tribunal member disqualified because she may have participated in the 

initiation of the proceedings. See Withrow, 421 U.S. at 56-57. 

However, Mr. Hicks has presented evidence that Ms. Diffey was the 

target of personal criticism by Mr. Hicks arising out of the 

traffic ticket incident. The Supreme Court has stated that when a 

tribunal member has been the target of personal abuse or criticism, the risk of actual bias is unconstitutionally high. Id. at 

47. Mr. Hicks' evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact 

as to whether Ms. Diffey was biased when she sat on the tribunal 

which upheld his termination. The law is clearly established that 

a person who is biased in fact may not sit on a quasi-judicial 

tribunal. We emphasize again, however, the narrowness of this 

holding, which says nothing about causation or damages. 

In summary, we hold that Mr. Hicks has failed to state a 

claim for deprivation of a liberty interest without due process of 

law. We hold that Ms. Diffey is not entitled to immunity on the 

First Amendment claim or the claim for deprivation of a property 

interest without due process of law. We hold that all other 

appellants are qualifiedly immune on those claims. 

The order of the trial court is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED 

in part, and the case is REMANDED to the trial court for action in 

accordance with this opinion. 

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