Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00163/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00163-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

LATEACHEEAH G. ANDERSON

SALVATTO, and RICHARD

SALVATTO, individually and as

guardians for JAMAL THROWER, a

minor,

NO. CIV. S-04-0163 WBS GGH

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COUNTY OF SOLANO, CITY OF

VALLEJO, COUNTY OF SOLANO

SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT,

LIEUTENANT LIDDICOET, OFFICER

K. MCCARTHY, VALLEJO POLICE

DEPARTMENT, WATCH COMMANDER K.

SCHROEDER, CORPORAL B. CLARK,

OFFICER WHITNEY,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on the motion of all

defendants for summary judgment, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 56(b),

on all of plaintiffs’ claims for relief.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiffs are Jamal Thrower, Lateacheeah G. Salvatto

(“L. Salvatto”), and Richard Salvatto (“R. Salvatto”). R.

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Plaintiff dismissed defendant County of Solano on April 1

1, 2004, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). 

2

Salvatto is the husband of L. Salvatto. (Compl. ¶ 85.) At the

time of incidents underlying the complaint, Thrower was a minor

child living voluntarily with the Salvattos, but neither related

to nor a foster child of the Salvattos. (Pl.’s Statement of

Disputed and Undisputed Facts # 1-2.) Defendants are the City of

Vallejo, specifically the Vallejo Police Department (“VPD”), and

the following individual police officers from VPD: Lieutenant Tom

Liddicoet, Officer Kevin McCarthy, Watch Commander Kelly

Schroeder, Corporal Brett Clark, and Officer John Whitney. 

1

On Sunday, January 5, 2003, Whitney observed Thrower

operating his motor scooter on the sidewalk. (Id. # 4-5.) 

Whitney detained Thrower and transported him to the VPD police

station after Thrower failed to provide identification. (Id. #

7-9, 11.) Whitney subsequently cited Thrower for driving on the

sidewalk. (Id. # 13.) 

Later that day, L. Salvatto visited VPD headquarters to

complain about the citation issued to Thrower. (Id. # 19.) 

Because it was Sunday, the VPD lobby was closed to the public. 

(Id. # 20.) Outside the VPD building, there is a courtesy phone,

which connects to a VPD dispatcher. (Id. # 21.) L. Salvatto

placed a call to complain about Whitney’s citation and detention

of Thrower. (Id. # 22.) The dispatcher contacted Whitney, who

was out on patrol. (Id. # 23.) While waiting for Whitney to

arrive, L. Salvatto called dispatch via the courtesy phone

numerous times, demanding entry into the VPD lobby. (Id. # 24;

Knight Decl. Ex. A (transcripts of L. Salvatto’s calls to

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3

dispatch).) She was told that she would have to wait outside for

Whitney. (Knight Decl. Ex. A.) After several calls demanding

attention, a dispatcher told her, “I’m sorry but I can’t waste

time continuing to talk to you,” and, on another occasion, to

stop raising her voice to the dispatcher. (Id.) However, she

continued to call demanding either to be let into the lobby or

speak with the watch commander. (Id.) At one point, she

demanded to speak to the chief of police. (Pl.’s Statement of

Disputed and Undisputed Facts # 61.) 

L. Salvatto was admitted to the lobby and told to cease

disturbing dispatch operations. (Id. # 27.) Lieutenant

Liddicoet asked her to come back when the office was open. (Id.

# 28.) Liddicoet also explained to her the citizen complaint

procedure. (Id. # 31.) He offered her a complaint form, but she

refused to take it. (Id.) After L Salvatto was ordered to exit

the lobby or be arrested, McCarthy placed both hands on her arms

and forcibly removed her from the building. (Id. # 35, 37)

Shortly thereafter, Whitney arrived at VPD and attempted to

explain to L. Salvatto why he issued a citation to Thrower. (Id.

# 38-39.) Whitney terminated the conversation as L. Salvatto did

not appear satisfied by Whitney’s explanation. (Id. # 41.) 

L. Salvatto then returned home and contacted Liddicoet

to complain that McCarthy assaulted her when he removed her from

the VPD lobby. (Id. # 42-43, 48.) Liddicoet again explained the

citizen complaint procedure and offered to send her a form by

U.S. mail. (Id. # 45.) Around 7:15 p.m. that evening, L.

Salvatto returned to the police station and, via the courtesy

phone, told Schroeder, who had taken over as watch commander from

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4

Liddicoet, that she was there to fill out a crime report. (Id. #

46-48.) Schroeder let her in and again explained the citizen

complaint procedure to her and gave her a complaint form, but she

refused to take it. (Id. # 50-51.) After twenty minutes of

conversation, Schroeder told her that she must leave the property

to avoid arrest. (Id. # 48, 53.) L. Salvatto left the VPD

lobby, but remained outside of the premises. (Id. # 54.) 

L. Salvaatto promptly used the courtesy phone two more

times to demand attention to her complaints. (Schroeder Decl.

Ex. A (Supplemental to Arrest Report).) Sargent Clark

investigated the situation and learned that L. Salvatto had

repeatedly used the courtesy phone earlier in the day to demand

immediate attention to her complaints. (Id. # 56.) Clark and

Huff proceeded to L. Salvatto’s position outside the lobby and

told her that she was interfering with dispatch by making

repeated calls, had already been assisted by two watch

commanders, already told to leave to the premises twice, and that

refusal to leave would result in arrest. (Id. # 62-65.) L.

Salvatto did not leave. (Id. # 66.) Clark gave her one last

opportunity. (Id. # 68.) When she failed to leave, Huff

arrested her and VPD impounded her vehicle, which was parked in a

green zone in front of the VPD building. (Id. # 69-71.) 

Prior to January 5, 2003, Dr. Aaron Meltzer, L.

Salvatto’s podiatrist, medically broke her foot. (Id. # 73.) 

The day after the incidents at VPD, Meltzer examined L. Salvatto

and could not find any injury attributable to her forcible

removal from VPD. (Id. # 76.) Meltzer concludes that the

condition of her foot was entirely attributable to his action of

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Plaintiffs do not specifically invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983 2

in their complaint. In the order of December 16, 2005, the court

granted plaintiffs’ request to stay defendants’ previous summary

judgment motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

56(f). The court also gave plaintiffs an opportunity to amend

their complaint to correct this and other defects. 

Plaintiffs failed to file an amended complaint. 

Defendants cite Doe v. Klein for the proposition that failure to

specifically invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983 precludes the court’s

jurisdiction. 599 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1979). In Klein, the Ninth

Circuit held that the Social Security Act does not fulfill the

prerequisites of § 1343(3) or (4) because the Congressional

purpose behind that legislation was not providing for equal

rights or for the protection of civil rights. Id. at 341. Thus,

the action in Klein could never properly invoke § 1983 regardless

of whether plaintiff properly plead it in his complaint. Klein

is inapplicable here. L. Salvatto and Thrower sufficiently

allege cognizable legal claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

the claims will be construed as such even though the complaint

does not specifically invoke § 1983. 

Plaintiffs filed their opposition to defendants’ motion 3

on March 7, 2007, which is in violation of Local Rule 78-230(c). 

Defendants request that the court not consider this late filed

document. The rule reads in part: “No party will be entitled to

be heard in opposition to a motion at oral arguments if

opposition to the motion has not been timely filed by that

party.” L.R. 78-230(c). The imposition of that sanction is

discretionary. The court declined to impose it at oral argument

5

breaking her foot for medical purposes. (Id.) 

On January 23, 2004, plaintiffs filed a complaint,

alleging federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in their first 2

and fourth claims for: 1) Thrower’s detainment and citation; 2)

L. Salvatto’s forcible removal from the police station; 3) her

subsequent arrest; and 4) the impoundment of her vehicle. 

Plaintiffs allege that the above actions violated their rights

under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and additionally

allege state law claims of false arrest, assault, battery, abuse

of process, and negligence. R. Salvatto asserts a singular cause

of action for loss of consortium. Defendants filed this motion

for summary judgment on February 2, 2007.3

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because defendants suffered little prejudice as a result of 

delay. 

6

II. Discussion

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome of

the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a

reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s

favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial

burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that

negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

Alternatively, the movant can demonstrate that the non-moving

party cannot provide evidence to support an essential element

upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. 

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the

non-moving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own

affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324 (quoting Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The non-movant “may not rest upon . . . mere

allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading . . . .” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135,

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Defendants have moved, in the alternative, for summary 4

adjudication. While caselaw exists suggesting that a party may

move for summary adjudication of issues, see, e.g., Barker v.

Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1123 (5th Cir. 1981); First Nat’l Ins. Co.

v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 977 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D. Cal. 1997),

this is not the type of motion originally contemplated by Rule

56. Moreover, motions for summary adjudication of issues request

that the court resolve issues that dispose of neither a party nor

a claim, and seldom accomplish anything. Importantly, defendants

do not distinguish between their general request for summary

judgment and particular issues apt for summary adjudication. 

Therefore the court’s following discussion applies to both

requests.

7

1137 (9th Cir. 1989). However, any inferences drawn from the

underlying facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Additionally, the

court must not engage in credibility determinations or weigh the

evidence, for these are jury functions. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 4

255. 

 A. L. Salvatto’s Fourth Amendment Claims

Plaintiffs allege violations of L. Salvatto’s civil

rights in their first and fourth claims for relief. To prove a

claim under section 1983, plaintiffs must establish that (1) the

defendants acting under color of state law (2) deprived

plaintiffs of rights secured by the Constitution or federal

statutes. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir.

1986). Defendants admit that at all relevant times the

individual officers were acting under color of state law. 

Plaintiffs allege that defendants violated L. Salvatto’s Fourth

Amendment rights by using excessive force to remove her from the

VPD lobby, arresting her, and impounding her vehicle. 

///

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8

1. Excessive Force 

Under the Fourth Amendment, police may use only such

force as is objectively reasonable under the circumstances. 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989); Scott v. Henrich, 39

F.3d 912, 914 (9th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is appropriate

if, after resolving all factual disputes in favor of the

plaintiff, the district court concludes that the officer’s use of

force was objectively reasonable. Scott, 39 F.3d at 914. 

After telling L. Salvatto to exit the lobby or else she

would be arrested, McCarthy placed both hands on her arms and

forcibly removed her from the building. L. Salvatto alleges that

McCarthy kicked her, resulting in a resulted in her broken foot. 

(Compl. ¶ 46(e).) However, plaintiffs’ counsel admits that this

allegation was in error since her foot was previously medically

broken. (Pl.’s Statement of Disputed and Undisputed Facts # 72-

73). Further, at oral argument, plaintiffs’ counsel admitted

that L. Salvatto’s position is that McCarthy simply contacted her

foot while he was removing her from the lobby. The Supreme Court

counsels that “the calculus of reasonableness must embody

allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to

make split-second judgments--in circumstances that are tense,

uncertain, and rapidly evolving--about the amount of force that

is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at

397. 

L. Salvatto ignored an order to leave the VPD lobby,

which was closed at the time. At that point, she had been

assisted by Liddicoet and offered a civilian complaint form. She

was also told that her conduct, specifically the numerous calls

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Further, plaintiffs introduce no evidence that 5

McCarthy’s action aggravated her preexisting injury to her foot. 

In fact, she admits that Dr. Meltzer’s examination of her foot on

the very next day did not reveal an injury other than that which

was attributable to her previous medical procedure. 

9

to dispatch, disrupted police operations. Plaintiffs do not

offer evidence that McCarthy’s contact with L. Salvatto’s foot,

if he indeed contacted her foot, was anything more than

incidental to his action of escorting her out of the VPD lobby. 

“Pushes and shoves, like other police conduct, must be judged

under the Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness.” Saucier

v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 209 (2001). The court concludes that no

reasonable jury would find McCarthy’s decision to use force, or

the amount of force employed, unreasonable under these

circumstances. Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary 5

judgment must be granted on plaintiffs’ excessive force claim. 

2. Arrest of L. Salvatto

L. Salvatto’s arrest was lawful if the arresting

officer had probable cause to believe she had committed a crime. 

United States v. Buckner, 179 F.3d 834, 837 (9th Cir. 1999)

(further citations omitted). “Probable cause exists when, under

the totality of the circumstances known to the arresting

officers, a prudent person would have concluded that there was a

fair probability that [the defendant] had committed a crime.” 

Buckner, 179 F.3d at 837. This question is “‘an essentially

legal question’ that should be determined by the district court

at the earliest possible point in the litigation.” Act

Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1993)

(quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). 

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In California, it is unlawful to “intentionally

interfere[] with any lawful business carried on by the employees

of a public agency open to the public, by obstructing or

intimidating those attempting to carry on business.” Cal. Pen.

Code § 602.1(b). It is undisputed that L. Salvatto called one

dispatcher sixteen times within a one hour period and another

dispatcher five or six times within a fifteen minute period. 

These calls interfered with police operations as dispatch was

busy with calls for police and fire services. (Raymos Decl. ¶ 6;

Barden Decl. ¶ 5.) 

Plaintiffs dispute that the dispatchers were busy with

other calls, but offer no credible evidence to rebut defendants’

evidence. Further, L. Salvatto’s calls were not emergencies and

the dispatchers told her this. (Knight Decl. Ex. A.) She was

told at least twice by different officers that her calls

disrupted dispatch operations. It is also undisputed that Clark

told her that her calls were interfering with dispatch’s ability

to provide necessary services to other members of the public and

not to call dispatch unless she had a real need for police

services. (Clark Decl. ¶¶ 5, 9.) She was thrice told about the

civilian complaint procedure and twice given forms. She demanded

immediate attention to her complaints, refusing to follow the

civilian complaint procedure or return during a time when the VPD

lobby was open to the public. 

Plaintiffs argue that probable cause did not exist

because the VPD lobby was not open for business. However, the

fact that VPD’s lobby was closed made her conduct even more

disruptive. Officers twice let her into the lobby to attempt to

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Plaintiffs further argue that there was not probable 6

cause for an arrest because L. Salvatto was ultimately charged

with violating California Penal Code § 602.1(a). It is well

established that an arrest is valid even if probable cause does

not exist for the stated offense so long as there is probable

cause for another valid offense. Bingham v. City of Manhattan

Beach, 341 F.3d 939, 952 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v.

Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 564 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“an arrest will be

upheld if probable cause exists to support arrest for an offense

that is not denominated as the reason for the arrest by the

arresting officer”) (further citations omitted)). Moreover,

Clark’s VPD Crime Report denominated L. Salvatto’s crime as

interfering with a public agency in violation of California Penal

Code § 602.1(b). (Clark Decl. Ex. A.) 

11

reason with her when they could simply have told her to return

during business hours. Moreover, Clark told her that she would 6

be arrested for her disruptive behavior if she did not leave the

premises. Clark investigated L. Salvatto’s behavior and found

out about her excessive use of the courtesy phone. Although she

was standing in outside of the VPD building when confronted by

Clark and Huff, L. Salvatto’s disruptive behavior throughout the

course of the day reasonably led Clark to believe that she would

continue her disruptive behavior (e.g. using the courtesy phone

for non-emergency calls) if she did not leave the property. 

Clark’s conclusion that there was a fair probability that L.

Salvatto had committed a violation of California Penal Code

602.1(b) is in line with what a prudent person would have

concluded. Buckner, 179 F.3d at 837. Therefore, Clark had

probable cause to arrest L. Salvatto under California Penal Code

602.1(b), and the arrest did not violate L. Salvatto’s rights

under the Fourth Amendment. 

3. Impoundment of L. Salvatto’s Vehicle

Plaintiffs contend that towing L. Salvatto’s vehicle

concomitant with her arrest violated her rights under the Fourth

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Amendment. An impoundment of a vehicle is not an illegal seizure

under the Fourth Amendment if it was reasonable under all the

circumstances known to the police officer at the time the officer

made the decision to impound. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.

364 (1976.) California authorizes peace officers to remove

vehicles parked or stopped in violation of local ordinances. 

Cal. Veh. Code § 22651(n). California Vehicle Code § 21458

expressly authorizes localities to indicate time limit parking by

painting a curb green. The City of Vallejo prohibits stopping,

standing, or parking beyond posted time limits in areas

demarcated with curbs painted green. Vallejo Mun. Code §

8.12.030. 

The curb outside VPD was painted green, and plaintiffs

do not dispute that L. Salvatto’s vehicle was there longer than

the time allowed. Nor do plaintiffs argue that there was

inadequate notice that vehicles could be towed from this

location. Plaintiffs only argue that “if the arrest was illegal,

then the towing of the car was illegal.” (Opp’n 6.) However,

the court has concluded that the arrest was valid. Further,

Clark’s impoundment was justified given that he could reasonably

have been protecting the vehicle from vandalism or damage given

L. Salvatto’s inability to do so at the time. See Hallstrom v.

Garden City, 991 F.2d 1473, 1478 (9th Cir. 1993) (“In discharging

their community caretaking functions, it was not unreasonable for

the arresting officers to protect the car from vandalism or theft

by having it towed.” (citing United States v. Johnson, 734 F.2d

503, 505 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Griffin, 729 F.2d

475, 480 (7th Cir. 1984))). Impoundment of L. Salvatto’s vehicle

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13

was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the

court will grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment on L.

Salvatto’s Fourth Amendment claims. 

B. Thrower’s Fourth Amendment Claims

At oral argument, plaintiffs advised that plaintiffs do

not oppose defendants’ motion on Thrower’s Fourth Amendment

claims. Whitney had probable cause to stop and detain Thrower. 

In California, an operator of a motorized scooter may not

“[o]perate a motorized scooter upon a sidewalk, except as may be

necessary to enter or leave adjacent property.” Cal. Veh. Code §

21235(g). Additionally, failure to produce satisfactory

identification allows an officer to make an arrest without

violating the Fourth Amendment. People v. McKay, 27 Cal. App.

4th 601, 620 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2002) (citing Cal. Veh.

Code § 21650.1); People v. Hart, 74 Cal. App. 4th 479, 488 (Cal.

Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1999). Accordingly, the court will grant

defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Thrower’s Fourth

Amendment claims. 

C. Plaintiffs’ Claim under the Fourteenth Amendment

Plaintiffs contend defendants violated their rights to

equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to

meet with L. Salvatto and Thrower, failing to investigate L.

Salvatto’s assault claim, and selectively towing L. Salvatto’s

vehicle. (Compl. ¶¶ 44-46.) Presumably, plaintiffs also contend

that the impoundment of L. Salvatto’s vehicle violated the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

provides that “no State shall . . . deny to any person within its

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It is also unclear that defendants ever failed to meet 7

with Thrower. At oral argument, plaintiffs affirmatively stated

their non-opposition to the summary judgment motions as against

14

jurisdiction equal protection of its laws.” “The central purpose

of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the

prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of

race.” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238 (1976). In a §

1983 claim alleging a violation of equal protection, a plaintiff

“must prove that the defendant acted in a discriminatory manner

and that the discrimination was intentional.” Fed. Deposit Ins.

Corp. v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing

Stones v. Los Angeles Cmty. College Dist., 796 F.2d 270, 275 (9th

Cir. 1986)) (further citations omitted). Further, a plaintiff

need “only produce evidence sufficient to establish a genuine

issue of fact as to the defendant’s motivations.” Id. 

Plaintiffs fail to make any allegations regarding

racial animus or any allegations as to defendants’ motivation. 

Plaintiffs simply state the above actions violated the rights of

Thrower and L. Salvatto.

Plaintiffs complain that defendants failed to meet with

Thrower and L. Salvatto and failed to investigate L. Salvatto’s

assault claim. It is undisputed that the VPD lobby was closed on

Sunday. L. Salvatto was given a citizen complaint form and told

to come back during specified hours when the VPD lobby would be

open. Plaintiffs fail to submit any evidence indicating that L.

Salvatto was treated any differently from any person attempting

to file a complaint in person at VPD on any given Sunday

afternoon. 

7

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It is well established that an officer may not rely

solely on the claims of a victim of a crime, but must conduct an

independent investigation before filing charges. Arpin v. Santa

Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001)

(“In establishing probable cause, officers may not solely rely on

the claim of a citizen witness that he was a victim of a crime,

but must independently investigate the basis of the witness’

knowledge or interview other witnesses.” (citing Fuller v. M.G.

Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1444 (9th Cir. 1991))). There is no

indication that defendants treated L. Salvatto differently in

refusing to take a criminal report for the alleged assault on L.

Salvatto. Further, inadequate investigation by police officers

is not sufficient to state a § 1983 claim “unless there was

another recognized constitutional right involved.” Gomez v.

Whitney, 757 F.2d 1005, 1006 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Plaintiffs’ claim that L. Salvatto’s vehicle was

“selectively” towed lacks merit. Plaintiffs offer no evidence

indicating that the impoundment was discriminatory. As discussed

above, L. Salvatto’s vehicle was parked in violation of state and

local law and was impounded concomitant with her arrest,

demonstrating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for

defendants’ action. Plaintiffs do not attempt to demonstrate

that defendants’ reasons are a mere pre-text. See Henderson, 940

F.2d at 470-473 (affirming summary judgment where plaintiff

failed to rebut defendant’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason

for adverse employment action after plaintiff proffered evidence

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The named individual police officers assert qualified 8

immunity. Because the court has concluded that plaintiffs have

not established a violation of their constitutional rights, there

is no need to address the officers’ qualified immunity argument. 

Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (“[I]f a

[constitutional] violation could be made out on a favorable view

of the parties’ submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask

whether the right was clearly established.”)). 

 

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with an inference of racial animus). Defendants’ actions did not

violate the equal protection rights of L. Salvatto or Thrower. 

Impoundment of L. Salvatto’s vehicle also is not a

violation of her rights under the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. When “no practical way to provide a

predeprivation hearing exists, a postdeprivation hearing provided

at a ‘meaningful time and in a meaningful manner’ will suffice.”

Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir.

1981) (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540 (1981)).

A predeprivation hearing is not required prior to towing an

illegally parked vehicle. Sutton v. Milwaukee, 672 F.2d 644, 646

(7th Cir. 1982). It is undisputed that California provides

adequate postdeprivation opportunities for redress. 

Specifically, plaintiff would have a remedy pursuant to the

California Government Tort Claims Act, Cal. Gov’t. Code § 810 et.

seq. Accordingly, the court will grant defendants’ motion for

summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs’ claims under the

Fourteenth Amendment. 

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D. Liability of the City of Vallejo and VPD

Plaintiffs name as defendants the City of Vallejo and

VPD. Because plaintiffs’ claims relate to conduct by individual

VPD officers, the only theory by which the City and VPD could be

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directly liable is respondeat superior. However, the Supreme

Court has made it clear that “a municipality cannot be held

liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of NY, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). 

These entities may be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, when

“the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or

executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision

officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” 

Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. In the alternative, the city may be

liable where the municipality’s failure to train employees

amounts to “deliberate indifference” to the rights of persons

with whom the police come into contact. City of Canton v.

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); Alexander v. City and County of

San Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355, 1367 (9th Cir. 1994). A plaintiff

bringing a Monell claim must demonstrate both that a

constitutional deprivation occurred and that the municipality was

the “moving force behind the injury alleged.” Id. at 385; Gibson

v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986).

Plaintiffs fail to allege that defendant officers’

conduct was a result of custom or policy as required by Monell. 

Plaintiffs have also failed to allege or submit any evidence

indicative of the City’s policies exhibiting “deliberate

indifference.” City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389. Further, the

lack of any constitutional violation by any of the named officers

precludes damages. Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799

(1986) (“[N]either Monell . . . nor any other of our cases

authorizes the award of damages against a municipal corporation

based on the actions of one of its officers when in fact the jury

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Plaintiffs’ complaint is not organized by right nor do 9

plaintiffs clearly articulate which specific federal rights were

purportedly violated by the defendants. To the extent that are

any other conceivable rights that plaintiffs allege defendants’

conduct violated under the vast catalog of rights afforded by the

Constitution or federal statutes, plaintiffs fail to meet their

evidentiary burden to proffer evidence that raises a disputed

issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment. Celotex, 

477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). 

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has concluded that the officer inflicted no constitutional

harm.”). There are no viable claims pursuant to § 1983 against

either the City of Vallejo or VPD. Accordingly, the court will

award summary judgment, as against these defendants, with regard

to plaintiffs’ first and fourth claims for relief.9

E. State Law Claims

Plaintiffs’ second, third, fifth, sixth, and seventh

claims for relief are brought under the laws of the state of

California. A district court may sua sponte determine whether to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. 

Ballard v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 186 F.R.D. 589, 599 (E.D.

Cal. 1999); see also Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999,

1000 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[A] federal district court with power to

hear state law claims has discretion to keep, or decline to keep,

them under the conditions set out in § 1367(c).”).

Section 1367(c)(3) allows a district court to decline

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim if

“the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has

original jurisdiction . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). In this

case, the only federal law claim over which the court had

original jurisdiction were the claims pursuant to § 1983, the

first and fourth claims for relief. Consequently, pursuant to 28

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Because L. Salvatto’s claims are dismissed, R. 10

Salvatto’s claim for loss of consortium as a result of her

injuries must also be dismissed.

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U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the court declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims.10

III. Conclusion

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion for

summary judgment as to the first and fourth causes of action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, be and the same hereby is, GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all plaintiffs’ remaining

state law claims be, and the same hereby are, DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and this action is

hereby DISMISSED.

DATED: March 26, 2007

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