Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06106/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06106-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN BERNARD BROOKS,

Plaintiff,

v.

RAYMOND ANDREWS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:03-CV-06106-AWI-SMS-P

ORDER STRIKING PLAINTIFF’S SURREPLY

(Doc. 114)

ORDER DISMISSING BIVENS CLAIMS

AGAINST DEFENDANT GEO, GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

DEFENDANTS KROGER AND CALABRESE,

AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION ON

PLAINTIFF’S EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND

STATE LAW TORT CLAIMS

(Doc. 93)

ORDER REQUIRING DEFENDANTS

ANDREWS, RINSON, AND JOHNSON TO FILE

A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ADDRESSING PLAINTIFF’S EQUAL

PROTECTION CLAIM WITHIN FORTY-FIVE

DAYS

I. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment, and Dismissal of Bivens Claims

Against GEO

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Steven Bernard Brooks (“Plaintiff”) is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis in this civil action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which provides for recovery of money damages against

federal actors, and pursuant to California tort law. This action is proceeding on Plaintiff’s amended

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 Identified as Calabrise in the amended complaint. 1

 Identified as Rison in the amended complaint. 2

 Defendants Harvey, Haro, and Erlewine were dismissed from this action on September 28, 2005, pursuant 3

to Plaintiff’s notice of voluntary dismissal. (Doc. 104.)

 Plaintiff was provided with notice of the requirements for opposing a motion for summary judgment by the 4

Court in orders filed on January 14, 2004, and January 10, 2005. Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir.

1988). (Docs. 9, 52.)

 As discussed in subsection F, the Court will not consider Defendants’ equal protection argument, raised by 5

Defendants for the first time in their reply. Thus, declining to consider the surreply will not deprive Plaintiff of his

right to respond to that argument.

2

complaint, filed on April 22, 2004, against Defendants Andrews, Global Experts in Outsourcing

Corporation (GEO), Calabrese, Kroger, Johnson, and Rinson (“Defendants”) on Plaintiff’s Eighth 1 2

Amendment, Equal Protection Clause, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence

per se claims. 

3

On August 1, 2005, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary

judgment, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), 12(b)(6), and 56. (Docs. 93, 95.)

Plaintiff filed an opposition on November 17, 2005, and Defendants filed a reply on December 23,

2005. (Docs. 90-94.) Plaintiff filed a surreply on January 18, 2006. However, neither the Federal

4

Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Local Rules provides for a surreply. Although the Court has

discretion to request a surreply or grant leave to file a surreply, it has done neither in this instance

and the surreply will not be considered by the Court. Defendants’ motion was deemed submitted 5

upon the filing of the reply. Local Rule 78-230(m).

B. Dismissal of Bivens Claims Against Defendant GEO

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the Court shall dismiss at any time if the Court

determines that there exists a failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. “Leave to

amend should be granted [only] if it appears . . . that the plaintiff can correct the defect.” Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). 

Plaintiff may not recover damages against private corporations pursuant to Bivens.

Correctional Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63 (2001). Because Plaintiff’s Bivens claims

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against GEO, a private corporation, fail as a matter of law, the claims shall be dismissed, with

prejudice. 

C. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

Defendants move for the dismissal of Defendants Kroger and Calabrese on the basis that the

Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). Plaintiff bears the burden of

establishing that the Court has personal jurisdiction. See Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co.,

374 F.3d 797, 800-801 (9th Cir. 2004). When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction, the plaintiff is “obligated to come forward with facts, by affidavit or otherwise,

supporting personal jurisdiction.” Scott v.Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 1986); Amba Mktg.

Sys., Inc. v. Jobar Int'l, Inc., 551 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir. 1977). The plaintiff must “only make a

prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts through the submitted materials,” if the trial court's ruling

is based solely upon a review of affidavits and discovery materials. Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech.

Assoc., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1970). “In determining whether [plaintiff] has met this

burden, uncontroverted allegations in [plaintiff’s] complaint must be taken as true, and conflicts

between the facts contained in the parties’ affidavits must be resolved in [plaintiff’s] favor for

purposes of deciding whether a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction exists.” AT&T v.

Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). “If the

pleadings and other submitted materials raise issues of credibility or disputed questions of fact with

regard to jurisdiction, the district court has the discretion to take evidence at a preliminary hearing

in order to resolve the contested issues,” at which the plaintiff must establish personal jurisdiction

by a preponderance of the evidence. Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 1285. 

In the absence of specific statutory provision, federal courts apply the personal jurisdiction

laws of the state in which they are situated. See T.M. Hylwa, M.D., Inc. v. Palka, 823 F.2d 310, 312

(9th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10, California’s long-arm statute reaches

as far as the Due Process Clause permits. “Since California’s jurisdictional statute is coextensive

with federal due process requirements, the jurisdictional inquiries under state law and federal due

process merge into one analysis.” Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 620 (9th Cir. 1991). “We

are not bound by state cases, although theymay be considered persuasive authority.” Data Disc, Inc.

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v. Systems Technology Associates, Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1286 n.3 (9th Cir. 1977). “A state may

exercise either general or specific jurisdiction over a defendant. If a defendant's activities within the

forum state are ‘continuous and systematic’ or ‘substantial,’ the state has a sufficient relationship

with the defendant to assert general jurisdiction. If, however, a forum state cannot assert general

jurisdiction over the defendant, it may still assert specific jurisdiction depending on the quality and

nature of the defendant's contacts with the forum state in relation to the cause of action.” Lake v.

Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1420-21 (9th Cir. 1987). “To the extent that a corporation exercises the

privilege of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of

that state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations; and, so far as those obligations

arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which requires the

corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be

undue.” International Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). 

“The standard for establishing general jurisdiction is fairly high, and requires that the

defendant’s contacts be of the sort that approximate physical presence. Factors to be taken into

consideration are whether the defendant makes sales, solicits or engages in business in the state,

serves the state’s markets, designates an agent for service of process, holds a license, or is

incorporated there.” Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat. Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir.

2000) (citations omitted). 

For specific jurisdiction, there is a three part test: “1) the nonresident defendant must have

purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum by some

affirmative act or conduct; 2) plaintiff’s claim must arise out of or result from the defendant’s

forum-related activities; and 3) exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.” Roth v. Garcia

Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 620-21 (9th Cir. 1991) (emphasis in original). “When a court is exercising

specific jurisdiction over a defendant, arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the

forum, the fair warning that due process requires arises not at the time of the suit, but when the

events that gave rise to the suit occurred.” Steel v. United States, 813 F.2d 1545, 1549 (9th Cir.

1987) (citations omitted). 

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“The purposeful availment standard requires more than foreseeability of causing injury in

another state. Rather, the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is that the defendant’s

conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being

haled into court there. The purposeful availment prong prevents defendants from being haled into

a jurisdiction through random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts.” Terracom v. Valley Nat'l Bank,

49 F.3d 555, 560 (9th Cir. 1995). “[O]rdinarily use of the mails, telephone, or other international

communications simply do not qualify as purposeful activity invoking the benefits and protection

of the forum state.” Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1262 (9th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).

The second prong requires that the contacts relied on for personal jurisdiction actually relate to the

cause of action. MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1085 (C.D. Cal. 2003)

(“Contacts with a forum state are relevant for purposes of specific jurisdiction only if they are

sufficiently related to the cause of action.....Thus, if Plaintiffs’ claims would have arisen

notwithstanding certain contacts, those contacts are not relevant to the jurisdictional analysis.”).

“But for” causation is all that is required since “A restrictive reading of the ‘arising out of’

requirement is not necessary in order to protect potential defendants from unreasonable assertions

of jurisdiction.” Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385 (9th Cir. 1990) rev’d on other

grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). Once a court has found purposeful availment, the reasonableness of

jurisdiction is presumed. Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1364 (9th Cir. 1990). The burden is then

shifted to the defendant to show “the presence of some other considerations would render

jurisdiction unreasonable.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985).

Notwithstanding these requirements, the Ninth Circuit has stated that a more “flexible

approach” may be appropriate: “Jurisdiction may be established with a lesser showing of minimum

contacts if considerations of reasonableness dictate. Underthis analysis, there will be cases in which

the defendant has not purposefully directed its activities at the forum state, but has created sufficient

contacts to allow the state to exercise personal jurisdiction if such exercise is sufficiently

reasonable.” Ochoa v.J.B. Martin & Sons Farms, 287 F.3d 1182, 1189 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002). Overall,

“[q]uestions of personal jurisdiction admit of no simple solutions and that ultimately due process

issues of reasonableness and fairness must be decided on a case-by-case basis.” Wells Fargo & Co.

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v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 426 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting Perkins v. Benguet Consol.

Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952)).

In this instance, Defendants Calabrese and Kroger work and reside in Florida. Defendant

Calabrese is the President and Chief Operating Officer of GEO, and Defendant Kroger is the Vice

President of Medical Services for GEO. Defendant Kroger oversees the medical services provided

by GEO, including the drafting and implementation of medical policy and procedures for GEO. 

Plaintiff contends that general jurisdiction is appropriate becauseDefendants are responsible

for implementing policies which govern the medical and dental care of inmates at TCI. Plaintiff

further contends that Defendants’ conduct in creating and implementing policies that are in effect

at TCI is sufficient to afford the Court special jurisdiction.

Plaintiff’s conclusory argument is unpersuasive. Plaintiff has made no showing that

Defendants’ conduct approximates any sort of physical presence in California. Defendants are

employees of GEO, and work and reside in Florida. This is insufficient to establish general

jurisdiction. 

With respect to specific jurisdiction, being employed by a corporation and drafting policies

for that corporation which will affect institutions such as that where Plaintiff is currently housed are

insufficient to establish that Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of

conducting activities in California. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants Calabrese and

Kroger are entitled to dismissal from this action.

D. Motion for Summary Adjudication on Eighth Amendment Claim

1. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue

as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the

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burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’”

Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon

motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

Id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s

case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment

should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard

for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence

of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is

required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586

n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630

(9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436

(9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’”

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963

amendments).

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In resolving the summary judgment motion, the Court examines the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule 56(c).

The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable

inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the Court must be drawn in favor of the

opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655

(1962) (per curiam). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing

party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. Richards

v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th

Cir. 1987). 

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show

that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

2. Summary of Relevant Allegations Set Forth in Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint

Plaintiff is an inmate housed at Taft Correctional Institution (“TCI”) in Taft, California. In

his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that pursuant to Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) Program

Statement 6005.5, BOP-housed inmates receive root canals and apioectomies on all

treatable/salvageable teeth. Plaintiff alleges that pursuant to GEO/TCI policy 514.1, root canals on

back teeth and apiectomies on any teeth are precluded, and only extractions are allowed under the

policy, regardless of the salvageability of the teeth. 

Plaintiff alleges that on April 16, 2002, he was informed by a TCI dentist that he was in

urgent need of an apiectomy on tooth #5, below an abscess that had formed. Plaintiff alleges that

on April 3, 2003, after he complained of severe pain and an abscessed, swollen right jaw, Dr. Liu,

a TCI dentist, determined that Plaintiff was in urgent need of a root canal on tooth #30. Plaintiff

alleges that as late as July 9, 2003, Dr. Liu informed him that his teeth could be saved by an

apiectomy and a root canal, but that the TCI policy precluded these treatments and allowed only for

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extractionsin such situations. Plaintiff alleges that on those occasions, he refused extraction because

he did not want to unnecessarily lose his teeth.

Plaintiff alleges that by November 30, 2003, the infection in tooth #30 had spread and

between the pain and the knowledge that the spreading infection was putting his other teeth at risk,

he allowed Dr. Liu to extract tooth #30. Plaintiff alleges that since April 16, 2002, he has suffered

from severe mental and physical pain, an inability to eat properly, spreading infection, and teeth

degeneration due to the condition of tooth #5, which Plaintiff refuses to allow a TCI dentist to

extract.

Plaintiff alleges that in early 2003, he filed an administrative appeal, which was denied by

Defendant Rinson, the Associate Warden at TCI, pursuant to policy 514.1. Plaintiff then pursued

his appeal to the next level of review, where it was denied by Defendant Andrews, Warden of TCI,

pursuant to policy 514.1. 

Plaintiff alleges that by denying his appeal, Defendants Rinson and Andrews acted with

deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff

alleges that Defendants GEO, Calabrese, Kroger, and Johnson were involved in the creation,

approval, and/or implementation of policy 514.1 solely as a cost-cutting measure and without regard

for the health and safety of inmates, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff alleges that

because BOP inmates would be entitled to the treatment he was precluded from receiving at TCI,

Defendants have violated his right to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. Finally, Plaintiff

alleges that Defendants GEO and Calabrese’s involvement in creating, approving, and/or

implementing the policy constitutes intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that their failure

to implement policies, guidelines, or procedures to prevent the violation of Plaintiff’s Fifth and

Eighth Amendment rights constitutes negligence per se. 

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 Plaintiff’s amended complaint is verified and shall be treated as an affidavit for purposes of the summary 6

judgment rule where it is based on facts within Plaintiff’s personal knowledge of admissible evidence, and not

merely on Plaintiff’s belief. Lew v. Kona Hospital, 754 F.2d 1420, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

10

3. Undisputed Facts6

1. On May 4, 2001, Plaintiff was committed to the custody of the BOP, and on April 5, 2002,

Plaintiff was designated to TCI, which is a privately operated by the GEO Corporation under

contract with the BOP. 

2. On April 10, 2002, TCI dental staff gave Plaintiff his initial dental screening and oral

examination. Over the next year, TCI dental staff saw Plaintiff on six separate occasions:

• April 16, 2002 (abscess on tooth #5, stating a “hopeless prognosis” and extraction may be

necessary);

• May 2, 2002 (tooth #19 needed re-cementing, extraction of #5 recommended);

• July 19, 2002 (extraction of #5 recommended, but Plaintiff wanted to save #5 so he was

informed that he could hire an outside dentist to come to the institution to perform his

desired treatment);

• March 31, 2003 (tooth #30 swollen, cracked and abscessed, extraction needed, prescribed

antibiotic and pain medication);

• April 3, 2003 (#30 extraction refused but Plaintiff would not sign refusal form, #5

extraction previously refused, Plaintiff inquired about getting a private dentist to come to the

institution and about his options in getting extracted teeth replaced upon his release);

• April 17, 2003 (#5 abscess noted, extraction needed, Motrin prescribed).

3. Between April 2003 and August 2003, Plaintiff was seen byTCI dental staff on nine separate

occasions:

• April 24, 2003 (Plaintiff placed on dental cleaning wait list and given Motrin);

• May 15, 2003 (abscess on #5 and #30, extraction recommended but refused due to Plaintiff

waiting for outside dentist to perform root canals, he was warned about spread of infection

and possible health problems and given Motrin);

• May 30, 2003 (#30 abscess, extraction needed, antibiotics prescribed); 

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• June 9, 2003 (Plaintiff refused extraction of #30,signed refusal form, wants outside dentist

to come in for treatment);

• July 8, 2003 (pain from #30 abscess, wants medication only, Motrin);

• July 10, 2003 (requested medical records for outside dentist, scheduled x-ray appointment);

• July 17, 2003 (took two x-rays for outside dentist consult);

• July 21, 2003 (scheduled consultation, outside dentist, Dr. Arza, was called on July 18,

2003, but did not want to come to prison facilities to perform treatment, Plaintiff advised to

clarify protocol to dentist); and

• August 11, 2003 (#30 infected, antibiotics and Motrin).

4. Between August 2003 and March 2005, Plaintiff was seen by TCI dental staff or had a

scheduled dental appointment on fifteen separate occasions concerning his abscessed teeth

and other dental problems related (and unrelated) to his abscessed teeth: November 6, 2003;

November 13, 2003; November 19, 2003; November 24, 2003 (failed to show for

appointment); November 25, 2003; December 8, 2003; December 30, 2003; February 12,

2004; March 15, 2004; March 26, 2004; June 10, 2004; June 22, 2004; December 1, 2004;

December 21, 2004 (Plaintiff 30 minutes late, appointment rescheduled); March 8, 2005.

5. TCI Health Services Policies, including 514.1 Guidelines for Infection Control in Dental

Clinics and Dental Laboratories, were reviewed and accepted by the BOP on May 9, 1998.

6. The BOP requires that TCI develop and maintain proper procedures to adequately address

the inmates’ medical and dental needs. The section on inmate health care in the BOP-TCI

Statement of Work provides the following requirements: The contractor shall provide all

essential health services while meeting the applicable standards and levels of quality

established by the ACA [American Correctional Association] and the designated BOP

ambulatory health care accreditation provider, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of

Health Care Organizations (JCAHO). In addition, the contractor shall adhere to all

applicable Federal, state and local laws and regulations governing the delivery of health

services and establish the necessary quality controls to ensure all policies and procedures are

designed and implemented in a manner to promote orderly and efficient delivery and

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management of health services to the inmate population. . . . The provision of medical

services commensurate to the level of care available in the community is an essential

component of successful performance under the contract. . . . The contractor shall have

written plans and procedures for providing urgent medical, health, mental health and dental

services. The plan shall include, but is not limited to the following: (1) 24 hour a day, seven

day a week emergency medical, health, mental health and dental care; . . . (10) dental

services - routine and emergency; . . . and (16) quality control/peer reviews.

7. Under the requirements set forth in the Statement of Work, Wackenhut/GeoCorp/TCI drafted

Dental Policy 514.1, Guidelines for Infection Control in Dental Clinics and Dental

Laboratories. The BOP reviewed and approved Dental Policy 514.1 on May 9, 1998.

8. On May 19, 2003, Defendant Andrews was involved in preparing a response to Plaintiff's

step two administrative remedy which was prepared only after a thorough review of

Plaintiff's medical records was made by counselor Dickerson by the health services

administrator and the dental department.

9. Defendant Andrews was informed that the dental treatment requested by Plaintiff was not

covered under TCI Policy 514.1 because the root canal was not restorable with any degree

of certainty and was informed that an extraction was the only procedure that would afford

Plaintiff with 100% recovery.

10. In 2003, Defendant Rinson was involved in Plaintiff's step one TCI administrative remedy

appeal and denied Plaintiff's appeal after consultation with TCI’s dental department, after the

review of Plaintiff's medical records by TCI’s Health Services Department and after

consultation with TCI’s Health Services Administrator.

11. Defendant Rinson was informed by Health Services Administrator and the Chief Dentist that

extraction of Plaintiff's tooth was the only viable and medically probable treatment that

would alleviate his condition.

12. Defendants Rinson and Andrews were not responsible or involved with the drafting of or

implementation of TCI's policies and procedures, nor are they experienced in or have

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received the training necessary to make decisions about appropriate dental treatment for

inmates.

13. Defendants Kroger and Johnson oversee the medical services provided by GEO, to include

the drafting and implementation of medical policy and procedures for GEO. GEO medical

policies and procedures are based upon national standards of health care for incarcerated

individuals.

14. Although Defendants Kroger and Johnson are responsible for drafting and implementing

policies relating to health care, they are not responsible for the immediate, day-to-day,

individual decisions made for the care and treatment of inmates by dentists, who are acting

as individual practitioners under guidance by GEO health care policies and procedures.

15. Defendants Kroger and Calabrese are employed and reside outside of the State of California.

16. Warren H. Liu, D.D.S. was the Chief Dentist whom conducted numerous dental examination

of Plaintiff. Plaintiff was treated at TCI’s dental offices on multiple occasions and dental

treatment was provided as needed. TCI has a treatment program, an extraction, which is

currently available to Plaintiff and will provide Plaintiff with relief from all of his alleged

pain and suffering.

17. On April 3, 2003, Dr. Liu informed Plaintiff that under TCI policy he is allowed to obtain

alternative treatment by another dentist if that dentist is willing to see Plaintiff within the

facility. On July 18, 2003, Dr. Arza contacted Dr. Liu relating to Plaintiff. Dr. Arza

informed Dr. Liu that he was contacted by Plaintiff but would not be willing to treat Plaintiff

at the TCI facility.

4. Discussion

a. Eighth Amendment Claim

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452

U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the level of an

Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with deliberate

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indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett

v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). Deliberate indifference may be

manifested “when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment,” or

in the manner “in which prison physicians provide medical care.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133,

1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Supervisory personnel cannot be held liable in a Bivens action for

the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d

1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 1991). Therefore, no defendant may be held liable for acting with deliberate

indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment unless that defendant “knows of and disregards

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 

“A difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities regarding

treatment does not give rise to a s 1983 claim.” Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir.

1981) (internal citation omitted). The Eighth Amendment does not provide Plaintiff a right to

choose between alternate courses of treatment. Rather, to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim

based on a disagreement in treatment, Plaintiff must set forth admissible evidence showing “that the

course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances . . . and

. . . that they chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [his] health.” Jackson

v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal citations omitted). Despite Plaintiff’s

assertion to the contrary, this case involves Plaintiff’s disagreement with the treatment option he was

provided with and Plaintiff’s disagreement with a policy governing treatment choices. 

Defendants’ position is that Plaintiff received thorough, attentive dental care at TCI.

Defendants contend that TCI policy does not prohibit medically viable root canals or apioectomies,

but rather that Warren H. Liu, D.D.S., the Chief Dentist who conducted numerous dental

examinations of Plaintiff, recommended on May 15, 2003, that Plaintiff’s tooth number 30 be

extracted because it was cracked and had an infectious abscess, and recommended on April 16, 2002,

that Plaintiff’s tooth number 5 be extracted because Plaintiff had a failing of a previous root canal

and an infectious abscess. (Liu Dec., ¶¶5,6,8,11; Johnson Dec. ¶3; Kroger Dec., ¶3.) Defendants

contend that Dr. Liu determined extraction is necessary to ensure that Plaintiff has a 100% chance

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of recovery and that it is a perfectly acceptable course of treatment for a person with such a poor

prognosis as Plaintiff. (Liu Dec., ¶8.) Defendants contend that Dr. Liu determined the alternate

treatments as requested by Plaintiff, re-treatment of the root canal or apioectomy, have very poor

chances of success with limited chances of recovery. (Id.) Defendants contend that TCI has a

treatment program, an extraction, which is currently available to Plaintiff and will provide Plaintiff

with relief from all of his alleged pain and suffering, but Plaintiff has refused that recommended

course of treatment. (Id., ¶¶8, 10.) Defendants contend that the treatment program that is available

at TCI is acceptable in the dental community, and re-treatment of Plaintiff’s root canal is not a viable

procedure because of the way in which his first root canal was performed. (Id., ¶11.) Defendants

contend that although an apioectomy would be possible on Plaintiff’s tooth, Dr. Liu would not

recommend the treatment because Plaintiff’s prognosis is so poor and an extraction is the more

appropriate treatment. (Id.)

Further, on April 3, 2003, Dr. Liu informed Plaintiff that under TCI policy he is allowed to

obtain alternative treatment by another dentist if that dentist is willing to see Plaintiff within the

facility. (U.F. 21.) On July 18, 2003, Dr. Arza contacted Dr. Liu relating to Plaintiff and informed

Dr. Liu that he was contacted by Plaintiff but would not be willing to treat Plaintiff at the TCI

facility. (Id.)

Turning to Plaintiff’s position, Plaintiff contends that TCI has a policy precluding root canals

and apiectomies, and that this policy was enacted to cut costs at the expense of inmate health and

safety. However, the policy statement submitted by the parties contains no statement that these

procedures are precluded, and, with the exception of Dr. Liu’s statement discussed in the following

paragraph, Plaintiff hassubmitted no evidence supporting that interpretation of the policy. (Ds’ Ex.

C, attached to Ex. 1; P’s Ex. G.) As a layman, Plaintiff is not qualified to provide an interpretation

of the policy’s meaning from a medical standpoint. 

In his declaration, Plaintiff attests that Dr. Liu told him that the policy precludes root canals

on back teeth and apiectomies on any teeth regardless of whether these treatments are medically

viable options that can save an inmate’s teeth, and that the policy was created solely as a cost-cutting

measure because extractions are much cheaper to provide. (Brooks Dec., ¶¶12-13.) Even if the

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Court were to consider these statements as admissions, they are insufficient to raise a triable issue

of fact. In order to prevail on his Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff must submit evidence showing

that the course of treatment chosen was medically unacceptable. Plaintiff has not done so. As a lay

witness, Plaintiff is not qualified to opine that a root canal and an apiectomy are the only medically

appropriate treatments for his teeth and that extractions are medically unacceptable under the

circumstances, and Dr. Liu’s alleged statements fall short of demonstrating that the treatment

available to Plaintiff under the policy and the treatment offered to Plaintiff by TCI dentists was

medically unacceptable under the circumstances. Because there has been no showing that the

alternate treatment of a root canal and/or an apiectomywas the only medically acceptable course and

that the recommended course of extraction was medically unacceptable, Defendants are entitled to

judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against them. 

E. Motion for Summary Adjudication on State Law Claims

1. IIED Claim

Plaintiff alleges tort claims against Defendant GEO for intentional infliction of emotional

distress and negligence per se. Under California law, the elements of intentional infliction of

emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of

causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s

suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the

emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. Sabow v. United States, 93 F.3d 1445,

1454 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing to Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.3d 868 (1991)) (quotations

omitted).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot establish the elements of his IIED claim. Defendants

contend that policy 514.1 does not prohibit root canals and apiectomies as long as Plaintiff is a

candidate for the procedures, which he is not in Dr. Liu’s opinion, and there is therefore no conduct

at issue that is outrageous. (Ds’ Memo., 13:7-15.) Defendants further contend that there was no

intent to harm Plaintiff. (Id., 13:19-21.) Plaintiff contends that whether or not policy 514.1

precludes root canals and apiectomies is in dispute and that if the policy precludes these options, a

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trier of fact could conclude that Defendant’s conduct was outrageous and in reckless disregard of the

probability that Plaintiff would suffer emotional distress. (P’s Memo., 25:7-19.)

Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence that the policy was medically unacceptable or

otherwise so deficient such that it constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct. Further, the conduct

at issue must have been either directed at Plaintiff or in reckless disregard of Plaintiff and the

probability that the conduct would cause severe emotional distress. Sabow, F.3d at 1455. There is

simply no evidence that Defendant GEO, in allowing the implementation of policy 514.1, acted with

the intention to cause severe emotional distress or acted with reckless disregard to the probability

that severe emotional distress would be caused. Accordingly, the Court finds that GEO is entitled

to summary adjudication on Plaintiff’s IIED claim.

2. Negligence Per Se Claim

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges a claim for relief for negligence per se.

“[California] Evidence Code section 669 allows proof of a statutory violation to create a presumption

of negligence in specified circumstances. It codifies the common law doctrine of negligence per se,

pursuant to which statutes and regulations may be used to establish duties and standards of care in

negligence actions.” Elsner v. Uveges, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 530, 536-37 (Cal. 2004). In order to create

a presumption of negligence, four elements must be met: “(1) the defendant violated a statute,

ordinance, or regulation of a public entity; (2) the violation proximately caused death or injury to

person or property; (3) the death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature of which the

statute, ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and (4) the person suffering the death or

the injury to his person or property was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute,

ordinance, or regulation was adopted.” Spates v. Dameron Hosp. Assoc., 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 597, 606

(Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (internal quotations and citation omitted). “The first two elements are questions

of fact, while the latter of questions of law.” Id. “[T]he presumption of negligence concerns the

standard of care” rather than the duty of care. California Serv. Station & Automobile Repair Assoc.

v. American Home Assurance Co., 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 182, 189 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).

Defendants argue that GEO is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Plaintiff cannot

establish a violation, as he has not identified a statute, ordinance, or regulation Defendant allegedly

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violated. (Ds’ Memo., 14:20-25.) In addition, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has neither made

a claim of negligence nor stated a claim for negligence. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that his amended

complaint can be liberally construed as raising a general negligence claim against Defendant, and

that he has met the elements because Defendant had a duty to him and breached that duty by

allowing the implementation of policy 514.1, which caused his injuries. (P’s Memo., 26:18-28:12.)

Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). “Such a statement must

simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it

rests.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). “[T]he liberal pleading standard

. . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9

(1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of

the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257

(9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint neither pled a general negligence claim nor pled the essential

elements, thereby arguably placing Defendants on notice as to the existence of a general negligence

claim in the amended complaint. Rather, Plaintiff specifically pled tort claims for IIED and

negligence per se, thereby giving Defendants notice of those two state law tort claims. (Comp., 1:24-

25 & 9:22-10:5.) This is not a situation where Plaintiff’s factual allegations were inartfully pled,

leading to some uncertainty over the bases of Plaintiff’s claims for relief, with the Defendants

seeking to take advantage of that inartful pleading by arguing that a claim was not specifically pled.

Instead, Plaintiff clearly pled the bases for his state law claims and now, after being placed on notice

via Defendants’ motion for summary judgment that his negligence per se claim suffers from fatal

deficiencies, seeks to include a claim neither actuallypled or inferentially pled via factual allegations

setting forth the essential elements. Accordingly, Plaintiff shall be held to the claims set forth in his

amended complaint.

Turning to the merits of Plaintiff’s negligence per se claim, Plaintiff has neither pled nor set

forth any evidence that GEO violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation. GEO is therefore entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. 

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28 Defendants did raise this argument in their reply. However, as the parties moving for summary judgment, 7

Defendants must set forth this argument in their moving papers, not in their reply.

19

F. Fifth Amendment Equal Protection Claim

Finally, in his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges a claim based on violation of the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Defendants do not address this claim in their motion.7

Within forty-five days from the date of service of this order, remaining Defendants Andrews, Rinson,

and Johnson shall file a motion for summary judgment addressing this remaining claim.

G. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s surreply, filed January 18, 2006, is STRICKEN from the record;

2. Plaintiff’s Bivens claims against Defendant GEO are dismissed, with prejudice, for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;

3. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Calabrese and Kroger from this action for lack of

personal jurisdiction, filed August 1, 2005, is GRANTED, with prejudice;

4. Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

claim against Defendants Andrews, Rinson, and Johnson, filed August 1, 2005, is

GRANTED;

5. Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication on Plaintiff’s state law tort claims

against Defendant GEO is GRANTED; and

6. Defendants Andrews, Rinson, and Johnson shall file a motion for summary judgment

on Plaintiff’s remaining equal protection claim within forty-five days (45) from the

date of service of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 15, 2006 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

9h0d30 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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