Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00355/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00355-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

NICHOLAS SANTS, an individual, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

DEPUTY MICHAEL SEIPERT, 

individually and in his official capacity; 

COUNTY OF PLACER; COUNTY OF 

PLACER SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; 

and DOES 1-10,1

 inclusive. 

Defendants. 

No. 2:15–cv–00355–KJM–CKD 

ORDER 

 

 This matter is before the court on defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s 

complaint based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff has filed an 

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 The Ninth Circuit has held that if a defendant’s identity is not known before the 

complaint is filed, a “plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify the 

unknown defendants.” Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (quotation 

marks omitted) (quoting Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980)). Plaintiff is 

warned, however, that doe defendants will be dismissed if “it is clear that discovery would not 

uncover the[ir] identities, or that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds.” Id. 

(quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642). Plaintiff is also warned that 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) is applicable to doe defendants. That rule provides the 

court must dismiss defendants who have not been served within 120 days after the filing of the 

complaint unless good cause is shown. See Glass v. Fields, No. 09-00098, 2011 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 97604 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2011); Hard Drive Prods. v. Does, No. 11-01567, 2011 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 109837, at *2–4 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 27, 2011). 

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untimely opposition (ECF No. 7), and defendants an untimely reply (ECF No. 8). Despite their 

untimeliness, the court will consider both filings. The court submitted the matter without oral 

argument. As explained below, defendants’ motion is GRANTED. 

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 The claims in this case, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arise out of defendant 

sheriff’s deputy Michael Seipert’s alleged use of excessive force against and arrest without 

probable cause of plaintiff Nicholas Sants on February 12, 2013 at the Squaw Valley Resort (the 

Resort). (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff is a resident of Truckee, California. (Id. 

¶ 8.) Defendants are Placer County (the County), Placer County Sheriff’s Department, and 

Deputy Seipert. (Id. ¶ 9.) 

 On February 12, 2013, plaintiff was socializing with friends at the Squaw Valley 

Resort. (Id. ¶ 13.) Defendant Seipert approached plaintiff and announced he was arresting 

plaintiff for public intoxication. (Id. ¶ 16.) When plaintiff inquired about the reasons for arrest, 

defendant Seipert “became aggressive,” “punch[ed] him in the face,” and struck him with a billy 

club. (Id. ¶¶ 16–17.) Plaintiff did not attack defendant at any point and acted only in selfdefense. (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff had a pre-existing seizure disorder; he repeatedly informed both the 

paramedics and police personnel of the disorder. (Id. ¶ 19.) In the summer of 2014, plaintiff was 

declared permanently disabled “as a result of the exacerbation of the pre-existing seizure 

disorder.” (Id. ¶ 20.) Eventually, plaintiff was charged with public intoxication, resisting arrest, 

and assaulting a police officer in the County Superior Court, in case number 72-008156B. (Id. ¶¶ 

15, 21.) Defendants represent plaintiff’s criminal case is still pending.2

 (ECF No. 5-1 at 2.) As 

of the date of this order, the court understands the criminal case is set for a trial confirmation 

conference on October 16, 2015. 

 Plaintiff commenced this action in this court on February 11, 2015, alleging ten 

claims: (1) excessive force, (2) false arrest, (3) malicious prosecution, (4) fabrication of false 

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 The court takes judicial notice of (1) the felony complaint filed in the Placer County 

Superior Court against plaintiff Sants and (2) a minute order showing a preliminary hearing was 

set for April 30, 2015. (ECF No. 5-2, Exs. 1–2.) See Moore v. City of Vallejo, 73 F. Supp. 3d 

1253, 1256 (E.D. Cal. 2014).

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evidence, (5) conspiracy, (6) failure to implement appropriate policies and customs, 

(7) negligence, (8) negligent training and supervision, (9) intentional infliction of emotional 

distress, and (10) negligent infliction of emotional distress. (See ECF No. 1.) Defendants have 

moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint. (ECF No. 5-1.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a 

complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A court may dismiss 

“based on the lack of cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a 

cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Although a complaint need contain only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief,” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), to survive a motion to dismiss this short 

and plain statement “must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint must include something more than “an 

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” or “‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action . . . .’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555). Determining whether a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Ultimately, the inquiry focuses on the interplay 

between the factual allegations of the complaint and the dispositive issues of law in the action. 

See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). 

In making this context-specific evaluation, this court “must presume all factual 

allegations of the complaint to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

nonmoving party.” Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). This rule 

does not apply to “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” Papasan v. Allain, 478 

U.S. 265, 286 (1986), quoted in Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, to “allegations that contradict matters 

properly subject to judicial notice,” or to material attached to or incorporated by reference into the 

complaint, Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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III. ANALYSIS 

A. Staying this Action Pending the Criminal Prosecution 

 Defendants argue this court should stay the instant civil case while the underlying 

criminal case is pending. (ECF No. 5-1 at 5.) “Plaintiff has no objection to staying this action 

during the pendency of the state criminal prosecution.” (ECF No. 7 at 1.) 

 A party has no constitutional right to a stay of civil proceedings during the 

pendency of a criminal investigation. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Molinaro, 889 F.2d 899, 

902 (9th Cir. 1989) (“While a district court may stay civil proceedings pending the outcome of 

parallel criminal proceedings, such action is not required by the Constitution.”); see also Wallace 

v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393–94 (2007) (noting “it is within the power of the district court, and in 

accord with common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a 

criminal case is ended”). After considering “the particular circumstances and competing interests 

involved in the case,” a court has discretion either to stay the entire proceeding or fashion some 

other, less drastic remedy. Id.; see also eBay, Inc. v. Digital Point Solutions, Inc., No. 08-4052, 

2010 WL 702463, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2010) (considering plaintiff’s proposed alternatives to 

a stay, but ultimately denying the stay); accord In re CFS-Related Sec. Fraud Litig., 256 F. Supp. 

2d 1227, 1236 (N.D. Okla. 2003) (“A general stay is just one of several procedures available. 

Other options may be utilized in lieu of imposing a stay. These alternate tools include the 

imposition of protective orders, sealed interrogatories, a stay for a finite period of time, or a stay 

limited to a specific subject matter.”). 

 In considering whether to stay the proceedings, the court should consider the 

following factors: 

(1) the interest of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously with 

this litigation or any particular aspect of it, and the potential 

prejudice to plaintiffs of a delay; (2) the burden which any 

particular aspect of the proceedings may impose on defendants; 

(3) the convenience of the court in the management of its cases, and 

the efficient use of judicial resources; (4) the interests of persons 

not parties to the civil litigation; and (5) the interest of the public in 

the pending civil and criminal litigation. 

Molinaro, 889 F.2d at 903. 

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1. Plaintiff’s Interest, Burden on Defendants, and Convenience of the Court 

 Because plaintiff “has no objection to staying this action,” he will not be 

prejudiced by a stay. The interests of defendants, as movants, weigh too in favor of a stay. As to 

the court’s interest, the court, undeniably, has an interest in managing its cases efficiently. 

McCormick, 2010 WL 934242, at *3. In the instant case, the court’s interest weighs in favor of a 

stay. Douglas v. United States, No. 03-04518, 2006 WL 2038375, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 

2006) (noting that allowing the criminal action to proceed first may narrow the issues and 

streamline discovery in the civil proceeding). 

2. Third Parties’ and Public’s Interests 

 Because no party has presented any evidence or compelling arguments on the 

factors regarding the potential burden to the interests of the public or non-parties, these factors are 

neutral on the question of the stay. 

 The court GRANTS defendants’ motion to stay this action, subject to addressing 

the motion to dismiss as discussed below. The parties are DIRECTED to file a status report 

within thirty days of the date of this order, reporting on the progress of the criminal prosecution 

and every thirty days thereafter until the criminal case is concluded. 

B. The Sheriff’s Department Must be Dismissed 

 Defendants argue the Sheriff’s Department should be dismissed because it is not a 

person within the meaning of § 1983. (ECF No. 5-1 at 6.) Plaintiff agrees and requests leave to 

amend to dismiss “charges” against the Sheriff’s Department. According to the parties’ 

agreement, the court DISMISSES the Sheriff’s Department with prejudice. See Melendres v. 

Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254, 1260 (9th Cir. 2015) (ordering Maricopa County be substituted as a party 

in lieu of the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office). 

C. Claims Against Defendant Seipert in his Official Capacity are Redundant 

 Defendants argue the claims against defendant Seipert in his official capacity are 

redundant of those alleged against the County and thus should be dismissed. (ECF No. 5-1 at 6–

7.) Plaintiff does not address that argument. 

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 “Where both the public entity and a municipal officer are named in a lawsuit, a 

court may dismiss the individual named in his official capacity as a redundant defendant.” 

Sanchez v. City of Fresno, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1114 (E.D. Cal. 2012). Here, defendant Seipert 

is named as a defendant both in his official capacity and as an individual. The court DISMISSES 

only the official-capacity claim as redundant because plaintiff also has named the County as a 

defendant. 

D. Municipal Liability 

 Defendants argue the allegations of the complaint are too conclusory to give rise to 

a claim under Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 

(ECF No. 5-1 at 7–10.) Here, plaintiff disagrees. (ECF No. 7 at 2–3.) 

 Municipalities may be held liable as “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but not for 

the unconstitutional acts of their employees based solely on a respondeat superior theory. Monell, 

436 U.S. at 691. Rather, a plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983 is 

required “to identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff’s injury.” Bd. of 

Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). 

 To sufficiently plead a Monell claim and withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss, allegations in a complaint “may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but 

must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the 

opposing party to defend itself effectively.” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 

631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011)). A Monell

claim may be stated under three theories of municipal liability: (1) when official policies or 

established customs inflict a constitutional injury; (2) when omissions or failures to act amount to 

a local government policy of deliberate indifference to constitutional rights; or (3) when a local 

government official with final policy-making authority ratifies a subordinate’s unconstitutional 

conduct. Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1249–50 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, 

plaintiff asserts liability under the first theory, offering the support that, “it is the customs and 

common practices of the county at fault.” (ECF No. 7 at 2−3.) 

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 A plaintiff may establish municipal liability based on this first theory by 

demonstrating “the constitutional tort was the result of a ‘longstanding practice or custom which 

constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity.’” Price v. Sery, 513 

F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ulrich v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 308 F.3d 968, 984–85 (9th 

Cir. 2002)). To establish liability in this way, a plaintiff must show (1) that the plaintiff 

“possessed a constitutional right of which [he or she] was deprived; (2) that the municipality had 

a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional 

right; and, (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Plumeau v. 

Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

 Here, while the allegations of the complaint are too conclusory to survive 

defendants’ motion to dismiss, the new facts stated in plaintiff’s opposition brief warrant allowing 

leave to amend. See Orion Tire Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 268 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (“new” facts in a plaintiff's opposition papers can be considered by courts in deciding 

whether to grant leave to amend). Specifically, in his opposition brief, plaintiff states the 

following: 

Audio recordings on the night of Mr. Sants’ arrest show systematic 

and total disregard for both the safety and the constitutional rights 

of Mr. Sants. Placer County employees, from dispatchers to 

Sheriff’s deputies to medical personnel, at various times did not 

respond to Mr. Sants calls for help when being beaten by Deputy 

Seipert or when attempting to get medical attention in police 

custody. 

Mr. Sants was heard begging to be taken to the hospital by multiple 

Sheriff’s Deputies, one of whom is heard on the police audio 

recording informing Mr. Sants that Mr. Sants is having a panic 

attack. The Deputy goes on to inform Mr. Sants that he has over a 

decade of medical training. Furthermore, the deputy volunteered in 

a pre-trial hearing that he, in fact, found Mr. Sants to be credible 

while he was in the throes of his panic attack, begging for medical 

attention. Despite that, every deputy made Mr. Sants wait to 

receive necessary attention. 

(ECF No. 7 at 3.) Accordingly, the court GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s 

Monell claim, but GRANTS plaintiff leave to amend after the stay is lifted, if plaintiff can do so 

consonant with Rule 11. 

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E. Plaintiff’s State-Law Claims 

 Defendants argue plaintiff’s state law claims should be dismissed because plaintiff 

has not complied with the requirements of the Government Claims Act. (ECF No. 5-1 at 10–12.) 

Plaintiff does address that argument in his opposition brief. 

 “As a prerequisite for filing suit for ‘money or damages’ against a public entity, 

the California Government Claim Act requires presentation of a claim to the public entity.” Gen. 

Sec. Servs. Corp. v. Cnty. of Fresno, 815 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1131 (E.D. Cal. 2011); see Cal. Gov’t 

Code §§ 911.2, 945.4; see also State of California v. Superior Court (“Bodde”), 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 

1240–44 (2004). This requirement applies to claims sounding in tort. See City of Stockton v. 

Superior Court, 42 Cal. 4th 730, 738 (2007). Claims involving death or injuries to a person or 

personal property must be presented no later than six months after the accrual of the claim. See

Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.2(a). The date of accrual is that which would pertain under the statute of 

limitations if the dispute were between private litigants. See Shirk v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist., 42 

Cal. 4th 201, 208–09 (2007). The Government Claims statutes “must be satisfied even in the face 

of the public entity’s actual knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the claim.” City of 

Stockton, 42 Cal. 4th at 738. The failure to timely present a claim for money or damages to a 

public entity bars a plaintiff from bringing suit against that entity. Bodde, 32 Cal. 4th at 1240. 

 Here, the complaint’s allegations do not show compliance with the Government 

Claims Act. Plaintiff’s state-law claims are (1) negligence, (2) negligent training and supervision, 

(3) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress. 

(Compl. at 14–17.) Those claims arise from the same event: plaintiff’s arrest in February 2013. 

Plaintiff’s complaint neither mentions a timely filing nor alleges an excuse from compliance with 

the filing requirement, if there is one. Accordingly, the court DISMISSES plaintiff’s state-law 

claims. Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to amend once the stay is lifted, if he can do so consonant 

with Rule 11. 

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IV. MEET AND CONFER EFFORTS AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE (OSC) 

A. Defendants’ Counsel 

 Defendants’ counsel reports he tried to meet and confer with plaintiff’s counsel by 

e-mail and telephone at about 10:00 a.m. on April 29, 2015 regarding the issues identified in the 

instant motion. (ECF No. 5 at 2.) He further reports that plaintiff’s counsel “was not available to 

discuss the matters and defendants’ motion needed to be filed on that day.” (Id.) 

 Here, defendants’ counsel is subject to an OSC because he did not comply with 

this court’s Standing Order. The court is baffled by defendants’ effort to meet and confer. This 

court’s Standing Order directs the parties to engage in a pre-filing meet and confer to thoroughly 

discuss the substance of the contemplated motion and any potential resolution. (Standing Order, 

ECF No. 3-1 at 3.) By seeking to contact plaintiff’s counsel on the day the motion “needed to be 

filed,” as defendants’ counsel represents, defendants’ counsel clearly did not exhaust efforts to 

meet and confer. Moreover, defendants’ counsel filed an untimely reply and before doing so, he 

did not seek a belated stipulation in light of plaintiff’s position expressed in his “opposition.” 

Accordingly, defendants’ counsel is hereby ORDERED, within seven (7) days of entry of this 

order, to show cause why he should not be sanctioned in the amount of $250 for failure to comply 

with this court’s Standing Order. 

B. Plaintiff’s Counsel 

 Plaintiff’s counsel also has not complied with applicable rules. Specifically, 

counsel has not complied with Local Rule 230(c), providing that any opposition to a motion must 

be in writing and filed not less than fourteen days before the noticed hearing date. The noticed 

hearing on the instant motion was June 5, 2015. Plaintiff’s opposition, if any, or notice of nonopposition must have been filed no later than May 22, 2015. Plaintiff filed his opposition on May 

29, 2015. (ECF No. 7.) And to the extent the opposition did not oppose some of the arguments 

raised by defendants, plaintiff’s counsel could and should have sought a stipulation to that extent. 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s counsel is hereby ORDERED, within seven (7) days of entry of this 

order, to show cause why he should not be sanctioned in the amount of $250 for failure to comply 

with this court’s Local Rules. 

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V. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the court orders as follows: 

1. Notwithstanding the stay imposed below, counsel are ordered to respond to the 

orders to show cause incorporated above. 

2. Placer County Sheriff’s Department is DISMISSED with prejudice. 

3. All official-capacity claims against Sheriff’s Deputy Seipert are DISMISSED 

with prejudice. 

4. Plaintiff’s municipal liability claim is DISMISSED with leave to amend. 

5. Plaintiff’s state-law claims are DISMISSED with leave to amend. 

6. Plaintiff’s amended complaint is due within twenty-one (21) days of the date 

on which the stay imposed below is lifted. 

7. The case is STAYED. The parties are directed to file a status report within 

thirty (30) days of the date of this order, reporting on the progress of the 

criminal prosecution and every thirty (30) days thereafter until the criminal 

case is concluded. Within seven (7) days of the criminal case concluding, the 

parties shall file a joint statement proposing a schedule for the balance of this 

case. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: September 3, 2015. 

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