Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00103/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00103-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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FILED' 

[ MAB- 9 2012 1 

Dj'8.~'ji.QI"""'" BY DEPUI'Y 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

IMHOTEP JORDAN, Jr., 

aka JOHN JORDAN, 

CDCR#C-71742, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

T. PRICE, 

Defendant. 

Civil No. 12cv0103 WQH (JMA) 

ORDER: 

(1) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

FOR FAILING TO PAY FILING 

FEES AND FOR FAILING TO 

MOVE IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

AND 

(2) AS FRIVOLOUS AND 

MALICIOUS PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) 

Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison ("CAL"), in Calipatria, 

California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a set ofdocuments entitled "Notice ofFiling Intent" 

(ECF No.1). In his pleadings, comprised of a ''Notice,'' a "Request for Entry of Default 

Judgment," a "Notice and Demand," and an "Affidavit of Truth," Plaintiff appears to seek a 

default judgment and monetary "settlement" against a correctional lieutenant at CAL based on 

vague and unspecified acts ofmisconduct. (ECF No.1, 3, 10,21.) 

Plaintiff specifically alleges only that a default judgment must be entered against Price 

for "malicious[ly] and sadistic[ally]" and with "deliberate indifference and callous disregard," 

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violating his "commercial, civil, constitutional and human rights" as a "living breathing flesh 

and blood God created sovereign sentient being." (ECF No.1 at 2, 21, 25.) Plaintiff makes 

clear that he "does not intend ... his filings be constructed and/or construed to be a complaint, 

specifically not a 42 U.S.C. § 1983," because he is, instead, filing only a "request for entry of 

default judgment." (ld. at 2.)1 

I. FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE OR REQUEST IFP STATUS 

Any party instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court ofthe United 

States, other than a writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 19l4(a). An action may proceed despite a party's failure to pay only ifthe party is granted 

leave to proceed in Jorma pauperis ("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 19l5(a). See Andrews v. 

Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th 

Cir. 1999). However, Plaintiffhas notprepaid the $350 filing fee required to commence any sort 

offederal civil action; nor has he submitted a Motion to Proceed IFP. Therefore, his case must 

be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). 

II. INITIAL SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) 

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is 

obligated to review civil actions filed by anyone "incarcerated or detained in any facility who 

is accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the 

terms or conditions ofparole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program," "as SOOn as 

1 Plaintiff's "Notice" is identical to five others, all filed with the Clerk on the same day, 

purporting to seek default judgments against five other individual CAL correctional officials, all 

asserting the same frivolous claims and attempting to employ the same illicit procedure. See also Jordan 

v. Madden, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 12cv0098 DMS (POR); Jordan v. Builteman, S.D. Cal. Civil Case 

No. 12cv0099 BEN (NLS); Jordan v. Coronado, S.D. Civil Case No. 12cvOl00 WQH (RBB); Jordan 

v. Carpio, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 12cvOl01 lEG (JMA); and Jordan v. Powell, S.D. Cal. Civil Case 

No. 12cvOl02 DMS (BLM). A court '''may take notice ofproceedings in other courts, both within and 

without the federal judicial system, ifthose proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue. '" Bias 

v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 

803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002». Plaintiffhas not paid the $350 civil filing fee in any ofthese, or any prior civil 

case he has filed in the Southern District, and had thus far managed to avoid 28 U.S.c. § 1915(g)'s "3­

strikes" bar by submitting "Requests for Entry ofDefault Judgment" unaccompanied by complaints or 

motions to proceed informa pauperis. See e.g., Jordan v. Cardenas, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 11 cv1152 

DMS (NLS); Jordan v. Andersen, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. lIcvI153 lEG (JMA); Jordan v. Borem, 

S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. Ilcv1154 BEN (NLS); Jordan v. Drake, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. llcv1155 

AJB (MDD); and Jordan v. Coronado, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. l1cvl156 BTM (MDD). 

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practicable after docketing" and regardless ofwhether the prisoner prepays filing fees or moves 

to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 19 I 5A(a), (c). The Court must sua sponte dismiss prisoner 

complaints, or any portions thereof, which "seek[] redress from a governmental entity or officer 

or employee ofa governmental entity," if they are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 

1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010). 

As noted above, Plaintiffs pleading seeks to only to notifY the Court of his intent to file 

a request for entry of default judgment against a CAL correctional lieutenant, who allegedly 

breached ofhis "oath ofoffice" in violation ofPlaintiff s "commercial, civil, constitutional and 

human rights" on an unspecified occasion. (ECF No. 1 at 10-14.) Because Plaintiff is 

proceeding pro se, the Court would generally consider his claims liberally to arise under the Civil 

Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519-20 (1972) (noting that 

allegations asserted by pro se petitioners, "however inartfully pleaded," are held "to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers"). However, Plaintiff 

unequivocally states that he "does not intend ... his filings be constructed and/or construed to be 

a complaint, specifically not a 42 U.S.c. § 1983." (ECF No.1 at 2.) 

Without § 1983 or some other constitutional or federal statutory basis for his suit, this 

Court lacks subject matterjurisdiction altogether. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212 (2007) 

("Within constitutional bounds, Congress decides what cases the federal courts have jurisdiction 

to consider. Because Congress decides whether federal courts can hear cases at all, it can also 

determine when, and under what conditions, federal courts can hear them.") (citation omitted); 

see also SEC v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding the naming of a person 

in a motion insufficient to commence a civil action against him as a party). 

Moreover, "[the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] govern the procedure in all civil 

actions and proceedings in the United States district courts." FED.R.Clv.P. 1 (emphasis added); 

see also SECv. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650,655 (9th Cir. 2003). "There is one form ofaction-the 

civil action," FED.R.CIV.P. 2, which is "commenced by filing a complaint with the court." 

FED.R.Clv.P.3. "In short, an 'action' is the formal and ordinary means by which parties seek 

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legal and/or equitable relief before a court of law through the filing of a fonnal complaint, 

triggering the full array of legal, procedural, and evidentiary rules governing the process by 

which a court adjudicates the merits ofa dispute. Absent express statutory authorization stating 

otherwise, there is no question that the Federal Rules govern all 'actions' [brought] before the 

district courts of the United States." New Hampshire Fire Ins_ Co. v. Scanlon, 362 U.S. 404, 

407-08 (1960); McCarthy, 322 F.3d at 657. 

Thus, even if this Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 

based on a liberal construction ofPlaintiff s references to his "constitutional" rights (ECF No. 

1 at 10,21,25), to the extent he apparently seeks to avoid the procedures required to commence 

a civil action as set forth by both the Civil Rights Act and the Federal Rules and simply forge 

ahead to victory by being granted an unnoticed and unopposed default judgment in his favor, his 

"Notice" is null and his litigation strategy futile. See Powell v. Rios, 241 F .App 'x 500, 504 n.4 

(lOth Cir. 2007) (holding that '''[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make clear that only a 

properly-filed' complaint' can commence a civil action," and rejecting Plaintiff s attempts to file 

a motion for a temporary restraining order without first commencing a civil action pursuant to 

FED.R.CIY.P. 3 by filing a complaint); see also Boosalis Options, LP v. Farnbacher Loles 

Motorsports, LLC, 2010 WL 335651 at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (unpub.) (rejecting plaintiffs 

attempt to circumvent Federal Rules by submitting an "Application for Entry of Judgment 

Pursuant to a Confession" to the court without first commencing a civil action by filing a 

complaint, paying the requisite filing fee, and serving a summons upon the defendants, as an 

illicit attempt "to skip over all the usual safeguards of a lawsuit," and "go straight to an 

unopposed victory .... The Federal Rules do not authorize such a procedure."); Patray v. 

Northwest Pub., Inc., 931 F. Supp 865, 869 (D. Ga. 1996) (court must have both personal and 

subject-matter jurisdiction over defendant in order to entertain any request for default judgment); 

lOA Wright, Miller & Kane, FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIY., § 2682 (3d ed.) (2011). 

An action is frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(I) '"where it lacks an arguable basis 

either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Lopez v. Dept. o/Health 

Servs., 939 F.2d 881, 882-83 (9th Cir. 1991). Here, there is no question that Plaintiffs 

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suit-regardless ofwhat he wishes to call it-lacks any arguable basis in either law or fact, and is 

therefore frivolous under § 1915A(b)(l). Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328. 

In fact, Plaintiffs submissions, when considered in light of his repeated pattern of 

frivolous filings in this district,2 may further be classified as "malicious" insofar as they appear 

to lack good faith and "suggest[ s] an intent to vex the defendants or abuse the judicial process." 

See Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (a complaint may be inferred to 

be "malicious" ifit suggests an intent to abuse the judicial process); accord Aston v. Probst, 217 

F.3d 844,844 (9th Cir. 2000) (table disposition); Ballentine v. Crawford, 563 F. Supp. 627, 629 

(N.D. Ind. 1983). The test for maliciousness is subjective and requires the court to "determine 

the ... good faith ofthe applicant." Kinneyv. Plymouth Rock Squab Co., 236U.S.43, 46 (1915). 

In determining a litigant's "good faith," a court may consider not only the "printed words" ofthe 

complaint, but the circumstances and history of the filing, the tone of the allegations, and the 

presence or absence of probative facts. See Gjurovich v. California, 2010 WL 4321604 at *5 

(E.D. Cal. 2010) (unpub.) (quotingSpencerv. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 463 (E.D. N.C.), aff'd, 

826 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1987». Nothing in Plaintiffs "Notice" in this case, orin his litigation 

history in this district, suggests good faith of any sort. 

For these additional reasons, the Court dismisses the entirety ofPlaintiff s action as both 

frivolous and malicious pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(I); Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004. 

III. 	 CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby: 

(1) DISMISSES this action sua sponte without prejudice for failing to pay the $350 

filing fee or file a Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a) and 1915(a). 

2 See, e.g., Jordan v. Lloyd, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. llcvl724 JLS (BLM); Jordan v. 

Moskowitz, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. llcv1725 JLS (WMc);Jordan v. Sabraw, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 

Ilcvl726 JAH (JMA); Jordan v. Gonzalez, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. llcvl727 JLS (CAB); Jordan v. 

Battaglia, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. II cv1728 LAB (BLM); Jordan v. Benitez, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 

II cvl729 MMA (POR) and Jordan v. Anello, S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 11-1730 DMS (POR). In this 

series offilings, Plaintiff purported to sue a Clerk's Office employee and individual judges ofthis Court 

for alleged violations offederal and state criminal statutes, rules ofcivil procedure, government codes, 

and ''maxims'' of commercial law, justice, truth, and sovereignty, simply for dismissing his previous 

cases. All ofthese cases, which were also initially presented to the Clerk captioned as ''Notices'' without 

accompanying complaints or motions to proceed IFP, have also been dismissed as frivolous and 

malicious pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). 

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1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 

2 
 (2) The entirety ofthis action is DISMISSED as frivolous and malicious pursuant to 

3 28 U.S.C. § 19l5A(b)(1). Moreover, because the Court fmds amendment futile, leave to amend 

4 is DENIED. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F .3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996) (denial of a 

5 leave to amend is not an abuse ofdiscretion where further amendment would be futile); see also 

6 Robinson v. California Bd. ofPrison Terms, 997 F. Supp. 1303, 1308 (C.D. Cal. 1998) ("Since 

7 plaintiff has not, and cannot, state a claim containing an arguable basis in law, this action should 

8 be dismissed without leave to amend; any amendment would be futile.") (citing Newland v. 

9 Dalton, 81 F.3d 904,907 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

10 (3) Finally, this Court CERTIFIES that no IFP appeal from this Order could be taken 

11 "in good faith" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 

12 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is 

13 permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal would not be frivolous). 

14 (4) The Clerk of Court shall close the file. 

15 

HON. WILLIAM . HAYES 

United States Distnct Judge 

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