Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00289/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00289-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRIAN C. APPLEGATE,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAID, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:16-cv-00289-JLT (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 

(Doc. 1) 

30-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff alleges multiple claims for relief based on his assertion that he did not receive 

appropriate medical care and accommodation for a plethora of medical ailments from which he 

suffers. However, as discussed below, because his complaint violates Rule 8 of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure, raises claims and are not related under Rules 18 and 20, and raises 

claims that are barred by the statute of limitations, it is DISMISSED with leave to file an 

amended complaint. 

I. Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2); 28 U.S.C. 

Case 1:16-cv-00289-JLT Document 13 Filed 11/16/16 Page 1 of 17
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§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). If an action is dismissed on one of these three basis, a strike is imposed 

per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). An inmate who has had three or more prior actions or appeals dismissed 

as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and has 

not alleged imminent danger of serious physical injury does not qualify to proceed in forma 

pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir. 2015). 

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. 

Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred 

elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged 

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 

U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

II. Summary of Plaintiff=s Complaint

Plaintiff complains that, when he was transferred to the California Correction Institute in 

Tehachapi, California, he was not provided appropriate medical care and accommodations for a 

number of medical conditions from which he suffers. He names sixteen Defendants in their 

individual capacities and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Rather 

than organizing his factual allegations by claims/counts against various defendants, Plaintiff has 

provided a chronology of his medical care since he was initially incarcerated in 2007. Plaintiff 

seeks monetary damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief via medical treatment. 

As discussed below, Plaintiff’s complaint violates this Court’s Local Rules and the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court declines to expend limited resources attempting to 

ferret through the morass of allegations Plaintiff has presented. However, Plaintiff is given the 

applicable pleading and legal standards that appear applicable to his issues and leave to file a first 

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amended complaint which shall be no more than 20 pages of double-spaced sentences.

1

 

III. Pleading Requirements

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. 

Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). A complaint must contain "a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. 

Civ. Pro. 8(a). "Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the 

plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but A[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim that is 

plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual 

allegations are accepted as true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal. at 678; see also Moss v. U.S. 

Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557. 

While Aplaintiffs [now] face a higher burden of pleadings facts . . . ,@ Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 

580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), the pleadings of pro se prisoners are still construed liberally 

and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Blaisdell v. Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 

2013); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). However, "the liberal pleading 

standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations," Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 

n.9 (1989), "a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 

of the claim that were not initially pled," Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 

1257 (9th Cir. 1997) quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982), and courts 

are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences, Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 

681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The “sheer possibility that a 

 

1 The lines of Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint are, at most, single-spaced. Many times, the bottom of one line 

of words touches or overlaps with the top of the words on the following lines. Local Rule 130(c) requires that all 

submissions be double-spaced. 

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defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a 

defendant’s liability” fall short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 

S. Ct. at 1949; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. Plaintiff must identify specific facts supporting the 

existence of substantively plausible claims for relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby, __ U.S. __,135

S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014) (per curiam) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff’s complaint violates Rule 8(a) because it does not contain "a short and plain 

statement of the claim” that shows his entitlement to relief. Rather, it is comprised of twenty-five 

pages of single-spaced allegations with no clear identification of the rights he feels were violated

or the facts upon which he relies to support the claimed violation. If he chooses to file a first 

amended complaint, is SHALL be as concise as possible. He should merely state which of his 

constitutional rights he feels were violated by each Defendant and the factual basis. 

B. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. ' 1983) requires an actual connection or link between the 

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 

(1976). 

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or 

other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 

1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); 

Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. “Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely 

provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Crowley v. Nevada ex rel. 

Nevada Sec’y of State, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 

386, 393-94, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To state a claim, 

Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating the existence of a link, or causal connection, between 

each defendant’s actions or omissions and a violation of his federal rights. Lemire v. California 

Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 

1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that A[a] person >subjects= another to the deprivation of a 

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constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 

in another=s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.@ Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 

Cir. 1978). Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

Plaintiff must clarify which defendant(s) he feels are responsible for each violation of his 

constitutional rights and the factual basis for each violation to put each Defendant on notice of 

Plaintiff=s claims against him or her. See Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Plaintiff’s generalized assertions that “defendants” acted in a certain way, are insufficient. 

C. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a)

Fed.R.Civ.P. 18(a) states that "[a] party asserting a claim to relief as an original claim, 

counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as independent or as alternate 

claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as the party has against an opposing party." 

However, Plaintiff may not bring unrelated claims against unrelated parties in a single action. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a), 20(a)(2); Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2011); George v. 

Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). 

Plaintiff may bring a claim against multiple defendants so long as (1) the claim(s) arise 

out of the same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions and occurrences, and (2) there 

are commons questions of law or fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2); Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 

1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1997); Desert Empire Bank v. Insurance Co. of North America, 623 F.3d 

1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1980). Only if the defendants are properly joined under Rule 20(a) will the 

Court review the extraneous claims to determine if they may be joined under Rule 18(a), which 

permits the joinder of multiple claims against the same party.

The Court must be able to discern a relationship between Plaintiff’s claims and/or there 

must be a similarity of parties. The fact that claims are premised on the same type of 

constitutional violation(s) (i.e. deliberate indifference to serious medical needs) against multiple 

defendants does not make them factually related. Claims are related where they are based on the 

same precipitating event, or a series of related events caused by the same precipitating event. In 

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this case, Plaintiff may state all allegations that he has against medical providers for one of his 

medical conditions. For example, he may state all allegations that pertain to his ENT issues in 

this action, or his podiatry issues, or his tinnitus/hearing loss issues, or his dizziness/vertigo 

issues, or his cognitive difficulties/slurred speech/memory loss. But he may not pursue claims 

pertaining to all, or any combination of his medical issues, without making a specific showing 

that they are related under Rule 18.

Further, Plaintiff’s allegations span Plaintiff’s transfer among various facilities, including

NKSP, SATF, CCI, COR, CAL, and LACJ. If Plaintiff desires to pursue claims based on 

allegations that occurred at various of these facilities, he must file separate pleadings/complaints 

for each unrelated claim against the different defendants at the different facilities, or he must 

specifically show how claims at different facilities are related, other than a continuing medical 

issue.

All claims that do not comply with Rules 18(a) and 20(a)(2) are subject to dismissal. 

Plaintiff is cautioned that if he fails to make the requisite election regarding which category of 

claims to pursue and his amended complaint sets forth improperly joined claims, the Court will 

determine which claims proceed and which will be dismissed. Visendi v. Bank of America, N.A., 

733 F3d 863, 870-71 (9th Cir. 2013). Whether any claims will be subject to severance by future 

order will depend on which claims are pled in the amended complaint and which of those pled are 

viable.

D. Exhibits

Plaintiff attached 50 pages of exhibits to his Complaint which he fails to refer to in his 

allegations. Originals, or copies of evidence (i.e., prison or medical records, witness affidavits, 

inmate appeals, etc.) need not be submitted until the course of litigation brings the evidence into 

question (for example, on a motion for summary judgment, at trial, or when requested by the 

Court). At this point, the submission of evidence is premature as Plaintiff is only required to state 

a prima facie claim for relief via his factual allegations. Thus, if he chooses to amend his 

complaint, he need only state the facts upon which he alleges a defendant has violated his 

constitutional rights and should not submit exhibits. 

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If Plaintiff feels compelled to submit exhibits with an amended complaint, he is reminded 

that such exhibits must be attached to the amended pleading and must be incorporated by 

reference. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 10(c). For example, Plaintiff must state Asee page 2 of Exhibit A@ or 

something similar to direct the Court to the specific exhibit and the specific portion thereof and he 

should explain what he thinks the exhibit shows. Finally, if Plaintiff attaches exhibits to his 

complaint, he is advised that the Court will not wade through exhibits to verify evidentiary 

support. Rather, his allegations must be sufficient standing alone.

IV. Legal Standards for Plaintiff’s Claims for Relief

A. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment if they are “deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to [a 

prisoner's] serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). “A medical need 

is serious if failure to treat it will result in ‘ “significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain.” ’ ” Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1081-82 (2014) (quoting Jett v. Penner, 

439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir.2006) (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th 

Cir.1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th 

Cir.1997) (en banc))

To maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on medical care in prison, a plaintiff must 

first “show a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner=s condition 

could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Second, 

the plaintiff must show the defendants= response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” 

Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 

1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted)). 

“Indications that a plaintiff has a serious medical need include the existence of an injury 

that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the 

presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the 

existence of chronic or substantial pain.” Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 

2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 

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1122 (9th Cir. 2012); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Deliberate indifference is “a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence” and 

“requires ‘more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety.’ ” Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319). “Deliberate indifference 

is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir.2004). “Under this 

standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from which the inference could 

be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the 

inference.’ ” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). A>If a prison official should have 

been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no 

matter how severe the risk.=@ Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 

1188 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

In medical cases, this requires showing: (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a 

prisoner=s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference. Wilhelm, 680 

F.3d at 1122 (quoting Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). More generally, deliberate indifference Amay 

appear when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it 

may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.@ Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Under Jett, A[a] prisoner need not show his harm was substantial.@ Id.; 

see also McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (A[A] finding that the defendant=s activities resulted in 

>substantial= harm to the prisoner is not necessary.@). 

B. The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act

Title II of the ADA and section 504 of the RA prohibit discrimination on the basis of 

disability. Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). Title II applies to the 

services, programs, and activities provided for inmates by jails and prisons. Pennsylvania Dep’t 

of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 208-13 (1998); Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., 609 F.3d 1011, 1021-

22 (9th Cir. 2010); Pierce v. Cnty. of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 2008). “To 

establish a violation of Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) [he] is a qualified 

individual with a disability; (2) [he] was excluded from participation in or otherwise 

discriminated against with regard to a public entity’s services, programs, or activities; and (3) 

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such exclusion or discrimination was by reason of [his] disability,” and “[t]o establish a violation 

of § 504 of the RA, a plaintiff must show that (1) [he] is handicapped within the meaning of the 

RA; (2) [he] is otherwise qualified for the benefit or services sought; (3) [he] was denied the 

benefit or services solely by reason of [his] handicap; and (4) the program providing the benefit 

or services receives federal financial assistance.” Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1052. “To recover 

monetary damages under Title II of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must prove 

intentional discrimination on the part of the defendant,” and the standard for intentional 

discrimination is deliberate indifference. Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 

2001).

Individual liability is precluded under the ADA and the RA. A.W. v. Jersey City Public 

Schools, 486 F.3d 791, 804 (3d Cir. 2007); Green v. City of New York, 465 F.3d 65, 78-9 (2d Cir. 

2006); Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Servs. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2001); 

Roundtree v. Adams, No. 1:01-CV-06502 OWW LJO, 2005 WL 3284405, at *8 (E.D.Cal. Dec. 1, 

2005). Thus, under the ADA and the RA, Plaintiff may name the entity or state officials in their 

official capacities, but he may not name individual prison employees in their personal capacities. 

Shaughnessy v. Hawaii, No. 09-00569 JMS/BMK, 2010 WL 2573355, at *8 (D.Hawai’i Jun. 24, 

2010); Anaya v. Campbell, No. CIV S-07-0029 GEB GGH P, 2009 WL 3763798, at *5-6 

(E.D.Cal. Nov. 9, 2009); Roundtree v. Adams, No. 1:01-CV-06502 OWW LJO, 2005 WL 

3284405, at *8 (E.D.Cal. Dec. 1, 2005). Moreover, the quality of Plaintiff’s medical care does not 

provide a basis upon which to impose liability under the RA or the ADA. See e.g., Burger v. 

Bloomberg, 418 F.3d 882, 882 (8th Cir. 2005) (medical treatment decisions not a basis for RA or 

ADA claims); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2005) (RA not 

intended to apply to medical treatment decisions); Fitzgerald v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 403 F.3d 

1134, 1144 (10th Cir. 2005) (medical decisions not ordinarily within scope of ADA or RA); 

Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The ADA does not create a remedy for 

medical malpractice.”). 

C. Inmate Appeals

It appears that Plaintiff feels his inmate appeals related to his medical issues were not 

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handled appropriately. However, a “grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not 

confer any substantive right upon the inmates.@ Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 

1993) (citing Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982)); see also Ramirez v. 

Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no liberty interest in processing of appeals because no 

entitlement to a specific grievance procedure); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 

2001) (existence of grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on prisoner); Mann v. Adams, 

855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). AHence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest 

requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the Fourteenth Amendment.@ Azeez v. 

DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. at 10; Spencer v. Moore, 638 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986). 

Actions in reviewing prisoner=s administrative appeal cannot serve as the basis for liability 

under a ' 1983 action. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. The argument that anyone who knows about a 

violation of the Constitution, and fails to cure it, has violated the Constitution himself is not 

correct. AOnly persons who cause or participate in the violations are responsible. Ruling against 

a prisoner on an administrative complaint does not cause or contribute to the violation. A guard 

who stands and watches while another guard beats a prisoner violates the Constitution; a guard 

who rejects an administrative complaint about a completed act of misconduct does not.@ George 

v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609-10 (7th Cir. 2007) citing Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 656-57 (7th 

Cir.2005); Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 851-52 (7th Cir.1999); Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 

992-93 (7th Cir.1996). Thus, since he has neither a liberty interest, nor a substantive right in 

inmate appeals, Plaintiff fails, and is unable to prove the elements of a constitutional violation 

purely for the processing and/or reviewing of his inmate appeals. 

However, Plaintiff may be able to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment for 

deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs as to those reviewing his inmate appeals if

they had medical training and the authority to intercede and/or to take corrective action. If 

Plaintiff meets his burden of proof as to the elements of a claim against a defendant for deliberate 

indifference to his serious medical needs, he will likely also be able to meet his burden of proof as 

to the elements of a claim against defendants with medical training if they reviewed and ruled 

against Plaintiff in his medical grievances/appeals on that same issue.

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Further, at least one Circuit has held that A[o]nce a [non-medical] prison grievance 

examiner becomes aware of potential mistreatment, the Eighth Amendment does not require him 

or her to do more than >review [the prisoner=s] complaints and verif[y] with the medical officials 

that [the prisoner] was receiving treatment.@ Greeno, 414 F.3d at 656 citing Spruill v. Gillis, 372 

F.3d 218, 236 (3rd Cir. 2004) (non-physician defendants cannot Abe considered deliberately 

indifferent simply because they failed to respond directly to the medical complaints of a prisoner 

who was already being treated by the prison doctor@ and if Aa prisoner is under the care of medical 

experts . . . a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner 

is in capable hands.@) This Court concurs with the analysis in Greeno and Spruill. Thus, nonmedical prison personnel, and lower medical staff such as nurses and/or medical technicians, 

cannot be held liable for their involvement in processing and/or ruling on inmate appeals for 

medical issues where the inmate is under the care of a physician for the issues raised. 

D. Statute of Limitations

The applicable statute of limitations starts to run upon accrual of the plaintiff's claim, i.e. 

when he knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of his action, Douglas v. 

Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009), which is normally on the date of injury, Ward v. 

Westinghouse Canada, Inc., 32 F.3d 1405, 1407 (9th Cir.1994). Actions under section 1983 fall 

under the limitations period from the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury torts, 

see Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007), which is two years in California, see Maldonado 

v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1. 

The statute of limitations period is tolled for two years if the plaintiff is a prisoner serving 

a term of less than life which gives such prisoners effectively four years to file a federal suit. See

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a); Azer v. Connell, 306 F.3d 930, 936 (9th Cir. 2002) (federal 

courts borrow the state's California's equitable tolling rules if they are not inconsistent with 

federal law). Though the term of Plaintiff’s sentence is not known, the limitations period for his 

claims would not differ if he were serving a term of life with the possibility of parole, as that is 

considered a term of less than life. Martinez v. Gomez, 137 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Further, California courts have extended the tolling benefit of section 352.1 to prisoners serving 

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life sentences. See Grasso v. McDonough Power Equip., 264 Cal.App.2d 597, 601, 70 Cal.Rptr. 

458 (1968). Thus, any claims based on incidents that occurred before March 2, 2012 (four years 

before Plaintiff filed this action) are barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff should not state 

any allegations prior to March 2, 2012 in an amended complaint. 

E. Claims Under California Law

Under the California Tort Claims Act, set forth in California Government Code sections 

810 et seq., a plaintiff may not bring a suit for monetary damages against a public employee or 

entity unless the plaintiff first presented the claim to the California Victim Compensation and 

Government Claims Board and the Board acted on the claim, or the time for doing so expired. 

“The Tort Claims Act requires that any civil complaint for money or damages first be presented 

to and rejected by the pertinent public entity.” Munoz v. California, 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1776, 

39 Cal.Rptr.2d 860 (1995). The purpose of this requirement is “to provide the public entity 

sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if 

appropriate, without the expense of litigation.” City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.3d 

447, 455 (1974) (citations omitted). Compliance with this “claim presentation requirement” 

constitutes an element of a cause of action for damages against a public entity or official. State v. 

Superior Court (Bodde), 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1244 (2004). Thus, in the state courts, “failure to 

allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement 

subjects a claim against a public entity to a demurrer for failure to state a cause of action.” Id. at 

1239 (fn.omitted).

To be timely, a claim must be presented to the VCGCB “not later than six months after 

the accrual of the cause of action.” Cal. Govt.Code § 911.2. Thereafter, Aany suit brought against 

a public entity@ must be commenced no more than six months after the public entity rejects the 

claim. Cal. Gov. Code, ' 945.6, subd. (a)(1). 

Federal courts must require compliance with the CTCA for pendant state law claims that 

seek damages against state employees or entities. Willis v. Reddin, 418 F.2d 702, 704 (9th 

Cir.1969); Mangold v. California Public Utilities Commission, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th 

Cir.1995). State tort claims included in a federal action, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, may 

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proceed only if the claims were first presented to the state in compliance with the applicable 

requirements. Karim–Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Department, 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th 

Cir.1988); Butler v. Los Angeles County, 617 F.Supp.2d 994, 1001 (C.D.Cal.2008).

1. Negligence/Medical Malpractice

“An action in negligence requires a showing that the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal 

duty, that the defendant breached the duty, and that the breach was a proximate or legal cause of 

injuries suffered by the plaintiff. [Citations.]” Regents of the Univ. of California v. Superior 

Court of Los Angeles Cty., 240 Cal. App. 4th 1296, 1310 (2015), reh'g denied (Oct. 26, 2015) 

quoting Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, 6 Cal.4th 666, 673 (Ann M.) (1993); 

[disapproved on another ground in Reid v. Google, Inc., 50 Cal.4th 512, 527, fn. 5 (2010).) 

"In order to establish liability on a negligence theory, a plaintiff must prove duty, breach, 

causation and damages. The threshold element of a cause of action for negligence is the existence 

of a duty to use due care toward an interest of another that enjoys legal protection against 

unintentional invasion. Whether this essential prerequisite to a negligence cause of action has 

been satisfied in a particular case is a question of law to be resolved by the court. To say that 

someone owes another a duty of care is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid 

to analysis in itself. [D]uty is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of 

those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to 

protection. [L]egal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions 

that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for damage done.” Los Angeles 

Memorial Coliseum Commission v. Insomaniac, Inc. 233 Cal.App.4th 803, 908 (2015) (citations 

and quotations omitted).

Medical malpractice is negligence applied in a medical setting. “The elements of a 

medical malpractice claim are (1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and 

diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that 

duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and resulting injury; and 

(4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional's negligence.” Avivi v. Centro Medico 

Urgente Medical Center, 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 468, n. 2, 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 707 (Ct.App.2008) 

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(internal quotations and citation omitted); Johnson v. Superior Court, 143 Cal.App.4th 297, 305, 

49 Cal.Rptr.3d 52 (2006).

Medical professionals are negligent if they fail to use the level of skill, knowledge, and 

care in diagnosis and treatment that other reasonably careful medical professional would use in 

the same or similar circumstances. This level of skill, knowledge, and care is sometimes referred 

to as "the standard of care" and can usually only be opined by other medical professionals. 

Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal.3d 399, 408 (1976); see also Brown v. Colm, 11 Cal.3d 639, 642B643 

(1974); Mann v. Cracchiolo, (1985) 38 Cal.3d 18, 36; and Judicial Council of California Civil 

Jury Instruction 500, Summer 2008 Supplement Instruction.

2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Under California law, the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) 

extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless 

disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or 

extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by 

the defendant’s outrageous conduct. Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 571 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(quotation marks omitted); Tekkle v. United States, 567 F.3d 554, 855 (9th Cir. 2007); Simo v. 

Union of Needletrades, Industrial & Textile Employees, 322 F.3d 602, 621-22 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Conduct is outrageous if it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a 

civilized community. Corales, 567 F.3d at 571; Tekkle, 511 F.3d at 855; Simo, 322 F.3d at 622

In addition to the requirement that the conduct be intentional and outrageous, the conduct 

must have been directed at Plaintiff or occur in the presence of Plaintiff, of whom Defendant was 

aware. Simo, 322 F.3d at 622.

F. Supervisory Liability

It appears that Plaintiff named a number of individuals as Defendants because they hold 

supervisory positions. However, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 

1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, 

when a named defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between him and the 

claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 

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862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 

941 (1979). To state a claim for relief under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory 

liability, Plaintiff must allege some facts that would support a claim that supervisory defendants 

either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the 

violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or "implemented a policy so deficient 

that the policy 'itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights' and is 'the moving force of the 

constitutional violation.'" Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations 

omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Under section 1983, liability may

not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions of their employees under a theory of 

respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. "In a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action - where masters 

do not answer for the torts of their servants - the term 'supervisory liability' is a misnomer." Id. 

The Supreme Court has rejected liability on the part of supervisors for “knowledge and 

acquiescence” in subordinates’ wrongful discriminatory acts. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

677 (2009) (“[R]espondent believes a supervisor’s mere knowledge of his subordinate’s 

discriminatory purpose amounts to the supervisor’s violating the Constitution. We reject this 

argument.”) However, “discrete wrongs B for instance, beatings B by lower level Government 

actors . . . if true and if condoned by [supervisors] could be the basis for some inference of 

wrongful intent on [the supervisor’s] part.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 683. Further, the Ninth Circuit 

recently held that where the applicable constitutional standard is deliberate indifference, a 

plaintiff may state a claim for supervisory liability based upon the supervisor’s knowledge of and 

acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct by others. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2011). 

It is under this rubric that the traditional and still valid elements of supervisor liability within the 

Ninth Circuit are properly analyzed. 

It is worth restating that A>bare assertions . . . amount[ing] to nothing more than a 

Aformulaic recitation of the elements@ of a constitutional discrimination claim,= for the purposes of 

ruling on a motion to dismiss [and thus also at screening], are not entitled to an assumption of 

truth.@ Moss, 572 F.3d at 969 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 1951 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555)). ASuch allegations are not to be discounted because they are >unrealistic or nonsensical,= but 

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rather because they do nothing more than state a legal conclusion B even if that conclusion is cast 

in the form of a factual allegation.@ Id. To this end, allegations simply stating that a given 

defendant knew of, or was aware of a situation that violated Plaintiff's rights will not suffice. 

Rather, Plaintiff must state specific factual allegations showing the events that give rise to a 

specific defendant having knowledge of the offending condition/situation and thereafter failing to 

rectify it. Thus, allegations that a Defendant in a supervisory position is liable merely because 

his/her subordinates violated Plaintiff's rights, are not cognizable. 

II. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed, with leave to file a first

amended complaint within 30 days. Any first amended complaint must be double-spaced and 

no more than 25 pages in length. If Plaintiff chooses not to pursue this issue in an action under 

§ 1983, he may file a notice of voluntary dismissal of this action in that same time. If Plaintiff 

fails to file either a first amended complaint or a notice of voluntary dismissal, the action will be 

dismissed for his failure to state a claim and may count as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. If he 

chooses to dismiss the action, it may not count as a strike.

Plaintiff must demonstrate in any first amended complaint how the conditions complained 

of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 

227 (9th Cir. 1980). The first amended complaint must allege in specific terms how each named 

defendant is involved. There can be no liability under section 1983 unless there is some 

affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo 

v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. 

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Plaintiff's first amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Such a short and 

plain statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) quoting Conley v. 

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Although accepted as true, the "[f]actual allegations must be 

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." Twombly, 550 U.S. 127, 555 

(2007) (citations omitted).

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Plaintiff is further advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original, Lacey v. 

Maricopa County, Nos. 09-15806, 09-15703, 2012 WL 3711591, at *1 n.1 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 

2012) (en banc), and must be "complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded 

pleading," Local Rule 220. 

The Court provides Plaintiff with opportunity to amend to cure the deficiencies identified 

in this order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff may not change 

the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his first amended complaint. George v. 

Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no "buckshot" complaints). Based on the foregoing, the 

Court ORDERS:

1. Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk's Office is directed to send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within 30 days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must file either:

a. a first amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in 

this order, not to exceed twenty-five pages of double-spaced sentences, 

excluding exhibits; or

b. a notice of voluntary dismissal; and

///

///

4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for 

failure to obey a court order and for failure to prosecute. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 16, 2016 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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