Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-00121/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-00121-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

LAWRENCE OGBECHIE,

Plaintiff,

v.

R. COVARRUBIAS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-CV-00121-EJD 

ORDER RE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 50

Plaintiff Lawrence Ogbechie is a psychiatrist who worked as a contract medical provider at 

Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”). One of his inmate patients was Daniel.

1 On May 8, 2017, 

Daniel attacked Plaintiff during a session in Plaintiff’s office at SVSP. Plaintiff has filed this civil 

rights and negligence suit against certain correctional officers at SVSP for prolonging Daniel’s 

attack on Plaintiff through their failure to visually monitor the session. Presently before the Court 

is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative partial summary judgment. 

Dkt. 50. The Court finds this matter suitable for decision on the papers and, for the ensuing 

reasons, GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background 

The following basic facts form the basis of Plaintiff’s claims. They are undisputed unless 

otherwise noted. See generally Dkt. 56-1 (“Pl. Responsive Separate Statement”). 

Plaintiff Lawrence Ogbechie is an experienced psychiatrist who has been practicing for 

1 The Court follows the parties’ lead in not using Daniel’s last name in order to protect his privacy. 

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around 20 years. Dkt. 40 (“FAC”) ¶ 4; ECF 51 (“Purcell Decl.”) at 11-13 (Ogbechie Depo. at 22-

24). He began working at Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”) as a contract medical provider in 

March 2017. See Dkt. 50 (“Mot.”) at 5; Dkt. 56 (“Opp.”) at 2; Purcell Decl. at 14 (Ogbechie 

Depo. at 25); ECF 56-2 (“Fiol Decl.”) at 10 (Ogbechie Depo. at 17). Specifically, he provided 

psychiatric services at the Correctional Treatment Center (“CTC”) at SVSP, which Plaintiff 

describes as “the emergency room section” of the prison where both medical and psychiatric 

treatment is provided. Purcell Decl. at 18-19 (Ogbechie Depo. at 30-31). Plaintiff saw his inmate 

patients in his office in the CTC. Id. at 25-26 (Ogbechie Depo. at 37-38). Generally, there were 

three or four correctional officers—two or three Officers and one Sergeant—stationed at the CTC 

at any given time to provide security. Mot. at 8; Pl. Responsive Separate Statement at 4; Purcell 

Decl. at 180 (Sharps Depo. at 26). 

On or before May 3, 2017, Plaintiff became the psychiatrist for an inmate patient named

Daniel; as such, he was part of Daniel’s Interdisciplinary Treatment Team (“IDTT”). Pl. 

Responsive Separate Statement at 1-2; Fiol Decl. at 27 (Ogbechie Depo. at 70). Daniel had been 

referred to the CTC because he was a “danger to self” due to suicide ideation. Purcell Decl. at 38

(Ogbechie Depo. at 55); Pl. Responsive Separate Statement at 2. Plaintiff’s notes indicate that he

met with Daniel twice prior to May 8, 2017. Pl. Responsive Separate Statement at 2 (citing Fiol. 

Decl. at 28-29 (Ogbechie Depo. at 106-07)). 

On May 8, 2017, Plaintiff asked a correctional officer to bring Daniel to his office for a 

treatment session. Purcell Decl. at 72-73 (Ogbechie Depo. at 115-16). During that shift, Officers 

R. Covarrubias, G. Guzman, and C. Alejo were assigned to the CTC, along with their supervisor,

Sergeant Zamora; of those, only Officer Covarrubias is a defendant in this case. Fiol Decl. at 72, 

90 (Covarrubias Depo. at 70, 111). Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant Covarrubias remember who 

brought Daniel to Plaintiff’s office, but Officer Guzman testified that he and Defendant 

Covarrubias did so together. Id. at 31, 80-81, 248 (Ogbechie Depo. at 116; Covarrubias Depo. at 

89-90; Guzman Depo. at 67). Although some inmate patients are placed in the Therapeutic 

Treatment Module (a cage-like structure) or restrained during their sessions, Plaintiff did not order

that to be done to Daniel; Daniel simply sat in a chair in Plaintiff’s office. Purcell Decl. at 23-24, 

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73 (Ogbechie Depo. at 35-36, 117). Plaintiff testified that although he considered all prisoner 

patients to be potential threats to others, “there was nothing prior to Inmate [Daniel] entering the 

office that day that indicated to [Plaintiff] that he was a particular threat.” Purcell Decl. at 41-42, 

73 (Ogbechie Depo. at 58-59, 117). Indeed, Plaintiff believed that, “based on what he had told 

[Plaintiff]” in their last session, he was “getting better and that he [could] be sent back to his 

yard.” Id. at 73 (Ogbechie Depo. at 117). 

At some point during the session, Daniel stood up and attacked Plaintiff. Fiol Decl. at 34

(Ogbechie Depo. at 119). Plaintiff cannot recall the details of the attack. Id. at 34-36 (Ogbechie 

Depo. at 119-121). The first person to become aware of the attack was a nurse, Brian Terhaar. 

Mot. at 10; Opp. at 4. Terhaar testified that he heard a loud bang, and then a series of bangs less 

than a minute later. Fiol Decl. at 319-320 (Terhaar Depo. at 36-37). The noise caused him to exit 

the nursing station and look up and down the hallway, where he saw Plaintiff “stumble[] out of his 

office” followed by Daniel. Id. at 320-22 (Terhaar Depo. at 37-39). Upon seeing Daniel 

“attacking Dr. Ogbechie,” Terhaar yelled “Custody”; Daniel then “turned and started coming at” 

Terhaar. Id. at 322 (Terhaar Depo. at 39). Terhaar yelled “Officer,” at which point Defendant 

Covarrubias came out of correctional officers’ station and sprayed Daniel with pepper spray. Id.

at 324-25 (Terhaar Depo. at 41-42). Daniel went to the ground after being sprayed, ending the 

attack. Id. at 328 (Terhaar Depo. at 45). 

Precisely where Defendant Covarrubias was during the time of the attack is disputed.

Defendant Covarrubias admits, though, that he was not standing outside Plaintiff’s office and 

visually monitoring the session through the window in the door when the attack commenced. See 

Pl. Responsive Separate Statement at 5; Purcell Decl. at 161 (Covarrubias Depo. at 93-94). 

Defendant Covarrubias testified that he was in the corrections officers’ station processing a “bed 

change” using the computer and phone. Purcell Decl. at 161-62 (Covarrubias Depo. at 93-94). 

Plaintiff brings the instant suit because he believes the SVSP correctional staff failed to 

adequately protect him during the May 8, 2017 attack. The gravamen of Plaintiff’s suit is that 

Defendant Covarrubias should have been observing Plaintiff’s treatment session with Daniel, 

which would have permitted him to intervene in the attack sooner. Plaintiff further alleges such 

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monitoring was provided for by that the Operational Procedures in place at SVSP. See Opp. at 2. 

Specifically, Plaintiff cites SVSP Operational Procedure 39, Section 39.29 (“OP 39.29”), which 

provides, in pertinent part: “The correctional officer assigned to provide coverage will position 

him/herself outside of the treatment room in a manner that he/she can see the clinician, but not 

hear what is being said, thus maintaining security and confidentiality simultaneously”; and “The 

correctional officer(s) providing coverage will remain nearby, where the clinician can be seen but 

the clinical interaction between the [Inmate/Patient] and attending clinician cannot be overhead.” 

Purcell Decl. at 116-121. 

Although Defendants contest whether OP 39.29 had been orally abrogated prior to the 

incident and whether OP 39.29 required continuous monitoring, they acknowledge it was part of 

the written SVSP Operational Procedures. It is likewise undisputed that the “post order”—i.e., the

formal description of duties—for Defendant Covarrubias’s position at the CTC included, “Provide 

coverage for medical staff, medical rounds, examinations.” Fiol Decl. at 228-29, 233-35 (Guzman 

Depo. at 43-44, 49-51). Defendant Covarrubias testified that he was given and reviewed his post 

order upon being assigned to the CTC in February 2017. Id. at 54-55 (Covarrubias Depo. at 28-

29). 

The parties dispute whether Plaintiff had reason to expect Defendant Covarrubias (rather 

than some other correctional officer) to monitor the session. See Pl. Responsive Statement at 4. It 

is undisputed, though, that the other correctional officers on duty at the CTC (Officer Guzman, 

Officer Alejo, and Sergeant Zamora) were not in the vicinity. Officer Guzman testified that after 

he and Officer Covarrubias escorted Daniel to Plaintiff’s office, he was called away for another 

task by Sergeant Zamora. Fiol Decl. at 248-49 (Guzman Depo. at 67-68). Accordingly, says 

Officer Guzman, it was “implicit between the two of [them] that [Officer Covarrubias] was going 

to keep an eye on the treatment session.” Id. Officer Covarrubias also acknowledges that the 

other two correctional officers were occupied with “other duties” in other parts of the CTC at the 

time. Purcell Decl. at 159 (Covarrubias Depo. at 90); Mot. at 10. 

B. Procedural Background

The operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) was filed on June 27, 2019 and 

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answered by Defendants on August 2, 2019. Dkt. 40 (“FAC”); Dkt. 41 (“Answer”). The FAC 

contains two counts: (1) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the Fourteenth 

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, FAC ¶¶ 27-32; and (2) a claim for common law negligence 

under California law, id. ¶¶ 33-39. Both counts are brought against Defendant Covarrubias, Doe 

correctional officers, and three supervisory correctional officers: Correctional Sergeant P. Soto, 

Correctional Captain M. Thomas, and Associate Warden N. Walker. Id. ¶¶ 5-9. These latter three 

Defendants were not present at the CTC at the time of the incident, but were allegedly responsible 

for training Defendant Covarrubias and ensuring that correctional staff complied with OP 39.29. 

See Opp. at 3, 6-8. All Defendants are sued in their personal capacities. Id. at p. 5-6. 

On January 16, 2020, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the 

alternative partial summary judgment. ECF 50. The motion has been fully briefed and is suitable 

for decision without oral argument. 

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a court “shall grant summary judgment if 

the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). On a motion for summary 

judgment, the basic question is “whether there is a need for trial—whether, in other words, there 

are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they 

may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 250 (1986). 

To be clear, the mere existence of a factual dispute, by itself, does not necessarily preclude 

summary judgment. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255. The dispute must be genuine and the 

disputed fact must be material. A dispute is only genuine if “the evidence presents a sufficient 

disagreement to require submission to a jury.” Id. at 251–52. In other words, the evidence must 

be sufficient to support a jury’s finding for either side. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 

(2007); see also Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–587 

(1986) (“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’”). Furthermore, a fact is only material if it 

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could establish an element of a claim or defense and, therefore, “might affect the outcome of the 

suit under the governing law.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986) (explaining that “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential 

element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial”). 

The party seeking summary judgment bears the “initial responsibility of informing the 

district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp., 477 

U.S. at 323 (internal quotation marks omitted). When the moving party will have the burden of 

proof on an issue at trial, it must “affirmatively demonstrate” that no reasonable trier of fact could 

find other than for the moving party. Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th 

Cir. 2007). On the other hand, “[w]hen the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the 

moving party need only point out ‘that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving 

party’s case.’” Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Celotex Corp., 

477 U.S. at 325). If a moving party fails to carry its burden of production, then “the non-moving 

party has no obligation to produce anything, even if the non-moving party would have the ultimate 

burden of persuasion.” Nissan Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-

03 (9th Cir. 2000). But if the movant carries its initial burden, the nonmovant “‘may not rest upon 

the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading,’ but must provide affidavits or 

other sources of evidence that ‘set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 

trial.’” Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). 

The court must view evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw 

all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Weil v. Citizens Telecom Servs. Co., LLC, 922 

F.3d 993, 1002 (9th Cir. 2019); see also Scott, 550 U.S. at 378. That is because the court “does 

not assess credibility or weigh the evidence, but simply determines whether there is a genuine 

factual issue for trial.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 559-60 (2006). 

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants move for summary judgment as to both of Plaintiff’s claims and all 

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Defendants. 

At the outset, the Court DISMISSES the claims as to the Doe Defendants. Although the 

FAC names Does 4-50 as defendants for both Count 1 and Count 2, Plaintiff does not introduce 

any evidence as to these defendants or otherwise address them in the Opposition briefing. 

Plaintiff has now had “ample opportunity prior to the time defendants moved for summary 

judgment to conduct reasonable discovery, identify these defendants, and seek leave to amend the 

complaint to name them properly.” Garcia ex rel. Estate of Acosta-Garcia, 428 Fed. App’x 706, 

708–09 (9th Cir. 2011). The Court will therefore exercise its authority to dismiss the Doe 

defendants from the case. See Craig v. United States, 413 F.2d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 1969). 

Having dealt with that housekeeping, the Court focuses its analysis on the named 

Defendants. For the reasons below, the Court will GRANT the motion as to the § 1983 claim

(Count 1) and DENY the motion as to the negligence claim (Count 2). 

A. Count 1: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim

As noted above, Plaintiff brings his § 1983 claim against Officer Covarrubias and three 

supervisory officers (Correctional Sergeant P. Soto, Correctional Captain M. Thomas, and 

Associate Warden N. Walker). The Court first addresses the claim against Defendant Covarrubias 

before moving to the claim against the supervisory officers. 

1. Claim against Officer Covarrubias

Plaintiff claims that Officer Covarrubias’s failure to adequately protect him from Daniel’s 

attack violated his substantive due process rights under the 14th Amendment. Specifically, 

Plaintiff charges Officer Covarrubias with not visually monitoring Plaintiff’s session with Daniel, 

as allegedly required by OP 39.29; that omission allegedly caused a delay in Officer Covarrubias’s 

intervention in the attack. In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants argue that 

Plaintiff’s evidence does not suffice to establish the alleged violation and, even if it did, Officer 

Covarrubias is entitled to qualified immunity. 

“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their 

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 

person would have known.” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam). 

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Accordingly, a plaintiff asserting a § 1983 claim against an individual official “must demonstrate 

that (1) a federal right has been violated and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the 

violation.” Horton by Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 599 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing 

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). Both prongs must be satisfied for the plaintiff to 

prevail, and the court has “discretion in deciding which . . . should be addressed first.” Pearson, 

555 U.S. at 236.

In this case, the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff has not met his burden as to 

either prong. That is, Plaintiff’s evidence does not suffice to demonstrate that Officer Covarrubias 

violated Plaintiff’s 14th Amendment right to due process or that the asserted right was clearly 

established. 

a. State-Created Danger 

The Court begins by setting out the basic legal framework for Plaintiff’s claim against 

Officer Covarrubias. At a high level, Plaintiff alleges a deprivation of his substantive due process 

right to liberty under the 14th Amendment. As relevant here, “simply failing to prevent acts of a 

private party” is generally “insufficient” to establish a denial of substantive due process. Martinez 

v. City of Clovis, 943 F.3d 1260, 1271 (9th Cir. 2019). “The general rule is that a state is not liable 

for its omissions and the Due Process Clause does not impose a duty on the state to protect 

individuals from third parties.” Martinez, 943 F.3d at 1271 (internal quotations omitted). 

However, “[t]here are two exceptions to this general rule: (1) when a ‘special relationship’ exists 

between the plaintiff and the state (the special-relationship exception); and (2) when the state 

affirmatively places the plaintiff in danger by acting with ‘deliberate indifference’ to a ‘known or 

obvious danger’ (the state-created danger exception).” Pauluk v. Savage, 836 F.3d 1117, 1122 

(9th Cir. 2016). 

Plaintiff Ogbechie asserts a claim under the state-created danger exception.2 To make out 

2 Plaintiff does not claim that the special relationship exception—which the Ninth Circuit has said 

“does not apply when a state fails to protect a person who is not in custody,” Patel v. Kent Sch. 

Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 972 (9th Cir. 2011)—applies here. See also Campbell v. State of Washington 

Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 671 F.3d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 2011) (The “special relationship 

exception is created when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his 

will.”) (internal quotations omitted); Arnold v. Cty. of Alameda, No. 15-CV-04083-HSG, 2016 

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a claim under the state-created danger exception, a plaintiff must establish three things: “First, she 

must show that the officers’ affirmative actions created or exposed her to an actual, particularized 

danger that she would not otherwise have faced”; “[s]econd, she must show that the injury she 

suffered was foreseeable”; “[t]hird, she must show that the officers were deliberately indifferent to 

the known danger.” Martinez, 943 F.3d at 1271; see also L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894, 900 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (hereinafter “Grubbs II”) (applying the framework “in an action against a state official 

for an injury to a prison employee caused by an inmate”). In the instant case, the alleged danger 

was the risk of being attacked and injured by the inmate patient, Daniel. The Court therefore 

begins by asking whether Defendant Covarrubias’s affirmative actions exposed Plaintiff to a risk 

of harm at the hands of Daniel. 

The “affirmative conduct” requirement has several components. Pauluk, 836 F.3d at 1124. 

To begin with, a plaintiff must show that state action as opposed to inaction placed him in danger. 

Penilla v. City of Huntington Park, 115 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1997). A mere failure—or even 

refusal—to act in response to a known danger does not suffice. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. 

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989) (“Because . . . the State had no constitutional duty 

to protect Joshua against his father’s violence, its failure to do so—though calamitous in 

hindsight—simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.”); e.g., Pinder v. 

Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1175-76 & n.* (4th Cir. 1995) (“As was true in DeShaney, the state did 

not ‘create’ the danger, it simply failed to provide adequate protection from it. In both cases, the 

most that can be said of the state functionaries is that they stood by and did nothing when 

suspicious circumstances dictated a more active role for them.”) (internal quotations omitted); 

Majors v. City of Oakland, No. C 05-00061 CRB, 2005 WL 2216955, * 4 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 

2005) (“The Oakland Police Department might have understood that taking no action to break up 

the disruption in the church could have left plaintiffs in danger; however, their refusal to act is not 

an affirmative creation of an already-existing danger.”). 

Further, “a plaintiff must show not only that the defendant acted ‘affirmatively,’ but also 

WL 4074484, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2016) (no special relationship between a nurse who was 

attacked by an inmate and the officers at Santa Rita Jail).

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that the affirmative conduct placed him in a ‘worse position than that in which he would have been 

had the state not acted at all.’” Pauluk, 836 F.3d at 1124–25 (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201); 

see also Johnson v. City of Seattle, 474 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The decision to switch 

from a more aggressive operation plan to a more passive one was not affirmative conduct that 

placed the Pioneer Square Plaintiffs in danger, because it did not place them in any worse position 

than they would have been in had the police not come up with any operational plan whatsoever.”). 

To be clear, the question is not “whether the danger already existed” because, “by its very nature, 

the doctrine only applies in situations in which the plaintiff was directly harmed by a third party—

a danger that, in every case, could be said to have ‘already existed.’” Martinez, 943 F.3d at 1271. 

Rather, the defendant officer must have done something either to “expose[] an individual to a 

danger which he or she would not have otherwise faced” or leave the person “in a situation that 

was more dangerous than the one in which they found” him. Id. at 1271-72 (internal quotations 

omitted). The danger, moreover, must be “actual” and “particularized.” Id. at 1271. 

Applying these requirements to the instant case, Plaintiff must show that Officer 

Covarrubias played some role in creating or exacerbating the risk that Plaintiff would be attacked 

by Daniel; only then could he be liable for his failure to intervene more quickly in the attack. 

In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not done so. 

Mot. at 12-13. Plaintiff disagrees of course, offering two potential affirmative acts. 

First, Plaintiff says that “the State” created the danger Dr. Ogbechie faced in that “[t]he 

prison was a state creation . . . populated by dangerous felons in the custody of the State.” Opp. at 

9. There are several problems with this argument, however. The creation of the prison is not

affirmative conduct on the part of Officer Covarrubias, the state official against whom Plaintiff 

brings his claim. See Grubbs II, 92 F.3d at 900 (The “plaintiff must show that the state official 

participated in creating a dangerous condition.”). There is no evidence that Defendant 

Covarrubias had any role in creating SVSP, and Plaintiff has not sued the State entity responsible 

for doing so. 

Even if an affirmative act by some other state entity could qualify, a claim for a statecreated danger must be based on “more than merely a failure to create or maintain a safe work 

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environment.” Pauluk, 836 F.3d at 1124. As the Supreme Court explained in Collins, the State 

does not have a “federal constitutional obligation to provide its employees with certain minimal 

levels of safety and security.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 127 (1992); 

see also Jensen v. City of Oxnard, 145 F.3d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir. 1998). Consequently, though 

prisons are certainly dangerous work environments, Plaintiff cannot base his claim on the mere 

creation of that work environment. 

Moreover, Plaintiff does not dispute that he “voluntarily accepted” an offer of employment 

at SVSP. Collins, 503 U.S. at 128-29. Nor is there any evidence that he objected to being 

assigned to the CTC or as Daniel’s psychiatrist. Plaintiff’s claim thus differs substantially from 

that in Pauluk v. Savage, the sole case Plaintiff cites in support of his argument. There, the Ninth 

Circuit found that Plaintiff’s involuntary transfer to a dangerous work site was an affirmative act 

because Plaintiff had resisted the transfer; the Ninth Circuit also found that the specific defendants 

“were sufficiently involved” in the transfer decision “that a reasonable jury could conclude they 

should bear some responsibility for that transfer.” 836 F.3d at 1125. 

Plaintiff responds that he was “lured into” accepting the offer to work at SVSP “based on 

the obvious understanding that he would be provided adequate security.” Opp. at 9. The 

implication appears to be that he would not have accepted the job if he had not believed he would 

be adequately protected. That may be so, but Plaintiff cites no affirmative representations by 

Officer Covarrubias or any other defendant regarding the protection he would receive, or assuring 

him of safety while working at the CTC. In other words, though Plaintiff may have believed he 

would receive a certain level of protection, that belief is not attributable to the Defendants in this 

case. 

For all these reasons, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the State’s establishment 

of SVSP and/or subsequent hiring of him constitutes the affirmative act necessary for his claim 

against Officer Covarrubias. 

The second affirmative act Plaintiff cites is also flawed. Plaintiff says that Defendant 

Covarrubias’s “act of bringing Daniel to Dr. Ogbechie for the treatment session” qualifies. Opp. 

at 10. Yet, according to Plaintiff’s own version of the facts, “there was no set schedule for seeing 

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prisoner-patients” and that Plaintiff himself would typically determine when to see a particular 

patient. Id. Correctional officers like Officer Covarrubias had no authority to direct Plaintiff’s 

treatment of inmate patients. Pl. Responsive Separate Statement at 3-4. And indeed, Plaintiff 

testified that on May 8, 2017, he asked a correctional officer to bring Daniel to his office for a 

treatment session. Purcell Decl. at 72-73 (Ogbechie Depo. at 115-16). Because Plaintiff made the 

decision to see Daniel and requested that he be brought to Plaintiff’s office, it cannot be said that 

Defendant Covarrubias’s acquiescence was responsible for exposing Plaintiff to harm. 

Plaintiff disagrees, arguing that Officer Covarrubias’s action “impli[ed]” he “was ready to 

do his job”—an implication Plaintiff purportedly relied upon in choosing to move forward with 

the session. The Court may accept, for the purposes of argument, Plaintiff’s interpretation of 

Officer Covarrubias’s action as an assurance that he would protect Plaintiff during Daniel’s 

session. That alone does not constitute the affirmative creation of danger. As the Supreme Court 

made clear in DeShaney, the State does not acquire a duty to protect under the 14th Amendment 

by “voluntarily undertaking to protect [an individual] against a danger it concededly played no 

part in creating.” 489 U.S. at 201; see also Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 700 

(9th Cir. 1988) (allegation “that state actors knew of her plight and affirmatively committed to 

protect her” did not establish special relationship or state-created danger). Consequently, 

Defendant Ogbechie’s bringing Daniel to Plaintiff’s office did not render him a participant in 

creating a dangerous condition. 

In sum, Plaintiff has not identified any affirmative conduct by Defendant Covarrubias that 

created danger, as opposed to a mere failure to act in the face of danger. Although Officer 

Covarrubias’s failures may have violated OP 39.29 and “may have been a dereliction of [his] 

duties, they were not an affirmative act that created an actual, particularized danger.” Martinez, 

943 F.3d at 1271 (internal quotations and alterations omitted). Plaintiff’s claim for a state-created 

danger thus fails at the first requirement, wherefore Defendant Covarrubias is entitled to summary 

judgment in his favor. See Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076. 

b. Qualified Immunity

Defendant Covarrubias is entitled to summary judgment for yet another reason: qualified 

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immunity. Even assuming a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional right to be free from statecreated danger, the right was not clearly established. 

“A clearly established right is one that is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official 

would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Isayeva v. Sacramento Sheriff’s 

Dep’t, 872 F.3d 938, 946 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. at 308. 

Specifically, existing precedent “must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond 

debate.” Shafer v. Cty. of Santa Barbara, 868 F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 2017). “The precedent 

must be ‘controlling’—from the Ninth Circuit or the Supreme Court—or otherwise be embraced 

by a ‘consensus’ of courts outside the relevant jurisdiction.” Martinez v. City of Clovis, 943 F.3d 

1260, 1275 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999)). 

Importantly, moreover, the Court’s analysis is guided by the “longstanding principle that 

‘clearly established law’ should not be defined at a high level of generality.” White v. Pauly, 137 

S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is, “[t]he clearly established law 

must be particularized to the facts of the case.” Id. “This exacting standard gives government 

officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments by protecting all but the 

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” City & County of San Francisco v. 

Sheehan, 135" S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 

Here, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the basic legal standard for claims under the statecreated danger exception was clearly established at the time of the events in this case, as was the 

applicability of the exception to claims by prison staff who are harmed by inmates. Opp. at 15. 

However, Plaintiff has not met his burden of identifying controlling authority in which “an officer 

acting under similar circumstances as Officer [Covarrubias] was held to have violated” the 14th 

Amendment. White, 137 S. Ct. at 552. 

Most of the cases Plaintiff cites—Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), 

Penilla v. Huntington Park, 115 F.3d 707 (9th Cir. 1997), Munger v. City of Glasgow Police 

Dep’t, 227 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000), Kennedy v. Ridgefield City, 439 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2006), 

and Bracken v. Okura, 869 F.3d 771 (9th Cir. 2017)—“lay out [state-created danger] principles at 

only a general level.” White, 137 S. Ct. at 552. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized 

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that such cases “are not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning to officers.” Id.

(internal quotations omitted). The Court therefore rejects Plaintiff’s contention that Wood, 

Penilla, Munger, Kennedy, and Bracken meet his burden in the clearly established inquiry.

The case bearing the closest resemblance to this one is L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 11 (9th 

Cir. 1992) (hereinafter “Grubbs I”). See Opp. at 15-18. In Grubbs I, “L.W., a registered nurse 

employed by the State of Oregon at a medium security custodial institution for young male 

offenders, was raped and terrorized by an inmate.” Grubbs I, 974 F.2d at 120. The defendants 

were her supervisors at the correctional institution; they had also hired L.W. after representing to 

her that “she would not be required to work alone with violent sex offenders.” Id. at 120; see also 

id. at 121 (noting that defendants had “misrepresent[ed] to her the risks attending her work”). The 

Ninth Circuit held, on a motion to dismiss, that L.W. had plausibly alleged that the defendants had 

affirmatively “created the danger to which L.W. fell victim.” Id. They had purportedly done so 

by “knowingly assign[ing]” inmate David Blehm to work alone with L.W. “despite their 

knowledge that . . . Blehm had an extraordinary history of unrepentant violence against women 

and girls” and “was likely to assault a female if left alone with her.” Id. The defendants had thus 

“create[d] an opportunity for Blehm to assault L.W. that would not otherwise have existed.” Id. 

Plaintiff contends that Grubbs I clearly established that the state-created danger doctrine 

applies “in the prison healthcare provider context.” Opp. at 17. True enough. But the factual 

circumstances in Grubbs I differ substantially from the ones at issue here. See Horton, 915 F.3d 

601. 

In particular, the Grubbs I defendants were L.W.’s supervisors; as such, they determined 

who she worked with. They also possessed information about the inmates that they could use in 

making those assignments. Officer Covarrubias, by contrast, in no way directed Plaintiff 

Ogbechie to work with Daniel or any particular inmate. He had neither the information nor the 

authority to make such decisions. On the contrary, Office Covarrubias acted at Plaintiff’s behest 

in bringing Daniel to Plaintiff’s office on the day of the incident. The Court finds that this 

difference is material to the “clearly established” analysis. Although Grubbs I put officers with 

the authority to make personnel decisions on notice that they could be liable for exposing their 

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subordinates to dangerous inmates, it did not clearly establish that an officer without such 

authority could be liable for failing to protect fellow staff from dangerous inmates. And, it 

certainly did not make clear that complying with an individual’s request to see a dangerous inmate 

could amount to the affirmative creation of danger. 

The Court therefore holds that a reasonable officer in Officer Covarrubias’s position would 

not have known that failing to visually monitor Plaintiff’s session with Daniel was unlawful at the 

time of the incident. Accordingly, Defendant Covarrubias would be entitled to qualified immunity 

for the asserted constitutional violation. 

***

Without dispute, Plaintiff’s allegations and evidence describe a traumatic and frightening 

attack. Nevertheless, even construing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, they do not 

suffice to make out a state-created danger claim against Officer Covarrubias. Defendants’ motion 

for summary judgment as to Count 1 against Officer Covarrubias is, therefore, GRANTED. 

2. Claim against Supervisory Officers 

The Court now turns to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the three supervisory defendants,

Correctional Sergeant P. Soto, Correctional Captain M. Thomas, and Associate Warden N. 

Walker. 

“[T]here is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.” Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of 

S. Nevada, 649 F.3d 1143, 1151 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of 

New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). Instead, a “supervisory official” is liable under § 1983 only 

if “there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a 

sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional 

violation.” Rodriguez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 798 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal 

quotations omitted). Hence, though a supervisor will “rarely be directly and personally involved 

in the same way” as individual officers, he may be liable for “setting in motion of acts which 

cause others to inflict constitutional injury.” Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 645 (9th 

Cir. 1991). 

In this case, none of the supervisory defendants was alleged to have been directly involved 

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in the incident with Daniel. See Opp. at 11; Pl. Responsive Separate Statement at 3. Rather, they 

are sued as supervisory officials for “failing to properly train Covarrubias” or “acquiescing if not 

contributing to his reckless disregard for the monitoring requirement.” Opp. at 11. As the Court 

just held, however, Plaintiff has failed to raise a triable dispute that Officer Covarrubias committed 

a constitutional violation. Consequently, Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants contributed to any 

violation likewise fails. Accord Arnold v. Cty. of Alameda, No. 15-CV-04083-HSG, 2016 WL 

4074484, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2016). 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Count 1 against Defendants Soto, 

Thomas, and Walker is GRANTED.

B. Count 2: Negligence 

Defendants also move for summary judgment as to Count 2, Plaintiff’s negligence claim. 

They make two arguments in support of their motion. First, Defendants contend that the claim is 

“prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment,” which they believe bars official capacity suits against 

government officials. Mot. at 20-21. Second, Defendants say they are immune from liability “for 

their discretionary acts” per California Government Code § 820.2. Mot. at 22-23. The Court 

considers each argument in turn. 

1. Sovereign Immunity under the 11th Amendment

“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits which seek either damages or injunctive relief 

against a state, an arm of the state, its instrumentalities, or its agencies.” Franceschi v. Schwartz, 

57 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted). “Absent such waiver or legislation, 

the state is absolutely immune from suit in federal court.” Ashker v. California Dep’t of Corr., 

112 F.3d 392, 395 (9th Cir. 1997). “That immunity extends to damages claims against state 

officials acting in their official capacities, whether such claims are grounded in federal or state 

law.” Id. As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, “official-capacity suits generally represent 

only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent” and are 

therefore “treated as suits against the State.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). 

As relevant here, however, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar claims against state 

officials sued in their “personal” or “individual” capacities. Id. Count 2 is expressly brought 

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against all Defendants in their personal capacities. See FAC at 6. 

Defendants respond that although Count 2 is styled a personal-capacity suit, it is actually

an official-capacity suit because “Defendants’ alleged liability arises only from their alleged 

breach of work-related duties.” Dkt. No. 57 (“Reply”) at 13. However, this argument is 

foreclosed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s definition of “personal” and “official” capacity suits. See 

Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25; see also Ashker, 112 F.3d at 395. “[T]he phrase ‘acting in their official 

capacities’ is best understood as a reference to the capacity in which the state officer is sued, not 

the capacity in which the officer inflicts the alleged injury.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25. Thus, a 

personal-capacity suit may properly be brought “to impose individual liability upon a government 

officer for actions taken under color of state law.” Id. Count 2 purports to do just that. See 

Ashker, 112 F.3d at 395 (accepting the complaint’s characterization of the claim as a personalcapacity claim). 

Hence, because Count 2 sues Defendants in their personal capacities, the Eleventh 

Amendment does not bar it.

2. Discretionary Immunity under California Government Code § 820.2

Having rejected Defendants’ claim of immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, the Court 

considers Defendants’ alternative argument that they are entitled to discretionary immunity under 

California Government Code § 820.2. That provision states:

Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not 

liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or 

omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, 

whether or not such discretion be abused.

Cal. Gov. Code § 820.2. Defendants contend that Officer Covarrubias’s decision not to visually 

monitor Plaintiff’s session with Daniel was within his discretion; they further contend that the 

supervisory defendants’ respective managerial decisions are within their discretion. 

In determining what acts are immune under § 820.2, the California Supreme Court has 

“draw[n] the line between ‘planning’ and ‘operational’ functions of government.” Liberal v. 

Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064, 1084–85 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Caldwell v. Montoya, 10 Cal. 4th 972, 

981 (1995)). “Immunity is reserved for those basic policy decisions which have been expressly 

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committed to coordinate branches of government, and as to which judicial interference would thus 

be unseemly.” Id. (quoting Gillan v. City of San Marino, 147 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1051 (2007))

(internal quotations and alterations omitted). “On the other hand, . . . there is no basis for 

immunizing lower-level, or ‘ministerial,’ decisions.” Caldwell, 10 Cal. 4th at 981. For instance, 

the California Supreme Court has held that “a police officer’s decision to detain or arrest a suspect 

is ‘not a basic policy decision, but only an operational decision by the police purporting to apply 

the law.’” Liberal, 632 F.3d at 1085 (quoting Gillan, 147 Cal. App. 4th at 1051). The California 

Supreme Court has similarly rejected claims of immunity for:

a bus driver’s decision not to intervene in one passenger’s violent 

assault against another (Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist.

(1985) 40 Cal. 3d 780, 793–795), a college district’s failure to warn 

of known crime dangers in a student parking lot (Peterson v. San 

Francisco Community College Dist. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 799, 815), a 

county clerk’s libelous statements during a newspaper interview 

about official matters (Sanborn v. Chronicle Pub. Co. (1976) 18 

Cal.3d 406, 415–416), university therapists’ failure to warn a patient’s 

homicide victim of the patient’s prior threats to kill her (Tarasoff v. 

Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 444–447), 

and a police officer’s negligent conduct of a traffic investigation once 

undertaken (McCorkle v. City of Los Angeles (1969) 70 Cal.2d 252, 

261–262).

Caldwell, 10 Cal. 4th at 981-82. 

Considering these precedents, the Court finds that the decision for which Officer 

Covarrubias has been sued is closely analogous to the above-cited examples of lower-level, 

operational decisions. In particular, Officer Covarrubias’s decision not to visually monitor 

Plaintiff’s session with Daniel is akin to “an individual bus driver’s decision concerning what 

form of protective action to take in a particular case” and hence “does not rise to the level of 

governmental decisions calling for judicial restraint.” Lopez v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 40 Cal. 

3d 780, 794 (1985) (internal quotations omitted). The Court therefore holds that Officer 

Covarrubias is not entitled to discretionary immunity against Count 2. 

The decisions by Defendants Soto, Thomas, and Walker present a closer call. These 

defendants are sued for having allegedly failed to train subordinates to follow the monitoring 

requirement in OP 39.29 or otherwise enforce said monitoring requirement. Pl. Responsive 

Separate Statement at 15. The Court agrees with Defendants that a decision to formally repeal or 

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change OP 39.29 would constitute a “basic policy decision” covered by discretionary immunity. 

However, Plaintiff disclaims any claim based on a repeal of the monitoring requirement in OP 

39.29; indeed, he cites evidence showing that Defendants Soto, Thomas, and Walker all lacked the 

authority to amend OP 39.29. Pl. Responsive Separate Statement at 15 (citing Purcell Decl. at 93, 

which indicates that the “Warden” must give “final approval” over Operational Procedure 39). 

Thus, in the Court’s view, Plaintiff’s claim against these Defendants is based on their alleged

failure to properly implement a policy. That is an operational decision, and as such is not shielded 

by discretionary immunity. Accord Turano v. Cty. of Alameda, No. 17-CV-06953-KAW, 2019 

WL 501479, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2019). 

In sum, the Court holds that discretionary immunity under California Government Code 

§ 820.2 does not cover the decisions at issue in Count 2 and DENIES Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment. 

IV. ORDER

As set out above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in full as to 

Count 1 and DENIED as to Count 2. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 11, 2020

EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge

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