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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 11, 2010 Decided March 26, 2010

No. 09-5099

PRIME TIME INTERNATIONAL COMPANY,

 FORMERLY KNOWN AS SINGLE STICK, INC.,

APPELLANT

v.

THOMAS J. VILSACK, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:06-cv-01077)

Reed Rubinstein and Mark Solomons argued the cause and

filed the briefs for appellant.

Sydney A. Foster, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Mark

B. Stern, Attorney. R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney,

entered an appearance.

USCA Case #09-5099 Document #1236845 Filed: 03/26/2010 Page 1 of 16
2

Before: ROGERS and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: In 2004 Congress enacted the Fair

and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act (“FETRA”), 7 U.S.C. § 518

et seq., repealing a system of quotas and price supports for

tobacco production and providing for payments for ten years to

producers and persons who had established marketing quotas to

ease the transition. These payments are funded by quarterly

assessments on manufacturers and importers of tobacco

products. Prime Time International Company, a manufacturer

of small cigars, challenged its assessments for three quarters of

FY 2005, asserting claims under FETRA, the Information

Quality Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3516 note, and the Due Process Clause

of the Constitution. The district court granted summary

judgment to the Secretary and Department of Agriculture on the

FETRA and due process claims, and dismissed the IQA claim

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure

to state a claim. Our review is de novo, and we affirm in part

and reverse in part.

I.

Upon “repeal[ing] all aspects of the Federal tobacco support

program,” H.R. REP. NO. 108-755, at 440 (2004) (Conf. Rep.),

reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1341, 1518, Congress

established a ten-year transitional program under which the

United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) continues

to make payments to farmers formerly covered by marketing

quotas. 7 U.S.C. § 518e. The payments come from a newly

established Tobacco Trust Fund in the Commodity Credit

Corporation at USDA. Id. § 518e(a). The Trust Fund is

supported by quarterly assessments on tobacco manufacturers

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1

 Chapter 52 exempts from taxation several classes of

tobacco, including: “Tobacco products furnished for employee use or

experimental purposes”; “Tobacco products and cigarette papers and

tubes transferred or removed in bond from domestic factories and

export warehouses”; “Tobacco products and cigarette papers and tubes

released in bond from customs custody”; and “Tobacco products and

and importers. Id. § 518d(b). Under FETRA, assessments are

to be allocated among manufacturers and importers of six types

of tobacco: cigarettes, cigars, snuff, roll-your-own, chewing, and

pipe. Id. § 518d(c). The allocation within each class of tobacco

product “shall be . . . on a pro rata basis . . . based on each

manufacturer’s or importer’s share of gross domestic volume,”

with “[n]o manufacturer or importer . . . required to pay an

assessment that is based on a share that is in excess of [its] share

of domestic volume.” Id. § 518d(e)(1), (2). An individual

manufacturer’s or importer’s assessment within a class of

tobacco product is determined by multiplying its market share

of the tobacco class by the total amount of the assessment for the

tobacco class. Id. § 518d(f). “Market share” is defined as “the

share of each manufacturer or importer of a class of tobacco

product . . . of the total volume of domestic sales of the class of

tobacco product during the base period for a fiscal year for an

assessment . . . .” Id. § 518d(a)(3).

Congress set the class allocations for FY 2005, see id.

§ 518d(c)(1), while authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to

adjust the allocations in subsequent years “to reflect changes in

the share of gross domestic volume held by that class of tobacco

product,” id. § 518d(c)(2). Gross domestic volume is defined as

“the volume of tobacco products removed (as defined by section

5702 of Title 26)” and “not exempt from tax under chapter 52 of

Title 26 at the time of their removal under that chapter or the

Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States,” neither of

which is germane.1 Id. § 518d(a)(2). “[R]emoved,” as used by

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cigarette papers and tubes exported and returned.” 26 U.S.C. § 5704.

“The Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States . . . is

maintained and published periodically by the United States

International Trade Commission.” 19 U.S.C. § 1202; see Chapter 24,

Tobacco & Manufactured Tobacco Substitutes (2010), available at

http://www.usitc.gov/publications/docs/tata/hts/bychapter/1000C24.

pdf.

2

 “Removal” or “remove” is defined as:

the removal of tobacco products or cigarette papers or

tubes, or any processed tobacco, from the factory or

from internal revenue bond under section 5704, as the

Secretary shall by regulation prescribe, or release

from customs custody, and shall also include the

smuggling or other unlawful importation of such

articles into the United States. 

26 U.S.C. § 5702(j) (emphasis added).

FETRA, means “the removal of tobacco products or cigarette

papers or tubes, or any processed tobacco, from the factory . . .

or release from customs custody.” 26 U.S.C. § 5702(j).2 A

manufacturer or importer may appeal its assessment to the

Secretary, using “any information that is available, including

third party data on industry or individual company sales

volumes,” and the Secretary “must make any revisions

necessary to ensure that each manufacturer and importer pays

only its correct pro rata share of total gross domestic volume

from all sources.” Id. § 518d(i)(2), (i)(4)(B). 

As interpreted by USDA, FETRA creates a two-step process

for determining the amount of each manufacturer’s or importer’s

quarterly assessment. First, assessments are allocated among six

classes of tobacco. Id. § 518d(c); 7 C.F.R. § 1463.5. For FY

2005, Congress apportioned 2.783% of the total assessment to

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the cigar class. 7 U.S.C. § 518d(c)(1)(B). Second, USDA

allocates each class’s share among individual manufacturers and

importers based on market share, which turns on the “volume of

domestic sales.” See id. § 518d(f), (a)(3). For cigarette and cigar

companies, the “volume of domestic sales” is, according to

USDA, determined solely by the number of cigarettes and cigars,

without differentiating between large and small cigars. USDA

relies on section 518d(g)(3)(A), which provides that “the

volumes of domestic sales shall be measured by — in the case of

cigarettes and cigars, the number of cigarettes and cigars.” See

also 7 C.F.R. § 1463.7(b)(1). For “other classes of tobacco

products,” the measurement of the “volumes of domestic sales”

shall be “in terms of number of pounds, or fraction thereof, of

those products.” 7 U.S.C. § 518d(g)(3)(B); see also 7 C.F.R.

§ 1463.7(b)(2). USDA obtains the data needed for these

calculations from copies of tax and customs forms (listing the

number of cigarettes and cigars and numbers of pounds of other

tobacco products “removed” into domestic commerce) that are

filed with the Treasury Department and the Department of

Homeland Security and submitted to USDA by manufacturers

and importers. See 7 U.S.C. § 518d(h)(1), (2); 7 C.F.R.

§ 1463.7(b).

Prime Time is a manufacturer of “small” cigars, which

weigh less than three pounds per thousand cigars. Cf. 26 U.S.C.

§ 5701(a)(1) (defining “small cigars”). For FY 2005, USDA

initially assessed Prime Time $339,719 for the first quarter based

on a market share for the cigar class of 4.81%; $455,374 for the

second quarter based on a market share of 6.45%; and

$1,152,530 for the third quarter based on a market share of

7.78%. Prime Time filed an administrative appeal of its

assessments to the Secretary pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 518d(i),

arguing that USDA’s per-stick approach improperly treated

differently sized cigars similarly and submitted verifiable A.C.

Nielsen sales data as an alternative source for calculating its

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market share. The Secretary, acting through the Deputy

Administrator for Farm Programs, acknowledged that Prime

Time’s objection to the inequity of assessing large and small

cigars equally was “philosophically well founded,” but took the

position that the per-stick method was mandated by section

518d(g)(3)(A) of FETRA. Letter Decision of Feb. 8, 2006 at 4.

The Secretary also took the position that A.C. Nielsen data,

which measures across-the-counter sales of tobacco products, did

not conform to the requirement that market share calculations be

based on the amount of product “removed.” See id. at 6. The

Secretary agreed, however, that Prime Time correctly challenged

both the exclusion of non-reporting manufacturers and importers

in apportioning assessments and the inclusion of certain expenses

in calculating assessments under the transition payment program.

The Secretary rejected Prime Time’s claim that it was entitled as

a matter of due process to examine the industry-wide tax and

customs data used by USDA to calculate the assessments on the

ground that such information about other companies was made

confidential by statute, see 26 U.S.C. § 6103. As subsequently

revised, Prime Time’s FY 2005 assessments for the first, second,

and third quarters were $351,007.23, $472,017.47, and

$1,135,353.46, respectively. 

Prime Time petitioned for review in the district court

pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 518d(j). The district court granted

summary judgment for the Secretary and USDA. Single Stick,

Inc. v. Johanns, 601 F. Supp. 2d 307 (D.D.C. 2009). The district

court deferred to USDA’s interpretation of FETRA that the perstick method of determining market share was statutorily

mandated as not contrary to congressional intent and a

permissible interpretation of the statute under Chevron U.S.A.,

Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837

(1984). Single Stick, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 314. It rejected Prime

Time’s due process claim regarding access to the data underlying

the Secretary’s assessments because Prime Time failed to

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demonstrate prejudice. Id. at 315. Finally, it dismissed Prime

Time’s claim that USDA’s failure to respond to requests for

disclosure and “correction” of the data underlying the

assessments violated the Information Quality Act (“IQA”), 44

U.S.C. § 3516 note, ruling that the IQA did not vest any party

with the right to disclosure and correction and that USDA’s

failure to respond did not constitute final agency action subject

to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5

U.S.C. § 704. Single Stick, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 316–17. Prime

Time appeals, and this court’s review is de novo, “as if the

agency’s decision had been appealed to this court directly.”

Gerber v. Norton, 294 F.3d 173, 178 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

II.

Prime Time contends that USDA’s interpretation of the Fair

and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act is contrary to ordinary

construction and plain meaning of the word “volume” in the

phrase “gross domestic volume,” which is defined in section

518d(a)(2) as the “volume of tobacco products — removed (as

defined by section 5702 of Title 26)” and “not exempt from tax”

pursuant to provisions not relevant to this appeal, supra note 1.

It observes that where statutory terms, such as “volume” here,

are not defined in a statute, courts give them their ordinary

meaning, citing Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179,

187 (1995). USDA responds that “volume” is “clearly

explained” in FETRA to mean the number of cigars because

section 518d(g)(3) provides that the number of cigars determines

the “volume of domestic sales” and thus “market share” under

section 518d(f). 

Prime Time replies that under USDA’s elastic construction

it has calculated the cigar class’s share of gross domestic volume

at step one by separately calculating the excise tax paid on large

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and small cigars and then adding the two amounts. See 70 Fed.

Reg. 7007, 7008 (Table 1) (Feb. 10, 2005). But then, at step two,

USDA calculates the market shares for individual manufacturers

and importers based on their share of the “commingled number

of large and small cigars.” Reply Br. 5. This skips a necessary

step, Prime Time maintains, because FETRA requires that the

allocation within a tobacco class be “on a pro rata basis” with

“[n]o manufacturer or importer . . . required to pay an assessment

that is based on a share that is in excess of the manufacturer’s or

importer’s share of domestic volume.” 7 U.S.C. § 518d(e).

Therefore, it argues, after allocating the assessment by class of

tobacco products, USDA should divide the cigar class

assessment into sub-classes of large and small cigars, with the

relative allocation determined by total weight, and then divide

the assessments among individual large and small cigar

manufacturers and importers on a per-stick basis from the subdivided assessments, satisfying subsection (g)(3)(A). Prime

Time contends such a method is required by the plain text of

subsection (e) as well as subsection (i)(4)(B), which, upon

administrative appeal, requires the Secretary to “make any

revisions necessary to ensure that each manufacturer and

importer pays only its correct pro rata share of total gross

domestic volume from all sources.” 

In interpreting a statute, the court begins with the text, and

employs “traditional tools of statutory construction” to determine

whether Congress has spoken directly to the issue. See Chevron,

467 U.S. at 842–43 & n.9. If so, the court’s task is at an end.

See id. at 842–43. USDA construes section 518d(g)(3)(A) of

FETRA to mandate the per-stick method for apportioning

assessments among individual manufacturers and importers

within the cigarette and cigar class without first sub-dividing the

cigar class into large and small cigars. In its view “[t]he statute

could hardly be more explicit.” Appellees’ Br. 15. It suggests

Swisher Int’l Inc. v. Schafer, 550 F.3d 1046 (11th Cir. 2008),

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cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 71 (2009), supports this interpretation.

However, Swisher provides no analysis, stating only that “[f]or

cigarette and cigar sellers, the individual assessments are

determined by the number of cigarettes and cigars sold,” while

for other tobacco classes, the number of pounds of tobacco is

used. Id. at 1050. 

The plain text of FETRA does not self-evidently vindicate

USDA’s two step assessment method. Under FETRA, the

“volume of domestic sales” and “market share” are not

synonymous with “gross domestic volume.” FETRA provides,

for example, that “[t]he volume of domestic sales shall be

calculated based on gross domestic volume,” 7 U.S.C.

§ 518d(g)(2) (emphasis added), indicating two different

meanings for the terms. And section 518d(g)(3)(A) does not, on

its face, require that a compound number of large and small

cigars serve as the denominator when calculating a

manufacturer’s or importer’s volume of domestic sales on a perstick basis. Most critically, USDA’s interpretation appears to

ignore the pro-rata-basis limitation Congress imposed on

assessments within a tobacco class in subsection (e). As

interpreted by USDA, it is irrelevant that one large cigar

consumes far more tobacco than a small cigar, and so accounts

for a far larger segment of the market than its per-stick

contribution would indicate. Yet the text and structure of the

statute titled the Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act

suggests an easy counting metric for cigarettes and cigars may

not override a statutory mandate that assessments be “allocated

on a pro rata basis” within each class of tobacco product, id.

§ 518d(e)(1). Prime Time’s interpretation suggests that there is

at least one way to interpret FETRA’s provisions consistently

and in harmony, with none made superfluous or insignificant.

See Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558, 1566 (2009); City

of Anaheim, Cal. v. FERC, 558 F.3d 521, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

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3

 Prime Time’s objection to increases in its market share

following its administrative appeal, which is not part of the USDA

record before the court, is subsumed in our remand; we thus expect its

objection will be addressed on remand should the issue arise.

For the purpose of this appeal, the court need only observe

that USDA’s present interpretation is not mandated by the plain

text of FETRA. USDA does not maintain that its interpretation

of FETRA is a permissible view of an ambiguous statute entitled

to deference under Chevron step 2, 467 U.S. at 843. Given that

FETRA does not appear to be susceptible of only a single

interpretation, we reverse and remand to the district court with

instructions to remand Prime Time’s FETRA claims to the

USDA for further proceedings. See PDK Labs. Inc. v. U.S. DEA,

362 F.3d 786, 797–98 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

To the extent Prime Time contends USDA arbitrarily and

capriciously overestimated its market share by relying on

inaccurate data, USDA adequately explained why it rejected

Prime Time’s view that A.C. Nielsen data on industry and

individual sales volumes should be used in lieu of “removal”

data.3

 Section 518d(g)(1) directs USDA to calculate the volume

of domestic sales and thus market share using “removal” forms

and tax returns “as well as any other relevant information

provided to or obtained by the Secretary.” Section 518d(i)(2)

also permits manufacturers and importers to use data on

“individual company sales volumes” to challenge their

assessments. While these provisions do not require USDA to

accept such non-“removal” data or change an assessment based

on it, USDA would be advised on remand to offer an explanation

in response to Prime Time’s argument that the discrepancy in

results indicated USDA’s data and calculations were inaccurate.

For the relevant period, the A.C. Nielsen data showed Prime

Time’s market share was between 1.05% and 2.5% as compared

to between 4.81% and 7.78% computed by USDA. In ruling on

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Prime Time’s administrative appeal, the Secretary pointed out

that A.C. Nielsen data “is across-the-counter ‘sales’ data,”

tracking the number of cigars sold at the point of sale, while

under FETRA “[m]arket shares . . . are computed based on

tobacco product ‘removal’ data.” Letter Decision at 6; see 7

U.S.C. § 518d(a)(3),(g)(2),(a)(2). Because FETRA adopted the

definition of “removal” in 26 U.S.C. § 5702, supra note 2, the

Secretary concluded USDA had to rely on excise tax and

customs forms that report data on “removal.” By contrast,

because A.C. Nielsen’s over-the-counter sales data does not track

“removal,” it “[is] not (and will not be) synonymous” with

“removal” data. Letter Decision at 6. USDA was not required

to provide more of an explanation for rejecting Prime Time’s

suggestion it use A.C. Nielsen data instead of “removal” data.

See Tourus Records, Inc. v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 259 F.3d

731, 737 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Still, the discrepancy is troubling and

inasmuch as the Secretary’s explanation was based on his view

that section 518d(g)(3)(A) was dispositive, we leave open the

question whether, upon remand, A.C. Nielsen data may assume

significance should Prime Time renew its argument.

We do not address Prime Time’s contention that its due

process rights were violated when USDA refused to disclose the

tax and customs data underlying its FETRA assessments. On

appeal USDA advises that, with Treasury Department

agreement, certain previously unavailable industry-wide data

sought by Prime Time can now be disclosed without running

afoul of the tax confidentiality statute, 26 U.S.C. § 6103. See

Appellees’ Br. 34; 7 C.F.R. § 1463.8(b)(8). Any due process

challenge would therefore arise in a different context upon

remand.

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4

 The USDA’s IQA guidelines are available at

www.ocio.usda.gov/qi_guide/. 

5

 Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality,

Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by

III.

The Information Quality Act of 2000 provides that the

Director of the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”)

shall, “with public and Federal agency involvement,” issue

guidelines by the end of September 2001 that:

provide policy and procedural guidance to Federal

agencies for ensuring and maximizing the quality,

objectivity, utility, and integrity of information

(including statistical information) disseminated by

Federal agencies in fulfillment of the purposes and

provisions of chapter 35 of title 44, United States Code,

commonly referred to as the Paperwork Reduction Act.

44 U.S.C. § 3516 note (a). The guidelines “apply to the sharing

by Federal agencies of, and access to, information disseminated

by Federal agencies,” and require such agencies to “issue

guidelines ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity,

utility, and integrity of information . . . disseminated by the

agency.” Id. § 3516 note (b)(1), (2)(A). Each such Federal

agency shall, under the guidelines, “establish administrative

mechanisms allowing affected persons to seek and obtain

correction of information maintained and disseminated by the

agency that does not comply with the guidelines issued under”

the IQA. Id. § 3516 note (b)(2)(B).4

The OMB Guidelines define “dissemination” as “agency

initiated or sponsored distribution of information to the public.”5

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Federal Agencies; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452 (Feb. 22, 2002)

(“OMB Guidelines”). 

6

 Prime Time also submitted, pursuant to the Freedom of

Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, a request for the data underlying its

assessments, which USDA denied and Prime Time did not appeal. 

67 Fed. Reg. at 8460. The definition excludes “distribution

limited to . . . adjudicative processes.” Id. On appeal, USDA

points to the preamble to OMB’s Guidelines:

The exemption from the definition of “dissemination”

for “adjudicative processes” is intended to exclude,

from the scope of these guidelines, the findings and

determinations that an agency makes in the course of

adjudications involving specific parties. There are

well-established procedural safeguards and rights to

address the quality of adjudicatory decisions and to

provide persons with an opportunity to contest

decisions. These guidelines do not impose any

additional requirements on agencies during adjudicative

proceedings and do not provide parties to such

adjudicative proceedings any additional rights of

challenge or appeal.

67 Fed. Reg. at 8454. USDA’s guidelines, in turn, exclude

“documents prepared and released in the context of adjudicative

processes.” USDA Information Quality Guidelines, Definitions,

§ 2, supra note 4. 

Prime Time sought disclosure and correction under the IQA

of the data that USDA used to calculate its FETRA assessments,

USDA never responded, and Prime Time challenges that nonresponse.6

 USDA maintains that the IQA does not mandate the

issuance of information but merely instructs OMB to “provide

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policy and procedural guidance” for ensuring quality, utility,

and integrity of information. 44 U.S.C. § 3516 note (a). Prime

Time relies, however, on the provision that requires agencies to

“establish administrative mechanisms allowing affected persons

to seek and obtain correction of information maintained and

disseminated by the agency.” Id. § (b)(2)(B). Regardless,

because Congress delegated to OMB authority to develop

binding guidelines implementing the IQA, we defer to OMB’s

reasonable construction of the statute. See United States v.

Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). The IQA is silent on the

meaning of “dissemination,” and in defining the term OMB

exercised its discretion to exclude documents prepared and

distributed in the context of adjudicative proceedings. This is a

permissible interpretation of the statute, see Chevron, 467 U.S.

at 843, and Prime Time does not contend otherwise. Rather,

Prime Time attempts to avoid the consequences of the IQA

exemption for adjudications on the ground it is waived because

USDA did not raise it in the district court. 

This court has repeatedly recognized that issues and legal

theories not asserted in the district court “ordinarily will not be

heard on appeal.” See, e.g., Horowitz v. Peace Corps, 428 F.3d

271, 282 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Hall v. Ford, 856 F.2d 255, 267 (D.C.

Cir. 1988); District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d

1077, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1984) . The reasons for this rule are clear:

[O]ur procedural scheme contemplates that parties shall

come to issue in the trial forum vested with authority to

determine questions of fact. This is essential in order

that parties may have the opportunity to offer all the

evidence they believe relevant to the issues which the

trial tribunal is alone competent to decide; it is equally

essential in order that litigants may not be surprised on

appeal by final decision there of issues upon which they

have had no opportunity to introduce evidence.

USCA Case #09-5099 Document #1236845 Filed: 03/26/2010 Page 14 of 16
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Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556 (1941). 

USDA did not raise the “exemption for adjudications”

argument in the district court, so normally it would be forfeited.

See generally United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993).

However, in Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976), the

Supreme Court observed: 

The matter of what questions may be taken up and

resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily

to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be

exercised on the facts of individual cases. We

announce no general rule. Certainly there are

circumstances in which a federal appellate court is

justified in resolving an issue not passed on below, as

where the proper resolution is beyond any doubt, see

Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962). 

The “proper resolution [of the IQA issue] is beyond any doubt,”

so this court is free to reach it. The issue involves a

straightforward legal question, and both parties have fully

addressed the issue on appeal. Consequently, no “injustice” will

be done if we decide the issue. Id. USDA’s determination of

Prime Time’s assessments for three quarters of FY 2005 was an

adjudication, attendant to which Prime Time had rights to an

administrative appeal and judicial review. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(7)

(defining “adjudication”); 7 U.S.C. § 518d(i), (j). Prime Time’s

contention that USDA violated the IQA when it did not respond

to a request to disclose and correct certain information

underlying the tobacco assessments thus fails.

Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgment to

USDA on Prime Time’s FETRA claims, we do not reach its due

process claims in view of USDA’s representation about

requested data that will become available to Prime Time upon

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remand, and we affirm the dismissal of the IQA challenge,

although on a different ground than relied upon by the district

court.

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