Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02173/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02173-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Job Discrimination (Race)

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 Golden Eagle’s Motion for Summary Disposition on its Motion to Strike and Motion

for Summary Judgment (Doc. 43) is moot because the Court accepts Plaintiff’s late response

to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike (Doc. 44).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Donald J. Hardge, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Golden Eagle Distributors, Inc., 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-08-2173-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before this Court are a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 36) and Motion

to Strike (Doc. 40) filed by Defendant Golden Eagle Distributors, Inc. (“GED”).1

 For the

reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

36) and grants in part and denies in part Defendant’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 40). 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Donald J. Hardge (“Hardge”) filed a Complaint alleging discrimination in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Specifically,

Hardge, an African American, claims that GED terminated him for racially-motivated and

discriminatory reasons. 

Plaintiff worked as a warehouseman with GED, a company that sells and distributes

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Budweiser and Anheuser-Busch products throughout Arizona. His responsibilities included

moving and stocking merchandise, loading and unloading trucks, and stacking empty pallets.

Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor was Elias Mendoza. Plaintiff and Mendoza appear to have

had several disagreements which required the intervention of branch managers through a

series of meetings.

On January 5, 2006, the day Plaintiff was terminated, Mendoza saw Plaintiff stacking

empty pallets inappropriately in a manner inconsistent with GED policy, and asked him to

re-stack the pallets. Plaintiff questioned the directive and felt that “[Mendoza] was wasting

time.” (Doc. 37, Ex. B, p.98). Mendoza responded, “if you’re not going to do your job,

[then] leave.” (Id. at 96). Plaintiff then called the branch manager, J. Michael Oglesbee, who

instructed him to either do as Mendoza instructed or to clock out. After Plaintiff clocked out,

and while in the presence of co-workers, he asked Mendoza, “are you a f****** idiot?” and

laughed at him. Plaintiff was terminated by Oglesbee for “[r]efusal to perform duties as

assigned by team leader / insubordination.” (Doc. 37, Ex. L).

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party, demonstrates “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2).

Substantive law determines which facts are material and “[o]nly disputes over facts that

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry

of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “A fact

issue is genuine ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.’” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002)

(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). When the nonmoving party “bear[s] the burden of proof

at trial as to an element essential to its case, and that party fails to make a showing sufficient

to establish a genuine dispute of fact with respect to the existence of that element, then

summary judgment is appropriate.” Cal. Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan

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Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986)). 

II. Analysis

A. Motion to Strike

GED moves to strike Plaintiff’s response to GED’s Statement of Facts and Plaintiff’s

Separate Statement of Facts. (Doc. 40). Under Local Rule 7.2(m), a party can move to strike

“any part of a filing or submission on the ground that it is prohibited (or not authorized) by

a statute, rule, or court order.” 

Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s Statement of Facts does not comply with Local

Rule 56.1(b), which requires a party opposing a motion for summary judgment to file a

statement setting forth “for each paragraph of the moving party’s statement of facts, a

correspondingly numbered paragraph indicating whether the party disputes the statement of

facts set forth in that paragraph and a reference to the specific admissible portion of the

record supporting that party’s position if the fact is disputed.” Plaintiff’s cursory response

to Defendant’s Statement of Facts neither identifies which, if any, of GED’s specific facts

he controverts, nor does it reference any specific admissible portion of the record to

contradict GED’s facts. Accordingly, the Court strikes Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s

statement of facts (Doc. 39) and, in accordance with Local Rule 56.1(b), Defendant’s

statement of facts are deemed admitted for purposes of the motion for summary judgment.

Local Rule 56.1(b) further requires a party opposing summary judgment to set forth

“any additional facts that establish a genuine issue of material fact or otherwise preclude

judgment in favor of the moving party. Each additional fact shall be set forth in a separately

numbered paragraph and shall refer to a specific admissible portion of the record where the

fact finds support.” In lieu of setting forth his own statement of facts, Plaintiff submits an

affidavit. In its discretion, the Court may accept a plaintiff’s affidavit instead of a separate

statement of facts. However, consistent with Defendant’s motion, the Court strikes those

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 A party cannot create an issue of fact by an affidavit contradicting his prior

deposition testimony if the affidavit is a sham produced merely to avoid summary judgment.

See, e.g., Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1991).

3

 For the purposes of this Motion, Defendant concedes that prior to January 5, 2006,

Plaintiff had not been trained to build stacks of 14 pallets on 14 pallets. Nonetheless, the

undisputed evidence confirms that Plaintiff’s job duties included stacking empty pallets, and

that on the day of the incident Mendoza instructed him to build the pallets in stacks of 14 in

compliance with GED’s policy. 

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portions of Plaintiff’s affidavit that are in violation of the sham affidavit rule,2

 not based on

his personal knowledge, or are irrelevant. For example, Hardge’s statements concerning

Mendoza’s alleged stealing of gas (¶ 4–6) and Plaintiff’s lack of training and/or awareness

of GED’s policy with respect to the stacking of pallets (¶ 17–22) are stricken for irrelevancy.3

 Similarly, Plaintiff’s allegations in paragraphs 35, 38-39, and 42-43 are stricken because

they are not based on Plaintiff’s personal knowledge. Finally, Plaintiff’s allegations in

paragraph 27 violate the sham affidavit rule because in his deposition testimony Plaintiff

states that he did not tell Human Resources (“HR”) that there was ongoing harassment

between him and Mendoza (Doc. 37, Ex. B, p. 136), whereas in his affidavit Plaintiff

indicates telling HR that “Mendoza had made racial remarks and comments; was overly

critical of me compared to non-black employees; and singled me out for discipline while

ignoring similar or more serious infractions by other employees.” Accordingly, the Court

only accepts Plaintiff’s affidavit to the extent that it is relevant, based on personal

knowledge, and not in violation of the sham affidavit rule. 

The only other evidence submitted by Plaintiff is an Arizona administrative law

judge’s (“ALJ”) finding, dated April 2006. However, A.R.S. § 23-672.01 bars the

introduction of this ALJ decision. The statute states that a finding of fact or law by an ALJ

“is not conclusive or binding in any separate or subsequent action or proceeding and shall

not be used as evidence in any separate or subsequent action or proceeding between an

individual and the individuals’ . . . former employer brought before [a] court or judge of . .

. the United States.” Accordingly, the ALJ’s findings are disregarded for purposes of

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summary judgment and the portions of Plaintiff’s affidavit which rely on the ALJ decision

are similarly stricken. See Doc. 39, ¶ 32–33, 50. 

The Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s

Response to Defendant’s Statement of Facts and Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Facts.

Because Plaintiff has not contradicted, for the most part, any of Golden Eagle’s facts with

admissible evidence, the uncontradicted facts set forth by GED and supported by admissible

evidence are deemed admitted for purposes of this motion. 

B. Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Claims

Plaintiff claims he was terminated illegally because of his race and seeks to recover

damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

prohibits employment discrimination on account of race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (“It shall be

an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge any individual . . . because

of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”). Similarly, section 1981

“guarantees ‘all persons’ the right to ‘make and enforce contracts.’” Johnson v. Riverside

Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)). Title

VII claims and claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1981 may be addressed together, because § 1981

claims are analyzed under the same framework as Title VII claims. See Surrell v. Cal. Water

Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008); see also White v. AKDHC, LLC, 664

F.Supp.2d 1054, 1067 (D. Ariz. 2009).

As the Supreme Court set forth in McDonnell Douglas, there are four elements a

plaintiff must satisfy in order to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). “[T]he plaintiff must show that (1)

he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was subject to an

adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside his protected class

were treated more favorably.” Id.; Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 753 (9th Cir. 2006). The

proof required to establish the prima facie case is “minimal and does not even need to rise to

the level of a preponderance of the evidence.” Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889

(9th Cir. 1994). Nevertheless, Plaintiff “must offer evidence that ‘give[s] rise to an inference

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of unlawful discrimination,’ either through the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas or

with direct or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent.” Vasquez v. Cnty. of L.A., 349

F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 2004). In the event that the plaintiff is able to establish a prima facie

case, “the burden of production, but not persuasion” then shifts to the defendant to offer a

legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the employment action. Chuang v. Univ. of Cal.-

Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2000). If the employer is able to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who must be “afforded a fair

opportunity to show that [the] stated reason for [the challenged action] was in fact pretext.”

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. If the plaintiff wishes to show indirectly that the

employer’s reason is “unworthy of credence,” the plaintiff’s evidence must be “specific” and

“substantial” in order to create a triable issue. Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217,

1222 (9th Cir. 1998). The Ninth Circuit has refused to find a “genuine issue” where the only

evidence presented is “uncorroborated and self-serving” testimony. Kennedy v. Applause,

Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996). 

1. Prima Facie Showing of Racial Discrimination 

 Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima

facie case of racial discrimination. Specifically, Plaintiff has not demonstrated the fourth

element – “similarly situated individuals outside his protected class were treated more

favorably.” To show that the employees allegedly receiving more favorable treatment are

similarly situated, Plaintiff “must demonstrate, at least, that [he is] similarly situated to those

employeesin all material respects.” Moran, 447 F.3d at 755. Individuals are similarly situated

when “they have similar jobs and display similar conduct.” Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 641. Plaintiff

relies on four alleged incidents to demonstrate that non-protected class employees received

more favorable treatment: 1) denial of bereavement leave while employees David and Joey

Hodges were granted similar leave; 2) harsher disciplinary action in response to a loading

mistake that two other employees were also involved in; 3) insufficient disciplinary action

when Harrington, a white employee, tried to run over Plaintiff; 4) no disciplinary action taken

against Christopher Clements, the company CEO, for crashing into Plaintiff’s parked car

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 In his deposition, Plaintiff suggests that Bob Murrieta and Joey Hodges, two other

GED employees, were also not terminated after engaging in serious misconduct. Plaintiff

does not address either of these allegedly similarly situated individuals in his Response to

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Nevertheless, the incidents involving these two

employees related to off-site activities and are not comparable to Plaintiff’s misconduct in

all material respects. 

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while allegedly driving under the influence.4

Plaintiff has provided no admissible evidence to support his alleged denial of

bereavement leave in April 2003, when his mother died, while maintaining that employees

Joey and David Hodges were granted leave. Meanwhile, Mendoza’s sworn affidavit indicates

that Hardge was granted bereavement leave in accordance with GED policy but that he chose

to return to work earlier. (Doc. 37, Ex. N). The affidavit of Cyndy Valdez, Vice President and

General Counsel for GED, also states that neither Joey nor David Hodges ever requested

bereavement leave because the former was not an employee of GED at the time his

grandmother passed away, and the latter did not request leave. (Doc. 37, Ex. M).

Plaintiff further alleges that GED handled disciplinary measures in a racially

discriminatory manner. Specifically, he alleges that he received harsh disciplinary action, a

write-up and verbal counseling, for a load mistake in May 2004. However, this allegation does

not demonstrate that similarly situated employees were treated more favorably where Plaintiff

admits in his deposition that he does not know whether two other employees who were

equally responsible for the mistake were verbally warned and similarly written up after the

incident. (Doc. 37, Ex. B, p. 112). Speculation as to how similarly situated employees may

or may not have been treated does not “give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.”

Plaintiff also attempts to demonstrate the more favorable treatment of others by

alleging that when a GED employee, Steve Harrington, tried to run him over in the company

parking lot, Harrington was merely reassigned to a different location rather than terminated.

In his sworn affidavit, Mendoza states that he investigated Hardge’s allegations and the

incident “and could not find any conclusive evidence of wrongdoing.” (Doc. 37, Ex. N).

Although Mendoza concluded that this was a “‘he said/he said’ situation,” “in an abundance

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of caution, [he] reassigned Harrington to the field to defuse the situation.” (Id.). Plaintiff has

not provided any admissible evidence to the contrary.

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Christopher Clements, GED’s CEO, crashed his vehicle

into Hardge’s parked car after drinking at a company holiday party. Plaintiff alleges that there

is no evidence that Clements was disciplined for his actions, and that Gary Wesnitzer, the

branch manager at the time, allegedly told Hardge to give false statements about the incident

if he were asked about it by the police. Employees in supervisory positions are generally

deemed not to be similarly situated to lower level employees. See Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 641

(citing Ward v. Procter & Gamble Paper Prods. Co., 111 F.3d 558, 560–61 (8th Cir. 1997)).

In this case, the two individuals were clearly not similarly situated because Hardge was a

warehouseman while Clement was the company’s CEO.

Based on the absence of any evidence of disparate treatment in the record, and

Plaintiff’s admissions pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(b), the Court finds that no other employee

engaged in conduct similar to Hardge and received less severe discipline. Plaintiff has neither

offered evidence that gives rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination under the

McDonnell Douglas framework nor has he offered any direct or circumstantial evidence of

discriminatory intent. Accordingly, Hardge’s prima facie showing of racial discrimination

fails for lack of showing that similarly situated employees not in his protected class received

more favorable treatment. 

2. Legitimate Non-Discriminatory Reason 

Even if Plaintiff had satisfied his burden of establishing a prima facie case, Defendant

has offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the termination: “[r]efusal to perform

duties as assigned by team leader/insubordination.” (Doc. 37, Ex. L). Specifically, Plaintiff

testifies that GED told him he was being terminated for using profanity, violating a safety

policy, and failure to reply to a reasonable request by his supervisor. (Doc. 37, Ex. B, p.

14–15). Defendant’s proffered reason is supported by admissible evidence, including

Hardge’s own testimony, wherein he admits his prior disrespectful treatment of his supervisor,

including shaking his head at Mendoza and not waiting for him to finish his sentence when

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he gave him instructions with which he disagreed. (Id. at 119–20). Hardge further admits that

on the day he was terminated he used profanity in addressing his supervisor and then laughed

at him while in front of co-workers. (Id. at 97–98). Hardge testifies that he reacted in this way

because Mendoza was wasting his time. (Id.). Defendant’s non-discriminatory reason for

terminating Hardge is further bolstered by Plaintiff’s admission that over the years he had

disagreements with Mendoza over his management style. (Id. at 117). The troubled

relationship between Mendoza and Hardge is further apparent from the series of meetings held

between the two individuals and various GED branch managers to resolve the conflict

between them. (Id. at 84–85, 118; Doc. 37, Ex. D, E). Hardge admits that during these

meetings he was repeatedly reminded that Mendoza was his supervisor. (Doc. 37, Ex. B,

p.118–19). 

Plaintiff’s serious misconduct qualifies as a legitimate and non-discriminatory reason

for his termination. See Unt v. Aerospace Corp., 765 F.2d 1440, 1446 (9th Cir. 1985) (“An

employee is not protected by Title VII when he violates legitimate company rules, knowingly

disobeys company orders, disrupts the work environment of his employer, or willfully

interferes with the attainment of the employer’s goals.”) Accordingly, GED has satisfied its

burden of articulating a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the challenged action. See

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 

3. Pretext

Because GED has proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the

termination, Plaintiff must prove that GED’s reason is pretextual. A plaintiff can show pretext

directly, by showing that discrimination more likely motivated the employer, or indirectly, by

showing that the employer’s explanation is unworthy of credence. Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1127.

As discussed above, Plaintiff has offered no direct admissible evidence that GED was more

than likely motivated by racial animus. Further, to indirectly show that the employer’s reason

is “unworthy of credence,” the plaintiff’s evidence must be “specific” and “substantial.”

Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1062. 

Plaintiff fails to meet his burden of offering “specific” and “substantial” evidence that

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insubordination and use of profanity with his supervisor was pretext for a racially-motivated

termination. Plaintiff’s allegation that Mendoza often made racially hostile and inappropriate

remarks which were never taken seriously by the management lacks the support of any

admissible evidence (Doc. 37, Ex. I), and, as a result, does not create a genuine issue. See

Kennedy, 90 F.3d at 1481 (finding no genuine issue where only evidence presented is

“uncorroborated and self-serving” testimony); see also Mondero v. Salt River Project, 400

F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Stray remarks not acted upon or communicated to a

decision maker are insufficient to establish pretext.”). Furthermore, Plaintiff’s allegations in

his affidavit that Wesnitzer excused Mendoza’s alleged racist remarks and treatment when

Plaintiff complained to him “on numerous occasions” is neither sufficient nor substantial

enough to establish pretext where Oglesbee, not Wesnitzer, made the ultimate decision to

terminate Hardge. (Doc. 39, ¶ 24–25).

The undisputed evidence refutes any showing that GED’s reasons for terminating

Hardge were pretextual. Specifically, in his deposition testimony and EEOC rebuttal letter,

Plaintiff admits that he had “issues with Elias Mendoza on numerous occasions” and that he

verbally abused Mendoza by swearing and laughing at him while in front of co-workers. (Doc.

37, Ex. B, p. 98, 171; Ex. F). Hardge further admits that he reacted in this way after Mendoza

asked him to stack the pallets differently, a task which he considered a waste of time. (Id. at

96, 98). Further, Plaintiff admits in his deposition that he was aware of company policy

requiring him to conduct himself in a positive manner in order to promote the best interest of

GED and that refusing to follow a supervisor’s instructions concerning a job-related task

could cause him to be disciplined up to and including termination. (Id. at. 56–57). 

Thus, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of establishing an issue of fact as to pretext

by raising “specific” and “substantial” circumstantial evidence that GED’s proffered

legitimate and non-discriminatory reason for discharge was pretextual. As a result, Defendant

is entitled to summary judgment on the Title VII and § 1981 racial discrimination claims.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has not demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimination. Alternatively,

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GED has demonstrated a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating Hardge, a

reason that was non-pretextual. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

36) filed by Defendant Golden Eagle Distributors, Inc. is GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 40) is

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Disposition

on its Motion to Strike and Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 43) is DENIED as

MOOT. 

The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate this action. 

DATED this 22nd day of December, 2010.

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