Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01779/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01779-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MAURICE L. VENABLE,

Plaintiff,

v.

TALLY,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:24-cv-1779-JDP (P)

ORDER; FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, alleges in his first amended complaint that defendant Talley 

violated his Eighth Amendment rights by using excessive force against him. ECF No. 8. The 

complaint has not cured the defects identified in the court’s prior screening order and continues to

fail to state an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim. Therefore, I will recommend that this 

action be dismissed without leave to amend for failure to state a claim. 

Screening Order

I. Screening and Pleading Requirements

A federal court must screen a prisoner’s complaint that seeks relief against a governmental 

entity, officer, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify any cognizable 

claims and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2).

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A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not 

require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 

possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 

identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 

1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 

give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 

n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 

The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 

U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it 

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 

would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). 

However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 

of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 

1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

II. Analysis

Plaintiff alleges that on September 20, 2023, he reported to the education department and 

sat at a computer to begin working. ECF No. 8 at 3. Plaintiff attempted to log into the computer, 

but his password was not working. Id. Plaintiff asked his teacher, defendant Talley, why his 

password was always changing, to which she responded that she did not know. Id. Plaintiff then 

asked Talley for the code to reset his password, and when she approached his desk and told him 

to put his code in, plaintiff explained to her that he had already done so. Talley told plaintiff to 

do it again. Plaintiff did not respond, but Talley tried to make it seem as if plaintiff was causing 

the computer error. Id. at 3-4. Talley asked plaintiff again if he was going to type in the code, to 

which plaintiff did not respond. Id. at 4. Talley then asked plaintiff if he wanted to go back his 

cell, to which he responded that he did not want to return to his cell, he only wanted his code 

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reset. Id. Following this conversation, plaintiff “felt a hit on [his] should[er] and [his] vest lift 

up, Talley had struck [him] in her actions to remove me from her class with force enough to lift 

[his] vest from [his] shoulder and back area.” Id. Plaintiff told Talley to not touch him, to which 

she responded that she had not touched him. Talley then sought the assistance of Officer Mortel. 

Id. Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from stress, anxiety, anger, and fear as a result of Talley’s 

actions. Id. at 6. 

These allegations, taken as true, fail to state a claim for excessive force against Talley. 

The alleged use of force is that Talley’s hand “hit” plaintiff’s shoulder and lifted his vest. This is 

the kind of de minimis use of force that the Supreme Court has held does not violate the Eighth 

Amendment. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992) (“The Eighth Amendment’s 

prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition 

de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the 

conscience of mankind.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). As explained in the court’s prior 

screening order, the allegations do not claim that Talley struck plaintiff with any great force or 

that she inflicted significant injury or pain by making contact with his shoulder and lifting his 

vest. The alleged contact does not rise above the de minimis threshold. See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 

559 U.S. 34, 40 (2010) (“An inmate who complains of a ‘push or shove’ that causes no 

discernible injury almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive force claim.”); Ferrell v. 

Clackamas Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 93-35042, 1993 WL 501590, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 1993)

(holding that pushing the plaintiff into a desk “would not rise to the level of a constitutional 

violation” and explaining that the Eighth Amendment “does not reach de minimis uses of physical 

force”); Broadway v. Lynn, No. CV S-09-0192 GGH P, 2009 WL 10658353, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 

Aug. 28, 2009), aff’d, 523 F. App’x 465 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that “[n]ot every unnecessary 

push and shove is actionable under the Eighth Amendment”). 

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Clerk of Court randomly assign a district judge to 

this matter. 

Further, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed for failure to state a 

claim without leave to amend and that the Clerk of Court be directed to close this action. 

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez 

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 19, 2024 

JEREMY D. PETERSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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