Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01045/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01045-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 28:1132 E.R.I.S.A.

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BARBARA STERIO,

Plaintiff,

vs. CIV-S-06-1045 MCE GGH 

HIGHMARK LIFE INSURANCE CO., et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Previously pending on this court’s law and motion calendar for July 12, 2007, was

plaintiff’s motion for Rule 60(b) relief from this court’s June 14, 2007, order denying withdrawal

of plaintiff’s motion for discovery. Jesse Kaplan appeared for plaintiff. Nancy Potter

represented defendants. Having heard oral argument and reviewed the papers, the court now

issues the following order. 

BACKGROUND

On June 5, 2007, this court issued an order resolving plaintiff’s motion for

discovery under an abuse of discretion standard of review as conceded by plaintiff’s counsel at

the hearing. That same date, plaintiff filed a motion to withdraw the discovery motion, which the

court denied on June 14, 2007. Also on June 14, 2007, plaintiff filed a motion for relief from the

order denying the motion to withdraw, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). 

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DISCUSSION

The purported basis for requested relief from the discovery order is counsel’s

mistake, surprise, and that the motion for withdrawal of the discovery motion was filed about

forty minutes before the discovery order issued. Plaintiff’s counsel is willing to pay defendant’s

fees and costs incurred in opposing the motion to compel and motions flowing from it, and

sanctions to the court for the trouble caused.

The court must place plaintiff’s request in its proper context. Plaintiff does not in

actuality seek to be relieved of any order, discovery or otherwise, nor does plaintiff seek to have

some type of default lifted. Rather, plaintiff seeks to eradicate from the record a statement

concerning the standard of review in this ERISA case made in the course of a discovery hearing,

which plaintiff’s counsel now regrets making. Counsel believes that if he is allowed to now

withdraw the discovery motion and order, the problematic statement vanishes along with the ill

advised motion.

Plaintiff has improperly analyzed the issue as one for relief from order, rather than

as a request not to be judicially estopped from disavowing his previous concession to be bound

by the abuse of discretion standard of review for the remainder of this action. 

Several factors typically inform a court’s decision whether to apply

judicial estoppel. First, “a party’s later position must be ‘clearly

inconsistent’ with its earlier position.” New Hampshire v. Maine,

532 U.S. 742, 750, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001).

Second, courts often inquire whether the party achieved success in

the prior proceeding, as “judicial acceptance of an inconsistent

position in a later proceeding would create ‘the perception that

either the first or the second court was misled.’ ” Id. (quoting

Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 599 (6th Cir.1982)).

Third, courts consider whether, if not estopped, “the party seeking

to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage

or impose an unfair detriment on the other party.” Id. at 751.

Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Moose Creek, Inc., 486 F.3d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 2007). 

The undersigned nevertheless cannot issue an advisory opinion as to the standard

of review to be applied in this case as it must be determined by the district judge, and therefore

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26 If counsel believes this amount overstates defendant’s expenses in opposing the initial 1

motion, and this present motion, he may file a motion to ascertain the “correct” amount.

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will not rule on the issue of judicial estoppel. The appropriate time on which to determine

whether plaintiff should be estopped is the time that plaintiff takes a position inconsistent with

the position taken at discovery hearing. The court will not strike the discovery motion and

hearing from the record as if it never existed. The significance of the statement made, in light of

the entire record, is one that the trial judge will determine. However, the court will accept

plaintiff’s counsel’s agreement to withdraw the previous discovery requests which led to the

motion for discovery, and his unequivocal statement that he does not desire the discovery. This

retraction may be factored into the estoppel issue by the trial judge. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for relief under Rule 60(b), filed June 14, 2007, is vacated as

premature.

2. Plaintiff’s discovery requests underlying the motion for discovery, filed May 1,

2007, are withdrawn.

3. Plaintiff’s counsel shall pay sanctions in the amount of $900 to defense

counsel within ten days of this order.1

DATED: 7/13/07 /s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

 U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:076/Sterio1045.R60

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