Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02017/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02017-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 368
Nature of Suit: Asbestos Personal Injury - Prod.liab.
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Personal Injury

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PETER GALASSI and LOUISE L. GALASSI,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

A. W. CHESTERTON CO. et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 05-02017 WHA

ORDER REMANDING CASE 

AND VACATING HEARING

INTRODUCTION

In this personal-injury case, the Court finds that there was no basis for removal under

either 28 U.S.C. 1441(b) or 1442(a)(1). Moreover, the removal was procedurally defective. 

Accordingly, this order GRANTS plaintiff’s motion to remand the action.

STATEMENT

On November 8, 2004, plaintiff Peter Galassi (along with his wife) filed a complaint in

state court alleging among other things, that he had been exposed to asbestos in products made

by numerous defendants while working at Naval shipyards (see Compl. Exh. A). Plaintiffs

expressly disclaimed “any cause of action or recovery for any injuries caused by any exposure

to asbestos dust that occurred in a federal enclave” as well as “any cause of action or recovery

for any injuries resulting from exposure to asbestos dust caused by any acts or omissions of a

party committed at the direction of an officer of the United States Government” (Compl. ¶ 3). 

Galassi suffers from mesothelioma (a fatal lung cancer) and his treating physician has expressed

doubt that he will survive beyond the next six months (Valieres Decl. ¶ 14). Pursuant to a state

court procedure for expediting such cases, a trial date was set for the week of June 13, 2005. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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California Civil Procedure Code § 36. Plaintiffs’ motion for remand was briefed on an

shortened schedule in light of this upcoming trial date.

On May 16, 2005, defendant Warren Pumps, Inc. removed the action to this Court,

acknowledging that there was no basis for removal on the face of plaintiffs’ complaint (Notice

of Removal ¶ 3–4). Nonetheless, Warren Pumps alleged that removal was timely pursuant to 28

U.S.C. 1446(b), which provides for removal “within thirty days after receipt by the defendant,

through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper

from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.” 

The “other paper” received was a set of discovery requests, served on April 12, 2005,

that allegedly raised a federal question (Notice of Removal ¶ 6). Specifically, Warren Pumps

objects to plaintiffs’ requests for production Nos. 3 (“all documents pertaining to your

manufacture of asbestos-containing products”), 13 (“any document that relates to the hazards of

your asbestos-containing product(s)”), and 18 (“any documents relating to your warnings

between 1930 and the present”). It argues that these requests were overly broad and sought

classified information related to matters of national defense, such that only a federal court can

decide whether such documents must be produced (id. ¶¶ 8, 12). In addition, Warren Pumps

argues that removal is otherwise proper under the federal officer removal statute because it was

obligated to manufacture pumps according to specifications set forth by the United States Navy

or agents thereof (id. ¶¶ 23–28).

On May 24, 2005, defendant IMO Industries, Inc. filed a joinder in the notice of

removal. This joinder was subsequently withdrawn on June 2, 2005. It is the Court’s

understanding that no other defendants have joined in the removal.

ANALYSIS

1. 28 U.S.C. 1441(b).

Removal under 28 U.S.C. 1441(b) is permitted for actions involving a federal question

over which the district court would have had original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331. 

The removing party always bears the burden of establishing removal is proper. Emrich v.

Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1990). The “well-pleaded complaint rule”

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For the Northern District of California

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provides that federal jurisdiction only exists when a federal question is presented on the face of

plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint, unaided by the answer or by the petition for removal. 

Gully v. First Nat’l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 113 (1936)(further noting that the federal

issue must not be “merely a possible or conjectural one”). Similarly, where removal is based on

a federal question ascertainable for the first time in an amended pleading, motion, order or other

paper, the federal question must appear on the face of that document. Roskind v. Morgan

Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 165 F.Supp.2d 1059, 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2001). A federal defense,

even if anticipated, is not part of a plaintiff’s cause of action. Rivet v. Regions Bank, 522 U.S.

470, 475 (1998). This rule thus enables the plaintiff, as “master of the complaint” to have his

action heard in state court “by eschewing claims based on federal law.” Caterpillar Inc. v.

Williams, 482 U.S. 385, 399 (1987).

Here, Warren Pumps has openly conceded that there was no federal question presented

on the face of the complaint. Plaintiff correctly argues that while discovery responses could

qualify as “other papers” that trigger removal under 28 U.S.C. 1446(b), discovery requests

cannot. By its very nature, a request for documents seeks, rather than provides, information. 

Regardless, no federal question appears on the face of the challenged discovery request.

Even accepting arguendo that some responsive documents would be privileged as a

matter of national security, that plaintiffs’ discovery requests were too broad is an objection that

can be adequately addressed by the state court. It does not raise even a federal defense to

plaintiffs’ causes of action. In any event, the privilege to protect military and state secrets by

blocking discovery that would adversely affect national security “belongs to the Government

and must be asserted by it; it can neither be claimed nor waived by a private party,” such as

Warren Pumps. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953). Moreover, Warren Pumps has

not asserted that the Department of Defense did object to this discovery, merely that it might.

Plaintiffs further argue that the removal was procedurally defective. This order agrees. 

Where fewer than all the defendants have joined in a removal action, the removing party has the

burden “to explain affirmatively the absence of any co-defendants in the notice for removal.” 

Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix, Inc., 167 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1999). Here, the record suggests

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For the Northern District of California

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that no co-defendants joined in the removal, with the exception of IMO Industries, which

subsequently withdrew its joinder. The absence of the other defendants was not explained in

the notice for removal. Moreover, IMO Industries’ withdrawal also prevents Warren Pumps

from curing this defect within the thirty-day statutory period permitted for joinder. Ibid. For

numerous reasons, removal under 28 U.S.C. 1441 was improper.

2. 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1).

In the alternative, Warren Pumps argues that removal was proper under 28 U.S.C.

1446(a)(1), which provides that an action may be removed by federal officers acting under color

of such office or any person acting under direction of such officer. Under this section, removal

solely on the basis of a federal defense is allowed and co-defendants need not be joined. 

Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 431 (1999). To qualify for removal, the defendant

must: (1) demonstrate that it acted under the direction of a federal officer, (2) raise a colorable

federal defense to the plaintiff’s claims; and (3) demonstrate a causal nexus between the

plaintiff’s claims and the acts the defendant performed under color of federal office. Mesa v.

California, 489 U.S. 121, 124–25, 134–35 (1989).

As a procedural matter, this order finds that removal on this basis is untimely. To the

extent that Warren Pumps could assert a federal defense on the basis that it was acting under

direction of the United States Navy, it would have been alerted to availability of that defense by

the complaint, which listed all the Navy ships on which plaintiff had worked. There is no

dispute that more than thirty days have elapsed since that filing.

Even if the Court were to reach the merits, Warren Pumps has failed to meet its burden

of demonstrating removal was proper. With regard to the first prong of the Mesa test, the notice

of removal fails to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that Warren Pumps was acting under

direction of the Navy. There is no evidence proffered demonstrating that Navy specifications

for the manufactured pumps required the use of asbestos materials or that the Navy exercised

any control over defendant’s asbestos warnings (or absence thereof). As to the second prong,

Warren Pumps has failed to raise a colorable federal defense to plaintiffs’ claims. As discussed

above, not only does a discovery objection fail to rise to the level of a “defense,” but the

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privilege to protect matters of national security cannot be asserted by Warren Pumps on behalf

of the Government. Finally, under the third prong of the Mesa test, Warren Pumps does not

(and cannot) demonstrate a causal nexus between plaintiffs’ claims and the acts allegedly

performed under color of federal office because it concedes that the complaint expressly

disclaims any cause of action based asbsetos exposure resulting from such acts. Compare

Westbrook v. Asbestos Defendants, 2001 U.S. Dist LEXIS 11575 (N.D. Cal. 2001)(remanding

case when plaintiff waived all claims arising from acts under the direction of federal officers,

rendering defendant’s military contractor defense unavailable). Thus, remand is appropriate.

3. 28 U.S.C. 1447(c).

“An order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual

expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. 1447(c). The

Court has “wide discretion” to award attorney’s fees and costs under this section, even in the

absence of a finding that the removing party acted in bad faith. Moore v. Permanente Medical

Group, Inc., 981 F2d. 443, 446–47 (1992). Independent of the questionable timing, Warren

Pumps’ removal of the action was wholly unnecessary, meritless and obviously an attempt to

delay plaintiffs’ upcoming trial date. Accordingly, an award of attorney’s fees and costs, in an

amount to be determined, is warranted.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs’ motion to remand is GRANTED. This action is

immediately REMANDED to the Superior Court of California for the County of San Francisco. 

The hearing on this motion, currently scheduled for JUNE 16, 2005 AT 8:00 A.M., is VACATED. 

The Court retains jurisdiction to decide only the collateral matter of attorney’s fees. A separate

order will issue on the procedure to determine the amount that shall be awarded.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 13, 2005 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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