Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-04211/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-04211-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:451 Employment Discrimination

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1

 Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts in support of her Response (Dkt. 70) fails to set forth

correspondingly numbered paragraphs to the District’s Statement of Facts, as required by the

Local Rules. LRCiv 56.1(b). An opposing party’s failure to set forth the separate statement

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Loretta T. Avent,

Plaintiff, 

v.

Tempe Union High School District No.

213,

Defendant. 

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No. CV-05-4211-PHX-SMM

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Tempe Union High School District’s (“the

District”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 63). Plaintiff Loretta T. Avent

(“Plaintiff”) opposes the motion. (Dkt. 74.) Having reviewed the parties’ contentions,

the Court now issues this Memorandum of Decision and Order.

BACKGROUND

The District is a school district located in Maricopa County, Arizona. Plaintiff is

an African-American woman who was hired as a security guard for Desert Vista High

School (“Desert Vista”), a school located within the District. (Dkt. 64, Def.’s Statement

of Facts (“DSOF”) ¶¶ 1, 2.)1

 Desert Vista’s attendance area includes neighborhoods in

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of facts in this manner requires that the moving party’s statement of facts be deemed

admitted for purposes of a motion for summary judgment. LRCiv 56.1(b)(2). However, the

District’s Statement of Facts in support of its Reply identifies, in correspondingly numbered

paragraphs, Plaintiff’s admissions or denials of Defendant’s Statement of Facts. (Dkt. 79.)

Therefore the Court will use the District’s Reply Statement of Facts to determine what facts

are in dispute.

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Ahwatukee and Chandler, and includes the Lone Butte area of the Gila River Indian

Community. (DSOF ¶ 1.) Plaintiff was hired by Dr. Joe McDonald, the Desert Vista

principal from 1994 to 2006. (DSOF ¶¶ 4-5.) Plaintiff was hired on a year-to-year

contract, beginning in the fall of 2003. (DSOF ¶¶ 3, 16.) Plaintiff had an employment

contract for the 2004-2005 school year, and that contract expired on May 26, 2005. 

(DSOF ¶ 90.) Plaintiff previously worked in the administration of President Clinton on

issues affecting Native Americans. (DSOF ¶ 2.) Because of her experience working on

Native American issues, Plaintiff was assigned responsibilities beyond those ordinarily

assigned to security guards, including working with Native American students. (DSOF ¶

26.)

Plaintiff sought a position at Desert Vista because she lived outside the attendance

area and she wanted her granddaughter, who lived with her, to attend Desert Vista. 

(DSOF ¶ 17.) Students who live outside the attendance area of a school can nonetheless

attend a school at which their parents or guardians are employed. (DSOF ¶ 18.) 

Plaintiff’s granddaughter tried out for the Desert Vista volleyball team in fall of 2004, but

was not selected. (DSOF ¶ 30.)

In the summer of 2004, The District hired Dr. Shirley Miles as the new

superintendent. (DSOF ¶ 27.) Dr. Miles appointed Plaintiff as the Parent Liaison for the

District in January or February 2005. (DSOF ¶ 28.) In her role as Parent Liaison,

Plaintiff communicated with parents of students regarding the District’s performance. 

(DSOF, Ex. 2, Dep. of Loretta Avent 63:17-21.) This included addressing concerns

regarding Lone Butte students, and coordinating meetings at which concerns could be

addressed. (Id. at 67:14-68:13.) On February 8, 2005, Plaintiff, Dr. Miles, and a number

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of Native American students and parents attended the Desert Vista Site Council Meeting

to address concerns. (DSOF ¶ 35.)

On March 25, 2005, Plaintiff filed her first discrimination complaint with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Plaintiff alleged that Dr.

McDonald made her employment difficult as a result of her concerns about her

granddaughter being cut from the volleyball team. Plaintiff stated that she believed Dr.

McDonald was trying to force her to resign due to her age. (DSOF ¶ 37.) The EEOC

dismissed Plaintiff’s discrimination charge on April 21, 2005. (DSOF ¶ 41.)

On March 31, 2005, Plaintiff filed another discrimination charge with the EEOC. 

That charge stated that Plaintiff had been vocal about the needs of Lone Butte students.

(DSOF ¶ 42.) Plaintiff claimed that Dr. McDonald was retaliating against her for

“continuing to oppose the school’s pattern and practice of abandoning the educational

mission of the students of color and by exercising the protection of Native American

students.” (Id.) The EEOC determined that this charge failed to state a claim under any

statutes enforced by the EEOC, and closed the file on this charge. (DSOF, Ex. 11.)

On April 26, 2005, representatives from the District and Desert Vista met with

representatives from the Gila River Indian Community (“the April 26 meeting”). (DSOF

¶ 44.) Plaintiff arranged the April 26 meeting. (DSOF ¶ 45.) Dr. Miles believed the

meeting would be a dialogue between the District and Gila River Indian Community

leaders to address issues. Dr. Miles did not realize that students would be in attendance. 

The press was also in attendance. (DSOF ¶ 46.) Mary Thomas, Lieutenant Governor of

the Gila River Indian Community, was also in attendance, told the District representatives

that it was a “listening meeting,” and discouraged District representatives from

interjecting. (DSOF ¶ 48; DSOF, Ex. 12, Dep. of Nicole Greason 18:21-19:2.) Students,

former students, and parents of students at the April 26 meeting told stories about their

concerns, asserting that students had been called “savages” on campus, told to “go back

where [they] came from,” and were unfairly singled out by campus security when

allegations of misconduct arose. (DSOF ¶ 49.)

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Plaintiff then arrived at the April 26 meeting and stated that Desert Vista was not

meeting its educational mission to Native American students. (DSOF ¶ 50.) She also

stated that Dr. McDonald was deficient as a leader. (DSOF ¶ 51.) Plaintiff attacked Dr.

McDonald and his ability to run Desert Vista, and claimed that Lone Butte students were

mistreated at the school. (DSOF ¶ 52.) The meeting was publicized and reflected

negatively on Desert Vista and the District. (DSOF ¶ 53.)

On May 9, 2005, Plaintiff filed a third charge with the EEOC, stating that Dr.

McDonald had retaliated against her for filing two previous EEOC charges and for

opposing the school’s pattern or practice of abandoning the educational mission of

students of color. Plaintiff alleged that Dr. McDonald retaliated against her by hiring an

investigator to collect information on her, by soliciting negative information about her

from staff and parents, and by directing her not to speak with Native American students

regarding their issues or concerns. Plaintiff also alleged that Dr. McDonald harassed her

by telling her that nothing was going to happen with her previous EEOC charges. (DSOF

¶ 54.)

On May 10, 2005, Dr. McDonald contacted Janet Seegren, Assistant

Superintendent for Human Resources, stating that he had concerns regarding Plaintiff and

her performance. (DSOF ¶¶ 7, 55.) Ms. Seegren told Mr. McDonald that she would need

to review evaluations relating to Plaintiff’s performance. (DSOF ¶ 56.) Dr. McDonald

signed Plaintiff’s evaluations, which indicated that Plaintiff received “meets standards in

all categories.” (DSOF ¶ 57.) Dr. McDonald stated that he had some concerns that were

not set forth in the evaluation. (DSOF ¶ 58.) Ms. Seegren did not change the

administrative recommendation to issue Plaintiff a contract for the 2005-2006 academic

year. (DSOF ¶ 59.)

On May 11, 2005, the District’s administration recommended that Plaintiff’s

contract be renewed for the following year. (DSOF ¶ 60.) The Governing Board

accepted the administration’s recommendation, and approved rehiring Plaintiff to work as

a security guard. (DSOF ¶ 61; DSOF, Ex. 19 at 9.) 

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On May 12, 2005, Plaintiff obtained and served an Injunction Against Harassment

against Dr. McDonald. (DSOF ¶ 62.) The injunction stated that Dr. McDonald was not

to contact Plaintiff in person or by telephone, and not to go on or near where Plaintiff

resided. (DSOF ¶ 63.) On May 13, 2005, Ms. Seegren tried to meet with Plaintiff to

discuss how they could facilitate compliance with the injunction until such time as it was

amended or vacated by the issuing court. (DSOF ¶ 64.) Plaintiff refused to meet with

Ms. Seegren. (DSOF ¶ 65; DSOF, Ex. 2, Dep. of Loretta Avent 193:24-194:16.) 

Plaintiff then informed the District receptionist that she was leaving campus for the rest of

the day. (DSOF ¶ 66.)

On May 13, 2005, the District faxed a letter to Plaintiff’s counsel outlining

Plaintiff’s work schedule and assigned duties. (DSOF ¶ 67.) The letter also addressed

where she should park and her assigned work area. (DSOF ¶ 68.) Plaintiff was instructed

not to be in the administration building where Dr. McDonald’s office was located, and not

to be in the visitor parking lot near the administration building. (DSOF ¶ 69.) Plaintiff

was instructed to clock in and out on the machine in the cafeteria, and not the machine in

the administration building. (DSOF ¶ 69.) The letter instructed Plaintiff to contact

Assistant Principal Bob Cox if she had any difficulties, and informed her that she would

no longer report to Roseyn Hood, her previous supervisor. (DSOF, Ex. 1, Decl. of Janet

Seegren, Ex. B at 3.)

On May 16, 2005, Plaintiff did not report to work. (DSOF ¶ 70.) That afternoon,

Ms. Seegren was served with a Notice of Hearing prior to Injunction Against Harassment

identifying Ms. Seegren as the defendant and Plaintiff as the aggrieved party. (DSOF ¶

71.) Plaintiff also sought injunctions against harassment against Bob Cox, a Desert Vista

Assistant Principal, and Beth Lyon, the Desert Vista Counseling Office Receptionist. 

(DSOF ¶ 72.) 

On May 17, 2005, Plaintiff parked near the administration building and clocked in

on the machine located in the administration building. (DSOF ¶¶ 74-75.) Plaintiff

refused to accept any further written letter of direction from the administration. (DSOF ¶

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76; DSOF, Ex. 2, Dep. of Loretta Avent 212:19-23.) Plaintiff told Joe Feinstein, the lead

security guard attempting to deliver the letter, that any communication directed to her

need to be delivered to her attorney. (DSOF ¶ 77.) Later that day, when Mr. Cox began

speaking with Plaintiff, Plaintiff responded that if he continued to talk to her she would

call the sheriff and have Mr. Cox arrested, put in handcuffs, and taken away. (DSOF ¶

78.)

Following this conduct, Dr. Miles signed a Notice of Reassignment to Home. 

(DSOF ¶ 80.) Mr. Cox attempted to deliver the Notice of Reassignment to Plaintiff, but

she refused to accept service. (DSOF ¶ 81.) Based on these incidents, the District

administration determined that Plaintiff was unwilling to perform her assigned duties or

respond to reasonable direction from her supervisors. (DSOF ¶ 82.) The administration

concluded that Plaintiff’s continued employment in her position with the District could

not be managed. (DSOF ¶ 83.) On June 8, 2005, the District recommended to the

Governing Board to rescind the offer of employment to Plaintiff for the school year 2005-

2006. (DSOF ¶ 84.) The Governing Board rescinded Plaintiff’s contract offer for the

2005-2006 school year. (DSOF ¶ 85.)

Plaintiff never submitted an employment discrimination complaint to the District

under the District’s non-discrimination policy. (DSOF ¶ 86.) Plaintiff later amended her

May 9, 2005 charge with the EEOC to state that she was terminated from her security

guard position on June 8, 2005. (DSOF ¶ 87.) The EEOC dismissed Plaintiff’s amended

charge on September 23, 2005.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents,

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, “show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Jesinger v. Nevada Fed. Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994). Substantive

law determines which facts are material. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242,

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248 (1986); see also Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130. “Only disputes over facts that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of

summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The dispute must also be genuine, that

is, the evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” Id.; see Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130.

A principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of factually

unsupported claims.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. Summary judgment is appropriate

against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of

proof at trial.” Id. at 322; see also Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th

Cir. 1994). The moving party need not disprove matters on which the opponent has the

burden of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. The nonmovant “may not rest

upon the mere allegations or denials of [the party’s] pleadings, but . . . must set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-88 (1986);

Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995). A trial court

can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e); Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff sets forth four claims in her First Amended Complaint (Dkt. 18): (1) 

violation of her First Amendment right to free speech pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2)

wrongful termination pursuant to A.R.S. § 23-1501; (3) violation of Title VII; and (4)

violation of Title VI. The District seeks summary judgment as to each of these claims. 

These claims will be discussed in turn.

A. First Amendment/§ 1983

Plaintiff asserts that the District retaliated against her for statements she made at

the April 26 meeting, and that this retaliation violated her First Amendment right to free

speech. (First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28-34.) In order to state a claim for violation of the First

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Amendment’s protection of free speech, a public employee must show that the employee

spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77,

80 (2004); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). Additionally, the public

employee must demonstrate that the alleged adverse employment action was caused by

the exercise of constitutionally protected First Amendment freedoms. Mt. Healthy City

Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1977).

The first inquiry to guide constitutional protections accorded to public employee

speech requires determining whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of

public concern. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. “If the answer is no, the employee has no First

Amendment cause of action based on his or her employer’s reaction to the speech.” Id.

The controlling factor in this inquiry is whether the statements were made pursuant to the

employees official duties. Id. at 421. “[W]hen public employees make statements

pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First

Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from

employer discipline.” Id.

The employee in Garcetti did not dispute that the speech at issue was made

pursuant to his official duties. Id. Therefore the Court did not “articulate a

comprehensive framework for defining the scope of an employee’s duties in cases where

there is room for serious debate.” Id. at 424. No comprehensive framework is needed

here, as there is no room for serious debate that Plaintiff’s statements at the April 26

meeting were made pursuant to her official duties. In addition to her duties as a security

guard, Plaintiff was assigned to work with Native American students at Desert Ridge. 

(DSOF ¶ 26.) Dr. Miles later appointed Plaintiff to serve as Parent Liaison. (DSOF ¶

28.) Prior to the April 26 meeting, Plaintiff attended a District Site meeting to address

issues regarding Native American students. (DSOF ¶ 35.) In her capacity as Parent

Liaison, Plaintiff arranged for the April 26 meeting. (DSOF ¶ 45.) It is therefore clear

that Plaintiff’s statements at the April 26 meeting were made pursuant to her official

duties.

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In response to these facts, Plaintiff asserts that she was “not hired to be a public

advocate for Lone Butte [Gila River Indian Community] students. She was hired to be a

security guard.” (Dkt. 74, Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 10:13-14.) But

Plaintiff does not dispute that, subsequent to her initial hiring, she was appointed to serve

as Parent Liaison, or that she arranged for the April 26 meeting. Indeed, she admitted as

much in her deposition. (DSOF, Ex. 2, Dep. of Loretta Avent 63:1-21, 67:23-68:13.) 

Plaintiff also states that Garcetti cautions against using “excessively broad job

descriptions” to limit public employee speech. 547 U.S. at 424. Although this is true,

Plaintiff’s role as Parent Liaison did not stem from an excessively broad job description,

but rather from a specific appointment based on Plaintiff’s prior work with Native

Americans and other students of color. Therefore her argument is unavailing.

Furthermore, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the adverse employment action was

caused by her statements. Regarding causation, the initial burden is on Plaintiff to show

that her conduct was constitutionally protected, and that the conduct was a “substantial”

or “motivating” factor in the adverse employment action. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. 

If Plaintiff meets this burden, the District must then show that it would have rescinded

Plaintiff’s offer of employment for the 2005-2006 school year even in the absence of the

protected conduct. Id. 

Plaintiff’s offer of employment was rescinded not because of her statements at the

April 26 meeting, but because of her subsequent conduct. The District decided to renew

Plaintiff’s contract on May 11, 2005—after her statements at the April 26 meeting. 

(DSOF ¶ 60.) Plaintiff subsequently refused to accept direction from Desert Vista

administrators when they sought to adjust her ordinary responsibilities in order to avoid

violating the injunction obtained against Dr. McDonald. (DSOF ¶¶ 64-65, 74-78.) In

fact, Plaintiff then sought injunctions against three other Desert Vista employees and

threatened to have one of them arrested. (DSOF ¶¶ 71-72, 78.) Plaintiff received notice

regarding where she was to park and clock in, but refused to abide by those adjustments. 

(DSOF ¶¶ 74-7.) These actions by Plaintiff, and not her statements at the April 26

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meeting, caused the District to recommend Plaintiff’s offer of employment be rescinded. 

Plaintiff therefore fails to meet the causation requirement, even if her statements at the

April 26 meeting were constitutionally protected. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.

The District’s motion for summary judgment shall be granted as to Plaintiff’s First

Amendment § 1983 claim.

B. Wrongful Termination

Plaintiff’s second claim for relief alleges wrongful termination in violation of the

Arizona Employment Protection Act, A.R.S. § 23-1501(3). (First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 35-42.) 

That statute provides, in pertinent part: 

3. An employee has a claim against an employer for termination of

employment only if one or more of the following circumstances have

occurred:

. . . 

(c) The employer has terminated the employment relationship of an

employee in retaliation for any of the following: 

(i) The refusal by the employee to commit an act or omission that

would violate the Constitution of Arizona or the statutes of this state. 

(ii) The disclosure by the employee in a reasonable manner that the

employee has information or a reasonable belief that the employer, or an

employee of the employer, has violated, is violating or will violate the

Constitution of Arizona or the statutes of this state . . . .

A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(c)(i)-(ii).

The District argues that summary judgment should be granted on this claim

because Plaintiff cannot establish that she was terminated. (Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.

14:23-15:6.) The District asserts that Plaintiff had an employment contract for the 2004-

2005 school year that expired on May 26, 2005. (DSOF ¶ 90.) The District further

asserts that Plaintiff never signed, and was not ultimately offered, an employment

contract for the 2005-2006 school year. (Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 14:25-27.) Plaintiff

does not deny that her contract expired, but asserts that she “had been informed that her

contract would be renewed.” (Pl.’s Resp. 11:26-28.)

The public policy of the State of Arizona is that the employment relationship is

contractual in nature. A.R.S. § 23-1501(1). Arizona courts apply common law principles

of contract interpretation in determining whether the requirements of § 23-1501 have

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been satisfied. Johnson v. Hispanic Broadcasters of Tucson, Inc., 2 P.3d 687, 689 (Ariz.

Ct. App. 2000)(citing Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 854 P.2d 1134, 1138

(Ariz. 1993)). For a contract to exist, there must be an offer, acceptance of the offer, and

consideration. Savoca Masonry Co., Inc. v. Homes & Son Const. Co., Inc., 542 P.2d 817,

819 (Ariz. 1975); Revised Arizona Jury Instructions (Civil) (“RAJI”) Contract 3 (4th ed.). 

The person making the offer may revoke the offer at any time before the communication

of acceptance by the person to whom the offer is made. See Richards v. Simpson, 531

P.2d 538, 540-41 (Ariz. 1975); RAJI Contract 5. An acceptance is an expression of

agreement to the terms of the offer by the person to whom the offer was made. Contempo

Const. Co. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 736 P.2d 13, 15 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987);

RAJI Contract 6.

There is no dispute in this case that on May 11, 2005 the District’s Governing

Board approved issuing Plaintiff a contract to work as a security guard for the 2005-2006

school year. (DSOF ¶ 60.) Nor is there a dispute that on June 8, 2005 the Governing

Board rescinded the offer. (DSOF ¶ 85; DSOF, Ex. 1, Decl. of Janet Seegren, Ex. F,

Letter to Loretta Avent dated June 13, 2005; DSOF, Ex. 2, Dep. of Loretta Avent 217:22-

24.) Plaintiff does not assert that she accepted the offer before it was revoked. As no

contract was ever formed, no employment relationship existed for the 2005-2006 school

year. Plaintiff was therefore not terminated, and her claim for wrongful termination fails. 

The District’s motion for summary judgment shall be granted as to Plaintiff’s Wrongful

Termination claim.

C. Title VII

Plaintiff’s third claim for relief alleges violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Dkt. 18, First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 43-45.) To make

out a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, an employee must show that (1) she

engaged in a protected activity; (2) her employer subjected her to an adverse employment

action; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action.

Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000). If a plaintiff has asserted a

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prima facie retaliation claim, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate

nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. Id. 

If the defendant articulates such a reason, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of

demonstrating that the reason was merely a pretext for a discriminatory motive. Id. The

plaintiff may show pretext “either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory

reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s

proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281

F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th Cir. 2002). Circumstantial evidence relied on to show pretext must

be “both specific and substantial.” Id.

The District asserts that, even if Plaintiff made out a prima facie case of retaliation,

it has rebutted that case by articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its

decision. (Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 12.) The District contends that it was aware of

Plaintiff’s EEOC filings when it initially approved re-hiring Plaintiff on May 11, 2005,

and decided to rescind the offer of employment because of Plaintiff’s subsequent conduct. 

(Id.)

Plaintiff asserts that a causal connection between the May 9, 2005 EEOC charge

and the District’s decision to rescind her offer of employment may be inferred from the

proximity in time between the two. (Pl.’s Resp. 8-9.) This assertion, while accurate, see

Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1986), is problematic for

several reasons. First, it fails to demonstrate why the District’s legitimate

nondiscriminatory reason is merely a pretext. In fact, the word “pretext” does not appear

in Plaintiff’s response. However, the same evidence that makes out a prima facie case

may be relied upon to establish pretext. Id. at 732. Therefore the Court will treat

Plaintiff’s temporal proximity argument as Plaintiff’s position regarding pretext. 

Nonetheless, the causal inference that may be drawn from the temporal proximity

fails to persuade the Court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the District,

or that the District’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Villiarimo, 281 F.3d

at 1062. The Court should not look only at the length of time, without regard to factual

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circumstances, when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Coszalter v. City of

Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 978 (9th Cir. 2002)(“In some cases, the totality of the facts may

form such a clear picture that a district court would be justified in granting summary

judgment, either for or against a plaintiff, on the issue of retaliatory motives.”). As

discussed above regarding the First Amendment claim, Plaintiff’s offer of employment

was rescinded on account of her conduct subsequent to the April 26 meeting. Plaintiff

refused to accept direction from Desert Vista administrators, refused to meet with the

administrators to accommodate her work responsibilities in light of the injunction she

obtained against Dr. McDonald, threatened to “call the Sheriff” and have one of them

arrested, and refused to park and clock in at the designated locations. 

Plaintiff asserts that she refused to meet with the Desert Vista administrators

because the administrators were attempting to “negotiate terms of a Court Order,” i.e., the

injunction against Dr. McDonald. (Pl.’s Resp. 7:17-19, 9:15-16.) This contention is

supported only by Plaintiff’s subjective beliefs, and is contradicted by the record. 

(Compare Dkt. 70, PSOF, Ex. 17, Decl. of Jim Goggin ¶ 41 (“My impression was that she

felt that Mr. Cox or the District were attempting to involve her in conduct that the court

staff had warned her against.”) and id., Ex. 16, Decl. of Loretta Avent ¶¶ 86-87 (“It was

apparent to me that they intended to try to negotiate the terms of the [injunction] . . . . I

was concerned that [Bob Cox was attempting to negotiate the terms of the injunction.]”)

with DSOF, Ex. 1, Decl. of Janet Seegren, Ex. B, Letter to Loretta Avent dated May 13,

2005 (“In order to make sure that you receive the message I intended to deliver this

morning I have decided to put this in writing . . . . We are hopeful that this plan will

provide the protection you claim you need.”).)

Plaintiff’s causation argument is further undermined by the fact that the District

was aware of Plaintiff’s March 2005 EEOC charges when it extended an offer of

employment in May 2005. (DSOF ¶¶ 37, 42.) The second of these EEOC charges alleged

retaliation against Plaintiff for “continuing to oppose the school’s pattern and practice of

abandoning the educational mission of the students of color and by exercising the

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protection of Native American students.” (DSOF, Ex. 10.) Despite these charges, the

District extended an offer of employment. Plaintiff’s third EEOC charge filed May 9,

2005 repeated the allegation of retaliation for “opposing the school’s pattern and practice

of abandoning the educational mission of the students of color.” (DSOF, Ex. 14.) 

Plaintiff fails to address why the District would extend an offer after the second EEOC

charge, but would rescind the offer in retaliation for the third EEOC charge. Although

the offer was rescinded after Plaintiff’s third EEOC charge, the evidence clearly

demonstrates that the decision was motivated by Plaintiff’s subsequent conduct. See

Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270-71 (9th Cir. 1996)(“We therefore

hold that where the same actor is responsible for both the hiring and the firing of a

discrimination plaintiff, and both actions occur within a short period of time, a strong

inference arises that there was no discriminatory motive.”).

Plaintiff also asserts that she was subjected to adverse terms and conditions of

employment after she filed her first EEOC charges and while she was still employed. 

(Pl.’s Resp. 9:5-13.) Plaintiff alleges that she was shunned, she was subjected to an

attempt to rescind her prior positive performance evaluation, and that Janet Seegren

opened an “investigation” of Plaintiff. (Id.) As to being “shunned” and Ms. Seegren’s

“investigation,” Plaintiff fails to direct the Court’s attention to competent evidence that

supports her assertion. Title VII only protects against retaliatory acts which are

“materially adverse.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S. Ct.

2405, 2415 (2006). “We speak of material adversity because we believe it is important to

separate significant from trivial harms.” Id. Plaintiff’s assertion as to being subjected to

an “attempt” to rescind her performance evaluation by definition fails to demonstrate any

harm. Id. at 2414 (“The anti-retaliation provision protects an individual not from all

retaliation, but from retaliation that produces and injury or harm.”).

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that a discriminatory reason more likely

motivated the District, or that the District’s proffered explanation is unworthy of

credence. Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1062. The totality of the facts “form such a clear

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picture” to justify granting summary judgment in favor of the District on the issue of

retaliatory motives. Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 978. The District’s motion for summary

judgment shall be granted as to Plaintiff’s Title VII claim.

D. Title VI

Plaintiff’s fourth and final claim for relief alleges a violation of Title VI of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 46-48.) “No

person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be

excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination

under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. 

However, Title VI contains an important limitation: “Nothing contained in this subchapter

shall be construed to authorize action under this subchapter by any department or agency

with respect to any employment practice of any employer, employment agency, or labor

organization except where a primary objective of the Federal financial assistance is to

provide employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (emphasis added). Plaintiff must therefore

establish that the District received federal funds, and that providing employment was a

primary objective of those funds. Temengil v. Trust Territory of Pacific Islands, 881 F.2d

647, 653 (9th Cir. 1989)(upholding dismissal of class action employment discrimination

claim); see also Reynolds v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 69 F.3d 1523, 1531-32 (10th Cir.

1995)(upholding summary judgment where plaintiff offered no evidence federal funds

received by school district were for a primary objective of providing employment).

The District contends that Plaintiff cannot establish the requisite elements of her

Title VI claim, in that the District receives funds for education, not employment. (Def.’s

Mot. for Summ. J. 16-17.) Plaintiff’s response fails to address this contention in any

fashion whatsoever. (See Pl.’s Resp. 12-13.) No genuine issue of material fact existing

as to whether the District received federal funds for a primary objective of providing

employment, the District’s motion for summary judgment shall be granted as to Plaintiff’s

Title VI claim. See Temengil, 881 F.2d at 653.

//

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting Defendant Tempe Union High School

District No. 213’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 63). Plaintiff shall take nothing

by this action, and judgment shall be entered in favor of Defendant.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment

accordingly.

DATED this 13th day of May, 2008.

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