Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_18-cv-02088/USCOURTS-alnd-5_18-cv-02088-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

NORMAN PATRICK HODGSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) 5:18-cv-02088-LSC

)

ANDREW SAUL, )

Commissioner of )

Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

I. Introduction

The magistrate judge to whom this Social Security appeal was previously 

assigned has entered a Report & Recommendation recommending reversal of the 

Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of benefits and remand to consider the 

evidence of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine, right heel spur, and Achilles tendinopathy. 

(Doc. 16.) The Commissioner filed an objection to the Report & Recommendation 

within the time allotted by the magistrate judge. (Doc. 17.) This case was then 

reassigned to the undersigned pursuant to the Court’s General Order for Referral 

of Civil Matters to Magistrate Judges. (Docs. 19 & 20.) 

FILED

 2020 Mar-24 PM 03:31

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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After now having thoroughly reviewed the entire administrative record and

having the benefit of the parties’ original briefs, this Court finds that the magistrate 

judge’s Report & Recommendation is not due to be adopted and accepted. Rather, 

for the following reasons, the decision of the Commissioner is due to be affirmed. 

II. Background

The plaintiff, Norman Patrick Hodgson, appeals from the decision of the 

Commissioner denying his application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”).

Hodgson timely pursued and exhausted his administrative remedies and the 

decision of the Commissioner is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 

1383(c)(3).

Hodgson was 48 years old on his alleged disability onset date, and 49 years 

old on December 31, 2013, his date of last insured (“DLI”). (Tr. at 7, 12, 15, 177.)

Hodgson has a limited education and past work experience as a trailer truck driver. 

(Tr. at 15, 102, 200.) Hodgson claims that he became disabled on March 31, 2013,

due to back, shoulder, elbow, and wrist problems, arthritis, and bipolar disorder. 

(Tr. at 199.)

The Social Security Administration has established a five-step sequential 

evaluation process for determining whether an individual is disabled and thus 

eligible for DIB or SSI. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Doughty v. Apfel, 

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245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The evaluator will follow the steps in order 

until making a finding of either disabled or not disabled; if no finding is made, the 

analysis will proceed to the next step. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 

416.920(a)(4). The first step requires the evaluator to determine whether the 

plaintiff is engaged in substantial gainful activity (“SGA”). See id. §§ 

404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If plaintiff is not engaged in SGA, the evaluator 

moves on to the next step. 

The second step requires the evaluator to consider the combined severity of 

the plaintiff’s medically determinable physical and mental impairments. See id. §§ 

404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An individual impairment or combination of 

impairments that is not classified as “severe” and does not satisfy the durational 

requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509 and 416. 909 will result in a finding 

of not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). The decision 

depends on the medical evidence contained in the record. See Hart v. Finch, 440 

F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971) (concluding that “substantial medical evidence in 

the record” adequately supported the finding that the plaintiff was not disabled). 

Similarly, the third step requires the evaluator to consider whether the 

plaintiff’s impairment or combination of impairments meets or is medically equal 

to the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 

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See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the criteria of a listed 

impairment and the durational requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509 and 

416.909 are satisfied, the evaluator will make a finding of disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). 

If the plaintiff’s impairment, or combination of impairments, does not meet 

a medically equal a listed impairment, the evaluator must determine the plaintiff’s 

residual functional capacity (“RFC”) before proceeding to the fourth step. See id. §§ 

404.1520(e), 416.920(e). The fourth step requires the evaluator to determine 

whether the plaintiff has the RFC to perform the requirements of his past relevant 

work. See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the plaintiff’s impairment 

or combination of impairments does not prevent him from performing his past 

relevant work, the evaluator will make a finding of not disabled. See id. 

The fifth and final step requires the evaluator to consider the plaintiff’s RFC, 

age, education, and work experience in order to determine whether the plaintiff 

can make an adjustment to other work. See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 

416.920(a)(4)(v). If the plaintiff can perform other work, the evaluator will find him 

not disabled. Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If the plaintiff 

cannot perform other work, the evaluator will find him disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(g), 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g).

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Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ first determined that 

Hodgson has not engaged in SGA since March 31, 2013, his alleged onset date, 

through his date last insured of December 31, 2013. (Tr. at 12.) According to the 

ALJ, Plaintiff’s status post 2011 cervical fusion and obesity are considered “severe” 

based on the requirements set forth in the regulations. (Id.) However, he found 

that these impairments neither met nor medically equaled any of the listed 

impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. at 13.) The ALJ did 

not find Hodgson’s allegations to be totally credible, and he determined that 

Hodgson has the RFC to:

perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except that he is 

limited to occasionally climbing stairs and ramps, but never climbing 

ladders or ropes. The claimant should avoid exposure to hazardous 

environments including, but not limited to, unprotected heights and 

unguarded machinery. The claimant is also limited to occasional 

overhead reaching, and frequent, but not constant forward reaching, 

handling, and fingering.

(Tr. at 13.) 

According to the ALJ, Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work, 

he is a “younger individual age 18-49,” he has “a limited education,” and he “is able 

to communicate in English,” as those terms are defined by the regulations. (Tr. at 

15.) The ALJ determined that transferability of job skills is not an issue because

using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that Hodgson 

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is “not disabled,” whether or not Hodgson has transferable job skills. (Id.)

Moreover, the ALJ enlisted a vocational expert (“VE”) and used the MedicalVocational Rules to find that through the DLI, considering Hodgson’s age, 

education, work experience, and RFC, there were jobs that existed in significant 

numbers in the national economy that Hodgson could have performed, such as 

counter clerk, garment sorter, and ticket marker. (Tr. at 15-16.) The ALJ concluded 

his findings by stating that Plaintiff has not been “under a disability, as defined in 

the Social Security Act, at any time from March 31, 2013, the alleged onset date, 

through December 31, 2013, the date last insured.” (Tr. at 17.)

III. Standard of Review

This Court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is 

a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there 

is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the 

Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Stone 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 544 F. App’x 839, 841 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Crawford v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004)). This Court gives 

deference to the factual findings of the Commissioner, provided those findings are 

supported by substantial evidence, but applies close scrutiny to the legal 

conclusions. See Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996).

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Nonetheless, this Court may not decide facts, weigh evidence, or substitute 

its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 

(11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 

2004)). “The substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision makers 

to act with considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing two inconsistent 

conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding 

from being supported by substantial evidence.’” Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 

1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 

383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Indeed, even if this Court finds that the proof 

preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision, it must affirm if the decision 

is supported by substantial evidence. Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400 (citing Martin v. 

Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).

However, no decision is automatic, for “despite th[e] deferential standard 

[for review of claims], it is imperative that th[is] Court scrutinize the record in its 

entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision reached.” Bridges v. 

Bowen, 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Arnold v. Heckler, 732 F.2d 881, 

883 (11th Cir. 1984)). Moreover, failure to apply the correct legal standards is 

grounds for reversal. See Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984).

IV. Discussion

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Hodgson contends that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed and remanded 

for one reason: the ALJ erred in his RFC assessment as it is unsupported by 

substantial evidence.

A claimant bears the burden of proving he was disabled within the meaning 

of the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(5)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(H)(i); 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.912(a), (c); Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). The ALJ 

considered Plaintiff’s disability claim using the five-step sequential evaluation 

process. To determine if Plaintiff could perform his past relevant work at step four 

or other work at step five, the ALJ had to first assess Plaintiff’s RFC. An individual’s 

RFC represents the most he can still do, despite his limitations, in a work setting. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). In order to determine an individual’s RFC, the ALJ 

assesses all of the relevant evidence in the record, including medical reports 

prepared by a physician or other healthcare provider, as well as more subjective 

descriptions and observations of an individual’s limitations. Id. § 404.1545(a)(3). 

Moreover, the evaluator considers not only the impairments classified as “severe” 

but the “limiting effects” of all conditions when making a judgment about an 

individual’s RFC. Id. § 404.1545(e). A reviewing court will affirm the ALJ’s RFC 

assessment if it is supported by the objective medical evidence. See Lewis v. 

Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997).

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Hodgson raises two arguments with respect to his RFC assessment. First, he 

argues that the ALJ failed to provide any analysis regarding the degeneration of his 

lumbar spine. Second, he argues that the ALJ failed to provide any analysis 

regarding his right heel spur and Achilles tendinopathy. 

A. Diagnosis of Degeneration of Lumbar Spine

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination as to Hodgson’s RFC. 

Hodgson argues that the ALJ did not consider a diagnosis of degeneration in his 

lumbar spine in his RFC determination, but a diagnosis does not establish 

limitations. See Moore, 405 F.3d at 1213; see also Davis v. Barnhart, 153 F. App’x 

569, 572 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding that “[d]isability is determined by the effect an 

impairment has on the claimant’s ability to work, rather than the diagnosis of an 

impairment itself”). Moreover, Hodgson points to two letters from May 2011 

written by Dr. Morris Seymour, Hodgson’s treating physician, which predate 

Hodgson’s alleged onset date by two years. (Tr. at 14, 316-20.)

After an examination of Hodgson’s lumbar spine, Dr. Seymour stated in his 

May 20, 2011, letter that Hodgson’s gait is grossly normal; his spine is without signs 

of scars, trauma, masses, unusual hair or pigment; no lymphadenopathy is noted; 

no deformity is noted of the shoulders, pelvis, knees, ankles, and feet; there is no 

evidence of lumbar or thoracic scoliosis; and no tenderness is noted of the spinous 

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processes. (Tr. at 319.) Then, Dr. Seymour stated in a May 24, 2011, letter that 

Hodgson’s MRI showed “significant degenerative changes” in his lumbar spine. (Tr. 

at 316.) However, Dr. Seymour does not note any functional limitations regarding

the diagnosis of degeneration in the lumbar spine or any other limitations in 

connection to Hodgson’s alleged back impairments. (Tr. at 316-20.) Notably, Dr. 

Seymour stated that in May 2011 it was the first time he had seen Hodgson in nine 

years and pointed out that Hodgson continued to work as a truck driver even while 

alleging his disabling lower back pain. (Tr. at 318.) These letters fail to establish 

limitations greater than the ALJ’s RFC determination. (Tr. at 14.) 

Rather, the ALJ focused his findings on Hodgson’s alleged symptoms based 

on treatment records from the relevant period in 2013. (Tr. at 14.) The ALJ found 

that the examinations and medical records do not provide objective medical 

evidence to support Hodgson’s subjective complaints regarding his back pain. (Tr. 

at 14.) Specifically, the ALJ noted that the examinations were unremarkable and 

generally normal during the relevant period. (Tr. at 14, 269-70.) The ALJ discussed

Hodgson’s cervical fusion surgery and neck pain because Dr. Seymour noted that 

those were Hodgson’s most severe symptoms. (Tr. at 14, 316.) Thus, the ALJ 

determined that the 2013 medical records were inconsistent with Hodgson’s 

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testimony about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms. 

(Tr. at 14, 88-104, 269-70.)

B. Diagnosis of Right Heel Spur and Achilles Tendinopathy

Hodgson argues that the ALJ failed to consider his right heel spur and Achilles 

tendinopathy in determining his RFC. In August 2011, approximately a year and a 

half prior to the relevant period, Plaintiff again visited Dr. Seymour complaining of 

right foot pain. (Tr. at 321). Dr. Seymour noted Plaintiff’s report that his pain was a 

“4 out of 10” but that it was exacerbated by “walking, shoe gear, and heavy 

activities.” (Id.) Dr. Seymour noted a diagnosis of mild Achilles tendon contracture 

with a posterior heel spur and Achilles tendinopathy. Dr. Seymour advised him to 

use ice every hour for 10 minutes to treat the pain. However, the ALJ did not find 

Plaintiff capable of heavy work, instead finding his RFC was limited to a reduced 

range of light work. Further, Plaintiff cites no additional treatment note, from any 

other medical provider, indicating Plaintiff had this additional limitation or was 

unable to work for any consecutive twelve-month period, during the relevant 

period, as required to meet the definition of disability under the Social Security Act. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 404.1509. Instead, the record 

indicates Plaintiff continued to work through this allegedly disabling limitation, 

testifying he had his Achilles’ issue when he was driving. (Tr. at 96). 

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Hodgson saw Dr. Matthew DeOrio in September 2011, in connection with his 

right heel pain. (Tr. at 323.) Dr. DeOrio diagnosed Hodgson with chronic calcific 

insertional Achilles tendinopathy. (Id.) Dr. DeOrio noted Plaintiff’s reports of “5/10” 

right heel pain, aggravated by walking. (Tr. at 323). Dr. DeOrio also noted that a 

rocker bottom shoe “helps,” though Plaintiff’s pain continued. (Id.) Plaintiff stresses 

that Dr. Orio said that “if icing, a rocker bottom shoe, anti-inflammatories, and a 1⁄4-

inch elevation in his heel did not relieve the pain, then the only other treatment 

would be significant surgery requiring a cast and boot for 8-10 weeks.” (Tr. at 323-

24). However, Dr. DeOrio actually noted that “[i]f and when this bothers him 

enough,” the surgery would be scheduled. (Tr. at 323). There is no indication 

Plaintiff’s pain continued to the point that Dr. DeOrio, or any other medical 

provider, actually ordered the surgery. In addition, Plaintiff does not cite any 

additional treatment notes for his right heel pain and does not establish that, even 

if he needed surgery on his right heel, that he would be disabled for any 12-month 

period, as the outpatient surgery would only place him in a cast and boot for 8-10 

weeks. (Tr. at 323-24). 

Therefore, Hodgson has failed to demonstrate any further functional 

limitations as a result of the treatment notes of either Dr. Seymour or Dr. DeOrio, 

concerning his right heel spur or Achilles tendinopathy. These records do not 

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provide objective medical evidence that Hodgson had additional limitations or was 

unable to work for any consecutive twelve-month period, during the relevant 

period, as required to meet the definition of disability under the Social Security Act. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 404.1509.

V. Conclusion

Upon review of the administrative record, and considering all of Hodgson’s

arguments, the Court finds that the magistrate judge’s Report & Recommendation 

(doc. 16) is not due to be adopted and accepted. Rather, the Commissioner’s 

decision is supported by substantial evidence and in accord with the applicable law. 

A separate order will be entered.

DONE and ORDERED on March 24, 2020.

_____________________________

L. Scott Coogler

United States District Judge

201416

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