Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01781/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01781-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 245
Nature of Suit: Real Property Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Product Liability

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WAWANESA GENERAL INSURANCE

COMPANY, a California corporation as

subrogee of SANDY ASCH,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06cv1781 WQH (NLS)

ORDER

vs.

APPLICA CONSUMER PRODUCTS,

INC., WHICH WILL DO BUSINESS IN

CALIFORNIA AS FLORIDA APPLICA

CONSUMER PRODUCTS, INC.; and

DOES 1-20, inclusive,

Defendants.

HAYES, Judge:

The matters before the Court are (1) Motion in Limine No. One (Doc. # 24) filed by

Plaintiff Wawanesa General Insurance Company; (2) Motion in Limine No. Two (Doc. # 25)

filed by Plaintiff Wawanesa General Insurance Company; and (3) Cross Motion in Limine

Nos. 1-4 (Doc. # 26) filed by Defendant Applica Consumer Products, Inc. 

Background

On July 21, 2006, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing the Complaint in the Superior

Court of California, County of San Diego. Not. of Removal, p. 11. On September 5, 2006,

Defendant removed the Complaint to this Court (Doc. # 1). The Complaint alleges that on or

about January 28, 2005, an electric toaster/oven (the “Toaster/Oven”), sold under the trade

name of Black and Decker, and manufactured and distributed by Defendant, caused a fire in

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the residence of Plaintiff’s insured, Sandy Asch. Complaint, ¶ 11. The Complaint alleges that

“[a]s a result of the fire caused by the toaster/oven, [Asch’s residence] sustained damages in

the amount of $266,748.45.” Id., ¶ 13. The Complaint alleges that Asch made a claim to

Plaintiff pursuant to the terms and conditions of her insurance policy with Plaintiff, thereby

obligating Plaintiff to pay the amount of $267,748.45 to and on behalf of Asch. The

Complaint alleges that the Toaster/Oven “was defective in that the designs of various

components of the toaster/oven were defective.” Id., ¶ 17. The Complaint alleges that “[a]s

a proximate result of the defective design, Wawanesa’s insured’s residence was damaged and

pursuant to the policy Wawanesa became obligated to and did pay to and on behalf of their

insured a total $267,748.45.” Id., ¶ 22. The Complaint alleges the following causes of action:

(1) Strict Products Liability (Defective Design); and (2) Subrogation. 

On May 19, 2008, the Court held a pretrial conference where the Court set the jury trial

for November 18, 2008 (Doc. # 17). 

On August 22, 2008, Plaintiff filed two Motions in Limine. On August 22, 2008,

Defendant filed four Cross-Motions in Limine. On September 5, 2008, Defendant filed

Responses in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine (Docs. # 28, 29). On September 5,

2008, Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motions in Limine (Doc. # 30).

On September 12, 2008, Plaintiff filed a Reply to the Responses in Opposition to Plaintiff’s

Motions in Limine (Doc. # 31). On September 12, 2008, Defendant filed Replies to Plaintiff’s

Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motions in Limine (Docs. # 32, 33, 34, 35). 

On October 10, 2008, the Court heard oral argument on the Motions in Limine (Doc.

# 36).

Standard of Review

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact

to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as

an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify

thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon

sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and

methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to

the facts of the case. 

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Fed. R. Evid. 702. The trial judge must find that expert testimony is “properly grounded, wellreasoned and not speculative before it can be admitted.” Fed. R. Evid. 702, Advisory

Committee Notes (2000); see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 597

(1993). The proponent of the expert testimony has the burden of proving the factual

prerequisites necessary to the admissibility of expert testimony. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.

Trial courts serve as gatekeepers, evaluating proposed expert testimony for the expert’s

qualifications, reliability, and relevance. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-590. The trial court must

determine (1) whether the proposed expert is qualified to testify as an expert by knowledge,

skill, experience, training or education, and (2) whether the reasoning or methodology

underlying the proposed expert’s opinion is reliable and relevant. Id. at 589-594. In

determining whether expert testimony is reliable, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals

(Daubert II), 43 F.3d 1311, 1316-1317 (9th Cir. 1995), advised trial courts to consider whether

the theory or technique employed by the expert is generally accepted in the scientific

community; whether it has been subject to peer review and publication; whether it can be and

has been tested; and whether the known or potential rate or error is acceptable. However, the

trial judge’s reliability inquiry is “flexible,” and therefore trial courts can and should consider

other factors not specifically mentioned by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert.

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.

“Trial courts must exercise reasonable discretion in evaluating and in determining how

to evaluate the relevance and reliability of expert opinion testimony.” United States v.

Alatorre, 22 F.3d 1098, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). A trial judge has “considerable leeway” in

deciding not only “how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is

reliable,” but also in deciding whether the testimony is reliable. Kumho Tire, 509 U.S. at 153.

“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the

burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible

evidence.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. “Rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather

than the rule.” Fed. R. Evid. 702, Advisory Committee Notes to the 2000 Amendments. 

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1

 Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine also contends that the April 28 Report should be stricken on

grounds that it was untimely because it was not produced in compliance with Rule 26 of the

Federal Rules of Evidence and this Court’s May 18, 2007 scheduling order. However, at oral

argument, Plaintiff’s counsel withdrew the objection to the admissibility of the April 28 Report on

timeliness grounds. 

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Analysis

I. Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine

A. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine # 1 - Regarding April 28, 2008 Ignition Report

Plaintiff moves to exclude a supplemental report produced on April 28, 2008 (the 

“April 28 Report”) and any testimony based on the April 28 Report. The April 28 Report was

based on an experiment involving radiant heat and ignition tests by Defendant’s expert, Ron

Liem. In the April 28 Report, Liem reported that “he conducted tests on combustible materials

and that the temperature in the toaster oven was not high enough to ignite any known

material.” Mot. in Limine # 1, p. 2. Plaintiff contends that the April 28 Report should be

stricken because it is unreliable within the meaning of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of

Evidence and Daubert, 509 U.S. 579.1

 Plaintiff contends that the April 28 Report is unreliable

for the following reasons: (1) Liem made the conclusions in the April 28 Report without

establishing that his testing had been subject to peer review and publication, and without

establishing the potential rate of error for his testing; (2) Liem did not test the other types of

combustible material located on the counter near the Toaster/Oven; and (3) Liem’s testing was

incomplete because it only tested temperatures without testing whether actual materials would

ignite.

Defendant contends that the April 28 Report is reliable. Defendant contends that it did

not test other types of combustible materials because the only material identified by Plaintiff’s

experts as the initial “fuel for the fire” was the Corian countertop in Asch’s kitchen.

Defendants contend that without evidence of other combustible materials in or around the

subject Toaster/Oven, there was nothing more for Liem to test. Defendant also contends that

it would be irrelevant for Liem to determine if any material could be ignited by the radiant heat

generated by the Toaster/Oven since the Corian countertop was the only material identified by

Plaintiff’s experts as being the first material ignited. Regarding Plaintiff’s contention that

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Liem’s test was incomplete because it only tested temperatures, Defendant states that Liem

was attempting to verify what external temperatures were generated by radiant heat from the

Toaster/Oven in order to ascertain if the radiant heat would in fact ignite the Corian

countertop. Defendant contends that the “alleged defect was identified at deposition (a fused

switch), the mechanism for heat generation was identified (radiant heat at a set temperature),

and the first material ignited (Corian) was also identified.” Opp. to Pltf’s Mot. in Limine # 1,

p. 12-13. Defendant contends that in reaching the results reported in the April 28 Report, Liem

coupled all of these facts in conducting his test, which makes the April 28 Report “extremely

reliable, and beneficial to the trier of fact.” Id. at 13. 

Plaintiff objects to Liem’s testing on grounds that he did not test other types of

combustible material near the Toaster/Oven; and that he only tested temperatures without

testing if actual materials would ignite. The Court has considered Plaintiff’s objections and

concludes that Plaintiff’s objections go to the weight to be given to the April 28 Report by the

trier of fact. The Court cannot conclude that the April 28 Report is so lacking as to render it

unreliable, as opposed to simply worthy of cross-examination. The Court also finds that the

April 28 Report is relevant. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine # 1 is DENIED without prejudice.

B. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine # 2- Regarding Ron Liem’s Testimony

Plaintiff moves to preclude Liem from testifying at trial regarding other potential

sources of the fire, such as appliances and/or food cooking on the stove, on grounds that the

testimony is unreliable within the meaning of Rule 702 and Daubert. Plaintiff moves to

exclude this testimony for the following reasons: (1) Liem has made his conclusions without

establishing whether the testing upon which he bases his conclusions has been subject to peer

review and publication, and without establishing the potential error rate of his testing; (2) Liem

did not test the other types of combustible material located on the counter such that his

opinions are conclusory, not supported by scientific or research evidence, and are speculative;

and (3) Liem’s investigation was not done in accordance with the basic principles of National

Fire Protection Association (“NFPA”) 921, entitled “A Guide for Fire and Explosion

Investigations.” Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Liem cannot identify the specific

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component or components in other appliance that he believes are the ignition source of the fire,

what items were ignited by the stove, or that the stove was still on after Asch finished cooking

on it. 

Defendant contends that Liem, in accordance with NFPA 921, did consider other

appliances as possible ignition sources. Defendant emphasizes Liem’s testimony that “[i]f the

plaintiff’s claim is that the origin is at the location of the toaster oven, then this blender and

coffee maker, due to their close proximity and extensive damage, become the leading candidate

as a cause of the fire and cannot be ruled out.” Opp. to Pltf’s Mot. in Limine # 2, p. 6.

Defendant contends that Liem could not have tested these other appliances because they were

not collected and preserved by Plaintiff. Defendant contends that the photographs of Plaintiff’s

own expert, Ron Ablott, establish that the stove remained “on” after Ash was cooking.

Defendant contends that Liem did identify the first material ignited, as evidenced by his

deposition testimony that the material that was first ignited was “[t]he food in the pan.” Id. at

8. 

The parties dispute whether Liem’s failure to test other types of combustible material

located near the Toaster/Oven renders Liem’s testimony regarding alternative source of the fire

unreliable, and whether Liem failed to comply with NFPA 921 by failing to identify the first

material ignited and consider other possible ignition sources. The Court concludes that the

parties’ dispute goes to the weight to be given to Liem’s testimony by the trier of fact. After

considering Plaintiff’s objections, the Court cannot conclude that Liem’s testimony is so

lacking as to render it unreliable, as opposed to simply worthy of cross-examination. The

Court also finds that Liem’s proposed testimony is relevant. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine # 2

is DENIED without prejudice. 

///

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2

 At oral argument, Defendant also objected to the admissibility of Hsu’s July 2008 report on

timeliness grounds. The Court declined to consider Defendant’s objection to Hsu’s July report on

timeliness grounds because Defendant raised the issue for the first time in its Reply to the Motion in

Limine. 

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II. Defendant’s Motions in Limine

A. Defendant’s Motion in Limine # 1 - to Exclude Testimony of Plaintiff’s Expert

Frank Hsu

Defendant contends that the proffered expert opinion of Frank Hsu, who has been 

offered by Plaintiff to support its contention that a defective condition in the Toaster/Oven was

the cause of the fire, is unreliable and speculative, and therefore should be excluded.2

Defendant contends that the specifics of Hsu’s theory have been a “moving target” because

Hsu initially stated that he was unable to determine the “exact failure mode of the toaster

oven,” and later stated that a defect in the door switch of the toaster/oven likely caused the fire.

Mot. in Limine # 1, p. 9-10. Defendant contends that the factual basis for Hsu’s determination

that there was a defect in the door switch is insufficient because the sole basis for his opinion

is his “observations with respect to the damage pattern present on the surface of those

contacts.” Mot. in Limine # 1, p. 18-19. Defendant contends that Hsu’s opinion is not

supported by relevant test data because he could have, but did not review any data obtained by

Underwriter’s Laboratories (“UL”) from safety testing performed on the model line for the

Toaster/Oven. Defendant also contends that Hsu’s tests attempted to burn different

combustible materials that were arbitrarily positioned next to the Toaster/Oven with the radiant

heat emitted from the toaster oven while at a setting of 500EF. Defendant contends that this

testing is not supported by the facts that have been established during discovery because

“[n]owhere in the record is it stated that Ms. Asch was operating the subject toaster oven at a

temperature setting of 500EF,” and “Ms. Asch did not testify that she left any sort of paper

material or cotton material, or any other type of combustible material for that matter, resting

on the toaster oven’s door before leaving her house on the day of the fire.” Mot. in Limine #

1, p. 13. Defendant contends the methodology used by Hsu does not meet the standards for

investigating fires set forth in NFPA 921 because Hsu was initially unaware of the scope of

his assignment before embarking on his investigation, Hsu initially testified that he was not

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able to identify a first material ignited, and although Mr. Hsu speculates that the first material

ignited would have been a combustible household material, “he does not reference any facts

to show the type and form of the material that he believes served as the first material ignited

in this fire.” Mot. in Limine # 1, p. 16. Defendant contends that Hsu is a mechanical engineer,

who does not possess any work related experience, specialized knowledge or training with

respect to the manufacturing of electric appliances, or in designing or evaluating the safety of

a design as it relates to electric appliances or toaster ovens. 

Plaintiff contends that Hsu’s opinion is consistent with NFPA 921. Plaintiff contends

that Hsu was initially aware of the scope of his assignment as evidenced by his testimony that

the initial assignment was to examine the Toaster/Oven involved in the incident to determine

if there was any evidence to indicate that the Toaster/Oven was the ignition source, and that

the subsequent assignment was to determine the cause of the ignition. Plaintiff contends that

there is a factual basis for Hsu’s determination that there was a defect in the door switch based

on his observation that the two contact points on the switch were melted together, which kept

the toaster on despite the door being open. Plaintiff contends that Hsu did identify the first

material ignited, as evidenced by his testimony that often in fires, the first ignition source is

destroyed and an investigator may have to determine a more broad type of material as the first

ignition source. Plaintiff contends that Hsu is qualified as an expert because he has a Ph.D.

in the subject major of combustion and fire, is a licensed mechanical engineer, and is a

certified fire and explosion investigator, has testified in four matters that involved electrical

appliances, and has 11-12 years of experience as an expert related to the investigation of fires

and has investigated hundreds of cases involving an electrical appliance, including as many

as five that involved toaster/ovens. 

Defendant objects to the reliability of Hsu’s testimony on grounds that Hsu did not

review any UL data, failed to comply with the standards articulated in NFPA 921, did not have

a sufficient factual basis for determining that there was a defect in the door switch, and failed

to comport his tests with facts established in discovery (namely the temperature setting of the

Toaster/Oven and the combustible materials located near the Toaster/Oven). However, these

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objections go to the weight to be given to Hsu’s testimony by the trier of fact. After

considering Plaintiff’s objections, the Court cannot conclude that Hsu’s testimony is so lacking

as to render it unreliable, as opposed to simply worthy of cross-examination. The Court also

finds that Hsu’s proposed testimony is relevant and that Hsu is qualified to testify as to the

cause of the fire. Defendant’s Motion in Limine # 1 is DENIED without prejudice. 

B. Defendant’s Motion in Limine # 2 - to Exclude Testimony of Plaintiff’s Expert

Ron Ablott

Defendant moves to exclude the testimony of cause and origin investigator Ron Ablott.

Defendant contends that Ablott “was the only person to perform an investigation at the scene,

to collect data, take photographs and to secure evidence.” Mot. in Limine # 2, p. 8. Defendant

contends that Ablott opines at his deposition that the Toaster/Oven malfunctioned and

generated radiant heat that resulted in the ignition of the Corian countertop, but that none of

his reports ever identified the first material ignited. Defendant contends that Ablott’s opinion

is unreliable because he did not measure the countertop area where the Toaster/Oven had been

located, he did not diagram the presence of a coffee maker or blender on the counter, and he

was not even aware of the presence and use of an adapter on the outlet used by the

Toaster/Oven and coffee maker. Defendant also contends that Ablott’s opinion is unreliable

because he labeled the front left burner on the stove top as being in the “off” position, despite

a photograph clearly indicating that the left front burner was left in the “on” position. 

Plaintiff contends that, contrary to Defendant’s assertion, Ablott was not the only person

to perform an investigation at the scene and collect data such as photographs because the San

Diego Fire Department conducted an investigation and took many photographs at the scene.

Plaintiff contends that, pursuant to NFPA 921, the diagrams which Ablott produced did not

need to be made to scale, and that the countertop could not be measured because it was no

longer whole after the fire. Plaintiff contends that Ablott did not consider the coffee maker as

a potential ignition source based on his testimony that “when he spoke to Sandy Asch she did

not mention the presence of a coffee maker in the vicinity of where it was determined the fire

originated.” Opposition to Dft’s Motion in Limine # 2, p. 8. With respect to Defendant’s

contention that the control knob on the left burner of the stove in the Ash kitchen may have

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was left in the “on” position, Plaintiff states that “Mr. Ablott explained that he probably moved

the kno[b] himself to see if it worked and then inadvertently left it in a different position than

it was originally when he photographed it.” Id.

Defendant contends that numerous deficiencies, from the failure to identify the first

material ignited in compliance with NFPA 921 to labeling the control knob on the left stove

burner as “off,” in Ablott’s investigation make his testimony unreliable. However,

Defendant’s objections to Ablott’s investigation go to the credibility of Ablott’s testimony, and

are therefore more properly considered by the jury in weighing his testimony. After

considering Plaintiff’s objections, the Court cannot conclude that Ablott’s testimony is so

lacking as to render it unreliable, as opposed to simply worthy of cross-examination. The

Court also finds that Ablott’s proposed testimony is relevant. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine #

2 is DENIED without prejudice.

C. Defendant’s Motion in Limine # 3 - to Exclude Testimony Concerning Any

Alleged Defect with the Toaster Oven or, in the Alternative, for an Adverse

Inference Jury Instruction

Defendant contends that “the following acts and omissions on the part of the plaintiff

constitute spoliation of evidence:” (1) Defendant was not afforded the opportunity to inspect

the fire scene before evidence was destroyed, and “[t]he unilateral inspection of the fire scene

performed by the plaintiff was grossly inadequate with regard to their legal duty to document

and record material evidence;” (2) the original post-fire condition of the Toaster/Oven, its

temperature control and its component parts were not documented or recorded by Plaintiff’s

experts, and the Toaster/Oven was not adequately preserved by Plaintiff after it was removed

from the scene; and (3) the original post-fire condition of the gas stove top controls were not

properly documented by Plaintiff. Mot. in Limine # 3, p. 2-3. Defendant contends that

evidence of the fire scene is relevant to the issues in this case, “and not taking appropriate

measures to protect the integrity of the evidence knowing that litigation is going to ensue can

only lead to an egregious result.” Id. at 10. Defendant contends that the evidence concerning

the Toaster/Oven’s temperature control and component parts, and the gas stove top controls

should be “be stricken or, alternatively, an adverse inference jury instruction given.” Id.

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With respect to Defendant’s contention that the fire scene was not preserved, Plaintiff

responds that the Asch kitchen was sufficiently documented after the fire and before the

evidence was destroyed. Plaintiff contends that, in addition to Ablott, the San Diego Fire

Department conducted an investigation, and took many photographs of the scene and issued

a report that Defendant reviewed. Plaintiff contends that “there is ample evidence available

that allows the defendant to determine the post-fire condition of the toaster oven” based on

Asch’s testimony that she would typically cook chicken nuggets (which she cooked in the

Toaster/Oven on the night of the fire) at 300 degrees and Hsu’s testimony that he observed the

setting to be at 400 degrees. Regarding Defendant’s contention that the gas stove was properly

documented, Plaintiff contends that Asch has made no reference to the left front burner, that

Ablott probably moved the knob himself to see if it worked and inadvertently left it in a

different position, and that regardless, “Mr. Ablott repeatedly testified that the burn patterns

and other evidence do not support the theory of the fire originating at the stove.” Opp. to Dft’s

Mot. in Limine # 3, p. 4. Plaintiff emphasizes that the evidence in this case was not totally

destroyed and was available for inspection by Defendant, and that there were various

photographs available for Defendant’s inspection of the Toaster/Oven and the scene as a

whole. Plaintiff also states that Defendant cannot claim prejudice because Defendant has been

able to conclude where the fire started to a reasonable degree of engineering and scientific

certainty and Defendant’s expert “was not deprived of inspecting the toaster oven and based

on his inspection concluded that it, without question, could not have been the cause of the

fire.” Id. at 7. 

Defendant objects to the admissibility of any evidence or expert testimony concerning

any alleged defect with the Toaster/Oven on grounds that its admission is prejudicial to

Defendant because Plaintiff did not afford Defendant sufficient opportunity to inspect the fire

scene and then destroyed the Toaster/Oven and other evidence from the fire scene. Defendant

has not demonstrated bad faith on the part of Plaintiff in failing to notify Defendant of the fire

or preserve and document the fire scene. Defendant does not dispute that the evidence in this

case was not totally destroyed and was available for inspection. Defendant does not dispute

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that there was photographic documentation of the fire scene for Defendant’s inspection. The

Court declines to exclude expert testimony concerning any alleged defect with the

Toaster/Oven. The Court further concludes that Defendant’s request for an adverse inference

jury instruction is premature. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine # 3 is DENIED without prejudice.

D. Motion in Limine # 4 - to Exclude Any Opinion Testimony from San Diego

Firefighters, Officer Jeffrey A. Carle and Officer Eric D. Kelley

Defendant contends that Officer Kelly and Officer Carle should not be permitted to 

testify at trial as to the origin or cause of the fire in question. Defendant contends that the

Officers do not have a sufficient factual basis to testify that the “toaster oven was located

within the area of origin since they did not interview Sandy Asch or any other persons who

were living at the home at the time of the fire to determine the pre-fire position of the toaster

oven or to determine what in fact was located on the kitchen counter top at the time of the

fire.” Mot. in Limine # 4, p. 5-6. Defendant states that since the Officers “did not inspect the

fire scene until after the fire suppression efforts of the San Diego Fire Department had been

completed, they cannot testify with any certainty that the subject toaster oven was in its

original placement, without having the benefit of interviewing the occupants of the home.”

Mot. in Limine # 4, p. 6. 

Plaintiff states that Officer Kelly and Officer Carle will not be testifying that a defective

condition in the Toaster/Oven was the cause of the fire, but rather will be testifying that the fire

originated at the Toaster/Oven. Plaintiff contends that based on the Officers’ testimony that

there was a lot of material consistent with orginary combustibles in the area around the

Toaster/Oven, the Officers have factual information to support their opinion that the fire

originated in the vicinity of the Toaster/Oven. Plaintiff also contends that Asch had been

interviewed by another member of the San Diego Fire Department, and “all pertinent

information would have been communicated to officers Kelly and Carle.” Opp. to Dft’s Mot.

in Limine # 4, p. 4. 

At oral argument, Plaintiff’s counsel stated that the Officers are not going to testify that

the Toaster/Oven was the cause of the fire, but rather that in their view, the fire originated in

the vicinity of the Toaster/Oven. At oral argument, Defendant’s counsel stated that he does

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not object to Officer Carle and Officer Kelly testifying that in their view, based on their

experience and their observations of the burn patterns of the fire and debris in front of the

Toaster/Oven, the fire originated in the vicinity of the Toaster/Oven. After considering the

parties’ arguments, the Court cannot conclude that the Officers do not have a sufficient factual

basis to testify at trial that, in their view, the fire originated in the vicinity of the Toaster/Oven.

Defendant’s objections go to the weight to be given to the Officers’ testimony by the trier of

fact. The Court cannot conclude that the Officers’ testimony is so lacking as to render it

inadmissible, as opposed to simply worthy of cross-examination. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine

# 3 is DENIED without prejudice. 

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the (1) Motion in Limine No. One (Doc. # 24) filed

by Plaintiff Wawanesa General Insurance Company is DENIED without prejudice; (2)

Motion in Limine No. Two (Doc. # 25) filed by Plaintiff Wawanesa General Insurance

Company is DENIED without prejudice; and (3) Cross Motion in Limine Nos. 1-4 (Doc. #

26) filed by Defendant Applica Consumer Products, Inc. are DENIED without prejudice. 

DATED: October 23, 2008

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

Case 3:06-cv-01781-WQH-NLS Document 37 Filed 10/23/08 Page 13 of 13