Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01208/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01208-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-(Citizenship)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRIS PYARA on behalf of 

himself, all others similarly 

situated, and on behalf of 

the general public,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SYSCO CORPORATION; SYSCO 

SACRAMENTO, INC., A 

California Corporation; and 

DOES 1-100,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-01208-JAM-KJN

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

Plaintiff Chris Pyara (“Pyara” or “Plaintiff”) filed this 

wage and hour case against Sysco Corporation and Sysco 

Sacramento, Inc. (collectively “Sysco” or “Defendants”) in April 

2015, on behalf of himself and similarly situated Sysco 

employees. ECF No. 1-1. Pyara now seeks leave to amend his 

complaint. ECF No. 20. Sysco opposes amendment. ECF No. 24.1

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for October 18, 2016.

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I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Pyara worked for Sysco as a non-exempt truck driver from 

October 31, 2011 to November 27, 2013. Tzintun Decl. ¶¶ 2-3, ECF 

No. 1-5. Pyara sued Sysco in California state court, and Sysco 

removed the case to this Court under the Class Action Fairness 

Act. Notice of Removal at 1, ECF No. 1. Pyara alleged ten 

causes of action in his complaint. Compl. at 2. In July 2016, 

the Court granted Sysco’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on 

three of Pyara’s causes of action. Order Granting in Part and 

Denying in Part Defs.’ Mot. for J. on the Pleadings (“Jul. 20, 

2016 Order”) at 20, Jul. 20, 2016, ECF No. 18. 

In August 2015, the parties submitted a Joint Scheduling 

Report (“JSR”). ECF No. 7. In the JSR, the parties “jointly 

request[ed] that the Court make the deadline to amend the 

pleadings coextensive with the discovery cut-off deadlines . . . 

[and] defer setting a discovery cut off until after the Court 

rules on class certification issues.” Id. at 4-5. The JSR also 

indicated that “[b]oth parties agree that the deadline to amend 

the pleadings and/or add parties should be the same as the Class 

Certification Motion Filing Deadline or some reasonable time 

thereafter.” Id. at 9. 

Over objections by Sysco, the Court extended the motion for 

class certification hearing twice. See ECF Nos. 22, 23, 31, 32. 

The class certification hearing is currently set for February 7, 

2017. Order Granting Ex Parte Appl. at 2, Nov. 10, 2016, ECF No. 

32. 

Pyara now seeks leave to amend to add one new cause of 

action to his complaint: a claim for violation of Labor Code 

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Sections 221 and 2802 for failure to reimburse/illegal deductions 

of business related expenses (“Section 2802 claim”). Mot. to 

Amend at 1. 

II. Judicial Notice 

In support of its opposition to Pyara’s motion, Sysco asks 

this Court to take judicial notice of complaints filed in two 

cases: John Martin v. Sysco Central California, Inc., Case No. 

1:15-cv-990-DAD-SAB (E.D. Cal.) and Toiyagudah Stone v. Sysco 

Corp., Case No. 1:16-cv-1145-DAD-JLT (E.D. Cal.). Defs.’ Req. 

for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) at 1-2, ECF No. 25. 

A court may take judicial notice of a fact if it “can be 

accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy 

cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). 

Courts may take judicial notice of “court filings and other 

matters of public record.” Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, 

Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006).

The complaints attached to Sysco’s request for judicial 

notice as Exhibits A and B are matters of public record and 

proper for judicial notice. The Court therefore takes judicial 

notice of the complaints filed in the Martin and Stone cases. 

III. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, a litigant may 

amend his complaint once within twenty-one days of serving it. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A). After the twenty-one day deadline 

has passed, “a party may amend its pleading only with the 

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opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The 

court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Leave to amend “lies within the sound 

discretion of the trial court.” DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 

833 F.2d 183, 185-86 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). “Rule 

15’s policy of favoring amendments to pleadings should be 

applied with extreme liberality.” U.S. v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 

979 (9th Cir. 1981). In deciding a request for leave to amend, 

a court considers “bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the 

opposing party, futility of amendment, and whether the plaintiff 

has previously amended the complaint.” Johnson v. Buckley, 356 

F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999). “[D]elay, by itself, is 

insufficient to justify denial of leave to amend.” DCD 

Programs, 833 F.2d at 186. On the other hand, futility of 

amendment alone can justify such denial. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 

F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995).

The party opposing amendment carries the burden of showing 

why leave to amend should not be granted. Dong Ah Tire & Rubber 

Co. v. Glasforms, Inc., 2009 WL 667171, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar.

10, 2009). Additionally, a court should draw all inferences in 

favor of granting leave to amend. Griggs v. Pace Am. Grp., 

Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1999).

B. Analysis

Sysco argues that the Court should deny Pyara’s motion to 

amend for three reasons: (1) Pyara unduly delayed in seeking 

leave to amend, (2) allowing Pyara to amend his complaint would 

prejudice Sysco, and (3) amendment is futile. Opp’n at 4-8. 

Sysco does not argue that Pyara’s motion is made in bad faith,

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and Pyara has not previously amended his complaint in this 

litigation. 

1. Delay

Sysco argues that Pyara unduly delayed in seeking amendment 

because Pyara and his counsel knew before filing this action 

that Pyara had a potential Section 2802 claim. Opp’n at 2. 

Sysco cites to the complaints in the judicially noticed cases 

Martin and Stone. Id. at 5. In both Martin and Stone, the 

plaintiffs have the same counsel as Pyara and assert Section 

2802 claims in their complaints. See RJN Exs A, B. Sysco 

argues that Pyara’s counsel, having asserted Section 2802 claims 

in at least two other cases, should have investigated the 

possibility of a Section 2802 cause of action in Pyara’s case. 

Opp’n at 5. 

Pyara states that “he was not aware that drivers employed 

by Sysco Sacramento, Inc. used their personal cell phones at the 

time of the filing the original complaint.” Mot. to Amend at 9. 

Pyara explains that he did not seek to amend his complaint in 

June 2016, when Plaintiff’s counsel filed Martin and Stone, 

because Pyara “was still evaluating whether [a Section 2802 

claim] may also be viable in this case.” Reply at 3. Pyara 

states that he wanted to take the deposition of Sysco’s personmost-knowledgeable (“PMK”) before seeking leave to amend. Id. 

Plaintiff avers that the deposition of Sysco’s PMK showed that 

Sysco violated Section 2802, and Pyara “promptly sought leave to 

amend his complaint” following that deposition. Id. Pyara 

argues that he “should not be penalized for investigating these 

claims before seeking leave to amend.” Id. 

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Sysco argues that Pyara’s request to amend should be denied 

because “amendments are untimely when a plaintiff seeks to 

incorporate facts that were available to the plaintiff when he 

filed his complaint.” Id. at 4-5. Sysco cites to Kaplan v. 

Rose, 49 F.3d 1363 (9th Cir. 1994), Fresno Unified School

District v. K.U., 980 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (E.D. Cal. 2013), and 

Dong Ah, 2009 WL 667171, at *3. In each of these cases, the 

court denied leave to amend, but not solely because the 

predicate facts were available to the plaintiff at the outset of 

the litigation. In Kaplan, the appellate court affirmed the 

trial court’s denial of leave to amend because the trial was 

only two months away, discovery had been completed, and the 

plaintiff had already amended the complaint twice. Kaplan, 49 

F.3d at 1370. In Fresno, the party requesting amendment sought 

a “nearly wholesale amendment of her counter claim (sic).” 

Fresno, 980 F. Supp. 2d at 1176. The court noted that the 

amendment would “fundamentally alter[] the nature of the case, 

which previously focused on a single issue.” Id. at 1178. The 

court elaborated that “[w]hen an amendment merely incorporates 

alternative theories using existing facts, it falls safely 

within Rule 15(a)’s policy of promoting litigation on the merits 

over procedural technicalities . . . [b]ut when . . . a party 

proposes a late-tendered amendment that would fundamentally 

change the case . . . the amendment may be appropriately 

denied.” Id. Finally, in Dong Ah, fact discovery had closed 

and the dispositive motion deadline had passed. Dong Ah, 2009 

WL 667171, at *3. Unlike the cases cited by Sysco, here, 

discovery has not yet closed and the dispositive motion deadline 

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has not been set, let alone passed. Sysco has failed to cite 

any cases where a court has denied leave to amend when discovery 

is still open and the dispositive motion deadline has not 

passed. 

Sysco next argues that Mr. Pyara and his counsel cannot 

both assert that they did not know of a potential Section 2802 

claim when they filed the suit and purport to adequately 

represent the putative class. Opp’n at 5. The Court is 

concerned about whether Mr. Pyara has standing to bring a 

Section 2802 claim if he “was not aware” that other drivers used 

their cell phones for business purposes. However, Sysco has not 

asserted a standing argument, and that issue is not before the 

Court. Whether Mr. Pyara is an appropriate class action 

plaintiff for this litigation and whether his counsel can 

adequately represent the putative class are likewise not before 

the Court at this time. Additionally, Sysco does not provide 

any case law to support the argument that leave to amend should 

be denied because of a representativeness issue with the 

plaintiff or the putative class counsel.

2. Prejudice

The party opposing amendment must show “substantial” 

prejudice to overcome Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment policy. 

Dong Ah, 2009 WL 667171, at *2. “Neither delay resulting from 

the proposed amendment nor the prospect of additional discovery 

needed by the non-moving party itself constitutes a sufficient 

showing of prejudice.” Id. 

Sysco argues that allowing Pyara to amend his complaint 

would prejudice Sysco for four reasons:

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(1) Defendants have already conducted written 

discovery as to Plaintiff’s claims; (2) Defendants 

already have filed and briefed a dispositive motion 

upon which the Court already has ruled; (3) during the 

18 months since Plaintiff filed his Complaint, the 

recollection of witnesses undoubtedly has 

deteriorated; and (4) Plaintiff’s egregious, 

unexplained delay alone raises a presumption of 

prejudice against Defendants.

Opp’n at 6. 

Pyara argues that amendment will not prejudice Sysco 

because neither the discovery nor dispositive motion deadline 

has passed. Reply at 3. Additionally, Pyara notes that Sysco 

has “not yet conducted the deposition of Plaintiff [and] 

Defendants will be able to conduct discovery as to all of 

Plaintiff’s causes of action, including the additional claim 

under Labor Code § 2802.” Id. Pyara further argues that any 

additional written discovery will pertain only to one new cause 

of action and that “any documents that pertain to this cause of 

action are in Defendants’ custody and control.” Id. Lastly, 

Pyara points out that “no trial date is pending and a pretrial 

conference has not been scheduled.” Id. at 4. 

Sysco can still conduct discovery and file dispositive 

motions. And any delay caused by additional discovery does not 

alone constitute prejudice that justifies denying leave to 

amend. As such, Sysco has not shown “substantial” prejudice to 

preclude the Court from allowing Pyara to amend his complaint. 

3. Futility 

“[T]he general rule that parties are allowed to amend their 

pleadings does not extend to cases in which any amendment would 

be an exercise in futility or where the amended complaint would 

also be subject to dismissal.” Novak v. U.S., 795 F.3d 1012, 

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1020 (9th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). “The showing of 

futility must be ‘strong’ to warrant a departure from the 

liberal application of Rule 15(a).” Dong Ah, 2009 WL 667171, at 

*2. Federal courts determine the legal sufficiency of a 

proposed amendment under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard. Gibson 

Brands, Inc. v. John Hornby Skewes & Co., Ltd., No. CV 14-00609 

DDP(SS), 2015 WL 4651250, at *4 n.4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2015). 

The Court will therefore consider whether Plaintiff’s 

allegations, taken as true, state a plausible claim for relief. 

Sysco argues that Pyara’s proposed amendment is futile 

because a Section 2802 claim “requires that the expenditure or 

loss incurred by the employee is necessary, which in turn 

depends on the reasonableness of the employee’s choices.” Opp’n 

at 7. Sysco argues that it did not require drivers to use their 

own cellphones and that “[a]ny purported choice by Plaintiff to 

use his private cell phone instead of the equipment [provided] 

is unreasonable and does not constitute an actionable 

expenditure.” Id. at 8. 

Pyara counters that his proposed additional cause of action 

“states facts which, if proven, constitute a valid claim.” 

Reply at 4. In Pyara’s proposed First Amended Complaint

(“FAC”), he alleges that Sysco had a “consistent policy and/or 

practice of willfully failing to reimburse Plaintiff and those 

similarly situated for the use of their personal cell phones to 

conduct and further [Sysco’s] business practices, in direct 

consequence of discharging their work duties.” Mot. to Amend, 

Ex. 2. These allegations are sufficient to state a plausible 

Section 2802 claim against Sysco. The Court thus finds that 

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allowing Pyara to amend his complaint is not futile. 

4. Costs

A court may, in its discretion, impose conditions on 

granting leave to amend, including awarding costs to the party 

opposing amendment. Gen. Signal Corp. v. MCI Telecommunications 

Corp., 66 F.3d 1500, 1514 (9th Cir. 1995). Sysco asks the Court 

to “require Plaintiff to pay the sum of $4,000.00 to Defendants 

to compensate Defendants for additional costs that have been and 

will be incurred by Defendant.” Opp’n at 9. 

The Court declines to award costs to Sysco because Sysco 

has not shown that it will be prejudiced by the proposed 

amendment. See Willner v. Manpower Inc., 2013 WL 3339443, at *4

(N.D. Cal. Jul. 1, 2013) (declining to impose costs requested by 

defendant because defendant had not shown that it would be 

prejudiced by the proposed amendments). 

IV. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend. The Court declines to 

deem the FAC submitted with Plaintiff’s motion as filed because 

the submitted FAC contains causes of action that the Court 

dismissed with prejudice in its July 20, 2016 Order. Plaintiff 

shall file his FAC consistent with the July 20, 2016 Order within 

20 days of the date of this order. Defendant’s responsive 

pleading shall be filed within 20 days thereafter.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 23, 2016

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