Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05568/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05568-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 20, 1999 Decided December 14, 1999

No. 98-5568

Carolyn M. Grant,

Appellant

v.

United States Air Force, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv02914)

Carol J. Banta argued the cause for the appellant.

Lisa Goldfluss, Assistant United States Attorney, argued

the cause for the appellees. Wilma A. Lewis, United States

Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant United States

Attorney, were on brief for the appellees.

USCA Case #98-5568 Document #483449 Filed: 12/14/1999 Page 1 of 6
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Before: Sentelle, Henderson and Garland, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: Plaintiff Carolyn Grant (Grant) sought to enjoin the United States Air

Force (Air Force) from discharging her from the Air Force

Reserves. She claimed that, in nonselecting her for reenlistment, the Air Force denied her due process and violated the

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. s 702. The district

court denied Grant's motion for a temporary restraining

order and granted summary judgment to the Air Force. For

the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court.

I.

Grant had been a civilian Air Reserve Technician and an

enlisted member in the Communications Flight unit of the

459th Airlift Wing, Air Force Reserves, since 1980. Air

Force regulations required Grant to reenlist within six

months of December 7, 1997, the date of her expiration of

term of service (ETS).1 Grant signed a reenlistment contract

on June 4, 1997,2 three days before the six-month reenlistment window opened. Although her unit commander, Lieutenant Colonel Brad Buchanan, could have declared her ineligible for reenlistment by nonselecting her before she signed

the reenlistment contract, see Air Force Instruction (AFI)

36-2612 s 3.5.3, once the reenlistment contract was properly

executed, Buchanan could not nonselect her. See id. s 2.4.

The Air Force attempted to void Grant's reenlistment

contract three times. First, on June 10, Major Ted Covert,

the 459th Airlift Wing Military Personnel Flight Commander,

concluded that Grant's reenlistment contract was invalid because she signed it prematurely. On August 8 Grant was

informed that Covert had "voided out" her reenlistment con-

__________

1 To be eligible for reenlistment an enlisted Air Force member

must be "within 6 months of current ETS." Air Force Instruction

(AFI) 36-2612 s 2.1.

2 All dates occurred in 1997 unless otherwise noted.

tract. See Complaint p 12. Grant immediately met with

Covert who informed her that her reenlistment contract had

been removed from her record and that Buchanan had made

the decision to void it. Under the applicable regulations,

however, neither Covert nor Buchanan was authorized to void

her reenlistment contract. See AFI 36-2612 ss 4.5.1, 4.5.1.1.

Subsequently, on September 18, Chief Master Sergeant Eva

Holland, Director of Military Personnel, 22nd Air Force,

voided Grant's reenlistment contract. This attempt was also

invalid because Grant had not yet submitted her statement of

circumstance explaining why her contract should not be voided, as she was entitled to do under the regulations. See id.

s 4.5.1.1. Finally, on October 31, Holland again voided

Grant's reenlistment contract after Grant submitted her

statement of circumstance.

USCA Case #98-5568 Document #483449 Filed: 12/14/1999 Page 2 of 6
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

On September 7 Buchanan nonselected Grant for reenlistment.3 Buchanan notified Grant of her nonselection on September 9 by letter and accompanying package sent certified

mail.4 Grant failed to appeal her nonselection to Military

Personnel Flight before the next Unit Training Assembly, see

AFI 36-2612 s 3.5.5.1, and therefore waived her right to

__________

3 Different Air Force regulations govern the nonselection of a

member for reenlistment and the voiding of a reenlistment contract.

To nonselect a member for reenlistment, the unit commander

"personally advises the member of the nonselection" and "advises

the member in writing of the right to appeal nonselection under

paragraph 3.8 of this instruction." AFI 36-2612 s 3.5.3.2. A

member who has been nonselected "must submit a written appeal to

[Military Personnel Flight] by the next scheduled [Unit Training

Assembly] after the date [he is] notified." Id. s 3.5.5.1. By

contrast, a reenlistment contract is voided by a "numbered" (here,

the 22nd) Air Force official. See id. ss 4.5.1, 4.5.1.1.

4 The letter and package were returned by the United States Post

Office marked "refused." The mail carrier who attempted delivery

testified that he specifically recalled delivering the certified mail to

Grant at her apartment and that Grant refused both. Grant

admitted that she refused to accept the package, see Complaint

p 17, but denied that she refused to accept the certified letter. See

Grant's November 18, 1997 Memorandum.

USCA Case #98-5568 Document #483449 Filed: 12/14/1999 Page 3 of 6
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

further review. Her only challenge to the district court's

grant of summary judgment involves her reenlistment contract which she maintains was not properly voided.5

II.

On appeal Grant argues that her reenlistment contract was

valid because the three-day prematurity defect was cured on

June 7 when the six-month period began (the Air Force

having failed to discover the defect until June 10). We apply

de novo review "[w]here the decision under review is the

district court's assessment of the legal sufficiency of an

agency's action in light of the record." Dr Pepper/Seven-Up

Cos. v. FTC, 991 F.2d 859, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quotation

omitted). "[O]ur review ... is limited to determining whether [the Air Force's] decision is arbitrary and capricious." Id.

(citation omitted).

The record indicates that Grant did not raise her contract

claim before the district court, either in her complaint or in

her opposition to the Air Force's summary judgment motion.

At argument Grant maintained that, by explicitly challenging

her nonselection in her complaint, she also challenged by

implication the voiding of her reenlistment contract because

"the nonselection issue which we are not pursuing on appeal

and the contract issue were very closely intertwined." Transcript of October 20, 1999 Oral Argument 4; cf. Reply Br. 3-

4. Although the district court addressed the reenlistment

contract issue, see Memorandum Opinion 2 n.1, 17-18 ("the

plaintiff contends that the Air Force acted arbitrarily and

capriciously when it voided her reenlistment contract"), it is

not clear why the district court mentioned the issue because,

in another footnote, it indicated that it believed the contract

issue had been resolved. See id. at 9 n.6 ("Grant now

concedes that the Air Force's final decision of October 28

[sic], 1997 to void her reenlistment contract corrected any

procedural defects in the original voiding of the contract.").

__________

5 Although Grant challenged her nonselection in her complaint

filed in district court, she has not challenged it on appeal.

USCA Case #98-5568 Document #483449 Filed: 12/14/1999 Page 4 of 6
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

"Absent 'exceptional circumstances,' the court of appeals is

not a forum in which a litigant can present legal theories that

it neglected to raise in a timely manner in proceedings

below."6 Tomasello v. Rubin, 167 F.3d 612, 618 n.6 (D.C. Cir.

1999). Nevertheless, assuming without deciding that Grant

properly preserved her contract argument, her challenge fails

on the merits. The Air Force complied with AFI 36-2612

when Holland voided Grant's reenlistment contract on October 31. Grant concedes that her reenlistment contract was

voidable, see Petitioner's Br. 12, and that the Air Force

ultimately properly voided the contract. See Reply Br. 2

(Grant "did not challenge the Air Force's pro forma procedural compliance with its regulations in the third attempt to

void Grant's contract"). She argues, however, that under the

holding in Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 545-46 (1959), the

Air Force's pro forma compliance cannot cure its previous

error. In Vitarelli the Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior dismissed an employee on September 10, 1954 because his "sympathetic association" with Communist supporters posed a "security risk." Purporting to act

pursuant to departmental regulations, the Secretary filed a

"Notification of Personnel Action" on September 21, 1954

setting forth the reasons for the employee's dismissal. The

employee then challenged her termination as illegal and

ineffective because the Secretary had failed to comply with

the regulations applicable to dismissal for national security

reasons. Two years later, the Interior Department, realizing

it had failed to comply with its regulations, reissued the

notification, backdated to September 21, 1954 and described

as "a revision of and replac[ing] the original bearing the same

date." The notification was identical to the original except

that it omitted any reference to the reason for the employee's

discharge or to the authority under which the discharge was

effected. The Supreme Court held that the post hoc compli-

__________

6 Although Grant appeared to challenge the contract voiding in

her reply brief, see Reply Br. 11-12, our caselaw makes clear that

an argument first made in a reply brief comes too late. See

Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 173 F.3d 898, 902-03

(D.C. Cir. 1999).

USCA Case #98-5568 Document #483449 Filed: 12/14/1999 Page 5 of 6
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

ance did not validly "revise" the initial defective dismissal.

Grant's case is distinguishable. Holland's second voiding of

Grant's reenlistment contract was not "a revision" of her first

attempt but an entirely new action which addressed Grant's

statement of circumstance as intended by the regulations.7

Thus, Holland properly voided Grant's reenlistment contract

on October 31 and, unlike the Interior Department in Vitarelli, did so timely. The fact that the Air Force erred in two

earlier attempts does not nullify its final, and correct, voiding

of Grant's reenlistment contract in compliance with AFI 36-

2612. Accordingly, the district court is

Affirmed.

__________

7 Holland's October 31st memorandum voided Grant's contract

"[a]fter further review of the request to void the reenlistment

(including the member's Statement of [Circumstance]) of Sergeant

Grant."

USCA Case #98-5568 Document #483449 Filed: 12/14/1999 Page 6 of 6