Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01392/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01392-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

UNITED CONSTRUCTION PRODUCTS, INC., D/B/A 

BISON INNOVATIVE PRODUCTS,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

 

TILE TECH, INC.,

Defendant-Appellant

______________________ 

2016-1392

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Central District of California in No. 2:14-CV-08570-RVBK, Judge Manuel L. Real.

______________________ 

Decided: December 15, 2016

______________________ 

DAVID VON GUNTEN, von Gunten Law LLC, Denver, 

CO, argued for plaintiff-appellee. Also represented by 

MICHELLE CORRELL, Smith Correll LLP, Los Angeles, CA.

KELLY W. CUNNINGHAM, Cislo & Thomas LLP, Los 

Angeles, CA, argued for defendant-appellant.

______________________ 

Before MOORE, WALLACH, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

WALLACH, Circuit Judge. 

Case: 16-1392 Document: 49-2 Page: 1 Filed: 12/15/2016
2 UNITED CONSTR. PRODS., INC. v. TILE TECH, INC. 

Tile Tech, Inc. (‘Tile Tech”) appeals the decision of the 

U.S. District Court for the Central District of California 

(“District Court”) granting default judgment and a permanent injunction to United Construction Products, Inc., 

doing business as Bison Innovative Products (“United”), 

on claims of patent infringement and unfair competition. 

See United Constr. Prods., Inc. v. Tile Tech, Inc., No. 2:14-

cv-08570-R-VBK, 2015 WL 7776795, at *6−8 (C.D. Cal. 

Dec. 1, 2015). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

This case comes to our court following a series of delays, missed deadlines, and other procedural missteps by 

Tile Tech that are necessary to describe in full. United 

brought suit against Tile Tech claiming infringement of 

U.S. Patent No. 8,302,356 (“the ’356 patent”), which is 

entitled “Support Pedestal Having an Anchoring Washer 

for Securing Elevated Surface Tiles.” ’356 patent col. 1 ll.

1−3. Following transfer of the case to the District Court, 

United, 2015 WL 7776795, at *1, United served Tile Tech 

with its first set of discovery requests, including interrogatories, requests for admission, and requests for production, J.A. 140, 149, 282. Tile Tech missed the deadline to 

respond to the discovery requests, and when contacted by 

United, it claimed that it had not received the requests. 

United, 2015 WL 7776795, at *2. Although service of the 

requests was valid, United granted Tile Tech twenty 

additional days to respond. Id. Tile Tech then requested 

two additional extensions and finally served initial responses to United nearly one month after the original 

response deadline. Id.

Tile Tech’s responses to United’s discovery requests 

were deficient. Id. United requested a conference regarding the responses and Tile Tech agreed, but two hours 

before the scheduled conference, Tile Tech requested that 

it be rescheduled. Id. United agreed and provided a five 

hour time frame on Tile Tech’s proposed date; Tile Tech 

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UNITED CONSTR. PRODS., INC. v. TILE TECH, INC. 3

responded on the proposed rescheduled date and again 

asked to postpone. Id. The conference was postponed a 

third time, and eventually occurred following United’s 

warning to Tile Tech that it would file a motion to compel 

if Tile Tech did not commit to a time for the conference. 

Id. At the conference, Tile Tech agreed to “supplement 

virtually every response to [United]’s Discovery Request[s] and to produce all responsive documents” by an 

agreed-upon date. Id.

The agreed-upon date passed with no response from 

Tile Tech. Id. United offered to give Tile Tech ten additional days beyond the agreed-upon date to adequately 

respond. Id. at *3. When Tile Tech again failed to respond to the discovery requests, United filed a Motion to 

Compel Further Responses to Written Discovery and 

Production of Documents and for Sanctions (“Motion to 

Compel”). Id.; J.A. 221. Tile Tech never responded to the 

Motion to Compel. United, 2015 WL 7776795, at *3. It 

instead served supplemental responses to the discovery 

requests, which were still deficient, including unverified 

responses to the interrogatories. Id. The District Court 

took the Motion to Compel under submission, and Tile 

Tech proceeded to provide a third set of deficient supplemental responses. Id. 

The District Court issued an Order to Compel on October 5, 2015. J.A. 421–23. It found that, inter alia, Tile 

Tech had “failed to produce a single document in response 

to [United]’s document requests and ha[d] failed to supplement its deficient discovery responses,” and such 

actions “create . . . a waste of this [c]ourt’s time.” J.A. 

421, 422. The District Court ordered Tile Tech to respond 

to the discovery requests, imposed monetary sanctions, 

and warned that it would enter default judgment if Tile 

Tech did not comply with the Order by October 12, 2015. 

J.A. 422. United’s attorney stated in his declaration, and 

the District Court found, that he informed Tile Tech’s 

attorney during a deposition on October 9, 2015, that the 

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4 UNITED CONSTR. PRODS., INC. v. TILE TECH, INC. 

Order to Compel had issued and that it included sanctions. J.A. 918; United, 2015 WL 7776795, at *4.

Tile Tech failed to respond to the Order.1 On October 

12, 2015, United filed its Motion for Entry of Default 

Judgment. J.A. 756–65. Tile Tech responded and 

claimed that it had not known of the Order’s response 

deadline; that it had produced a set of supplemental 

responses to the discovery requests; and that it required 

an expert opinion to fully respond to part of the discovery 

requests, which would be forthcoming. J.A. 813–14. The 

District Court found that Tile Tech’s claim of producing 

additional responses was a “misrepresentation to the 

[c]ourt” because no responses had been served as of the 

filing of Tile Tech’s Opposition to Motion for Default 

Judgment. United, 2015 WL 7776795, at *4. In addition, 

the District Court held Tile Tech’s claim that it would 

provide an expert witness was “facially insufficient and 

unjustified” because the time to designate an expert 

witness had “long passed.” Id. Moreover, although Tile 

Tech had produced only two documents during the prolonged discovery period, both of which were nonresponsive, and had not disclosed any persons with relevant knowledge in response to interrogatories pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1),2 it nonetheless 

 

1 Counsel for Tile Tech acknowledged at Oral Argument that the sanctions mandated in the Order still 

have not been paid. See Oral Argument at 

1:25−2:05, http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.

aspx?fl=2016-1392.mp3. 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1) states, inter alia: 

[A] party must, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to the other parties: (i) the name 

and, if known, the address and telephone number 

of each individual likely to have discoverable inCase: 16-1392 Document: 49-2 Page: 4 Filed: 12/15/2016
UNITED CONSTR. PRODS., INC. v. TILE TECH, INC. 5

listed over a dozen exhibits and over a dozen potential 

trial witnesses in its Joint Exhibit and Witness Lists

disclosed at the end of the discovery period. Id. 

On November 2, 2015, Tile Tech finally served another set of supplemental responses, which contained information disclosing its destruction of a previously 

undisclosed mold used to make one key component of the 

disputed support pedestal. Id. at *5. United filed a 

Motion for Spoliation Sanctions, J.A. 1090–97, and filed 

an unopposed Amended Complaint adding a claim for 

unfair competition, to which Tile Tech never responded, 

J.A. 404–11 (Amended Complaint); United, 2015 WL 

7776795, at *5 (finding that Tile Tech never responded to 

the Amended Complaint). The District Court later entered default judgment, granted relief for all of United’s 

claims, and entered a permanent injunction. United, 

2015 WL 7776795, at *6–8. 

Tile Tech timely appealed. This court has jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012).

DISCUSSION

Tile Tech raises two principal arguments on appeal, 

one concerning the entry of default judgment and the 

other related to the scope of the District Court’s permanent injunction. Appellant’s Br. 14–28, 29–33. “A decision to sanction a litigant [by ordering default judgment] 

pursuant to Fed[eral] R[ule of] Civ[il] P[rocedure] 37[3] is 

 

formation . . . [and] (ii) a copy―or a description by 

category and location―of all documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things that 

the disclosing party has in its possession . . . . 

3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A)(vi) 

provides that “[i]f a party . . . fails to obey an order to 

provide or permit discovery, . . . the court where the 

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6 UNITED CONSTR. PRODS., INC. v. TILE TECH, INC. 

one that is not unique to patent law . . . and we therefore 

apply regional circuit law to that issue . . . .” ClearValue, 

Inc. v. Pearl River Polymers, Inc., 560 F.3d 1291, 1304 

(Fed. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted); see also Drone Techs., Inc. v. Parrot S.A., 838 

F.3d 1283, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (considering an appellant’s challenge to the imposition of default judgment and 

stating that “[w]e are guided by regional circuit law when 

reviewing discovery rulings . . . and the imposition of 

sanctions” (internal citations omitted)). In this case, we 

look to Ninth Circuit precedent, and the relevant standard is articulated below. Because the injunction “enjoins 

the violation of a[] right secured by a patent . . . [it] involves substantive matters unique to patent law and, 

therefore, is governed by the law of this court.” Hybritech 

Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1451 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 

1988); see Signtech USA, Ltd. v. Vutek, Inc., 174 F.3d 

1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (applying Federal Circuit law 

as the standard of review for the scope of an injunction). 

We similarly articulate the applicable standard for this 

issue below. 

I. Default Judgment

A. The Malone Factors Support the Grant of Default 

Judgment

Under Ninth Circuit precedent, a court must consider 

the following five factors from Malone v. United States

Postal Service before entering default judgment: “(1) the 

public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; 

(2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of 

prejudice to the [other party]; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the avail-

 

action is pending may issue further just orders . . . [including] rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party . . . .” 

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UNITED CONSTR. PRODS., INC. v. TILE TECH, INC. 7

ability of less drastic sanctions.” 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th 

Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “It is not necessary for a district court to make 

explicit findings to show that it has considered these 

factors” and, on appeal, the court “may review the record 

independently” for abuse of discretion. Id. (citations 

omitted). The sanction of default judgment is “appropriate only . . . where the violation is due to willfulness, bad 

faith, or fault of the party.” Fair Hous. of Marin v. 

Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (reviewing district 

court’s entry of default judgment based on discovery 

violations). A default judgment will be overturned “only if 

[the appeals court] ha[s] a definite and firm conviction 

that it was clearly outside the acceptable range of sanctions.” Hester v. Vision Airlines, Inc., 687 F.3d 1162, 1169 

(9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). We address these factors in turn.

1. The Public’s Interest in Expeditious Resolution of 

Litigation

The first Malone factor, the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation, weighs in support of the 

District Court’s decision to enter default judgment. As in

Malone, “[Tile Tech]’s dilatory conduct greatly impeded 

resolution of the case and prevented the [D]istrict [C]ourt 

from adhering to its trial schedule.” 833 F.2d at 131 

(citation omitted). Tile Tech argues that, even if the 

District Court had granted Tile Tech’s request for a ninety

day extension, the length of time between pleadings and 

trial still would be less than the national average, such 

that the resolution could be considered “expeditious” and 

within the public’s interest. Appellant’s Br. 15. However,

comparison to the national average for length of district 

court proceedings is not the measurement that courts use 

to weigh the first Malone factor. Rather, “[t]he public’s 

interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always 

favors dismissal.” Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 

Case: 16-1392 Document: 49-2 Page: 7 Filed: 12/15/2016
8 UNITED CONSTR. PRODS., INC. v. TILE TECH, INC. 

642 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). 

2. The Court’s Need to Manage Its Docket 

As to the second Malone factor, the court’s need to 

manage its docket, we recognize that “[t]he trial judge is 

in the best position to determine whether the delay in a 

particular case interferes with docket management and 

the public interest.” Id. (citation omitted). Here, the 

District Court correctly noted that Tile Tech “demonstrated a lack of respect for virtually every . . . deadline in this 

case,” such that “there is no assurance that this matter 

can proceed to trial on the true facts.” United, 2015 WL 

7776795, at *5−6. Contrary to Tile Tech’s characterization of its behavior as “‘hiccups’ in the discovery process,” 

Appellant’s Br. 20, Tile Tech missed every deadline to 

which it had agreed, failed to respond to the District 

Court’s orders, and produced responses to discovery that 

were routinely inadequate. More importantly, the District Court could not be assured of the validity of the 

factual record on which to base a decision. The District 

Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that its need 

to manage its docket weighed in favor of United’s default 

judgment motion. See, e.g., Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642 

(“It is incumbent upon the [district court] to manage its 

docket without being subject to routine noncompliance of 

litigants . . . .” (citation omitted)).

3. The Risk of Prejudice to the Other Party

As to the third Malone factor, the risk of prejudice to 

the other party, Tile Tech states that “the record does not 

indicate any prejudice to [United].” Appellant’s Br. 19. 

We disagree.

“In determining whether [the moving party] has been 

prejudiced, we examine whether the [non-moving party]’s 

actions impair the [moving party]’s ability to go to trial or

threaten to interfere with the rightful decision of the 

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UNITED CONSTR. PRODS., INC. v. TILE TECH, INC. 9

case.” Malone, 833 F.2d at 131 (emphasis added). Tile 

Tech focuses on the first clause of the relevant benchmark, i.e., the other party’s ability to go to trial, and 

claims that its actions did not hinder United’s ability to 

proceed to trial in any meaningful way. Appellant’s Br. 

17−20 (“While there were some ‘hiccups’ in the discovery 

process, the case was on track for a trial in early 2016. 

There was no prejudicial delay at all . . . .”). In contrast, 

the District Court focused on the second clause, i.e.,

actions that threaten to interfere with the rightful decision of the case, when it emphasized that “there can never 

be assurance of proceeding on the true facts” in this case. 

United, 2015 WL 7776795, at *5 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). 

The District Court did not abuse its discretion in its

finding related to the second clause of the prejudice 

determination, which is sufficient to find prejudice under 

Malone. See 833 F.2d at 131 (using the disjunctive “or” in 

articulating the prejudice benchmark). Where one party 

withholds evidence, repeatedly declines to truthfully 

respond to discovery requests or comply with the District 

Court’s rules, and fails to properly designate witnesses 

and exhibits during discovery, such conduct prejudices an 

opposing party’s ability to reach a rightful disposition of 

the case.

4. The Public Policy Favoring the Disposition of Cases on 

Their Merits 

The fourth Malone factor, public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits, “always weighs against 

dismissal.” Dreith v. Nu Image, Inc., 648 F.3d 779, 788 

(9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Therefore, this factor 

favors Tile Tech. 

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10 UNITED CONSTR. PRODS., INC. v. TILE TECH, INC. 

5. The Availability of Less Drastic Sanctions (i.e., Alternatives to Dismissal)

As to the fifth Malone factor, the availability of less 

drastic sanctions, Tile Tech argues that the District Court 

abused its discretion when it “fail[ed] to consider . . . 

lesser sanctions” and “simply penalized Tile Tech rather 

than [e]nsuring future compliant behavior by Tile Tech’s 

trial counsel.” Appellant’s Br. 25, 26. As Malone explained, though, “warning a [non-moving party] that 

failure to obey a court order will result in dismissal can 

suffice to meet the ‘consideration of alternatives’ requirement.” 833 F.2d at 132 (citations omitted). Here, the 

District Court gave ample warning to Tile Tech in its 

Order to Compel that it would enter default judgment if 

discovery responses were not forthcoming. J.A. 422. The 

Order still did not “[e]nsur[e] future compliant behavior” 

from Tile Tech, Appellant’s Br. 26; Tile Tech did not pay 

the monetary sanction, its third production was again 

deficient, and it did not respond to the Order in a timely 

manner. The District Court also concluded that Tile Tech 

had committed spoliation of evidence, for which Tile Tech 

admitted its wrongdoing. United, 2015 WL 7776795, at 

*6; J.A. 1092−93 (“Q: So after you new [sic] of the lawsuit 

. . . you then just threw . . . the washers away? A: Correct.”). Finally, the District Court found that Tile Tech 

allowed deadlines for discovery to pass “without any effort 

or comment,” despite knowing that supplementation of 

discovery was necessary and required as of right for the 

opposing party. United, 2015 WL 7776795, at *5. 

The District Court’s opinion demonstrates its thorough consideration of the Malone factors leading to the

ultimate decision not to impose lesser sanctions in this 

case, a decision which we find was not an abuse of discretion. As the District Court explained, “[w]here a party so 

damages the integrity of the discovery process that there 

can never be assurance of proceeding on the true facts, a 

case dispositive [remedy] may be appropriate.” Id. (quotCase: 16-1392 Document: 49-2 Page: 10 Filed: 12/15/2016
UNITED CONSTR. PRODS., INC. v. TILE TECH, INC. 11

ing Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly 

Hills, 482 F.3d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 2007)). 

Four factors favor dismissal and one weighs against 

dismissal. Under these circumstances, we cannot say 

that the District Court abused its discretion.

B. Willfulness Is Sufficient to Uphold a Grant of Default 

Judgment

In addition, Tile Tech argues that a default judgment 

was not appropriate because the District Court did not 

find bad faith on Tile Tech’s part. Appellant’s Br. 26−29. 

In support of its position, Tile Tech correctly notes that 

the District Court, in a separate Order Denying Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Award of Attorney’s Fees, stated that “while 

defense counsel perhaps handled the case unreasonably, 

this [c]ourt does not attribute that to bad faith, but instead a complete lack of preparation.” J.A. 1611. 

However, Tile Tech omits the full test for default 

judgment, which is whether a party’s conduct was due to 

“willfulness, bad faith, or fault.” Fjelstad v. Am. Honda 

Motor Co., 762 F.2d 1334, 1341 (9th Cir. 1985) (emphasis 

added). Fjelstad further explained that willfulness may 

be satisfied simply by finding “disobedient conduct not 

shown to be outside the control of the litigant.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). While Tile Tech has argued that its trial attorney had “unfamiliarity” with 

federal court practice, it has not offered any evidence to 

suggest that its dilatory actions were outside of its attorney’s control. Appellant’s Br. 24. We therefore uphold 

the District Court’s grant of default judgment.

II. The District Court’s Injunction Was Not Overly Broad 

Finally, Tile Tech makes three arguments for why the 

permanent injunction is overbroad and should be modified, claiming: (1) it enjoins “substantially similar” products that do not necessarily infringe on the ’356 patent; 

(2) it requires Tile Tech to surrender the notched washer 

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12 UNITED CONSTR. PRODS., INC. v. TILE TECH, INC. 

mold even though the washer by itself does not directly 

infringe; and (3) it prohibits Tile Tech from using images 

of United’s products in any marketing materials, even if 

there is no likelihood of confusion. Id. at 29−33. We 

disagree with each argument.

To determine the scope of an injunction, we look to 

Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which 

sets out the proper form and scope of an injunction issued 

by a district court to be one that “states[s] the reasons 

why it issued,” “state[s] its terms specifically,” and “describe[s] in reasonable detail—and not by referring to the 

complaint or other document—the act or acts restrained

or required.” “Whether the terms of an injunction fulfill 

the mandates of Rule 65(d) is a question of law that we 

review without deference.” Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS 

Corp., 383 F.3d 1312, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations 

omitted). As the Supreme Court has stated, “one basic 

principle built into Rule 65 is that those against whom an 

injunction is issued should receive fair and precisely 

drawn notice of what the injunction actually prohibits.” 

Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto 

Truck Drivers Local No. 70 of Alameda Cty., 415 U.S. 423, 

444 (1974) (footnote omitted). In the patent infringement 

context, this court has held that injunctions have satisfactory scope when they prohibit “infringement of the patent 

by the adjudicated devices and infringement by devices 

not more than colorably different from the adjudicated 

devices.” Int’l Rectifier Corp., 383 F.3d at 1316. 

Turning to the terms of the subject permanent injunction, we do not find them overly broad. The injunction 

prohibits Tile Tech from 

any and all acts of infringement of the [’356 patent], including making, using, importing, selling, 

offering for sale, advertising, marketing or promoting the sale of any adjustable building surface 

support product incorporating the [’356 patent], or 

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UNITED CONSTR. PRODS., INC. v. TILE TECH, INC. 13

any substantially similar adjustable building surface support product sold, advertised, marketed or

promoted in the United States.

United, 2015 WL 7776795, at *6 (emphasis added). The 

plain language of the injunction prohibits all acts of 

infringement, with specific hypothetical examples following the term “including.” To the extent that sale, advertisement, marketing, or promotion of a substantially 

similar product to United’s would constitute infringement 

if evaluated under the two-step test that this court set out 

in TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., such actions would be 

prohibited. 646 F.3d 869, 882 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[T]he 

party seeking to enforce the injunction must prove both 

that the newly accused product is not more than colorably 

different from the product found to infringe and that the 

newly accused product actually infringes.”). We see no 

problem with the use of the term “substantially similar” 

in the injunction to the extent that it prevents Tile Tech

from infringing United’s patent as assessed under this 

court’s standard and, thus, find that the District Court 

did not err in issuing this injunction. 

We also find the requirement to surrender “any mold, 

or other device, by which any notched washer utilized 

with the [’356 patent] was made” an acceptable means of 

preventing future infringement to United. United, 2015 

WL 7776795, at *6. United submitted that the notched 

washer was a “crucial” component of the patented support 

pedestal, Appellee’s Br. 31, which Tile Tech acknowledged 

when it intentionally destroyed all molds and notched 

washers upon learning of this litigation, J.A. 1092−94. 

Tile Tech’s President acknowledged that Tile Tech voluntarily changed its product’s washer to a full washer from 

the notched washer “based upon . . . notification of the 

patent.” J.A. 467. He also testified that Tile Tech has 

never sold a notched washer. J.A. 467. Putting aside the 

fact that such an injunction does not immediately present 

any potential disruption to Tile Tech’s non-infringing 

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14 UNITED CONSTR. PRODS., INC. v. TILE TECH, INC. 

business products, we note that United’s counsel also 

stated at argument that United would not seek to enforce 

the injunction should Tile Tech use notched washers or 

their molds for non-infringing purposes. Oral Argument

at 20:49−21:35, http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/

default.aspx?fl=2016-1392.mp3. As such, the requirement 

to surrender the molds for washers is appropriate. 

Finally, we construe the language of the injunction 

with respect to the unfair competition claim in a manner

consistent with the rights of Tile Tech. United alleged 

violations of unfair competition under both common law 

and section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)

(2012). J.A. 418. “It is well established that the Lanham 

Act does not prevent one from using a competitor’s mark 

truthfully to identify the competitor’s goods . . . .” 

Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174

F.3d 1036, 1065 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). The 

language of the injunction permanently enjoins Tile Tech 

and its representatives or agents from “any and all acts of 

unfair competition, including using images of [United]’s 

products, projects[,] and drawings on its website and in 

any other marketing materials.” United, 2015 WL 

7776795, at *8 (emphasis added). The District Court 

found that the current use of United’s products in Tile 

Tech’s marketing materials violates section 43(a) of the 

Lanham Act because it “misrepresents that such products, projects, and drawings are the products, projects, 

and drawings of Tile [Tech],” J.A. 418, and such advertising should be removed. To the extent that in the future 

Tile Tech’s advertising clearly distinguishes its product 

from that of United’s in a comparative advertisement, in a 

way that is not “an act of unfair competition,” we read the 

injunction to not prohibit such uses. At oral argument, 

United agreed with this interpretation of the injunction. 

Oral Argument at 25:00−26:15, http://oralarguments.cafc.

uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2016-1392.mp3. In sum, we 

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UNITED CONSTR. PRODS., INC. v. TILE TECH, INC. 15

find that the injunction is not overbroad as written under 

the facts presented.

CONCLUSION

We have considered Tile Tech’s remaining arguments 

and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, the decision of 

the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California is

AFFIRMED

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