Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_12-cv-06537/USCOURTS-cand-4_12-cv-06537-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JERRY DILLINGHAM, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

EVA SCRUGGS, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 12-cv-06537-YGR (PR) 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION 

Plaintiff Jerry Dillingham, currently incarcerated at the California Substance Abuse and 

Treatment Facility, brings the instant pro se action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, stemming from 

alleged constitutional violations that took place while he was incarcerated at Salinas Valley State 

Prison (“SVSP”) from 2011 through 2012, including a retaliation claim against his bakery 

supervisors for drafting disciplinary memos (“128-A” or “chronos”) and rules violation reports 

(“RVRs”) documenting his bad behavior in retaliation for Plaintiff filing inmate grievances 

against them. The operative pleading is Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), which 

the Court has reviewed and has found to have raised cognizable claims against the following 

Defendants: Bakery Supervisors Eva Scruggs and J. Brunscher; Officer S. Lawson; Lieutenants P. 

Sulliven, R. Mojica, and E. Medina; Captain R. Binkele; former Chief Deputy Warden A. 

Hedgpeth; and M. “Cats” or “Cate”1

 (“Defendant Cats/Cate”). 

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion for 

Summary Judgment. Dkt. 65. They argue that (1) the SAC should be dismissed for failure to state 

a claim; (2) Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform 

Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), as to some of his claims; and (3) Plaintiff cannot 

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 There is some dispute in the record as to whether this named Defendant is “M. Cats” or 

“M. Cate”; therefore, the Court will refer to this Defendant using both names. In addition, to date, 

Defendant Cats/Cate has not yet been served; however, as explained below, the Court will resolve 

all claims against this unserved Defendant after it has resolved all claims against the served 

Defendants. 

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satisfy the elements of his remaining retaliation claim against Defendants Brunscher, Scruggs, and 

Lawson. Id. at 1. Plaintiff has filed an opposition to the motion,2 and Defendants have filed their 

reply. Dkts. 89, 96. 

For the reasons outlined below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment based on Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies as to some of his claims, 

GRANTS the motion for summary judgment as to his failure to satisfy the elements of the 

remaining retaliation claim, and DENIES as moot their alternative motion for judgment on the 

pleadings. Because the Court has resolved similar claims in favor of the served Defendants, it also 

GRANTS summary judgment as to the claims against unserved Defendant Cats/Cate based on 

Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Background 

1. Summary of Claims 

The following summary of Plaintiff’s claims is taken from the Court’s August 28, 2014 

Order of Partial Dismissal and Service, which states as follows: 

In his SAC, Plaintiff alleges multiple incidents involving 

various SVSP prison officials. Specifically, the Court finds that 

Plaintiff has alleged the following cognizable claims against the 

following named Defendants: 

 (1) a claim of retaliation against Defendants Scruggs, 

Brunscher, Lawson, Sulliven, Binkele, and Hedgpeth for acting in 

retaliation for Plaintiff filing grievances and leading to Plaintiff’s 

termination from his employment based on his refusal to sign a 

“discresionary [sic] binfit [sic] agreement[]” and “conditioning [his] 

employment on such a waiver”; 

 (2) an Eighth Amendment claim that Defendants Scruggs 

and Brunscher acted with deliberate indifference to the threat of 

serious harm or injury to Plaintiff by other prisoners resulting from 

these Defendants spreading certain rumors that Plaintiff was an 

“F.B.I., snitch, rat, informer”; 

 (3) a claim for emotional distress and mental torture 

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 In opposition to the pending dispositive, Plaintiff’s filed a document entitled, “Brief in 

Support of Pl.[’s] Motion for Partial Summary Judgment[,] Motion [for] Judgment on [the] 

Pleading[s] Exhaust Administrative Remedies & Summ. J. In Pl.[’s] Favor,” which the Court 

construes to be Plaintiff’s verified opposition. Dkt. 89. 

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against Defendants Scruggs, Brunscher, Mojica and Medina for their 

“acts/ommissions [sic] of [] malicious callous intent” prior to the 

incident involving an assault and battery with a weapon by his cell 

mate inmate Lozano, who stated to Plaintiff, “That ass kicking is for 

being a SNITCH!”; 

 (4) a claim of retaliation against Defendants Brunscher, 

Scruggs, Lawson, Medina and Mojica for retaliation against Plaintiff 

for filing grievances; 

 (5) a claim of a denial of Plaintiff’s right to access to the 

courts against Defendants Mojica and Medina; and 

 (6) a claim of conspiracy and a related claim of failing to 

prevent the conspiracy, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986, against 

Defendants Mojica, Medina, Hedgpeth and Cats[/Cate]. 

Dkt. 16 [SAC] at 15-16.3

Dkt. 23 at 3-4. 

2. Background Relating to Exhaustion 

Defendants have presented Plaintiff’s prison records, which they argue prove that he never 

submitted grievances through the CDCR’s administrative grievance process concerning a majority 

of the aforementioned cognizable claims, i.e., all claims except for the retaliation claim against 

Defendants Brunscher, Scruggs, and Lawson. Dkt. 65 at 29. They state as follows: 

A very liberal construction of [Plaintiff]’s grievances might construe 

them to complain about retaliation by Defendants Brunscher, 

Scruggs, and Lawson. But no fair reading of [Plaintiff]’s grievances 

could conclude that he complained that any Defendants put him in 

harm’s way by labeling him a snitch, caused him to be threatened or 

attacked by other inmates, conspired to violate his constitutional 

rights, violated his right to court access, or mentally tortured him in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Medina Decl., Exs. B, D, E.) 

Thus, [Plaintiff] failed to exhaust administrative remedies for his 

deliberate-indifference claim, court access claim, conspiracy claim, 

and Eighth Amendment claim for mental torture. Griffin[ v. Arpaio], 

557 F.3d [1117,] 1120 [(9th Cir. 2009)]. Accordingly, the Court 

should grant summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on each of 

those claims. 

Id. Before turning to the facts relating to exhaustion in the present case, the Court briefly reviews 

the requirements of the PLRA and administrative review process applicable to California 

prisoners. 

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 Page number citations refer to those assigned by the Court’s electronic case management 

filing system and not those assigned by Plaintiff. 

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a. Legal Framework Relating to Exhaustion 

The PLRA requires a prisoner to exhaust “available administrative remedies” before 

bringing an action with respect to prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “[T]he PLRA’s 

exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general 

circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other 

wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). 

Exhaustion of all “available” remedies is mandatory; those remedies need not meet federal 

standards, nor must they be “plain, speedy, and effective.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739-

40 (2001). The PLRA requires proper exhaustion of administrative remedies. Woodford v. Ngo, 

548 U.S. 81, 83 (2006). “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and 

other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without 

imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Id. at 90-91. Thus, the PLRA 

requires compliance with prison grievance procedures to exhaust properly. Id. The PLRA’s 

exhaustion requirement cannot be satisfied “by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally 

defective administrative grievance or appeal.” Id. at 84. 

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) provides its 

inmates and parolees the right to appeal administratively “any policy, decision, action, condition, 

or omission by the department or its staff that the inmate or parolee can demonstrate as having a 

material adverse effect upon his or her health, safety, or welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, 

§ 3084.1(a).4

 

To initiate an appeal, the inmate or parolee must submit a CDCR Form 602 (“appeal” or 

“grievance”) describing the issue to be appealed to the Appeals Coordinator’s office at the 

institution or parole region for receipt and processing. Id. § 3084.2(a)-(c). The level of detail in 

an administrative grievance necessary to exhaust a claim properly is determined by the prison’s 

applicable grievance procedures. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). The level of 

specificity required in the appeal is described in the California Code of Regulations as follows: 

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 The regulations pertaining to the inmate appeal process were amended effective January 

28, 2011. As explained below, Plaintiff’s grievances were submitted after January 28, 2011; 

therefore, the amended regulations were in effect and govern his grievances. 

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The inmate or parolee shall list all staff member(s) involved and 

shall describe their involvement in the issue. To assist in the 

identification of staff members, the inmate or parolee shall include 

the staff member’s last name, first initial, title or position, if known, 

and the dates of the staff member’s involvement in the issue under 

appeal. 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(a)(3) (emphasis added). Inmates have “30 calendar days” to 

submit a grievance (using the prescribed CDCR Form 602) from the “occurrence of the event or 

the decision being appealed.” Id. § 3084.8(b)(1). 

The CDCR’s appeal process consists of three formal levels of appeals: (1) first formal 

level appeal filed with one of the institution’s appeal coordinators, (2) second formal level appeal 

filed with the institution head or designee, and (3) third formal level appeal filed with the CDCR 

director or designee (“Director’s Level”). Id. §§ 3084.7.5

 A prisoner exhausts the appeal process 

when he completes the third level of review. Id. § 3084.1(b); Harvey v. Jordan, 605 F.3d 681, 683 

(9th Cir. 2010). A “cancellation or rejection” of an appeal “does not exhaust administrative 

remedies.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(b). 

b. Plaintiff’s Relevant Appeal History 

From 2000 to the present, Plaintiff has administratively exhausted “more than 30 inmate 

grievances” to the Director’s Level. Briggs Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. A. Among those grievances exhausted 

through the Director’s level, two were submitted during the relevant period of 2011 through 

2012—SVSP-12-02488 and SVSP-11-01435. Briggs Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. A; Medina Decl. ¶ 15, Exs. B, 

C. The record shows that SVSP-12-02488 concerned Plaintiff’s complaint about the outcome of 

the hearing on an unrelated May 26, 2012 RVR. Medina Decl., Ex. C. However, the other 

exhausted grievance, SVSP-11- 01435, concerned some of the claims in the present action, as 

further explained below. Medina Decl. ¶¶ 17, 21, Ex. B. 

In addition, Plaintiff submitted, albeit only to the lower levels of review, two other 

grievances concerning the issues in the present action and related to his job in the bakery in 2011 

and 2012—SVSP-L-11-379 and SVSP-L-11-669. Medina Decl. ¶¶ 17-20, Exs. D, E. 

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 Under the regulations, as amended effective January 28, 2011, the informal grievance 

level has been omitted and there are now only three levels: first level appeal, second level appeal, 

and third level appeal. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.7. 

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Defendants have supplied copies of the relevant grievances, to which the Court will cite. 

Plaintiff does not dispute that these grievances are relevant to the present case. Therefore, the 

Court will limit its analysis to the three relevant grievances, which are summarized below: 

1) SVSP-L-11-3796

On February 9, 2011, Plaintiff submitted SVSP-L-11-379 to the first level of review. 

Medina Decl. ¶ 18, Ex. D. In SVSP-L-11-379, Plaintiff complained about a chrono that 

Defendant Scruggs prepared on February 4, 2011, and in which she was critical of Plaintiff’s job 

performance on January 27, 2011, i.e., that he was “working at an extremely slow pace in the 

Central Kitchen Bakery, which was impeding bakery production.” Id. SVSP-L-11-379 asserted 

that another inmate manipulated Defendant Scruggs into writing the chrono. Id. Plaintiff claimed 

the chrono was false and requested that Defendant Scruggs withdraw it. Id. SVSP-L-11-379 did 

not complain about the actions of anyone other than Defendant Scruggs. Id. 

The record shows Plaintiff pursued SVSP-L-11-379 through the first level of review, 

where it was denied. Id. The prison does not have any record indicating that Plaintiff pursued 

SVSP-L-11-379 to the higher levels of review. 

2) SVSP-L-11-669 

On March 17, 2011, Plaintiff submitted SVSP-L-11-669 to the first level of review. 

Medina Decl. ¶ 19, Ex. E. SVSP-L-11-669 only concerned Defendant Scruggs and a February 4, 

2011 chrono she issued to Plaintiff for theft of food. Medina Decl., Ex. E, Dkt. 70-5 at 2-8. 

Specifically, Plaintiff complained that Defendant Scruggs attended a meeting with Supervising 

Correctional Cook A. Fagan and Plaintiff, during which Defendant Scruggs allegedly stated as 

follows: “The 2-4-2011 CDCR 128-A Chrono Information is a[n] error on my part & I recant.” 

Medina Decl., Ex. E, Dkt. 70-5 at 2. Plaintiff further claimed that Defendant Scruggs added: “I 

will write up a new chrono which will clear [Plaintiff]’s name regarding the 128-A.” Id. at 4. 

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 The Court notes that the only copy of SVSP-L-11-379 in the record is missing the page 

containing the “extra space for [Plaintiff] to continue describing the issue that he was grieving and 

the relief he was requesting.” Medina Decl. ¶ 18. However, there is a summary of the issue he 

was grieving and relief requested outlined in the first-level response to SVSP-L-11-379, id., and 

Plaintiff does not dispute that the summary is a correct interpretation of this information from 

SVSP-L-11-379. 

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However, Plaintiff complained that despite the aforementioned statements by Defendant Scruggs 

at that meeting, she later refused to retract the previous chrono or prepare a new laudatory chrono 

for Plaintiff (as a compensation). Id.

Plaintiff pursued SVSP-L-11-669 through the first two levels of review. It was partially 

granted at the second level of review on May 9, 2011. However, the “inquiry [was] not yet 

complete.” Id. at 8. The record shows that the second-level response indicates that a “confidential 

inquiry was conducted,” although the summary of the appeal inquiry was incomplete because it 

seems to end mid-sentence. Id. Nevertheless, Plaintiff appealed it to the Director’s level review 

on June 7, 2011. Medina Decl. ¶ 19, Ex. E; Mojica Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. D; Decl. Briggs ¶ 9, Ex. B; 

Dkt. 16 ¶ 14. On September 7, 2011, the third level reviewer informed Plaintiff that it had 

returned the grievance to the SVSP appeal coordinators because aforementioned second-level 

response was inadequate. Medina Decl., Ex. E, Dkt. 70-5 at 9-11. Directions from the third level 

required the creation of an amended second-level response and that Plaintiff be provided the 

opportunity to review the amended response and appeal the decision to the third level again should 

he so choose. Id.; Decl. Briggs ¶ 9, Ex. B. On October 25, 2011, an amended second-level 

response was completed. Medina Decl. ¶ 20, Ex. E, Dkt. 70-5 at 12-13; Mojica Decl. ¶ 11. The 

reviewer explained that the appeal was partially granted to the extent that an “inquiry” was 

conducted, and the “inquiry” was complete upon finding that “[s]taff did not violate CDCR 

policy.” Medina Decl., Ex. E, Dkt. 70-5 at 12. The amended second-level response explicitly 

advised Plaintiff that to exhaust all remedies, he would need to submit the grievance to the thirdlevel review. Id. However, the record shows that Plaintiff did not pursue SVSP-L-11-669 to the 

final level of review. 

3) SVSP-L-11-1435 

On June 16, 2011, Plaintiff submitted SVSP-L-11-1435 to the first level of review. 

Medina Decl. ¶ 21, Ex. B. Plaintiff pursued this grievance through all three levels of review and 

completely exhausted available administrative remedies for it. Id. SVSP-L-11-1435 asserted that 

Defendant Hedgpeth ordered Defendants Lawson, Scruggs, and Brunscher to “stop illegally 

preventing [Plaintiff] from working in the bakery,” and complained that Defendants Lawson, 

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Scruggs, and Brunscher had continued to prevent Plaintiff from working despite the Defendant 

Hedgpeth’s order. Id., Ex. 70-2 at 2. The grievance further asserted that his bakery supervisors, 

Defendants Brunscher and Scruggs, filed false documents about Plaintiff causing him to lose his 

job and that they did this in retaliation for grievances he filed against them. Id. at 4. Although this 

grievance referenced Defendant Hedgpeth, it did not alert the prison to any problem with his 

conduct. Id. To the contrary, as mentioned above, it asserted that Defendant Hedgpeth attempted 

to help Plaintiff by ordering others to allow him to work. Id. 

On June 24, 2011, SVSP-L-11-1435 was initially screened out at the first level of review 

because it was not submitted on the “departmentally approved appeal forms” and did not include 

the required attachments to support his grievance. Id. at 12. On July 22, 2011, Plaintiff resubmitted SVSP-L-11-1435 on the correct form along with the required attachments. Id. at 2-11. 

On August 23, 2011, SVSP-L-11-1435 was partially granted at the second level of review 

in that an “inquiry into [his] allegation ha[d] been conducted.” Id. at 13. The summary for appeal 

inquiry stated: 

You were interviewed on August 17, 2011 by R. Rodriguez you 

stated you worked in the bakery for about 4 years and [you were] the 

senior baker with a pay rate of .32 per hour. You claim staff singled 

you out and were issuing unjustified 128s and 128B1s. You said the 

write ups were for Staff Manipulation, Over Familiarity and slowing 

down production. You added by not providing you with the 101s 

from the request date July 2010-March 2011, you were deprived of 

your Due Process. You admitted that you failed to follow a baking 

procedure by not placing a sheet pan on the top rack when baking 

the cakes causing metal shaving[s] to fall in the cakes. You felt that 

this write up was unjust because your supervisors were watching 

you and they should have corrected you at the time. There were no 

witnesses interviewed. The following information was reviewed as 

a result of your allegations of staff misconduct. On October 21, 

2010, January 27, 2011 and February 3, 2011 you received 128-As 

for poor job performance. On February 22, 2011 you received a 

128-B for attempting to manipulate staff then on April 26, 2011 you 

received a 128-B for program failure at which time you were placed 

on S time. This reviewer found no violation of CDCR policies by 

staff. 

Id. at 13. Plaintiff then appeal SVSP-L-11-1435 to the Director’s level, where it was initially 

rejected on October 4, 2011 and January 27, 2012 for being incomplete and for having “excessive 

attachments,” respectively. Id. at 15-16. 

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 On May 18, 2012, SVSP-L-11-1435 was denied at the Director’s level and “no relief” was 

provided at this final level of review. Id. at 17. The third-level reviewer “determined that 

[Plaintiff’s] allegations have been reviewed and evaluated by administrative staff and an inquiry 

has been completed” at the second level of review. Id. The third-level response also indicated 

that “[n]o changes or modifications are required by the Institution,” and that “[t]his decision 

exhausts the administrative remedies available to [Plaintiff] within CDCR.” Id. at 18. 

B. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a party may move for summary judgment 

on some or all of the claims or defenses presented in an action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)(1). “The 

court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.; see Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party has the burden of 

establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 323 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (requiring citation to “particular parts of materials in 

the record”). If the moving party meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 

477 U.S. at 324; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 

(1986). 

The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that must be raised 

in a motion for summary judgment. See Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (en 

banc). The defendants have the initial burden to prove “that there was an available administrative 

remedy, and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy.” Id. at 1172; Williams v. 

Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015). If the defendants carry that burden, “the burden 

shifts to the prisoner to come forward with evidence showing that there is something in his 

particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively 

unavailable to him.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. The ultimate burden of proof remains with 

defendants, however. Id. “If material facts are disputed, summary judgment should be denied, 

and the district judge rather than a jury should determine the facts.” Id. at 1166. 

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A district court may only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary 

judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002). 

In support of the motion for summary judgment, Defendants have presented declarations from the 

following: Acting Chief of the Office of Appeals R. Briggs as well as Defendants Brunscher, 

Lawson, Medina, Mojica, and Scruggs. Dkts. 67-72. Meanwhile, Plaintiff has filed his verified 

SAC (Dkt. 16), his verified declaration (Dkt. 16 at 19-23), his verified opposition to Defendants’ 

motion (Dkt. 89), and his verified declarations in opposition to Defendants’ supporting 

declarations (Dkts. 91-94). The Court will construe these filings as affidavits under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 56, insofar as they are based on personal knowledge and set forth specific facts 

admissible in evidence. See Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 

1995). 

C. Analysis of Motion for Summary Judgment Relating to Unexhausted Claims 

1. Defendants’ Initial Burden of Proving Unexhaustion 

As explained in above, Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiff filed one relevant grievance 

to the retaliation claim against Defendants Brunscher, Scruggs and Lawson, but contend that 

Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies as to all other claims in the SAC. Dkt. 56 at 

29. The undisputed evidence shows that SVSP-L-11-1435 involved the aforementioned retaliation 

claim and that Plaintiff pursued this grievance to the highest level of appeal. The undisputed 

evidence also reveals that Plaintiff filed two other grievances, also dealing with the retaliation 

claim (but mostly against Defendant Scuggs); however, SVSP-L-11-379 and SVSP-L-11-669 

were not pursued to the highest level of appeal. Therefore, Defendants argue that they are entitled 

to summary judgment based on Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies as to all 

claims except for the aforementioned retaliation claim. Id.

Defendants have met their initial burden as the moving party by setting forth evidence to 

demonstrate Plaintiff’s non-exhaustion as to all claims except for the aforementioned retaliation 

claim, specifically by conducting a search of the CDCR’s records and finding no grievances 

submitted to the Director’s level by Plaintiff concerning the claims at issue. See Paramo, 775 

F.3d at 1191. Defendants cite the declarations of Acting Chief Briggs of the Office of Appeals 

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and Appeals Coordinator Medina who have reviewed Plaintiff’s grievances and concluded that: 

(1) Plaintiff only submitted two grievances during the 2011-2012 time period at issue that were 

pursued to the Director’s level, only one of which related to the aforementioned retaliation claim; 

and (2) he did not submit any grievances concerning his deliberate indifference claim, court access 

claim, conspiracy claim, and Eighth Amendment claim for mental torture against Defendants that 

were accepted at any level of review. Briggs Decl. ¶ 8; Medina Decl. ¶¶ 17-24. Specifically, 

Appeals Coordinator Medina, who is responsible for “receiving, logging, routing, and monitoring 

the disposition of inmate grievances” at SVSP, attests that a search of the database containing 

records of all inmate appeals filed by Plaintiff at SVSP was conducted and that the search 

produced a grievance activity report showing proof that Plaintiff submitted a total of eight inmate 

appeals during the 2011-2012 time period. Medina Decl. ¶ 14. Appeals Coordinator Medina 

reviewed the grievance activity report and reviewed the grievances Plaintiff submitted from 2011 

through 2012 states as follows relating to eight inmate appeals that were accepted for review: 

I am informed by the Attorney General’s Office that Dillingham’s 

lawsuit concern work related incidents that occurred in 2011 and 

2012 between Dillingham and his bakery supervisors. Based on my 

review of the IATS printout and my review of the grievances 

Dillingham submitted in 2011 and 2012, I have confirmed that 

Dillingham submitted only three grievances concerning those 

alleged events, and he pursued one of them through the final level of 

review. 

Id. ¶ 17. The three relevant grievances, which have been described in detail above as only 

pertaining to the aforementioned retaliation claim, are: SVSP-L-11-379, SVSP-L-11-669, and 

SVSP-11-01435. Id. ¶¶ 18-21. 

 In sum, Defendants have adequately shown that there were available administrative 

remedies that Plaintiff did not fully exhaust as to all claims in his SAC, except for the 

aforementioned retaliation claim. 

2. Plaintiff’s Burden of Proving Unavailability of Administrative Remedies 

As such, the burden shifts to Plaintiff “to come forward with evidence showing that there 

is something in his particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative 

remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. Improper screening of a 

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prisoner’s administrative grievances may excuse a failure to exhaust. See Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 

F.3d 813, 822-23 (9th Cir. 2010). The prisoner must demonstrate “(1) that he actually filed a 

grievance or grievances that, if pursued through all levels of administrative appeals, would have 

sufficed to exhaust the claim that he seeks to pursue in federal court, and (2) that prison officials 

screened his grievance or grievances for reasons inconsistent with or unsupported by applicable 

regulations.” Id. at 823-24. 

As explained above, Defendants have presented evidence that Plaintiff’s prison records 

prove that he did not submit grievances through CDCR’s administrative grievance process 

concerning the claims in his SAC, other than the aforementioned retaliation claim. In response, 

Plaintiff has filed a verified opposition to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff has filed a verified 

opposition as well as various verified declaration in opposition to Defendants’ declarations, which 

are excessively lengthy (with multiple attachments) and difficult to decipher, but they seem to 

indicate that he concedes that the three aforementioned grievances are the ones relevant to the 

present case. Dkts. 91 at 5-6, 13-15; 93 at 3. The Court notes that in his verified SAC, Plaintiff 

claims that he filed one other grievance against Defendants Brunscher and Scruggs on March 27, 

2011, which is a different filing date than the three aforementioned grievances. Dkt. 16 at 12, 

¶ 24. Attached to the SAC is Plaintiff’s March 27, 2011 grievance on the original appeal form, in 

which he complains that Defendants Brunscher and Scruggs filed “false[,] erroneous[,] 

prejudicial” chronos and RVRs in retaliation for his filing grievances against them. Id. at 71-74. 

However, there are no markings on that form indicating that this grievance was received or 

processed through the highest level of appeal. See id. Plaintiff claims that he submitted this 

grievance for review; however, Defendant Mojica (an appeals coordinator) “ma[d]e unavailable 

administrative redress of this grievance with [Defendant] Mojica’s staff . . . .” Id. ¶ 24. He adds 

that the unanswered grievance was not returned to him. Id. Thus, Plaintiff claims that he was 

“unable to complete final exhaustion” of this grievance. Id. Even though it seems that Plaintiff’s 

March 27, 2011 was unanswered, the Court finds that the previously-mentioned three grievances, 

which were accepted for review—i.e., SVSP-L-11-1435 was exhausted through the Director’s

level—are sufficient evidence showing that Plaintiff has exhausted administrative remedies as to 

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his retaliation claim against Defendants Brunscher, Scruggs and Lawson. Accordingly, 

Defendants have not met their ultimate burden to show that Plaintiff did not exhaust his available 

administrative remedies as to the aforementioned retaliation claim. 

However, as to the other claims in his SAC, it seems that Plaintiff generally argues that the 

administrative remedies were made “unavailable” to him; however, his arguments in support of 

such a claim are not clearly outlined in his opposition. Instead, they are separately argued in a 

conclusory fashion in his declarations in opposition to Defendants’ declarations. See generally

Dkts. 91, 93. Although Plaintiff is not required to allege that he resorted to extraordinary 

measures in order to exhaust his administrative remedies, conclusory allegations that the 

administrative remedies process is inadequate are insufficient to defeat dismissal for failure to 

exhaust. See White v. McGinnis, 131 F.3d 593, 595 (6th Cir. 1997). Furthermore, the record 

contradicts Plaintiff’s arguments because, as mentioned above, it shows that Plaintiff was able to 

pursue two grievances to the Director’s level at the time period during which his administrative 

remedies were allegedly not made available to him—SVSP-12-02488 and SVSP-11-01435. 

Briggs Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. A; Medina Decl. ¶ 15, Exs. A-C. Plaintiff does not support his allegation 

that the administrative remedies were made unavailable to him; therefore, they are conclusory at 

best. Further, the Court is not required to scour the record to determine which particular argument 

and/or exhibit pertains to Plaintiff’s conclusory claim that his administrative remedies were made 

unavailable to him. Thus, the aforementioned conclusory evidence presented by Plaintiff is 

insufficient to defeat Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the other claims in his SAC. 

Furthermore, the fact that Plaintiff was able to file eight inmate appeals between 2011 and 2012 

and pursue two grievances to the Director’s level suggests that he had adequate access to the 

administrative appeals process. See Medina Decl. ¶ 14; Briggs Decl. ¶ 8. Meanwhile, the 

evidence produced by Defendants is sufficient to carry their ultimate burden of proof to show that 

the other claims are unexhausted, even in light of Plaintiff’s verified factual allegations. 

Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment based on the failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies, and their motion is GRANTED as to most of the claims in his SAC, i.e., 

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all claims except for the aforementioned retaliation claim (which will be addressed below).7

D. Analysis of Motion for Summary Judgment Relating to Retaliation Claim 

The only remaining claim is Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants Brunscher, Scruggs, and 

Lawson retaliated against him by drafting chronos and RVRs documenting his bad behavior in the 

bakery. Plaintiff contends the aforementioned Defendants were retaliating against him for filing 

grievances against them. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against each of these 

Defendants fails as a matter of law, and Defendants Brunscher, Scruggs, and Lawson are therefore 

entitled to judgment in their favor. Dkt. 65 at 30-34. 

1. Facts Relating to Retaliation Claim 

a. Plaintiff’s Version 

Plaintiff worked at the SVSP bakery for several years and was supervised by Defendants 

Brunscher and Scruggs, who are both women and not correctional officers. Brunscher Decl. ¶¶ 2, 

12; Scruggs ¶¶ 2, 13. 

As mentioned above, in February and March 2011, Plaintiff filed grievances—SVSP-L-11-

379 and SVSP-L-11-669—against Defendant Scruggs. Dkt. 16. at 7, 9-10, ¶¶ 1, 6, 12; Medina 

Decl. ¶ 17, Exs. D, E. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Scruggs retaliated against him by engaging 

in a “campaign of severe abuse of authority, work place reprisal, harassment[, and] life threatening 

misconduct . . . individually and collusively with Defendant Brunscher.” Dkt. 16 at 9, ¶ 6. 

According to Plaintiff, Defendant Scruggs issued chronos to Plaintiff based on false 

accusations. Id. at 9, ¶ 11. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Brunscher colluded in this conduct 

because she wanted to get Plaintiff to quit or be fired from his bakery job. Id. at 10-11, ¶¶ 18-21. 

On February 7, 2011, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Brunscher told another bakery employee, 

Antonio James, that Plaintiff was “going around telling on us,” meaning prison staff, which was 

“an indirect way of labeling plaintiff a snitch, informer, cop, troublemaker.” Id. at 10, ¶ 20, Ex. 8. 

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 The Court’s finding that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment (based on the 

failure to exhaust administrative remedies) as to all claims in Plaintiff’s SAC except for the 

retaliation claim obviates the need to address Defendants’ alternative arguments to dismiss the 

SAC for failure to state a claim. Therefore, their motion for judgment on the pleadings is 

DENIED as moot. 

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On February 8, 2011, Defendant Scruggs allegedly told James that Plaintiff was “working for the 

CIA,” and James concluded that this was the same as calling Plaintiff a “rat.” Id. at 12, ¶ 22, Ex. 

9. These rumors allegedly caused Plaintiff’s co-workers to shun him and want to harm him. Id. at 

12, ¶ 23. As explained above, Plaintiff also claims that he filed another grievance against 

Defendants Brunscher and Scruggs on March 27, 2011.8 Id. at 12, ¶ 24. 

On May 19, 2011, Defendants Brunscher and Scruggs, together with Defendant Lawson (a 

correctional officer), allegedly gave Plaintiff employment-related forms for his new position 

consisting of a contract and a work expectations document, and requested that he sign them. Id. at 

13, ¶ 26. The forms showed that Plaintiff was receiving a reduction in pay. Id., Ex. 12. Plaintiff 

refused to sign the forms. Id. Defendants Lawson, Brunscher and Scruggs allegedly 

“threaten[ed] to file” a rule violation report (RVR) alleging that Plaintiff refused to work as 

ordered if he did not sign the forms. Id. at 13, ¶ 26. When Plaintiff refused to sign the forms, he 

claims Defendant Lawson issued the RVR, accusing Plaintiff of refusing to perform work as 

ordered. Id. The RVR states: 

Dillingham was refusing to sign his “Job Expectations Forms” 

which is a requirement for all new workers or for ones who are 

changing job assignments, as was the case here. I gave inmate 

Dillingham direct order to read & sign his Job Expectation Form and 

get to work, again, with no compliance. Inmate Dillingham’s job 

performance has been poor of late. This is the reason for current job 

assignment change in the first place. The documentation is critical 

(Job Expectation Form), without it, inmate Dillingham cannot be 

allowed to work in the Bakery. This writer is requesting that Inmate 

Dillingham be taken to Unit Classification Committee immediately 

in order to be remove[d] from his current job location. 

Id., Ex. 12. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Lawson, Brunscher and Scruggs “filed the job 

termination false accusation in retaliation for filing grievances.” Id. at 15, ¶ 36. 

During his RVR hearing, Plaintiff claims he reiterated that he told Defendants Lawson, 

Brunscher and Scruggs that he was ready to work but would not sign the forms. Id. Plaintiff was 

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 As mentioned above, there is nothing in the record indicating that Plaintiff’s March 27, 

2011 grievance was received or pursued to the higher levels of appeal. In any event, the 

retaliation claim against Defendants Brunscher and Scruggs has not been dismissed for failure to 

exhaust administrative remedies. Thus, it does not matter that Plaintiff’s March 27, 2011 

grievance was unanswered because the Court is handling the retaliation claim on the merits. 

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found guilty of the RVR by Defendant Sulliven. Id. at 13, ¶ 26, Ex. 12 at 1-2. 

Again, as mentioned above, Plaintiff filed one final grievance pertaining to his retaliation 

claim against Defendants Lawson, Brunscher and Scruggs—SVSP-11-01435, which he exhausted 

through to the Director’s level. Medina Decl. ¶ 21, Ex. B. 

b. Defendants’ Version 

In their roles as bakery supervisors, Defendants Brunscher and Scruggs did not have the 

authority to hire or fire inmate employees. Scruggs Decl. ¶ 3; Brunscher Decl. ¶ 3. Likewise, 

Defendant Lawson had no authority to hire or fire inmate employees. Lawson Decl. ¶ 3. Those 

types of decisions are made by classification committees that determine appropriate programming 

for each inmate. Scruggs Decl. ¶ 3; Brunscher Decl. ¶ 3; Lawson Decl. ¶ 3. Thus, a classification 

committee, and not Defendants Brunscher, Scruggs, or Lawson, terminated Plaintiff from his 

position in the bakery. Id.

Defendants Brunscher and Scruggs were responsible, however, for documenting the 

performance and conduct of inmate employees in the kitchen, and making recommendations 

concerning their employment. Scruggs Decl. ¶¶ 3-4, 10, 11-12, 27, Ex. H; Brunscher Decl. ¶¶ 3-4, 

9-11, Ex. H. Meanwhile, Defendant Lawson was responsible for disciplining inmates who 

violated rules or who refused to appropriately perform their work duties. Lawson Decl. ¶ 4. 

Correctional officers and other prison staff members typically discipline inmates by 

providing oral counseling or writing a short report or chrono about problematic conduct. Id. 

Correctional officers also document more egregious conduct in longer reports called RVRs. Id. 

The CDCR’s official policies, as set forth in the Department Operations Manual, specifically 

direct that these forms of documentation be used in disciplinary situations. Id. And the 

Department Operations Manual also requires that an inmate’s refusal to work be documented in 

RVRs. Id. 

As mentioned above, Defendants Brunscher and Scruggs are women, and they were bakery 

supervisors, not correctional officers. Scruggs Decl. ¶ 8; Brunscher Decl. ¶ 8. Correctional 

officers were assigned to the central kitchen, but they circulated through different areas of the 

kitchen throughout the day. Id. Consequently, for most of each day, there were no correctional 

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officers monitoring the behavior of inmates in the bakery. Id. For this reason, if conflicts 

developed between particular inmates and the supervisory staff in the bakery, Defendants 

Brunscher and Scruggs sometimes had serious concerns about their safety. Id. 

During her years of working in the kitchen at SVSP, Defendant Scruggs learned about the 

dangers of allowing conflicts between supervisors and inmates to go unaddressed. Scruggs Decl. 

¶ 9. Defendant Scruggs was “personally assaulted” on three different occasions by inmates in the 

bakery and “sustained injuries from those assaults.” Id. 

The work performed in the central kitchen bakery is important because it plays an 

important part in feeding the thousands of inmates housed at SVSP. Scruggs Decl. ¶¶ 5- 6; 

Brunscher Decl. ¶¶ 5-6. Baked goods, such as biscuits, cornbread, and cake, are prepared by 

workers in the bakery, and are then distributed to satellite kitchens throughout the prison to be 

included in the meals provided to inmates on a daily basis. Id. One of the bakery’s primary goals 

is to produce quality, safe food for the thousands of inmates housed at SVSP. Id. 

When inmates who work in the kitchen perform their work slowly or poorly, it can result 

in food that is not prepared on time and food that is unsafe for consumption. Scruggs Decl. ¶¶ 5-6, 

11; Brunscher Decl. ¶¶ 5-6, 10; Lawson Decl. ¶ 5. And when the important work of the kitchen is 

not completed on time, it can disrupt programming and prison operations. Id. Additionally, 

workplace conflicts between inmates and supervisors can potentially erupt into violence if they are 

not appropriately addressed. Scruggs Decl. ¶ 9. Thus, Defendants Brunscher, Scruggs, and 

Lawson claim that there are legitimate correctional reasons for documenting, and taking measures 

to address, inmates who perform their kitchen jobs poorly, are insubordinate, break the rules, or 

cause other problems or conflicts in the bakery work environment. Scruggs Decl. ¶¶ 5-6, 11; 

Decl. Brunscher ¶¶ 5-6, 10; Lawson Decl. ¶ 5. 

In early 2011, Plaintiff’s job performance in the bakery and his attitude toward his 

supervisors and coworkers became problematic. Scruggs Decl. ¶ 14; Brunscher Decl. ¶ 13; 

Lawson Decl. ¶ 6. In particular, Plaintiff’s attitude and demeanor toward Defendants Brunscher 

and Scruggs became negative, and at times Plaintiff became confrontational with them. Scruggs 

Decl. ¶¶ 14-23, Exs. A-G; Brunscher Decl. ¶¶ 13-24, Ex. A-H; Lawson Decl. ¶¶ 6-16, Exs. A-F. 

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Additionally, Plaintiff began refusing to take directions and follow orders, his safety practices 

became inadequate, and he was no longer a dependable employee. Id. 

Under the CDCR’s hiring criteria, these problems with Plaintiff’s conduct in the bakery 

ultimately indicated that he was not suitable for employment there. Id. The hiring criteria requires 

that inmates must demonstrate: (a) an ability to deal with authority figures and job supervisors; 

(b) a willingness to take directions and orders; (c) dependability; and (d) that they can comply with 

safety practices. Scruggs Decl. ¶ 14; Brunscher Decl. ¶ 13. In 2011, Plaintiff failed to satisfy 

these requirements. Id. As Plaintiff’s supervisor, Defendants Brunscher and Scruggs had to 

document Plaintiff’s problems with performance as part of their supervisorial duties. Scruggs 

Decl. ¶ 25; Brunscher Decl. ¶ 25. Defendants Brunscher and Scruggs also became concerned for 

their safety and that was an additional factor that motivated them to request the Plaintiff be 

permanently removed from the bakery. Scruggs Decl. ¶ 24; Brunscher Decl. ¶ 25. Their concern 

was documented in a March 15, 2011 RVR for Failure to Perform Work as Ordered. Scruggs 

Decl., Ex. C. The RVR, which was reported by Defendant Scruggs, states: 

On 3/15/11, at approximately 0900 hours, while I was assigned as 

Baker II in Central Kitchen’s Bakery, Ms. Brunscher called Inmate 

DILLINGHAM (C-95149, A2-134) out of the bakery to the outside 

ovens by Distribution. A rack that Inmate DILLINGHAM had filled 

was put in the oven with cakes in every rung. Cakes will not back 

uniformly if they are put on every rung, as Inmate DILLINGHAM 

has been trained. Inmate DILLINGHAM did not put sheet pans on 

the top of the rack to catch the gear oil and metal shavings. Inmate 

DILLINGHAM knows that this will compromise the cakes, making 

them unfit for human consumption. The product could not be 

served. Inmate DILLINGHAM also over-sealed items on the same 

rack, knowing they will not bake properly and the potential for 

someone getting burned transferring the pans is huge. Inmate 

DILLINGHAM will not give his supervisor the respect that CCR 

§ 3004(b) addresses in Rights and Respect of Others. Inmate 

DILLINGHAM has been verbally counseled previously, as well as 

received CDCR-128As and CDCR-128Bs . . . . 

Id. Plaintiff was found guilty by Defendant Sulliven of a lesser included offense of Failure to 

Perform Word as Ordered, an administrative offense. Id.

Defendants deny that they “tried to get [Plaintiff] fired from his bakery position in 

retaliation for his submitting an inmate grievance against [them].” Scruggs Decl. ¶ 25; Lawson 

Decl. ¶ 17. Instead, Defendant Brunscher prepared an April 26, 2011 chrono which documented 

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Plaintiff’s “defiant and negative attitude, his attempts to manipulate his supervisors, his failure to 

follow proper food-preparation procedures, and his deliberate acts to contaminate bakery product.” 

Brunscher Decl. ¶ 18. She also explained in the chrono that Plaintiff’s conduct in the bakery could 

potentially cause illness or injury to others if it were allowed to continue. Id. Because of 

Plaintiff’s behavior in the bakery, Defendant Brunscher requested that the classification committee 

consider removing Plaintiff from his baker position. Id. Effective May 19, 2011, the 

classification committee directed that Plaintiff’s job position in the bakery be changed to a new 

lower-paying position. Id. ¶ 19. On that date, Defendant Brunscher was informed about 

Plaintiff’s change in job position, and instructed Plaintiff to review and sign the usual packet of 

documents that inmates must sign when they change positions. Id. ¶ 21. 

As explained above, Plaintiff refused to sign the documents, and Defendant Brunscher 

drafted another chrono documenting that Plaintiff refused to comply with her instruction that he 

review and sign the required packet of documents for his new position. Id. ¶ 22. Defendant 

Brunscher also deemed Plaintiff’s refusal to follow her directions to sign the required documents 

as a refusal to work, which she documented in the chrono. Id. 

Also as indicated above, the May 19, 2011 incident resulted in Plaintiff being charged and 

convicted of an RVR refusal to comply with his supervisor’s direct orders. Id. ¶ 23. 

As a result of the incident on May 19, 2011, and Plaintiff’s other job performance issues, 

Defendants Brunscher and Scruggs submitted a June 1, 2011 memorandum requesting that 

Plaintiff be permanently removed from the bakery. Id. ¶ 24. The memorandum states: 

In regards to Inmate Dillingham, CDCR # C-95149, I, J. 

Brunscher[,] and E. Scruggs, Baker II’s are requesting Inmate 

Dillingham be removed from his job position, MKB-A-106 in 

Central Kitchen due to an excess amount of 115’s and 128’s he has 

recently received. The first 115 he received was due to him 

knowingly compromising our product and manipulation of staff on 

3-15-11. Once this 115 was heard it was dropped to a 128. He was 

given a reduction in pay and was allowed to return to work on 

5/17/11. This ended in Dillingham being issued another 128 and 

115 for refusing to sign his new job description and Central 

Kitchens Standards of Participation and Performance. We are 

recommending Dillingham be removed from his job position MKBA-106 based on the excess amount of 128’s and 115’s received and 

also creating a distraction in Central Kitchen Bakery by his poor job 

performance. 

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Id., Ex. H. In sum, Defendants claim the actions they took concerning Plaintiff’s removal from 

the bakery were in response to: (a) his poor job performance and his disruption of work in the 

bakery; (b) concerns that Plaintiff’s poor performance would result in unsafe food products that 

could harm inmates; (c) Plaintiff’s insubordination and refusal to follow directions; (d) Plaintiff’s 

defiant demeanor and bad attitude; and (e) concerns about Defendants Brunscher’s and Scruggs’s 

safety. See Scruggs Decl. ¶ 25; Brunscher Decl. ¶¶ 24-25; Lawson Decl. ¶ 17. 

2. Legal Framework 

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic 

elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate 

(2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s 

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). 

The prisoner must show that the type of activity he was engaged in was constitutionally 

protected, that the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor for the alleged 

retaliatory action, and that the retaliatory action advanced no legitimate penological interest. 

Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267-68 (9th Cir. 1997) (inferring retaliatory motive from 

circumstantial evidence). Retaliatory motive may be shown by the timing of the allegedlyretaliatory act and other circumstantial evidence, as well as direct evidence. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 

F.3d 1283, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 2003). However, mere speculation that defendants acted out of 

retaliation is not sufficient. Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 904 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing cases) 

(affirming grant of summary judgment where there was no evidence that defendants knew about 

plaintiff’s prior lawsuit, or that defendants’ disparaging remarks were made in reference to prior 

lawsuit). 

To raise a triable issue as to motive, a plaintiff must offer evidence that the defendants 

knew about the protected speech. Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 568 (9th Cir. 2009). In 

addition, a plaintiff must show “either direct evidence of retaliatory motive or at least one of three 

general types of circumstantial evidence [of that motive].” McCollum v. California Dept. of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation, 647 F.3d 870, 882 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Allen v. Iranon, 283 

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F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002)). To survive summary judgment without direct evidence, 

therefore, a plaintiff must “present circumstantial evidence of motive, which usually includes: 

(1) proximity in time between protected speech and the alleged retaliation; (2) [that] the 

[defendant] expressed opposition to the speech; [or] (3) other evidence that the reasons proffered 

by the [defendant] for the adverse . . . action were false and pretextual.” McCollum, 647 F.3d at 

882 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

3. Elements of Retaliation Claim 

Plaintiff claims that his First Amendment rights were violated when Defendants 

Brunscher, Scruggs, and Lawson drafted chronos and RVRs documenting his bad behavior in the 

bakery, and that they did so with retaliation motives. Defendants Brunscher, Scruggs, and Lawson 

argue they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim of retaliation because (a) there is 

an absence of evidence as to a retaliatory motive and (b) Plaintiff has failed to prove that there was 

no legitimate penological reason for these Defendants’ actions. Dkt. 65 at 32-34. 

a. Second and Third Elements 

 In determining whether a retaliatory motive exists, a relevant factor includes whether the 

defendant was aware of the prisoner’s protected conduct. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 808 (9th 

Cir. 1995). Here, Plaintiff does not proffer facts to show that Defendants Brunscher, Scruggs, and 

Lawson knew about his protected conduct or that the protected conduct (i.e., Plaintiff filing 

grievances against them) motivated these Defendants to retaliate. 

First, the timeline of events does not indicate that Defendants Brunscher, Scruggs, and 

Lawson could have known about Plaintiff’s grievances prior to their actions of documenting his 

bad behavior. The record shows Defendant Scruggs documented Plaintiff’s poor behavior and 

work performance in a chrono she drafted on February 4, 2011, relating to an incident on January 

27, 2011. Scruggs Decl. ¶ 16, Ex. A. Plaintiff submitted his first grievance—SVSP-L-11-379—

complaining about Defendant Scruggs on February 9, 2011, which was five days after Defendant 

Scruggs drafted the chrono. Medina Decl. ¶ 18, Ex. D. Although Defendant Scruggs continued to 

document Plaintiff’s poor conduct after Plaintiff filed his first grievance, this initial sequence of 

events demonstrates that Plaintiff’s filing of SVSP-L-11-379 did not motivate her to document 

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Plaintiff’s problematic behavior, because she began documenting it before Plaintiff submitted 

SVSP-L-11-379. 

Similarly, Defendant Brunscher documented problems with Plaintiff in April and May 

2011. Brunscher Decl. ¶¶ 18, 22, 24, Exs. D, F, H. However, Plaintiff’s grievance that included a 

complaint about Defendant Brunscher—SVSP-L-11-1435—was not filed until June 16, 2011. 

Medina Decl. ¶¶ 17-19, 21, Ex. B, D, E. As explained above, Plaintiff’s two other grievances 

during the relevant period concerning his work in the bakery—SVSP-L-11-379 and SVSP-L-11-

669—were directed at Defendant Scruggs, and not Defendant Brunscher. Id., Ex. D, E. 

Likewise, Defendant Lawson documented problems with Plaintiff and initiated 

disciplinary proceedings on March 15, 2011 and May 23, 2011. Lawson Decl. ¶¶ 8, 15, Exs. B, F. 

However, Plaintiff first complained about Defendant Lawson in the June 16, 2011 grievance— 

SVSP-L-11-1435—and not in his previous two grievances that only concerned Defendant 

Scruggs. Medina Decl. ¶¶ 17-19, 21, Ex. B, D, E. 

Therefore, the record shows that Defendants Brunscher, Scruggs, and Lawson could not 

have been aware that Plaintiff had filed grievances against them because no such grievances were 

filed when they initially drafted chronos and RVRs documenting his bad behavior in the bakery, 

thus indicating a lack of retaliatory motive. Arguably, Plaintiff could point out that Defendants 

Brunscher, Scruggs, and Lawson continued to document his bad behavior in March and May 2011 

after he had filed his first two grievances—SVSP-L-11-379 and SVSP-L-11-669—in February 

and March 2011, albeit only naming Defendant Scruggs. Even assuming that Defendants 

Brunscher, Scruggs, and Lawson knew about Plaintiff’s protected activities, although retaliatory 

motive may be shown by the timing of the allegedly retaliatory act and inconsistency with 

previous actions, as well as direct evidence, Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 2003), 

it is not established simply by showing adverse activity by the defendant after protected speech; 

rather, the plaintiff must show a nexus between the two, Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 

899 (9th Cir. 2000) (retaliation claim cannot rest on the logical fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter 

hoc, i.e., “after this, therefore because of this”). Here, Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing 

that retaliation was the “substantial” or “motivating” factor behind the actions of Defendants 

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Brunscher, Scruggs, and Lawson (i.e., documenting Plaintiff’s bad behavior). Plaintiff’s bare 

factual assertions that these Defendants’ documenting his bad behavior was motivated by such a 

reason is no more than post hoc, ergo propter hoc. In other words, Plaintiff seems to assert that 

because he had filed those two initial grievances, the documenting of his bad behavior must have 

been retaliatory based upon suspect timing. Yet, Plaintiff has put forth no non-speculative 

evidence showing a triable issue of fact of a causal nexus. For example, he offers no evidence of 

having personal knowledge, as opposed to offering speculation, of such a motive. Further, there is 

no evidence that any of these Defendants expressed opposition to Plaintiff’s First Amendment 

activities. Nor is there evidence tending to show that these Defendants’ reasons for documenting 

his bad behavior were false or pretextual. In fact, Plaintiff admits that there were reasons for these 

Defendants to believe he was behaving badly in the bakery. For example, in his initial grievance 

against Defendant Scruggs (SVSP-L-11-379), Plaintiff claimed that she was being manipulated by 

other inmates into writing the chrono. Medina Decl., Ex. D. Moreover, Plaintiff has attached a 

verified declaration to his SAC, in which he described how other inmate workers tricked his 

supervisors into believing that Plaintiff was causing problems in the bakery. Dkt. 16 at 19-23. 

Thus, Plaintiff seems to put forth some evidence that these Defendants’ adverse actions could have 

been motivated by the belief that he was causing problems in the bakery. 

In sum, the timing of Plaintiff’s filing of the grievances against Defendants Brunscher, 

Scruggs, and Lawson, and his own admissions about what motivated their conduct demonstrates 

that they were not taking adverse action against him in retaliation for his filing grievances. 

Plaintiff, therefore, cannot satisfy the second and third elements of his retaliation claim against 

them, i.e., that these Defendants took some adverse action against him because of his protected 

conduct. See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68. 

b. Fifth Element 

In addition, for his retaliation claim to survive, Plaintiff must also prove the fifth element, 

i.e., that there was no legitimate penological reason supporting Defendants Brunscher, Scruggs, 

and Lawson’s efforts to document and discipline Plaintiff for his bad behavior. See Rhodes, 408 

F.3d at 567-68. The Court finds that Plaintiff cannot satisfy that element of his retaliation claim. 

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The record shows that Defendants Brunscher, Scruggs, and Lawson had a duty to 

document poor workplace conduct and take disciplinary action against Plaintiff when he was 

insubordinate and broke the rules. Scruggs Decl. ¶¶ 4-12, 25; Brunscher Decl. ¶¶ 4-11, 25; 

Lawson Decl. ¶¶ 4-5, 17. By performing those duties, these Defendants maintained order and 

discipline, ensured the production of safe and healthy food for inmates, avoided the disruption of 

programming and prison operations, and maintained safety in SVPS’s central kitchen, which are 

all important correctional goals. Id. Because their conduct advanced legitimate correctional goals, 

Plaintiff fails to satisfy the final element and cannot prevail on his retaliation claim against them. 

See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68. 

Accordingly, Defendants Brunscher, Scruggs, and Lawson are entitled to summary 

judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against them.9

E. Analysis of Claims Against Unserved Defendant Cats/Cate 

Summary judgment may be properly entered in favor of unserved defendants where (1) the 

controlling issues would be the same as to the unserved defendants, (2) those issues have been 

briefed, and (3) Plaintiff has been provided an opportunity to address the controlling issues. 

Columbia Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Ahlstrom Recovery, 44 F.3d 800, 802-03 (9th Cir. 1995). 

As mentioned above, Defendant Cats/Cate has not been served and has not joined the other 

Defendants in their motion for summary judgment. It is apparent, however, that the claim of 

conspiracy and a related claim of failing to prevent the conspiracy against unserved Defendant 

Cats/Cate are subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The allegations 

against unserved Defendant Cats/Cate in Plaintiff’s SAC are the same as those against the served 

Defendants Mojica, Medina, and Hedgpeth. As explained above, the Court has determined that 

the claim of conspiracy and a related claim of failing to prevent the conspiracy against served 

Defendants Mojica, Medina, and Hedgpeth are unexhausted. Therefore, the Court has granted 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative 

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 The Court’s finding that Defendants Brunscher, Scruggs, and Lawson are entitled to 

summary judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim obviates 

the need to address these Defendants’ alternative arguments regarding their entitlement to 

qualified immunity or that this claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 

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remedies as to the aforementioned claims. There is no suggestion in the SAC, the exhibits 

attached thereto, or in the briefs and exhibits filed in connection with the present motion for 

summary judgment, that the analysis differs with respect to unserved Defendant Cats/Cate as 

opposed to the aforementioned served Defendants. See Columbia Steel Fabricators, Inc., 44 F.3d 

at 803 (affirming grant of summary judgment in favor of nonappearing defendant where plaintiff, 

in response to summary judgment motion filed by defendant who had appeared, had “full and fair 

opportunity to brief and present evidence” on dispositive issue as to claim against nonappearing 

defendant). Accordingly, Defendant Cats/Cate is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law 

based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies.10

III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons outlined above, the Court orders as follows: 

1. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on the 

failure to exhaust administrative remedies as to most of the claims in the SAC (i.e., all claims 

except for the retaliation claim against Defendants Brunscher, Scruggs, and Lawson) against the 

served Defendants, and also as to the claims against unserved Defendant Cats/Cate. Dkt. 65. The 

aforementioned claims are DISMISSED without prejudice to refiling after exhausting California's 

prison administrative process. See McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1201 (9th Cir. 2002). 

2. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s 

remaining retaliation claim against Defendants Brunscher, Scruggs, and Lawson. 

3. Defendants’ alternative motion for judgment in the pleadings is DENIED as moot. 

4. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment, terminate all pending motions, and 

close the file. 

5. This Order terminates Docket No. 65. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 ______________________________________ 

Dated: September 8, 2015 YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS 

United States District Judge 

 10 Because the Court has resolved all claims against Defendant Cate/Cats, this Defendant 

need not be served. Therefore, the Court DENIES as moot any pending request made by Plaintiff 

to compel Defendants to provide a current address for Defendant Cate/Cats. Dkt. 88. 

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