Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02808/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02808-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Margaret J. Brown, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Litchfield Elementary School District No.

79, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-10-2808-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 4) filed by Defendant

Litchfield Elementary School District No. 79. For the following reasons, the Court grants the

Motion to Dismiss, with leave to amend.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges claims for age discrimination, race discrimination, and wrongful

termination arising from her termination as a Site Leader from Litchfield Elementary School

District on September 3, 2010. (Doc. 1). The only reason Plaintiff was allegedly given for

her termination was that she was overheard speaking the name of her direct supervisor and

Program Director, Megan Duplain, in a private conversation with a teacher’s aide. (Doc. 1

at 9). Plaintiff appears to assert that the Director’s reasoning for Plaintiff’s termination was

merely pretext and that Plaintiff’s supervisor, Brittany Fluesche, repeatedly discriminated

against her because of her age. (Id. at 10). Plaintiff alleges that Fluesche then convinced

Case 2:10-cv-02808-GMS Document 16 Filed 07/22/11 Page 1 of 8
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Duplain to terminate her based on an excuse. (Id.). Moreover, Plaintiff, an African American,

contends that her wrongful termination was also motivated by racial animus. Plaintiff had not

been written up prior to her termination and allegedly received the highest rating available

during her most recent performance review. (Id.). 

Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) on September 27, 2010, alleging that Defendant discriminated

against her because of her race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and because

of her age pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). Plaintiff filed

her Complaint in the instant action on December 30, 2010. Defendant now moves to dismiss

all of Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12(b)(6). 

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

To state a claim under Rule 8 and to survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a

complaint must contain more than “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action”; it must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right

to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

While “a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations . . . it must plead ‘enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler

Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The

plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s

liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.”

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “[a]ll

allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party.” Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996). However, legal

conclusions couched as factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness, and

“conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a

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motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The Court must construe the complaint liberally since Plaintiff is proceeding pro se.

See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (“It is settled law that the allegations of [a pro se

plaintiff’s] complaint, ‘however inartfully pleaded’ are held ‘to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’”) (citations omitted); Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132,

1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The Supreme Court has instructed federal courts to liberally construe

the ‘inartful pleading’ of pro se litigants.”) (citation omitted); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d

1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[W]e hold [plaintiff’s] pro se pleadings to a less stringent

standard than formal pleadings prepared by lawyers.”).

II. Analysis

A. Age Discrimination

The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer “to discharge any individual or

otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. §

623(a)(1). In the absence of direct evidence of age discrimination, Plaintiff can rely on the

burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

Under this approach, Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of age discrimination by

showing that (1) she was a member of the protected class (at least age 40), (2) performed her

job satisfactorily, (3) was subjected to an adverse employment action, and (4) employees who

were both substantially younger and similarly situated were treated more favorably. See Diaz

v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P’ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207–08 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Coleman v.

Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1280–81 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing elements in the

context of termination).

Plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to support the first three elements of an ADEA

claim. While Plaintiff fails to indicate her age in the Complaint, her EEOC Charge (attached

to the Complaint) provides that her date of birth is January 13, 1965, suggesting that at the

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1

 Although a district court generally may not consider any material beyond the

pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, material which is properly submitted as part

of the complaint may be considered. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896

F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990). Because Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge of Discrimination

is part of her complaint and its authenticity has not been called into question, it is appropriate

for the Court to consider it in resolving the motion to dismiss.

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time of her termination she was 45 years old, and therefore a member of the protected class.1

Plaintiff also alleges sufficient facts to show that she performed her job satisfactorily. She

conveys that she has “never been written-up” and that she “was marked straight 5’s (highest

marks allowed)” during her May 2010 appraisal. (Doc. 1 at 10). With respect to the third

element of her prima facie case, Plaintiff adequately alleges that she was subject to an

adverse employment action by stating that the Program Director terminated her employment

on September 3, 2010. (Id. at 9). However, Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to

demonstrate that similarly situated individuals were treated more favorably because of their

age. Plaintiff asserts that, on more than one occasion, Fluesche emphasized how old Plaintiff

was after Plaintiff expressed her personal issues of pain or illness. (Id. at 6). She also alleges

that “a Caucasian employee (aide under me)” was written up twice without being fired. (Id.

at 10). In her Response, Plaintiff clarifies that the Caucasian male aide was “young”. (Doc.

10). However, to show that the employees allegedly receiving more favorable treatment are

similarly situated, Plaintiff “must demonstrate, at least, that [she is] similarly situated to

those employees in all material respects.” Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 755 (9th Cir. 2006).

Individuals are similarly situated when “they have similar jobs and display similar conduct.”

Vasquez v. Cnty. of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2004). Employees in supervisory

positions are generally deemed not to be similarly situated to lower level employees. See id.

(citing Ward v. Procter & Gamble Paper Prods. Co., 111 F.3d 558, 560–61 (8th Cir. 1997)).

Plaintiff, a Site Leader, only points to a young aide who was not terminated despite two

write-ups even though Plaintiff was terminated without any warnings or write-ups. (Doc. 1

at 10). Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the young aide held a similar job; in fact, she

seems to assert the opposite by indicating that the aide worked “under [her]”. (Id.). Nor has

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Plaintiff alleged that the aide displayed similar conduct. These allegations, therefore, are not

sufficient to establish that employees who were both substantially younger and similarly

situated were treated more favorably.

“In civil rights cases where the plaintiff appears pro se, the court must construe the

pleading liberally and must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt.” Karim-Panahi v. L.A.

Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). Additionally, “[a] pro se litigant must be

given leave to amend his or her complaint unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies

of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Id. (quotation marks and citations

omitted). In this case, Plaintiff could cure her ADEA claim by demonstrating that similarly

situated employees outside her protected class were treated more favorably. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s ADEA claim is dismissed, with leave to amend.

B. Race Discrimination 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination on

account of race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for

an employer . . . to discharge any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color,

religion, sex, or national origin.”). As the Supreme Court set forth in McDonnell Douglas,

there are four elements a plaintiff must satisfy in order to establish a prima facie case of

racial discrimination. 411 U.S. at 792. “[T]he plaintiff must show that (1) he belongs to a

protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was subject to an adverse

employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside his protected class were

treated more favorably.” Id.; Moran, 447 F.3d at 753. The proof required to establish the

prima facie case is “minimal and does not even need to rise to the level of a preponderance

of the evidence.” Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994). Nevertheless,

Plaintiff “must offer evidence that ‘give[s] rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination,’

either through the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas or with direct or circumstantial

evidence of discriminatory intent.” Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 640.

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima

facie case of racial discrimination. Plaintiff has alleged that she is a member of a protected

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class by asserting that she is African American. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff also sets forth sufficient

facts to demonstrate that she was qualified for the position. These include her factual

allegations that she had never been written-up, and that she received the highest marks

possible in her May 2010 appraisal. (Doc. 1 at 10). Plaintiff has also adequately pled that her

September 2010 termination constituted an adverse employment action. Nevertheless, as with

her age discrimination claim, Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that

similarly situated individuals outside her protected class were treated more favorably. Again,

Plaintiff only alleges that a Caucasian aide who worked under her was written up twice but

never terminated. Plaintiff has set forth no facts to demonstrate that she and the aide had

similar jobs or displayed similar conduct. Moreover, Plaintiff’s assertion that she was the

only African-American employee at the school, without more, does not provide sufficient

support for this element. Because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts establishing that similarly

situated employees outside her protected class were treated more favorably, her Title VII

claim is dismissed, with leave to amend.

C. Wrongful Termination

The Arizona Equal Protection Act (“AEPA”) provides several scenarios in which an

employee may sue for wrongful termination. A.R.S. § 23-1501(3). Beyond a single isolated

reference to “wrongful termination,” Plaintiff makes no further reference to this claim or

identifies which scenario it is based upon. 

To determine “whether claims survive a motion to dismiss, the Court looks to the

[Complaint] in its entirety, not merely the count as articulated. Thus, the Court must consider

if there are any plausible claims that can be maintained from the allegations asserted, not just

the specific statute alleged.” Lombardi v. Copper Canyon Academy, LLC, 2010 WL

3775408, at *6 (D. Ariz. Sept. 21, 2010). In Lombardi v. Copper Canyon Academy, LLC, the

plaintiff’s AEPA claim survived a motion to dismiss because the Court found that the

complaint “as a whole demonstrate[d] a violation of AEPA,” so the claim would “not be

dismissed for failure to cite the correct section of the AEPA that was violated or failure to

state which source statute was violated under the AEPA.” (Id.). Plaintiff’s Complaint, viewed

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in its entirety, could plausibly state a claim for wrongful termination pursuant to A.R.S. § 23-

1501(3)(b), which provides that “[t]he employer has terminated the employment relationship

of an employee in violation of a statute of this state.” Specifically, Plaintiff likely alleges a

violation of the Arizona Civil Rights Act (“ACRA”), A.R.S. § 41-1463(B)(1). ACRA, in

part, states: “[i]t is an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge any

individual . . . because of the individual’s race, color, religion, sex, age or national origin or

on the basis of disability.” A.R.S. § 41-1463(B)(1). However, because it remains unclear on

what protected characteristic Plaintiff is asserting wrongful termination – age, race, or both

– the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claim, with leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s Motion to dismiss is granted with respect to all three claims. At the same

time, the Court “should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” FED.R.CIV.

P. 15(a)(2). The Ninth Circuit has characterized this as a standard of “extreme liberality.”

Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 972 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations marks

omitted). Given that Plaintiff may be able to allege sufficient facts with regard to her claims,

dismissal is with leave to amend. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 4) is

GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have 30 days from the date of this

Order to file an amended complaint with respect to her claims. If an amended complaint is

not timely filed on this claim by August 22, 2011, it will be terminated consistent with this

Order. Should Plaintiff choose to file an amended complaint, the Court requests that it

comply with Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1.

/ / / 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to terminate this

matter after August 22, 2011, should Plaintiff not file an amended complaint, without further

notice.

DATED this 22nd day July, 2011. 

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