Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-96-01047/USCOURTS-ca10-96-01047-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FILED 

&JaiCtd &tiCM Court ot AIJ)Jeala Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 1 8 1996 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

ROBERT L. CARPENTER, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

~ ) 

) 

JAY F. WILLIAMS, PHYLLIS HUDSON, John ) 

Does 1 through 100; DEFENSE FINANCE AND ) 

ACCOUNTING SERVICE, Cleveland Center, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

No. 96-1047 

(D.C. No. 95-S-2762) 

(D. Colorado) 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 95-S-2762) 

Robert L. Carpenter, Rohnert Park, California, prose. 

Henry L. Solano, United States Attorney, and Robert D. Clark, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Denver, Colorado, representing Defendants-Appellees. 

Before BRORBY, EBEL and HENRY, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiff Robert L. Carpenter, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals the district 

court's dismissal ofhis civil rights complaint. The district court entered its dismissal order on January 

4, 1996. On January 26, 1996, Mr. Carpenter filed a document which the district court construed 

Appellate Case: 96-1047 Document: 01019279367 Date Filed: 06/18/1996 Page: 1 
as a motion for reconsideration. Because the document was filed more than ten days after the entry 

of the dismissal order, it is properly viewed as a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Fed. R 

Civ. P. 60(b)ratherthan amotion to aher or amend the judgment pursuantto Fed. R Civ. P. 59( e). 

Hawkins v. Evans, 64 F.3d 543, 546 (lOth Cir. 1995); Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 

1243 (lOth Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 828 (1992). The district court denied the motion on 

January 29, 1996. Because Mr. Carpenter did not file his Rule 60(b) motion within ten days after the 

district comt dismissed his complaint, the time for filing notice of appeal was not tolled pending the 

district comt's disposition ofhis Rule 60(b) motion. Fed. R App. P. 4(a)(4)(F). Mr. Carpenter filed 

this notice of appeal on January 30, 1996. 1 

In Van Skiver, we held that if the appellant filed notice of appeal more than thirty days after 

the district comt entered its final decision, but less than thirty days after the district entered its order 

denying the appellant's Rule 60(b) motion, and the Rule 60(b) motion was filed more than ten days 

after the district comt entered its final decision, we will not review the district court's final decision, 

but only the order denying the Rule 60(b) motion. Van Skiver, 952 F.2d at 1243; see also Bud 

Brooks Trucking, Inc. v. Bill Hodges Trucking Co., 909 F.2d 1437, 1439 (lOth Cir. 1990); United 

States v. 31.63 Acres of Land, 840 F.2d 760,761 (lOth Cir. 1988);Morris v. Adams-Millis Corp., 

758 F.2d 1352, 1356 &n.5 (lOth Cir. 1985); V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 591 F.2d 220, 223-24 & n.8 

(1Oth Cir. 1979) (stating general rule but noting denial of Rule 60(b )( 4) motion asserting underlying 

judgment is void necessarily requires the court of appeals to review the validity of the underlying 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has detennined unanimously that oral 

argument would not materially assist the detennination of this appeal. See Fed. R App. P. 34(a); 1Oth Cir. R. 

34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

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Appellate Case: 96-1047 Document: 01019279367 Date Filed: 06/18/1996 Page: 2 
judgment). The importance of the Van Skiver rule is obvious: among other things, it prevents 

appellants from circumventing Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) and extending the thirty-day period for filing 

notice of appeal by filing a Rule 60(b) motion after the ten-day period specified in Fed. R. App. P. 

4(a)( 4Xf) has expired. In this case, however, Mr. Carpenter filed his notice of appeal within thirty 

days after the district court entered its dismissal order. Accordingly, Van Skiver is distinguishable, 

and we will review the district court's dismissal order, and not merely the order denying Mr. 

Carpenter's Rule 60(b) motion. 

Having reviewed the district court's order, we find no fauh with its conclusion Mr. Carpenter's 

complaint fell well short of the requirements ofFed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(l) (pleading shall include "a short 

and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends") and Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(2) (pleading shall include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief'). Even h"berally construed, Mr. Carpenter's complaint, like his opening brief on 

appeal, is incomprehensible. 

AFFIRMED. 

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