Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00560/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00560-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TYRONE ROGERS,

Plaintiff,

v.

G.J. GIURBINO, et al.,

Defendants.

 

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Civil No. 11cv560 IEG(RBB)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

[ECF NO. 42], ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

APPOINTMENT OF INVESTIGATOR

[ECF NO. 58], AND REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT

JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 44]

Plaintiff Tyrone Rogers, a state prisoner proceeding pro se

and in forma pauperis, initiated this action with a Complaint filed

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [ECF Nos. 1-2]. After the Complaint

and First Amended Complaint were dismissed for failing to state a

claim [ECF Nos. 4, 5, 7], Rogers filed a Second Amended Complaint

[ECF No. 8]. Plaintiff’s only surviving cause of action is against

Defendant Kuzil-Ruan for violating the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”) [ECF Nos. 8-9, 18,

33]. In his Second Amended Complaint, the operative pleading,

Plaintiff contends that Captain Kuzil-Ruan violated RLUIPA when she

locked down the “B-Yard” on three separate occasions, preventing

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Rogers from exercising religious practices mandated by his faith. 

(See generally Second Am. Compl. 3-5, 8, ECF No. 8.) On February 1

27, 2012, Defendant P. Kuzil-Ruan’s Answer to Plaintiff’s Second

Amended Complaint was filed [ECF No. 34].

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s “Ex Parte Motion to Compel

Discovery on Defendant’s Non Compliance to This Court’s Order to

Plaintiff’s Request for Interrogatories and Production of Documents

with Points and Authorities,” which was filed on April 5, 2012 [ECF

No. 42]. In his Motion to Compel, Rogers seeks further responses

from Kuzil-Ruan to his requests for production of documents and

interrogatories. (Ex Parte Mot. Compel Disc. 1-3, ECF No. 42.)2

On April 30, 2012, Defendant Kuzil-Ruan filed an Opposition to

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel, along with attachments [ECF No. 48]. 

In addition to substantive objections, Defendant claims that the

Motion should be denied because Rogers failed to satisfy the meet

and confer requirement prior to filing the Motion. (Def.’s Opp’n

Mot. Compel 3-4, ECF No. 48.) Also, Kuzil-Ruan asserts she

sufficiently supplemented her responses to Plaintiff’s requests for

production of documents and interrogatories. (Id.) Plaintiff

filed a Reply on May 9, 2012, with exhibits [ECF No. 50]. In his

Reply, Rogers claims that Defendant’s supplemental responses were

inadequate, but Plaintiff also argues that the documents produced

 Because the Second Amended Complaint is not consecutively 1

paginated, the Court will cite to it using the page numbers

assigned by the electronic case filing system (“ECF”).

 Many of the filings and attachments related to Rogers’s 2

motions are not consecutively paginated. Therefore, the Court will

cite to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel, Defendant’s Opposition, and

Rogers’s Reply using the ECF pagination. The Court will also cite

to the Motion for Default Judgment and Motion for Appointment of

Investigator using the pages numbers assigned by ECF.

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were excessive, and that Kuzil-Ruan also failed to make attempts to

meet and confer. (Pl.’s Reply 1, ECF No. 50.) 

Next, “Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Investigator

Under Rule 26" was filed nunc pro tunc to June 18, 2012 [ECF No.

58]. Rogers asks the Court to appoint an investigator to assist

him in obtaining information that is reasonably calculated to lead

to new, admissible evidence. (Pl.’s Mot. Appointment Investigator

4, ECF No. 58.) Kuzil-Ruan has not filed an opposition. 

Finally, Rogers’s Ex Parte Motion for Default Judgment was

filed nunc pro tunc to March 19, 2012 [ECF No. 44]. He urges the

Court to enter a default judgment for Defendant’s failure to

adequately respond to Plaintiff’s discovery requests. (Pl.’s Mot.

Default J. 1, 3, ECF No. 44.) The Defendant has not filed an

opposition. 

The Court finds Rogers’s Ex Parte Motion to Compel Discovery,

Motion for Appointment of an Investigator, and Motion for Default

Judgment suitable for resolution on the papers, pursuant to Civil

Local Rule 7.1. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1). The Court has

reviewed Rogers’s three Motions and exhibits, Kuzil-Ruan’s

Opposition to the Motion to Compel and attachments, as well as

Plaintiff’s Reply, including the exhibits and attachments. For the

reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Motion to Compel

Discovery is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, his Motion for

Appointment of an Investigator is DENIED, and his Motion for

Default Judgment should be DENIED.

///

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I. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The allegations in the Second Amended Complaint arise from

events that occurred while Rogers was housed at Centinela State

Prison. (Second Am. Compl. 1, ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff pleads that

Captain Kuzil-Ruan violated RLUIPA when she locked down the “BYard” three times. (Id. at 3.) The first lockdown was from May

18-28, 2010, when Defendant declared a state of emergency because

the “B-Yard medical staff . . . knowingly released scissors to the

C-Yard MTA.” (Id.) The second lockdown was from June 12-22, 2010,

when a correctional officer “lost a single bullet.” (Id.) The

third lockdown occurred from August 13-24, 2010, because of a

missing dental tool. (Id.) Rogers asserts that these lockdowns

prevented him from engaging in practices mandated by his religion

because he was unable to attend weekend fellowship, Saturday

morning bible studies, and Sunday morning prayer services. (Id. at

4.) Plaintiff insists that Defendant did not impose the prison

lockdowns to further a valid penological interest; rather, she

implemented them to reduce costs because fewer correctional staff

members were needed during the restrictions so lockdowns furthered

the three to five percent reduction plan. (Id. at 4-5.)

II. 

MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

A. Failure to Meet and Confer

In his Motion to Compel, Plaintiff notes that “counsel must

meet and confer [on] all disputed issues.” (Ex Parte Mot. Compel

Disc. 2, ECF No. 42.) Defendant argues in her Opposition that

Rogers’s Motion to Compel should be denied because he failed to

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meet and confer with defense counsel prior to bringing the Motion. 

(Def.’s Opp’n Mot. Compel 1, ECF No. 48.) Kuzil-Ruan claims that

if Plaintiff had appropriately conferred with defense counsel, she

would not have had to answer irrelevant interrogatories and

requests for production of documents bearing on the involvement of

subsequently dismissed Defendants, as she is now the only remaining

Defendant. (Id. at 3-4.) Additionally, the Defendant maintains

that conferring would have resulted in the omission or modification

of irrelevant discovery requests, and Kuzil-Ruan would have

provided responses without court intervention. (Id. at 4.)

In his Reply, Plaintiff concedes that he did not confer with

defense counsel prior to filing this Motion to Compel, but he

argues that his incarceration made it difficult for him to do so. 

(Reply 5, ECF No. 50.) Rogers contends that Kuzil-Ruan admits that

“Plaintiff is incarcerated and therefore cannot be easily

contacted.” (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff urges the Court to instruct

the Defendant to arrange meet-and-confer sessions because Plaintiff

is incarcerated and has limited opportunities to initiate

communications with defense counsel. (See id. at 6.)

Civil Local Rule 26.1 provides, “The court shall entertain no

motion pursuant to Rules 26 through 37, Fed. R. Civ. P., unless

counsel shall have previously met and conferred concerning all

disputed issues.” S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 26.1(a). Counsel for the

moving party must serve and file a certificate of compliance with

this rule when filing a discovery motion. S.D. Cal. Civ. R.

26.1(b). Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 provides

that a motion to compel discovery responses “must include a

certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or

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attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make the

disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without court

action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1). 

Rules requiring meet-and-confer efforts apply to pro se

litigants. Madsen v. Risenhoover, No. C 09-5457 SBA (PR), 2012

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90810, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 2012) (finding

that the meet-and-confer requirement applies to incarcerated

individuals, but noting that the incarcerated plaintiff may send a

letter to defendants); Walker v. Ryan, No. CV-10-1408-PHX-JWS

(LOA), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63606, at *5-6 (D. Ariz. May 7, 2012)

(denying motion to compel where unrepresented party did not include

a certification of attempts to meet and confer); see Jourdan v.

Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 109 (6th Cir. 1991) (discussing that although

courts should liberally construe pro se plaintiffs’ pleadings and

legal arguments, this liberality does not apply to compliance with

straightforward procedural requirements).

A court can deny a motion to compel solely because of a

party’s failure to meet and confer prior to filing the motion. 

Scheinuck v. Sepulveda, No. C 09-0727 WHA (PR), 2010 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 136529, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2010); see Shaw v. Cnty.

of San Diego, No. 06-CV-2680-IEG (POR), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

80508, at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2008) (denying plaintiff's motion

to compel for failing to attempt to meet and confer.) Nonetheless,

courts can still decide a motion on the merits despite a failure to

meet and confer. See Marine Group, LLC v. Marine Trvelift, Inc.,

No. 10cv846-BTM (KSC), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49064, at *6-7 (S.D.

Cal. Apr. 6, 2012) (explaining failure to meet and confer is

grounds for denying a motion, but still addressing the merits). 

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Rogers failed to meet and confer with Kuzil-Ruan's attorney

prior to filing this Ex Parte Motion to Compel Discovery. Even so,

Rogers’s incarcerated status frustrates his ability to meet and

confer. See Kunkel v. Dill, No. 1:09-cv-00686-LJO-SKO PC, 2010

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121754, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2010) (stating

that counsel must make themselves reasonably available to the

incarcerated party in person, via telephone, or via video

conference for a meet and confer.) Although Rogers could have

attempted to confer with counsel by telephone or mail, his failure

to do so, without more, does not warrant an outright denial of his

Motion to Compel. See Marine Group LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

49064, at *7. For the purposes of this Motion, the Court will

waive the meet and confer requirement. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R.

1.1(d). Nevertheless, additional motions will not be entertained

absent certification by the moving party of compliance with the

meet-and-confer requirement. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 26.1(a). 

B. Requests for Production of Documents

On November 17, 2011, Rogers served Defendant with requests

for production of documents. (Pl.’s Reply Ex. 1, at 18, ECF No.

50.) Kuzil-Ruan served objections to the requests on December 20,

2011. (Def.’s Opp’n Mot. Compel Attach. #1 Ex. 4, at 38, ECF No.

48.) On April 26, 2012, Defendant supplemented her responses to

Rogers’s document requests. (Id. at 3 (citing id. Attach. #1 Ex.

6, at 63).) Plaintiff argues that the documents produced are

insufficient and seeks a further production in response to document

requests 1, 5, 8, 9, and 10. (Pl.’s Reply 1-2, ECF No. 50.)

For all of his document requests, Plaintiff contends that the

requests seek relevant, important information that he cannot obtain

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elsewhere. (Ex Parte Mot. Compel Disc. 2, ECF No. 42.) According

to Rogers, the requested discovery will also assist him in finding

additional relevant information and witnesses. (Id. at 3.) 

In her Opposition, Captain Kuzil-Ruan asserts that she has

provided a sufficient supplemental production to Rogers’s discovery

requests directed to her. (Def.’s Opp’n Mot. Compel 4, ECF No.

48.) Defendant maintains that she has produced “109 pages of

documents,” so Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel is moot. (Id.) KuzilRuan agreed to produce documents during the period that she was

employed at Centinela; she agreed to produce, or was unable to

locate, documents for all of Rogers's document requests except one. 

(Id.)

In his Reply, Rogers asserts that the 109 pages of documents

produced by Defendant were duplicative and excessive. (Reply 2, 6,

ECF No. 50.) He pleads that Civil Local Rule 83.4(a)(2)(g)

prevents attorneys from engaging in “excessive, abusive discovery,

or delaying tactics.” (See id. at 6 (citing S.D. Cal. Civ. R.

83.4(a)(2)(g)).) Because the Defendant's production was

incomplete, Plaintiff argues that his Motion to Compel should be

granted. (Id.) 

1. Document requests 1 and 10

In request 1, Rogers “request[s] a copy of all Memorandums

dated Feb. 2010 thru June 2011 concerning rolling lockdowns and 10

day lock-downs.” (Pl.’s Reply Ex. 2, at 21, ECF No. 50.) In

document request 10, Plaintiff “requests a copy of all actual 10

day lockdown and actual one day lockdown dates documentations [sic]

that occurred on the B-Yard.” (Id. at 22.) Defendant objects that

both document requests because they seek information that is

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protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work product

doctrine. (Def.’s Opp’n Mot. Compel Attach. #1 Ex. 6, at 56, 61-

62, ECF No. 48.) Kuzil-Ruan also objects that the requests are

overbroad, unduly burdensome, and irrelevant; further, they

improperly seek material regarding institutional safety, security,

and official information. (Id.) 

With respect to document request 1, Defendant further

responded, “Subject to these objections, Defendant will produce

memorandums from February 2010 through June 2010, when Defendant

left Centinela State Prison.” (Id. Attach. #1 Ex. 6, at 56.) The

Defendant also produced five memoranda, four of which addressed the

three and five percent reduction plan and one addressed the lost

munition lockdown. (Id. at 3, 54, 56, 60, 89.) Rogers claims, in

his Reply, that Kuzil-Ruan failed to produce documents from

February 2010 to June 2011 relating to “rolling lockdowns” and tenday lockdowns. (Reply 2, 6, ECF No. 50.) 

Kuzil-Ruan asserts a multitude of formulaic objections. It is

well established that a party may obtain discovery regarding any

nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any claim or defense. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Relevant information need not be

ultimately admissible at trial so long as the discovery appears to

be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible

evidence. Id. Relevance is construed broadly to include any

matter that bears on, or reasonably could lead to other matter that

could bear on, any issue that may be in the case. See Oppenheimer

Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 350-51 (1978) (footnote

omitted) (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947)

(discussing relevance to a claim or defense, although decided under

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1978 version of Rule 26 that authorized discovery relevant to the

subject matter of the action)). Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure enables the propounding party to bring a motion to

compel responses to discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B). The

party opposing discovery bears the burden of resisting disclosure. 

Miller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D. 292, 299 (C.D. Cal. 1992). 

The memoranda Rogers seeks in document request 1 are for a

period of time greater than the term of Defendant’s employment at

Centinela. Documents from June 2010 to June 2011 are not relevant

to Plaintiff’s claim that Kuzil-Ruan prevented Rogers from

practicing his religion because of prison lockdowns imposed merely

to save institutional costs. Because the Defendant left Centinela

in June 2010, memoranda related to rolling and ten-day lockdowns

dated after this time are not relevant to the elements of Rogers's

claim. See Fleming v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, No. 2:11-cv00131-MMD-VCF, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83193, at *9 (D. Nev. June 15,

2012) (explaining that documents not known to defendant prior to

the incident were not relevant to plaintiff’s due care claim). 

There is no indication that Kuzil-Ruan had control over the

implementation of the rolling and ten-day lockdowns at a prison at

which she was no longer employed. This observation, however, does

not end the inquiry.

In her Answer to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, as

Defendant’s eleventh affirmative defense, Kuzil-Ruan alleges that

her “actions were reasonably related to advancing legitimate

penological goals.” (Answer 4, ECF No. 34.) The twenty-fifth

affirmative defense is that “[t]he actions of Defendant were

reasonable and proper based upon the circumstances or exigent

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circumstances that existed at the time.” (Id. at 6.) Her twentyeighth affirmative defense is that “[i]n enacting a policy or

choosing a course of action, Defendant employed the least

restrictive alternative available.” (Id. at 7.)

The Defendant’s affirmative defenses are sufficient to expand

the scope of discovery beyond Kuzil-Ruan's date of departure. An

analysis of other lockdowns sheds light on the reasonableness of

her conduct and whether less restrictive alternatives were

available. Consequently, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel further

responses to document request 1 for the period from February 2010

through June 2011 memoranda is GRANTED. 

As to document request 10, Kuzil-Ruan did not state that she

would produce responsive documents, but merely asserted objections. 

(See Def.’s Opp’n Mot. Compel Attach. #1 Ex. 6, at 61-62, ECF No.

48.) Although the request does not identify a relevant time

period, in his Reply, Plaintiff generally maintains that Defendant

did not provide all relevant memoranda from February 2010 to June

2011. (Reply 4, ECF No. 50.) A review of Defendant’s production

reveals that she provided Rogers with the following documents

relating to the dates of the ten-day and one-day lockdowns on the

B-Yard: eighty-one “Program Status Report Part B - Plan of

Operation/Staff & Inmate Notification” forms, eight “Program Status

Report Part C - Weekly Status/Closure” forms, and four “Program

Status Report Part A - Initial Notification” forms. (See generally

Reply Ex. 6; Attach. #1 Ex. 6, ECF No. 50.) Each of these

documents contains the date the form was filled out, the date the

action was taken, whether the lockdown affected religious services,

and when religious services would return to normal. (See id.) 

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Still, Kuzil-Ruan asserts a host of boilerplate objections, which

the Court will address in turn. 

a. Attorney-client privilege and work product

For some reason, the Defendant asserts objections based on the

attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. (Def.’s Opp’n

Mot. Compel Attach. #1 Ex. 6, at 61, ECF No. 48.) But the

Defendant’s privilege and work product objections do not provide

sufficient substance for the Court to determine whether they are

valid.

When claiming a privilege or work product objection, a party

must adequately describe the withheld material without revealing

privileged or protected information to allow the propounding party

to assess the objection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A)(ii). Merely

providing a boilerplate assertion of privilege is insufficient. 

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 408 F.3d 1142,

1147 (9th Cir. 2005). Generally, the privilege protects

confidential communications between an attorney and a client when

made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. Upjohn Co. v.

United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); see United States v.

Richey, 632 F.3d 559, 566 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v.

Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2010)). 

The work product doctrine protects documents and tangible

things from discovery if they were prepared by a party or his

attorney in anticipation of litigation. Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(b)(3)(A). “To qualify for work product protection, documents

must: (1) be ‘prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial’

and (2) be prepared ‘by or for another party or for that other

party’s representative.’” Richey, 632 F.3d at 567 (quoting In re

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Grand Jury Subpoena, 357 F.3d 900, 907 (9th Cir. 2004)). A party

must identify which documents were prepared in anticipation of

litigation. United States v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d

1065, 1080-84 (N.D. Cal. 2002).

Although Defendant Kuzil-Ruan makes both objections in

response to document request 10, she provides nothing more than a

blanket assertion. It is unclear what “B-Yard” lockdown documents

qualify as attorney-client communications or attorney work product,

or how a particular document comes within either description. See

United States v. Martin, 278 F.3d 988, 1000 (9th Cir. 2002)

(explaining that to assert the attorney-client privilege, a party

must “identify specific communications and the grounds . . . as to

each piece of evidence over which privilege is asserted[]”); see

Marti v. Baires, No. 1:08-cv-00653-AWI-SKO PC, 2012 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 77962, at *16-17 (E.D. Cal. June 5, 2012) (overruling

defendant’s work product doctrine objection because the assertion

was unsupported). Similarly, these boilerplate objections are

overruled.

b. Institutional safety and security

The Defendant also objects to document request 10 because it

seeks information that will compromise prison safety. (Def.’s

Opp’n Mot. Compel Attach. #1 Ex. 6, at 61, ECF No. 48.) When

discoverable information may give rise to institutional safety and

security concerns, courts balance the need for the information and

the extent the information compromises security to determine

whether disclosure is warranted. See Marti, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

77962, at *5-6. A conclusory objection based on institutional

security, however, is insufficient. See Goolsby v. Carrasco, No.

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1:09-cv-01650 JLT (PC), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71627, at *17-18

(E.D. Cal. July 5, 2011). 

Defendant Kuzil-Ruan objects that producing these documents

will compromise institutional security but does not explain how. 

(Def.’s Opp’n Mot. Compel Attach. #1 Ex. 6, at 61-62, ECF No. 48.) 

There is nothing to show that producing particular documents

pertaining to lockdowns affects safety and security. Cf. Walker v.

Ryan, No. CV-10-1408-PHX-JWS (LOA), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63606, at

*8-9 (D. Ariz. May 7, 2012) (finding that providing details about

how prison gang members are identified and how gang intelligence is

analyzed and collected would compromise prison security); see also

Ibanez v. Miller, No. CIV S-06-2668 JAM EFB P, 2009 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 98394, at *7-9 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2009) (reviewing the

associate warden's declaration and concluding that disclosing

details about how prison officials respond to prison alarms would

compromise prison safety). Defendant’s conclusory objection is

overruled.

c. Official information privilege

Next, Kuzil-Ruan protests that document request 10 seeks

information that is protected by the official information

privilege. (Def.’s Opp’n Mot. Compel Attach. #1 Ex. 6, at 61, ECF

No. 48.) The Ninth Circuit has recognized a qualified privilege

for official information. Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist.

of Cal., 511 F.2d 192, 198 (9th Cir. 1975). A “court must balance

the government’s interest in protecting official information from

disclosure against the plaintiff’s need for the information.” 

Edwards v. Cnty. of L.A., No. CV 08-07428 GAF(SSx), 2009 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 114577, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2009). This balancing test

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is “moderately pre-weighted in favor of disclosure” in civil rights

cases. Kelly v. San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 661 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 

Before the court engages in this balancing, the party seeking

to invoke the privilege must make a “substantial threshold

showing.” Buchanan v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, No. 2:11-cv00271-RCJ-GWF, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85144, at *3 (D. Nev. June 20,

2012) (quoting Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at 661). Specifically, the

withholding party must submit a declaration from a department head

who controls the records that includes the following:

(1) an affirmation that the agency generated or collected

the material at issue and has maintained its

confidentiality; (2) a statement that the official has

personally reviewed the material in question; (3) a

specific identification of the governmental or privacy

interests that would be threatened by disclosure of the

material to plaintiff and/or his lawyer; (4) a

description of how disclosure subject to a carefully

crafted protective order would create substantial risk of

harm to significant governmental interests if disclosure

were made.

Edwards, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114577, at *7-8. If the

nondisclosing party does not meet this initial burden, the court

will order disclosure of the documents; if the party meets this

burden, the court generally conducts an in camera review of the

material and balances each party's interests. Soto v. City of

Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 613 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at

671. 

Here, Defendant Kuzil-Ruan has not made the requisite showing

to assert the official information privilege because she has not

submitted a declaration with sufficient information to warrant a

balancing of competing interests. See Edwards, 2009 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 114577, at *8-9. Nor has Defendant demonstrated why lockdown

documentation constitutes official information. See id. at *10

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(finding insufficient information to apply the balancing test in

the stipulation for in camera review and proposed order); see also

Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at 672 (stating that generalized claims of harm

are insufficient to satisfy the objecting party's burden). KuzilRuan’s official information privilege objection is also overruled. 

d. Relevance, overbreadth, and burdensomeness

Defendant also objects to request for production of documents

10 because it is overbroad, burdensome, and irrelevant. Rogers

contends that his request is relevant. (Ex Parte Mot. Compel Disc.

2, ECF No. 42.) 

Plaintiff seeks documentation showing the dates of the ten-day

and one-day lockdowns of the “B-Yard.” (See Reply Ex. 2, at 22,

ECF No. 50.) This information is relevant to Rogers’s claim that

the lockdowns interfered with the exercise of his religious

beliefs. Furthermore, Defendant makes no showing that the request

is irrelevant. See Painters Joint Comm. v. Emp. Painters Trust

Health & Welfare Fund, No. 2:10-cv-01385-JCM-PAL, 2011 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 113278, at *16 (D. Nev. Sept. 29, 2011) (indicating that the

party opposing the discovery bears the burden of showing that a

request is not relevant by specifically detailing the reasons). 

Defendant’s relevance objection is overruled.

As for overbreadth, however, Rogers’s request is open-ended

and seeks documents that are beyond the relevant range of events,

making his request too broad. See Perez v. Cate, No. C 10-3730 JSW

(PR), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49706, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2012)

(finding that a request seeking all “work histories of past suits,

reprimands for misbehavior and misuse of force” was too broad). As

drafted, Plaintiff seeks documents for every ten-day and one-day

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lockdown that has ever occurred in the “B-yard” at Centinela State

Prison. See Manriquez v. Huchins, No. 1:09-cv-00456-OWW-SMS PC,

2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82350, at *15-19 (E.D. Cal. July 27, 2011)

(finding that document request seeking cell extractions for all

inmates on a specified date was overbroad and limiting the scope to

the cell extraction of the plaintiff). Kuzil-Ruan’s overbreadth

objection is sustained in part. Rogers’s request is limited to

documents for lockdown dates from February 2010, when Plaintiff

alleges the lockdowns began, to June 2011. 

Finally, there is no indication that document request 10 is

unduly burdensome. Johns v. Bayer Corp., No. 09-cv-1935-AJB(DHB),

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60121, at *10 n.4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2012)

(noting that defendant did not provide evidence as to how

responding to Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice was unduly

burdensome); see Pham v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-01148-

KJD-GWF, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130038, at *14-15 (D. Nev. Nov. 9,

2011) (finding that a document request requiring “just over 56

hours” to review and locate responsive information was not an undue

burden). Defendant Kuzil-Ruan's undue burden objection is

overruled. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel further responses to

document request 10 is GRANTED in part. Defendant is to supplement

her production by providing Rogers with documents concerning tenday and one-day lockdowns from February 2010 to June 2011. 

Although it appears that some of the documents already produced may

be responsive, neither Kuzil-Ruan’s response to document request 10

nor her Opposition indicates whether all the documents pertaining

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to this specific request have been produced. Plaintiff is entitled

to all responsive documents for this time period.

2. Document requests 5, 8, and 9

Document request 5 states, “Plaintiff request[s] a copy of the

result from the June 12, 2010, loss of the single bullet in

Building 1 on the B-Yard.” (Reply Ex. 2, at 21, ECF No. 50.) 

Next, in request for production 8, Rogers seeks “a copy of the

actual name of the MTA on May 28, 2010, whom lent the scissor [sic]

to the named MTA on the C-Yard.” (Id. at 22.) Document request 9

reads, “Plaintiff request[s] a copy of the actual name of the

dental staff on Aug. 24, 2010, who lost the dental tool.” (Id.) 

Kuzil-Ruan objects to these document requests on attorneyclient privilege and work product grounds. (Def.’s Opp’n Mot.

Compel Attach. #1 Ex. 6, at 58, 60-61, ECF No. 48.) Also, the

requests are overbroad, burdensome, irrelevant, and improperly seek

information regarding institutional safety and security as well as

official information based on federal and state law. (Id.) The

Defendant further maintains that the document requests invade her

right to privacy under California Penal Code §§ 832.7 and 832.8. 

(Id.) In her supplemental responses to requests 8 and 9, Defendant

stated, “After a diligent search, Defendant confirms that no such

documents exists. Defendant will produce the status report

authorizing the lockdown as a result of a missing [pair of

scissors][,]” (id. at 60), and “missing dental tool,” (id. at 61).

a. Document request 5

In his Motion to Compel, Rogers insists that his discovery

requests are relevant and that the information is unavailable

elsewhere. (Ex Parte Mot. Compel Disc. 2, ECF No. 42.) Defendant

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Kuzil-Ruan states that she has produced 109 pages of responsive

documents. (See Def.’s Opp’n Mot. Compel 4, ECF No. 48

(“[Defendant] also produced 109 pages of documents related to the

lockdowns and the three to five percent budget cuts CDCR faced

statewide.”).) Rogers complains that the documents produced for

request 5 are insufficient because they do not provide the names of

the individuals who were in “Building One’s tower” when the single

bullet was lost. (Reply 4, ECF No. 50.) 

As discussed previously, subject to her objections, Defendant

produced eighty-one “Program Status Report Part B - Plan of

Operation/Staff & Inmate Notification” forms, eight “Program Status

Report Part C - Weekly Status/Closure” forms, and four “Program

Status Report Part A - Initial Notification” forms. (See generally

Reply Ex. 6, ECF No. 50.) These documents describe the

restrictions imposed on inmates during the lockdowns, why the

lockdowns were implemented, and the events giving rise to the

lockdowns. (Id.)

The documents produced are responsive to Plaintiff’s document

request 5, as drafted. See McGinnis v. Atkinson, No. 1:11-cv-01337

LJO JLT (PC), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74069, at *8 (E.D. Cal. May 29,

2012) (denying motion to compel where the documents produced were

responsive). Rogers seeks documents showing the “result” of the

lost bullet, not the names of the individuals who were involved. 

(See Def.'s Opp'n Mot. Compel Attach. #1 Ex. 2, at 20-21, ECF No.

48.) The produced documents concern the events surrounding the

lost bullet. (See id. Ex. 6, at 83-84, 86, 88, 90-95; id. Attach.

#1 Ex. 6, at 1-6, 9-14.) The documents indicate when the bullet

was lost, what actions were taken to find it, and what restrictions

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were placed on inmates during the search. (Id.) The documents

produced are responsive, although they do not identify any

correctional staff by name. Presumably, Defendant has produced all

responsive documents. Consequently, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel a

further response to document request 5 is DENIED.

b. Document requests 8 and 9

Again, the Defendant generally argues that she has produced

109 pages of responsive documents, but Rogers claims that the

quantity is excessive and the documents actually relate to the same

dates. (See Def.’s Opp’n Mot. Compel 3-4, ECF No. 48; Pl.’s Reply

3, ECF No. 50.) Plaintiff also asserts that the documents produced

are insufficient because they do not reveal the names of the

medical staff working on May 16, 2010, or the dental staff working

on August 17, 2010, as requested. (Pl.’s Reply 4, ECF No. 50.) 

Requests 8 and 9 seek documents identifying staff by name. 

The Defendant responds to both requests, stating that no such

documents exist. (Def.’s Opp ’n Mot. Compel Attach. #1 Ex. 6, at

60-61, ECF No. 48.) Defendant has produced a status report in

response to request 8 and a progress report in response to request

9. (See id.) The 109 pages of produced documents do not include

the names of the staff who lent and received the scissors on May

28, 2010. The produced documents also do not show the names of the

dental staff who lost the dental tool on August 24, 2010. KuzilRuan has asserted multiple objections and has not produced

documents that identify individuals and are responsive to document

requests 8 and 9. As a result, the Court must address her

objections.

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i. Relevance

The Defendant objects that the information in requests 8 and 9

is not relevant. (Id.) Plaintiff asks Defendant to produce

records reflecting the names of the individuals who lent the

scissors, received the scissors, and lost the dental tool. This

information is relevant to Rogers’s RLUIPA claim against Kuzil-Ruan

because these individuals could provide insight into whether the

lockdowns were imposed to perpetuate the reduction plan or were a

valid response to losing medical scissors and a dental tool. 

Further, Defendant’s blanket assertion that the requests are

irrelevant is insufficient. See Painters Joint Comm., 2011 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 113278, at *16-17. This objection is overruled. 

ii. Other objections

Kuzil-Ruan also objects that the information Rogers seeks is

protected by the attorney-client privilege and constitutes work

product and that the requests are overbroad and burdensome; she

also argues that the requested information will compromise prison

safety. (Def.’s Opp’n Mot. Compel Attach. #1 Ex. 6, at 60-61, ECF

No. 48.) As discussed above, these blanket objections are

unavailing. See Marti, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77962, at *50

(stating that boilerplate objections are insufficient). 

The Defendant has not demonstrated how documents containing

the names of the individuals involved with the lost items that led

to the lockdowns constitutes a protected attorney-client

communication or work product. See Richey, 632 F.3d at 566-67; Moe

v. Sys. Transp., Inc., 270 F.R.D. 613, 625 (D. Mont. 2010) (“The

party resisting discovery . . . on the grounds of the work product

doctrine . . . bears the burden of establishing the right to

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withhold the documents.” ). Kuzil-Ruan also has not explained how

the requests are overbroad or unduly burdensome. See Painters

Joint Comm., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113278, at *16. Finally, a case

has not been made that providing documents identifying the

individuals involved will compromise prison safety. See Marti,

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77962, at *18-19 (overruling a boilerplate

objection because there was no legitimate basis for it).

Therefore, Kuzil-Ruan’s privilege, work product, overbreadth,

burdensome, and prison safety objections are overruled.

iii. Official information and privacy

Next, Defendant protests in a conclusory fashion that requests

8 and 9 seek information protected by the official information

privilege under California Penal Code §§ 832.7 and 832.8. (Def.’s

Opp’n Mot. Compel Attach. #1 Ex. 6, at 60-61, ECF No. 48.) Also,

the requests invade the Defendant’s privacy rights. (Id.) 

Although Kuzil-Ruan relies on state privilege law in her

objections, federal law dictates whether a privilege applies in §

1983 cases. See Heilman v. Vojkufka, No. CIV S-08-2788 KJM EFB P,

2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26004, at *47 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2011)

(citing Agster v. Maricopa Cnty., 422 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir.

2005)); see also Hampton v. City of San Diego, 147 F.R.D. 227, 228,

230 (S.D. Cal. 1993) (explaining that in civil rights cases

questions of privilege are governed by federal law); Miller v.

Pancucci, 141 F.R.D. at 297-300 (discussing conflict between

California and federal evidence and concluding that courts use

federal law when resolving claims of official government

information). Courts determine whether the information should be

disclosed in light of the competing interests, even though the test

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is slightly weighted in favor of disclosure in civil rights cases. 

See Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at 661, 663. Nevertheless, as a threshold

matter, the party claiming the privilege must provide the court

with a declaration sufficient to conduct the balancing test and

determine whether the privilege applies. See Edwards, 2009 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 114577, at *7-8. 

Defendant failed to comply with the requirements for asserting

the official information privilege. See Robinson v. Adams, No.

1:08-cv-01380-AWI-BAM PC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41165, at *6-8

(E.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012) (explaining that the court did not abuse

its discretion when it ordered production of documents, subject to

an in camera review, and overruled defendant’s information

privilege objection for failure to follow procedural requirements). 

The Court has insufficient information to conduct a meaningful

balancing of documents claimed to be privileged official

information. See Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 613. This objection is

overruled.

As for privacy, federal courts recognize “a constitutionallybased right of privacy that can be raised in response to discovery

requests.” Guthrey v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., No. 1: 10-cv02177-AWI-BAM, 2012 U.S. 89174, at *27 (E.D. Cal. June 27, 2012)

(citation omitted). The right to privacy is not absolute and can

be outweighed; courts generally balance the need for the

information against the severity of the invasion of privacy. See

Ragee v. MCA/Universal, 165 F.R.D. 601, 604-05 (C.D. Cal. 1995)

(finding that disclosing employment records is not “unusual or

unexpected”). Disclosure must be narrowly construed to limit the

invasion “‘to the extent necessary for a fair resolution of the law

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suit.’” Id. at 605 (quoting Cook v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 132

F.R.D. 548, 552 (E.D. Cal. 1990)).

Rogers’s need for information outweighs the severity of the

invasion. The objection appears to be premised on Defendant’s

privacy, not staff members’ privacy rights. Nevertheless, document

requests 8 and 9 will not result in an invasion of privacy, of the

Defendant or correctional staff.

iv. Documents do not exist

Lastly, the Defendant represents that no documents exist that

are responsive to requests 8 and 9. (Def.’s Opp’n Mot. Compel.

Attach. #1 Ex. 6, at 60-61, ECF No. 48.) Rogers contends that

despite Kuzil-Ruan’s supplemental response, she failed to “produce

the names of the medical staff and correction officers involved

with the loss of medical scissors [on] May 16, 2010. . . . [and]

the name of the dental staff who lost a dental tool, [on] Aug. 17,

2010.” (Reply 4, ECF No. 50.)

A party is deemed to have control over documents if he or she

has a legal right to obtain them. See Clark v. Vega Wholesale,

Inc., 181 F.R.D. 470, 472 (D. Nev. 1998); see also 7 James Wm.

Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice, § 34.14[2][b], at 34-73 to

34-75 (3d ed. 2012) (footnote omitted) (“The term ‘control’ is

broadly construed.”). A party responding to a document request

“‘cannot furnish only that information within his immediate

knowledge or possession; he is under an affirmative duty to seek

that information reasonably available to him from his employees,

agents, or others subject to his control.’” Meeks v. Parsons, No.

1:03-cv-6700-LJO-GSA, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90283, at *11-12 (E.D.

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Cal. Sept. 18, 2009) (quoting Gray v. Faulkner, 148 F.R.D. 220, 223

(N.D. Ind. 1992)). 

A party must make a reasonable inquiry to determine whether

responsive documents exist, and if they do not, the “party should

so state with sufficient specificity to allow the Court to

determine whether the party made a reasonable inquiry and exercised

due diligence.” Marti, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77962, at *49-50

(citing Uribe v. McKesson, No. 08cv1285 DMS (NLS), 2010 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 35359, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2010)). A party, however,

is not required to create a document where none exists. Goolsby v.

Carrasco, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71627, at *20-21 (finding that a

document request that would require the defendant to create a

roster of all employees who supervised the prison cage yard is not

a proper request under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(a));

Robinson v. Adams, No. 1:08-cv-01380-AWI-SMS PC, 2011 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 60370, at *53 (E.D. Cal. May 27, 2011) (ruling that defendant

is not required to create a document in response to a request for

production). 

Here, Defendant asserts that she conducted a diligent search

and confirmed that there are no documents responsive to requests 8

and 9. (Def.’s Opp’n Mot. Compel Attach. #1 Ex. 6, at 60-61, ECF

No. 48.) Defendant must do more than merely assert that the search

was conducted with due diligence; rather, she must briefly describe

the search to allow the Court to determine whether it was

reasonable. See Marti, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77962, at *49-50. 

Plaintiff similarly failed to meet his burden of showing that

Defendant actually controls the documents. See Int’l Petroleum &

Indus. Workers, 870 F.2d at 1452. Nevertheless, responsive

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documents are likely to exist; prisons generally maintain employee

records that contain the employee’s name, the employee’s schedule,

where they worked, and when they worked. See Meeks, 2009 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 90283, at *11. 

When a party responds to a document request with an answer as

opposed to production or an objection, the party must answer under

oath. 7 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice, §

34.13[2][a], at 34-57 (footnote omitted); see id. § 34.14[2][a], at

34-73 (footnote omitted). If Defendant Kuzil-Ruan’s maintains that

there is no relevant material in her control, she must state so

under oath. See Vazquez-Fernandez v. Cambridge Coll., Inc., 269

F.R.D. 150, 155 (D. P.R. 2010). Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel a

further response to requests 8 and 9 is GRANTED.

C. Interrogatories

On November 17, 2011, Rogers served Defendant with a set of

interrogatories. (Pl.’s Reply Ex. 1, at 18, ECF No. 50.) KuzilRuan served her objections to the interrogatories on December 20,

2011. (Def.’s Opp’n Mot. Compel Attach. #1 Ex. 3, at 27, ECF No.

48.) On April 26, 2012, Defendant supplemented her responses to

Rogers’s interrogatories. (Id. at 3 (citing id. Attach. #1 Ex. 5,

at 53).) Plaintiff argues that Kuzil-Ruan has failed to answer

interrogatories 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18. (Pl.’s Reply 1-2, ECF

No. 50.) 

1. Interrogatories 13, 14, and 15

Interrogatory 13 reads:

If the answer to interrogatory 12 is yes, did you

authorize any rolling lockdowns or/and three series of

ten day lockdowns (May 18-28, 2010; June 12-22, 2010;

[and] Aug. 13-24, 2010) to substantiate regulation pasted

[sic] down by Warden Uribe and Director G.J. Giurbino

which involved the 3% to 5% Staff Reduction Plan?

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(Id. Ex. 1, at 16.) Interrogatory 12 asked whether Kuzil-Ruan was

captain of the B-yard between March 2010 and June 2011. (Id.) 

Interrogatory 14 states, “If the answer to interrogatory 13 is no,

what was your purpose for authorizing the rolling lockdowns or/and

three series of ten day lock-downs between the months of March 2010

thru June 2011?” (Id.) Finally, interrogatory 15 reads, “If the

answer to interrogatory 12 is yes, did any rolling lockdowns and

any three series of ten day lockdowns affect Plaintiff Rogers,

Tyrone or any other protestant inmates from attending any type of

B-Yard Chapel service or schooling?” (Id.) 

Defendant objects to interrogatories 13, 14, and 15 because

they seek information that is protected by the attorney-client

privilege and the work product doctrine. (Def.’s Opp’n Mot. Compel

Attach. #1 Ex. 5, at 47-48, ECF No. 48.) Kuzil-Ruan also objects

that the interrogatories are overbroad, burdensome, irrelevant, and

improperly seeks information regarding institutional safety and

security as well as official information. (Id.) Additionally, she

objects that request 14 is “vague in that Defendant did not

authorize the lockdowns.” (Id.) In her supplemental responses,

Defendant answered, “No” to interrogatory 13, and in response to

interrogatory 14, she stated that “Defendant P. Kuzil-Ruan did not

authorize the lockdowns.” (Id.) 

a. Interrogatories 13 and 14

Captain Kuzil-Ruan asserts that, as the only remaining

Defendant, she has provided sufficient supplemental responses to

answer the interrogatories applicable to her. (Def.’s Opp’n Mot.

Compel 4, ECF No. 48.) In his Reply, Plaintiff counters that

Captain Kuzil-Ruan failed to fully respond to the interrogatories. 

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(Reply 2, 5, ECF No. 50.) He urges that this hinders his ability

to obtain material evidence that is unavailable elsewhere, locate

additional witnesses, and correct information already exchanged. 

(Id.) 

Defendant’s answers to interrogatories 13 and 14 are

responsive. She states that she did not authorize any lockdowns

that involved the staff reduction plan; in fact, she submits that

she did not authorize any lockdowns. See Allianz Ins. Co., v.

Surface Specialties, Inc., No. 03-2470-CM-DJW, 2005 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 301, at *22-23 (D. Kan. Jan. 7, 2005) (finding the answer,

no, was responsive to an interrogatory asking if plaintiff received

any “statements” from defendant or others identified in the

interrogatory). For interrogatory 13, Kuzil-Ruan answers that she

did not authorize the lockdowns. For interrogatory 14, because

Kuzil-Ruan answers that she did not authorize the lockdowns, she

was not responsible for the decision. Therefore, Plaintiff’s

Motion to Compel further responses to interrogatories 13 and 14 is

DENIED.

b. Interrogatory 15

In her supplemental response to interrogatory 15, Defendant

stated: 

Defendant cannot respond without knowing the dates on

which Plaintiff was allegedly prevented from attending

services. Generally, a lockdown will prevent inmates

from attending non-critical programs, such as religious

services outside their cell, on the day of the lockdown. 

The prison staff would make every effort to reschedule

any group religious services that inmates missed as a

result of a lockdown.

(Def.’s Opp’n Mot. Compel Attach. #1 Ex. 5, at 49, ECF No. 48.)

Indeed, interrogatory 15 does not provide Kuzil-Ruan with any

specific lockdown dates. (See Reply Ex. 1, at 16.) Nevertheless,

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when viewed in the context of the other interrogatories and

Plaintiff’s definition of “incident,” a reasonable interpretation

of interrogatory 15 would include lockdowns that occurred during

the relevant period, which is February 2010 to June 2011. (See id.

at 14-17); Jourdan, 951 F.2d at 109 (explaining that courts should

liberally construe pro se plaintiffs’ arguments). The Defendant’s

supplemental response, then, is incomplete. Absent a valid

objection to interrogatory 15, Rogers is entitled to this

information.

i. Relevance

Kuzil-Ruan again asserts a boilerplate relevance objection. 

(Def.’s Opp’n Mot. Compel Attach. #1 Ex. 5, at 49, ECF No. 48.) 

Interrogatory 15 seeks relevant information relating to whether the

lockdowns affected Plaintiff's religious practice. From this

information, Plaintiff can attempt to determine the reasons for,

and effects of, the lockdowns on those specific dates. See Avila

v. Cate, No. 1:09-cv-00918-SKO PC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34529, at

*8 n.3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2011) (requiring defendant to produce

all documents relating to lockdown of Hispanic inmates over a

thirteen month period). As applied to Rogers’s claim that the

lockdowns interfered with his religious practices, Kuzil-Ruan’s

relevance objection is overruled.

ii. Attorney-client privilege and work product 

Defendant protests that interrogatory 15 seeks information

protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work product

doctrine. (Def.’s Opp’n Mot. Compel Attach. #1 Ex. 5, at 49, ECF

No. 48.) Plaintiff argues that Kuzil-Ruan does not provide the

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Court with sufficient information to determine whether these

objections are valid. (Ex Parte Mot. Compel 2, ECF No. 42.) 

As discussed, general boilerplate objections are insufficient

to assert attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine

objections. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., 408 F.3d at 1147. A

party asserting the attorney-client privilege must identify

specific communications and the basis for each claim of privilege. 

See United States v. Salyer, No. CR. 10-0061 LKK, 2012 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 18649, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2012) (citing United States

v. Martin, 278 F.3d 988, 1000 (9th Cir. 2002)). Additionally, to

assert the work product doctrine, a party must establish that the

information or documents it seeks to withhold were prepared in

anticipation of litigation. Chevron Texaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d

at 1080-81. Captain Kuzil-Ruan’s objections are insufficient and

are overruled. 

iii. Burdensomeness, overbreadth, and prison safety

An objecting party must make some showing that the

interrogatory is unduly burdensome or overly board. See Hall v.

Tehrani, No. C 09-0057 RMW (PR), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83284, at *3

(N.D. Cal. July 29, 2011). Kuzil-Ruan’s objections on these

grounds are overruled. 

To assert that institutional safety would be compromised by

answering the interrogatory, the Defendant must provide more than a

vague boilerplate objection. See Goolsby, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

71627, at *17-18. An objecting party must follow the procedural

requirements to assert the official information privilege. See

Williams, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122970, at *24-26 (explaining that

objections based on official information privilege must be made by

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the warden, assistant warden, or appropriately delegated prison

official who personally considers the material requested and

explains why it is privileged). Defendant’s institutional safety

objection fails.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel a further response to

interrogatory 15 is GRANTED.

2. Interrogatories 16, 17, and 18

In interrogatory 16, Plaintiff asks, “If the answer to

interrogatories 1, 6, [and] 12 are yes, were any of the rolling

lockdowns or/and three series of ten day lockdowns substantiated by

a legal penological interest?” (Reply Ex. 1, at 16, ECF No. 50.) 

Interrogatory 17 reads, “If the answer to interrogatory 16 is yes

or no, what were the penological interests CDCR Codes or Penal

Codes used to authorize the rolling lockdowns or/and three series

of ten day lockdowns between the months of March 2010 thru June

2011?” (Id. at 17.) In interrogatory 18, Rogers states, “If the

answer[s] to interrogatories 1, 6, [and] 12 are yes, is the use of

the 3% to 5% Staff Reduction Plan to reduce California financial

deficit a part of any known legal penological interest to lockdown

Plaintiff Tyrone Rogers or any other inmate at CEN?” (Id.) 

Kuzil-Ruan objected to all three interrogatories on the ground

they seek information protected by the attorney-client privilege

and work product doctrine. (Def.’s Opp’n Mot. Compel Attach. #1

Ex. 5, at 49-51, ECF No. 48.) She also contends that the

interrogatories are overbroad, burdensome, irrelevant, and they

request information regarding institutional safety and security, as

well as official information. (Id.) The Defendant objected that

the interrogatories are vague because “the answer to Interrogatory

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1 and 6 is no, while the response to Interrogatory 12 is yes, but

only to a portion of the time, making the contention portion of the

interrogatory inapplicable.” (Id.)

Rogers claims that the requested discovery will assist him in

finding additional relevant information and additional witnesses. 

(Ex Parte Mot. Compel 3, ECF No. 42.) Kuzil-Ruan asserts as the

only remaining Defendant, she has provided sufficient supplemental

responses to Plaintiff’s discovery requests; she answered all the

interrogatories that were applicable to her. (Def.’s Opp’n Mot.

Compel 4, ECF No. 48.) In her supplemental response, Kuzil-Ruan

answered interrogatories 16, 17, and 18: “Not Applicable.” (Id.

Attach. #1 Ex. 5, at 49-51.)

a. Relevance

Interrogatories 16, 17, and 18 seek relevant facts, as all

three request information about Defendant’s asserted compelling

governmental interest in locking down the “B-Yard.” Question 16

asks the Defendant to identify the compelling interests; 17 asks

what laws or regulations the Defendant relied on when authorizing

the lockdowns, and 18 asks whether a lockdown based on the “3% to

5% Staff Reduction Plan” is a legitimate penological interest. 

(See Reply Ex. 1, at 16-17, ECF No. 50.) Whether a penological

interest is compelling is an integral component of a RLUIPA claim. 

The Defendant’s relevance objections to interrogatories 16, 17, and

18 are overruled.

b. Attorney-client privilege and work product 

Although Kuzil-Ruan must assert the particular basis for her

attorney-client privilege objection, she fails to do so. See

Salyer, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18649, at *9. Defendant also does

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not specify what information was generated in anticipation of

litigation to constitute work product. See Chevron Texaco Corp.,

241 F. Supp. 2d at 1080-81. These objections are overruled.

c. Other objections

Next, Kuzil-Ruan argues that the interrogatories are

overbroad, burdensome, improperly seek information about prison

safety and official information. (Def.’s Opp’n Mot. Compel Attach.

#1 Ex. 5, at 49-51, ECF No. 48.) Again, the Defendant does not

establish how interrogatories 16, 17, and 18 are burdensome or

overbroad. See Tehrani, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83284, at *3. Nor

does she satisfy the threshold requirement for asserting a prison

safety objection. Goolsby, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71627, at *17-18

(explaining that vague institutional security objections are

insufficient). There is no indication that the interrogatories

request information that would compromise safety; they merely seek

information relating to whether these were legitimate penological

justifications for instituting the lockdowns. Additionally,

Defendant does not comply with the procedural requirements for

asserting the official information privilege - she offers no

explanation as to what requested information is privileged or how

the privilege applies. See Rackliffe, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57973,

at *10. The institutional safety, burden, overbreadth, and

official information objections are overruled.

d. Vagueness

Finally, Defendant objects that interrogatories 16, 17, and 18

are vague. (Def.’s Opp’n Mot. Compel Attach. #1 Ex. 5, at 49-51,

ECF No. 50.) In particular, the claimed vagueness renders the

contention portions of the interrogatories inapplicable because

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they rely on interrogatories 1, 6, and 12. (Id.) Interrogatory 1

states, “During March 2010, were you G.J. Giurbine the Director of

the Division of Adult Operations for California’s prison system?”

(Def.’s Opp’n Mot. Compel Attach. #1 Ex. 5, at 41, ECF No. 48.) 

Rogers asks in interrogatory 6, “During March 2010, thru June 2011,

were you Uribe Domingo, Jr. the warden of Centinela State Prison

(CEN)?” (Id. at 43.) Interrogatory 12 asks, “During March 2010,

thru June 2011, were you defendant Cpt. Paul[a] Kuzil-Ruan captain

of the B-Yard?” (Id. at 46.) In her supplemental response, KuzilRuan answered “No” to interrogatories 1 and 6, but answered

interrogatory 12, stating that “Defendant was not the captain of

the B Yard during the entire period, but was for a portion of the

period.” (Id. at 41, 43, 46-47.) 

The party claiming that an interrogatory is vague has the

burden of demonstrating its vagueness. Swackhammer v. Sprint

Corp., 225 F.R.D. 658, 662 (D. Kan. 2004) (footnote omitted). The

responding party should exercise “common sense” and attribute

ordinary definitions to terms in discovery requests. Id. (footnote

omitted). Here, Defendant’s explanation is insufficient to show

that interrogatories 16, 17, and 18 are vague. Although Giurbino

and Domingo are no longer parties to this lawsuit, Kuzil-Ruan

responded to interrogatory 12; she should exercise common sense and

answer the interrogatories. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(2) (stating

that parties may not object because an interrogatory seeks an

opinion or contention that relates to facts or the application of

law to facts). Interrogatories 1, 6, and 12 do not add conditional

information; they merely limit the questions to three of the four

Defendants named in the suit. (See Second Am. Compl. 1, ECF No.

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8.) The subsequent dismissal of Giurbino and Uribe but does not

make these interrogatories vague. Kuzil-Ruan’s vagueness

objections are also overruled.

The Defendant has not provided responsive answers to

interrogatories 16, 17, and 18; she has merely stated the questions

are not applicable. Kuzil-Ruan also has failed to make valid

objections to the interrogatories. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel

further responses to interrogatories 16, 17, and 18 is therefore

GRANTED. 

III. 

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF INVESTIGATOR

Finally, in “Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of

Investigator Under Rule 26 [ECF No. 56],” Rogers contends that

Defendant Kuzil-Ruan was required to provide initial disclosures

and the discovery he now seeks. (Mot. Appointment Investigator 3,

ECF No. 58.) Plaintiff maintains that he needs an investigator to

compel proper responses from Defendant. (Id. at 4.) Specifically,

an investigator will help Rogers pursue information that will

prevent him from having to survive summary judgment motions. (Id.) 

To date, Defendant Kuzil-Ruan has not filed an opposition to

Rogers’s request. The Court will consider the merits of

Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of an Investigator despite

Defendant’s failure to oppose the request. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R.

7.1(f)(c)(3). 

A court may only authorize the use of public funds for

indigent litigants when authorized by Congress. Graves-Bey v.

Hedgepeth, No. 1:08-cv-01718-LJO-GSA PC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

109881, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2009) (citing Tedder v. Odel, 890

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F.2d 210, 211-12 (9th Cir. 1989)). The in forma pauperis statute

does not authorize federal courts to spend public funds on

investigators. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915 (West 2006); see also

Graves-Bey, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109881, at *2 (finding the in

forma pauperis statute does not authorize expenses for

investigators).

Rogers does not refer to any statute or case that allows a

court to appoint an investigator for an indigent pro se plaintiff

in a § 1983 case. See Strain v. Sandham, No. CIV S-05-0474 GEB GGH

P, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84688, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2007)

(denying plaintiff’s motion for appointment of investigator because

the statute does not authorize that expense). Plaintiff’s Motion

for Appointment of Investigator [ECF No. 58] is DENIED.

IV. 

MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Also before the Court is the following Motion: “Plaintiff

move[s] for Default Judgment on Defendant’s Non Compliance to

Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents and Interrogatories

Pursuant to Rule 55.1” [ECF No. 44]. The Court construes this as a

Motion for Default Judgment. To date, Defendant Kuzil-Ruan has not

opposed this Motion. Although the failure to oppose a motion may

constitute consent to granting it, the Court will consider the

merits of Rogers’s Motion for Default Judgment. S.D. Cal. Civ. R.

7.1(f)(3)(c).

Rogers argues that he is entitled to a default judgment

because Kuzil-Ruan failed to produce discovery, in violation of

Civil Local Rule 55.1. (Mot. Default J. 1, 3, ECF No. 44.) He

explains that rule 55.1 requires courts to issue an order to show

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cause why the complaint should not be dismissed if a plaintiff

“fails to move for default judgment within thirty days of the entry

of a default.” (Id. at 3.) “Plaintiff is early filing this

Default Judgment knowing the Court would have Plaintiff show cause

why the complaint against defaulty [sic] party should not be

dismissed.” (Id. at 4 (citing cases dealing with having an

adequate opportunity to conduct discovery).) Rogers further

alleges that a default judgment is appropriate under Civil Local

Rule 83.1 because Defendant “fail[ed] to comply with the Court[‘s]

request,” the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and “any other

authorized statute.” (Id.) 

Civil Local Rule 55.1 is implicated when a default judgment

has been entered, but no default has been entered in this case. 

See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 55.1. Although Rogers appears to also rely

on civil local rule 26.1(a) in support of default, the rule is

inapplicable. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 26.1(a), (a)(3), (e)

(describing the meet and confer requirement). As discussed above,

the parties did not meet and confer prior to the filing of Rogers’s

discovery motion, but this failure cannot support his request for

default. 

Further, Plaintiff cites to local rule 83.1, which explains

that a default is an available sanction for a party’s failure to

comply with the local rules, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

or a court order. S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 83.1. Even if Plaintiff seeks

an order entering a default judgment as a discovery sanction,

relief is not warranted. To determine whether a default judgment

is an appropriate sanction, courts look to five factors: “(1) the

public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the

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court’s need to manage its dockets; (3) the risk of prejudice to

the party seeking sanctions; (4) the public policy favoring

disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of

less drastic sanctions.” Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of

Beverley Hills, 482 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting

Jorgensen v. Cassidy, 320 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 2003)). “This

‘test’ in not mechanical. It provides the district court with a

way to think about what to do, not a set of conditions precedent

for sanctions . . . .” Id. 

 As discussed, some of Defendant’s responses are sufficient,

and some of her objections are valid. Even though many of the

objections are unfounded, a default judgment is an inappropriate

sanction. The Court’s need to manage its docket is not

particularly affected. See Allen v. Bayer Corp. (In re

Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig.), 460 F.3d 1217, 1227

(9th Cir. 2006). Further, Rogers is not prejudiced by Defendant’s

discovery responses; delay alone is insufficient to warrant a

default. Adriana Int’l Corp. v. Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th

Cir. 1990). Next, Kuzil-Ruan’s conduct did not inhibit the

progression of the litigation or interfere with the expeditious

resolution of this case. Allen, 460 F.3d 1228 (“We have often said

that the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their

merits strongly counsels against dismissal.”). Finally, the Court

has had no previous occasion to sanction or warn Defendant that a

default judgment is a possible sanction. See id. at 1228-29

(explaining that a court abuses its discretion if it first imposes

default judgment as a sanction without first considering whether

less drastic sanctions are adequate). 

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No factors weigh in favor of a default judgment. Although

Defendant Kuzil-Ruan's discovery responses are subject to

criticism, they do not fall to the level of being sanctionable. 

See id. at 1226-29. Rogers’s Motion for Default Judgment [ECF No.

24] should be DENIED. 

V.

CONCLUSION

A. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel and Motion for Appointment of

Investigator

For the reasons described previously, Plaintiff’s Motion to

Compel [ECF No. 42] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. His

Motion for Appointment of Investigator [ECF No. 58] is DENIED.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 

1. Rogers’s Motion to Compel further responses to document

request 1 is DENIED because the documents produced by

Defendant are responsive. The Motion to Compel as to

document request 10 is GRANTED in part. Kuzil-Ruan must

produce all relevant documents between February 2010 and

June 2011. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel further

responses to document request 5 is DENIED because the

documents produced by Defendant are responsive. The

Motion is GRANTED for document requests 8 and 9.

2. Rogers’s request to compel further responses to

interrogatories 13 and 14 is DENIED because Defendant’s

answers are responsive to the questions as written. As

to interrogatory 15, the Motion is GRANTED, as explained. 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Kuzil-Ruan to provide

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further responses to interrogatories 16, 17, and 18 is

GRANTED.

3. The Defendant is to provide Rogers with the supplemental

discovery responses no later than October 19, 2012.

4. Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Investigator [ECF

No. 58] is DENIED.

B. Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment

Along with the foregoing Order, the Court submits this

accompanying Report and Recommendation to United States District

Judge Irma E. Gonzalez under 28 U.S.C. s 636(b)(1) and Local Civil

Rule HC.2 of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of California. Rogers’s Motion for Default Judgment [ECF

No. 44] should be DENIED. For the reasons outlined above, IT IS

HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the district court issue an Order (1)

approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation that

Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment [ECF No. 44] be DENIED.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than October 19, 2012, any party

to this action may file written objections to the recommendation

that the Motion for Default Judgment [ECF No. 44] be DENIED. The

objections are filed with the district court and a copy must be

served on all the parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation Denying Plaintiff’s Motion

for Default Judgment.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to these objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

October 31, 2012. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to rasie

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v.

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Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATE: September 26, 2012 _______________________________

RUBEN B. BROOKS

 United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Gonzalez 

All Parties of Record

I:\Chambers Brooks\CASES\_1983\PRISONER\ROGERS560\Order Re Mot. Compel & Default & Investigator.wpd41 11cv560 IEG(RBB)

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