Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_22-cv-00343/USCOURTS-alsd-1_22-cv-00343-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity Action

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

ARETHA RAQUEL GUIDRY-DAVIS, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) CIV. ACT. NO. 1:22-cv-343-TFM-N 

 ) 

STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY ) 

COMPANY, ) 

 ) 

Defendant. ) 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

 

Now pending before the Court are three motions filed by State Farm: (1) Motion to Exclude

Expert Testimony of Eduard Badiu, PhD, P.E. (Doc. 36, filed 07/21/23), (2) Motion to Exclude 

Expert Testimony of Dennis James (Doc. 37, filed 07/21/23), and (3) State Farm Fire and Casualty 

Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 38, filed 07/21/23). Having considered the 

motions, memoranda, supporting briefs, responses, replies, and relevant law, the motions to 

exclude (Docs. 36, 37) are DENIED and the motion for summary judgment (Doc. 38) is 

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as discussed below. 

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 

No party contests jurisdiction or venue, and the Court finds adequate support for both. The 

Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 

(diversity). The Court has personal jurisdiction over the claims in this action because the events 

that gave rise to this action occurred within this district. See Consol. Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 

216 F.3d 1286, 1291-92 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Specific jurisdiction arises out of a party’s activities in 

the forum that are related to the cause of action alleged in the complaint . . . . General personal 

jurisdiction, on the other hand, arises from a defendant’s contacts with the forum that are unrelated 

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to the cause of action being litigated. The due process requirements for general personal 

jurisdiction are more stringent than for specific personal jurisdiction and require a showing of 

continuous and systematic general business contacts between the defendant and the forum state.”). 

Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the 

events that gave rise to the claims in this matter occurred in this judicial district. 

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

A. Factual Background

As it must, the Court takes the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff Aretha GuidryDavis (“Guidry-Davis” or “Plaintiff”). Guidry-Davis is the owner of a residential home located 

on Wynnfield Drive West (“the Property”) in Mobile, Alabama. Doc. 1-2 at ¶ 1. On September 

16, 2020, the Property sustained damage as a result of Hurricane Sally (“the Loss”). Id. at 6; Doc. 

39 at 2. 

At the time of the Loss, the Property was insured under a homeowner’s policy issued by 

Defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (“State Farm” or “Defendant”), Policy No. 01-

B2-N846-5, which covered the period 1/11/2021 to 1/11/2022 (the “Policy”). See Doc. 39-1 (State 

Farm Certified Policy Record). The Policy insured Plaintiff’s dwelling located at the Property, its 

exterior and interior fixtures, Plaintiff’s personal property, loss of use, and other applicable 

coverage. Id.; Doc. 1-2 at ¶ 5. The Policy contains a hurricane deductible of 2%, or $9,094.00 

(Doc. 39-1 at 5), and pays the Actual Cash Value (ACV)1 of the damages and the Replacement 

Cost Value (RCV) upon completion of the repairs. Doc. 39-1 at 9. 

Plaintiff filed a claim, No. 0-1-11P1-04,2 with State Farm after the Loss on September 18, 

1 The Policy defines ACV as the repair cost less pre-loss depreciation (Doc. 39-1 at 17). 

2 State Farm incorrectly references the Claim No. 1-11P1-04F, when discussing Plaintiff’s 

Certified Insurance Policy and the related documents which all reference Policy No. 01-B2-N846-

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2020. Doc. 1-2 at ¶ 7; Doc. 39 at 3. According to State Farm, in the initial claim call Plaintiff 

reported wind damage to the roof and fence, along with water spots on the ceilings and tree debris 

damage. Doc. 39-2 at 16-17. During the call, State Farm also noted that Plaintiff was informed of 

her duty to mitigate damages and the policy allowance for reasonable costs incurred to mitigate 

damages along with the claims adjuster encouraging Plaintiff to document the loss with photos 

and to retain all receipts for reimbursement purposes. Id. 

On September 29, 2020, State Farm scheduled an inspection of the Property and explained 

the hurricane deductible to Plaintiff’s husband, Kevin Davis.3 Doc 39-1 at 4. Levi Thibault 

(“Thibault”), a State Farm claims handler certified in inspecting steep roofs, inspected the property 

on October 13, 2020, and prepared a claim note of his observations and conclusions regarding 

damage to the Property. Doc. 39-2 at 13. Id. On the interior, Thibault noted light water staining to 

the ceilings in the kitchen and downstairs hall bathroom. Doc. 39 at 4. On the exterior, Thibault 

noted no damage to any of the elevations and two sections of fencing that were blown down; in 

addition, Thibault observed light tree scraping to the main front slope and the left and right gable 

extension on the left front slope. Id. at 4-5. 

Later that same day, Thibault prepared the State Farm estimate. Id. The estimate included 

allowances to spot paint and seal those areas in the interior noted above as well as replacement of 

each of the four slopes on the exterior. Doc. 33-2 at 239. Thibault also allowed for removal and 

replacement of 11.64 roofing squares, along with other roofing items; for a partial roof repair using 

the roofing measurements estimated by Thibault. Id. Thibault advised Plaintiff, via telephone and 

letter, that the loss would not exceed the policy’s hurricane deductible, and that as a result State 

5. The distinction does not ultimately affect the outcome of the case as the validity of underlying 

coverage is not in dispute. 

3 All parties agree that Plaintiff gave her husband authority to discuss the claim with State Farm. 

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Farm was unable to make a payment on the claim. Id. at 13, 77. 

On April 19, 2021, Plaintiff hired Tommy Tompkins at ATA Loss Consulting, LLC 

(“ATA”) to conduct a secondary estimate of the property; the inspection was done on May 4, 

2021. Doc. 39-2 at 25. The ATA estimate totaled $223,722.29 in damages to Plaintiff’s property 

with a value of $212,716.73 after depreciation. Id. at 62-63. In response to the ATA estimate, State 

Farm requested a reinspection with State Farm Claim Specialist Eric McGill (“McGill”), Mr. 

Davis, and a representative of ATA present to take place on July 1, 2021. Doc. 39 at 6. 

Upon reinspection, as to the exterior, State Farm found no additional damage to the fencing, 

no additional wind damage, no tree removal was required, and agreed with the scope of roof 

damage indicated in the original State Farm estimate. Id. On the interior, the reinspection noted 

the following storm-related damage: 

light separation on crown molding in the entry/foyer; light separation on crown 

molding; window stool and casing need caulking in the office; peeling paint along 

the arch of the wall and ceiling in the living room; fireplace mantle had small crack 

in caulking in the living room; “2x2” water stain and light separation on crown 

molding in the kitchen; light separation on crown molding in the dining room; light 

separation on crown molding in both hallways; small crack on ceiling, minor 

separation on crown molding, window caulking and caulking on window stool in 

the master bedroom; light separation on crown molding in master bathroom; light 

separation on crown molding in the master bathroom toilet closet; large water stain; 

light separation of crown molding in the second-floor bathroom; no ADPL in 

bedroom 1; light separation on crown molding in bedroom 2; light separation on 

crown molding in bedroom 3; no ADPL in bedroom 4; small damage to drywall on 

the wall in game room; and window caulking and caulking on window stool in the 

game room. 

Id. (citing SF 0027-0026). McGill also noted that there was no personal property being claimed. 

Id.

Based upon the reinspection, McGill revised the State Farm estimate to include the repairs 

of note to reconcile the ATA estimate with the initial State Farm estimate. Doc. 39-2 at 83-125. 

The revised estimate totaled $22,155.31 with Plaintiff being issued a check for $7,205.25, the 

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amount of the repair estimate less the hurricane deductible and depreciation. Id.; Id. at 9. In 

addition, State Farm informed Plaintiff that an additional $5,272.12 was available in replacement 

cost benefits for any repairs completed within two years of the date of loss upon notification to 

State Farm withing thirty days of completion. Id. 63-64. 

Plaintiff hired licensed professional engineer Eduard Baidu (“Baidu”) of CeBB 

Engineering & Testing, Co to provide an expert assessment of the damages and determine their 

cause of origin. Doc. 36-1 at 1. Baidu inspected the Property on December 7, 2022, and April 5, 

2023 and met with Plaintiff and her husband along with reviewing aerial images of the Property 

of property records. Doc. 48 at 2. Baidu’s investigation identified wind borne debris impact 

damage, scuffs/abrasions/scratches; granule loss, contamination of sealant from debris and other 

foreign substances, and moss and leaf growth on the property’s roof. Doc. 36-1 at 3. Baidu opined 

that, within a reasonable degree of engineering probability, roof and interior damages were, more 

likely than not, caused by wind, windborne debris and water intrusion that ultimately compromised 

the function and usefulness of the roof. Id. at 7. 

As to the interior of the property, Baidu’s investigation noted: 

“(1) crown molding separation in the foyer and downstairs bathroom (Bathroom 1); 

(2) water damage to the ceiling in the family room; (3) water damage to the ceiling 

in the kitchen; (4) water damage to the ceiling in Bathroom 1; (5) water damage to 

the roof decking above an upstairs bedroom (Bedroom 2); (6) ceiling gypsum board 

separation in another upstairs bedroom (Bedroom 3); (7) water damage to the 

ceiling in the upstairs hallway; (8) ceiling gypsum board separation in the 

downstairs master bedroom; and (9) water damage to the ceiling in the garage.” 

Doc. 48 at 2. Baidu opined that, within a reasonable degree of engineering certainty, the interior 

damages were caused by moisture/water intrusion through the wind and wind-borne debris created 

openings. Doc. 36-1. at 8. 

Plaintiff also retained Dennis James, owner, and operator of Triad Restoration Services 

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(“Triad”), as an expert on the cost of repair damages to the property. Id at 9; Doc. 47 at 1. Triad’s 

inspector, Alex Falke, inspected the Property taking field notes and photographs on November 3, 

2022. Doc. 47 at 2. James reviewed the field notes and photographs from Falke, the ATA estimate, 

the July 11, 2021, the State Farm estimate, and the Baidu report. Id. He opined “the replacement 

cost value of the hurricane damage to the Property is $87,034.89, and that the actual cash value of 

the damage to the Property is $67,781.98.” Id. 

State Farm retained an engineer, Kevin Vanderbrook, P.E. of VECO Consulting, LLC as

its expert witness, who inspected the Property on February 6, 2023. Doc. 39 at 10. Vanderbrook 

opined that: 

(1) the roof of the home was not damaged by wind forces; (2) some minor 

miscellaneous interior water stains in this home may be related to wind, including 

the stain on the living room ceiling and downstairs bedroom; (3) the stain on the 

garage ceiling may be related to windblown rain; (4) these interior water stains are 

cosmetic in nature and can be spot repaired and repainted without any replacement 

of sheetrock; and, (5) there was no damage to the windows on this home which 

would necessitate replacement. 

Id. 

B. Procedural Background 

On April 4, 2022, Plaintiff originally filed with the Circuit Court of Mobile County, 

Alabama her complaint against Defendant in which she brings claims for breach of contract (Count 

1) and bad faith (Count 2). Doc. 1-2. On September 1, 2022, Defendant filed its notice of removal 

with this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Doc. 1. On the same date, Defendant filed its 

answer to the complaint. Doc. 4. 

On July 21, 2023, Defendant filed the instant motion for summary judgment and brief in 

support. Docs. 38, 39. Contemporaneously, Defendant filed motions to exclude the expert 

testimony of Eduard Badiu and Dennis James. Docs. 36, 37. Plaintiff and Defendant timely filed 

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their respective responses and replies. See Docs. 47, 48, 49, 52, 53, 54. The motions are fully 

briefed and ripe for review, and the Court finds oral argument unnecessary. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

A. Summary Judgment 

A party in a lawsuit may move a court to enter summary judgment before trial. FED. R.

CIV. P. 56(a), (b). Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party establishes there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see also Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 

1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers 

to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no 

genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.’”). “[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material.” Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); see also 

Ritchey v. S. Nuclear Operating Co., 423 F. App’x 955 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson, 477 

U.S. at 248, 106 S. Ct. at 2510).4 At the summary judgment juncture, the court does not “weigh 

the evidence and determine the truth of the matter,” but solely “determine[s] whether there is a 

genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S. Ct. at 2511. Only disputes about the 

material facts will preclude the granting of summary judgment. Id. 

The movant bears the initial burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 

106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). A party must support its assertion that there is no 

4 In this Circuit, “[u]npublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be 

cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (effective Dec. 1, 2014); see also Henry v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 n.1 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“Cases printed in the 

Federal Appendix are cited as persuasive authority.”). 

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genuine issue of material fact by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including 

depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . 

. . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” or by “showing that the materials cited 

do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot 

produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1). The admissibility of 

evidence is subject to the same standards and rules that govern admissibility of evidence at trial. 

Clemons v. Dougherty County, 684 F.2d 1365, 1369 n.5 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Pan-Islamic Trade 

Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d 539, 556 (5th Cir. 1980)). 

Once the movant meets its burden under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, the non-movant must go 

beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 

1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when ‘the evidence is such 

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Moore ex rel. Moore v. 

Reese, 637 F.3d 1220, 1232 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S. Ct. at 

2510). The court must view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. (citing Rosario v. Am. Corrective Counseling Servs., Inc., 506 F.3d 1039, 1043 

(11th Cir. 2007)); Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1265 (“We view the evidence and all factual inferences 

therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.”). However, to avoid 

summary judgment, the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some 

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S. Ct. at 1356 

(citations omitted). Conclusory assertions, unsupported by specific facts, that are presented in 

affidavits opposing the motion for summary judgment are likewise insufficient to defeat a proper 

motion for summary judgment. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 

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3188, 111 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1990). “Speculation does not create a genuine issue of fact.” Cordoba 

v. Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). If the evidence is merely 

colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See Anderson, 477 

U.S. at 249-50, 106 S. Ct. at 2511 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). In short, summary 

judgment is proper after adequate time for discovery and upon motion against a party who fails to 

make a showing that is sufficient to establish the existence of an element that is essential to that 

party’s case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S. Ct. at 2552. 

Finally, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) also provides that “[i]f a party fails to properly support an 

assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 

56(c), the court may: (1) give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact; (2) consider 

the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion; (3) grant summary judgment if the motion and 

supporting materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled 

to it; or (4) issue any other appropriate order.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e).

B. Daubert motions 

 The admission of expert testimony is governed by FED. R. EVID. 702, which provides that, 

if “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the 

evidence or to determine a fact in issue,” a witness “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill 

experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” FED. R.

EVID. 702. The U.S. Supreme Court elucidated this requirement in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and its progeny, noting that district courts are 

gatekeepers charged with ensuring that “speculative, unreliable expert testimony does not reach 

the jury.” McCorvey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253, 1256 (11th Cir. 2002). In 

determining the admissibility of expert testimony under Daubert, the district court must consider 

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whether: (1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he intends to 

address; (2) the methodology by which the expert reaches his conclusions is sufficiently reliable;

and (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of scientific, technical, or 

specialized expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Rink v. 

Cheminova, Inc., 400 F.3d 1286, 1291-92 (11th Cir. 2005). “While there is inevitably some 

overlap among the basic requirements — qualification, reliability, and helpfulness — they remain 

distinct concepts and the courts must take care not to conflate them.” Rosenfeld v. Oceania 

Cruises, Inc., 654 F.3d 1190, 1193 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). 

The district court’s objective is to “make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony 

upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of 

intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.” United States v. 

Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004). The proponent of the expert testimony bears the 

burden of demonstrating that the expert is qualified to render his testimony, the methodology by 

which he reached his conclusions is sufficiently reliable, and his opinions will assist the trier of 

fact. Id. 

If a witness’ qualifications to render an opinion rest exclusively or primarily on experience, 

the witness “must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience 

is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.” Id. 

at 1261 (internal quotations and citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Reliability may not be 

premised “merely by the ipse dixit of an admittedly qualified expert.” Id. When determining 

reliability, the district court may take into consideration a range of factors, including: (1) whether 

the expert’s theory can be, and has been, tested; (2) whether the expert’s theory has been subjected 

to peer review and publication; (3) whether the employed technique has a known error rate; and 

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(4) whether the methodology is generally accepted in the scientific community. Id. at 1262; 

McCorvey, 298 F.3d at 1256. These factors, however, are non-exhaustive. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. 

v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1175, 143 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1999). The district 

court has “broad discretion in determining whether to admit or exclude expert testimony, and its 

decision will be disturbed on appeal only if it is manifestly erroneous.” Evans v. Mathis Funeral 

Home, 996 F.2d 266, 268 (11th Cir. 1993).

IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 

A. Daubert Motions 

As the motions to exclude the expert testimony in this case may or may not impact the 

summary judgment determination, the Court resolves those motions first. 

i. Dennis James 

State Farm moves to exclude the report and deposition testimony of Plaintiff's expert 

witness, Dennis James (“James”), as failing to satisfy the minimum Rule 702 and 703 admissibility 

standards under the Federal Rules of Evidence. As grounds, State Farm argues that: (1) James’ 

opinion regarding the Hurricane Sally damage to the Property incurred is not his own but instead 

the opinion of his investigator (Alex Falke); (2) James did not prepare the Triad estimate himself; 

(3) James did not review the deposition transcript of Plaintiff or her husband; (4) Falke conducted 

the field inspection, took measurements, photographs, noticed observable damage, prepared a 

sketch of the property, and prepared the field notes that would ultimately become the Triad 

estimate; and (5) based on James’ participation in the preparation of the Triad estimate – or rather 

the lack thereof – James cannot provide expert testimony by merely adopting the opinions of 

another, which is inadmissible hearsay. Doc. 37 at 3-4. 

In response, Plaintiff argues that (1) Triad is a licensed general contracting firm in the State 

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of Florida, owned and operated by Dennis James, focusing on residential and commercial 

restoration work, general contracting, remodeling, and consulting; (2) James is personally licensed 

as a general contractor; and (3) James relied on his experience as a licensed general contractor, the 

field notes and photographs from his estimator Alex Falke’s inspection of the Property on 

November 3, 2022, a prior estimate for the cost to repair the Property prepared by ATA Loss 

Consulting, photographs from ATA Loss Consulting’s inspection of the Property, State Farm’s 

repair estimate dated July 11, 2021, and an engineering report prepared by Eduard Baidu of CeBB 

Engineering when formulating his opinion. Doc. 47 at 2. 

No dispute exists as to James’ qualifications. Further, the Court finds that a review of his 

qualifications and experience establishes that he is qualified. State Farm’s argument hinges on its 

assertion that James’ opinion isn’t predicated upon a reliable foundation of facts and data since he 

reviewed photographs and notes taken by his field inspector during his inspection of the Property 

to help form the basis of his opinion, instead of James going out to the property himself. This goes 

to methodology – the second prong of the Daubert analysis. State Farm’s argument fails as a 

matter of law. 

The fact that an expert does not personally inspect the scene of an incident is not by itself 

determinative; personal inspections are not a black letter requirement. See, e.g., Woienski v. United 

Airlines, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1348 (M.D. Fla. 2019) (“an expert is permitted to form 

conclusions by extrapolating from existing data.”) (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 

146 (1997)); Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999) (“factors which 

this and other courts have considered in the Daubert analysis are reliance on anecdotal evidence 

(as in case reports)...”); Bryant v. BGHA, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 3d 1374, 1392 (M.D. Ga. 2014) 

(permitting opinion of expert who did not personally visit the scene of the incident and did not 

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inspect the hunting tree stand because he relied upon partner's measurements, photos and data); 

Am. Key Corp. v. Cole Nat. Corp., 762 F.2d 1569, 1580 (11th Cir. 1985) (“An expert witness’s 

opinion testimony does not have to be based upon admissible evidence.”). 

“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on 

the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible 

evidence.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. Here, James’ testimony is directly related to the damage the 

Property sustained during Hurricane Sally. More specifically, James would testify as to the scope 

of storm damage and State Farm refutes the scope of damages the Property incurred as a result of 

Hurricane Sally. 

As to the final prong of the Daubert analysis, clearly, James’ testimony concerning the 

scope of damage to the Property is relevant and would assist a jury in reaching their conclusion. 

Ultimately, the Court finds that the crux of State Farm’s argument against James’

qualifications goes to the weight of evidence, which can be addressed during cross-examination 

and does not merit exclusion of his testimony. As such, State Farm’s motion to exclude James as 

an expert witness is denied. 

ii. Eduard Badiu, PhD 

Defendant argues Badiu’s opinions are due to be excluded because they will not assist the 

trier of fact in determining the extent of damage caused to the Property by Hurricane Sally or 

whether the alleged damages are covered by the State Farm Insurance policy. Doc. 36 at 3. More 

specifically, State Farm alleges Badiu’s testimony fails to meet the requirements of the helpfulness 

prong because he is unable to attribute the damage to the Property to Hurricane Sally as alleged in 

Plaintiff’s Complaint. Id. at 4. The motion does not challenge either Badiu’s qualifications or even 

methodology. Rather the sole focus is on the third prong – whether the information and testimony 

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will assist the trier of fact. 

State Farm argues Badiu’s opinion that the damage to the property was caused by wind 

and/or windborne debris – but not necessarily Hurricane Sally – is sufficiently imprecise and 

unspecific that it will not assist the trier of fact in determining the extent of damage caused to the 

Property by Hurricane Sally. 

In response, Plaintiff asserts Badiu is licensed as a professional engineer in the State of 

Alabama who personally inspected the property twice. Doc. 48 at 1-2. He identified physical 

damage to the Property during those inspections, interviewed Plaintiff’s husband, reviewed aerial 

images of the Property, reviewed property records, and reviewed the deposition testimony from 

Plaintiff and her husband in formulating his expert opinion. Id. at 2. Thus, Plaintiff argues Baidu’s 

ability to distinguish between all of the reasonably potential causes of damage to the Property and 

render an opinion that the cause of the damage is likely wind, wind-driven debris, and water 

intrusion is helpful to the trier of fact because it eliminates other potential causes of the damage to 

the Property and “Baidu’s opinion that the Property sustained wind, wind-driven debris, and water 

intrusion damage is simply one piece of the puzzle” in Plaintiff proving her claim. Id. at 6. 

“The rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule.” Moore, 995 F.3d 

at 850 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702 Advisory Committee’s Note to 2000 Amendments). The decision 

to admit or exclude expert testimony is within the trial court’s discretion and the court enjoys 

“considerable leeway” when determining the admissibility of this testimony. See Cook v. Sheriff 

of Monroe County, Fla., 402 F.3d 1092, 1103 (11th Cir. 2005). In providing causation opinions, 

“absolute certainty is not required. Expert testimony is admissible which connects conditions 

existing later to those existing earlier provided the connection is concluded logically.” Jones v. 

Otis Elevator Co., 861 F.2d 655, 662 (11th Cir. 1988). 

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Here, the Court again finds that the crux of State Farm’s arguments against Baidu’s 

qualifications go to the weight of evidence, which can be addressed during cross-examination and 

does not merit exclusion of his testimony. As such, State Farm's motion to exclude Baidu as an 

expert witness is denied.

B. Summary Judgment 

State Farm argues it is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff has not offered any 

admissible evidence that Hurricane Sally caused any damage to the Property nor admissible 

evidence of the reasonable cost of repair to Plaintiff’s property as a result of Hurricane Sally. Doc. 

39 at 1. Defendant argues expert testimony is required to prove both causation and cost. Id. In 

response, Plaintiff argues she has provided extensive expert testimony on both causation and cost. 

Doc. 49 at 2. However, she also asserts expert testimony is not required to prove causation in an 

insurance coverage dispute. Id. Moreover, the totality of the evidence proffered, including, but not 

limited to, Plaintiff’s proffered expert reports, State Farm’s claim documents, eyewitness 

testimony of Plaintiff and her husband, and photographs of the property, are all sufficient to 

establish both the cost and causation of damages to her property. Id. Finally, Plaintiff argues that 

the multiple competing estimates create a genuine issue as to the insurance company’s liability. 

Id. at 3. 

“In this diversity action, Alabama’s substantive law governs the interpretation of the 

[insurance contract] at issue.” Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Mallard, 309 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th 

Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Alabama law provides that “[i]nsurance policies are contracts, and 

like other contracts, they are governed by the general rules of contracts.” James River Ins. Co. v. 

Ultratec Special Effects Inc., 22 F.4th 1246, 1254 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Twin City Fire Ins. 

Co. v. Alfa Mut. Ins. Co., 817 So. 2d 687, 691 (Ala. 2001) and internal modifications omitted). To 

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prevail on a breach of contract claim under Alabama law, a party must establish: (1) the existence 

of a valid contract binding the parties in the action, (2) its own performance under the contract, (3) 

the [other party’s] non-performance, and (4) damages. Ex parte American Heritage Life Ins. Co., 

46 So.3d 474, 477 (Ala. 2010) (citing Congress Life Ins. Co. v. Barstow, 799 So. 2d 931, 937 (Ala. 

2001)); Shaffer v. Regions Fin. Corp., 29 So. 3d 872, 880 (Ala. 2009) (quoting Reynolds Metals 

Co. v. Hill, 825 So.2d 100, 105 (Ala. 2002)). 

However, where a party fails to comply with a condition precedent to recovery under a 

contract, said party cannot sustain a breach of contract claim. More specifically, under Alabama 

law, the burden is on the insured to establish coverage exists under an insurance policy.” Mallard, 

309 F.3d at 1307 (citations omitted). 

The insurer has the burden of establishing that an exclusion excludes coverage for 

a claim. Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Brown, 832 So. 2d 1, 12 (Ala. 2001). Exclusions 

must be interpreted “as narrowly as possible in order to provide maximum coverage 

for the insured and must be construed most strongly against the company that drew 

the policy and issued it.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 103 So. 3d 795, 805 

(Ala. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

James River, 22 F.4th at 1254. 

Here, State Farm argues that lay witness testimony is inadmissible to prove the cause of 

the damages claimed by Plaintiff. State Farm cites to Nix v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 444 F. 

App’x 388 (11th Cir. 2011), an appeal from a decision by the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Alabama, to support its argument. In Nix, the Eleventh Circuit stated: 

The district court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of State Farm 

because the uncontroverted evidence establishes that the Nixes’ claim was excluded 

from coverage. State Farm introduced testimony from its expert witness, Mark 

Voll, that the retaining wall in the basement of the Nixes’ home collapsed because 

the wall was not properly designed or built and collapsed from hydrostatic pressure. 

See Jordan v. Nat’l Accident Ins. Underwriters Inc., 922 F.2d 732, 735 (11th Cir. 

1991). Voll, an engineer, testified that the retaining wall lacked reinforcing steel, 

as required by a local building code, and could not withstand the pressure created 

by groundwater that had accumulated during a heavy rainfall. Voll also testified 

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that a French drain installed alongside the retaining wall failed to disperse the 

groundwater because the drain had been covered with clay soil instead of gravel. 

Although the Nixes argued that the main line water pipe burst and caused the 

retaining wall to collapse, they based that argument on the opinions of Terry Nix 

and a contractor who made temporary repairs to the wall, and those opinions were 

not admissible as lay testimony. Neither Nix nor the contractor witnessed the wall 

collapse or had personal knowledge about the construction of the Nixes’ home. See 

FED. R. EVID. 701. Because the collapse of the retaining wall was attributable to 

causes excluded from coverage under the Nixes’ insurance policy, State Farm did 

not breach its contract with or owe a duty to further investigate or to pay the claim 

filed by the Nixes. 

Nix, 444 F. App’x at 390. 

However, in Nix, the Eleventh Circuit did not discuss whether Alabama law requires expert 

testimony to prove causation, and State Farm does not cite to Alabama substantive law that states 

such. See Nix, 444 F. App’x at 390. Importantly, in Nix, the Eleventh Circuit based its decision 

to disregard the Nixes’ proffered lay witness testimony to prove causation on Fed. R. Evid. 701 

since the witnesses neither witnessed the damage nor had personal knowledge about the 

construction of the damaged area. See id.

Cases that were decided after Nix by courts that applied Alabama law have cited to that 

case to exclude lay witness testimony that was introduced to prove causation. The Court will 

discuss those cases in chronological order. 

In McPherson v. Allstate Indemnity Co., Civ. Act. No. 3:11cv638-WHA(wo), 2012 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 58557, 2012 WL 1448049 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 26, 2012), the cause of a fire that 

destroyed a dwelling was contested and was before the district court on cross-motions for summary 

judgment. The insurance company’s expert opined the cause of the fire was incendiary. Id., 2012 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58557, at *5-6, 2012 WL 1448049, at *2-3. In response, the McPhersons 

submitted an affidavit from their nephew, who was the caretaker of the property at issue but did 

not live there, in which he recalled “several occasions where gas was inadvertently spilled on the 

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interior floors at the property,” “gasoline was used to cleans stains and blemishes off the vinyl 

flooring throughout the property,” and when he was notified of the fire, he drove to the property 

and observed lightning while he drove to, and when arrived at, the property. Id., 2012 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 58557, at *7, 2012 WL 1448049, at *3. The district court concluded the McPhersons’ 

evidence was insufficient to create a question of fact as to the cause of the fire because they were 

obliged to “do more than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts.” Id., 

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58557, at *23, 2012 WL 1448049, at *8 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 

In Ware v. National Insurance Co., Civ. Act. No. 7:11-cv-4272-LSC, 2013 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 52641, 2013 WL 1680514 (N.D. Ala. 2013 Apr. 12, 2013), cited by State Farm, the cause 

of water damage to a home was contested and was before the district court on the insurance 

company’s motion for summary judgment. The insurance company argued the damage was 

excluded from policy coverage and offered evidence, including expert testimony, that showed the 

damage was the result of ground water accumulation, which was not covered. Id., 2013 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 52641, at *14-15, 2013 WL 1680514, at *5. The Wares submitted testimony from the 

original installer of their roof to support their claim that the damage was caused by a leaking roof 

and heavy rains, but the district court did not allow the testimony insofar as it offered expert 

opinion because it was not properly disclosed. Id., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52641, at *8-12, 2013 

WL 1680514, at *3-5. The district court allowed portions of the installer’s testimony insofar as it 

was admissible for a lay witness but found it had little probative value because he did not possess 

first-hand knowledge of the damage to the roof and water damage to the home, which was 

supported by the Nix decision. Id. 

In Johnson v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., Civ. Act. No. 12-00534-N, 2013 U.S. 

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Dist. LEXIS 123525, 2013 WL 4607548 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 29, 2013), the cause of water damage to 

a home was contested and was before the district court on the insurance company’s motion for 

summary judgment. The insurance company argued the damage was excluded from policy 

coverage and offered evidence, including expert testimony, that showed the damage was the result 

of surface water runoff, which was not covered. Id., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123525, at *30-31, 

2013 WL 4607548, at *9. The Johnsons submitted lay witness accounts to show there was a 

pinhole leak in a pipe under their house that, at least in part, caused the water damage, but the 

district court found, while the testimony was from witnesses who either personally spotted or 

repaired the leak, the testimony could not be used to show the leak, in fact, caused the water 

damage. Id. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123525, at *32, *41-42, 2013 WL 4607548, at *9, *12. 

In Brown v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 358 F. Supp. 3d 1265 (N.D. Ala. 2018), the 

cause of the failure of a concrete basement wall was at issue and before the district court on the 

insurance company’s motion for summary judgment. The insurance company argued the failure 

was excluded from policy coverage and offered expert testimony that showed the failure was the 

result of hydrostatic pressure. Id. at 1268-69. The Browns submitted lay witness testimony to 

show the failure was caused by a nearby lightning strike, but the district court only allowed the 

testimony insofar as it reflected their observations and first-hand knowledge of the failure, none 

of which saw a lightning strike cause the damage, then found “lay testimony is inadmissible to 

establish causation.” Id. at 1272-74. 

However, in Greater Hall Temple Church of God v. Southern Mutual Church Insurance 

Co., 820 F. App’x 915 (11th Cir. 2020)[, a case in which Georgia, and not Alabama, law was at 

issue, the decision of the district court to grant the insurance company’s motion for summary 

judgment was before the Eleventh Circuit. The underlying issue in the matter was what caused 

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damage to a church roof. Id. at 916-18. The Eleventh Circuit summarized the district court’s 

decision: 

First, the district court held that the meaning of the term “surface water” – which 

Greater Hall’s insurance contract specifically excludes from coverage-should be 

interpreted to include rainwater that collects on a roof. Therefore, the court 

reasoned, “Greater Hall’s claim fails because the Policy does not insure the church 

for damage caused by surface water, which is what Plaintiff alleges here.” Second, 

and separately, the court held that “[e]ven if [it] did not adopt this definition, 

Greater Hall’s claim would still fail” because “Greater Hall was presented no 

admissible evidence [that] damage to the church’s roof [was] caused by [Hurricane 

Matthew].” 

Greater Hall, 820 F. App’x at 917-18. 

The Eleventh Circuit found the district court construed Greater Hall’s claims too narrowly 

and, when properly construed, Greater Hall’s claims were covered under the insurance policy. Id.

at 920-21. The Eleventh Circuit then stated, since the damage as alleged was covered, the inquiry 

became whether Greater Hall produced sufficient evidence to support its allegations to survive 

summary judgment and, since all of Greater Hall’s expert witnesses had been excluded, whether 

expert testimony was required to prove the cause of the damage. Id. at 921-22. As to that inquiry, 

the Eleventh Circuit treated it as a question of state law, since the district court treated the issue as 

such and neither party challenged that determination on appeal, id. at 922 (citing Bahamas Sales 

Assoc., LLC v. Byers, 702 F.3d 1335, 1342 (11th Cir. 2012)), then determined, under Georgia law, 

“expert testimony is not necessarily required to prove causation in the insurance-contract context, 

and that-even in the face of admissible expert testimony from the defendant-the plaintiff may 

satisfy its burden of proof with circumstantial lay testimony.” Id.

Despite Greater Hall’s lack of admissible expert testimony to support its claim and the fact 

that none of its lay witnesses saw the hurricane cause the damage, the Eleventh Circuit found 

Greater Hall provided enough circumstantial evidence, based on lay witness testimony, for a jury 

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to conclude the hurricane caused the damage. Id. Such circumstantial evidence included testimony 

from the church’s pastor about the church’s condition after the hurricane, testimony from the 

constructor of the church’s roof about the condition of the roof from before and after the hurricane, 

and testimony from another lay witness about the condition of the church a few days after the 

hurricane. Id.

After the Eleventh Circuit found Greater Hall presented sufficient circumstantial evidence 

to survive summary judgment, it then addressed Southern Mutual’s argument that Greater Hall 

was required to prove causation through expert testimony: 

Southern Mutual, like the district court, relies heavily on our unpublished decision 

in Nix v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, which it claims stands for the 

proposition that “proving causation requires expert testimony.” Br. Of Appellee at 

26 (citing Nix, 444 F. App’x at 390). There are a couple of problems with Southern 

Mutual’s reliance on Nix. First, Nix dealt with Alabama-not Georgia-law. Nix, 444 

F. App’x at 389. Second, we don’t think that Nix should be read as requiring expert 

testimony to prove causation. Although the Nix Court granted summary judgment 

for the defendant in that case-and held that the defendant’s expert provided 

“uncontroverted evidence” showing that the basement wall at issue collapsed 

because it was not properly designed-it suggested that the plaintiff could have 

survived summary judgment through lay witness testimony, so long as the witness 

“had personal knowledge about the construction of the [plaintiff’s] home.” Id. at 

390. Applying that principle here, Greater Hall survives summary judgment 

through the lay-witness testimony of Alfred Teston, who personally constructed the 

church roof at issue. 

Greater Hall, 820 F. App’x at 923 (emphasis in original). 

 When comparing Nix and Greater Hall, the Court finds that Greater Hall is more 

applicable to the situation and hand. In Nix, the Eleventh Circuit did not discuss whether Alabama 

law requires expert testimony to prove causation, unlike its discussion of Georgia law in Greater 

Hall. State Farm does not cite to Alabama substantive law that provides otherwise. Importantly, 

in Nix, the Eleventh Circuit based its decision to disregard the Nixes’ proffered lay witness 

testimony to prove causation on Fed. R. Evid. 701 since the witnesses neither witnessed the 

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damage nor had personal knowledge about the construction of the damaged area. See id. 

Therefore, Nix is distinguishable. 

Here, Plaintiff was present in the Property immediately before, during, and after the 

hurricane. Both she and her husband provided testimony about the damage that they observed to 

the property. Further, Plaintiff made her claim with State Farm less than 48 hours after the 

hurricane and, in the initial claim call, as documented by State Farm, Plaintiff reported wind 

damage to the roof and fence, along with water spots on the ceilings and tree debris damage. In 

the initial report notes of State Farm, the field inspector noted that the roof was a 19-year-old roof 

in non-repairable condition, that the wind blew down two separate sections of the fencings, and 

water staining in the kitchen and bathroom. In addition, State Farm tacitly acknowledged that 

Plaintiff’s damages, or at least a portion thereof, were caused by Hurricane Sally as the hurricane 

deductible was applied in both the original and amended State Farm estimates. Viewing the 

evidence in light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Court finds Plaintiff and her husband’s 

proffered lay witness testimony, along with their supporting documentation, provides sufficient 

circumstantial evidence to show the hurricane caused the alleged damages to the property and from 

which a jury could find in Plaintiff’s favor. 

As to State Farm’s argument that Plaintiff has not presented expert testimony to show the 

cost of repairs and that the repair costs were reasonable, the Court finds expert testimony is not 

required and Plaintiff has submitted sufficient evidence that a jury could award damages that are 

reasonably certain. 

Damages for breach of contract “‘“‘should return the injured party to the position 

he would have been in had the contract been fully performed.’”’” Parsons v. Aaron, 

849 So. 2d 932, 949 (Ala. 2002) (quoting other cases). Although they need not be 

proved to a mathematical certainty, “damages [for breach of contract] may not be 

awarded where they are remote or speculative. A jury must have some reasonable 

basis for the amount of its award.” Parsons, 849 So. 2d at 949. See also Ricwil, 

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Inc. v. S.L. Pappas & Co., 599 So. 2d 1126, 1132 (Ala. 1992). 

“It is true that damages may be awarded only where they are 

reasonably certain. Damages may not be based upon speculation. 

Industrial Chemical & Fiberglass Corp. v. Chandler, 547 So. 2d 

812 (Ala. 1988); see also Alabama Power service Commission, 267 

Ala. 474, 103 So. 2d 14 (1958). . . . [The plaintiff] ‘must produce 

evidence tending to show the extent of damages as a matter of just 

and reasonable inference.’ C. Gamble, Alabama Law of Damages 

§ 7-1 (2d ed. 1988), as cited in Industrial Chemical, supra, at 820. 

The rule that one cannot recover uncertain damages relates to the 

nature of the damages, and not to their extent. If the damage or loss 

or harm suffered is certain, the fact that the extent is uncertain does 

not prevent a recovery. Story Parchment CO. v. Paterson 

Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 51 S. Ct. 248, 75 L. Ed. 544 

(1931); see also Shook Vertagreen Credit Union, 460 So. 2d 1343 

(Ala. Civ. App. 1984).” 

Jamison, Money, Farmer & Co. v. Standeffer, 678 So. 2d 1061, 1067 (Ala. 1996). 

See also Birmingham News Co. v. Horn, 901 So. 2d 27, 65 (Ala. 2004) (damages 

for lost profits based upon tort claim are recoverable if proved with reasonable 

certainty). 

Systrends, Inc. v. Group 8760, LLC, 959 So. 2d 1052, 1075-76 (Ala. 2006) (alterations in original). 

In the present case, even if the Court had excluded both of plaintiff’s proffered experts, 

State Farm took into consideration Plaintiff’s estimate prepared by her contractor, ATA Loss 

Consulting, and documented his inspection of each area of concern depicted in the ATA estimate 

in calculating its supplemental estimate on Plaintiff’s claim. The ATA estimate clearly established 

both the causation and cost of Plaintiff’s damages. The two disparate estimates alone establish 

that a genuine dispute of fact exists as to the extent of Defendant's liability for the residence. The 

Court cannot resolve those discrepancies here on summary judgment. Further, as previously noted, 

the Court does not exclude the Plaintiff’s experts. Therefore, when considering them, the facts 

certainly are in further dispute. 

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, genuine disputes of material 

fact for jury resolution exist regarding the scope of the damage to the Property, and the cost to 

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repair those damages. Accordingly, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment is denied as to Count One Breach of Contract. 

As to Count Two Bad Faith, Plaintiff explicitly states that she “does not object to State 

Farm’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s bad faith claim (Count II).” Doc. 49 at 3. 

Therefore, Plaintiff has effectively conceded it and the Court need not analyze it further. Therefore, 

summary judgment is granted as to Count Two, Bad Faith. 

V. CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing discussion and analysis, it is ORDERED that State Farm Fire and 

Casualty Company’s Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Eduard Badiu, PhD, P.E. (Doc. 36) 

and Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Dennis James (Doc. 37) are DENIED and State Farm 

Fire and Casualty Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 38) is GRANTED in part 

and DENIED in part. The motion for summary judgment is denied as to breach of contract and 

granted as to bad faith. Therefore, the case will proceed to trial on the remaining claim (Count One 

breach of contract). 

DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of January 2024. 

 /s/ Terry F. Moorer 

TERRY F. MOORER 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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