Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-04115/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-04115-42/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 15:15 Antitrust Litigation

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE KOREAN RAMEN ANTITRUST 

LITIGATION

Case No. 13-cv-04115-WHO 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS FOR 

CLASS CERTIFICATION

Re: Dkt. Nos. 361, 364, 490, 492

INTRODUCTION

Defendants Nongshim Co., Ltd., Nongshim America, Inc. (collectively Nongshim), Ottogi 

Co, Ltd., and Ottogi America, Inc. (collectively Ottogi), allegedly conspired, along with Samyang 

Foods Co. Ltd., and Korea Yakult Co. Ltd. (collectively “conspirators”) to raise the price of 

Korean Noodles1in Korea and in the United States.

2

 Two groups of plaintiffs in these 

consolidated cases – Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs (DPPs), food retailers and distributors that 

purchased Korean Noodles directly from defendants,

3

and Indirect Purchaser Plaintiffs (IPPs),

individuals who purchased Korean Noodles manufactured by defendants from non-party retailers 

in California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Michigan, Florida, and New York4– now move for class 

 

1 Korean Noodles are defined as by plaintiffs as Nongshim and Ottogi branded bag, cup, or bowl 

ramen, including fried, dried, fresh and frozen noodle products. DPP Mot. at 2, n6.

2

Samyang Foods Co. Ltd. and Sam Yang (USA), Inc. settled with the plaintiffs and judgment has 

been entered against them. Dkt. Nos. 398, 399. Korea Yakult Co. Ltd. was dismissed. Dkt. No. 

115.

3

The named DPP plaintiffs are: The Plaza Market, Plaintiff Pacific Groservice, Inc. d/b/a/ Pitco 

Foods, Summit Import Corporation, and Rockman Company U.S.A. Inc. 

4

The named IPP plaintiffs are: Stephen Fenerjian, Joyce Beamer, Kendal Martin, Anthony An, 

Eleanor Pelobello, Jill Bonnington, Kenny Kang, Christina Nguyen, Thu-Thuy Nguyen, Yim Ha 

Nobel, Ji Choi, and Charles Chung.

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certification, arguing that the Korean conspiracy impacted the price of Korean Noodles sold in the 

United States and that they paid more for Korean Noodles than they would have in a competitive 

market.5 

Defendants oppose certification, arguing primarily that the econometric models used by the 

DPPs’ expert (Dr. Russell W. Mangum, III) and the IPPs’ expert (Dr. Daniel A. Ackerberg) are 

inherently unreliable and the inputs they use in their models are counter-factual, so their opinions 

as to classwide injury and damages are without basis and excludable under Daubert v. Merrell 

Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Defendants also argue that the models’ inherent 

unreliability means that both sets of plaintiffs have not shown that they can prove injury on a 

classwide basis and that plaintiffs otherwise fail the acertainability, typicality, and predominance 

requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b). They stress that the court’s analysis of the expert opinions 

must be rigorous and that the experts’ evidence must be persuasive.

Defendants raise reasonable criticisms of plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions. But it is not my job 

to choose which side’s experts appear strongest, at least at this stage. Instead, I need to determine 

that the experts’ methodologies and opinions are sufficiently reliable to support certification of the 

class by a preponderance of the evidence and that the experts’ opinions are admissible. Plaintiffs 

have met that burden for certification. I GRANT their motions and DENY defendants’ Daubert

motions.

BACKGROUND

I. KOREAN MARKET AND ALLEGED CONSPIRACY

A. Korean Ramen Noodles in Korea and the United States

During the relevant timeframe there were four main entities in the Korean Noodle6 market: 

 

5

The DPPs allege a cause of action for price-fixing conspiracy in violation of Sections 1 and 3 of 

the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3. The IPPs allege causes of action for: (i) price-fixing 

conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1; (ii) price-fixing conspiracy 

in violation of California’s Cartwright Act, Cal. Bus. & Code §§ 16700, et seq.; (iii) violations of 

antitrust and restraint of trade laws of California, Michigan, Hawaii, and New York; (iv) violations 

of state consumer protection laws of California, Florida, and Massachusetts; and (v) unjust 

enrichment and disgorgement under the common laws of Hawaii and Massachusetts. Dkt. No. 121

¶¶ 170-214.

6 Defendants do not take issue with how plaintiffs have defined Korean Noodles, but assert there 

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defendants Nongshim Korea and Ottogi Korea, settled-defendant Samyang Foods Co., and 

dismissed-defendant Korea Yakult. Nongshim was the dominant company, possessing 

approximately 70% of the Korean Noodle market share in Korea. Declaration of Russell W. 

Mangum, III (Dkt. No. 363-3) ¶ 33; Declaration of Alan J. Cox (Dkt. No. 441-6) ¶¶ 13, 127. 

Ottogi had between 9-12% of the market from 2000 through 2007, Samyang between 10-11%, and 

Yakult between 2 and 6%. Mangum Decl. ¶ 68; see also Dosker Decl., Ex. 1 at 11 (Nongshim 

70.7%, Ottogi 9.5%, Samyang 12.4%, Yakult 7.5% in 2010). Given the high level of market 

concentration for Korean Noodles in Korea, plaintiffs assert and defendants do not dispute that 

defendants jointly had the ability to raise prices of Korean Noodles in Korea. Mangum Decl. ¶¶ 

106, 127.

All four companies exported Korean Noodles to the United States, through their 

subsidiaries or otherwise related companies; Nongshim America, Inc., Ottogi America, Inc., 

Samyang (USA), Inc. and Paldo America. Nongshim America, Inc. is headquartered in Rancho 

Cucamonga, California, and has locations in California, Texas, New Jersey, Illinois, Georgia, and 

Maryland. Mangum Decl. ¶ 31. Throughout the Class Period, Nongshim Korea exported noodles 

from Korea to the United States, but in 2005, Nongshim Korea also established a factory in 

Rancho Cucamonga, California, to manufacture Korean Noodles. Mangum Decl. ¶ 32. No other 

defendants or co-conspirators had manufacturing facilities in the United States. Id. Prior to 2005, 

the Korean Noodles sold by Ottogi America in the United States were manufactured by Ottogi 

Ramen in South Korea and sold to Ottogi Korea, who either sold to exporters in Korea (who 

imported into the United States) or sold directly to United States distributors. Declaration of 

Joseph P. Grasser (Dkt. No. 407-1) Ex. 4 (Deposition Transcript of Min Hwan Choi), 7:5-8:11, 

16:22-17:2. Defendant Ottogi America, Inc. was formed in 2005 and is headquartered in Gardena, 

California. Mangum Decl. ¶ 35. Once Ottogi America existed, Ottogi Korea continued to 

purchase the noodles from an Ottogi Ramen affiliate in Korea, but the noodles were sold 

 

are about 150 different products in the Korean market, which contain noodles of different 

thicknesses, weights, and densities; a variety of flavors and added ingredients; and different 

packaging (e.g., bags, bowls or cups). Declaration of Mark C. Dosker (Dkt. No. 406-1), Ex. 1 at 

2-6.

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exclusively in the United States by Ottogi America to various United States-based distributors. 

Choi Depo. Tr. 15:6-17, 17:20-18:8; see also Declaration of Ki Su Jeong ¶¶ 3-5.

According to plaintiffs, Korean Noodles have a unique flavor profile and are different from 

Japanese or Chinese ramen products (which tend to be less spicy). Mangum Decl. ¶ 61; 

Ackerberg Decl. at 9-10.7 Because of their unique flavor profile, they were marketed to specific 

communities in the United States. Mangum Decl. ¶ 60.8 Korean ramen products in the United 

States were positioned as high-end or premium and “not in competition with,” the Japanese ramen 

brands Nissin and Maruchan. Mangum Decl. ¶ 62; Mangum Reply Decl. ¶¶ 42-48; Ackerberg 

Decl. at 10-14; Ackerberg Reply Decl. at 14-17.9 However, Korean Noodles are interchangeable 

with each other. Mangum Decl. ¶¶ 83, 85-90.10 Defendants contend that in the relevant market –

the United States – Korean Noodles are in competition with Japanese, Chinese, and domesticallyproduced instant ramen noodles. Cox Decl. ¶¶ 133-137. Cox asserts that substitution between 

Japanese and Korean Noodles is likely, especially at the higher “premium end” where much of the 

Korean and some Japanese noodles are positioned. Cox Decl. ¶¶ 142-44.

Defendants characterize the United States market as much more competitive than, and 

 

7

See Declaration of Stephanie Y. Cho (Dkt. No. 363-5), Ex. 7 (2003 Nongshim Factbook) at p. 

16; Cho Decl., Ex. 10 (Nongshim 2004 Annual Report); Cho Decl., Ex. 5 (Nongshim 2005 Annual 

Report).

8 Cho Decl., Ex. 12 (NSK0091453) at p. 10; Cho Decl., Ex. 7 (Nongshim 2003 Factbook) at p. 16 

(“[b]y targeting Korean Americans and locals, exports to the U.S[.] increased by 14.2% over the 

previous year”); Cho Decl., Ex. 8 (Nongshim 2008 Annual Report) at p. 41 (“[t]argeting over 1.4 

million ethnic Koreans living in the United States, we have exported instant noodles to Los 

Angeles since 1971”).

9 Cho Decl., Ex. 6 (NSA0179630) (Krith Roth e-mail); Cho Decl., Ex. 7 (Nongshim 2003 Fact 

Book) at p. 16 (“Currently three Japanese firms, Maruchan, Nissin and Sanyo, have an oligopoly 

in the U.S[.] market. The three firms are competing on low-priced products, whereas Nong Shim 

is focused on differentiating itself through high-end products.”); Cho Decl., Ex. 8 (Nongshim 2008 

Annual Report) at p. 41 (“Shin Ramyun is sold for 90 cents United States, two to three times 

higher than that of Japanese companies such as Nissin Foods or Maruchan. Such a price 

differential makes an impression on local consumers as a premium brand.”); Cho Decl., Ex. 9 

(Deposition of Whiting Wu, plaintiff Summit Import Corporation) at 63:16-19; 24-25 (“Within the 

trade, we call them Korean noodles, Korean ramen. We just basically classify them into Korean, 

Japanese, Chinese. Each with their own . . . style . . . .” “Each ha[s] their own characteristics.”).

10 Cho Decl., Ex. 3 (Deposition of Bong-Hoon Kim) at 134:7-12 (“the companies in

the same industry means [] the companies that make Ramen—in this case, Nongshim, Samyang,

Paldo, Ottogi.”).

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starkly different from, the Korean market. In the United States, Japanese-style ramen dominates, 

while Korean, Chinese, and domestically produced products have much smaller shares but have 

been growing in popularity. Cox Decl. ¶ 38. So while Nongshim America sells 90% of the 

Korean Noodles in the United States market, that accounts for just 13% of total instant ramen sales 

in the United States. Cox Decl. ¶ 38. Ottogi’s share of the United States market is much smaller. 

Id. Within the Korean Noodle portion of the United States instant ramen market, however, during 

the relevant time period Nongshim and Ottogi accounted for 93.4% of the sales of Korean 

Noodles. Mangum Decl. ¶ 107. This high level of concentration, according to plaintiffs, meant 

that defendants jointly had the ability to raise prices for the distinct United States Korean Noodle 

market. Mangum Decl. ¶ 108.

According to plaintiffs, the raw material costs for Korean Noodles manufactured in Korea 

(looking to market data and Nongshim’s own documents) remained fairly stable with slight 

increases from 2000 through mid-2007, when raw material and fuel costs increased and production 

costs increased starkly. Mangum Decl. ¶¶ 72-76. For noodles manufactured in the United States

by Nongshim, costs only rose slightly between 2006 and 2010. Mangum Decl. ¶ 78. According to 

Mangum, the costs do not match or justify the increases in prices. Mangum Decl. ¶¶ 79-81. A 

comparison between costs of goods sold (COGS) and prices by Mangum shows that the “delta”

between those measures almost tripled by the end of the conspiracy period, after removing

overhead costs. Mangum Reply Decl. ¶ 27 & Exhibit 29.1-R.

Defendants’ expert Cox has a number of explanations for rising prices, which are in his 

view inconsistent with a conspiracy to fix prices. He concludes that prices among all ramen 

producers (including Japanese, Thai, and Chinese producers) rose during the relevant period,

rising 60% between 2005 and 2010 along. Cox Decl. ¶ 50. He also notes that demand for Korean 

Noodles in the United States increased during the relevant time period, with Nongshim’s sales in 

the United States almost doubling between 2003 and 2010, while Ottogi’s sales grew by a factor 

of almost five during the same time period. Cox Decl. ¶¶ 52-53. Cox also focuses on profit 

margins, asserting that Nongshim America’s profit margin in the relevant timeframe fluctuated 

from 0.3% to 4.7% (which was much lower than Japanese and United States-based competitors

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during that timeframe). Cox Decl. ¶¶ 59-60. Cox also determined that Nongshim and Ottogi’s 

profit margins were very similar during the alleged collusive periods as compared to non-collusive 

periods. Cox Decl. ¶ 62.

Plaintiffs contend that wholesale prices of Korean Noodles in the United States are set 

according to price lists, which are not typically individually tailored, and any discounts are driven 

by volume purchasing or early payment. Mangum Decl. ¶ 64. Defendants counter that Nongshim 

set its prices for product manufactured in America by adding 3 to 5 percent on top of its costs, so 

the prices after 2005 were driven by United States costs. Dosker Decl., Ex. 7. And while 

Nongshim America modified its price list six times during the class period, each time the 

implementation of the price change varied and “some types” of unidentified customers were not 

affected. Cox Decl. ¶¶ 79, 110. Ottogi contends it used a number of different price lists for

different types of customers in different geographic areas. Jeong Decl. ¶ 6 & Exs. A, E, L. These 

lists were modified during the class period numerous times, on different dates, and with respect to 

different products for different customers. Jeong Decl. ¶ 8. Both defendants also deviated from 

their prices lists by offering “frequent, substantial and unique” discounts and promotions. Jeong 

Decl. ¶ 8; Cox Decl. Exs. 13.1-13.10, 14-1-14.5. Therefore, the actual price paid by a DPP 

depended on any number of customer specific factors like customer type, type of product, 

purchase volume, inventory level, season, and geographic location. Cox Decl. ¶¶ 87-89, 98. 

Named DPPs admit that they received individualized discounts, but argue the discounts were 

typically small and not a regular occurrence. Mangum Reply Decl. ¶¶ 133, 138. However, the 

prices actually paid by the DPPs are documented in defendants’ transaction data. 

Defendants assert that there was even more variety in end-consumer prices because the 

products were sold through a chain of intermediaries at different prices. Cox Decl. ¶¶ 308, 324. 

Sometimes DPPs were retailers who sold directly to customers. Jeong Decl. ¶ 4. Other times, 

distributors were DPPs who then sold to retailers who then sold to consumers. Id. Some retailers 

bought both from Ottogi and also from distributors (and therefore are DPPs or IPPs, depending on 

the purchase). Id.

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B. The Alleged Price Fixing Conspiracy in Korea

Plaintiffs allege that starting at the end of 2000 or the beginning of 2001, representatives of 

all four conspirators met at a hotel in Seoul and agreed to a specific protocol to raise factory-level 

(wholesale) prices for their Korean Noodles.11 It was agreed that Nongshim, as the market leader, 

would generally increase prices first, and the other defendants would raise prices shortly 

thereafter.12 The defendants allegedly met again on March 28, 2001, where the companies’ 

executives had gathered to attend the Ramen Transaction Order Association (the “RTOA” or 

“Ramen Conference”). According to plaintiffs, senior representatives from Nongshim, Ottogi, 

Yakult, and Samyang met at least twice and discussed a “very broad” range of topics, but 

specifically including Korean Noodle price increases and the need to “make sure” that the price is 

appropriate “to make a profit.”13

As a result of these meetings, plaintiffs allege that the conspirators implemented the priceraising plan first discussed in the Seoul hotel. Nongshim would announce a price increase for its 

Korean Noodles and the other companies would follow shortly thereafter.14 Pursuant to the 

alleged conspiracy, Nongshim announced its first price increases on May 10, 2011, and the other 

conspirators announced that they were “contemplating” price increases as well, and all of them 

increased factory prices between May 14 and May 30, 2001. The conspirators agreed on five 

subsequent price increases between October 2002 and April 2008. Mangum Decl. ¶¶ 40, 48. The 

conspiracy ended in 2010 when Samyang took the lead in decreasing its prices to “apologize to 

 

11 Cho Decl, Ex. 2 (Deposition of Jung-Soo Kim) at 38:9-15, 39:23-40:2.

12 Id. at 38:12-15 (Samyang executive reporting on meeting); id. at 41:15-18 (“[t]he report that I 

received from” the meeting was that “if Nongshim raised the price, the other companies will 

follow”); id. at 56:17-57:4.

13 Cho Decl., Ex. 13 (Deposition of Soo-Chang Ahn) at 72:4-13; id. at 43:20-24; 59:15-60:2. 

60:21-22; 64:9-11; 69:6-72:19; 77:7-80:10.

14 See Cho Decl., Ex. 2 (Jung-Soo Kim Dep.) at 131:14-18 (“[I]f Nongshim raised the price, then

[Samyang] would raise price, and Ottogi would have raised the price after we raised our price.”); 

id. at 93:22-94:8 (agreeing there was a “consensus between Nongshim and Samyang and Ottogi 

and Paldo that Nongshim should raise the price of Korean Ramen noodles and that Samyang, 

Paldo, and Ottogi would then follow that price”).

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our customers” for the previous price increases.15 Plaintiffs’ experts opine that the pricing 

behavior of Korean Noodles during the class period by the conspirators is consistent with “price 

leadership cartel behavior.” Mangum Decl. ¶¶ 91, 93. 

The Korean conspirators effectuated the conspiracy by sharing with each other non-public 

pricing information and plans with respect to prices through in-person meetings, telephone 

conversations, emails, and faxes.

16

 This included sensitive management and price-related 

information, including sales results, business support strategies, plans for new product releases, 

sales promotion and advertisement plans, in order to ensure that each company would agree to the 

price increases.17 Plaintiffs contend that departments in each of the conspirator companies were 

set up to effectuate the information exchange.18 Plaintiffs assert that while Nongshim and Ottogi 

either negligently or intentionally destroyed records of the communications between them, 

Samyang’s marketing department maintained a portable hard drive on which it kept copies of 

communications between the conspirators (Samyang Hard Drive).19 

Defendants vigorously contest the allegations and evidence regarding a conspiracy. Much 

of plaintiffs’ evidence supporting the “information exchange” portion of the alleged conspiracy 

comes from information on the Samyang Hard Drive. Defendants make numerous evidentiary 

 

15 Cho Decl., Ex. 2 (Jung-Soo Kim Dep.) at 92:12-17.

16 Cho Decl., Ex. 13 (Soo-Chang Ahn Dep.) at 88:17-18.

17 “Price list[s], competitors weekly trend report[s], DAUM mailbox or—and the competitors’ 

events, advertising campaign, and personnel or organizational chart, competitors’ regular event, 

competitors’ price increase, competitors’ new product, competitors’ sales figures, competitors’ 

strategy.” Cho Decl., Ex. 16 (Deposition of Jeong-Eun Park Dep.) at 65:10-17; id. at 17:13-16 

(conspirators exchanged detailed information, including “[m]anagement strategy, price increase, 

and sales strategy after price increase, [and] new product information”); see also Cho Decl., Ex. 

54 (Deposition of Bong-Hoon Kim) at 128:13-16 (“[I]f we [Samyang] do not raise our price more 

than a month after [Nongshim] raised their price, then we start getting calls from them or hearing 

from them.”).

18 Cho Decl., Ex. 14 (Deposition of Jin-Woo Seo) at 16:10-16; Cho Decl., Ex. 2 (Jung-Soo Kim 

Dep.) at 182:23-183:4 (market research team’s purpose as “[n]ot just to exchange pricing 

information, but also to learn about what is going on with the competitors. So learning about the 

pricing change, price increase or decrease, would be one of the tasks of the team”).

19 Cho Decl., Ex. 16 (Jeong-Eun Park Dep.) at 16:11-16 (Samyang Hard Drive included 

“information that [Samyang] exchanged with competitors with respect to Ramen”); id. at 27:3-

28:3.

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objections to the authenticity and admissibility of documents from that drive, arguing that the hard 

drive was corrupted, the records are unreliable, and defendants’ witnesses uniformly testified they 

did not recall or did not author various documents purportedly secured from the Hard Drive. 

On the merits, defendants argue that the price of Korean Noodles was de facto controlled 

by the Korean government because of its importance as staple food and the resulting impact prices 

of ramen could have on the economy. Cox. Decl. ¶¶ 68-69. Under the government controls 

existing at the relevant time, Nongshim as the market leader “petitioned” the government for 

permission to raise prices in the Korean market. Only after numerous meetings, and only if the 

government consented, could Nongshim raise its prices. Cox. Decl. ¶¶ 68-72.

20

 Nongshim’s 

competitors treated Nongshim’s newly raised prices as a ceiling and always stayed at or below it. 

Cox Decl. ¶ 75. Defendants point out that while in July 2012 the Korean Fair Trade Commission 

(KFTC) found that Nongshim, Ottogi, Samyang and Yakult conspired to raise prices and imposed 

significant fines on them, that decision and the fines were overturned by the Korean Supreme 

Court in December 2015.21 

II. THE IMPACT IN THE UNITED STATES

Plaintiffs allege that the six price increases agreed to by the conspirators led to price 

increases in the United States. Mangum Decl. ¶¶ 44-45; 138-146. Plaintiffs rely both on 

defendants’ admissions that United States prices were set based off of Korean prices,

22 and on

 

20 Plaintiffs argue that the Korean government’s preapproval process was “not legally enforceable” 

and was used to provide only non-binding “administrative guidance.” See Cho Supp. Decl., Exh. 3 

(Declaration of Bong-ik Kim) (NSKHC00005269-70T)). Plaintiffs also argue that the guidance 

did not prevent price collusion at or below any government guided cap. Cho Supp. Decl., Exh. 14 

(Deposition of Soo-Chang Ahn) at 164:16-166:10.

21 The Korean Supreme Court determined there was insufficient evidence of an express concerted 

agreement to fix prices, based on a lack of direct, non-hearsay evidence regarding the alleged 

initiation meeting in 2000. Dosker Decl., Ex. 36. The Court also concluded there was insufficient 

evidence to show a tacit agreement to fix prices, in light of the history of government regulation of 

the ramen market, the history of the market share-dominant company (here Nongshim) increasing 

its prices and competitors following suit (“follow-the-leader-pricing”), and the differences in the 

amount of price increases and the timing of the price increases by the “followers” after Nongshim 

acted. Id. There is no discussion in the Supreme Court’s decision of export markets or 

international markets. 

22 Cho Decl., Ex. 11 (NSK0134526T from 2008) at p. 2; Cho Decl., Ex. 37 (NSA0009654 from 

2010) at NSA0009655; Cho Decl., Ex. 39 (NSKHC-K00000742Tfrom 2003); Cho Decl., Ex. 43 

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evidence that price increases in the United States market followed closely after price increases in 

the Korean market. Mangum Decl. ¶¶ 97, 98-99 (United States price increases uniformly followed 

Korean ones, except with respect to first Nongshim Korea price increase [which was not 

implemented in the United States market] and the 2006 Nongshim USA price increase [which did 

not follow a Korean price increase]). With respect to the Nongshim products manufactured in the 

United States, plaintiffs likewise allege that they were priced with reference to Korean prices.23 

Mangum, the DPPs’ expert, relies on several factors to conclude that defendants’ antitrust 

conduct impacted DPPs in the United States: (i) information about the markets and the market 

concentrations, and therefore, the power of defendants and the conspirators to raise prices in Korea 

and in the United States; (ii) correlations between prices charged in Korea and the United States

by the conspirators; (iii) correlations between prices as they were raised in Korea and then in the 

United States; and (iv) a multiple regression “hedonic” or “dummy variable” analysis showing for 

each of the six price increases a positive and statistically significant coefficient. More specifically, 

Mangum’s econometric regression analysis shows that for 299 DPPs whose data was included in 

the analysis, only 5 (or 2% of the class or 0.019 of total purchases) did not suffer prices higher 

than Mangum’s estimated but-for price (the more competitive, lower price that would have existed 

but-for the antitrust conspiracy). Mangum Decl. ¶ 180. Using that base model analysis and 

excluding the transactions that were not higher than the but-for price, Mangum calculates classwide aggregate damages on sales of $393.6 million at $115.7 million, and asserts that the products 

were priced on average 44% higher than they should have been in the but-for world. Mangum 

Decl. ¶¶ 177, 187. 

Ackerberg, the IPPs’ expert, concludes that defendants’ antitrust conduct impacted IPPs in 

the United States by relying on a similar model as Mangum, except that he uses an averaged price 

index (calculated on a monthly basis across different product groups) and a monthly 

 

(OTGKR-0020731T and OTGKR-0020732T-37T from 2008); Cho Decl., Ex. 42 (OTGKR0018885T from 2010); Cho Decl., Ex. 45 (OTGAM-0040220T—21T from 2010).

23 Cho Decl., Ex. 44 (NSA0015298) (undated pricing spreadsheet); see also Cho Decl., Ex. 11 

(NSK0134526T) at p. 2 (meeting minutes between NSK and NSA employees from November 

2008).

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manufacturing cost index. Based on Ackerberg’s regression model with his different inputs, 

Ackerberg determined that DPPs suffered an average overcharge of 31.3% and $130,358,002 in 

overcharge damages. Ackerberg Decl. at 35. He also provides a lower estimate of aggregate 

damages if a nationwide class is not certified under California law. Id. at 36. Ackerberg opines 

that wholesalers and retailers passed on 100% of the overcharges to the IPPs based on (i) 

testimony from retailers as well as an analysis of manufacturer prices compared to the retail price 

paid and (ii) a review of sample data from distributors and retailers which showed pass on rates 

between 93% to 138%. For purposes of his damages estimate, he uses a conservative 100% rate 

as the pass-through. Ackerberg Decl. at 30-35. 

Defendants challenge the reliability of plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions and seek to exclude 

them under Daubert. Defendants’ expert Cox seeks to undermine Mangum’s showing on impact 

in the United States by arguing that Mangum’s model is based on inaccurate prices and artificial 

costs estimates, and that any price increases were the result of increases in costs (because of 

increasing demand, increased marketing expenditures, and increases in fixed costs) and not 

collusion. Cox argues that Mangum’s analysis is fatally flawed because: (i) he did not consider 

the actual price paid by DPPs after discounts and incentives; (ii) he artificially inflated his but-for 

price to support an unrealistic conclusion that there was an average 44% overcharge during the 

class period; and (iii) his hedonic or “dummy variable” model was constructed without the 

appropriate variables, undermining its predictive value.

Defendants attack Ackerberg on similar grounds, adding that Ackerberg failed to control 

appropriately for costs in part because he improperly averaged costs among products when costsper-product varied widely and he averaged costs between Nongshim and Ottogi when their costs 

differed significantly. Cox Decl. ¶¶ 157-168. As with Mangum, Cox also argues that the prices 

used by Ackerberg do not take into account the actual prices paid including significant discounts 

and incentives. Cox. Decl. ¶ 181. With respect to the IPPs more specifically, Cox faults 

Ackerberg’s “pass-through” analysis because: (i) it rests on his and Mangum’s faulty assumption 

that there was classwide impact; (ii) his pass-through analysis (finding pass-through rates between 

93 to 138 percent) was based on a far-too limited dataset (2 retailers and 2 wholesalers); and (iii) 

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Ackerberg ignores intermediaries. Cox Decl. ¶¶ 306, 307, 328. Finally, Cox criticizes

Ackerberg’s attempt to allocate damages to specific states according to their Korean population, 

which contradicts facts showing increasing purchases by Hispanic and other non-Korean 

customers in the relevant timeframe. Id. ¶¶ 335-336. 

Cox performs his own analysis to establish a but-for price, based on a “more general” 

“forecasting” approach (contrasted with Mangum and Ackerberg’s “dummy variable” approach)

relying on observed data in the non-collusive period. Cox Decl. ¶¶ 204-205; Mangum Reply Decl. 

¶ 160. Under Cox’s approach, the but-for prices are much closer to the real world prices charged 

in the conspiracy period (and sometimes exceeded actual prices). Cox Decl. ¶ 243. Cox also ran 

Mangum’s and Ackerberg’s models after “correcting” for alleged “errors” in prices and costs, 

showing an average overcharge from Mangum’s model of just 1.85% and classwide damages at $7 

million. Cox Decl. ¶ 245. That analysis also reduced Ackerberg’s average overcharge to 7.2% 

and classwide damage to $27.4 million. Cox Decl. ¶ 249. Cox emphasizes that both of these 

partially “corrected” calculations still overstate the damages because not all errors could be 

corrected using Mangum and Ackerberg’s models. When Cox used his “improved costs and 

prices data” and tests specifically for whether the conspiracy impacted different types of 

consumers differently, that analysis shows negative impact, zero impact, and positive impact 

which varied according to the size of the purchases made by the consumer. Id. ¶¶ 253, 279-280. 

All of this, according to Cox, “implies” that plaintiffs’ expert models “as presented” are incapable 

of reliably estimating overcharges across all proposed class members. Id. ¶ 255. 

Mangum and Ackerberg charge Cox with his own set of errors and over-estimations. With 

respect to Cox’s model, plaintiffs’ experts criticize Cox’s approach as less precise (because it uses 

less data) and less flexible (it is unable to account for more factors). Mangum Reply Declaration 

(Dkt. No. 466-8) ¶¶ 50, 164; Ackerberg Rebuttal Declaration (Dkt. No. 473-2) at 26-27. With 

respect to Cox’s assertion that their results are “untenable,” Ackerberg argues that Cox’s reliance 

on defendants’ own reports of their net and gross profit margins (to assert plaintiffs’ models would 

have them operating at a loss) is misplaced because Cox’s use of “accounting costs” as opposed to 

“true costs” is not reliable. Ackerberg Reb. Decl. at 33. With respect to pricing differentials, 

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Mangum points out that Cox’s samples – used by Cox to show large differences in prices paid by 

DPPs – are themselves extreme and not typical, and presents counter-evidence that the “vast 

majority of prices” fall within a narrow corridor where variables are driven mostly by geography. 

Mangum Reply Decl. ¶¶ 52-59, 62, 66.

In his reply declaration, Mangum clarifies that his prior cost index was the best measure he 

had at the time of his initial report based on his incomplete data, but that with the production of 

additional information from defendants, he was able to construct a more refined cost series based 

on product-specific costs but with a focus on volume (which Cox allegedly continues to ignore) 

and also to refine his model to account for lag due to transportation time. Mangum Reply Decl. ¶¶ 

75, 114. He disputes Cox’s characterization of his analysis as ignoring or under-assessing 

discounts and promotions in prices. Mangum Reply Decl. ¶¶ 123-128. Running his regression 

model with the refined data, Mangum still shows overcharges ranging between 29% and 38%. 

Mangum Reply Decl. ¶¶ 197-200. Under that refined analysis, less than 1.5% of total purchasers 

were not impacted by the overcharges, accounting for 0.01% of all transactions. Id. 203. 

Damages for the class under the refined data set were $83,642,717. Id. ¶ 204. 

In his rebuttal declaration, Ackerberg responds to some of the criticisms and also uses 

more refined cost measures (based on additional cost data provided by defendants), adds a new 

dummy variable to address post-collusion behavior, and included a lag time for costs (to account 

for shipping). Ackerberg Reb. Decl. at 20-24. Those refinements did not materially change his 

conclusion of impact, and still showed an overcharge ranging between 30% and 31.5%. 

Ackerberg Reb. Decl. at 32. Ackerberg also defends his pass-through calculations and points out 

that Cox’s own analysis supports a finding that all retailers passed the overcharges through and 

does nothing to undermine Ackerberg’s use of a conservative 100% pass-through rate. Id. at 35-

37. Finally, Ackerberg defends his use of Korean population as an initial way to address 

allocation of damages between states, but acknowledges that his model can accommodate other 

ethnicities as well, including the growing sales to Hispanic and other populations. Id. at 38.

In his Reply declaration (to which plaintiffs’ experts did not have an opportunity to 

respond), Cox uses new information from Nongshim employees to support his argument that 

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Mangum and Ackerberg undercounted discounts. Cox Reply Declaration (Dkt. No. 476-8) ¶¶ 50-

58. Based on this new information, he also alleges plaintiffs’ experts double or triple counted 

some purchases. Cox Reply Decl. ¶¶ 59-64. Finally, Cox strengthens his criticism of the 

plaintiffs’ regression models for an excessive amount of multicollinearity and their failure to 

consider important variables. Cox Reply Decl. ¶¶ 7-29. 

III. CLASSES SOUGHT TO BE CERTIFIED

The DPPs seek to certify the following class:

All persons and entities in the United States and its territories who 

purchased Korean Noodles directly from Defendants Nong Shim 

Co., Ltd., Nongshim America, Inc., Ottogi Co., Ltd., or Ottogi 

America, Inc. at any time from April 1, 2003 through January 31, 

2010. The Class excludes the Defendants Samyang Foods Co., Ltd., 

Samyang (USA), Inc., Korea Yakult, Co., Ltd., Paldo Co., Ltd. and 

any of their current or former parents, subsidiaries or affiliates. The 

Class also excludes all judicial officers presiding over this action 

and their immediate family members and staff, and any juror 

assigned to this action.

DPP Mot. at 2.

The IPPs seek to certify the following class:

All persons and entities that purchased “Korean Ramen Noodles” 

anywhere in the United States [or such subset of the United States 

market as the Court may elect to certify] for their own use and not 

for resale, from March 1, 2003 through January 31, 2010. For 

purposes of this definition, “Korean Ramen Noodles” means 

Nongshim, Ottogi and Samyang branded bag, cup or bowl ramen, 

including fried, dried, fresh and frozen noodle products. Specifically 

excluded from this class are any Defendant; the officers, directors, 

or employees of any Defendant; any entity in which any Defendant 

has a controlling interest; and any affiliate, legal representative, heir, 

or assign of any Defendant. Also excluded are the judicial officers to 

whom this case is assigned and any member of such judicial 

officers’ immediate family.

IPP Mot. at i.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. EXCLUSION OF EXPERT OPINIONS UNDER DAUBERT

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 allows a qualified expert to testify “in the form of an opinion 

or otherwise” where:

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 

will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine 

a fact in issue;

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(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; 

and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the 

facts of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Expert testimony is admissible under Rule 702 if it is both relevant and reliable. See 

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). “[R]elevance means that the 

evidence will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.” Cooper v. Brown,

510 F.3d 870, 942 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Primiano v. Cook, 598 F.3d 558, 564 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(“The requirement that the opinion testimony assist the trier of fact goes primarily to relevance.”) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

Under the reliability requirement, the expert testimony must “ha[ve] a reliable basis in the 

knowledge and experience of the relevant discipline.” Primiano, 598 F.3d at 565. To ensure 

reliability, the court must “assess the [expert’s] reasoning or methodology, using as appropriate 

such criteria as testability, publication in peer reviewed literature, and general acceptance.” Id. 

These factors are “helpful, not definitive,” and a court has discretion to decide how to test 

reliability “based on the particular circumstances of the particular case.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks and footnotes omitted). “When evaluating specialized or technical expert opinion 

testimony, the relevant reliability concerns may focus upon personal knowledge or experience.” 

United States v. Sandoval-Mendoza, 472 F.3d 645, 655 (9th Cir. 2006).

The inquiry into the admissibility of expert testimony is “a flexible one” where “[s]haky 

but admissible evidence is to be attacked by cross examination, contrary evidence, and attention to 

the burden of proof, not exclusion.” Primiano, 598 F.3d at 564. “When the methodology is 

sound, and the evidence relied upon sufficiently related to the case at hand, disputes about the 

degree of relevance or accuracy (above this minimum threshold) may go to the testimony’s 

weight, but not its admissibility.” i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 852 (Fed. Cir. 

2010). The burden is on the proponent of the expert testimony to show, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that the admissibility requirements are satisfied. Lust By & Through Lust v. Merrell 

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Dow Pharm., Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 598 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Fed. R. Evid. 702 Advisory Cttee. 

Notes.

II. CLASS CERTIFICATION

Class actions are governed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs 

bear the burden of showing that they have met each of the four requirements of Rule 23(a) and at 

least one subsection of Rule 23(b). Berger v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (citing Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001)). The 

plaintiff “must actually prove – not simply plead – that their proposed class satisfies each 

requirement of Rule 23, including (if applicable) the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).” 

Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2398, 2412 (2014) (citing Comcast Corp v. 

Behrend, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 1431-32 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551-

52 (2011)).

The court’s “class certification analysis must be rigorous and may entail some overlap with 

the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim.” Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and 

Trust Funds, 133 S.Ct. 1184, 1194 (2013) (quoting Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2551 (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). These analytical principles govern both Rule 23(a) and 23(b). Behrend, 133 

S.Ct. at 1342. However, “Rule 23 grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits 

inquiries at the certification stage.” Amgen, 133 S.Ct. at 1194-95. “Merits questions may be 

considered to the extent – but only to the extent – that they are relevant to determining whether 

Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.” Id.

As the Ninth Circuit clarified in Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 982 (9th 

Cir. 2011), simply because an expert opinion clears the “scientifically reliable and relevant” hurdle 

of Daubert, does not mean it passes the “rigorous analysis” required by Rule 23 to support class 

certification. Instead, at class certification a court must determine whether the expert’s evidence 

supporting certification is persuasive following a rigorous analysis of the same. Id. at 983-84. As 

part of that rigorous analysis, a court may be required to resolve factual disputes between the 

plaintiffs’ and defendants’ experts if those disputes go to whether or not the injury at issue can be 

shown on a classwide basis. Id. 

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Under Rule 23(a), the class may be certified only if: (1) the class is so numerous that 

joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) questions of law or fact exist that are common to the 

class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses 

of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 

class. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). A plaintiff must also establish that one or more of the grounds for 

maintaining the suit are met under Rule 23(b): (1) that there is a risk of substantial prejudice from 

separate actions; (2) that declaratory or injunctive relief benefitting the class as a whole would be 

appropriate; or (3) that common questions of law or fact predominate and the class action is 

superior to other available methods of adjudication. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).

DISCUSSION

I. DPP MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION 

Defendants do not contest numerosity, and I find the proposed class is numerous as it 

includes approximately 229 DPP entities. Mangum Decl. ¶ 180. Defendants do not contest 

ascertainability or adequacy of plaintiffs’ counsel, and I find that the DPP class members are

ascertainable and the proposed class representatives and their law firms are adequate under Rule 

23(a).24

Instead, defendants argue that individual questions predominate as to both injury and 

damages, and that the named DPP class representatives are not typical and cannot represent the 

larger DPP class.

A. Predominance of Common Questions under Rule 23(b)(3)

Defendants do not dispute that plaintiffs will attempt to show through common, classwide 

proof the existence and nature of the conspiracy (although they vigorously dispute that a 

conspiracy existed). The question is whether plaintiffs have shown that they will be able to prove 

injury and damages through common proof. Defendants contend that individualized issues as to 

 

24 On February 3, 2014, I appointed two firms Hausfeld LLP and Glancy Binkow & Goldberg 

LLP as interim class counsel for the DPPs based on a showing of experience and adequacy. Dkt. 

No. 22. Those firms have continued to vigorously litigate this case and nothing has occurred to 

undermine my initial determination of their experience and adequacy. See also Declaration of 

Stephanie Y. Cho (Dkt. No. 363-5) ¶ 59.

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injury and damages will swamp the otherwise common questions. 

1. Injury

Plaintiffs argue that have shown that they will be able to provide injury on a classwide 

basis through three types of proof: (i) contemporaneous evidence, including defendants’ own 

documents and documents of their co-conspirators demonstrating the conspiracy in Korea and 

price increase patterns in Korea correlated to price increases in the United States; (ii) market 

evidence showing the Korean Noodle market is highly concentrated, and given their market 

shares, defendants has the power to jointly raise prices; and (iii) Mangum’s econometric 

regression analysis of market data. 

a. Mangum’s Regression Analysis

Actual Price: Defendants first attack the validity of Mangum’s model based on Mangum’s 

failure to consider discounts and incentives provided to DPPs. Cox Decl. ¶¶ 179-82. Because of 

price variability based on defendants’ promotions and individual DPPs’ purchasing power and 

negotiated discounts, according to Cox, determination of antitrust injury for each DPP requires 

individualized analyses. Cox Decl. ¶¶ 270-97. Without taking into account the actual prices paid, 

defendants argue that Mangum’s model fails to accurately determine whether class members were

injured.

The DPPs respond that the discounts have generally been accounted for in the transactional 

data provided by defendants and considered by Mangum. Mangum Reply Decl. ¶ 116.25 They 

add that even if discounts were not fully addressed by Mangum, Cox admitted that the impact of 

the discounts is “relatively small” and would not undermine Mangum’s conclusion that classwide 

injury and damage occurred. Supplemental Declaration of Stephanie Y. Cho (Dkt. No. 466-7), 

Ex. 2 (Deposition of Alan Cox.) at 154:19-155:2.26 

 

25 Plaintiffs contend that it is Cox’s model that contains an error by counting discounts twice. Id. ¶ 

116. More specifically, Mangum criticizes the discount figures Cox uses as based on discounts 

provided in the post-conspiracy period but applied to the pre-2005 period where there no evidence 

of discounts. Mangum Reply Decl. ¶¶ 137, 141-142.

26 That is likely, according to plaintiffs, because defendants’ own transaction data show that few 

customers received discounts and most transactions were not discounted. Mangum Decl. ¶¶ 139-

141; Mangum Reply Decl. ¶ 137. 

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In a reply declaration, which plaintiffs did not have an opportunity to address in their 

briefing, Cox contends that on his re-review of the Nongshim USA data (and with the benefit of 

additional information provided by Nongshim employees to interpret the transaction and discount 

data), his suspicions that Mangum failed to account for all of the discounts were confirmed. That 

is because only some of the transaction data relied on by Mangum (and by Cox initially) show net 

discounts, but there were “many transactions where the discount clearly was not included in the 

net sale price” because of how actual discounts were listed in the discount and transaction 

databases provided by Nongshim. Cox Reply Decl. ¶¶ 51-52. As a result of Mangum’s (and 

Ackerberg’s) misinterpretation of the data, according to Cox, plaintiffs ignored $1.7 million in 

discounts, in addition to ignoring $2.4 million in promotions (because as Mangum admitted, there 

was no classwide way to account for promotions). Compare Cox Reply Decl. ¶ 57 with Mangum 

Reply Decl. ¶¶ 122-123. 

That said, there is no evidence that these omissions are material to the question of injury or 

ability to prove classwide injury. Not only did Cox admit in deposition that defendants’ discounts 

and incentives had a “small impact,” even after determining that plaintiffs’ experts failed to take 

into account $4.1 million in discounts/incentives, but also he does not assert or show in his reply

declaration that the omitted the $4.1 million has a material impact on plaintiffs’ experts’ models 

and finding of classwide harm. Instead, the relevance of the omitted discounts/incentives,

according to Cox, is simply further proof of allegedly wide “price dispersion” that in Cox’s

opinion is inconsistent with allegations of a price-fixing conspiracy and creates individualized 

issues. Cox Reply Decl. ¶¶ 69-70. When pressed during oral argument on the motions for class 

certification, defense counsel admitted that in their view the impact of Mangum’s omission of the 

$4.1 million in discounts/incentives was to bolster their argument that Mangum’s models and 

analyses were incomplete and therefore unreliable. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29:10-20; 

47:21-48:3.

For current purposes – which is to assess whether the DPPs have put forth a reliable 

methodology to show impact on classwide basis – the allegedly ignored discounts/incentives have 

not been shown to be so sizable that they would undermine the reliability of Mangum’s model (or 

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its showing of classwide impact) or Mangum’s general approach.27 As the transaction and 

discount data is further clarified and reviewed, that revised data can be accommodated by

Mangum’s model. 

As to the price dispersion issue, while truly wide price dispersions between DPPs might 

undermine in part allegations of a price-fixing conspiracy,28 the evidence of the width of those 

dispersions is not clear. In his reply, Mangum points out that many of the data points Cox uses in 

an attempt to show prices vary widely are outliers that represent under 1% of the transactions 

because Cox fails to account for volume when modeling price dispersion; the existence of price 

dispersion does not undermine Mangum’s showing as to impact. Mangum Reply Decl. ¶¶ 63-66.

In short, defendants have not shown that the alleged failure of the DPPs to account for 

discounts/incentives and “actual price” materially impacts their preliminary classwide showing as 

to injury (or the utility of their regression model) to such a degree that Mangum’s opinion should 

be excluded under Daubert or his determination of classwide impact discounted.

But-For Price: Defendants also attack Mangum’s but-for price, arguing that he chose not 

to use actual data but instead based his but-for cost price on an average of production costs for 

dozens of Nongshim America products. Cox Decl. ¶ 155. According to defendants, this approach 

downplays the significance of differences between products’ ingredients and other production 

costs (e.g,. bag vs. vs. cup vs. bowl). Mangum Decl. ¶¶ 171-172. Cox argues that Mangum’s

approach is faulty because production costs vary between $0.20 to $1.26 per unit. Cox. Decl. ¶ 

161. As Mangum failed to use product-specific costs for his model, Cox argues that Mangum’s 

model assumes but does not prove injury across the different categories of products. Cox Decl. ¶¶ 

220, 286, 298-304.

In his reply declaration, Mangum justifies his average costs approach by noting that he 

 

27 The same is true of Cox’s allegation – first raised in his Reply Declaration – that plaintiffs 

double or triple counted certain transactions because of their failure to differentiate between 

purchase entries and discount entries in the data.

28 According to Cox in typical price-fixing conspiracies, there is little price dispersion as prices 

have been agreed to by the conspirators. Cox Decl. ¶ 44. The allegations here, however, are not 

that prices will be identically fixed, but that prices will be raised in a coordinated fashion.

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used a “weighted costs series,” an approach that Cox admitted reasonably accounts for and is 

appropriately used where a business produces different products with different costs (as here). 

Mangum Reply Decl. ¶ 71; see generally id. ¶¶ 78-82.29 And when Mangum uses Cox’s preferred 

cost series in his model, the result is roughly the same, showing 97% of class members were 

injured during the conspiracy. Mangum Reply Decl. ¶ 202. Plaintiffs also assert that Mangum 

was correct in not using Cox’s proposed “six-month rolling costs” averages to take account of the 

lag between manufacture, transit, and sale (use of which significantly reduces the showing of 

classwide impact). They argue that Mangum’s use of a lag approach, whereby costs are shifted by

two to three months to accommodate transit and sale, is more appropriate especially given shelf 

life issues for the perishable products at issue. Mangum Reply Decl. ¶¶ 105-110. Mangum uses 

that lag approach in support of his reply, as part of his “refinement” of his costs inputs, and his 

model continues to show significant classwide impact.

Finally, defendants criticize Mangum because he ignored Ottogi cost data altogether, and 

they argue Mangum should have followed Cox’s lead and used actual Ottogi cost information 

post-2006 and transfer pricing information between Ottogi and Ottogi Ramen (the company who 

manufactured all of Ottogi’s ramen during the relevant timeframe) to estimate pre-2006 costs. 

Mangum admits that he did not incorporate Ottogi data, but explains that decision is a rational one 

because: (a) Ottogi-specific cost data was only produced starting in 2006 (and using only a partial 

data set could lead to unexplained and invalidating differences and require finding an appropriate 

proxy for the earlier dates); (b) Nongshim’s data was broken down into “smaller constituent 

components” where Ottogi’s data was grouped into 3 larger categories (and therefore more 

susceptible to problems comparing Nongshim and Ottogi information); and (c) Nongshim Korea 

data provided an appropriate proxy for Ottogi. Mangum Reply Decl. ¶¶ 95-99. Indeed, 

 

29 Mangum also compared his weighted cost series to actual transaction prices for wheat,

vegetable oil, and labor reported by the Korean government. Mangum Reply Decl. ¶¶ 71-73, 75-

76. This data was not included in the model, but used only to double-check the accuracy of cost 

data reported by defendants. Mangum Reply Decl. ¶ 73. While defendants attempt to criticize 

Mangum for his double-check measures (e.g., Mangum should have used palm oil, not vegetable 

oil), defendants provide no examples of specific costs that were not accounted for or under 

accounted for by Mangum that would have made a material difference had they been considered. 

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defendants do not show how Mangum’s use of Nongshim cost data either actually skewed or 

otherwise undermined the reliability of his model and conclusions. 

Defendants’ criticisms as to Mangum’s costs, and the role they play in setting his but-for 

price, rest primarily on disputes of fact and the reasonableness of assumptions made by the experts 

on both sides. There is nothing in Mangum’s approach that fatally undermines the reliability of 

his methodology or model such that Mangum’s opinion should be excluded under Daubert or his 

determination of classwide impact significantly discounted.

Wrong Model/Wrong Variables: Another “intractable error” in Mangum’s approach,

according to defendants, is his use of the hedonic/dummy variable approach to estimate 

overcharges without using appropriate variables; namely, he uses variables that are highly 

correlated to each other and erase the model’s predictive values. Cox Decl. ¶¶ 206-219 

(discussing “multicollinearity”). In other words, Mangum allegedly uses as variables facts which 

have legitimate, not illegitimate, effects on price, thereby reducing the model’s ability to 

determine impact from price collusion (i.e., facts which correlate to costs of manufacture, changes 

in the Korean population, etc.).

Generally, disputes about the appropriate degree of collinearity in a regression model do 

not defeat class certification. See, e.g., In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV02509-LHK, 2014 WL 1351040, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2014) (“Other courts have admitted 

regressions even in the face of expert disagreement regarding whether collinearity posed a 

problem. . . . This is not surprising given that the concept of collinearity is not a methodology, but 

a common phenomenon that results when using the methodology of regression analysis.” (citation 

omitted)); In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., No. 06-MD-1175 JG VVP, 2014 WL 

7882100, at *19 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, No. 06-MD-1775 

JG VVP, 2015 WL 5093503 (E.D.N.Y. July 10, 2015) (“The fact that Kaplan’s model may be 

tainted by multicollinearity goes purely to its weight, and is not a reason to strike it.”).30 The DPPs 

 

30 Defendants rely on cases where expert models were excluded under Rule 702 if “severe” 

multicollinearity was shown to exist. See, e.g., Reed Const. Data Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Companies, 

Inc., 49 F. Supp. 3d 385, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff'd, 638 F. App’x 43 (2d Cir. 2016) (excluding 

expert’s method, in part, because of severe multicollinearity). At oral argument, defendants 

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and Mangum assert that some degree of collinearity is permissible and only perfect collinearity 

creates a problem (which did not occur with the variables in Mangum’s model). Mangum Reply 

Decl. ¶¶ 15, 153-60.

While Cox’s reply declaration in support of defendants’ Daubert motion focuses 

significantly on multicollinearity, his contentions rest in large part on the parties’ dispute over 

which “costs” should be used in the variables (i.e., Cox’s six-month averaged costs or Mangum’s 

two month lagged revised costs). See Cox Reply Decl. ¶¶ 11-12, 16, 30-31; see also id. ¶¶ 18-19 

(using Cox’s costs and reviewing only Ottogi’s purchases, shows little statistical significance, 

supporting Cox’s theory that the overcharge allegations are driven by Nongshim’s prices and not 

by an actual conspiracy). Cox’s multicollinearity argument also rests to a lesser extent on whether 

Mangum’s other variables correlate too much in a legitimate manner with price increases, a topic 

of dispute between the experts.31 

In sum, defendants have not shown that alleged errors by Mangum fatally undermine his 

showing of classwide injury or that his model/approach is unreliable.

b. Correlation Analysis

Finally, defendants criticize Mangum’s confirmation of his model’s conclusions by 

looking to correlation analyses between prices of products and prices as raised in Korea and the 

United States. Mangum’s correlation analysis, according to Cox, is itself riddled with mistakes, 

including imputing a United States effect on pricing decisions made in the Korean domestic 

market, relying only on Nongshim data, not using actual price data (with discounts/incentives), 

 

characterized the degree of collinearity in Mangum’s model as “severe,” but Cox says only the 

collinearity is “significant” and never characterizes it as “severe.”

31 Cox uses a different, allegedly more “general” approach called the “forecasting approach” that 

freezes in place the market dynamics existing at the end of the benchmark period, but does not 

account for changes during that period, including Ottogi America’s creation and Nongshim’s 

United States production facility. Compare Cox Decl. ¶¶ 242-55; with Mangum Reply ¶ 164-66. 

Cox also argues that Mangum’s model produced an average overcharge that is 26 points different 

than Cox’s, after Cox adjusted it to take into account the proper variables. Cox Decl. ¶¶ 157-58, 

284. But Cox does not dispute that Mangum’s model – even after “correction” by Cox—still 

shows significant classwide injury. Instead, Cox argues that Mangum’s model should have 

included a variable accounting for increased marketing to explain the growth in demand and price. 

Cox Reply. Decl. ¶ 27. 

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and ignoring correlations in price changes (degree of change) by looking only to price (absolute 

price point). Once Cox corrects those “errors,” he finds very little correlation between the 

percentage price changes between Korean ramen suppliers and the American affiliates. Cox Decl. 

¶¶ 111-12.32 Mangum not surprisingly characterizes Cox’s correlation analysis as impaired by its 

inclusion of faulty data and assumptions, including use of a too short window for comparing price 

changes (daily or weekly), where Mangum uses a longer window (during each six month interval) 

because the United States price changes did not immediately follow the Korean ones, but took 

effect within a six month window. Mangum Reply Decl. ¶¶ 36-42. 

Plaintiffs also defend Mangum’s model’s conclusions by reference to Cox’s own analysis 

that the delta between the prices charged in the United States and the costs of goods manufactured

increased substantially between the benchmark period and the last conspiracy period. Cox Rep., 

Ex. 12.2. Mangum in his reply declaration used Cox’s approach as a rough “sanity check” and 

concluded that the delta between price and COGS tripled during the overcharge period, supporting

his conclusion that there was a 44% overcharge during the conspiracy. Mangum Reply Decl. ¶¶ 

69-72, Ex. 29.1-R (using Cox’s assumptions). 

In response, defendants argue that 44% overcharge estimate is itself incredible when the 

defendants never achieved a net profit margin over 10% or a gross profit even approaching that 

much. But as Mangum explains, net/gross profits are imprecise metrics in part because 

accounting techniques can “hide” true costs and profits, and that here facilities expansion took up 

 

32 Defendants point to a case where Mangum’s testimony was rejected. In In re Florida Cement 

& Concrete Antitrust Litig., No. 09-23187-CIV, 2012 WL 27668 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2012), 

Mangum attempted to extrapolate classwide injury by using average list prices without – as here –

considering the discounts or price deviations. The court rejected that approach, because “Dr. 

Mangum did not conduct any significant analysis at the individual customer level to determine 

whether any price changes were consistent across the putative Class.” Id. at *9. Plaintiffs 

distinguish Florida Cement by pointing out that the evidence in that case showed that many 

customers’ actual prices did not correspond with defendants’ increased prices, which is not the 

situation here. In Florida Cement, Mangum’s correlation analyses were also rejected because they 

were based on “average monthly prices” but Mangum “offers no explanation as to how this 

analysis of ‘average monthly price’ establishes that individual customers were affected by the 

purported conspiracy,” and his model showed negative correlation when a separate analysis was 

done for prices paid by the ten largest customers, indicating the aggregate analysis was faulty. Id. 

at *10. No such analysis is provided by or suggested by defendants here. Most importantly, in 

Florida Cement, Mangum did not provide a regression analysis, which he did here. Florida 

Cement is not persuasive.

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much of the profit being made. Magnum Reply Decl. ¶ 27 & n.34. Therefore, according to 

Mangum, looking to the growing delta between price and COGS is more instructive. 

Again, in the end, the parties’ disputes’ regarding the reliability and the conclusions to be 

drawn from the experts’ regression models and correlations comes down to which experts input 

the more plausible facts and used the right assumptions to determine costs. DPPs have presented a 

methodology to show classwide antitrust impact from the alleged conspiracy and proven its 

relevance and reliability by a preponderance of the evidence. Defendants have not shown that 

errors in Mangum’s methodology or in the resulting modeling fatally undermine its reliability so 

that his opinions based on his model should be excluded.

c. Contemporaneous Evidence and Market Evidence

Plaintiffs also rely on anecdotal evidence of the existence of the conspiracy and its impact 

on the United States market to reinforce their econometric showing. In re High-Tech Employee 

Antitrust Litig., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1217 (N.D. Cal. 2013), Judge Koh recognized the 

established proposition that “the importance of these statistical models is diminished in light of the 

extensive documentary evidence that supports Plaintiffs’ theory of impact,” including direct and 

anecdotal evidence. Id. The direct and anecdotal evidence of the conspiracy in Korea and its 

impact in the United States market is significant, but not by any means extensive. 

Defendants argue that the evidence of the Korean conspiracy is undermined by the realities 

of the Korean pricing system and government controls, as found by the Korean Supreme Court 

when it overturned the contrary KFTC findings. They also note that plaintiffs have presented no 

evidence that the alleged conspiracy was aimed at the United States market. DPPs do not contest 

that there is no direct evidence of a conspiracy aimed at the United States, but say that their 

evidence is sufficient because it shows that the prices in the United States market were set based 

off of prices in the Korean market. 

As to the market evidence, defendants point out that plaintiffs’ experts barely address the 

fact that Korean Ramen represents less than 15% of United States instant noodles market. Instead, 

both of plaintiffs’ experts posit a smaller market – the “Korean Noodle market” – which is 

dominated by the defendants in both Korea and in the United States. Mangum Decl. ¶¶ 105-08; 

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Ackerberg Decl. at 18-19. This is part of the DPPs attempt to differentiate themselves from the 

wider instant noodle market in the United States and to support their argument that the Korean 

Noodle market in the United States is inelastic in light of Korean Noodles’ “unique” flavor profile 

and “premium” branding. 33 Cox points out that the majority of noodles sold at the “premium” 

Korean Noodle price point ($1.00 to $1.50) are Japanese ramen, Cox Reply Decl. ¶ 49, although 

the vast majority of the Japanese ramen are sold at the lower non-premium price points. Mangum 

Reply Decl. ¶¶ 43, 47; Ackerberg Decl. at 12-13, Ackerberg Reply Decl. at 5. 

A final determination of the relevant market and what the defendants’ market power was in 

that relevant market need not be decided on this motion. Plaintiffs have made a showing that, if 

defined as the narrower Korean Noodle market, the defendants had market power to be able to 

increase prices in the United States (and there is no dispute that the defendants had that power in 

the domestic market in Korea). That showing, combined with the modicum of evidence that the 

prices in the United States market were set off of the prices in the Korean market, support a 

preliminary showing of market power and impact.

Similar to the attacks on the inputs used by Mangum in his econometric model, defendants 

criticize Mangum’s showing of correlation between prices as increased in Korea and the United 

States. But that attack largely depends on how long a lag time between the price rises of one 

defendant and the other conspirators should be considered, and how long a lag time between 

increased prices in Korea and increased prices in the United States should be considered. 

Relatedly, the parties dispute whether absolute price increases or percentage increases should be 

used for those correlation analyses. At base, however, Cox admits that prices increased in the 

United States during the relevant time frame and the delta between COGS and sales prices 

increased during the class period. Cho Supp. Decl., Exh. 2 (Cox Tr.) at 102:12-15; 102:21-

 

33 Defendants point out that Mangum’s analysis of market characteristics was criticized in In re 

Florida Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litig., No. 09-23187-CIV, 2012 WL 27668 *11 (“While a 

market with the characteristics identified by Dr. Mangum may in theory be vulnerable to a pricefixing conspiracy (and capable of proof under a common impact theory), Dr. Mangum fails to 

show that the market at issue here possesses those characteristics.”). However, the characteristics 

of the Korean domestic market are undisputed, and only a few narrow questions regarding the 

United States market are presented, i.e., whether to consider lower price point instant noodles or 

Japanese, Chinese, and other noodles at all. 

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103:21. Mangum shows how, once manufacturing overhead costs are removed, the delta between 

the prices charged and COGS tripled in magnitude by the end of the conspiracy period. Mangum 

Reply Decl. ¶ 27 & fn. 34. Cox does not address the delta between prices and costs in his reply 

declaration, except to further argue Mangum’s costs estimates are faulty and low. 

Overall, at this stage, I conclude that Mangum’s opinions – based on anecdotal evidence, 

correlations on prices, and his regression model – provide a reliable and accepted source of 

classwide proof of impact. Defendants’ arguments as to divergent and unaccounted for actual 

prices, underestimated costs (and therefore underestimated but-for prices), and the resulting 

alleged weaknesses or irrational conclusions in Mangum’s regression model and “cross-check” 

correlation determinations, can be attacked at summary judgment or trial. They do not require

exclusion of Mangum’s opinions or a conclusion that impact cannot be determined on a classwide 

bases for the DPPs.34 

2. Damages

Untenable Results: Defendants argue Mangum’s damages showing is likewise inherently 

unreliable because it “departs from reality.” Defendants point to Mangum’s conclusion that 

defendants’ average overcharge was 44%, and that prices therefore should have been 60% lower. 

Where defendants’ net profit margin (according to defendants) was never over 10%, that level of 

overcharge is simply implausible and would require multiple years of below actual cost sales. 

According to defendants, Mangum’s model is no different from the model rejected in In re Rail 

Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig.-MDL No. 1869, 725 F.3d 244, 254 (D.C. Cir. 2013), 

where plaintiff’s model was rejected because it generated substantial false positives for damage 

 

34 See e.g., In re Optical Disk Drive Antitrust Litig., No. 3:10-MD-2143 RS, 2016 WL 467444, at 

*7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2016) (rejecting defendants’ attack on econometric regression model based 

on plaintiffs’ expert’s “selection of particular data to utilize, the variables he has elected to include 

in his regressions, and similar details relating to the implementation of his econometric models,” 

and noting that those challenges may be “considered by a fact-finder evaluating the persuasiveness 

of” that expert’s conclusions but do not provide a “basis for wholly rejecting those conclusions at 

this stage in the proceedings as methodologically unsound.”); see also Kumar v. Salov N. Am. 

Corp., No. 14-CV-2411-YGR, 2016 WL 3844334, at *10 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2016) (“While the 

ultimate persuasiveness of the [regression] model is a matter to be decided by a trier of fact, 

Kumar has sufficiently established that it has a model for calculating the damages resulting from 

its theory of liability.”). 

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where they could be none. 

According to defendants, there are obviously false positives for the class members here 

given the improbably high 44% overcharge. However, as explained above, simply because profit 

margins remained constant – despite the increase in prices and only slight increase in COGS – that 

does not mean a 44% overcharge departs from reality. The income that may have resulted from 

what plaintiffs allege were conspiracy overcharges were, according to plaintiffs, simply put to 

other uses like manufacturing expansion. See Mangum Decl. Exs. 29.1-R, 29.2-R. On reply, after 

using different cost inputs in response to Cox’s criticism, Mangum’s model produces between a 

29% and 37% overcharge. Mangum Reply ¶ 200.35 Mangum’s inputs and resulting estimated 

overcharge may be ripe for attack on summary judgment or trial, but they are not to inherently 

unreliable or untenable to be excludable or preclude class certification.36

Methodological Errors: Building on some of the same criticisms of the injury showing, 

defendants again attack Mangum’s “faulty inputs” that produce unreliable outputs, including 

ignoring customer-specific discounts (miscalculating actual prices paid) and relying on 

“imprecise” average-cost indexes (which manipulated the but-for price and ignored the actual cost 

data which Mangum had access to). Defendants argue that Nongshim America and Ottogi had 

very different costs, given Nongshim’s production in the United States and Ottogi’s importation 

from Korea, and Mangum ignored cost differentials between different products. Cox Decl. ¶ 167. 

Defendants assert when actual prices are considered, some DPPs were undercharged. Cox Decl. 

¶¶ 237-40, 268-97. 

As with impact, the success of defendants’ arguments as to damages hinge on the disputed 

 

35 And Cox, using his own cost inputs and Mangum’s model, calculated damages running from 

6% in the initial conspiracy period and up to 40% in the last conspiracy period, with lower ranges 

for periods inbetween. Cox Decl., Ex. 22.

36 The alleged defaults in Mangum’s model are not, even accepting defendants’ criticisms, similar 

to the defects in the plaintiffs’ model in the In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig.-

MDL No. 1869, 725 F.3d 244, 252 (D.C. Cir. 2013) case. There, the plaintiffs’ model showed 

significant injury to a group of shippers who no one disputed were not injured. Id. at 252. 

Plaintiffs’ expert’s admission that his model was overinclusive, “shred[ed] the plaintiffs’ case for 

certification.” Id. 

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facts and assumptions utilized by the competing experts. Defendants’ and Cox’s complaints about 

the aggregate damages produced from Mangum’s model are essentially directed to the same 

complaints as to injury discussed above, many of which were addressed in Mangum’s “refined” 

model discussed in his reply declaration. False positives – inclusion of class members who were 

not damaged in any of the conspiracy periods at issue – occur with any significance only when 

Cox’s preferred cost index and price measures are used. Mangum’s showing that 97% of class 

members were injured during the conspiracy (Mangum Reply Decl. ¶ 202), is substantiated and

sufficient at this juncture to show how plaintiffs can prove damages on a classwide basis. 

In the antitrust context, aggregate damages calculations “need not be exact” at classcertification stage. Instead, the model supporting a damages case must be consistent with

plaintiffs’ liability theory, as it is here. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 (2013). 

That different class members suffered different levels of damages likewise will not usually

preclude certification. See, e.g., Vaquero v. Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc., 824 F.3d 1150, 1155 

(9th Cir. 2016) (“We have repeatedly confirmed . . . that the need for individualized findings as to 

the amount of damages does not defeat class certification.”).

B. Typicality

Defendants argue that because the DPPs are differently situated, they are not adequate to 

represent the class. Defendants first note that the DPPs are different types of entities; national 

chains vs. distributors vs. wholesalers vs. Korean or Hispanic markets. They next point out that 

the named DPPs are (or were) based in California and New Jersey and, therefore, differently 

situated from DPPs located in other states who paid different prices based on freight costs. These 

differences, when combined with Cox’s showing that different DPPs paid different prices based 

on purchasing power and purchasing history, are the basis for defendants’ claim that the named 

DPPs’ claims are not typical of the absent DPP class members. 

However, that DPPs paid different prices for their Korean Ramen and purchased in 

different quantities, and therefore suffered different damages, does not create conflicts between 

class members that precludes a finding of typicality. “[T]here is substantial legal authority 

holding in favor of a finding of typicality in price fixing conspiracy cases, even where differences 

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exist between plaintiffs and absent class members with respect to pricing, products, and/or 

methods of purchasing products.” In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust 

Litig., No. M 02-1486 PJH, 2006 WL 1530166, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2006); see also In re 

Optical Disk Drive Antitrust Litig., No. 3:10-MD-2143 RS, 2016 WL 467444, at *12 (N.D. Cal. 

Feb. 8, 2016) (same); In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 267 F.R.D. 291, 306 (N.D. Cal. 

2010) abrogated on different grounds by In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 

2012) (“There is ample support in the antitrust case law for certifying classes in which there are 

some variations between products, customers, marketing and distribution channels.”). 

Plaintiffs point out that the wholesale plaintiffs (Rockman and Pitco) were some of 

Nongshim’s largest customers during the relevant time frame. Cho Ex. 15.3. The representative 

DPPs also purchased ramen over numerous years, with Rockman purchasing in every year of the 

class period while Summit (a wholesaler in New Jersey) purchased less product and in only a few 

of the periods. These DPPs represent, therefore, a cross-section of potential DPPs. Cho Exs. 7.1, 

7.2. Defendants have not identified any unique defenses directed to any particular DPPs that 

would create actual conflicts between class members or otherwise undermine the named DPP 

plaintiffs’ typicality or ability to represent the other DPPs.

In sum, plaintiffs have shown that the class is numerous, plaintiffs and their counsel are 

adequate, and the named DPPs are typical. I also conclude that classwide proof can be used to 

demonstrate classwide impact from the alleged antitrust conspiracy (or under defendants’ theories, 

classwide proof of a lack of impact) and that common issues of fact and law will predominate. 

C. Certification of Injunctive Relief Class under Rule 23(b)(2)

Plaintiffs also move to certify their injunctive relief claim under Rule 23(b)(2). DPPs do 

not assert that there is any ongoing collusive conduct and admit that the collusive conduct ended 

in 2010 when Samyang reduced its prices to apologize to its customers for its behavior. Cho 

Decl., Ex. 2 (Jung-Soo Kim Dep. Tr.) at 92:12-17. However, the DPPs argue that certification of 

their injunctive relief claims is appropriate because, “Defendants are still very much capable of 

engaging in the types of anti-competitive conduct that has caused injury to the Class.” DPP Mot. 

at 17. DPPs rely on cases where injunctive relief (b)(2) classes were certified under similar 

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circumstances. See, e.g., In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 267 F.R.D. 583, 596 (N.D. 

Cal. 2010), amended in part, No. M 07-1827 SI, 2011 WL 3268649 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2011) 

(certifying injunctive relief class where “Plaintiffs have alleged a multi-company cartel that 

operates in a market with high barriers to entry, and that engaged in frequent clandestine meetings 

and employed sophisticated monitoring devices to ensure compliance.”); In re Static Random

Access memory (SRAM) Antitrust Litig., 264 F.R.D. 603, 611 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“They allege that 

Defendants’ price-fixing resulted from a systematic, repeated pattern of sharing sensitive 

competitive information which was greatly facilitated by the cross-competitor business 

relationships that still exist. Thus, there is alleged a significant risk that the conspiracy will persist 

or reform in the future.”).

Defendants do not oppose or address the propriety of certification under (b)(2) in their 

opposition. In light of the evidence of continuing market power of defendants and concentration

in the market, certification of the injunctive relief claims under Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate.

II. IPP MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

A. Predominance Under Rule23(b)(3)

1. Injury

Defendants argue that Ackerberg’s regression model fails for essentially the same reasons 

as Mangum’s. I have addressed and largely rejected those arguments above. They also raise two

IPP-specific arguments: (i) Ackerberg fails to account for significant variations in sales prices to 

the differently situated IPPs; and (ii) Ackerberg fails to offer any methodology to determine passthrough rates on a classwide basis. 

Actual Price Data: As with Mangum, defendants fault Ackerberg for not using actual price 

data with discounts. That issue is addressed above, and does not make Ackerberg’s model or his 

conclusions so unreliable that either fails to pass muster under Daubert or the rigorous showing 

required by Rule 23. That prices charged by Nongshim and Ottogi to the DPPs differed according 

to price lists, time period, geographic location, or the negotiating skills of particular DPPs has 

little relevance in light of the actual transaction data from the defendants (which may need to be 

adjusted in plaintiffs’ experts’ models in light of the new information disclosed by Cox and 

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received from Nongshim employees about how to interpret that transaction data).37 

Cost-Indices: Similar to their attack on Mangum, defendants argue that Ackerberg erred in 

failing to use actual cost data or product-specific costs to calculate his but-for price and instead 

erroneously relied on an average set of cost indices. As noted above, in his Rebuttal Declaration

Ackerberg takes advantage of additional cost data produced by defendants and adds to his model

(a) product-category cost indices (similar to Cox), (b) company-specific cost indices for Ottogi 

products, Nongshim products manufactured in Korea, and Nongshim products manufactured in the 

U.S (like Cox, using Ottogi’s internal transfer prices for pre-2006 Ottogi sales data), and for added 

confirmation, (c) his original cost index. Ackerberg Reb. Decl. at 25-26. Use of this additional 

data addresses many of defendants’ main attacks, and Ackerberg’s model continues to show 

significant injury to class members except for the first conspiracy period, where impact existed but 

was much lower. Id. at 26. In the end, what the but-for price should have been (based in large 

part on what costs were) will be debated on summary judgment and trial. But Ackerberg’s 

showing at this juncture is based on reasonable (if debatable) cost measures that show classwide 

impact.

Pass-Through: Defendants criticize Ackerberg’s use of a 100% pass-through rate, which 

Ackerberg arrived at after reviewing deposition testimony from IPPs as well as data from two 

retailers and two end purchasers which shows pass-through rates from 93% to 138%. Defendants 

fault Ackerberg for not reviewing additional pass-through data to come up with a more robust 

estimate of pass through rates, especially in light of their argument that the channels of 

distribution in the ramen market are many and diverse (and changed overtime with the formation 

of Ottogi America). Defendants rely on In re Graphics Processing Units, 253 F.R.D. 478, 505 

(N.D. Cal 2008), where the court noted – in absence of any econometric modeling – that “[c]lass 

certification is problematic where a plaintiff’s method of proving pass-through requires a reseller-

 

37 I note, again, that defendants do not identify any individual DPPs who were allegedly uninjured 

throughout the collusion periods because they negotiated significant discounts on every purchase 

from defendants. They apparently are unable to do so if using Mangum’s or Ackerberg’s models 

with the revised price data, and likely can only do so when relying on Cox’s model with its much 

lower but-for price.

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by-reseller analysis.” However, the market in the GPU case was markedly more complex than 

here. Not only were there a “variety” of resellers and distinct channels through which graphics 

chips flowed, the chips were sold “to some indirect purchasers on a stand-alone basis but to others 

bundled in a computer” creating an especially “intricate” distribution chain. Id. at 499. Here, the 

distinctions between wholesalers and different types and sizes of retailers selling packaged 

noodles do not present those sorts of intricacies. Ackerberg based his analysis on an admittedly 

small sampling of resellers, but defendants do not show how that small sample size creates actual 

problems with his conclusions. Finally, Ackerberg’s use of a conservative pass-through estimate 

of 100% further supports the reasonableness of his approach at this juncture.

38

Wrong Model/Wrong Variables: As with Mangum, this argument criticizes Ackerberg’s 

use of the hedonic/dummy variable approach, instead of Cox’s forecasting model, and asserts 

without support that Ackerberg’s model suffers from a “severe” multicollinearity problem. As 

noted above, disputes about the appropriate degree of collinearity cannot defeat class certification. 

See, e.g., In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-02509-LHK, 2014 WL 1351040, 

 

38 Defendants also rely on In re Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litig, No. C 06-4333 PJH, 

2008 WL 4155665 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2008), where the Court rejected plaintiffs’ expert’s passthrough estimate because it failed to adequately address significant differences in pass-through 

rates. Id *8. However, the DRAM market also presented “unique” complexities (the product 

came in different densities, speeds, and frequencies was sold in three forms-as free-standing 

memory chips, as a component in DRAM ‘modules,’ or as a component in other electronic 

products, such as computers, printers and networking equipment) and included government 

purchasing classes which varied dramatically in size, purchasing power, and rebates secured. Id. 

at *8. The ramen market does not present the same sort of complexities. Defendants also cite In re 

Processed Egg Prod. Antitrust Litig., 312 F.R.D. 124 (E.D. Pa. 2015), which dealt with another 

complex market. In that case, the experts’ pass-on analysis was rejected because it did not account 

for the evidence showing the use of cost-plus contracts, pricing eggs as loss-leaders, and the 

practice of smaller retailers matching pricing of bigger box stores. Id. at 158. In addition, the 

expert there performed an analysis of only one retailer (as opposed to the two retailers and two 

distributors here), and the defense expert presented contradictory evidence having “analyzed the 

store-level data and concluded that significant variation exists between different retailers and even 

for different types, sizes, and colors of eggs.” Id. at 159. That sort of contradictory evidentiary 

showing has not been made here. Finally, in In re Florida Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litig., 

278 F.R.D. 674 (S.D. Fla. 2012), the court rejected the expert’s assumption that 100% pass 

through would occur based on contract terms that contemplated pass-through, in light of 

significant evidence that DPPs did not consistently pass through and instead absorbed the impact 

from higher concrete prices given the “poor” state of the construction industry. Similar 

contradictory evidence or expert testimony regarding Ackerberg’s evidence-based estimate of pass 

through have not been presented here.

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at *21 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2014). 

2. Damages

Defendants argue that the flaws in Ackerberg’s analysis – his failure to address differences 

in the manufacture, procurement, and sale of ramen and use of cost averages – render his 

aggregate damages (based on the regression model’s output) inherently unreliable. This, 

compounded with an alleged failure to adequately account for differing pass through rates, means 

that Ackerberg’s model is insufficient under Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013) 

and that his opinions excludable under Daubert, according to defendants. These attacks are 

similar in scope and effect to the ones made against Mangum that I have rejected.39 As with 

injury, defendants challenge Ackerberg’s failure to take into account more actual data to support 

his 100% pass-through estimate and argue that his aggregate damages estimate is inherently 

unreliable as a result. However, defendants do not identify any evidence to support their argument 

(e.g., there is no evidence that given the actual market dynamics for Korean Noodles, DPPs were 

unable to pass through the alleged overcharge). As defendants fail to show that Ackerberg’s 100% 

pass-through estimate is significantly flawed, that evidence-based estimate is sufficient at this 

juncture. 

B. Typicality

Defendants focus on the differences between the IPPs – individuals from six states who 

purchased ramen through different channels (Korean grocery stores, Hispanic markets, or 

warehouse stores) – to argue that the named IPPs are differently situated from and not typical of

absent IPPs who reside in other states and who purchased through different channels. While 

defendants identify many individual types of consumers and show that the IPPs purchased Korean 

Noodles from different channels, defendants fail to show how those differences separate them 

from each other with respect to the overcharge claim at issue. See, e.g., Ellis v. Costco Wholesale 

 

39 For example, defendants challenge Ackerberg’s initial estimate of a 31% average overcharge as 

“untenable” as Mangum’s 41% estimate. Defendants likewise challenge Ackerberg’s omission of 

discounts/incentives and actual cost data, as well as his use of averaged-cost indices. For the 

reasons discussed above, these challenges do not show that Ackerberg’s model is inherently 

unreliable or unable to show classwide injury. 

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Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 984 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The test of typicality ‘is whether other members have 

the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not unique to the 

named plaintiffs, and whether other class members have been injured by the same course of 

conduct.’” (quoting Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir.1998)).

Simply because the consumers are different does not make them atypical with respect to 

the factual or legal issues in this case. Defendants only real stab at differentiating the IPPs is to 

argue that Ackerberg’s model fails to prove that each IPP suffered damage from the overcharge. 

However, if a putative IPP was not damaged by any overcharge during the class period, then that 

person is not within the class. If a putative IPP was damaged even once, then they are in the class 

and not differently situated from the other IPPs, even though they may have purchased less ramen 

or purchased it through different channels.40

C. Ascertainability

Because absent class members can only be identified by uncorroborated self-identification, 

defendants argue the class is not ascertainable. However, as the Ninth Circuit recently reaffirmed, 

concerns about illegitimate claims and manageability – such as those expressed by defendants here 

– are accounted for by other provisions of Rule 23; that consumers do not generally save “grocery 

receipts and are unlikely to remember details about individual purchases of a low-cost product” 

like ramen, does not mean a class of consumers cannot be certified. See Briseno v. ConAgra 

Foods, Inc., No. 15-55727, 2017 WL 24618, at *3, 10 (9th Cir. Jan. 3, 2017). Neither the fact that 

class members have to “self-identify” nor that they might not have readily available proof of 

purchase, means that they are not ascertainable sufficient for class certification. See, e.g., Kumar 

v. Salov N. Am. Corp., No. 14-CV-2411-YGR, 2016 WL 3844334, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2016) 

(finding class members ascertainable despite defendant’s arguments that class members would 

have to self-identify and show “what they paid, where they purchased it, and how many times, 

 

40 This is not a situation like In re Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litig., 253 F.R.D. 478, 

489–90 (N.D. Cal. 2008) where the “overwhelming disparities” between the IPPs – the average

wholesaler purchased $19.2 million in products but the aggregate of hundreds of thousands of 

individual consumer transactions only came to $7.83 million – created significant typicality 

hurdles.

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plus whether they saw and were deceived” by a product’s label). Post-judgment claims forms and 

other tools can be used to allow defendants to test an absent class member’s purported entitlement 

to damages and to appropriately apportion damages between class members. Id. at *7; see also

Briseno, 2017 WL 24618 at *9 (at “the claims administration stage, parties have long relied on 

‘claim administrators, various auditing processes, sampling for fraud detection, follow-up notices 

to explain the claims process, and other techniques tailored by the parties and the court’ to validate 

claims.”).

D. State Law Claims

 Generally, due process requires a showing of either sufficient contacts or absence of 

conflict between laws before one state’s laws can be exported and apply to the claims of class 

members in other states. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808, 819-820 

(1985); AT & T Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 707 F.3d 1106, 1113 (9th Cir. 2013). Even 

if constitutional concerns are satisfied, however, choice of law rules should be considered to weigh 

the different interest of the different state laws at issue. AU Optronics Corp., 707 F.3d at 1113 

(“Objections based on the interests of other states are more properly raised under a choice of law 

analysis.”). Defendants argue that a nationwide class is inappropriate under the Cartwright Act 

and that variations in the state laws of the states where the named IPPs live preclude certification.

As to due process, plaintiffs rely heavily on AT & T Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 

707 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2013). There, in a price-fixing case with similar aspects to this one (a 

foreign conspiracy with alleged collusive behavior in California impacting the United States

market), the Ninth Circuit held that where “the underlying conduct in this case involves not just 

the indirect purchase of price-fixed goods, but also the conspiratorial conduct that led to the sale of 

those goods,” California’s Cartwright Act could be applied to a class without impinging on 

defendants’ due process rights.41 The court held “that the Cartwright Act can be lawfully applied 

 

41 The California-based conspiratorial conduct alleged in AU Optronics there was extensive, 

namely that defendants: (i) engaged in and implemented their conspiracy in the U.S. through the 

offices they maintained in California; (ii) that Defendants entered into agreements to fix the prices 

of LCD panels in California; (iii) that significant conspiratorial conduct took place in California, 

including that “specific employees of particular Defendants, operating from offices in California, 

participated in illegally obtaining and sharing their co-conspirators’ pricing information.” Id. at 

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without violating a defendant’s due process rights when more than a de minimis amount of that 

defendant’s alleged conspiratorial activity leading to the sale of price-fixed goods to plaintiffs took 

place in California. Such a defendant cannot reasonably complain that the application of California 

law is arbitrary or unfair when its alleged conspiracy took place, at least in part, in California.” Id. 

at 1113. 

The court rejected a focus on place-of-purchase to define the “relevant transaction or 

occurrence” because that “too-narrow focus” “severely truncates the scope of anticompetitive 

conduct that the Act proscribes.” Id. at 1110.42 Therefore, the district court must consider “all of 

the Defendants’ conduct within California leading to the sale of price-fixed goods outside the state 

when determining whether California law could be applied without offending Defendants’ due 

process rights.” Id. at 1112. Here, there are more than de minimis allegations of conspiratorial 

conduct and impact occurring in California.

As to the choice of laws analysis, before California law can be used on a classwide basis, 

plaintiffs must show that “California has ‘significant contact or significant aggregation of 

contacts’ to the claims of each class member;” if that is shown, defendants must demonstrate that 

the foreign law, rather than California law, should apply to the claims because the interests of 

those states outweigh the interests of California. Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 

590 (9th Cir. 2012). Under that second prong, the court applies California’s three-part choice of 

law analysis: (i) whether the relevant law of each of the potentially affected jurisdictions with 

regard to the particular issue in question is the same or different; (ii) if there is a difference, 

 

1109.

42 This clear admonition makes the two primary cases defendants rely on to oppose application of 

the Cartwright Act outside of California unpersuasive. See In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 221 

F.R.D. 260, 277 (D. Mass. 2004) (concluding the “most significant contact in this context to be the 

location of the injury—that is, the location of the sales to the end payor plaintiffs” and declining to 

certify a nationwide antitrust class under Pennsylvania law); In re Graphics Processing Units 

Antitrust Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (following Relafen). The Ninth 

Circuit in AU Optronics undercut the Relafen decision in another significant way by explaining 

that the purpose of the Cartwright Act as confirmed by the California Supreme Court is not only to 

compensate injured consumers but to also deter defendants and disgorge ill-gotten profits. 707 

F.3d at 1113-1114. 

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examine whether each jurisdiction’s interest in the application of its own law under the 

circumstances of the particular case to determine whether a true conflict exists; and (iii) if there is 

a true conflict, evaluate and compare the nature and strength of the interest of each jurisdiction in 

the application of its own law to determine which state’s interest would be more impaired if its 

policy were not applied, and then apply the law of the state whose interest would be more 

impaired. Id. 

The only potential conflict between state laws identified by defendants – and it is their 

burden to identify conflicts – is the distinction between states who have repealed Illinois Brick and 

allow indirect purchaser plaintiffs to pursue price-fixing claims and those that have not. Oppo. to 

IPP at 24-25.43 Defendants have not identified any conflicts to applying the Cartwright Act to the 

24 Illinois Brick repealer jurisdictions, and therefore class certification for those jurisdictions is 

appropriate.

44

 See, e.g., In re Optical Disk Drive Antitrust Litig., No. 3:10-MD-2143 RS, 2016 

WL 467444, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2016) (certifying a class under the Cartwright Act for IPPs 

in Illinois Brick repealer states). 

The next question is whether application of the Cartwright Act to the non-repealer states 

would undermine the interests of those states and impair those interests more than California’s 

interests in punishing price-fixing behavior that emanates from its borders. Plaintiffs argue that 

despite failing to repeal Illinois Brick, those states have no compelling interest in denying their 

 

43 Instead of identifying conflicts between other states’ laws and the Cartwright Act, defendants 

rely on false advertising and unfair competition cases, mostly from the food and product mislabelling contexts, which generally follow’s Mazza’s recognition that there are material 

differences in each state’s consumer protection statutes and that states have conflicting interests 

“insofar as consumer protection laws affect a states’ ability to attract industry.” Astiana v. Kashi 

Co., 291 F.R.D. 493, 510 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (quoting Mazza); Oppo. to IPP. at 25. Those cases are 

not persuasive on the question of whether the Cartwright Act should be applied to a class broader 

than California residents. See also In re Yahoo Mail Litig., 308 F.R.D. 577, 602 (N.D. Cal. 2015 

(declining to certify a nationwide class because of material differences between California’s 

Invasion of Privacy Act [CIPA] and the wiretapping statutes of the other states, especially in light 

of the different standards of liability under the statutes and the California legislature’s express 

statement that CIPA was intended to protect residents of California).

44 Those jurisdictions are Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, 

Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, 

New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, 

and the District of Columbia.

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citizens the ability to recover for antitrust violations committed by out-of-state or foreign 

companies. However, as recently recognized in this District, “[g]iven that the action simply could 

not go forward in non-repealer states, however, it is too much of a stretch to employ California 

law as an end run around the limitations those states have elected to impose on standing.” In re 

Optical Disk Drive Antitrust Litig., No. 3:10-MD-2143 RS, 2016 WL 467444, at *12 (N.D. Cal. 

Feb. 8, 2016).

Therefore, IPP’s claims only under the 24 repealer jurisdictions are certified for purposes 

of Rule 23(b)(3) under the Cartwright Act. 

E. Nationwide Injunctive Relief Class under Rule 23(b)(2)

The IPPs argue that a nationwide injunction class should be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) 

and the Sherman Act, given the highly concentrated nature of the industry and defendants’ alleged 

ability to resume their price-fixing plan at will.45 As with the DPPs’ motion, defendants do not 

address this issue or attempt to show why certification of an injunctive relief class is inappropriate. 

As noted above, plaintiffs have put forth evidence of market power by defendants, as well 

as evidence of a conspiracy to engage in antitrust conduct that impacted the United States. That 

evidence provides a sufficient basis for certifying an injunctive relief class at this juncture.

III. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

Defendants also assert a number of objections to the evidence plaintiffs rely on, and do so 

in an exceptionally cursory manner. See Dkt. No. 403-2 at 25; Dkt. No. 403-4 at 25.

46

 Plaintiffs 

 

45 A class may be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) where “the party opposing the class has acted or 

refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or 

corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 

23(b)(2). 

46 Defendants object to and move to strike the DPPs responses to these evidentiary objections 

because the responses for the initial objections should have been included in the DPP Reply, and 

instead DPPs filed a 9 page brief and 57 page chart responding in detail to the objections a month 

after their reply brief was filed. Dkt. No. 492; see also Dkt. No. 486-4. DPPs have filed an 

administrative motion seeking to have those errors forgiven and ask the Court to consider the 

objections in Dkt. No. 486-4. Defendants move to strike the administrative motion and/or to be 

given the opportunity to file their own chart in similar length to substantiate their original 

objections. Dkt. No. 492. While plaintiffs erred in not responding to defendants’ initial set of 

objections in their reply, defendants’ presentation of their objections was not in full compliance 

either (i.e., submitting a cursory chart of numerous objections with citations to “supporting” 

evidence contained in declarations). However, I have adequate information to be able to resolve 

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object that evidentiary objections are not appropriately considered at the class certification stage. 

See, e.g., Keilholtz v. Lennox Hearth Prod. Inc., 268 F.R.D. 330, 337 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“On a 

motion for class certification, the Court may consider evidence that may not be admissible at 

trial.”). Nonetheless, I will address the objections briefly.

Hearsay Objections: Defendants object to portions of Exhibits to the Cho Declaration, the 

Birkhaeuser Declaration, and the Cho Supplemental Declaration on the ground of hearsay.47 

Most of the objections are directed to statements (from deposition transcripts or documents from 

the Samyang Hard Drive) from alleged coconspirator Samyang regarding the alleged conspiracy. 

Some of the other objections are to documents produced by Nongshim, received from the alleged 

conspirators. These statements and documents arguably fall within the hearsay exception for 

coconspirator statements (Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E)) and the objections are OVERRULED for 

purposes of the class certification motions. Objections are also made to documents produced by 

Nongshim and/or Ottogi from their own employees. Objections to these documents are 

OVERRULED for purposes of the class certification motion as party admissions. Fed. R. Evid. 

801(d)(2). Some of the other hearsay objections are directed to newspaper articles about the 

Korean Ramen Noodle industry. I have not relied on those newspaper articles, therefore, the 

objections are OVERRULED as moot for purposes of the class certification motions. 

Authentication Objections: Defendants object to portions of Exhibits to the Cho 

Declaration on the ground of lack of lack of authentication.48 These are mostly Nongshim or 

Ottogi business records, documents attached to or otherwise part of the KFTC and Korean 

Supreme Court proceedings, documents from the Samyang Hard Drive, or deposition excerpts. 

For purposes of the motions for class certification, the authentication objections are 

OVERRULED.

 

the objections as necessary. Plaintiffs’ administrative motion (Dkt. No. 490) is GRANTED. 

Defendants’ motion to strike (Dkt. No. 492) is DENIED.

47 Cho Decl.: Exs. 2, 14, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 40, 43, 48, 49, 52, 54; 

Birkhaeuser Decl.: Exs. O, Z; Cho Supp. Decl.: Ex. 14.

48 Cho Decl.: Ex. 4, 7, 8, 15, 17, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 37, 40, 43, 50, 54.

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Lacks Completeness: Defendants object to portions of the Exhibits to the Cho Declaration 

and the Birkhaeuser Declaration on the ground that the deposition excerpts “lack completeness.”49 

Any lack of completeness could have been cured by defendants’ exhibits. The objections are 

OVERRULED for purposes of the class certification motions.

Lack of Personal Knowledge/Speculative: Defendants object to portions of the Exhibits to 

the Cho Declaration and the Birkhaeuser Declaration on the ground that the deponent lacks 

personal knowledge and/or is being speculative.

50

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excerpts from current or former employees of the alleged conspirators and named plaintiffs. Those 

objections are OVERRULED for purposes of the class certification motions.

Relevance: Defendants object to exhibits attached to the Cho Supplemental Declaration on 

the grounds of relevance, as those exhibits were not actually cited in the DPPs reply.51 Those 

objections are OVERRULED for purpose of the class certification motions.

IV. MOTIONS TO SEAL

The parties have filed a number of motions to seal in conjunction with their filings in 

support of or in opposition to the class certification motions. These sealing motions will be 

addressed in a separate order. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the DPP and the IPP motions for class certification are 

GRANTED and defendants’ Daubert motions are DENIED. The following classes are certified 

under Rule23(b)(2) and (b)(3):

DPP Class:

All persons and entities in the United States and its territories who 

purchased Korean Noodles directly from Defendants Nong Shim 

Co., Ltd., Nongshim America, Inc., Ottogi Co., Ltd., or Ottogi 

America, Inc. at any time from April 1, 2003 through January 31, 

2010. The Class excludes the Defendants Samyang Foods Co., Ltd., 

Samyang (USA), Inc., Korea Yakult, Co., Ltd., Paldo Co., Ltd. and 

any of their current or former parents, subsidiaries or affiliates. The 

Class also excludes all judicial officers presiding over this action 

 

49 Cho Decl.: Exs. 19, 20; Birkhaeuser Decl.: Ex. M.

50 Cho Decl. Exs. 2, 3, 13, 14, 16, 18, 20, 30, 47, 49, 50, 54; Birkhaeuser Decl. Exs. O & Z.

51 Cho Supp. Decl. Exs. 4, 6, 7, 8, 15, 16, 18.

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and their immediate family members and staff, and any juror 

assigned to this action.

IPP Class:

All persons and entities that purchased “Korean Ramen Noodles” in 

Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, 

Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New 

Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, 

Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, and the 

District of Columbia for their own use and not for resale, from 

March 1, 2003 through January 31, 2010. For purposes of this 

definition, “Korean Ramen Noodles” means Nongshim, Ottogi and 

Samyang branded bag, cup or bowl ramen, including fried, dried, 

fresh and frozen noodle products. Specifically excluded from this 

class are any Defendant; the officers, directors, or employees of any 

Defendant; any entity in which any Defendant has a controlling 

interest; and any affiliate, legal representative, heir, or assign of any 

Defendant. Also excluded are the judicial officers to whom this case 

is assigned and any member of such judicial officers’ immediate 

family.

A Case Management Conference is set for February 14, 2017, at 2:00 p.m. to set a trial 

date and pre-trial calendar. The parties shall meet and confer and file a Joint Statement on or 

before February 8, 2017 proposing dates and identifying any other issues they wish me to consider

at the CMC.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 19, 2017

______________________________________

WILLIAM H. ORRICK

United States District Judge

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