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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3192

___________

Thomas Bainbridge, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Southern

* District of Iowa.

Loffredo Gardens, Inc., *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: April 12, 2004

Filed: August 4, 2004

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, RICHARD S. ARNOLD and FAGG, Circuit Judges.

___________

FAGG, Circuit Judge.

Loffredo Gardens, Inc., a fresh produce company, hired Thomas Bainbridge as

its warehouse manager in June 1998. Bainbridge’s wife is Japanese. During

Bainbridge’s employment, he informed management his wife was Japanese, and

complained to them about racial epithets for Asians and other minorities used by the

Loffredo brothers, the company’s owners and operators. On June 15, 2000,

Bainbridge complained to his supervisor, Dave Dennis, that he could not take the

racial slurs anymore. Dennis told Bainbridge he would take care of it, then

Bainbridge left on a scheduled vacation. During Bainbridge’s vacation, Mike Jacobs,

Lee Bunch, and Mark DeJoode, three supervisors who worked with Bainbridge,

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stated they would quit if Loffredo Gardens did not fire Bainbridge. It is disputed

whether the supervisors went to management or whether management sought out the

supervisors after they decided to terminate Bainbridge for complaining. On June 21,

2000, before Bainbridge returned, Loffredo Gardens sent him a letter stating his

employment was terminated because his interpersonal skill with subordinates was

problematic. Gene Loffredo, Jr., Larry Loffredo, controller Mark Zimmerman, and

Dave Dennis signed the termination letter. 

Bainbridge brought this action asserting he was subjected to a hostile work

environment based on racial comments made by the Loffredos about Asians, blacks,

and other minorities. Bainbridge also asserted his discharge was in retaliation for

complaints of discrimination and harassment in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §

1981, and Iowa Code § 216. The district court granted summary judgment to

Loffredo Gardens. Bainbridge v. Loffredo Gardens, Inc., 2003 WL 21911063 (S.D.

Iowa 2003). The district court held Loffredo Gardens was entitled to summary

judgment on the merits of the hostile work environment claim and the 42 U.S.C. §

1981 retaliation claim, and Bainbridge had failed to exhaust administrative remedies

on the Title VII and Iowa retaliation claims. Bainbridge appeals. 

Summary judgment was proper if the evidence, viewed in the light most

favorable to Bainbridge, showed there was no genuine issue of material fact and

Loffredo Gardens was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Jackson v. Flint Ink

No. Am. Corp., 370 F.3d 791, 792-93 (8th Cir. 2004). Reviewing the district court’s

grant of summary judgment de novo, see id. at 793, we affirm on the hostile work

environment claims and the Title VII and Iowa Code § 216 retaliation claims, but

reverse and remand the 42 U.S.C. § 1981 retaliation claim.

On appeal, Bainbridge first contends he generated a question of fact on the

elements of his hostile work environment claim. To prevail, Bainbridge was required

to show he is a member of a protected group, he was subjected to unwelcome

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harassment, the harassment was because of his membership in the group, and the

harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of his employment. Id. To be

actionable under Title VII, the work environment must have been both objectively

and subjectively offensive. Id. To decide whether a work environment is objectively

offensive, that is, one which a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, we

examine all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct,

its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating or a mere offensive

utterance, and whether the conduct unreasonably interfered with the employee’s work

performance. Id. To constitute an objectively offensive work environment, the

discriminatory conduct must be so severe or pervasive that it alters the conditions of

the plaintiff’s employment. Id. A hostile work environment exists when the

workplace is dominated by racial slurs, but not when the offensive conduct consists

of offhand comments and isolated incidents. Id. at 794. 

Bainbridge contends he heard the Loffredos make racially offensive remarks

about Asians (“Jap,” “nip,” “gook”) approximately once a month during his two years

of employment. Nevertheless, despite taking contemporaneous notes, Bainbridge can

recall only a few specific instances of racially derogatory comments about Asians

made in his presence. Bainbridge asserts that on June 25, 1998, Jim Loffredo referred

to a white employee as a “Jap,” that on November 20, 1998, he overheard Mike

Loffredo refer to an Asian customer as a “Jap,” that on June 12, 1999 Mike Loffredo

referred to an Asian customer as a “nip,” and that on October 29, 1999, while

showing his Nissan to Mike and Larry Loffredo, Larry said, “Yea, those Japs can do

something right.” Bainbridge also contends Mike Loffredo used the term “Jap” or

“nip” in front of him at least once a month even after Bainbridge reminded him his

wife was Japanese. Bainbridge also contends the Loffredos used racial slurs referring

to other minorities, including “spic,” “wetback,” “monkey,” and “nigger.” Bainbridge

contends he complained to Gene Loffredo, Jr. in 1998 about the derogatory remarks

directed at Asians. Finally, on June 25, 2000, while Bainbridge was talking with

Mike Loffredo, Mike stated another “Jap” produce company was going to try to run

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Loffredo Gardens out of business. Bainbridge then complained to his immediate

supervisor, Dave Dennis, and left on his scheduled vacation. 

Under our case law, the racial slurs did not render the work environment at

Loffredo Gardens objectively hostile. See id. at 794-95. For example, in Jackson, we

held six instances of racially derogatory language from managers and coworkers over

the course of a year and a half, together with burning cross graffiti, did not render the

workplace objectively hostile. Id. Although managers and coworkers said, “that

damn nigger,” “damn black,” “nigger s**t, radio,” “nigger-rigging,” and “f***ing

nigger,” we pointed out two of the comments were not made to the plaintiff, two were

not referring directly to him, and another was made in the heat of an altercation

involving threats by the plaintiff. Id. at 795. Here, the remarks were also sporadic,

no more than one per month, and were not even about Bainbridge, his wife, or their

marriage. Instead, the alleged remarks were used in reference to customers,

competitors, or other employees. Some of the remarks were merely overheard by

Bainbridge. We thus conclude Bainbridge failed to present sufficient evidence that

the harassment at Loffredo Gardens was so severe or pervasive that it altered the

terms or conditions of his employment. Id. at 796. 

Bainbridge next asserts he exhausted his administrative remedies for his Title

VII and Iowa Code § 216 claims by raising the issue of retaliation in his Iowa civil

rights complaint. We disagree. Bainbridge did not check the box next to

“Retaliation” on the complaint form and did not allege any facts in the complaint

form connecting his termination with his alleged complaint about the racial slurs.

Indeed, the Iowa civil rights complaint investigator noted he “didn’t address

[retaliation] because [Bainbridge] did not directly allege retaliation.” We conclude

the district court properly applied the relevant case law to the facts in holding

Bainbridge failed to exhaust administrative remedies. See Bainbridge v. Loffredo

Gardens, Inc., 2003 WL 21911063, at *4-*7 (S.D. Iowa 2003).

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Bainbridge also contends the district court committed error in granting

summary judgment on the merits of his § 1981 retaliation claim, for which exhaustion

of administrative remedies is not required. Under the traditional McDonnell Douglas

analysis, Bainbridge first had to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under §

1981. To do so, Bainbridge had to show he engaged in statutorily protected activity

(complaining about racial slurs), Loffredo Gardens took adverse employment action

against him (termination of employment ), and there is a causal connection between

the two events. Jackson, 370 F.3d at 797; Roxas v. Presentation College, 90 F.3d

310, 315 (8th Cir. 1996) (recognizing elements of Title VII discrimination claim and

§ 1981 discrimination claim are the same). Second, if Bainbridge made this prima

facie showing, then the burden of production shifted to Loffredo Gardens to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to terminate Bainbridge.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). At the third step, the

burden would then shift back to Bainbridge to show the legitimate reason is

pretextual. See id. at 804; Raytheon v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, __, 124 S. Ct. 513,

518-19 & n.3 (2003). 

The district court held Bainbridge failed to establish a prima facie case of

retaliation because he did not show a causal connection between his termination from

employment and his complaints about racial slurs. The court rejected Bainbridge’s

assertion that timing alone could establish causation. The court held that even if

Bainbridge could establish a prima facie case, Loffredo Gardens articulated a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Bainbridge’s termination–Bainbridge’s

inability to get along with his coworkers. The court held that the timing of

Bainbridge’s termination was not enough to allow a jury to infer retaliatory motive

and to show Loffredo Gardens’ proffered reasons were merely pretextual. 

Although the issue is close, we hold Bainbridge has enough circumstantial

evidence to get his retaliation claim to a jury. “‘A plaintiff can establish a causal

connection between statutorily protected activity and an adverse employment action

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through circumstantial evidence, such as the timing between the two events.’”

Jackson, 370 F.3d at 798 (quoting Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 819

(8th Cir. 1998)). “Generally, more than a temporal connection between the protected

conduct and the adverse employment action is required to present a genuine factual

issue on retaliation.” Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir.

1999) (en banc). In this case, Bainbridge left immediately on vacation after his last

complaint, and was fired just six days later, before he returned to work. In addition,

although there are documents and testimony produced immediately before or after

Bainbridge’s termination, Bainbridge had no extensive disciplinary record, cf.

Jackson, 370 F.3d at 798, despite Loffredo Gardens’s claim that it had problems with

Bainbridge from the beginning. Loffredo Gardens contends it demoted Bainbridge

during his employment, but Bainbridge asserts he merely assumed the tasks of a

subordinate in addition to his usual duties after the subordinate’s termination.

Because Bainbridge consistently received raises during his employment indicating

more than satisfactory performance, and the record indicates no change in his job

title, we give Bainbridge the benefit of the inference on this issue. A reasonable jury

could infer Loffredo Produce tried to paper Bainbridge’s file to justify his

termination. Bassett v. City of Minneapolis, 211 F.3d 1097, 1107-08 (8th Cir. 2000).

Contrary to Loffredo Gardens’s assertion that the supervisors made unsolicited threats

to quit if Bainbridge remained employed, the record shows Loffredo Gardens may

have sought out the supervisors to justify Bainbridge’s termination. In responding

to Bainbridge’s claim for unemployment benefits, Bainbridge’s direct supervisor,

David Dennis, told the Iowa Workforce Development Center that “[w]hen Mr.

Bainbridge went on vacation we got the warehouse managers together [and] heard

[Bainbridge] tugged at shirts, yell[ed] at warehouse staff, et cetera.” From these

circumstances, a jury could reasonably conclude by a preponderance of the evidence

that Loffredo’s stated reason for firing Bainbridge was pretextual. 

We thus affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on all claims,

except for the § 1981 retaliation claim, which we remand for further proceedings. 

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RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

While I join in most of the Court's result, I believe that we should also reverse

the dismissal of the hostile-work-environment claim. In my opinion, the repeated,

seemingly habitual, use of anti-Asian and other slurs in front of Mr. Bainbridge

created a hostile work environment.

I agree with most of the Court's statement of the law. To survive the summaryjudgment motion, Mr. Bainbridge needed to show that he was a member of a

protected class, that he was subjected to unwelcome harassment because of his

membership in the protected class, and that the harassment affected a term or

condition of his employment. Ante at 2-3. Further, he needed to show that the

harassment was both objectively and subjectively offensive. Ibid.

I also agree with the Court's statement of the facts. Mr. Bainbridge, a white

man married to a woman of Japanese descent, heard his employers and fellow

employees make offensive anti-Asian slurs approximately once a month during his

two-year employment, translating to roughly 25 disparaging comments. His

employers, the owners of the store, knew that the comments were being made (in no

small part because they were making them), and that the remarks were extremely

offensive to Mr. Bainbridge. Ante at 3-4.

I disagree, however, with the Court's application of the facts to the law. I find

the conduct here objectively offensive, and I believe the case should have proceeded

to trial.

The Court relies heavily on the case of Jackson v. Flint Ink N. Am. Corp., 370

F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2004). I think the level of conduct in this case satisfies the Jackson

standard. In Jackson, the plaintiff, an African-American, endured hearing six racial

epithets in 17 months and was exposed to graffiti depicting a burning cross and Klu

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Klux Klan markings. Id. at 793-794. The Court in Jackson, although finding the

graffiti combined with the comments sufficient evidence to survive a summaryjudgment motion, did not believe the comments standing alone were sufficiently

offensive. Id. at 795. Wanting to avoid turning Title VII into a "code of workplace

civility," the Court reasoned that the slurs "were infrequent and few in number," and

that there was no "steady barrage of opprobrious racial comment." Ibid. It noted that

the result in our hostile-environment jurisprudence turns on the pervasiveness of the

offensive conduct. Id. at 794. Similarly, we have held elsewhere that "[o]ffhand

comments and isolated incidents of offensive conduct (unless extremely serious) do

not constitute a hostile work environment." Burkett v. Glickman, 327 F.3d 658 (8th

Cir. 2003).

While I concede that looking to the number of incidents per month reduces

what is likely a horrific emotional experience to a numeric fraction, objectively, I

think one comment every three months is different than one comment a month.

Imagine an employee who gets paid once a month, and every time he goes to pick up

his paycheck, he is insulted or overhears a racial slur; it is almost an exchange. I

believe our Court would have no problem finding that offensive enough to survive

a summary-judgment motion. This case is no different than the hypothetical except

that Mr. Bainbridge did not know when to expect the comment. Once a month a

remark by his boss or his co-worker would degrade his wife. That does not seem

"offhanded" or "isolated." A jury could reasonably find that this pattern of conduct

was habitual, routine, and pervasive.

In Crawford v. Runyan, 37 F.3d 1338 (8th Cir. 1994), we held that "summary

judgment should seldom be used in employment discrimination cases." Id. at 1341.

Since the decision in Runyan, we have affirmed many summary-judgment orders in

employment-discrimination cases, see e.g., Wheeler v. Aventis Pharm., 360 F.3d 853

(8th Cir. 2004), and rightly so. Some cases just shouldn't be litigated. But, I still

believe there is merit to the Runyan principle. In a case such as this, where there is

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a lot of evidence demonstrating discriminatory behavior over a sustained period of

time, we should not stand in for the jury. I would reverse. This hostile-workenvironment claim meets the standard set out in Jackson and should go to trial.

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