Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-04405/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-04405-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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Case No.: 10-CR-00897-LHK

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE, CORRECT, OR VACATE SENTENCE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

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United States District Court 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION 

RICARDO RAMIREZ-RAMIREZ,

Petitioner, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Respondent. 

 Case No.: 10-CR-00897-LHK 

Civil Case No.: 14-CV-04405-LHK 

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S 

MOTION TO SET ASIDE, CORRECT, 

OR VACATE SENTENCE PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

On September 26, 2014, Petitioner Ricardo Ramirez-Ramirez (“Petitioner”), in pro se, 

filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 challenging his sentence and arguing that the Court 

erred “by failing to consider and explain why a term of supervision [sic] release was warranted in 

light of U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1.” ECF No. 36 (Motion to Set Aside, Correct, or Vacate Sentence 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255) (“Petition”) at 2.1

On October 13, 2014, the Court issued an Order directing the United States to respond. 

 

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 All ECF citations refer to Case No. 10-CR-00897-LHK, unless otherwise noted. 

Case 5:14-cv-04405-LHK Document 2 Filed 04/06/15 Page 1 of 10
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Case No.: 10-CR-00897-LHK

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE, CORRECT, OR VACATE SENTENCE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

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ECF No. 39. The United States filed its Opposition on January 30, 2015. ECF No. 40. Petitioner 

filed a reply on March 23, 2015. ECF No. 48. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Petitioner’s Binding Plea Agreement 

 On January 30, 2013, with the assistance of counsel, Petitioner executed a plea agreement 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C). ECF No. 20 (“Plea Agreement”). 

Rule 11(c)(1)(C) provides that where the parties “agree that a specific sentence . . . is the 

appropriate disposition of the case . . . such a recommendation or request binds the court once the 

court accepts the plea agreement.” The Plea Agreement provided, in part: 

The Defendant’s Promises 

1. I agree to plead guilty to Count One of the captioned indictment 

charging me with Illegal Re-Entry Following Deportation, in 

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. . . . 

. . . . 

3. I agree to give up all rights that I would have if I chose to proceed 

to trial, including the rights to a jury trial with the assistance of an 

attorney; to confront and cross-examine government witnesses; to 

remain silent or testify; to move to suppress evidence or raise any 

other Fourth or Fifth Amendment claims; to any further discovery 

from the government; and to pursue any affirmative defenses and 

present evidence. 

4. I agree to give up my right to appeal my conviction, the judgment, 

and orders of the Court. I also agree to waive any right I may have 

to appeal any aspect of my sentence, including any orders relating to 

forfeiture and/or restitution. 

5. I agree to waive any right I may have to file any collateral attack 

on my conviction or sentence, including a petition under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255 or 28 U.S.C. § 2241, except that I reserve my right to claim 

that my counsel was ineffective in connection with the negotiation 

of this Agreement or the entry of my guilty plea. . . . 

. . . . 

7. I agree that the Court will use the Sentencing Guidelines to 

calculate my sentence. I understand that the Court must consult the 

Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing, together 

with the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). I agree that the 

Case 5:14-cv-04405-LHK Document 2 Filed 04/06/15 Page 2 of 10
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Case No.: 10-CR-00897-LHK

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE, CORRECT, OR VACATE SENTENCE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

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Sentencing Guidelines offense level will be calculated as follows 

and that I will not ask for any other adjustment to or reduction in the 

offense level or for a downward departure or variance from the 

offense level and Guidelines range as determined by the Court. 

 

 a. Base Offense Level: 8 

 (U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2) 

 b. Specific offense characteristic: +16 

 (U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii)) 

 

 c. Acceptance of Responsibility: -3 

(If I meet the requirements of U.S.S.G. 

§ 3E1.1, I may be entitled to a three level 

reduction for acceptance of responsibility, 

provided that I forthrightly admit my 

guilt, cooperate with the Court and the 

Probation Office in any presentence 

investigation ordered by the Court, and 

continue to manifest an acceptance of 

responsibility through and including the 

time of sentencing.) 

 

 e. Adjusted offense level: 21 

 

8. I agree that a reasonable and appropriate disposition of this case, 

under the Sentencing Guidelines and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and the 

sentence to which the parties have agreed, is as follows: a 70-month 

term of imprisonment, with 23-months considered time-served as of 

the date this sentence is imposed, a three-year term of supervised 

release, and a $100 special assessment. 

. . . . 

The Defendant’s Affirmations 

16. I confirm that I have had adequate time to discuss this case, the 

evidence, and this Agreement with my attorney and that my attorney 

has provided me with all the legal advice that I requested. 

17. I confirm that while I considered signing this Agreement, and at 

the time I signed it, I was not under the influence of any alcohol, 

drug, or medicine that would impair my ability to understand the 

Agreement. 

18. I confirm that my decision to enter a guilty plea is made 

knowing the charges that have been brought against me, any 

Case 5:14-cv-04405-LHK Document 2 Filed 04/06/15 Page 3 of 10
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Case No.: 10-CR-00897-LHK

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE, CORRECT, OR VACATE SENTENCE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

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possible defenses, and the benefits and possible detriments of 

proceeding to trial. I also confirm that my decision to plead guilty is 

made voluntarily, and no one coerced or threatened me to enter into 

this Agreement. 

Plea Agreement ¶¶ 1-19. 

B. Petitioner’s Plea of Guilty 

On January 30, 2013, pursuant to the binding Plea Agreement, Petitioner pleaded guilty to 

one count of illegal re-entry following deportation. ECF No. 19 (Minute Entry). 

 During the plea colloquy, Petitioner and the Court engaged in the following exchange, in 

which Petitioner acknowledged that he understood his sentencing agreement and its consequences: 

THE COURT: All right. Sir, did you read this plea agreement? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

THE COURT: Did you understand it? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I did. 

THE COURT: Did you have enough time to discuss this plea 

agreement with you attorney? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I did. 

THE COURT: Was your attorney able to answer your questions 

about this plea agreement? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the services that your attorney 

as provided to you? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

THE COURT: Other than the promises that are contained in this 

plea agreement, has anyone else promised you anything in order to 

get you to plead guilty today? 

THE DEFENDANT: No. 

THE COURT: Has anyone made any threats against you in order to 

get you to plead guilty? 

THE DEFENDANT: No. 

Case 5:14-cv-04405-LHK Document 2 Filed 04/06/15 Page 4 of 10
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Case No.: 10-CR-00897-LHK

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE, CORRECT, OR VACATE SENTENCE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

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THE COURT: Is your decision to plead guilty free and voluntary? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is. 

THE COURT: Have you taken any drug or medication that affects 

your ability to understand what’s happening today? 

THE DEFENDANT: No. 

ECF No. 43 (Plea Tr.) at 5:13-6:14. The colloquy continued: 

THE COURT: Sir, you are – you have entered into what is referred 

to as a Rule C – 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, which means that you 

and the government have agreed to what your sentence should be. 

If I don’t sentence you according to this agreement, you can 

withdraw your guilty plea. 

Do you understand that? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 

ECF No. 43 (Plea Tr.) at 7:20-8:2. 

 The Court explained to the Petitioner that his plea agreement waived certain rights, 

including the right to appeal his sentence: 

THE COURT: If you were to go to trial and be convicted of this 

offense, you would have the right to appeal your conviction, the 

judgment, the sentence, any orders made by this court. 

But in paragraph 4 of this plea agreement, you’re giving up your 

right to appeal. 

Do you understand that, sir? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

THE COURT: You also have the right to file other types of motions 

or petitions attacking orders made by this court, your conviction, 

and you sentence. 

In your plea agreement in paragraph 5, you’re giving up that right, 

except you are keeping the right to argue that your lawyer was not 

effective in negotiating this plea agreement and in your entry of a 

guilty plea. 

Do you understand that, sir? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 

Case 5:14-cv-04405-LHK Document 2 Filed 04/06/15 Page 5 of 10
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Case No.: 10-CR-00897-LHK

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE, CORRECT, OR VACATE SENTENCE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

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Id. at 10:1-17. 

C. Petitioner’s Sentencing 

 On July 17, 2013, Petitioner appeared with his counsel for sentencing. ECF No. 34. 

Petitioner was sentenced to 47 months (70 months less 23 months of time served), three years of 

supervised release, and a $100 special assessment. Id. The Court again informed Petitioner that 

he waived the right to appeal or file a collateral attack on his sentence: 

THE COURT: Let me also just state, Mr. Ramirez-Ramirez, you did 

give up your right to appeal in paragraph 4 of your plea agreement, 

and in paragraph 5 of your plea agreement, you gave up your right 

to file a collateral attack on your conviction or your sentence. 

ECF No. 44 (Sentencing Tr.) at 19:24-20:3. A final judgment of conviction was entered on July 

19, 2013. See ECF No. 35. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

 A Section 2255 motion to set aside, correct or vacate a sentence of a person in federal 

custody entitles a prisoner to relief “[i]f the court finds that . . . there has been such a denial or 

infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to 

collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). Under Section 2255, “a district court must grant a hearing 

to determine the validity of a petition brought under that section, [u]nless the motions and the files 

and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” United States 

v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). A court need not hold an evidentiary hearing where the prisoner’s allegations, when 

viewed against the record, either do not state a claim for relief or are so palpably incredible as to 

warrant summary dismissal. See United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 1996); 

United States v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing 

is required only if: (1) a petitioner alleges specific facts, which, if true would entitle him to relief; 

and (2) the petition, files, and record of the case cannot conclusively show that the petitioner is 

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Case No.: 10-CR-00897-LHK

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE, CORRECT, OR VACATE SENTENCE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

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entitled to no relief. See Howard, 381 F.3d at 877.

B. Petitioner Waived the Right to Collaterally Attack His Sentence 

 A defendant may expressly waive the statutory right to bring a Section 2255 motion 

challenging the conviction or sentence. United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Two claims that cannot be waived, however, are that the waiver itself was involuntary or that 

ineffective assistance of counsel rendered the waiver involuntary. See Washington v. Lampert, 

422 F.3d 864, 870-71 (9th Cir. 2005). Based on the language of the Plea Agreement, Petitioner 

has waived his right to attack his sentence under Section 2255 on any basis other than ineffective 

assistance of counsel. See Plea Agreement ¶¶ 4-5; Plea Tr. at 10:1-17; Sentencing Tr. at 19:24-

20:3. Petitioner, however, does not claim ineffective assistance of counsel in his Petition. 

 Neither does Petitioner challenge the voluntariness of his waiver of the right to collaterally 

attack his sentence. Nevertheless, the Court finds that Petitioner’s waiver of the right to 

collaterally attack his sentence pursuant to a binding plea agreement under Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) was knowing and voluntary. Petitioner repeatedly acknowledged 

that he was entering into the Plea Agreement knowingly and voluntarily. In the binding Plea 

Agreement, Petitioner affirmed that he: (1) “had adequate time to discuss th[e] case, the evidence, 

and [the Plea Agreement] with [his] attorney;” (2) “was not under the influence of any alcohol, 

drug, or medicine” when considering and signing the Plea Agreement; (3) was entering the Plea 

Agreement “knowing the charges that have been brought against me, any possible defenses, and 

the benefits and possible detriments of proceeding to trial.” Plea Agreement ¶¶ 16-18. Petitioner 

further confirmed “that [his] decision to plead guilty [was] made voluntarily,” without threats or 

coercion. Id. ¶ 18. 

During the plea colloquy, Petitioner reiterated that his plea was made knowingly and 

voluntarily. Petitioner also confirmed that he discussed the plea agreement with his counsel and 

was satisfied with the services provided by his counsel. Plea Tr. at 5:18-6:1. The Court reminded 

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Case No.: 10-CR-00897-LHK

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE, CORRECT, OR VACATE SENTENCE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

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Petitioner that by accepting the Plea Agreement, Petitioner was waiving the right to collaterally 

attack his sentence, and Petitioner confirmed that he understood that he was waiving this right. Id. 

at 10:1-17. Petitioner further affirmed that he understood the Plea Agreement and that he was 

entering the Plea Agreement voluntarily. Id. at 6:9-14 (“THE COURT: Is your decision to plead 

guilty free and voluntary? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is. THE COURT: Have you taken any 

drug or medication that affects your ability to understand what’s happening today? THE 

DEFENDANT: No.”). 

Nor is there any indication that Petitioner had any difficulty understanding the Plea 

Agreement. Petitioner speaks English and was provided with an attorney both when reviewing the 

Plea Agreement and at his change of plea hearing. Id. at 3:21-23 (“THE COURT: Mr. RamirezRamirez, you do not need the assistance of an interpreter; is that correct? THE DEFENDANT: 

No, I don’t need one.”). 

Because Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to collaterally attack his 

sentence on grounds other than ineffective assistance of counsel as part of his binding Plea 

Agreement, the Court finds that the claim in the Petition are waived. 

C. Petitioner’s Claims Lack Merit 

Even if Petitioner had not waived the right to collaterally attack his sentence, Petitioner’s 

claim that the Court erred in imposing a term of supervised release is without merit. First the 

Court notes that Petitioner stipulated to the term of supervised release in his binding Rule 

11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement. Plea Agreement at ¶ 8. Nonetheless, Petitioner now contends that the 

Court erred by failing to consider and explain why a term of supervised release was warranted in 

light of U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) (2011), which directs that a district court ordinarily should not 

impose a term of supervised release if the defendant is a deportable alien. Application Note 5 to 

the Commentary Section to U.S.S.G. Section 5D1.1 provides: 

In a case in which the defendant is a deportable alien specified is 

subsection (c) and supervised release is not required by statute, the 

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Case No.: 10-CR-00897-LHK

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE, CORRECT, OR VACATE SENTENCE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

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court ordinarily should not impose a term of supervised release. 

Unless such a defendant legally returns to the United States, 

supervised release is unnecessary. If such a defendant illegally 

returns to the United States, the need to afford adequate deterrence 

and protect the public ordinarily is adequately served by a new 

prosecution. The court should, however, consider imposing a term 

of supervised release on such a defendant if the court determines it 

would provide an added measure of deterrence and protection based 

on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. 

 The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that the Guidelines’ use of the word “ordinary” leaves 

the district court with discretion to impose “supervised release in uncommon cases where added 

deterrence and protection are needed.” United States v. Valdavinos-Torres, 704 F.3d 679, 693 

(9th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Dominguez-Alvarado, 695 F.3d 324, 329 (5th Cir. 

2012)). 

 Here, the Petitioner’s circumstances were not “ordinary” for at least two reasons. First, 

Petitioner was already on supervised release for a prior federal illegal re-entry conviction at the 

time he committed the illegal re-entry which was the subject of his instant conviction. See 

Sentencing Tr. at 5:12-18, 8:9-11; ECF No. 34. At the same time that Petitioner was sentenced in 

the instant case, he admitted to illegal re-entry, a violation of a term of his prior federal illegal reentry conviction’s supervised release in Eastern District of California Case No. 13-CR-00323. 

ECF No. 34. Specifically, Petitioner admitted that he “illegally re-entered the United States and 

failed to report to the probation officer with 72 hours, which is a violation of special condition 

number 2 of your supervised release.” Sentencing Tr. at 5:12-17. Petitioner was given a twomonth concurrent sentence for his supervised release violation in Case No. 13-CR-00323. ECF 

No. 34. The Court was thus aware of the likelihood that Petitioner could illegally re-enter the 

United States, making the imposition of a term of supervised release appropriate for “added 

deterrence and protection.” Valdavinos-Torres, 704 F.3d at 693. 

 Second, Petitioner has strong ties to the United States, which the Court recognized, making 

it more likely that he will return. The Court noted that “Mr. Ramirez-Ramirez has had all of his 

education in the U.S., he doesn’t speak Spanish, he came to the United States when he was four, 

Case 5:14-cv-04405-LHK Document 2 Filed 04/06/15 Page 9 of 10
United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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