Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03071/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03071-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 17, 2000 Decided January 19, 2001

Nos. 99-3065 and 99-3071

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Scott Lee Feuver, a/k/a Scott Lee Feuer,

Appellant

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 96cr00397-01)

Adam N. Steinman argued the cause as amicus curiae on

behalf of the appellant. Steven H. Goldblatt, amicus curiae

appointed by the court, was on brief.

Elizabeth H. Danello, Assistant United States Attorney,

argued the cause for the appellee. Wilma A. Lewis, United

States Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Roy W. McLeese, III,

Mary-Patrice Brown, and Jonathan M. Malis, Assistant

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United States Attorneys, were on brief. Alex J. Bourelly,

Assistant United States Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: Sentelle, Henderson and Garland, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: In No. 99-

3071, Scott Lee Feuver, a/k/a Scott Lee Feuer, appeals from

the district court's denial of his Section 2255 motion. The

government asserts that the court lacks jurisdiction to hear

the appeal because Feuver's notice of appeal is untimely

under Rule 4(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure. We agree and accordingly dismiss the appeal.1

I. BACKGROUND

Scott Lee Feuver was charged with six counts of bank

robbery and attempted bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C.

s 2113(a) and one count of attempted robbery in violation of

D.C. Code Ann. s 22-2902. On December 12, 1996 Feuver

pleaded guilty to three counts of bank robbery and on July

18, 1997 he was sentenced to 115 months of imprisonment, 3

years of supervised release and a $300 special assessment.

At the sentencing hearing, Feuver asserted that the public

defender representing him had been ineffective and sought

the appointment of new counsel. The district court refused

to appoint new counsel and also denied Feuver's motion to

withdraw his plea.

On August 4, 1997 Feuver filed in the district court a pro se

Section 2255 motion to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence alleging primarily that his lawyer's inadequate performance had deprived him of effective assistance of counsel.

On September 28, 1998 the district court denied the Section

2255 motion without holding a hearing. The district court

__________

1 In No. 99-3065, Feuver appeals the district court's denial of his

motion to set aside the order denying the Section 2255 motion. As

explained infra at note 3, we conclude that all appealable issues in

No. 99-3065 are abandoned.

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order was entered on October 21, 1998.2 Feuver asserts he

never received notice of the district court's decision.

Over five months later, on March 30, 1999 Feuver filed with

the district court a "Motion for Determination of Status"

seeking information about his case. On April 6, 1999 the

district court directed the Clerk of Court to send Feuver a

copy of the September 28, 1998 order. See United States v.

Feuver, Criminal No. 96-397 (TPJ) (D.D.C. Apr. 6, 1999). On

April 27, 1999 Feuver, through his new counsel, John A.

Briley, Jr., moved to set aside and vacate the September 28,

1998 order. The district court promptly denied the motion on

April 29, 1999. See United States v. Feuver, Criminal No.

96-397 (TPJ) (D.D.C. Apr. 29, 1999). On May 10, 1999 Briley

submitted an "Application for Certificate of Appealability

__________

2 Because of its importance to the jurisdictional question, we set

forth the complete text of the district court order:

Order

Upon consideration of the motion under 28 U.S.C. s 2255 to

vacate, set aside, or correct sentence by a person in federal

custody [16] [sic] the government's opposition thereto, the

movant's pro se memoranda in support thereof, the memoranda

by counsel for movant in support thereof, the affidavit of

movant's former counsel, Assistant Federal Public Defender

Valencia R. Rainey, and the entire record herein, it is this 28th

day of September, 1998,

ORDERED, it appearing to the Court that movant has failed

to establish that his attorney provided representation that was,

"outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance," Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984), and

for substantially the reasons advanced in the government's

opposition, that movant's motion under 28 U.S.C. s 2255 is

denied; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED, that C.A. No. 97-1783 is dismissed

with prejudice.

Thomas Penfield Jackson /s/

U.S. District Judge

United States v. Feuver, Criminal No. 96-397 (TPJ), Civil Action

No. 97-1783 (D.D.C. Sep. 28, 1998).

from the Order Dated September 28, 1998" asking the court

to issue the certificate dated nunc pro tunc. On May 13,

1999 the district court issued a certificate of appealability

dated nunc pro tunc October 5, 1998. See United States v.

Feuver, Criminal No. 96-397 (TPJ) (D.D.C. May 13, 1999).

On May 21, 1999 Feuver, through counsel, filed a notice of

intent to appeal the September 28, 1998 order (Appeal No.

99-3071). Meanwhile, on May 12, 1999 Feuver himself filed a

notice of appeal of the April 29, 1999 order denying the April

27, 1999 motion (Appeal No. 99-3065). On June 4, 1999,

pursuant to Feuver's pro se motion, No. 99-3065 was consolidated with No. 99-3071.

On July 13, 1999 the government moved to dismiss No. 99-

3071 for lack of jurisdiction and sought summary affirmance

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in No. 99-3065. A motions panel of this court denied the

motion for summary affirmance, referred the motion to dismiss to the merits panel and appointed an amicus curiae to

argue the issues on Feuver's behalf. See United States v.

Feuver, No. 99-3065 (consolidated with No. 99-3071) (D.C.

Cir. Oct. 14, 1999). The motions panel directed the parties to

address whether Rule 58 applies to this Section 2255 proceeding and, if so, whether the order entered by the district court

satisfies the requirements of Rule 58. The panel also

brought to the parties' attention Kidd v. District of Columbia

(No. 98-7075), a case then pending before the court involving

the application of Rule 58.

Feuver's pro se briefs failed to comply with the briefing

schedule and on February 17, 2000 the consolidated cases

were dismissed for failure to prosecute. See United States v.

Feuver, No. 99-3065 (consolidated with No. 99-3071) (D.C.

Cir. Feb. 17, 2000). On April 25, 2000, however, the court

vacated its February 17, 2000 order and decided that the

cases should proceed based only on the arguments presented

in the amicus brief. See United States v. Feuver, No. 99-

3065 (consolidated with No. 99-3071) (D.C. Cir. Apr. 25,

2000). The cases are now before us on the merits.3

__________

3 As noted supra, our April 25, 2000 order permitted the cases to

proceed only on the basis of the amicus briefs. See United States

v. Feuver, No. 99-3065 (consolidated with No. 99-3071) (D.C. Cir.

Apr. 25, 2000). Because the amicus brief advances no arguments

II. DISCUSSION

Rule 4(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure

provides that "[w]hen the United States . . . is a party, the

notice of appeal may be filed by any party within 60 days

after the judgment or order appealed from is entered." Fed.

R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). It is well settled that the time limits

set out in the Rule are "mandatory and jurisdictional."

Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 264

(1978); Moore v. South Carolina Labor Bd., 100 F.3d 162, 163

(D.C. Cir. 1996) ("In general, the time limit established by

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) for noting an appeal

of an order of the district court is mandatory and jurisdictional."). Thus, resolution of this case turns on whether Feuver's

notice of appeal was timely.

The amicus offers two alternative theories to support the

timeliness of the appeal. First, the amicus submits that the

district court's September 28, 1998 order failed to comply

with Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and

therefore the time for filing a notice of appeal has not yet

begun to run. Second, the amicus contends that on May 13,

1999 the district court, by granting a certificate of appealability nunc pro tunc, extended Feuver's time to file an appeal

pursuant to Rule 4(a)(6) of the Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure. We find both arguments unpersuasive.

As noted above, Rule 4(a)(1)(B) requires that an appeal be

taken "within 60 days after the judgment or order appealed

from is entered." Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). Rule 4(a)(7)

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explains that a "judgment or order is entered for purposes of

this Rule 4(a) when it is entered in compliance with Rules 58

and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Fed. R.

App. P. 4(a)(7). Rule 58 in turn provides that "[e]very

judgment shall be set forth on a separate document. A

judgment is effective only when so set forth . . . ." Fed. R.

Civ. P. 58. Thus, in order to start the clock on a party's right

__________

regarding No. 99-3065, we deem all appealable issues in No. 99-

3065 abandoned. See Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1415 (D.C. Cir.

1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1264 (1997). Accordingly, we discuss

only the issues raised in No. 99-3071.

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to appeal, the district court must enter a judgment that

complies with Rule 58.

Earlier in this litigation, there was a question whether the

requirements of Rule 58 apply to a Section 2255 proceeding.

See United States v. Feuver, No. 99-3065 (consolidated with

No. 99-3071) (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 1999). The government no

longer disputes the applicability of Rule 58.4 What is disputed, however, is whether the order entered by the district

court here, see supra note 2, complies with the "separate

document" requirement of Rule 58.

The government argues that the district court order satisfies Rule 58 as the Rule was interpreted in Kidd v. District of

Columbia, 206 F.3d 35 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 214

F.3d 179 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 69 U.S.L.W. 3281 (U.S.

Jan. 8, 2001) (No. 00-544). In Kidd, we held that an order

containing one citation to legal authority and one sentence

explaining the district court's reasoning conformed to Rule

58's "straightjacket." Id. at 39 ("Our decision in Diamond

itself endorses decisions of other circuits allowing inclusion of

at least one citation to legal authority and at least a onesentence explanation of the court's reasoning."); id. ("Although our single-citation, single-sentence standard for Rule

58 may well seem arbitrary, . . . we think it most proper to

follow Diamond's analysis."). Here, argues the government,

the order contains only one sentence explaining the court's

reasoning and one citation and therefore complies with Kidd.

We agree.

The amicus contends that the order is distinguishable from

Kidd because it "makes legal findings regarding a claim's

substantive merits." Reply Brief of Amicus Curiae at 1.

The amicus's argument is not compelling. In Kidd, the

district court order addressed the merits of the plaintiff's

argument and concluded that the plaintiff " 'does not set forth

any arguments that would cause the Court to reject Magistrate Judge Robinson's Report and Recommendation.' "

__________

4 Because the government concedes the issue, we need not decide

whether compliance with Rule 58 is required in all Section 2255

proceedings.

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Kidd, 206 F.3d at 38-39 (quoting from district court order).

Thus, because there is no meaningful distinction between

Kidd and this case, the district court order complies with the

separate document requirement of Rule 58 and the time for

appeal started running on October 21, 1998 when the district

court order was entered. See Kidd, 206 F.3d at 39. Consequently, because the notice of appeal was filed more than 60

days after the entry of judgment, the appeal is untimely.

The amicus, relying on Rule 4(a)(6) of the Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, offers another argument to sidestep the

timeliness issue.5 The argument runs as follows: (1) in light

of the convention that a pro se plaintiff's motions are construed liberally, Feuver's "Motion for Determination of Status" is properly construed as a Rule 4(a)(6) motion to reopen

the time to file an appeal; (2) the district court construed the

motion in this way; (3) on May 13, 1999 the district court

issued a certificate of appealability dated nunc pro tunc

October 5, 1998, in effect granting Feuver's motion to reopen

the time to file an appeal; (4) Feuver filed an appeal on May

21, 1999 which was within the 14-day period permitted by

Rule 4(a)(6); (5) therefore, Feuver's appeal is timely. The

argument, although deft, is without merit.

Given the 180-day requirement of Rule 4(a)(6), see Fed. R.

App. P. 4(a)(6)(A), the only motion eligible for consideration

under the Rule is Feuver's "Motion for Determination of

__________

5 Rule 4(a)(6) provides:

Reopening the Time to File an Appeal. The district court

may reopen the time to file an appeal for a period of 14 days

after the date when its order to reopen is entered, but only if

all the following conditions are satisfied:

(A) the motion is filed within 180 days after the judgment

or order is entered or within 7 days after the moving party

receives notice of the entry, whichever is earlier;

(B) the court finds that the moving party was entitled to

notice of the entry of the judgment or order sought to be

appealed but did not receive the notice from the district

court or any party within 21 days after entry; and

(C) the court finds that no party would be prejudiced.

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6).

Status." Counsel's April 27, 1999 motion to set aside the

September 28, 1998 order came too late--it was filed after the

180-day period had expired. But, even under the most

charitable reading of Feuver's "Motion for Determination of

Status," we simply cannot see how the motion can be interpreted as a motion to reopen the time for filing an appeal.

All Feuver sought in his motion was to obtain a copy of the

order.6 The motion does not even mention the word "appeal"

from which the district court could have concluded a Rule

4(a)(6) request was before it.7 Nor does the district court's

response to the "Motion for Determination of Status" indicate

that the district court treated it as such. The district court

merely directed the Clerk of Court to send Feuver another

copy of the September 28, 1998 order. Finally, the May 13,

1999 certificate of appealability was issued in response to the

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May 10, 1999 request by Briley and does not refer to Feuver's Motion for Determination of Status nor does it mention

Rule 4(a)(6). In light of the foregoing, we conclude that Rule

4(a)(6) does not save Feuver's untimely appeal.

__________

6 According to the Motion for Determination of Status, on February 2, 1999 Feuver inquired of the Clerk of Court about his case.

In response, the Clerk forwarded Feuver an updated docket statement showing that the 2255 motion had been denied with prejudice.

On March 1, 1999 Feuver again inquired of the Clerk, "requesting

an order." Appendix to Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of

Appellant at 199. After receiving no response to the second

inquiry, Feuver filed his Motion for Determination of Status.

7 Thus, the amicus's reliance on cases in which courts have

construed pro se motions as Rule 4(a)(6) motions is unavailing.

Unlike here, in the cases cited, the pro se motion made clear that

the court was asked to decide a question about the timeliness of the

appeal. See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 113 F.3d 184, 186 (11th

Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (construing late-filed notice of appeal as

motion to reopen under Rule 4(a)(6)); Ogden v. San Juan County,

32 F.3d 452, 454 (10th Cir. 1994) (construing pro se notice of appeal

as motion to reopen where notice of appeal proffered excuse for

lack of timeliness), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1090 (1995).

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In sum, Feuver's appeal came too late and we are without

jurisdiction to proceed further. The appeal is therefore

Dismissed.

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