Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00613/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00613-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN KELLER,

 Plaintiff,

 vs.

NKSP WARDEN, et al.,

 Defendants.

1:16-cv-00613-EPG-PC

ORDER FINDING CERTAIN

COGNIZABLE CLAIMS AND 

DISMISSING OTHER CLAIMS

ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO EITHER:

 (1) FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT,

OR

 (2) NOTIFY COURT OF HIS 

WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED ONLY 

AGAINST DEFENDANT IGI FOR 

ADVERSE CONDITIONS OF 

CONFINEMENT AND VIOLATION OF 

DUE PROCESS

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE 

 

I. BACKGROUND

John Keller (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On May 2, 2016, Plaintiff filed the 

Complaint commencing this action. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff‟s Complaint tells of how he was 

falsely validated as a gang member and detained in solitary confinement for more than five 

years, causing a decline in his mental health, after which he was cleared of gang activity and 

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released. For the reasons described in this order, the Court finds that Plaintiff states cognizable 

claims for adverse conditions of confinement and violation of due process against the IGI. The 

Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state any other claims based on this Complaint. Plaintiff must 

now tell the Court to go forward on the claims against the IGI, or file an amended complaint.

On May 11, 2016, Plaintiff consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction in this action 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 636(c), and no other parties have made an appearance. (ECF No. 7.) 

Therefore, pursuant to Appendix A(k)(4) of the Local Rules of the Eastern District of 

California, the undersigned shall conduct any and all proceedings in the case until such time as 

reassignment to a District Judge is required. Local Rule Appendix A(k)(3).

Plaintiff‟s Complaint is now before the Court for screening.

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

' 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or 

appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff‟s allegations are 

taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart 

Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

To state a viable claim, Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

„state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‟” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. 

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Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls 

short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id. While factual allegations are accepted as true, 

legal conclusions are not. Id.

III. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

The events at issue in the Complaint allegedly occurred at North Kern State Prison 

(NKSP) in Delano, California, when Plaintiff was incarcerated there in the custody of the 

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Plaintiff names as 

defendants the Warden of NKSP and the IGI (Institutional Gang Investigator) (“Defendants”). 

Defendants were employed by the CDCR at NKSP at the time of the events at issue. Plaintiff‟s 

factual allegations follow. 

Plaintiff is an African-American man who is “mentally challenged.” (Complaint, ECF 

No. 1 at 11:26-27). On September 3, 2008, the IGI at NKSP illegally placed Plaintiff in 

Administrative Segregation, leading to years of solitary confinement on a false gang validation. 

Plaintiff is not affiliated with a gang and has no gang tattoos. He was held in isolation from 

September 3, 2008 until May 7, 2015. Due to his isolation, Plaintiff‟s mental health declined. 

He is now a mental health patient and takes psychotropic medication. Plaintiff alleges that he 

suffers from severe and lasting mental health issues as a result of his detention. He describes 

his mental state as “psychotic” and alleges that “I went crazy in isolation.” (Complaint at 3 ¶4.) 

On May 7, 2015, the DRB (Departmental Review Board) cleared Plaintiff of gang activity and 

released him from the SHU (Security Housing Unit).

Plaintiff alleges that the CDCR used an “underground rule” to validate him as a gang 

associate in 2008, “for possessing pictures of grass roots Freedom Fighters like Malcolm X, 

Martin L. King or George L. Jackson, and having a Prison Focus, Bay View Newspaper, and 

writing grass roots political articles or Prison Law News editor.” (Complaint at 4 ¶3.) Plaintiff 

alleges that the CDCR “continues to retaliate against me, knowing I am mentally retarded.” Id. 

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages as relief.

///

///

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IV. PLAINTIFF=S CLAIMS

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 

usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes 

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

“[Section] 1983 „is not itself a source of substantive rights,‟ but merely provides „a 

method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.‟” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see also Chapman 

v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 

F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012); 

Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). 

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted 

under color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the 

Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 

2006); see also Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing 

“under color of state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the 

meaning of § 1983, „if he does an affirmative act, participates in another‟s affirmative act, or 

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 

complaint is made.‟” Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The requisite 

causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a „series of acts by others 

which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict‟ constitutional 

harms.” Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of 

causation “closely resembles the standard „foreseeability‟ formulation of proximate cause.” 

Arnold v. Int‟l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City 

of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).

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A. Adverse Conditions of Confinement – Eighth Amendment

“It is undisputed that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions 

under which [the prisoner] is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” 

Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 

(1994). Conditions of confinement may, consistent with the Constitution, be restrictive and 

harsh. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 

1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006); Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 1996); Jordan v. 

Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1531 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). Prison officials must, however, 

provide prisoners with “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” 

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated in part on other 

grounds by Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); see also Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 

731 (9th Cir. 2000); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982); Wright v. Rushen, 

642 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1981). 

When determining whether the conditions of confinement meet the objective prong of 

the Eighth Amendment analysis, the Court must analyze each condition separately to determine

whether that specific condition violates the Eighth Amendment. See Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 

1107; Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1246-47; Wright, 642 F.2d at 1133. “Some conditions of 

confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation „in combination‟ when each would 

not do so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the 

deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise – for 

example, a low cell temperature at night combined with a failure to issue blankets.” Wilson v. 

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991); see also Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1151 (9th Cir. 

2010); Osolinski, 92 F.3d at 938-39; Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1107; Wright, 642 F.2d at 1133. 

When considering the conditions of confinement, the Court should also consider the amount of 

time to which the prisoner was subjected to the condition. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 

686-87 (1978); Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005); Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 

1258. As to the subjective prong of the Eighth Amendment analysis, prisoners must establish 

prison officials‟ “deliberate indifference” to unconstitutional conditions of confinement to 

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establish an Eighth Amendment violation. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 

303. This Court has found that “placement of seriously mentally ill inmates in the harsh, 

restrictive and non-therapeutic conditions of California's administrative segregation units for 

non-disciplinary reasons for more than a minimal period necessary to effect transfer to 

protective housing or a housing assignment violates the Eighth Amendment.” Coleman v. 

Brown, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1068, 1099 (E.D.Cal. 2014).

Based on Plaintiff‟s allegations that the IGI held him in isolation for non-disciplinary 

reasons from September 3, 2008 until May 7, 2015, the Court finds that Plaintiff states a claim 

for violation of the Eighth Amendment against the IGI. 

B. Warden - Supervisory Liability

Plaintiff has named the Warden of NKSP, who holds a supervisory position, as a 

defendant, without alleging that the Warden personally acted against him. Plaintiff is advised 

that “[l]iability under [§] 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the 

defendant. A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional violations of . . . subordinates if the 

supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act 

to prevent them. There is no respondeat superior liability under [§] 1983.” Taylor v. List, 880 

F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). Plaintiff must demonstrate that each 

defendant, through his or her own individual actions, violated Plaintiff=s constitutional rights. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). Therefore, 

Plaintiff fails to state a claim against the Warden of NKSP. 

C. Due Process

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects prisoners from being 

deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.

539, 556 (1974). The procedural guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments‟ Due 

Process Clauses apply only when a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest is at 

stake. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-73 (1977); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 

564, 569 (1972); Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 

F.3d 818, 827 (9th Cir. 1997); Erickson v. United States, 67 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 1995); 

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Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 462 (9th Cir. 1995); Tellis v. Godinez, 5 F.3d 1314, 1316 

(9th Cir. 1993).

Liberty interests can arise both from the Constitution and from state law. See 

Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983). 

The Due Process Clause itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in avoiding Amore 

adverse conditions of confinement.@ Id. The Due Process Clause itself does not confer on 

inmates a liberty interest in being confined in the general prison population instead of 

administrative segregation. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466-68; see also May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 

557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997) (convicted inmate‟s due process claim fails because he has no liberty 

interest in freedom from state action taken within sentence imposed and administrative 

segregation falls within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a sentence) 

(quotations omitted); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff=s 

placement and retention in the SHU was within range of confinement normally expected by 

inmates in relation to ordinary incidents of prison life and, therefore, plaintiff had no protected 

liberty interest in being free from confinement in the SHU) (quotations omitted). 

With respect to liberty interests arising from state law, the existence of a liberty interest 

created by prison regulations is determined by focusing on the nature of the deprivation. 

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 481-84. Liberty interests created by prison regulations are limited to 

freedom from restraint which “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in 

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484; see also Myron v. Terhune, 476 

F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 2007); Jackson, 353 F.3d at 755; Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 

1078 (9th Cir. 2003); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003). When conducting 

the Sandin inquiry, Courts should look to Eighth Amendment standards as well as the 

prisoners‟ conditions of confinement, the duration of the sanction, and whether the sanctions 

will affect the length of the prisoners‟ sentence. See Serrano, 345 F.3d at 1078; Ramirez, 334 

F.3d at 861; Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996). The placement of an inmate 

in the SHU indeterminately may amount to a deprivation of a liberty interest of “real 

substance” within the meaning of Sandin. See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224. The “atypicality” 

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prong of the analysis requires not merely an empirical comparison, but turns on the importance 

of the right taken away from the prisoner. See Carlo v. City of Chino, 105 F.3d 493, 499 (9th 

Cir. 1997). A plaintiff must assert a “dramatic departure” from the standard conditions of 

confinement before due process concerns are implicated. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485–86; see also

Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1088–89. 

Plaintiff alleges that he is “mentally challenged” and was held in solitary confinement 

for more than five years on false charges that he was a gang associate. While Plaintiff has not 

described in detail the conditions of his confinement in segregation, it is sufficient that he 

alleges he was detained in isolation for more than five years on false charges. The fact that he 

was later cleared of gang activity and released from segregation does not diminish the 

conditions under which he was held. It is true that “[s]ome conditions of confinement may 

establish an Eighth Amendment violation „in combination‟ when each would not do so alone.” 

Chappell v. Mandeville 706 F.3d 1052, 1061 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304). 

Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from severe and lasting mental health issues as a result of his 

detention. Plaintiff describes his mental state as “psychotic” and alleges that “I went crazy in 

isolation.” (Complaint at 3 ¶4.) Based on these allegations, the Court finds that Plaintiff‟s 

detention was a “dramatic departure” from the standard conditions of confinement, and 

therefore Plaintiff had a liberty interest in avoiding his detention.

The assignment of validated gang members to the SHU is an administrative measure 

rather than a disciplinary measure, and is Aessentially a matter of administrative segregation.@ 

Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Munoz v. Rowland, 104 F.3d 

1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 1997)). As such, Plaintiff is entitled to the minimal procedural protections 

set forth in Toussaint, such as notice, an opportunity to be heard, and periodic review. Bruce, 

351 F.3d at 1287 (citing Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1100). Due process also requires that there be 

an evidentiary basis for the prison officials‟ decision to place an inmate in segregation for 

administrative reasons. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985); Toussaint, 801 F.2d 

at 1104-05. This standard is met if there is "some evidence" from which the conclusion of the 

administrative tribunal could be deduced. Id. at 1105. The standard is only “minimally 

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stringent” and the relevant inquiry is whether there is any evidence in the record that could 

support the conclusion reached by the prison decision-makers. Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 

705 (9th Cir.1987). The “some evidence” standard applies to an inmate‟s placement in the 

SHU for gang affiliation. See Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1287-88. 

When a prisoner is placed in administrative segregation, prison officials must, within a 

reasonable time after the prisoner‟s placement, conduct an informal, non-adversary review of 

the evidence justifying the decision to segregate the prisoner. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 476, 

abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); Mendoza v. Blodgett, 960 

F.2d 1425, 1430 (9th Cir. 1992), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. 472; 

Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1100, abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. 472. The 

Supreme Court has stated that five days is a reasonable time for the post-placement review. 

See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477. Before the review, the prisoner must receive some notice of the 

charges and be given an opportunity to respond to the charges. See id. at 476; Mendoza, 960 

F.2d at 1430-31; Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1100. The prisoner, however, is not entitled to 

“detailed written notice of charges, representation of counsel or counsel-substitute, an 

opportunity to present witnesses, or a written decision describing the reasons for placing the 

prisoner in administrative segregation.” Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1100-01 (citations omitted). 

After the prisoner has been placed in administrative segregation, prison officials must 

periodically review the initial placement. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477 n.9; Toussaint, 801 F.2d 

at 1101. Annual review of the placement is insufficient. See Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1101.

Plaintiff alleges that he is not a gang member, and the CDCR used an “underground 

rule” to validate him as a gang associate, merely “for possessing pictures of grass roots 

Freedom Fighters like Malcolm X, Martin L. King or George L. Jackson, and having a Prison 

Focus, Bay View Newspaper, and writing grass roots political articles or Prison Law New

editor.” (Complaint at 4 ¶3.) These allegations are sufficient to state a cognizable claim 

against the IGI for violation of Plaintiff‟s rights to due process.

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D. Equal Protection – Fourteenth Amendment

The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated 

alike. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); Shakur v. 

Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir. 2008). An equal protection claim may be established by 

showing that Defendants intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff based on his membership 

in a protected class, Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 

702-03 (9th Cir. 2009); Serrano, 345 F.3d at 1082, Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 

686 (9th Cir. 2001), or that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated differently 

without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose, Engquist v. Oregon Department of 

Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 601-02 (2008); Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 

(2000); Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2008); North Pacifica LLC 

v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 486 (9th Cir. 2008).

Plaintiff alleges that his right to equal protection was violated. However, Plaintiff has 

not alleged any facts demonstrating that he was intentionally discriminated against on the basis 

of his membership in a protected class, or that he was intentionally treated differently than 

other similarly situated inmates without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. 

Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief for violation of his right to equal protection.

E. Retaliation

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner‟s First Amendment rights to speech or to 

petition the government may support a 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 5527, 532 (9th 

Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. 

Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First 

Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some 

adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner‟s protected conduct, and that 

such action (4) chilled the inmate‟s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action 

did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68; accord

Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2012); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 

1269 (9th Cir. 2009).

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Plaintiff merely states that the CDCR “continues to retaliate against me, knowing I am 

mentally retarded.” (Complaint at 4 ¶3.) This allegation, without more, is insufficient to state a 

claim for retaliation.

F. State Law Claims

Plaintiff alleges that prison officials violated state law in their application of rules and 

policies of the CDCR. A violation of state law is not sufficient to state a claim for relief under 

' 1983. Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state law. See Galen 

v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 662 (9th Cir. 2007). To state a claim under ' 1983, 

there must be a deprivation of federal constitutional or statutory rights. See Paul v. Davis, 424 

U.S. 693 (1976); also see Buckley v. City of Redding, 66 F.3d 188, 190 (9th Cir. 1995); 

Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 279 (2002). Although the Court may exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, Plaintiff must first have a cognizable claim for 

relief under federal law. See 28 U.S.C. ' 1367.

In this instance, the Court has found cognizable ' 1983 claims in the Complaint against 

defendant IGI. Therefore, at this juncture, the Court shall exercise supplemental jurisdiction 

over Plaintiff=s state law claims that form part of the same case or controversy as Plaintiff=s 

cognizable federal claims.1

G. Doe Defendants

Plaintiff names Doe defendants in this action. Unidentified, or "John Doe" defendants 

must be named or otherwise identified before service can go forward. AAs a general rule, the 

use of >John Doe= to identify a defendant is not favored.@ Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 

642 (9th Cir. 1980). Plaintiff is advised that John Doe or Jane Doe defendants cannot be served 

by the United States Marshal until Plaintiff has identified them as actual individuals and

amended his complaint to substitute names for John Doe or Jane Doe. For service to be 

successful, the Marshal must be able to identify and locate defendants.

 

1At this stage of the proceedings, the Court makes no determination about the viability of Plaintiff=s state 

law claims.

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V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The Court finds that Plaintiff‟s Complaint states cognizable claims against Defendant 

IGI for adverse conditions of confinement under the Eighth Amendment and violation of due 

process under the Fourteenth Amendment. However, Plaintiff fails to state any other claims 

upon which relief may be granted.

Plaintiff shall be required to either file an amended complaint, notify the Court of his 

willingness to proceed only on the claims against Defendant IGI as found cognizable by the 

Court, or notify the Court that he stands on the Complaint as filed, subject to dismissal of 

claims consistent with this order. 

Should Plaintiff choose to amend the complaint, the Amended Complaint should be 

brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what each named defendant did that led to the 

deprivation of Plaintiff=s constitutional or other federal rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Jones v. 

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter . 

. . to „state a claim that is plausible on its face.‟” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555). There is no respondeat superior liability, and each defendant is only liable for his or her 

own misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant

personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones, 297 F.3d at 934 (emphasis 

added). Plaintiff should state clearly, in his own words, what happened and how each 

defendant‟s actions violated the particular right described by Plaintiff.

Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it is not 

for the purposes of adding allegations of events occurring or claims arising after the original 

Complaint. Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in 

his amended complaint. In addition, Plaintiff should take care to include only those claims that 

were administratively exhausted before he filed the initial Complaint on May 2, 2016. 

If Plaintiff decides to file an amended complaint, he is advised that an amended 

complaint supercedes the original complaint, Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F. 3d 896, 907 

n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be complete in itself without reference to the prior or 

superceded pleading. Local Rule 220. Once an amended complaint is filed, the prior

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complaint no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in 

an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently 

alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First Amended 

Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed under penalty of 

perjury. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk‟s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall 

either:

(1) File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified in this 

order,

or

(2) Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended 

complaint and is instead willing to proceed only on the cognizable due 

process and conditions of confinement claims against defendant IGI

discussed above;

3. Should Plaintiff choose to amend the complaint, Plaintiff shall caption the 

amended complaint “First Amended Complaint” and refer to the case number 

1:16-cv-00613-EPG-PC; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action may be dismissed for 

failure to comply with a Court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 16, 2016 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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