Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02669/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02669-19/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

McKESSON INFORMATION

SOLUTIONS, INC.,

NO. CIV. S-02-2669 FCD KJM

Plaintiff,

v. FINDINGS OF FACT AND 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

BRIDGE MEDICAL, INC.,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

On December 13, 2002, plaintiff and counter-defendant

McKesson Information Solutions, Inc. (“McKesson”) filed a patent

infringement suit against defendant and counter-plaintiff Bridge

Medical, Inc. (“Bridge”) based on U.S. Patent No. 4,857,716 (“the

‘716 patent”), entitled “Patient Identification and Verification

System and Method.” By way of affirmative defense and

counter-complaint for declaratory judgment, Bridge asserted that

the ‘716 patent is unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. 

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1 The parties filed proposed Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law on May 16, 2006. In some respects herein the

court has adopted, without attribution, language suggested by one

side or the other. In all such instances, the finding of fact or

conclusion of law has become the court’s own, based upon its

review of the evidence and the law. To the extent that any of

the court’s findings of fact may be considered conclusions of law

or vice versa, they are to be considered as such.

2

At the parties’ request, the court bifurcated trial of this

case into two phases: Phase I, a bench trial on Bridge’s

affirmative defense of inequitable conduct, and Phase II (if

Bridge did not prevail), a jury trial on McKesson’s infringement

claim in which the court would concurrently decide Bridge’s other

equitable defenses of equitable estoppel and unclean hands. (Am.

Pretrial Conf. Order, filed Mar. 23, 2006, § II.) 

The Phase I bench trial on the issue of inequitable conduct

took place on May 2, 3, 4, and 9, 2006. Considering the evidence

presented therein and the parties’ written submissions

thereafter,1 the court enters the following findings of fact and

conclusions of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

52(a). The court finds that inequitable conduct occurred during

prosecution of the ‘716 patent and accordingly, enters judgment

declaring the patent unenforceable for that reason. The Phase II

jury trial of this matter, and any pending motions related

thereto, are therefore vacated.

FINDINGS OF FACT

A. Time-line of Events

1. Attorney Michael D. Schumann (“Mr. Schumann”)

prosecuted the patent application that ultimately issued as the

‘716 patent, in addition to several copending applications for

the same client, CliniCom, Inc., McKesson’s predecessor-inCase 2:02-cv-02669-FCD-KJM Document 696 Filed 06/13/06 Page 2 of 50
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2 All citations to “TT ___” are to the Trial Transcript

of the bench trial. All citations infra to “TX ___” are to the

exhibits admitted into evidence during the trial.

3

interest to the ‘716 patent. (Undisputed Facts, Am. Pretrial

Conf. Order, filed Mar. 23, 2006, [hereinafter, “Undisputed

Facts”], at 4:15-25.) Mr. Schumann, an experienced patent

prosecution attorney, is currently a name partner in a patent law

firm in Minneapolis, MN. (TT 30:5-8.)2 Previously, Mr. Schumann

spent 24 years with another patent law firm in Minneapolis,

during which time he prosecuted the ‘716 patent at issue in this

case. (TT 30:8-11.)

2. On July 19, 1985, Mr. Schumann filed the original

grandparent application (“the ‘277 application”) that would

ultimately mature into the ‘716 patent. (TT 82:7-83:3.) That

application was assigned for review to Examiner David Trafton at

the United States Patent & Trademark Office (the “PTO”), and

identifies Peter Gombrich, Ronald Zook and Max Hendrickson as the

inventors. (TX B-00001.) The ‘277 application is also the

grandparent application for CliniCom, Inc.’s copending U.S.

Patent No. 4,835,372, bearing the title “Patient Care System”

(“the ‘372 patent”). (TX Q-00001.)

3. On May 12, 1986, Mr. Schumann filed the parent

application (“the ‘278 application”) that later issued as the

‘716 patent. (TT 49:21-24.) That application in the chain of

the ‘716 patent remained before Examiner Trafton. (TX B-00001.)

The ‘278 application is also the parent application for the

copending ‘372 patent, which was also before Examiner Trafton.

(TX Q-00001.)

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4. The same day Mr. Schumann filed the parent application

for the ‘716 patent, he also filed another application, the ‘149

application, for CliniCom, Inc. which later issued as U.S. Patent

No. 4,850,009 (“the ‘009 patent”). (TX R-00001.) That

application was assigned for review to PTO Examiner Robert Lev. 

(Id.)

5. In the first Information Disclosure Statement (“IDS”)

in the ‘009 prosecution, filed on August 12, 1986, Mr. Schumann

informed Examiner Lev of the existence of the copending

‘716 application. (TT 94:21-95:19; TX X-00129.) Mr. Schumann

also disclosed the ‘009 application to Examiner Trafton in the

‘716 case on August 14, 1986. (Undisputed Facts at 5:19-25.) 

6. On February 26, 1987, Examiner Lev issued an Office

Action in the ‘009 prosecution, rejecting every claim of the

application as obvious over the prior art. (TX X-00042-46.)

7. In a supplemental IDS, of March 20, 1987, while

disclosing additional prior art references, Mr. Schumann notified

Examiner Trafton again of the copending application that issued

as the ‘009 patent. (TX W-00105.)

8. Through March of 1987, Mr. Schumann had disclosed

identical prior art to Examiner Trafton and Examiner Lev--the

same 33 patents and five articles--in the copending ‘716 and ‘009

prosecutions. (TT 105:1-10.)

9. On April 6, 1987, Examiner Trafton rejected every claim

in the ‘716 application as obvious in light of the prior art. 

(TT 110:11-17; TX W-00111.)

10. On October 6, 1987, Mr. Schumann filed an “Amendment

under Rule 111" in the ‘716 prosecution. (TX W-00115-125.) In

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the amendment, Mr. Schumann made arguments in response to

Examiner Trafton’s rejections. Specifically, he distinguished

the prior art, and in particular argued:

None of the references either singularly or in

combination teach or suggest the claimed invention. 

In addition to numerous other differences, none of 

the references teach the three node approach to

communications as provided in the claimed invention. 

In the present invention, the first node of

communication is a main or central computer . . . 

The second node of communication are the base 

stations which are wired to the main computer. . . .

The third node of communication in the present

invention is the portable handheld patient terminal

which cooperates with the base stations to

provide for wireless transmission of data between 

the base station and the patient terminal.

(TX W-00124.)

11. In the amendment, Mr. Schumann also notified Examiner

Trafton of a new copending application that he filed (TX W00125), the ‘195 application, which was a continuation-in-part of

the ‘278 application and eventually issued as the ‘372 patent. 

(TX Q.)

12. On October 23, 1987, Mr. Schumann participated in a

telephonic interview with Examiner Lev in the copending ‘009

prosecution. (TX X-00062.) Throughout the entire prosecution of

both the ‘716 and ‘009 patents, the October 23, 1987 interview

with Examiner Lev was the only telephonic interview. 

(TT 117:21-118:5.) During that interview, Examiner Lev raised

one piece of prior art, U.S. Patent No. 4,456,793 to Baker et al.

(“the Baker patent”), which had not previously been disclosed in

either the ‘009 or ‘716 proceedings. (TX X-00062; TT

119:17-120:2.) Examiner Lev suggested that claims 1s9-24 of the

pending ‘009 application be cancelled in light of the Baker

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patent. (TT 120:9-18; TX X-000062.)

13. On December 1, 1987, Examiner Lev issued another

rejection in the ‘009 prosecution, again rejecting every claim as

obvious. (TX X-00064-68.) In particular, he rejected certain

claims--claims 20 and 22-24--as obvious in light of the Baker

patent in combination with other prior art. (TX X-00066-67.)

14. On December 8, 1987, Examiner Trafton again rejected

the majority of the claims pending in the ‘278 application (the

‘716 patent), but found that two of the pending claims would be

allowable if rewritten as independent claims. (TX W-00129.) In

response to the examiner's action, Mr. Schumann filed a

continuation application on June 8, 1988, the '527 application,

and abandoned the '278 application. (TX W-00133.) In a

Preliminary Amendment in the '527 application, Mr. Schumann

amended the allowable claims in accordance with the examiner's

previous comments and cancelled the remaining rejected claims.

(TX W-00135-138.) But Mr. Schumann also informed the examiner

that he reserved the right to pursue the other rejected claims of

the '278 application in the copending '195 application, which

eventually issued as the ‘372 patent, thus notifying the examiner

for the second time of that copending application. (Id. at

W-00137.)

15. On June 17, 1988, in response to Examiner Lev’s

December 1, 1987 rejections, Mr. Schumann filed a Preliminary

Amendment in the ‘009 prosecution and cancelled claims 19-

24, “in an effort to obtain early allowance of at least some

claims to the invention.” (TX X-00077.)

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16. Mr. Schumann did not inform Examiner Trafton in the

‘716 prosecution of either of Examiner Lev’s rejections in the

‘009 prosecution, or of the Baker patent. (TT 110:5-8;

121:10-13; 126:22-127:3.)

17. On September 19, 1988, Mr. Schumann filed another

patent application for CliniCom, Inc. which ultimately issued as

U.S. Patent No. 4,916,441, “Portable Handheld Terminal”

(“the ‘441 patent”). (TX T-00001.) That application was

assigned to Examiner Donald Yusko at the PTO. (Id.) While the

copending ‘716 patent application continued to be under

review by Examiner Trafton, Mr. Schumann disclosed the Baker

patent to Examiner Yusko in the first IDS in the ‘441

prosecution. (TX Y-00079.) 

18. On December 16, 1988, the Notice of Allowability

regarding the ‘372 patent was mailed to Mr. Schumann. 

(TX H-13-00066.) The ‘372 patent assigned to CliniCom, Inc. 

issued on May 30, 1989 and lists as inventors Peter Gombrich,

Richard Beard, Richard Griffee, Thomas Wilson, Ronald Zook and

Max Hendrickson. (TX Q-00001.) Claim 1 of the ‘372 patent

claims a “patient identification and verification system for

relating items to specific patients and for ensuring that an

identified item corresponds to an identified patient,” comprised

of three nodes of communication: (1) “programmed system computer

means,” (2) “microprocessor controlled portable handheld patient

terminal means,” and (3) “microprocessor controlled base station

means including electromagnetic wave transceiver means.” 

(TX Q-00051-52.)

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19. The PTO issued the ‘009 patent on July 18, 1989. 

(TX R-00001.) The ‘009 patent, titled “Portable Handheld

Terminal Including Optical Bar Code Reader And Electromagnetic

Transceiver Means For Interactive Wireless Communication With A

Base Station,” is assigned to CliniCom, Inc. and lists as

inventors Ronald Zook and Peter Gombrich. (TX R-00001.) The

‘009 patent claims, inter alia, a “portable handheld terminal”

including keyboard means, display means, optical sensor means for

sensing bar code indicia, and electromagnetic transceiver means.

(TX R-00014 at claim 16, lines 37-59.) The patent further claims

“a system” in which the “base station means” includes “programmed

microprocessor and memory means for controlling communication

between the portable handheld terminal and a central computer

system electrically wired to the base station means.” 

(TX R-00015 at Claim 16.)

20. On August 15, 1989, the ‘716 patent was issued by the

PTO. (TX B-00001.) Claim 1 of the ‘716 patent claims a “patient

identification and verification system” comprising three nodes of

communication: (1) “programmed system computer means,” (2)

“microprocessor controlled portable handheld patient terminal

means,” and (3) “microprocessor controlled base station means

including electromagnetic wave transceiver means.” (TX B-00036.)

The portable handheld patient terminal means further includes bar

code reader means, keyboard means, display means, and

electromagnetic wave transceiver means. (TX B-00036 at

30:42-58.) Claim 1 of the ‘716 patent also specifies that the

base station is “interconnected to the programmed system

computer means at least in part by electrical lines.” 

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3 The reference in the December 1, 1987 Office Action to

“Claim 26” (TX X-00066 at ¶ 5) is a typographical error, as there

was no Claim 26 pending. In light of the otherwise sequential

treatment of claims by Examiner Lev, the court finds that the

rejection at issue applies to pending Claim 20, as patent law

expert James Sheridan (“Mr. Sheridan”) testified. 

(TT 345:25-346:11.)

9

(TX B-00036 at 30:65-67.)

B. The Baker Patent

21. Examiner Lev rejected claims 20 and 22-24 in the ‘009

application because of the Baker patent. (TX X-00066-67.)3

Rejected Claim 20 involved a portable handheld terminal with a

“unique address signal,” and rejected claims 22-24 involved

methods of transmitting patient information from a handheld to a

base station using a “unique address recognizable by a base

station programmed to accept patient related information

containing the unique address.” (TX X-00056-57.) Examiner Lev

found that Baker rendered the address code in the portable

handheld obvious. (TX X-00066-67.) Mr. Schumann testified that

the limitations Examiner Lev rejected were also present in the

‘716 application he was prosecuting concurrently. 

(TT 128:25-129:13.) 

22. Additionally, the Baker patent includes the very

features relied upon by Mr. Schumann to argue for patentability

of the ‘716 patent. (TX W-000124.) The parties did not dispute

that Baker teaches a three-node approach to communications

similar to that claimed in the ‘716 patent; the three

nodes are plainly depicted in the Baker patent’s Figure 1. 

(TX AA-00002.) Bridge’s expert Dr. Lawrence Fagan (“Dr. Fagan”)

explained that the first node in the Baker patent is the “central

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controller” in that figure, the second node is the “subsystem

controller,” and the third node is the handheld device, depicted

as a cordless phone. (TT 264:5-265:22.) McKesson’s expert Dr.

Harry Bims (“Dr. Bims”) agreed that the Baker patent discloses a

three-node system, where the central controller is the first

node, the subsystem controller is the second node, and the

handheld device is the third node. (TT 446:1-18.)

23. Mr. Schumann cited as relevant prior art at least five

cordless telephone references to the ‘716 Examiner. (TX W-00105-

107.) The Baker patent also related to a cordless telephone

system. (TT 246:24-247:1.) Mr. Schumann also cited among the 33

prior art patents disclosed to both the ‘716 and ‘009 Examiners

patents relating to “monitoring test animal activity,” a

“security system,” and a “theft detection system.” (TX V-00069-

70; TX W-00095-96.) None of these patents related to patient

identification systems, yet Mr. Schumann disclosed them “in

accordance with the applicant’s duty of good faith and candor

toward the Patent Office.” (TX W-00093; TX V-00068.) Mr.

Schumann testified that patents can be material where there is “a

different application even though the underlying technology might

be relevant to the case that you’re handling.” (TT 89:24-90:1.)

24. Examiner Lev had both U.S. Patent 4,628,193 to Blum

(the “Blum patent”) and U.S. Patent 4,593,155 to Hawkins (the

“Hawkins patent”) before him (TX X-00130) but used the Baker

patent to reject the ‘009 patent’s claims to a portable handheld

terminal, as discussed above. 

25. The Baker patent more explicitly and clearly discloses

a three-node wireless communications system than either the Blum

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or Hawkins patents. The Blum patent (TX CC) does not disclose a

three-node system at all; it discloses a two node system with a

handheld and a central computer, where the handheld is physically

docked in the computer to transmit information. (TT 271:19-

272:25.) There is no base station that wirelessly transmits data

from the handheld to the central computer. (Id.) The Hawkins

patent (TX U9) only implicitly suggests a third node, a central

computer, rather than expressly disclosing it, like the Baker

patent. (TT 270:14-271:18.) Also, the parties’ experts agreed

that the Baker patent includes the “display” claim limitation of

the ‘716 patent, which is missing from Hawkins. (TT 270:9-13;

451:6-18.) 

26. Mr. Schumann admits that he knew that his duty to

disclose material information in the ‘716 prosecution continued

until that patent issued on August 15, 1989. (TT 50:23-51:2.)

After learning of the Baker patent on October 23, 1987 from

Examiner Lev, Mr. Schumann continued to actively prosecute the

‘716 patent for another 22 months until his admitted duty of

disclosure expired. (See TT 127:6-16.)

27. Mr. Schumann cancelled the claims in the ‘009

application that were rejected due to the Baker patent. 

(TT 131:8-132:1; TX X-00077.) Features of those cancelled claims

included aspects of the invention under review in the ‘716 patent

prosecution. (TT 128:25-129:13.)

28. Mr. Schumann has no present recollection of prosecuting

the ‘716 patent and thus cannot describe why, at the time, he did

not disclose the Baker patent to the ‘716 Examiner. (TT 212:2-5;

218:2-6; 222:1-22.) He believes now, looking at the Baker

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patent, that it is cumulative prior art. (TT 221:17-21.)

C. The Rejections in the ‘009 Prosecution

29. The rejected ‘009 claims were substantially similar to

the ‘716's Claim 1. In the first rejection issued by Examiner

Lev on February 26, 1987, he rejected then-pending ‘009 claims 15

and 16. Claim 15 claimed:

A portable handheld terminal system, comprising:

(a) a portable handheld terminal, including:

(i) a housing having first and second spaced

apart, opposing major surfaces extending

longitudinally of the housing between first and

second end portions;

(ii) keyboard means disposed on the first surface

for entering data;

(iii) display means disposed on the first surface

for displaying data;

(iv) optical sensor means disposed in the housing

for sensing bar code indicia;

(v) RF transceiver means contained in the housing

for transmitting and receiving RF signals;

(vi) control means contained in the housing and

operatively interconnected to the keyboard means,

display means, optical sensor means, and RF

transceiver means for controlling operation of the

portable handheld terminal; and

(vii) power supply means for powering the portable

handheld terminal; and

(b) base station means including RF transceiver means

for communication with the portable handheld terminal.

(TX X-00117-118.) This claim alone bears striking resemblance to

Claim 1 of the ‘716 patent. Like the rejected ‘009 claim, Claim

1 of the ‘716 patent claims a “portable handheld patient

terminal means” having “bar code reader means,” “keyboard means”

and “display means,” “electromagnetic wave transceiver means,”

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and “base station means” that transmit data wirelessly

to the handheld terminal. (TX B-00036 at col. 30:42-64.)

Rejected claim 16 in the ‘009 application strengthens the

similarity, adding a “central computer system electrically wired

to the base station means” (TX X-00118), the final node of the

‘716 patent’s three-node system. (See TX B-00036 at col.

30:65-67 [“the base station means being interconnected to the

programmed system computer means at least in part by electrical

lines . . .”].) In sum, these two rejected claims substantially

overlap with the limitations of Claim 1 of the ‘716 patent. Also

notable, these two ‘009 claims disclose all three nodes of the

‘716’s patient identification system, with the identical means of

communication among the core structures: the portable

handheld terminal, communicating wirelessly with base stations,

which in turn, communicate by electrical lines with a central

computer.

30. The second rejection issued by Examiner Lev on December

1, 1987, again rejected ‘009 claims which were substantially

similar to the ‘716's Claim 1. There, Examiner Lev rejected ‘009

pending claims 19 and 21, which like Claim 1 in the ’716 patent,

included a “handheld terminal” with “keyboard means,” “display

means,” “optical sensor means . . . for sensing bar code data,”

“electromagnetic transceiver means for transmitting and receiving

electromagnetic signals representing the exchange of data,”

transmitting wirelessly “to a base station patient related

information” which, in turn, transmits that “patient related

information . . . to the central computer location by” electrical

lines. (TX X-00055-57.) Moreover, in the second rejection,

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Examiner Lev also rejected the newly-added limitation of a

“unique address recognizable by a base station programmed to

accept patient related information containing the unique

address.” (TX X-00057 [rejected ‘009 claims 22 and 23].) This

limitation appears in the ‘716 patent as the “programmable unique

identifier” aspect of the base station means. (TX B-00037.)

31. Several other ‘716 claim elements were also present in

the rejected ‘009 claims; namely, a “bar reader,” a “programmable

identification code” and “the transmission of patient data.” 

(TT 656:4-9.) Rejected claim 15 included “optical sensor

means disposed on the housing for sensing bar code indicia,” 

(TX X-00117), which Mr. Schumann testified is “basically the same

thing” as the bar code reader in the ‘716 claims. (TT 76:2-7.) 

Rejected claims 22 and 23 include a “unique address,” and further

specify that the base station is “programmed” with that address. 

(TX X-00057 [“transmission of a unique address recognizable by a

base station programmed to accept patient related information

containing the unique address . . . the step of programming with

the base station, the portable handheld terminal to transmit the

unique address”].) Finally, rejected claim 22 explicitly

discloses “transmitting patient related information to the base

station from the handheld.” (TX X-00057.)

32. Mr. Schumann has no present recollection of prosecuting

the ‘716 patent and thus cannot describe why, at the time, he did

not disclose the ‘009 rejections to the ‘716 Examiner. Looking

back, Mr. Schumann believes now that he either (1) probably

believed activity in the ‘009 prosecution was immaterial to the

‘716 prosecution because the ‘009 case involved only a terminal,

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while the ‘716 case involved an entire “system” or (2) he was

simply following his former law firm’s policy and practice of not

disclosing rejections in copending applications, even where the

rejections related to other substantially similar, pending

claims. (See TT 239:18-240:4; 155:21–156:20; 41:11-19; 229:5-

21.)

D. Allowance of the ‘372 Patent

33. The allowed ‘372 claims were substantially similar to

the ‘716 claims. As an initial matter, the two patents share the

same assignee, three of the same inventors, 35 identical

figures and identical specifications. (TT 238:18-20;

63:12-64:13; 65:4-67:20; compare TX B [‘716 patent] with TX Q

[‘372 patent].) Moreover, the claims of the two patents are

nearly identical. Both patents claim a “patient identification

and verification system” comprising (1) “programmed system

computer means for processing and storing patient data,” (2) a

“microprocessor controlled portable handheld patient terminal

means” that further includes “barcode reader means,” “display

means,” and “keyboard means,” and (3) “microprocessor controlled

base station means” which is wired to the programmed system

computer means and which includes “electromagnetic wave

transceiver means” for communication with the portable handheld.

(TX B-00036 and TX Q-00051-52.)

34. The only significant variation between the ‘372 and

‘716 patents is that the “base station means” in the ‘716 patent

includes a “programmable unique identifier” and “means for only

allowing communication with a portable handheld patient terminal

means having a corresponding program identifier,” elements not

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4 The clear and convincing standard of proof of facts is

an intermediate standard which lies somewhere between “beyond a

(continued...)

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present in the ‘372 claims. (TX B-00037 at col. 31:2-11.)

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Legal Standard

35. Stated generally, patent applicants and their patent

attorneys have a duty of candor, good faith and honesty in their

dealings with the PTO. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1989). The duty of

candor, good faith and honesty includes the duty to submit

truthful information and the duty to disclose to the PTO

information known to the patent applicants or their attorneys

which is material to the examination of the patent application. 

Elk Corp. of Dallas v. GAF Bldg. Materials Corp., 168 F.3d 28, 30

(Fed. Cir. 1999); 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1989). The duty of candor

extends throughout the patent’s entire prosecution history. Fox

Industries v. Structural Preservation Systems, Inc., 922 F.2d

801, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

36. Breach of the duty of candor, good faith and honesty

may constitute inequitable conduct. Id. If it is established

that a patent applicant engaged in inequitable conduct before the

PTO, the entire patent application so procured is rendered

unenforceable. Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister

Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

37. To establish inequitable conduct due to the failure to

disclose material information or the submission of false

information, the party raising the issue must prove by clear and

convincing evidence4 that (1) the information is material; (2)

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4(...continued)

reasonable doubt” and a “preponderance of the evidence.” 

Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979). Clear and

convincing evidence requires proof that a contention is “highly

probable.” Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984).

17

the knowledge of this information and its materiality is

chargeable to the patent applicant; and (3) the applicant's

submission of false information or its failure to disclose this

information resulted from an intent to mislead the PTO. Id.

38. Information is deemed material if there is a

substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would have

considered the material important in deciding whether to issue

the application as a patent. See Elk Corp., 168 F.3d at 31; 37

C.F.R. § 1.56(a). Accordingly, a reference does not have to be

prior art to be material information that must be disclosed to

the PTO. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1989). “The [information]

need only be within a reasonable examiner’s realm of

consideration.” Merck & Co., Inc. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc.,

873 F.2d 1418, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 1989).

39. Disclosure is required where the materiality of the

information is in doubt because “[c]lose cases should be resolved

by disclosure, not unilaterally by the applicant.” LaBounty

Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm., 958 F.2d 1066,

1076 (Fed. Cir. 1992).

40. “[A]n otherwise material reference need not be

disclosed if it is merely cumulative of or less material than

other references already disclosed.” Elk Corp., 168 F.3d at 31.

41. Intent to deceive is rarely established by direct

evidence, and therefore, may be inferred from the facts and

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circumstances surrounding the applicant's overall conduct. 

Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1995)

(intent to deceive is most often proven “by a showing of acts,

the most natural consequence of which are presumably intended by

the actor”). For example, “intent may be inferred where a patent

applicant knew, or should have known, that withheld information

would be material to the PTO’s consideration of the patent

application.” Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular

Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In

determining whether the applicant's overall conduct evidences an

intent to deceive the PTO, the Federal Circuit has emphasized

that “the involved conduct, viewed in light of all the evidence,

including evidence indicative of good faith, must indicate

sufficient culpability to require a finding of intent to

deceive.” Paragon Podiatry Laboratory, Inc. v. KLM Laboratories,

Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (internal quotations

and citation omitted).

42. While “materiality does not presume intent, which is a

separate and essential component of inequitable conduct,” Allen

Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed.

Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), the

materiality of a reference may lead to an inference of intent. 

Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs., 394 F.3d

1348 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“in the absence of a credible explanation,

intent to deceive is generally inferred from the facts and

circumstances surrounding a knowing failure to disclose material

information”). “Intent to deceive, however, cannot be ‘inferred

solely from the fact that information was not disclosed;’ there

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must be a factual basis for a finding of deceptive intent.” 

Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharm., 438 F.3d 1123, 1133-34 (Fed.

Cir. 2006).

43. Moreover, if the failure to disclose or

misrepresentation occurred due to “[s]imple negligence,

oversight, or an erroneous judgment made in good faith,” the

intent element is not satisfied. See Speciality Composites v.

Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 982 (Fed. Cir. 1988). A finding of

“gross negligence,” likewise, “does not itself justify an

inference of intent to deceive.” Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876. 

However, a patent applicant cannot “cultivate ignorance, or

disregard numerous warnings that material information or prior

art may exist, merely to avoid actual knowledge of that

information or prior art.” FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Industries,

Inc., 836 F.2d 521, 526 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

44. Once materiality and intent have been established, the

court must conduct a balancing test to determine “whether the

scales tilt to a conclusion that ‘inequitable conduct’ occurred.”

Critikon, 120 F.3d at 1256. Generally, “when the

misrepresentation or withheld information is highly material, a

lesser quantum of proof is needed to establish the requisite

intent, . . . In contrast, the less material the information, the

greater the proof must be.” Purdue Pharma L.P., 438 F.3d at

1128-29 (internal citations omitted).

45. Ultimately, the question of whether inequitable conduct

occurred is equitable in nature. The court must make the

“equitable judgment concerning whether the applicant’s conduct is

so culpable that the patent should not be enforced.” Life

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Techns., Inc. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 224 F.3d 1320, 1324 (Fed.

Cir. 2000). During this step of the analysis, the court

determines “whether the material misrepresentations or omissions

in question are sufficiently serious in light of the evidence of

intent to deceive, under all the circumstances, to warrant the

severe sanction of holding the patent unenforceable.” Hoffman-La

Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1372 (Fed. Cir.

2003).

B. The Subject Conduct in the ‘716 Patent Prosecution

46. Having considered the evidence presented at trial, and

the law governing the factual determinations of materiality and

intent, the court finds that Bridge has proven materiality and

intent by clear and convincing evidence with respect to three

categories of information Mr. Schumann withheld from Examiner

Trafton during the ‘716 patent’s prosecution: (1) the Baker

patent, (2) the rejections by Examiner Lev in the

‘009 prosecution, and (3) the allowance of the ‘372 patent.

1. Nondisclosure of the Baker Patent

a. Materiality

47. An examiner’s reliance on a prior art reference in a

related prosecution supports a finding of materiality. See

Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1995)

(affirming holding of materiality where one set of patent

examiners considered a prior art reference material). Similarly,

here, Examiner Lev in the copending ‘009 prosecution brought the

Baker patent to Mr. Schumann’s attention during a telephonic

interview and recommended that claims 19-24 of that application

be cancelled in light of the Baker patent. (TX X-00062.) Up

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until that interview, Mr. Schumann had cited the same 38 prior

art references in the ‘716 and ‘009 prosecutions. (TT 105:1-10.) 

48. Indeed, Mr. Schumann testified that Examiner Lev’s

reliance on the Baker patent supports a finding of materiality:

Q. My question to you is: If the examiner in the primary

copending application had the exact same prior art in front

of him and the examiner in the co-pending application used

an additional piece of prior art to reject claims that were

substantially similar, that piece of prior art would be

material and should be cited back to the primary

application, shouldn't it?

A. If the same art had been before the examiners and the

claims are substantially similar, probably a pretty good

indication that the reference would be pretty material, yes.

(TT 58:4-13.)

49. Moreover, Examiner Lev not only brought the Baker

patent to Mr. Schumann’s attention, he ultimately rejected claims

20 and 22-24 in the ‘009 prosecution because of Baker. (TX X00066-67.) Specifically, rejected Claim 20 involved a portable

handheld terminal with a “unique address signal,” and rejected

claims 22-24 involved methods of transmitting patient information

from a handheld to a base station using a “unique address

recognizable by a base station programmed to accept patient

related information containing the unique address.” (TX X-00056-

57.) Examiner Lev found that the Baker patent rendered the

address code in the portable handheld obvious. (TX X-00066-67.)

50. In his testimony, Mr. Schumann confirmed that the

limitations Examiner Lev rejected were also present in the ‘716

application he was prosecuting concurrently:

Q. The unique address code existed in both claims, the

claims in both patents; right?

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5 McKesson at times blurred the distinction between the

tests for the materiality of the prior art Baker patent, and for

the materiality of Examiner Lev’s rejections in the copending

‘009 prosecution, discussed infra. The “Dayco test” (also

discussed infra) requiring “substantially similar” claims relates

to the materiality of the rejections, and confirms that those

rejections are material. The “substantial similarity” between the

rejected ‘009 claims and the ‘716 claims is relevant to, but is

not determinative of, the Baker patent’s materiality. There is

no requirement that a prior art reference be used to reject

“substantially similar” claims in order to be material. 

Moreover, the prior art reference itself need not exhibit any

specific threshold level of “similarity” with the patent at issue

to be relevant. Critikon, 120 F.3d at 1258 (reversing

non-materiality finding where the prior art was

(continued...)

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A. Was an element in some of the claims, yes.

Q. Examiner Lev found that Baker rendered that obvious, 

the address code?

A. He found that our claims to a portable handheld 

terminal were not allowable in view of the Baker 

reference for those specific claims, not the others.

Q. You had a portable handheld terminal as part of the 

716 claim; right?

A. Yes. A portable handheld terminal as part of the 716

claims.

Q. You had a unique address as part of the 716 claims?

A. That is one of the aspects.

(TT 128:25-129:13.) 

51. Therefore, in light of Examiner Lev’s citation of the

Baker patent in the copending ‘009 prosecution (in which Mr.

Schumann had previously disclosed the identical prior art as in

the ‘716 prosecution), and Examiner Lev’s reliance on the Baker

patent to reject claim limitations that were also present in the

‘716 application, the court finds that the Baker patent meets the

“reasonable examiner” materiality standard and should have been

disclosed to Examiner Trafton.5

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5(...continued)

“substantially different” and “operate[d] differently,” but

“nonetheless [had] relevant features”).

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52. Additionally, the court also finds the Baker patent

material because it contradicts the position Mr. Schumann took in

arguing for issuance of the ‘716 patent. See Critikon, 120 F.3d

at 1258. In Critikon, the Federal Circuit reversed the district

court’s findings of non-materiality and lack of intent, in a case

where a prior art patent had been withheld from the Examiner. 

The Federal Circuit found that, even though the undisclosed

patent overall was “substantially different” from the patent at

issue, it was material because it included a “retaining means,”

and the patentee had “relied on the novelty of the ‘retaining

means’ . . . to gain allowance of the patent application.” Id.;

see also Hoffman-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1368 (a “reasonable

examiner would have wanted to know that the patentability

argument” made by the patentee was actually unsupported by their

experimental results, and thus those results were material).

53. In this case, the Baker patent includes the features

relied upon by Mr. Schumann to argue for patentability of the

‘716 patent. In responding to an Office Action, Mr. Schumann

told Examiner Trafton that:

None of the references either singularly or in 

combination teach or suggest the claimed invention. In

addition to numerous other differences, none of the

references teach the three node approach to

communications as provided in the claimed invention. In 

the present invention, the first node of communication 

is a main or central computer . . . The second node of

communication are the base stations which are wired to the

main computer . . . . The third node of communication in the

present invention is the portable handheld patient terminal

which cooperates with the base stations to provide for

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wireless transmission of data between the base station

and the patient terminal.

(TX W-00124.) Mr. Schumann could not have made this

patentability argument if Examiner Trafton had the opportunity to

consider the Baker patent. Both parties’ experts agreed that the

Baker patent teaches a three-node approach to communications

similar to that claimed in the ‘716 patent. (TT 264:5-265:22

[Dr. Fagan]; TT 446:1-18 [Dr. Bims].) Indeed, in the ‘716

patent’s three nodes are plainly depicted in the Baker patent’s

Figure 1. (TX AA-00002.) Accordingly, the court finds that, as

Dr. Lawrence Fagan testified, Mr. Schumann’s representation to

Examiner Trafton, above, would be inaccurate had the Baker patent

been added to the mix of prior art. (TT 282:1-24.) Thus, for

all of the reasons stated above, the court finds the Baker patent

was highly material prior art to the ‘716 prosecution.

54. McKesson raised several arguments why the Baker patent

should be found not material. The court rejects those arguments

for the following reasons:

55. First, the Baker patent is not cumulative of the other

prior art cited to Examiner Trafton in the ‘716 prosecution. 

McKesson’s legal expert, Thomas Smegal (“Mr. Smegal”), opined

that Baker is cumulative because one could find all of its

elements by combining two other prior art references, the Blum

and Hawkins patents. (TT 497:5-498:1.) However, this is not the

standard for materiality.

56. A withheld reference is not cumulative and may be

“highly material when it discloses a more complete combination of

relevant features, even if those features are before the patent

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examiner in other references.” Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v.

Samsung Elecs. Co., 204 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The

Baker patent is not cumulative under this controlling standard.

57. Initially, the court finds significant that Examiner

Lev, who already had both the Blum and Hawkins patents before him

(TX X-00130), added the Baker patent to the mix of prior art in

the ’009 prosecution, and then relied on it in rejecting claims

to a portable handheld terminal, as discussed above. Clearly,

Examiner Lev did not view Baker as cumulative, but rather treated

it as an important addition to the prior art previously cited by

Mr. Schumann.

58. Furthermore, as the court found above, the Baker patent

more explicitly and clearly discloses a three-node wireless

communications system than either the Blum or Hawkins patents. 

Accordingly, the Baker patent is not cumulative because

admittedly “no reference before the examiner disclosed this

combination of required elements.” GFI, Inc. v. Franklin Corp.,

265 F.3d 1268, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

59. Also, the court is not called upon to determine whether

the Baker patent would have affirmatively invalidated the ‘716

patent. While Bridge did present such evidence from Dr. Fagan

(TT 276:16-281:3), prior art can be material even where it would

not invalidate a patent. Molins, 48 F.3d at 1180. The question

is whether a reasonable examiner would have been substantially

likely to consider the Baker patent important to the evaluation

of the ‘716 application. Given the similarity of the core

features of the Baker patent to the subject matter of the ‘716

patent, it certainly meets that level of interest. See Akron

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Polymer Container Corp. v. Exxel Container, Inc., 148 F.3d 1380,

1382 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (concluding that in light of the

“considerable overlapping content in the specifications and

claims of the two applications . . . the Venus application was

highly material”).

60. McKesson also argued that Baker was not material

because it related to a cordless telephone system, rather than a

system for transmitting and storing medical patient data. (See

McKesson Information Solutions Inc.’s Trial Brief for Phase 1

Trial on Inequitable Conduct [Docket No. 638] at 10:13-17; TT

246:24-247:1.) This narrow view of materiality is belied by Mr.

Schumann’s own testimony and his conduct in prosecuting the

copending patent applications. The 33 prior art patents that Mr.

Schumann did disclose to both the ‘716 and ‘009 examiners

included patents relating to “monitoring test animal

activity,” a “security system,” and a “theft detection system.”

(TX V 00069-70; TX W 00095-96.) None of these related to patient

identification systems, yet Mr. Schumann disclosed them in

accordance with his duty of good faith and candor toward the PTO.

(TX W-00093, TX V-00068.) Moreover, Mr. Schumann cited as

relevant at least five cordless telephone references to the ‘716

Examiner. (TX W 00105-00107.) As Mr. Schumann testified at

trial, patents can be material where there is “a different

application even though the underlying technology might be

relevant to the case that you’re handling.” (TT 89:24-90:1.) 

Furthermore, McKesson’s expert, Dr. Bims, confirmed that “three

node wireless systems which are used for realtime interactive

exchange of data”--such as disclosed in the Baker patent--are

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material from a scientific standpoint. (TT 463:13-464:10.) 

Finally, Examiner Lev’s reliance on the Baker patent in issuing

rejections, discussed above, additionally confirms that wireless

technology, whether or not applied in the medical field, meets

the “reasonable examiner” test in this case.

b. Intent

61. Having determined that the Baker patent is highly

material and not cumulative, the court next addresses whether

Bridge has established intent to deceive by clear and convincing

evidence. 

62. The overwhelming circumstantial evidence, combined with

Mr. Schumann’s failure to provide a credible explanation

for the nondisclosure, leads the court to find that Bridge has

proven intent by clear and convincing evidence on multiple,

alternative grounds.

63. First, the Federal Circuit’s decision in Bruno Indep.

Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs., 394 F.3d 1348 (Fed.

Cir. 2005), is instructive here. In Bruno, a prior art stairlift

(“the Wecolator”) was not disclosed to the PTO during prosecution

of the patent-in-suit. It was, however, concurrently disclosed

to the FDA in seeking approval to sell a product covered by the

patent. Id. at 1350. The Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment

of unenforceability, stating: “[t]he fact that an official of

Bruno, who was involved in both the FDA and PTO submissions,

chose to disclose the Wecolator to the FDA, but not to the PTO,

certainly supports a finding of deceptive intent.” Id. Here,

the circumstantial evidence of intent is even stronger than in

Bruno. There, the applicant’s knowledge of materiality was

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inferred from disclosure to the FDA. In this case, Mr. Schumann

was informed of the Baker patent’s materiality by the PTO itself

when Examiner Lev brought the patent to his attention, suggested

cancellation of certain claims, and then rejected claims as

obvious in light of Baker--including claim elements that were

present in the ‘716 application.

64. Mr. Schumann’s knowledge that the Baker patent was

material is further confirmed by his disclosure of the patent to

Examiner Yusko in the copending ‘441 prosecution. (TX Y-00079.)

Under Bruno, this simultaneous withholding from one examiner

while disclosing to another examiner supports an inference of

deceptive intent. See also Molins, 48 F.3d at 1182 (“[f]ailure

to cite to the PTO a material reference cited elsewhere in the

world justifies a strong inference that the withholding was

intentional”).

65. Second, the timing of Mr. Schumann’s telephone

conference with Examiner Lev provides additional support for

inferring deceptive intent. The call took place on October 23,

1987 during which Examiner Lev discussed only one piece of prior

art (the Baker patent), and suggested cancellation of several

claims in the ‘009 application based on Baker. (TX X-00062.) It

was only seventeen days earlier that Mr. Schumann had made the

representation to Examiner Trafton that the prior art does not

disclose the “three-node approach to communications” as provided

in the claimed invention. (TX W-00124.) Mr. Schumann could not

have (or certainly should not have) missed Baker’s significance,

given that it rendered his recent statement to Examiner Trafton

untrue, further confirming that intent to deceive should be

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inferred. See, e.g., GFI, 265 F.3d at 1275 (“[w]e have

held deceptive intent to be shown where a patentee withheld

references and made an argument for patentability that could not

have been made had the art been disclosed”); LaBounty Mfg., 958

F.2d at 1076 (superseded on other grounds by revision to Rule

1.56)(“[T]he evidence amply supports an inference that LaBounty

acted with culpable intent to mislead or deceive the PTO by

withholding its own known prior art devices and by making an

argument for patentability which could not have been made had the

art been disclosed.”).

66. Third, Mr. Schumann admits that he knew that his duty

to disclose material information in the ‘716 prosecution

continued until that patent issued on August 15, 1989. 

(TT 50:23-51:2.) After learning of the Baker patent on October

23, 1987 from Examiner Lev, Mr. Schumann continued to actively

prosecute the ‘716 patent for another 22 months until his

admitted duty of disclosure expired. (See TT 127:6-16.) During

this extended period of time when Mr. Schumann did nothing to

bring Baker to the attention of the ‘716 examiner, Examiner

Lev again highlighted the materiality of Baker for Mr. Schumann

when he rejected the copending ‘009 patent claims based on Baker.

(TT 125:5-8; TX X-00066-67.) Also during this period, Mr.

Schumann himself evidenced his realization of the strength of the

Baker patent when he chose not to even attempt to overcome

Examiner Lev’s rejection based on Baker and cancelled the

claims in the ‘009 application that were rejected due to Baker.

(TT 131:8-132:1; TX X-00077.) Given that the features Mr.

Schumann cancelled in the ‘009 prosecution because of Baker

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included, according to Mr. Schumann’s own admission, aspects of

the invention under review in the ‘716 prosecution 

(TT 128:25-129:13), Mr. Schumann either knew or should have known

that the Baker patent was material in the ‘716 case. For this

reason as well, deceptive intent is established. See, e.g.,

Brasseler, U.S.A. I., L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370,

1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“intent may be inferred where a patent

applicant knew, or should have known, that withheld information

could be material to the PTO’s consideration of the patent

application”).

67. Fourth, Mr. Schumann did not proffer a single “credible

explanation” for his failure to disclose the Baker patent to

Examiner Trafton. Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d

1181,1191 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Bruno, 394 F.3d at 1354. Mr.

Schumann’s most prominent “explanation” is that looking at the

Baker reference now, he believes it is cumulative. 

(TT 221:17-21.) Not only does the court find Baker not

cumulative for the reasons set forth above, such “contemporaneous

evidence that he did not believe [Baker] material” cannot explain

away an inference of an “intent to mislead.” Bristol-Myers

Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226, 1241

(Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Mr. Pilard’s assessment occurred after the

issuance of the ‘011 patent and, thus, does not shed light on . .

. intent with regard to the prosecution of the ‘011 patent

application”). Mr. Schumann repeatedly testified that he has no

recollection whatsoever of prosecuting the ‘716 patent (TT

212:2-5; 218:2-6; 222:1-22), leaving the record wanting of the

required evidence of an explanation contemporaneous with the

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prosecution of the ‘716 patent. See also Brasseler, 267 F.3d at

1377 (affirming explanation as “incredible” where patentee “could

not recall having discussed any potential bar events” material to

the prosecution of the patent-at-issue).

68. Even if the “hindsight” explanation offered by Mr.

Schumann could suffice as a legal matter, the court does not find

it credible. Mr. Schumann suggested that he must have analyzed

the Baker patent and determined that it was not material to the

‘716 patent. (TT 246:14-20 [“I’ve got to assume it was

reviewed for materiality and a decision was made not to cite

it.”].) But there is no evidence that such an analysis actually

took place. No notes or records from Mr. Schumann’s files were

offered documenting that Mr. Schumann either reviewed Baker or

made an affirmative decision that it was not material to the ‘716

prosecution. Moreover, based on the following sequence of

events, Mr. Schumann’s explanation strains credulity: 

(1) Examiner Lev located the Baker patent on his own; (2) he

brought it to Mr. Schumann’s attention in a telephone interview;

(3) he suggested the cancellation of certain ‘009 claims, and

then issued a rejection of those claims based in part on Baker;

(4) shortly thereafter, Mr. Schumann found that the rejection

based on Baker could not be overcome, requiring him to cancel the

claims (regarding a handheld patient terminal system

communicating wirelessly with base stations and via wires with a

remote central computer) in order to continue with the ‘009

prosecution; (5) finally, even though Mr. Schumann had disclosed

the same prior art in both the ‘009 and ‘716 prosecutions through

that point in time, he concluded that the Baker patent had no

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bearing on the ‘716 prosecution (which involved the same

three-node wireless system rejected in the ‘009 prosecution).

69. Furthermore, the notion that Mr. Schumann might have

made a materiality determination regarding the Baker patent and

not produced it based on that assessment is also belied by the

very practices and procedures he purportedly always followed. 

Mr. Schumann repeatedly testified that his practice was to be

“over inclusive” and to “bend[] over backwards to make sure [he]

got everything into the case.” (TT 86:2-10; 169:18-19). Thus,

Mr. Schumann’s explanation that he cut a very fine line in the

instance of the Baker patent is simply not credible.

70. In sum, this case bears strong similarity to Critikon,

Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253,

1256 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In Critikon, the applicant had failed to

disclose a prior art patent (“the McDonald patent”) to the PTO

during prosecution, but the district court found both materiality

and intent lacking at the conclusion of a bench trial. The

Federal Circuit reversed on both issues, and entered judgment of

unenforceability. Id. at 1260. Like the Baker patent in this

case, the McDonald patent was material despite being

“substantially different” from the claimed invention, because it

included a claim limitation the patentee had relied on in arguing

for patentability. Id. at 1258. Given the high degree of

materiality, and the applicant’s undisputed knowledge of that

materiality, the Federal Circuit held that:

A relatively high degree of intent may be inferred 

under the facts of this case. Critikon was aware of the

McDonald Patent. It was aware that the ‘retaining means’ 

was a point of novelty the examiner relied upon during 

the course of prosecution . . . . And, despite this, it 

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did not disclose the patent or provide a good faith

explanation for not disclosing the patent.

Id. at 1256. Similar to Mr. Schumann’s reasons here, one

patentee in Critikon argued that he believed the prior art

reference was not material, and the other claimed he could not

remember it. Id. The Federal Circuit rejected these

“explanations,” because there was evidence the patentees were

aware of the McDonald patent’s materiality, since they had “cited

the McDonald patent to the PTO in several other patent

proceedings,” just like Mr. Schumann did when he submitted the

Baker reference in the ‘441 prosecution. Id. While the district

court in Critikon had found the applicants’ testimony “credible

under the totality of the circumstances,” the Federal Circuit

rejected this finding as unsupported and noted that the record

“does not reveal a single instance where [the applicants]

provided a good faith explanation for the exclusion.” Id. at

1257. On these facts, the Federal Circuit reversed the judgment

of enforceability and found the patent at issue unenforceable. 

Id. at 1258. 

71. Given the Federal Circuit’s guidance in Critikon, the

court infers deceptive intent here.

72. Based on any one of the foregoing reasons, the evidence

overwhelmingly establishes that Mr. Schumann knew of the Baker

patent, knew or should have known that it could be material to

the ‘716 prosecution, and yet withheld that prior art from

Examiner Trafton. Under the totality of circumstances, the court

finds that Mr. Schumann failed to disclose the Baker patent in

the ‘716 prosecution under circumstances proving an intent to

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6 See Mem. & Order, filed Aug. 11, 2005 (Docket #533), at

10 n.8: “In Dayco Prods., the court simply stated that it ‘had

never addressed whether the prior rejection of a substantially

(continued...)

34

deceive.

2. Nondisclosure of the Rejections in the ‘009

Prosecution

a. Materiality

73. While Mr. Schumann’s failure to disclose the Baker

reference “alone supports unenforceability,” GFI, 265 F.3d at

1275, a finding of unenforceability of the ‘716 patent is further

supported by Mr. Schumann’s failure to inform Examiner Trafton of

two adverse Office Actions by Examiner Lev in the ‘009

prosecution. Said Office Actions, namely, the rejections of

certain ‘009 claims, were material to the ‘716 prosecution.

74. The law requires that material rejections in one

prosecution be disclosed to the examiner in a copending case. As

stated by the Federal Circuit in Dayco Products, Inc. v. Total

Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003):

When prosecuting claims before the Patent Office, a 

patent applicant is, at least implicitly, asserting that

those claims are patentable. A prior rejection of a

substantially similar claim refutes, or is inconsistent 

with the position that those claims are patentable. 

An adverse decision by another examiner, therefore,

meets the materiality standard.

McKesson repeatedly has asserted that the 2003 Dayco decision

created a new disclosure requirement that does not apply to Mr.

Schumann’s prosecution of the ‘716 patent in the 1980s. The

court rejected that argument in its ruling on the parties’ crossmotions for summary judgment on the issue of inequitable conduct,

and rejects it again here.6 The materiality of an Office Action

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6(...continued)

similar claim in a copending United States application is

material;’ it did not make that finding in the first instance.

Rather, it applied the duty to disclose such information, as

embodied in 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)(2), to conduct that had occurred

more than a decade earlier. As such, Dayco Prods. is not

dispositive of the materiality of this nondisclosure.”

35

stems from the Manual of Patent Examination and Procedure

(“MPEP”) provision requiring disclosure of “information within

[the applicants’] knowledge as to other copending United States

applications which are ‘material to the examiner’ of the

application in question,”--a provision in existence since before

any of the applications here were filed. See MPEP § 2001.06(b)

(4th Ed., Rev. 8, Oct. 1981) (quoting 37 C.F.R. 1.56 (“Rule

56”)).

75. The principle requiring disclosure of material events

during prosecution, including rejections, had been recognized

prior to Dayco. See, e.g., Li Second Family Ltd. P’ship v.

Toshiba Corp., 231 F.3d 1373 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming

inequitable conduct judgment based in part on failure to disclose

decision of PTO Board of Appeals in copending application);

Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 837 F.

Supp. 1444, 1474 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (finding inequitable conduct

based on failure to disclose rejection in copending case).

The Federal Circuit in Dayco applied this rule to patents that

were, like the ‘716 patent, prosecuted in the 1980s. Indeed,

McKesson’s own legal expert, Mr. Smegal, a former patent examiner

with 40 years’ experience prosecuting patents (TT 465:10-466:24),

testified that Dayco did not create a new duty of disclosure. 

(TT 532:12-14.)

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7 McKesson argues that Dayco requires that the rejected

claims be substantially similar “in content and scope”

to the ‘716 claims. However, this language does not appear in

the Dayco holding: “We hold that a contrary decision of another

examiner reviewing a substantially similar claim meets the . . .

‘reasonable examiner’ threshold materiality test.” 329 F.3d at

1368 (emphasis added). Moreover, McKesson has not provided any

persuasive explanation for how this language substantively alters

the result here. Accordingly, in determining materiality, the

court applies the test of whether the rejected ‘009 claims were

“substantially similar” to the ‘716 claims.

36

76. Having determined that the rule requiring disclosure of

material rejections applies in this case, the court turns to

whether Examiner Lev’s two rejections in the ‘009 prosecution

were material and should have been disclosed to Examiner Trafton

in the ‘716 prosecution. Under Dayco, the rejections are

material if the rejected claims were “substantially similar” to

the claims pending before Examiner Trafton.7 Dayco, 329 F.3d at

1368. McKesson relied on “redline” comparisons of the various

claims to demonstrate that there are wording differences, and

even some differences in claim limitations, but the law does not

require that the claims be completely identical to trigger the

disclosure requirement. Dayco, 329 F.3d at 1361 (finding

claims “substantially similar” when the “claims submitted in the

‘196 family of applications were in some respects substantially

identical”) (emphasis added). Similarly, here, the rejected ‘009

claims were “in some respects” identical to the ‘716's Claim 1,

directly implicating the materiality of the ‘009 rejections to

the ‘716 prosecution.

77. The court has found, above, that the rejected ‘009

claims were “substantially similar” to the ‘716's Claim 1. As

such, applying the controlling law, the court finds that Mr.

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Schumann should have disclosed the adverse Office Actions in the

‘009 prosecution to Examiner Trafton. Specifically, with respect

to the first Office Action on February 26, 1987, rejected claims

15 and 16 of the ‘009 patent substantially overlapped with the

limitations of Claim 1 of the ‘716 patent, and accordingly, that

rejection would have been material to Examiner Trafton. Indeed,

these two rejected ‘009 claims disclosed all three nodes of the

‘716's patient identification system, with the identical means of

communication among the core structures. A reasonable examiner

would consider the fact that Examiner Lev had rejected claims

containing these very elements important.

78. Additionally, in the second Office Action of December

1, 1987, rejected ‘009 claims 19, 21, 22 and 23 were

substantially similar to the ‘716's Claim 1, thus making

Examiner’s Lev’s second rejection material to the ‘716

prosecution. Moreover, this second rejection was particularly

material to the ‘716 prosecution because Examiner Lev relied on

the Baker patent, which had not been disclosed in the ‘716

prosecution, to reject the “unique address” limitation of the

‘009 claims, which was also a limitation of the ‘716 patent. Mr.

Schumann did not contest this rejection, but instead cancelled

the ‘009 claims that Examiner Lev had rejected over the Baker

patent “in an effort to obtain early allowance of at least some

claims to the invention.” (TX X-00077.) The court finds this

information highly material--a reasonable examiner would find it

important that (1) another examiner had rejected a claim

limitation that he himself was considering, (2) that another

examiner had done so based on prior art that was not before him,

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and (3) the applicant had acquiesced in the rejection and

cancelled all claims that had been rejected based on that same

prior art.

79. Beyond meeting the Dayco “substantially similar” test,

the two rejections by Examiner Lev are material for the

independent reason that they contradict Mr. Schumann’s

argument for patentability in the ‘716 prosecution. See Bruno,

394 F.3d at 1353 (“Had the examiner known about the Wecolator,

however, Bruno could not have touted the front offset

swivel as a point of novelty.”). In responding to Examiner

Trafton’s rejection of every claim of the ‘716 application, Mr.

Schumann attempted to distinguish the prior art and argued that

the ‘716 invention was novel and patentable because it

encompassed a three-node approach to communications, with

a central computer wired to the base stations, which then

communicated wirelessly with the portable handheld patient

terminals. (TX W-00124.) Examiner Lev rejected as obvious this

very combination of elements at least three times. Claim 16,

rejected in the first Office Action, claimed a “central

computer system electrically wired to the base station means,”

and the base station means included “means for wireless

communication with the portable handheld terminal.” (TX X00118.) Amended Claims 15 and 16, rejected by Examiner Lev on

December 1, 1987, included “base station means including RF

transceiver means for communication with the portable

handheld terminal,” and “a central computer system electrically

wired to the base station means.” (TX X-00054-55.) Finally,

Claim 21, rejected on December 1, 1987, claimed electromagnetic

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(i.e. wireless) transmission of data between a handheld terminal

and a base station, and data over voice (i.e. wired) transmission

of data between the base station and a central computer. (TX X00056-57.) Examiner Lev’s repeated rejection of this combination

of elements directly conflicted with Mr. Schumann’s patentability

argument to Examiner Trafton.

80. In sum, the February 27, 1987 and December 1, 1987

rejections in the ‘009 prosecution were material because (1) they

involved claims substantially similar to those pending

in the ‘716 application, and (2) they directly addressed the

point of novelty Mr. Schumann had advanced to Examiner Trafton.

81. The court rejects McKesson’s contention that Mr.

Schumann satisfied his duty to disclose these two material

rejections by merely disclosing the existence of the copending

‘009 application to Examiner Trafton. McKesson relies primarily

on Akron Polymer Container Corp. v. Exxel Container, Inc., 148

F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1998), for its position. In that case, the

charge of inequitable conduct turned on an attorney’s failure to

disclose the copending application, itself, to an examiner. Id.

at 1381. In Akron Polymer there was no allegation of deceit

regarding rejections or other material information in either

application. Thus Akron Polymer is inapposite. Moreover,

contrary to McKesson’s arguments, the MPEP requires far more than

disclosure of the copending application--it requires disclosure

of “information within [the applicants’] knowledge as to other

copending United States applications.” MPEP § 2001.06(b)

(4th Ed., Rev. 8, Oct. 1981). That disclosure of a copending

application does not constitute disclosure of all information

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regarding that application was confirmed by the Federal Circuit

in Li Second Family. There, the Federal Circuit affirmed a

finding of inequitable conduct for failure to disclose the

PTO Board’s decision in a copending case, even though the

existence of the co-pending case had been disclosed:

Although the genealogy chart filed by Li shows the 

chain of parent applications and related applications,

including the ‘758 application, we agree . . . that 

the chart does not adequately disclose the relevant

information—the Board’s decision regarding priority

dates. . . . Li’s submission of the genealogy chart 

. . . was not sufficient to disclose the Board’s 

decision to Examiner Saba.

231 F.3d at 1378-79. The controlling law plainly imposes a duty

of disclosure beyond citation of the co-pending application

alone. Indeed, McKesson’s expert, Mr. Smegal, concurred and

testified that there is a duty to disclose material rejections.

(TT 492:24-493:4; 535:18-536:14.)

b. Intent

82. A patentee aware of material information but who fails

to disclose it to the PTO “can expect to have great difficulty in

establishing subjective good faith sufficient to overcome an

inference of intent to mislead.” Bristol-Myers Squibb, 326 F.3d

at 1239. Mr. Schumann undeniably was aware of the rejections; he

responded to both of them. Moreover, he either knew or should

have known that they were material to the ‘716 application, given

that those rejections directly contradicted the point of novelty

Mr. Schumann had argued to Examiner Trafton regarding the ‘716

claims. Thus, Mr. Schumann must provide “facts supporting a

plausible justification or excuse” for the nondisclosure. 

Paragon, 984 F.2d at 1191.

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83. Here, Mr. Schumann offers two excuses for the

nondisclosure of the ‘009 rejections. The court does not find

either credible. First, Mr. Schumann speculates that he probably

did not believe activity in the ‘009 application was material to

the ‘716 prosecution because the ‘009 case involved only a

terminal, while the ‘716 involved an entire “system.” (See TT

239:18-240:4; 155:21-156:20.) This excuse is contradicted by the

actual wording of the claims rejected by Examiner Lev, which, as

discussed above, included all of the elements of a three-node

wireless system. Further, Mr. Schumann admitted on cross

examination that his terminal/system argument was a

distinction without a difference. (TT 242:3-243:6.) Thus, the

terminal/system distinction is not accurate and does not overcome

the inference of deceptive intent that arises from Mr. Schumann’s

withholding of known material information.

84. Second, Mr. Schumann attempts to justify his conduct by

explaining that he acted in conformance with his firm’s policy at

the time. 

Q. In your practice, do you follow that? Do you believe

that your duty of disclosure requires the disclosure of

a substantial – of a contrary decision regarding a

substantial[ly] similar claim in a copending

application?

A. I can tell you what the practice was over the 25 years

I’ve been in the practice. We did – we never did

docket a review of office actions coming in on a

co-pending case for citation in another copending

case.

***

Q. Isn’t it true that you believe that if a rejection 

in a co-pending application, the rejection itself, is

relevant to an application that you’re prosecuting, 

you have a duty to disclose that rejection even

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if you’ve disclosed the existence of the co-pending

application?

***

A. Given our operating standards, the way we handle

applications back during the time in the eighties when

this case was being prosecuted, we did not have

procedures set up to cite the office action in a

co-pending case. We looked at the references and we

cited references which we felt were material.

(TT 41:11-19; 229:5-21.) Preliminarily, the court does not find

Mr. Schumann’s trial testimony credible, as it appears to be a

product of newly developed hindsight. Indeed, Mr. Schumann

contradicted his trial testimony in his deposition, testifying

there that he would disclose an adverse Office Action, if it was

material:

Q. The sense I’m getting from your testimony is that 

even if it’s relevant that in the normal course it’s

not necessary to disclose a rejection as long as the

references are disclosed in the other actions; is 

that true? Am I –

***

Q. If I’ve misstated it, I want to get it right, so 

that’s why I’m asking?

A. Of course, if it was deemed to be relevant and in your

duty to disclose you should disclose it, you would do

that. I’m just saying that the typical normal course is

that it’s rare that you would bring an office action to

the attention of an examiner in a copending

case. But, of course, if there are issues of relevancy

you would do that.

(M. Schumann Depo. Tr. at 127:10-128:4 [emphasis added].)

85. Even if Mr. Schumann’s firm did have a policy of never

disclosing Office Actions in copending prosecutions, that policy

cannot erase the inference of deceptive intent that arises

from withholding information Mr. Schumann knew or should have

known could be material to patentability. If his former law firm

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indeed had a policy of never disclosing Office Actions, that

policy was contrary to the duty of disclosure, as confirmed by

both parties’ patent law experts. (TT 313:14-314:2 [Bridge’s

patent law expert, Mr. Sheridan, testified in pertinent part,

“[T]he standard wasn’t so much to disclose the fact of a

copending application as to disclose relevant information that

occurred or that came to light in the course of prosecution of

that copending application.”]; TT 492:24-493:4; 535:18-536:14

[McKesson’s patent law expert, Mr. Smegal, testified in pertinent

part, “Mr. Schumann . . . had an obligation under Rule 56 to

disclose material information . . . . If a . . . rejection, if

that document satisfied that criteria with respect to claims of

substantially similar[] content and scope, then he had a duty as

we’ve always had a duty.]”)

86. Attorneys cannot insulate themselves against charges of

inequitable conduct by instituting policies that prevent them

from complying with the law, as Mr. Schumann claims his former

firm apparently did in the 1980s. Under Federal Circuit case

law, “studied ignorance” such as that professed by Mr.

Schumann, supports, rather than defeats, an inference of

deceptive intent. Brasseler, 267 F.3d at 1377. In Brassler, the

district court found that the prosecuting attorney deliberately

avoided learning about a potential on-sale bar event because “he

was reluctant to learn the specific facts pertaining to earlier

sales that he would have been obliged to disclose to the PTO.”

Id. The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating that “one should not

be able to cultivate ignorance, or disregard numerous warnings

that material information or prior art may exist, merely to avoid

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8 148 F.3d at 1384 (finding that disclosure of the

copending application is a fact that “points away from an intent

to deceive”).

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actual knowledge of that information or prior art. . . . Where

one does, deceptive intent may be inferred.” Id. at 1383

(quotation omitted).

 87. Here, Mr. Schumann’s new claim at trial that he never

disclosed Office Actions, and that he was simply complying with

firm policy when he failed to disclose Examiner Lev’s rejections,

is the same sort of “studied refusal to investigate” that

supported an inference of deceptive intent in Brasseler. Id.

Mr. Schumann either knew, or should have known, that rejections

can be material in copending applications, and that Examiner

Lev’s rejections addressed the very point of novelty he had

advanced to Examiner Trafton. This knowledge put him on notice

that an investigation was necessary, regardless of his firm’s

policy. Id. at 1385 (“Attorneys must conduct meaningful

inquiries when the surrounding factual circumstances

would cause a reasonable attorney to understand that relevant and

questionable material information should be assessed.”).

88. Finally, while Mr. Schumann’s disclosure of the copendency of the ‘009 application to Examiner Trafton is some

evidence of a lack of intent to deceive under Akron Polymer,

8

weighing all the evidence here, as the court must, said

disclosure does not overcome the inference of an intent to

deceive established by the above facts. 

89. In sum, the court finds Mr. Schumann’s two stated

justifications for failure to disclose the rejections are wholly

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insufficient to overcome the inference of intent that arises when

“the withheld information is material and the patentee knew or

should have known of that materiality.” Bristol-Myers, 325 F.3d

at 1239 (affirming finding of deceptive intent where the

patentee’s “attempted justifications for [the nondisclosure] were

not credible”).

3. Nondisclosure of the Notice of Allowability of the

‘372 Patent

a. Materiality

90. A finding of unenforceability is further supported by

Mr. Schumann’s conduct in failing to disclose the Notice of

Allowability of the ‘372 patent in the ‘716 prosecution. 

91. The court analyzes this nondisclosure under the same

rule discussed above, established in the MPEP and confirmed in

Dayco, that an applicant must disclose material “information . .

. as to copending United States applications . . . .” MPEP §

2001.06(b) (4th Ed., Rev. 8, Oct. 1981) (emphasis added). The

MPEP instructs that information relating to copending U.S. patent

applications “in which similar subject matter but patentably

indistinct claims are present” must be disclosed to the examiner

of each of the involved applications. Dayco, 329 F.3d at 1365

(quoting MPEP § 2001.06(b)). Information from the prosecution of

a patent application is “highly material” to the prosecution of a

copending application where “it could have conceivably served as

the basis of a double patenting rejection.” Id. (citation and

internal quotation omitted). The doctrine of double patenting

“prohibits an inventor from obtaining a second patent for claims

that are not patentably distinct from the claims of [a] first

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patent,” id. (citation and internal quotation omitted), thus

preventing the extension of the statutory patent term. In re

Emert, 124 F.3d 1458, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1997). A notice of

allowance of a patent with claims similar to those of a

co-pending application can generate a double-patenting rejection

for that copending application. See id. McKesson’s expert, Mr.

Smegal, agreed at his deposition that the “federal circuit had

articulated the duty to disclose information such as a rejection

or notice of allowance of a substantially similar case in a

copending application” in the Dayco decision. (T. Smegal Depo. at

186:2-187:7 [emphasis added].)

92. Here again, McKesson’s defense that Dayco created new

law fails, and the court rejects McKesson’s contention that the

law requires disclosure only of the existence of the copending

application, not the allowance of those claims, as discussed

above. McKesson’s only remaining argument is that the ‘372 and

‘716 claims are not “substantially similar.” The court rejects

this argument as well.

93. The court has found above that the allowed ‘372 claims

were “substantially similar” to the ‘716 claims. The court finds

that this substantial similarity in claim elements renders the

allowance of the ‘372 patent material to the ‘716 prosecution. 

While there is one notable variation in the two patents in that

the “base station means” of the ‘716 patent includes a

“programmable unique identifier” and “means for only allowing

communication with a portable handheld patient terminal means

having a corresponding program identifier,” while the ‘372 patent

does not, the court nevertheless finds that this difference does

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not render the allowance of the ‘372 patent immaterial to the

‘716 application. Allowance of the ‘372 still “could have

conceivably served as the basis of a double patenting rejection.” 

Dayco, 329 F.3d at 1365 (citation and internal quotation omitted)

(emphasis added). Examiner Trafton should have been given the

opportunity to consider whether the added limitations in the ‘716

were non-obvious. See LaBounty, 958 F.2d at 1076 (When

materiality is close it is “all the more necessary that the

[information] should have been disclosed to the examiner. Close

cases should be resolved by disclosure, not unilaterally by the

applicant.”). Indeed, given that Examiner Lev had rejected the

“unique identifier” as obvious (TX X-00066-67), it is certainly

conceivable that the ‘716 could have been rejected under the

doctrine of obvious-type double patenting. The ‘372 allowance

was therefore material and should have been disclosed.

b. Intent

94. The court finds that the ‘372 allowance was withheld

with deceptive intent. Again, the information Mr. Schumann

withheld was highly material. Mr. Schumann himself confirmed at

trial that the two patents “disclose similar subject matter.” 

(TT 64:10-12.) While Mr. Schumann, looking back, asserts they

“claim patentably distinct inventions” (TT 64:12-13), that was a

judgment Mr. Schumann was duty-bound to let Examiner Trafton

make. LaBounty, 958 F.2d at 1076.

95. Given the high level of materiality, as with Mr.

Schumann’s other nondisclosures, Mr. Schumann faces “great

difficulty in establishing subjective good faith sufficient to

overcome an inference of intent to mislead.” Bristol-Myers, 326

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F.3d at 1239 (citation omitted). “A mere denial of intent to

mislead (which would defeat every effort to establish inequitable

conduct) will not suffice.” GFI, 265 F.3d at 1275. Again

disclaiming any recollection of the reason he withheld the

allowance in the ‘716 case (TT 224:1-13), Mr. Schumann rests on

the implausible explanation that the two patents did not raise a

double patenting issue because “the claims were different in

those cases.” (TT 135:22-136:23.) But, by Mr. Schumann’s own

admission, those claims involved multiple “means-plus-function”

claims, which Mr. Schumann conceded are defined by the

specification, not just the claims. (TT 238:2-23.) And, the

entire ‘716 specification, according to Mr. Schumann, is included

in the ‘372 specification. (TT 238:18-20.) Mr. Schumann

certainly should have known, if he did not know, that an

allowance of identical claims might have been important to make

of record in the ‘716 prosecution.

96. Finally, again, while Mr. Schumann’s disclosure of the

copendency of the ‘372 application to Examiner Trafton is some

evidence of a lack of intent to deceive under Akron Polymer,

weighing all the evidence, said disclosure does not overcome the

inference of an intent to deceive established by the above facts.

C. Equitable Balancing

97. Having found materiality and intent to deceive based on

clear and convincing evidence, the court weighs the two against

each other to determine whether inequitable conduct has occurred. 

Bristol-Myers, 326 F.3d at 1234.

98. A pattern of material nondisclosures, such as present

here, weighs firmly in favor of unenforceability. Ferring, 437

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F.3d at 1194 (affirming finding of inequitable conduct entered as

a matter of law because “there was not simply a single omission.

Rather, there were multiple omissions over a long period of

time--a fact that heightens the seriousness of the conduct”)

(citation omitted); Critikon, 120 F.3d at 1259 (“Given the

materiality and the failure at any point to offer a good faith

explanation of the pattern of nondisclosure, an intent to mislead

may be inferred.”).

99. The items of information Mr. Schumann withheld from

Examiner Trafton, both individually and as a whole, constitute

matter a reasonable examiner would have been substantially likely

to consider important while evaluating patentability of the

‘716 patent application, and there is no dispute that Mr.

Schumann was aware of each piece of material information--the

Baker patent, the ‘009 rejections, and the allowance of the ‘372

patent.

100. Moreover, the circumstantial evidence here strongly

supports an inference of deceptive intent, and significantly, Mr.

Schumann failed to provide a credible explanation for his

nondisclosures. Indeed, this is not a case of mistake or

negligence, since Mr. Schumann, an experienced patent prosecutor,

testified that he would make all of the same decisions again if

prosecuting these applications today. (TT 210:25-211:7.) That

Mr. Schumann failed to appreciate his duty of disclosure when he

prosecuted the ‘716 patent, and that he continues in that

wayward position contrary to the law does not excuse his conduct. 

See Brasseler, 267 F.3d at 1376 (“a patentee’s failure to

appreciate the legal significance of the facts that it failed to

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disclose did not absolve it of its duty to disclose”).

101. Weighing materiality against intent, the court finds

that each of the nondisclosures set forth above, the Baker

patent, the ‘009 rejections, and the ‘372 allowance,

individually would support judgment of unenforceability. For

each, the showings of materiality and intent are high. The court

finds significant that for each nondisclosure, Mr. Schumann

offered nothing other than bare denials of intent, combined with

numerous excuses that this court finds implausible and not

credible. Paragon, 984 F.2d at 1190 (“merely conclusory

statements or completely insupportable, specious, or conflicting

explanations or excuses” are insufficient to defeat a finding of

inequitable conduct). The record compels a finding that the ‘716

patent was procured through inequitable conduct, thereby

rendering the ‘716 patent unenforceable.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 13, 2006.

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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