Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-08040/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-08040-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dan Frazier, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Patricia J. Boomsma, in her official

capacity as the City Attorney of the City of

Flagstaff, Arizona; Terence Hance, in his

official capacity as the Coconino County

Attorney, Arizona; Terry Goddard, in his

official capacity as the Attorney General

of the State of Arizona; John and Jane

Does, 1-50, individually and in their

official capacity as city or county attorneys

in Arizona; John and Jane Does 51-3551,

citizens provided a private right of action

against Plaintiff in Senate Bill 1014, 

Defendants. 

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No. 07-CV-8040-PHX-NVW

ORDER

Plaintiff Dan Frazier (“Frazier”) brought this action for injunction against

prosecution and a declaration that A.R.S. § 13-3726 is unconstitutional on its face and as

applied to his conduct. The court preliminarily enjoined Defendants from enforcing the

law against Frazier on September 27, 2007. Frazier and the State have now submitted

cross-motions for summary judgment. (Doc. ## 73, 84.) 

Case 3:07-cv-08040-NVW Document 100 Filed 08/20/08 Page 1 of 8
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I. Background

The court quoted the statute and made findings of fact in its previous order

granting Frazier’s motion for preliminary injunction. (Doc. # 40.) Frazier and the State

agree on the continuing accuracy of those findings (doc. # 85 at 2–8), so they are

incorporated into this order in their entirety along with the following summary and

additions. 

Frazier is a peace activist and resident of Flagstaff, Arizona, who owns and

operates CarryaBigSticker.com, a website devoted in part to selling T-shirts, buttons,

magnets, and bumper stickers expressing views on a variety of political topics. Frazier

uses CarryaBigSticker.com as a vehicle to advance his political views in a variety of ways

unrelated to the sale of merchandise. Among the items for sale on CarryaBigSticker.com

is a T-shirt that contains the words “Bush Lied” and “They Died” superimposed over the

names of 3,461 soldiers that died in Iraq. Two other versions of the shirt with different

anti-war messages are also available on the website. On one portion of his website,

Frazier explains that “[t]he names of the troops are used to underscore the scale of the

human tragedy caused by the president’s lies.” (Doc. # 86, Tab 3 at 15.) Under the

heading “What do you mean, Bush Lied?,” Frazier states that the T-shirts are “a scathing

indictment of George W. Bush . . . for lying about the weapons of mass destruction in

Iraq” and are “a memorial to the brave young soldiers who gave their lives in Iraq on

behalf of their country.” (Id. at 9.) 

The homepage of Frazier’s website advertises the T-shirts as “Anti-War T-Shirts

featuring the names of 3,461 troops who died in Iraq.” To the left of this text is an

alternating image that displays the front of the shirt, the back of the shirt, and a close-up 

of soldiers’ names that appear on the shirt. The names of several deceased soldiers are

legible in the close-up display. When asked why he included the close-up of the names,

Frazier testified: 

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I felt it was important for my customers to get a sense of the product they were

buying. And the shirt . . . doesn’t look very good when the names are not at all

legible. The names just look like a large bock of greyish text . . . . Some

legibility of the names is important to represent the shirts and get across what

exactly the product is that is offered up for sale to the customer.

(Doc. # 86, Tab 1 at 43–44.) Another portion of his website enables members of the

public to buy his T-shirts. That page contains the same front, back, and close-up images

of the T-shirt, a sizing chart, pricing information, and a link to add the shirt to the

shopper’s shopping cart. (Doc. # 86, Tab 3 at 1–3.) 

In its order on the preliminary injunction, the court held that Frazier had standing

to challenge the State’s law and that the controversy was ripe for review. It further held

that Frazier had shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits. Specifically, the

court concluded that his T-shirts are core political speech and his online display and sale

of those shirts is fully protected by the First Amendment. It also concluded that A.R.S. §

13-3726 imposes content-based restrictions on that speech and that enforcement of the

law against Frazier would not survive strict scrutiny. After finding that Frazier had

shown sufficient harm to warrant a preliminary injunction, the court granted his motion.

II. Standard on a Motion for Summary Judgment

Rule 56(c), Fed. R. Civ. P., provides that summary judgment is proper when “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” A “genuine issue” of material

fact will be absent if, “viewing the evidence and inferences which may be drawn

therefrom in the light most favorable to the adverse party, the movant is clearly entitled to

prevail as a matter of law.” Jones v. Halekulani Hotel, Inc., 557 F.2d 1308, 1310 (9th

Cir. 1977); see also Baldwin v. Trailer Inns, Inc., 266 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Summary judgment is appropriate against a party who “fails to make a sufficient showing

to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322

(1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) 

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(nonmovant’s showing of “some metaphysical doubt” as to material facts insufficient);

see also Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 1994). Summary

judgment is not appropriate when the nonmoving party identifies or produces evidence

from which a reasonable juror, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,

could return a verdict in the nonmoving party’s favor. United States v. Shumway, 199

F.3d 1093, 1103–04 (9th Cir. 1999).

III. Analysis

Laws that restrict political speech based on content are subject to strict scrutiny

and violate the First Amendment unless they are “necessary to serve a compelling state

interest and . . . [are] narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” Foti v. City of Menlo Park,

146 F.3d 629, 635 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’

Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). The State’s statute prohibits Frazier from using the name

of a deceased soldier “for the purpose of advertising” his T-shirts. A.R.S. § 13-3726(A). 

The State now concludes that the statute does not criminalize Frazier’s use of the soldiers’

names on the T-shirts, nor does it criminalize the sale of those shirts. It only prohibits

him from displaying the soldiers’ names in his advertising. The State therefore contends

that the statute only regulates the commercial element of his speech, and so it should be

reviewed deferentially. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of

N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (affording commercial speech less protection than other

constitutionally guaranteed expression). 

Distinguishing commercial speech from political speech can be difficult, especially

when the speech at issue proposes a commercial transaction and contains discussion of

important public issues. Frazier’s online display of his T-shirts presents such a challenge. 

Superimposing “Bush Lied – They Died” over the names of fallen soldiers obviously

critiques the initiation and administration of the war in Iraq, among the most debated

issues in current American politics. Frazier’s website also plainly proposes a commercial

transaction—to sell T-shirts. This mixture of speech interests complicates the review of

the State’s regulation of his advertisement. 

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1

 The Supreme Court did not subsequently disavow this aspect of Murdock in Texas

Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) or Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of

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Where “the component parts of a single speech are inextricably intertwined, we

cannot parcel out the speech, applying one test to one phrase and another test to another

phrase.” Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988) (explaining Village

of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980)). Our circuit

applied this test in a situation similar to Frazier’s case. In Gaudiya Vaishnava Society v.

City & County of San Francisco, 952 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1991), several nonprofit

organizations sought to sell message-bearing merchandise on street-side tables without

obtaining a permit from the City of San Francisco. The case presented a question of first

impression for the courts of appeals: “whether the sale of merchandise which carries or

constitutes a political, religious, philosophical or ideological message falls under the

protection of the First Amendment.” Id. at 1063. The court applied the analysis from

Riley, concluding that because the commercial and protected aspects of the speech were

“inextricably intertwined, the entirety must be classified as noncommercial and we must

apply the test for fully protected speech.” Id. at 1064 (citing Riley, 487 U.S. at 796, 108

S. Ct. at 2677, and Shaumburg, 444 U.S. at 63[2]). 

The State heavily relies on Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60

(1983). There the Supreme Court observed that if the speech at issue is an advertisement

for a specific product and the speaker has an economic motive for engaging in the speech,

there is “strong support for . . . the conclusion that [the speech is] properly characterized

as commercial speech.” Id. at 67. The State would like to turn that observation into a

mechanical “three-prong test” for identifying commercial speech. But the Court itself

noted that even when such strong support for the commercial character of the speech

exists, “a different conclusion may be appropriate in a case where the [speech] advertises

an activity itself protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at 67 n.14 (citing Murdock v.

Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943),1

 and Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943)). 

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Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990). Those cases addressed whether states may tax the sale

of religious merchandise. In neither case did any party argue that the sale of religious

merchandise deserves lesser First Amendment protection because it is commercial in

character. The Court nevertheless reaffirmed that “Murdock . . . establish[es] that appellant’s

form of religious exercise [the sale of religious merchandise] has ‘as high a claim to

constitutional protection as the more orthodox types[.]’” Jimmy Swaggart, 493 U.S. at 387.

It held that despite full protection under the Free Exercise Clause, the state may tax the sale

of religious publications. Id. at 389–90; Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 24 (disavowing any

dicta from Murdock that “suggest that the States and the Federal Government may never tax

the sale of religious or other publications”).

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Where the activity itself is fully protected by the First Amendment, the commercial

element of the speech becomes “‘inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected

speech,’ and [] the level of First Amendment scrutiny must depend upon ‘the nature of the

speech taken as a whole.’” Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989) (quoting Riley,

487 U.S. at 796). The speech at issue in Bolger was not fully protected because its

commercial and protected elements were separable from one another. A contraceptive

manufacturer wished to send out advertisements “discussing the desirability and

availability of prophylactics in general or [the company’s] products in particular.” 463

U.S. at 62. The contraceptive products were not a means of political expression for the

manufacturer or its customers. It was simply using its advertising to “link[] a product to a

current public debate” in an effort to increase sales. Id. at 68 (quoting Central Hudson,

447 U.S. at 563 n.5); see also Fox, 492 U.S. at 474 (holding that “nothing in the nature of

things requires” a Tupperware salesperson to combine a discussion of home economics

with a sales pitch). 

In contrast, Frazier’s T-shirts are themselves core political speech fully protected

by the First Amendment, notwithstanding the fact that he offers them for sale. See

Gaudiya Vaishnava Soc’y, 952 F.2d at 1063 (citing City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer

Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 756 n.5 (1988)) (“[A]n expressive item does not lose its

constitutional protections because it is sold rather than given away.”); ETW Corp. v. Jireh

Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 924 (6th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases) (“Speech is protected

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2

 The State has not reargued that Frazier’s T-shirts themselves are commercial speech.

The court therefore adopts its previous holding that Frazier’s T-shirts are core political

speech. 

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even though it is carried in a form that is sold for profit.”).2

 His website is like a streetside table used to disseminate anti-war and political messages in a variety of ways,

including displaying and selling his message-bearing T-shirts. The State has criminalized

part of his display because the shirts are offered for sale. But if the shirts “would

otherwise be constitutionally protected from the present judgment, they do not forfeit that

protection because they were published in the form of a[n] . . . advertisement.” New York

Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).

The website displays images of one of his shirts showing the words “Bush Lied”

on the front, “They Died” on the back, and a close-up of the names of the deceased

soldiers. It is impossible to separate the political from the commercial aspects of that

display. For example, the State argues that Frazier can sell his shirts without displaying

the soldiers’ names. But Frazier’s product is his message, and his customers’ message. 

Just as the State cannot “punish[] public utterance of [an] unseemly expletive in order to

maintain what they regard as a suitable level of discourse within the body politic,” it also

cannot criminalize Frazier’s decision to honestly display his T-shirts to his customers

without passing strict scrutiny. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23 (1971).

The State has not reargued that A.R.S. § 13-3726's restrictions are content-neutral,

or that their application to Frazier can withstand strict scrutiny. The court therefore

adopts its previous holdings on those issues. The statute’s restrictions are content-based

and, as applied to Frazier’s conduct, are not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling

government purpose. The State will be permanently enjoined from enforcing A.R.S. §

13-3726 against Frazier for the reasons given in the court’s preliminary injunction order. 

Because the court concludes that A.R.S. § 13-3726 is unconstitutional as applied to

Frazier, it need not consider whether the statute is unconstitutional on its face. 

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff Dan Frazier’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (doc. # 73) is granted and Defendant Terry Goddard’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (doc. # 84) is denied. Upon the entry of the separate permanent injunction this

day, the clerk shall terminate this action.

DATED this 19th day of August, 2008.

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