Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02056/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-02056-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARRYL MURRAY and DEBRA

MURRAY,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 07-CV-2056 H (BLM)

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

vs. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

HMSHOST CORPORATION,

Defendant.

On August 29, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Superior Court of the State of

California in the County of San Diego alleging a violation of the Fair Employment and

Housing Act, wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, breach of contract, breach of

the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and loss of consortium. On October 29,

2007, Defendant HOST International, Inc. removed this case to the District Court for the

Southern District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. On August 22, 2008, Defendant

moved for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 20.) Plaintiffs filed their opposition to that motion

on September 9, 2008. (Doc. No. 25.) Defendant’s filed their reply in support of its motion

on September 15, 2008. (Doc. No. 33.) On September 22, 2008, the Court held a hearing on

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. David Miller and Patricia James appeared for the

Plaintiffs. Kathy Bailey and Serafina Raskin appeared for the Defendant. After due

consideration, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Case 3:07-cv-02056-H-BLM Document 42 Filed 09/30/08 Page 1 of 7
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Background

Plaintiff Darryl Murray began working for Defendant HOST International (“HOST”)

in December 1988. (Pltf’s Opp. to Def’s Stmt. of Uncontroverted Material Facts ISO Mot for

Summ. Jdgmt. ¶ 1.) (“Pl.’s Facts”) Throughout his 18 year employment with HOST, Mr.

Murray held a management level position. (Id. ¶ 2.) On September 6, 2006, HOST human

resources personnel received an incident report from HOST employee Sandra Rosales claiming

that Mr. Murray kissed Ms. Rosales at a party. (Castro Decl. ISO Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 3; Decl.

Ex. A.) Mr. Murray has confirmed that he attended the private party and kissed Ms. Rosales

but denies any sexual harassment. (Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 12, 14.) Mr. Murray’s employment with

HOST was terminated on September 21, 2006. (Id. ¶ 1.) In October or November 2006, Joe

Niknam took over Mr. Murray’s previous position as HOST’s general manager at the San

Diego International Airport. (Id. ¶ 15.) At the time of Mr. Murray’s termination, he was 52

years old. (Id. ¶ 17.) Mr. Niknam was 47 years old. (Niknam Decl. ISO Mot. for Summ.

Jdgmt. ¶ 2.)

Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Murray never engaged in sexual misconduct, that HOST never

informed Mr. Murray of the specifics of the allegations against him, and that HOST never

conducted a proper investigation. Plaintiff claims that Ms. Rosales opted not to file a

complaint after discussing the incident with HOST human resources personnel and that she

admitted in her deposition that the kiss was not sexual in nature. (Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J.

Ex. 26, 27.) Plaintiff contends that HOST used this incident as a pretext for termination.

Plaintiff further asserts that Mr. Murray was told that he could stay at San Diego until a year

before his retirement. (Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 2.)

After discovery, on August 22, 2008, Defendant HOST International, Inc. moved for

summary judgment. (Doc. No. 20.)

Discussion

I. Summary Judgment - Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs summary judgment. Section (b) provides

that “a party against whom relief is sought may move at any time, with or without supporting

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affidavits, for summary judgment on all or part of the claim.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b). A motion

for summary judgment should not be granted unless the pleadings, affidavits and evidence on

file present “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

The Supreme Court interprets Rule 56 as permitting summary judgment against any

party who, after sufficient time for discovery, “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish

the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the

burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In the Ninth

Circuit, “[t]he plaintiff in an employment discrimination action need produce very little

evidence in order to overcome am employer’s motion for summary judgment.” Chuang v.

Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000). The ultimate question is “one that

can only be resolved through a searching inquiry – one that is most appropriately conducted

by a factfinder, upon a full record.” Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1410

(9th Cir. 1996).

II. Plaintiff’s Age Discrimination Claim Under FEHA

The age discrimination section of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act

(“FEHA”) is closely related to its federal counterpart, the Age Discrimination in Employment

Act (“ADEA”). “California courts interpreting FEHA often look to federal cases interpreting

[the ADEA].” Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1996).

Following Nidds, this Court will similarly rely on such cases when instructive. Id. 

FEHA itself provides that it is unlawful employment practice for an employer to dismiss

any individual over 40 on the ground of age, except in cases where the law compels or

provides for such action. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12941. In the Ninth Circuit, age discrimination

cases involve shifting burdens of proof. Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir.

1994). As described in Wallis:

[A] plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. If the

plaintiff established a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant

to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision.

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Then, in order to prevail, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer’s

alleged reason for the adverse employment decision is a pretext for another

motive which is discriminatory.

Id. “The burden of persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Id. at 916-17.

A. Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case

In order to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, a plaintiff may rely on

direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. at 917. Here, Plaintiff may make out a prima facie case

through evidence showing: (1) that he was a member of a protected class [age 40-70]; (2) that

he was performing his job in a satisfactory manner; (3) that he was discharged; and (4) that he

was replaced by a substantially younger employee with equal or inferior qualifications. Wallis,

26 F.3d at 891.

In this case, there is no dispute that Mr. Murray was 52 years old at the time of his

discharge from HOST. (Pl.’s Facts ¶ 17.). However, the parties disagree as to whether Mr.

Murray was performing his job in a satisfactory manner. Plaintiff points to testimony from

HOST employees commending his job performance. (Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 15.)

Defendant HOST asserts that Mr. Murray was accused of harassment policy violations twice

before the incident in question, but admits in the pleadings that these investigations were

inconclusive. (Mot. for Summ. Jdgmt. 3; Ex. 1 at 73) Nonetheless, HOST concedes that Mr.

Murray’s job performance was adequate up until the incident involving Ms. Rosales. (Def.’s

Reply ISO Mot. 4.) Because the nature of that incident is factually disputed, the Court

concludes that Mr. Murray has made out a prima facie case under the FEHA.

The parties also dispute whether Joe Niknam, Plaintiff’s replacement at HOST, was

“substantially younger” under Wallis. Mr. Niknam is approximately five years younger than

Mr. Murray. Plaintiff cites an Eleventh Circuit case, Carter v. DecisionOne Corp. ex rel. C.T.

Corp. Sys., 122 F.3d 997, 1003 (11th Cir. 1997), holding that a mere three year difference may

be sufficient. On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit has held that a gap less than ten years is

presumptively insubstantial. Hartley v. Wisconsin Bell, Inc., 124 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir.

1997). In the Ninth Circuit, this element of the prima facie case is “treated with some

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flexibility.” Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court

concludes that, for purposes of establishing a prima facie case, Plaintiff has shown that his

replacement was substantially younger and no more qualified.

B. Plaintiff’s Burden at Summary Judgment

Once a plaintiff makes a prima facie case of discrimination, the employer defendant

may rebut a presumption of discrimination. Nidds, 113 F.3d at 917. To rebut such a

presumption, an employer must “articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the

action.” Id. Here, the Defendant has articulated such a reason – Mr. Murray’s alleged

violation of HOST’s sexual harassment policy. Therefore, the burden returns to Plaintiff to

show that HOST’s articulated reason was a pretext for discrimination. Id. In order to survive

summary judgment, a plaintiff must “produce enough evidence to allow a reasonable factfinder

to conclude either: (a) that the alleged reason for [plaintiff’s] discharge was false, or (b) that

the true reason for his discharge was a discriminatory one.” Id.

To meet that burden, Plaintiff raises material issues of fact concerning the

circumstances surrounding his termination. Plaintiff submits evidence that he worked for

HOST for 18 years, that his last performance review was satisfactory, and that the alleged

incident occurred at a private party. Plaintiff further argues that he should not have been fired

because Ms. Rosales “opted not to file a complaint” and admitted “that the kiss was not sexual

in nature.” (Opp. to Mot. for Summ. Jdgmt. 8.) Plaintiff also criticizes HOST’s investigation

as inadequate. (Compl. ¶ 13.) These allegations present genuine issues of material fact under

Rule 56 and involve an evaluation of witness credibility. If Plaintiff proves these assertions

at trial, a reasonable jury could infer that the alleged reason for Plaintiff’s termination was

pretextual. The Ninth Circuit recognizes the importance of an employee’s right to a full trial,

“since discrimination claims are frequently difficult to prove without a full airing of the

evidence and an opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.” McGinest v. GTE

Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1112 (9th Cir. 2004).

Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect

to Mr. Murray’s claim under FEHA.

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III. Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy

Plaintiff next asserts a common law tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of

public policy. (Compl. ¶¶ 20,21.) This claim is wholly based on Defendant’s alleged violation

of FEHA. Under California state case law, such claims are proper. See, Stevenson v. Superior

Ct., 16 Cal.4th 880, 897 (Cal. 1997) (“FEHA’s policy against age discrimination in

employment is sufficiently substantial and fundamental to support a tort claim for wrongful

discharge.”) The Court has determined that Plaintiff’s FEHA claim presents genuine issues of

material fact for trial. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment with respect to the wrongful termination claim.

IV. Breach of Implied Contract and Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Plaintiff further asserts that there were “policies, guidelines and practices and individual

performance warnings, evaluations and instruction giving rise to an implied-in-fact contract

that Mr. Murray would not be discharged unless there was good cause to do so.” (Compl. ¶

23.) In determining whether an implied employment contract exists, California courts examine

“the totality of the circumstances” considering several factors. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.,

47 Cal.3d 654, 675 (1988). These factors include: (1) the personnel policies or practices of the

employer; (2) the employee’s longevity of service; (3) actions or communications by the

employer reflecting assurances of continued employment; and (4) the practices of the industry

in which the employee is engaged. Id. at 680.

HOST employed Mr. Murray for nearly eighteen years. (Pl.’s Facts ¶ 1.) This

longevity of service is a favorable fact for Mr. Murray and is directly relevant to the second

factor in Foley. Plaintiff states that he consistently received favorable performance reviews

and commendations. (Opp. to Mot. for Summ. Jdgmt. 11.) Plaintiff further asserts that he was

told “that he could stay at San Diego until a year before his retirement.” (Opp. to Mot. for

Summ. Jdgmt. 11.) If true, these facts might suggest the existence of an implied contract.

However, their veracity and significance are questions of fact appropriate for consideration by

a jury.

If an implied employment contract existed between Mr. Murray and HOST, the question

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of breach turns on the reason for Mr. Murray’s termination. As discussed, this issue is best left

for trial.

As a result, the Court denies without prejudice Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment as to Plaintiff’s implied contract claim. Because Plaintiff’s claim for breach of the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is duplicative of the implied contract claim, it

must survive summary judgment as well.

V. Loss of Consortium

Plaintiff Debra Murray asserts a claim against HOST for loss of consortium. (Compl.

¶¶ 33-35.) In requesting summary judgment on this claim, Defendant HOST argues that the

success of the claim depends on the existence of a tortious injury to the spouse. (Mot. for

Summ. J. 14.) The Court agrees. However, because the existence of that tortious injury is still

an open question, the loss of consortium claim cannot be dismissed.

Conclusion

To survive summary judgment, Plaintiff had to produce evidence sufficient to create a

genuine issue of material fact for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The material facts in this case

involve the reason for Mr. Murray’s termination and the nature of his relationship with his

former employer, HOST. An issue is “genuine” if the plaintiff has produced enough evidence

to allow a reasonable jury to find in his favor. Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d

912, 916 (9th Cir. 1996). Mr. Murray has met this standard. Accordingly, the Court denies

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to all claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 30, 2008

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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