Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01627/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01627-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFF GILBERT, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

OFFICER BALDWIN, et al., )

)

)

Defendants. )

)

)

No. CV-F-05-1627 OWW/GSA

MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING 

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. 38) 

Plaintiff Jeff Gilbert, a state prisoner proceeding in pro

per, is proceeding pursuant to an Amended Complaint against

Defendants Inyo County Sheriff's Department Officers Paul

Baldwin, Jamery Ray, and the County of Inyo. Plaintiff alleges

that his rights to due process and equal protection of the laws

under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated by the officers' use

of excessive force and "failure to act." The Amended Complaint

alleges:

On .01/20/04, at approximately 12:00 hours

Plaintiff in an nonlogical [sic] state of

mind entered a home with intentions [sic] to

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get shelter from the Bishop, California.

weather i had stayed in the residence for 4

to 5 days. I began to drink, I became very

depressed. I got a gun from my truck and was

contemplating sucide when I saw two officer’s

arrive on the scene, Ofc. Paul Baldwin and

Jamery Ray ... The door was locked they said

it was the sheriff’s department they also had

a canine unit which was barking aggressively

and the sound of the officer’s was difficult

to here. The first officer stepped in

simultanously I began to raise my weapon

befor it was copletly up Ofc. Paul Baldwin

had shot the gun completely from my hand

severing my finger, Then shooting the

plaintiff three more times. The 2 shot was nd

Fired into the plaintiff’s left arm, between

my wrist and elbow breaking both bones. In a

defensive move I raised my right hand to

protect my face. The 3 shot went through rd

the palm of my right hand. The fourth shot

went through my right arm as I was rolling

off the bed onto the floor ...

... [T]he plaintiff contends that the

application of force was no longer needed to

maintain or restore oder once the defendant,

fired the first shot knocking the gun from

the plaintiffs hand, and severed the

plaintiffs finger off. Instead the defendant

maliciously and sadistically fired 3 more

additional shots at the plaintiff for the

very purpose of causing harm.

...

... [P]laintiff contends that defendant

Jamery Ray violated plaintiff’s rights to due

process and equal protection of the laws,

where as he failed to act to prevent

defendant Paul Baldwin use of excessive force

despite having the duty to do so. [SIC]

The Amended Complaint alleges Defendant Inyo County failed to

properly train Defendant Baldwin “on policy and customs that

prevent the deprivation of plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right

against the excessive use of force.” 

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Defendants move for summary judgment in connection with

Plaintiff's claims on the grounds of qualified immunity from

liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and on the ground that Inyo

County’s policy and practice regarding the use of force is

constitutional.

Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to the motion as

required by Rules 78-230 and 56-260, Local Rules of Practice, and

did not make arrangements to appear in opposition to the motion

by telephone. Plaintiff, who is incarcerated, was served with a

“Second Informational Order and Summary Judgment Notice” on April

6, 2006 (Doc. 13), which advised Plaintiff, pursuant to Klingele

v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9 Cir.1988), of the requirements th

to oppose a motion for summary judgment. 

A. GOVERNING STANDARDS.

Summary judgment is proper when it is shown that there

exists “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. A fact is “material” if it is relevant to an

element of a claim or a defense, the existence of which may

affect the outcome of the suit. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v.

Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th

Cir.1987). Materiality is determined by the substantive law

governing a claim or a defense. Id. The evidence and all

inferences drawn from it must be construed in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. 

Even though Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to

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A plaintiff’s verified complaint may be considered as an 1

affidavit in opposition to summary judgment if it is based on

personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in

evidence. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.14 (9 Cir.2000). th

Here, however, the Amended Complaint is not verified.

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Defendants’ motion as required by Rule 56-260, Local Rules of

Practice, summary judgment may not be granted on that ground

alone. See Henry v. Gill Industries, Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950

(9 Cir.1993). The initial burden in a motion for summary th

judgment is on the moving party. The moving party satisfies this

initial burden by identifying the parts of the materials on file

it believes demonstrate an “absence of evidence to support the

non-moving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 325 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party

to defeat summary judgment. T.W. Elec., 809 F.2d at 630. The

nonmoving party “may not rely on the mere allegations in the

pleadings in order to preclude summary judgment,” but must set

forth by affidavit or other appropriate evidence “specific facts

showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. The nonmoving

party may not simply state that it will discredit the moving

party’s evidence at trial; it must produce at least some

“significant probative evidence tending to support the

complaint.” Id. As explained in Carmen v. San Francisco 1

Unified School District, supra, 237 F.3d at 1031:

[T]he district court may determine whether

there is a genuine issue of material fact, on

summary judgment, based on the papers

submitted on the motion and such other papers

as may be on file and specifically referred

to and facts therein set forth in the motion

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papers. Though the court has discretion in

appropriate circumstances to consider other

materials, it need not do so. The district

court need not examine the entire file for

evidence establishing a genuine issue of

material fact, where the evidence is not set

forth in the opposing papers with adequate

references to that it could conveniently be

found.

The question to be resolved is not whether the “evidence

unmistakably favors one side or the other, but whether a fairminded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the

evidence presented.” United States ex rel. Anderson v. N.

Telecom, Inc., 52 F.3d 810, 815 (9 Cir.1995). This requires th

more than the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in

support of the plaintiff’s position”; there must be “evidence on

which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. 

The more implausible the claim or defense asserted by the

nonmoving party, the more persuasive its evidence must be to

avoid summary judgment.” Id.

B. DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS.

Defendants set forth the following statement of undisputed

facts in support of their motion for summary judgment.

UMF 1. On January 26, 2004, Deputy Paul Baldwin of

the Inyo County Sheriff’s Department was working the night shift

patrol (8:00 p.m. to 4:00 a.m.) in the Northern Division of Inyo

County. At approximately 9:30 p.m., he received a call from Inyo

County Sheriff’s Dispatch advising that a call had been received

from a female reporting party, from the Aspendell area, and that

the female reporting party advised that when she had arrived home

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that night, after having been gone for the weekend, she observed,

from outside her home, and while looking through a front window,

a strange man inside her home watching television. The address of

her home was 127 Cardinal Road, Aspendell. Declaration of Deputy

Paul Baldwin, 9/24/07 (“Baldwin Declaration”), ¶ 3.

UMF 2. Inyo County Sheriff’s Department Corporal

Jamery Ray, who was working as a K-9 unit in the Northern Area,

followed Deputy Baldwin to Aspendell and assisted in the response

to this call. Baldwin Declaration, ¶ 4.

UMF 3. Deputy Baldwin and Corporal Ray arrived in the

Aspendell area at approximately 9:50 p.m. It was dark outside.

Baldwin Declaration, ¶ 5.

UMF 4. Deputy Baldwin contacted the reporting party,

Ms. Camille Suetos, who was at a neighbor’s house. Deputy

Baldwin was told by Ms. Suetos that she and her neighbor placed

a telephone call to her home and that a man whom she did not know

answered. The man told her that someone named “John Anderson”

had told him he could stay there. Ms. Suetos advised Deputy

Baldwin she told the man that he was in the wrong house, that it

was her house, that he was trespassing, and that he had to leave. 

Baldwin Declaration, ¶¶ 6 & 7.

UMF 5. Ms. Suetos gave Deputy Baldwin a key to her

residence, and permission to enter. Baldwin Declaration, ¶ 8.

UMF 6. Deputy Baldwin and Corporal Ray decided to drive

to the Suetos residence at 127 Cardinal Road, park a house or two

away, walk up to the house, ring the doorbell, announce that the

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Sheriff’s Department was present, and then, if the person did not

answer or reveal his presence, they would open the door, make the

canine announcement, and hopefully, the man would come out. 

Baldwin Declaration, ¶ 8.

UMF 7. They approached the residence. There were no

lights on inside or outside the house. Deputy Baldwin rang the

door bell, but did not hear a ring. He then opened the screen

door, and knocked several times, very loudly. He also announced,

several times, very loudly: SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; PLEASE OPEN THE

DOOR ... SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; OPEN THE DOOR. There was no

response. Baldwin Declaration, ¶¶ 9-10.

UMF 8. Deputy Baldwin, using the key that Ms. Suetos

had given him, unlocked the dead bolt in the door, and opened the

door. It swung inward, from his right to his left as he was

looking at the door. He did not enter the house at that time, but

rather announced very loudly: “Sheriff’s Department; if you’re

inside, please come out now.” He announced this two or three

times. The house remained dark; and there was no response.

Baldwin Declaration, ¶¶ 11, 12.

UMF 9. At that point, Deputy Baldwin stepped to the

side, and Corporal Ray took over, giving the K-9 announcement and

warning. Corporal Ray made the announcement two or three times.

After the second or third K-9 announcement, a male subject from

inside the residence call out: “I’m in here.” Baldwin

Declaration, ¶¶ 13, 14.

UMF 10. Corporal Ray then backed the dog away. Deputy 

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Baldwin told the man inside the house: “Sir, I want you to come

over here, and I want to see your hands; put your hands in

the air; walk over to the door.” The man responded: “No.” There

then appeared to be no need to send the dog in to search for and

hurt someone, so Deputy Baldwin announced that he was coming in.

He was dressed in his Sheriff’s Department patrol officer

uniform. Before entering the residence, he announced, two or

three times, loudly, that it was: “Sheriff’s Department; I’m

coming in.” Baldwin Declaration, ¶¶ 15, 16.

UMF 11. Deputy Baldwin drew his duty weapon, a .40

caliber semi-automatic pistol, held it in one hand, and

illuminated the interior of the residence with his flashlight. 

He walked through the threshold of the doorway, and past the door

which was opened and on his left. As he got through the doorway

threshold, and past the open door which had swung open and was on

his left, he immediately turned to his left. He saw a male

subject (later identified as Jeff Gilbert, the plaintiff in this

case) lying on a bed approximately 15 feet away. Gilbert was

lying on his back, propped up against the wall like one situates

himself or herself when watching TV in bed, with two pillows

behind his head and with his legs extended, his feet generally

pointed toward Deputy Baldwin. The man was looking at Baldwin,

and he had a bundle of blankets or covers over his chest area.

His hands were under the blanket, and Deputy Baldwin could not

see them. The man was fully dressed wearing a shirt, pants, and

shoes. Corporal Ray was behind Deputy Baldwin, in the threshold

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of the doorway. Baldwin Declaration, ¶ 17.

UMF 12. Deputy Baldwin focused on the man in the bed.

Because he could not see the man’s hands, he told him: “I want to

see your hands; let me see your hands now!” Deputy Baldwin said

this several times, very loudly. Baldwin was shining his

flashlight in the man’s face, and had his service weapon pointed

at him. The man ultimately responded, in a clear, calm voice:

“No.” Baldwin Declaration, ¶¶ 18, 19.

UMF 13. Deputy Baldwin again commanded, very loudly:

“I want to see your hands; I want to see your hands now!” The

male subject said in response – “No, I have a gun.” Baldwin

Declaration, ¶¶ 20-21.

UMF 14. Deputy Baldwin continued to issue the command

to let him see the man’s hands, at which point the man started to

move or pivot to his left, as if to step off the bed, and his

right hand came up from underneath the blanket. Deputy Baldwin

saw that the man was holding a silver or nickel-plated pistol. As

the man turned off the bed, the pistol came up from under the

covers, and the man held it straight out, as he was extending his

arm toward Deputy Baldwin, and bringing the gun to point it

directly at Baldwin. Baldwin Declaration, ¶ 22.

UMF 15. As the man began this movement, and as soon as

Deputy Baldwin saw the gun starting to come up from under the

covers, and beginning to be pointed at him, he commanded: “Drop

the gun! Drop the gun! Drop the gun!” As the gun became pointed

directly at Deputy Baldwin, he feared for my life, and the life

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of Corporal Ray, who was now standing somewhere to his left, with

the door blocking his view of the subject. Deputy Baldwin fired

his duty weapon at the subject, successive rounds, in controlled

but rapid succession. Deputy Baldwin aimed at his center of mass,

as he had been trained to do. Deputy Baldwin fired until he saw

that the male subject was going to the floor. It appeared to

Deputy Baldwin that the man was no longer in possession of the

gun and was otherwise no longer an immediate threat to his life.

At that time, Deputy Baldwin stopped firing. Deputy Baldwin fired

a total of three rounds; his weapon was loaded with 15 rounds.

Baldwin Declaration, ¶¶ 23, 24.

UMF 16. As Deputy Baldwin stopped firing, the male

subject slid off the bed, landed on his knees on the floor, and

then fell forward or rolled to the floor. Corporal Ray covered

Baldwin as he holstered his weapon, went to the male subject and

located his gun underneath him, after Baldwin rolled Gilbert over

onto his back, and put a pillow under his head. Corporal Ray then

started administering first aid. Baldwin Declaration, ¶ 25.

UMF 17. At no time did Deputy Baldwin use any more

force, or fire any more rounds, than was necessary to prevent the

subject, Gilbert, from firing his weapon at him. Under the

circumstances of this encounter with Gilbert, in the dark room,

illuminated only by flashlight, it was necessary for Deputy

Baldwin to fire his weapon at Gilbert in order to prevent Gilbert

from shooting Baldwin, and Corporal Ray, as well. As soon as the

threat of death or serious bodily injury to Deputy Baldwin and/or

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Corporal Ray terminated, Deputy Baldwin immediately stopped

firing and stopped all other use of force against Gilbert. 

Baldwin Declaration, ¶¶ 26, 27.

UMF 18. Deputy Baldwin then immediately called for an

ambulance and proper medical attention for Gilbert, and attempted

to keep Gilbert calm and comfortable while awaiting medical

personnel. During that time, Baldwin asked Gilbert “Why did you

point the gun at me?” Gilbert responded: “That was stupid.”

Baldwin Declaration, ¶ 28.

UMF 19. While waiting for the ambulance, and trying to

keep Mr. Gilbert calm, Deputy Baldwin also asked Gilbert if this

was his house? And Gilbert said, “No – it wasn’t his house.” 

Baldwin then asked what he was doing there, if it wasn’t his

house? And Gilbert said, “I’m looking for home; I’m lost;

confused.” Then he began to ramble on about Jesus and some other

religious things. Baldwin Declaration, ¶ 29.

UMF 20. As Deputy Baldwin was beginning to enter the

residence, Corporal Ray was just behind him, and restraining his

K-9, Britt, who had become excited. After Corporal Ray heard

Deputy Baldwin issue several commands to Let me see your hands!

Sheriff’s Department! Let me see your hands!, and after Corporal

Ray heard the subject refuse to show his hands, Corporal Ray

heard the subject announce that he had a gun, and thereafter,

Deputy Baldwin commanded loudly: “Drop the gun! Drop the gun!

Drop the gun!” Deputy Baldwin’s “Drop the gun!” commands were

followed by Deputy Baldwin firing his service weapon three times

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Attached to the Ray Declaration is a not-to-scale drawing of 2

the room in the Suetos residence where the shooting occurred as

well as photographs of the scene taken by Corporal Ray on January

26, 2004. 

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in rapid succession. Declaration of Corporal Jamery Ray, 9/24/07

(“Ray Declaration”), ¶¶ 11, 12, 13.

UMF 21. Both Deputy Baldwin and Corporal Ray were in

Deputy Sheriff Uniform, and were on uniformed patrol on that

night. Ray Declaration, ¶ 14.

UMF 22. As soon as Corporal Ray cleared the doorway 

and could see into the room, after the shots were fired, he

observed the male subject on the edge of the bed, sitting

somewhat sideways, with his head down, and in a position that

would have allowed a kind of somersault off the bed. Gilbert then

slid off the bed onto the floor. The subject began yelling: “I’m

shot!” Ray Declaration, ¶ 15.

UMF 23. Deputy Baldwin subsequently asked Mr. Gilbert:

“Why didn’t you put the gun down?” To this Mr. Gilbert responded:

“I don’t know. I’m stupid. I didn’t want to get into trouble.”

Ray Declaration, ¶ 16.

UMF 24. When Deputy Baldwin was moving Gilbert away 

from the bed, Corporal Ray saw a silver and black semi-automatic

pistol lying on the floor, under the area where Gilbert’s stomach

had been against the floor. Ray Declaration, ¶ 17.2

UMF 25. The Inyo County Sheriff’s Department’s Use of

Force Policy is set forth at Section 307.00 of the Sheriff’s

Department manual, and is entitled: “Use of Force.” A true and

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correct copy of the Department’s Use of Force Policy is attached

as Exhibit A to the Declaration of Lieutenant Stephan J. Rogers,

9/23/07 (“Rogers Declaration”). Section 307.01 provides in

pertinent part:

A. While the following guidelines generally

apply, officers are permitted to use any

force which is reasonable to protect

themselves and others from bodily harm while

accomplishing a lawful police purpose.

B. Force shall be used at an officer’s

discretion:

1. When necessary to defend

themselves or others;

2. To effect arrests;

3. To prevent the commission of a

public offense.

C. Officers must maintain control of all

enforcement situations at all times. 

Suspects should not be allowed to gain the

advantage in a physical confrontation.

D. The use of physical force shall be

restricted:

1. To circumstances authorized by

policy or law;

2. To the level necessary to

accomplish a law enforcement task.

E. Deadly force may only be used:

1. As a means of self defense, to

defend the life of another Peace

Officer, or to defend the life of a

victim, witness, or the public from

an immediate threat of death or

violent injury;

2. To prevent a crime in which

human life is in immediate threat

of death or violent injury as a

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result of the suspect’s action;

...

F. Use of Force Continuum:

1. Levels of force are used as

needed, there is not a ‘ladder’ of

force that must be followed. The

officer shall choose the available

force option, which is reasonable

and necessary to effectively

establish control of the situation.

UMF 26. All Inyo County Sheriff’s Deputies are 

trained to the “Use of Force” Policy. It is the policy required

of all Sheriff’s Deputies when performing their duties. Rogers

Declaration, ¶ 7.

UMF 27. There is no unwritten accepted practice, no

unwritten accepted custom, and no unwritten policy, of a standard

for the implementation or use of force by Inyo County Sheriff’s

Department Deputies other than the Department’s formal and

written “Use of Force” Policy. Rogers Declaration, ¶ 8.

UMF 28. The Inyo County Sheriff’s Department’s Use of

Force Policy complies with the standards and requirements of the

California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and

Training. Rogers Declaration, ¶ 5; Declaration of San Bernardino

County Sheriff’s Department Captain Robert Fonzi, 9/25/07 (“Fonzi

Declaration”), ¶ 10. 

UMF 29. Both Deputy Baldwin and Corporal Ray had been

trained in the California P.O.S.T. compliant Use of Force policy

of the Inyo County Sheriff’s Department, prior to the events

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occurring January 26, 2004, involving Gilbert. Rogers

Declaration, ¶ 9.

UMF 30. On February 9, 2004, Inyo County Sheriff’s 

Department Lieutenant Rogers chaired a Shooting Review Board,

which reviewed and evaluated the decisions and actions of Deputy

Baldwin and Corporal Ray on the night of January 26, 2004,

involving Gilbert. After reviewing the Sheriff’s Department

policy on the Use of Force, the actions of Deputy Baldwin and

Corporal Ray, and the actions of the Gilbert, it was concluded by

the Shooting Review Board that the shooting was within Department

policy and consistent with current training standards for use

of force by peace officers in California. Rogers Declaration, ¶¶

10, 11.

UMF 31. The use of force by Deputy Baldwin on the

night of January 26, 2004, in firing his weapon at a suspect who

refused to show his concealed hands, after being repeatedly

ordered by a uniformed Deputy Sheriff to do so, and who then

presented a previously concealed pistol in his hand, and then

refused to drop the pistol upon after being ordered to do so by

the Deputy, and who actually extended his arm and the pistol

toward the Deputy, pointing the pistol directly at him,

constituted a justifiable use of deadly force by Deputy Baldwin

to protect himself and others from death or serious bodily

injury, and was not an excessive use of force. Rogers

Declaration, ¶ 12.

UMF 32. The use of deadly force by Deputy Baldwin was

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Defendants submit evidence that Deputy Baldwin acted in a 3

professional manner by immediately calling for medical assistance

for Gilbert, and in acting to comfort and keep the wounded Gilbert

calm, thus helping to prevent Mr. Gilbert from going into shock,

after the shooting. Rogers Declaration, ¶ 14. This evidence is not

relevant to Plaintiff’s claim of excessive force.

38. Deputy Paul Baldwin used reasonable force only, and not

excessive force, in dealing with threat of the semi-automatic

pistol being pointed at him by Mr. Gilbert. Rogers

Declaration, para 15.A.; Fonzi Declaration, para 17.A.

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reasonable based upon his perception, observation, and fear for

his safety and that of Corporal Ray. Deputy Baldwin‘s use of

deadly force comports with both state and national standards and

training. Fonzi Declaration, ¶ 10. 

UMF 33. Deputy Baldwin followed appropriate state law,

department policies, and training as it relates to the use of

deadly force. Fonzi Declaration, ¶ 10.

UMF 34. Deputy Baldwin fired three rounds, and he

stopped firing when he perceived that the deadly threat was

terminated. Deputy Baldwin had an additional 12 rounds in his

duty weapon that were available to him, but which he did not

fire, because of his perception that the need to do so had ended.

This is consistent and in compliance with Inyo County Sheriff’s

Department training and policy, and with the California

Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training use of force

policy in California. Rogers Declaration, ¶ 13.3

UMF 35. Under similar circumstances, most if not all

reasonable peace officers would have acted just as did Deputy

Baldwin in firing his weapon repeatedly at a burglary suspect who

was pointing a handgun at him. Rogers Declaration, ¶ 15.B.; Fonzi

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Declaration, ¶ 17.B.

UMF 36. Deputy Baldwin’s use of force to stop the

threat of death or serious bodily injury that he was facing did

not call for Corporal Ray to intercede or attempt to stop Deputy

Baldwin from protecting himself against the deadly threat being

presented by Gilbert. Rogers Declaration, ¶15.C.; Fonzi

Declaration, ¶ 17.C.

UMF 37. Under similar circumstances, most if not all

reasonable peace officers would have acted just as did Corporal

Ray, in not interceding and attempting to stop Deputy Baldwin

from protecting himself. Rogers Declaration, ¶ 15.D.; Fonzi

Declaration, ¶ 17.D.

UMF 38. The response, tactics, and communication

displayed by the Deputies, initially, during, and at the

conclusion of the incident, were reasonable based on officers’

perception and the totality of the circumstances. Fonzi

Declaration, ¶ 10.

UMF 39. It was reasonable for the Deputies to approach

Gilbert, who was located inside the residence, based on their

perception, training, and experience as it relates to burglary

suspects and the risk to public safety. Fonzi Declaration, ¶ 10.

UMF 40. The use of deadly force by Deputy Baldwin was

reasonable based upon his perception, observation, and fear for

his safety and that of Corporal Ray. Deputy Baldwin‘s use of

deadly force comports with both state and national standards and

training. Deputy Baldwin followed appropriate state law,

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department policies, and training as it relates to the use of

deadly force. Fonzi Declaration, ¶ 10.

UMF 41. Corporal Ray followed appropriate state law,

department policies, and training as it relates to a deadly force

encounter and declining to intercede to stop Deputy Baldwin from

protecting himself. Fonzi Declaration, ¶ 10.

UMF 42. Nothing in this incident supports a finding or

a claimed existence of any custom, policy, or practice that

encourages or condones the use of excessive force by members of

the Inyo County Sheriff’s Department. Fonzi Declaration, ¶ 10. 

UMF 43. Nothing in this incident supports a propensity

for violence on the part of Deputy Baldwin or Corporal Ray that

contributed to the decision to use deadly force against Gilbert.

Fonzi Declaration, ¶ 10.

UMF 44. As a result of the following, Gilbert posed an

immediate and deadly threat to the Deputies because of his

actions:

a. According to police reports and statements, Gilbert

refused to comply with or surrender to both Deputy Baldwin’s and

Corporal Ray’s simple and uncomplicated commands.

b. Instead, Gilbert verbally refused to come out, which

forced the Deputies to enter the residence.

c. Additionally, when confronted inside the residence,

Gilbert refused to show his hands, which were concealed under a

blanket.

d. When Gilbert removed his hands from the blanket, he

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had a handgun in his right hand, and proceeded to extend his arm

and point the weapon directly at Deputy Baldwin in a lifethreatening manner.

e. Gilbert refused to drop the handgun when ordered to

do so by Deputy Baldwin.

f. It was obvious that Gilbert posed an immediate and

deadly threat to the Deputies because of his actions.

g. The decision not to release the canine into the

residence, after a person ultimately called out from inside, was

reasonable for several reasons, including without limit that it

was unknown whether the person who called out was ill, injured,

handicapped, simply intoxicated, or otherwise incapacitated.

Fonzi Declaration, ¶ 11.

UMF 45. It is reasonable to assess and assume that 

Gilbert posed an imminent threat to both the Deputies and the

community based on Gilbert’s unauthorized entry into someone

else’s residence and the fact he was armed with a handgun. Fonzi

Declaration, ¶ 13.

UMF 46. This incident had a significant degree of 

uncertainty and was obviously tense and rapidly changing. In a

matter of seconds, the seriousness of the crime escalated from

burglary, up to and including brandishing a firearm, and assault

on a police officer with a handgun. Fonzi Declaration, ¶ 14.

UMF 47. There is clear evidence that Gilbert posed a

significant threat to the Deputies, which culminated in Gilbert

displaying and pointing his handgun at Deputy Baldwin in a

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Attached to Eropkin’s Declarations are photographs of the 4

residence where the incident took place and of Gilbert’s gun.

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lifethreatening manner. At the same time, there is no evidence

that supports that the Deputies engaged in excessive force. Fonzi

Declaration, ¶ 15.

UMF 48. The response and action of both Deputy Baldwin

and Corporal Ray was appropriate and reasonable given the

information and circumstances. It was obvious that Gilbert posed

an immediate and deadly threat to the Deputies because of his

actions. 

UMF 49. The use of deadly force against Gilbert by

Deputy Baldwin comports with the training, policies, and

practices commonly recognized by the law enforcement community. 

Fonzi Declaration, ¶ 18.

UMF 50. Such circumstances, if repeated, would 

predictably cause trained law enforcement personnel to respond

and act in the same manner, regardless of jurisdiction or

agency. Fonzi Declaration, ¶ 19.

UMF 51. The handgun that Gilbert admits to pointing at

Deputy Baldwin is a .380 caliber Bersa Thunder semi-automatic

pistol. It was recovered at the scene of the shooting on the

night of the shooting. Declaration of Inyo County Sheriff’s

Department Undersheriff John N. Eropkin, 9/25/07 (“Eropkin

Declaration”), ¶ 5.4

UMF 52. A photograph taken of Gilbert’s gun in the

condition in which it was recovered, shows that the hammer was

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back and the safety was in the off position. There was a live

round in the chamber, along with a fully loaded 7-round magazine. 

The weapon was fully ready to fire, merely by applying light

pressure to the trigger. Eropkin Declaration, ¶ 8.

UMF 53. Gilbert was convicted by guilty plea of 

Assault on a Police Officer with a Deadly Weapon, namely, a

firearm, in violation of California Penal Code Section

245(d)(2), as a result of the events of January 26, 2004. 

Gilbert was sentenced to eight years in State Prison following 

that conviction. Request for Judicial Notice, Exhibits A and B.

UMF 54. On the night of January 26, 2004, Mr. Gilbert

made the conscious and deliberate decision to use his pistol to

provoke the Inyo County Deputy Sheriffs into fearing for their

life, and into therefore shooting and killing him (Mr. Gilbert),

as a form of suicide. Deposition Testimony of Gilbert, 94:2-

103:2. 

UMF 55. Gilbert had been having suicidal thoughts for

several months prior to January 26, 2004, and on more than 50

occasions contemplated killing himself, including at putting his

pistol in his mouth, and otherwise up to his head. Deposition

Testimony of Gilbert, 57:17-58:21, 82:15-24.

UMF 56. Gilbert did not actually pull the

trigger and shoot himself because he was afraid that the single

self-inflicted gunshot he could fire might not be enough to

actually kill him, and he did not want to live in some kind of

“vegetable” state, in the event he survived the single shot he

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could fire himself. Deposition Testimony of Gilbert, 82:15-

83:13. 

C. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY.

Defendants Baldwin and Ray move for summary judgment with

regard to Plaintiff’s claims of excessive force on the ground of

qualified immunity from liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Although the Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff’s

rights to due process and equal protection of the laws under the

Fourteenth Amendment were violated by the officers' use of

excessive force, all claims of excessive force are analyzed under

the objective reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment set

forth in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) and Tennessee v.

Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 

Qualified immunity serves to shield government officials

“from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does

not violate clearly established or constitutional rights of which

a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457

U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The Supreme Court has set forth a twopronged inquiry to resolve all qualified immunity claims. First,

“taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the

injury, do the facts alleged show the officers’ conduct violated

a constitutional right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201

(2001). If the court determines that the conduct did not violate

a constitutional right, the inquiry is over and the officer is

entitled to qualified immunity. However, if the court determines

that the conduct did violate a constitutional right, Saucier’s

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second prong requires the court to determine whether, at the time

of the violation, the constitutional right was “clearly

established.” Id. “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in

determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it

would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 202. The

inquiry is wholly objective and is undertaken in light of the

specific factual circumstances of the case. Id. at 201. Even if

the violated right is clearly established, Saucier recognized

that, in certain situations, it may be difficult for a police

officer to determine how to apply the relevant legal doctrine to

the particular circumstances he faced. If an officer makes a

mistake in applying the relevant legal doctrine, he is not

precluded from claiming qualified immunity so long as the mistake

is reasonable. If “the officer’s mistake as to what the law

requires is reasonable, ... the officer is entitled to the

immunity defense.” Id. at 205. In Brosseau v. Haugan, 543 U.S.

194 (2004), the Supreme Court reiterated:

Qualified immunity shields an officer from

suit when she makes a decision that, even if

constitutionally deficient, reasonably

misapprehends the law governing the

circumstances she confronted. Saucier v.

Katz, 533 U.S., at 206 (qualified immunity

operates ‘to protect officers from the

sometimes “hazy border between excessive and

acceptable force”’). Because the focus is on

whether the officer had fair notice that her

conduct was unlawful, reasonableness is

judged against the backdrop of the law at the

time of the conduct. If the law at that time

did not clearly establish that the officer’s

conduct would violate the Constitution, the

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officer should not be subject to liability

or, indeed, even the burdens of litigation.

It is important to emphasize that this

inquiry ‘must be undertaken in light of the

specific context of the case, not as a broad

general proposition.’ Id., at 201. As we

previously said in this very context:

‘[T]here is no doubt that Graham v.

Connor, supra, clearly establishes

the general proposition that use of

force is contrary to the Fourth

Amendment if it is excessive under

objective standards of

reasonableness. Yet, that is not

enough. Rather, we emphasized in

Anderson [v. Creighton] “that the

right the official is alleged to

have violated must have been

‘clearly established’ in a more

particularized, and hence more

relevant, sense: The contours of

the right must be sufficiently

clear that a reasonable officer

would understand that what he is

doing violates that right.’ ... 

The relevant, dispositive inquiry

in determining whether a right is

clearly established is whether it

would be clear to a reasonable

officer that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he

confronted.’ ... 

The Court of Appeals acknowledged this

statement of law, but then proceeded to find

fair warning in the general tests set out in

Graham and Garner ... In so doing, it was

mistaken. Graham and Garner, following the

lead of the Fourth Amendment’s text, are cast

at a high level of generality. See Graham v.

Connor, supra, at 396 (‘”[T]he test of

reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is

not capable of precise definition or

mechanical application”’). Of course, in an

obvious case, these standards can ‘clearly

establish’ the answer, even without a body of

relevant case law.’

543 U.S. at 198-199. However, as explained in Wilkins v. City of

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Oakland, 350 F.3d 949, 956 (9 Cir.2003), cert. denied sub nom. th

Scarrot v. Wilkins, 543 U.S. 811 (2004):

Where the officers’ entitlement to qualified

immunity depends on the resolution of

disputed issues of fact in their favor, and

against the non-moving party, summary

judgment is not appropriate. See Saucier,

533 U.S. at 216 ... (Ginsberg, J.,

concurring)(‘Of course, if an excessive force

claim turns of which of two conflicting

stories best captures what happened on the

street, Graham will not permit summary

judgment in favor of the defendant 

official.’). 

“Determining whether the force used to effectuate a

particular seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment

requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the

intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against

the countervailing governmental interests at stake. Graham v.

Connor, supra, 490 U.S. at 396. This balancing test entails

consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances in

the particular case, including “the severity of the crime at

issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the

safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively

resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. 

The most important of these factors is the threat posed by the

suspect. Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 702 (9 Cir.), th

cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1128 (2005). In Garner, the Supreme Court

explained that, while it is unreasonable to apprehend an unarmed,

nondangerous suspect by killing him, “[w]here the officer has

probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of

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serious physical harm, either to the officers or to others, it is

not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using

deadly force [and] if the suspect threatens the officer with a

weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has

committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened

infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if

necessary to prevent escape, and, if, where feasible, some

warning has been given.” Tennessee v. Garner, supra, 471 U.S. at

11-12. The “broad discretion that must be afforded to police

officers who face a tense situation,” must be extended to

mistakes of fact concerning “the existence of probable cause” as

well as to mistakes as to what the law requires under the 

particular circumstances. Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 909

(9 Cir.2001). “The reasonableness of a particular use of force th

must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on

the scene, rather that with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. The “question is whether the officers’

actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and

circumstances confronting them, without regard to their

underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 397.

Defendants argue that the undisputed facts set forth above

demonstrate that Deputy Baldwin was faced with a serious and

deadly threat by Plaintiff. Plaintiff was sitting in the dark 

in a private residence without permission from the owner of the

residence. When Deputy Baldwin entered the residence after

announcing his identity, he saw Plaintiff sitting on a bed with

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his chest area covered. Deputy Baldwin, whose gun was drawn,

ordered Plaintiff repeatedly to show his hands. Plaintiff

refused to do so by saying “no” to each of the officer’s commands

to put his hands in sight and to put the gun down. Plaintiff

told Deputy Baldwin that he, Plaintiff, had a gun. Plaintiff

then pivoted as if to get off the bed and brought his gun from

under the covers and pointed it directly at Deputy Baldwin. 

Deputy Baldwin ordered Plaintiff to drop the gun and, when

Plaintiff continued to point his gun at him, fired three shots in

rapid succession at Plaintiff’s center of mass, and ceased firing

when he saw Plaintiff going to the floor. 

These undisputed facts establish as a matter of law that

Deputy Baldwin did not violate Plaintiff’s right against

excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Deputy

Baldwin was faced with an immediate and serious threat of deadly

force and personal safety. Deputy Baldwin fired his weapon only

to the extent necessary to subdue Plaintiff, and remove the

firearm from Plaintiff. Although Plaintiff alleges that the

second and third shots were not necessary because the first shot

had severed his finger, he presents no evidence to support this

contention, presents no evidence that Deputy Baldwin’s first shot

disabled and disarmed him, and presents no evidence that Deputy

Baldwin had knowledge of the effect of the first shot on his

finger. 

Because Deputy Baldwin did not violate Plaintiff’s right to

be free from excessive force, pursuant to Saucier, Deputy Baldwin

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is entitled to summary judgment. He is qualifiedly immune from

further suit. No reasonable officer would have responded

differently. 

With regard to Plaintiff’s claim against Corporal Ray for

failure to act, because Deputy Baldwin did not violate

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right, Corporal Ray is also entitled

to summary judgment. Although an officer has a duty to intervene

when a fellow officer violates the constitutional rights of a

suspect or citizen, United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1447

n.25 (9 Cir.1994), rev’d on other grounds, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), th

an officer can be held liable for failing to intercede only if

the officer had a realistic opportunity to intercede, Cunningham

v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289-1290 (9 Cir.2000). Here, th

Plaintiff presents no evidence that Corporal Ray had a realistic

opportunity to intervene to prevent Deputy Baldwin’s firing of

the second and third shots, as the time interval was short and

the sequence of events continuous. 

D. Liability of Inyo County.

Because summary judgment for Deputy Baldwin and Corporal Ray

is granted, it is unnecessary to address Plaintiff’s claim that

Inyo County is liable for the alleged constitutional violation.

The undisputed facts set forth above, however, demonstrate

that Inyo County has no liability under Section 1983 as a matter

of law.

In Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436

U.S. 658, 692 (1978), the Supreme Court limited a local

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government’s liability under Section 1983 to those cases where

“some official policy ‘causes’ an employee to violate another’s

constitutional rights.” 

[A] local government may not be sued under §

1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its

employees or agents. Instead, it is when

execution of a government’s policy or custom,

whether made by its lawmakers or by those

whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to

represent official policy, inflicts the

injury that the government as an entity is

responsible under § 1983. 

Id. at 694. Since “Congress did not intend municipalities to be

held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy

of some nature caused a constitutional tort[,] ... a municipality

cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tort feasor -

or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under §

1983 on a respondeat superior theory. Id. at 691. A

municipality will be held liable under § 1983 only if “the

municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at

issue.” Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). “City

policy ‘causes’ an injury where it is the ‘moving force’ behind

the constitutional violation ... or where ‘the city itself is the

wrongdoer.” Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1444 (9 Cir.1994). th

The undisputed facts set forth above demonstrate as a matter

of law that the Inyo County had in place a reasonable Use of

Force Policy and that its officers, including Deputy Baldwin and

Corporal Ray, were trained pursuant to the Use of Force Policy as

well as receiving POST training on the use of force. There is no

basis to impose liability on Inyo County pursuant to Monell. 

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 CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED;

2. Counsel for Defendants shall prepare and lodge a form of

order that the rulings set forth in this Memorandum Decision

within five (5) days following the date of service of this

decision.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 29, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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