Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02192/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02192-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

HAROLD EUGENE HIGGINS, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

ANTHONY HEDGPETH, Warden, 

 

Respondent.1

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CASE NO. 2:06-cv-02192-RAJ-JLW 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Petitioner is a California prisoner who is currently incarcerated at the Salinas Valley 

State Prison, in Soledad, California. (See Docket 34.) He was convicted by a jury of seven 

counts of child molestation of two or more victims, with substantial sexual conduct, in 

Sacramento County Superior Court on October 19, 2004, and sentenced to thirty-two years to 

life in prison. (See Dkt. 26 at 1-2.) Petitioner has filed an amended petition under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 challenging the constitutionality of his conviction on eleven grounds. (See Dkt. 10.) 

Respondent has filed an answer to the amended petition, together with relevant portions of the 

 1 Because Anthony Hedgpeth is currently the warden at the institution in which petitioner is 

incarcerated, the Court has substituted his name for that of the original respondent, James Yates. See

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). (See Docket 34.) 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 2 

state court record, and petitioner has filed a traverse in response to the answer. (See Dkts. 26 

and 29.) The briefing is now complete and this matter is ripe for review. The Court, having 

thoroughly reviewed the record and briefing of the parties, recommends the Court deny the 

petition, and dismiss this action with prejudice. 

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

The following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal’s April 7, 2006, 

opinion. (See Dkt. 28, Lodged Docket 3.) The state court’s findings of fact are presumed 

correct unless petitioner rebuts that presumption with clear and convincing evidence. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004). Petitioner has 

not overcome the presumption with respect to any of the following facts. This Court therefore 

relies on the state court’s recitation. 

An information charged defendant with two counts of lewd and 

lascivious acts upon a minor and five counts of lewd and 

lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14. The information 

also alleged defendant committed the offenses against two or 

more victims. . . . Defendant entered a plea of not guilty to all 

counts. The district attorney dismissed one of the counts of 

lewd and lascivious acts on a minor. 

The alleged victims of the charged conduct were related to 

defendant’s wife. In 2003 the wife’s son and his wife relocated 

from Indiana to California. Their children included their 

adopted daughter, S., who was then 14 years old. In California, 

S. and her family stayed in defendant’s home while their new 

home was being built. S., who had previously met defendant 

and his wife when they visited in Indiana, referred to defendant 

as “grandpa.” 

The day after their arrival in California, S. took a shower. She 

dressed and joined her siblings, who were watching television 

in the living room. S. sat on the couch next to defendant. 

Defendant put his arm around S., reached down inside her 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 3 

shorts, and rubbed the outside of her vagina. When S.’s father 

entered the room, defendant stopped. 

The following day, S., her family, and defendant and his wife 

took a car trip to Lake Tahoe. S. lay down on defendant’s lap. 

He took her hand and placed it next to his penis. S. told her 

father about both incidents the next day. 

S.’s sister D. was in born in 1991. In 2003, while her family 

stayed at defendant’s house, D. accompanied defendant outside 

as he smoked his pipe. Defendant put his arm around D. and 

said: “Let’s see what’s down here” and tried to stick his hand 

down her pants. D. pushed his hand away, but defendant was 

able to touch her lower stomach. Defendant persisted for a few 

moments and then stopped. 

Prior to their move, defendant and his wife had visited D.’s 

family in Indiana. During those visits, defendant frequently 

grabbed D.’s chest. Once, when D. wore a shirt that said 

“Genuine Girl,” defendant grabbed her chest and said, “Let’s 

see if you really are genuine.” 

After S. told their father about defendant’s actions, D. also told 

him about what defendant had done. Their father removed the 

family from defendant’s home immediately. 

D.M., born in 1995, is S. and D.’s cousin. Defendant is his 

grandfather. D.M. and his mother lived in defendant’s home 

while he attended first grade. D.M. was seven years old in first 

grade. 

Over a five-month period, defendant sexually molested D.M. at 

night on several occasions. Defendant would touch D.M.’s 

penis and scrotum as he tried to sleep. Defendant touched 

D.M.’s penis and scrotum with his hands and mouth. During 

the molestations, D.M. would turn over to make defendant stop. 

D.M. finally told his mother about defendant’s actions just prior 

to their moving to Bakersfield. 

Two victims, E. and S.S., provided evidence of uncharged acts 

pursuant to Evidence Code section 1108. E. is D.M.’s halfsister, but they did not live together. E. considered defendant 

her grandfather. 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 4 

When E. was four years old, she visited defendant’s home.[2] 

As she was changing her clothes, and while she was naked, 

defendant took her into his room. He sat her on his bed and 

touched her on the outside of her vagina with his hand. E. told 

defendant it hurt and defendant got some lotion and began 

rubbing her vagina again. Defendant told E. it was a secret and 

so she told no one. 

During another incident, defendant rubbed his penis on top of 

E.’s vagina, causing skin contact. Later, at preschool, a teacher 

found E. on top of a boy. When the teacher asked what she was 

doing, E. told her that was what she and defendant did. E. then 

told her father and the police about the incident. 

S.S., born in 1955, is defendant’s niece. When S.S. was a child, 

defendant lived with her family. When S.S. was six, she was in 

the back of a flatbed truck on a trip from Los Angeles to 

Bakersfield. Her two brothers and defendant were also in the 

truck. 

While S.S. tried to sleep, defendant moved to lie down with her. 

He put his hand under her nightgown, pulled her underwear to 

one side, and put his fingers in her vagina. S.S. felt pressure 

and pain. Defendant told her, “You are Uncle Harold’s little 

precious princess. You are my girl.” S.S. squeezed her legs 

together and moaned in an attempt to stop defendant. 

Defendant stopped when her brothers, who were unaware of the 

molestation, attracted his attention. 

Eight months to a year later, S.S. told her mother. Her father 

refused to believe his brother was capable of such conduct and 

labeled S.S. a liar. 

On another occasion, defendant came to S.S.’s home for a 

family gathering. While pushing S.S. on a swing, he squeezed 

her breasts. Again, defendant told her: “You are Uncle Harold’s 

little precious princess. You are my girl.” S.S. ran and hid until 

defendant left. She then told her mother about the incident. 

When S.S. heard about the more recent molestation allegations, 

she reported these prior incidents to the district attorney. 

 [2] At the time of trial, E. was 13 years old. 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 5 

The defense presented testimony of Jaylene Higgins, 

defendant’s wife. Married since 1989, they moved to 

Sacramento in 1993. Although the couple had no children 

together, Jaylene has two children from a prior relationship. 

Jaylene testified no one ever mentioned anything unusual 

between defendant and any of his grandchildren. Nor did 

Jaylene witness any untoward behavior. Neither D. nor S. ever 

said anything to her about inappropriate behavior by defendant. 

Defendant quit smoking a pipe in 2002. However, Jaylene 

admitted she was not in the house when S. alleged defendant 

put his hand down her pants. 

According to Jaylene, before S. made her accusations, she was 

upset about being forced to give up her relationship with her 

biological mother in Indiana. Prior to her accusations, S.’s 

father angrily confronted her about her reluctance to move. 

Jaylene testified that S.’s father initially told Jaylene not to 

confront defendant about the allegations, since it was probably a 

misunderstanding. Jaylene told defendant, who asked S.’s father 

if there was a problem. S.’s father exploded and threatened to 

kill defendant, and defendant asked them to leave. 

Jaylene confronted defendant in 1995 about E.’s accusation. 

Defendant denied molesting her. 

Jaylene also admitted D.M. stayed with them occasionally. She 

testified that whenever D.M. stayed over she put him to bed, 

and she was always with defendant afterwards. Jaylene also 

testified she slept lightly and knew defendant never left the 

bedroom at night. D.M. never consistently slept in the house. 

Instead, he slept outside in a trailer with his mother. 

On rebuttal, Deputy Ramona Feuillard testified regarding her 

interview with defendant over the allegations. Feuillard stated 

defendant told her D.M. stayed with them a lot and slept in 

Jaylene’s mother’s room. Defendant denied committing any of 

the charged offenses. 

Defendant testified on surrebuttal. He denied telling Feuillard 

that D.M. stayed with him a lot. Defendant told Feuillard that 

D.M. stayed with them occasionally. He denied going into 

D.M.’s bedroom and putting his mouth on D.M.’s penis. 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 6 

Defendant denied doing anything inappropriate with S. or D. 

He admitted telling Feuillard he might have touched S., but he 

couldn’t be sure because he had fallen asleep next to her. 

Defendant denied doing anything inappropriate to S.S. 

(Dkt. 28, LD 3 at 1-7.) 

 The jury found defendant guilty on all counts and found the allegations all true. (See 

id., LD 7 at 560-72.) “The trial court sentenced defendant to 32 years: the middle term of two 

years on count one, plus 15 years to life on counts two and three . . . to be served 

consecutively. The court also sentenced defendant to 15 years to life each on counts four 

through six, to be served concurrently.” (Id., LD 3 at 7.) 

With the assistance of counsel, petitioner timely appealed his judgment and sentence 

to the California Court of Appeal. (See id., LD 1.) The California Court of Appeal denied 

petitioner’s claim in a reasoned decision, and affirmed the Sacramento County Superior 

Court’s judgment on April 7, 2006. (See id., LD 3.) Petitioner filed a petition for review in 

the California Supreme Court, which was summarily denied on June 21, 2006. (See id., LD 4 

and 5.) 

Petitioner filed his initial federal habeas petition in this Court on September 6, 2006. 

(See Dkt. 1.) By Court Order, petitioner filed an amended petition on November 21, 2006. 

(See Dkts. 9 and 10.) In his Answer, respondent admits petitioner timely filed his appeal and 

exhausted what he characterizes as petitioner’s “claims 3 through 9.” (See Dkt. 26 at 2.) He 

contends, however, that petitioner failed to exhaust his first two federal claims for relief. (See 

id.) 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 7 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs this 

petition because it was filed after the enactment of AEDPA. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 

320, 326-27 (1997). Because petitioner is in custody of the California Department of 

Corrections pursuant to a state court judgment, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides the exclusive 

vehicle for his habeas petition. See White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(providing that § 2254 is “the exclusive vehicle for a habeas petition by a state prisoner in 

custody pursuant to a state court judgment. . . .”). Under AEDPA, a habeas petition may not 

be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless petitioner 

demonstrates that the highest state court decision rejecting his petition was either “contrary to, 

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 

the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of 

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(1) and (2). 

As a threshold matter, this Court must ascertain whether relevant federal law was 

“clearly established” at the time of the state court’s decision. To make this determination, the 

Court may only consider the holdings, as opposed to dicta, of the United States Supreme 

Court. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). It is also appropriate to look to 

lower federal court decisions to determine what law has been “clearly established” by the 

Supreme Court and the reasonableness of a particular application of that law. See Duhaime v. 

Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 598 (9th Cir. 1999). In this context, Ninth Circuit precedent 

 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 8 

remains persuasive but not binding authority. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; Clark v. 

Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003).

The Court must then determine whether the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” See Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may 

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the 

Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] 

Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the 

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but 

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. At all 

times, a federal habeas court must keep in mind that it “may not issue the writ simply because 

[it] concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather that application must also be 

[objectively] unreasonable.” Id. at 411. 

 In each case, the petitioner has the burden of establishing that the state court decision 

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). To determine 

whether the petitioner has met this burden, a federal habeas court looks to the last reasoned 

state court decision because subsequent unexplained orders upholding that judgment are 

presumed to rest upon the same ground. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 

(1991); Medley v. Runnels, 506 F.3d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 2007). 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 9 

Finally, AEDPA requires federal courts to give considerable deference to state court 

decisions, and state courts’ factual findings are presumed correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

Federal courts are also bound by a state’s interpretation of its own laws. See Murtishaw v. 

Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 964 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Powell v. Ducharme, 998 F.2d 710, 713 

(9th Cir. 1993)). 

 IV. FEDERAL CLAIM FOR RELIEF 

 Petitioner raises the following eleven claims for relief in his amended federal habeas 

corpus petition: 

A. Conviction obtained by prejudicing jury[.] Defendant was 

paraded across hallway, in front of jurors and prospective 

jurors, while in handcuffs, while jury was being selected and 

while trial was going on, also bailiff came up and stood between 

witness stand and jury box while defendant was testifying, 

prejudicing the jury. 

B. Denial of effective assistance of counsel. Defense law[y]er did 

not call any witnesses for defendant other than defendant and 

his spouse. There were many people present when alleged, 

supposed offinces [sic] took place who could have given 

evidence that offinces [sic] never took place. They were never 

called. 

C. Evidence code 1108 is a violation of due process of law, on its 

face and as applied[.] An unproven and uncharged, 43 year old 

incident, which was never proven to have happened, and 

defendant says never happened, should never have been 

admitted. This also goes for incident with . . . [E.], which 

nothing ever happened. She admitted not remembering. 

D. Denial of sixth amendment rights to jury determination on all 

issues. Jury was not instructed about possible findings of 

less[e]r offences [sic]. Denying defendant of his rights of 

determination by a jury of all issues. 

E. The court err[ed] prejudicially in failing to instruct sua sponte 

the jury in accordance with CALJIC No. 2.71, or similar 

instruction which defined admission and informed the jury that 

evidence of an oral admission of a defendant should be viewed 

with caution. 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 10 

F. The trial courts giving of CALJIC 2.20.1 was reversible error as 

it deprived appellant of due process of law. 

G. Even if evidence code section 1108 is constitutional the 2002 

revision of CALJIC No. 2.50.01 given here regarding 

propensity evidence, was erroneous, denying appell[ant] due 

process of law and a fair trial. 

H. The court err[ed] in failing to instruct on two essent[i]al 

elements of the one strike law, denying appell[ant] due process 

of law, a fair trial, and the right of a jury determination on all 

issues. 

I. The cumulative effect of errors discussed here in section 12 

deprived appel[lant] of due process of law and a fair trial and 

should result in a reversal of judgement [sic]. 

J. The court err[ed] in applying the multiple victim circumstance 

under the one strike law 5 times in a case involving two victims 

in violation of penal code 654 and state and federal 

constitutional principles of due process and double jeopardy. 

K. The term of 32 yrs to life imposed upon appel[lant], an ailing 68 

year-old man, with no criminal record or history of violence 

constitute cruel and unusual punishment under both the 

California and U.S. Constitutions and should be reversed. 

(Dkt. 10 at 5-6 and Attachments.) The above claims and supporting facts 

constitute the entirety of petitioner’s federal habeas petition. Although 

petitioner filed a traverse in response to his answer, his petition does not 

contain any additional briefing, citation to legal authority, or factual support. 

 V. EXHAUSTION 

 Respondent submits that petitioner’s first two federal claims for relief are unexhausted 

because petitioner failed to present them to any state court. (See Dkt. 26 at 12.) Respondent 

contends the amended petition should be dismissed without prejudice, or that petitioner 

should be directed to file an amended petition absent the unexhausted claims. (See id.) In the 

alternative, respondent asserts this Court should deny the claims on the merits. (See id. at 14.) 

Petitioner fails to address this issue in his traverse. (See Dkt. 29.) 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 11 

 In order to properly exhaust state court remedies, California state prisoners must 

present the California Supreme Court with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of every 

issue raised in his federal habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) & (c); Granberry 

v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987). See also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 

(1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). Petitioners must notify the state courts 

that they are presenting a federal claim in order to satisfy the fair opportunity rule. See 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66. More specifically, in this Circuit, petitioners must “make the 

federal basis of the claim explicit either by specifying particular provisions of the federal 

Constitution or statutes, or by citing to federal case law.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 

657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668, 670 (9th Cir. 2000), as 

modified by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that the law in this Circuit requires 

petitioners to “make the federal basis of the claim explicit either by specifying particular 

provisions of the federal Constitution or statutes, or by citing to federal case law.”)). 

 Here, petitioner failed to present his first two federal claims in either of his state court 

petitions. In general, petitions that contain unexhausted claims must be dismissed. Rose v. 

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982). Federal courts have the discretion to deny a habeas 

application on the merits, however, notwithstanding a petitioner’s failure to fully exhaust his 

state court remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“[a]n application for a writ of habeas 

corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the 

remedies available in the courts of the State”); Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 

2005) (a federal court considering a habeas petition may deny an unexhausted claim on the 

merits when it is perfectly clear that the claim is not “colorable”). For the reasons discussed 

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infra, petitioner’s claims must fail on the merits. I therefore recommend the Court proceed to 

the merits of all eleven of petitioner’s claims and deny the petition. To require him to return 

to the California Supreme Court would further delay an already protracted case, for no other 

purpose. 

This Court also notes that respondent has addressed nine of petitioner’s eleven federal 

claims for relief, omitting any discussion regarding exhaustion or the merits of petitioner’s 

third and fourth claims. (See Dkt. 26 at 2 and 12-20.) Respondent’s failure to address all of 

the allegations in the amended petition appears to be an oversight and is in violation of Rule 

5(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, which 

requires respondent to address all allegations presented in a habeas corpus petition. In light of 

the already lengthy delay in this case, however, the Court has independently reviewed the 

record and determined that petitioner properly presented his third and fourth claims to the 

state’s highest court. (See Dkt. 28, LD 4 at 6-12.) See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3); O’Sullivan v. 

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (“[s]tate prisoners must give the state courts one full 

opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s 

established appellate review process”); Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(holding that California law requires presentation of claims to the California Supreme Court 

through petition for discretionary review in order to exhaust state court remedies). 

Accordingly, I recommend the Court find that petitioner has properly exhausted his third and 

fourth grounds for relief and should proceed to the merits of both claims as well. 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 13 

VI. DISCUSSION 

A. Unconstitutional Security Precautions (Unexhausted Claim)

 Petitioner contends that potential jurors and, ultimately those jurors who were selected 

to serve on the jury, were prejudiced when they saw petitioner walk down the hallway 

towards the courtroom in handcuffs “on occasions.” (See Dkt. 10 at 5 and Dkt. 29 at 1.) In 

addition, he contends that on two occasions they saw him enter the courtroom and sit at 

counsel’s table before his handcuffs were removed. (See id.) He also asserts that the jury was 

prejudiced when the Bailiff stood in between the petitioner and the jury box when he testified. 

(See id.) Respondent argues that petitioner’s claims are baseless as he fails to show how the 

alleged security precautions were sufficiently prejudicial and he fails to cite a federal case, 

statute or constitutional provision to support his claim. (See id.; Dkt. 29 at 1-3; and Dkt. 26 at 

16.) 

 1. Unconstitutional Shackling

 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the appearance of a defendant in shackles 

before a jury during a trial can violate the defendant’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights 

to due process. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 629-634 (2005). The Court reasoned that 

“[v]isible shackling undermines the presumption of innocence and related fairness of the 

factfinding process[,] . . . can interfere with the accused’s ‘ability to communicate’ with his 

lawyer” and “participate in his own defense[,]” and “‘affront[s]’ the ‘dignity and decorum of 

judicial proceedings that the judge is seeking to uphold.’” Id. at 630-31 (alteration in original) 

(quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970)). 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 14 

 The Court therefore held that “[trial] courts cannot routinely place defendants in 

shackles or other physical restraints visible to the jury” without making a specific 

determination that such restraints are necessary with regard to this particular defendant on the 

basis that shackling is ‘“inherently prejudicial’.” Id. at 634 (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 

U.S. 560, 568 (1986)). Thus, “where a court, without adequate justification, orders the 

defendant to wear shackles that will be seen by the jury, the defendant need not demonstrate 

actual prejudice to make out a due process violation.” Id. Instead, the State bears the burden 

of proving “beyond a reasonable doubt that the [shackling] error complained of did not 

contribute to the verdict obtained.” Id. (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 

(1967)). 

 Although Deck set forth a heightened standard of review by shifting the burden to the 

State, the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently clarified that in § 2254 proceedings courts are to 

apply the “more forgiving” standard of review set forth in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 

619, 631 (1993). See Frye v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121-22 (2007) (“a court must assess the 

prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial under the ‘substantial 

and injurious effect” standard set forth in Brecht . . . whether or not the state appellate court 

recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness under the [Chapman standard of 

review].”). 

 Here, petitioner asserts that both the potential and empanelled jurors witnessed him 

walk down the hallway towards the courtroom in handcuffs “on occasions” and on at least 

two occasions saw him enter the courtroom and sit down at counsel’s table before his 

handcuffs were removed. (See Dkt. 10 at 5 and Dkt. 29 at 1.) Even if we assume petitioner’s 

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factual allegations are correct, nowhere does petitioner allege he was restrained or shackled 

during the trial. The Deck-line of cases is applicable where a trial court determines that a 

defendant must be physically restrained during the guilt or penalty phase of a trial. That is not 

our case. 

 The facts alleged by petitioner establish that petitioner, who was in custody, was being 

brought into the courtroom in handcuffs and that the handcuffs were removed once he was 

seated. The Ninth Circuit has long “held that a jury’s brief or inadvertent glimpse of a 

defendant in physical restraints outside of the courtroom does not warrant habeas corpus relief 

unless the petitioner makes an affirmative showing of prejudice. See Ghent v. Woodford, 279 

F.3d 1121, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002) (the jurors’ occasional, brief glimpses of the defendant in 

handcuffs and other restraints in the hallway at the entrance to the courtroom was not 

prejudicial); Olano, 62 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 1995) (“a jury’s brief or inadvertent glimpse 

of a defendant in physical restraints is not inherently or presumptively prejudicial to a 

defendant”); Castillo v. Stainer, 983 F.2d 145, 148 (9th Cir. 1992) (no prejudice when, during 

transport to or from the courtroom, some members of the jury pool saw the defendant in 

shackles in the court corridor); United States v. Halliburton, 870 F.2d 557, 560-62 (9th Cir. 

1989) (jurors’ inadvertent observation of the defendant in handcuffs in the corridor did not 

prejudicially impair the defendant’s right to a fair trial); Wilson v. McCarthy, 770 F.2d 1482, 

1485-86 (9th Cir. 1985) (the jury’s brief viewing of defendant’s shackles as he left the witness 

stand at the conclusion of his testimony was not prejudicial). 

 Accordingly, the jurors’ view of petitioner in handcuffs as he walked down the 

hallway and went into the courtroom was not inherently or presumptively prejudicial. See 

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Williams v. Woodford, 398 F.3d 567, 592-593 (9th Cir. 2004) (as amended); United States v. 

Leach, 429 F.2d 956, 962 (8th Cir. 1970) (“[i]t’s a normal and regular as well as highly 

desirable and necessary practice to handcuff prisoners when they are being taken from one 

place to another, and the jury is aware of this.”). I therefore recommend this Court find that 

petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief as to this claim.3

2. Unnecessary Security During Petitioner’s Testimony

 Petitioner alleges that the Bailiff came up to the front of the courtroom when he took 

the stand and stood between him and the jury. (See Dkt. 29 at 2.) He contends the Bailiff 

“appeared to be guarding the jury from some kind of attack.” (See id.) 

 First, this Court’s review is limited to determining whether a conviction violated 

federal law, which petitioner fails to clearly allege. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 

(1991). Even assuming he asserts a federal constitutional violation, the U.S. Supreme Court 

has held that the presence of armed guards in the courtroom is not equivalent to physically 

restraining the defendant. Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 568-69 (petitioner is not denied his 

constitutional right to a fair trial when, at his trial with five co-defendants, customary 

courtroom security force was supplemented by four uniformed state troopers sitting in the first 

row of spectator section). The presence of security personal in close proximity to the 

defendant is expressly contrasted with inherently prejudicial practices such as shackling 

during a trial. See id. Thus, when analyzing the situation alleged in this case, this Court is 

required to: 

 3 For the same reasons, petitioner’s claim in his traverse that he complained to his trial counsel 

about this issue does not merit habeas corpus review. (See Dkt. 29 at 1.) 

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look at the scene presented to the jurors and determine whether 

what they saw was so inherently prejudicial as to pose an 

unacceptable threat to defendant’s right to trial; if the 

challenged practice is not found inherently prejudicial and if the 

defendant fails to show actual prejudice, the inquiry is over. 

Id. at 572. 

 If petitioner intended to assert that the above security measures violated his federal 

due process rights, his claim fails because he has not demonstrated that he suffered any 

prejudice as a result of the alleged security precautions. He simply fails to present any 

documentary or other evidence to support his claims. Moreover, the type of security present 

in this particular courtroom – a single bailiff positioned between the defendant and the jury 

during the defendant’s testimony – is not inherently prejudicial. Because petitioner is 

ultimately unable to demonstrate actual prejudice as a result of the Bailiff’s position, I 

recommend the court deny petitioner’s claim. 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (Unexhausted Claim)

 Petitioner claims his trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to “call any witnesses 

for defendant other than defendant and his spouse.” (Dkt. 10 at 5.) Respondent contends this 

claim is without merit as petitioner is unable to show that defense counsel’s representation 

was deficient and that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different if additional 

witnesses were called. (See Dkt. 26 at 17-20.) 

 In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner must demonstrate that 

counsel’s representation fell below the objective standard of reasonableness and that the 

deficient performance affected the result of the proceeding. United States v. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 687-88. A strong presumption exists that counsel’s conduct falls within the wideCase 2:06-cv-02192-RAJ -JLW Document 36 Filed 05/10/10 Page 17 of 45
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range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689. To demonstrate prejudice, “[t]he 

defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. 

The U.S. Supreme Court defines “reasonable probability” as a “probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. Thus, in all cases, “the defendant bears the 

burden of proving that counsel’s representation was unreasonable under prevailing 

professional norms and that the challenged action was not sound strategy.” Kimmelman v. 

Morison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986). 

Here, petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

because counsel failed to call additional witnesses in his defense. He claims many people 

were present when the alleged offenses occurred and that those people could have testified 

that such offenses never took place. (See Dkt. 10 at 5.) He identifies these witnesses by name 

in his traverse. (See Dkt. 29 at 7-8.) A review of the record reveals that petitioner fails to 

show there is a reasonable probability that if such witnesses were called, the outcome of the 

trial would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Specifically, to establish 

ineffective assistance of counsel based upon a failure to call witnesses, petitioner must 

identify the witnesses in question, state with specificity what those witnesses would have 

testified to, and explain how that testimony might have altered the outcome of the trial. See 

Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 872-73 (9th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Berry, 

814 F.2d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1987) (rejecting appellant’s ineffective assistance claim where 

“[h]e offer[ed] no indication of what these witnesses would have testified to, or how their 

testimony might have changed the outcome of the hearing.”). Finally, the petitioner must 

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show that the witnesses in question were actually available and willing to testify. See Alcala, 

334 F.3d at 872-73. See also United States v. Harden, 846 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 

1988) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim where there was no evidence which established 

that the witness would have testified in the trial). 

Petitioner is unable to overcome the strong presumption that: 1) defense counsel’s 

decision to only call petitioner and his wife was sound trial strategy; 2) such decision was 

unreasonable under prevailing professional norms; and 3) the witnesses he identified would 

have been available and willing to testify at trial. I therefore recommend this Court deny 

petitioner’s claim. 

In addition to the unexhausted ineffective assistance of counsel claim presented in his 

amended federal habeas corpus petition, petitioner also raises several additional claims of 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel in his traverse. (See Dkt. 29 at 3-10.) Specifically, he 

claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by: (1) failing to suppress several 

victims’ testimony; (2) having no experience with “life sentence” cases; and (3) failing to 

obtain impeachment evidence. (See id.) To the extent petitioner is attempting to belatedly 

raise new claims in his traverse, relief should be denied. See Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 

F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994) (a traverse is not the proper pleading to raise additional grounds 

for relief); see also Greenwood v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) 

(“we review only issues which are argued specifically and distinctly in a party’s opening 

brief”). Even if these claims had been properly raised or petitioner had sought leave to amend 

to add these unexhausted claims, such amendment would be futile as he fails to demonstrate 

that any of these claims rise to the level of a constitutional violation entitling him to relief. 

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C. Due Process Challenge to California Evidence Code § 1108 

 Petitioner contends his due process rights were violated when the trial court admitted 

evidence of uncharged prior sexual offenses against two victims under California Evidence 

Code § 1108. (See Dkt. 10 at 3-4.) Two victims testified at trial that petitioner had previously 

molested them on multiple occasions. (See id.) Petitioner also contends that § 1108 is 

unconstitutional “on its face” and “as applied.” (See id. 10 at 6.) Although respondent failed 

to address this claim in his answer, this same issue was fully briefed and addressed in the 

California Court of Appeal, which issued a reasoned decision denying petitioner’s claim on 

state law grounds. (See Dkt. 28, LD 3 at 7-13.) 

 California Evidence Code § 1108(a) states that “[i]n a criminal action in which the 

defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another 

sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by Section 1101, if the evidence is not 

inadmissible pursuant to Section 352 [which allows a trial court to exclude evidence if its 

probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect].” (See id. at 8-9.) While this 

legislative language is not a model of clarity, the thrust of it appears to be as follows: the trial 

court may admit evidence of commission of another, uncharged sexual offense unless its 

probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The California Court of Appeal 

rejected petitioner’s due process claim on direct review based upon the California Supreme 

Court’s decision in People v. Falsetta, which held that § 1108 does not violate federal or state 

due process because it requires the trial court to weigh the evidence under Evidence Code 

§ 352. 21 Cal.4th 903, 910-922 (1999). (See Dkt. 28, LD 3 at 9.) 

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 Petitioner challenges this statute on federal due process grounds. The Due Process 

Clause has limited operation “beyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of 

Rights,” however. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990). In fact, state laws 

only violate the Due Process Clause if they offend “some principle of justice so rooted in the 

traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Montana v. 

Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996). Review of a due process claim in a federal habeas corpus 

petition is further limited to whether the trial court admitted an error that rendered the trial so 

arbitrary and fundamentally unfair that it violated federal due process. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67; 

Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 Moreover, the Supreme Court “has never expressly held that it violates due process to 

admit other crimes evidence for the purpose of showing conduct in conformity therewith, or 

that it violates due process to admit other crimes evidence for other purposes without an 

instruction limiting the jury’s consideration of the evidence to such purposes.” Garceau v. 

Woodford, 275 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Woodford v. 

Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003). To the contrary, the Supreme Court has expressly left open 

the precise question of whether propensity evidence offends the Due Process Clause. Estelle, 

502 U.S. at 75 n. 5 (“Because we need not reach this issue, we express no opinion on whether 

a state law would violate the Due Process Clause if it permitted the use of ‘prior crimes’ 

evidence to show propensity to commit a charged crime”). See Mejia v. Garcia, 534 F.3d 

1036, 1046 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a state court had not acted objectively unreasonable 

in determining that the propensity evidence introduced against the defendant did not violate 

his right to due process); Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 863-67 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. 

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denied, 549 U.S. 1287 (2007) (denying the petitioner’s claim that the introduction of 

propensity evidence violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment because 

“the right [petitioner] asserts has not been clearly established by the Supreme Court, as 

required by AEDPA.”). 

 Furthermore, “[w]hile no federal court has specifically ruled on the constitutionality of 

section 1108, several circuit courts, including the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, have upheld 

the use of propensity evidence under Rule 413 and 414 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.” 

Smiley v. Evans, 2009 WL 2912514, *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2009) (unpublished) (citing United 

States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that Federal Rule of 

Evidence 414, which permits admission of evidence of similar crimes in child molestation 

cases, does not violate the due process cause because it is limited by Rule 403)); Wolff v. 

Newland, 67 Fed. Appx. 398 (9th Cir. 2003) (California’s Rule 1108 was modeled after the 

Federal Rules, and contains an express requirement that courts balance the probative value of 

the evidence against its prejudicial effect”); United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 881 (10th 

Cir. 1998); United States v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799, 801 (8th Cir. 1998)). See also Soto v. 

Adams, 2010 WL 1286877 (E.D. Cal. March 29, 2010) (unpublished) (holding the California 

state court’s rejection of a petitioner’s due process challenge to § 1108 was not contrary to 

U.S. Supreme court law); Barreto v. Martel, 2010 WL 546586, *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2010) 

(the same). 

 Because the Supreme Court has expressly left open the question of whether the 

admission of propensity evidence violates due process, the California state courts’ rejection of 

petitioner’s § 1108 claim was not contrary to or an unreasonably application of U.S. Supreme 

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Court precedent. See Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 955 (9th Cir. 2004) (“If no Supreme 

Court precedent creates clearly established federal law relating to the legal issue the habeas 

petitioner raised in state court, the state court’s decision cannot be contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law”). I therefore recommend this 

Court find petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

D. Juror Instruction Error - No. 1 

 Petitioner contends that his Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of all 

issues was violated when the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on a lesser 

included offense. (See Dkt. 10 at 6.) Petitioner does not cite a single federal case or fact to 

support his claim. (See id. and Dkt. 29.) Respondent also fails to address this claim in his 

answer. (See Dkt. 26.) And, while petitioner presented this as a federal constitutional issue in 

his state court briefs, the California Court of Appeal rejected it on state law grounds, holding 

that trial court did not have a duty sua sponte to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense 

in this case. (See Dkt. 29, LD 3 at 13-15.) 

 Even assuming petitioner properly presented this claim in this Court, there is no 

clearly established federal law that requires a trial court to instruct on a lesser included 

offense. In Beck v. Alabama, a capital case, the Supreme Court held that the failure to instruct 

the jury on a lesser-included offense violates the Due Process Clause if there is evidence to 

support the instruction. 447 U.S. 625 (1980). The Beck Court expressly declined to decide 

whether the Due Process Clause requires the sentencing court to provide a lesser-included 

offense instruction in a noncapital case, however. Id. at 638 n.14. See United States v. 

Torres-Flores, 502 F.3d 885, 888 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Beck left open whether the due process 

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right extends to defendants in noncapital cases.”). After Beck, the Ninth Circuit held that the 

failure of a state trial court to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense in a non-capital 

case, in general, is not a federal constitutional question and cannot be considered in a habeas 

corpus proceeding. Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1240 (9th Cir. 1984); Windham v. 

Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1105-1106 (9th Cir. 1998). While the Ninth Circuit left open the 

possibility that “the defendant’s right to adequate jury instructions on his or her theory of the 

case might, in some cases, constitute an exception to the general rule,” such an exception 

requires that the lesser included offense be consistent with the defendant’s theory of his case. 

Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 2000). See Bradley v. Duncan, 315 F.3d 1091, 

1098-1100 (9th Cir. 2002) (failure to instruct on a theory of defense may constitute a violation 

of due process by depriving the defendant of the right to present his case if substantial 

evidence was presented to support that defense). 

 Having reviewed the record, this Court finds the California Court of Appeal 

reasonably concluded that the evidence did not support the trial court’s sua sponte inclusion 

of the lesser included offense of attempted commission of a lewd act, a theory that does not 

appear to have been presented by the defense in the first instance. (Dkt. 28, LD 3 at 13-15.) 

As the state court held: 

 

D’s testimony established defendant touched her stomach, she 

was under 14, and defendant announced his desire to “see 

what’s down here” while struggling to push his hand farther 

down her pants. Defendant’s intent was clear from his words 

and actions. The fact that D. managed to thwart his efforts to 

reach her private parts does not turn defendant’s actions into an 

 

 

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attempt.” Defendant completed an act qualifying as a 

molestation under section 288, subdivision (a). 

 

 (Id. at 15.) 

 Thus, even assuming that instructional error occurred, it was harmless, given the lack 

of support for this theory. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. Accordingly, I recommend the Court 

find that the omission of the lesser included instruction did not render petitioner’s trial 

fundamentally unfair under constitutional due process standards, and more importantly, the 

state courts’ rejection of this claim was not contrary to or an unreasonably application of U.S. 

Supreme Court authority. See Brewer, 378 F.3d at 955. Petitioner’s claim should therefore 

be denied. 

E. Jury Instruction Error - No. 2

 Petitioner claims the trial court erred “prejudicially” when it failed to instruct the jury, 

sua sponte, with California Jury Instruction No. 2.71 (“evidence of an oral admission of the 

defendant not made in court should be viewed with caution”). Again, petitioner fails to 

articulate the basis for his federal constitutional claim, but reading his petition leniently, it 

appears he challenges the trial court’s failure to instruct on due process grounds. Respondent 

contends the state courts properly rejected petitioner’s constitutional claim. 

 In a reasoned decision, the California Court of Appeal held as follows: 

Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct sua 

sponte with CALJIC No. 2.71. CALJIC No. 71 provides: “An 

admission is a statement by [a] [the] defendant which does not 

by itself acknowledge [his] [her] guilt of the crime[s] for which 

the defendant is on trial, but which statement tends to prove 

[his] [her] guilt when considered with the rest of the evidence 

. . . . You are the exclusive judges as to whether the defendant 

made an admission, and if so, whether that statement is true in 

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whole or in part. . . . [Evidence of an oral admission of [a] [the] 

defendant not made in court should be viewed with caution.] 

Defendant argues the record is “replete” with statements made 

by defendant that the prosecution used to prove his guilt. 

Among the statements defendant labels admissions are: D.’s 

statement that defendant said he was going to see what was 

“down there,” E.’s statement that defendant told her his actions 

were a secret, defendant’s questioning S.’s father about whether 

there was a problem with the girls, and defendant’s statements 

to police regarding D.M.’s and E.’s living arrangements. 

Any statements made outside the courtroom, whether 

inculpatory or exculpatory, that tends to prove guilt when 

considered with the rest of the evidence constitutes an 

admission. If substantial evidence exists that a defendant made 

an oral admission, the court must sua sponte instruct the jury to 

view the evidence with caution. The purpose of this cautionary 

instruction is to assist the jury in determining whether the 

defendant actually made the statement. (People v. Vega (1990) 

220 Cal.App.3d 310, 317-318; People v. Zichko, (2004) 118 

Cal.App.4th 1055, 1059; People v. Livaditis, (1992) 2 Cal.4th 

759, 784.) 

The People contend most of the statements defendant terms 

admissions are, in fact, not admissions. We agree. Defendant 

fails to explain how his remarks to S.’s father and the police 

tend to prove his guilt for the underlying offense. 

Defendant’s statements to D. that he was going to see what was 

“down there,” suggesting sexual intent, does qualify as an 

admission tending to prove defendant guilty of the charged 

offense. As such, the trial court was required to instruct the jury 

to view defendant’s statement with caution. 

Failure to give CALJIC No. 2.71 is harmless if it is not 

reasonably probable a result more favorable to the defendant 

would have been reached absent the error. (People v. Pensinger

(1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1268-1269.) Here, it is not reasonably 

probable defendant would have achieved a more favorable 

result had the court given CALJIC No. 2.71. Defendant’s 

statement to D. provided evidence of this intent in touching her. 

However, D. provided other evidence of defendant’s intent. 

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Prior to the incident, defendant, when visiting the family in 

Indiana, frequently grabbed D.’s chest. This testimony, coupled 

with the Evidence Code section 1108 testimony of E. and S.S. 

regarding defendant’s molestations of them, established 

defendant’s motive of sexual gratification in touching his 

victims. Any error was harmless. 

Defendant’s statement to E. at most tended to prove the 

uncharged conduct involving E. However, defendant’s 

statement to E. that it was a secret paled in comparison to E.’s 

recollection of the sexual conduct itself. Even assuming 

defendant’s statement qualifies as an admission, it added little 

to E.’s description of his actions. Again, error was harmless. 

 

(Dkt. 28, LD 3 at 15-18.) 

 To obtain relief in a habeas corpus proceeding for errors in the jury charge, a 

petitioner must demonstrate that the jury instruction error “so infected the entire trial that the 

resulting conviction violates due process.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. In order to make this 

determination, the court must evaluate the jury instructions in the context of the charge to the 

jury and the entire trial process. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982). As 

discussed briefly in the prior section, if the court determines the instruction violated 

petitioner’s due process rights, he can only obtain relief if the error “‘had [a] substantial and 

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 

U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). Trial 

errors that do not meet this test are deemed harmless. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 824 

(9th Cir. 1995). See also Hedgpeth v. Pulido, --- U.S. ---, 129 S.Ct. 530, 531 (2008). 

 As the California Court of Appeal found, two out of the three alleged “admissions” 

were not admissions at all. Petitioner’s statements to S.’s father and to the police did not 

constitute admissions and therefore the court’s failure to advise the jury did not require a 

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cautionary instruction. Petitioner’s statement to D. that he was going to see what was “down 

here” was found to be an admission, however, warranting instruction under CALJIC 2.71. 

Nonetheless, there was additional testimony from D. and other victims to support the 

allegation that petitioner’s intent was sexual. As the California Court of Appeal explained, 

the evidence against petitioner was substantial. Thus, even if the cautionary instruction had 

been given, petitioner is unable to demonstrate that such an instruction would have made a 

difference in this case. 

 Accordingly, the California courts’ decision to reject petitioner’s jury instruction claim 

is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established U.S. Supreme Court 

precedent. I therefore recommend the Court deny petitioner relief as to this claim. 

F. Jury Instruction Error - No.3 

 Petitioner asserts that CALJIC No. 2.20.1 violated his constitutional right to due 

process. (See Dkt. 10 at 6a, “Section # 12 Continuation #1.”) Again, he provides no authority 

or factual support for his assertion. Respondent contends that the state court properly rejected 

petitioner’s claim. The California Court of Appeal addressed this claim and held as follows: 

 

Defendant argues the trial court’s instruction on the evaluation 

of the testimony of a child under 10 years of age violated his 

right to due process. According to defendant, the instruction 

unfairly enhanced the credibility of D.M., lessening the 

People’s burden of proof. 

 

The court instructed: “In evaluating the testimony of a child ten 

years of age or younger, you should consider all of the factors 

surrounding the child’s testimony including the age of the child 

and any evidence regarding the child’s level of cognitive 

development. . . . A child, because of age and level of cognitive 

development, may perform differently than an adult as a 

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witness, but that does not mean a child is any more or less 

believable than an adult. You should not discount or distrust 

the testimony of a child solely because he or she is a child. . . . 

‘Cognitive’ means the child’s ability to perceive, to understand, 

to remember, and to communicate any matter about which the 

child has knowledge.” (CALJIC No. 2.20.1.) 

 

Numerous courts have upheld CALJIC No. 2.20.1 in the face of 

a due process challenge. In People v. Harlan (1990) 222 

Cal.App.3d 439 (Harlan), the court found CALJIC No. 2.20.1 

does not inform jurors to disregard a child’s age and cognitive 

abilities. The second sentence of the instruction “merely 

advises the jury that due to the age and level of cognitive 

development, a child may act differently on the witness stand 

than an adult. It does not relate to the truth or falsity of the 

content of the child’s testimony. The language refers to one of 

many factors to be applied to a jury in determining a witness’s 

credibility, namely, the demeanor and manner of the witness 

while testifying.” (Harlan, at p. 455.) 

 

The Harlan court concluded the instruction does not rob the 

jury of its role in making findings on the child’s credibility as a 

witness. Instead, the instruction requires that jurors not find a 

child witness unreliable solely because of his or her age. Jurors 

should consider the child’s testimony in light of evidence of the 

child’s cognitive development and other factors. (Harlan, 

supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 456.) 

 

Other courts have found CALJIC No. 2.20.1 did not 

impermissibly lessen the prosecution’s burden of proof, but 

only provided the jury with guidance in assessing the credibility 

of a class of witnesses, supplanting a traditional bias against 

these witnesses. (People v. Gilbert (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1372, 

1393.) Nor does CALJIC 2.20.1 remove the issue of credibility 

from the jury. Instead, the instruction directs the jury to 

determine credibility after considering all the factors related to a 

child’s testimony, including the demeanor of the child. (People 

v. Jones (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1574.) 

 

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury 

pursuant to CALJIC 2.20.1. 

 

(Dkt. 28, LD 3 at 18-19.) 

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 In Cupp v. Naughten, the Supreme Court held that a state judge’s instruction to a jury 

at a criminal trial advising that “[e]very witness is presumed to speak the truth,” and 

explaining ways in which that presumption might be overcome, did not violate due process. 

414 U.S. 141, 142 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if such an instruction 

were undesirable or erroneous, a state conviction would not be overturned unless the 

instruction “violated some right which was guaranteed to the defendant by the Fourteenth 

Amendment.” Id. at 146. 

 The strict standard for evaluating state courts’ jury instructions coupled with the 

California Court of Appeal’s reasoned explanation that this instruction prevents the jury from 

disregarding a child’s testimony, without “amplifying” it, renders petitioner’s claim without 

merit. See Brodit v. Cambra, 350 F.3d 985, 990-91 (9th Cir. 2003). Because the state courts’ 

decisions do not contravene or unreasonably apply clearly established Supreme Court 

precedent, I recommend this Court deny petitioner’s claim for relief. 

G. Jury Instruction Error - No. 4 

 Petitioner asserts that even if California Code of Evidence § 1108 is found to be 

constitutional, “the 2002 revision of CALJIC No. 2.50.01 given here regarding propensity 

evidence was erroneous, denying appellate [sic] due process of law and a fair trial.” (Dkt. 10 

at 6a, “Section #12 Continuation #1.”) Specifically, petitioner contends in his brief in the 

state courts that the trial court erred and deprived him of due process of law in giving this 

instruction because it impermissibly lessened the burden of the prosecution to prove him 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Dkt. 28, LD 1 at 51-52.) Respondent claims “the 

state courts reasonably found no likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instructions to 

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convict Petitioner based on a preponderance of the evidence or any standard below proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” (See Dkt. 26 at 24-25.) 

 The California Court of Appeal considered this claim and held: 

Defendant objects to the trial court’s giving of CAJIC No. 

2.50.01, arguing the instruction violated his due process rights. 

Defendant contends the instruction allows the jury to use his 

prior acts of molestation, proven by a preponderance of the 

evidence, as proof of his intent in the charged offenses. 

CALJIC 2.50.01, as given, states: “Evidence has been 

introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant 

engaged in a sexual offense on one or more occasions other than 

that charged in the case. . . . ‘Sexual offense’ means a crime 

under the laws of the state or of the United States that involves 

any of the following: . . . Any conduct made criminal by Penal 

Code section 288(a). . . . If you find that the defendant 

committed a prior sexual offense, you may, but are not required 

to, infer that the defendant had a disposition to commit sexual 

offenses. . . . If you find that the defendant had this disposition, 

you may, but are not required to, infer that he was likely to 

commit and did commit the crime or crimes of which he is 

accused. . . . However, if you find by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the defendant committed a prior sexual 

offense . . . that is not sufficient by itself to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that he committed the charged crimes. If 

you determine an inference properly can be drawn from 

this evidence, this inference is simply one item for you to 

consider, along with all other evidence, in determining 

whether the defendant has been proved guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt of the charged crime. You must not 

consider this evidence for any other purpose. 

As defendant concedes, the Supreme Court has found this 

language passes constitutional muster. In People v. Reliford

(2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007 (Reliford), the court found CALJIC No. 

2.50.01 specifically the 2002 revision given in the present case, 

“provides additional guidance on the permissible use of the 

other-acts evidence and reminds the jury of the standard of 

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proof for a conviction of the charged offenses.” (Reliford, at p. 

1016.) We find no error. 

(Dkt. 28, LD 3 at 20-21 and LD 8 at 135) (emphasis added). 

 The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that the Due Process Clause is violated if the 

trial court fails to properly instruct the jury that the defendant is presumed innocent until 

proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 

(2004). Thus, due process “requires the prosecution to prove every element charged in a 

criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Gibson v. Ortiz, 387 F.3d 812, 820 (9th Cir. 

2004), overruled on other grounds by Byrd v. Lewis, 566 F.3d 855, 866 (9th Cir. 2009), 

(citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). “Any jury instruction that ‘reduce[s] the 

level of proof necessary for the Government to carry its burden . . . is plainly inconsistent 

with the constitutionally rooted presumption of innocence.’” Gibson, 387 F.3d at 820 

(alterations in original) (quoting Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100, 104 (1972)). 

 In Gibson, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the 1996 version of CALJIC 

No. 2.50.01 and CALJIC No. 2.50.14

 were constitutionally flawed because the “interplay of 

the two instructions allowed the jury to find that [the defendant] committed the uncharged 

sexual offense by a preponderance of the evidence and thus to infer that he had committed the 

charged acts based upon facts not found beyond a reasonable doubt, but by a preponderance 

of the evidence.” 387 F.3d at 822. In 1999, CALJIC No. 2.50.01 was amended to clarify how 

jurors should evaluate a defendant’s guilt if they found that he had committed a prior sexual 

 4 The trial court also gave CALJIC No. 2.50.1, which instructed that “the prosecution has the 

burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant committed sexual offenses 

other than those for which he is on trial.” (Dkt. 28, LD 8 at 136.) 

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offense. The revision added the following sentence: “However, if you find by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed prior sexual offenses, that is not 

sufficient by itself to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the charged crimes.” 

CALJIC No. 2.50.01 (7th ed. 1999). This instruction also added that “[t]he weight and 

significance of the evidence, if any, are for you to decide.” Id. This same instruction was 

revised again in 2002. That version deleted the sentence “[t]he weight and significance of the 

evidence, if any, are for you to decide,” and inserted the following statement: “If you 

determine an inference properly can be drawn from this evidence, this inference is simply one 

item for you to consider, along with all other evidence, in determining whether the defendant 

has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged crime.” CALJIC No. 

2.50.01. As discussed above, the California Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 

the 1999 version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01 in Ruliford. 29 Cal.4th 1007, 1016 (2003). It also 

stated that the 2002 version, although not directly before the court, was “an improvement.” 

Id. 

 The trial court in this case charged the jury with the 2002 revision of CALJIC No. 

2.50.01. Challenges to the constitutionality of the 2002 version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01 have 

been rejected by numerous federal courts in unpublished opinions on the basis that “the 2002 

version is materially different, as it includes an explicit admonition that the evidence of a 

prior sexual offense is not, by itself, sufficient to convict the defendant of the charged 

crimes.” Abel v. Sullivan, 326 Fed. Appx. 431, 434 (9th Cir. 2009). See e.g., Soto v. Adams, 

2010 WL 1286877, *11-12 (E.D. Cal. March 29, 2010) (2002 version); Barreto v. Martel, 

2010 WL 546586, *10-12 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2010) (2002 version). In addition, the 

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instruction given in this case cautions the jury that the defendant must be proved guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged offenses. 

 Based on the reasoning of the above-cited opinions, I recommend this Court deny 

petitioner’s claim as he has failed to show how the California state courts’ reliance on 

Reliford in this case was contrary to, or an unreasonable application, of U.S. Supreme Court 

precedent. 

H. Jury Instruction Error - No. 5

 Petitioner claims the trial court failed to instruct the jury on two essential elements of 

the one strike law, thereby denying him due process of law, a fair trial, and the right to a jury 

determination on all issues. (See Dkt. 10 at 6a, “Section #12 Continuation #1.”) Again, 

petitioner presents no legal or factual support for his claim, other than that provided by 

counsel in his state court briefs. (See Dkt. 28, LD 1 at 63-61.) Respondent argues that 

petitioner’s claim was properly rejected by the California state courts. (See Dkt. 26 at 25-26.) 

 The California Court of Appeal summarized this claim and held as follows: 

 

Defendant faults the trial court for failing to instruct on two 

essential elements of the one strike law, denying him his rights 

to due process, a fair trial, and to a jury determination on all 

issues. Defendant contends the jury had to find him ineligible 

for probation under section 1203.066 before the trial court could 

sentence him under section 667.61.[5] Defendant also argues the 

court should have instructed the jury that it had to find separate 

occasions regarding the same victim to support multiple terms 

for defendant’s molestation of D.M. Defendant contends these 

 [5] Section 667.61, subdivision (b) provides as follows: “Except as 

provided in subdivision (a), a person who is convicted of an offense 

specified in subdivision (c) under one of the circumstances specified 

in subdivision (e) shall be punished by imprisonment in the state 

prison for life and shall not be eligible for release on parole for 15 

years except as provided in subdivision (j).” 

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omissions violate his right to a have a jury determine all issues 

under Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [159 L.Ed.2d 

403] (Blakely). 

 

As defendant acknowledges, we previously rejected similar 

arguments in People v. Benitez (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1274, 

1278 (Benitez): “Finding a defendant ineligible for probation is 

not a form of punishment, because probation itself is an act of 

clemency on the part of the trial court. [Citation.] Because a 

defendant’s eligibility for probation results in a reduction rather 

than an increase in the sentence prescribed for his offenses, it is 

not subject to the rule of Blakely. [Citations.] As a result, the 

enhancement of his molestation convictions did not offend his 

constitutional rights.” We decline defendant’s request to 

reconsider Benitez. 

 

Defendant’s claim that the court erred in failing to instruct the 

jury it must find separate occasions of molestation of D.M. to 

support multiple life terms also fails. Counts three through six 

detailed specific, separate incidents of molestations committed 

by defendant against D.M. In instructing the jury, the court 

stated counts three through six were “a further and separate 

cause of action, being a different offense of the same class of 

crimes and offenses connected in its commission” in other 

charges. The jury found defendant guilty of each separate count. 

As a result, the jury found each count a separate cause of action. 

 

 

(Dkt. 28, LD 3 at 21-22.) 

 As discussed above, where a petitioner claims there was an instructional error in a 

collateral proceeding such as this, the only question for this Court is “whether the ailing 

instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due 

process.” Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147. In this case, petitioner’s “burden is especially heavy 

because no erroneous instruction was given . . . . An omission, or an incomplete instruction, is 

less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law.” Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 

145, 154-155 (1977). 

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 Petitioner presents no facts, case law, or legal argument to support his claim. The 

California Court of Appeal, relying upon California Supreme Court case law, found no 

constitutional violation under Blakely because an instruction on the probation-eligibility 

requirement would only have reduced petitioner’s sentence, rather than increased it. In 

addition, petitioner’s claim that the jury was not properly instructed that they must find 

separate occasions of molestation was belied by the California Court of Appeal’s finding that 

the jury was instructed that “counts three through six were ‘a further and separate cause of 

action, being a different offense of the same class of crimes and offenses connected in its 

commission’ in other charges.” (Dkt. 28, LD 3 at 22.) Because the jury found petitioner 

guilty on each separate count, the state court properly determined that the “jury found each 

count a separate cause of action.” (Id.) 

 Moreover, the California state courts’ decisions were neither contrary to or an 

unreasonable determination of clearly established U.S. Supreme Court law, as nothing in the 

record indicates the omission of the above suggested instructions infected the trial in any way. 

I therefore recommend the Court find that petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

I. Cumulative Error 

Petitioner claims the cumulative effect of the alleged trial errors in this case resulted in 

prejudice. (See Dkt. 10 at 6a, “Section #12 Continuation #1.”) Respondent argues that where 

no single constitutional error has occurred, nothing accumulates to the level of a constitutional 

violation. (See Dkt. 26 at 27.) 

While no single trial error may warrant relief, in some cases, the cumulative effect of 

several errors may rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Alcala, 334 F.3d at 893-

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95; Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). Where such trial errors have 

occurred, but petitioner fails to show he suffered prejudice as a result, he must then show that 

the combined effect of those deficiencies resulted in prejudice. See Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 

F.3d 616, 632 (9th Cir. 1997). We find, like the California courts found, that one trial error 

occurred in this case, but that it had no prejudicial effect. There were three other claims that 

potentially presented trial errors (supra pgs. 15, 17, 25, 28), none of which had any prejudicial 

effect. With the overwhelming weight of the evidence against him, petitioner is unable to 

demonstrate that the cumulative effect of these potential errors was prejudicial and, thus, that 

any constitutional violation occurred. I therefore recommend the Court deny this claim.

J. Sentence Violated the Due Process and Double Jeopardy Clauses 

 Petitioner contends “the court err[ed] in applying the multiple victim circumstances 

under the one strike law 5 times in a case involving two victims in violation of penal code 654 

and state and federal constitutional principles of due process and double jeopardy.” (Dkt. 10 

at 6b, “Section #12 Continuation #2.”) Petitioner cites no federal authority or factual support 

for his claim and respondent fails to address the merits of this claim in his answer. (See Dkt. 

26 at 28-29.) 

 In analyzing petitioner’s state and federal claims, the California Court of Appeals 

carefully considered the double jeopardy provision in California Penal Code § 654 and held: 

 

Defendant argues the trial court erred in applying the multiple 

victim circumstance under the one strike law when sentencing 

him pursuant to section 667.61, subdivision (e)(5). Defendant 

asserts the 15-years-to-life terms for counts four, five, and six 

violate section 654. 

 

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Section 667.61, subdivision (b) provides that a defendant 

convicted under section 288, subdivision (a) who committed the 

offense against multiple victims shall be punished by the 

indeterminate term of 15 years to life. (§ 667.61, subds. (c), 

(e)(5).) Section 667.61, subdivision (g) states that the defendant 

shall be sentenced to one life term per victim per occasion no 

matter how many offenses listed in subdivision (c) the 

defendant committed against a particular victim on a particular 

occasion. 

 

Section 654, subdivision (a) provides: “An act or omission that 

is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law 

shall be punished under the provision that provides for the 

longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the 

act or omission be punished under more than one provision. An 

acquittal or conviction and sentence under any one bars a 

prosecution for the same act or omission under any other.” 

 

Defendant contends his sentence under section 667.61 violates 

section 654. However, as one court concluded: “Like other 

habitual offender provisions, section 667.61, subdivision (e)(5) 

“merely specifies the applicable sentence upon the present 

conviction for one with a certain criminal history. It is the 

current offense which calls for the penalty, the magnitude of 

which is attributable to appellant’s status as a repeat offender.” 

[Citations.] That the conviction used to invoke punishment 

under subdivision (e)(5) occurred in the present case rather than 

in a prior proceeding does not warrant a different application of 

section 654.” (People v. DeSimone (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 693, 

700 (DeSimone).) 

 

Defendant disagrees with DeSimone, arguing the multiple 

victim circumstance in the present case “should not be 

considered a recidivist- or status-based penalty provision which 

is not subject to section 654.” Specifically, defendant argues 

the multiple counts involving D.M. offend section 654. 

 

The people point out the counts involving D.M. detail violations 

that occurred at different times and involved different 

molestations. We agree. Courts three, four, five, and six charged 

defendant with separate violations against D.M. that took place 

over five months. 

 

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Section 654 precludes multiple punishments for offenses 

committed as part of an indivisible course of conduct with a 

single intent and objective. When offenses are independent of 

one another, a defendant may be punished separately even 

though the offenses share common acts or were part of an 

otherwise indivisible course of conduct. (People v. Hester

(2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 294; People v. Green (1996) 50 

Cal.App.4th 1076, 1084-1085.) Here, defendant’s offenses 

against D.M. do not form an indivisible course of conduct. 

Defendant molested D.M. on at least four discrete occasions 

over a five-month period. We find no error. 

 

(Dkt. 28, LD 3 at 23-25.) 

 The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person shall 

“be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. 

amend. V. In Benton v. Maryland, such protections were held applicable to the states through 

the Fourteenth Amendment. 395 U.S. 784 (1969). The double jeopardy guarantee protects 

against: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal or conviction; and (2) 

multiple punishments for the same offense. See Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 395-96 

(1995). 

 In this case, as determined by the California Court of Appeal, petitioner received five 

separate terms for five separate offenses. Because he did not receive cumulative punishments 

for any single act, his sentence did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The California 

courts denied petitioner’s federal due process claim on the same grounds as petitioner was 

unable to support his argument that he received multiple punishments for the same act. See 

Watts v. Bonneville, 879 F.2d 685, 687-88 (9th Cir. 1989). Because the California state 

courts’ decisions were not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established 

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U.S. Supreme Court law, I recommend this Court deny habeas corpus relief as to petitioner’s 

double jeopardy and due process claims. 

K. Cruel and Unusual Punishment 

 Petitioner claims “[t]he term of 32 yrs to life imposed upon appellant, an ailing 68 

year-old man, with no criminal record or history of violence constitute[s] cruel and unusual 

punishment under both the California and U.S. Constitutions and should be reversed.” (Dkt. 

10 at 6(b), “Section #12 Continuation #12.”) He elaborates further in his traverse. (See Dkt. 

29 at 11.) Respondent contends the state courts properly “applied the federal standard in 

denying Petitioner’s claim.” (Dkt. 26 at 31-32.) 

 The California Court of Appeal denied petitioner’s federal claim in a clearly reasoned 

decision.6

 Specifically, it held: 

 

A sentence violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 

against cruel and unusual punishment if it is grossly out of 

proportion to the severity of the crime. Under both the 

California and federal Constitutions, the test is whether the 

sentence is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is 

inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental 

notions of human dignity. (People v Alvarado (2001) 87 

Cal.App.4th 178, 199 (Alvarado); Rummel v. Estelle (1980) 445 

U.S. 263, 271-72 [63 L.Ed.2d 382].) 

 

In assessing a cruel and unusual punishment claim, we consider: 

the nature of the offense and the offender, how the punishment 

compares with punishments for more serious crimes in the 

jurisdiction, and how the punishment compares with the 

 6

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habeas petition. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68 (asserting that “it is not the province of a federal 

habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.”). 

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punishment for the same offense in other jurisdictions. (In re 

Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 425-427 (Lynch).) 

 

In considering the nature of the offense and the offender, we 

examine not only the offense as defined by the statutes but also 

the fact of the crime in question. We review motive, manner of 

commission, the extent of defendant’s involvement, and the 

consequences of the defendant’s acts. We also take into account 

the defendant’s culpability in light of age, prior criminality, 

personal characteristics, and state of mind. (People v. Crooks

(1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 797, 806.) 

 

Defendant stresses his age and lack of a prior criminal record as 

support for his claim. Defendant claims his sentence is the 

equivalent of life without the possibility of parole, keeping him 

in prison “long past the age appellant would be likely to repeat 

anything like the charged offenses.” 

 

Defendant’s claim pales in the face of the other factors we must 

consider. A jury convicted defendant of sexually molesting 

three young children. Defendant engaged in substantial sexual 

conduct, including committing oral copulation on D.M. 

Defendant took advantage of his position of trust as their 

grandfather, and their proximity within his home, to abuse his 

grandchildren. 

 

The acts were not isolated incidents. Defendant molested D. 

both in Indiana and California. He molested D.M. over a span 

of five months. Defendant molested S. twice. In each case, 

defendant isolated the child, using his position as grandfather to 

gain access and control over his victim. This ongoing pattern of 

predatory behavior toward vulnerable family members justifies 

the harshness of defendant’s sentence. 

 

Defendant also argues his sentence is cruel and unusual in 

relation to terms imposed for similar offenses. However, while 

California has taken an aggressive approach reflecting a zero 

tolerance toward the commission of sexual offenses against 

particularly vulnerable victims, this alone does not render a 

defendant’s sentence excessive as a matter of law. (Alvarado, 

supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at pp. 200-201.) As the People point out, 

although defendant notes more heinous crimes punished less 

severely, the converse is also true. Although voluntary 

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manslaughter merits a lesser sentence, some nonviolent crimes 

result in sentences of 25 years to life. 

 

* * * 

 

After weighing the factors enunciated in Lynch, we find 

defendant’s sentence does not run afoul of the constitutional 

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 

 

 

(Dkt. 28, LD 3 at 25-27.) 

 

 The Eighth Amendment provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be 

inflicted. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. A sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment if it 

is “grossly disproportionate” to the crimes committed. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 

(2003) (holding that a California state court’s affirmance of two consecutive twenty-fiveyears-to-life sentences for petty theft was not grossly disproportionate and not contrary to nor 

an unreasonable application of federal law). See also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) 

(holding that a sentence of twenty-five-years-to-life for theft under California’s three strikes 

law was not cruel and unusual punishment); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961 (1991) 

(mandatory sentence of life without possibility of parole for first offense of possession of 672 

grams of cocaine did not raise inference of gross disproportionality). 

 When reviewing an Eighth Amendment claim in a federal habeas corpus petition, the 

gross disproportionality principle is “the only relevant clearly established law amenable to the 

‘contrary to’ or ‘unreasonable application of’ framework” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73. The “gross disproportionality rule” applies “only in the ‘exceedingly 

rare’ and ‘extreme’ case.” Id. 

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 Petitioner offers no cases that stand for the proposition that a thirty-two-years-to-life 

sentence for multiple counts of child molestation with multiple victims over an extended 

period of time is a grossly disproportionate sentence. The California state courts considered 

the gravity of his offenses and found no “gross disproportionality” between the crimes and the 

sentence. (See Dkt. 28, LD 3 at 27.) See People v. Bestelmeyer, 166 Cal.App.3d 520, 529 

(1985) (imposition of sentence of 129 years upon conviction of multiple sex offenses not 

cruel or unusual punishment). “In light of the broad deference owed to the California 

legislature and the lack of any further evidence provided by [petitioner], this Court cannot 

make the threshold determination that [petitioner’s] sentence, compared to the crimes that he 

committed, leads to an inference of gross proportionality.” Roos v. Runnels, 2001 WL 

1563704, *9 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (unpublished). This is not the “extremely rare” case that 

warrants habeas relief. Because the California state courts’ rejection of petitioner’s Eighth 

Amendment claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of clearly 

established U.S. Supreme Court law, I recommend this Court deny petitioner’s Eighth 

Amendment claim. 

VII. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners have recently been 

amended to require a district court that denies a habeas petition to grant or deny a certificate 

of appealability in the ruling. See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 (effective December 1, 2009). 

A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief under § 2254 may appeal a district court’s 

dismissal of his federal habeas petition only after obtaining a certificate of appealability from 

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a district or circuit judge. A judge shall grant a certificate of appealability only where a 

petitioner has made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” See 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3). The certificate must indicate which issues satisfy this standard. See id. 

§ 2253(c)(3). “Where a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the 

showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: the petitioner must demonstrate that 

reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims 

debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 474 (2000). 

For the reasons set out in the discussion of the merits, above, jurists of reason would 

not find the result debatable. Accordingly, I recommend that the Court decline to issue a 

certificate of appealability. Petitioner is advised that he may not appeal the denial of a 

certificate of appealability in this Court. Rather, he may seek a certificate from the court of 

appeals under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

VIII. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, the California Court of Appeal’s decision denying 

petitioner’s claims was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

federal law, or based on an unreasonable determination of facts. I therefore recommend the 

Court find that petitioner’s constitutional rights were not violated and that petitioner’s 

amended habeas petition (Dkt. 10) be DENIED and this action DISMISSED with prejudice. 

Furthermore, I recommend the Court decline to issue a certificate of appealability. 

 This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) 

days after being served with this Report and Recommendation, any party may file written 

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JOHN L. WEINBERG 

United States Magistrate Judge 

objections with this Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.” Any response to 

the objections shall be filed and served within fourteen (14) days after service of the 

objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time 

might waive the right to appeal this Court’s Order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th 

Cir. 1991). A proposed order accompanies this Report and Recommendation. 

DATED this 10th day of May, 2010. 

A 

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