Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01339/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01339-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

BRENT LEE HARDING, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

NATHAN WISE et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:15-cv-1339 AC (TEMP) P 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff is a county jail inmate proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 and has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1). 

 Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a). Accordingly, the court will grant plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. 

 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 

the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 

forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments 

of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s trust account. These 

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payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the 

amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(b)(2). 

SCREENING REQUIREMENT 

 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims 

that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2). 

 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 

 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more 

than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual 

allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 

U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the 

allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 

738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all 

doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

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 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows: 

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes 

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See 

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the 

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or 

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

 Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of 

their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant 

holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional 

violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); 

Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 

concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See 

Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT1

 Plaintiff has identified Detective Nathan Wise and several Sacramento County Sheriff’s 

Deputies as the defendants in this action. Plaintiff alleges that he was at the Holiday Inn in 

Rancho Cordova when the defendants checked the guest registry for his name and proceeded to 

his hotel room. According to plaintiff, the defendants arrested him and illegally searched the 

premises. They also seized his companion’s phone, three computers, and his wallet. In terms of 

relief, plaintiff requests monetary damages and return of all of his property. (Am. Compl. at 1-3.) 

 

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 Before the court had an opportunity to screen plaintiff’s original complaint, he filed a first 

amended complaint. The court will proceed on plaintiff’s first amended complaint as the 

operative pleading in this action. 

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DISCUSSION 

The allegations in plaintiff’s amended complaint are so vague and conclusory that the 

court is unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for 

relief. The complaint does not contain a short and plain statement as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair 

notice to the defendants and must allege facts that support the elements of the claim plainly and 

succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff 

must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that 

support his claims. Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 8(a)(2), the complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file a 

second amended complaint. 

If plaintiff chooses to file a second amended complaint, he must allege facts 

demonstrating how the conditions complained of resulted in a deprivation of his federal 

constitutional or statutory rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The second 

amended complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant was involved in the 

deprivation of plaintiff’s rights. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is 

some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. 

Rizzo, 423 U.S. 362; May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson, 588 F.2d at 

743. Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not 

sufficient. Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268. 

In any second amended complaint plaintiff elects to file, he will need to clarify whether 

the alleged illegal search and seizure he complains of resulted in a conviction or sentence. It is 

well established that a “§ 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation) - no matter the relief 

sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct 

leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings) - if success in that action would necessarily 

demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-

82 (2005) (emphasis in original); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (finding a § 

1983 action for damages that was based on “actions whose unlawfulness would render a 

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conviction or sentence invalid” when the conviction or sentence has not yet been reversed, 

expunged, or otherwise invalidated to be barred). See also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 

(1997) (dismissing a § 1983 action for declaratory relief and monetary damages because a 

successful challenge to procedures used in disciplinary hearing would necessarily imply the 

invalidity of the punishment imposed). 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has made clear that this bar applies to claims brought 

under the Fourth Amendment. See Szajer v. City of Los Angeles, 632 F.3d 607, 611-12 (9th Cir. 

2011) (Heck applies to Fourth Amendment claims) (citing Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 

583-84 (9th Cir. 2007) (section 1983 challenge to “search and seizure of the evidence upon which 

[defendants’] criminal charges and convictions were based barred by Heck); Harvey v. Waldron, 

210 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2000) (“a § 1983 action alleging illegal search and seizure of 

evidence upon which criminal charges are based does not accrue until the criminal charges have 

been dismissed or the conviction has been overturned. Such a holding will avoid the potential for 

inconsistent determinations on the legality of a search and seizure in the civil and criminal 

cases....”), overruled in part on other grounds by Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393-94 (2007). 

See also Backus v. Gissel, 491 F. App’x 838, 839 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Szajer for the 

proposition “a claim alleging an illegal search and seizure of evidence that was used to secure a 

conviction necessarily implies the invalidity of that conviction”); Kassab v. San Diego Police 

Dept., 441 F. App’x 476, 477 (9th Cir. 2011) (same). In this case, plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment 

claims appear to be barred, but in an abundance of caution, the court will grant plaintiff leave to 

amend in the event that he can assert a cognizable claim against defendants. 

Plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make his 

second amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be 

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an 

amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th 

Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files a second amended complaint, the prior pleading no longer serves 

any function in the case. Therefore, in a second amended complaint, as in an original complaint, 

each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

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CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted. 

 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. The fee 

shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the Sheriff of Sacramento 

County filed concurrently herewith. 

 3. Plaintiff’s amended complaint is dismissed. 

 4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a second 

amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the second amended complaint must bear the 

docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Second Amended Complaint”; failure 

to file a second amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in dismissal of this 

action without prejudice. 

 5. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff the court’s form for filing a civil 

rights action. 

DATED: May 5, 2016 

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