Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00598/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00598-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ROBIN H. CANFIELD, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CA 06-0598-C

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, :

Commissioner of Social Security, 

:

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking

judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

denying her claim for disability insurance benefits. The parties have consented

to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(c), for all proceedings in this Court. (Doc. 21 (“In accordance with the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. 636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73, the parties in this case

consent to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct any and all

proceedings in this case . . . and order the entry of a final judgment, and

conduct all post-judgment proceedings.”); see also Doc. 22 (order of

reference)) Upon consideration of the administrative record, plaintiff's

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1 Any appeal taken from this memorandum opinion and order and judgment shall

be made to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. (See Doc. 21 (“An appeal from a judgment

entered by a Magistrate Judge shall be taken directly to the United States Court of Appeals for

this judicial circuit in the same manner as an appeal from any other judgment of this district

court.”))

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proposed report and recommendation, the Commissioner's proposed report and

recommendation, and the parties' arguments at the June 6, 2007 hearing before

the Court, it is determined that the Commissioner's decision denying benefits

should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with

this decision.1

Plaintiff alleges disability due to lumbar failed back surgery syndrome,

lumbar degenerative disc disease with osteoarthritis and mild multi-level disc

bulging, annular fissure at L5-S1, lumbar spondylolysis, facet joint syndrome,

sacroilitis, and recurrent right radiculitis. The Administrative Law Judge

(ALJ) made the following relevant findings:

3. The claimant is obese, and has degenerative disc disease

and depression, all of which are “severe” impairments.

4. The claimant’s impairments, when considered

individually and in combination, do not meet or medically equal

one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P,

Appendix 1.

5. The claimant’s assertions relative to symptomatology,

functional limitations and restrictions of activities of daily living

have been considered in light of the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R.

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§ 404.1529 and Social Security Ruling 96-7p, and are found to

lack corroboration and substantiation in the medical evidence,

and are not credible as to a disabling impairment.

6. The claimant possesses the residual functional capacity

to perform light, unskilled work activity on a regular and

sustained basis (20 C.F.R. § 404.1567). Specifically, the

claimant can: occasionally lift and/or carry 20 pounds;

frequently lift and/or carry up to 10 pounds; sit (with normal

breaks) at least six hours in an eight-hour workday; stand and/or

walk (with normal breaks) at least six hours in an eight-hour

workday; push and/or pull with the upper and lower extremities

at will; occasionally stoop and climb ramps/stairs; and

frequently balance, kneel, crouch and crawl. The claimant

cannot climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, but she has no

manipulative, visual or communicative limitations. The only

environmental restriction the claimant has is her inability to be

exposed to workplace hazards (e.g., machinery, heights, etc.).

The claimant can remember, understand and carry out very short

and simple instructions, and she can concentrate for two-hour

intervals. The claimant is not significantly limited in her ability

to respond appropriately to supervisors and co-workers in a

work setting, and she can respond appropriately to routine

changes in the work environment. In addition, the

Administrative Law Judge finds that the claimant possesses a

“mild” limitation in her ability to perform daily activities and

maintain social functioning, a “moderate” restriction in her

capacity to maintain attention, concentration or pace, and would

have no episodes of extended decompensation during her

attempts at performing work and work-like activities.

7. The claimant is unable to perform her past relevant work

(20 C.F.R. § 404.1565).

8. The claimant is a “younger person,” with more than a

“high school education” (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563 and 404.1564).

9. The claimant’s knowledge of medical procedures and

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general medical terminology are skills that are transferable to

work at the light and sedentary exertional levels (20 C.F.R. §

404.1568).

10. Based on the testimony of the vocational expert, and

using Medical-Vocational Rules 202.21 and 202.22 as a

framework for decision-making, there are a significant number

of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform.

11. The hypotheticals posed to the vocational expert by the

claimant’s representative were not credible because they were

based on opinions and/or arguments that are unsupported by the

totality of the objective clinical findings of record. As such, the

vocational expert’s responses to these hypothetical questions are

invalid. 

12. The claimant was not under a “disability,” as defined in

the Social Security Act, at any time through the date of this

decision (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)).

(Tr. 37-38) The Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ's decision (Tr. 6-8) and

thus, the hearing decision became the final decision of the Commissioner of

Social Security.

DISCUSSION

In all Social Security cases, the claimant bears the burden of proving

that she is unable to perform her previous work. Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d

1001 (11th Cir. 1986). In evaluating whether the claimant has met this burden,

the examiner must consider the following four factors: (1) objective medical

facts and clinical findings; (2) diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence

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of pain; and (4) the claimant's age, education and work history. Id. at 1005.

Once the claimant meets this burden, as here, it becomes the Commissioner's

burden to prove that the claimant is capable, given her age, education and work

history, of engaging in another kind of substantial gainful employment which

exists in the national economy. Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th

Cir. 1985).

The task for the Magistrate Judge is to determine whether the

Commissioner's decision to deny claimant benefits, on the basis that she can

perform those light jobs identified by the vocational expert and is not disabled

under the framework of the grids, is supported by substantial evidence.

Substantial evidence is defined as more than a scintilla and means such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d

842 (1971). "In determining whether substantial evidence exists, we must

view the record as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as

unfavorable to the [Commissioner's] decision." Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d

129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).

In this case, the plaintiff contends that the ALJ made the following

errors: (1) he improperly discounted the evidence from Dr. Patrick Couch; and

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2 The opinion of a non-examining, reviewing physician “is entitled to little weight

and taken alone does not constitute substantial evidence to support an administrative decision.”

Swindle v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 222, 226 n.3 (11th Cir. 1990). 

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(2) he improperly determined her residual functional capacity.

It is clear in this circuit that the Commissioner of Social Security must

develop "a full and fair record regarding the vocational opportunities available

to a claimant." Allen v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1200, 1201 (11th Cir. 1989)

(citation omitted). The Commissioner must articulate specific jobs that the

claimant can perform given her age, education and work history, if any, "and

this finding must be supported by substantial evidence, not mere intuition or

conjecture." See id. (citation omitted) Stated differently, the burden is on the

Commissioner at the fifth step of the sequential evaluation process to establish

capacity to perform other work and thereby to establish the claimant’s residual

functional capacity. See Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995).

This Court has held on numerous occasions that the Commissioner’s

fifth-step burden cannot be met by a lack of evidence or, where available, by

the residual functional capacity assessment of a non-examining, reviewing

physician;2

 instead, this fifth-step burden must be supported by the residual

functional capacity (and pain) assessment of a treating or examining physician.

Such an assessment particularly is warranted where, as here, the ALJ has

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3 “I had made the assessment that any employment position which requires

repetitive stooping[,] crawling[,] climbing and reaching would eventually result in a major

relapse in her back pain.” (Tr. 570)

4 A comparison of the findings on these forms to the ALJ’s RFC determination

leaves no doubt that the ALJ’s RFC determination was grounded solely upon same as the ALJ’s

determination tracks the findings on these forms. (Compare id. with Tr. 37, Finding No. 6)

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rejected the only pain assessment in the record. The ALJ specifically rejected

the pain assessment form completed by plaintiff’s treating pain-management

physician, Dr. Couch, as well as the RFC limitations found by Couch3

 (Tr. 35),

same establishing Canfield’s inability to perform any work (see Tr. 636-637

(vocational expert’s testimony that based upon Dr. Couch’s assessment,

plaintiff would be incapable of performing any work)). Having rejected Dr.

Couch’s RFC and pain assessments, the ALJ turned to and relied solely upon

the physical and mental assessments completed by Dr. Van B. Hayne, Jr., on

October 9, 2003 (Tr. 380-405),4

 to establish that plaintiff can perform the

physical and mental requirements of light work. As previously indicated, the

ALJ’s sole reliance upon the assessments of a non-examining, reviewing

physician was error and need be corrected on remand. 

In addition, on remand the ALJ need recognize that “at bottom” this is

a pain case and should take particular note of same when questioning the

vocational expert (“VE”). Even assuming the correctness of the ALJ’s

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5 That plaintiff’s pain is a significant problem is established by evidence of the

numerous steroid blocks she has received (see, e.g., Tr. 284, 298-299, 302, 310, 313, 315, 559 &

572-573) and the discussions about insertion of a permanent pain pump (see Tr. 595-596 & 601-

610).

6 The ALJ not only failed to pose questions to the VE in this instance quantifying

plaintiff’s pain but, as well, failed to incorporate into his hypothetical question the mental

limitations established by the evidence. (See Tr. 635) This failure constitutes reversible error.

See Pendley v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 1561, 1562 (11th Cir. 1985) (“‘[U]nless there [is] vocational

expert testimony concerning the availability of jobs for a person with the claimant’s educational

level, work skills and experience and physical [and mental] limitations, the decision of the ALJ,

based significantly on the expert testimony, would be unsupported by substantial evidence.’”).

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determination that plaintiff’s pain is not disabling in and of itself, the evidence

of record overwhelmingly establishes that Canfield’s primary limiting

impairment is her chronic back pain (see, e.g., Tr. 267-379 & 416-616).5

Accordingly, it is incumbent upon the ALJ to quantify such pain, based upon

the evidence of record, and pose questions to a VE about the impact of such

impairment and the limitations attributable to that impairment, Foote, supra,

67 F.3d at 1559 (“Pain is a nonexertional impairment.”); see Phillips v.

Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1242 n.11 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Nonexertional

limitations or restrictions affect an individual’s ability to meet the other

demands of jobs and include mental limitations, pain limitations, and all other

physical limitations that are not included in the seven strength demands.”)

upon plaintiff’s ability to perform the physical and mental requirements of

other work in the national economy.6

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CONCLUSION

The Court ORDERS that the decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security denying plaintiff benefits be reversed and remanded pursuant to

sentence four of § 405(g), see Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 111 S.Ct.

2157, 115 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991), for further proceedings not inconsistent with this

decision. The remand pursuant to sentence four of § 405(g) makes the plaintiff

a prevailing party for purposes of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2412, Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 113 S.Ct. 2625, 125 L.Ed.2d 239

(1993), and terminates this Court’s jurisdiction over this matter.

DONE this the 19th day of June, 2007.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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