Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06388/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06388-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

CLERK 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE 

DENVER, COLORADO 802D4 

March 15, 1991 

To: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

Re: 89-6388, McEwen v. City of Norman 

(Lower docket: CIV-88-1383-T,) 

(303) 844-3157 

FTS 584-3157 

The Court has made the following correction in its opinion which 

was filed March 1, 1991, by Judge James E. Barrett. 

The correction occurs on page 21, the fifth sentence of the 

second full paragraph which should read: 

"Here, the probative value of the blood alcohol content 

certainly outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice in the 

context of this case. " 

RLH:lb 

Enclosure 

Sincerely, 

Appellate Case: 89-6388 Document: 01019301411 Date Filed: 03/01/1991 Page: 1 
discovery deposition of Officer Post before trial knowing that he 

was defendant City of Norman's chief investigator and accident 

reconstruction expert. Plaintiff failed during the deposition to 

ask Post any questions on whether alcohol was a factor in the 

collision. Further, it was plaintiff who called Officer Post as a 

witness at trial. As heretofore noted, the pre-trial order simply 

listed Officer Post, under summary of testimony, as "deposed." 

Thus, we reject, just as did the trial court, plaintiff's 

objection on the basis of surprise. Furthermore, we agree with 

the trial court's determination that the evidence of Lawrence 

McEwen's blood alcohol content of .11 on the night of the 

collision was relevant and that its probative value outweighed any 

unfair prejudice under Rule 403, Fed. R. Evid., 28 u.s.c.A. 

Officer Post testified to the effect of alcohol impairment on 

a driver in relation to judgment, control and balance and slowed 

reaction time. Id. at 276-78. This evidence did not tend to 

confuse or mislead the jury; rather, it 

determining the cause of the collision. 

assisted the jury in 

It was both relevant and 

material to the defense. 

discretion in admitting 

The district court did not 

Officer Post's challenged 

abuse its 

testimony. 

Marshall v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. supra; Fox v. Mazda Corp., 

supra. Here, the probative value of the blood alcohol content 

certainly outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice in the context 

of this case. The "unfair prejudice" stated in Rule 403 cannot be 

equated with testimony which is simply unfavorable to a party. It 

must be unfair in the sense that it would be misleading 

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·' 

PQBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OP APPEALS 

TEB'rll CIRCUIT 

KENNETH FRANKLIN McEWEN, as Representative 

of the Estate of Lawrence Robert McEwen, 

Deceased, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

THE CITY OF NORMAN, OKLAHOMA, and JIM PARKS, ) 

Individually and in his Official Capacity ) 

as a Police Officer of the City of Norman, ) 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) 

FILiP 

United sr,~ C,qyn qf Appeals Tent.~ C:irruir 

MAR .. i f901 

ROBERT t. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-6388 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CIV-88-1383-T) 

Mark Hammons of Hammons, Taylor & Moore, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 

attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Chris J. Collins (Burton J. Johnson with him on the brief) of 

Looney, Nichols, Johnson & Hayes, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and 

Robert E. Manchester (Haven Tobias with him on the brief) of 

Manchester, Hiltgen & Healy, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, attorneys 

for Defendant-Appellees. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, BARRETT and 'l'ACIIA, Circuit Judges. 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 89-6388 Document: 01019301411 Date Filed: 03/01/1991 Page: 3 
Plaintiff below, Kenneth Franklin McEwen, as representative 

of the Estate of Lawrence Robert McEwen, deceased, appeals from 

the district court's judgment on jury verdict in this civil rights 

damage action in favor of defendants, the City of Norman, 

Oklahoma, and Jim Parks, individually and in his capacity as a 

police officer of the City of Norman. 

Plaintiff's claim was based on alleged Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendment violations. Plaintiff alleged that: defendant Officer 

Parks employed the deliberate use of a deadly force in the 

apprehension of a misdemeanant; defendant City of Norman failed 

to supervise and discipline Officer Parks; and the City concealed 

and ratified Officer Parks' actions. The plaintiff's complaint 

was anchored to 42 u.s.c. § 1983 and sought substantial damage 

awards, including damages under a pendent state claim. (R., Vol. 

I, Tab 1). 

At the conclusion of the evidence, and upon motions for 

directed verdicts, the court denied defendant Parks' motion on 

both the issue of his liability involving the collision of his 

police patrol vehicle with Lawrence McEwen's motorcycle and his 

alleged use of excessive force in arresting McEwen following the 

collision. The trial court did grant the City of Norman's motion 

for directed verdict on the alleged use of excessive force charge, 

but denied its motion relative to the "roadblock" and "ramming" 

issue involved in the collision. 

Facts 

At about 1:58 a.m. on August 28, 1986, Officer Mike Freeman 

who was employed by the City of Norman, Oklahoma, observed a 

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motorcycle driven by decedent Lawrence Robert McEwen with his 

brother, Kenneth McEwen, II, riding as a passenger speeding 

northbound on Porter Avenue in Norman, Oklahoma. Freeman 

attempted to intercept and stop the motorcycle by turning on his 

patrol vehicle's red light. Instead of stopping, the motorcycle 

picked up speed. As Officer Freeman continued his pursuit of the 

motorcycle, he radioed the police dispatcher and informed his 

supervisor of the ongoing pursuit. 

The motorcycle proceeded northbound on Porter Avenue before 

turning onto Crystal Bend Street. Eventually the motorcycle headed 

westbound on Dale Street at a high rate of speed with Officer 

Freeman still in pursuit. Defendant Officer Parks of the Oklahoma 

City Police force, then in his patrol vehicle, had heard the radio 

dispatch concerning the motorcycle pursuit. He contacted the 

police dispatcher and notified him that he would proceed to assist 

Officer Freeman. Parks 

turned eastbound on 

proceeded 

Dale in the 

southbound on Stubbeman and 

hope that his presence would 

encourage the operator of the motorcycle to stop. Such was not to 

be. The motorcycle drove past Officer Parks' vehicle in an 

attempt to turn northbound on Stubbeman. Lawrence McEwen lost 

control of the motorcycle and Kenneth McEwen, II, was ejected in 

the process. At the same time, Officer Parks had backed his 

vehicle onto Stubbeman so that his vehicle was positioned 

northbound. Plaintiff contends that Officer Parks positioned 

his patrol vehicle so as to blockade the street, thus using deadly 

force in the apprehension of Lawrence McEwen. Defendants 

specifically deny that Officer Parks intended to create a 

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Appellate Case: 89-6388 Document: 01019301411 Date Filed: 03/01/1991 Page: 5 
roadblock, but, and rather, that he had moved his vehicle only 

with intent to pursue the motorcycle. In any event, Lawrence 

McEwen righted the motorcycle and drove it southbound on Stubbeman 

toward Officer Parks' patrol vehicle, where it collided on the 

driver's side in the area of the front tire. 

As a result of the impact Lawrence McEwen was thrown from the 

motorcycle. He was thereafter arrested by Officer Parks. 

Plaintiff contends that, as the injured McEwen lay on the ground, 

Officer Parks pushed him down by placing a foot on his back, 

flipped McEwen back and forth from his stomach to his side or 

chest, and threatened to put him "out of his misery" with a drawn 

gun even though Lawrence McEwen offered no resistance. Defendants 

counter that, as Officer Parks approached Lawrence McEwen lying 

face down in a ditch, McEwen got up on his hands and knees and 

Officer Parks directed McEwen to "freeze" because he wanted 

McEwen's hands out in front of him: Officer Parks had not drawn 

his gun: Officer Parks proceeded to handcuff Lawrence McEwen and 

raise him to his feet as McEwen was resisting him: when McEwen 

remarked that he was "hurting inside, real bad," Officer Parks 

asked Officer Freeman to call for an ambulance which arrived 

within a few minutes: and Officer Parks did not flip McEwen's body 

back and forth. Lawrence McEwen later died at the hospital. 

Following a nine-day trial, the jury returned a verdict 

finding that (a) plaintiff had failed to prove the essential 

elements of his 42 u.s.c. § 1983 civil rights claim of 

unreasonable seizure with a police vehicle against defendant 

Officer Jim Parks, and (b) plaintiff failed to prove the essential 

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Appellate Case: 89-6388 Document: 01019301411 Date Filed: 03/01/1991 Page: 6 
elements of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights claim against the 

defendant City of Norman based on the unreasonable seizure with a 

police vehicle. Judgment was entered thereon. 

Plaintiff filed a "Motion for Relief from Judgment" based 

solely on alleged "surprise and misconduct" because witnesses 

Officer Post, Donald Boyd and defendant Parks offered materially 

different testimony at trial than that given by deposition and no 

supplementation had been filed notifying plaintiff that they had 

changed their positions. (R., Vol. I., Tab 169). The trial court 

treated the aforesaid motion as a Rule 60(b)(3), Fed. R. Civ. P. 

motion and denied it by a detailed Order. Id. at Tab 180. 

Appellate Contentions - Discussion 

On appeal, plaintiff contends that: (1) the expert testimony 

of Samuel Chapman was inadmissible and highly prejudicial, (2) the 

court permitted improper impeachment of witness Jamie Hall, (3) 

the admission of Lawrence McEwen's blood alcohol content was 

improper, (4) the trial court improperly and prejudicially allowed 

counsel for both defendants to examine witnesses and argue to the 

jury, (5) the court's jury instructions were erroneous and 

prejudicial, (6) the trial court improperly allowed dramatizations 

of defendants' evidence, and (7) the accumulations of errors 

requires reversal. 

I. 

Plaintiff contends that the 

Samuel G. Chapman on questions 

inadmissible and highly prejudicial. 

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expert testimony of Professor 

of law and credibility was 

Appellate Case: 89-6388 Document: 01019301411 Date Filed: 03/01/1991 Page: 7 
Samuel Chapman, a professor of political science and the 

director of the Law Enforcement Administration degree program at 

the University of Oklahoma, was called by the defendants to give 

expert testimony relative to "[c)ompliance or noncompliance with 

police policy and police procedure" applicable in this case. (R., 

Vol. X, pp. 1505-10). Chapman had obtained a Masters Degree in 

criminology and had taught at the University of Oklahoma for 

twenty-two years. In his opening testimony, Chapman related that 

he had studied photographs, read depositions, visited the scene, 

interviewed some persons and had been present throughout the 

entire trial in preparation for his opinion testimony in four 

areas: (1) the propriety of the police pursuit of the motorcycle, 

(2) the review procedures of the Chief and the Board, (3) the 

roadblocks, and (4) the method of arrest and the handling of the 

incident after the accident. Id. at 1511. 

Plaintiff had deposed Chapman and had filed a Motion in 

Limine with supporting brief seeking to exclude his testimony. 

Neither the motion (Docket Sheet No. 75) nor the brief (Docket 

Sheet No. 76) has been certified by plaintiff-appellant as part of 

the record on appeal. The trial court reserved ruling and, during 

trial, read the deposition of Chapman. (R., Vol. VIII, pp. 1311-

12). Later, the court ruled, out of the presence of the jury, 

that Chapman would be permitted to testify. (R., Vol. IX, pp. 

1453-54). The court further stated that, as a matter of courtesy, 

the plaintiff was to have any other opportunity he wished to make 

a record on that ruling. Id. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6388 Document: 01019301411 Date Filed: 03/01/1991 Page: 8 
Chapman was then qualified as an expert witness, without 

objection. Indeed, counsel for plaintiff objected only once and 

only in part to Chapman's testimony. In that objection, counsel 

asserted that testimony regarding the propriety of the police 

pursuit was irrelevant because plaintiff had not challenged this 

and did not seek damages based thereon. (R., Vol. X, p. 1512). 

The objection was overruled and the court observed that plaintiff 

had presented some "[v]ery pointed testimony that went to the 

pursuit." Id. 

At the conclusion of Chapman's testimony the trial court 

instructed the jury that, while other experts had testified on 

velocities and measurements and rendered opinions thereon, Chapman 

had testified "[t]o things other than scientific facts and 

opinions based on them." Id. at 1536. Pointedly, the court noted 

that Chapman had been permitted "[t]o include, without objection, 

some matters of a character that are within your common knowledge 

because they were entwined and involved with the basis for his 

expert opinion on matters which may not be among your common 

knowledge." Id. at 1537 (emphasis supplied). The court concluded 

its instruction as follows: 

And the reason I'm emphasizing this is that you 

understand, in this expert witness's testimony as well 

as with the other expert witnesses, you are not to 

surrender your own views as to what the facts are, 

because you are the final judges of the facts. You can 

simply take all of this testimony and give it just such 

weight and value as it's entitled to receive. 

I do not, for a minute, wish to cast any kind of 

opinion on any of the expert's opinions here, but they 

did come to you in different forms, the last one 

involving things that are within your common knowledge 

and decision-making process without the helping of 

experts, but I permitted this expert witness to talk 

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Id. 

about things as it might bear on the issue of 

reasonableness or unreasonableness in the case, or the 

issues of excessive force, and the issues of policy or 

custom, as will be later fully explained to you in my 

instructions. 

instance and in no event are you to 

complete independence in finding the 

believe they exist from the evidence, and 

applies to all of the expert witnesses in 

But in no 

surrender your 

facts as you 

that statement 

the trial. 

Plaintiff urges us to adopt the rule followed in Palmerin v. 

City of Riverside, 794 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1986), where the court 

held that where the substance of an objection has been thoroughly 

explained during the hearing on the Motion in Limine, and the 

trial court's ruling thereon was explicit and definitive, no 

further action is required to preserve the issue of admissibility 

of that evidence for appeal. See also American Home Assur. Co. v. 

Sunshine Supermarket, Inc., 753 F.2d 321 (3d Cir. 1985) (when 

trial court conducted a hearing on a Motion in Limine on the 

admissibility of evidence and rendered a definitive ruling 

thereon, making it clear that the ruling would not be 

reconsidered, no contemporaneous objection to the evidence at 

trial was required to preserve the issue under Rule 103(a) of the 

Federal Rules of Evidence); Robinson v. Shapiro, 646 F.2d 734 (2d 

Cir. 1981); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), 

cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981). The difficulty with 

plaintiff's position is that even if we were inclined to follow 

the rule in these cases, we would be lacking the "substance" of 

plaintiff's objection because plaintiff did not make his Motion in 

-8-

Appellate Case: 89-6388 Document: 01019301411 Date Filed: 03/01/1991 Page: 10 
L~ine or Brief (Docket Sheet Nos. 75 and 76) part of the record 

on appeal. Thus, we have nothing to review. 

In any case, we decline to follow the Palmerin rule. In SilFlo, Inc. v. SFHC, Inc., 917 F.2d 1507, 1512-13 (lOth Cir. 1990), 

this court held that an objection made to a jury instruction at 

conference did not satisfy the requirement of Rule 51, Fed. R. 

Civ. P., i.e., that a party must object to an instruction before 

the jury retires to consider its verdict. We held that: 

At a minimum, counsel must note for the record at the 

close of the charge that his previous objections stand, 

although we have been critical of this practice as well. 

See, ~' Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing 

Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1984) 1514-15 (lOth Cir.), aff'd, 

472 U.S. 585, 105 S. Ct. 2844, 86 L. Ed.2d 467 (1985). 

Sil-flo is consistent with Northwestern Flyers, Inc. v. Olson 

Bros. Mfg, Co., 679 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir. 1982), Collins v. Wayne 

Corp., 621 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1980) and Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 

527 (5th Cir. 1980), which hold that where a party objected to the 

admissibility of evidence in a Motion in Limine but did not 

interpose an objection at trial, the issue was not preserved for 

appeal. Thus we hold that, because plaintiff did not object to 

Professor Chapman's testimony at trial, the issue was not 

preserved for appeal. A party whose motion in limine has been 

overruled must nevertheless object when the error he sought to 

prevent by his motion occurs at trial. Only by specific, t~ely 

trial objection can the trial court entertain reconsideration of 

the grounds of the motion in light of the actual trial testimony 

and the surrounding circumstances developed at trial. 

In recognition of the broad discretion vested in the trial 

court, evidentiary rulings made over contemporaneous objection 

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Appellate Case: 89-6388 Document: 01019301411 Date Filed: 03/01/1991 Page: 11 
will be upheld on appeal unless they constitute an abuse of 

discretion. Fox v. Mazda Corp. of America, 868 F.2d 1190 (lOth 

Cir. 1989); Firestone Fire & Rubber Co. v. Pearson, 769 F.2d 1471 

(lOth Cir. 1985). Here, plaintiff's only contemporaneous 

objection to Chapman's testimony related to the propriety of the 

pursuit. We hold that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in admitting this testimony, given the fact that 

plaintiff introduced testimony on this subject prior to Chapman's 

testimony. 

As to the rest of plaintiff's allegations of error on appeal 

with regard to Chapman's testimony, we must now determine, absent 

a contemporaneous objection, whether the admission of Chapman's 

testimony constituted "plain error." 

Rule 103(a)(l)(d), Fed. R. Evid., 28 U.S.C.A. provides: 

(a) Effect 

predicated upon 

evidence unless 

affected, and 

of erroneous ruling. Error may not be 

a ruling which admits or excludes 

a substantial right of the party is 

(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one 

admitting evidence a timely objection or motion to 

strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of 

objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from 

the context; or 

* * * 

(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes 

taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial 

rights although they were not brought to the attention 

of the court. 

The "plain error" exception in civil cases has been limited 

to errors which seriously affect "'the fairness, integrity or 

public reputation of judicial proceedings,'" Karns v. Emerson 

Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 1452, 1460 (lOth Cir. 1987) citing to Aspen 

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Appellate Case: 89-6388 Document: 01019301411 Date Filed: 03/01/1991 Page: 12 
Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Corp., 738 F.2d 1509, 1516 

(lOth Cir. 1984), aff'd, 472 u.s. 585 (1985), quoting from Rowe 

International, Inc. v. J. B. Enterprises, Inc., 647 F.2d 830, 835 

(8th Cir. 1981). See also Bannister v. Town of Noble, Okla., 812 

F.2d 1265, 1271 (lOth Cir. 1987). 

In Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805 (lOth Cir. 1988), cert. 

denied 488 u.s. 1008 (1989), cited and relied upon by plaintiff, 

we held that a legal expert should not have been permitted to give 

testimony relative to legal conclusions he drew from the evidence 

presented that there had been a search of the residence -

because such opinion testimony interfered with the trial judge's 

role as sole arbiter of the law. No error of that kind occurred 

in the instant case. This case is more analogous to Karns v. 

Emerson Elec. Co., supra, a products liability case, where we 

found no abuse of discretion, and thus no plain error, in the 

trial court's admission of certain expert testimony: 

Defendant argues that the district court erred in 

permitting plaintiff's expert, Robert Black, to testify 

that the XR-90 was 'unreasonably dangerous beyond the 

expectation of the average user ... ,' and that 'Emerson 

acted recklessly 'in producing and distributing it ... Fed. R. Evid. 704(a) provides that an expert's opinion 

testimony 'is not objectionable because it embraces an 

ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.' 

Opinions embracing legal standards may, however, be 

excluded for other reasons, such as the likelihood of 

jury confusion, the danger of unfair prejudice, or the 

inability of such evidence to assist the trier of fact. 

See Fed. R. Evid. 403, 702; Strong v. E. I. DuPont de 

Nemours Co., 667 F.2d 682, 685-86 (8th Cir. 1981) 

(district court did not err in excluding expert's 

testimony that product was 'unreasonably dangerous'). 

These are matters committed to the trial court's 

discretion, and we review a decision admitting or 

excluding such testimony only for abuse of discretion . 

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Here, the most that can be said is that the 

testimony defendant challenges was not helpful to the 

jury in deciding the case, since the expert was, in 

effect, merely telling the jury what result to reach on 

two of the elements. We do not believe, however, that 

the jury is likely to have been confused or misled by 

this testimony . . . • Black explained the bases for 

his opinions in sufficient detail to permit the jury to 

independently evaluate his conclusions . . . • Finally, 

the court instructed the jury that it was free to 

entirely disregard an expert's opinion 'if you should 

conclude that the reasons given in support of the 

opinion are not sound .... ' We do not believe that 

the jury 'was prevailed upon to abdicate its function or 

responsibility for reaching an independent judgment on 

the ultimate issues.' Frase v. Hen~, 444 F.2d 1228, 

1231 (lOth Cir. 1971). 

817 F.2d at 1459. 

We have carefully examined Chapman's trial testimony and we 

agree with plaintiff that Chapman did render opinions in certain 

instances which indicated to the jury the precise result the 

jurors should reach based on the evidence. For example, Chapman 

testified that: he had heard no evidence that persuaded him that 

the police officers intended to establish a roadblock or that they 

positioned their automobiles to accomplish a roadblock (R., Vol. 

X, pp. 1517-18); he attributed the motorcycle striking Officer 

Parks' patrol car to "extraordinary disorientation" due perhaps to 

an injury and "suffering the effects of alcohol and not really 

knowing what he was doing" (id. at 1519); he did not believe that 

defendant Parks had rolled Lawrence McEwen back and forth or used 

excessive force as testified by others (id. at 1522); he did not 

hesitate to agree with the police board's administrative 

determination that Officer Parks should not be subject to any 

disciplinary action arising out of his encounter with the Lawrence 

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McEwen motorcycle, etc. (id. at 1527) and this latter opinion was 

based in part on the credibility of witnesses. Id. 

However, no objections were lodged by plaintiff to any of the 

above-referenced testimony of Chapman. Arguably, his testimony 

was proper under Rules 702 and 704, Fed. R. Evid., 28 u.s.c.A. 

Furthermore, the trial court's cautionary instruction to the jury 

was explicit, full and complete in advising the jury that matters 

of common knowledge, credibility and fact findings were within the 

exclusive domain of the jury. No plain error occurred in the 

admission of Chapman's testimony. 

II. 

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in permitting 

improper impeachment of plaintiff's witness, Jamie Hall. 

As heretofore observed, much of the dispute of fact involved 

in this case centered on the testimony of witnesses relative to 

what occurred or was said at the scene of the collision between 

the motorcycle and the patrol vehicle. One of the plaintiff's 

witnesses was Jamie Hall, age 23, who saw the collision. 

Hall and others with him observed Lawrence McEwen's 

motorcycle make a wide turn to the north on Stubbeman and upset 

into a ditch. Hall testified that: he saw Lawrence McEwen pick up 

the motorcycle from the ditch, turn it around heading south on 

Stubbeman, and, with "three hops," head the motorcycle southward 

toward the patrol vehicle; the patrol car had already backed up 

and was facing toward the motorcycle; as the motorcycle proceeded 

down Stubbeman, he saw the patrol car pull in front of and collide 

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with the motorcycle; the police car was moving north but at an 

angle with the motorcycle at the point of collision; he observed 

Officer Parks get out of the police car, pull his gun, stick the 

gun in Lawrence McEwen's face and ask McEwen whether "he'd like 

him to put him out of his misery;" he observed Officer Parks roll 

McEwen over, put handcuffs on him and roll him over again; after 

another police officer arrived at the scene, Hall gave him the 

fictitious name of David Fields because he was intimidated due to 

past experiences and what could happen in the future involving 

Officer Parks; Hall was arrested by Officer Parks following the 

time he gave a deposition in this case; and when Officer Parks 

booked him, Officer Parks said that "he owed me one, or I owed 

him one." (R., Vol. VIII, pp. 1190-96). 

On cross-examination, Hall testified, without objection, that 

on the evening of the collision he had given an improper name and 

address, that on prior occasions he had gone by other aliases, and 

that he had been drinking in a nightclub on the night of the 

collision even though he was underage. Id. at 1197-98. Defense 

counsel then inquired of Hall relative to the traffic offense he 

had said worried him. An objection was lodged that it was 

improper to explore the details of the charge in that it would 

create unreasonable prejudice under Rule 403, Fed. R. Evid., 28 

U.S.C.A. Id. at 1198-99. The objection was overruled following 

an in-chambers hearing where the court ruled that inquiry into the 

bench warrant and Hall's use of an alias was proper, given that 

plaintiff opened the door on these issues. Id. at pp. 1199-1201. 

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Thereafter, upon further cross-examination, the following 

colloquy occurred, without objection: 

Q. (By Mr. Collins): Mr. Hall the reason you did 

not give a correct name that night was not because you 

were intimidated by Mr. Parks, it was because you had an 

outstanding bench warrant out for your arrest, did you 

not? 

A. True. 

Q. And that 

A. That's part of the reason. 

Q. And that stemmed from a DUI offense that you 

had been cited on and didn't show up in court, did you? 

A. True. 

Q. And the officer had -- and the court had every 

right to issue the bench warrant, did they not? 

A. Yes. They did. 

Q. And it was outstanding. 

A. Yes, it was. 

Q. Now, this other incident that I think Mr. 

Hammons brought up was that after your deposition that 

you were arrested, is that not correct? 

A. That's correct. 

Id. at 1203-04. 

Mr. Hall also acknowledged that sometime between August of 

1986 and the date of his arrest in February, 1989, another bench 

warrant had been issued for his arrest on bogus check charges. 

at 1204. He also testified that he had used the alias of 

Jamie Fields. 

At the conclusion of Hall's cross-examination, the trial 

court instructed the jury that evidence of the bench warrants was 

admitted to permit the defendants to show why the witness was 

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arrested by Officer Parks and to speak to Hall's credibility and 

veracity as a witness as it relates to a case where the City of 

Norman and its police officers are defendants. Id. at 1210-11. 

Plaintiff also contends that defense counsel was improperly 

permitted to question witness Hall about whether he had used 

illegal drugs on the evening of the collision and inquiries about 

his drinking habits. No objections were lodged to this line of 

cross-examination. 

We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

allowing the aforesaid cross-examination of witness Jamie Hall. 

See Fox v. Mazda Corp. of America, supra; United States v. Heath, 

580 F.2d 1011 (lOth Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1075 

(1979). Plaintiff "opened the door" and invited cross-examination 

relative to Hall's use of the alias, his reason for using it, his 

intimidation by Officer Parks, his use of alcohol, and his fear of 

reprisals. A clear implication flowed from Hall's testimony that 

Officer Parks was "out to get" Hall because of his deposition 

testimony given in the instant case in January, 1989. The reasons 

for his use of the alias and the questions relative to the bench 

warrants were probative of matters directly or inferentially 

developed during Hall's direct examination by plaintiff's counsel. 

Furthermore, no contemporaneous objections were lodged during 

Hall's cross-examination. This court will generally not address 

issues that were not raised and ruled upon by the district court. 

Farmers Ins. Co., Inc. v. Hubbard, 869 F.2d 565 (lOth Cir. 1989). 

Finally, we hold that the trial court's carefully 

cautionary instruction to the jury clearly pinpointed 

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crafted 

that the 

Appellate Case: 89-6388 Document: 01019301411 Date Filed: 03/01/1991 Page: 18 
evidence on the bench warrants was admitted only to the extent 

that it bore on Hall's credibility and veracity. We hold that 

this line of cross-examination was in nowise "plain error" 

affecting the substantial right of the plaintiff. Big Horn Coal 

Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 852 F.2d 1259, 1270-71 (lOth Cir. 

1988); Bannister v. Town of Noble, Okla., supra; K-B Trucking Co. 

v. Riss Intern. Corp., 763 F.2d 1148, 1154-55, n.8 (lOth Cir. 

1985). 

III. 

Plaintiff urges reversal because of the trial court's order 

overruling plaintiff's objection to testimony by Officer Robert w. 

Post of the Norman Police Department relative to Lawrence McEwen's 

.11 blood alcohol level on the night of the collision. 

Prior to trial, plaintiff filed a Motion in Limine and 

supporting brief to exclude any reference at trial to the fact 

that decedent Lawrence McEwen had a post mortem blood alcohol 

reading of .11. Plaintiff argued that such evidence would be 

highly prejudicial and irrelevant to any issue in the case. (See 

Brief on Motion in Limine, Vol. I, Tab 78). Our record does not 

contain any pre-trial order of the district court on this motion. 

At trial, plaintiff had the deposition of Doctor Chai s. 

Choy, a forensic pathologist, Office of the Chief Medical Examiner 

of the State of Oklahoma, admitted into evidence. (R., Vol. VI, 

pp. 846-52). Dr. Choy testified that the legal limit for 

classification of one driving under the influence in Oklahoma is 

.10. Id. at 851. When asked whether, as a medical doctor, he had 

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an opinion, based upon a reasonable medical certainty, that a 

person with a ethyl alcohol limit of .11 would be affected in his 

driving ability, Dr. Choy responded, "I don't know." Id. at 851-

52. 

Thereafter, the following colloquy occurred: 

MR. HAMMONS (Counsel for plaintiff): Your Honor, 

my record's just very brief. 

I had filed a Motion in Limine on the exclusion of 

the blood alcohol content on the basis that it was 

unduly prejudicial. 

THE COURT: Yes . 

MR. HAMMONS: My argument was simply that the 

mention of alcohol is highly prejudicial. It is like 

sounding a bell: once it's done, you cannot unring the 

bell. As a result, I did a Motion in Limine and advised 

the Court that I did not think I could preserve that 

record by making an objection at opening statement or 

during the time the evidence was first offered because 

that would be something, if it were going to come in, I 

would have to address in opening statement somewhat 

also. 

My argument on admissibility was that there was not 

sufficient evidence to tie the consumption of alcohol, 

which admittedly was in existence, to a cause of the 

collision in this case, and that I felt, therefore, that 

the prejudicial impact of the evidence outweighed any of 

its proper probative purposes . . . . 

THE COURT: . . . lest there be any misunderstanding 

about it on the record, you did make a timely objection, 

properly did so, argued it effectively, and my 

considered judgment under all of the circumstances of 

this case, as sensitive as that subject is, always is, 

that with the testimony that we expected then and, 

indeed, have now had, that the probative value of it 

under these circumstances, was such that it should be 

admitted under all the standards that we've all 

understood and discussed previously. 

But your objection was certainly made, it fully 

protects you in that regard, if necessary, on appeal. 

Id. at 868-70. 

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Plaintiff also called as a witness Officer Post, an accident 

reconstructionist and investigator for Norman. In the course of 

cross-examination, Post was asked whether he had obtained training 

in alcohol and how alcohol affects driving habits. He responded 

that he was a breathalizer operator and that he had received 

training in testing individuals for alcohol influence. (R., Vol. 

III, p. 245). Thereafter, in chambers, counsel for plaintiff 

objected to any testimony from Officer Post relative to Lawrence 

McEwen's blood alcohol level at the time of the collision, based 

on surprise. Counsel for plaintiff argued that Officer Post had 

never been identified by defendants as an expert with respect to 

alcohol consumption or the effects of alcohol consumption on the 

operation of motor vehicles. Id. at 246. The court observed that 

the pre-trial order did not relate to what the various witnesses 

who had been deposed would testify to in that it simply showed 

that they had been "deposed" and that this was agreeable to the 

parties. Id. at 248. The trial court then observed that at a 

pre-trial conference a day or two prior to trial, the court was 

called upon to rule on the issue of admitting the .11 blood 

alcohol report on decedent Lawrence McEwen, which is above the .10 

Driving Under the Influence (DUI) level, and determined that such 

evidence had obvious probative value in determining the cause of 

the collision. The court overruled plaintiff's objection. Id. at 

249-52. 

We note that the trial court was understandably upset to 

ascertain that the pre-trial order (which is not part of the 

record on appeal) did not indicate what any of the witnesses who 

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had been deposed would testify to (under the "summary" caption, 

apparently only the word "deposed" appeared). The court 

nevertheless overruled plaintiff's objection and observed: 

But there's no question but this officer (Post) is 

a qualified person in that respect, it is already in 

evidence that the blood alcohol is .11, and the issue in 

this case is what happened at that collision, and I 

believe the jury should have the benefit and the 

defendant should have the opportunity to ask their 

expert his op1n1on on it. It can be argued and 

discredited, perhaps, but it's just too important a part 

of this case and was obviously an important issue from 

the outset, and the case is old enough that why it 

hasn't been developed in that respect before I don't 

know. 

But, it's unfortunate, and I will tell you that I 

will not look forward to anymore problems in regard to 

any witness for which the summary of testimony is simply 

the word 'deposed.' I don't expect that to come up 

again, and I will not approve a pretrial order hereafter 

that departs from our required form in that respect. 

So the objection is overruled . . . . 

Id. at 252. 

Thereafter, Officer Post testified that Lawrence McEwen's 

blood alcohol concentration on the night of the collision was .11: 

under Oklahoma law .10 is DUI: in his opinion, the alcohol 

consumed by Lawrence McEwen was a contributing factor to the 

accident: he believed that Lawrence McEwen's consumption of 

alcohol affected his reaction time and balance: and Lawrence 

McEwen was "out of control" when his motorcycle struck the patrol 

vehicle. Id. at 276-78. 

On appeal, plaintiff again argues that Lawrence McEwen's 

blood alcohol level of .11, lacking competent medical evidence of 

its effect on his ability to drive, was unfairly presented through 

"surprise" witness Officer Robert Post. However, plaintiff took a 

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discovery deposition of Officer Post before trial knowing that he 

was defendant City of Norman's chief investigator and accident 

reconstruction expert. Plaintiff failed during the deposition to 

ask Post any questions on whether alcohol was a factor in the 

collision. Further, it was plaintiff who called Officer Post as a 

witness at trial. As heretofore noted, the pre-trial order simply 

listed Officer Post, under summary of testimony, as "deposed." 

Thus, we reject, just as did the trial court, plaintiff's 

objection on the basis of surprise. Furthermore, we agree with 

the trial court's determination that the evidence of Lawrence 

McEwen's blood alcohol content of .11 on the night of the 

collision was relevant and that its probative value outweighed any 

unfair prejudice under Rule 403, Fed. R. Evid., 28 u.s.c.A. 

Officer Post testified to the effect of alcohol impairment on 

a driver in relation to judgment, control and balance and slowed 

reaction time. Id. at 276-78. This evidence did not tend to 

confuse or mislead the jury; rather, it assisted the jury in 

determining the cause of the collision. It was both relevant and 

material to the defense. The district court did not abuse its 

discretion in admitting Officer Post's challenged testimony. 

Marshall v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. supra; Fox v. Mazda Corp., 

supra. Here, the probative value of the blood alcohol content was 

certainly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice in the 

context of this case. The "unfair prejudice" stated in Rule 403 

cannot be equated with testimony which is simply unfavorable to a 

party. It must be unfair in the sense that it would be misleading 

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and not aid and assist the jury in making a material determination 

in the case. 

IV. 

Plaintiff argues that he was prejudiced when the trial court 

allowed counsel for both defendants to examine witnesses and argue 

to the jury. 

Plaintiff points to his "Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's 

Application to Substitute Counsel," Docket Item 100, to show that 

he "recognized and objected to this strategy." (Brief of 

Appellant, p. 26). The difficulty is that plaintiff did not order 

up Docket Item 100, Vol. I, as part of the record on appeal. 

Under these circumstances, we can only speculate relative to 

plaintiff's grounds and contentions. Further, we can only 

speculate that docket Item 101 denied the objection or objections 

lodged by plaintiff because it, too, was not ordered up by 

plaintiff as part of the record 

parties do not refer us to any part 

relating to this argument. 

on appeal. Furthermore, the 

of the trial transcript 

Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 

Circuit, effective January 1, 1989, provide, inter alia, that the 

appellant shall file in the court of appeals an original and one 

copy of a designation of record upon filing appellant's principal 

brief (Rule 10.2.5); and when an appeal is based upon a challenge 

to any ruling or order, a copy of pages of the reporter's 

transcript at which the ruling or order and any necessary 

objection are recorded must be included (Rule 10.2.3). Here, 

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, 

plaintiff failed to follow either of these rules. Thus, plaintiff 

has failed to certify an adequate record on appeal which would 

provide a basis for review whether the district court abused its 

discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to disqualify counsel. 

United States v. Bolton, 905 F.2d 319 (lOth Cir. 1990), cert. 

denied, ___ U.S. ___ (1991). 

Generally, a party may not assign error on appeal unle5~ he 

objects thereto, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects 

and the grounds therefore, Prebble v. Brodrick, 535 F.2d 605 (lOth 

Cir. 1976), and designates that part of the district court 

proceeding relevant thereto for appellate review. Turnbull v. 

Wilcken, 893 F.2d 256 (lOth Cir. 1990). Failure to do so requires 

our holding that plaintiff did not meet his burden of proving that 

the finding of the district court was clearly erroneous or that 

its ruling constituted an abuse of discretion. Id. This is 

consistent with our rule that the court of appeals generally will 

not address issues which were not considered and ruled upon by the 

district court. Burnette v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 849 F.2d 

1277 (lOth Cir. 1988). 

Even had plaintiff preserved this issue on appeal, we would 

hold that plaintiff has not demonstrated trial court error. In 

United States v. Bolton, supra, we held that a district court 

decision on a motion to disqualify counsel is reviewed for an 

abuse of discretion, citing to E.E.O.C. v. Orson H. Gygi Co., 749 

F.2d 620, 621 (lOth Cir. 1984). No such abuse of discretion is 

evident here. 

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.. 

v. 

Plaintiff contends that the court's instructions given at 

defendants' request on the propriety of a high-speed chase and the 

removal of debris from the road were prejudicial to plaintiff 

because they were on non-issues at trial. 

Plaintiff states that plaintiff never challenged the pursuit 

of Lawrence McEwen, but rather and only challenged the use of the 

rolling roadblock to cut off his motorcycle (Brief of Appellant, 

p. 27). Similarly, plaintiff contends that removal of debris from 

the roadway went to no material issue. Id. at 28. 

In the course of her direct testimony, Mrs. Cecilia McEwen, 

mother of decedent Lawrence McEwen, stated that shortly after her 

son's death she visited with Norman Police Chief Cary in his 

office. (R., Vol. III, p. 141). She inquired why the Norman 

police undertook pursuit of the motorcycle instead of just taking 

his "tag number" down and simply follow the motorcycle home or 

phone her the next day so that she could have presented Lawrence 

McEwen if requested. Id. at 142-43. During her testimony, Mrs. 

McEwen also highlighted the fact that her son had committed only a 

misdemeanor, inferentially discrediting the police policy of 

pursuing vehicles violating speed limits. 

The trial court's challenged instruction given on police 

pursuit was: 

You are instructed that law enforcement officers 

are entitled to pursue traffic offenders even when such 

pursuits involve high speeds. In this case, the 

officers were entitled to pursue Lawrence McEwen since 

he had violated the traffic laws of the City of Norman. 

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(R., Vol. X, p. 1633). 

Plaintiff objected to both of the challenged instructions 

"[o]n the basis that they did not relate to the triable issues 

within the case." Id. at 1646-47. The objection was overruled. 

Id. 

We hold that in light of the testimony elicited by plaintiff 

from his witness, Mrs. McEwen, the trial court did not err in 

giving the instruction on police pursuit. We must consider the 

instruction in the context of the case presented. Furthermore, 

"[i]t is elementary that instructions must be considered as a 

whole and particular instructions . . . are to be taken in the 

framework of the entire charge." Marshall v. Ford Motor Company, 

446 F.2d 712, 715 (lOth Cir. 1971). In reviewing plaintiff's 

allegations of error, we must consider the instructions given as 

whole, McGrath v. Wallace Murray Corporation, 496 F.2d 299, 301 

(lOth Cir. 1974), to determine whether the instructions convey 

correct statements of the applicable law. Perrell v. 

Financeamerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654, 656 (lOth Cir. 1984). In the 

instant case, the trial court's carefully crafted instructions, 

taken as a whole, did convey the correct statements of applicable 

law to the jury. 

Plaintiff also challenged the following instruction, again on 

the basis that it did not relate to any triable issue in the case: 

You're further instructed that the statutes of the 

State of Oklahoma provide that: 

Any person removing a wrecked or damaged 

vehicle from a highway shall remove any glass 

or other injurious substance dropped upon the 

highway from such vehicle. 

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(R., Vol. X, p. 1633). 

Plaintiff argues that the instruction on removal of debris 

from the roadway went to no material issue, but only served to 

bolster the credibility of the Norman police officers. (Brief of 

Appellant, p. 28). This contention is without merit. 

In the course of direct examination, Sergeant Louis Schultz, 

patrol supervisor and investigator, Norman Police Department, 

testified that certain debris was present at the scene of the 

collision as reflected in photographs taken by Sergeant Moody but 

that the debris had been removed before photographs at the scene 

were later taken by Sergeant Post when a wrecker crew was present. 

(R., Vol. IX, pp. 1325-27). Thereafter, Sergeant Gerald Roy Moody 

of the Norman Police Department testified that he took photographs 

at the scene of the collision shortly after the accident when 

debris was visible and that the debris was later swept up. Id. at 

1338-42. 

In his cross-examination of Sergeant Moody, counsel for 

plaintiff attempted to impeach the testimony of Sergeant Robert w. 

Post, a traffic accident specialist with the Norman Police 

Department. (Appellant's Brief, p. 28). Sergeant Moody had 

previously testified that he had taken photographs at the scene as 

part of his investigative report. (R., Vol. III, p. 181). He 

testified that nothing had been moved before his photographs were 

taken and that the photographs reflected that which existed after 

the collision. Id. at 230. However, plaintiff points out that 

this apparent inconsistency occurred "[b]ecause . unknown to 

Post . . • certain photographs were taken prior to his arrival, 

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.. 

[and] Plaintiff was able to provide (among other things) that the 

accident area was swept clear of debris before Post started taking 

photographs." (Brief of Appellant, p. 28). Thus, by plaintiff's 

admission, there was no false testimony on the part of Sergeant 

Post. He simply did not know that certain debris had been removed 

from the accident scene prior to the time he took photographs. 

No prejudice resulted to plaintiff when the trial court 

instructed the jury on the law relative to the removal of the 

debris. In his closing argument to the jury, counsel for the 

plaintiff made full play upon the debris removal matter: "We look 

and see that the photographs, the color photographs, that are 

supposed to represent the accident condition scene exactly as it 

took place after the collision, have all the debris swept away 

from it." (R., Vol. X, p. 1592). This factor was used by counsel 

for plaintiff in arguing that the point of impact was not as 

depicted by Officer Post in his diagram because certain physical 

evidence "was not recorded." Id. at 1592-93. Thus, the debris 

instruction was relevant and proper. 

VI. 

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in allowing the 

defendants to undertake in-court "dramatizations" of certain 

evidence. The record reflects that the trial court allowed, over 

objection, three very brief in-court demonstrations. 

The first demonstration complained of occurred during the 

testimony of Jamie Hall. Two of plaintiff's witnesses, Hall and 

Terry Adams, testified that they saw defendant Officer Parks 

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._I 

approach Lawrence McEwen following the 

drawn in his right hand and holding it to 

collision with his gun 

the head of Lawrence 

McEwen as Officer Parks stated, "Do you want me to put you out of 

your misery?" (R., Vol. VII, p. 952; Vol. VIII, pp. 1244-49). 

After Hall had acknowledged during cross-examination that in 

deposition testimony he had stated that Officer Parks had drawn 

his gun with his right hand, id. at 1244, counsel for Officer 

Parks requested permission of the court, out of the presence of 

the jury, to impeach witness Hall by having Officer Parks stand 

and demonstrate that he is left-handed by showing that his gun 

holster was located on the left side of his belt. Id. at 1248. 

Counsel for Officer Parks had requested this in-court 

demonstration to show that Parks is left-handed. Id. at 1245. 

The only objection lodged by counsel for plaintiff was that it 

would be more appropriate to have Officer Parks testify during his 

"part of the case." Id. After the demonstration the trial court 

observed, "Well, I think there's no objection to it, there's no 

harm done." Id. at 1246. We agree. 

Plaintiff also contends that error occurred when the court 

allowed reenactment of the "handcuffing process." (Appellant's 

Brief, p. 30). Plaintiff's witness Terry Adams testified that he 

saw defendant Officer Parks, after the collision, approach 

Lawrence McEwen with his gun drawn and grab McEwen "[b]y the 

shoulder and jerked him he was on his stomach and he jerked 

him over onto his back, and then flipped him back on his stomach, 

jerked him back over to the back, and flipped him over to his 

stomach-- back to his stomach, and then put handcuffs on him." 

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(R., Vol. VII, pp. 887-88). Plaintiff's witness Valerie Johnson 

stated that when she observed Lawrence McEwen he was face down, 

handcuffed, and that Officer Parks flipped him back and forth. 

Id. at 1060. Jamie Hall also testified that Officer Parks struck 

his gun in Lawrence McEwen's face, asked him if he would like to 

be put out of his misery, handcuffed him, and rolled him over 

again and again. (R., Vol. VIII, p. 1192). 

During the cross-examination of witness Valerie Johnson, 

counsel for defendant Officer Parks knelt down and the following 

colloquy occurred: 

Q. Now, ma'am, am I correct, as I understand the 

position of Lawrence McEwen was 

MR. HAMMONS: Your Honor, I don't think counsel 

should act out his version of what took place. 

THE COURT: It's a perfectly permissible 

demonstration technique if he wishes to use it. 

Q. (By Mr. Manchester): As I understand, Ma'am, 

Lawrence McEwen was something in the position that I was 

-- am at this time, where I'm down on my hands and 

knees; is that correct?" 

* * * 

A. He was laying face down. 

Q. He was laying face down. Were his hands under 

him? 

A. No, they were already 

[handcuffed]. 

(R., Vol. VII, pp. 1058-59). 

behind his back 

The witness, Valerie Johnson, had directly disputed that 

Lawrence McEwen was in the kneeling position demonstrated by 

counsel. Thus, it is difficult to follow plaintiff's contention 

that plaintiff was prejudiced thereby. we must conclude that no 

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.. 

prejudicial error occurred when the trial court allowed this 

demonstration. 

The third demonstration complained of occurred during direct 

examination of Officer Parks. During a bench conference, counsel 

for defendant Parks requested that Parks be permitted to 

demonstrate the manner in which he had handcuffed Lawrence McEwen 

by actually handcuffing his counsel. (R., Vol. IV, p. 1451). 

Counsel for plaintiff objected on the ground that staged 

reenactments are notoriously unreliable, that Officer Parks was 

capable of describing what he did, and that the purpose was to 

dramatize, not to educate or inform. Id. at 1451-52. The trial 

court overruled plaintiff's objection: 

THE COURT: A very important part of this case is 

what happened just after the impact, the question of 

reasonableness, the question of excessive force, perhaps 

even as a separate item of recovery. In any event, 

evidence of the intention of the officer in regard to 

the impact is critically important in the case. 

I do not consider this 

dramatization as you have 

not always permit this type 

case the officer's entitled 

type of demonstration to be 

characterized it though I do 

of display; I think in this 

to show exactly what he did. 

Id. at 1452. The demonstration which followed involved the use of 

a Mr. Lyons who took specific positions related by Officer Parks 

during the arrest-handcuffing procedure. Id. at 1458, 61. 

Each of these demonstrations was, in effect, a defense 

mechanism for testing the knowledge and truthfulness of 

plaintiff's witnesses on important, relevant issues before the 

jury. Thus, the demonstrations were part of the defendants' 

cross-examination. Fed. R. Evid., Rule 611, 28 u.s.c.A. provides, 

inter alia: 

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. ' 

.. , . 

(a) Control by the court. The court shall 

exerc1se reasonable control over the mode and order of 

interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to 

(1) make the interrogation and presentation effective 

for the ascertainment of the truth . . 

(b) Scope of cross-examination. Cross examination 

should be limited to the subject matter of the direct 

and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. 

The district court is vested with broad discretion in ruling 

on the relevancy of evidence, United States v. Alexander, 849 F.2d 

1293 (lOth Cir. 1988), and in reviewing evidentiary ruling of the 

trial court, we may not reverse absent an abuse of discretion. 

Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories, 906 F.2d 1399, 1401 (lOth Cir. 

1990): Bannister v. Town of Noble, Okla., supra. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting 

the aforesaid limited demonstrations. 

VII. 

Finally, plaintiff argues that the errors addressed in 

Propositions I through VI, taken together, and considered in the 

light of other alleged errors, require reversal on the basis of 

accumulated error. We disagree. 

We have carefully considered each of plaintiff's additional 

contentions of trial court errors. These are complaints relative 

to the district court's evidentiary rulings. We hold that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in that regard. In 

United States v. Ortez, 804 F.2d 1161, 1164 n. 2 (lOth Cir. 1986), 

we held: 

Under the abuse of discretion standard, a trial court's 

decision will not be disturbed unless the appellate 

court has a definite and firm conviction that the lower 

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·' 

court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the 

bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances. 

When we apply the 'abuse of discretion' standard, we 

defer to the trial court's judgment because of its 

first-hand ability to view the witness or evidence and 

assess credibility and probative value. 

We AFFIRM. 

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