Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00538/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00538-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Age)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Mark E. Wardlow, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Ralph’s Moving & Storage, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 10-538-TUC-DCB (HCE)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s “Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Or

In the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment” (Doc. 25). For the following reasons the

Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court grant Defendant’s Motion for Judgment

on the Pleadings and deny Defendant’s alternative Motion for Summary Judgment as moot.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this pro se action pursuant to “Title VII, Age Discrimination in

Employment Act” (hereinafter “ADEA”) against his former employer. (Complaint (Doc. 1),

p.1). Plaintiff alleges that he began working for Defendant as a driver on May 22, 2008.

(Id.). According to Plaintiff, during the term of his employment, Robbie Wicks, the son of

the owner of Defendant business, began hiring employees whom Mr. Wicks referred to as

“a younger batch of employees...[and] the face of the future of Ralph’s Moving and Storage.”

(Id. at, p.2) Plaintiff also alleges that the general manager, Scott Ferree, promised him a

Case 4:10-cv-00538-DCB Document 29 Filed 02/07/12 Page 1 of 4
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“C.D.L. License Training Program”, but Plaintiff was later told in May or June of 2009 that

he would not be trained because Defendant “had the new employees to take care of first, as

they could provide more years of service.” (Id.). Plaintiff further alleges that he was

disciplined for things he did not do and when he asked why, he was told that “I was a liability

at my age.” (Id.). According to Plaintiff, his hours and assignments were assigned to the

younger employees.

Plaintiff alleges that in September 2009, he filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging

age discrimination. (Id. at p.3). Plaintiff alleges that after Defendant received his EEOC

complaint, his hours were reduced and he was written up twice, once for missing a day of

work even though he had called in as required. (Id.). According to Plaintiff, in October 2009,

Mr. Ferree terminated Plaintiff for “‘making waves’....” (Id.). 

On December 30, 2011, Defendant filed the instant Motion arguing that Plaintiff

failed to state a claim for relief under the ADEA because Plaintiff failed to allege he is within

the class of individuals protected by the Act or that he was qualified to be promoted. (See

Defendant’s Motion, p. 2 (citing Epps v. Phoenix Elem. Sch. Dist, 2009 U.S.Dist. LEXIS

32814 *14-15, 2009 WL 996308, *5, (D.Ariz. April 14, 2009) (In order for plaintiff to

establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, he must show that he was: (1) a least 40

years old; (2) performing his job in a satisfactory manner; (3) discharged; and (4) replaced

by a substantially younger employee with equal or inferior qualifications.)). Defendant also

argues that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his claim of retaliation with the EEOC. Alternatively,

Defendant seeks summary judgment arguing that Plaintiff failed to meet the relevant

requirements to be promoted to “CDL” driver status and that legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons supported Defendant’s decision to terminate Plaintiff.

On January 5, 2012, the Court entered an order advising Plaintiff, inter alia, that

pursuant to LRCiv 7.2(i), Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for the District of

Arizona, his failure to respond to Defendant’s Motion by January 30, 2012, may be deemed

as Plaintiff’s consent to the granting of the motion and that the Court may enter judgment

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against Plaintiff. (Doc. 28). The time to respond to Defendant’s Motion has passed and

Plaintiff has not filed a response.

II. DISCUSSION

Under LRCiv 7.2(i), if the opposing party to a motion, such as a motion to dismiss or

a motion for summary judgment, “does not serve and file the required answering memoranda

...such non-compliance may be deemed a consent to the denial or granting of the motion and

the Court may dispose of the motion summarily.” “[F]ailure to follow a district court’s local

rules is a proper ground for dismissal.” Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995)

(affirming dismissal of action pursuant to a local rule similar to LRCiv. 7.2(i) where the

plaintiff failed to file an opposition to the defendant’s motion to dismiss). Whether to

dismiss the action for failure to respond to a motion to dismiss is within the trial court’s

discretion. Id. In exercising its discretion, the trial “court is required to weigh several

factors: ‘(1) the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need

to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy

favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic

sanctions.’” Id. (quoting Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir.1986)).

Herein, the first three factors tip the balance in favor of dismissal. Moreover, although

public policy favors disposition of cases on their merits, the record reflects that Plaintiff has

made no effort to continue with this action. Not only has Plaintiff failed to respond to

Defendant’s Motion, but he has also failed to file his witness list within the time set by the

Court. (See Doc. 27). Plaintiff’s failure to respond to Defendant’s Motion despite the Court’s

express warning of the consequences supports the conclusion that imposition of less drastic

sanctions would not be beneficial. See Henderson, 779 F.2d 1421 (affirming dismissal where

the plaintiff failed to meet deadlines despite court’s express warning of consequences).

Indeed, in such a case as this, the Ninth Circuit has affirmed dismissal. See Ghazali, 46 F.3d

at 53-54.

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III. CONCLUSION

The time to respond to Defendant’s Motion has expired and Plaintiff has not filed a

response. Plaintiff has been advised that his failure to file a timely response may be deemed

as his consent to the granting of Defendant’s Motion. The five factors identified by the Ninth

Circuit for consideration in such cases support granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

pursuant to LRCiv. 7.2(i). Defendant’s alternative Motion for Summary Judgment should

be denied as moot. 

IV. RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court

grant Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 25) pursuant to LRCiv. 7.2(i)

and deny Defendant’s alternative Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 25) as moot.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and LRCiv 7.2(e), Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for the District of

Arizona, any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after being

served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to another

party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed.R.Civ.P.

72(b)(2). If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV 10-

538-TUC-DCB.

Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate

Judge may be deemed a waiver of the party’s right to de novo review of the issues. See

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S.

900 (2003).

DATED this 6th day of February, 2012.

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