Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02307/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02307-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Mark A. Sterr,

Plaintiff, CASE NO.CIV-S-08-2307-DOC

vs.

D. Baptista, et. al., 

Defendants.

 /

Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Marc A. Sterr’s (“Plainitff”) Motion for

Reconsideration of Denial of an Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (the “Motion”). 

The Court finds the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. FED. R. CIV. P. 78;

E.D. Cal. R. 78-230(m). After considering the moving papers, and for the reasons set forth

below, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and DENIES Plaintiff’s

Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction. 

I. BACKGROUND

At all times relevant, Plaintiff has been a prisoner of the State of California in the custody

of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, confined at Mule Creek State

Prison. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants D. Baptista, S. Barham, I. Mohamed, D. Long, R.

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Rubia, and M. Martel (collectively, “Defendants”) have denied his right to practice his sincerely

held religious faith of Asatru. 

On July 2, 2009, Plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and/or

preliminary injunction. Plaintiff alleged he was being denied possession of personal religious

artifacts, the ability to grow medicinal herbs, the use of a ceremonial wood-burning fire, and the

authorization to have flowers growing on the ceremonial spiritual grounds. Plaintiff also alleged

that the “grass only” policy prohibiting the Earth-based religions from having flowers on

ceremonial grounds would force Plaintiff to dig up the current floral arrangements and gardens. 

Plaintiff further alleged the policy outlining the days and times the Earth-based religions may use

the grounds restricted his ability to use the grounds on a daily basis. 

On July 17, 2009, this Court denied Plaintiff’s motion. Relying on the factors set forth in

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (1987), the Court found Plaintiff did not present a

meritorius case and was therefore not entitled to preliminary relief. The Court also found that

Defendants did not impose a substantial burden on Plaintiff’s religious practices under the

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). 

On July 30, 2009, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of this Court’s denial of

Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. Plaintiff urges that

the “grass-only” policy creates an undue burden under RLUIPA and holds no compelling,

legitimate governmental interest. Plaintiff also alleges the grounds schedule regulation restricts

Plaintiff’s ability to use the grounds on a daily basis. Plaintiff’s motion is therefore limited to

reconsideration of the “grass-only” policy and the grounds schedule regulation. While this Court

previously considered and summarily denied Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim, the Court reconsiders

this claim below. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion for Reconsideration

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides for reconsideration only upon a showing of “(1) mistake,

surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) a void judgment; (5)

a satisfied or discharged judgment; or (6) ‘extraordinary circumstances’ which would justify

relief.” School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County v. Acands, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir.

1993) (quoting Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1442 (9th Cir. 1991)).

These grounds are further limited by the Local Rules. E.D. Cal. R. 78-230(k) provides

that the party seeking reconsideration must provide the court with the material facts and

circumstances surrounding the motion, indicating “(1) when and to what Judge or Magistrate

Judge the prior motion was made, (2) what ruling, decision or order was made thereon, (3) what

new or different facts or circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist or were not

shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion, and (4) why the facts

or circumstances were not shown at the time of the prior motion.” E.D. Cal. R. 78-230(k).

In Plaintiff’s motion, Plaintiff moves this Court to conduct an additional analysis of his

claim under RLUIPA. A “First Amendment claim is subject to a rational relationship test which

requires the state to show the regulation has a reasonable relationship to a legitimate penological

interest. [A] RLUIPA claim mandates a ‘more searching standard’ of review: strict scrutiny

which requires the state to show the regulation is the least restrictive means to further a

compelling interest.” Schnitzler v. Reisch, 518 F.Supp.2d 1098 (D. S.D. 2007), quoting Murphy

v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 372 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 2004). Because the majority of the

Court’s original opinion focused on the First Amendment claim, the Court will reconsider the

RLUIPA claim at this time. However, upon reconsideration, Plaintiff’s claim still fails to meet

the required showing to issue a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. 

B. Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction 

Generally, courts grant equitable relief in the event of irreparable injury and the

inadequacy of legal remedies. See Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1320 (9th Cir.

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1994); see also Weinberer v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312, 102 S. Ct. 1798 (1982)

(“[T]he basis for injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable injury and the

inadequacy of legal remedies.”). Plaintiffs must satisfy additional requirements to be granted

preliminary relief. Plaintiffs have the burden of showing that they are entitled to preliminary

relief. The “traditional test” requires that Plaintiffs demonstrate (1) a strong likelihood of

success on the merits; (2) a significant threat of irreparable injury; (3) greater hardship to

Plaintiffs than Defendants; and (4) that the public interest favors granting the injunction. See

American Motorcyclist Ass’n v. Watt, 714 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1983). 

The “alternative test” permits the plaintiff to meet its burden by showing either “(1) a

likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury or (2) the existence of

serious questions going to the merits and the balance of hardships tipping in [the plaintiff’s]

favor.” Nike, Inc. v. McCarthy, 379 F.3d 576, 580 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “These two formulations represent two points on a sliding scale in which the required

degree of irreparable harm increases as the probability of success decreases.” U.S. v.

Nutri-cology, Inc., 982 F.2d 394, 397 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). “The critical element in

determining the test to be applied is the relative hardship to the parties. If the balance of harm

tips decidedly toward the plaintiff, then the plaintiff need not show as robust a likelihood of

success on the merits as when the balance tips less decidedly.” State of Alaska v. Native Vill. of

Venetie, 856 F.2d 1384, 1389 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Reconsideration

Plaintiff urges that this Court improperly focused its order denying Plaintiff’s motion on

the First Amendment claim and consequently, the Turner factors. Thus, Plaintiff states that

under RLUIPA, the court should analyze the Defendants’ actions using heightened review. See

42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc. As RLUIPA does provide a more stringent standard for land use

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regulations, the Court will evaluate Plaintiff’s claim accordingly. 

B. Temporary Restraining Order

Plaintiff urges this Court to reconsider its order denying Plaintiff’s request for a

temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Determining whether the traditional or

alternative test applies depends on the nature of the hardship to the parties. “If the balance of

harm tips decidedly toward the plaintiff, then the plaintiff need not show as robust a likelihood of

success on the merits as when the balance tips less decidedly.” State of Alaska v. Native Vill. of

Venetie, 856 F.2d 1384, 1389 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). In the present case, Plaintiff’s

claim is most appropriately analyzed under the traditional test because the balance of the harm

does not tip decidedly toward Plaintiff. See American Motorcyclist Ass’n, 714 F.2d at 965. 

(1) Likelihood of success on the merits: Plaintiff’s complaint alleges claims under the

First and Fourteenth Amendments and RLUIPA. However, Plaintiff’s most recent motion is

limited to reconsideration of his RLUIPA claim in terms of the “grass only” policy and the

grounds schedule. 

Under RLUIPA, “No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a

manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a

religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the

burden on that person, assembly, or institution (A) is in furtherance of a compelling

governmental interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling

governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc. To establish a prima facie case, the court must

first, “identify[] the ‘religious exercise’ allegedly impinged upon” and second, determine

“whether the prison regulation ‘substantially burdens’ that religious exercise.” Greene v. Solano

County Jail, 513 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2007). 

RLUIPA may not be read “to elevate accommodation of religious observances over an

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institution’s need to maintain order and safety. . . [A]n accommodation must be measured so that

it does not override other significant interests.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722, 125

S.Ct. 2113 (2005). In fact, “[l]awmakers supporting RLUIPA were mindful of the urgency of

discipline, order, safety, and security in penal institutions. They anticipated that courts would

apply the Act’s standard with ‘due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail

administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order,

security and discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and limited resources.’” Id. at 723

(citations omitted). 

As to the first prong, RLUIPA defines “religious exercise” as “any exercise of religion,

whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” U.S.C.A. §

2000cc-5(7)(A). “The Supreme Court has noted that ‘the exercise of religion often involves not

only belief and profession but the performance of . . . physical acts [such as] assembling with

others for a worship service [or] participating in sacramental use of bread and wine.’” Cutter,

544 U.S. at 720. Here, there is no dispute that Plaintiff seeks to engage in religious exercise. 

As to the second prong, “[a]lthough RLUIPA does not define ‘substantial burden,’”

courts have stated that such a burden “must be ‘oppressive’ to a ‘significantly great’ extent, such

that it renders religious exercise ‘effectively impracticable.’” Sefeldeen v. Alameida, 238

Fed.Appx. 204, 205-06 (9th Cir. 2007), quoting San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan

Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2004). Likewise, “a burden is substantial under RLUIPA

when the state ‘denies [an important benefit] because of conduct mandated by religious belief,

thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his

beliefs.’” Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 888 (9th Cir. 2008), quoting Warsoldier v.

Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind.

Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18, 101 S.Ct. 1425 (1981). “Government regulation

must compel action or inaction with respect to a sincerely held belief; mere inconvenience to the

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religious institution or adherent is insufficient.” Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Yuba City v. County

of Sutter, 326 F.Supp.2d 1140 (E.D. Cal. 2003), aff’d 456 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2006). 

 Plaintiff urges that the “grass only” policy creates an undue burden under RLUIPA, and

it does not further a compelling or legitimate governmental interest. Plaintiff argues that he has

no access to plants and cannot use them during daily and monthly holy days and ceremonies. 

Plaintiff also argues that while the “grass only” policy is shrouded as neutral, it is not equally

applied to all Earth-based religions. In addition, Plaintiff describes the grounds schedule

regulation as restrictive and urges that before the policy was adopted, Plaintiff could use his time

off from work assignments to attend religious functions. Plaintiff argues that the new policy

restricts his ability to use the grounds on a daily basis. 

A review of cases considering RLUIPA claims within the Ninth Circuit proves

instructive. In Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 2008), plaintiff Shakur argued that

the district court erred in granting summary judgment on his claim that the denial of a

Halal/kosher meat diet violated RLUIPA. Specifically, Shakur alleged that the vegetarian diet he

was served in lieu of a Halal/kosher diet exacerbated his hiatal hernia and interfered with the

purity required for Islamic worship. Id. at 888. The Shakur court contrasted Shakur’s claim with

Sefeldeen’s, the Muslim plaintiff in Sefeldeen v. Alameida, 238 Fed. Appx. 204 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Shakur, 514 F.3d at 888. In Sefeldeen, the court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary

judgment, finding that Sefeldeen could not point to any adverse physical effects resulting from

the vegetarian meal plan. 238 Fed. Appx. at 206. The Sefeldeen court engaged in a comparative

analysis, explaining that Sefeldeen did not face punishment or loss of coveted privileges for

following his religious beliefs, as the prisoner did in Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989 (9th

Cir. 2005). Sefeldeen, 238 Fed. Appx. at 206.

Unlike Sefeldeen, the court in Shakur found that whether plaintiff Shakur’s medical

condition placed a substantial burden on his practice of religious activities was an issue for the

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lower court to resolve. 514 F.3d at 889. Noting the “Hobson’s choice” in light of Shakur’s

choice of a vegetarian diet that disrupted his religious activities or the regular diet forbidden by

Haram, or changing his religious designation to Jewish to receive a kosher meal, the court found

that the prison’s policy pressured Shakur to betray his religious beliefs. Id.; see also Warsoldier,

418 F.3d at 989. Plaintiff’s case is easily distinguishable from Shakur. Here, there is no such

choice to be made by Plaintiff. Plaintiff is neither being denied an important benefit nor is he

being pressured to modify his belief system. Lewis v. Ollison, 571 F.Supp.2d 1162, 1170 (C.D.

Cal. 2008). Rather, Plaintiff is directed to ask for time during which he may have religious

ceremonies and use an area for religious practice that is grass-only.

In Lewis v. Ollison, 571 F.Supp.2d 1162 (C.D. Cal. 2008), the court held that a temporary

shower policy which required prisoners to travel from their cells to the shower room wearing

only boxer shorts and shower shoes, due to security concerns, did not interfere with Muslim

religious practices requiring men to exercise modesty by covering the area of the body from navel

to knee. Id. at 1170-71. The court reasoned that “the complained of practice must be a

substantial burden on religious exercise; that is, Plaintiff must be denied an important benefit

based on conduct mandated by his religious belief, which places substantial pressure on him to

modify his behavior and to violate his belief system.” Id. at 1170. The court found that even if

the plaintiff’s allegations as to the requirement that he be covered from navel to knee were true,

the plaintiff failed to allege that he must shower every day to practice his religion. Id. at 1171. 

This Court finds Plaintiff’s case to be similar to Lewis, because there, plaintiffs failed to make a

showing that their religious practices were substantially burdened in the same way that Plaintiff

has failed to do so here. 

In a distinguishable case, the Ninth Circuit held that a substantial burden is established

when a prisoner is subject to significant pressure to abandon his religious beliefs. See

Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 996 (Native American inmate’s right to religious exercise was

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substantially burdened in light of punishment and loss of privileges for failure to comply with

hair grooming policy due to religious belief that hair could only be cut upon death). The Ninth

Circuit has also held that an outright ban on a particular religious exercise is a substantial burden

on that religious exercise. Greene v. Solano County Jail, 513 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2007)

(policy prohibiting maximum security prisoners from participating in group worship substantially

burdened plaintiff’s right to religious exercise). 

Plaintiff’s case is distinguishable from Warsoldier and Greene. Plaintiff has not made a

showing that the new policies have placed significant pressure upon him to abandon his religious

beliefs. While Plaintiff may not have the immediate access to the religious grounds that he had

before the new schedule was imposed, the schedule has neither required Plaintiff to abandon his

religion exercises entirely nor subjected him to a significant pressure to do so. Also, unlike in

Greene, where there was an “outright ban” on the plaintiff’s chosen religious exercise, here, no

outright ban on Plaintiff’s ceremonies has been imposed. Rather, Plaintiff must ask for

permission to schedule such ceremonies and he may still use the outdoor area to hold his

ceremonies.

Plaintiff has failed to make a showing that the new policies imposed by the prison amount

to a substantial burden on his religious exercise. Because Plaintiff has failed to show his

religious exercise has been substantially burdened, the Court need not reach an analysis of

whether the prison’s policy serves a compelling government interest and is the least restrictive

means of achieving that interest. See Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d at 889; see also Smith v. Allen,

502 F.2d 1255 (11th Cir. 2007); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214,

1228 (11th Cir. 2004). 

(2) Significant threat of irreparable injury: Based on the foregoing regarding the

merits of Plaintiff’s claim, it does not appear Plaintiff is under a significant threat of irreparable

injury. Plaintiff has not been pressured to abandon his religion. Plaintiff’s religious practices

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have not been banned. Plaintiff may still practice his religion. Therefore, this factor is not met

for the same reasons Plaintiff’s motion was previously denied. There is no significant threat of

irreparable injury to Plaintiff. 

(3) Hardship to Plaintiff: Given the low likelihood of Plaintiff succeeding on the

merits, the hardship to Plaintiff is relatively low. The hardship to Plaintiff does not tip in his

favor. 

(4) Public Interest: The public interest’s stake in whether a preliminary injunction or

temporary restraining order should be granted largely turns on the security of the prison in which

Plaintiff remains. Prison security has been declared a compelling government interest. Cutter,

544 U.S. at 725 n.12. Consequently, even if Plaintiff’s claim amounted to a substantial burden

required to trigger strict scrutiny analysis, it is arguable whether Plaintiff could succeed given the

government’s interest in prison security and the limited means through which the government

achieve such an interest. The public interest weighs in favor of Defendants. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth, Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining

Order/Preliminary Injunction is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED

DATED: February 5, 2010

 

 DAVID O. CARTER 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

 Sitting by Designation

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