Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01536/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-01536-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Milton Tucker, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV-03-1536-PHX RCB (JI)

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

Ralph Kluff, et. al., )

)

Defendants. ) )

The present matter arises out of a civil rights action filed

in this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on August 11, 2003. 

Compl. (doc. # 1). Currently pending before the Court are

Plaintiff's Motion for Change of Judge, Appointment of

Attorney, and Reinstatement of Previous Case (doc. # 24),

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (doc. # 35), and Plaintiff's

Motion for Time Extension (doc. # 42). Having carefully

considered the arguments raised, the Court now rules. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a prisoner incarcerated at the Cheyenne Unit of

the Arizona State Prison Complex in Yuma, Arizona. In a previous

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lawsuit initiated in this Court on May 8, 2001, Plaintiff alleged,

inter alia, that he was denied access to the courts. Tucker v.

Stewart, No. CV-01-811-PHX-RCB-JRI (D. Ariz. 2001) (doc. #

1). That complaint was twice dismissed with leave to amend. Id.

(doc. ## 9, 17). On January 9, 2003, Plaintiff's third amended

complaint was dismissed without prejudice for, among other reasons,

nonconformance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). Id.

(doc. # 21). Plaintiff appealed. Id. (doc. # 23). On August 27,

2003 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

issued a mandate affirming the dismissal. Id. (doc. # 25).

On August 11, 2003, Plaintiff filed the present complaint,

later amended on July 12, 2004, claiming that Defendants violated

his civil rights accorded to him under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Compl.

(doc. # 1); Am. Compl. (doc. # 11). In this action, Plaintiff

asserts an access-to-court claim identical to, and based on the

same underlying facts as, the access-to-court claim in Tucker v.

Stewart. Compare Compl. (doc. # 1) at 6-6A and Am. Compl.

(doc. # 11) at 5-5B with Tucker v. Stewart, No. CV-01-811-

PHX-RCB-JRI (D. Ariz. 2001) (doc. # 20) at 4-4A. In addition,

Plaintiff's present action raises a threat-to-safety claim based on

an incident in which his hand was injured while working for Arizona

Correctional Industries. Am. Compl. (doc. # 11) at 4.

On May 23, 2005, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Change of

Judge, Appointment of Attorney, and Reinstatement of Previous

Case. Mot. (doc. # 24). On December 9, 2005, Defendants filed a

motion to dismiss arguing that both of Plaintiff's claims are

barred by the statute of limitations. Mot. to Dismiss (doc. # 35)

at 2-4. On February 27, 2006, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting

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an extension of time to respond to Defendants' motion. Mot. (doc.

# 42).

II. MOTION FOR CHANGE OF JUDGE

Plaintiff claims that the undersigned is personally

biased against pro se prisoner litigants and must therefore

disqualify himself from hearing this case. Mot. (doc. # 24)

at 6. This argument is premised on the fact that this Court

has issued rulings adverse to Plaintiff in prior proceedings

in which he was a party. Id. at 7; see, e.g., Tucker v.

Stewart, No. CV-01-811-PHX-RCB-JRI (D. Ariz. 2001) (doc. #

21) (dismissing action without prejudice).

A judge must disqualify himself if his impartiality might

reasonably be questioned, or if he has a personal bias or

prejudice for or against a party. 28 U.S.C. §§ 455(a),

455(b)(1). The test for recusal is "whether a reasonable

person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that

the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 

United States v. Wilkerson, 208 F.3d 794, 797 (9th Cir. 2000)

(quoting United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453 (9th

Cir. 1997)). To be disqualifying, the bias must stem from an

extrajudicial source. In re Beverly Hills Bancorp, 752 F.2d

1334, 1341 (9th Cir. 1984). Simply because a judge has made

adverse rulings against a party in prior proceedings is not a

sufficient ground to demonstrate bias or prejudice requiring

recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455, unless the judge "(1) relied

upon knowledge acquired outside such proceedings or (2)

displayed deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism that would

render fair judgment impossible." Liteky v. United States,

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510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994); see also Ex parte Am. Steel

Barrel Co. & Seaman, 230 U.S. 35, 44 (1913)

("[Disqualification] was never intended to enable a

discontented litigant to oust a judge because of adverse

rulings made, for such rulings are reviewable otherwise 

. . . ."); Lewis v. Tuscan Dairy Farms, 25 F.3d 1138, 1141

(2d Cir. 1994) (finding that district judge's ruling against

union president in prior proceeding did not require judge's

recusal in later case involving union).

In this case, Plaintiff's allegations of impartiality

rest solely on the adverse decisions of this Court in

Plaintiff's prior cases. Mot. (doc. # 24) at 6-7. Adverse

decisions, alone, are insufficient to warrant recusal,

because it is in the very nature of the adversarial system

that a decision will be adverse to one of the parties

involved. Moreover, Plaintiff has not presented any facts

showing that this Court's decisions were tainted by any

extrajudicial bias or that the undersigned has otherwise

displayed a "deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism that

would render fair judgment impossible." Liteky, 510 U.S. at

555-56. As such, Plaintiff's request for change of judge

must be denied. See Tucker v. Kerner, 186 F.2d 79, 85 (7th

Cir. 1950) (stating that there is as much obligation upon a

judge not to recuse himself when there is no occasion for

doing so as there is a duty for him to do so when there is).

Finally, Plaintiff attempts to create an appearance of

bias by using his motion to air personal attacks against the

Court as well as the panel of circuit judges who decided his

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1

 In a related vein, Plaintiff challenges the Court to find him

in contempt for the inflammatory statements made in his motion,

suggesting that a failure to do so would be tantamount to admitting

to Plaintiff's accusations, thereby proving bias. Mot. (doc. # 24)

at 7-8. This argument also fails because the contempt power is

vested in the federal courts to be used at their discretion, not at

the direction of litigants before them. See 18 U.S.C. § 401; Green

v United States, 356 U.S. 165, 188 (1958). Although conduct similar

to that of Plaintiff has been held to warrant contempt, see Fleming

v. United States, 279 F. 613, 614-16 (9th Cir. 1922) (affirming

district court's finding of contempt based on disrespectful and

slanderous affidavit of judicial bias), the Court will exercise

its discretion not to hold Plaintiff in contempt.

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appeal in Tucker v. Stewart. Mot. (doc. # 24) at 7-8. By

doing so, he purports to have rendered the undersigned

incapable of presiding over all matters in which he appears

as a party. Id. at 7. The test for recusal, however, is not

tailored to a party's subjective views. Rather, the need for

recusal is decided according to an objective test. See

Wilkerson, 208 F.3d at 797. Because a reasonable person with

knowledge of the facts would not find that Plaintiff's

decision to vent his frustrations in his brief would in any

way infect the impartiality of this Court, Plaintiff's

request for change of judge must be denied.1 See id.

III. MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF ATTORNEY

Plaintiff has asked for the appointment of counsel at

government expense, essentially arguing that such an

appointment is necessary in the interest of time and in light

of the complexity of the legal issues that are expected to be

involved in this case. Mot. (doc. # 24) at 8-10. 

There is no constitutional right to appointment of

counsel in a civil case. See Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ.

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of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 269 (9th Cir. 1982). In proceedings

in forma pauperis, the district court "may request an

attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel." 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); Agyeman v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 390

F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004). "The decision to appoint

such counsel is within 'the sound discretion of the trial

court and is granted only in exceptional circumstances.'" 

Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103 (quoting Franklin v. Murphy, 745

F.2d 1221, 1236 (9th Cir. 1984)). In determining whether

there are exceptional circumstances warranting such

assistance, the court must evaluate "'the [plaintiff's]

likelihood of success on the merits as well as the ability of

the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of

the complexity of the legal issues involved.'" Wilborn v.

Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting

Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983)); see

also Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103-04 (counsel required in a case

of "triple complexity" involving novel issues concerning

jurisdiction, standing, and the rights of persons in

noncriminal custody). These factors are not dispositive and

must be viewed together in considering whether the

circumstances require designation of counsel. Wilborn, 789

F.2d at 1331.

In this case, Plaintiff states that "[t]he first and

foremost reason" for his request for counsel "is [that] the

courts will not acknowledge pro se prisoner litigants." Mot.

(doc. # 24) at 8. By way of example, Plaintiff maintains

that this Court's dismissal of his claims in a previous case,

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2

 Plaintiff contends that his lack of access to a legal library

has prevented him from citing case law and thereby placed him at a

disadvantage in this litigation. Mot. (doc. # 24) at 10. Because

pro se pleadings are liberally construed, particularly in civil

rights cases, it is generally unnecessary for a pro se plaintiff

to cite case law. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261

(9th Cir. 1992); Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th

Cir. 1987). Rather, it is sufficient for the plaintiff to

provide factual allegations showing that he suffered a specific

injury as a result of the specific conduct of a defendant, and

to demonstrate an affirmative link between the injury and that

conduct. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976).

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Tucker v. Stewart, No. CV-01-811-PHX-RCB-JRI (D. Ariz. 2001),

necessitates the appointment of counsel in the current case. 

Mot. (doc. # 24) at 8. However, the fact that his previous

case was dismissed without prejudice says nothing about the

complexity of issues involved in the current case or his

likelihood of success on the merits. Therefore, under the

law of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit, this cannot be a basis for appointment of counsel.

Plaintiff maintains that appointed counsel is also

necessary in light of his lack of access to proper legal

resources as well as his indigent and incarcerated status,

which makes it difficult for him to investigate the case and

obtain favorable evidence. Mot. (doc. # 24) at 9-10. With

respect to accessing legal sources, the United States Supreme

Court has stated that the constitutional right of access to

the courts does not so much require "the capability of

turning pages in a law library" as it does "the capability of

bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions

of confinement before the courts."2 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.

343, 356-57 (1996). Similarly, with respect to the ability

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to investigate the case, the right of access to the courts is

only a right to bring complaints to the federal court and not

a right to discover such claims or to litigate them

effectively once filed with a court. See id. at 354-55;

Madrid v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 1999).

Finally, anticipating a statute of limitations defense,

Plaintiff argues that the Court must appoint counsel to help

his complaint survive dismissal. Mot. (doc. # 24) at 8-9. 

The statute of limitations and any grounds for equitable

tolling of the limitations period involve straightforward

questions that are resolved on the factual allegations of the

complaint. See Vaughan v. Grijalva, 927 F.2d 476, 478 (9th

Cir. 1991) (quoting Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d

677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980)) (finding that a § 1983 claim should

be dismissed on statute of limitations grounds pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6) "only if the assertions of the complaint, read

with the required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff

to prove that the statute was tolled."). At this stage in the

proceedings, it is manifestly unlikely that the appointment of

counsel will sharpen the presentation of surrounding facts on

which the Court will depend for illumination of any statute

of limitations issue. As such, the Court does not find the

statute of limitations to present a legal issue of such

complexity requiring appointment of counsel. See Agyeman,

390 F.3d at 1103-04.

In sum, the Court does not find that the present facts

establish "exceptional circumstances" that would warrant the

appointment of an attorney under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) and

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3

 Arizona law applies to the statute of limitations issues in

this civil rights action because Congress has not specified a federal

statute of limitations for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As

such, federal courts presiding over § 1983 cases borrow the

limitations period and tolling rules applicable to personal injury

torts in the forum state. Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 (1989)

(state tolling rules); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279-80 (1985)

(state statute of limitations); TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987,

991-92 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying Arizona's two-year statute of

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the law of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit. In particular, there is no indication as to the

likelihood of Plaintiff's success on the merits or that the

legal issues involved are so complex as to require appointed

counsel. Accordingly, Plaintiff's request for appointment of

an attorney will be denied without prejudice at this time.

IV. MOTION FOR REINSTATEMENT OF PREVIOUS CASE

Plaintiff has requested reinstatement of his previous

case, Tucker v. Stewart, on the basis that his access-tocourt claim articulated in Count II of his current complaint

is identical to, and based on the same underlying facts as,

the same claim expressed in Count I of Tucker v. Stewart. 

See Mot. (doc. # 24) at 10-12. Plaintiff essentially argues

that he filed his previous action within the limitations

period, pursued it as vigorously and diligently as possible

within his abilities as a pro se litigant, and that he would

be substantially prejudiced if the statute of limitations

were applied to bar the identical claim raised in the current

action. See id. In light of these arguments, Plaintiff's

request for reinstatement of his previous case is construed as a

request for relief under section 12-504 of the Arizona

Revised Statutes.3

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28 limitations for personal injury torts in § 1983 civil rights claim).

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Arizona courts recognize equitable exceptions to the

application of the statute of limitations when necessary to

prevent injustice. Nolde v. Frankie, 192 Ariz. 276, 964 P.2d

477, 480 (1998). Advancing a similar policy, the Arizona

legislature enacted a savings statute in 1986 to allow

certain actions, though previously dismissed, to be "saved"

from the statute of limitations when they are refiled within

a limited period of time after their dismissal. That statute

provides as follows:

If an action is commenced within the time limited 

for the action, and the action is terminated in any 

manner other than by abatement, voluntary dismissal,

dismissal for lack of prosecution or a final 

judgment on the merits, the plaintiff, or a 

successor or personal representative, may commence a

new action for the same cause after the expiration 

of the time so limited and within six months after 

such termination.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-504(A) (West 2003). Relief under the statute

is automatic when the first action is terminated for reasons other

than "abatement, voluntary dismissal, dismissal for lack of

prosecution or a final judgment on the merits," and the second

action is filed within the six-month window. Jepson v. New, 164

Ariz. 265, 792 P.2d 728, 734 (1990). The six-month period in which

an action may be refiled begins upon the action's "termination,"

which in cases of appeal, occurs upon the issuance of the mandate

by the appellate court. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-504(B) (West 2003);

Roller Vill., Inc. v. Superior Court, 154 Ariz. 195, 741 P.2d 328,

330 (Ct. App. 1987).

In this instance, Plaintiff's § 1983 access-to-court claim

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4

 Although state law determines the statute of limitations for

§ 1983 civil rights claims, federal law determines when the cause of

action accrues. TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991. Under federal law, a

civil rights cause of action accrues when the plaintiff has reason to

know of the injury. See id. at 992-93; see also Vaughan v. Grijalva,

927 F.2d 476, 480 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that federal law

determines when a cause of action under § 1983 accrues and the

statute of limitations begins to run). In the present case,

Plaintiff could not have known of the injury underlying his accessto-court claim any earlier than May 9, 2000, the date on which

Defendant librarian refused to provide him the address of a state

court in which he intended to file a complaint. See Am. Compl. (doc.

# 11) at 5; Tucker v. Stewart, No. CV-01-811-PHX-RCB-JRI (D.

Ariz. 2001) (doc. # 20) at 4.

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accrued at the earliest on May 9, 2000.4 Am. Compl. (doc. # 11) at

5; Tucker v. Stewart, No. CV-01-811-PHX-RCB-JRI (D. Ariz.

2001) (doc. # 20) at 4. Plaintiff's original complaint was filed

on May 8, 2001, well within the two-year limitations period

applicable to § 1983 claims in Arizona. TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at

991-92 (9th Cir. 1999); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1) (West 2003).

Plaintiff's action in Tucker v. Stewart was dismissed without

prejudice on January 9, 2003 for reasons other than "abatement,

voluntary dismissal, dismissal for lack of prosecution or a

final judgment on the merits." Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-504(A)

(West 2003); Tucker v. Stewart, No. CV-01-811-PHX-RCB-JRI (D.

Ariz. 2001) (doc. # 21). The mandate of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirming that dismissal was

issued on August 27, 2003. Tucker v. Stewart, No. CV-01-811-

PHX-RCB-JRI (D. Ariz. 2001) (doc. # 25). Thus, Plaintiff could

refile his new action up to six months after the mandate-- on or

before February 27, 2004-- and fall within the purview of the

savings statute. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-504(B) (West 2003).

Plaintiff filed the complaint in the present action on August

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5

 In his request for reinstatement of his access-to-court claim,

Plaintiff has also demanded that the Court reimburse the filing fees

incurred in connection with his appeal in Tucker v. Stewart. Mot.

(doc. # 24) at 11. As there is no basis in the law for such relief,

that request is denied.

Plaintiff has also requested an order clarifying that, for

purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), Tucker v. Stewart was not "dismissed

on grounds that it [was] frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted." Id. at 12; 28 U.S.C. §

1915(g). Although that question may arise if Plaintiff were to file

another civil case in the future seeking to proceed in forma

pauperis, that possibility is too remote and speculative at this time

for the Court to issue such a ruling at this time. Therefore, the

Court finds that the question, which is primarily one of statutory

construction, is not ripe for resolution on the present motion. See

Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967).

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11, 2003, well before the expiry of the six-month window of the

savings statute. Compl. (doc. # 1). Plaintiff's access-to-court

claim in the current complaint is identical to, and based on the

same underlying facts as, the same claim dismissed in Tucker v.

Stewart. Compare Compl. (doc. # 1) at 6-6A and Am. Compl.

(doc. # 11) at 5-5B with Tucker v. Stewart, No. CV-01-811-

PHX-RCB-JRI (D. Ariz. 2001) (doc. # 20) at 4-4A.

The Court finds that, under these circumstances, Plaintiff is

entitled to automatic relief pursuant to the savings statute. See

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-504(A); Jepson, 792 P.2d at 734. This result

is consistent with the Court's "duty to ensure that pro se

litigants do not lose their right to a hearing on the merits of

their claim due to ignorance of technical procedural requirements." 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

1990). Therefore, under section 12-504, Plaintiff may maintain the

access-to-court claim set out in Count II of the amended complaint

(doc. # 11) notwithstanding the possible lapse of the two-year

limitations period.5

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V. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

In view of the Arizona savings statute's application to

this case, it appears to the Court that Defendants' motion to

dismiss (doc. # 35), which is based solely on the statute of

limitations, is now ready for the Court's consideration. 

Therefore, the reference of this case to the magistrate judge

is withdrawn as to that motion (doc. # 35) as well as

Plaintiff's related motion (doc. # 42) seeking an extension

of time within which to respond.

Although Plaintiff's access-to-court claim is saved by

section 12-504, the question remains whether Plaintiff's

threat-to-safety claim is barred by the two-year statute of

limitations. See Mot. to Dismiss (doc. # 35) at 2-3. The

latter question has not been fully briefed and would have to

be retained under advisement pending Plaintiff's response. 

It is apparent from this result that the application of the

Arizona savings statute has substantially altered Defendants'

motion. Rather than ruling piecemeal on the motion to

dismiss (doc. # 35), the Court finds that justice is best

served by denying Defendants' motion (doc. # 35) without

prejudice. Plaintiff's related motion for extension of time

to respond (doc. # 42) is denied and dismissed as moot.

In light of the foregoing analysis,

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for

Change of Judge (doc. # 24) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for

Appointment of Attorney (doc. # 24) is DENIED without

prejudice.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for

Reinstatement of Previous Case (doc. # 24) is construed as a

request for relief pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-504 and,

so construed, is GRANTED. Pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-

504, Plaintiff may maintain the access-to-court claim set out

in Count II of the amended complaint (doc. # 11)

notwithstanding the possible lapse of the limitations period

applicable to that claim.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the reference of this case to the

magistrate judge is withdrawn as to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

(doc. # 35) and Plaintiff's Motion for Time Extension (doc. # 42).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (doc.

# 35) is DENIED without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Time

Extension (doc. # 42) is DENIED and dismissed as moot.

DATED this 28th day of March, 2006.

Copies to counsel of record and Plaintiff pro se.

Case 2:03-cv-01536-RCB-JRI Document 44 Filed 03/28/06 Page 14 of 14