Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02060/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02060-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

CLIFFORD J. OCHSER, )

)

Plaintiff, ) 

) No. CIV 05-2060 PHX RCB

vs. ) 

)

MARICOPA COUNTY, et al., ) O R D E R

)

Defendants. ) )

This matter arises out of an incident in which Plaintiff was

arrested by Maricopa County Sheriff's Office ("MCSO") deputies on a

warrant that had previously been quashed. Plaintiff alleges that

his constitutional rights were violated and seeks recovery under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and state tort law. Compl. (doc. # 1). Currently

before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc. #

37). The matter has been fully briefed. See Resp. (doc. # 46);

Reply (doc. # 47). Having carefully considered the arguments

raised, the Court now rules.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 3, 2003, the Superior Court of Arizona in Maricopa

County issued a child support arrest warrant for Plaintiff in his

domestic relations case, but later quashed that warrant by minute

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entry on March 13, 2003. Defs.' Statement of Facts ("DSOF") (doc.

# 38) ¶¶ 3-4. On May 5, 2004, MCSO deputy Funk and sergeant Cruz

arrested Plaintiff in the parking lot of his place of work on that

warrant. Id. ¶ 18. Although Plaintiff informed the MCSO officers

that the warrant had been quashed and that a certified copy of the

minute entry quashing it was available in his office, the officers

did not enter Plaintiff's office to verify the warrant's validity. 

Resp. (doc. # 46), Ex. 3.

On July 12, 2005, Plaintiff filed the present action against

Defendants Maricopa County and Sheriff Joseph Arpaio, seeking

recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state tort law. Compl. (doc. #

1). On July 25, 2006, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint in

a separate state court action naming MCSO depty Funk and sergeant

Cruz, among others, as defendants. Resp. (doc. # 46), Ex. 1. Upon

filing the amended complaint in the state court action, Plaintiff's

counsel suggested to Defendants that they remove the case to

federal court so that it could be consolidated with the present

matter. Resp. (doc. # 46), Ex. 2. Defendants apparently declined.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate "when there is no genuine

issue of material fact" such that "the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. In determining

whether to grant summary judgment, a district court must view the

underlying facts and the inferences to be drawn from those facts in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita

Elec. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

. . .

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If a party will bear the burden of proof at trial as to an

element essential to its claim, and fails to adduce evidence

establishing a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the

existence of that element, then summary judgment is appropriate. 

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Not

every factual dispute is capable of defeating a properly supported

motion for summary judgment. Rather, the party opposing the motion

must show that there is a genuine issue of material fact. See

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A

factual dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a rational

trier of fact could resolve the dispute in favor of the nonmoving

party. Id. at 248. A fact is material if determination of the

issue might affect the outcome of the case under the governing

substantive law. Id. Thus, a party opposing a motion for summary

judgment cannot rest upon bare allegations or denials in the

pleadings, but must set forth specific facts demonstrating a

genuine issue for trial. See id. at 250. If the nonmoving party's

evidence is merely colorable or not significantly probative, a

court may grant summary judgment. See id. at 249; see also Cal.

Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d

1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants contend that they cannot be held directly liable

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Plaintiff's federal civil rights claims,

because Plaintiff cannot point to any custom or policy indicative

of their deliberate indifference to his rights. Mot. (doc. # 37)

at 3-10. Plaintiff concedes this point and does not oppose the

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grant of summary judgment with respect to his section 1983 claims

against Defendants Maricopa County and Sheriff Joseph Arpaio. 

Resp. (doc. # 46) at 2. The Court will therefore grant Defendants'

motion with respect to Plaintiff's federal claims.

Defendants also seek summary judgment on Plaintiff's state law

claims. In particular, Defendants argue that they cannot as a

matter of law be held vicariously liable for any tortious conduct

by the arresting officers, and, in any event, that there are no

genuine issues of material fact which would suggest that the

officers acted unreasonably or breached any duty to Plaintiff. 

Mot. (doc. # 37) at 10-12. Plaintiff maintains that Defendants'

vicarious liability is not clearly vitiated under Arizona law, and

that there are genuine issues of material fact concerning the

reasonableness of the arresting officers' conduct. Resp. (doc. #

46). In addition, Plaintiff argues that his remaining state law

claims should be dismissed without prejudice so that they may be

refiled in the state court and consolidated with the matter already

pending there. Id. at 2-5. The Court will first address

Defendants' arguments for summary judgment on the state law claims.

In Defendants' view, the County cannot be vicariously liable

for the MCSO officers' allegedly tortious conduct, because the

officers were acting pursuant to duties imposed by law rather than

by the County. See Mot. (doc. # 37) at 10-11; Ariz. Rev. Stat. §

11-441(A)(2) (West 2001) ("The sheriff shall . . . [a]rrest and

take before the nearest magistrate for examination all persons who

attempt to commit or who have committed a public offense."). 

Defendants rely on Fridena v. Maricopa County, 18 Ariz. App. 527,

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504 P.2d 58 (1972), where the Court of Appeals of Arizona held that

Maricopa County, "having no right of control over the Sheriff or

his deputies in service of [a] writ of restitution, [could] not [be

held] liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the

Sheriff's torts." In spite of this, Plaintiff contends that the

extent of the County's vicarious liability remains uncertain,

because, as the Fridena court recognized, "the County exercises

supervision of the official conduct of the Sheriff." Resp. (doc. #

46) at 3-4 (citing Fridena, 504 P.2d at 61). The Court does not

perceive any uncertainty that would give rise to a triable issue. 

The County's supervisory authority over its officers is clearly

delineated at Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-251, and does not encompass any

power over the Sheriff's statutorily mandated duty to arrest those

persons who have committed a public offense. Thus, the County

cannot be held liable for the MCSO officers' conduct under the

doctrine of respondeat superior, and is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law with respect to the state law claims. See Fridena,

504 P.2d at 61-62.

Defendants also claim that the Sheriff is entitled to summary

judgment, because they believe his "deputies in this case acted as

a careful and prudent officer would have acted in the same

circumstances." Mot. (doc. # 37) at 11-12. Defendants point out

that Plaintiff's arrest was carried out in connection with

"Operation Mother's Day 2004"-- a reference to the Sheriff's crackdown on parents who had been delinquent in their child support

payments. Defendants also point out that, although the arresting

officers did not ask to see the minute entry quashing the warrant

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that Plaintiff claimed to have nearby, they did verify the validity

of the warrant by other means prior to arresting Plaintiff. See

id. at 11. While these may be reasonable arguments for Defendants

to present to the trier of fact, they fail to convince the Court

that there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding their

allegedly tortious conduct. Plaintiff's testimony of the arresting

officer's unwillingness to walk the short distance to his office

where he could have easily produced the minute entry quashing his

arrest warrant is particularly troublesome. See Resp. (doc. # 46),

Ex. 3. Plaintiff's evidence is significantly probative and could

easily influence a rational trier of fact to find in his favor on

the issue of the Sheriff's liability. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at

248. Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendants' motion for

summary judgment with respect to the state law claims asserted

against Defendant Joseph Arpaio.

The Court now considers whether it should retain supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state law claims against

the Sheriff. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the district court has

broad discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction,

and the Supreme Court has stated that "in the usual case in which

all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of

factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction

over the remaining state-law claims." Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.

Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988); accord Hardage v. CBS, 427

F.3d 1177, 1189 (9th Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff urges the Court to decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction and to dismiss his remaining state law claims without

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1

 The Arizona savings statute provides as follows:

If an action is commenced within the time limited

for the action, and the action is terminated in

any manner other than by abatement, voluntary

dismissal, dismissal for lack of prosecution or

a final judgment on the merits, the plaintiff, or

a successor or personal representative, may

commence a new action for the same cause after

the expiration of the time so limited and within

six months after such termination.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-504(A) (West 2001). Because this tolling

period is greater than that provided under the federal statute, the

Court will apply the Arizona savings statute. See 28 U.S.C. §

1367(d).

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prejudice. Resp. (doc. # 46) at 2. Plaintiff expects that under

Arizona's savings statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-504, the statute

of limitations for his state law claims will have been tolled

during the course of this litigation,1

 allowing him to refile those

claims in state court and have them consolidated with the case

already pending there. However, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's

state law claims were not timely filed in the present action, and

that Plaintiff therefore cannot rely on the savings statute. Reply

(doc. # 47) at 3-4. In particular, Defendants assert that

Plaintiff knew or should have known of his injury as of the date of

his arrest on May 5, 2004, and, by waiting until July 12, 2005 to

bring this action, failed to file within the one-year limitations

period for actions against public entities and employees. Id.; see

also Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-821 (West 2001) ("All actions against

any public entity or public employee shall be brought within one

year after the cause of action accrues and not afterward").

. . .

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The statute of limitations question having been presented for

the first time by Defendants in their reply memorandum, the Court

is reluctant to resolve it now in a case dispositive manner. Cf.

Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding

that where a party introduces new evidence in its reply brief, the

district court should not consider the new evidence without giving

the non-movant an opportunity to respond); Corson & Gruman Co. v.

NLRB, 283 U.S. App. D.C. 239, 899 F.2d 47, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1990)

(requiring moving party to raise all arguments in its opening brief

to prevent "sandbagging" of opposing party). Because the Court has

dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, the

Court will, in the interest of judicial economy and comity, decline

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining

state law claims against Defendant Joseph Arpaio. See 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3); Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 484 U.S. at 350 n.7; Hardage,

427 F.3d at 1189.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants' motion for summary

judgment (doc. # 37) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. With

respect to Plaintiff's federal civil rights and constitutional

claims, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted as to

Defendants Maricopa County and Joseph Arpaio. With respect to

Plaintiff's state law claims, Defendants' motion for summary

judgment is granted as to Defendant Maricopa County, and is denied

as to Defendant Joseph Arpaio.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing Plaintiff's state law claims

against Defendant Joseph Arpaio without prejudice to their

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reassertion in state court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to

enter judgment accordingly and terminate this case. 

DATED this 30th day of May, 2007.

Copies to counsel of record

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