Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00749/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00749-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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1

 Plaintiff erroneously sued these defendants as M. Magdalena

Carrilla Mejia, Lewis Preston, Gloria Talley and Rawanda Bishop.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE SPITTAL, No. CIV.S-05-0749 FCD DAD PS

Plaintiff,

v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

WILLIAM B. SHUBB, et al.,

Defendants.

__________________________/

This matter is before the court on the following: (1)

Motions to dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and for an order declaring plaintiff

George Walker Spittal a vexatious litigant (Doc. nos. 6 & 23) filed

on behalf of defendants M. Magdalena Carrillo Mejia, Preston Lewis,

Gloria Nogales-Talley and Ramona Bishop;1 (2) The motion to dismiss

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) filed on behalf of defendant United States

District Judge William B. Shubb (Doc. no. 11); (3) The motion to

Case 2:05-cv-00749-FCD-DAD Document 38 Filed 11/02/05 Page 1 of 12
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2

 At the time defendants filed their motions to dismiss the

operative pleading in this case was plaintiff’s original complaint. 

While those motions were under submission, plaintiff, who is

proceeding pro se, filed an amended complaint, which he was entitled

to do. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). While in some instances the

filing of an amended pleading moots a motion to dismiss, such is not

the case here. As explained below, plaintiff’s amended complaint

does not cure the deficiencies detailed in defendants’ motions. 

Therefore, the undersigned has considered defendants’ motions to

dismiss as directed at plaintiff’s amended complaint. See Schwarzer,

Tashima and Wagstaffe, Federal Procedure Before Trial, ¶ 9:262 (The

Rutter Group 2004)(“An amended complaint supersedes the prior

complaint as a pleading. Thus, the court will usually treat the

motion to dismiss as mooted. It may, however, proceed with the

motion if the amendment does not cure the defect.”).

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dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) filed on behalf of defendant United

States Magistrate Judge Peter A. Nowinski (Doc. no. 14); (4)

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. no. 10); and (5)

Plaintiff’s motion re contempt (Doc. no. 29). Having considered all

written materials submitted in connection with the motions, for the

reasons explained below, the undersigned will recommend that

defendants’ motions to dismiss be granted, defendants’ vexatious

litigant motion be denied and plaintiff’s motions be denied. The

undersigned will further recommend that plaintiff’s amended complaint

be dismissed with prejudice and this action be closed.2

I. Motions to Dismiss

A. Applicable Legal Standards

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of the claim or claims that

would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,

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3

 A court may take judicial notice of court records. See MGIC

Indem. Co. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 1986); United

States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980). The undersigned

hereby takes judicial notice of these court files. 

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73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)); Palmer v.

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). 

In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept

as true the allegations of the complaint. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex

Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976). Furthermore, the court

must construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. See

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). In a case where the

plaintiff is pro se, the court has an obligation to construe the

pleadings liberally. Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th

Cir. 1985) (en banc). However, the court’s liberal interpretation of

a pro se complaint may not supply essential elements of a claim that

are not pled. Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992);

Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

Cir. 1982).

B. Analysis

This is one of eight actions plaintiff has initiated in

this court over the last five years. (See No. CIV.S-00-1287 WBS PAN

PS; No. CIV.S-00-1766 LKK GGH PS; No. CIV.S-01-00036 GEB JFM PS; No.

CIV.S-04-1198 GEB DAD PS; No. CIV.S-05-0112 MCE DAD PS; No. CIV.S-05-

0749 FCD DAD PS; No. CIV.S-05-1157 MCE KJM PS; No. CIV.S-05-2042 FCD

GGH PS.3) All of the actions arise out of plaintiff’s employment as

a substitute teacher with the Sacramento City Unified School District

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4

 Such accusations appear to be routine for plaintiff, a former

lawyer whom the Supreme Court of Ohio has permanently disbarred from

the practice of law in that state. In 1990, the Supreme Court of

Ohio found “the flagrant disrespect that [Mr. Spittal] has

demonstrated toward the entire judicial system deserving of the legal

profession's most severe sanction.” Akron Bar Ass'n v. Spittal, 51

Ohio St. 3d 121, 122, 554 N.E. 2d 1338, 1339 (1990). In disbarring

plaintiff, the Supreme Court of Ohio relied on evidence presented to

a disciplinary panel which

established that [Mr. Spittal] routinely, and

without justification, referred to the decisions

made by federal and Ohio judges as being the

product of dishonesty, partiality, ignorance, and

incompetence. The evidence further established

that [Mr. Spittal] routinely, and without

justification, accused judges and attorneys alike

of lying. Indeed, the record manifests that [Mr.

Spittal] made these remarks simply because he

disagreed with a judge's decision or an

attorney's argument.

51 Ohio St. 3d at 122, 554 N.E. 2d at 1339.

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(“District”). All of the actions also involve allegations that the

District and its employees have retaliated against plaintiff for

speaking out against District policies regarding classroom

management, particularly those policies which plaintiff perceives as

being motivated by race, socio-economic factors, or circumstances

related to students’ behavior. Some of the actions additionally name

as defendants the lawyers who have defended the District and its

employees against plaintiff’s numerous legal actions as well as the

judges who have been assigned tp preside over those actions. In this

regard, plaintiff typically accuses defense counsel and the judges of

lying, contempt, conspiracy and the like in connection with the

litigation of plaintiff’s claims.4

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The crux of the amended complaint in this action is

plaintiff’s allegation that District employees have retaliated

against him (i.e., altered his teaching assignments and criticized

him) in response to an earlier lawsuit initiated by plaintiff wherein

he accused District employees of managing classrooms in a manner that

is racially discriminatory and/or mistreats students with

disabilities. (Am. Compl. at 12-13.) The amended complaint also

alleges retaliation, and a failure to investigate, in connection with

more recent statements by plaintiff at work regarding his belief that

certain students “have a right not to be around” other students whom

plaintiff describes as violent and as subject to arrest for their

behavior. (Am. Compl. at 13.) The named defendants with respect to

these allegations are M. Magdalena Carrillo Mejia, the superintendent

of the District; Preston Lewis, a teacher; Gloria Nogales-Talley, a

principal; and Ramona Bishop, another principal. As to defendants

William B. Shubb and Peter A. Nowinski, the amended complaint accuses

these judges of lying and conspiring with the District defendants in

denying plaintiff access to the courts. Liberally construed, the

amended complaint alleges that all of the defendants in some fashion

have violated, and conspired to violate, plaintiff’s First Amendment

right to free speech and his substantive due process rights. The

amended complaint prays for unspecified compensatory and punitive

damages.

As an initial matter, it must be noted that plaintiff’s

amended complaint is unfocussed, laced with invectives and replete

with conclusory allegations. It does not contain “a short and plain

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statement” of a claim showing that plaintiff is entitled to relief. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This alone warrants dismissal. See

Jones v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.

1984). Nonetheless, even considering the merits of plaintiff’s

claims, the undersigned concludes that this entire action should be

dismissed with prejudice as to all named defendants for failure to

state a claim.

Beginning with defendants Judge Shubb and Judge Nowinski,

it is clear that plaintiff is attempting to sue these judges for

actions taken within the course and scope of their judicial duties in

a previous action initiated by plaintiff in this court, presumably

Spittal v. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., No. CIV.S-00-1287 WBS

PAN PS. As such, under well-settled authority defendants Judge Shubb

and Judge Nowinski are absolutely immune from suit. See Mireles v.

Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-

56 (1978); Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965-66 (9th

Cir. 1999). Therefore, the undersigned will recommend that their

motions to dismiss be granted.

The undersigned also will recommend that the motion to

dismiss brought by defendants Mejia, Lewis, Nogales-Talley and Bishop

because they are entitled to qualified immunity. Whether a defendant

is entitled to qualified immunity involves a two-step inquiry. 

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). The first step is to ask

whether the alleged facts, taken in the light most favorable to the

party asserting the injury, show the officer's conduct violated a

constitutional right. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If this question is

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answered in the negative, then "there is no necessity for further

inquiries concerning qualified immunity." Id. If the question is

answered in the affirmative, the next step is “to ask whether the

right was clearly established." Id. A constitutional right is

clearly established when "it would be clear to a reasonable officer

that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Id.

at 202. See also Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1183-84 (9th

Cir. 2002).

With respect to plaintiff’s attempted First Amendment

claim, the alleged facts do not demonstrate that defendants’ conduct

violated plaintiff’s right to free speech. This is because the

allegations of the amended complaint indicate that plaintiff’s speech

as a public employee regarding the placement and management of

students within the District does not amount to speech upon “a matter

of public concern." See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143-46

(1983); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 561, 568 (1968);

Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2004). Rather,

the alleged speech encompassed by the instant amended complaint is

simply part of a larger, ongoing internal dispute between plaintiff

and the District defendants regarding classroom management within the

District. That dispute amounts to an individual personnel dispute

that clearly is “of no relevance to the public's evaluation of the

performance of” the District. See Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1173. See

also Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 973-74 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“[S]peech that deals with ‘individual personnel disputes and

grievances’ and that would be of ‘no relevance to the public’s

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evaluation of the performance of governmental agencies’ is generally

not of ‘public concern’”). Accordingly, accepting the allegations of

the complaint as true, plaintiff’s speech did not regard a matter of

public concern and defendants did not violate plaintiff’s First

Amendment rights.

Even assuming plaintiff has spoken upon a matter of public

concern, as opposed to a matter only of personal interest, the court

further finds that the District’s interest as an employer in

promoting efficiency of the public services it performs through its

employees outweighs plaintiff’s interest in that speech. See

Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; Gillbrook v. City of Westminster, 177

F.3d 839, 867 (9th Cir. 1999). In weighing whether the government’s

interest in promoting an effective workplace outweighs an employee’s

First Amendment rights, courts may consider “whether the speech (i)

impairs discipline or control by superiors, (ii) disrupts co-worker

relations, (iii) erodes a close working relationship premised on

personal loyalty and confidentiality, (iv) interferes with the

speaker's performance of her or his duties, or (v) obstructs the

routine operation of the office. Hyland v. Wonder, 972 F.2d 1129,

1139 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, the School District’s interest in

maintaining discipline and control in its schools, promoting coworker relations and fostering an educational environment outweighs

plaintiff’s interest in speaking out against what plaintiff may

perceive as the disparate treatment of students. See Goss v. Lopez,

419 U.S. 565, 590-91 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent

Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969)(“[T]he Court has

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repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive

authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with

fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control

conduct in the schools.”). For this reason as well, the undersigned

finds that plaintiff’s speech as alleged in the complaint is not

protected by the First Amendment. 

Accordingly, the District defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity on plaintiff’s First Amendment claims. The

undersigned therefore will recommend that defendants’ motions to

dismiss be granted.

Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim also must be

dismissed. As set forth above, the allegations of the amended

complaint, like the allegations in plaintiff’s other actions, boil

down to the assertion that plaintiff is being retaliated against for

speaking out against perceived inequities within District schools. 

As such, plaintiff’s claims must be addressed under the First

Amendment, not substantive due process. This is because "[w]here a

particular Amendment 'provides an explicit textual source of

constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government

behavior, 'that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of

"substantive due process," must be the guide for analyzing these

claims.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (quoting

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). As just discussed, the

District defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s

First Amendment claims. Therefore, defendants’ motion to dismiss 

must be granted with respect to plaintiff’s substantive due process

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claim for this reason as well.

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s amended

complaint is fatally deficient. Moreover, the arguments presented by

plaintiff in the motions pending before the court are frivolous.

Finally, whatever his intentions, through the numerous lawsuits filed

in this court involving either essentially the same subject or

plaintiff’s displeasure with the results obtained in prior litigation

with respect thereto, plaintiff has engaged in conduct that has

harassed the named defendants. For all these reasons, it appears

clear that plaintiff cannot cure the defects in his amended

complaint. Granting leave to amend under these circumstances would

be futile. See Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th

Cir. 1990); Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729,

738 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 n.8

(9th Cir. 2000) (“When a case may be classified as frivolous or

malicious, there is, by definition, no merit to the underlying action

and so no reason to grant leave to amend.”) Accordingly, the

undersigned will recommend that this action be dismissed with

prejudice.

II. Plaintiff’s Motions for Summary Judgment and Re Contempt

Plaintiff’s perfunctory motion for summary judgment is

based on the unsupported assertion that defendants Judge Shubb and

Judge Nowinski “lied” in connection with plaintiff’s earlier action

so as to “deny him access to a jury trial.” (Doc. no. 10 at 2.) 

Plaintiff also offers that “[d]efendants’ motion to dismiss is a

sham.” (Id.)

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 See fn. 4, infra.

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Plaintiff’s equally perfunctory and unsupported motion re

contempt, in turn, seeks an order holding Assistant United States

Attorney Bobbie J. Montoya in contempt for “lying on behalf of

defendants Shubb and Nowinski.” (Doc. no. 29 at 1.) Ms. Montoya is

counsel of record for the defendant judges.

The baseless and harassing content of plaintiff’s motions

for summary judgment and re contempt speaks for itself.5 The

undersigned therefore will recommend that those motions be denied.

III. Defendants’ Vexatious Litigant Motion

While plaintiff has demonstrated a pattern of harassing

defendants and others with his numerous actions initiated in this

court, the undersigned will recommend against the extreme remedy of

imposing a pre-filing order at this time. See De Long v. Hennessey,

912 F.2d 1144, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Keeping in mind the

particular caution with which such orders should be issued, we remand

this case to the district court to apply the guidelines we set forth

below before ordering pre-filing restrictions.”); Wood v. Santa

Barbara Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 705 F.2d 1515, 1523-26 (9th Cir.

1993). Therefore, the court will recommend that defendants’ motion

for an order declaring plaintiff a vexatious litigant be denied

without prejudice to renewal in the event plaintiff were to continue

to engage in such abusive conduct.

/////

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED

that:

1. Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Doc. nos. 6, 11 & 14) be

granted;

2. Plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment and re contempt

(Doc. nos. 10 & 29) be denied;

3. Defendants’ motion to have plaintiff declared a

vexatious litigant (Doc. no. 23) be denied; and

4. Plaintiff’s amended complaint be dismissed with

prejudice.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the

United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within ten days after being

served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file

written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. 

Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections shall be

served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s

order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: October 31, 2005.

DAD:th

DDad1\orders.prose\spittal0749.f&r.dism

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