Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00629/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00629-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 16:1538 Endangered Species Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HOME BUILDERS ASSOCIATION OF

NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, et al.,

NO. CIV. S-05-629 LKK/GGH

Plaintiffs,

v. O R D E R

UNITED STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE

SERVICE, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

DEFENDERS OF THE WILDLIFE, et al.,

Intervenors.

 /

Placer Ranch, Inc. (“Placer Ranch”) seeks to intervene

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) or, in the alternative, pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). Placer Ranch owns a 2,213-acre parcel

in Western Placer County, which is the site of a proposed mixed-use

development. 

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 Plaintiffs include Butte Environmental Council, Defenders 1

of Wildlife, California Native Plant Society, San Joaquin Raptor

and Wildlife Rescue Center, Sierra Foothills Audubon Society, and

Vernalpools.org. 

 See Butte Envtl. Council v. Norton, Civ. No. S-04-0096 2

(E.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2004)(Shubb, J.).

2

The underlying action involves claims brought by Butte 

Environmental Council, et al. (“environmental groups” or

“plaintiffs”) under the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-

1544 (“ESA”), and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 

§ 706(2)(A) (“APA”), against Gale Norton, the Secretary of the

Interior, and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service

(collectively, “FWS.”). Plaintiffs challenge an FWS final rule 1

designating critical habitat for fifteen vernal pool species in

California and Southern Oregon, including the vernal pool fairy

shrimp. In August 2003, FWS’ final rule designated all 2,213

acres of the Placer Ranch property as critical habitat for the

fifteen vernal pool series. 68 Fed. Reg. 46684 (2003)(“August 2003

final rule”). The August 2003 final rule was remanded, in part,

by an order of this court dated October 28, 2004. 

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On August 11, 2005, the Service issued a revised final rule

designating critical habitat for the vernal pool species. 70 Fed.

Reg. 46924(2005)(“August 2005 final rule”). The August 2005 final

rule excluded the Placer Ranch property from the critical habitat

designation along with the rest of the Census Tract 06061021301

“based on economic impacts.” Id. at 46931. Plaintiffs now

challenge the August 2005 final rule on several accounts, including

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 Specifically, plaintiffs allege that FWS unlawfully relied 3

upon an inadequate analysis of economic impacts that overestimated

potential costs of designation, as well as underestimated and

disregarded potential benefits of designation, to exclude 23 census

tract areas. Compl. at 2. Plaintiffs aver that FWS unlawfully

excluded many areas - including National Monuments, National

Wildlife Refuges, and lands overlapping with habitat conservation

plans - based on inadequate existing protections. Id. Finally,

plaintiffs contend that FWS failed to provide public notice and to

follow comment procedures for critical habitat exclusion. Id. at

15-16.

 Home Builders Assoc. of Northern California, et al. v. FWS, 4

et al., Civ. No. S-05-0629 LKK/GGH, the lead case, involves a

challenge to the Service’s same final rules designating critical

habitat for the vernal pool species. Whereas Home Builders Assoc.

of Northern California and other building industry entities are

challenging various aspects of the critical habitat designation

which they argue is overinclusive, Placer Ranch seeks to intervene

in Butte Environmental Council, et al., Civ. No. S-05-2524-LKK/JFM,

to defend the exclusion of its property from the critical habitat

designation. In other words, Placer Ranch seeks to defend the

status quo.

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the “economic impacts” analysis upon which FWS relied on to exclude

the Placer Ranch property and other properties from critical

habitat designation. Plaintiffs seek, inter alia, an order 3

declaring that defendants have violated the two aforementioned

statutes and directing defendants to issue a revised and lawful

critical habitat designation for the fifteen vernal pool species.

Compl. at 17.

Placer Ranch seeks to intervene in Civ. No. S-05-0524 LKK/PAN

and does not plan to take a position with respect to the issues

raised by the other parties in Home Builders Association of

Northern California, which was consolidated with the aforementioned

case on January 13, 2006. Mot. to Intervene at 1. Plaintiffs 4

Butte Environmental Council, et al., oppose this motion, contending

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 Statements of non-opposition have been filed by the City 5

of Suisun, federal defendants, and plaintiffs Home Builders

Association of Northern California, et al.

Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 6

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. Local Rule

78-230(h). Further, the court notes that although this motion was

noticed to be heard on the court’s June 12, 2006 Law and Motion

calendar, the court resolves it in an expedited fashion because on

May 11, 2006, plaintiffs Butte Environmental Council et al.

(“environmental groups”) wrote the court to request the court to

act expeditiously in granting or denying the motion to intervene

because proposed intervenor, Placer Ranch, filed an opposition to

plaintiffs’ brief as proposed intervenors on May 5, 2006. The

environmental groups noted that “absent an early decision,

environmental groups will have to research and brief arguments that

may ultimately be untimely.” The court resolves the motion after

receipt of Placer County’s reply brief, which was not filed until

after May 16, 2006.

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that Placer Ranch failed to intervene in a timely manner. Opp’n 5

at 2. I decide the matter based on the pleadings and the parties’

papers without oral argument. 

6

II. 

 ANALYSIS 

Placer Ranch seeks to intervene as of right under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 24(a). Below, I explain why Placer Ranch’s motion must be

granted.

A. INTERVENTION AS A MATTER OF RIGHT

An order granting intervention as of right is appropriate if

“(1) the applicant’s motion is timely; (2) the applicant has

asserted an interest relating to the property or transaction which

is the subject of the action; (3) the applicant is so situated that

without intervention the disposition may, as a practical matter,

impair or impede its ability to protect that interest; and (4) the

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applicant’s interest is not adequately represented by the existing

parties.” County of Orange v. Air California, 799 F.2d 535, 537

(9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987). 

The Ninth Circuit has held, often in the context of

environmental disputes, that “Rule 24 is broadly construed in favor

of intervention.” United States v. Washington, 86 F.3d 1499, 1503

(9th Cir. 1996); Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 409 (9th Cir.

1998)(“In determining whether intervention is appropriate, we are

guided primarily by practical and equitable considerations. We

generally interpret the requirements broadly in favor of

intervention.”) Courts are to “take all well-pleaded nonconclusory

allegations in the motion to intervene, proposed complaint or

answer in intervention, and declarations supporting the motion as

true absent sham, frivolity or other objections.” Southwest Center

for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 820 (9th Cir.

2001). 

The test for intervention should be applied with an eye on

practical consideration. United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d

821, 826 (9th Cir. 1986)(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) advisory

note 9)(“if an [applicant] would be substantially affected in a

practical sense by the determination made in an action, [the

applicant] should, as a general rule, be entitled to

intervene . . . .”)). 

1. Timeliness

Placer Ranch argues that it has moved to intervene in a timely

fashion. The only opposition to this motion is filed by Butte

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 The Ninth Circuit reviews for abuse of discretion a 7

district court’s determination that an application for intervention

is untimely. United States v. Carpenter, 298 F.2d 1122, 1124 (9th

Cir. 2002).

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Environmental Council, et al., (“environmental groups) and the only

argument raised by the environmental groups is that Placer Ranch’s

motion is untimely. I cannot agree.

Timeliness is measured by reference to “(1) the stage of the

proceeding at which an applicant seeks to intervene, (2) the

prejudice to other parties; and (3) the reason for the length of

the delay.” County of Orange v. Air Calif., 799 F.2d 535, 537 (9th

Cir. 1986); United States v. Carpenter, 298 F.2d 1122, 1125 (9th

Cir. 2002). “Timeliness is a flexible concept; its determination 7

is left to the district court’s discretion.” United States v.

Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d 915, 921 (9th Cir. 2004)(citation

omitted).

The environmental groups contend that Placer Ranch did not

intervene in a timely fashion because the suit is at “an advanced

stage.” Opp’n at 2. They point out that Home Builders, the lead

case, was filed over a year ago, and that the instant suit was

filed five months ago. They also note that the court has issued

several orders, including an order consolidating the cases, an

order setting the summary judgment briefing schedule, and that the

briefing has already began about a month ago. Id. Finally, the

environmental groups contend that they would be prejudiced if

Placer Ranch’s motion is granted because they would have to address

new legal arguments not raised by federal defendants. 

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In considering the three factors set forth by the Ninth

Circuit, first, the motion is filed at an early stage in the

proceedings. Although the court has issued several orders in this

case, the case is not at an “advanced stage” because no orders

have been issued with regard to the merits. Ninth Circuit

authority supports the court’s conclusion that intervention should

not be denied based on this argument. See, e.g., County of Orange

v. Air Calif., 799 F.2d at 538 (filing a motion after the parties

had come to an agreement following five years of litigation weighs

heavily against intervention); Calif. Dept. of Toxic Substances

Control, 309 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2002)(intervention not

appropriate where the parties have settled and more than six years

after litigation commenced); United States v. State of Oregon, 913

F.2d 576, 588-89 (9th Cir. 1990)(district court did not abuse its

discretion by denying intervention when intervention was sought

after settlement involving a compromise following four years of

negotiation). Because Placer Ranch moved to intervene less than

five months after the environmental groups filed their complaint,

and because no substantive orders have been issued, the court holds

that the motion was filed at an early stage of the proceedings. 

Secondly, the environmental groups’ argument that they would

be prejudiced by Placer Ranch’s intervention is without merit. The

environmental groups maintain that they would be prejudiced because

they would have to address new arguments and had a “mere three

weeks to respond to these arguments.” They argue that intervention

should be denied because Placer Ranch has raised issues which are

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Indeed, the court concludes that three weeks is more than 8

sufficient time to respond to Placer Ranch’s thirty-five page

brief.

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“well beyond the scope of claims and defenses raised by existing

parties.” Opp’n at 3. The type of prejudice cited by the

environmental groups does not rise to the level which the Ninth

Circuit has found to be enough to preclude intervention. In most

cases, the Ninth Circuit has found prejudice where the passage of

time weighs against intervention because the court has resolved a

number of issues on the merits. See supra at 7. As discussed

above, the passage of time does not weigh against intervention.

Further, based on the court’s examination of Placer Ranch’s

opposition brief, it does not appear that it has raised “new issues

or matters” that are well beyond the scope of claims and defenses

raised by the existing parties. As Placer Ranch points out, they

make the same fundamental arguments as those made by federal

defendants. That is, that FWS acted lawfully to exclude Placer

Ranch and other properties from the critical habitat designation

for the vernal pool species. Finally, the court is tasked with 8

considering the reason for the delay. The court notes that

although Placer Ranch has not presented a reason for not moving to

intervene sooner, the court concludes that it was reasonable for

Placer Ranch not to be aware of the litigation until March 2006,

three months after this suit was filed, and that it was also

reasonable not to file the motion to intervene until May 5, 2006.

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For all the reasons stated above, the court concludes that

Placer Ranch filed their motion to intervene in a timely fashion.

2. The Interests of the Intervenors

Placer Ranch argues, and no party disputes, that it has

protectible interests in this litigation. The Ninth Circuit has

held that a “non-speculative, economic interest may be sufficient

to support a right of intervention” when the interest is “concrete

and related to the underlying subject matter of the action.” 

United States v. Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d 915, 919-920 (9th

Cir. 2004)(citation omitted). “It is generally enough that the

interest is protectible under some law, and that there is a

relationship between the legally protected interest and the claims

at issue.” Sierra Club v. U.S. E.P.A., 995 F.2d 1478, 1484 (9th

Cir. 1993). Economic interests cannot be “based upon a bare

expectation.” Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. Berg,

268 F.3d 810, 819 (9th Cir. 2001).

First, Placer Ranch has an interest that is protectible under

the law. Placer Ranch owns 2,213 acres of property in fee simple,

which was originally designated as critical habit in August 2003.

Rights in real property are undoubtedly protected by both federal,

state, and local laws, as well as under the common law. Secondly,

there is a relationship between the legally protected interest and

the causes of action alleged by plaintiffs. In the case of Placer

Ranch, it was ultimately excluded from the designation based on the

economic analysis impact published on June 30, 2005 and on

subsequent public comment. The environmental groups allege that

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FWS “unlawfully relied upon inadequate analysis of economic impacts

that overestimated potential costs of designation as well as

underestimated and disregarded potential benefits of

designation . . . .” Compl. at 2. Thus, as Placer Ranch notes,

the environmental groups seek to have the basis for exclusion of

the Ranch “declared invalid and to have the Ranch designated as

critical habitat for the vernal pool fairy shrimp.” 

I conclude that Placer Ranch has a cognizable interest

sufficient to support intervention. 

3. Impairment of the Interests of the Applicants

To meet the impairment prong, applicants need only

demonstrate that “disposition of the lawsuit may adversely affect

the applicant’s interest if intervention is not granted.” United

States v. State of Washington, 86 F.3d 1499, 1503 (9th Cir. 1996).

Rule 24(a)’s “impairment” requirement addresses whether, as a

practical matter, a denial of intervention would impede a

prospective intervenor’s ability to protect its interests in the

subject of the action. As the Advisory Committee Notes for the

1966 amendments to Rule 24(a) explain, “[i]f an absentee would be

substantially affected in a practical sense by the determination

made in an action, he should, as a general rule, be entitled to

intervene.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 Advisory Committee’s Note to 1966

Amendments. 

Placer Ranch states that disposition of this case would impair

or impede its interests. Mot. to Intervene at 11. Indeed, if

plaintiffs succeed, and the court declares that defendants are in

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violation of ESA and the APA, it seems clear that Placer Ranch

would be affected “in a practical sense” as the designation of

critical habitat would affect the permissible uses of its 2,213

acres of property. Further, as the court explained in its order

granting intervention to Tsakopoulos in the lead case, this court’s

resolution of the validity of the FWS critical habitat designation

would have some preclusive effect on later challenges to that same

FWS designation. Issue preclusion and stare decisis have been held

to prevent an applicant from being able to protect its interests.

United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 826 (9th Cir. 1986),

vacated on other grounds sub nom Stringfellow v. Concerned

Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370 (1987). 

In sum, proposed intervenors have significant interests that

are at stake in this litigaiton.

4. Adequacy of Representation

The final factor asks whether the interest of the party 

seeking to intervene are adequately represented by other parties.

The factors governing whether existing parties represent

intervenor’s interests include “(1) whether the interest of a

present party is such that it will undoubtedly make all the

intervenor’s arguments; (2) whether the present party is capable

and willing to make such arguments; and (3) whether the would-be

intervenor would offer any necessary elements to the proceedings

that other parties would neglect.” Northwest Forest Resources

Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 838 (9th Cir. 1996). 

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An applicant for intervention has the burden to demonstrate

that its interests may not be adequately represented by the

existing parties to the suit.” Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 954

(9th Cir. 1977); Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525,

528 (9th Cir. 1983). The Supreme Court has explained that this

burden is “minimal.” Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S.

528, 538 n. 10 (1972). “[T]he Rule is satisfied if the applicant

shows that the representation of his interest ‘may be’ inadequate.”

Id. Placer Ranch meets this test. 

First, the building industry entities that are already parties

to this litigation (they are plaintiffs in the lead case),

including Home Builders Association of Northern California,

challenge various aspects of the critical habitat designation.

Unlike those building industry entities, Placer Ranch seeks to

intervene to defend the exclusion of its property from designation

and seeks to maintain the status quo. 

Placer Ranch rightly notes that the parties who most closely

come to representing its interests are the federal defendants, who

are also seeking to defend the status quo. It is true that there

is an assumption of adequacy when the government is acting on

behalf of a constituency that it represents. United States v. City

of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391 (9th Cir. 2002). That assumption is

inapplicable here. As Placer Ranch maintains, its interests are

not identical to the present defendants, although it shares with

the present defendants a desire for continued approval of the

present critical habitat designation. The federal defendants’

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 Because I have determined that Placer Ranch is entitled to 9

intervention as a matter of right, it is not necessary to discuss

whether they are entitled to permissively intervene pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). 

13

primary interest must be compliance with federal laws, rather than

in protecting Placer Ranch’s property interests. These divergent

interests may conceivably lead to litigation strategies on the part

of named defendants which will not adequately represent the

interests of Placer Ranch.

All the above convinces the court that Placer Ranch satisfies

the final criterion for intervention. 

III.

 CONCLUSION

As the court noted previously in orders related to motions to

intervene filed by the City of Suisun and Tsakopoulous, Placer

Ranch is restricted to raising arguments which relate to the issues

concerning the species on the land that it owns, and that it will

not raise any arguments connected with the related case.

For the foregoing reasons, Placer Ranch’s motion to intervene

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) is GRANTED with the restrictions

noted above.9

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: May 23, 2006.

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