Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00505/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00505-26/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

RANDY COSBY, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

AUTOZONE, INC., JAMES KULBACKI, 

and DOES 1-100, inclusive, 

Defendants. 

No. 2:08-cv-00505-KJM-DAD 

ORDER 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Plaintiff Randy Cosby brought this action under the California Fair Employment 

and Housing Act (FEHA). Compl., ECF No. 1. Judgment was entered on February 24, 2010 

after a jury trial, and Cosby was awarded $1.5 million in damages. Jury Verdict, ECF No. 88. 

Thereafter, defendant Autozone filed three appeals, each regarding the issue of Cosby’s damages. 

ECF Nos. 119, 176, 204. 

Cosby now seeks attorneys’ fees for time expended in preparation for trial, time 

during trial, as well as time expended in defending against Autozone’s appeals, in two separate 

applications. Appl. #1, ECF No. 107; Appl. #2, ECF No. 222. The matters were submitted 

without a hearing. ECF No. 229. As explained below, Application #1 is GRANTED IN PART 

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in accordance with the principles established in an order of the previously assigned district judge. 

See Prior Order, ECF No. 143. Application #2 also is GRANTED IN PART. 

II. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Randy Cosby, a former employee of Autozone, Inc., sued his former employers 

asserting claims for violations of the FEHA. Not. Remov., ECF No. 1. On January 26, 2010, a 

jury trial commenced to address five claims: (1) disability discrimination; (2) failure to prevent 

disability discrimination and retaliation; (3) failure to engage in the interactive process; (4) failure 

to provide reasonable accommodations; and (5) retaliation. Prior Order at 2. On February 12, 

2010, the jury reached verdicts on the claims. See Jury Verdicts, ECF Nos. 81–86. The jury 

found for Cosby with respect to his claims of failure to engage in the interactive process and 

failure to provide reasonable accommodations. ECF Nos. 82, 83. The jury found for Autozone 

with respect to the claims of disability discrimination, failure to prevent disability discrimination 

and retaliation, and retaliation. ECF Nos. 84–86. 

 On February 24, 2010, the jury awarded Cosby $174,000 in economic losses and 

$1,326,000 in damages for emotional and mental distress, totaling $1.5 million in compensatory 

damages. Jury Verdict, ECF No. 88. On March 17, 2010, Autozone moved for a new trial or 

remittitur, claiming the damages award was excessive. ECF No. 97. On April 19, 2010, the court 

denied this motion. ECF No. 106. In response, Autozone filed its first of three appeals, 

challenging the court’s entry of judgment on damages. ECF No. 119. 

 While the first appeal was pending, Cosby filed his first application with this court 

for attorneys’ fees and costs. Appl. #1. This application covered hours incurred from the date he 

says investigation began on September 25, 2006, well before trial, to April 21, 2010, when the 

first application was submitted. See id.; see also Bohm Decl., ECF No. 110-1. 

On December 16, 2010, while the first appeal was still pending, the court issued an 

order deciding, inter alia, that Cosby was the prevailing party in the jury trial, and in the court’s 

discretion, he would be awarded attorneys’ fees. Prior Order at 6. The court also set billing rates 

for Joseph Earley, Charles Moore and Lawrence Bohm at $375 an hour. Id. at 6. The court 

concluded several deductions were warranted, including deductions for hours Earley billed to 

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attend a deposition in Albuquerque, New Mexico, because the court reasoned it was unnecessary 

for two counsel to attend the deposition. Id. at 7. The court also declined to compensate in full or 

in part for several time entries. Id. at 8, 12. For example, it reduced the amount billed for travel 

time by fifty percent and reduced Earley’s lodestar to $100 per hour for 16.5 hours spent 

accompanying a witness to Northern California so he could testify at trial. Id. at 8, 12. In the 

court’s judgment, a paralegal was just as capable of performing this task. Id. at 8. 

The court also identified and declined to compensate for several inflated fee 

requests, including requests connected to “time entries for events at the court where the court 

knows that plaintiff has over-billed and several entries which appear to the court to be 

unreasonable.” Id. at 9. For the same reason, the court identified and declined to compensate for 

several “dubious fee requests.” Id. As a result of apparent “padding,” the court reduced the 

lodestar for all attorneys by ten percent across the board. Id. at 12. It also declined to apply a 

multiplier. Id. The court later issued a supplemental decision on February 28, 2011, ordering 

Autozone to pay for fees associated with expert testimony on economic losses. ECF No. 147 at 5. 

The court stayed the award of fees based on Application #1 pending resolution of defendant’s 

appeal. Id. 

 On August 1, 2011, the Ninth Circuit issued a memorandum decision granting 

Autozone’s first appeal, reversing based on the district court’s error in allowing an award of both 

economic and non-economic damages. ECF Nos. 149, 150 at 5–6. The Circuit remanded with an 

order to remit economic and non-economic damages. ECF No. 149. Accordingly, the district 

court reduced economic damages from $174,000 to $4,917.60, and non-economic damages from 

$1,326,000 to $250,000. ECF No. 172 at 3, 7. The court gave Cosby the option of a new trial if 

he did not accept the damages award as remitted, with a new trial addressing only economic and 

non-economic damages, as well as punitive damages. Id. 

Autozone then filed its second appeal, challenging the district court’s decision to 

allow consideration of punitive damages if Cosby chose a new trial. ECF No. 176 at 1–2. Cosby 

accepted remittitur, $250,000 in non-economic and $4,917.60 in economic damages were 

awarded, and Autozone’s appeal was mooted. ECF Nos. 199, 200. 

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Autozone then appealed for a third time, challenging the amount of non-economic 

damages awarded. ECF No. 204. On March 18, 2015, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district 

court’s reduced award of non-economic damages. ECF No. 213. 

 On June 2, 2015, Cosby renewed his first application for attorneys’ fees, which 

was stayed pending appeals. Appl. #2, ECF No. 222. That same day, Cosby also submitted a 

second application to this court for the balance of his attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. Application 

#2 covers hours incurred from May 10, 2010, shortly after the jury verdict and Cosby’s first 

application for attorneys’ fees, through Autozone’s three appeals, and to June 2, 2015. Bohm 

Decl. Exs., ECF No. 222-3. On July 10, 2015, Autozone filed an opposition to Cosby’s motion, 

Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 224, to which Cosby has replied, Reply, ECF No. 227. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD 

Attorney’s fees in FEHA actions are governed by statute, which provides that a 

court, “in its discretion, may award to the prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” 

Cal. Gov’t Code § 12965(b); Beaty v. BET Holdings, Inc., 222 F.3d 607, 609 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(interpreting the FEHA). Unless special circumstances would render a fee award unjust, the court 

should ordinarily award attorneys’ fees to a prevailing FEHA plaintiff. Steele v. Jensen 

Instrument Co., 59 Cal. App. 4th 326, 330 (1997). 

After the court decides to award attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party, it 

determines the award amount. See Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1478 

(9th Cir. 1995) (interpreting the FEHA). Courts in the Ninth Circuit apply state law in 

determining the right to fees in addition to the method of calculating fees. Id. In California, the 

court determines the award amount through the “lodestar adjustment method.” Ketchum v. 

Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1132 (2001). The lodestar adjustment method requires the court to 

determine a “touchstone” figure based on the number of hours reasonably expended, multiplied 

by the reasonable hourly rate. Id. at 1132. 

After determining the lodestar amount, the court can determine whether it will 

apply a multiplier. A multiplier may be used to adjust the lodestar based on several factors, 

including “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in 

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presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment 

by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” Nichols v. City of Taft, 

155 Cal. App. 4th 1233, 1240 (2007). The “court is not required to include a fee enhancement to 

the basic lodestar figure for contingency cases, exceptional skills, or other factors, although it 

retains discretion to do so in the appropriate case.” Id. 

IV. DISCUSSION 

As noted, Cosby filed two applications for attorneys’ fees. Appl. #1, Appl. #2. 

The first application remains pending as renewed following conclusion of appeal. The court 

addresses each application in turn. 

A. Fee Application #1 

Application #1 covers attorney hours billed from September 25, 2006 to April 21, 

2010. ECF No. 110. 

As noted, the previously-assigned district judge addressed this application for 

attorneys’ fees in two orders. See Prior Order; see also ECF No. 147. In general, “judges who sit 

[on the same case] should not attempt to overrule the decisions of each other.” Castner v. First 

Nat’l Bank of Anchorage, 278 F.2d 376, 379 (9th Cir. 1960) (citation and quotation marks 

omitted). “[J]udges must, in light of the overarching ‘principles of comity and uniformity,’ make 

every effort ‘to preserve the orderly functioning of the judicial process’ when reconsidering an 

order of a prior judge in the same case.” Baldwin v. United States, 823 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1099 

(D. N. Mar. 1, 2011) (quoting Castner, 278 F.2d at 379–80). While a second judge has discretion 

to review the decision of a predecessor in the same case, the law of the case doctrine can limit 

that discretion. Delta Savings Bank v. United States, 265 F.3d 1017, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(quoting Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d at 1484, 1489 (9th Cir. 1997)). Indeed, “the prior decision 

should be followed unless (1) the decision is clearly erroneous and its enforcement would work a 

manifest injustice, (2) intervening controlling authority makes reconsideration appropriate, or 

(3) substantially different evidence was adduced at a subsequent trial.” Id. 

Neither Cosby nor Autozone contend the prior judge committed clear error in his 

orders addressing Application #1. Indeed, in his reply to Autozone’s opposition to his second 

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application for attorneys’ fees, Cosby has recalculated the award following Application #1 based 

on the principles reflected in the prior judge’s December 2011 order. See Reply at 6. 

In the absence of evidence indicating the prior decision was erroneous, that 

circumstances have changed, or that manifest injustice will otherwise result, this court will not 

disturb the decision. See United States v. Alexander, 106 F.3d 874, 878 (9th Cir. 1997). To 

review, that decision (1) determined Cosby was the prevailing party; (2) determined attorneys’ 

fees were warranted; (3) ordered Autozone to pay for fees incurred for expert testimony on 

economic losses; (4) set billable rates for Joseph Earley, Charles Moore, and Lawrence A. Bohm 

at $375 per hour; (5) deducted hours Earley billed to attend a deposition in Albuquerque, New 

Mexico; (6) reduced Earley’s lodestar to $100 per hour for 16.5 hours spent accompanying a 

witness to Northern California; (7) identified several inflated fee requests, including requests for 

“time entries for events at the court where the court knows that plaintiff has over-billed and 

several entries which appear to the court to be unreasonable”; (8) identified several “dubious” fee 

requests, which the court also thought to be unreasonable; (9) reduced travel time by fifty percent; 

(10) reduced the lodestar by ten percent for all attorneys across the board for dubious and 

unreasonable fee requests; and (11) declined to apply a multiplier. See generally Prior Order; see 

also ECF No. 147 at 5. 

While the court identified the means by which to calculate the award amount, it 

did not ultimately calculate a total award amount. See Prior Order at 16. Accordingly, this court 

will apply the Prior Order’s provisions to determine the total fees and costs to be awarded based 

on Application #1. 

B. Fee Application #2 

1. Prevailing Party 

Cosby contends he continues to be the prevailing party following resolution of all 

appeals, because he obtained a “net monetary recovery.” ECF No. 222 at 4. Although Autozone 

contends Cosby had “limited success” on appeal, it does not contest Cosby’s argument that he is 

the prevailing party. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 19. For purposes of evaluating the second application, 

the court concludes Cosby is the prevailing party. 

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2. Lodestar 

The first step in determining the amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees is to 

multiply the number of hours reasonably expended in the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate, 

i.e., by calculating the “lodestar” fee. EnPalm, LLC v. Teitler Family Trust, 162 Cal. App. 4th 

770, 774 (2008). The lodestar rate reflects the “basic fee for comparable legal services in the 

community.” Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1132. 

To determine the lodestar, the court determines: (1) whether the number of hours 

Cosby’s counsel expended is reasonable; (2) whether the hourly rate is reasonable; and 

(3) whether a multiplier should be applied to the final calculation of the fee award. Each issue 

will be addressed in turn below. 

a) Reasonable Hours 

Counsel can receive compensation for those hours “reasonably spent” to “litigate 

the action to a successful conclusion.” Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Cal. State Univ., 

132 Cal. App. 4th 359, 394 (2005). Reasonably expended hours include “those [hours] necessary 

to establish and defend the [attorneys’] fee claim.” Serrano v. Unruh, 32 Cal. 3d 621, 639 (1982). 

They do not, however, include time spent “in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts.” 

Horsford, 132 Cal. App. 4th at 394. Such time “is not subject to compensation.” Id.

Considering the “matter of reasonableness of attorney fees is within the sound 

discretion of the [] judge,” this court can draw upon its own wisdom and experience to determine 

the reasonableness of various time entries Cosby has submitted to the court. See Stokus v. Marsh, 

217 Cal. App. 3d 647, 656 (1990). This court has concerns regarding some of the time entries 

relied on in Application #2, reviewed below. 

(1) Ninth Circuit Boot Camp 

In April 2011, Charles E. Moore, one of Cosby’s attorneys, attended a “9th Circuit 

Boot Camp,” an “annual” event providing “a beginning and intermediate guide to 9th Circuit 

Practice.” Bohm Decl. Ex. A. 

In his declaration, however, Moore states he is an “experienced appellate attorney 

having briefed and successfully argued numerous cases,” which he identifies by name. Moore 

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Decl. ¶ 12, ECF No. 222-4. Moore also explains he gained extensive knowledge of Autozone 

based on his experience in resolving two trials and two appeals in other cases against Autozone. 

Id. On this record, it would be unreasonable to charge Autozone for a trip to a conference that, in 

light of Moore’s experience, was not “reasonably spent” to “litigate the action to a successful 

conclusion.” Horsford, 132 Cal. App. 4th at 394. 

The court declines to award attorneys’ fees for sixteen hours expended to attend 

the Ninth Circuit Boot Camp. 

(2) Other Hours 

Other time entries in Cosby’s application also cause the court concern in light of 

the relatively limited and straightforward questions raised on appeal. The main issues before the 

appellate court included (1) whether the jury’s damages verdict was excessive, see ECF No. 119; 

(2) whether punitive damages should be considered if Cosby chose retrial instead of remittitur, 

see ECF No. 176; and (3) whether Cosby’s economic damages award was excessive, see ECF 

No. 204. 

“[T]rial courts must carefully review attorney documentation of hours expended; 

‘padding’ in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation.” 

Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1132. A court may “reduce the award or deny one altogether” if the fee 

request “appears unreasonably inflated.” Chavez v. City of Los Angeles, 47 Cal. 4th 970, 990 

(2010) (quoting Serrano, 32 Cal. 3d at 635). 

The court finds a number of time entries reflect block billing on which the court 

frowns. In these entries, counsel has assigned one-time charges to multiple discrete tasks. See

Heritage Pac. Fin., LLC v. Monroy, 215 Cal. App. 4th 972, 1010 (2013) (“Trial courts retain 

discretion to penalize block billing when the practice prevents them from discerning which tasks 

are compensable and which are not.”). The court finds the following specific entries 

unreasonable on this ground: 

1. Lawrence A. Bohm 

a. 07/12/2010: Review highlighted trial transcripts and prepare 

annotated summary Vol. 1, 2 & 3: 7.7

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b. 07/12/2010: Review highlighted trial transcripts and prepare 

annotated summary Vol. 4 & 5: 8.0 

c. 08/01/2010: Review highlighted trial transcripts and prepare 

annotated summary Vol. 10, 11 & 12: 10.8

d. 09/02/2010: Research & Review highlighted authorities cited by 

AutoZone opening brief: 8.7

e. 09/09/2010: Work on statement of facts for responding brief: 7.6

f. 10/28/2010: Work on responding brief: 7.8

g. 11/2/2010: Work on responding brief: 6.6

h. 11/5/2010: Work on responding brief: 5.9

i. 11/07/2010: Work on responding brief: 11.1

j. 11/11/2010: Final review and edit of responding brief: 13.6 

k. 06/07/2011: Prepare for appellate oral argument: 6.5

l. 06/11/2011: Prepare for appellate oral argument: 6.4

m. 06/14/2011: Final preparation for oral argument: 11.2

n. 04/21/2013: Review and revise responding brief: 11.9

o. 02/03/2015: Prepare for oral argument: 6.9

p. 02/08/2015: Prepare for oral argument: 11.7

2. Charles E. Moore 

a. 04/09/2013: Research legal authorities for brief: 14.2 

This list in fact is an example of time entries the court finds excessive or 

unreasonable in light of the questions considered during the appeals. Several other time entries 

include unexplained block billing. See Bohm Decl. Ex. A at 15 (“Continue Research Legal 

Authorities for Brief” is listed for eleven consecutive days without further explanation, averaging 

9.5 hours a day); see also id. at 22–23 (“Research, [v]erify document records for attorney fee 

motion” is listed forty-four times consecutively, without further explanation, averaging 4.9 hours 

a day). In light of the myriad concerns identified above, in addition to those entries the court has 

not identified with particularity, the court intends to reduce the lodestar for all attorneys and 

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paralegals by ten percent, which is modest considering the number of entries the court finds 

excessive or unreasonable. See California Common Cause v. Duffy, 200 Cal. App. 3d 730, 752–

54 (1987) (reducing award by fifty percent based on duplication of effort, requests for 

compensation for time spent on media relations, and unnecessary adversarial “skirmishes”). The 

calculation below will reflect this deduction. 

(3) 	Travel	Time	

The court also considers the travel time of counsel and reduces it by fifty percent, 

applying a principle established by the prior court’s order. See Prior Order at 12; but see 

Gauchat-Hargis v. Forest River, Inc., No. 11-02737, 2013 WL 4828594, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 

2013) (state attorneys are generally compensated at their full hourly rate). The applicable time 

entries prior to reduction are as follows: 

a. Lawrence A. Bohm 

i. 06/15/2011: Travel to and from Ninth Circuit and appear for 

appellate oral argument: 6.0

ii. 02/09/2015: Travel to and from Ninth Circuit and attend 

oral argument: 6.3

Total Hours: 12.3

b. Charles E. Moore 

i. 06/15/2011: Travel to and from San Francisco to Attend 

Oral Argument: 8.0

ii. 11/16/2011: Travel to and from San Francisco from San 

Diego to attend the Court Ordered Settlement Conference: 

8.0

iii. 12/18/2011: Travel to and from San Francisco from San 

Diego to Attend Oral Argument: 8.0 

iv. 06/18/2012: Travel to and From Sacramento from San 

Diego to attend the Court Ordered Mediation: 8.0

Total Hours: 32.0 

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c. Bianca N. Saad 

i. 02/09/2015: Travel to and from Ninth Circuit and Attend 

Oral argument: 6.3

Total Hours: 6.3 

b) Reasonable Fee 

Once the number of reasonable hours is set, “the district court must determine a 

reasonable hourly rate considering the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting 

fees.” Jadwin v. Cty. of Kern, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1124 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (interpreting the 

FEHA). 

 As a preliminary matter, the court determines whether the rates articulated in the 

prior court’s order apply to Application #2. While the law of the case limits the court’s discretion 

to deviate from prior rulings, fee determinations are necessarily related to the time frame in which 

fees are incurred. Governing case law encourages the court, when determining attorneys’ fees, to 

consider protracted proceedings as well as fair market value of services rendered. See City of 

Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 203 Cal. App. 3d 78, 83 (1988) (applying an enhancement on 

grounds of delay). The prior court order issued in 2010, and after a series of appeals, Cosby 

submitted Application #2 in 2015. To make up for the protracted appellate proceedings, spanning 

almost seven years, the court will consider updated market rates for services rendered in 

Application #2. 

To determine the market rates, the court need not reference rates actually charged 

by the prevailing party. Jadwin, 767 F. Supp. 2d at 1130. Instead, courts look to the “prevailing” 

or “basic fee for comparable legal services in the community.” Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1132. 

The “relevant legal community” for the lodestar calculation is generally the forum in which the 

district court sits. Jadwin, 767 F. Supp. 2d at 1124. Another forum may provide the proper 

relevant community, however, “if local counsel was unavailable, either because they are 

unwilling or unable to perform because they lack the degree of experience, expertise, or 

specialization required to handle properly the case.” Id. The court may rely on rates outside the 

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local forum if the plaintiff establishes either unwillingness or inability; “[t]here is no requirement 

that plaintiffs prove both.” Id. 

Here the case was originally brought in Sacramento County Superior Court, was 

removed to federal district court in Sacramento, and was litigated in Sacramento. To the extent 

post-trial proceedings took place in district court, that district court is located in Sacramento. 

Appellate proceedings occurred before the Ninth Circuit in San Francisco, with Sacramento 

attorneys appearing for argument. Plaintiff’s primary counsel worked out of an office in 

Sacramento. The relevant community for purposes of determining the reasonable fee is 

Sacramento, California, as also was true for Application #1. See PLCM Grp. v. Drexler, 22 Cal. 

4th 1084, 1096 (2000) ([T]he prevailing market rate for comparable legal services is San 

Francisco, where counsel is located.”). Accordingly, the court will apply the prevailing market 

rate for a civil rights attorney practicing in the Sacramento area. Knox v. Chiang, No. 05-02198, 

2013 WL 2434606, at *7 (E.D. Cal. June 5, 2013). 

(1) Charles E. Moore 

Charles E. Moore requests the court grant his billing rate of $450 an hour. Moore 

Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 222-4. Moore graduated from IIT-Chicago Kent College of Law in 1988 and 

has been practicing since then. Id. ¶ 5. As relevant here, Moore practiced in the San Diego 

market. See generally Moore Decl. His practice handles employment issues including “wrongful 

termination, unfair competition, antitrust/trade secret, intellectual property rights, restrictive 

covenant and representation of employers in administrative hearings.” Id. ¶ 6. To support his 

requested billing rate, Moore cites a San Diego Superior Court case, which he avers approved his 

$450 per hour billing rate. See id. ¶ 14. 

Decisions from this district have found the hourly rate Moore requests to be 

reasonable in the prevailing community for the time frame covered by Application #2. See Pehle 

v. Dufour, No. 06–1889, 2014 WL 546115, at *5–6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2014) ($350 reasonable 

hourly rate for labor attorney practicing since 1989); Knox, 2013 WL 2434606, at *7–9 (E.D. Cal. 

June 5, 2013) ($450 reasonable hourly rate for attorneys with extensive trial and appellate 

experience in labor and constitutional law); Monterrubio v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 291 F.R.D. 443, 

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460 (E.D. Cal. 2013) ($400 prevailing hourly rate for counsel in wage-and-hour class action); see 

also McCarthy v. Reynolds, No. 09–2495, 2011 WL 4344147, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2011) 

($285 reasonable hourly rate for counsel in employment action brought under Title VII and the 

FEHA); Trulsson v. Cty. of San Joaquin Dist. Attorney’s Office, No. 11–02986, 2014 WL 

5472787, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014) ($450 reasonable hourly rate for labor attorney with 22 

years’ litigation experience). 

The court concludes that Moore, a labor and employment attorney with twentyseven years of experience can reasonably be awarded fees at a rate of $450 an hour. 

(2) Lawrence A. Bohm 

Lawrence A. Bohm requests the court grant his billing rate of $350 per hour for 

time expended from May 10, 2010 to June 28, 2010; $400 per hour for July 12, 2010 to 

December 28, 2010; $500 per hour for January 3, 2011 to November 29, 2012; $600 per hour for 

January 18, 2013 to June 27, 2013; $700 per hour for December 1 to December 3, 2014; and $800 

per hour for February 2, 2015 to June 1, 2015. Bohm Decl. Ex. A, ECF No. 222-3. 

Bohm graduated from Tulane University Law School in 2000 and has been 

practicing since then. Bohm Decl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 222-2. As with Moore, Bohm’s practice consists 

of employment law. See id. ¶¶ 6–7. In his 15 years of practice, Bohm has acquired extensive 

trial experience from his participation in numerous civil trials from start to final disposition. Id.

¶ 10. 

Bohm avers his top hourly rate of $800 is reasonable because of his familiarity 

“with the market rates charged by attorneys in California for employment-related matters.” Id. ¶ 

23. He attests “the market rate awarded in employment-related cases is over $500/hour to 

$800/hour.” Id. Bohm bases his conclusion on his review of other court orders awarding fees, 

information posted on the California Employment Lawyer’s website and list-serve, and 

documentation provided by Richard M. Pearl as author of the resource titled California Attorney 

Fee Awards. Id. Bohm also provides one example of a Sacramento state court case approving his 

hourly rate at $700. Id. ¶ 4. But upon review, the court concludes this decision was not final, but 

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tentative. See Bohm Decl. Ex. A, ECF No. 222-3. Bohm provides no final court ruling 

supporting his $800 hourly rate. 

Bohm also has submitted several declarations from colleagues in support of his 

$800 hourly fee. See Bohm Decl. Exs. E–M, ECF No. 222-3. The court may properly consider 

the declarations of other lawyers in determining what constitutes a reasonable hourly rate. 

Viveros v. Donahoe, No. 10–08593, 2013 WL 1224848, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2013).1 Bohm 

submits declarations from a total of nine lawyers: (1) Christopher Whelan; (2) Elisa Ungerman; 

(3) Jill Telfer; (4) Phil Horowitz; (5) Daniel Wilcoxen; (6) Galen T. Shimoda; (7) James 

Desimone; (8) Robert L. Boucher; and (9) Erik Roper. See Bohm Decl. Exs. E–M, ECF No. 222-

3. These lawyers have a range of experience from eight years to forty-two years. See id. With 

the exception of two attorneys, they practice in Sacramento. Phil Horowitz, who practices in the 

Bay Area, charges $675 per hour, id. Ex. H, and James Desimone who practices in Southern 

California, charges $750.00 an hour, id. Ex. K. The only Sacramento attorneys who come close 

to these rates are Christopher Whelan and Danial Wilcoxen, who say they charge $700 and $600 

an hour, respectively. The court notes Whelan and Wilcoxen have 38 years and 42 years of 

experience, also respectively. See id. Exs. E, I. 

In sum, no other lawyer claims an hourly rate of more than $750.00 an hour, and 

no Sacramento attorney claims a court sitting in Sacramento has awarded him or her more than 

$650 an hour. See generally Exs. E–M. In the case where $650 an hour was granted, counsel had 

34 years’ experience. Id. Ex. E. Attorneys with comparable years of experience to Bohm have 

charged $450 an hour, see id. G, J, L, M, and none of these attorneys claim a court has awarded 

more than $450 an hour. See id. Ex. G. 

The court finds the record does not support Bohm’s request for $800 an hour for 

his time in 2015. At the time Bohm filed his fee request, he had been practicing for 

 1 Viveros interprets the attorneys’ fee provisions in Title VII. See Viveros, 2013 WL 

1224848, at *1. In interpreting the FEHA’s attorneys’ fee provisions, California courts have 

looked for guidance to federal decisions construing Title VII’s fee provision. Chavez, 47 Cal. 4th 

at 985. 

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approximately fifteen years. Bohm Decl. ¶¶ 5–20, ECF No. 222-2. Comparing his years of 

experience with those attorneys who have provided declarations, and considering persuasive 

authority from this district, the court concludes $450 per hour is a reasonable hourly rate for 

Bohm in 2015. Recognizing that Bohm’s 2010 hourly rates were lower than $450, and also that 

payment of his fees has been delayed by post-trial litigation, the court will apply $450 as the 

hourly rate for all of Bohm’s work performed subject to Application #2. See City of Oakland, 

203 Cal. App. 3d at 83 (applying a fee enhancer for deferral of payment to counsel). 

(3) Bianca N. Saad 

Bianca N. Saad requests the court grant her billing rates of $300 per hour for time 

expended from October 12–14, 2011; $350 per hour for February 22, 2013 to April 24, 2013; and 

$400 per hour for December 2, 2014 to May 22, 2015. Bohm Decl. Ex. A. 

Ms. Saad graduated from California Western School of Law in 2009. Bohm Decl. 

¶ 21(d). She was admitted to the bar in 2010 and has been practicing since then.2

 Her practice 

consists mainly of employment and labor law. See id. ¶¶ 21(a)–21(o). 

Cosby provides no support for awarding Ms. Saad, an attorney with less than 6 

years’ experience, fees at a top rate of $400 an hour. She does not have the extensive trial 

experience Moore and Bohm do. The court concludes Ms. Saad may be compensated at a rate of 

$300.00 per hour. 

(4) Kelsey K. Ciarimboli 

Kelsey K. Ciarimboli requests the court grant her billing rate of $350 per hour. 

Bohm Decl. Ex. A. Ciarimboli graduated from Tulane Law School in 2014. Bohm. Decl. 

¶ 22(a). She has practiced law for a little over one year. See id. The record before the court does 

not support compensation for Ciarimboli, a new attorney, at $350 an hour. The court will 

compensate Ciarimboli at a rate of $150 an hour. See Orr v. California Highway Patrol, No. 14-

 2

 In accordance with Rule 201, the court may take judicial notice of matters of public 

record. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Mack v. South Bay 

Beer Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986)). Accordingly, the court takes judicial notice 

of the information on the California State Bar website, which provides Ms. Saad’s credentials. 

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585, 2015 WL 9305021, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2015) (market rate for second- and third-year 

associates between $150 and $170 per hour). 

c) Multipliers 

The court also determines whether it will apply a multiplier. The lodestar may be 

adjusted by the court based on several factors, including (1) the novelty and difficulty of the 

questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of 

the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, and (4) the contingent nature of the 

fee award. Nichols, 155 Cal. App. 4th at 1240. The court has no obligation to apply a multiplier 

when determining the fee award. Id.

Cosby does not discuss the second and third multiplier factors in his moving 

papers. He does request the court consider two additional factors: (1) results obtained, and 

(2) delay in payment. See Appl. #2 at 13–14. Autozone contends the court should apply a 

negative multiplier instead of a positive multiplier due to Cosby’s “limited success” on appeal. 

Opp’n at 19. 

(1) Novelty/Difficulty 

When determining the appropriate enhancement, a trial court should not consider 

the novelty and difficulty factors to the extent they are already encompassed within the lodestar. 

Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1138. The factor of extraordinary skill, in particular, appears 

susceptible to improper double counting; for the most part, the difficulty of a legal question and 

the quality of representation are naturally encompassed in the lodestar. Id. A more difficult legal 

question typically requires more attorney hours. Id. 

For purposes of this application, the court will consider difficulty to the extent it 

involved litigating Autozone’s appeals. As noted, the main legal questions raised on appeal were 

(1) whether the jury verdict was excessive; (2) whether punitive damages should be considered if 

Cosby chose retrial instead of remittitur; and (3) whether Cosby’s economic damages award was 

excessive. 

Cosby argues difficulty is supported by his counsel’s “learning Autozone’s 

complex corporate structure, along with obtaining documents to prove [the] case,” Appl. #2 at 11, 

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but this knowledge was not necessary to defend against Autozone’s appeals. In addition, these 

tasks are reflected in the time entries submitted to the court. 

No multiplier is warranted on grounds of difficulty or novelty. 

(2) Contingent Nature of the Fee Award 

A contingency adjustment may be made at the lodestar phase of the court’s 

calculation or by applying a multiplier to the noncontingency lodestar calculation, but not both. 

Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1133–34; Horsford , 132 Cal. App. 4th at 395. In support of applying a 

multiplier for contingency risk, California courts say the following: 

The contingent and deferred nature of the fee award in a civil rights 

or other case with statutory attorney fees requires that the fee be 

adjusted in some manner to reflect the fact that the fair market 

value of legal services provided on that basis is greater than the 

equivalent noncontingent hourly rate. 

A lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides 

legal services is not receiving the fair market value of his work if he 

is paid only for the second of these functions. If he is paid no more, 

competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases. 

Id. Cosby cites Crommie v. State of Cal., Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 840 F. Supp. 719, 726 (N.D. Cal. 

1994), to support his argument that the court should apply a contingency multiplier of two to 

three. Appl. #2 at 12. But in awarding a 2.0 multiplier in Crommie, that court not only 

considered that counsel took the case on a contingency basis, but also that counsel prevailed after 

a protracted complicated three-week trial, which was exceptional in light of defense counsel’s 

excessively vexatious and often unreasonable opposition. Id.

As the court has noted, the appellate stage of this case was not exceptionally 

difficult, even if protracted. Additionally, Cosby does not argue Autozone engaged in excessive 

or unreasonable appellate practice. He does not question the legitimacy or veracity of Autozone’s 

appeals, arguing only that the case was made more difficult because of the appeals. See Appl. #2 

at 11. 

Considering the contingent nature as only a partial factor in Crommie’s analysis, 

but also giving weight to the fact that counsel took Cosby’s case on a contingent basis, the court 

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concludes a modest enhancement of 1.3 is justified. See Noyes v. Kelly Servs., Inc., No. 02–2685, 

2008 WL 3154681, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2008) (applying 1.2–1.4 multiplier). 

(3) Results Obtained and Delay in Receipt of Payment 

Cosby asks the court apply a multiplier on grounds of results obtained and delay of 

payment. Appl. #2 at 13–14. Given the narrow issues raised on appeal, the results obtained, 

although not inconsequential, also were not “beyond those that might be expected of attorneys of 

comparable expertise or experience.” See Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1139. Cosby has not shown 

the results obtained justify a fee enhancement. 

As for delay, Cosby cites City of Oakland, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 83, to argue an 

enhancement should be applied on this ground. In City of Oakland, the court enhanced counsel’s 

award based on several factors including the “extraordinary novelty and complexity of the issues 

presented, the need for []counsel to act quickly throughout the litigation, the deferral of payment 

of counsel’s fees, and most significantly the critical importance of the litigation [] and the result 

obtained.” Id. at 83. Here, as discussed above, the court has already applied an enhancement by 

other means, namely applying reasonable rates for the years 2014 to 2015 to all hours expended, 

even if such hours were expended prior to 2015. The court declines to apply an additional 

multiplier on grounds of delay. 

(4) Negative Multiplier 

Autozone argues not only should the court decline to apply any positive multiplier, 

it should apply a negative multiplier because of plaintiff’s “limited success” in the appeals 

process. Opp’n at 19 (citing Chavez, 47 Cal. 4th at 989, Harman v. City and Cnty of S.F., 158 

Cal. App. 4th 407, 425 (2007), Sokolow v. Cnty of San Mateo, 213 Cal. App. 3d 231, 248–49 

(1989), Californians for Responsible Toxics Mgmt. v. Kizer, 211 Cal. App. 3d 961, 974–75 

(1989)). However, it never argues what “limited success” is, or why such an analysis is 

appropriate. Instead, defendants merely argue the reduction of damages on appeal constitutes 

“limited success” for which a negative multiplier would be appropriate. Opp’n at 19. 

In the authority Autozone cites, a “limited success” analysis applies to cases in 

which the plaintiff has prevailed on some claims but not others. See Chavez, 47 Cal. 4th at 989. 

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Such analysis requires the consideration of both successful and unsuccessful claims. See id.; 

Harman, 158 Cal. App. 4th at 417 (limited success analysis requires consideration of successful 

and unsuccessful claims); Sokolow, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 248 (same); Californians for Responsible 

Toxics Mgmt., 211 Cal. App. 3d at 975 (declining to apply a negative multiplier because 

plaintiff’s claims could not be easily segregated into successful and unsuccessful ones to which 

hours can easily be attributed). 

Here, Cosby prevailed on two of his five claims. For purposes of Application #2, 

however, defendants do not request the court reduce attorneys’ fees based on the hours spent on 

ultimately unmeritorious claims. Instead, defendants request the court reduce attorneys’ fees 

based on the net damages award that was small in comparison to the original jury award. The 

cases cited by Autozone do not support this analytical approach. 

However, as a general rule and a matter of common sense, the amount of damages 

ultimately recovered can be considered when calculating reasonable attorney fees. Bucci v. 

Chromalloy Am. Corp., Liberty Radiator Div., No. 85–8768, 1989 WL 222441, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 

Sept. 15, 1989) (interpreting the FEHA). A mandate that attorneys’ fees be reduced based on the 

proportion of a jury’s damages award received, however, would make it “difficult if not 

impossible for individuals with meritorious civil rights claims but relatively small potential 

damages to obtain redress from the courts.” Id. 

In Bucci, defendant contended plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees should be reduced 

because plaintiff obtained a jury award of only $55,000 rather than the $350,000 requested in 

closing argument. Id. The court disagreed, recognizing the significant public interest served by a 

successful civil rights verdict, regardless of the size of the monetary award or the fact that the 

action was brought by an individual plaintiff. Id. 

Here, as in Bucci, Cosby brought this action under the FEHA. Cosby’s jury 

verdict advanced the public interest to some degree, regardless of the monetary award. As the 

Ninth Circuit has observed, a court “should not reduce lodestars based on relief obtained simply 

because the amount of damages recovered on a claim was less than the amount requested.” 

Quesada v. Thomason, 850 F.2d 537, 538 (9th Cir. 1988). Rather, a court should consider the 

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“important social benefits [] not reflected in nominal or relatively small damage awards.” Id. at 

540. 

These considerations persuade the court a negative multiplier is inappropriate here. 

V. COSTS 

Cosby also requests reimbursement of costs in the amount of $29,368.38. See

ECF Nos. 91, 203. “An award of standard costs in federal district court is normally governed by 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), even in diversity cases.” Champion Produce, Inc. v. Ruby 

Robinson Co., 342 F.3d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir.2003); see also Drumm v. Morningstar, Inc., 695 F. 

Supp. 2d 1014, 1027 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“Since the awarding of costs here is procedural, not 

substantive, federal law governs.”). The Supreme Court has held that 28 U.S.C. §1920 “defines 

the term ‘costs’ as used in Rule 54(d).” Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 

437, 441 (1987). In so doing, the Court has rejected the view that the discretion granted by Rule 

54(d) is a separate source of power to tax as costs expenses not enumerated in § 1920. Id. at 441. 

Travel expenses such as airfare, hotel, and rental car, are not recoverable under § 1920. Kern v. 

Levolor Lorentzen, Inc., 899 F.2d 772, 795 (9th Cir. 1990); Warkentin v. Federated Life Ins. Co., 

No. 10–0221, 2012 WL 3869865, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2012). 

As for other costs, Rule 54(d)(1) creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs 

to a prevailing party, but the district court may refuse to award costs within its discretion. See 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1); see also Champion Produce, 342 F.3d at 1022 (“[C]osts other than 

attorneys’ fees shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise 

directs . . . .”). “A district court need not give affirmative reasons for awarding costs; instead, it 

need only find the reasons for denying costs are not sufficiently persuasive to overcome the 

presumption in favor of an award. The presumption itself provides all the reason a court needs 

for awarding costs.” Sunstone Behavioral Health, Inc. v. Alameda Cty. Med. Ctr., 646 F. Supp. 

2d 1206, 1218 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 

Autozone objects to Cosby’s bill of costs on several grounds. First, Autozone 

objects to treating the bills of costs for Application #1 and Application #2 as separate documents 

because they are duplicative of each other. See Defs.’ Obj. 2, ECF No. 207. When Cosby filed 

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the bill of costs for Application #2 he himself labeled it a “renewed” bill of costs. See ECF No. 

203. The two bills of costs, namely ECF Nos. 91 and 203, will be treated as one. 

Second, Autozone objects to the total amount requested in the bill of costs. Id. at 

2. Autozone notes the total amount for printed or electronically recorded transcripts should be 

$17,949.44, not $19,365.23. Id. Cosby concedes $17,949.44 is the correct amount. See Pl.’s 

Reply 2, ECF No. 95. The total amount for printed or electronically recorded transcripts is 

$17,949.44, subject to any deductions the court deems proper. 

Third, Autozone objects to counsels’ travel costs claimed on May 12, 2009 and 

May 26, 2009, to attend depositions of Rick Smith and Bonnie Shaw, totaling $676.40. Defs.’ 

Obj. at 2. As noted above, counsels’ travel costs to attend the Smith and Shaw depositions will 

be deducted from the cost total. See Kern, Inc., 899 F.2d at 795. 

Fourth, Autozone objects to all costs associated with video transcripts of 

depositions for Kathy Pope, Steve Bender, Sheri Lemond, and Jim Kulbacki, in the amounts of 

$761.69, $348.80, $700.95, and $1,352.97, respectively. See ECF No. 91. Defs.’ Obj. at 2. In 

response, plaintiff notes video depositions were used to expedite the presentation of evidence and 

to avoid having to make witnesses appear in court. Reply at 4. But plaintiff provides no 

explanation why presentation of evidence could not be achieved by paper transcripts. See Oyarzo 

v. Tuolumne Fire Dist., No. 11–01271, 2014 WL 1757217, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2014) 

(“Plaintiffs Hart and Oyarzo have not shown that video recording the depositions was ‘necessarily 

obtained’ for use in this trial, rather than merely for the convenience of counsel.”); see also U.S. 

ex rel. Berglund v. Boeing Co., No. 02–193, 2012 WL 697140, at *3 (D. Or. Feb. 29, 2012) 

(“[Plaintiff] provides no explanation or justification for the decision to videotape Berglund’s 

deposition.”). In light of the record before the court, the court finds these expenses, totaling 

$3,164.41, are unreasonable. 

Fifth, Autozone objects to the costs identified for the deposition of expert Dr. 

Marcia Nelson. Defs.’ Obj. at 2. Autozone contends Nelson did not testify at trial, thus making 

her costs unnecessary. Id. Dr. Nelson examined medical records during her deposition, which in 

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turn were used to prepare for trial and were identified for possible introduction into evidence. 

The court concludes these costs were necessary and reasonable. 

Sixth, Autozone objects to the costs arising from the taking of several other 

depositions. Specifically, Autozone objects to costs associated with (1) Nicole McCollum’s 

deposition ($1,266.70); (2) Richard Smith’s deposition on January 29, 2010 ($937.75 and 

$93.00); (2) Jim Kulbacki’s deposition on October 17, 2007 ($309.40); (3) Staci Saucier’s 

deposition on October 17, 2007 ($463.45); and Brenda Granville-Brooks’ deposition on 

November 12, 2007 ($373.60). Def.’s Obj. at 2. Regarding Nicole McCollum’s deposition, 

Autozone notes there are two entries listed with no explanation. Autozone also argues Richard 

Smith’s deposition was not necessary to Cosby’s case, but does not explain why Smith’s 

deposition was unnecessary. Autozone argues the Kulbacki, Saucier and Granville-Brooks 

depositions were taken in a separate case. 

As to McCollum’s deposition, Cosby merely explains that there were two separate 

charges related to the deposition, without clarifying why the charges accrued or how they related 

to the litigation. See Reply 3–4, ECF No. 95. Similarly, Cosby does not explain how Smith’s 

deposition testimony related to this litigation. As to the depositions of Kulbacki, Saucier, and 

Granville-Brooks, they were taken three years before Cosby filed the original complaint in this 

case. Cosby explains counsel needed to review the deposition transcripts to “research his similar 

claims handled by these witnesses.” Reply at 4. This does not explain why the time billed for 

deposing the witnesses, as opposed to time billed for reviewing their deposition transcripts, is 

listed on the bill of costs. Based on the record before the court, transcripts of these depositions 

are not reasonably related to this litigation. The court deducts a total of $3,443.90 from the costs 

for depositions of McCollum, Smith, Kulbacki, Saucier and Granville-Brooks. 

Seventh, Autozone objects to all items described as “fees and disbursements for 

printing,” totaling $247.95. ECF No. 93. It argues there is no documentation to support this 

charge, and there is no explanation why these materials had to be prepared instead of using the 

court’s overhead projector. ECF No. 93. In response, plaintiff has filed an invoice supporting the 

printing fee. ECF No. 95. As to whether such costs were reasonable, plaintiff contends the costs 

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relate to the preparation of plaintiff’s timeline used in his closing argument. Id. at 95. 

Considering the presumption in favor of awarding costs, plaintiff’s costs are not unreasonable 

simply because there were other available means of presenting the same evidence. The Ninth 

Circuit has held costs for demonstrative evidence are recoverable under §1920. See Maxwell v. 

Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellschaft, Hamburg, 862 F.2d 767, 770 (9th Cir. 1988) (“In the context of 

§1920, exemplification and copies of papers has been interpreted to include all types of 

demonstrative evidence, including photographs and graphic aids.”). The court finds these costs 

reasonable. 

VI. SUMMARY 

Taking into account the above, the following attorneys’ fees and costs may 

reasonably be awarded based on Application #1 and Application #2. 

A. Application #1 

1. Fee Amounts 

To recap, the following principles will be applied to determine the fee award based 

on Application #1: (1) Earley, Moore, and Bohm will be compensated at a rate of $375 per hour; 

(2) except that Earley will be compensated at a rate of $100 an hour for 16.5 hours spent 

accompanying a witness to Northern California; (3) and Earley will not be compensated for 16.5 

hours spent attending a deposition in Albuquerque, New Mexico; (4) travel time will be reduced 

by fifty percent; (5) the lodestar for all attorneys will be reduced by ten percent across the board, 

given the inflated and dubious fee requests; and (6) no multiplier will be applied. See generally

Prior Order. 

Accordingly, the court awards fees as follows, for hours expended in preparing for 

the trial and in preparing the first application for attorneys’ fees: 

Charles E. Moore—227.8 hours between January 10, 2010 and April 19, 2010, 

compensated at $375 per hour, totaling $85,425. See Prior Order; see also Bohm Decl., ECF 

No. 110-1. 

Joseph M. Earley—148.2 hours between May 23, 2009 and April 16, 2010, less 

16.5 hours for attending the deposition in Albuquerque, New Mexico, for a total 131.7 hours. 

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The court reduces Earley’s hourly rate to $100 for 16.5 hours, and calculates the remaining time 

at $375 an hour: (16.5 hours x $100=$1,650) + (115.2 x $375=$43,200) = $44,850. 

Lawrence A. Bohm—1,458.1 hours between September 25, 2006 and April 21, 

2010, compensated at $375 per hour, totaling $546,787.50. Id. 

Angela Williams—39.50 hours between January 8, 2007 and August 13, 2009, 

compensated at $100 per hour, totaling $3,950. Id.

Randy Torres—298.50 hours between September 28, 2009 and April 14, 2010, 

compensated at $100 per hour, totaling $29,850. Id.

Andrea Jennings—149.80 hours between February 25, 2010 and April 14, 2010, 

compensated at $100 per hour, totaling $14,980. Id. 

Before additional deductions, these fees amount to $725,842.50. 

2. Deductions 

In accordance with the prior judge’s order, the amount incurred for travel time will 

be reduced by fifty percent and all attorneys’ fees will be reduced by ten percent. Travel time 

totaled 25.8 hours for Earley at $375 an hour, totaling $9,675, and 26.3 hours for Bohm, totaling 

$9,862.50. The total amount for travel time, $19,537.50, divided by 2, equals $9,768.75. 

3. Totals 

 Deducting this amount from $725,842.50 totals $716,073.75. Applying a ten 

percent reduction across the board, the total amount is $644,466.38 

d. Application #2 

The following principles are carried over in determining the fee award for 

Application #2: (1) travel time will be reduced by fifty percent, and (2) the lodestar for all 

attorneys and paralegals will be reduced by ten percent across the board. Additionally, for the 

reasons discussed above, (1) Moore and Bohm will be compensated at a rate of $450 an hour; (2) 

Saad a rate of $300 an hour; (3) Ciarimboli a rate of $150 an hour; (4) Moore will not be 

compensated for 16 hours expended in attending the Ninth Circuit Boot Camp; and (5) a 1.3 

multiplier will be applied. 

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The court awards fees as follows, for time spent in connection with the appellate 

process as well as preparing the second application for attorneys’ fees: 

i. Fee Amounts 

Lawrence Bohm—643.3 hours between May 10, 2010 and June 1, 2014, 

compensated at $450 per hour, totaling $289,485. 

Charles E. Moore—135.6 hours between August 24, 2010 and June 1, 2015, 

compensated at $450 per hour, totaling $61,020.

Bianca Saad—221.1 hours between October 12, 2011 and May 22, 2015, 

compensated at $300 per hour, totaling $66,330. 

Kelsey K. Ciarimboli—49.3 hours between May 20, 2015 and June 2, 2015, 

compensated at $150 per hour, totaling $7,395. 

Andrea Jennings—0.2 hours at a rate of $100 an hour, totaling $20.00. 

Kim Pittner—244.6 hours at a rate of $100 an hour, totaling $24,460. 

Randy Torres—133.4 hours at a rate of $100 an hour, totaling $13,340. 

Before deductions, these fees amount to $462,050. 

ii. Deductions 

As the hours expended by Moore to attend the Ninth Circuit Boot camp were 

unreasonable, the court deducts 16 hours at Moore’s rate of $450.00 per hour, totaling $7,200. 

Travel time equaled 12.3 hours for Bohm (totaling $5,535), 32.0 hours for Moore 

(totaling $14,400), and 6.3 hours for Saad (totaling $1,890). The total of these amounts is 

$10,912.50 after reducing them by fifty percent. 

iii. Totals 

Deducting the Boot Camp and half of travel hours yields $451,138. Applying a 

further across the board ten percent reduction, the total is $406,024.20. Applying a positive 

multiplier of 1.3, the total equals $527,831.45. 

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e. Bill of Costs 

The total for printed or electronically recorded transcripts is $17,949.44. 

Accordingly, the total before deductions is not $29,368.38 as stated in the bill of costs, but 

$27,952.59. See ECF Nos. 91, 203. 

Travel costs, video deposition fees, and deposition fees for McCollum, Smith, 

Kulbacki, Saucier and Granville-Brooks are deducted as unreasonable. Accordingly, $7,284.71 is 

deducted, leaving a total of $20,667.88. 

2. CONCLUSION 

Cosby’s Application #1 and Application #2 each are GRANTED IN PART. 

Accordingly, the court awards $644,466.38 in fees on Application #1, and $527,831.45 for fees 

on Application #2, for a total of $ 1,172,297.83. The court awards $20,667.88 for costs. 

This order resolves ECF Nos. 107 and 222. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: April 24, 2016. 

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