Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00165/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00165-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:451 Employment Discrimination

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY )

COMMISSION, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

KOVACEVICH "5" FARMS, )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-06-165 OWW/TAG

ORDER DEFERRING PLAINTIFFINTERVENORS' MOTION FOR

CLASS-CERTIFICATION PURSUANT

TO FRCP 23(a) AND 23(b)(2)

(Doc. 41) AND DENYING

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY ADJUDICATION WITHOUT

PREJUDICE (Doc. 51)

On February 13, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC) filed a Complaint against Kovacevich “5" Farms

(K5) pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and

Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 alleging unlawful

employment practices on the basis of sex and seeking relief on

behalf of six charging parties: Patricia Delgado, Myriam Cazares,

Flor Rivera, Miriam Delgado, Terri Salcedo, and Delia Casas. The

EEOC’s Complaint alleges in paragraph 9: “Since at least January

of 1998, Defendant have [sic] engaged in unlawful practices of

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sex discrimination ... by refusing to hire the Charging Parties

and similarly situated female employees based on their sex.” 

The charging parties named in the EEOC’s Complaint have

intervened in this action as Plaintiff/Intervenors (hereinafter

referred to as Intervenors). The Intervenors allege claims for

sex discrimination in violation of Title VII and for sex

discrimination in employment in violation of the Fair Employment

and Housing Act (FEHA), California Government Code §§ 12900 et

seq. 

Intervenors move for class certification pursuant to Rule

23(a) and (b)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of the

following class, described in paragraph 4 of the Complaint in

Intervention:

(a) All women who applied for employment with

Defendant Kovacevich “5" Farms and who were

denied employment because of their gender

(female) at any time during the period from

January 1998 to the present.

(b) All women who were deterred from applying

for or seeking employment with Defendant

Kovacevich “5" Farms, at any time during the

period from January 1998 to the present,

because of the company’s known policy and

practice of refusing employment to females

because of their gender.

The EEOC has filed a Statement of Non-Opposition to the

motion. In its Statement of Non-Opposition, the EEOC asserts

that certification of the two classes from January 1998 to the

present is appropriate because of application of the continuing

violation doctrine. 

Kovacevich “5" Farms (K5) has filed an opposition to the

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motion and a reply to the EEOC’s Statement of Non-Opposition,

contesting application of the continuing violation doctrine. 

Because Plaintiff-Intervenors did not address the merits of this

issue in their reply brief, Plaintiff-Intervenors were ordered to

file a supplemental reply brief. See discussion infra. K5's

objection to class certification essentially is limited to the

temporal scope of the class. 

Subsequent to the filing of the motion for class

certification, K5 filed a motion for summary adjudication,

seeking an order “limiting individual damages sought under Title

VII by the EEOC and the Intervenors to individuals who can show

that they were denied employment or deterred from applying from a

date 300 days prior to the filing of Intervenors EEOC charges

(February 13, 2003) to the present, and limiting damages sought

by Intervenors under the California Fair Employment and Housing

Act (FEHA) to individuals who can show that they were denied

employment or deterred from applying from a date one year prior

to the filing of Intervenors EEOC charges (December 12, 2002) to

the present.” 

At the hearing on these motions, the parties were ordered to

file supplemental briefs addressing whether the issue raised by

K5 is appropriate for resolution on summary adjudication and

whether there is no statute of limitations period applicable to

individual claims when alleged in a pattern or practice case. 

These supplemental briefs were timely filed.

A. Motion for Summary Adjudication.

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1. Temporal Scope of Class.

The Charges of Discrimination filed by Terri Salcedo on

November 13, 2003 and by Delia Casas on November 19, 2003 allege

in pertinent part that Ms. Salcedo and Ms. Casas with a group of

women applied for work with K5 “in or about July, 1998", that K5

employees told Ms. Casas and the other women that K5 does not

hire women, and that “[i]n the following seasons, including 2003

(up and through the present), [they were] deterred from applying

for work at Kovacevich because [they] knew about the policy of

refusing to hire female workers [and they] believed that

Kovacevich would reject [them] again based on my sex.” The

Charge of Discrimination filed by Miriam Cazares on November 19,

2003 alleges in pertinent part that she and two other women 

applied for work with K5 “in or about July, 2001", that they were

told by a K5 employee that K5 was not hiring at the time, that K5

was hiring men at the time, that K5 refused to hire them because

of their sex, and that “[i]n the following seasons, including

2003 (up to and including the present), I was deterred from

applying for work at Kovacevich because I knew about the policy

of refusing to hire female workers [and] I believed that

Kovacevich would reject me again based on my sex.”

The EEOC and Intervenors argue that the continuing violation

doctrine is applicable to a systemic policy or a pattern-orpractice of discrimination and that evidence in addition to that

set forth in the Charges of Discrimination provided in discovery

substantiates this contention.

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Although K5 does not dispute the facts set forth for purposes 1

of its motion for summary adjudication, K5 reserves the right to

dispute these facts later in this litigation.

5

In its motion for summary adjudication, K5 assumes arguendo

that it had a policy against hiring women and that there were

zero women in the work force but contends that only those women

who can prove that they were refused hire because of their gender

and those who were deterred from applying for an available

position within the 300-day period and/or the one year period

immediately preceding the filing of the EEOC charges of

discrimination are eligible to recover damages. K5 asserts that

its motion does not address factual issues but, rather, “K5 asks

the court to rule on who may bring timely individual claims for

monetary damages, if the EEOC succeeds on its theory of

liability”. K5 contends, as a matter of law, the only actionable

claims in this case are those that arose during the applicable

charge filing period, and damages can only be awarded on those

claims.

2. Governing Standard.

Summary judgment is proper when it is shown that there

exists “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.

3. Factual Background.1

K5's Answer to the First Amended Complaint filed in

Gutierrrez v. Kovacevich “5" Farms, No. CV-F-04-5515 OWW/DLB,

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admits that it is a single integrated enterprise, to grow, pick,

pack and ship table grapes and other crops in Tulare County,

California. K5's position statement submitted to the EEOC in

connection with the charges of discrimination filed in the

instant action states, “[t]he Company’s labor needs fluctuate

depending upon seasonal activities, with peak employment levels

occurring in the harvest during late summer and early fall”; that

K5 “has highly informal hiring procedures in seasonal

operations”; and that “[f]arm workers are generally aware of the

seasonal activities that occur in the table grape [industry] and

will begin to inquire as to the availability of work when those

seasonal activities begin.” K5's Employee Handbook states that

K5 “does not utilize a seniority system and the company does not

guarantee any laid off employees to recall rights.” In K5's 

responses to Requests for Admission, Set One, K5 admits the

number of its employees during the period 1998 to 2003 ranged

from 277 to 301. The Joint Scheduling Report states that it is

“undisputed by the parties that K-5 had no female employees from

1998 to October 2003". K-5's response to the Charges of

Discrimination filed with the EEOC states “there were 95 female

applicants in October 2003.” In the Declaration of Lucio

Arciniega, a crew boss for K5 submitted to the EEOC in connection

with its investigation, Mr. Arciniega averred in pertinent part:

5. My job duties include supervising and

overseeing a crew of farm laborers in

seasonal agricultural activities. I hire the

employees for my crew.

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6. When people ask me for work, I consider

their past work history with the Company,

their past performance and whether their

abilities are suited for the job that I need

done. If the person has no work history with

the Company, I hire the person who asks for

work first.

7. I have refused to hire female applicants

who have asked for work when no positions are

available in my crew. I have never refused

to hire a woman because she was female, and

have never told any one that I would not hire

women. 

8. When I need workers for my crew, I will

either tell the people in my crew that more

jobs are available and they will spread the

word, or I will call however many people I

need from a list of people who have worked in

my crew in the past. I call one or two

times, and will leave a message if I can.

9. In 2003, some employees started asking

that the Company hire their wives. As I was

instructed by management, I told my crew that

women were welcome to seek work, and asked

for the names of women who wished to work. I

prepared a list of names of female

applicants, and provided it to the office. 

The office chose names of women, and I was

told to hire those women. If a woman was

unavailable, I was provided with another

name. Ultimately, both wives and daughters

of employees were hired.

Onecimo Calderon, a crew boss for K5, averred in pertinent part:

6. When I hire employees, I consider whether

the person has worked for the Company in the

past, and whether or not the person has been

a good worker. If the person has no work

history, I hire the people on a first come,

first served basis.

7. I have refused to hire female applicants

who applied when there were no available jobs

in my crew. When this happens, I tell them

to check back later to see if work is

available. I have never turned away a woman

because she was female, and have never told

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any applicant that I do not hire women.

8. Most of the people in my crew live near

me. If I only need a small number of

workers, I may call each person that I need

from those who have worked in the crew in the

past. If I need a large number of workers, I

will call as many as I can, but sometimes the

workers are difficult to reach because their

phone numbers change frequently. I leave

messages when I can, but many workers do not

have message machines. I will call one or

two times when I need people. I do not

remember any woman approaching me to seek

work at a time when work was available.

9. During 2003, some of the workers asked me

if their wives could work at the Company. I

was instructed by management to prepare a

list of women who wanted to work for the

Company. I announced to my crew that women

would be hired, and they provided me with

names for the list. The office selected the

names of the women who would be hired and

gave them to me. I then informed the

employees who gave me the names and asked

them to let the women know that I had a job

for them. If the woman was unavailable, the

office provided me with a new name.

Augustin Castillo, a crew boss for K5, averred in pertinent part:

6. When I hire employees, I prefer employees

who have worked for the Company in the past

and who have a history of good performance. 

Most of the employees in my crew are

employees who have worked for the Company in

the past. When I hire applicants who have

not worked for the Company before, I will

hire the first person who seeks work when

work is available.

7. I have turned away female job applicants

when they have asked for work at times when

no work is available. I have never refused

to hire a woman because she was female, and

have never told any person that I do not hire

women.

8. I almost always have at least a small

crew working. When I am told by management

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to hire more workers, I will tell the members

of the crew, and they spread the word that

work is available. Those who are interested

in working will come to my house or to the

fields to ask for work. If there are no crew

members working, I will call a few people who

have worked before and inform them that work

is available. They will spread the word, and

people will come to my house or show up at

the fields to seek work. The people that I

select to call are those for whom I have good

contact information. Many of the people in

my crew are difficult to contact by

telephone, or move frequently. Those who I

know I can contact are the people that I

call. I usually will try two or three times

to reach these people, and I ask them to

spread the word that work is available. I

never call each and every employee that I

need, and I never seek out the people. If

they want to work, they must find me. I do

not recall a woman ever asking me for work at

a time when work was available.

9. In 2003, a number of employees approached

me and asked if their wives could work for

the Company. I was told by management that

the Company would hire any woman who wished

to work, and I informed the crew. The

members of the crew gave me the names of

women who wished to work for the Company, and

I gave a list of these names to management. 

The office selected the names of women I was

to hire, and gave me a list of these names. 

I was not involved in the selection process. 

I told the men in my crew who gave me the

women’s names that I had jobs for them, and

they told me whether or not the woman was

available. If a woman was available, she was

hired, and if not, I was given another name.

In the Declaration of Manuel Hernandez, submitted in opposition

to K5's motion for summary adjudication, Mr. Hernandez avers

that he has worked as a farmworker at K5 since 1985 and further

avers in pertinent part:

Prior to October 2003, I never saw a woman

get hired by K-5. However, I did hear that

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The Declaration of Yolanda Hernandez electronically filed 2

with the court is not signed.

10

several years ago a woman disguised herself

as a woman [sic] in order to get work at K-5. 

When the crew leader found out she was a

woman, she was immediately fired. Other than

that, I don’t know of any woman that was ever

hired during my twenty-two years with the

company. 

4. I heard that the owners did not want

women workers because there were no bathrooms

for them, women should stay home with their

children and because women would want time

off from worker [sic] for things like taking

their kids to the doctors.

5. I wanted my wife and daughters to work

with me at K-5 and over the years when work

was available I repeatedly asked the crew

leaders if they could work. I was told by a

crew leader that the owners did not want

women workers. I saw that the crew leaders

would only offer work to men. Numerous coworkers confirmed to me that the company did

not hire women. And again, I never saw a

woman working there prior to October 2003.

6. All the employees’ wives and daughters

preferred working at K-5 because of the

proximity to their home, less transportation

and safer.

7. When the company finally decided to

consider women for work, the crew leaders’

wives and daughters were among the first to

be hired. I think that the crew leaders

wanted to hire women, including their female

relatives, but could not do so before October

2003 because the owners directed them not to

hire women.

In the Declaration of Yolanda Hernandez, wife of Manual

Hernandez, it is averred:2

1. I have worked as a farmworker my entire

life. I have specifically worked in grape

vineyards since the age of 14 years old and

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have performed many duties related to the

production of grapes including deleafing,

pruning, tipping, and picking.

2. Five of my male relatives have worked and

continue to work at K-5 for many years,

including my husband, Manuel ....

3. I am fully aware of the seasonal cycles

for farm work including grape vineyards in

the Delano-Earlimart area because my income

depends on it. I also know in particular

when K-5 has work available because I have so

many family members working there.

4. I first sought work at K-5 in 1998, when

I along Delia Casas, Myrian Cazarez, Terri

Salcido, Adela Hernandez, Isabel Hernandez,

Eva Hernandez, Rachel Ramirez, Maria Rocha

and some other women walked to K-5 to ask for

employment. We knew that K-5 was hiring from

friends and relatives.

5. We spoke with Kenny Kovacevich, Sr., and

his two sons, Kenny Jr. and Mark Kovacevich. 

We told them we had experience working in the

vineyards and wanted to apply for work. 

Kenny Kovacevich, Jr., stated that the

company did not employ women. When we asked

why the Kovacevichs said that we needed to be

home with our kids. The men then got a truck

and drove away. They left us standing there

in the dust.

6. I have wanted to work at K-5 so that I

could work with my husband and other

relatives. Working together costs the family

expenses and provides a safer work

environment.

7. Over the years, I hoped that the owners

would change their mind about women, so I

would continue to ask my husband and other

men who worked at K-5 if they were hiring

women. However, until late 2003, I was

repeatedly told that the owners still did not

want to hire women workers.

Evidence from K-5's payroll records demonstrates that at least

two of the Charging Parties were rejected for work at K5 on July

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23, 2003 but that 20 men were hired from July 24, 2003 to August

4, 2003, all of whom were first time hires. Mark Kovacevich

testified at his deposition that the door of a bathroom was

marked for women in approximately October 2003. Linda OrdonioDixon, counsel for the EEOC in this action, avers:

16. Only limited discovery has been

conducted in this case thus far. No

depositions have been taken and the parties

have only recently begun to identify the

victim class in this case. However, the EEOC

is informed and believes that subsequent

discovery will reveal numerous other victims

of K-5's exclusionary policy. Even at this

stage of the lawsuit, the EEOC has

interviewed no less than fifty women who have

potential claims in this lawsuit. Each of

these potential claimants experienced

discrimination similar to that which is

detailed above.

4. Analysis.

K5 asserts that the proposed class definition is defective

on its face because of the time covered by the class definition. 

Specifically, K5 challenges the request that the class run from

January 1998.

K5 cites 4 Larson, Employment Discrimination, 2d Ed., §

81.09[2], that “courts follow an initial rule that the class may

include only those individuals whose claims are not foreclosed by

the Title VII statute of limitations and who therefore could have

filed charges with the EEOC in a timely manner on the date that

the actual class representative filed charges.” K5 contends

that, under federal and state authority, the temporal scope of

the class is limited to those who were unlawfully denied

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employment or who were deterred from applying during the 300-day

period to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC for the

Title VII causes of action and to the one-year period for filing

DFEH charges for the FEHA cause of action. Therefore, the class

can include only those who were alleged victims of sex

discrimination on or after February 15, 2003 for Title VII and on

or after December 12, 2002 for the FEHA claim. 

K5 relies on Williams v. Owens-Illinois, 665 F.2d 918 (9th

Cir.), modified on denial of rehearing, 1982 WL 308873 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982). In Williams, the Ninth

Circuit held in pertinent part:

In a class action, a class representative’s

EEOC complaint tolls the statute of

limitations for all class members ... The

trial court established the limitations

period for the two classes by subtracting the

180 day statute of limitations for filing

with the EEOC complaint filed by a member of

each class. The court therefore concluded

that claims of sex discrimination based on

acts prior to March 1974 and of race

discrimination based on acts prior to March

1971 were time-barred. The court rejected

the continuing violation doctrine as

inapplicable.

The doctrine of continuing violations, as one

court observed, is ‘actually a conglomeration

of several different ideas.’ ... For present

purposes, however, the relevant strain of

continuing violation doctrine is that a

systematic policy of discrimination is

actionable even if some or all of the events

evidencing its inception occurred prior to

the limitations period ... The reason is that

the continuing system of discrimination

operates against the employee and violates

his or her rights up to a point in time that

falls within the applicable limitations

period. Such continuing violations are most

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likely to occur in the matter of placements

or promotions. A minority employee who is

not promoted in 1973, for example, and is

subject to a continuing policy against

promotion of minorities, may then file a

timely charge in 1976, because the policy

against promoting him or her continued to

violate the employee’s rights up to the time

the charge was filed. With regard to such

discrimination in promotion, this court has

accepted the following formulation:

[A] challenge to systematic

discrimination is always timely if

brought by a present employee, for

the existence of the system deters

the employee from seeking his full

employment rights or threatens to

adversely affect him in the future.

...

The situation may be different, however, with

regard to complainants who have ceased to be

employees or never were employees. A refusal

to hire or a decision to fire an employee may

place the victim out of reach of any further

effect of company policy, so that such a

complainant must file a charge within the

requisite time period after the refusal to

hire or termination, or be time-barred. If

in those cases the victim can show no way in

which the company policy had an impact on

them within the limitations period, the

continuing violation doctrine is of no

assistance or applicability, because mere

‘continuing impact’ from past violations is

not actionable. Continuing violations are.’ 

....

We agree with the trial court that in this

case Owens-Illinois’ refusals to hire and

terminations did not give occasion to apply

the continuing violations doctrine. Claims

based on discriminatory refusals to hire or

on terminations occurring before the

limitations period were therefore properly

excluded.

665 F.2d at 923-924. 

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K5 also refers to Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 727 F.2d

1429 (9 Cir.1982), order modified, 742 F.2d 520 (9 Cir.1984). th th

In Domingo, the district court certified the plaintiff class

as all nonwhites who were either employed by Nefco, applied for

employment by Nefco, or were deterred from applying for

employment with Nefco at any time between 300 days prior to

November 26, 1971 (the date Domingo filed his charge with the

EEOC) and the date of the damages phase of the trial. 727 F.2d

at 1442. In pertinent part, Domingo argued on appeal that the

continuing violation theory permits victims of discrimination at

an earlier time to recover. The Ninth Circuit held that the

district court was correct in establishing the starting date of

the class action 300 days prior to the date Domingo filed his

EEOC charge. Id. The Ninth Circuit held in pertinent part:

It is now well settled that a named plaintiff

who has filed a timely charge may bring a

class action on behalf of class members who

have not filed charges ... In addition, the

filing of a class action suspends the

applicable statute of limitation for all

class members ... It follows, then, that

Domingo may represent all class members whose

claims were not already time-barred at the

time he filed his charge, irrespective of

whether the class members had filed charges

of their own.

...

Domingo argues, nevertheless, that the

continuing violation doctrine announced in

this circuit operates to eliminate the

limitation period. The continuing violation

theory recognizes the principle that a

plaintiff may be able to recover under Title

VII if he or she can demonstrate a pattern or

practice of discrimination that has continued

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into the present, notwithstanding his or her

ability to prove specific instances of

discrimination personally suffered at the

hands of the defendant within the limitation

period of Title VII ... Thus, Domingo

reasons, if a continuing violation has been

demonstrated a class member should be able to

recover regardless of when the class member

was employed. That statement is not quite

true.

We note, first, that the defendant’s conduct,

as found by the district court, did indeed

constitute a continuing violation of Title

VII. In order for a violation to be

continuing, it must involve a practice,

continued over a period of time, which

operates to injure the plaintiff either

individually or as a member of a class to

which the plaintiff belongs ... Here,

plaintiffs have attacked Nefco’s hiring and

promotion policies. There is no question

that these policies remained intact from

season to season. Moreover, the practices

were not confined in application to any

particular individual or group of

individuals, but operated against the class

generally. Indeed, the district court

implicitly found, as a matter of fact, that

Nefco’s practices were classwide in

application when it certified the class under

Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2).

Domingo’s argument, however, would

effectively read the limitations period out

of the statute, which we cannot do. As the

Supreme Court has stated:

A discriminatory act which is not

made the basis for a timely charge

is the legal equivalent of a

discriminatory act which occurred

before the statute was passed. It

may constitute relevant background

evidence in a proceeding in which

the status of a current practice is

at issue, but separately

considered, it is merely an

unfortunate event in history which

has no present legal consequences.

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United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 

... (1977). The continuing violation theory

is a way of introducing this type of

background evidence ... It follows that, as a

prerequisite to obtaining relief, each class

member must demonstrate, by fact of

employment or otherwise, that he or she has

been discriminated against during the

limitation period or was a member of a group

exposed to discrimination during that time.

727 F.2d at 1442-1443.

With regard to the FEHA, K5 cites Alch v. Superior Court,

122 Cal.App.4th 339, 377 (2004)(“[T]he employers and the agencies

would not be liable for any discriminatory refusal to refer or

refusal to hire that occurred more than one year before the

complaints in these cases were filed with the Department of Fair

Employment and Housing.’).

In Morgan v. National Railroad P. Corp., 232 F.3d 1008 (9th

Cir.2000), the Ninth Circuit ruled that plaintiff can establish a

continuing violation in two ways:

... First, by showing a series of related

acts one or more of which are within the

limitations period - a serial violation. A

serial violation is established if the

evidence indicates that the alleged acts of

discrimination occurring prior to the

limitations period are sufficiently related

to those occurring within the limitations

period ... Precedent makes clear that the

alleged incidents of discrimination cannot be

isolated, sporadic, or discrete ... [T]his

court [has] found a sufficient relationship

where the acts were ‘plausibly related as

acts of discrimination ....” ....

The second way to establish a continuing

violation is to show a systematic policy or

practice of discrimination that operated, in

part, within the limitations period - a

systemic violation ... Systemic violations

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involve ‘demonstrating a company wide policy

or practice’ and most often occurs in matters

of placement or promotion. 

232 F.3d at 1015-1016. However, in National Railroad P. Corp. v.

Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002), the Supreme Court granted certiorari

and rejected the Ninth Circuit’s application of the continuing

violation doctrine to “serial violations”. The Supreme Court

held:

The Court of Appeals applied the continuing

violation doctrine to what it termed ‘serial

violations,’ holding that so long as one act

falls within the charge filing period,

discriminatory and retaliatory acts that are

plausibly or sufficiently related to that act

may also be considered for purposes of

liability ... With respect to this holding,

... we reverse.

Discrete acts such as termination, failure to

promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to

hire are easy to identify. Each incident of

discrimination and each retaliatory adverse

employment decision constitutes a separate

actionable ‘unlawful employment practice.’ 

Morgan can only file a charge of

discrimination to cover discrete acts that

‘occurred’ within the appropriate time

period. 

536 U.S. at 114. However, Morgan specifically did not address

the timely filing question with respect to “pattern-or-practice”

claims brought by private litigants. 536 U.S. at 115 n.9.

Although noting that the Supreme Court in Morgan expressly

declined to address the timely filing with respect to “patternor-practice” claims, K5 asserts that another statement in Morgan

suggests that only timely discrete acts are actionable under a

pattern or practice theory. 

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The statement in Morgan upon which K5 relies is not

supportive as K5 argues. The Supreme Court was addressing

Morgan’s contention that the statute does not require the filing

of a charge of discrimination within 180 or 300 days of each

discrete act of discrimination, but that the language requires

the filing of a charge within the specified number of days after

an “unlawful employment practice”. 536 U.S. at 510-511. In

rejecting Morgan’s position, the Supreme Court stated that

“[t]here is simply no indication that the term ‘practice’

converts related discrete acts into a single unlawful practice

for the purpose of timely filing” and that “[w]e have repeatedly

interpreted the term ‘practice’ to apply to a discrete act or

single ‘occurrence,’ even when it has a connection to other

acts.” 536 U.S. at 511. This latter statement was made by the

Supreme Court in rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s position

concerning “serial violations”. Given the Supreme Court’s

express statement in Morgan that it was not addressing timely

filing questions with respect to “pattern-or-practice” claims

brought by private litigants statement, K5's assertion that the

Supreme Court in Morgan suggests what the resolution might be is

speculative.

Nonetheless, in Raad v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School

Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1192 (9 Cir.2003), the plaintiff, a th

substitute teacher, alleged in pertinent part that the School

District subjected her to disparate treatment because of her

national origin when it refused to hire her as a permanent

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teacher during three consecutive hiring cycles, beginning in

1991. The Ninth Circuit held in pertinent part:

In Morgan, the [Supreme] Court drew a

distinction between harassment-based and nonharassment-based claims under Title VII:

plaintiffs may not establish employer

liability for events occurring prior to the

statutory limitations period in nonharassment-based claims, even if events

occurring outside of the limitations period

form part of a pattern extending to events

that are not time-barred. Morgan, 122 S.Ct.

at 2072 (stating that ‘discrete

discriminatory acts are not actionable if

time barred, even when they related to acts

alleged in timely filed charges’); see also

id. at 2071 (‘We have repeatedly interpreted

the term “practice” to apply to a discrete

act or single “occurrence,” even when it has

connection to other acts.’). In other words,

a discriminatory practice, although it may

extend over time and through a series of

related acts, remains divisible into a set of

discrete acts, legal action on the basis of

which must be brought within the statutory

limitations period.

Here, Raad filed her EEO charge with the

ASCHR on September 16, 1993. Because she

filed her charge with the state agency, the

300-day limitations period governs her claim. 

Therefore, the District may be held liable

only for discriminatory acts perpetrated

within 300 days of September 16,1993,

counting backward from that date. As a

result, Raad’s claims based on the District’s

denial of her full-time application in August

1993 for the science position at Lathrop, as

well as her claims based on the report of a

bomb threat and ensuing disciplinary action,

are not time-barred. The District may be

held liable for damages caused by these acts,

assuming that Raad is able to prove her case.

The failure-to-hire claims arising out of

Raad’s applications in 1991 and 1992 are

time-barred; however, their supporting

factual allegations may remain relevant to

Raad’s live claims. See Morgan, 122 S.Ct. at

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2072; United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431

U.S. 553, 558 ... (1977). Accordingly, while

these claims are not independently

actionable, evidence about the District’s

refusal to hire Raad for a full-time teaching

position in 1991 and 1992 is relevant and

admissible insofar as it bears on her claim

that she was discriminatorily refused a fulltime position in August 1993.

323 F.3d at 1192.

K5 further contends that the Supreme Court’s decision in

Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) establishes that

persons seeking individual recovery in pattern or practice cases

must demonstrate that they have an actionable claim under Title

VII. In so arguing, K5 refers to the Supreme Court’s discussions

at pp. 361-362, 367-368, and 371. 

In Teamsters, the United States instituted federal court

actions under Title VII against a nationwide common carrier of

motor freight and the union representing many of its employees,

alleging that the employer had engaged in a pattern of

discrimination against African-Americans and Spanish-surnamed

persons with regard to hiring for and transfers or promotions to

certain preferred truck driving positions, and that the seniority

system in the bargaining agreement between the defendants

perpetuated the effects of past discrimination. In pertinent

part, the defendants (petitioners before the Supreme Court) then

argued that no employee should be entitled to relief unless the

United States demonstrates that he was an actual victim of the

company’s discriminatory policies. The Supreme Court, relying

Franks v. Bowman, 424 U.S. 747 (1976), and cautioning that not

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all class actions will necessarily follow the Franks model, held

in pertinent part:

The plaintiff in a pattern-or-practice action

is the Government, and its initial burden is

to demonstrate that unlawful discrimination

has been a regular procedure or policy

followed by an employer ... At the initial,

‘liability’ stage of a pattern-or-practice

suit the Government is not required to offer

evidence that each person for whom it will

ultimately seek relief was a victim of the

employer’s discriminatory policy. Its burden

is to establish a prima facie case that such

a policy existed. The burden then shifts to

the employer to defeat the prima facie

showing of a pattern or practice by

demonstrating that the Government’s proof is

either inaccurate or insignificant. ....

If an employer fails to rebut the inference

that arises from the Government’s prima facie

case, a trial court may then conclude that a

violation has occurred and determine the

appropriate remedy. Without any further

evidence from the Government, a court’s

finding of pattern or practice justifies an

award of prospective relief ....

When the Government seeks individual relief

for the victims of the discriminatory

practice, a district court must usually

conduct additional proceedings after the

liability phase of the trial to determine the

scope of individual relief. The petitioners’

contention in this case is that if the

Government has not, in the course of proving

a pattern or practice, already brought forth

specific evidence that each individual was

discriminatorily denied an employment

opportunity, it must carry that burden at the

second, ‘remedial’ stage of trial. That

basic contention was rejected in the Franks

case. As was true of the particular facts in

Franks, and as is typical of Title VII

pattern-or-practice suits, the question of

individual relief does not arise until it has

been proved that the employer has followed an

employment policy of unlawful discrimination. 

The force of that proof does not dissipate at

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the remedial stage of the trial. The

employer cannot, therefore, claim that there

is no reason to believe that its individual

employment decisions were discriminatorily

based; it has already been shown to have

maintained a policy of discriminatory

decisionmaking. 

The proof of the pattern or practice supports

an inference that any particular employment

decision, during the period in which the

discriminatory policy was in force, was made

in pursuit of that policy. The Government

need only show that an alleged individual

discriminatee unsuccessfully applied for a

job and therefore was a potential victim of

the proved discrimination. As in Franks, the

burden then rests on the employer to

demonstrate that the individual applicant was

denied an employment opportunity for lawful

reason.

... [W]e have held that the District Court

and the Court of Appeals were not in error in

finding that the Government had proved a

systemwide pattern and practice of racial and

ethnic discrimination on the part of the

company. On remand, therefore, every postAct minority group applicant for a linedriver position will be presumptively

entitled to relief, subject to a showing by

the company that its earlier refusal to place

the applicant in a line-driver job was not

based on its policy of discrimination.

431 U.S. at 361-362. The Supreme Court subsequently discussed

the appellate court’s conclusion that where there has been a

showing of class-wide discriminatory practices coupled with a

seniority system that perpetuates the effects of that

discrimination, an individual member of the class need not show

that he unsuccessfully applied for the position from which the

class had been excluded. The Supreme Court held:

[A]n incumbent employee’s failure to apply

for a job is not an inexorable bar to an

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award of retroactive seniority. Individual

nonapplicants must be given an opportunity to

undertake their difficult task of proving

that they should be treated as applicants and

therefore presumptively entitled to relief

accordingly.

431 U.S. at 364. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court

stated in pertinent part: 

To conclude that a person’s failure to submit

an application for a job does not inevitably

and forever foreclose his entitlement to

seniority relief under Title VII is a far cry

... from holding that nonapplicants are

always entitled to such relief. A

nonapplicant must show that he was a

potential victim of unlawful discrimination. 

Because he is necessarily claiming that he

was deterred from applying for the job by the

employer’s discriminatory practices, his is

the not always easy burden of proving that he

would have applied for the job had it not

been for those practices ... When this burden

is met, the nonapplicant is in a position

analogous to that of an applicant and is

entitled to the presumption discussed ...

supra.

431 U.S. at 367-368. The Supreme Court further held:

While it may be true that many of the

nonapplicant employees desired and would have

applied for line-driver jobs but for their

knowledge of the company’s policy of

discrimination, the Government must carry its

burden of proof, with respect to each

specific individual, at the remedial hearings

to be conducted by the District Court on

remand.

431 U.S. at 371. 

K5 argues that Teamsters makes

absolutely clear that, notwithstanding an

alleged pattern or practice of

discrimination, each person seeking

individual relief must demonstrate an

actionable claim of discrimination under

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Title VII, and it is equally clear that to

demonstrate an actionable claim requires

proof of a discriminatory refusal to hire or

legitimate deterrence during the 300 days

preceding the filing of the underlying EEOC

charge. In this case, therefore, the class

can only include individuals who can prove

that they were refused hire, or legitimately

deterred from applying for work on or after

February 13, 2003. 

The EEOC and Intervenors rely on EEOC v. Local 350, Plumbers

and Pipefitters, 998 F.2d 641 (9 Cir.1992). In Local 350, the th

EEOC brought an action under the ADEA on behalf of a local union

member, Pilot, and similarly situated members challenging the

union’s policy of refusing to allow retired members to seek work

through its hiring hall while receiving pensions. Pilot, who had

retired in 1983, had signed on to the union’s work list in 1984. 

The union removed him from the work list in 1984, advising him

that to be eligible he would have to stop receiving his pension. 

Pilot continued to seek to sign up on the work list up to

November 1987. In December 1987, Pilot filed a discrimination

charge with the EEOC. Id. at 643. The Ninth Circuit accepted

the EEOC’s argument that Pilot could obtain monetary relief from

the date he was first refused listing because the union’s policy

constituted a “continuing violation”:

‘Under the continuing violation doctrine, “a

systematic policy of discrimination is

actionable even if some or all of the events

evidencing its inception occurred prior to

the limitations period.”’ 

Id. Here, the EEOC and Intervenors argue, K5 continued its

exclusionary hiring policy into the charge filing period and,

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following Local 350, K5 “should be held accountable for the

entire scope of its systematic discrimination for the duration of

the policy’s implementation.” 

K5 responds that Local 350 is distinguishable because Pilot

had been refused listing within one month of the EEOC charge of

discrimination and because Local 350 was decided before the

Supreme Court’s opinion in Morgan. K5 contends:

[T]here was a continuing obligation to refer

the applicant for employment which could

support a continuing violation, at least

prior to Morgan, due to the continuing

relationship between the applicant and the

union. Of course, Morgan eviscerated this

approach to alleged continuing violations, by

holding that the limitations period begins to

run from the date of each discrete

discriminatory act, such as a refusal to

hire. 

The EEOC and Intervenors also refer to Douglas v. California

Dept. of Youth Authority, 271 F.3d 812 (9 Cir.), amended, 271 th

F.3d 910 (9 Cir.2001), petition for rehearing en banc denied,

th

285 F.3d 1226 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 924 (2002). th

Douglas was a case involving a suit claiming discrimination under

the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act by

an applicant for employment who was denied employment by CYA

because a vision test indicated the applicant was color-blind. 

The Ninth Circuit, relying on its opinion in Morgan v. Nat’l R.R.

Passenger Corp., held that a plaintiff “may show a ‘systematic

policy or practice of discrimination that operated, in part,

within the limitations period - a systemic violation.’” 271 F.2d

at 822. The Douglas court was aware that the Supreme Court had

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granted certiorari in Morgan but concluded that “[b]ecause the

present case involves the second method of establishing a

continuing violation - a systemic violation - the Supreme Court’s

decision is unlikely to control this case.” 271 F.3d at 822 n.9. 

The Ninth Circuit, addressing Douglas’ allegation that CYA’s

color vision requirement constitutes a systemic policy of

discrimination, explained:

A systemic violation claim ‘requires no

identifiable act of discrimination in the

limitations period, and refers to general

practices or policies, such as hiring,

promotion, training and compensation.’

Provencher v. CVS Pharmacy, Div. of Melville

Corp., 145 F.3d 5, 14 (1 Cir.1998). ‘In st

other words, if both discrimination and

injury are ongoing, the limitations clock

does not begin to tick until the invidious

conduct ends.’ Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea

Co., 871 F.2d 179, 183 (1 Cir.1989). st

271 F.3d at 822. The Ninth Circuit, noting that its decisions

applying the systemic policy or practice method of demonstrating

a continuing violation have largely arisen in the context of

placement or promotion discrimination cases, stated that Douglas

presented a case where the plaintiff alleges discrimination in

hiring and considered whether “the maintenance of a systemic

discrimination policy, when combined with repeated efforts by the

plaintiff to gain employment, extends the accrual of the

limitations period. Id. at 822-823. After discussing the

specific facts relative to the statutes of limitation applicable

to Douglas’ claims, the Ninth Circuit referred to Domingo v. New

England Fish Co., supra, and EEOC v. Local 350, Plumbers and

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Pipefitters, supra, and ruled:

Thus, under Domingo and Local 350, the

critical inquiry is whether in this case,

Douglas has introduced facts, which if viewed

in the light most favorable to him, raise

material questions about whether he was

‘exposed’ to CYA’s discriminatory policy

during the period of limitations. We

conclude that Douglas raised material

questions of fact about whether CYA continued

to discriminate against him by not

considering or responding to his pending

application during the 1996-1998 period. 

When Douglas applied in 1994, he proceeded

successfully through each of the hiring

steps, until he reached the vision test at

the end. We have no reason to believe that

Douglas was less qualified when he re-applied

in 1996. It is a reasonable inference from

these facts that CYA failed to respond to

Douglas’s 1996 application throughout the

1996-1998 period because of its

discriminatory policy about the vision test. 

In any event, by reapplying in the fall of

1996 during the window for applications for

hiring in 1996-1998, Douglas remained

‘exposed’ to CYA’s discriminatory vision 

policy during the entire 1996-1998 period. 

This exposure renders his claims timely by

extending the claims past the June 22, 1996

deadline for filing his ADA claim, and the

July 5, 1997 deadline for filing his

Rehabilitation Act claim. 

271 F.3d at 824. In Douglas, the Ninth Circuit further noted:

We need not decide the broader question

whether the maintenance of a systematic

policy of discrimination alone is enough to

extend the limitations period for a failure

to hire case. We note that the Fifth Circuit

has answered this question in the negative,

reasoning that ‘[i]f the mere existence of a

policy is sufficient to constitute a

continuing violation, it is difficult to

conceive of a circumstance in which a

plaintiff’s claim of an unlawful employment

policy could be untimely.’ Abrams v. Baylor

Coll. of Med., 805 F.2d 528, 533 (5th

Cir.1986). In our view, this rationale

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ignores the fact that the employer may end

the period of exposure to litigation by

disavowing the discriminatory policy.

271 F.3d at 823 n.10.

K5 argues that Douglas is distinguishable because Douglas

could show that he had been denied employment due to the

discriminatory policy within the 300-day period. In addition, as

in Local 350, there was a continuing relationship between Douglas

and CYA as evidenced by the two-year application period, “until

the Morgan decision eliminated continuing violations in refusal

to hire cases.” K5 contends:

While the [Ninth Circuit in Douglas] did not

address the scope of available remedies, such

a factual scenario is clearly distinguishable

from the case presented here. Even by the

EEOC’s version of the facts, K5 maintains a

highly informal hiring process where there

are no written applications, much less ones

that are retained for multiple years with the

right to appeal hiring decisions. Thus,

there is nothing ‘continuing’ about the

application process at K5 that can support a

continuing violation, and of course, after

Morgan, it is clear that refusals to hire

cannot be a continuing violation.

The EEOC and Intervenors also refer to Lyons v. England, 307

F.3d 1092, 1106-1107 (9 Cir.2002): th

... We must conclude from the [Supreme]

Court’s statements [in Morgan] that when ...

a plaintiff pursues several disparate

treatment claims, based on discrete

discriminatory acts, the limitations period

will begin to run for each individual claim

from the date on which the underlying act

occurs. [footnote omitted]. If a plaintiff

chooses to bring separate claims based on

each discriminatory act, his assertion that

this series of discrete acts flows from a

company-wide, or systematic, discriminatory

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practice will not succeed in establishing the

employer’s liability for acts occurring

outside the limitations period because the

Supreme Court has determined that each

incident of discrimination constitutes a

separate actionable unlawful employment

practice.

However, in Lyons, the Ninth Circuit further noted:

We do not mean to suggest that after Morgan

the same plaintiff would be precluded from

bringing a class-wide pattern-or-practice

claim based on a series of discrete acts,

including, for example, separate incidents of

an employer’s failure-to-train and failureto-promote the plaintiff because of his

membership in a protected class. In

International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.

United States, 431 U.S. 324 ... (1977), the

Supreme Court held that the government

successfully proved its case of pattern-orpractice discrimination based on the

employer’s ‘refusal to recruit, hire,

transfer, or promote minority group members

on an equal basis with white people,’ id. at

335,336 ... The Court noted in Morgan that it

‘ha[d] no occasion [] to consider the timely

filing question with respect to “pattern-orpractice” claims brought by private

litigants.’ ... Therefore, the question of

how Title VII’s filing deadlines should be

applied to pattern-or-practice claims based

on a series of discriminatory acts, some of

which occurred outside the limitations

period, has been left unanswered by the

Court, and we do not consider it here.

The EEOC and Intervenors also refer to Cherosky v.

Henderson, 330 F.3d 1243 (9 Cir.2003). In Cherosky, the Ninth th

Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to assert that an

employer’s individual denials of respirators for asthma was a

pattern-or-practice claim:

... Although the terms ‘pattern-or-practice’

are not defined by statute, we have held that

these terms have their ordinary meaning ...

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As the Supreme Court explained, pattern-orpractice claims cannot be based on ‘sporadic

discriminatory acts’ but rather must be based

on discriminatory conduct that is widespread

throughout a company or that is a routine and

regular part of the workplace. See Int’l

Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.

324, 336 ... (1977).

Here, the Employees have not attempted to

show, by argument let alone with statistical

or any other evidence, that the Postal

Service widely discriminates against

employees with disabilities or even that it

routinely discriminates with respect to

respirator requests.

330 F.3d at 1247.

The EEOC and Intervenors contend that the evidence to be

presented in this case will focus on statistical evidence of K5's

failure to hire women and will establish that this failure was

systematic and company-wide. 

The EEOC and Intervenors argue that the Supreme Court’s

opinion in Morgan supports a finding of a “continuing violation”

in this case. The “continuing violation” is K5's policy of

excluding women from the workplace, resulting in repeated

failures to hire women, “as well as discrimination in the form of

on-going deterrence from application for employment at K-5

because of its policy of excluding women from employment.” The

EEOC and Intervenors assert: “Unlike the rejection of an actual

applicant, a deterred applicant suffers continuous discrimination

not manifested in a specific act.” They refer to the discussion

in Morgan of the difference between “discrete acts” of

discrimination and “hostile environment” claims:

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Hostile environment claims are different in

kind from discrete acts. Their very nature

involves repeated conduct ... The ‘unlawful

employment practice’ therefore cannot be said

to occur on any particular day. It occurs

over a series of days or perhaps years and,

in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single

act of harassment may not be actionable on

its own ... Such claims are based on the

cumulative effect of individual acts.

Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115. The EEOC and Intervenors contend:

Systemic cases are comparable to hostile work

environment cases because they are both

comprised of a series of acts that constitute

a specific type of violation. As with a

hostile work environment claim, a claim of

pattern and practice systemic discrimination

cannot be said to occur on any particular

day. It occurs over a series of days, months

and perhaps years ... Thus, it is

unsurprising that the Supreme Court left the

door open for continuing violation claims

based on pattern and practice systemic

discrimination which is manifested in such a

way. Indeed, the very nature of such a claim

requires a court to look beyond the 300-day

limit. Just as in hostile environment

claims, proof of a violation in pattern and

practice case [sic] will require a showing

that a policy or practice existed over time.

K5 responds that this attempt to draw an analogy between

deterrence and hostile work environment claims is “misguided”,

arguing that deterrence is a discrete act and is not analogous to

a hostile work environment claim. K5 asserts that “[c]ase law

reveals that there is no difference between the claim of an

applicant rejected due to a discriminatory policy, and the claim

that an individual was deterred from applying for an open

position”, citing EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d

1265(11 Cir.2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 941 (2003). th

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In Joe’s Stone Crabs, the EEOC brought an action against the

restaurant under Title VII, contending that the restaurant

intentionally discriminated against four female applicants, none

of whom actually applied for a position during the actionable

time period. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that the actionable

period was 300 days prior to the filing of the EEOC’s

discrimination charge:

The EEOC, however, argues that the

discrimination in this case constituted a

continuing violation, which extended the

limitations period beyond [the 300-day

limit]. In determining whether a

discriminatory employment practice

constitutes a continuing violation, ‘we must

distinguish between the present consequence

of a one-time violation, which does not

extend the limitations period, and the

continuation of the violation into the

present, which does.’ ... The disparate

treatment claims asserted by the EEOC fall

into the former category. The alleged acts

at issue - the failure to hire the claimants

because they were women - were discrete, onetime employment events that should have put

the claimants on notice that a cause of

action had accrued. See Morgan, 122 S.Ct. at

____.

Id. at 1271-1272. Even though none of the women had applied for

a job at the restaurant during the 300 days prior to the EEOC

charge of discrimination, the Eleventh Circuit held:

... Our precedent demonstrates that a nonapplicant may ... establish a prima facie

case by showing that she refrained from

applying due to a justifiable belief that the

employer’s discriminatory practices made

application a futile gesture ... To have a

‘justifiable belief’ for purposes of this

exception to the application requirement, a

person must demonstrate: (1) that she had a

real and present interest in the job for

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which the employer was seeking applications;

and (2) that she would have applied for the

job but effectively was deterred from doing

so by the employer’s discriminatory

practices.

Id. at 1274. After concluding that the EEOC had carried its

burden with respect to two of the women, the Eleventh Circuit

reversed the district court’s award of backpay beginning prior to

the 300-day period. Id. at 1276. K5 asserts that “[n]othing

could be a more clear example of the issue presented to the court

here.”

The EEOC and Intervenors further argue that Congressional

intent supports a finding of liability beyond the 300-day statute

of limitations. They refer to the 1972 amendment to 42 U.S.C. §

2000e-5(g) prohibiting accrual of backpay more than two years

prior to the filing of the charge of discrimination and cite

Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 290-291 (D.C.Cir.1982):

The legislative history of Congress’ decision

to limit Title VII compensation to two years

further supports our decision to allow back

pay awards to take into account the effects

within the accrual period of illegal

discrimination that came before. By in

effect imposing a statute of limitations on

Title VII, Congress intended to protect

employers against the ‘enormous monetary

penalties’ that might result from ‘indefinite

liabilities.’ H.R.Rep.No. 238, 92d Cong.,

1 Sess. 66 (1971) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. st

News 1972, p. 2175 (minority views). 

Because courts are “‘obliged to give effect, is possible, to

every word Congress used,’” and to reject “‘interpretations that

would render a statutory provision surplusage or a nullity’”, 

Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Services, Inc., 460 F.3d

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In its Supplemental Brief filed after the hearing, K5 refers 3

to several unpublished rulings from various United States District

Courts which K5 contends support its position. However, this court

is not bound by any ruling of another District Court and

unpublished decisions are not citable as precedent under the

applicable rules of court.

35

1162, 1175 (9 Cir.2006), the EEOC and Intervenors argue: th

Congress’s limitation of backpay to two years

is only comprehensible if a plaintiff can

recover relief for discriminatory acts prior

to the 300 day limitation period. That is

because backpay is only available in cases

based upon wrongful termination, demotion,

constructive discharge, failure to hire or

failure to promote. Calculation of backpay

runs from the date of the wrongful employment

action. If recovery were limited to wrongful

acts within the 300 day charge-filing period,

... there would be no reason for Congress to

enact a two-year (i.e., 730-day) backpay

limitation. 

K5 responds that this argument is an attempt to show that

the Supreme Court’s opinion in Morgan was wrongly decided and

that the court “should reject the EEOC’s backhanded effort to

evade the clear directive of the Supreme Court to restrict

application of the continuing violation doctrine.” K5 further

asserts that, “[f]rom the facts presented by the EEOC in their

Opposition and supporting declarations, it is clear that the

allegedly objectionable hiring decisions were immediate,

unequivocal, and final, with no avenue of appeal” and that “[i]t

is difficult to conceive of a more discrete act of explicitly

informing an applicant that she will not and cannot be hired

because of her gender.”3

3. Conclusion.

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The EEOC is exempt from the requirements of Rule 23. See 4

General Telephone Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318,

333-334 (1980)(“The EEOC may seek class wide relief under §

706(f)(1) without being certified as the class representative under

36

This is a difficult issue to resolve. The law is anything

but clear. K5's basic premise is that the Supreme Court’s

decision in Morgan precludes any continuing violation doctrine if

the underlying acts of discrimination are a failure to hire. 

However, the Supreme Court in Morgan did not address the

continuing violation doctrine based on systematic, company-wide

discrimination and, as noted above, the Ninth Circuit has

indicated in cases following Morgan that such a theory may be

sustainable depending on the evidence. It is apparent that the

EEOC and the Intervenors have selected 1998 as the starting point

for the class and for damages based on the Supreme Court’s

holding in Teamsters. K5, with its assumption arguendo of facts

supporting the EEOC’s and Intervenors’ position, attempts to

present this solely as a question of law. It is not. Pattern or

practice or systemic violations that have the potential to extend

claims to the time during which the practice or systemic

violations occurred. This requires factual development through

discovery. Foreclosing pre-limitations period claims is

premature on this record.

K5's motion for summary adjudication as to the applicable

statutes of limitations is DENIED without prejudice.

B. Intervenors’ Motion for Class Certification.

1. Rule 23(a) Requirements.4

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Rule 23; the EEOC may maintain its § 706 civil actions for the

enforcement of Title VII and may seek relief for a group of

aggrieved individuals without first obtaining class certification

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.”).

37

Certification of a class of plaintiffs is governed by

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), which states in pertinent

part that “[o]ne or more members of a class may sue or be sued as

representative parties on behalf of all.” As a threshold matter,

in order to certify a class, a court must be satisfied that 

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all

members is impracticable (the "numerosity"

requirement); (2) there are questions of law or fact

common to the class (the "commonality" requirement);

(3) the claims or defenses of representative parties

are typical of the claims or defenses of the class (the

"typicality" requirement); and (4) the representative

parties will fairly and adequately protect the

interests of the class (the "adequacy of

representation" requirement).

In re Intel Secs. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 104, 112 (N.D. Cal.

1981)(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)). 

In opposing the application of the Rule 23(a) factors, K5

addresses only the “numerosity” requirement, stating that “it

does appear that [plaintiff/intervenors] can establish the

remaining requirements for class certification based upon the

allegations in the Complaint in Intervention.” K5, however,

asserts that it “reserves the right to move to decertify the

class should any conflicts of interest arise between the class

representatives and the class, or class counsel and the class.”

(1) Numerosity.

The numerosity requirement demands “examination of the

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specific facts of each case and imposes no absolute limitations. 

General Tel. Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318,

330 (1980). Nevertheless, “Plaintiffs must show some evidence of

or reasonably estimate the number of class members. Mere

speculation as to satisfaction of this numerosity requirement

does not satisfy Rule 23(a)(1).” Schwartz v. Upper Deck Co., 183

F.R.D. 672, 681 (S.D.Cal.1999).

Intervenors assert that it is “readily apparent” that the

size of the class will measure in the hundreds, referring to the

evidence that K-5 employed almost 300 persons during the years

1998 through 2003. Intervenors contend that “[i]n view of the

fact that the allegations and scope of the putative class extend

over many years, the potential size of the class will necessarily

exceed over one hundred individuals ....” 

In challenging the requested class certification, K5 focuses

primarily on the “temporal scope” of the proposed class. 

Specifically the request that the class be defined to run from

January 1998. In so contending, K5 cites 4 Larson, Employment

Discrimination, 2d Ed., § 81.09[2], that “courts follow an

initial rule that the class may include only those individuals

whose claims are not foreclosed by the Title VII statute of

limitations and who therefore could have filed charges with the

EEOC in a timely manner on the date that the actual class

representative filed charges.” This issue is discussed above. 

K-5 further asserts:

Intervenors ask the court to presume

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numerosity by assuming that hundreds of women

were denied jobs on or after the opening date

for the class without presenting any evidence

regarding the number of job openings during

the actionable period, the number of women

who applied for or were deterred from

applying during that period, or the

percentage of the workforce that would be

female absent any discrimination. This falls

short of their burden. 

Intervenors respond that even if the court rules for K-5 on

the issue of continuing violation and the actionable period, K-5

admits that the claims would reach back to February 15, 2003, 

making a minimum of three years of applicants or deterred

applicants who will comprise the class. Reference is also made

to K-5's admissions set forth above that K-5 employed nearly 300

employees during each of the years 1998-2003. Intervenors

contend that it is “without question that the size of the class

will be substantially large enough to merit proceeding as a

class.” 

Courts have routinely found the numerosity requirement

satisfied when the class comprises 40 or more members. Ansari v.

New York Univ., 179 F.R.D. 112, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Numerosity

is also satisfied where joining all Class members would serve

only to impose financial burdens and clog the court’s docket. In

re Intel Secs. Litig. 89 F.R.D. at 112. Although it appears

numerosity will be met, it is prudent to permit class discovery

to provide information as to the potential number of class

members.

(2) Common Questions of Fact and Law.

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Commonality exists when there is either a common legal issue

stemming from divergent factual predicates or a common nucleus of

facts resulting in divergent legal theories. Hanlon v. Chrysler

Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998).

Intervenors assert that the common issues of fact are

whether the class member was qualified and available to perform

the unskilled jobs and whether, during the applicable time, each

applied or was deterred from applying because of K-5's policy of

refusing employment to females. Intervenors describe the common

questions of law as including whether the denial of employment to

females who applied or were deterred from applying violates Title

VII and/or the FEHA.

 K-5 does not dispute the showing made by the Intervenors. 

Even without this concession, commonality is not a demanding

requirement. Meiresonne v. Marriott Corp., 124 F.R.D. 619, 622

(N.D.Ill.1989). Commonality is present. 

(2) Typicality.

Typicality is satisfied if the representative’s claims arise

from the same course of conduct as the class claims and are based

on the same legal theory. See e.g., Kayes v. Pac. Lumber Co., 51

F.3d 1449, 1463 (9th Cir. 1995).

Again, K-5 does not dispute the showing made by the

Intervenors. Typicality is present. 

(3) Fair & Adequate Representation.

The final Rule 23(a) requirement is that the class

representative fairly and adequately protect the interests of the

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class. This requirement has two parts. First, the

representative’s attorney must be “qualified, experienced, and

able to conduct the litigation.” In re United Energy Corp. Solar

Power Modules Tax Shelter Inv. Secs. Litig., 122 F.R.D. 251, 257

(C.D. Cal. 1998). Second, the suit must not be “collusive” and

the named Plaintiff’s interests must not be “antagonistic to the

class.” Id. 

With regard to the first requirement, the Intervenors

represent that class counsel include highly experienced attorneys

with many years specializing in employment discrimination,

including class actions. Intervenors’ attorneys include Tomas

Olmos, who previously served as the Regional Attorney of the Los

Angeles District Office of the EEOC, Dolores Leal, who previously

served as President of the California Employment Lawyers

Association, Marcos Camacho, who served for many years as General

Counsel to the United Farm Workers of America, and Tom Lynch, who

was employed with the EEOC for over three years. 

With regard to the second requirement, Intervenors assert

that there is no evidence of collusion by class representatives

with K-5 or evidence of antagonism between the class

representatives and the members of the class

K-5 does not dispute the showing of representativenesss made

by counsel for Intervenors as proposed class counsel. Fair and

adequate representation is present.

B. Certification as a Mandatory Class under Rule 23(b)(1)

or (b)(2).

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Once the threshold requirements of Rule 23(a) are satisfied,

a class may be certified only if the class action satisfies the

requirements of Rule 23(b)(1), (b)(2), and/or (b)(3). Here,

Plaintiff/Intervenors seek certification of a mandatory class

under Rule 23(b)(2). 

Rule 23(b)(2) permits the maintenance of a class action

(assuming Rule 23(a) is also satisfied) if “the party opposing

the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally

applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final

injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with

respect to the class as a whole.”

K-5 does not oppose that this requirement has been

satisfied.

C. Conclusion.

For the reasons stated above:

1. K-5's motion for summary adjudication is DENIED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE following discovery;

2. Intervenors’ motion for class certification is DEFERRED

pending discovery to more specifically define the temporal

characteristic of class members.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 18, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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