Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00909/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00909-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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AMY McCONNELL and AMY

McCONNELL on behalf of her

four minor children, A.B.,

A.B. J.M. and J.M.,

NO. CIV. S-05-0909 FCD DAD

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

(Board of Supervisors)

LASSEN COUNTY, CALIFORNIA;

JAMES CHAPMAN, BOB PYLE, LLOYD

KEIFER, BRIAN DAHLE and JACK

HANSON, BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

OF LASSEN COUNTY, CALIFORNIA;

MARGARET CROSBY, DIRECTOR OF

CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES,

LASSEN COUNTY, TERRY CHAPMAN,

LOEL GRIFFITH and DIRECTOR OF

CALIFORNIA STATE DEPARTMENT OF

SOCIAL SERVICES,

Defendants.

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1 Plaintiff Amy McConnell brings this action on her own

behalf and on the behalf of her four minor children. 

2 On June 10, 2005, plaintiff filed the first amended 

complaint pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Rule 15 provides that “a party may amend the pleading

once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive

pleading is served . . . . [o]therwise a party may amend the

party’s pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of

the adverse party.” (emphasis added). On August 22, 2005,

plaintiff filed a second amended complaint without leave of

court. The second amended complaint is stricken, but will be

viewed as a proposed complaint for the purpose of assessing the

plaintiff’s ability to allege sufficient and definite facts

against defendants should leave be granted. Therefore, the

ruling on defendants’ motion to dismiss addresses the sufficiency

of the allegations in plaintiff’s first amended complaint only. 

3 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance,

the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h).

4 The facts of this case are set out in the order regarding

Lassen County et al.’s motions, and are thus not repeated herein.

2

This matter comes before the court on defendants James

Chapman, Bob Pyle, Lloyd Keifer, Brian Dahle, and Jack Hanson’s

(Board of Supervisors) motion to dismiss Amy McConnell

(plaintiff)1 first amended complaint2 (“Pl’s 1st Am. Cmpl.”,

filed June 10, 2005.) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.3 

STANDARD4

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff 

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need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id. 

Given that the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader, the court may not dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would

entitle him or her to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45

(1957); NL Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th

 Cir. 1986).

Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to assume that plaintiff

“can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendant

ha[s] violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been

alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal.

State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). Moreover,

the court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in

the form of factual allegations.” United States ex rel. Chunie

v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986).

In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the court may consider

only the complaint, any exhibits thereto, and matters which may

be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. 

See Mir v. Little Co. Of Mary Hospital, 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th

Cir. 1988); Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. Consumers Union of United

States, Inc., 12 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 1998).

ANALYSIS

A. Section 1983 Claims

The Board of Supervisors asserts that it has absolute

immunity from civil liability under Section 1983. Specifically,

it argues that the failure to train, hire, and correct problems

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within CPS, is a legislative decision under which it is

absolutely immune. 

“Local legislators are entitled to the same absolute

immunity from civil liability under section 1983 for their

legislative activities as has long been accorded to federal,

state, and regional legislators.” Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523

U.S. 44, 49 (1998). However, “[a]bsolute immunity applies only

when legislators act in their legislative capacities, not in

their administrative or executive capacities.” Chateaubriand v.

Gaspard, 97 F.3d 1218, 1220 (9th. Cir. 1996). “Whether an act is

legislative turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the

motive or intent of the official performing it.” Kaahumanu v.

County of Maui, 315 F.3d 1215, 1219 (9th Cir. 2003).

The Ninth Circuit has set out a four factor analysis for

determining whether an act is legislative for the purposes of

establishing absolute immunity. See id. at 1220. The court must

consider: 

“(1) whether the act involves ad hoc decisionmaking, or the

formulation of policy; (2) whether the act applies to a few

individuals, or to the public at large; (3) whether the act

is formally legislative in character; and (4) whether it

bears all the hallmarks of traditional legislation.” 

Id. at 1220 (internal citations and quotations omitted). “The

Supreme Court has generally been quite sparing in its recognition

of claims to absolute official immunity.” Id. at 1219-20

(internal quotations omitted).

 The facts alleged against the Board of Supervisors in the

complaint do not clearly amount to a legislative act under this

four factor analysis. See Thomas v. Baca, 2005 WL 1030247, at 4

(C.D.Cal., 2005) (finding the court did not have enough

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information to determine whether the failure of the Board of

Supervisors to adequately supervise was a legislative act when

deciding a motion to dismiss). The court must read the complaint

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. On the face of the

complaint, it is not clear whether the Board’s alleged failures

to act were legislative acts for the purposes of absolute

immunity. Specifically, it is possible that the Board of

Supervisors’ actions are not “formally legislative in character”

and do not bear “all the hallmarks of traditional legislation.” 

See Kaahumanu, 315 F.3d at 1220. Therefore, because the

defendants’ actions may not be legislative acts, the Board of

Supervisors’ motion is DENIED.

B. State Law Claims

Government Code § 820.2 provides immunity to a public

employee for injuries resulting from “his act or omission where

the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the

discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be

abused.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 820.2 (West 2005). Generally, “a

discretionary act is one which requires the exercise of judgment

or choice.” Kemmerer v. County of Fresno, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1426,

1437 (1988). However, California courts have not set forth a

definitive rule which resolve every case. Id. Rather, the

California Supreme Court has adopted an analysis that relies on

the “policy considerations relevant to the purpose of granting

immunity to the governmental agency whose employees act in

discretionary capacities.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

Immunity is reserved for those basic policy decisions

which have been expressly committed to coordinate

branches of government, and as to which judicial

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interference would thus be ‘unseemly.’ Such areas of

quasi-legislative policy-making are sufficiently

sensitive to call for judicial abstention from

interference that might even in the first instance

affect the coordinate body’s decision-making process.

 

Barner v. Leeds, 24 Cal. 4th 676, 685 (2000). 

Plaintiff alleges that the Board of Supervisors of Lassen

County failed and refused to remedy known violations, and

inadequately trained and staffed Lassen County CPS. (Pl’s 1st

Am. Cmpl. at 6.) “A decision involving the allocation of limited

funds is purely a discretionary one.” Taylor v. Buff, 172 Cal.

App. 3d 384, 390 (1985) (finding that the Chairman of the Board

of Supervisor’s decision to not allocate funds for an improved

security system in the county jail was a discretionary act). 

Thus, the Board’s decisions regarding allocation of resources are

entitled to immunity. The Board of Supervisor’s motion to

dismiss is GRANTED with prejudice for any state law claims

arising out of allegations regarding these decisions. 

C. Compliance With the California Tort Claims Act

The Board of Supervisors alleges that plaintiff’s state tort

claims should be dismissed because the complaint fails to plead

compliance with the California Tort Claims Act. In order to

state a tort claim against a public entity, the California Tort

Claims Act requires “the timely presentation of a written claim

and the rejection of the claim in whole or in part.” Mabe, 237

F.3d at 1111 (quoting Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 67 F.3d

1470 (9th Cir. 1995)). Plaintiff must present claims to the

government entity for money or damages with few exceptions. Cal.

Code § 905 (West 2005). Tort claims such as the instant claims

for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence

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are not listed among the exceptions to § 905. Moreover, under

Government Code § 945.4,

no suit for money or damages may be brought against a

public entity on a cause of action for which a claim

is required to by presented in accordance with Chapter

1 (commencing with section 900) and Chapter 2

(commencing with section 910) of Part 3 of this

division until a written claim therefore has been

presented to the public entity and has been acted upon

by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected

by the board. 

Cal. Code § 945.4 (West 2005). Finally, under Government Code 

§ 950.2, any suit against a public employee is barred in cases

where a plaintiff’s action against the agency is barred for

failure to present a claim. The 1965 Amendment to § 950.2 makes

it clear the “the presentation of a claim to the employing public

entity is a prerequisite to suit against an employee.” Id.

Plaintiff has the burden of pleading compliance with the

California Tort Claims Act in their complaint. Wood v. Riverside

General Hospital, 25 Cal. App. 4th 1113, 1119 (1994). Moreover,

compliance with the California claims statutes is mandatory. 

City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 4447, 454 (1974). 

Federal courts have recognized these requirements. See Ortega v.

O’Connor, 764 F.2d 701, 707 (9th Cir. 1985), rev’d on other

grounds, 107 S.Ct. 1492 (1987) (failure to comply with claimfiling requirements imposed by California Tort Claims Act bars

pendent state claims). Finally, where employees of the agency in

question act within their express or implied authority, despite

the wrongful nature of their actions, a complaint based on the

employees’ actions may be properly dismissed for failing to

allege proper filing of the claim with the employing government

entity. Neal v. Gatlin, 35 Cal. App. 3d 871, 877-78 (1973).

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Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege compliance with the

California Tort Claim Act procedures. As such, and given that

plaintiff has not alleged that the Board of Supervisors acted

outside of its express or implied authority, the Board of

Supervisors’ motion to dismiss as to plaintiff’s claims of

intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence is

GRANTED.

D. Leave to Amend

Pursuant to Rule 15(a), “leave [to amend] is to be freely

given when justice so requires.” “[L]eave to amend should be

granted unless amendment would cause prejudice to the opposing

party, is sought in bad faith, is futile, or creates undue

delay.” Martinez v. Newport Beach, 125 F.3d 777, 785 (9th Cir.

1997). Plaintiff’s second amended complaint demonstrates her

ability to allege further facts with greater specificity as they

relate to this matter. Therefore, justice requires that

plaintiff be granted leave to amend the first amended complaint. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Board of Supervisor’s motions

are DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. Because plaintiff has

demonstrated the possible ability to plead sufficient and

definite allegations against the Board of Supervisors in the

proposed second amended complaint, plaintiff is granted fifteen

(15) days from the date of this order to file a second amended

complaint in accordance with this order. The Board of 

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Supervisors are granted thirty (30) days from the date of service

of plaintiff’s second amended complaint to file a response

thereto.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 20, 2005 

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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