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Nature of Suit Code: 304
Nature of Suit: 
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

SALMA ACEVEDO, JAIME A. ALVARADO, PETER 

J. APPELT, JOHN BILOTTI, JR., WILLIAM W.

BRADLEY, JEFFREY BRODACK, JOHNNY R. 

CISNEROS, PIERRE DE BONO, JAMES E. 

DEZENDORF, ROBERT DOBIECKI, CESAR 

ESPEJO, TARA FIONDA, LISA FOOSE, JUAN 

ANTONIO GALLARDO, CATHERINE 

GIARRAPUTO, SERGIO PIMENTA GODINHO, 

BRIAN HERLIHY, CRISTOBAL HERNANDEZ, 

TRACEY HILL, CHERYL LISE JACOBO, DAVID F. 

JONES, DAVID R. KAISER, DAVID LANDERER, 

ANDREW J. LONG, RICHARD J. LORIA, 

JEANNETTE POZO, GUILLERMO C. SALOMON, 

JESSICA ALFRED, ADELA T. ARGUELLO, MARITA 

BAEZ, DANIEL E. BAUTISTA, PABLO R. 

CARDENAS, OLGA L. CASEY, CHRISTINE M. 

COOPER, TOMMY L. COOPER, GEORGE O. 

DORADO, KEITH R. DURHAM, JOSEFINA FARIAS, 

KENNETH P. KELLY, RAYMOND F. KNOPP, 

TAMARA T. LACY, FRANK MADDALENA, RALPH 

MARTINEZ, CLAUDIA MONISTROL, RAYMOND 

MONZON, RAYMOND MORABITO, TODD 

NICHOLAS, KAREN O'NEILL, THOMAS O'SHEA, 

DENNYSON F. PADILLA, JOSE E. PORRONDO, 

JEANNINE PERNICIARO, CHRISTINE POWERS, 

EMA QYTEZA, DEBORAH ANN REINOA, GONZALO 

REINOSA, JOHN RIOMAO, DULCE MARIA 

RODRIGUEZ, KARLA RODRIGUEZ, KERRI 

ROONEY, NORMAN A. ROY, GEORGE RUDY, 

DEBRA K. RUTTER, JACQUELINE SALAMON, 

MICHAEL B. SAUER, KENNETH J. SCOTT, 

CHARLES SHEGOG, LINDA SHOUPE, MICHAEL 

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2 ACEVEDO v. US

SILVA, STACEY SIMON, ADRIAN SMITH, 

MICHAEL J. SMITH, RONALD M. SMITH, PHILLIP 

THOMPSON, PETER TOUHY, WAYNE T. WILSON, 

JOHN F. YOUNG, ROBERT ZYLSTRA,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-5126

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:11-cv-00768-EDK, Judge Elaine Kaplan.

______________________ 

Decided: June 9, 2016

______________________ 

JULES BERNSTEIN, Bernstein & Lipsett, P.C., Washington, DC, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. Also represented by LINDA LIPSETT; EDGAR N. JAMES, James & 

Hoffman, P.C., Washington, DC.

LAUREN MOORE, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by 

BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., REGINALD 

T. BLADES, JR. 

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, LOURIE and TARANTO, Circuit 

Judges.

PROST, Chief Judge. 

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ACEVEDO v. US 3

Plaintiffs-Appellants Salma Acevedo et al. (“Appellants”) allege that the United States violated 5 U.S.C. 

§ 5928 by refusing to provide them with danger pay

allowances. The Court of Federal Claims (“Claims 

Court”) held that it lacked jurisdiction over the case 

because § 5928 and its implementing regulations are not 

money-mandating, as required for the court to possess 

jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). 

Acevedo v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 57, 59 (2015). For 

the reasons stated below, we affirm the Claims Court’s

ruling. 

BACKGROUND

The Appellants in this case are employed by the U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland 

Security (“CBP”), as present and former Supply Chain 

Security Specialists in its Customs-Trade Protection 

Against Terrorism (“C-TPAT”) program. The purpose of 

the C-TPAT program is to improve the security of the 

importation of goods into the United States. Pursuant to 

this mission, C-TPAT employees, including the Appellants 

in this case, travel and work at foreign posts designated 

by the Secretary of State as “danger pay posts” in an 

attempt to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from 

entering the United States. 

In Count I of their complaint against the government, 

the Appellants alleged that they did not receive overtime 

pay as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act and thus

sought back pay, liquidated damages, attorney fees and 

other relief pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). In Count II, 

the Appellants alleged violations of 5 U.S.C. § 5928, 

contending that CBP refused to provide them with danger 

pay allowances for work performed in posts of duty that 

the Department of State has designated as eligible for 

such allowances. 

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4 ACEVEDO v. US

Section 5928 (“the danger pay statute”) is part of the 

Overseas Differentials and Allowances Act of 1960 

(“ODAA” or “the Act”). Section 5928 provides as follows:

An employee serving in a foreign area may be 

granted a danger pay allowance on the basis of 

civil insurrection, civil war, terrorism, or wartime 

conditions which threaten physical harm or imminent danger to the health or well-being of the 

employee. A danger pay allowance may not exceed 

35 percent of the basic pay of the employee, except 

that if an employee is granted an additional differential under section 5925(b) of this title with 

respect to an assignment, the sum of that additional differential and any danger pay allowance 

granted to the employee with respect to that assignment may not exceed 35 percent of the basic 

pay of the employee. The presence of nonessential 

personnel or dependents shall not preclude payment of an allowance under this section. In each 

instance where an allowance under this section is 

initiated or terminated, the Secretary of State 

shall inform the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate of the action taken and the 

circumstances justifying it.

5 U.S.C. § 5928 (emphasis added). 

Pursuant to Executive Order No. 10,903, the President delegated to the Secretary of State the authority to 

promulgate regulations governing the payment of allowances under § 5928. Exec. Order No. 10,903, 26 Fed. Reg. 

217 (Jan. 9, 1961); see also Department of State Standardized Regulations (“DSSR”) §§ 011(a), 650. The regulations 

state that the “danger pay allowance prescribed in Chapter 650 may be granted to employees defined in Section 

040i.” DSSR § 031.2 (emphasis added). 

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ACEVEDO v. US 5

The DSSR also prescribes the basis for danger pay allowance: 

A danger pay allowance is established by the Secretary of State when, and only when, civil insurrection, civil war, terrorism or wartime conditions 

threaten physical harm or imminent danger to the 

health or well being of a majority of employees officially stationed or detailed at a post or country/area in a foreign area. To determine whether 

the situation meets the danger pay criteria, a post 

usually must submit the Danger Pay Factors 

Form (FS–578) along with pertinent supporting 

information to the Department of State (Office of 

Allowances) for review. The Director of the Office 

of Allowances will chair a working group which 

will make a recommendation to the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration concerning a 

danger pay designation.

DSSR § 653.1. Moreover, section 013 of the DSSR, entitled “Authority of Head of Agency,” provides, in relevant 

part:

When authorized by law, the head of an agency 

may defray official residence expenses for, and 

grant . . . danger pay . . . to an employee of his/her 

agency and require an accounting therefor, subject to the provisions of these regulations and the 

availability of funds. Within the scope of these 

regulations, the head of an agency may issue such 

further implementing regulations as he/she may 

deem necessary for the guidance of his/her agency 

with regard to the granting of and accounting for 

these payments.

The government moved to dismiss Count II of the Appellants’ complaint, contending that the Claims Court

lacks jurisdiction on the grounds that 5 U.S.C. § 5928 is 

not a money-mandating statute, that the DSSR is not

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6 ACEVEDO v. US

money-mandating, and that CBP has not adopted a policy 

of paying danger pay to all eligible employees. The 

Claims Court agreed with the government and granted its 

motion to dismiss Count II. The Claims Court then 

granted the Appellants’ motion pursuant to Court of 

Federal Claims Rule 54(b) and entered final judgment 

with respect to the danger pay claim. The Appellants 

timely appealed to us. 

DISCUSSION

We review de novo the Claims Court’s decision to 

dismiss a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Bianchi v. United States, 475 F.3d 1268, 1273 (Fed. Cir.

2007). The Appellants bear the burden of establishing the 

court’s jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. 

Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 

1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011). “In determining jurisdiction, a 

court must accept as true all undisputed facts asserted in 

the plaintiff’s complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Id.

The Tucker Act provides the Claims Court with jurisdiction over claims “against the United States founded 

either upon the Constitution or any Act of Congress or 

any regulation of an executive department, or upon any 

express or implied contract with the United States or for 

liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding 

in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). However, the Tucker Act 

is “only a jurisdictional statute; it does not create any 

substantive right enforceable against the United States 

for money damages.” United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 

392, 398 (1976). “Instead, to invoke jurisdiction under the 

Tucker Act, a plaintiff must identify a contractual relationship, constitutional provision, statute, or regulation 

that provides a substantive right to money damages.” 

Khan v. United States, 201 F.3d 1375, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 

2000). 

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ACEVEDO v. US 7

Here, the Appellants argue that “[t]he CBP policy and 

practice of paying danger pay to its employees, the relevant statutory provisions of 5 U.S.C. §§ 5921–5928, their 

legislative history, and the provisions of the DSSR serve 

to establish 5 U.S.C. § 5928 to be money-mandating.” 

Appellants’ Br. 11–12. As the Claims Court properly 

determined, however, the Appellants are incorrect.

In a thorough and well-reasoned decision, the Claims 

Court concluded that the danger pay statute and the 

DSSR, taken individually or together, are merely moneyauthorizing and not money-mandating. Acevedo, 121 Fed. 

Cl. at 63–66. The Claims Court also determined that the 

Appellants had “failed to establish the existence of agency 

regulations or a formal agency policy by which all employees eligible to receive danger pay allowances under 

the DSSR must be provided such allowances.” Id. at 66. 

We agree.

The Appellants rely on the purpose and legislative 

history of § 5928 to argue that it is money-mandating. 

They acknowledge that § 5928 says that “[a]n employee 

serving in a foreign area may be granted a danger pay 

allowance” but they argue that this is a case where the 

presumption that “may” means money-authorizing and 

not money-mandating can be rebutted. For support, the 

Appellants cite to Doe v. United States where we held that 

the moiety statute—which authorizes the Secretary of the 

Treasury to compensate informants in customs investigations with a portion of the recovery—is money-mandating, 

even though the statute uses the word “may.” 100 F.3d 

1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996); 19 U.S.C. § 1619(a) (2000)

(stating that “the Secretary may award and pay such 

person an amount that does not exceed 25 percent of the 

net amount so recovered”). But in Doe, we specifically 

noted that we were not “writ[ing] on a clean slate,” and 

explained that prior cases had interpreted the moiety 

statute as requiring some award, although it left to the 

Secretary’s discretion the amount of the award. 100 F.3d 

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at 1582. We also relied on our understanding that Congress did not intend to vest complete discretion with the 

Secretary in awarding the compensation. Id. Here, we do 

not have the same legislative history or understanding 

that § 5928 was intended to require some type of danger 

payment, and only the amount was up to the discretion of 

the agency.

Indeed, that is precisely what we concluded in Roberts 

v. United States, 745 F.3d 1158, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 

Looking at the same Act and evaluating similar arguments, we determined that § 5928, standing alone, is not 

money-mandating. We also determined that the DSSR is 

not money-mandating, at least with respect to living 

quarters allowances (“LQA”). Id. at 1164–65. Much of 

the same analysis from Roberts is applicable here. For 

example, in Roberts, we noted that section 013 of the 

DSSR contemplates further regulations, because it states: 

When authorized by law, the head of an agency 

may defray official residence expenses for, and 

grant . . . [danger pay and LQA] . . . to an employee of his/her agency . . . . Within the scope of 

these regulations, the head of an agency may issue 

such further implementing regulations as he/she 

may deem necessary for the guidance of his/her 

agency with regard to the granting of and accounting for these payments.

DSSR § 013 (emphasis added). Similarly, the definition of 

“employee” in the danger pay and LQA regulations contemplates further regulations, stating: “‘Employee’ means 

an individual . . . who is . . . eligible for allowances and 

differential under subchapter 030 . . . as determined by 

relevant agency authority.” DSSR § 040(i)(4) (emphasis 

added). 

The Appellants contend that the danger pay regulations are different from the LQA regulations in key ways, 

such that our conclusion in Roberts is not applicable here. 

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ACEVEDO v. US 9

The Appellants argue that in the case of danger pay, 

unlike LQA, the eligibility requirements are “fully and 

completely set forth in the DSSR and no further implementing regulations or agency decisions are needed or 

contemplated.” Appellants’ Br. 39–40. But the Appellants fail to specifically indicate the differences between 

the regulatory schemes that would support that broad 

proposition. In contrast, as the government notes, the 

LQA provisions and danger pay provisions are “equally 

detailed.” Appellee’s Br. 24. For example, the DSSR 

provides the specific costs that LQA is designed to cover, 

DSSR § 131.3 (“LQA rates are designed to cover substantially all of the rent, heat, light, fuel, gas, electricity, 

water, taxes . . . insurance, and agent’s fee . . . .”); what 

qualifies as “rent” under the provision, DSSR § 131.2; 

when and how LQA grants commence, DSSR § 132.1;

when and how LQA grants terminate, DSSR § 132.4; how 

to determine the LQA rate, DSSR § 134; and how LQA is 

paid, DSSR § 135. Notably, what is not in the DSSR is 

any requirement that LQA be paid; instead the regulations merely set forth a framework for LQA when an 

agency exercises its discretion to provide such allowances. 

That is equally true for the danger pay allowance. Thus, 

our conclusion in Roberts that § 5928 and the DSSR 

“standing alone, are only money-authorizing, not moneymandating,” is also applicable in this case. 745 F.3d at 

1162.

Finally, the Appellants argue that the CBP has an 

unwritten policy of paying danger pay and that policy, in 

conjunction with the statute and regulations, confers 

Tucker Act jurisdiction. They note that in Roberts, although we concluded that § 5928 and the DSSR were not 

money-mandating, we nonetheless ultimately held that 

the Claims Court had jurisdiction over the case. We 

relied on the fact that there were “[f]urther implementing 

regulations,” id. at 1160, which, together with the statute 

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10 ACEVEDO v. US

and DSSR, were “fairly construed as money-mandating,” 

id. at 1166. Here, we have no such regulations. 

The Appellants point only to a number of letters and 

emails from various officials—including CBP’s Assistant 

Commissioner for Legislative Affairs, individuals from 

CBP’s Office of Congressional Affairs, and individuals 

from CBP’s Office of Human Resources Management—

which state that CBP provides danger pay to all eligible 

employees. But as the Claims Court noted, “[a]t best” 

these letters show “that CBP has had a practice of providing such pay to employees, in at least some cases, upon 

the request of their supervisors.” Acevedo, 121 Fed. Cl. at 

66. The Appellants have not, however “identified any 

agency-wide policy or directive that requires supervisors 

to request such allowances for employees who meet the 

State Department’s eligibility criteria.” Id. Moreover, 

such letters and emails are not akin to formal agency 

rules or binding written directives and therefore cannot 

constitute a “source of substantive law [that] can fairly be 

interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal 

Government for the damages sustained.” United States v. 

Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 218 (1983). 

Because § 5928, the DSSR, and the alleged unwritten 

policy of providing danger pay, cannot reasonably be 

construed as “money-mandating,” we conclude that the 

Appellants have failed to establish jurisdiction over their 

complaint. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Claims 

Court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

AFFIRMED

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