Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-00260/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-00260-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALFONSO HELENA and DANIEL TZIU,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF SAN FRANCISCO, COUNTY OF SAN

FRANCISCO, JOSEPH SALAZAR and DOES 1-

25,

Defendants.

 /

No. C04-0260 CW

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANT

SALAZAR'S MOTION

FOR A NEW TRIAL,

GRANTING

DEFENDANT CHING'S

MOTION FOR

JUDGMENT AS A

MATTER OF LAW AND

DENYING PLAINTIFF

TZIU'S MOTION TO

AMEND JUDGMENT

Defendant Officer Joseph Salazar moves pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 59 for a new trial. Defendant Sergeant

Kyle Ching moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b)

for judgment as a matter of law on the basis of qualified immunity. 

Plaintiffs Alfonso Helena and Daniel Tziu, respectively, oppose the

motions. Mr. Tziu also moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 60(a) to correct or amend the judgment by awarding

nominal damages. Sergeant Ching opposes this motion. 

The matters were heard on March 3, 2006. Having considered

all of the papers filed by the parties and oral argument on the

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motion, the Court denies Officer Salazar's motion for a new trial,

grants Sergeant Ching's motion for judgment as a matter of law and

denies as moot Mr. Tziu's motion to amend the judgment.

BACKGROUND

 Plaintiffs' lawsuit arises out of a March 7, 2003, incident in

which they were arrested or detained by Officer Salazar and

Sergeant Ching of the San Francisco Police Department. At trial,

Mr. Helena brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer

Salazar for excessive force, false arrest and unreasonable search;

Mr. Tziu brought § 1983 claims against Sergeant Ching for excessive

force and false arrest. The jury heard these matters during the

week of December 12 through 16, 2005. 

The evidence at trial showed that at midnight on the night of

the incident, Plaintiffs were together at Jose Coronado Park, where

some of their friends had been playing soccer. The officers

testified that they considered the park to be a dangerous, highcrime area. Mr. Tziu was a seventeen-year old minor. 

Mr. Helena admitted to drinking three small shots of cognac

while at home earlier in the evening. Mr. Helena and Mr. Tziu

testified that they had only been at the park for a short time when

police arrived, but their friends Angelos Turcios and Adolfo

Siliezar testified that Plaintiffs had been at the park for one and

a half to two hours. 

Officer Salazar testified that he initially drove past the

park and observed Plaintiffs. On the police report, he wrote that

he saw Mr. Helena drinking, urinating in a bush and retching. At

trial, Officer Salazar admitted that he did not actually see urine

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1

Mr. Tziu also testified that he was assaulted by Sergeant

Ching; the jury found against Mr. Tziu on his excessive force

claim, and that finding is not challenged here. 

3

or vomit, but that he thought that was what was happening based on

Mr. Helena's position. 

Officer Salazar testified that he got out of the car and saw

Mr. Helena fall into a bush; Mr. Helena was staggering and smelled

of alcohol. He arrested Mr. Helena for public intoxication. 

Mr. Helena testified that despite the three cognacs earlier in

the evening, he was sober when he encountered the police. He

denied urinating, vomiting or falling into a bush. Mr. Helena

testified that Officer Salazar assaulted him for several minutes at

the scene of the arrest, including slamming Mr. Helena's head into

cars, punching him and choking him until he fell down. He

testified that, when he was taken to the Mission Police Station,

Officer Salazar hit him again while interrogating him about guns. 

Sergeant Ching and Officer Greiner, who were also at the

scene, corroborated Officer Salazar's testimony that Mr. Helena was

drunk and that no assault occurred. Officer Peter Shields, Officer

Raymond Lee and Officer Angel Lozano, all of whom saw Mr. Helena

after his arrest, testified that he seemed drunk and that they saw

no signs of injury. 

Mr. Tziu corroborated Mr. Helena's testimony that he was

sober. Mr. Tziu testified that he wasn't able to see Mr. Helena

the whole time,1 but that he did see Officer Salazar slam Mr.

Helena's head into a car and punch him several times. 

Mr. Turcios also testified that he did not see the entire

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incident. He did not see Mr. Helena fall into a bush, urinate or

vomit. Mr. Turcios testified that Mr. Helena was drunk, based on

his past observations of Mr. Helena in that condition and the fact

that Mr. Helena was angry, excited and raised his voice to the

officers. Mr. Turcios said that he saw Officer Salazar hold Mr.

Helena's head against the car, and that he heard Mr. Helena

complain that Officer Salazar was hurting his fingers. 

Mr. Siliezar testified that he did not see Mr. Helena

drinking, but that he was at the park to play soccer, not to see

who was drinking. Mr. Siliezar came over to watch the arrest, but

by that time, Mr. Tziu and Mr. Helena were already handcuffed. Mr.

Siliezar saw no assault. 

Linda Felix, Mr. Helena's godmother, testified that she saw

him the morning after the incident and observed redness around his

neck, swollen fingers and red and swollen wrists. She observed no

redness or bruising on his face. 

Dr. Steven Fugaro, Defendants' expert medical witness,

reviewed the records from Mr. Helena's examination at San Francisco

General Hospital the day after the incident. Dr. Fugaro testified

that the only objective signs of injury detected during the

examination were two abrasions, one on the right side of Mr.

Helena's face and one on his neck, and abrasions on his wrists. He

also noted that Mr. Helena had reported feeling tenderness and

pain. Dr. Fugaro testified that the wrist abrasions were

consistent with being handcuffed and the neck and face abrasions

were consistent with falling into a bush, although he acknowledged

that other scenarios could have caused the injuries. Dr. Fugaro

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testified that there was no evidence of the blunt force trauma that

he would expect on someone who had been slammed into a car or

punched, and no evidence of the bruising expected in an individual

who had been strangled. He acknowledged that many factors could

affect the type of injury and how the injury manifested itself, for

example, the amount of force used. 

 Plaintiffs sought to call witnesses who alleged that Officer

Salazar used excessive force against them or their families in the

past, as well as current or former SFPD members with information

relating to past incidents involving Officer Salazar, and to

introduce written complaints and disciplinary records. Defendants

filed a motion in limine to exclude such evidence. The Court

granted the motion with respect to most of the evidence Plaintiffs

intended to bring, but admitted evidence related to two particular

incidents, a complaint of excessive force by witness Michael Avila,

which was sustained by San Francisco's Office of Citizen

Complaints, and official records related to Officer Salazar's

filing of a false or inaccurate police report. Mr. Avila testified

at trial, and admitted to smoking marijuana prior to his testimony

as well as on the day of his encounter with Officer Salazar. 

The Court instructed the jury that the evidence of Officer

Salazar's prior use of excessive force and submission of a false

police report could be considered "only for the purpose of showing,

to the extent the evidence does show, intent, motive, bias or lack

of mistake." The Court additionally cautioned the jury,

This evidence may not be used to show that the police officers

acted in any particular way on the date of the incident in

question. And, further, you should understand that any such

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evidence is not used to show any character trait of the police

officers, or any tendency of the police officer to engage in

misconduct.

Final Jury Instructions at 5. 

Neither party requested, and the Court did not give, an

instruction on nominal damages. 

The Court instructed the jury on the issue of punitive

damages, and the first verdict form given to the jury asked them to

decide whether or not Officer Salazar should pay punitive damages

to Mr. Helena. Final Jury Instructions at 17; Verdict Form at 3. 

Pursuant to the parties' stipulation bifurcating the trial,

however, the jury was told, "Any damages award you make at this

time may not include any amount for punitive damages. The amount

of punitive damages, if any, will be decided at another time." 

Final Jury Instructions at 17. 

When Plaintiffs' counsel referred in his closing argument to

Mr. Avila's complaint against Officer Salazar and suggested that

this was "not the first time" the officer had used excessive force,

Defendants objected. The Court sustained the objection. 

Plaintiffs' counsel also conceded to the jury that it might find

that the force actually used was not as great as Mr. Helena's

subjective perception of it. 

 The jury found that Officer Salazar used excessive force

against, and falsely arrested, Mr. Helena, and that Sergeant Ching

falsely arrested Mr. Tziu. However, the jury found that Officer

Salazar did not conduct an unreasonable search of Mr. Helena's car,

and that Sergeant Ching did not use excessive force against Mr.

Tziu. The jury awarded Mr. Helena compensatory damages in the

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amount of $5,000, and awarded Mr. Tziu no compensatory damages. 

The jury found that Mr. Helena was entitled to punitive damages

from Officer Salazar in connection with the excessive force and

false arrest. The jury then received Officer Salazar's financial

statement, and awarded Mr. Helena $5,000 in punitive damages. 

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Judgment as a Matter of Law

A motion for judgment as a matter of law after the verdict

renews the moving party's prior Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a

matter of law at the close of all the evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P.

50(b). The post-trial motion may be raised only as to the same

claims and upon the same grounds as the prior motion. Murphy v.

City of Long Beach, 914 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1990); Collins v.

City of San Diego, 841 F.2d 337, 342 (9th Cir. 1988).

Judgment as a matter of law after the verdict may be granted

only when the evidence and its inferences, construed in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party, permits only one reasonable

conclusion as to the verdict. Where there is sufficient

conflicting evidence, or if reasonable minds could differ over the

verdict, judgment as a matter of law after the verdict is improper. 

See, e.g., Kern v. Levolor Lorentzen, Inc., 899 F.2d 772, 775 (9th

Cir. 1990); Air-Sea Forwarders, Inc. v. Air Asia Co., 880 F.2d 176,

181 (9th Cir. 1989); Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1252 (9th

Cir. 1985); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1387

(9th Cir. 1984). 

II. New Trial 

Under Rule 59, "the trial court may grant a new trial, . . .

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if the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, or

is based upon evidence which is false, or to prevent, in the sound

discretion of the trial judge, a miscarriage of justice." Hanson

v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1359 (9th Cir. 1976) (internal

citations omitted). There is no easily articulated formula for

passing on such motions. Probably the best that can be said is

that the Court should grant the motion "[i]f, having given full

respect to the jury's findings, the judge on the entire evidence is

left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed." Landes Constr. Co., Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 833

F.2d 1365, 1371-72 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting 11 Wright & Miller,

Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 2806, at 48-49). 

 The Ninth Circuit has found that the existence of substantial

evidence supporting the verdict does not prevent the court from

granting a new trial if the verdict is nonetheless against the

clear weight of the evidence. Landes, 833 F.2d at 1371. "The

judge can weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of

witnesses, and need not view the evidence from the perspective most

favorable to the prevailing party." Id. Therefore, the standard

for evaluating the evidence is less stringent than that governing

Defendants' Rule 50(b) renewed motion for judgment as a matter of

law. 

DISCUSSION

I. New Trial

A. Evidence of Excessive Force and False Arrest

Officer Salazar claims that he is entitled to a new trial

because the jury's findings that he used excessive force against

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and falsely arrested Mr. Helena were contrary to the weight of the

evidence. 

Defendants argue that the evidence overwhelmingly showed that

there was no assault. This case was essentially a credibility

contest between Plaintiffs and the officers, who proffered very

different versions of the events at issue. All of the parties

delivered competent, believable testimony, yet the jury could

reasonably have questioned the credibility of any or all of the

major witnesses. The jury could have concluded, consistently with

the weight of the evidence, that the police officers were not

telling the truth about their treatment of Mr. Helena and credited

Plaintiffs' testimony that force was used without justification,

but nevertheless found that Mr. Helena's subjective memory of the

amount of force used by Officer Salazar was exaggerated. Such a

finding would have been consistent with Mr. Turcio and Mr.

Siliezar's testimony that they did not see an assault of the type

described by Mr. Helena, but that they were not watching the entire

time. A finding of a lesser, but still excessive, use of force

would also have been consistent with Ms. Felix's testimony, the

medical evidence, including the facial abrasions and red marks on

Mr. Helena's neck, and the testimony of Dr. Fugaro, who

acknowledged that the abrasions were consistent with scenarios

other than the one described by Officer Salazar. 

Defendants argue that, even if the jury credited Mr. Turcio's

testimony that Officer Salazar hurt Mr. Helena's fingers, this

force would not be excessive, as a matter of law. The Ninth

Circuit has found, in certain contexts, that forcible handcuffing

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or painful wrist and finger holds may be used against non-violent,

non-cooperative subjects. See Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp.

Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 921-22 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding reasonable

use of force in handcuffing arrestee who stiffened her arm in

resistence); Eberle v. City of Anaheim, 901 F.2d 814, 819-20 (9th

Cir. 1990) (finding use of index-finger control hold on spectator

reasonable as a matter of law where officers faced with "explosive

and potentially dangerous situation"); Forrester v. City of San

Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 807-8 (9th Cir. 1994) (upholding use of pain

compliance techniques on resisting, non-violent anti-abortion

protestors despite injury to arms and hands). Here, however, close

factual questions preclude the Court from ruling that Officer

Salazar's use of a pain compliance hold on Mr. Helena's fingers

would have been reasonable as a matter of law. Unlike the

situation in Arpin, there is evidence that Mr. Helena did not

resist arrest, i.e. Mr. Helena's own testimony. The overall

situation faced by the officers here was neither explosive nor

dangerous, cf. Eberle, 901 F.2d at 820; in fact, the extent of Mr.

Helena's inebriation was subject to dispute. Furthermore, even if

the jury did credit only Mr. Turcios' testimony regarding force,

that testimony does not show that Officer Salazar was using a pain

compliance hold that applied force only in proportion to Mr.

Helena's resistence. Cf. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 807. Moreover, as

described above, Mr. Turcios' testimony was not the only evidence

supporting the jury's finding of excessive force. 

Defendants also maintain that the verdict of false arrest in

favor of Mr. Helena was contrary to the clear weight of the

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2Plaintiffs suggest that Mr. Turcios' evaluation of Mr.

Helena's condition was unreliable because he comes "from a culture

where one doesn't challenge authority," Helena's Opp. at 7;

however, there is no evidence to support this assertion. 

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evidence. In order for probable cause to exist, Mr. Helena would

have to have been found intoxicated and in such a condition that he

was "unable to exercise care" for his "own safety and the safety of

others." Cal. Penal Code § 647(f). Again, this was a question of

fact, the resolution of which depended largely on the jury's

credibility determinations. The only additional relevant testimony

was that of Mr. Turcios, who testified, based on his own past

experience with Mr. Helena and the fact that Mr. Helena was talking

back to Officer Salazar, that Mr. Helena was drunk.2

 This

testimony fell far short of showing that Mr. Helena was unable to

exercise care for his own safety. The fact that all of the

officers present testified that Mr. Helena fell into a bush, while

Plaintiffs testified that he did not, does not mean that the clear

weight of the evidence favored Defendants; instead, the weight of

the evidence depended on whose story was believed. The reliability

of Officer Salazar's testimony was compromised by its discrepancies

with his official police report. 

In sum, upon review of the jury's findings and all of the

evidence presented at trial, the Court finds that the jury was

justified in crediting Plaintiffs' testimony, even if Mr. Helena

overstated the severity of force used, and thus the verdict was not

contrary to the weight of the evidence.

B. Admission of Prior Incident Evidence

Officer Salazar claims that he is entitled to a new trial due

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to the Court's alleged error in admitting evidence relating to the

prior Avila incident involving use of excessive force and to the

prior filing of a false police report. 

The Ninth Circuit has articulated a four-part test governing

the admission of prior bad acts:

(1) There must be sufficient evidence to support a finding by

the jury that the defendant committed the similar bad act. 

(2) The prior act must not be too remote in time from the

commission of the present wrong. (3) The prior conduct must,

in some cases, be similar to the offense charged. (4) The

prior conduct must be introduced in order to prove an element

of the charged offense that is a material issue in the case. 

Trahan v. City of Oakland, 960 F.2d 152, **1 (9th Cir. 1992)

(citing United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1268 (9th Cir.

1989)) (internal citations, quotations and ellipses omitted). 

1. Prior Use of Excessive Force

Defendants now reassert their arguments that the Avila

incident was not sufficiently similar or relevant to an element of

the charged violation of § 1983 to be admissible. 

Defendants claim that the Avila incident was dissimilar

because there, the Chief of Police found only that Officer Salazar

punched Avila in the face, while here, Mr. Helena alleged a more

sustained assault, including choking and slamming his head into a

car. The fact that the incidents were not identical does not

change the fact that both involved allegations of excessive force

used against a suspect who talked back to Officer Salazar. The

Avila incident is sufficiently similar to Mr. Helena's claim of

excessive force. 

Defendants further claim that because intent to deprive Mr.

Helena of his constitutional rights was not a required element of

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his § 1983 claim, the Avila evidence is not relevant to any element

of the claim. 

At trial, the parties disputed the factual question of whether

Officer Salazar used force against Mr. Helena, and if so how much. 

Therefore, whether Officer Salazar had the specific intent to use

force against Mr. Helena is relevant and probative, even though

intent to deprive him of his constitutional rights was not. Cf.

Tanberg v. Sholts, 401 F.3d 1151, 1168 (10th Cir. 2005) (affirming

district court's exclusion of police officer's prior acts where

officer's intent to use force not disputed); Clark v. Martinez, 295

F.3d 809, 813 (8th Cir. 2002) (affirming district court's exclusion

of testimony regarding prior bad act where officer's intent to

strike plaintiff not in dispute). The Avila evidence was more

probative than prejudicial. 

Furthermore, even though a malicious intent to cause harm is

not relevant to Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims, such an intent is

relevant to Officer Salazar's liability for punitive damages,

another issue that the jury decided in the first phase of the

trial. Thus, the Court did not err in allowing evidence relevant

to intent, including the Avila incident. 

2. Prior Filing of False Police Report

Defendants assert that the evidence regarding Officer

Salazar's past filing of an inaccurate police report should have

been excluded because it was too remote in time, and too dissimilar

to Plaintiffs' allegations. 

As Plaintiffs note, evidence of the filing of the false report

was admitted for the purpose of impeaching Officer Salazar's

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credibility pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b), and thus

must simply pass the Rule 403 bar against admission of evidence

that is more prejudicial than probative. The incident occurred in

1999, just four years prior to the events of the trial. Although

Officer Salazar described the inaccuracies in his report as

inadvertent, the evidence showed that he altered some facts in a

way that minimized his own responsibility, although the official

investigation was not concluded in time for discipline to be

imposed. If the jury chose not to believe his testimony that the

inaccuracies were unintentional, then the evidence would be

probative enough of Officer Salazar's credibility to outweigh any

risk of undue prejudice. 

C. Compromise Verdict

Officer Salazar claims that he is entitled to a new trial

because the $5,000 compensatory damages award was simply a

"compromise verdict" intended to send a message that Officer

Salazar was a "bad cop." 

A "compromise verdict is one reached when the jury, unable to

agree on liability, compromises that disagreement and enters a low

award of damages . . . . [S]uspicion should be aroused if the jury

awards only nominal damages." Romberg v. Nichols, 970 F.2d 512,

521 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated on other grounds, 506 U.S. 1075

(1993), (quoting Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Koch Indus., 701

F.2d 108, 110 (10th Cir. 1983)). In determining whether a jury

reached a compromise verdict, courts look to the "totality of

circumstances," and consider "any indicia of compromise apparent

from the record and any other factors that may have caused a

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verdict for damages that would be inadequate if the jury actually

found liability." Yarbrough v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 964 F.2d 376,

379 (5th Cir. 1992). These include "a close question of liability,

a damages award that is grossly inadequate, and other circumstances

such as length of jury deliberation." Shugart v. Central Rural

Elec. Co-op., 110 F.3d 1501, 1505-06 (quoting Nat'l R.R. Passenger,

701 F.2d at 110). 

Contrary to Defendants' assertions, there is little in the

record to indicate that the jury was unable to agree on liability

and thus compromised by entering a low award of damages. Although

the liability issue was close, for the reasons described above, the

jury's verdict is not contrary to the weight of the evidence. 

Furthermore, the damage award, although low, was not grossly

inadequate. The jury awarded more than nominal damages to Mr.

Helena, and the $5,000 compensatory award to him was reasonable,

especially in light of the evidence, discussed above, that his

injuries were not particularly severe. Moreover, the speed with

which the jury delivered the verdict indicates that the jury

decided the liability issues easily, without compromise. 

Therefore, the Court denies Officer Salazar's motion for a new

trial based on an alleged compromise verdict. 

D. Jury Misconduct

Lastly, Officer Salazar claims that he is entitled to a new

trial due to jury misconduct, as shown by the declaration of juror

Karen Lavsa. 

When a jury verdict contravenes a court's instructions, "an

appellate court will reverse for legal error." Thomas v. Stalter,

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20 F.3d 298, 303 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Rosario v. Livaditis, 963

F.2d 1013, 1021 (7th Cir. 1992)) (affirming district court's award

of new trial where jury verdict inherently inconsistent and

contrary to the weight of the evidence); see also Vidrine v. Kansas

City S. Ry. Co., 466 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir. 1972) (reversing district

court's decision to deny motion for new trial where uniform pattern

of awards showed jury failed to obey instructions to make each

award on individual merits). 

Here, however, there is nothing in the verdict itself that

indicates that juror misconduct occurred. Defendants' only

evidence of juror misconduct is the Lavsa Declaration, which is

inadmissible. 

Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibits a juror

from testifying about the jury's deliberations or how the jurors

reached their conclusions unless "extraneous prejudicial

information was improperly brought to the jury's attention." Fed.

R. Evid. 606(b). Where affidavits or juror testimony are offered

to impeach a verdict, the district court must examine this material

to determine if it is the type of juror testimony permitted by

Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). Hard v. Burlington Northern R.R.

Co., 870 F.2d 1454, 1461 (9th Cir. 1989). Rule 606(b) permits

juror testimony only on the questions of “‘whether extraneous

prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s

attention’” and “‘whether any outside influence was improperly

brought to bear on any juror.’” Id. Looking at only permissible

evidence, the district court must decide whether an evidentiary

hearing is needed to determine whether a new trial is necessary. 

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Id. Unless the affidavits on their face support the conclusion, by

a preponderance of the evidence, that but for this evidence the

outcome of the trial would have been different, no evidentiary

hearing is necessary. Id. 

Ms. Lavsa declares that the jury decided during the first

phase of deliberations, prior to receiving Officer Salazar's

financial statement, that $5,000 would be an appropriate punitive

damages award. Defendants describe this determination during the

first phase of deliberations as an "extraneous influence" that

affected the second phase of jury deliberations, and thus argue

that it is a permissible subject of juror testimony. Defendants'

characterization is unsupported by any case law and is inconsistent

with the "long-recognized and very substantial concerns

support[ing] the protection of jury deliberations from intrusive

inquiry." Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987). 

Moreover, even if Ms. Lavsa's declaration were admissible, it does

not show that any misconduct in fact occurred, much less misconduct

that would warrant retrying the case. The jury instructions did

not forbid the jury from discussing in its initial deliberations

the size of a possible punitive damages award, and, notwithstanding

her subjective misgivings about other jurors' understanding of

Officer Salazar's financial statement, Ms. Lavsa states that the

jury reached its final determination "after reviewing his financial

statement." Lavsa Decl. ¶ 4 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the

Court denies Officer Salazar's motion for a new trial on the basis

of juror misconduct. 

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II. Qualified Immunity

Sergeant Ching moves for judgment as a matter of law on the

basis of qualified immunity. 

The defense of qualified immunity protects government

officials "from liability for civil damages insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The

threshold question is whether, taken in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff, the facts alleged show that the officer's conduct

violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,

201 (2001). If so, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the

existence of a clearly established right at the time of the

allegedly impermissible conduct. Maraziti v. First Interstate

Bank, 953 F.2d 520, 523 (9th Cir. 1992). In determining whether

qualified immunity exists, the particular contours of the

constitutional right at stake "must be sufficiently clear that a

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates

that right." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202 (quoting Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643 (1987)). 

If the law is determined to be clearly established, the next

inquiry is whether a reasonable official could have believed his or

her conduct was lawful. Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868,

871-72 (9th Cir. 1993). The defendant bears the burden of

establishing that his or her actions were reasonable, Doe v.

Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 54 F.3d 1447, 1450 (9th Cir. 1995), and

the defendant's good faith or subjective belief in the legality of

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his or her actions is irrelevant. Alford v. Haner, 333 F.3d 972,

978-79 (9th Cir. 2003). Where there are genuine issues of fact

relating to what the officer knew or did, or if a reasonable juror

could find that the officer acted unreasonably, the question is

appropriately for the trier of fact. Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v.

City of Simi Valley, 70 F.3d 1095, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 1995). Once

the jury has resolved necessary underlying factual disputes,

whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity is a question

of law for the court to decide. Act Up!/Portland, 988 F.2d at 873. 

The jury found that Sergeant Ching's conduct violated Mr.

Tziu's Fourth Amendment rights. However, Plaintiffs have not met

their burden to show that clearly established law guarantees minors

a right to be free from detention in circumstances such as these. 

Plaintiffs identify clearly established law that an individual's

constitutional rights are violated if he or she is detained without

probable cause for the purpose of custodial interrogation, even if

the individual is not arrested. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,

216 (1979). However, Plaintiffs have not shown that the holding in

Dunaway, a case which did not involve detention of a minor, clearly

applies to Sergeant Ching's conduct, which did not involve

detention for interrogation. 

Furthermore, even assuming that Sergeant Ching did violate

rights of Mr. Tziu that were clearly established, Defendants show

that police officers are faced with competing legal obligations,

and Sergeant Ching could have reasonably, if mistakenly, believed

that these obligations applied. In Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583

(9th Cir. 1989), the Ninth Circuit held that a police officer had

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an affirmative duty to protect a person where the officer arrested

and impounded her companion's car, and then left her stranded in a

high-crime neighborhood. An officer may be liable under this

"state-created danger" theory if a plaintiff shows (1) that the

officer's actions created or increased the danger facing him or

her; and (2) that the State official acted with deliberate

indifference to a known or obvious danger. Kennedy v. City of

Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1062 (9th Cir. 2006). 

In accordance with Wood, the jury was instructed that a police

officer has a legal duty to afford some measure of safety if his

own conduct affirmatively places an individual in a position of

danger. In finding in favor of Mr. Tziu, the jury necessarily

found that Sergeant Ching had no legal duty to detain him. The

jury may have found that the arrest of Mr. Helena did not

affirmatively place Mr. Tziu in danger; the jury could have, for

instance, credited Plaintiffs' testimony that they did not consider

it dangerous to be in Jose Coronado Park late at night. 

In addressing the issue of qualified immunity, however, the

Court looks at the question of whether a reasonable official could

have believed that his conduct was lawful. Officials are granted

immunity "even if a reasonable mistake as to the legality of their

actions occurs." Haynie v. County of Los Angeles, 339 F.3d 1071,

1077-78 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Saucier). 

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs,

the Court concludes that Sergeant Ching could have reasonably

believed that leaving Mr. Tziu at the park would affirmatively

place him in danger. It is undisputed that the officers believed

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that Jose Coronado Park was a dangerous place for an individual to

be left alone at night. All the parties agree that the police were

not aware that Mr. Tziu lived nearby. A reasonable officer could

have believed, based on the fact that Plaintiffs were together with

only one car, that Mr. Tziu was dependent on Mr. Helena for

transportation. Thus, a reasonable officer could have believed

that arresting Mr. Helena and locking up his car would leave Mr.

Tziu stranded and endanger him. It was in this context that

Sergeant Ching ordered that Mr. Tziu be taken to the police station

to be picked up by his mother. 

The parties disputed at trial whether Sergeant Ching was aware

that Mr. Tziu was a minor. Sergeant Ching testified that he knew

Mr. Tziu was under eighteen. On the other hand, Plaintiffs point

to evidence from which they say a jury could have drawn an

inference that Sergeant Ching did not know that Mr. Tziu was a

minor, including Mr. Tziu's testimony that he told no one his age;

Officer Greiner's testimony that he did not discover Mr. Tziu's age

until asking Mr. Helena at the police station; and that fact that,

at the station, the police failed to follow protocol for treatment

of minors in protective custody. Nevertheless, Sergeant Ching's

belief was reasonable, and, in fact, accurate, even if it was based

on incomplete or mistaken information. 

The Court does not, and need not, decide whether Sergeant

Ching was in fact obliged under the law to ensure Mr. Tziu's

safety, and what steps Sergeant Ching should have taken to do so. 

Although Plaintiffs persuasively distinguish Wood on the facts, a

reasonable officer could nevertheless have concluded that

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handcuffing Mr. Tziu and taking him into temporary protective

custody was necessary in order to protect him, in accordance with

the State-created danger doctrine. 

For these reasons, the Court grants Sergeant Ching's motion

for judgment as a matter of law based on qualified immunity. 

Because Sergeant Ching is immune from suit, Mr. Tziu's motion to

amend the judgment to award nominal damages is moot. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Officer Salazar's motion for a new

trial is DENIED (Docket No. 92) and Sergeant Ching's motion for

judgment as a matter of law is GRANTED (Docket No. 93). Mr. Tziu's

motion to amend or correct the judgment is DENIED as moot (Docket

No. 85). 

The Clerk shall enter an amended judgment accordingly. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 5/1/06

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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