Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01352/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01352-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MITCHELL SHAKA No. CIV S-07-1352-LKK-CMK-P

SENEGAL MUHAMMAD,

Plaintiff, 

vs. ORDER

D.K. SISTO,

Defendant.

 /

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s amended complaint (Doc. 16), filed

on December 28, 2007.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain

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statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne,

84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied

if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon

which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must

allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support

the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is

impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague

and conclusory. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff names as defendants in his amended complaint the Secretary of

Corrections and Warden D.K. Sisto. Plaintiff’s original complaint was dismissed for failure to

link any named defendant with the alleged constitutional violations, failure to allege liability of

Warden Sisto as a supervisory defendant, and failure to allege any supporting facts. Plaintiff was

allowed to amend his complaint, which is now before the court. In his amended complaint,

which consists of two pages plus several pages of exhibits, it appears that plaintiff is attempting

to state a claim for a violation of his right to free exercise of his religion, equal protection

violations, and the conditions of his confinement.

II. DISCUSSION

The court previously advised plaintiff what was required when he filed his

amended complaint. The court explained to plaintiff the need to allege an actual connection or

link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged constitutional violations. He

was also advised what was required to successfully name supervisory personnel, as well as the

requirement for him to alleged specific facts in his amended complaint. Plaintiff has failed to

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heed this advice, and his amended complaint again fails to state a claim. 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual

connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. 

See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and

conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations

are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the

plaintiff must set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged

constitutional deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).

The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the

prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel

and unusual punishment. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth

Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards,

humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). A prison official violates

the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or

omission must be so serious such that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of

life’s necessities; and (2) subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and

wantonly for the purpose of inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the

Eighth Amendment, a prison official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. 

Under these principles, prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to

protect inmates from physical abuse. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250-51 (9th Cir.

1982); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. To demonstrate that a prison official was deliberately indifferent

to a safety risk, the prisoner must establish that the official knew of the risk but disregarded it. 

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See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The very obviousness of the risk may suffice to establish the

knowledge element. See Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1995). Prison officials

are not liable, however, if evidence is presented that they lacked knowledge of a safety risk. See

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. 

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their

employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no

respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional

violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or had actual

knowledge of the violations and failed to act to prevent them. See id. When a defendant holds

a supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must

be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v.

Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the

involvement of supervisory personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v.

Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

The United States Supreme Court has held that prisoners retain their First

Amendment rights, including the right to free exercise of religion. See O'Lone v. Estate of

Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987). Thus, for example, prisoners have a right to be provided

with food sufficient to sustain them in good health and which satisfies the dietary laws of their

religion. See McElyea v. Babbit, 833 F.2d 196, 198 (9th Cir. 1987). Prison officials are also

required to provide prisoners facilities where they can worship and the opportunity for clergy or

spiritual leaders to visit the prison. See Glittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 4 (3rd Cir. 1970). 

Officials are not required to supply clergy at state expense. See id. 

However, the court has also recognized that limitations on a prisoner’s free

exercise rights arise from both the fact of incarceration and valid penological objectives. See id.

at 197. For instance, the penological interest in a simplified food service has been held sufficient

to allow a prison to provide orthodox Jewish inmates with a pork-free diet instead of a

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completely kosher diet. See Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877-79 (9th Cir. 1993). Similarly,

prison officials have a legitimate penological interest in getting inmates to their work and

educational assignments. See Mayweathers v. Newland, 258 F.3d 930, 38 (9th Cir. 2001)

(analyzing Muslim inmates’ challenge to prison work rule). 

Prison regulations alleged to infringe on the religious exercise right must be

evaluated under the “reasonableness” test set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91

(1987). See O’Lone, 382 U.S. at 349; Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997)

(recognizing that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores,

521 U.S. 507 (1997), invalidated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and restored the

“reasonableness test” as the applicable standard in free exercise challenges brought by prison

inmates).

In determining the reasonableness of a challenged restriction on First Amendment

rights, the court considers four factors. First, there must be a valid, rational connection between

the prison regulation and the legitimate government interest put forward to justify it, and the

governmental objective must itself be a legitimate and neutral one. A second consideration is

whether alternative means of exercising the right on which the regulation impinges remain open

to prison inmates. A third consideration is the impact accommodation of the asserted right will

have on guards, other inmates, and the allocation of prison resources. The absence of ready

alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation. See Allen v. Toombs, 827

F.2d 563, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91). 

To prevail, the prisoner must establish that the defendants substantially burdened

the practice of his religion by preventing him from engaging in conduct mandated by his faith. 

See Freeman, 125 F.3d at 732, 736. To show a substantial burden, the prisoner must demonstrate

that prison officials’ conduct “. . . burdens the adherent’s practice of his or her religion by

pressuring him or her to commit an act forbidden by the religion or by preventing him or her

from engaging in conduct or having a religious experience which the faith mandates.” Graham v.

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Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 850-51 (9th Cir. 1987). The burden must be more than a mere

inconvenience. See id. at 851. 

Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated

individuals are treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. 

See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). Prisoners are protected from

invidious discrimination based on race. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). 

Racial segregation is unconstitutional within prisons save for the necessities of prison security

and discipline. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (per curiam). Prisoners are also

protected from intentional discrimination on the basis of their religion. See Freeman v. Arpaio,

125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997). Equal protection claims are not necessarily limited to racial

and religious discrimination. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686-67 (9th Cir.

2001) (applying minimal scrutiny to equal protection claim by a disabled plaintiff because the

disabled do not constitute a suspect class) see also Tatum v. Pliler, 2007 WL 1720165 (E.D. Cal.

2007) (applying minimal scrutiny to equal protection claim based on denial of in-cell meals

where no allegation of race-based discrimination was made); Hightower v. Schwarzenegger,

2007 WL 732555 (E.D. Cal. March 19, 2008). 

In order to state a § 1983 claim based on a violation of the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that defendants acted with

intentional discrimination against plaintiff, or against a class of inmates which included plaintiff,

and that such conduct did not relate to a legitimate penological purpose. See Village of

Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (holding that equal protection claims may be

brought by a “class of one”); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir.

2000); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v.

Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1010

(9th Cir. 1985). 

/ / /

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Plaintiff’s amended complaint again fails to state any facts to support any of his

claims. He appears to be attempting to state a claim under the First and Eighth Amendment, but

does not provide any supporting facts as to how he has been subjected to offensive, unsafe

conditions, or what those offensive, unsafe conditions are, how his right to the free practice of his

religion has been obstructed, how his right to equal protection has been violated and/or what

inhumane treatment he has been subjected to. In addition, plaintiff again fails to specify which

defendants have violated his civil rights and in what manner. Plaintiff appears to be complaining

about prison conditions and obstruction of his religious practice, yet he fails to name any

defendant, except warden Sisto (who is considered a supervisor for the above discussion), who

could be responsible for these violation. As to defendant Sisto, plaintiff again fails to state how

the warden was personally responsible for violating his civil rights. 

III. CONCLUSION

Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by

amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire

action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Therefore,

plaintiff will have one more opportunity to correct the deficiencies in his complaint. Plaintiff is

informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See

Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to

amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended

complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if

plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make

plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 15-220. An amended complaint must

be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint again, plaintiff must demonstrate how

the conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms

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how each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection

between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d

164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Plaintiff must set

forth in his complaint exactly what has happened to him, who is responsible, and exactly what

each individual did. 

Finally, plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the

time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 

1260-61; see also Local Rule 11-110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to

comply with Rule 8 may, in the court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule

41(b). See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s amended complaint, filed on December 28, 2007, is dismissed

with leave to amend; and

2. Plaintiff shall file a second amended complaint within 30 days of the date

of service of this order.

DATED: April 21, 2008

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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