Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_11-cv-03568/USCOURTS-alnd-2_11-cv-03568-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TRACY O. CRANE,

Plaintiff,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR.,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 2:11-CV-3568-VEH

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This is a civil action filed by the plaintiff, Tracy O. Crane, against the

defendant, Eric H. Holder, Jr., in his official capacity as the Attorney General of the

United States, and head of the United States Department of Justice. (Doc. 16). The

Amended Complaint alleges that Federal Bureau of Investigation, a division of the

Department of Justice, recruited the plaintiff for a so called “direct hire” position as

a “Paralegal Specialist/Asset Forfeiture Investigator,” but then “denied [the]

[p]laintiff employment even though he was the most qualified applicant.” (Doc. 16

at 1). The plaintiff alleges the department’s actions violated Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”). 

Specifically, the Amended Complaint sets out the following violations of Title VII:

“National Origin Discrimination” (Count One); “Racially Disparate Impact

FILED

 2014 Dec-11 PM 05:15

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:11-cv-03568-VEH Document 79 Filed 12/11/14 Page 1 of 50
[Discrimination]” (Count Two); and various acts of retaliation (Counts Three, Four,

Five, Six, and Seven). The Amended Complaint also alleges that the defendant

discriminated against the plaintiff on account of his age in violation of the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (“ADEA”)

(Count Eight). 

The case comes before the court on the cross motions for summary judgment

by the parties. (Docs. 68, 70). For the reasons stated herein the plaintiff’s motion

(doc. 68) will be DENIED, and the defendant’s motion (doc. 70) will be GRANTED

in part and DENIED in part.

I. STANDARD

Under FederalRule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper if there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (“[S]ummary judgment is proper if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). The party requesting summary judgment always bears

the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and

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Case 2:11-cv-03568-VEH Document 79 Filed 12/11/14 Page 2 of 50
identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings that it believes demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the

moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) requires the non-moving party to go

beyond the pleadings in answering the movant. Id. at 324. By its own affidavits – or

by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file – it must

designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.

The underlying substantive law identifies which facts are material and which

are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). All

reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor

of the non-movant. Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1023. Only disputes over facts that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the

entry of summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute is genuine “if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.” Id. If the evidence presented by the non-movant to rebut the moving party’s

evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment

may still be granted. Id. at 249.

How the movant may satisfy itsinitial evidentiary burden depends on whether

that party bears the burden of proof on the given legal issues at trial. Fitzpatrick v.

City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). If the movant bears the burden

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Case 2:11-cv-03568-VEH Document 79 Filed 12/11/14 Page 3 of 50
of proof on the given issue or issues at trial, then it can only meet its burden on

summary judgment by presenting affirmative evidence showing the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact – that is, facts that would entitle it to a directed verdict

if not controverted at trial. Id. (citation omitted). Once the moving party makes such

an affirmative showing, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce

“significant, probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact.”

Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

For issues on which the movant does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it can

satisfy its initial burden on summary judgment in either of two ways. Id. at 1115-16.

First, the movant may simply show that there is an absence of evidence to support the

non-movant’s case on the particular issue at hand. Id. at 1116. In such an instance,

the non-movant must rebut by either (1) showing that the record in fact contains

supporting evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion, or (2)

proffering evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on

the alleged evidentiary deficiency. Id. at 1116-17. When responding, the non-movant

may no longer rest on mere allegations; instead, it must set forth evidence of specific

facts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 (1996). The second method a movant in this

position may use to discharge its burden is to provide affirmative evidence

demonstrating that the non-moving party will be unable to prove its case at trial.

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Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1116. When this occurs, the non-movant must rebut by offering

evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict at trial on the material fact sought

to be negated. Id.

“The standard of review for cross-motions for summary judgment does not

differ from the standard applied when only one party files a motion, but simply

requires a determination of whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a

matter of law on the facts that are not disputed.” S. Pilot Ins. Co. v. CECS, Inc., No.

1:11 CV 3863 AT, 2014 WL 4977805, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 12, 2014) (citing

Am. Bankers Ins. Group v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir.2005)). 

“The Court must consider each motion on its own merits, resolving all reasonable

inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration.” Id. “The Eleventh

Circuit has explained that ‘[c]ross-motions for summary judgment will not, in

themselves, warrant the court in granting summary judgment unless one of the parties

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not genuinely disputed.’”

Id. (quoting United States v. Oakley, 744 F.2d 1553, 1555 (11th Cir.1984)). “Crossmotions may, however, be probative of the absence of a factual dispute where they

reflect general agreement by the parties as to the controlling legal theories and

material facts. Id. (quoting Oakley, 744 F2d at 1555–56).

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Case 2:11-cv-03568-VEH Document 79 Filed 12/11/14 Page 5 of 50
II. FACTS

A. The FBI’s Diversity Program

The FBI has a “diversity program” concerning Native Americans (doc. 69-1 at

17), which the plaintiff references in some of his claims. According to its website

[t]he Program is directed at ensuring that all American Indians/Alaskan

Natives have the full measure of employment in the federal work force.

These rights are protected through Government Treaties.

The goals and objectives of the American Indian/Alaskan Native

Program are to:

– Eliminate discriminatory practices

– Assure that American Indians/Alaskan Natives are

appropriately represented throughout the work force

– Increase the representation of American Indians/Alaskan

Natives in key occupational categories throughout the grade

levels (SES, GS, and WGB), and in policy-making positions

(particular attention will be focused on increasing representation

in the Senior Executive Service)

– Modify and/or change policy to increase opportunities for all

employees to advance to their highest potential[, and]

– Provide advisory services including: informational programs,

training sessions, and counseling

(Doc. 69-1 at 18).1 Native Americans account for 0.40% of Special Agents (i.e., 55

Special Agents out of 13,766 total agents) and 0.51% of the Professional Staff

1

 The plaintiff asserts in his facts that this is “a policy of affirmative action.” (Doc. 69 at

4 (proffered fact 4)). In support of this assertion he cites generally to “Exhibit ‘C’” to his motion

for summary judgment. (Doc. 69 at 4 (proffered fact 4)). Nothing in Exhibit C supports this

assertion.

6

Case 2:11-cv-03568-VEH Document 79 Filed 12/11/14 Page 6 of 50
Employees (i.e., 111 Professional Staff Employees out of 21,863 total employees).2

B. The Plaintiff

The plaintiff, Tracy O. Crane, is Native American. He also is a former FBI

employee, who was assigned to the Birmingham Division of the FBI. Before he

retired, the plaintiff was with the FBI for approximately seventeen (17) years, during

which he served part of his time as a Supervisory Intelligence Analyst (SIA) for the

FBI’s Birmingham Division. In 2008, he retired from the FBI with a pay

classification of “GS-14.” At the time he retired, he commanded a Field Intelligence

Group (“FIG”). 

Crane previously held the Paralegal Specialist/Asset Forfeiture Investigator

position at issue in the instant case. After he held the Paralegal Specialist/Asset

Forfeiture Investigator, he was assigned to the Birmingham Office as a Supervisory

Administrative Specialist at the GS-12 pay grade before becoming the commander

of a FIG as a GS-14. The plaintiff states in his affidavit that “a few days prior to my

retirement in 2008, the previous [SAC] stated that the Birmingham Office would

2

 The fact which contains these figures is proffered by the plaintiff who cites, as

evidentiary support, a printed copy of a web page. (Doc. 69 at 5 (citing doc. 69-1 at 19-20)). 

The court notes that the referenced exhibit is unreadable and the fact which contains these

percentages is “disputed” by the defendant. (Doc. 75-1 at 4). However, the defendant does not

dispute the percentages quoted, only the portion of the fact which stated that “[t]he FBI is

woefully deficient in the hiring of Native Americans.” (Doc. 69 at 5 (proffered fact 5)). That

conclusory and argumentative statement has been omitted. The reminder of the fact is deemed

admitted for the purpose of resolving the instant motions, and has been included. 

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‘direct hire’ me at the GS-12, Step 10, pay grade if I would consider staying on

instead of retiring.” (Doc. 69-1 at 25, ¶ 12). The plaintiff declined this offer.

Crane’s last Performance Evaluation Report (“PAR”) prior to his retirement

gave him an “Excellent” performance rating, and contained comments by the rating

official about Crane’s skills and resourcefulness.3 The comments were written by

Acting Special Agent in Charge (“ASAC”) Charles E. Regan. (Doc. 69-1 at 22, ¶5).4

While the entire report is difficult to read, the following favorable comments are

clear:

– “Crane demonstrated his ability to be flexible and adjust to an ever-changing

program.”

– “Crane is well respected within the Birmingham Field Office and with

outside agencies.”

3

 This fact, proffered by the plaintiff also included the conclusory statement that the

comments were “glowing.” (Doc. 69 at 5 (proffered fact 7)). The court has omitted that

argumentative and conclusory statement. 

4

 The defendant disputes that the comments were written by Regan, but states only that

“[t]he PAR for FY 2007 does not specify the name of the person who drafted the comments . . ..” 

(Doc. 75-1 at 5). That is so. Indeed, in the plaintiff’s affidavit, wherein he states that Regan

wrote the comments (doc. 69-1 at 22, ¶5), he also acknowledges that the “rating official’s name

and signature has been redacted for some reason. (doc. 69-1 at 22, ¶5).” The defendant’s

“dispute” cites no evidence which contradicts the plaintiff’s statement, and there is no argument

that the plaintiff’s statement is not based on personal knowledge or otherwise should be

disregarded. Interestingly, the defendant does not affirmatively state that Regan was not the

person who wrote the comments. Regardless, consistent with the uncontroverted evidence, the

court includes the fact as proffered by the plaintiff.

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– “Crane has an excellent working relationship with the ATAC at the United

States Attorney’s Office.”

– “Crane . . . has enhanced the prominence of the FIG [with] outside agencies.”

– “Crane has performed in an exceptional manner . . .. He has earned the trust

and confidence of Birmingham . . . management.”

(Doc. 69-1 at 41). On his ratings of “Critical Elements,” Crane received the highest

marks of “Outstanding” for “Relating with Others and Providing Professional

Service,” “and “Maintaining High Professional Standards.” (Doc. 69-1 at 40). On

a scale of 1-5 (with 5 being the highest rating), out of eight critical elements his

average rating was 4.13. (Doc. 69-1 at 40).

C. Norman Odom’s Claim of Discrimination

After Januaryof 2009, Division Administrative Officer (“AO”) Norman Odom

filed an EEO complaint alleging mistreatment by hissupervisors. (Doc. 74 at 34, ¶5). 

Crane and Odom were friends. In late 2009 or early 2010, Crane provided an

affidavit which supported Odom. (Doc. 74 at 35, ¶6). 

D. The Paralegal Specialist/Asset Forfeiture Investigator Position

The parties agree that, in 2010, the need for a Paralegal Specialist/Asset

Forfeiture Investigator occurred. It is also clear that the person holding the position

would have been supervised by Raymond Zicarelli, the Chief Division Counsel

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Case 2:11-cv-03568-VEH Document 79 Filed 12/11/14 Page 9 of 50
(“CDC”) at the FBI office in Birmingham, Alabama. (Doc. 69-1 at 50(13, 16)). 

However, there are varying accounts of how that position was filled.

5

1. The Plaintiff’s and Stacy Crane’s Version

The plaintiff statesin his affidavit that, atsome point (the affidavit does notsay

when), Zicarelli called him and “wanted to know if [Crane] wasinterested in a ‘direct

hire’” for the position. (Doc. 69-1 at 24, ¶10). The parties appear to agree that a

“direct hire” occurs when a position is not posted, there is no competition for it, and

a candidate is “directly” contacted and hired by the FBI.6In his affidavit, Crane states

that Crane told Zicarelli that “[he] might be interested, but [Crane] needed to discuss

it with [his] wife.” (Doc. 69-1 at 24, ¶10). Crane also states that “Zicarelli then

contacted my wife to see if I would be willing to accept the job as a ‘direct hire.’”

(Doc. 69-1 at 24, ¶11). 

5

 Because there are cross motions for summary judgment on the exact same issues, it is

impossible to merely cast the facts “in the light most favorable to the non-movant,” as each side

is both movant and non-movant. Accordingly, the court sets out all versions of the facts which

are supported by the record.

6

 No evidence has been presented on this issue. The plaintiff proffers the following fact:

14. A “direct hire” is done by hiring the job candidate directly and without

any competition versus a traditional posting which requests applicants to apply. 

Deposition of Raymond Zicarelli (Exhibit “H”) at 73.

(Doc. 69 at 6-7, ¶14). The citation to Zicarelli’s deposition does not support this fact. Indeed,

elsewhere in his deposition Zicarelli stated that he does not know the difference between a

“direct hire or regular posting.” (Doc. 69-1 at 64(69)). This “fact” will not be included.

10

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The plaintiff states in his affidavit:

Early in the week of June 27, 2010, Mr. Zicarelli called again. He asked

me again if I would accept a “direct hire” position as a GS-12 Paralegal

Specialist/Asset Forfeiture Investigator in the FBI. He also told me that

he knew that I retired as a GS-14, but the . . . position would only go to

the GS-12, Step 10, pay grade.

(Doc. 69-1 at 25, ¶13). Crane also statesthat he “understood” that “direct hire” meant

that there would be no competition for the position and that the FBI would hire him

directly. (Doc. 69-1 at 25, ¶14). Crane states that he (Crane) “responded that he

would accept the position.” (Doc. 69-1 at 25, ¶15). Crane states in his affidavit that

Zicarelli told Crane to come in to the FBI’s Birmingham Office the following

Tuesday, July 6, 2010, and “fill out paperwork.” (Doc. 69-1 at 25, ¶16). 

Crane states that on June 27, 2010, Zicarelli called Crane to tell him that

“funding problems” came up, and the hire would take place after the fiscal year,

“most likely in the Fall of 2010.” (Doc. 69-1 at 25, ¶17). Crane states that Zicarelli

“stated that I should not report on Tuesday, July 6, 2010, due to this funding

problem.” (Doc. 69-1 at 26, ¶18). Crane states that “[i]n reliance on . . . Zicarelli’s

statements, I waited until the Fall of 2010 before I enquired again about the position.” 

(Doc. 69-1 at 26, ¶19).

Crane’s wife, Stacy Crane, states in her affidavit that Zicarelli called her on

June 23, 2010, and left a message. (Doc. 69-1 at 43, ¶3). She statesthat atsome point

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(which is unstated in the affidavit) she returned his call and “[h]e said that he wanted

to talk to me about Tracy Crane coming back to work at the FBI in the Paralegal

Specialist/Asset Forfeiture Investigator position,”and “asked [her]for [her]thoughts

about Tracy Crane going back to work at the FBI.” (Doc. 69-1 at 43-44, ¶¶6-7). 

Mrs. Crane stated in her affidavit thatshe told Zicarelli that she would support

her husband if he was interested in the position. (Doc. 69-1 at 44, ¶8). It was clear

to Mrs. Crane that Zicarelli was talking about hiring her husband through the “direct

hire” process. (Doc. 69-1 at 44, ¶10). 

2. Odom’s Version

Odom states in his affidavit that “[i]n late June of 2010, . . . Zicarelli . . .

approached [Odom] about the recruitment of Crane as a ‘direct hire,’” for the position

at issue in this case. (Doc. 74 at 35, ¶8). Odom states that when Special Agent in

Charge (“SAC”) Patrick Maley “discovered that Zicarelli was recruiting Crane as a

‘direct hire’ for the [position] . . . Maley called me to his office.” (Doc. 74 at 35,

¶10). Maley asked Odom what he thought about Crane for the position and Odom

responded that Crane “had performed the same job for 4 or 5 years . . . had a Master’s

Degree . . . had a history of good job performance, and . . . seemed well qualified for

the job.” (Doc. 74 at 35, ¶¶11-12). Odom stated that Maley then told him that they

“‘would be going in a different direction,’” and “that they would advertise the job

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instead of making a ‘direct hire’ of Crane.” (Doc. 74 at 36, ¶13) (internal quotes in

original). 

3. Zicarelli’s Version

In his deposition, Zicarelli stated that “for a while,” as part of his job as CDC,

he was “the special agent recruiter.” (Doc. 69-1 at 50(13)).7 He stated that the special

agent recruiter would “attend career fairs and discussspecial agent opportunities with

people at the career fair if they are interested in joining the FBI.” (Doc. 69-1 at

50(14-15)). Zicarelli knew the plaintiff was Native American. 

Zicarelli confirms in his deposition that, before the position was posted, he

“discussed the opportunity with a number of individuals that a position was coming

open, and if they were interested, they should apply.” (Doc. 69-1 at 51(17), 65(74,

76)). He also confirmed in his deposition that one of these people was Crane. (Doc.

69-1 at 51(18)).8 

Zicarellistated that he initiated a phone call to Tracy Crane sometime in April,

May, or June of 2010. (Doc. 69-1 at 61(60), 61(81)). He made the call “[t]o advise

[Crane] of a position coming open. And that if he were interested, he should apply.” 

7

 The citation refers to page 50 of document 69-1, which is a page out of a deposition

travel transcript. The court indicates in parentheses that the material cited appears on deposition

page 13, on page 50 of document 69-1. 

8

 It is unclear from the evidence whether Zicarelli made these calls as part of his job as

special agent recruiter.

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(Doc. 69-1 at 62(61); see also, doc. 69-1 at 63(68), 64(70), 68(88), 69(89)). The

position had not been posted at that time. (Doc. 69-1 at 69(89)). Zicarelli stated in

his deposition that he “believes” this was the only conversation that he had with the

plaintiff while they were trying to find a person to fill the position. (Doc. 69-1 at

63(65)). 

Zicarelli denied having a conversation with StaceyCrane “about whether or not

her husband should go back to work for the FBI.” (Doc. 69-1 at 70(94-95)). Zicarelli

stated in his deposition that he did call Mrs. Crane and that he “told her that he was

trying to – [he] needed to get Tracey’s number to advise himof an upcoming position. 

If he were interested, he should apply.” (Doc. 69-1 at 70(95-96)). Zicarelli could not

recall saying anything else. (Doc. 69-1 at 70(96)). 

In his deposition, Zicarellistates that he was never “involved in any direct hire

in the FBI,” was not “involved in any direct hiring policy of procedures.” (Doc. 69-1

at 79(132)). He states that he never spoke to Regan about a possible direct hire of the

plaintiff for the instant position. (Doc. 69-1 at 78(128)). Zicarelli confirmed in his

deposition that “as the former CDC . . . it was not [his] job to perform any of the HR

duties.” (Doc. 69-1 at 79(131-132)). 

As noted above, Zicarelli stated that, before the position was filled, he only

spoke to the plaintiff the one time, in April, May, or June of 2010. The position was

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Case 2:11-cv-03568-VEH Document 79 Filed 12/11/14 Page 14 of 50
posted internally and externally on July 13, 2010. (Doc. 69-1 at 74(109)). Zicarelli

states that he never called Crane back to tell him that the position had been posted. 

(Doc. 69-1 at 69(89)). Zicarelli states that after the position was posted he did not

contact Crane about the position. (Doc. 69-1 at 79(132)). He states that he did not

call any of the individuals back (whom he had originally contacted) after the job was

posted. (Doc. 69-1 at 80(133))

Zicarellistatesthat, at some point, “I received a call from Tracey. [sic] He did

the talking. I did the listening.” (Doc. 69-1 at 71(97)). Zicarelli could not remember

the exact date of the conversation because he was sure that it occurred after Zicarelli

had retired in September of 2010. (Doc. 69-1 at 71(97)). Zicarelli further confirmed

that Crane contacted him about the position, that Zicarelli “only listened to what

[Crane] said,” and that Zicarelli “did not discuss the job.” (Doc. 69-1 at 79(132)-

80(133)). Other than this conversation and the one in April, May, or June of 2010,

Zicarelli could recall no other conversations with Mr. Crane. (Doc. 69-1 at 71(97)). 

4. Maley’s Version

After Zicarelli's initial discussions with Crane

9

, Zicarelli had a conversation

with Maley regarding whether he wanted the job to be a “direct hire or traditional”

position. (Doc. 69-1 at 65(73-76). Maley did not know Crane because Crane retired

9

 The court here refers to the discussion that occurred in April, May, or June of 2010. 

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in 2008 prior to Maley’s arrival in Birmingham in July of 2009. Maley also admitted

that he was “unaware” of Crane’s national origin. Zicarelli did not inform Maley that

Crane was Native American. 

In his sworn statement, Maley stated as follows:

It came to my attention, but I don't recall specifically how, that

AO Odom and Birmingham Division Chief Division Counsel (CDC)

Raymond Zicarelli were attempting a direct hire for the Paralegal

Specialist position. This occurred a short time before the Paralegal

Specialist position was officially posted on July 13, 2010. At that time,

Crane appeared to have been recruited by either Zicarelli or Odom and

the direct hiring process was well underway prior to my knowledge of

this situation. As soon as I became aware, I inquired into the situation

because as stated above “direct hires” are completely inconsistent with

my leadership philosophy of being transparent, my promises to the

Birmingham Division as to how I would lead the office, and division

policiesset forth in “issue # 76”10

set forth earlier in the sign [sic],sworn

statement. I recall I met with Odom and Zicarelli, [sic] on or about the

same day I became aware of the situation, in my office. I remember that

at this meeting, Odom advised me that Crane had served as the

Forfeiture Paralegal previously, for many years, and that he

recommendedCrane for the Paralegal Specialist position. CDC Zicarelli

concurred with Odom’s opinion. I was frustrated that for a second time

Odom was attempting to complete a direct hire which was completely

inconsistent with my direction and established policy for the division.

In only an abundance of caution, on the chance that Crane was

uniquely qualified, as well as out of respect to Odom and Zicarelli, I

further sought advice from Birmingham Division Assistant Special

10

 In his sworn statement Maley referred to “a division-wide ‘issue list’” he created upon

beginning work in the Birmingham division in July 2009 which “consist[ed] of about 140 issues

requiring remedies.” (Doc. 69-1 at 101). “Issue 76” was entitled “The posting of support jobs

does not appear to be transparent.” (Doc. 69-1 at 103). 

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Agent in Charge (ASAC) Charles Regan, who had previously directly

supervised Crane. Regan described Crane as a poor and

underperforming employee and very highlyrecommended thatCrane not

be hired for the position. Regan did not mention to me anything

regarding Crane’s national origin, or anything relative to Crane having

any involvement, at anytime [sic], in EEO protected activities. 

(Doc. 69-1 at 107-108). 

Maley states that he “also sought the advice of Supervisory Intelligence

Analyst (SIA) Stephen Robert Forsyth, who directly worked for Crane on the Field

Intelligence Group.” (Doc. 69-1 at 107). According to Maley, Forsyth “described

Crane in a manner similar to ASAC Regan and did not recommend Crane for the

position.” (Doc. 69-1 at 107). Maley states that he does not recall Forsyth

mentioning anything to him about Crane’s national origin, or any of Crane’s EEO

activities. (Doc. 69-1 at 107). 

Maley noted that, when he learned from either Regan or Forsyth (he could not

remember which), that Odom and Crane were friends, “that exacerbated the

situation,” “because the direct hiring of Crane would be perceived by division

personnel as possibly underhanded or nefarious.” (Doc. 69-1 at 107). Maley states

that, based on all of the information he received, he directed Odom and Zicarelli to

post the position both internally and externally. (Doc. 69-1 at 108). He statesthat his

motivation in doing so was “to have a fair and open posting to allow internal

17

Case 2:11-cv-03568-VEH Document 79 Filed 12/11/14 Page 17 of 50
candidates to have an opportunity to compete for the job in complete transparency.” 

(Doc. 69-1 at 108).11

5. Regan’s Version

In Regan’s sworn statement, he statesthat when Maley spoke to him he recalls

that he told Maley that he “viewed Crane as lazy, that he had a history of being late

for work, and that he was a disruptive influence within the office.” (Doc. 69-1 at 3). 

He also states that he told Maley that “it was a good day when [Crane] resigned from

the FBI.” (Doc. 69-1 at 3). He also recalls mentioning to Maley that Odom and

Crane were personal friends. (Doc. 69-1 at 3). He states that he did not mention to

Maley “anything regarding Crane’s national origin, or anything relative to Crane

having any involvement, at anytime, in EEO protected activities.” (Doc. 69-1 at 3). 

6. Forsyth’s Version

Forsyth states in his sworn statement that he “was not contacted, and did not

11

 The plaintiff proffers the following facts:

27. With no independent knowledge about the Plaintiff, Maley relied on

Regan’s false information about Tracy Crane. Signed Sworn Statement of Patrick

Maley at 8 - 9 (Exhibit "I"). 

28. Based on Regan’s adverse comments, the FBI did not direct hire Crane,

but instead conducted a competition for the position. Deposition of Raymond

Zicarelli (Exhibit "H") at 75.

(Doc. 69 at 10). The citations given by the plaintiff do not support the conclusory and vague

statement that Maley “relied on Regan’s false information about Tracy Crane,” or that the

decision to post the position was based on “Regan’s adverse comments.” 

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speak, with . . . Maley, concerning the potential direct hiring, or hiring of Crane.” 

(Doc. 69-1 at 131). He does not recall ever having any discussion with Maley

regarding Crane. (Doc. 69-1 at 131). Forsyth states that Maley did not ask him if he

“would recommend or notrecommendCrane to fill the Paralegal Specialist position.” 

(Doc. 69-1 at 131). 

E. The Position Is Filled

On or about July 13, 2010, the Birmingham Office advertised the Paralegal

Specialist/Asset Forfeiture Investigator position both externally and internally. After

posting for the Paralegal Specialist position, the FBI only considered internal

candidates (current FBI employees) for the position. 

Although there is some discussion in the evidence of an entity called the

“career board,” the parties have presented no evidence or argument regarding which

person or what entity wasthe “decisionmaker” in this case. However, it is undisputed

that an FBI employee, Dan Russell, a Caucasian male FBI motor pool mechanic, was

selected (by someone or something) for the position. There is evidence that Russell

wasthe No. 2 candidate overall, and No. 3 on Zicarelli’s list of candidates. (Doc. 69-

1 at 69(90)). Zicarelli could not recall what discussions he had with the career board

about who was most qualified for the position. (Doc. 69-1 at 58(46)). Russell had

been unsuccessfully considered before for the same position on at least 3 different

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occasions. 

On November 17, 2010, Crane asked the Administrative Officer (“AO”) of the

BirminghamOffice what progress was being made to solve the funding problem. The

AO informed Crane that the Birmingham Office had filled the position through a

competitive hiring process on or about the prior August of 2010 . This was the first

time that Crane knew about the FBI's use of the posting process instead of the “direct

hire” process to fill the job. 

Crane had served on the Career Board, or selection panel, on one or more of

those occasions, and Crane was familiar with the mechanic’s qualifications. In his

affidavit, Crane notes: 

(1) [Crane] possessed a Master's Degree, while [the mechanic] only had

a Bachelor's Degree;(2) [Crane] had successfully served asthe Paralegal

Specialist/Asset Forfeiture Investigator before, while the motor pool

mechanic had never held a similar position; (3) the FBI hired the

mechanic at a GS-7 pay grade the previous August, which was a

reduction from his WG-10 motor pool position, while [Crane] had

already held the same Paralegal Specialist/Asset Forfeiture Investigator

position at a higher pay grade; (4) [Crane] had successfully served asthe

GS-14 Commander of a FIG, where [he] supervised Special Agents,

other investigators, and other technical personnel, while the motor pool

mechanic had never served in such a supervisory capacity of

investigators[.]

(Doc. 69-1 at 26).

F. Other Facts

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Regan knew the plaintiff was Native American. 

Zicarelli confirmed in his deposition that was “aware that the FBI places an

emphasis on Native American hiring.” (Doc. 69-1 at 66(79)). Zicarelli also agreed

that “to the best of our ability,” it is “the duty of every FBI employee to make sure

that FBI policies, procedures, directives, and guidelines are followed.” (Doc. 69-1

at 68(88)). Zicarelli retired on or about September 1, 2010. 

In his affidavit, the plaintiff states that when he first met Regan, Regan made

derogatory comments about Native Americans. (Doc. 69-1 at 23). The plaintiff states

that, at their first meeting, Regan stated, “I don’t want any Wounded Knee

sympathizers in my command.” (Doc. 69-1 at 23). At some later point, the plaintiff

states that Regan referred to a former co-worker, Jane Turner, and complained that

she was never in the FBI’s Minneapolis Office because she was “always out in Indian

land”–using the phrase “in Indian land” as an expression of disdain. (Doc. 69-1 at

23). The plaintiff states that during a later “career counseling” session between

Regan and Crane, Regan referred to Native Americans as “lazy,” “disgusting,”

“drunk,” “people who beat their wives,” and “people who committed incest.” (Doc.

69-1 at 23). At this session, Regan discouraged Tracy Crane from using the “Indian

card” during Crane's career with the FBI. (Doc. 69-1 at 23). 

Odom stated in his affidavit that, “[i]n previous conversations prior to . . .

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Crane’s retirement in 2008,” Regan “and others” told him “that . . . Crane was doing

an excellent job. . . . Regan and others told [Odom] that Crane did an excellent job

until his retirement in 2008.” (Doc. 74 at 34, ¶2). 

The plaintiff never applied for the Paralegal Specialist position. The plaintiff

never submitted a resume or application in response to the Paralegal Specialist

position posting. The plaintiff was never formally offered the position and never

received anything in writing offering him the Paralegal Specialist position in 2011. 

G. The Charge of Discrimination/Investigation

Plaintiff first contacted the FBI’s EEO office on December 27, 2010, and filed

a charge of discrimination (“COD”) or about February 7, 2011. (Doc. 20-1 at 1-2). 

The COD indicatesthat the “[m]ost[r]ecent[a]lleged [d]iscrimination [t]ook [p]lace”

on January 24, 2011. (Doc. 20-1 at 1). In the COD, the plaintiff only checked the

boxesfor National Origin (Native American) and Reprisal discrimination. (Doc. 20-1

at 1). Plaintiff did not check the box to indicate a claim for Sex, Age, Religion, or any

other type of discrimination. (Doc. 20-1 at 1).

In response to the COD’s Question No. 7 asking how he was discriminated

against, the plaintiff attached a single-spaced document to explain his claim of

discrimination. (Doc. 20-1 at 4-6). In his EEO complaint, in answer to the question

asking how he was discriminated against, the plaintiff attached a two page, single

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spaced document which discussed the factual allegations contained herein, including

Zicarelli’s attemptsto recruit the plaintiff as a direct hire, Zicarelli’s alleged statement

about the “budget issue” preventing Crane from being directly hired right away, the

posting of the position, and the subsequent filling of the position with someone

outside of his protected class. (Doc. 20-1 at 4-6). By letter dated April 12, 2011, the

defendant notified the plaintiff that it had accepted for investigation:

Whether [the plaintiff] was discriminated against based on national

origin (Native American) and reprisal for alleged prior EEO activity

when a decision was made to fill the position of Paralegal Specialist,

Birmingham Division, internally instead of hiring him as a direct hire.

(Doc. 12-2 at 1). On April 12, 2011, the plaintiff was notified, in writing, that only

the above-referenced issue was accepted for investigation. (Doc. 12-2 at 1-2). The

plaintiff was also notified that if he believed “the bases or allegation described in

[his] EEO complaint has not been properly identified,” he could appeal this in

writing, “within 15 calendar days after [his] receipt of this letter.” (Doc. 12-2 at 2). 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Age Discrimination (Count Eight)

The Amended Complaint alleges that the defendant discriminated against the

plaintiff on account of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment

Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (“ADEA”) (Count Eight). (Doc. 16 at 21-22).

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However, in his brief in opposition to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment,

the plaintiff states that he “is not pursuing an Age Discrimination Claim.” (Doc. 74

at 16). In light of thisrepresentation, the court determinesthat the age discrimination

claim is abandoned. Summary judgment will be granted as to Count Eight. 

B. "Racially Disparate Impact [Discrimination]" (Count Two)

1. The Plaintiff Failed to Exhaust His Administrative Remedies

Regarding This Claim12

The law is clear that

[b]efore an aggrieved employee may seek relief through the filing of a

civil action in federal court . . . he or she must first seek relief in the

agency that has allegedly engaged in discrimination. Brown v. GSA, 425

U.S. at 832, 96 S.Ct. at 1967–68. This requirement is not a technicality;

“[r]ather, it is part and parcel of the congressional design to vest in the

federal agencies and officials engaged in hiring and promoting

personnel‘primary responsibility’for maintaining nondiscrimination in

employment.” Kizas v. Webster, 707 F.2d 524, 544 (D.C.Cir.1983).

Grier v. Sec'y of Army, 799 F.2d 721, 724 (11th Cir. 1986); see also, Tillery v. U.S.

Dep't of Homeland Sec., 402 F. App'x 421, 425 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Crawford v.

Babbitt, 186 F.3d 1322, 1326 (11th Cir.1999)) (prior to filing a Title VII action, a

federal employee must timely exhaust his administrative remedies). In order to

12

 This argument was raised by the defendant in his response to the plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment. (Doc. 75-1 at 32-35). The plaintiff failed to respond to this argument in his

reply brief. (Doc. 78). It is also not addressed in either of the plaintiff’s briefs in support of his

own motion for summary judgment. (Docs. 69, 74).

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exhaust his administrative remedies, the plaintiff must first “seek relief in the agency

that has allegedly discriminated against him.” Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S.

820, 832, 96 S. Ct. 1961, 1967, 48 L. Ed. 2d 402 (1976). The Eleventh Circuit has

noted that

the purpose of exhaustion is to permit the department the first

opportunity to investigate the alleged discriminatory or retaliatory

practices, and a plaintiff's judicial complaint is thereby limited by the

scope of the investigation that can reasonably be expected to grow out

of the administrative charge of discrimination or retaliation. See

Gregory v. Georgia Dep't of Human Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 1279–80 (11th

Cir.2004). The proper inquiry is, therefore, whether the plaintiff's

judicial complaint was like or related to, or grew out of, the

administrative allegations. See id. at 1280. id. at 1279–80 (quotation

omitted).

Basel v. Sec'y of Def., 507 F. App'x 873, 875 76 (11th Cir. 2013)

In this case, although the plaintiff initially sought relief from the Department

of Justice by filing a charge of discrimination on or about February 7, 2011, the

charge did not allege disparate impact discrimination and did not discuss the

plaintiff’s current allegations that “[t]he FBI is woefully deficient in the hiring of

Native Americans.” (Doc. 69 at 5 (proffered fact 5)). Those allegations are not “like

or related to” the administrative complaint’s allegations, nor could they be expected

to “grow out of” them. For this reason, the disparate impact claims must be

dismissed.

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2. The Disparate Impact Claim Also Fails on Its Merits

a. The Plaintiff Fails to Establish a Prima Facie Case of

Disparate Impact Discrimination

In E.E.O.C. v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000), the

Eleventh Circuit explained:

“[D]isparate impact theory prohibits neutral employment practices

which, while non-discriminatory on their face, visit an adverse,

disproportionate impact on a statutorily-protected group. See Griggs v.

Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 853, 28 L.Ed.2d 158

(1971) (explaining that Title VII “proscribes not only overt

discrimination but also practicesthat are fair in form, but discriminatory

in operation”);see also In re Employment, 198 F.3d at 1311; Fitzpatrick

v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1117 (11thCir.1993). The doctrine seeks

the removal of employment obstacles, not required by business

necessity, which create “ ‘built-in headwinds' ” and freeze out protected

groups from job opportunities and advancement. Griffin v. Carlin, 755

F.2d 1516, 1524 (11th Cir.1985) (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431–32,

91 S.Ct. 849). Asthe district court correctly identified, “[t]he premise of

disparate impact theory is that some employment practices, adopted

without a deliberately discriminatory motive, may be the functional

equivalent of intentional discrimination.” Joe's Stone Crab, 969 F.Supp.

at 735. In essence, disparate impact theory is a doctrinal surrogate for

eliminating unprovable acts of intentional discrimination hidden

innocuously behind facially-neutral policies or practices.

The disparate impact framework under Title VII by now is

well-settled. “Since Griggs, Congress has codified the appropriate

burdens of proof in a disparate impact case in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)

(1994), and a settled jurisprudence has arisen to implement the

methodology.” In re Employment, 198 F.3d at 1311. . . . [A] plaintiff in

a [disparate impact case] must establish three elements: first, that there

is a significant statistical disparity between the proportion of [the

protected class] in the available labor pool and the proportion of

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[persons in the protected class] hired; second, that there is a specific,

facially-neutral, employment practice which is the alleged cause of the

disparity; and finally, and most critically in this case, that a causal nexus

exists between the specific employment practice identified and the

statistical disparity shown. . . . See generally MacPherson v. University

of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766, 771 (11th Cir.1991) (citing Wards Cove

Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 655–56, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 2124, 104

L.Ed.2d 733 (1989); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977,

994–95, 108 S.Ct. 2777, 2789, 101 L.Ed.2d 827 (1988)).

According to Title VII, “[i]n the first stage of a disparate impact

case, the ‘complaining party [must] demonstrate [ ] that a respondent

uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on

the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’ ” In re

Employment, 198 F.3d at 1311 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §

2000e–2(k)(1)(A)(I)). “To ‘demonstrate’ means to ‘meet[ ] the burdens

of production and persuasion.’ ” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m)

(1994)). “In other words, in order to surmount the first hurdle in a

disparate impact race discrimination case, the plaintiff must make out a

prima facie case ‘that [a] facially neutral employment practice ha[s] a

significantly discriminatory impact.’ ” Id. (quoting Connecticut v. Teal,

457 U.S. 440, 446, 102 S.Ct. 2525, 2530, 73 L.Ed.2d 130 (1982)). As

the Supreme Court explained in Watson, “the plaintiff must offer

statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the

practice in question has caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or

promotions because of their membership in a protected group.” Watson,

487 U.S. at 994, 108 S.Ct. 2777 (emphasis added); see also Edwards v.

Wallace Community College, 49 F.3d 1517, 1520 (11th Cir.1995)

(observing that “[a] plaintiff must identify a specific employment

practice that leads to the disparate impact”); MacPherson, 922 F.2d at

771(noting that “ ‘a plaintiff must demonstrate that it is the application

of a specific or particular employment practice that has created the

disparate impact under attack’ ”) (internal citation omitted).

Once each of these three elements are shown, a plaintiff has

established a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination. See

Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1117; MacPherson, 922 F.2d at 771. The burden

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of production then shiftsto the defendant to establish that the challenged

employment practice serves a legitimate, non-discriminatory business

objective. See Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1117. However, even if the

defendant satisfies this burden, a plaintiff may still prevail by proving

that an alternative, non-discriminatory practice would have served the

defendant's stated objective equally as well. See id. at 1118.

E.E.O.C. v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1274-75 (11th Cir. 2000)

(emphasis by underlining added); see also, Turner v. City of Auburn, 361 F. App'x

62, 65 (11th Cir. 2010) (“To establish a prima facie case of disparate impact

discrimination, a plaintiff must show (1) a significant statistical disparity among

members of different racial groups; (2) a specific facially-neutral employment policy

or practice; and (3) a causal nexus between that specific policy or practice and the

statistical disparity.”); Johnson v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala., 191 F. App'x 838,

843 (11th Cir. 2006) (discussing the burden shifting framework of disparate impact

cases).13

13

 The plaintiff sets out the incorrect elements for a prima facie case. The plaintiff

paraphrases the following quote from Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961 (11th Cir. 2008):

To make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show (1)

she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was qualified to do the job; (3) she was

subjected to adverse employment action; and (4) her employer treated similarly

situated employees outside her class more favorably.

Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 2008). He then states, without citation to

authority, that “[t]he . . . elements hold true for both individual and disparate impact cases.” 

(Doc. 69 at 17; doc. 74 at 17). Crawford is a disparate treatment case. The elements cited apply

only to those cases. Confusingly, in one of his briefs, the defendant also cites the Crawford

statement of the prima facie case. (Doc. 71 at 15). However, in another brief, he cites the correct

elements. (Doc. 75-1 at 35). The use of the incorrect legal framework by both parties has

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In the instant case, the plaintiff argues only that“Native Americans only

account for .40% of the Special Agents (i.e., 55 Special Agents out of 13,766 total

agents) and only 0.51% of the Profession Staff Employees (i.e., 111 Professional Staff

Employees out of 21,863 total professional staff employees).” (Doc. 69 at 17; doc.

74 at 17-18). However, the singular fact that a small number of Native Americans

are employed at the FBI is not, alone, evidence of a significant statistical disparity

between the proportion of Native Americans in the available labor pool and the

proportion of Native Americans hired. Further, the plaintiff fails to even allege a

specific facially-neutral employment policy or practice and a causal nexus between

that specific policy or practice and the statistical disparity.

14

“[A] plaintiff must do

more than simply identify a workforce imbalance to establish a prima facie disparate

impact case; it must causally connect a facially-neutral employment practice to the

identified disparity.” Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d at 1276. The plaintiff’s

disparate impact claims fail.

contributed to the court’s difficulty in resolving these motions.

14

 Even the Amended Complaint merely states only generally that the “[d]efendant’s

hiring policies and practices have a disparate impact on Native-American salaried applicants,”

and “[d]efendant ineffectively recruits, hires, or retains Native Americans . . . [t]he FBI has less

than 1% of Native Americans on its employment roles. [sic]” (Doc. 16 at 19). Although the

plaintiff does discuss at the length the aforementioned diversity program put in place by the FBI

(see doc. 69 at 18-19, 20; doc. 74 at 18-19, 21), that is not a facially neutral policy or practice

which would result in fewer Native Americans being hired. Indeed, the plaintiff argues the

contrary–that it is non-neutral and should result in more Native Americans being hired.

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b. The Plaintiff’s “Other” Arguments in Support of His

Disparate Treatment Claim Are Without Merit

The plaintiff’s discussion of Regan’s alleged comments regarding Native

Americans, his alleged opinions regarding that group of individuals, and his

statements regarding the plaintiff’s work history (doc. 69 at 19-20, 22-23; doc. 74 at

20, 22-23), are irrelevant in a disparate impact scenario, which does not focus on

intent.

15 Similarly, whether or not “the boss” was kept “in the dark,” about the

plaintiff’s status as a Native American (doc. 69 at 21, 22; doc 74 at 21, 22) is

irrelevant to this discussion. The key is whether the plaintiff identified a neutral

policy or practice which kept him from being hired. He did not.

Summary judgment is appropriate in favor of the defendant on Count Two.

C. “NationalOrigin Discrimination” – TheDisparateTreatmentClaim

(Count One)

1. The Exact Nature of the Plaintiff’s Claim

The court has found this claim especially difficult to resolve because the

15

 The plaintiff’s citation to Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254,

101 S. Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981) in the midst of his disparate impact argument

underscores his misunderstanding. (Doc. 69 at 20; doc. 74 at 20). The citation he gives

references the “disparate treatment” analysis. Similarly, as noted previously, the plaintiff’s

discussion of the disparate treatment prima facie elements from Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d

961, 970 (11th Cir. 2008) (see doc. 69 at 20-21; doc. 74 at 20-21) is misplaced.

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plaintiff constantly presents a moving target as the basis for this claim.

16 Sometimes

he argues that his claim is based on the failure to directly hire him. See, e.g. doc. 69

at 25; doc. 74 at 25 (“The decision not to ‘direct hire’ the [p]laintiff was based solely

on the poisonous discussion with Regan.”); doc. 78 at 3 (“The [d]efendant must

provide ‘significant probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue

of fact’ on the issue of whether there was an effort to direct hire [the plaintiff].”)

(emphasis in original). Elsewhere the plaintiff’s arguments center on the posting of

the position, and the failure to inform the plaintiff that it had been posted. See e.g.,

doc. 69 at 27 and doc. 74 at 27 (“After the decision not to ‘direct hire’ Crane, the FBI

advertized the job. No one, including Maley, advised Crane that the job was going

to be advertized for applicants through the competitive process.”); doc. 78 at 6

(“Maley changed the course of the hiring process from direct hiring of Crane to

advertized hiring only after talking to Regan.”). The Amended Complaint alleges

something altogether different, more generally stating that “[t]he [d]efendant violated

Title VII when SAC Maley hired a less qualified non minority over [p]laintiff.” (Doc.

16 at 18). 

In his EEO complaint, in answer to the question asking how he was

16

 While the parties have not raised this issue, the court finds that any discussion of the

merits of this claim cannot begin until its exact nature is determined.

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discriminated against, the plaintiff attached a two page, single spaced document

which discussed the factual allegations contained herein, including Zicarelli’s

attemptsto recruit the plaintiff as a direct hire, Zicarelli’s alleged statement about the

“budget issue” preventing Crane from being directly hired right away, the posting of

the position and subsequent filing of the position with someone outside of his

protected class. (Doc. 20-1 at 4-6). By letter dated April 12, 2011, the defendant

notified the plaintiff that it had accepted for investigation:

Whether [the plaintiff] was discriminated against based on national

origin (Native American) and reprisal for alleged prior EEO activity

when a decision was made to fill the position of Paralegal Specialist,

Birmingham Division, internally instead of hiring him as a direct hire.

(Doc. 12-2 at 1).17

 

As has been noted:

In this circuit, a plaintiff cannot amend his complaint through argument

made in his brief in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary

17

 Whether the claim in Count One is administratively barred was not raised by the

parties. The court is not required to reach this issue sua sponte. See, Harris v. Bd. of Trustees

Univ. of Alabama, 846 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1236 (N.D. Ala. 2012) (Hopkins, J.) (citing Zipes v.

Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393, 102 S. Ct. 1127, 71 L. Ed. 2d 234 (1982)

(“Though required, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a ‘jurisdictional requirement’

such that it would divest the court of subject-matter jurisdiction.”). Regardless, the court finds

that the allegations in the judicial complaint are like, related to, and/or could be expected to grow

out of the administrative complaint. See, Basel v. Sec'y of Def., 507 F. App'x 873, 877 (11th Cir.

2013) (citing Gregory v. Georgia Dep't of Human Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 1280 (11th Cir. 2004))

(“[The] judicial complaint [is] limited by the scope of the investigation that could reasonably be

expected to grow from the [administrative] complaint.”).

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judgment. Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315

(11th Cir.2004) (per curiam). Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a).” Hurlbert v. St.

Mary's Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1297 (11th Cir.2006).

And it goes without saying that the court is barred from amending a

plaintiff's claim. One reason for barring such amendment is that in sua

sponte amending a plaintiff's claimon summary judgment,the courtmay

create the impression that it has become the plaintiff's advocate—or his

worst enemy—depending on what the court does with the claim after

amending it.

Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. United States, 716 F.3d 535, 559 (11th Cir.

2013). Considering the EEO complaint, the totality of the factual allegations in the

judicial complaint, and the broad wording of Count One, the court determinesthat the

plaintiff has not alleged new claims in his briefs from those alleged in his Amended

Complaint. Instead, the court determines that there is only one claim of disparate

treatment national original discrimination–that the defendant hired a non-Native

American for the position over the plaintiff. The eventssurrounding the “direct hire,”

the posting of the position, the failure to inform the plaintiff that the position was

posted, and all other factual allegations, merely support this one claim.

2. The McDonnell Douglas Framework

Title VII provides:

[i]tshall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail

or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to

discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such

individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

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42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1). “In evaluating disparate treatment claimssupported by

circumstantial evidence, we use the framework established by the Supreme Court in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668

(1973), and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101

S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981).” Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079,

1087 (11th Cir. 2004). Under that framework,

[t]he Title VII plaintiff bears “the ultimate burden of proving

discriminatory treatment by a preponderance of the evidence.” Earley v.

Champion Int’l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir.1990). Thus,

under the first part of McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must establish

by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination.

If she does, the burden of production shifts to the employer, which

requires the employer to introduce evidence of “some legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason” for its employment decision. McDonnell

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the employer satisfies its burden, “the

presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted.” Collado v.

United Parcel Serv. Co., 419 F.3d 1143, 1151 (11th Cir.2005) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Because the burden of persuasion remains

with the employee, she must then show that the seemingly legitimate

reason the employer gave was pretextual—i.e., the “proffered reason

was not the true reason for the employment decision.” St. Mary’s Honor

Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407

(1993) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Collado, 419 F.3d

at 1150 (noting that once the employer satisfies its burden “the

presumption of discrimination that arose when the plaintiff made [her]

prima facie showing ‘drops from the case,’ and ‘the case is placed back

into the traditional framework—in other words, the plaintiff still bears

the burden of proving, more probably than not, that the employer took

an adverse employment action against [her] on the basis of a protected

personal characteristic’ ” (internal citations omitted)).

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Kidd v. Mando Am. Corp., 731 F.3d 1196, 1202 (11th Cir. 2013). 

3. NeitherParty IsEntitled to Summary Judgment on Whetherthe 

Plaintiff Has Satisfied HisPrimaFacie Case Because Each Has

Argued the Wrong Elements

Similar to the arguments regarding disparate impact, bothmotionsfor summary

judgment begin the disparate treatment argument by incorrectly articulating the

required elements of a prima facie case. 

The defendant argues: “In a prima facie case of discrimination for an alleged

non-selection case, a plaintiff meets his prima facie burden of proof by establishing

that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3)

he was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4) he was treated less

favorably than a similarly situated person outside his protected class.” (Doc. 71 at

16). The plaintiff’s motion sets out, for the most part, the exactsame elements. (Doc.

69 at 17). While these are the standard elements for a disparate treatment case, see 

E.E.O.C. v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1286 (11th Cir. 2000), the

Eleventh Circuit has noted that “[t]he methods of presenting a prima facie case are

not fixed; they are flexible and depend to a large degree upon the employment

situation.” Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1087 (11th Cir. 2004)

(emphasis added) (citing Nix v.WLCY Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181,

35

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1185 (11th Cir.1984)); see also, McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 806, n. 13

(“The facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification above of the

prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every

respect to differing factual situations.”). 

The correct articulation of the elements in a failure to hire national origin

discrimination case is: “(1) that [the plaintiff] is a member of a protected class, (2)

that [he] applied and was qualified for the job, (3) that despite [his] qualifications,

[]he was rejected, and (4) that the position remained open or was filled by a person

outside the protected class.” Coutu v. Martin Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 47 F.3d

1068, 1073 (11th Cir. 1995) (failure to hire national origin discrimination); see also,

Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186-87, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2378, 105

L. Ed. 2d 132 (U.S. 1989)(“[plaintiff must] prove by a preponderance of the evidence

that she applied for and was qualified for an available position, that she was rejected,

and that after she was rejected respondent either continued to seek applicants for the

position, or, as is alleged here, filled the position with a white employee”);

McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802 (“[plaintiff must prove] (I) that he

belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which

the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was

rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the

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employer continued to seek applicants frompersons of complainant's qualifications”);

Lane v. Broward Cnty., Florida, 411 F. App'x 272, 273 (11th Cir. 2011) (same);

Childress v. Caterpillar Logistics Servs., Inc., 369 F. App'x 95, 96 (11th Cir. 2010)

(same but stating the fourth element as “the defendant filled the position with a

person outside the protected class”). 

The fact that the parties both argued the wrong set of elements for the

plaintiff’s prima facie case means that summary judgment on that issue is

inappropriate for either side. The Eleventh Circuit has admonished that “‘[s]ummary

judgment is such a lethal weapon, depriving a litigant of a trial on the issue, caution

must be used to ensure only those cases devoid of any need for factual determinations

are disposed of by summary judgment.’” Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012,

1069 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949, 952–53 (11th

Cir.1986)). Further, it is “[t]he party moving for summary judgment [who] ‘bearsthe

initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion.’” 

Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1314-15 (11th Cir.

2011) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553,

91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). The court cannotsee how either movantsatisfied its burden

when both fail to set out, or argue, the proper elements of the plaintiff’s prima facie

case. 

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Nor does the court feel that it can properly grant summary judgment sua

sponte on this issue. The Eleventh Circuit has previous stated that a party against

whom summary judgment is granted, even if done sua sponte, must have been given

“adequate notice that they must present all of their evidence.” Imaging Bus.

Machines, LLC. v. BancTec, Inc., 459 F.3d 1186, 1191 (11th Cir. 2006). Here,

neither side can be said to have adequate notice that they must present all their

evidence on elements not even raised by the other side.18

4. The State of the Evidence Suggests that Summary Judgment is

Inappropriate on this Issue

In addition to the above reasons for not granting summary judgment the state

of the evidence suggests multiple genuine issues of material fact that preclude

summary judgment. A reasonable jury could conclude that Zicarelli “offered” and the

plaintiff “accepted” the position at issue, which was ultimately taken away from the

plaintiff, posted, and given to a person outside the plaintiff’s protected class. The

plaintiff was certainly qualified for the position, as he had held it before. This alone

seems to satisfy the elements of the plaintiff’s prima facie case. 

Albeit in reference to the wrong elements, the defendant argues that Zicarelli

18

 The defendant could argue that its motion amounts to a general attack that the

plaintiff’s prima facie case is in some (unstated) way insufficient. This argument would also fail

as “[t]here is no burden upon the district court to distill every potential argument that could be

made based upon the materials before it on summary judgment.” Resolution Trust Corp. v.

Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995). 

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had no authority to offer the plaintiff the position. Indeed, Zicarellistatesthat he was

never “involved in any direct hire in the FBI,” and was not “involved in any direct

hiring policy or procedures.” (Doc. 69-1 at 79(132)). Zicarelli confirmed in his

deposition that “as the former CDC . . . it was not [his] job to perform any of the HR

duties.” (Doc. 69-1 at 79(131-132)). However, Maley confirmed in his affidavit that

Zicarelli and Odom had “recruited” the plaintiff, “were attempting a direct hire,” and,

by the time Maley found out about it, “the direct hiring process was well underway.” 

(Doc. 69-1 at 106). Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that

Zicarelli had the authority to and did directly hire the plaintiff.19

The defendant, again focusing on the wrong elements, argues that the plaintiff

did not suffer “an adverse employment action.” (Doc. 71 at 16-19; doc. 75-1 at 28). 

He writes:

Plaintiff did not suffer any real harm because he was only informed of

a potential job vacancy opportunity that he did not even apply for when

it was posted on a public website.

The fact that Plaintiff was told about an upcoming vacancy and

then failing to apply for the position [sic] does not qualify as an adverse

employment action under Title VII discrimination . . . 

(Doc. 71 at 18) (emphasis added). He also writes:

19

 Regardless of Zicarelli’s authority, which only pertains to the direct hire issue,

ultimately the plaintiff was not offered the position, or even considered for it, by the person or

entity that hired Russell. 

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Plaintiff did not suffer an adverse employment action because he never

applied for the position. There is absolutely no evidence that Plaintiff

was ever formally offered the position as a direct hire, especially since

CDC Zicarelli also called other potential candidates about the very same

position. Plaintiff never received any paperwork, an offer of salary, or

a conditional offer from the FBI’s BFO or Headquarters. Instead, he

received a call from CDC Zicarelli who never directly hired an

employee during the course of his FBI career and did not have authority

to offer Plaintiff a direct hire position.

(Doc. 75-1 at 28) (emphasis added). Even if the court construes this misplaced

argument as attacking the (correct) prima facie element, which requires the plaintiff

to have applied for the position, the argument still fails.

20 The Eleventh Circuit has

stated that

a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case—that is, he creates a

presumption of discrimination and forces the employer to articulate

legitimate reasons for his rejection—as long as he establishes that the

company had some reason or duty to consider him for the post. The

employer cannot avoid a Title VII violation by showing that it

incorrectly assumed that the plaintiff was uninterested in the job. When

the plaintiff had no notice of or opportunity to apply for the job, such a

reason for rejection is “legally insufficient and illegitimate”. 

Carmichael v. Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126, 1133 34 (11th Cir. 1984)

(emphasis added); see also, Walker v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 286 F.3d

1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Under Carmichael, an employee may be excused from

the application requirement of a prima facie case ‘as long as he establishes that the

20

 As noted above, the element requires a showing that the plaintiff applied and was

qualified for the job.

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company had some reason or duty to consider him for the post.’”). In the instant case,

the evidence, when cast in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, establishes that

Zicarelli was attempting to directly hire the plaintiff for the position, the plaintiff

accepted the position, and then Zicarelli told the plaintiff that “funding problems,” 

would cause a delay and that the hire would take place after the start of the new fiscal

year. Of course, in reality, Maley, once he found out what was happening, ordered

that the position be posted, and it was, on June 13, 2010. 

Regardless of whether Zicarelli had authority to hire the plaintiff, a jury could

determine that the reason the plaintiff never applied for the job was because he did

not know that he needed to. Indeed, casting the evidence in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff, Zicarelli led the plaintiff to believe that the job was already his. 

Further, Maley admits that he knew about the attempts to directly hire the plaintiff

when he ordered that the job be posted. Despite Maley’s knowledge of the interaction

between the plaintiff and Zicarelli, no one informed the plaintiff that the job would

be posted and that the plaintiff needed to apply.

21 Under these circumstances, the

defendant not only should have advised the plaintiff that the position was posted, it

had a “reason” and a “duty” to consider him for the position. See, Walker, 286 F.3d

21

 Further, since the plaintiff was retired, it cannot be said that he should have been aware

of the posting in the office.

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at 1276. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff’s “failure to apply” is excused. 

Of course, as noted, the above cited evidence is cast in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff. There remains a genuine issue of material fact as to what occurred in

the conversations between Zicarelli and the plaintiff and Zicarelli and Mrs. Crane.

Other evidence referenced above is also disputed. Accordingly, summary judgment

also is not appropriate for the plaintiff on this claim.

D. Retaliation

The defendant alleges that the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of

retaliation.

1. The Nature of the Plaintiff’s Claims

The plaintiff’s initial and reply briefs in support of his motion for summary

judgment do not discuss retaliation. The plaintiff’s entire argument on this issue can

be found in his response to the defendant’s motion, where he writes only: 

After the [p]laintiff’s retirement and sometime in late 2009 or

early 2010, [p]laintiff Tracy Crane submitted a statement in support of

. . . Odom’s EEO complaint against the FBI. . . . The submission of a

statement related to an EEO complaint is a protected activity.

Prior to Crane’s submission of the statement supporting Odom’s

EEO complaint, there were no job performance criticisms of Crane by

management. . . . Odom reported that the attitude about Crane by

management changed after Crane submitted this statement. . . . Only a

few short weeks later, senior management declined to direct hire Crane

even though the direct hiring process was “well underway.” The

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conclusion is that Crane’s participation in a protected activity further

poisoned management’s attitude against him and contributed to the

discriminatory employment decision.

(Doc. 74 at 31-32). This argument is vague, but seems to suggest that “the

discriminatory employment decision” at issue is only the failure to directly hire the

plaintiff. However, none of the retaliation counts assert that claim.

22 The closest is

22

 As noted above, the plaintiff alleges retaliation in four confusing counts. The

complaint states:

127. The Defendant violated the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII by the

comments of . . . SAC Maley’s SSS dated 6/22/2011, Maley says one of the

reasons for Plaintiff's denial of employment was due in part to Issue #46 of the

Birmingham Issue List.

128. Maley’s denial of Plaintiff’s employment was due to the Plaintiff

being involved in the EEO process (issue #46) and his friendship with Odom.

(Doc. 16 at 20 (quoting Count Four))

130. The Defendant violated the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII by SAC

Maley's SSS dated 6/22/2011, Maley stated “a direct hire would have violated my

commitment to the Birmingham division employees to create a transparency and

trusting workplace and violate established division policy, and would have created

a real or perceived perception that Odom was hiring a ‘friend’ in a

noncompetitive, ‘under the table’ manner.”

131. Maley hired the spouse of a Special Agent as a direct hire SST. Maley has

encouraged all employees to recruit and obtain resumes from “friends and

family.” Maley’s denial of Plaintiff’s employment is inconsistent with his actions.

(Doc. 16 at 20 (quoting Count Five).

133. The Defendant violated the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII when he

failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct wrongful

conduct within the Birmingham Division, despite being repeatedly made aware of

retaliatory actions and violations directly related to and connected with Title VII

activity, which resulted in Plaintiff's harm and the harm of others known and

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Count Four, which alleges that “Maley’s denial of [p]laintiff's employment was due

to the [p]laintiff being involved in the EEO process (issue #46) and his friendship

with Odom.” (Doc. 16 at 20). 

Still, in light of the court’s analysis determining that the plaintiff’s direct hire

discrimination allegations are merely part of his larger failure to hire discrimination

allegations, the court reaches the same conclusion here regarding the plaintiff’s

retaliation claims, and holdsthat the plaintiff’s argument isin support of Count Four. 

However, the court will deem all other bases for the plaintiff’s retaliation counts to

be abandoned, and will grant summary judgment to the defendant on Counts Five,

Six, and Seven. See, Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599

(11th Cir. 1995) (“[G]rounds alleged in the complaint but not relied upon in summary

judgment are deemed abandoned.”). 

unknown.

(Doc. 16 at 21 (quoting Count Six)).

135. The Defendant violated the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII when he

improperly counseled the Plaintiff and conducted a biased investigation.

(Doc. 16 at 21 (quoting Count Seven)). Each quoted portion cited above constitutes the entirety

of the count except for the following language which appears at the beginning of each count:

“Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the above paragraphs with the same force and

affect as if fully set forth herein, and further states as follows[.]” 

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2. Analysis

The Eleventh Circuit has noted that

Title VII also prohibits retaliation against an employee “because [s]he

has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by

[Title VII], or because [s]he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or

participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing

[thereunder].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). Title VII requires the plaintiff

to show that: (1) she engaged in an activity protected under Title VII; (2)

she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal

connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment

action. Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th

Cir.2001).

Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 2008). The Crawford case

continues:

In the past this circuit's standard for both discrimination and retaliation

claims has required an employee to establish an “ultimate employment

decision” or make some other showing of substantiality in the

employment context in order to establish an adverse employment action.

See Stavropoulos v. Firestone, 361 F.3d 610, 616–17 (11th Cir.2004);

Gupta v. Florida Board of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 587 (11th Cir.2000);

Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir.2001).

We defined ultimate employment decisions as those “such as

termination, failure to hire, or demotion.” Stavropoulos, 361 F.3d at 617.

And we required that conduct falling short of an ultimate employment

decision must, in some substantial way, “alter[ ] the employee's

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, deprive

him or her of employment opportunities, or adversely affect [ ] his or her

status as an employee.” Gupta, 212 F.3d at 587 (quotation and citation

omitted). More particularly, when defining the level of substantiality

required for a Title VII discrimination claim, we required an employee

to demonstrate she suffered “a serious and material change in the

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” to show an adverse

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employment action. Davis, 245 F.3d at 1239 (emphasis added).

Crawford, 529 F.3d at 970. 

The defendant movesfor summary judgment on the retaliation claims, arguing

that the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination because: 1) the

plaintiff did not engage in prior protected activity; and 2) the plaintiff suffered no

adverse employment action. (Doc. 71 at 16-21).23 There is evidence that the plaintiff

participated in the EEO investigation of Odom’s claim by filing an affidavit in

support of Odom. That is clearly protected activity. Further, the failure to hire the 

plaintiff is an adverse employment action. See, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a) (prohibiting

discrimination against an applicant for employment “because he has made a charge,

testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or

hearing under this subchapter.”). Summary judgment is not appropriate for the

defendant on the issue of whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of

retaliation.

24

23

 The defendant’s only argument on this issue is found in its brief in support of his

motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 71). There is no discussion of retaliation in the

defendant’s response to the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (doc. 75-1), or the

defendant’s reply (doc. 77) to the plaintiff’s response to the defendant’s motion for summary

judgment. 

24

 The plaintiff has not moved for summary judgment on this issue, but, even if he had,

there remain genuine issues of material fact as to the plaintiff’s prima facie case. The court here

makes no judgment as to any other aspect of the plaintiff’s prima facie case of retaliation.

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E. Pretext

Assuming that the plaintiff “has established a prima facie case of

discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to produce ‘legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged employment action.’” Conner v.

Lafarge N. Am., Inc., 343 F. App'x 537, 541 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Combs v.

Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1528 (11th Cir. 1997)). Similarly,

[a]s with claims of substantive discrimination, Title VII retaliation

claims require that “[o]nce the plaintiff establishes [a] prima facie case,

the employer must proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for

the adverse employment action.” 

Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 976 (11th Cir. 2008). Assuming the defendant

has proffered a legitimate non-discriminatory reason, “[i]n order to avoid summary

judgment, a plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to

conclude that each of the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons is

pretextual.” Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1037 (11th Cir. 2000). The

Eleventh Circuit has noted that

an employee must meet that reason head on and rebut it, and the

employee cannot succeed by simply quarreling with the wisdom of that

reason.” Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030. If the employer proffers more than

one legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, the plaintiff must rebut each

of the reasons to survive a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1037.

A legitimate nondiscriminatory reason proffered by the employer is not

a “pretext for discrimination unless it is shown both that the reason was

false and that discrimination was the real reason.” St. Mary's Honor

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Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2752, 125 L.Ed.2d

407 (1993) (citation omitted).

Garcia v. DS Waters of Am., Inc., 372 F. App'x 925, 927 (11th Cir. 2010).

Summary judgment is not appropriate for the defendant

25

on the issue of pretext

because, instead of focusing on the ultimate issue of whether the plaintiff was

discriminated against when he was not hired, the defendant’s reasons focus

exclusively on the “direct hire” allegations. He argues:

1) the plaintiff was “simply” told that the position would be posted. (Doc. 71

at 22; 75-1 at 31-32; 77 at 8);

2) Zicarelli called others (not just the plaintiff) about the position and the

plaintiff was never formally notified that he had the position through the direct

hire process (Doc. 71 at 22);

3) Zicarelli did not have authority to directly hire for the position (Doc. 75-1

at 31);

4) Maley did not think directly hiring someone for a position was appropriate

and thought the best course of action for the FBI, to include employee morale,

was to allow others, including FBI employees, to compete for positions within

the BFO (Doc. 75-1 at 31; 77 at 9);

25

 The plaintiff has not moved for summary judgment on this issue.

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5) SAC Maley did not know Plaintiff or that Plaintiff was a Native American

(Doc. 75-1 at 31); and

5) Regan’s comments did not affect Maley’s because he did not want anyone

to be directly hired for the position (Doc. 75-1 at 32).

The defendant does not give any reasons why Crane was not: 1) told about the

position’s being posted; 2) considered for the position after it was posted; or 3) 

ultimately hired when someone outside of his protected class was.

26 Accordingly, the

defendant has failed to carry its burden and summary judgment is not appropriate.27

26

 The defendant might be arguing that it did not consider the plaintiff because he never

applied for the position after he was told that it would be posted. While that argument appears

elsewhere in the defendant’s submissions, it is not listed as one of his legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons and, again, the court is under no obligation to formulate arguments for the

defendant. Further, it would be unfair to assume such an argument when it was not presented to

the plaintiff, and therefore the plaintiff had no opportunity to rebut it.

27

 The court notes that there is significant evidence from which a jury could determine

that the reasons that were proffered were not the reasons the plaintiff was not hired. For

example, while the defendant argues that the plaintiff was told that the position “would be”

posted, Zicarelli stated that he never called Crane back to tell him that the position had been

posted. (Doc. 69-1 at 69(89)). Crane stated that Zicarelli told him that he had the job, and that

he only learned later, after the position had been filled, that the job had been posted. Further, as

shown in earlier sections of this opinion, a reasonable jury could conclude that Zicarelli had at

least some authority to directly hire the plaintiff and actually did so. Finally, the defendant

argues that Regan’s comments had no affect on Maley, and that Maley did not directly hire the

plaintiff because he was against direct hires in general. Certainly there is evidence that direct

hires were not Maley’s preferred method, but Maley also stated that, “[i]n only an abundance of

caution, on the chance that Crane was uniquely qualified, as well as out of respect to Odom and

Zicarelli, I further sought advice from . . . Regan, who had previously directly supervised Crane.” 

(Doc. 69-1 at 107). A reasonable jury could determine that Crane might (or might not) have been

directly hired, but that, in this instance, Regan’s bad recommendation, not Maley’s general

policy, made sure that would not happen. There is also at least some evidence that at one point

Maley might have hired Crane, but for the comments by Regan, who had a history of negative

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IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is

DENIED. The defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to

Counts Two, Three, Five, Six, Seven, and Eight. Those Counts are DISMISSED

with prejudice. The defendant’s motion is DENIED in all other respects. 

DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of December, 2014.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

comments regarding Native Americans. Regardless, the court need not reach these issues, as it

finds the defendant has not carried its burden.

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