Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-05158/USCOURTS-caDC-12-05158-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 10, 2013 Decided January 22, 2014 

No. 12-5158 

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY, 

APPELLANT

v. 

UNITED STATES SECTION, INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AND 

WATER COMMISSION, U.S. - MEXICO, 

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:11-cv-00261) 

Paula Dinerstein argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellant. 

Jane M. Lyons, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause 

for appellee. With her on the brief were Ronald C. Machen 

Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. 

Attorney. Marian L. Borum, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered 

an appearance. 

Before: KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge, and SENTELLE and 

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judges. 

USCA Case #12-5158 Document #1476059 Filed: 01/22/2014 Page 1 of 18
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge

KAVANAUGH. 

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: Throughout the United 

States, one finds a great deal of critical infrastructure, such as 

bridges, airports, railroad tracks, dams, and research facilities. 

Federal agencies possess many documents relating to critical 

infrastructure. For understandable security reasons, 

particularly in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks on 

the United States and the threat of future attacks, federal 

agencies sometimes want to keep that information 

confidential. At the same time, members of the public 

sometimes want to review that sensitive information to see 

what the government is up to and to help ensure that the 

government is adequately protecting the country from harm. 

Our task here is to interpret how the Freedom of Information 

Act balances those competing interests. 

For decades, this Court held that agencies could withhold 

critical infrastructure records under FOIA’s Exemption 2, 

which covers documents “related solely to the internal 

personnel rules and practices of an agency.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(b)(2); see Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & 

Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In Milner v. 

Department of the Navy, the Supreme Court ruled that 

Exemption 2 does not encompass critical infrastructure 

records because those records do not relate “solely to the 

internal personnel rules and practices of an agency.” 131 S. 

Ct. 1259, 1262 (2011). In an important concurring opinion, 

however, Justice Alito explained that Exemption 7, which 

encompasses certain records compiled for law enforcement 

purposes, could cover some critical infrastructure records. Id.

at 1271-73 (Alito, J., concurring). 

USCA Case #12-5158 Document #1476059 Filed: 01/22/2014 Page 2 of 18
3 

Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, 

known as PEER, is a non-profit organization dedicated to 

educating the public about the activities of the U.S. 

Government. PEER wants records related to two dams 

located on the border between the United States and Mexico, 

Amistad Dam and Falcon Dam. So PEER submitted a FOIA 

request to the United States Section of the International 

Boundary and Water Commission, the federal agency that 

manages the dams. Citing security concerns, the U.S. Section 

initially claimed that the records fell within Exemption 2. 

After the Supreme Court’s decision in Milner, the U.S. 

Section changed course, arguing that some requested records 

were exempt under Exemption 5, some were exempt under 

Exemption 7(E), and some were exempt under Exemption 

7(F). Exemption 5 covers, among other things, agency 

records that fall within the deliberative process privilege. 

Exemptions 7(E) and 7(F) cover various kinds of law 

enforcement records. 

First, invoking Exemption 5, the U.S. Section withheld a 

report about Amistad Dam that had been prepared by a panel 

of expert advisors. The expert report discusses potential 

structural deficiencies in the dam’s foundation and 

embankment. Second, invoking Exemption 7(E), the U.S. 

Section withheld portions of its emergency action plans for 

Amistad Dam and Falcon Dam. The emergency action plans 

contain guidelines outlining the steps that law enforcement 

and emergency personnel should take in response to a failure 

of the dams. Third, invoking Exemption 7(F), the U.S. 

Section withheld a set of inundation maps displaying the 

downstream areas and populations that would be affected if 

the dams were to break. The District Court upheld the 

claimed exemptions. 

USCA Case #12-5158 Document #1476059 Filed: 01/22/2014 Page 3 of 18
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Here, we vacate and remand on Exemption 5 and the 

expert report because a potentially dispositive factual question 

is unresolved. We affirm the District Court’s judgment as to 

Exemption 7(E) and the emergency action plans and as to 

Exemption 7(F) and the inundation maps. 

I 

The United States Section is one component of the 

International Boundary and Water Commission, a joint U.S.-

Mexico entity created by treaty to implement the two nations’ 

agreements regarding the Rio Grande River. One of the U.S. 

Section’s functions is to manage dams along the river, 

including Amistad Dam and Falcon Dam. 

A non-profit organization known as Public Employees 

for Environmental Responsibility submitted a FOIA request 

to the U.S. Section seeking information about Amistad Dam 

and Falcon Dam. PEER wanted to apprise the public of what 

it believed to be hazards stemming from the U.S. Section’s 

poor management of the dams. 

In response to PEER’s request, the U.S. Section released 

many of the requested records. But the U.S. Section withheld 

three sets of records. First, the U.S. Section withheld a report 

about Amistad Dam that had been prepared by a panel of 

expert advisors. The report discusses potential structural 

deficiencies in the dam’s foundation and embankment. 

Second, the U.S. Section withheld portions of its emergency 

action plans for Amistad Dam and Falcon Dam. The 

emergency action plans contain guidelines outlining the steps 

that law enforcement and emergency personnel should take in 

response to a failure of the dams. Third, the U.S. Section 

withheld a set of inundation maps. The maps display the 

downstream areas and populations that would be affected if 

USCA Case #12-5158 Document #1476059 Filed: 01/22/2014 Page 4 of 18
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the dams were to break. The maps also reveal the estimated 

time it would take floodwater to reach downstream locations 

and peak flow times at those locations. 

After exhausting its administrative remedies, PEER 

sought judicial review in the U.S. District Court for the 

District of Columbia. The U.S. Section initially relied 

primarily on Exemption 2 to justify its withholding of the 

expert report, emergency action plans, and inundation maps. 

Shortly after PEER filed suit, the Supreme Court decided 

Milner v. Department of the Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259 (2011). 

That decision made clear that Exemption 2 does not cover 

records relating to critical infrastructure. In response to 

Milner, the U.S. Section invoked new exemptions to justify its 

withholdings. The agency asserted that the expert report fell 

within Exemption 5, that the emergency action plans were 

covered by Exemption 7(E), and that the inundation maps 

were exempt under Exemption 7(F). The U.S. Section moved 

for summary judgment on those grounds. PEER cross-moved 

for summary judgment, contesting the applicability of those 

exemptions and arguing that the U.S. Section’s alleged bad 

faith precluded reliance on the affidavits submitted in support 

of the agency’s motion. 

The District Court granted the U.S. Section’s motion for 

summary judgment. The court ruled that the U.S. Section had 

conducted an adequate search for the documents requested by 

PEER, had properly withheld the three sets of records under 

Exemptions 5 and 7, and had released all segregable material 

in those records. See PEER v. USIBWC, 839 F. Supp. 2d 304 

(D.D.C. 2012). PEER timely appealed that decision.1

 We 

 1

 The District Court also concluded that Exemption 6 covered 

personal contact information within the emergency action plans and 

USCA Case #12-5158 Document #1476059 Filed: 01/22/2014 Page 5 of 18
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review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de 

novo. See CREW v. FEC, 711 F.3d 180, 184 (D.C. Cir. 

2013). 

II 

PEER contends that the U.S. Section acted in bad faith 

when it responded to PEER’s FOIA request and that the 

District Court therefore should not have relied on the U.S. 

Section’s affidavits in granting summary judgment. As 

evidence of bad faith, PEER points out that the U.S. Section 

both denied awareness of the expert report in its initial reply 

to PEER and failed to uncover a set of inundation maps in its 

initial FOIA search. But an agency’s failure to turn up every 

responsive document in an initial search is not necessarily 

evidence of bad faith. During a second search prompted by 

PEER’s administrative appeal, the U.S. Section found the 

expert report and the inundation maps. The agency then 

quickly notified PEER that it had located the records. Under 

our precedents, those actions do not suggest that the U.S. 

Section was acting in bad faith. See Iturralde v. Comptroller 

of the Currency, 315 F.3d 311, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2003); 

Meeropol v. Meese, 790 F.2d 942, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 

PEER also seizes on picayune differences in the agency’s 

various submissions to the District Court to contend that the 

agency intentionally misled that court. PEER’s claims on this 

score totter between the trivial and the speculative. Stated 

simply, we agree with the District Court that PEER’s 

allegations do not undermine the reliability of the agency’s 

affidavits. 

 

that Exemption 5 covered an email related to the emergency action 

plans. PEER does not challenge either decision on appeal. 

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III 

On the merits of its FOIA request, PEER first argues that 

it is entitled to the expert report on structural deficiencies in 

Amistad Dam. With respect to the expert report, the U.S. 

Section asserted Exemption 5. That exemption covers “interagency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would 

not be available by law to a party . . . in litigation with the 

agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). Exemption 5 incorporates the 

deliberative process privilege. The expert report is plainly 

deliberative and pre-decisional and therefore otherwise would 

fall within the deliberative process privilege, as the District 

Court concluded. The question is whether it is an “interagency or intra-agency” report. 

As its reference to “inter-agency” and “intra-agency” 

records would indicate, Exemption 5 is most often invoked 

for documents authored by officers or employees of a U.S. 

government “agency.” See Department of the Interior v. 

Klamath Water Users Protective Association, 532 U.S. 1, 8 

(2001). For FOIA purposes, the term “agency” is defined to 

mean, with certain exceptions not relevant here, “each 

authority of the Government of the United States.” 5 U.S.C. 

§§ 551(1), 552(f)(1). Because Congress defined “agency” to 

include only authorities of the U.S. Government, “intraagency” and “inter-agency” are ordinarily read to refer only to 

documents created by officers or employees within the U.S. 

Government. 

In the District Court, PEER asserted that officials of the 

Mexican National Water Commission assisted in preparing 

the expert report. A foreign entity such as the Mexican 

National Water Commission is of course not an authority of 

the U.S. Government. Therefore, according to PEER, if 

USCA Case #12-5158 Document #1476059 Filed: 01/22/2014 Page 7 of 18
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officials of the Mexican agency assisted in preparing the 

expert report, the expert report would not fall within the terms 

of Exemption 5 – “inter-agency or intra-agency” – as those 

terms are ordinarily interpreted. 

As the U.S. Section correctly responds, however, this 

Court has also interpreted the phrase “intra-agency” in 

Exemption 5 to go beyond the text and include U.S. agency 

records authored by non-agency entities if those records were 

solicited by a U.S. agency in the course of its deliberative 

process. See McKinley v. Board of Governors of the Federal 

Reserve System, 647 F.3d 331, 336 (D.C. Cir. 2011). This 

Court has referred to this as the “consultant corollary” to 

Exemption 5. 

The consultant corollary was addressed by the Supreme 

Court in Klamath. Assuming without deciding that the 

consultant corollary was valid, the Court held that the 

corollary would not exempt records that had been created by 

several Indian tribes and provided to a U.S. agency, the 

Bureau of Reclamation. See Klamath, 532 U.S. at 12. The 

Court reasoned that the corollary would not apply because the 

tribes provided the records to the Bureau of Reclamation 

“with their own . . . interests in mind” and as “self-advocates 

at the expense of others seeking benefits inadequate to satisfy 

everyone.” Id. In the wake of Klamath, we have confined the 

consultant corollary to situations where an outside consultant 

did not have its own interests in mind. See McKinley, 647 

F.3d at 336-37. 

Here, the U.S. Section argues that even if PEER is correct 

that the Mexican National Water Commission assisted in 

preparing the expert report, the Mexican agency did so in 

order to advise the U.S. Section, not to advance the Mexican 

USCA Case #12-5158 Document #1476059 Filed: 01/22/2014 Page 8 of 18
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agency’s own interests. For that reason, the U.S. Section 

believes that the expert report falls within the consultant 

corollary. 

PEER disagrees, based on Klamath. PEER argues that, 

like the Indian tribes in Klamath, the Mexican National Water 

Commission is not a mere consultant to a U.S. agency. In 

PEER’s view, foreign government entities may not be 

characterized as mere consultants to an executive agency of 

the U.S. Government, at least in this context. Therefore, 

PEER argues that the consultant corollary cannot apply in this 

case – and that Exemption 5 does not cover the expert report. 

This is a legal issue of first impression. And it would be 

unnecessary to resolve it if officials of the Mexican National 

Water Commission did not actually assist in preparing the 

expert report. The problem is that we do not know if officials 

of the Mexican National Water Commission actually assisted 

in preparing the expert report.2

If the Mexican agency did not assist in preparing the 

expert report, the deliberative process privilege – and 

therefore Exemption 5 – would cover the report.3 We 

therefore vacate the District Court’s judgment as to 

Exemption 5 and the expert report and remand for the District 

Court to determine whether officials of the Mexican agency 

assisted in preparing the expert report. 

 2

 This factual issue was not resolved in the District Court 

because the District Court found that Exemption 5 would apply 

even if the Mexican National Water Commission assisted in 

preparing the expert report. 

3

 If the Mexican agency did assist in preparing the expert 

report, we take no position at this time on whether the expert report 

would be covered by the consultant corollary. 

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IV 

We next consider the emergency action plans and the 

inundation maps. The U.S. Section asserted Exemptions 7(E) 

and 7(F) to justify its withholding of those records. To fall 

within any of the exemptions under the umbrella of 

Exemption 7, a record must have been “compiled for law 

enforcement purposes.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7). To fall within 

Exemptions 7(E) and 7(F), release of a record also must 

threaten a particular harm. Exemption 7(E) covers a record 

where the record’s release “would disclose techniques and 

procedures for law enforcement investigations or 

prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law 

enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure 

could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the 

law.” Id. § 552(b)(7)(E). Exemption 7(F) covers a record 

where the record’s release “could reasonably be expected to 

endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.” Id.

§ 552(b)(7)(F). 

We conclude that the emergency action plans and the 

inundation maps were “compiled for law enforcement 

purposes,” the threshold requirement for application of 

Exemption 7. We also conclude that the release of the records 

could lead to the harms listed in Exemptions 7(E) and 7(F). 

Therefore, the U.S. Section permissibly withheld the 

emergency action plans and the inundation maps. 

A 

To fall within Exemption 7, documents must first meet a 

threshold requirement: that the records were “compiled for 

law enforcement purposes.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7). 

USCA Case #12-5158 Document #1476059 Filed: 01/22/2014 Page 10 of 18
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The term “law enforcement” in Exemption 7 refers to the 

act of enforcing the law, both civil and criminal. See Tax 

Analysts v. IRS, 294 F.3d 71, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2002); BLACK’S 

LAW DICTIONARY 964 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “law 

enforcement” as the “detection and punishment of violations 

of the law”). Law enforcement entails more than just 

investigating and prosecuting individuals after a violation of 

the law. As Justice Alito explained in his important 

concurrence in Milner, the “ordinary understanding of law 

enforcement includes . . . proactive steps designed to prevent 

criminal activity and to maintain security.” Milner v. 

Department of the Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1272 (2011) (Alito, 

J., concurring). “Likewise, steps by law enforcement officers 

to prevent terrorism surely fulfill ‘law enforcement 

purposes.’” Id. 

According to the Supreme Court, the term “compiled” in 

Exemption 7 requires that a document be created, gathered, or 

used by an agency for law enforcement purposes at some time 

before the agency invokes the exemption. See John Doe 

Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 155 (1989). As 

Justice Alito explained in Milner, “federal building plans and 

related information – which may have been compiled 

originally for architectural planning or internal purposes – 

may fall within Exemption 7 if that information is later 

compiled and given to law enforcement officers for security 

purposes.” Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1273 (Alito, J., concurring). 

In this case, the U.S. Section therefore needs to establish that 

the emergency action plans and the inundation maps were 

created for law enforcement purposes or were later gathered 

or used for such purposes. 

This Court assesses an agency’s Exemption 7 claim of a 

law enforcement purpose in a manner first articulated in Pratt 

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v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1982). See Tax Analysts, 

294 F.3d at 76-79. If the agency’s principal function is law 

enforcement, we are “more deferential” to the agency’s 

claimed purpose for the particular records. Id. at 77. If the 

agency has mixed law enforcement and administrative 

functions, we will “scrutinize with some skepticism the 

particular purpose claimed.” Id. (quoting Pratt, 673 F.2d at 

418). That said, it is not evident that the Pratt formulation 

adds all that much to the statutory text. What we must 

initially do in any Exemption 7 case is assess whether the 

document in question was compiled for law enforcement 

purposes. 

PEER insists that an agency must have some statutory 

law enforcement function, in addition to a law enforcement 

purpose for the particular records at issue, before the agency 

can invoke Exemption 7. And PEER claims that the U.S. 

Section does not have a law enforcement function. That 

argument is wrong both on the law and on the facts. 

On the law: Under the text of Exemption 7, the withheld 

record must have been compiled for law enforcement 

purposes; the withholding agency need not have statutory law 

enforcement functions. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7). Congress 

knew how to delimit a FOIA provision based on the functions 

of the agency involved. See id. § 552(b)(7)(D) (referring to 

records or information compiled by “criminal law 

enforcement authority”). It chose not to do so here. 

And on the facts: The U.S. Section does perform a law 

enforcement function. The U.S. Section is a part of the 

Interagency Committee on Dam Safety, which has the 

statutory duty to establish programs and policies to “enhance 

dam safety for the protection of human life and property.” 33 

USCA Case #12-5158 Document #1476059 Filed: 01/22/2014 Page 12 of 18
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U.S.C. § 467e. That duty necessarily encompasses security 

and prevention of criminal or terrorist attacks. 

So on both the law and the facts, we reject the “agency 

function” argument advanced by PEER. In light of the 

statutory language, we focus instead on whether the 

emergency action plans and the inundation maps were 

compiled for law enforcement purposes. 

The emergency action plans plainly were created for law 

enforcement purposes; they describe the security precautions 

that law enforcement personnel should implement around the 

dams during emergency conditions. On the facts of this case, 

it is also apparent that the inundation maps serve security 

purposes – namely, to assist law enforcement personnel in 

maintaining order and security during emergency conditions, 

and to help prevent attacks on dams from occurring in the first 

place. “Crime prevention and security measures are critical to 

effective law enforcement as we know it.” Milner, 131 S. Ct. 

at 1272 (Alito, J., concurring). In this context, preventing 

dam attacks and maintaining order and ensuring dam security 

during dam emergencies qualify as valid law enforcement 

purposes under the statute. Because the emergency action 

plans and the inundation maps were created in order to help 

achieve those purposes, among others, they were “compiled 

for law enforcement purposes.” 

In short, the emergency action plans and the inundation 

maps readily satisfy Exemption 7’s threshold “compiled for 

law enforcement purposes” requirement. 

B 

Having concluded that the records meet the threshold 

requirement of Exemption 7, we next address whether the 

USCA Case #12-5158 Document #1476059 Filed: 01/22/2014 Page 13 of 18
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emergency action plans fall within Exemption 7(E) and 

whether the inundation maps fall within Exemption 7(F). 

1 

The U.S. Section asserted Exemption 7(E) to withhold 

the emergency action plans. Exemption 7(E) covers 

documents that “would disclose techniques and procedures 

for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would 

disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or 

prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected 

to risk circumvention of the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E).4

 

 4

 Exemption 7(E) covers “techniques and procedures for law 

enforcement investigations or prosecutions” as well as “guidelines

for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(b)(7)(E) (emphases added). The exemption’s final, 

qualifying clause requires that an agency demonstrate that the 

disclosure of the records at issue “could reasonably be expected to 

risk circumvention of the law.” Id. The “risk circumvention of the 

law” requirement clearly applies to records containing “guidelines,” 

because the requirement follows directly after the phrase “would 

disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or 

prosecutions.” Id. But courts have disagreed over whether the 

requirement also applies to records containing “techniques and 

procedures.” 

This Court has applied the “risk circumvention of the law” 

requirement both to records containing guidelines and to records 

containing techniques and procedures. See, e.g., Blackwell v. FBI, 

646 F.3d 37, 41-42 (D.C. Cir. 2011). By contrast, the Second 

Circuit has held that the requirement applies only to records 

containing guidelines. See Allard K. Lowenstein International 

Human Rights Project v. Department of Homeland Security, 626 

F.3d 678, 681-82 (2d Cir. 2010). 

This case involves records containing guidelines, and thus the 

“risk circumvention of the law” requirement clearly applies. So 

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Exemption 7(E)’s requirement that disclosure risk 

circumvention of the law “sets a relatively low bar for the 

agency to justify withholding.” Blackwell v. FBI, 646 F.3d 

37, 42 (D.C. Cir. 2011). To clear that relatively low bar, an 

agency must demonstrate only that release of a document 

might increase the risk “that a law will be violated or that past 

violators will escape legal consequences.” Mayer Brown LLP 

v. IRS, 562 F.3d 1190, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 

The emergency action plans contain guidelines that 

inform emergency personnel how to manage a dam failure at 

Amistad Dam or Falcon Dam from “event detection to 

termination.” J.A. 62, Declaration of Steven Fitten at ¶ 23, 

PEER v. USIBWC, No. 11-cv-00261 (D.D.C. Apr. 11, 2011). 

Those guidelines describe the surveillance and detection of 

the cause of an emergency dam failure as well as the process 

for evaluating the dam failure when the emergency subsides. 

The guidelines also set forth the security precautions that law 

enforcement personnel should implement around the dams 

during emergency conditions. The guidelines therefore 

describe how law enforcement personnel might investigate 

the cause of a dam failure. And because such investigations 

may constitute “law enforcement investigations” when there 

is suspicion of criminal sabotage or terrorism, we conclude 

that the emergency action plans contain guidelines “for law 

enforcement investigations or prosecutions.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(b)(7)(E). 

As the U.S. Section reasonably explained, disclosing the 

emergency action plans also “risks circumvention of the law 

 

this case does not implicate the difference between this Court and 

the Second Circuit. And in any event, given the low bar posed by 

the “risk circumvention of the law” requirement, it is not clear that 

the difference matters much in practice. 

USCA Case #12-5158 Document #1476059 Filed: 01/22/2014 Page 15 of 18
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by those who might seek to exact the greatest amount of 

damage against the public affected by a dam failure or flood 

event.” J.A. 62, Declaration of Steven Fitten at ¶ 23. 

Terrorists or criminals could use the information in the 

emergency action plans to thwart rescue operations following 

a dam failure or to obstruct attempts to investigate the source 

of such a failure. Disclosure of the emergency action plans 

would therefore risk circumvention of the law. We uphold 

the U.S. Section’s invocation of Exemption 7(E) as to the 

emergency action plans. 

2 

The U.S. Section invoked Exemption 7(F) in order to 

withhold the inundation maps. Exemption 7(F) covers 

records that, if disclosed, “could reasonably be expected to 

endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.” 5 

U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F). That language is very broad. The 

exemption does not require that a particular kind of individual 

be at risk of harm; “any individual” will do. Disclosure need 

not definitely endanger life or physical safety; a reasonable 

expectation of endangerment suffices. Cf. Mayer Brown LLP 

v. IRS, 562 F.3d 1190, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Exemption 

7(E) similarly broad). 

“[I]n the FOIA context, we have consistently deferred to 

executive affidavits predicting harm to the national security, 

and have found it unwise to undertake searching judicial 

review.” Center for National Security Studies v. Department 

of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 927 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The 

confluence of Exemption 7(F)’s expansive text and our 

generally deferential posture when we must assess national 

security harms means that, in Exemption 7(F) cases involving 

documents relating to critical infrastructure, “it is not difficult 

USCA Case #12-5158 Document #1476059 Filed: 01/22/2014 Page 16 of 18
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to show that disclosure may ‘endanger the life or physical 

safety of any individual.’” Milner v. Department of the Navy, 

131 S. Ct. 1259, 1272 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring). 

Therefore, assuming an agency has met Exemption 7’s 

threshold test, it will ordinarily be able to satisfy Exemption 

7(F) for documents relating to critical infrastructure, such as 

blueprints, maps, and emergency plans. 

Here, the inundation maps fall comfortably within 

Exemption 7(F). As the U.S. Section explained in its 

declaration, disclosing the maps would give anyone seeking 

to cause harm “the ability to deduce the zones and populations 

most affected by dam failure.” J.A. 61, Declaration of Steven 

Fitten at ¶ 22, PEER v. USIBWC, No. 11-cv-00261 (D.D.C. 

Apr. 11, 2011). Terrorists or criminals could use that 

information to determine whether attacking a dam would be 

worthwhile, which dam would provide the most attractive 

target, and what the likely effect of a dam break would be. 

The record in this case includes an intelligence alert from 

the Department of Homeland Security describing an alleged 

plot by drug traffickers to blow up Falcon Dam. The alert 

states that traffickers warned some local residents to evacuate 

in advance of a possible attack on the dam. That record 

evidence confirms what common sense suggests: The 

inundation maps, if disclosed, could reasonably be expected 

to endanger life or physical safety. 

To be clear, Exemption 7(F) does not require concrete 

evidence in every case. The terms “could” and “expected” in 

Exemption 7(F) evince congressional understanding of the 

many potential threats posed by the release of sensitive 

agency information. An agency therefore need only 

demonstrate that it reasonably estimated that sensitive 

USCA Case #12-5158 Document #1476059 Filed: 01/22/2014 Page 17 of 18
18 

information could be misused for nefarious ends. The U.S. 

Section has done so here. 

PEER counters that Exemption 7(F) should not be 

construed as broadly as its plain text would indicate. As 

support, PEER cites the Second Circuit’s decision in ACLU v. 

Department of Defense, 543 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2008), vacated, 

558 U.S. 1042 (2009), which interpreted the term “any 

individual” in Exemption 7(F) to require a particularized 

threat to a discrete population rather than a diffuse risk to an 

amorphous population. But even if we agreed with the 

Second Circuit’s reading of Exemption 7(F), the Second 

Circuit itself conveyed that a threat to the population living 

downstream of a dam would be sufficiently specific to satisfy 

the exemption. See id. at 81-82. In this case, the U.S. Section 

points to the same kind of potential harm to a similarly 

circumscribed population, meaning that the U.S. Section 

would prevail even under the Second Circuit’s approach. 

In short, the U.S. Section has connected the release of the 

inundation maps to a reasonable threat of harm to the 

population downstream of the dams. The inundation maps 

fall within Exemption 7(F). 

* * * 

We vacate and remand the judgment of the District Court 

with respect to its holding on Exemption 5 and affirm the 

judgment of the District Court with respect to its holdings on 

Exemptions 7(E) and 7(F). 

So ordered. 

USCA Case #12-5158 Document #1476059 Filed: 01/22/2014 Page 18 of 18