Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02817/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02817-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 465
Nature of Suit: Other Immigration Actions
Cause of Action: 08:1329 Writ of Mandamus to Adjudicate Visa Petition

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefing. E.D.

Cal. Local Rule 230(g).

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MELODY WEST and MARK WEST, No. 2:09-cv-02817-MCE-GGH

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ERIC H. HOLDER et. al.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Through the present action, Plaintiffs Melody West and her

father, Mark West, (“Plaintiffs”) seek declaratory relief from

the Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) denial of Melody

West’s application for adjustment of her immigration status. 

Plaintiffs also seek a writ of mandamus compelling Defendants

Eric H. Holder, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service

(“USCIS”), Janet Napolitano, Alejandro Mayorkas, and Susan M.

Curda (collectively “Defendants”) to complete the adjudication of

Melody West’s application for lawful permanent residence, as well

as attorney’s fees and costs.1

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 The facts in this section are taken from the Plaintiffs’ 2

and the Defendants’ Statements of Undisputed Material Facts

unless otherwise noted. 

2

Presently before the Court are Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Summary Judgment as well as Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary

Judgment. For the reasons set forth below, both motions are

denied. 

BACKGROUND2

The present dispute centers around the immigration status of

Plaintiff Melody West, a citizen of Canada. On January 3, 2008,

Melody and her father Mark, a United States citizen living in

Canada, were detained while crossing the border between the

United States and Canada near Seattle, Washington. During

interrogation by Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), Melody

initially indicated that she was entering the United States to

attend a two-week yoga class in Nevada City, California and that

afterwards she would return to Canada. (Defs.’ Cross-Mot. Summ.

J. 4.) When CBP contacted the yoga school, they discovered that

Melody had been living in Nevada City since 2006, contrary to her

claims that she had been living in Canada. (Id.) When

confronted with this information, Melody maintained that she had

been living in Canada, not the United States, between 2006 and

2007. (Id.) Melody ultimately signed a sworn statement,

however, in which she admitted that she had been living in the

United States since 2006, and that her father had coached her to

provide answers to immigration officials. (Id. at 5.)

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3

Melody was then served with a Notice to Appear for removal

proceedings, charging her with fraud in violation of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(1). The notice provides that “you are an alien,

who, by fraud or wilfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks

to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, or

other documentation, or admission into the United States or other

benefit provided under this Act.” According to the notice,

Melody had misrepresented an intent to return to her permanent

residence in the United States. 

Melody was conditionally released into the United States

pending hearing on her Notice to Appear. On June 17,2008 she

appeared in Immigration Court and was granted leave to file a

motion to terminate removal proceedings, which she did on

July 14. This motion challenged the Notice to Appear and the

fraud charges as “facially defective.” (Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. Ex.

A.) The DHS opposed this motion, but in its opposition withdrew

the charge of fraud without prejudice and substituted a lesser

charge under 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(7)(A)(i)(I) (immigrant not in

possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit,

border crossing card, or other valid entry document). Id. On

September 4, 2008, in light of DHS’s withdrawal of the fraud

charge, the Immigration Judge denied the motion to terminate

removal proceedings. 

In November 2008, Melody moved to administratively close the

proceedings in order to file an application for adjustment of

status as the daughter of a U.S. citizen. This motion was

unopposed by DHS and granted by the Immigration Judge. 

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4

Melody’s application for adjustment of status, however, was

denied by the USCIS, a division of DHS, on August 27, 2009. The

denial stated two grounds for this decision: “you are ineligible

for adjustment of status under INA § 245(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)],

and you are inadmissible to the United States pursuant to INA

§ 212(a)(6)(C)(I) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i)].” (Defs.’ CrossMot. Summ. J. 6.) As to the first ground, USCIS noted that only

aliens who are “inspected and admitted or paroled” into the

United States are eligible to apply for an adjustment of status. 

(Id.) USCIS asserted that Melody was conditionally released into

the U.S., which is not “parole” for the purposes of adjustment of

status. (Id.) As to the second ground for denial, USCIS found

that Melody “inadmissible” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(I)

due to her failure to timely retract misrepresentations made

during questioning by immigration officials on January 3, 2008. 

(Id.)

After the denial of Melody’s application for adjustment of

status, Plaintiffs brought the present action.

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

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5

One of the principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of

factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary adjudication on

part of a claim or defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party

seeking to recover upon a claim...may...move...for a summary

judgment in the party’s favor upon all or any part thereof.”);

see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan, 889 F. Supp. 374, 378-79

(C.D. Cal. 1995); France Stone Co., Inc. v. Charter Township of

Monroe, 790 F. Supp. 707, 710 (E.D. Mich. 1992).

The standard that applies to a motion for summary

adjudication is the same as that which applies to a motion for

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), 56(c); Mora v.

ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d. 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323 (quoting Rule 56(c)).

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-89 (1968).

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6

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party must tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must demonstrate that

the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that

the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52

(1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of Western Pulp and Paper

Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). Stated another way,

“before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary

question for the judge, not whether there is literally no

evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could

properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it,

upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

251 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442, 448, 20 L.

Ed. 867 (1872)). As the Supreme Court explained, “[w]hen the

moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its

opponent must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts....Where the record

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find

for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87.

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7

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the

opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences

that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be

drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the court does

not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting

evidence. See T.W. Elec. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n,

809 F.2d 626, 630-631 (9th Cir. 1987), citing Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is

the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate

from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985),

aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

ANALYSIS

I. JURISDICTION

Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief identifying the rights

and duties of parties as well as a finding that Defendants’

denial of Plaintiffs’ petition for adjustment of status was based

upon an incorrect application of law. (Pls.’ Compl. 8:18-21) 

Plaintiffs further request that this Court compel Defendants to

complete adjudication of Melody West’s application for lawful

permanent residence. (Pls.’ Compl. 8:22-24)

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8

To the extent that Plaintiffs’ request for relief asks this

Court to mandate that Defendants commence proceedings, adjudicate

cases, or execute orders relating to removal, the Court lacks

jurisdiction to do so. 8 U.S.C. § 12562(g). Moreover, this

Court lacks jurisdiction to review a discretionary denial of

adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(I).

However, the Court does retain jurisdiction to decide, as a

matter of law, whether an alien is statutorily eligible for

adjustment of status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); OrtegaCervantes v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007)

(citing Freeman v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1031, 1037 (9th Cir. 2006). 

It is the legal question of eligibility that is at issue here.

Melody’s eligibility for adjustment of status to that of a

person admitted for permanent residence is guided by 8 U.S.C.

§ 1255 (a, which states:

The status of an alien who was inspected and admitted

or paroled into the United States... may be adjusted by

the Attorney General, in his discretion and under such

regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien

lawfully admitted for permanent residence if (1) the

alien makes an application for such adjustment, (2) the

alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is

admissible to the United States for permanent

residence, and (3) an immigrant visa is immediately

available to him at the time his application is filed.

Therefore, eligibility for discretionary review hinges on

inspection and admittance or parole, an application,

admissibility and eligibility for a visa, and immediate

availability of a visa at the time of application.

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9

Defendants denied Melody’s application on two alternate

grounds: 1) Melody was not “paroled” into the United States

within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1255, and 2) Melody was

inadmissable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(I) as a result of

misrepresentations made to border officials on January 3, 2008. 

Both of these grounds touch on Plaintiffs’ prerequisite

eligibility for review, and are not a result of discretionary

review itself. Accordingly, this Court holds jurisdiction over

Plaintiffs’ challenge to Defendants’ denial of Melody’s

application.

II. PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs bring their Motion for Summary Judgment on the

grounds that the doctrine of res judicata bars Defendants from

using allegations of fraud as a basis for denying Melody’s

application for adjustment of status. Plaintiffs argue that

because Defendants initially charged Melody with fraud in

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(I), but then withdrew those

charges during removal proceedings, that Defendants are now

precluded from pointing to the same events of alleged fraud in

denying her application.

However, Plaintiffs’ res judicata argument addresses only 

one of two alternate grounds Defendants provided for her denial. 

While the Defendants deemed Melody inadmissable based on a

finding of fraud, they alternatively found Melody ineligible for

adjustment based on a finding that she was not “paroled” within

the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1255. 

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10

Plaintiffs have failed to substantively address this issue of

parole. In moving for summary judgment, Plaintiffs have failed

to meet their initial burden of identifying any portion of the

record which demonstrates that Melody is in fact “paroled” within

the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1255. Without meeting such burden,

Plaintiffs cannot be said to be entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary judgment is

denied. 

III. DEFENDANTS’ CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants concurrently move for summary judgment on the

grounds that 1) Melody West was never paroled into the United

States thus she is statutorily ineligible to adjust status, and

2) the evidence in the record support a finding of inadmissability–

namely that Melody misrepresented herself to border officials on

January 8, 2008. To obtain summary judgment Defendants need only

make a favorable showing on either ground as either would render

Melody ineligible for adjustment of status.

A. Parole

To qualify for adjustment of status, an alien must be

“inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States”. 

8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). Defendants argue that Melody was not

paroled, but rather “conditionally released” pursuant to INA

§ 236, 8 U.S.C. § 1226, which is not “parole” for the purpose of

adjustment of status. 

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11

In making this argument, Defendants rely on the Ninth Circuit’s

ruling in Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir.

2007). 

In Ortega-Cervantes the Ninth Circuit outlined the

distinctions between “parole”, as defined by 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(d)(5)(A), and “conditional parole,” as defined by 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226(a). The Court ultimately held that the applicant at issue

had been conditionally paroled and that, as such, he was not

eligible for adjustment of status. Id. at 1120. However in

determining whether the applicant was “paroled” or “conditionally

paroled” the Court looked to several factors, including the fact

the applicant’s release was conditioned on reporting back to the

INS following testimony in criminal proceedings, that none of the

forms issued to applicant made reference to “parole into the

United States,” and immigrant officials did not issue the

applicant an I-94 card, which is typically given to

§ 1182(d)(5)(A) parolees. Id. at 1115. 

Here, although Defendants summarily state that Melody was

conditionally paroled under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, and thus ineligible

for adjustment of status, they fail to point to any evidence in

the record to warrant such a designation. Defendants cite to the

Administrative Record at pages 30 and 329 as verifying their

proposition, however, neither citation supports a finding of

conditional parole. The Record at 30 provides the currently

disputed Notice of Decision denying Plaintiffs’ application for

adjustment. However, the Decision itself fails to identify any

factors suggesting that Melody should be deemed “conditionally

paroled.” 

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12

The Record at 329 provides a copy of the I-94 card issued to

Melody. However, the court in Ortega-Cervantes identify the I-94

cards as being typically given to § 1182(d)(5)(A) parolees, which

are eligible for adjustment of status. Ortega-Cervantes, 501

F.3d at 1115.

Without factual support for their allegations, Defendants

have done little more than state a legal conclusion. 

Consequently, Defendants have failed to show that they are

entitled to summary adjudication on the issue of Melody’s

ineligibility for adjustment of status as a “conditional

parolee.”

B. Inadmissability

Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), an inadmissable alien is

ineligible for adjustment of status. In denying Melody’s

application for adjustment, Defendants found Melody inadmissable

under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C) which states: 

Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a

material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to

procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation,

or admission into the United States or other benefit

provided under this chapter is inadmissible. 

Defendants point to Melody’s initial misrepresentations to border

officials on January 3, 2008 as the basis for her

inadmissability. Defendants argue that the administrative record

fully support their finding, and therefore they are entitled to

summary judgment.

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13

However, Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that Melody’s

misrepresentations occurred in the course of ten hours of

interrogation during which time she was separated by her father

and eventually became despondent. (Pls.’ Compl. 1-13) 

Defendants respond to these allegations by arguing that

“[n]othing in the record suggests deviation from standard border

practices.” Regardless of its merits, the suggestion of improper

questioning techniques is a factual determination material to the

issue of whether Melody “willfully” misrepresented information. 

Although the Court acknowledges that a decision of

inadmissability is “conclusive unless manifestly contrary to

law,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(C), for the purposes of summary

judgment the Court finds that a dispute exists as to a genuine

issue of material fact. 

As such, Defendants have failed to show that they are

entitled to summary adjudication on either the issue of parole or

the issue of inadmissability as a basis for denial of Melody’s

application for adjustment of status. Accordingly, Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Summary Judgment (Docket No. 16) is DENIED. Defendants’ CrossMotion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 18) is also DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 29, 2010

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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