Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00735/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00735-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PHILLIP FRANCIS GRAZIDE, )

)

Petitioner, )

vs. )

)

)

PEOPLE OF STATE OF CALIFORNIA, )

)

Respondent. )

)

)

___________________________________ )

1:07-cv-00735-LJO WMW HC

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK

OF COURT TO CORRECT

RESPONDENT

ORDER DIRECTING

PETITION TO INFORM

COURT HOW HE WISHES TO

PROCEED IN CASE

Response due in thirty days

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate

Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-302.

A petitioner seeking habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 must name the state

officer having custody of him as the respondent to the petition. Rule 2 (a) of the Rules

Governing § 2254 Cases; Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 1996);

Stanley v. California Supreme Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994). Normally, the person

having custody of an incarcerated petitioner is the warden of the prison in which the

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petitioner is incarcerated because the warden has "day-to-day control over" the petitioner. 

Brittingham v. United States, 982 F.2d 378, 379 (9th Cir. 1992); see, also, Stanley v.

California Supreme Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994). However, the chief officer in

charge of state penal institutions is also appropriate. Ortiz, 81 F.3d at 894; Stanley, 21 F.3d at

360. 

In this case, petitioner names the People of the State of California. Petitioner is

incarcerated at High Desert State Prison. Tom Felker is the warden of that institution. 

Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court is HEREBY DIRECTED to correct the named

respondent in this case to Tom Felker, Warden.

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his

conviction by a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives

the state court the initial opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy,

455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1203 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th

Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state

court with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal

court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88

F.3d 828, 829 (9 Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given

th

a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state

court with the claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct.

887, 888 (1995) (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719

(1992) (factual basis). Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court

that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66, 115 S.Ct. at

888; Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). th

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In the present petition, Petitioner raises a total of eleven claims. Petitioner states in

his petition that of these, only claims one and two have been presented to the California

Supreme Court. Claims three through eleven have never been presented to the California

Supreme Court and therefore, are unexhausted. The court must dismiss a petition that

contains unexhausted claims, even if it also contains exhausted claims. Rose, 455 U.S. at

521-22, 102 S.Ct. at 1205; Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Gordon), 107 F.3d 756,

760 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc) cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 265 (1997); Guizar v. Estelle, 843 F.2d th

371, 372 (9 Cir.1988). th

In 1996, Congress enacted the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.

Pub.L. No 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. Under the AEDPA, exhaustion can be waived by

Respondent. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(C). The court can also excuse exhaustion if “(I) there is an

absence of available State corrective process; or (ii) circumstances exist that render such a

process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B). In this

case, Respondent has not waived exhaustion. In addition, California provides avenues for

Petitioner to pursue state claims. For example, these claims could have been presented in a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. See, Cal. Penal Code §§ 1473 - 1475. Finally, there are

not sufficient circumstances in this case for the Court to ignore the United States Supreme

Court’s admonishment that comity demands exhaustion and find that California’s corrective

processes are ineffective to protect Petitioner’s rights. Therefore, because the petition for

writ of habeas corpus currently before this court contains both exhausted and unexhausted

claims, it must be dismissed. See, Rose, 455 U.S. at 521-22, 102 S.Ct. at 1205; Gordon, 107

F.3d at 760; Guizar 843 F.2d at 372. 

Pursuant to Ninth Circuit holdings, a petitioner should be given the option of

withdrawing his unexhausted claims and proceeding in federal court with those claims that

are exhausted. Guizar v. Estelle, 843 F.2d 371, 372 (9 Cir. 1988), citing, Rose v. Lundy, th

455 U.S. 510, 520 (1982). However, should Petitioner abandon his unexhausted claims, any

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later attempt to amend the petition to include newly exhausted claims may be subject to an

abuse of the writ challenge. See McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S.Ct. 1454 (1991); Rose v. Lundy,

455 U.S. 455 U.S. 510, 520-521 (1982); see also, Rule 9(b), Rules Governing Section 2254

Cases; 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (failure to allege all available grounds for relief in a single petition

may be abuse of the writ). Should the Petitioner fail to withdraw the unexhausted claims or

withdraw the Petition, the petition will be dismissed. Rose, 455 U.S. at 519; Guizar, 843 F.2d

at 372. This dismissal will not bar Petitioner from returning to federal court after exhausting

available state remedies. See, Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9 Cir.1995). th

However, Petitioner should bear in mind that 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) sets out a critical one-year

limitations period within which a federal habeas petition may be filed. In most cases, the one

year period starts to run on the date the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s direct

review. See, id. Although the limitations period tolls while a properly filed request for

collateral review is pending in state court, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), is does not toll for the

time an application is pending in federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 531 U.S.

991 (2001). 

The Court HEREBY ORDERS:

1. Petitioner is GRANTED thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order

to inform the court whether he seeks to withdraw the unexhausted claims and

proceed with those that are exhausted or withdraw the entire petition and

return to state court to exhaust those claims that are unexhausted. Petitioner’s

failure to respond to this order will result in the dismissal of this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 6, 2007 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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