Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_13-cv-00894/USCOURTS-alnd-2_13-cv-00894-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CECIELE PARKS,

Plaintiff,

vs.

THE CITY OF BIRMINGHAM,

ALABAMA; EMANUEL ROSATO;

TYRONE POLK,

Defendants.

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CASE NO. 2:13-cv-0894-SLB

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case is presently pending before the court on a Motion for Summary Judgment

filed bydefendants City of Birmingham, Alabama, Emanuel Rosato, and Tyrone Polk. (Doc.

21.)1 Plaintiff Ceciele Parks filed this suit against defendants, the City and its police officers

Rosato and Polk, following her arrest for disorderly conduct on June 1, 2011. Parks alleges

that the arrest was unlawful and that the force used to arrest her was excessive in violation

ofthe Fourth Amendment ofthe United States Constitution. She also alleges state-law causes

of action for false imprisonment and assault and battery (state-law excessive force) against

defendants. Upon consideration of the record, the submissions of the parties, the arguments

1 Reference to a document number, (“Doc. ___”), refers to the number assigned to

each document as it is filed in the court’s record. Page numbers for documents refer to the

page number assigned by the court’s CM/ECF system, except that page numbers for

deposition transcripts refer to page numbers of the original deposition transcript.

FILED

 2015 Mar-30 PM 12:58

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:13-cv-00894-SLB Document 28 Filed 03/30/15 Page 1 of 27
of counsel, and the relevant law, the court is of the opinion that defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment, (Doc. 21), is due to be granted in part and denied in part.

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d

604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). Once

the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving partymust go beyond the pleadings and

show that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

324 (1986). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return

a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986).

A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support

the assertion by: 

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including

depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or

declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the

motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or 

(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or

presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce

admissible evidence to support the fact. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see also Clark, 929 F.2d at 608 (“it is never enough simply to state

that the non-moving party cannot meet its burden at trial”).

2

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In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court’s function is not to “weigh the

evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “[C]ourts are required to view the facts and draw

reasonable inferences ‘in the light most favorable to the party opposing the [summary

judgment] motion.’” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (quoting United States v.

Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam)). Nevertheless, the non-moving party

“need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference.” 

Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Brown v.

City of Clewiston, 848 F.2d 1534, 1540 n.12 (11th Cir. 1988)); see also Scott, 550 U.S. at

380 (“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted

by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that

version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”).

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS2

On June 1, 2011, plaintiff and her foster son, LaDanta Howard, drove to Wings R

King, a restaurant located in Birmingham, Alabama, to return a pizza plaintiff’s mother had

purchased the previous day. (Doc. 22-4 at 21-24.) Plaintiff’s mother had bought two pizzas,

and plaintiff and her family had eaten a few pieces, which caused several people to become

sick fromfood poisoning. (Id. at 24, 26.) When they arrived at the restaurant, Howard walked

2

 The court recognizes that defendants dispute plaintiff’s account of the incident on

June 1, 2011. However, for purposes of summary judgment, the court must view the facts in

the light most favorable to plaintiff, the non-movant. 

3

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inside and attempted to return the pizza while plaintiff remained in the car.3

(Id. at 26.) A

female employee told Howard she needed to call the manager to address his problem, and

once on the phone, the manager said he would not accept the returned pizza and that he

would be at the restaurant in ten to fifteen minutes to talk with Howard. (Id. at 28-29.)

Howard returned to the car to explain the situation to plaintiff, and plaintiffthen called

911 because she wanted a record or her son’s attempt to return the spoiled pizza. (Id. at 29.) 

Approximately five minutes later, Officers Polk and Rosato arrived and parked around the

corner from the spot in which plaintiff was parked. (Id. at 30-32.) Howard approached the

officers to explain the situation. (See id.) One of the officers asked Howard for his driver’s

license, and around this time, the female employee walked outside and told the officers that

Howard had threatened to hit her with the pizza box while he was inside the restaurant

attempting to return the pizza. (Id. at 33.) One of the officers handed Howard’s license to the

employee, so she could write down his information. (Id.) In response to these events, Howard

3 At times, plaintiff’s testimony relates to facts that occurred outside her presence and

is based on Howard’s description of those facts to plaintiff at a later time. Therefore, those

facts constitute otherwise inadmissible hearsay. While courts generally do not consider

inadmissible hearsay when deciding a motion for summary judgment, “the district court may

consider a hearsay statement if the statement could be reduced to admissible form at trial,”

Hill v. Manning, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1297 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (citing Macuba v. Deboer,

193 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir.1999)), and here, it seems likely that Howard would testify

to these facts at trial. Furthermore, the court may consider evidence that would otherwise

constitute hearsay when a party offers it for a purpose other than proving the truth of the

matter asserted. See Fed. R. Evid. 801. Additionally, the court notes that the facts for which

plaintiff does not have personal knowledge, but rather learned about through Howard, are not

critical to the court’s analysis of whether summary judgment should be granted.

4

Case 2:13-cv-00894-SLB Document 28 Filed 03/30/15 Page 4 of 27
called plaintiff, and plaintiff drove around the corner, parked, and got out of the car.4

(Doc.

22-4 at 34.) According to plaintiff, Officer Polk was cursing and not taking the situation

seriously. (Doc. 22-4 at 37.)

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Mo, the owner of Wings R King, arrived, shook hands with the

officers and began talking to them about football. (Doc. 22-4 at 40-41; see Doc. 22-1 at 23.)

According to plaintiff, Mr. Mo and the officers appeared to be friends. (Doc. 22-4 at 40.)

Some time later, Mr. Mo walked over to plaintiff and Howard and said that they had not

purchased pizza from him. (Id. at 41.) Plaintiff conceded that she had not purchased the pizza

but told Mr. Mo that her mother had purchased it. (Id.) Plaintiff called her mother on a cell

phone and turned on the speaker, and plaintiff’s mother explained to Mr. Mo that she had

come in the restaurant the night before and placed a big order. (Id. at 43.) Mr. Mo

remembered the order and stated that plaintiff’s mother should have called the previous

night, when the pizza made her family sick. (Id.) Plaintiff testified that, throughout this

interaction, Mr. Mo was cursing and that Mr. Mo then told plaintiff he would not “take the

f’ing pizzas back.” (Id. at 44-45.) Howard responded by asking the officers why they were

allowing Mr. Mo to disrespect him and his mother. (Id. at 45-46.) Howard told the officers

4 The court notes that it considers this testimony for the non-hearsay purpose of

explaining why plaintiff drove around the corner and got out of her car and not the hearsay

purpose of showing that the officers, in fact, took Howard’s license information and gave it

to the female employee.

5

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that if he and plaintiff were cursing, the officers would have already arrested them. (Id. at

46.) 

Mr. Mo continued to tell plaintiff and Howard that he would not take the pizza back,

and when he said “y’all can do whatever the fuck you want to do with the pizza,” Howard

threw the pizza box5 onto the parking lot, and pieces of pizza fell out of the box in several

different directions. (Id. at 49.) Polk and Rosato pulled out pepper spray and told Howard to

calm down or else they would take him to jail. (Id. at 50.) Howard refused to pick up the

pizza, and by this point, he was cursing and very tense. (Id. at 51.) According to plaintiff, the

situation had escalated at this point, so plaintiff attempted to calm Howard down by telling

him to get in the car, which he then did. (Id. at 52.) Plaintiff acknowledged that Howard

“blew up at the wrong time . . . and [acted in a way] he shouldn’t have.” (Id.)

Plaintiff told the officers she would pick up the pizza, and Polk responded that he

wanted Howard “to go get the damn pizza.” (Id. at 53, 55.) Plaintiff nevertheless picked up

a few pieces of pizza, put them back in the box, and put the box in the trunk of her car. (Id.

at 56-58.) Polk told her “to pick up all the fucking pieces of pizza.” (Id. at 56-57) Because

some pieces were farther away, plaintiff responded that a stray dog could eat the rest. (Id. at

57.) Plaintiff testified that, during this time, “there was no traffic in the parking lot where

we were speaking with the officers.” (Doc. 26-1 ¶ 4.) Neither Polk nor Rosato asked plaintiff

5 Apparently, Howard had only one pizza box in his hand at this time. (See Doc. 22-4

at 26 (“[W]e took the pizzas back.”).)

6

Case 2:13-cv-00894-SLB Document 28 Filed 03/30/15 Page 6 of 27
or Howard to move, and plaintiff’s car remained parked in a marked parking space. (Id.)

After picking up the pizza, plaintiff attempted to get in her car. (Doc. 22-4 at 60.) As she put

one foot in the car, she told her mother, who was still on the phone, that the situation was

“fucked up.” (Id.) Plaintiffspoke to the officers and her mother using a normal tone of voice.

(Doc. 26-1 ¶ 2.) 

At this time, Polk approached plaintiff, pulled her out of the car, and told her that she

was going “to fucking jail.” (Doc. 22-4 at 62-63.) Plaintiff asked why, but Polk did not

respond, and he then slapped plaintiff’s face, causing her glasses to fall off, and pepper

sprayed her. (Id. at 63-64.) According to plaintiff, she did not resist Polk and could not see

as a result of the pepper spray. (Id. at 64.) Rosato ran over to ask what was happening, and

after Polk told him plaintiff was going to jail, Rosato handcuffed plaintiff. (Id. at 65, 67, 69.)

Even though plaintiff could not see, she could differentiate Polk and Rosato by their voices.

(Id. at 65-66.) Plaintiff testified that, once Rosato handcuffed her, Polk continued to pepper

spray her. (Id. at 70.) Plaintiff tried to avoid the pepper spray by moving her head down, but

she did not resist arrest with her arms, which were handcuffed. (Id. at 70-71.) Howard, who

was still sitting in the car at this time, had picked up plaintiff’s phone and was telling

plaintiff’s mother that police were arresting plaintiff. (Id. at 66.) 

At this point, Rosato was behind plaintiff, and according to plaintiff, probably lost his

balance as he was backing away from the pepper spray, which caused Rosato and plaintiff

to fall. (Id. at 73.) Plaintiff fell on top of Rosato, and Polk fell on top of plaintiff. (Id. at 72.)

7

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According to plaintiff, Polk then stood up, and plaintiff felt a sharp pain, indicating that Polk

kicked her. (Id. at 74-75.) As plaintiff began screaming for help, Howard exited the car, and

the officers told him to get back. (Id. at 75-76.) When plaintiff asked the officers to call 911,

they responded by telling her again that she was going to jail. (Id. at 78.) Plaintiff yelled for

Howard to call 911, which he did, and an ambulance arrived some time thereafter. (Id. at 79,

82.) The officers arrested Howard after he called 911, and by this time, plaintiff was lying

face down on the ground. (Id. at 79-80.) 

When the paramedics arrived, plaintiff was placed on a stretcher and transported by

ambulance to Cooper Green Hospital. (Id. at 83.) Plaintiff was released from Cooper Green

without any medical treatment, and Polk and Rosato then drove her to the UAB psych ward

for another medical exam. (Id. at 84-85, 89-90.) Sometime thereafter, plaintiff was booked

into jail on the charge of disorderly conduct and released around 12:00 or 1:00 p.m. the next

day. (Id. at 91, 100-01.) After seeing her primary physician, a magnetic resonance imaging

(“MRI”) test on plaintiff’s knee showed tendon damage in plaintiff’s knee for which plaintiff

underwent surgery on June 22, 2011. (Id. at 91-94.) 

III. DISCUSSION

A. DEFENDANTS CITY OF BIRMINGHAM AND EMANUEL ROSATO

“Parks agrees to the dismissal of defendant Rosato and the City . . . .” (Doc. 26 at 3.) 

Therefore, without opposition, defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted

on all claims against the City and Rosato, and those claims will be dismissed. 

8

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B. TYRONE POLK

Plaintiff alleges federal law claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Polk for unlawful

seizure and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and state law claims

against Polk for false imprisonment and assault and battery. (Doc. 1 at 9, 12, 15-16.)

Defendant Polk moves for summary judgment on all four claims and argues that he is entitled

to qualified immunity from plaintiff’s § 1983 claims and discretionary function immunity

from plaintiff’s state law claims. (Doc. 22 at 9, 20.) 

1. FEDERAL CLAIMS

Section 1983 “provides a federal remedy for the deprivation of rights, privileges, or

immunities protected by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.” Von Stein v.

Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 578 (11th Cir. 1990). “To sustain a cause of action based on section

1983, [a plaintiff] must establish two elements: (1) that [she] suffered a deprivation of

‘rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States,

and (2) that the act or omission causing the deprivation was committed by a person acting

under color of law.” Wideman v. Shallowford Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1032 (11th

Cir. 1987). There is no dispute that defendant Polk committed the acts complained of under

the color of state law. Therefore, the court must determine whether a genuine issue of

material facts exists as to whether plaintiff suffered the deprivation of a constitutional right

and whether immunity protects Polk from suit. 

9

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“To receive qualified immunity, the public official must first prove that he was acting

within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.”

Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir.2002) (citation and internal quotations

omitted). If the parties do not dispute that the official’s actions were discretionary, the burden

shifts to the plaintiff to satisfy the two-part qualified immunity test. Crawford v. Carroll, 529

F.3d 961, 977 (11th Cir. 2008). Under the two-part test, the plaintiff must “show that the

defendant committed a constitutional violation and that the constitutional right the defendant

violated was clearly established at the time he committed the violation.” Angeline v. City of

Hoover, Ala., 352 F. App’x 332, 334 (11th Cir. 2009). Because the parties do not dispute that

Polk acted within the scope of his discretionary authority, the remaining issue for the court

is whether the two-step qualified immunity test is satisfied as to each of plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment claims.

a. Unlawful Seizure

“Under the Fourth Amendment, an individual has a right to be free from

‘unreasonable searches and seizures[,]’ and an arrest is a seizure of the person.” Case v.

Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1326 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Skop v. City of Atlanta, Ga. 485

F.3d 1130, 1137 (11th Cir. 2007)) (alterations omitted) (internal quotations omitted). The

existence of probable cause determines the reasonableness of an arrest under the Fourth

Amendment. Id. “A warrantless arrest without probable cause violates the Constitution and

provides a basis for a section 1983 claim, but the existence of probable cause at the time of

10

Case 2:13-cv-00894-SLB Document 28 Filed 03/30/15 Page 10 of 27
arrest constitutes an absolute bar to a section 1983 action for false arrest.” Id. at 1326-27

(quoting Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotations and

alteration omitted); see also Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 579 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[A]n

arrest without probable cause to believe a crime had been committed violate[s] the Fourth

Amendment.”). 

“When the constitutional validity of an arrest is challenged, it is the function of the

court to determine whether the facts available to the arresting officers at the moment of the

arrest support a finding of probable cause.” United States v. Allison, 953 F.2d 1346, 1350-51

(11th Cir. 1992). “Probable cause to arrest exists when law enforcement officials have facts

and circumstances within their knowledge sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that the

suspect had committed or was committing a crime.” Case, 555 F.3d at 1327 (quoting United

States v. Gonzalez, 969 F.2d 999, 1002 (11th Cir. 1992)); see also Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d

1188, 1195 (11th Cir. 2002) (requiring that arrest be objectively reasonable based on the

totality of the circumstances). 

An officer who lacks probable cause to arrest may nonetheless be entitled to qualified

immunity provided that arguable probable cause to arrest existed. Id. (citing Ferraro, 284

F.3d at 1195). “Arguable probable cause exists [when] reasonable officers in the same

circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the [defendant] could have believed

that probable cause existed to arrest.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Whether a particular set of

facts gives rise to probable cause or arguable probable cause to justify an arrest for a

11

Case 2:13-cv-00894-SLB Document 28 Filed 03/30/15 Page 11 of 27
particular crime depends . . . on the elements of the crime.” Crosby v. Monroe Cnty., 394

F.3d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir. 2004). 

In cases alleging wrongful or false arrest, “[the Eleventh Circuit has] frequently

framed the ‘clearly established’ prong as an ‘arguable probable cause’ inquiry.” Poulakis v.

Rogers, 341 F. App’x 523, 526 (11th Cir. 2009). Thus, “[q]ualified immunity [still] applies

when there was arguable probable cause for an arrest even if actual probable cause did not

exist.” Crosby, 394 F.3d at 1332 (citing Jones v.Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1283 n.3 (11th Cir.

1999)). And, “[a]rguable probable cause exists if, under all of the facts and circumstances,

an officer reasonably could–not necessarily would–have believed that probable cause was

present.” Id. at 1332-33 (citing Durruthy v. Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080, 1089 (11th Cir. 2003)). 

“Arguable probable cause does not require an arresting officer to prove every element of a

crime or to obtain a confession before making an arrest, which would negate the concept of

probable cause and transform arresting officers into prosecutors.” Scarbrough v. Myles, 245

F.3d 1299, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 2001).

As instructed by the Eleventh Circuit, to determine whether plaintiff “has shown that

the right violated was clearly established at the time of the violation,” – whether defendant

Polk had arguable probable cause to arrest plaintiff for disorderly conduct – this court must

look to the precedent of the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, and the Supreme Court of

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Alabama, which “interpret[s] and appl[ies] the law in similar circumstances.”

6 Oliver v.

Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 907 (11th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). “[I]f case law, in factual

terms, has not staked out a bright line, qualified immunity almost always protects the

defendant.” Id. (quoting Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 208 F.3d 919, 926 (11th Cir.

2000) (internal quotations omitted)). The Eleventh Circuit has determined that “the law [is]

clearly established that an arrest without probable cause to believe a crime ha[s] been

committed violate[s] the Fourth Amendment.” Von Stein, 904 F.2d at 579; see, e.g., Herren

v. Bowyer, 850 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1988). 

Plaintiff argues that Polk did not have probable cause or arguable probable cause to

arrest her for disorderly conduct. (Doc. 26 at 8.) Defendant contends that plaintiff’s behavior

undoubtedly constituted arguable probable cause for plaintiff’s arrest, citing the officers’

deposition testimony that plaintiff “caused public alarm[,] . . . had people com[ing] out of the

restaurant . . . looking at her because of her actions[, and] imped[ed] the flow of traffic” as

evidence supporting his argument. (Doc. 22 at 22.) It bears emphasis to note that the court’s

function is not to “weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine

whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Furthermore, “courts

are required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences ‘in the light most favorable to

6 The Eleventh Circuit noted that for § 1983 claims, courts should “look to the highest

court of the pertinent state to ‘clearly establish’ the law . . . because decisional law drawn

from intermediate state courts is too unsettled and too readily subject to split authority to put

an officer on clear notice that his conduct would be unlawful.” See Poulakis, 341 F. App’x

at 528 (footnote omitted).

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the party opposing the [summary judgment] motion.’” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378

(2007) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam)). 

Despite defendant Polk’s repeated attempts to have the court view the evidence in the light

most favorable to him, the court accepts plaintiff’s properly supported version of the facts. 

Outside of Wings R King, plaintiff got out of her car, told her son to calm down and

get in the car, and picked up pieces of pizza that her son had tossed on the ground. Her only

statement to Polk and Rosato was that a stray dog could eat the remaining pieces of pizza that

were laying further away on the ground. There was no traffic during this time, and the

officers never asked plaintiff to move. Plaintiff never raised her voice, but rather stated to

her mother, in a normal tone of voice, that the situation was “fucked up,” (Doc. 22-4 at 60),

as plaintiff was stepping into her car. Polk then pulled plaintiff out of her car and made the

decision to arrest plaintiff, stating that she was going “to fucking jail.” (Id. at 62-63.) 

Alabama’s disorderly conduct statute states, “A person commits the crime of

disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or

recklessly creating a risk thereof, he or she . . .(1) Engages in fighting or in violent

tumultuous or threatening behavior[;] (2) Makes unreasonable noise[;] (3) In a public place

uses abusive or obscene language or makes an obscene gesture[;] (4) Without lawful

authority, disturbs any lawful assembly or meeting of persons[;] (5) Obstructs vehicular or

pedestrian traffic, or a transportation facility. . . .” Ala. Code § 13A-11-7(a).

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Here, construing the facts in favor of plaintiff, plaintiff did not make unreasonable

noise, much less raise her voice, and she did not impede traffic, as there was no traffic in the

Wings R King parking lot while plaintiff was speaking with the officers. While defendant

contends that he was alarmed by the presence of Howard, plaintiff testified that Howard

remained in the car from the time she offered to pick up the pizza until she yelled for Howard

to call an ambulance. (See Doc. 22 at 16.) Plaintiff has cited ample case law showing that

Polk had “fair warning” that he could not arrest plaintiff on a disorderly conduct charge for

simply telling her mother in a normal tone of voice that the situation was “fucked up.”7(Doc.

26 at 11-13.) See Walker v. Briley, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1258-59 (N.D. Ala. 2001), for its

analysis of case law “clearlyestablish[ing]” that certain conduct is not violative of Alabama’s

disorderly conduct statute:

[T]he Alabama courts [have], in order to avoid potential First Amendment

infirmities, sharply and consistently limited what conduct and attendant

circumstances are required for a violation of the disorderly conduct statute,

especially where the defendant is addressing a police officer, and even more

so where such exchange is not heard by other members of the public, as

Walker claims occurred here. Compare Duncan v. State, 686 So.2d 1279,

1281–82 (Ala.Cr.App.1996) (vehicle passenger's refusal to produce driver's

license for officer and statement of “fu* * you” to officer did not support

7 Defendant makes a last-ditch effort to prevail on his summary judgment motion by

arguing that plaintiff’s unlawful seizure claim against Polk fails because Rosato, not Polk,

arrested plaintiff by placing handcuffs on her. (Doc. 27 at 11-12.) However, plaintifftestified

that Polk made the decision to arrest her. (Doc. 22-4 at 63.) Rosato’s assistance in

handcuffing plaintiff does not somehow negate Polk’s critical decision-making role in

plaintiff’s arrest, nor does it change the violent manner in which Polk effected plaintiff’s

arrest.

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disorderly conduct conviction, where the passenger remained sitting in truck

during conversation, passenger had not broken any laws when officer asked to

see license, and passenger's statement did not constitute “fighting words”);

R.I.T. v. State, 675 So.2d 97, 98–100 (Ala.Cr.App.1995) (juvenile's statement

of “fu* * you” to police officer, spoken in front of only family members and

as juvenile was walking away from officer, did not constitute “fighting

words,” and thus juvenile could not be adjudicated delinquent for this

statement based on finding of disorderly conduct); Robinson v. State, 615

So.2d 112, 113–14 (Ala.Cr.App.1992) (No offense committed where

defendant shouted at police officer on patrol, “fu* * ” and the officer's name,

because such did not amount to “fighting words,” absent evidence that

statement was for purpose of provoking physical retaliation or causing

immediate breach of the peace); L.M.A.W. v. State, 611 So.2d 497,

(Ala.Cr.App.1992) (student who was told that she was being expelled from

school, who said, “I don't need this fu* *in' school anyway” as she walked

down a hallway and then violently slammed the door behind her was not guilty

of disorderly conduct where police chief was the only person who heard her

remark); Swann v. City of Huntsville, 455 So.2d 944, 950–51 (conviction for

disorderly conduct reversed, although evidence suggested the defendant was

“loud,” where no evidence showed that he made noise unreasonable under the

circumstances, and his comments, “This is some sh* * .... Damn you; you're

just doing this because I'm black. You're bringing us back a hundred years,”

did not contain a threat and did not have the likelihood of causing a violent

response by the police officer to whom they were addressed); and Skelton v.

City of Birmingham, 342 So.2d 933, 936–37 (Ala.Cr.App.), remanded, 342

So.2d 937 (Ala.1976) (holding that the language, “Are you big sh* *s going

to move or am I going to have to go around,” deemed not “fighting words”

when addressed to a police officer), with Hutchins v. City of Alexander City,

822So.2d 459, ––––, 2000 WL 572726, *4 (Ala.Cr.App.2000) (finding

defendant had made “unreasonable noise” when he screamed, “Don't you fu*

*ing tell me what to do,” in front of police officers and members of the public

in a public area of the police station); and Smith v. City of Anniston, 668 So.2d

96, 98 (Ala.Cr.App.1995) (evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction for

disorderly conduct where the defendant incited numerous others around him

to become disorderly by yelling at a police officer, “Suck my di* * ” and

“Well, I'm on private fu* *ing property and you can't arrest me”). 

The court agrees with plaintiff that “no reasonable officer would have believed

[plaintiff] committed any crime by telling her mother she thought the situation was “fucked

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up.” Accordingly, construing the facts in favor of plaintiff, the court finds that Polk did not

have arguable probable cause to arrest plaintiff for disorderly conduct. Therefore, defendant

Polk is not entitled to summary judgment on his qualified immunity defense, and defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied as to plaintiff’s § 1983 unlawful seizure claim

against Polk in his individual capacity.

b. Excessive Force

“The Fourth Amendment’s freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures

encompasses the right to be free from excessive force during the course of a criminal

apprehension.” Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 905 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989)). In determining whether an officer’s use of force is

excessive, “[t]he question is whether the officer’s conduct is objectively reasonable in light

of the facts confronting the officer.” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1347 (11th Cir. 2002)

(citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97)). The reasonableness of the use of force is measured

objectively, Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2009), and it is “judged from

the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of

hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. The examination of reasonableness allows for the fact

that “police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments – in circumstances that

are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving – about the amount of force that is necessary in a

particular situation.” Oliver, 586 F.3d at 905-06 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97). 

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Plaintiff alleges that Polk used unwarranted force that resulted in injury. (Doc. 1 at

12-13.) An evaluation of the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force requires the court

to balance the nature and quality of the intrusion and countervailing government interests. 

Crenshaw, 556 F.3d at 1290 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). “This analysis ‘requires

careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity

of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the

officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by

flight.’” Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Other considerations include: “(1) the need

for the application of force, (2) the relationship between the need and the amount of force

used, [and] (3) the extent of the injury inflicted.”8Id. (citing Hadley, 526 F.3d at 1329-30)

(identifying factors but recognizing invalidation of the subjective element)).

If the court finds that Polk violated plaintiff’s constitutional right, the court must then

determine whether the right violated was clearly established. Lee, 284 F.3d at 1197. The

Eleventh Circuit has noted, “[W]e have no difficulty finding that by September 2003,

previous case law clearly established that officers may not use excessive force against a

non-resisting suspect who has already been subdued.” Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1274

n.33 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Hadley v. Gutierrez, No. 06-12605, 2008 WL 1947008, at *7

8

In Lee, 284 F.3d at 1198 n.7, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the fourth factor, the

“subjective prong examining whether the force was applied maliciously, . . . has been

eliminated from the analysis by Graham and other cases establishing that the excessive force

inquiry should be completely objective, therefore excluding consideration of the officer’s

intentions.” Id. (citing Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1257 n.3 (11th Cir. 2000)).

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. . . (11th Cir. May 6, 2008)). The Eleventh Circuit specifically addressed a police officer’s

use of pepper spray during an arrest in Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2002),

in which an officer used pepper spray on an arrestee who was in the back of a police car with

her hands cuffed behind her back. The court reversed the district court’s grant of qualified

immunity, holding that “no factually particularized, preexisting case law was necessary for

it to be very obvious to every objectively reasonable officer facing Stanfield's situation that

Stanfield's conduct during the jail ride violated Vinyard's constitutional right to be free of the

excessive use of force.” Id. at 1355. 

The Eleventh Circuit applied Vinyard’s holdings in Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253

(11th Cir. 2008), and Brown v. City of Huntsville, Ala., 608 F.3d 724 (11th Cir. 2010),

denying qualified immunity in both to officers who pepper sprayed an arrestee who “was not

suspected of having committed a serious crime, did not pose an immediate threat of harm to

anyone, and was not actively resisting or evading arrest.” See Brown, 608 F.3d at 738

(quoting Reese, 527 F.3d at 1273-74) (internal quotations omitted); see also id. at 739-40

(holding that “an objectively reasonable police officer would have known it was unlawful

to use pepper spray and other force against an arrestee who was suspected only of a minor

offense (playing music too loud), was not threatening the officer or the public, was not

attempting to flee, and who had communicated her willingness to be arrested”). 

Again, defendant erroneously bases his qualified immunity defense on his version of

the facts. However, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Graham

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factors all support plaintiff’s excessive force claim. First, plaintiff was not arrested for a

serious crime. She was suspected only of blocking traffic and causing public alarm by

yelling. Second, the evidence does not support a finding that plaintiff posed a threat to Polk,

Rosato, or anyone else. Third, plaintiff did not resist arrest, as she had no time in which to

do so. Polk pulled plaintiff out of her car and slapped her face, causing her glasses to fall. He

then peppersprayed plaintiffrepeatedly, including after Rosato handcuffed her. Plaintiff tried

to lower her head to avoid the pepper spray, but she never resisted Polk’s force. Furthermore,

plaintiff sustained an injury requiring surgery, which plaintiff argues is attributable to the

force Polk inflicted on plaintiff when he kicked her. Based on the foregoing facts, the court

finds that Polk’s use of force against plaintiff was objectively unreasonable and, therefore,

violative of plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force.

Furthermore, the court concludes that no objectively reasonable officer would have

thought it was lawful to slap, pepper spray, and kick an arrestee who was suspected only of

yelling loudly and impeding the flow of traffic in a parking lot and was neither threatening

the officers nor attempting to resist arrest. Polk pepper sprayed plaintiff both before and after

Rosato hand cuffed her, thereby violating clearly established law prohibiting the use of

pepper spray on an arrestee who is not suspected of a severe crime, who does not pose an

immediate danger to anyone, and who was not resisting arrest or attempting to flee. See

Brown, 608 F.3d at 738-40. Therefore, Polk is not entitled to qualified immunity based on

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the foregoing facts, and summary judgment is due to be denied as to plaintiff’s § 1983

excessive force claim.

2. STATE LAW CLAIMS

The Alabama legislature granted statutory immunity from state tort liability to

municipal police officers for “conduct in performance of any discretionary function within

the line and scope of his or her law enforcement duties.” Ala. Code § 6-5-338(a).9 Alabama

state courts have afforded discretionaryfunction immunityto officers, so long as the officer’s

9Section 6-5-338(a) and (b) state:

(a) Every peace officer, except constables, who is employed or appointed

pursuant to the Constitution or statutes of this state, whether appointed or

employed as such peace officer by the state or a county or municipality thereof,

or by an agency or institution, corporate or otherwise, created pursuant to the

Constitution or laws of this state and authorized by the Constitution or laws to

appoint or employ police officers or other peace officers, and whose duties

prescribed by law, or by the lawful terms of their employment or appointment,

include the enforcement of, or the investigation and reporting of violations of,

the criminal laws of this state, and who is empowered by the laws of this state

to execute warrants, to arrest and to take into custody persons who violate, or

who are lawfully charged bywarrant, indictment, or other lawful process, with

violations of, the criminal laws of this state, shall at all times be deemed to be

officers of this state, and as such shall have immunity from tort liability

arising out of his or her conduct in performance of any discretionary

function within the line and scope of his or her law enforcement duties.

(b) This section is intended to extend immunity only to peace officers and

governmental units or agencies authorized to appoint peace officers. No

immunityis extended herebyto anyprivate non-governmental person or entity,

including any private employer of a peace officer during that officer's off- duty

hours.

Ala. Code § 6-5-338 (a) & (b) (emphasis added).

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actions are (1) within his discretion and (2) are not done willfully, in bad faith, or with

malice. City of Birmingham v. Sutherland, 834 So. 2d 755, 759 (Ala.), cert. denied 537 U.S.

1018 (2002); see also Roberts v. City of Geneva, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1216 (M.D. Ala.

2000) (quoting Couch v. City of Sheffield, 708 So. 2d 144, 153 (Ala. 1998) (police officers

“are entitled to immunity unless their conduct was ‘so egregious as to amount to willful or

malicious conduct or conduct engaged in bad faith.’”)).

“The restatement of State-agent immunity as set out in [Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.

2d 392, 405 (Ala. 2000)], now governs the determination of whether a police officer is

entitled to immunity under § 6-5-338 (a).” Ex parte City of Tuskegee, 932 So. 2d 895, 904

(Ala. 2005). Under the test defined byCranman, and subsequentlymodified byHollis v. City

of Brighton:

A State agent shall be immune from civil liability in his or her personal

capacity when the conduct made the basis of the claim against the agent is

based upon the agent’s . . . (4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of the

criminal laws of the State, including, but not limited to, law-enforcement

officers’ arresting or attempting to arrest persons, or serving as peace officers

under circumstances entitling such officers to immunity pursuant to § 6-5-

338(a), Ala. Code 1975.

Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950 So. 2d 300, 309 (Ala. 2006) (modifying standard set forth in

Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405)). However, “a State-agent shall not be immune from civil

liability” in his individual capacity either: (1) when required by law; or (2) “when the State

agent acts willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or

under a mistaken interpretation of the law.” Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405. 

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Courts in Alabama utilize a “burden-shifting process when a party raises the defense

of State-agent immunity.” Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So. 2d 1276, 1282 (Ala. 2008) (internal

quotations omitted) (citing Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006)). 

A state-agent asserting immunity bears the initial “burden of demonstrating that the

plaintiff’s claims arise from a function that would entitle the State-agent to immunity.” Id.

(citing Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d at 452). Should he do so, “the burden shifts

to the plaintiff to show that one of the two categories of exceptions to State-agent immunity

recognized in Cranman is applicable.” Id. The applicable Cranman standard specifically

provides immunity to state-agents performing or attempting to perform an arrest. Cranman,

792 So. 2d at 405. 

In this case, the parties do not dispute that, at the time of the relevant conduct, Polk

was “exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State.” Hollis, 950

So. 2d at 309. Thus, plaintiff bears the burden of proving that Polk is not entitled to immunity

because he acted “willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his authority, or

under a mistaken interpretation of the law.” Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405. In Borders v. City

of Huntsville, 875 So. 2d 1168, 1179 (Ala. 2003), the Alabama Supreme Court addressed the

issue of “whether a peace officer making a warrantless arrest on a charge based upon conduct

the officer witnessed is entitled to discretionary-function immunity in a subsequent civil

action after the arrestee is acquitted.” The Alabama Supreme Court resolved the question by

determining that the absence of arguable probable cause defeats the officer’s claim to

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immunity under Ala. Code § 6-5-338. Borders, 875 So. 2d at 1180. Under the arguable

probable cause standard, the court must ask whether, construing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff, ‘no reasonable police officer would have believed that he had

probable cause to arrest.’” Harris v. City of Prattville, No. 2:07-cv-349-WHA, 2008 WL

2704684, at *16 (M.D. Ala. July 7, 2008) (citing Borders, 875 So. 2d at 1180).

a. False Imprisonment

False imprisonment, under Alabama law, is the “unlawful detention of the person of

another for any length of time whereby he is deprived of his personal liberty.” Ala. Code 

§ 6-5-170. “If a police officer has no arguable probable cause under the Fourth Amendment

to arrest a plaintiff without a warrant for disorderly conduct, no probable cause exists for

[the] purpose of plaintiff’s state law claim of false imprisonment.” Harris, 2008 WL

2704684, at *16 (citing Stovall v. Allums, No. 1:04-CV-659-F(WO), 2005 WL 2002069, at

*9 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 16, 2005); Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110, 122 (5th Cir. 1963)

(equating Alabama probable cause standard for malicious prosecution with the federal

standard)). Without arguable probable cause to effectuate a warrantless arrest, a police

officer is not entitled to State-agent immunity. Harris, 2008 WL 2704684, at *16 (applying

Alabama law established in Borders, 875 So. 2d at 1181-82).

For purposes of defendant Polk’s Motion for Summary Judgment and consistent with

the court’s finding above in its discussion of plaintiff § 1983 unlawful seizure claim, the

court finds that Polk acted without arguable probable cause to arrest plaintiff for disorderly

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conduct. Accordingly, absent arguable probable cause, Polk is not entitled to State-agent

immunity as to plaintiff’s state law claim for false imprisonment, and defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment with respect to this claim is due to be denied.

b. Assault and Battery

The Supreme Court of Alabama has defined assault as “an intentional, unlawful offer

to touch the person of another in a rude or angry manner under such circumstances as to

create in the mind of the party alleging the assault a wellfounded fear of an imminent battery,

coupled with the apparent present ability to effectuate the attempt, if not prevented.” Wright

v. Wright, 654 So. 2d 542, 544 (Ala. 1995) (quoting Allen v. Walker, 569 So. 2d 350, 351

(Ala. 1990) (internal quotations omitted). A battery is a successful assault, and consists of

touching another in a hostile manner. Surrency v. Harbison, 489 So. 2d 1097, 1104 (Ala.

1986); Mann v. Darden, 630 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1315 (M.D. Ala. 2009) (requiring proof that

defendant touched plaintiff, that he intended to touch plaintiff, and that the touching was

conducted in a harmful or offensive manner, in order to prevail on battery claim). 

Defendant argues that plaintiff cannot show that Polk “acted willfully, maliciously,

fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond his . . . authority,” and thus, defendant is entitled to

discretionary function immunity. (Doc. 22 at 14.) Once again, defendant improperly relies

on the officers’ testimony to support his argument and completely ignores plaintiff’s

testimony. Plaintiff responds that just as “a reasonable jury can conclude Polk lacked

arguable probable cause and used excessive force, in violation of the U.S. Constitution and

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§ 1983[,] [a] reasonable jury can also conclude defendant acted willfully, maliciously, in bad

faith, [and] beyond [his] authority.” (Doc. 26 at 18.) 

Excessive force during an arrest constitutes assault and battery. Franklin v. City of

Huntsville, 670 So. 2d 848, 852 (Ala. 1995). “As the Alabama Supreme Court has held,

‘before force can be used in making an arrest, probable cause must exist to make a lawful

arrest.’” Mann, 630 F. Supp. 2d at 1316 (quoting Franklin v. City of Huntsville, 670 So. 2d

848, 852 (Ala. 1995) (“However before any force can be used in making an arrest, probable

cause must exist to make a lawful arrest.”) (emphasis added)); see also id. (“Because the

facts that would enable a determination of arguable probable cause to be made are in genuine

dispute, Darden is not entitled to immunity for the force used in the course of the incident

that led to Mann’s disorderly conduct charge.”). The court finds that the absence of probable

cause is dispositive of defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on plaintiff’s state law

assault and battery claim against Polk. As the court has already found that Polk lacked

arguable probable cause to arrest plaintiff, Polk had no discretion to willfully use force

against plaintiff. For this reason and the reasons enumerated above in the court’s § 1983

excessive force analysis, the court finds that Polk is not entitled to State-agent immunity.

Therefore, defendant Polk’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to plaintiff’s assault and

battery claim will be denied.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, the court is of the opinion that Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment, (Doc. 21), is due to be granted as to plaintiff’s claims against

defendants City of Birmingham, Alabama and Emanuel Rosato and denied as to plaintiff’s

claims against defendant Polk. 

DONE this 30th day of March, 2015.

SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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