Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00866/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00866-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

GERALD WILSON, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

J. PRICE, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:15-cv-0866-KJM-EFB P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that defendant S. De La Cruz1

 (hereafter “defendant”) violated his 

Eighth Amendment rights by denying him a lower bunk assignment. ECF No. 1 at 7-8. 

Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss (ECF No. 19) arguing that plaintiff failed to exhaust his 

administrative remedies before filing this suit. Plaintiff filed a response (ECF No. 22), defendant 

filed a reply (ECF No. 23) and, wanting to have the last word, plaintiff filed an unauthorized2

 1

 Plaintiff’s complaint also named three other officials, but each was dismissed on 

screening. ECF No. 11. 

2

 Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor this district’s Local Rules entitle a party 

to a surreply as a matter of right. Instead, the Local Rules provide for a motion, a response in 

opposition to the motion, and a reply. See E.D. Cal. R. 230(b)-(d). The court may, in its 

discretion, allow a surreply “where a valid reason for such additional briefing exists, such as 

where the movant raises new arguments in its reply brief.” Hill v. England, 2005 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 29357, 2005 WL 3031136, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2005). Defendant raised a new 

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surreply (ECF No. 24). After review of the relevant pleadings, the court recommends that 

defendant’s motion to dismiss be denied. 

I. Background 

Plaintiff arrived at Deuel Vocation Institution (hereafter “DVI”) on September 30, 2014. 

ECF No. 1 at 6. He was transported to the housing unit where defendant informed him of his cell 

assignment. Id. at 7. After realizing his assignment would require him to occupy an upper bunk, 

he informed defendant that he suffered from a back injury which required assignment to a lower 

bunk. Id. at 7-8. Plaintiff alleges that defendant declined to address the issue directly and told 

him to work out bunk assignments with his new cellmate. Id. at 8. Plaintiff claims that he 

attempted to do so, but quickly learned that his cellmate also had medical reasons requiring 

assignment to a lower bunk. Id. Plaintiff resigned himself to the upper bunk and, the next 

morning, sustained an injury when he slipped and fell while attempting to climb down. Id. 

Plaintiff now alleges that defendant violated his rights by failing to accommodate his need for a 

lower bunk. Id. at 10. 

 Plaintiff submitted a prison grievance appeal regarding the allegations relevant to this suit. 

ECF No. 1, Ex. B at 5. That appeal was denied at the first level of review. Id. Plaintiff pursued 

his appeal to the second level of prison review and received a rejection on January 6, 2015. Id. at 

3. The appeals coordinator noted that the appeal was rejected pursuant to California Code of 

Regulations, Title 15, Section 3084.6(b)(13).3

 Id. Specifically, the appeal was determined to be 

incomplete because plaintiff failed to complete section D of the 602 appeal form prior to 

completing 602-A. Id. Plaintiff ultimately filed a corrected appeal response to this rejection, but 

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argument in his reply, namely that plaintiff failed to administratively challenge the cancellation of 

his appeal (ECF No. 23 at 3), and the court will therefore exercise its discretion to consider the 

surreply. 

3

 This provision provides that an appeal may be rejected if “[t]he appeal is incomplete; for 

example, the inmate or parolee has not provided a signature and/or date on the appeal forms in the 

designated signature/date blocks provided.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(b)(13). 

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prison officials did not receive it within the thirty day time limit allowed for resubmission. Id. at 

2. Prison officials therefore cancelled the appeal pursuant to Title 15, section 3084.6(c)(4).4 Id. 

II. Legal Standards 

A. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 

A complaint may be dismissed under that rule for “failure to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to 

state a claim, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has “facial plausibility 

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability 

requirement,” but it requires more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

For purposes of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the court generally considers only 

allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly 

subject to judicial notice, and construes all well-pleaded material factual allegations in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 

F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir. 2013); Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on either: (1) lack of a cognizable legal 

theory, or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. Chubb Custom Ins. Co., 710 F.3d 

at 956. Dismissal also is appropriate if the complaint alleges a fact that necessarily defeats the 

claim. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228-1229 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Pro se pleadings are held to a less-stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam). However, the Court need not accept as 

true unreasonable inferences or conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual 

 4

 This provision provides that an appeal may be cancelled if “[t]ime limits for submitting 

the appeal are exceeded even though the inmate or parolee had the opportunity to submit within 

the prescribed time constraints.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(c)(4). 

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allegations. See Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Western Mining 

Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981)). 

B. Dismissal for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies 

 The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (hereafter “PLRA”) states that “[n]o action 

shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . or any other Federal 

law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such 

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The PLRA 

applies to all suits about prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002), but a prisoner is 

only required to exhaust those remedies which are “available.” See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 

731, 736 (2001). “To be available, a remedy must be available as a practical matter; it must be 

capable of use; at hand.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Brown v. 

Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 937 (9th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotations omitted). If “a failure to exhaust is 

clear on the face of the complaint, a defendant may move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id. 

at 1166. 

 As with other Rule 12(b) motions, consideration of a motion to dismiss for failure to 

exhaust should be confined to the face of the complaint. Thus, dismissal for failure to exhaust 

should generally be brought and determined by way of a motion for summary judgment under 

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless it is clear from the complaint itself that the 

claim is unexhausted. Albino, 747 F.3d. at 1168. Under this rubric, a Rule 12 motion tests the 

sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint, whereas a Rule 56 motion tests whether the evidence 

is sufficient to establish genuine dispute over a given material fact. But here, defendant has 

raised by way of a Rule 12 motion an affirmative defense claiming that plaintiff has failed to 

exhaust available administrative remedies. Because this is an affirmative defense, it is the 

defendant that bears the burden of pleading and proving that administrative remedies were 

available and that the plaintiff did not exhaust those remedies. Id. at 1172. Yet, as discussed 

below, neither the text of the complaint, nor its attachments, nor other documents incorporated by 

the complaint demonstrates either element to establish this affirmative defense. 

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III. Analysis 

Defendant argues that it is apparent from the face of the complaint that plaintiff did not 

exhaust his administrative remedies before filing this suit. Notably, the exhibits attached to 

plaintiff’s complaint indicate that his appeal was rejected at the second level for failure to 

properly complete the appeal form and ultimately cancelled when prison officials did not receive 

the corrected form within the thirty day deadline. ECF No. 1-2 at 2-3. By way of his opposition 

plaintiff now claims that the actions of prison officials prevented him from meeting that deadline, 

thereby rendering administrative remedies unavailable. ECF No. 22 at 5-12. Specifically, he 

alleges that, after receiving the second level rejection dated January 6, 2015, he submitted his 

corrected appeal to prison officials at Calipatria State Prison on January 22, 2015 – well within 

the thirty day deadline. Id. at 9. He has attached an envelope to his opposition which purports to 

show that his corrected appeal was mailed to DVI officials on January 25, 2015. Id. at 16. 

Plaintiff claims, however, that DVI officials returned the corrected appeal to him unopened “for 

no reason” and he was forced to resubmit it, presumably explaining the delay. Id. at 10. 

Defendant addresses this contention in his reply and raises two countervailing arguments: (1) the 

envelope submitted in support of plaintiff’s opposition lacks foundation to support the contention 

that it contained the corrected appeal and (2) plaintiff failed to challenge the cancellation of his 

appeal by way of a new administrative grievance, as the cancellation notice suggested he could 

do. ECF No. 23 at 2-3. 

 The court is precluded from considering the envelope because it is outside the pleadings. 

See Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007) (“In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, a 

court may generally consider only allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the 

complaint, and matters properly subject to judicial notice.”). Irrespective of the envelope, 

however, plaintiff alleges that he attempted to comply with the relevant administrative deadlines, 

but was thwarted by prison officials when they returned his unopened grievance “for no reason.” 

ECF No. 22 at 9-10. Defendant correctly points out that plaintiff did not actually include this 

explanation for his failure to exhaust in his complaint (ECF No. 23 at 3), but prisoner complaints 

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are not required to plead exhaustion. Jones, 549 U.S. at 216. Thus, it is not clear from the face of 

the complaint that this claim is unexhausted and dismissal on this basis is unwarranted. 

 Defendant’s second argument – that plaintiff should have administratively appealed his 

cancellation – is also unavailing. To be sure, the notice of cancellation provided, in relevant part: 

Pursuant to CCR 3084.6(e), once an appeal has been cancelled, that appeal may 

not be resubmitted. However, a separate appeal can be filed on the cancellation 

decision. The original appeal may only be resubmitted if the appeal on the 

cancellation is granted. 

ECF No. 1, Ex. 2 at 2 (emphasis added). And other courts in this circuit have emphasized that an 

inmate is required to avail himself of this opportunity in order to fully exhaust. See Wilson v. 

Zubiate, No. 14-cv-01032-VC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78951 at * 3 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2016) 

(“Under the applicable regulations, this was not the end of the line — instead, [plaintiff] had the 

opportunity to (and was required to) appeal the cancellation. See 15 CCR §§ 3084.6(e), 

3084.7(c), 3084.1(b).”); see also McCowan v. Hedricks, No. C 13-3554 RS (PR), 2016 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 78795 at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2016) (“Although a cancelled appeal may not be 

submitted for further review, the inmate may separately appeal the cancellation. 15 CCR § 

3084.6(e). A cancelled appeal does not exhaust administrative remedies. Id. § 3084.1(b).”). The 

record before the court, however, is silent as to whether plaintiff availed himself of this option. 

Crucially, the complaint contains no affirmative evidence of plaintiff’s failure to pursue this 

remedy. Rather, defendant’s reply suggests that the court should interpret plaintiff’s silence on 

this matter as tacit admission of that failure. ECF No. 23 at 3. Acceptance of this argument 

would reverse the structure of burdens laid out in Jones and run contrary to its edict that failure to 

exhaust under the PLRA is “an affirmative defense which the defendant must plead and prove.” 

Jones, 549 U.S. at 216. 

 In light of the foregoing, the court concludes that this is not one of those rare cases in 

which failure to exhaust is apparent from the face of the complaint. As the Ninth Circuit noted in 

Albino, defendants will generally be required to “produce evidence proving failure to exhaust in 

order to carry their burden” and, as such, a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 is more 

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likely to be the appropriate vehicle for demonstrating an inmate’s failure to exhaust. 747 F.3d at 

1166. 

IV. Conclusion 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendant’s motion to dismiss 

(ECF No. 19) be DENIED without prejudice. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections 

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. 

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: February 8, 2017. 

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