Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01729/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01729-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 By order filed September 27, 2004, plaintiff’s amended complaint was dismissed with 1

leave to amend. On August 15, 2005, plaintiff’s second amended complaint was dismissed with

leave to amend being granted.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESSE T. MOTEN,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-03-1729 GEB DAD P

vs.

JAMES GOMEZ, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Now before the court is plaintiff’s third amended

complaint. Plaintiff has previously been informed that the court must screen complaints brought 1

by prisoners seeking redress from a governmental entity or employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

Plaintiff has also been previously advised that he must set forth allegations as to how each named

defendant violated his constitutional rights, that the causal link between defendants in

supervisory positions and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged and

that the adverse prison conditions he challenges must have affected him personally. Nonetheless,

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 The court may take judicial notice of the court’s records in another case. United States 2

v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 876 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118,

119 (9th Cir. 1980)). 

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plaintiff’s third amended complaint is as defective as those previously dismissed by the court. 

For the reasons set forth below, the court will recommend that this action be dismissed with

prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

In the caption of the third amended complaint, plaintiff presents nine causes of

action and lists the following defendants: (1) Captain J.P. Moser, (2) James Gomes [sic], the

former Director of the Department of Corrections, (3) A. Newland, former warden of California

State Prison-Solano (CSP-Solano), (4) Terry Dickerson, former plant manager, (5) counselor N.

Fry, (6) correctional officer Renwick, (7) associate warden Y.M. Page, (8) counselor E.C.

Baskerville, (9) and Doe defendants. However, in several instances plaintiff has presented

identical claims in other civil rights actions he has brought in this court and those claims have

been rejected. Such claims that are brought again in this action are duplicative and abusive 2

under § 1915A and should be dismissed. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th

Cir. 1995) (there is no abuse of discretion where a district court dismisses a complaint under

former § 1915 where the complaint merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims); Bailey

v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal of case as duplicative and

frivolous where the same factual allegations were asserted but a different defendant was named);

Hronis v. California Dep’t of Corrections Medical Health Professionals, No. CIV S-04-1267

GEB DAD P, 2005 WL 3481494, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2005) (dismissing claims as 

frivolous and action barred by res judicata where claims were duplicative of claims presented in a

prior action before the court); Simms v. Santa Rita Jail Medical Staff, No. C04-0450VRW(PR),

2004 WL 316035, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2004) (“A prisoner complaint that merely repeats

pending or previously litigated claims may be considered abusive and dismissed under the

authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.”)

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 The Fourteenth Amendment does not provide an independent basis by which state 3

prisoners may challenge the conditions of confinement. Rather, the Eighth Amendment applies

to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Robinson v.

California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962). 

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In his first cause of action, plaintiff claims that the living conditions at CSPSolano violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In this regard, plaintiff contends that 3

the swamp cooling system at CSP-Solano is inadequate to keep the cells cool and that at times,

the blowers are turned off to punish prisoners who complain about the heat. (Third Am. Compl.

¶¶ 6-7 at 4-5.) In addition, plaintiff alleges that emergency lockdowns are “contrived” and that

the lockdowns are “used to harass[,] punish and discriminate against Moten because of his prison

litigation . . . .” (Id. ¶ 14 at 6.) In the court’s September 27, 2004 and August 15, 2005 orders,

plaintiff was advised that he must set forth allegations showing the involvement of each

defendant in connection with his claims and, with respect to this particular Eighth Amendment

claim, how each defendant was involved in the operation of the cooling system at CSP-Solano. 

(Order, filed 8-15-05, at 2.) Instead, plaintiff once again has made only a broad claim regarding 

the inadequacy of the cooling system, but has failed to provide allegations regarding the

involvement of any of the named defendants. In addition, plaintiff’s claim concerning the

allegedly inadequate ventilation and cooling system at CSP-Solano was previously litigated by

plaintiff in this court in the case entitled Moten v. Gomez, CIV S-97-1520 GEB GGH P. In that

case, defendants warden Newland and plant manager Dickerson submitted evidence concerning

the CSP-Solano Extreme Weather Plan, the ventilation system, plaintiff’s medical care, and the

indoor/outdoor temperatures for several months in 1998, in support of their motion for summary

judgment. The defendants’ motion was granted with respect to this claim. The court concludes

that this recycled claim should be dismissed as frivolous since it was previously litigated and also

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 Court records indicate that plaintiff is currently incarcerated at CSP-Corcoran. 4

Accordingly, plaintiff cannot state a cognizable claim for injunctive relief with respect to

conditions at CSP-Solano. See Darring v. Kincheloe, 783 F.2d 874, 876-77 (9th Cir. 1986).

4

because it fails to state a cognizable claim as to the defendants not named in plaintiff’s earlier

lawsuit challenging the ventilation and cooling system at CSP-Solano. 

4

In plaintiff’s second cause of action, he claims that defendants violated the

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, and the First and Fourteenth

Amendments. Plaintiff contends that he is a Hebrew Israelite and cannot eat meat, that his

grievances regarding his religious diet were not processed, and that he received no reply to letters

he sent to former Director of Corrections Gomez and former plant manager Dickerson. Plaintiff

again fails to set forth any factual allegations as to how each of the named defendant imposed a

substantial burden on plaintiff’s exercise of his religion. In the order filed August 15, 2005, the

court noted that plaintiff’s religious diet claim arose while plaintiff was incarcerated at California

State Prison-Centinela and California State Prison-Calipatria. Plaintiff was advised that he

should pursue this claim only by filing an action in the judicial district within which those

institutions were located, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. In his

third amended complaint, plaintiff does not set forth allegations suggesting that venue with

respect to this claim is proper in the Eastern District of California. Nor does he allege how each

of the named defendants is involved in this claim. As for defendants Gomez and Dickerson,

plaintiff has previously been advised that the causal link between the claimed constitutional

violation and a supervisorial defendant must be specifically alleged. “A supervisor is only liable

for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the 

violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d

1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, there are no allegations which would demonstrate that

defendants Gomez or Dickerson were aware of the claimed violation. “Letters written to

supervisors do not make the supervisors liable for their subordinates[’] conduct absent acquiesce

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or support from the subordinates.” Baskett v. Washington, No. C06-5130FDB, 2006 WL

1148645 at *1 (W. D Wash. April 21, 2006). See also Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F. Supp 1235, 1239

(S.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that allegation that two letters about subordinates were sent to

supervisor is inadequate to show that supervisor actually knew of any constitutional violations). 

Therefore, plaintiff’s second cause of action should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

In his third cause of action, plaintiff claims that in violation of the First and

Fourteenth Amendments, defendants “obstructed” his right to file an inmate grievance. Plaintiff

contends that he submitted a grievance concerning defendant Renwick’s racial comments and

about how defendant Renwick was telling other prisoners that plaintiff was “a jail house snitchrat.” (Third Am. Compl. at 8.) Plaintiff’s grievances were not processed and were returned to

him by defendant Fry who stated that the grievances were rejected because there was no adverse

effect on plaintiff. (Id.) In Moten v. Renwick, S-98-0118 LKK DAD P, plaintiff presented this

same claim, alleging that defendant Renwick made racist and inflammatory remarks, and that

defendant Fry failed to process his inmate grievances about defendant Renwick. See Order and

Findings and Recommendations, CIV S-98-0118 LKK DAD P, filed April 24, 2001 at 4. In

findings and recommendations issued in that case, the undersigned recommended that plaintiff’s

First Amendment access to court claim be dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim. Id. 

Those findings and recommendations were adopted on June 12, 2001, and the action was

dismissed. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Accordingly, the court will 

recommend that plaintiff’s third cause of action be dismissed as duplicative and frivolous. In

addition, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment

claim. “[I]nmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance

procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Mann v. Adams, 855

F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988)), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1063 (2004). See also, Buckley v. Barlow,

997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that prisoner “failed to state a claim because no 

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26 See Third Amended Complaint at pp. 7-8. 5

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constitutional right was violated by the defendants’ failure, if any, to process all of the grievances

he submitted for consideration.”). 

In his fourth and fifth causes of action, plaintiff claims that defendant Renwick

subjected plaintiff to racial discrimination and violated the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. In this regard, plaintiff contends that defendant Renwick made racial

 remarks which were offensive to plaintiff who is African American. This claim was also 5

presented by plaintiff in Moten v. Renwick, CIV S-98-0118 LKK DAD P. Although the alleged

remarks were offensive and insensitive, neither verbal abuse nor the use of profanity is sufficient

to state a constitutional claim under § 1983. See Freeman v. Arapio, 125 F.3d 732, 738 (9th Cir.

1997) (holding that abusive language directed at one’s ethnic and religious background fails to

state an equal protection claim); Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987)

(upholding summary judgment on claim that defendant used vulgar language; profanity, verbal

abuse and verbal harassment do not state an Eighth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 

This claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

In his sixth cause of action, plaintiff alleges that the defendants conspired to

deprive plaintiff of his right to equal protection because of his race and in violation of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1985. The seventh cause of action claims that the defendants are liable to plaintiff for their

failure to prevent the conspiracy in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986. 

Section 1985 of the Civil Rights Act “proscribes conspiracies to interfere with

civil rights.” Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1039 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). The

statute provides that

[i]f two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire . . . , for

the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or

class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal

privileges and immunities under the laws . . . whereby another is

injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and

exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States,

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the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the

recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation,

against any one or more of the conspirators.

42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). A § 1985 claim must be based on allegations that establish the existence of

a conspiracy. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971). “A mere allegation of

conspiracy without factual specificity is insufficient to support a claim.” Sanchez, 936 F.2d at

1039.

In order to proceed under § 1985, a plaintiff must allege facts which “show . . .

that ‘some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus [lay]

behind the conspirators’ action.’” Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263,

267-68 (1993) (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)). See also Kush v.

Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 720, 722-23 (1983); Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1039; Bretz v. Kelman, 773

F.2d 1026, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). Here, plaintiff’s only allegations concerning

discriminatory animus was the racially offensive remarks made by defendant Renwick. Plaintiff

sets forth no allegations suggesting that defendant Renwick entered into an agreement with the

other defendants to deprive plaintiff of his civil rights. Moreover, plaintiff makes only the

following conclusory allegation regarding the alleged conspiracy: “each defendant, and all of

them, collectively conspired to chill the effects of Plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment

rights.” (Third Am. Compl.¶ 40 at 10.) This is not sufficient to state a cognizable claim. 

Finally, there is no action under § 1986 absent a valid claim for relief under §1985. See Sanchez

v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1040 (9th Cir. 1990); Trerice v. Pedersen, 769 F.2d 1398,

1403 (9th Cir. 1985). Therefore, the sixth and seventh causes of action fail to state cognizable

claims.

In his eighth cause of action, plaintiff claims that defendant Renwick violated the

Eighth Amendment when he circulated rumors that plaintiff was a “snitch-rat.” (Third Am.

Compl. ¶ 59 at 14.) Specifically, plaintiff alleges as follows:

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 In recommending dismissal of the claim at that time the undersigned observed: 6

Significantly absent are allegations demonstrating how defendant

Renwick’s actions subjected plaintiff to a substantial risk of serious

harm. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Some

five years after defendant Renwick allegedly made his comment,

plaintiff has provided no allegation that he faced threats or even

animosity from other inmates as a result of the defendant’s alleged

conduct.

Findings and Recommendations filed April 24, 2001 at p 4.

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On March 24, 1997, while in unit 3, dayroom, during an open

conversation, with several prisoners, Moten was informed that

RENWICK had told other prisoners that he was a jail house

snitch-rat. This rumor could have had Plaintiff assaulted by

prisoner. [sic]

 (Id. at 8.) In Moten v. Renwick, CIV S-98-0118 LKK DAD P, this same Eighth Amendment 

claim was dismissed and the dismissal was affirmed on appeal. Thus, this cause of action 6

should be dismissed as duplicative and frivolous.

In his ninth cause of action, plaintiff claims that he suffered retaliation at the

hands of the defendants because of his use of the inmate grievance process and the filing of civil

rights lawsuits. “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails

five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an

inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the

inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a

legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. April 25,

2005) (amended opinion). A prisoner must also establish that the protected conduct was a

substantial or motivating factor for the alleged retaliatory acts. See Mt. Healthy City Board of

Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-87 (1977).

Plaintiff has renewed his retaliation claim which was previously presented in

Moten v. Renwick, CIV S-98-0118 LKK DAD P. In that case, plaintiff alleged retaliation by

defendant Renwick who threatened to send plaintiff to the “hole” and to mishandle plaintiff’s

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 There is a two year statute of limitations in California in § 1983 cases. See Cal. Civ. 7

Proc. Code § 335.1; Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954-55 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied sub

nom. Kempton v. Maldonado, --- U.S. ----, 12 5 S.Ct. 1725 (2005). Thus, it would appear that

this claim seeking relief with respect to alleged unlawful retaliation carried out in 1996 is timebarred.

 See fn. 7, infra. 8

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mail because of his inmate grievances and lawsuits. The court dismissed the retaliation claim for

failure to state a claim, and this decision was affirmed on appeal. Here, plaintiff presents three

more theories for his retaliation claim. 

First, plaintiff claims that in 1996, defendant Fry retaliated against plaintiff when

he found plaintiff guilty of drug use following a positive urinalysis test. Plaintiff claims that the 7

positive test result was tainted by his flu medication. Plaintiff’s claim fails because he has not

provided any allegations that would demonstrate that retaliation, rather than the positive

urinalysis, was the substantial or motivating factor for the disciplinary action. 

Second, plaintiff claims that defendants Page, Baskerville and Moser who were

members of the unit classification committed, retaliated against plaintiff by having him moved to

a higher security prison after the committee illegally raised his classification score in July of

1999. Again, plaintiff fails to allege any facts demonstrating that retaliation was the substantial 8

or motivating factor for the change in classification. Moreover, in light of the fact that plaintiff

was found guilty of drug use which was supported by a urinalysis report, plaintiff has failed to

demonstrate that the change of classification did not advance legitimate penological goals, such

as preserving institutional order and discipline. See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir.

1995); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532

(9th Cir. 1985). 

Finally, plaintiff claims that Doe defendants at CSP-Solano lost or confiscated

plaintiff’s personal property in July of 1999 in retaliation for his having engaged in protected

activities. Plaintiff contends that when he arrived at CSP-Calipatria, his typewriter and a box of

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legal documents were missing. In the court’s August 15, 2005 order granting plaintiff leave to

file the pending third amended complaint, plaintiff was advised that he could pursue this loss of 

property claim only by filing an action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of

California since his own allegations indicated that this claim arose at CSP-Centinela or CSPCalipatria. Instead, plaintiff apparently attempts to now proceed on the theory that some

unknown persons at CSP-Solano must have deliberately lost plaintiff’s property in an act of

retaliation because when plaintiff arrived at CSP-Calipatria, his property was missing. Such a

claim is vague, conclusory and speculative. It should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 

The court has concluded that plaintiff has failed to state any cognizable claim. 

Plaintiff has been granted leave to amend on two occasions and has failed to cure the defects in

his complaint. In light of the nature of plaintiff’s allegations and his inability to cure the defects

noted by the court, the granting of further leave to amend would be futile. Schmier v. United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 279 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2002); Lopez v. Smith,

203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Under Ninth Circuit case law, district courts are only

required to grant leave to amend if a complaint can possibly be saved. Courts are not required to

grant leave to amend if a complaint lacks merit entirely.”). 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed

with prejudice as frivolous and for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the

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specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: May 19, 2006.

DAD:4

mote1729.56

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