Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00093/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00093-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Wayne Alan Harr initiated this action by filing a complaint against Channel 17 News, 

Mercy Hospital, San Joaquin Community Hospital, Serenity House, and the Bakersfield Police 

Department “for gross malicious physiological infliction of psycho-physiological [distress].” (Doc. 1 

at 1) Because Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support his claims or a determination that this 

Court has jurisdiction over the matter, the complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend.

I. Motion to proceed in forma pauperis

The Court may authorize the commencement of an action without prepayment of fees when an 

individual “submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such person . . . possesses [and] 

that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The Court 

has reviewed Plaintiff’s application and has determined his affidavit satisfies the requirements of 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a). Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.

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WAYNE ALAN HARR,

 Plaintiff,

v.

CHANNEL 17 NEWS, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:16-cv-00093 - AWI - JLT

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, AND 

DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND

Case 1:16-cv-00093-AWI-JLT Document 3 Filed 02/01/16 Page 1 of 6
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II. Screening Requirement

When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the Court is required to review the complaint, and 

shall dismiss the case at any time if the Court determines that the allegation of poverty is untrue, or the 

action or appeal is “frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . 

seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2). A 

claim is frivolous “when the facts alleged arise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, 

whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 

504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992).

III. Pleading Standards

General rules for pleading complaints are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A 

pleading stating a claim for relief must include a statement affirming the court’s jurisdiction, “a short 

and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief; and . . . a demand for the 

relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a). The Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, and pro se pleadings are held to “less 

stringent standards” than pleadings by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521-21 (1972).

A complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the plaintiff’s claim in a plain and 

succinct manner. Jones v. Cmty Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Further, a 

plaintiff must identify the grounds upon which the complaint stands. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 

U.S. 506, 512 (2002). The Supreme Court noted,

Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an 

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers 

labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will 

not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further 

factual enhancement.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Conclusory and vague allegations do not support a cause of action. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). The Court clarified further,

[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.” [Citation]. A claim has facial plausibility when 

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. [Citation]. The 

plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than 

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a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. [Citation]. Where a complaint 

pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of 

the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’

Iqbal, 566 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted). When factual allegations are well-pled, a court should 

assume their truth and determine whether the facts would make the plaintiff entitled to relief; legal 

conclusions in the pleading are not entitled to the same assumption of truth. Id. 

The Court has a duty to dismiss a case at any time it determines an action fails to state a claim, 

“notwithstanding any filing fee that may have been paid.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915e(2). Accordingly, a court 

“may act on its own initiative to note the inadequacy of a complaint and dismiss it for failure to state a 

claim.” See Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal 

Practice and Procedure, § 1357 at 593 (1963)). However, the Court may grant leave to amend a 

complaint if the deficiencies in the complaint can be cured by an amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 

F.3d 1122, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

IV. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff asserts the defendants are liable for “gross malicious physiological infliction of psychophysiological [distress].” (Doc. 1 at 1) According to Plaintiff, he was invited to visit Channel 17 News 

to “be interviewed as a Republican candidate for President of the United States of America.” (Id. at 3) 

However, Plaintiff contends he was arrested for misdemeanor trespassing on the Channel 17 News 

property. (Id.)

In addition, Plaintiff reports he currently resides at Serenity House, which is “owned and 

operated by Christian Felix and her boyfriend ‘Bob.’” (Doc. 1 at 3) Plaintiff alleges the owners have 

failed to protect him from a female resident who “attacked Plaintiff with a butcher knife.” (Id.) He 

asserts another resident named Nick “assaulted Plaintiff while ‘Bob’ watched.” (Id.) According to 

Plaintiff, Nick was arrested by Bakersfield police officers, but he was not prosecuted. (Id.) Further, he 

alleges a third resident named Kevin “assaulted Plaintiff in the bathroom,” after which police officers 

“advised Plaintiff ‘to move out.’” (Id.)

Finally, Plaintiff contends the “Bakersfield Police Department is liable to Plaintiff in the amount 

of $1 billion dollars for stealing Plaintiff’s Bakersfield Police Department badge.” (Doc. 1 at 6) He 

asserts that the department promised to return the badge “on numerous occasions” but has not done so. 

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(Id.) Further, he alleges that “Bakersfield police offers have beaten Plaintiff after arresting Plaintiff for 

allegedly resisting arrest [for] which Plaintiff was [exonerated].” (Id.)

Based upon the foregoing facts, Plaintiff contends the defendants “are liable to Plaintiff for 

malicious gross intentional infliction of psychological distress.” (Doc. 1 at 6)

V. Discussion and Analysis

A. Intentional infliction of emotional distress

To state a cognizable claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Plaintiff must allege: 

(1) outrageous conduct by the defendants (2) who intended to cause or recklessly disregarded the 

probability of causing emotional distress, (3) and the defendants’ actions were the actual and proximate 

cause (4) of Plaintiff’s severe emotional suffering. Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 

2004) (citing Brooks v. United States, 29 F. Supp. 2d 613, 617 (N.D. Cal. 1998)). Outrageous conduct 

is demonstrated when a “defendant’s conduct was ‘so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually 

tolerated in a civilized society.’” Van Horn v. Hornbeak, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16134, at *8 (E.D. 

Cal. Feb. 18, 2009) (quoting Ricard v. Pacific Indemnity Co., 132 Cal. App. 3d 886, 895 (1982)). Here, 

Plaintiff has failed to link individual defendants to any outrageous conduct, and has not alleged facts 

which show a specific intent to cause Plaintiff emotional distress. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to 

recognize that, except for the Bakersfield Police Department and its officers, none of the defendants are 

state actors such to invoke federal court jurisdiction and this claim is a mere state law tort. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress, and this cause of action is DISMISSED with leave to amend.

B. Excessive Force

Plaintiff suggests the Bakersfield Police Department is liable for the use of excessive force 

during the course of his arrest(s). The Supreme Court of the United States has determined that the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals who have not yet been convicted of 

a crime “from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 

386, 388 (1989). However, allegations of excessive force during the course of an arrest are analyzed 

under the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits arrests without probable cause or other justification. Id.

(“claim[s] that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, 

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investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ ... are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s 

‘objective reasonableness’ standard”); see also Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1440 (9th Cir. 1994) (“the 

use of force to effect an arrest is subject to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable 

seizures”). The Supreme Court explained,

As in other Fourth Amendment contexts . . . the “reasonableness” inquiry in an excessive force 

case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers’ actions are “objectively 

reasonable” in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their 

underlying intent or motivation. An officer’s evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment 

violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer’s good intentions 

make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional.

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97 (1989) (internal citations omitted). In applying this standard, the Ninth 

Circuit instructs courts to consider “the totality of the circumstances and . . . whatever specific factors 

may be appropriate in a particular case.” Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 826 (9th Cir. 2010).

In Graham, the Supreme Court set forth factors to be considered in evaluating whether the force 

used was reasonable, “including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an 

immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or 

attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id., 490 U.S. at 396 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 

(1985). In addition, Court may consider “whether officers administered a warning, assuming it was 

practicable.” George v. Morris, 736 F.3d 829, 837-38 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 

372, 381-82 (2007). Ultimately, the “reasonableness” of the actions “must be judged from the 

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 

Here, Plaintiff fails to provide any facts related to the actions taken by officers in the course of 

his arrest. Plaintiff must do more than offer only his conclusion that the officers used excessive force; 

he must provide sufficient facts support his claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Given the lack of supporting 

factual allegations, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for the use of excessive force, and this 

claim is DISMISSED with leave to amend.

VI. Conclusion and Order 

Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient facts sufficient to support his claims. However, the 

deficiencies identified in this order may be cured if Plaintiff provides additional facts to support his 

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claims. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1128 

(dismissal of a pro se complaint without leave to amend for failure to state a claim is proper only 

where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts alleged, and that an opportunity to 

amend would be futile). If Plaintiff fails to provide information supporting his claims, the Court will 

find he is unable to do so.

Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Forsyth v. 

Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

In addition, the amended complaint must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or 

superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220. Once Plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original 

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. The amended complaint must bear the docket 

number assigned this case and must be labeled “First Amended Complaint.” Finally, Plaintiff is 

warned that “[a]ll causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged in an amended 

complaint are waived.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing London v. Coopers & 

Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981).

Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED;

2. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; and 

3. Within thirty days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff SHALL file a First 

Amended Complaint. 

If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order to file an amended complaint, the action may be 

dismissed for failure to prosecute and failure to obey the Court’s order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 1, 2016 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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