Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05491/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05491-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 10, 1999 Decided October 8, 1999

No. 98-5491

Navegar, Incorporated, d/b/a Intratec, and

Penn Arms, Incorporated,

Appellants

v.

United States of America,

Appellee

---------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 95cv00550)

---------

Richard E. Gardiner argued the cause and was on the

briefs for appellants.

Mark B. Stern, Attorney, United States Department of

Justice, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief

were David W. Ogden, Acting Assistant Attorney General,

Michael S. Raab, Attorney, and Wilma A. Lewis, United

States Attorney.

Before: Wald, Silberman and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Wald.

USCA Case #98-5491 Document #468769 Filed: 10/08/1999 Page 1 of 31
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Wald, Circuit Judge: Navegar, Inc., doing business as

Intratec ("Intratec"), and Penn Arms, Inc. ("Penn Arms")

(together "appellants"), are licensed by the United States

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("BATF") to manufacture firearms. Intratec and Penn Arms brought a declaratory judgment action under 28 U.S.C. s 2201 in the United

States District Court for the District of Columbia to challenge

the constitutionality of section 110102 of the Violent Crime

Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. See Pub. L. No.

103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1996-98 (codified at 18 U.S.C.

ss 921(a)(30), 922(v) (1994)). Section 110102(a) makes it unlawful to "manufacture, transfer or possess a semiautomatic

assault weapon." See 108 Stat. at 1996-97 (codified at 18

U.S.C. s 922(v)(1)). Section 110102(b) specifically identifies

the precise weapons Intratec and Penn Arms manufacture as

semiautomatic assault weapons. See 108 Stat. at 1997-98

(codified at 18 U.S.C. ss 921(a)(30)(A)(viii), (ix)). Appellants

sought a declaration that these provisions exceed Congress'

Commerce Clause power, and are unconstitutional Bills of

Attainder.

Both the appellants and the government filed cross-motions

for summary judgment on both of the constitutional challenges to the Act. See Memorandum Order and Opinion,

Joint Appendix ("J.A.") at 43. The district court issued a

Memorandum Order and Opinion granting the government's

motion, rejecting appellants' motion and dismissing the case.

We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on

both of appellants' challenges.

I. Background

A. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of

1994

In 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and

Law Enforcement Act. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796

("the Act"). Subtitle A of Title XI of the Act, which regulates

assault weapons, is entitled the "Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Act." See Violent Crime Control and

Law Enforcement Act of 1994, s 110101, 108 Stat. 1796, 1996.

USCA Case #98-5491 Document #468769 Filed: 10/08/1999 Page 2 of 31
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Section 110102(a) of the Act makes it "unlawful for a person

to manufacture, transfer, or possess a semiautomatic assault

weapon." See 18 U.S.C. s 922(v)(1). Section 110102(b) defines "semiautomatic assault weapon" to include "any of the

firearms, or copies or duplicates of the firearms" enumerated

in nine categories of guns identifying 15 weapons by name.

See 18 U.S.C. s 921(a)(30)(A). Two of the categories of guns

specified by the statute are "INTRATEC TEC-9, TEC-DC9,

and TEC-22; and ... revolving cylinder shotguns, such as

(or similar to) the Street Sweeper and Striker 12." 18 U.S.C.

ss 921(a)(30)(A)(viii), (ix). The definition of "semiautomatic

assault weapon" in section 110102(b) also includes semiautomatic rifles and semiautomatic pistols that have the ability to

accept a detachable magazine and any two of five enumerated

accessories, and semiautomatic shotguns that have any two of

four enumerated features. See 18 U.S.C. ss 921(a)(30)(B)-

(D).

Section 110102(a) of the Act contains a "grandfather"

clause which exempts from the Act semiautomatic assault

weapons lawfully possessed on the date of enactment. See 18

U.S.C. s 922(v)(2). The Act does not apply to certain enumerated firearms as well as firearms, replicas or duplicates of

firearms specified in an appendix. See id. s 922(v)(3); id.

App. A. Persons convicted of knowingly violating the Act are

subject to a fine and imprisonment of up to five years. See

id. s 924(a)(1).

B. Factual Background

Appellants are the sole manufacturers of firearms identified by name in the Act as "semiautomatic assault weapons."

See 42 U.S.C. s 921(a)(30)(A)(viii), (ix). Intratec is the sole

manufacturer of the TEC-DC91 and TEC-22 semiautomatic

pistols. Penn Arms is the sole manufacturer of the Striker

12, 12S, 12E and 12SE, 12-gauge revolving cylinder shotguns.

See Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 914 F. Supp. 632, 633

(D.D.C. 1996). On September 13, 1994, the Act became law

and agents from the BATF visited appellants' facilities to

__________

1 The Itratec TEC-DC9 is simply the the Intratec TEC-9 renamed. See Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 914 F. Supp. 632, 633

(D.D.C. 1996).

inform appellants' officers of the prohibitions of the Act and

give notice that they planned to conduct inventories of the

weapons that would be grandfathered. See Navegar, Inc. v.

United States, 103 F.3d 994, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Over the

next two days, the BATF conducted these inventories. See

id.

On September 26, 1994, the BATF sent letters to all

federally licensed firearm manufacturers, including Intratec

and Penn Arms, giving notice of the "grandfather" provision,

and that the BATF would permit seven additional days of

weapon manufacturing before it would take a final inventory

identifying all grandfathered weapons. See Navegar, 914 F.

Supp. at 633. When the additional seven-day window for

grandfathering weapons closed, Intratec held in its inventory

over 40,000 TEC-DC9 and TEC-22 frames and thousands of

USCA Case #98-5491 Document #468769 Filed: 10/08/1999 Page 3 of 31
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

dollars of gun parts which it could no longer assemble. Penn

Arms was unable to take advantage of the seven-day window

and was left with an inventory of $58,000 worth of gun parts

for the Striker 12 series of shotguns. See id. at 634-35.

C. Procedural Background

In March, 1995, Intratec and Penn Arms filed a declaratory

judgment action in the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia, challenging the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Act. See First Amended Compl., J.A.

at 9. Appellants alleged that neither s 922(v)(1) nor

s 922(w)(1), which prohibits the transfer or possession of a

large capacity feeding device, fell within the powers delegated

to Congress under Article I because there were no legislative

findings nor anything in the language of the Act which

indicated any nexus with Congress' delegated powers. See

id., J.A. at 15. In addition, appellants asserted that

s 922(v)(1) together with s 922(a)(30)(A)(viii), (ix), singled out

the TEC-DC9, TEC-22 and Striker 12 for prohibition in

order to punish them for manufacturing their products and

thus were unconstitutional Bills of Attainder. See id., J.A. at

15-16, 20-22. Further, they alleged that provisions using

general terms to include certain types of semiautomatic rifles,

pistols and shotguns, 18 U.S.C. s 921(a)(30)(B)-(D), in the

definition of "semiautomatic assault weapon" were void for

USCA Case #98-5491 Document #468769 Filed: 10/08/1999 Page 4 of 31
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

vagueness under the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment. See id., J.A. at 17-20.

The government filed a motion for summary judgment on

the ground that appellants did not have standing to bring a

pre-enforcement challenge to the provisions of the Act since

they did not demonstrate a genuine threat of prosecution.

On February 1, 1996, the district court issued a Memorandum

Order and Opinion granting the government's motion and

dismissing appellants' case. See Navegar, 914 F. Supp. at

632. Appellants appealed the district court's decision on

standing to this court. See Navegar, Inc. v. United States,

103 F.3d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1997). This court held that since the

provisions prohibiting the weapons that Intratec and Penn

Arms alone manufactured effectively single them out as intended targets, these provisions presented an imminent

threat of prosecution sufficient to bring a pre-enforcement

challenge. See id. at 1001. However, this court also held

that appellants had failed to show an imminent threat of

prosecution under 18 U.S.C. ss 921(a)(30)(B)-(D) and 922(w),

which outlawed items using general terms, because nothing

indicated a special priority of enforcement against appellants

and the general nature of the language made it impossible to

predict whether these provisions would be applied to them.

See id. at 1002. Therefore, this Court reversed the part of

the order of the district court relating to the enumerated

powers claims challenge to s 922(v)(1) and the Bill of Attainder challenge to 18 U.S.C. ss 921(a)(30)(A)(viii), (ix) in conjunction with s 922(v)(1) and affirmed the decision to dismiss

the void for vagueness claims and the enumerated powers

challenge to s 922(w)(1). See id.

On remand to the district court, appellants sought leave to

amend their complaint to demonstrate that their challenges to

the general provisions of the Act were justiciable in light of

this court's prior decision. See Memorandum Order and

Opinion, J.A. at 43. On December 1, 1997, the district court

issued an opinion denying appellants' motion to amend their

complaint. See Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 986 F. Supp.

650 (1997). The district court held that the motion to amend

was futile because the proposed amended complaint failed to

USCA Case #98-5491 Document #468769 Filed: 10/08/1999 Page 5 of 31
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

establish standing to bring a pre-enforcement challenge to the

provisions of the Act prohibiting general categories of weapons. See id. at 653. Appellants did not appeal that order.

The appellants and the government subsequently filed

cross-motions for summary judgment on the enumerated

powers challenge to s 922(v)(1) and the Bill of Attainder

challenge to s 922(v)(1) in conjunction with

s 921(a)(30)(A)(viii), (ix). The district court held that Congress did not exceed its authority in enacting s 922(v)(1) of

the Act and that s 922(v)(1) together with s 921(a)(30)(viii),

(ix) does not constitute a Bill of Attainder with respect to

Intratec and Penn Arms. See Memorandum Order and Opinion, J.A. at 89. On the basis of congressional testimony

discussing the Act, the legislative history of prior Acts regulating firearms and the decisions of other courts of appeals

upholding the validity of the Firearms Owner Protection Act

of 1986, which prohibits the "transfer or possession of machine guns," the district court held that the Act regulated

activities that had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

See id., J.A. at 76. The district court further held that the

Act did not constitute a Bill of Attainder because even though

provisions of the Act singled out guns made by Intratec and

Penn Arms, the ban on the manufacture, transfer and possession did not fall within a historical meaning of punishment,

promoted non-punitive legislative purposes, and did not manifest a congressional intent to punish. See id., J.A. at 88.

Therefore, the district court granted the government's motion

for summary judgment, denied appellants' motion and dismissed appellants' claims. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

A. The Constitutional Attack Under the Commerce Clause

1. The Scope of Congress' Commerce Clause Power After

Lopez

In United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), the Supreme Court refined the scope of Congress' powers under the

Commerce Clause. Lopez held that the Gun Free School

USCA Case #98-5491 Document #468769 Filed: 10/08/1999 Page 6 of 31
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Zones Act of 1990, which made possession of a firearm within

1,000 feet of a school a federal offense, exceeded Congress'

Commerce Clause authority. See id. at 561. The Lopez

Court identified three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its Commerce Clause authority: (1)

The "use of the channels of interstate commerce"; (2) "the

instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things

in interstate commerce"; and (3) "those activities having a

substantial relation to interstate commerce ... i.e., those

activities that substantially affect interstate commerce." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.

The Court quickly concluded that possession of a gun in a

school zone did not fit the first two categories. See id. at 559.

The Court subsequently concluded that such activity could

not be regulated under the third category either; it did not

substantially affect interstate commerce because it was not

related to any sort of economic enterprise, nor was its regulation an essential part of a larger regulation of interstate

economic activity, so that the interstate regulatory scheme

would be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. See id. at 560. Further, the Court explained that

Congress had made no findings about the effect of such

activity on interstate commerce nor did the Act contain a

jurisdictional element which would ensure that, as applied,

the firearm possession in question would always affect interstate commerce. See id. 561-62. In addition, the Court

rejected arguments made at trial about the economic costs of

gun possession in school or that effective education is essential to national productivity; it said such attenuated reasoning, which would require it to pile inference upon inference to

find a connection to commerce, would justify a limitless

amount of regulation of intrastate activity by Congress. See

id. at 564, 567. Therefore, the Court concluded that Congress had no rational basis for finding that gun possession in

a school zone had a substantial effect on interstate commerce

and declared the statute unconstitutional. See id. at 567.

In this case, we do not find it necessary to analyze whether

the Act is a Lopez category 1 regulation of the channels of

interstate commerce or a category 2 regulation of the instruUSCA Case #98-5491 Document #468769 Filed: 10/08/1999 Page 7 of 31
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

mentalities of or persons or things in interstate commerce

because the Act readily falls within category 3 as a regulation

of activities having a substantial affect on interstate commerce.2 The legislative history and congressional hearings

conducted prior to the Act clearly manifest a congressional

intent to restrict the interstate flow of "semiautomatic assault

weapons," especially across the borders of states which had

laws prohibiting such weapons. Furthermore, the constitutionality of the Act is supported by the history of prior

firearms legislation such as the Omnibus Crime Control and

Safe Streets Act of 1968 and the Gun Control Act of 1968,

which contain congressional findings that there is a large

interstate market in firearms and firearms legislation is

aimed at controlling that market. Finally, eight other circuit

courts of appeals have upheld a similar prohibition of the

"transfer or possession of machine guns" against post-Lopez

__________

2 Appellees argued below that the provisions at issue may also be

classified as a category 1 regulation of the channels of interstate

commerce. The trial judge concluded that it could not. We need

not address this issue. Some of our prior cases indicate that some

statutes are capable of classification as both a category 1 and

category 3 regulation of commerce. See National Ass'n of Home

Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1997). A prime

example of the interconnection of categories 1 and 3 is the Lopez

Court's citation of United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941),

as a category 1 case and Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196, n.27

(1968), for category 3. See 514 U.S. at 558-59. Wirtz involved a

challenge to a 1961 amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act

originally challenged in Darby. The amendment extended the

coverage of the FLSA from employees "engaged in commerce" to

employees "employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in

the production of goods for commerce." See 392 U.S. at 188. The

Supreme Court held that the constitutionality of the 1961 extension

of employees covered by the Act was "settled by the reasoning of

Darby itself." Id. Therefore Wirtz, the paradigmatic category 3

case according to Lopez, is in fact a category 1 case as well. The

confluence of categories 1 and 3 demonstrates that while the

categories are useful as a synopsis of the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the attempt to fit a regulation squarely

within one category can prove elusive, even fruitless.

USCA Case #98-5491 Document #468769 Filed: 10/08/1999 Page 8 of 31
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

commerce clause challenges.3

2. Activities Which May Be Regulated Because they Have

a Significant Effect on Interstate Commerce

Appellants argue that after Lopez, Congress only has power to regulate "economic" or "commercial" activities and since

Congress passed this statute principally to regulate the criminal activity--not commercial activity--associated with possession of a semiautomatic assault weapon, the Act is not a

proper exercise of the Commerce power. This court has

already held that a "regulated activity ... need not be

commercial, so long as its effect on interstate commerce is

substantial." Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1417 (D.C. Cir.

1996). Alas, appellants contend that this Court's conclusion

__________

3 The confluence of Lopez categories 1 and 3 is also apparent

from the cases where other circuits have upheld the Firearm

Owners Protection Act of 1986, ("FOPA"), which makes it unlawful

to "transfer or possess a machine gun." 18 U.S.C. s 922(o) (1994).

FOPA has been upheld as a Lopez category 3 regulation of an

activity with a substantial effect on interstate commerce by the

Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits. See

United States v. Franklyn, 150 F.3d 90, 96 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1998) (not

deciding whether FOPA fell within Lopez category 1); United

States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 1997), vacated on

other grounds, 133 F.3d 1412 (1998); United States v. Knutson, 113

F.3d 27, 30 (5th Cir. 1997) (avoiding the issue of category 1 to

prevent controversy); United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 283 (3d

Cir. 1996); United States v. Kenney, 91 F.3d 884, 890 (7th Cir.

1996); United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1521 (10th Cir. 1995).

The FOPA has been upheld as a Lopez category 1 regulation of the

channels of interstate commerce by the Sixth and Ninth Circuits.

See United States v. Beuckelaere, 91 F.3d 781, 783 (6th Cir. 1996);

United States v. Rambo, 74 F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 1995); see also

United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791, 796-97 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated,

78 F.3d 160 (1996). Likewise, the First Circuit has upheld under

Lopez category 3 section 110201 of the Violent Crime Control and

Law Enforcement Act, entitled the Youth Handgun Safety Act,

which prohibits the mere possession of a firearm by a juvenile. See

United States v. Cardoza, 129 F.3d 6, 12 (1st Cir. 1997); 108 Stat.

1796, 2010 (codified at 18 U.S.C. s 922(x) (1994)).

USCA Case #98-5491 Document #468769 Filed: 10/08/1999 Page 9 of 31
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

in Terry is incorrect and "finds no support in Lopez." See

Appellants' Br. at 10. Appellants badly misread both Terry

and Lopez.

A close examination of Lopez reveals that it supports the

reasoning of Terry. Lopez described a statute prohibiting

possession of a gun within 1000 feet of a school which it

struck down as involving in "no sense an economic activity

that might ... substantially affect any sort of interstate

commerce." United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995)

(emphasis added). However, the Lopez Court pointedly left

out both "economic" and "commercial" when it concluded in a

normative vein that "the proper test requires an analysis of

whether the regulated activity 'substantially affects' interstate

commerce." 514 U.S. at 559. Furthermore, when the Lopez

Court did use the term "economic activity," it cited as an

example the home consumption of wheat at issue in Wickard

v. Filburn. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560-61 (citing 317 U.S.

111, 127 (1942).

The Lopez Court noted that Wickard "involved economic

activity in a way that the possession of a gun in a school zone

does not." Id. at 560. Wickard involved a constitutional

challenge to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 by

farmer Roscoe Filburn. The Lopez Court specifically cited as

an example of "economic activity" farmer Filburn's personal

consumption of his home-grown wheat. See Lopez, 514 U.S.

at 560 (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128). The passage from

Wickard quoted in Lopez makes clear that wheat grown at

home, even if it is not marketed, has a substantial effect on

interstate commerce because it competes with wheat in commerce by supplying the " 'need of the man who grew it which

would otherwise be reflected by purchases in the open market.' " Id. at 560 (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128). The

Lopez Court's discussion of Wickard demonstrates that what

makes a regulated activity "economic" is not that it is intrinsically commercial in any ordinary sense of the word, but

rather that it "substantially affects" a larger market for the

product in interstate commerce. See id. The Lopez Court

made this point clear with the following quotation from

Wickard:

USCA Case #98-5491 Document #468769 Filed: 10/08/1999 Page 10 of 31
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Even if ... activity be local and though it may not be

regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature,

be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of

whether such effect is what might at some earlier time

have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect.'

Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 at 556 (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125)

(emphasis added).

Our decision in Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412 (D.C. Cir.

1997), is a logical extension of the reasoning in Lopez. In

Terry, this court upheld the Freedom of Access to Clinic

Entrances Act ("FACEA") against a Commerce Clause challenge. See 101 F.3d at 1418. This court rejected the argument that Congress could not regulate protest in front of

abortion clinics because protest against abortion clinics is an

intrastate, noncommercial activity. See id. at 1417. We

concluded that the regulated activity need not be commercial

in nature, rather the only relevant inquiry is whether the

effect on interstate commerce is substantial. See id. This

court found that Congress had a rational basis to conclude

that abortion clinics engage in interstate commerce because,

among other things, they treat patients who travel interstate

to obtain abortion services and obtain medical equipment and

supplies through interstate commerce. See id. at 1415-16,

1417. Therefore, even though violent and obstructive protest

was not an intrinsically "commercial" or "economic" activity,

we upheld the FACEA because such activity had a substantially adverse effect on interstate commerce in reproductive

health services. See id. at 1417-18.

The most recent Supreme Court Commerce Clause case of

Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520

U.S. 564 (1997), also reinforces our holding in Terry that

activity need not be commercial in character in order to be

regulated under the Commerce Clause. Camps involved a

Commerce Clause challenge to an otherwise generally applicable state property tax exemption for charitable institutions

which excluded organizations operated principally for the

USCA Case #98-5491 Document #468769 Filed: 10/08/1999 Page 11 of 31
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

benefit of nonresidents. See id. at 568. The Supreme Court

held that the Commerce Clause applies to activity regardless

of whether it was pursued with the purpose of earning a

profit. See id. at 584. The Camps Court cited an earlier

opinion in which it struck down a California statute prohibiting the transport of indigent persons into the State under the

Commerce Clause by holding that transportation is commerce

" 'whether or not the transportation is commercial in character.' " Id. (quoting Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 166

n.1). The Camps decision makes clear that an activity can be

regulated under the Commerce Clause regardless of whether

it is intrinsically "economic" or "commercial" but solely on the

basis of its substantial effect on interstate commerce. See

National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041,

1050 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (hereinafter (NAHB).

3. Whether the Activity Regulated By the Act Has a

Substantial Effect on Interstate Commerce

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the manufacture of goods which may ultimately never leave the state can

still be activity which substantially affects interstate commerce. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118-19

(1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1, 37

(1937) (holding that if manufacturing which may be intrastate

in character when separately considered has a substantial

effect on commerce, Congress may regulate it). Furthermore, Supreme Court precedent makes clear that the transfer of goods, even as part of an intrastate transaction, can be

an activity which substantially affects interstate commerce.

See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560-61 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317

U.S. 127-28 (1942)) (noting that farmer's home consumption

of wheat substantially affected interstate commerce)); see

also Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114, 127 (noting that the farmer

sold some of his wheat, and that even local marketing substantially affects interstate commerce). Therefore, it is not

even arguable that the manufacture and transfer of "semiautomatic assault weapons" for a national market cannot be

regulated as activity substantially affecting interstate commerce.

USCA Case #98-5491 Document #468769 Filed: 10/08/1999 Page 12 of 31
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

However, the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez does raise

a question of whether mere possession of a "semiautomatic

assault weapon" can substantially affect interstate commerce.

For that reason, it is necessary to examine the purposes

behind the Act to determine if it was aimed at regulating

activities which substantially affect interstate commerce.

Appellants contend that as in Lopez, Congress in this Act

did not even address the issue of whether the manufacture,

transfer and possession of semiautomatic assault weapons

affects Commerce. To the contrary, there is extensive legislative history indicating a firm congressional intent to control

the flow through interstate commerce of semiautomatic assault weapons bought or manufactured in one state and

subsequently transported into other states. First, although

the legislative reports accompanying the 1994 Act do not

specifically address the Commerce Clause, one report does

state that the purpose of the Act was to stop the "widespread" and growing threat posed by "criminal gangs, drugtraffickers and mentally-deranged individuals armed with

semiautomatic assault weapons" by "restricting the availability of such weapons in the future." See H.R. Rep. No. 103-489,

at 12 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1820, 1820.

That report chronicles five years of congressional hearings on

the escalating use of semiautomatic assault weapons, the

difficulties such weapons cause state police officers and the

disproportionate link between such weapons and drugtrafficking and violent crime. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-489, at

13-18. While the report itself does not pinpoint the effect of

the regulated activities on interstate commerce, the five years

of hearings discussed in the legislative report do contain

extensive testimony detailing the kind and extent of interstate

commerce, featuring the flow of semiautomatic assault weapons across state lines. See id. at 13.

The congressional hearings referred to in House Report

489 of the 1994 Act amply demonstrate that the ban on

possession in the Act was a measure conceived to control and

restrict the interstate commerce in "semiautomatic assault

weapons," especially their importation into states which prohibit them. To restrict that commerce it imposed criminal

liability for those activities which fuel the supply and demand

for such weapons. The ban on possession is a measure

USCA Case #98-5491 Document #468769 Filed: 10/08/1999 Page 13 of 31
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

intended to reduce the demand for "semiautomatic assault

weapons." See United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 283 (3d

Cir. 1996) (holding that FOPA targets the mere intrastate

possession of machine guns as a "demand-side measure to

lessen the stimulus that prospective acquisition would have on

the commerce in machine guns"); United States v. Rambo, 74

F.3d 948, 951 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the ban on possession is in effect " 'an attempt to control the interstate market

... by creating criminal liability' " for the " 'demand-side of

the market, i.e., those who would facilitate illegal transfer out

of the desire to acquire mere possession") (quoting United

States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791, 796 (5th Cir. 1995), vacated, 78

F.3d 160 (1996)). The restriction on the manufacture and

transfer of such weapons is an attempt to restrict the supply

of such weapons in interstate commerce. Manufacture, transfer and possession are activities that not only substantially

affect interstate commerce in "semiautomatic assault weapons," but are also the necessary predicates to such commerce.

See NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1047. The ban on possession of

"semiautomatic assault weapons" in this context is necessary

to allow law enforcement to effectively regulate the manufacture and transfers where the product comes to rest, in the

possession of the receiver. See id.; Kirk, 70 F.3d at 796; see

also 1 Lawrence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law

s 5-4 at 819-20 n.50 (3d ed. 2000) (suggesting that the Act in

Lopez might have been upheld as a necessary and proper

means of effectuating the commerce power if Congress criminalized only the possession of guns whose interstate sale or

transport had been outlawed on the theory that making

possession a crime would facilitate enforcement of the ban on

sale or transport). The congressional testimony unmistakably shows that the purpose of the ban on possession has an

"evident commercial nexus." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

For instance, Barbara Fass, the Mayor of Stockton, California, testified about the 1989 murders at a schoolyard in her

city and complained that "legislation alone in our community

is not sufficient." Semiautomatic Assault Weapons Act of

USCA Case #98-5491 Document #468769 Filed: 10/08/1999 Page 14 of 31
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

1989: Hearings on H.R. 1190 Before the Subcomm. on Crime

of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 142 (1989)

(noting that the assault weapon used was prohibited in Stockton, but the assailant subverted local laws by legally purchasing an assault weapon in Oregon and purchasing the bullets

in Rhode Island). Similarly, Boston Mayor Raymond L.

Flynn testified that local controls on assault weapons were

ineffective since "people can still buy guns in one state and

bring them into another." Assault Weapons: Hearings on

S.386 and S.747 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of

the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 130 (1989);

see also id. at 87, 143 (remarks of Sen. Simon and statement

of Sen. Kennedy) (same). Richard Cook, the Chief of the

Firearms Division of the BATF attested to the existence of

interstate trafficking in weapons and its connection to interstate drug trafficking. See Select Crime Issues: Prevention

and Punishment: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime

and Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,

102d Cong. 43 (1991) (also noting that "New York City alone

seizes some 17,000 illegal weapons each year with 96 percent

coming from outside the State" as an example of the large

interstate market for firearms).4

Congress also heard extensive testimony from police officers about the significant flow of weapons across state lines

and the inability of a state to control it. The Vice President

of the International Association of Chiefs of Police and Chief

of Police of Greensboro North Carolina, Sylvester Daughtry,

Jr., testified that "the reason there is no decrease in gunrelated mayhem as a result of stringent State and local gun

control laws is that guns are easily purchased in less stringent locations and brought into these stricter areas.... Gun

__________

4 Congress heard other testimony regarding specific crimes

where the assailant subverted state laws by buying a semiautomatic

assault weapon in one state and using it to commit a crime in

another where it was prohibited. See id. at 246 (statement of

Catherine Varner); Assault Weapons: A View From the Front

Lines: Hearing Before Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 103d

Cong. 38 (1994) (Statement of Sarah Brady, chair of Handgun

Control Int'l).

USCA Case #98-5491 Document #468769 Filed: 10/08/1999 Page 15 of 31
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

control will only work if all states are required to observe it."

Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act:

Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 165

(1994). Fred Thomas, Chief of Police in Washington, D.C.

testified that despite stringent gun control laws in the District

of Columbia, gun violence did not decrease because "guns are

easily purchased in less stringent locations and brought into"

D.C. Assault Weapons: A View From the Front Lines:

Hearing Before Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 103d

Cong. 49 (1994) (also noting that of all the firearms seized by

D.C. police in the previous year, 97.7 percent came from

outside of D.C.). The National President of the International

Brotherhood of Police Officers concluded that a national ban

on assault weapons was necessary because not only do "many

individuals ... travel from one state into another to circumvent state laws" which restrict the sale and use of such

weapons, but "such circumvention of laws is common." See

id. at 58 (statement of Kenneth T. Lyons).5

In sum, the congressional testimony on the bill shows that

Congress was well aware that there was significant interstate

__________

5 Congress also heard testimony from state and federal lawmakers regarding the necessity of a national ban on semiautomatic

assault weapons because existing state and federal regulation were

insufficient. Jim Florio, at that time Governor of New Jersey,

testified that "no individual state law, no matter how strong, can

stop the deadly flow of these weapons across State lines." Assault

Weapons: A View From the Front Lines: Hearing Before Senate

Committee on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 22 (1994) (also noting that

the day a New Jersey statewide ban on assault weapons took effect,

a man with an assault weapon obtained from Florida took a mother

and her two children hostage, murdered the mother and shot her

daughter 14 times). Then-Representative Charles Schumer testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee that "[o]ne city or state

simply can't control the flow of weapons. They just go buy them in

another state. We need a national ban." Id. at 7; see also id. at 11

(statement of Senator Diane Feinstein) (stating that "without a

national ban on these weapons ... state and local initiatives are

meaningless. Lenient laws allow gun buyers ... to simply cross

state lines and purchase their weapons of choice.").

USCA Case #98-5491 Document #468769 Filed: 10/08/1999 Page 16 of 31
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

traffic in semiautomatic assault weapons and that state laws

and existing federal firearms regulation were inadequate to

control the flow of these weapons across state lines.

Appellants asserted at oral argument, however, that the

real purpose of the Act must be to prohibit purely intrastate

manufacture, transfer and possession of semiautomatic assault weapons because both the manufacture and transfer of

semiautomatic assault weapons designed for interstate commerce is already prohibited by statute. However, we can

locate no federal law other than the Act which specifically

restricts intra- or interstate manufacture, transport or possession of semiautomatic assault weapons. See, e.g., 18

U.S.C. s 922. Before this Act was passed, manufacturing,

importing, and dealing in "semiautomatic assault weapons"

was legal for any licensed importer, licensed manufacturer

or licensed dealer of firearms (hereinafter "licensee"). See

18 U.S.C. s 922(a)(1). The prior statutory framework of

firearms legislation thus left unregulated a wide array of

manufacture, transfer and possession of firearms all with undeniable substantial effects on interstate commerce.6 The

__________

6 While s 922(b)(3) prohibits a licensee from selling or delivering

a firearm to an unlicensed transferee whom the licensee knows or

has reasonable cause to know does not reside in the state of the

licensee's place of business ("LPOB"), it allows a licensee to (a) sell

or deliver any rifle or shotgun to a resident of a state other than the

state of the LPOB if the transferring parties meet in person to

effectuate the transfer, and the sale, delivery and receipt comply

with legal conditions of sale in both the state of residence of the

transferee and place of business of the transferor and (b) to loan or

rent a firearm to any person for temporary use for lawful sporting

purposes.

Further, s 922(a)(3) allows any licensee to transport or deliver

any firearm obtained outside her state into her state. See id.

s 922(a)(3). Persons without a license cannot transport weapons in

that fashion except for lawful receipt out-of-state through intestate

succession or bequest or the transportation or receipt of any rifle or

shotgun sold or delivered to her under s 922(b)(3). See id.

s 922(a)(3)(A), (B). In addition, any unlicensed person is prohibited

from transferring any firearm to any person whom the transferor

USCA Case #98-5491 Document #468769 Filed: 10/08/1999 Page 17 of 31
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

interstate activities prohibited solely by the 1994 Act, such as

the interstate sale and delivery of semiautomatic weapons

between federal licensees, are the type of activities which

arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction,

and when viewed in the aggregate substantially affect interstate commerce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; see also Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29. Moreover, since the Act does not

apply to the transfer or possession of a weapon otherwise

__________

knows or has reason to believe does not reside in her state except

for (a) the transport, transfer or delivery of a firearm pursuant to a

bequest or intestate succession and (b) the loan or rental of a

firearm to another for temporary use for lawful sporting purposes.

See id. s 922(a)(5). Finally, any person not otherwise prohibited

from transporting, shipping or receiving a firearm may transport a

firearm for any lawful purpose from any place where she may

lawfully possess such firearm to any other place where she may

lawfully possess such firearm so long as during such transportation,

the firearm is unloaded and neither the firearm nor ammunition is

accessible from the passenger compartment of the transporting

vehicle. See id. s 926A.

Many activities affecting interstate commerce which would be

prohibited under the Act in dispute here are not covered by the

firearms regulation framework existing before the Act. For example, a licensee could otherwise buy, receive, sell or deliver in

interstate commerce any "semiautomatic assault weapon" to or from

a fellow licensee. See id. ss 922(a), (b). A licensee could sell or

deliver any rifle or shotgun, including the Penn Arms Striker 12 or

any semiautomatic rifle or shotgun under the definition of

s 921(a)(30)(B) or (D) to any transferee whom the licensee has

reason to know resides in another state that does not prohibit the

weapon. See id. s 922(b)(3). In turn, the transferee could then

transport that weapon into any other state which does not prohibit

that weapon. See id. s 926A. In addition, any licensee could sell

any type of "semiautomatic assault weapon" to another person

residing in his state, even if for the express purpose of the buyer

using it interstate. See id. ss 922(a)(3), 926A. The buyer could

then transport it to any other state which does not prohibit the

weapon. See id. ss 922(a)(3), 926A. In addition, a person from any

state could loan or rent a "semiautomatic assault weapon" for

temporary use in lawful sporting activities in another state. See id.

ss 922(a)(5)(B), (b)(3)(B).

lawfully possessed on the date of the Act's effectiveness, the

intrastate possession banned by the Act will virtually always

arise out of an illegal manufacture or transfer of a "semiautomatic assault weapon". See 18 U.S.C. s 922(v)(2).

In the final analysis, however, the primary reason why

appellants' point about the purpose of the Act is not well

taken is because even if the interstate activities regulated by

this statute are already prohibited, the intrastate activities

regulated by the Act nonetheless have a substantial effect on

interstate commerce. The prohibition of the intrastate activities is an "essential part of a larger regulation of economic

activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut

unless the intrastate activity were regulated." Lopez, 514

U.S. at 561; see also 1 Tribe, s 5-4, at 819-20 n.50. The

congressional testimony behind the 1994 Act demonstrated

USCA Case #98-5491 Document #468769 Filed: 10/08/1999 Page 18 of 31
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

that the previous federal firearms regulation scheme and

state law were being widely circumvented and were thus

inadequate to allow states to control the flow of semiautomatic assault weapons across their borders. Based on the grave

dangers posed by such weapons before prior federal and state

laws could be enforced, Congress decided that it needed to

take the additional step of stifling their manufacture and flow

in interstate commerce. These circumstances necessitated a

law that would prevent any commercial activity in these

particularly dangerous types of guns where it began with the

manufacture and interstate transfer, and where it ended with

their possession in other states throughout the nation.7

__________

7 While it may be argued that the statute sweeps too broadly by

prohibiting "purely" intrastate transfers or possession of "semiautomatic assault weapons," the Supreme Court has made clear that

"where the class of activities is regulated and that class is within

the reach of federal power, the courts have no power 'to excise, as

trivial, individual instances' of the class." Perez v. United States,

402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at

193); see also 1 Tribe, s 5-5, at 831 n.27 (noting that if a gun was

manufactured in one state and happened to be purchased by the

ultimate buyer in that same state, the purchase can "affect" interstate commerce, even though it was intrastate in this one instance,

USCA Case #98-5491 Document #468769 Filed: 10/08/1999 Page 19 of 31
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

It may be argued that congressional hearings alone are not

sufficient to demonstrate that a statute is directed at regulating interstate commerce, but the Supreme Court's precedent

dictates otherwise. In Lopez, the Supreme Court stated that

it would consider legislative findings and even congressional

committee findings to determine if there was a rational basis

for congressional action; the Court in truth did not say

whether it would consider congressional hearings. See 514

U.S. at 562. However, there are instances where even

though Congress has not made findings about any substantial

effect on interstate commerce, the Supreme Court has upheld

legislation under the Commerce Clause solely on the basis of

congressional hearings. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.

United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964); Katzenbach v.

McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1964).

Both Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung involved Commerce Clause challenges to the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which contained no

congressional findings. The Court in both cases held, as it

did in Lopez, that Congress was not required to make formal

findings in order to legislate under the Commerce Clause.

See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 252; McClung, 379

U.S. at 299, 304; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562 (noting that

Congress is normally not required to make formal findings as

to the substantial effects that an activity has on interstate

commerce). In fact, the Lopez Court cited McClung with

approval for this exact proposition. See 514 U.S. at 563. As

with the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, the "record" of the Violent Crime Control and

Law Enforcement Act's "passage through each house is replete with evidence" of the effect of the prohibited activities

on interstate commerce. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 252;

McClung, 379 U.S. at 299. Therefore, we find that in light of

the extensive testimony regarding the interstate flow of semiautomatic assault weapons across state lines, that Congress

had a rational basis for regulating the manufacture, transfer

__________

in the same way that the farmer's consumption of his home-grown

wheat did in Wickard).

USCA Case #98-5491 Document #468769 Filed: 10/08/1999 Page 20 of 31
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

and possession of semiautomatic assault weapons as an exercise of the commerce power that substantially affects interstate commerce.

Our conclusion that the Act regulates activity which has a

substantial effect on interstate commerce is supported not

only by testimony before the Congress that enacted it but

also by the congressional findings accompanying federal firearms legislation enacted prior to the Act at issue. In 1938,

Congress enacted the Federal Firearms Act, which regulated

the manufacture and transfer of firearms in interstate commerce, and defined it as "[a]n Act to regulate commerce in

firearms." See Pub. L. No. 785, 52 Stat. 1250, 1250. In 1968,

Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe

Streets Act of 1968 ("OCCSSA") and the chapter regulating

firearms was titled "State Firearms Control Assistance."

Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 225. The OCCSSA contained congressional findings that: "there is a widespread

traffic in firearms moving in or otherwise affecting interstate

commerce, and ... the existing Federal controls over such

traffic do not adequately enable the states to control this

traffic within their own borders through the exercise of their

police power." 82 Stat. at 225. Congress further found that

"the ease with which any person can acquire firearms, ... is

a significant factor in the prevalence of lawlessness and

violent crime in the United States." See id.8 These two

__________

8 Appellants claim that the Gun Control Act of 1968 superseded

and impliedly repeals these findings from the OCCSSA because the

findings were not contained in the later Act. However, the House

Report accompanying the Gun Control Act states that the Act

"builds substantially on the regulatory framework contained in title

IV of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968" and

makes three major additions. See H.R. Rep. No. 90-1577, at 7

(1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410, 4413. Since the Gun

Control Act was merely extending the OCCSSA, the congressional

findings were omitted as unnecessary. See id. at 5. The report

does not make any reference to the Gun Control Act repealing or

superseding any part of the OCCSSA.

It is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that

implied repeals should be avoided. See, e.g., Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 661 (1986) ("repeals by implication are not

findings express the widely accepted knowledge that there is

a vast interstate market in firearms that makes the states

unable to control the flow of firearms across their borders or

to prevent the crime inevitably attendant to the possession of

such weapons once inside their borders.

The congressional findings which accompanied the Gun

Control Act of 1968 were even more explicit: "the principal

purpose of [the Act] ... is to strengthen Federal controls

over interstate and foreign commerce in firearms and to

assist the States effectively to regulate firearms traffic within

their borders." H.R. Rep. No. 90-1577, at 6 (1968), reprinted

in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410, 4411. These congressional findings further attest to Congress' concern over a significant

interstate commerce in firearms, and the need to regulate

possession of firearms to control the unwanted flow of fireUSCA Case #98-5491 Document #468769 Filed: 10/08/1999 Page 21 of 31
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

arms across state lines.

The district court here found that s 922(v) is sufficiently

similar to the subject matter of prior federal firearms legislation to permit the use of earlier findings to demonstrate that

the activities regulated by the current Act substantially affect

interstate commerce. See Memorandum Order and Opinion,

J.A. at 69. Appellants argue that under Lopez, the prohibitory provisions of the Act cannot be supported by legislative

findings in previous firearms legislation. In Lopez, the Court

refused to import Congressional findings from previous fire-

__________

favored"). Courts have "seldom, if ever, held that a federal statute

is impliedly repealed," and will only find such a repeal when two

statutes are in "irreconcilable conflict." See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 381 (1996). Furthermore, this

court has noted that the reason for the rule is that Congress is

normally expected to be aware of its previous enactments and to

provide clear statement of repeal if it intends to do so. See

Samuels v. District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184, 194 n.7 (citing TVA

v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189-93 (1978)). This rationale is particularly

applicable here, where the two laws at issue were passed four

months apart and the legislative history of the second Act specifically discusses the first Act. See H.R. Rep. No. 90-1577, at 6-7. The

legislative report shows that not only was Congress aware of the

Omnibus Act, it also did not intend to repeal the Omnibus Act's

congressional findings.

arms legislation in order to find an interstate nexus for the

Gun Free School Zones Act ("GFSZA"). See Lopez, 514 U.S.

at 563. The Court said that importing findings from previous

law was "especially inappropriate" since previous enactments

and findings did not address the subject matter of the ban in

dispute, i.e., a ban on guns in a school zone and its relationship to interstate commerce. Rather, the Court concluded,

the GFSZA " 'plows thoroughly new ground and represents a

sharp break with the long-standing pattern of federal firearms legislation.' " Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 2

F.3d 1342, 1366 (5th Cir. 1993)); see also Lopez, 2 F.3d at

1366-67 (noting that the GFSZA is a regulation of schools).

True, the Supreme Court's opinion in Lopez does not speak

with sharpness or clarity in laying down a test for determining if a statute represents a break with a long-standing

pattern of prior legislation. See 514 U.S. at 559. However,

the Supreme Court's decision in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S.

183 (1968), overruled on other grounds by National League of

Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v.

San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528

(1985), is more instructive on this issue. In Wirtz, the Court

considered a Commerce Clause challenge to the 1961 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, which had itself been

upheld as a valid exercise of the Commerce power in United

States v. Darby. See id. at 188 (citing Darby, 312 U.S. 100

(1941)). The provision at issue in Wirtz extended the scope of

employees covered by the Act from employees "engaged in

commerce or in the production of goods for commerce" which

was upheld in Darby, to every employee "employed in an

enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods

USCA Case #98-5491 Document #468769 Filed: 10/08/1999 Page 22 of 31
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

for commerce" even if the particular employee did not work

in the enterprise's commercial activity. Id. at 188. The

Wirtz Court concluded that the constitutionality of the extended protection was settled by the Court's reasoning in

Darby. See id. The Court reasoned that it was irrelevant

whether the legislative history of the amendments contained

a new finding that the extension affected commerce because

"the original Act stated Congress' findings and purposes as of

USCA Case #98-5491 Document #468769 Filed: 10/08/1999 Page 23 of 31
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

1938. Subsequent extensions of coverage were presumably

based on similar findings and purposes with respect to the

areas newly covered." Id. at 190 n.13. Therefore, even

though the amendments at issue in Wirtz in some sense

"broke new ground," the prior findings were nonetheless held

sufficient to support the constitutionality of the new amendments under the Commerce Clause.

The extension of federal regulation over "semiautomatic

assault weapons" to all manufacture, transfer and possession

is in our view, quite similar to the extension of the scope of

employees covered by the FLSA in Wirtz. In Wirtz, the

subject matter of both the original act and the amendments

was employees of manufacturers engaged in interstate commerce. See 392 U.S. at 187. The congressional findings in

the original FLSA that sub-par labor conditions in manufacture carried on in one state could cause interstate commerce

to be used to spread poor labor conditions among workers in

other states, burden the flow of commerce, and constitute an

unfair method of competition in interstate commerce served

to adequately explain the connection between the labor conditions of the newly-protected employees and interstate commerce. See id. at 190. In this case, the subject matter of

both the prior firearms legislation and the present Act is

control over the distribution of firearms in a national market.

See Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 564 (1977);

Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 824 (1974) (holding that the purpose of the OCCSSA and Gun Control Act

was to control the "widespread traffic in firearms"). In

addition, Congress originally found a connection between the

widespread traffic in firearms in interstate commerce, and the

purpose of the present Act, i.e., to help states adequately

control that traffic across their own borders. See 82 Stat. at

225-26 (1968). This Act merely extends federal control over

the distribution of a certain type of firearm to all manufacture, transfer and possession. To the extent that the connection to interstate commerce is not clear from the congressional hearings for the present Act, the congressional findings in

prior federal firearms regulation more than adequately demonstrate that connection.

USCA Case #98-5491 Document #468769 Filed: 10/08/1999 Page 24 of 31
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

The statute at issue in Lopez is clearly distinguishable

because it dealt not with federal control over the distribution

of firearms, but with federal protection of a discrete geographical zone around a school. The congressional findings

behind earlier federal firearms regulation that we have alluded to did not address the subject of gun possession around a

school, rather they addressed the widespread flow of weapons

across state lines and the inability of state law enforcement to

regulate it. Nor did these findings explain how possession in

a school zone has any connection to interstate traffic in

firearms or the flow of firearms across state lines. Finally,

the statute in Lopez was not supported by any extensive

congressional testimony addressing problems discussed in

congressional findings behind earlier firearms legislation. As

a result, the ban on school zone firearm possession, entirely

intrastate, could not be justified as necessary to effectuate a

larger scheme to control interstate traffic.

The use of congressional findings from prior federal firearms legislation to demonstrate the connection between the

Act and interstate commerce is supported by the decisions of

other circuits upholding the Firearms Owner Protection Act

of 1986 ("FOPA"). Courts of appeals have unanimously

upheld the FOPA, which makes it unlawful to "transfer or

possess a machine gun."9 18 U.S.C. s 922(o) (1994). The

FOPA is not supported by any legislative findings. See

United States v. Franklyn, 157 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1998);

United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 279 (3d Cir. 1996).

Nonetheless, other circuits have held that the subject matter

of FOPA is sufficiently similar to previous firearms legislation

to render appropriate the importation of prior legislative

findings as a reliable statement of Congress' intent in passing

FOPA. See, e.g., Franklyn, 150 F.3d at 95; Rybar, 103 F.3d

at 279; Kenney, 91 F.3d at 890; Wilks, 58 F.3d at 1521; see

also Knutson, 113 F.3d at 30-31; Beuckelaere, 91 F.3d at

__________

9 The Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and

Eleventh Circuits have all upheld the FOPA against post-Lopez

Commerce Clause challenges. In each case, the court upheld the

defendant's conviction for possession of a machine gun. In addition,

the First Circuit has upheld a similar statute banning possession of

firearms by juveniles. See supra, note 3.

USCA Case #98-5491 Document #468769 Filed: 10/08/1999 Page 25 of 31
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

784-85 (not specifically making a finding of similar subject

matter but nonetheless relying on congressional findings in

prior acts). These cases have distinguished FOPA from the

Gun Free School Zone Act in Lopez on the ground that the

former does not represent a "sharp break" with the longstanding pattern of federal firearms legislation, but rather a

continuation of the design of earlier statutes to regulate the

interstate flow of firearms. See Rybar, 103 F.3d at 279;

Wilks 58 F.3d at 1521 n.4. That is certainly true of this Act

as well, which prohibits a particularly dangerous class of

weapons from interstate commerce.

B. The Constitutional Attack Under the Bill of Attainder

Clause

Appellants' argument that s 921(a)(30)(viii) and (ix) when

combined with s 922(v)(1) is an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder is largely disposed of by this court's recent decisions

involving the BellSouth Corporation's challenges to provisions

of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. See BellSouth Corp.

v. FCC, 162 F.3d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("BellSouth II");

BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("BellSouth I"). BellSouth II defined the framework for modern

bill of attainder analysis. Under the current interpretation of

the Bill of Attainder Clause, a law is constitutionally impermissible if it both specifically singles out individuals (or

businesses) and imposes punishment on them. See BellSouth

II, 162 F.3d at 683 (citing United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S.

303, 315 (1946)); see also Nixon v. Administrator of Gen.

Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 471-72 (1977) ("the Act's specificity, the

fact that it refers to appellant by name does not automatically

offend the Bill of Attainder Clause"). Once it is determined

that a law identifies its subject with specificity, the next

question is whether the statute inflicts punishment as defined

by Nixon. See BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 684. Under Nixon,

whether a statute inflicts a "punishment" under the Bill of

Attainder Clause depends on

(1) whether the challenged statute falls within the

historical meaning of legislative punishment; (2) whether

the statute, viewed in terms of the type and severity of

USCA Case #98-5491 Document #468769 Filed: 10/08/1999 Page 26 of 31
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

the burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further

non-punitive legislative purposes; and (3) whether the

legislative record evinces a congressional intent to punish.

See BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 684 (quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at

473, 475-76, 478).

We need not address the issue of whether the Act applies

with specificity,10 because the Act does not impose punishment on Intratec and Penn Arms as contemplated by the Bill

of Attainder Clause in Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution.

The historical meaning of legislative punishment includes a

death sentence, imprisonment, banishment, confiscation of

property and legislative bars to participation by individuals or

groups in specific employments or professions. See Nixon,

433 U.S. at 473-74; Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub.

Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 852 (1984). The Act

at issue in this case does not condemn appellants to death or

imprisonment, but rather specifies certain conduct from

which appellants must refrain in order to avoid punishment.

Appellants argue that the Act operates as a legislative bar to

their participation in specific employments or professions.

Appellants claim that the Act prohibits them from the employment or profession of manufacturing "semiautomatic assault weapons."

Those cases in which the Supreme Court has struck down

statutes which bar specific parties from employment as imposing punishment, however, are different than the present

case because all involved situations in which the ban was used

as a "mode of punishment ... against those legislatively

branded as disloyal." Nixon, 433 U.S. at 474; see United

States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (statute preventing a

__________

10 Indeed, the fact that ss 921(a)(30)(A)(viii) and (ix) name not

only the guns produced by appellants but also any copies or

duplicates of those firearms, raises a question of whether or not the

Act specifically applies to appellants. Moreover, the fact that the

definition of "semiautomatic assault weapons" includes fourteen

other firearms by name as well as three broad categories of pistols,

rifles and shotguns is evidence that Congress was not singling out

appellants, but rather aiming to prohibit an entire class of weapons.

member of the Communist Party from holding office in a

labor union); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946)

(statute cutting off salary of three named employees based on

their membership in the Communist Party); Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866) (statute requiring attorneys to take

oath that they had not aided the Confederacy before being

allowed to practice in federal court); Cummings v. Missouri,

71 U.S. 277 (1866) (state constitution provision barring those

who had aided or sympathized with the Confederacy from

teaching, holding office, or serving as a trustee for a religious

organization). This court in BellSouth I focused on the

Supreme Court's opinion in Brown which distinguished a

statute making it a crime for a member of the Communist

Party to hold a position as an officer in a labor union from

section 32 of the Banking Act which prevented members of

USCA Case #98-5491 Document #468769 Filed: 10/08/1999 Page 27 of 31
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

securities underwriting firms from working for banks that

belong to the Federal Reserve System. See BellSouth I, 144

F.3d at 65 (citing Brown, 381 F.3d at 453-55). The court in

Brown distinguished the two statutes on the ground that

while the former statute " 'inflicted its deprivation upon the

members of a group thought to present a threat to the

national security' " the latter " 'incorporate[d] no judgment

censuring or condemning any man or group of men.' " See

BellSouth I, 144 F.3d at 65 (quoting Brown, 381 U.S. at 453-

54); see also BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 686 (noting that a law

falls within the historical punishment of a bar to employment

only where there are concerns that the restrictions it imposes

violate fundamental guarantees of political and religious freedom). In this case, the ban on semiautomatic assault weapons raises no concern that Congress is singling out appellants

for punishment because they are disloyal or disfavored. Congress has rather singled out certain weapons as dangerous

and disproportionately linked to crime. Therefore, the Act's

prohibition of the specific weapons manufactured by appellants does not fall within the historical meaning of punishment.

Even if a statute does not fall within the historical definition of a punishment, this court must apply the second prong

of Nixon, which requires that a nonpunitive legislative purpose is served by the legislation. See BellSouth I, 144 F.3d

USCA Case #98-5491 Document #468769 Filed: 10/08/1999 Page 28 of 31
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

at 65. The purpose of this requirement is to "prevent

Congress from circumventing the clause by cooking up newfangled ways to punish disfavored individuals or groups." Id.

This approach recognizes that merely because a regulation is

burdensome does not mean that it constitutes punishment.

For example, the Supreme Court has upheld a statute prohibiting convicted felons from serving as officers of a waterfront

union. See DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960). The

Court reasoned that even though the statute placed a burden

on convicted felons, it did not seek to punish them but rather

to devise an effective scheme to regulate waterfront criminal

activity. Since the goal of the legislative scheme was to

improve the integrity of waterfront commerce, exclusion of

individuals previously convicted of a felony was a legitimate

means to that end. See id. at 160. Similarly, although the

Act in this case does place a particular burden on appellants,

the legislative history of the Act shows that the intent of the

Act was not to inflict punishment on appellants, but rather to

reduce the availability of semiautomatic assault weapons,

prevent the flow of such weapons into states with laws

prohibiting them, and reduce the violent crime disproportionately associated with these types of guns. See H.R. Rep. No.

103-489, at 1-2 (1994). In addition, Congress' inclusion of

copies and duplicates of the guns made by appellants, fourteen other guns by name and three broad categories of

pistols, rifles and shotguns in the definition of "semiautomatic

assault weapon" indicates that it was aiming not to punish

appellants, but rather to regulate an entire class of weapons.

See 18 U.S.C. s 922(a)(30). The text and legislative history

of the Act therefore demonstrate that the Act serves a

legitimate nonpunitive purpose.

The final prong of the Nixon test is whether the legislative

record indicates a legislative intent to punish. The case law

instructs that under this prong, appellants must show " 'unmistakable evidence of punitive intent.' " See BellSouth I,

144 F.3d at 67 (quoting Selective Serv. Sys., 468 U.S. at 856

n.15. Moreover, isolated statements are not sufficient to

show a punitive intent. See Selective Serv. Sys., 468 U.S. at

856 n.15; see also BellSouth I, 144 F.3d at 67 (requiring

USCA Case #98-5491 Document #468769 Filed: 10/08/1999 Page 29 of 31
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

" 'smoking gun' evidence of congressional vindictiveness" to

justify finding punitive intent). Appellants note that in a

footnote the House Report summarizing the Act lists all of

the semiautomatic weapons that are specifically listed in the

statute. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-489, at 20 n.35. Furthermore, appellants point out that they are repeatedly named in

the floor debates as the manufacturers of banned weapons.

These allegations fall well short of the type of evidence

required to show a legislative intent to punish. In BellSouth

I, this court held that even a few scattered remarks referring

to anti-competitive abuses committed by baby-Bells in the

past were insufficient to show the necessary legislative intent

to punish. See 144 F.3d at 67. The statements appellants

complain of do not rise to the statements in BellSouth I. In

BellSouth I, the statement singled out specific bad acts by the

party, indicating the possibility that the speaker had found

fault with the baby-Bell. Here, the mere mention of appellants' guns in the House Report and their names in the floor

debates do not so much suggest an intent to punish as

represent mere recitals of the content of the Act itself. This

is far from the unmistakable evidence of punitive intent

required by the Supreme Court in Selective Serv. Sys. See

468 U.S. at 856 n.15.

Therefore, since the prohibition effectuated by the Act

neither falls within the historical meaning of punishment, nor

exhibits a purely punitive purpose, nor manifests a congressional intent to punish appellants, it does not constitute an

unconstitutional Bill of Attainder.11

__________

11 Finally, appellants argue that the BellSouth cases and the

Nixon test should be inapposite here because the statute at issue

imposes a criminal penalty whereas the statutes in BellSouth,

Nixon and previous Bill of Attainder cases did not. See Appellants'

Reply Br., at 19-20. However, appellants are unable to point to

any authority nor give a rational justification for this distinction.

Rather, appellants argue that since the Act imposes a criminal

penalty, it automatically satisfies the punishment requirement of a

bill of attainder. Yet nowhere in Nixon or the cases subsequent to

USCA Case #98-5491 Document #468769 Filed: 10/08/1999 Page 30 of 31
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

III. Conclusion

We hold that section 110102 of the Violent Crime Control

and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 is within Congress' Commerce Clause power and does not constitute an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder. The district court's decision granting

the government's motion for summary judgment is therefore

Affirmed.

__________

it is there indication that the Nixon test doesn't apply to a statute

that imposes criminal penalties. Furthermore, appellants' argument is disproved by United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965),

which also involved a statute imposing a criminal penalty. See id.

at 438. In Brown, the Court applied the same factors as Nixon

when it inquired into the question of punishment by first considering the historical gloss on the meaning of punishment, and next

determining whether the purpose of the Act was punitive or nonpunitive. See id. at 458-59. The Court's analysis in Brown demonstrates that the factors used in the Nixon test for punishment

under the Bill of Attainder Clause apply with equal force to both

civil and criminal statutes. Indeed, the mere fact that Nixon cites

Brown as determining whether punitive or nonpunitive objectives

underlie a law is strong evidence that the Nixon Court did not

believe that a different test applied to a statute which imposed a

criminal penalty, as was the case in Brown. See 433 U.S. at 475-76

n.40.

USCA Case #98-5491 Document #468769 Filed: 10/08/1999 Page 31 of 31