Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-07470/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-07470-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

---

1

Case No. 19-CV-07470-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY 

OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

LEICA MICROSYSTEMS INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-CV-07470-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 17

The Regents of the University of Michigan (“Michigan”) bring this action for patent 

infringement against Leica Microsystems Inc. (“Leica”). ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). Michigan 

alleges that Leica infringes U.S. Patent No. 7,277,169 (the “’169 Patent”) either literally or under 

the doctrine of equivalents. See id. ¶¶ 23–53. Before the Court is Leica’s motion to dismiss for 

failure to state a claim. ECF No. 17. Having considered the submissions of the parties, the 

relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court DENIES Leica’s motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

1. The Parties

Case 5:19-cv-07470-LHK Document 56 Filed 04/30/20 Page 1 of 16
2

Case No. 19-CV-07470-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Michigan is a “constitutional corporation of the State of Michigan” primarily located in 

Ann Arbor, Michigan. Compl. ¶ 2. Michigan is the assignee and sole owner of the ’169 Patent. 

Id. ¶ 9. Leica is a Delaware corporation with its primary place of business in San Francisco, 

California. Id. ¶ 3.

2. The ’169 Patent

The ’169 Patent is titled “Whole Spectrum Fluorescence Detection with Ultrafast White 

Light Excitation.” ECF No. 1-1 (“’169 Patent”). The ’169 Patent was filed on February 16, 2006 

and issued on October 2, 2007. See id.

The ’169 Patent relates to “fluorescence measurements and, more particularly, relates to a 

method and apparatus for detecting multiple fluorophores using an ultrafast super continuum light 

source for excitation.” Id. at col. 1:23–25. Specifically, the ’169 Patent describes a novel 

fluorescence detection system that “employ[s] a single laser source to simultaneously excite a 

plurality of dye molecules and collect the entire spectrum [of light] ranging from visible to near 

infrared emitted therefrom.” Id. at col. 3:25–28. The fluorescence detection system of the ’169 

Patent features two main components, “a single source white light generation system” and a “timeresolving detector.” Id. at col. 7:46–55.

Moreover, the ’169 Patent states that it teaches “a unique approach for fluorescence 

excitation and detection in contrast to conventional fluorescence measurements.” Id. at col. 5:53–

55. The ’169 Patent highlights that “conventional fluorescence” techniques use “a single 

excitation wavelength, such as a laser source,” which can only “excite[] and thus detect[]” a 

“limited number of fluorophores that have absorption [wavelengths] matched with the excitation 

wavelength.” Id. at col. 2:23–25. In contrast, the ’169 Patent teaches the use of “a single laser 

source” which generates a “white light pulse” that comprises the entire spectrum of visible light 

and that can “simultaneously excite a plurality of dye molecules and collect the entire spectrum 

ranging from visible to near infrared emitted therefrom.” Id. at col. 3:25–28. Accordingly, 

“[u]nlike prior art systems, the usefulness of the [] teachings [of the ’169 Patent] is not dependent 

upon the use of band pass filters and/or dichroic mirrors and, thus, the present teachings [of the 

Case 5:19-cv-07470-LHK Document 56 Filed 04/30/20 Page 2 of 16
3

Case No. 19-CV-07470-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

’169 Patent] provide a significantly simplified configuration.” Id. at col. 3:28–32.

Michigan asserts “at least claim 1 of the ’169 Patent.” Compl. ¶ 26. Claim 1 of the ’169 

Patent recites:

1. A fluorescence detection system for testing a sample, said sample having a 

plurality of fluorophores, said fluorescence detection system comprising:

a single-source white light generation system outputting a supercontinuum white 

light pulse comprising an entire spectrum of white light, said supercontinuum white 

light pulse exciting the plurality of fluorophores of the sample to emit fluorescence; 

and 

a time-resolving detector receiving said fluorescence and at least a portion of said 

supercontinuum white light pulse, said time-resolving detector separating said 

fluorescence from said portion of said supercontinuum white light pulse.

’169 Patent col. 7:43–55.

3. Leica’s Accused Products

Michigan alleges that Leica’s infringing products are “each and every model of Leica’s 

SP8 confocal microscope family that employs a white light laser, including, for example, without 

limitation, the TCS SP8 X and TCS SP8 microscopes” (the “SP8 microscopes”). Compl. ¶ 25. 

Michigan alleges that the SP8 microscopes are fluorescence detection systems that allow for 

exciting a fluorophore in a sample and then detecting the fluorescence the sample emits. Id. ¶ 28–

31; Mot. at 13–14. The SP8 microscopes “employ an innovative Leica White Light Laser that is a 

single device that produces a continuous spectral output between the wavelengths of 470 and 670 

nanometers” and that “covers the full spectrum of visible light.” Compl. ¶ 28 (quotation marks 

omitted). Using this light source, the SP8 microscopes function “[b]y tuning both excitation and 

detection [wavelengths to obtain] complete excitation and emission spectra.” Id. ¶ 32. This 

tuning process also features a “beam splitter,” which splits the initial light from the light source 

into “up to eight discrete wavelengths” that ultimately contact the sample. ECF No. 17 at 13. 

Further, the SP8 microscopes feature a detector that observes the fluorescence emitted from the 

sample and also “[a]n adjustable time gate” that can function to remove “non-wanted 

fluorescence” by “switch[ing] off the data collection.” Compl. ¶¶ 35–36.

B. Procedural History

Case 5:19-cv-07470-LHK Document 56 Filed 04/30/20 Page 3 of 16
4

Case No. 19-CV-07470-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

On November 13, 2019, Michigan filed its complaint for patent infringement against 

Leica. See Compl. Michigan alleges that Leica directly infringes the ’169 Patent “literally and/or 

under the doctrine of equivalents,” and also indirectly infringes through induced and contributory 

infringement. Id. ¶¶ 25, 40–45. Michigan further alleges that Leica’s infringement merits 

enhanced damages because Leica’s infringement of the ’169 Patent is willful. Id. ¶¶ 46–52.

On January 15, 2020, Leica filed the present motion to dismiss Michigan’s complaint for 

failure to state a claim. ECF No. 17 (“Mot.”). In conjunction with Leica’s motion to dismiss, 

Leica also filed a request that the Court take judicial notice of the prosecution history of the ’169 

Patent. ECF No. 17-2. On March 5, 2020, Michigan filed an opposition to Leica’s motion to 

dismiss. ECF No. 41 (“Opp’n”). On March 19, 2020, Leica filed a reply. ECF No. 45 (“Reply”). 

On March 26, 2020, Michigan filed an objection to evidence contained in Leica’s reply brief.

ECF No. 46. On April 1, 2020, Leica filed a response to Michigan’s objection, ECF No. 49, as 

well as a motion for the Court to review Michigan’s objection, ECF No. 50.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include “a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A complaint 

that fails to meet this standard may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Rule 8(a) requires a 

plaintiff to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility 

standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Generally, motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim raise “purely procedural 

question[s] not pertaining to patent law” and are therefore governed by regional circuit law. 

McZeal v. Spring Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (applying Fifth Circuit case 

Case 5:19-cv-07470-LHK Document 56 Filed 04/30/20 Page 4 of 16
5

Case No. 19-CV-07470-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

law and vacating dismissal of a patent infringement case). However, where “the issue pertains to 

or is unique to patent law,” courts follow Federal Circuit law for “both substantive and procedural 

issues ‘intimately involved in the enforcement of the patent right.’” Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 

238 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Amana Refrigeration, Inc. v. Quadlux, Inc., 172 F.3d 

852, 855–56 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); see, e.g., Takeda Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Mylan Inc., 62 F. Supp. 3d 

1115, 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2014).

Accordingly, with respect to the pleading standard, the Court applies Ninth Circuit law to 

“accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 

1031 (9th Cir. 2008). The Court, however, need not accept as true allegations contradicted by 

judicially noticeable facts, see Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000), and it 

“may look beyond the plaintiff’s complaint to matters of public record” without converting the 

Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment, Shaw v. Hahn, 56 F.3d 1128, 1129 n.1 

(9th Cir. 1995). Nor must the Court “assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they 

are cast in the form of factual allegations.” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(per curiam). Indeed, mere “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are 

insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 

2004).

B. Direct Infringement

Direct infringement occurs when an unauthorized party “makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells 

any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented 

invention during the term of the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 

Infringement is a question of fact and “can be found when a defendant makes a product 

containing ‘each and every limitation set forth in a [patent] claim.’” CenTrak, Inc. v. Sonitor 

Techs., Inc., 915 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Cross Med. Prods. v. Medtronic Sofamor 

Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). To sufficiently plead a claim of direct 

infringement under Twombly and Iqbal, “plaintiffs [must] plausibly allege that the accused product 

Case 5:19-cv-07470-LHK Document 56 Filed 04/30/20 Page 5 of 16
6

Case No. 19-CV-07470-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

practices each of the limitations found in at least one asserted claim.” e.Digital Corp. v. iBaby 

Labs, Inc., No. 15-cv-05790-JST, 2016 WL 4427209, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2016) (collecting 

cases). 

However, to state a claim of direct infringement, the accused products may satisfy all of a 

claim’s limitations “either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.” Cheese Sys. V. Tetra Pak 

Cheese & Powder Sys., 725 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013). “[L]iteral infringement requires 

that each and every limitation set forth in a claim appear in an accused product.” Frank’s Casing 

Crew & Rental Tools, Inc. v. Weatherford Int’l, Inc., 389 F.3d 1370, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 

By contrast, “[i]nfringement under the doctrine of equivalents requires the patentee to 

prove that the accused device contains an equivalent for each limitation not literally satisfied.” 

Wi-LAN, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 811 F.3d 455, 463 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “An element in the accused 

product is equivalent to a claimed element if the differences between the two elements are 

‘insubstantial’ to one of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. 

Because the doctrine of equivalents is only relevant in the absence of literal infringement, 

courts regularly decline to consider infringement under the doctrine of equivalents where literal 

infringement has been found. See, e.g., Cheese Sys., Inc., 725 F.3d at 1349 (“This court affirms on 

the ground that the accused products literally infringe this element and so does not reach the 

alternative ground of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.”); Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott 

Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Because of this holding on the question of literal 

infringement, we need not reach Abbott's arguments concerning infringement pursuant to the 

doctrine of equivalents.”). 

C. Indirect Infringement

In addition to any direct infringement claim, a patentee may bring a claim for indirect 

infringement against a defendant under either a theory of induced infringement or contributory 

infringement. 

Induced infringement may apply where a defendant has induced a third party to directly 

infringe a patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). “For an allegation of induced infringement to survive a 

Case 5:19-cv-07470-LHK Document 56 Filed 04/30/20 Page 6 of 16
7

Case No. 19-CV-07470-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

motion to dismiss, a complaint must plead facts plausibly showing that the accused infringement 

specifically intended [another party] to infringe [the patent] and knew that the [other party]’s acts 

constituted infringement.” Nalco Co. v. Chem-Mod, LLC, 883 F.3d 1337, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 

(quoting Lifetime Indus., Inc. v. Trim-Lok, Inc., 869 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2017)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Thus, for an allegation of induced infringement, the plaintiff must 

allege that a defendant knew that another party was infringing and intended for that other party to 

infringe. Id.

A theory of contributory infringement may apply where a defendant has contributed to a 

third party’s direct infringement. See id. § 271(c). Contributory infringement refers to the “core 

notion that one who sells a component especially designed for use in a patented invention may be 

liable as a contributory infringer, provided that the component is not a staple article of commerce 

suitable for substantial noninfringing use.” Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta Computer Inc., 550 F.3d 

1325, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). Therefore, to state a claim 

for contributory infringement, one must plead that a party sells or offers to sell “a component of a 

patented . . . combination, . . . or a material . . . for use in practicing a patented processing 

constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially 

adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of 

commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use.” Nalco, 883 F.3d at 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 

(quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(c)).

Under either a theory of induced infringement or contributory infringement, indirect 

infringement requires an act of direct infringement as a predicate, and thus, there cannot be 

indirect infringement without direct infringement. See Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., 

Inc., 572 U.S. 915, 920–26 (2014).

D. Willful Infringement

Furthermore, a patentee can allege willful infringement and seek enhanced damages 

pursuant to “Section 284 of the Patent Act[,] [which] provides that, in a case of infringement, 

courts ‘may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.’” Halo Elecs., 

Case 5:19-cv-07470-LHK Document 56 Filed 04/30/20 Page 7 of 16
8

Case No. 19-CV-07470-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1928 (2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 284). For infringement 

to be willful and to merit enhanced damages, an infringer must act despite a risk of infringement 

that was “either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused 

infringer.” Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1930. “Accordingly, to state a claim for willful infringement [and 

enhanced damages], a complaint must allege that an infringer knew of the patents and then acted 

or continued to act even though the infringer knew that it was infringing or that the risk of such 

infringement was obvious.” Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple, Inc., No. 17-CV-06457-LHK, 2018 WL 

4772340, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2018) (citing Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Rec. Prods., 876 

F.3d at 1350, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).

III. DISCUSSION

In Leica’s motion to dismiss, Leica argues that the Court should dismiss Michigan’s claims 

for direct infringement, indirect infringement, and willful infringement. The Court first addresses 

Michigan’s direct infringement claim, which alleges both literal infringement and infringement 

under the doctrine of equivalents. Next, the Court turns to Michigan’s indirect infringement 

claim, and then finally, Michigan’s claim for enhanced damages via willful infringement.

1

A. Direct Infringement

Leica’s motion alleges that Leica’s accused products, i.e., the SP8 microscopes, do not 

directly infringe—either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents—because the SP8 

microscopes fail to satisfy the following limitation of independent claim 1: “said supercontinuum 

white light pulse exciting the plurality of fluorophores of the sample to emit fluorescence”

(hereafter, the “supercontinuum white light limitation”). See Mot. at 18 (quoting ’169 Patent col. 

7:45–50). Leica argues, and Michigan does not dispute for purposes of this motion, that this 

limitation is identical or functionally identical to a limitation present in the remaining independent 

1 Michigan alleges willful infringement as a separate count in the Complaint, whereby Michigan 

asserts that all of Leica’s allegedly infringing conduct, including both direct infringement and 

indirect infringement, was willful. See Compl. ¶¶ 46–52.

Case 5:19-cv-07470-LHK Document 56 Filed 04/30/20 Page 8 of 16
9

Case No. 19-CV-07470-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

claims of the ’169 Patent.

2 See id. at 18; Opp’n at 1. Moreover, Leica does not dispute that 

Michigan sufficiently alleges that the SP8 microscopes satisfy the remaining limitations of claim 

1. See Mot. at 18–23. As such, the Court need only address the parties’ dispute with regard to the 

supercontinuum white light limitation. See Mot. at 18–23.

Below, the Court first addresses literal infringement before turning to infringement under

the doctrine of equivalents.

1. Literal Infringement

Leica argues that the SP8 microscopes cannot satisfy the supercontinuum white light 

limitation in light of the limitation’s plain meaning and the patent’s specification and prosecution 

history. See id. However, Leica does not otherwise dispute that Michigan sufficiently pleads that 

the SP8 microscopes satisfy this limitation under Michigan’s interpretation of the claim. See id. 

For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that Leica’s motion would require the Court to 

construe a disputed clam term, which is inappropriate at this procedural posture.

Specifically, Leica argues that the supercontinuum white limitation, as informed by the 

’169 Patent’s specification and prosecution history, requires that the entirety of the 

“supercontinuum white light pulse” reach and excite the fluorophores in the sample. See id. at 18–

21; Reply at 6–11. Leica argues that the SP8 microscopes cannot literally infringe because the 

“SP8 microscopes excite fluorophores . . . with up to eight narrow-band (1 nm) discrete 

wavelengths” and not with the entirety of the “supercontinuum white light pulse.” Mot. at 18. 

On the other hand, Michigan argues that under the “plain meaning of the [limitation]” 

“[t]he claims would [] encompass Leica’s purported [eight] excitation lines.” Opp’n at 4–6. 

Moreover, Michigan argues that Leica mischaracterizes both the specification of the ’169 Patent 

and the patent’s prosecution history. Id. at 6–14. Michigan protests that Leica’s “entire argument 

2 The other independent claims from the ’169 Patent are claims 10 and 19. Claim 10 recites an 

identical limitation as to that in claim 1. ’169 Patent col. 8:29–31. Claim 19 features an 

analogous limitation that recites “said supercontinuum white light pulse exciting the first 

fluorophore and the second fluorophore to emit a first florescence and a second fluorescence 

respectively.” Id. at col. 9:5–8.

Case 5:19-cv-07470-LHK Document 56 Filed 04/30/20 Page 9 of 16
10

Case No. 19-CV-07470-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

in its motion to dismiss” is an improper attempt at premature claim construction. Id. at 8–9.

Although Leica argues that “[n]o claim construction is needed,” Reply at 2, the Court 

disagrees. Leica’s motion to dismiss would require the Court to decide whether the 

supercontinuum white light limitation requires all or only a portion of the “supercontinuum white 

light pulse” to physically reach and excite the fluorophores in the sample. See Mot. at 18; Opp’n 

at 9. Leica’s argument for dismissal is fundamentally an issue of claim construction. See

Clearstream Wastewater Sys. V. Hydro-Action, 206 F.3d 1440, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[C]laim 

construction [is where] the scope and meaning of the patent claims asserted are determined.”); 

United States Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Claim 

construction is a matter of resolution of disputed meanings and technical scope.”). Thus, 

unsurprisingly, both parties rely on the claim language, the specification, and the prosecution 

history of the ’169 Patent to justify their respective interpretations of the supercontinuum white 

light limitation and argue whether this construction could encompass Leica’s SP8 microscopes. 

See Mot. at 19–20; Opp’n at 4–8; Reply at 6–10. 

These arguments, and this type of evidence, are more appropriately presented during claim 

construction. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (describing 

claim construction as heavily dependent on “intrinsic evidence,” which includes the claims 

themselves, the patent’s specification, and the patent’s prosecution history). By contrast, it is 

inappropriate to resolve a claim construction dispute on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim of infringement for at least three reasons. First, this District's Patent Local Rules establish 

the proper procedure for claim construction proceedings. See Patent L.R. 4. Under Patent Local 

Rule 4, claim construction proceeds in an orderly fashion after the parties disclose their asserted 

claims, infringement contentions, and invalidity contentions. 

Second, an assessment of claim construction often requires the consideration of extrinsic 

evidence—such as expert reports—which are not generally considered on a motion to dismiss for 

failure to state a claim. “The words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary 

meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the 

Case 5:19-cv-07470-LHK Document 56 Filed 04/30/20 Page 10 of 16
11

Case No. 19-CV-07470-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

invention.” Kara Tech. Inc. v. Stamps.com Inc., 582 F.3d 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citation 

omitted). “Because the meaning of a claim term as understood by persons of skill in the art is 

often not immediately apparent, and because patentees frequently use terms idiosyncratically, the 

court looks to those sources available to the public that show what a person of skill in the art 

would have understood disputed claim language to mean.’” Id. at 1314 (quotation marks omitted). 

“Those sources include the words of the claims themselves, the remainder of the specification, the 

prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence concerning relevant scientific principles, the meaning 

of technical terms, and the state of the art.’” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Third, even if the Court adopted a construction favorable to Leica, the Court would still 

need to assess infringement, which itself is “a question of fact.” Bd. of Regents v. BENQ Am. 

Corp., 533 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Fact disputes, such as the question of infringement, 

are inappropriate for a Court to resolve on a motion to dismiss, where a court must resolve factual 

disputes in favor of the plaintiff. See Manzarek, 519 F.3d at 1031 (“[A court must] accept factual 

allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party.”). 

Along these lines, both the Federal Circuit and this Court have held that a claim 

construction dispute is not appropriate to resolve on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 

of infringement. For instance, in Nalco Co. v. Chem-Mod, LLC, the Federal Circuit reversed a 

district court’s dismissal of a patent infringement case because the defendants’ “objections to [the

plaintiff’s] proposed claim construction [was] a dispute not suitable for resolution on a motion to 

dismiss.” 883 F.3d 1337, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In Nalco, the district court dismissed the 

plaintiff’s claims because the district court “concluded that the ‘[accused product] differ[ed] from 

the [asserted patent claims] in both the location and method of application.’” Id. at 1347. On 

appeal, plaintiff argued that the “district court must have [implicitly] construed” a disputed claim 

term, which plaintiff argued on appeal “was inappropriate at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.” Id. In 

reversing the district court, the Federal Circuit found that plaintiff’s infringement theory rested on 

a plausible interpretation of the disputed term and that “[d]efendants’ objections to [plaintiff’s] 

Case 5:19-cv-07470-LHK Document 56 Filed 04/30/20 Page 11 of 16
12

Case No. 19-CV-07470-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

theory of infringement read like classic Markman [claim construction] arguments.” Id. at 1349. 

As such, the Federal Circuit concluded that “[d]efendants’ arguments boil down to objections to 

[plaintiff’s] proposed claim construction,” which the panel held was “not appropriate to 

resolve . . . on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, without the benefit of claim construction.” Id. at 1350.

Similarly, in Fujitsu Ltd. v. Belkin Int’l, Inc., this Court held that “[c]laim construction and 

infringement analysis should not be resolved on a motion to dismiss.” 782 F. Supp. 2d 868, 890 

(N.D. Cal. 2011). There, the defendants argued in a motion to dismiss that defendants’ product 

could not plausibly infringe the asserted patent because “in order to infringe the [patent], they 

must operate three separate and distinct devices.” Id. at 886. In opposition, plaintiff argued that 

defendants’ “argument rest[ed] on an erroneous construction” of the claims and that infringement 

could occur “with only a single device.” Id. In ruling on the motion to dismiss, the Court found 

that the “[dispositive] issue turn[ed] on claim construction” and that defendants’ briefing largely 

amounted to an argument on the scope of the patent’s claims. Id. at 889. As such, the Court 

found that “[i]f the Court were to construe the [patent’s] claims at the motion to dismiss stage, it 

would be starting the process of evaluating the merits of [plaintiff’s] case.” Id. Accordingly, the 

Court ruled that defendants’ motion was “not the proper time to initiate claim construction.” Id. at 

890.

Other district courts have similarly denied motions to dismiss that would require the court 

to construe claims and resolve questions of infringement. Opp’n at 14–15; see, e.g., Par Pharm., 

Inc. v. Hospira, Inc., No. 17-944-JFB-SRF, 2018 WL 3343238, at *3 (D. Del. May 11, 2018) 

(“Because construction of the disputed claim term is critical to the viability of [Plaintiff’s] 

infringement contentions, the court cannot properly render a dispositive decision on infringement 

prior to the issuance of a Markman ruling in the present case.”); Pressure Specialist, Inc. v. Next 

Gen Mfg., No. 17-CV-6582, 2018 WL 572834, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2018) (“[T]he Court will 

not ‘engage in an infringement analysis at the pleading stage’ or attempt to analyze—before any 

claim construction—the scope of the patent or the differences between the [accused product] and 

Plaintiff’s [claim].” (quoting Lecat’s Ventriloscope v. MT Tool & Mfg., No. 16-C-5298, 2017 WL 

Case 5:19-cv-07470-LHK Document 56 Filed 04/30/20 Page 12 of 16
13

Case No. 19-CV-07470-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

1362036, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2017)); Anglefix Tech, LLC v. Nuvasive, Inc., No. 13-CV-983-

BEN (RBB), 2014 WL 197736, at *2–3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2014) (“[Defendant’s] [m]otion must 

fail because its argument requires this Court to construe key terms in the patent at the pleading 

stage.”); Deston Therapeutics LLC v. Trigen Labs., Inc., 723 F. Supp. 2d 665, 672 (D. Del. 2010) 

(“While it is true that claim construction is a matter of law to be determined by the Court, the 

process for properly construing a patent claim is unsuited for a motion to dismiss.”).

However, the Federal Circuit has created a narrow exception when an infringement theory 

rests on an implausible claim construction. Specifically, in Ottah v. Fiat Chrysler, the Federal 

Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a pro se plaintiff’s claim of patent infringement. 

884 F.3d 1135, 1141–42 (Fed. Cir. 2018). There, the district court had found that the asserted 

patent contained “no claim that c[ould] be plausibly construed” to cover the defendants’ product. 

Id. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the patent’s claim, which was to a “book holder,” 

covered the defendants’ camera even though the patent “d[id] not mention a camera or recite 

typical functions or components of a camera.” Id. at 1141. In affirming the district court, the 

Federal Circuit held that the “[asserted] claim . . . is explicitly limited to books” and that “the 

‘book holder’ cannot plausibly be construed to include [defendants’ device].” Id. at 1141–42.

Here, Leica attempts to get around Nalco and Fujitsu by simply arguing that Michigan’s 

“infringement allegations rest on an unreasonable view of the claim language.” See Reply at 2. 

As such, Leica argues that Ottah applies to the current case, rather than Nalco or Fujitsu. See id.

at 10–11. The Court disagrees.

Contrary to Leica’s assertion, Michigan identifies language in the claims and in the 

specification to argue that the disputed limitation does not require the entirety of the 

“supercontinuum white light pulse” to reach and excite the fluorophores in the samples. See 

Opp’n at 4–8. Specifically, Michigan argues that “‘said supercontinuum white light pulse exciting 

the plurality of fluorophores of the sample to emit fluorescence’ refers to the fact that the light that 

excites the fluorophores . . . is supplied by, and must originate at, the ‘single-source white light 

generation system.’” Id. at 6. Michigan explains that “[t]he plain language of the claims requires 

Case 5:19-cv-07470-LHK Document 56 Filed 04/30/20 Page 13 of 16
14

Case No. 19-CV-07470-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

a single-source of white light that supplies the light for excitation regardless of whether one or 

hundreds of wavelengths reach the sample as the purpose of that portion of the invention was to 

eliminate the need for multiple lasers.” Id. At this juncture, the Court cannot agree that it is 

implausible that a person of ordinary skill in the art could understand the limitation’s recitation of 

a “supercontinuum white light pulse exciting the [] fluorophores” to mean that the supercontinuum 

of white light merely provides the source of light to excite the fluorophores, as Michigan argues, 

rather than that the full spectrum of light must excite the fluorophores, as Leica argues. See ’169 

Patent col. 7:45–50.

Accordingly, the instant case is readily distinguishable from Ottah. In Ottah, the Federal 

Circuit found that the patentee’s claim was facially implausible because it attempted to stretch a 

patent claim for a “book holder” to cover a “camera,” which was entirely absent and distinct from 

the patented invention. Ottah, 884 F.3d at 1141–42. By contrast, Leica merely disputes 

Michigan’s plausible interpretation of a claim term. Opp’n at 4–8. Unlike Ottah, the instant case 

presents legal questions as to the interpretation of the supercontinuum white light limitation and

factual questions as to whether the SP8 microscopes infringe. As such, in contrast to Ottah, the 

Court here requires a complete record with which to decide questions of claim construction and 

infringement. Ottah is inapposite.

Therefore, the Court finds that Leica’s motion to dismiss for noninfringement amounts to 

an objection to Michigan’s plausible interpretation of a disputed claim limitation, which the Court 

finds premature to resolve at this point. Accordingly, Nalco and Fujitsu are on all fours with this 

case. As a result, as in Nalco and Fujitsu, the Court declines to construe the scope of the disputed 

limitation “without the benefit of claim construction.” Nalco, 883 F.3d at 1350. Moreover, 

because the Court finds that claim construction of the supercontinuum white light limitation is 

premature, the Court finds that it is unnecessary to assess and weigh the prosecution history of the 

’169 Patent. Because the Court does not evaluate the ’169 Patent’s prosecution history at this 

Case 5:19-cv-07470-LHK Document 56 Filed 04/30/20 Page 14 of 16
15

Case No. 19-CV-07470-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

time, the Court DENIES Leica’s motion to take judicial notice of the prosecution history.3 ECF 

No. 17-2.

In sum, because Leica does not dispute that the SP8 microscopes infringe under 

Michigan’s interpretation of the supercontinuum white light limitation, and because the Court 

finds Michigan’s interpretation of this limitation plausible, the Court concludes that Michigan has 

adequately pled literal direct infringement. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Leica’s motion to 

dismiss Michigan’s claim of literal direct infringement.

2. Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents

The Court next turns to Leica’s argument that Michigan fails to state a claim of 

infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Specifically, Leica argues that “any allegation of 

infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is precluded by prosecution history estoppel.” Mot. 

at 21. However, “[p]rosecution history estoppel applies as a limitation to the doctrine of 

equivalents after the claims have been properly interpreted and no literal infringement is found.” 

GE Co. v. Nintendo Co. Ltd., 179 F.3d 1350, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting Loctite Corp. v. 

Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). As discussed above, courts regularly decline 

to reach arguments about infringement under the doctrine of equivalents where literal infringement 

has been sufficiently established. See, e.g., Cheese Sys., Inc., 725 F.3d at 1349. Accordingly, 

because the Court found that Michigan sufficiently pleaded literal infringement, the Court need 

not reach any of Leica’s arguments concerning infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Leica’s motion to dismiss Michigan’s claim of direct 

infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.

3 The Court also notes that Michigan filed an objection to Leica’s inclusion of and reliance on a 

provisional patent application in Leica’s reply brief. See ECF No. 46. However, because the 

Court denies Leica’s request for judicial notice as to the ’169 Patent’s prosecution history, and 

because the provisional application is part of the ’169 Patent’s prosecution history, the Court need 

not separately address Michigan’s objection. See, e.g., L.A. Biomedical Research Inst. at Harbor- UCLA Med. Ctr. v. Eli Lilly Co., 849 F.3d 1049, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (assessing a provisional 

patent application as part of a patent’s prosecution history). Accordingly, Michigan’s objection is 

OVERRULED. Similarly, Leica’s motion seeking review of Michigan’s objection is DENIED as 

moot. ECF No. 50.

Case 5:19-cv-07470-LHK Document 56 Filed 04/30/20 Page 15 of 16
16

Case No. 19-CV-07470-LHK 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

B. Indirect Infringement

Michigan alleges that Leica indirectly infringes the ’169 Patent through induced 

infringement and contributory infringement. See Compl. ¶¶ 40–43. However, Leica’s arguments 

regarding indirect infringement merely restate Leica’s arguments regarding direct infringement, 

and Leica does not offer any independent reason why the Court should dismiss Michigan’s

remaining claims. See Mot. at 23 (“Because the Complaint does not state a plausible claim for 

direct infringement for the reasons discussed above, there can be no indirect infringement as a 

matter of law.”). Therefore, because the Court already rejected Leica’s arguments concerning 

direct infringement as discussed above, the Court DENIES Leica’s motion to dismiss with respect 

to indirect infringement.

C. Willful Infringement

Finally, Michigan alleges that Leica’s direct and indirect infringement warrant enhanced 

damages because the infringement was willful. See Compl. ¶¶ 46–52. Leica merely argues that 

Michigan’s willful infringement claim fails “[b]ecause the Complaint does not state a plausible 

claim for direct infringement.” See Mot. at 23 (“[I]t is axiomatic that in the absence of 

infringement there can be no willful infringement.”). Therefore, because the Court already 

rejected Leica’s arguments concerning direct infringement as discussed above, the Court DENIES 

Leica’s motion to dismiss with respect to willful infringement.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Leica’s motion to dismiss.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 30, 2020

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

Case 5:19-cv-07470-LHK Document 56 Filed 04/30/20 Page 16 of 16