Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_02-cv-00656/USCOURTS-azd-2_02-cv-00656-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 “Dkt.” refers to documents filed in this action.

2

 Kent Cattani, counsel for Respondents, confirmed Respondents’ position in a

phone call with Court staff on February 7, 2006.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Graham S. Henry, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, 

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 02-656-PHX-SRB

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER RE: PETITIONER’S MOTION

FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE

AMENDED PETITION

Before the Court is Petitioner’s motion for a 120-day extension to file an amended

petition in this capital habeas matter. (Dkt. 131.)1

 The motion states that Respondents have

agreed to a 90-day extension, but oppose a longer one.2

 For the reasons set forth herein, the

Court finds good cause for the requested extension and concludes that equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations is warranted.

BACKGROUND

Following the conclusion of state post-conviction proceedings on March 19, 2002,

Petitioner initiated these habeas proceedings by filing a skeletal petition on April 10, 2002,

summarily raising five claims for relief. (Dkt. 1.) The Court appointed counsel and provided

leave to amend. (Dkts. 3, 11, 15, 26.) In March 2003, prior to completion of the amended

Case 2:02-cv-00656-SRB Document 132 Filed 02/08/06 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

petition and on the eve of expiration of the statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d), the parties stipulated to an extension of time to file an amended petition and

Respondents expressly agreed not to raise an affirmative defense to the amended petition

filed within the extended deadline. (Dkt. 29.) The Court granted the stipulation as well as

three subsequent stipulations filed in conjunction with further requested extensions. (Dkts.

31, 46, 47, 48, 49, 56, 57.) On the eve of the deadline to file the amended petition, as

extended, counsel sought and was granted an evidentiary hearing concerning Petitioner’s

competence to assist them in these proceedings. See Rohan v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803 (9th

Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1069 (2004). In conjunction with habeas counsel’s request

for an evidentiary hearing, Respondents stipulated to a waiver of the statute of limitations and

subsequently agreed to extend the stipulation to allow for the filing of an amended petition

“not later than fourteen days from the date” Petitioner received notice of any ruling by the

Court finding him competent. (Dkts. 29, 46, 48, 56, 60.) While the competency issue was

under advisement and for unrelated reasons, counsel was granted leave to withdraw and the

Federal Public Defender was substituted to represent Petitioner. (Dkt. 127.) The Court

thereafter issued a decision finding Petitioner competent to assist counsel in these

proceedings and, pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, directed Petitioner to file an

amended petition within fourteen days from the filing date of that Order, or February 7, 2006.

(See dkts. 61, 130.) The instant motion followed.

DISCUSSION

In Mayle v. Felix, 125 S. Ct. 2562 (2005), the Supreme Court held that new claims,

presented in an amended habeas petition filed after the limitations period under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d) has run, do not relate back to a previously-filed petition to the extent they assert

grounds for relief supported by facts that differ in time and type from those contained in the

earlier petition. Petitioner seeks an extension of time to file an amended petition which, if

granted, will result in the filing of an amended petition beyond the AEDPA’s statute of

limitation and Respondents’ stipulated waiver of the limitation period. 

Case 2:02-cv-00656-SRB Document 132 Filed 02/08/06 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

In Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1815 n.8 (2005), the Supreme Court

assumed without deciding that the AEDPA’s statute of limitation could be equitably tolled.

Citing the standard for equitable tolling set forth in Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498

U.S. 89, 96 (1990), the Court observed that a litigant generally “bears the burden of

establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that

some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 125 S.Ct. at 1814. Federal

appellate courts have held that the AEDPA statute of limitation may be equitably tolled,

applying the same criteria. See Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d

1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v. United States

Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Howell v. Crosby, 415 F.3d

1250 (11th Cir. 2005); Brambles v. Duncan, 412 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2005); Taliani v.

Chrans, 189 F.3d 597, 597-98 (7th Cir. 1999); Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 810-11 (5th

Cir. 1998); Miller v. New Jersey State Dep’t Corr., 145 F.3d 616, 617-19 (3d Cir. 1998);

Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998). Thus, the Ninth Circuit has held that the

limitation period may be equitably tolled when “‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288.

In Beeler, the petitioner’s original counsel withdrew before the first habeas petition

had been prepared. The district court found that although counsel had proceeded diligently

in preparing the petition, much of his work product was unusable by replacement counsel.

The Ninth Circuit agreed and concluded that these were “extraordinary circumstances” that

justified equitable tolling. Id. at 1288-89. Further, the Ninth Circuit approved addressing

equitable tolling without requiring a petitioner to first miss the filing deadline and then raise

equitable tolling as a defense to a claim of untimeliness. Calderon v. United States Dist.

Court (Beeler), 112 F.3d 386, 391, as amended and superseded by 128 F.3d 1283. In Kelly,

the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s application of equitable tolling based on the

court’s previous stay of litigation pending competency proceedings and the petitioner’s

Case 2:02-cv-00656-SRB Document 132 Filed 02/08/06 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

alleged incompetency, as well as for a reasonable period after the district court issued its

competency determination. 163 F.3d at 541.

In this case, Petitioner’s former habeas counsel challenged Petitioner’s competence,

despite Petitioner’s objections. Respondents conceded that Petitioner’s state record and

habeas counsel’s avowals raised a legitimate concern regarding Petitioner’s competence to

assist in these proceedings and thereafter agreed to a limited waiver of the statute of

limitations. Subsequently, for reasons wholly unrelated to this case, habeas counsel sought

and were granted leave to withdraw and the FPD was substituted. As the FPD asserts,

drafting an amended petition will entail review of voluminous records and consultation with

Petitioner, notwithstanding prior counsel’s work in the case to date. For these reasons, the

Court finds that a 120-day extension is reasonable under the circumstances and will grant

Petitioner’s request. Further, the Court concludes that the statute of limitations is subject to

equitable tolling as to any “new” claims presented in an amended petition filed within this

120-day period.

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file his amended

petition is GRANTED. (Dkt. 131.) Petitioner shall file his amended petition no later than

June 7, 2006. 

DATED this 8th day of February, 2006.

Case 2:02-cv-00656-SRB Document 132 Filed 02/08/06 Page 4 of 4