Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-07012/USCOURTS-caDC-94-07012-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 10, 1995 Decided July 28, 1995

No. 94-7012

CORAMAE ELLA GARY,

APPELLANT

v.

JAMES EDWARD LONG, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(90cv03076)

Charles W. Scarborough argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Woodley B. Osborne argued the cause and filed the brief for appellee Long.

Gerard J. Stief, Associate General Counsel, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

("WMATA"), with whom Robert L. Polk, General Counsel, and Robert J. Kniaz, Deputy General

Counsel, WMATA, were on the brief, argued the cause for appellee WMATA.

Karen M. Moran, Attorney, United States Equal Employment OpportunityCommission, argued the

cause and filed the brief for amicus curiae.

Before BUCKLEY, WILLIAMS, and SENTELLE, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BUCKLEY.

BUCKLEY, Circuit Judge: Coramae Ella Gary alleges that her employer, the Washington

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ("WMATA"), and one of its supervisory employees, James

Edward Long, violated Title VII ofthe CivilRights Act of 1964 and committed various common law

torts by subjecting her to sexual harassment. The district court granted appellees' motions for

summary judgment, dismissing the Title VII claims against WMATA and refusing to exercise

jurisdiction over Gary's common law tort claims. A magistrate judge then dismissed Gary's Title VII

claim against Long. We affirm the dismissal of the Title VII claims and remand the others.

I. BACKGROUND

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In reviewing a district court's decision on a motion for summary judgment, we must consider

the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Accordingly, the following account of Long's conduct is

based on the allegations in Gary's complaint and deposition.

Coramae Gary began working at WMATA in May 1983 and was promoted to the position

ofstock clerk in 1987. Beginning in April 1988, Long, her second-level supervisor, began a pattern

of sexual harassment. Long first attempted to entice Gary into having sexual relations with him

through promisesthat he could make her job easier. After this carrot proved unsuccessful, Long tried

using a stick. He repeatedly threatened Gary with adverse employment consequences, including

termination of employment, ifshe did not submit to his advances. Long made crude references to her

body, regularly expressed his desire to have sex with her, threatened to "get" her for refusing to meet

with him, and indicated that he would have her fired ifshe told anybody of hissexual advances. Gary

unfailingly rejected Long's overtures and made him aware that they were unwelcome.

Long's harassment was not limited to verbal abuse. According to Gary, in May or June of

1989, under the pretext of conducting an inspection of a WMATA construction site, Long drove her

to a secluded storage facility and, while driving, fondled her breasts and rubbed his hands between

her legs. Upon their arrival at the storage facility, he raped her. Thereafter, Long threatened reprisals

if Gary told anyone what had happened. Gary was subsequently in an automobile accident and did

not return to work until January 1990, whereupon Long resumed his verbal harassment.

On February 14, 1990, Gary reported Long'ssexual harassment to a WMATA counselor and

later filed a formal grievance with WMATA. Three months later, Gary filed a charge of sexual

harassment with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. After receiving a "right to sue"

letter from the agency, Gary filed this action against Long and WMATA in the U.S. District Court

for the District ofColumbia. In her complaint, she alleged that Long and WMATA had discriminated

against her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988), and

that Long and WMATA had committed various common law torts, including battery, invasion of

privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Gary's Title VII claim was premised on the

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"hostile environment" theory of sexual harassment: She alleged that Long's "actions ... created a

sexually hostile atmosphere detrimental to [Gary's] emotional and physical health...." Complaint ¶

13. Gary also argues that her Title VII claim effectively asserts a claim of "quid pro quo" sexual

harassment. Brief for Appellant at 20-23.

In response to Gary's allegations, WMATA stated that it had not received notice of the

alleged sexualharassment untilFebruary28, 1990. On its receipt, WMATA conducted an immediate,

detailed investigation of the charges and concluded that there was no corroborating evidence to

support them. WMATA also reassigned Gary to another facility where she could avoid further

contact with Long.

WMATA noted that, at all relevant times, it had an "active and firm policy against sexual

harassment." For example, it sponsored numerous seminars on sexual harassment, issued notices to

all employees that such conduct would not be tolerated at any level, published a Civil Rights Policy

Statement, prominently displayed the names, photographs, and telephone numbers of its Equal

Employment Opportunity Counselors, and established, publicized, and enforced its discrimination

complaint procedures. These procedures provided employees with the right to complain informally

to EEO Counselors and formally to WMATA's Office ofCivilRights, the right to representation, and

the right to an internal review of any unfavorable determinations.

On December 2, 1992, the district court dismissed Gary's Title VII claim against WMATA.

In an unpublished opinion, the court held that

[a]n employer is not liable for the hostile environment created by a supervisor when

the employer (1) has done nothing to indicate that it sanctionsthe type of conduct for

which the offending supervisor is accused, (2) has a strong policy against sexual

harassment and has made available to employees an avenue of complaint which steers

clear of the offending supervisor, and (3) takes prompt remedial measures as soon as

it is alerted of the situation.

Gary v. WMATA, Civ. A. No. 90-3076 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 1992) ("Memorandum Opinion and Order").

Without explanation, the court also declined to exercise jurisdiction over Gary's common law tort

claims.

By consent of the parties, the district court referred the Title VII claim against Long to a

magistrate judge. The magistrate judge dismissed the claim, holding that individual supervisors

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cannot be held personally liable for monetary damages under Title VII. Gary appeals these decisions.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Gary's Title VII Claim Against WMATA

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer

(1) ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex....

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988). The Supreme Court has held that

this language is not limited to "economic" or "tangible" discrimination. The phrase

"terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" evinces a congressional intent to

strike at the entire spectrumof disparate treatment ofmen and women in employment,

which includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive

environment.

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts

have found sexual harassment to be discriminatory in either oftwo circumstances: the grant or denial

of an economic quid pro quo in exchange forsexualfavors,see, e.g., Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc.,

915 F.2d 777, 782-83 (1st Cir. 1990); Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l Management Co., 805 F.2d 644,

648 (6th Cir. 1986), or discrimination that has created a hostile or abusive work environment. See,

e.g., Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986); Hirschfeld v. New Mexico

Corrections Dep't, 916 F.2d 572, 575 (10th Cir. 1990). In the latter context, the Supreme Court has

noted that

[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and

insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's

employment and create an abusive working environment, Title VII is violated.

Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Because Title VII only prohibits an "employer" from discriminating on the basis of sex, the

question arises as to when courts should impute to the employer the sexual harassment of one

employee by another. The statute defines "employer" to include "any agent of" an employer. 42

U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988). Although, in Meritor, the Supreme Court declined to issue a definitive

rule on employer liability for sexual harassment of one employee by another, the Court did offer the

following guidance:

Congresswanted courtsto look to agency principlesfor guidance in this area. While

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such common-law principles may not be transferable in all their particulars to Title

VII, Congress' decision to define "employer" to include any "agent" of an employer

surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for which

employers under Title VII are to be held responsible. For this reason, we hold that

the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that employers are always automatically

liable forsexualharassment bytheirsupervisors. See generally Restatement(Second)

of Agency §§ 219-237 (1958). For the same reason, absence of notice to an employer

does not necessarily insulate that employer from liability.

Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Accordingly, in determining

whether an employer may be held liable, under Title VII, for acts ofsexual harassment, we will apply

the commonlawprinciples of agency, with particularreliance on theRestatement (Second) ofAgency

("Restatement").

1. Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment

As the name suggests,

[t]he gravamen of a quid pro quo claim is that a tangible job benefit or privilege is

conditioned on an employee's submission to sexual black-mail and that adverse

consequences follow from the employee's refusal.

Carrero v. NewYork City Hous. Authority, 890 F.2d 569, 579 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Meritor, 477

U.S. at 76 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment) ("[E]veryCourt of Appealsthat has considered the

issue has held that sexual harassment by supervisory personnel is automatically imputed to the

employer when the harassment results in tangible detriment to the subordinate employee.");

Chamberlin, 915 F.2d at 783 (quid pro quo harassment exists where victim'sresponse to unwelcome

sexual advances affects "tangible aspects of her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment") (ellipses omitted); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1414 (10th Cir. 1987)

(same).

Although not explicitly alleged in her complaint, Gary asserts that Long's conduct gave rise

to a Title VII claim under a quid pro quo theory of sexual harassment. She argues that "[w]hen, as

in this case, the conduct creating a hostile work environment consists of work-related threats and

promises by a supervisor with actual or apparent authority to make good on those threats and

promises, the distinction between the quid pro quo and hostile work environment theories makes no

practical difference." Brief for Appellant at 23.

WMATA counters that Long's conduct cannot properly be characterized as quid pro quo

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harassment because he lacked the authority to fire or suspend Gary. WMATA also asserts that

because, in her complaint, Gary limited her sexual harassment claim to a hostile work environment

theory,she cannot raise a quid pro quo theory for the first time on appeal. We need not address these

defenses however, because even assuming that a quid pro quo theory is properly before this court,

we agree that there can be no such harassment in this case.

Under the circumstances alleged here, it takes more than saber rattling alone to impose quid

pro quo liability on an employer; the supervisor must have wielded the authority entrusted to him to

subject the victim to adverse job consequences as a result of her refusal to submit to unwelcome

sexual advances. See Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1127 (10th Cir. 1993) ("If the

plaintiff can show that she suffered an economic injury from her supervisor's actions, the employer

becomes strictly liable without any further showing of why the employer should be responsible for

the supervisor's conduct.") (quoting Kotcher v. Rosa and Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59,

62 (2d Cir. 1992); Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., Autolite Div., 970 F.2d 178, 186 (6th Cir. 1992)

("[T]he employee's refusal to submit to the supervisor's sexual demands [must have] resulted in a

tangible job detriment.") (quoting Highlander, 805 F.2d at 648); Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1414 (quid pro

quo sexualharassment exists whenadverse job consequencesresult fromemployee'srefusalto submit

to sexual advances); Highlander, 805 F.2d at 649 (no cause of action for quid pro quo sexual

harassment where "the record [is] totally devoid of any evidence tending to demonstrate that plaintiff

was denied a job benefit or suffered a job detriment as a result of her failure to engage in the activity

suggested by [defendant]"); but see Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 513 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[A]

supervisor'sintertwining of a request for the performance ofsexualfavors with a discussion of actual

or potential job benefits or detriments in a single conversation constitutes quid pro quo sexual

harassment."). To hold otherwise would be to impose liability on the employer without evidence that

the supervisor has acted asits agent. Although Gary alleged that Long repeatedly threatened her with

adverse job consequencesifshe did not submit to hissexual advances, those threats were not carried

out. Accordingly, we hold that Gary has failed to make out a claim of quid pro quo sexual

harassment.

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2. Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment

Whereas a supervisor's mere threat or promise of job-related harmor benefitsin exchange for

sexualfavors does not constitute quid pro quo harassment, either maycreate or contribute to a hostile

work environment. Such conduct will be actionable if it is "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter

the conditions ofthe victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Meritor, 477

U.S. at 67 (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). As the Supreme Court noted in Harris,

Title VII comesinto play before the harassing conduct leadsto a nervous breakdown.

A discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not seriously affect

employees' psychological well-being, can and often will detract from employees' job

performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from

advancing in their careers. Moreover, even without regard to these tangible effects,

the very fact that the discriminatory conduct wasso severe or pervasive that it created

a work environment abusive to employees because of their ... gender ... offends Title

VII's broad rule of workplace equality.

Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370-71.

There is no doubt that Long's alleged conduct wassufficiently severe and pervasive to create

a hostile work environment. If proven to be true, Long's repeated verbal and physical harassment of

Gary, culminating in a rape, is "not only pervasive harassment but also criminal conduct of the most

serious nature" that is "plainly sufficient to state a claimfor "hostile environment'sexual harassment."

Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.

The question remains, however, whether WMATA may be held liable for the appalling

conduct attributed to Long. WMATA argues that in order to hold an employer liable for a hostile

work environment, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer knew or should have known of

the alleged harassment and failed to take remedial action. Gary concedes that the "knew or should

have known" standard is appropriate in certain circumstances, but argues that where a supervisor

invokes his power as a supervisor to create a hostile work environment, employer liability is

appropriate even absent the employer's actual or imputed knowledge of the harassment.

We resolve the question of WMATA's liability for Long's conduct by applying common law

principles of agency. As a general rule, "[a] master is not subject to liability for the torts of his

servants acting outside the scope of their employment...." Restatement § 219(2). In certain

circumstances, however, a master may be held liable for the servant's conduct outside the scope of

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his employment. See Restatement §§ 219(2)(a)-(d). The exception to the rule on which Gary relies

is described in section 219(2)(d). It provides that the master may be held liable if

the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was

reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the

existence of the agency relation.

Id. § 219(2)(d) (emphasis added). Gary argues that WMATA falls within this exception to the

general rule because Long was aided by his employer-delegated authority in carrying out the

harassment.

In a sense, a supervisor is always "aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the

agency" because his responsibilities provide proximity to, and regular contact with, the victim. As

Judge MacKinnon noted some years ago, however,such a reading ofsection 219(2)(d) "argue[s] too

much." Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (MacKinnon, J., concurring). The

commentary to the Restatement suggeststhat this exception embraces a narrower concept that holds

the employer liable only if the tort was "accomplished by an instrumentality, or through conduct

associated with the agency status." Id. (citing Restatement § 219 cmt. e). Thus a telegraph company

may be held liable for a tort committed by a telegraph operator who sends a false telegraph message,

as may the undisclosed principal of a store whose manager cheats a customer. Id. In such cases,

"[l]iability is based upon the fact that the agent's position facilitates the consummation of the [tort],

in that from the point of view of the third person the transaction seems regular on its face and the

agent appearsto be acting in the ordinarycourse ofthe business confided to him." Restatement § 261

cmt. a; see also id. § 219 cmt. e (citing § 261 in discussion of § 219(2)(d)).

Gary, however, cannot avail herself of the exception described in section 219(2)(d) for one

overriding reason. Unlike the individual who received the false telegram or who was cheated by the

store manager, she could not have believed (and nor does she claim) that Long was acting within the

color of his authority. It is a general principle of agency law that

[i]f a person has information which would lead a reasonable man to believe that the

agent is violating the orders of the principal or that the principal would not wish the

agent to act under the circumstances known to the agent, he cannot subject the

principal to liability.

Restatement § 166 cmt. a. As the Third Circuit noted in Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d

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103 (3d Cir. 1994),

[o]ur agency precedent requires the belief in the agent's apparent authority to be

reasonable before the principal will be bound. This theory reconciles the exonerating

effect of a remedial policy, which appears to stem from the negligence principles of

§ 219(2)(b) [ ("the master was negligent or reckless") ], with the apparent authority

theory of § 219(2)(d). It also indicates that the reasonableness of the employee's

perception of the combined message fromthe harasser and the employer isimportant.

Id. at 109 (internal citations omitted).

Based on the above, we conclude that an employer may not be held liable for a supervisor's

hostile work environment harassment if the employer is able to establish that it had adopted policies

and implemented measuressuch that the victimized employee either knew orshould have known that

the employer did not tolerate such conduct and that she could report it to the employer without fear

of adverse consequences. Cf. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72-73 (employer's nondiscrimination policy not

dispositive because it failed to address sexual harassment and grievance procedure that required

complaints first to be lodged with supervisor who, in that case, was the alleged harasser). While a

supervisor might purport to act or speak on behalf of the employer, there can be no liability if the

victim could not reasonably rely on the supervisor's representations.

Significantly, Gary does not dispute that WMATA had an active policy against sexual

harassment, conceding at oral argument that there is "no challenge to the adequacy of WMATA's

procedures in terms of providing avenues for relief for sexual harassment" and that there is no claim

that these procedures were not known by the employees. In light of that concession, we find that

Gary could not have reasonably believed that Long had the authority, apparent or otherwise, to

sexuallyharass her. Therefore, we hold that WMATA is not liable under section 219(2)(d) for Long's

alleged sexual harassment.

We do not suggest that an employer must be found liable under Title VII if it has failed to

adopt such measures; a determination of liability will always require the application of the law of

agency to the particular facts of the case. Rather, we hold that when, as here, an employer has taken

energetic measuresto discourage sexualharassment in the workplace and has established, advertised,

and enforced effective proceduresto deal with it when it does occur, it must be absolved of Title VII

liability under a hostile work environment theory of sexual harassment. That defense depends, of

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course, on the ability of the employer to establish that its employees could not reasonably have failed

to know of those measures and that its grievance procedures were clearly "calculated to encourage

victims of harassment to come forward." Id. at 73.

In this case WMATA had pursued an active and firm policy against sexual harassment

throughout the period of Gary's alleged mistreatment. WMATA had sponsored seminars on the

subject, distributed staff notices to all employees informing them that sexual harassment would not

be tolerated, publicized its Civil Rights policy statement, and made available to all employees the

names and telephone numbers of the EEO Counselors to whom they could report acts of

discrimination.

WMATA also had a detailed grievance procedure for the formal and informal internal

processing and review of discrimination complaints. As a result of Gary's complaint, for example,

a WMATA attorney met with Gary's attorney, interviewed all persons concerned; and, although he

determined that there was no corroborating evidence to support her claim, WMATA's General

Counsel granted Gary's request to be transferred to another facility to avoid contact with Long. We

find such a detailed and thorough grievance procedure to be "calculated to encourage victims of

harassment to come forward." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73.

B. Gary's Title VII Claims Against Long

As noted earlier, Gary assertsthat Long is directly liable under Title VII for his acts ofsexual

harassment. In doing so, she relies on Title VII's definition of "employer" as "a person engaged in

an industry affecting commerce who hasfifteen or more employees... and any agent of such a person

...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (emphasis added). Gary argues that the "plain and unambiguous

language" ofsection 2000e(b) can only mean that Long, as an "agent" of WMATA, is an "employer"

liable under section 2000e-2(a)(1) for discriminating against her on the basis of her sex.

While a construction of the statute to impose individual liability on an agent is facially

plausible, we agree with the Ninth Circuit that "[t]he obvious purpose of this agent provision was to

incorporate respondeat superior liability into the statute." Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d

583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, while a supervisory

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employee may be joined as a party defendant in a Title VII action, that employee must be viewed as

being sued in his capacity asthe agent of the employer, who is alone liable for a violation ofTitle VII.

See Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that "relief granted under

Title VII is against the employer, not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of

[Title VII]" (emphasis in original)).

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Gary, we find that Long qualifies as

an "employer" under Title VII because he served in a supervisory position. Because Long cannot be

held liable in his personal capacity, however, Gary's claim against him essentially merges with her

claim against WMATA. See Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993) (claim

against supervisor "is a claim against Salt Lake County itself"); Busby, 931 F.2d at 772.

Accordingly, we conclude that the magistrate judge did not err in dismissing Gary's Title VII claim

against Long.

C. Jurisdiction over the Common Law Tort Claims

In addition to her Title VII claims, Gary alleges that WMATA and Long were liable for

several common law torts, including battery, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of

emotional distress. The district court declared that it would not exercise pendent jurisdiction over

those claims, but did not explain why. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 2 (emphasis added).

As an initial matter, we hold that the district court had original jurisdiction over Gary's

common law tort claims against WMATA. Under District of Columbia law, "[t]he United States

District Courtsshall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Courts of Maryland and Virginia,

of all actions brought by or against [WMATA]...." D.C. Code Ann. § 1-2431(81) (1981). WMATA

acknowledgesthat, "at least insofar as WMATA was concerned, both the Title VII and common law

[tort] claims were properlybefore the District Court under original, not "pendent,' jurisdiction." Brief

for WMATA at 27. Thus the court erred in refusing to hear Gary's common law tort claims against

WMATA.

In arguing that the district court erred in refusing to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the

common law tort claims against both WMATA and Long, Gary relies on subsection (a) of 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1367 (Supp. III 1991), which provides that

in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district

courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to

claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same

case or controversy....

Undersubsection (c), however, "district courtsmaydecline to exercise supplementaljurisdiction over

a claim under subsection (a)" under any one of four circumstances. Id. § 1367(c). As we have

recently pointed out, "[w]hether actually to decide [the pendent claims] is a matter left to the sound

discretion of the district court, guided by consideration of the factors enumerated in 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)...." Edmondson &Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Ass'n, 48 F.3d 1260, 1265-66 (D.C.

Cir. 1995).

The district court may or maynot have erred in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over the common law tort claims against Long; but without knowing its reasons, we cannot

determine whether it abused its discretion under the statute, or even whether it had any to exercise.

Because the common law claims against him were "so related to [the common law] claims [against

WMATA] ... that they form part of the same case or controversy ...," 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), the

district court clearly had pendent jurisdiction over them. Whether it had the authority to refuse to

hear them depended on the presence of one of the factors described in section 1367(c).

Accordingly, we remand the question to the district court. If it determines that it has the

authority to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the common law claims against Long and decides

to exercise it, the district court should either remand the claims to the courts of the District of

Columbia or dismissthem without prejudice to permit Gary to file her claimsthere. See Edmondson

& Gallagher, 48 F.3d at 1267.

III. CONCLUSION

The goal of Title VII is "to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and

women in employment." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 (internal quotation marks omitted). Discriminatory

conduct that is so severe or pervasive that it creates a work environment abusive to employees

because of their sex offends this "broad rule of workplace equality." Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371. The

mere fact that an individual perpetrates sexual misconduct while in the employ of another, however,

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does not ipso jure render that action violative of Title VII.

On applying traditional common law principles of agency to the facts before us, we hold that

Gary has failed to support her Title VII sex discrimination claim against WMATA on either a quid

pro quo or hostile work environment basis. She failed to establish the first because Long did not

exercise his delegated authority to impose economic harm on her. Nor could she hold WMATA

responsible for Long's creation of a hostile work environment because in light of WMATA's

preventive policies and remedial practices, Gary knew, or should have known, that Long's conduct

was unauthorized.

We therefore affirm the district court's dismissal of Gary's Title VII claim against WMATA.

We also affirm the magistrate judge's dismissal of that claim against Long because Title VII does not

impose individual liability on supervisory employees. We remand the common law claims against

WMATA and Long, however, because the district court has original jurisdiction over the former and

must consider the propriety of asserting pendent jurisdiction over the latter.

So ordered.

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