Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00348/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00348-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEMETRIS R. JEWELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

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1:09-cv-0348 SKO 

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S

SOCIAL SECURITY COMPLAINT

(Doc. 2)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the

"Commissioner" or "Defendant") denying her applications for disability insurance benefits ("DIB")

and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act

(the "Act"). 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The matter is currently before the Court on the parties'

briefs, which were submitted, without oral argument, to the Honorable Sheila K. Oberto, United

States Magistrate Judge.1

The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. (Docs. 8, 9.) On April 7,

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2010, the action was reassigned to the Honorable Sheila K. Oberto for all purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed. R. Civ.

P. 73; see also L.R. 301, 305.

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FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

A. Prior Proceedings

Plaintiff protectivelyfiled applicationsforDIBand SSI on August 3, 2005, alleging disability

beginning September 1, 2004, due to depression and anxiety. (AR 132, 179, 477.) Following the

Commissioner's denial of her applications initially and on reconsideration, Plaintiff requested a

hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (AR 64-73, 80-86, 478-79.)

ALJ James Berry held hearings on November 27, 2007, and March 17, 2008, and issued a

decision on April 17, 2008, finding Plaintiff not disabled. (AR 19-30, 35-63.) On November 24,

2008, the Appeals Council denied review. (AR 12-15.) Therefore, the ALJ's decision became the

final decision of the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.

B. Factual Background

Plaintiff was born in 1970 and asserts she has a bachelor's degree in elementary education. 

(AR 45.) From 1996 to 1998, Plaintiff worked for a cable company as a sales representative. (AR 2

46.) Plaintiff also worked as a property manager until October 2004. (AR 46-47.) Plaintiff left 3

work as a property manager because of "real bad episodes" of depression and anxiety. (AR 47.) 

Plaintiff asserts that her depression is a lifelong problem and that she stopped working because she

"couldn't function at work," "didn't have energy," and "didn't want to live." (AR 47.) Plaintiff did

some work in 2005 through a temporary agency for one and a half months. (AR 55.) According to

Plaintiff, she left because of medical reasons, but the ALJ noted that the record indicated that she

was laid off. (AR 56, 298.) 

According to Plaintiff, in 2004 she became forgetful, and she "started hearing voices" and

"feeling really, really depressed." (AR 48.) The voices would tell her to kill herself; at one time, the

Other evidence indicates that Plaintiff reportedly worked for a cable company between June 1997 and April

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1999. (AR 186.)

Plaintiff testified in 2008 that she had worked as a property manager for eleven years. (AR 46.) Other

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evidence in the record indicates, however, that she reportedly worked as a property manager from either April 2001 or

April 2002 to September 2004. (AR 153, 186.)

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voices told her to burn down the house with her children in it. (AR 48.) She has attempted to

commit suicide three times, the last time in 2006 or 2007. (AR 48.)

In April 2004, Plaintiff was admitted to Loma Linda UniversityBehavioral Medicine Center

("Loma Linda"), where testing revealed a Global Assessment of Functioning ("GAF") of 35 on

admission and 45 at the time of discharge. In July 2005, Plaintiff admitted herself to Good

Samaritan Hospital Southwest ("Good Samaritan") for suicidal ideation, but she left the hospital the

same day. (AR 357.) 

In August 2005, Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI pursuant to Titles II and XVI, asserting that

she was disabled due to her mental impairments. In October 2005, Plaintiff submitted a function

report, indicating that she had no problems with her personal care, that she prepared her own meals

once a week, cleaned her room, drove a car, handled money, and shopped for groceries. (AR 17-72.) 

In October 2005, Plaintiff's sister also completed a third-party function report which noted that

Plaintiff provided care for her two sons, was able to handle her own personal care, prepared meals

once a week, shopped for groceries, and managed finances. (AR 162-64.)

In November 2005, Plaintiff underwent a psychiatric examination conducted by Shailesh

Patel, M.D., a Board-certified psychiatrist. (AR 272-74.) Dr. Patel found that Plaintiff was able to

interact with coworkers and supervisors, deal with the public, understand, remember, and carry out

simple instructions. (AR 274.) He also found that she showed fair attention and concentration, a

fair ability to work full-time, and the ability to handle funds. (AR 274.)

On March 29, 2006, Barry Rudnick, M.D., a state agency psychiatrist, assessed Plaintiff's

functional limitations utilizing a psychiatric review technique form pursuant to 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520a(e) and 416.920a(e). (AR 306-19.) Dr. Rudnick opined that Plaintiff's activities of

daily living were mildly restricted, that she had moderate difficulties in maintaining social

functioning, concentration, persistence, and pace, and that she would experience one or two episodes

of decompensation, each of extended duration. (AR 316.) 

Dr. Rudnick also assessed Plaintiff's mental residual functional capacity ("RFC") on March

29, 2006. (AR 320-23.) Dr. Rudnick's mental RFC assessment included the following information:

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The claimant has a severe mental impairment that does not meet or equal a listing. 

She was briefly hospitalized in 2004 in the context of her fear of being assaulted by

her husband. When he was in police custody, she felt safe returning to her home. 

The claimant has some symptoms of social withdrawal. She mainly stays at home. 

She is able to drive and can do basic [activities of daily living]. Cognitive function

is more than mildly limited by depressive and anxiety symptoms. The severity of the

mental impairment would be consistent with her being expected to be able to perform

routine work related tasks not calling for more than routine interpersonal interaction.

(AR 323.) Another state agency psychiatrist confirmed Dr. Rudnick's mental RFC assessment on

December 13, 2006. (AR 320.)

On December 14, 2006, Plaintiff admitted herself to Good Samaritan again, asserting that

voices were instructing her to kill herself. (AR 347.) Dr. Raul Mendoza examined Plaintiff and

assigned her a GAF of 15. (AR 351.) Upon Plaintiff's discharge on December 23, 2006, her GAF

was assessed as 50. (AR 356.)

On January22, 2007, Plaintiff again admitted herself to Good Samaritan because of increased

suicidal ideation. (AR 454-55.) Dr. Mendoza assessed Plaintiff's GAF to be 15. On January 26,

2007, Plaintiff discharged herself over the advice of Dr. Mendoza. (AR 458-59.) Plaintiff returned

to Good Samaritan on March 12, 2007, and in August 2007. She was prescribed psychotropic

medications during the course of her March 2007 hospitalization. (AR 436-37.) In August 2007,

Dr. Mendoza opined that Plaintiff's prognosis was poor because of noncompliance with treatment. 

(AR 410.) 

On March 17, 2008, Plaintiff appeared before the ALJ to provide testimony regarding her

disability claim. During the hearing, Plaintiff stated that a normal day consists of sitting around in

her room. (AR 51.) Her twenty-year-old son does the grocery shopping. (AR 52.) Plaintiff stated

that she occasionally goes to church but does not exercise. (AR 52.) Plaintiff further testified that

she sometimes attends her sons' extracurricular activities at school. (AR 56.) Plaintiff testified that

she does not have the energy to lift. She estimated that the most she could lift would be ten pounds,

but probably could not carry that weight because of dizziness from the medication. (AR 56.) She

could sit for two hours and stand for two hours, and estimated that she could walk for two to three

minutes. (AR 56-57.) Plaintiff further testified that she receives food stamps but no rent subsidy. 

(AR 57.)

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According to Plaintiff, she has trouble with her concentration and memory; if she were to

begin a job, she would not be able to complete it. (AR 52.) She experiences paranoia, crying spells,

and panic attacks every two hours that leave her "real nervous and shaking." (AR 52-53.) Her

insomnia causes her to sleep only three hours a night. (AR 53.) Other than attending her own

doctor's appointments, she would leave her home onlyto accompanyher sons on their appointments. 

(AR 53.) Plaintiff testified that she takes so many different medications because "they're trying so

many different things to see what could work for" her. (AR 54.) She further testified that the

medications are not helpful, however. (AR 54.) 

On April 17, 2008, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff's disability application. 

Specifically, the ALJfound that Plaintiff (1) had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the

alleged onset of her disability; (2) has an impairment or a combination of impairments that is

considered “severe” based on the requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations; (3) does not

have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals one of the impairments set

forth in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) could not perform her past relevant work;

and (5) could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. (AR 24-30.)

On November 24, 2008, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for a review of the

ALJ's decision. A timely appeal to this Court followed.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

The ALJ's decision denying benefits "will be disturbed only if that decision is not supported

by substantial evidence or it is based upon legal error." Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir.

1999). In reviewing the Commissioner's decision, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that

of the Commissioner. Macri v. Chater, 93 F.3d 540, 543 (9th Cir. 1996). Instead, the Court must

determine whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards and whether substantial

evidence exists in the record to support the Commissioner's findings. See Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d

909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007).

"Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance." Ryan v.

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). "Substantial evidence" means "such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 

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Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305

U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The Court "must consider the entire record as a whole, weighing both the

evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion, and may

not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence." Lingenfelter v. Astrue,

504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

APPLICABLE LAW

An individual is considered disabled for purposes of disability benefits if she is unable to

engage in any substantial, gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or

mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted, or can be expected to

last, for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A),

1382c(a)(3)(A); see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 23 (2003). The impairment or

impairments must result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities that are

demonstrable by medically accepted clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and must be of

such severity that the claimant is not only unable to do her previous work, but cannot, considering

her age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial, gainful work that

exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)-(3), 1382c(a)(3)(B), (D).

The regulations provide that the ALJ must make specific sequential determinations in the

process of evaluating a disability. In the First Step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant

is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If not,

in the Second Step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a severe impairment or a

combination of impairments significantly limiting her from performing basic work activities. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If so, in the Third Step, the ALJ must determine whether the

claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments that meet or equal the requirements

of the Listing of Impairments ("Listing"), 20 C.F.R. 404, Subpart P, App. 1. 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If not, in the Fourth Step, the ALJ must determine whetherthe claimant

has sufficient residual functional capacity despite the impairment or various limitations to perform

her past work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If not, in Step Five, the burden shifts to the

Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers

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in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If a claimant is found to be

disabled or not disabled at any step in the sequence, there is no need to consider subsequent steps. 

Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999).

Applying this process in this case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff (1) had not engaged in

substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of her disability; (2) has an impairment or a

combination of impairments that is considered "severe" based on the requirements in the

Regulations; (3) does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals

one of the impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) could not perform

her past relevant work; and (5) could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national

economy. (AR 24-30.)

On appeal, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ (1) did not fully develop the record and (2)

improperly evaluated her subjective complaints. 

DISCUSSION

A. The ALJ’s Duty to Develop the Record

Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ erred in failing to recontact the psychiatrists who treated her

at Loma Linda and Good Samaritan before relying on the opinions of Dr. Patel and reviewing

physicians to address her residual functional limitations. (Pl.'s OpeningBr. at 8.) She further asserts

that the ALJ failed to use the services of a medical expert to evaluate additional medical evidence

she submitted. (Pl.'s Opening Br. at 8-9.) Plaintiff, therefore, contends that the ALJ failed to fully

and fairly develop the record in this case. (Pl.'s Opening Br. at 9.) 

RFC is an assessment of an individual's ability to do sustained work-related physical and

mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis of 8 hours a day, for five days

a week, or an equivalent work schedule. Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 96-8p. The RFC 4

assessment considers only functional limitations and restrictions that result from an individual's

SSRs are "final opinions and orders and statements of policy and interpretations" that the Social Security

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Administration has adopted. 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1). Once published, these rulings are binding precedent upon ALJs.

Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U.S. 870, 873 n.3 (1984); Gatliff v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 172 F.3d 690, 692 n.2 (9th

Cir. 1999).

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medicallydeterminable impairment or combination of impairments. Id. "In determining a claimant's

RFC, an ALJ must consider all relevant evidence in the record including, inter alia, medical records,

lay evidence, and 'the effects of symptoms, including pain, that are reasonably attributed to a

medically determinable impairment.'" Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir.

2006).

Plaintiff's argument is based on her belief that "treatment records that do not contain an

opinion from a treating source render them inadequate to allow for a proper disability

determination." (Pl.'s OpeningBr. at 8.) This "inadequacy," according to Plaintiff, triggers the ALJ's

duty to recontact the treating source. As discussed below, this argument lacks merit.

First, the ALJ's duty to recontact a medical source is only triggered where the medical record

is insufficient to make a disability finding or the evidence conflicts to the extent that the ALJ cannot

reach a conclusion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(e), 416.912(e) ("When the evidence we receive from

your treating physician or psychologist or other medical source is inadequate for us to determine

whether you are disabled, we will need additional information to reach a determination or a

decision."); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(3), 416.927(c)(3); see also Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453,

459-60 (9th Cir. 2001).

A medical record that does not contain an opinion from a treating source does not, by itself,

render it inadequate. Although the Ninth Circuit, most recently in Orn v. Astrue, reiterated the

requirement of deference to a treating source’s opinion, it does not follow that the absence of such

an opinion automatically renders a medical record insufficient. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631-34

(9th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff's citation to Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2001), does not

aid her. In Tonapetyan, the court found that additional information about the claimant's mental

impairment was necessarybecause the consultative examiner's report upon which the ALJrelied was

unclear and specifically stated a more detailed report was necessary. Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150.

Here, the ALJ reviewed all of the medical evidence of record, including medical records

obtained from physicians who treated Plaintiff at Loma Linda and Good Samaritan between 2004

and 2007. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was limited to simple, repetitive tasks; could maintain

attention, concentration, persistence, and pace; could relate to and interact with others; could adapt

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to usual changes in work settings; and could adhere to safety rules. (AR 25.) In so finding, the ALJ

adopted the opinion of the consultative examiner, Dr. Patel, who determined that Plaintiff could

understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions. (AR 28, 274.) Dr. Patel's report noted his

observations of Plaintiff, her past psychiatric history, and her activities of daily living and social

functioning. (AR 272.) Dr. Patel further reviewed Plaintiff's chart provided by the Commissioner

and Plaintiff's past medical history. (AR 273.) In conducting Plaintiff's mental status examination,

Dr. Patel evaluated her thought process and thought content, and tested her memory and cognition,

before ultimately reaching a diagnosis and assessing Plaintiff's level of functioning. (AR 273-74.) 

Dr. Patel's report is clear, consistent, and based upon his independent clinical findings. See id. at

1149 (consultative examiner's opinion may constitute substantial evidence when it is based on

examiner's independent findings and observations). 

Moreover, Plaintiff points to no conflict or insufficiency in the medical record that would

require the ALJ to seek clarification from the physicians who had treated Plaintiff in the past. This

is particularly true because the medical records from those providers were before the ALJ for

consideration – even though none of those physicians provided a formal written opinion as to

Plaintiff's functional limitation. Plaintiff is essentially arguing that once the ALJ received records

from physicians who had treated her in the past, the ALJ was under a sua sponte duty to solicit

formal and current opinions from those physicians – even though the medical evidence of record was

clear and consistent, providing sufficient evidence to decide the claim. There simply is no such duty

to collect further evidence absent inconsistency, conflict, or a lack of evidence in the medical record

such that additional or supplement medical evidence is necessary to make a decision on the claim.

Second, Plaintiff fails to point to any evidence in the record that would contradict the RFC

finding. Consistent with the diagnoses in the record, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's major

depressive disorder and anxiety disorder were severe impairments. There was substantial evidence,

however, that, despite these impairments, Plaintiff could perform simple, repetitive tasks. In short,

Plaintiff's suggestion that a treating source must always provide an opinion as to a claimant's

limitations is simply not correct. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(e), 416.912(e).

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Plaintiff next maintains that, because additional medical evidence was submitted after Dr.

Patel's examination and Dr. Rudnick's review of records, the ALJ should have used the services of

a medical expert. (Pl.'s Opening Br. at 8.) Plaintiff cites SSR 96-6p for the proposition that the ALJ

or the Appeals Council must obtain an updated medical expert opinion before making a decision of

disability based on medical equivalence. Plaintiff's argument is unavailing.

SSR 96-6p provides that an ALJ and the Appeals Council must obtain an updated medical

opinion from a medical expert either (1) when no additional medical evidence is received, but in the

opinion of the ALJ or the Appeals Council the symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings reported

in the case record suggest that a judgment of equivalence may be reasonable; or (2) when additional

medical evidence is received that in the opinion of the ALJ or the Appeals Council may change the

state agency medical or psychological consultant's finding that the impairment is not equivalent in

severity to any impairment in the Listing of Impairments. Plaintiff has not shown that either

condition applies in this case to warrant obtaining an updated medical expert opinion. See Albidrez

v. Astrue, 504 F. Supp. 2d 814, 820 n.9 (C.D. Cal. 2007). Neither the ALJ nor the Appeals Council

found that the "additional medical evidence" would change the state agency consultant's finding that

Plaintiff's impairments were not equivalent in severity to any impairment in the Listing of

Impairments. Accordingly, the ALJ's RFC findingwas supported bysubstantial evidence and legally

correct.

B. Plaintiff’s Credibility

Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ failed to set forth legally sufficient reasons for rejecting

her subjective complaints. According to the Commissioner, however, the ALJ gave valid reasons

for finding Plaintiff not entirely credible.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff's "medically determinable impairments could reasonably be

expected to produce the alleged symptoms; however,[Plaintiff's] statements concerning the intensity,

persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent

with the residual functional capacity assessment." (AR 26.) The ALJ further found that the

objective medical evidence in the record did not fully support Plaintiff's subjective complaints. (AR

28.) In this regard, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff left the hospital against medical advice on a number

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of occasions. (AR 28.) Plaintiff's claim that her medications were not helpful was contradicted by

the treatment record. (AR 28.) The ALJ further found Plaintiff "not truthful" about the alleged

number of her medications because the medical record did not reflect such a high number. (AR 28.) 

Further, Plaintiff alleged she quit working due to medical problems, but the medical record indicated

she was "laid off." (AR 28.) She denied abusing drugs or alcohol, but a drug test was positive for

benzodiazepines. (AR 27, 28, 449.) The ALJ also found that Plaintiff's daily living activities belied

her claim of disability. (AR 28.) When Plaintiff took her medications, the ALJ further found that

she was able to function well enough to do simple, repetitive tasks. (AR 28.)

The ALJ also considered the third-partyfunction report byPlaintiff's sister. (AR 28-29.) The

ALJ noted that the report referred to Plaintiff’s significant activities of daily living, including

watching television, resting, and eating; managing personal care; preparing food once a week;

driving a car; and shopping in stores. (AR 28, 161-64.) Plaintiff's sister also claimed that Plaintiff's

condition affected certain areas such as memory, completing tasks, and getting along with others. 

(AR 166.) According to the ALJ, however, the statement failed to quantify any such limitations or

explain how those areas were affected. Although Plaintiff's sister stated that Plaintiff did not finish

tasks when starting them, the ALJ found that this purported limitation was contrary to the medical

evidence. (AR 28-29, 166.)

1. Legal Standard

In evaluating the credibility of a claimant's testimony regarding subjective pain, an ALJ must

engage in a two-step analysis. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). First, the ALJ

must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying

impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged. Id.

The claimant is not required to show that her impairment "could reasonably be expected to cause the

severity of the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could reasonably have caused

some degree of the symptom." Id. (quoting Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir.

2007)). If the claimant meets the first test and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can only

reject the claimant's testimony about the severity of the symptoms if she gives "specific, clear and

convincing reasons" for the rejection. Id. As the Ninth Circuit has explained:

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The ALJ may consider many factors in weighing a claimant's credibility, including

(1) ordinarytechniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant's reputation for

lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other testimony

by the claimant that appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or inadequately

explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment; and

(3) the claimant's daily activities. If the ALJ's finding is supported by substantial

evidence, the court may not engage in second-guessing.

Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted); see also Bray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 2009);

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929. Other factors the ALJ may consider include a claimant's work

record and testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of

the symptoms of which he complains. Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997).

2. Analysis

In this case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments could

reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms. Therefore, absent affirmative evidence

of malingering, the ALJ's reasons for rejecting Plaintiff's testimony must be clear and convincing. 

As discussed further below, although some of the reasons the ALJ gave were improper, the Court

finds that the ALJ nonetheless gave clear and convincing reasons supported by the record to discount

Plaintiff's credibility.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly discounted her credibility on the basis of a drug

test that was positive for benzodiazepines. Plaintiff notes that the anti-anxiety medications she is

taking would account for the positive drug test. Accordingly, the Court concludes this reason in the

ALJ's decision was not a proper basis for rejecting Plaintiff's credibility. 

Plaintiff further maintains that the ALJ erred in discounting her complaints because she left

the hospital against medical advice. The Ninth Circuit has "particularly criticized the use of a lack

of treatment to reject mental complaints both because mental illness is notoriously under reported

and because it is a questionable practice to chastise one with a mental impairment for the exercise

of poor judgment in seeking rehabilitation." Regennitter v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 166 F.3d

1294, 1299-1300 (9th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the Court concludes that this

reason was also not a proper basis for the ALJ's rejection of Plaintiff's credibility.

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The fact that the Court discounts two of the reasons identified by the ALJ for discrediting

Plaintiff's testimony does not, however, render the ALJ's credibility determination invalid, as long

as that determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record overall. See Batson v.

Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that, even if record

did not support one of ALJ's stated reasons for disbelieving claimant's testimony, error was

harmless).

Here, although the ALJ improperly relied upon Plaintiff's positive drug test and leaving the

hospital against medical advice, the ALJ's errorwas harmless because substantial evidence otherwise

supports the ALJ's credibility determination. First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's assertions that her

medication did not help alleviate anyof her symptoms were directlycontrary to the medical evidence

of record indicating that she was able to do simple, repetitive tasks when she took her medications. 

See Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999) (ALJ's finding that

symptoms improved with medication was valid consideration in assessing claimant's credibility).

Second, in discounting Plaintiff's credibility, the ALJ found multiple inconsistencies in the

record. Inconsistent statements are matters appropriately considered in evaluating a claimant's

subjective complaints. In rejecting testimony regarding subjective symptoms, permissible grounds

include a reputation for dishonesty, conflicts or inconsistencies between the claimant's testimonyand

his conduct or work record, internal contradictions in the testimony, and testimony from physicians

and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the symptoms of which the claimant

complains. Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2004); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d

947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002). The ALJ may consider whether the Plaintiff's testimony is believable

or not. Verduzco v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1999).

In this case, the ALJ found Plaintiff's statement that she quit work because of medical

problems inconsistent with the medical record indicating that she was laid off. See Bruton v.

Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that ALJ's specific, cogent reasons for

disregarding claimant's testimony included, inter alia, claimant's statement to his doctor that he left

his job because he was laid off, rather than because he was injured). Further, Plaintiff does not

dispute the ALJ's finding that she was not truthful regarding the number of psychotropic medications

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she claimed to be taking because this number conflicted with the actual number of medications

prescribed at any one time throughout 2004 to 2007. (AR 28.) 

Third, the ALJ found that the objective medical evidence in the record did not fully support

Plaintiff's subjective complaints. Although the inconsistency of objective findings with subjective

claims may not be the sole reason for rejecting subjective complaints of pain, Light, 119 F.3d at 792,

it is one factor which may be considered with others. Moisa, 367 F.3d at 885; Morgan, 169 F.3d at

600. Here, for example, although Plaintiff testified that she has occasional hallucinations, the record

indicates that she denied having hallucinations on several occasions. (AR 28, 273, 286, 298, 378,

425.) Plaintiff further testified that her medications were not helpful (AR 54), yet her treatment

record contradicts her testimony and indicates that her medications in December 2006 decreased the

voices she heard telling her to kill herself, and in March 2007, improved her psychotic symptoms

and suicidal tendencies. (AR 327, 437.) Moreover, Plaintiff's alleged lack of concentration, inability

to complete a job, and panic attacks every two hours are inconsistent with Dr. Patel’s findings that

Plaintiff's attention and concentration were "fair" at the evaluation; Plaintiff has the ability to

understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions; and Plaintiff has a "fair ability to handle

eight hours of work." (AR 274.)

Fourth, it was appropriate for the ALJ to consider Plaintiff's activities of daily living in

determining that she was not entirelycredible. The mere fact of a claimant's carrying on certain daily

activities does not necessarily detract from credibility as to overall disability. However, a negative

inference is permissible where the activities contradict the other testimony of the claimant, or where

the activities are of a nature and extent to reflect transferable work skills. Daily activities support

an adverse credibility finding if a claimant is able to spend a substantial part of her day engaged in

pursuits involving the performance of physical functions or skills that are transferable to a work

setting. Orn, 495 F.3d at 639; Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600; see also Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959. A

claimant's performance of chores such as preparing meals, cleaning house, doing laundry, shopping,

occasional childcare, and interacting with others has been considered sufficient to support an adverse

credibility finding when performed for a substantial portion of the day. See Stubbs-Danielson v.

Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008); Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680-81 (9th Cir.

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2005); Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959; Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600; Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1130

(9th Cir. 1990).

In Stubbs-Danielson, for example, the court found that the ALJ sufficiently explained his

reasons for discrediting the claimant's testimony because the record reflected that the claimant

performed normal activities of daily living, including cooking, housecleaning, doing laundry, and

helping her husband in managing finances. 539 F.3d at 1175. These activities tended to suggest that

the claimant may have still been capable of performing the basic demands of unskilled work on a

sustained basis. Id.

Here, the ALJ appropriately considered Plaintiff's admitted activities of daily living in 2005,

which included housekeeping, self-care, shopping, cooking, and financial management comparable

to the activities in the cases cited above. The ALJ found that Plaintiff's statements that, inter alia,

she shopped two to three times a month, cleaned her room, and could go out alone were inconsistent

with her claimed inability to work. Plaintiff's activities of daily living were, therefore, clear and

convincing evidence to discount her credibility.

5

Fifth, the ALJ also expressly considered and rejected the third-party report, giving it little

weight because it was contrary to the objective medical evidence contained in the record. (AR 28-

29.) This reasoning was specific and germane to the witness. Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915,

918-19 (9th Cir. 1993). Specifically, the statement by Plaintiff’s sister that Plaintiff could not finish

tasks was contrary to Dr. Rudnick's mental RFC assessment that Plaintiff was not significantly

limited in her ability to carry out short and simple instructions and only moderately limited in her

abilities to carry out detailed instructions and maintain attention and concentration for extended

periods of time. (AR 320.) Dr. Patel also opined that Plaintiff could understand, remember, and

The Commissioner points out that Plaintiff's activities as reported in her October 2005 function report are

5

inconsistent with her activities about which she testified in March 2008. (Def.'s Opp'n Br. at 12.) Plaintiff argues,

however, that her activities as reported in her function report are not inconsistent with her hearing testimony, but rather

reveal her deteriorating condition over this period of time. (Pl.'s Reply Br. at 6.) It is not clear whether Plaintiff's

condition deteriorated as much as she maintains. For example, although Plaintiff testified in 2008 that she no longer

drives and neither cooks nor shops, she also testified that she occasionally attends church, accompanies her children on

appointments, and attends their extracurricular events at school. In any event, the ALJ did not base his adverse

credibility determination on Plaintiff's purportedly inconsistent reports of daily living activities between 2005 and 2008.

Rather, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's "wide range of activities of daily living" as reported in October 2005 were "not fully

consistent with her claim of total disability," which, according to Plaintiff, began on September 1, 2004. (AR 28.)

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carry out simple instructions. (AR 274.) Thus, the ALJ's reasoning was based on the contradictory

medical evidence, which was appropriately considered. Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511-12 (9th

Cir. 2001); see also Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958-59.

In sum, the ALJ cited clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff's subjective

complaints regarding the intensity, duration, and limiting effects of her symptoms. Cf. Batson, 359

F.3d at 1196. Moreover, the ALJ's reasons were properly supported by the record and sufficiently

specific to allow this Court to conclude that the ALJrejected the claimant's testimony on permissible

grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit Plaintiff's testimony.

CONCLUSION

After consideration of the Plaintiff's and Defendant's briefs and a thorough review of the

record, the Court finds that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record as

a whole and is based on proper legal standards. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's appeal

from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. The Clerk of this Court

is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social

Security, and against Plaintiff Demetris R. Jewell.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 11, 2010 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

ie14hj UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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