Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01275/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01275-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Product Liability

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lisa St. Clair and Richard Poulin, as

parents and natural guardians of HP, a

minor child, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Nellcor Puritan Bennett, LLC, a Delaware

Limited Liability Company, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-10-1275-PHX-LOA

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Nellcor Puritan Bennett, LLC’s (“Nellcor”)

Motion for Extension of Time to Serve Reports for Non-Retained Expert Witnesses, filed on

February 25, 2011. (Doc. 38) The Motion requests “the Court extend the deadline for

Nellcor to serve non-retained expert witness reports until thirty (30) days after examining the

resuscitator bag and thirty (30) days after taking the deposition of plaintiffs’ retained expert

David Eckmann[.]” (Id. at 1) Because timing is critical at this stage of the case, the Court

denied the motion on March 9, 2011, indicating a formal order would follow. (Doc. 43) This

is that order. 

After considering the briefing and file as a whole, the Court finds that Nellcor

has failed to demonstrate good cause and the exercise of due diligence to comply with the

expert disclosure deadline to warrant modification of the firm Rule 16 deadlines. Nellcor’s

motion is denied.

Case 2:10-cv-01275-LOA Document 44 Filed 03/21/11 Page 1 of 9
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I. Background

This products liability diversity action was removed on June 16, 2010 from the

Superior Court of Arizona, Maricopa County. (Doc. 1) Suit was initially filed on August 7,

2009, against six corporate defendants, including Nellcor which was served three days later

on August 10, 2009. (Doc. 1-2 at 21; doc. 1-4 at 2) The First Amended Complaint was filed

on August 20, 2009. (Doc. at 169-176) Nellcor answered on October 7, 2009. (Id. at 83-93;

doc. 1-4 at 2) It appears from the State record that meaningful discovery was conducted by

the various parties before Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed all defendants except Nellcor in the

State action on or about June 3, 2010. (Id. at 201-203)

The parties’ August 20, 2010 Second Amended Joint Case Management Report

provides a summary of the parties’ claims. While Plaintiffs’ three-year old child, H.P., was

recovering from surgery at Phoenix Children’s Hospital (“PCH”), H.P.’s healthcare providers

utilized an allegedly defective resuscitator bag manufactured by Nellcor, without realizing

that it was not functioning properly. (Doc. 28 at 2) As a consequence, Plaintiffs contend

H.P. suffered a thirteen minute deprivation of oxygen, leaving her permanently and severely

brain injured. (Id.) Plaintiffs assert product liability and negligence claims against Nellcor

arising from the design, manufacture, and sale of the allegedly defective resuscitator. Nellcor

denies its resuscitator bag was defective and contends that Nellcor’s conduct was reasonable

and appropriate and that the resuscitator bag used on H.P. did not cause or contribute to the

injuries and damages claimed by Plaintiffs. (Id.)

Relevant to Nellcor’s Motion for Extension of Time to Serve Reports for

Non-Retained Expert Witnesses is information contained in the State record. According to

Plaintiffs, counsel learned by letter, dated December 7, 2009, from counsel for Phoenix

Children’s Hospital “(who presently maintains custody of the subject resuscitator bag )” that

the actual resuscitator bag involved in H.P.’s September 13, 2007 incident was allegedly “a

single-patient use pediatric flat bag mask PEEP PBMV, lot number 7141147, manufactured

and sold by Nellcor [].” (Doc. 1-2 at 155; Exhibit (“Exh”) C, at 178) This information is

reflected in Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, filed on April

Case 2:10-cv-01275-LOA Document 44 Filed 03/21/11 Page 2 of 9
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26, 2010. (Id. at 153-158) The amendment motion indicates that at the then recent

depositions of PCH employees, counsel “was able to inspect the bag involved in the

incident.” (Id. at 155) Plaintiffs contend that “defendants were likely aware of this issue

[misidentification of the wrong resuscitator bag involved in H.P.’s incident] before it was

discovered by the Plaintiffs.” (Id. at 156) The Court assumes, without knowing for certain,

that Nellcor’s lawyers were also present at these depositions of PCH’s employees and

examined the correct resuscitator bag. Most certainly, however, two of Nellcor’s counsel

were endorsed on Plaintiffs’ amendment motion, and one was endorsed on the December 7,

2009 letter from PCH’s counsel. (Id. at 158; Exh C at 178) Plaintiffs’ amendment motion

was granted on May 21, 2010. (Id. at 192-193) Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed all defendants

except Nellcor in the Maricopa County Superior Court action on or about June 3, 2010. (Id.

at 201-203) The lawsuit was removed to this District Court shortly thereafter.

At the August 23, 2010 scheduling conference, the Court informed counsel that

it would give great weight to the deadlines counsel wanted within reason. It was made plain

to counsel, however, both verbally and in the Court’s subsequent order that once the

deadlines were agreed upon and established, the “deadlines in the scheduling order were

real, firm, and, consistent with the undersigned’s responsibilities mandated by Congress in

the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 471 et seq., will not be altered except

upon a showing of good cause and by leave of the assigned trial judge.” (Doc. 29 at 4)

(emphasis in original; footnote omitted). The scheduling order makes clear that in the Ninth

Circuit, the Rule 16 deadlines are “to be taken seriously,” citing Janicki Logging Co. v.

Mateer, 42 F.3d 561, 566 (9th Cir. 1994). (Id.) Further, counsel were informed orally and

in writing that “[t]he Court intends to enforce the deadlines in this Order. Counsel should

plan their litigation activities accordingly.” (Id.) 

With the firmness of the prospective deadlines patent and counsels’ active

involvement in setting them, the Court fashioned mutually agreed-upon deadlines for the fair

and reasonably expeditious resolution of this case. The scheduling order mandates, among

others, that Plaintiffs’ expert disclosures will be made by Friday, January 7, 2011; Nellcor’s

Case 2:10-cv-01275-LOA Document 44 Filed 03/21/11 Page 3 of 9
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1 Plaintiffs’ Response was not properly filed in electronic, text-searchable format,

contrary to the District Court’s Local Rules, LRCiv 7.1(c). This non-compliance will be

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expert disclosures “(regardless of whether such expert witness has or has not been

specifically retained for this case, such as, if the expert is an employee of [Nellcor])” will be

made by Friday, February 25, 2011; Plaintiffs’ true rebuttal expert disclosures by Friday,

March 25, 2011; supplementation of all discovery pursuant to Rule 26(e), Fed.R.Civ.P., by

Friday, April 29, 2011; completion of all discovery by Tuesday, May 31, 2011; and filing

of dispositive motion(s) by Thursday, June 30, 2011. (Id. at 5-6) (emphasis in original).

Nellcor’s Motion confirms that Plaintiffs timely “served 11 expert reports from

retained experts and a cover letter identifying various treating physicians as expert

witnesses.” (Doc. 38 at 2) Nevertheless, Nellcor requests an extension of the deadline for

the disclosure of its own employee, non-retained experts and reports “until thirty (30) days

after examining the resuscitator bag and thirty (30) days after taking the deposition of

plaintiffs’ retained expert David Eckmann[.]” (Id. at 1) Nellcor claims that it is “unable to

timely provide written reports from” Roger Mecca, M.D., VP of Medical Affairs, and Stan

Kaus, a Sustaining Engineer, both Nellcor employees. Nellcor vaguely claims that “[t]he

examination of the subject resuscitator bag is currently scheduled to take place on a date to

be determined prior to April 30, 2011 by agreement of counsel.” (Id. at 2) Even if a

stipulation alone could modify a Rule 16 scheduling order, which it cannot, no written

stipulation is provided the Court regarding a date for the bag’s inspection nor is an

explanation given why Nellcor’s employees could not have examined the resuscitator bag

earlier in this case. Nellcor criticizes one of Plaintiffs’ experts, Dr. David Eckmann, whose

report allegedly “raises only general criticisms of the design, manufacturing and testing of

the subject resuscitator bag, but does not sufficiently detail his general criticisms in a manner

that allows for a meaningful written response.” (Id. at 3)

Plaintiffs’ Response denies Nellcor’s criticism of Dr. Eckmann’s report and

that a date was currently scheduled for Nellcor’s employees to examine the resuscitator bag.1

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28 addressed at the end of this order.

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(Doc. 39 at 3) Plaintiffs claim that Nellcor “raised this issue in late February [2011], and

Plaintiffs promptly requested that the defense provide proposed dates for this examination,

but Plaintiffs have not received any specific date when this examination is to take place.”

(Id.) Attorney Tanner, Plaintiffs’ out-of-district counsel, explained that he is lead counsel

in a three-week trial, will be out of the country during the last two weeks of March, and

“desires to be present if this critical evidence is examined.” (Id.) This response suggests it

will be, at least, April before the various individuals and conditions can be met before the

lawyers and Nellcor’s employees may examine the bag. Plaintiffs write that they do not

oppose Nellcor’s request for extension if “Plaintiffs receive reciprocal extensions of time to

complete the remaining discovery and assembly of rebuttal information.” (Id. at 3-4)

“However, in the absence of such a reciprocal extension of time, this extension will prove

prejudicial to Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs have no choice but to oppose it.” (Id.) 

Nellcor’s March 7, 2011 Reply indicates that this lawsuit is “being handled by

experienced trial counsel” who “ recently exchanged dates and compared schedules and have

determined that the week of April 18, 2011 will allow the best opportunity to conduct both

the device examination and the examination of HP in Phoenix, Arizona.” (Doc. 42 at 1-2)

“Nellcor requests May 6, 2011 as the operative deadline for the parties to serve expert reports

arising out of the inspection of the device . . . [and] May 20, 2011 as the operative deadline

for either party to serve a rebuttal report in response to expert reports arising out of the

inspection of the device.” (Id. at 2) Nellcor’s proposed May 20, 2011 deadline for the parties

to serve a rebuttal report would leave a mere 11 days for the completion of all discovery,

including, of course, the scheduling and taking of expert rebuttal depositions. Disclosure this

late will most likely require the Court to modify the scheduling order again and, perhaps,

re-open discovery, rather than focusing on dispositive motions or setting this case for a final

pretrial conference and trial. Such multiple modifications to the Court’s and parties’

schedules diminish the importance of the initial scheduling order and may support a finding

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that the failure to timely disclose expert witnesses was not harmless. Wong v. Regents of the

Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 1062 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Courts set such schedules to permit the

court and the parties to deal with cases in a thorough and orderly manner, and they must be

allowed to enforce them, unless there are good reasons not to. The district court did not abuse

its discretion here in refusing to permit Wong to supplement his disclosure with the

additional expert witnesses and in barring testimony by and relying upon those witnesses.”).

II. Good Cause and Rule 16 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)’s “good cause” standard primarily

considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment. Johnson v. Mammoth

Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th Cir. 1992). A district court may modify the

pretrial schedule “if it cannot reasonably be met despite diligence of the party seeking the

extension.” Id. at 608; Fed.R.Civ.P. 16 advisory committee’s notes (1983 amendment).

“Good cause” means the Rule 16 scheduling deadlines cannot be met despite the party’s

diligence, citing Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1522.1 at 231 (2d ed.

1990). Id. “Carelessness is not compatible with a finding of diligence and offers no reason

for a grant of relief.” Soto v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 2010 WL 457351, * 1 (E.D.Cal., Feb.

3, 2010). “Although the existence or degree of prejudice to the party opposing the

modification might supply additional reasons to deny a motion, the focus of the inquiry is

upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification. If that party was not diligent, the

inquiry should end.” Id.

III. Discussion

The requisite good cause for extending Nellcor’s non-retained expert disclosure

and report deadline has not been shown. The docket reflects that Nellcor knew, at least, as

early as PCH’s December 7, 2009 letter, of the type and lot number of the resuscitator bag

(“a single-patient use pediatric flat bag mask PEEP PBMV, lot number 7141147,

manufactured and sold by Nellcor”) that Plaintiff claims caused H.P.’s serious injuries and

who had physical possession of it at the time. It is beyond a simple judge’s understanding

why a product manufacturer would wait approximately 18 months after it had been sued for

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2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) provides in part: 

1) Failure to Disclose or Supplement. If a party fails to provide information or

identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use

that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a

trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.

Rule 37(c)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P.

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injuries and damages worth potentially millions of dollars before its in-house experts

examine its alleged defective product unless, of course, there is a motive for such delay, such

as, gaining a tactical advantage by deposing an adverse party’s expert before disclosing its

own employees’ expert opinions. Nellcor is attempting to undo the measured schedule

established to facilitate a thorough and orderly resolution of this case not for some extremely

busy, nationally-renowned expert over whom Nellcor has little control but for two of its own

employees over whom it has significant, if not total, employment control. Surely,

“experienced trial counsel” recognizes that at some point in litigation when cooperative

efforts toward discovery with adverse counsel fail and time is running short, counsel must

resort to the Federal Rules of Procedure and seek judicial intervention for assistance. Waiting

until the very last day to seek judicial approval of an extension to disclose non-retained

experts and their reports is clearly too late and a formula for possible disastrous

consequences. Wilderness Development, LLC v. Hash, 2009 WL 564224, * 3 (D. Mont.

2009) (“The federal courts strictly enforce the expert witness disclosure requirements in Rule

26(a)(2)(B), and have the discretion to impose sanctions for an untimely or inadequate expert

disclosure including the exclusion of expert witness testimony.”) (citing Yeti by Molly, Ltd.

v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001)). “Exclusion of expert

testimony ‘is an appropriate remedy for failing to fulfill the required disclosure requirements

of Rule 26(a).’” Id. “Rule 37(c)(1) gives teeth to [the disclosure] requirements by forbidding

the use at trial of any information required to be disclosed by Rule 26(a) that is not properly

disclosed.2

” Yeti by Molly, 259 F.3d at 1106. 

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If sufficiently motivated to discover this case, the length of time provided to

Nellcor’s counsel in the scheduling order to, for example, schedule an examination of the

alleged defective product was more than reasonably adequate if diligence were exercised

with the slightest amount of planning. If the Court were to grant both Nellcor’s and

Plaintiffs’ requested extensions, it would result in a serious disruption of the August 24, 2010

scheduling order and the orderly resolution of this case or reduce an important case

management order into a nullity. Nellcor has not demonstrated that the Rule 16 pretrial

schedule “cannot reasonably be met despite diligence” by Nellcor. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 608.

Like other deadlines set forth in the federal civil rules, to hold that good cause has been

shown here “would allow the good cause exception to swallow the rule.” Townsel v. County

of Contra Costa, 820 F.2d 319, 320 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiffs appear to have fully complied

with the scheduling order’s January 7, 2011 expert disclosure deadline. Fundamental fairness

and impartiality demand nothing less from Nellcor.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Nellcor Puritan Bennett, LLC’s Motion for

Extension of Time to Serve Reports for Non-Retained Expert Witnesses, doc. 38, is

DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, except as set forth herein, all pleadings,

motions, memoranda, or other filings in this case shall be created via personal computer with

a word processing application, e.g., Microsoft Word® or Corel WordPerfect®, then

converted to portable document format (.pdf). See, definition of “.pdf,” ECF Manual, at

I(A), p. 2. (“[E]lectronic documents must be converted to .pdf directly from a word

processing program (e.g., Microsoft Word® or Corel WordPerfect®) and must be text

searchable.”). Such filings shall not be printed to paper and then scanned and saved as

portable document format (.pdf). Documents which exist only in paper form, like exhibits

or certain attachments to pleadings may, however, be scanned from a paper copy and saved

/ / /

/ / /

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in a portable document format (.pdf). Future violations of this or other Local Rules may

result in the striking of the non-conforming motion, brief or other document.

Dated this 21st day of March, 2011.

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