Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03105/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03105-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAY FELIX, 

Plaintiff.

v.

JOANNE B. BARNHART,

Defendant.

___________________________________/

No. C 04-3105 MJJ

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment in a Social Security appeal

brought by Ray Felix Jr. (“Plaintiff”) and Joanne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration (“Defendant”). These motions require the Court to determine if (1) substantial

evidence exists in support of the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision, and (2) correct legal

standards were applied. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND

DENIES IN PART Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, DENIES Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment, and REMANDS the case to the ALJ for a determination consistent with this

opinion.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff seeks review of the February 26, 2003 unfavorable decision by Administrative Law

Judge (“ALJ”) Richard P. Laverdure regarding Plaintiff’s claim for disability benefits. Plaintiff, at
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the time of the ALJ hearing, was a 42 year-old, 6 foot 8 inch man, weighing approximately 370

pounds, who completed the 11th grade. Plaintiff earned sufficient quarters of Social Security

coverage to remain insured until March 31, 2002, his Date Last Insured (“DLI”). 

Plaintiff was injured on May 5, 1998, when he became caught in an automatic door which

squeezed his pelvis, causing intense pain to his testicles and inguinal areas. Plaintiff filed his

application for disability insurance benefits on August 31, 2001, alleging disability beginning on

May 5, 1998. Plaintiff based his disability claim on his pelvic injury and resulting ilioinguinal

neuropathy, a right shoulder rotator cuff tear, knee complications, obesity, asthma, diabetes mellitus,

and carpal tunnel syndrome. In addition, Plaintiff complained that his medications did not always

help ease his pain, that his clothing bothers him, and as a result, he wears a robe most of the time. 

Plaintiff testified that he is unable to sit upright, and needs to sit back or recline. Plaintiff also

complained of being unable to sleep more than three and a half hours per night, and subsequently

needs frequent rest periods during the day. 

Plaintiff was diagnosed on July 14, 1998, as having torsion of the testicle, with ilioinguinal

neuropathy. Plaintiff underwent a series of four ilioinguinal nerve blocks, beginning on July 29,

1998 and ending on October 21, 1998. After the last injection, Plaintiff indicated that he

experienced better relief and hoped that he might return to work. However, he returned for further

treatment on January 4, 1999, complaining of increased pain and being out of medications. 

On April 26, 1999, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Remer, who recommended a series of

hypogastric nerve blocks, which were performed on June 1 and July 6, 1999. Plaintiff was examined

again on July 26, 1999, and he demonstrated some, but not total, improvement. On October 28,

1999, Dr. Remer opined that Plaintiff’s condition continued to cause him pain in the left groin and

down into the front of the left thigh. It was acknowledged that Plaintiff required the use of narcotic

medications in order to function even minimally, and that his ability to perform daily activities was

limited to sitting only brief periods of 15 minutes or less. 

Plaintiff underwent an MRI of the pelvis on April 6, 2000, which showed nothing unusual. 

On April 12, 2000, Dr. Remer noted Plaintiff’s motor testing revealed trace weakness in his left

hamstring, and described atrophy and weakness in his impression of Plaintiff’s situation. On June 7,
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2000, Dr. Remer reported that Plaintiff suffers from chronic pain and disability and that Plaintiff was

unable to work as a result of his continued pain and physical problems. On November 5, 2001,

Plaintiff was re-examined and it was noted in his file that he had attempted to return to work on a

part-time basis, but had to stop because he was unable to tolerate the pain. The next clinic note is

dated January 18, 2002, and mentions that Plaintiff returned to full-time work, but was having

difficulty with increased pain. Dr. Remer opined that Plaintiff’s symptoms indicated possible

femoral nerve injury. 

On October 20, 2002, Plaintiff underwent MRI of the right knee, which revealed a small tear

in the medial meniscus. On January 3, 2003, Plaintiff underwent a right knee arthroscopy with

partial meniscectomy. On February 10, 2003, Plaintiff underwent MRI of the left knee, which

revealed a possible small tear in the meniscus, and a small evolving Baker’s cyst. 

During his hearing, Plaintiff alleged multiple emergency room visits while in California, but

there was no evidence submitted to corroborate this allegation. Furthermore, the record

demonstrates that between April 14, 2000 and February 27, 2003, Plaintiff claimed to have lost or

run out of his prescription and requested an early refill on five occasions. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment is appropriate if there

are no genuine issues as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. A dissatisfied Social Security claimant may seek judicial review in federal district court,

under 42 U.S.C. sections 405(g) and 421(d), after exhausting administrative remedies. Schweiker v.

Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 424 (1988). 

The Court may disturb the ALJ’s final decision “only if it is based on legal error or if the fact

findings are not supported by substantial evidence.” Smith v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 1222, 1224 (9th Cir.

1988). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. 

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). “[C]onsidering the entire record,

[substantial evidence] is relevant evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.” Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 679 (9th Cir. 1993). Determinations of

credibility, resolution of conflicts in medical testimony, and all other ambiguities are to be resolved
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by the ALJ. Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 750. The decision of the ALJ will be upheld if the evidence is

“susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th

Cir. 1995). A decision of the ALJ will not be reversed for errors that are harmless. Curry v.

Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991). 

ANALYSIS

To qualify for Title II and Title XVI benefits, a claimant must establish a medically

determinable physical or mental impairment that is expected to result in death or last for a

continuous period of at least twelve months that prevents him from engaging in substantial gainful

activity. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). In addition, to establish a disability, an individual “must show

that he is precluded from engaging not only in his ‘previous work,’ but also from performing ‘any

other kind of substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy.’” Matthews, 10 F.3d at

680 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)).

To determine whether a claimant is disabled and entitled to benefits, the ALJ conducts a fivestep sequential inquiry. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 415.920. In the first step, the ALJ considers

whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If not, the ALJ assesses

whether the claimant has a severe impairment. In step three, the ALJ determines whether the

claimant has a condition which meets or equals the conditions outlined in the Listings of

Impairments in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulation 4. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. If the claimant does

not have such a condition, step four requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant has the

Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) to perform his past relevant work. If not, in step five, the

ALJ considers whether the claimant has the ability to perform other work which exists in substantial

numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b)-(f), 404.920(b)-(f).

Here, the ALJ conducted the five-step sequential inquiry and found that Plaintiff was not

disabled. In step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in any substantial or gainful

activity since May 5, 1998, the alleged onset date. In step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s

“severe” impairments include a status post pelvic crush injury and ilioinguinal neuropathy, status

post right shoulder rotator cuff tear, status post multiple knee surgery, and obesity. In addition, the

ALJ noted that Plaintiff has asthma and diabetes mellitus, which are controlled by medication, but
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were considered in combination with Plaintiff’s other impairments. In step three, the ALJ found that

although Planitiff suffered from severe impairments, they were not severe enough to meet or

medically equal one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Appendix 1 to Subpart P of the

Social Security Regulations No. 4. In step four, the ALJ found that based on Plaintiff’s RFC, he is

unable to perform any of his past relevant work (“PRW”). The ALJ went on to consider in step four

whether there are other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff

can perform, consistent with his RFC. Plaintiff was found to retain the RFC to perform less than a

full range of light work, which includes a substantial range of sedentary work. This led the ALJ to a

finding of “not disabled” for Plaintiff, on the basis that there are jobs existing in significant numbers

in the national economy which Plaintiff is able to perform. 

Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s findings on two grounds: (1) whether the ALJ failed to

adequately consider Plaintiff’s obesity when determining his residual functional capacity; and (2)

whether the ALJ improperly discounted Plaintiff’s testimony and statements regarding his

allegations of pain.

A. The ALJ’s Consideration of Plaintiff’s Obesity in Determining Residual Functional

Capacity

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred when determining his RFC by failing to adequately

consider the additional and cumulative effects of Plaintiff’s obesity. Defendant asserts that the ALJ

sufficiently took into account Plaintiff’s obesity because obesity was referred to in the ALJ’s

decision and, in determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ relied upon the assessment of physicians who

noted Plaintiff’s obesity. Plaintiff responds that although the ALJ mentioned Plaintiff’s obesity in

the opinion, the effects of obesity in combination with other impairments were not adequately

discussed in determining Plaintiff’s RFC. Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that the mere mention of

obesity fails to properly provide the rationale required by a reviewing court.

In determining an adult’s RFC, “[a]n assessment should also be made of the effect obesity

has upon the individual’s ability to perform routine movement and necessary physical activity within
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Social Security Rulings are administrative interpretations of regulations and do not have the

force of law. Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1989). Nonetheless, the Court is to accord

due deference to the Rulings unless they are plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the Social Security

Act and regulations. Paxton v. Sec’y of Health & Human Services, 856 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir. 1988);

see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-48 (1984). 

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the work environment.” SSR No. 02-01p.1 In addition, the Social Security Regulations require an

explanation of how the conclusions were reached on whether obesity caused any physical

limitations. SSR No. 02-01p. The requirement of an explanation by the ALJ must be viewed in the

context of setting forth a rationale that permits a claimant to know why his claim has been rejected. 

“Any such decision by the Commissioner of Social Security . . . shall contain a statement of the case,

in understandable language, setting forth a discussion of the evidence, and stating the

Commissioner’s determination and the reason or reasons upon which it is based.” 42 U.S.C. § 405. 

The ALJ has a “special duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to assure that the claimant’s

interests are considered.” Brown v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983). 

Here, the ALJ took note of Plaintiff’s obesity, and in fact, found it a severe impairment in

step two of his analysis. In the ALJ’s analysis of Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ mentioned that Plaintiff

needs assistance getting dressed, particularly with getting his shoes/socks on, but did not attribute

this difficulty to Plaintiff’s obesity. In addition, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff alleged that he had

gained about 65 pounds since his injury. However, the ALJ did not explicitly discuss whether

Plaintiff’s obesity affected his ability to perform a range of light and sedentary work.

The ALJ relied upon two medical assessments in making his RFC analysis: the assessment of

the State Agency physician, who filled out a form entitled “Physical Residual Functional Capacity

Assesment” (“PRFCA”); and the report of the consultative examiner, who completed a

“comprehensive orthopedic evaluation.” Where a Physical Residual Functional Capacity

Assessment (“PRFCA”) form is incomplete, “[t]o the extent that the ALJ’s judgment rests upon [the

PRFCA’s] conclusions, it does not rest upon substantial evidence.” Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d

1177, 1184 (9th Cir. 2003). In Celya, the court held that the ALJ’s exclusion of obesity from his

analysis was error, despite his reliance upon a PRFCA report. The court found that the PRFCA form

did not adhere to the directions on the form that required the person completing it to “describe how

the evidence substantiates [the] conclusions.” Celaya, 332 F.3d at 1184 (alterations in original). 
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Here, the PRFCA was similarly sparse. There were no explanations of how and why the

evidence supported the conclusions made on the form. (Administrative Transcript (“Tr.”) at

154,155.) The only mention of obesity occurred on the last page, under Additional Comments,

where it was noted, “Obesity - 6'8" @ 300#.” (Tr. at 160.) There was no discussion of obesity or

the effect of Plaintiff’s obesity on his physical work limitations. 

The second report the ALJ relied on was that of the consultative examiner, who completed a

“comprehensive orthopedic evaluation.” (Tr. at 149-52.) The evaluation was based on a fill in the

blank questionnaire and a physical examination. At trial, Plaintiff disputed the thoroughness of the

examination, testifying that the doctor only examined him for four minutes. The written evaluation

noted Plaintiff’s obesity, his height and weight. There was no further discussion or mention of

Plaintiff’s obesity. To the extent the ALJ relied upon the consultative examiner’s report as evidence

of Plaintiff’s obesity, like in Celaya, this does not constitute substantial evidence. 

Defendant also argues that the ALJ’s mention of obesity shows that he took obesity into

consideration in the RFC analysis. Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s lack of discussion of obesity, and

his failure to further develop the record regarding Plaintiff’s obesity, is legal error. In Stack v.

Barnhart, an ALJ made a passing reference to the plaintiff’s obesity, and relied upon functional

capacity assessments. 327 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2004). The Stack court found that “the

ALJ’s passing reference to a recommended weight loss program falls far short of acknowledging a

diagnosis of obesity and weighing the effect[s] of that obesity.” Id. at 1179. The court remanded the

case with the instruction that the “ALJ also shall consider and discuss how Plaintiff’s obesity factors

into her residual functional capacity.” Id. The seminal word here is “discuss,” which is exactly

what the ALJ in the present case failed to do. The ALJ did not mention obesity in his RFC analysis,

nor discuss how it factored into his RFC findings. Therefore, the Court finds that the ALJ did not

adequately consider Plaintiff’s obesity in his RFC analysis.

Even if the ALJ considered obesity, the fact that he did not explain this in his analysis is

legal error. Where the basis for the ALJ’s decision is unclear, the case should be remanded for

clarification. Barrett v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1065, 1068 (7th Cir. 2004). In Barrett, the court stated

that “[m]aybe the [ALJ] thought that since he had already ruled that Barrett’s obesity was a sever
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The Burch court specifically mentioned this fact, noting that Burch was distinguishable on the

fact that “Celaya’s obesity was at least close to the listing criterion, and was a condition that could

exacerbate her reported illness.” Burch, 400 F. 3d at 682 (quoting Celaya, 332 F. 3d at 1182).

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impairment, though not totally disabling in itself, conditions caused or aggravated by obesity were

irrelevant. That of course would be wrong.” Id. at 1068. The court then stated that “[t]he problem is

that we don’t know what he thought.” Id. at 1068. The Barrett court remanded the matter because

of the cumulative effect of the ALJ’s errors and omissions. 

Here, it is unclear on what basis the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s obesity did not affect his

RFC. The ALJ did not explain how he came to his conclusion, and it is unclear as to whether or not

he even considered Plaintiff’s obesity in the RFC analysis. “[I]n order to make our review

meaningful, we must be able to determine what statutory and regulatory requirements the ALJ did in

fact apply -- where we cannot do that we must vacate and require a remand to the Secretary for

clarification.” Jamison v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 585, 589 (11th Cir. 1987) (quoted with approval in

Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 176 (9th Cir. 1990). Therefore, it cannot be determined whether

or not the ALJ applied the regulatory requirement that an ALJ assess the effects of obesity on a

plaintiff’s RFC. 

Defendant’s attempt to compare the present case to Burch v. Barnhart is not persuasive. 400

F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2005), ordered published at 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 3756 (9th Cir. Mar. 7, 2005). 

In Burch, the ALJ had merely acknowledged the plaintiff’s obesity in passing. The Burch court

found that the ALJ adequately considered the plaintiff’s obesity in his RFC analysis, noting that the

record did not indicate that the plaintiff’s obesity exacerbated her symptoms. Id. at 684. However,

Burch is distinguishable for two reasons: first, the ALJ in Burch did not find the plaintiff’s obesity

was severe, leaving no reason for the ALJ to further develop the record regarding the plaintiff’s

obesity;2

 and second, the plaintiff in Burch was represented by counsel.

Here, the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s obesity was severe, the numerous references to

Plaintiff’s obesity in the record and the fact that Plaintiff was not represented by counsel, were more

than enough reason to alert the ALJ that Plaintiff’s obesity may have an effect on his RFC, and

trigger the ALJ’s duty to fully develop the record. “[W]here the claimant is not represented, it is

incumbent upon the ALJ to scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for
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all the relevant facts.” Higbee v. Sullivan, 975 F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Cox v. Califano,

587 F.2d 988, 991 (9th Cir. 1978)). Plaintiff was not represented by counsel (he was accompanied

by a non-attorney representative), and therefore the ALJ should have inquired into the effects, if any,

of Plaintiff’s obesity on his ability to perform the range of work attributed to him. Even if the effect

of Plaintiff’s obesity was unclear, it was the ALJ’s duty to further investigate and determine what, if

any, effects there were. 

In sum, the ALJ provided no discussion of Plaintiff’s obesity, nor of whether it caused any

physical limitations, and the ALJ failed to explain how his conclusions regarding Plaintiff’s RFC

and obesity were reached. Based upon a review of the record, and in accordance with Celaya and

Stack, the Court finds that the ALJ did not adequately consider Plaintiff’s obesity in conducting the

RFC analysis, and did not rely upon substantial evidence in his determination of Plaintiff’s RFC.

B. Plaintiff’s Testimony and Statements Regarding his Allegations of Pain

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the existence and significance of his

neuropathic pain without citing “clear and convincing” reasons for doing so. Defendant argues that

the ALJ did not find the statements false, but instead found them exaggerated due to inconsistencies

in Plaintiff’s testimony.

An ALJ may not discredit a plaintiff’s testimony as to the severity of symptoms merely

because it is unsupported by objective medical evidence. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 343

(9th Cir. 1991). If the ALJ finds a plaintiff’s testimony not to be credible, the ALJ “must

specifically make findings that support this conclusion.” Id. at 345. If there is no affirmative

evidence that the plaintiff is malingering, the ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons for

rejecting the plaintiff’s testimony regarding severity of symptoms. Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d

853, 856-57 (9th Cir. 2001). In assessing the claimant’s credibility, the ALJ may use “ordinary

techniques of credibility evaluation,” such as considering the claimant’s reputation for truthfulness

and any inconsistent statements in her testimony. Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 n.5 (9th Cir.

1989).

Here, the ALJ provided several reasons to support his conclusion that Plaintiff’s testimony

regarding the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of his impairments were exaggerated. 
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The ALJ noted that Plaintiff “had a habit of losing his prescription medication and then seeking

more.” (Tr. At 21.) Plaintiff argues that the ALJ was implying a narcotic habit where there is no

evidence in the record of narcotic abuse or habit. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s repeated requests

for early refills of narcotic medication give rise to a reasonable inference that Plaintiff was abusing

drugs and that such behavior negatively impacted Plaintiff’s credibility. Character evidence may be

used to assess the credibility of a claimant. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, at 346-47 (9th Cir.

1991). If Plaintiff was lying in order to receive additional refills of his pain medication, that would

constitute a clear and convincing reason to find him lacking credibility. See Fair, 885 F.2d at 604

n.5 (noting that reputation for truthfulness may be taken into account to evaluate a claimant’s

credibility). 

The ALJ also mentioned that Plaintiff has a period of sporadic medical treatment. 

“[U]nexplained, or inadequately explained, failure to seek treatment” is a proper form of evidence

on which an ALJ can rely to find a pain allegation incredible. Id. at 603. Here, there was a break in

Plaintiff’s medical treatment from July 1999 until April 2000. However, during this time, there is

documentation that a procedure Plaintiff was supposed to undergo was denied by his insurance, and

he was therefore unable to be treated. In addition, Plaintiff testified to problems finding a doctor in

California that would treat him under his Texas Worker’s Compensation benefits. This time period

coincides with part of the time period the ALJ cited as a period of “sporadic treatment.” While

Plaintiff was able to explain part of his sporadic treatment, the Court finds that it was not improper

for the ALJ to find that Plaintiff failed to adequately explain his lack of consistent treatment. 

 The ALJ additionally pointed out that despite well-documented complaints of pain and a

serious injury, Plaintiff moved back and forth from Texas to California. At trial, Plaintiff said that

he moved from Texas to California in April of 2000, but had to return to Texas on several occasions

to straighten out his Workers Compensation issues, and for treatment because he could not find a

doctor in California that would take his Texas Worker’s Compensation plan. Plaintiff’s allegations

of pain may or may not be inconsistent with his flying to Texas to receive Worker’s Compensation

and his medical treatment.

The ALJ also pointed out inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the number of
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hours he rested during the day. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff indicated that he takes naps during the

day, resting between one and four hours at a time, but denied sleeping during the day at the hearing. 

However, an examination of the record reveals that the original question Plaintiff answered was on a

questionnaire dated May 2, 2002, and was worded: “Do you require rest periods or naps during the

day?” (Tr. at 102.) Plaintiff answered yes, with the comment “One or two times a day from one to

four hours.” While Plaintiff’s statement is equivocal, the ALJ implied it was inconsistent with

Plaintiff’s statement at trial that he did not “sleep” during the day.

Where a claimant’s testimony is somewhat equivocal, and the ALJ’s interpretation of his

testimony may not be the only reasonable one, as long the ALJ’s interpretation is reasonable and

supported by substantial evidence, it is not the reviewing court’s role to second-guess it. Rollins v.

Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). In Rollins, even though some of the testimony was

equivocal, the court still found that the “ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons for discounting

portions of [plaintiff’s] excess pain testimony, and those reasons were supported by substantial

evidence.” Id. Here, although each of the inconsistencies cited by the ALJ are somewhat equivocal,

the Court will not second-guess the ALJ’s determination on credibility. See id.; see also Burch v.

Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680-81 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that even where evidence may lead to an

interpretation more favorable to a Plaintiff, if the ALJ’s interpretation was rational, the ALJ’s

decision must be upheld “where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational

interpretation.”) (citing Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 750). Even though each of reasons given by the

ALJ could be interpreted in a light more favorable to Plaintiff, the instances cited could rationally

lead to the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff lacked credibility. Therefore, the Court finds that the ALJ

gave clear and convincing reasons for discounting portions of Plaintiff’s pain testimony, and those

reasons were supported by substantial evidence. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN

PART and DENIED IN PART and REMANDED to the ALJ for a determination consistent with

this opinion. 

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August__11_, 2005 

MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE