Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-02219/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-02219-20/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

TRUE HEALTH CHIROPRACTIC INC, et 

al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

MCKESSON CORPORATION, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 13-cv-02219-HSG (DMR) 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART 

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR 

SANCTIONS 

Re: Dkt. No. 162 

Plaintiffs filed a motion for sanctions for Defendants’ alleged failure to produce discovery 

previously ordered by this court. [Docket No. 162.] The court held a hearing on the motion on 

March 26, 2015. For the reasons stated below and at the hearing, the court grants in part

Plaintiffs’ motion. 

I. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR COURT ORDERS 

This is a putative class action brought under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 

1991, as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (“TCPA”). It 

challenges Defendants’ alleged practice of sending unsolicited facsimile advertisements, or socalled “junk faxes.” 

This is the parties’ third time before the court on the same discovery issues. In October 

2013, Plaintiffs served the document requests, interrogatories, and requests for admission that 

form the basis for the underlying disputes. Mot. at 3. Plaintiffs filed their first motion to compel 

Defendants to produce “all facsimile advertisements that it transmitted during the four-year period 

prior to the filing of the Complaint” on June 23, 2014. [Docket No. 79.] Judge Tigar, the thenpresiding judge, handled the dispute and delayed a determination on the matter because 

Defendants’ motion to stay the case was still pending. See Docket No. 87. On October 22, 2014, 

Case 4:13-cv-02219-HSG Document 178 Filed 04/01/15 Page 1 of 15
2 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

Judge Tigar denied the motion to stay and referred Docket No. 79 to this court for resolution. On 

November 13, 2014, the court held a hearing on Docket No. 79, as well as two other discovery 

letters the parties had filed in the meantime, see Docket Nos. 110, and 111. On November 14, 

2014, this court issued an order compelling Defendants to produce discovery, after some 

additional meet and confer discussions to narrow the scope of discovery. See November 14 Order 

[Docket No. 127]. The parties met and conferred, but were unable to agree upon a narrower scope 

for the discovery, and thus presented their dispute again to this court. [Docket No. 133.] The 

court issued an order on Docket No. 133 on December 5, 2014, directing Defendants to produce 

certain discovery. See December 5 Order [Docket No. 143]. 

Because the specifics of the December 5 Order are at issue in the sanctions motion, the 

court will review its prior order in greater detail. 

A. Exemplar Faxes [Docket No. 79] 

In Docket No. 79, Plaintiffs moved to compel Defendants to produce exemplars1 of all fax 

advertisements that did not include an opt-out notice that Defendants sent during the class period. 

In the November 14 Order, the court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to compel and ordered Defendants 

to produce “all unique fax ads without opt-out notices sent by Defendants during the class period.” 

However, the court noted that “the discovery request propounded by Plaintiffs is too broadly 

worded, and could capture documents well beyond the ‘fax advertisements without opt-out 

notices’ that are the subject of this case.” The court therefore ordered the parties to “have a 

detailed and specific meet and confer session so that they can identify the types of documents that 

fall within the scope of this case, and those that are outside that scope.” November 14 Order at 2. 

 The parties met and conferred, but were unable to agree upon a narrower scope for this 

discovery. Plaintiffs proposed that Defendants produce exemplar faxes that fall within the 

following description: 

Any document that was: (1) created, in whole or in part, by one or 

 

1

 As the court noted in its November 14 Order, during the November 13, 2014 hearing, 

“Plaintiffs’ counsel clarified that Plaintiffs sought only exemplars of each unique ad, not copies of 

every single ad sent to a recipient.” November 14 Order at 1 n. 1. 

Case 4:13-cv-02219-HSG Document 178 Filed 04/01/15 Page 2 of 15
3 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

more employees of the marketing department of McKesson 

corporation, McKesson Technologies, Inc., McKesson Provider 

Technologies, or other McKesson entity; (2) transmitted to one or 

more fax numbers via server, computer, or other automated 

function; (3) that advertised the commercial availability or quality of 

any property, good, or service or McKesson; (4) after June 20, 2009. 

In the December 5 Order, the court found Plaintiffs’ proposal to be reasonable “in that it describes 

the relevant documents while also incorporating measures likely to reduce burden and weed out 

non-responsive documents.” December 5 Order at 3. The court also noted that Plaintiffs’ 

definition would avoid “word-mincing disputes” about the scope of discovery. Id. The court then 

ordered Defendants to produce “exemplar documents meeting the definition in Plaintiffs’ 

proposal” by December 12, 2014. Id.

B. Discovery Related to Prior Express Permission Defense [Docket No. 110] 

In Docket No. 110, Plaintiffs moved to compel documents showing that the recipients of 

fax advertisements sent by Defendants had given Defendants prior express permission to send 

those faxes (i.e., documents relevant to the “permission defense”). The court granted Plaintiffs’ 

motion to compel, stating that the “evidence sheds light on the question of whether the permission 

defense is an individualized inquiry or a generalized argument.” November 14 Order at 2-3. 

However, the court also expressed its “concern that Plaintiffs’ request as currently written will be 

burdensome.” Id. at 3. The court thus ordered the parties to “meet and confer regarding a more 

efficient way for Plaintiffs to discover information about Defendants’ permission defense. For 

example, if Defendants contend that a customer’s software registration constitutes that customer’s 

express permission to receive fax ads, Defendants could produce an example of one customer’s 

software registration, and explain in an interrogatory response which recipients allegedly granted 

Defendants permission to send fax ads by completing similar software registrations.” Id.

The parties met and conferred and Defendants agreed to produce “a supplemental 

interrogatory response that details the categories of permission . . . [and] identify the evidentiary 

categories that would frame discovery.” Docket No. 133 at 6. However, the parties disagreed as 

to one aspect of this discovery request: Plaintiffs wanted Defendants to identify the recipients that 

allegedly fall into each category of permission, but Defendants proposed to list the number of 

Case 4:13-cv-02219-HSG Document 178 Filed 04/01/15 Page 3 of 15
4 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

recipients that fall into each category with no individually identifying information. 

In the December 5 Order, the court rejected Defendants’ proposal and stated, “The court 

has already ordered Defendants to identify the recipients, and has already found that the protective 

order is sufficient to safeguard Defendants’ proprietary interests. Accordingly, Defendants shall 

respond to the discovery request at issue in Docket No. 110, including by identifying the names 

and fax numbers of the recipients, by December 12, 2014.” December 5 Order at 4. 

C. Transmission Records [Docket No. 111] 

In Docket No. 111, Plaintiffs moved to compel the production of documents containing 

information about recipients of the fax ads sent by Defendants during the class period, including 

their identities and fax numbers, and the dates and times they received transmissions. The court 

found “this information to be relevant to class certification issues, and further finds that 

Defendants’ concerns about the recipients’ confidential information are adequately addressed by 

the parties’ protective order” and therefore granted Plaintiffs’ motion to compel. November 14 

Order at 3. Furthermore, the court held that “[t]he universe of recipients shall be bounded by the 

group of ‘fax advertisements’ identified . . . [for] Docket No. 79.” Id. 

On December 5, 2014, the court noted that it had “resolve[d] the issues in Docket No. 79,” 

and therefore required Defendants to produce documents responsive to the discovery request at 

issue in Docket No. 111 by December 12, 2014. 

D. Procedural History and Case Management Deadlines 

On December 11, 2014, the day before Defendants’ discovery responses were due, 

Defendants filed a motion for relief from this court’s December 5 Order. Judge Tigar denied the 

motion for reconsideration on December 19, 2014, finding that the December 5 Order was “wellreasoned, thorough, and correct in all respects.” See Docket No. 148. 

On the same day they filed their motion for reconsideration, Defendants also filed a motion 

to bifurcate discovery so that discovery related to the named Plaintiffs’ individual claims would 

proceed before other discovery. On January 20, 2015, Judge Tigar denied Defendants’ motion to 

bifurcate discovery, finding that several factors weighed against bifurcation, including the 

likelihood of overlap between individual and class discovery; that bifurcating discovery would not 

Case 4:13-cv-02219-HSG Document 178 Filed 04/01/15 Page 4 of 15
5 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

allow class certification motions to be filed by the scheduled deadline; that bifurcation has 

potential to further complicate this litigation by “rais[ing] a slew of issues as to what discovery 

relates to the class, as opposed to the named plaintiffs”; and that Defendants requested bifurcation 

at a “relatively late date . . . especially given that the parties initially agreed not to bifurcate 

discovery.” See Docket No. 157 at 1-6. 

On February 13, 2015, this case was reassigned to Judge Gilliam. On April 1, 2015, Judge 

Gilliam extended some of the case management deadlines. Expert disclosures are now due on 

April 22, 2015. Expert discovery closes on May 26, 2015. Dispositive motions, including 

Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, are due on June 29, 2015. [Docket No. 177.] 

II. DEFENDANTS’ PRODUCTION TO DATE 

Defendants’ actions following the December 5 Order exhibit a good deal of foot-dragging 

as well as a distinct lack of candor. The parties met and conferred on December 22, 2014, after 

Judge Tigar denied Defendants’ motion for reconsideration of this court’s December 5 Order. 

Defendants informed Plaintiffs that they would not be able to produce the ordered discovery until 

after the holidays, and asked for an extension until January 21, 2015. Plaintiffs refused the 

extension, but agreed not to file a motion to compel or for sanctions until the parties conferred 

during the week of January 5, 2015. Mot. at 7; Stubbs Decl. [Docket No. 162-3] at ¶¶ 4-6. 

Plaintiffs’ counsel stated that they expected Defendants to begin “rolling” production of the 

discovery during that week. 

On January 8, 2015, the parties conferred by phone. Defendants stated they would produce 

transmission records for the four faxes attached to the SAC by January 15, 2015. Defendants also 

stated they would produce “exemplar” faxes by that date but would likely need additional time to 

produce the transmission records associated with those faxes. On January 15, 2015, Defendants 

informed Plaintiffs’ counsel by email that “[y]ou will have the information tomorrow.” On 

January 16, 2015, Defendants sent an email stating that the production would actually occur on 

January 20, 2015. Wanca Decl. [Docket No. 162-1] at ¶¶ 2-3, 6. 

On January 20, 2015, Defendants sent Plaintiffs’ counsel a DVD containing the fax 

transmission information for the four faxes attached to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint. 

Case 4:13-cv-02219-HSG Document 178 Filed 04/01/15 Page 5 of 15
6 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

Stubbs Decl. at ¶ 7. The letter did not mention any of the other outstanding discovery that this 

court had ordered in the December 5 Order. The transmission records relate to four “job 

numbers,” with each “job” showing a single fax broadcast on each of the dates of the four faxes 

attached to the SAC. Wanca Decl. at ¶ 7. Notably, Plaintiff True Health’s fax number was not 

contained in the transmission records, “even though the ‘Back to Black’ fax attached to the SAC 

shows it was transmitted from McKesson to True Health’s fax number on April 20, 2010.” Mot. 

at 9; Hara Decl. [Docket No. 162-2] at ¶ 11. 

On January 22, 2015, Plaintiffs’ counsel sent Defendants’ counsel an email stating that 

Defendants had only sent fax transmission information for the four faxes attached to the SAC, but 

not for any other faxes, which Plaintiffs considered to be in violation of the December 5 Order. 

Hara Decl. at ¶ 8. On January 23, 2015, Defendants’ counsel responded, stating that the January 

20 production “was not complete” and that “we are working toward making it complete.” Id. at ¶ 

9. Defendant proposed making another production by February 6, 2015, but would produce 

documents until then on a “rolling basis.” Id. 

On February 3, 2015, counsel conferred by phone. Plaintiffs noted that Defendants had not 

produced any documents on a “rolling basis” and informed Defendants that they were drafting a 

motion for sanctions. Id. at ¶ 2. Plaintiffs stated that they would wait to file the motion until after 

Defendants produced documents on February 6, since the sanctions remedy could be shaped by 

the completeness of Defendants’ second production. Id. Defendants stated the February 6 

production would be “substantial.” Id. at ¶ 3. 

On February 6, 2015, Defendants produced four pages of documents, consisting of four 

“exemplar” fax advertisements, each relating to a specific “job number.” Wanca Decl. at ¶ 10. 

Defendants stated that “transmission information associated with each Job” would be produced by 

February 9, 2015. Id. On February 12, 2015, Defendants produced transmission logs for the four 

“job numbers” relating to the four “exemplar” faxes, with each “job” showing a single broadcast 

of each fax to several thousand fax numbers. Id. at ¶ 10. 

On February 13, 2015, Defendants requested that Tiffany Cheung and Ben Patterson of 

Morrison & Foerster LLP be substituted in as counsel, replacing Defendants’ previous counsel, 

Case 4:13-cv-02219-HSG Document 178 Filed 04/01/15 Page 6 of 15
7 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

Tyree Jones, David Reidy and Andrew Amoroso of Reed Smith, LLP. Judge Gilliam granted the 

request on February 18, 2015. See Docket Nos. 159, 161. 

On February 17, 2015, Plaintiffs’ counsel conferred with new counsel to advise that 

Plaintiffs would be filing this Motion. Hara Decl. at ¶ 7. Plaintiffs asked if Defendants’ 

production was complete. Id. Counsel stated she did not know, having just entered the case. Id. 

Plaintiffs then contacted Defendants’ prior counsel to pose the same question. Plaintiffs 

Defendants’ prior counsel responded in an email the next day, stating that “Defendants have 

complied with Magistrate Judge Ryu’s order,” because Defendants “produced exemplar faxes, and 

thereafter produced the corresponding transmission records, which again included the identity of 

those to which it sent those faxes.” Id. at ¶ 9. With respect to a discovery response explaining 

Defendants’ claim of “prior express invitation or permission,” Defendants’ prior counsel stated 

that “Magistrate Judge Ryu’s order did not direct that such a response be provided; she only 

suggested it as a means to resolve the dispute.” Id. 

In sum, to date, Defendants have produced four “exemplar” faxes and transmission records 

for eight “job numbers,” each showing one broadcast of one of the eight known fax images (the 

four faxes attached to the SAC and the four additional “exemplar” faxes). Defendants have 

produced no additional documents or information regarding its claim that it obtained “prior 

express invitation or permission” to send fax advertisements to the class. 

III. LEGAL STANDARDS 

Rule 37 authorizes the imposition of various sanctions for discovery violations, including a 

party’s failure to obey a court order to provide or permit discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A). 

Such sanctions may include “(i) directing that matters embraced in the order or other designated 

facts be taken as established for purposes of the action, as the prevailing party claims; (ii) 

prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, or 

from introducing designated matters in evidence; (iii) striking pleadings in whole or in part; (iv) 

staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed; (v) dismissing the action or proceeding in 

whole or in part; (vi) rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party; or (vii) treating as 

contempt of court the failure to obey any order except an order to submit to a physical or mental 

Case 4:13-cv-02219-HSG Document 178 Filed 04/01/15 Page 7 of 15
8 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

examination.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vii). In addition, “the court must order the 

disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, 

including attorneys’ fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or 

other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). 

IV. DISCUSSION 

Plaintiffs note that the discovery it seeks is urgent, as it is required for Plaintiffs’ experts to 

offer opinions on (1) the number of unique fax images sent to the class, (2) the number of 

transmissions of those images to each unique fax number, and (3) the nature of the records 

showing those transmissions. Plaintiffs also contend that they require the discovery for their class 

certification motion: Defendants have signaled their intention to argue that class certification is 

inappropriate because some class members gave “prior express invitation or permission” to 

receive the allegedly offending faxes, but without discovery relevant to this defense Plaintiffs 

cannot prepare a response. Mot. at 16. 

A. Defendants’ Violation of December 5 Order 

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants violated this court’s December 5 Order by (1) not 

producing all exemplars, transmission records, and evidence of permission by December 12, 2014, 

(2) producing only selective subsets of documents on January 20, February 6 and 12, 2015, and (5) 

failing to set forth which “categories of permission” they are relying on and failing to identify the 

class members that allegedly fall into each such category. Mot. at 15. 

1. Discovery of “Exemplar” Faxes 

In the December 5 Order, the court expressed its desire to avoid “word-mincing disputes” 

between the parties and therefore ordered Defendants to produce documents responsive to the 

following request: 

Any document that was: (1) created, in whole or in part, by one or 

more employees of the marketing department of McKesson 

corporation, McKesson Technologies, Inc., McKesson Provider 

Technologies, or other McKesson entity; (2) transmitted to one or 

more fax numbers via server, computer, or other automated 

function; (3) that advertised the commercial availability or quality of 

any property, good, or service or McKesson; (4) after June 20, 2009. 

Case 4:13-cv-02219-HSG Document 178 Filed 04/01/15 Page 8 of 15
9 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

December 5 Order at 3. These are specific, measurable, and concrete limitations on the document 

request based on the author of the document, the method by which it was transmitted, its content, 

and its date. 

Despite this clear marching order, Defendants have attempted to interpose additional 

restrictions on this definition. Remarkably, Defendants avoid addressing the operative language in 

the December 5 Order in their opposition papers. Instead, they quote selectively from comments 

made by Plaintiffs’ counsel during the November 13, 2014 hearing in which Plaintiffs’ counsel 

purported restricted the discovery sought to advertisements “so similar in time, so similar in 

substance that they would be part of the class.” Opp. at 5. This not only predates the December 5 

Order, but also quotes Plaintiffs’ counsel out of context. There is no indication that Plaintiffs 

actually intended this to be an additional limitation, as the parties’ subsequent filings do not 

mention it, nor does the court’s December 5 Order. 

Defendants’ opposition also includes this paragraph: 

The search ultimately conducted by Defendants, as required by the 

Court’s December 5, 2014 Order, went well beyond merely looking 

for only fax exemplars with slight differences. Indeed, on the face of 

the four additional unique fax exemplar found, it is clear that they 

are quite different from the faxes attached to the complaint. (Jones 

Decl. ¶ 17, Ex. H.) Consistent with the Court’s order, Defendants 

used reasonable search terms based on Plaintiffs’ position that the 

exemplars relevant to this case are those “so similar in substance” to 

the faxes attached to the Complaint that Plaintiffs may argue those 

faxes are encompassed within the class definition. (Docket No. 130 

(Hearing Tr.) at 8:4-5.) 

Opp. at 6-7. What this amounts to is Defendants’ imposition of a limitation on discovery that the 

court did not order, and then seeking recognition from the court for being slightly flexible about 

that artificial restriction. 

The court’s order was clear. There is no limitation to faxes that are “similar” to the faxes 

attached to the complaint. Defendants’ attempts to read additional limitations are perplexing at 

best. Defendants’ untenable interpretation of this court’s order is especially suspect, given that 

they apparently understood the scope of the order when they quoted the discovery request 

verbatim in their motion for reconsideration and then argued to Judge Tigar in detail about how 

Case 4:13-cv-02219-HSG Document 178 Filed 04/01/15 Page 9 of 15
10 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

the specific parameters of that request would be onerous to meet. See Docket No. 144 at 2-3 and 

n. 2 (“In terms of burden, the Order still requires Defendants to search all of their fax 

transmissions created and sent by those in the marketing department to anyone during the 4-year 

class period to determine whether they were fax advertisements that contained TCPA-compliant 

opt-out language, and sent to those who had provided prior permission, a group not encompassed 

by the putative class.”). 

By April 2, 2015, Defendants shall produce documents that fall within this description, 

which is slightly modified from the court’s December 5, 2014 Order: “Any document that was: 

(1) created, in whole or in part, by one or more employees of the marketing department of 

McKesson Corporation or McKesson Technologies, Inc.; (2) transmitted to one or more fax 

numbers via server, computer, or other automated function; (3) that advertised the commercial 

availability or quality of any property, good, or service or McKesson; (4) after June 20, 2009.” 

Defendants shall simultaneously file declarations from its lead outside counsel and lead in-house 

counsel certifying that this production of documents is complete. The court notes that its 

December 5, 2014 Order included the marketing department of “McKesson Provider Technologies 

or other McKesson entity.” The court is not excusing Defendants from producing such 

documents. However, based on defense counsel’s representation that production of such 

documents would be “impossible” by April 2, 2015, and may include irrelevant documents, the 

court ordered the parties to meet and confer further. If they cannot agree on the scope and phased 

production schedule of documents regarding “McKesson Provider Technologies or other 

McKesson entities,” they should file a joint letter by no later than April 9, 2015.2

 

 

2

 The court notes that Plaintiffs have already suggested one possible method for identifying the 

relevant documents from other McKesson entities. See Docket No. 133 at 3 (“If the Court 

believes that Plaintiffs’ proposed order would place too much of a burden on the McKesson 

entities, this Court could order McKesson to cooperate with Plaintiffs in searching and retrieving 

data from the pertinent electronic systems. Plaintiffs have identified their electronic discovery 

coordinator, Robert Biggerstaff, and repeatedly offered to have Mr. Biggerstaff work with an 

electronic discovery coordinator designated by McKesson to accomplish this. McKesson has 

ignored or denied these requests.”). See also “Guidelines for the Discovery of Electronically 

Stored Information,” Guideline 2.05 (E-Discovery Liaison(s)), available at 

http://cand.uscourts.gov/eDiscoveryGuidelines. 

Case 4:13-cv-02219-HSG Document 178 Filed 04/01/15 Page 10 of 15
11 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

2. Discovery of Transmission Records 

Plaintiffs noted that the transmission records produced by Defendants did not include 

Plaintiff True Health’s fax number as one of the recipients. Apparently, Defendants have 

corrected this problem. According to Defendants, this was Plaintiffs’ “core concern” with 

Defendants’ production of transmission records, and Defendants’ correction of that problem 

means that all of the problems with its responses to the discovery requests identified in Docket No. 

110 have been resolved. 

This is not so. As described above, this court ordered Defendants to produce transmission 

records for all exemplar faxes that it identified. Because Defendants imposed artificial additional 

limitations on its search for exemplar faxes, it has not produced all responsive documents. 

By April 9, 2015, Defendants shall produce transmission records for any additional 

documents produced on April 2, 2015, and shall also file certifying declarations as described 

above. 

3. Discovery Related to “Prior Express Permission” Defense 

With respect to the materials relevant to Defendants’ contention that putative class 

members had given Defendants prior express permission to send them faxes, Defendants contend 

that the court’s order was not actually an order, but rather a suggestion. See Opp. at 10-11 (court 

only “suggested” that Defendants provide an interrogatory response to satisfy this discovery 

request); Hara Decl. at ¶ 9 (Defendant’s prior counsel expressing belief that “Magistrate Judge 

Ryu’s order did not direct that such a response be provided; she only suggested it as a means to 

resolve the dispute”). This characterization is flagrantly unbelievable. As explained above, the 

court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to compel Defendants to produce this information on November 

14, noting that the information was relevant and discoverable, but required the parties to meet and 

confer “regarding a more efficient way for Plaintiffs to discover information about Defendants’ 

permission defense.” November 14 Order at 2-3. The court suggested one possibility: “For 

example, if Defendants contend that a customer’s software registration constitutes that customer’s 

express permission to receive fax ads, Defendants could produce an example of one customer’s 

software registration, and explain in an interrogatory response which recipients allegedly granted 

Case 4:13-cv-02219-HSG Document 178 Filed 04/01/15 Page 11 of 15
12 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

Defendants permission to send fax ads by completing similar software registrations.” Id. 

Subsequently, as the court noted in its December 5 Order, “[t]he parties met and conferred and 

Defendants agreed to produce ‘a supplemental interrogatory response that details the categories of 

permission . . . [and] identify the evidentiary categories that would frame discovery.’” December 5 

Order at 4 (quoting Docket No. 133 at 6); see also Docket No. 133 at 7 (“Defendants ask that the 

Court find that . . . Defendants be allowed to provide a supplementary interrogatory response.”). 

The only disagreement with respect to this discovery dispute that required further judicial 

intervention was Defendants’ refusal to provide identifying information for the recipients that 

allegedly fall into each category of permission (as opposed to just the number of recipients). This 

court’s December 5 Order found Defendants’ refusal unreasonable and already in violation of the 

court’s previous order. See December 5 Order at 4 (“This court has already ordered Defendants to 

identify the recipients, and has already found that the protective order is sufficient to safeguard 

Defendants’ proprietary interests.”). That Defendants now say that the court did not order this 

discovery beggars belief. 

Defendants also argue that they have in fact produced discovery in response to this request, 

specifically by producing the transmission records which “include[] the contact information for all 

corresponding fax recipients that was reasonably available in Defendants’ records.” Opp. at 11. 

This misses the point. The purpose of this discovery request is not simply to learn the identities of 

the recipients of Defendants’ faxes, but to explore Defendants’ defense that some or all of these 

fax recipients gave Defendants “prior express permission,” and the method by which such 

permission was allegedly given. Defendants’ discovery to date does not answer these questions. 

Thus by April 2, 2015, Defendants shall produce an interrogatory response that (1) 

identifies each type of act that Defendants believe demonstrates a recipient’s express permission to 

receive faxes (e.g. completing a software registration), (2) explains how that act qualifies as 

express permission, and (3) identifies each recipient allegedly giving that type of permission by 

name and contact information (including, at a minimum, fax and phone number). The effect of 

this interrogatory response should be to identify every putative class member who supposedly 

gave permission and explain how that recipient gave permission. Defendants shall also file 

Case 4:13-cv-02219-HSG Document 178 Filed 04/01/15 Page 12 of 15
13 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

certifying declarations as described above. 

4. Failure to Meet and Confer 

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs did not meet and confer about the purported deficiencies 

in Defendants’ production prior to filing this motion for sanctions. Plaintiffs’ submissions include 

declarations from three of their attorneys, which describe the sequence of communications 

between Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ attorneys and attach written communications between them 

between December 19, 2014 and February 18, 2015. They demonstrate that Plaintiffs’ in fact 

repeatedly informed Defendants of the insufficiency of their discovery responses. See Wanca 

Decl.; Hara Decl.; Stubbs Decl. It appears that Defendants may be arguing that Plaintiffs failed to 

adequately meet and confer with Defendants’ new counsel, who substituted into the action on 

February 18, 2015, the day before Plaintiffs filed their motion for sanctions. But Plaintiffs’ 

submissions also describe how Plaintiffs’ attorneys spoke with new counsel on February 17, 2015 

and informed her of Plaintiffs’ intention to file a motion for sanctions; attempted to speak with her 

again on February 18; and called and exchanged emails Defendants’ prior counsel Tyree Jones on 

February 17 and 18, 2015. Hara Decl. at ¶¶ 7-10. The meet and confer communications between 

the parties regarding the instant discovery disputes were amply documented in writing prior to the 

substitution of counsel. Given Defendants’ wholly deficient performance regarding their 

obligations, as well as the impending case management deadlines, Plaintiffs were well within their 

rights in moving for sanctions at this juncture, rather than waiting for new counsel to get fully up 

to speed.3

 

Defendants also claim that Plaintiffs have failed to meet and confer since they filed the 

motion for sanctions, but the requirement in the Federal and Civil Local Rules is that the parties 

 3

 In fact, the only specific issue that Defendants point to as not ripe for court intervention is 

the transmission records’ omission of Defendants’ fax number. Opp. at 12 (“As just one example, 

the first time Defendants learned from Plaintiffs that True Health’s fax number was not contained 

in the produced transmission records was in the motion for sanctions itself.”) (emphasis in 

original). As noted above, this is a de minimis issue. The record shows that Plaintiffs repeatedly 

raised concerns that Defendants were failing to produce the discovery ordered by this court by the 

deadlines that this court had set. 

Case 4:13-cv-02219-HSG Document 178 Filed 04/01/15 Page 13 of 15
14 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

meet and confer before a discovery motion is filed, not after. See Civil L.R. 37-1(a) (“The Court 

will not entertain a request or a motion to resolve a discovery dispute unless, pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 37, counsel have previously met and conferred for the purpose of attempting to resolve all 

disputed issues.”) (emphasis added); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(1)(B) (“A motion for sanctions for 

failing to answer or respond must include a certification that the movant has in good faith 

conferred or attempted to confer with the party failing to act in an effort to obtain the answer or 

response without court action.”) (emphasis added). 

B. Attorneys’ Fees 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(C), “the court must order the 

disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, 

including attorneys’ fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or 

other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” 

This is the third time, in some form, that this court has ordered Defendants to produce the 

discovery that Plaintiffs originally requested in October 2013. The positions Defendants have 

taken with respect to its interpretation of the court’s December 5 Order are unreasonable, as 

demonstrated above and by the contrary positions taken by Defendants in its other submissions, 

including in its motion for reconsideration before Judge Tigar. Defendants have had nearly four 

months to comply with the court’s December 5 Order, but have failed to do so without substantial 

justification. Accordingly, the court finds that Plaintiffs should be awarded attorneys’ fees. 

The court grants Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions in the form of attorneys’ fees and costs. 

By April 9, 2015, Plaintiffs shall file its fee motion.4

 The court will decide whether and when to 

set a hearing on the fee motion.5

 

4

 Civil Local Rule 37-4(b)(3) provides that a party moving for an award of attorney fees or other 

form of sanction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 must file a declaration which 

“itemize[s] with particularity the otherwise unnecessary expenses, including attorney fees, directly 

caused by the alleged violation or breach, and set forth an appropriate justification for any 

attorney-fee hourly rate claimed.” 

5

 Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions specifically notes that “Plaintiffs are not, in this Motion, asking 

the Court to deem it ‘established’ that McKesson did not obtain ‘prior express invitation or 

permission’ to send its fax advertisements or to prohibit McKesson from introducing any evidence 

(if it actually has any) on that issue. Instead, the Ninth Circuit first requires the Court to consider 

Case 4:13-cv-02219-HSG Document 178 Filed 04/01/15 Page 14 of 15
United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

fur

add

Da

 

‘th

Int

$10

the

nec

(iii

day

Pla

exe

cou

mo

or 

issu

For the 

rther delay in

ditional mon

IT IS S

ated: April 1,

 

e availability

terlink, 284 F

0,000 per da

e amount of t

cessary) the 

i).” Mot. at 

y penalty an

aintiffs argua

ercises its di

urt hold Defe

otion for leav

evidentiary s

ues raised in

reasons stat

n producing 

netary or oth

SO ORDER

, 2015 

 

y of less dra

F.3d 1007, 1

ay first, and “

the coercive 

more severe

18. Howeve

d preclusion

ably made th

scretion and

fendants in ci

ve to file a su

sanctions, bu

n the opening

V

ted above, Pl

the discover

er sanctions

RED. 

 

stic sanction

022 (9th Cir “if this ‘less 

penalty sub

e preclusiona

er, in its Rep

nary or evide

his request in

d declines to 

ivil contemp

urreply (purp

ut in reality 

g motion), se

15

V. CONC

laintiffs’ mo

ry discussed 

. 

__

 DO

 UN

 

ns.’” Mot. at

r. 2002)). Th

drastic’ san

bstantially an

ary sanctions

ply, Plaintiffs

entiary sanct

n its opening

consider the

pt and issue c

portedly to r

also to add f

ee Docket N

5

CLUSION

otion for san

in this Orde

__________

ONNA M. R

NITED STA

 

t 16 (quoting

hus Plaintiff

nction[] is no

nd/or order (o

s authorized 

fs seem to be

tions. Reply

g motion, rat

ese sanctions

coercive mo

respond to P

further argum

No. 169, is th

ctions is gra

er may expos

___________

RYU 

ATES MAGI

 

g Rio Props.

fs request a c

ot effective, t

or recomme

d by Fed. R. C

e requesting 

y [Docket No

ther than on 

s, as well Pla

onetary sanct

Plaintiffs’ req

ment regardi

herefore deni

anted in par

se Defendan

__________

ISTRATE JU

 

., Inc. v. Rio

coercive pen

the Court sh

nd to Judge 

Civ. P. 37(b

both the $10

o. 168] at 14

reply, this c

aintiff’s requ

tions. Defen

quest for pre

ing the subst

ied as moot

rt. Any 

nts to 

_________ 

UDGE 

 

 Int'l 

nalty of 

ould raise 

Gilliam, as 

)(2)(A)(i)–

0,000 per 

4. Even if 

ourt 

uest that the 

ndants’ 

eclusionary 

tantive 

t. 

 

Case 4:13-cv-02219-HSG Document 178 Filed 04/01/15 Page 15 of 15