Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00021/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00021-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 385
Nature of Suit: Property Damage - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Product Liability

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BT COLLECTIVE, a California Non-Profit

Mutual Benefit Corporation, on behalf of

itself and on behalf of all others similarly

situated,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11cv0021-LAB (WVG)

ORDER DENYING JOINT

MOTION TO SEAL MOTION TO

DISMISS

vs.

IP HOLDINGS, LLC, a Washington

Limited Liability Company, and DOES 1

to 100 Inclusive,

Defendants.

I. Introduction

BT Collective, which in 2009 grew and distributed marijuana for medical use, has

moved to seal Sunlight Supply’s motion to dismiss its product liability complaint, as well as

supporting exhibits, because the documents include deposition testimony of BT Collective’s

principals that exposes violations of the federal Controlled Substances Act. Sunlight Supply

initially joined BT Collective’s motion to seal, but now opposes it. Earlier in the litigation,

Magistrate Judge Gallo entered protective orders barring the disclosure of the deposition

testimony. A subsidiary question is whether those protective orders were legitimate in the

first place. Although Sunlight Supply agreed to the protective orders at the time, it supports

the Court vacating them now. The parties have briefed both questions.

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This Court is inclined to pass on the legitimacy of the protective orders at this point.

No party has moved to modify them, and BT Collective’s principals would likely not have

provided potentially incriminating deposition testimony had the protective orders not been in

place. But more to the point, the Court doesn’t need to consider the legitimacy of the

protective orders because sealing judicial records nevertheless demands an independent

justification beyond the existence of a protective order that covers them. In other words, the

mere fact that discovered material is subject to a protective order does not mean it must be

sealed when filed with the Court. See Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d

1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 2006); Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1134 (9th

Cir. 2003). Indeed, district courts routinely decline to seal documents when the sole basis

for the request is a protective order that covers them. See, e.g., Stone v. Advance America,

2011 WL 662972 at *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2011); Bain v. AstraZeneca, 2011 WL 482767 at

*1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2011); Hershey Co. v. Promotion in Motion, Inc., 2010 WL 1812593 at

*3 (D.N.J. May 4, 2010). A case relied on by BT Collective to defend the protective orders

makes this important point. See Hobley v. Chicago Police Commander Burge, 225 F.R.D.

221, 224 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (emphasizing distinction “between materials generated by pretrial

discovery and materials that are in the public record because they form part of the judicial

decision-making process”). 

It’s worth noting, too, that the parties’ first joint motion for a protective order requested

that “any portions of the deposition transcript that are filed or otherwise submitted . . . be filed

or otherwise submitted under seal,” but Judge Gallo declined to include such a provision in

the protective order that he subsequently entered. (See Dkt. Nos. 15, 17.) That,

presumably, is why his first order was captioned “Order Granting In Part and Denying In Part

Joint Motion for Protective Order.” The parties’ second joint motion for a protective order did

not even request a sealing provision. (See Dkt. No. 25.) As a result, the protective orders

merely provide that “only the parties to this action, their attorneys of record, their expert

witnesses, and any other persons ordered by the Court shall be permitted access to and use

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1

 Perhaps Judge Gallo declined to include a sealing provision in the protective orders

not because he found no basis for sealing, but simply because the sealing of judicial records

is rarely approved prospectively. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 2009 WL 2605377

at *1 n.2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2009). If so, it isn’t fair to BT Collective to suggest that their

sealing request has already been considered and denied. At the same time, it is relevant to

the force of the principals’ reliance on the protective orders that sealing was never a sure

thing, and that when protected discovery material is actually filed with the Court “its status

changes” and some additional showing must be made to justify sealing. Foltz, 331 F.3d at

1134.

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of the transcript of [the principal’s] deposition.” (Dkt. No. 17 at ¶ 3; Dkt. No. 25 at ¶ 5.)1

II. The Law

Subject to a couple of exceptions that are inapplicable here, judicial records are

presumptively open to public inspection. Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678

(9th Cir. 2010); Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178; Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1134-35; Phillips v. Gen.

Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2002). This presumption applies to pleadings

filed with the Court, obviously, and it extends to discovery material attached to those

pleadings. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1134. The presumption doesn’t detach, either, just because

the material is subject to a protective order. Id. at 1136. See also Kamakana, 447 F.3d at

1179. 

A request to seal judicial records offends the presumption in favor of access, and to

overcome it a party “must show that ‘compelling reasons supported by specific factual

findings . . . outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring

disclosure.’” Pintos, 605 F.3d at 678 (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178–79). Compelling

reasons generally include the use of the records for an improper purpose, “such as . . . to

gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade

secrets.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179. Avoiding embarrassment or incrimination, however,

is not a compelling reason to seal judicial records. Id. (citing Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136). 

A compelling reason is not required, however, to seal nondispositive motions. Those

motions, the Ninth Circuit has held, are often unrelated to the underlying causes of action in

a case and the public has a reduced interest in accessing them. Pintos, 605 F.3d at 678;

Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179. “Therefore, when a party attaches a sealed discovery

document to a nondispositive motion, the usual presumption of the public’s right of access

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2

 Relying on Foltz, BT Collective also argues that the “narrow scope” of Sunlight

Supply’s motion to dismiss, the traditional protection afforded to the deposition transcripts

at issue, and the principals’ reliance on the protective orders are compelling reasons for

sealing. The Court disagrees. 

First, Foltz did not hold that the narrow scope of a document is, by itself, a compelling

reason to seal that document. It held that a document with a narrow scope contained

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is rebutted . . . .” Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1213. 

Only “good cause” need be shown to seal a nondispositive motion. Pintos, 605 F.3d

at 678; Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180. This is the same good cause standard that applies to

the entry of protective order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c): “The court may, for good cause,

issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or

undue burden or expense . . . .” The implication here is that if private discovery material is

subject to a protective order, it can be sealed almost automatically when attached to a

nondispositive motion. The district court doesn’t need to conduct a fresh analysis because

“it has already determined that ‘good cause’ exists to protect this information from being

disclosed to the public by balancing the needs for discovery against the need for

confidentiality.” Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1213. Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded in Kamakana,

“a particularized showing under the good cause standard of Rule 26(c) will suffice to warrant

preserving the secrecy of sealed discovery material attached to non-dispositive motions.”

Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

III. Discussion

The Court considers first whether BT Collective has offered a compelling reason to

seal Sunlight Supply’s motion to dismiss, assuming it is a dispositive motion. It considers

second whether the motion to dismiss may be considered nondispositive, and if so, whether

good cause support sealing it.

A. There is no compelling reason for sealing.

Motions to dismiss are typically treated as dispositive. See In re PPA Products

Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1231 (9th Cir. 2006). That means the presumption in favor

of access applies and BT Collective must offer compelling reasons for sealing the pleadings.

The only real reason it offers, however—the concealment of violations of federal law—is not

compelling as a matter of law. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179.2

 

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“privileged attorney-client communications and possibly work product that are traditionally

protected from disclosure” and that “[n]either the public nor collateral litigants have any

apparent right to or interest in such disclosure.” Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1138. In other words, the

compelling reason for sealing the document was its content, not its scope. Second, deposition transcripts attached to a motion to dismiss, contrary to BT

Collective’s conclusory assertion, are not “traditionally protected from disclosure.” A

deponent may have a Fifth Amendment right not to answer questions put to him, but the

invocation of that right is not protected from disclosure, nor are incriminating statements that

he makes when he fails to invoke that right.

Third, while a party’s reliance on a protective order may be a compelling reason to

seal the discovery the protective order incentivized that party to produce, this is no firm rule.

In Foltz, the court held that reliance on a protective order was not a compelling reason for

sealing where the order was by its nature overinclusive and entered without “a particularized

showing of good cause with respect to any individual document.” Id. at 1138. In Kamakana, too, the court held that a protective order “geared primarily to discovery,” and “recogni[zing]

that confidential documents may find their way into a court file” could not induce reliance that

specific documents would actually be shielded from public access when they became judicial

records. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1183. It’s clear in this case that BT Collective’s principals

relied on the protective orders in sitting for depositions. However, the first order explicitly

denied a requested sealing provision, and it is criminal conduct, after all, that BT Collective

wishes to conceal. BT Collective also admits that at least Mr. Eckel invoked his Fifth

Amendment rights “repeatedly . . . and said little that could be considered incriminating.”

Finally, BT Collective can choose to abandon this case with the protective orders fully intact,

in which event its principals suffer no prejudice for offering the deposition testimony at issue.

In light of these considerations, the principals’ reliance on the protective orders is not a

compelling reason for the sealing requested. 

3 See Ryan Grim, Medical Marijuana Memo: DOJ Cracks Down on Pot Shops, THE

H UFFINGTON P OST , July 1, 2011,

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/01/medical-marijuana-memo-doj_n_888995.html (last

visited November 23, 2011).

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Related to this, the incidents giving rise to this case transpired in the latter half of 2009

when it was the policy of the Department of Justice to not pursue marijuana collectives

operating in compliance with California law—and BT Collective has since dissolved. Even

in light of a recent, apparent shift in policy suggesting that California law-abiding marijuana

collectives are no longer safe from federal prosecution,3 the Court suspects the prosecution

of BT Collective’s principals is a remote possibility. So, even assuming the threat of criminal

prosecution supports sealing, which it does not, the Court would still find that BT Collective

has failed to offer a compelling reason for sealing the motion to dismiss. 

B. Sunlight Supply’s motion to dismiss is a dispositive motion.

BT Collective urges the Court to regard Sunlight Supply’s motion to dismiss as

nondispositive for the purpose of sealing because it does not go to the merits of BT

Collective’s product liability claims. This is not a frivolous argument. The basis of Sunlight

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Supply’s motion to dismiss is that BT Collective’s principals’ persistent invocation of the Fifth

Amendment during their depositions prevents Sunlight Supply from obtaining sufficient

discovery to defend against BT Collective’s claims. The motion, therefore, is only

tangentially related to the substantive merits of BT Collective’s lawsuit, and the caselaw is

subject to the interpretation that such a motion is nondispositive by definition. 

For example, in Kamakana the Ninth Circuit explained the different presumptions of

access to dispositive and nondispositive motions by observing that “the resolution of a

dispute on the merits . . . is at the heart of the interest in ensuring the public’s understanding

of the judicial process and of significant public events.” 447 F.3d at 1179 (internal quotations

omitted). Likewise, in Pintos, the court noted that “[n]ondispositive motions are often

unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action, and, as a result, the

public’s interest in accessing dispositive materials does not apply with equal force to

nondispositive materials.” 605 F.3d at 678 (internal quotations omitted). Along these lines,

this Court has previously held that a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is

nondispositive for the purpose of sealing exhibits because “[i]f such a motion is granted, it

is without prejudice to re-filing the action so as to cure the jurisdictional defect.” Young v.

Actions Semiconductor, 2007 WL 2177028 at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 27, 2007). 

It is true that Sunlight Supply’s motion to dismiss doesn’t go to the underlying merits

of this case. But the Court disagrees that this is some kind of bright-line test that renders it

nondispositive for the purpose of determining a sealing standard. The public interest behind

the presumption of access to judicial pleadings is its understanding of the judicial process.

Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179; Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1213. Kamakana does suggest that it is

the resolution of disputes on their merits that goes to the heart of this interest, but it doesn’t

go so far as to require that a typically dispositive motion tackle the merits of a case before

it serves the public’s understanding of the judicial process such that a presumption of access

should attach. That would be an insensible rule to apply in a case like this. The factual issue

in this case—whether irrigation tubing sold by Sunlight Supply leached chemicals that killed

BT Collective’s marijuana plants—is not a particularly interesting or essential one, and

certainly not critical to the public’s understanding of the judicial process. The issue raised

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4

 Greg Moran, Marijuana Collective Case Won’t Be Sealed, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE, http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2011/nov/21/marijuana-collective-case-wont-be-se

aled/ (last visited November 22, 2011); Greg Moran, Medical Pot Business Wants Court Fight

Secret , S AN D IEGO U NION T RIBUNE , Sept. 22, 2011,

http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2011/sep/22/medical-pot-business-wants-to-keep-c

ourt-battle/ (last visited November 20, 2011).

5

 The Court is likewise unpersuaded by In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records

Litig., 2007 WL 549854 at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2007), in which the court held that a

preliminary injunction motion is not dispositive because it requires a “consideration” rather

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by Sunlight Supply’s motion to dismiss, however, is of statewide if not national interest. The

manner in which California’s decriminalization of medical marijuana collides with federal

criminal law, and the ability of medical marijuana dispensaries to seek legal relief in the

federal courts, are matters of great public interest, and far more critical than an ordinary

product liability lawsuit to the “public’s understanding of the judicial process and of significant

public events.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1172. Indeed, while an ordinary product liability case

brought in federal court would attract no media attention, this case has—precisely because

of the issues presented in the sealing request and in Sunlight Supply’s motion to dismiss.4

The labeling of Sunlight Supply’s motion to dismiss as nondispositive is, therefore, an

elevation of form over substance; it is a disservice to the very purpose to be served by

distinguishing between nondispositive and dispositive motions in the first place. 

The word “dispositive” is a term of art, and the Ninth Circuit has not endeavored to

define it. But in common usage, a dispositive motion is one that has the potential to

terminate an action for good. It is a motion that, if granted, “would result either in the

determination of a particular claim on the merits or elimination of such a claim from the case.”

Burkhart v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 112 F.3d 1207, 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

Sunlight Supply’s motion to dismiss is, under this understanding, dispositive. If the Court

grants it, BT Collective will not be able to pursue its product liability claim in this or any other

federal court because of its principals’ steadfast unwillingness to provide certain deposition

testimony. That unwillingness is not analogous to a personal jurisdictional defect that any

plaintiff would happily cure by re-filing an action; Young is therefore distinguishable, and the

Court again sees no reason to regard Sunlight Supply’s motion to dismiss as nondispositive

for the purpose of sealing.5

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than “resolution” of the merits. Sunlight Supply’s motion to dismiss doesn’t get to the

question of whether tubing it sold to BT Collective was actually responsible for the death of

its marijuana crop, but be that as it may, the court’s working definition of a dispositive motion

was one that either “resolves a case on the merits [or] serves as a substitute for trial.”

Sunlight Supply’s motion to dismiss is a “substitute for trial” in this sense. The motion argues

that the principals’ unwillingness to testify openly and fully to certain facts prevents Sunlight

Supply from defending this case and prevents BT Collective from proving its claims. To

suggest, as BT Collective has, that Sunlight Supply’s motion to dismiss merely presents a

discovery dispute is to completely miss the consequences of the Court granting that motion.

6

 The Court does not mean to suggest that Judge Gallo entered the protective orders

casually and without giving serious thought to them. The opposite is likely true. (See Dkt.

No. 39 at 8.) At the same time, the protective orders, on their face, contain no specific

findings. Perhaps this explains BT Collective’s request that the Court allow Judge Gallo to

amend his protective orders to lay out the specific bases for his finding of good cause. (Id.)

The Court reiterates, though, that it is willing to leave the protective orders alone. The

immediate question is whether there is a basis for overriding a strong presumption that

judicial records are accessible by the public. Judge Gallo’s finding of good cause for entry

of the protective orders simply isn’t transferrable to that question. 

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C. There is no good cause for sealing.

Even assuming Sunlight Supply’s motion to dismiss is nondispositive, the Court does

not find good cause to seal it. Above, the Court repeated the holding in Kamakana that “a

particularized showing under the good cause standard of Rule 26(c) will suffice to warrant

preserving the secrecy of sealed discovery material attached to non-dispositive motions.”

Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180 (internal quotations and citations omitted). BT Collective takes

this to mean its work is done, and that it can simply point to the protective orders entered by

Judge Gallo to show good cause for the requested sealing. 

It is not so simple. The protective orders entered in this case were the product of a

stipulation, and while Judge Gallo did find they were supported by good cause, he did not

make “an individualized determination as to specific documents.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at

1183.6

 Court have declined sealing requests under these circumstances. See Gonzalez v.

Comcast Corp., 2011 WL 4089542 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2011). Indeed, the protective

orders were entered before the BT Collective principals even sat for deposition—before it

was certain what the scope of their testimony would be, and before it was certain how or to

what extent they would incriminate themselves under the Controlled Substances Act. They

are not the kind of protective orders, then, that can automatically supply the good cause

required to seal the documents they cover. 

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Under Rule 26(c), the burden is on BT Collective to show that “for each particular

document it seeks to protect . . . specific harm or prejudice will result if not protective order

is granted.” Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1130. See also Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1211. The harm or

prejudice can’t be speculative; they must be substantiated “by specific examples or

articulated reasoning.” Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir.

1992). The Court has already articulated its skepticism about the risk BT Collective would

run by litigating this case publicly. It dissolved after its claims against Sunlight Supply arose,

and it was in operation during a time when the Department of Justice had little interest in

pursuing marijuana collectives in compliance with California law. The Court is also mindful

that, under Rule 26(c), a protective order may be granted to protect a party from

embarrassment and oppression. Applying that same standard to the requested sealing, it

is hard to see how requiring that Sunlight Supply’s motion to dismiss be filed publicly could

be embarrassing. It is no secret that BT Collective is a marijuana collective and that its

principals (or at least one principal) invoked their Fifth Amendment rights in their respective

depositions. Enough information about BT Collective and this case, therefore, is already

public, and it is doubtful that Sunlight Supply’s motion to dismiss would be an additional or

heightened embarrassment to BT Collective’s principals. Likewise, it is not oppressive for

violators of federal law to be exposed to criminal prosecution for their violations. 

BT Collective cites a number of cases that, it argues, defend the entry of protective

orders to bar disclosure of incriminating discovery. Because those cases don’t speak to the

subsequent sealing of such discovery, they are not so helpful, and they are distinguishable

anyway. For example, in Rivera v. Nibco, Inc., the Ninth Circuit approved a protective order

in an employment discrimination case that prohibited the defendant employer from using the

discovery process to inquire into the plaintiff employees’ immigration status. 364 F.3d 1057

(9th Cir. 2004). But there, the court reasoned that the incriminating information sought in

discovery was not relevant to the plaintiffs’ claims and that it was being sought for a nefarious

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7

 There was also a proposal by the plaintiffs in Rivera that the trial be bifurcated into

a liability and damages phase, and that if they established liability, the court conduct an in

camera review in which each plaintiff would have to testify to his or her immigration status.

BT Collective’s case is entirely different. Fully aware now, along with the Court, that it has

violated the Controlled Substances Act, it asks the Court to help it conceal these violations

solely so it can bring a product liability claim in federal court. 

8

 The Second Circuit in Andover did reference a line of cases “wherein we have

upheld the use of protective orders limiting disclosure of potentially incriminating testimony

where parties have voluntarily consented to testify in civil cases in reliance upon such

protective orders.” Andover, 876 F.2d at 1084. Those cases are descendants of Martindell

v. ITT Corp., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979), in which the Second Circuit denied the

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purpose, namely to chill civil rights actions. Id. at 1064. Neither concern is present here.7

The information sought by Sunlight Supply, far from being irrelevant, is so relevant that the

basis of Sunlight Supply’s motion to dismiss is that it cannot defend this case without it. BT

Collective has also conceded that Sunlight Supply is not trying to bully it out of this lawsuit

by threatening criminal exposure. Indeed, Sunlight Supply was initially amenable to the

protective orders entered by Judge Gallo as well as the sealing now being sought. Finally,

there is a clear distinction in the Court’s judgment between, on the one hand, the public’s

interest in a discrimination-free workplace and the robust, private enforcement of Title VII,

and, on the other hand, the public’s interest in a criminal enterprise seeking legal redress in

court for a faulty product that impeded the enterprise. 

The Court would also distinguish Hobley and Andover Data Servs., 876 F.2d 1080 (2d

Cir. 1989). The question in Hobley was whether to enter a protective order barring the

plaintiff’s counsel from publicly disseminating or commenting on the depositions of nonparties in which they asserted their Fifth Amendment rights. That kind of protective order

binding the parties is in place in this case, and the Court is willing to let it be. It is another

question entirely whether to use invoke the same good cause supporting that protective to

justify the sealing of a judicial record. The court in Hobley was quick to observe “[a]s a

threshold matter” that the protective order sought “does not relate to materials filed as part

of the public record in this case.” Hobley, 225 F.R.D. at 224. Andover is even easier to

distinguish. The question in that case, which the Second Circuit answered in the negative,

was whether a court could essentially override a non-party deponent’s invocation of his Fifth

Amendment rights by subjecting his deposition testimony to a protective order.8

 That is

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Government access to deposition transcripts for the purposes of a criminal investigation.

The depositions were taken pursuant to a court-approved stipulation that the parties would

treat them as confidential and use them only to prosecute or defend the action, and the court

held that “a witness should be entitled to rely upon the enforceability of a protective order

against any third parties.” The Court doesn’t disagree with that, which is why it is willing to

leave the protective orders in place insofar as they bind Sunlight Supply not to disclose the

deposition transcripts. There is no doubt that BT Collective’s principals relied on the

protective orders and wouldn’t have consented to depositions without them. The Martindell

line of cases says nothing, though, about the fate of material that is subject to a protective

order when it is actually filed with a court as, or as part of, a judicial record. BT Collective’s

reliance on Sunlight Supply not disclosing the deposition transcripts goes only that far; it is

no justification—not even good cause—for the Court sealing those depositions wherever in

the record they appear. 

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wholly inapplicable to this case. 

IV. Conclusion 

The joint motion to seal Sunlight Supply’s motion to dismiss is DENIED. This Court

believes the motion is a dispositive one and finds that the reasons BT Collective has offered

for sealing are not compelling. Alternatively, if the motion is properly treated as

nondispositive, the Court would still not find good cause to seal it. The Court simply cannot

look past what it is being asked to do here, which is not only overlook BT Collective’s likely

violations of federal law but actually aid BT Collective in concealing them. The answer is no.

BT Collective cites a lot of legal authority, to be sure, but it cites none for the proposition that,

as a plaintiff in a civil case whose claims arise out of criminal conduct under federal law, it

can invoke a stipulated protective order between itself and the defendant, approved by the

Court, to litigate this case entirely behind the curtain. 

The Court therefore reinstates its original ultimatum. (See Dkt. No. 32.) BT Collective

can litigate this case transparently and hope that the United States takes no interest in

investigating its apparent violations of the Controlled Substances Act. If it doesn’t want to

do that, it can voluntarily dismiss the action. All discovery in this case, and this Order itself,

will be stayed pending BT Collective’s representation that it will pursue an interlocutory

appeal. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 23, 2011

Case 3:11-cv-00021-LAB-WVG Document 44 Filed 11/23/11 Page 11 of 11