Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-02236/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-02236-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

QUINN WILRIDGE,

Petitioner,

v.

TERRI GONZALES,

Respondent.

Case Nos.

09-17695 (COA), Dkt. 66

09-cv-02236-SI, Dkt. 131 

ORDER ISSUING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

The appellate commissioner seeks this Court’s issuance or denial of a certificate of 

appealability from this Court’s April 6, 2015 denial of petitioner’s motion for relief from judgment 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). See 09-17695 (COA), Dkt. 66; 09-cv-02236-SI, Dkt. 131. 

Petitioner filed a statement in support of this Court’s issuance of the certificate. 09-cv-02236-SI, 

Dkt. 141. For the reasons that follow, this Court issues the certificate.

Petitioner sought to equitably toll, on the basis of mental incapacity, the one-year 

limitations period pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”), which imposed a statute of limitations on petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by 

state prisoners. 09-cv-02236-SI, Dkt. 131 at 4-6. Following a remand from the Ninth Circuit and 

two evidentiary hearings, the Court ruled on petitioner’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion, finding that 

petitioner had not demonstrated that he was entitled to equitable tolling for mental illness between 

February 2005 and January 2007, and that his federal habeas petition was therefore untimely. Id. 

at 1-6.

Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner seeking to appeal a district court’s final order in a 

habeas corpus proceeding must obtain a certificate of appealability from the district judge or a 

circuit judge. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate may issue “only if the applicant has made 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. at § 2253(c)(2); accord Williams 

v. Calderon, 83 F.3d 281, 286 (9th Cir. 1996). “A petitioner satisfies this standard by 

demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his 

constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve 

encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003); see also 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000).

The Court concludes that whether Wilridge is entitled to equitable tolling of the AEDPA 

statute of limitations on the basis of mental incapacity is, among reasoned jurists, debatable. 

Whether Wilridge’s mental incapacity was an extraordinary circumstance beyond his control 

sufficient to trigger equitable tolling is a multi-factor analysis, and for this Court, was a factintensive inquiry. See Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 772 (9th Cir. 2010); Mendoza v. Carey, 

449 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Equitable tolling determinations are highly factdependent.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 

1148 (9th Cir. 2000))).

Wilridge was required to demonstrate both:

(1) [That] his mental impairment was an extraordinary circumstance beyond his 

control by demonstrating the impairment was so severe that either

(a) [he] was unable rationally or factually to personally understand the need 

to timely file, or

(b) [his] mental state rendered him unable personally to prepare a habeas 

petition and effectuate its filing;

[and]

(2) [...] [D]iligence in pursuing the claims to the extent he could understand them, 

but that the mental impairment made it impossible to meet the filing deadline under 

the totality of the circumstances, including reasonably available access to 

assistance.

Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted).

Specifically, the Court zeroed in on the first factor in Bills, finding that the record and 

expert testimony indicated that, during the relevant time period, Wilridge was performing tasks 

which were inconsistent with the kind of incapacity required by Bills factor one (under either 

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United States District Court

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subparts (a) or (b) as listed above). Dkt. 131 at 10-14. The Court found that Wilridge’s 

performance of a series of tasks over a roughly two year period from February 2005 to January 

2007 suggested that he possessed the requisite mental acuity to timely file a habeas petition. Id.

This conclusion was based on a thorough review of the records and the expert testimony 

presented over two evidentiary hearings. Dkt. 131 at 3. The Court is mindful, however, that factintensive analyses call for the fact-finder to apportion weight to a given set of facts to the 

exclusion of others, and thus, reasoned jurists could reach a different conclusion based on the 

evidence presented. A certificate of appealability “does not require a showing that the appeal will 

succeed.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 337.

For this reason, the court issues a certificate of appealability examining whether Wilridge 

is entitled to equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute of limitations on the basis of mental 

incapacity, specifically, whether during the relevant time period (February 2005 to January 2007), 

Wilridge was performing tasks which were inconsistent with the kind of incapacity required under 

Bills factor one. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3) (“The certificate of appealability . . . shall indicate 

which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing[.]”); United States v. Asrar, 116 F.3d 1268, 

1270 (9th Cir. 1997)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 19, 2016

______________________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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