Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02088/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02088-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 245
Nature of Suit: Real Property Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity Action

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROY VICTOR BOYKO; CARRIE L.

BOYKO; RAFAEL ARREDONDO;

MARIA R. ARREDONDO; GERALD

E. JAMISON; KAREN J. JAMISON;

CONSTRUTECH, LLC; YOSSI

BOUZAGLO; ADRIANA

BOUZAGLO; DANIEL PAUL

ATTAWAY; MICHELLE DIANE

ATTAWAY; ROBERT J.

HERNANDEZ; JULIE R.

HERNANDEZ; UDO NIETSCH;

BIANCA VOK; DORA LUZ

SEPULVEDA; WILLIE MAJOR;

RENE Y. MAJOR; ERIK M. DALEY;

CARINNE C, DALEY; MARCOS A.

BORRERO; ROSA M. BORRERO;

JAIME GOMEZ; and BARBARA

SOLARES,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 15cv2088 JM(JLB)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART MOTION TO

DISMISS; DENYING MOTION TO

STRIKE; REMANDING ACTION TO

STATE COURT

v.

TERVENO, LP; CORNERSTONE

COMMUNITIES CORPORATION;

CORNERSTONE COMMUNITIES

LLC; and UPONOR, INC.,

Defendants.

Defendant Uponor, Inc. (“Uponor”) moves to dismiss all claims asserted in the

Second Amended Compliant (“SAC”) and to strike the class action allegations. 

Plaintiffs oppose both motions. Pursuant to L.R. 7.1(d)(1), the court finds the matters

presented appropriate for resolution without oral argument. For the reasons set forth

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below, the court grants in part and denies in part the motion to dismiss, denies the

motion to strike, and remands the action to state court.

BACKGROUND

On September 18, 2015, Defendant Uponorremoved Plaintiffs’ class action SAC

from the San Diego County Superior Court. (Ct. Dkt. 1). Plaintiffs originally filed this

construction defect action as a multiparty individual action on December 22, 2014. 

The SAC, filed in the Superior Court on August 21, 2015, set forth class action

allegations for the first time and led to Uponor’s removal of the SAC pursuant to the

Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. ¶1332(d). Plaintiffs do not challenge

the timeliness of removal. 

Named Plaintiffs, located in Chula Vista, California in the same development

(the “Subject Properties”), are purchasers of residential properties developed,

constructed, improved, and/or sold by Defendants Treveno L.P., Cornerstone

Communities LLC, and Cornerstone Communities Corporation (collectively

“Builders”). (SAC ¶¶ 17-19). Defendant Uponor allegedly designed, manufactured,

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maintained, sold, supplied, and/or installed the PEX piping in Plaintiffs’ residences. 

The Plaintiff class brings class claims against only Uponor. The class is defined as:

All owners of originally constructed individual dwelling units, other than

condominium conversions, in the State of California where the original

purchase agreements for the individual dwelling units were signed by the

originalseller, on or after January 1, 2003, where the residential units had

installed, as part of the original construction of their plumbing systems,

Cross-linked Polyethylene (also known as “PEX”) piping manufactured

by Uponor, Inc.

(SAC ¶44).

Plaintiffs allege three claims for relief: (1) violation of the California Right to

Repair Act (“RORA”), Cal. Civil Code §895, et seq. brought by Named Plaintiffs

against Uponor asthe only class-wide cause of action and individually against Builders

(the factual allegations for the imposition of liability under RORA are distinct for

Uponor and Builders); (2) negligence, brought by Plaintiffs individually against all

 On November 6, 2015, Builders filed an answer to the SAC. 1

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Defendants; and (3) strict liability, brought by Plaintiffs individually against Uponor

only. 

In broad brush, Plaintiffs allege that the PEX piping designed and manufactured

by Uponor is defective, prematurely deteriorates, and fails, causing extensive water

leaks and concomitant damage. This allegation is at the heart of the class-wide RORA

claim and Plaintiffs’ individual claims for negligence and strict liability.

Plaintiffs’ individual claims against Builders for violation of RORA and

negligence arise fromallegations that the residencessufferfromnumerous construction

defects. (SAC ¶58). Plaintiffs allege that the residences suffer from, among other

things, stress cracks resulting in water intrusion; splitting and deterioration of exterior

door frames resulting in water intrusion; fogging of window panes resulting in water

intrusion; mold damage on stucco and drywall; cracking of stucco resulting in water

intrusion; and defective PEX piping resulting in water intrusion and damage. 

DISCUSSION

Legal Standards

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only in

"extraordinary" cases. United States v. Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir.

1981). Courts should grant 12(b)(6) relief only where a plaintiff's complaint lacks a

"cognizable legal theory" or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Courts should

dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim when the factual allegations are

insufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (the complaint’s allegations must “plausibly

suggest[]” that the pleader is entitled to relief); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)

(under Rule 8(a), well-pleaded facts must do more than permit the court to infer the

mere possibility of misconduct). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Id. at 678. Thus, “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

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supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. The defect must appear

on the face of the complaint itself. Thus, courts may not consider extraneous material

in testing its legal adequacy. Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1482 (9th

Cir. 1991). The courts may, however, consider material properly submitted as part of

the complaint. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555

n.19 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Finally, courts must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. dismissed, 116

S. Ct. 1710 (1996). Accordingly, courts must accept as true all material allegations in

the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. Holden v.

Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 1992). However, conclusory allegations of

law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. In

Re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 1996).

The Motion to Dismiss

The RORA Claim

Uponor moves to dismiss the RORA claim on grounds that (1) the action is

barred by RORA’s four year statute of limitations; (2) Plaintiffs failed to comply with

the pre-litigation requirements of RORA; and (3) RORA does not permit class actions. 

Each is discussed in turn.

Plaintiffs allege that Uponor violated Civil Code §§896(a)(14), (15), and (e) of

RORA. (SAC ¶58(j)). These sections provide that, in the original construction of

individual dwellings, the “plumbing system . . . shall not leak,” §896(a)(14), the

plumbing lines shall not “corrode so as to impede the useful life of the system,”

§896(a)(15), and the plumbing systems shall be “installed properly” and not “materially

impair the use of the structure by its inhabitants.” §896(e). Within §896(e) itself, the

statute provides that no action may be brought more than four years after the close of

escrow.” §896(e).

Uponor comes forward with documents, obtained from official, publically

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available records to show that each Plaintiff purchased their residences more than four

years prior to the December 22, 2014 filing date of the present action. Based upon the

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this evidentiary showing and RORA’s specific four-year limitation period for plumbing

system issues contained in §896(e), the court concludes that Plaintiffs cannot state a

claim because the RORA §896(e) claim is time-barred. The claims under §896(e) are

dismissed as time-barred.

Defendants also seek to dismiss the §§896(a)(14) and (15) claims astime-barred. 

Uponor contendsthat the four-year statute of limitations of §896(e) applies to bar these

claims. The court concludes that the ten-year statute of limitations of §941(a) applies

to claims under §§896(a)(14) and (15). Section §941(a) provides:

Except as specifically set forth in this title, no action may be brought to

recover under this title more than 10 years after substantial completion of

the improvement but not later than the date of recordation of a valid

notice of completion.

This section provides a ten-year statute of limitations unless otherwise specified

in RORA. Because §§896(a)(14) and (15) do not contain a specific statute of

limitations like §896(e), the ten- year limitation period applies. Section §896(e), in

contrast, specifically contains a four-year statute of limitations. Construing the

complaint in the best light for Plaintiffs, the court concludes that Plaintiffs’ §896(e)

claims are time-barred but their §§896(a)(14) and (15) claims are not.

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Next, Uponor contends that Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the prelitigation requirements of RORA. Section 910 requires that a claimant must provide

Pursuant to FRE 201(f), the court takes judicial notice of the grant deeds

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submitted by Uponor. 

The court notes that there is some overlap between the plumbing issues 3

identified in §896(e) and §§896(a)(14) and (15). Section §896(e) provides that

plumbing systems “shall be installed to operate properly and shall not materially impair

the use of the structure by its inhabitants.” In contrast, §§896(a)(14) and (15) require

that plumbing lines not leak or corrode. While the four year statute of limitations

targets the installation of plumbing systems (§896(e)), §§896(a)(14) and (15) require

that the plumbing lines not leak or corrode, even if properly installed, for a period of

ten years.

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written notice via certified mail to the “builder.” The term “builder means:

any entity or individual, including but limited to a builder, developer,

general contractor, contractor, or original seller . . . who, at the time of

sale, was also in the business of selling residential units to the public for

the property that is the subject of the homeowner’s claim or was in the

business of building, developing, or constructing residential units for

public purchase for the property that is the subject of the homeowner’s

claim.

§911(a). Uponor asserts that Plaintiffs allege that they provided pre-litigation notice

to Uponor. (SAC ¶16). Uponor deniesthat it ever received written notice of any claim

from Plaintiffs.

The court concludes that Uponor is not a “builder” for purposes of RORA and,

therefore, not subject to RORA’s pre-litigation notice requirements. A “builder” is

defined as a builder, contractor or other entity that is also in the business of selling

residential units to the public. Uponor supplied plumbing lines to the properties, and

did not act as a contractor nor is it in the business of selling residential real estate. As

Uponor is not a builder for purposes of §910, Plaintiffs need not comply with the prelitigation requirements.

Finally, Uponor contends that §931 prevents Plaintiffs from pursuing a RORA

claim as a class action. Section 931 identifies causes of action or damages exceeding

the scope of RORA. Civil Code § 931 states:

If a claim combines causes of action or damages not covered by this part

[i.e., “Real or Immovable Property”], including, without limitation,

personal injuries, class actions, other statutory remedies, or fraud-based

claims, the claimed unmet standards shall be administered according to

this part, although evidence of the property in its unrepaired condition

may be introduced to support the respective elements of any such cause

of action. As to any fraud-based claim, if the fact that the property has

been repaired under this chapter is deemed admissible, the trier of fact

shall be informed that the repair was not voluntarily accepted by the

homeowner. As to any class action claims that address solely the

incorporation of a defective component into a residence, the named and

unnamed class members need not comply with this chapter [i.e., the

chapter on prelitigation procedures].

In large part, Uponor urges the court to follow the reasoning in Greystone

Homes, Inc. v. Midtec, Inc., 168 Cal.App.4th 1194 (2008) and Kingsbury v. U.S.

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Greenfiber, LLC, No. CV-08-00151 AHM(JTLx), 2009 WL 2997389 (C. D. Cal.

2009). In Greystone, the plaintiff homebuilder brought an action against a

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manufacturer of plumbing fittings for negligence and equitable indemnity under

RORA. The manufacturer argued that RORA did not apply to plaintiff’s claims

because §896(g)(3)(E) provides: “This title does not apply in any action seeking

recovery solely for a defect in a manufactured product located within or adjacent to a

structure.” The California court rejected the manufacturer’s argument that

§896(g)(3)(E) excluded all product liability claims from RORA. The California court

concluded that §896(g)(3)(E) “is intended to bar actions in which the claimant seeks

to recover for a defect in a product that does not violate one of the standards set forth

in section 896.” Id. at 1222.

Applying the Greystone reasoning to §931, the court concludes that RORA

claims may not be bought as class claims but non-RORA claims may be brought as

class claims. The first sentence of §931 provides that class actions are excluded from

the scope of RORA while the last sentence of §931 indicates that class actions

“address[ing] solely the incorporation of a defective component into a residence” need

not comply with the prelitigation procedures. 

The court notes that RORA does not define “component,” nor has anyCalifornia

state court addressed this precise issue of state law, and the last sentence of §931

appears to contradict the first sentence of §931 that excludes class action claims from

the scope of RORA. This apparent contradiction in §931 is harmonized when the last

sentence §931 is interpreted to mean, consistent with the reasoning in Greystone, that

any claim based on a defect other than those listed in §896, is excluded from the scope

of RORA. See Greystone, 168 Cal.App. at 1221-23. This is another way ofsaying that

Notably, the court in Kingsbury did not determine whether plaintiffs were able 4

to bring RORA class claims.

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non-RORA claims may be brought as class actions, but RORA claims may not.5

Further support for the proposition that RORA does not permit class actions is found

in Miller and Starr California Real Estate 3d §29.2 (2009):

“[RORA] excludes certain types of claims from its scope and from the

pre-litigation procedure. The pre-litigation procedures and SB800 do not

apply to claims for fraud, personal injury, class actions or other statutory

remedies.”

Harry D. Miller & Marvin D. Starr, Miller and Star California Real Estate 3d §29.2

(2009). The court grants the motion to dismiss the class action RORA claim.

In sum, the court denies the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ individual RORA

claims but grants the motion to dismiss the class action RORA claim. 

The Negligence and Strict Liability Claims

Plaintiffs do not oppose the dismissal of these claims. Accordingly, the court

grants the motion to dismiss these claims. 

The Motion to Strike

Uponor moves to strike the class action allegations on grounds that the class

action allegations are overbroad and fail to identify an ascertainable claim. The court

notes that motions to strike are disfavored motions and infrequently granted. See

Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cie. 1993), rev’d on other grounds,

510 U.S. 517 (1994). Accordingly, the court denies the motion to strike and notes that

challenges to class certification issues are better addressed in context of a motion for

class certification.

The court notes that the district court in Kingsbury, applying the rationale of 5

Greystone, reached a similar result in interpreting §931:

Under the above reading of §931, any claim based on a defect other than

those listed in §896 standard is exempt from the prelitigation procedure

[of RORA]. This universe of exempt claims islarger than those exempted

altogether from RORA; the latter group includes defect claims that are

both based on something other than §896 and related to manufactured

products.

Kingsbury, 2009 WL 2997389 at *6.

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Subject Matter Jurisdiction

In light of dismissal of the RORA class claim, the only basis for the exercise of

diversity jurisdiction under CAFA, 28 U.S.C. §1332(d), the court sua sponte remands

the action to state court. See Maniar v. FDIC, 979 F.2d 782, 785 (9 Cir. 1992) (the

th

court may sua sponte remand an action to state court). Federal question removal

jurisdiction is determined from the face of the complaint as it existed at the time of

removal. Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 1979);

Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998) (whether a claim arises

under federal law is determined by the “well-pleaded complaint rule”). Defendants, as

the parties who invoke federal removal jurisdiction, have the burden of demonstrating

the existence of federal jurisdiction. See Serrano v. 1809 Connect, Inc., 478 F.3d 1018,

1021 (9th Cir. 2007). Any doubtsregarding removal jurisdiction are construed against

Defendants and in favor of remanding the case to state court. Id. As a consequence of

Uponor prevailing on its argument that RORA does not permit class action claims for

violation of the standards contained therein, CAFA jurisdiction did not exist at the time

of removal. The court, therefore, lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action and

remands the case to state court. 

In sum, the court grants the motion to dismiss that portion of the RORA claim

alleging a violation of §896(e) as time-barred, denies the motion to dismiss the

individual RORA claims arising under §§896(a)(14) and (15), grants the motion to

dismiss the RORA class claim, denies the motion to strike, and remands the action to

state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 26, 2016

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All parties

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