Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00714/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00714-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dawn Michelle Thompson

Plaintiff, 

v.

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner

of the Social Security Administration, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-12-714-PHX (LOA)

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Award of Attorney’s Fees

Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Motion

for Award of Attorney’s Fees, and the Affidavit of Plaintiff’s Counsel Regarding Attorney’s

Fees. (Docs. 22-24) Carolyn W. Colvin, the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration (the “Commissioner”) filed a Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney

Fees, stating she has no objection to Plaintiff’s requested attorney’s fees of $10,605.54.

(Doc. 28)

I. Background

On August 14, 2009, Plaintiff filed applications for Social Security Disability

Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income under Titles II and XVI, respectively,

of the Social Security Act (“Act”). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 and §§ 1381-1383c. (Doc. 20

at 1) Plaintiff’s disability benefits requests were denied initially and on reconsideration.

Thereafter, a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Patrick Kilgannon.

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The ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. This decision

became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Social Security Appeals Council

denied Plaintiff’s request for review. Plaintiff then sought review in this District Court. On

July 2, 2013, the Court entered an order, remanding this matter for an award of benefits and

concluding the ALJ committed legal error when he failed to provide specific and legitimate

reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record for rejecting the opinions of Drs.

Feldman and Torzala. (Doc. 20 at 14) The Clerk of Court entered judgment on the same day.

(Doc. 21) Plaintiff now seeks an award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA.

II. Attorney’s Fees under the EAJA 

In any action brought by or against the United States except one sounding in tort, the

EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, provides that “a court shall award to a prevailing party other than

the United States fees and other expenses . . . unless the court finds that the position of the

United States was substantially justified.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The EAJA creates a

presumption that fees will be awarded to the prevailing party unless the Government

establishes that its position was “substantially justified.” Thomas v. Peterson, 841 F.2d 332,

335 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Substantially justified means “justified in substance

or in the main - that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce

v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal citations omitted). A substantially justified

position must have a reasonable basis both in law and fact. Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d

1255,1258 (9th Cir. 2001); Thomas, 841 F.2d at 335. 

The Government bears the burden of establishing substantial justification. Gutierrez,

274 F.3d at 1258. In determining whether the Government’s position was substantially

justified, a district court considers both the Government’s position during the litigation and

“the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2412(d)(2)(D). Thus, a court considers: “first, whether the government was substantially

justified in taking its original action; and second, whether the government was substantially

justified in defending the validity of the action in court.” Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1258

(citation omitted).

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III. Analysis

In her Brief in Support of Motion for Award of Attorney’s Fees, Plaintiff argues she

is the prevailing party in this action, and entitled to attorney’s fees under the EAJA. Plaintiff

further argues the Commissioner cannot meet her burden of showing the Social Security

Administration’s position in this case was substantially justified. In Plaintiff’s counsel’s

affidavit, counsel itemizes the services he performed for Plaintiff. Based on the hours

expended and the adjusted hourly rate permitted under the EAJA, counsel requests total

attorney’s fees of $10,605.54. (Doc. 24-1 at 2) 

As noted above, the Commissioner filed a Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney

Fees, indicating she does not object to Plaintiff’s motion for fees under the EAJA. (Doc. 28)

Absent any opposition, the Court accepts Plaintiff’s argument she is entitled to an award of

attorney’s fees. The Court finds the total fees requested, including the hours expended and

the hourly rates, are reasonable.

Lastly, Plaintiff requests, pursuant to Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 130 S.Ct. 2521

(2010), that the check for EAJA fees be made payable to Plaintiff, but that it be mailed to

Plaintiff’s counsel’s office. (Doc. 23 at 9) In Ratliff, the United States Supreme Court held

that EAJA fees are payable to the prevailing party, not the prevailing party’s attorney.

Ratliff, 130 S.Ct. at 2524. In so holding, the Court noted the “practical reality that attorneys

are the beneficiaries and, almost always, the ultimate recipients of the fees that the statute

awards to the ‘prevailing part[ies]’” because of “nonstatutory (contractual and other

assignment-based) rights that typically confer upon the attorney the entitlement to payment

of the fees award the statute confers on the prevailing litigant.” Id. at 2529 (quoting Venegas

v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 86 (1990)). Plaintiff’s request regarding the check will, therefore,

be granted.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Award of Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to

the Equal Access to Justice Act, doc. 22, is GRANTED.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is awarded $10, 605.54 in attorney’s fees

to be mailed to Plaintiff’s counsel, Mark Caldwell, 1940 East Camelback Road, Suite 150,

Phoenix, AZ 85016. 

DATED this 20th day of November, 2013.

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