Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_15-cv-00086/USCOURTS-almd-3_15-cv-00086-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

EASTERN DIVISION 

 

KEITH ANTHONY SMITH, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:15cv86-WC 

 ) 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ) 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

I. INTRODUCTION

 Keith Anthony Smith (“Plaintiff”) filed an application for disability insurance 

benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq, on 

March 5, 2012. His application was denied at the initial administrative level. Plaintiff 

then requested and received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). 

Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled from the 

alleged onset date of February 28, 2012, through the date of the decision. Plaintiff 

appealed to the Appeals Council, which issued a decision affirming the ALJ’s decision. 

The Appeals Council’s decision consequently became the final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”).1

 See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 

 

1

 Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 

103-296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with respect to 

Social Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security. 

Case 3:15-cv-00086-WC Document 16 Filed 01/08/16 Page 1 of 12
2 

129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). The case is now before the court for review under 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), both parties have consented to the conduct of all 

proceedings and entry of a final judgment by the undersigned United States Magistrate 

Judge. Pl.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. 10); Def.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. 11). 

Based on the court’s review of the record and the briefs of the parties, the court 

AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to benefits when the person is 

unable to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to 

result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months. 

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).2

 To make this determination, the Commissioner employs a five-step, sequential 

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2011). 

(1) Is the person presently unemployed? 

(2) Is the person’s impairment severe? 

(3) Does the person’s impairment meet or equal one of the specific 

impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 [the Listing of 

Impairments]? 

(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation? 

(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy? 

 

2

 A “physical or mental impairment” is one resulting from anatomical, physiological, or psychological 

abnormalities that are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic 

techniques. 

Case 3:15-cv-00086-WC Document 16 Filed 01/08/16 Page 2 of 12
3 

An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next 

question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative 

answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of 

“not disabled.” 

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).3

 The burden of proof rests on a claimant through Step Four. See Phillips v. 

Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237-39 (11th Cir. 2004). A claimant establishes a prima facie

case of qualifying disability once they have carried the burden of proof from Step One 

through Step Four. At Step Five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner, who must then 

show there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy the claimant can 

perform. Id. 

 To perform the fourth and fifth steps, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s 

Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). Id. at 1238-39. The RFC is what the claimant is 

still able to do despite the claimant’s impairments and is based on all relevant medical 

and other evidence. Id. It may contain both exertional and nonexertional limitations. Id. 

at 1242-43. At the fifth step, the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and 

work experience to determine if there are jobs available in the national economy the 

claimant can perform. Id. at 1239. To do this, the ALJ can either use the Medical 

 

3

 McDaniel is a supplemental security income (SSI) case. The same sequence applies to disability 

insurance benefits. Supplemental security income cases arising under Title XVI of the Social Security 

Act are appropriately cited as authority in Title II cases. See, e.g., Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408, 412 

(5th Cir. 1981); Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F. App’x 874, 876 n.* (11th Cir. 2012) (“The 

definition of disability and the test used to determine whether a person has a disability is the same for 

claims seeking disability insurance benefits or supplemental security income.”). 

Case 3:15-cv-00086-WC Document 16 Filed 01/08/16 Page 3 of 12
4 

Vocational Guidelines4 (“grids”) or call a vocational expert (“VE”). Id. at 1239-40. 

 The grids allow the ALJ to consider factors such as age, confinement to sedentary 

or light work, inability to speak English, educational deficiencies, and lack of job 

experience. Each factor can independently limit the number of jobs realistically available 

to an individual. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240. Combinations of these factors yield a 

statutorily-required finding of “Disabled” or “Not Disabled.” Id. 

 The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. This court 

must find the Commissioner’s decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial 

evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). 

“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see also Crawford v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Even if the evidence 

preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings, [a reviewing court] must affirm if the 

decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.”). A reviewing court may not look 

only to those parts of the record which support the decision of the ALJ, but instead must 

view the record in its entirety and take account of evidence which detracts from the 

evidence relied on by the ALJ. Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1986). 

[The court must] . . . scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the 

reasonableness of the [Commissioner’s] . . . factual findings. . . . No 

 

4

 See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 2. 

Case 3:15-cv-00086-WC Document 16 Filed 01/08/16 Page 4 of 12
5 

similar presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner’s] . . . legal 

conclusions, including determination of the proper standards to be applied 

in evaluating claims. 

Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987). 

III. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 

 Plaintiff was fifty years old on the alleged disability onset date, and had a tenthgrade education although he never achieved his GED. Tr. 52, 55. Following the 

administrative hearing, and employing the five-step process, the ALJ found at Step One 

that Plaintiff “has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 28, 2012, the 

alleged onset date[.]” Tr. 46. At Step Two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffers from the 

following severe impairments: “chronic obstructive pulmonary disease; bronchitis with 

ongoing tobacco abuse; obesity; sever [sic] bullous emphysema; benign pulmonary 

nodule, right lung; and pulmonary arterial hypertension[.]” Tr. 46. At Step Three, the 

ALJ found that Plaintiff “does not have an impairment or combination of impairments 

that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments[.]” Tr. 48. 

Next, the ALJ articulated Plaintiff’s RFC as follows: 

[Plaintiff] has the [RFC] to perform a light work as defined in 20 CFR 

404.1567(b) except that on a function-by-function basis, [Plaintiff] can 

frequently lift and carry up to and more than 25 pounds. He does not suffer 

any additional manipulative limitations. He can sit at least seven hours of 

an eight-hour workday. He can stand at least six hours of an eight-hour 

workday. He can walk up to one hour without interruption and a total of 

four hours over the course of an eight-hour workday. He can occasionally 

climb, balance, stoop, kneel or crouch. He cannot crawl. He should avoid 

any exposure to extreme temperatures. He can tolerate frequent exposure 

to wetness and humidity and occasional exposure to fumes, odors, dust, 

Case 3:15-cv-00086-WC Document 16 Filed 01/08/16 Page 5 of 12
6 

gases, poorly ventilated areas and other pulmonary irritants. He should 

avoid any exposure to operating hazardous machinery and unprotected 

heights. He can operate a motor vehicle seven hours of an eight-hour 

workday. 

Tr. 49. Having consulted with a VE at the hearing, the ALJ concluded at Step Four that 

Plaintiff is “able to perform past relevant work” as a security guard. Tr. 55. Finally, at 

Step Five, and based upon the testimony of the VE, the ALJ determined that 

“[c]onsidering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional 

capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the 

claimant can perform.” Tr. 55. The ALJ identified several representative occupations, 

including “assembler, electrical accessories,” “wire worker,” and “hand packager.” Tr. 

56. Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff “has not been under a disability . . . 

from February 28, 2012, through the date of this decision[.]” Tr. 56. 

IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM

 Plaintiff presents one issue for the court to consider in its review of the 

Commissioner’s decision: “[w]hether the ALJ’s finding that [Plaintiff] has the residual 

functional capacity to perform light work . . . with limited exceptions is supported by 

substantial evidence.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 13) at 5. 

V. DISCUSSION 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s findings that Plaintiff can perform light work with 

certain exceptions and that he can perform his past relevant work as a security guard are 

not supported by substantial evidence. Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 13) at 6. In support of his 

Case 3:15-cv-00086-WC Document 16 Filed 01/08/16 Page 6 of 12
7 

argument, Plaintiff mostly relies on his own testimony regarding his subjective 

complaints of the severity of his ailments. Specifically, Plaintiff contends (1) that the 

ALJ’s findings are “simply inconsistent with [Plaintiff]’s severe medical problems” 

because Plaintiff’s “respiratory problems and side effects of his medications” cause him 

to be “unable to perform any job that requires a good deal of walking or standing or even 

sitting which requires pushing and pulling arm and leg controls,” Id. at 6, 7; (2) that if he 

is unable to perform sustained work on a regular and continuing basis, he is disabled 

according to SSP 96-8, Id. at 7; and (3) that the VE testified that if Plaintiff’s testimony 

had been found credible regarding daytime naps and occasionally using oxygen during 

the course of the day, there would be no jobs that Plaintiff could perform, Id. Each of 

Plaintiff’s arguments, and the evidence supporting the ALJ’s findings relevant thereto, 

are discussed below. 

A. Plaintiff’s Respiratory Problems 

Plaintiff’s first challenge to the ALJ’s finding is that Plaintiff’s respiratory 

problems are too severe for Plaintiff to be capable of the light work RFC as assessed by 

the ALJ. Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 13) at 6-7. Plaintiff argues that his “respiratory problems are so 

severe that he has to use Albuterol four times a day and oxygen on a regular basis,” and, 

as he testified, “he uses oxygen every night and whenever he cannot catch his breath.” 

Id. Additionally, Plaintiff “testified that if he walks to the mailbox, he can hardly catch 

his breath and must use oxygen for about 30 minutes.” Id. Plaintiff does not point to any 

Case 3:15-cv-00086-WC Document 16 Filed 01/08/16 Page 7 of 12
8 

medical evidence of record in support of his argument. Rather, he relies on his own 

subjective statements to evidence his inability to sustain employment. 

When considering the credibility of a claimant’s subjective complaints, the ALJ 

has wide discretion so long as the he “clearly articulate[s] explicit and adequate reasons” 

for the credibility determination. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). This court must uphold the ALJ’s credibility 

determination if it is supported by substantial evidence, see Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 

1219, 1246 (11th Cir. 2002) (“If the ALJ discredits subjective testimony, he must 

articulate explicit and adequate reasons for doing so.”), which is “more than a scintilla, 

but less than a preponderance.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). 

Here, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s complaints to be incredible, and the ALJ clearly 

articulated explicit and adequate reasons for his credibility determination. The ALJ 

explained, 

The undersigned has considered all of the evidence of record and the 

testimony offered at the hearing and in light of this, finds [Plaintiff] to be 

less than credible. For example, he reported to Dr. Smith that he was able 

to tend to his personal care needs and the household chores without 

assistance. He stated that he does not drive but revealed to Dr. Smith that 

his license was suspended due to DUI. [Plaintiff] alleged a disability as of 

February 2012 but admitted he lost his job in 2010 when the business 

closed. There is no indication he actively sought other employment, 

including employment that was indoors to accommodate his respiratory 

condition. He continued to smoke excessively and was repeatedly 

cautioned by treating physicians regarding the dangers of his habit. He 

stated he even got a “cancer scare” which caused him to stop, but 

apparently, it did not alarm him enough to stop smoking. 

Case 3:15-cv-00086-WC Document 16 Filed 01/08/16 Page 8 of 12
9 

Tr. 54. 

Additionally, the ALJ noted several pieces of medical evidence that contradicted 

the severity of Plaintiff’s description of his breathing problems. Specifically, the ALJ 

pointed to the following evidence of record: when Plaintiff “underwent a teleclaim 

interview with a social security claims representative, [he] was not perceived [as having] 

any difficulty . . . breathing,” Tr. 50; in March 2012, “his wheezing was only minor when 

he was examined” and his pulse oxygen level was 97% on room air, Tr. 51-52; in April 

2012, Plaintiff “was not wheezing during the examination” and completed a breathing 

test that “reflected an improvement after medication was administered,” Tr. 52; in April 

2013, Plaintiff’s oxygen “saturation averaged between 93 and 95% on room air,” “his 

lungs expanded bilaterally without any signs of wheezes, rales, or rhonchi,” and “[h]is 

treatment was conservative in nature,” Tr. 53. The ALJ also noted throughout the 

decision that, despite Plaintiff’s serious, subjective complaints of breathing problems, 

Plaintiff continued to smoke, as much as up to two packs of cigarettes a day, except for 

one brief period where Plaintiff quit smoking temporarily. Tr. 51-53. The ALJ took the 

position that had Plaintiff’s breathing problems been as severe as he alleges they were, 

Plaintiff would have cut back or given up his smoking habit. Tr. 54. 

The court finds that the ALJ has clearly articulated explicit and adequate reasons 

for finding Plaintiff’s subjective complaints regarding the severity of his breathing 

troubles to be not credible. 

Case 3:15-cv-00086-WC Document 16 Filed 01/08/16 Page 9 of 12
10 

B. Side Effects of Plaintiff’s Medication 

Second, Plaintiff argues that the RFC is not supported by substantial evidence 

because the side effects of his medication cause him to be overly drowsy. Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 

13) at 7. Plaintiff contends that he “takes Loretab 7.5 three times a day for pain 

management and Xanax for anxiety and both medications make him drowsy,” and “he 

takes daytime naps for several hours two or three days of the week and cannot get 

through a whole week without taking a nap.” Id. 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “allegations cannot be objectively verified with any 

reasonable degree of certainty.” Tr. 54. Further, the ALJ explained that Plaintiff’s 

“activities of daily living further undermine his credibility.” Tr. 54. 

[T]here is no evidence in the record that medication side effects can be 

expected to limit [Plaintiff]’s effectiveness in the performance of work 

duties or everyday tasks or that those side effects can be expected to be 

severe and to limit [Plaintiff]’s effectiveness due to distraction, inattention 

and drowsiness. 

There is no medical evidence of record to support [Plaintiff]’s contention 

that he has to recline or nap during the day. Further, there is no evidence 

that [Plaintiff] has been on any medications on a regular and continual basis 

that would cause such to occur. 

Tr. 54. The ALJ also noted that the evidence indicates that Plaintiff has no limitation in 

concentration, persistence, or pace; has no limitations in his ability to understand, 

remember and carry out instructions, and is “able to drive an automobile as well as take 

care of his personal needs and enjoyed watching television, all of which are tasks and 

activities that require a certain level of sustained concentration and attention.” Tr. 48, 52. 

Case 3:15-cv-00086-WC Document 16 Filed 01/08/16 Page 10 of 12
11 

The court finds that the ALJ has clearly articulated explicit and adequate reasons 

for finding Plaintiff’s subjective complaints regarding the side effects of his medication 

to be not credible. 

C. Testimony of the VE 

Third, Plaintiff contends the RFC is not supported by substantial evidence because 

“[t]he [VE] testified that if the totality of [Plaintiff]’s impairments, limitations, pain and 

medications precluded [Plaintiff] from having the concentration, persistence and pace 

necessary to perform unskilled work activities and further limited his ability to attend to 

all customary work pressures, including arriving on time [and] returning from breaks on 

time, there would be no jobs in significant numbers in the local or national economies 

that [Plaintiff] could perform.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 13) at 7. 

 The ALJ did not find that the totality of Plaintiff’s impairments, limitations, pain 

and medications precluded Plaintiff from having the concentration, persistence and pace 

necessary to perform unskilled work activities and further limited his ability to attend to 

all customary work pressures, including arriving on time and returning from breaks on 

time. As discussed above, that decision was supported by substantial evidence. 

Accordingly, it is of no import that the VE opined that had the ALJ made different 

findings, there would be no jobs in significant numbers in the local or national economies 

that Plaintiff could perform. Plaintiff has shown no error. 

Case 3:15-cv-00086-WC Document 16 Filed 01/08/16 Page 11 of 12
12 

VI. CONCLUSION 

 The court has carefully and independently reviewed the record and concludes that, 

for the reasons given above, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. A 

separate judgment will issue. 

Done this 8th day of January, 2016. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 WALLACE CAPEL, JR. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case 3:15-cv-00086-WC Document 16 Filed 01/08/16 Page 12 of 12