Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01307/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01307-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1345 Foreclosure

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1

 Christopher Stoller (Christopher or Plaintiff) is incarcerated in the Dixon

Correctional Center in Dixon, Illinois and is a “prisoner” within the meaning of the Prison

Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) because he was a prisoner at the time he commenced this

action. (Doc. 1.) That is, Christopher was a “person incarcerated or detained in any facility”

who had been convicted and sentenced for violations of criminal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h);

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h). As a consequence, this case is subject to requirements under the

PLRA and this action is subject to screening by the Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Christopher

Stoller has filed a number of cases in both Illinois and Arizona. 

2

 Specifically, the Christopher Stoller Pension and Profit Sharing Plan Limited, a

Bahamas corporation (CSPPSP). See CSPPSP v. Countrywide Bank, No. CV09-0002-PHXNVW. 

WO SC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Christopher Stoller, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co., et

al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 12-1307-PHX-GMS (JFM)

ORDER

Christopher Stoller, “[by and through his agent, Leo Stoller,” filed this action through

Illinois attorney, Aaron Penna, against numerous Defendants, and an Application to Proceed

In Forma Pauperis.

1

 Christopher, Leo, or an entity2 affiliated with one or both of them, have

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3

 According to the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) website, Leo

Stoller has been a party, since 1985, in 87 civil actions or appeals in Illinois, Missouri,

Minnesota, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Utah, California, and Arizona. He is currently a criminal

defendant in the Northern District of Illinois, case no. 1:2010CR1052. On or about April 13,

2012, Leo entered into a plea agreement under which he pleaded guilty to one count of

knowingly and fraudulently making a false statement under penalty of perjury in a Chapter

13 bankruptcy proceeding in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152(3). Sentencing is scheduled for

October 29, 2012. 

4

 In a footnote, the Complaint states that “Leo Stoller, Christopher Stoller’s brother[,]

has the power, as Plaintiff’s agent, to commence and litigate this action on Plaintiff’s behalf,

through a Power of Attorney granted by Christopher Stoller to him.” As discussed further

below, while Leo appears to have the power to commence and litigate lawsuits on

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previously sued most if not all of the Defendants in this case regarding one or more of the

same four properties located in Arizona.3

 Christopher has filed motions for a temporary

restraining order and to disqualify the undersigned. (Doc. 2, 3, 5.) As discussed below, the

Court finds no basis for recusal or disqualification, accordingly, that motion will be denied.

The Court will order Christopher to show cause why this action should not be dismissed

based on his lack of legal capacity to commence this action, hold his Application to Proceed

In Forma Pauperis in abeyance pending that determination, and deny his motion for

injunctive relief.

 Defendants Bank of America (BOA), Bryan Cave LLP, Steven R. Smith, and Michael

Werich have filed a motion for leave to exceed the page limit for their lodged “Motion,

Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1651, for Sanctions Against Leo Stoller, Christopher

Stoller, and Their Counsel, Aaron Penna.” (Doc. 12, 13.) Neither Christopher, nor his

attorney, have opposed the motion to exceed the page limit. To date, Leo Stoller has not

appeared in this action nor have Defendants included a certificate of mailing or service of

their motion on Leo Stoller. The Court will grant the motion to exceed the page limit and

will order Christopher and his attorney to respond to the motion for sanctions. Because Leo

is not a party to this case and has not appeared in this case, the Court will not require him to

respond to the motion for sanctions at this time.4

 Defendants may thereafter file a reply. 

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Christopher’s behalf as Christopher’s agent, the Complaint is not signed by Leo, nor does

Christopher’s attorney, Aaron Penna, indicate that he represents Leo in this action. On the

current record in this case, the Court is unable to conclude that Leo is a party to this action,

but the Court will reconsider that determination if it is subsequently appears that Leo

instigated or endorsed the filing of this action.

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I. Motion for Disqualification

Plaintiff has filed a motion to disqualify the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 144

and 455. (Doc. 5.) Section 455(a) provides that a United States judge or magistrate judge

“shall disqualify” himself in any proceeding in which his “impartiality might reasonably be

questioned.” Section 455(b)(1) provides that a judge must also disqualify himself, where he

“has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed

evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding[.]” Recusal pursuant to § 455(b) is required only

if the bias or prejudice stems from an extra-judicial source, not from conduct or rulings

during the course of the proceedings. See Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 842 F.2d 1034, 1046

(9th Cir. 1987), aff’d, 496 U.S. 543 (1990); United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th

Cir. 1986) (judge’s prior adverse rulings are insufficient cause for recusal). “[J]udicial

rulings alone almost never constitute [a] valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky

v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1157 (1994). Adverse rulings should be appealed; they do

not form the basis for a recusal motion. Further, where the judge forms opinions in the

courtroom, either in the current proceeding or in a prior proceeding, these opinions “do not

constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism

or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Id.

Plaintiff fails to allege or show any basis for recusal under § 455. Rather, he

complains of the Court’s rulings in previous cases filed by him. As discussed above, that is

not a basis upon which the Court’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned for purposes

of § 455(a). Further, the Court does not have a personal bias or prejudice concerning

Plaintiff or other potential parties to this action or personal knowledge of disputed

evidentiary facts at issue in this proceeding. Plaintiff also asserts that the Court should

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5

 For appointment of a plenary guardian, the trial court must find the disabled adult

is totally without capacity. In re Estate of Fallos, 898 N.E.2d 793, 800 (Ill. Ct. App. 2008).

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recuse even if it is not personally biased or prejudiced against him to avoid an appearance

or impropriety in light of the Court’s rulings in previous cases filed by him. The Court

discerns no appearance of impropriety by presiding over the instant case simply because

Plaintiff’s prior efforts were unsuccessful. Again, Plaintiff’s disagreement with rulings in

prior cases were matters to raise on appeal. The Court finds no reason to recuse or disqualify

itself from the instant action. 

Plaintiff also seeks disqualification under § 144. Section 144 provides: 

Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files

a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is

pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any

adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge

shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.

The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias

or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the

beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause

shall be shown for failure to file it within such time. A party may file only one

such affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel

of record stating that it is made in good faith.

28 U.S.C. § 144 (emphasis added). 

As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s attorney has not filed a certificate stating that the

motion is made in good faith. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to file a “sufficient affidavit.”

Instead, he seeks disqualification solely based on his disagreement with the Court’s rulings

in previous cases filed by him. For both reasons, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s request and

deny his motion for disqualification. 

II. Background

In this case, as in at least one previous case, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of a

February 2011 Order of the Illinois Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit (Illinois

Probate Court) appointing the Illinois Office of the State Guardian as plenary guardian over

Plaintiff’s estate and person, case# 09 P 957, which was sought by Plaintiff’s brother, Leo.5

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“The probate court, upon petition of a guardian, . . . and after notice to all other persons

interested as the court directs, may authorize the guardian to exercise any or all powers over

the estate and business affairs of the ward that the ward could exercise if present and not

under disability.” 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11a-18(a). In addition, “[a]ctions or applications

of funds [by a guardian] may include, but shall not be limited to, the following: . . . (2)

conveying, releasing, or disclaiming his or her contingent and expectant interests in property

. . .; [and] (8) exercising the rights of the ward to elect benefit or payment options, to

terminate, to change beneficiaries or ownership, to assign rights, to borrow, or to receive cash

value in return for a surrender of rights under any one or more of the following: (i) life

insurance policies, plans, or benefits, (ii) annuity policies, plans, or benefits, (iii) mutual fund

and other dividend investment plans, (iv) retirement, profit sharing, and employee welfare

plans and benefits; . . . . 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-18(a-5). Finally, the guardian of the estate

of a ward shall appear for and represent the ward in all legal proceedings unless another

person is appointed for that purpose as guardian or next friend. . . . 755 Ill. Comp. Stat.

5/11a-18(c) (emphasis added). 

6

 The Probate Court noted a Physician’s Report in support of its determination.

“‘Incapacitated’, when used to describe a principal, means that the principal is under a legal

disability as defined in Section 11a-2 of the Probate Act of 1975. A principal shall also be

considered incapacitated if: (i) a physician licensed to practice medicine in all of its branches

has examined the principal and has determined that the principal lacks decision making

capacity; (ii) that physician has made a written record of this determination and has signed

the written record within 90 days after the examination; and (iii) the written record has been

delivered to the agent. The agent may rely conclusively on the written record.” 755 Ill.

Comp. Stat. 45/2-3(c-5). 

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(Doc. 2, attach.); see Stoller v. Bank of New York Mellon Trust, No. CV11-2454-PHX-GMS

(JFM), doc. 10, ex. 1. The Illinois Probate Court determined that Plaintiff was “totally

without understanding or capacity to make and communicate decisions regarding his person”

and his estate.6

 (Id.); see CV11-2454, doc. 10, ex. 1.

In CV11-2454, the Court ordered briefing of Plaintiff’s legal capacity to commence

that case. Stoller, CV11-2454, doc. 16. Through attorney Penna, Plaintiff filed a

memorandum. Id., doc. 58. In it, Plaintiff stated that three years prior to the appointment of

a guardian, he executed a “General Durable Power of Attorney Effective Upon Execution”

(POA) naming his brother, Leo, as his attorney-in-fact. Id. Plaintiff submitted a copy of the

POA as exhibit 2 to his memorandum, which reflected that it had been signed and notarized

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7

 Plaintiff alludes to the POA in his motion to disqualify, doc. 5 at 1, n.1.

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by a Maricopa County notary on October 24, 2007.7 Id., ex. 2. In the POA, Plaintiff

delegated to Leo full power and authority to manage and conduct all of Plaintiff’s affairs and

to exercise Plaintiff’s legal rights and powers, including among others, those: to collect, hold,

maintain, improve, invest, lease or otherwise manage any or all of his real or personal

property or any interest therein; to purchase, sell, mortgage, grant options, or otherwise deal

in any way in any real or personal property; to engage in any administrative or legal

proceedings or lawsuits in connection with any matter covered by the POA; to engage and

dismiss agents, counsel, and employees in connection with any matter, upon such terms as

Leo, as Plaintiff’s agent, determined and to sue on Plaintiff’s behalf; and to contravene any

medical power of attorney Plaintiff executed whether prior or subsequent to the execution

of the POA. Id. (emphasis added). Plaintiff argued, and the Court found, that under Illinois

law the power granted pursuant to the POA governed or controlled any subsequent power

conferred on the later-appointed guardian. Id., doc. 63 at 5 (citing 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11a17(c) and 5/11a-18(e)). However, the Court rejected Plaintiff’s assertion that his brother,

Leo, had commenced that case. Id. The Court noted that the complaint and everything filed

in that case had been signed by Plaintiff, or later, Plaintiff’s attorney. Id., doc. 63 at 6. The

Court found that while Leo Stoller had the power, as Plaintiff’s agent, to commence and

litigate an action on Plaintiff’s behalf, nothing in the case supported that Leo had done so.

Id. The Court further found that while Plaintiff asserted that his agent, Leo, endorsed the

filing of that action, Plaintiff’s attorney did not claim to represent Leo and Leo never

otherwise appeared. Id. On that basis, the Court found that Plaintiff had not demonstrated

that he had the legal capacity to litigate that action and that his agent, Leo, had not appeared

in the action. Id. Because Plaintiff failed to show that he possessed the legal capacity to

litigate that case, the Court dismissed the complaint and that action. Id.

III. Order to Show Cause

As noted in CV11-2454, the Illinois Probate Court determined Plaintiff to be “totally

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without understanding or capacity to make and communicate decisions regarding his person”

and estate. The Court rejected Plaintiff’s unsupported assertion, in the previous case, that

his brother, Leo, had commenced or endorsed the filing of that case, noting that the

complaint and everything else filed in the case had been signed by Plaintiff, or later,

Plaintiff’s attorney. Id., doc. 63 at 6. 

This case is in a similar posture as CV11-2454. Although, given Leo’s past proclivity

for filing suits regarding the same four properties at issue in this case, e.g., Stoller v. Bank

of New York Mellon Trust, No. CV11-0338-PHX-GMS, and his removal of a forcible

detainer action from the Maricopa County Superior Court, Bank of New York Mellon v.

Ribadeneira, No. CV11-0982-PHX-FJM (granting plaintiff’s motion to remand) (D. Ariz.

July 8, 2011), concerning one of those properties, Defendants’ assumption that Leo is

involved in this case is understandable. However, nothing in this case, to date, reflects that

Leo instigated or endorsed the commencement of this case, nor does Plaintiff’s attorney

indicate that he represents anyone either than Christopher. Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis

application, Complaint, and motions in this case have all been signed by Plaintiff and/or his

attorney, Mr. Penna. For example, Christopher declares that he is authorized to execute the

in forma pauperis application, but there is nothing in the record to support that Christopher

possesses the legal capacity to do so. Further, nothing in the record reflects that Leo has

approved or endorsed the filing of this action on his brother’s behalf. Plaintiff’s assertion

that he brings this case “by and through his Agent, Leo Stoller” is wholly unsupported by the

record; nothing submitted thus far reflects that Leo authorized, endorsed, or is aware of the

filing of this case. Nor does Plaintiff’s attorney claim to be representing Leo, as

Christopher’s agent. In short, while Leo Stoller has the power, as Plaintiff’s agent, to

commence and litigate an action in Plaintiff’s name through counsel, nothing in this case

supports that Leo has done so. Assuming the Illinois judgment of incapacity remains in

force, Plaintiff may not act as a party in this or any other action on his behalf as it relates to

his estate or financial affairs. Further, to the extent that the POA remains in effect, Plaintiff’s

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agent, Leo, must endorse or authorize the filing of an action on his brother’s behalf. Under

these circumstances, Plaintiff will be ordered to show cause within 30 days why this action

should not be dismissed for lack of legal capacity to commence this action by establishing

that the guardianship was terminated prior to the commencement of this action.

Alternatively, if the guardianship remained in effect at the time Plaintiff commenced this

action, Plaintiff must show cause within 30 days, why this action should not be dismissed

absent an endorsement by Plaintiff’s agent, Leo Stoller, to the filing and maintenance of this

action on Plaintiff’s behalf. 

III. Payment of Filing Fee

If Plaintiff shows cause to support that he had the legal capacity to file this action or

that his agent, Leo, endorses the commencement of this action, Plaintiff must either pay the

$350.00 filing fee or file an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Non-Habeas) using

this District’s approved form. The Court will hold Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In

Forma Pauperis in abeyance pending the above determination. 

IV. Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order

As noted above, Plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. (Doc. 3.)

Because it appears that Plaintiff lacked the legal capacity to commence this case and that his

agent has not endorsed the commencement of this action, the Court will deny his motion for

injunctive relief without prejudice. 

V. Defendants’ Motion to Exceed Page Limit/Motion for Sanctions

As noted above, Defendants BOA, Bryan Cave, Smith, and Werich filed a motion to

exceed the page limit for their lodged motion for sanctions. (Doc. 12.) Neither Plaintiff, nor

his attorney, have opposed the motion to exceed the page limit. Accordingly, that motion

will be granted and the lodged motion ordered filed.

In the motion for sanctions, Defendants ask the Court to sanction Leo, Christopher,

and Christopher’s attorney, Aaron Penna. Specifically, the Defendants seek the following

relief: (a) dismissal of this case with prejudice; (b) an award of attorneys’ fees against Leo,

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Christopher, and Penna, jointly and severally; (c) restraining Leo, Christopher, and “anyone

in privity with them or acting on their behalf, from ever bringing any further legal actions

related to the properties at issue in this case against any person or entity in any court in the

United States or abroad; (d) restraining Leo and Christopher, and anyone in privity with them

or acting on their behalf, from suing any of the Defendants or their agents, including counsel,

for any alleged reason without leave of Court; and (e) revoking Penna’s pro hac status

because he has abused his privilege to practice before this Court. Defendants argue that

sanctions against Leo and Christopher are appropriate because this is the sixth lawsuit “they”

have “brought forth” related to three properties and the second action as to a fourth property.

(Doc. 13 at 3.) Defendants argue that monetary sanctions will not deter the filing of further

suits by them, and that Leo and Christopher either have no assets or have hidden their assets.

Defendants argue that Mr. Penna should be sanctioned because he failed to exercise due

diligence by filing this case after being put on notice of the case’s infirmities, including

findings in previous cases that are res judicata or collaterally estop the current claims. 

As discussed herein, nothing, to date, establishes that Leo Stoller instigated or

endorsed the commencement of this case, and he has not appeared in this action. At this

juncture, therefore, the Court will not require that Leo Stoller be served with the motion for

sanctions or required to respond. However, the Court will require Christopher Stoller and

his attorney, Mr. Penna, to respond to the motion for sanctions within 30 days. Defendants

must thereafter file any reply within 15 days. 

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) Within 30 days of the filing date of this Order, Plaintiff must show cause why

this action should not be dismissed based on Plaintiff’s lack of legal capacity to bring this

action by demonstrating that the Illinois guardianship terminated prior to the commencement

of this case, or alternatively, by showing that his agent, Leo Stoller, authorized or endorsed

the commencement of this action. 

(2) Plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief is denied. (Doc. 3.)

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(3) Defendants’ motion to exceed the page limit is granted. (Doc. 12.)

(4) Plaintiff Christopher Stoller and his attorney, Aaron Penna, must file a response

to Defendants’ motion for sanctions no later than 30 days from the filing date of this Order.

Defendants must thereafter file within 15 days any reply to Plaintiff’s and/or Mr. Penna’s

response. 

DATED this 17th day of October, 2012.

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