Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02330/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02330-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:2617 FMLA: Enforcement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PETER ROSS,

Plaintiff,

v.

P.J. PIZZA SAN DIEGO, LLC., et al,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-02330-L-JMA

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION [Doc. 10] TO DISMISS

Pending before the Court is Defendant PJ Cleveland LLC’s (“Defendant”) motion 

to dismiss1 Plaintiff’s first amended complaint as to it. The Court decides the matter on 

the papers submitted and without oral argument. See Civ. L. R. 7.1(d.1). For the reasons 

stated below, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion. 

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1 Defendant also moves to compel arbitration pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement Plaintiff executed 

with co-defendants P.J. Pizza San Diego LLC and P.J. Pizza Holdings. In light of this Court’s previous 

order finding the Arbitration Agreement invalid (See May 11, 2017 Order [Doc. 40]) the Court DENIES

Defendant’s present motion to enforce it. 

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I. BACKGROUND 

The three defendants in this action collectively own and operate approximately

twenty five Papa John’s Pizza franchise stores in the San Diego area. Plaintiff was a 

delivery driver for defendants. Like other delivery drivers employed by defendants, 

Plaintiff used his own vehicle to make deliveries and defendants provided financial 

reimbursement. Because defendants’ reimbursement formula underestimates the drivers’

automobile expenses, Plaintiff’s effective hourly wage fell below that required by federal 

and California law. Accordingly, On November 11, 2016, Plaintiff filed an Amended 

Complaint against defendants alleging various putative class and collective action claims 

stemming from violations of California and federal labor laws. (See FAC [Doc. 3].) 

Defendant PJ Cleveland now moves to dismiss the First Amended Complaint as to it, 

arguing Plaintiff has not adequately alleged it was a joint employer. (See MTD [Doc. 

10].) Plaintiff opposes. (See Opp’n [Doc. 17].) 

 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

The court must dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) 

tests the complaint’s sufficiency. See N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n., 720 F.2d 578, 

581 (9th Cir. 1983). The court must assume the truth of all factual allegations and 

“construe them in the light most favorable to [the nonmoving party].” Gompper v. VISX, 

Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Walleri v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of 

Seattle, 83 F.2d 1575, 1580 (9th Cir. 1996). 

As the Supreme Court explained, “[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to 

provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and 

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted). Instead, the allegation in the complaint “must be enough to 

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raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 1965. A complaint may be 

dismissed as a matter of law either for lack of a cognizable legal theory or for insufficient 

facts under a cognizable theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 

534 (9th Cir. 1984).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant argues the Court should dismiss it from this action because the FAC 

does not adequately allege Defendant was a joint employer of Plaintiff.2 Joint 

employment generally exists when “1) the employers are not “completely disassociated” 

with respect to the employment of the individuals and 2) where one employer is 

controlled by another or the employers are under common control.” Chao v. A-One Med. 

Servs. Inc., 346 F.3d 908, 918 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 791(b)(3).) 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that an individual named Christopher Kelleher manages all 

three defendants to this action and that all three defendants have integrated their 

operations such that they share in the right to make hiring and firing decisions and to 

direct all employees’ work efforts and compensation. (FAC ¶¶ 10, 25.) For purposes of 

this Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion, these allegations, taken as true, plausibly suggest 

that Defendant may have been a joint employer of Plaintiff. See Creech v. P.J. Wichita, 

L.L.C., 2016 WL 4702376 (D. Kan. 2016) (reaching the same conclusion on a nearly 

identical complaint drafted by the same attorneys). Accordingly, the Court DENIES 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss. 

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2 The Court notes that Defendant has withdrawn its motion to the extent it argued Plaintiff failed to 

properly allege the elements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. (Reply [Doc. 27] 4:1–6.) 

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IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the foregoing reasons the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 15, 2017

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