Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01470/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01470-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GLENNA JO TRAMELL,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-09-1470 GEB EFB PS

vs.

THE GOLDEN 1 CREDIT UNION,

ORDER AND

Defendant. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

This case, in which plaintiff is proceeding pro se, is before the undersigned pursuant to

Eastern District of California Local Rule 302(c)(21). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Presently

before the undersigned is defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dckt. No. 13. Defendant contends, inter alia, that plaintiff’s

complaint is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. For the reasons stated herein, the

undersigned recommends that the motion be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 3, 2008, plaintiff filed a complaint in Sacramento County Superior Court against

defendant, alleging general negligence, intentional tort, violation of the Family Medical Leave

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 Defendant’s request for judicial notice of various state court records, Dckt. No. 14, is

granted. A court may take judicial notice of court records. See MGIC Indem. Co. v. Weisman,

803 F.2d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980). 

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Act (“FMLA”), harassment, and wrongful termination.1 Def.’s Req. for Jud. Notice, Dckt. No.

14, Ex. A. Plaintiff alleged that defendant “[d]id not replace bad office equipment for 5 months

after making continuous repair reports, caus[ing] injury to left upper extremity” and that

defendant violated the Family Medical Leave Act “by intentionally counting [plaintiff’s] medical

absences as regular time, in which, caused constant harassment, being singled-out in front of coworker by management that caused me to be terminated from my employment.” Id. Defendant

filed a demurrer to plaintiff’s complaint on statute of limitations grounds, and on September 16,

2008, the state court issued an order affirming its earlier tentative ruling sustaining defendant’s

demurrer and granting plaintiff leave to amend. Id., Ex. B, C. 

Thereafter, on September 25, 2008, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, alleging the

same claims for relief, along with additional factual allegations, including allegations that she

was harassed, discriminated, and retaliated against because of her medical condition. Id., Ex. D. 

Defendant demurred to plaintiff’s amended complaint, and on December 24, 2008, the state

court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Id., Ex. E, F. On January 8, 2009, the

state court entered judgment against plaintiff and in favor of defendant. Id., Ex. G. 

On May 28, 2009, plaintiff filed the instant complaint. Dckt. No. 1. The complaint

alleges that plaintiff suffered permanent injury as a result of her employer’s failure to provide a

physically adequate work setting (keyboard), and was thereafter denied medical leave to which

she was entitled, resulting in unexcused absences, which in turn served as the rationale for

defendant’s alleged harassment, retaliation and wrongful termination of plaintiff. The complaint

appears to allege claims of employment discrimination, harassment, retaliation and wrongful

termination, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.; the

federal Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq.; the California Fair

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Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov’t Code. §§ 12940 et seq.; the California Family Rights

Act, Cal. Gov’t Code § 12945.2; and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 (equal

rights),1981a (damages for intentional employment discrimination). Id.; see also Dckt. No. 3.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6), arguing, inter alia, that the complaint is barred by the doctrine of

res judicata. To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a

complaint must contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”; it

must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “The pleading must contain something

more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable

right of action.” Id. (quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216,

pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.

Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of the

complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trs., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe

the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolve all doubts

in the pleader’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, reh’g denied, 396 U.S. 869

(1969). The court will “‘presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are

necessary to support the claim.’” Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 256

(1994) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). Moreover, pro se

pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner,

404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

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The court may consider facts established by exhibits attached to the complaint. Durning

v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). The court may also consider facts

which may be judicially noticed, Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct., 828 F.2d at 1388, and matters of

public record, including pleadings, orders, and other papers filed with the court. Mack v. South

Bay Beer Distribs., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986). The court need not accept legal

conclusions “cast in the form of factual allegations.” W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618,

624 (9th Cir. 1981). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Res Judicata

Federal courts “are required to give state court judgments the preclusive effect they

would be given by another court of that state.” Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir.

2009) (citing Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 84 (1984)). In

California, res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars a second lawsuit between the same parties on

the same cause of action. People v. Barragan, 32 Cal. 4th 236, 252 (2004). Collateral estoppel,

or issue preclusion, bars the relitigation of issues that were actually litigated and determined in

the first action. Id. at 252-53. The elements for applying either claim preclusion or issue

preclusion to a second action are the same: “(1) A claim or issue raised in the present action is

identical to a claim or issue litigated in a prior proceeding; (2) the prior proceeding resulted in a

final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom the doctrine is being asserted was a

party or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding.” Id. at 253 (internal quotations omitted).

Here, the same plaintiff is suing the same defendant in the present action and the state

court action. Therefore, the only issues for the court are whether the claims she raises in the

present action are identical to those litigated in state court and whether the state court action

resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 

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 In fact, plaintiff admits in her opposition that the parties, the facts, and the claims are

the same in both actions. Dckt. No. 17 at 4.

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California law holds that a final judgment of a state court “precludes further proceedings

if they are based on the same cause of action.” Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 952 (9th Cir.

2004). Unlike the federal courts, which apply a “transactional nucleus of facts” test, “California

courts employ the ‘primary rights’ theory to determine what constitutes the same cause of action

for claim preclusion purposes.” Id. Under this theory, “a cause of action is (1) a primary right

possessed by the plaintiff, (2) a corresponding primary duty devolving upon the defendant, and

(3) a harm done by the defendant which consists in a breach of such primary right and duty.” 

City of Martinez v. Texaco Trading & Transp., Inc., 353 F.3d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing

Citizens for Open Access to Sand & Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift Ass’n, 60 Cal. App. 4th 1053, 1065

(1998)). “[I]f two actions involve the same injury to the plaintiff and the same wrong by the

defendant, then the same primary right is at stake even if in the second suit the plaintiff pleads

different theories of recovery, seeks different forms of relief and/or adds new facts supporting

recovery.” Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1170, 1174 (1983).

Here, the “causes of action” in the federal action are the same as those asserted in the

state court action. The two actions involve the same alleged injury to plaintiff and the same

alleged wrongs by defendant. Specifically, in both actions, plaintiff alleges that defendant

violated her rights by deliberately counting protected leave time as excessive absences after she

was injured on the job by bad office equipment, that defendant retaliated against her by

constantly singling her out in front of her fellow co-workers and harassing her in front of them,

at least in part, because of these events, and that defendant’s wrongful actions prevented her

from receiving proper job evaluations, bonuses, and raises and ultimately led to her wrongful

termination. The factual allegations in both the state action and the present federal action

involve the same alleged misconduct by defendant, by the same alleged actors, and within the

same alleged timeframe.2

 Additionally, plaintiff seeks substantially the same relief in both

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 Additionally, in his tentative ruling on defendant’s initial state court demurrer and in

his minute order affirming that tentative ruling, the state court judge stated that he was sustaining

the demurrer “for failure to state a cause of action for the reasons set forth in the demurrer.” 

Def.’s Req. for Jud. Notice, Dckt. No. 14, Ex. C.

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actions – compensatory and punitive damages for failing to replace bad office equipment which

allegedly caused injury to her left upper extremity, for violating her FMLA, or other protected

leave, rights by intentionally counting her medical absences as regular time which allegedly

caused her to be constantly harassed and singled out in front of co-workers by management and

terminated from employment, and for violating her FMLA, or other protected leave, rights by

counting protected leave days as days that were considered excessive absences. Therefore,

under California’s primary rights theory, plaintiff’s state and federal “causes of action” are the

same.

Further, the judgment entered in state court amounted to a final judgment on the merits. 

Here, after considering “the papers submitted in support of [defendant’s] demurrer [which

included defendant’s substantive arguments that plaintiff’s claims failed as a matter of law, 

Def.’s Req. for Jud. Notice, Dckt. No. 14, Ex. E], the oral argument of the parties and counsel,

[and] in full consideration of the admissible evidence,” the state court sustained defendant’s

demurrer to plaintiff’s amended state law complaint “without leave to amend for failure to state

causes of action.”3

 Def.’s Req. for Jud. Notice, Dckt. No. 14, Ex. F. In California, “[a] judgment

entered after a general demurrer has been sustained ‘is a judgment on the merits to the extent that

it adjudicates that the facts alleged do not constitute a cause of action, and will accordingly, be a

bar to a subsequent action alleging the same facts.’” Crowley v. Modern Faucet Mfg. Co.

44 Cal. 2d 321, 323, 282 P.2d 33 (1955) (citing Keidatz v. Albany, 39 Cal. 2d 826, 828, 249 P.2d

264 (1952)). Also, although judgments are not final in California until the time for appeal has

expired, People ex rel. Gow v. Mitchell Bros.' Santa Ana Theater, 101 Cal. App. 3d 296, 306

(1980), here the time for appeal has expired since judgment was entered on January 8, 2009, and

plaintiff did not file this action until May 28, 2009. See Cal. Rule of Court 8.104 (stating that a

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 Also, to the extent plaintiff seeks to allege that she has been wronged by the state

court’s alleged erroneous decision, this court lacks jurisdiction to provide such relief under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280,

292-93 (2005); see also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923) and Dist. of

Columbia Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 (1983).

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 As a result, the parties are not required to submit status reports as provided in the June

4, 2009 order. See Dckt. No. 5 at 2. However, if the recommendation of dismissal herein is not

adopted by the district judge, the undersigned will reschedule the status conference and require

the parties to submit status reports. 

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notice of appeal must be filed within “60 days after the party filing the notice of appeal serves or

is served by a party with a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a file-stamped

copy of the judgment, accompanied by proof of service”) and Def.’s Req. for Jud. Notice, Dckt.

No. 14, Ex. G (indicating that defendant served plaintiff with a copy of the state court judgment

on January 6, 2009)). 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and should be

dismissed without leave to amend. Although a pro se litigant is typically entitled to notice of the

deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity to amend, leave to amend should be denied here

because the complaint’s deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. See Noll v. Carlson, 809

F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987) (While the court ordinarily would permit a pro se plaintiff to

amend, leave to amend should not be granted where it appears amendment would be futile). 

B. Failure to State a Claim

Because plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, the court need not

address the other grounds raised in defendant’s motion.4

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the status conference currently set for

September 29, 2010, is vacated.5

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Further, it is RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Dckt. No. 13, be granted;

2. Plaintiff’s complaint, Dckt. No. 1, be dismissed without leave to amend; and

3. The Clerk be directed to close this case.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: August 24, 2010.

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