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Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 

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,. 

FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

Unlttld Stata Oourt ot Appeala Tt!nth llfrl'luf t 

AU02819SO 

WILLIAM B. TAYLOR, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY) 

OF MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN, a Wisconsin ) 

corp.; NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL CASUALTY ) 

COMPANY, a Wisconsin corp.; UNIVERSAL ) 

REINSURANCE CORPORATION, a Wisconsin ) 

corp., ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Nos. 88-2447 

& 

88-2614 

(D.C. No. 87-M-1361) 

(D. Colo.) 

Before SEYMOUR, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cases are therefore ordered 

This diversity action arises out of plaintiff's termination 

as an insurance agent for defendants. The action was commenced as 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 88-2614 Document: 010110041603 Date Filed: 08/28/1990 Page: 1 
one for breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good 

faith, tortious interference with business relations, negligence 

and breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiff appeals from district 

court orders denying his motion to amend the complaint, granting 

defendants' motion for summary judgment, and denying his motion 

for reconsideration. Plaintiff argues that the following errors 

of the district court require reversal: 1) the district court 

erred in granting summary judgment on the breach of contract 

claim; 2) the district court erred in granting summary judgment on 

the ground that plaintiff was precluded from seeking relief on 

tort and contract grounds simultaneously; 3) the district court 

erred in refusing to allow plaintiff to amend the complaint; 4) 

the district court erred in refusing to allow the deposition 

transcript of Ray Pelletier as an affidavit to support plaintiff's 

objection to defendants' motion for summary judgment; and 5) the 

district court erred in granting summary judgment while discovery 

was stayed. We affirm. 

JURISDICTION 

Before discussing the merits of this action, we must consider 

defendants' motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction. Defendants argue that because plaintiff filed an 

untimely motion to reconsider, his time for filing a notice of 

appeal was not extended. 

The district court entered its order granting summary 

judgment and dismissing the case on August 23, 1988. Plaintiff 

filed a motion for reconsideration on September 13, 1988, and a 

first notice of appeal on September 16, 1988. The district court 

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Appellate Case: 88-2614 Document: 010110041603 Date Filed: 08/28/1990 Page: 2 
denied the motion for reconsideration as untimely and without 

merit on September 22, 1988. Plaintiff filed his second notice of 

appeal on October 17, 1988. 

A post-judgment motion made within ten days of the entry of 

judgment, which questions the correctness of the judgment, is a 

motion to alter or amend judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). 

Venable v. Haislip, 721 F.2d 297, 299 (10th Cir. 1983). Because 

the motion in this case questioned the district court's judgment, 

but was filed more than ten days after the district court's 

judgment, it was an untimely Rule 59(e) motion. See Fox v. 

Brewer, 620 F.2d 177, 179 (8th Cir. 1980)(district court may not 

enlarge time for filing a Rule 59(e) motion). An untimely Rule 

59(e) motion will not toll the thirty-day time period for filing a 

notice of appeal. Kraus v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 899 F.2d 

1360, 1362 (3d Cir. 1990); Green v. Bisby, 869 F.2d 1070, 1072 

(7th Cir. 1989); Washington v. Patlis, 868 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 

1989); Rivera v. M/T Fossarina, 840 F.2d 152, 154 (1st Cir. 1988); 

cf. Clayton v. Douglas, 670 F.2d 143, 144 (10th Cir.)(timely Rule 

59(e) motion does toll the time), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1109 

(1982) . Thus, the first notice of appeal, filed within the 

untolled thirty-day period following entry of final judgment, was 

effective to confer jurisdiction on this court. See 

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(l); cf. Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount 

Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982)(pendency of timely Rule 59(e) motion 

renders notice of appeal ineffective to confer jurisdiction on 

this court); Skagerberg v. Oklahoma, 797 F.2d 881, 883 (10th Cir. 

1986)(same). 

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Appellate Case: 88-2614 Document: 010110041603 Date Filed: 08/28/1990 Page: 3 
In addition, plaintiff's second notice of appeal is timely as 

to the district court's denial of the motion for reconsideration. 

See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(l). Consequently, we have jurisdiction 

to consider all issues raised on appeal. 

MERITS 

1. Breach of Contract 

Plaintiff argues the district court erred in granting summary 

judgment when there was a factual issue regarding oral amendment 

of the employment agreement. According to plaintiff, he was only 

to be terminated for cause. Because he was terminated according 

to the contract language with 180 days notice, plaintiff contends, 

contrary to the district court's ruling on summary judgment, that 

defendant breached the employment contract. 

In our de novo consideration of a district court's order 

granting summary judgment, we view the record in the light most 

favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Bishop v. Federal 

Intermediate Credit Bank, F.2d , No. 88-1787, slip op. at 2 

(10th Cir. July 17, 1990). Summary judgment may be entered if 

there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Although we give some deference 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 

to the district 

56(c). 

court's 

interpretation of Colorado law, review is ultimately de novo. See 

Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories, F.2d , Nos. 88-1337, 88-2302, 

89-3066, 89-3121, slip op. at 4 (10th Cir. June 25, 1990). 

The employment contract specifically provided that upon 

giving 180 days notice by either party the contract could be 

cancelled. As the district court found, defendants terminated the 

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Appellate Case: 88-2614 Document: 010110041603 Date Filed: 08/28/1990 Page: 4 
contract in conformity with the 180-day provision. Nothing in the 

record indicates there is an issue of fact regarding oral 

modification of the contract to permit only termination for cause. 

Whether, as plaintiff contends, defendants actually terminated 

plaintiff for lack of profitability is irrelevant since the 

contract permitted termination for any reason with 180 days 

notice. We conclude the district court correctly granted summary 

judgment on this issue. 

2. Tort Claims 

Initially, plaintiff 

implicitly ruling that 

argues the district 

plaintiff could not 

court erred 

raise breach 

in 

of 

contract and tort claims at the same time. Although the district 

court did not discuss the tort claims in detail, it did consider 

and reject them. The district court did not preclude plaintiff 

from raising tort and contract claims at the same time. 

Plaintiff also argues that defendants breached their 

fiduciary duty by terminating him with only 180 days notice. A 

fiduciary relationship may arise when one party has justifiably 

reposed a special confidence in another. Dolton v. Capitol Fed. 

Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 642 P.2d 21, 23 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981); Breeden 

v. Dailey, 574 P.2d 508, 510 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977). In Colorado, 

there is no law setting forth an implied fiduciary duty by an 

employer to an independent contractor in employment contracts. 

Thus, the district court correctly concluded defendants had not 

breached a fiduciary duty to plaintiff. 

Plaintiff alleges defendants acted negligently in terminating 

his employment. This claim is also without merit. As the 

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district court found, plaintiff failed to prove defendants owed a 

duty of care to plaintiff. Absent such a duty, tort liability may 

not be imposed on defendants. See Iverson v. Solsbery, 641 P.2d 

314, 315 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982). 

Plaintiff's argument that defendants breached 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing fails, because 

an implied 

Colorado 

law does not recognize a claim for unfair dealing in the 

termination of an at-will contract. See Friedman & Son, Inc. v. 

Safeway Stores, Inc., 712 P.2d 1128, 1131 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); 

Corporon v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 708 P.2d 1385, 1390 (Colo. Ct. 

App. 1985). Furthermore, as the district court determined, a 

proper termination could not result in an interference with 

business relationships. Cf. Electrolux Corp. v. Lawson, 654 P.2d 

340, 342 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982)(plaintiff cannot recover for 

tortious interference with employment contract terminated but not 

breached). 

3. Amendment of Complaint 

Plaintiff argues the district court erred in failing to 

permit him leave to amend his complaint to assert claims for fraud 

by misrepresentation, deceit, and concealment. The district court 

denied leave to amend on untimeliness grounds and because the 

proposed amendment failed to state a claim for relief. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) provides that leave to amend should be 

"freely given when justice so requires." Disallowance of 

amendment is within the discretion of the district court. Zenith 

Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330 (1971); 

LeaseAmerica Corp. v. Eckel, 710 F.2d 1470, 1473 (10th Cir. 1983). 

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Appellate Case: 88-2614 Document: 010110041603 Date Filed: 08/28/1990 Page: 6 
Based on the facts and circumstances of this case, we conclude the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to 

amend. Cf. First City Bank, N.A. v. Air Capitol Aircraft Sales, 

Inc., 820 F.2d 1127, 1132-33 (10th Cir. 1987)(court within bounds 

of its discretion when it denies leave to amend on untimeliness 

grounds). 

4. Admissibility of Pelletier Deposition 

Plaintiff attempted to offer the deposition of Ray Pelletier, 

a former employee of defendants, as an affidavit in support of 

plaintiff's arguments against summary judgment. The deposition 

had been taken in another lawsuit. Plaintiff argues the district 

court erred in denying admission of the deposition because it 

would have shown that the 180-day notice provisions were not the 

only criteria for terminating plaintiff. 

Depositions may be used as affidavits under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Hoover v. Switlik Parachute Co., 663 F.2d 

964, 966-67 (9th Cir. 1981); Microsoft Corp. v. Very Competitive 

Computer Prods. Corp., 671 F. Supp. 1250, 1254 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 

1987); see also 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & 

Procedure § 2142 at 452 (1970). Before admission, however, the 

deposition must satisfy the Rule 56(e) requirements that it set 

forth competent and admissible facts as evidence. Hoover, 663 

F.2d at 966; Samuels v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 588 F.2d 485, 486 n.2 

(5th Cir. 1979); Tormo v. Yormark, 398 F. Supp. 1159, 1169 (D.N.J. 

1975). We have reviewed the deposition, and even assuming the 

district court erroneously excluded it, we are not persuaded that 

it raises a fact question as to whether there was an oral 

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Appellate Case: 88-2614 Document: 010110041603 Date Filed: 08/28/1990 Page: 7 
modification of the written contract between the defendants and 

this plaintiff in this case. 

5. Discovery 

Plaintiff argues the district court erred in granting summary 

judgment while discovery was stayed. The district court did not 

abuse its discretion as plaintiff made no showing of what 

additional discovery would prove. See Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors 

of Am., Inc., 850 F.2d 1373, 1376-77 (10th Cir. 1988)(district 

court did not abuse discretion in granting summary judgment where 

nonmoving party failed to file an affidavit under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(f) explaining why he could not present evidence opposing 

summary judgment); Pasternak v. Lear Petroleum Exploration, Inc., 

790 F.2d 828, 832-33 (10th Cir. 1986)(when party opposing summary 

judgment fails to file Rule 56(f) affidavit explaining how 

discovery is incomplete, district court does not abuse its 

discretion in granting summary judgment if it is appropriate); 

Weir v. Anaconda Co., 773 F.2d 1073, 1082 n.10 (10th Cir. 

1985)(same). 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Colorado is AFFIRMED. Defendants' motion to dismiss 

for lack of jurisdiction is DENIED. Plaintiff's request for oral 

argument is DENIED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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