Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01088/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01088-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

IL ...., D . ~:!J . F . Court of Appet.b Umted STtaretsh Circuit en" 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

OCT 3 0 1991 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

GOODRICH FARMS PARTNERSHIP, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 91-1088 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 90-C-710) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Hans w. Johnson and Scott C. Brown of Johnson, Oldham & Angell, 

P.C., Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Barry M. Hartman, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Michael J. 

Norton, United States Attorney, and Chalk s. Mitchell, Assistant 

u.s. Attorney for the District of Colorado; Jacques B. Galin and 

Robert L. Klarquist, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Environment 

& Natural Resources Division, Washington, D.C., for PlaintiffAppellee. 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

Appellate Case: 91-1088 Document: 01019291358 Date Filed: 10/30/1991 Page: 1 
assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

The United States brought an action for declaratory relief to 

quiet title to certain Colorado lands. The defendant brought a 

cross-complaint requesting that title be quieted in it. On crossmotions for summary judgment, the trial court granted the United 

States' demand for quiet title. The essence of the dispute is 

whether a ditch running through the property was conveyed to the 

United States' predecessor-in-interest to the center of the ditch 

or only to the bank of the ditch. 

The undisputed facts as recited by the trial court in its 

memorandum opinion and order are as follows: 

Prior to July 17, 1962, three brothers, James L. Cook, 

George E. Cook and George s. Cook as joint tenants, 

owned a parcel of land in Morgan County, Colorado. 

Located on the property is a ditch, referred to by the 

parties as the "Jackson Lake Inlet Ditch." The brothers 

decided to divide the property, and on July 17, 1962, 

they executed two deeds, one conveying the northern 

portion to James Cook and George S. Cook, and the other 

conveying the southern portion to George E. Cook. In 

pertinent part, the July 17, 1962 deeds described the 

property as: 

and 

"That part of the North Half (Nl/2), the 

Southeast Quarter (SEl/4) and the Southeast 

Quarter of the Southwest Quarter (SE1/4SW1/4) 

of Section Thirty-three (33), and the South 

Half (Sl/2) of Section Twenty-eight (28), 

Township Five (5) North, Range Sixty (60) West 

of the Sixth (6th) Principal Meridian, Lying 

south of the Jackson Lake Inlet Ditch •••• " 

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Appellate Case: 91-1088 Document: 01019291358 Date Filed: 10/30/1991 Page: 2 
"All that part lying north of the Jackson Lake 

Inlet Ditch." (Emphasis added). 

The meaning of the underlined words constitutes the 

issue in this litigation. 

On April 15, 1975, James Cook and George S. Cook 

conveyed their interest in the northern portion to 

Kenneth v. Dixon Jr., w. Morgan Oakes and Paul R. 

Thayer. On June 11, 1975, Dixon, Morgan and Thayer 

conveyed their interest to the defendant. George E. 

Cook conveyed his interest in the southern half of the 

property to the United States on February 4, 1977. To 

describe the respective properties being conveyed, each 

conveyance used language similar to that quoted above. 

Memorandum Opinion and Order, Jan. 9, 1991, at 1-2. 

Put simply, the dispute is whether the language of the deed 

conveys the parcels to the thread of the stream or to the bank 

only. It has been the settled law of Colorado (whose law governs 

the decision in this case) since 1897 that if a nonnavigable 

stream, such as a ditch, is described as the boundary or a 

monument in a deed conveying land bordered by that non-navigable 

stream, the conveyance includes the stream's bed to its center. 

More v. Johnson, 568 P.2d 437, 439 (D. Colo. 1977); Hanlon v. 

Hobson, 51 P. 433 (Colo. 1897). Under Colorado law, "the 

intention of the parties to a conveyance is open to interpretation 

only when the words used are ambiguous." Radke v. Union Pac. 

R.R., 334 P.2d 1077, 1088 (Colo. 1959); More, 568 P.2d at 439; 

Hudgeons v. Tenneco Oil Co., 796 P.2d 21, 22 (Colo. Ct. App. 

1990). Here, the deed unambiguously uses the ditch as a boundary 

and therefore, under applicable Colorado law, unambiguously 

conveyed land to the center of the stream. Accordingly, Colorado 

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Appellate Case: 91-1088 Document: 01019291358 Date Filed: 10/30/1991 Page: 3 
law precludes the use of extrinsic evidence to determine the 

parties' intent. 

The trial court corrected granted summary judgment. 

AFFIRMED. 

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Appellate Case: 91-1088 Document: 01019291358 Date Filed: 10/30/1991 Page: 4