Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_06-cv-05030/USCOURTS-arwd-5_06-cv-05030-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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Michael J. Astrue became the Social Security Commissioner on February 12, 2007. Pursuant to Rule 1

25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Michael J. Astrue has been substituted for acting Commissioner Jo Anne B. Barnhart as the defendant in this suit.

 The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “Doc. No.” 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

JEANNIE G. SCOTT PLAINTIFF

vs. Civil No. 5:06-CV-05030

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE1

Commissioner, Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

 

ORDER

Pending now before this Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees under the Equal Access

to Justice Act (“EAJA”). (Doc. No. 11). Defendant has responded to this motion and has no 2

objections. (Doc. No. 14). This matter is ready for decision.

Background:

On February 16, 2006, Jeannie G. Scott (“Plaintiff”) appealed the Secretary of the Social

Security Administration’s (“SSA”) denial of her request for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”).

(Doc. No. 1). On March 27, 2007, this Court entered an order reversing and remanding Plaintiff’s

case to the SSA. (Doc. No. 10). After this remand, Plaintiff filed the present motion for attorney’s

fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1998). (Doc. No. 11). This

motion was filed on June 25, 2007. In this motion, Plaintiff’s attorney, Conrad Odom, seeks

approval of attorney’s fees for professional services in the amount of $3,436.26. 

Applicable Law: 

Pursuant to the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), a court must award attorney's fees to a

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prevailing social security claimant unless the Secretary’s position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The Secretary has the burden of proving that the denial of benefits was

substantially justified. See Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir.1986) (“The Secretary

bears the burden of proving that its position in the administrative and judicial proceedings below

was substantially justified”). An EAJA application also must be made within thirty days of a final

judgment in an action, See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), or within thirty days after the sixty day

time for appeal has expired. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 298 (1993). 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though, at the conclusion

of the case, the plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and to collect a fee pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. §

406(b)(1) was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. See Gisbrecht v.

Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002) (citing Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 186 (1985)). The United

States Supreme Court stated that Congress harmonized an award of attorney’s fees under the

EAJA and under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) as follows:

Fee awards may be made under both prescriptions [EAJA and 42 U.S.C. §

406(b)(1)], but the claimant’s attorney must “refun[d] to the claimant the amount

of the smaller fee.”. . .“Thus, an EAJA award offsets an award under Section

406(b), so that the [amount of total past-due benefits the claimant actually receives]

will be increased by the . . . EAJA award up to the point the claimant receives 100

percent of the past-due benefits.” 

Id. Furthermore, awarding fees under both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is

to shift to the United States the prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting

unreasonable government action. See id.; Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 986 (8th Cir.

1984).

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The statutory ceiling for an EAJA fee award is $125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. §

2412(d)(2)(A). A court is only authorized to exceed this statutory rate if “the court determines

that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified

attorneys for the proceedings involved justifies a higher fee.” Id. A court may determine that

there has been an increase in the cost of living, and may thereby increase the rate per hour, based

upon the United States Department of Labor’s Consumer Price Index (CPI). See Johnson v.

Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503, 504 (8th Cir. 1990). 

Discussion:

In the present action, Plaintiff’s case was remanded to the SSA. (Doc. No. 10). The

Defendant does not contest Plaintiff’s claim that she is the prevailing party, does not oppose

Plaintiff’s attorney’s application for fees under the EAJA, does not object to the hourly rate

requested, and does not dispute the number of hours expended by counsel. (Doc. No. 14). This

Court construes this lack of opposition to Plaintiff attorney’s application in the present action as

an admission that the government's decision to deny benefits was not "substantially justified" and

that Plaintiff was the prevailing party. 

Plaintiff’s attorney requests an award under the EAJA at the rate of $140.00 per hour for

the 24.25 hours which he asserts were devoted to the representation of the Plaintiff in this Court

in addition to expenses of $41.26. (Doc. No. 11). This hourly rate is authorized by the EAJA

if Plaintiff submits proof of a cost of living adjustment. Plaintiff has submitted a CPI as proof of

this cost of living adjustment. (Doc. No. 11-2). The Court finds that, based upon the CPI

Plaintiff submitted, this rate, $140.00 per hour, is an appropriate hourly rate for the award of

attorney's fees in this case. 

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Further, I have reviewed counsel’s itemization of time appended to his petition. (Doc. No.

11-1). The Court notes that Defendant has not objected to the number of hours for which counsel

seeks a fee award, and this Court finds the time asserted to be spent in representation of Plaintiff

before the district court is reasonable. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to

compensation under the EAJA in the amount of $3,436.26, which is a total of 24.25 hours at a

rate of $140.00 per hour plus $41.26 in expenses. 

Conclusion:

Based upon the forgoing, the Court awards Plaintiff’s attorney $3,436.26 in attorney’s fees

pursuant to the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412. This total represents a fee of $140.00 per hour for 24.25

hours of work plus $41.26 in expenses. 

ENTERED this 2 day of July, 2007. nd

 

 /s/ Barry A. Bryant 

 Honorable Barry A. Bryant 

 United States Magistrate Judge

 

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