Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01413/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01413-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL HARRISON,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

BIRTWELL, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:24-cv-1413 CSK P

ORDER

Plaintiff, a federal inmate, filed this civil rights action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown 

Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed 

in forma pauperis. 

Plaintiff submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. 

 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct 

the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and 

forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff is obligated to make monthly payments 

of twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s trust account. 

These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time 

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the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(2). 

 As discussed below, plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. 

I. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

 Plaintiff was housed at the Federal Correctional Institution, Herlong, at all times relevant 

herein. Plaintiff brings claims for monetary damages against defendants, federal Bureau of 

Prisons (“BOP”) employees, in their individual capacities for violations of the federal 

Constitution. In his complaint, plaintiff alleges violations of his Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights. (Id. at 1.) Specifically, plaintiff alleges he was wrongfully housed in the 

segregated housing unit (“SHU”) for almost 16 months “for fabricated reasons” and “without 

disciplinary action.” (ECF No. 1 at 10.) Plaintiff alleges he was provided no due process prior to 

or during such housing, and his lengthy placement in the SHU interfered with plaintiff’s access to 

the courts and deprived him of outside exercise, adequate heat, a pillow, and visitors. Id. at 7-9. 

Further, plaintiff claims he was not visited daily by a health services staff member or examined or 

interviewed by mental health staff after his placement exceeded thirty days, as required by 

“28 C.F.R. § 541.32.” (ECF No. 1 at 10.) 

II. SCREENING STANDARDS 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

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Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 

2000) (“[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably 

meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 

1227. 

 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations 

sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555. 

However, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal 

quotations marks omitted). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as 

true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the 

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 

(1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984). 

III. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR BIVENS CLAIMS

 Prisoners may bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against state and local actors, but 

section 1983 does not apply to federal actors, and there is no parallel statute governing 

constitutional violations by federal actors. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 130 (2017); see

Harper v. Nedd, 71 F.4th 1181, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2023). The Supreme Court has implied a 

damages remedy for Constitutional violations against federal actors, which is referred to as a 

Bivens claim. Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 130-31. The Supreme Court has recognized a Bivens claim in 

only three contexts: (1) a Fourth Amendment claim based on a warrantless search in Bivens, 403 

U.S. at 396-97; (2) a Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause claim against a Congressman for 

employment gender discrimination in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248-49 (1979); and (3) an 

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Eighth Amendment claim for failure to provide adequate medical care to a federal prisoner in 

Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980). Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 130-31. 

 The Supreme Court has not extended the Bivens remedy since Carlson, and has made 

clear that “expanding the Bivens remedy is now considered a disfavored judicial activity.” 

Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 130 (citation omitted). In 2022, the Supreme Court further restricted Bivens 

claims by rejecting a Fourth Amendment claim excessive force claim. See Egbert v. Boule, 596 

U.S. 482 (2022). Courts are expected to defer to “Congress’ preeminent authority in this area.” 

Id. at 492 (quoting Hernández v. Mesa, 589 U.S. 93, 100 (2020)). In Egbert, the Court refused to 

extend Bivens to a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim and a First Amendment retaliation 

claim against a U.S. Border Patrol agent “[b]ecause our cases have made clear that, in all but the 

most unusual circumstances, prescribing a cause of action is a job for Congress, not the courts.” 

Egbert, 596 U.S. at 486. After Egbert, “rarely if ever is the Judiciary equally suited as Congress 

to extend Bivens even modestly.” Mejia v. Miller, 61 F.4th 663, 669 (9th Cir. 2023). 

To determine whether a Bivens claim is permitted, courts apply a two-step test. 

Hernandez, 589 U.S. at 102; Egbert, 596 U.S. at 492. First, the Court determines “whether the 

case presents a new Bivens context, -- i.e., is it meaningfully different from the three cases in 

which the [Supreme] Court has implied a damages action.” Egbert, 596 U.S. at 492. For 

example, 

[a] case might differ in a meaningful way because of the rank of the 

officers involved; the constitutional right at issue; the generality or 

specificity of the official action; the extent of judicial guidance as to 

how an officer should respond to the problem or emergency to be 

confronted; the statutory or other legal mandate under which the 

officer was operating; the risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary 

into the functioning of other branches; or the presence of potential 

special factors that previous Bivens cases did not consider. 

Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 139-40. “A claim may arise in a new context even if it is based on the same 

constitutional provision as a claim in a case in which a damages remedy was previously 

recognized.” Hernandez, 589 U.S. at 103. 

Second, if a claim arises in a new context, no remedy under Bivens is available if there are 

“special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.” 

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Hernandez, 582 U.S. at 553 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). These two steps 

“often resolve to a single question: whether there is any reason to think that Congress might be 

better equipped to create a damages remedy.” Egbert, 596 U.S. at 492. 

IV. DISCUSSION

 In order to determine whether plaintiff may bring his claims under Bivens, the Court 

addresses the two steps identified in Egbert. 

A. Bivens Step One: Context 

In the instant action, the Court finds that all of plaintiff’s claims arise in new contexts

from those identified in Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396-97, Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19, and Davis, 442 U.S. 

at 248-49. See Egbert, 596 U.S. at 492-93; Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 139-40. The complaint alleges 

due process, First Amendment access to courts, Eighth Amendment medical claims, and various 

other alleged violations associated with plaintiff’s SHU placement and retention (i.e., outside 

exercise, adequate heat, a pillow, and visitors).

1. Due Process Claims

Plaintiff alleges his due process rights were violated in connection with his placement and 

retention in the SHU for about 16 months, in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights. However, plaintiff’s due process claims arise under the Fifth, not the Fourteenth 

Amendment. Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1002 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The Fifth 

Amendment prohibits the federal government from depriving persons of due process by the 

several States.”).

 The Ninth Circuit has declined to find a Bivens remedy appropriate for a former 

prisoner’s Fifth Amendment due process claim, finding the case was “different in a meaningful 

way from previous Bivens cases.” Vega v. United States, 881 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2018) 

(internal citation omitted); Harper, 71 F.4th at 1187 (finding new Bivens context in Fifth 

Amendment due process claim because claim involved a new category of defendants and 

alternative remedial scheme). As in Vega, plaintiff’s alleged due process violations are not 

similar to the Fifth Amendment claim raised in Davis, 442 U.S. 228, an employment 

discrimination case based on gender. Rather, plaintiff alleges he was denied due process when 

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placed and retained in the SHU. Because plaintiff’s due process claims are meaningfully 

different from those raised in Davis, plaintiff’s due process claims arise in a new context. See, 

e.g., Cantu v. Moody, 933 F.3d 414, 422 (5th Cir. 2019) (explaining that Davis, 442 U.S. 228, 

does not hold that “the entirety of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is fair game in a 

Bivens action”). 

2. First Amendment Access to Courts Claim

Plaintiff’s claim alleging interference with his access to the courts, a First Amendment 

violation, also presents a new context. The Supreme Court has never recognized a Bivens remedy 

under the First Amendment. See Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 663 n.4 (2012) (citing 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 368 (1983) (declining 

to “authorize a new nonstatutory damages remedy for federal employees whose First Amendment 

rights are violated by their superiors.”). The Ninth Circuit has also declined to recognize a 

Bivens remedy under the First Amendment. Schwarz v. Meinberg, 761 F. App’x 732, 734-35 

(9th Cir. 2019) (finding denial of access to courts claim was a “new Bivens context” and 

declining to extend private right of action); Vega, 881 F.3d at 1152 (citing Reichle for the 

proposition that a Bivens remedy has never been recognized for a First Amendment claim).1

3. Eighth Amendment Medical Claims 

As for his Eighth Amendment medical claims, plaintiff’s allegations that he was not 

visited by medical or mental health staff while he was in the SHU fail to state cognizable 

deliberate indifference claims. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (prisoner must 

demonstrate that defendant was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs.) 

Plaintiff identifies no serious medical or mental health needs and does not identify a defendant 

who was deliberately indifferent to such needs. 

In addition, plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment medical claims differ significantly from those 

alleged in Carlson, where federal prison officials failed to provide medical treatment for the 

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 The Court notes that in order to state a cognizable access to the courts claim, a prisoner must 

show that he suffered an “actual injury” by being shut out of court. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 

343, 350-51 (1996). Plaintiff concedes he sustained no actual injury to his pending 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255 motion as a result of the alleged impaired access. (ECF No. 1 at 6.) 

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inmate’s serious medical needs for hours after the inmate suffered an asthma attack, and when 

treatment was provided, prison officials used a broken respirator and administered antipsychotic 

medication, leading to respiratory arrest and the inmate’s death. See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 16; 

Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669, 671 (7th Cir. 1978). Again, the complaint does not allege any 

serious medical or mental health needs. Therefore, the Eighth Amendment medical claims 

present a new context than Carlson. 

4. Other Allegations

None of the other alleged violations associated with plaintiff’s SHU placement and 

retention (i.e., outside exercise, adequate heat, a pillow, and visitors) are similar to the narrow 

claims presented in Bivens, Carlson or Davis. (See ECF No. 1 at 7-9.) 

Because the Supreme Court has not extended a Bivens remedy to the facts presented in 

plaintiff’s complaint, plaintiff’s claims present new contexts under Bivens. Thus, the Court turns 

to the second step. 

B. Bivens Step Two: Special Factors

Because the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint present new contexts under Bivens, the 

Court must determine whether any special factors preclude the extension of Bivens. To do so, 

this Court must address “whether there is any rational reason (even one) to think that Congress is 

better suited to ‘weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.’” Egbert, 

596 U.S. at 496 (citation omitted). Applying Egbert to plaintiff’s allegations, the Court finds that 

a Bivens remedy should not be extended here. First, extending Bivens to plaintiff’s claims 

“would create a broad new source of liability for prison officials,” and “[t]his alone is enough to 

place it beyond the purview of the courts to create a remedy, because courts may not 

‘independently assess the costs and benefits of implying a cause of action.’” Chambers v. 

Herrera, 78 F.4th 1100, 1106 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Egbert, 596 U.S. at 496). 

Second, a Bivens remedy is foreclosed because there is an alternative remedial structure in 

place. Egbert, 596 U.S. at 493; Mejia, 61 F.4th at 667. In this case, the government has provided 

an alternative remedial structure for plaintiff’s claims. The BOP Administrative Remedy 

Program qualifies as an alternative remedy. See Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 

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61, 74 (2001) (“Inmates in respondent’s position also have full access to remedial mechanisms 

established by the BOP, including . . . grievances filed through the BOP’s Administrative 

Remedy Program.”). “In Malesko, we explained that Bivens relief was unavailable because 

federal prisoners could, among other options, file grievances through an Administrative Remedy 

Program.” Egbert, 596 U.S. at 497 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Hoffman v. Preston, 

2022 WL 6685254, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 11, 2022) (finding Bivens remedy unavailable because 

Congress had not authorized a damages remedy and there were rational reasons why Congress 

might not authorize such a remedy, noting the “existence of the [BOP’s] formal review process 

for inmate complaints”); Camillo-Amisano v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2023 WL 2658742, at *1 

(9th Cir. Mar. 28, 2023) (affirming district court’s dismissal with prejudice of a federal prisoner’s 

complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A where complaint alleged new Bivens context and BOP’s 

Administrative Remedy Program provided federal prisoner with an alternative remedial structure, 

establishing a special factor that foreclosed a Bivens remedy after Egbert). Thus, plaintiff’s 

claims are foreclosed by the BOP’s Administrative Remedy Program.2 

C. Conclusion 

 Plaintiff’s allegations arise in new contexts and therefore may not be asserted under 

Bivens. In addition, special factors counsel against recognizing new Bivens claims in such 

contexts because to do so would broaden federal prison officials’ liability, and plaintiff has an 

alternative remedy under the BOP Administrative Remedy Program. Thus, plaintiff’s complaint 

must be dismissed. 

V. LEAVE TO AMEND

Because extending Bivens is a “disfavored judicial activity,” Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 135, it is 

unlikely plaintiff can amend his complaint to state a cognizable claim under Bivens. However, in 

an abundance of caution, plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint. If plaintiff 

chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions about which he 

2

 Such foreclosure applies even if the alternative remedial structure does not afford plaintiff a 

right to participate or provide for damages or judicial review. Egbert, 596 U.S. at 498. “[T]he 

question whether a given remedy is adequate is a legislative determination that must be left to 

Congress, not the federal courts.” Id.

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complains resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See, e.g., West v. Atkins, 

487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms how each named 

defendant is involved. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976). There can be no liability 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s 

actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371; May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 

(9th Cir. 1980). Furthermore, vague, and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil 

rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

 In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 

make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This requirement exists 

because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ramirez 

v. County of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015) (“an ‘amended complaint 

supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.’” (internal citation 

omitted)). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any 

function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim 

and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 6) is granted. 

 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 

is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 

Warden of Federal Correctional Institution, Lompoc II, filed concurrently herewith.

3. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed. 

 4. Within thirty days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall complete the attached 

Notice of Amendment and submit the following documents to the court: 

 a. The completed Notice of Amendment; and 

 b. An original of the Amended Complaint. 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint shall comply with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the 

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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must 

also bear the docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” 

Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order may result in the dismissal of 

this action.

Dated: August 5, 2024

/1/harr1413.Bivens.14n

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL DAVID HARRISON,

Plaintiff,

v. 

BIRTWELL, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:24-cv-1413 CSK P

NOTICE OF AMENDMENT

 

Plaintiff submits the following document in compliance with the court’s order 

filed on ______________ (date).

 Amended Complaint 

(Check this box if submitting an Amended Complaint) 

DATED: 

 ________________________________ 

 Plaintiff

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