Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01802/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01802-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 230
Nature of Suit: Rent, Lease, Ejectment
Cause of Action: 28:1443(1) Rent, Lease &amp; Ejectment

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Phoenix 328 Apartments, LLC; and Glendale 

Manor Apartments, 

Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, 

v. 

Janice Walker, 

Defendant/Counterclaimant.

No. CV-13-01802-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 This case involves an action for eviction against Defendant Janice Walker. 

Plaintiffs Phoenix 328 Apartments and Glendale Manor Apartments filed the special 

detainer action against Walker in the Maryvale Justice Court of Maricopa County 

pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1377 on August 27, 2013. (Doc. 1-1 at 11–12.) Plaintiffs allege 

in their Complaint that Walker materially and irreparably breached her rental agreement 

with Plaintiffs when she falsified information on her rental application regarding her 

current address and prior eviction record in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1368. (Id. at 12.) 

 On September 3, 2013, Walker filed an answer and counterclaims in the state 

action alleging race and disability discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing Act (the 

“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. § 3604 and retaliation for opposing such discrimination. (Id. at 2–7.) 

She then removed the action to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and the violation of her civil rights pursuant to id. § 1443(1).1

 

1

 This is not the first time. Walker attempted to remove another special detainer action to this Court by asserting federal question jurisdiction. (See Doc. 6-9 at 2.) But that 

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(Doc. 1.) 

 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; they have subject-matter 

jurisdiction only over those matters specifically authorized by Congress or the 

Constitution. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A party may 

remove an action from state court only if the action could have been brought in the 

district court originally. Ramirez v. Fox Television Station, Inc., 998 F.2d 743, 747 (9th 

Cir. 1993). But the party asserting federal jurisdiction has the burden of proof on a 

motion to remand to state court. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Further, the removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Id. (citing 

Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988)). There is a “strong 

presumption” against removal jurisdiction, and “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if 

there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Id.

 In removing this case, Walker asserts that the Court has federal question 

jurisdiction. “[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the 

United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the 

defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division 

embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “A case ‘arises 

under’ federal law . . . if ‘a well-pleaded complaint establishes that federal law creates the 

cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a 

substantial question of federal law.’” Proctor v. Vishay Intertech. Inc., 584 F.3d 1208, 

1219 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 

677, 689–90 (2006)). “The rule makes the plaintiff the master of the claim; he or she may 

avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 

482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 

 Considering Plaintiffs’ claims and allegations in their Complaint, this is a plain 

special detainer action arising entirely under state law, namely, A.R.S. § 33-1377. 

Further, there are no substantial questions of federal law that must be resolved in 

 attempt was unsuccessful and the case was remanded back to state court. (Id. at 3–4.) 

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determining whether Plaintiffs are entitled to relief in this landlord-tenant dispute. State 

law provides the claims and remedies to a landlord in circumstances where a tenant 

allegedly breached a rental agreement. See id. §§ 33-1368, 33-1377. 

 Walker also removes this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1). “The Supreme 

Court, however, has given section 1443 a restrictive interpretation.” People of State of 

Cal. v. Sandoval, 434 F.2d 635, 636 (9th Cir. 1970). To remove under that Section, 

Walker must demonstrate that: (1) as a defense to a civil action or prosecution, she has 

asserted “rights that are given to [her] by explicit statutory enactment protecting equal 

racial civil rights”; and (2) “that the state court upholds a statute or constitutional 

provision that orders the state court not to enforce those federally protected civil rights.” 

Id. (citing Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 788–92, 794–804 (1966); City of 

Greenwood, Miss. v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 824–28 (1966)). But Walker has not 

identified a relevant Arizona statute that would preclude her from asserting any of her 

federal civil rights or any federal statutory enactment protecting equal racial civil rights 

that the state court is refusing to enforce. Therefore, removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1443 is improper. 

 Walker’s counterclaims against Plaintiffs of race and disability discrimination in 

violation of the FHA arise under federal law. Nevertheless, the assertion of federal 

counterclaims in an action alleging state law claims does not convert the action into one 

“arising under” federal law for purposes of federal question jurisdiction. Caterpillar, 482 

U.S. at 392 (“[F]ederal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on 

the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.”) (emphasis added); Holmes 

Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002) (“[A] 

counterclaim—which appears as part of the defendant’s answer, not as part of the 

plaintiff’s complaint—cannot serve as the basis for ‘arising under’ jurisdiction.”). Hence, 

Walker has not shown that there is federal question jurisdiction in this case to serve as a 

basis for removal. 

/ / / 

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this action is remanded for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction. The Clerk of Court is directed to remand this action back to the 

Maryvale Justice Court of Maricopa County. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Proceed in Forma 

Pauperis (Doc. 3), is denied as moot. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand to State Court, 

(Doc. 6), is denied as moot. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Leave to File 

Amended Counterclaim, (Doc. 7), is denied as moot. 

 Dated this 23rd day of September, 2013. 

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