Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-01007/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-01007-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

CAROLYN SMITH, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

v. ) CASE NO. 2:10-CV-1007-WKW

 ) [WO]

CITY OF MONTGOMERY, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

 

ANTONIO HAIGLER, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

v. ) CASE NO. 2:10-CV-1008-WKW

 ) [WO]

 )

CITY OF MONTGOMERY, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Antonio Haigler (“Mr. Haigler”) claims that Corporals Eric L. Morris

(“Cpl. Morris”) and Michael E. Mashburn (“Cpl. Mashburn”) of the Montgomery 

Police Department used excessive force in arresting him, unlawfully arrested him,

falsely imprisoned him and filed a false report against him in violation of the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution, as enforced by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§

Case 2:10-cv-01007-WKW-TFM Document 68 Filed 11/02/11 Page 1 of 48
1983”). Plaintiff Carolyn Smith (“Mrs. Smith”) also asserts a Fourth Amendment

1

claim of excessive force against Cpls. Morris and Mashburn. Plaintiffs assert § 1983

supervisory liability claims against Defendants Mayor Todd Strange (“Mayor

Strange”), Police Chief Kevin Murphy (“Chief Murphy”) and the City of

Montgomery (“the City”). In addition to the above mentioned claims, Plaintiffs also 2

assert claims against all Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) and 42 U.S.C. §

1985(3) for conspiracy to interfere with civil rights and under Alabama law for fraud.3

Before the court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. # 40),

which is accompanied by a supporting brief and evidentiary submissions (Doc. # 41). 

Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition. (Doc. # 43.) After careful consideration of

the arguments of counsel, the applicable law and the record as a whole, the court

finds that the motion is due to be granted in part and denied in part.

 Mr. Haigler and Mrs. Smith will be referred to collectively as “Plaintiffs.” 1

 Cpls. Morris and Mashburn, Mayor Strange, Chief Murphy, and the City will be 2

referred to collectively as “Defendants.”

 Plaintiffs’ claims will be referred to as stated in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (Doc. # 3

30): Excessive Force (Count A), Unlawful Arrest (Count B), Filing a False Report or Complaint

(Count C), Failure to Supervise Police Officers (Count D), Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil

Rights (Counts E & F), False Imprisonment/Wrongful Incarceration (Count G), and State Law

Fraud (Count H). Mr. Haigler is involved in all claims; Mrs. Smith is involved only in the claims

of Excessive Force and Failure to Supervise Police Officers.

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II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court properly exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this action,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil

rights jurisdiction), and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). Personal

jurisdiction and venue are adequately pleaded and not contested.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

On summary judgment, the evidence and the inferences from that evidence

must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Jean-Baptiste v.

Gutierrez, 627 F.3d 816, 820 (11th Cir. 2010). Hence, “‘facts, as accepted at the

summary judgment stage of the proceedings, may not be the actual facts of the case.’” 

Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1190 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Priester v. City of

Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 925 n.3 (11th Cir. 2000)).

“Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 498 F.3d

1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the

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movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). 

The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of[the record, including pleadings, discoverymaterials and

affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant may meet this

burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by

showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some

element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322–24.

If the movant meets its evidentiary burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving

party to establish, with evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine issue material

to each of its claims for relief exists. Shiver v. Chertoff, 549 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th

Cir. 2008); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). When the nonmovant failsto set forth specific facts

supported by appropriate evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to its case and on which the nonmovant will bear the burden of proof at trial,

summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex Corp.,

477 U.S. at 323 (“[F]ailure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”).

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IV. BACKGROUND4

In the evening of August 7, 2010, Mr. Haigler and his friends came by the

apartment of Mrs. Smith, who is Mr. Haigler’s mother. Mr. Haigler had stopped by

to check on Mrs. Smith, who was having knee problems for which prescription pain

relief was prescribed. (C. Smith Dep. 19 (Doc. # 40, Ex. 4).) Mr. Haigler and several

of his friends, including Mrs. Smith’s husband Isaiah (“Mr. Smith”), were sitting in

chairs outside of apartment. Mrs. Smith was in her living room, speaking to her

mother on the phone. (Haigler Dep. 43 (Doc. # 40, Ex. 3); C. Smith Dep. 18.) 

During this time, the Montgomery Police Department Crime Reduction Taskforce

(also known as “Jump Street”) was patrolling the area in a black unmarked SUV, after

having received tips regarding on-going drug and gun activity. (Morris Aff. (Doc. 5

# 40, Ex. 1); Mashburn Aff. (Doc. # 40, Ex. 2).) Mr. Haigler, upon seeing the police

vehicle pulling to a stop, walked inside to avoid the officers because he had five

outstanding capias warrants. (Haigler Dep. 42– 43.) Then, a black SUV pulled up 6

 The actual facts may be different than those stated here. See Lee, 284 F.3d at 1190. 4

 Mr. Haigler stated he has heard gunshots at Smith’s residence “maybe like every other 5

night.” (Haigler Dep. 78–79.) Mrs. Smith says she hears them on the weekends but not every

weekend. (C. Smith Dep. 107.) 

 Cpls. Morris and Mashburn both state that Mr. Haigler “fled” into the apartment. 6

(Morris Aff.; Mashburn Aff.) 

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behind Mrs. Smith’s truck, and Cpl. Morris, dressed in all black, ran up to Mrs.

Smith’s apartment door. (C. Smith Dep. 27.) 7

Cpl. Morris kicked in the door, went inside, and pushed Mr. Haigler against the

wall. Cpl. Morris put Mr. Haigler’s hands behind his back and said, “Don’t move,

where the mother------- drugs at?” (Haigler Dep. 45.) Then, Cpl. Mashburn came

into the house. Cpl. Morris told Cpl. Mashburn to handcuff Mr. Haigler because he

had seen the drug transaction. (Haigler Dep. 46–47.) Cpl. Morris pulled out his taser,

told Mr. Haigler not to move and kept asking where the drugs were. (Haigler Dep.

47–48.) Mr. Haigler was not moving or resisting during this time. (Haigler Dep.

8

48.) Mr. Haigler told Cpl. Morris that he did not sell drugs and that all he did was

work. (Haigler Dep. 48.) Cpl. Morris turned Mr. Haigler around and pointed his

taser at Mr. Haigler’s chest while repeatedly telling him not to move. (Haigler Dep.

48.) Then Cpl. Mashburn handcuffed Mr. Haigler. (Haigler Dep. 48, 52.) The other

9

 Cpls. Morris and Mashburn state that, while they were observing the area from the 7

SUV, they saw Mr. Haigler, who was sitting in a chair in front of an apartment, reach into his

shirt pocket and pull out what they believed to be marijuana. (Morris Aff.; Mashburn Aff.) Mr.

Haigler insists he did not have drugs on him, did not pick up drugs, and did not see anyone with

drugs. (Haigler Dep. 79.) Other witnesses also state they never saw Mr. Haigler reach into his

pocket or pull anything out of it while on the front porch. (Brown Aff. 14 (Doc. # 30, Aff.

Attach.); Williams Aff 22 (Doc. # 30, Aff. Attach.).)

 Cpls. Morris and Mashburn stated that Mr. Haigler was struggling with the officers 8

during the search. (Morris Aff.; Mashburn Aff.)

 Corporal Morris states that he searched Mr. Haigler and did not find drugs so Cpl. 9

Mashburn looked under the living room sofa and found the marijuana there. They then placed

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officers then searched the apartment. (Haigler Dep. 48.) During the search, the

10

officers pushed over Mrs. Smith’s sofa and loveseat, pulled everything out of the

closets, knocked all the cereal off the top of the refrigerator, pulled the flowers down,

and knocked over a lamp and pictures. (C. Smith Aff. 7 (Doc. # 30, Aff. Attach.).) 

While Cpl. Mashburn handcuffed Mr. Haigler, Cpl. Morris went into Mrs.

Smith’s kitchen. (Haigler Dep. 52.) After Mr. Haigler was handcuffed, Cpl. Morris

came out of the kitchen, elbowed Mr. Haigler in the side, and said, “Where the

mother------- drugs at; you know where the drugs are at.” (Haigler Dep. 52–53.) 

Then, another officer pushed Mr. Haigler. (Haigler Dep. 53.) 

During Mr. Haigler’s arrest, Mrs. Smith kept telling the officers that Mr.

Haigler did not sell drugs, that he was lawfully employed and that she did not

understand why they were arresting Mr. Haigler. (C. Smith Dep. 57.) Cpl. Mashburn

pushed Mrs. Smith in the chest and told her to “shut the ---- up.” (C. Smith Dep.

11

57.) Mrs. Smith never touched, threw anything at or hit any of the officers. (C. Smith

Dep. 58.)

Mr. Haigler under arrest. (Morris Aff.; Mashburn Aff.)

 At least one other officer, Cpl. Davis, was also in the apartment; however he is not a 10

defendant in this suit.

 Both Cpls. Morris and Mashburn stated that they never saw anyone strike or shove 11

Mrs. Smith. (Morris Aff.; Mashburn Aff.)

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While Cpls. Morris and Mashburn were in Mrs. Smith’s apartment, no one was

allowed to go in or out. (C. Smith Aff. 7; I. Smith Dep. 20 (Doc. # 40, Ex. 5).) One

officer stayed outside with the men on the porch. (I. Smith Dep. 20.) The men on the

porch were searched and then told to leave after no contraband was found. (Brown

Dep. 23 (Doc. # 40, Ex. 6).) One of the men on the porch threw a cellophane bag of

marijuana on the ground before the officer searched him. (Brown Dep. 26.) The

officers did not see the bag until at least thirty minutes later. (Brown Dep. 26.) 12

Cpl. Morris brought Mr. Haigler outside in handcuffs and threw Mr. Haigler

to the ground. (Haigler Dep. 60.) Mr. Haigler was not resisting and had been

walking normally. (Haigler Dep. 60.) During this time, Mr. Smith told the officers

that their actions were not necessary and that they did not need to be so rough with

Mr. Haigler. (I. Smith Aff. ¶ 5. (Doc. # 43, Ex. 2).) Mr. Smith and another friend,

Ms. Lynne Williams, told the officersthat Mr. Haigler took medicine for seizures and

that the force used could cause him to have a seizure. (Williams Aff. 22; I. Smith Aff.

¶ 6.) After Mr. Smith said this, Cpl. Mashburn pulled out his taser and pointed it at

Mr. Smith’s face saying, “Shut the ---- up or I’ll shoot you in your mother------- face!” 

(I. Smith Aff. ¶ 5.) The officers made Mr. Haigler lie down on the ground for a

 From the record, it is unclear which officer found the bag of marijuana on the ground 12

outside and at what point in the timeline.

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minute until the “little short” officer said, “I got him.” (Haigler Dep. 60.) Then, the

officers picked up Mr. Haigler, threw him against the truck and threw him into the

truck. (Haigler Dep. 60–6; Haigler Aff. ¶ 4 (Doc. # 30, Aff. Attach.).) During this

time, Mr. Haigler stated that he heard the “little short” officer talking on the phone

and saying that Mr. Haigler had been arrested for no reason. (Haigler Dep. 61 (“We

just put one of the guys [away]; we don’t have nothing on him.”).) On the ride to the

station, the officers beat Mr. Haigler and poked his side and ribs with their clubs. 

(Haigler Aff. ¶ 5.)

After being put in jail, Mr. Haigler complained of knee pain in his right knee

from being thrown to the ground. (Attach. A to Hopkins Aff. (Doc. # 40, Ex. 7).) He

was given ibuprofen for his pain. (Attach. A to Hopkins Aff.) In his Initial Inmate

Health Assessment, Mr. Haigler’s general appearance was marked as good but that

he walked with a limp from right knee pain and his left thumb was swollen at the

joint. (Attach. B to Hopkins Aff.) Mr. Haigler was charged with unlawful possession

of marijuana in the second degree. (Doc. # 30, Ex. 1.)13

On August 10, 2010, after he was released on bond, Mr. Haigler went to a

hospital emergency room for a thumb injury and back soreness. (Doc. # 40, Ex. 8.) 

 From the record, the outcome of Mr. Haigler’s charge of unlawful possession of 13

marijuana is unclear.

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He was diagnosed with a sprained finger, for which he received a splint. Mr. Haigler

stated that he had cuts and bruises on his face and body and that he was sore all over. 

(Haigler Aff. ¶ 7.)

Also on August 10, 2010, Mr. and Mrs. Smith filed a complaint with the City

of Montgomery Internal Affairs Department regarding the August 7, 2010 incident. 

(I. Smith Aff. ¶ 8.) On September 20, 2010, Mr. and Mrs. Smith, along with their

friend Ms. Barbara Mays, spoke with then acting Chief Murphy regarding the

incident. (Mays Aff. ¶ 1 (Doc. # 30, Aff. Attach.).) During the meeting, Chief

Murphy expressed concerns about how the recent academy graduates “have no real

world experiences, and . . . sometimes are not prepared to deal with many of the

emotions, attitudes, and behaviors they face from the public on a daily basis.” (Mays

Aff. ¶ 3.) Chief Murphy explained that changing the colors of their uniforms can help

diffuse situations and that he will focus on this as the new Montgomery Police Chief. 

(Mays Aff. ¶ 3.) Chief Murphy told the Smiths that he would send someone from the

city to repair their door and wall, and the door and wall were fixed that afternoon. 

(Mays Aff. ¶ 4; I. Smith Aff. ¶ 10.) 

During this meeting, Chief Murphy told the Smiths and Ms. Mays that the

department did not have a “solid case” against Mr. Haigler and that his officers did

not find drugs at the time of their search. (Mays Aff. ¶ 6.) He also performed a

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demonstration to show them that the officers could not have seen what was in Mr.

Haigler’s hand. (Mays Aff. ¶ 6; I. Smith Aff. ¶ 9; see supra note 7.) Either at this

meeting or another (it is unclear when this event took place), Chief Murphy asked the

Smiths to have Mr. Haigler sign a release form stating that Mr. Haigler’s possession

of marijuana charge would be dismissed if Mr. Haigler would not sue or hold the city

liable for any claims. (I. Smith Aff. ¶ 11; Doc. # 30, Ex. 2.) Mr. Haigler did not sign

this form.

Since the incident, Mrs. Smith cannot sleep regularly because she has

nightmares about the incident and her knee hurts. (C. Smith Aff. 7–8.) She has to

take sleeping pills to sleep. (I. Smith Aff. ¶ 13.) The medicine she took for her knee

no longer helps with the pain after she was pushed by Cpl. Mashburn. Mrs. Smith

had to have surgery on her knee. (C. Smith Aff. 7–8.) Mr. Haigler also has had

trouble sleeping since the incident. (Haigler Aff. ¶ 8.)

Seeking redress, Mrs. Smith and Mr. Haigler filed separate actions on

November 29, 2010. The two cases were consolidated on December 28, 2010. (See

Doc. 17.) The governing Amended Complaint alleges § 1983 claims of excessive

force, unlawful arrest, filing a false report or complaint, failure to supervise police

officers and false imprisonment, § 1985 claims for conspiracy to interfere with civil

rights and a fraud claim under Alabama law against all Defendants in their individual

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and official capacities. Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages;

employment termination of all officers who participated in the August 7, 2010

incident; restraining orders on the Montgomery Police Officers to protect Plaintiffs,

Plaintiffs’ witnesses, and Plaintiffs’ counsel; and attorney’s fees.

V. DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Matters

Plaintiffs concede that summary judgment is due to be entered in Defendants’

favor on their § 1985 conspiracy claims (Counts E and F) and their fraud claims under

Alabama law (Count H). (Pls.’ Resp. Br. 6 (Doc. # 43).) Additionally, at the October

19, 2011 pretrial hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel agreed that Defendant Mayor Todd

Strange may be dismissed from this action. Thus, summary judgment will be entered

on all claims against Mayor Strange.

Plaintiffs have sued Defendants Kevin Murphy, Chief of Police of the City of

Montgomery; and Cpls. Morris and Mashburn, officers for the Montgomery Police

Department, in both their official and individual capacities. “Under the Eleventh

Amendment, state officials sued for damages in their official capacity are immune

from suit in federal court.” Jackson v. Ga. Dep’t of Transp., 16 F.3d 1573, 1575

(11th Cir. 1994);see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (stating that

“an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit

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against the entity”). Thus, the individual Defendants are entitled to absolute

immunity with regard to any claims for damages against them in their official

capacities. Similarly, the individual Defendants in their official capacities are not

“persons” for purposes of § 1983 monetary relief. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,

491 U.S. 58, 70–71 (1989).

Plaintiffs’ remaining claims against Defendants in their individual capacities

all arise under § 1983. To establish § 1983 individual liability, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that (1) he or she was deprived of a right secured by the United States

Constitution, and (2) the act or omission causing the deprivation was committed by

an individual acting under color of state law. Wideman v. Shallowford Cmty. Hosp.,

Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1032 (11th Cir. 1987). 

Given the number of defendants and claims in this case, the opinion will be

broken up by defendant. Part V.B. will address Plaintiffs’ claims against Cpls. Morris

and Mashburn,includingCpls. Morris’s and Mashburn’s qualified immunity defense. 

Part V.C. will address all of Plaintiffs’ claims against Chief Murphy. Finally, Part

V.D. will address all of Plaintiffs’ claims against the City, including the City’s

municipal liability defense.

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B. Cpls. Morris and Mashburn in Their Individual Capacities

Cpls. Morris and Mashburn assert qualified immunity as a defense to Mr.

Haigler’s Fourth Amendment claims of excessive force, false arrest, and filing a false

report and Mrs. Smith’s Fourth Amendment claims of excessive force against them

in their individual capacities. First, general principles on the law governing qualified

immunity will be given, followed by an analysis as to whether the corporals are

entitled to qualified immunity on each § 1983 claim.

1. General Principles of Qualified Immunity

“The doctrine of qualified immunity provides that government officials

performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil

damages” unless they have violated a clearly established constitutional right. 

Townsend v. Jefferson Cnty., 601 F.3d 1152, 1157 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). A qualified immunity determination requires the

application of a multi-part test. First, a defendant must establish that he or she was

acting within his or her discretionary authority as a public employee when the

conduct in question occurred. Id. at 1158. Next, a plaintiff must demonstrate “‘that:

(1) the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) this right was clearly

established at the time of the alleged violation.’” Id. (quoting Holloman v. Harland,

370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004)).

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In previous years, this two-step inquiry had to be conducted in order. That is,

the court had to decide whether a right existed (and whether it was violated) before

deciding whether it was clearly established. Now, courts may “‘exercise their sound

discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis

should be addressed first.’” Id. (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236

(2009)). Here, the court proceeds in the sequence set forth in Townsend.

It is undisputed that Cpls. Morris and Mashburn were acting within their

discretionary authority as officers of the Montgomery police department at all times

material to thislawsuit. (Defs.’ Summ. J. Br. 22 (Doc. # 41).) Thus, the burden shifts

to Plaintiffs to show that Cpls. Morris and Mashburn are stripped of qualified

immunity based on their actions.

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2. Fourth Amendment Claims for Unlawful Arrest and False

Imprisonment (Counts B & G)14

These claims relate only to Mr. Haigler. “There is no question that an arrest

without probable cause to believe a crime has been committed violates the Fourth

Amendment.” Madiwale v. Savaiko, 117 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing

Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 579 (11th Cir. 1990)). “[I]f an arresting officer

does not have the right to make an arrest, he does not have the right to use any degree

of force in making the arrest.” Bashir v. Rockdale Cnty., Ga., 445 F.3d 1323, 1332

(11th Cir. 2006). Likewise, “the damages recoverable on an unlawful arrest claim

‘include damages suffered because of the use of force in effecting the arrest.’” Id.

(citing Williamson v. Mills, 65 F.3d 155, 158–59 (11th Cir. 1995)).

“Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the collective

knowledge ofthe law enforcement officials, of which theyhad reasonablytrustworthy

 Because Mr. Haigler’s § 1983 claims of false arrest and false imprisonment are both 14

dependent on the absence of probable cause, the two claims will be analyzed together. See Case

v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1330 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Our precedents establish that a claim of false

imprisonment . . . depends on an absence of probable cause . . . . Where a police officer lacks

probable cause to make an arrest, the arrestee has a claim under section 1983 for false

imprisonment based on a detention pursuant to that arrest . . . .”); see also Sada v. City of

Altamonte Springs, No. 11-10203, 2011 WL 2749664, at *5 (11th Cir. July 15, 2011)

(“[B]ecause the officers had probable cause to arrest Sada for battery, the district court did not err

in granting summary judgment on Sada’s federal constitutional claims and state law false

arrest/false imprisonment claims.”); Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir. 1998)

(stating that probable cause constitutes an absolute bar to § 1983 claims alleging false arrest). 

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information, are sufficient to cause a person of reasonable caution to believe an

offense has been or is being committed.” United States v. Jimenez, 780 F.2d 975, 978

(11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

“Probable cause does not require the same type of specific evidence of each element

of the offense as would be needed to support a conviction.” Adams v. Williams, 407

U.S. 143, 149 (1972).

a. QualifiedImmunity and Unlawful Arrest: Arguable Probable

Cause

“While an officer who arrests an individual without probable cause violatesthe

Fourth Amendment, this does not inevitably remove the shield of qualified

immunity.” Skop v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 485 F.3d 1130, 1137 (11th Cir. 2007). For

qualified immunity on a claim of unlawful arrest, an officer need not have actual

probable cause, but only arguable probable cause. Holmes v. Kucynda, 321 F.3d

1069, 1079 (11th Cir. 2003). Arguable probable cause exists where “‘reasonable

officers in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the

[d]efendants could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest [the] [p]laintiff

. . . .’” Kingsland v. City of Miami, Fla., 382 F.3d 1220, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004)

(quoting Von Stein, 904 F.2d at 579). The plaintiff bears the burden to “demonstrate

that no reasonable officer could have found probable cause under the totality of the

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circumstances.” Id. Thus, “even law enforcement officials who reasonably but

mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present are entitled to immunity.” 

Holmes, 321 F.3d at 1079 (internal quotations marks and citations omitted).

Whether an officer possesses arguable probable cause depends on the elements

of the alleged crime and the operative fact pattern. Skop, 485 F.3d at 1137–38. 

Arguable probable cause does not, however, require an arresting officer to establish

every element of a crime before making an arrest, because such a requirement “would

negate the concept of probable cause and transform arresting officers into

prosecutors.” Scarbrough v. Myles, 245 F.3d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001). Thus, the

inquiry is “whether [the defendant] violated clearly established law in making the

arrests based on the objective factors that gave rise to his probable-cause

determination and not whether the arrestees’ actions actually constituted a crime.” 

Id. at 1303 n.8.

Additionally, qualified immunity will protect officers who make good faith

mistakes. Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 7 F.3d 1552, 1558 (11th Cir. 1993)

(granting qualified immunity on the basis of arguable probable cause where the

officers erroneously counted people in excess of a restaurant’s maximum capacity),

modified, 14 F.3d 583 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). However, it will not protect

officers whose conduct “creates factual issues as to their honesty and credibility.” 

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Kingsland, 382 F. 3d at 1233; see also Holmes, 321 F.3d at 1083–84 (reversing the

grant of qualified immunity and summary judgment because factual questions existed

whether officers filed a recklessly false application for an arrest warrant). 

On the offense of unlawful possession of marijuana in the second degree for

which Mr. Haigler was arrested, Alabama Code § 13A-11-7 provides that:

(a) A person commits the crime of unlawful possession of marihuana in

the second degree if, except as otherwise authorized, he possesses

marihuana for his personal use only.

(b) Unlawful possession of marihuana in the second degree is a Class A

misdemeanor.

The key for this crime is possession of marijuana by the arrestee. Thus, the

inquiry is whether Cpls. Morris and Mashburn had arguable probable cause that Mr.

Haigler possessed marijuana.

b. Whether Cpls.Morris and MashburnHad Arguable Probable

Cause to Arrest Mr. Haigler for Possession of Marijuana

Defendants’ argument focuses on arguable probable cause for Cpls. Morris’s

and Mashburn’s warrantless entry into Mrs. Smith’s apartment. Defendants argue

they had arguable probable cause to arrest Mr. Haigler for this offense because Cpl.

Morris thought he saw Mr. Haigler pull marijuana out of his shirt pocket while Mr.

Haigler was sitting outside Mrs. Smith’s apartment and Mr. Haigler was in an area

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known for drug dealing and where gunfire could often be heard. (Defs.’ Summ. J. Br.

8–9.) According to Defendants, these facts provided a hot pursuit justification for

entering Mrs. Smith’s apartment when Mr. Haigler went inside. However, Mr.

Haigler’s unlawful arrest claim is not based on Cpls. Morris’s and Mashburn’s

warrantless entry into Mrs. Smith’s apartment. (See Pls.’ Resp. Br. 2 (Doc. # 43).) 15

Instead, Mr. Haigler’s basis for the unlawful arrest claim is that Cpls. Morris and

Mashburn falsified facts to gain probable cause to justify the warrantless entry and

arrest. 

Mr. Haigler points to Cpl. Morris’s report, which states that Cpl. Mashburn

found marijuana under the couch in Mrs. Smith’s apartment before arresting Mr.

Haigler. (Doc. # 30, Ex. 1.) However, Mrs. Smith and Mr. Haigler (who were both

inside the apartment when the marijuana was allegedly found under Mrs. Smith’s

couch) submitted affidavits stating that the officers never found marijuana under the

couch or even in Mrs. Smith’s apartment. In addition, Mr. Haigler submitted

 Plaintiffs’ brief states that “[e]ven if the Defendants did mistakenly believe so, that 15

would entitle them to pursue and detain Mr. Haigler inside the residence, but not to

subsequently arrest him.” (Doc. # 43 at 2.) Defendants’ reliance on United States v.

Echevarria, 238 F. App’x 424 (11th Cir. 2007), is misplaced. In Echevarria, the Eleventh

Circuit found that the warrantless entry into a defendant’s trailer and the subsequent search came

within the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 425. However,

Echevarria dealt with whether the officers’ entry into defendant’s residence was valid, not with

whether the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant. Probable cause to arrest is the

disputed issue in this case.

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evidence that Chief Murphy indicated the officers did not find drugs in the apartment

or on Mr. Haigler’s person.

Cpls. Morris and Mashburn are not entitled to qualified immunity if their

conduct violates Mr. Haigler’s clearly established rights. It is clearly established that

“[f]alsifying facts to establish probable cause is patently unconstitutional . . . .” 

Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1232; see also Williams v. Miami-Dade Police Dep’t, 297 F.

App’x 941, 946 (11th Cir. 2008). It must then be determined if there is evidence

creating a genuine issue of material fact that, under the totality of the circumstances,

the officers’ initial observations of Mr. Haigler as he sat outside his mother’s

apartment were objectively reasonable. 

Based on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable officer could not have

objectively believed that Mr. Haigler possessed marijuana. Under Plaintiffs’ version

of the events, the only facts known to Cpls. Morris and Mashburn at the time of Mr.

Haigler’s arrest were that Mr. Haigler was hanging out with friends in an area known

for guns and drugs, and he walked into an apartment upon seeing Jump Street’s

vehicles. Under these facts, “a link between the suspected criminal activity and [Mr.

Haigler]” is missing. Williamson, 65 F.3d at 158. Mr. Haigler’s activities of hanging

out on a porch with friends and walking inside is a “facially innocent act.” Id.

(holding that “[t]aking photographs at a public event is a facially innocent act” and

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that “[t]he mere fact that [these] photographs could have been used for unlawful

activity . . . [was] not enough to establish even arguable probable cause” for arresting

the photographer). 

Mr. Haigler raises a question of fact as to whether arguable probable cause

existed to believe that from the officers’ vantage point they objectively could have

ascertained that Mr. Haigler pulled marijuana out of his shirt pocket. (See supra note

7; see also Mays Aff. ¶ 6; I. Smith Aff. ¶ 9.) Moreover, whether Cpls. Morris and

Mashburn found marijuana under Mrs. Smith’s couch, after having found no

marijuana on Mr. Haigler, is a question of fact for the jury to decide. Thus, qualified

immunity must be denied at this time on Mr. Haigler’s Fourth Amendment claims of

unlawful arrest and false imprisonment. See Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1226–27. 

3. Fourth Amendment Claim for Excessive Force (Count A)

This claim is brought by both Plaintiffs. As will be seen, because Mrs. Smith

was not arrested, the analysis for excessive force in her case differs from the analysis

for excessive force in the case of Mr. Haigler, who was arrested. 

TheFourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard governs whether

a use of force is excessive. Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir.

2008); see also Lee 284 F.3d at 1197. The reasonableness inquiry requires the court

to “carefully balance ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s

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Fourth Amendment interests’ against ‘the countervailing governmental interests at

stake.’” Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 905 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).

First, to determine whether the force applied was reasonable, the court looks

“at the fact pattern from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene with

knowledge of the attendant circumstances and facts, and balance[s] the risk of bodily

harm to the suspect against the gravity of the threat the officer sought to eliminate.” 

McCullough v. Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201, 1206 (11th Cir. 2009). The quantumof force

used should be measured against “the severity of the crime at issue; whether the

suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others; and whether

he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Oliver, 586

F.3d at 905 (citing Lee, 284 F.3d at 1197–98); see also McCullough, 559 F.3d at

1206.

Second, the court considers “‘(1) the need for the application of force, (2) the

relationship between the need and the amount of force used, [and] (3) the extent of

the injury inflicted.’” Leslie v. Ingram, 786 F.2d 1533, 1536 (11th Cir. 1986),

abrogated in part by Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 2000)

(recognizing that Leslie’s fourth factor, the subjective inquiry into the officer’s

motive, was invalidated by Graham); see also Lee, 284 F.3d at 1198 n.7 (discussing

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the continuing validity of the other three Leslie factors). However, “the application

of de minimis force, without more, will not support a claim for excessive force in

violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Nolin, 207 F.3d at 1257.

Third, “[F]ourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right

to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some

degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 

Furthermore, “[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the

peace of a judge’s chambers” violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). “The calculus of reasonableness must embody

allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second

judgments – in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving – about

the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. Hence, “[u]se of

force must be judged on a case-by-case basis from the perspective of a reasonable

officer on the scene, [instead of] with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Vinyard v.

Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1347 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted).

Finally, in conducting the reasonablenessinquiry based on Plaintiffs’ facts, the

Eleventh Circuit has recognized that an officer’s use of force is more likely to be

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unlawful when it occurs “after the arrest [has] been fully effected, the arrestee

completely secured, and all danger vitiated.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1199–1200.

a. Qualified Immunity and Mr. Haigler’sExcessive Force Claim

Assuming for purposes of this analysis that his arrest was legal, Mr. Haigler

asserts claims of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment against Cpls.

Morris and Mashburn. The corporals have asserted qualified immunity on this 16

claim. Under Plaintiffs’ version of the events on August 7, 2010, Mr. Haigler can

establish that Cpls. Morris and Mashburn violated his clearly established Fourth

Amendment right to be free from excessive force. Because there are genuine issues

of material fact surrounding the incident, Cpls. Morris and Mashburn are not entitled

to qualified immunity at this time.

i. Whether Cpls. Morris and Mashburn Violated Mr.

Haigler’s Right to Be Free from Excessive Force Under

the Fourth Amendment

Under Fourth Amendment law, a distinction is made between the type of force

allowed to effectuate arrest and the type of force allowed after arrest. Cpls. Morris

and Mashburn arrested Mr. Haigler for unlawful possession of marijuana, a Class A

 As mentioned previously, if Mr. Haigler was arrested without probable cause, his 16

excessive force claim would be subsumed by his unlawful arrest claim. See Bashir, 445 F.3d at

1332.

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misdemeanor in Alabama. See Ala. Code § 13A-11-7. Not only has Fourth

Amendment jurisprudence long recognized that the right to make an arrest

“necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat

thereof to effect it,” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, but the Eleventh Circuit “has made

clear that some use of force by a police officer when making a custodial arrest is

necessary and altogether lawful, regardless of the severity of the alleged offense.” 

Durruthy v. Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080, 1094 (11th Cir. 2003). “In the Eleventh Circuit,

[courts] recognize that the typical arrest involves some force and injury.” Rodriguez

v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1351 (11th Cir. 2002). For even minor offenses, police

officers are authorized to use physical restraint, handcuffs, and to push suspects. See,

e.g., Nolin, 207 F.3d at 1257 (no constitutional violation to grab suspect, push him

against a van, search his groin in an uncomfortable manner, and place him in

handcuffs); Jones v. City of Dothan, 121 F.3d 1456, 1460 (11th Cir. 1997) (per

curiam) (no constitutional violation to slamplaintiff against wall, kick plaintiff’s legs

apart, and require plaintiff to raise arms above his head); Gold v. City of Miami, 121

F.3d 1442, 1446–47 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (no constitutional violation for

affixing handcuffs too tightly on disorderly conduct arrestee); Post, 7 F.3d at

1559–60 (not excessive force to arrest a plaintiff for building code violation by

pushing him against a wall, applying a chokehold, and handcuffing him even though

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plaintiff was not resisting); cf. Lee, 284 F.3d at 1191, 1198 (finding a constitutional

violation for the defendant’s unreasonable use of force after the plaintiff was arrested

and secured, but making no such finding on the defendant’s use of force in subduing

and securing the plaintiff by pulling her out of her car by her wrist, shoving her

against the car, throwing her hands on top of the hood, and then handcuffing her).

To effectuate the arrest of Mr. Haigler, Cpl. Morris pushed Mr. Haigler against

a wall, put Mr. Haigler’s hands behind his back, and pulled out his taser and pointed

it toward Mr. Haigler’s chest. Against the legal backdrop set out above, these facts

17

are insufficient to establish that the force used to effectuate Mr. Haigler’s arrest

violated the Fourth Amendment. Thus, no Fourth Amendment violation has been

demonstrated by Mr. Haigler regarding the force used by Cpls. Morris and Mashburn

to make his arrest.

However, after an arrest is effectuated and the arrestee is secured, the use of

force is more likely to be unlawful. Lee, 284 F.3d at 1199–1200. After Mr. Haigler

was arrested, there is evidence that Mr. Haigler was elbowed in the side, pushed,

thrown on the ground, forced to stay on the ground, then picked up and thrown

against a truck, thrown into the truck, and beaten and poked in his side and ribs with

 There is no evidence that Cpl. Mashburn touched Mr. Haigler or activated the taser 17

prior to handcuffing him. Thus, Cpl. Mashburn cannot be found liable on an excessive force

claim for actions that occurred prior to the arrest.

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the officers’ clubs on the way to the station. Each Graham factor will be analyzed in

turn to decide whether the force used by Cpls. Morris and Mashburn after Mr.

Haigler’s arrest was reasonable.

18

The first factor is the severity of the crime at issue. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 

Mr. Haigler was arrested for unlawful possession of marijuana, which is a Class A

misdemeanor in Alabama. (Ala. Code 1975 § 13A-12-214(b); Ex. 1, Pls.’ Am.

Compl.) As a general rule, “more force is appropriate for a more serious offense and

less force is appropriate for a less serious one.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1198. Because this

is a misdemeanor, less force is generally appropriate. 

The second factor is whether Mr. Haigler posed an immediate threat to the

safety of the officers or others. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Defendants argue that

there was an immediate threat to their safety because they were in an area known for

illegal drug and weapons activities and were inside an unfamiliar home. (Def.’s

Summ. J. Br. 16.) While this may have been true before the arrest, after the officers

had effectuated the arrest, there is no evidence that Mr. Haigler was a threat to their

safety. Mr. Haigler had already been searched, and no weapons or drugs were found

on him. Mr. Haigler was not trying to flee or struggling. He was also in handcuffs

 From the record, it is unclear which officer did what to Mr. Haigler. The only clear

18

action taken by a specific officer is that Cpl. Morris elbowed Mr. Haigler in the side after he was

arrested.

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and being watched by another officer. Finally, Mr. Haigler and Mrs. Smith were the

only ones in the apartment with at least three officers. Thus, on the summary

judgment facts, Mr. Haigler did not pose a threat to the safety of Cpls. Morris and

Mashburn.

The third factor is whether Mr. Haigler was actively resisting arrest or

attempting to evade by flight. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. If Mr. Haigler’s version

of the events is credited, as it must be, he was not struggling or resisting arrest. Cpls.

Mashburn and Morris say that Mr. Haigler was struggling during the arrest. 

However, all accounts from Plaintiffs indicate that there were no signs of struggle by

Mr. Haigler. While Mr. Haigler did walk inside upon seeing Jump Street’s SUV, he

did not run nor did he try to escape once the officers were inside Mrs. Smith’s

apartment.

Because of the lack of severity of the crime and the fact that Mr. Haigler was

not resisting arrest and did not pose a danger to the officers because he was arrested

and secured, there was no need to use post-arrest force on Mr. Haigler. Throwing Mr.

Haigler on the ground, against the truck, and into the truck, as well as continuing to

poke and hit him with clubs on the way to the station, would be excessive in light of

Mr. Haigler being in handcuffs and not resisting arrest.

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However, even if the force used is found to be unnecessary, the de minimis

principle may apply. Nolin, 207 F.3d at 1257 (reaffirming that after Graham, the de

minimis principle still applies). Under the de minimis principle, “a minimal amount 19

of force and injury . . . will not defeat an officer’s immunity in an excessive force

case.” Id. at 1258. Thus, even if the force was unnecessary, if “the actual force used

and the injury inflicted were both minor in nature[,] . . . the application of the

excessive force standard would not inevitably lead an official in [the defendant’s]

position to conclude that the force was unlawful.” Id. at 1256–57 (discussing and

quoting Jones, 121 F.3d at 1460–61).

Mr. Haigler was walking with a limp from pain to his right knee after being

thrown on the ground and had a swollen left thumb joint. He was given ibuprofen. 

Three days later, he went to the emergency room for back soreness and swelling of

his thumb. He was diagnosed with a sprained thumb, and his thumb was splinted. 

Mr. Haigler also attests that he had bruising and cuts on his face and body. The

Eleventh Circuit has classified minor bruising, skin abrasions, and pain experienced

during the search or arrest that required minor medical treatment as minor injury. 

 In reversing a district court’s ruling to the contrary, Nolin reaffirmed the de minimis 19

principle and three circuit opinions that applied it after Graham to reverse district courts that

denied qualified immunity. 207 F.3d at 1257–58. According to Nolin, one of those cases,

“Post[,] refined Graham by concluding that in making the highly fact-intensive excessive force

inquiry, a court may conclude that an officer retains qualified immunity when the facts show a

minimal amount of force combined with a minor or nonexistent injury.” Id. at 1257 n.3.

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See, e.g., Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1349 n.13 (noting a strong argument that “minor

bruising” is de minimis injury); Nolin, 207 F.3d at 1258 n.4 (finding de minimis force

when “minor bruising” along with minimal force); Jones, 121 F.3d at 1460 (finding

that the plaintiff’s pain from lifting his arms because of a prior stroke, and his pain

from an arthritic knee after having his legs kicked apart, which required minor

medical treatment three days later, was “minor” injury); Gold, 121 F.3d at 1446

(describing “skin abrasions” as a minor injury, though they were “skin abrasions for

which [the plaintiff] did not seek medical treatment”). While Mr. Haigler did need

medical attention, his injuries were minor under the controlling law. He did not have

any broken bones or open wounds, was not prescribed any medication other than

ibuprofen and only needed a splint put on his thumb.

However, minor injuries do not automatically make the force used de minimus. 

Lee, 284 F.3d at 1200. “[O]bjectively unreasonable force does not become

reasonable simply because the fortuity of the circumstances protected the plaintiff

from suffering more severe physical harm.” Id. In the cases where the de minimus

principle was applied, the force and injury sustained were in effectuating an arrest. 

See Rodriguez, 280 F.3d at 1345 (injury occurred during handcuffing); Nolin, 207

F.3d at 1255–57 (plaintiff grabbed, thrown against van, and handcuffed before

arrest); Jones, 121 F.3d at 1458, 1460–61 (plaintiff slammed against wall and

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searched as officers carried out arrest); Gold, 121 F.3d at 1446–47 (minor injury

caused solely by tight handcuffs); Post, 7 F.3d at 1556, 1559–60 (arrestee pushed

against wall when continuing to speak despite being ordered by officer to stop

talking). Here, the force that caused the injuries occurred after the arrest.

In Lee, the Eleventh Circuit found that slamming an arrestee’s head into a car

trunk after the “arrest ha[d] been fully secured and any potential danger or risk of

flight vitiated” was severe and unnecessary force, even though the arrestee’s injuries

were only bruises, aching wrists, and bilateral wrist trauma. 284 F.3d at 1200. 

Similarly, in Vinyard, the Eleventh Circuit found an excessive force violation when

an officer grabbed “the arrested, secured and handcuffed [plaintiff] forcibly enough

to bruise her arm and breast and then us[ed] pepper spray” on her while she was in

the back of the police car. 311 F.3d at 1349. 

Like in Vinyard and Lee, Mr. Haigler had been arrested, secured and

handcuffed when the officers inflicted further force on him. In addition, he was in

the presence of at least three officers and never resisted arrest or attempted to flee

once secured. Despite these facts, the officers dragged him outside in handcuffs,

threw him on the ground, picked him up and threw him against the truck, threw him

inside the truck, and then beat him with their clubs on the way to the station house. 

This force does not become de minimus simply because Cpls. Mashburn and Morris

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were fortunate that Mr. Haigler did not suffer more severe injuries. See Lee, 284 F.3d

at 1200. 

Based on the facts viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Haigler, he has

raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Cpls. Morris and Mashburn

violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. Having shown

that the corporals “violated a constitutional right,” Townsend, 601 F.3d at 1157, Mr.

Haigler has satisfied the first prong of the qualified immunity defense. The analysis

now turns to the second prong of the qualified immunity defense.

ii. Whether the Right Violated by Cpls. Morris and

Mashburn Was Clearly Established

In order to overcome qualified immunity, Plaintiffs must also demonstrate that

as of August 7, 2010, the law was clearly established that the force used by Cpls.

Morris and Mashburn was excessive. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001),

abrogated by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (holding that judges may decide which prong

of the Saucier qualified immunity test to address first). “The relevant, dispositive

inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be

clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he

confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. Put another way, did the state of the law in

2010 provide Cpls. Morris and Mashburn with fair warning that their treatment of Mr.

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Haigler after he was arrested was unconstitutional? See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730,

741 (2002). 

Plaintiffs cite Lee and Vinyard in defending Mr. Haigler’s excessive force

claim against qualified immunity. These cases are similar to Mr. Haigler’s claim

because, as stated supra in Part V.B.2.a.i., Cpls. Morris and Mashburn used

unnecessary force against Mr. Haigler after he was arrested, secured and handcuffed. 

Lee and Vinyard were both issued by the Eleventh Circuit in 2002. In 2010, the

officers would have had fair warning that throwing and beating an arrestee who was

arrested for a misdemeanor and not resisting arrest would violate that arrestee’s

Fourth Amendment rights. Thus, Cpls. Morris and Mashburn are not entitled to

qualified immunity because there is a genuine issue of material fact asto whether Mr.

Haigler offered any resistance once handcuffed, and the right to be free from

excessive force on these facts was clearly established in 2010. See Smith v. Mattox,

127 F.3d 1416, 1420 (11th Cir. 1997) (denying summary judgment on the issue of

qualified immunity where it was unclear if the arrestee continued to resist arrest).

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b. Mrs. Smith’s Excessive Force Claim

Mrs. Smith also claims excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment

against Cpl. Mashburn. Cpl. Mashburn has asserted qualified immunity on this 20

claim. Cpl. Mashburn is not entitled to qualified immunity because Mrs. Smith can

show that he violated her clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from

excessive force and there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mrs. Smith

was pushed.

i. Whether Cpl. Mashburn Violated Mrs. Smith’s Fourth

Amendment Right to Be Free from Excessive Force 

A claim of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment requires a seizure. 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 394 (“In addressing an excessive force claim brought under §

1983, analysis begins by identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly

infringed by the challenged application of force. . . . In most instances, that will be

either the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures of the

person, or the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments . . . .”). 

The Supreme Court in Graham noted that “[a] ‘seizure’ triggering the Fourth

 Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint makes a general allegation of excessive force. 20

However, the Amended Complaint states that Cpl. Mashburn was the one who pushed Mrs.

Smith, and there is no evidence to the contrary. Thus summary judgment is due to be entered in

Cpl. Morris’s favor on Mrs. Smith’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim. 

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Amendment’s protections occurs only when government actors have, ‘by means of

physical force or show of authority, . . . in some way restrained the liberty of a

citizen.’” Id. at 395 n.10 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)). Put

another way, an individual isseized if, “in view of all the surrounding circumstances,

a reasonable person would believe that he was not free to leave.” United States v. De

La Rosa, 922 F.2d 675, 678 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S.

567, 573 (1988)).

Here, the evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact that Mrs. Smith was

seized. An officer kicked in Mrs. Smith’s apartment door, while yelling, proceeded

to search her home, told her she could not leave, and did not allow anyone to enter

or exit the apartment. On these facts, a reasonable person would believe she was not

free to leave.

The evidence also raises a genuine issue of material fact asto whether the force

used by Cpl. Mashburn was excessive. According to Mrs. Smith, she was not yelling

at the officers nor did she touch, hit or throw anything at the officers. She simply told

the officers that Mr. Haigler did not sell drugs, that he worked for a living and that

she did not understand why they were arresting him. Mrs. Smith also was not being

arrested and was not a suspect. Despite her nonaggressive behavior, Cpl. Mashburn

pushed Mrs. Smith in the chest and told her to “shut the ---- up,” causing her to

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almost fall into a table and twist her knee to prevent the fall. This amount of force

is unreasonable. See Payton v. City of Florence, 413 F. App’x 126, 133 (11th Cir.

2011) (finding excessive force where officers pulled plaintiff out of a doorway,

grabbed her thumb and pulled it up behind her back past her shoulder, where the

plaintiff was not being arrested, was not “being belligerent and made no aggressive

movement toward the officers”); see also Jones v. Buchanan, 325 F.3d 520, 531 (4th

Cir. 2003) (finding excessive force where the plaintiff voluntarily came to the

sheriff’s department and was never under arrest or suspected of any crime and an

officer knocked the plaintiff to the floor, jumped on him, crushed his nose, lacerated

his nose and lips, and bruised his ribs to quiet the drunk plaintiff down); Ikerd v.

Blair, 101 F.3d 430, 435 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding excessive force where a 300-pound

officer violently jerked a ten-year-old child out of her living room chair and dragged

her into another room, where the child was not under arrest and did not pose a threat

to anyone); McDonald III v. Haskins, 966 F.2d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 1992) (allowing an

excessive force claim to go forward where the officer held his gun to the head of a

nine-year-old child and threatened to pull the trigger, where the child was not a

suspect, not attempting to evade the officers, nor posing a threat). 

Defendants argue that Mrs. Smith cannot show that Cpl. Mashburn’s push

caused injury to her knee because Mrs. Smith had a preexisting knee injury. (Defs.’

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Summ. J. Br. 15.) “[R]easonable force does not become excessive force when the

force aggravates (however severely) a preexisting condition . . . unknown to the

officer at the time.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1200 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

No one disputes that Cpl. Mashburn had no reason to know of Mrs. Smith’s knee

injury. However, whether a plaintiff had a preexisting injury is not dispositive on an

excessive force claim. De minimus force and injury will not defeat an excessive force

claim where the officer had no probable cause to effectuate an arrest on an arrestee. 

See Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1272–73 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding in the

absence of probable cause, the officer was not entitled to use any force on the

arrestee). Thus, by even more compelling reasoning, an excessive force claim would

not be defeated where the officer did not attempt to arrest the plaintiff and did not

suspect her of any crime.

Thus, when the facts are taken in the light most favorable to Mrs. Smith, she

demonstrates a Fourth Amendment violation of her right to be free from excessive

force. Having shown thatCpl. Mashburn “violated a constitutionalright,” Townsend,

601 F.3d at 1157, Mrs. Smith has satisfied the first prong of the qualified immunity

defense. The analysis now turns to the second prong of the qualified immunity

defense.

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ii. Whether Cpl. MashburnViolateda ClearlyEstablished

Right

Mrs. Smith’s right to be free from excessive force is clearly established. 

Incorporating the words of Payton, “no objectively reasonable police officer could

believe that, consistent with the dictates of the Constitution, he could [push a woman

hard enough that she would almost fall into a table,] who was suspected of no crime,

who verbally objected to the search of her home in a non-belligerent manner and

made no aggressive movements . . . .” 413 F. App’x at 133. Thus, the facts here

indicate that the force used by Cpl. Mashburn was “so far beyond the hazy border

between excessive and acceptable force [that every objectively reasonable officer]

had to know he was violating the Constitution without case law on point.” Vinyard,

311 F.3d at 1355 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Because Cpl. Mashburn denies shoving Mrs. Smith, there is a genuine issue of

material fact that must be resolved by a jury, and qualified immunity is due to be

denied at this time.

4. Filing a False Report or Complaint (Count C)

All Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Haigler’s § 1983

claim for filing a false report or complaint. Plaintiffs cite no authority that filing a

false report or complaint is a viable claim under § 1983. While the alleged

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misrepresentation in the report is relevant to Mr. Haigler’s claims of unlawful arrest

and false imprisonment as discussed supra in Part V.B.2, it is not a separate claim.

See Koch v. Austin, No. 1:03-CV-5021, 2006 WL 403818, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 16,

2006) (finding that “a complaint alleging that an officer filed a false report, by itself,

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted); Webb v. Abolt, No. CV406-

209, 2007 WL 39714, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 4, 2007); Pratt v. Rowland, 769 F. Supp.

1128, 11234 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (filing a false report will state a claim if in retaliation

for exercising a constitutional right).

Section 1983 requires that the plaintiff name the constitutional deprivation. 

Mr. Haigler does not demonstrate which constitutional right is violated when false

information is included in a police report. If it is assumed that Mr. Haigler is

claiming a Fourth Amendment violation of hisright against unreasonable seizure, Mr.

Haigler cannot show that the filing of the false report caused a seizure. Cpl. Morris

did not fill out this report until after Mr. Haigler had already been arrested and

imprisoned. The report did not lead to Mr. Haigler being incarcerated; his alleged

unlawful arrest did. 

Furthermore, Mr. Haigler’s claim cannot be construed as a malicious

prosecution claim under § 1983. A claim for malicious prosecution requires “that the

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prior proceeding end[] in favor of the present plaintiff.” Delchamps, Inc. v. Bryan,

21

738 So. 2d 824, 831–32 (Ala. 1999). Plaintiffs present no evidence about the result

of Mr. Haigler’s state trial. Thus, all Defendants are entitled to summary judgment

21

as a matter of law on Mr. Haigler’s § 1983 claims predicated on the filing of a false

report.

C. Chief Murphy

Plaintiffs contend that Chief Murphy is also liable on their § 1983 claims of

excessive force, false arrest, false imprisonment and filing a false report based upon

a supervisory liability theory. As stated above, all Defendants have been granted

22

summary judgment on Mr. Haigler’s claim of filing a false report. Thus, the

remaining supervisory claims against Chief Murphy relate to the Fourth Amendment

 “To establish a federal malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must 21

prove a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures [and] the

elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution.” Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 881

(11th Cir. 2003) (emphasis omitted). Under Alabama law, the following are required to make a

claim of malicious prosecution: “(1) that a prior judicial proceeding was instituted by the present

defendant, (2) that in the prior proceeding the present defendant acted without probable cause

and with malice, (3) that the prior proceeding ended in favor of the present plaintiff, and (4) that

the present plaintiff was damaged as a result of the prior proceeding.” Delchamps, Inc., 738 So.

2d at 831–32.

 Plaintiffs’ counsel argued at the pretrial hearing held October 19, 2011, that Mr. 21

Haigler was acquitted of the unlawful possession of marijuana charge. Because no evidence of

this acquittal was submitted, it cannot be considered. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

 On these facts, there can be no liability solely on the underlying alleged constitutional 22

violations because there is no evidence of personal involvement by Chief Murphy, as discussed

below.

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violations for excessive force, false arrest, and false imprisonment. See Gish v.

Thomas, 516 F.3d 952, 955 (11th Cir. 2008) (“There can be no supervisory liability

. . . if there was no underlying constitutional violation . . . .”).

The law is well settled that a defendant cannot be held liable in an action

brought pursuant to § 1983 under a theory of respondeat superior or on the basis of

vicarious liability. Gray v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006); Belcher v.

City of Foley, 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11th Cir. 1994); Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d

667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990); Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986). 

The language of § 1983 requires proof of an affirmative causal connection between

the actions taken by a defendant and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Zatler,

802 F.2d at 401.

Although supervisory officials cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the

unconstitutional actions of their subordinates based on respondeat superior liability,

Gray, 458 F.3d at 1308, supervisors can be held liable for subordinates’ constitutional

violations on the basis of supervisory liability under § 1983. Cottone v. Jenne, 326

F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003). Supervisory liability under § 1983 occurs “either

when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct

or when there is a causal connection between the actions of the supervising official

and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Id. A causal connection may be

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established when:(1) a “history of widespread abuse” putsthe responsible supervisor

on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he or she fails to do so;

(2) a supervisor’s custom or policy results in deliberate indifference to constitutional

rights; or (3) facts support an inference that the supervisor directed subordinates to

act unlawfully or knew thatsubordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them

from doing so. Mathews v. Crosby, 480 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007); Cottone,

326 F.3d at 1360. Deprivations that constitute widespread abuse sufficient to

constitute notice to the supervising official must be “obvious, flagrant, rampant and

of continued duration, rather than isolated occurrences.” Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.

2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990).

Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that Chief Murphy participated

personally in any of the events surrounding the August 7, 2010 incident. Thus, in

order to survive summary judgment, Plaintiffs must have provided evidence of a

causal connection. Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence that Chief Murphy had

a custom or policy that resulted in deliberate indifference. In fact, Chief Murphy was

not the Chief of Police when these incidents occurred but was the Deputy Chief of

Police. (Pls.’ Am. Compl. 10–11 (Doc. # 30).) Additionally, Plaintiffs have not

presented any evidence that would support an inference that Chief Murphy, in his

former position as deputy chief, directed Cpls. Morris and Mashburn to act the way

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they did or that Chief Murphy knew that Cpls. Morris and Mashburn would act

unlawfully. Plaintiffs have submitted affidavits stating that Chief Murphy told Mrs.

Smith in a meeting that many of the young officers “have no real life experiences, and

. . . sometimes are not prepared to deal with many of the emotions, attitudes, and

behaviors they face from the public on a daily basis.” (Mays Aff. ¶ 3.) Chief Murphy

went on to say that changing the officers’ shirt colors and uniforms may help diffuse

situations and that he is focusing on this as the new chief of police. (Mays Aff. ¶ 3.) 

However, these comments came after the incident, when Chief Murphy had become

Montgomery’s Chief of Police. These comments do not show that Chief Murphy

knew Cpls Morris and Mashburn would act unlawfully. 

Plaintiffs argue that there is a “widespread pattern of police abuse and

misconduct in Montgomery, Alabama [that] has been fostered and, thus, sanctioned

by [Chief Murphy].” (Pls.’ Am. Compl. 17.) Plaintiffs point to three newspaper

articles detailing misconduct byMontgomerypolice officers. Assuming these articles

would be admissible and are acceptable means of providing notice to Chief Murphy,

which is dubious at best, they are not enough to show a history of widespread abuse. 23

 Newspaper articles generally are considered hearsay under Rule 801(c) when offered

23

for the truth of the matter asserted. See United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1211 (11th Cir.

2005) (“The Miami Herald articles are . . . inadmissible hearsay, as they are relevant primarily to

establish the truth of their contents – the identity of the gunmen.”). Indeed, statements in

newspapers often present hearsay within hearsay problems. Id. at 1211 n.23 (“[T]he articles are

likely a reporter’s account of what eyewitnesses reported; in other words, double hearsay

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Two of the articles were published in October 2010, more than two months after the

date of the incident at issue. Another article reportsthat a Montgomery police officer

was caught pulling over cars and stealing possessions inside. This article would not

put Chief Murphy on notice that there was a problem of excessive force within the

police department. 

Because Plaintiffs cannot show that Chief Murphy personally participated in

or otherwise caused the constitutional deprivations to Mr. Haigler and Mrs. Smith,

summary judgment is due to be granted on all claims against Chief Murphy.

D. City of Montgomery

Plaintiffs assert the same claims against the City as they do against Chief

Murphy. For similar reasons granting summary judgment on all claims against Chief

Murphy, summary judgment is due to be granted on all claims against the City.

1. Municipal Liability

It is well established that a municipality cannot be held liable for a § 1983

violation based upon the theory of respondeat superior; it must have itself caused the

constitutional violation at issue. Skop, 485 F.3d at 1145 (citing Monell v. Dep’t of

Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978)). Thus, Mrs. Smith and Mr. Haigler can

forbidden by Rule 805.”). And, “[t]he general rule is that inadmissible hearsay ‘cannot be

considered on a motion for summary judgment.’” Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th

Cir. 1999) (citation and internal footnote omitted). 

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only succeed on their § 1983 claims against the City of Montgomery by showing: 

“(1) that his constitutionalrights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom

or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3)

that the policy or custom caused the violation.” McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283,

1289 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). 

The Eleventh Circuit has “emphasized that, to establish a policy or custom, ‘it is

generally necessary to show a persistent and wide-spread practice.’” Turner v. Jones,

415 F. App’x 196, 202 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (quoting Depew v. City of St.

Marys, 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986)).

Here, Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that the City of Montgomery itself

caused Mrs. Smith’s and Mrs. Haigler’s constitutional deprivations due to excessive

force, false arrest and false imprisonment. These claims against the City are founded

on the basis of respondeat superior, which cannot be a basis for establishing liability

on the city. See Skop, 485 F.3d at 1145. In addition, Plaintiffs have not identified

any policy or custom promoted by the City that would have caused these violations. 

Thus, the City is due to be granted summary judgment on these claims.

2. Failure to Supervise (Count D)

A plaintiff may prove that a failure to supervise is a city policy by

demonstrating that the city’s failure “evidenced a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the

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rights of its inhabitants.” Gold, 151 F.3d at 1350. Deliberate indifference requires

proof that “the municipality knew of a need to train and/or supervise in a particular

area and the municipality made a deliberate choice not to take any action.” Id.

“[W]ithout notice of a need to train or supervise in a particular area, a municipality

is not liable as a matter of law for any failure to train and supervise.” Id. at 1351.

As stated above, Plaintiffs have not submitted any evidence that would put the

City on notice of a need to supervise the Jump Street team. Assuming, for argument

only, that the newspaper articles would be admissible, the three newspaper articles

alone are not enough “to show a persistent and widespread practice.” There is no

evidence that the City was aware that this unit had engaged in previous similar

patterns of abuse. 

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. # 40) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as

follows:

1. Summary judgment is GRANTED on (1) all claims against Mayor

Strange, (2) the § 1985(2) claims against all Defendants, (3) the §

1985(3) claims against all Defendants, (4) the fraud claims under

Alabama law against all Defendants, (5) Mrs. Smith’s § 1983 Fourth

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Amendment excessive force claimagainst Cpl. Morris, (6) Mr. Haigler’s

§ 1983 false report claims against all Defendants, and (7) all claims

against Chief Murphy, and (8) all claims against the City of

Montgomery.

2. Summary judgment is DENIED with respect to (1) Mrs. Smith’s § 1983

Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against Cpl. Mashburn, (2)

Mr. Haigler’s § 1983 Fourth Amendment excessive force claims against

Cpls. Mashburn and Morris for force used after his arrest, and (3) Mr.

Haigler’s § 1983 Fourth Amendment false arrest/false imprisonment

claims against Cpls. Mashburn and Morris.

DONE this 2nd day of November, 2011.

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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