Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01876/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01876-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MICHAEL T. PINES, 

Plaintiff,

vs. 

DIRECTOR OF ATASCADERO STATE 

HOSPITAL, et al., 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 3:18-cv-01876-MMA-JLB 

ORDER: (1) GRANTING 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO 

PROCEED IFP; (2) DISMISSING 

PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO 

STATE A CLAIM, AS FRIVOLOUS, 

AND FOR SEEKING MONEY 

DAMAGES AGAINST IMMUNE 

DEFENDANTS; AND (3) DENYING 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

EXPEDITED RULINGS, 

APPLICATION FOR ORDERS, AND 

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF 

COUNSEL 

On June 27, 2018, Plaintiff Michael T. Pines, proceeding pro se, and while civilly 

detained at Atascadero State Hospital in Atascadero, California, filed this civil action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Northern District of California. See Doc. No. 1. 

Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead he has 

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filed multiple Motions to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§1915(a), see Doc. Nos. 6, 14, 20, along with motions for immediate and preliminary 

injunctive relief. See Doc. Nos. 2, 3, 7. 

United States District Judge Susan Illston denied Plaintiff’s motions for injunctive 

relief. See Doc. No. 9. On July 26, 2018, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint 

(“FAC”). See Doc. No. 10. Thereafter, Judge Illston issued an “Order of Partial 

Dismissal and Transfer” on August 8, 2018. See Doc No. 22. In this Order, Judge Illston 

dismissed Defendants State Bar of California and Kamala Harris with prejudice, denied 

Plaintiff’s motion of reconsideration of the order denying his request for immediate 

injunctive relief as frivolous, and transferred the matter to the Southern District of 

California. Id. at 8. 

 On August 7, 2018, the Court received and docketed correspondence from the 

“Officer of the District Attorney for the County of San Diego,” dated July 31, 2018, that 

included a copy of a plea agreement between Plaintiff and the San Diego County District 

Attorney’s Office. See Doc. No. 21. The Court took judicial notice of the plea 

agreement, and a provision contained therein purportedly agreed to by Plaintiff which 

states that Plaintiff “may not and will not initiate any civil actions of any kind, as an in 

propria persona or as a pro se litigant in any state or federal court located within the 

State of California without the express prior approval of the presiding judge of the Court 

in which the contemplated action would be filed.” See Doc. No. 21 at 6. In addition, the 

terms of the plea agreement reflect that Plaintiff agreed “to dismiss and/or withdraw from 

every state or federal civil action of which he is a complainant and which he filed or 

joined the action as an in propria persona or as a pro se plaintiff-litigant, without express 

prior approval of the presiding judge of the Court in which the contemplated action 

would be filed.” Id. In light of the terms set forth in the plea agreement, the Court 

ordered Plaintiff to show cause why the case should not be dismissed, as it appeared that 

Plaintiff did not seek permission to file this action with the Presiding Judge of either the 

Northern District of California or the Southern District of California. See Doc. No. 35. 

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 On September 6, 2018, Plaintiff filed his response to the Court’s Order and 

subsequently filed a declaration in support of his response. See Doc. Nos. 35, 36. In 

these documents, Plaintiff claims he does not recall this plea agreement and “such 

conditions of plea bargains are improper and void.” Doc. No. 35 at 1. For the reasons set 

forth below, the Court finds that the entire action should be dismissed pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Accordingly, the Court need not resolve the enforceability of the 

pre-filing condition set forth in Plaintiff’s plea agreement. However, the Court notes that 

any further actions may ultimately be barred if Plaintiff fails to comply with the express 

conditions of his plea agreement. 

I. Motion to Proceed IFP 

 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he or she is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). 

However, “[u]nlike other indigent litigants, prisoners proceeding IFP must pay the 

full amount of filing fees in civil actions and appeals pursuant to the PLRA [Prison 

Litigation Reform Act].” Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 886 (9th Cir. 2002). As 

defined by the PLRA, a “prisoner” is “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility 

who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations 

of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or 

diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). 

A “civil detainee” on the other hand, is not a “prisoner” within the meaning of the 

PLRA. Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir 2005); Agyeman, 296 F.3d at 886 

(holding that INS detainee not also facing criminal charges is not a “prisoner” under § 

1915); Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000) (person confined under 

California’s Sexually Violent Predator Law, while a “a ‘prisoner’ within the meaning of 

the PLRA when he served time for his conviction, ... ceased being a ‘prisoner’ when he 

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was released from the custody of the Department of Corrections.”). 

 Because Plaintiff is currently committed at Atascadero, and was not a “prisoner” as 

defined by the PLRA when he filed this action, the filing fee provisions of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b) do not apply to this case. Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1122. Therefore, the Court has 

reviewed Plaintiff’s affidavit of assets, just as it would for any other non-prisoner litigant 

seeking IFP status, finds it is sufficient to show that he is unable to pay the fees or post 

securities required to maintain this action, and GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed 

IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Doc. No. 34; S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2(d). 

II. Request for Counsel 

Plaintiff seeks appointment of counsel to assist him in this matter. See Doc. No. 

41. However, there is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. Lassiter v. Dept. 

of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). While under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), district 

courts have some limited discretion to “request” that an attorney represent an indigent 

civil litigant, Agyeman v. Corr. Corp. of America, 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004), 

this discretion is rarely exercised and only under “exceptional circumstances.” Id.; see 

also Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). A finding of exceptional 

circumstances requires “an evaluation of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the 

merits and an evaluation of the plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims ‘in light of the 

complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103 (quoting Wilborn 

v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

The pleadings filed by Plaintiff to date demonstrate he is capable of legibly 

articulating the facts and circumstances relevant to his claims, which are typical, 

straightforward, and not legally “complex.” Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103. Therefore, 

neither the interests of justice nor any exceptional circumstances warrant the appointment 

of counsel in this case at this time. LaMere v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); 

Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017. 

/// 

/// 

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III. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

 A. Standard of Review 

 A complaint filed by any person proceeding IFP is subject to sua sponte dismissal 

if the complaint is “frivolous, malicious, fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted, or seek[s] monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per 

curiam) (holding that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to 

prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 

1915(e) not only permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis 

complaint that fails to state a claim.”). 

 All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining 

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a context-specific task that 

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.

The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. 

Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that 

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). 

 However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, 

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 

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petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not 

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of 

Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

 B. Plaintiff’s FAC 

 As Judge Illston stated in her August 8, 2018 Order “Pines’ [FAC] covers a wide 

range of problems he has encountered over the last decade” and contains “more than 

thirty defendants.” See Doc. No. 22 at 1. The Court addresses Plaintiff’s remaining 

claims in turn. 

 1. Plaintiff’s Bankruptcy Claims

 Plaintiff alleges he filed for bankruptcy in San Diego in January of 2010. See FAC 

at 2. Plaintiff contends that the “U.S. Trustee and her attorneys, private trustees and her 

attorneys, the Judge, and Lisa DeBenedittis and attorney Christina McLaughlin engaged 

in a criminal conspiracy and committed crimes against Plaintiff.” Id.

 Plaintiff has already filed these identical claims against these identical defendants 

in 2011. See Pines v. McLaughlin, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:11-cv-00474-WQHJMA. A court “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without 

the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at 

issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. 

Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)). A plaintiff’s complaint is 

considered frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) [formerly § 1915(d)] if it 

“merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims.” Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 

1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (construing former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)) (citations 

omitted). 

 Because Plaintiff’s current bankruptcy-related claims are identical to the claims he 

made against the same individuals in the 2011 action, the Court DISMISSES the claims 

as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 

/// 

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 2. Prosecutorial Immunity 

 Plaintiff names the District Attorney for “San Diego, Orange County, and Los 

Angeles” as Defendants, and alleges that their “acts in prosecuting Plaintiff were 

knowing, intentional and done with malice and in conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s 

rights.” See FAC at 8. To the extent that Plaintiff seeks “punitive damages” against 

these Defendants, these claims must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 

because these Defendants are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. See Van de 

Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341 (2009) (state prosecutors are entitled to absolute 

prosecutorial immunity for acts taken in their official capacity); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 

U.S. 409, 427, 430-31 (1976) (holding prosecutors absolutely immune from civil suits for 

damages under § 1983 for initiating criminal prosecutions and presenting cases); Olsen v. 

Idaho State Bd. of Medicine, 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Absolute immunity is 

generally accorded to judges and prosecutors functioning in their official capacities.”). 

 3. Excessive Force and Inadequate Medical Care Claims 

 Plaintiff alleges that “during one of [his] arrests,” an unnamed Sheriff Deputy 

“immediately threw Plaintiff to the ground breaking” his collar bone. See FAC at 9. 

Plaintiff claims he was “taken to Scripps Encinitas Hospital.” Id. 

 Plaintiff acknowledges that he has been incarcerated since 2011. See Doc. No. 27 

at 2. Plaintiff did not file this action until June 2018. See Doc. No. 1. Therefore, since 

these incidents were alleged to have occurred prior to his incarceration, these claims 

arose at least seven years ago. “A claim may be dismissed [for failing to state a claim] on 

the ground that it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations only when ‘the running 

of the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint.’” Von Saher v. Norton Simon 

Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Huynh v. Chase 

Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 997 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

 Section 1983 contains no specific statute of limitation; therefore, federal courts 

apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Jones v. Blanas, 

393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004); Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 

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2004); Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1999). Before 2003, California’s

statute of limitations was one year. Jones, 393 F.3d at 927. Effective January 1, 2003, 

the limitations period was extended to two. Id. (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 335.1). 

The law of the forum state also governs tolling. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 394 

(2007) (citing Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 538-39 (1989)); Jones, 393 F.3d at 927 

(where the federal court borrows the state statute of limitation, the federal court also 

borrows all applicable provisions for tolling the limitations period found in state law). 

 Under California law, the statute of limitations for prisoners serving less than a life 

sentence is tolled for an additional two years. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 352.1(a); Johnson 

v. California, 207 F.3d 650, 654 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds, 543 U.S. 

499 (2005). Accordingly, the effective statute of limitations for most California prisoners 

is three years for claims accruing before January 1, 2003 (one year limitations period plus 

two year statutory tolling), and four years for claims accruing thereafter (two year 

limitations period plus two years statutory tolling). 

 Unlike the length of the limitations period, however, “the accrual date of a § 1983 

cause of action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.” 

Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388; Hardin, 490 U.S. at 543-44 (federal law governs when a 

§ 1983 cause of action accrues). “Under the traditional rule of accrual ... the tort cause of 

action accrues, and the statute of limitation begins to run, when the wrongful act or 

omission results in damages.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 391. Put another way, “[u]nder 

federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury 

which is the basis of the action.” Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 955; TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 

F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 In this case, the “wrongful acts” alleged to have been taken against Plaintiff 

occurred more than seven years before he filed this action on June 27, 2018, and thus, are 

outside California’s statute of limitations – even if the Court presumes Plaintiff is entitled 

to two years of statutory tolling pursuant to CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 352.1(a). Wallace, 

591 U.S. at 391; see also Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 955; CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 335.1 

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(tolling statute of limitations “for a maximum of 2 years” during a prisoner’s 

incarceration). 

 Plaintiff’s claims could be considered timely if he alleged facts sufficient to show 

the limitations period may be equitably tolled. See Cervantes, 5 F.3d at 1276-77. 

Generally, federal courts also apply the forum state’s law regarding equitable tolling. 

Fink, 192 F.3d at 914; Bacon v. City of Los Angeles, 843 F.2d 372, 374 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Under California law, however, Plaintiff must meet three conditions to equitably toll the 

statute of limitations: (1) he must have diligently pursued his claim; (2) his situation must 

be the product of forces beyond his control; and (3) Defendants must not be prejudiced 

by the application of equitable tolling. See Hull v. Central Pathology Serv. Med. Clinic, 

28 Cal. App. 4th 1328, 1335 (1994); Addison v. State of California, 21 Cal. 3d 313, 316-

17 (1978); Fink, 192 F.3d at 916. 

 As currently pleaded, however, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to plead any 

facts which, if proved, would support any plausible claim for equitable tolling. See 

Cervantes, 5 F.3d at 1277; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A review of the PACER system shows 

that Plaintiff has filed over twenty civil actions since 2011, none of which raise these 

claims, and thus, he cannot demonstrate that he “diligently pursued” the claims.1

 

Accordingly, the Court finds that because it is clear from the face of Plaintiff’s FAC that 

his claims against Defendant San Diego Sheriff and Scripps Encinitas Hospital are barred 

by the statute of limitations, those claims are subject to sua sponte dismissal for failing to 

state a claim upon which section 1983 relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 

 4. Heck Bar 

 Plaintiff claims that several Defendants, the U.S. Bankruptcy Trustee, the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), and various other individuals acted with “malice and 

conscious disregard” for his “rights,” which led to his incarceration. FAC at 11-13. 

                                               

1 See PACER case locator https://pcl.uscourts.gov/pcl/pages/welcome.jsf (website last visited October 3, 

2018.) 

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Plaintiff also alleges that he has been confined past the date of his release date. See FAC 

at 17. 

 Claims challenging the validity of a person’s continued incarceration, including the 

fact or length of the custody, are within the “heart of habeas corpus” and are cognizable 

only in federal habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-99 & n.14 

(1973). In contrast, a civil rights action, typically brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

is the proper method for challenging unconstitutional conditions of confinement, but not 

the fact or length of custody. See McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1991); 

Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499. 

 To the extent Plaintiff seeks damages based on his allegedly wrongful commitment 

and sentence, he may not do so in a § 1983 suit before successfully invalidating his 

criminal conviction and sentence either by way of direct appeal or the issuance of a state 

or federal writ of habeas corpus: 

[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or 

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by action whose unlawfulness 

would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove 

that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged 

by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make 

such a determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of 

a writ of habeas corpus, 22 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 

850, 856 (9th Cir. 2003); Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489-99 (holding that a writ of habeas 

corpus is “explicitly and historically designed” to provide a state prisoner with the 

“exclusive” means to “attack the validity of his confinement” in federal court); see also 

Rodgers v. Superior Court of San Diego, No. 3:16-CV-02864-BEN-JMA, 2017 WL 

890469, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2017) (sua sponte dismissing § 1983 suit filed by patient 

committed to Atascadero State Hospital based on Heck’s favorable termination doctrine 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).).

/// 

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 5. Claims arising at Atascadero State Hospital 

 Plaintiff raises several claims arising while housed at Atascadero. See FAC at 17-

20. First, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Plaintiff has already raised these 

claims in a separate action in the Central District of California. See Pines v. Director of 

Atascadero State Hospital, et al., C.D. Civil Case No. 2:18-cv-06854-RGK-MRW. 

Therefore, the Court must dismiss these claims as duplicative, and therefore frivolous, 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Moreover, the Southern District of California is not 

the proper venue for claims that arose at Atascadero because the hospital is not located in 

San Diego County or Imperial County. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (A “civil action may be 

brought in – (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are 

residents of the State in which the district is located; [or] (2) a judicial district in which a 

substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a 

substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated[.]”). 

IV. Conclusion 

Based on the foregoing, the Court: 

 1) GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (Doc. No. 34); 

2) DENIES Plaintiff’s Request for Counsel (Doc. No. 41); 

 3) DISMISSES Plaintiff’s FAC sua sponte as frivolous, for failing to state a 

claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted, and for seeking monetary damages 

against immune defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 

 4) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for “Request for Expedited Rulings” and 

Motion for “Application for Orders” (Doc Nos. 30, 32) as moot; 

 5) DENIES leave to amend as futile, see Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127; Schmier v. 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 279 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(recognizing “[f]utility of amendment” as a proper basis for dismissal without leave to 

amend); 

/// 

/// 

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 6) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal of this dismissal would not be taken in good 

faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); and 

 7) DIRECTS the Clerk to enter a final judgment and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE: October 9, 2018 _______________________________________

 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 

 United States District Judge 

 

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