Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-05045/USCOURTS-ca10-15-05045-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 TENTH CIRCUIT

ELBERT KIRBY, JR.; CALEB 

MEADOWS,

 Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

DAVID M. O’DENS,

 Defendant - Appellee.

No. 15-5045

 (D.C. No. 4:15-CV-00156-GKF-FHM) 

(N.D. Oklahoma)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, HARTZ and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

 

Elbert Kirby Jr. and Caleb Meadows (Appellants), proceeding in forma pauperis, 

sued David O’Dens for defamation, slander, and libel in the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Oklahoma. The district court dismissed the action sua sponte 

 

*

 After examining the brief and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously 

that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See 

Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted 

without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under 

the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited 

for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

October 13, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be 

granted. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the dismissal. 

“We review de novo the district court’s decision to dismiss an IFP complaint 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim.” Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 

1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). Appellants premise their complaint on a statement made by 

Mr. O’Dens while litigating an earlier case in the same federal district court. Their 

complaint, however, does not describe the circumstances of Mr. O’Dens’s statement, 

alleging only that he “published a public document viewable to the public quoting the 

Plaintiffs were ‘control[ling] the state court judge,’ by the FDCPA action which was filed 

by the Plaintiffs in this federal court.” Verified Compl. at 2, Kirby v. O’Dens, No. 4:15-

cv-00156-GKF-FHM (N.D. Okla. Apr. 1, 2015). In evaluating the sufficiency of the 

complaint, we exercise our discretion to take judicial notice of publicly filed records in 

that earlier case, Kirby v. O’Dens, No. 14-CV-388-JHP-PJC (N.D. Okla. 2015). See Gee 

v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1186 (10th Cir. 2010) (“matters of which a court may take 

judicial notice” may be used in deciding whether to dismiss for failure to state a claim 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). 

The prior litigation alleged violations of federal consumer-protection laws arising 

out of state-court foreclosure proceedings against property owned by Kirby and tenanted 

by Meadows. Appellants had moved to compel discovery responses. In his response to 

the motion, Mr. O’Dens wrote: “[T]he gravamen of [Appellants’] complaint is based 

upon what they perceive as incorrect rulings by [the state judge] in the state court 

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collection action. As expressed by Kirby at the scheduling conference, this action was 

brought to ‘control the state court judge.’” Resp. to Mot. to Compel at 6, Kirby, No. 14-

CV-388-JHP-PJC, (N.D. Okla. Feb. 20, 2015). Appellants claim that Mr. O’Dens’s 

statement about controlling the state judge was “libelous on its face” and “clearly exposes 

the [Appellants] to hatred, contempt, ridicule and obloquy because it accuses the 

[Appellants] of saying something behind someone’s . . . back out of spite.” Verified 

Compl. at 2‒3, Kirby, No. 4:15-cv-00156-GKF-FHM. 

Appellants’ claim fails because the allegedly libelous statement was privileged. 

“Oklahoma has long recognized that attorneys, parties and witnesses are immune from 

defamation and certain other suits where those suits are based upon communications 

made during or preliminary to judicial proceedings as long as the communication is in 

some way relevant to the proceeding.” State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Dobbs, 94 P.3d 

31, 45 (Okla. 2004). The statement in Mr. O’Dens’s response to Appellants’ motion to 

compel satisfies these conditions. It was made during a judicial proceeding. And it was 

relevant because it concerned the factual background of Appellants’ complaint. The 

purpose of the statement was apparently to strengthen the argument that the motion to 

compel was meritless by pointing out that the claim itself was frivolous. There is ample 

authority for Mr. O’Dens’s effort. In Munoz v. St. Mary-Corwin Hosp., 221 F.3d 1160, 

1169 (10th Cir. 2000), we upheld the denial of a motion to compel because the action was 

brought “without any factual basis evincing specific misconduct by the defendants” and 

the plaintiff’s discovery requests were a “fishing expedition” based “upon conclusory 

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allegations in the hope of finding the necessary evidence of misconduct.” And the 

federal rules permit a district court to forbid discovery “to protect a party . . . from 

annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(c)(1). Mr. O’Dens’s statement is therefore absolutely privileged because it was made 

during a judicial proceeding and was relevant to that proceeding. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

 Harris L Hartz 

Circuit Judge 

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