Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00794/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00794-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROSALINDA GARCIA, individually

and as a successor in interest

to Decedent ANTONIA GARCIA, JR.;

THE ESTATE OF ANTONIO GARCIA,

JR.,

 Plaintiffs,

 v. 

COUNTY OF FRESNO, FRESNO COUNTY

SHERIFF RICHARD PIERCE, and DOES

1 through 100, inclusive, 

 Defendants.

1:05-CV-0794 OWW SMS

ORDER GRANTING, IN PART, AND

DENYING, IN PART,

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS, AND GRANTING, IN

PART, AND DENYING, IN PART,

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR MORE

DEFINITE STATEMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Rosalinda Garcia and the Estate of Antonio

Garcia, Jr., bring this action pursuant to Title 42, Section 

1983, of the United States Code, alleging violation of their

federal civil rights. Plaintiffs also bring an action for

wrongful death and causes of action relating to alleged

violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act and other causes of

action under the laws of the State of California. Plaintiffs’

claims are based upon the March 20, 2004, fatal shooting of

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decedent Antonio Garcia, Jr., allegedly by Fresno County

Sheriff’s Deputies Eric Broughton and Carlin Williams. 

The Defendants move to dismiss for failure to state a claim,

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), F.R.Civ.P., and for more definite

statement, pursuant to Rule 12(e), F.R.Civ.P. The Plaintiffs

oppose the former in its entirety. The Plaintiffs oppose the

latter with regard to the First and Fifth Causes of Action, but

request leave to amend their Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth,

Seventh, and Eighth Causes of Action. 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

The Plaintiffs originally filed the complaint in Fresno

County Superior Court on May 13, 2005, Case Number 05 CE CG 01473

MWS. On June 17, 2005, the Defendants filed notice of removal to

federal court pursuant to Title 28, Section 1441(b), of the

United States Code. 

III. BACKGROUND

The Plaintiffs assert eight causes of action. In the First

Cause of Action, based on Section 1983, the Plaintiffs sue

Sheriff Richard Pierce (hereinafter, “Pierce”), in both his

official and individual capacities; “Doe One” and “Doe Two,” the

deputies who allegedly shot the decedent to death, and whom

Plaintiffs have identified in their Opposition to Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss (hereinafter, “the Opposition”) as Eric

Broughton and Carlin Williams (hereinafter, “the Officers”); and

the County of Fresno (hereinafter, “the County”) (hereinafter,

collectively, “the Defendants”). 

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The Plaintiffs allege that the Officers maliciously and

intentionally used excessive force against the decedent,

resulting in his death. The Plaintiffs further allege that the

Defendants failed to provide adequate training and supervision in

the lawful use of force, a failure which amounted to deliberate

indifference to the safety and lives of County citizens, and

which was the proximate cause of the decedent’s death. They

allege that the Defendants created and fostered within the

Department an “atmosphere of lawlessness,” in which officers were

led to believe that the use of excessive force would be condoned

by their superiors, and that this atmosphere led to the

decedent’s death. They claim that the Defendants carried out a

policy or custom that presumed that all Mexican males were

violent, and had to be approached with the intent to subdue them. 

They further allege that the decedent’s due process rights were

violated when he was unlawfully killed. 

Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of Action is for violation of the

decedent’s rights enumerated in Article 1, Section 1 of the

California Constitution, invasion of privacy and deprivations of

life and liberty. 

Plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action is against the officers

for assault and battery.

The Fourth Cause of Action alleges that the Defendants

violated the decedent’s civil rights under California Civil Code

Section 51.7.

The Fifth Cause of Action is for wrongful death and a

survival action arising out of the events of March 20, 2004. 

The Sixth and Seventh Causes of Action allege intentional

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and negligent infliction of emotional distress, respectively. 

The Eighth Cause of Action alleges negligence on the part of

the Defendants which resulted in the death of the decedent. 

IV. LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs do not oppose the motions as to and request leave

to amend their Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth

Causes of Action. The analysis focuses on the First and Fifth

Causes of Action. 

1. The First Cause of Action: 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A. Sheriff Pierce

The Defendants move to dismiss the First Cause of Action

against the Sheriff on the grounds that he is subject to suit

neither in his official nor in his individual capacity. 

The Defendants state that Pierce can only be sued in his

individual capacity on proof of some “direct and personal

participation in the incident in question.” Dismiss Mot. at 3

(citing Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645-46 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

Plaintiffs do not allege any fact from which it could be inferred

that Pierce personally took part in, had knowledge of, or

ratified the events which directly led to the decedent’s death. 

Menotti v. City of Seattle, outlines the rule:

[s]upervisory liability is imposed against a supervisory

official in his individual capacity for his own culpable

action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control

of his subordinates, for his acquiescence in the

constitutional deprivations of which the complaint is made,

or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous

indifference to the rights of others.

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Menotti, 409 F.3d 1113, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). 

Plaintiffs’ factual allegations against Pierce include none

of these prerequisites to supervisor liability. The motion to

dismiss the first claim must be granted, with leave to amend. 

The Defendants further claim qualified immunity for Pierce. 

Qualified immunity which entails a fact-intensive analysis of the

government actor’s conduct cannot be decided if factual or

credibility disputes exist. The legal conclusion of alleged

immunity is not sufficient to defeat the allegations of a wellpleaded complaint which must be accepted as true on a motion to

dismiss. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Government officials performing discretionary functions

generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar

as their conduct does not violate clearly-established statutory

or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (emphasis

added). Qualified immunity shields officials from civil damages

as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought

consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated. 

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (emphasis added). 

The threshold question which a court must consider when it

is required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue is whether

the facts alleged, when taken in the light most favorable to the

party asserting the injury, show the officer’s conduct violated a

constitutional right. 

If no constitutional right would have been violated were the

allegations established, there is no necessity for further

inquiries concerning qualified immunity. On the other hand,

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if a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the

parties' submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask

whether the right was clearly established. This inquiry

. . . must be undertaken in light of the specific context of

the case, not as a broad general proposition; and it too

serves to advance understanding of the law and to allow

officers to avoid the burden of trial if qualified immunity

is applicable. . . . The relevant, dispositive inquiry in

determining whether a right is clearly established is

whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his

conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. 

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-202 (2001). 

The reasonableness requirement of the qualified-immunity

rule presents a fact-intensive inquiry if plaintiffs can state a

claim. Plaintiffs must allege the Sheriff’s personal knowledge

and ratification or participation in establishing a policy of

deficient training. 

A suit against Pierce in his official capacity, under

McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997), is in effect a

suit against the pubic entity. See Luke v. Abbott, 954 F.Supp.

202, 203-204 (9th Cir. 1997). Whether Pierce is a state official

for purposes of Eleventh-Amendment immunity depends on state law,

and Venegas v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal.4th 820 (2004). 

There, the California Supreme Court held that sheriffs, like

Pierce, are state officials for such purposes. See Dismiss Mot.

at 6. Plaintiffs concede that Pierce in his official capacity is

a redundant defendant with the County, Luke, and acquiesce in his

dismissal in his official capacity only. Opp. at 2. The motion

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to dismiss the official capacity claim against Pierce is GRANTED. 

B. The County of Fresno

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim

against the County should be dismissed on the grounds that the

Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to state a claim. Specifically,

Plaintiffs do not allege what unlawful acts or

practices [the County] supervisors knew of, or should

have known of, prior to the death of the decedent. 

Plaintiffs do not allege what actions [the County]

failed to adequately supervise or discipline or any

facts to support their position that [the County]

carried out an official policy that presumed all

Mexican males are violent and should be approached with

the intent of subduing them. Plaintiffs also fail to

provide any facts that establish [the County] knew, or

acted with reckless disregard, or acted willfully and

maliciously, so as to display a conscious indifference

to the danger of harm and injury to any citizen. 

Plaintiffs have offered insufficient facts that the

training and supervision of [the County’s] Sheriff’s

Deputies was inadequate. 

Dismiss Mot. at 7.

In an opinion cited by neither side, however, the Ninth

Circuit, following United States Supreme Court authority,

rejected, in the context of a 12(b)(6) motion, the imposition of

a heightened pleading standard for Section 1983 suits, except as

otherwise required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Empress LLC v. City and County of San Francisco, 419 F.3d 1052,

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1055-56 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The County may be held liable under Section 1983 for the

violations alleged only if the officers' conduct was a product of

County policy or custom. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436

U.S. 658, 691-694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). 

"Liability may attach to a municipality only where the

municipality itself causes the constitutional violation through

'execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by

its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said

to represent official policy.' " Ulrich v. City and County of

San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Monell,

436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018) (a county is subject to Monell

under Section 1983). A municipal "policy" exists when "a

deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among

various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for

establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in

question." Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483, 106

S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) (plurality opinion); Fairley v.

Luman, 281 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir.2002) (per curiam).

There are three ways to establish a policy or custom of

public entity: (1) by showing a longstanding practice or custom

which constitutes the “standard operating procedure” of the local

government entity; (2) by showing that the decision-making

official was, as a matter of state law, a final policymaking

authority whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent

official policy in the area of decision; or (3) by showing that

an official with final policymaking authority either delegated

that authority to, or ratified the decision of, a subordinate. 

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The Ninth Circuit has held that a municipal policy may be

inferred from widespread practices or evidence of repeated

constitutional violations for which the errant municipal officers

were not discharged or reprimanded. Menotti, 409 F.3d at 1147

(9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Plaintiffs allege that the County failed to train and

supervise their officers, including a failure to properly train

them in the use of force, and that this failure resulted in

decedent’s death. In City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378

(1989), the Court indicated that lack of instruction in the use

of deadly force could constitute “deliberate indifference,”

sufficient to establish a policy of inadequate training or

supervision. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 387; Bd. of Cty.

Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409-10 (1997); Erwin Chemerinsky,

Federal Jurisdiction § 8.5.2, pp. 499-502 (Aspen, 4th ed. 2003).

Plaintiffs further allege that the County created, or

participated in the creation of, an “atmosphere of lawlessness,”

resulting more or less proximately in the death of the decedent. 

The phrase “atmosphere of lawlessness” has been interpreted as

sufficient to mean “both [] the existence of general policies and

practices within the” defendant police department “which led to

the violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights,” and

“acceptance or support of these policies” by the supervisors. 

Norton v. McKeon, 444 F.Supp. 384, 388 (E.D.Pa. 1977). 

Plaintiffs’ allegation of a “policy” which presumed all

Mexican males to be pre-disposed to violence is directly

cognizable as a “policy or custom.”

Under notice-pleading requirements, the Monell allegations

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are sufficient to enable Defendants to frame a response.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the County is DENIED under Monell.

The First Cause of Action, however, is dismissed on other

grounds. 

2. The Second Cause of Action: Deprivation of Rights Guaranteed

by the California Constitution, Article 1, Section 1

Plaintiffs allege that the County, Pierce, and the Sheriff’s

Deputies deprived the decedent of his rights to life and liberty

under Article 1, Section 1, of the California Constitution:

All people are by nature free and independent and have

inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending

life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting

property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and

privacy.

Cal. Const., Art. 1, § 1. 

The Plaintiffs, however, have failed to cite authority that

this constitutional provision supports a private cause of action

for damages. Although the Plaintiffs also allege an invasion of

the right of privacy, for which Article 1, Section 1, has been

interpreted to provide such a remedy, see, e.g., Urbaniak v.

Newton, 226 Cal.App.3d 1128, 1136 (1991), a meaningful reading of

the complaint indicates that the violation of privacy rights is

not raised by any facts alleged. The Defendants’ motion to

dismiss is GRANTED with respect to the Second Cause of Action. 

3. The Third Cause of Action: Assault and Battery 

Plaintiffs advance claims of assault and battery against the

County, Pierce, and the officers. 

As to the officers, the complaint states a cause of action

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with sufficient definiteness under the notice-pleading standard,

alleging that the officers shot and killed the decedent

unlawfully, which satisfies the requirement of an offensive or

harmful touching. 

As to Pierce, however, the complaint fails to state a claim. 

As noted above, Plaintiffs do not allege any fact from which it

can be inferred that Pierce personally took part in, had

knowledge of, or ratified the events which directly led to the

decedent’s death. As to the County, the Monell allegations are

sufficient. 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the third claim is GRANTED as

to Pierce with leave to amend. It is DENIED as to the other

Defendants. 

4. The Fourth Cause of Action: Interference with State Civil

Rights 

Plaintiffs allege violations of California Civil Code

Section 51.7, and claim damages for these violations pursuant to

Sections 52(b) and 52.1. 

As to the Sheriff, this cause of action suffers from the

same defect in pleading as the Third Cause of Action: Plaintiffs

do not allege any fact from which it could be inferred that

Pierce personally took part in, had knowledge of, or ratified the

events which directly led to the deprivations of the decedent’s

rights of which Plaintiffs complain. A claim of liability is

properly pled against the Sheriff’s Deputies, however. Nor is an

allegation of discriminatory animus required to support the cause

of action under state law. Venegas, 32 Cal.4th at 841-43. 

5. The Fifth Cause of Action: Wrongful Death and Survival

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Action 

Although neither party has cited the law, Plaintiffs’

wrongful-death action against the County for the Officers’

alleged actions is authorized by California Government Code

Section 815.2, which provides in relevant part: 

A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused

by an act or omission of an employee of the public

entity within the scope of his employment if the act or

omission would, apart from this section, have given

rise to a cause of action against that employee or his

personal representative.

Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2; Zelig v. County of Los Angeles, 119

Cal.4th 1112, 1127-28 (2002). 

Plaintiff Rosalinda Garcia, the decedent’s mother, has

standing to sue for the decedent’s wrongful death as his

successor in interest under California Code of Civil Procedure

Section 377.30:

A cause of action that survives the death of the person

entitled to commence an action or proceeding passes to

the decedent’s successor in interest . . . and an

action may be commenced by the decedent’s personal

representative or, if none, by the decedent’s successor

in interest. 

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.30. 

The elements of a wrongful-death are: (1) a wrongful act or

neglect on the part of one or more persons that (2) causes (3)

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the death of another person. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.60;

Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 21 Cal.4th 383, 390 (1999). The complaint

alleges facts addressing each of these elements. The Plaintiffs

claim that the Officers (1) used excessive force against the

decedent, thereby (2) causing (3) his death. The County, if

liable under Monell, is a proper defendant under Section 377.60

of the California Code of Civil Procedure. 

Defendants point out that the complaint alleges that the

County and Pierce also caused the decedent’s death by failing to

train the Officers in the appropriate use of force, a failure

which the Plaintiffs claim resulted from a “policy or custom.” 

The Defendants’ motion to dismiss and motion for more

definite statement regarding the Fifth Cause of Action are

DENIED. 

6. The Sixth Cause of Action: Intentional Infliction of

Emotional Distress

Plaintiffs claim Defendants intentionally inflicted

emotional distress upon the decedent. 

“[T]o state a cause of action for intentional infliction of

emotional distress, a plaintiff must show: (1) outrageous conduct

by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s intention of causing or

reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional

distress; (3) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme

emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the

emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” 

Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty

USA, Inc., 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1259 (Cal.App. 2005). 

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Plaintiffs do not allege any fact from which it could be

inferred that Pierce personally took part in, had knowledge of,

or ratified the events which directly led to the decedent’s

death. Plaintiffs have not alleged facts from which the first,

second, or fourth elements of this cause of action could be

found. The Defendants’ motion to dismiss with regard to Pierce

is GRANTED with leave to amend. 

In alleging that the Officers intentionally shot decedent to

death, in part because he was Hispanic, Plaintiffs state a cause

of action against the Officers for intentional infliction of

emotional distress. The County may be liable for the Officers’

alleged actions through Section 815.2 of the California

Government Code. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the sixth claim

as to the County and the Officers is DENIED. 

7. The Seventh Cause of Action: Negligent Infliction of

Emotional Distress

A cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional

distress requires that a plaintiff show (1) serious emotional

distress, (2) actually and proximately caused by (3) wrongful

conduct (4) by a defendant who should have foreseen that the

conduct would cause such distress.” Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d

1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying California law). 

Plaintiffs have not alleged facts sufficient to show that

the Sheriff actually and proximately caused decedent’s emotional

distress. As to the Sheriff, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is

GRANTED, with leave to amend. 

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In alleging that the Officers shot decedent to death, in

part because he was Hispanic, Plaintiffs have stated a cause of

action against the Officers for intentional infliction of

emotional distress. The County is potentially liable for the

Officers’ alleged actions through Section 815.2 of the California

Government Code. With regard to the County and the Officers,

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the seventh claim is DENIED. 

8. The Eighth Cause of Action: Negligence

Plaintiffs allege that the County, the Sheriff, and the

Officers all had a duty not to use excessive force while

attempting to arrest the decedent. Plaintiffs allege that the

County, the Sheriff, and the Officers all breached this duty when

the Officers fatally shot the decedent. 

Plaintiffs have not alleged facts sufficient to show that

the Sheriff participated in or ratified the decedent’s death. As

to the Sheriff, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED, with

leave to amend. 

In alleging that the Officers unnecessarily shot decedent to

death, Plaintiffs have stated a cause of action against the

Officers for negligence. The County may be liable for the

Officers’ alleged actions through Section 815.2 of the California

Government Code. With regard to the County and the Officers,

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED. 

 VI. CONCLUSION

Leave to amend is GRANTED regarding the Second, Third,

Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Causes of Action. The

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Defendants’ motion to dismiss and for more definite statement is

DENIED regarding the First and Fifth Causes of Action. Any

amended complaint shall be filed within twenty (20) days

following service of this decision by the clerk of court. 

SO ORDERED

DATED: November _21__, 2005.

/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER

____________________________

OLIVER W. WANGER

United States District Judge

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