Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01126/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01126-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARREN VINCENT FORD,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 16cv1126-LAB (BLM)

ORDER REVOKING PLAINTIFF’S IN

vs. FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS

J. LEWIS, et al.,

Defendants.

After the Court dismissed Plaintiff Darren Ford’s complaint, he took an appeal. The

Ninth Circuit referred this matter to the Court for the limited purpose of determining whether

Ford’s in forma pauperis status should continue for the appeal or whether the appeal is

frivolous or taken in bad faith.

Ford is a prisoner in state custody, serving two sentences of 25 years to life. In this

§ 1983 civil rights action, Ford asked the Court to order Defendants to provide him with

mental health treatment specifically for sex offenders. He did not contend that he was

denied mental health treatment altogether, but argues that he ought to receive treatment

specifically for sex offenders. He believes he ought to be released from prison and civilly

committed to the care of a state hospital, which is the only facility where he could receive the

treatment he wants. (See Objections to Report and Recommendation, Docket no. 46, at

4:1–9, 9:1–5.) He points to state law that, in his view, mandates a civil commitment. (See

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Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, Docket no. 34, at 15:12–23.) He abandoned any claim for 1

damages. (Obj. at 16, ¶ 1.) He argues that, in general, sex offenders are subject to

mistreatment at the hands of other prisoners, but he does not claim Defendants have failed

or are failing to protect him and he is not seeking increased security. In other words, he

wants to be released from prison and put into a mental hospital.

Defendants, citingdocuments attached to the complaint, point out that Ford was being

provided with outpatient treatment and that he routine access to mental health services and

clinical staff. (Complaint, Docket no. 1, at 27.) Ford does not dispute any of this. Instead,

his contention is that the generalized outpatient care he is being received is inadequate and

that Defendants are wrong in thinking he is receiving appropriate mental health care.

Although Ford is in effect seeking release from custody, the Court liberally construed

his complaint as a § 1983 claim rather than a habeas petition. Had the Court construed it

as a habeas petition, it would have been subject to immediate dismissal for failure to comply

with several of AEDPA’s requirements. To the extent Ford has any § 1983 claims, they

must arise under federal law. See, e.g., West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48–49 (1988) (holding

that one element of a § 1983 claim is the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or

federal law). His arguments that state officials ignored or violated state law do not give rise

to a federal claim cognizable under § 1983. Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1088–89

(9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that ordinary violations of state law, without more, do not give rise

to a substantive due process claim). Because Defendants are offering him mental health

care, they cannot be held liable for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, even

if he disagrees with their decision about what kind of care to offer. See Toguchi v. Chung,

391 F.3d 1051, 1060–61 (9th Cir. 2004) And he does not have a constitutional right, or any

other federally-created right to the treatment he is seeking. See Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of

Corr., 869 F.2d 461, 470 (9 Cir. 1989) (holding that states are not required to provide th

In fact, the procedure for referring a prisoner for release to the Department of State 1

Hospitals involves discretionary determinations by a number of officials who are not parties

to this action. (See Report and Recommendation at 4:27–5:5 (citing the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s 2009 Mental Health Services Delivery

System Program Guide, which Ford relied on in the complaint).) 

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special psychological treatment programs for incarcerated sex offenders). To the extent he

may be raising any state-law claims, Defendants are immune. See Pennhurst State School

& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984). 

Furthermore, no Defendant has the power to release Ford from prison and to commit

him to a state mental hospital. So even if Ford had a valid claim, which he does not, the

Court could not grant him the relief he requests. See Zepeda v. United States Immigration

Service, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9 Cir.1985) (holding that a federal court “may not attempt to th

determine the rights of persons not before the court”). The officials and entities who have

that power (the Department of State Hospitals, the Board of Parole Hearings, the District

Attorney, and state judges) are not parties to this case. And in any event, they would be

immune as well.

Ford made untimely objections to the denial by Magistrate Judge Barbara Major of

his two discovery motions, but those motions were properly denied, for reasons set forth in

the Court’s order of dismissal. 

The Court therefore determines that any appeal from its order of dismissal would be

frivolous, and REVOKES Ford’s in forma pauperis status.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 13, 2017

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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