Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_22-cv-02186/USCOURTS-arwd-2_22-cv-02186-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

MANES’ PHARMACY, INC. PLAINTIFF

v. No. 2:22-cv-2186

AMERISOURCEBERGEN DRUG CORPORATION DEFENDANT

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are two motions to exclude expert testimony filed by Plaintiff Manes’ 

Pharmacy, Inc. (“Manes”) (Docs. 67, 69) and one motion to exclude expert testimony filed by the 

Defendant AmerisourceBergen Drug Corporation (“AmerisourceBergen”) (Doc. 72). The Court 

has reviewed the motions as well as the briefs and exhibits filed in support of, and in opposition 

to, the motions. See Docs. 68, 70, 73, 76–77, 81, 85–86. Manes’ motions will be DENIED, and 

AmerisourceBergen’s motion will be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, as explained 

below.

I. Background

This dispute is between a pharmacy and the pharmacy’s wholesale distributor of, among 

other products, controlled substances. Manes is a pharmacy that has served the Van Buren, 

Arkansas community for nearly 40 years. (Doc. 53, p. 2). AmerisourceBergen is a wholesale 

distributor of pharmaceutical products, including controlled substances. (Doc. 16, p. 4). This

dispute arises from AmerisourceBergen’s decision to restrict its sale of controlled substances to 

Manes. Manes sued AmerisourceBergen for breach of contract, tortious interference with Manes’

business expectancies, defamation, and compelled self-defamation. (Doc. 53).0F

1

 

1 Initially, Manes asserted a procedural due process claim under the United States and 

Arkansas Constitutions. (Doc. 4, pp. 12–15). However, Manes dropped that claim in its amended 

complaint. See Doc. 53.

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The Court has previously denied Manes’ motions for a temporary restraining order 

(Doc. 17) and preliminary injunction (Doc. 38).1F

2

 Those orders contain a longer recitation of the 

factual background in this matter, but that background is not necessary to resolve these motions. 

Now, after discovery, both parties have moved to exclude some of the other parties’ experts. 

II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. That rule 

allows a witness “who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 

education” to provide opinion testimony if the party offering his testimony demonstrates to the 

court that it is more likely than not that:

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the 

trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of the principles and methods 

to the facts of the case.

See Fed. R. Evid. 702. The proponent of expert testimony bears the burden of proving its 

admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence. See In re Bair Hugger Forced Air Warming 

Devices Prods. Liability Litig., 9 F.4th 768, 776 (8th Cir. 2021). Eighth Circuit caselaw recognizes

that Rule 702 embodies a “liberal thrust” in favor of admitting expert testimony. See id. at 777. 

In other words, exclusion of expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule. Robinson v. 

GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 447 F.3d 1096, 1100 (8th Cir. 2006). However, “[t]rial judges are tasked 

with a gatekeeping role to ‘ensur[e] that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation 

and is relevant to the task at hand.’” Shipp v. Murphy, 9 F.4th 694, 700 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting 

2 The parties consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction to resolve the motion for 

preliminary injunction, Doc. 43, p. 5, so Chief United States Magistrate Judge Mark E. Ford ruled

on that motion. See Doc. 38, p. 10.

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Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993)). “It is within the broad discretion 

of the trial court whether to allow expert testimony.” Koslov v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, 

Inc., 818 F.3d 380, 393 (8th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations omitted).

III. Analysis

Both parties seek to exclude some of their opponent’s experts. Manes seeks to exclude the 

testimony of James Place and Deborah Komoroski. AmerisourceBergen seeks to exclude the 

testimony of Jack Teitelman. The Court will consider each expert in turn. 

A. James Place

Manes first seeks to exclude James Place on the grounds that he is testifying on matters 

outside of his area of expertise. Mr. Place has 27 years of experience working for the United States 

Drug Enforcement Administration and nearly ten years of doing compliance work in the private 

sector. (Doc. 77-2, p. 3). However, Manes argues the Court should exclude Mr. Place’s opinions 

because he is not a pharmacist and his expert report contains opinions about “the practice of 

pharmacy and how a pharmacist fulfills his/her corresponding responsibility.” (Doc. 68, p. 2). 

Additionally, Manes argues Mr. Place should be excluded under Arkansas law because he cannot 

judge whether a medical professional has deviated from the accepted standard of care. Id. at 4 

(citing Ark. Code Ann. § 16-114-206(a)(1)). The Court rejects both arguments.

The Arkansas statute Manes relies on does not apply to this case for three independent 

reasons. First, the statute is titled “Plaintiff’s burden of proof” and discusses what a plaintiff must 

show “when the asserted negligence does not lie within the jury’s comprehension as a matter of 

common knowledge.” Ark. Code Ann. § 16-114-206(a)(1). Manes is the plaintiff here and this is 

not an action for negligence, so the statute plainly does not apply here. Second, the statute applies 

to “any action for medical injury.” Id. The statute defines “any action for medical injury” as all 

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actions against medical care providers. Id. § 16-114-201(1). And its definition of medical care 

provider does not include a drug distributor like AmerisourceBergen, so the statute does not apply. 

Id. § 16-114-201(2). Third, Manes has not alleged a medical injury. A “medical injury” is “any 

adverse consequences arising out of or sustained in the course of the professional services being 

rendered by a medical care provider to a patient or resident.” Id. § 16-114-201(3). Manes alleges 

injuries arising out of AmerisourceBergen’s decision to stop selling it controlled substances. Those 

are not medical injuries. The Arkansas statute therefore does not mandate excluding Mr. Place.

Manes also challenges specific opinions Mr. Place offers in his report as being beyond his 

area of expertise because he has not worked or trained as a pharmacist. However, the Court finds 

Mr. Place’s opinions do not discuss the exercise of pharmacological judgment, which might require 

such experience. Instead, Mr. Place’s testimony discusses the steps a distributor or government 

agency might take when investigating possible diversion. Mr. Place’s opinions do not question the 

drugs Manes’ pharmacists dispensed; his opinions question the steps the pharmacists took to 

investigate questionable prescriptions based on red flags (such as commonly diverted substances) 

before filling the prescriptions. This opinion falls within his decades of experience with 

investigations and compliance in the public and private sector.

Also, some of Manes’ objections are simply disputes over the factual basis for Mr. Place’s 

opinions. Disputes over the factual basis for an expert’s opinion relate to the testimony’s 

credibility, not admissibility. Bonner v. ISP Techs., Inc., 259 F.3d 924, 929 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting 

Hose v. Chicago Nw. Transp. Co., 70 F.3d 968, 974 (8th Cir. 1996)). For example, Manes takes 

issue with paragraph 39 of Mr. Place’s report. That paragraph reads, in part, “[p]roper controls 

can be accomplished by following common sense, sound professional practice, and proper 

dispensing procedures.” (Doc. 77-2, p. 7). This paragraph is a direct quote from the DEA’s 

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Pharmacist’s Manual. (Doc. 77-1, p. 113). Manes argues that this is an example of where Mr. 

Place “opines as to what pharmacies and pharmacists should or should not do.” (Doc. 68, p. 2). 

In fact, that paragraph is an example of what the DEA says what a pharmacist should or should not 

do. The same is true for paragraphs 38, 41, 43, and 44, which Manes also challenges. Manes’ 

argument misses the mark because it challenges the factual basis for Mr. Place’s opinions. Manes 

can use cross-examination to challenge the factual basis for Mr. Place’s opinions. See Bonner, 259 

F.3d at 929.

The last opinion Manes challenges is within Mr. Place’s area of expertise. Manes argues 

the following opinion is impermissible: “AmerisourceBergen was justified in questioning 

Plaintiff’s ability to satisfy its corresponding responsibility for the proper dispensing of controlled 

substances.” (Doc. 77-2, ¶ 22). Mr. Place’s decades of experience in the DEA and private sector 

compliance render him qualified to state that opinion. Mr. Place’s opinion is made from the 

perspective of an outside investigator, not that of a pharmacist challenging Manes’ pharmacist’s 

pharmacological judgment. This is within his area of expertise.

In sum, Mr. Place’s opinions all fall within his area of expertise and Arkansas’s statute 

about the standard of care does not apply in this case. Manes is free to challenge the factual basis 

of Mr. Place’s opinions on cross-examination, but Manes has not identified any reason Mr. Place’s 

testimony is inadmissible. Manes’s motion to exclude Mr. Place will be denied.

B. Deborah Komoroski

Manes next asks the Court the exclude Deborah Komorski because she is testifying on 

matters outside of her experience. AmerisourceBergen offers Ms. Komorski as a rebuttal expert 

to Manes’ expert witnesses. (Doc. 76-2, p. 3). Ms. Komorski works for Cencora, Inc., which is 

AmerisourceBergen’s parent company. Id. She has eight years’ experience as a pharmacist, 

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twenty-five years’ experience as a Drug Control Agent for the State of Connecticut, and thirteen 

years’ experience doing compliance and diversion control work for private companies. (Doc. 76-

2, pp. 19–22). Manes argues that Ms. Komoroski’s opinions fall outside her area of expertise. 

(Doc. 70, pp. 3–4). Manes makes the same argument as above about Arkansas’s standard of care 

for pharmacists, citing Ark. Code Ann. § 16-114-206(a)(1). The Court rejects that argument for 

the same reasons stated above: the statute does not apply to this case.

The Court also rejects Manes’ argument that Ms. Komoroski’s opinions should be excluded 

because she would testify outside her area of expertise. Manes objects to Ms. Komoroski’s 

opinions which discuss AmerisourceBergen’s processes when investigating whether a pharmacist

carries out their corresponding responsibility. (Doc. 70, p. 2 (citing Doc. 76-2, pp. 3–5, 11)). These 

opinions all fall within her decades-long experience as both a pharmacist and diversion control 

agent. 

Manes offers two additional brief arguments which are not convincing. Manes argues that 

“Ms. Komorski failed to consider all the facts.” (Doc. 70, p. 4). This is a point Manes can press 

on cross-examination, but it is not a reason to exclude Ms. Komoroski. See Bonner, 259 F.3d at 

929. Finally, Manes argues that because Ms. Komoroski never practiced pharmacy in Arkansas, 

she cannot testify as to the applicable standard of care. This argument misses the mark because 

Ms. Komoroski’s opinions do not discuss the standard of care. 

Based on the above, Manes’ motion to exclude Ms. Komoroski will be denied.

C. Jack Teitelman

AmerisourceBergen seeks to exclude Jack Teitelman, arguing his testimony is (1) factually 

unsupported, (2) factually flawed, and (3) purely speculative. (Doc. 85, p. 2). Manes retained Mr. 

Teitelman as a rebuttal witness to Mr. Place. Id. at 1. Mr. Teitelmean worked for the DEA as a 

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special agent for 13 years, and he has worked in other law enforcement capacities for an additional 

13 years. (Doc. 72-12, pp. 29–33). For the last seven years, he has worked for a private company 

which he describes as “a leading Veterinary Industry provider of DEA-compliance and controlledsubstance anti-diversion solutions.” Id. at 17. 

To start, the Court will not exclude Mr. Teitelman’s testimony as so fundamentally 

unsupported that it cannot offer the jury assistance. AmerisourceBergen argues that because Mr. 

Teitelman failed to review a multitude of key sources of information, his testimony should be 

excluded because it is “so fundamentally unsupported that it can offer no assistance to the jury.” 

(Doc. 85, p. 4) (citing Cole v. Homier Distrib. Co., 599 F.3d 856, 865 (8th Cir. 2010)). The parties 

primarily dispute what documents Mr. Teitelman reviewed to prepare his report. 

AmerisourceBergen lists in its brief crucial documents that it claims Mr. Teitelman should have 

reviewed. Id. at 5. Additionally, AmerisourceBergen faults Mr. Teitelman for listing in his report 

that he reviewed Mr. Place’s expert report but failing to specifically list that he reviewed the 

documents cited in Mr. Place’s report. Id. While Mr. Teitelman’s report may have more thoroughly 

listed the documents he relied on, that he might base his opinion on different facts than Mr. Place 

does not render his opinion inadmissible. See Hopman v. Union Pac. R.R., 2020 WL 12654460, 

at *6 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 9, 2020). The Court cannot conclude that Mr. Teitelman’s report is so 

fundamentally unsupported that it should be excluded. AmerisourceBergen can, as it 

acknowledges, challenge the factual basis and credibility of Mr. Teitelman’s testimony at trial.

Next, the Court will not exclude Mr. Teitelman’s opinions based on AmerisourceBergen’s 

arguments that his opinions are factually flawed. AmerisourceBergen argues Mr. Teitelman is 

unaware of the steps in its investigation. (Doc. 85, p. 8). It points to instances where Mr. 

Teitelman’s opinion stated that AmerisourceBergen drew conclusions “solely on one telephone 

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interaction” and relied “solely on algorithmic indicators” to identify red flags for diversion. Id.

(citing Doc. 72-12, pp. 12, 17). However, reviewing Mr. Teitelman’s report in its entirety reveals 

that he is aware of various steps AmerisourceBergen took as part of its investigation. If 

AmerisourceBergen contends that Mr. Teitelman misunderstands or should have placed more 

emphasis on certain facts, those matters can be addressed through cross-examination.

However, the Court will exclude Mr. Teitelman’s testimony as it relates to his interpretation 

of Ruan v. United States, 497 U.S. 450 (2022). Mr. Teitelman’s report attempts to explain how 

Ruan applies to the way that AmerisourceBergen and the DEA should evaluate a pharmacist’s 

corresponding responsibility. Several reasons counsel against allowing Mr. Teitelman to testify 

about this topic, but the most critical is that experts cannot testify about legal matters.2F

3

 S. Pine 

Helicopters, Inc. v. Phx. Aviation Managers, Inc., 320 F.3d 838, 841 (8th Cir. 2003). It is the 

judge’s role to instruct the jury on legal matters. Id. 

Mr. Teitelman’s testimony about Ruan impermissibly ventures into testimony about legal 

matters because he applies the Ruan case out of its criminal context. See Doc. 72-12, pp. 9–10. 

Mr. Teitelman’s report discusses how Ruan should change the DEA’s historical interpretation of 

regulations. Id. at 10. Courts can allow experts to testify about regulations, but not in the way that 

Mr. Teitelman discusses Ruan’s effect on regulations. See, e.g., Langenbau v. Med-trans Corp., 

167 F. Supp. 3d 983, 1004 (N.D. Iowa 2016) (discussing expert testimony on regulations). For 

example, “‘experts may refer to regulations in addition to their industry experience,’ but they 

cannot ‘properly testify as to whether a regulation was violated.’” Id. (quoting Cowden v. BNSF 

3 Another reason is that Ruan concerned the government’s burden to prove a criminal 

defendant’s state of mind in prosecutions of doctors for unauthorized prescribing of controlled 

substances such as opioids. 597 U.S. at 454. The facts and reasoning in Ruan are of little utility 

in this civil context.

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Ry. Co., 2013 WL 5442926, *6 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 30, 2013)) (emphasis in original). Mr. Teitelman 

uses Ruan to discuss what AmerisourceBergen or the DEA must show before determining Manes 

has violated a regulation. This is the Court’s role, not Mr. Teitleman’s, so his testimony about 

Ruan is not admissible. If Manes believes Ruan changes the way the Court should instruct the 

jury on the law, Manes can address that when proposing jury instructions.

Finally, the Court does not agree with AmerisourceBergen that Mr. Teitelman’s opinions 

about AmerisourceBergen’s policies are unreliable because they are purely speculative. 

AmerisourceBergen primarily argues that because Mr. Teitelman does not have personal 

knowledge of how AmerisourceBergen’s policies have changed over time, his opinions on the 

topic should be excluded. However, Mr. Teitelman bases his opinion in part on his previous work 

with pharmacies that had a relationship with AmerisourceBergen. See Doc. 72-1, internally 

numbered 213:12–215:17. Additionally, Mr. Teitelman can base his opinion on facts or data he 

has been made aware of or personally observed. Fed. R. Evid. 703. Personal knowledge is not a 

prerequisite to his testimony. As with the above, AmerisourceBergen’s criticism is of the factual 

basis of Mr. Teitelman’s opinions. Those concerns can be addressed through cross-examination, 

with the jury determining Mr. Teitelman’s credibility. See Bonner, 259 F.3d at 929. 

IV. Conclusion

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Manes’ motions (Docs. 67, 69) are DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that AmerisourceBergen’s motion (Doc. 72) is GRANTED 

IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, as explained above. 

IT IS SO ORDERED this 23rd day of July, 2024.

/s/P. K. Holmes, III

P.K. HOLMES, III

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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