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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

IRENE P. TOMSIC and SHEILA 

BROWNING, 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

FILED 

Ualted Stites Court of Appetll Tenth Circuit 

JUN 07 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 95-4002 

v. 

STATE FARM MUTUAL 

AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 

COMPANY, an Illinois corporation; and 

NORMAN MILLER, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 93-CV-470) 

JohnS. Chindlund (James A. Boevers and Robert G. Wing with him on the brief) of Prince, 

Yeates & Geldzahler, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Glenn C. Hanni (David R. Nielson with him on the brief) of Strong & Hanni, Salt Lake City, 

Utah, for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before HENRY, HOLLOWAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. 

HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 95-4002 Document: 01019301476 Date Filed: 06/07/1996 Page: 1 
Plaintiffs/appellants Irene Tomsic and Sheila Browning appeal the district court's 

grant of summary judgment for defendant/appellee State Farm on their Title Vll gender 

discrimination claims. 1 Tomsic v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 870 F. Supp. 318 

(D. Utah 1994). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

I 

Plaintiffs were hired on Apri11, 1991, as trainee agents of defendant. 2 Employment 

as a trainee agent is temporary, lasting at most two years. Employees who successfully 

complete the training program become agents with the defendant under a contractual 

relationship but are no longer employees. Plaintiffs were terminated after about nine months 

in the program. A third trainee who had been hired at the same time as plaintiffs, a male 

named Toby Gonzales, was retained and successfully completed the program. 

Under the terms of the employment contract, defendant was obligated to assign a 

management employee to provide training and supervision to plaintiffs. The supervisor 

assigned to train plaintiffs during the first three months of their employment was Dean Olsen. 

Olsen testified in deposition that plaintiffs were committed to the program, had good 

1

At the hearing on defendant's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs stipulated 

to dismissal of their Title Vll claim against Norman Miller and to dismissal of all claims 

against State Farm except the Title Vll claim and a claim for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress. On appeal, plaintiffs challenge only the adverse judgment on the Title 

vn claim. 

~ecause we are reviewing a summary judgment in favor of defendant, we state the 

facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. 

2 

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attitudes, and showed professionalism in dealing with clients. 

After three months, plaintiffs were assigned a new supervisor, Norman Miller, who 

had been supervising Toby Gonzales from the beginning of his employment. Miller devoted 

more of his attention to Gonzales than to plaintiffs, according to Browning's deposition. 

Miller was supposed to complete weekly progress reports on plaintiffs as well as evaluations 

every three months. Miller prepared the evaluation for the initial three months of plaintiffs' 

employment, even though he had not been their supervisor during that period, and did so 

without the input of Olsen. Later, Miller sometimes falsified the weekly progress reports by 

claiming to have spent more time in training plaintiffs than he actually had, the plaintiffs said 

in their depositions. Miller's reports on Browning were conflicting; one week she would be 

rated very highly in all areas, while the next report would say she had a bad attitude and 

wasn't a team player. In September 1991, Browning won a contest among both trainees and 

experienced agents by submitting the highest number of life insurance applications in her 

district. 

Within a month after becoming plaintiffs' supervisor, Miller told plaintiff Tomsic that 

he did not think she would succeed; he said her husband made too much money and that she 

therefore would lack incentive. He asked about Tomsic's marital relationship and whether 

her husband had ever had an affair. At about the same time, Miller told plaintiff Browning 

and Toby Gonzalez that Tomsic would be fired and one of them could have her office. Two 

weeks later he again told Browning that Tomsic would be fired 

On December 16, 1991, in a tape recorded conversation, Miller told Browning that 

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she had a great future with State Farm but that production was not the most important 

evaluation factor. He said he was concerned that she devoted so much of her time to her 

career and that her personal and family life might suffer. He also expressed concern that 

marital problems might arise in a few years because she would likely be earning more than 

her husband Miller later testified that his purpose in this interview, on instructions from his 

superior, was to try to convince Browning to resign voluntarily. 

Three days later the decision was made to fire both plaintiffs, but apparently the 

decision was not acted on immediately. Plaintiffs were asked to resign in January. Tomsic 

resigned in late January. Browning refused to resign. On February 26, 1992, a letter was 

mailed notifying Browning that she was terminated as of February 29. She turned in a 

resignation on February 28. 

The decision to fire plaintiffs was made by Mr. Lee Baumann, after receiving the 

comments and recommendations of Dave Powell and Norm Miller. Brief of Appellee at 15; 

Defendants' Answer, Aplt. App. at 24. Miller did not have the actual authority to terminate 

a trainee. Gonzales was retained, even though his production was not significantly better 

than plaintiffs', according to their deposition testimony, and poor production was ostensibly 

the primary reason for plaintiffs' termination. 

II 

The District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order 

The district court first analyzed the case according to the four elements of a prima 

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Appellate Case: 95-4002 Document: 01019301476 Date Filed: 06/07/1996 Page: 4 
facie case under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 3 The court found 

that plaintiffs had shown they were members of a protected class and that issues of fact 

existed with regard to the second and third elements. The court held that plaintiffs' claims 

failed because they could not satisfy the fourth element, which the court viewed as requiring 

plaintiffs to show that State Farm had replaced them with individuals who were not members 

of the protected class. Because State Farm had neither sought nor hired replacements, 

plaintiffs could not establish a prima facie case, the judge concluded 

The district court then considered whether plaintiffs had shown direct evidence of 

discrimination which would make it unnecessary for them to follow the prima facie case 

paradigm of McDonnell Douglas. The court found that plaintiffs had not presented direct 

evidence of discriminatory intent. The statements by Miller to plaintiffs regarding their 

marital relationships alluded to "arcane" notions of women's role in society, but it did not 

appear that Miller himself held such views. Rather, as to the statement regarding Browning 

and the possibility that she might make more money than her husband, the judge said that 

Miller's concern was that such views, if held by others, might create an obstacle to plaintiff 

Browning's success with State Farm. 

As to the statement regarding Tomsic's possible lack of motivation because of her 

3Jhe judge stated the four elements as: (1) plaintiffs belong to a protected group; (2) 

they were qualified for their jobs; (3) they were terminated despite their qualifications; and 

(4) after their termination the employer hired someone or sought applicants for plaintiffs' 

vacated positions whose qualifications were no better than those of plaintiffs. 870 F. Supp 

at 323. 

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husband's substantial earnings, the judge said that State Farm had a legitimate concern with 

its trainees' incentive; it would not be in State Farm's interest to expend resources training 

one whose only motivation was to "earn pocket change." 870 F. Supp. at 324. Further, the 

judge concluded that plaintiffs had failed to show that Miller's statements had anything to 

do with the decision to fire plaintiffs. At most, the judge concluded, plaintiffs could argue 

that discriminatocy intent could be inferred from the statements, but this would not be direct 

evidence of discrimination. Id.. (citing Heim y. State of Utah, 8 F.3d 1541, 1547 (lOth Cir. 

1993)). 

Somewhat less clearly, the district judge also concluded that plaintiffs had failed to 

offer sufficient evidence that defendant's proffered reasons for discharging plaintiffs were 

a mere pretext for discrimination. Id.. The judge's conclusion in this portion of his 

memorandum follows immediately from his conclusion that Miller's remarks did not 

constitute direct evidence of discrimination; it is unclear whether he actually analyzed the 

issue of whether sufficient evidence of pretext had been submitted. 

III 

A 

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the 

district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( c). Universal Money Centers, Inc. y. AT.& T, 22 

F.3d 1527, 1529 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 655 (1994). Summary judgment is 

appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( c). We examine the factual 

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Appellate Case: 95-4002 Document: 01019301476 Date Filed: 06/07/1996 Page: 6 
record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party. Id. If there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute, we must determine whether 

the district court correctly applied the law. Applied Genetics Intemat'l. Inc. v. First 

Mfiliated Securities, Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

B 

Plaintiffs contend that the district judge's conclusion that they had failed to satisfy the 

fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case test was erroneous because that 

prong as stated in that case is simply inapplicable to the facts and circumstance of this case, 

which plaintiffs analogize to a failure to promote case. Plaintiffs contend that the particular 

structure of their employment, in which State Farm does not replace trainee agents who fail, 

should not insulate State Farm from liability if it unlawfully discriminates in its decisions. 

Plaintiffs argue that the district court failed to recognize that the McDonnell Douglas 

structure was never intended to be applied rigidly but instead should be adapted to the 

varying circumstances presented in particular cases. 

We agree that the district court erred in applying the McDonnell Douglas framework 

without modification to suit the circumstances of this particular controversy. It is not 

necessary that plaintiffs' claims fit neatly into a pre-established category such as wrongful 

termination or failure to promote. We have previously noted the necessity of adapting the 

framework in the light of the facts presented In Cole v. Ruidoso Municipal Schools, 43 F.3d 

1373, 1380 (lOth Cir. 1994), we described the fourth prong of the prima facie case standard 

as merely requiring a showing that the plaintiff was "treated less favorably than her male 

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Appellate Case: 95-4002 Document: 01019301476 Date Filed: 06/07/1996 Page: 7 
counterparts. "4 In McDonnell Dou~as itself the Court cautioned that the framework for 

analysis would require tailoring for the particular facts of individual cases: "The facts 

necessarily will vary in Title Vll cases, and the specification ... of the prima facie proof 

required ... is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations." 

411 U.S. at 802 n. 13. This admonition has since been illustrated by the Court's approach 

to cases such as Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984), in which the plaintiff 

brought a claim under Title VII based on the failure of the defendant law firm to recommend 

her for partnership. Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, there said: 

The benefit a plaintiff is denied need not 1K employment to fall within Title 

VII's protection; it need only be a term, condition, or privilege Q{ employment. 

It is also of no consequence that employment as an associate necessarily ends 

when an associate becomes a partner. A benefit need not accrue before a 

person's employment is completed to be a term, condition, or privilege of that 

employment relationship. . . . . Accordingly, nothing in the change in status 

that advancement to partnership might entail means that partnership 

consideration falls outside the terms of the statute. 

467 U.S. at 77 (emphasis in original). 

We believe that plaintiffs' position as trainees aspiring to complete their limited 

period of employment and to be rewarded thereafter with an offer to enter into a continuing 

contractual relationship with State Farm as independent contractor agents is closely 

analogous to the position of the plaintiff in Hishon. Hence, we hold that plaintiffs presented 

4

The district court did not have the benefit of CQk to guide its decision. In CQk, 

however, we simply restated the requirement of the fourth prong as set out in Rea y. Martin 

Marietta Corp., 29 F. 3d 1450, 1454 (lOth Cir. 1994), a reduction in force case which also 

was not stating new law. 

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Appellate Case: 95-4002 Document: 01019301476 Date Filed: 06/07/1996 Page: 8 
sufficient evidence on the fourth element of a prima facie case, to avoid an adverse summary 

judgment, by proof that they were denied that opportunity while a similarly situated male, 

Gonzales, was given the opportunity. Thus, the district court erred in holding that plaintiffs 

had failed to establish a prima facie case. 

Defendant contends, inter alia, that plaintiffs did not raise the failure to promote 

theory in the district court. Plaintiffs did, however, raise this theory at argument on 

defendant's motion, Aplt. App. at 261-63, without objection from defendant, and defense 

counsel addressed the merits of the promotion argument, i..d.. at 267-69. Thus, this issue is 

properly before us. More fundamentally, plaintiffs assert that their argument is not that this 

is a failure to promote case per se, but that analogy to failure to promote cases is instructive 

of the case-sensitive approach to be taken in assessing what a Title VII plaintiff must show 

to establish a prima facie case. Thus, we perceive plaintiffs' argument to be that under the 

particular circumstances here, their terminations must be analyzed with a flexible, rather than 

rigid, application of the McDonnell Dou~as prima facie case standard, which takes into 

account the fact that their employment was of such a nature that replacements could not 

expect to be hired in the normal course of defendant's business. We agree with plaintiffs on 

this point and hold that the district court erred in concluding that they failed to meet the 

prima facie case standard. 

c 

Plaintiffs also contend that summary judgment was improper, even if they had failed 

to satisfy the prima facie case element of the McDonnell Dou~as analysis, because they 

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presented sufficient direct evidence of discriminatory motive in their terminations. We 

believe that we should resolve this issue, in spite of our resolution of the previous issue in 

plaintiffs' favor, because if plaintiffs prevail on this issue it would affect the course of 

proceedings on remand We accept plaintiffs' legal premise, as we have previously noted 

that direct evidence of discrimination makes the McDonnell Douglas approach unnecessary. 

~. ~.Furry. AT&T Technologies. Inc., 824 F.2d 1537, 1549 (lOth Cir. 1987). We do 

not agree, however, that plaintiffs' proof constitutes direct evidence. 

A plaintiff in an employment discrimination case proves discrimination by direct 

evidence when she presents proof of "an existing policy which itself constitutes 

discrimination .... " Ramsey v. City and County ofDenver, 907 F.2d 1004, 1008 (lOth Cir. 

1990) (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985)), cert. denied, 

506 U.S. 907(1992). Statements which on their face are expressions of personal opinion, 

however, can only support an inference of discrimination if the trier of fact finds the 

inference reasonable, and so constitute only circumstantial or indirect evidence of 

discrimination against the plaintiff. Id.. 

In contending that they presented direct evidence of discrimination, plaintiffs rely on 

the remarks made by the supervisor, Miller, to the effect that Tomsic could be expected to 

lack motivation because her husband earned a substantial income, while Browning could be 

expected to encounter problems in her marital relationship, which might adversely affect her 

performance as an agent, because her husband would probably become uncomfortable with 

her earning more than he in future years. Initially, we note the fundamental discrepancy in 

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• 

defendant's position regarding Browning. She purportedly was terminated for poor 

perfonnance, yet Miller's remarks to her suggest that he must have believed she eventually 

could become quite successful. We also note that the district judge appears to have 

impennissibly drawn inferences from this evidence in favor of State Farm, as he concluded 

that these remarks did not actually represent Miller's personal views but only those of others 

with whom Browning might have to contend It is fundamental that the jury must be 

permitted to decide from among the different inferences which might be drawn from the 

evidence. 

As to Miller's remarks to Tomsic, the district judge concluded that Miller was only 

expressing a legitimate concern of State Farm that it would not be profitable to expend 

company resources in training her if her only motivation was to "earn pocket change." No 

evidence has been identified to us that would suggest that Tomsic had displayed insufficient 

motivation. Moreover, it is again for the jury to determine the issue of Miller's intent in 

making this statement. The district judge may have been correct in his conclusion, or it may 

be that Miller was displaying stereotyped views of women and of marriage which he actually 

held and which may have affected his relationship with plaintiffs in other ways. The 

question is not one capable of resolution on summary judgment. 

That said, however, we agree with the district judge that these remarks are insufficient 

to constitute direct evidence of discriminatory intent in the terminations, even though 

Miller's recommendation was considered in State Farm's decisions. Although "stereotyped 

remarks can certainly be evidence that gender played a part" in an employment decision, 

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• 

• 

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (emphasis in original), statements 

such as those in issue here which "are on their face expressions of . . . personal opinion, and 

not an existing policy which itself constitutes discrimination" constitute circumstantial or 

indirect evidence, not direct evidence, Ramsey v. City and County of Denver, 907 F.2d 1004, 

1008 (lOth Cir. 1990)~ accord EEOC v. WilteL Inc., 81 F.3d 1508 (lOth Cir. 1996)~ Heim 

v. State ofUtah, 8 F.3d 1541, 1546-47 (lOth Cir. 1993).5 

D 

We next consider whether plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence of pretext to 

withstand defendant's summary judgment motion. Plaintiffs do not dispute that defendant 

proffered a legitimate reason for requesting their resignations. Under the McDonnell 

Douglas paradigm, plaintiffs must counter defendant's proffer by presenting "enough 

evidence to support an inference that the employer's reason was merely pretext, by showing 

either 'that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or ... that the 

employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.'" Cone v. Longmont United 

Hospital Ass'n, 14 F.3d 526, 530 (lOth Cir. 1994) (quoting Texas Dept. of Community 

5

Plaintiffs also argue that summary judgment should have been denied defendant, even 

if they failed to establish a prima facie case, on the basis that plaintiffs had carried the 

burden of showing sufficient indirect evidence to establish a probability that, but for the 

plaintiffs' status, the challenged employment decision would have favored the plaintiffs. 

They rely on Notari v. Denver Water Dept., 971 F.2d 585 (lOth Cir. 1992), as establishing 

this method of proof as an alternative to the more familiar McDonnell Douglas framework 

Defendant in response contends that Notari was a case of reverse discrimination and that its 

holding should not be applied in other contexts. Our holding that the district court erred in 

concluding that plaintiffs had failed to show a prima facie case makes it unnecessary for us 

to reach this alternative argument. 

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• 

• 

Affairs y. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)). 

Plaintiffs contend, inter alia, that pretext could be inferred from several circumstances 

shown by their evidence. First, plaintiffs point to the inconsistency, noted previously, in Mr. 

Miller's statements to plaintiff Browning concerning whether her production was the most 

important factor in her evaluation. Second, plaintiffs contend that the statements by Mr. 

Miller discussed above could support an inference of discriminatory intent even if, as we 

have concluded, they do not constitute direct evidence of discrimination. Third, plaintiffs 

cite to Miller's statements to others soon after he became plaintiffs' supervisor that Tomsic 

would be fired, these conversations having occurred several months before the decision to 

ask for her resignation was actually made. Plaintiffs do not go into much detail on the 

significance they attribute to these remarks, but we gather that their argument is that a 

permissible inference from this evidence is that Miller had prematurely and unfairly 

prejudged Tomsic solely on the basis of her gender. Fourth, plaintiffs say that the fact that 

other reasons given by defendant for their discharge, such as abrasiveness and generally poor 

attitudes, were totally subjective ones can support an inference of pretext. Finally, plaintiffs 

suggest that the evidence is at least sufficient that a jury could find that State Farm acted on 

both legitimate and prohibited reasons, making this a "mixed motive" case similar to Price 

Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1988), a contention which we feel we need not 

consider here. We agree that these evidentiary matters raised factual issues on pretext. 

As to the statements by Miller on which plaintiffs rely, defendant contends that these 

statements were, at most, "stray remarks" of the kind found insufficient to establish a jury 

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• 

question on pretext in Cone v. Longmont United Hospital Ass'n, 14 F.3d 526 (lOth Cir. 

1994), and Rea y. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1450 (lOth Cir. 1994). We disagree. In 

~. an Age Discrimination in Employment Act case, we began our discussion on this point 

by noting that remarks exhibiting bias which refer directly to the plaintiff may support an 

inference of discrimination. 14 F.3d at 531. We said that a plaintiff must show a nexus 

between the allegedly discriminatory statements and the employer's decision. ld.. We found 

in that case that there was no such nexus and that an inference of bias could not be supported 

from the remarks there at issue for two reasons. First, we found that one of the speakers had 

not been shown to have had any role in the employment decision. Id.. Second, as to a remark 

which was made by one involved in the employment decision, we found that his very general 

remark that "long-term employees have a diminishing return," had not been shown to have 

had any connection with a discriminatory motive in terminating the plaintiff. ld.. We find 

significant differences in the circumstances presented in the instant case, however. 

The remarks at issue in this case were directed to the plaintiffs individually, unlike 

the very general statements in ~. Moreover, as we have noted, Miller's recommendation 

was clearly before the decision maker, Baumann. We believe that this is a sufficient nexus 

to the decision to ask for plaintiffs' resignation; a jury could infer from Miller's remarks in 

the total context presented that unlawful bias was a motivating factor in defendant's 

decision. 6 

6

0ur analysis in .Rml followed closely the analysis in Cmle. Therefore, defendant's 

reliance on that case is similarly misplaced 

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I, 

In the context of the case, we also think it is significant that Miller at one critical point 

offered an inconsistent explanation of his evaluation of the performance of plaintiff 

Browning. As noted, on December 16, 1991, three days before State Farm decided to ask 

for plaintiffs' resignations, Miller discussed with Browning her future with State Farm. He 

told her in that interview that production was not the most important criterion, a statement 

inconsistent with the justification State Farm later gave for its actions. Such inconsistencies 

can support an inference that the proffered reasons for plaintiffs' discharge were pretextual. 

~Coley. Ruidoso Municipal Schools, 43 F.3d at 1380. Miller was also inconsistent in his 

evaluations of plaintiffs, as we have noted 

In short, we conclude that the district court was in error in holding that plaintiffs had 

failed to produce sufficient evidence of pretext to withstand the summary judgment motion. 

A jury may infer discriminatory animus from "the simple showing of pretext," and it may 

find illegal discrimination upon a prima facie case and pretext. Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 

F. 3d 441, 451 (lOth Cir. 1995). In sum, we hold that plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence 

to require submission to ajury. 7 

Accordingly, the summary judgment is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for 

further proceedings in accord with this opinion. 

7

0n remand, the district court will have the benefit of Randle and CQk, which he did 

not have before his ruling in this case. They should be applied because of their pertinence 

here. 

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