Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02638/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02638-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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The Court dismissed the fourth Defendant, Sheriff Joe Arpaio, on Arpaio’s summary

judgment motion (Doc. 115).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Mark Gunn Lloyd, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Joseph M. Arpaio, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 07-2638-PHX-RCB (MEA)

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants’ second Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 169),

to which Plaintiff did not respond.

The Court will dismiss this action for failure to prosecute and deny Defendants’

motion as moot.

I. Background

In December 2007, Plaintiff Mark Gunn Lloyd filed a pro se civil rights action under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Detention Officers Barron and Olague and Nurse Jackie Preston

(Doc. 1).1

 Plaintiff’s claim arose on November 23, 2007, during his confinement as a pretrial

detainee at the Maricopa County Towers Jail in Phoenix, Arizona (id.). Plaintiff alleged that

he and his cell mate were in a caged outdoor recreation area when Barron, Olague, and

Preston, without any justification or provocation, repeatedly shot towards Plaintiff with a

Case 2:07-cv-02638-RCB Document 181 Filed 02/09/11 Page 1 of 6
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The Court reviewed the Electronic Court Reporting audio of the August 2, 2010

hearing (see Doc. 167).

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high-powered pepper ball gun (id. at 3-3I). Plaintiff claimed that he was hit by pieces of the

pepper ball pellets, that the pepper ball powder caused him eye and throat irritation, and that

Defendants’ conduct caused him to live in fear and anxiety (id. at 3). 

On April 21, 2008, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 26).

Defendants moved to extend the time to respond to the motion (Doc. 32). The Court granted

Defendants’ request and directed that their response be filed by September 29, 2008

(Doc. 46).

Defendants did not file a response to Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion. On

February 9, 2009, the Court issued its Order granting Plaintiff’s motion as to his excessiveforce claim against Defendants (Doc. 111). The Court found that Plaintiff met his burden

on summary judgment to demonstrate that Defendants’ conduct was objectively unreasonable

under the Fourth Amendment (id. at 7-8). See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). In

the alternative, the Court construed Defendants’ failure to respond as consent to the granting

of the motion under Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.2(I). Judgment was entered in favor of

Plaintiff on the excessive-force claim, and the issue of damages remained (id. at 10). 

Defendants filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 112) and a Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 114). The Court denied both motions (Doc. 131).

Thereafter, Plaintiff retained counsel (see Doc. 157), and, on August 2, 2010,

Defendants filed a Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

166). That same day, the Court held a status hearing (Doc. 167). At this hearing, the Court

granted Defendants leave to file another summary judgment motion (id.). Also, Plaintiff’s

counsel indicated that Plaintiff had been released from custody the previous month and she

had not had contact with him (id.2

). The Court directed Plaintiff’s counsel to make attempts

in the next 30 days to locate her client, and, if she could not locate him, the case would be

subject to dismissal for failure to prosecute (id.). If counsel located Plaintiff, the Court

directed that Defendants must then file their second summary judgment motion by September

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13, 2010 (id.). 

The docket does not reflect whether Plaintiff was contacted during the 30 days

following the hearing. But on September 13, 2010, Defendants filed their second Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 169). Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff’s counsel moved to withdraw

(Doc. 173). The Court granted the motion to withdraw and extended the deadline for

Plaintiff, now acting pro se, to respond to the summary judgment motion (Doc. 175). The

response was due by January 11, 2011 (id.). 

Meanwhile, the Court held another status hearing on November 15, 2010 (Doc. 177).

There was no appearance for Plaintiff at the hearing (id.). The Court directed defense

counsel to re-contact Plaintiff’s former counsel and ascertain whether she notified him of the

hearing and his obligation to respond to the summary judgment motion (id.). If such

notification had not been made, defense counsel was ordered to obtain defendant’s address

or some other contact information from former counsel and file a notice with the Court

documenting these efforts (id.). 

On December 7, 2010, defense counsel filed a Notice stating that she had written two

emails to Plaintiff’s former counsel, telephoned former counsel and spoke to an assistant, and

followed up with another email; there was no response to these inquiries (Docs. 179-180).

Defense counsel indicated that her secretary also made two telephone calls to the Arizona

Department of Community Corrections, Inmate Records, but was unable to obtain any

information on Plaintiff (id.). 

On December 14, 2010, the Court received an email from Dana Gavin, paralegal for

Plaintiff’s former counsel. The email included the copy of a letter that Gavin mailed that day

to Plaintiff to an address in Gilbert, Arizona. The letter advised Plaintiff that the Court had

granted his counsel’s motion to withdraw and he was therefore obligated to respond to

Defendants’ pending motion by January 11, 2011. Gavin sent a follow up email to the Court

indicating that there was no response to the letter from Plaintiff and the letter was not

returned in the mail.

To date, Plaintiff has not filed a response to Defendants’ summary judgment motion,

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and the deadline for doing so has expired.

II. Failure to Prosecute

It is well established that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), a district court

has authority to dismiss a plaintiff’s action because of his failure to prosecute or to comply

with court orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626,

629-30 (1962) (a district court has the inherent power to dismiss a case sua sponte for failure

to prosecute); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may

dismiss an action for failure to comply with any order of the court); see also Ghazali v.

Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to

comply with a local rule). 

Before dismissal for failure to prosecute or failure to comply with court orders, the

Court must consider the following factors: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution

of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the

defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the

availability of less drastic sanctions.” In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prod. Liability

Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226-1228, 1234-1252 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing and applying the

five factors); Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642-43 (9th Cir. 2002) (same). If the court

does not consider these factors, the record may be reviewed independently on appeal for

abuse of discretion. Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Here, the first two factors favor dismissal. “[T]he public’s interest in expeditious

resolution of litigation always favors dismissal,” Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983,

990 (9th Cir. 1999), and the second factor favors dismissal in most cases. Wanderer v.

Johnston, 910 F.2d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 1990). This case was initiated in 2007, and the Court’s

Order granting summary judgment to Plaintiff on liability was entered on February 9, 2009

(Doc. 111). Thus, the sole remaining issue of damages has been pending for two years.

Plaintiff has failed to keep the Court apprised of his address despite Court Orders specifically

informing him of his obligation to file a Notice of Change of Address upon any address

changes (Docs. 2-3). See LRCiv 83.3(d) (requiring unrepresented party to file a notice of

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address change). The Court’s Service Order also informed Plaintiff that his action could be

dismissed for failure to comply with any order of the Court (Doc. 3 at 3). Plaintiff has

ostensibly lost interest in prosecuting this action, and his conduct hinders the Court’s ability

to move this case toward disposition. See Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1065

(9th Cir. 2004) (noting that “resources continue to be consumed by a case sitting idly on the

court’s docket”).

The third factor also favors dismissal. There is no risk of prejudice to Defendants in

dismissing this action. Indeed, prejudice to Defendants is presumed from unreasonable

delay. See In re Eisen, 31 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal citation omitted).

Public policy favors disposition of cases on their merits, so the fourth factor weighs

against dismissal. Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 643. 

The final factor requires the Court to consider the availability of less drastic sanctions.

Plaintiff was given multiple warnings of his obligations to comply with the Court’s orders

and to notify the Court of address changes. A “[w]arning that failure to obey a court order

will result in dismissal can itself meet the ‘consideration of alternatives’ requirement.” In

re PPA, 460 F.3d at 1229. Nonetheless, without Plaintiff’s current address, certain

alternatives are bound to be futile; “[a]n order to show cause why dismissal is not warranted

. . . would only find itself taking a round trip tour through the United States mail.” Carey v.

King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1441 (9th Cir. 1988). 

In sum, the five-factor analysis supports dismissal in this case. Plaintiff’s claim for

damages will be dismissed for failure to prosecute, and the pending Motion for Summary

Judgment will be denied as moot.

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendants’ second

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 169).

(2) Plaintiff’s remaining damages claim is dismissed with prejudice pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

(3) Defendants’ second Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 169) is denied as moot.

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 (4) The Clerk of Court must terminate this action.

 DATED this 9th day of February, 2011.

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