Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01358/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01358-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Shawn Norton, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social

Security, 

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 09-01358-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Application for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to

the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). (Doc. 27). The

Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) filed a Response, (Doc. 29), and

Plaintiff filed a Reply. (Doc. 31). After reviewing the pleadings, the Court issues the

following Order.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 25, 2009, Plaintiff sought judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision

rejecting his disability claim. On September 27, 2009, this Court reversed the

Commissioner’s decision and remanded the case for an award of benefits. In that decision,

this Court found that “the ALJ’s failure to consider Plaintiff’s VA disability rating in

reaching his decision constitute[d] legal error.” (Doc. 25 at 15). This Court further

Case 2:09-cv-01358-DGC Document 32 Filed 03/09/11 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

determined that had the ALJ properly reviewed the evidence, he would have been required

to find that the Plaintiff was disabled. Id.. Plaintiff subsequently filed the instant motion for

attorney’s fees on December 15, 2010. 

II. REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

Section 2412(d)(1)(A) of the EAJA provides that a prevailing party in any civil action

brought by or against the United States shall be reimbursed for fees and other expenses

incurred by that party in the action “unless the court finds that the position of the United

States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28

U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). To award attorney’s fees under the EAJA, the Court must determine

(1) that the claimant was the prevailing party; (2) that the government has not met its burden

of showing that its position was “substantially justified” or that special circumstances make

the award unjust; and (3) that the requested fees and costs are reasonable. See PerezArellano v. Smith, 279 F. 3d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, it is uncontested that the

Plaintiff is the prevailing party. 

A. Substantial Justification

Under the EAJA, the Court is required to award fees to the prevailing party unless the

position of the government was substantially justified. Id. at 793. A position is

“substantially justified” when it has a reasonable basis in both law and fact. See Pierce v.

Underwood, 487 U.S. 522 (1988). It is the government’s burden to prove its position was

substantially justified. See Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1324, 1330 (9th Cir. 1987). The

Commissioner’s position is substantially justified if it meets the “traditional reasonableness

standard–that is, it was ‘justified in substance or in the main,’ or ‘to a degree that could

satisfy a reasonable person.’” Lewis v. Barnhart, 281 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citations omitted). Further, the Commissioner’s position must be substantially justified

“with respect to the issue on which the court based its remand.” Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d

562, 569 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Here, the government has failed to meet its burden of showing that its position was

substantially justified. In reversing the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits, this Court

Case 2:09-cv-01358-DGC Document 32 Filed 03/09/11 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

found that “the ALJ improperly disregarded the VA’s disability rating that Plaintiff is unable

to work due to a service-connected disability.” (Doc. 25 at 21). Accordingly, this Court

concluded that the “ALJ’s decision constitute[d] legal error.” Id. Furthermore, this Court

determined that “the ALJ would [have been] required to find Plaintiff disabled were the

rejected evidence credited.” Id. In light of such significant procedural errors, the Court in

essence found that the ALJ’s decision to deny benefits had no reasonable basis in law or fact.

Accordingly, the Commissioner’s position was not substantially justified. See Shafer v.

Astrue, 518 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that “the government’s defense of the

ALJ’s procedural errors was not substantially justified.”); Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d

1255, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding an ALJ’s failure to follow procedure was not

substantially justified); Corbin v. Apfel, 149 F.3d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that

“the defense of basic and fundamental errors . . . is difficult to justify.”). 

Furthermore, the Commissioner’s argument that its position was substantially justified

rests on a misreading of this Court’s previous order. The Commissioner argues that “[i]n

remanding the case for calculation of benefits, this Court focused on . . . whether the ALJ

erred in evaluating the credibility of Plaintiff’s subjective statements.” (Doc. 29 at 4). That

argument, however, misunderstands the Court’s previous order. In that order, Court

concluded that, “[a]s the ALJ’s failure to evaluate the VA’s disability rating constitutes legal

error, the Court reverses the ALJ’s decision on this ground and does not reach the other

grounds of error asserted by Plaintiff.” (Doc. 25 at 14) ( emphasis added). Specifically, the

Court did not reach whether the Commissioner failed to “properly evaluate Mr. Norton’s

credibility.” Id. Accordingly, because the credibility of Plaintiff’s subjective statements was

not the “issue on which the Court based its remand,” the Commissioner’s arguments on that

point are of no consequence to the resolution of this case. 

B. Reasonableness of Fees

In the alternative, the Commissioner disputes the amount attorney’s fees requested by

the Plaintiff. Specifically, the Commissioner contends that Plaintiff’s requested fees award

of $8,799.12, representing 50.5 hours of work, should be reduced to $6969.60, for 40 hours

Case 2:09-cv-01358-DGC Document 32 Filed 03/09/11 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

of work, a reduction of 10.5 hours of work. The Commissioner raises two objections to

Plaintiff’s counsel’s claimed attorney hours: (1) that “Plaintiff’s counsel raised only routine

arguments,” and (2) that because Plaintiff was represented by the same law firm at the

administrative level, “Plaintiff’s claim for approximately 30 hours spent on the statement of

facts at the district court level is excessive.” (Doc. 29 at 8). The Commissioner does not,

however, make any specific requests as to how the reduction of hours should be ascertained.

“Social security cases are fact-intensive and require a careful application of the law

to the testimony and documentary evidence, which must be reviewed and discussed in

considerable detail.” Patterson v. Apfel, 99 F.Supp.2d 1212, 1213 (C.D. Cal. 2000). As

such, “[t]he Court will not second-guess counsel about the time necessary to achieve a

favorable result for his client.” Kling v. Sect'y of Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 790

F.Supp. 145, 152 (N.D. Ohio 1992). However, if the requested fees are not shown to be

reasonable, then the Court may reduce the award. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,

433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (“It remains for the district court to determine

what fee is ‘reasonable.’ ”); Atkins v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 986, 988 (9th Cir.1998) (applying

Hensley to cases involving the EAJA). Thus, “[t]he district court should exclude from [the]

initial fee calculation hours that were not ‘reasonably expended[,] ... [and] hours that are

excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434; see also

Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1211 (9th Cir.1986), reh’g denied,

amended on other grounds, 808 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir.1987) (“Those hours may be reduced ...

if the case was overstaffed and hours are duplicated; if the hours expended are deemed

excessive or otherwise unnecessary.”). 

In asserting that Plaintiff’s counsel’s hours are unreasonable, the Commissioner has

offered no expert or other authority to suggest that the time billed is unreasonable. Instead,

it appears that the arguments advanced by the Commissioner are based merely on defense

counsel’s own opinion as to the time necessary for the Plaintiff’s counsel’s research and

briefing of his case before this Court. Without evidence to support the Commissioner’s bald

assertions, the Court will not second-guess Plaintiff’s counsel regarding the time expended

Case 2:09-cv-01358-DGC Document 32 Filed 03/09/11 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Plaintiff is also entitled to an award of costs under the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1).

However, as costs, unlike expenses, are administered by the U.S. Department of Justice, the

Court will direct that the $350.00 awarded to Plaintiff for costs shall be paid out of the

Judgement Fund.

- 5 -

to achieve a favorable result. See Kling, 790 F.Supp. at 152. As such, the Court finds that

Plaintiff's counsel's billed time of 50.5 hours of work is reasonable as required under the

EAJA, and thus the Court awards Plaintiff attorney's fees and costs in the amount of

$9147.60 as the “prevailing party” under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).1

 That amount includes

$348.48 for the two hours that Plaintiff’s counsel spent preparing the reply in support of his

fees application. 

III. EAJA AWARD DISBURSEMENT

Finally, the Commissioner argues that the EAJA award should be disbursed directly

to the Plaintiff and not to Plaintiff’s counsel. In light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision

in Astrue v. Ratliff, the Court agrees. 130 S.Ct. 2521, 2529 (2010) (holding that the plain

text of the EAJA “‘awards fees to the litigant.”) Accordingly, the Court will direct the Clerk

to pay attorney’s fees to the Plaintiff. 

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, the Court finds that the Commissioner’s position was not substantially

justified and that the attorney's fees requested are reasonable.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Application for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to the

Equal Access to Justice Act is GRANTED. (Doc. 27). Plaintiff is awarded attorney's fees

totaling $9147.60, resulting from 52.5 attorney hours.

/ / / 

Case 2:09-cv-01358-DGC Document 32 Filed 03/09/11 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is awarded $350.00 in costs, to be paid

out of the Judgment Fund, as administered by the Department of Justice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all fees and costs shall be paid directly to

Plaintiff, Shawn Norton. 

DATED this 8th day of March, 2011.

Case 2:09-cv-01358-DGC Document 32 Filed 03/09/11 Page 6 of 6