Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01605/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01605-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In support of its opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, Goldman 1

requests the Court to take judicial notice of certain documents. (Doc. 76.) As these documents have

either been recorded in San Diego County or are publicly-filed legal documents, they are capable of

accurate and ready determination and are therefore subject to judicial notice under Federal Rule of

Evidence 201. Accordingly, Goldman’s request for judicial notice is granted.

- 1 - 10cv1605

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KOPOPELLI COMMUNITY WORKSHOP

CORPORATION, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 10CV1605 DMS (RBB)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF

BETTY BRYAN’S MOTION FOR

vs. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC.,

et al.,

Defendants.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Betty Bryan’s (herein, “Plaintiff”) motion for summary

judgment on her claim against Defendants for elder abuse pursuant to California Welfare and

Institutions Code § 15600, et seq. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is denied.

I.

BACKGROUND

On November 7, 2005, Plaintiffs obtained a refinance mortgage loan from Novelle Financial

Services (“Novelle”) in the amount of $649,000.00, secured by a Deed of Trust on the subject

property, which Plaintiff Betty Bryan purchased in 1950. (Goldman RJN Ex. 1.) Plaintiff claims to 1

have sent a notice of rescission to certain Defendants pursuant to the Truth in Lending Act, dated

Case 3:10-cv-01605-CAB-KSC Document 107 Filed 08/10/11 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 - 10cv1605

February 5, 2007. Subsequent to the alleged notice of rescission, Plaintiff made an additional

approximately $80,000 in payments to Defendant Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (“SPS”).

Nonetheless, Quality Loan Service Corporation, as agent for Beneficiary Novelle, issued a Notice of

Default, which was recorded on June 19, 2008. (Id. at Ex. 2.) Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in San

Diego Superior Court on November 3, 2008. (Id. at Ex. 6.) An Assignment of the Deed of Trust

transferring the Deed to MTGLQ Investors, LP was signed on October 21, 2008 and recorded on

December 15, 2008. (Id. at Ex. 3.) Plaintiff Betty Bryan filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy on

November 4, 2008. On March 23, 2009, Plaintiffs BettyBryan and Catherine Bryan recorded a Grant

Deed deeding their interest in the subject property to Kokopelli Community Workshop Corporation.

(Id. at Ex. 4.) A Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale was recorded on October 30, 2009, granting to MTGLQ

Investors, LP all interest in the subject property under the Deed of Trust. (Id. at Ex. 5.) This action

was removed to this Court on August 2, 2010. (Doc. 1.) 

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense–or the part of

each claim or defense–on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material when, under the

governing substantive law, it could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if “the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. “A party asserting that a fact

cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of

materials in the record . . . ; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or

presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support

the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). “A party may object that the material cited to support or dispute

a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2).

The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis

for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

Case 3:10-cv-01605-CAB-KSC Document 107 Filed 08/10/11 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 10cv1605

and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of

a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)(citation omitted).

Where the moving party fails to carry its initial burden of production, the opposing party has no

obligation to produce anything in opposition to the motion. See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd.

v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). 

III.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment solely on her claim for elder abuse pursuant to

California Welfare and Institutions Code § 15600, et seq. Plaintiff argues “records show all defendants

were fully informed as to plaintiff BettyBryan[‘s] fragile state and challenging medical condition; yet

nonetheless engaged in and continue to engage in an unfair pattern and practice of tortious actions of

wrongfully depriving Plaintiff Betty Bryan of her equity, home and property, thereby establishing

Plaintiff Betty Bryan[‘s] case for punitive damages and further unfairly deprived Plaintiff Betty Bryan

of costly medical care and persisted in tormenting plaintiff with a wrongful attempt to evict her from

her home of 60 years while knowing that she lay in her sickbed recovering from painful surgery.”

(MSJ at 7.) Plaintiff further argues, without citation, that SPS has “admitted to some liability for elder

financial abuse, so it is only the amount of defendant SPS liability which must be judicially

determined.” (Id. at 4.) 

“Abuse of an elder or a dependent adult” means either “(a) Physical abuse, neglect, financial

abuse, abandonment, isolation, abduction, or other treatment with resulting physical harm or pain or

mental suffering. [or] (b) The deprivation by a care custodian of goods or services that are necessary

to avoid physical harm or mental suffering.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 15610.07. Financial abuse of

an elder occurs when an entity “[t]akes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains real or personal

property of an elder or dependent adult for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both.” Id. at §

15610.30. 

In her moving papers, Plaintiff makes no citations to portions of the record which she believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiff’s argument in support of her

motion for summary judgment is essentially that she sent a notice of rescission and qualified written

Case 3:10-cv-01605-CAB-KSC Document 107 Filed 08/10/11 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff states she sent notices of rescission to MTGLQ on June 12, 2009 and 2

September 3, 2009. (See Memo. in Opp. to Litton/MTGLQ Mot. for Denial at 22.) Plaintiff also

attaches purported notices of rescission sent to SPS on March 12, 2007 and August 29, 2007 to her

Reply to Goldman’s opposition. (Reply to Goldman Opp. Exs. IV-V.) Plaintiff further states she gave

Defendants notice of her rescission when she filed an initial Complaint in State Court on November

3, 2008. (Id. at 12.)

- 4 - 10cv1605

request to Defendant SPS on February 5, 2007, as well as subsequent notices of rescission to various

Defendants, which automatically rescinded the loan and that Defendants’ subsequent conduct in 2

failing to adequately respond to her rescission and in initiating and proceeding with the nonjudicial

foreclosure process was fraudulent and constituted financial elder abuse in light of Plaintiff’s

rescission of the loan. (See MSJ, Reply to Goldman Opp.) Plaintiff’s argument, however, is

fundamentally flawed. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion, rescission under TILA is not automatic unless

the creditor acquiesces to the rescission, which clearly did not occur here. Rather, “rescission under

§ 1635(b) is an ongoing process consisting of a number of steps.” Yamamoto v. Bank of New York,

329 F.3d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir. 2003). “[U]nder the statute and the regulation, the security interest

‘becomes void’ only when the consumer ‘rescinds’ the transaction. In a contested case, this happens

when the right to rescind is determined in the borrower’s favor.” Id. at 1172. Although the Court has

held that Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for rescission in her Third Amended Complaint,

Plaintiff’s rescission was not automatic and, accordingly, there are genuine issues of material fact as

to whether the conduct of Defendants subsequent to Plaintiff’s alleged rescission of her loan

constituted elder abuse within the meaning of the California Welfare and Institutions Code.

Furthermore, a claim for elder financial abuse requires a showing that Defendants took Plaintiff’s

property “for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 15610.30.

Plaintiff alleges and concludes Defendants did so, but points to no evidence in the record establishing

such motive on behalf of Defendants. 

Despite Plaintiff’s failure to satisfy her initial burden in moving for summary judgment,

Defendants SPS and Koch filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion, in which they argue a genuine

issue of fact exists as to whether they took, secreted, appropriated, or retained Plaintiff’s property in

bad faith. (Doc. 72) Defendants argue there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether SPS ever received

Plaintiff’s alleged February 5, 2007 correspondence and submit a Declaration stating no such

Case 3:10-cv-01605-CAB-KSC Document 107 Filed 08/10/11 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff filed an ex parte motion to strike Defendant SPS’s opposition to her motion 3

for summary judgment and to strike the Declarations of William Idelman and Diane Weinberger filed

by SPS. (Doc. 84.) Plaintiff’s ex parte motion is denied.

Defendants Litton and MTGLQ filed a motion for denial or continuance of Plaintiffs’

4

motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 71.) Plaintiff filed an opposition to this motion. (Doc. 78.)

Because the Court herein finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden in showing she is entitled

to summary judgment, this motion is denied as moot.

- 5 - 10cv1605

correspondence wasin fact received by them. (Weinberger Decl. ¶¶ 9-10.) Goldman Sachs Mortgage 3

Company (“Goldman”) also filed an opposition, arguing Plaintiff has pointed to no evidence in the

record indicating Goldman was in fact involved in her loan. The only evidence pointed to by Plaintiff

in support of her allegations as to Goldman is a July 6, 2009 letter from Defendant Stephen C.

Wichmann on behalf of The Impac Companies stating it had no records of Plaintiff’s mortgage loan

transaction and suggesting Plaintiff contact Goldman Sachs. (See Reply to Goldman Opp. at 25.)

Goldman argues this letter is inadmissible hearsay. (Goldman Sur-Reply at 3.) Regardless, even if

admissible, this single letter is insufficient to support a claim for summary judgment as to Goldman.

Moreover, for the reasons set forth in its Order on Goldman’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff has failed

to allege sufficient facts in support of its claim that Goldman is liable to her based on its agency or

parent/subsidiary relationships with other named Defendants, let alone demonstrated an absence of a

genuine question of material fact as to Goldman’s liability. 

4

Accordingly, although Plaintiff may ultimately prevail on her claim for elder abuse and

although the Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff’s health condition, there are genuine issues of material

fact which prevent the Court from granting Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment at this stage in

the proceedings. 

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on her claim for elder

abuse in violation of California Welfare and Institutions Code § 15600, et seq, is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 9, 2011

HON. DANA M. SABRAW

United States District Judge

Case 3:10-cv-01605-CAB-KSC Document 107 Filed 08/10/11 Page 5 of 5