Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_05-cv-00715/USCOURTS-almd-2_05-cv-00715-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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A prisoner who is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis in this court will have his complaint screened

in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This screening procedure requires the court

to dismiss a prisoner’s civil action prior to service of process if it determines that the complaint is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a

defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

 ______________________________

JAMES OSTEEN *

Plaintiff, *

 v. * CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:05-CV-715-A

(WO)

LELAND ENZOR, JR., et al., *

Defendants. *

 ______________________________

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, James Osteen, a county inmate, challenges the

constitutionality of his incarceration in the Covington County Jail. He files this action

against attorney Leland Enzor, Jr., and Sheriff Anthony Clark. Plaintiff seeks monetary

damages and/or his immediate release from confinement. 

After a thorough review of the complaint, the court concludes that dismissal of this

case prior to service of process is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).1

 

I. THE COMPLAINT

Shortly after being released from prison, Plaintiff was re-incarcerated for being in

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contempt of court for failing to pay child support. He contends that Defendant Enzor abused

the legal process by causing him to be arrested on the contempt charges without first

providing him with notice that such action would be taken. Plaintiff states that since he had

just been released from prison, he had insufficient time to find a job in order to pay his child

support.

Plaintiff further complains that Sheriff Anthony Clark is illegally holding him in

prison on the contempt charge. According to the complaint, Sheriff Clark has advised

Plaintiff that he can purge himself of the contempt charge and obtain his release from prison

by making a payment toward the amount of child support in arrearage.

 II. DISCUSSION

A. The Unlawful Incarceration Claim

Plaintiff complains that his incarceration in the Covington County Jail pursuant to an

order of contempt for failure to pay child support issued by the District Court of Covington

County is illegal. This claim goes to the fundamental legality of Plaintiff’s confinement, and,

consequently, provides no basis for relief at this time. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641,

646 (1997); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,

500 (1973).

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a claim for damages challenging the legality of

a prisoner’s conviction or confinement is not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action “unless

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and until the [order requiring such confinement] is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or

impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus” and complaints containing such claims

must therefore be dismissed. 512 U.S. at 483-489. The Court emphasized that “habeas

corpus is the exclusive remedy for a [confined individual] who challenges the fact or duration

of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may

come within the literal terms of § 1983” and, based on the foregoing, concluded that Heck’s

complaint was due to be dismissed as no cause of action existed under section 1983. 512

U.S. at 481. In so doing, the Court rejected the lower court's reasoning that a section 1983

action should be construed as a habeas corpus action.

In Balisok, the Court further concluded that an inmate's “claim[s] for declaratory [and

injunctive] relief and money damages, . . . that necessarily imply the invalidity of the

punishment imposed, is not cognizable under § 1983 . . .” unless the inmate can demonstrate

that the challenged action has previously been invalidated. 520 U.S. at 648. Moreover, the

Court determined that this is true not only when a prisoner challenges the judgment as a

substantive matter but also when “the nature of the challenge to the procedures could be such

as necessarily to imply the invalidity of the judgment.” Id. at 645. The Court reiterated the

position taken in Heck that the “sole remedy in federal court” for a prisoner challenging the

constitutionality of his confinement is a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Balisok, 520 U.S.

at 645. Additionally, the Court “reemphasize[d] . . . that a claim either is cognizable under

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§ 1983 and should immediately go forward, or is not cognizable and should be dismissed.”

Id. at 649. 

Plaintiff’s complaint that Defendant Clark is unlawfully detaining him on contempt

charges asserts a challenge to the constitutionality of an order of incarceration entered

against Plaintiff by the District Court of Covington. A judgment in favor of Plaintiff in this

cause of action would necessarily imply the invalidity of this order and Plaintiff’s resulting

confinement. It is clear from the complaint that the order of incarceration about which

Plaintiff complains has not been invalidated in an appropriate proceeding. Consequently, the

instant collateral attack on his confinement in the Covington County Jail is prohibited as

habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for an inmate who challenges the validity of the fact

or duration of his confinement. Balisok, 520 U.S. at 645; Heck, 512 U.S. at 481; Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-490 (1973). Such attack is, therefore, subject to summary

dismissal by this court in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

B. Attorney Leland Enzor

According to the complaint, Leland Enzor, Jr. is a state attorney who subjected

Plaintiff to unlawful incarceration after he issued an affidavit which led to Plaintiff’s arrest

for failing to pay child support. Plaintiff maintains that Defendant Enzor’s actions subjected

him to harassment, malicious prosecution, and failed to afford him due process.

If Defendant Enzor’s conduct about which Plaintiff complains was taken in the

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capacity of an assistant district attorney, the court notes that “[a] prosecutor is entitled to

absolute immunity for all actions he takes while performing his function as an advocate for

the government.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993). The prosecutorial

function includes the initiation and pursuit of criminal prosecution, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424

U.S. 409, 424 (1976), and all appearances before the court, including examining witnesses

and presenting evidence. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492 (1991).” Rowe v. Fort

Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Mastroianni v. Bowers, 60 F.3d

671, 676 (11th Cir. 1998). 

[A]bsolute immunity is an entitlement to be free from suit for

money damages.... [T]he purpose of the immunity is to shield

officials from the distractions of litigation arising from the

performance of their official functions. To fulfill its purpose,

official immunity protects government officials not only from

having to stand trial, but also from having to bear the other

burdens attendant to litigation, including pretrial discovery....

In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d

128 (1976), the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor is

absolutely immune from civil suit for damages under section

1983 for actions taken "in initiating a prosecution and in

presenting the State's case." Id. at 431, 96 S.Ct. at 995.

Marx v. Gumbinner, 855 F.2d. 783, 788-89 (11th Cir. 1988). 

If the actions about which Plaintiff complains with respect to Defendant Enzor arise

from this defendant’s role “as an ‘advocate’ for the state,” such actions were “intimately

associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Mastroianni, 60 F.3d at 676.

(citations omitted). Defendant Enzor is, therefore, “entitled to absolute immunity for that

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conduct.” Id.

 To the extent the actions about which Plaintiff complains with respect to Defendant

Enzor were taken in his capacity as a private attorney, such claims likewise provide no basis

for relief in the instant cause of action. An essential element of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is

that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law.

“[P]rivate attorneys, even court-appointed attorneys, are not official state actors and . . . are

not subject to suit under section 1983.” Mills v. Criminal District Court No. 3, 837 F.2d

677, 679 (5th Cir. 1988) ; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

claims against Defendant Enzor are due to be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Enzor be DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i);

2. Plaintiff’s unlawful confinement claim be DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii);

3. This complaint be DISMISSED prior to service of process.

It is further

ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said

Recommendation on or before September 13, 2005. Any objections filed must specifically

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identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation objected to. Frivolous,

conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are

advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not

appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the

Magistrate Judge's report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual

findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain

error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein

v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of

Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the

decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on

September 30, 1981.

Done this 31st day of August, 2005.

 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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