Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-56088/USCOURTS-ca9-11-56088-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HENRY J. WEILAND,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 11-56088

D.C. No.

8:10-cv-01451-

JVS-SS

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 2, 2015—Pasadena, California

Filed March 2, 2015

Before: Stephen Reinhardt and Ronald M. Gould, Circuit 

Judges, and J. Frederick Motz, Senior District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Motz;

Dissent by Judge Reinhardt

 

 

 

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2 WEILAND V. AMERICAN AIRLINES

SUMMARY*

Federal Aviation Administration

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of 

airline pilot Henry Weiland’s action against American 

Airlines, holding that Weiland, who turned 60 six days 

before the Federal Aviation Administration’s Age 60 Rule 

was abrogated by the Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots 

Act (“FTEPA”), did not qualify for one of the Act’s 

exceptions to non-retroactivity.

The FAA’s Age 60 Rule required air carriers operating 

under 14 C.F.R. § 121(a) to cease scheduling pilots from 

operating aircraft when they turned 60. The FTEPA 

abrogated the Age 60 Rule, delaying the age at which pilots 

must cease flying from 60 to 65, and was explicitly nonretroactive with two exceptions. 

The panel held that Weiland did not qualify for the 

FTEPA’s 49 U.S.C. § 44729(e)(1)(A)’s exception because 

although he was employed by an air carrier, he was not 

employed “in such operations” and was not a “required 

flight deck member.” The panel concluded that because 

Weiland did not qualify for an exception to the FTEPA’s 

non-retroactivity, its abrogation of the Age 60 Rule was 

inapplicable to Weiland; and American acted “in 

conformance” with both the Age 60 Rule and the FTEPA 

when each was in effect, thereby immunizing American 

from any civil liability.

 * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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WEILAND V. AMERICAN AIRLINES 3

Judge Reinhardt dissented because he would hold that 

Weiland qualified for the exception in § 44729(e)(1)(A).

COUNSEL

John S. Lopatto III (argued), Law Offices, Washington, 

D.C.; Richard A. Voll, Law Offices, Ridgewood, New 

Jersey, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Robert Jon Hendricks (argued) and Larry M. Lawrence, 

Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Los Angeles, California; 

Donald L. Havermann, and David R. Broderdorf, Morgan, 

Lewis & Bockius, Washington, D.C., for DefendantAppellee.

OPINION

MOTZ, Senior District Judge:

This case involves a difficult question of statutory 

construction that may currently apply only to a class of one. 

Although somewhat uncomfortable with the conclusion we 

reach, we hold that Plaintiff Henry Weiland, who turned 60 

six days before the FAA’s Age 60 Rule was abrogated by 

the Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act (“FTEPA”), 

does not qualify for one of the FTEPA’s exceptions to nonretroactivity. The district court reached the same result, 

and its decision is affirmed.

I.

Until December 13, 2007, airline pilots at air carriers 

operating under 14 C.F.R. § 121(a) (“Part 121 air carriers”) 

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4 WEILAND V. AMERICAN AIRLINES

were subject to the FAA’s Age 60 Rule. See 14 C.F.R. 

§ 121.383(c) (2007). That rule required Part 121 air 

carriers to cease scheduling pilots from operating aircraft 

when they turned 60. On December 13, 2007 the FTEPA 

was enacted and abrogated the Age 60 Rule, delaying the 

age at which pilots must cease flying from 60 to 65. See

49 U.S.C. §§ 44729(a), (d). The FTEPA is explicitly nonretroactive, excluding any “person who has attained 60 

years of age before the date of enactment of this section” 

from serving “as a pilot for an air carrier engaged in 

covered operations” unless the “person” qualifies for one of 

two exceptions. Only the first exception is at issue in this 

appeal; it reads:

(A) such person is in the employment of that 

air carrier in such operations on such date of 

enactment as a required flight deck crew 

member;

Id. § 44729(e)(1)(A). The FTEPA also contains a 

“protection for compliance” provision that immunizes Part 

121 air carriers from liability for actions taken in 

conformance with the FTEPA or the prior Age 60 Rule. Id.

§ 44729(e)(2).

Weiland was a check airman when he turned 60 on 

December 7, 2007. American’s Collective Bargaining 

Agreement (“CBA”) defined a check airman “as a pilot 

who is on Check Airman salary for the month.” As pleaded 

in his complaint, Weiland’s duties as a joint check 

airman/pilot included evaluating pilots in land-based 

simulators and in the air during cockpit “line checks,” and 

piloting aircraft.

The Age 60 Rule was in effect on December 7 when 

Weiland turned 60 and American ceased scheduling him 

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WEILAND V. AMERICAN AIRLINES 5

for active duty. Weiland requested to be reinstated in lieu 

of the FTEPA, and received a response from American on 

December 24, 2007. American explained that it interpreted 

§ 44729 (e)(1)(A) to not apply to Weiland, and accordingly 

he would remain “inactive” and be retired on his “Normal 

Retirement Date” pursuant to the Retirement Plan—

January 1, 2008. Weiland filed a charge of discrimination 

with the California Department of Fair Employment and 

Housing (“DFEH”) on December 23, 2008, and filed a 

complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District 

of California on September 27, 2010. The district court 

below granted American’s motion to dismiss on February 

18, 2011, which Weiland timely appealed. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II.

We review de novo the district court’s granting of a 

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Balistreri 

v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

“We accept as true all well pleaded facts in the complaint 

and construe them in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party.” Zadrozny v. Bank of New York Mellon, 

720 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal citation 

omitted).

III.

Weiland’s claims for relief depend on qualifying for the 

(e)(1)(A) exception to the FTEPA’s non-retroactivity 

clause.1

 The exception can be divided into three elements: 

(1) “in the employment of that air carrier,” (2) “in such 

 1 Weiland did not seek to qualify for the (e)(1)(B) exception, which 

applies to pilots who are “newly hired” and forgo their accrued 

seniority.

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6 WEILAND V. AMERICAN AIRLINES

operations,” and (3) “as a required flight deck crew 

member.” These terms are undefined in the statute, and 

there is no legislative history shedding light on their 

meaning. We therefore must interpret the statutory 

language in a vacuum. We find that while Weiland was 

employed by American, he was not employed “in such 

operations” and was not a “required flight deck crew 

member.”

Weiland’s complaint does plausibly plead that he was 

“in the employment of” American on December 13. 

Although undefined by the FTEPA, the plain meaning of

“employment” is commonly understood as receiving 

compensation in return for work. Here, Weiland was 

employed by American on December 13 as an inactive 

check airman/pilot. American did not terminate Weiland’s 

employment on December 7; it only ceased scheduling him 

for check airman and pilot duties pursuant to the FAA’s 

Age 60 Rule then in effect. His retirement date was not 

until January 1, 2008 pursuant to American’s policy. The 

record is unclear when Weiland received his final 

paycheck, but we note that the California Unemployment 

Insurance Appeals Board found Weiland’s “end of 

employment date” was after December 24, 2007 for 

purposes of calculating his unemployment insurance. That 

finding provides further support for concluding that 

Weiland was employed by American on December 13. 

Moreover, presumably he continued to be eligible for 

employee benefits provided by American.

Section 44729(e)(1)(A) does not simply say, however, 

that a person must be “in the employment” of an air carrier 

on the date of the enactment of the FTEPA in order to 

qualify for the exception to non-retroactivity. It says that 

the person must be “in the employment of that air carrier in 

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WEILAND V. AMERICAN AIRLINES 7

such operations.” (emphasis added). “Such operations” 

refers back to the language “covered operations” used in 

§ 44729(e)(1), and “covered operations,” in turn, is defined 

in § 44729(b) as “operations under part 121 of title 14, 

Code of Federal Regulations.” Weiland could not have 

been lawfully engaged in any such operations on December 

13, 2007—the effective date of the FTEPA—because he 

was ineligible to do so under the FAA’s Age 60 Rule when 

he turned 60 on December 7. On December 13, 2007, he 

was employed by American as an inactive check airman.

Likewise, it cannot be said that Weiland was “a 

required flight deck crew member” on December 13, 2007. 

As a pilot and check crew airman, he certainly fell in the 

class of “required flight deck crew member.” See Emory v. 

United Air Lines, Inc., 720 F.3d 915, 926 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 

2013) (“Pity the passengers on a plane with an ‘optional’ 

pilot.”). But, by virtue of the FAA’s Age 60 Rule in effect 

when he turned 60 on December 7, 2007, Weiland also fell 

within a subclass that was excluded from the general class 

of “required flight deck crew member.” Not only was he 

not a “required flight deck crew member,” he was, as of 

December 7, 2007, prohibited from being a “flight deck 

crew member.” That was the holding of the district court, 

and albeit reluctantly, we believe the district court was 

correct.2

 2 It is fair to ask to whom Section 44729(e)(1)(A) applies, if our 

interpretation is correct. There are two answers. First, the section 

would appear to apply to pilots who turned 60 on December 13, 2007. 

Second, under at least one collective bargaining agreement, check 

airmen who did not have to be active pilots were “required flight deck 

crew members.” See Brooks v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Intern., 630 F. 

Supp. 2d 52, 54 (D.D.C. 2009) (upholding Continental’s decision to 

allow its check airmen who did not fly aircraft to qualify under 

§ 44729(e)(1)(A)).

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8 WEILAND V. AMERICAN AIRLINES

IV.

Because Weiland did not qualify for an exception to the 

FTEPA’s non-retroactivity, its abrogation of the FAA’s 

Age 60 Rule is inapplicable to Weiland, who turned 60 on 

December 7, 2007. American acted “in conformance” with 

both the Age 60 Rule and the FTEPA when each was in 

effect, thereby immunizing American from any civil 

liability. See 49 U.S.C. § 44729(e)(2) (the FTEPA’s 

“protection for compliance” provision). Accordingly, 

Weiland cannot recover on his claims under California’s 

FEHA.3

AFFIRMED.

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

“No person who has attained 60 years of age before the 

date of enactment of this section may serve as a pilot for an 

air carrier engaged in covered operations unless . . . such 

person is in the employment of that air carrier in such 

operations on such date of enactment as a required flight 

deck crew member.” 49 U.S.C. § 44729(e)(1)(A).

Statutory construction is frequently not easy. For that 

reason I set forth the sentence we are construing at the top 

of this dissent. In this case, however, a plain reading of the 

statutory language would seem to provide a clear answer to 

the question before us. Henry Weiland was “in the 

employment” of American Airlines on December 13, 2007. 

 3 Because we hold that Weiland did not qualify for the (e)(1)(A) 

exception, we need not address the final issue on appeal of whether his 

charge to the California DFEH on December 23, 2008 was timely filed.

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WEILAND V. AMERICAN AIRLINES 9

American Airlines was at the time engaged in part 121 

operations, so that it was “in such operations” for purposes 

of § 44729(e)(1)(A). Weiland was a pilot and check 

airman, and a pilot, as the majority acknowledges, certainly 

is a “required flight deck crew member.” Weiland was thus 

“in the employment of [an air carrier engaged in covered 

operations] on such date of enactment as a required flight 

deck crew member.” He needs no more to prevail.

The majority argues that Weiland could not have been 

employed “in such operations” because he “could not have 

been lawfully engaged in any such operations on December 

13, 2007.” The phrase “in such operations” in 

§ 44729(e)(1)(A), however, modifies “air carrier,” not 

“person.” By “such operations” Congress referred to 

“covered operations,” which are in turn defined as 

“operations under part 121.” See 49 U.S.C. § 44729(b), 

(e)(1). Part 121 operations are the “operations of each 

person who holds or is required to hold an Air Carrier 

Certificate or Operating Certificate under part 119.” 

14 C.F.R. § 121.1(a). Air Carrier Certificates or Operating 

Certificates are held by airlines, not by the individual pilots 

employed by airlines. It is thus American Airlines, not 

Weiland, who holds an “Air Carrier Certificate,” and it 

follows that the only entity that may properly be said to 

engage in “part 121 operations” is American Airlines, not 

Weiland. This common sense conclusion is reinforced by 

part 119, which defines by reference the scope of part 121 

operations, and which “applies to each person operating or 

intending to operate civil aircraft . . . [a]s an air carrier or 

commercial operator, or both, in air commerce.” 14 C.F.R. 

§ 119.1(a)(1). A pilot employed by an airline does not 

himself “operate civil aircraft as an air carrier or 

commercial operator.” The airline does. In sum, the 

statutory and regulatory scheme make it clear that the 

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10 WEILAND V. AMERICAN AIRLINES

phrase “in such operations” in § 44729(e)(1)(A) qualifies 

“air carrier” and not “person” (the airline’s individual 

pilot).

Even were we to assume that “in such operations” 

refers to Weiland, however, that section does not say that in 

order to qualify for the exception a person must be actually 

“engaged,” or even “able to lawfully engage,” in covered 

operations on the date of enactment. It only says that such 

person must be “in the employment of” the airline in 

covered operations on that date, and all parties agree that 

Weiland was in the employment of American Airlines on 

the relevant date. Aside from the Rule of 60, there are 

many reasons why an otherwise qualified pilot in the 

employment of an airline may not be able to lawfully 

operate a commercial aircraft on a given day. For example, 

he may have flown on a number of days or hours the 

preceding day or days that required him to be off duty on 

the day in question. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 117.5, 117.23, 

117.25; see also id. § 91.17(a)(2) (intoxication); id. 

§ 91.17(a)(3) (use of certain drugs). Thus, under the 

majority’s logic, someone who would otherwise qualify for 

the exception but who happened to be on his “required rest 

period” on December 13, 2007 would not qualify because, 

as the majority says, he “could not have been lawfully 

engaged in any such operations on December 13, 2007.” 

See 14 C.F.R. § 117.25(a) (“No certificate holder may 

assign and no flightcrew member may accept assignment to 

any . . . duty with the certificate holder during any required 

rest period.”). Similarly, otherwise qualifying pilots taking 

certain prescription drugs, or who consumed alcohol on 

December 13, 2007, would not qualify for the exception. 

See id. § 91.17(a)(2) (“No person may act . . . as a 

crewmember of a civil aircraft . . . [w]hile under the 

influence of alcohol.”); id. § 91.17(a)(3) (“No person may 

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WEILAND V. AMERICAN AIRLINES 11

act . . . as a crewmember of a civil aircraft . . . [w]hile using 

any drug that affects the person’s faculties in any way 

contrary to safety.”).

The majority also argues that Weiland was not a 

“required flight deck crew member” because far from being 

“required” he was in fact “prohibited from being a ‘flight 

deck crew member.’” The question, however, is not 

whether Weiland was himself individually required, but 

whether “pilots,” as a category, are “required.” In fact, 

under the majority’s logic no one in a major airline would 

probably qualify because it can hardly be said that any 

individual pilot is truly “required.” Except in exceptional 

circumstances, there will likely be a replacement 

reasonably available. Furthermore, as with the majority’s 

first argument, it follows from the majority’s reasoning that 

someone who was disqualified from lawfully operating a 

commercial aircraft on December 13, 2007 for any of the 

multiple reasons that I mentioned above would not be a 

“required flight deck crew member” and would not qualify 

for the exception in § 44729(e)(1)(A).

I doubt that is what Congress intended, and it is 

certainly not what it wrote in the statute. The exception it 

made for pilots who were 60 as of the date of enactment 

and employed by the air carrier on that date fits Weiland to 

a T. I respectfully dissent.

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