Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_12-cv-00687/USCOURTS-almd-1_12-cv-00687-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

 SOUTHERN DIVISION

KENNETH W. DAVIDSON, #274 925, ) 

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO.: 1:12-CV-687-WKW

) [WO]

WARDEN SHARON )

MCSWAIN-HOLLAND, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is pending before the court on a complaint filed by

Plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated at the Coffee County Jail in New Brockton, Alabama. 

Plaintiff brings this lawsuit seeking to challenge the actions of correctional officials

regarding three incidents which occurred during his incarceration at the Elba Community

Based Facility/Work Center in July 2012, which Plaintiff alleges subjected him to racial

discrimination in violation of his right to equal protection. Named as defendants are Sharon

McSwain-Holland, Chief Steward Jesse Youngblood, and Sergeant Crystal Smith-James. 

For relief, Plaintiff requests that he receive punitive damages, that Defendants be "held liable

for their indiscretions," and that he be assured that neither Defendants nor the ADOC will

subject him to retribution or retaliation. Doc. No. 1.

Pursuant to the orders of this court, Defendants filed an answer, special report, and

supporting evidentiary material addressing Plaintiff’s claims for relief. Doc. Nos. 14, 15. 

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The court then informed Plaintiff that Defendants’ special report may, at any time, be treated

as a motion for summary judgment, and the court explained to Plaintiff the proper manner

in which to respond to a motion for summary judgment. Doc. No. 17. Plaintiff filed a

response to the special report. Doc. No. 18. This case is now pending on Defendants’ motion

for summary judgment. Upon consideration of the motion, the evidentiary materials filed in

support thereof, and Plaintiff’ opposition to the motion, the court concludes that Defendants’

motion for summary judgment is due to be granted.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no

genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.’” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir.

2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) (“The court shall

grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). The party moving 1

for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including pleadings,

Effective December 1, 2010, Rule 56 was “revised to improve the procedures for presenting and

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deciding summary-judgment motions.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes. Under this revision,

“[s]ubdivision (a) carries forward the summary-judgment standard expressed in former subdivision (c), changing

only one word -- genuine ‘issue’ becomes genuine ‘dispute.’ ‘Dispute’ better reflects the focus of a summaryjudgment determination.” Id. “‘Shall’ is also restored to express the direction to grant summary judgment.” Id. 

Thus, although Rule 56 underwent stylistic changes, its substance remains the same and, therefore, all cases citing

the prior versions of the rule remain equally applicable to the current rule. 

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discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine

[dispute] of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant

may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact

or by showing the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence to support some element

on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-324.

 Defendants have met their evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of any

genuine dispute of material fact. Thus, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to establish, with

appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. 

Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324;

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to

properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required [by citing to materials in the

record including affidavits, relevant documents or other materials] the court may ... grant

summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials -- including the facts considered

undisputed -- show that the movant is entitled to it.”) A genuine dispute of material fact

exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263. Consequently, to survive

Defendants’ properly supported motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff must produce

“sufficient [favorable] evidence” which would be admissible at trial supporting his claims

for relief. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Rule 56(e), Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. “If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely

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colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson,

477 U.S. at 249-250 (internal citations omitted). “A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting

the opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the

[trier of fact] could reasonably find for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242,

106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th

Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations based on subjective beliefs likewise cannot create a

genuine issue of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice to oppose a motion for summary

judgment. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997) (plaintiff’s

“conclusoryassertions ..., in the absence of[admissible] supporting evidence, are insufficient

to withstand summary judgment.”); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11th Cir. 1995)

(grant of summary judgment appropriate where inmate produces nothing beyond his own

conclusoryallegations challenging actions ofthe defendants); Fullman v.Graddick, 739F.2d

553, 557 (11th Cir. 1984) (“mere verification of party’s own conclusory allegations is not

sufficient to oppose summary judgment....”). Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set forth

specific facts supported by requisite evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to his case and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial,

summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at

323 (“[F]ailure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”); Barnes v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc.,

814 F.2d 607, 609 (11th Cir. 1987) (If on any part of the prima facie case the plaintiff

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presents insufficient evidence to require submission of the case to the trier of fact, granting

of summary judgment is appropriate).

For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are relevant. 

United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74 Avenue, Miami, th

Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the

substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Secretary of the

Dept. of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Only factual

disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will preclude entry

of summary judgment.”). “The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat

summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome

of the case.” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003).

To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material

facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for

the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine [dispute] for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.

Ltd., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (internal citations omitted). In

cases where the evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which can be

reduced to admissible form indicates there is no genuine dispute of material fact and

establishes the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law,

summary judgment is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-324 (Summary judgment is

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appropriate where pleadings, evidentiarymaterials and affidavits before the court show there

is no genuine dispute on a requisite material fact.); Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental

Associates, Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001) (to establish a genuine dispute of

material fact, the nonmoving partymust produce evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact

could return a verdict in his favor.).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts, a

pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine

dispute of material fact. See Beard, 548 U.S. at 525; Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670

(11th Cir. 1990). Thus, Plaintiff’s pro se status alone does not mandate this court’s disregard

of elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case. Here, Plaintiff fails to

demonstrate a requisite genuine dispute of material fact in order to preclude summary

judgment. 

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff claims that Defendants subjected him to racial discrimination once on July

25, 2012, and twice on July 30, 2012. Regarding the incident on July 25, Plaintiff was

working outside at the canteen storage trailer when chow was called. Plaintiff complains that, 

when he arrived at the chow hall at 12:20 p.m., Defendant Youngblood refused to feed him

but allowed two African-American inmates who had also been on the Compound to eat. Doc.

No. 1 at 3. 

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Plaintiff also alleges that a racially discriminatory incident occurred at 10:00 a.m. on

July 30, 2012. He alleges that an African-American inmate at the work release center was

found in possession of contraband on July 22, 2012. The inmate claimed that he obtained the

contraband from the laundry facilitywhere two African-American inmates worked, but then

changed his story and alleged that he got the contraband from maintenance. Plaintiff was the

only inmate who worked at maintenance. Although Defendant Smith-James absolved

Plaintiff of any wrongdoing in the incident, Plaintiff complains that he was subsequently

removed from his job at maintenance. The African-American inmates who worked in the

laundry received no punishment and, although the inmate caught with the contraband was

placed in lock-up, Defendant McSwain-Holland "allowed [him] to E.O.S on 7-29-2012 with

no loss of privileges nor good time removed or taken." Doc. No. 1 at 3-4. 

The third incident of alleged race discrimination occurred on July 30, 2012, at 7:55

p.m. After his shower, Plaintiff stopped at the officer's station to pick up various hygiene

articles but "was denied." An African-American inmate who showered at the same time as

Plaintiff "received his about (3) min[utes] after [Plaintiff’s] leaving the station." Doc. No.

1 at 4.

A. Defendant Smith-James

In his opposition, Plaintiff indicates that the conduct of Defendant Smith-James about

which he complains “may have been an oversight by her because it has not happened again.”

Doc. No. 18. Plaintiff indicates that he does not oppose her dismissal from this case. Id. To

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the extent that Plaintiff’s opposition contains a motion to dismiss Defendant Smith-James 

from this cause of action, the court concludes that the motion should be granted. 

B. Equal Protection

"Despite the tendency of all rights 'to declare themselves absolute to their logical

extreme,' there are obviously limits beyond which the equal protection analysis may not be

pressed... . The Fourteenth Amendment 'does not require absolute equality or precisely

equal advantages,'... nor does it require the State to 'equalize [prison] conditions.'" Ross

v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611-612 (1974) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted); Hammond

v. Auburn University, 669 F. Supp. 1555, 1563 (M.D. Ala. 1987) ("The Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require all persons to be treated either

identically or equally."). To present a claim of discrimination cognizable under the Equal

Protection Clause, "a prisoner must [at a minimum] demonstrate that (1) he is similarly

situated to other prisoners who received more favorable treatment; and (2) the state

engaged in invidious discrimination against him based on race, religion, national origin,

or some other constitutionally protected basis. Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 946-47 (11th

Cir. 2001); Damiano v. Florida Parole and Prob. Comm’n, 785 F.2d 929, 932-33 (11th

Cir. 1986)." Sweet v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 467 F.3d 1311, 1318-1319

(11th Cir. 2006). "[O]fficial action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it

results in a racially disproportionate impact.... Proof of racially discriminatory intent or

purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." Village of

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Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-265

(1977). "'Discriminatory purpose' ... implies more than intent as volition or intent as

awareness of consequences. It implies that the decision maker ... selected ... a particular

course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon

an identifiable group." Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,

279 (1979) (footnote omitted)(citation omitted);see also Hernandez v.NewYork, 500 U.S.

352, 359 (1991). 

In a case such as this one, in which Plaintiff challenges actions of correctional

officials, an inmate's conclusory allegations are insufficient, as exceptionally clear proof of

discrimination is required. Fuller v. Georgia State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 851 F.2d

1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 1988). Mere differential treatment of similarly situated inmates,

without more, fails to allege a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Sweet, 467 F.3d at

319; E & T Realty Company v. Strickland, 830 F.2d 1107 (11th Cir. 1987); McKleskey v.

Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (claims of mere disparity of treatment or even arbitrary

administration of state power are insufficient to establish discrimination violative of equal

protection).

Defendants deny that they acted in violation of Plaintiff’s equal protection rights.

Defendant Youngblood maintains that Plaintiff entered the kitchen at approximately 12:45

p.m. and stood in front of the serving line, which had been disassembled for clean up.

Plaintiff told Defendant Youngblood that he wanted a tray. The steward informed Plaintiff

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that chow call had ended, to which Plaintiff responded “to hell with it!” and walked away.

Doc. No. 15, Exh. 2. Defendant McSwain-Holland states that inmate job assignments may

be changed at any time, and that Plaintiff’s dismissal fromhis maintenance shop job occurred

based on Defendant McSwain-Holland’s decision that this was in the best interest of the

smooth running ofthe Elba CommunityBased Facility. She indicates further that, in addition

to two black inmates working at the laundry during the incident in question, two white

inmates also worked there. Additionally, the inmate found in possession of contraband was 2

released from prison based on a provision regulated by the judicial system. Id. at Exh. 1. 

Since this case is before the court on a properly supported motion for summary

judgment, Plaintiff must produce specific, substantial evidence that Defendants intentionally

discriminated against him due to his race. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265. Purposeful

discrimination can be shown either by direct evidence, i.e., admissions of the defendant, or

indirectly by way of circumstantial evidence. Id. at 266. A plaintiff, however, cannot rest on

conclusoryallegations of a constitutional violation to defeat summary judgment, nor is “[t]he

mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of [his] position” sufficient to avoid

summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252. Instead, a plaintiff must

present significant probative evidence to preclude summary judgment in favor of the

Plaintiff asserts that only one white inmate worked at the laundry and was off duty when the

2

contraband incident occurred. Doc. No. 18. These facts, taken as true, do not create a genuine dispute of

material fact regarding Plaintiff’s equal protection claim for the reasons explained. Further, although

Plaintiff complains that the inmate in possession of contraband was not subject to any penalties for his

behavior, he states in his complaint that this inmate was placed in a lock-up cell. Doc. No. 1 at 4.

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defendant. Id. at 249. 

The sole basis for Plaintiff’s equal protection claims relies exclusively on his being

penalized for his conduct, while black inmates who engaged in allegedly similar conduct

were not subject to any repercussions. However, even if Plaintiff and the African-American

inmates that he alleges received more favorable treatment are similarly situated, Plaintiff has

presented no evidence that racial discrimination or purpose constituted a motivating factor

regarding the conduct about which he complains. The circumstantial evidence presented, and

the inconsistencies identified by Plaintiff, warrant no inference of discriminatory intent. A

showing of disparate impact upon two racially diverse inmates is insufficient to demonstrate

an equal protection violation. E & T Realty, 830 F.2d at 1114; Horner v. Kentucky High

School Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265, 276 (6th Cir. 1994). The arbitrary application of

administrative rules likewise does not run afoul of the Constitution. E & T Realty, 830 F.2d

at 1114. 

Here, Plaintiff simply makes the conclusory legal assertion that Defendant

Youngblood’s failure to serve him a lunch after the chow hall closed, and Defendant

McSwain-Holland’s decision to remove him from an institutional job assignment, resulted

from racial discrimination because similarly situated black inmates were not treated in the

same manner. The evidentiary materials filed by Defendants indicate that Plaintiff’s

treatment was based on facts and circumstances wholly unrelated to his race and was not the

result of purposeful discrimination, and Plaintiff has offered no probative evidence to the

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contrary. “Exact equality is no prerequisite of equal protection of the laws within the

meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment." Norvell v. State of Ill., 373 U.S. 420, 423 (1963). 

Here, other than Plaintiff’s conclusoryallegationsthatthe actions of Defendants Youngblood

and McSwain-Holland were intentionally discriminatory, the record is devoid of any proof

that the conduct about which he complains occurred intentionally because he is white.

Summary judgment is, therefore, due to be granted in favor of Defendants Youngblood and

McSwain-Holland. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. 317.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss Defendant Smith-James (Doc. No. 18) be

GRANTED and this defendant be DISMISSED with prejudice; 

2. Defendants Youngblood’s and McSwain-Holland’s motion forsummaryjudgment

(Doc. No. 15), be GRANTED;

3. Judgment be ENTERED in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff; and

4. This case be DISMISSED with prejudice.

It is further 

ORDERED that on or before February 10, 2015, the parties may file an objection to

the Recommendation. Any objection filed must specifically identify the findings in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which a party objects. Frivolous, conclusive or

general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised this

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Recommendation is not a final order and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file a written objection to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the

District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar a party from attacking

on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the District Court

except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d

404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See

also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), adopting as

binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the

close of business on September 30, 1981.

DONE, this 27 day of January, 2015. th

/s/ Susan Russ Walker 

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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