Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00420/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00420-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 05:704 Labor Litigation

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BEATRIZ ALDAPA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FOWLER PACKING COMPANY INC., et 

al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:15-cv-00420-DAD-SAB

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS‟ 

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER 

RESPONSES AT PLAINTIFFS‟ 

DEPOSITIONS

ECF No. 54

Currently before the Court is Defendants‟ motion to compel further responses at 

Plaintiffs‟ depositions. (ECF No. 54). 

The hearing on the matter took place on March 16, 2016. Mario Martinez and Erica 

Deutsch appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs. Howard Sagaser and Ian Wieland appeared on behalf 

of Defendants. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants‟ motion to compel further responses 

at Plaintiffs‟ depositions is granted.

I.

BACKGROUND

The complaint in this action was filed on March 17, 2015. (ECF No. 2.) Plaintiffs

Beatriz Aldapa and Elmer Avalos (“Plaintiffs”) raise claims on behalf of a proposed class of 

non-exempt agricultural employees of Defendants Fowler Packing Company Inc., AG Force 

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LLC, and Fowler Marketing International LLC (“Defendants”) who performed uncompensated 

work in Defendants‟ fields in or near Fresno County within the past four years, excluding

irrigators, tractor drivers, and swampers. Plaintiffs raise nine causes of action: 1) for violation of 

the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (29 U.S.C. § 1801, et seq.); 2) for 

failure to provide rest periods; 3) for failure to pay all wages owed under established 

employment contracts; 4) for failing to pay overtime; 5) for failing to pay minimum wages; 6) 

for failing to pay waiting time penalties; 7) for failing to provide tools necessary to the 

performance of a job and failing to provide reimbursement for tool expenses; 8) for violation of 

California Business and Professions Code § 17200; and 9) for failing to keep accurate statements 

on hours worked and wages earned.

Plaintiffs are seasonal agricultural workers involved in the cultivation and harvest of fruit 

grown by Defendants. Plaintiffs allege that they have not been fully compensated by Defendants 

for all of their time worked. Plaintiffs allege that their pay is calculated under one of three 

methods: 1) hourly wages; 2) piece rate for certain work; and 3) a crew piece rate determined by 

total production by a crew, to be divided evenly among individual members of the crew. 

Plaintiffs contend that they were not paid for off-the-clock work while organizing materials and 

equipment for work and were not paid while attending training sessions. Plaintiffs further 

contend that they did not receive required rest breaks.

Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants added “ghost workers” to crew lists, which resulted 

in a reduction in pay for jobs paid by the crew piece rate. Plaintiffs contend that supervisors 

added fictitious names to crew lists, resulting in actual crew members receiving less pay when 

the piece rate was divided among members of the crew, including fictitious members.

Plaintiffs also allege that they were required to provide their own tools necessary for 

working, and Defendants did not reimburse Plaintiffs for those tools.

On July 28, 2015, the Court issued a pretrial scheduling order. (ECF No. 22.) The Court 

ordered Plaintiffs to file a motion for class certification no later than April 25, 2016. 

On March 2, 2016, the parties filed a Joint Statement re Discovery Disagreement for 

Defendants‟ motion to compel further responses at Plaintiffs‟ depositions. (ECF No 54.) On 

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March 4, 2016, the Court set Defendants‟ motion to compel for hearing on March 16, 2016. 

(ECF No. 55.) 

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any 

party‟s claim or defense. . . . Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible 

in evidence to be discoverable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 

Depositions are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30, which states, in 

pertinent part:

(c) Examination and Cross-Examination; Record of the 

Examination; Objections; Written Questions.

(2) Objections. An objection at the time of the examination—

whether to evidence, to a party‟s conduct, to the officer‟s 

qualifications, to the manner of taking the deposition, or to any 

other aspect of the deposition—must be noted on the record, but 

the examination still proceeds; the testimony is taken subject to 

any objection. An objection must be stated concisely in a 

nonargumentative and nonsuggestive manner. A person may 

instruct a deponent not to answer only when necessary to preserve 

a privilege, to enforce a limitation ordered by the court, or to 

present a motion under Rule 30(d)(3). 

Motions to compel are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, which states, in 

pertinent part:

(a) Motion for an Order Compelling Disclosure or Discovery.

(3) Specific Motions.

(B) To Compel a Discovery Response. A party seeking discovery 

may move for an order compelling an answer, designation, 

production, or inspection. This motion may be made if:

(i) a deponent fails to answer a question asked under Rule 30 or 31.

If the motion to compel is granted, the court must, after giving an opportunity to be 

heard, require the deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion to pay the movant‟s 

reasonable expenses including attorney‟s fees. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). 

Rule 37(a)(5)(A) provides:

But the court must not order this payment if:

(i) the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to 

obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action;

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(ii) the opposing party‟s nondisclosure, response, or objection was 

substantially justified; or

(iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.

III.

DISCUSSION

The instant discovery dispute concerns two main discovery issues: 1) the refusal by 

Plaintiffs‟ counsel to allow Plaintiffs Elmer Avalos and Beatriz Aldapa to answer questions 

during their depositions regarding the identities of putative class members who attended 

meetings with Plaintiffs‟ counsel; and 2) Defendants‟ request to reopen Mr. Avalos‟s deposition 

because Mr. Avalos made changes to his deposition transcript after review. 

In the instant case, Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence determines applicable 

privileges in this federal action. Fed. R. Evid. 501; Star Editorial, Inc. v. U.S. District Court, 7 

F.3d 856, 859 (9th Cir. 1993). 

A. Questions During Mr. Avalos’s and Ms. Aldapa’s Depositions Regarding the 

Identities of Putative Class Members Who Attended Meetings with Plaintiffs’ 

Counsel

Defendants argue that Mr. Avalos and Ms. Aldapa should have answered questions 

during depositions regarding the identities of putative class members who attended meetings 

with Plaintiffs‟ counsel. Defendants contend that no privilege applies to the identity of those 

individuals who attended the meetings. Plaintiffs argue that disclosure of the names of the 

putative class members who attended the meetings will result in a risk that potential class 

members may be harassed, intimidated and coerced in connection with the opt-out discovery 

notice or for other reasons.

In the joint statement, Defendants state:

When Defense counsel attempted to lay the foundation during Ms. 

Aldapa‟s deposition as to whether the information discussed at 

these meetings was protected by a privilege, Mr. Martinez directed 

his client not to answer and asserted the following:

“Based on the privilege under both NLRB and ALRB law that the 

identity of works that participate in meetings involving a wage an 

hour cases is considered protected concerted activity and the 

identity of those participants is protected from discovery.” 

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(Aldapa, p. 35:21-36:1.) 

(ECF No. 54 at 4.)1

At the hearing, the Court requested that the parties submit a copy of the relevant portions 

of the deposition transcripts where Plaintiffs‟ counsel asserted the privilege. On March 16, 2016, 

Defendants lodged the relevant portion of the deposition transcript of Ms. Aldapa. (ECF No. 

59.) The relevant portion of the deposition transcript of Ms. Aldapa states:

MR: SAGASER: Well, you‟re precluding me from asking 

it here, if I ask her to give me the names.

Just so the record is clear, if I ask her who are the names of 

the people who were present at the May meeting, the March 

meeting, the August meeting, your instruction to her would be the 

same for her not to answer and what would be the privilege? 

MR. MARTINEZ: Well, what we can do is we would be 

willing to do something expedited where you can tell me what you 

want to see and we could say instead of 30 days, two weeks to 

respond, because I do have authority on this issue to discuss with 

you. I don‟t want to take up your deposition time.

MR. SAGASER: I just want to make sure the record is 

clear that if I ask her all those questions that you would instruct her 

not to answer based on what privilege? 

MR: MARTINEZ: Based on the privilege under both 

NLRB and ALRB law that the identity of workers that participate 

in meetings involving wage an[d] hour cases is considered 

protected concerted activity and the identity of those participants is 

protected from discovery. That would be the basis.

And also the basis for any information concerning 

discussion would be attorney/client privilege because at this point 

putative class members or absent class members do have an 

attorney/client relationship with the attorneys in the case. 

(Aldapa Depo. at 35: 5-36:7).2

On March 17, 2016, Plaintiffs lodged the relevant portions of the deposition transcript of 

 

1 The Court‟s references to page numbers are the ECF page numbers stamped at the top right hand corner of the 

page.

2 On March 17, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a notice of objection to the lodging of documents by Defendants. (ECF No. 

61.) Plaintiffs object to Defendants‟ lodging of pages 149-152 of the deposition transcript of Ms. Aldapa. Plaintiffs 

argue that these pages do not address the Court‟s request to lodge deposition transcript excerpts relating to 

objections made to questions inquiring as to the identity of individuals who attended meetings with counsel about 

this lawsuit. The Court notes that on page 151 of the deposition transcript of Ms. Aldapa is a reference to Plaintiffs‟ 

counsels‟ objection to the questions regarding the people at the meetings. (Aldapa Depo. 151:16-22.) However, the 

Court notes that it did not consider pages 149-152 of the deposition transcript of Ms. Aldapa in reaching its decision 

on the instant motion. The parties are reminded that depositions should be conducted according to the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Local Rules, and the Rules of Professional Conduct.

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Mr. Avalos. (ECF No. 60.) The relevant portion of the deposition transcript of Mr. Avalos 

states:

Q. Whose idea was it to go to the UFW Foundation?

A. Both of ours.

Q. Anyone else?

MR. GOTTLIEB: I'm going to object to that, to him

answering any questions about any union-related activity. 

That's protected activity and, frankly, asking this employee

about those activities and specifically naming names, is itself

an unfair labor practice under the Agricultural Labor

Relations Act.

MR. WIELAND: Specifically, as we sit here today,

this is about a wage-an-hour class action. And Mr. Martinez

made the same objections on the record. And I'm asking

about percipient witnesses regarding the wage-an-hour class

action. I'm limiting my questions to what's at issue here

today, which is this lawsuit. And the line of cases that Mr.

Martinez cited yesterday involve actions that were initiated

by employers.

In this case when the employer is being sued and is

looking at percipient witnesses, we don't believe those cases

apply. Also, yesterday Mr. Martinez represented that

plaintiff's counsel was representing the putative class and that's

just simply not true. Counsel, doesn't represent the putative

class members until the class was certified. So we're allowed

to ascertain who the percipient witnesses are and discover

what they know.

And if you want to put on the record here objections 

and instruct your client not to answer the names of the

employees that attended meetings regarding the lawsuit,

initiating the lawsuit and whose idea it was to start the

lawsuit, feel free to do that. We can meet and confer over

those issues.

MR. GOTTLIEB: Well, that is exactly what I will do,

is to instruct this witness not to further answer any questions

about the names of people who attended any meetings

concerning the lawsuit other than, obviously, you know about

the two named plaintiffs and certainly whose idea it was

further than you already have explored that and we disagree. 

There's an associational right and there's an unfair labor

practice that are perpetrated if you continue to ask these

questions.

There's also, the associational right, I don't think we

brought up yesterday, there's a case called Britt versus

Superior Court, there's another case called UFW versus

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Superior Court and there's another case called Coors v.

Wallace, all involving associational rights and limits. And

there are other cases. I won't burden the record with those at

this point.

And we should meet and confer over those if defense

feels it needs to get into that in a way that we think is

threatening and beyond the scope of what's really needed in

this lawsuit.

MR. WIELAND: Okay. So just to be clear, you're

instructing the witness not to answer questions regarding

whose idea it was to start the lawsuit, names of employees

that met regarding the lawsuit?

MR. GOTTLIEB: I think it may be best to look at

these questions on a case by case basis. But that general line

that was brought up yesterday I'm familiar with is, we stand

by that, so.

MR. WIELAND: Those are the questions I'm about to

ask. So just to make it clear, are you instructing him not to

answer and we can meet and confer over those issues instead

of wasting time.

 MR. GOTTLIEB: Yeah. Yeah.

(Avalos Depo. 16:1-18:22.) 

At the hearing, Plaintiffs‟ counsel represented to the Court that they “instructed [their] 

clients not to answer based on [their] view that the question was illegal under California law and 

that defense counsel had no right to ask the question.” Plaintiffs‟ counsel stated that it was an 

illegal question, as opposed to a privilege. Later during the hearing, Plaintiffs‟ counsel stated 

that there was an assertion of First Amendment privilege during the course of Mr. Avalos‟s 

deposition. Upon review of the deposition transcripts of Ms. Aldapa and Mr. Avalos, the Court 

will review Plaintiffs‟ assertions of attorney-client privilege, privilege pursuant to the ALRB and 

NLRB, and privilege pursuant to the First Amendment. 

1. Attorney-Client Privilege

Plaintiffs contend that the identities of the potential class members who met with class 

counsel and Plaintiffs are protected by attorney-client privilege. Pursuant to California law, the 

client “has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential 

communication between client and lawyer. . . . Cal. Evid. Code § 954. A confidential 

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communication is “information transmitted between a client and his or her lawyer in the course 

of that relationship and in confidence by a means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses 

the information to no third persons other than those who are present to further the interest of the 

client in the consultation or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the 

transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the lawyer is 

consulted, and includes a legal opinion formed and the advice given by the lawyer in the course 

of that relationship.” Cal. Evid. Code § 952. 

The attorney-client privilege is absolute and disclosure cannot be ordered regardless of 

necessity, relevance, or any other circumstance particular in the case. Costco Wholesale Corp. v. 

Superior Court, 47 Cal.4th 725, 732 (2009). The party claiming the privilege has the burden of 

establishing the facts necessary to support a prima facie claim of privilege. Costco Wholesale 

Corp., 47 Cal.4th at 733. Once the party asserting the privilege has met its burden, the 

communication is presumed to be confidential and the party seeking disclosure has the burden to 

establish that the communication was not confidential or that there are other reasons that the 

privilege does not apply. Id. 

Defendants argue that putative class members are not represented by Plaintiffs‟ counsel 

before class certification, so there is no attorney-client relationship between Plaintiffs‟ counsel 

and the putative class members prior to class certification. In this case, the class has not been 

certified yet. Plaintiffs concede that the weight of authority holds that there is no attorney-client 

relationship in the context of communications to the entire putative class prior to class 

certification. See Atari, Inc. v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. App. 3d 867, 873 (1985). 

Plaintiffs argue that because the discrete group of putative class members approached 

counsel regarding potentially pursuing their claims, this created a privilege because it was a 

confidential communication with counsel. See Ross, Johnson, Rosso & Ebersold v. Superior 

Court, 191 Cal. App. 3d 1514, 1518-1519 (1987) (the identity of a client may be treated as 

privileged information where disclosing a client‟s name will betray a confidential 

communication). However, “[a]s a general proposition, client identity and fee arrangements are 

not protected in California by the attorney-client privilege.” Liew v. Breen, 640 F.2d 1046, 1049 

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(9th Cir. 1981) (citing Hays v. Wood, 25 Cal.3d 772 (1979); Brunner v. Superior Court, 51 

Cal.2d 616 (1959)). “Both the California courts and the federal courts recognize, however, that 

such information may come within the ambit of the privilege when the client‟s name itself has an 

independent significance, such that disclosure would uncover client confidences.” Liew, 640 at 

1049 (internal citations omitted). The attorney-client privilege applied to the client‟s identity 

where the witness-attorney made an anonymous tax payment on behalf of a client and the IRS 

sought the disclosure of the identity of the client. See Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 634-35 

(9th Cir. 1960). The disclosure of the client‟s identity was deemed to fall within the purview of 

the attorney-client privilege because disclosing the client‟s identity would have disclosed the 

client‟s communication to the attorney that he thought he owed money to the government. Id. 

Here, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate how disclosure of the identities of the putative 

class members who met with Plaintiffs‟ counsel could lead to the disclosure of any client 

confidences. The putative class members are all farmworkers and employees or former 

employees of Defendants. The meetings were regarding this lawsuit and the putative class 

members‟ rights in this lawsuit. The disclosure of the identities of those who met with class 

counsel will not disclose any client confidences. 

Plaintiffs argue that ordering the disclosure of putative class member names who attended 

meetings would force counsel to violate Rule 1.18 of the American Bar Association Model Rules 

of Professional Conduct to the extent that putative class members relied on Plaintiffs‟ counsels‟ 

assurances that their participation in the meeting with them would be maintained as confidential. 

The fact that Plaintiffs‟ counsel may have made assurances to the putative class members who 

attended the meeting is not sufficient to justify a privilege and deny Defendants‟ motion. As 

stated above, the disclosure of the identities of those who met with class counsel will not disclose 

any client confidences. 

Plaintiffs also argue that they should not be required to disclose the identities of putative 

class members that were obtained through Plaintiffs‟ counsel‟s own industry and effort, citing 

Coito v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 4th 480 (2012). Defendants argue that Coito is distinguishable 

from the instant case. 

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In Coito, the California Supreme Court found that “a recorded witness interview may, in 

some instances, reveal the „impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research and or theories‟ 

of the attorney and thus be entitled to absolute protection,” such as “when the questions that the 

attorney has chosen to ask (or not ask) provide a window into the attorney‟s theory of the case or 

the attorney‟s evaluation of what issues are most important.” Coito, 54 Cal. 4th at 495. Also, 

the California Supreme Court held that “the very fact that the attorney has chosen to interview a 

particular witness may disclose important tactical or evaluative information, perhaps especially 

so in cases involving a multitude of witnesses.” Coito, 54 Cal. 4th at 495. “Absent a showing 

that a witness is no longer available or accessible, or some other showing of unfair prejudice or 

injustice (§ 2018.030, subd. (b)), the Legislature‟s declared policy is to prevent an attorney from 

free-riding on the industry and efforts of opposing counsel (§ 2018.020, subd. (b)).” Coito, 54 

Cal. 4th at 496. Coito is a wrongful death case where plaintiff‟s counsel sought information 

regarding witnesses who provided defense counsel statements regarding a drowning incident. Id. 

The present case is distinguishable from Coito. In Coito, one party‟s counsel attempted 

to use the efforts of the other party‟s counsel to find witnesses and information about the case 

that was readily available to both parties. The Court finds that disclosure will not reveal class 

counsel‟s tactics, impressions, or evaluation of the case. In this matter, Defendants have the 

putative class member list, and after the opt-out notice, Plaintiffs will also have the contact 

information for those putative class members who do not opt-out. The Court finds that 

disclosure of the identities of the potential class members who attended meetings with Plaintiffs 

and class counsel will not result in Defendants‟ counsel taking advantage of the efforts and 

industry of Plaintiffs‟ counsel. 

Therefore, the Court finds that the attorney-client privilege does not apply to the 

identities of the putative class members who met with class counsel and Plaintiffs. 

2. California Agricultural Labor Relations Act

Plaintiffs argue that the putative class members are farmworkers who are protected by the 

California Agricultural Labor Relations Act (“ALRA”) and have the right to engage in concerted 

activity intended to improve their working conditions. Plaintiffs argue that this Court should 

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defer to the ALRB regarding whether Plaintiffs have to disclose the identities of the putative

class members who met with Plaintiffs and class counsel. Defendants did not address the 

preemption issue. In footnote three of the joint statement regarding this discovery dispute, 

Plaintiffs state:

The Agricultural Labor Relations Act (“ALRA”) requires the 

ALRA to follow applicable NLRA precedent. Lab. Code § 1148 

(“The board shall follow applicable precedents of the National 

Labor Relations Act”). In reliance on that precedent, Plaintiffs 

have filed an unfair labor practice charge with the ALRB against 

Defendants for their insistence on seeking the identities of workers 

who attended meetings with Plaintiffs‟ counsel. Preemption 

principles dictate that this Court permit the ALRB to resolve this 

issue in the first instance. Courts are required to defer to labor 

board “determinations [as to unfair labor practices],” which are to 

be left “in the first instance to the National Labor Relations 

Board.” When an activity is arguably subject to NLRA or ALRA 

regulation, “the States as well as the federal courts must defer to 

the exclusive competence of the [NLRB] if the danger of state 

interference with national policy is to be averted.” Building Trades 

Council v. Garmon (1957) 359 U.S. 236, 244-245 (emphasis 

added). The preemption doctrine is equally applicable under the 

ALRA. See, e.g., Kaplan‟s Fruit & Produce v. Sup. Court, 26 

Cal.3d 60, 70 (1979). Because the conduct at issue is arguably 

regulated by the ALRA, the Court should defer to the ALRB‟s 

investigative process. 

(ECF No. 54 at 20 n.3.) 

The Court finds that Plaintiffs‟ preemption argument is inapposite because the instant 

dispute involves discovery in a federal class action lawsuit for wage and hour violations. 

Further, the issue is not one of preemption, but whether the information sought is privileged 

within the meaning of Fed. R. Evid. 501, et seq. The Court clearly has the ability to oversee and 

issue orders regarding discovery in a federal class action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d). Therefore, 

the Court finds that it is not preempted from deciding the instant motion. 

Plaintiffs argue that employees have the right to engage in concerted activity intended to 

improve their working conditions. Plaintiffs also argue that employer questions during or in 

anticipation of litigation about protected concerted activity can violate the NLRA by tending to 

interfere with the exercise of employee rights. See Tower Indus., 349 N.L.R.B. 1077 (2007); 

Guess? Inc., 339 N.L.R.B. 432 (2003). Defendants argue that the ALRB and ALRA are 

inapplicable to the instant discovery matter. 

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Plaintiffs have not presented any case law that supports their argument that the ALRA 

protections are privileges that are applicable to federal class action discovery matters. Courts 

have supervisory authority pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(d) to regulate 

communications in order to protect the interests of class members. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d). 

This matter is a matter before the district court, and not the NLRB or ALRB. Therefore, the 

Court has the ability to regulate the discovery before it and it is not required, nor was authority 

provided, which requires a federal court to adhere to decisions by the NLRB or ALRB in 

ascertaining privileges for use in federal court actions

Furthermore, even if the Court considers the applicable standard under the ALRA that the 

ALRB uses for determining whether an employer‟s deposition questions were lawful, the Court 

finds that Defendants‟ questions were appropriate and Plaintiffs‟ privilege claim is inapplicable. 

In Guess? Inc., 339 N.L.R.B. at 434, the National Labor Relations Board held that the 

analysis for determining the lawfulness of when employees are interrogated during depositions 

about their union activity is: 1) whether the questioning is relevant; 2) whether it had an illegal 

objective; and 3) whether the need for information outweighs the employees‟ rights under the 

National Labor Relations Act. 

The Court finds that the information sought is relevant to the instant class action lawsuit, 

and there is no evidence in the record that Defendants have an illegal objective under the ALRA. 

Also, the Court notes that the parties will not initiate communications with putative class 

members during the twenty-one day opt-out period and the five day period of time for the mail to 

be received. Therefore, Plaintiffs‟ concerns for the disclosure of the identities because of 

potential coercion for signing the opt-out postcards are now moot by the Court‟s order on the 

opt-out disclosure notice, which restricts the parties from initiating communications with the 

putative class members during the twenty-one day opt-out disclosure period and the five day 

period of time for the mail to be received. The Court finds that the employees‟ confidentiality 

interests are outweighed by Defendants‟ need for this information. As stated above, Defendants 

seek the identities of the putative class members who met with Plaintiffs‟ counsel regarding this 

lawsuit. Plaintiffs‟ counsel has stated that the meetings were only regarding this lawsuit, and did 

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not involve any union activity. Therefore, even if the Court considers the ALRB‟s three-part test 

in determining whether an employer‟s deposition questions were lawful, the Court finds that 

Defendants‟ deposition questions regarding the identities of the putative class members who 

attended meetings with Plaintiffs‟ counsel did not violate the ALRA. The Court finds that 

Plaintiffs‟ assertion of privilege under the ALRA and NLRA does not apply. 

Defendants ask the Court to stay Plaintiffs‟ pending charge before the ALRB regarding 

Defendants‟ deposition questioning. However, Defendants have not provided any authority that

the Court has the power to stay a matter before the ALRB. Therefore, Defendants‟ request for 

the Court to stay Plaintiffs‟ pending charge before the ALRB regarding Defendants‟ deposition 

questioning is denied. 

3. First Amendment Protection

Plaintiffs argue that the First Amendment of the United States Constitution bars 

disclosure of the identities of employees who meet to discuss protected concerted activity. 

Plaintiffs argue that workers have the right to assembly, free speech and petition. Defendants 

reply that Plaintiffs‟ First Amendment argument is displaced because this is not a situation where 

the group espouses dissident beliefs. 

Courts advert to balancing three factors when conducting the compelling 

interest/substantial relation inquiry to determine whether First Amendment privilege applies: the 

relevance of the information sought, the need for that information, and the extent of injury that 

disclosure may cause to associational rights. See Black Panther Party, 661 F.2d 1243, 1268 (D.C. 

Cir. 1981); Adolph Coors Co. v. Wallace, 570 F. Supp. 202, 208 (N.D. Cal. 1983). The party 

seeking disclosure bears the burden of proving that the balance of these factors weighs in his 

favor. Id. 

Here, Defendants seek the identities of the putative class members who met with class 

counsel and Plaintiffs. Defendants are not seeking an anonymous member list or information 

from a group that espouses dissident beliefs. There is not a dissident organization in the 

background, such as the Ku Klux Klan, Black Panthers, etc. The putative class members are 

farmworkers who are or were employed by Defendants and who are seeking 

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class certification in federal court for their proposed class. Plaintiffs have not shown that 

Defendants are likely to harass or retaliate against the individuals who have met with Plaintiffs 

and class counsel. There has been no indication that Defendants have engaged in any 

inappropriate conduct in this case. Disclosing the identities of the potential class members who 

met with Plaintiffs and class counsel will not have a chilling effect on the putative class 

members‟ First Amendment rights. Furthermore, the information that Defendants seek to obtain 

is relevant to their case. Defendants indicate that they may depose putative class members that 

Plaintiffs may elicit testimony from to support Plaintiffs‟ motion for class certification. 

Accordingly, the Court does not find that Plaintiffs‟ claim of First Amendment privilege should 

be applied to preclude discovery in the instant case. 

4. Plaintiffs Should Have Answered Defendants‟ Questions Regarding the Identities 

of the Putative Class Members Who Attended the Meetings 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs were not entitled to assert a 

privilege for not answering Defendants‟ questions regarding the identities of the putative class 

members who attended meetings with Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs‟ counsel. Plaintiffs should have 

answered Defendants‟ questions regarding the identities of the putative class members who 

attended the meetings with Plaintiffs‟ counsel regarding this lawsuit.

B. Reopening of Plaintiff Elmer Avalos’s Deposition Because of Changes Made 

to Deposition Transcript

Defendants argue that Plaintiff Elmer Avalos‟s deposition should be reopened because 

Mr. Avalos made multiple significant changes to his deposition transcript that rendered the 

deposition useless or incomplete absent further deposition. Defendants argue that Mr. Avalos 

completely changed his answers from unequivocally stating he was being paid hourly and not 

piece rate, to that he was paid piece rate. Further, Defendants argue that these changes 

materially affect the testimony because they would have elicited further questions if Mr. Avalos 

had answered that he was paid piece rate. Defendants state that based on Mr. Avalos‟s 

unequivocal “yes” or “no” responses to questions at the deposition, further questions were not 

required.

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Plaintiffs respond that Mr. Avalos permissibly made changes to his deposition transcript 

pursuant to Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Avalos 

provided complete and thorough explanations for the changes to his deposition testimony, and 

did so in a timely manner. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(e) reads, in pertinent part, that:

[i]f requested by the deponent or a party before completion of the 

deposition, the deponent shall have 30 days after being notified by 

the officer that the transcript or recording is available in which to 

review the transcript or recording and, if there are changes in form 

or substance, to sign a statement reciting such changes and the 

reasons given by the deponent for making them.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(e).

The Court notes that the parties do not dispute that Mr. Avalos made permissible changes 

to his deposition transcript pursuant to Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that 

he did so in a timely manner. The only issue is whether the changes by Mr. Avalos to the 

deposition transcript rendered his testimony useless or incomplete absent further deposition. 

Plaintiffs argue that the changes do not render his testimony incomplete. Plaintiffs point 

out that Defendants have not explained what follow-up questions they would have asked. 

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants seek to harass Mr. Avalos for exercising his right to make the 

changes to his deposition transcript. Plaintiffs argue that the changed answers are not material, 

unverifiable, or unexplained so as to warrant reopening the deposition. Plaintiffs also argue that 

the cases where depositions are reopened are ones where the deponent did not provide an 

explanation for the change to the deposition transcript. 

However, it is clear that a deposition may be reopened where the changed answers result 

in the deposition being incomplete without additional testimony. See Herring v. Teradyne, Inc., 

2002 WL 32068318 (S.D. Cal. 2002); Lugtig v. Thomas, 89 F.R.D. 639, 642 (N.D. Ill. 1981); 

Colin v. Thompson, 16 F.R.D. 194, 194-95 (W.D. Mo. 1954). Plaintiff is correct that the district 

court in Lugtig addressed whether the deponent complied with Rule 30(e). Lugtig, 89 F.R.D. at 

641-42. In Lugtig, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois addressed both whether 

the changes by the deponent to the deposition transcript were properly done pursuant to Rule 

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30(e) and whether the deposition should be reopened based on the changes. Id. However, the 

district court in Lugtig also addressed whether the changes by the deponent justified allowing the 

deposing party to reopen the deposition. Lugtig, 89 F.R.D. at 642. In Lugtig, the district court 

did not reopen the deposition because of non-compliance with Rule 30(e), but “because of the 

number and type of changes made by the defendant-deponent.” Id. 

In Colin v. Thompson, 16 F.R.D. 194, 195 (W.D. Mo. 1954), the District Court for the 

Western District of Missouri addressed the issue of reopening a deposition when material 

changes are made even if changes comply with Rule 30(e):

Whether his reasons are good or not will not impair his right to 

make the changes, if made in the way stated in Rule 30(e), but if 

those changes, when made, destroy the usefulness of the deposition 

(as those heretofore improperly made do), then the deposition will 

not have been finalized, and the plaintiff will be subject to further 

examination.

Colin v. Thompson, 16 F.R.D. at 195. 

Furthermore, in Lugtig, the Court found that “[s]ince it is defendant's actions which 

necessitate reopening the examination of defendant, the costs and attorneys fees connected with 

the continued deposition will be borne by defendant.” Id. (citing Colin v. Thompson, 16 F.R.D. 

at 195). 

Here, Mr. Avalos made seventeen changes to his deposition transcript. (ECF No. 54-1.) 

He changed his answers from stating that he was being paid hourly and not piecework, to that he 

was paid piecework. One change to the deposition transcript was changing “[t]he checks would 

end up as an hourly rate” to “[t]he checks would end up paying us below the piece rate promised 

or understood.” (ECF No. 54-1 at 3.) Another change to the deposition transcript was changing 

“[t]hey paid us hourly all the time. They never paid us piecework” to “[t]hey never properly paid 

us for piecework.” (ECF No. 54-1 at 3.) He made these changes reflecting that he was actually 

paid piecework in multiple places to his deposition testimony. 

The Court finds that these are changes that render his deposition incomplete without 

additional testimony. Defendants did not ask further questions of Mr. Avalos because of his 

answers that he was paid hourly and not paid piecework. These questions are clearly relevant to 

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the case, as there is an issue about how the employees were paid. Also, Mr. Avalos is a named 

plaintiff and whether he is typical of the class and subclasses that he seeks to represent is a 

relevant issue for class certification. Deposing counsel can ask questions which were made 

necessary by the changed answers, questions about the reasons for the changes, and questions 

about whether the changes originated with Mr. Avalos or with his attorney. See Lugtig, 89 

F.R.D. at 642.

Therefore, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to conduct another deposition of 

Mr. Avalos, and Mr. Avalos must pay for the cost of such further deposition. 

C. Defendants’ Request for Sanctions

Rule 37(a) provides that if the motion to compel discovery is granted: “the court must, 

after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated 

the motion. . .to pay the movant‟s reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including 

attorney‟s fees” unless “the opposing party‟s nondisclosure, response, or objection was 

substantially justified; or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Paige v. 

Consumer Programs, Inc., 248 F.R.D. 272, 277 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 

37(a)(5)(A)). 

At the hearing, Defendants only requested sanctions for the cost and attorney‟s fees 

associated with Defendants‟ request to reopen Mr. Avalos‟s deposition because of changes he 

made to the deposition transcript. Plaintiffs argue that sanctions should not be imposed because 

Mr. Avalos did what is permitted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and they allege that 

this is a novel issue of law. The Court notes that the case law cited by Plaintiffs even provides 

for the reopening of a deposition when the changes to the deposition result in the deposition 

being incomplete absent further examination. Although Plaintiffs may disagree about whether 

the changes made to the deposition transcript were material and resulted in the deposition being 

incomplete absent further examination, the Court does not find that Plaintiffs‟ objection to 

reopening Mr. Avalos‟s deposition based on the changes he made to the deposition transcript is 

substantially justified. The changes made were clearly material, especially based upon the 

assertion being made for certifying this class and this person‟s potential status as a named 

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representative. The sanctions are not imposed by the Court because the deponent made 

corrections to his deposition under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(e), but for Plaintiff‟s refusal and 

requirement that Defendants bring a motion to compel to re-open the deposition. 

As the Court grants Defendants‟ motion to compel, the Court orders Plaintiffs to pay 

Defendants‟ reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion regarding reopening Mr. 

Avalos‟s deposition because of the changes to the deposition transcript, including attorney‟s fees. 

The Court will order Defendants to file a motion for reasonable attorney‟s fees within 

fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this order. Any opposition to the motion for attorney 

fees shall be filed within seven (7) days of the date of service of Defendants‟ filing. 

IV.

ORDER

Based upon the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendant‟s motion to compel answers to deposition questions is GRANTED as 

follows: 

a. Mr. Avalos‟s deposition is to be reopened because of the changes made to the 

deposition transcript. Mr. Avalos shall pay for the cost of this further deposition. 

b. Ms. Aldapa and Mr. Avalos must answer questions at their depositions regarding 

the identities of people who met with Plaintiffs‟ counsel at meetings regarding 

this lawsuit.

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2. Plaintiffs must pay Defendants‟ reasonable attorney‟s fees associated with the 

motion to compel regarding reopening Mr. Avalos‟s deposition because of 

changes he made to his deposition transcript. Defendants shall file a motion for 

attorney‟s fees within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this order. Any 

opposition to Defendants‟ motion for attorney‟s fees shall be filed within seven 

(7) days of the date of service of Defendants‟ filing.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 18, 2016 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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