Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01842/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01842-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 448
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights - Education
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

J.L., a minor, by and through 

his parent and guardian ad 

litem, Y.L. and Y.L., 

individually,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MANTECA UNIFIED SCHOOL 

DISTRICT and SAN JOAQUIN 

COUNTY OFFICE OF EDUCATION,

Defendants.

CIV. NO. 2:14-01842 WBS EFB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: CROSSMOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS. 

----oo0oo----

This suit was initiated by plaintiff J.L., a student 

with an autism and speech language impairment, by and through his

mother and guardian ad litem, Y.L., against defendants Manteca 

Unified School District and San Joaquin County Office of 

Education (“SJCOE”) under the Individuals with Disabilities

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Education Act (the “IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. Both 

parties move for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 56. (Docket Nos. 29, 30.) 

I. Procedural & Factual Background

J.L. is a nine-year-old boy with autism who has been 

eligible for an Individual Education Plan (“IEP”) since 2009. 

Pursuant to a settlement agreement, which was in effect until the 

start of the 2012-2013 school year, J.L. attended the Kendall 

School from April 11, 2011 through April 5, 2012, a center-based 

one-to-one Applied Behavior Analysis (“ABA”) program run by the 

nonpublic agency Therapeutic Pathways. (Admin. R. (“AR”) at 

2285.) In May 2012, he transitioned to an autism-specific

severely handicapped special day class at Veritas Elementary 

School within the Manteca Unified School District. (Id.) He has 

a 1:1 aide with him at all times and the classroom employs ABA

methodologies throughout the day. (Id. at 2564.) 

On November 22, 2013, plaintiffs filed a request for a 

due process hearing with the Office of Administrative Hearings 

(“OAH”) challenging various portions of J.L.’s IEP for the 2012-

2013 and 2013-2014 school years pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f). 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Peter Paul Castillo presided 

over a nine-day hearing that involved approximately thirty 

witnesses, over 2,000 pages of evidence, and generated over 2,000 

pages of testimony transcripts. (Id. at 2225.) The ALJ found in 

favor of plaintiffs on two issues and in favor of defendants on 

all others. Both parties have appealed the ALJ’s decision 

pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). 

II. Applicable Law

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The IDEA, originally enacted in 1975 as the “Education 

for All Handicapped Children Act,” provides federal assistance to 

state and local agencies for the education of children with 

disabilities. To qualify for assistance under the IDEA, a state 

must provide a “free appropriate public education” (“FAPE”) that 

is tailored to the unique needs of the child with a disability 

through the development of an “individualized educational 

program.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) & (4).

A “free appropriate public education” means “special 

education and related services” that:

(A) have been provided at public expense, under public 

supervision and direction, and without charge;

(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency;

(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or 

secondary school education in the State involved; and

(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized 

education program required under [the Act].

Id. § 1401(9). “Special education” is instruction specially 

designed to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability. 

Id. § 1401(29). “Related services” are transportation and other 

developmental, corrective, and supportive services, including 

physical and occupational therapy, required to assist the child 

in benefiting from special education. Id. § 1401(26). The IDEA 

is satisfied if the state complies with the act’s procedures and 

“the individualized education program developed through the Act’s 

procedures [is] reasonably calculated to enable the child to 

receive educational benefits.” Park, ex rel. Park v. Anaheim 

Union High Sch. Dist., 464 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2006). 

An “individualized education program” or IEP is “a 

written statement for each child with a disability that is 

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developed, reviewed, and revised in accordance with section 

1414(d) of [the Act].” Id. § 1401(14). Section 1414(d) provides 

that the IEP must contain a statement of the child’s present 

levels of academic achievement and functional performance and

measurable annual academic and functional goals. Id.

§ 1414(d)(1). The IEP is developed and reviewed each year by a 

team comprised of the child’s parents, teachers, and other 

specialists. Id.

III. Discussion

The IDEA does not employ the usual deferential standard 

of review for administrative decisions, but rather provides that

the court “(i) shall receive the records of the administrative 

proceedings; (ii) shall hear additional evidence at the request 

of a party; and (iii) basing its decision on the preponderance of 

the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is 

appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C). The district court 

should review for procedural compliance with the statute and for 

whether the program is reasonably calculated to enable the child 

to receive educational benefits. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. 

v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1995).

“The requirement that the district court receive the 

hearing officer’s record ‘carries with it the implied requirement 

that due weight shall be given to the [administrative] 

proceedings.’” Id. (quoting Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 

176, 206 (1982)). The amount of deference given to the 

administrative findings is within the court’s discretion and 

increases when the hearing officer’s findings are “thorough and 

careful.” Id. The court gives the hearing officer’s decision 

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“substantial weight” when it “‘evinces his careful, impartial 

consideration of all the evidence and demonstrates his 

sensitivity to the complexity of the issues presented.’” County 

of San Diego v. Cal. Special Educ. Hearing Office, 93 F.3d 1458, 

1466 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Complete de novo review 

is inappropriate because “Congress intended states to have the 

primary responsibility of formulating each individual child’s 

education” and the court must defer to the “specialized knowledge 

and experience” of the state’s administrative bodies. Amanda J.

ex rel. Annette J. v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 887-

88 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The Ninth Circuit has recognized that the procedure 

under the IDEA is “not a true summary judgment procedure,” but is 

“essentially . . . a bench trial based on a stipulated record.” 

Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir.

1993). “It is hard to see what else the district court could do 

as a practical matter under the statute except read the 

administrative record, consider the new evidence, and make an 

independent judgment based on a preponderance of evidence and 

giving due weight to the hearing officer’s determinations.” 

Capistrano, 59 F.3d at 892. “Even though [this method of review] 

does not fit well into any pigeonhole of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure,” it is appropriate because it “appears to be 

what Congress intended under the Act.” Id.

A. Failure to Answer Defendants’ Counterclaims

Defendants argue that because plaintiffs failed to file 

an answer to defendants’ counterclaims, plaintiffs judicially 

admitted all of the matters alleged and the court can grant 

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defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this ground alone. 

(Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 5-6 (Docket No. 29-1)); Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 8(b)(6). A party must serve an answer to a counterclaim or 

crossclaim within twenty-one days of being served with the 

pleading, id. R. 12(a)(1)(B), and an allegation “is admitted if a 

responsible pleading is required and the allegation is not 

denied,” id. R. 8(b)(6). See also Lockwood v. Wolf Corp., 629 

F.2d 603, 611 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding the defendant’s failure to 

deny an allegation in its answer to the plaintiff’s complaint 

constituted an admission and, as a result, no evidence on this 

element of the bankruptcy case was required); Keel v. Dovey, 459 

F. Supp. 2d 946, 950 n.3 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (same). 

The court, however, will not grant defendants’ motion 

for summary judgment on such a technicality. Deciding the issues 

based on this procedural error is inappropriate, especially in 

light of the fact that both parties have already fully briefed 

the issues and participated in a nine-day hearing in front of the 

ALJ. There is no question that defendants have been aware of 

plaintiffs’ claims and defenses from the beginning and were not 

prejudiced by plaintiffs’ failure to file an answer to its 

counterclaims. Accordingly, the court will deny defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment on this ground. 

B. Assessments

A student must be assessed in all areas related to a 

suspected disability. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(3)(B); 34 C.F.R. 

§ 300.304(c)(4). A procedural violation, such as a failure to 

conduct appropriate assessments, results in a denial of a FAPE if 

the violation (1) impeded the child’s right to a FAPE, (2) 

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seriously infringed the parents’ opportunity to participate in 

the decision making process, or (3) caused a deprivation of 

educational benefits. See Park, 464 F.3d at 1031; Cal. Educ. 

Code § 56505(f)(2). 

1. Augmentative and Alternative Communication Assessment

Plaintiffs first argue that defendants denied J.L. a 

FAPE by failing to assess him in the area of augmentative and 

alternative communication (“AAC”) in the 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 

school years. AAC includes all forms of communication, other 

than oral speech, that are used to express thoughts, needs, 

wants, and ideas. (Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 20 n.4.) Special 

AAC aids, such as picture and symbol communication boards and 

electronic devices, can be used to help children express 

themselves. (Id.) 

The ALJ correctly concluded that plaintiffs failed to 

bring forth sufficient evidence that defendants were required to 

conduct an AAC assessment to find communication tools that are 

more effective for J.L. Ginna Brents, the licensed speech and 

language pathologist hired by plaintiffs, stated at the hearing 

that an AAC assessment would benefit J.L. because “for a 

communicative purpose, it’s a good idea to see if [J.L.] would 

benefit from an AAC device.” (Id. at 2387-88.) Brents, however, 

did not recommend an AAC assessment in either her 2010 or 2013 

speech and language evaluations and also admitted at the hearing 

that she never observed J.L. at school and therefore did not know 

if his picture exchange book system was being implemented 

consistently at school. (Id. at 2389, 2409.) Dr. Carina M. 

Grandison, the developmental neuropsychologist hired by 

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plaintiffs, also failed to recommend such an assessment in her 

developmental neuropsychology assessment report based on her 

observations in May and September 2013. (Id. at 1688-98.) 

Similarly, SJCOE’s speech and language pathologist, Isabel 

Contreras, assessed J.L. in May-June 2012 and did not recommend

an AAC assessment. (Id. at 837-47.) 

There was also significant evidence presented that 

defendants were already effectively using augmentative 

communication with J.L. in the form of a picture exchange book

and that J.L.’s speech was emerging. (See id. at 3568-69, longterm substitute teacher Cindy Kelch; id. at 4371, SJCOE speech 

and language pathologist Juana Mier-Anaya; id. at 2484, 2508-09 

SJCOE behavior analyst Susan Scott; id. at 2509, 2603, 4089, 

4097, SJCOE speech therapist Monica Filoso; id. at 2729, SJCOE 

instructional assistant Wanda Luis; id. at 3734-35, senior 

service coordinator at Valley Mountain Regional Center Elizabeth 

Diaz.) The school also attempted to teach J.L. how to

communicate with an iPad but J.L. did not show an interest in 

this device. (Id. at 2241.) 

For all the above reasons, the court finds defendants 

were not required to provide J.L. an AAC assessment. 

2. Functional Behavior Assessment

Plaintiffs next argue J.L. was denied a FAPE under the 

IDEA because defendants developed J.L.’s IEPs without a 

functional behavior assessment. In the “case of a child whose 

behavior impedes the child’s learning or that of others,” the IEP 

team must “consider the use of positive behavioral interventions 

and supports, and other strategies, to address that behavior.” 

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20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i); 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(2)(i); Cal. 

Educ. Code § 56341.1(b)(1). A functional behavior assessment is 

one type of behavioral intervention or strategy that helps 

identify causative factors and objectionable behaviors. See

Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022, 1026 (8th Cir. 

2003). A functional behavior assessment is not, however, 

required. See S.J. ex rel. S.H.J. v. Issaquah Sch. Dist. No. 

411, Civ. No. C04-1926 RSL, 2007 WL 2703056, at *5 (W.D. Wash. 

Sept. 12, 2007) (noting that a functional behavior assessment is 

required only when a student has been removed from her current 

placement). 

In this case, the ALJ carefully weighed the evidence 

and concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish that J.L. had 

serious behavior problems at school that warranted a functional 

behavior assessment. The staff at Veritas were aware of J.L.’s 

behavioral issues, such as scratching, pinching, lack of 

attention, and running into others, but reported that they were 

able to easily redirect J.L. from the maladaptive behaviors. 

(See, e.g., AR at 4026, teacher Cindy Campero (testifying that 

she could re-direct Ivan from staring at the ceiling in seconds); 

id. at 3526, 3565, 3574 long-term substitute teacher Cindy Kelch 

(testifying that J.L. was redirected from avoiding eye contact, 

staring at the ceiling, or grabbing, pinching, and scratching in 

seconds).) 

The court agrees with the ALJ’s finding that the report 

produced by Dr. Carina M. Grandison, a developmental 

neuropsychologist, was not as credible as the testimony of the 

Veritas staff and overemphasized J.L.’s behavioral problems. Dr. 

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Grandison was hired by plaintiffs and based her report on an 

interview of Y.L., review of school records and a questionnaire 

filled out by J.L.’s teacher, two observations and testing 

sessions in the office, and two ninety-minute school observations

in April and September 2013. (Id. at 1688-98, Dr. Grandison 

Report of Developmental Neuropsychology Assessment.) Dr. 

Grandison observed J.L. staring at the ceiling and being 

disconnected for much longer periods of time than reported by the 

Veritas staff, particularly during her second school visit. (Id.

at 1692-93.) While J.L. was in her office, he was often crying, 

refusing to work, lying on the floor, scratching, and kicking. 

(Id. at 1693.) Dr. Grandison noted that this behavior was 

typical of what Y.L. reported seeing at home. (Id.) She 

concluded that J.L.’s “behaviors outside of the school 

environment are of great concern, maladaptive, and even posing 

the risk of harming himself and others (such as scratching and 

other acts of aggression).” (Id. at 1697.) 

The ALJ found that Dr. Grandison was not reliable 

because she does not have experience in the behavior field, the 

Veritas staff persuasively testified that Dr. Grandison’s report 

had several significant inaccuracies, the Veritas staff was more 

convincing in their statements overall, and Dr. Grandison failed 

to differentiate between J.L.’s behavior at home and at school. 

(Id. at 2233-34.) Given that the ALJ was able to listen to the 

testimony of the witnesses and observe their demeanor first-hand, 

he was better equipped to assess the credibility of the witnesses 

than this court. The court will therefore defer to his more 

informed assessment of their credibility. 

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In addition, Susan Scott, a Board Certified Behavior 

Analyst, did eventually conduct a functional behavior assessment 

on behalf of defendants on April 30, 2013 in an effort to 

cooperate with J.L.’s parents. (Id. at 2448, 2599.) The 

assessment concluded that “[a]gression was observed at extremely 

low levels in frequency, duration, and intensity” and “[b]ehavior 

does not appear to be impeding [J.L.’s] learning.” (Id. at 388, 

Functional Behavior Assessment.) Scott recommended that J.L.’s 

parents seek out behavior services at home because it was clear 

from a comparison of Y.L.’s reports and classroom observation 

that J.L. was “not displaying the same pattern of behavior at 

school.” (Id. at 389.) The assessment found that a positive 

behavior support plan was not needed. The assessment therefore 

provides further evidence that additional functional behavior 

assessments were not necessary in the 2013-2014 school year. 

Accordingly, the court finds that the preponderance of 

the evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that defendants did not 

deny J.L. a FAPE by failing to conduct additional functional 

behavior assessments. 

C. Parental Rights to Observe and Participate in Student’s 

Educational Decision Making Process

The parents of a child with a disability have a right 

to be a member of the IEP team and to participate in meetings 

respecting the identification, assessment, and education 

placement of their child. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(i); Cal. 

Educ. Code §§ 56304, 56342.5. “Among the most important 

procedural safeguards are those that protect the parents’ right 

to be involved in the development of their child’s educational 

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plan.” Amanda J. ex. rel. Annette J., 267 F.3d at 882. To 

accomplish the IDEA’s goal of providing all children with 

disabilities a FAPE, it is critical that the parents, the 

“individuals who have first-hand knowledge of the child’s needs 

and who are most concerned about the child,” be involved in the 

IEP creation process. Id. at 891. 

1. Quarterly Progress Reports on IEP Goals

The IEP must include a description of how the child’s 

progress toward meeting the annual goals will be measured and 

when periodic reports on the child’s progress will be provided, 

such as through the use of quarterly or other period reports. 20 

U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(III). Plaintiffs claim that they did not 

receive quarterly progress reports and, as a result, Y.L. was 

prevented from meaningfully participating in IEP meetings. The 

evidence demonstrates, however, that the ALJ was correct in 

finding that defendants provided plaintiffs with quarterly 

updates on J.L.’s progress in the form of handwritten updates on 

the Kendall goals, (AR at 1596-1631, 2528-2530, 2577-83), goal 

update forms, (id. at 1467-93, 2612), or bi-weekly narrative goal 

updates, (id. at 1712-27, 1735-39, 3572, 4052-54, 4124-25). 

2. Observation

Likewise, the evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that 

defendants did not deny Y.L. her parental right to participate in 

the educational decision making process by requiring her to drop 

off and pick up J.L. from the driveway, rather than directly from 

the classroom, and limiting Y.L.’s observation of J.L.’s 

classroom. Plaintiffs first argue that Y.L. was treated 

unequally because other parents were allowed to drop off and pick 

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up from the classroom on a daily basis and she was not. (Id. at 

2543.) Defendants made clear, however, that while they 

previously allowed classroom drop off/pick up, the security 

policy changed and parents are all now required to drop off and

pick up students in the driveway. (Id. at 498, Veritas Handbook, 

2768.) Further, it is difficult to conceive how the drop off and 

pick up location relates to Y.L.’s rights to observe her child’s 

classroom.

Plaintiffs also argue Y.L. was prevented from observing 

J.L.’s classroom even when she made requests to observe ahead of 

time. The Veritas handbook provides that parents may only visit 

a child’s classroom if it is “arranged in advance with the 

teacher.” (Id. at 498.) It further states that there “are times 

when testing is taking place or other activities that may make 

visiting an inappropriate distraction or that would disrupt 

instruction.” (Id.) Y.L. argues that defendants retaliated 

against her advocacy work on behalf of J.L. by applying a more

strict observation policy to her than other parents. (Pls.’ Mot. 

for Summ. J. at 39.) Veritas staff’s persuasively testified, 

however, that they attempted to comply with Y.L.’s observation 

requests but had to limit visitation periods to an hour to avoid

disrupting the classroom and that they sometimes could not 

accommodate Y.L.’s requests because she did not provide them with 

enough advanced notice. (AR at 3176, 3239-42.) 

Accordingly, the court must find that defendants did 

not interfere with Y.L.’s parental rights by requiring her to 

comply with its drop off/pick up and observation policies.

3. Parental Participation in IEP Meetings

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“Parental participation in the IEP and educational 

placement process is central to the IDEA’s goal of protecting 

disabled students’ rights and providing each disabled student 

with a FAPE.” Doug C. v. Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 720 F.3d 1038, 

1040-41 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding the student was denied a FAPE 

because the parent was denied the opportunity to participate in 

the IEP meeting). An IEP meeting may be conducted without the 

parents only if the parents “affirmatively refuse to attend.” 

Id. at 1041 (citation omitted). Id. Accordingly, the ALJ was 

correct in finding that defendants committed a procedural 

violation by holding the August 6, 2013 IEP team meeting in 

Y.L.’s absence. Defendants do not dispute that Y.L. requested to 

reschedule the meeting and at no time refused to attend. It is 

no excuse that defendants sought to hold the IEP meeting before 

the start of the upcoming 2013-2014 school year.1 

Plaintiffs also contend that even when they were 

included in IEP meetings, defendants ignored the parents’ input 

and thereby denied them their right to participate in the 

decision making process. While parents must be given an 

opportunity to meaningfully participate, the education agencies 

are not required to agree with the parents or to execute their 

suggestions. See, e.g., J.R. ex rel. W.R. v. Sylvan Union Sch. 

Dist., Civ. No. S-06-2136 LKK GGH, 2008 WL 682595, at *10 (E.D. 

Cal. March 10, 2008). Plaintiffs identify examples of how

 

1 The court need not address defendants’ argument 

regarding whether in light of this finding plaintiffs were the 

prevailing party for the purposes of attorney’s fees as the 

attorney’s fees are the subject of a separate action, Civ. No. 

2:14-01364 WBS AC. 

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defendants failed to adopt the changes the parents suggested but 

fail to provide sufficient evidence that defendants refused to 

consider the parents’ input or denied them meaningful 

participation. In fact, contrary to plaintiffs’ position, there 

is evidence of several instances in which defendants changed 

their course of action in response to the parents’ requests and 

concerns. For example, defendants agreed to conduct an AAC 

assessment and a functional behavior assessment at the parents’ 

request. (AR at 193-96, 2448, 2599.) Further, defendants 

adopted the specific changes requested by J.L.’s parents to 

J.L.’s first, second, sixth, and thirteenth annual goals and 

objectives in his October 2, 2013 IEP. (Compare id. at 362-64, 

Plaintiffs’ Letter with Input to Drafted Goals, with id. at 1509-

26, Oct. 2, 2013 IEP Annual Goals and Objectives.) Plaintiffs 

therefore did not establish that defendants failed to consider 

their input.

D. Adequate Goals

The IEP must include “a statement of measurable annual 

goals, including academic and functional goals, designed to” both 

“meet the child’s needs that result from the child’s disability 

to enable the child to be involved in and make progress in the 

general education curriculum” and also to “meet each of the 

child’s other educational needs that result from the child’s 

disability.” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(1)(A)(i)(II). “The IEP shall show 

a direct relationship between the present levels of performance, 

the goals and objectives, and the specific educational services 

to be provided.” Cal. Code. Regs., tit. 5, § 3040(b).

Plaintiffs contend that defendants failed to offer J.L. 

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adequate goals when he transferred from the Kandall School to 

Veritas. (Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 46-48.) J.L. had forty 

operative goals at the Kendall School whereas he had only 

eighteen offered at Veritas in the October 2, 2013 IEP. (See AR 

at 1509-26, IEP Annual Goals and Objectives.) Plaintiffs 

requested that defendants add fourteen additional goals but 

defendants did not comply. (Id. at 362-64.) Plaintiffs contend 

this is evidence that defendants failed to set goals sufficient 

to meet J.L.’s needs.

The evidence, however, supports the ALJ’s finding that 

the goals were adequate. For example, Marie Polk, a board 

certified behavior analyst who was J.L.’s clinical supervisor at 

the Kendall School and supervised the Kendall School aides who 

helped transition J.L. to Veritas, testified that the forty goals 

implemented at the Kendall School were not all targeted every 

day. (Id. at 3318-19.) Instead, the Kendall School staff would 

select priority areas for him and work on the goals in that 

order. (Id. at 3327.) Further, she explained that the Kendall 

School goals were distilled into a smaller number of goals when 

J.L. transitioned to Veritas and that she supported the goals 

that were ultimately agreed upon by the IEP team at Veritas. 

(Id. at 3357.) Moreover, aside from J.L.’s parents, none of the 

witnesses suggested that J.L.’s goals were insufficient. 

The record also supports the ALJ’s finding that J.L. 

continued to make progress on his goals after transferring from 

the Kendall School to Veritas. Dr. Grandison, whom the ALJ found 

to be not credible as discussed above, and Y.L. were the only

witnesses who testified that J.L. regressed while at Veritas. In 

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contrast, Polk testified that J.L. continued to make “slow 

progress” and to “gain some skills” during the transition months 

from Kendall School to Veritas that she oversaw. (Id. at 3368.) 

She represented that J.L. had a similarly slow rate of

acquisition while at the Kendall School. (Id. at 3369-70.) 

Further, the IEP team at Veritas, (id. at 1530), J.L.’s long-term 

substitute teacher Cynthia Kelch, (id. at 3524, 3571), teacher 

Cindy Campero, (id. at 3969, 4036-37, 4041-42, 4056, 4060-61), 

SJCOE instructional assistant Wanda Luis, (id. at 2733), and 

occupational therapist Kelly Inderbitzen, (id. at 4311-12, 4320-

24, 4328), all testified that J.L. was making progress towards 

his goals.

Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiffs failed to 

establish that J.L.’s IEP goals were inadequate or that he did 

not make sufficient progress towards his goals. 

E. Adequate Services

1. Fine Motor and Sensory Needs

Occupational therapy is a type of “related service” 

that can be required in order for a student “to take advantage of 

the education opportunities” and receive a FAPE. Park, 464 F.3d 

at 1033; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A). 

Plaintiffs argue that the ALJ erred in finding that the

Occupational Therapy (“OT”) consultations defendants provided in 

the special day class at Veritas were sufficient and contend that 

defendants should have provided direct pull-out OT services to 

address J.L.’s sensory processing, core strength and security, 

fine motor skills, gravitation insecurity and visual perception

issues. (Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 57.) J.L.’s 2012 IEP 

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offered sixty minutes per month of OT consultation and his 2013 

IEP offered ninety minutes per month. (AR at 4323-24.) 

In finding in favor of defendants, the ALJ carefully 

explained why he relied more on the report and testimony of 

defendants’ occupational therapist, Kelly Inderbitzin, who 

recommended OT consultation, than the report and testimony of 

plaintiffs’ occupational therapist, Karen Chaddock, who 

recommended direct OT. The ALJ found that Chaddock “failed to 

consider in her analysis that the Veritas special day class 

integrates OT into its program, and that Veritas staff could 

implement the recommendations she made in her report without 

individual OT service.” (Id. at 2259.) After reviewing 

Chaddock’s report, the court agrees that Chaddock recommended 

J.L. “begin an OT clinic experience” and suggested that “[c]linic 

based OT weekly can enhance his learning experience at school and 

help prepare him to engage in pre-academics.” (Id. at 1372.) 

Chaddock did not consider the OT programming already in place at 

Veritas or what sort of OT would be appropriate in the context of

J.L.’s school, rather than a clinic. 

The ALJ noted that Inderbitzin did not dispute J.L.’s 

fine and gross motor and sensory processing deficits but rather 

concluded that he would “benefit from Occupational Therapy 

consultation and collaboration with the IEP team to help support, 

modify, or adapt his education programming to optimize successful 

occupational performance.” (Id. at 608.) Inderbitzin testified 

that the consultative model was sufficient because J.L.’s fine 

motor and sensory goals could “be worked on in the classroom 

every day” because the staff “have the knowledge to support the 

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goals.” (Id. at 4324.) Based on her knowledge of the Veritas 

class and staff, she believed J.L. would benefit from working on 

his goals throughout the day in different contexts, rather than 

in only the discrete trial context. (Id. at 4317.) 

It is clear that the ALJ thoroughly and carefully 

considered this question and that the preponderance of the 

evidence supports his finding that direct OT services were not 

required.

2. Speech and Language Services 

The court agrees with the ALJ’s reliance on the 

professional opinions of Brents and the ALJ’s finding that J.L. 

required direct speech and language services, rather than just 

consultation. (See id. at 2259.) After reviewing J.L.’s IEP 

documents and conducting three to four hours of testing, Brents, 

a licensed speech and language pathologist, concluded that J.L. 

required five, twenty-minute sessions of direct speech and 

language therapy per week with an additional hour of consultation 

per month. (Id. at 2375.) She testified that this 

recommendation was for direct speech services in the school 

setting, not a clinical setting. (Id. at 2374-75.) 

Defendants argue that Brents relied on an improper 

standard because she suggested that direct speech and language 

therapy would “help [J.L.] make the greatest gains and most 

rapidly acquire appropriate speech language and learnings skills” 

and best meet his needs. (Id. at 491 (emphasis added).) The 

IDEA does not require schools to provide children with

disabilities “the absolutely best or ‘potential-maximizing’ 

education” but rather “to provide ‘a basic floor of opportunity’ 

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through a program ‘individually designed to provide educational 

benefit to the handicapped child.’” Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 

15 F.3d 1519, 1524 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted); see also

Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 

U.S. 178, 200-01 (1982). 

Congress, however, “did not intend that a school system 

could discharge its duty under the [IDEA] by providing a program 

that produces some minimal academic advancement, no matter how 

trivial.” Amanda J. ex rel. Annette J., 267 F.3d at 890 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). While Brents 

recommended what she thought would be best for J.L., she also

found in both her 2010 and 2013 evaluations that J.L. was 

“severely delayed in all aspects of communication and requires 

intervention for speech and language remediation with a qualified 

speech and language pathologist.” (AR at 490, 422.) She 

expressed “great concern” that he “does not currently have a 

consistent communication system in the home and school 

environments.” (Id. at 490.) Direct services are, in her 

opinion, necessary for J.L. to acquire the skills he needs to 

communicate and to communicate consistently across different 

environments. (Id. at 491.) Furthermore, while she did not 

recommend direct services, SJCOE’s speech and language therapist, 

Isabelle Contreras, also recognized J.L.’s severe language 

deficits and slow progress. (Id. at 846-47, 2977.) 

Accordingly, the court finds that the ALJ’s order that 

defendants provide 30 minutes a week of direct language and

speech services for the 2014 extended school year and the 2014-

2015 school year is supported by the record. 

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for 

summary judgment (Docket No. 30) be, and the same hereby is, 

DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment (Docket No. 29) be, and the same hereby is, 

DENIED. The ALJ was correct in finding that defendants committed 

a procedural violation by holding the August 6, 2013 IEP meeting 

without J.L.’s parents and a substantive violation by failing to 

provide direct individual speech and language services. 

Defendants are therefore ordered to provide the remedies 

previously ordered by the ALJ. 

Dated: June 14, 2016

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