Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01320/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01320-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Sean Patrick Husband, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. CV 13-01320-PHX-DLR (DMF)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 

TO THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. RAYES: 

 Petitioner Sean Patrick Husband filed a pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) on July 1, 2013, and filed an Amended 

Petition (Doc. 15) on December 18, 2013. Respondents answered the amended petition 

(Docs. 25, 26). Magistrate Judge Mark E. Aspey issued a Report and Recommendation 

(“R&R”) on November 4, 2014 (Doc. 41), recommending that the Amended Petition be 

denied and dismissed with prejudice. The Court entered an order adopting the R&R 

(Doc. 50) and Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, Motion to Vacate Judgment 

or, Alternatively, Motion for Extension of Time (Doc. 52). After oral argument on May 

13, 2015, the Court granted Petitioner’s Motion and ordered Petitioner to file his 

objection and ordered Respondents to respond to the objection. 

 The Court found that additional briefing was necessary on Petitioner’s claims and 

objections as to Grounds One and Six of his Amended Petition. The Court ordered the 

briefing to address Petitioner’s claims regarding an irreconcilable conflict/fractured 

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relationship with his trial attorney, and to address Respondents’ argument that these 

claims are procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 66 at 1–2.) The Court appointed the Federal 

Public Defender to represent Petitioner. After briefing by both parties, the Court held 

oral argument on February 4, 2016. At the oral argument, Petitioner sought for the first 

time to amend the Petition to include a claim of ineffective assistance of appellant 

counsel pursuant to Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). The Court ordered 

briefing on the issue. (Doc. 79.) Petitioner filed his Supplemental Brief on the 

Applicability of Martinez v. Ryan on February 18, 2016 (Doc. 81); Respondents filed 

their Response to Petitioner’s Supplemental Brief Re: the Inapplicability of Martinez v. 

Ryan on March 28, 2016 (Doc. 87); and Petitioner filed his Reply Brief (Doc. 89) on 

April 15, 2016. The District Judge referred the issues in the supplemental briefing 

regarding the applicability of Martinez v. Ryan to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a 

Report and Recommendation (Doc. 88). 

I. Background

 A Maricopa County grand jury indictment returned November 28, 2005, charged 

Petitioner with three counts of sexual assault and three counts of sexual abuse. (Doc. 25–

1 at 10–12.) On December 3, 2005, Petitioner informed the state court that he was not 

indigent and his retained counsel, David J. Wolf, entered an appearance on behalf of 

Petitioner. (Id. at 20–21.) On December 9, 2005, Michael Freeman (“Freeman”), an 

attorney with Wolf & Associates, Mr. Wolf’s law firm, entered an appearance on behalf 

of Petitioner. 

On November 28, 2006, the date set for Petitioner’s trial, Petitioner moved (on his 

own, not through counsel) to replace attorney Freeman and to continue his trial pending 

his retention of new counsel. (Doc. 25–2 at 3.) A hearing on the motion was conducted 

that same day, and the motion to change counsel and to continue the trial was denied at 

the conclusion of the hearing. The trial judge gave Petitioner, attorney Freeman, and the 

State’s attorney an opportunity to respond to the motion. The State’s attorney objected to 

continuing the trial. (Id. at 246.) Freeman stated that: 

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Mr. Husband and I have had problems working together for sometime. I 

told him before that he wants to essentially represent himself, or get other 

counsel. Yesterday he wanted to do the opening statements. He wants to 

do closing arguments, and he was very unhappy with my questioning 

yesterday, feeling that I’m leaving out major issues. There’s been an 

ongoing antagonistic relationship between what he thinks should be done, 

and what I believe should be done. Some of it is material. It doesn’t go to 

ethical. We can’t work together. We haven’t been working together. I 

think he wants—he didn’t hire me. He hired the firm of Wolf and 

Associates. The year before I wasn’t with the firm. He started to hire me 

before because I had my own private practice. I probably wouldn’t have 

taken the case. Based on different statements he’s made in the posture of 

the case as well. But I’m also employed by the firm, they wanted me to try 

it. If Mr. Husband wants to terminate me, that’s fine with me. I think in 

some ways that’s to his advantage, so—I believe he does want to have 

additional time to hire other counsel. 

(Doc. 25–2 at 225–226.) In response to the trial judge’s inquiry as to whether or not 

Freeman could still represent Petitioner to the best of his ability and whether or not he 

was prepared to go to trial that day, Freeman answered: 

I can represent him to the best of my ability, but there are major differences 

that we have. I think another attorney could represent Mr. Husband’s 

interests better. I’m not sure that my representation is in Mr. Husband’s 

best interest. . . . I would be prepared to go to trial today. Mr. Husband is in 

custody. He’s being held without bond. I believe he indicates he does want 

to hire other counsel. He would want additional time. He and his mother 

have the funds to hire other counsel. 

(Id. at 226–227.) 

 Petitioner addressed the timing of his motion, noting that the motions hearing was 

the previous day. Petitioner stated that: 

Up to this point I had been working with Michael Freeman. I didn’t think 

we had quite a contentious relationship. However, I was under the 

impression that a number of things would happen at this hearing. . . . I 

haven’t had a visit this entire month. I figured maybe things will go the 

way I wanted. You know, I’m not inflexible. I had dialogues with him. I 

was under the impression through mutual dialogue, without mutual 

dialogue, things would go one way, and they didn’t. . . . I didn’t have any 

statistics or prior experience up to this point on how Michael Freeman 

would handle himself when he was faced with logistics and questioning, 

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and what not. And while he always a skillful orator, I think in a case like 

this it really comes down to the grind. 

(Id. at 230–231.) Petitioner expressed his dissatisfaction with the amount of work 

Freeman had put into the case, including his failure to depose or interview Detective Hall. 

Freeman indicated that he had not interviewed the two officers, including Detective Hall, 

on Melissa A.’s case, and that the investigator hired by Petitioner was doing the 

interviews. Freeman added in reference to Petitioner that: 

I don’t think we have the relationship between ourselves that would make 

for effective assistance of counsel at this time. I read this motion in a little 

more detail. And I think that—especially where he’s likely to testify that 

relationship is necessary. So I don’t believe that I would be effective based 

on our relationship. 

(Id. at 234.) 

During the hearing, Freeman acknowledged that he had not met with Petitioner in 

the month preceding the trial, but indicated he had talked with him over the phone. (Id. at 

243.) Freeman noted that he had not met with Petitioner as much as Petitioner had 

wanted, and that Petitioner had sent him over 70 pages of questions or comments and that 

he had “not sent him anywhere near the answers he has wanted.” (Id. at 243.) Freeman 

stated that he didn’t think he and Petitioner had “the relationship that he wants with an 

attorney, to have confidence in the attorney. I certainly don’t have confidence in him. I 

have certainly told people I prefer not to be on this case, just because of the relationship 

that I have with Mr. Husband.” (Id. at 244.) 

In denying the motion, the trial judge noted that the motion to terminate counsel 

came after a somewhat unsuccessful motions hearing the prior day, and that Petitioner’s 

counsel would have the opportunity to talk to Detective Hall before she testifies. (Id. at 

238–239.) 

The jury convicted Petitioner on four counts and acquitted him on two charges, 

and Petitioner was sentenced on February 2, 2007. (Doc. 25–5 at 232–233, 240.) 

Petitioner filed a timely direct appeal of his convictions and sentences. Petitioner 

retained private counsel, Thomas J. Phalen (“Phalen”), to represent him in his direct 

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appeal. On direct appeal, Petitioner asserted, among other claims, that the trial court 

committed structural error when it deprived Petitioner of his 6th and 14th Amendment 

right to counsel of his choice. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s 

convictions and sentences in a decision issued September 4, 2008. (Doc. 25–7 at 47–78; 

see also 2008 WL 4152841.) The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied review on 

February 10, 2009. (Doc. 25–8 at 126.) 

 Petitioner initiated a timely action for state post-conviction relief (“PCR”) 

pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Petitioner was again 

represented by retained private counsel Phalen in his Rule 32 action, and asserted that his 

trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel (“IATC”) in violation of the 6th 

and 14th Amendments, by providing deficient performance under the test set forth in 

Strickland v. Washington. (Doc. 25–8 at 128; Doc. 25–9 at 9, 12.) The deficient 

performance was based on trial counsel’s failures during trial, largely resulting from the 

conflict between trial counsel and Petitioner. Id. In a supplemental pleading Petitioner 

argued an additional subclaim to his IATC claim—that Freeman provided IATC for 

failing to plead or argue he was denied his right to confront the witnesses against him 

because Petitioner’s counsel was not allowed to cross-examine a victim-witness 

regarding a prior experience of alleged sexual assault. (Doc. 25–9 at 165–167.) 

However, Phalen did not raise a claim of irreconcilable conflict between Petitioner and 

trial counsel, nor did he raise any claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 

(“IAAC”), which was Phalen himself, for failure to raise the irreconcilable conflict claim 

on direct appeal. 

The state trial court denied relief on May 21, 2010, summarily finding that 

Petitioner had failed to establish a colorable claim for relief based on IATC and that 

Petitioner’s claim regarding the cross-examination of a witness was precluded by the 

failure to raise the issue in his direct appeal. (Doc. 25–9 at 208–209.) Petitioner 

appealed the trial court’s decision regarding his IATC claims but did not seek review of 

the trial court’s ruling that his confrontation-clause claim was precluded pursuant to Rule 

32.2(a)(3), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. On March 28, 2012, the Arizona Court 

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of Appeals summarily denied review of the trial court’s decision denying state postconviction relief. (Doc. 26–3 at 32.) The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied 

review on September 25, 2012. (Doc. 26–7 at 20.) 

 Petitioner initiated this action with a Petition filed on July 1, 2013 (Doc. 1), and 

Petitioner filed an Amended Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 15) on December 18, 

2013. In Ground One of the Amended Petition, Petitioner alleges as follows: 

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: 

CUMULATIVE PREJUDICE 

Husband was Denied his Right to Retain Counsel of Choice 

and Thereby Forced to Trial With Admittedly Deficient 

Counsel with Whom he had an Irreparably Fractured 

Relationship. Predictably, This Resulted in Numerous 

Instances of Deficient Performance, the Cumulative Effect of 

Which Violated his Rights Under the 6th and 14th 

Amendments. 

(Doc. 15 at 8.) Petitioner alleges in Ground Six of the Amended Petition: 

COUNSEL OF CHOICE VIOLATION 

The Trial Court Committed Structural Error When it 

Deprived Husband of his 6th Amendment and 14th

Amendment Right to Retain Counsel of his Choice, Thereby, 

Forcing him to Trial With Admittedly Deficient Counsel 

With Whom he had an Irreparably Fractured Relationship. 

(Doc. 15 at 34.) 

 Magistrate Judge Aspey’s R&R recommends a denial of relief on Grounds One 

and Six, after addressing the grounds as exhausted claims and finding that the Arizona 

Court of Appeals’ decision denying Petitioner’s choice of counsel claim was not clearly 

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law. (Doc. 41 at 19–22.) The 

R&R also recommends a denial of Petitioner’s various IATC claims that were raised in 

his PCR proceeding, finding that the state court’s conclusion that none of the claims 

raised a colorable claim for relief was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of 

federal law. (Id. at 23–28.) 

 Petitioner’s objection to the R&R alleged that the R&R failed to address his 

irreconcilable conflict claim. (Doc. 57 at 12–14.) Respondents allege that the claim was 

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never exhausted in state court because Petitioner’s direct appeal only alleged that his 

Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice was violated, not that he and Freeman had 

an irreconcilable conflict. (Doc. 62 at 10–12.) The Court ordered additional briefing 

(Doc. 66) and held oral argument on the irreconcilable conflict/fractured relationship 

claim and whether or not the claim was procedurally defaulted (Doc. 79). At oral 

argument, Petitioner argued for the first time to amend the Petition to include a claim of 

IAAC and that his procedural default was excused under Martinez v Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 

1309 (2012). The Court ordered additional briefing regarding the applicability of 

Martinez and referred the issue of the applicability of Martinez to the undersigned for a 

Report and Recommendation. 

II. Analysis

 Petitioner alleges that his relationship with Freeman, his retained trial counsel, at 

the time of trial constituted an irreconcilable conflict between an attorney and his client in 

violation of the Sixth Amendment. This irreconcilable conflict claim is a claim that 

Arizona law allows—if not requires—to be raised on direct appeal. See State v. Gomez, 

293 P.3d 495, 500–02 (Ariz. 2012) (reviewing trail court’s decision to deny a request for 

new counsel for abuse of discretion). Appellate counsel Phalen failed to raise the 

fractured relationship and irreconcilable conflict between Petitioner and Freeman on 

direct appeal. Instead, Phalen raised the Sixth Amendment violation that resulted from 

the trial court depriving Petitioner of choice of counsel. In the PCR proceedings, Phalen 

raised several IATC claims based on Freeman’s failures during trial, but again did not 

raise a claim of irreconcilable conflict between Petitioner and Freeman, nor did he raise 

any IAAC claims for failure to raise the irreconcilable conflict claim on direct appeal. To 

raise any IAAC claims for failure to raise the irreconcilable conflict claim on direct 

appeal, Phalen would have had to raise the IAAC claim against himself. 

Petitioner argues that Phalen provided IAAC on direct appeal for failing to raise 

the irreconcilable conflict claim and then subsequently provided ineffective assistance as 

PCR counsel for failing to address his IAAC or, implicitly, for failing to withdraw so that 

alternate post-conviction counsel could raise the claim. The parties dispute whether or 

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not Martinez provides an excuse for the procedural defaults, thereby allowing the Court 

to consider the merits of the underlying irreconcilable conflict claim. 

“In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court 

pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of 

the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual 

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to 

consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). Where there is a constitutional right to counsel, 

attorney error that constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes cause, because 

“if the procedural default is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Sixth 

Amendment itself requires that responsibility for the default be imputed to the State.” Id. 

at 753–54 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)). The Supreme Court in 

Coleman held that where there is no constitutional right to counsel, attorney error that led 

to the procedural default cannot constitute cause. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 757. 

 The Supreme Court in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), carved out an 

exception to the rule in Coleman: 

[W]hen a State requires a prisoner to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trialcounsel claim in a collateral proceeding, a prisoner may establish cause for 

a default of an ineffective-assistance claim in two circumstances. The first 

is where the state courts did not appoint counsel in the initial-review 

collateral proceeding for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. 

The second is where appointed counsel in the initial-review collateral 

proceeding, where the claims should have been raised, was ineffective 

under the standards of Strickland v. Washington. 

Id. at 1318 (citations omitted). Also, the prisoner must also demonstrate that the 

underlying IATC claim is a substantial one, which is to say the claim has some merit. Id. 

(citation omitted). 

 The Supreme Court in Trevino v. Thaler, defined the Martinez exception to 

Coleman as “allowing a federal habeas court to find ‘cause,’ thereby excusing a 

defendant’s procedural default, where (1) the claim of ‘ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel’ was a ‘substantial’ claim; (2) the ‘cause’ consisted of there being ‘no counsel’ or 

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only ‘ineffective’ counsel during the state collateral review proceeding; (3) the state 

collateral review proceeding was the ‘initial’ review proceeding in respect to the 

‘ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim;” and (4) state law requires that an 

“ineffective assistance of trial counsel [claim] . . . be raised in an initial-review collateral 

proceeding.” Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013) (quoting Martinez, 132 S. 

Ct. at 1318–1319, 1320–1321). The Court in Trevino then expanded the fourth element 

to include situations where the “state procedural framework, by reason of its design and 

operation, makes it highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will have a 

meaningful opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct 

appeal.” Id. at 1921. 

 After Trevino, the Ninth Circuit in Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287 (9th Cir. 

2013), held that the standard for “cause” articulated in Martinez and reaffirmed in 

Trevino applies in a cases where the underlying IAC is by appellate counsel rather than 

trial counsel. “The Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel applies equally to both 

the trial and appellate counsel.” Id. at 1293. In Nguyen, appellate counsel failed to 

inform the Petitioner of his right to and the requirement that he file a post-conviction 

petition in the California state court before filing a federal petition for habeas corpus. Id. 

at 1290. Nguyen, thus, filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal court without filing a 

petition for post-conviction relief in the California state court. In the federal habeas case, 

the federal court found that Nguyen had two potentially meritorious claims, one being 

that his appellate counsel was ineffective based on failure to raise a double jeopardy 

claim. Id. at 1291. The federal case was stayed to give Nguyen an opportunity to raise 

his unexhausted potentially meritorious claims in a petition for post-conviction relief in 

the California state courts. Id. The state court petition was denied as untimely, and 

before the United States Supreme Court decided Martinez, the magistrate judge denied 

the federal habeas petition without prejudice, finding that Nguyen had not showed 

Coleman cause and prejudice for the two potentially meritorious claims, including 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel based on the failure to raise the double 

jeopardy claim on direct appeal. Id. 

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Here, like in Nguyen, Petitioner’s IAAC claim was procedurally defaulted. In 

both cases, Petitioner must rely on the ineffective assistance of his PCR counsel to 

establish the equitable “cause” exception established by Martinez for not raising the 

IAAC claim. The Ninth Circuit in Nguyen, held that “the Martinez standard for ‘cause’ 

applies to all Sixth Amendment ineffective-assistance claims, both trial and appellate, 

that have been procedurally defaulted by ineffective counsel in the initial-review statecourt collateral proceeding.” Id. at 1295. This holding applies in equal force where in 

Nguyen, there was no counsel for a post conviction state proceeding and here, where the 

counsel for the post-conviction state proceeding was unable to raise the ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel claim in the PCR because appellate and PCR counsel were 

one and the same. 

Respondents argue in opposition to Nguyen’s extension of the Martinez exception 

(Doc. 87 at 4), but this Court is bound by Nguyen. Respondents also argue that this case 

is distinguishable from Nguyen and Martinez, because Arizona law allows for a second 

PCR when appellate and first PCR counsel are one and the same. (Doc. 87 at 5, 11.) 

Respondents correctly point out that a second PCR is the first realistic opportunity (is the 

initial review stage) to raise IAAC when appellate counsel and PCR counsel are one and 

the same. See State v. Bennett, 146 P.3d 63, 67 (Ariz. 2006) (holding that “the second 

post-conviction relief petition, in which Bennett was represented by different counsel, 

was the first proceeding in which she could raise the ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel argument . . . [t]herefore Rule 32.2.a(3) does not preclude Bennett’s ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim). Yet, Respondents are incorrect in asserting that Petitioner, 

if indigent, was entitled to court appointed counsel for the second PCR. See Rule 

32.4(c)(2) (“Upon the filing of all other notices in non-capital cases, the appointment of 

counsel is within the discretion of the presiding judge.”); Osterkamp v. State of Arizona, 

250 P.3d 551, 556 n.4 (Ariz. App. 2011) (non-pleading defendant would be entitled to 

counsel in a second, timely filed post-conviction proceeding only if a notice is filed 

before the appeal is resolved and another notice is filed after the appeal is concluded). 

Without the right to court appointed counsel if indigent, the second PCR argument falls 

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short of preventing the Martinez exception as interpreted by Nguyen. Although Petitioner 

did not initiate a second PCR proceeding (which would have amounted to the initial 

collateral review proceeding for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and for which 

there is no right to counsel for a non-pleading defendant), the petitioner in Nguyen did not 

initiate an initial PCR proceeding before his federal habeas action. Therefore, 

Respondents cannot persuasively argue that Petitioner’s failure to take advantage of an 

opportunity to present the IAAC claim to the state court is fatal procedural default to 

federal habeas relief. As the Supreme Court stated in Martinez about its announced 

equitable rule exception to Coleman: 

An equitable ruling, by contrast [to a constitutional rule], permits States a 

variety of systems for appointing counsel in initial-review collateral 

proceedings. And it permits a State to elect between appointing counsel in 

initial-review collateral proceedings or not asserting a procedural default 

and raising a defense on the merits in federal habeas proceedings. 

Id. at 1320. 

Respondents argue that because Petitioner did not raise any IAAC claims as 

grounds for habeas relief, the ineffectiveness of his PCR counsel cannot constitute cause 

to excuse the procedural default of the IAAC claim. (Doc. 87 at 4.) Respondents argue 

that Nguyen only held that the ineffectiveness of PCR counsel may constitute cause 

excusing the procedural default of an IAAC claim raised as a ground for habeas relief. 

Id. (citing Nguyen, 736 F.3d at 1289) (emphasis added). However, Petitioner has 

requested leave to amend his habeas petition to include IAAC and ineffective assistance 

of PCR counsel claims. (Doc. 89 at 5.) The Court in Nguyen addressed the issue of 

amending the petition to add the IAAC claim and found that the IAAC claim would relate 

back to the filing of the petition under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c). Id. at 1297 (finding that the 

“time and type” language refers not to the claims or grounds for relief, but rather to the 

facts that support those grounds). 

The Court in Nguyen noted that the Court’s “central point in Martinez is that a 

‘substantial’ IAC claim deserves one chance to be heard on initial review in a state 

postconviction proceeding.” Nguyen, 736 F.3d at 1294. Further, “[i]f a procedural 

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default by an ineffective postconviction counsel forfeits an underlying trial-counsel or an 

appellate-counsel IAC claim, no court will ever hear that underlying IAC claim.” Id. 

The Martinez exception, as applied in Nguyen, addresses this injustice. 

To find that the Martinez exception as applied in Nguyen does not apply here 

would be a nonsensical result. Both Martinez and Nguyen regarded ineffective PCR 

counsel failing to raise an underlying constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim; in Martinez, IATC, while in Nguyen, IAAC. Here, like both Martinez and 

Nguyen, there is also an ineffective PCR counsel failing to raise a constitutional 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The ineffective assistance cause in Nguyen at the 

PCR stage was not being advised of state PCR existence; here, the PCR ineffective cause 

is even greater because the appellate counsel should have declined to be PCR counsel so 

that a different attorney could evaluate whether or not appellate counsel provided 

effective assistance of counsel. Further, in this case, had attorney Phalen advised 

Petitioner of the right to a second PCR, it would not have been enough to cure the 

problems from Phalen’s dual representation in the appeal and the first PCR because of the 

lack of the right of appointed counsel in Arizona for a second PCR for a non-pleading 

defendant. See Runningeagle v. Ryan, ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 3213095, at *9 (9th Cir. 

June 10, 2016) (“As in Trevino, there is no principled reason why federal law should 

‘deny defendants the benefit of Martinez solely because of the existence of a theoretically 

available procedure . . .,’ which is ‘difficult, and in the typical case all but impossible, to 

use successfully, and which [Arizona] courts so strongly discourage defendants from 

using.”) (citation omitted). 

Undersigned recommends that Martinez be applied to the procedural defaults of 

Petitioner’s IAAC claim and his irreconcilable conflict claim. Therefore, Petitioner 

should have the opportunity to show “cause” and “prejudice” for the procedural defaults. 

“To demonstrate cause and prejudice sufficient to excuse the procedural default,” 

Petitioner must show: 

First, to establish “cause,” he must establish that his counsel in the state 

postconviction proceeding was ineffective under the standard of Strickland. 

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Strickland, in turn, requires him to establish that both (a) post-conviction 

counsel’s performance was deficient, and (b) there was a reasonable 

probability that, absent the deficient performance, the result of the postconviction proceedings would have been different. See Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 687, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052. Second, to establish “prejudice,” he 

must establish that his “underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel 

claim is a substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner must 

demonstrate that the claim has some merit.” Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318. 

Clabourne v. Ryan, 745 F.3d 362, 377 (9th Cir. 2014). 

“Section 2254(e) . . . does not bar a hearing before the district court to allow a 

petitioner to show ‘cause’ under Martinez” because a claim of ineffective assistance of 

PCR counsel is not a “claim” for relief under § 2254(e)(2), but rather it is asserted as an 

equitable basis to excuse the procedural default. Dickens v. Ryan, 740 Fl.3d 1302, 1321 

(9th Cir. 2014). Therefore, Petitioner should be afforded a hearing to establish “cause” 

and “prejudice” as set forth in Clabourne. In this case, Petitioner must show that the 

IAAC claim, and then the irreconcilable conflict claim, are substantial—meaning the 

claims have some merit. 

“The Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a ‘meaningful relationship’ between a 

client and his attorney.” Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 885–86 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(citing Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983)). “However, forcing a defendant to go to 

trial with an attorney with whom he has an irreconcilable conflict amounts to constructive 

denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Id. (citing Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 

1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 1970)). “An irreconcilable conflict in violation of the Sixth 

Amendment occurs only where there is a complete breakdown in communication 

between the attorney and client, and the breakdown prevents effective assistance of 

counsel.” Id. (citing Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

“Disagreements over strategical or tactical decisions do not rise to level of a complete 

breakdown in communication.” Id. The Court looks to three factors in determining 

whether a conflict rises to the level of “irreconcilable”: “1) the extent of the conflict; 2) 

the adequacy of the inquiry by the trial court; and 3) the timeliness of the motion for 

substitution of counsel.” Id. (citing United States v. Moore, 159 F.3d 1154, 1158–59 (9th 

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A trial court’s inquiry on a motion to substitute counsel should be “such necessary 

inquiry as might ease the defendant’s dissatisfaction, distrust, and concern” and “should 

provide a ‘sufficient basis for reaching an informed decision[ ]’ regarding whether to 

appoint new counsel.” Id. (citing United States v. Garcia, 924 F.2d 925, 926 (9th Cir. 

1991) and United States v. McClendon, 782 F.2d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 1986) overruled on 

other grounds by United States v. Garrett, 179 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir.1999)). The Ninth 

Circuit has held in extreme cases that a complete breakdown in communication may 

occur even where counsel is providing competent representation. 504 F.3d at 887 (citing 

United States v. Nguyen, 262 F.3d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 2001); United States. v. Musa, 220 

F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000)). In Nguyen, 262 F. 3d at 1003, the trial court's inquiry 

focused “exclusively on the attorney's competence and refused to consider the 

relationship between Nguyen and his attorney.” Id. The court's refusal to consider the 

relationship was significant in Nguyen because, by the time trial began, Nguyen was “left 

to fend for himself”; he could not confer with his attorney about trial strategy or 

evidence, or even get his attorney to explain the proceedings. Id. at 1004. No 

communication at all flowed between attorney and client. Id. A habeas petitioner who 

satisfies his or her burden and shows a serious conflict that resulted in a constructive 

denial of counsel need not make any further showing of prejudice. Schell, 218 F.3d at 

1026. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Court order that Petitioner’s 

habeas petition be amended, as requested by Petitioner’s counsel (Doc. 89 at 5), to 

include IAAC and ineffective assistance of PCR counsel claims. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court find Martinez v. Ryan, 132 

S. Ct. 1309 (2012), applicable to excuse Petitioner’s procedural defaults of his IAAC 

claim and his irreconcilable conflict claim in Grounds One and Six of his Amended 

Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 15). 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court conduct a hearing to allow 

Petitioner to establish cause and prejudice for the procedural defaults. 

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 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s 

judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties shall have fourteen days within 

which to file responses to any objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the 

Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United 

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely 

objections to any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a 

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or 

judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72. 

 Dated this 21st day of June, 2016. 

Honorable Deborah M. Fine

United States Magistrate Judge

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