Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-07005/USCOURTS-caDC-97-07005-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 9, 1997 Decided July 1, 1997 

No. 97-7005

PARALYZED VETERANS OF AMERICA, ET AL.,

APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS

v.

D.C. ARENA L.P., A DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES

Consolidated with 

No. 97-7017

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(96cv01354)

John G. Kester argued the cause for appellants, with whom 

Brendan V. Sullivan, Jr., Paul Mogin, and Thomas G. 

Hentoff were on the briefs.

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Niki Kuckes argued the cause for appellees, with whom 

William H. Jeffress, Jr., David S. Cohen, and Lawrence B. 

Hagel were on the briefs.

Samuel R. Bagenstos, Attorney, United States Department 

of Justice, argued the cause and filed the brief for amicus 

curiae the Unites States.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, SILBERMAN and SENTELLE, 

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.

SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge: Appellees/cross-appellants (appellees) sued appellants/cross-appellees (appellants) to require that the wheelchair seating in an arena under construction provide lines of sight over standing spectators. The 

district court concluded that most, but not all, of the wheelchair seating must have such sightlines. We affirm.

I.

Appellants own and will operate the MCI Center, an arena 

currently under construction in downtown Washington, D.C. 

It will house the NBA's Washington Wizards and the NHL's 

Washington Capitals, and will host concerts and other special 

events. One aspect of the design of any arena is the choice of 

the "seating bowls," a selection that determines what seats 

will be offered for sale at what events. Because the games 

and events will be exciting affairs and the patrons are expected, even encouraged at times, to stand and cheer for the 

home teams, wheelchair users are understandably concerned 

about whether the seats available to them will allow them to 

see the action during the most dramatic moments.

The case arises under Title III of the Americans with 

Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. (1994). The general rule of Title III provides:

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No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis 

of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, 

services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person 

who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of 

public accommodation.

Id. § 12182(a). Newly constructed facilities subject to the 

ADA must be "readily accessible to and usable by individuals 

with disabilities." Id. § 12183(a)(1). Congress has directed 

the Department of Justice to flesh out these general principles by "issu[ing] regulations ... that include standards 

applicable to facilities" covered by Title III. Id. § 12186(b). 

One of these regulations, known as Standard 4.33.3, is the 

centerpiece of this litigation. It states:

Wheelchair areas shall be an integral part of any fixed 

seating plan and shall be provided so as to provide people 

with physical disabilities a choice of admission prices 

and lines of sight comparable to those for members of the 

general public. ... At least one companion fixed seat 

shall be provided next to each wheelchair seating area. 

When the seating capacity exceeds 300, wheelchair 

spaces shall be provided in more than one location....

28 C.F.R. Part 36, App. A, § 4.33.3 (1996). The controversy 

concerns whether the "lines of sight comparable" language of 

Standard 4.33.3 requires wheelchair seats to afford sightlines 

over standing spectators.

The Department did not actually draft the language of 

Standard 4.33.3; it was fashioned by the Architectural and 

Transportation Barriers Compliance Board, known as the 

Access Board. Congress had instructed that Justice's regulations be "consistent with the minimum guidelines and requirements issued by" the Board. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(c). It is 

comprised of 13 individuals appointed by the president and 

representatives of 12 government departments or agencies, 

including the Department of Justice. See 29 U.S.C. 

§ 792(a)(1) (1994). And it is charged, inter alia, with "develop[ing] advisory guidelines for," and "establish[ing] and maintain[ing] minimum guidelines and requirements for the stanUSCA Case #97-7005 Document #282183 Filed: 07/01/1997 Page 3 of 20
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dards issued pursuant to," Title III of the ADA. Id.

§ 792(b)(2), (3) (emphasis added).

In January of 1991, the Board proposed accessibility guidelines, one of which would have required that wheelchair 

seating be "located to provide lines of sight comparable to 

those for all viewing areas." It pointed out that its wording 

"may not suffice in sports arenas or race tracks where the 

audience frequently stands." Therefore it solicited comments 

on "whether full lines of sight over standing spectators ... 

should be required." 56 Fed. Reg. 2296, 2314 (1991). Meanwhile, in February of that year, the Justice Department 

issued its own notice of proposed rulemaking in which it 

proposed, inter alia, "to adopt [the Access Board's] guidelines 

as the accessibility standard applicable under this rule" and in 

which it directed "any comments" to those guidelines to be 

sent to the Board. 56 Fed. Reg. 7452, 7478-79 (1991). 

Although "[m]any commenters ... recommended that lines of 

sight should be provided over standing spectators," the Board 

in July issued a guideline, essentially the same as the proposal, that omitted reference to the standing spectator problem: 

it recommended "lines of sight comparable to those available 

to the rest of the public," and stated that the issue of lines of 

sight over standing spectators "[would] be addressed in 

guidelines for recreational facilities." 56 Fed. Reg. 35,408, 

35,440 (1991); see also 56 Fed. Reg. at 60,618. On the same 

day, the Department promulgated Standard 4.33.3, worded 

identically to the Board's guideline.

Unlike the Board, the Department did not initially express 

a view on whether the "lines of sight comparable" language 

required sightlines over standing spectators. In a 1992 

speech to a conference of Major League Baseball stadium 

operators, the deputy chief of the Public Access Section of the 

Department of Justice did say that "[t]here is no requirement 

of line of sight over standing spectators." By the middle of 

1993, however, when Justice initiated its investigation into the 

accessibility of venues for the 1996 summer Olympic games, it 

began taking the position that "lines of sight comparable to 

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1 The Olympics investigation culminated in May of 1996 with a 

settlement that identified Olympic Stadium as "the most accessible 

stadium in the world," in part because "virtually all wheelchair seats 

have a comparable 'line of sight,' so that wheelchair users can still 

see the playing surface even when spectators in front of them stand 

up during the event." 

those for members of the general public" meant "line[s] of 

sight over standing spectators."1

Then, in late 1994, Justice undertook to publicize more 

formally its position that "lines of sight comparable" included 

sightlines over standing spectators. As part of its Title III 

regulatory responsibility, Justice is required to "ensure the 

availability and provision of appropriate technical assistance 

manuals." 42 U.S.C. § 12206(c)(3). The Department's first 

Americans with Disabilities Act Title III Technical Assistance Manual, and several successive annual supplements, 

contained exceedingly detailed requirements for compliance 

with Title III, but said nothing about sightlines over standing 

spectators. But, in December, the Department published, 

without notice and comment, a supplement to its manual that 

explicitly interpreted "lines of sight comparable" to require 

sightlines over standing spectators. The supplement noted 

that "wheelchair locations [must] provide ... lines of sight 

comparable to those for members of the general public," and 

stated, "[t]hus, in assembly areas where spectators can be 

expected to stand during the event or show being viewed, the 

wheelchair locations must provide lines of sight over spectators who stand." (Emphasis added.)

A month after Justice issued the supplement appellants 

chose four seating bowls for the MCI Center: one each for 

hockey and basketball games and two for concerts. The 

seating bowls that appellants settled on included wheelchair 

seating in the amount of more than 1% of the total seats, as 

required by regulation, and they allowed for a variety of 

admission prices and locations in the arena. Some, but not 

all, of the wheelchair seating in the chosen designs would 

have lines of sight over standing spectators. It is undisputed 

that, as they evaluated their options, appellants were fully 

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aware that the Justice Department had taken the position 

that "lines of sight comparable" includes sightlines over 

standing spectators.

Appellees, the Paralyzed Veterans of America and several 

Washington-area sports enthusiasts who use wheelchairs, 

challenged the seating bowl designs in the district court 

under the ADA's private right of action. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12188 (1994). They focused on Standard 4.33.3's requirements that wheelchair seating be integrated with seating for 

ambulatory patrons, that it be dispersed throughout the 

facility, and, at least as interpreted by Justice, that it provide 

lines of sight over spectators who can be expected to stand. 

Appellants responded that the seating bowls fully satisfied 

the integration and dispersal requirements, and that Standard 4.33.3 properly read did not require that wheelchair 

seating provide sightlines over standing spectators. The 

Department, despite its own enforcement authority in the 

statute, see 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b), and notwithstanding several 

invitations by the district judge, refused to intervene in the 

case. In contrast to its rather aggressive enforcement posture in other similar cases, see generally David W. Dunlap, 

The Disabled Present New Hurdles for Architects, N.Y.

TIMES, June 1, 1997, at 30, Justice sought to participate only 

as amicus. The district court granted the Department leave 

to file a brief but did not allow it to participate at oral 

argument. The court refused to allow Justice to file a second 

brief which would have "address[ed] [appellants'] arguments 

about the Department of Justice's interpretation and enforcement of ... the ADA's Standards for Accessible Design."

The district judge concluded that, although the wheelchair 

seating in the proposed seating bowls was sufficiently integrated with the seating for ambulatory patrons, it was not 

adequately dispersed. As for the sightlines requirement, the 

only issue that the parties appeal, the district judge agreed 

with appellees in the main. He concluded that Justice's 

manual interpretation was a binding construction of its own 

regulation to which he should defer. But he determined that 

the regulation, as actually applied, did not require that every

wheelchair seat have a line of sight over standing spectators. 

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In light of his perception of Justice's enforcement positions

what he termed a "hazy tapestry of action and inaction"

along with the good faith of appellants, he concluded that 

"substantial compliance" was sufficient. Accordingly, although he found appellants' initial plan deficient, he subsequently approved a plan which would provide sightlines over 

standing spectators in 78% of the wheelchair seating in one 

configuration, and 85% to 88% in the other three.

The district court's decision is challenged from both directions. Appellants claim the court erred in reading 4.33.3 

to require any sightlines over standing spectators. Appellees 

believe the only error was in not requiring that all wheelchair 

seating have such sightlines.

II.

It should be understood that appellants do not contend that 

the Department's interpretation of the regulation is unfaithful 

to the governing statute. This case involves just the proper 

interpretation of the regulation. Still, it raises important 

doctrinal issues. Appellants present three arguments directed at the district judge's acceptance of the Department's 

interpretation of the regulation. First, it is claimed that the 

Department and the district judge have it flatly wrong; the 

language of the regulation simply will not bear the interpretation the manual places on it. Second, even if we think the 

regulation is ambiguous, we should approach the task of 

interpretation with fresh eyesin other words, without granting deference to the Department's interpretation. As such, 

we should conclude that appellants' reading of the regulation 

is the better one. Third, even if Justice could have interpreted the regulation as it has in the manual as an initial matter, 

the Department actually originally adopted the interpretation 

appellants place on it. Accordingly, the Department's change 

in interpretation is contrary to the Administrative Procedure 

Act because it circumvents section 553, which requires that 

notice and comment accompany the amendment of regulations. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994). Even if not a change, it 

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constitutes a substantive addition which itself requires notice 

and comment.

A.

The phrase "lines of sight comparable to those for members of the general public," appellants argue, means only that 

wheelchair areas are to be dispersed throughout a facility. 

All different geographical locations within that facility are to 

be available to wheelchair users. Appellees and the government, in its amicus brief, point out that the regulation, by 

requiring facilities with over 300 seats to provide wheelchair 

seating "in more than one location" and to give wheelchair 

users a choice of admission prices, already accomplishes the 

dispersal objective, and therefore "lines of sight comparable" 

must have an added meaningand the most obvious is an 

unobstructed view. We agree. We think the language "lines 

of sight comparable" quite naturally is interpreted to refer to 

the ability of a wheelchair user to see a performance without 

any obstruction.

Appellants maintain nevertheless that "lines of sight comparable"by the time it was used in the regulationhad 

gathered a specific meaning, a meaning other than that which 

the Department manual ascribes to it. (Appellants do not 

even concede that the regulation refers to obstructions, but, 

in any event, according to them, it certainly does not cover a 

temporary obstruction caused by standing spectators.) The 

language had its genesis apparently in guidance issued by the 

American National Standards Institute, a private body, in 

1980. Appellants contend that there is no contemporary 

manifestationnot even a hintthat the Institute meant the 

phrase to reach the standing spectator problem. That may 

be so. Still, as appellees and the government correctly insist, 

there was no uniformly understood construction of the language prior to the time it was picked up by the Board and the 

Department. Although there is no indication that the words 

were intended to address sightlines over standing spectators, 

neither is there any evidence to the contrary. The words 

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simply had not taken on a well-understood meaning. It could 

be that the Board, picking up the phrase from the Standards 

Institute, intended it to be limited to permanent obstructions, 

not standing spectators, but as we discuss infra, that is 

relevant to the question whether Justice's manual interpretation is entitled to deference and whether it should be thought 

a modification of the regulation; it does not demonstrate that 

"lines of sight comparable" had developed a universally accepted linguistic meaning contrary to the one Justice asserts.

B.

We thus think the phrase "lines of sight comparable" is 

easily read as a view no more obstructed than would be 

available to non-wheelchair users. But whether that refers 

only to permanent obstructions or those caused temporarily 

by standing spectatorsparticularly vexing to those in wheelchairs (children and shorter people may be able to stand on 

the seats)is by no means obvious. As applied to that 

situation, the phrase is ambiguous, which gives rise to the 

second question: whether the manual interpretation is entitled to deference.

Agency interpretations of their own regulations have been 

afforded deference by federal reviewing courts for a very long 

time and are sustained unless "plainly erroneous or inconsistent" with the regulation. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. 

v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994); Bowles v. Seminole Rock 

& Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). It is sometimes said 

that this deference is even greater than that granted an 

agency interpretation of a statute it is entrusted to administer. See, e.g., Capital Network Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 28 F.3d 201, 

206 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In the aftermath of Chevron, it may be 

that our deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous 

regulations is no different than that which we afford to 

interpretations of ambiguous statutes. It would seem that 

there are few, if any, cases in which the standard applicable 

under Chevron would yield a different result than the "plainly 

erroneous or inconsistent" standard set forth in Bowles v. 

Seminole Rock & Sand Co., supra. After all, Chevron

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2

Professor Manning acknowledges that an agency's authority 

to proceed through adjudication, rather than rulemaking, may 

reduce that incentive but here the Department must seek enforcement in federal court.

His prescription is that the rule of ordinary contract interpretationthat ambiguities are construed against the draftershould 

apply to agency regulations. We think his contract model for an 

agency drafting regulations does not quite fit; it assumes that the 

only two "parties" are the agency and the regulated class. Actually, when an agency promulgates regulations, just as when Congress 

passes legislation, many different parties are affected and that 

includes various sorts of beneficiaries who may have an interest in 

giving the agency the benefit of the doubt. We nevertheless 

appreciate serious discussions of legal doctrine, increasingly rare in 

the leading law journals. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing 

Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 

MICH. L. REV. 34, 42 (1992); United States v. Six Hundred and 

Thirty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred and Fifty-Eight Dollars in 

U.S. Currency, 955 F.2d 712, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Silberman, J., 

concurring); see also Deborah J. Merritt & Melanie Putnam, 

Judges and Scholars: Do Courts and Scholarly Journals Cite the 

Same Law Review Articles? 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 871 (1996). 

requires a reviewing court to affirm a permissible (or reasonable) interpretation of an ambiguous statute, and we very 

much doubt that we would defer to an unreasonable agency 

interpretation of an ambiguous regulation. See Thomas Jefferson, 512 U.S. at 512.

Of late, it has been argued that the Supreme Court should 

abandon deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous 

regulations, because it arguably creates perverse incentives 

for an agency to draft vague regulations that give inadequate 

guidance. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure 

and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency 

Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1996);2cf. Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hosp., 115 S. Ct. 1232, 1243 (1995) (O'Connor, 

J., dissenting) (criticizing Court for deferring to an agency 

interpretation "that would force us to conclude that [the 

Secretary] has not fulfilled her statutory duty"); Thomas 

Jefferson, 512 U.S. at 524 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Although 

the Court has only very recently reaffirmed its doctrine of 

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3

In that regard, surely the APA imposes a considerably tighter 

restriction than does the non-delegation doctrine as applied to 

legislation. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American 

Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980). Indeed, a broad delegation of 

substantive authority may require stricter procedural safeguards. 

4 Appellants do argue that the interpretation violates section 

553 because it reversed prior agency position. That argument is 

taken up infra.

deference of this kind, see Auer v. Robbins, 117 S. Ct. 905, 

911 (1997), there is, to be sure, an outer limit to that 

deference imposed by the Administrative Procedure Act. A 

substantive regulation must have sufficient content and definitiveness as to be a meaningful exercise in agency lawmaking. 

It is certainly not open to an agency to promulgate mush and 

then give it concrete form only through subsequent less 

formal "interpretations." Compare Manning, supra, at 655-

57. That technique would circumvent section 553, the notice 

and comment procedures of the APA.3 But appellants do not 

actually argue that the regulation at issue is of that type

and we do not think it can be so fairly characterized.4 Nor do 

we believe the proposed regulation did not give adequate 

notice that it could be interpreted as the Department now 

does. Anyone considering the phrase "lines of sight comparable" should have thought that it might imply an unobstructed 

view over standing spectators.

Appellants, nevertheless, argue that deference is inappropriate here because it was not the Department of Justice that 

actually drafted the regulation; it was the Access Board 

which did so, as a proposed guideline. Indeed, Justice's 

notice indicated that it intended to adopt the Board's standards and that responses should be directed to the Board, 

thus suggesting that it was the Board that controlled the 

process by which the language of both the guideline and the 

regulation was to be adopted. We do not defer, however, to 

an administrative agency's interpretation of its regulation 

solely because its employees are the drafters and presumably 

have superior knowledge as to what they intended. Of 

course, contemporary indications as to what the agency 

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meant by the language used, such as the comments received, 

could play the same role as legislative history does in both 

steps of a Chevron analysis. See, e.g., King Broadcasting Co. 

v. FCC, 860 F.2d 465, 469 (D.C. Cir. 1988); City of Cleveland 

v. NRC, 68 F.3d 1361, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1995). But the doctrine 

of deference is based primarily on the agency's statutory role 

as the sponsor of the regulation, not necessarily on its drafting expertise. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 110, 

112 (1992); American Train Dispatchers Ass'n v. ICC, 54 

F.3d 842, 848 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1261 

(1996); see also Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 

680 (1991). Under Chevron, an agency's interpretation of 

ambiguous statutory language is entitled to deference because of the agency's delegated authority to administer the 

statute, and the same consideration underlies deference to an 

agency's interpretation of its own regulation. The resolution 

of ambiguities in a regulation implicates the same sort of 

policy choices it does with regard to a statute, see, e.g., 

Pauley, 501 U.S. at 697, and Congress should therefore be 

thought to have delegated to agencies the authority to reconcile regulatory ambiguities. Once the Board's language was 

put out by the Department as its own regulation, it became, 

as the statute contemplates, the Justice Department's and 

only the Justice Department's responsibility. That is why 

this case is different from those upon which appellants rely 

involving a statute (or regulation) administered by more than 

one department or agency. See, e.g., Wachtel v. OTS, 982 

F.2d 581, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Association of Am. Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 913 (D.C. 

Cir. 1993).

We recognize that the Department has no administrative 

adjudicatory authority which it could use to interpret its 

regulation; either it or a private party must go to federal 

court to enforce the regulation. Yet Congress unquestionably 

delegated to the Department the authority to flesh out the 

statutory framework by issuance of its regulations, so the 

Department has a good deal more legal/policymaking authority than would be true if it had merely a prosecuting role. 

Compare Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1994), 

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5 Appellants mistakenly rely on Kelley to suggest that the 

Department is not entitled to deference because this is a suit 

between private persons brought under the ADA's private right of 

action. There, we concluded that the EPA lacked statutory authority to issue regulations defining CERCLA liability of a particular 

class where the statute provided that liability would be determined 

by the court. 

cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110 (1995).5 Moreoverand we think 

this is significantCongress, by specifically requiring the 

publication of a technical manual that would further refine or 

interpret in detail the regulation's substantive obligations, 

contemplated a continuing administration of the regulation 

that approaches, if not equates with, the adjudicatory authority of other statutory schemes.

C.

We have concluded that the language of Standard 4.33.3 is 

susceptible to Justice's present interpretation and that the 

statutory scheme contemplates that we would defer to the 

Department's reasonable interpretations of its regulation as 

set forth in the technical manual. That does not mean that 

appellees and the government are home free regarding their 

interpretation of the regulation. Appellants' most powerful 

argument remains: that the Department of Justice's present 

interpretation of the regulation constitutes a fundamental 

modification of its previous interpretation and, even if it 

legitimately could have reached the present interpretation 

originally, it cannot switch its position merely by revising the 

technical manual. Once an agency gives its regulation an 

interpretation, it can only change that interpretation as it 

would formally modify the regulation itself: through the 

process of notice and comment rulemaking.

The government asserts that even if appellants' characterization of the Justice Department's initial treatment of the 

regulation were correctwhich both it and appellees deny

an agency is completely free to change its interpretation of an 

ambiguous regulation so long as the regulation reasonably 

will bear the second interpretation. The government argues 

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that an agency has the same latitude to modify its interpretation of a regulation as it does its interpretation of a statute 

under Chevron. We think the government is wrong. The 

premise of Chevron, as we have noted, is that Congress has 

delegated implicitly to administrative agencies and departments the authority to reconcile, within reason, ambiguities in 

statutes that the agencies and departments are charged with 

administering. See, e.g., Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1108; Oil, Chem. 

& Atomic Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 46 F.3d 

82, 90 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 81 (1995). That 

delegation is, as the Supreme Court recognized in Chevron,

itself a continuing one; there is no barrier to an agency 

altering its initial interpretation to adopt another reasonable 

interpretationeven one that represents a new policy response generated by a different administration. See Chevron 

U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 

U.S. 837, 863 (1984). The government is certainly correct in 

suggesting that the doctrine of deference to an agency's 

interpretation of its own regulation and Chevron deference 

are analogous. But Congressand it is congressional will 

that is crucialhas said more, specifically on the subject of 

regulations. Under the APA, agencies are obliged to engage 

in notice and comment before formulating regulations, which 

applies as well to "repeals" or "amendments." See 5 U.S.C. 

§ 551(5). To allow an agency to make a fundamental change 

in its interpretation of a substantive regulation without notice 

and comment obviously would undermine those APA requirements. That is surely why the Supreme Court has noted (in 

dicta) that APA rulemaking is required where an interpretation "adopt[s] a new position inconsistent with ... existing 

regulations." Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hosp., 115 

S. Ct. 1232, 1239 (1995); see also National Family Planning 

& Reproductive Health Ass'n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 240-

41 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

We therefore reject the government's bold, complete analogy to Chevron and turn to the question whether the Department should be regarded, as appellants argue, as having 

actually "amended" its regulation without notice and comment 

in contravention of section 553. Appellees and the governUSCA Case #97-7005 Document #282183 Filed: 07/01/1997 Page 14 of 20
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ment insist that no authoritative interpretation of the phrase 

"lines of sight comparable" was ever presented until the 

supplement to the manual was published in 1994. As we have 

described, the Board in its notice of proposed rulemaking 

conceded that the guidelines "may not suffice in sports arenas 

or race tracks where the audience frequently stands." It 

solicited comments on "whether full lines of sight over standing spectators ... should be required," and in promulgating 

the final rule the Board acknowledged that "[m]any commenters ... recommended that lines of sight should be provided 

over standing spectators"which implies that the Board did 

not believe its guidelines alleviated their concern. 56 Fed. 

Reg. at 35,440. It then stated its "intention to address the 

issue of lines of sight over standing spectators in the guidelines for recreational facilities which will be proposed at a 

future date." 56 Fed. Reg. at 60,618.

If the Department, when it promulgated the regulation, had 

said what the Board said, or even clearly adopted what the 

Board said, it would be hard to conclude that the Department 

did not subsequently "amend" the regulation in violation of 

the APA. But Justice did not do so in its statement of basis 

and purpose. It never referred to the Board's concern, nor 

did it imply that its regulation did not address the problem of 

lines of sight over standing spectators. It may well be that it 

is a plausible inference that Justice, at the time, deliberately 

intended the regulation to mean the same thing as did the 

Boardbut it is not a necessary inference. And, as we have 

observed, Congress did not mandate that Justice follow the 

Board's guidelines. It said only that "[s]tandards included in 

regulations issued under [the facility provisions of Title III] 

shall be consistent with the minimum guidelines and requirements issued by the ... Board." 42 U.S.C. § 12186(c) (emphasis added). Nothing prevented the Department from 

imposing a greater burden on those entities covered by its 

regulation.

Appellants, in their effort to tease out of events prior to the 

1994 supplement a previous inconsistent department interpretation, can point only to a speech given by the deputy chief of 

the Public Access Section of the Civil Rights Division to 

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6 The Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights 

Division (to which the Department has delegated enforcement of 

Title III) testified that from 1991 until he left office in 1993 "it was 

never the position ... of Justice that wheelchair locations were 

required to have lines of sight over spectators ... who spontaneously stand." That testimony, putting aside its negative phrasing, is no 

more probative than would be a congressman's post-enactment 

testimony as to what Congress intended when it passed legislation. 

See, e.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 556-67 (1988). 

Major League Baseball stadium operators, in which she said 

"[t]here is no requirement for line of sight over standing 

spectators."6 A speech of a mid-level official of an agency, 

however, is not the sort of "fair and considered judgment" 

that can be thought of as an authoritative departmental 

position. Auer, 117 S. Ct. at 912; see also Drummond Coal 

Co. v. Hodel, 796 F.2d 503, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied,

480 U.S. 941 (1987). It is not equivalent to the technical 

assistance manual, which "represented formal agency action 

upon which affected parties could reasonably rely, in contrast 

to the informal, nonauthoritative nature of what had gone 

before." New York State Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Bowen, 835 

F.2d 360, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 

(1988). If the supplement to the manual had not issued prior 

to appellants' commencement of arena planning, the speech 

might well take on added significance, but it is not open to 

appellants to claim that they reasonably relied to their detriment on the speech or any other indication of the Department's interpretation. As noted, there is no question but that 

appellants were on notice of Justice's interpretation. See 

Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 1225, 

1235 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1994); compare Satellite Broadcasting 

Co., Inc. v. FCC, 824 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (if an agency 

"wishes to use [an] interpretation to cut off a party's right, it 

must give full notice of its interpretation").

We admit the issue is not easy; appellants almost but do 

not quite establish that the Department significantly changed 

its interpretation of the regulation when it issued the 1994 

technical manual. We conclude finally, however, that the 

Department never authoritatively adopted a position contrary 

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to its manual interpretation and as such it is a permissible 

construction of the regulation.

We are left with the question whether the interpretation is 

itself a "substantive rule" having the force of law and, for that 

independent but related reason, is subject to notice and 

comment. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (b)(3)(A). As we have often 

recognized, it is quite difficult to draw a line between substantive and interpretative rules. See, e.g., American Mining 

Congress v. MSHA, 995 F.2d 1106, 1108-09 (D.C. Cir. 1993); 

American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1046 (D.C. 

Cir. 1987). A number of our cases suggest the result turns 

on whether the agency "intend[s]" the rule "to create new 

rights or duties." See, e.g., Orengo-Caraballo, 11 F.3d 186, 

195 (D.C. Cir. 1993). But we have recognized that a stated 

intent to treat a major substantive legal addition as an 

"interpretative" rule will not by itself suffice to escape the 

notice and comment requirements of section 553. See American Mining Congress, 995 F.2d at 1109-10; Chamber of 

Commerce v. OSHA, 636 F.2d 464, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1980). We 

still must look to whether the interpretation itself carries "the 

force and effect of law," see American Mining Congress, 995 

F.2d at 1109 (citing Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act (1947)), or rather whether it spells 

out a duty fairly encompassed within the regulation that the 

interpretation purports to construe. See, e.g., Kelley, 15 F.3d 

at 1108.

The Department's interpretation of its regulation, of 

course, has real consequences. But that is always true when 

a Department or agency selects an interpretation of an 

ambiguous statute or rule, and often we acknowledge a 

government agency's right to do so as an "interpretative" rule 

without notice and comment. See, e.g., Fertilizer Inst. v. 

EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The distinction 

between an interpretative and substantive rule more likely 

turns on how tightly the agency's interpretation is drawn 

linguistically from the actual language of the statute or rule. 

See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce, 636 F.2d at 469. If the 

statute or rule to be interpreted is itself very general, using 

terms like "equitable" or "fair," and the "interpretation" 

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really provides all the guidance, then the latter will more 

likely be a substantive regulation. See, e.g., United States v. 

Picciotto, 875 F.2d 345, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Here, however, 

the government's position is driven by the actual meaning it 

ascribes to the phrase "lines of sight comparable"the "legal 

base upon which the rule rests." United Technologies v. 

EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 719-20 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In this case, 

even "in the absence of the [interpretation] there would [ ] be 

an adequate [regulatory] basis for enforcement action to ... 

ensure the performance of duties." American Mining Congress, 995 F.2d at 1112. In other words, the government 

arguably could have relied on the regulation itself, even 

without the manual interpretation, to seek lines of sight over 

standing spectators. In sum, we believe the manual interpretation is not sufficiently distinct or additive to the regulation 

to require notice and comment.

III.

In their cross-appeal, appellees contend that the district 

judge erred in holding that only "substantial" compliance with 

the Department's regulation is required of arena builders. It 

will be recalled that the district judge's final order called for 

75-88% of wheelchair seating to be provided with a view over 

standing spectators. Appellees' argument stems not from its 

own interpretation of the regulation, but rather from its claim 

that the Department interprets the regulation to require 

100% compliance. The district court, we are told, should have 

deferred in this respect to the Department's interpretation of 

its regulation just as it did regarding the meaning of the 

phrase "lines of sight comparable."

The difficulty with appellees' argument is that the government never indicated in the manual whether every single 

wheelchair location must be afforded a view over standing 

spectators, and the district judge thought there was some 

practical tension between the lines of sight requirement and 

the companion requirement in the regulation that wheelchair 

seating be dispersed (yet integrated with other seating) 

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7 The manual itself suggests that lines of sight over standing 

spectators may be provided at the expense of integration: such 

lines of sight "can be accomplished in many ways, including placing 

wheelchair locations at the front of a seating section, or by providing sufficient elevation for wheelchair locations placed at the rear of 

seating sections to allow those spectators to see over the spectators 

who stand in front of them." The district court noted that "[i]f 

anything, [appellees] have argued that the seating is too integrated, 

and that lines of sight have suffered from the failure to place 

wheelchair spaces further above those seats in front of them." 

throughout the facility.7Indeed, the Department had indicated in letters from its trial attorneys and a document called a 

1996 Accessible Stadium Memorandum that unobstructed 

sightlines are required only at "all or substantially all" wheelchair locations. And in a settlement reached with the organizers of the Atlanta Olympics, the Department agreed that 

"substantially all" wheelchair locations would provide unobstructed sightlines; this after advising the organizers that 

Justice would not agree to settle unless "at least a reasonable 

number" of the wheelchair seats had lines of sight over 

standing spectators.

Appellees contend that the district judge misunderstood 

the Department's official position because he erroneously 

refused to permit the Department to file a second amicus

brief which explainedas the Department has before us

that the Department permits substantial compliance only 

where (1) 100% compliance is structurally impractical or 

technically infeasible, or (2) where standing spectators' views 

are obstructed by other standing spectators. Appellees dismiss the district court's reliance on the Atlanta settlement, 

because it was merely an exercise of enforcement discretion 

with no precedential value.

Although there are circumstances in which a federal court 

may accept an agency's interpretation of a statute or regulation set forth only in an amicus brief, see Auer, 117 S. Ct. at 

911-12 (1997); compare Church of Scientology v. IRS, 792 

F.2d 153, 162 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (en banc), aff'd, 484 U.S. 9 

(1987), with id. at 165-66 (Silberman, J., concurring), it is not 

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clear here that the Department, which has the authority and 

duty to issue technical assistance manuals interpreting and 

applying its regulation, can further add to its interpretation in 

litigationand get deference to that marginally additional 

interpretation. Cf. General Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 

1329 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In any event, a federal district court, 

unlike a court of appeals, see FED. R. APP. P. 29, is not obliged 

to accept an amicus brief from the government, let alone a 

second one purporting to refine arguments that could have 

been presented in its first. In this case, an understandably 

exasperated district judge, who had repeatedly asked the 

government to come into the case as an intervenor, was 

surely within his discretion in rejecting the second amicus

brief. Without that brief, we do not see that appellees had 

much of an argument and they certainly may not improve 

their position by relying on the government's amicus brief on 

appeal. This is not a case of "agency action," the review of 

which is strictly a question of law. See Marshall County 

Health Care Auth. v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 1221, 1225 (D.C. Cir. 

1993). Appellees came into federal court as a private party 

seeking equitable relief. Under the circumstances, we think 

the district judge was more than justified in concluding there 

was a good deal of wiggle room in the degree of compliance 

contemplated by the regulation and manual, and that he, as a 

judge sitting in equity, had ample discretion to fashion the 

remedial order that he did.

Appellees (and the government) complain that to affirm the 

district court on this point would encourage disuniformity of 

interpretation of the regulation. That argument overlooks 

the Department of Justice's authority to put out an amendment to the manual which clarifies its position. Perhaps the 

government really would like to preserve a certain flexibility, 

which may explain why it refused to come in as intervenor. 

But the government cannot have it both ways; if it wishes 

uniformity in treatment, it certainly has the legal tools to 

accomplish that result.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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