Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00520/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00520-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RENO RIOS,

Plaintiff,

v.

C. GIPSON, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:14-cv-00520-BAM-PC

ORDER DISMISSING CLAIMS

ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO 

EITHER FILE SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT OR NOTIFY COURT OF 

WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED ONLY ON 

COGNIZABLE CLAIMS

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. Plaintiff has consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

1

 

Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s May 20, 2016, first amended complaint, filed in response 

to the February 16, 2016, order, dismissing the original complaint with leave to amend. (ECF 

No. 14.)

I.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or 

that “seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 

 

1

Plaintiff filed a consent to proceed before a magistrate judge on May 9, 2014. (ECF No. 4.) 

Case 1:14-cv-00520-DAD-BAM Document 17 Filed 10/18/16 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

1915(e)(2)(B).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate 

that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Jones v. 

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir.2002). 

Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings 

liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 

1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012)(citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be 

facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer 

that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss 

v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant 

has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s 

liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 

F.3d at 969. 

II.

COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (CDCR) at Kern Valley State Prison, brings this civil rights action against 

Defendant correctional officials employed by the CDCR at Corcoran State Prison. Plaintiff 

names the following individual defendants: Warden Connie Gipson; Captain T. Campbell; 

Lieutenant A. Johnson; Lt. W. Brodie; Lt. S. Pina; Sergeant M. Cuevas; Sgt. J. C. Garcia; 

Correctional Officer (C/O) Hiracheta; Correctional Counselor (CCII) D. Goree; CCII A. Pasillas; 

Institutional Gang Investigator (IGI) J. Ortega; IGI A. Mayo. Plaintiff’s claims stem from his 

classification as a validated gang member. In the order dismissing the original complaint, the 

Court noted that Plaintiff stated a claim for relief against Defendants Gipson, Mayo, Ortega, 

Case 1:14-cv-00520-DAD-BAM Document 17 Filed 10/18/16 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Garcia, and Pina for due process violations regarding his gang validation. Plaintiff failed to state 

a claim for being unlawfully charged with a rules violation.

Plaintiff alleges that on July 26, 2006, he was originally validated as an associate member 

of the Mexican Mafia (EME) prison gang. Plaintiff alleges that this was done without due 

process and in retaliation for filing inmate grievances. Plaintiff alleges that pursuant to the 

applicable regulations, he met the criteria for inactive review on the ground that, for a period of 

six years, there was no reliable gang activity information that would justify he retention in the 

Security Housing Unit (SHU). 

Plaintiff alleges that on August 23, 2010, Defendant IGI Assistant Mayo authored a 

confidential memorandum, indicating that while working in the Corcoran SHU, he intercepted a 

manila envelope that inmates Berry and Dominguez were passing to each other. The manila 

envelope included an “outside note” address to “all in good standing.” (ECF No. 14 ¶ 22.) 

Inside the manila envelope, Mayo discovered a CDCR Form 602 group appeal, including 

signatures from inmates that supported the appeal. The appeal related to SHU conditions. May 

indicated that because the grievance was addressed to “all in good standing” it means that “all 

inmates who signed the CDCR-602 group grievances were in good standing with the Mexican 

Mafia (EME) prison gang to commit criminal activities.” (Id. ¶ 23.) On the same date, Mayo 

filed a confidential memorandum in each inmate’s central file “in retaliation for signing the 

alleged CDCR-602 group appeal because inmates were challenging the CSP-COR-SHU, harsh 

conditions.” (Id. ¶ 24.) 

On October 2, 2012, Lt. Pina was assigned as the Institution Gang Investigator (IGI) by 

Defendant Warden Gipson. On the same date, Lt. Pina assigned Defendant Ortega to assist him. 

Ortega was assigned by Lt. Pina to disclose any confidential information that constituted gang 

activity within the past six years that Plaintiff was in the SHU. On October 2, 2012, Ortega 

disclosed the fact that Mayo had filed a confidential memorandum in his file regarding the group 

appeal. Plaintiff alleges that Ortega abused his discretion by failing to accurately disclose all 

information to “adequately rebut such entries.” (Id., ¶ 33.) 

On October 4, 2012, Ortega told Plaintiff that Lt. Pina did not have time to conduct a 

Case 1:14-cv-00520-DAD-BAM Document 17 Filed 10/18/16 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

hearing within 24 hours, and that Plaintiff would be re-validated as a prison gang associate 

because he signed the group appeal. Ortega told Plaintiff that “such inmates rebuttals were 

never considered by the OCS in charge to validate inmates because they never comment or 

reply.” (Id. ¶ 34.) Plaintiff explained to Ortega that he needed to talk to Lt. Pina to explain 

why the information that was submitted to validate him was fabricated. 

On October 18, 2012, Plaintiff filed an inmate grievance (CDCR Form 602) against 

Defendants Pina, Ortega, and Mayo for using fabricated information on which to validate 

Plaintiff’s gang affiliation. On November 15, 2012, Sergeant Garcia interviewed Plaintiff 

regarding his grievance. Plaintiff explained to Sgt. Garcia that he was at the SHU law library 

when he signed the group appeal. Plaintiff told Garcia that Defendants Pina, Ortega and Mayo 

altered their report, and refused to provide Plaintiff with information that Plaintiff could have 

used to rebut the allegations. Garcia told Plaintiff that no matter what Plaintiff says, the IGI 

would not consider his evidence. Sgt. Garcia told Plaintiff that he was not the only inmate who 

was validated as a result of the group appeal, that several other inmates were re-validated as a 

result of the group appeal. 

On November 1, 2012, at his ICC hearing, Defendants Pina, Ortega, and Mayo elected to 

retain Plaintiff in the SHU. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denied his request to call witnesses, 

or to have an Investigative Employee to assist in his defense. Plaintiff filed another inmate 

grievance regarding this decision.

On January 7, 2013, Plaintiff was interviewed by Defendant Pasillas regarding his 

grievance. Pasillas told Plaintiff that the ICC could not correct the IGI’s actions, as the only way 

to be released from the SHU would be to debrief. Plaintiff was told that inmates were not 

allowed to call witnesses at ICC reviews, because the reviews were meaningless. Pasillas told 

Plaintiff that inmates must serve six years before they are eligible for inactive review, and that he 

could not do anything for Plaintiff because Plaintiff had filed several grievances and civil 

actions, and “inmates like Plaintiff should be kept in the SHU until they debrief.” (Id. ¶ 44.) 

Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to retaliation. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he 

was subjected to constant cell searches because of inmate grievances that he filed. Plaintiff also 

Case 1:14-cv-00520-DAD-BAM Document 17 Filed 10/18/16 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

alleges that as a result of his complaints, Lt. Brodie ordered staff to place Plaintiff on single cell 

status. Lt. Brodie placed Plaintiff in single cell status “because institutional gang investigators 

alleged that they had received anonymous note by correctional counselor A. BanksGraves at which Defendants J. Ortega and A. Pasillas could not found any reliable information 

which justified their action in regard to the anonymous note.” (Id. ¶ 45.)

Once Plaintiff was placed on single cell status, he was subjected to harsh conditions. 

Plaintiff alleges that he was “without water for approximately two weeks,” and that he was fed 

“constantly imitation flavored food served every day.” (Id. ¶ 45.) Plaintiff alleges that there 

was minimum access to the law library, recreation, yard programs, laundry, showers, cleaning, 

and ventilation. Plaintiff alleges that these harsh conditions were imposed against him and other 

inmates in retaliation for their refusal to debrief. Plaintiff alleges that the inmates had no other 

remedy to challenge their conditions other than a refusal to eat.

Plaintiff alleges that in response to the hunger strike, Defendants Johnson, Cuevas, and 

Hiracheta issued retaliatory counseling chronos (CDCR Form 128A) and a Rules Violation 

Report (RVR). Plaintiff disagreed with the regulations that define a hunger strike as refusing 

nine consecutive meals, and indicated that he consumed food that he had purchased from the 

canteen. Plaintiff alleges that the information in the chrono was fabricated, as he was never 

interviewed or asked why he refused meals. Plaintiff was not provided with an IE to assist him 

with collecting evidence to prepare a defense. On July 22, 2013, Lt. Brodie conducted the 

hearing on the RVR. Plaintiff alleges that Lt. Brodie denied his request to call witnesses and 

present evidence in his defense. 

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Gang Validation

As noted, Plaintiff’s original complaint stated a claim for relief against Defendants 

Warden Gipson, Lt. Mayo, Lt. Pina, IGI Ortega, Sergeant Garcia for improper gang validation 

based on falsified information. The Court noted that Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that

Defendants Warden Gipson, IGI Lt. Mayo, IGI Ortega, IGI Sergeant Garcia, Lt. Pina had 

Case 1:14-cv-00520-DAD-BAM Document 17 Filed 10/18/16 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

predetermined that Plaintiff would be re-validated based upon a refusal to de-brief. Plaintiff restates these allegations in the first amended complaint. For the reasons noted in the February 16, 

2016, order, the first amended complaint states a claim against these Defendants for improper 

gang validation.

As to the remaining Defendants, in the February 16, 2016, order, Plaintiff was advised 

that the statute under which this action proceeds requires that there be an actual connection or 

link between the actions of the defendants, and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by 

the plaintiff. See Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 

U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the 

deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an 

affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is 

legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. 

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). (ECF No. 9 at 8:3-10.) Plaintiff fails to correct this 

deficiency in the first amended complaint. Based upon the allegations in Plaintiff’s original and 

first amended complaint, the Court is persuaded that Plaintiff is unable to allege any additional 

facts that would support a claim for improper gang validation by Defendants Campbell, Johnson, 

Brodie, Cuevas, Hiracheta, Goree, and Pasillas, and further amendment would be futile. See

Hartmann v. CDCR, 707 F.3d 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A district court may deny leave to 

amend when amendment would be futile.”) Based on the nature of the deficiencies at issue, the 

Court finds that further leave to amend is not warranted. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 

(9th. Cir. 2000); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446-1449 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff’s improper gang 

validation claim as to these Defendants should therefore be dismissed for failure to state a claim 

upon which relief could be granted.

B. Rules Violation Report

Plaintiff’s claims that he was unlawfully charged with a serious rules violation report in 

retaliation because he refused meals. Plaintiff’s central claim is that he was falsely convicted. It 

is unclear whether Plaintiff suffered the loss of any credits as a result of his disciplinary charge.

State prisoners may not challenge the fact or duration of their confinement in a section 

Case 1:14-cv-00520-DAD-BAM Document 17 Filed 10/18/16 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

1983 action and their sole remedy lies in habeas corpus relief. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 78. Often 

referred to as the favorable termination rule, this limitation applies whenever state prisoners 

“seek to invalidate the duration of their confinement – either directly through an injunction 

compelling speedier release or indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily 

implies the unlawfulness of the state’s custody.” Id. at 81, Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477 

(1994). Accordingly, “a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation) – no 

matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit 

(state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings) – if success in that action 

would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Id. at 81-82. The 

favorable termination rule applies to prison disciplinary proceedings if those proceedings 

resulted in the loss of good-time or behavior credits. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646-68 

(1997). 

Here, the allegations indicate that the charges were filed against Plaintiff in retaliation 

and that officials conspired to violate Plaintiff’s rights by failing to consider evidence and 

witnesses. A favorable finding on this claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of Plaintiff’s 

conviction. There are no allegations that Plaintiff’s disciplinary conviction has been reversed, 

expunged, or otherwise invalidated. Further, it is unclear whether Plaintiff was assessed any loss 

of credits or any punishment that affected the length of his sentence. Plaintiff was advised of this 

deficiency in the order dismissing the original complaint. (ECF No. 9 at 9:5-8.) Plaintiff fails to 

correct this deficiency in the first amended complaint. An allegation that Plaintiff was not 

allowed to call witnesses or to present evidence in his defense necessarily implies the invalidity 

of Plaintiff’s conviction. In the first amended complaint, Plaintiff does not allege that his 

conviction was reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated. Further, Plaintiff was specifically 

advised that the complaint was vague as to whether Plaintiff suffered the loss of any credits as a 

result of his disciplinary conviction. Plaintiff fails to correct this deficiency in the first amended 

complaint. Plaintiff does not allege what punishment was imposed, or whether it resulted in the 

loss of any credits. Based upon the allegations in Plaintiff’s original and first amended 

complaint, the Court is persuaded that Plaintiff is unable to allege any additional facts that would 

Case 1:14-cv-00520-DAD-BAM Document 17 Filed 10/18/16 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

support a claim for an illegal rules violation hearing, and further amendment would be futile. 

See Hartmann , 707 F.3d at 1130. Based on the nature of the deficiencies at issue, the Court 

finds that further leave to amend is not warranted. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130; Noll, 809 F.2d at 

1446-1449. Plaintiff’s claims regarding due process violations at his disciplinary hearing are 

therefore dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

C. Retaliation

A plaintiff may state a claim for a violation of his First Amendment rights due to 

retaliation under section 1983. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995). A viable 

claim of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment consists of five elements: “(1) an 

assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that 

prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First 

Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” 

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005); accord Watison v. Cartier, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009). 

1. Hunger Strike

In the order dismissing the original complaint, Plaintiff was advised that to the extent that 

he set forth a claim of retaliation for engaging in a hunger strike, such a claim was inconsistent 

with a claim that Plaintiff was not in fact participating in a hunger strike. Though participating 

in a hunger strike can, in certain circumstances, constitute activity protected by the First 

Amendment, the basis of Plaintiff’s claim appeared to be that he was not participating in a 

hunger strike, but falsely charged with participating in a hunger strike. Plaintiff’s retaliation 

claim was therefore dismissed with leave to file an amended complaint in which he alleges that 

he was in fact participating in a hunger strike. Liberally construed, the first amended complaint 

alleges that Plaintiff was participating in a hunger strike to protest Defendants’ policy of 

retaining him in the SHU in order to get him to debrief, and that he was charged with a serious 

rules violation in retaliation for participating in the hunger strike. Plaintiff therefore states a 

claim for relief against Defendants Johnson, Cuevas, and Hiracheta for retaliating against 

Plaintiff for participation in a hunger strike in violation of the First Amendment.

Case 1:14-cv-00520-DAD-BAM Document 17 Filed 10/18/16 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

2. Conditions of Confinement

Plaintiff alleges that he and other inmates were subjected to harsh conditions of 

confinement “in retaliation because 4B facility 4R building was assigned to house only gang 

validated inmates to enforce them to debrief.” (ECF No. 14, ¶ 45.) The Court finds this 

allegation fails to state sufficient factual matter to assert a claim. As noted above, Plaintiff must 

link each individual defendant with specific conduct that deprived Plaintiff of a protected 

interest. Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743. A bare allegation that defendants in general subjected 

Plaintiff to unconstitutional conditions of confinement because he was in a housing unit where 

inmates were “enforced to debrief” is insufficient to state a claim for retaliation. There are no 

facts alleged indicating that any of the named Defendants caused any of the specific conditions 

that Plaintiff complained of, or any facts suggesting that a particular condition of Plaintiff’s 

confinement was imposed on him in response to Plaintiff’s exercise of a protected activity. 

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim regarding the conditions of his confinement should therefore be 

dismissed. Because Plaintiff raises this claim for the first time in the first amended complaint, he 

will be granted an opportunity to file a second amended complaint that cures this defect.

Regarding any challenge to the conditions of confinement imposed on Plaintiff while in 

the SHU on Eighth Amendment grounds, he is advised of the following legal standards for an 

Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim.

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and 

from inhumane conditions of confinement. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Morgan v. 

Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). “[R]outine discomfort inherent in the prison 

setting” does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 

731 (9th Cir. 2000). Rather, extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions of 

confinement claim, and only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s 

necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer, 

511 U.S. at 834; Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). In order to state a claim, Plaintiff 

must allege facts sufficient to show that prison officials knew of and disregarded a substantial 

risk of serious harm to the plaintiff. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847; Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 

Case 1:14-cv-00520-DAD-BAM Document 17 Filed 10/18/16 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

1150-51 (9th Cir. 2010); Richardson v. Runnels, 594 F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir. 2010). 

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint states a cognizable claim against Defendants Gipson, 

Mayo, Ortega, Garcia and Pina for due process violations regarding his gang validation, and 

against Defendants Johnson, Cuevas, and Hiracheta for retaliating against Plaintiff for engaging 

in a hunger strike. Plaintiff’s claims regarding due process violations at his disciplinary hearing 

are dismissed, without leave to amend, for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 

granted. Plaintiff’s gang validation claims against Defendants Campbell, Johnson, Brodie, 

Cuevas, Hiracheta, Goree, and Pasillas are dismissed, without leave to amend, for failure to state 

a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court will provide Plaintiff with the 

opportunity to file an amended complaint regarding his conditions of confinement, curing the 

deficiencies identified by the Court in this order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th 

Cir. 1987).

If Plaintiff does not wish to file an amended complaint and is agreeable to proceeding 

only against Defendants Gipson, Mayo, Ortega, Garcia and Pina on his due process gang 

validation claim and against Defendants Johnson, Cuevas, and Hiracheta on his retaliation claim, 

Plaintiff may so notify the Court in writing. The other defendants and claims will then be 

dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff will then be provided eight summons and eight

USM-285 forms for completion and return. Upon receipt of the forms, the Court will direct the 

United States Marshal to initiate service of process on Defendants Gipson, Mayo, Ortega, 

Garcia, Pina, Johnson, Cuevas and Hiracheta.

If Plaintiff elects to amend, his amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), 

but must state what each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s 

constitutional or other federal rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-679; Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. 

Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief 

above the speculative level . . . Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The mere 

possibility of misconduct is insufficient to state a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Further, 

Case 1:14-cv-00520-DAD-BAM Document 17 Filed 10/18/16 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended 

complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 1467, 1474 (7th Cir. 2007)(no “buckshot” complaints).

Finally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Forsyth v. Humana,

Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), and 

must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading,” Local Rule 

220.

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send to Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Plaintiff’s claims regarding due process violations at his disciplinary hearing are 

dismissed, without leave to amend, for failure to state a claim upon which relief 

could be granted; 

3. Plaintiff’s gang validation claims against Defendants Campbell, Johnson, Brodie, 

Cuevas, Hiracheta, Goree, and Pasillas are dismissed, without leave to amend, for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; 

4. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must 

either:

a. File a second amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court 

in this order, or

b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file a second amended 

complaint and is willing to proceed only against Defendants Gipson, Mayo, 

Ortega, Garcia and Pina on his due process gang validation claims and against 

Defendants Johnson, Cuevas, and Hiracheta on his retaliation claim; and

5. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure 

to prosecute and to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 18, 2016 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00520-DAD-BAM Document 17 Filed 10/18/16 Page 11 of 11