Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01304/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01304-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Kini M. Seawright; et al., 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

State of Arizona; et al., 

 Defendants. 

No. CV 11-1304-PHX-JAT 

ORDER 

 

 Pending before the Court is Defendants’1

 Motion for Summary Judgment (the 

“Motion”). (Doc. 83). Defendants have filed a Separate Statement of Facts in Support of 

the Motion. (Doc. 84). Plaintiffs have filed a Response (Doc. 97), a Controverting and 

Separate Statement of Facts (Doc. 96), and a Supplemental Response (Doc. 116). 

Defendants have also filed a Reply (Doc. 107). Prior to filing their Response, Plaintiffs 

filed a pending motion to exceed the page limit in their Response (Doc. 95). The Court 

will deny Plaintiffs’ motion to exceed the page limitation as moot. The parties appeared 

before the Court for oral argument on Tuesday, August 27, 2013. The Court now grants 

Defendants’ Motion for the following reasons. 

 

1

 Defendants are the State of Arizona and Corrections Officers Edna Jackson-Bey, Clayton Thompson, and Jennifer Blondin. 

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I. BACKGROUND 

On November 24, 2009, Dana Seawright (“Dana”) was committed to the Arizona 

Department of Corrections (“ADOC”) to serve a twelve year sentence related to various 

felony charges. (Doc. 84 at 2). On July 2, 2010, Dana was housed with medium security 

inmates at the Stiner Unit in Blue Yard, Dorm 2, in Pod F, at Arizona State Prison 

Complex-Lewis (ASPC-Lewis). (Id.). Stiner Unit contains two yards—Blue and Red 

Yards. Each yard contains three dorms. Blue Yard contains Dorms 1-3. Each dorm 

contains six separate living areas called pods. Each pod houses between 35-40 inmates 

and has communal toilets, urinals, showers and sinks, as well as a common “Day Room” 

for inmate use. (Id. at 3). As medium security inmates, the inmates Dana was housed 

with inside Dorm 2 had demonstrated that they were not physical threats to each other 

and were, therefore, housed in dormitory-style housing. (Id.). Generally, inmates were 

free to move around within Blue Yard, the dorm, and pods without an officer escort. 

(Id.). 

 On July 2, 2010, Dana was involved in a fight with another inmate that Dana 

reportedly started. (Doc. 96 at 24 ¶ 78). On that day, Dana was moved from Pod F to 

Pod D in Dorm 2. (Doc. 84 at 4). On the morning of July 3, 2010, at some point between 

7:22 and 7:56 a.m., Dana was beaten and stabbed by fellow inmates and left in his cell. 

(Doc. 96 at 11). Dana was assaulted by members of his own race because he was 

engaging in a homosexual relationship with an inmate of a different race. (Id. at 23-25). 

 At 7:56 a.m. Defendant Edna Jackson-Bey was called by other inmates to Dorm 2 

and told she needed to call medical. (Doc. 84 at 14). Jackson-Bey found Dana in his bed 

lying face down and bleeding. She initiated the Incident Command System. (Id.). 

Jackson-Bey tried to communicate with Dana and all Dana would do was make moaning 

noises when she called his name. (Doc. 96-1 at 47). On July 7, 2010, Dana was removed 

from life support systems at St. Joseph’s medical center in Phoenix and he died as a result 

of injuries sustained in the beating. (Doc. 97 at 4). 

 On the day Dana was assaulted, Stiner unit where Dana was housed was 

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understaffed with only 11 correctional officers on duty instead of the normal 24 

correctional officers. Defendant Clayton Thompson was the sergeant in charge of the 

Stiner unit on July 3rd. (Doc. 96 at 13 ¶14). Normally there would have been six 

correctional officers working in the three dorms in Blue Yard—a Dorm Officer and Floor 

Officer for each dorm. (Id. at ¶23). Thompson was required by policy to call the Deputy 

Warden if there were less than 14 staff members present to work at the Stiner Unit—a 

call that Thompson made to the Deputy Warden between 6:30 and 7:00 a.m. that 

morning. (Id. at ¶¶15-16). The Deputy Warden did not answer the phone and Thompson 

was unable to communicate with the Deputy Warden about the situation. (Id.). After not 

being able to get ahold of the Deputy Warden, Thompson made the decision to “collapse” 

Dorm 3 in Blue Yard at 7:10 a.m. in accordance with established procedures because of 

being short staffed. (Id. at ¶28). Collapsing a post could be done when there was not 

enough staff to have a dedicated employee assigned to each post. (Doc. 84 at 5). After 

collapsing a post, an employee already assigned to another post would take on the 

additional assignment of covering the collapsed post. (Id.). As a result, after collapsing 

Dorm 3, two correctional officers—Defendants Jackson-Bey and Jennifer Blondin—were 

in charge of security checks at Dorms 1, 2, and 3 in Blue Yard, which housed 

approximately 550 inmates on the morning Dana was assaulted. (Doc. 96 at ¶¶9, 25). 

Specifically, following the collapse, Blondin was in charge of security checks at Dorms 2 

and 3 and Jackson-Bey was in charge of security checks at Dorms 1 and 3. 

 On July 3rd, Blondin arrived on post at 6:00 a.m. (Id. at ¶55). Two security 

checks were required by policy to be conducted in Dorm 2 between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. 

and two more security checks were required to be conducted between 7:00 and 8:00 a.m. 

(Id. at ¶56). Blondin knew that security checks needed to be conducted twice an hour and 

that the hour started on the clock hour. (Id. at ¶51). Blondin performed security checks 

at 6:30 and 6:59, and again at 7:22 a.m. (Id. at ¶58). At 7:10 a.m., after the collapse, 

Blondin became responsible for conducting security checks in Dorm 3 as well. (Id. at 

¶28). After the security check at 7:22 in Dorm 2, Blondin left Dorm 2 to go to Dorm 3 

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and she gave Jackson-Bey the keys to Dorm 2 in order for Jackson-Bey to continue 

securing Dorm 2 inmates returning from the dining hall. (Id. at ¶63). 

 Jackson-Bey was not responsible for security checks in Dorm 2 at any time on 

July 3rd. (Doc. 84 at 14). Blondin assumed Jackson-Bey would do the second security 

check in Dorm 2 between 7 and 8:00 a.m. and she assumed that Jackson-Bey was in 

Dorm 2 between 7:22 and 7:56 a.m. (Doc. 96 at ¶¶ 43, 63). Jackson-Bey did not know 

to do another security check because she did not know that two checks were made per 

hour in Dorm 2. (Id. at ¶ 65). When turning over the keys, Blondin told Jackson-Bey 

that Blondin had already done the 7:22 security check and that everything was fine. (Id. 

at ¶ 66). Jackson-Bey was outside Dorm 2 between 7:22 and 7:56 a.m. (Id. at ¶67). 

Plaintiffs are the Estate of Dana Seawright (the “Estate”) and Kini Seawright. 

Kini Seawright is the mother of Dana. Plaintiffs originally filed a complaint in this Court 

on June 30, 2011. (Doc. 1). On October 12, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended 

Complaint. (Doc. 19). On June 18, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint. 

(Doc. 53). Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (the “Complaint”) brought this action 

against various Defendants including, the State of Arizona, Charles L. Ryan, the Director 

of the ADOC, and individual Corrections Officers that were on duty at the Stiner Unit 

when Dana was assaulted. (Id. at 1). In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege five counts 

against Defendants. (Id. at 9-22). 

 On February 6, 2013, the Court entered an order granting in part and denying in 

part Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 73). As a result of that order, the claims 

remaining against Defendants include: Count One, the Estate’s and Kini Seawright’s 

claim for violation of Plaintiffs’ rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Edna 

Jackson-Bey, Clayton Thompson, and Jennifer Blondin (collectively the “Officer 

Defendants”); Count Three, Kini Seawright’s claim of negligence and/or gross 

negligence against the State of Arizona (the “State”); Count Four, both Plaintiffs’ claims 

for violation of the Arizona Constitution “Article 2 section 2” (due process of law2

) and 

 

2

 Article 2, section 2 of the Arizona Constitution does not address due process at all. 

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Article 2 section 15 (cruel and unusual punishment), against the State; and Count Five, 

Kini Seawright’s claim for wrongful death under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 

12-611, et. seq. against the State. See (Doc. 53; Doc. 73). 

II. ANALYSIS 

 Defendants have moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 56 on Plaintiffs’ remaining claim against the Officer Defendants (i.e. Count 

One), and on Plaintiffs’ remaining claims against the State (i.e. Counts Three, Four, and 

Five). (Doc. 83 at 1). Summary judgment is only appropriate when “the movant shows 

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A party asserting that a fact cannot 

be or is genuinely disputed must support that assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of 

materials in the record,” or by “showing that materials cited do not establish the absence 

or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible 

evidence to support the fact.” Id. 56(c)(1)(A)&(B). Thus, summary judgment is 

mandated “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the 

burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

 Initially, the movant bears the burden of pointing out to the Court the basis for the 

motion and the elements of the causes of action upon which the non-movant will be 

unable to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to 

the non-movant to establish the existence of material fact. Id. The non-movant “must do 

more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” by 

“com[ing] forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986) (quoting 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (1963) (amended 2010)). In the summary judgment context, the 

Court construes all disputed facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 

 This provision of the Arizona Constitution addresses “Political Power” and the “purpose of government.” Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2. Plaintiffs may have meant section 4, which 

does address due process. See Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 4. 

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Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not 

defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is 

that there be no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 247-248 (1986). A material fact is any factual issue that might affect the outcome of 

the case under the governing substantive law. Id. at 248. A material fact is “genuine” if 

the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. 

Id. 

 At the summary judgment stage, the trial judge’s function is to determine whether 

there is a genuine issue for trial. There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient 

evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. Id. at 

249-250. If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, the judge 

may grant summary judgment. Id. 

A. Count One 

 First, the Officer Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ 

claim against them in Count One under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983”). (Doc. 83 at 4-

12). The Officer Defendants have also moved for summary judgment on Count One due 

to qualified immunity. (Id. at 12-16). The Court will address Plaintiffs’ section 1983 

claim first and then address Defendants’ qualified immunity challenge. 

 1. Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 Claim 

 Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights on its own. Graham v. Connor, 

490 U.S. 386, 393 (1989). Section 1983 “merely provides ‘a method for vindicating 

federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Id. at 394 (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 

137, 144, n. 3 (1979)). “To make out a cause of action under section 1983, plaintiffs must 

[show] that (1) the defendants acting under color of state law (2) deprived plaintiffs of 

rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes.” Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 

1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 190 (9th Cir. 1962)). 

“The first inquiry in any § 1983 suit” is “to isolate the precise constitutional violation with 

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which [the defendant] is charged.” Baker, 443 U.S. at 140. Plaintiffs allege that the 

Officer Defendants violated Dana’s federal rights against unreasonable seizures by use of 

excessive force under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Dana’s 

right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 

53 at 9). 

 In the Order dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims in part, the Court “dismiss[ed] Plaintiffs’ 

Fourth Amendment claim in Count One for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted” because the Fourth Amendment protections against excessive force do not 

apply after conviction and the pending action arose after Dana’s conviction. (Doc. 73 at 

6). Consequently, only Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim under section 1983 remains 

in Count One and the Court must determine if there is a genuine issue for trial over 

whether Dana’s Eighth Amendment rights were violated by the Officer Defendants. 

 To survive Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the Court must determine 

if the undisputed facts show that there is sufficient evidence favoring Plaintiffs for a jury 

to find that (1) the Officer Defendants were acting under color of state law, and (2) that 

the Officer Defendants deprived Dana of rights secured by the Constitution or federal 

statutes. Gibson, 781 F.2d at 1338; see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. The undisputed 

facts show that the Officer Defendants were acting under color of state law as Correctional 

Officers assigned to the Stiner Unit at ASPC-Lewis. (Doc. 84 at 8, 11, 13). The Court 

must now determine if there is a genuine issue of fact over whether the Officer Defendants 

deprived Dana of his Constitutional rights guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment as 

Plaintiffs allege. 

Plaintiffs claim that the Officer Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the 

health, safety, protection and medical needs of prisoners and that they permitted 

excessive and unnecessary force used maliciously for the purpose of causing harm in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment. 

(Doc. 53 at 9). “[T]he treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under 

which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” Farmer v. 

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Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994) (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 

(1993)). The Eighth Amendment imposes “duties on [prison] officials, who must provide 

humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive 

adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to 

guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Id. (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–

527 (1984)). “In particular, as the lower courts have uniformly held, and as we have 

assumed, ‘prison officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands 

of other prisoners.’” Id. (quoting Cortes–Quinones v. Jimenez–Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 

558 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 823 (1988)). 

It is not, however, every injury suffered by one prisoner at 

the hands of another that translates into constitutional liability 

for prison officials responsible for the victim’s safety. Our 

cases have held that a prison official violates the Eighth 

Amendment only when two requirements are met. First, the 

deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious, a 

prison official’s act or omission must result in the denial of the 

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. 

Id. at 834 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

 Accordingly, the evidence must first show that Dana was deprived of something 

“sufficiently serious.” See Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). The undisputed facts clearly show Dana was killed 

by a savage attack at the hands of other inmates. (Doc. 96 at 11-12 ¶¶ 2, 4). The Court 

finds this more than qualifies as sufficiently serious. 

The second requirement follows from the principle that 

only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates 

the Eighth Amendment. To violate the Cruel and Unusual 

Punishments Clause, a prison official must have a sufficiently 

culpable state of mind. In prison-conditions cases that state of 

mind is one of deliberate indifference to inmate health or 

safety. 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus, the Court 

must now determine if the Officer Defendants acted with a culpable state of mind. This 

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state of mind is proven by showing the Officer Defendants were deliberately indifferent 

to Dana’s health and safety. 

 “[D]eliberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence, the cases 

are also clear that it is satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very 

purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Id. at 835. 

“[S]howing ‘deliberate indifference,’ involves a two part inquiry. First, [Plaintiffs] must 

show that the prison officials were aware of a “substantial risk of serious harm” to an 

inmate’s health or safety.” Thomas, 611 F.3d at 1150 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). 

“This part of our inquiry may be satisfied if [Plaintiffs] show[ ] that the risk posed by the 

deprivation is obvious.” Id. (citation omitted). “The correct issue for consideration is [ ] 

whether the prison officials were subjectively aware of a ‘serious risk of substantial 

harm.’” Id. at 1150 n. 5 (emphasis in original) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; citing 

Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993) (“That the Eighth Amendment protects 

against future harm to inmates is not a novel proposition.”)). “[T]he official must both be 

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 

harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

 Second, Plaintiffs must show that the prison officials acted unreasonably, or 

“show that the prison officials had no ‘reasonable’ justification for the deprivation, in 

spite of that risk.” Thomas, 611 F.3d at 1150 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844 (“[P]rison 

officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found 

free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately 

was not averted.”). “[P]rison officials who act reasonably cannot be found liable under 

the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845. 

 Consequently, to determine if the Officer Defendants were deliberately indifferent 

the Court considers if there is a genuine issue of fact over whether the Officer Defendants 

were subjectively aware of the substantial risk of serious harm to Dana on the morning of 

July 3, 2010. If there is enough evidence to establish this issue of fact, the Court will 

then determine if there is a triable question of fact regarding whether the Officer 

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Defendants had a reasonable justification for not acting to mitigate that risk. 

 a. Awareness of a Substantial Risk of Serious Harm 

 In Thomas, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals focused on the first prong of the 

test for deliberate indifference and called it an “obviousness requirement.” Thomas, 611 

F.3d at 1151 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). “Whether a prison official had the 

requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in 

the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence and a fact finder may 

conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk 

was obvious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (citation omitted). “[W]e measure what is 

‘obvious’ in light of reason and the basic general knowledge that a prison official may be 

presumed to have obtained regarding the type of deprivation involved.” Thomas, 611 

F.3d at 1151 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). “[I]f a [claimant] presents evidence of 

very obvious and blatant circumstances indicating that the prison official knew a 

substantial risk of serious harm existed, then it is proper to infer that the official must 

have known of the risk.” Id. at 1152 (citation omitted). Further, in order to survive 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs must show that each Officer 

Defendant, through their own individual actions, has violated the Eighth Amendment. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“[A] plaintiff must plead that each 

Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has 

violated the Constitution.”). 

 In this case, the Court finds that there is a question of fact regarding whether 

Defendants Thompson and Jackson-Bey were aware of a substantial risk of serious harm 

to Dana. Dana was housed in the Stiner Unit, Blue Yard, Dorm 2, Pod D on the morning 

he was assaulted, July 3rd. (Doc. 96 at ¶2). The undisputed facts show that the Stiner unit 

where Dana was housed was understaffed with only 11 correctional officers on duty on 

the day Dana was assaulted instead of the normal 24 correctional officers. There should 

have been six correctional officers working in the Blue Yard, which contained three 

dorms—a Dorm Officer and Floor Officer for each dorm. (Id. at ¶23). Policy allowed 

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for a minimum of three officers to be used to oversee the three dorms in Blue Yard. (Id. 

at ¶20). Yet on July 3rd there were only two correctional officers working the three 

dorms in the Blue Yard where Dana was housed in Dorm 2. (Id. at ¶23). 

 Defendant Thompson, the sergeant in charge of the Stiner unit on July 3rd, testified 

in his deposition that “it was a concern” that he was short-staffed that day. (Id. at ¶14). 

Further, policy required Thompson to call the Deputy Warden if there were less than 14 

staff members present to work at the Stiner Unit—a call that Thompson made to the 

Deputy Warden between 6:30 and 7:00 a.m. that morning. (Id. at ¶¶15-16). However, 

the Deputy Warden did not answer the phone and no evidence has been presented that 

shows Thompson made any other calls. (Id.). Further, because of being short staffed, 

Thompson made the decision to “collapse” Dorm 3 at 7:10 on July 3rd. (Id. at ¶28). As a 

result, two correctional officers, Defendants Jackson-Bey and Blondin, were in charge of 

the safety and security of approximately 550 inmates living in the three dorms of Blue 

Yard on the morning Dana was assaulted. (Id. at ¶¶9, 25). This meant that at all times 

until another correctional officer could be used by Thompson, at least one dorm in Blue 

Yard would not have a correctional officer physically present in the building. (Id. at 

¶33). 

 The undisputed facts show that Thompson knew that his unit was understaffed, 

that he was concerned about the situation, and that the policies which Thompson 

followed were put in place because such a situation was deemed serious enough. When 

looking at the facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the Court finds that Plaintiff 

has presented enough evidence of obvious and blatant circumstances to create an issue of 

fact over whether Thompson knew a substantial risk of serious harm existed. See

Thomas, 611 F.3d at 1152; Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1075. 

 With regard to Defendant Jackson-Bey, she testified in her deposition that the day 

Dana was assaulted “[i]t wasn’t a normal day” “[b]ecause we were short staffed” and that 

she “believed that the checks were not made because [she was] short staffed that day.” 

(Doc. 96 at ¶26). Further, Jackson-Bey testified that on the day Dana was assaulted that 

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in her mind the day was “out of the ordinary” “[b]ecause I had never in my career 

experienced a unit running under those circumstances,” “[s]hort staffed that way where a 

building was collapsed with no officer.” (Id.). Jackson-Bey also testified that there 

should have been a correctional officer in Dorm 2 ensuring all inmates returned to their 

assigned bed spaces between 7:22 and 7:56 a.m. when Dana was assaulted, and that no 

correctional officer was there at that time. (Id. at ¶37). The Court finds this testimony is 

also enough to show obvious and blatant circumstances that create an issue of fact over 

whether Jackson-Bey knew that a substantial risk of serious harm existed on the morning 

Dana was assaulted. 

 With regard to Defendant Blondin, at approximately 7:10 a.m. on July 3rd, she was 

assigned to cover security checks for both Dorms 2 and 3. (Id. at ¶28). Because she was 

assigned to both Dorms 2 and 3, she was not in Dorm 2 when Dana was assaulted 

between 7:22 and 7:56 a.m. (Id. at ¶35). In her deposition testimony, Blondin testified 

that if the dorms had not been collapsed on the morning of July 3rd, somebody would 

have been in Dorm 2 when Dana was assaulted. (Id. at ¶40). Blondin also testified that it 

was not common to leave a dorm unattended for more than half an hour with no 

correctional officer on the floor at all. (Id. at ¶41). Blondin knew that security checks 

were to be conducted twice an hour and that the hour started on the clock hour. (Id. at 

¶51). Blondin arrived on post at 6:00 a.m. (Id. at 55). Two security checks were 

required to be conducted between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. and two more security checks were 

required to be conducted between 7:00 and 8:00 a.m. (Id. at ¶56). Blondin performed 

security checks at 6:30 and 6:59, and again at 7:22 a.m. (Id. at ¶58). However, after the 

security check at 7:22, Blondin left the building and testified that she assumed JacksonBey would do the second security check in Dorm 2 between 7 and 8:00 a.m. because she 

gave Jackson-Bey the keys to Dorm 2. (Id. at ¶63). Further, Blondin assumed that 

Jackson-Bey was in Dorm 2 between 7:22 and 7:56 a.m. (Id. at ¶43). 

 The Supreme Court in Farmer stated clearly that “Eighth Amendment liability 

requires consciousness of a risk.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 840. While Blondin knew she 

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had been assigned to cover both Dorm 2 and 3 as of 7:10 a.m. that morning, there is no 

evidence to suggest that she believed this situation caused a substantial risk of serious 

harm or that she knew Dorm 2 would be unstaffed for the 36 minutes following her 

security check at 7:22 a.m. Any conclusion that she did know this is purely speculative 

given the evidence. Accordingly, the Court finds that there are not enough facts to show 

obvious and blatant circumstances or to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether 

Defendant Blondin knew that a substantial risk of serious harm existed when she left 

Dorm 2 after conducting the security check at 7:22. Therefore, Blondin could not be 

found to be deliberately indifferent and liable for violating Dana’s Eighth Amendment 

right against cruel and unusual punishment. 

 b. Reasonableness of Officer Defendants’ Response 

 Next, the Court must determine if there is enough evidence to create a triable issue 

of fact over whether the Officer Defendants “responded reasonably to the risk, even 

[though] the harm ultimately was not averted.” Id. at 842. 

A prison official’s duty under the Eighth Amendment is to 

ensure reasonable safety, a standard that incorporates due 

regard for prison officials’ unenviable task of keeping 

dangerous men in safe custody under humane conditions. 

Whether one puts it in terms of duty or deliberate 

indifference, prison officials who act reasonably cannot be 

found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 

Clause. 

Id. 

 As explained in the previous section, Thompson was the sergeant in charge of 

Dorm 2 on the morning Dana was assaulted. The undisputed facts show Thompson was 

concerned because he did not have enough staff members overseeing Blue Yard. He was 

required to call the Deputy Warden due to the man power shortage that morning and he 

made that phone call. However, no evidence shows Thompson took any further action to 

alleviate the risk at hand. Thompson made the decision to “collapse” the entire housing 

unit in Dorm 3 which led to Dorm 2 not being manned when Dana was assaulted. (Doc. 96 

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at ¶28). Blondin testified that had the dorms not been collapsed, Dorm 2 would not have 

been unmanned when Dana was assaulted. (Id. at ¶40). While Thompson was left in a 

precarious position due to the staff shortage, the Court finds a question of fact exists as to 

whether Thompson responded reasonably to the risk. 

 Jackson-Bey knew Blondin had performed the last security check at 7:22 a.m. and 

testified that Blondin told her everything was fine. (Id. at ¶66). While Jackson-Bey was 

not assigned to Dorm 2, Blondin testified that she gave Jackson-Bey the keys to Dorm 2 

after the 7:22 security check. (Id. at ¶63). Jackson-Bey testified that there should have 

been a correctional officer in Dorm 2 ensuring that all inmates returned to their assigned 

bed spaces between 7:22 and 7:56, yet she also testified that in spite of having received the 

keys to Dorm 2 from Blondin, she did not go inside Dorm 2 between 7:22 and 7:56. (Id. at 

67). Given these facts, the Court finds a question of fact also exists as to whether JacksonBey responded reasonably to the risk. 

 c. Plaintiffs’ Remedies Under their Section 1983 Claim 

 Having found that a question of fact exists over whether the remaining Officer 

Defendants acted with deliberate indifference, the Court turns to whether Plaintiffs would 

have any remedy for their section 1983 claim if a jury found in their favor. As the Court 

explained in its previous order dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims in part (Doc. 73), section 1983 

merely creates a civil cause of action for any person whose federal rights have been 

deprived by a person acting under color of law. The statute does not, however, specify the 

remedies available to such a person, nor does it address whether the cause of action 

survives the death of the injured person. The remedies of a section 1983 claim and 

whether the cause of action survives the death of the decedent come from the laws of the 

forum state, as long as these laws are consistent with the laws of the United States and the 

policy underlying section 1983. (Id. at 17) (quoting Gotbaum v. City of Phx., 617 F. Supp. 

2d 878, 882 (D. Ariz. 2008)). 

 In this case, Dana Seawright has died. Therefore, the Court must turn to the laws 

of Arizona to determine if any cause of action survives for Dana Seawright’s Estate or 

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Dana Seawright’s mother. As the Court explained in its previous order, the only causes of 

action that survive for Plaintiffs are a survival claim for the Estate and a wrongful death 

claim for Kini Seawright. (Id. at 16-17). 

 i. Kini Seawright’s Section 1983 Claim

 The Officer Defendants argue that Plaintiff Kini Seawright cannot bring a section 

1983 claim against them seeking damages for “her” pain and suffering. (Doc. 83 at 4-5). 

The Officer Defendants acknowledge that the Court dismissed Kini Seawright’s section 

1983 claim seeking damages for her son’s pre-death pain and suffering, but they contend 

that Kini Seawright still could have a claim under section 1983 for her own pain and 

suffering and they argue this claim should also be dismissed. (Id.). In spite of the Court’s 

order clearly dismissing Kini Seawright’s section 1983 claim seeking damages for her 

son’s pre-death pain and suffering (see Doc. 73 at 13-18), Plaintiffs still argue this issue 

(Doc. 97 at 19) and like Defendants, Plaintiffs also argue that she has a claim for “her 

[own] pain and suffering in needlessly losing her son” (id. at 20). The Court has already 

thoroughly addressed half of Plaintiffs’ argument and explained to the parties that no, Kini 

Seawright does not have a section 1983 claim for the pre-death pain and suffering of her 

son. (Doc. 73 at 16-18). 

 With regard to a section 1983 claim for Kini Seawright’s own pain and suffering, 

the parties contend in their pleadings and at oral argument that she can bring such a claim 

because the Ninth Circuit recognizes a right for parents to bring a section 1983 claim 

“based upon the substantive due process right to family integrity and familial association,” 

that “a parent has a ‘fundamental liberty interest’ in the companionship of his or her child,” 

and to “amount to a violation of substantive due process . . . the harmful conduct must 

‘shock the conscience.’” (Doc. 83 at 4-5) (quoting Kelson v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 

651, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1985) and Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th 

Cir. 2012)); (Doc. 97 at 19-20). Defendants raised this argument in their Motion to 

Dismiss and argued that the Officer Defendants’ conduct did not shock the conscience and 

that is why Kini Seawright cannot bring a section 1983 claim on her own behalf. See (Doc. 

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63 at 13-14). In the order granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the Court explained 

that this argument completely misses the mark and is irrelevant to why Kini Seawright 

cannot seek damages for both her own suffering and Dana Seawright’s pre-death pain and 

suffering. (Doc. 73 at 16-18). In spite of this, Defendants have raised this argument again 

in their Motion for Summary Judgment and at oral argument, arguing that Kini Seawright’s 

own claim for pain and suffering is dependent on whether the Officer Defendants’ conduct 

shocks the conscience. See (Doc. 83 at 4-5). 

 The Court will endeavor to explain more thoroughly why the parties’ argument—

whether or not the Officer Defendants’ conduct shocks the conscience—is irrelevant to 

Kini Seawright’s 1983 claim. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized 

that “the parent-child relationship is constitutionally protected and that governmental 

interference with it gives rise to a section 1983 action for damages.” Kelson, 767 F.2d at 

654 (citing Morrison v. Jones, 607 F.2d 1269, 1275 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 

962 (1980)). However, as the Court of Appeals also explained and the parties appear to 

miss, this right is protected by the “Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Ninth Amendment’.” Id. 

(quoting Morrison, 607 F.2d at 1275-76). 

 Plaintiffs have made no claims against the Officer Defendants under these 

Amendments to the Constitution. As explained above, see supra Section II.A.1, section 

1983 is not a source of substantive rights on its own, it “merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 393 (quotation 

omitted). The first inquiry in any section 1983 suit is to isolate the precise constitutional 

violation with which the defendant is charged. Baker, 443 U.S. at 140 (emphasis added). 

As further explained above in the same section, the only constitutional charge remaining in 

Count One is Plaintiffs’ claim that the Officer Defendants violated the Eighth Amendment. 

Further, Plaintiffs have never made claims against the Officer Defendants under the 

Fourteenth Amendment nor the Ninth Amendment.3

 The Eighth Amendment does not give 

 

3

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rise to a right to family integrity and familial association. Consequently, Plaintiffs’ 

arguments for a section 1983 claim based on a right to family integrity and Defendants’ 

arguments against it are irrelevant to Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims in Count One against 

the Officer Defendants. 

 Kini Seawright has a section 1983 claim based on the Officer Defendants’ alleged 

violation of Dana’s Eighth Amendment rights. As explained in the Court’s previous 

order, section 1983 provides no federal remedy for such a claim and looks to the 

applicable state law for a remedy. (Doc. 73 at 16-18). Kini Seawright has asked for 

“general damages, including . . . wrongful death” on her claims. (Doc. 53 at 22). The 

Officer Defendants have made no argument for why Kini Seawright cannot seek damages 

for wrongful death under her section 1983 claim. As the Court has explained, under 

Arizona law and pursuant to section 1983, Kini Seawright cannot pursue damages for her 

own pain and suffering on her section 1983 claim under the Eighth Amendment, but she 

can pursue damages for the wrongful death of her son. (Doc. 73 at 16-18). If Kini 

Seawright’s claim were to survive the Officer Defendants’ qualified immunity challenge, 

see infra Section II.A.2, the Court would apply a federal remedy that permits the recovery 

of such damages. See, e.g., Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1507 (10th Cir. 

1990); Bass by Lewis v. Wallenstein, 769 F.2d 1173, 1190 (7th Cir. 1985). 

 ii. The Estate’s Section 1983 Claim 

 Next, the Officer Defendants argue that the Estate has no section 1983 claim for 

Dana’s pre-death pain and suffering. (Doc. 83 at 5-16). The Court has explained that the 

Estate can bring a section 1983 claim seeking damages for Dana’s pre-death pain and 

suffering if the facts support such damages. (Doc. 73 at 13-16). 

 In this case, the facts support damages for pre-death pain and suffering. “Before a 

decedent’s beneficiary may recover for the decedent’s pre-death pain and suffering, the 

 is Count One. Count One invokes only the Fourth and Eighth Amendments. (Doc. 53 at 9). Count Two invokes the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at 13). Count Two, 

however, was previously dismissed by the Court and Count Two was only made against Defendant Charles Ryan to begin with, not the Officer Defendants. (Id. at 13). 

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beneficiary must show by a preponderance of the evidence ‘that the decedent was 

conscious for at least some period of time after he suffered the injuries which resulted in 

his death.’” F/V Carolyn Jean, Inc. v. Schmitt, 73 F.3d 884, 885 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting 

Cook v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 626 F.2d 746, 749-50 (9th Cir. 1980)). 

Defendants argue that there is no evidence that Dana ever regained consciousness after the 

assault. (Doc. 83 at 5). However, the Court of Appeals in F/V Carolyn Jean went on to 

explain that “[a]lthough eyewitness evidence of the decedent’s consciousness is not 

essential, merely alleging pain and suffering is insufficient where the record supports a 

finding of almost instantaneous death.” Id. (citations omitted). 

 The record does not support an instantaneous death and suggests that Dana was 

conscious following the attack. Dana was attacked by fellow inmates sometime between 

7:22 and 7:56 a.m. on July 3, 2010. Dana was stabbed and beaten in the attack. He died 

as a result of injuries suffered in the attack on July 7, 2010. He was first discovered by 

Defendant Jackson-Bey at 7:56. Jackson-Bey testified that when she tried to 

communicate with Dana he would make a moaning noise each time she called his name. 

(Doc. 96-1 at 47). Further, the Arizona Department of Corrections Executive Report filed 

after the attack states “[a]t the time of this report Seawright was breathing on his own and 

was conscious.” (Id. at 153). From these facts it is undisputed that Dana did not 

experience an instantaneous death in the attack. There is at the very least a disputed issue 

of fact over whether he was conscious when Jackson-Bey found him and tried to 

communicate with him. The Court finds this is enough evidence for a reasonable jury to 

allow the Estate to recover damages for Dana’s pre-death pain and suffering if the jury 

found for the Estate on the section 1983 claim. Further, as explained above, see supra

Section II.A.1, the Estate has presented enough evidence to show there is a question of 

fact regarding whether the remaining Officer Defendants violated Dana’s Eighth 

Amendment rights. Accordingly, because the Estate’s section 1983 claim survives 

Defendants’ constitutional challenge on the merits, the Court could apply a federal remedy 

that permits the Estate to recover damages for Dana’s pre-death pain and suffering. See, 

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e.g., McClurg v. Maricopa Cnty., CIV-09-1684-PHX-MHB, 2011 WL 4434029 (D. Ariz. 

Sept. 23, 2011); Berry, 900 F.2d at 1507; Bass, 769 F.2d at 1190. 

 2. Qualified Immunity 

 In addition to their argument that Plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim fails on the merits, 

the Officer Defendants have also argued for qualified immunity. (Doc. 83 at 12-16). 

Qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability . . . .” 

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). A defendant in a section 1983 action is 

entitled to qualified immunity from damages for civil liability if his or her conduct does 

not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 

person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 

 There is a two-step sequence for resolving a qualified immunity claim: the 

“constitutional inquiry” and the “qualified immunity inquiry.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 

194, 201 (2001). The “constitutional inquiry” asks whether, when taken in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party, the facts alleged show that the official’s conduct 

violated a constitutional right. Id. If so, a court turns to the “qualified immunity inquiry” 

and asks if the right was clearly established at the relevant time. Id. at 201-02. Courts are 

“permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the 

qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the 

particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). The Court has 

already addressed the constitutional inquiry. As discussed above, see supra Section 

II.A.1, a question of fact exists over whether the Officer Defendants’ conduct violated a 

constitutional right. Thus, the Court turns to the qualified immunity inquiry. This second 

inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad 

general proposition.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. 

 While both inquiries determine whether there was a substantial risk of serious 

harm, “the qualified immunity inquiry ‘has a further dimension’” than the constitutional 

inquiry in an Eight Amendment case. Estate of Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 

1049 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205). In a claim under section 1983 

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based on an alleged violation of the Eighth Amendment, “[e]ven though the constitutional 

issue turns on the officers’ state of mind (here, deliberate indifference to a substantial risk 

of serious harm), courts must still consider whether—assuming the facts in the injured 

party’s favor—it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful.” 

Id. at 1045. 

 “The concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes 

can be made as to the legal constraints on particular police conduct.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 

205. “The Court emphasized that it is often difficult for an officer to determine how the 

relevant legal doctrine will apply to the factual situation that he faces.” Estate of Ford, 

301 F.3d at 1049. “This is why ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly 

violate the law’ have immunity from suit; officers can have a reasonable, but mistaken, 

belief about the facts or about what the law requires in any given situation.” Id. (quoting 

Saucier, 533 at 202; also citing Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 909 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(noting in Eighth Amendment case that in Saucier “the Court emphasized the broad 

discretion that must be afforded to police officers who face tense situations, and the 

importance of granting immunity even when officers make mistakes”)). 

 In Estate of Ford, the family of a state inmate who was killed by his cellmate 

brought a section 1983 action based on a violation of the Eighth Amendment against 

correctional officers who allowed the decedent to be double-celled with the cellmate. 301 

F.3d 1043. The district court denied defendant officers’ motions for summary judgment 

on a qualified immunity defense. Id. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. Id. 

The Court of Appeals found that the district court erred by denying a qualified immunity 

defense solely because there was a triable issue of fact as to whether the correctional 

officers were deliberately indifferent. Id. at 1045. As discussed above, see supra Section 

II.A.1, the Court is faced with the same issue here—the Court has found that there is a 

triable issue of fact as to whether the Officer Defendants were deliberately indifferent. 

 The Court of Appeals explained in Estate of Ford that “a reasonable prison official 

understanding that he cannot recklessly disregard a substantial risk of serious harm, could 

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know all of the facts yet mistakenly, but reasonably, perceive that the exposure in any 

given situation was not that high. In these circumstances, he would be entitled to qualified 

immunity.” Id. at 1050 (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205). To determine qualified 

immunity the Court must ask “whether the constitutional right that would be violated was 

clearly established.” Id. Finding whether a constitutional right is clearly established “is a 

two-part inquiry: (1) Was the law governing the state official’s conduct clearly 

established? (2) Under that law could a reasonable state official have believed his conduct 

was lawful? However, the relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is 

clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was 

unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202). A 

correctional officer is entitled to qualified immunity if it would not have been clear to a 

reasonable correctional officer, knowing what the officer in question knew, that their 

conduct posed such a substantial risk of serious harm that doing so would be 

constitutionally impermissible. Id. at 1053. 

 In Estate of Ford, the Court of Appeals explained that “before the decision to 

double cell [the decedent] with [the cellmate] was made, it would have been clear to a 

reasonable prison official that if he knew about an excessive risk to inmate safety, and 

inferred from the facts of which he was aware that a substantial risk of serious harm 

exists, he would violate the law by disregarding it. He would also have known that merely 

being negligent, or failing to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but 

did not, is not constitutionally deficient conduct.” Id. at 1050 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

835, 838). The Court of Appeals also, 

emphasized that determining whether the law was clearly 

established “must be undertaken in light of the specific 

context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” 

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Therefore, it is not sufficient that 

Farmer clearly states the general rule that prison officials 

cannot deliberately disregard a substantial risk of serious 

harm to an inmate; here, in addition, it is relevant that neither 

Farmer nor subsequent authorities has fleshed out “at what 

point a risk of inmate assault becomes sufficiently substantial 

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for Eighth Amendment purposes.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 

n. 3; cf. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36, 113 S.Ct. 

2475, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993) (indicating in second-hand 

smoke case that a risk is intolerable under the Eighth 

Amendment when it violates contemporary standards of 

decency to expose anyone unwillingly to it). Thus, it would 

not be clear to a reasonable prison official when the risk of 

harm from double-celling psychiatric inmates with one 

another changes from being a risk of some harm to a 

substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer left that an open 

issue. This necessarily informs “the dispositive question” of 

whether it would be clear to reasonable correctional officers 

that their conduct was unlawful in the circumstances that [the 

correctional officers] confronted. 

Id. at 1050-51. 

 In analyzing the facts of the case, the Court of Appeals found that the correctional 

officers knew of the aggressor cellmate’s violent history toward other cellmates, but they 

had no knowledge of a specific threat to inmate that was killed. Id. at 1051-53. The facts 

did not establish that the risk of some harm changed to such a substantial risk of serious 

harm that made their actions clearly unlawful. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals 

overturned the district court’s decision not to grant qualified immunity; finding that while 

the correctional officer’s conduct turned out to be quite unfortunate judgments, the Court 

of Appeals could not say that a reasonable correctional officer would have clearly 

understood that the risk of serious harm was so high that he should not have authorized the 

double-celling. Id. at 1053. 

 Thus, in this case the Court is faced with determining what the Officer Defendants 

actually knew, and if their conduct in light of that knowledge posed such a substantial risk 

of serious harm that doing so would be constitutionally impermissible. Viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Thompson knew he was short staffed, he 

was concerned about being short staffed, and he called the Deputy Warden due to the 

manpower issue that morning. Further, the evidence shows that Thompson had no control 

over the number of staff members that were available to him and he made staffing 

decisions that caused the least amount of disruption based on the staff members he had 

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available that morning. (Doc. 84 at ¶¶22-61). Even if the Court determined that 

Thompson’s conduct was negligent, “negligence, or failure to avoid a significant risk that 

should be perceived but wasn’t, ‘cannot be condemned as the infliction of punishment,’” 

and cannot disqualify Thompson from qualified immunity. Estate of Ford, 301 F.3d at 

1052 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838). 

 Similar to the officers in Estate of Ford, there is no evidence that Thompson knew 

a substantial risk of serious harm to Dana existed. Thompson testified in his deposition 

that he did not know who Dana was prior to the assault (Doc. 84 at ¶73) and Plaintiffs 

have provided no evidence to dispute this fact. Thompson did not know why Dana had 

been moved to Pod D prior to the assault nor did Thompson know of any relationships 

Dana had with other inmates prior to the assault. (Id. at ¶¶ 74-77). 

 Plaintiffs point to circumstantial evidence to support their argument for what the 

Officer Defendants knew prior to the assault. The Court does not find this evidence 

persuasive. Evidence must show that the Officer Defendants had knowledge of such a 

substantial risk of serious harm to Dana that they would know their actions violated clearly 

established law. Plaintiffs argue that an Information Report filed six days after the assault 

and prepared by a correctional officer in a different Dorm than Dana’s at Stiner Unit is 

“very telling regarding the dangerous conditions at Stiner prior to Seawright’s murder.” 

(Doc. 96 at ¶10). However, this report begins “On the above date” and is dated July 9, 

2010, six days following Dana’s assault. Further the report makes no statement about 

conditions in Dorm 2 or at Stiner Unit prior to or on the date Dana was assaulted. 

Consequently, this report says nothing about the conditions in the area Thompson oversaw 

on the morning of July 3rd nor does any other circumstantial evidence that Plaintiffs have 

offered. 

 Plaintiffs also argue that Dana was assaulted because he was a known homosexual 

and because he had engaged in homosexual conduct with members of another race, and 

that the Officer Defendants knew these facts. Plaintiffs make this assertion because 

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American inmate that Dana had previously engaged in homosexual conduct with, because 

Mendoza had engaged in this conduct with someone (i.e. Dana) outside Mendez’s race. 

(Doc. 97 at 13). However, the same circumstantial evidence proffered by Plaintiff also 

suggests Dana was attacked in retaliation for attacking another inmate on July 2nd. The 

evidence shows Dana had engaged in homosexual conduct with inmate Hamilton (id. at 

14), that Hamilton was an African-American inmate (Doc. 96-1 at 98-99), that Dana 

attacked Hamilton on July 2nd (Doc. 97 at 14), that Dana was moved after the attack (id.), 

and that Dana was attacked by Hamilton and other African-American inmates on July 3rd

(id.). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ own evidence gathered after the assault suggests multiple 

reasons for the attack—retaliation for a prior attack, retaliation for being a homosexual, 

retaliation for homosexual conduct with members of another race, or some combination of 

the aforementioned. Yet Plaintiffs argue that the Officer Defendants had this knowledge 

and more clarity regarding this knowledge prior to the attack, or in the alternative that all of 

these reasons somehow add up to knowledge on the part of the Officer Defendants. 

Regardless of what this contradicting circumstantial evidence shows, there is no evidence 

to support the claim that the Officer Defendants had any knowledge of an alleged risk from 

African-American inmates in Pod D Dorm 2 to Dana on the morning of July 3rd. There is 

even less evidence to support the assertion that the Officer Defendants’ alleged knowledge 

of any risk to Dana changed from a risk of some harm to knowledge of a substantial risk of 

serious harm on the morning of July 3rd. 

 Plaintiffs’ argument concerning the circumstantial evidence of the motive for 

Dana’s assault can be summed up by the proposition that because the inmates purportedly 

knew why Dana was attacked after the assault (which is still not necessarily clear), the 

Officer Defendants must have known Dana would be attacked and why prior to the assault. 

This is not enough to survive Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. While the 

Court has found above, see supra Section II.A.1.a., that a question of fact exists regarding 

whether Thompson was aware of a substantial risk in the constitutional inquiry, there is not 

enough evidence to establish a question of fact regarding whether Thompson was aware 

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that his conduct was unlawful in the qualified immunity inquiry. In these circumstances 

the Court cannot say that a reasonable officer in Thompson’s position would necessarily 

have perceived that collapsing a dorm in Blue Yard was unlawful in the situation he 

confronted nor can the Court find that a reasonable officer would perceive that the risk to 

Dana of collapsing a dorm under these circumstances was so high as to be constitutionally 

impermissible. Therefore, the right was not clearly established and Thompson is entitled to 

qualified immunity. 

 Similarly, Jackson-Bey was tasked with overseeing the security of Dorm 1 on the 

morning of July 3rd. At some point between 7:22 and 7:56 a.m., Blondin gave Jackson-Bey 

the keys to Dorm 2 where Dana was housed so that Jackson-Bey could secure Dorm 2 

inmates returning from the dining hall. (Doc. 84 at ¶102). No evidence suggests that 

Jackson-Bey was tasked with or thought she needed to perform a security check of Dorm 2 

when Blondin gave her the keys to secure Dorm 2. As Jackson-Bey was securing Dorm 2 

she heard inmates banging on a window to get her attention and inform her that someone 

needed medical attention. (Id. at ¶103). While she testified that the day was out of the 

ordinary because she had never seen a unit that short staffed, the Court cannot say that a 

reasonable officer in her position would have perceived that failing to conduct another 

security check in a dorm that she was not assigned to without being told to do so was 

unlawful in the situation she confronted or the risk of not acting was so high as to be 

constitutionally impermissible. 

 Accordingly, the Court finds that both Defendants Thompson and Jackson-Bey are 

entitled to qualified immunity because it would not have been clear to a reasonable 

correctional officer, knowing what each knew, that collapsing a dorm under the 

circumstances or not ensuring another security check was done in Dorm 2 created such a 

substantial risk of serious harm to Dana that made these actions unlawful. Therefore, the 

Court grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment with regard to Defendants 

Thompson and Jackson-Bey on their qualified immunity defense. 

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triable issue of fact regarding whether Defendant Blondin violated Dana’s Eighth 

Amendment rights, she would still also be entitled to qualified immunity. Defendant 

Blondin was assigned to Dorm 2 on July 3rd and was then also assigned to Dorm 3 in the 

hour Dana was assaulted. After performing her assigned security check in Dorm 2 at 7:22 

a.m. she gave the keys to Jackson-Bey and assumed Jackson-Bey would perform the 

second security check that hour. There was a miscommunication between Blondin and 

Jackson-Bey because Jackson-Bey did not know another security check needed to be done. 

Blondin assumed Jackson-Bey would be securing Dorm 2 inmates returning from the 

dining hall and that Jackson-Bey would be in Dorm 2. Given these circumstances, a 

reasonable officer in her position would not have perceived that following orders to cover 

Dorm 3 and assuming Jackson-Bey was inside Dorm 2 was unlawful in the situation she 

confronted or the risk of not communicating with Jackson-Bey further was so high as to be 

constitutionally impermissible. 

B. Remaining Claims 

 The three remaining claims in this case are Counts Three, Four, and Five; all three 

claims are made solely against the State of Arizona. (Doc. 53 at 19-21). In their moving 

papers, Defendants have only raised a valid argument for granting summary judgment on 

Count Three and part of Count Five. (Doc. 83; Doc. 107). Defendants failed to address 

Count Four in their Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 83) and only minimally 

addressed their failure to do so in their Reply4

 (Doc. 107 at 15-16). Defendants have also 

 

4

 In Count Four of the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the State 

violated Plaintiffs’ rights under “Article 2, section 2 of the Arizona Constitution 

guarantee[ing] persons due process of law, and Article 2, section 15 of the Arizona 

Constitution [that] forbids cruel and unusual punishment.” (Doc. 53 at 21). In spite of 

Defendants telling the Court that they are moving for summary judgment on all 

remaining Counts in the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 83 at 1), as Plaintiffs point 

out (see Doc. 97 at 2-3), Defendants motion for summary judgment failed to address 

Count Four of the Second Amended Complaint. In their Reply, Defendants argue that 

they did not need to address Count Four because it “was not a serious claim” as “Arizona 

courts have consistently evaluated cruel and unusual treatment claims under the Arizona 

and U.S. Constitutions identically” so if “summary judgment is granted on Plaintiff’s 

Eighth Amendment claims, it should also be granted on the Arizona Constitutional claim. 

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failed to address the part of Plaintiffs’ wrongful death claim in Count Five premised on 

violations of the Arizona Constitution (Doc. 53 at 21-22). As a result, the Court is left to 

address these claims on its own. 

 “[A] district court ‘may grant summary judgment on any legal ground the record 

supports.’” Glenn K. Jackson Inc. v. Roe, 273 F.3d 1192, 1202 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 6 

James W. Moore, Walter J. Taggart and Jeremy C. Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 

56.14[1] (1994)). Plaintiffs were put on notice that Defendants were seeking summary 

judgment on all claims. Accordingly, the Court will address whether disputed issues of 

fact for trial are present as to these remaining claims. 

 The Eleventh Amendment provides, “The Judicial power of the United States shall 

not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against 

one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any 

Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Under the Eleventh Amendment, States are 

immune from suit in federal court for state or federal causes of action by private parties. 

In re Mitchell, 209 F.3d 1111, 1115–16 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled in part on other 

grounds, Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 

Although Eleventh Amendment immunity is not absolute, the United States 

Supreme Court has recognized only two circumstances under which an individual may 

sue a State in federal court. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 

Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999). First, Congress may authorize suit against the 

States in the exercise of its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Second, a 

State may waive its sovereign immunity by consenting to suit. Id. If Congress has not 

abrogated Arizona’s Eleventh Amendment immunity for purposes of this suit and 

Arizona has not waived that immunity, then the Court lacks jurisdiction over this case. 

Id. at 691. 

 Neither party has argued that Congress abrogated the State’s Eleventh Amendment 

immunity for purposes of the claims in this case. Thus the Court turns to whether 

 

The analysis is identical.” (Doc. 107 at 15-16) (citations omitted). 

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Arizona has waived its sovereign immunity—the Court finds that it has. Eleventh 

Amendment immunity is an affirmative defense. Hill v. Blind Indus. & Servs. of Md., 

179 F.3d 754, 760 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing In ITSI TV Prods., Inc. v. Agric. Ass’ns, 3 F.3d 

1289 (9th Cir. 1993)). 

[L]ike every other defendant, a state must timely object to the 

forum or be deemed to have waived its objections. The 

Eleventh Amendment was never intended to allow a state to 

appear in federal court and actively litigate the case on the 

merits, and only later belatedly assert its immunity from suit 

in order to avoid an adverse result. 

Id. at 763. 

 In this case, at oral argument the State asserted that it did not raise an Eleventh 

Amendment defense because the claim was originally filed in state court and removed by 

the Defense to federal court. This statement, however, is not true. This claim was 

originally filed in this Court on June 30, 2011. See (Doc. 1). Thus, apparently due to 

oversight the State has not raised an Eleventh Amendment defense to Plaintiffs’ claims. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the State has waived any immunity afforded to it by the 

Eleventh Amendment by this point in the case. 

 1. Vicarious Liability of the State 

 The Court now turns to Plaintiffs’ claims in Counts Three, Four, and Five. The 

State of Arizona, as a party, can only be held liable for Plaintiffs’ claims against it under 

a theory of vicarious liability in the circumstances of this case. There are no disputed 

facts to show otherwise. In setting oral argument, the Court ordered “the parties [to] 

come to oral argument prepared to address whether the State of Arizona can be 

vicariously liable under a respondeat superior theory if all of the actors upon whose 

actions liability would be premised were granted summary judgment.” (Doc. 112). In 

spite of this order, neither party addressed this issue at oral argument. 

 Under Arizona law, “[w]hen a judgment on the merits—including a dismissal with 

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prejudice—is entered in favor of the ‘other person’ in A.R.S. § 12–2506(D)(2)5 [i.e. the 

Officer Defendants here], there is no fault to impute and the party potentially vicariously 

liable [i.e. the State here] is not ‘responsible for the fault’ of the other person.” Law v. 

Verde Valley Med. Ctr., 170 P.3d 701, 705 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (footnote added). As 

discussed above, see supra Section II.A.2., the actors, or other persons, whom the State 

would be liable for under this theory cannot be held liable due to qualified immunity and 

a judgment on the merits will be entered in their favor. Consequently, there is no 

remaining party to this suit who’s actions the State can be held liable for and there is no 

fault to impute to the State. Therefore, the Court will grant summary judgment to the 

State on Counts Three, Four, and Five. 

 2. Kini Seawright’s Negligence Claims 

 Even if the Court were to consider Plaintiff Kini Seawright’s gross negligence 

claim in Count Three and the portion of Kini Seawright’s wrongful death claim in Count 

Five premised on negligence and/or gross negligence, the Court would still grant 

summary judgment to the State on Count Three and any claim for wrongful death in 

Count Five premised on negligence. 

 In Count Three, Plaintiff Kini Seawright alleges that the State is guilty of 

“Negligence and/or Gross Negligence.” (Doc. 53 at 19). There is no simple negligence 

claim against a public entity under Arizona law when an inmate injures another inmate. 

See A.R.S. § 12-820.02(A)(4). Plaintiff must prove that the State intended to cause the 

injury or was grossly negligent. Id. 

 Defendants argue that Plaintiff will not be able to prevail on her gross negligence 

claim because she will not be able to establish the standard of care to which Defendants 

had a duty to conform. The Court agrees, and finds that Plaintiff would be required to 

proffer an expert witness to establish the applicable standard of care in this case; 

something she has not done and will not be able to do now that discovery has ended. 

 

5

 A.R.S. § 12–2506 abolishes joint and several liability. However, “[s]ubsection 12-

2506(D)(2) preserves the vicarious liability of a principal or master for the conduct of an agent or servant.” Law, 170 P.3d at 704. 

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Another Court in this district addressed this very issue in Porter v. Arizona Department 

of Corrections, and explained, 

“Ordinarily, the standard of care to be applied in a negligence 

action focuses on the conduct of a reasonably prudent person 

under the circumstances.” Sw. Auto Painting and Body 

Repair, Inc. v. Binsfeld, 904 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

1995). “In such cases, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to 

present evidence to establish the standard of care because the 

jury can rely on its own experience in determining whether 

the defendant acted with reasonable care under the 

circumstances.” Bell v. Maricopa Med. Ctr., 755 P.2d 1180, 

1182 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988). “However, when a person holds 

himself out to the public as possessing special knowledge, 

skill, or expertise, he must perform according to the standard 

of his profession.” Sw. Auto Painting and Body Repair, 904 

P.2d at 1272. “Where, . . . the alleged lack of care occurred 

during the professional or business activity, the plaintiff must 

present expert testimony as to the care and competence 

prevalent in the business and profession.” St. Joseph’s 

Hospital v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 742 P.2d 808, 816 (Ariz. 

1987). 

Defendant contends that a professional standard of care 

applies here because a prison is a specialized setting with 

specialized concerns and corrections officers have specialized 

training and are held to a different standard than typical 

citizens. As proof, defendant cites to DOC Order 509.02.1.1, 

which provides that “[e]mployees in the Correctional Officer 

Series shall complete a minimum of 360 hours of pre-service 

training.” Because it contends that this is a professional 

standard of care case, defendant argues that plaintiff must 

present expert testimony as to the care and competence 

required by correction officers. 

Porter v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corr., 2:09-CV-2479-HRH, 2012 WL 7180482, at *3 (D. Ariz. 

Sept. 17, 2012) (footnote omitted). The Court in Porter held that it was a professional 

standard of care case and expert testimony was required “to help the jury understand what 

the proper standard of care is in a gross negligence case involving a correctional facility.” 

Id. at *5. 

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to establish the standard of care for Plaintiffs’ gross negligence and wrongful death 

claims.” (Doc. 97 at 25) (citing Porter, 2012 WL 7180482, at *4-*5). However, Plaintiff 

filed a motion with the Court to re-open discovery and allow Plaintiff to find such an 

expert. (Doc. 94). The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for failure to justify 

reconsideration. (Doc. 115). Consequently, Plaintiff has not retained an expert witness 

nor will she be able to get an expert witness since discovery ended over nine months ago 

and the Court has denied her motion to re-open discovery. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to 

establish and will not be able to establish the proper standard of care under Arizona law 

in a gross negligence case involving correctional officers. As a result, even if the Court 

were to address Count Three, the Court would grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment on Count Three against the State and Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim premised 

on gross negligence in Count Five. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 83) is 

granted. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exceed the Page Limit 

for their Response (Doc. 95) is denied as moot. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in 

favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs, with Plaintiffs to take nothing. 

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall close this case. 

 Dated this 4th day of September, 2013. 

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