Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-06270/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-06270-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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Case No.: 5:16-cv-06270-EJD

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR EMERGENCY TEMPORARY 

RESTRAINING ORDER

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

WO OF IDEAFARM,

Plaintiff,

v.

MOUNTAIN VIEW POLICE 

DEPARTMENT, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 5:16-cv-06270-EJD 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR EMERGENCY

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

Re: Dkt. No. 6

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Wo Of Ideafarm (“Plaintiff”) asserts in this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that 

Defendant Mountain View Police Department (“MVPD”) and two of its officers, S. Nelson and T. 

Low, have prevented him from speaking publicly on a sidewalk and street in Mountain View, 

California, by arresting him and citing him for violations of California Vehicle Code § 21954(a) 

and California Penal Code §§ 370 and 372.1 In addition to monetary relief, Plaintiff also seeks 

 

1 Vehicle Code § 21954(a) provides that “[e]very pedestrian upon a roadway at any point other 

than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the 

right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway so near as to constitute an immediate hazard.” 

Penal Code § 370 defines a public nuisance as “[a]nything which is injurious to health, or is 

indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere 

with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property by an entire community or neighborhood, or by 

any considerable number of persons, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the 

customary manner, of any . . . street, or highway . . . .” 

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Case No.: 5:16-cv-06270-EJD

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR EMERGENCY TEMPORARY 

RESTRAINING ORDER

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injunctive relief “so that he can speak during the seven days that remain before the Presidential 

Election.” 

Presently before the court is Plaintiff’s ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order 

(“TRO”), filed in conjunction with the Complaint. Dkt. No. 6. Having carefully considered the 

matter, the court has determined that Plaintiff’s application is both procedurally and substantively 

deficient. Accordingly, the motion for a TRO will be denied for the reasons explained below. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Temporary Injunctive Relief

The standard for issuing a TRO is the same as that for the issuance of preliminary 

injunction. See New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1347 n.2 

(1977). Thus, a TRO, like a preliminary injunction, is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be 

awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 

555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008).

“To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party ‘must establish that: (1) it is likely to 

succeed on the merits; (2) it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary 

relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in its favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest.’” 

Idaho v. Coeur D’Alene Tribe, 794 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Pom Wonderful LLC 

v. Hubbard, 775 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2014)). 

Alternatively, “‘serious questions going to the merits’ and a hardship balance that tips 

sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary injunction, so long as the 

plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the 

public interest.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). 

This articulation represents “one alternative on a continuum” under the “‘sliding scale’ approach 

 

Relatedly, Penal Code § 372 states that “[e]very person who maintains or commits any public 

nuisance, the punishment for which is not otherwise prescribed, or who willfully omits to perform 

any legal duty relating to the removal of a public nuisance, is guilty of a misdemeanor.” 

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Case No.: 5:16-cv-06270-EJD

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR EMERGENCY TEMPORARY 

RESTRAINING ORDER

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to preliminary injunctions employed” by the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 1131-32.

Whether to grant or deny a TRO or preliminary injunction is a matter within the court’s 

discretion. See Miss Universe, Inc. v. Flesher, 605 F.2d 1130, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1979).

B. Pro Se Pleadings

Where, as here, the pleading at issue is filed by a plaintiff proceeding pro se, it must be 

construed liberally. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). In doing so, the court 

“need not give a plaintiff the benefit of every conceivable doubt” but “is required only to draw 

every reasonable or warranted factual inference in the plaintiff’s favor.” McKinney v. De Bord, 

507 F.2d 501, 504 (9th Cir. 1974). In addition, the court “should use common sense in 

interpreting the frequently diffuse pleadings of pro se complainants.” Id. 

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff requests a TRO embodying several orders, including one permitting MVPD to 

enforce Penal Code §§ 370 and 372 “only upon actual notice and probable cause and only when 

that actual notice and probable cause is documented and preserved in the form of two video 

recordings.” Plaintiff proposes that such video recording must “clearly show . . . an offending 

act,” as well as show the “public right that offending act tends to interfere with unreasonably.” 

Plaintiff also requests the court order that “every detainee and arrestee and defendant shall be 

immediately told the specific act, factual context, and public right elements of the offense being 

alleged” which must be preserved on video for 180 days, and order that detainees and arrestees be 

given “an opportunity to avoid prosecution by abating the nuisance.” Plaintiff’s proposal also 

states that, while MVPD’s failure to preserve video evidence would not prevent prosecution, it

would establish a “strict scrutiny rebuttable presumption against notice and probable cause.” 

The TRO application is problematic on both procedural and substantive grounds. As to 

procedure, the court observes that Plaintiff has not demonstrated complete compliance with 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1) and Civil Local Rule 65-1(b), both of which impose 

certain prerequisites before an ex parte TRO may issue. Specifically, Federal Rule of Civil 

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Case No.: 5:16-cv-06270-EJD

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR EMERGENCY TEMPORARY 

RESTRAINING ORDER

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Procedure 65(b)(1)(b) requires the moving party certify “in writing any efforts made to give notice 

and the reasons why it should not be required.” Similarly, Local Rule 65-1(b) mandates notice to 

the opposing party “on or before the day of an ex parte temporary restraining order.” The court is 

unable to find in Plaintiff’s application any indication of his effort to comply with either rule. 

Though the court understands that Plaintiff is representing himself, he is nonetheless expected to 

comply with the basic rules governing the relief he seeks. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (holding that while their pleadings are construed liberally, “pro se litigants are bound 

by the rules of procedure”). 

On its substance, the application does not convincingly demonstrate that Plaintiff is likely 

to prevail on the merits of this action, or that there exist “serious questions” sufficient to support 

temporary injunctive relief. Though the court is mindful that Plaintiff need not “prove his case in 

full,” or show that he is “more likely than not” to prevail (Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 

390, 395 (1981); Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2011)), he must demonstrate 

a “fair chance of success on the merits” or raise questions “serious enough to require litigation.” 

Benda v. Grand Lodge of the Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 584 F.2d 308, 315 

(9th Cir. 1978). Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint, upon which he relies for the facts underlying the 

TRO application, merely concludes that officers arrested him and issued citations for violations of 

Vehicle Code § 21954(a) and Penal Code §§ 370 and 372 without probable cause. Though 

Plaintiff alleges that these arrests and citations violated his civil rights, there are simply not 

enough facts “to state a claim that is plausible on its face,” let alone show that Plaintiff has a fair 

chance of success on the merits. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). For 

example, Plaintiff relies on a legal opinion couched as an allegation; Plaintiff believes he is not 

violating Vehicle Code § 21954(a) when he is standing in the roadway. But whether that is true or 

not is a fact-specific inquiry that must be undertaken by the state court charged with adjudicating 

the purported citation. Simply declaring an opinion of legal innocence does not render Plaintiff’s 

claims plausible in this context. 

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Case No.: 5:16-cv-06270-EJD

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR EMERGENCY TEMPORARY 

RESTRAINING ORDER

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In addition, Plaintiff has failed to make a “clear showing of irreparable harm.” Garcia v. 

Google, 786 F.3d 733, 746 (9th Cir. 2015). “Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable 

injury sufficient to warrant granting a preliminary injunction.” Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. 

Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988). “A plaintiff must do more than merely allege 

imminent harm sufficient to establish standing; a plaintiff must demonstrate immediate threatened 

injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief.” Id. In the TRO application, Plaintiff only 

describes further injury in a speculative manner. To that end, Plaintiff states he has ceased public 

speaking because he fears further “police interference and violence.” But the possibility of 

additional interference by law enforcement is not the equivalent of “immediate threatened injury,”

and does not satisfy Plaintiff’s burden on this element. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (rejecting a 

“possibility” standard in the context of injunctive relief as “too lenient”)

Furthermore, it is worth noting that Plaintiff’s proposed TRO cannot be harmonized with 

the purpose of such orders. As described above, Plaintiff requests a detailed and wide-ranging 

order that, if granted, has the capacity to interfere with the duties of both law enforcement and the 

state courts. Indeed, Plaintiff appears to seek relief for both himself and other unidentified 

individuals, proposes requirements that may be inconsistent with MVPD protocol, and provides a 

legal standard - a “strict scrutiny rebuttable presumption” - that may not otherwise apply in 

misdemeanor prosecutions under Vehicle Code § 21954(a) and Penal Code §§ 370 and 372. Such 

drastic modifications, even if ordered on a temporary basis, cannot be undertaken through an 

application for temporary injunctive relief. See Jones v. H.S.B.C. (USA), 844 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 

1100 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck 

Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974) (“The underlying purpose of a TRO is to preserve the status 

quo and prevent irreparable harm before a preliminary injunction hearing may be held.”)). 

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that Plaintiff has not made the “clear showing” 

necessary for the extraordinary remedy he seeks. Consequently, his motion will be denied. 

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Case No.: 5:16-cv-06270-EJD

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR EMERGENCY TEMPORARY 

RESTRAINING ORDER

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IV. ORDER

The “Motion for Emergency Temporary Restraining Order” (Dkt. No. 6) is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 1, 2016

______________________________________

EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge

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