Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06255/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06255-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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 This information is derived from the Third and Second Amended Petitions, and Respondent’s answer to

the petition.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

REGGIE L. McCOY,

Petitioner,

v.

JEFF WRIGLEY,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 04-6255 OWW SMS HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

Petitioner is a federal inmate currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution

in Victorville, California (FCI II Victorville). (Respondent’s Exhibit 1, Declaration of Natalie

Wight, BOP Attorney Advisor, Attachment A, at p.1.) On July 1, 1991, the United States

District Court for the Middle District of Florida sentenced Petitioner to a life sentence for two

counts of conspiracy to possess, and attempted possession of cocaine base with intent to

distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846. Id. at 4. On August 19, 1991, Petitioner was

committed to the custody of the BOP. Id. 

As Respondent points out, Petitioner has filed numerous § 2255 challenges to the

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imposition and duration of his sentence based on the argument that his presentence report

incorrectly reflects two Florida state drug convictions. The United States District Court for the

Middle District of Florida has repeatedly reviewed and denied his petitions over the past fifteen

years. See Respondent’s Exhibit 4, PACER Criminal Docket for United States v. Reginald

McCoy, Case NO. 8:90-cr-00132-4 (including 8:05-cv-10-T-17-EAJ, January 12, 2005, the most

recent Judgment and Order denying Petitioner’s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his

sentence.) 

Petitioner has also filed numerous appeals with the Eleventh Circuit. See Respondent’s

Exhibit 5, Petitioner’s PACER docket for the Eleventh Circuit (including, Appeal No. 04-16159-

C, where the Eleventh Circuit denies Petitioner’s application to file a successive § 2255 motion

to vacate, set aside or correct sentence). 

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on September 9, 2004. An

amended petition was filed on September 10, 2004; a second amended petition was filed on

October 18, 2004; and a third amended petition was filed on November 5, 2004. 

Respondent filed a response to the third amended petition on March 14, 2005. On March

21, 2005, Petitioner filed a “motion requesting denial of respondents request for extension of

time and to grant writ of habeas corpus on merits.” As this is the only response filed to

Respondent’s answer, the Court construes this motion to be a response to Respondent’s answer. 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

Writ of habeas corpus relief extends to a person in custody under the authority of the

United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241. While a federal prisoner who wishes to challenge the

validity or constitutionality of his conviction must bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a petitioner challenging the manner, location, or conditions of that

sentence's execution must bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

See, e.g., Capaldi v. Pontesso, 135 F.3d 1122, 1123 (6th Cir. 1998); Kingsley v. Bureau of

Prisons, 937 F.2d 26, 30 n.5 (2nd Cir. 1991); United States v. Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 893-94 (6th

Cir. 1991); Brown v. United States, 610 F.2d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 1990). To receive relief under

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28 U.S.C. § 2241 a petitioner in federal custody must show that his sentence is being executed in

an illegal, but not necessarily unconstitutional, manner. See e.g., Clark v. Floyd, 80 F.3d 371,

372, 374 (9th Cir. 1995) (contending time spent in state custody should be credited toward

federal custody); Jalili, 925 F.2d at 893-94 (asserting petitioner should be housed at a

community treatment center); Barden, 921 F.2d at 479 (arguing Bureau of Prisons erred in

determining whether petitioner could receive credit for time spent in state custody); Brown, 610

F.2d at 677 (challenging content of inaccurate pre-sentence report used to deny parole). A

petitioner filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 must file the petition

in the judicial district of the petitioner's custodian. Brown, 610 F.2d at 677. At the time

Petitioner filed the instant petition he was confined at the United States Penitentiary in Atwater,

California (USP Atwater), therefore, venue is proper in the Eastern District of California. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d).

II. Proper Respondent

The proper respondent is the custodian of the institution where the petitioner is

incarcerated. 28 U.S.C. § 2242. Warden Paul Schultz has custody over inmates at USP Atwater.

However, on February 2, 2005, the BOP temporarily transferred Petitioner to the Federal

Correctional Institution in Victorville, California. See Wight Decl., Attachment A, at p.1. The

warden where Petitioner is currently incarcerated, Jeff Wrigley at FCI II Victorville, shall be

substituted as the Respondent in this case. See Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 25(d)(1). 

III. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Before filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, a federal prisoner challenging any

circumstance of imprisonment must first exhaust all administrative remedies. Martinez v.

Roberts, 804 F.2d 570, 571 (9th Cir. 1986); Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308,

1313 (9th Cir. 1984); Ruviwat v. Smith, 701 F.2d 844, 845 (9th Cir. 1983). The requirement that

federal prisoners exhaust administrative remedies before filing a habeas corpus petition was

judicially created; it is not a statutory requirement. Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir.

1990). Thus, “because exhaustion is not required by statute, it is not jurisdictional.” Id. If

Petitioner has not properly exhausted his claims, the district court, in its discretion, may either

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 The Third Amended Petition incorporates the Second Amended Petition. See Third Amended Petition, at

p.3, Ground One. 

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“excuse the faulty exhaustion and reach the merits or require the petitioner to exhaust his

administrative remedies before proceeding in court.” 

If the petitioner did not properly exhaust his administrative remedies, and such remedies

are no longer available, he may have procedurally defaulted on his claims. See Francis v. Rison,

894 F.2d 353, 354-55 (9th Cir.1990) (applying procedural default rules to administrative

appeals); see generally Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433

U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977); Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th Cir.1988). If a claim is

procedurally defaulted, the court may require the petitioner to demonstrate cause for the

procedural default and actual prejudice from the alleged constitutional violation. See Francis,

894 F.2d at 355 (suggesting that the cause and prejudice test is the appropriate test); Murray, 477

U.S. at 492 (cause and prejudice test applied to procedural defaults on appeal); Hughes v. Idaho

State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 906-08 (9th Cir.1986) (cause and prejudice test applied to pro

se litigants).

Respondent concedes, so this Court finds, that Petitioner has exhausted the administrative

remedies with respect to the instant petition. Respondent submits that computerized indexes of

all administrative remedy appeals filed by inmates are maintained by the Regional and Central

offices. The computerized indexes reflect that Petitioner has exhausted his administrative

remedies. (See Wight Decl., ¶ 4, Attachment A.) 

IV. Analysis of Claim

In the instant petition, Petitioner contends that his Pre-Sentence Investigation Report

(PSR) and Judgment and Commitment Order (J&C) contain inaccurate information used by the

Federal Bureau of Prison (BOP) to make adverse determinations against him. (Second Amended

Petition at 2.)2 

Respondent contends that the instant petition must be dismissed because Petitioner is

attempting to use § 2241 instead of § 2255 without properly demonstrating his entitlement to do

so; therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction over his petition. In the alternative, Respondent argues

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that the Court should deny the petition on the merits as Petitioner has failed to state a

constitutional claim to warrant relief. 

1. Jurisdiction

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) provides that:

A second or successive [section 2255] motion must be certified as

provided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain -

(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light

of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear

and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have

found the movant guilty of the offense; or

(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable.

28 U.S.C. § 2255. No such certificate has been issued in this case. 

A federal prisoner who wishes to challenge the validity or constitutionality of his

conviction or sentence must do so by way of a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir.1988); Thompson v.

Smith, 719 F.2d 938, 940 (8th Cir.1983); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249 (3rd 1997);

Broussard v. Lippman, 643 F.2d 1131, 1134 (5th Cir.1981). In such cases, only the sentencing

court has jurisdiction. Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1163. A prisoner may not collaterally attack a federal

conviction or sentence by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2241. Grady v. United States, 929 F.2d 468, 470 (9th Cir.1991); Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1162; see

also United States v. Flores, 616 F.2d 840, 842 (5th Cir.1980). 

In contrast, a federal prisoner challenging the manner, location, or conditions of that

sentence's execution must bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

Capaldi v. Pontesso, 135 F.3d 1122, 1123 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Tubwell, 37 F.3d 175,

177 (5th Cir. 1994); Kingsley v. Bureau of Prisons, 937 F.2d 26, 30 n.5 (2nd Cir. 1991); United

States v. Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 893-94 (6th Cir. 1991); Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478-79

(3rd Cir. 1991); United States v. Hutchings, 835 F.2d 185, 186-87 (8th Cir. 1987); Brown v.

United States, 610 F.2d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 1990). 

A federal prisoner authorized to seek relief under § 2255 may seek relief under § 2241 if

he can show that the remedy available under § 2255 is "inadequate or ineffective to test the

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validity of his detention." Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864-5 (9th Cir.2000); United

States v. Pirro, 104 F.3d 297, 299 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting § 2255). The Ninth Circuit has

recognized that it is a very narrow exception. Id; Ivy v. Pontesso, 328 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2003)

(a petitioner must show actual innocence and that he never had the opportunity to raise it by

motion to demonstrate that § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective); Moore v. Reno, 185 F.3d 1054,

1055 (9th Cir.1999) (per curium) (holding that the AEDPA’s filing limitations on § 2255 Motions

does not render § 2255 inadequate or ineffective); Aronson v. May, 85 S.Ct. 3, 5 (1964) (a

court’s denial of a prior § 2255 motion is insufficient to render § 2255 inadequate.); Lorentsen v.

Hood, 223 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2000) (same); Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1162-63 (9th Cir.1988) (a

petitioner's fears bias or unequal treatment do not render a § 2255 petition inadequate); Williams

v. Heritage, 250 F.2d 390 (9th Cir.1957); Hildebrandt v. Swope, 229 F.2d 582 (9th Cir.1956); see

United States v. Valdez-Pacheco, 237 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2001) (procedural requirements of

§ 2255 may not be circumvented by invoking the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651). The burden

is on the petitioner to show that the remedy is inadequate or ineffective. Redfield v. United

States, 315 F.2d 76, 83 (9th Cir. 1963). 

Because the current petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) apply to Petitioner's current

petition. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). A federal court must dismiss a second or

successive petition that raises the same grounds as a prior petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). The

court must also dismiss a second or successive petition raising a new ground unless the petitioner

can show that 1) the claim rests on a new, retroactive, constitutional right or 2) the factual basis

of the claim was not previously discoverable through due diligence, and these new facts establish

by clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder

would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B).

However, it is not the district court that decides whether a second or successive petition meets

these requirements, which allow a petitioner to file a second or successive petition. 

Section 2244 (b)(3)(A) provides: "Before a second or successive application permitted by

this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of

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appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application." In other words,

Petitioner must obtain leave from the Ninth Circuit before he can file a second or successive

petition in district court. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 656-657 (1996). This Court must

dismiss any second or successive petition unless the Court of Appeals has given Petitioner leave

to file the petition because a district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a second or

successive petition. See United States v. Allen, 157 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 1998) (failure to

request the requisite authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 motion deprives the

district court of jurisdiction). 

Respondent argues and submits evidence that Petitioner has filed numerous § 2255

challenges to the imposition and duration of his sentence based on the argument that the PSR

incorrectly reflects two Florida state drug convictions. Petitioner has also filed numerous appeals

to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. See Respondent’s Exhibit 5, Petitioner’s PACER

docket for the Eleventh Circuit (including, Appeal No. 04-16159-C, where the Eleventh Circuit

denies Petitioner’s application to file a successive § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside or correct

sentence). More specifically, as Respondent correctly states, the United States District Court for

the Middle District of Florida denied one of Petitioner’s § 2241 requests for correction of sentence

due to his “erroneous” Florida state drug convictions. See Respondent’s Exhibit 6A, Petition and

Order, McCoy v. United States, et al., Case No. 8:01-cv-1299 (M.D. Fla. filed July 9 and July 30,

2001, respectively). The court held that, “McCoy’s present petition is an attempt to file yet

another successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct an allegedly illegal sentence pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2255[.]” Id., Order at pp. 1-2. 

In 2004, Petitioner filed a § 2241 petition in the United States District Court for the

Western District of Louisiana. See Respondent’s Exhibit 6B, Report & Recommendation and

Judgment, McCoy v. Warden Tapia, et al., Case NO. 04-0194-P (W.D. La. filed May 24 and July

8, 2004, respectively). In this case, Petitioner again challenged the validity of his sentence due to

the allegedly erroneous prior Florida drug convictions and requested release from confinement. 

Id., Report & Recommendation, at pp. 1-2. The Court held that Petitioner was attempting to

attack his sentence via a § 2241 motion, without properly satisfying the § 2255 “savings clause,”

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and dismissed the petition. Id. at 3-5; see also Order, at 1. 

Then, again in the Middle District of Florida, Petitioner’s mother, Delorse McCoy, filed a

§ 2241 petition as a “Next Friend” status on behalf of her son. See Respondent’s Exhibit 6C,

Petition and Order, Delorse McCoy on behalf of Reginald McCoy v. Ashcroft, et al., Case No.

8:04-cv-179-T-17 (M.D. Fla. filed January 30 and February 4, 2004, respectively). The Court

held that Ms. McCoy had failed to adequately demonstrate why Reginald McCoy [Petitioner]

could not appear on his own behalf. Id. at 2. The Court stated that Petitioner had filed seven

earlier § 2255 motions which were denied, an earlier § 2241 petition had been denied by that

court, and the Eleventh Circuit denied Petitioner’s application for permission to file successive §

2255 motions. Id. The court interpreted the petition as “an attempt to circumvent the Eleventh

Circuit’s ruling[.]” Id. 

In the instant petition, as previously stated herein, Petitioner continues to contend that his

PSR and J&C order contain inaccurate information used by the BOP to make adverse

determinations against him. Second Amended Petition, at 2. Specifically, Petitioner claims his

PSR and J&C reflect two prior drug convictions in the State of Florida that he believes were

dismissed, and that the BOP has improperly used those convictions to incorrectly designate him at

a “high” security classification level. Id. at 2-4. It is apparent that Petitioner is attempting to

incorporate a claim that his conviction and sentence were invalid because the indictment did not

charge, nor did the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt, the quantity of cocaine base for which he

was sentenced. Id. at 3-4. This claim challenges the validity, not execution, of Petitioner’s

sentence, which is improper via § 2241. 

In Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding

in Apprendi, which held that “any fact [other than the fact of a prior conviction] that increases the

penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and

proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 341; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 506 U.S.

466, 488-490 (2000). In United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), the

Supreme Court held that the Sentencing Guidelines, as written, violated the Sixth Amendment

principles articulated in Blakely. Id. at 749-756. As a remedy, the Supreme Court declared the

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Guidelines to be “effectively advisory.” Id. at 756. 

Both Blakely and Booker are extensions of the principles the Supreme Court announced in

Apprendi. Although Petitioner attempts to couch his claim in terms of a classification error, his

challenge is indeed based on the holding in Apprendi, and Apprendi is not a new rule of

constitutional law. Indeed, it has been held that Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker do not apply

retroactively to cases on collateral review. Reynolds v. Cambra, 290 F.3d 1029, 1030 (9th Cir.

2002) (Apprendi does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review); Schardt v. Payne, 414

F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2005) (Blakely does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review);

United States v. Cruz, 423 F.3d 1119, 1120 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Booker is not retroactive, and does

not apply to cases on collateral review where the conviction was final as of the date of Booker’s

publication.”) Petitioner has made no showing that he is factually innocent of the crime for which

he was convicted and, as outlined herein, he has previously had an “unobstructed procedural shot”

at presenting this claim. Accordingly, the instant petition must be dismissed. Because the Court

does not have jurisdiction to review the instant petition, the Court does not address the merits of

the instant petition. 

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The instant petition for writ of habeas corpus be DISMISSED for lack of

jurisdiction; and

2. The Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgment. 

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within

thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the court

and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate

Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed

within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. The

Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The

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parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 16, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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