Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01683/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01683-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RACHEE A. WILLIS

Plaintiff,

v.

MCEWEN, et al.,

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 11cv01683 LAB(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 34] 

Plaintiff Rachee A. Willis, a state prisoner proceeding pro se

and in forma pauperis, filed a Complaint on July 25, 2011 [ECF Nos.

1, 3], and a First Amended Complaint nunc pro tunc to November 23,

2011 [ECF No. 5], pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Willis claims that

the Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from

cruel and unusual punishment while he was incarcerated at

Calipatria State Prison ("Calipatria"). (First Am. Compl. 1, 3-4,

10-11, ECF No. 5.)1

1

 The Court will cite to all documents using the page numbers

assigned by the electronic case filing system.

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On May 21, 2012, Defendants Cerros, Navarro, Landeros, and the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR")

filed a Motion to Dismiss, along with a Memorandum of Points and

Authorities [ECF No. 15]. The Motion to Dismiss was granted as to

the CDCR and denied as to the three individual Defendants on

January 16, 2013. (Report & Recommendation 21, ECF No. 20; Order

Adopting Report & Recommendation 2, ECF No. 24.) The remaining

three Defendants filed an Answer on January 30, 2013 [ECF No. 25]. 

Defendants Cerros, Navarro, and Landeros filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment on October 21, 2013, along with a Memorandum of

Points and Authorities (the "Memorandum of Points and Authorities")

and several attachments [ECF No. 34]. Plaintiff was given notice

on October 23, 2013, of his opportunity to submit evidence in

opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, pursuant to

Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc), and

Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988) [ECF No. 35]. 

Willis filed a Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

(the "Response") on November 26, 2013 [ECF No. 38]. Defendants did

not file a reply. 

The Court has reviewed the First Amended Complaint and

attachments, the Motion for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiff's

Response. The Motion for Summary Judgment is suitable for

resolution on the papers. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1). For

the reasons discussed below, the Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF

No. 34] should be DENIED.

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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

Willis pleads that on October 19, 2010, officials initiated an

"emergency recall" from the recreation yard due to poor visibility

caused by rain. (First Am. Compl. 8, ECF No. 5.) Two officers who

are not Defendants were patting down inmates outside of building

A-1, and Defendants Landeros and Cerros were conducting boot checks

at the "podium." (Id.) Plaintiff maintains that while waiting for

his boot check, a prisoner in "upper C-section" called his name. 

(Id.) When he looked to see who it was, he noticed only Black

inmates were being placed back in their cells –- except the

building porter –- whereas Hispanic inmates were allowed to stand

in front of their cells, unsecured. (Id.) According to Willis,

this was "extremely unusual" because the "normal procedure" is for

officers to cell inmates one building section at a time, as opposed

to one race at a time. (Id.) "[I]n my 5 years at this prison I've

never seen [this] before and because it is common knowledge that

such circumstances are ideal for riots where in a single race of

inmates have the tactical advantage of numbers over another or the

unified co-oporation [sic] to commit to mass disturbances against

correctional staff." (Id.) Defendant Navarro was purportedly in

the "A-1 control tower," and he decided to cell only Black inmates. 

(Id. at 2.) 

Plaintiff urges that as soon as he stepped in front of the

"staff office door," Defendants Cerros and Landeros ran out of the

building to assist with a riot in the recreation yard; a large

2 Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is not verified because

it was not signed "under the pains and penalties of perjury." (See

First Am. Compl. 11, ECF No. 5); Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d

454, 460 n.10 (9th Cir. 1995). The Court cites to the First

Amended Complaint as background, not as evidence. 

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group of prisoners ran out with the Defendants to attempt to

participate in the riot. (Id. at 8-9.) Defendant Navarro closed

the building door after realizing that inmates were running out to

join in the riot. (Id.) One of the Hispanic inmates had yelled

something in Spanish, and a large group ran toward the metal

detector where two Black inmates were putting on their boots. (See

id.) 

Willis alleges that when he realized the Hispanic inmates were

attacking the Black prisoners, three Hispanic inmates ran toward

him and "everything went black for a moment." (Id. at 9.) 

Plaintiff was purportedly attacked by approximately forty Hispanic

prisoners with weapons for ten minutes; he was hit with the "base

of a large telephone" and a "large stick." (See id.) At some

point during the riot, Willis lost consciousness and was found

lying in a pool of his blood while medical personnel assisted him. 

(See id.) He told the medical staff that his head, face, and left

lung hurt. (Id.) Plaintiff was taken to a medical facility and

given a tetanus shot and antibiotics; he was also informed that the

puncture wound to his face "would probably need stitches." (Id.)

Defendants Landeros and Cerros allegedly failed to secure the

building's equipment locker and center podium before the "first or

second voluntary inlines" from the recreation yard. (Id.) 

Plaintiff states that prison procedures require officers to secure

these areas to prevent inmates from using a "mop and broom sticks

and shaving razor blades" as weapons. (Id.) Willis further

submits that after the incident and while prisoners were being

interviewed, Defendant Landeros apologized to the Black inmates

saying, "'I'm so sorry, I had no idea [the Hispanic prisoners were]

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going for you guys, we thought they were going to fight each

other.'" (Id.) According to Plaintiff, this shows that Landeros

and other officers knew that a "mass altercation" was about to

transpire. (Id.) Willis insists that it was later discovered

"that the tower officer in building A-3" only let Black inmates

into their cells but left Hispanic prisoners unsecured in the

building. (Id. at 10.)

Plaintiff argues that Defendants Landeros, Cerros, and Navarro

violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect him. 

(Id.) Landeros and Cerros knowingly neglected to secure the

equipment locker and razor cabinet. (Id.) Also, Navarro

intentionally permitted only Black prisoners to enter their cells,

contrary to prison procedures. (Id.) Willis maintains that

Defendants left him in a building with forty to fifty unrestrained

Hispanic prisoners outside of their cells, although the Defendants

anticipated a riot. (Id.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides, "The court

shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Like the

standard for a directed verdict, judgment must be entered for the

moving party "if, under the governing law, there can be but one

reasonable conclusion as to the verdict." Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (citing Brady v. S. Ry. Co.,

320 U.S. 476, 479-80 (1943)). "If reasonable minds could differ,"

judgment should not be entered in favor of the moving party. Id.

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at 250-51; see Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 470

(9th Cir. 2007).

The parties bear the same substantive burden of proof that

would apply at a trial on the merits, including the plaintiff's

burden to establish any element essential to his case. Cleveland

v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 805-06 (1999); Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson, 477 U.S. at

252; see Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

"When the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial,

summary judgment is warranted if the nonmovant fails to 'make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to [its] case.'" Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590

(1993) (alteration in original) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at

322). The absence of a genuine issue of material fact on a single

element of a claim is sufficient to warrant summary judgment on

that claim. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.

The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying the

pleadings and evidence it "believes demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323; see Adickes v. S.H.

Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Martinez v. Stanford, 323

F.3d 1178, 1182-83 (9th Cir. 2003). The burden then shifts to the

nonmoving party to establish, beyond the pleadings, that there is a

genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. To

successfully rebut a defendant's properly supported motion for

summary judgment, the "plaintiff[] must point to some facts in the

record that demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact and, with

all reasonable inferences made in the plaintiff[']s[] favor, could

convince a reasonable jury to find for the plaintiff[]." Reese v.

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Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323;

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249). Material issues are those that "might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson,

477 U.S. at 248; see Chevron USA, Inc. v. Cayetano, 224 F.3d 1030,

1039-40 (9th Cir. 2000); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301,

1305-06 (9th Cir. 1982). More than a "metaphysical doubt" is

required to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

In deciding whether any genuine issue of material fact remains

for trial, courts must "view[] the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party . . . ." Fontana v. Haskin, 262

F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image

Technical Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456 (1992) (stating that the

nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed and all reasonable

inferences drawn in the nonmoving party's favor). "When opposing

parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly

contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could

believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for

purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Scott v.

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). While the district court is not

required to search the entire record for an issue of fact, the

court may nevertheless exercise its discretion to consider

materials in the record that are not specifically referenced. 

Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031

(9th Cir. 2001); Forsberg v. Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d

1409, 1417-18 (9th Cir. 1988).

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When the nonmoving party is proceeding pro se, the court has a

duty to consider "all of [the nonmovant's] contentions offered in

motions and pleadings, where such contentions are based on personal

knowledge and set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence,

and where [the nonmovant] attested under penalty of perjury that

the contents of the motions or pleadings are true and correct." 

Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 922-23 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations

omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Eighth Amendment: Failure to Protect

"[T]he treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the

conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under

the Eighth Amendment." Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31

(1993). The Eighth Amendment "requires that inmates be furnished

with the basic human needs, one of which is 'reasonable safety.'" 

Id. at 33 (quoting Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc.

Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)). Therefore, a plaintiff has a

right to be protected from violence while in custody. Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994); Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726,

731 (9th Cir. 2000); Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138

(9th Cir. 1989). "Prison officials have a duty to take reasonable

steps to protect inmates from physical abuse." Hoptowit v. Ray,

682 F.2d 1237, 1250 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted), abrogated

in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). 

When the state takes a person into custody, the Constitution

imposes a duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and

well-being. Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 1005.

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To constitute an Eighth Amendment violation, a plaintiff must

show that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to a

substantial risk of serious harm to the prisoner's safety. Farmer,

511 U.S. at 834; see Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 913 (9th Cir.

2001) ("A prison official is deliberately indifferent to a

substantial risk of serious harm to inmates if that official is

subjectively aware of the risk and does nothing to prevent the

resulting harm."). The prison official is only liable when two

requirements are met; one is objective, and the other is

subjective. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 838; see Foster v. Runnels,

554 F.3d 807, 812 (9th Cir. 2009). First, the purported violation

must be objectively "sufficiently serious." Farmer, 511 U.S. at

834 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second,

the prison official must subjectively "know[] of and disregard[] an

excessive risk to inmate health or safety." Id. at 837.

1. Defendants Landeros and Cerros

a. Objective requirement: sufficiently serious

deprivation

To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, the alleged

deprivation must be "objectively, 'sufficiently serious.'" Farmer,

511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298). In cases

alleging prison authorities' failure to prevent harm, the inmate

may satisfy the "sufficiently serious" requirement by showing that

"he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of

serious harm" to him. Id. Courts must consider the seriousness of

the potential harm and whether society deems the risk to be so

grave that it violates standards of decency. Helling, 509 U.S. at

36; see Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992).

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Defendants Landeros and Cerros contend that they followed

prison protocol by allowing the inmate porter to keep the equipment

locker open during the voluntary in-lines while he was cleaning. 

(Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 15, ECF No. 34; id.

Attach. #4 Decl. Landeros at 2.) Further, they maintain that they

were unable to close the equipment locker due to "(1) the emergency

recall which occurred immediately after a voluntarily in-line; (2)

the wet weather, causing inmates to group in the entry way to the

housing unit; and (3) a race riot on the yard immediately following

the emergency recall." (Id. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. at 15.) The

Defendants argue that they acted reasonably under the

circumstances; at most, they claim they were negligent. (Id. at

15-16 (citations omitted).)

In the Response, Willis urges that Cerros and Landeros

"facilitated the riot thereby creating circumstances that ended in

[him] being attacked by about 40 Hispanic inmates with weapons,

making them liable under the Eighth Amendment." (Resp. 2, ECF No.

38.) He responds to Defendants arguments by insisting that they

could have secured the locker in the fifteen minutes between the

time the voluntary in-line began and the emergency recall was

announced. (Id. at 7 (citing id. at 15; Defs.' Mot. Summ. J.

Attach. #4 Decl. Landeros 3, ECF No. 34).) Further, he argues that

they could have closed the locker in the eight minutes between the

announcement of the emergency recall and beginning of the race

riot. (Id. (citing Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #4 Decl. Landeros

3, ECF No. 34).) The equipment locker is secured during mass

movements, Plaintiff contends, and the inmate porter is not

responsible for locking it. (Id.) Similarly, "[p]rotocol does not

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mandate that the porter be allowed to leave the locker open or that

it is his decision to have it open or closed." (Id.) 

Next, Willis maintains that no inmates were grouped in the

entry way of the housing unit. (Id. (citing id. at 15).) To the

extent there was any grouping, Plaintiff claims that it was due to

Officer Navarro prohibiting Hispanic inmates from entering their

cells during the voluntary in-lines. (Id. (citing id. at 16).) 

Moreover, "[t]he Defendants could've easily ordered inmates to go

back out if they [felt] that inmates were crowding up the entry way

and 'preventing' them from tending to the safety and security

requirements they are to fulfill." (Id.) 

In their Answer, Landeros and Cerros deny that the equipment

locker and podium were left unsecured prior to the riot. (Compare

First Am. Compl. 9, ECF No. 5 (stating that the locker and podium

were left open prior to the voluntary in-lines), with Defs.' Answer

First Am. Compl. 2, ECF No. 25) (denying allegations in paragraph

eight of First Amended Complaint). It is also disputed that items

from the locker and podium were used as weapons against Willis. 

(Compare First Am. Compl. 9, ECF No. 5 (claiming that a large stick

and phone base were used to beat Plaintiff), Resp. 13, ECF No. 38

(same), with Defs.' Answer First Am. Compl. 2, ECF No. 25) (denying

allegations in paragraph eight of First Amended Complaint).

Defendants do not dispute that the equipment locker, which

housed brooms and mops, remained unlocked during the voluntary

recall at 10:15 a.m., emergency recall at 10:30 a.m., and at 10:38

a.m., when a "Code 2 riot on the yard" was declared. (Defs.' Mot.

Summ. J. Attach. #4 Decl. Landeros 3, ECF No. 34; id. Attach. #5

Decl. Cerros at 2.) Both officers state that the podium, however,

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"had been locked and remained locked." (Id.) According to

Landeros, "No metal objects are kept in the equipment locker to

prevent the inmates from stealing them and fashioning weapons." 

(Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #4 Decl. Landeros 2, ECF No. 34.) 

Finally, both Defendants admit that "[o]n October 19, 2010, [each]

was assigned as a floor officer on Facility A, Housing Unit A-1, at

Calipatria State Prison." (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #4 Decl.

Landeros 2, ECF No. 34; id. Attach. #5 Decl. Cerros at 2.)

In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants' arguments

focus almost entirely on their conduct after the emergency recall. 

(See id. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. at 15-16.) Yet, Plaintiff's claim

is that Landeros and Cerros failed to secure the equipment locker

and podium before the voluntary in-lines. (See First Am. Compl. 9,

ECF No. 5 ("Landeros and Cerros did not secure the building's

equipment locker or the center podium before first or second

voluntary inlines from [the] recreational yard . . . ."); see also

Resp. 7, ECF No. 38 (arguing that the correctional officers also

could have secured the items (1) after the voluntary in-lines began

but before the recall and (2) after the recall but before the

riot).)3

3 Defendants briefly address the relevant time period by

stating that the equipment locker is typically left open while the

inmate porter cleans. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. &

A. 15, ECF No. 34; id. Attach. #4 Decl. Landeros at 2.) Because

this assertion is relevant to the reasonable justification inquiry,

the Court will address it in its subsequent analysis of that issue.

It is a bit unclear in the Complaint if, in addition to their

failure to secure the podium and locker prior to the voluntary inlines, the Plaintiff also faults Defendants Cerros and Landeros for

leaving the housing unit floor to respond to the riot outside.

(Compare First Am. Compl. 2, 8, ECF No. 5 (stating that Defendants

ran out of the building), with id. Ex. A Decl. Willis at 14 ("N.E.

Landeros and Cerros were forced to ignore and advertently neglect

the obvious dangerous zone/circumstances by leaving the building

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Ultimately, "[t]he objective question of whether a prison

officer's actions have exposed an inmate to a substantial risk of

serious harm is a question of fact, and as such must be decided by

a jury if there is any room for doubt." Lemire v. Cal. Dep't of

Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing

Conn v. Reno, 591 F.3d 1081, 1095 (9th Cir. 2010)). A reasonable

juror could determine that these Defendants created a substantial

risk of serious harm when they failed to secure the equipment

locker (which contained brooms and mops that could be used as

potential weapons) prior to the riot.

Courts recognize that "virtually anything can be employed as a

weapon," including "pool cues, brooms, and chairs." See Clay v.

Wilkinson, No. 07-CV-0730, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102032, at *10

(W.D. La. Dec. 10, 2007). An open equipment locker would allow

inmates to use its contents as weapons to injure Willis and others. 

If one inmate is armed and another is not, a substantial risk of

harm exists. If multiple inmates are armed, the risk remains.

The court in Brittain v. Clemons, Civil Action No.

4:09CV-P123-M, 2011 WL 2471587, at *8 (W.D. Ky. June 21, 2011)

discussed the objective prong of an Eighth Amendment claim alleging

that a prison official failed to timely respond to an altercation

between inmates.

If two inmates are armed with weapons and engaged in

combat with one another, there is an objective risk that

serious harm will come to one or both of them if prison

officials do not intervene. Accordingly, for the

unsecured to follow the common practices of alarm response.").) In

his Response, Willis clarifies that he does not fault Defendants

for leaving the building to quell the riot. (See Resp. 8, ECF No.

38 ("I agree that the Defendants had no choice but to respond to

the Code 3 race riot call, but they had ample opportunity to secure

the locker before that time.").)

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purposes of summary judgment, Plaintiff satisfies the

first prong necessary to prevail on a failure-to-protect

claim.

As to the objective question of whether Landeros's and Cerros's

failure to secure the equipment locker during an emergency recall

or Code 2 riot exposed Willis to a substantial risk of serious

harm, the Defendants have failed to prove that summary judgment

should be entered in their favor. 

b. Subjective requirement: deliberate indifference

After an inmate has shown a triable issue as to whether he

suffered a deprivation that was objectively, "sufficiently

serious," he must also establish a triable issue regarding whether

the prison officials had a "sufficiently culpable state of mind,"

acting with deliberate indifference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see

Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1151 (9th Cir. 2010). 

"[D]eliberate indifference entails something more than mere

negligence . . . [but] is satisfied by something less than acts or

omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge

that harm will result." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Liability

materializes if the defendant knew the inmate faced a risk of harm

and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to

abate it. Id. at 847. Therefore, demonstrating subjective

deliberate indifference involves a two-part inquiry: (1) whether

the defendant was subjectively aware of a risk of serious harm to

the prisoner's safety, and (2) whether the official had a

''reasonable justification' for the deprivation." Thomas, 611 F.3d

at 1150-51; see Sistrunk v. Hall, No. 3:09-cv-01122-BR, 2012 WL

1357659, at *6 (D. Or. Apr. 19, 2012) (citation omitted) (internal

quotation marks omitted) ("Deliberate indifference is evaluated in

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this context by considering whether . . . the defendant prison

official(s) were guided by considerations of safety to other

inmates, whether the official(s) took prophylactic or preventive

measures to protect the prisoner, and whether less dangerous

alternatives were in fact available.").

"First, the inmate must show that the prison officials were

aware of a 'substantial risk of serious harm' to an inmate's health

or safety." Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at

837). This may be satisfied if the prisoner establishes that the

risk posed by the violation was "obvious." Id. (citations

omitted). A plaintiff need not show that an "individual prison

official had specific knowledge that harsh treatment of a

particular inmate, in particular circumstances, would have a

certain outcome." Id. "Rather, [courts] measure what is 'obvious'

in light of reason and the basic general knowledge that a prison

official may be presumed to have obtained regarding the type of

deprivation involved." Id. at 1151 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at

842). For example, if a substantial risk of inmate attacks was

"longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by

prison officials in the past," and the defendant "had been exposed

to information concerning the risk and thus must have known about

it," a trier of fact could find defendant had actual knowledge of

the risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (citations omitted) (internal

quotations omitted); see Thomas, 611 F.3d at 1151. Whether a

defendant had the requisite knowledge is a question of fact subject

to substantiation in the usual ways, including inferences drawn

from circumstantial evidence. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. 

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"The standard does not require that the guard or official

'"believe to a moral certainty that one inmate intends to attack

another at a given place at a time certain before that officer is

obligated to take steps to prevent such an assault. But, on the

other hand, he must have more than a mere suspicion that an attack

will occur."'" Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir.

1986) (quoting State Bank of St. Charles v. Camic, 712 F.2d 1140,

1146 (7th Cir. 1983)).

"Second, the inmate must show that the prison officials had no

'reasonable' justification for the deprivation, in spite of that

risk." Thomas, 611 F.3d at 1150-51 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at

844). "[P]rison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk

to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they

responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was

not averted." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844.

Here, Plaintiff maintains that Landeros told him, "I'm so

sorry. I had no idea they [were] going for you guys, we thought

they were going to fight each other." (First Am. Compl. 9, ECF No.

5; Resp. 14, ECF No. 38.) In her declaration, Landeros denies

making the statement. (See Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #4 Decl.

Landeros 4, ECF No. 34.) Cerros and Landeros contend that even if

she did make the assertion, it "in no way indicate[s] she knew

about the riot prior to its occurrence." (Id. Attach. #1 Mem. P. &

A. at 16.) "[T]he most logical reading of the alleged comments are

[sic] that Landeros believed when she was out in the yard

responding to the Code 3 that the Hispanic inmates were fighting

each other." (Id.) 

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Defendants insist they did not know that a riot might occur. 

(Id. (citing id. Attach. #4 Decl. Landeros at 4; id. Attach. #5

Decl. Cerros at 3).) Specifically, Landeros claims that she "had

no idea it was a race riot until after she returned to the housing

unit and saw that Plaintiff had been in an altercation." (Id.) 

For these reasons, Cerros and Landeros request that summary

judgment be entered in their favor as to the subjective prong. 

(Id. at 17.)

In the Response, Willis challenges Officer Landeros's

assertion that she did not know that the riot was racially

motivated until after it was over. (Resp. 8, ECF No. 38.) 

Plaintiff relies on Navarro's declaration that an announcement was

made that a "Code 3 racial riot" was occurring. (Id. (citing

Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #6 Decl. Navarro 3, ECF No. 34).) 

Thus, "Landeros could not have ran to the yard expecting to see

inmates of the same race fighting . . . ." (Id.) Willis stresses

that Landeros said that the correctional officers thought the

Hispanics "'were going to fight'" each other. (Id.) He contends

that if Defendant Landeros meant to articulate that she had just

witnessed the Hispanics fighting, she would have said something

like, "'We thought they were fighting each other . . . .'" (Id.) 

Further, he insists that Officer Landeros would have nothing to

apologize for if her conduct was appropriate and the events that

transpired were truly unexpected. (Id.) 

i. Actual knowledge

Plaintiff relies solely on Landeros's statement to prove that

the officers knew there was a strong likelihood that a riot would

occur. As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that the

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Defendants do not make any evidentiary objections in their Motion

for Summary Judgment. (See generally Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach.

#1 Mem. P. & A. 13-21, ECF No. 34.) Willis declares under penalty

of perjury that Landeros made the statement; Landeros swears under

penalty of perjury that she did not. (Compare Resp. 14-15, ECF No.

38, with Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #4 Decl. Landeros 4-5, ECF

No. 34.) The Court does not weigh evidence or make credibility

determinations at this stage. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. at 255. After considering the conflicting evidence, a

reasonable juror could find Plaintiff's evidence more credible. 

See Kramer v. Thomas, No. CV 05-8381 AG (Ctx), 2006 WL 4729242, at

*9 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2006) (denying motion for summary judgment

because the parties introduced contradictory evidence about whether

certain material statements were made).4 

Even assuming Landeros made the statement, the parties dispute

its meaning. (Compare Resp. 8, ECF No. 38 (explaining how the

statement should be interpreted), with Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach.

#1 Mem. P. & A. 16, ECF No. 34 ("[T]he most logical reading of the

alleged comments are [sic] that Landeros believed when she was out

in the yard responding to the Code 3 that the Hispanic inmates were

fighting each other.").) "[T]hat a statement admits of more than

4

 Adding to the factual dispute, Defendants note that

Plaintiff stated at his deposition that "none of the correctional

officers knew about the riot prior to it commencing." (Defs.' Mot.

Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 11, ECF No. 34 (citing id. Attach.

#3 Decl. Findley at 24).) Defendants only mention this in passing,

however, and other than generally referencing it in the

introduction of the Motion for Summary Judgment, they do not allude

to it again. (See generally id. at 15-20.) In his Response,

Willis claims that Defendants take his answer out of context. 

(Resp. 5-6, ECF No. 38.) He alleges that the question was posed to

inquire whether, outside of Landeros's statement, Plaintiff knew

"with certainty" whether the correctional officers anticipated a

mass altercation. (Id. at 6.) 

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one interpretation in itself suggests that there is a genuine issue

of material fact as to its meaning." Lucas v. Paige, 435 F. Supp.

2d 165, 171 (D.D.C. 2006); see Goodell v. Chhon, No. S–01–0484 FCD

DAD, 2002 WL 32943053, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 11, 2002) ("A

reasonable juror could interpret this statement in many different

ways, and on that basis alone, the court could find that the

testimony presents a triable issue of fact for the jury and is

sufficient to withstand summary judgment."). A factfinder could

reasonably determine that the statement proves that Officer

Landeros was subjectively aware of a risk of serious harm to inmate

safety. Accordingly, issues of material fact exist that preclude

entry of summary judgment in Landeros's favor. 

As to Defendant Cerros, Plaintiff maintains that Landeros used

the term "we," indicating that she and other officers knew of the

possibility of a riot. (Resp. 8, ECF No. 38 ("'We thought'

includes Landeros as well as others . . . ."); First Am. Compl. 9,

ECF No. 5 (imputing Landeros's knowledge that a mass altercation

was going to occur to the other correctional officers).) Cerros

denies under penalty of perjury that he knew an altercation was

likely to occur. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #5 Decl. Cerros 3,

ECF No. 34.) Here, a jury could reasonably credit Willis's

evidence and reject Cerros's evidence. Accordingly, a genuine

issue of material fact exists that also precludes entry of summary

judgment in favor of Officer Cerros. See Page v. Hense, No.

1:10–cv–01186–AWI–SKO PC, 2013 WL 3936513, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July

30, 2013) (finding an issue of fact where defendant denied having

knowledge of a chrono and plaintiff provided evidence showing that

defendant did have knowledge of the chrono). 

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ii. No reasonable justification

Next, the Court must consider whether the officers' conduct

was reasonably justified. See Thomas, 611 F.3d at 1150-51. These

Defendants focus largely on their actions after the riot began,

which, as discussed above, is not responsive to Plaintiff's claim. 

They briefly address their pre-riot conduct by stating that they

"followed protocol when they allowed the inmate porter to leave the

equipment locker open." (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. &

A. 15, ECF No. 34; see also id. Attach. #4 Decl. Landeros at 2

("The locker is left open during a voluntary in-line, because the

porter is still cleaning at that point.").) As noted, Willis

argues that prison protocol does not require the inmate porter to

leave the locker open. (Resp. 7, ECF No. 38.) It is the

correctional officers, not the inmate porters, who are responsible

for securing the locker. (Id.)

Whether a correctional officer's conduct is reasonably

justified is typically a fact intensive inquiry and not appropriate

for resolution at the summary judgment stage. See Lemire v. Cal.

Dep't of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d at 1078. Other than the vague

references above, these Defendants do not elaborate on the alleged

protocol. Further, it appears that it was within their discretion

to decide whether to secure the locker. (See Defs.' Mot. Summ. J.

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 15, ECF No. 34 (stating that they followed

protocol by "allowing" the inmate porter to leave the locker

open).) A factfinder could reasonably determine that Landeros and

Cerros were not reasonably justified in leaving the equipment

locker and podium open so the inmate porter could clean, in light

of the fact that they contained potential weapons that could be

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used in a looming riot. See Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1080 (noting that

triable issue of fact had been created regarding whether defendants

were reasonably justified). For these reasons, Landeros and

Cerros's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's Eighth

Amendment claim should be DENIED.

2. Defendant Navarro

a. Objective requirement: sufficiently serious

deprivation

In the Motion for Summary Judgment, Officer Navarro argues

that his decision not to admit inmates by section during the

voluntary in-lines does not amount to deliberate indifference. 

(Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 17, ECF No. 34.) The

Defendant contends that inmates are normally not admitted into

their cells by section, as it is neither safe nor feasible. (Id.

(citing id. Attach. #6 Decl. Navarro at 2).) "To require the

inmates to wait while other sections are admitted, would allow

inmates to congregate on the housing unit floor, which is dangerous

because it may lead to altercations between the inmates waiting to

be let into their cells." (Id. (citing id. Attach. #6 Decl.

Navarro at 2).) Further, according to Navarro, opening an entire

section of cell doors at one time could lead to an increase in

theft. (Id. (citing id. Attach. #6 Decl. Navarro at 2).) 

Defendant Navarro does not explain the manner in which he

allowed the inmates into their cells on October 19, 2010, the day

of the riot. (See generally id. Attach. #6 Decl. Navarro at 1-5.) 

He submits that typically inmates are allowed to return to their

cells in the order they are processed through the metal detector. 

(Id. at 2.) Navarro concedes that admitting inmates to their cells

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in that order occasionally leads to racial imbalances. (Id.

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. at 17 (citing id. Attach. #6 Decl. Navarro

at 2).) "Inmates self-segregate by race . . . . As a result,

inmates of one race are often let into their cells before inmates

of another race." (Id.) Defendant asserts that this method is

safer than allowing a large group of inmates to congregate on the

housing unit floor. (Id. at 18 (citing id. Attach. #6 Decl.

Navarro at 2).) He maintains:

It was only the combination of (1) an emergency

recall shortly after a voluntary recall; (2) wet weather

that caused the inmates to enter the housing unit more

quickly than normal; and (3) a race-riot on the yard

immediately after the emergency recall, that led to a

large group of Hispanic inmates on the housing unit floor

during the race riot.

(Id.) Officer Navarro insists that he acted appropriately after

the riot started by ordering inmates to stop fighting, activating

his personal alarm, and firing direct-impact rounds. (Id.) 

Finally, he asserts that he did not know a riot might occur and

could not have prevented it. (Id. (citations omitted).)

In the Response, Willis contends that despite Navarro's

assertions, correctional officers normally admit inmates into their

cells by section. (Resp. 9, ECF No. 38.) According to Plaintiff,

the Defendant did not admit inmates into their cells as they passed

through the metal detector on the day of the riot. (Id.) Rather,

Willis submits that the officer allowed only "Black inmates into

their cells even though there were several dozen of Hispanic

inmates who were actually processed through the metal detector and

were waiting in front of their cells but simply weren't let in." 

(Id. (citing id. at 13, 16).) Willis claims that Defendant's

actions "created a risk of serious harm." (Id.) 

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As noted, whether a prison official exposed an inmate "to a

substantial risk of serious harm is a question of fact." Lemire,

726 F.3d at 1075-76. Plaintiff states under penalty of perjury

that he witnessed Officer Navarro only letting Black inmates into

their cells on October 19, 2010. (Resp. 13, 15, ECF No. 38.) 

Defendant does not expressly refute Willis's version of the facts;

he does not explain the manner in which he allowed inmates into

their cells on the day of the riot. (See Defs.' Mot. Summ. J.

Attach. #6 Decl. Navarro 1-4, ECF No. 34.) Assuming the facts are

as Plaintiff presents them, a reasonable trier of fact could

determine that Officer Navarro created an objective risk of serious

harm by allowing only Black inmates into their cells, creating a

racial imbalance that could lead to an altercation. Cf. Woods v.

Fermaint, No. 10 C 3853, 2012 WL 3581177, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17,

2012) ("The Court finds there was a substantial risk in leaving

unsupervised a gang member who has requested transfer because a

disproportionate number of opposing gang members have recently

specifically threatened to beat members of his gang.").

b. Subjective requirement: deliberate indifference

"The Ninth Circuit has traditionally required some sort of

notice (constructive or otherwise) of impending harm before

liability could be imposed under the Eighth Amendment for failure

to protect an inmate." Pickett v. Williams, Civil No. 09–689–TC,

2011 WL 4913573, at *3 (D. Or. Aug. 23, 2011) (citations omitted).

Here, Willis alleges that Defendant Navarro had knowledge of two

risks to inmate safety: (1) the obvious risk due to the racially

imbalanced lockup and (2) the risk to inmate safety in light of a

possible race riot (as evidenced by Landeros's statement), which

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Navarro exacerbated by creating the racial imbalance. (See First

Am. Compl. 8, 9, ECF No. 5; Resp. 8, 11, 15, ECF No. 38.)

i. Sufficiently obvious risk

Navarro alleges that he "had no suspicion or information that

the riot would occur." (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #6 Decl.

Navarro 4, ECF No. 34.) Plaintiff maintains that the threat to

inmate safety should have been obvious to Navarro due to the

dangerous manner in which he allowed inmates back into their cells. 

(See First Am. Compl. 8, ECF No. 5 ("[I]t is common knowledge that

such circumstances are ideal for riots where[]in a single race of

inmates have the tactical advantage of number over another

. . . ."); Resp. 15, ECF No. 38 ("It i[s] common Knowledge among

correctional officers that a drastic racial imbalance results in

racial tension and/or riots because they are ideal circumstances

for one racial group to severely harm the other.").) 

"In order to prove that an official is subjectively aware of a

risk to inmate health or safety, a plaintiff inmate need not

produce direct evidence of the official's knowledge; a plaintiff

can rely on circumstantial evidence indicating that the official

must have known about the risk." Robertson v. Newland, No.

CIVS031712MCEKJMP, 2006 WL 509773, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2006)

(citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002)); see Wallis v.

Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1995). "Whether a prison

official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a

question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways,

including inference from circumstantial evidence, and a factfinder

may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from

the very fact that the risk was obvious." Farmer v. Brennan, 511

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U.S. at 842 (internal citation omitted); see Lemire, 726 F.3d at

1078; Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1190 (9th

Cir. 2002) ("In this case, a plethora of circumstantial evidence

could lead a reasonable jury to infer that the County was aware of

the risk that its policies presented."). Courts "measure what is

'obvious' in light of reason and the basic general knowledge that a

prison official may be presumed to have obtained regarding the type

of deprivation involved." Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d at 1151

(citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).

Here, the parties dispute whether the risk of harm due to the

racial imbalance was obvious. (Compare Defs.' Mot. Summ. J.

Attach. #6 Decl. Navarro 4, ECF No. 34, with Resp. 15, ECF No. 38.) 

A jury could find that Navarro created an obvious risk of harm by

returning Black inmates to their cells at a pace that resulted in a

small number of Black inmates being out of their cells among forty

to fifty Hispanic inmates. See Thomas, 611 F.3d at 1150. Racial

imbalances on prison yards have led to conflicts in the past. In

Robertson v. Newland, 2006 WL 509773, at *5, "Plaintiff protested

that it was not safe for any African-American, because . . . 'you

cannot put 30 of nothing [sic] on a yard with five of anything else

. . . . [M]y concern was the numbers.'" There, the court denied

the defendants' motion for summary judgment and concluded that "an

issue of fact remains as to whether the risk of harm to

non-Hispanics on the yard was obvious, particularly in light of

unequal numbers on controlled compatible yard 3." Id. at *8. 

Similarly, disputed issues of fact do not warrant the entry of

summary judgment in favor of Defendant Navarro.

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ii. Actual knowledge

In his declaration, Navarro states under penalty of perjury

that he "did not have prior notice that the riot on October 19,

2010 would occur." (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #6 Decl. Navarro

4, ECF No. 34.) Plaintiff relies on Landeros's statement to prove

that Defendant Navarro knew that a mass altercation might take

place. (See First Am. Compl. 9, ECF No. 5 (arguing that Landeros's

statement shows that "other correctional officers were well aware"

that a riot was going to occur); Resp. 8, ECF No. 38 ("Again,

Landeros['s] statement shows the Defendants knew of a pending

attack involving the Hispanic inmates."); id. at 11 (arguing that

Navarro expected a riot).) As discussed, to the extent Officer

Landeros's statement can be interpreted to mean that other officers

knew of a possible race riot, this is an issue of fact not proper

for summary adjudication. See Page v. Hense, 2013 WL 3936513, at

*6.

iii. No reasonable justification

Navarro does not address whether his alleged conduct was

reasonably justified. (See generally Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach.

#6 Decl. Navarro 1-4, ECF No. 34.) Navarro's declaration is

ambiguous. The officer maintains that "inmates are typically let

into their cells as they are processed through the metal

detector . . . ." Yet, he does not state that this was done during

the voluntary recall or emergency recall on October 19, 2010. 

(Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #6 Decl. Navarro 2-3, ECF No. 34.) 

Willis stated that "[he] noticed only Black inmates were being let

into their cells by Officer Navarro . . . ." (Resp. 13, ECF No.

38.) "[T]here were about 50 Hispanic inmates waiting in front of

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their cells for the tower officer [Navarro] to let them in, but

were all being skipped while Black inmates were secured." (Id.) A

reasonable trier of fact could determine that there was no

reasonable justification for celling Black prisoners first, leaving

a disproportionate number of Hispanic inmates unsecured. See

Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1080. Further, a material factual issue exists

as to whether Defendant's claimed course of conduct was reasonably

justified. See id. at 1078. Defendant Navarro's Motion for

Summary Judgment as to Willis's Eighth Amendment claim should be

DENIED.

B. Qualified Immunity

1. Defendants Landeros and Cerros

Next, Landeros and Cerros raise the affirmative defense of

qualified immunity. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A.

20, ECF No. 34.) These Defendants allege that they are entitled to

qualified immunity because there is no case law holding that a

correctional officer may be liable for deliberate indifference for

failing to secure an equipment locker prior to an "emergency

recall" and race riot. (Id.) Cerros and Landeros contend that

they "could not have known they would be subjected to liability for

leaving the equipment cabinet open or responding to a Code 3

alarm." (Id.) In his Response, Plaintiff maintains that the

Defendants knew that a race riot would likely occur and they "had

no reasonable justification for not securing the potential weapons

prior to the riot, before the inmates were allowed to enter the

building for recall, a safety measure that was supposed to be taken

before the building's front security door was opened." (Resp. 10,

ECF No. 38 (citations omitted).) 

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"Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil

damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or

constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of

the challenged conduct." Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. ____, 132 S.

Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012). When considering a claim for qualified

immunity, courts engage in a two-part inquiry: Do the facts show

that the defendant violated a constitutional right, and was the

right clearly established at the time of the defendant's purported

misconduct? See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). A

right is clearly established if its contours are so clear that a

reasonable official would understand his conduct was unlawful in

the situation he confronted. Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196,

1199–1200 (9th Cir. 2010). This standard ensures that government

officials are on notice of the illegality of their conduct before

they are subjected to suit. Hope, 536 U.S. at 739. "This is not

to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity

unless the very action in question has previously been held

unlawful . . . ." Id. (citations omitted).

"[L]ower courts have discretion to decide which of the two

prongs of qualified-immunity analysis to tackle first." Ashcroft

v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. ____, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) (citing

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. at 236). "An official is entitled to

summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity where his or

her 'conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.'" James v. Rowlands, 606 F.3d 646, 650 (9th Cir. 2010)

(citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

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Courts should attempt to resolve this threshold immunity

question at the earliest possible stage in the litigation "before

expending 'scarce judicial resources' to resolve difficult and

novel questions of constitutional or statutory interpretation that

will 'have no effect on the outcome of the case.'" Ashcroft, 563

U.S. ____, 131 S. Ct. at 2080 (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at

236–37). "If no constitutional violation is shown, the inquiry

ends." Cunningham v. City of Wenatchee, 345 F.3d 802, 810 (9th

Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).

Qualified immunity protects an officer who makes a decision

that, even if constitutionally deficient, is based on a reasonable

misapprehension of the law governing the circumstances he

confronted. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004); see also

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001) (quoting Priester v.

Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 926–27 (11th Cir. 2000) ("Qualified

immunity operates . . . to protect officers from the sometimes

'hazy border between excessive and acceptable force[ ]' . . ."),

abrogated in part on other grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236). 

The inquiry is whether the officer knew his conduct was unlawful,

and "reasonableness is judged against the backdrop of the law at

the time of the conduct." Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198. If at the

time, the law did not clearly establish that the conduct violated

the Constitution, the officer should not be subject to liability. 

Id. "The plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving that the

right was clearly established." Sweaney v. Ada Cnty., Idaho, 119

F.3d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).

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a. Violation of a constitutional right

Willis maintains that Defendants Landeros and Cerros violated

his Eighth Amendment right to reasonable safety and to be protected

from violence while in custody. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S.

at 33. As discussed, a triable issue of fact exists as to whether

these Defendants deprived Plaintiff of his Eighth Amendment rights.

b. Whether the right was clearly established

"Whether a right is clearly established turns on the

'objective legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of

the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was

taken.'" Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1241

(9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244). "This is 'a

two-part inquiry: (1) Was the law governing the state official's

conduct clearly established? (2) Under that law could a reasonable

state official have believed his conduct was lawful?'" Estate of

Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002)

(quoting Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d at 910); see Browning v.

Vernon, 44 F.3d 818, 822 (9th Cir. 1995).

First, the law governing the Defendants' conduct was clearly

established. Whether the right is clearly established is a pure

question of law. Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873

(9th Cir. 1993). "[T]he right alleged to have been violated must

not be so broadly defined as to 'convert the rule of qualified that

our cases plainly establish into a rule of virtually unqualified

liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract

rights.'" Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1288 (2000) (quoting

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987)). "On the other

hand, . . . the right can not be so narrowly construed so as to

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'define away all potential claims.'" Id. (quoting Kelley v. Borg,

60 F.3d 664, 667 (9th Cir. 1995)).

A prisoner's right to be protected from a substantial risk of

assault by other prisoners was clearly announced in Farmer, if not

before. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842-43. There, the Supreme Court

made clear that if a prison official knows of an excessive risk to

inmate safety, or infers from known facts that a substantial risk

of serious harm exists, he violates the law by disregarding the

risk. Id. at 835-37. The right to protection from violence while

in custody, established by Farmer, has been consistently

recognized. See Estate of Ford, 301 F.3d at 1050; Easter v. CDC,

No. 09cv0555–LAB (RBB), 2012 WL 760639, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 8,

2012). Thus, the right was clearly established.

Next, the Court must consider whether Landeros and Cerros knew

they were failing to protect Willis from danger by not securing the

equipment locker and podium prior to the voluntary in-lines or at

the time of the emergency recall, or whether the failure to do so

was a reasonable mistake. See Easter v. CDC, 2012 WL 760639, at *3

(citing Brooks v. Seattle, 599 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010)). 

Defendants bear the burden of proving that their actions were made

in the belief that they were lawful. Crawford–El v. Britton, 523

U.S. 574, 586–87 (1998). Landeros and Cerros do not argue that

they made a reasonable mistake by failing to secure the equipment

locker and podium prior to the voluntary in-lines. (See generally

Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #4 Decl. Landeros 1-5, ECF No. 34; id.

Attach. #5 Decl. Cerros at 1-3.)

The emergency recall occurred at 10:30 a.m. There is no

showing that between the time of the recall and any increased

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volume of inmates entering the housing unit, the equipment locker

could not be secured. Neither officer indicates that it would take

more than one person a minimal amount of time (possibly seconds) to

lock the equipment locker. Their proximity to the locker is also

unstated. At most, they contend, "Because of the number of inmates

entering the housing unit, Officer Cerros and I were not able to

lock the equipment locker." (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #4 Decl.

Landeros 3, ECF No. 34.) To show a reasonable belief that their

actions were lawful or they were reasonably mistaken, thus entitled

to qualified immunity, more specificity is required from each. 

Furthermore, their focus on the events after the emergency recall

is not responsive to Plaintiff's claims. These Defendants have

failed to prove that they are entitled to qualified immunity. 

2. Defendant Navarro

Navarro contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity

because "[t]here is no case law that holds that admitting inmates

into their cells one at a time, as opposed to admitting them in

sections, constitutes deliberate indifference." (Id. Attach. #1

Mem. P. & A. at 20.) He insists that allowing inmates to enter

their cells one at a time is quicker and safer than alternative

methods. (Id.) 

In the Response, Willis argues that the Defendant focuses on

the wrong issue. (Resp. 11, ECF No. 38.) He maintains:

The issue is the Defendant choosing to not secure

Hispanic inmates during a voluntary in-line and an

emergency recall while allowing the Black inmates into

their cells while expecting a mass altercation to occur,

creating a serious risk of harm to the remaining Black

inmates. Even without the knowledge of a pending attack,

it is common knowledge among correctional officers that a

drastic imbalance results in racial tension and/or riots. 

Defendant Navarro knew proper procedure was to secure

inmates as they were ready to enter their cells but still

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skipped Hispanic inmates who were ready to instead secure

Black inmates leaving a drastic racial imbalance of about

4 to 50.

(Id. (internal citations omitted).) Plaintiff asserts that Officer

Navarro has not shown reasonable justification for his conduct. 

(Id.) 

As discussed, an issue of fact exists as to whether Navarro,

the tower officer, deprived Willis of his Eighth Amendment rights. 

The law governing Defendant's conduct was clearly established; the

Court must consider whether a reasonable officer in Defendant

Navarro's position could not have believed his conduct was lawful. 

See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842-43; Martinez v. Bryant, No. CV

06-5344-GW (AGR), 2009 WL 1456399, at *10 (C.D. Cal. May 19, 2009)

(citations omitted). 

Navarro's Declaration is ambiguous and does not expressly

refute Willis's version of the facts. Further, Defendant does not

argue that a reasonable officer in his position could have

determined it was reasonable to allow Hispanic inmates to

congregate outside their cells, creating a racial imbalance. (See

generally Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 20, ECF No.

34; id. Attach. #6 Decl. Navarro at 1-4.) Officer Navarro fails to

carry his burden of proving that he is entitled to qualified

immunity.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court recommends that

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 34] be DENIED.

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

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objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before March 14, 2014. The document should be captioned

"Objections to Report and Recommendation." Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before April 1, 2014. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court's

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE: February 20, 2014 _____________________________

Ruben B. Brooks, Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

cc:

Judge Burns

All parties of record

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