Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-19-01813/USCOURTS-ca2-19-01813-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 448
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights - Education
Cause of Action: 

---

19-1662-cv; 19-1813-cv

Ventura de Paulino; Navarro Carrillo v. New York City Dep’t of Educ.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit

AUGUST TERM 2019

No. 19-1662-cv

ROSA ELBA VENTURA DE PAULINO, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS 

P/N/G OF R.P.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND

NEW YORK STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT

Defendants-Appellees,

ROBERT BRIGILIO,

Defendant.

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of New York

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page1 of 38
2

No. 19-1813-cv

MARIA NAVARRO CARRILLO, AS PARENT AND NATURAL GUARDIAN OF 

M.G. AND INDIVIDUALLY; JOSE GARZON, AS PARENT AND NATURAL 

GUARDIAN OF M.G. AND INDIVIDUALLY,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,

Defendant-Appellant.*

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of New York

ARGUED: JANUARY 28, 2020

DECIDED: MAY 18, 2020

Before: LEVAL, CABRANES, AND SACK, Circuit Judges.

The plaintiffs in these tandem cases, parents of students with 

disabilities (“Parents”), chose to withdraw their children (“Students”)

* The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official caption as shown 

above.

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page2 of 38
3

from one private school and to enroll them in a new private school. 

Shortly after, the Parents initiated administrative proceedings to 

challenge the adequacy of the Students’ individualized educational 

programs (“IEPs”), written statements developed by a local committee 

on special education that set out, among other things, the Students’ 

educational needs and the services that must be provided to meet 

those needs. The Parents sued the New York City Department of

Education (“City”) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education 

Act to obtain public funding for the new school’s tuition and services

during the pendency of those proceedings. 

In the first case, Ventura de Paulino v. New York City Department 

of Education, No. 19-1662-cv, Plaintiff-Appellant Rosa Elba Ventura de 

Paulino appeals from an order denying her application for a 

preliminary injunction and from a final judgment entered on May 31, 

2019, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

New York (George B. Daniels, Judge), dismissing her lawsuit. In the 

second case, Navarro Carrillo v. New York City Department of Education, 

No. 19-1813-cv, the City appeals from an order entered on June 13, 

2019, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

New York (Colleen McMahon, Chief Judge), granting an application by 

Plaintiffs-Appellees Maria Navarro Carrillo and Jose Garzon for a 

preliminary injunction directing the City to pay for the new school’s 

tuition and educational services.

Although these tandem cases come to us in different procedural 

postures, the question presented on appeal is the same: whether 

parents who unilaterally enroll their child in a new private school and

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page3 of 38
4

challenge the adequacy of the child’s IEP are entitled to public funding 

for the new school during the pendency of the IEP dispute, on the basis 

that the educational program being offered at the new school is 

substantially similar to the program that was last agreed upon by the 

parents and the school district and was offered at the previous school. 

On de novo review, we conclude that such parents are not 

entitled to public funding because it is the school district, not the 

parents, who has the authority to decide how a child’s last agreedupon educational program is to be provided at public expense during 

the pendency of the child’s IEP dispute. 

Accordingly, the May 31, 2019 judgment in favor of the City in 

Ventura de Paulino is AFFIRMED. And the June 13, 2019 order granting 

the application for preliminary injunction against the City in Navarro 

Carrillo is VACATED, and the cause REMANDED with instructions 

to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted.

KARL J. ASHANTI (Peter G. Albert, on the brief), 

Brain Injury Rights Group, Ltd., New York, 

NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant in Ventura de 

Paulino, and KARL J. ASHANTI (Peter G. 

Albert, on the brief), Brain Injury Rights 

Group, Ltd., New York, NY, for PlaintiffsAppellees in Navarro Carrillo.

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page4 of 38
5

ERIC LEE, Assistant Corporation Counsel

(Richard Dearing and Scott Shorr, on the 

brief), for James E. Johnson, Corporation 

Counsel of the City of New York, New York, 

NY, for City Defendant-Appellee in Ventura de 

Paulino, and ERIC LEE, Assistant Corporation 

Counsel (Richard Dearing and Scott Shorr, on 

the brief), for James E. Johnson, Corporation 

Counsel of the City of New York, New York, 

NY, for Defendant-Appellant in Navarro 

Carrillo.

BLAIR J. GREENWALD, Assistant Solicitor 

General (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor 

General, and Steven C. Wu, Deputy Solicitor 

General, on the brief), for Letitia James, 

Attorney General, State of New York, New 

York, NY, for State Defendant-Appellee in 

Ventura de Paulino.

JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:

The plaintiffs in these tandem cases, parents of students with 

disabilities (“Parents”), chose to withdraw their children (“Students”)

from one private school and to enroll them in a new private school. 

Shortly after, the Parents initiated administrative proceedings to 

challenge the adequacy of the Students’ individualized education 

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page5 of 38
6

programs (“IEPs”), written statements developed by a local committee 

on special education that set out, among other things, the Students’ 

educational needs and the services that must be provided to meet 

those needs.1 The Parents also sued the New York City Department of 

Education (“City”) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education 

Act (“IDEA”)2 to obtain public funding for the new school’s tuition

and services during the pendency of the Students’ IEP disputes. 

In the first case, Ventura de Paulino v. New York City Department 

of Education, No. 19-1662-cv, Plaintiff-Appellant Rosa Elba Ventura de 

Paulino (“Ventura de Paulino”) appeals from an order denying her 

application for a preliminary injunction and from a final judgment 

entered on May 31, 2019, in the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York (George B. Daniels, Judge), dismissing 

her lawsuit. In the second case, Navarro Carrillo v. New York City 

1 More specifically, the IEP is “a written statement that sets out the child’s 

present educational performance, establishes annual and short-term objectives for 

improvements in that performance, and describes the specially designed 

instruction and services that will enable the child to meet those objectives.” M.H. v.

N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 224 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). The State of New York “has assigned responsibility for 

developing appropriate IEPs to local Committees on Special Education . . ., the 

members of which are appointed by school boards or the trustees of school 

districts.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also N.Y. Educ. 

Law § 4402(1)(b)(1). 

2 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482. 

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page6 of 38
7

Department of Education, No. 19-1813-cv, the City appeals from an order 

entered on June 13, 2019, in the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of New York (Colleen McMahon, Chief Judge), 

granting an application by Plaintiffs-Appellees Maria Navarro Carrillo 

(“Navarro Carrillo”)3 and Jose Garzon (“Garzon”) for a preliminary 

injunction directing the City to pay for the new school’s tuition and 

educational services.4

3 The record reveals that the name of Plaintiff-Appellee is Maria Navarro 

Carrillo, not Maria Navarro Carrilo as referred to by counsel. We note that 

“Carrillo,” unlike “Carrilo,” is a common Hispanic surname. Indeed, the 

administrative proceedings and school enrollment documents correctly identify 

her surname as “Navarro Carrillo,” see, e.g., Navarro Carrillo Joint App’x at 80, 83, 

89, 143. The name was changed to “Carrilo,” a misspelling of her maternal surname, 

by her counsel when filing the complaint. The misspelled name was used 

throughout the litigation of her case.

4 Because there appears to be some confusion in the briefs as to the correct 

surname of the Parents in these tandem cases, we take this opportunity to recall the 

proper usage of Hispanic names and surnames. As a general rule, according to 

Spanish naming conventions, Hispanics typically have two surnames. The first last 

name is the father’s family name, and the second last name is the mother’s paternal 

family name. A person may be “known by merely his father’s name, as in English; 

still in all formal cases,” or where the father’s name is common, the mother’s name 

is often used in addition to the father’s name. MARATHON MONTROSE RAMSEY, A

TEXTBOOK OF MODERN SPANISH, AS NOW WRITTEN AND SPOKEN IN CASTILE AND THE 

SPANISH AMERICAN REPUBLICS 678 (Rev. New York: H. Holt and Co. 1958) (Orig. 

Publ. 1894); see also Wendy Squires, A Short Guide to Establishing a Multilingual 

Practice, 50 No. 6 PRAC. LAW. 31, 33 (2004). Here, with respect to Ms. Maria Navarro 

Carrillo, we assume based on the record that her father’s last name is “Navarro” 

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page7 of 38
8

Although these tandem cases come to us in different procedural 

postures, they present the same material facts and legal issues. The 

Students’ educational program that was last agreed upon by the City 

and the Parents in the end of the 2017-2018 school year listed the 

International Academy of Hope (“iHOPE”), a private school, as the

Students’ educational provider. Prior to the beginning of the 2018-2019 

school year, the Parents unilaterally enrolled the Students in a new 

private school, the International Institute for the Brain (“iBRAIN”). On 

appeal, the Parents contend that the City is obligated to pay for the 

Students’ tuition at iBRAIN because iBRAIN’s educational program is 

substantially similar to the program that was offered at iHOPE, which 

the City consented to and paid for. 

The question presented in these cases is one of first impression: 

whether under the “stay-put” provision of the IDEA parents who

unilaterally enroll their child in a new private school and challenge the

child’s IEP are entitled to public funding for the new school during the 

pendency of the IEP dispute, on the basis that the educational program 

being offered at the new school is substantially similar to the program

that was last agreed upon by the parents and the school district and 

was offered at the previous school. More fundamentally stated, we 

must determine whether the fact that the school district has authority 

and her mother’s paternal family name is “Carrillo.” Therefore, for purposes of her 

legal identification, the last name of Maria Navarro Carrillo is “Navarro Carrillo,” 

or just “Navarro.” Referring to her as “Carrillo,” or to the family as the “Carrillos,” 

is incorrect. 

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page8 of 38
9

to decide how the child’s agreed-upon educational program is to be 

provided during the pendency of an IEP dispute means that the 

parents also have such authority. 

In the circumstances presented, we conclude, on de novo review, 

that parents are not entitled to such public funding because it is 

generally up to the school district to determine how an agreed-upon 

program is to be provided during the pendency of the IEP dispute. 

Regardless of whether iBRAIN’s educational program is substantially 

similar to that offered previously at iHOPE, the IDEA does not require 

the City to fund the Students’ program at iBRAIN during the 

pendency of their IEP dispute; when the Parents unilaterally enrolled 

the Students at iBRAIN, the Parents did so at their own financial risk.

Accordingly, in Ventura de Paulino, we AFFIRM the May 31, 

2019 judgment of the District Court in favor of the defendant school 

system; in Navarro Carrillo, we VACATE the District Court’s June 13, 

2019 order granting the application for a preliminary injunction 

against the school system and REMAND the cause with instructions 

to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted.5

5 A third case presenting the same legal question, see Mendez v. New York 

City Department of Education, No. 19-1852-cv, was argued before this Court on the 

same day, January 28, 2020, along with these tandem cases. We have disposed of 

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page9 of 38
10

I. BACKGROUND

A. The IDEA’s Legal Framework

The IDEA authorizes the disbursement of federal funds to 

States6 that develop appropriate plans to, among other things, provide 

a free and appropriate public education (“FAPE”) to children with 

disabilities.7 To provide a FAPE to each student with a disability, a

school district must develop an IEP that is “reasonably calculated to 

enable the child to receive educational benefits.”8 The IEP must

identify the student’s “particular educational needs . . . and the 

services required to meet those needs.”9

the appeal in Mendez by summary order filed simultaneously herewith, in which 

we dismiss the case for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Of course, upon the issuance 

of the mandate in Ventura de Paulino and Navarro Carrillo, our analysis in this 

opinion will bind the District Court in Mendez.

6 “The term ‘State’ [in the IDEA] means each of the 50 States, the District of 

Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and each of the outlying areas.” 20 

U.S.C. § 1401(31).

7 See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 295 (2006); 

see also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A).

8 T.M. ex rel. A.M. v. Cornwall Cent. Sch. Dist., 752 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2014) 

(quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982)). 

9 Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1998). 

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page10 of 38
11

The IDEA also requires participating States to develop an

administrative review process for parents who are dissatisfied with 

their child’s education and wish to challenge the adequacy of the 

child’s IEP.10 To that effect, the State of New York “has implemented a 

‘two-tier system of administrative review.’”11 In the first tier, a parent 

can file an administrative “due process complaint” challenging the IEP

and requesting a hearing before an impartial hearing officer.12 The

party aggrieved by the hearing officer’s decision may then “proceed 

to the second tier, ‘an appeal before a state review officer.’”13 Once the 

state review officer makes a final decision, the aggrieved party may 

seek judicial review of that decision in a state or federal trial court.14

At the crux of these cases is a provision in the IDEA known as 

the “pendency” or “stay-put” provision.15 It provides that, while the 

10 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)–(8).

11 Mackey ex rel. Thomas M. v. Bd. of Educ. for the Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 386 

F.3d 158, 160 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 

297 F.3d 195, 197 (2d Cir. 2002)). 

12 Id. (citing N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)). 

13 Id. (quoting Murphy, 297 F.3d at 197) (citing N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(2); 20 

U.S.C. § 1415(g)). 

14 See id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)). 

15 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). 

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page11 of 38
12

administrative and judicial proceedings are pending and “unless the 

school district and the parents agree otherwise,” a child must remain, 

at public expense, “in his or her then-current educational 

placement.”16 The term “educational placement” refers “only to the 

general type of educational program in which the child is placed”17—

i.e., “the classes, individualized attention and additional services a 

child will receive.”18

Parents who are dissatisfied with their child’s education can

“unilaterally change their child’s placement during the pendency of 

review proceedings”19 and can, for example, “pay for private services, 

including private schooling.”20 They “do so,” however, “at their own 

16 Mackey, 386 F.3d at 160 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j)). The IDEA’s 

implementing regulations under federal law, see 34 C.F.R. § 300.514(a) (“Child’s 

status during proceedings”), and New York state law, see N.Y. Educ. L. § 4404(4)(a), 

impose the same requirement. 

17 Concerned Parents v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 629 F.2d 751, 753 (2d Cir. 1980). 

18 T.Y. v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 412, 419 (2d Cir. 2009). 

19 Sch. Comm. of the Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep’t of Educ. of Mass., 471 

U.S. 359, 373–74 (1985) (“Burlington”); see also Florence Cty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 

510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993) (“Carter”). 

20 T.M., 752 F.3d at 152 (citations omitted); see also R.E. v. N.Y. City Dep’t of 

Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 175 (2d Cir. 2012). 

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page12 of 38
13

financial risk.”21 They can obtain retroactive reimbursement from the 

school district after the IEP dispute is resolved, if they satisfy a threepart test that has come to be known as the Burlington-Carter test.22 A

parent can obtain such reimbursement if: “(1) the school district’s 

proposed placement violated the IDEA” by, for example, denying a 

FAPE to the student because the IEP was inadequate; (2)“the parents’ 

alternative private placement was appropriate”; and (3) “equitable 

considerations favor reimbursement.”23

B. The Parties’ Relationship and Administrative Proceedings

Ventura de Paulino is the mother of R.P., and Navarro Carrillo 

and Garzon are the parents of M.G. Both Students, R.P. and M.G., are 

minors with disabilities stemming from acquired brain injuries, who 

are entitled to a FAPE under the IDEA. During the 2017-2018 academic 

year, the Students were unilaterally enrolled by the Parents at iHOPE, 

a private school. The Parents filed due process complaints alleging that 

the Students’ IEPs proposed by the local committee on special 

education for that school year was inadequate and that iHOPE’s IEP 

was appropriate for the Students. 

In both instances—in June 2018 in the case of R.P., and in April 

2018 in the case of M.G.—impartial hearing officers determined that: 

21 Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374. 

22 E.M. v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., 758 F.3d 442, 451 (2d Cir. 2014).

23 T.M., 752 F.3d at 152 (citations omitted); see also E.M., 758 F.3d at 451. 

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page13 of 38
14

(1) the City had failed to provide the Students with a FAPE in violation 

of the IDEA; (2) the Parents’ alternative placement at iHOPE for the 

2017-2018 school year was appropriate; and (3) equitable 

considerations favored reimbursement to the Parents. The impartial

hearing officers ordered the City to reimburse the Parents for the 

expenses incurred at iHOPE during the 2017-2018 school year and 

ordered the local committee on special education to draft a new IEP 

that incorporates all the items of iHOPE’s IEP. The City did not appeal.

Following the reimbursement orders, in or around June 2018, 

the Parents unilaterally enrolled the Students at iBRAIN, a newly 

created private school, for the 2018-2019 school year. On July 9, 2018, 

the Students’ first day at iBRAIN, the Parents filed a due process 

complaint alleging that the City continued to fail to provide the

Students with a FAPE for the new school year. In that complaint, the

Parents asked for an order pursuant to the IDEA’s stay-put provision 

directing the City to fund the Students’ placement at iBRAIN during 

the pendency of the proceedings. 

On November 22, 2018, the impartial hearing officer in R.P.’s 

proceeding denied the request for a pendency order and concluded 

that, consistent with the June 2018 administrative order that the City 

did not appeal, iHOPE was R.P.’s pendency placement. Although 

Ventura de Paulino quickly appealed the interim decision to a state 

review officer, she did not wait for a final decision and filed a

complaint in the district court. 

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page14 of 38
15

On March 5, 2019, the impartial hearing officer in M.G.’s 

proceeding denied the request for a pendency order on the basis that 

iBRAIN and iHOPE were not substantially similar and that M.G.’s 

pendency placement remained at iHOPE. Navarro Carrillo and 

Garzon did not appeal the interim decision to a state review officer. 

Instead, they too filed their own complaint in the district court. 

C. District Court Proceedings

On January 9, 2019, Ventura de Paulino filed her complaint

seeking, among other things, a preliminary injunction requiring the 

City to pay for R.P.’s iBRAIN tuition and services. On March 20, 2019, 

the District Court rejected the City’s argument that Ventura de Paulino 

was required to exhaust New York’s two-tier review process, but 

denied her application for emergency relief.24 On May 31, 2019, the 

District Court granted the City’s motion to dismiss the complaint for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, as well as the 

24 See Ventura de Paulino v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., No. 19-cv-222 (GBD), 

2019 WL 1448088, at *1, 5–7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2019), reconsideration denied sub nom.

Ventura De Paulino v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., No. 19-cv-222 (GBD), 2019 WL 2498206 

(S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2019).

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page15 of 38
16

motion to dismiss by co-defendant State of New York.25 Final 

judgment dismissing the case was entered on the same day.26

On April 2, 2019, Navarro Carrillo and Garzon filed their 

complaint seeking the exact same remedy sought by Ventura de 

Paulino. On June 13, 2019, after concluding that iHOPE and iBRAIN 

were substantially similar, the District Court granted the requested 

preliminary injunction and vacated the March 2019 Interim Order by 

the impartial hearing officer in M.G.’s proceeding.27 The District Court 

ordered the City to pay for M.G.’s education at iBRAIN during the 

pendency of M.G.’s FAPE proceeding.28 

These appeals followed. In Navarro Carrillo, the District Court 

granted the City’s motion to stay the order of preliminary injunction 

pending the City’s interlocutory appeal. 

25 See Ventura De Paulino v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., No. 19-cv-222 (GBD), 

2019 WL 2499204, at *1–3 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2019).

26 On appeal, Ventura de Paulino’s reply brief belatedly objects to the 

dismissal of the State of New York, but her failure to raise the objection in her 

opening brief waived any challenge to the District Court’s dismissal. See EDP Med. 

Computer Sys., Inc. v. United States, 480 F.3d 621, 625 n.1 (2d Cir. 2007). In any event, 

any such challenge to the dismissal would be meritless, since Ventura de Paulino’s 

complaint does not plausibly allege any claims against the State of New York, or 

even seek any relief from it. 

27 Navarro Carrilo v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., 384 F. Supp. 3d 441, 459–65 

(S.D.N.Y. 2019). 

28 Id. at 465. 

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page16 of 38
17

D. Unfamiliar Litigation and a Curious Set of Facts

Before proceeding to analyze the Parents’ claims, we would be 

remiss not to emphasize the somewhat unusual set of facts presented 

in these tandem cases, which in turn have given rise to an unfamiliar 

pattern of IDEA litigation. To our knowledge, these tandem cases are 

just two of approximately 23 cases presenting similar, if not virtually 

identical, legal questions in our Court and in the Southern District of 

New York. In these cases, the parents or natural guardians of the 

students with disabilities transferred their children from iHOPE to

iBRAIN for the 2018-2019 school year without the City’s consent and 

are now claiming that they are entitled to an order requiring the City 

to pay for the educational services at iBRAIN on a pendency basis. The 

vast majority, if not all, of these plaintiffs are represented by the 

Parents’ counsel in these tandem cases. 

The arguably unusual circumstances surrounding the mass 

exodus of students from iHOPE to iBRAIN were thoroughly described 

by Judge Jesse M. Furman of the Southern District of New York in one 

of the many iHOPE-to-iBRAIN-pendency cases.29 It has been alleged 

29 While tangential to our disposition of the Parents’ legal claims, we rely on 

Judge Furman’s summary as an interesting backdrop for our analysis set forth 

below. See Ferreira v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., No. 19-cv-2937 (JMF), 2020 WL 

1158532, at *2 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2020) (denying the parent’s motion for summary 

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page17 of 38
18

that, during the summer of 2018, there was a “’split between the 

original founders and some of the [iHOPE] board’ over whether 

[iHOPE] should admit students with disabilities besides traumatic 

brain injuries,”30 and that “‘the original founders and some of the 

administration w[ere] ousted’ from [iHOPE].”31 Donohue left iHOPE 

and became the founder and registered agent of iBRAIN.32 Donohue 

also happens to be the founder of the Brain Injury Rights Group,33 the 

law firm representing the Parents in these tandem cases and the other 

plaintiffs seeking public funding from the City for iBRAIN’s tuition 

and related services.

judgment and application for preliminary injunction, and granting the City’s crossmotion for summary judgment), appeal filed No. 20-908-cv (2d Cir. Mar. 13, 2020). 

30 Id. (quoting Fiallos v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., No. 19-cv-334 (JGK) (S.D.N.Y. 

Sept. 16, 2019), ECF No. 59, at 6-7, appeal filed No. 19-1330-cv (2d Cir. May 3, 2019)).

31 Id. (quoting Mendez v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., No. 19-CV-2945 (DAB) 

(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2019), ECF No. 27, at 6-7, 17, appeal filed No. 19-1852-cv (2d Cir. 

June 24, 2019)). 

32 Id. (quoting Navarro Carrilo, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 447, 450 (alteration 

omitted)) (citing Docket No. 19-cv-2937, ECF No. 33, at 11 & n.9, 169).

33 Id. (citing Donohue v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., No. 18-CV-9364 (DAB) 

(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2018), ECF No. 7, ¶ 8; id. ECF No. 34, at 2). 

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page18 of 38
19

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss a 

complaint de novo, “credit[ing] all non-conclusory factual allegations 

in the complaint and draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in [the

plaintiffs’] favor,”34 to determine “whether such allegations and 

inferences plausibly indicate [the plaintiffs’] entitlement to relief.”35

Similarly, “questions of law decided in connection with requests for 

preliminary injunctions . . . receive the same de novo review that is 

appropriate for issues of law generally.”36

Ordinarily, to obtain a preliminary injunction, the movant has 

to “show (a) irreparable harm and (b) either (1) likelihood of success 

on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits 

to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships 

tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary 

34 Loreley Fin. (Jersey) No. 3 Ltd. v. Wells Fargo Sec., LLC, 797 F.3d 160, 171 (2d 

Cir. 2015) (citing Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2014)). 

35 Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–80 (2009)). 

36 Am. Express Fin. Advisors Inc. v. Thorley, 147 F.3d 229, 231 (2d Cir. 1998).

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page19 of 38
20

relief.”37 But where the IDEA’s stay-put provision is implicated, the 

provision triggers the applicability of an automatic injunction 

designed to maintain the child’s educational status quo while the 

parties’ IEP dispute is being resolved.38

Because we conclude on de novo review that the Parents’ 

complaints fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, we 

need not decide what standard applies to the Parents’ request for 

preliminary injunctive relief.39

37 Citigroup Glob. Markets, Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 

598 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2010). 

38 See Zvi D. v. Ambach, 694 F.2d 904, 906 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating that the stayput provision “is, in effect, an automatic preliminary injunction” that “substitutes 

an absolute rule in favor of the status quo for the court’s discretionary consideration 

of the factors of irreparable harm and either a likelihood of success on the merits or 

a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships”); see also Arlington Cent. Sch.

Dist. v. L.P., 421 F. Supp. 2d 692, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Pendency has the effect of an 

automatic injunction, which is imposed without regard to such factors as 

irreparable harm, likelihood of success on the merits, and a balancing of the 

hardships.”).

39 Our conclusion that the Parents’ complaints fail to state a claim is based 

on our review of the final judgment in Ventura de Paulino. Because the Parents’ 

complaints are virtually identical in all material respects, our affirmance of the 

dismissal of Ventura de Paulino’s complaint necessarily means that Navarro 

Carrillo and Garzon cannot succeed on the merits of their pendency claim and that 

the District Court’s order of preliminary injunction in their favor must be vacated. 

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page20 of 38
21

B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 

The IDEA requires that any available administrative remedies

be exhausted before a lawsuit is filed in federal court.40 There are,

however, some exceptions to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement.41

We have stated in the past that, unless an exception applies, the 

exhaustion of administrative remedies under the IDEA is a 

“jurisdictional prerequisite”42 of the statute and that a “plaintiff’s 

failure to exhaust . . . deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction”

over any IDEA claims.43 Although we have questioned more recently 

the supposed jurisdictional nature of the exhaustion requirement,44

40 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (providing a cause of action in federal or state 

court to any party “aggrieved” by a “final” decision of either an impartial hearing 

officer, if the state does not have an appeals process, or the state review officer, if it 

does); accord J.S. v. Attica Cent. Sch., 386 F.3d 107, 112 (2d Cir. 2004).

41 “[E]xhaustion is not necessary if (1) it would be futile to resort to the 

IDEA’s due process procedures; (2) an agency has adopted a policy or pursued a 

practice of general applicability that is contrary to the law; or (3) it is improbable 

that adequate relief can be obtained by pursuing administrative remedies.”

Murphy, 297 F.3d at 199 (citing Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748, 756 (2d Cir. 1987)). 

42 Id. 

43 Polera v. Bd. of Educ. of Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 288 F.3d 478, 483 

(2d Cir. 2002).

44 In Coleman v. Newburgh Enlarged City School District, we noted that our 

precedent has not been entirely clear on whether the IDEA’s exhaustion 

requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite or a mandatory claim-processing rule. 

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page21 of 38
22

because we are arguably bound by those earlier statements and 

because, in all but the rarest of cases, we “must determine that [we] 

have jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits” of a claim,45 we first 

consider the City’s argument that dismissal is appropriate because the 

Parents failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. 

The City contends that the Parents were required to wait for a 

ruling by a state review officer before filing their complaints in federal 

court. But that argument ignores the fact that where “an action alleg[es 

a] violation of the stay-put provision,” such action “falls within one, if 

not more, of the enumerated exceptions” to the IDEA’s exhaustion 

503 F.3d 198, 203 (2d Cir. 2007); accord Paese v. Hartford Life Accident Ins. Co., 449 F.3d 

435, 444 n.2 (2d Cir. 2006). Unlike a jurisdictional prerequisite, the affirmative 

defense that a party has failed to satisfy a mandatory claim-processing rule is 

subject to the doctrines of waiver and forfeiture. See Coleman, 503 F.3d at 203. Like 

in Coleman, however, “we are not forced to decide whether our precedent [in Polera 

and Murphy], which labels the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement as a rule affecting 

subject matter jurisdiction rather than an ‘inflexible claim-processing’ rule that may 

be waived or forfeited, remains good law . . . because there can be no claim of 

waiver or forfeiture here.” Id. at 204. 

45 Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a

Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998); but see Ctr. for Reprod. Law and Policy v. Bush, 304 

F.3d 183, 195 (2d Cir. 2002) (recognizing a discretionary exception to Steel Co. on the 

basis that a court, in very rare circumstances, “may dispose of the case on the merits 

without addressing a novel question of jurisdiction”). 

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page22 of 38
23

requirement.46 That is clearly the case here. The Parents’ complaints 

allege that the City’s failure to pay for the Students’ services at iBRAIN 

violates the stay-put provision of the IDEA. 

The City also contends that the Parents cannot rely on the stayput provision to circumvent the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement 

because the City has not violated the stay-put provision. That 

argument also fails, as it conflates the merits inquiry of whether the 

Parents have stated a claim upon which relief can be granted with the 

arguable threshold inquiry of whether the Parents needed to exhaust 

their administrative remedies. Because the Parents allege that the 

City’s failure to pay for the Students’ services at iBRAIN violates the 

stay-put provision of the IDEA, the Parents are not required to satisfy 

the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement.

C. The IDEA’s Stay-Put Provision

The IDEA’s stay-put provision provides in relevant part that 

“during the pendency of any [administrative and judicial] proceedings

conducted pursuant to this section, unless the [school district] . . . and 

46 Murphy, 297 F.3d at 199; accord Doe v. E. Lyme Bd. of Educ., 790 F.3d 440, 

455 (2d Cir. 2015). As we explained in Murphy, “given the time-sensitive nature of 

the IDEA’s stay-put provision,” and the amount of time it would take a plaintiff to 

exhaust the administrative process, “an immediate appeal is necessary to give 

realistic protection to the claimed right.” 297 F.3d at 199 (citation and quotation 

marks omitted).

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page23 of 38
24

the parents otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then-current 

educational placement of the child.”47 We have interpreted this 

provision to require a school district “to continue funding whatever 

educational placement was last agreed upon for the child until the 

relevant administrative and judicial proceedings are complete.”48 To 

that effect, although we may not have previously stated the 

proposition clearly, the IDEA does not authorize a school district to 

recoup payments made for educational services pursuant to the stayput provision (i.e., pendency services).49 As reflected in the text of the 

provision and our cases, Congress’s policy choice was that a child is 

entitled to remain in his or her placement at public expense during the 

47 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j).

48 T.M., 752 F.3d at 171 (citing Mackey, 386 F.3d at 163). 

49 See Mackey, 386 F.3d at 160–61, 165–66 (explaining that school districts are 

required to pay for a child’s pendency placement regardless of who prevails in the 

IEP dispute and authorizing an award for pendency services even after parents lost 

their IEP dispute for the relevant school year). District courts in this Circuit also 

have noted repeatedly that “a school district has no right under the [IDEA] to 

recoup pendency tuition payment from a parent.” N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ. v. S.S.,

No. 09-cv-810 (CM), 2010 WL 983719, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. March 17, 2010); see, e.g., N.Y.

City Dep’t of Educ. v. V.S., No. 10-cv-05120 (JG)(JO), 2011 WL 3273922, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. 

July 29, 2011); E. Z.-L. ex rel. R.L. v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., 763 F. Supp. 2d 584, 599

(S.D.N.Y. 2011); C.G. ex rel. B.G. v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., 752 F. Supp. 2d 355, 361 

(S.D.N.Y. 2010); Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 86 F. Supp. 2d 354, 

367 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page24 of 38
25

pendency of an IEP dispute, regardless of the merit of the child’s IEP 

challenge or the outcome of the relevant proceedings.50

Where, as here, the stay-put provision is invoked, our inquiry 

generally focuses on identifying the child’s “then-current educational 

placement,” as it is the only educational program the school district is 

obligated to pay for during the pendency of an IEP dispute.51 The term 

“then-current educational placement” in the stay-put provision 

typically refers to the child’s last agreed-upon educational program 

before the parent requested a due process hearing to challenge the 

child’s IEP.52 Under the IDEA, an initial placement is made by the 

school district upon the consent of the parent.53 A child’s educational 

placement (or program) may be changed if, for example, the school 

district and the parents agree on what the new placement should be. 

The placement can also be changed if an impartial hearing officer or 

state review officer finds the parents’ new placement to be appropriate 

50 See Mackey, 386 F.3d at 160–61; see also Susquenita Sch. Dist. v. Raelee S., 96 

F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 1996), cited with approval in Mackey, 386 F.3d at 161. 

51 See Mackey, 386 F.3d at 163; Zvi D., 694 F.2d at 906.

52 See, e.g., T.M., 752 F.3d at 171; Mackey, 386 F.3d at 163; Zvi D., 694 F.2d at 

906.

53 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (“[I]f applying for initial admission to a public school, 

[the child] shall, with the consent of the parents, be placed in the public school 

program until all such proceedings have been completed.”). 

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page25 of 38
26

by adjudicating the IEP dispute in the parents’ favor, and the school 

district chooses not to appeal the decision.54 Accordingly, implicit in

the concept of “educational placement” in the stay-put provision (i.e., 

a pendency placement) is the idea that the parents and the school 

district must agree either expressly or as impliedly by law to a child’s 

educational program. 

When the impartial hearing officers in these tandem cases 

concluded that iHOPE was an appropriate placement for the Students 

and the City chose not to appeal the ruling to a state review officer, the 

City consented, by operation of law, to the Students’ private placement 

at iHOPE. At that moment, the City assumed the legal responsibility 

to pay for iHOPE’s educational services to the Students as the agreedupon educational program that must be provided and funded during 

the pendency of any IEP dispute. What is in dispute here, however, is 

whether the stay-put provision requires the City to pay for the

educational services being provided to the Students at the new school, 

iBRAIN.

The stay-put provision does not guarantee a child with a 

disability “the right to remain in the exact same school with the exact 

54 See Mackey, 386 F.3d at 163; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Schutz, 290 F.3d 476, 484 

(2d Cir. 2002) (“[O]nce the parents’ challenge [to a proposed IEP] succeeds . . ., 

consent to the private placement is implied by law, and the requirements of 

§ 1415(j) become the responsibility of the school district.”).

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page26 of 38
27

same service providers while his administrative and judicial 

proceedings are pending. Instead, it guarantees only the same general 

level and type of services that the . . . child was receiving.”55

With this in mind, the Parents first argue that, because the 

educational program offered at iBRAIN is arguably substantially 

similar to that offered at iHOPE, the decision of the Parents to move 

the Students to iBRAIN did not change the placement for which the 

City is required to pay. In the alternative, the Parents argue that the 

Students’ operative placement is at iBRAIN, since that is where the 

Students were enrolled at the time that the Parents initiated the 

administrative proceedings challenging the Students’ IEPs for the 

2018-2019 school year.

The Parents’ arguments focus on identifying the pendency 

placement that the Students are entitled to receive—the inquiry that, 

as stated above, typically underlies most pendency disputes. The 

parties’ dispute requires us, however, to answer a different question: 

Does the fact that the City retains authority to determine how the 

Students’ pendency services are to be provided mean that the Parents 

may also exercise that authority?

55 T.M., 752 F.3d at 171 (citing Concerned Parents, 629 F.2d at 753, 756). 

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page27 of 38
28

1. The Parents’ Primary Argument

The Parents’ argument that the Students’ new enrollment at

iBRAIN did not constitute a change in the Students’ pendency 

placement is misplaced. In Concerned Parents v. New York City Board of 

Education, we concluded, albeit in a different context, that the City’s 

transfer of children with disabilities in special education classes at one 

school to substantially similar classes at other schools within the same 

school district did not result in a change to the students’ educational 

placement.56 That conclusion, however, offers no solace to the Parents’ 

pendency claims here.

Underlying the Parents’ primary argument is the assumption 

that because a school district can move a child to a new school that 

offers the same general level and type of services without violating the 

IDEA’s stay-put provision, a parent is likewise authorized to invoke 

the stay-put provision to require the school district to pay for a new 

school identified by the parent so long as the new school offers 

substantially similar educational services. Not so.

56 See Concerned Parents, 629 F.2d at 756 (rejecting claim that there had been 

a change in the children’s educational placement that triggered prior notice and 

hearing requirements). 

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page28 of 38
29

For the reasons stated below, it is the City, not the Parents, that 

is authorized to decide how (and where) the Students’ pendency 

services are to be provided. 

a. First Reason: The IDEA’s Text and Structure

We start by recognizing the well-settled principle that “[b]y and 

large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of the 

state and local authorities.”57 By choosing to accept federal funds 

under the IDEA, participating States do not relinquish their control

over public education, including their authority to determine the 

educational programs of students.58 Nor do States agree to the 

wholesale transfer of that authority to the parents of children with 

disabilities. Rather, by accepting federal funds, States primarily agree 

to establish procedures to ensure that a FAPE is provided to children

57 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). 

58 See Tilton v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 705 F.2d 800, 804 (6th Cir. 1983) 

(“Congress did not compel, as the price for federal participation in the education 

for the handicapped, a wholesale transfer of authority over the allocation of 

educational resources from the duly elected or appointed state and local boards to 

the parents of individual handicapped children.”), cited with approval in Fallis v. 

Ambach, 710 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1983).

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page29 of 38
30

with disabilities.59 One of those “procedural safeguards”60 is the right 

to pendency services under the stay-put provision.61

The stay-put provision therefore was enacted as a procedural 

safeguard in light of the school district’s broad authority to determine 

the educational program of its students. The provision limits that 

authority by, among other things, preventing the school district from 

unilaterally modifying a student’s educational program during the 

pendency of an IEP dispute. It does not eliminate, however, the school 

district’s preexisting and independent authority to determine how to 

provide the most-recently-agreed-upon educational program. As we 

have recognized, “[i]t is up to the school district,” not the parent, “to 

decide how to provide that educational program [until the IEP dispute 

is resolved], so long as the decision is made in good faith.”62

If a parent disagrees with a school district’s decision on how to 

provide a child’s educational program, the parent has at least three

options under the IDEA: (1) The parent can argue that the school 

59 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (“Any State educational agency, State agency, or local 

educational agency that receives assistance under this subchapter shall establish 

and maintain procedures in accordance with this section to ensure that children 

with disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with 

respect to the provision of a free appropriate public education by such agencies.”).

60 Id. § 1415 (entitled, “Procedural Safeguards”).

61 See id. § 1415(j).

62 T.M., 752 F.3d at 171 (citing Concerned Parents, 629 F.2d at 756). 

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page30 of 38
31

district’s decision unilaterally modifies the student’s pendency 

placement and the parent could invoke the stay-put provision to 

prevent the school district from doing so; (2) The parent can determine 

that the agreed-upon educational program would be better provided 

somewhere else and thus seek to persuade the school district to pay 

for the program’s new services on a pendency basis; or (3) The parent

can determine that the program would be better provided somewhere 

else, enroll the child in a new school, and then seek retroactive 

reimbursement from the school district after the IEP dispute is 

resolved. 

That said, what the parent cannot do is determine that the 

child’s pendency placement would be better provided somewhere 

else, enroll the child in a new school, and then invoke the stay-put 

provision to force the school district to pay for the new school’s 

services on a pendency basis. To hold otherwise would turn the stayput provision on its head, by effectively eliminating the school 

district’s authority to determine how pendency services should be 

provided.

Here, the Parents’ pendency claims seek to do exactly that. The 

Parents and the City had agreed that the Students’ educational 

program would be provided at iHOPE. When apparently dissatisfied 

with unspecified changes to iHOPE’s “management” and 

“philosophy,” the Parents unilaterally decided that iBRAIN was a 

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page31 of 38
32

better school for the Students.63 The Parents are certainly entitled to 

make that decision for the benefit of their children, but in claiming that 

the City must continue to pay for iBRAIN’s services on a pendency 

basis, the Parents effectively “seek a ‘veto’ over school choice rather 

than ‘input’—a power the IDEA clearly does not grant them.”64

Regardless of whether the educational program that the Students are 

receiving at iBRAIN is substantially similar to the one offered at 

iHOPE, when the Parents unilaterally enrolled the Students at iBRAIN 

for the 2018-2019 school year, they did so at their own financial risk.65

63 At oral argument, counsel for the Parents generally attributed the exodus 

of students from iHOPE to iBRAIN to “changes in the management” and 

“philosophy” of iHOPE. 

64 T.Y., 584 F.3d at 420. 

65 We do not consider here, much less resolve, any question presented where 

the school providing the child’s pendency services is no longer available and the 

school district either refuses or fails to provide pendency services to the child. 

Those circumstances are not present here. We note, however, that at least one of 

our sister Circuits has acknowledged that, under certain extraordinary 

circumstances not presented here, a parent may seek injunctive relief to modify a 

student’s placement pursuant to the equitable authority provided in 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(i)(2)(B)(iii). See Wagner v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery Cty., 335 F.3d 297, 302–

03 (4th Cir. 2003) (involving a situation in which the pendency placement was no 

longer available, and the school district had failed to propose an alternative, 

equivalent placement). 

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page32 of 38
33

b. Second Reason: Cost of Pendency Services

As a practical matter, it makes sense that it is the party generally 

responsible for paying a student’s agreed-upon educational 

program—here, the City—who determines how the pendency services 

are to be provided. That is so for two reasons: (i) public funding for 

pendency services can never be recouped; and (ii) the cost of 

educational services in schools can vary dramatically.

i. Recoupment versus reimbursement

One can imagine circumstances in which a school district pays 

on a pendency basis for the educational services of a private school 

selected unilaterally by the parents, after which a court decides in the 

school district’s favor, by holding that the parents’ unilateral transfer 

modified the child’s pendency placement, or that the school district’s 

proposed IEP would have afforded the child a FAPE.66 In these 

circumstances, the school district would have no recourse under the 

66 Cf. S.S., 2010 WL 983719, at *1 (rejecting claim by the City that it is entitled 

to be reimbursed for the payments made “to advance the child[’s] . . . private school 

tuition during hearing and appeal process” pursuant to the stay-put provision in 

light of the state review officer’s final decision that the IEP “proposed for the child 

would have afforded him a” FAPE for the relevant school year). 

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page33 of 38
34

IDEA to recoup the sums it expended on the child.67 By contrast, if the 

school district were found to have unilaterally modified the child’s 

placement, the parent could seek injunctive relief against the school 

district for violating the IDEA.68

ii. Difference in educational costs

Dramatically different costs may be presented when parents

unilaterally choose to enroll their child in a new school. Indeed, the

cost of providing pendency services in the new school may be 

substantially higher than the cost of providing those services at the 

previous school.69 Nothing in the statutory text or legislative history

67 See ante, note 49. This did not happen here only because the District Court 

in Navarro Carrillo granted the City’s motion to stay the order granting the 

application for a preliminary injunction.

68 Cf. T.M., 752 F.3d at 172 (authorizing limited reimbursement to parents in 

light of, among other things, the fact that the school district refused to provide the 

child pendency services in the first instance); Mackey, 386 F.3d at 165–66 

(authorizing reimbursement for pendency services even after parents lost their IEP 

dispute for the relevant school year).

69 In these cases, neither the City nor the Parents presented any evidence in 

the record about the cost of iBRAIN’s services and how they compare to the cost of 

similar services at iHOPE. At oral argument, however, counsel for the City 

informed us, without contradiction, that the cost of attending iBRAIN was 

significantly higher, and that the Parents had disavowed the City’s transportation 

arrangement at iHOPE in favor of a private transportation service arranged by 

iBRAIN. 

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page34 of 38
35

of the IDEA, however, “implies a legislative intent to permit” the 

parents of children with disabilities “to utilize the [stay-put 

provision’s] automatic injunctive procedure . . . to frustrate the fiscal 

policies of participating states.”70

c. Third Reason: Uncertainty of Litigation 

The Parents’ pendency claims seek to upend the educational 

status quo that the stay-put provision was enacted to protect. Under 

the Parents’ theory, litigation at the outset of an IEP dispute seems 

inevitable. The parties will need to rush to court to obtain a ruling on 

an emergency basis on whether the new school selected by the parent 

offers a program that is substantially similar to the program offered at 

the prior agreed-upon school. A provision that guarantees the right of 

a child to stay put can hardly justify the uncertainty inherent in a race 

to the courthouse. 

2. The Parents’ Alternative Argument

The Parents also argue that the City must pay for iBRAIN’s 

services on a pendency basis because it is the Students’ “operative 

placement” at the time when the IEP proceedings were initiated. That 

argument fails for all of the reasons stated above. A parent cannot 

unilaterally transfer his or her child and subsequently initiate an IEP 

dispute to argue that the new school’s services must be funded on a 

70 Fallis, 710 F.2d at 56 (quoting Tilton, 705 F.2d at 804). 

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page35 of 38
36

pendency basis. That argument effectively renders the stay-put 

provision meaningless by denying any interest of a school district in 

resolving how the student’s agreed-upon educational program must 

be provided and funded. 

It bears recalling that the term “operative placement” has its 

origin in cases where the school district attempts to move the child to 

a new school without the parents’ consent,71 or where there is no 

previously implemented IEP so that the current placement provided 

by the school district is considered to be the pendency placement for 

purposes of the stay-put provision.72 Neither circumstance is

presented here. 

* * *

Although the stay-put provision prevents a school district from 

modifying a student’s pendency placement without the parents’ 

consent, it does not prohibit the school district from determining how, 

and where, a student’s pendency placement should be provided. The 

Parents and the City had agreed that the Students’ pendency 

placement should be provided at iHOPE. When the Parents enrolled 

the Students at iBRAIN, they did so at their own financial risk; the 

Parents cannot determine unilaterally how the Students’ educational 

71 Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 867 (3d Cir. 1996), cited with 

approval in Mackey, 386 F.3d at 163. 

72 Thomas v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 918 F.2d 618, 625–26 (6th Cir. 1990). 

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page36 of 38
37

program is to be provided at the City’s expense. The Parents having

failed to plausibly allege a violation of the stay-put provision and an 

entitlement to a pendency order requiring the City to pay for iBRAIN’s 

services, they may obtain retroactive reimbursement for their expenses 

at iBRAIN only if they are able to satisfy the three-factor BurlingtonCarter test after their IEP disputes are resolved. That question, if ever 

presented, is one that we leave for another day. 

III. CONCLUSION

To summarize, we conclude that: 

(1) An action that alleges a violation of the stay-put provision

falls within one or more of the exceptions to the exhaustionof-administrative-remedies requirement of the Individuals 

with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”).

(2) Because the Parents’ complaints allege that the City’s failure 

to pay for the Students’ educational services at the 

International Institute for the Brain (“iBRAIN”) violates the

IDEA’s stay-put provision, the Parents were not required to 

exhaust their administrative remedies. 

(3) The stay-put provision of the IDEA, which was enacted to 

limit a school district’s broad authority to determine or 

modify a child’s educational program without the parent’s 

consent, does not eliminate the school district’s authority to 

determine how, and where, a student’s agreed-upon 

educational program is to be provided at public expense

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page37 of 38
38

during the pendency of a parental challenge to the student’s 

individualized education program (“IEP”) dispute.

(4) The fact that the City retains authority to determine how and 

where the Students’ most-recently-agreed-upon educational 

program is to be provided during the pendency of the 

Students’ IEP disputes does not mean that the Parents may 

exercise similar authority. The Parents are not entitled to 

receive public funding under the stay-put provision for a 

new school on the basis of its purported substantial 

similarity to the last agreed-upon placement.

(5) Accordingly, regardless of whether iBRAIN provided the

Students’ last agreed-upon educational program in a manner 

substantially similar to iHOPE, when the Parents unilaterally 

enrolled the Students at iBRAIN, the Parents did so at their 

own financial risk. 

For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s May 31, 2019 

judgment in Ventura de Paulino is AFFIRMED; the District Court’s June 

13, 2019 order granting the application for preliminary injunction in 

Navarro Carrillo is VACATED and the cause in Navarro Carrillo is 

REMANDED with instructions to dismiss the complaint for failure to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Case 19-1813, Document 122-1, 05/18/2020, 2840924, Page38 of 38