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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES couRT OF APPEALS F 1 L r,j ·o 

United States Coμrt ~! Approfo 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ) 

COMMISSION, ) 

) 

Plaintiff ) 

) 

and ) 

) 

WILLET F. GRIFFIN, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Intervenor- ) 

Appellant, ) 

) 

V • ) 

) 

FOOTHILLS TITLE GUARANTY COMPANY, ) 

formerly known as Foothills Title ) 

Insurance Agency Ltd . ; FIDCO, ) 

INC., formerly known as Stewart ) 

Title Company of Colorado, ) 

formerly known as Stewart Title ) 

Company of Denver; STEWART TITLE ) 

COMPANY OF DENVER, a Texas ) 

corporation, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

Tenth C1rcUJ , 

Mi\R O 2 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No . 91-1221 

(D.C. No . 90-A-361) 

( D. Colo.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before SEYMOUR, ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges . 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctri nes of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-1221 Document: 010110226694 Date Filed: 03/02/1992 Page: 1 
assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed . R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1 . 9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Willet Griffin appeals from the dismissal of his claim under 

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 u.s.c. §§ 621 et. 

~ (1988) (ADEA), on the grounds that it was precluded by the 

applicable statute of limitations. Mr. Griffin was employed by 

FIDCO on September 30, 1987, when the company sold its assets to 

Foothills Title Guaranty ("Foothills") and ceased to do business. 

On October 26, 1987, he was laid off by Foothills as part of a 

reduction in force. Mr. Griffin filed a charge with the EEOC, 

alleging that he was terminated by Foothills in violation of the 

ADEA as a result of a negative reference written by FIDCO, and the 

EEOC instituted an age discrimination suit. Since then, Mr. 

Griffin has joined the litigation as a plaintiff-intervenor, and 

the EEOC has stipulated to dismissal of FIDCO. Both plaintiffs 

have stipulated to dismissal of Foothills. 

A plaintiff who does not allege willful discrimination has 

two years from the date of injury to file a claim under the ADEA. 

29 U.S.C. SS 255, 626(e). The ADEA also provides that this period 

shall be tolled for up to one year upon the commencement of 

conciliation proceedings. Id. S 626(e). The questions presented 

in this appeal are when the cause of action accrued, and when the 

conciliation process began. 

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Appellate Case: 91-1221 Document: 010110226694 Date Filed: 03/02/1992 Page: 2 
FIDCO moved for summary judgment on the question of the 

statute of limitations and on another ground not presently before 

the court. Mr. Griffin requested, and received, several 

extensions of time to file a response. In the end, he failed to 

respond to FIDCO's motion in writing, and his attorney appeared 

before the district court on January 29, 1991 for the summary 

judgment hearing. At the hearing, the only issue raised or 

debated with respect to the statute of limitations was the date 

that conciliation began. See Appellant's Appendix, vol. II at 

127-160 (Official Transcript 1/29/91). The defendant suggested, 

and the plaintiff apparently did not disagree, that the cause of 

action accrued on October 1, 1987, the day after FIDCO ceased 

operations. Id. at 169 (Memorandum Opinion and Order, 3/7/91). 

Mr. Griffin argued then that conciliation began on September 27, 

1989, which would have tolled the running of the two-year 

limitations period, while FIDCO contended that conciliation began 

only on October 24, 1989, three full weeks after the statute of 

limitations had run. It is apparent to us, as it was to the 

district court, that Mr. Griffin and his attorney conceded the 

accuracy of the October 1 accrual date at the summary judgment 

argument: "[Griffin's] argument that the September 27, 1989 

letter, not the October 24, 1989 letter, began the conciliation 

period, implies that the accrual date must lie between the dates 

of these two letters." Id. at 192 (Memorandum Opinion and Order, 

4/12/91). 

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Appellate Case: 91-1221 Document: 010110226694 Date Filed: 03/02/1992 Page: 3 
It was only in his motion for reconsideration that Mr. 

Griffin raised the issue of the accrual of his action. He now 

offers instead October 26, 1987, the date of his termination, or 

early November of that year, when he learned about the negative 

reference. A trial court need not entertain new arguments or 

evidence on a motion for reconsideration. Hagerman v. Yukon 

Energy Corp., 839 F.2d 407, 413-14 (8th Cir.), cert . denied, 488 

U.S. 820 (1988). "'Motions for reconsideration . .. cannot in 

any case be employed as a vehicle to introduce new evidence that 

could have been adduced during pendency of the summary judgment 

motion.'" Publishers Resource, Inc. v. Walker-Davis Publications, 

Inc., 762 F.2d 557, 561 (7th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). The 

district court here acted within its discretion in refusing to reevaluate FIDCO's statute-of-limitations defense on the basis of a 

theory that Mr. Griffin could have, but chose not to, present 

earlier. Despite what Mr. Griffin claims was an insufficient time 

to respond to FIDCO's summary judgment motion, he and his counsel 

had ample opportunity to contest FIDCO's assertion of October 1 as 

the accrual date; indeed, it is somewhat absurd to imagine that 

they could have argued against a statute of limitations dismissal 

without having considered, and adopted at least in their own 

minds, an accrual date. We will not disturb the district court's 

determination that the cause of action accrued on October 1, 1987. 

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Appellate Case: 91-1221 Document: 010110226694 Date Filed: 03/02/1992 Page: 4 
Given that accrual date, the present cause of action would 

have been timely if conciliation had begun by October 1, 1989. 

Mr. Griffin points to a letter dated September 27, 1989, in which 

an EEOC employee wrote that he "invite[d]" the parties to begin 

reconciliation, and that "[a] representative from the Commission's 

field office will be contacting the parties to begin the 

conciliation process." Appellant's Appendix, vol. II at 170 

(Memorandum Opinion and Order, 3/7/91) (emphasis added). The 

language of this letter, however, indicates to us only that 

conciliation would begin at some time in the future. We agree 

with FIDCO and the district court that conciliation began on 

October 24, 1989, when an EEOC investigator wrote, "I have been 

delegated authority to commence resolution of these charges 

through the conciliation process." Id. Conciliation thus began 

too late to toll the statute of limitations for Mr. Griffins's 

ADEA claim. 

Because we agree that this action was untimely, we need not 

reach Mr. Griffin's final claim, that he was improperly denied the 

opportunity to amend his complaint to name an additional party. 

We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

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Entered for the Court 

Stephanie K. Seymour 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 91-1221 Document: 010110226694 Date Filed: 03/02/1992 Page: 5