Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00668/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00668-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

QUNICY SIMS,

Petitioner,

v.

M.D. BITER, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:16-cv-00668 DAD MJS (HC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION 

TO DISMISS 

[Doc. 11]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent is represented in this action by Maria 

Chan, of the Office of the Attorney General for the State of California.

I. Background

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections 

pursuant to a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, upon 

being convicted on three counts of lewd acts upon a child. (Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 1, ECF 

No. 11-1 at 33.) On November 2, 2010, Petitioner was sentenced to a determinate prison 

sentence of twenty-five years. Id. In 2006, Petitioner was convicted of an in-prison 

offense for indecent exposure and sentenced to additional four years to be served

consecutively. (Id. at 35.)

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On January 5, 2015, Petitioner filed a state court petition in the Kern County 

Superior Court in which he challenged his fifteen percent credit earning status, alleging 

that he is entitled to twenty percent credit earning status. (Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 1.) He 

also challenged the fact that he forfeited credits for disciplinary behavior on the grounds 

that state law does not permit such forfeiture. (Id.)

On March 27, 2015, the superior court denied the petition. (Id., Ex. 2.) The court 

found that in 1996, Petitioner was convicted of three counts of lewd and lascivious acts, 

namely, forcible oral copulation of a child under fourteen years old. Because these are 

serious or violent felonies under the California Penal Code section 667.5(c)(5), the court 

found that the convictions limit Petitioners’ accrual of conduct credits to fifteen percent 

under Penal Code section 2933.1(b). (Id.) The court also noted that in 2006 Petitioner 

was convicted of indecent exposure while in prison. He was sentenced to four years to 

be served consecutive to the 1996 sentence. (Id.) The court found that the 2006 

conviction permits accrual of the conduct credits at twenty percent. (Id.) Finally, the court 

found that “there is no authority that no matter how many rules violation an inmate 

accrues, he cannot have his conduct credits taken away.” (Id.) The court concluded that 

“Petitioner has numerous rules violations which delay his earliest possible release date.” 

(Id.)

On January 11, 2016, Petitioner filed a petition in the California Supreme Court 

raising the same claims he raised in the superior court. (Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 3.) The 

California Supreme Court summarily denied the Petition. (Id., Ex. 4.)

On May 12, 2016, Petitioner filed the instant petition requesting this Court grant

him the appropriate credit earning status in accordance with alleged conviction as a 

second strike offender, which would allow the maximum credit earning of 20%. (Pet., p. 

16.) In addition, Petitioner requests all of his good time credits be restored. (Id.)

On July 13, 2016, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss asserting that Petitioner 

has not presented federally cognizable claims. (ECF No. 11.) Petitioner filed an 

opposition to the motion on August 5, 2016. (ECF No. 12.) Accordingly, the matter 

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stands ready for adjudication. 

II. Discussion

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to 

dismiss a petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the 

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an 

answer if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being 

in violation of the state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 

420 (9th Cir. 1990) (using Rule 4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to 

exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using 

Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for state procedural default); 

Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n. 12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, a 

respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court 

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & 

n. 12.

B. Legal Standard of Review

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus

filed after its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 138 L. Ed. 

2d 481 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997). The instant 

petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its 

provisions.

Under AEDPA, an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody 

under a judgment of a state court may be granted only for violations of the Constitution 

or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 375 n. 

7 (2000). Federal habeas corpus relief is available for any claim decided on the merits in 

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state court proceedings if the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

C. Petitioner Presents No Federal Question

Here, Petitioner does not specifically identify a federal question. He asserts that 

the state courts misapplied the rate to which he was entitled to earn credits, but did not 

provide any support to controlling legal authority as to why the claims were in violation of 

federal law. 

A claim of state sentencing error does not raise a federal constitutional question. 

Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 783, 110 S. Ct. 3092, 111 L. Ed. 2d 606 (1990). The 

Ninth Circuit has refused to consider state law errors in the application of state 

sentencing law. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 623 (9th Cir. 2002); Christian v. Rhode, 

41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir. 1994); Hendricks v. Zenon, 993 F.2d 664, 674 (9th Cir. 1993);

Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1989) (refusing to examine state's 

determination that a prior was a serious felony); Johnson v. Arizona, 462 F.2d 1352, 

1353-54 (9th Cir. 1972) (rules of sentencing adopted by state court do not raise 

constitutional issues which may be reached by habeas corpus); Adams v. Eyman, 418 

F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1969); Sturm v. California Adult Authority, 395 F.2d 446, 448 (9th Cir. 

1967). Therefore, to the extent that Petitioner claims that there was a violation of 

California law relating to sentencing, he does not state a cognizable federal question. 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S. Ct. 475, 116 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1991).

In his opposition, Petitioner claims that the state court decisions violated his 

federal Due Process rights. (Opp’n, ECF No. 11.) “As for the Due Process Clause, 

standard analysis under that provision proceeds in two steps: We first ask whether there 

exists a liberty or property interest of which a person has been deprived, and if so we 

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ask whether the procedures followed by the State were constitutionally sufficient. 

Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 861 (2011); Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. 

Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460, 109 S. Ct. 1904, 104 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1989). 

California has not created a protected liberty interest in earning credits for work. 

See California Penal Code § 2933(c) ("Credit is a privilege, not a right"); Kalka v. 

Vasquez, 867 F.2d 546, 547 (9th Cir. 1989) ("section 2933 does not create a 

constitutionally protected liberty interest"). Because Petitioner has no constitutionally 

protected liberty interest in earning work time credit, an allegation that he is being 

deprived of the opportunity to earn such credit cannot form a basis for habeas corpus 

relief.

In order to state a due process claim, Petitioner must show that a constitutionally 

protected liberty interest is implicated. Baumann v. Arizona Dept. of Corrections, 754 

F.2d 841, 844 (9th Cir. 1985). A state may create a constitutionally protected liberty 

interest if it establishes regulatory measures that impose substantive limitations on the 

exercise of official discretion. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470-72, 103 S. Ct. 864, 74 

L. Ed. 2d 675 (1983), overruled in part by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S. 

Ct. 2293, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1995).

However, a state prisoner does not have a liberty interest in a classification status 

under the Fourteenth Amendment. Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th 

Cir. 1987); see Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9, 97 S. Ct. 274, 50 L. Ed. 2d 236 

(1976) (Due Process Clause not implicated by federal prisoner classification and 

eligibility for rehabilitative programs, even where inmate suffers "grievous loss").

Petitioner simply has no constitutional right to a particular classification or to earn 

credits. Because Petitioner has not shown a violation of the Federal Constitution, 

petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (habeas corpus 

available for violations of the Constitution or federal law.) Therefore the state court's 

denial of Petitioner's due process claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams, 529 U.S. at 

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412-13.

III. Conclusion

In sum, Petitioner has not presented cognizable claims. Further, to the extent that 

this Court construed Petitioner's claims as potentially cognizable claims, the state court's 

denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. The Court 

therefore recommends that Respondent's motion to dismiss be granted and the petition 

for writ of habeas corpus be dismissed. 

IV. Recommendation

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the motion to dismiss for 

Petitioner’s failure to state a federally cognizable claim be GRANTED.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States 

District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and 

Rule 304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern 

District of California. Within thirty (30) days after the date of service of this Findings and 

Recommendation, any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy 

on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the Objections shall be served and filed 

within fourteen (14) days after service of the Objections. The Finding and 

Recommendation will then be submitted to the District Court for review of the Magistrate 

Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(c). Petitioner is advised that failure

to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 

Court's order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 30, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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