Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02748/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02748-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILMER AGUILAR, 

Petitioner,

v. 

SCOTT FRAUENHEIM, Warden, 

Respondent.

 Case No.: 3:15-cv-02748-H-BGS 

ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS UNDER 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 

[Doc. No. 10]

(2) ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

[Doc. No. 15] 

(3) DENYING MOTION TO AMEND 

[Doc. No. 20 at 3] 

(4) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY 

On December 1, 2015, Petitioner Wilmer Aguilar, a state prisoner proceeding pro se 

and in forma pauperis, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.1

 

(Doc. No. 1.) On February 5, 2016, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the 

petition is barred by the one-year statute of limitations provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

                                                                

1

 The Court substitutes in Scott Frauenheim, Warden of Pleasant Valley State 

Prison, where Petitioner is currently incarcerated, as Respondent under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 25(d). 

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(Doc. No. 10.) On February 17, 2016, Petitioner opposed Respondent’s motion. (Doc. 

No. 12.) On June 14, 2016, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation 

recommending dismissing the petition as untimely. (Doc. No. 15.) Petitioner filed a 

motion to amend and an objection to the report and recommendation. (Doc. Nos. 20 at 3, 

22.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Respondent’s motion to dismiss, 

denies Petitioner’s motion to amend, adopts the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation, and denies a certificate of appealability. 

Background 

In June 2009, a jury convicted Petitioner of robbery, burglary, false imprisonment, 

attempted carjacking, and kidnapping for robbery. (Doc. No. 1 at 59–60.) Petitioner is 

serving a term of eight years to life imprisonment. (Id.) The California Court of Appeal 

struck the second-degree robbery convictions because they are lesser included offenses of 

the first-degree robbery convictions, stayed the sentence imposed for the burglary count, 

and affirmed the judgment in all other respects. (Id. at 54.) On September 14, 2011, the 

California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for direct review. (Doc. No. 11-2, 

Lodg. No. 2.) Petitioner did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States 

Supreme Court. (Doc. No. 1 at 3.) 

On December 17, 2014, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the San Diego Superior 

Court. (Doc. No. 11-3, Lodg. No. 3.) The Superior Court denied it on January 30, 2015. 

(Doc. No. 11-4, Lodg. No. 4.) On November 18, 2015, he filed a habeas petition in the 

California Court of Appeal. (Doc. No. 11-5, Lodg. No. 5.) The Court of Appeal denied it 

on December 1, 2015. (Doc. No. 11-6, Lodg. No. 6.) On December 14, 2015, he filed a 

habeas petition in the California Supreme Court. (Doc. No. 11-7, Lodg. No. 7.) The 

California Supreme Court denied it on April 13, 2016. (Doc. No. 15 at 2.) 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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On December 1, 2015,2

 Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254, alleging that there was insufficient evidence of aggravated kidnapping, that the 

trial court erred by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on various points of law, and that 

the trial court failed to poll the jury on the unanimity of its verdict after his counsel and the 

government waived the polling procedure. (Doc. No. 1 at 6–47.) On February 5, 2016, 

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the petition is barred by the one-year 

statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). (Doc. No. 10.) On June 14, 2016, the 

magistrate judge concluded that the petition was untimely, and that Petitioner was not 

entitled to statutory or equitable tolling. (Doc. No. 15.) On August 12, 2016, Petitioner 

filed an objection and additional evidence. (Doc. No. 22.) 

Discussion 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), a district judge “shall make a de novo determination 

of those portion of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which 

objection is made.” Therefore, the Court conducts its own analysis.

I. Statute of Limitations 

Since Petitioner filed the present federal habeas petition after April 24, 1996, the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs the petition. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326–27 (1997); Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (en banc). AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions 

filed by state prisoners in federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Holland v. Florida, 560 

U.S. 631, 635 (2010). Section 2244(d) provides: 

/ / / 

                                                                

2

 Under the mailbox rule, a pro se prisoner’s petition for habeas corpus is 

constructively filed at the moment of delivery to prison authorities. See Houston v. Lack, 

487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988); Campbell v. Henry, 614 F.3d 1056, 1058–59 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Petitioner signed the petition on December 1, 2015. (Doc. No. 1 at 113.) It was postmarked 

on December 4, 2015. (Id. at 117.) The Court need not determine whether the petition is 

dated from the signature or from the postmark because it would not affect the Court’s 

analysis. See Campbell, 614 F.3d at 1059 n.2.

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(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ 

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 

State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of— 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of 

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from 

filing by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was 

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been 

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of 

due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of 

limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)–(2). 

For purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), the one-year limitations period begins 

to run the day after the judgment becomes final on direct review. See McMonagle v. 

Meyer, 802 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a). The 

direct review process includes the ninety-day period within which a petitioner can seek a 

writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, whether or not the petitioner actually files 

a petition. McMonagle, 802 F.3d at 1097; see also U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13. 

Respondent contends, correctly, that the petition is barred by the one-year statute of 

limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). (Doc. No. 10-1 at 2–5.) The California Supreme 

Court denied Petitioner’s petition for direct review on September 14, 2011. (Doc. No. 11-2, 

Lodg. No. 2.) Petitioner had ninety days, until December 13, 2011, to file a petition for a 

writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. See McMonagle, 802 F.3d at 1097; 

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see also U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13. He did not seek certiorari. Therefore, his conviction became 

final on the following day, December 14, 2011, and AEDPA’s one-year statutory period 

began to run that same day. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Hence, AEDPA’s limitations 

period expired one year later, on December 13, 2012. Petitioner filed his petition in this 

Court on December 1, 2015, (Doc. No. 1), almost three years after AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations expired. As a result, absent a basis for tolling, his petition is untimely. 

II. Statutory Tolling 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), a properly filed state court application for collateral 

review tolls the one-year AEDPA limitations period. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 217 

(2002). Here, however, Petitioner’s state habeas petitions did not toll AEDPA’s statutory 

period because he filed his state petition in the San Diego Superior Court on December 17, 

2014, two years after AEDPA’s statute of limitations had already run. (Doc. No. 11-3, 

Lodg. No. 3.) See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[S]ection 

2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the 

state petition was filed.”). Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling of the 

limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

III. Equitable Tolling 

A petitioner seeking habeas relief may be entitled to equitable tolling if the petitioner 

can establish two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that 

some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 

418 (2005). “The threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling under the AEDPA is very 

high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1068 

(9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Petitioner first argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling because he cannot “read, 

write, or speak good English.” (Doc. No. 12. at 7.) However, as the magistrate judge 

explained, “a petitioner’s inability to speak, write and/or understand English, in and of 

itself, does not automatically justify equitable tolling.” Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1069–70 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, “a non-English-speaking petitioner seeking 

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equitable tolling must, at a minimum, demonstrate that during the running of the AEDPA 

time limitation, he was unable, despite diligent efforts, to procure either legal materials in 

his own language or translation assistance from an inmate, library personnel, or other 

source.” Id. at 1070. The petitioner “bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling is 

appropriate.” Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

The trial court transcript indicates that Petitioner did not require a court interpreter 

during the proceedings, and he responded in English to the trial court’s question of whether 

to postpone his sentencing. (Doc. No. 1 at 109–12.) Moreover, he has not presented 

evidence showing that he diligently pursued, but failed to procure, the necessary legal 

materials or assistance during the relevant time period. The additional materials he filed 

in his objection do not change that assessment. (See Doc. No. 22.) Therefore, Petitioner 

has failed his burden to demonstrate that language difficulties prevented him from a timely 

filing. See Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1069. 

Petitioner further argues that he did not know about the AEDPA deadline and he 

lacks the education to represent himself and produce papers to the court. (Doc. No. 12 

at 2–3.) However, the Ninth Circuit has held that a pro se petitioner’s lack of legal 

sophistication is not an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling. See 

Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the defendant’s 

inability to correctly calculate the limitations period is not an extraordinary circumstance 

warranting equitable tolling). 

Finally, Petitioner argues that the inmates helping him with the petition did not 

adequately understand or explain the legal issues involved in his case. (Doc. No. 12 at 3.) 

Again, these are not extraordinary circumstances as to “ma[ke] it impossible to file a 

petition on time.” Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 

marks omitted); see Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he fact 

that an inmate law clerk was assisting in drafting the state petition does not relieve him 

from the personal responsibility of complying with the law.”). Petitioner has failed to make 

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the requisite showing that his inadequate understanding of the legal issues prevented him 

from filing on time. Therefore, he does not qualify for equitable tolling, and his petition is 

barred by AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. 

Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Respondent’s motion to dismiss the 

petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, denies Petitioner’s motion to amend as moot,3

 and adopts 

the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. (Doc. Nos. 10, 15, 20.) Additionally, 

because the Court concludes that reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s analysis 

debatable or wrong, the Court denies a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(2); see also Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (“When the district 

court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s 

underlying constitutional claim,” a certificate of appealability may issue only if, at least, 

“jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its 

procedural ruling.”). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 1, 2016 

 

 MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

                                                                

3

 Petitioner moved to amend the petition “to attack the sentence instead of 

conviction.” (Doc. No. 20 at 3.) Since the amendment would be futile to save the petition 

from being barred by the statute of limitations, the Court denies Petitioner’s motion to 

amend. See Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Futility of amendment 

can, by itself, justify the denial of a motion for leave to amend.”). 

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