Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00479/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00479-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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06CV0479W

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES R. JORDAN,

Plaintiff,

Case No: 06-CV-0479 W (RBB)

ORDER (1) GRANTING AIR

FORCE DEFENDANTS’

MOTIONS TO DISMISS,

AND (2) GRANTING, IN

PART, AND DENYING, IN

PART, POSTAL SERVICE

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS

TO DISMISS

 v.

ELAINE CHOA, et al., 

Defendants.

On March 3, 2006, Plaintiff Charles Jordan (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action

against Defendants Elaine Choa, Secretary for the Department of Labor; the

Department of Labor; John E. Potter, Postmaster General; the United States Postal

Service (“USPS”); Pete Geren, Acting Secretary for the Department of the Air Force;

and the United States Air Force Reserves (“USAFR”). On April 17, 2006, Plaintiff filed

a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). Plaintiff asserts claims for wrongful termination

under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994

Case 3:06-cv-00479-W-RBB Document 31 Filed 11/13/06 Page 1 of 10
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1

The caption of Plaintiff’s FAC lists fraud as a cause of action, but not intentional

infliction of emotional distress. However, there are no allegations specific to the fraud claim

in the body of the complaint, but there are allegations specific to the emotional distress claim.

The Court, therefore, construes the reference to the fraud claim on the caption as a

typographical error. 

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(“USERRA”), disability discrimination, retaliation, tortious termination and intentional

infliction of emotional distress.1

On June 27, 2006, Defendants Secretary of the Air Force and U.S. Air Force

Reserves (the “Air Force Defendants”) filed a joint motion to dismiss. On the same day,

Defendants John Potter and the USPS (the “Postal Service Defendants”) jointly filed

a separate motion to dismiss. The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted

and without oral argument. See Civil Local Rule 7.1(d.1). For the reasons outlined

below, the Court GRANTS the Air Force Defendants’ motion, and GRANTS, in part,

and DENIES, in part, the Postal Service Defendants’ motion.

I. BACKGROUND

The USPS employed Plaintiff as a letter carrier from 1972 until 1995. (FAC at

8:17–19.) During his employment, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered a number of injuries,

some of which rendered him “temporarily totally disabled” for various periods. (Id. at

4:9–17.) Contemporaneous with his USPS employment, Plaintiff was also a member of

the USAFR. (Id. at 8:22–23.) 

According to the complaint, in December 1994, Plaintiff was ordered to report

to active military duty at March Air Force Base, where he was deployed to Guantanamo

Bay, Cuba until February 23, 1995. (FAC at 10:25–27.) The day before he was

deployed, Plaintiff’s treating doctor “declared him fit for full duty with no restrictions.”

(Id. at 10:4–5, emphasis in original.) While on deployment, however, Plaintiff alleges

that sustained upper extremity injuries when carrying out a “direct order to help move

some liquid oxygen converters.” (Id. at 7:9–14.)

Plaintiff alleges that when he returned to work at the USPS, he was arrested and

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2

 Before filing this action, Plaintiff filed a separate lawsuit against the Postal Service

Defendants asserting a USERRA violation, disability discrimination, retaliation, five related

tort claims and one contract claim (the “Related Action”). On September 12, 2006, this Court

dismissed all but the disability discrimination and retaliation claims with prejudice as to the

USPS and Postmaster. 

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prosecuted for allegedly claiming to be too injured to work. (FAC at 11:3–21.) Plaintiff

denies that he claimed to be too injured to work. (Id. at 11:12–21.) Then in April

1995, Plaintiff was terminated for misrepresenting his physical abilities. (Id. at

11:23–27.)

On September 28, 2000, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Merit Systems

Protection Board (“MSPB”) alleging that the USPS’s decision to terminate his

employment violated USERRA because the USPS allegedly discriminated against him

because of his military service. Jordan v. U. S. Postal Serv., 82 Fed.Appx. 42, 43 (Fed.

Cir. 2003). In an initial decision, the administrative judge rendered judgment on the

written record against Plaintiff. Id. On January 9, 2002, the MSPB vacated the initial

decision and remanded the matter for further adjudication because it found that Jordan

had specifically requested a hearing. Id. After a hearing on remand, the administrative

judge held that Plaintiff had not satisfied his burden pursuant to USERRA “of showing

by a preponderance of the evidence that the employee’s military service was a

substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment action.” Id. 

 On June 18, 2003, the MSPB denied review. Jordan, 82 Fed.Appx. at 43. Plaintiff

timely sought review in the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. On December 4,

2003, the Federal Circuit affirmed, ruling that Plaintiff had not satisfied his burden

under USERRA of establishing that his military service was a substantial motivating

factor in his removal and found that the MSPB’s decision was supported by substantial

evidence. Id. at 43. 

 On March 3, 2006, Plaintiff commenced this action.2

 On April 17, 2006, Plaintiff

filed the FAC. Defendants’ motions to dismiss followed. 

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(1) provides that a court may dismiss a claim for “lack of jurisdiction

over the subject matter[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Subject matter jurisdiction cannot

be waived, and the court is under a continuing duty to dismiss an action whenever it

appears the court lacks jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d

134, 136 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1982). 

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the complaint’s sufficiency. See

North Star Int’l. v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n., 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983).

Dismissal of a claim according to this rule is appropriate only where it “appears beyond

doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would

entitle him to relief.” Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1482 (9th Cir.

1991) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). In reviewing a motion

to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the truth of all factual

allegations and must construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). The complaint and all

reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the plaintiff’s favor. Walleri v. Fed.

Home Loan Bank of Seattle, 83 F.3d 1575, 1580 (9th Cir. 1996). 

III. DISCUSSION - THE AIR FORCE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

A. The USERRA Claim Fails to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be

Granted.

Plaintiff’s complaint asserts a USERRA cause of action. USERRA prohibits an

“employer” from discriminating against employees on the basis of an employee’s

membership or prior service in the uniformed services. 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a). The term

“employer” means “any person, institution, organization, or other entity that pays salary

or wages for work performed or that has control over employment opportunities . . .”

and includes the “Federal Government.” 38 U.S.C. § 4303(4)(A)(ii). The term

“Federal Government” is defined to include “any Federal executive agency,” which

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includes any military department . . . with respect to the civilian employees of that

department.” 38 U.S.C. § 4303(5),(6). Therefore, military departments are not

“employers” for the purpose of a non-civilian employee’s USERRA claim. 

The Air Force Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s USERRA claim should be

dismissed because non-civilian military employees cannot bring USERRA claims against

the military. (Def.’s P.& A. at 5.) Plaintiff responds by stating that “Defendant, in its

motion, makes the mistake of identifying the military as the actor in the unlawful

discrimination attacked under USERRA. The fact is that the actor in plaintiff’s

complaint was the post office.” (Pl.’s Opp. at 2–3.) 

It is unclear whether Plaintiff’s argument is meant to clarify that the Air Force

Defendants are not parties to the USERRA cause of action or that Plaintiff is asserting

that the Air Force Defendants are liable under some alternative agency theory. The

Court notes, however, that the FAC alleges that the USAFR was engaged in an alleged

conspiracy with the Postal Service Defendants to “discharge [Plaintiff] from . . . the

USPS.” (FAC at 7:18-21.) Given this allegation and the fact that the Opposition does

not clearly state that the Air Force Defendants are not parties to the USERRA claim,

the Court will assume that the Air Force Defendants are parties to that claim.

The FAC alleges that Plaintiff was a Master Sergeant in the Air Force Reserves

(FAC at 1:24–25), and thus he was not a civilian employee of the military. With respect

to his civilian job as a letter carrier, the FAC alleges that the USPS was Plaintiff’s

employer, not the USAFR. (Id. at 2:16–18.) Because the statute defines the military

as an employer only “with respect to the civilian employees of that department” (38

U.S.C. § 4303(5),(6)), Plaintiff cannot assert a USERRA claim against the Air Force

Defendants. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted and the Air Force Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s USERRA claim is

GRANTED. 

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3

 The Court presumes Plaintiff asserts his disability discrimination claim under the

Rehabilitation Act because the only statute under which disability discrimination claims may

be asserted is the Americans With Disabilities Act, which only applies to the federal

government through section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act. 

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2. The Title VII and Rehabilitation Act Claims Fail To State a Claim

Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted.

(a) Title VII does not apply to military personnel.

The Air Force Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim should

be dismissed because “military members are barred from raising claims under Title VII.”

(Def.’s P. & A. at 4.) Plaintiff does not address this argument in his Opposition.

The Court agrees with the Air Force Defendants. Title VII prohibits

discrimination by the Federal Government and more specifically, by the United States

Air Force. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16; 5 U.S.C § 102. The statute, however, does not

protect uniformed members of the armed forces; only civilian employees may bring Title

VII claims against military departments. Gonzalez v. Dept. of Army, 718 F.2d 926, 928

(9th Cir. 1983). Because there is no question that Plaintiff was a uniformed member of

the Air Force, he cannot bring a Title VII retaliation claim against the Air Force

Defendants. Accordingly, the Air Force Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

retaliation claim is GRANTED.

(b) The Rehabilitation Act does not apply to military personnel.

Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim is also barred because uniformed military

personnel cannot bring claims under the Rehabilitation Act.3

 See Lopez v. Johnson, 333

F.3d 959, 962 (9th Cir. 2003) (providing that section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act does

not apply to uniformed military personnel). Therefore, the Air Force Defendants’

motion to dismiss the disability discrimination claim is GRANTED.

3. The Feres Doctrine Bars Plaintiff’s Tort Claims.

The Air Force Defendants argue that the Feres doctrine bars Plaintiff’s tort

claims. (Def.’s P. & A. at 4.) Under the Feres doctrine, members of the armed services

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cannot sue the Government for injuries that “arise out of or are in the course of activity

incident to service.” Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). It applies

“whenever a legal action would require a civilian court to examine decisions regarding

management, discipline, supervision, and control of members of the armed forces of the

United States.” Hodge v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 705, 710 (9th Cir. 1997)). “The test has

been broadly construed to immunize the United States and members of the military from

any suit which may intrude in military affairs, second-guess military decisions, or impair

military discipline.” Id. The Feres doctrine bars intentional tort claims as well as simple

negligence claims. Bowen v. Oistead, 125 F.3d 800, 804 (9th Cir. 1997). Additionally,

the Ninth Circuit has stated that termination decisions are “inherently military.” Bowen

v. Oistead, 125 F.3d 800, 806 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Plaintiff responds to the Air Force Defendants’ argument by asserting that he

“was the primary force behind the decision to elect voluntary retirement. Therefore, the

military authorities were not substantially involved in that decision, and no action by

them is subject to the ‘dangerous’ precedent of allowing second-guessing as to their

decision.” (Pl.’s Opp. at 3.) The Court disagrees because the FAC’s allegations

establish that the injuries attributable to the Air Force Defendants arose from conduct

that was incident to Plaintiff’s military service. 

Based on the Court’s review of the FAC, there appear to be three factual

allegations regarding the Air Force Defendants’ conduct. First, Plaintiff alleges that

while on active “duty in Cuba,” he sustained upper extremity injuries while following a

“direct order to help move some liquid oxygen converters.” (FAC at 7:9-13.) Next,

Plaintiff alleges that the USAFR allowed the Postal Service Defendants to videotape

him while following his direct order to move the liquid oxygen converters. (Id. at 10:11-

18.) Plaintiff’s third “factual” allegation is that the Air Force Defendants illegally and

unlawfully discharged Plaintiff from his position as a master sergeant. (Id. at 7:5–9.) 

Based on these factual allegations, it is clear that the claims against the Air Force

Defendants arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to Plaintiff’s military

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service. Indeed, Plaintiff appears to admit as much when he states that he is attempting

to have the Air Force “take responsibility for injuries and ailments that [he] sustained

while in the service of [his] country.” (FAC at 7:3–5.) Accordingly, the Feres doctrine

bars Plaintiff’s tort claims and the Air Force Defendants’ motion to dismiss the causes

of action for false imprisonment, tortious termination and intentional infliction of

emotional distress is GRANTED. 

IV. DISCUSSION - THE POSTAL SERVICE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

A. Plaintiff’s USERRA Claim Is Dismissed For Lack of Subject Matter

Jurisdiction.

As mentioned above, before filing this lawsuit, Plaintiff filed the Related Action

against the Postal Service Defendants, which included a claim for violation of USERRA.

In that action, the Court held that judicial review of USERRA claims by federal

employees is limited to the Federal Circuit, and thus dismissed the USERRA claim. As

explained therein, USERRA provides that an employee wishing to bring a

discrimination claim may submit the claim directly to the Merit Systems Protection

Board. 38 U.S.C. § 4324(b). If the MSPB’s decision is adverse to the employee, he may

appeal to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. 38 U.S.C. § 4323(d)(1). However, as

this Court previously stated:

Importantly, USERRA limits review of final MSPB decisions regarding

federal employee claims to the Federal Circuit: “[s]ection 4324 does not

authorize a private USERRA action against the Federal Government, as

an employer, in federal district court; rather it confers jurisdiction upon the

Merit Systems Protection Board[.]” Dew v. United States Dept. of

Defense, 192 F.3d 366, 372 (2nd Cir. 1999), cert. denied 529 U.S. 1053

(2000). “Decisions of the MSPB are subject to review in the Court of

Appeals for the Federal Circuit.” Id. Federal Circuit jurisdiction over

MSPB appeals is exclusive: because section 4324 does not provide for

another means of review, plaintiffs proceeding under it may not bring a

federal district court action. Dew, 192 F.3d at 372-73 (holding that the

district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction where an analogous section

of USERRA did not provide for review other than by the Inspector

General.) 

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 Postmaster Potter was named in his official capacity. 

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(Order Granting Def.’s Motion to Dismiss, Case No. 05-CV-2203, at 4:22–5:5.)

Accordingly, appellate review of the MSPB decision denying Plaintiff’s USERRA

claim was limited to the Federal Circuit. Thus, this Court lacks jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s USERRA claim. Accordingly, the Postal Service Defendants’ motion to

dismiss the USERRA claim is GRANTED. 

2. Plaintiff’s Tort Claims Are Dismissed For Lack of Subject Matter

Jurisdiction

The Court also lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s tort claims because the named

defendants, the USPS and Postmaster, are improper parties under the Federal Tort

Claims Act (“FTCA”). “[T]he United States is the only proper party defendant in an

FTCA action[.]” Kennedy v. United States Postal Serv., 145 F.3d 1077, 1078 (9th Cir.

1998) (per curiam). Additionally, “[t]he FTCA is the exclusive remedy for tort actions

against a federal agency[.]” Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a). A “claim against the United

States Postal Service in its own name is not a claim against the United States.” Id. 

Here, Plaintiff has named the USPS and the Postmaster but has not named the

United States. Since the only remedy for tort actions against a federal agency is the

FTCA, and the only appropriate party for an FTCA claim is the United States, Plaintiff

should have named the United States rather than the USPS and Postmaster. Plaintiff’s

failure to name the proper party deprives this Court of jurisdiction to hear his tort

claims.4

 Accordingly, the Postal Service Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED

on Plaintiff’s false imprisonment, tortious termination, and intentional infliction of

emotional distress claims. 

3. Plaintiff’s Retaliation and Disability Discrimination Claims Are Not

Duplicative.

The Postal Service Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation and disability

discrimination claims on the ground that they are duplicative of the claims asserted in

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the Related Case. As discussed above, however, on September 12, 2006, this Court

granted the Postal Service Defendants’ motion to dismiss in that case. Thereafter,

Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint against the United States. Because the

Postal Service Defendants are not parties in the Related Case, the retaliation and

disability discrimination claims in this case are not duplicative of the claims in the

Related Case. For this reason, the Postal Service Defendants’ motion to dismiss the

disability discrimination claim and the retaliation claim is DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the Air Force Defendants’ motion

to dismiss. Plaintiff’s causes of action for disability discrimination, false imprisonment,

USERRA, retaliation, tortious termination, and intentional infliction of emotional

distress are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to the Air Force Defendants. 

The Court also GRANTS, in part, the Postal Service Defendants’ motion to

dismiss. The causes of action for false imprisonment, USERRA, tortious termination,

and intentional infliction of emotional distress are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE

as to the Postal Service Defendants. Their motion to dismiss the retaliation and

disability discrimination claims is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 8, 2006

Hon. Thomas J. Whelan

United States District Judge

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