Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00014/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00014-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Juan Castanon Guel, )

)

Defendant/Movant, )

) CR 11-01320 PHX PGR

v. ) CIV 12-00014 PHX PGR(MEA)

)

United States of America, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

)

Plaintiff/Respondent. )

)

_____________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT:

On or about December 27, 2011, Mr. Juan Castanon Guel

(“Movant”) filed a pro se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct

Sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Movant filed an amended

motion on March 12, 2012. Respondent filed a response (Doc. 8)

to Movant’s motion to vacate or set aside his sentence on April

26, 2012. 

I Procedural History

On May 27, 2011, Movant was found and arrested by law

enforcement officers at the United States Port of Entry, San

Luis, Arizona. See Response, Exh. A. On May 31, 2011, a

complaint was issued alleging Movant had violated 8 U.S.C. §§

1326, subsections (a) and (b)(1). On July 7, 2011, Movant pled

guilty to an information filed that date alleging a violation of

8 U.S.C. § 1326, subsections (a) and (b)(1). Id., Exh. A. 

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On July 7, 2011, Movant entered into a plea agreement

with the United States. Id., Exh. B. On September 29, 2011,

Movant’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. On

October 3, 2011, the District Court granted that motion and

appointed new counsel. 

On November 7, 2011, Movant’s new counsel filed an

objection to the Presentence Report. Movant argued that

additional levels were improperly added to the base level for

the crime of illegal reentry after deportation. On December 19,

2011, the District Court overruled the Movant’s objection to the

Presentence Report and sentenced Movant to a term of 46 months

imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release.

Id., Exh. C.

Movant contends that he was improperly sentenced.

Movant asserts that his crime was improperly aggravated based on

a prior conviction which was erroneously construed by the

sentencing court.

II Analysis

Waiver of the right to a collateral attack

Respondent asserts that this section 225 action must be

dismissed because Movant waived his right to collaterally attack

his conviction and sentence in the written plea agreement. The

plea agreement signed by Movant expressly waived his right to

collaterally attack any matter pertaining to Movant’s conviction

and sentence if the sentence imposed was consistent with the

written terms of the agreement. The sentence imposed on Movant

was consistent with the terms of the plea agreement. Because

the sentence imposed was in accordance with the plea agreement,

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the plea agreement is valid. Therefore, Movant is bound by the

plea agreement’s waiver of his right to collaterally attack his

conviction and sentence. 

Because Movant legitimately waived his right to bring

this action, his section 2255 motion may be summarily denied.

See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508-09, 104 S. Ct. 2543,

2546-47 (1984) (“It is well settled that a voluntary and

intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person, who has

been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally

attacked.”); United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th

Cir. 2005) (reaching this conclusion in the context of a direct

appeal wherein the Movant waived his right to directly appeal or

collaterally attack his conviction and sentence in a plea

agreement); United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478, 480-81 (9th

Cir. 1991). 

A defendant’s waiver of his right to a direct appeal

and a section 2255 action is enforceable if the language of the

waiver encompasses his right to appeal on the grounds raised,

and the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made. See United

States v. Speelman, 431 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 2005).

However, a plea agreement which waives the Movant’s right to

collaterally attack their sentence is not enforceable if the

waiver was involuntary. See, e.g., Washington v. Lampert, 422

F.3d 864, 870-71 (9th Cir. 2005). See also United States v.

White, 307 F.3d 336, 343 (5th Cir. 2002). A collateral attack

alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in negotiating a plea

agreement may be brought notwithstanding a waiver of this right

in a plea agreement if the agreement was involuntary or

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unknowing or where the agreement was otherwise unlawful. See

United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir.

2001)(“[A] waiver of appeal may not be enforced against a

section 2255 petitioner who claims that ineffective assistance

of counsel rendered that waiver unknowing or involuntary.”);

Bridgeman v. United States, 229 F.3d 589, 591 (7th Cir. 2000).

Movant does not challenge the adequacy of his counsel’s

representation in his section 2255 motion. Movant asserts only

that the sentence imposed was unfair based on his actual

conduct. 

Movant’s contemporaneous statements regarding his

understanding of the plea agreement carry substantial weight in

determining if his entry of a guilty plea was knowing and

voluntary. See United States v. Mims, 928 F.2d 310, 313 (9th

Cir. 1991); United States v. Walker, 160 F.3d 1078, 1096 (6th

Cir. 1998) (holding that “a straightforward and simple ‘Yes,

your Honor’ is sufficient to bind a Movant to [the] consequences

[of a plea agreement].”). Additionally, because he was

adequately informed of the consequences of his plea, Movant’s

guilty plea can be considered voluntary and knowing. See Boykin

v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712 (1969).

The undersigned concludes Movant’s guilty plea was voluntary and

made intelligently. See Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562

(9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1383

(9th Cir. 1986).

Because Movant does not produce any evidence indicating

he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into the agreement,

the undersigned concludes the plea agreement was valid, as was

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Movant’s voluntary waiver of his right to collaterally attack

his sentence. Accordingly, the section 2255 petition should be

denied and dismissed. Compare United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d

431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994).

III Conclusion

Movant waived his right to collaterally attack his

convictions and sentences in his plea agreement. Movant has not

established that his waiver of these rights was not knowing and

voluntary. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Castanon Guel’s

motion for relief from his convictions and sentences pursuant to

section 2255 be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. 

Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil Procedure

for the United States District Court for the District of

Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

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exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to de novo appellate consideration of the issues. See United

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of

fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

DATED this 30th day of May, 2012.

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