Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02295/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02295-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BARRY A. HAZLE, JR., )

)

Plaintiff, ) 2:08-cv-02295-GEB-EFB

)

v. ) ORDER ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE

) 

MITCH CROFOOT, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

Nine motions in limine are addressed below.

I. Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine

A. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 1

Plaintiff seeks in his first motion to exclude evidence

concerning whether he “agreed to participate in [a] NA or AA-based

program as a term or condition of his parole.” (Docket # 104.) 

Plaintiff contends this evidence is irrelevant under Federal Rule of

Evidence 402, because “it would be a defense to liability” which “has

already been adjudicated.” Defendants counter the evidence is

relevant on the following propositions: the state of mind each

defendant had “when . . . actions were taken – i.e., that . . .

[defendant was] not motivated by evil motive or intent, elements in

plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages;” on “consideration of value

associated with . . . [plaintiff’s] loss of liberty claim,” since

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plaintiff would not have been released “had he not agreed to the

conditions of parole;” and on plaintiff’s credibility under Federal

Rule of Evidence 608 since “[b]y plaintiff’s own admission during

discovery, he knowingly lied to obtain what he wanted, for whatever

reason.” 

Plaintiff responds in his reply brief with the new argument

that this evidence should be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence

403. However, Plaintiff’s Rule 403 argument is waived since it was

not stated as a basis for exclusion of the evidence in Plaintiff’s

opening brief. See United States v. Anderson,472 F.3d 662, 668 (9th

Cir. 2006)(“Issues raised for the first time in an appellant's reply

brief are generally deemed waived.”); Alcan Elec. & Eng'g, Inc., 197

F.3d 1014, 1020 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that argument raised on

appeal for the first time in a reply brief is waived and need not be

considered).

Since it is unclear what Defendants mean in the portion of

their argument in which they contend the evidence is relevant as to

the “value associated” with Plaintiff’s “loss of liberty claim,” that

argument has not been shown to be a basis for admission of the

evidence. However, the document is probative on each Defendant’s

state of mind when the decisions were made to place Plaintiff into the

program, keep him in the program, subsequently revoke his parole, and

incarcerate him, and is therefore admissible on Plaintiff’s damage

claims. Further, since Plaintiff seeks punitive damages, a

determination must be made whether or not each Defendant’s conduct was

driven by evil motive or intent, or involved a reckless disregard of

Plaintiff’s rights under the Establishment Clause. Morgan v. Woessner,

997 F.2d 1244, 1255 (9 Cir. 1993). Each Defendant’s involvement with th

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Plaintiff’s placement into the program and to what Defendant would be

subject therein is relevant to these damage issues. Since Plaintiff

has not shown that the referenced evidence is irrelevant to his damage

claims, the motion is denied.

B. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 2

Plaintiff seeks in his second motion to exclude two

certificates of achievement that purport to confirm Plaintiff’s

completion of twelve weeks of NA and AA substance abuse programs

during his incarceration at Norco State Prison from May 2006 through

February 2007. (Docket # 105.) Plaintiff argues the certificates are

irrelevant inadmissible hearsay. The portion of Plaintiff’s motion

challenging the AA certificate is denied as moot since Defendants

state in their response that they “agree to withdraw” the AA

certificate as an exhibit. 

Defendants argue that the NA certificate is admissible “to

refute [Plaintiff’s] emotional distress claims for attending a program

that was the equivalent of the program he attended in prison before

being paroled.” Since this evidence has not been shown inadmissible

on this proposition, this motion is denied.

C. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 3

Plaintiff seeks in his third motion to exclude Mel Huffman

from testifying about Hazle’s “participation in NA and AA meetings

while in Norco State prison before the events at issue in this

litigation.” (Docket # 106.) Plaintiff argues this witness should be

excluded because Defendants did not identify Huffman in their response

to Plaintiff’s interrogatory, which states:

If you contend that Barry Hazle participated in one

or more 12-STEP MEETINGS while incarcerated in

California Rehabilitation Center in Norco,

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California, state all facts that support such

contention, including the IDENTITY of persons with

knowledge of such facts.

(Heller Decl. Ex. E., Special Interrogatory No. 1.) Defendants did

not identify Mel Huffman in their response. Defendants argue

Plaintiff “was fully aware of [Huffman’s] identit[y]” because

Huffman’s identity was “disclosed by Plaintiff himself when he 

produced documents to Defendants that had been provided to Plaintiff

by Mental Health Systems.” However, Defendants have not offered

support for their conclusory argument that Plaintiff’s referenced

production of documents is sufficient to notice Plaintiff that

Defendants intended to have Huffman testify about Plaintiff’s

participation in NA and AA meetings.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A)(i) imposes on

each party a duty to disclose initially, “the name . . . of each

individual likely to have discoverable information.” “A party . . .

who has made a disclosure . . . or who has responded to an

interrogatory . . . must supplement or correct its . . . response

 . . . if the party learns that in some material respect the

disclosure or response is incomplete.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1). “If

a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required

by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information

or witness to supply evidence . . . at trial, unless the failure was

substantially justified or is harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1).

Defendants have not met their burden of showing their

failure to identify Huffman as a witness was “substantially justified

or . . . harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1); see also Megus v.

Emporia State Univ., 326 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1218 (D. Kan. 2004)

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(rejecting defendant’s argument “that by disclosing a document, it has

sufficiently disclosed its intent to ‘call the authors as witnesses at

trial to authenticate the complaint documents.’”). Therefore, this

motion is granted.

Plaintiff also seeks in his third motion to exclude Cynthia

Cate, R. Thurman, and Barry Lindstrom from testifying about

Plaintiff’s participation in NA or AA-based programs. This portion of

the motion is denied as moot since Defendants state they will not 

call these individuals as witnesses.

D. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 4

Plaintiff seeks in his fourth motion to exclude a worksheet

containing “a number of expletives” filled out by Plaintiff during his

final day at Empire Recovery Center. (Docket # 107.) Plaintiff

argues the worksheet is “not relevant” and is “more prejudicial than

probative.” 

Defendants counter the worksheet is relevant to show

Plaintiff’s “subjective value of his liberty – measured by what he was

doing and would have done with it.” Specifically, Defendants argue

the worksheet is “illustrative of Plaintiff’s intent, motive or design

regarding his true purpose for participating in the Empire Substance

abuse program.” Plaintiff replies he would be prejudiced if the

worksheet is admitted and that this prejudice is not outweighed by any

probative value the worksheet has. Defendants have not shown that how

Plaintiff subjectively values his liberty is a proposition that

justifies admission of this evidence.

Defendants also argue the worksheet is admissible to impeach

Plaintiff because it “bears on his character for truthfulness.”

Further, Defendants conclude arguing: “This evidence affects his

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credibility, which the jury must be free to assess given the

essentially subjective nature of Plaintiff’s claim for damages,” and

that the exhibit is admissible for the jury’s “consideration of

damages and credibility in this case.” Plaintiff rejoins Defendants

have “identif[ied] no lie in this document, [nor an] example of

untruthfulness that might bear on this issue.” 

Plaintiff’s arguments show that the worksheet has probative

value on Plaintiff’s emotional distress claim, which is not

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 

Defendants are permitted to admit evidence probative on whether

Plaintiff endured mental anguish due to Defendants’ impermissible

coercion. Plaintiff wrote the contents of the worksheet after he “had

been seeking unsuccessfully for weeks to convince authorities of his

right to be free from compulsory religious training.” Therefore, what

he wrote is admissible on the proposition of whether and to what

extent he suffered emotional distress due to impermissible coercion. 

Whether Plaintiff experienced stress caused by interference with his

decision not to be subjected to anything religious, and the nature of

any such interference, are relevant to Plaintiff’s damage claims. 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion is denied.

E. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 5

Plaintiff seeks in his fifth motion to exclude the following

six “encounters with law enforcement”: (1) a 1987 arrest for public

drunkenness; (2) a 1989 arrest and conviction for felony possession of

a controlled substance; (3) a 1990 arrest and conviction for felony

possession of a controlled substance; (4) a “1991-1993

(approximately)” arrest and conviction for driving on a suspended

license, a misdemeanor; (5) a 1995 arrest and conviction for felony

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possession of a controlled substance; and (6) a 2001 arrest for

fighting in public, a misdemeanor. (Docket No. 108.) Plaintiff

argues these arrests and convictions are “not relevant” to the damages

issue, “not admissible for impeachment,” and that the probative value

is “far outweighed by [their] potential for unfair[] prejudic[e].” 

 Defendants counter “they do not intend to introduce

evidence of Plaintiff’s felony convictions at trial for the purpose of

attacking Plaintiff’s character for truthfulness; rather, they “seek

to introduce evidence of Plaintiff’s felony convictions for [their]

relevance to valuing Plaintiff’s claim for loss of liberty damages.” 

Defendants further argue “[e]vidence of Plaintiff’s clearlydemonstrated propensity for repeatedly engaging in, and being

convicted for, the same felonious behavior over a span of more than

twenty years . . . is highly probative of the fact that through his

own conduct, he places little value on his liberty.” 

Defendants’ argument that evidence of demonstrates

Plaintiff’s “propensity for repeatedly engaging in, and being

convicted for, the same felonious behavior over a span of more than

twenty years” appears to suggest the evidence is offered for

impersible character evidence purpose. This argument has not been

shown to be a basis for denying Plaintiff’s motion. However,

Defendants’ argument that the evidence is relevant “to valuing

Plaintiff’s claim for loss of liberty damages” is persuasive. 

“[P]laintiff's prior incarceration[s] [are] relevant to the extent he

claim[s] damages for mental suffering occasioned by wrongful

confinement.” Green v. Baca, 226 F.R.D. 624, 657 (C.D. Cal.

2005)(stating “the court agrees that the fact that plaintiff has been

incarcerated on a number of prior occasions, and the length of those

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periods of incarceration, is relevant to the jury's consideration of

the damages he is entitled to recover in this case.”); See also Ford

v. Wells, 347 F.Supp. 1026, 1030 (D.C. Tenn. 1972)(noting that a

person incarcerated numerous times before “being unlawfully arrested

and imprisoned” may not be “as damaged by being unlawfully arrested

and imprisoned as another person with an unblemished record might have

been.”). As the Fifth Circuit observed in Bryan v. Jones, 519 F.2d 44

(5 Cir. 1975), when a plaintiff is allowed to introduce evidence of th

the adverse conditions of his confinement, defendants should be given

the opportunity to develop all factual elements which relate to his

damages. Bryan v. Jones, 519 F.2d 44, 46 (5 Cir. 1975). th

One such element is the suffering caused by the

very fact of incarceration, absent any issue

concerning the condition of or reason for such

incarceration. Even a minimal sort of penal

confinement may be debilitating to many. Under

comparable conditions of confinement, however,

this mental anguish may be much less for the

recidivist than for one incarcerated for the first

time. Therefore, the fact of prior imprisonment is

a consideration to the extent of mental suffering

occasioned by the wrongful confinement. 

Id. (internal citations omitted). 

Therefore, this motion is denied. 

F. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 6

Plaintiff seeks in his sixth motion to exclude evidence that

on May 15, 2010, he was arrested and charged with (1) possession for

sale of marijuana; (2) possession of a controlled substance; and (3)

possession of a knife in a motor vehicle. (Docket # 109.) This

motion is denied as moot since Defendants state they “do not intend to

present any evidence of Plaintiff’s May 15, 2010 arrest.”

///

///

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G. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine No. 7

Plaintiff seeks in his seventh motion to exclude Directive

08-06 and an email from Robert Neil dated September 21, 2007. (Docket

# 110.) This motion is denied as moot since Defendants respond that

these exhibits are withdrawn. (Docket # 145.)

II. Defendants’ Motions in Limine

A. Defendants’ Motion in Limine No. 1

Defendants seek in their first motion “an order restricting

all of Plaintiff’s non-party witnesses from entering the courtroom

until called to testify” “in order to minimize the risk that the

witnesses will be unfairly educated on the forthcoming interrogation.” 

(Docket # 101.) Plaintiff responds in a “conditional non-opposition”

that the non-party witnesses should be permitted to attend “other

points in the trial proceedings” besides testimony of other witnesses. 

Defendants reply that all witnesses be excluded from attending the

opening statement, as well as “any other part of the trial, prior to

their actually taking the stand to testify.”

Federal Rule of Evidence 615, which addresses the

sequestration of witnesses, reads in part: “At the request of a party

the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the

testimony of other witnesses . . . .” However, “a party’s request for

the exclusion of witnesses prior to opposing counsel’s opening

statement [is not] within the purview of Rule 615.” U.S. v. Brown,

547 F.2d 36, 37 (3d Cir. 1976).

Admittedly, there may exist a danger of improper

suggestions to witnesses during counsel’s opening

statement, but that danger is not dealt with in

Rule 615. The decision as to whether witnesses

should be excluded prior to counsel’s opening

statement is committed to the discretion of the

district court.

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Id. Here, Defendants argue that “given the subjective nature of

Plaintiff’s damages, and the family-type relationships of the nonparty witnesses to Plaintiff” the Court should exercise its discretion

to exclude these witnesses from the opening statements. Defendants’

position is persuasive. Therefore, all non-party witnesses are

excluded from attending any part of the trial, including opening

statements, prior to giving their own testimony.

B. Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 2

Defendants seek in their second motion to exclude “any and

all testimony of (1) Danny Ratledge; (2) Paul Soden; (3) Jackie

Berryessa; (4) Maline Hazle; (5) Judy Pfahnl; and (6) Brian Hazle,

identified by Plaintiff as trial witnesses in . . . the Joint Pretrial

Statement.” (Docket # 102.) Defendants argue Plaintiff failed to

identify these witnesses “in his Rule 26 Initial Disclosures or during

the course of discovery.” In support of their motion, Defendants

filed Plaintiff’s Rule 26 initial disclosures, which do not list the

six defendants to which Defendants object. (Irby Decl. Ex. A.)

Plaintiff argues he disclosed the identity and contact

information for each of the six witnesses in November 2009, when he

responded to an interrogatory propounded by Defendant Westcare.

Plaintiff also presented a proof of service showing that Defendants’

counsel received this information. Plaintiff argues this shows

Defendants had actual notice of the identities of these witnesses, and

therefore, Plaintiff’s failure to disclose this information to

Defendants in some other manner is “harmless.” Therefore, Defendant’s

motion is denied.

Defendants also argue these witnesses lack “personal

knowledge” to testify about Plaintiff’s emotional distress, and

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“[c]onsequently, any testimony that any of the Plaintiff’s proposed

lay witnesses might give regarding Plaintiff’s alleged emotional

distress damages . . . would not be helpful to, and in fact could

confuse, the jury.” Plaintiff responds that testimony of “persons

close to the plaintiff is appropriate and relevant” to emotional

distress damages. This motion lacks a sufficient factual context for

an in limine ruling and is therefore denied since it concerns issues

that now should be decided during trial.

Dated: June 17, 2010

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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