Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00651/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00651-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 15:1126 Trademarks - International conventions

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THERMOLIFE INTERNATIONAL, 

LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

MYOGENIX CORP.; GNC 

CORPORATION; GENERAL 

NUTRITION CENTERS, INC.; and 

GENERAL NUTRITION 

CORPORATION,

Defendants.

Case No.: 13cv651 JLS (MDD)

(LEAD CASE)

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART 

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION IN LIMINE 

AND (2) DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION IN LIMINE / DAUBERT 

MOTION

(ECF Nos. 209 & 210)

Presently before the Court are Plaintiffs the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford 

Junior University and ThermoLife International, LLC’s Motion In Limine to Exclude 

Certain Prior Art-Related Evidence (Plaintiffs’ Motion), (ECF No. 209), as well as 

Defendants’ Opposition to, (ECF No. 219), and Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of, (ECF No. 

222), Plaintiffs’ Motion. Also before the Court are Defendants’ Motion In Limine / 

Daubert Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs’ Expert From Offering Testimony Regarding 

Secondary Considerations of Non-Obviousness (Defendants’ Motion), (ECF No. 210), as 

well as Plaintiffs’ Opposition to, (ECF No. 218), and Defendants’ Reply in Support of, 

(ECF No. 221), Defendants’ Motion. The Court held a hearing on these Motions on July 

21, 2016. As explained below, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART 

Plaintiffs’ Motion and DENIES Defendants’ Motion. 

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PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION

The Plaintiffs ask the Court to preclude Defendants from introducing various prior 

art references and combinations thereof at trial. This District’s Local Rules require 

invalidity contentions to include “an explanation of why the prior art renders the asserted 

claim obvious,” Patent L.R. 3.3(b), which prevents unfair surprise at trial and allows

patentees time to analyze the prior art as it pertains to particular claims and terms. 

Similarly, expert reports must disclose the substance of an expert’s testimony for direct 

examination and the bases for those opinions. See Jenkins v. Bartlett, 487 F.3d 482, 487 

(7th Cir. 2007) (“The purpose of the report is to ‘set forth the substance of the direct 

examination.’ . . . A party is barred from using at trial evidence that it failed to disclose 

‘without substantial justification’ as required by Rule 26(a), unless that failure was 

harmless.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i) (expert reports must contain “a complete 

statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them.”).

The Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs’ Motion and 

ORDERS as follows:

1. References Allowed if Disclosed as to Claim Element: Where prior art was 

disclosed with respect to a particular claim element, whether in the Defendants’ Amended 

Invalidity Contentions, expert report, rebuttal expert report, or expert deposition, 

Defendants are not precluded from relying on that reference as invalidating art with respect 

to that claim or claim element. However, Plaintiffs may renew their objections at trial and 

explain why, despite the disclosure of the reference in one of these mediums, they would 

be prejudiced and could not cure the prejudice through cross examination. To the extent 

that this ruling is more liberal than the Court’s conclusion on summary judgment (with 

respect to the combination of Levere and Mugge as to claim 10 of the ’459 Patent), the 

difference is attributable to the static evidentiary record on summary judgment, whereas 

here Plaintiffs will have the opportunity to explore testimony on cross examination. That 

is not to say that particularized disclosure was not required, however. 

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2. References Precluded if Not Disclosed as to Claim Element: Where prior art 

was not disclosed with respect to a particular claim or claim element in Defendants’

Amended Invalidity Contentions, expert report, rebuttal expert report, or expert deposition, 

Defendants are precluded from relying on that reference as invalidating art for that claim 

element. 

3. Defendants’ Expert is Precluded from Testifying About Motivations to 

Combine References That Were Not Disclosed or Supported by Disclosures in His Expert 

Report, Rebuttal Expert Report, or Deposition.

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 Plaintiffs devote much of their briefing to 

arguing Defendants’ expert, Dr. Volek, should not be allowed to testify to reasons a person 

of ordinary skill in the art would be motivated to combine prior art references where those 

reasons were not provided in his expert report. Although it is unclear whether Defendants 

actually intend to introduce any such testimony, the Court notes that Defendants’ expert 

may not introduce bases for his opinion and may not testify about reasons or motivations 

to combine that were not disclosed in his expert report, rebuttal expert report, or deposition. 

See Jenkins, 487 F.3d at 487; Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i). By way of example, Dr. Volek 

is not precluded from testifying that the disclosure in Weider’s Arginine & Lysine product 

would motivate a person of ordinary skill to rely on other teachings—or providing greater 

detail and elaborating on this disclosed motivation to combine—because this opinion and 

the basis for it are outlined in his Expert Report. Dr. Volek would be precluded, however, 

from testifying about some other publication that was not discussed in his report that 

suggests combining certain prior art references. 

/ / /

 

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In light of the discussion at the hearing on this motion, the Court clarifies that this Order precludes 

introduction of individual prior art references as they pertain to particular claims and elements, and does 

not preclude combinations of art that were not otherwise disclosed. That is, where Defendants have 

disclosed prior art and explained how it reads on certain claim elements, Plaintiffs are already on notice 

of how that art might be applied to those elements. The issue likely to arise with respect to previously 

undisclosed combinations of art will be the motivation to combine those references. Where Defendants’ 

expert has not in his expert report, rebuttal expert report, or deposition explained the basis for why a skilled 

artisan would combine those references, he may not do so for the first time at trial. 

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DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

Next, Defendants ask the Court to preclude Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Boger, from 

testifying regarding the secondary considerations of nonobviousness. 

“‘[T]he Daubert gatekeeping obligation is less pressing in connection with a bench 

trial’ where ‘the ‘gatekeeper’ and the trier of fact [are] one and the same.’” AngioScore, 

Inc. v. TriReme Med., Inc., 87 F. Supp. 3d 986, 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (citing various 

cases). The gatekeeping function must still be performed, however. See Metavante Corp. 

v. Emigrant Sav. Bank, 619 F.3d 748, 760 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow 

Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) (“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of 

contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and 

appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”).

Much of Dr. Boger’s testimony with respect to the secondary considerations of 

nonobviousness would be based on his “knowledge and experience” in the industry, “rather 

than the methodology or theory behind” his testimony. United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 

1160, 1169 (9th Cir. 2000). In such cases, “[t]he Daubert factors (peer review, publication, 

potential error rate, etc.) simply are not applicable.” Id.; see also See Kumho Tire Co. v. 

Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999) (“Engineering testimony rests upon scientific 

foundations, the reliability of which will be at issue in some cases. . . . In other cases, the 

relevant reliability concerns may focus upon personal knowledge or experience.”).

Although Dr. Boger’s deposition testimony appeared not to be based on particular 

data or analysis thereof, his opinions are based on his personal experience in the arginine 

supplementation field and meet the minimum requirements for admissibility. The concerns 

with the reliability of Dr. Boger’s testimony on this point are more appropriately 

considered with respect to the weight to which his testimony is entitled. Further, given that 

this is a bench trial, the danger of prejudice is lessened. If cross examination reveals a

complete lack of factual basis for particular aspects of Dr. Boger’s testimony, it may be 

stricken and disregarded, as opposed to merely given less weight. As a general matter, 

however, it is not precluded. 

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Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART 

Plaintiffs’ Motion and DENIES Defendants’ Motion. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 22, 2016

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