Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_17-cv-00497/USCOURTS-cand-5_17-cv-00497-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 47:227 Restrictions of Use of Telephone Equipment

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

TERRACE ELLIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

ENERGY ENTERPRISE USA, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No.17-cv-00497-VKD 

ORDER FOR REASSIGNMENT TO A 

DISTRICT JUDGE

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

RE MOTION FOR DEFAULT 

JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 37

Pro se plaintiff Terrace Ellis sues defendant Energy Enterprise USA, Inc. d/b/a National 

Renewable Energy Center and Canopy Energy California (“Energy Enterprise”) for violation of 

the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227. Ms. Ellis requested, and the 

clerk entered, default as to Energy Enterprise. Dkt. No. 33, 35. Ms. Ellis now moves for default 

judgment. Dkt. No. 37. The Court deems the matter suitable for determination without oral 

argument. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). 

Ms. Ellis has consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. Dkt. No. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. Energy Enterprise, however, has never appeared and thus has not consented to 

magistrate judge jurisdiction. Accordingly, this Court directs the Clerk of the Court to reassign 

this action to a district judge, with the following report and recommendation that Ms. Ellis’s 

motion for default judgment be granted.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. BACKGROUND

According to the third amended complaint, between November 2014 and January 2015, 

Energy Enterprise made 16 telemarketing phone calls to Ms. Ellis’s cell phone, soliciting her to 

Case 5:17-cv-00497-LHK Document 43 Filed 11/20/18 Page 1 of 11
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

purchase solar power-related services or products. Dkt. No. 30 ¶ 23. Despite Ms. Ellis’s repeated 

statements of disinterest in its products and services and her repeated requests to take her cell 

phone number off of its call list, Energy Enterprise continued to call Ms. Ellis. Id. ¶¶ 28-29. The 

Energy Enterprise representatives with whom Ms. Ellis spoke admitted that they used an auto 

dialer to place the calls. Id. ¶ 27. Ms. Ellis never provided Energy Enterprise with written consent 

to receive auto-dialed calls to her cell phone. Id. ¶ 26. The Energy Enterprise representatives with 

whom Ms. Ellis spoke said they were not certain that her number could be “removed from their 

auto dialer.” Id. ¶ 30. 

Ms. Ellis filed this action in January 2017 against National Renewable Energy Center

(“NREC”) and served that entity on February 25, 2017. Dkt. Nos. 1, 7. On March 9, 2017, Ms. 

Ellis received a phone call from Linda Lucero, who informed Ms. Ellis that she was an attorney 

who represented NREC, and that there was an error in NREC’s name as printed on the summons. 

Dkt. No. 41 ¶ 12. Ms. Lucero also informed Ms. Ellis that NREC was in the process of “closing 

its doors” and that she was helping them “wrap things up.” Id. ¶ 13. Ms. Ellis advised Ms. Lucero 

that she would serve corrected summons. Id. 

After the revised summons issued (Dkt. No. 8), Ms. Ellis re-served NREC at its address at 

5632 Van Nuys Blvd., Van Nuys CA 91401, and also served Ms. Lucero, who held herself out as 

counsel to NREC. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. Ms. Lucero purportedly informed the process server that she was 

the “attorney of record” for NREC. Id. ¶ 17. After the deadline for responding to the complaint 

passed, Ms. Ellis discovered that NREC is the business alias for a company named Renewable 

Energy Center, LLC (“REC”). Id. ¶ 20. Ms. Ellis filed a first amended complaint naming 

“Renewable Energy Center, LLC” as defendant. Id. ¶ 21; Dkt. No. 11. She unsuccessfully 

attempted service on REC’s listed address, and she also served Ms. Lucero, whom she believed to 

be counsel to REC. Dkt. No. 37-1 ¶ 23; see Dkt. Nos. 14, 15, 16.

Ms. Ellis contacted the Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder office and learned that 

NREC is a fictitious business name for a California corporation known as Energy Enterprise USA, 

Inc. (“Energy Enterprise”), whose president is Ofir Attal. Dkt. No. 41 ¶¶ 22, Ex. B. She filed a 

second amended complaint naming “Energy Enterprise USA, Inc. d/b/a National Renewable 

Case 5:17-cv-00497-LHK Document 43 Filed 11/20/18 Page 2 of 11
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Energy Center.” Dkt. No. 17. She then served Energy Enterprise by mail and substitute service at 

5632 Van Nuys Blvd., #36, Van Nuys, CA 91401. Dkt. No. 41 ¶¶ 24, 25; Dkt. No. 22. Ms. Ellis 

later discovered that Energy Enterprise is also associated with a second address of 6736 Vesper 

Ave., Van Nuys, CA 91405. Dkt. No. 41 ¶ 26, Ex. C.

On July 25, 2017, Ms. Ellis asked the Clerk of the Court to enter default against Energy 

Enterprise. The Clerk entered default on July 27, 2017. Dkt. Nos. 23, 25. Ms. Ellis served a copy 

of the summons, the second amended complaint, her request for default entry, and the Clerk’s 

entry of default on Energy Enterprise at the 6736 Vesper Ave. address via mail, return receipt with 

signature requests. Dkt. No. 41 ¶ 28. Energy Enterprise received the documents on August 14, 

2017, but it did not respond. Id.

Ms. Ellis then filed her first motion for default judgment. Dkt. No. 23. Because the Court 

was not satisfied that Energy Enterprise had been properly served, it set aside the entry of default 

without prejudice and terminated Ms. Ellis’s motion for default judgment as moot. Dkt. No. 27. 

After conducting additional research, Ms. Ellis discovered that Energy Enterprise was 

associated with a website, www.canopyenergy.com. Dkt. No. 41 ¶ 31. Ms. Ellis also discovered 

that the Better Business Bureau’s website listed “Energy Enterprise USA, Inc.” as an alternative 

business name for “Canopy Energy.” Id., Ex. C-2. Both Canopy Energy and Energy Enterprise 

appear to have the same president, Ofir Attal, and to share the same address, 5632 Van Nuys 

Blvd., Van Nuys, CA. Id. ¶ 31. Ms. Ellis learned that Energy Enterprise is registered to do 

business as “Canopy Energy” with the California Secretary of State, and that its registered agent is

Incorp Services Inc. (“Incorp”). Id. ¶ 32, Ex. D. Incorp’s agent for service of process is Steve 

Pickett, 5716 Corsa Ave., Ste. 110, Westlake Village, CA 91362-7354. Id., Ex. E.

On December 18, 2017, Ms. Ellis filed a third amended complaint against “Energy 

Enterprise USA, Inc. d/b/a National Renewable Energy Center” and “Energy Enterprise USA, Inc. 

d/b/a Canopy Energy California” on December 18, 2017 and served summons on Incorp. Dkt. 

Nos. 30, 34.1 After Energy Enterprise failed to respond, Ms. Ellis again requested, and the Clerk 

 

1

The third amended complaint also names Does 1-20.

Case 5:17-cv-00497-LHK Document 43 Filed 11/20/18 Page 3 of 11
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

again entered, default against Energy Enterprise. Dkt. Nos. 33, 35. On July 24, 2018, Ms. Ellis 

filed a second motion for default judgment with a supporting declaration. Dkt. No. 37. After the 

Court identified several problems with the supporting declaration, Ms. Ellis amended and re-filed 

the declaration on October 2, 2018. Dkt. No. 41. She served her re-filed declaration, notice of 

motion, and motion for default judgment and exhibits on Incorp, as Energy Enterprise’s registered 

agent. Dkt. No. 41 ¶ 44, Ex. G.

Energy Enterprise has not appeared.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Default may be entered against a party who fails to plead or otherwise defend an action, 

who is neither a minor nor an incompetent person, and against whom a judgment for affirmative 

relief is sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).

After entry of default, a court may, in its discretion, enter default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 55(b)(2); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). In deciding whether to enter 

default judgment, a court may consider the following factors: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the 

plaintiff; (2) the merits of the plaintiff’s substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) 

the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; 

(6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy underlying the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 

1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986). In considering these factors, all factual allegations in the 

plaintiff’s complaint are taken as true, except those relating to damages. TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. 

Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917–18 (9th Cir. 1987). When the damages claimed are not readily 

ascertainable from the pleadings and the record, the court may hold a hearing to conduct an 

accounting, determine the amount of damages, establish the truth of any allegation by evidence, or 

investigate any other matter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction and Service of Process

“When entry of judgment is sought against a party who has failed to plead or otherwise 

defend, a district court has an affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction over both the subject 

Case 5:17-cv-00497-LHK Document 43 Filed 11/20/18 Page 4 of 11
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

matter and the parties.” In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999). Here, the Court has subject 

matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Ms. Ellis’s TCPA claim 

arises under federal law. Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 378–79 (2012) (TCPA 

private right of action arises under federal law). The Court also possesses personal jurisdiction 

over Energy Enterprise. Ms. Ellis has submitted evidence that Energy Enterprise is incorporated 

in California and that it maintains a registered California agent for service of process. Am. Ins. 

Co. v. R&Q Reinsurance Co., No. 16-cv-03044-JST, 2016 WL 5930589, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 

2016); Dkt. No. 38-1 at 3 (listing state of incorporation as California); Dkt. No. 41, Ex. B (same); 

see also Dkt. Nos. 38-2, 38-3; Dkt. No. 41-1, Exs. C-2 and C-3. 

A court must also ensure the adequacy of service on the defendant. See Timbuktu Educ. v. 

Alkaraween Islamic Bookstore, No. C 06–03025 JSW, 2007 WL 1544790, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 

25, 2007). Pursuant to Rule 4(h)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, service on a 

corporation, partnership, or association may be made by delivery of process to an authorized 

agent. Ms. Ellis has shown that she served Energy Enterprise, doing business as Canopy Energy,

with process by personally serving its authorized agent, Incorp. Dkt. No. 34; see Drew v. 

Lexington Consumer Advocacy, No. 16-cv-00200-LB, 2016 WL 9185292, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 

11, 2016) (accepting service on defendant’s receptionist and employee of defendant’s registered 

agent), report and recommendation adopted, No. 16-cv-00200 SBA, 2016 WL 9223901 (N.D. 

Cal. Sept. 2, 2016). Moreover, Ms. Ellis previously served NREC, its attorney, Ms. Lucero, and 

Energy Enterprise doing business as NREC, all by personal service. Dkt. Nos. 7, 16, 22-1. The 

Court also notes that Ms. Ellis served Energy Enterprise with her first and second motions for 

default judgment by U.S. mail. Dkt. Nos. 26-5, 37-3, 42.

The Court is satisfied that Ms. Ellis has established that the Court has subject matter and 

personal jurisdiction and that service was properly effected. 

B. Eitel Factors

For the reasons discussed below, the Eitel factors weigh in favor of entering default 

judgment.

Case 5:17-cv-00497-LHK Document 43 Filed 11/20/18 Page 5 of 11
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

1. The possibility of prejudice to Ms. Ellis

The first Eitel factor considers whether the plaintiff would suffer prejudice if default 

judgment is not entered, and whether such potential prejudice to the plaintiff weighs in favor of 

granting default judgment. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471; Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. 

Supp. 2d 1039, 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 

Ms. Ellis originally sued Energy Enterprise on January 31, 2017. She subsequently 

amended her complaint three times and attempted to serve Energy Enterprise each time. Dkt. Nos. 

1, 7, 11, 16, 17, 22, 30, 32. Now, after having been served with the operative complaint and Ms. 

Ellis’s motion for default judgment, Energy Enterprise has not responded to or otherwise defended 

the action. Given Energy Enterprise’s apparent unwillingness to litigate, Ms. Ellis would likely be 

left without recourse if the Court does not enter default judgment. 

The possibility of prejudice to Ms. Ellis therefore weighs in favor of granting default 

judgment.

2. The merits of Ms. Ellis’s claim and the sufficiency of the complaint

The second and third Eitel factors concern the merits of the claim and the sufficiency of the 

complaint. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471. The Ninth Circuit suggests that these factors require that a 

plaintiff state a claim for relief on which she may recover. Kloepping v. Fireman’s Fund, No. C 

94-2684 TEH, 1996 WL 75314, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 1996) (citing Danning v. Lavine, 572 

F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978)).

Ms. Ellis asserts claims for violations of the TCPA. Dkt. No. 30 ¶¶ 1, 32-36. She alleges 

that Energy Enterprise used an automatic telephone dialing system to call her cell phone without 

her express written consent, in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A).2 Id. ¶¶ 14-30. The issue is 

whether she has pled facts sufficient to state a claim under the TCPA. 

The TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b), prohibits calls (other than for an emergency) to a 

telephone number assigned to a cell phone by way of an automatic telephone dialing system 

 

2 Although Ms. Ellis’s complaint pleads that her cell phone number has been on the National Do 

Not Call list as of June 30, 2003 and that she expressed that fact to Energy Enterprise

representatives each time they called, Dkt. No. 30 ¶ 28, Ms. Ellis does not allege any violations of 

47 U.S.C. § 227(c). The Court therefore proceeds with the understanding that Ms. Ellis seeks 

recovery under § 227(b) alone.

Case 5:17-cv-00497-LHK Document 43 Filed 11/20/18 Page 6 of 11
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

without the prior express consent of the called party. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). To state a 

claim for relief under this part of the statute, a plaintiff must show: “(1) the defendant called a 

cellular telephone number; (2) using an automatic telephone dialing system; (3) without the 

recipient’s prior express consent.” Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 

1043 (9th Cir. 2012). A plaintiff must also be a “called party” within the definition of the 

TCPA. Charkchyan v. EZ Capital, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-03564-ODW (ASx), 2015 WL 3660315, at 

*3 (CD. Cal. June 11, 2015). 

The Court finds that Ms. Ellis has stated a claim under § 227(b) of the TCPA. She alleges

that Energy Enterprise called her cell phone attempting to market solar power products and 

services to her without prior express written consent to do so, and that the Energy Enterprise 

representatives with whom she spoke confirmed that they place the calls using an auto dialer. Dkt. 

No. 30 ¶¶ 23-27, 30. 

These factors weigh in favor of default judgment.

3. The amount of money at stake

The fourth Eitel factor considers the amount of money at stake in the litigation. Eitel, 782 

F.2d at 1471. When the money is substantial or unreasonable, default judgment is discouraged. 

See id. at 1472 (three-million dollar judgment, considered in light of parties’ dispute as to material 

facts, supported decision not to enter default judgment); Tragni v. S. Elec. Inc., No. 09-32 JF (RS), 

2009 WL 3052635, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2009); Bd. of Trustees v. RBS Washington Blvd, 

LLC, No. C 09-00660 WHA, 2010 WL 145097, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2010). When the sum of 

money at stake is tailored to the specific misconduct of the defendant, default judgment may be 

appropriate. See Bd. of Trustees of the Sheet Metal Workers Health Care Plan of N. Cal. v. 

Superhall Mechanical, Inc., No. C-10-2212 EMC, 2011 WL 2600898, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 

2011) (the amount of unpaid contributions, liquidated damages, and attorney’s fees were 

appropriate as they were supported by adequate evidence provided by the plaintiffs).

Here, Ms. Ellis seeks statutory TCPA damages of $500 per violation for each of the 16 

telephone calls she received from Energy Enterprise, trebled for Energy Enterprise’s willful or 

knowing violations, for a total of $24,000, plus fees and costs of $581.82. Dkt. No. 30 ¶¶ 34, 35, 

Case 5:17-cv-00497-LHK Document 43 Filed 11/20/18 Page 7 of 11
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Prayer for Relief; Dkt. No. 37 at 15–16. As discussed below, the Court adjusts this amount to 

include only minimum statutory damages of $500 per violation, and not treble damages, plus 

costs. 

In view of the connection between the alleged wrongdoing and the amount of statutory 

damages, the amount of money at stake does not weigh against default judgment.

4. The possibility of a dispute concerning material facts or excusable 

neglect

The fifth and sixth Eitel factors concern the potential for factual disputes and whether a 

defendant's failure to respond was likely due to excusable neglect. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72. In 

Eitel, there was both a factual dispute and excusable neglect. Id. at 1472. There, the defendant 

filed an untimely answer and counterclaim in which it disputed a number of material facts. Id.

Moreover, the defendant’s response to the complaint was untimely because, as the court found, the 

parties had previously agreed to a final settlement of the action. Id. Because the defendant

reasonably relied on this agreement and promptly responded to the complaint when the agreement 

dissolved, the court excused the defendant’s failure to timely respond. Id.

Here, the record demonstrates that Ms. Ellis served Energy Enterprise with notice of this 

action and of her intent to seek default several times using different methods of service. Dkt. Nos. 

7, 16, 22, 32, 34; Dkt. No. 41 ¶¶ 11, 16-17, 24, 28, 36, 44. Yet Energy Enterprise has never 

appeared or responded to the complaint, suggesting that it has chosen not to present a defense or 

dispute any material facts in this matter. There is no indication that Energy Enterprise’s default is

due to excusable neglect. 

These factors also weigh in favor of default judgment.

5. The strong policy favoring decisions on the merits

The seventh Eitel factor requires considering the strong policy favoring decisions on the 

merits. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472; see also Pena v. Seguros La Comercial, S.A., 770 F.2d 811, 814 

(9th Cir. 1985). Although default judgment is disfavored, “[t]he very fact that [Rule] 55(b) exists 

shows that this preference, standing alone, is not dispositive.” Kloepping, 1996 WL 75314 at *3. 

“While the Federal Rules do favor decisions on the merits, they also frequently permit termination 

Case 5:17-cv-00497-LHK Document 43 Filed 11/20/18 Page 8 of 11
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

of cases before the court reaches the merits [,] . . . [as] when a party fails to defend against an 

action[.]” Id.

While the Court prefers to decide matters on the merits, Energy Enterprise’s failure to 

participate in this litigation makes that impossible. Default judgment against Energy Enterprise is 

Ms. Ellis’s only recourse. See United States v. Roof Guard Roofing Co., Inc., No. 17-cv-02592-

NC, 2017 WL 6994215, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2017) (“When a properly adversarial search for 

the truth is rendered futile, default judgment is the appropriate outcome.”). 

This factor also weighs in favor of default judgment.

C. Requested Judgment

1. Money damages

Ms. Ellis seeks only damages under the TCPA, not injunctive relief. The TCPA authorizes 

private actions for injunctive relief and/or damages equal to the greater of actual monetary loss or 

$500. 47 U.S.C. §§ 227(b)(3), (c)(5). The Court has discretion to award up to three times the 

damages value when the defendant “willfully or knowingly” violated the TCPA. Id. §§ 227(b)(3), 

(c)(5). The issue here is whether Ms. Ellis has established entitlement to treble damages. See 

Amini Innovation Corp. v. KTY Int’l Mktg., 768 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1053–54 (C.D. Cal. 2011).

“To recover damages after securing a default judgment, a plaintiff must prove the relief it 

seeks through testimony or written affidavit.” Bd. of Trustees of the Laborers Health & Welfare 

Trust Fund for N. Cal. v. A & B. Bldg. Maint. Co. Inc., No. C 13-00731 WHA, 2013 WL 5693728, 

at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2013); Cannon v. City of Petaluma, No. C 11-0651 PJH, 2011 WL 

3267714, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2011) (“In order to ‘prove up’ damages, a plaintiff is generally 

required to provide admissible evidence (including witness testimony) supporting damage 

calculations.”) see also Bd. of Trustees of Bay Area Roofers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. 

Westech Roofing, 42 F. Supp. 3d 1220, 1232 n.13 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“It is Plaintiffs’ burden on 

default judgment to establish the amount of their damages.”).

The Court addresses three issues when considering TCPA damages. See, e.g., Roylance v. 

ALG Real Estate Servs., Inc., No. 5:14-cv-02445-PSG, 2015 WL 1522244, at *9–12 (N.D. Cal. 

Mar. 16, 2015), report and recommendation adopted as modified, No. 14-cv-02445-BLF, 2015 

Case 5:17-cv-00497-LHK Document 43 Filed 11/20/18 Page 9 of 11
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

WL 1544229 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2015); Heidorn v. BDD Mktg. & Mgmt. Co., No. C-13-00229

JCS, 2013 WL 6571629, at *15–17 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2013). First, the Court must determine 

the number of TCPA violations the plaintiff has established. Roylance, 2015 WL 1522244 at *9; 

Heidorn, 2013 WL 6571629 at *15. Here, Ms. Ellis has submitted evidence of 16 phone calls 

placed in violation of § 227(b)(1)(A). Dkt. No. 41-1 at 2–3; Dkt. No. 38-1 at 4–17. 

Second, the Court must determine whether the “violations should be counted as separate 

violations for the purposes of damages.” Heidorn, 2013 WL 6571629 at *16 (emphasis in 

original); Roylance, 2015 WL 1522244 at *10. Ms. Ellis only seeks damages for the 16 calls and 

does not argue that the 16 calls amount to more than 16 violations under other subsections of 

§ 227. The Court therefore determines that Ms. Ellis has established and is eligible to recover for 

16 violations.

Third, the Court must determine the appropriate amount of damages to be awarded, 

including whether the damages should be trebled. Roylance, 2015 WL 1522244 at *10–11; 

Heidorn, 2013 WL 6571629 at *16–17. The TCPA provides for a statutory minimum of $500 per 

violation and gives the Court discretion to award up to three times that amount for knowing or 

willful violations. 47 U.S.C. §§ 227(b)(3), (c)(5).

Here, Ms. Ellis seeks an award of treble damages. However, the record before the Court is 

not sufficient to establish that Energy Enterprise acted knowingly or willfully. For example, there 

is no evidence that Energy Enterprise has previously been sued for violating the TCPA, that it 

continues to violate the TCPA, or that Energy Enterprise would consider minimum statutory 

damages of $8,000 trivial. See Heidorn, 2013 WL 6571629 at *17 (denying treble damages where 

plaintiff did not provide evidence that the defendant was previously sued under the TCPA or that 

the statutory minimum would be trivial to the defendant); Drew, 2016 WL 9185292, at *11. On 

this record, an award of minimum statutory damages in the amount of $8,000 is sufficient to 

address the violations claimed and to serve the purposes of the TCPA’s remedial provisions. See 

j2 Global Commc’ns, Inc. v. Blue Jay, Inc., No. C 08-4254 PJH, 2009 WL 4572726 at *8 (N.D. 

Cal. Dec. 1, 2009). 

The Court recommends that Ms. Ellis’s demand for treble damages be denied, and that she 

Case 5:17-cv-00497-LHK Document 43 Filed 11/20/18 Page 10 of 11
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

be awarded the statutory minimum of $500 per violation for a total of $8,000.

2. Fees and Costs

In addition to statutory damages, Ms. Ellis requests fees and costs in the amount of 

$581.82. Dkt. No. 37 at 15–16. Ms. Ellis’s motion indicates that these costs and fees are for: (1) 

court filing fees ($400.00), (2) service costs ($150.00), (3) records request from the Los Angeles 

County Recorder’s Office ($7.00), and (4) postage for serving copies of court filings on Energy 

Enterprise ($24.82). Ms. Ellis is entitled to an award of costs under Rule 54(d) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure because she is the prevailing party. Civil Local Rule 54-3 and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1920 expressly permit an award of costs for filing fees, service of process, and copies 

necessarily obtained for use in the case, and therefore Ms. Ellis is entitled to $557.00 in costs for 

those items. Postage, however, is not a taxable cost under either the local rule or § 1920. 

Heidorn, 2013 WL 6571629 at *19. 

The Court recommends an award of $557.00, which excludes the cost of postage. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, because not all parties have consented to magistrate judge

jurisdiction, it is ORDERED that this case be reassigned to a district judge. 

For the reasons discussed above, it is RECOMMENDED that Ms. Ellis’s motion for 

default judgment be granted and that judgment be entered against Energy Enterprise in the amount 

of $8,557.00.

Ms. Ellis is directed to personally serve Energy Enterprise with this Report and 

Recommendation and to file a proof of service with the Court. Any party may serve and file 

objections to this Report and Recommendation within 14 days after being served. 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; Civ. L.R. 72-3.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 20, 2018

VIRGINIA K. DEMARCHI

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 5:17-cv-00497-LHK Document 43 Filed 11/20/18 Page 11 of 11