Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01113/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01113-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1345 Foreclosure

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JIM LAWSON,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 13cv1113-GPC(RBB)

ORDER SUA SPONTE

REMANDING ACTION TO STATE

COURT

vs.

MARY WOLFE; DOES 1-10,

Defendants.

On May 9, 2013, Defendant Mary Wolfe filed a notice of removal of this

unlawful detainer action from the Superior Court of the State of California for San

Diego County. Having reviewed Defendant's notice of removal, the Court findsit does

not have subject matter jurisdiction over this action. Accordingly, the Court sua sponte

REMANDS the action to state court. 

Discussion

The federal court is one of limited jurisdiction. Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat'l

Ass'n, 479 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2007). It possesses only that power authorized by

the Constitution or a statute. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S.

534, 541 (1986). It is constitutionally required to raise issues related to federal subject

matter jurisdiction, and may do so sua sponte. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't,

523 U.S. 83, 93–94 (1998); see Indus. Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090,

1092 (9th Cir.1990). Removal jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441 et seq. A

state court action can only be removed if it could have originally been brought in

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federal court. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 (1987); Duncan v.

Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir.1996). Thus, for an action to be removed on the

basis of federal question jurisdiction, the complaint must establish either that federal

law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends

on the resolution of substantial questions of federal law. Franchise Tax Board of Cal.

v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1983).

Alternatively, a federal court may have diversity jurisdiction over an action involving

citizens of different states where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28

U.S.C. § 1332.

The presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction “is governed by the

‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when

a federal question is presented on the face of plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.”

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). A review of the state court

complaint in this case shows that Plaintiff alleges a single unlawful detainer claim

under California state law. (Dkt. No. 1-3.) It also alleges that the amount demanded

does not exceed $10,000 and seeks possession only. (Id.)

“The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is on the party seeking removal,

and the removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction.” Emrich v.

Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir.1988). “Federal jurisdiction must

be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus

v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). 

In the notice of removal, Defendant alleges that the Court has jurisdiction

pursuant to diversity and federal question. (Dkt. No. 1-1.) Defendant contends that

there is diversity between Plaintiff, not a citizen of California, and Defendant, a citizen

of California. Moreover, she contends that her damages exceed $75,000 as the value

of the residence exceeds $75,000. However, the Court looks to the Complaint to see

whether diversity exists. The complaint states that the amount in controversy does not

exceed $10,000. Thus, Defendant fails to show that this Court has diversity

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jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

Defendant also contends that there is a federal question surrounding the

construction of the Pooling and Service Agreement of the Bear Stearns Asset Backed

Securities I Trust 2005-AQ2 and alleges due process rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment arising from property interests and an unlawful foreclosure by Plaintiff. 

Defendant’s alleged federal “claims” are actually defenses and potential

counterclaims against Plaintiff. However, neither defenses nor counterclaims are

considered in evaluating whether a federal question appears on the face of a Plaintiff's

complaint. Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009) (federal question

jurisdiction cannot “rest upon an actual or anticipated counterclaim”); Valles v. IvyHill

Corp., 410 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A federal law defense to a state-law claim

does not confer jurisdiction on a federal court, even if the defense is that of federal

preemption and is anticipated in the plaintiff's complaint.”). As such, Defendant's

allegations do not establish federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

Defendant has not adequately established a basis for this Court’s subject matter

jurisdiction. The Court must remand the case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

Conclusion

Based on the above, the Court sua sponte REMANDS the action to the Superior

Court of the State of California for San Diego County.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 30, 2013

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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