Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00201/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00201-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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Unless otherwise noted, all further references to “Rule” or 1

“Rules” in this Memorandum and Order are to the Federal Rules of

Evidence.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

ELAINE STEVENSON,

NO. CIV. S 03-0201 MCE PAN

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, CRAIG

HILL, JOHN McGINNESS and DOES

1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Through this motion, Plaintiff seeks to have the original

verdict reinstated on grounds that the note received from the

jury after the first verdict was taken amounts to a statement

regarding the jury’s deliberations that is inadmissible under

Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). In support of that 1

contention, Plaintiff has produced a declaration from one of the

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jurors, Susan A. Taylor. According to Plaintiff, the initial

verdict must stand because it was not inconsistent on its face

and because the post-verdict note should not have been

considered. Defendants, on the other hand, argue that the import

of the note was not content of deliberations per se but rather

the fact that the verdict as published did not reflect the

verdict intended by the jury. Defendants further contend that

the Taylor declaration must be disregarded as inadmissible. As

set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion to Reinstate the Original

Verdict in this matter is denied. In addition, the Declaration

of Susan A. Taylor is in plain contravention of Rule 606(b) and

is accordingly not being considered in deciding this matter.

BACKGROUND

The jury in this matter returned their initial verdict at

approximately 2:05 p.m. on June 24, 2005. That verdict awarded

Plaintiff Elaine Stevenson the sum of $20,000 for past economic

loss and $153,000 in non-economic damages. Defendant Hill was

found to have acted with malice or reckless disregard of

Plaintiff’s federally protected rights in recommending that she

be transferred from the Homicide Bureau of the Sacramento County

Sheriff’s Department. After receiving the verdict, court was

adjourned for the day. The jury was not discharged, however,

because it was ordered to return on July 5, 2005 for the punitive

damages portion of the trial as against Defendant Hill.

At 2:25 p.m., or approximately ten minutes after the court’s

adjournment, jury foreperson Jonathan Blank sent a jury note

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stating as follows:

“It was our belief that we were deliberating the punitive

damages as ‘non-economic.’ We intended the sum of $153,000

as punitive and not emotional or other. We had decided that

the sum of 153,000 is the punitive damage.” 

Based on that note, the Court sua sponte vacated the

original verdict and directed the jury to resume deliberations

after providing re-instruction as to the meaning of economic and

non-economic damages. At 3:30 p.m., a second unanimous verdict

was reached which reduced the non-economic damages from $153,000

to $75,000.

ANALYSIS

A. Reinstatement of Initial Verdict

Plaintiff contends that the court’s consideration of the

jury note forwarded after the initial verdict was read violates

the provisions of Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which states

in pertinent part as follows:

“Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or

indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or

statement occurring during the course of the jury’s

deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any

other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing the juror to

assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or

concerning the juror’s mental processes in connection

therewith... Nor may a juror’s affidavit or evidence of any

statement by a juror concerning a matter about which the

juror would be precluded from testifying be received for

these purposes.”

(emphasis added).

According to Plaintiff, because the note references the

jury’s “belief” and further refers to their deliberation and

decision, it runs afoul of Rule 606(b) and should not have been

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considered. Plaintiff cites authority for the proposition that

evidence of a jury’s misunderstanding of instructions given

cannot be used to impeach a jury verdict, and argues that the

initial verdict should therefore stand. See United States v.

Stacey, 475 F.2d 1119 (9 Cir. 1973) (declarations filed by th

former jurors in support of a motion for new trial, as to jury

misunderstanding of the elements of the offense at issue, concern

the jurors’ mental processes and should not have been used for

purposes of impeaching the verdict); Peveto v. Sears. Roebuck &

Co., 807 F.2d 486 (5 Cir. 1987) (post-trial polling of jurors th

which revealed alleged misunderstanding as to contributory

negligence could not be used to impeach jury verdict).

The present case is distinguishable on its facts from either

Stacey or Peveto. Unlike those cases, the issue in this case was

brought to the court’s attention by the jury itself within

minutes of the time the initial verdict was rendered. 

Additionally, and even more importantly, the substance of the

jury’s note refers not to the deliberations themselves or to any

misunderstanding by the jurors to the substantive instructions

they received. Instead, the jury indicates it made a mistake in

awarding punitive damages it was not yet supposed to be

considering at that stage of the proceedings, before any evidence

as to punitive damages had been introduced. The jury realized

that fundamental error as soon as it was told by the court to

return for the punitive damages component of the trial, and it

immediately notified the court accordingly.

There appears to be no Ninth Circuit authority directly

addressing these particular factual circumstances. It is

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nonetheless well recognized that a juror affidavit is admissible

“to show that the verdict delivered was not that actually agreed

upon”. United States v. Dotson, 817 F.2d 1127, 1130 (5 Cir. th

1987), citing University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp.,

504 F.2d 518, 547-58 n. 43 (5 Cir. 1974). As the Tenth Circuit th

explained in Young v. United States, 163 F.2d 187, 189 (10 Cir. th

1947):

“Jurors cannot be heard to testify that while the substance

of the verdict returned into court was understood, it was

predicated upon a mistake of testimony, a misrepresentation

of law, unsound reasons, or improper motives. But jurors

are competent witnesses for the purpose of showing that

through oversight, inadvertence, or mistake respecting the

substance of the verdict returned into court, it was not the

verdict on which agreement was actually reached in the jury

room.” 

(emphasis added).

Here, it seems clear that the error identified by the jury

fits within the exception to the nonimpeachment rule recognized

by these cases. In this case, the jury thought they were

awarding punitive damages when they were not in fact doing so and

were instead making an award of non-economic damages. This Court

properly directed the jury to reconvene, after receiving its

note, for purposes of reaching a verdict which in fact

represented non-economic damages, rather than punitive damages

which were not yet to be considered. Plaintiff’s Motion to

Reinstate the Original Verdict is consequently denied.

B. Declaration of Susan A. Taylor

The Declaration of Susan A. Taylor, which Plaintiff offers

to support her argument that the initial verdict should stand, is

replete with references to the manner in which the jury

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Within her motion, Plaintiff has also requested that the 2

Court clarify the Amended Judgment in this case filed July 11,

2005. Concurrently with the filing of this Memorandum and Order,

the Court has issued a Second Amended Judgment which should, as

requested by Plaintiff’s counsel, resolve any ambiguity as to the

effect of the mistrial reached in the punitive damages aspect of

this trial.

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deliberated in this matter, and consequently should be

disregarded and stricken in its entirety. Given the clear

inadmissibility of that declaration, the Court need not consider

Ms. Taylor’s allegation that the post-verdict jury note did not

reflect the overall views of the juror as opposed to its author,

the jury foreperson. Even were that issue addressed, however,

Plaintiff’s contention that the Court should have polled the

members of the jury (to ascertain whether the note represented

their views) appears misplaced. Examination of the record shows

that after receiving the note and reinstructing the jurors as to

damage issues, the Court specifically asked the jurors whether

they had any questions before reconvening. No juror indicated at

that time that the note was inaccurate as not representing the

views of the jury as a whole. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion to Reinstate the

Initial Verdict in this Motion is DENIED. The Declaration of 2

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Susan A. Taylor, offered in support of Plaintiff’s Motion, is

inadmissible under Rule 606(b) and was accordingly not considered

by the Court in making its decision. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 28, 2005

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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