Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02496/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02496-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0423 Social Security Act (Disability Insurance Benefit Payments)

---

1 

17-cv-02496-MMA (RNB) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SCOTT KEVIN WHEAT, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 17-cv-02496-MMA (RNB) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION REGARDING 

CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

(ECF Nos. 11, 14) 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Michael M. Anello, 

United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Civil Local Rule 

72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

On December 12, 2017, plaintiff Scott Kevin Wheat filed a Complaint pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of a decision by the Commissioner of Social 

Security denying his application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. 

(ECF No. 1.) 

Now pending before the Court and ready for decision are the parties’ cross-motions 

for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS that 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be GRANTED, that the Commissioner’s crossmotion for summary judgment be DENIED, and that Judgment be entered reversing the 

Case 3:17-cv-02496-MMA-RNB Document 17 Filed 08/14/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 13
2 

17-cv-02496-MMA (RNB) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

decision of the Commissioner and remanding this matter for further administrative 

proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 8, 2014, plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and 

disability insurance benefits, alleging disability beginning March 3, 2014. (Certified 

Administrative Record [“AR”] 182-85.) After his application was denied initially and upon 

reconsideration (AR 112-15, 119-22), plaintiff requested an administrative hearing before 

an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) (AR 123-24). An administrative hearing was held on 

February 22, 2017. (AR 33-80.) Plaintiff appeared at the hearing with counsel, and 

testimony was taken from him and a vocational expert (“VE”). (AR 33-80.) 

As reflected in his April 20, 2017 hearing decision, the ALJ found that plaintiff had 

not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, prior to April 17, 2017, 

but became disabled on that date. (AR 12-32.) The ALJ’s decision became the final 

decision of the Commissioner on October 18, 2017, when the Appeals Council denied 

plaintiff’s request for review. (AR 1-6.) This timely civil action followed. 

SUMMARY OF THE ALJ’S FINDINGS

In rendering his decision, the ALJ followed the Commissioner’s five-step sequential 

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. At step one, the ALJ found that plaintiff 

had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 3, 2014, his alleged onset date. 

(AR 18.) 

At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff had the following severe impairments: 

degenerative disc disease; a chronic pain disorder with complaints of back, neck and 

shoulder pain; an obsessive compulsive disorder; an anxiety disorder with panic attacks 

secondary to agoraphobia; a depressive disorder; attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 

(ADHD); and a neurocognitive disorder. (AR 18-19.) 

At step three, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination 

Case 3:17-cv-02496-MMA-RNB Document 17 Filed 08/14/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 13
3 

17-cv-02496-MMA (RNB) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the impairments listed 

in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments. (AR 20-22.) 

Next, the ALJ determined that, from the alleged onset date to the date of the decision, 

plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to “perform light work as defined in 

20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b).” (AR 22.) He further determined that plaintiff could do the 

following: lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently, stand/walk for six 

hours in an eight-hour workday and sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday, with 

postural limitations including frequent balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling, 

and climbing ramps/stairs and ladders/ropes/scaffolds, and frequent overhead reaching 

with the non-dominant upper extremity. (AR 22.) He also determined that plaintiff was 

limited to understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple, routine, repetitive tasks, 

with standard industry work breaks every two hours; no interaction with the general public; 

and occasional work-related, non-personal, non-social interaction with co-workers and 

supervisors involving no more than a brief exchange of information or hand-off of product. 

(AR 22.) 

For purposes of his step four determination, the ALJ adduced and accepted the VE’s 

testimony that a hypothetical person with plaintiff’s vocational profile would be unable to 

perform the exertional demands of plaintiff’s past relevant work as a truck driver and 

dispatcher. Accordingly, the ALJ found that plaintiff was unable to perform any past 

relevant work since his alleged onset date. (AR 26.) 

The ALJ then proceeded to step five of the sequential evaluation process. Based on 

the VE’s testimony that a hypothetical person with plaintiff’s vocational profile would have 

been able to perform the requirements of occupations that existed in significant numbers 

in the national economy (i.e., hand packer, subassembler), the ALJ found that plaintiff was 

not disabled prior to April 17, 2017. (AR 26-28.) However, beginning on April 17, 2017, 

the date plaintiff’s age category changed, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was disabled. 

(AR 27.) 

/// 

Case 3:17-cv-02496-MMA-RNB Document 17 Filed 08/14/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 13
4 

17-cv-02496-MMA (RNB) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

DISPUTED ISSUES 

As reflected in plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, the disputed issues that 

plaintiff is raising as the grounds for reversal and remand are as follows: 

1. Whether the ALJ properly rejected the opinion of Arvin Mirow, M.D., 

plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, that plaintiff was extremely limited in “maintaining social 

functioning.” (See ECF No. 11-1 at 5-9.) 

2. Whether, assuming arguendo that the ALJ did properly assess plaintiff’s 

social functional limitations, the ALJ’s assessed RFC allowed for the performance of the 

two jobs identified by the VE at step five. (See ECF No. 11-1 at 9-10.) 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to 

determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and 

whether the proper legal standards were applied. DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 846 

(9th Cir. 1991). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but less than a 

preponderance. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Desrosiers v. Sec’y of 

Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 575-76 (9th Cir. 1988). Substantial evidence is 

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. This Court must review the record as a whole 

and consider adverse as well as supporting evidence. Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 529-

30 (9th Cir. 1986). Where evidence is susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, 

the Commissioner’s decision must be upheld. Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452 

(9th Cir. 1984). 

DISCUSSION 

As discussed hereafter, the Court concurs with plaintiff that reversal is warranted 

based on the ALJ’s alleged failure to properly consider the treating psychiatrist’s opinion 

as to plaintiff’s social functional limitations. As a result of the Court’s finding with respect 

Case 3:17-cv-02496-MMA-RNB Document 17 Filed 08/14/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 13
5 

17-cv-02496-MMA (RNB) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to that issue, it is unnecessary for the Court to reach the issue of whether the ALJ made a 

proper determination at step five. 

Medical opinions are among the evidence that the ALJ considers when assessing a 

claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b). The law is well established in this Circuit 

that a treating physician’s opinion is entitled to special weight because a treating physician 

is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an 

individual. See McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). “The treating 

physician’s opinion is not, however, necessarily conclusive as to either a physical condition 

or the ultimate issue of disability.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 

1989). The weight given a treating physician’s opinion depends on whether it is supported 

by sufficient medical data and is consistent with other evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2). If the treating physician’s opinion is uncontroverted by 

another doctor, it may be rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons. See Lester v. 

Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995); Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.3d 1391, 1396 (9th Cir. 

1991). Where, as here,1

 a treating physician’s opinion is controverted, it may be rejected 

only if the ALJ makes findings setting forth specific and legitimate reasons that are based 

on the substantial evidence of record. See, e.g., Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th 

Cir. 1998) (“A treating physician’s opinion on disability, even if controverted, can be 

rejected only with specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the 

record.”); Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751; Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 

1987). 

Here, Arvin L. Mirow, M.D., plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist since at least October 

2014, provided a one-page opinion dated January 18, 2017 listing plaintiff’s diagnoses and 

                                               

1

 Here, the opinion of Dr. Mirow as to plaintiff’s social functional limitations 

is contradicted by the opinions of the State Agency physicians, who are non-examining, 

non-treating physicians. (See AR 22-23, 25-26.) 

Case 3:17-cv-02496-MMA-RNB Document 17 Filed 08/14/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 13
6 

17-cv-02496-MMA (RNB) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

symptoms, and assessing plaintiff’s functional limitations.2

 Dr. Mirow diagnosed plaintiff 

with the following: bipolar disorder; panic disorder with agoraphobia; generalized anxiety 

disorder; obsessive-compulsive disorder; major neurocognitive disorder due to multiple 

etiologies; and ADHD. (AR 734.) He opined that plaintiff had the following “signs and 

symptoms”: pervasive loss of interest in almost all activities; feelings of guilt or 

worthlessness; generalized persistent anxiety; emotional withdrawal or isolation; 

psychomotor agitation or retardation; difficulty thinking or concentrating; thoughts of 

suicide; mood disturbance; manic syndrome; and bipolar syndrome with a history of 

episodic periods manifested by the full symptomatic picture either both manic and 

depressive syndromes. (AR 734.) In addition, in assessing plaintiff’s functional 

limitations, Dr. Mirow opined that plaintiff had “extreme” 3 difficulty in maintaining social 

functioning, “extreme” difficulty in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace, and 

“marked” difficulty in restriction of activities of daily living. (AR 734.) 

In his motion for summary judgment, plaintiff claims that the ALJ improperly 

rejected Dr. Mirow’s opinion that plaintiff had extreme difficulty in maintaining social 

functioning. (See ECF No. 11-1 at 5-11.) In plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ limited plaintiff to 

“no interaction with the general public,” but with respect to co-workers and supervisors, 

limited him only to “occasional work-related, non-personal, non-social interaction . . . 

involving no more than a brief exchange of information or hand-off of product.” (See id. 

at 5 (citing AR 22).) Based on Dr. Mirow’s opinion that plaintiff could not socially 

function at all, plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in formulating plaintiff’s RFC. 

                                               

2

 The Administrative Record contains approximately 193 pages of treatment 

notes from Dr. Mirow, beginning in October 2014 and continuing to January 2017. (See 

AR 506-46, 610-21, 624-73, 737-36.) 

3

 The form on which Dr. Mirow gave his opinion defines “extreme” impairment 

as meaning that “the patient cannot function at all in the listed area.” (AR 734.) 

Case 3:17-cv-02496-MMA-RNB Document 17 Filed 08/14/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 13
7 

17-cv-02496-MMA (RNB) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In his decision, the ALJ did not accord Dr. Mirow’s opinions substantial weight for 

two reasons, which the Court discusses below. 

A. Dr. Mirow’s opinions were supposedly inconsistent with the mental status 

examinations in evidence. 

The first reason proffered by the ALJ for rejecting Dr. Mirow’s opinion was that it 

was “inconsistent with the mental status examinations in evidence and discussed [by the 

ALJ], that show primarily mild to moderate findings.” (AR 24.) The ALJ elaborated that 

“[t]here is no evidence of record supporting the extreme mental functioning limitations set 

forth by Dr. Mirow.” (AR 24.) He added that Dr. Mirow’s “findings are not corroborated 

by the objective mental status examinations of record, which reflect that frequently, the 

claimant was oriented in four spheres with depressed mood and constricted affect. His 

memory was at times intact and at times impaired. Sensorium was clear. The claimant 

was of average intellect. His impulse control was good. Insight and judgment were fair at 

times and at other times good. Thought processes were logical. Thought content was 

unremarkable at times and at times revealed compulsions, obsessions and having to do 

things at an even numbered number of times. Psychomotor behaviors were hypoactive to 

unremarkable, and reasoning was good.” (AR 24 citing AR 510, 515-16, 524-25, 614, 625-

26, 630-31, 745-46.) 

As an initial matter, the Court notes that the ALJ’s statement that the mental status 

examinations in evidence show primarily “mild to moderate” findings is the ALJ’s own 

interpretation of the findings. The treatment notes cited by the ALJ do not use the phrase 

“mild to moderate” to describe the findings. Thus, to the extent that the ALJ reinterpreted 

the raw medical data to reach a different assessment of plaintiff’s condition, the ALJ was 

not qualified to do so. See Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975) 

(recognizing that an ALJ is “not qualified as a medical expert”); see also Taylor v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228, 1235 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that an ALJ may not 

substitute his layperson personal observations of claimant for the opinions of claimant’s 

Case 3:17-cv-02496-MMA-RNB Document 17 Filed 08/14/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 13
8 

17-cv-02496-MMA (RNB) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

treating physicians); Manso-Pizarro v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 76 F.3d 15, 17 

(1st Cir. 1996) (“With few exceptions, . . . an ALJ, as a lay person, is not qualified to 

interpret raw data in a medical record.”); Ross v. Gardner, 365 F.2d 554, 558 (6th Cir. 

1966) (“While the Secretary may have expertise in respect of some matters, we do not 

believe he supplants the medical expert.”); Padilla v. Astrue, 541 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1106 

(C.D. Cal. 2008) (“[A]s a lay person, an ALJ is simply not qualified to interpret raw 

medical data in functional terms.”); see generally Nguyen v. Chater, 172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st 

Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (ALJ is not at liberty to ignore medical evidence or substitute his 

own views of the medical evidence). 

Furthermore, the Court notes that the only objective mental status examinations of 

record cited by the ALJ in support of this proffered reason are the treatment notes of Dr. 

Mirow himself. A conflict between treatment notes and a treating provider’s opinions may 

constitute an adequate reason to discredit the opinions of a treating physician. Ghanim v. 

Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 

1111-12 (9th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that a conflict with treatment notes is a germane 

reason to reject a treating physician’s assistant’s opinion); Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 692-93 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that a conflict with a treating 

physician’s own treatment notes is a specific and legitimate reason to reject treating 

physician’s opinion). 

However, in this case, the ALJ failed to specifically identify the contradiction 

between Dr. Mirow’s findings listed above and Dr. Mirow’s opinion that plaintiff was 

extremely limited in maintaining social function. (See AR 734.) Moreover, a review of 

Dr. Mirow’s treatment notes indicates that plaintiff was extremely limited in maintaining 

social function. His notes state that plaintiff was agoraphobic and primarily stayed home 

for fear of having a panic attack, which he would routinely have in both public and private. 

(See, e.g., AR 508, 513, 519, 522, 533, 612, 617, 624, 629, 633, 655, 659, 744, 749.) His 

notes further indicate that plaintiff could not go to crowded places (see, e.g., AR 503, 513, 

519, 530, 533, 612) and was only able to leave the house one to two times per week, and 

Case 3:17-cv-02496-MMA-RNB Document 17 Filed 08/14/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 13
9 

17-cv-02496-MMA (RNB) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

typically only if accompanied by his wife or son (see, e.g., AR 508, 513, 522, 527, 533, 

617, 624, 739; see also 508 (occasionally able to walk by himself in a park)). Plaintiff 

further reported difficulty and/or fear of going to the store or gym, dropping off his son at 

school, waiting in the emergency room, opening his front door, checking his mail, 

answering the phone, and interacting with friends or a neighbor. (See, e.g., AR 508, 513, 

519, 533, 612, 617, 624, 629, 638, 649, 655, 659, 664, 669, 744.) On one occasion, plaintiff 

did report going to church with his wife and “really liking the people there.” (See AR 643, 

646.) However, this appears to be the only instance of positive interaction with strangers 

identified in Dr. Mirow’s treatment notes, and Dr. Mirow’s opinion of plaintiff’s social 

functional limitations took the interaction into consideration. See Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2008) (references in notes that claimant’s anxiety 

and depression were “improving” are not “sufficient to undermine the repeated diagnosis 

of those conditions”); Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1205 (9th Cir. 2001) (“That 

a person who suffers from severe panic attacks, anxiety, and depression makes some 

improvement does not mean that the person’s impairments no longer seriously affect her 

ability to function in a workplace.”); Knape v. Berryhill, No. 16-16700, 2018 WL 2473471, 

at *2 (9th Cir. June 4, 2018). 

The Court further notes that the only opinions which contradicted Dr. Mirow’s 

opinion on plaintiff’s social functioning ability were those of the State Agency physicians, 

Heather Barrons, Psy.D. and Anna M. Franco, Psy.D. (See AR 22-23, 25-26.) Both 

physicians opined that plaintiff would be “moderately limited” in his ability to interact 

appropriately with the general public and to get along with coworkers or peers without 

distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes. (AR 91.) They elaborated that plaintiff 

would be able to “accept supervision and interact with co-workers on a non-collaborative 

basis” and “tolerate brief and superficial public contact.” (AR 91.) They further opined 

that plaintiff would not be significantly limited in his ability to accept instructions and 

respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors. (AR 91.) 

Case 3:17-cv-02496-MMA-RNB Document 17 Filed 08/14/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 13
10 

17-cv-02496-MMA (RNB) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

However, both physicians, who are non-examining, non-treating physicians, 

reviewed a very limited subset of plaintiff’s psychiatric records. On initial review, Dr. 

Barrons only reviewed 2012 and 2013 records from Kaiser and two 2014 treating source 

statements from Barbara Lee, MFT at Psychiatric Centers at San Diego. (See AR 83-86.) 

In 2012 and 2013, plaintiff visited psychiatrists at Kaiser regarding his previouslydiagnosed major depression, obsessive compulsive disorder, anxiety disorder, and panic 

disorder with agoraphobia to discuss his medications. (AR 494-501.) At the time, plaintiff 

was employed and in overall stable condition. (AR 494-501.) As such, one psychiatrist 

noted that plaintiff would have no more than slight impairment in social functioning. (See 

AR 496.) On reconsideration, Dr. Franco reviewed an additional 41 pages of treatment 

records from Psychiatric Centers at San Diego, which included 25 pages of Dr. Mirow’s 

treatment records. (See AR 97-103.) However, neither State Agency physician reviewed 

any of Dr. Mirow’s treatment notes from the second half of 2015, 2016, the beginning of 

2017, or the January 2017 opinion itself. 

As the ALJ noted in his decision, plaintiff’s condition reportedly worsened over 

time. (See AR 20-21.) For example, in 2014, plaintiff was given a GAF score of 60. In 

2015, however, plaintiff received a GAF score of 43 and 55, and in 2016, he received GAF 

scores of 40 and 44. (See, e.g., AR 488, AR 539, AR 511, AR 520, AR 651, AR 640.) 

Thus, Dr. Mirow’s opinion is arguably more probative than earlier opinions. See Stone v. 

Heckler, 761 F.2d 530, 532 (9th Cir. 1985) (where the claimant’s “condition [is] 

progressively deteriorating, the most recent medical report is the most probative”); see also 

Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 754-55 (“Where a claimant’s condition becomes progressively 

worse, medical reports from an early phase of the disease are likely to be less probative 

than later reports.”).4

 

                                               

4

 Moreover, the Court notes that shortly after Dr. Mirow’s opinion in January 

2017, as soon as plaintiff reached a new age category on April 17, 2017, the ALJ 

determined that he was disabled. (AR 27.) 

Case 3:17-cv-02496-MMA-RNB Document 17 Filed 08/14/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 13
11 

17-cv-02496-MMA (RNB) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s first reason for rejecting Dr. 

Mirow’s opinion as to plaintiff’s social functional limitations was legally insufficient. 

B. Plaintiff’s self-reported activities were supposedly inconsistent with Dr. 

Mirow’s opinions. 

The second reason proffered by the ALJ for rejecting the opinions of Dr. Mirow was 

that they were inconsistent with “plaintiff’s self-reported activities in the function report of 

record.” (AR 24.) Among other things, the ALJ noted that plaintiff reported that he “can 

drive a car and can go out alone.” (AR 25, citing AR 237.) The ALJ also noted that 

plaintiff reported that he could shop in stores for food, follow instructions, and get along 

well with others, including authority figures. (AR 25, citing AR 237, 239-40.) 

Plaintiff submitted a “Function Report” dated October 30, 2014. (AR 234-42.) In 

the report, plaintiff reported that his anxiety and panic attacks “stop [him] at times from 

being able to leave [his] house” for “fear of socializing” and “fear of a panic attack.” (AR 

234.) He reported that he can no longer take his family out to eat, spend time with friends, 

socialize, and do physical activities. (AR 235.) Plaintiff also reported that he can drive a 

car, and go shopping for food, which he does three times a month for ten minutes at a time. 

(AR 237.) Sometimes he needs his wife to go shopping with him. (AR 237.) Plaintiff 

reported that he does not have problems getting along with people, including authority 

figures, but that he also does not spend time with others or socialize. (AR 238-40.) 

On February 5, 2015, plaintiff submitted another “Function Report,” which was not 

cited by the ALJ. (AR 244-51.) In this report, plaintiff reported that his “mental health 

condition affect[ed] [his] ability to talk or be around people due to [his] anxiety and 

agoraphobia.” (AR 244.) Plaintiff reported that his ability to go outside was “very limited” 

due to his agoraphobia, and when he would go out, he could not go out alone and needed 

his wife to accompany him. (AR 247.) Plaintiff further reported that his wife did the 

shopping. (AR 247.) Plaintiff reported spending time with his family and his hobbies 

included playing video games with his son and watching television. (AR 248.) Plaintiff 

Case 3:17-cv-02496-MMA-RNB Document 17 Filed 08/14/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

 13
12 

17-cv-02496-MMA (RNB) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

further reported that his condition affected getting along with others and that he did not see 

his friends very often due to his anxiety. (AR 249.) He also reported that he got along 

“fine” with authority figures. (AR 250.)5

Based on the foregoing, the Court cannot discern an inconsistency between Dr. 

Mirow’s opinion that plaintiff had extreme impairment in social functioning and the 

function reports submitted by plaintiff. Plaintiff consistently reported difficulty leaving 

the house, particularly alone, and almost no social interaction for fear of panic attacks. 

Although plaintiff reported that he could get along with others, including authority figures, 

it also appears that following the exacerbation of plaintiff’s illness, he did not – and could 

not – interact with anyone but his immediate family (i.e., his wife, son, and daughter), his 

doctors, and occasionally someone at the grocery store. Accordingly, the Court finds that 

the ALJ’s second reason for rejecting Dr. Mirow’s opinion as to plaintiff’s social functional 

limitations also was legally insufficient. 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 

For the foregoing reasons, this Court RECOMMENDS that plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment be GRANTED, that the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary 

judgment be DENIED, and that Judgment be entered reversing the decision of the 

                                               

5

 In two third party Function Reports, dated October 31, 2014 and March 4, 

2015, submitted by plaintiff’s wife, she corroborated plaintiff’s function reports. She 

similarly highlighted the decreasing ability over time of plaintiff to leave the house, 

particularly alone. In March 2015, she stated that due to her husband’s mental illness, “he 

[could not] go out by his own because of his anxiety and agoraphobia.” (AR 253.) She 

added that he “seldom” goes outside, except for doctor’s appointments, and that he has a 

hard time going out alone without her along. (AR 254, 256-57.) She stated that she does 

all the shopping. (AR 256.) She noted that his condition affects him getting along with 

others, but also noted that he does not have a problem getting along with family, friends, 

neighbors, or authority figures. (AR 258-59.) The ALJ found that her “recorded 

observations [we]re consistent with [plaintiff’s] disability function report and testimony.” 

(AR 24.) 

Case 3:17-cv-02496-MMA-RNB Document 17 Filed 08/14/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of

 13
13 

17-cv-02496-MMA (RNB) 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Commissioner and remanding this matter for further administrative proceedings pursuant 

to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

Any party having objections to the Court’s proposed findings and recommendations 

shall serve and file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a 

copy of this Report and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The objections 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” A party may respond 

to the other party’s objections within 14 days after being served with a copy of the 

objections. See id. 

Dated: August 14, 2018 

 __________________________________ 

 ROBERT N. BLOCK 

 United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:17-cv-02496-MMA-RNB Document 17 Filed 08/14/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of

 13