Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04228/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04228-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN NEBLETT,

Petitioner,

v.

S. W. ORNOSKI, warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 05-4228 SI (pr)

ORDER DENYING HABEAS

PETITION

INTRODUCTION

John Neblett, an inmate at San Quentin State Prison, filed this pro se action seeking a writ

of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is now before the court for consideration

of the merits of the petition. For the reasons discussed below, the petition will be denied. 

BACKGROUND

Neblett was convicted in San Diego County Superior Court of second degree murder and

was sentenced in 1985 to 15 years to life in prison. His habeas petition does not challenge his

conviction but instead challenges a March 26, 2003 decision of the Board of Prison Terms, now

known as the Board of Parole Hearings ("BPH"), that found him not suitable for parole. The

2003 hearing was Neblett's fifth parole hearing, and was conducted at a time when he was 18

years into his 15-to-life sentence. 

The BPH identified the circumstances of the commitment offense, Neblett's unstable

social history, his prior criminality, and his need for further therapy as the reasons for the

determination that Neblett was not suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to society or a threat to public safety if released from prison. Resp. Exh. 2 (reporter's

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transcript of March 26, 2003 BPH hearing (hereinafter “RT”)) at 58-59. The specifics regarding

the crime and the circumstances supporting the finding of unsuitability are described in the

Discussion section later in this order. 

Neblett sought relief in the California courts. Neblett filed a habeas petition in 2004 in

the Marin County Superior Court that was transferred to the San Diego County Superior Court,

where it was denied in a reasoned decision. Resp. Exhs. 25-26. The California Court of Appeal

denied Neblett's habeas petition in a reasoned decision. Resp. Exhs. 27-28. The California

Supreme Court summarily denied Neblett's habeas petition. Resp. Exhs. 29-30.

Neblett then filed his federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court found

cognizable three claims -- i.e., that there was not sufficient evidence to support the decision, that

the decision breached the plea agreement he entered when he pled guilty, and that the regulation

the BPH uses to determine parole suitability is void for vagueness – and ordered respondent to

show cause why the writ should not issue. Respondent filed an answer and Neblett filed a

traverse. The matter is now ready for a decision on the merits.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this habeas action for relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the challenged

action concerns the execution of the sentence of a prisoner housed at San Quentin State Prison

in Marin County, within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 2241(d).

EXHAUSTION

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas

proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are required first to exhaust state

judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the

highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim

they seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). The parties do not dispute that

state court remedies were exhausted for the claims asserted in the petition.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The

petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

409-13 (2000). Section 2254(d) applies to a habeas petition from a state prisoner challenging

the denial of parole. See Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1126-27 (9th

Cir. 2006).

DISCUSSION

A. Due Process Requires That Some Evidence Support a Parole Denial

A California prisoner with a sentence of a term of years to life with the possibility of

parole has a protected liberty interest in release on parole and therefore a right to due process in

the parole suitability proceedings. See Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536, 542 (9th Cir. 2008);

Sass, 461 F.3d at 1127-28; Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b); see also Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482

U.S. 369 (1987); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979).

A parole board's decision satisfies the requirements of due process if “some evidence”

supports the decision. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29 (adopting some evidence standard for

disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985)). "To

determine whether the some evidence standard is met 'does not require examination of the entire

record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.

Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support

the conclusion reached'" by the BPH. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128 (quoting Superintendent v. Hill,

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Although Sass saw the requirement that the decision not be "otherwise arbitrary" as part

of the "some evidence" standard, 461 F.3d at 1129, Hayward saw the "some evidence"

requirement as separate from the requirement that the decision not be "otherwise arbitrary."

Hayward quoted Irons, infra, for the proposition: "We have held that 'the Supreme Court ha[s]

clearly established that a parole board's decision deprives a prisoner of due process with respect

to this interest if the board's decision is not supported by "some evidence in the record," or is

"otherwise arbitrary."'" Hayward, 512 F.3d at 542. 

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472 U.S. at 455-56.) The "some evidence standard is minimal, and assures that 'the record is not

so devoid of evidence that the findings of the . . . board were without support or otherwise

arbitrary.'" Id. at 1129 (quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 457).1

 The some evidence

standard of Superintendent v. Hill is clearly established law in the parole context for purposes

of § 2254(d). Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. 

What little guidance has come from the Supreme Court suggests that judicial review

should be extremely deferential to the original decision-maker in the parole context. In addition

to the very low evidentiary standard that Superintendent v. Hill imposes, other Supreme Court

comments suggest that the judiciary should be quite mindful of the subjective and predictive

nature of a parole board's decision. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 13. "No ideal, error-free way

to make parole-release decisions has been developed; the whole question has been and will

continue to be the subject of experimentation involving analysis of psychological factors

combined with fact evaluation guided by the practical experience of decisionmakers in

predicting future behavior. Our system of federalism encourages this state experimentation."

Id.; see also id. at 8. 

Having determined that there is a due process right, and that some evidence is the

evidentiary standard for judicial review, the next step is to look to state law because that sets the

criteria to which the some evidence standard applies. See Hayward, 512 F.3d at 542. One must

look to state law to answer the question, "'some evidence' of what?"

B. State Law Standards For Parole For Murderers In California

California uses indeterminate sentences for most non-capital murderers, with the term

being life imprisonment and parole eligibility after a certain minimum number of years. A first

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 The listed circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole are the nature of the

commitment offense, i.e., whether the prisoner committed the offense in "an especially heinous,

atrocious or cruel manner;" the prisoner has a previous record of violence; the prisoner has an

unstable social history, the prisoner previously engaged in a sadistic sexual offense, the prisoner

has a lengthy history of severe mental problems related to the offense; and negative institutional

behavior. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c). The listed circumstances tending to show suitability

for parole are the absence of a juvenile record, stable social history, signs of remorse, a stressful

motivation for the crime, whether the prisoner suffered from battered woman's syndrome, lack

of criminal history, the present age reduces the probability of recidivism, the prisoner has made

realistic plans for release or developed marketable skills, and positive institutional behavior. 15

Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(d). 

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degree murder conviction yields a minimum term of 25 years to life and a second degree murder

conviction yields a minimum term of 15 years to life imprisonment. See In re Dannenberg, 34

Cal. 4th 1061, 1078 (Cal.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 844 (2005); Cal. Penal Code § 190. The

upshot of California's parole scheme described below is that a release date normally must be set

unless various factors exist, but the "unless" qualifier is substantial. 

A BPH panel meets with an inmate one year before the prisoner's minimum eligible

release date "and shall normally set a parole release date. . . . The release date shall be set in a

manner that will provide uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in respect

to their threat to the public, and that will comply with the sentencing rules that the Judicial

Council may issue and any sentencing information relevant to the setting of parole release

dates." Cal. Penal Code § 3041(a). Significantly, that statute also provides that the panel "shall

set a release date unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or

offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that

consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this

individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting." Cal. Penal Code

§ 3041(b). 

One of the implementing regulations, 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2401, provides: "A parole

date shall be denied if the prisoner is found unsuitable for parole under Section 2402(c). A

parole date shall be set if the prisoner is found suitable for parole under Section 2402(d). A

parole date set under this article shall be set in a manner that provides uniform terms for offenses

of similar gravity and magnitude with respect to the threat to the public."2

 The regulation also

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provides that "[t]he panel shall first determine whether the life prisoner is suitable for release on

parole. Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and

denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to society if released from prison." 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(a). The panel may

consider all relevant and reliable information available to it. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(b). 

The federal habeas court's task is not to determine whether some evidence supports the

reasons cited for the denial of parole, "but whether some evidence indicates a parolee's release

unreasonably endangers public safety. Some evidence of the existence of a particular factor does

not necessarily equate to some evidence the parolee's release unreasonably endangers the public

safety." Hayward, 512 F.3d at 543 (citation omitted). 

A critical issue in parole denial cases concerns the parole authority's use of evidence

about the murder that led to the conviction. Four Ninth Circuit cases provide guidance for

applying the Superintendent v. Hill some evidence standard on this point: Biggs v. Terhune, 334

F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2003), Sass, 461 F.3d 1123, Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846 (2007), and, most

recently, Hayward, 512 F.3d 536. Biggs explained that the value of the criminal offense fades

over time as a predictor of parole suitability: “The Parole Board’s decision is one of ‘equity’ and

requires a careful balancing and assessment of the factors considered. . . . A continued reliance

in the future on an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to

imprisonment, runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could

result in a due process violation.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17. Biggs upheld the initial denial of

a parole release date based solely on the nature of the crime and the prisoner’s conduct before

incarceration, but cautioned that “[o]ver time . . ., should Biggs continue to demonstrate

exemplary behavior and evidence of rehabilitation, denying him a parole date simply because

of the nature of Biggs’ offense and prior conduct would raise serious questions involving his

liberty interest in parole.” Id. at 916. Next came Sass, which criticized the Biggs statements as

improper speculation and beyond the scope of the dispute before the court. Sass, 461 F.3d at

1129. Sass determined that the parole board is not precluded from relying on unchanging factors

such as the circumstances of the commitment offense or the petitioner's pre-offense behavior in

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The California Supreme Court has determined that the facts of the crime can alone

support a sentence longer than the statutory minimum even if everything else about the prisoner is laudable. "While the Board must point to factors beyond the minimum elements of the crime

for which the inmate was committed, it need engage in no further comparative analysis before concluding that the particular facts of the offense make it unsafe, at that time, to fix a date for

the prisoner's release." Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071; see also In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th

616, 682-83 (Cal. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 980 (2003) ("[t]he nature of the prisoner's offense, alone, can constitute a sufficient basis for denying parole" but might violate due process "where no circumstances of the offense reasonably could be considered more aggravated or violent than the minimum necessary to sustain a conviction for that offense"). Hayward does

not explain how Dannenberg's more-than-the-minimum-elements rule fits into the picture, and simply ignores it. 

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determining parole suitability. See id. (commitment offenses in combination with prior offenses

provided some evidence to support denial of parole at subsequent parole consideration hearing).

The next decision, Irons, aligned with Biggs, determining that due process was not violated by

the use of the commitment offense and pre-offense criminality to deny parole for a prisoner 16

years into his 17-to-life sentence, but emphasized that in all three cases (Irons, Sass and Biggs)

in which the court had "held that a parole board's decision to deem a prisoner unsuitable for

parole solely on the basis of his commitment offense comports with due process, the decision

was made before the inmate had served the minimum number of years required by his sentence."

Irons, 505 F.3d at 853. Most recently, Hayward granted relief to a prisoner who had been in

custody 27 years on his 15-to-life sentence. Hayward repeated the quoted passage from Biggs

and stated Irons had noted that "'in some cases, indefinite detention based solely on an inmate's

commitment offense, regardless of the extent of his rehabilitation, will at some point violate due

process, given the liberty interest in parole that flows from the relevant California statutes.'

Irons, 505 F.3d at 854. 'The commitment offense can negate suitability only if circumstances

of the crime reliably established by evidence in the record rationally indicate that the offender

will present an unreasonable public safety risk if released from prison.' [In re] Scott, 133

Cal.App.4th [573, 595 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)]." Hayward, 512 F.3d at 545.3

 

The message of these cases is that the BPH can look at immutable events, such as the

nature of the conviction offense and pre-conviction criminality, to predict that the prisoner is not

currently suitable for parole even after the initial denial (Sass), but the weight to be attributed

to those immutable events should decrease over time as a predictor of future dangerousness as

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the years pass and the prisoner demonstrates favorable behavior (Biggs, Irons, and Hayward).

Also, the focus must be on whether the commitment offense demonstrates present dangerousness

if it is relied upon to deny parole (Hayward). Superintendent v. Hill's standard might be quite

low, but it does require that the decision not be arbitrary, and reliance on only the facts of the

crime might eventually make for an arbitrary decision.

C. The Claims

1. Some Evidence Supports The BPH’s Decision In Neblett's Case

The BPH identified the circumstances of the commitment offense, Neblett's unstable

social history, Neblett's prior criminality, and his need for further therapy as the reasons for the

determination that Neblett was not suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to society or a threat to public safety if released from prison. 

The crime was summarized in the probation officer's report, which was incorporated by

reference at the 2003 hearing:

On 7-14-84 at 1635 hours, police responded to a shooting that had occurred in a motor

home parked on Fiesta Island. The motor home belonged to William Mohrman.

According to witnesses, one gunshot was fired within the motor home, followed by a

white male with blood on his hand, later identified as John Neblett, stating "I shot him[.]"

The victim was 22-year old Robert Anthony Gortarez.

Earlier that day, Neblett and a friend picked up a quarter-keg of beer and drove to Fiesta

Island for the 'over-the-line' tournament. They began to socialize with Mohrman (a coworker of Neblett's) and various other people, at Mohrman's motor home. Mohrman took

out his gun to show nearby friends. He returned a short time later, unloaded the gun and

left it on the sofa in the motor home. The shells were placed next to the gun. DaVilla,

Neblett's friend, put the gun and shells in a rear cabinet. Mohrman and Neblett left to get

some ice for the beer. During the time they were gone, DaVilla and the others were

joined outside by Gortarez. Gortarez was in and out of the motor home on several

occasions, drinking beer and asking for cigarettes. Upon his return with ice, Neblett gave

Gortarez another beer and cigarette, then told him to leave. Gortarez complied but

returned a short time later asking for more. Neblett became agitated with Gortarez's

obnoxiousness and unwillingness to leave. Neblett retrieved the gun from the rear of the

motor home and placed it to Gortarez's head while he was seated on the step outside the

motor home. Neblett stated, "We told you to get the hell out of here. I'm not fucking

with you." Gortarez told him to take it easy. Neblett fired the gun in an upward angle

below Gortarez's ear, resulting in the victim's death. Neblett then moved the body to the

back of the motor home and told somebody to call the cops because he had killed a man.

Resp. Exh. 9 at 1, Exh. 10 at 2-3; RT 6. When prodded, Neblett admitted that he had been

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motivated in part by bigotry: "The skin tone of my victim influenced me slightly." RT 55; but

cf. RT 37-38 (doesn't remember making "the remark that he killed the victim because the victim

was a Mexican.") Neblett also stated that, on the day of the shooting, he had a "hallucination

thinking that [the victim] had come back to harm [him]." RT 7. Neblett obtained the gun to

defend himself and once he had the gun, his temper "went through the ceiling" and he felt

powerful. RT 7, 39. Neblett wrestled with feelings of inadequacy, as he thought he "was a sissy

and [he] wouldn't do anything because [he] was so afraid," RT 7, and then shot the victim.

Neblett pulled the trigger with the intent to kill. 

The BPH next considered Neblett's pre-incarceration factors. RT 12; Resp. Exhs. 11-13.

Neblett came from a dysfunctional family, his parents abused alcohol, and Neblett had

developed a serious alcohol problem. Neblett stated that he had consumed a lot of alcohol on

the day of the murder. He also explained that, since his juvenile years, he had been drinking

until he passed out. He also had two juvenile arrests involving alcohol, for which he was fined.

His parents also had abused alcohol, fought regularly, showed minimal affection for the children,

and divorced when he was 14. Resp. Exh. 12. Neblett smoked some marijuana, but when he

dropped out of school and joined the Navy, he switched to alcohol consumption that

progressively worsened. The BPH considered Neblett's favorable behavioral history in

custody. Neblett had received a rules violation report in 1988 for delaying lock-up and had six

counseling memoranda (the last of which was in 1996 for violating the smoking policy). His

counselor gave him a good evaluation and opined he would pose a low degree of threat to the

public if released on parole. The psychologist also gave a favorable evaluation, and wrote that

Neblett's violence potential was low or less than average, and that his potential to be violent was

no greater than for an average person as long as he did not drink alcohol. Resp. Exh. 13. The

psychologist downplayed the hallucination that Neblett had reported, seeing it as a perceptual

disturbance brought on by the alcohol consumption. Id. at 7-8. 

The BPH reviewed Neblett's accomplishments in custody. Neblett had positive work

evaluations in the PIA. He also had numerous certificates of completion for electrical work and

was working toward becoming an electrician. Neblett had participated in several self-help

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programs, including Alcoholics Anonymous, substance abuse recovery, Kairos, Bible studies,

Gavel Club, Alternatives to Violence, and Squires programs. He had received his A.A. degree

in prison in 1988 and had been working toward his B.A. degree but the prison did not currently

have classes that allowed him to obtain that degree. He continued taking classes and studying

to stay current, however. He also participated on the prison baseball team since 1997.

The BPH also considered Neblett's parole plans. He had a job offer that was not in the

county of commitment. He also had an offer to live with his 76-year old father in his apartment

in New York (but Neblett had no job offer there). Neblett had applied to a residential treatment

program but had not yet been accepted to it. He planned to continue substance abuse treatment

if paroled. Neblett explained that the kind of electrical work he wanted to do was of the sort that

did not hire far in advance, and that the employers were more likely to offer work if they knew

he actually would be available. See RT 32-33.

The BPH then considered the objections of the local police department where the murder

occurred and responses to questions posed by the district attorney of the county in which the

murder occurred. Neblett, Neblett's attorney and the district attorney gave final statements

before the BPH recessed to deliberate. 

The BPH decided that Neblett was "not suitable for parole and would pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety if released from prison at this

time." RT 58. The "paramount" reason for denying parole was the commitment offense. RT

58. The BPH found that the killing was carried out in an especially vicious and brutal manner

and was essentially an execution-style murder. RT 58. The murder was done for a trivial motive

– as the state court succinctly put it, the victim only had committed the transgression of

"mooching" cigarettes and alcohol. Resp. Exh. 26, p. 4. The BPH considered a circumstance

and factors proper under California law. A circumstance tending to indicate unsuitability for

parole is that "the prisoner committed the offense in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel

manner." 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c)(1). The factors to be considered in determining whether

that circumstance exists included whether "[t]he offense was carried out in a dispassionate and

calculated manner, such as an execution-style murder,"§ 2402(c)(1)(B), which this one was, and

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This was a follow-up to the part of the hearing in which the district attorney had

discussed Neblett's claims of a hallucination on the day of the murder. The district attorney's

mere opposition to parole generally does not provide a sufficient ground for denying parole,

see Hayward, 512 F.3d at 545 n.9, and his comments and questions are noted here only as

relevant to the "hallucination" that Neblett claimed to have been acting under on the day of the

murder. As the district attorney stated, hallucinations and hearing voices are suggestive of a

mental illness that needed to be addressed but had been overlooked in the psychological

evaluation. 

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an offense done for a "very trivial" motive, § 2402(c)(1)(D), which this one was. The facts of

this murder were far beyond the minimum elements of a second degree murder. See

Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071; see also In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th at 682-83. It cannot

be said that 18 years into Neblett's 15-to-life sentence, the BPH acted arbitrarily or capriciously

or without some evidentiary support, in determining that the execution-style murder of a nonthreatening victim showed that Neblett currently presented an unreasonable risk of danger to

society if released. See Hayward, 512 F.3d at 545.

Although the murder was paramount, RT 58, the BPH identified other reasons to support

the determination that Neblett's release would present an unreasonable risk of danger to society.

The BPH relied on his unstable social history, which did have evidentiary support, but was of

slight predictive value. The BPH also relied on Neblett's history of prior criminality which,

although it consisted of only two minor juvenile offenses related to alcohol consumption, was

noteworthy because it was related to his abuse of alcohol and alcohol abuse had played a major

role in the commitment offense. RT 9-11, 59. The factor had evidentiary support, but was of

somewhat limited predictive value. The BPH determined that Neblett "has programmed for the

most part sufficiently; however, it's just not enough at this time." RT 59. The Board found that

Neblett still needed therapy in order to face, discuss, understand and cope with stress in a nondestructive manner. The BPH ordered a new psychologist's report to obtain information whether

a racial bias still existed and whether the hallucination represented a psychiatric issue that could

reappear.4

 RT 61. 

The California Court of Appeal upheld the decision in a short but reasoned order. Resp.

Exh. 28. The state court correctly identified the “some evidence” standard as the applicable

standard for judicial review, as evidenced by its citation to In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616

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(Cal. 2002), which had cited and adopted the Superintendent v. Hill some evidence standard as

the proper standard for judicial review of evidentiary sufficiency for parole denial cases.

See Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th at 665-67. Because the California Court of Appeal's decision is

the last reasoned decision, that is the decision to which § 2254(d) applies. See Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir.

2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1138 (2006). The California Court of Appeal's rejection of

Neblett's due process claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Superintendent

v. Hill's some evidence standard. 

B. Breach Of Plea Agreement Claim

Neblett asserts that his plea agreement was breached when the BPH denied parole. He

does not identify the alleged breach with any clarity and is unable to point to any particular

provision that has been breached. It appears that he is claiming a breach based on the failure of

the plea bargain to work out as he subjectively expected it would, i.e., that he would receive a

parole date if he fulfilled all the Board's requirements and would be eligible for parole in 10

years. Replacement Memo. of P&As, p. 16, Traverse, p. 19. 

The breach of plea agreement claim is time-barred. “A 1-year period of limitation shall

apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). A habeas petition by a state prisoner

challenging a decision of an administrative body, such as the BPH, is covered by the statute and

the limitations period starts to run from “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(D); Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Redd v.

McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, the factual predicate or basis of

Neblett's claim that his plea agreement was violated was known to him on January 2, 1994, when

his minimum eligible parole date arrived and he was not paroled, or no later than 1995, when

he had served ten years in custody and he was not paroled or given a parole date. Neblett’s

claim accrued in 1994 or no later than 1995 and he did not file this federal habeas petition within

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the one-year limitations period, even allowing for the time during 2004 and 2005 that his state

habeas petitions were pending. He could not revive the time-barred claim by asserting that the

agreement – which by his account was irrevocably breached in 1994 or 1995 – was breached

again in 2003, no more than one can revive a time-barred claim on a contract by demanding a

new performance and alleging a new breach years after the contract has been irrevocably

breached.

Even if the claim was not barred by the statute of limitations, the breach of plea bargain

claim has no merit. “Plea agreements are contractual in nature and are measured by contract law

standards.” Brown v. Poole, 337 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. De

la Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1337 (9th Cir. 1993)). Although a criminal defendant has a due process

right to enforce the terms of a plea agreement, see Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261-

62 (1971), there is no evidence that Neblett's subjective expectations about how parole would

be decided were part of the plea agreement. He has not pointed to any language in any plea

agreement that shows that any particular term in his plea agreement has been breached. Neblett's

sentence upon his conviction based on a plea agreement was 15-to-life and not a straight 15 year

sentence. He has received the parole considerations to which he was entitled. 

Neblett's assertion of some sort of entitlement to a parole date also appears to rest on the

regulation that contains a matrix of suggested base terms for several categories of crimes. See

15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403. The problem for Neblett is that the relevant statute and regulations

require that he first to be found suitable for parole before the matrix is consulted. See Cal. Penal

Code § 3041; 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402; Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1070-71; 15 Cal. Code

Regs. § 2403(a) ("[t]he panel shall set a base term for each life prisoner who is found suitable

for parole"). Neblett has not been found suitable, so the time for application of the matrix has

not yet arrived. 

C. Vagueness of Regulation

Neblett argues that the parole regulation's phrase "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel"

is unconstitutionally vague. He fails to acknowledge that the language following this phrase

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provides a list of five factors to consider when determining whether a crime is especially

"heinous, atrocious or cruel," including the presence of multiple victims, the abuse or mutilation

of the victim and a trivial motive for the crime. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c)(1)(A)-(E).

The term "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel," as further limited by five detailed factors/subdefinitions, is not constitutionally vague. Cf. Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 470-78 (1993)

(Idaho death penalty statute citing as an aggravating factor crimes carried out in an "utter

disregard for human life" was not impermissibly vague because limiting construction had been

adopted which defined factor as those crimes demonstrating "the utmost disregard for human

life, i.e., the cold-blooded pitiless slayer"). "The Due Process Clause does not require the same

precision in the drafting of parole release statutes as is required in the drafting of penal laws."

Hess v. Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 514 F.3d 909, 913-14 (9th Cir. 2008). Not

only was the regulation not impermissibly vague on its face, Neblett cannot seriously assert an

as-applied challenge because his activity fit squarely within one of the listed factors to be

considered in determining whether the offense was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious

or cruel manner: "The offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner, such

as an execution-style murder." 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c)(1)(D). Neblett put the rifle to the

victim's head and shot him near the ear, which is a classic example of an execution-style killing.

The state courts' rejection of Neblett's claim was not an objectively unreasonable application of

clearly established Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition is denied. The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 14, 2008 

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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