Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00635/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00635-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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28 1 Plaintiff is currently housed at Calipatria State Prison. 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHAUN DARNELL GARLAND,

Plaintiff,

 vs.

ANTHONY HEDGPETH, J. BOLIN,

THOMPSON, BLACKSTONE, 

J. VARGAS, J. OSTRANDER, 

Defendants. 

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No. C 08-00635 WHA (PR)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

TO DISMISS; DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A 

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION;

DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO

SERVE DEFENDANTS BOLIN

AND THOMPSON

(Docket Nos. 13 & 23)

Plaintiff, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging inter alia that Defendants Hedgpeth, Bolin,

Thompson, Blackstone, Vargas, and Ostrander, officers and employees of Kern Valley

State Prison, retaliated against Plaintiff for his exercise of his First Amendment rights.1

Defendants have moved to dismiss the action under the unenumerated portion of Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) and under Rule 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated herein,

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction is DENIED. Plaintiff is

DIRECTED to properly execute summons on Defendants Bolin and Thompson. 

Case 1:08-cv-00635-WHA Document 29 Filed 01/11/10 Page 1 of 10
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BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff alleges that at Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”) on and around June 4th

and June 16th of 2007, Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff for exercising his First

Amendment rights. Plaintiff filed two prison grievances related to these claims. As to the

events of June 4th, the prison’s written decision on Plaintiff’s administrative grievance

provides a useful summary of Plaintiff’s allegations: 

It is [Plaintiff]’s position that on June 4, 2007, Kern Valley State Prison

(KVSP) Third Watch Correctional Officer (CO) J. Bolin, who is assigned to

Building 4, served [Plaintiff] an evening meal tray that did not contain the

peanut butter protein supplement that is customarily given to [Plaintiff] to

replace the meat that [Plaintiff] does not eat. On June 5, 2007, CO Bolin

served [Plaintiff]’s evening meal tray with cheese as a protein replacement. 

It is contended that [Plaintiff] alerted CO Bolin that [Plaintiff] does not eat

cheese due to dairy products causing allergic reactions to him. CO Bolin

informed [Plaintiff] that be would bring him a peanut butter packet later. 

[Plaintiff] claims that later that evening, he asked CO Bolin about the

peanut butter that the officer did not bring him. CO Bolin stated that he was

not going to bring [Plaintiff] anything and also stated, “We have had

enough of you, nigger. You and your 602’s and lawsuits and we are going

to get you.” [Plaintiff] also claims this action took place at approximately

2110 hours, when CO Bolin came to collect the mail. On June 6, 2007,

Second Watch CO A. Thompson served [Plaintiff] a breakfast tray with

cheese on it. On April 9, 2007, [Plaintiff] wrote a complaint involving CO

Blackstone’s refusal to supplement [Plaintiff]’s meal with peanut butter and

her insistence on giving [Plaintiff] cheese or tuna, which she is aware that

[Plaintiff] does not eat. [Plaintiff] requests that Warden A. Hedgpeth halt

the racial threats and retaliatory acts of his subordinates against [Plaintiff].

(Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“MTD”), Decl. of Rachel Munoz, Ex. A at 6.) 

With regard to the events of June 16th, the prison’s written decision on Plaintiff’s

administrative grievance provides a useful summary of Plaintiff’s allegations:

It is the [Plaintiff]’s position that on June 16, 2007, during the Third Watch,

a Kern Valley State Prison (KVSP) Correctional Officer appeared at

[Plaintiff]’s cell door and announced that boxer shorts and shower shoes are

to be worn outside of the cell for the purpose of a cell search. [Plaintiff]

states that he was still eating his dinner meal, when the two officers

approached his door for the search. [Plaintiff] claims he was complying

with one of the officer’s strip search instructions, when this particular

officer called [Plaintiff] an “Idiot[,]” as [Plaintiff] was trying to finish

chewing some food to allow the officer to look into [Plaintiff]’s mouth. It is

contended that [Plaintiff] asked the officer for his name but the officer

refused to identify himself but after several more times asking, the officer

said his name was Vargas. [Plaintiff] also claims that this officer also

elbowed [Plaintiff] as [Plaintiff] passed by the officer. Upon returning to

Case 1:08-cv-00635-WHA Document 29 Filed 01/11/10 Page 2 of 10
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his cell, [Plaintiff] noted that the cell was in shambles and his property was

strewn about the cell, with several items taken or thrown away, including

[Plaintiff]’s prescribed medication of Metamucil. [Plaintiff] requests that

Warden A. Hedgpeth call off the verbal disrespect and retaliatory acts of his

subordinates against [Plaintiff]. 

(Id., Ex. B at 9.) 

Based on these asserted facts, Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants violated his 

(1) First Amendment rights by retaliating against him; (2) Eighth Amendment right to be

free from cruel and unusual punishment; and (3) Fourteenth Amendment right to be free

from racial discrimination. 

DISCUSSION

I. Defendants Ostrander and Hedgpeth

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Ostrander and

Hedgpeth should be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies for these claims. (MTD at 7.) Ostrander was in charge of the Institutional Gang

Investigations/Investigative Services Unit at the time of the alleged incidents. Hedgpeth

was the warden of KVSP at this same time. 

As detailed above, Plaintiff filed two prison grievances related to the claims he

raises in the instant action. In these grievances, Plaintiff mentions only that Ostrander is

Vargas’s supervisor, and details no invidious actions Ostrander may have taken. Also,

Plaintiff does not detail in these grievances that or how Hedgpeth violated Plaintiff’s

rights or otherwise caused Plaintiff injury. Rather, in those grievances Plaintiff appeals to

Hedgpeth for relief, rather than accusing him of misdeeds. 

“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is mandatory and no longer left to the discretion of the

district court. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006) (citing Booth v. Churner, 532

U.S. 731, 739 (2001)). 

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 Compliance with prison grievance procedures is all that is required to “properly

exhaust.” Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 922–23 (2007). The level of detail necessary in

a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and

claim to claim, but it is the prison’s requirements, and not the Prison Litigation Reform

Act [42 U.S.C. § 1997e], that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion. Id. at 923. The

inmate’s grievance must be sufficiently detailed to alert the prison as to “the nature of the

wrong for which redress is sought.” Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir.

2009) (citing Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2002)). A grievant must use

all steps the prison holds out, enabling the prison to reach the merits of the issue. 

Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90. 

Plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies as to his claims against

Defendants Ostrander and Hedgpeth. As to Ostrander, Plaintiff’s prison grievances do

not detail any invidious actions attributable to Defendant. Rather, Ostrander is mentioned

in the grievances only as Vargas’s supervisor, and is not alleged to have known of or

participated in the alleged violations. Because his grievance insufficiently detailed

Ostrander’s alleged invidious actions, Plaintiff’s grievance cannot have alerted the prison

as to “the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.” Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1120. 

As to Hedgpeth, Plaintiff’s prison grievances do not describe any wrong

committed by such Defendant. Indeed, Plaintiff appealed to Hedgpeth for relief, rather

than listing him as a wrongdoer. Because his prison grievance insufficiently detailed

Hedgpeth’s alleged invidious actions, Plaintiff’s grievance cannot have alerted the prison

as to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought. 

Plaintiff having failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, Defendants’ motion

to dismiss all claims against Defendants Ostrander and Hedgpeth is GRANTED. All

claims against Ostrander and Hedgpeth are hereby DISMISSED. Ostrander and

Hedgpeth are hereby TERMINATED from this action. 

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II. Defendant Thompson

Defendants have not moved for the dismissal of the claims against Defendant

Thompson. 

III. Defendants Bolin, Blackstone, and Vargas

Defendants move to dismiss all claims against Defendants Bolin, Blackstone, and

Vargas, all of whom were correctional officers at the relevant time. (MTD at 9–18.) 

A. First Amendment Claims

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails

five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against

an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action 

(4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559,

567–68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). 

Reading Plaintiff’s complaint broadly, it appears that Plaintiff has stated a claim

against Defendants Bolin and Vargas for a First Amendment violation. As to each,

Plaintiff alleges that each state actor took an adverse action (serving food allergic to

Plaintiff, searching his cell, elbowing him) because of Plaintiff’s protected activity of

filing grievances (“We have had enough of you, nigger. You and your 602’s and lawsuits

and we are going to get you”), and that such action did not reasonably advance a

legitimate correctional goal. On these facts, Defendants’ motion as to the First

Amendment claims against Defendants Bolin and Vargas is DENIED. In denying such

motion as to these claims, the Court makes no comment whether Plaintiff’s claims will

succeed on the merits. 

Plaintiff has not, however, alleged facts sufficient to state a claim against

Defendant Blackstone for a First Amendment violation. Plaintiff has alleged only that he

sent her a grievance regarding his food. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that Blackstone

took an actual adverse action that chilled his exercise of his First Amendment rights. 

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Accordingly, Defendants’ motion as to the First Amendment claims against Blackstone is

GRANTED. All First Amendment claims against Blackstone are hereby DISMISSED. 

B. Fourteenth Amendment Claims

A plaintiff alleging denial of equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on

race or other suspect classification must plead intentional unlawful discrimination or

allege facts that are at least susceptible of an inference of discriminatory intent. Monteiro

v. Tempe Union High School Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). To state a claim

for relief, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant state actor acted at least in part

because of plaintiff’s membership in a protected class. Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d

1071, 1081–82 (9th Cir. 2003).

Plaintiff has stated a claim against Defendant Bolin for racial discrimination for his

levelling a threat, prefaced with a racially pejorative epithet, at Plaintiff, and other

allegedly retaliatory acts. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss all Fourteenth

Amendment claims against Bolin is DENIED. In denying such motion as to these claims,

the Court makes no comment whether Plaintiff’s claims will succeed on the merits. 

Plaintiff, however, has not alleged facts sufficient to state a claim for racial

discrimination against Defendants Vargas or Blackstone. Indeed, Plaintiff alleged in his

prison grievances that Vargas retaliated against him by searching his cell, but did not

allege that Vargas’s actions were racially motivated. (MTD, Decl. of Rachel Munoz, Ex.

B at 9.) Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss all Fourteenth Amendment claims

against Vargas and Blackstone is GRANTED. All Fourteenth Amendment claims against

Vargas and Blackstone are hereby DISMISSED.

C. Eighth Amendment Claims

Adequate food is a basic human need protected by the Eighth Amendment. See

Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 1996), amended, 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir.

1998). Denial of food service presents a sufficiently serious condition to meet the

objective prong of the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference analysis. Foster v.

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Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812–13 (9th Cir. 2009); see, e.g., id. at 812 (denial of 16 meals

over 23 days was “a sufficiently serious deprivation because food is one of life’s basic

necessities”); id. at 812 n.1 (denial of 2 meals over 9-week period was not sufficiently

serious to meet objective prong of Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference). 

A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met:

(1) the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious, Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)), and (2) the

prison official possesses a sufficiently culpable state of mind, id. (citing Wilson, 501 U.S.

at 297).

In determining whether a deprivation of a basic necessity is sufficiently serious to

satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim, a court must consider the

circumstances, nature, and duration of the deprivation. The more basic the need, the

shorter the time it can be withheld. See Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir.

2000). Substantial deprivations of shelter, food, drinking water or sanitation for four

days, for example, are sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth

Amendment claim. See id. at 732–733; see, e.g., Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036,

1041–42 (9th Cir. 2005) 

Plaintiff has failed to state Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Bolin,

Blackstone, and Vargas. Considering the circumstances, nature, and duration of the

alleged acts, Defendants having brought or ordered to be brought to Plaintiff a tray of

food with one unacceptable item on it a handful of times does not amount to a sufficiently

serious deprivation under the Eighth Amendment. See Foster, 554 F.3d at 812 n.1. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss all Eighth Amendment claims against

Bolin, Blackstone, and Vargas is GRANTED. All Eighth Amendment claims against

Bolin, Blackstone, and Vargas are hereby DISMISSED. 

Furthermore, Defendant Blackstone is hereby TERMINATED from this action, all

claims against her having been dismissed. 

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PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Plaintiff asks the Court to issue a preliminary injunction to transfer him from the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to the Federal Bureau of Prisons. 

(See Docket No. 13.) As grounds for such a request, Plaintiff alleges that his transfer

from KVSP to his current residence at Calipatria State Prison (“CSP”) was retaliatory,

and that the officers and employees of CSP have failed to respond to his prison

grievances. See ibid. 

A preliminary injunction will not issue. Rather than stating grounds for a 

preliminary injunction, Plaintiff has stated grounds for a new civil rights action involving 

persons and circumstances different from those in the present action. If Plaintiff wishes

to seek relief for such claims, he must file a new and separate civil action from the instant

matter. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction (Docket No. 13) is

DENIED. 

SERVICE 

Defendants Bolin and Thompson remain unserved. Summons for Bolin was

returned unexecuted for the reason that he is no longer employed at KVSP. (See Docket

No. 25.) Summons for Thompson was returned unexecuted because the Marshal was

unable to identify the correct defendant, as there were many officers named Thompson. 

(See Docket No. 9.) 

In cases wherein the plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the “officers of the court

shall issue and serve all process.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). The Court must appoint the

Marshal to effect service, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2), and the Marshal, upon order of the

Court, must serve the summons and the complaint, see Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415,

1422 (9th Cir. 1994). Although a plaintiff who is incarcerated and proceeding in forma

pauperis may rely on service by the Marshal, such plaintiff “may not remain silent and do

nothing to effectuate such service”; rather, “[a]t a minimum, a plaintiff should request

service upon the appropriate defendant and attempt to remedy any apparent defects of

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which [he] has knowledge.” Rochon v. Dawson, 828 F.2d 1107, 1110 (5th Cir. 1987). 

Here, Plaintiff’s complaint has been pending for over 120 days, and, consequently,

absent a showing of “good cause,” is subject to dismissal without prejudice as to the

unserved defendants, Bolin and Thompson. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Because Plaintiff

has not provided sufficient information to allow the Marshal to locate and serve Bolin and

Thompson, Plaintiff must remedy the situation or face dismissal of his claims against said

Defendants. See Walker, 14 F.3d at 1421–22 (holding prisoner failed to show cause why

prison official should not be dismissed under Rule 4(m) where prisoner failed to show he

had provided Marshal with sufficient information to effectuate service). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff must either himself serve Bolin and Thompson with the

summons and complaint, or provide the Court with an accurate current location such that

the Marshal is able to serve Bolin and Thompson. If Plaintiff fails to effectuate service

on Bolin and Thompson, or provide the Court with an accurate current location for said

Defendants, within thirty (30) days of the date this order is filed, Plaintiff’s claims

against the unserved Defendants will be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule

4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part. All claims against Defendants Ostrander, Hedgpeth, and

Blackstone are DISMISSED. Ostrander, Hedgpeth, and Blackstone are hereby

TERMINATED from this action. All Eighth Amendment claims against Bolin and

Vargas are DISMISSED. All Fourteenth Amendment claims against Vargas are

DISMISSED. 

Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction is DENIED.

Plaintiff must comply with this order’s directions regarding the execution of

proper service on Defendants Bolin and Thompson within thirty (30) days from the date

of this order, or face dismissal of the claims against the unserved Defendants. 

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This order terminates Docket Nos. 13 & 23. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 7 , 2010 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:08-cv-00635-WHA Document 29 Filed 01/11/10 Page 10 of 10