Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_21-cv-08156/USCOURTS-azd-3_21-cv-08156-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Before the Court are Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Count Two 

and Count Three of First Amended Complaint (Doc. 105), Defendant’s Statement of Facts 

to Support Motion for Summary Judgment on Count Two and Count Three of First 

Amended Complaint (Doc. 106), Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

(Doc. 107), and Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts (Doc. 108). The Motions have been fully 

briefed and are ready for consideration.1(Docs. 109, 110, 111, 112, 115, 116). The Court 

rules as follow.

I. BACKGROUND

This case is based on an employment discrimination dispute. Defendant Lake 

Mohave Ranchos Fire District (“the District”) provides fire, medical, and community 

services to residents who live within the District’s boundaries. (Docs. 106 at ¶ 1). The

1 Because it would not assist in resolution of the instant issues, the Court finds the 

pending motion is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); 

Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998).

Karen Jackson,

 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Lake Mohave Ranchos Fire District, et 

al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV-21-08156-PCT-SPL

ORDER

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District is governed by board members (the “Board”), and the Board manages the District’s 

finances, ensures the District operates within the budget, and employs the Fire Chief. 

(Docs. 106 at ¶ 2). At relevant times, the Fire Chief was responsible for, among other 

things, the hiring, equipping, training, oversight, and evaluation of the work of all District 

personnel. (Doc. 109 at 1). In November 2016, the District employed Plaintiff Karen 

Jackson to work as the Administrative Assistant. (Docs. 106 at ¶ 8; Doc. 108 at ¶ 1). 

Plaintiff was an hourly employee and was expected to work at least 32 hours per week in 

the District office. (Doc. 106 at ¶ 10; Doc. 110 at 1).

Plaintiff attributes the following circumstances to the fact that she has long suffered 

from, and been diagnosed with, anxiety, depression, and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 

(“PTSD”). (Doc. 109 at 2). Plaintiff claims to have a significant mental health history that 

began when she was only 12, which includes substantial difficulty sleeping, depression,

and suicidal ideation. (Id.). In or about 2001, Plaintiff was drugged and raped by someone 

she met at a bar. (Id.). From about 2004 to 2006, Plaintiff was verbally and physically 

abused by her former husband; and in 2006, she was raped by this former husband. (Id.). 

Plaintiff claims that her medical problems affect her ability to groom properly, have sexual 

relations with her husband, and interact with others. (Id.). It also causes her to experience 

periods of generalized fear, severe anxiety, mistrust, and several other issues. (Id.).

On December 20, 2016, Plaintiff was the only person in the fire station when “a 

woman ran into the station screaming and bloodied, and told [Plaintiff] that a man was 

trying to rape her.” (Doc. 110 at 5). In February 2017, the Fire Chief, Tony DeMaio, 

approved Plaintiff’s request to work from home because Plaintiff was pregnant and felt 

unsafe working in the office alone. (Doc. 106 at ¶¶ 11–16; Doc. 110 at 6). In November 

2017, the Board asked Mr. DeMaio why Plaintiff did not perform her duties in the office, 

and he expressed that the Board could not ask questions about why Plaintiff worked from 

home because “it was protected by law.” (Doc. 106 at ¶ 20–23; Doc. 110 at 7). 

Nevertheless, Mr. DeMaio told the Board that Plaintiff worked at home to “tak[e] care of 

her baby.” (Doc. 106 at ¶ 20–23; Doc. 110 at 7). The parties dispute whether Mr. DeMaio 

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ever informed the Board that Plaintiff was experiencing medical problems. (Id.).

In May 2019, Mr. DeMaio retired as the Fire Chief. (Doc. 106 at ¶ 24; Doc. 110 at 

1). The fire chief position changed two additional times during Plaintiff’s employment. 

(Doc. 106 at ¶¶ 24, 37; Doc. 110 at 1). The parties agree that Plaintiff told both of the fire 

chiefs that she worked from home due to a disability. (Doc. 106 at ¶¶ 25, 38; Doc. 110 at 

3, 8). The parties, however, dispute whether Plaintiff provided the fire chiefs or the Board 

with any additional information or documentation pertaining to her disability. (Id.). 

After November 2019, Plaintiff was still working from home when the Board 

changed Plaintiff’s title to Administrative Manager and gave her a raise. (Doc. 106 at ¶¶

29–30; Doc. 110 at 1). But on December 7, 2020, the Board held a special meeting and

voted to eliminate the Administrative Manager position. (Doc. 106 at ¶ 45; Doc. 108 at ¶

8). Following this meeting, several members of the public filed complaints with the 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office (the “AGO”) alleging that the Board violated Arizona’s 

open-meeting law by voting to eliminate the Administrative Manager position when that 

issue was not on the agenda. (Doc. 106 at ¶ 50; Doc. 110 at 1). On December 9, 2020, 

Plaintiff emailed the Fire Chief stating that she understood the Board’s actions to mean her 

employment was terminated, and the Fire Chief confirmed that her understanding was 

correct. (Doc. 31 at ¶ 55).

On December 17, 2020, the Board held a subsequent meeting with a new agenda for 

the purpose of ratifying the votes taken on December 7, 2020. (Doc. 106 at ¶ 50–53; Doc.

108 at ¶¶ 13–15). On January 28, 2021, the Board received a letter from the AGO regarding 

the open-meeting law complaints, and the Board responded that it had ratified the actions 

from December 7, 2020. (Doc. 106 at ¶ 54–55; Doc. 110 at 1). On October 29, 2021, the 

Board received another letter from the AGO stating it had concluded that open-meeting 

law violations had occurred in December 2020. (Doc. 106 at ¶ 56; Doc. 108 at ¶¶ 18–19). 

On January 13, 2022, Plaintiff served Defendant a Notice of Claim. On May 13, 

2022, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), alleging three causes of action 

against the District and individual members of the Board. (Doc. 109 at 9).

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden 

of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party can satisfy its burden by demonstrating that 

the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential 

to that party’s case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. When 

considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the factual record and draw 

all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Leisek v. 

Brightwood Corp., 278 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2002). When parties file cross-motions for 

summary judgment, the court must review each motion separately, giving the nonmoving 

party for each motion the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Eat Right Foods Ltd. v. 

Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 880 F.3d 1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 2018).

III. DISCUSSION

Both parties are moving for partial summary judgment with respect to Counts Two 

and Three asserted within the FAC. (Doc. 31). In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendant discriminated against her under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 

(the “ADA”) by eliminating the Administrative Manager position. (Doc. 31 at 8–9). In 

Count Three, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated Arizona’s Employment Protection 

Act by terminating her from her employment. (Doc. 31 at 9). The Court will address the 

claims individually.

A. Count Two: Disability Discrimination Claim Under The ADA

The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating “against a qualified individual 

on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). “To withstand a motion for summary 

judgment on an ADA claim, a plaintiff must either provide sufficient direct evidence of an 

employer’s discriminatory intent, or give rise to an inference of discrimination by 

satisfying the burden-shifting test from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 

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93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).” Mickealson v. Cummins, Inc., 792 F. App’x 438, 

440 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal citations omitted). “To establish a prima facie case for 

disability discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (1) [s]he is disabled, 

(2) [s]he is qualified to perform the essential functions of [her] position, and (3) [s]he 

suffered an adverse employment action because of [her] disability.” Id.

i. Defendant Is An “Employer” Under The ADA

As an initial matter, Plaintiff moves for summary judgment to establish that 

Defendant is an employer as defined by the ADA. (Doc. 107 at 11). The ADA defines an 

“employer” as a person “engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more 

employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or 

preceding calendar year.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111. During discovery, Defendant produced a 

list of individuals who were employed at the District in some compacity from January 2016 

through December 2020. (Doc. 108-1 at 2–3). The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff was 

terminated in December 2020, therefore, 2019 and 2020 are the relevant years for 

calculating Defendant’s employees.

Plaintiff argues that “the District had employment relationships with 20 employees 

for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in 2020, and had employment 

relationships with 26 employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks 

in 2019.” (Doc. 107 at 12). Defendant raises no factual dispute concerning the list that 

Plaintiff relied on to reach this total, however, Defendant objects to the method that

Plaintiff used to calculate the total number of employees. (Doc. 111 at 13). Plaintiff argues 

that the total number of employees include all employees that were on Defendant’s payroll 

in 2019 and 2020. (Docs. 107 at 12). But Defendant argues that the total should not include

part-time and sporadic employees who did not actually work for Defendant every week 

during the year. (Doc. 111 at 13). Defendant’s method for calculating the total is incorrect 

because “[an individual] is counted as an employee for each working day after [the 

individual’s] arrival and before [the individual’s] departure,” and not the number of 

individuals compensated on a given day. See Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enterprises, Inc., 519 

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U.S. 202, 211–12 (1997) (finding that the ultimate touchstone for defining employer is the 

number of employment relationships that exists). Therefore, Defendant is an employer 

under the ADA because it maintained employment relationships with at least fifteen 

employees in 2019 and 2020. (See Doc. 108-1 at 2–3). For the following reasons, however,

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Court Two is nevertheless denied

as moot.

ii. Disability Discrimination

Defendant moves for summary judgment to dismiss Count Two because Plaintiff 

fails to establish a prima facie case for disability discrimination under the ADA. (Doc. 105 

at 8). “To bring a successful ADA discrimination claim, a plaintiff must first prove that 

[s]he is disabled as defined by the ADA.” Higley v. Rick’s Floor Covering, Inc., 400 F. 

App’x 244, 245 (9th Cir. 2010). The ADA provides that a person is deemed disabled if that 

person has (1) “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major 

life activities,” (2) “a record of such an impairment,” or (3) is “regarded as having such an 

impairment.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(1). Under the first prong, “major life activities” include, 

but are not limited to, “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, 

sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, 

concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(A).

“‘Substantially limited’ means that a person is ‘significantly restricted as to condition, 

manner or duration under which [she] can perform [the] particular major life activity as 

compared to . . . [an] average person in the general population.’” Ravel v. Hewlett-Packard 

Enter., Inc., 228 F. Supp. 3d 1086, 1092 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (quoting Coons v. Sec’y of U.S. 

Dep’t of Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 885 (9th Cir. 2004).

The second prong, a “record of such an impairment” may be established “if the 

individual has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical 

impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 

1630.2(k)(1). To prove a disability exists under the “regarded as” prong, a plaintiff must 

show that her employer mistakenly perceived her as having either “a physical impairment 

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that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or . . . an actual, nonlimiting 

impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities.” Coons, 383 F.3d at 886

(citation omitted); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(3). Stress, depression, panic attacks, and PTSD 

can all be considered mental impairments under the ADA. Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. 

Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2001).

Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to show that she has a disability under 

the first prong. (Doc. 105 at 9). Defendant explains that Dr. Tsanadis completed an 

independent medical examination of Plaintiff and noted that “there is no compelling 

evidence in the available documentation to indicate that she had any functional impairment

after [the incident with the woman at the District office.]” (Doc. 106-3 at 28–29). 

According to Dr. Tsanadis, Plaintiff reported that “she has a significant history of mental 

health treatment and conditions as well as a significant trauma-related history.” (Doc. 106-

3 at 28). Ultimately, Dr. Tsanadis concluded that “due to evidence of over-reporting of 

symptoms, an accurate diagnosis is not possible.” (Doc. 106-3 at 29). Dr. Tsanadis’ final

diagnostic impressions were that Plaintiff had “PTSD (per history),” “Unspecified 

Depressive Disorder,” and “Unspecified Anxiety Disorder.” (Doc. 106-3 at 30). Defendant 

also argues that Plaintiff failed to put forth any evidence to support her claims that she was 

previously diagnosed with anxiety, depression, and PTSD by a medical professional.

Plaintiff argues that Dr. Tsanadis’ diagnostic impressions are enough to cast doubt 

and survive summary judgment. (Doc. 109 at 12). At her deposition, Plaintiff alleged that 

she was first diagnosed with PTSD in 2017 by Dr. Kenneth Jackson (no relation to Plaintiff 

Karen Jackson). (Doc. 106-1 at 82). She further alleged that Dr. Jackson diagnosed her 

with “something related to the anxiety, PTSD, and depression.” (Doc. 106-1 at 80). The 

only medical evidence Plaintiff provided to support that she has been diagnosed with

anxiety, PTSD, and depression are three doctors’ notes that state Plaintiff should work from 

home due to one or more of these conditions. (Doc. 110-1 at 67–71). But each of the three 

doctors confirmed that they never diagnosed Plaintiff with anxiety, PTSD, and depression.

(Docs. 106-2 at 83, 106-3 at 4, 11). Instead, the doctors wrote the notes based on 

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information that they received from Plaintiff. (Docs. 106-2 at 77–81, 106-3 at 4, 16). More 

importantly, during his deposition, Dr. Jackson stated that he has “never personally 

diagnosed anybody with PTSD.” (Doc. 106-2 at 83) (emphasis added). Even assuming the 

doctors’ notes are evidence showing that Plaintiff has been diagnosed with a mental 

impairment, the notes make no comment about whether Plaintiff’s impairment

substantially limit any major life activities. (Doc. 110-1 at 67–71). And while Plaintiff 

asserts that her alleged mental impairments have a “negative affect” on major life activities, 

she does not offer any further details or claims that these “negative affects” are any greater 

than that of the average person. See Coons, 383 F.3d at 886. 

For these same reasons, Plaintiff has failed to show that there is a record of any

mental impairments that substantially limited any major life activity. See id. (finding that 

plaintiff did not introduce a record of an impairment substantially limiting any major life 

activity where the only evidence proffered was a letter from his doctor stating that he 

suffered from various impairments without referencing its effect on major life activities).

Lastly, Plaintiff failed to present evidence showing that Defendant regarded her as having 

any mental impairments that substantially limited a major life activity. 

Because the Court finds there is no question of material fact as to whether Plaintiff 

was disabled, the claim for disability discrimination cannot survive. Summary judgment 

will be granted on this claim in favor of Defendant. 

B. Count Three: Wrongful Termination Claim Under The AEPA

Pursuant to the Arizona Employment Protection Act (the “AEPA”), “[a]n employee 

has a claim against an employer for termination of employment only if,” in relevant part, 

“[t]he employer has terminated the employment relationship of an employee in violation 

of a statute of this state.” A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(b). However, “[i]f the statute provides a 

remedy to an employee for a violation of the statute, the remedies provided to an employee 

for a violation of the statute are the exclusive remedies for the violation of the statute or 

the public policy set forth in or arising out of the statute.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges that during the special meeting on December 7, 2020, Defendant 

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wrongfully terminated her under the AEPA by violating Arizona’s open-meeting law at 

A.R.S. § 38-431.02(H) (the “Open Meeting law”). (Doc. 31 at 9). The Open Meeting law

provides that when a public body hosts a meeting, it shall provide a public notice which 

includes an agenda that “list[s] the specific matters to be discussed, considered or decided 

at the meeting.” A.R.S. § 38-431.02(H). Moreover, “[t]he public body may discuss, 

consider or make decisions only on matters listed on the agenda and other matters related 

thereto.” Id. There is no genuine dispute that the agenda for the December 7th meeting 

failed to specify that the Board would discuss, consider, and decide to eliminate the 

Administrative Manager position in violation of the Open Meeting law. (Doc. 105 at 13–

14; Doc. 107 at 6). However, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the 

AEPA’s exclusive-remedy provision and the statute of limitations.

i. Exclusive Remedy

The parties dispute whether the Open Meeting law provides Plaintiff with an 

exclusive remedy that bars Plaintiff from bringing a claim under the AEPA. The Open 

Meeting law provides that any person affected by the statute may commence a suit in the 

superior court “for the purpose of requiring compliance with, or the prevention of 

violations” of the statute. A.R.S. § 38-431.07. Civil penalties awarded pursuant to the Open 

Meeting law shall not to exceed $500 for the second offense and $2,500 for the third and 

subsequent offenses. Id. Any civil penalties awarded under the statute, “shall be deposited 

into the general fund of the public body concerned.” Id. “The court may also order payment 

to a successful plaintiff in a suit brought under this section of the plaintiff's reasonable 

attorney fees.” Id.

Plaintiff cites to Chen v. Cozzoli, LLC, to argue that the Open Meeting law does not 

provide a remedy for wrongful termination. In Chen, the plaintiff asserted a wrongful 

termination claim under the AEPA asserting that the defendant violated criminal theft and 

assault statutes. Chen v. Cozzoli LLC, No. CV-21-01025-PHX-DWL, 2022 WL 5169236, 

at *4 (D. Ariz. Oct. 5, 2022). The defendant moved to dismiss the claim and argued that 

the AEPA’s exclusive-remedies provision “bars AEPA claims premised on Arizona’s 

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criminal theft and assault statutes because they have their own remedial scheme[s] (i.e., 

prosecution).” Id. This Court held that the exclusive-remedy provisions are applicable to

one particular category of statutes—those that regulate the employee-employer 

relationship. See id at *6. The Court explained that the “exclusive-remedy provisions make 

sense ‘in the employment relationship, [where] overlapping theories of recovery . . . make 

the calculation of damages uncertain.’” Id. at *7 (quoting Cronin v. Sheldon, 991 P.2d 231, 

241 (Ariz. 1999)). The Court also added that this concern is inapplicable where the statute 

does not present uncertainty concerning the amount that the plaintiff can recover under 

AEPA. Id.

Defendant argues that the facts in Chen are distinguishable because unlike the 

criminal statutes in discussed in Chen, “[t]he Open Meetings laws provide [Plaintiff] with 

a remedy she can pursue as a private citizen without relying upon prosecutor discretion to 

pursue criminal charges.” (Doc. 111 at 9). This is true; however, the Open Meeting law

does not regulate the “employee-employer relationship.” Moreover, if Plaintiff’s claim 

prevails, there will be no overlapping theories of recovery. As the Open Meeting law 

provides, Plaintiff’s recovery would be limited to reasonable attorney’s fees, and any civil 

penalties recovered will go directly to the “general fund of the public body.” See A.R.S. §

38-431.07. Therefore, the exclusive-remedy provisions are not applicable here. See also

Smith-Florez v. City of Nogales, No. CV 09-139-TUC-FRZ, 2010 WL 11515521, at *4 (D. 

Ariz. May 18, 2010) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss an AEPA claim asserting that 

plaintiff was wrongfully terminated for reporting violations of Arizona’s open-meeting 

laws).

ii. Statute of Limitations

The parties agree the statute of limitations in this case is one year from the date of 

accrual. See A.R.S. § 12–541(4); (Doc. 105 at 14–15; Doc. 109 at 15). The parties also 

agree that accrual is subject to the discovery rule, meaning the limitations period does not 

begin running until “the plaintiff knows or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should 

know the facts underlying the cause.” Gust, Rosenfeld & Henderson v. Prudential Ins. Co. 

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of Am., 182 Ariz. 586, 898 P.2d 964, 966 (1995) (See Doc. 105 at 15; Doc. 109 at 16).

Plaintiff “need not know all the facts underlying a cause of action” because accrual is 

triggered when Plaintiff possesses at least a “minimum requisite of knowledge sufficient 

to identify that a wrong occurred and caused injury.” Cruz v. City of Tucson, 401 P.3d 

1018, 1021 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Doe v. Roe, 955 P.2d 951, 961 (Ariz. 1998)). 

Generally, determining whether an action has accrued is a question of fact, however, 

“[a]ccrual can be decided as a matter of law when ‘there is no genuine dispute as to facts 

showing the plaintiff knew or should have known the basis for the claim.’” Strojnik v. State 

ex rel. Brnovich, No. 1 CA-CV 20-0423, 2021 WL 3051887, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. July 20, 

2021) (quoting Humphrey v. State, 466 P.3d 368, 375 ¶ 25 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2020)).

Here, there is no genuine dispute as to the facts showing that Plaintiff’s claim 

accrued by December 7, 2020, when Defendant eliminated Plaintiff’s position in violation 

of the Open Meeting law. First, Plaintiff admits that she understood the Board’s actions on 

December 7, 2020, to mean that her employment was terminated. (Doc. 107 at 3).

Moreover, Plaintiff alleges in her FAC that:

79. The Board took legal action during its meeting on 

December 7, 2020, including passing a motion to terminate 

Jackson’s employment with the District, in violation of 

Arizona’s open meeting law at A.R.S. § 38-431.02(H).

(Doc. 31 at 9) (emphasis added). Plaintiff also states in her Motion that there is “no genuine 

dispute that [Defendant] violated A.R.S. §§ 38-431.02(A) and (H) at its meeting on 

December 7, 2020.” (Doc. 107 at 6). Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that she was aware that, 

under the advice of its legal counsel, Defendant scheduled an additional meeting on

December 17, 2020, to ratify its decision to terminate her employment. (Doc. 107 at 10).

Nevertheless, Plaintiff objects that the accrual date is December 7, 2020, because 

she did not know Defendant failed to ratify its decision to terminate her employment, and 

therefore did not know that Defendant violated the Open Meeting law, until after October 

29, 2021, when the AGO sent its letter to Defendant. (Id.). In other words, without any 

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legal authority, Plaintiff claims that Defendant’s attempt to correct its failure to follow the 

Open Meeting law tolled her claim until the AGO confirmed whether the ratification was 

proper. In response, Defendant argues that “it is irrelevant for accrual purposes whether the 

District Board in fact violated the Open Meeting laws.” (Doc. 105 at 16). The Court agrees. 

Pursuant to Arizona’s open-meeting laws, “[a]ny person affected by an alleged violation” 

of the open-meeting laws has standing to commence a suit. A.R.S. § 38-431.07 (emphasis 

added). Therefore, Defendant’s belief that it complied with the law or later ratified its 

decision had no impact on the accrual date. Accordingly, as a matter of law, Plaintiff’s 

claim is time barred. For the same reasons, Plaintiff’s claim that her termination is null and 

void also fails. 

IV. CONCLUSION

In reviewing the record, motions, and responsive briefings, the Court has found no 

issues of material fact or law on any of Plaintiff’s claims. The Court found Defendant met 

its burden of proof on each claim to prevail on its Motion. The Court further found 

Plaintiff’s Motion is moot as to Count Two and found in favor of Defendant as to Count 

Three. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 107) 

is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary 

Judgment on Count Two and Count Three of First Amended Complaint (Doc. 105) is 

granted.

Dated this 16th day of January, 2024.

Honorable Steven P. Logan

United States District Judge

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