Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-09-01498/USCOURTS-ca4-09-01498-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

DEBORAH MERRITT, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

OLD DOMINION FREIGHT LINE, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.  No. 09-1498

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

COMMISSION,

Amicus Supporting Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Virginia, at Lynchburg.

Norman K. Moon, District Judge.

(6:07-cv-00027-nkm-mfu)

Argued: January 27, 2010

Decided: April 9, 2010

Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and DAVIS,

Circuit Judges.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which Judge Duncan and Judge

Davis joined. Judge Davis wrote a concurring opinion.

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COUNSEL

ARGUED: Valerie Ann Chastain, VALERIE A.

CHASTAIN, PC, Bedford, Virginia, for Appellant. Julie

Loraine Gantz, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Supporting Appellant. Robert Craig Wood, MCGUIREWOODS,

LLP, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:

James L. Lee, Deputy General Counsel, Lorraine C. Davis,

Acting Associate General Counsel, Vincent J. Blackwood,

Assistant General Counsel, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Washington, D.C., for

Amicus Supporting Appellant. Aaron J. Longo, MCGUIREWOODS, LLP, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-appellant Deborah Merritt was a truck driver

employed by defendant-appellee Old Dominion Freight Line,

Inc. ("Old Dominion"). After being fired from her job, Merritt

sued Old Dominion in the United States District Court for the

Western District of Virginia, alleging sex discrimination

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e et seq. Merritt asserted that Old Dominion fired her

due to a discriminatory belief that women were incapable of

performing the duties of her position. In its defense, Old

Dominion claimed that it discharged Merritt instead because

she had failed a physical ability test following an ankle injury.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Old

Dominion, determining that Merritt had produced insufficient

evidence to demonstrate that Old Dominion’s legitimate and

non-discriminatory reason for her termination was "pretext for

discrimination." Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450

U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Under the particular circumstances

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here, we think Merritt has presented an issue of triable fact,

and we must accordingly reverse. 

I.

We review the facts under the traditional summary judgment standard, giving the benefit of inferences to the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 254-55 (1986). The defendant, Old Dominion, is a

nationwide trucking company that employs thousands of drivers, including both "Line Haul" drivers and "Pickup and

Delivery" drivers. Line Haul drivers often drive long distances across state lines, spending some nights and weekends

away from home. Pickup and Delivery drivers, on the other

hand, work more locally and rarely work nights and weekends. Also, because Pickup and Delivery drivers pick-up and

unload freight, the job requires more lifting and is physically

more demanding than that of a Line Haul driver. Of Old

Dominion’s workforce of approximately 3100 Pickup and

Delivery drivers, about six are female.

Deborah Merritt’s story is one of a certain grit and perseverance. For six years, she was employed by Old Dominion

as a Line Haul driver at its Greensboro, North Carolina and

Waynesboro, Virginia terminals. During her time as a Line

Haul driver, Merritt often made lengthy cross-country trips, to

places like California and Texas, and sometimes logged more

than five hundred miles per day. She performed her duties

without incident or complaint. Eventually, Merritt became

interested in becoming a Pickup and Delivery driver so she

could work more regular hours and spend her nights and

weekends at home. To show Old Dominion that she could

perform the job successfully, she filled in numerous times as

a Pickup and Delivery driver in May 2002. When filling in,

she likewise performed the duties without incident or complaint. In fact, the record reflects that Merritt’s supervisor

found her work as a Pickup and Delivery driver to be fully

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satisfactory and even received compliments from clients

about it.

Shortly thereafter, a permanent Pickup and Delivery position became available at Old Dominion’s Lynchburg, Virginia

terminal. Merritt expressed her interest in the position to

Bobby Howard, the Lynchburg terminal manager. Howard

informed Merritt that he lacked the authority to fill the position, but that was untrue. In fact, Howard later filled the position with a male, who had less truck-driving experience than

Merritt and who had not previously worked for Old Dominion. Merritt continued to fill in temporarily as a Pickup and

Delivery driver during the rest of 2002. 

In May 2003, another permanent Pickup and Delivery position became available in Lynchburg, and Merritt again

expressed her interest in it to Howard. Yet again, Merritt was

passed over in favor of a less-experienced male driver. When

Merritt asked why she was not hired to fill the positions,

Howard told her that "it had been discussed and it was

decided that they could not let a woman have that position."

Howard also reminded her that "the company did not really

have women drivers in the city [as Pickup and Delivery drivers]." On another occasion, Howard told Merritt that Lemuel

Clayton, Old Dominion’s Regional Vice President, was worried about hiring a female Pickup and Delivery driver and

"was afraid [a female] would get hurt." On still another occasion, Howard told Merritt that Clayton had concerns about her

being a Pickup and Delivery driver because he "didn’t think

a girl should have that position." Clayton, however, denies the

allegations.

Finally, in March 2004, Old Dominion hired Merritt to fill

a permanent Pickup and Delivery position in the Lynchburg

terminal. Before making the decision to do so, however, Howard allegedly asked two male Pickup and Delivery drivers

how they would feel working with a woman, and they

responded they would not have a problem with it. After Mer4 MERRITT v. OLD DOMINION FREIGHT

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ritt was hired, she was placed on a ninety-day probationary

period, during which she stood to lose the job if any performance problems arose. According to Merritt, this probationary period was unusual, since no male drivers were subject to

anything similar, while according to Clayton, the probationary

period was a standard opportunity afforded to all transferring

employees to allow them to change their minds about the

transfer. In any event, it is uncontradicted that although Merritt’s duties and pay were those of a Pickup and Delivery

driver, her official job classification was never changed from

Line Haul to Pickup and Delivery driver.

From March 2004 to September 2004, Merritt performed

her Pickup and Delivery duties, by all accounts satisfactorily.

She never had a problem lifting freight or performing the

same duties that male Pickup and Delivery drivers performed,

and she never received any complaints about her work from

management, coworkers, or customers. Despite her positive

record with the company, Steve Godsey, the then Operations’

Manager for the Lynchburg terminal, told a male Pickup and

Delivery driver that he "d[idn’t] see why they brought [Merritt] here in the first place. This is not a woman’s place."

Then, on September 29, 2004, Merritt suffered an ankle

injury while moving boxes on the job. When Brian Stoddard,

the Vice President of Safety and Personnel at Old Dominion,

learned of Merritt’s injury, he put her in touch with a workers’

compensation representative and several human resources

employees. Merritt’s doctor, Dr. Jay Hopkins, examined Merritt and diagnosed her with "plantar fasciitis with a superimposed strain." Dr. Hopkins put Merritt on light-duty work

until her next appointment with him on December 27, 2004.

Around that same time, Merritt began expressing an interest

in returning to her normal duties, since her ankle was healing

well and she was not having any serious or lingering problems

with it. 

Before Merritt’s December 27 doctor appointment, Stoddard decided to require Merritt to take a fitness test to assess

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her ability to perform her Pickup and Delivery duties. Accordingly, on December 22, 2004, Old Dominion booked an

appointment for a physical ability test ("PAT") for Merritt to

take on December 28, 2004. The PAT is a full-body test,

divided into six separate components, that evaluates the test

taker’s general strength, agility, and cardiovascular endurance. It is graded on a pass/fail basis. To pass, an employee

must perform various tasks roughly designed to mimic those

required of Line Haul and Pickup and Delivery drivers. The

PAT was created for Old Dominion by an independent company in 2001 "to be used in the hiring process." Consistent

with this purpose, Old Dominion uses the PAT primarily in

the pre-employment context to evaluate potential hires, but, as

Stoddard himself testified, only on a "very variable" basis. 

On December 27, Merritt met with Dr. Hopkins. During

that visit, Dr. Hopkins examined Merritt’s foot and ankle, noting that "her foot [wa]s feeling fine," that the injury was not

a "disabling condition," and that Merritt seemed "to be on the

right track." Dr. Hopkins concluded that "[t]he good news is

that she has had a good response to treatment and I would

have every reason to think that this will do fine." As Dr. Hopkins later testified, "there was nothing about Ms. Merritt’s

medical condition which would have prevented her from performing her job duties as a Pickup and Delivery driver for Old

Dominion as of December 27, 2004." Despite a clean bill of

health, Dr. Hopkins followed his standard practice and

released Merritt back to work on a "trial basis," since he "cannot give the patient’s employer a one hundred percent guarantee." 

The day after seeing her doctor, Merritt took the PAT, as

scheduled. Merritt struggled with several segments of the

PAT and received an overall failing grade. According to Merritt, the tasks with which she had problems were unrelated to

her ankle injury. For example, on one portion of the PAT,

Merritt was unable to place a box of weights on an overhead

shelf simply because the shelf was too high for her (at barely

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over five feet, one inch tall) to reach. On another part of the

PAT, Merritt had difficulty walking backward pulling a cable

due to people bumping into her in a crowded hallway. 

After receiving the results of Merritt’s PAT, Stoddard

decided to terminate Merritt’s employment with Old Dominion. It is undisputed that Stoddard alone made the decision to

fire Merritt. Stoddard was also the sole decision maker

responsible for requiring Merritt to take the PAT. In fact, as

Vice President of Safety and Personnel "throughout the entire

company," Stoddard handled all "question[s] about the physical capability of a driver to perform safely." On February 1,

2005, Merritt’s employment was officially terminated, with

the reason documented on her paperwork as "inability to perform job." To replace Merritt, Old Dominion hired male

Pickup and Delivery drivers in the Lynchburg terminal. 

In August 2005, Merritt filed a charge of sex discrimination

against Old Dominion with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Upon issuance of a right-to-sue notice,

Merritt then filed this action in the district court for the Western District of Virginia. She alleged that Old Dominion’s termination of her employment constituted unlawful

discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. In response, Old Dominion claimed

that it had fired Merritt, not because she was a woman, but

because she failed the PAT.

Following cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted Old Dominion’s motion for summary judgment and denied Merritt’s. The district court assumed,

without deciding, that Merritt had demonstrated a prima facie

case under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). The district court also found that Old Dominion had

satisfied its burden of production under McDonnell Douglas

to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Merritt’s discharge: "that she failed the PAT, which indicated that

MERRITT v. OLD DOMINION FREIGHT 7

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she did not have the requisite physical strength to safely perform her job duties." 

The district court, however, determined that Merritt had

failed to carry her ultimate burden of persuasion under

McDonnell Douglas. Specifically, the court found that Merritt

had "failed to prove that [Old Dominion’s reason for firing

her] was a pretext for discrimination, because she has not produced any evidence that Brian Stoddard, the Old Dominion

employee responsible for Merritt’s discharge, harbored any

discriminatory animus." According to the district court, Merritt’s "limited circumstantial evidence" simply "[wa]s not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on whether

Merritt’s failure of the PAT was a pretext for discrimination."

Merritt now appeals. 

II.

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate

against an individual on the basis of sex. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(a)(1). As one method of establishing a successful

Title VII case, a plaintiff may proceed under the burdenshifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and its progeny. See, e.g., Hill

v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277 (4th

Cir. 2004) (en banc). Pursuant to this framework, a plaintiff

first must make out a prima facie case of discrimination. Tex.

Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53

(1981). The burden of production then shifts to the employer

to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory justification for

its allegedly discriminatory action. Id. at 253. Finally, if the

employer carries this burden, the plaintiff then has an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the

neutral reasons offered by the employer "were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination." Id. The final pretext inquiry "merges with the ultimate burden of persuading

the court that [the plaintiff] has been the victim of intentional

8 MERRITT v. OLD DOMINION FREIGHT

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discrimination," which at all times remains with the plaintiff.

Id. at 256. 

Notwithstanding the intricacies of proof schemes, the core

of every Title VII case remains the same, necessitating resolution of "the ultimate question of discrimination vel non." U.S.

Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714

(1983). As the Supreme Court has explained, "[t]he ultimate

question in every employment discrimination case involving

a claim of disparate treatment is whether the plaintiff was the

victim of intentional discrimination." Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000). Thus,

"[c]ourts must . . . resist the temptation to become so

entwined in the intricacies of the [McDonnell Douglas] proof

scheme that they forget that the scheme exists solely to facilitate determination of ‘the ultimate question of discrimination

vel non.’" Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 798 (4th Cir. 1991)

(citation omitted).

By the time of appeal especially, the issue boils down to

whether the plaintiff has presented a triable question of intentional discrimination, and "the McDonnell Douglas

framework—with its presumptions and burdens—is no longer

relevant." St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510

(1993); see also Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-43 (discussing the

reduced relevance of burden-shifting paradigm once the

employer has met its burden of production); Tex. Dep’t of

Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.10 (1981)

(same). As the Supreme Court has made clear, "courts should

[not] treat discrimination differently from other ultimate questions of fact." U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens,

460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983). Under this rubric, summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and . . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

MERRITT v. OLD DOMINION FREIGHT 9

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III.

With these principles in place, we turn to the matter at

hand. Here Old Dominion proffers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for discharging Merritt: her failure

of the PAT, "which indicated that she did not have the requisite physical strength to safely perform her job duties." Merritt not surprisingly insists that this asserted rationale was

really a "pretext for discrimination." St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v.

Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993). We think the record as a

whole supports Merritt’s claim that a jury could find that discrimination on the basis of gender was afoot. 

A.

To begin, Merritt has introduced ample evidence showing

that Old Dominion’s proferred explanation for the discharge

—Merritt’s failure on the PAT—was "unworthy of credence."

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. Two considerations compel this

conclusion. First, the record indicates that Merritt’s ankle

injury was temporary and had healed at the time of her termination. Merritt’s physician, Dr. Hopkins, testified that as of

December 27, 2004—one day before the PAT—Merritt’s

ankle was fully healed and "doing as well, if not better, . . .

than before her injury." Hopkins also noted that the injury was

not a disabling condition. The district court likewise found

that "Merritt’s injury was temporary" and that "there was no

indication that the injury would prevent her from resuming

her full duties once it healed." Based on her speedy recovery

and sunny prognosis, Merritt felt ready and able to return to

work as soon as possible and expressed her willingness to do

so to Old Dominion. Indeed, as Dr. Hopkins stated, "there

was nothing about Ms. Merritt’s medical condition which

would have prevented her from performing her job duties as

a Pickup and Delivery driver for Old Dominion as of December 27, 2004."1

1Although Dr. Hopkins released Merritt only on a "trial basis," that

notation, according to Dr. Hopkins, was not indicative of any real limita10 MERRITT v. OLD DOMINION FREIGHT

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Yet Old Dominion did not allow Merritt to return to work.

It did not even leave open the possibility that she could return

to work at a later date, for example by providing additional

time for recovery or by waiting for Merritt’s next doctor visit

to resolve ongoing concerns about the injury’s effect on job

performance. Instead, Old Dominion deemed it necessary to

order a full-blown fitness test to assess the effects of an injury

that was neither severe nor long-lasting and then used the

results of that PAT to claim Merritt was physically unable to

perform the job she had been physically performing for

months prior to her minor injury. In doing so, Old Dominion

terminated a good employee who, pre-injury, performed her

job ably and without complaint and who, post-injury, was

both willing and able to report to this same job for work.

These facts, if believed, would allow a trier of fact to think

Old Dominion was simply looking for a reason to get rid of

Merritt. 

Second, Old Dominion’s proferred rationale is undermined

by the undisputed fact that the PAT was a general, full-body

physical fitness test not designed to test any body part in particular. Some of the six segments of the PAT tested overall

strength and agility and some tested cardiovascular endurance, but none directly evaluated Merritt’s ankle. Only one

component of the test, on which Merritt did well, even arguably gave Old Dominion any information regarding the condition of her ankle. According to an expert on trucking industry

standards, Old Dominion’s use of the PAT on Merritt was

atypical, both because the PAT "was not specific to [Merritt’s] foot sprain," and because he was "unaware of a single

tions on Merritt’s abilities to return to work but rather part of his standard

practice, based on his reluctance as a medical professional to fully guarantee complete recovery. As Dr. Hopkins further testified, if an employer

indicates that the "trial basis" release is problematic and prevents the

employer from allowing the employee back to work, he will rewrite it

without the notation. Here, Old Dominion never afforded Dr. Hopkins, or

Merritt, such an opportunity. 

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instance where any motor carrier had either established a policy for or had tested injured employees on portions of their

bodies which were not affected by an injury." Unsurprisingly

then, Merritt’s difficulties with the PAT appeared to have

nothing at all to do with her ankle. She struggled with the

"step test" portion, for example, because she was too short to

reach the overhead shelf. 

In light of evidence that the PAT was not even designed to

test Merritt’s alleged physical shortcoming, a jury could find

that Old Dominion’s contention—that Merritt’s minor and

temporary injury necessitated her passing the PAT—is specious. Especially in combination with Merritt’s other evidence, these alleged facts suggest that perhaps Old

Dominion’s neutral reason "w[as] not its true reason[], but

w[as] a pretext for discrimination." Id. at 253. 

B.

In this case, Merritt provided evidence not simply of falsity

but of discriminatory intent as well. Specifically, Merritt set

forth evidence that: (1) Old Dominion used the PAT selectively, excusing injured male employees from taking it; and

(2) The employee responsible for requiring the PAT and firing her, Stoddard, harbored discriminatory animus toward

women insofar as he was responsible for selectively employing the PAT and was part and parcel of Old Dominion’s widespread resistance to hiring women as Pickup and Delivery

drivers. Based on this evidence, Merritt claims a fact finder

could find in favor of her on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination. 

In arguing otherwise, Old Dominion contends that summary judgment is nonetheless warranted, because it has countered Merritt’s evidence of discriminatory motive with

evidence so compelling that "no rational factfinder could conclude that [its termination of Merritt] was discriminatory."

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,

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148 (2000). It maintains that, contrary to Merritt’s assertions,

the evidence compels the conclusions that: (1) Old Dominion

used the PAT consistently, pursuant to a prudent and neutral

company policy; and (2) Stoddard was himself blameless and

exhibited no discriminatory motive. We shall review those

contentions in turn.

1.

Old Dominion argues that its decision to terminate Merritt

was made pursuant to a uniform and neutrally administered

company policy. Under its alleged policy, any employee,

regardless of gender, must take and pass a PAT if that

employee missed work due to an injury and received anything

less than a complete and unequivocal medical authorization to

return to full duties. Stated differently, a PAT is automatically

required whenever an injured employee receives an ambiguous or conditional release from a physician (i.e., a release on

a "trial basis" or with "light duty" restrictions). According to

Old Dominion, the policy is intended to mitigate the potentially dire consequences of sending injured employees back to

work before they are physically ready. Because the PAT is

triggered by the language of the doctor’s note, a genderneutral criterion, Old Dominion argues that its policy conclusively negates a discriminatory intent.

We begin by acknowledging that if indeed Old Dominion

had such a policy and faithfully abided by it, that fact would,

as Old Dominion suggests, be a neutral and legitimate business practice. Old Dominion has understandable safety concerns, especially since its employees are responsible for

driving large trucks and carrying heavy freight. A policy of

the sort Old Dominion claims to have is sensible, because it

helps prevent an injured employee from further aggravating

an injury, thereby jeopardizing eventual recovery; ensure that

an injured employee’s job performance is not so impaired as

to endanger public safety, diminish employee morale, or generate customer complaints; and limit Old Dominion’s potenMERRITT v. OLD DOMINION FREIGHT 13

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tial workers’ compensation claims and tort liability.

Moreover, it is not our task to say what policies a company

should or should not adopt, if the policies it does adopt are

gender neutral. See Hawkins v. Pepsico, Inc., 203 F.3d 274,

279 (4th Cir. 2000); EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d

936, 946 (4th Cir. 1992). 

The problem with the policy lies not in theory but in practice. Here, Merritt has advanced evidence suggesting that the

policy does not exist or, alternatively, that it was erratically

implemented. Three considerations inform our conclusion.

First, the policy’s existence is drawn into question by the conspicuous lack of evidence in the record concerning it. As both

parties agree, the policy has never been memorialized in writing. And while an informal policy is no less a policy, it is

curious that no one at the company seemed to be familiar with

even an informal policy. Of eight Old Dominion employees

asked about the matter, all eight denied ever having heard of

the policy. In fact, Stoddard himself—the individual responsible for deciding whether and when to order PATs and thus

presumably charged with administering the policy—

suggested that Old Dominion did not have an official policy

regarding whether and when to order PATs. Rather, he

explained that if an employee could not perform job duties

because of pain due to an injury, he’s "not necessarily going

to send them for a [physical fitness] test." 

Second, the policy’s existence is dubious due to its delayed

emergence in the course of this litigation. Early on, Old

Dominion did not assert a firm policy on when PATs were

ordered, claiming instead that the test was given on an "as

needed basis." Likewise, although Old Dominion noted that it

was "its policy and practice [] not to return a driver to the road

following an injury unless that driver has a complete, unrestricted medical clearance," it expressly emphasized Stoddard’s discretion, stating that "[w]hen there is a question

about the physical capability of a driver to perform safely,"

Stoddard "must make a decision, based on the facts and cir14 MERRITT v. OLD DOMINION FREIGHT

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cumstances presented, about what to do." In making those

decisions, "the varying circumstances must be taken into

account, and each medical report must be handled on a caseby-case basis." Even before the district court, Old Dominion

did not allege a clear policy, leading the district court to find

that, "Old Dominion admitted that the PAT is given in ‘varying circumstances’ on a case-by-case basis" and "without a

clear policy on when it is to be used." 

It was only late in the game, on appeal and perhaps not

until oral argument before this court, that the policy really

took shape. At that point, Old Dominion began to pivot, arguing that PATs were not required after all on a discretionary,

case-by-case basis but each and every time, without exception, an injured employee was issued an ambiguous medical

release. But "a factfinder could infer from the late appearance

of [the employer’s] current justification that it is a post-hoc

rationale," "invented for the purposes of litigation," and "not

a legitimate explanation for [its] decision." EEOC v. Sears

Roebuck & Co., 243 F.3d 846, 853 (4th Cir. 2001). 

Third, apart from the paucity of evidence of the policy’s

existence and the policy’s late-blooming appearance, Merritt

has set forth evidence that Old Dominion did not faithfully

adhere to the policy and instead ordered PATs on an uneven

basis. As a general matter, Old Dominion used the PAT

rarely, even as to pre-hires, whom the PAT was designed to

evaluate. In fact, Old Dominion required a paltry four percent

of its Pickup and Delivery drivers to ever take the PAT. Especially as to injured employees, the test was administered

inconsistently. Although several injured employees received

ambiguous medical releases, there is limited evidence in the

record as to whether Old Dominion implemented the policy

to require them to take and pass PATs as a condition of

returning to work. Only two individuals at Old Dominion

recalled an injured employee taking a physical test, and they

could not remember whether the test was a PAT or some

other test.

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At least two injured employees exempted from the policy’s

reach were males, and their circumstances were similar to

Merritt’s own. Like Merritt, these male drivers missed work

as a result of an injury and received a conditional release from

a physician. Unlike Merritt, both men were allowed to return

to their full duties without passing a PAT. Importantly, in

both cases, Stoddard presumably was the decision maker who

opted against a PAT.2

Gerald Dalton, for instance, had a hernia operation, which

caused him to miss six months of work—about twice the time

Merritt missed. Although his doctor only gave him permission

to return to "light duty" work,3 Stoddard nonetheless returned

him to full duties without a PAT. Additionally, when Donald

Smith missed work due to a shoulder injury, he was issued a

physician’s note that was, by Old Dominion’s own admission,

"not . . . definitive enough." Yet Smith was not required to

take a PAT and instead required only to take a functional

capacity evaluation (FCE). In contrast to the full-body PAT,

the FCE was tailored to his injury, testing the mobility and

strength of his shoulder. 

In addition to the differential treatment of male comparators, Old Dominion failed to follow its purported policy even

2Stoddard testified that he has served as Vice President of Safety and

Personnel "throughout the entire company" for the past eleven or twelve

years, and, as Old Dominion admitted in its responses to interrogatories,

Stoddard was therefore responsible for making all decisions regarding

"question[s] about the physical capability of a driver to perform safely."

When asked whether he is "consulted or informed whenever an Old

Dominion employee is going to have to take [a physical fitness] test,"

Stoddard replied, "I’m the one that makes that decision, so, yeah, I’m

informed. Actually I inform other people." 

3

In disputing this evidence, Old Dominion points to a physician’s note

in the record that released Dalton "to regular work w/ splint." That release,

however, relates not to Dalton’s hernia operation but to a separate thumb

injury. Dalton unambiguously testified that after his hernia operation, he

was subject to "light duty" restrictions. 

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with regard to Merritt herself. Admittedly, the conditions necessary to trigger a PAT under the purported policy were present: Merritt was an injured employee who missed work due

to her injury and received a "trial basis" release from her doctor. However, these conditions were not met at the time Old

Dominion decided to require Merritt’s PAT. Rather, Old

Dominion scheduled Merritt’s PAT five days before she

received a "trial basis" release. Viewing the evidence in Merritt’s favor, Old Dominion’s decision to have Merritt take and

pass the PAT cannot be explained by the policy at all. 

To be sure, Old Dominion claims it scheduled the PAT

because it knew, based on conversations with Merritt’s doctor, that Merritt was going to receive a "trial basis" release.

That view, however, was thrown into question by evidence

that Merritt’s doctor had never communicated with anyone at

Old Dominion concerning his intent to release Merritt on a

"trial basis," whereupon Old Dominion clarified that it knew

Merritt might receive a "trial basis" release and wanted to

schedule the PAT just in case. These variously unsupported,

belated, and shifting rationales for requiring the PAT and

hence discharging Merritt have passed the point of pretext.

See Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 217

n.7 (4th Cir. 2007). While a neutral policy serving Old

Dominion’s legitimate business interests in public and

employee safety could certainly be put in place, a trier of fact

could reasonably find that Old Dominion’s selective application and ever-changing rationales for the PAT were designed

to conceal an intent to reserve the plum Pickup and Delivery

positions for male drivers only. 

2.

Old Dominion next argues that whatever the sentiments

about women at the company generally, Merritt has failed to

prove that Stoddard himself harbored discriminatory animus

against women. A plaintiff does not need a "smoking gun" to

prove invidious intent, and few plaintiffs will have one.

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Rather, "[c]ircumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but

may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than

direct evidence." Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90,

100 (2003) (citation and internal quotations omitted). This is

not to say that thin cases should go to trial. "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will

not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original). Rather, factual disputes must be both material and genuine, and district courts

must ensure both conditions are satisfied before sending a

case to trial. Id. at 248; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 322 (1986). We think, however, that Merritt has met

the standard.

By utilizing the PAT to assess the physical qualifications of

Merritt but not males similarly situated to her, Stoddard could

be seen by a jury to embrace beliefs that women are unsuited

for some of the more remunerative forms of manual labor

and, once injured, are less resilient in their ability to recover.

To be sure, certain jobs do require attributes of strength and

endurance, and an employer is plainly entitled to assure itself,

through testing or otherwise, that employees can actually perform the work for which they are hired. See 29 C.F.R.

§ 1607.1 et seq. But this justification is not available to Stoddard or to Old Dominion, because Merritt had not only been

performing her Pickup and Delivery duties for months before

her injury, but performing them very well. At least these proceedings have revealed no blemish on her record, and Old

Dominion does not to this day contend Merritt did not pass

muster. Even were a jury to conclude that Stoddard reacted to

Merritt’s ankle injury out of an allegedly benevolent view that

women were more fragile and thus more profoundly affected

by injuries than their male counterparts, that would fail to

square with Title VII’s mandate, which is to displace perceptions based on race, ethnicity, and gender with perceptions

based on such non-discriminatory criteria as capabilities and

qualifications. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,

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436 (1971) ("Congress has made such qualifications the controlling factor, so that race, religion, nationality, and sex

become irrelevant."). In short, a reasonable fact finder could

look askance at Stoddard’s selective use of the PAT, requiring

Merritt to take the test and exempting men who, like Smith

and Dalton, suffered arguably more debilitating physical setbacks and missed more work. 

We must of course be cautious about attributing to any ultimate decision maker such as Stoddard the most unfortunate

expressions and beliefs of those around him and those who

worked in his employ. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics

Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 291 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc). It

is regrettable that any distasteful comments will arise in the

workplace, but that cannot mean that the actual decision

maker is impugned thereby. It is the decision maker’s intent

that remains crucial, and in the absence of a clear nexus with

the employment decision in question, the materiality of stray

or isolated remarks is substantially reduced. See McCarthy v.

Kemper Life Ins. Cos., 924 F.2d 683, 686-87 (7th Cir. 1991).

But that nexus existed here. It is not unfair to observe that the

corporate culture evinced a very specific yet pervasive aversion to the idea of female Pickup and Delivery drivers. Old

Dominion employees, of all ranks, seemed to share a view

that women were unfit for that position. A regional vice president remarked, for instance, that he "didn’t think a girl should

have that [Pickup and Delivery] position." He also worried

that women were more injury-prone, explaining that he did

not want to hire a female Pickup and Delivery driver because

he "was afraid [she] would get hurt." An operations’ manager

stated, "[t]his is not a woman’s place." A terminal manager

forthrightly acknowledged the company’s reluctance to hiring

female Pickup and Delivery drivers, noting that "the company

did not really have women [Pickup and Delivery] drivers,"

and that Merritt was passed over because "it was decided that

[the company] could not let a woman have that position."

While the views of others are no proof of the views of

Stoddard, at some point the corporate environment in which

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he worked places Stoddard’s own selective use of the PAT in

Merritt’s case in a less neutral context. In Lettieri v. Equant,

Inc., 478 F.3d 640, 649 (4th Cir. 2007), for example, we noted

that the plaintiff had put forward the kind of "‘evidence that

clearly indicates a discriminatory attitude at the workplace

and . . . illustrate[s] a nexus between that negative attitude and

the employment action.’" Id. (quoting Brinkley v. Harbour

Rec. Club, 180 F.3d 598, 608 (4th Cir. 1999)). We accordingly deemed the plaintiff’s "powerful evidence showing a

discriminatory attitude at [her company of employment]

toward female managers" sufficient to "allow a trier of fact to

conclude that these discriminatory attitudes led to [plaintiff’s]

ultimate termination." Id. Likewise here. 

Female Pickup and Delivery drivers were rare, with only

six identified in a workforce of over 3000 and with Merritt the

only female in her terminal. As one Old Dominion driver concisely summarized, "We don’t have no females." Merritt’s

two-year quest to be transferred from Line Haul to Pickup and

Delivery is consistent with that general pattern. She was twice

passed over in favor of less-experienced males; she was not

told the truth about her supervisor’s authority to fill the position; and she was told that she was not hired become some

were uncomfortable with women having the job and were

wary that the enhanced physical requirements of Pickup and

Delivery, as compared to Line Haul, were too demanding for

women. Even after she was finally hired, she was placed on

an allegedly out-of-the-ordinary probationary status and never

granted a change in her official job title. The evidence would

allow a jury to conclude that Old Dominion never wanted to

hire Merritt in the first place and lends credence to the view

that it was looking for a reason to fire her. 

To be sure, we do not hold that Merritt’s evidence must be

believed or that, if believed, must yield an inference that Old

Dominion unlawfully discriminated against her. But because

Merritt’s evidence may well be believed and may well yield

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such an inference, Old Dominion is not entitled to summary

judgment. 

IV.

At this point, it is perhaps worthwhile to take a step back.

We fully acknowledge that the "elusive factual question of

intentional discrimination" is inevitably tough and rarely clear

cut. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,

254 n.8 (1981). Our holding is not about setting tripwires

whenever an employer fails to dot its "i’s" or cross its "t’s" in

following a policy. It is not about taking a fine-toothed comb

to the record in the hopes of unearthing some minor discrepancy in an employer’s story. And it is certainly not about

infusing fear and trembling into a company’s every employment decision.

But the alleged facts here are too problematic to overlook.

Evidence of a good employee record combines with evidence

of an impermissible company attitude to form a lethal concoction. Old Dominion fired an employee who was, according to

the district court, "able to do her job without assistance and

in a satisfactory manner," due to a treatable ankle injury,

while hiding behind the results of a selectively administered

physical fitness test that did not even purport to test the injury,

and while dubiously claiming that its decision was compelled

by a late-blooming policy, all in the context of, to put it

mildly, a sexually stereotyped work environment. In this case,

it is not any single piece of evidence but rather the evidence

taken in its entirety that leads us to believe Merritt deserves

a trial. Disposition of Merritt’s claim at the summary judgment stage would "intrude on the jury function by substituting

our own judgment for that of the finder of fact." Dennis v.

Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 650 (4th

Cir. 2002). At trial, Old Dominion will be free to note the burdens that law and regulation can impose on legitimate business judgment, but Merritt will be free to argue on her record

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that opportunity under law must be open to the talents and

industry of all. 

V.

Based on all the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district

court’s grant of summary judgment to Old Dominion and

remand for trial on Merritt’s Title VII claim.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

DAVIS, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I am pleased to join the majority opinion in full and

applaud the excellent craftsmanship of my good colleague in

authoring the opinion. I particularly appreciate the majority

opinion’s reminder that, in intentional discrimination cases,

we should not examine the trees so minutely that we lose

sight of the forest. The ultimate question in this case, as in all

intentional discrimination cases, is not whether the McDonnell Douglas test is satisfied. It is instead, as the majority

opinion teaches, whether the plaintiff has generated a genuine

dispute of material fact that she is the victim of intentional

discrimination, notwithstanding facially plausible reasons

offered by the employer for its adverse employment action.

The proof scheme is but a useful tool to help identify and

resolve that real issue. 

Although employment discrimination cases are inherently

fact-specific, this case stands for an important premise. Our

holding makes it abundantly clear that this court will evaluate

the actual application of employment tests and practices that

employers claim to apply in a neutral manner. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(h) (employment tests are not unlawful as long as

they are not "designed, intended or used to discriminate

because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin"). We

will scrutinize these ostensibly neutral practices with care,

particularly those that insulate employers from liability in

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workplace environments infused with discriminatory animus.

An ultimate decision maker’s proclamation that he or she neutrally applied a policy or test or practice simply will not withstand scrutiny under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 in the face of

substantial direct and circumstantial evidence to the contrary,

evidence, for example, that the employer makes exceptions to

the use of, or that that employer selectively applies, the ostensibly "neutral" device. 

The majority opinion cogently reasons to its conclusion

that, in this case, "a reasonable fact finder could look askance

at Stoddard’s selective use of the PAT, requiring Merritt to

take the test and exempting men who, like Smith and Dalton,

suffered arguably more debilitating physical setbacks and

missed more work[,]" Maj. Op. at 19, and that "[t]he evidence

would allow a jury to conclude that Old Dominion never

wanted to hire Merritt in the first place and lends credence to

the view that it was looking for a reason to fire her." Id. at 20.

I firmly agree. As the majority opinion notes, this case presents "evidence that clearly indicates a discriminatory attitude

at the workplace and . . . illustrate[s] a nexus between that

negative attitude and the employment action." Lettieri, 478

F.3d at 649 (quoting Harbour Rec. Club, 180 F.3d at 608). 

Moreover, while there are certainly some facts in dispute,

there are several evidentiary clusters that rest outside the credibility disputes alluded to by the majority. For example, as the

majority opinion recognizes, it is undisputed that Merritt’s

supervisor found Merritt’s work as a Pickup and Delivery

driver to be fully satisfactory and that he even received compliments from clients about her work. It is also undisputed

that Old Dominion applied the PAT test only on a "very variable" basis and did not apply it primarily to evaluate whether

an employee could return to work after a workplace injury. It

is undisputed that the PAT test was never intended to test the

rehabilitation of Merritt’s sprained ankle; instead, it was formulated to serve as a pre-employment test. It is undisputed

that Merritt was fired because she failed the PAT test. And

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lastly, it is undisputed that Old Dominion could only identify

six female Pickup and Delivery drivers out of its workforce

of 3,000 employees, and that Old Dominion replaced Merritt,

one of those six female employees, with a male Pickup and

Delivery driver. These undisputed facts are emphatically

material to the ultimate issue of whether Merritt is the victim

of intentional gender discrimination but they could easily

escape careful consideration by a busy district court because

they do not fit neatly within the McDonnell Douglas framework. The majority opinion persuasively demonstrates how a

court’s analysis of intentional discrimination claims must

accommodate probative evidence of every sort, and I am

happy to join it fully. 

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