Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-07196/USCOURTS-caDC-99-07196-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 8, 2000 Decided January 16, 2001

No. 99-7196

Anise Jenkins, et al.,

Appellants

v.

Washington Convention Center and District of Columbia,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cv02404)

Daniel M. Schember argued the cause for appellants.

With him on the briefs was Alisa A. Wilkins.

Lutz Alexander Prager, Assistant Deputy Corporation

Counsel, argued the cause for appellee District of Columbia.

With him on the brief were Robert R. Rigsby, Corporation

Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel.

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Glenn M. Young argued the cause for appellee Washington

Convention Center. With him on the brief were Mark D.

Poindexter and Frederick A. Douglas.

Before: Williams, Sentelle and Rogers, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Rogers.

Rogers, Circuit Judge: Appellants, who are 19 individuals

and one corporation,1 seek refunds of special District of

Columbia taxes enacted by the Council of the District of

Columbia ("D.C. Council") to finance a new convention center.

They alleged in their complaint that the Mayor exceeded his

authority under the District of Columbia Self-Government

and Governmental Reorganization Act2 by collecting the special taxes under an expired statute, and that, notwithstanding

later ratifications of the taxes by the D.C. Council, they were

deprived of property without procedural due process and just

compensation. They also alleged tortious conversion of their

money. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, appellants contend

that the district court erred in holding that the District of

Columbia is a "State" for purposes of the Federal Tax

Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. s 1341 (1994) ("FTIA"), that the

FTIA barred their claims under 42 U.S.C. s 1983 (Supp. III

1997), and that their claims may only be presented in the

Superior Court of the District of Columbia after exhaustion of

administrative remedies.

We need not decide whether the FTIA applies to the

District of Columbia, nor whether the FTIA bars appellants'

__________

1 The individual appellants are Anise Jenkins, Philip Barlow,

Matthew D. Bernstein, Steven L. Block, Christopher Crowder,

Steven Donkin, Kathryn Eckles, Jennifer Ellingston, Deborah Hanrahan, Harriet Hubbard, Eugene Dewitt Kinlow, Kevin M. McCarron, Joseph Passonneau, Gastrel L. Riley, Sandra Seegars, Thomas

C. Smith, Bradford Snell, Elizabeth Solomon, and Karen A. Szulgit.

The corporate appellant is Planet Vox, Inc.

2 Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (December 24, 1973) (codified

at D.C. Code s 1-201 et seq. (1981)) ("Self-Government Act"); see

also D.C. Code s 1-242 (1981).

claim for monetary damages under s 1983. Because Congress has granted exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to

District of Columbia tax assessments to the District of Columbia courts, see D.C. Code ss 11-921(a)(3)(B), 11-1201,

11-1202 (1981), we affirm the dismissal of the complaint for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction.3

I.

The Washington Convention Center Authority Act of 1994,

D.C. Law 10-188 (codified as amended at D.C. Code s 9-801

et seq.) ("1994 Act"), increased certain D.C. income and

franchise taxes and certain D.C. sales and use taxes on meals,

beverages, auto rentals, and hotels. See 1994 Act ss 301-

303. The special taxes were dedicated to the construction of

a new convention center in the District of Columbia, see id.

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ss 201(4), 208, and the Act required the Authority Board to

submit to the Mayor and D.C. Council, within 24 months, a

report including a financial statement and feasibility analysis

for the center's construction. See id. s 206(h). The 1994 Act

also included a sunset provision, providing that the special

taxes would expire after two years if the Authority Board

failed to submit the report within 24 months, or by September 28, 1996. See id. s 306(a).

Weeks prior to the deadline for submission of the report,

the D.C. Council concluded that it would be necessary to

extend the submission deadline, and thus extend the statute

imposing the special taxes. On October 1, 1996, the D.C.

Council passed an emergency act, effective September 28,

1996, extending the submission deadline to 30 months instead

of 24 months.4 On December 3, 1996, the D.C. Council

__________

3 The court may affirm the district court on grounds different

from those relied upon by the district court. See, e.g., United

States ex rel. Settlemire v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 913, 920

(D.C. Cir. 1999); see also Securities and Exchange Commission v.

Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943) (citing Helvering v. Gowran,

302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937)).

4 See Washington Convention Center Authority Act of 1994

Emergency Amendment Act of 1996, D.C. Act 11-393, effective

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passed a second emergency act, extending the submission

date to 29 months instead of 24 months, until February 28,

1997.5 On January 8, 1997, the D.C. Council also passed a

temporary act, effective after Congressional review on April

25, 1997, extending the submission deadline to February 28,

1997.6 Then, in June 1998, the D.C. Council passed permanent legislation to repeal, as of February 27, 1997, the

submission deadline in the temporary act.7 The D.C. Council

Report of the Committee on Finance and Revenue stated that

"a repeal of the [sunset] provision would remove any concerns

that the continued collection of the taxes is contingent upon

factual determinations and conditions precedent." Report of

D.C. Committee on Finance and Revenue, dated June 1,

1998, at 9. Finally, in December 1998, the D.C. Council

passed permanent legislation that stated "[n]othwithstanding

any other law, surtaxes and dedicated taxes shall be collected

by the Mayor," for the convention center, until the tax

provisions "are repealed by legislation enacted after September 27, 1996."8 This legislation, effective after congressional

review on April 20, 1999, states that it applies as of September 27, 1996.

__________

October 1, 1996, ss 2, 4. This Act was effective for ninety days.

See D.C. Code s 1-229(a) (1981).

5 See Washington Convention Center Authority Act of 1994

Time Extension Emergency Amendment Act of 1996, D.C. Act

11-509, effective January 8, 1997, ss 2, 4. This Act was effective

for ninety days. See D.C. Code s 1-229(a) (1981).

6 See Washington Convention Center Authority Act of 1994

Time Extension Temporary Amendment Act of 1997, D.C. Law

11-262, effective April 25, 1997, s 2. By its terms, the temporary

act expired after 225 days, on December 6, 1997. Id. s 4(b).

7 See Washington Convention Center Authority Financing

Amendment Act of 1998, D.C. Law 12-142, effective August 12,

1998, s 2(l ) ("1998 Act").

8 See Technical Amendments Act of 1998, D.C. Law 12-264,

effective September 27, 1996, s 21 (codified at D.C. Code s 9-833)

("1999 Act").

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The 1999 Act would appear to foreclose any argument that

the D.C. Council did not retroactively authorize the special

taxes.9 See generally United States v. Heinszen, 206 U.S.

370 (1907); Thomas v. Network Solutions, Inc., 176 F.3d 500,

506 (D.C. Cir. 1999). According to appellants' complaint,

however, the special tax laws expired "during all or portions

of the period from September 28, 1996 until August 12, 1998,"

yet the Mayor continued to collect, and appellants continued

to pay, the special taxes in an amount of not less than

$467.06.10 It is this amount, and similar amounts on behalf of

the class of similarly situated taxpayers, for which appellants

seek refunds. The Mayor's collection of the special taxes

after the statute had expired is the basis for appellants'

allegation that the Mayor acted ultra vires, beyond his authority under the Self-Government Act. Appellants maintain

that the temporary act and the 1998 Act should not be

interpreted to have retroactive application, and that to the

extent the 1999 Act is intended to have blanket retroactive

effect, it is an unconstitutional taking of property without just

compensation if administrative remedies cannot reasonably be

pursued. Appellants further allege that because taxation is

planned and systematic, not random, any reliance by the

District of Columbia on post-collection ratification, rather

than prior legislative action, violates the due process clause,

citing Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127-30, 135-39

__________

9 See id.

10 Appellants allege in their complaint that the taxes expired on

February 28, 1997, because financial submission requirements were

not met by the date specified in the temporary act. Alternatively,

appellants allege that the taxes expired on December 6, 1997, due to

the expiration of the temporary act on that date. Appellants also

allege that because the first emergency act expired on December

30, 1996, and the second emergency act did not become effective

until January 8, 1997, taxing authority expired from December 30,

1996 to January 8, 1997. Appellants also allege that the taxes

expired from December 30, 1996 to April 25, 1997, because the

second emergency act was invalid. Additionally, appellants allege

that the taxes expired from September 28, 1996 to April 25, 1997,

because the first emergency act was invalid.

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(1990). In addition, appellants allege the tortious conversion

of their money. They filed their complaint in the United

States District Court for the District of Columbia, asserting

that the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

ss 1331, 1343(a)(3), (4), and 1367.

In granting the motion of the Washington Convention

Center Authority and the District of Columbia to dismiss the

complaint, the district court ruled that the District of Columbia was a "State" for purposes of the FTIA, 28 U.S.C. s 1341

(1994), and hence the FTIA barred appellants' constitutional

claims under s 1983 because appellants had an adequate

remedy under District of Columbia law that they had not

exhausted.11 Because appellants did not seek a declaratory

judgment or an order enjoining continued collection of the

taxes, the district court ruled that it could not exercise

jurisdiction under the "multiplicity of suits" rationale. Regarding appellants' statutory and tort claims under District of

Columbia law, the district court ruled that, in view of its lack

of subject matter jurisdiction over appellants' s 1983 claims,

it was precluded from exercising supplemental jurisdiction.

II.

On appeal, appellants contend that the district court erred

as a matter of law in holding that the District of Columbia is

a "State" under the FTIA and in dismissing their claims

under s 1983 pursuant to the FTIA. Appellants also contend

that they were not required to exhaust their remedies under

District of Columbia law, and, alternatively, if exhaustion is

required, the administrative remedies were inadequate and

__________

11 The Federal Tax Injunction Act provides that:

The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the

assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where

a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had in the courts

of such State.

28 U.S.C. s 1341 (1994).

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exhaustion of them would be futile. In this regard, appellants

maintain that because the money was taken from members of

the class in countless daily transactions, each involving small

amounts of money, it would be unreasonable to require them

to keep records of each transaction in order to obtain relief

under administrative tax refund remedies, see D.C. Code

ss 47-1812.11(a)(2), 47-2020 (1981), and that because the

District of Columbia's position throughout this lawsuit has

been adverse to their claims in every important respect,

pursuing administrative remedies under District of Columbia

law would be futile.

In contending that the district court had subject matter

jurisdiction of their complaint, appellants rely on D.C. Transit

System, Inc. v. Pearson, 250 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1957). They

read that case to stand for the proposition that where anticipatory relief is not sought (and appellants do not seek to

enjoin current or future assessment or collection of the

special taxes) a suit in district court is not barred by the D.C.

Tax Injunction Act, D.C. Code s 47-3307 (1981).12 In Pearson, the court held that in view of adequate remedies under

District of Columbia law, a suit to enjoin collection of a

District of Columbia tax would not lie in the district court.

250 F.2d at 765. Our review of appellants' jurisdictional

contention is de novo. See Zappia Middle East Construction

Co. Ltd. v. Emirate of Abu Dhabi, 215 F.3d 247, 249 (2nd Cir.

2000); Trauma Service Group v. United States, 104 F.3d

1321, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Because Congress has vested

exclusive jurisdiction in the District of Columbia courts over

all challenges to assessments and claims for refunds of District of Columbia taxes, we hold that the district court lacked

jurisdiction of appellants' complaint, and we do not reach

appellants' contentions regarding the FTIA and the D.C. Tax

Injunction Act.

__________

12 The D.C. Tax Injunction Act provides that "[n]o suit shall be

filed to enjoin the assessment or collection by the District of

Columbia or any of its officers, agents, or employees of any tax."

D.C. Code s 47-3307 (1981).

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A.

For many years the courts of the District of Columbia were

courts of limited jurisdiction and a variety of matters arising

under District of Columbia law were litigated in the federal

courts of the District of Columbia. Congress changed that in

the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473, (July 29, 1970)

(codified at D.C. Code s 11-101 et seq. (1981)) ("Court Reform Act"). Acting pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 17

of the United States Constitution, Congress established a

state-type court system for the District of Columbia and

transferred jurisdiction over matters arising under District of

Columbia law from the federal courts to the new District of

Columbia courts. See Court Reform Act, Title I, s 111

(codified at D.C. Code ss 11-921 through 11-923 (1981)); see

also Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 392 n.2 (1973);

cf. Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 962 n.35 (D.C. Cir.

1973). As a result, the District of Columbia courts ceased to

be courts of limited jurisdiction, and the federal courts in the

District of Columbia assumed the traditional role of the

federal courts in our judicial system. See Andrade v. Jackson, 401 A.2d 990, 992 (D.C. 1979); Reichman v. Franklin

Simon Corp., 392 A.2d 9, 12 (D.C. 1978).

Section 111 of the Court Reform Act provided that the

newly established Superior Court of the District of Columbia

would have jurisdiction of "any civil action or other matter, at

law or in equity, which involves an appeal from or petition for

review of any assessment of tax (or civil penalty thereon)

made by the District of Columbia." Court Reform Act, Title

I, s 111 (codified as D.C. Code s 11-921(a)(3)(B) (1981)).

Further, s 111 provided that "[t]he Tax Division of the

Superior Court shall be assigned exclusive jurisdiction of all

appeals from and petitions for review of assessments of tax

(and civil penalties thereon) made by the District of Columbia

and all proceedings brought by the District of Columbia for

the imposition of criminal penalties pursuant to the provisions

of the statutes relating to taxes levied by or in behalf of the

District of Columbia." Id. (codified as D.C. Code s 11-1201

(1981)). Section 111 also provided:

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Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the jurisdiction of the Tax Division of the Superior Court to review

the validity and amount of all assessments of tax made

by the District of Columbia is exclusive. Effective on

and after the effective date of the [Court Reform Act],

any common-law remedy with respect to assessments of

tax in the District of Columbia and any equitable action

to enjoin such assessments available in a court other than

the former District of Columbia Tax Court is abolished.

Actions properly filed before the effective date of that

Act are not affected by this section and the court in

which any such action has been filed may retain jurisdiction until its disposition.

Id. (codified as D.C. Code s 11-1202 (1981)).

Congress' intent in the Court Reform Act could not be

more clear: Congress unambiguously intended to vest in the

District of Columbia courts exclusive jurisdiction over all

challenges to District of Columbia taxes including those involving federal statutory or constitutional claims in lieu of

(rather than concurrently with) jurisdiction in the federal

courts. Lest there be any doubt about Congress' intent to

place exclusive jurisdiction in the newly established District

of Columbia courts, in the Court Reform Act Congress expressly repealed its earlier enactment vesting concurrent

jurisdiction over matters relating to District of Columbia

taxes in the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia.

Prior to the Court Reform Act, the district court for the

District of Columbia was vested with "a two-fold jurisdiction,"

King v. Wall & Beaver Street Corp., 145 F.2d 377, 380 (D.C.

Cir. 1944), as "both a federal district court and the local trial

court of general jurisdiction." Fehlhaber Pile Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 155 F.2d 864, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1946); see

also W. Urn Mfg. Co. v. Am. Pipe and Steel Corp., 284 F.2d

279, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1960); D.C. Code ss 11-301, 11-305,

11-306 (1940). In 1952, Congress enacted legislation with a

"savings clause," S. Rep. No. 82-1471, at 3 (1952); H.R. Rep.

No. 82-1977, at 4 (1952), preserving the availability of judicial

remedies in the federal court for those District of Columbia

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taxpayers who elected not to pursue an administrative refund

process that was available under District of Columbia law.

See Act of July 10, 1952, ch. 649, 66 Stat. 543, 546 (codified at

D.C. Code s 47-2413(c) (1961)).13 Because the district court

for the District of Columbia at the time was the local trial

court of general jurisdiction, the 1952 statute had the effect of

vesting concurrent jurisdiction in the district court over actions seeking refunds of District of Columbia taxes, along

with the administrative jurisdiction of the District of Columbia Board of Tax Appeals. See, e.g., Pearson, 250 F.2d at

765. Section 111 of Title I of the Court Reform Act repealed

the 1952 statute. See D.C. Code s 11-1202 (1981) (repealing

D.C. Code s 47-2413(c) (1961)). Consequently, appellants'

reliance on Pearson, 250 F.2d at 765, for the proposition that

the district court had jurisdiction, is misplaced.

Congress also made clear that its grant of exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to tax assessments under District of

Columbia law included claims for refunds. Section 161 of the

Court Reform Act established an administrative procedure

for obtaining refunds of District of Columbia taxes, see Court

Reform Act, Title I, s 161(a)(7) (codified as amended at D.C.

Code s 47-3310 (1981)), and provided an appeal from an

administrative determination with de novo review in the D.C.

Superior Court, see id. s 161(a)(3) (codified as amended at

D.C. Code s 47-3303 (1981)), a right of appeal to the District

of Columbia Court of Appeals, see id. s 161(a)(4) (codified as

amended at D.C. Code s 47-3304 (1981)), and certiorari re-

__________

13 The 1952 Act provided, in relevant part:

The remedies provided to the taxpayer under this chapter shall

not be deemed to take away from the taxpayer any remedy

which he might have under any other provision of law, but no

suit for the recovery of overpayment of any tax shall be

instituted in any court if the taxpayer has elected to file an

appeal with respect to such overpayment with the Board of Tax

Appeals for the District of Columbia under this title.

Act of July 10, 1952, ch. 649, 66 Stat. 543, 546 (codified at D.C. Code

s 47-2413(c) (1961)).

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view by the United States Supreme Court. See id.; see also

D.C. Code s 11-102 (1981).

Having established a state-type court system for the District of Columbia, three years later Congress enacted the

District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (December

24, 1973) (codified at D.C. Code s 1-201 et seq. (1981)) ("SelfGovernment Act"). In addition to transferring certain functions previously performed by federal agencies to the District

of Columbia government, Congress delegated some of its

legislative authority under Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of

the United States Constitution to a new District of Columbia

government. Title IV of the Self-Government Act was a

Charter, which set forth the three branches of the District of

Columbia government and is similar, in some measure, to a

state constitution. See Shook v. D.C. Fin. Responsibility and

Mgmt. Assistance Auth., 132 F.3d 775, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

Therein Congress delegated to the D.C. Council certain legislative powers, including revenue raising powers, see D.C.

Code ss 1-227, 1-233 (1981), by means of legislation in the

form of either permanent, temporary, or emergency acts, as

appropriate. See id. ss 1-229, 1-233 (1981); see also United

States v. Alston, 580 A.2d 587, 590-91 (D.C. 1990). The

Mayor, in turn, was charged with the responsibility to enforce

the laws, including the levying and collection of taxes. See

D.C. Code ss 47-301, 47-310(6) (1981). Pursuant to their

delegated authority, the D.C. Council enacted the 1994, 1998,

and 1999 Acts, and the emergency and temporary acts, and

the Mayor collected the special taxes for which appellants

seek refunds.

By enactment of the Court Reform Act and the SelfGovernment Act, therefore, Congress has expressed its clear

intent to grant exclusive jurisdiction over claims for refunds

of District of Columbia taxes to the District of Columbia

courts and authorized District of Columbia government officials to enact and collect, as well as refund, taxes. Congress

divested the federal courts of any jurisdiction over such

challenges that they might otherwise have, including jurisdiction over challenges presenting federal statutory or constituUSCA Case #99-7196 Document #568931 Filed: 01/16/2001 Page 11 of 12
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tional claims. See Block v. District of Columbia, 492 F.2d

646, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1974); District of Columbia v. Berenter,

466 F.2d 367, 373 n.9, 376 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1972); H.R. Rep.

No. 91-907, at 165 (1970). The lack of life tenure and of the

other attributes of Article III status on the part of the judges

of the District of Columbia's courts does not render the

exclusive jurisdiction of those courts over federal statutory

and constitutional claims constitutionally problematic. See

Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 382-83 (1977). As would be

true of a litigant challenging State taxes, the refund and

appeal procedures in the Court Reform Act do not preclude a

litigant, including appellants, from raising federal statutory

and constitutional claims in the District of Columbia courts,

with ultimate review of federal claims by the United States

Supreme Court available by writ of certiorari. See Court

Reform Act, Title I, s 161(a)(7) (codified as amended at D.C.

Code s 47-3310 (1981)); id. s 161(a)(3) (codified as amended

at D.C. Code s 47-3303 (1981)); id. s 161(a)(4) (codified as

amended at D.C. Code s 47-3304 (1981)); see also D.C. Code

s 11-102 (1981).

Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of appellants' complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.14

__________

14 In view of our disposition, we do not address appellants'

contention that administrative remedies under District of Columbia

law are inadequate and that pursuit of them would be futile. We

note that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals summarily

affirmed dismissal of a similar complaint brought by appellants for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Jenkins v. Wash.

Convention Ctr. Auth., Nos. 00-CV-29 and 00-CV-239 (D.C. August 7, 2000). Further, it appears that on September 27, 1999,

appellants filed administrative claims for refunds. See Washington

Convention Center Authority's Brief at 19; Appellants' Reply Brief

at 7 n.4.

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