Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05486/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05486-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 On September 23, 2004, defendants Westphal, Mounce, and Velasquez were granted summary

adjudication on plaintiff’s excessive force claim against them with respect to the force used prior to and during the

administration of the annual TB test; defendant DeAzevedo was granted summary adjudication on plaintiff’s

excessive force claim against him; defendant Overly was granted summary adjudication on plaintiff’s Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment claims against him; defendant Tristan was granted summary adjudication on plaintiff’s First

Amendment claim against him; and defendant Suniga was granted summary adjudication on plaintiff’s First

Amendment damages claim against him on qualified immunity grounds.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES CATO, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. R. WESTPHAL, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:02-CV-5486-REC-SMS-P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING DEFENDANT SUNIGA’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

ON PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDMENT

CLAIM BE GRANTED

(Doc. 46)

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff James Cato, Jr. (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on

plaintiff’s complaint filed April 30, 2002, against defendants Westphal, Mounce, and Velasquez

under the Eighth Amendment for damages based on the use of excessive force after the annual TB

test was administered, and against defendant Suniga under the First Amendment for injunctive relief

based on the confiscation of plaintiff’s adult publications.1 (Doc. 45.) On October 21, 2004,

pursuant to the court’s order September 23, 2004, defendant Suniga filed an amended motion for

summary adjudication on plaintiff’s First Amendment claim against him. (Doc. 46.) Plaintiff filed

Case 1:02-cv-05486-REC -SMS Document 56 Filed 08/09/05 Page 1 of 11
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 Plaintiff was notified of the requirements for opposing a summary judgment motion on January 30, 2003. 

(Doc. 11.)

2

an opposition on December 29, 2004.2 (Doc. 50.) On April 5, 2005, pursuant to the court’s order

of February 24, 2005, defendant Suniga filed a supplement to his motion. (Docs. 52, 53.) Plaintiff

filed a response to the supplement on June 6, 2005. (Doc. 54.) 

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue

as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’”

Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon

motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

Id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s

case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment

should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard

for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence

of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is

required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586

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n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630

(9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is 

genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’”

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963

amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule 56(c).

The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable

inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the

opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655

(1962) (per curiam). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing

party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. Richards

v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th

Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine

issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

///

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 The Undisputed Facts are taken from the Findings and Recommendations filed on July 26, 2004, which

addressed the motion for summary judgment upon which the pending amended motion is based.

4

III. Undisputed Facts3

1. On July 24, 2001, mailroom staff employee Suniga confiscated four adult publications

addressed to plaintiff through the U.S. mail.

2. On August 13, 2001, defendant Suniga confiscated two more adult publications addressed

to plaintiff.

3. On November 13, 2001, defendant Suniga confiscated four more adult publications

addressed to plaintiff.

4. Defendant Suniga confiscated the publications pursuant to various subsections of section

3006(c) of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations. 

5. Section 3006(c) authorizes the confiscation of contraband, which includes certain types of

sexually explicit material, or material which is otherwise reasonably deemed by staff to be

a threat to legitimate penological interests. 

IV. Discussion

A. Challenge to Constitutionality of Section 3006(c)

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that section 3006(c) of Title 15 of the California Code of

Regulations violates his right under the First Amendment to possess legally acquired adult

publications and adult literature. (Doc. 1, Comp., p. 7.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant Suniga’s

confiscation of four publications on July 24, 2001, a book and a publication on August 15, 2001, and

four publications on November 13, 2001, violated his right under the First Amendment to possess

adult material. Plaintiff alleges that the materials were not “hardcore.” (Id., p. 7-8.) 

Prisoners clearly have “a First Amendment right to send and receive mail.” Witherow v.

Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995). However, not every infringement on this right rises to the

level of a constitutional violation. The question is whether the policy at issue in this action

impermissibly infringed upon plaintiff’s right to receive publications, resulting in a violation of

plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. 

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“Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the

Constitution.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). “Thus, [a] prisoner retains those First

Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate

penological objectives of the corrections system.” Ashker v. California Dep’t Of Corr., 350 F.3d

917, 922 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “A prison regulation that

impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights therefore is valid only if it is ‘reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests.’” Ashker, 350 F.3d at 922 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 88). “A

regulation cannot be sustained where the logical connection between the regulation and the asserted

goal is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. 

However, “courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison

administration and reform.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 84 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Thus, “‘deference is accorded to prison authorities in order to avoid hampering their ability to

anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison

administration,’” Ashker, 350 F.3d at 922 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 85, 88), and the regulation

must be upheld if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Mauro v. Arpaio, 188

F.3d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing to Turner, 482 U.S. at 84-85 (internal quotations omitted)).

In determining the reasonableness of the regulation, the court must consider the following

factors: (1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection between the regulation and the legitimate

government interest put forward to justify it,” (2) “whether there are alternative means of exercising

the right,” (3) the impact that the “accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on

guards and other inmates,” and (4) “the absence of ready alternatives.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90.

1. Rational Connection to Legitimate Penological Purpose

In considering the first Turner factor, the court must “(1) determine whether the regulation

is legitimate and neutral, and (2) assess whether there is a rational relationship between the

governmental objective and the regulation.” Ashker, 350 F.3d at 922. 

In determining whether there is a rational relationship between the purported

objective and the regulation, the level of scrutiny applied to the judgment of prison

officials depends on the circumstances in each case. If an inmate presents sufficient

evidence to refute a common-sense connection between a legitimate objective and

a prison regulation, ... the state must present enough counter-evidence to show that

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the connection is not so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational.” If,

however, the inmate does not present evidence sufficient to refute a common-sense

connection between the regulation and the government objective, prison officials

need not prove that the banned material actually caused problems in the past or that

the materials are likely to cause problems in the future. The only question is whether

prison administrators reasonably could have thought the regulation would advance

legitimate penological interests.

Ashker at 922-23 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Section 3006 governs contraband and, in relevant part, disallows inmates from possessing

any matter containing or concerning matter of a character tending to incite violence or physical harm

to any person; or which depicts, displays, or describes penetration of the vagina or anus, or contact

between the mouth and the genitals; or which depicts, displays, or describes an excretory function

including semen. Cal. Code Regs. tit 15, § 3006(c). Defendant contends that the objective of the

policy “is to maintain the security of the institution, to promote the rehabilitation of its inmates, and

to reduce sexual misconduct, in particular sexual harassment of female correctional officers and

medical staff.” (Doc. 46, Amend. Mtn., 3:4-7 & Doc. 47, Hansen Dec. ¶ 2.) Defendant contends

that “inmates may use such images to taunt or provoke other inmates or prison employees, which

could easily lead to a physical altercation or other conduct which would directly undermine the

security interests of [the] institution,” and that “the restriction is generally meant to help create an

atmosphere at the institution which reduces hostility and aggressive conduct, and which is conducive

to the institution’s rehabilitative objectives.” (Amend. Mtn., 3:7-12 & Hansen Dec. ¶ 2.) 

Defendant has set forth sufficient evidence to establish the common-sense connection

between the regulation and the government objective. Plaintiff disputes that the regulation promotes

rehabilitation or is in place to reduce sexual misconduct. (Doc. 50, 2nd Opp., p. 2.) Plaintiff’s bare

challenge is insufficient to refute the common-sense connection between the regulation and the

stated objective. It does not matter whether the policy in fact advances Wasco’s legitimate interests.

Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054, 1060 (9th Cir. 1999) (quotations and citations omitted). Given that

plaintiff did not refute the common-sense connection, defendant is not required to submit evidence

demonstrating “that the connection is not so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational.”

Ashker v. California Department of Corrections, 350 F.3d 917, 922 (9th Cir. 2003) (quotations and

citation omitted). 

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 Plaintiff’s claim in this action is not based on the confiscation of material depicting frontal nudity. 

Plaintiff’s materials were confiscated pursuant to section 3006(15) because they depicted mouth-to-genital contact,

penetration of the vagina, and/or excretion of semen, and/or contained material that tended to incite violence or

physical harm to a person. (Doc. 42, Findings and Recommendations, 17:13-21.) To the extent that plaintiff is

attempting to restate his claim as one challenging section 3006(17) which bans all frontal nudity, he may file a new

action. Plaintiff may not, in his opposition, alter his claim so he can, in this action, challenge a different subsection.

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2. Alternative Means of Exercising Right

The second factor requires consideration of “whether there are alternative means of

exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. “Where other

avenues remain available for the exercise of the asserted right, courts should be particularly

conscious of the measure of judicial deference owed to correctional officials . . . in gauging the

validity of the regulation.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

Defendant contends that the right at issue is the right to receive sexually explicit material.

(Doc. 52, 2nd Amend. Mtn., 4:8-9.) Defendant contends that the regulation does not ban all materials

with sexual content but instead is limited to matter that would incite violence or which are obscene

without the meaning of the regulation. (2nd Amend. Mtn., 4:9-12 & Doc. 53, Hansen Dec., ¶ 3.)

Defendant contends that inmates are generally allowed to possess educational, medical, or scientific

material which describe or depict the human body. (2nd Amend. Mtn., 4:1314 & Hansen Dec., ¶ 3.)

Plaintiff contends that all material depicting frontal nudity is now banned,4 and that with

respect to the allowance of educational, medical, or scientific material, this allowance demonstrates

that the regulation does not serve a penological interest, because nudity is nudity. (Doc. 54, 2nd Opp.,

4:22-24 & 5:7-12.) While defendant has submitted some evidence that there are alternate means to

the exercise of the right in question, plaintiff has not submitted any evidence that are no avenues

available to receive sexually explicit material. In addition to allowing educational,

medical/scientific, and artistic materials that are sexually explicit, the regulation does not ban all

sexual material. The regulation does not ban photographs of clothed females, for example, and does

not ban other sexual material, as long as the material is not obscene within the meaning of the

regulation and does not depict frontal nudity. See Mauro, 188 F.3d at 1061. Accordingly, the court

finds that the second factor weighs in favor of defendant. 

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3. Impact of Accommodating Right

The third factor requires consideration of the impact that the “accommodation of the asserted

constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates . . . .” Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. Defendant

contends that accommodating an unrestricted right to sexually explicit material would lead to an

increase in the sexual harassment of female officers and others, and to violence among inmates

stemming from the possession or use of such material. (Doc. 52, 2nd Amend. Mtn., 4:19-23 & Doc.

53, Hansen Dec. ¶ 4.) Defendant contends that a hostile work environment would be created,

particularly for female staff, and that the overall safety and security of employees, visitors, and

inmates would be jeopardized. (2nd Amend. Mtn., 4:23-5:1 & Hansen Dec. ¶ 4.)

Plaintiff’s contentions that he has never once seen inmates fight over explicit materials and

that sexual harassment of female officers will never cease are unpersuasive. (Doc. 54, 2nd Opp.,

5:16-27.) The Ninth Circuit has recognized that the impact of unrestricted access to sexually explicit

materials would be significant because it might lead to fights which could jeopardize the safety of

employees and inmates, and because it would expose female employees to sexual harassment and

a hostile work environment. Mauro, 188 F.3d at 1061-62. Accordingly, the third factor weighs in

favor of defendant. 

4. Absence of Ready Alternatives

“Finally, the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison

regulation.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating “that there are

obvious, easy alternatives to the regulation.” Mauro, 188 F.3d at 1062.

Plaintiff contends that the obvious and easy alternative to the regulation is to utilize the

disciplinary procedure already in place for inmates who misbehave. (Doc. 54, 2nd Opp., 6:20-21.)

Plaintiff’s suggestion is unpersuasive. Defendant has established that the policy was enacted “to

maintain the security of the institution, to promote the rehabilitation of its inmates, and to reduce

sexual misconduct,in particularsexual harassment of female correctional officers and medical staff.”

(Doc. 46, Amend. Mtn., 3:4-7 & Doc. 47, Hansen Dec. ¶ 2.) The bare suggestion that other existing

rules and regulations be utilized to discipline inmates when necessary is not an obvious, easy

alternative to the regulation, which specifically targets sexual material determined by correctional

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officials to create the precise problems the regulation seeks to alleviate. Plaintiff has not set forth

any alternative that can fully accommodate his rights at a de minimis cost to valid penological

interests. 

Accordingly, after consideration of all four Turner factors, the court finds that defendant is

entitled to summary adjudication on plaintiff’s First Amendment claim against him.

B. Application of Section 3006 to Plaintiff’s Materials

In his opposition, plaintiff denies he is challenging the constitutionality of the regulation and

argues that he is challenging whether the confiscated materials fell within the purview of section

3006. (Doc. 50, Opp., p. 2 ¶ 4 & p. 3 ¶ 1.) The claim set forth in plaintiff’s complaint appears to

the court to be one challenging the constitutionality of the regulation. (Doc. 1, Comp., p. 7-8.)

Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, the court will address plaintiff’s alternate theory. 

As set forth in the Findings and Recommendations filed on July 26, 2004, 

Section 3006 governs contraband and, in relevant part, disallows inmates from

possessing any matter containing or concerning matter of a character tending to incite

violence or physical harm to any person; or which depicts, displays, or describes

penetration of the vagina or anus, or contact between the mouth and the genitals; or

which depicts, displays, or describes an excretory function including semen. Cal.

Code Regs. tit 15, § 3006(c). On July 24, 2001, four magazines sent to plaintiff were

disapproved and withheld by defendant Suniga on the ground that they showed

mouth-to-genital contact and depicted penetration of the vagina. (Opp., Exhibit L,

p. 1-2.) On August 15, 2001, one magazine sent to plaintiff was disapproved and

withheld by defendant Suniga on the ground that it showed penetration and mouth-togenital contact, and another publication was disapproved and withheld by defendant

Suniga on the ground that it described penetration of the vagina and mouth-to-genital

contact. (Opp., Exhibit L, p. 3; Exhibit M.) On November 13, 2001, defendant

Suniga disapproved and withheld four magazines on the ground that they contained

material that tended to incite violence or physical harm to a person, and depicted

mouth-to-genital contact, penetration of the vagina, and excretion of semen. (Doc.

1, Comp., Exhibit D, p. 5-6.) 

(Doc. 42, 17:9-22.)

Plaintiff argues that the Constitution and section 3006(c) require a determination whether

plaintiff’s publications taken as a whole lack artistic, literary, political, or scientific value, and that

defendant Suniga did not make such a finding. (Doc. 50, Opp., p. 2 ¶ 2.) Plaintiff argues that only

a few pages of his material violated section 3006(c) and that because he has never seen those pages,

they are in question. (Id.) 

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Plaintiff’s arguments are unpersuasive. Section 3006(c)(15) defines obscene material, in

relevant part, as material that depicts mouth-to-genital contact, penetration of the vagina, and

excretion of semen. Plaintiff was notified that his materials were being withheld for depicting

mouth-to-genital contact, penetration of the vagina, and/or excretion of semen, and plaintiff does not

deny that his publications contained those images. Plaintiff’s contention that defendant needed to

have reviewed the entire publication, weighed the images deemed obscene against the other material

within the publication, and made a specific finding that the publication as a whole constituted

obscene material is without support. 

The court is equally unmoved by plaintiff’s assertions that because only select pages of his

publications were found to violate section 3006(c), the materials did not fall within the regulatory

definition of obscene material and that because plaintiff did not see the pages, they are at issue.

Material that depicts mouth-to-genital contact, penetration of the vagina, and/or excretion of semen

is obscene material within the meaning of the regulation. Plaintiff does not deny that his

publications contained pages depicting the images that defendant stated they depicted and which led

to their confiscation. Further, there is no requirement that an inmate be shown the obscene material

for the confiscation to be proper.

Accordingly, to the extent that plaintiff’s complaint can be read to state a claim for relief on

the basis that plaintiff’s publications did not fall within the purview of section 3006 and were

therefore wrongly confiscated by defendant, the court finds that there are no material issues of fact

is dispute and defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

V. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendant Suniga’s motion

for summary adjudication on the First Amendment injunctive relief claim against him, filed October

21, 2004, be GRANTED, and that this action be set for trial on plaintiff’s remaining Eighth

Amendment claim against defendants Westphal, Mounce, and Velasquez.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file written

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objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 8, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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