Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00150/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00150-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JACQUELINE PATRICK, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-00150-N

)

PUBLIX SUPER MARKETS, INC., )

Defendant. )

ORDER

This action is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (Doc. 40) and separate memorandum and exhibits 

in support (Doc. 41) filed by Defendant Publix Super Markets, Inc. (“Publix”). 

Plaintiff Jacqueline Patrick has timely filed a response (Doc. 44), supported by 

exhibits, in opposition to the motion, and Publix has timely filed a reply and

supporting exhibits (Doc. 45) to the response. The motion is now under submission 

(see Doc. 43) and is ripe for disposition.

With the consent of the parties, the Court has designated the undersigned 

Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings in this civil action, in accordance with 

28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73, and S.D. Ala. GenLR 73. 

(See Docs. 12, 14). Upon consideration, the Court finds that Publix’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment (Doc. 40) is due to be GRANTED.

I. Summary Judgment Analytical Framework

“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or 

defense--or the part of each claim or defense--on which summary judgment is sought. 

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The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “An issue of fact is ‘material’ if it might affect 

the outcome of the suit under governing law and it is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is such 

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Ave. CLO 

Fund, Ltd. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 723 F.3d 1287, 1294 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotations 

omitted). “Summary judgment is only appropriate if a case is ‘so one-sided that one 

party must prevail as a matter of law.’ ” Quigg v. Thomas Cty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 

1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

251-52 (1986)) (citation omitted). However, a “ ‘mere scintilla’ of evidence is 

insufficient; the non-moving party must produce substantial evidence in order to 

defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158, 

1165 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). In other words, “there must be enough of a 

showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party ... Where the record taken 

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, 

there is no genuine issue for trial.” Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 

(11th Cir. 1997) (quotations omitted).

“[C]ourts are required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the 

light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment motion.” 

Jackson v. West, 787 F.3d 1345, 1352 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 

U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (alteration adopted) (quotations omitted)). See also Allen, 121 

F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, 

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and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” (quotations omitted)). 

“The Court ‘must avoid weighing conflicting evidence or making credibility 

determinations.’ ” Ave. CLO Fund, 723 F.3d at 1294 (quoting Stewart v. Booker T. 

Washington Ins., 232 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 2000)). However, “ ‘an inference 

based on speculation and conjecture is not reasonable.’ ” Id. (quoting Blackston v. 

Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co., 764 F.2d 1480, 1482 (11th Cir. 1985)).

“Where, as here, the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on an issue 

at trial, the moving party, in order to prevail, must do one of two things: show that 

the non-moving party has no evidence to support its case, or present ‘affirmative 

evidence demonstrating that the nonmoving party will be unable to prove its case at 

trial.’ ” Hammer v. Slater, 20 F.3d 1137, 1141 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting United 

States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1437–38 (11th Cir. 1991) (en 

banc)). “Once the movant adequately supports its motion, the burden shifts to the 

nonmoving party to show that specific facts exist that raise a genuine issue for trial.” 

Dietz v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 598 F.3d 812, 815 (11th Cir. 2010). “For issues 

on which the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the non-moving 

party must either point to evidence in the record or present additional evidence 

‘sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged 

evidentiary deficiency.’ ” Hammer, 20 F.3d at 1141 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. City of 

Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 1993)).

“A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support 

the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including 

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depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, 

stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, 

interrogatory answers, or other materials; or (B) showing that the materials cited do 

not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party 

cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 

“The nonmoving party may avail itself of all facts and justifiable inferences in the 

record taken as a whole.” Allen, 121 F.3d at 646 (quotation omitted). “If 

reasonable minds could differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then a 

court should deny summary judgment.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Conclusory 

allegations and speculation are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material 

fact.” Valderrama v. Rousseau, 780 F.3d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing 

Cordoba v. Dillard's Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Speculation does 

not create a genuine issue of fact; instead, it creates a false issue, the demolition of 

which is a primary goal of summary judgment.”)).

Importantly, “ ‘[t]here is no burden upon the district court to distill every 

potential argument that could be made based on the materials before it on summary 

judgment. Rather, the onus is upon the parties to formulate arguments; grounds 

alleged in the complaint but not relied upon in summary judgment are deemed 

abandoned.’ ” Solutia, Inc. v. McWane, Inc., 672 F.3d 1230, 1239 (11th Cir. 2012)

(per curiam) (quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 

(11th Cir. 1995) (en banc)). Relatedly, while “it may consider other materials in the 

record[,]” the “court need consider only the cited materials...” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

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56(c)(3) (emphasis added).

II. Analysis

Patrick’s complaint alleges, in sum, that she was injured on March 10, 2014, 

when she slipped and fell while shopping at a grocery store in Spanish Fort, 

Alabama, owned and operated by Publix. Viewed in the light most favorable to 

Patrick, the evidence presented on summary judgment indicates that Patrick slipped 

on a clear liquid near the entrance to the store’s produce section. Patrick alleges 

causes of action for negligence (Count One) and wantonness (Count Two) against 

Publix arising from the incident. (See Doc. 1-1). Publix has moved for summary 

judgment on both.

A. Negligence

Under Alabama law,1 to “ ‘establish negligence, a plaintiff must prove: (1) a 

 1 This civil action was originally filed in Alabama state court but was removed 

to this Court by Publix under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The amended notice of removal 

(Docs. 1, 8) alleges sufficient facts demonstrating that this Court has subject matter 

jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), no party has 

challenged those facts, and the Court finds no basis in the record to question them 

sua sponte.

“In a diversity action such as this one, a federal court must apply the 

choice-of-law principles of the state in which it sits.” E.g., Michel v. NYP Holdings, 

Inc., 816 F.3d 686, 694 (11th Cir. 2016). “ ‘Lex loci delicti has been the rule in 

Alabama for almost 100 years. Under this principle, an Alabama court will 

determine the substantive rights of an injured party according to the law of the state 

where the injury occurred.’ ” Ex parte U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n, 148 So. 3d 1060, 1069 

(Ala. 2014) (quoting Fitts v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 581 So. 2d 819, 820 (Ala. 

1991)). “[T]he place of injury is in the state where the fact which created the right 

to sue occurs.” Id. at 1070. Here, it is undisputed that Patrick’s injuries occurred 

in Alabama, and all parties have argued that Alabama law applies to the claims at 

issue. Cf. Michel, 816 F.3d at 695 (“Because no party has challenged the choice of 

New York libel law, all are deemed to have consented to its application.” (quotation 

omitted)). However, “[a]lthough the substantive aspects of this diversity case are 

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duty to a foreseeable plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) proximate causation; and 

(4) damage or injury.’ ” Jones Food Co. v. Shipman, 981 So. 2d 355, 361 (Ala. 2006)

(quoting Martin v. Arnold, 643 So. 2d 564, 567 (Ala.1994), and Albert v. Hsu, 602 So.

2d 895, 897 (Ala. 1992)). Here, it is uncontested that Patrick’s alleged injuries 

occurred while she was shopping at Publix’s grocery store. 

Under Alabama law, a person invited onto another's premises for 

commercial purposes is an invitee. See Ex parte Mountain Top Indoor 

Flea Market, Inc., 699 So. 2d 158, 161 (Ala. 1997). The duty owed by the 

invitor to an invitee is to exercise ordinary and reasonable care to keep 

the premises in a reasonably safe condition. Winn–Dixie v. Godwin, 349 

So. 2d 37 (Ala. 1977). The party who controls the premises is not an 

insurer of the safety of the invitee, and no presumption of negligence 

arises from the mere fact of an injury to the invitee. See Great Atl. & 

Pac. Tea Co. v. Bennett, 267 Ala. 538, 103 So. 2d 177 (1958).

Id. See also Kmart Corp. v. Bassett, 769 So. 2d 282, 284–85 (Ala. 2000) (“[A]

premises owner is liable in negligence only if it ‘fail[s] to use reasonable care in 

maintaining its premises in a reasonably safe manner.’ ” (quoting Hose v. Winn–

Dixie Montgomery, Inc., 658 So. 2d 403, 404 (Ala. 1995)). “[M]ere proof of an accident 

or injury is not enough to establish negligence.” Knox v. United States of America, 

978 F. Supp. 2d 1203,1209 (M.D. Ala. 2013).

For a claim of negligence against a business invitor, “injured ‘plaintiffs must 

prove that the injury was proximately caused by the negligence of [the store owner] 

or one of its servants or employees. Actual or constructive notice of the presence of 

the substance [or instrumentality that caused the injury] must be proven before [the 

 

controlled by the law of [Alabama], federal law controls the procedural aspects. The 

grant of summary judgment is therefore controlled by Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 56.” Hammer, 20 F.3d at1140 (citations omitted).

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store owner] can be held responsible for the injury.’ ” Denmark v. Mercantile Stores 

Co., 844 So. 2d 1189, 1192 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Maddox v. K–Mart Corp., 565 So. 2d 

14, 16 (Ala. 1990)). “Actual or constructive notice” may be proved by showing “ ‘(1) 

that the substance slipped upon had been on the floor a sufficient length of time to 

impute constructive notice to [the storekeeper]; or (2) that [the storekeeper] had 

actual notice that the substance was on the floor; or (3) that [the storekeeper] was 

delinquent in not discovering and removing the substance.’ ” East v. Wal-Mart 

Stores, Inc., 577 So. 2d 459, 461 (Ala. 1991) (quoting Maddox, 565 So. 2d at 16). 

“Where, however, the defendant or his employees have affirmatively created the 

dangerous condition, the plaintiff need not introduce evidence that the defendant 

had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard. Under such circumstances, the 

courts presume notice.” Denmark, 844 So. 2d at 1192 (quotations omitted).

In support of the motion for summary judgment on the negligence claim

Publix maintains that Patrick is unable to produce evidence that would allow a 

reasonable jury to find actual, constructive, or presumed notice of the liquid that 

caused her fall. Publix cites Patrick’s own deposition testimony that she did not see 

the liquid before her fall and does not know how the liquid got on the floor or how 

long it had been there. (Doc. 41-1 at 7 [Patrick Deposition, p. 57]). In further 

support of the motion, Publix also submits affidavits from Publix employees Ashley 

Wooten and Khaleahcia Ford, both of whom were working at the Spanish Fort 

Publix store at the time Patrick fell. Wooten avers that she walked through the 

area where the fall occurred approximately 7 minutes prior to the accident, at which 

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time she “did not see any water and/or any other liquid substance on the floor..., nor 

did any other employee or customer notify [her] of, or direct [her] attention to any 

water and/or other liquid substance on the floor before Ms. Patrick’s accident.” 

(Doc. 41-2). Ford avers that she was working at the store’s bakery counter when 

she heard something, looked up, saw Patrick on the floor near the entrance of the 

produce section, and went over to check on her. (Doc. 41-3 at 2). Ford states that 

she was unaware of anything on the floor prior to the accident that could have 

caused Patrick’s fall, and avers that no other employee or customer directed her 

attention to any slippery substance on the floor in the area. (Id.). Further, there 

is no evidence before the Court that anyone saw any substance on the floor after 

Patrick’s fall. 

Considering the foregoing, the undersigned finds that Publix has met its 

initial burden as the summary judgment movant of showing that Patrick has no 

evidence to prove notice to Publix, whether actual, constructive, or presumed, of the 

hazard that caused her injuries, thus making her unable to prove the “proximate 

causation” element of her negligence claim. Thus, the burden of shifts to Patrick to 

show that specific facts exist that raise a genuine issue for trial as to notice.

In response, Patrick does not argue actual or constructive notice but claims 

that she can present sufficient evidence allowing a reasonable inference that Publix 

affirmatively created the liquid patch, thus allowing for presumed notice. 

Specifically, Patrick argues that, “[w]hether it came from a Publix employee actually 

cutting the fruit or whether the cut fruit was insufficiently packaged to contain the 

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liquid, the fluid on the floor is the direct result of the acts of Publix and/or a Publix 

employee.” (Doc. 44 at 7). In support, Patrick relies solely on the deposition 

testimony of Michael Gayheart, the store’s customer service manager. Gayheart, 

who was at the store the day of the accident, did not witness Patrick’s fall but went 

to the area after Ford notified him of the incident, where he had an opportunity to 

observe Patrick before paramedics took her away. (Doc. 44-3 at 3 – 4 [Gayheart 

Deposition Trans., pp. 8 – 9]). Gayheart testified that he did not see any liquid on 

the floor at the scene of the accident but observed a wet patch about the size of a 

silver dollar on the backside of Patrick’s pants. (Id. at 5 – 6 [pp. 13 – 14]).2 Upon 

questioning, Gayheart stated that he did not know where the liquid came from but,

“[g]iven the location, []would assume that it would have came from [the] cut fruit 

section, which is located right where she fell” and was “the only spot where there’s a 

viable source for liquid” – specifically, “water that comes from the fruit” when it is 

cut. (Id. at 6 – 7 [pp. 14, 24]). Gayheart also testified that, as part of Publix’s 

investigation of the incident, he reviewed camera footage of the area of Patrick’s fall

at the time of, and for an unspecified amount of time prior to, the fall and did not 

find any other potential source of the liquid. (Id. at 12 – 13 [pp. 29 – 30]).

Gayheart discounted a nearby cooler as a source of the liquid. (Id. at 7 [p. 24]).

In Dunklin v. Winn-Dixie of Montgomery, Inc., 595 So. 2d 463 (Ala. 1992), 

[t]he plaintiff slipped and fell in water while in the produce section of 

defendant's store. She testified that when she entered the store she 

passed the produce section and that at that time an employee was 

 

2 Patrick said in her deposition there was “quite a bit” of water “because [her] whole 

side was soaked.” (Doc. 45 Exhibit B, p. 53). 

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setting out vegetables with water on them. She stated that she fell after 

she returned to the produce section within a “couple of minutes.” The 

evidence also showed that vegetables were regularly washed and put 

out near the area where the fall took place and that that area was 

checked every 20 to 25 minutes. Finally, the evidence before the trial 

court indicated that no water was seen on the floor until after Ms. 

Dunklin’s fall.

595 So. 2d at 456. The Alabama Supreme Court held: “Although there was 

considerable dispute in the evidence about the source of the water on the floor where 

Ms. Dunklin slipped, we find that Ms. Dunklin did present substantial evidence 

that the water in which she slipped was spilled on the floor by a Winn–Dixie

employee...The record contains evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer 

that a Winn–Dixie employee spilled water on the floor while setting out wet 

produce[,]” thus allowing for a presumption of notice of the hazard. Id. 

Dunklin is distinguishable from the present case. In Dunklin, the plaintiff 

testified she actually witnessed an employee placing wet produce on display shortly 

before her fall or that liquid was in fact dripping from inadequately packaged 

produce. To the contrary, Patrick does not present any evidence indicating that 

Publix employees were actually cutting, packaging, or otherwise handling fruit 

around the time of her fall. 

In Howard v. Kroger Co., 752 So. 2d 504 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999), the plaintiff, 

was injured when she slipped on a clear substance while walking past a grocery 

store meat counter. 752 So. 2d at 504. In reversing the trial court’s grant of 

summary judgment to the defendant on Howard’s negligence claim, the Alabama 

Court of Civil Appeals held: “Howard’s shopping companion, Bledsoe, testified that, 

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after Howard fell, the store manager asked one of the employees where the water 

came from. Bledsoe further testified that the employee told the manager that the 

water came from a meat cooler and that the meat cooler had been leaking for some 

time. Id. at 505. In Howard, evidence indicated the water was leaking from a 

cooler that was known to have been malfunctioning prior to the plaintiff’s fall. To

the contrary, in the present case Plaintiff does not submit evidence of any specific 

act by a Publix employee that could reasonably be tied to the creation of the wet 

patch. See Rhodes v. United States, 2007 WL 2710385, at *4 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 13, 

2007)(“Rhodes has not shown that the defendant affirmatively created the 

hazardous condition. Rhodes speculates that ‘[s]ince no one other than the custodian 

or post office employee would wax the floors’ the post office must have waxed the 

floor ... Rhodes has offered no evidence to substantiate her conjectures that the floor 

was waxed and that the white powder on her shoes came from the defendant's wax. 

Unlike the plaintiff in Dunklin, Rhodes is unable to demonstrate how post office 

employees created the condition that caused her to fall. See Dunklin, 595 So.2d at 

465. Rhodes has not established that wax was used in the post office that day and 

has not shown the post office created the dangerous condition.”). Cf. Horne v. 

Gregerson's Foods, Inc., 849 So. 2d 173, 175 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) (evidence 

indicated wet floor caused by store employee packing produce bins with ice); 

Edwards v. Kroger Co., 681 So. 2d 223 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (“Mrs. Edwards testified 

that as she fell, she saw a piece of cardboard fly out from under her feet. A Kroger 

employee retrieved the piece of cardboard from the floor near where Mrs. Edwards 

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fell and kept it in a store file...Mrs. Edwards presented testimony that earlier in the 

day and near the area where she fell, three Kroger employees had been stocking 

shelves from cardboard boxes and then breaking those boxes down and removing 

the pieces. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovants, the 

Edwardses, we conclude that they presented substantial evidence that a Kroger 

employee created the hazardous condition; thus, the Edwardses eliminated the 

necessity of proving Kroger had notice of the condition.”). 

Patrick essentially argues that, because Gayheart’s testimony indicates his 

assumption that the only possible source of the liquid was the store’s cut fruit 

section, a reasonable jury could infer that the source of the liquid could only have 

been created by the Publix employees working at the cut fruit section, regardless of 

what specific actions might have led to its creation. However, Patrick cites no 

authority to support this theory, 3 and the undersigned is not persuaded. See 

Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 584 F.Supp 2d 1316, 1320 (M.D. Ala. 2008) 

(‘[t]here is no case law to support the argument that simply having employees in the 

vicinity provides evidence of negligence.”). Moreover, there is no evidence that a 

Publix employee was working cutting fruit in that section prior to the Plaintiff’s fall. 

Indeed, as Publix points out in its reply, immediately following the testimony on 

which Patrick relies, Gayheart further testified:

Q [by Patrick’s counsel]: So the only viable source of liquid for you is the 

cut fruit section, correct?

 3 At most, Plaintiff has string cited a line of Alabama cases supporting the general 

proposition of presuming notice when a defendant affirmatively creates the 

dangerous condition.

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A: Besides the other customers that would have come through the area.

Q: Well, I asked you while ago whether or not you saw any other 

sources, and you said no.

A: Because I did not see any at that moment when I’m standing there.

Q: But you went back and viewed the video; correct?

A: Yes. After reviewing the video.

Q: And you didn’t see anything in the video that caused you to believe it 

came from any of the other customers?

A: No, sir.

Q: No, that’s incorrect, or no, you didn’t see anything?

A: Yeah. The camera angle doesn’t really show the area in which she 

fell, so I can’t say for - - I can’t for a hundred percent positivity say that 

it came from a customer, nor can I say that it came from the cut fruit 

area.

Q: But as we sit here today, you believe it’s more likely than not that it 

came from the cut fruit section?

A: No.

(Doc. 45-1 at 3 – 5 [Gayheart Depo. Trans., pp. 33 – 35] (objections and commentary 

by Publix’s counsel omitted)). Given that Gayheart later admitted he could not 

fully see the area in which Patrick fell on the camera footage,4 his testimony that 

the cut fruit section was the only viable source of the liquid does not arise above 

mere speculation, which is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. 

Valderrama, 780 F.3d at 1112. Thus, Patrick has failed to produce sufficient 

 

4 The undersigned has viewed the camera footage. However, the footage does not 

clearly show the condition of the floor where Patrick fell. (Doc. 47)

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evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Publix

“affirmatively created” the wet patch on which Patrick slipped that would allow for 

presumed notice. Moreover, she has failed to present any argument or evidence of 

actual or constructive notice. Patrick has presented only speculation about the 

cause of the fall, which the undersigned finds insufficient to overcome a summary 

judgment motion. See Giles v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, 574 Fed. Appx 892, 894 

(11th Cir. 2014) citing Cordorba v. Dillard’s Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005) 

(“unsupported speculation...does not meet a party’s burden of producing some 

defense to a summary judgment motion. Speculation does not create a genuine

issue of fact; instead, it creates a false issue, the demolition of which is a primary 

goal of summary judgment.”) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, Publix’s motion for 

summary judgment is due to be GRANTED as to Patrick’s negligence claim in 

Count One of her complaint.

B. Wantonness

The Alabama Supreme Court has explained that wantonness “is not merely a 

higher degree of culpability than negligence. Negligence and wantonness, plainly 

and simply, are qualitatively different tort concepts of actionable culpability.” E.g., 

Ex parte Anderson, 682 So. 2d 467, 470 (Ala. 1996) (quotation omitted). In 

Alabama, wantonness “has been defined as the conscious doing of some act or the 

omission of some duty while under knowledge of existing conditions and while 

conscious that, from the doing of such act or the omission of such duty, injury will 

likely or probably result, and before a party can be said to be guilty of wanton 

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conduct it must be shown that with reckless indifference to the consequences he 

consciously and intentionally did some wrongful act or omitted some known duty 

which produced the result.” Berness v. Regency Square Assocs., Ltd., 514 So. 2d 

1346, 1349 (Ala. 1987) (quotation omitted). Publix argues it is due summary 

judgment on Patrick’s wantonness claim because she can produce no evidence from 

which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that any Publix employee or agent 

“consciously and intentionally” did, or failed to do, something that resulted in the 

wet patch on which she slipped.

Patrick does not address the issue of wantonness at all in her response to 

Publix’s motion for summary judgment. As such, she is deemed to have abandoned 

her wantonness claim.5 Alternatively, considering the evidence of record, see 

supra, the undersigned finds that Publix has made a prima facie showing that it is 

due judgment as a matter of law on the issue of wantonness because there is no 

 5 See, e.g., Clark v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 544 F. App'x 848, 854–55 (11th Cir. 2013) 

(per curiam) (unpublished) (“Mr. and Ms. Clark also argue on appeal that there was 

no need for them to respond to the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the 

§ 1983 excessive force and state law claims because the defendants' contentions did 

not support the entry of summary judgment. We, however, agree with the district 

court's determination that in failing to respond to the defendants' arguments, Mr. 

and Ms. Clark abandoned their excessive force and state law claims. ‘In opposing a 

motion for summary judgment, a party may not rely on his pleadings to avoid 

judgment against him.’ Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 

(11th Cir. 1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As such, ‘[t]here is 

no burden upon the district court to distill every potential argument that could be 

made based upon the materials before it on summary judgment.’ Id. (citation 

omitted). Instead, ‘the onus is upon the parties to formulate arguments; grounds 

alleged in the complaint but not relied upon in summary judgment are deemed 

abandoned.’ Id. (citations omitted). The district court, therefore, properly treated as 

abandoned the Clarks' excessive force and state law claims, which were alleged in 

the complaint, but not addressed in opposition to the motion for summary 

judgment.”).

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genuine issue of fact as to whether Patrick’s injuries were caused by the conscious 

and intentional action or inaction of a Publix agent, and Patrick has failed to rebut 

that showing. See Alfa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roush, 723 So. 2d 1250, 1256 (Ala. 1998) 

(defining “wantonness” as the conscious doing of some act or the omission of some 

duty, while knowing of the existing conditions and being conscious that, from doing 

or omitting to do an act, injury will likely or probably result.”). Accordingly, 

Publix’s motion for summary judgment is due to be GRANTED as to Patrick’s 

wantonness claim in Count Two of her complaint.

III. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that Publix’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment under Rule 56 (Doc. 40) is GRANTED and that 

Patrick’s claims for negligence and wantonness are due to be DISMISSED with 

prejudice. Final judgment shall be entered accordingly by separate document 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.

DONE and ORDERED this the 28th day of March 2017.

/s/Katherine P. Nelson 

KATHERINE P. NELSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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