Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01779/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01779-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALAN EUGENE BARBEE,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.1

Case No.: 3:16-cv-01779-BEN-DHB

ORDER:

(1) ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION;

(2) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT;

(3) DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT; and

(4) REMANDING FOR FURTHER 

PROCEEDINGS

/ / /

/ / /

 

1 The Court substitutes Nancy A. Berryhill, the Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 

for Carolyn W. Colvin, the former Acting Commissioner of Social Security, as Defendant 

in this suit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25.

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Plaintiff Alan Eugene Barbee filed this action seeking judicial review of the 

Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for Supplemental Security 

Income benefits. Plaintiff and Defendant each filed motions for summary judgment. 

(ECF Nos. 14, 15). The Honorable Louisa S. Porter issued a thoughtful and thorough 

Report and Recommendation recommending that this Court grant Plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment, deny Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and remand the 

case to the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) for further proceedings. (ECF No. 18). 

Defendant filed timely objections to the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 19), to 

which Plaintiff replied (ECF No. 20).

Where a party files a timely objection to a report and recommendation, the Court 

reviews de novo those portions of the report or specific proposed findings or 

recommendations to which an objection is filed. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Upon review of

the Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff’s Objections, the relevant portions of the 

record, and the law, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation in full.

BACKGROUND

The procedural history of this matter and a summary of the administrative record 

(“AR”) has been laid out in the thorough Report and Recommendation issued by the 

Magistrate Judge. As this history is well-known to the parties, this Court adopts the 

Magistrate Judge’s description of the administrative record and procedural history. A 

short summary of relevant events is laid out below.

Plaintiff applied for Supplemental Security Income benefits on April 30, 2012, 

claiming the onset of disability on June 1, 2006. Plaintiff alleges his disability is due to 

seizures, mental illness, back problems, and a head injury. On August 28, 2014, after 

holding a hearing, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits and denied 

his application. The Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision, rendering the 

ALJ’s decision final. 

Plaintiff sought judicial review of that decision. (Compl., ECF No. 1). Plaintiff 

challenges the ALJ’s decision at step five of the disability determination, in which the 

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ALJ must consider whether the claimant is capable of doing any work available in the 

national economy. At the administrative hearing, a vocational expert (“VE”) testified 

that Plaintiff could perform three jobs, and the ALJ adopted those findings. Plaintiff 

believes the requirements of those jobs, as outlined in the Dictionary of Occupational 

Titles (“DOT”), are not consistent with the limitations in his residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”) assessment. Plaintiff contends the ALJ committed reversible error by failing to 

reconcile apparent conflicts between the VE’s testimony and how those jobs are 

described in the DOT. 

In response, Defendant argues that by failing to cross-examine the VE on any 

potential conflict with the DOT at the hearing, Plaintiff waived the issue on appeal. 

Defendant further argues that the ALJ met his burden of resolving any apparent conflict 

between the VE’s testimony and the DOT by simply asking the VE whether his testimony 

conforms to the DOT and receiving an unchallenged affirmative response. Finally, 

Defendant contends that a residual functional capacity limiting a claimant to “simple job 

instructions” is consistent with a “Reasoning Level 2”

2

and thus the ALJ’s RFC finding 

and the jobs identified by the VE and adopted by the ALJ were appropriate. 

The Report and Recommendation first concluded that Plaintiff has not waived the 

 

2 The DOT defines different levels of reasoning skills. See DOT, App. C, 1991 WL 

688702; Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 2015). DOT job descriptions 

include the reasoning level required for the position. See ECF No. 14-3. At issue here 

are Reasoning Levels 2 and 3. Reasoning Level 1 is the lowest reasoning level. It

requires the employee to “[a]pply commonsense understanding to carry out simple oneor two-step instructions [and] [d]eal with standardized situations with occasional or no 

variables in or from these situations encountered on the job.” See DOT, App. C, 1991 

WL 688702. Reasoning Level 2 requires the employee to “[a]pply commonsense 

understanding to carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions [and] 

[d]eal with problems involving few concrete variables in or from standardized 

situations.” Id. Reasoning Level 3 requires the employee to “[a]pply commonsense 

understanding to carry out instructions furnished in written, oral, or diagrammatic form 

[and] [d]eal with problems involving several concrete variables in or from standardized 

situations.” Id.

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argument regarding the potential inconsistency between the VE and DOT because he 

raises a pure question of law, not new evidence. Judge Porter found that the 

Commissioner would not be unfairly prejudiced by Plaintiff’s failure to raise the issue 

earlier as she has had an opportunity to address the issue. Judge Porter rejected 

Defendant’s argument that the ALJ satisfied his duty to resolve apparent conflicts 

between the VE’s testimony and the DOT by simply asking the VE whether there is a 

conflict and relying on the VE’s response that there is none. 

In considering Plaintiff’s argument on the merits, Judge Porter agreed with 

Defendant that there is no apparent conflict that the ALJ failed to address regarding the 

VE’s testimony that Plaintiff can perform Reasoning Level 2 work and the DOT. 

However, she identified two conflicts between the VE’s testimony and the DOT that the 

ALJ should have identified and reconciled before relying on the VE’s testimony in the 

disability determination. See Lamear v. Berryhill, __ F.3d ___, 2017 WL 3254930, at *2

(9th Cir. Aug. 1, 2017) (“[I]f the [vocational] expert’s opinion that an applicant is able to 

work conflicts with, or seems to conflict with, the requirements listed in the [DOT], then 

the ALJ must ask the expert to reconcile the conflict before relying on the expert to 

decide if the claimant is disabled. . . . To avoid unnecessary appeals, an ALJ should 

ordinarily ask the VE to explain in some detail why there is no conflict between the DOT 

and the applicant’s RFC.”). 

First, Judge Porter found that the ALJ failed to address an apparent conflict 

between the VE’s testimony that Plaintiff can perform the job of a mail clerk and the 

DOT’s reasoning level requirements for a mail clerk. A mail clerk requires a claimant to 

have a Reasoning Level 3 capacity, but Judge Porter found that a Reasoning Level 3 

requirement is inconsistent with the ALJ’s RFC assessment that Plaintiff is limited to 

“carry[ing] out simple job instructions.” (AR 46). Second, Judge Porter found an 

unresolved, apparent conflict between the RFC assessment that Plaintiff can have “no 

direct interaction with the general public,” and the VE’s testimony that Plaintiff can

perform the work of a cafeteria attendant, which the DOT describes as involving 

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interaction with the public.

Judge Porter thus concluded that the ALJ committed legal error by failing to 

resolve apparent conflicts between the DOT and two of the three jobs that the VE 

testified Plaintiff can perform. If the legal error is harmless, however, the district court 

must affirm the ALJ’s decision. Zavalin, 778 F.3d at 845. Here, Judge Porter explained 

that she was “reluctant to find harmless error because the ALJ failed to explain at step 

five why he disregarded the VE’s testimony that no jobs exist in the national economy for 

a person who would be absent more than four times per month,” which was a limitation 

placed on Plaintiff’s ability to work by his treating physician. (R&R at 32-33). 

Accordingly, Judge Porter recommended remand to the ALJ for further proceedings.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

An applicant may seek judicial review of a final agency decision pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). An ALJ’s decision will be reversed by the reviewing court 

only if “it is based upon legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Bayliss 

v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). “Substantial 

evidence means more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The Court must 

consider the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and detracts 

from the ALJ’s conclusion. See Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir. 2001); 

Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). “The 

ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, 

and for resolving ambiguities.” Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. Where the evidence is 

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ’s decision must be upheld. 

Id at 1039-40. The Court may not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error that 

is harmless. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012).

/ / /

/ / /

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DISCUSSION

The Commissioner makes two objections. First, she argues that Plaintiff waived 

his argument about a conflict between the VE’s testimony and the DOT because he failed 

to bring the conflict to the ALJ’s attention. Second, she argues that Magistrate Judge 

Porter erred by failing to find harmless error. The Court addresses each argument in turn.

I. Waiver

The Commissioner argues that “Plaintiff’s entire argument concerning errors at 

step five [was] waived by failing to bring the alleged apparent conflict to the ALJ’s 

attention.” (Obj. at 4). The Ninth Circuit has recently rejected such an argument: 

[O]ur law is clear that a counsel’s failure [to raise a potential inconsistency 

between a VE’s testimony and the DOT] does not relieve the ALJ of his 

express duty to reconcile apparent conflicts through questioning: “When 

there is an apparent conflict between the vocational expert’s testimony and 

the DOT—for example, expert testimony that a claimant can perform an 

occupation involving DOT requirements that appear more than the claimant 

can handle—the ALJ is required to reconcile the inconsistency.” Zavalin,

778 F.3d at 846. That inquiry did not happen here, and so we must remand 

the case to permit the ALJ to follow up with the VE.

Lamear, __ F.3d ___, 2017 WL 3254930, at *4 (citing Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 

731, 735 (7th Cir. 2006) for support, which held that the claimant was “not required to 

raise t[he conflict] at the hearing, because [Social Security Ruling 00-4p] places the 

burden of making the necessary inquiry on the ALJ”). A claimant’s failure to raise a 

conflict between the VE’s evidence and the DOT at the administrative hearing does not 

preclude the claimant from raising the issue in district court. See id. The Ninth Circuit’s 

holding thus forecloses the Commissioner’s argument here. The Court overrules this 

objection.

II. Harmless Error

The Commissioner argues that Magistrate Judge Porter should have found that the 

ALJ’s legal errors constituted harmless error because Plaintiff can still perform the 

occupation of a routing clerk, which was the one job that the VE testified Plaintiff can

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perform where Judge Porter did not find error. The Commissioner contends that Judge 

Porter erred by sua sponte raising concerns about the ALJ’s decision to disregard the 

VE’s testimony regarding the availability of jobs if Plaintiff had to miss work four times 

a month.

A. Factual Background

One of Plaintiff’s treating physicians was Boris Khamishon, M.D. On June 18, 

2014, Dr. Khamishon completed a Seizure Disorder Residual Functional Capacity 

Questionnaire provided by Plaintiff. (AR 652-655). Dr. Khamishon stated that Plaintiff 

suffered from seizures twice a week, each of which average approximately three minutes. 

(AR 652). He indicated that Plaintiff loses consciousness during the seizures. (Id.) Dr. 

Khamishon further reported that Plaintiff’s seizures would likely disrupt the work of coworkers and that he needs more supervision than an unimpaired worker. (AR 654). He 

stated that Plaintiff would sometimes need to take unscheduled breaks during an eighthour work day and that his impairments would likely cause him to be absent from work 

more than four days per month. (Id.)

At the administrative hearing, the ALJ posed two hypotheticals to the VE. The 

first hypothetical asked if there would be any jobs available in the national economy for 

an individual having certain impairments. The VE responded that such a hypothetical 

person could perform three different jobs: a cafeteria attendant, a routing clerk, and a 

mail clerk. As explained above, Magistrate Judge Porter found conflicts between the 

VE’s testimony and the DOT for the jobs of a cafeteria attendant and a mail clerk. The 

second hypothetical asked the VE to assume the same hypothetical as the first, except 

that the individual would be absent four times a month because of his or her impairments. 

The VE replied that no jobs would be available in the national economy for such a 

hypothetical person.

In the ALJ’s findings and written decision, the ALJ addressed Dr. Khamishon’s 

Seizure Disorder Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire and gave it little weight 

“because it is not supported by objective evidence and it is inconsistent with the record as 

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a whole.” (AR 50). Although not discussed in direct relation to Dr. Khamishon’s 

opinion, elsewhere in the decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was inconsistent in stating 

how frequently the seizures occurred (AR 47); that Plaintiff’s seizures were controlled 

through medication (AR 47-48); and that Plaintiff’s diagnostic studies “have been 

essentially normal” (AR 49). The ALJ further discredited Dr. Khamishon’s “checkliststyle form” because it “appears to have been completed as an accommodation to the 

claimant and includes only conclusions regarding functional limitations without any 

rationale for those conclusions.” (AR 51). The ALJ suggested that Dr. Khamishon may 

have completed the Questionnaire to placate a demanding patient and “avoid unnecessary 

doctor/patient tension.” (Id.). The ALJ did not address the second hypothetical in his 

written findings.

B. Analysis

An ALJ’s error is harmless where it is “inconsequential to the ultimate 

nondisability determination.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (internal citations removed). 

The Ninth Circuit has explained that a court must “look at the record as a whole to 

determine whether the error alters the outcome of the case.” Id. An ALJ’s error in 

finding that a claimant can perform certain jobs is harmless if the “remaining jobs 

identified by the vocational expert exist in significant numbers.” Allison v. Astrue, 425 F. 

App’x 636, 640 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Carmickle v. Comm’r, 533 F.3d 1155, 1162-63 

(9th Cir. 2008)).

In this case, the Commissioner contends that the legal errors are harmless because 

thousands of routing clerk jobs exist in the national economy that Plaintiff can still 

perform. Generally, the Commissioner would be correct. See Yelovich v. Colvin, 532 F. 

App’x 700, 702 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that VE’s incorrect testimony as to two of the 

three jobs that claimant could perform was harmless error because 900 regional and 

42,000 national jobs existed for the third job). However, the issue is different here 

because Judge Porter has raised concerns about legal error in the ALJ’s decision that 

might infect the entire determination of Plaintiff’s non-disability.

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Judge Porter did not find harmless error because she was troubled by the ALJ’s 

apparent decision to disregard the VE’s answer to the second hypothetical that no jobs 

would exist for a person who is absent from work more than four times per month. As an 

initial matter, contrary to the Commissioner’s assertion, Judge Porter was not precluded 

from raising this issue sua sponte. See Farley v. Colvin, 231 F. Supp. 3d 335, 339-41 

(N.D. Cal. 2017) (collecting cases and explaining that the court has the power to consider 

issues sua sponte in social security appeals). The Court has a duty to make an 

“independent determination as to whether the [ALJ’s] findings are supported by 

substantial evidence.” Id.

Where the record is unclear, the court should not find that an ALJ’s legal error is 

harmless. See Lamear, __ F.3d ___, 2017 WL 3254930, at *3 (“[W]e cannot determine 

from his record, the DOT, or our common experience whether the jobs in question 

require both hands, so we cannot say the ALJ’s failure to inquire was harmless.”); 

Zavalin, 778 F.3d at 848 (“On this mixed record, ‘we cannot determine whether 

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s step-five finding that [Zavalin] could perform 

[the] work.’”). Such is the case here. The ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Khamishon’s 

opinion, but failed to address his limitation that Plaintiff would be absent from work 

more than four days per month and failed to address the second hypothetical, which 

relied on Dr. Khamishon’s opinion. Upon review of the ALJ’s decision, the Court has 

doubts whether the ALJ properly rejected Dr. Khamishon’s opinion. Accordingly, 

remand for further proceedings is appropriate. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (holding that ALJ erred in not considering hypothetical with treating 

physician’s comments about plaintiff’s limitations, to which the VE testified that no jobs 

would be available to plaintiff, because the ALJ did not provide clear and convincing 

reasons for rejecting the physician’s opinion). The Commissioner’s objection is 

overruled.

/ / /

/ / /

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CONCLUSION

The Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 18) and 

OVERRULES the Commissioner’s objections (ECF No. 19). Plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment is GRANTED (ECF No. 14) and Defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment is DENIED (ECF No. 15). This case is REMANDED for further proceedings.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 29, 2017

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