Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04176/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04176-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 

LETITIA BRENG ROSE

a/k/a Tish Rose,

Petitioner, 

 No C-04-4176 VRW

v

 ORDER

J MICHAEL HOGAN, SR, Deputy County 

Counsel Monterey County,

Public Guardian

and

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 

 Respondent.

_________________________________/

On October 1, 2004, a petition filed by Gail Sutton, the

adult daughter of the petitioner named on the caption, Letitia

Breng Rose, was filed with this court after transfer from two other

federal district courts. The stated purpose of the petition was

“to have [Ms Sutton’s mother released from the custody of the State

of California and to go to the State of New York so that she can be

with her family.” Doc # 1, Petition at 2. See order filed October

29, 2004 (Doc # 3). This court dismissed the petition without

prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies. Id. The court

did not reach two issues presented by the petition: (1) whether
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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federal habeas relief was available for an individual committed to

a nursing home by a public guardian; and (2) whether Ms Sutton

could file on behalf of Mrs Rose as a “next friend” pursuant to 28

USC § 2242.

On July 20, 2005, Ms Sutton, appearing in propria

persona, filed an “emergency request for leave to move for

reconsideration” of the order dismissing the petition. Doc # 4. 

Ms Sutton describes further procedural steps taken following the

October 29, 2004 dismissal of the petition and attaches documents

and photographs concerning Mrs Rose’s situation. Id. She also

states more clearly that the objective of the petition is to obtain

the release of Mrs Rose from a private nursing home, the Victorian

at Carmel-by-the-Sea, to which she had allegedly been committed by

the public guardian for the County of Monterey under the authority

of a court-ordered conservatorship. Id. For these reasons, Ms

Sutton’s filing is more properly styled as an amended petition for

habeas corpus. Because Ms Sutton is in propria persona and the

court must construe her papers liberally, the court construes the

motion for leave to file motion for reconsideration as, instead, an

amended petition for habeas corpus under 28 USC § 2254. For the

reasons stated herein, the amended petition is DISMISSED, without

leave to amend. 

I

As stated in the court’s October 29 order, prisoners in

state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas

proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are

first required to exhaust state judicial remedies, either on direct
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the highest

state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits

of each and every claim they seek to raise in federal court. See

28 USC § 2254(b), (c); Rose v Lundy, 455 US 509, 515-16 (1982);

Duckworth v Serrano, 454 US 1, 3 (1981); McNeeley v Arave, 842 F2d

230, 231 (9th Cir 1988). The state's highest court must be given

an opportunity to rule on the claims even if review is

discretionary. See O'Sullivan v Boerckel, 526 US 838, 845

(1999)(petitioner must invoke “one complete round of the State’s

established appellate review process”). 

Because the original petition openly acknowledged the

failure to exhaust state remedies (“Gail Sutton did not appeal to

any higher State Court in the State of California because she did

not have the resources to pursue same,” Doc # 1, ¶ 24), the court

dismissed the petition. The court has examined Ms Sutton’s new

filing and determined, for the reasons stated below, that state

remedies have still not been exhausted.

In her papers, Ms Sutton recites the steps she and her

husband John Sutton took in the California courts after the

dismissal of the original petition by this court, Doc # 3 at 2:

they petitioned twice to terminate the conservatorship; they filed

a writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal of the State of

California, Sixth Appellate District, “dismissed and Suttons’

request to file in forma pauperis denied”; and they filed a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme

Court, which was rejected for filing by the clerk of that court. 

Doc # 4 at 2-3.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Ms Sutton does not submit with her petition either of the

orders of the superior court to which she refers. As Exhibit C to

the petition, Ms Sutton attaches a copy of an order of the Court of

Appeal dated May 12, 2005 which states: “The petitioners having

failed to submit the required filing fee, the petition for writ of

mandate filed April 18, 2005 is hereby stricken.” The order makes

no reference to an in forma pauperis application, nor is any order

relating to such an application attached to the petition. As

Exhibit D to the petition, Ms Sutton includes a letter dated May

26, 2005 from the clerk of the California Supreme Court stating: 

“Returned unfiled is the petition for writ of habeas corpus you

attempted to file on behalf of Letitia Rose. California law does

not allow you to file on behalf of another party unless you are an

attorney.” Ms Sutton submits no other evidence regarding Ms

Sutton’s efforts on behalf of Mrs Rose in the state courts.

The exhaustion requirement is satisfied only if the

federal claim: (1) has been "fairly presented" to the state

courts, Picard v Connor, 404 US 270, 275 (1971), Crotts v Smith, 73

F3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1996); or (2) no state remedy remains

available, see Johnson v Zenon, 88 F3d 828, 829 (9th Cir 1996). 

Peterson v Lampert, 319 F3d 1153, 1155-56 (9th Cir 2003) (en banc). 

It does not constitute “fair presentation” if the claim is raised

by a procedural method which makes it unlikely that the claim will

be considered on the merits. See Castille v Peoples, 489 US 346,

351 (1989) (presentation by way of petition to state supreme court

for allocatur, which under state procedure may be considered only

when “there are special and important reasons therefor,”

insufficient to exhaust); Casey, 386 F3d at 917 (federal claims not
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For the Northern District of California

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fairly presented when petitioner “raised them for the first and

only time upon petitioning for discretionary review to the

Washington State Supreme Court”); Kibler v Walters, 220 F 3d 1151,

1153 (9th Cir 2000) (where state habeas petitioner failed to

satisfy procedural requirements for presentation of his claims to

Washington Supreme Court, he failed to fairly present his claims

for purposes of federal habeas corpus review).

It was incumbent on Ms Sutton to allege in her amended

petition that she has met the requirements for exhaustion and,

where appropriate, to attach evidence in support of that

allegation. The few attachments to the amended petition suggest

that Ms Sutton did not “fairly present” all available state courts

with an opportunity to rule on the merits. The petition states

that the superior court issued additional orders, but does not

explain why Ms Sutton did not file an appeal of those orders. 

Filing a petition for writ of mandamus in the court of appeal

unaccompanied by a filing fee or valid in forma pauperis

application does not constitute fair presentation of claims to that

court. 

Moreover, to establish exhaustion of state remedies, a

habeas petitioner must have apprised the California courts that she

was making a claim under the United States Constitution. Castillo

v McFadden, 399 F3d 993, 999 (9th Cir 2005). In so doing, she must

describe “both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on

which [her] claim is based,” id, citing Kelly v Small, 315 F3d

1063, 1066 (9th Cir 2003), and must have characterized the claims

raised in state proceedings “specifically as federal claims,”

Castillo at 999, citing Lyons v Crawford, 232 F3d 666, 670 (2000). 
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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“Mere general appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as

due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, do

not establish exhaustion.” Hiivala v Wood, 195 F3d 1098, 1106 (9th

Cir 1999). 

The original petition alleged three grounds for relief

under the United States Constitution, but specifically stated

“[t]he grounds for relief raised in this petition have not been

presented to the highest State Court in California having

jurisdiction,” Doc # 1 at 7, ¶ 31 and “[t]he grounds for relief set

forth in this petition have not been presented in any State or

Federal court.” Id at ¶ 32. Ms Sutton’s amended petition does not

allege or in any way suggest that she presented her Constitutional

claims on behalf of Mrs Rose to the state courts. 

Because Ms Sutton’s amended pleading fails to allege

exhaustion of state remedies, it must be, and hereby is, DISMISSED. 

II

In its previous order, the court noted that there is

little or no precedent for the use of the writ of habeas corpus to

challenge the confinement of an individual who has been adjudicated

incompetent. Ms Sutton’s amended petition sets forth additional

facts that plainly establish that the writ of habeas corpus is not

available to address the circumstances of Ms Rose’s confinement at

the Victorian. 

 The United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Lehman v

Lycoming County Children’s Services, 458 US 502, 512-16 (1982),

held that the writ of habeas corpus was not available to challenge

the placement of a child into the custody of foster and adoptive
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For the Northern District of California

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parents. A footnote, however, left open the possibility that

federal habeas corpus relief might be available in situations in

which individuals, including children, are confined in state

institutions pursuant to court order: “We express no view as to

the availability of federal habeas when a child is actually

confined in a state institution rather than being at liberty in the

custody of a foster parent pursuant to a court order.” 458 US 502,

511, n 12. 

The First Circuit, however, extended Lehman to the

context of placement of an elderly person into a nursing home by a

state-court appointed guardian, holding that such action was not

“imprisonment” redressable by federal habeas. Hemon v Office of

Public Guardian, 878 F2d 13, 15 (1st Cir 1989). That court cited

concerns about federalism and finality in the field of family law:

[T]he same concerns about federalism and finality

that counsel against federal habeas jurisdiction

over child custody disputes also counsel against

federal habeas jurisdiction over disputes regarding

guardianship. The long-standing policy of the

federal courts to avoid interference in state

domestic relations disputes – for example, by

abstaining from asserting federal subject matter

jurisdiction over domestic relations matters * * *

is not limited to the area of child custody, but

extends to the entire field of domestic relations. 

Id. 

The Ninth Circuit has not spoken on this issue. This

court, however, finds the reasoning of Hemon compelling in the

context of this case. The crux of Ms Sutton’s complaint is the

establishment of a conservatorship over her mother and the

appointment of a public guardian for her – a guardian whose

decisions she strongly disagrees with. Ms Rose is housed not in a

state institution but in a private nursing home, albeit pursuant to
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For the Northern District of California

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a decision of the public guardian, to whom the superior court

conferred the authority to make decisions regarding her care. 

These are matters traditionally committed entirely to state law. 

Because the court has determined that an exercise of federal

jurisdiction would not be appropriate given the underlying facts of

Ms Rose’s case, a further opportunity to amend the petition would

be futile. 

III

Another issue that remains unresolved is that Ms Sutton

must establish her qualifications to proceed as a “next friend” for

purposes of bringing a petition for writ of habeas corpus on Ms

Rose’s behalf. See 28 USC section 2242; Whitmore v Arkansas, 495

US 149, 165 (1990); Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers, and Professors v

Bush, 310 F3d 1153, 1159-60 (9th Cir 2002). There is insufficient

evidence in the record to allow the court to determine this

question. Given the court’s disposition of the amended petition,

it is unnecessary to reach this issue. 

IV

Finally, Ms Sutton cites Grant v Johnson, 757 F Supp 1127

(D Or 1991), in which a federal district court found

unconstitutional a state statute authorizing ex parte appointments

of indefinite temporary guardians without notice without due

process safeguards. Grant, however, is a civil rights action

brought under 42 USC § 1983, and therefore has little bearing on

the issues presented in the instant case, a habeas corpus matter.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254

Cases in the United States District Courts, this matter is

DISMISSED, without leave to amend. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge