Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00837/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00837-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL LAWRENCE SMITH, No. CIV S-07-0837-WBS-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

HERNANDEZ, et al.,

Defendants.

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Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is defendants’ motion to dismiss the first amended

complaint (Doc. 30). Defendants have also filed requests for judicial notice (Docs. 32 and 35). 

I. BACKGROUND

Pursuant to the court’s May 5, 2008, order, this action proceeds against defendants

Figeroe and Gordon only on plaintiff’s First Amendment claim based on denial of access to the

courts. Both defendants have appeared by way of their motion to dismiss. 

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Plaintiff claims that, in January 2006, correctional officer Figeroe packed all of

his legal documents and personal property into a large box to be transferred with plaintiff to

another prison. He states that correctional officers Figeroe and Gordon “took full control and

possession of all plaintiff’s legal materials. . . .” According to plaintiff, when he arrived at the

new prison, his property box was missing. Plaintiff claims that, without his legal documents, he

is unable to meet court filing deadlines in a number of pending cases. He states that he cannot

“file all appeal document(s) relevant to challenging the unjust conviction and unfair sentence in

my criminal case on time.” The court notes that, other than the current action, plaintiff states that

he does not have any other lawsuits pending. 

II. STANDARDS FOR MOTION TO DISMISS

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept all allegations of

material fact in the complaint as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S.Ct. 2197 (2007). The court

must also construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Scheuer v.

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see also Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425

U.S. 738, 740 (1976); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). All

ambiguities or doubts must also be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen,

395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those

drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). 

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain

more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual

allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 127 S.Ct.1955, 1964-65 (2007). Allegations of specific facts are not necessary so

long as the statement of facts gives the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds

upon which it rests. See Erickson, 127 S.Ct. at 2197. 

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To determine whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted,

the court generally may not consider materials outside the complaint and pleadings. See Cooper

v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1998); Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir.

1994). The court may, however, consider: (1) documents whose contents are alleged in or

attached to the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, see Branch, 14 F.3d at 454;

(2) documents whose authenticity is not in question, and upon which the complaint necessarily

relies, but which are not attached to the complaint, see Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668,

688 (9th Cir. 2001); and (3) documents and materials of which the court may take judicial notice,

see Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994), except prison regulations, see Anderson

v. Angelone, 86 F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1996).

Under these standards, a statute of limitations defense may be raised in a motion

to dismiss. Finally, leave to amend must be granted “. . . [u]nless it is absolutely clear that no

amendment can cure the defects.” Lucas v. Dep’t of Corrections, 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir.

1995) (per curiam); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants Figeroe and Gordon argue that plaintiff cannot state a First

Amendment claim based on denial of access to the courts because he cannot show an actual

injury. They also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. 

A. Failure to State a Claim

Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. See Lewis v. Casey,

518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977); Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d

1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing the right in the context of prison grievance procedures). 

This right requires prison officials to “assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful

legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from

persons trained in the law.” Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828. The right, however, only requires that

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prisoners have the capability of bringing challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement. 

See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356-57. Moreover, the right is limited to non-frivolous criminal appeals,

habeas corpus actions, and § 1983 suits. See id. at 353 n.3 & 354-55. Therefore, the right of

access to the courts is only a right to present these kinds of claims to the court, and not a right to

discover claims or to litigate them effectively once filed. See id. at 354-55.

As a jurisdictional requirement flowing from the standing doctrine, the prisoner

must allege an actual injury. See id. at 349. “Actual injury” is prejudice with respect to

contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or present a

non-frivolous claim. See id.; see also Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Delays in providing legal materials or assistance which result in prejudice are “not of

constitutional significance” if the delay is reasonably related to legitimate penological purposes. 

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 362. 

Defendants contend:

In the operative first amended complaint, Plaintiff does not cite any

specific case name or case number to notify the Court or Defendants what

particular claim or action Plaintiff alleges was compromised by

Defendants Figueroa or Gordon’s conduct. Plaintiff, however, states that

Defendants’ conduct interfered with his ability to challenge the “unjust

conviction and unfair sentence in my criminal case on time.” (Doc. 15 at

2:8-9). The Magistrate construed the first amended complaint to allege

that Defendants Figueroa and Gordon “thwarted [Plaintiff] from pursuing

habeas corpus relief with respect to his conviction.” (Doc. 16 at 3:11-13).

 In order to understand the nature of Plaintiff’s underlying claim

and its substantive and procedural details for the purposes of this Motion

to Dismiss, a review of the court’s PACER listings for Plaintiff was

conducted. The analysis revealed that Plaintiff had initiated an action for

habeas corpus relief in May 2005, in the Central District Court.

Defendants request this Court take judicial notice of Plaintiff’s habeas

corpus action, Smith v. D.L. Runnels, USDC-CD, Case No. 2:05-cv03793-VAP-SS. A review of the procedural history of Smith v. Runnels

confirms that Plaintiff filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(Habeas Doc. 1) on May 23, 2005 – which was eight months before

Plaintiff’s legal property was lost during the transfer in January 2006. A

copy of the PACER docket printout from Smith v. D.L. Runnels is attached

as Exhibit A to Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice. (footnotes

omitted). 

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* * *

. . . An analysis of the procedural history of Smith v. Runnels

evidences that on January 30, 2008, the District Court issued an Order

denying Plaintiff’s Certificate of Appealability. (Habeas Doc. 43).

In his opposition to defendants’ motion, plaintiff does not dispute the facts outlined by

defendants, but argues that he “. . . was denied access to the court due to the defendant loss of his

property, not only frustrated his attempts to press his claim in the court, but actual denied

plaintiff access to amend that claim with new evidence.” According to plaintiff, his lost legal

materials contained “Newly Discovered evidence, exculpatory witnesses declarations that

exonerate plaintiff of the current crime.” Plaintiff states that he had only obtained this new

evidence “shortly before January 31, 2006,” after filing his habeas corpus case. As to denial of

the COA, plaintiff argues that the district court did so without the benefit of his new evidence. 

Turning first to defendants’ requests for judicial notice, defendants ask the court

to judicially notice court records. The court again observes that plaintiff does not dispute the

facts concerning plaintiff’s other legal actions as outlined by defendants. In any event, the

requests for judicial notice should be granted. The court may take judicial notice pursuant to

Federal Rule of Evidence 201 of matters of public record. See U.S. v. 14.02 Acres of Land, 530

F.3d 883, 894 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus, this court may take judicial notice of state court records, see

Kasey v. Molybdenum Corp. of America, 336 F.2d 560, 563 (9th Cir. 1964), as well as its own

records, see Chandler v. U.S., 378 F.2d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 1967). 

Turning now to defendants’ motion to dismiss, it is clear that the loss of his legal

property did not prevent plaintiff from initially filing his habeas corpus action because it was

filed before his property was lost. The issue is whether the loss of his property sometime in

January 2006 prejudiced plaintiff’s ability to present a claim within the pending habeas action

based on the new evidence which was among the lost property. Plaintiff states that, but for

defendants’ conduct which resulted in the loss of his legal property, he would have been able to

amend his habeas petition based on the new evidence. Defendants argue in their reply brief that

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the mere existence of newly discovered evidence is not enough to justify habeas corpus relief

because plaintiff would still have had to show that the new evidence casts doubt on the reliability

of the criminal proceedings. This argument, however, misses the point of plaintiff’s current civil

rights claim that, due to defendants’ conduct, he was unable to make this showing in his habeas

proceeding. Moreover, prejudice in the context of the actual injury requirement does not mean

that plaintiff was prevented from pursuing a winning claim. Rather, it requires that plaintiff

show only that he was prevented from pursuing a non-frivolous claim. 

Defendants do, however, raise the persuasive argument that plaintiff has not

demonstrated that the new evidence would have given rise to a non-frivolous claim because he

has failed to describe the contents of the new evidence or explain why it was not available earlier

through due diligence. The court also notes that plaintiff has not explained why the new

evidence could not have been re-created despite the loss of his property. Because plaintiff has

failed to show that the new evidence would have given rise to a non-frivolous claim, the court

agrees with defendants that plaintiff’s first amended complaint does not adequately allege the

actual injury requirement. However, the court does not agree with defendants that this defect is

fatal as a matter of law. To the contrary, it is possible that plaintiff could cure the defect through

further amendment of the complaint. 

B. Qualified Immunity

Defendants also argue that, even if plaintiff has stated a First Amendment claim,

they are entitled to qualified immunity. Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from

civil damages unless their conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982). In general, qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). In ruling upon the

issue of qualified immunity, the initial inquiry is whether, taken in the light most favorable to the

party asserting the injury, the facts alleged show the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional

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right. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If, and only if, a violation can be made

out, the next step is to ask whether the right was clearly established. See id. This inquiry “must

be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition . . . .” 

Id. “[T]he right the official is alleged to have violated must have been ‘clearly established’ in a

more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that

right.” Id. at 202 (citation omitted). Thus, the final step in the analysis is to determine whether a

reasonable officer in similar circumstances would have thought his conduct violated the alleged

right. See id. at 205. 

When identifying the right allegedly violated, the court must define the right more

narrowly than the constitutional provision guaranteeing the right, but more broadly than the

factual circumstances surrounding the alleged violation. See Kelly v. Borg, 60 F.3d 664, 667

(9th Cir. 1995). For a right to be clearly established, “[t]he contours of the right must be

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand [that] what [the official] is doing

violates the right.” See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Ordinarily, once the

court concludes that a right was clearly established, an officer is not entitled to qualified

immunity because a reasonably competent public official is charged with knowing the law

governing his conduct. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982). However, even

if the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established right, the government official is

entitled to qualified immunity if he could have “. . . reasonably but mistakenly believed that his .

. . conduct did not violate the right.” Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 651 (9th Cir.

2001); see also Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. 

The first two steps in the qualified immunity analysis involve purely legal

questions. See Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 917 (9th Cir. 1996). The third inquiry involves a

legal determination based on a prior factual finding as to the government official’s conduct. See

Neely v. Feinstein, 50 F.3d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995). In resolving these issues, the court must

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view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff and resolve all material factual disputes

in favor of plaintiff. Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Defendants argue:

. . .[T]he relevant inquiry in this case is whether Defendants

Figueroa and Gordon could have reasonably believed that their alleged

negligent loss of Plaintiff’s box of property was unlawful. The court is to

look at the situation as reasonable officials in Defendants Figueroa and

Gordon’s position could have perceived it. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205.

Here, reasonable officials faced with the same knowledge and

circumstances as Defendants Figueroa and Gordon could have reasonably

believed that accidental misplacement or loss of an inmate’s box of

personal or legal property during a prison transfer – while to be

discouraged–did not constitute an unlawful act that would give rise to a

Constitutional violation. For these reasons, Defendants Figueroa and

Gordon are entitled to qualified immunity. 

The court finds defendants’ argument persuasive. Giving plaintiff the benefit of the doubt by

assuming that the facts alleged in his complaint establish violation of a clearly established

constitutional right, the court finds that defendants could have “. . . reasonably but mistakenly

believed that [their] . . . conduct did not violate the right.” Jackson, 268 F.3d at 651; see also

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. Specifically, plaintiff does not allege any malice on the part of

defendants with respect to the loss of his property. Rather, he claims that they were, at worst,

grossly negligent. In essence, it was an accident, not intentional conduct, which resulted in the

loss of plaintiff’s property and no reasonable officer could believe that such an accident would

violate a constitutional right. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Because the court has assumed that plaintiff states a cognizable First Amendment

claim and concludes that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, it is not necessary to

decide whether plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend.

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 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that:

1. Defendants’ requests for judicial notice (Docs. 32 and 35) be granted;

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 30) be granted on the basis of

qualified immunity; 

3. This action be dismissed with prejudice; and

4. The Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment and close this case. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 20 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: September 12, 2008

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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