Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01061/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01061-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061

CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ALAN SYMONS, et al.,

Defendants-Appellants.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:01-cv-00799-RLY-MJD — Richard L. Young, Chief Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 9, 2015 — DECIDED MARCH 22, 2016

____________________

Before ROVNER and SYKES, Circuit Judges, and ANDREA 

WOOD, District Judge.*

SYKES, Circuit Judge. IGF Insurance Company owed Continental Casualty Company more than $25 million for a cropinsurance business it bought in 1998. In 2002 IGF resold the

business to Acceptance Insurance Company for about 

 * Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 

Case: 15-1061 Document: 31 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 34
2 Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061

$40 million. Continental alleges that IGF’s controlling family—Gordon, Alan, and Doug Symons—structured the sale 

so that most of the purchase price was siphoned into the coffers of other Symons-controlled companies, rendering IGF 

insolvent. More specifically, Continental claims that $24 million of the $40 million purchase price went to three Symonscontrolled companies—Goran Capital, Inc.; Symons International Group, Inc.; and Granite Reinsurance Co.—for sham

noncompetition agreements and a superfluous and overpriced reinsurance treaty. Continental, still unpaid, sued for 

breach of contract and fraudulent transfer.

After lengthy motions litigation and a bench trial, the district court found for Continental and pierced the corporate 

veil to impose liability on the controlling companies and individuals. Continental’s damages totaled $34.2 million, so

the court entered judgment in that amount jointly and severally against IGF, Symons International, IGF Holdings, Inc., 

Goran, Granite Re, and Gordon and Alan Symons. (Gordon 

has since died; his estate was substituted for him. Doug Symons is in bankruptcy.)

Clearing away the factual complexity, this appeal presents three discrete questions for our review: (1) Is Symons 

International liable to Continental for breach of the 1998 sale 

agreement? (2) Are Symons International, Goran, Granite Re, 

Alan Symons, and the Estate of Gordon Symons liable as 

transferees under the Indiana Uniform False Transfer Act

(“IUFTA”)? and (3) Are Alan Symons and the Estate of Gordon Symons liable under an alter-ego theory? For the most 

part, we answer these questions “yes” and affirm the judgment in its entirety.

Case: 15-1061 Document: 31 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 34
Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061 3

I. Background

Like many fraudulent-transfer cases, this one comes to us

with a long and complicated factual and procedural history. 

We’ll try our best to simplify. In a nutshell, in February 1998 

IGF bought a multi-peril crop-insurance business from 

Continental at a price to be determined at either side’s option 

by the exercise of a put or call. In January 2001 Continental 

exercised its put option; under the contractual formula, IGF 

owed Continental $25.4 million. Around that same time, IGF 

decided to unload the business and eventually sold it to Acceptance Insurance Company for a total price of about

$40 million. The Symons family insisted that the purchase 

price be structured as follows: $16.5 million to IGF;

$9 million to IGF parent companies Symons International 

and Goran in exchange for noncompetition agreements; and 

$15 million to Granite Re, an affiliated Symons-controlled 

company, in exchange for a reinsurance treaty. Acceptance 

agreed to this arrangement. The key questions in this protracted litigation are whether the payments to Symons International, Goran, and Granite Re were fraudulent transfers

undertaken to evade IGF’s debt to Continental, and if so, 

which entities and persons may be held liable.

A. Corporate Structure

The Symons family ran a multinational insurance empire. 

On paper it stretched from Canada to Barbados, but in reality the companies were all interrelated and operated out of 

Indianapolis. Business was done through a complex web of 

parents, subsidiaries, and operating and holding companies,

all of which facilitated the easy—but circuitous—flow of 

money. It was at bottom a Symons-run family business with 

Case: 15-1061 Document: 31 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 34
4 Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061

interlocking equity, boards, and officers, all designed to keep

the companies firmly under the family’s control. 

Many components of the Symons family empire were involved in this litigation at its inception and through trial. 

The issues on appeal, however, concern only Symons International, Goran, Granite Re, Alan Symons, and the Estate of 

the late Gordon Symons.

Gordon Symons (Lord of Whitehouses, Nottinghamshire, 

U.K.) founded the family business in the 1970s. At the time 

of the events at issue in this suit, the business was run by 

Gordon’s sons Alan and Doug. (Doug filed for bankruptcy 

while the suit was ongoing; the proceedings against him 

were stayed.)

Together the Symons family owned 50.4% of Goran, 

while its officers owned 1.8% and the rest was publicly traded. Goran, in turn, owned 73.1% of Symons International

(the rest was also publicly traded) and 100% of Granite Re, 

which existed to reinsure contracts from other Symons subsidiaries (e.g., Pafco General Insurance Company, Superior

Insurance Company, and IGF) as well as third parties. Symons International, for its part, owned 100% of IGF Holdings, Inc., which in turn owned all of IGF.

All told, the Symons family directly or indirectly owned 

a majority stock interest in Goran, Symons International, 

IGF, and IGF Holdings. Gordon Symons was Chairman of

Goran and all its subsidiaries; he was also President and 

CEO of Granite Re. During the relevant time period, Alan 

Symons was President and CEO of Goran; Vice Chairman 

and CEO of Symons International; Vice Chairman of Granite 

Re; President and CEO of Superior; and Vice Chairman of

Case: 15-1061 Document: 31 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 34
Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061 5

IGF and IGF Holdings. He was also a member of all the relevant boards. Doug Symons was Executive Vice President 

and Chief Operating Officer of Goran; President, CEO, and 

COO of Symons International; Vice Chairman, Executive VP, 

and Secretary of IGF Holdings; CEO and Secretary of IGF;

Vice Chairman of Granite Re; and was on all the relevant 

boards. Indeed, at all times the Symons family held a controlling majority of the boards of IGF Holdings and IGF. The 

Granite Re board consisted of Symons family members, a 

family associate, and one independent director. Members of 

the Symons family and three others were also members of 

Goran’s board of directors, with Gordon Symons as Chairman breaking any ties. Commingling of officers and directors in the Goran-affiliated group of corporations was rampant. All this is to say that the Symons family ran the entire 

show.

At the time of the events at issue here, the Goran constellation of corporations was also undercapitalized. The district 

court found that Goran and Symons International were balance-sheet insolvent in 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002. IGF managed to keep its head above water, but when the debt to 

Continental was factored in, it too was insolvent. 

At the same time, Symons family members were well 

compensated in salaries, consulting fees, and loans from the 

family companies. Alan, Doug, and Gordon each received

large sums of money through unsecured, interest-free loans 

from Symons-family entities. Between 1999 and 2002, outstanding insider loans ranged from $2 million to more than

$8 million; at the end of 2001, the total amount due from directors and officers was $12.6 million. The businesses also

supplied security for outside loans to Symons family memCase: 15-1061 Document: 31 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 34
6 Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061

bers—for example, Alan and Doug personally received more 

than $2.5 million in loans from Huntington Bank secured by 

preferred shares of Symons International held by Granite Re.

More straightforwardly, between 1998 and 2002, each member of the Symons family collected more than $2 million in 

salary and consulting fees from Granite Re, Goran, and Symons International.

The Symons businesses observed corporate formalities 

only in their most basic sense. Each was separately incorporated, had its own board, and maintained its own bank account. At the same time, however, all mail went to a single

location, and concurrent board meetings were the norm, especially between Goran and Symons International.

B. Crop Insurance

With the corporate background now in place, we proceed

to the transactional facts of the case. The story begins

18 years ago with a deal over Continental’s crop-insurance 

business.

On February 28, 1998, Continental entered into a “Strategic Alliance Agreement” with IGF, IGF Holdings, and Symons International pursuant to which Continental sold its 

crop-insurance business to IGF at a future price to be determined by a complex put/call formula. Until Continental exercised its option, the IGF side of the deal promised to pay 

Continental a portion of the profits from the pooled cropinsurance business. 

Continental exercised its put on January 3, 2001. Under 

the formula specified in the agreement, the IGF side owed 

Continental $25.4 million. At the time IGF also owed ContiCase: 15-1061 Document: 31 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 34
Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061 7

nental more than $4 million in shared profits. The IGF side 

did not pay.

Shortly before Continental exercised its option, IGF decided to sell the crop-insurance business. Three buyers expressed interest: Acceptance Insurance, Archer Daniels Midland (whose buyer consortium actually included Continental), and the Westfield Group. Westfield valued the book of 

business at approximately $40 million and wanted to pay in 

one check to IGF, but Alan Symons insisted that the purchase price be divided into separate payments to various 

Symons-controlled entities. Archer Daniels Midland also 

priced the business at about $40 million.

Acceptance too valued IGF’s book of business at about

$40 million, but unlike Westfield it was prepared to accept 

Alan’s terms for how the purchase price would be structured 

and paid. Acceptance’s chairman (and principal negotiator) 

put it this way: “We’re willing to be as flexible as we can be, 

within regulatory constraints, in making the deal work for 

you and your companies.” Alan Symons proposed the following payment structure: $9 million to Symons International and Goran for noncompetition agreements; $15 million to Granite Re for a reinsurance treaty; and the remaining 

$16.5 million to IGF directly. 

The noncompetition agreements lacked legitimate business justification. Neither Symons International nor Goran

actually provided crop insurance; they’re just holding companies. Most of the IGF employees who posed a real competitive threat to Acceptance—i.e., those with relationships to 

insurance agents and brokers—would be retained by Acceptance. Indeed, Acceptance paid a relatively modest

$1.4 million to neutralize other competitive threats from the 

Case: 15-1061 Document: 31 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 34
8 Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061

IGF employees with expertise in crop insurance (compared 

to the $9 million it paid ostensibly to keep the two holding 

companies at bay).

The Symons family—again, Alan in particular—also devised the reinsurance component of the deal and set the 

premium. The agreement called for Acceptance to pay Granite Re $6 million immediately and then $9 million over the 

next three years for “stop-loss” insurance. We’ll provide 

more detail about this aspect of the transaction as needed

later in this opinion.

Acceptance consented to these terms, and on May 23, 

2001, entered into an agreement to purchase IGF’s cropinsurance business for a total of $40.5 million, structured as 

described above.

C. This Litigation

The IGF side actually commenced this litigation. On 

June 4, 2001—just after inking the deal with Acceptance—

IGF, IGF Holdings, and Symons International filed suit in 

federal court alleging that Continental had misrepresented

the profitability of the crop-insurance business. Continental

responded on June 6 with a suit of its own for breach of contract based on the nonpayment of the $25.4 million purchase 

price for the business. The IGF/Acceptance deal closed later 

that same day. 

The two actions were consolidated, and Continental 

eventually filed counterclaims for breach of contract and 

fraudulent transfer, adding Goran, Granite Re, Pafco, Superior, and Gordon, Alan, and Doug Symons as counterclaim 

defendants. As relevant here, Continental alleged that the 

counterclaim defendants breached the Strategic Alliance 

Case: 15-1061 Document: 31 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 34
Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061 9

Agreement and fraudulently diverted IGF assets to Goran, 

Symons International, Granite Re, Pafco, and Superior. Continental also alleged that the Symonses and the interrelated 

corporate defendants should be held liable for the fraudulent

transfer under an alter-ego theory.

After protracted discovery and motions proceedings, the 

district judge granted Continental’s unopposed motion for 

summary judgment on all claims raised by the IGF side in 

the original suit. (That decision is not challenged here.) The 

parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment on

Continental’s counterclaims. The judge granted summary 

judgment for Continental on the breach-of-contract claims

and set the remainder of the case for trial. 

After a lengthy bench trial, the judge entered a 136-page 

order finding for Continental on its fraudulent-transfer and 

alter-ego claims. After some posttrial skirmishes, judgment 

in the amount of $34.2 million was entered against Alan and 

Gordon Symons, IGF, IGF Holdings, Symons International, 

Goran, and Granite Re. As we’ve noted, Gordon Symons 

died while postjudgment proceedings were ongoing in the 

district court; his estate was substituted for him. This appeal 

followed.

II. Discussion

Because the appeal concerns only Continental’s counterclaims, the parties are inverted: Continental is now the plaintiff and the Symons-side parties are the defendants. The 

oversized briefs present a host of issues for our review. Distilling the arguments, we’re essentially asked to decide

whether the district judge got three main questions right: 

(1) Is Symons International an obligor on the Strategic AlliCase: 15-1061 Document: 31 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 34
10 Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061

ance Agreement and thus liable to Continental for breach?

(2) Are the defendants liable as transferees under the Indiana 

Uniform False Transfer Act? and (3) Are the defendants liable under an alter-ego theory?

As always, we review the judge’s legal conclusions de 

novo and his factual findings under the highly deferential 

clear-error standard. Goodpaster v. City of Indianapolis, 

736 F.3d 1060, 1070 (7th Cir. 2013). Indiana substantive law 

applies. We find no error.

A. Breach of Contract

There’s no challenge to the judge’s summary-judgment 

ruling that IGF and IGF Holdings breached the Strategic Alliance Agreement by failing to pay Continental what it was 

owed for the crop-insurance business. The only breach-ofcontract issue raised on appeal is whether the judge correctly 

found Symons International liable for the breach as well.

Symons International relies on section 3.8.B of the 

Agreement, which describes the put mechanism and places 

the burden of payment squarely on IGF Holdings: “In the 

event [Continental] shall exercise the Put Mechanism, [IGF 

Holdings] shall be obligated to pay [Continental] an amount 

equal to 5.85 times the Average Pre-Tax Income as computed 

pursuant to this Section.” But three Symons-family entities—

IGF, IGF Holdings, and Symons International—were parties 

and signatories to the Agreement. And as the district court 

found, sections 6.8 and 11.1 of the Agreement combine to 

show that Symons International was clearly on the hook

along with IGF and IGF Holdings.

Section 6.8, titled “Further Assurances,” states as follows:

The parties hereto shall use all commercially reaCase: 15-1061 Document: 31 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 34
Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061 11

sonable best efforts to take, or cause to be taken, all actions or to do, or cause to be done, all 

things or to execute any documents necessary, 

proper or advisable under applicable laws and 

regulations, to consummate and make effective 

the transactions contemplated by this Agreement ... . 

(Emphasis added.) Section 11.1, titled “Further Actions,” reinforces the point:

Each of the parties hereto agrees to use all reasonable effort to take, or cause to be taken, all 

reasonable actions and to do, or cause to be 

done, all reasonable things necessary, proper 

or advisable to consummate the transactions 

contemplated by this Agreement. None of the 

parties hereto will take or permit to be taken 

any action that would be in breach of the terms 

or provisions of this Agreement or that would 

cause any of the representations contained 

herein to be or to become untrue. 

(Emphasis added.)

Based on these clauses, the judge reasoned that Symons 

International, as a signatory to the Agreement (along with 

IGF and IGF Holdings), covenanted to do what was necessary to comply with the IGF side’s contractual obligations 

and avoid a breach. This, in turn, makes it liable for any

breach by IGF or IGF Holdings. Cf. Hinc v. Lime-O-Sol Co., 

382 F.3d 716, 721 (7th Cir. 2004) (enforcing “best efforts” 

provisions under Indiana law).

Symons International protests that this makes it a guarantor and a proper guaranty needs to be explicit; here it is 

Case: 15-1061 Document: 31 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 34
12 Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061

only implied. See, e.g., Lind Stoneworks, Ltd. v. Top Surface, 

Inc., 954 N.E.2d 1256, 1262 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011). Continental

counters that Symons International is not a third-party guarantor but a necessary party to the Agreement, rendering it 

not so much a guarantor as an additional obligor under the 

Agreement.

We agree with Continental and find the judge’s reasoning sound. While section 3.8.B, which describes the put 

mechanism, places the payment obligation on IGF Holdings, 

the “Further Assurances” and “Further Actions” clauses 

specifically refer to the obligations of the “parties hereto,” 

which must include Symons International as a signatory to 

the Agreement. In these sections Symons International—the 

parent company of IGF Holdings—covenanted not to “take 

or permit to be taken any action that would be in breach” of 

the contract and agreed to “use commercially reasonable 

best efforts” and “all reasonable effort” to comply with the 

terms of the Agreement. The judge did not clearly err in 

finding Symons International liable as a co-obligor.

B. The Indiana Uniform False Transfer Act

Moving beyond the contract claims, the judge found the 

defendants liable for fraudulent transfer under the Indiana 

Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, IND. CODE §§ 32-18-2-1 et 

seq. Broadly speaking, the IUFTA prevents a party from 

transferring assets in order to defraud a creditor. The question here is whether IGF’s sale of the crop-insurance business 

was structured so as to fraudulently transfer assets in order 

to avoid paying Continental what it was owed.

Case: 15-1061 Document: 31 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 34
Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061 13

1. The IUFTA

There are two possible grounds for liability under the 

IUFTA, and the judge found the defendants liable under both. 

The first—IUFTA § 14—requires a finding of actual intent to 

defraud, and the other—IUFTA § 15—covers transfers for less 

than reasonably equivalent value that leave the debtor insolvent, known as “constructive” fraudulent transfers. 

We’ll take the § 15 claim first. The statute states in relevant part: 

A transfer made or an obligation incurred by a 

debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose 

claim arose before the transfer was made or the 

obligation was incurred if: 

(1) the debtor made the transfer or incurred

the obligation without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the 

transfer or obligation; and 

(2) the debtor: 

(A) was insolvent at that time; or 

(B) became insolvent as a result of the 

transfer or obligation.

IND. CODE § 32-18-2-15.

Continental’s claim arose before the sale to Acceptance 

closed on June 6, 2001, and the judge found that IGF was insolvent at the time of the sale. The dispute on appeal centers 

on whether IGF “receiv[ed] a reasonably equivalent value in 

exchange for the transfer.” The judge concluded that it did

not. 

Case: 15-1061 Document: 31 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 34
14 Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061

Recall that Acceptance was willing to pay $40.5 million 

for IGF’s book of business, but IGF received only $16.5 million of the purchase price. The remainder was siphoned off 

to Goran and Symons International in exchange for noncompetition agreements ($9 million) and to Granite Re for a 

reinsurance treaty ($15 million). The judge concluded that 

this was a diversion of purchase-money funds, leaving IGF 

with less than reasonably equivalent value. The judge found 

that the structure of the transaction—specifically, the sham 

noncompetes and overpriced reinsurance treaty—had been

“proposed and driven” by Alan Symons on behalf of IGF. 

Acceptance, for its part, just wanted the crop-insurance 

business: It was happy to let Alan structure the sale however 

he wanted as long as the total price was around $40 million. 

This way of structuring Acceptance’s payment kept IGF 

from receiving reasonably equivalent value for the business. 

We’ll explain in more detail later why we think the judge’s 

findings regarding the noncompetes and reinsurance agreement were clearly correct. To assess liability under § 15,

however, what matters is that IGF—Continental’s debtor—

received less than half the value of what it was selling, with 

the rest of the money going to Symons International, Goran, 

and Granite Re instead. The deal thus met all the elements of 

§ 15: an open claim, insolvency, and a subvalue transfer.

Indeed, thanks largely to the same facts, the defendants

fared no better under § 14. That section reads:

A transfer made or an obligation incurred by a 

debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether 

the creditor’s claim arose before or after the 

transfer was made or the obligation was inCase: 15-1061 Document: 31 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 34
Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061 15

curred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation: 

(1) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or 

(2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or 

obligation, and the debtor: 

(A) was engaged or was about to engage 

in a business or a transaction for which

the remaining assets of the debtor were 

unreasonably small in relation to the 

business or transaction; or 

(B) intended to incur or believed or reasonably should have believed that the 

debtor would incur debts beyond the 

debtor’s ability to pay as the debts became due. 

Id. § 32-18-2-14.

In fraudulent-transfer cases under § 14, Indiana courts 

consult a list of factors known as the “badges of fraud” to

determine whether the transfer was made with intent to defraud a creditor.1 See Otte v. Otte, 655 N.E.2d 76, 81 (Ind. Ct. 

 1 These “badges” include:

(1) the transfer of property by a debtor during the pendency of a suit; (2) a transfer of property that renders the 

debtor insolvent or greatly reduces his estate; (3) a series 

of contemporaneous transactions which strip a debtor of 

all property available for execution; (4) secret or hurried 

transactions not in the usual mode of doing business; 

(5) any transaction conducted in a manner differing from 

Case: 15-1061 Document: 31 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 34
16 Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061

App. 1995), trans. denied. “The existence of several of these 

badges may warrant an inference of fraudulent intent, but 

no particular badge constitutes fraudulent intent per se.” 

Hoesman v. Sheffler, 886 N.E.2d 622, 630 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); 

see also Greenfield v. Arden Seven Penn Partners, L.P., 

757 N.E.2d 699, 703–04 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“As no single 

indicium constitutes a showing of fraudulent intent per se, 

the facts must be taken together to determine how many 

badges of fraud exist and if together they amount to a pattern of fraudulent intent.” (quoting Otte, 655 N.E.2d at 81)).

Applying these factors here, the judge found a valid inference of fraudulent intent based on the following factors: 

• Badge 1 (“transfer of property by a debtor during the 

pendency of a suit”): Continental had made it clear 

that legal action would follow if the contractual dispute, initiated in March 2001, was not resolved. Indeed, Continental filed suit for breach of contract on 

June 6, 2001, and the sale to Acceptance closed later 

that same day. 

• Badge 2 (“transfer of property that renders the debtor 

insolvent or greatly reduces his estate”): IGF and Symons International were insolvent.

 

customary methods; (6) a transaction whereby the debtor retains benefits over the transferred property; (7) little 

or no consideration in return for the transfer; and (8) a 

transfer of property between family members.

Otte v. Otte, 655 N.E.2d 76, 81 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).

Case: 15-1061 Document: 31 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 34
Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061 17

• Badge 3 (“a series of contemporaneous transactions 

which strip a debtor of all property available for execution”): In just this one transaction, IGF received less 

than half the value of its business, leaving it unable to 

satisfy any execution of its debt to Continental.

• Badge 5 (“any transaction conducted in a manner differing from customary methods”): The transaction 

differed from customary methods by transferring 

purchase-price consideration to unjustified noncompetes and reinsurance. (More on this later.)

• Badge 7 (“little or no consideration in return for the 

transfer”): IGF received inadequate consideration in

the transfer (less than 50% of the going market price).

• Badge 8 (“a transfer of property between family 

members”): The transfer was essentially between 

family members.

Based on these findings and the absence of evidence otherwise justifying the structure of the transaction, the judge 

concluded that assets were transferred “with actual intent to 

hinder, delay, or defraud” in violation of § 14(1).

The judge also found a violation of § 14(2) because the 

transfer was not made “for reasonably equivalent value,” 

IGF was insolvent at the time of the sale, and it knew or 

should have known that as a result of the transaction, it 

would be unable to pay its debts as they became due.

We don’t think the judge clearly erred in any of these 

findings, which were based largely on his subsidiary findings about the noncompetes and reinsurance treaty, to which 

we now turn. 

Case: 15-1061 Document: 31 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 34
18 Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061

(i) Noncompetes

The defendants would have us believe that the noncompetes were legitimate in large part because the expert testimony offered by Continental was procedurally and substantively flawed. They claim that Continental’s expert on the 

noncompetes, David A. Borghesi, should not have been allowed to testify and also that his testimony was flawed. 

On the admissibility question, the judge found that 

Borghesi, a CPA by training, is an experienced auditor and 

forensic accountant and rejected the defendants’ objections 

to his expertise relative to the question on which he was 

opining. The defendants had argued that Borghesi was insufficiently experienced in valuing noncompetes. The judge 

ruled that this objection concerned the weight of his testimony, not its admissibility. That was not an abuse of discretion. 

The defendants contest Borghesi’s conclusion that the 

chairman of Acceptance had reason to believe the Symonses 

would have trouble getting a standard reinsurance treaty 

from the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation and thus were 

effectively incapable of competing against Acceptance in the 

crop space, rendering the noncompetes valueless. But the 

record supports Borghesi’s conclusion in this regard. Acceptance’s chairman specifically testified at trial that it 

“would be highly unlikely that [the Symonses] would be 

able to get a new [Standard Reinsurance Agreement] any 

time -- any time soon.”

The defendants also argue that the noncompetes had 

value insofar as they prevented Symons International and 

Goran from acquiring any Acceptance competitors as operatCase: 15-1061 Document: 31 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 34
Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061 19

ing companies. But that does nothing to rebut the judge’s 

conclusion that the two holding companies were not themselves competitive threats. And even if there were some theoretical value to Acceptance in keeping Symons International and Goran from acquiring or launching a competitor, that 

threat was infinitesimally small since both companies were 

insolvent. 

Lastly, the defendants complain about Borghesi’s failure 

to use a so-called “with and without” methodology for valuing the noncompetes. Yet Borghesi was fully capable of using 

that valuation method, but in the end didn’t have to run the 

numbers because he concluded that any benefit to Acceptance was simply nonexistent.

Beyond objecting to the expert’s testimony, the defendants more generally contend that the noncompetes were serious efforts to preclude harmful competition against Acceptance. To engage this argument, we need to ask, just what 

was Acceptance buying? A noncompetition agreement is a 

tool by which a business’s goodwill is protected by the purchaser. See Kladis v. Nick’s Patio, Inc., 735 N.E.2d 1216, 1220 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2000). But there must be something the purchaser is buying when it contracts for a noncompetition 

agreement; otherwise the noncompete is a sham. See, e.g.,

United States v. Black, 530 F.3d 599, 605–06 (7th Cir. 2008) 

(Lord Black and his lawyer were convicted of having arranged multimillion dollar noncompetes that “made no 

sense” because Black was “on [the] way out of the newspaper business.”); SEC v. Black, No. 04 C 7377, 2005 WL 

1498893, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 17, 2005); Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. 

Hollinger Inc., No. 04 C 0698, 2005 WL 589000, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 

Mar. 11, 2005). 

Case: 15-1061 Document: 31 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 34
20 Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061

Here there was no goodwill to buy from the two holding

companies, Symons International and Goran. The employees 

of IGF with competitive knowledge were all neutralized by 

Acceptance separately. As the judge observed,

Both entities lacked the infrastructure and crop 

insurance goodwill—including employees 

with knowledge of the crop insurance business 

and special relationships with customers and 

agents—necessary to compete in the crop insurance business. In addition, both entities 

lacked the ability to compete as both were insolvent and unlikely to obtain a [Standard Reinsurance Agreement] from the [Federal Crop 

Insurance Corporation].

This finding also undercuts the defendants’ argument 

that Symons International and Goran could have acquired a 

competing crop-insurance enterprise. With what money? 

They were insolvent. All of which is to say that the judge did

not clearly err in concluding that the noncompetes only 

make sense as a fraudulent diversion of the purchase money

for the crop-insurance business, not as a purchase of goodwill and legitimate protection from competition.

(ii) Reinsurance

The defendants also argue that the reinsurance treaty 

was independently valuable. Here, too, they say the judge 

erred factually and in admitting Continental’s expert testimony. We don’t see how. 

The defendants first contend that James L. Driscoll, 

Ph.D., one of Continental’s reinsurance experts, was insufficiently experienced to price reinsurance. This argument is 

Case: 15-1061 Document: 31 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 34
Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061 21

hard to take seriously. Driscoll is an underwriter at the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation and has spent his entire career in the crop-insurance industry as an underwriter and 

actuary. 

Next we’re told that Driscoll’s analysis of the actual value 

of the Granite Re reinsurance treaty was flawed because it 

relied on a “pure premium” analysis. That is, Driscoll supposedly compared the actual treaty to the minimum amount 

of premium the insurer would need to pay expected losses, 

which (the defendants say) is not a realistic comparison. The 

problem with this argument is that Driscoll didn’t really do

that: instead he observed that the pure premium is the minimum amount the insurer needs to collect in order to break 

even, so while it is clearly not “apples to apples” for an actual treaty, it’s instructive nevertheless. (It goes without saying 

that the price of the pure premium—around $45,000—was 

nowhere near the $15 million price tag on the treaty.)

The defendants also claim that Driscoll miscalculated the 

total exposure to be mitigated in a pure-premium reinsurance analysis by a factor of three. Even assuming he did, the 

pure premium would still be orders of magnitude less than 

the $15 million Alan charged for the reinsurance. In short, 

even if we assume that Driscoll made all the errors the defendants insist that he did, the basic parameters of his opinion still remain intact: the actual value of the reinsurance 

treaty was nowhere near its cost. The judge’s fact-finding on 

this point was not clearly erroneous.

We hear similar complaints about Continental’s other reinsurance expert, William E. Totsch. The defendants challenge Totsch’s calculations regarding the reasonableness of 

the Granite Re treaty by comparing it to a supposedly simiCase: 15-1061 Document: 31 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 34
22 Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061

lar treaty Acceptance had with Scandinavian Reinsurance 

(“ScanRe”). The ScanRe treaty and the Granite Re treaty 

were more or less comparable, the defendants maintain, 

which means that it would not have been unusual for Acceptance to purchase the kind of loss mitigation provided by 

Granite Re here. The problem is that the ScanRe treaty was 

materially different from the Granite Re treaty in the extent 

to which ScanRe shared risk with the government and also 

in its terms of termination.

Finally, the defendants claim that because Totsch didn’t 

purport to offer an opinion on the “value” of the Granite Re 

treaty, it was a mistake for the judge to observe that Totsch 

“opined as to the value of the Reinsurance Agreement.” But 

when push came to shove and the judge actually analyzed 

Totsch’s testimony, he correctly characterized it as an opinion 

on “the costs of the contract.” That is, Totsch compared the 

price of the premium to the potential exposure from loss and 

concluded that the price didn’t match the risk. This isn’t pricing the value of the instrument but rather evaluating the 

price-to-risk ratio faced by Acceptance. This helped the 

judge conclude that the instrument was vastly overpriced. 

In sum, we see no error in the judge’s conclusion that this

$15 million reinsurance treaty—which was both suggested 

by Alan Symons and outside industry norms—was unjustified and overpriced. It follows that the judge committed no

error in deeming this payment a diversion of the purchase 

money for the crop-insurance business.

2. Who is Liable under the IUFTA?

So IGF executed a fraudulent transfer, but are the other 

defendants liable? The defendants say no, arguing that

Case: 15-1061 Document: 31 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 34
Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061 23

(1) Alan and Gordon Symons can’t be liable transferees under the statute as mere participants in the deal; and (2) the 

sale money from Acceptance to Symons International, 

Goran, and Granite Re isn’t an “asset” transferable under the 

statute. The first of these issues is one of first impression under Indiana law. 

(i) Transferee liability

Alan Symons and the Estate of Gordon Symons argue 

that they cannot be held liable for fraudulent transfer because the IUFTA does not account for “participation” liability. 

The IUFTA supplies two possible remedies: the defrauded creditor can avoid the transfer in rem or recover a judgment for the value of the transfer from liable parties, including “(1) the first transferee of the asset or the person for 

whose benefit the transfer was made; or (2) any subsequent 

transferee other than a good faith transferee who took for 

value or from any subsequent transferee.” IND. CODE § 32-18-

2-18(b). This language tracks section 8 of the Uniform False 

Transfer Act.

Everyone agrees that Alan and Gordon were not direct 

beneficiaries of the transfer (unlike Symons International, 

Goran, and Granite Re). So Alan and the Estate argue that 

they can be held liable only under a sort of accessory “participation” theory of liability, which has not been incorporated 

into the IUFTA. As support for this proposition, they cite 

APS Sports Collectibles, Inc. v. Sports Time, Inc., 299 F.3d 624, 

630 (7th Cir. 2002). There we found no legal authority for the 

proposition that an “insider” could be liable under the 

Illinois version of the UFTA. At issue in APS were corporate 

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24 Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061

officers who benefited indirectly from the transfer in question. Id. at 629. 

Alan and the Estate also rely on a district-court decision

noting that the IUFTA lacks accessory liability. Baker O’Neal 

Holdings, Inc. v. Ernst & Young LLP, No. 1:03-CV-0132-DFH, 

2004 WL 771230, at *14 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 2004) (Hamilton, 

J.). Baker O’Neal involved a claim of accessory liability 

against the accounting firm Ernst & Young, which had provided extensive financial advice for a likely insolvent corporation in exchange for $600,000 in fees. The district court in 

Baker O’Neal concluded that on balance, the caselaw pretty 

clearly established that there would be no basis for accountants qua accountants to be held liable as accessories to the 

client’s fraudulent transfer.2 Finally, the defendants cite to Shi 

v. Yi, 921 N.E.2d 31, 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), which held that 

common-law fraud remedies cannot be imported into an 

IUFTA action.

On the other side of the ledger, in DFS Secured Healthcare 

Receivables Trust v. Caregivers Great Lakes, Inc. 384 F.3d 338, 

347 (7th Cir. 2004), we considered whether an individual 

corporate actor could be held liable under the IUFTA under 

common-law fraud principles for his personal participation in 

the fraud. Finding “no case suggesting that ‘veil piercing’ is 

impermissible under the UFTA,” we noted that

[l]iability for officers or shareholders of a “first 

transferee” who personally participated in the 

fraud is a substitute for “veil piercing,” not an 

 2 It’s worth noting that Baker O’Neal doesn’t seem to turn on the definition of “transferee” but rather the scope of the IUFTA’s “catch-all” provision at section 17(a)(3)(C).

Case: 15-1061 Document: 31 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 34
Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061 25

extension of who can be a “transferee” under 

the UFTA. Moreover, the reasoning behind the 

general rule that courts should avoid extending 

the parties who can be a “transferee” under the 

UFTA appears to be based, at least in part, on 

the difficulty of proving damages.

Id. In other words, we suggested that if the IUFTA contemplates this kind of liability, it’s really an alternative avenue of 

seeking alter-ego liability—not an expansion of the definition of “transferee” to include vicarious liability. Nevertheless, “in an abundance of caution,” we certified the question 

to the Indiana Supreme Court. Id. at 349. But the case settled 

before the state high court could provide an answer. 

In the end we don’t need to resolve whether Alan and 

Gordon’s Estate can be liable as IUFTA “transferees.” The 

idea that veil-piercing principles can apply in this context is

sound. See id. at 348. Thus, even without the district judge’s 

findings on their liability for participation in the fraud, the 

judge’s alter-ego findings are enough to put Alan and Gordon’s Estate on the hook without broadening beneficiary liability under the IUFTA to include vicarious or participatory

liability. 

(ii) The transfer itself

The defendants also make a very formalistic argument 

that the money paid to Goran, Symons International, and 

Granite Re never belonged to IGF, so it couldn’t really have 

been transferred fraudulently. They noted that the statute 

defines “transfer” as “disposing of or parting with an asset,” 

IND. CODE § 32-18-2-10, and an “asset” is “property of a 

debtor,” id. § 32-18-2-2. So if the debtor doesn’t own someCase: 15-1061 Document: 31 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 34
26 Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061

thing, he can’t transfer it. See Grand Labs., Inc. v. Midcon Labs 

of Iowa, 32 F.3d 1277, 1281 (8th Cir. 1994) (“To recover on a 

fraudulent conveyance claim, a plaintiff-creditor must first 

show that the transferor actually owned the property that it 

allegedly fraudulently transferred.”).

This argument is creative but fundamentally misunderstands a basic precept of fraudulent-transfer doctrine: substance trumps form. As we have frequently noted in an analogous context, “fraudulent conveyance doctrine ... is a flexible principle that looks to substance, rather than form.” 

Boyer v. Crown Stock Distribution, Inc., 587 F.3d 787, 793 (7th 

Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted); see also In re Joy Recovery Tech. Corp., 286 B.R. 54, 74 (N.D. Ill. Bankr. 2002) (“Courts 

will eschew appeals to form which obscure the substance of 

a transaction. Thus, a multilevel transaction will be collapsed 

and treated as a single transaction in order to determine if 

there was a fraudulent conveyance.”). 

The IUFTA incorporates this principle in another part of 

the definition of “transfer” that the defendants conveniently 

ignore: a transfer is “disposing of or parting with an asset or 

an interest in an asset, whether the mode is direct or indirect.” 

§ 32-18-2-10 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., In re Unglaub, 

332 B.R. 303, 316 (N.D. Ill. Bankr. 2005) (“For purposes of the 

[Colorado Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act], equity looks to 

the substance of the transaction rather than its form.”); HBE 

Leasing Corp. v. Frank, 48 F.3d 623, 638 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding 

that “the District Court correctly disregarded the form of this 

transaction and looked instead to its substance” under the 

New York Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act).

Here the deal between IGF and Acceptance was structured to keep more than half the purchase price away from

Case: 15-1061 Document: 31 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 34
Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061 27

IGF and in the hands of the Symonses. The sleight of hand 

on which the defendants now rely was the very means of the 

fraud. If anything, this is a textbook example of why the law 

of fraudulent transfer privileges substance over form.

C. Alter Ego

Lastly, Alan and Gordon challenge their alter-ego liability. This issue too gets deferential review; we will reverse only for clear error. See Matter of Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 

954 F.2d 1279, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992); In re Bowen Transps., Inc., 

551 F.2d 171, 179 (7th Cir. 1977); see also Cent. States, Se. & Sw. 

Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 85 F.3d 1282, 1288–89 

(7th Cir. 1996) (adopting a clearly erroneous standard in a 

veil-piercing-like “common control” claim). After all, veilpiercing is a highly fact-intensive inquiry. See Winkler v. V.G. 

Reed & Sons, Inc., 638 N.E.2d 1228, 1232 (Ind. 1994). 

Indiana courts hesitate to pierce the corporate veil but

will do so to prevent fraud or injustice to a third party. See id.

Generally speaking, the corporate form “may be disregarded 

where one corporation is so organized and controlled and its 

affairs so conducted that it is a mere instrumentality or adjunct of another corporation.” Smith v. McLeod Distrib., Inc., 

744 N.E.2d 459, 462 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

Alter-ego analysis in Indiana proceeds along the socalled Aronson factors, which include:

(1) undercapitalization; (2) absence of corporate records; (3) fraudulent representation by 

corporation shareholders or directors; (4) use 

of the corporation to promote fraud, injustice 

or illegal activities; (5) payment by the corporation of individual obligations; (6) commingling 

Case: 15-1061 Document: 31 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 34
28 Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061

of assets and affairs; (7) failure to observe required corporate formalities; or (8) other 

shareholder acts or conduct ignoring, controlling, or manipulating the corporate form. 

Aronson v. Price, 644 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Ind. 1994). Where, as 

here, a court “is asked to decide whether two or more affiliated corporations should be treated as a single entity,” the 

analysis expands to consider other factors in addition to 

those from Aronson, including “whether similar corporate 

names were used; whether there were common principal 

corporate officers, directors, and employees; whether the 

business purposes of the corporations were similar; and 

whether the corporations were located in the same offices 

and used the same telephone numbers and business cards.”

Smith, 744 N.E.2d at 463 (citations omitted).

The defendants argue as a threshold matter that this case 

lacks the sort of injustice necessary to warrant a veil-piercing 

inquiry. Caveat emptor, they shrug. Continental knew what 

it was getting into when it sold its crop-insurance business to 

IGF. It was never misled. That IGF can’t pay makes this

merely “an unsatisfied judgment” and no reason to pierce 

the corporate veil. See Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. LatiniHohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 371, 381 n.1 (7th Cir. 2008). 

We’re not persuaded. Yes, it’s true that Continental was a 

sophisticated market actor; any deal can turn sour and sometimes judgments go unsatisfied. But none of this makes it 

just or fair for the Symons family to have structured the later

sale of the business to Acceptance to syphon assets away

from IGF to evade the debt to Continental, which is what the 

noncompetes and reinsurance in this deal accomplished. If 

nothing else, Continental had reason to believe that IGF 

Case: 15-1061 Document: 31 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 34
Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061 29

wouldn’t dump the crop-insurance business for less than 

half its value. We think this constitutes injustice to a third 

party. 

Moving on to the alter-ego test itself, the findings here 

were amply supported by the record. The judge found that 

“Alan, Doug, and Gordon Symons ignored, controlled, and 

manipulated the corporate forms” of IGF, IGF Holdings, 

Symons International, Granite Re, Superior, Pafco, and 

Goran, and “operated the corporations as a single business 

enterprise such that these entities were mere instrumentalities of the Symons family.” Thus, fraud was present and the 

corporation was operated as a mere instrumentality of the 

alter-ego liable parties. 

The judge evaluated the Aronson and Smith factors as follows:

• Undercapitalization. The judge did not find the companies undercapitalized for the purposes of the Aronson

test because “[t]he adequacy of capital is to be measured as of the time of a corporation’s formation.” 

Cmty. Care Ctrs., Inc. v. Hamilton, 774 N.E.2d 559, 565 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Nevertheless, the judge noted 

that the fact that almost all of the Symons companies 

were undercapitalized as of 1999 “cannot be ignored.”

• Fraudulent representation by corporation shareholders or 

directors. The judge found that the Symons family and 

the corporate counterclaim defendants had made 

fraudulent representations to regulatory agencies and 

the general public, in particular misrepresentations to 

the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation.

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30 Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061

• Corporate formalities. The judge found that corporate 

formalities maintained by the Symons-controlled 

companies were “entirely ‘cosmetic.’” The Goran and 

Symons International boards met at the same time 

and place on 18 separate occasions between March 

1997 and May 2001. IGF and Superior held coterminous board meetings three times. Lastly, Alan Symons 

was the principal representative of IGF, IGF Holdings, 

Symons International, Goran, and Granite Re during 

negotiations with Acceptance.

• Commingling Assets. The companies all made extensive use of intercompany loans, purchases, sales, securities, real estate, mortgages, and other investments. 

There was vertical overlap between IGF and IGF

Holdings in their payroll. In 2001 IGF, Superior, and 

Pafco were all incurring significant operating losses 

while their holding companies made over $40 million 

from the operating companies in management and 

service agreements.

• Common Address. Goran, Symons International, IGF, 

IGF Holdings, Pafco, and Superior all shared a business address in Indianapolis.

Based on these findings, the judge concluded that the 

Symonses used their control over the Goran-related companies to fraudulently avoid satisfying the debt to Continental.

The defendants argue that the judge’s analysis improperly blends the Aronson and Smith tests and that the judge 

failed to consider what they insist is the key Aronson inquiry: 

shareholder abuse and shareholder use of the corporation as 

a conduit for personal affairs. See Aronson, 644 N.E.2d at 868.

Case: 15-1061 Document: 31 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 34
Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061 31

As we’ve explained, however, Aronson isn’t exclusive. Aronson dealt with shareholder alter-ego liability, and Indiana 

decisions hold that the Aronson factors are “not necessarily

exhaustive.” Fairfield Dev., Inc. v. Georgetown Woods, 

768 N.E.2d 463, 469 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); see also Stacey-Rand, 

Inc. v. J.J. Holman, Inc., 527 N.E.2d 726, 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1988) (“While no one talismanic fact will justify with impunity piercing the corporate veil, a careful review of the entire 

relationship between various corporate entities, their directors and officers may reveal that such an equitable action is 

warranted.”). Furthermore, Aronson itself contemplated the 

sort of corporate-formality inquiry later applied in Smith to 

corporate-sibling liability. To see this one need only look to

the full sentence the defendants invoke from Aronson: “Lack 

of observance of formalities can provide circumstantial evidence of shareholder abuse and shareholder use of the corporation as a conduit for personal affairs.” 644 N.E.2d at 868

(emphasis added). Thus, we think the judge was correct to 

look to the factors identified in both Aronson and Smith to 

determine whether Alan and Gordon used their control over 

the corporate empire to enrich themselves at the expense of 

Continental.

The defendants also say that the Symons-family empire 

does not satisfy the “single business enterprise” rule for veil 

piercing. They argue that their conglomerate comprised decidedly separate companies and thus is not really eligible for 

veil piercing. In particular, the companies had different 

names, different directors and officers, different business 

purposes, and different locations, thus precluding them 

from being deemed a single business enterprise.

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32 Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061

But that isn’t the rule—or at least it’s not the whole rule. 

In fuller context Smith said, 

[W]e have previously noted that other jurisdictions have disregarded the separateness of affiliated corporations when the corporations are

not operated as separate entities but are manipulated or controlled as one enterprise through their 

interrelationship to cause illegality, fraud, or injustice or to permit one economic entity to escape 

liability arising out of an operation conducted by 

one corporation for the benefit of the whole enterprise. 

744 N.E.2d at 463 (emphases added). To that end, “[i]ndicia 

of common ‘identity,’ ‘excessive fragmentation,’ or ‘single 

business enterprise’ corporations may include, among other 

factors, the intermingling of business transactions, functions, 

property, employees, funds, records, and corporate names in 

dealing with the public.” Id. That’s almost precisely what we 

have here: IGF conducted an operation for the benefit of the 

Goran empire that was controlled as one enterprise by the 

Symons family. 

Nevertheless, the defendants also contend that the Goran 

companies can’t be considered “controlled as one enterprise” 

because they were regulated businesses and some were publicly traded. There’s no rule that publicly traded companies 

are exempt from veil-piercing, and the defendants don’t 

point to one. It’s true that veil-piercing is usually applied to 

closely held corporations, but that has more to do with the 

ease of abusing the corporate form in a closely held corporation than anything else. It isn’t a necessary condition for an 

alter-ego claim.

Case: 15-1061 Document: 31 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 34
Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061 33

Indeed, other courts have not ruled out piercing the veil 

of public companies. See Birbara v. Locke, 99 F.3d 1233, 1237–

38 (1st Cir. 1996) (“The key Massachusetts cases on piercing 

the corporate veil have all involved close, family-owned defendant corporations. In this silence, we will assume, dubitante, that Massachusetts would apply the same standards in 

deciding whether to pierce the corporate veil when the defendant is a public corporation as it has when the defendant 

is a close corporation.”). And it has happened before. See

Nerox Power Sys., Inc. v. M-B Contracting Co., 54 P.3d 791

(Alaska 2002). If there were a rule against public-company 

veil-piercing, it would be justified by a concern about innocent third-party shareholders. But here both Goran and Symons International have been delisted from the NASDAQ,

so that’s of limited salience. 

Similarly, the fact that the insurance industry is heavily 

regulated changes nothing of significance here. Unless the 

defendants can show that regulatory requirements prevented the Symonses from manipulating their companies (and 

they can’t), this argument doesn’t get off the ground.

Lastly, the defendants argue that the Aronson and Smith

factors simply don’t support veil-piercing given the facts of 

this case. The company names were different. There were 

some independent directors. Each operating company was 

doing business in a different insurance sector (e.g., IGF was 

in crops, Superior in autos). All the businesses had different 

headquarters.

It’s a nice try, but on this record we don’t think the judge’s 

factual findings regarding alter-ego liability were clearly 

wrong. Corporate formalities were both cosmetic and ignored. (For example, while the companies had different 

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34 Nos. 14-2665, 14-2671 & 15-1061

headquarters, Symons International, Goran, IGF, and Pafco 

all gave regulators the same address in Indiana as their actual base of operations.) Assets were commingled—indeed, the 

corporations all seem to have raided one another with some 

degree of impunity. Symons family members received millions of dollars in no-interest, unsecured loans from their 

companies. Finally, Alan was the principal agent of all the 

relevant companies and the architect of the sale. In short, the 

record amply supports the judge’s decision to pierce the corporate veil. Cf. Wachovia Sec., LLC v. Banco Panamericano, Inc., 

674 F.3d 743, 753–54 (7th Cir. 2012) (veil-piercing was justified in part by a looting of corporate assets following a margin call); Fairfield Dev., 768 N.E.2d at 472–73 (veil-piercing 

was justified when there were corporate loans that were really personal, commingled assets, one office, shared property, 

intercorporate cost coverage, and judgment proofing).

* * *

To summarize: The judge did not clearly err in finding 

Symons International liable as an obligor under the Strategic 

Alliance Agreement. Likewise, we find no error in the 

judge’s ruling that Symons International, Goran, and Granite 

Re are liable under the IUFTA. And while we are not prepared to say that Alan and the Estate of Gordon Symons are 

liable as transferees under the IUFTA, they are liable under 

alter-ego theory.

 AFFIRMED.

Case: 15-1061 Document: 31 Filed: 03/22/2016 Pages: 34