Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02612/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02612-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRUCE PHILLIPI aka

ROBERT MICHAEL RAY,

CDCR # K-79951,

Civil No. 11-2612 DMS (RBB)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[ECF No. 2]; and

(2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

FOR FAILING TO STATE 

A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b) 

vs.

JOHN/JANE DOES; D. FOSTON; 

M. JIMENEZ; M. HODGES;

G.J. JANDA,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, a state inmate currently incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison located in

Calipatria, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, Plaintiff has filed a certified copy of his inmate trust account

statement which the Court construes as a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (IFP) pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2].

I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

Case 3:11-cv-02612-DMS-RBB Document 3 Filed 12/20/11 Page 1 of 6
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U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to pay only if the party is

granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493

F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999).

Prisoners granted leave to proceed IFP however, remain obligated to pay the entire fee in

installments, regardless of whether the action is ultimately dismissed for any reason. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his trust account statement

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D.CAL.CIVLR 3.2. Plaintiff’s trust account statement

shows that he has insufficient funds from which to pay an initial partial filing fee.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [ECF No. 2] and

assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the Court further

orders the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”)

to garnish the entire $350 balance of the filing fees owed in this case, collect and forward them

to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1).

II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)’s amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 also

obligate the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like

Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or

adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole,

probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.”

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Under these provisions, the Court must sua

sponte dismiss any prisoner civil action and all other IFP complaints, or any portions thereof,

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-

27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 n.1 (9th Cir.

2000) (§ 1915A).

/ / /

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1

 Plaintiff alleges violation of his due process rights during his disciplinary hearing but he also

refers to “freedom from cruel and unusual punishment” arising from the same set of facts. (See Compl.

at 3.) However, where a particular provision of the Constitution “‘provides an explicit source of

constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of government behavior,” that provision must be the

guide for analyzing Plaintiff’s claims. Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting

Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273-74 (1994)). Accordingly, the Court will analyze Plaintiff’s claims

relating to his disciplinary hearing as arising under the Fourteenth Amendment.

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A. Due Process and Heck

As currently pleaded, all of Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed because they are

premature under the doctrine set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

Constitutional claims involving a prison’s disciplinary or administrative decisions to revoke

good-time credits are subject to sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

and 1915A(b)(1) since habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy whenever the claim for

damages depends on a determination that a disciplinary judgment is invalid or the sentence

currently being served is unconstitutionally long. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643-44

(1997); Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). 

Here, Plaintiff seeks the return of good time credits that were revoked at his disciplinary

hearing. (See Compl. at 5.) In order to state a claim for damages under section 1983 based on

these allegations under Heck and Edwards, however, Plaintiff must allege facts in his Complaint

sufficient to show that Defendants’ decision to remove his credits has already been “reversed

on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized

to make such a determination, or called into question by a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512

U.S. at 486-87. Plaintiff has failed to do so; therefore, he must sufficiently amend his Complaint

to provide such a showing before any cause of action for damages accrues under the Civil Rights

Act. Id.

B. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims1

Even if Plaintiff were able to overcome the Heck bar, he has failed to state a Fourteenth

Amendment due process claim. “The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the

deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and

property.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State statutes and prison

regulations may grant prisoners liberty interests sufficient to invoke due process protections.

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Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). However, the Supreme Court has significantly

limited the instances in which due process can be invoked. Pursuant to Sandin v. Conner, 515

U.S. 472, 483 (1995), a prisoner can show a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment only if he alleges a change in confinement that imposes an “atypical and

significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484 (citations

omitted); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1997). 

In this case, Plaintiff has failed to establish a liberty interest protected by the Constitution

because he has not alleged, as he must under Sandin, facts related to the conditions or

consequences of disciplinary hearing which show “the type of atypical, significant deprivation

[that] might conceivably create a liberty interest.” Id. at 486. For example, in Sandin, the

Supreme Court considered three factors in determining whether the plaintiff possessed a liberty

interest in avoiding disciplinary segregation: (1) the disciplinary versus discretionary nature of

the segregation; (2) the restricted conditions of the prisoner’s confinement and whether they

amounted to a “major disruption in his environment” when compared to those shared by

prisoners in the general population; and (3) the possibility of whether the prisoner’s sentence

was lengthened by his restricted custody. Id. at 486-87. 

Therefore, to establish a due process violation, Plaintiff must first show the deprivation

imposed an atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84. Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts from which the

Court could find there were atypical and significant hardships imposed upon him as a result of

the Defendants’ actions. Plaintiff must allege “a dramatic departure from the basic conditions”

of his confinement that would give rise to a liberty interest before he can claim a violation of due

process. Id. at 485; see also Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1996), amended

by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). He has not; therefore the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed

to allege a liberty interest in remaining free of Ad-seg, and thus, has failed to state a due process

claim. See May, 109 F.3d at 565; Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466; Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486 (holding that

placing an inmate in administrative segregation for thirty days “did not present the type of

atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest.”).

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Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a section 1983 claim

upon which relief may be granted, and is therefore subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). The Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to amend

his pleading to cure the defects set forth above. Plaintiff is warned that if his amended complaint

fails to address the deficiencies of pleading noted above, it may be dismissed with prejudice and

without leave to amend. 

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2]

is GRANTED.

2. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee

owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty

percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court

each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Matthew Cate,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502,

Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) & § 1915A(b).

5. Plaintiff is GRANTED forty-five (45) days leave from the date this Order is filed

in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted

above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to his

original Complaint. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not realleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565,

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567 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within 45 days, this action

shall remain dismissed without further Order by the Court.

6. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a Court approved § 1983 form to Plaintiff.

DATED: December 20, 2011

HON. DANA M. SABRAW

United States District Judge

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