Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01836/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01836-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

15cv1836 CAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OTONIEL PENNINGS,

Petitioner,

v.

SCOTT KERNAN,

Respondent.

Case No.: 15cv1836 CAB (BGS)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED 

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE TO 

DENY PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Otoniel Pennings (“Petitioner” or “Pennings”) has filed a Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner asserts four grounds for 

habeas relief all based on the denial of continuances of his criminal trial: (1) Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel; (2) Due Process based on lack of time to prepare; (3) Due 

Process based on denial of continuance motions; and (4) Due Process by Court of Appeal 

for assumptions.

1

(Pet. [ECF No. 1].) On the day set for trial, Petitioner sought to 

represent himself after his request for new counsel was denied. The trial court granted 

his request, appointed a runner and legal investigator, inquired about the amount of 

discovery to be provided to Petitioner, and continued the trial for two days. On the 

continued trial date and the following day, Petitioner sought to continue his trial 

 

1 Case No. SCD 240171 in the Superior Court of San Diego County

Case 3:15-cv-01836-CAB-BGS Document 19 Filed 02/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 25
2

15cv1836 CAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

numerous times. His requests were denied. Respondent filed an Answer and Petitioner 

filed a Traverse. [ECF Nos. 8, 16.]

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District 

Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 

HC.2 of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. After 

consideration of the Petition, Respondent’s Answer, Petitioner’s Traverse, and the 

Lodgments, the Court recommends Pennings’ Petition be DENIED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be 

correct; Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and 

convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 

35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including inferences properly drawn 

from these facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness).2 Accordingly, the 

following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal opinion:

On the morning of April 4, 2012, Pennings jumped a fence in the back of a 

house located on Mission Village Drive and entered the home through a 

sliding glass door at the back of the house. A 14–year–old girl awoke when 

the sliding door in her bedroom opened. She saw Pennings open the door, 

push the curtains aside and walk in. At first, she wondered if it was her 

brother, but soon realized she did not recognize the man. Pennings walked 

around her bed and grabbed her phone from where it was charging on the 

nightstand.

She told him to give her phone back. Pennings asked repeatedly, “Where are 

the keys?” He returned the phone to her, but told her, “Don’t call anyone.”

He did not apologize or indicate he made a mistake in entering the home.

Pennings left her bedroom and went down the hall. He went to a key rack 

located next to the front door of the house and grabbed keys off the rack. He 

tried to open the front door, which was locked.

 

2 Petitioner’s challenges to the Court of Appeal’s conclusions are addressed below, but 

concern the proceedings before the trial court leading up to his trial, rather than the 

evidence submitted at trial. 

Case 3:15-cv-01836-CAB-BGS Document 19 Filed 02/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 25
3

15cv1836 CAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The girl woke up her father, who was sleeping on the couch. The father saw 

Pennings standing at the front door reaching for a pair of keys on the rack 

with one hand and reaching for the doorknob with his other hand. When the 

father realized he had never seen Pennings before and he did not belong in 

the home, the father ran toward Pennings and grabbed him. The father hit 

and pushed Pennings toward the wall so Pennings could not open the door. 

In the meantime, the girl called the police.

While the father and Pennings struggled, Pennings said, “Let me go. Let me 

go. I don’t want to get arrested.” At no point did Pennings indicate this was a 

mistake or that he thought he was in someone else’s house. Instead, he 

repeated, “Let me go. I don’t want to go to jail.”

The girl’s brother awoke from the noise, came out of his room and ran to 

help. Pennings stopped struggling when the brother threatened him with a 

baseball bat. The father and the brother pinned Pennings to the floor and 

held him there until the police arrived. While they waited for the police, 

Pennings did not respond to any questions about whether Pennings lived in 

the neighborhood.

Pennings testified he was trying to go to a friend’s house. He stated he 

thought he was entering a house that belonged to people he knew. He 

claimed he did not realize he was in the wrong house until he picked up the 

girl’s phone. He stated it did not occur to him to leave through the back 

door. Pennings said he did not intend to steal anything when he entered the 

house and he denied grabbing keys.

Pennings admitted on cross-examination that his friend, Chris, who lives on 

a neighboring street, does not live on a corner and there is no access through 

a fence from a side street. However, Pennings then testified he was not 

actually going to Chris’s house, but rather to John’s house to “buy some 

time” and to make a telephone call until he could go back to Chris’s house to 

get things he had left there. Pennings admitted he never told the residents he 

made a mistake and was in the wrong house. He first mentioned this story 

while being questioned by a police officer at the station.

(Lodgment No. 5 at 6-8.) Petitioner was found guilty of residential burglary with 

another person, other than an accomplice, present in the residence (Cal. Penal Code §§ 

459/460, 667.5(c)(21). (Lodgment No. 1 at 114-15.) The court found Petitioner had 

served two prior prison terms and sentenced him to six years in prison. (Id. at 8.)

Case 3:15-cv-01836-CAB-BGS Document 19 Filed 02/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 25
4

15cv1836 CAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Court of Appeal found the following as to the trial proceedings leading up to 

Petitioner’s trial.

A. New Counsel3

On Monday July 30, 2012, the day Petitioner was scheduled to go to trial, 

Petitioner requested appointment of new counsel. (Id. at 2.) He had been represented by 

counsel for at least three months, and this was the first time Petitioner alerted the court 

that he wanted new counsel. (Id. at 10.) 

The Court of Appeal found that although Petitioner mentioned wanting witnesses 

questioned, at the time his counsel was relieved, he had not provided his counsel with the 

name of the individual’s house he claimed he was intending to visit when he entered the 

residence he was charged with burglarizing — the basis for his defense that he lacked 

intent. (Id. at 2.) The Court of Appeal also found that his counsel explained to the trial 

court that she had not interviewed the witnesses in the house, the only other witnesses

Petitioner had mentioned wanting interviewed, because those individuals had not 

indicated to police that Petitioner was violent and would only testify he was in the house, 

which he did not dispute. (Id. at 3.) The court denied his request for new counsel. (Id.) 

B. Representing Himself

Petitioner then sought to represent himself. (Id.) The court cautioned him not to 

and asked him “if he recognized he was going to trial ‘in the next few days, next week?” 

(Id.) Petitioner said he needed evidence to go to trial. (Id.) After going through the 

Faretta/Lopez4 waiver form, the court relieved his counsel.5 (Id. at 3-4.) 

 

3

In the record, the request for new counsel is referred to as a Marsden motion for People 

v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118 (1970). 

4 As the Court of Appeal’s decision explains, a Faretta/Lopez waiver refers to People v. 

Lopez, 71 Cal App. 3d 568, 571 (1977) and Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) —

cases addressing a defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel and to represent themselves.

5

In addition to numerous other warnings, Petitioner acknowledges in the form that as an 

incarcerated individual, contacting witnesses and investigating his case may be difficult, 

Case 3:15-cv-01836-CAB-BGS Document 19 Filed 02/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 25
5

15cv1836 CAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C. Continuances

Petitioner had already received one 30-day continuance before this scheduled trial 

date when he was represented by counsel. (Id. at 10.) After allowing Petitioner to 

proceed without counsel, the court declined to send the case to trial that day as scheduled 

and as suggested by the prosecutor, noting that Petitioner needed a runner and an 

investigator. (Id. at 4.) Then Petitioner sought a continuance based on needing 

discovery. (Id. at 4.) The Court continued the matter for two days, but noted that he 

should be able to go to trial that afternoon based on the amount of pages in the discovery

other than his own criminal history. (Id. at 4.) 

Following the continuance,6 Petitioner next appeared before the court on 

Wednesday August 1, 2012. (Id. at 4.) Petitioner acknowledged the court had previously 

advised him to be ready, he had received the discovery from the prosecutor the day 

before, and he had read the discovery. (Id. at 4.) However, he indicated he wanted more 

time before trial to file a motion under § 995 based on lack of intent,7 wanted to go to the 

law library, needed materials to file a motion, and wanted an investigator to “make a few 

questions to possible other witnesses for my defense,” but would not identify who those 

witnesses were in the prosecutor’s presence. (Id. at 4-5.) The court denied a continuance 

and sent the case to the trial department.8 (Id. at 5.) 

 

his ability to research and prepare motions limited, and that he will have no more 

privileges than anyone representing themselves. He also acknowledges he may not 

receive all the assistance he wants or needs from an investigator or runner. (Lodgment 

No. 1A at 2-3.) 

6 Petitioner disputes whether he was granted a continuance or the matter was trailed for 

two day, but does not dispute that two days passed before he was before the court again 

on August 1, 2012. 

7 California Penal Code § 995 allows a defendant to move the court to set aside an 

indictment or information if the defendant has been indicted or committed without 

reasonable or probable cause.

8 Petitioner argues that his request for a continuance was not “officially reviewed and was 

not ruled on,” but the transcript reflects that following the two-day continuance, 

Petitioner appeared before the court on August 1, 2012, the court inquired about his 

Case 3:15-cv-01836-CAB-BGS Document 19 Filed 02/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 25
6

15cv1836 CAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Before the trial judge, Petitioner again requested a continuance based on wanting 

to file a motion and have an investigator interview witnesses. (Id. at 5.) Petitioner 

acknowledged investigator services had been ordered on July 30, 2012 and receipt of 

paperwork on July 31, 2012, but he had not yet filed the paperwork to get investigator 

services. (Id. at 5.) The court heard argument from Petitioner and the prosecutor and 

denied the continuance. (Id. at 5.) 

Later in the proceedings that day, when Petitioner identified a possible witness in 

discussing the witness list and acknowledged needing to get a statement, the court 

explained any statement obtained would need to be provided to the prosecutor. (Id. at 5.) 

When asked, Petitioner indicated he did not have any motions other than the continuance 

request. (Id. at 5-6.) The request was again denied. (Id. at 6.) Petitioner then requested 

a continuance to get clothes to wear during trial. (Id. at 6.) The court again denied a 

continuance, but signed a “dress out order.” (Id. at 6.) 

Although his requests for continuances had been denied, his trial did not 

commence until the next day. (Id. at 12.) On August 2, 2012, Petitioner sought another 

continuance based on not being able to use the law library to research new authority he 

had just been provided by the prosecutor. (Id. at 12.) The request was denied. (Id. at 

12.) Petitioner was provided with copies of the new authority that morning and the next 

morning he distinguished the cases in prevailing on the prosecutor’s motion to introduce 

Petitioner’s prior criminal convictions in its case-in-chief to prove intent. (Id. at 12.) On 

the afternoon of August 2, 2012, the jury was empaneled, however, Petitioner was not 

required to present his defense until the afternoon of August 3, 2012. (Id. at 12-13.) 

 

readiness for trial, Petitioner articulated his reasons for needing more time, and the court 

stated “your motion for a continuance is denied” before assigning the case to a 

department for trial. (Lodgment 2, Vol. 2, at 23.) The judge did indicate Petitioner could 

raise these issues again before the trial department judge.

Case 3:15-cv-01836-CAB-BGS Document 19 Filed 02/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 25
7

15cv1836 CAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On August 6, 2012, as noted above, Petitioner was found guilty of residential 

burglary with another person, other than an accomplice, present in the residence. He was 

then sentenced to six years in prison. 

On appeal, Petitioner challenged the denial of a sufficient continuance of his 

criminal trial. (Lodgment No. 3.) The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment

in a reasoned decision. (Lodgment No. 5.) Petitioner then sought review by the 

California Supreme Court, which was summarily denied. (Lodgment Nos. 6-7.)9 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 

applicable to this Petition, a habeas petition will not be granted unless that adjudication: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of 

clearly established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state 

court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “This is a 

‘difficult to meet’ and ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, 

which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’” Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 

(2011); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)). 

 

9 Respondent submitted other lodgments related to proceedings Petitioner initiated before 

the state courts concerning conditions of his confinement at George Bailey Detention 

Facility in 2014 when he was being held as a material witness. Although Petitioner titled 

those filings as “habeas,” they do not challenge his August 6, 2012 conviction or 

sentence. (Lodgments 8-13.) The Court also notes that Lodgment No. 2 at 1 indicates 

that a sealed portion of the transcripts, Petitioner’s Marsden hearing, is included in 

Volume No. 1A. It is not. Lodgment 1A only includes Petitioner’s Faretta/Lopez waiver 

and the government’s trial brief. The transcript commences with the court’s reiteration 

that he thinks Petitioner’s decision to proceed without counsel is unwise, and the court

addressing Petitioner’s initial request for additional time on July 30, 2012, which he 

received. (Lodgment No. 2 at 13-16.) Petitioner does not dispute that he sought new 

counsel and then to represent himself when that request was denied or that he completed 

the Faretta/Lopez waiver, which is included. 

Case 3:15-cv-01836-CAB-BGS Document 19 Filed 02/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 25
8

15cv1836 CAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“The ‘contrary to’ and ‘unreasonable application of’ clauses in § 2254(d)(1) are 

distinct and have separate meanings.” Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73-75 (2003)). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause 

of § 2254(d)(1), a federal court may grant relief only when ‘the state court arrives at a 

conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the 

state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts.’” Loher v. Thomas, 825 F.3d 1103, 1111 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000)). 

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause of § 2254(d)(1), ‘a state-court 

decision involves an unreasonable application of the Supreme Court’s precedent if the 

state court identifies the correct governing legal rule . . . but unreasonably applies it to the 

facts of the particular state prisoners case.’” Id. (quoting White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 

1697, 1705 (2014). Unreasonable application is “not merely wrong” or “even clear 

error.” Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015). It must be “objectively 

unreasonable.” Id. “To satisfy this high bar, a habeas petitioner is required to ‘show that 

the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” Id. at 1377 (quoting Richter, 562 

U.S. at 103). “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court 

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied 

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must 

also be unreasonable. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 411. 

Under § 2254(d)(2) “a petitioner may challenge the substance of the state court’s 

finding and attempt to show that those findings were not supported by substantial 

evidence” or “challenge the fact-finding process itself on the ground that it was deficient 

in some material way.” Hibbler v. Benedetti, 693 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2012). 

“Regardless of the type of challenge, ‘the question under AEDPA is not whether a federal 

court believes the state court’s determination was incorrect but whether that 

Case 3:15-cv-01836-CAB-BGS Document 19 Filed 02/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 25
9

15cv1836 CAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

determination was unreasonable — a substantially higher threshold.” Id. “[W]hen the 

challenge is to the state courts procedure, . . . [the court] must be satisfied that any

appellate court to whom the defect in the state court’s fact-finding process is pointed out 

would be unreasonable in holding that the state courts fact-finding process was 

adequate.’” Id. at 1146-47; see also Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1001 (9th Cir. 

2004). (the federal court “must be convinced that an appellate panel, applying the normal 

standards of appellate review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding is supported 

by the record.”).

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court 

“looks through” to the last reasoned decision and presumes it provides the basis for the 

higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805-06 

(1991); see also Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1094 n.1 (2013). Here, the 

California Court of Appeal’s February 27, 2014 decision is the last reasoned decision.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. California Court of Appeal’s Decision

The California Court of Appeal found the two-day continuance Petitioner received 

on July 30, 2012 after being permitted to proceed without counsel was reasonable and the 

denial of further continuances on August 1, 2012 and August 2, 2012 were not an abuse 

of discretion. 

The court considered that Petitioner had appointed counsel for three months prior, 

had previously obtained a 30-day continuance of his trial, and that he waited until the day 

of trial to request appointment of new counsel — the denial of which prompted the 

request to proceed without counsel. The court also considered the circumstances 

presented to the trial court at the time Petitioner was denied a further continuance on 

August 1, 2012, including, but not limited to, the prior warning to be prepared to go to 

trial, the minimal discovery Petitioner was required to review, Petitioner’s claims 

concerning potential unidentified witnesses, and whether witnesses even existed that 

could present material evidence in his defense. The court acknowledged Petitioner was 

Case 3:15-cv-01836-CAB-BGS Document 19 Filed 02/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 25
10

15cv1836 CAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

entitled to a reasonable continuance after the trial court allowed him to proceed without 

counsel and found the two-day continuance he received was a reasonable continuance 

under the circumstances. Based on the information provided to the trial court at the time 

further requests were sought, the court found the denial of additional continuances was 

not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.

B. Ground One

In Ground One, Petitioner argues the “trial courts abused their judicial discretion 

by granting a ‘Faretta’ motion on the ‘eve of trial,’ but denied any reasonable 

continuances even though it was evident Petitioner needed more time to prepare a 

defense.” (Traverse at ¶ 6.) Petitioner claims that because he was not given the 

continuances he requested to prepare a meaningful defense, he was denied his Sixth 

Amendment right to represent himself. (Traverse at 1.) He argues that as his own 

counsel, he needed more time to utilize an investigator to collect potential witness 

statements, conduct legal research and file a § 995 motion, and generally did not have 

sufficient time to prepare for the in limine hearing or for trial. (Pet. at 6; Traverse at 1-4.) 

To the extent Petitioner is arguing that the trial court should have denied or 

revoked his right to represent himself at some point during the proceedings and/or he was 

denied effective assistance of counsel by being allowed to represent himself, these 

arguments have no merit.

10

 Petitioner’s right to counsel was not violated by being 

allowed to proceed without counsel. Petitioner does not dispute that he “unequivocally 

exercised his right to self-representation under Faretta.” (Traverse at 1.) He was advised 

 

10 To the extent Petitioner is arguing that the denial of continuances violated his Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel, the issue is analyzed below in Grounds Two and Three 

because the standard is the same as that applicable to Petitioner’s due process claims. 

Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983) (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 

(1964) (analyzing denial of a continuance as a due process claim) and finding “[b]road 

discretion must be granted trial courts on matters of continuances; only an unreasoning 

and arbitrary ‘insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for 

delay’ violates the right to assistance of counsel.”). 

Case 3:15-cv-01836-CAB-BGS Document 19 Filed 02/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 25
11

15cv1836 CAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

by the court that he should not represent himself. (Lodgment 2, Vol. 1 at 13 (after 

confirming his completion of the form, “you understand that, in this court’s opinion, 

you’re not doing the smart thing. You should let a lawyer represent you. I’m not say you 

can’t do it. I’m saying that it’s just not the smart thing.”). Petitioner completed a 

comprehensive form waiving his right to counsel before the court and Petitioner’s 

unequivocal request to represent himself was granted. (Lodgment 1A at 1-3 

[Faretta/Lopez waiver]; Lodgment 2, Vol. 1 at 13.) There is also nothing in the record to 

indicate that at any point prior to his appeal Petitioner sought to be represented by 

counsel or otherwise indicated he did not want to proceed representing himself. 

Petitioner does not even indicate now that he wanted to stop representing himself at any 

point prior to appeal. Under these circumstances, the court could not force Petitioner to 

have counsel. “It is the defendant . . . who must be free personally to decide whether in 

his particular case counsel is to his advantage. And although he may conduct his own 

defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of ‘that respect 

for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.’” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 

806, 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 850-51 (1970)); see also U.S. v. 

Flewitt, 874 F.2d 669, 674, 676 (9th Cir. 1989) (reversing lower court for terminating 

defendants’ pro se status for conduct that fell short of “uncontrollable and disruptive 

behavior in the courtroom.”) Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right was not violated by 

being allowed to proceed without counsel after he unequivocally requested to represent 

himself.

Further, Petitioner was not denied effective assistance of counsel by his own 

representation of himself. “[W]hatever else may or may not be open to him on appeal, a 

defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of 

his own defense amounted to a denial of ‘effective assistance of counsel.’” Id. n.46; see 

also Flewitt, 874 F.2d at 674 (discussing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n. 46 and finding “a 

defendant cannot claim ineffective assistance of counsel flowing from his failure to 

follow the rules of procedure or from his misinterpretation of the substantive law. If he 

Case 3:15-cv-01836-CAB-BGS Document 19 Filed 02/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

 25
12

15cv1836 CAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

chooses to defend himself, he must be content with the quality of that defense.”) 

Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights were not violated in being allowed to represent 

himself.

C. Ground Two and Three

In Grounds Two and Three, Petitioner argues that his 14th Amendment Due 

Process rights were violated because he needed more time to utilize an investigator to 

collect potential witness statements, conduct legal research and file a § 995 motion, and 

that he generally did not have sufficient time to prepare for the in limine hearing or for 

trial. (Pet. at 6; Traverse at 1-4.).

11

 (Pet. at 6-8; Traverse at 1-9.) Petitioner additionally 

argues throughout his Petition and Traverse that the trial judge failed to consider 

California Penal Code § 1059 in denying his request for a continuance. (Pet. at 6-8; 

Traverse at 3-7.) 

Petitioner’s arguments largely focus on his speculation concerning possible 

witnesses he might have been able to locate with more time and how those witnesses’

testimony, assuming they would have testified, might have altered the outcome of his 

trial. He speculates that these witnesses that might have been located and might have 

testified that “he was a drug addict who was homeless and only avoided sleeping on the 

streets because of his friends allowing him to stay with him” and that “his use of 

methenfetamine [sic] could cause delusions and his friend (Christopher Grissett) lived on 

the next street and allows him to jump the fence and enter his house through a sliding 

glass door in the backyard.” (Traverse at 9; Pet. at 8.) He argues that this would have 

allowed him to put on the defense he did — he entered the house by mistake and lacked 

 

11 The Court considers these grounds together because his arguments and the applicable 

standard are the same. As noted above, Petitioner’s argument that the denial of 

continuances violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel is subject to the same 

standard as Grounds Two and Three and is analyzed here.

Case 3:15-cv-01836-CAB-BGS Document 19 Filed 02/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of

 25
13

15cv1836 CAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

intent to steal12 —without having to testify to it himself and have his prior criminal 

history presented to the jury. Petitioner also generally argues that he needed more time to 

access the law library and to prepare and file motions and that the trial court did not 

sufficiently consider his need for continuances, particularly the judge the case was sent to 

for trial because he deferred to the earlier judge’s denial of a continuance. 

1. Respondent’s Argument

Respondent relies heavily on the Court of Appeal’s decision. Respondent 

generally argues that whether to grant a continuance is committed to the trial court’s 

discretion, the Court of Appeal’s rejection of Petitioner’s claims concerning the 

continuance was reasonable, and that Petitioner has not shown the trial court’s denial of a 

continuance violated due process. 

2. Analysis

a) Denial of Continuance

“There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so 

arbitrary as to violate due process.” Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964); 

Hernandez v. Holland, 750 F.3d 843, 858 (9th Cir. 2014). “The answer must be found in 

the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial 

judge at the time the request is denied.” Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589. “The matter of 

continuance is traditionally within the discretion of the trial judge, and it is not every 

denial of a request for more time that violates due process even if the party fails to offer 

evidence or is compelled to defend without counsel.” Id. “[O]nly an unreasoning and 

arbitrary ‘insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay’

violates the right to the assistance of counsel.” Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 

(1983) (quoting Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589).13 “Under both federal and state law, the 

 

12 California Penal Code § 459 requires the defendant enter “with intent to commit grand 

or petit larceny or any felony.” 

13 Although Morris v. Slappy articulated this standard in the context of the Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel, the same standard applies when the denial of a continuance 

Case 3:15-cv-01836-CAB-BGS Document 19 Filed 02/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of

 25
14

15cv1836 CAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

decision to grant or deny a motion for a continuance is within the trial court’s discretion.” 

Harris v. Henry, 2007 WL 1170925, *2 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589 

and People v. Howard, 1 Cal. 4th 1132 (1992)). 

The Court of Appeal recognized “there are no mechanical tests for deciding when a 

denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process” and acknowledged it 

depends on the circumstances of the case at the time it is considered by the trial court 

when denied.14 (Lodgment 5 at 9.) In this respect, Petitioner has not shown the Court of 

Appeal’s decision that was contrary to clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1). 

Petitioner relies heavily on decisions from federal courts of appeal addressing the 

denial of continuances in federal criminal cases. Although he acknowledges in his 

Traverse there are no mechanical tests for determining when the denial of a continuance 

constitutes a constitutional violation, he argues the Court should apply a four-part test 

articulated in U.S. v. Flynt, 756 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985). (Traverse at 7-9.)15 However, 

Flynt is a direct appeal in a criminal case originating in federal district court. Flynt, 756 

F.2d at 1354. It is not a habeas case subject to the deferential review required by § 2254. 

 

is presented as a violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Godoy 

v. Spearman, 834 F.3d 1078, 1092 (9th Cir. 2016) (petition for panel rehearing pending 

on a different issue) (addressing due process challenge and explaining that “[t]rial courts 

have broad discretion in determining whether continuances should be granted, and ‘only 

an unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable 

request for delay’ is constitutionally impermissible.” (quoting Morris, 461 U.S. at 11-

12)).

14 Although the state court is not required to cite or even be aware of Supreme Court 

cases, “so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision 

contradicts them,” Early, 537 U.S. at 8, the court applied and cited the correct standard. 

The Court of Appeal cites a California Supreme Court decision, People v. D’Arcy, 48 

Cal. 4th 257, 287-288 (2010), but the standard articulated in D’Arcy is drawn from and 

cites Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589.

15 Although the Court rejects application of this test for the reasons explained, the Court 

has considered Petitioner’s arguments as to these factors in assessing whether the denial 

of a continuance was constitutionally impermissible under the standards articulated by 

Supreme Court precedent. 

Case 3:15-cv-01836-CAB-BGS Document 19 Filed 02/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of

 25
15

15cv1836 CAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Id. Additionally, assuming the Court could use a test applicable to direct appeals in a 

habeas proceeding,16 recent Supreme Court authority makes clear that Ninth Circuit 

precedent may not “be used to refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court 

jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that [the Supreme Court] has not announced”

under § 2254. Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013). “Instead, the correct 

question is whether the California Court of Appeal reasonably concluded that the trial 

court did not abuse its broad discretion when it denied [petitioner’s] continuance.” 

Godoy, 834 F.3d at 1093. 

Petitioner has not shown the Court of Appeal’s decision involved an unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law under the second prong of § 2254(d)(1)

because its conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Petitioner’s requests for continuances was reasonable. The Court of Appeal’s decision 

was reasonable because it considered the information before the trial court at the time it 

denied Petitioner’s requests for continuances and identified numerous reasons why the 

denial of additional continuances was not an abuse of discretion. Specifically, the Court 

of Appeal found that Petitioner had received a two-day continuance of his trial after being 

allowed to proceed without counsel. (Lodgment 5 at 10.) Petitioner acknowledged prior 

to trial that he had received and read the only discovery. (Id. at 11.) The trial court had 

appointed a runner and investigator and the judge in the trial department confirmed the 

appointment and that Petitioner had the paperwork no later than July 31, 2012 — two 

days before trial commenced and three days before Petitioner had to put on his defense. 

(Id. at 12-13.) The Court of Appeal considered his claims concerning witnesses and 

 

16 In addition to Ungar’s rejection of mechanical tests, the Ninth Circuit itself has recently 

and specifically rejected consideration of the four-part test Petitioner relies. Godoy, 834 

F.3d at 1093. The petitioner’s opening brief in Godoy relied on a different case for the 

same four-part test. The panel found “[t]he Supreme Court’s command in Ungar, that a 

denial of a continuance must be assessed in light of ‘circumstances present in every case,’ 

cannot be refined by Ninth Circuit precedent into a specific review that looks only at 

certain factors.” Id. 

Case 3:15-cv-01836-CAB-BGS Document 19 Filed 02/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 15 of

 25
16

15cv1836 CAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

found that despite identifying one possible witness and alleging he could identify an 

address near the victim’s house, there was no indication Petitioner sent an investigator to 

that address or to contact the possible witness. (Id. at 13.) The Court of Appeal also 

noted that the trial court was aware that Petitioner had not been able to identify potential 

witnesses to his prior counsel for three months and could not provide the address of the 

person he claimed he was visiting. (Id. at 11.) The court found the trial court issued a 

dress out order when Petitioner sought a continuance to obtain clothes for trial, despite 

noting it was Petitioner’s responsibility. (Id.) And, as to Petitioner’s request for a 

continuance to access the law library to research new authority provided by the 

prosecutor in support of a motion, the Court of Appeal noted that Petitioner had received 

the cases that morning and successfully distinguished the authority in defeating the 

prosecutor’s motion.

17

 (Id.) 

Because the Court of Appeal’s conclusions are reasonable, the Court cannot find 

the Court of Appeal unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent under § 2254(d)(1)’s 

second prong. The Court of Appeal’s decision would have to be “so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Donald, 135 S. Ct. at 1376. That 

is not the case here. The trial court considered the relevant circumstances, including the 

trial schedule, Petitioner recently being allowed to proceed without counsel, prior 

continuances, discovery recently provided to Petitioner, the breadth of the discovery, 

Petitioner’s requests to file further motions, and Petitioner’s speculation about having an 

investigator contact witnesses to obtain statements from witnesses that might ultimately 

testify. Additionally, the record reflects that both trial court judges considered 

 

17 As discussed below, Petitioner suffered no prejudice in denial of access to the law 

library. Additionally, the Court also notes that denial of access to the law library is not a 

basis for habeas relief. Kane v. Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10 (2005) (“Faretta does not, 

as § 2254(d)(1) requires, ‘clearly establish’ the law library access right. In fact, Faretta

says nothing about any specific legal aid that the State owes a pro se criminal defendant.)

Case 3:15-cv-01836-CAB-BGS Document 19 Filed 02/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 16 of

 25
17

15cv1836 CAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner’s arguments in favor of a continuance, inquired further about those reasons, 

and considered them in denying his requests for continuances. That the judge the case 

was sent to for trial referenced the prior denial in his consideration of Petitioner’s 

arguments for a continuance does not mean, as Petitioner suggests, he did not consider 

Petitioner’s arguments or his decision was based exclusively on the earlier decision. 

Although it was a very short time to prepare, the Court of Appeal reasonably concluded 

that the denials of Petitioner’s requests for continuances were not an abuse of discretion. 

(1) Prejudice

Although the Court need not reach the issue, even if the denials of continuances 

had been an abuse of discretion, Petitioner has not demonstrated actual prejudice. 

“[E]ven if a trial court abuses its discretion in denying a continuance, a habeas petitioner 

must show actual prejudice to obtain relief.” Godoy, 834 F.3d at 1092-93 (citing Brecht 

v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)); Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121 (2007) 

(finding courts considering claims under § 2254 “must assess the prejudicial impact of 

constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial under the ‘substantial and injurious 

effect’ standard set forth in Brecht.”); see also Gallego v. McDaniel, 124 F.3d 1065, 1072 

(9th Cir. 1997).

Petitioner speculates about potential witnesses he might have located with an 

investigator and that these witnesses might have been willing to testify that he sometimes 

snuck into friends’ homes.

18

 This in turn might have meant he would not have needed to 

 

18 As noted above, and explained by the Court of Appeal, the trial court appointed an 

investigator on July 30, 2012 and Petitioner had the paperwork for an investigator no 

later than July 31, 2012. (Lodgment 2, Vol. 1 at 15 and Vol. 3 and 26.) The trial court 

confirmed it on August 1, 2012, the day before trial commenced. (Id.; Lodgment 2, Vol. 

3 at 26, 65.) Petitioner knew he had to file the paperwork. (Lodgment 2, Vol. 3 at 26 6-

14 (“I just got the papers yesterday, and to get an investigator through O.A.C., [Office of 

Advisory Counsel], I would have to file the paperwork.) But, as the Court of Appeal 

explained, Petitioner did not utilize an investigator, even to investigate the only possible 

witness identified to the court or as to an address of a house near the house he entered. 

Case 3:15-cv-01836-CAB-BGS Document 19 Filed 02/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 17 of

 25
18

15cv1836 CAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

testify that he was intending to sneak into a friend’s house that day and his priors19 would 

not have been before the jury. He argues the priors were the basis for the jury’s verdict.

This is too speculative to establish prejudice, particularly given Petitioner did not dispute 

that he jumped a fence and entered the home through a back sliding glass door and after 

awakening a sleeping 14 year old, took her phone, returned it, told her not to call anyone, 

and proceeded into (rather than out of) the house before he was restrained by two other 

residents of the house until police arrived. And, as noted above, there was also testimony 

that he was demanding keys as he proceeded into the house and that he was grabbing 

keys from a key rack before he was restrained by two other residents of the home until 

police arrived. Even if the Court accepted Petitioner’s speculation that these witnesses 

would have testified that in the past he snuck into friends’ homes that would not have 

helped him with the testimony that he was demanding and reaching for keys. Those 

witnesses, undisputedly not there that day, would not have been able to explain why 

Petitioner was seeking the residents’ keys. Petitioner would still have had to testify to 

dispute this testimony, thereby allowing his priors to come in. In this respect, even if 

these witnesses’ existence and willingness to testify as Petitioner speculates were more 

than speculation, their absence was not prejudicial to Petitioner given the evidence 

against him at trial. 

Additionally, Petitioner argues generally that he needed more time to access the 

law library to prepare motions he wanted to file, but he has not shown how he was 

prejudiced by not being able to file motions. For example, he indicates he wanted for file 

a late § 995 motion, but does not explain what it would have been based on. Given the 

evidence noted above, it would highly unlikely such a motion would have been granted. 

 

(Lodgment 5 at 13.) Petitioner did not have to put on his defense until two days later, but 

there is no indication he even filed paperwork for an investigator.

19 Petitioner’s convictions for possession of a stolen vehicle; burglary; and possession of 

marijuana for sale were presented to the jury on cross-examination. (Lodgment No.2, 

Vol. 4 at 225-26.)

Case 3:15-cv-01836-CAB-BGS Document 19 Filed 02/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 18 of

 25
19

15cv1836 CAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Considering all of Petitioner’s arguments concerning prejudice, even if the Court found 

the denial of continuances was unreasoning and arbitrary, the Court cannot find it “ha[d]

a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht,

507 U.S. at 637; Fry, 551 U.S. at 121.

b) § 2254(d)(2)

Petitioner does not make a particular challenge under grounds one, two or three as 

to § 2254(d)(2), however, he argues in his Traverse that the Court of Appeal incorrectly 

found he received a two-day continuance, as opposed to the matter being trailed for two 

days. (Traverse at 2.) To the extent this is a challenge to the Court of Appeal’s 

determination of the facts under § 2254(d)(2), Petitioner is not entitled to relief. Petition 

sought a continuance on Monday July 30, 2012. (Lodgment No. 2, Vol. 1 at 14 (“I’d 

need a continuance because I don’t have all my paperwork – I don’t have the 

discovery.”).) The court advised the prosecutor to get him an unredacted copy, as 

opposed to the redacted version he had already received, of the discovery, told Petitioner 

he should be able to read it and be ready for trial by that afternoon, but gave him until 

Wednesday. (Id. at 14-15.) The Court cannot find the Court of Appeal’s characterization 

of this as a continuance was objectively unreasonable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 

322, 340 (2003) (citing § 2254(d)(2) and explaining that “a decision adjudicated on the 

merits in state court and based on a factual determination will not be overturned on 

factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the 

state-court proceeding.”); see also Hibbler, 693 F.3d at 1146.

For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended relief on grounds one, two, and three 

be DENIED because the state court’s resolution of these claims was not contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law nor an unreasonable 

determination of the facts from the record presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

D. Ground Four

Petitioner appears to argue that the Court of Appeal erred in agreeing with 

Respondent’s argument on appeal that he was seeking continuances for purposes of delay

Case 3:15-cv-01836-CAB-BGS Document 19 Filed 02/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 19 of

 25
20

15cv1836 CAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

because that was not the basis for the trial court’s denial of a continuance. (Pet. at 8; 

Traverse at 2, 10-11.) It appears this challenge is to the Court of Appeal’s determination 

of the facts under § 2254(d)(2).20 The Court of Appeal decision states “[t]he record in 

this case shows the court properly exercised its discretion to deny Penning’s continuance 

requests, which appeared to be for purposes of delay.” (Id. at 13.) 

The Court finds that the Court of Appeal’s decision finding the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying Petition’s requests for continuances was not based on a 

finding that Petitioner sought the continuances for purposes of delay. The court had, to 

the contrary, concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Petitioner continuances for all the many reasons noted above, when it included this 

statement. (See IV.B.3.a).) The Court of Appeal found the two-day continuance that 

Petitioner received, following a grant of his motion for self-representation, was 

reasonable. (Lodgment 5 at 8-10.) The court considered the circumstances of this case, 

the status of the proceedings, the information before the trial court, and Petitioner’s 

arguments for continuances, each time he sought and was denied a continuance, in 

finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion. (Id. at 10-13.) The court’s inclusion of 

the language regarding delay appears to be a reasonable inference from the circumstances 

of the case, but was not the basis for the Court of Appeal’s opinion finding no abuse of 

discretion. 

To the extent Petitioner is arguing the trial court record does not support this

opinion regarding the appearance of delay, the Court disagrees. The Court of Appeal 

could reasonably conclude from the record before it that the requests for continuances 

were sought for purposes of delay, even without the trial court explicitly stating delay

 

20 To the extent these challenges are being asserted under § 2254(d)(1), Petitioner is not 

entitled to relief. As explained above, the Court of Appeal’s decision was not contrary to 

or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. And the trial court’s 

denial of a continuance was not unreasoning or arbitrary considering all the 

circumstances at the time the requests were made. 

Case 3:15-cv-01836-CAB-BGS Document 19 Filed 02/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 20 of

 25
21

15cv1836 CAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

was the basis for denying additional continuances. To the extent the court’s opinion 

about delay is based on factual determinations, such were not unreasonable. Hibbler, 693 

F.3d at 1146-47 (addressing § 2254(d)(2) and explaining that “the question under 

AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s determination was 

incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable — a substantially higher 

threshold.”). Specifically, the Petitioner sought new counsel on the day of trial. 

(Lodgment No. 2, Vol. 1 at 1.) When that request was denied, he sought to represent 

himself. (Id. at 13.) The trial court gave him a continuance, ordered unredacted 

discovery be provided, and appointed a runner and investigator. (Id. at 13-16.) Petitioner 

did not avail himself of those despite having the paperwork to do so no later than July 31, 

2012. (Lodgment 2, Vol. 1 at 15-16; Lodgment 2, Vol. 3 at 26.) Further, Petitioner’s 

counsel proffered that he had never identified any of these phantom witnesses. And, the 

only specific witness Petitioner ever identified before the trial court does not appear to 

have ever been contacted by any defense investigator appointed to Petitioner. From these 

facts alone, the Court of Appeal could reasonably conclude that Petitioner’s requests for

continuances appeared to be for purposes of delay. However, it is clear the Court of 

Appeal’s conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion was based on other 

factual determinations, not delay. (See IV.C.2.)

For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended relief on Ground Four be DENIED

because the state court’s resolution was not an unreasonable determination of the facts 

from the record presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 

E. Perceived Errors of State Law

Petitioner argues throughout his Petition and Traverse and through numerous 

grounds that the trial court’s denials of continuances violated California Penal Code 

§§ 1049 and 1050(a). The Court has considered his arguments as to these points in 

considering whether the denial of continuances constituted a constitutional violation

above, but addresses the arguments specific to these provisions as follows. Section 1049 

requires a defendant be given a minimum of five days to prepare for trial after entering a 

Case 3:15-cv-01836-CAB-BGS Document 19 Filed 02/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 21 of

 25
22

15cv1836 CAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

plea.21 Section 1050(a) explains why the State of California has found continuances in 

criminal cases have adverse consequences. It also discourages continuances in criminal 

cases by giving precedence to criminal matters over civil. The remainder of § 1050 

outlines the requirements and procedures for requesting and obtaining a continuance.

Petitioner’s claims of error in the application of §§ 1049 and 1050 present only 

issues of state law not cognizable on federal habeas review. Federal habeas writs may 

not issue on the basis of a perceived error of a state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 

67-68 (1991) (“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court 

determinations on state-law questions.”) A petitioner cannot transform a state law issue 

into a federal one by labeling it a due process violation. See Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 

1380, 1389 (9th Cir.1996); Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d 1075, 1083 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(Courts “cannot treat a mere error of state law, if one occurred, as a denial of due process; 

otherwise, every erroneous decision by a state court on state law would come here as a 

federal constitutional question.”) Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief based 

on an alleged error in applying §§ 1049 or 1050. 

F. Evidentiary Hearing

In his Traverse, Petitioner argues for the first time that he is entitled to an 

evidentiary hearing because the state court did not reasonably determine the facts from 

 

21 Although on its face the statute states simply “after his plea, the defendant is entitled to 

at least five days to prepare for trial” and would appear completely inapplicable here, 

there are California decisions suggesting that under § 1049, a defendant may, under 

certain circumstances, be entitled to five days to prepare for trial after being allowed to 

proceed without counsel. The Court notes only the particular circumstances, including 

the timeliness of the motion to proceed without counsel, i.e. not on the day set for trial, 

and other circumstances are considered in evaluating whether a continuance should be 

granted. See People v. Moore, 2003 WL 22463176, at *5 (Cal. App. 2003) (“This 

provision, [§ 1049], has been interpreted to mean that once a defendant is granter pro per 

status he is entitled to at least five days in which to prepare for trial” and citing People v. 

Maddox, 67 Cal. 2d 647, 653-54 (1967) and People v. Wilkins, 225 Cal. App. 3d 229, 

308-09 (1990)); but see People v. Jenkins, 22 Cal. 4th 900, 1037-38 (2000) (upon which 

the Court of Appeal relies in this case). 

Case 3:15-cv-01836-CAB-BGS Document 19 Filed 02/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 22 of

 25
23

15cv1836 CAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the record or conduct an evidentiary hearing. (Traverse at ¶10.) Other than this general 

statement, the only issues the Court can identify from the Traverse for purposes of an 

evidentiary hearing are whether the trial court considered § 1049 in denying Petitioner’s 

requests for continuances, whether Petitioner had a list of potential witnesses, and when 

Petitioner received his pro per privileges. (Traverse at 4-5.) 

AEDPA prescribes the manner in which federal habeas courts must approach the 

factual record and “substantially restricts the district court’s discretion to grant an 

evidentiary hearing.” Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir.1999). “[A] 

determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct,” 

with the petitioner having “the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by 

clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Section 2254(e)(2) limits “the 

discretion of federal habeas courts to take new evidence in an evidentiary hearing.” 

Cullen, 563 U.S. at 185. “If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a 

claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the 

claim” unless the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law 

“made retroactive on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously 

unavailable,” or “a factual predicated that could not have been previously discovered 

through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A). In the latter 

circumstance, the petitioner must also demonstrate that “the facts underlying the claim 

would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for 

constitutional error, no reasonable fact-finder would have found the applicant guilty of 

the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). Moreover, “[b]ecause a federal court 

may not independently review the merits of a state court decision without first applying 

the AEDPA standards, “a federal court may not grant an evidentiary hearing without first 

determining whether the state court’s decision was an unreasonable determination of the 

facts.” Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1166–67 (9th Cir.2005) (citing Lockyer, 538 

U.S. at 71); see Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (“Because the deferential 

standards prescribed by § 2254 control whether to grant habeas relief, a federal court 

Case 3:15-cv-01836-CAB-BGS Document 19 Filed 02/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 23 of

 25
24

15cv1836 CAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

must take into account those standards in deciding whether an evidentiary hearing is 

appropriate”). “If a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by a state court, a federal 

habeas petitioner must overcome the limitation of § 2254(d)(1) on the record that was 

before that state court.” Cullen, 563 U.S. at 185(“[E]vidence introduced in federal court 

has no bearing on § 2254(d)(1) review”). If a claim subject to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) 

does not satisfy that statutory requirement, it is “unnecessary to reach the question 

whether § 2254(e)(2) would permit a [federal] hearing on th[at] claim.” Id. at 184

(citation omitted). “In practical effect, . . . this means that when the state-court record 

‘precludes habeas relief’ under the limitations of § 2254(d), a district court is ‘not 

required to hold an evidentiary hearing.’” Cullen, 563 U.S. at 183. (citation omitted). 

Since Cullen, the Ninth Circuit has held that a federal habeas court may consider new 

evidence only on de novo review, subject to the limitations of § 2254(e)(2). See Stokley 

v. Ryan, 659 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir.2011).

As explained above, Petitioner is not entitled to relief under § 2254(d). And, as 

noted above, Petitioner’s challenge as to the trial court’s consideration of or compliance 

with § 1049, is a state law issue for which federal habeas relief is unavailable. 

Additionally, the Court of Appeal and the trial court both considered Petitioner’s claims 

concerning potential witnesses, including when he received paperwork to obtain an 

investigator and his diligence in pursing witnesses. (Lodgment 5 at 13; Lodgment 2, Vol. 

3 at 65.) Petitioner does not satisfy any of the exacting prerequisites to an evidentiary 

hearing on federal habeas review. 

Accordingly, the Court recommends Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing 

be DENIED.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED the Court 

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and (2) 

denying the Petition.

Case 3:15-cv-01836-CAB-BGS Document 19 Filed 02/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 24 of

 25
25

15cv1836 CAB (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IT IS ORDERED that no later than February 23, 2016, any party to this action 

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than March 2, 2017.

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Turner v. 

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th 

Cir. 1991).

Dated: February 2, 2017

Case 3:15-cv-01836-CAB-BGS Document 19 Filed 02/02/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 25 of

 25