Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00769/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00769-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OBA LEE FRELIMO,

Plaintiff,

v.

M. MARCHAK, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:15-cv-00769-SKO (PC)

FIRST SCREENING ORDER DENYING 

REQUEST FOR COUNSEL, DISMISSING 

CDCR MENTAL HEALTH DEPT. AS A 

PARTY, WITH PREJUDICE, AND 

DISMISSING COMPLAINT, WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND, FOR FAILURE TO STATE 

ANY CLAIMS

(Doc. 1)

I. Screening Requirement and Standard

Plaintiff Oba Lee Frelimo (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on February 5, 2015. The 

Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental 

entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must 

dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous 

or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall 

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 

(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)), and 

courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 

F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual 

allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated 

in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). This 

requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). Prisoners 

proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and 

to have any doubt resolved in their favor, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(citations omitted), but nevertheless, the mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting the 

plausibility standard, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

II. Discussion

A. Summary of Allegations

Plaintiff, an inmate at Folsom State Prison in Represa, California, brings this action against 

Staff Psychiatrist M. Marchak, M.D., Chief Psychiatrist S. Grewal, M.D., and the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) Department of Mental Health for 

violating his rights under the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the involuntary administration of the medication 

Zyprexa while he was at California State Prison-Corcoran in 2013. Plaintiff alleges that on July 1, 

2013, Defendant Marchak wrote a false mental health report stating that Plaintiff cut his wrists, 

admitted to cutting his wrists, and was self-injurious. As a result of the report, Plaintiff was 

placed in the prison’s mental health hospital, where he was held in a cold cell that had blood on 

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the floor and food stuck to the walls and ceiling. Plaintiff was then subject to a Keyhea order 

forcibly medicating him against his will for one year.1 

Plaintiff alleges that Zyprexa has serious side effects that render it dangerous. One of the 

side effects is high blood pressure and Plaintiff was previously diagnosed with high blood 

pressure. Plaintiff alleges that he now has to take hydrochlorothiazide, 25 mg., because of the 

Zyprexa.2 Plaintiff also alleges that he suffers from chronic headaches, abnormal muscle 

contractions, fatigue, weight gain, and sexual dysfunction as a result of the medications he was 

forced to take for one year. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Marchak’s report was false, as 

evidenced by his medical records documenting the lack of lacerations on him, and it caused him to 

be placed under CDCR Mental Health Department care.

B. CDCR Mental Health Department as Party

Plaintiff names the CDCR Mental Health Department as a defendant. However, the 

Eleventh Amendment erects a general bar against federal lawsuits brought against the state. 

Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation and quotation marks 

omitted). While “[t]he Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against a state official for 

prospective relief,” Wolfson, 616 F.3d at 1065-66, suits against the state or its agencies are barred 

absolutely, regardless of the form of relief sought, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. 

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900 (1984); Buckwalter v. Nevada Bd. of Medical 

Examiners, 678 F.3d 737, 740 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012). Thus, Plaintiff may not maintain a claim 

against the CDCR Mental Health Department and it shall be dismissed from this action.

///

///

 

1

In Keyhea v. Rushen, 178 Cal.App.3d 526, 542 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), the court set forth the substantive and 

procedural safeguards which must be adhered to when the state seeks to involuntarily medicate state prisoners with 

long-term psychotropic medications. Such courts orders are commonly known as Keyhea orders.

2 The Court may take judicial notice of information on government websites not subject to reasonable dispute, Fed. R. 

Evid. 201; Daniels-Hall v. National Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2010); Siebert v. Gene Security 

Network, Inc., 75 F.Supp.3d 1108, 1111 n.2 (N.D.Cal. 2014), and it takes judicial notice of the fact that 

hydrochlorothiazide is a diuretic (water pill) used to treat high blood pressure. 

https://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a682571.html (U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, 

National Institutes of Health website).

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C. Due Process Claims

1. Involuntary Administration of Medication

Turning first to Plaintiff’s due process claims, prisoners have a substantial liberty interest, 

grounded in the Due Process Clause, in avoiding the involuntary administration of antipsychotic 

medication. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229, 110 S.Ct. 1028 (1990). Prisoners may be 

involuntarily medicated if they are dangerous to themselves or others, and the treatment is in their 

best medical interest, but they must be provided with procedural protections to ensure that the 

decision to medicate them involuntarily is not arbitrary or erroneous. Harper, 494 U.S. at 227-28. 

Although Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Marchak falsely reported he cut his wrists, which 

led to a one-year Keyhea order for the involuntary administration of Zyprexa, the mere 

disagreement with Defendant’s decision to write a report and/or recommend medicating him does 

not evidence a constitutional violation. Given that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to set forth any facts 

indicating that he was subject to the Keyhea order without the procedural protections he was due 

under federal law, he fails to state a claim for relief under section 1983.

2. Inmate Appeals Process 

Next, Plaintiff alleges a claim for relief against Defendant Grewal based on his 

involvement in addressing Plaintiff’s inmate appeal. Plaintiff alleges that his appeal was granted 

but he remained subject to the involuntary administration of medication. 

As an initial matter, Plaintiff mischaracterizes the grant of his appeal. The appeal decision 

does not reflect that he was granted relief from the Keyhea order. To the contrary, the appeal 

reflects that it was granted in that Plaintiff agreed with the court order requiring he be medicated

because he was a danger to himself due to his mental illness. (Comp., Ex. B.) Regardless, the 

existence of an inmate appeals process does not create a protected liberty interest upon which 

Plaintiff may base a claim that he was denied a particular result, that the appeals process was 

deficient, and/or that the relief he was granted did not come to fruition. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 

U.S. 209, 221, 125 S.Ct. 2384 (2005); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); 

Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus, Plaintiff may not pursue a claim against 

Defendant Grewal under section 1983 based merely on Grewal’s appeal decision and there is 

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nothing about the substantive appeal response that supports a claim for relief. Peralta v. Dillard, 

744 F.3d 1076, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 2014).

D. Eighth Amendment Claim

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects 

prisoners not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also from inhumane conditions of 

confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994) and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 

101 S.Ct. 2392 (1981)) (quotation marks omitted). While conditions of confinement may be, and 

often are, restrictive and harsh, they must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of 

pain. Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347) (quotation marks omitted). 

Thus, conditions which are devoid of legitimate penological purpose or contrary to evolving 

standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society violate the Eighth Amendment. 

Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (quotation marks and citations omitted); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 

737, 122 S.Ct. 2508 (2002); Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346. 

Prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food, 

clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety, Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted), but not every injury that a prisoner sustains 

while in prison represents a constitutional violation, Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (quotation marks 

omitted). To maintain an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show that prison officials 

were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to his health or safety. E.g., Farmer, 511 

U.S. at 847; Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2010); Foster v. Runnels, 554 

F.3d 807, 812-14 (9th Cir. 2009); Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045; Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731; Frost v. 

Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998).

To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to pursue an Eighth Amendment claim based 

either on the cold, dirty conditions in the Mental Health Department or on the decision to medicate 

him with Zyprexa, his allegations do not support a viable claim. The allegation that he was 

housed in a cold cell that had blood on the floor and food stuck to the walls and ceiling does not 

demonstrate the existence of conditions that posed a substantial risk of serious harm to his health.

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Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S.Ct. 995 (1992); Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731. His 

allegation that Zyprexa is dangerous similarly fails to support a plausible claim based on the 

existence of a substantial risk of serious harm to his health of which the prescribing doctor was 

aware. Zyprexa is approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, and Plaintiff’s opinion 

that it is dangerous because it can lead to serious side effects does not suffice to support a 

reasonable inference that the medication posed a grave risk to Plaintiff’s health; a prisoner’s mere 

disagreement with his treating doctor’s chosen course of treatment does not give rise to a claim 

under section 1983.

3

Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled in part on 

other grounds, Peralta, 744 F.3d at 1082-83; Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122-23 (9th 

Cir. 2012). 

E. Request for Appointment of Counsel

In his complaint, Plaintiff requests the appointment of counsel. Plaintiff does not have a 

constitutional right to the appointment of counsel in this action. Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 

970 (9th Cir. 2009); Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981). While the Court 

may request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), it will do so 

only if exceptional circumstances exist. Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970; Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 

F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). In making this determination, the Court must evaluate the 

likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of Plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light 

of the complexity of the legal issues involved. Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970 (citation and quotation 

marks omitted); Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331. Neither consideration is dispositive and they must be 

viewed together. Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970 (citation and quotation marks omitted); Wilborn 789 

F.2d at 1331. 

Here, the Court does not find the required exceptional circumstances. Even assuming 

Plaintiff is not well versed in the law and that he has made serious allegations which, if proved, 

would entitle him to relief, his case is not exceptional. The Court is faced with similar cases 

almost daily. Further, at this early stage in the proceedings, the Court cannot make a 

 

3 The Court takes judicial notice of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration website. 

http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm.

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determination that Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits, and based on a review of the record 

in this case, the Court does not find that Plaintiff cannot adequately articulate his claims. Palmer, 

560 F.3d at 970.

III. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any claims upon which relief may be granted under 

section 1983. The Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to file an amended complaint 

curing the deficiencies he believes, in good faith, are curable. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 

1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); Noll v. Carlson, 

809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). However, Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit 

by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 

(7th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but under section 1983, 

it must state what each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional 

rights; liability may not be imposed under the theory of mere respondeat superior, Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 676-77; Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-07 (9th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff must demonstrate the 

existence of a link, or causal connection, between each defendant’s actions or omissions and a 

violation of his federal rights. Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 

1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Starr, 652 F.3d at 1205-08. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual 

allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. . . .” Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). 

Finally, an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Lacey v. Maricopa 

County, 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be “complete in itself without 

reference to the prior or superceded pleading,” Local Rule 220. 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request for the appointment of counsel is denied;

2. The CDCR Mental Health Department is dismissed, with prejudice;

3. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state a claim 

under section 1983;

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4. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

5. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file an 

amended complaint; and

6. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, this 

action will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim under section 

1983.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 29, 2015 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:15-cv-00769-SKO Document 12 Filed 12/30/15 Page 8 of 8