Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01008/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01008-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TRAVIS JEREL YOUNG,

Petitioner,

v.

TEHACHAPI WARDEN, XAVIER 

BECERRA; 

Respondents.

Case No. 18-cv-1008-BAS-MDD

ORDER DISMISSING SECOND

AMENDED PETITION WITH 

PREJUDICE

Petitioner Travis Jerel Young (“Petitioner”) has filed a Second Amended Petition 

for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. (ECF No. 8.) For the reasons herein, the Court dismisses the 

Petition with prejudice. 

BACKGROUND

On May 16, 2018, Petitioner filed his original Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) On May 29, 2018, the Court construed the 

Petition as one brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on the ground that Petitioner filed the 

Petition as “a state prisoner attacking the validity of a state court sentence imposed by the 

state of California.” (ECF No. 2.) The Court dismissed the Petition without prejudice 

because Petitioner (1) did not pay the $5 filing fee or request to proceed in forma pauperis

(“IFP”) and (2) failed to allege exhaustion of state judicial remedies, a prerequisite for a 

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Section 2254 Petition. (Id.) The Court instructed Petitioner that to reopen this case he had 

to (1) either pay the filing fee or provide adequate proof of his inability to pay and (2) file 

a First Amended Petition no later than August 6, 2018, which alleged his exhaustion of 

state judicial remedies. (Id.) 

On August 1, 2018, Petitioner filed a First Amended Petition and a motion to proceed 

IFP pursuant to this Court’s Order. (ECF No. 4.) The Court granted Petitioner IFP status, 

but dismissed the First Amended Petition without prejudice because “Petitioner has again 

failed to allege exhaustion of state judicial remedies.” (ECF No. 6 at 2.) The Court also 

determined that Petitioner has failed to name a proper respondent because he named the 

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,” rather than a specific warden. 

(Id. at 4.) The Court instructed Petition that “[i]n order for this Court to entertain the 

Petition . . . , Petitioner must name the warden in charge of the state correctional facility in 

which Petitioner is presently confined or the Secretary of the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation.” (Id.) The Court provided Petitioner until October 12, 

2018 to file a Second Amended Petition correcting the deficiencies identified by the Court. 

(Id. at 5.) Petitioner timely filed the Second Amended Petition on October 3, 2018. (ECF 

No. 8.) 

DISCUSSION

1. Failure to Name a Proper Respondent

A review of the Second Amended Petition reveals that Petitioner has again failed to 

name a proper respondent. On federal habeas, a state prisoner must name the state officer 

having custody of him as the respondent. Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (citing Rule 2(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254). Federal courts lack personal 

jurisdiction when a habeas petition fails to name a proper respondent. See id.

The warden is the typical respondent. However, “the rules following section 2254 

do not specify the warden.” Id. “[T]he ‘state officer having custody’ may be ‘either the 

warden of the institution in which the petitioner is incarcerated . . . or the chief officer in 

charge of state penal institutions.’” Id. (quoting Rule 2(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 advisory 

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committee’s note). If “a petitioner is in custody due to the state action he is challenging, 

‘[t]he named respondent shall be the state officer who has official custody of the petitioner 

(for example, the warden of the prison).’” Id. (quoting Rule 2, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 

advisory committee’s note). However, if a “petitioner is on probation or parole, he may 

name his probation or parole officer ‘and the official in charge of the parole or probation 

agency, or the state correctional agency, as appropriate.’” Id. (quoting Rule 2, 28 U.S.C. 

foll. § 2254 advisory committee’s note). 

Petitioner was released on parole in the time since his last filing. (ECF No. 7.) The 

Second Amended Petition therefore incorrectly names “Tehachapi Warden” as a 

Respondent. In order for this Court to entertain a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 

Petitioner must name the person who will produce “the body” if directed to do so by the 

Court. Because Petitioner is on parole, proper respondents are his parole officer and the 

official in charge of the parole agency. See Ortiz-Sandoval, 81 F.3d at 894. In California, 

the Director of the Department of Corrections, currently Ralph Diaz, is the official in 

charge of the parole agency. See In re Lusero, 4 Cal. App. 4th 572, 576 (Cal. Ct. App. 

1992) (“During the period of parole following incarceration, an inmate continues in the 

custody of the department.”). Petitioner has not named his parole agent or the Director of 

the California Department of Corrections. This is a sufficient basis to dismiss the Petition. 

Even if amendment would be proper to permit Petitioner to name his parole officer, 

dismissal of the Petition is warranted because Petitioner has failed for a third time to allege 

exhaustion of state judicial remedies for the claims he raises in the Petition. 

2. Repeated Failures to Allege Exhaustion of State Judicial Remedies

The Court has previously notified Petitioner that habeas petitioners who wish to 

challenge either their state court conviction or the length of their confinement in state 

prison, must first exhaust state judicial remedies. (ECF Nos. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); 

Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133–34 (1987). A petitioner can satisfy the state 

remedies exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a full and fair 

opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan v. 

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Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); see also Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 

1996) (citations omitted) (stating that to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a petitioner 

must “‘fairly present[]’ his federal claim to the highest state court with jurisdiction to 

consider it, or . . . demonstrate[] that no state remedy remains available”). Moreover, to 

properly exhaust state court remedies a petitioner must allege, in state court, how one or 

more of his or her federal rights have been violated. For example, “[i]f a habeas petitioner 

wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him [or her] the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he [or she] must say so, not only 

in federal court, but in state court.” See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365–66 (1995) 

(emphasis added). 

Despite being provided with repeated notice, Petitioner has not cured his Petition’s 

deficiencies. As in his original and First Amended Petition, Petitioner specifically 

indicates he did not seek review in the California Supreme Court. (ECF No. 1 at 5; ECF 

No. 4 at 2–4; ECF No. 8 at 5-8 at 5.) The multiple Petitions filed do not reflect that 

Petitioner has ever sought review in any California state court for the federal constitutional 

claim he purports to raise pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment. Instead, the Second 

Amended Petition, like the prior Petitions, indicates that Petitioner has only raised any sort 

of challenge with his individual parole officer. (ECF No. 1 at 3–4; ECF No. 8 at 7; but see

ECF No. 4 at 7 (indicating that Petitioner only challenged an alleged violation of his plea 

agreement).) The Court can only conclude that despite having three opportunities to 

properly allege initiation or exhaustion of state judicial remedies, Petitioner has not alleged 

exhaustion because he cannot do so. 

If available state court remedies have not been exhausted as to all claims, a district 

court must dismiss a petition. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515–16 (1982); see also 

Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 

481 (9th Cir. 2001) (both holding that when none of a petitioner’s claims has been 

presented to the highest state court as required by the exhaustion doctrine, the Court must 

dismiss the petition). Because Petition has not shown that he has ever exhausted the claims 

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he raises in his Petition, the Court finds that dismissal with prejudice is warranted.

CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE the 

Petition. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 9, 2018

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