Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00462/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00462-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DAVID CRAMER, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CITY OF AUBURN, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:15-cv-0462 KJM AC (PS) 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Plaintiff is proceeding in this case pro se. The case was therefore referred to the 

undersigned by Local Rule 302(c)(21). The Amended Complaint alleges that two City of Auburn 

police officers violated plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights, enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

when they arrested and jailed him on January 25, 2014. The court’s jurisdiction rests upon 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3). 

 Defendants move to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff is asserting that the arrest that led 

to his conviction lacked probable cause, and therefore, the action is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 

512 U.S. 477 (1994). ECF No. 12. Plaintiff moves to continue the action pending resolution of 

an application for habeas corpus which he says is pending in Placer County Superior Court. ECF 

No. 16. For the reasons set forth below, the court will recommend that defendants’ motion to 

dismiss be granted, and that plaintiff’s motion to continue be denied. 

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Case 2:15-cv-00462-KJM-AC Document 23 Filed 11/19/15 Page 1 of 6
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I. BACKGROUND 

 According to the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 8-1), there was “an incident” at a dog 

park in Auburn on January 23, 2014. Defendant Officers Dalton and Garlock showed up but did 

not make an arrest on that day. On January 25, 2014, Officer Dalton called plaintiff and asked 

him to return to the park. Officer Dalton then “made an unlawful arrest,” of plaintiff. Officer 

Garlock “initialed an evidence bag containing altered evidence.” Officer Garlock allowed that 

evidence to be altered on January 23, 2014, and then “booked the evidence” on January 31, 2014, 

knowing it would be used in a case against plaintiff. Officer Dalton presented the evidence in 

court. Finally, Officer Dalton perjured himself in court. 

II. MOTION TO DISMISS 

 All defendants move to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the action is 

barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). 

 A. Dismissal Standards – Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 

 The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal 

sufficiency of the complaint. N. Star Int'l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th 

Cir. 1983). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 

F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

 In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more 

than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual 

allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). It is insufficient for the pleading to contain a statement of 

facts that “merely creates a suspicion” that the pleader might have a legally cognizable right of 

action. Id. (quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 

(3d ed. 2004)). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

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for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. 

 In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court “must accept as true all of the 

factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56), construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff, Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (citing Twombly), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3055 (2011), and resolve all doubts in the 

plaintiffs' favor. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 340 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Hospital Bldg. Co. v. 

Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738 (1976)). The court need not accept as true, legal 

conclusions “cast in the form of factual allegations.” Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 

618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). 

 Moreover, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by 

lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). “Pro se complaints are construed 

‘liberally’ and may only be dismissed ‘if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no 

set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 

F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012)).1

 B. Motion To Dismiss 

 1. Section 1983 Claims: Counts One and Three 

 Defendants move to dismiss the Fourth Amendment claims contained in Counts One 

(“Fourth Amendment” based upon false arrest) and Three (“False Arrest/False Imprisonment”) on 

the grounds that they are based upon an arrest that led to plaintiff’s conviction. Defendants argue 

that the claims are therefore barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), since they would 

undermine the conviction if upheld. Defendants are correct. 

When a plaintiff who has been convicted of a crime under state law 

seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, “the district court must consider 

whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily 

 

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 “Iqbal did not alter the rule that, ‘where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, 

[courts should] construe the pleadings liberally and . . . afford the petitioner the benefit of any 

doubt.’” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121 (quoting Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Case 2:15-cv-00462-KJM-AC Document 23 Filed 11/19/15 Page 3 of 6
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imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” If the answer is 

yes, the suit is barred. 

Hooper v. Cty. of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) (quoting 

Heck). 

 At the hearing on this motion, plaintiff confirmed that he was challenging the arrest that 

led to his conviction. The basis for his challenge is that the arresting officer lacked probable 

cause to arrest or jail him. Were this court to find that there was no probable cause, that finding 

would necessarily imply that the resulting conviction was invalid: 

To prevail on his § 1983 claim for false arrest and imprisonment, 

Cabrera [plaintiff] would have to demonstrate that there was no 

probable cause to arrest him. See George v. City of Long Beach, 

973 F.2d 706, 710 (9th Cir. 1992). The police claim [that] hearing 

Cabrera's challenge to fight provided probable cause to arrest him 

for disturbing the peace. On these facts, finding there was no 

probable cause would “necessarily imply” that Cabrera's conviction 

for disturbing the peace was invalid. Therefore, under Heck, 

Cabrera's false arrest and imprisonment claims were not cognizable 

and did not accrue until his conviction was invalidated . . .. 

Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998); see also, Guerrero v. 

Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 703 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[w]rongful arrest, malicious prosecution, and a 

conspiracy among Los Angeles officials to bring false charges against Guerrero could not have 

occurred unless he were innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted”).2

 As such, this action is barred by Heck until plaintiff’s conviction is overturned.3

 2. Remaining claims 

 Counts Two (Fraud), Four (Obstruction of Justice) and Five (Perjury) are, or purport to be, 

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2

 Plaintiff’s other allegations here – that the police altered evidence, presented false physical 

evidence at trial, and presented perjured testimony by a police officer – would also undermine the 

conviction, if true. 

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 At the hearing on this matter, plaintiff argued that because he was not arrested on the day of the 

incident, but was instead arrested two days later, the arresting officer therefore lacked probable 

cause. Whether this reasoning is correct or not makes no difference to the outcome here. So long 

as plaintiff challenges the arrest that led to his conviction on the grounds of lack of probable 

cause, the action is barred by Heck. 

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state claims.4 Since the only claims over which the court has original jurisdiction should be 

dismissed, any remaining state claims should also be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) 

(court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state claims when all claims over 

which it has original jurisdiction are dismissed). 

III. MOTION TO CONTINUE 

 Plaintiff requests that the action be continued pending resolution of a habeas corpus 

petition he says is pending in Placer County Superior Court. Plaintiff has not provided any reason 

for continuing the case, rather than dismissing it without prejudice. If plaintiff gets his conviction 

overturned, he will be able to sue for his constitutional claims without facing the Heck bar. See 

Cabrera, 159 F.3d at 380 (“false arrest and imprisonment claims were not cognizable and did not 

accrue until his [plaintiff’s] conviction was invalidated”). Therefore, this motion should be 

denied. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that 

 1. Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss (ECF No. 12) should be GRANTED, as follows: 

 a. Counts One and Three should be dismissed without prejudice as barred by Heck 

v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); and 

 b. The court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Counts 

Two, Four and Five, and should therefore dismiss those claims without prejudice pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); and 

 2. Plaintiff’s Motion To Continue (ECF No. 16) should be DENIED. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen (14) 

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

 

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 The court is mindful that “obstruction of justice” is a predicate offense for a federal claim under 

the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B), 

however it is not a stand-alone federal claim. Defendants argue that there is no civil action in 

California for Obstruction of Justice or for Perjury. It is not necessary for the court to determine 

if defendants are correct. 

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objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Id.; see also Local Rule 304(b). Such a 

document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be filed with the court and served on all 

parties within fourteen days after service of the objections. Local Rule 304(d). Failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 

(9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: November 19, 2015 

Case 2:15-cv-00462-KJM-AC Document 23 Filed 11/19/15 Page 6 of 6