Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_14-cv-02029/USCOURTS-alnd-5_14-cv-02029-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 20:1681 Title IX Education Amendments of 1972

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

JANE DOE,

Plaintiff,

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE 

UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA, for 

and on behalf of THE UNIVERSITY 

OF ALABAMA, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-2029-MHH

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

In her lawsuit against the University of Alabama-Huntsville, Jane Doe alleges 

that UAH violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 

1681 et seq., because the university discriminated against her and was deliberately 

indifferent in its handling of her sexual assault charge against another student. 

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, UAH has asked the 

Court to enter judgment in its favor. For the reasons stated below, the Court denies 

the motion.1

1 This case initially was assigned to a magistrate judge under the district court’s former civil case 

assignment procedure. Consequently, the magistrate judges assigned to this case have issued 

reports concerning the parties’ dispositive motions. In his thoughtful report concerning UAH’s 

summary judgment motion, the magistrate judge recommended that the Court grant the motion for 

summary judgment. (Doc. 56). Ms. Doe objects to several of the magistrate judge’s factual 

findings, and she objects to his legal conclusions. (Doc. 57). Because the parties have not 

FILED

 2020 Mar-13 PM 03:17

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). To demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute 

as to a material fact that precludes summary judgment, a party opposing a motion 

for summary judgment must cite “to particular parts of materials in the record, 

including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or 

declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), 

admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A). 

“The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials 

in the record.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3).

When considering a summary judgment motion, a district court must view the 

evidence in the record and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to 

consented unanimously to dispositive jurisdiction by a magistrate judge, the magistrate judge’s 

report and Ms. Doe’s objections are before the undersigned for review. 

A district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or part, the findings or recommendations 

made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). When a party objects to a report and 

recommendation, a district court must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the 

report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” Id. 

Although § 636(b)(1) “does not require the [district] judge to review an issue de novo if no 

objections are filed, it does not preclude further review by the district judge, sua sponte or at the 

request of a party, under a de novo or any other standard.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 154 

(1985). That is because for dispositive issues, “the ultimate adjudicatory determination is reserved 

to the district judge.” United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 675 (1980). For purposes of this 

opinion, the Court has made a de novo review of the record. 

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the non-moving party. Asalde v. First Class Parking Sys. LLC, 898 F.3d 1136, 1138 

(11th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, where the evidence is disputed, the Court presents 

the evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Doe and describes, where relevant, 

the UAH’s version of the events at issue. 

II. TITLE IX STANDARD

Pursuant to Title IX, “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of 

sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 

discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial 

assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). “The Supreme Court has recognized an implied 

right of action for money damages in Title IX cases of intentional sexual 

discrimination . . .” Doe v. School Bd. of Broward Cnty., Fla., 604 F.3d 1248, 1254

(11th Cir. 2010). “[S]exual harassment is a form of discrimination for Title IX 

purposes,” Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1999), “and 

in certain narrow circumstances, a plaintiff may be able to recover for student-onstudent harassment,” Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Uni. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 

1293 (11th Cir. 2007). 

The standard for Title IX liability in cases involving student-on-student 

harassment is exacting. “Student-on-student sexual harassment rises to the level of 

actionable Title IX discrimination only if the harassment is ‘sufficiently severe.’” 

Hill v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948, 968 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 650). 

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In a student-on-student Title IX action, a plaintiff “must establish not only that the 

school district was deliberately indifferent to known acts of harassment, but also that 

the known harassment was ‘so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it 

denie[d] its victims the equal access to education that Title IX is designed to 

protect.’” Hill, 797 F.3d at 968-69 (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 651-52).

Per Davis, the standard for student-on-student Title IX liability is particularly 

rigorous in cases involving elementary and high school students. Hill, 797 F.3d at 

970. “The high burden of Davis ensures school districts are not financially crippled 

merely because immature kids occasionally engage in immature sexual behavior.” 

Hill, 797 F.3d at 970. In Hill, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated:

The Court imposed this high standard to guard against the imposition 

of “sweeping liability.” Unlike an adult workplace, children “may 

regularly interact in a manner that would be unacceptable among 

adults.” Due to their immaturity, children at various ages will invariably 

engage in some forms of teasing, shoving, and name-calling that “target 

differences in gender.” Some risk of sexual harassment is inherent to 

the enterprise of public education, in particular, because public schools 

must educate even the most troublesome and defiant students. 

Hill, 797 F.3d at 969 (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 651-52); see also Davis, 527 U.S. 

at 666 (Kennedy, J. dissenting). 

This case does not involve school children teasing or name-calling. This case 

does not involve First Amendment speech on a college campus. See Davis, 526 U.S. 

at 649 (noting that a university cannot “be expected to exercise the same degree of 

control over its students that a grade school would enjoy, and it would be entirely 

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reasonable for a school to refrain from a form of disciplinary action that would 

expose it to constitutional or statutory claims”), and Davis, 526 U.S. at 667-68 

(discussing the First Amendment implications for a university’s effort to discipline 

a student for verbal sexual harassment) (Kennedy, J. dissenting). This case concerns 

known instances of forced sex on a university campus that the university chose not 

to address, and it involves the university’s handling of the sexual assault of Ms. Doe 

by a member of the university’s hockey team. Because the Eleventh Circuit Court 

of Appeals’ analysis in Williams concerns sexual misconduct of athletes on a 

university campus, Williams provides the best guidance for the evaluation of Ms. 

Doe’s student-on-student Title IX claim. 

For a university to be held liable under Title IX for sexual assault of a plaintiff 

by a university student, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the university receives 

Title IX funds, that an “appropriate person” had actual knowledge of the 

discriminatory or harassing conduct that the plaintiff alleges, that “the funding 

recipient act[ed] with deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment in its 

programs or activities,” and that the harassment was “so severe, pervasive, and 

objectively offensive that it effectively bar[red] the victim’s access to an educational 

opportunity or benefit.” Williams, 477 F.3d at 1293 (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 

633). 

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For purposes of a claim for damages for deliberate indifference under Title 

IX, an “appropriate person” is, “at a minimum, an official of the recipient entity with 

authority to take corrective action to end the discrimination” or harassment. Gebser 

v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998). 

A plaintiff cannot establish deliberate indifference by a funding recipient 

simply by demonstrating that “a person affiliated with the funding recipient 

discriminated against or harassed the plaintiff.” Williams, 477 F.3d at 1293. Rather, 

a Title IX plaintiff must establish that the funding recipient’s response to sexual 

harassment was clearly unreasonable “‘in light of the known circumstances.’” 

Williams, 477 F.3d at 1295 (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 648); see also Davis, 526 

U.S. at 648-49. A university may be held liable for a clearly unreasonable response 

to known sexual harassment because the unreasonable response makes a Title IX 

plaintiff vulnerable to “further discrimination” or sexual harassment by the initial 

perpetrator or by “like-minded hooligans.” Williams, 477 F.3d at 1295-97. 

A plaintiff may prove that the harassment was “so severe, pervasive, and 

objectively offensive that it effectively bar[red] the victim’s access to an educational 

opportunity or benefit,” Davis, 526 U.S. at 633, by demonstrating that the funding 

recipient “failed to take any precautions that would prevent future attacks” from the 

harasser “by, for example, removing from student housing or suspending the alleged 

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assailants, or implementing a more protective sexual harassment policy to deal with 

future incidents.” Williams, 477 F.3d at 1297. 

“Whether gender-oriented conduct rises to the level of actionable

‘harassment’ [] ‘depends on a constellation of surrounding

circumstances, expectation[s], and relationships,’ including, but not 

limited to, the ages of the harasser and the victim and the number of 

individuals involved.” “[T]o have a ‘systemic effect’ of denying the 

victim equal access to an educational program or activity ... gender 

discrimination must be more widespread than a single instance of oneon-one peer harassment ....”

Williams, 477 F.3d at 1297-98 (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 651 and Hawkins v. 

Sarasota Cnty. Sch. Bd., 322 F.3d 1279, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003)) (second alteration 

added to reflect actual language from Davis). A “cycle of discrimination and 

deliberate indifference that last[s] for more than one year” may effectively bar a 

plaintiff’s access to educational opportunities. Williams, 477 F.3d at 1298.

Here, it is undisputed that the UAH receives Title IX funds and that an 

“appropriate person” was aware of Ms. Doe’s assault and of previous instances of 

student-on-student sexual assault on UAH’s campus. Therefore, to resolve the 

Board’s summary judgment motion, the Court must determine whether Ms. Doe has 

identified disputed issues of fact concerning deliberate indifference and access to 

educational opportunities.

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Ms. Doe’s rape by a UAH hockey player and UAH’s response

The facts that give rise to Ms. Doe’s Title IX claims are largely undisputed. 

In January 2013, a UAH hockey player sexually assaulted Ms. Doe, a UAH student,

in a UAH dorm room. After drinking a lot of wine, Ms. Doe fell asleep on the sofa 

in a suite in the dormitory in which the members of UAH’s hockey team lived. (Doc. 

53-1, p. 8, tpp. 22-23; Doc. 53-1, p. 50; Doc. 54-1, pp. 1-2, ¶¶ 3-4). A UAH hockey 

player, who Ms. Doe later learned was L.U., awakened her during the night and told 

her that she could not stay in the room in which she was sleeping. L.U. gathered 

Ms. Doe’s things and led her to a room in a suite on another floor of the dormitory. 

(Doc. 53-1, pp. 50-51). She entered one of the bedrooms and lay on the bed. L.U. 

lay beside her and began removing her clothes. (Doc. 53-1, pp. 51, 53). In L.U.’s 

words, he then “tried to have sex” with Ms. Doe. (Doc. 53-1, p. 53). 

In the handwritten report that he completed less than eight hours after his 

encounter with Ms. Doe, L.U. stated that he “had [his] penis in her [a] very short 

period of a time and [he] told [him]self I have to stop.” (Doc. 53-1, p. 53). L.U. 

wrote: “I stopped because she seemed to be drunk and didn’t know what was going 

on. She never said ‘NO’ or ‘stop’, but I realized that she couldn’t consent.” (Doc. 

53-1, pp. 53-54). L.U. wrote that after he decided to stop, he dressed Ms. Doe again 

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and took her to the suite where he found her. (Doc. 53-1, pp. 52-53; see also Doc. 

54-1, p. 2, ¶ 8). 

Sergeant John Beswick, a UAH police officer, investigated the event. In his 

report, Sergeant Beswick wrote that after he mirandized L.U., L.U. stated that he lay

in bed with Ms. Doe, began removing her clothes, and “inserted his fingers into her 

vagina and then got on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina.” (Doc. 53-

1, p. 49). L.U. told Sergeant Beswick that “after engaging in sexual intercourse for 

approximately ten seconds, he stopped and got off her because ‘she seemed to be 

drunk and didn’t know what was going on.’” (Doc. 53-1 p. 49). 

Ms. Doe asserts that she “did not give consent to sexual contact” and was not 

capable “of giving such consent.” (Doc. 54-1, p. 2, ¶¶ 5-7). Shortly after the assault, 

Ms. Doe went to UAH’s Crisis Services for an examination. The exam results 

indicated that Ms. Doe experienced “vaginal tearing.” (Doc. 53-3, p. 16). The day 

following the assault, in an interview with UAH Dean of Students Dr. Regina Hyatt,

Ms. Doe stated that “she did not participate in taking her clothes off, [L.U.’s] clothes 

off, or in the intercourse.” (Doc. 53-3, p. 16).2

 In an interview with Dr. Hyatt a few 

days after the incident, L.U. reported that he “had been drinking and was intoxicated 

2 Dr. Hyatt was UAH’s Deputy Title IX Coordinator. (Doc. 53-3, p. 3). Dr. Hyatt handled all 

Title IX and sexual violence-related complaints. (Doc. 53-2, p. 5, tp. 11).

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but knew what was going on.” (Doc. 53-3, pp. 17, 25).3 At the time of the assault, 

L.U. was on disciplinary probation at UAH for alcohol abuse and hazing violations. 

The assault occurred nearly four months into L.U.’s approximately eight-month 

probationary period. (Doc. 53-7, pp. 32-33).4

Sergeant Beswick and Dr. Hyatt advised Ms. Doe that she could pursue 

criminal charges against L.U. or she could bring charges against L.U. under UAH’s 

Student Conduct Code. Ms. Doe pursued charges against L.U. under UAH’s Student 

Conduct Code for sexual violence and violations of law, order, or University 

regulations or sanctions. (Doc. 53-7, pp. 8-9). With respect to the sexual violence 

charge, the Student Conduct Code prohibited “[p]hysical sexual assaults against a 

person’s will or where a person is incapable of giving consent due to the victim’s 

impairment by drugs or alcohol . . .” (Doc. 53-7, p. 8). With respect to the violation 

of law charge, the Student Conduct Code prohibited “[v]iolation of any federal, state, 

or local law.” (Doc. 53-7, p. 8). “Sanctions which can be imposed is a student is 

found responsible for sexual misconduct or violence include the full range of 

sanctions outlined in the Student Code of Conduct.” (Doc. 53-7, p. 71). “Sanctions 

3 During a hearing before the Student Conduct Board, L.U. stated that he was not intoxicated at 

the time of the incident. (Doc. 53-3, p. 31).

4 The Court has found nothing in the record that explains how L.U. ended up in the third-floor 

room where Ms. Doe was sleeping. Jurors could reasonably infer that L.U. – a student on probation 

for alcohol abuse and hazing – who had been drinking on the evening in question was walking 

through his dorm drunk, opening unlocked doors.

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may include probation, suspension, and expulsion even for a first time offense.” 

(Doc. 53-7, p. 71).5

 

Under Alabama law, “[a] person commits the crime of rape in the first degree 

if he or she . . . [e]ngages in sexual intercourse with another person who is incapable 

of consent by reason of being incapacitated.” Ala. Code § 13A-6-61(a)(2). 

“[S]exual intercourse” under Alabama law “occurs upon any penetration, however 

slight; emission is not required.” Ala. Code § 13A-6-60(4). Under Alabama law, 

the term “incapacitated” includes: 

b. A person [who] is temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling 

his or her conduct due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic, or 

intoxicating substance and the condition was known or should have 

been reasonably known to the offender.

c. A person who is unable to give consent or who is unable to 

communicate an unwillingness to an act because the person is 

unconscious, asleep, or is otherwise physically limited or unable to 

communicate.

Ala. Code § 13A-6-60(2).

On February 11, 2013, by a preponderance of the evidence, UAH’s Student 

Conduct Board found L.U. guilty of sexual violence and violation of the law and 

recommended that UAH expel L.U. (Doc. 53-7, pp. 9-10).6

 The Student Conduct 

5

 Before the formal Student Conduct Board proceeding began, Dr. Hyatt reached out to L.U. to 

let him know that if he would accept responsibility for sexual violence, she would recommend a 

one-year suspension. L.U. was not willing to accept responsibility. (Doc. 53-3, p. 36).

6

 The Student Conduct Board consisted of three faculty members and two graduate students. (Doc. 

53-7, p. 16).

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Board believed that the sanction of expulsion “must be made for the safety of all 

students at UAH.” (Doc. 53-3, p. 31). When the Board rendered its decision, the 

members of the Board did not know that L.U. already was on probation for a prior 

code violation. (Doc. 53-3, p. 31).

On February 22, 2013, UAH’s Student Conduct Director gave L.U. written 

notice of the Board’s recommendation and advised L.U. of his ability to appeal. 

(Doc. 53-7, p. 8). In a letter addressed to Associate Provost Dr. Brett Wren, L.U. 

appealed to challenge the sanction of expulsion. Dr. Wren was UAH’s Title IX 

appeal officer for sexual misconduct cases. (Doc. 53-7, p. 7). Dr. Wren presided 

over L.U.’s appeal and had the authority to impose the expulsion sanction or select 

a different consequence. (Doc. 53-7, p. 16). In his appeal letter, L.U. stated that 

“[l]osing his scholarship, education and chance to play in the [Western Collegiate 

Hockey Association] would be the end of the world for me. Therefore, I am willing 

to do whatever it takes to keep my scholarship and graduate from here.” (Doc. 53-

7, p. 11). Ultimately, Dr. Wren suspended L.U. for two semesters and delayed the 

suspension until the summer semester. (Doc. 53-10, p. 2).

B. Viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Doe, the evidence demonstrates 

that UAH acted with deliberate indifference to known acts of sexual 

assault. 

In many respects, the evidence of deliberate indifference in this case closely 

resembles the factual allegations in Williams. Therefore, to provide a backdrop for 

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the analysis of Ms. Doe’s evidence, the Court first describes the conduct that allowed 

Ms. Williams’s Title IX claim to proceed.

• Williams v. Bd. of Regents

Ms. Williams was a student at the University of Georgia when a UGA football 

player sexually assaulted her and a UGA basketball player sexually assaulted and 

raped her. Williams, 477 F.3d at 1288. After reporting the assaults to UGA police 

and pressing charges against the players who assaulted her and the player who 

instigated the assault, Ms. Williams withdrew from UGA. Williams, 477 F.3d at 

1289.7

 The players “were charged with disorderly conduct under UGA’s Code of 

Conduct.” 477 F.3d at 1289. One year later, a UGA judiciary panel decided not to 

sanction the players, two of whom, by the time of the panel decision, no longer were 

UGA students. 477 F.3d at 1289. 

In her Title IX complaint, Ms. Williams alleged that UGA’s basketball coach 

recruited the instigator of her assault even though the coach knew that the player had 

had disciplinary problems and had been charged criminally while attending other 

schools. Ms. Williams also alleged that the President of UGA, who was aware of 

the player’s disciplinary and criminal past, had to admit the basketball player to 

7 A UGA basketball player arranged for two UGA football players and a UGA basketball player 

to assault Ms. Williams. 477 F.3d at 1288. 

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UGA under a special admissions policy because the player “did not meet UGA’s 

standards for admissions.” 477 F.3d at 1290. 

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals explained that Ms. Williams identified 

“three forms of discrimination or harassment” that she faced: UGA’s recruitment of 

the instigator of the sexual assault, despite knowledge of his prior misconduct; her 

sexual assault by the football and basketball players; and UGA’s failure to respond 

adequately to her assault charges against the athletes. 477 F.3d at 1294. The Court 

of Appeals stated that UGA’s recruitment of the instigator of Ms. Williams’s assault 

with knowledge of his past conduct was an act of deliberate indifference on the part 

of the university but stated that Ms. Williams could not prove a Title IX violation 

unless she established that the university’s initial act of “deliberate indifference 

subjected her to further discrimination.” 477 F.3d at 1296. The Court of Appeals 

held that Ms. Williams satisfied the “further discrimination” requirement because 

she alleged that UGA placed the athlete with a known history of disciplinary 

problems in a student dorm without supervising him or advising him of the 

university’s sexual harassment policy. 477 F.3d at 1296. Ms. Williams also satisfied 

the “further discrimination” requirement for Title IX liability through her allegations 

concerning UGA’s response after she reported the assault. 477 F.3d at 1296. 

With respect to the university’s response to Ms. Williams’s report of the 

assault, the Court of Appeals found that UGA police “performed a thorough 

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investigation,” and that investigation “provided substantial evidence corroborating 

Williams’s version” of the assault and rape. 477 F.3d at 1296-97. Nevertheless, 

UGA waited eight months after it received the final police report to “conduct[] a 

disciplinary hearing to determine whether to sanction the alleged assailants.” 477 

F.3d at 1296. During that period, the university did nothing to prevent additional 

attacks by Ms. Williams’s assailants, such as suspending them or removing them 

from student housing. 477 F.3d at 1297. 

The Court of Appeals found that the discrimination that Ms. Williams alleged 

was “more widespread than a single instance of one-on-one peer harassment” and 

that the discrimination was “severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” because 

Ms. Williams suffered “two separate acts of sexual assault” by fellow students under 

the direction of another student. 477 F.3d at 1297-98 (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 

633 and Hawkins v. Sarasota County Sch. Bd., 322 F.3d 1279, 1285 (11th Cir.), 

reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 67 Fed. Appx. 590 (11th Cir. 2003)). The Court of 

Appeals stated that this “continuous series of events” was “sufficient to meet the 

requirements of severity and objective offensiveness.” 477 F.3d at 1298. The 

assaults, coupled with the university’s alleged discrimination before and after the 

assaults, if proven, would be sufficient “to show that the discrimination was 

pervasive.” 477 F.3d at 1298. 

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Turning to the evidence in this case, in her opposition to UAH’s motion for 

summary judgment, Ms. Doe identified “[four] forms of discrimination or 

harassment” that she faced at the university: UAH’s failure to address known 

instances of student-on-student sexual assault, UAH’s effort to discourage her from 

pursuing criminal charges against her assailant, UAH’s decision to allow L.U. to

remain enrolled at the university after he admitted to sexual assault, and UAH’s 

support and protection of L.U. (Doc. 54, pp. 24-28). Viewed in the light most 

favorable to Ms. Doe, she has presented sufficient evidence to support these alleged 

acts of harassment and discrimination, and much of the evidence of discrimination 

is undisputed.

• UAH’s failure to address known instances of student-on-student sexual 

assault 

When Dr. Wren evaluated L.U.’s appeal of the Student Conduct Board’s 

recommended sanction of expulsion, Dr. Wren reflected on the fact that several 

UAH students were victims of sexual assaults by other students, but UAH did not 

charge the assailants with violations of the UAH’s Student Code of Conduct. In an 

email to Dr. Hyatt, Dr. Wren wrote:

It’s just that we have people walking around this campus that are known 

to have committed worse sexual conduct than [L.U.] and they were 

never charged. I’m wondering if the board would consider that in 

evaluating whether this case should have been brought or not. 

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(Doc. 53-7, p. 15). In a later message in the same email strand, Dr. Wren wrote to 

Dr. Hyatt: 

[W]e have chosen not to file charges in at least two known instances of 

forced sex. We have a third one right now where a girl alleges 

excessively rough sex from a guy and we aren’t pursuing him either. If 

[I] was a lawyer I would be all over that. I don’t want us to get there if 

we can avoid it. 

(Doc. 53-7, p. 15). At the time of Ms. Doe’s assault, UAH had not “expelled anyone 

for anything other than severe academic misconduct.” (Doc. 53-7, p. 17; see also 

Doc. 53-3, p. 38). 

To assist Dr. Wren in his investigation of L.U.’s appeal, Dr. Hyatt collected 

information about recorded instances of student-on-student sexual assaults that 

preceded L.U.’s 2013 assault of Ms. Doe. Dr. Hyatt provided the following 

information to Dr. Wren concerning “Sexual Misconduct/Violence” in a document 

entitled “History of Suspension/Expulsion Sanctions”:

• Spring 2011

o Non-student assaulted by students. Complaint filed with 

University Police and adjudicated through Student 

Conduct process. Students found responsible in hearing 

with University Judicial Board and allowed to voluntarily 

withdraw in lieu of separation.

o Student filed complaint against another student via the 

Student Code of Conduct. Student found not responsible 

in hearing with University Judicial Board. 

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• Fall 2011

o Female student makes complaint with University Police 

regarding a sexual assault and through the course of the 

investigation, it was determined the report was unfounded. 

Female student subsequently recanted statement and 

ultimately withdrew from school.

• Spring 2012

o Female student states in an appeal form to Financial Aid 

she was sexually assaulted. Student was contacted by 

University Police and refused to file a complaint about 

incident. 

o Female student makes complaint with University Police 

regarding a sexual assault and recanted statement before 

any actions could be taken. Female student subsequently 

charged with filing a false report through Student Code of 

Conduct. She accepted responsibility and was sanctioned.

• Fall 2012 (please note new Title IX procedures were put in place 

during this term)

o Female student makes report to University Police and 

subsequently a complaint. Student is temporarily 

suspended as emergency measure. Hearing on emergency 

measure held, student subsequently withdraws before 

Student Code of Conduct process could take place.

o Female student makes disclosure to faculty member. RYH 

conducts Title IX investigation but female student refused 

to file a complaint about incident. Investigation document 

available upon request.

• Spring 2013

o Female student makes report to University Police and 

subsequently a complaint which is adjudicated through the 

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Student Code of Conduct. RYH conducts Title IX 

investigation and investigation document available upon 

request. Student found responsible in hearing with Student 

Conduct Board and expelled.8

o Female student makes disclosure to resident assistant. 

RYH conducts Title IX investigation but female student 

refused to file a complaint about incident. Investigation 

document available upon request.

(Doc. 53-7, pp. 18-19). 

After reviewing the information that Dr. Hyatt provided, Dr. Wren, “based on 

[his] knowledge of the events,” wrote in an email to his immediate superior Dr. 

Vistasp Karbhari, UAH’s Provost and Executive Vice President, (Doc. 53-2, p. 7, 

tp. 21):

The first Spring 2011 incident is the one with the [redacted]. They were 

slated to be suspended but never returned to school. 

The first Spring 2012 one is bothersome because we did not pursue 

anything on her behalf. 

The first Fall 2012 incident is the one in the [redacted] that was clearly 

rape. I was not aware that the student withdrew from school.

The first Spring 2013 incident is [L.U.].

The second Spring 2013 incident is the one that [Dr. Hyatt] refuses to

pursue without the consent of the girl.

(Doc. 53-7, p. 17).

8 This incident pertains to L.U.’s assault of Ms. Doe. (Doc. 52-7, p. 17). As noted, though the 

Student Conduct Board recommended expulsion, Dr. Wren overrode the recommendation and 

imposed a two-semester suspension beginning with the Summer 2013 semester. L.U. withdrew 

from UAH before the suspension took effect.

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In short, in Dr. Wren’s words, in the semesters preceding Ms. Doe’s assault, 

UAH had “chosen not to file charges in at least two known instances of forced sex,”

and UAH, to Dr. Wren’s knowledge, had “never expelled anyone for student 

misconduct absent criminal activity.” (Doc. 53-7, p. 15). UAH’s Student Conduct 

Board had fully adjudicated one sexual assault case. The victim in that case was not 

a student, and UAH allowed the student assailants “to voluntarily withdraw in lieu 

of suspension.” (Doc. 53-7, p. 18). In the semesters preceding Ms. Doe’s assault,

UAH expelled one student for academic misconduct. (Doc. 53-7, p. 18).9

• The August 2013 assault

Although Ms. Doe did not list it as an instance of discrimination, consistent 

with Williams, L.U.’s sexual assault of Ms. Doe is an instance of discrimination. 

• UAH’s effort to discourage criminal proceedings

With respect to Ms. Doe’s argument that UAH tried to discourage her from 

bringing criminal charges, Ms. Doe recounts that when Sergeant Beswick 

interviewed her a few hours after the assault, he told her “that ‘people who hang out 

at the hockey dorm share girls all the time’ and that it ‘was completely normal and 

ok to have sex with someone [Ms. Doe] didn’t know.’” (Doc. 54-1, p. 2, ¶ 10). Ms. 

Doe told Sergeant Beswick “that if he did not plan on taking the matter seriously 

9 There is a notation at the top of Doc. 53-7, p. 18 that states, “Spring 2013: Sexual violence –

expulsion.” The notation concerns L.U.’s assault on Ms. Doe. Again, Dr. Wren decided to 

overrule the Student Conduct Board and suspend L.U. rather than expel him. 

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that [she] didn’t want him to contact [her] rapist because [she] was afraid [the rapist]

would retaliate.” (Doc. 54-1, p. 2, ¶ 12).10 Ms. Doe attests that the following day, 

Sergeant Beswick told her that L.U. “had confessed to rape,” but she “would still 

never win in a court of law.” (Doc. 54-1, p. 3, ¶ 13). According to Ms. Doe, Sergeant 

Beswick “encouraged [her] to pursue the matter through the UAH Conduct Board, 

and [she] agreed to do so.” (Doc. 54-1, p. 3, ¶ 13).11 

10 Sergeant Beswick testified that he told Ms. Doe:

if she had engaged in intercourse with this guy and that – nobody was judging her. 

If she was – she was a young lady, if she made a mistake in judgment, no one was 

there to judge her. I just had to know that what she was saying was the truth. She 

said that it wasn’t an error in judgment. She said that it was not her choice. And 

based on her responses, then I said okay.

(Doc. 53-1, p. 7, tp. 20). Sergeant Beswick added:

anytime I get a complaint like this, I always give the purported victim a way out 

without losing face. Sometimes young people, male or female, have – make a 

mistake in judgment. Because of the seriousness of the case, I just needed to verify 

that what she was telling me was in fact the truth. She was very adamant about it, 

so I said okay. 

(Doc. 53-1, p. 7, tp. 21). A jury will have to determine which version of the conversation to 

believe; credibility determinations are the province of the factfinder.

Sergeant Beswick testified that after he saw that Ms. Doe was adamant about the fact that she had 

not consented to having sexual intercourse with L.U., he (Sergeant Beswick) “gave her the various 

options that were available to her, and [he] told her it was her choice.” (Doc. 53-1, p. 8, tp. 23). 

Sergeant Beswick testified that he told Ms. Doe that she could prosecute and that she “would have 

to testify to [her] knowledge and so on.” (Doc. 53-1, p. 8, tpp. 23-24). He told Ms. Doe that her 

second option was to “take it to the university student conduct board,” which could levy sanctions 

against her assailant if the board found him guilty. (Doc. 53-1, p. 8, tp. 24). And Sergeant Beswick 

explained to Ms. Doe that her third option “was to do nothing.” (Doc. 53-1, p. 8, tp. 24). Sergeant 

Beswick testified that he told Ms. Doe that he worked for her and that he would do whatever she 

wanted him to do. (Doc. 53-1, p. 8, tp. 24).

11 In her report concerning her meeting with Ms. Doe the day after the assault, Dr. Hyatt wrote that 

she explained to Ms. Doe that she (Ms. Doe) had three options: filing a criminal complaint, filing 

a “student code of conduct complaint, or do neither.” (Doc. 53-3, p. 16). Dr. Hyatt continued: 

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As noted above, when he received L.U.’s appeal of the Student Conduct 

Board’s decision, Dr. Wren asked in an email whether the Student Conduct Board 

might reconvene and consider “whether this [Student Conduct Code] case should 

have been brought or not.” (Doc. 53-7, p. 15).12

Weeks after Dr. Wren reduced L.U.’s sanction to a deferred suspension, Ms. 

Doe filed criminal charges against L.U., and UAHPD arrested L.U. and charged him 

with first degree rape. (Doc. 53-1, pp. 43-44; Doc. 53-2, p. 32, tp. 119; Doc. 53-6, 

p. 37, tpp. 139-140; Doc. 53-15, pp. 2-3; Doc. 54-1, p. 3, ¶ 20). At the request of 

L.U.’s family, hockey coach Kleinendorst posted bail for L.U. on April 1, 2013, the 

day of the arrest. (Doc. 53-7, p. 54). The following day, Coach Kleinendorst 

tweeted: “Things are not always what they seem. Be careful to judge.” (Doc. 53-

At the time of our conversation, she was unsure what she wanted to do but was 

leaning toward the student code of conduct complaint. She did not wish to pursue 

the criminal charge. . . . At the conclusion of our meeting, [Ms. Doe] indicated that 

she was going to go back over to Campus Police to talk with Sgt. Beswick. Within 

an hour or so from that time, I received a call from University Police indicating that 

[Ms. Doe] asked the Campus Police to file a student code of conduct complaint.

(Doc. 53-3, p. 16). 

12 If UAH’s effort to discourage her from pursuing criminal charges was the only instance of 

discrimination that Ms. Doe alleged, she likely would not have enough evidence to overcome 

UAH’s motion for summary judgment because the record shows that both Officer Beswick and 

Dr. Hyatt discussed with Ms. Doe her options. (Doc. 53-5, p. 2; Doc. 53-2, p. 5, tp. 12). In her 

email to Dr. Hyatt explaining her decision, Ms. Doe wrote: “it was a hard decision, but I think it 

is the best option.” (Doc. 53-2, p. 2). Dr. Wren’s suggestion that Ms. Doe should not have pursued 

charges under UAH’s Code of Conduct is another matter entirely.

 

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14, p. 2).13 Coach Kleinendorst explained that he paid L.U.’s bail because “he did 

not believe it would be right to turn his back on a kid in trouble, especially one with 

no family in the country.” (Doc. 53-7, p. 56). 

Over the next few weeks, “the District Attorney and lawyers from both sides” 

arranged for L.U., a native of Finland, “to leave the country in exchange for the 

[criminal] charges not being pursued.” (Doc. 53-7, p. 55; see also Doc. 54-1, p. 4, ¶ 

22). The District Attorney gave L.U. his passport and rescinded L.U.’s bond so that 

L.U. “would not be in violation of terms of bail if he left the country.” (Doc. 53-7, 

p. 55). 

• UAH’s decision to allow L.U. to remain enrolled at the university 

After Ms. Doe reported her sexual assault, UAH initially elected not to impose 

“emergency measures” which would have removed L.U. from campus because Dr. 

Hyatt did not consider L.U. to be an “ongoing threat.” (Doc. 53-2, p. 7, tp. 21). 

Instead, UAH issued a “no contact” order to L.U. (Doc. 53-2, pp. 7-8, tpp. 21-22).14 

Shortly after she learned from Ms. Morgan that the Student Conduct Board had voted 

13 L.U.’s family eventually reimbursed Coach Kleinendorst, but UAH concluded that the payment 

constituted a secondary violation of NCAA rules. (Doc. 53-7, p. 53). UAH self-reported the 

violation to the NCAA on May 28, 2013. (Doc. 53-7, pp. 54-56).

14 When Officer Beswick delivered Ms. Doe’s complaint to UAH administrators, Ms. Morgan 

drafted a conduct letter to L.U. that explained the charges against him. (Doc. 53-2, p. 6, tp. 14). 

Dr. Hyatt issued a no-contact order that Ms. Morgan included in the letter. The order directed L.U. 

not to have contact with Ms. Doe or her friends. (Doc. 53-2, pp. 7-8, tpp. 21-22).

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to expel L.U., Ms. Doe saw L.U. on campus and became shocked and upset. (Doc. 

54-1, p. 3, ¶ 15).

After the Student Conduct Board recommended that UAH expel L.U., while

Dr. Wren was considering L.U.’s appeal, Dr. Wren wrote in an email to Dr. Hyatt: 

the code of conduct says that suspensions that are levied after the 8th 

week of class will allow the student to complete the semester as long as 

there is not a risk of harm to the campus or other students. Is [L.U.]

considered a risk?

(Doc. 53-3, p. 12). Dr. Hyatt replied: “In general, I would say that any student found 

responsible for sexual violence is a risk to the campus community.” (Doc. 53-3, p.

11). Dr. Wren forwarded Dr. Hyatt’s response to UAH President Robert Altenkirch 

and Dr. Karbhari with the remark: “Here we go again.” (Doc. 53-3, p. 11).15

• UAH’s support and protection of Ms. Doe’s assailant

The evidence of UAH’s overriding concern for L.U. is abundant. President 

Altenkirch wanted to know why Ms. Doe was not charged with alcohol use. (Doc. 

53-3, p. 13).16 

Dr. Karbhari asked the Student Conduct Board to reconvene to reconsider the 

expulsion sanction. (Doc. 53-2, pp. 9-10, tpp. 29-32; Doc. 53-3, pp. 4-5). Dr. 

15 In his deposition, Dr. Wren testified that he does not know what he meant by that remark. (Doc. 

53-6, p. 28, tp. 104).

16 Dr. Hyatt replied that victims of sexual assault typically were granted amnesty for student code 

violations because sanctioning victims would chill victims’ willingness to report sexual assault. 

(Doc. 53-3, p. 13).

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Karbhari did not attend the meeting, but he suggested alternative disciplinary 

measures for consideration such as alcohol and drug treatment (a sanction already 

imposed on L.U. during his term of probation for his previous Student Conduct Code 

violation, (Doc. 53-3, p. 26)) and sexual violence education. (Doc. 53-2, pp. 10-11, 

tpp. 32-34).17 Dr. Hyatt reconvened the Board, and the Board refused to adjust the 

sanction. (Doc. 53-2, p. 10, tp. 31; 53-3, p. 5).

18 

Dr. Wray, the Student Conduct Board Chair for Ms. Doe’s case (Doc. 53-3, 

p. 20), wrote the following explanations for the Board’s decision:

1. [L.U.] had never met [Ms. Doe] . . .

. . .

8. We need to make sure that this doesn’t happen to anyone else.

9. Not expelling him sends the wrong message to women on campus 

and fears that he [may] perpetrate similar infractions.

10. We felt that there was preponderance of evidence that he raped her.

(Doc. 53-3, p. 4). In a typewritten explanation of the Student Conduct Board’s 

decision, Dr. Wray stated:

[L.U.] admitted that he had gone to the third floor of [his dorm], 

escorted [Ms. Doe] down the stairs to his room on the second floor, and 

had sex with [Ms. Doe]. In his testimony, [L.U.] stated that while 

17 Pursuant to UAH’s Student Conduct Code, the Provost and Executive Vice President—at the 

time, Dr. Karbhari—was to review the outcome of the hearings. (Doc. 53-2, p. 9, tp. 27). 

18 Dr. Hyatt testified that this was the only time during her tenure that UAH officials had 

reconvened a Student Conduct Board disposition. (Doc. 53-2, p. 11, tp. 37).

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having sex with [Ms. Doe], he recognized that she was intoxicated. The 

board felt that [L.U.] would have noticed that Ms. [Doe] was 

incapacitated when he first found her covered with a blanket and asleep 

on a couch. Further, it was felt by the board that [Ms. Doe] would have 

had trouble walking down the stairs if she had consumed such a large 

quantity of wine and [L.U.] would have noticed this. 

. . . 

[L.U.] admitted to having sex with the person that was incapacitated 

due to alcohol consumption which is a violation of 13a. of the Student 

Code of Conduct. Further, the board determined that [L.U.] violated 

15d. of the Student Code of Conduct through “violation of federal, 

state, and local law.”

The Hearing Board feels that expulsion is an appropriate sanction due 

to the severity of the infraction and that [L.U.] is currently on probation 

for other incidents on campus.

(Doc. 53-3, p. 20).

Dr. Wren believed the sanction of expulsion was too severe, and he did not 

want to “forever change” L.U.’s future. He preferred suspension because the 

university had suspended students in the past for sexual assaults. (Doc. 53-3, p. 12). 

In an email message to Dr. Hyatt, Dr. Wren wrote:

Before I send some kid home for good and forever change his life, I 

want to be sure that all evidence was on the table and that the case is 

treated consistently with our past behavior. There is a better than likely 

chance that he will sue the university over the expulsion, so we had 

better be certain that there are no holes or gaps in the case, and that we 

can’t be accused of treating him an[y] differently from other similar 

cases. 

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(Doc. 53-7, p. 15).

19 In a March 2013 letter to L.U. explaining the outcome of his 

appeal, Dr. Wren stated that L.U. was “on probation for a code of conduct violation 

(incident number 2012/13-0018)” when he assaulted Ms. Doe, that L.U. had violated 

his probation, and that L.U. was suspended for two academic semesters but the term 

of suspension was “deferred until the end of the Spring 2013 semester.” (Doc. 53-

3, p. 28). UAH suspended L.U. for the Summer 2013 and Fall 2013 semesters, 

banned L.U. from UAH extracurricular activities and university training facilities 

until January 2, 2014, re-imposed a no-contact order, and advised L.U. that future

Student Conduct Code violations of any type would result in immediate expulsion.

(Doc. 53-10, p. 2). 

Nothing in the record indicates that Dr. Wren or any “appropriate person” at 

UAH expressed concern for how rape would, paraphrasing Dr. Wren, “forever 

change [Ms. Doe’s] life.” There is no evidence that Dr. Wren, before he decided to 

allow L.U. to complete his spring semester on campus, asked Ms. Doe what 

19 In addition to serving as the Associate Provost, Dr. Wren served as the Faculty Athletic 

Representative, a position which provided a liaison between UAH’s athletic teams and the 

administration to ensure that the Athletics Department remained compliant with university policy 

and procedures. (Doc. 53-6, p. 4, tp. 33). Dr. Wren described this position as the “president’s 

eyes and ears in athletics” as well as “a go-between between academic affairs and athletics.” (Doc. 

53-6, pp. 4-5, tpp. 9-10). Initially, L.U. asked Dr. Wren to serve as his faculty advisor for his 

hearing before the Student Conduct Board. (Doc. 53-6, p. 10, tp. 32; Doc. 53-7, p. 7). Dr. Wren 

told L.U. that he could not serve as his advisor because he (Dr. Wren) “would be involved in the 

appeals process later.” (Doc. 53-6, p. 10, tp. 33). Reasonable jurors could conclude that Dr. 

Wren’s effort to protect L.U. from the severe sanction of expulsion was not about his concern over 

potential litigation but about his relationship with UAH’s hockey team.

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protection she might feel she needed if she and L.U. were both living on campus. 

There is no evidence that UAH offered Ms. Doe any type of support or 

accommodation to help her cope with her rapist’s continued presence on campus 

after the Student Conduct Board found L.U. guilty of sexual violence and violation 

of the law. 

To the contrary, the evidence suggests that the administrators responsible for 

handling L.U.’s appeal were more critical of Ms. Doe than of L.U. After L.U. 

appealed the expulsion sanction, Ms. Doe contacted Toni Morgan, UAH’s Student 

Conduct Director, and told Ms. Morgan that she wanted the expulsion sanction 

affirmed. (Doc. 53-3, p. 14). Ms. Morgan conveyed Ms. Doe’s message to Dr. 

Wren. Dr. Wren responded, “I’m just kinda floored that she would want to know 

the current status of the case.” (Doc. 53-3, p. 14). He stated: 

If it is our policy to inform the victim at the same time as the defendant, 

surely we don’t tell the victim whether or not the defendant is 

appealing. That seems all kinds of wrong to me, let alone the fact that 

she now wants to give her opinion whether the decision should be 

upheld or not. It seems that if she wants to give me input, then I should 

get the right to interview her.

(Doc. 53-3, p. 14). Reasonable jurors could conclude from these statements that Dr. 

Wren did not accept the Student Conduct Board’s sexual violence finding and that 

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he wanted to question Ms. Doe to see if he could persuade the Student Conduct 

Board to consider “whether this case should have been brought or not.”20 

• Summary of evidence of deliberate indifference

The evidence summarized above, viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. 

Doe, creates a question of fact regarding deliberate indifference. In the semesters 

preceding Ms. Doe’s assault, UAH had a record of choosing not to file charges in 

known instances of forced sex and of allowing students who sexually assaulted 

others to withdraw from the university before the university imposed sanctions that 

would impact the students’ records. In this instance, Ms. Doe demanded action. As 

in Williams, UAH’s police department investigated the assault on Ms. Doe. So did 

Dr. Hyatt. The Student Conduct Board gave the case a full and fair hearing, found 

L.U. responsible for sexual violence and a violation of the law, and recommended 

expulsion.

Then the decisionmakers – the appropriate persons under Title IX – stepped 

in. They ignored the fact that L.U. was on probation when he assaulted Ms. Doe. 

They seemed unphased by the undisputed fact that a male student (who was on 

probation) somehow entered another student’s room and took the intoxicated female 

student he found there to another floor of the dorm under pretense about her safety. 

20 Dr. Wren already had asked Dr. Hyatt if “new evidence” could be presented if there were a “rehearing.” (Doc. 53-3, p. 7). Dr. Hyatt told Dr. Wren that a reinvestigation would be atypical. 

(Doc. 53-3, pp. 7-8).

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Though L.U. challenged on appeal only the severity of the sanction that the Student 

Conduct Board imposed based on its finding that L.U. had engaged in sexual 

violence and violated the law when he raped Ms. Doe, UAH’s Title IX appeal officer 

questioned whether the case should have been brought at all and looked for ways to 

reopen the evidence before the Student Conduct Board. UAH’s vice president 

directed the Student Conduct Board to reconvene and consider alternative 

consequences like alcohol treatment – the very consequence that L.U. had received 

for his prior offense of alcohol abuse. UAH’s president wanted to know why Ms. 

Doe was not charged with alcohol use. UAH’s Title IX appeal officer was indignant 

that Ms. Doe advocated for L.U.’s expulsion after the Student Conduct Board 

recommended expulsion. The appeal officer imposed a reduced sanction that 

allowed L.U. to remain on campus until summer because the officer was concerned 

about the long-term impact that expulsion would have on L.U., and the officer did 

not want L.U. to lose credit for the spring semester that was underway. UAH’s Title 

IX appeal officer didn’t bother to ask Ms. Doe what safeguards she might require to 

help her feel safe while L.U. remained on campus, a campus where UAH’s hockey 

coach publicly advocated for L.U.’s innocence after the Student Conduct Board 

found that L.U. had committed sexual violence and broken the law. When Dr. Hyatt 

suggested that anyone who had been found guilty of sexual violence was a risk to 

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the campus community, UAH’s Title IX appeal officer gibed to UAH’s president 

and vice president: “Here we go again.” 

From these facts, reasonable jurors could conclude that UAH protected a male 

student assailant and was deliberately indifferent to the sexual assault of a female 

student and the safety of the campus community. 

C. Viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Doe, the evidence demonstrates 

that UAH’s conduct was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive 

that it effectively barred Ms. Doe’s access to an educational opportunity 

or benefit.

Ms. Doe’s sexual assault and UAH’s handling of her case impacted her 

educational experience at UAH. After L.U. assaulted her, Ms. Doe attended UAH 

counseling. She was prescribed anti-depression and anti-anxiety medication. (Doc. 

54-79, p. 12). She considered suicide. (Doc. 54-79, p. 12). She reported that she 

was “so scared to be asleep by [her]self that [she] slept in the living room with one 

of [her] roommates for the rest of the semester.” (Doc. 54-79, p. 12). She worked

two jobs and successfully maintained her grades, (Doc. 53-3, p. 14), but she was “so 

terrified of people on campus that she rarely left [her] dorm room except to attend 

classes.” (Doc. 54-79, p. 12). Ms. Doe explained that seeing L.U.’s teammates made 

her “heart drop” and her stomach race. (Doc. 54-79, p. 13). She reported that she 

had “a hard time focusing in classes or when talking to anyone” because her mind 

would “just wander[] back to that night over and over again.” (Doc. 54-79, p. 13). 

When she learned that Dr. Wren had changed L.U.’s sanction and allowed L.U. to 

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remain on campus, she “went to the Dean of Student’s Office and had a breakdown.” 

(Doc. 54-79, p. 15). She “deleted and deactivated all of [her] social media accounts 

for fear of [her] safety.” (Doc. 54-79, p. 17). She did not attend her graduation 

because she was too scared to interact with members of UAH’s administration. 

(Doc. 54-79, p. 16).

In Williams and Hill, the victims of sexual assault immediately left the schools 

that they attended. Ms. Doe opted to stay at UAH, but the evidence indicates that 

her educational experience was forever changed because of L.U.’s assault and the 

university’s response to it. The evidence demonstrates a cycle of discrimination. 

UAH’s administration’s prior disregard of student-on-student assaults and the 

decisionmakers’ effort in Ms. Doe’s case to protect her assailant made Ms. Doe and 

other students vulnerable to “further discrimination” or sexual harassment by L.U. 

or by “like-minded hooligans.” Williams, 477 F.3d at 1295-97. To protect L.U., the 

administrators designed a sanction that would have permitted him to stay on campus 

with Ms. Doe until the end of the spring semester. The only action that UAH took 

to protect Ms. Doe from L.U. during the spring semester was a no-contact order. A 

jury must decide whether that was sufficient to prevent future attacks by a student 

who already was on probation when he assaulted Ms. Doe. 

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IV. CONCLUSION

Having reviewed de novo the evidence in this case, for the reasons stated 

above, the Court denies UAH’s motion for summary judgment. By separate order, 

the Court will set this case for trial.

DONE and ORDERED this 13th day of March, 2020.

 _________________________________

 MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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