Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00911/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00911-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE MANUEL GARCIA,

Petitioner,

v. 

SCOTT KERNAN, Secretary of the 

California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation, 

Respondent.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-00911-H-PCL

ORDER:

(1) ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION; and

(2) DISMISSING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. Nos. 1, 39.]

On April 14, 2016, Petitioner Jose Manuel Garcia, a pro se prisoner at the Mule 

Creek State Prison in Ione, California, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his convictions for: (i) conspiracy to commit murder, Cal. 

Penal Code §§ 182(a)(1), 187(1); (ii) attempted murder through a conspiracy or aiding and 

abetting theory, Cal. Pen Code §§ 187(a), 664; (iii) solicitation of murder, Cal. Penal Code 

§ 653f(b); and (iv) assault with a deadly weapon by a prisoner, Cal. Penal Code § 4501. 

(Doc. No. 1.) On February 20, 2018, the Hon. Peter C. Lewis issued a Report and 

Recommendation recommending that the Court deny all relief. (Doc. No. 39.) Objections 

to the Report and Recommendation were due by March 20, 2018, but Petitioner has not 

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filed objections (or even a traverse) as of the date of this Order. For the reasons that follow, 

the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation as supplemented by the reasoning in this 

Order, and dismisses the petition. 

Background

I. Factual History

The California Court of Appeal described the facts relevant to Petitioner’s case as 

follows:

On July 5, 2010, the victim in this case—Victoriano Ortiz, an inmate at 

Donovan—was walking in a prison yard with two allies, Geronimo Polina 

(“Blue”) and Manuel Gonzalez (“Stomper”). Blue suddenly turned on Ortiz 

and attacked him. Numerous other inmates quickly joined the assault on Ortiz, 

while other inmates attacked Stomper. The prosecution's theory was that the 

attack was the outcome of a power struggle between two rival factions of the 

Mexican Mafia then competing for control of Donovan, one of which was led 

by Ortiz and his “mesa,” and the other led by a mesa composed of [Petitioner]

(“Crazy Joe”), Morones, and two others. The Mexican Mafia seeks to control 

prisons using mesas as a command system, which is in effect a governing 

council. Ordinarily, the chief of the mesa is a “shot-caller” or “key-holder,” 

and he has two or three “helpers” to help run various aspects or areas of the 

prison. The shot-caller and his helpers comprise the mesa. He derives his 

authority to run the prison from a “member” of the Mexican Mafia.

A. The Principal Participants

Morones was an associate in the Mexican Mafia serving a life sentence at 

Donovan. His eventual ally, [Petitioner], is also an active Mexican Mafia 

associate. Ortiz testified at trial about the structure of the Mexican Mafia. At 

the bottom of the organizational pyramid are “southsiders,” all members of 

Hispanic street gangs in southern California. These gang members must remit 

“taxes” (a portion of the proceeds of their illegal activity) to the Mexican 

Mafia. The next higher level consists of “surenos” or “soldiers,” gang 

members who have garnered authority and more respect than southsiders by 

working for the Mexican Mafia, collecting taxes or enforcing orders through 

violent attacks. Above the surenos are “associates,” who have worked their 

way up and are close to “members” (also referred to as “carnals”) of the 

Mexican Mafia. At the top of the pyramid are the carnals, who can order 

someone killed or assaulted (also called “giving the green light”) if the target 

is not respecting the authority of the Mexican Mafia. Such an order must be 

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followed by all persons within the structure. Orders to attack someone, when

issued by the mesa operating under a carnal's authority to run a prison, must 

be treated with the same obedience.

Ortiz was an associate in the Mexican Mafia and was incarcerated at Donovan 

to serve time for an assault he committed on its behalf. Ortiz believed his 

authority to run Donovan derived from his association with and permission 

from Richard Buchanon.

B. The Power Struggle for Control of Donovan and the Attack on Ortiz

Ortiz arrived at Donovan in March 2010 and almost immediately sent out 

word, through “kites” and word of mouth, that he was now in charge of 

Donovan and whoever was in charge needed to step down or risk being 

assaulted. “Kites” are small handwritten notes by which messages are 

surreptitiously passed to other inmates within the prison (either between cells 

within a cell block or even between cell blocks) or to persons outside the 

prison. Ortiz also formed his mesa, which included Stomper (Ortiz's righthand man), an inmate named “Pino,” and Morones. At one point, Morones 

asked Ortiz for paperwork containing Ortiz's authority, but Buchanon had 

verbally authorized Ortiz to run Donovan.

Another group apparently disagreed with Ortiz's attempt to exert control, and 

Ortiz believed this group was trying to challenge his authority. The group 

included Morones, who had been in a dispute with Stomper, and Pablo Franco 

(“Casper”). That group began sending kites asserting its authority to run 

Donovan, which those in the group believed was derived from another carnal, 

and included messages to Ortiz that Ortiz “had something coming.”

When Ortiz noticed that southsiders were beginning to follow Morones's 

group, he tried to reassert his authority because there can only be one mesa 

running a prison. Ortiz's efforts to regain control included writing a kite to 

Morones asking to resolve the power struggle (an offer that did not bear fruit) 

and challenging Casper to a fight, which Casper declined. Ortiz interpreted 

Casper's response as acquiescing to Ortiz's authority, and he sent a kite to 

Casper indicating they both were now working under Buchanon's authority. 

Ortiz formed a new mesa, including Stomper, Blue and Isaac Balesteros 

(“Lazy”). For the next month, everything appeared calm with Ortiz in control.

However, in late June or early July, problems over control reemerged after 

Rudy Espudo (“Crazy Boy”), a carnal, was temporarily incarcerated at 

Donovan. Espudo gave authority over Donovan to Morones, [Petitioner]

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(Morones's cellmate), and two other inmates (Casper and an inmate with the 

moniker “Oso”). Almost immediately, [Petitioner] began yelling on the tier 

of their cell block that he had “authority” and threatened that Ortiz and 

Stomper had “something coming”, which Ortiz understood to mean he was 

targeted for attack. Ortiz also saw kites written by [Petitioner] and Morones 

ordering Ortiz be “whacked” with “no exceptions.”

Authorities had placed [Petitioner] in a cell that was surreptitiously wired, 

and, during this period, numerous recordings were made of conversations 

between Morones and [Petitioner], as well as of conversations they had with 

other inmates. Some of the recordings from July 2, 2010 (three days before 

the attack on Ortiz and Stomper) showed that Morones had already begun 

writing a kite to Lazy when [Petitioner] began contributing to the kite. 

[Petitioner] told Morones to ensure that the kite declare Espudo's direct orders 

had established the new mesa, and the new mesa was ordering both Lazy and 

Blue (members of Ortiz's inner circle) to whack Ortiz and Stomper “on this 

next yard with no exceptions.” The next day, July 3, [Petitioner] and Morones 

discussed whether Ortiz was going to come out to the yard and that he had 

group yard, and appellant said, “[T]hat's a good thing, that way we can blast 

the fuck out of him.”

When Ortiz went to walk in the prison yard on July 5, 2010, he knew he was 

risking his safety because there was a chance he would be assaulted. 

However, he believed he still had authorization to run Donovan and could not 

show fear, so he nevertheless went into the yard. As Ortiz was walking with 

two of his allies (Blue and Stomper), Blue suddenly turned on Ortiz and began 

punching and cutting at him. Other inmates joined in the attack on Ortiz while 

yet another group of inmates attacked Stomper. Although correctional 

officers responded by ordering the inmates to get down, and thereafter by 

firing some shots when the inmates ignored the command, the attackers did 

not immediately cease but instead continued stabbing Ortiz and banging his 

head against a wall. Ortiz suffered head and other injuries from the attack.

People v. Garcia, No. D062370, 2014 WL 630307, at *2–3 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2014)

(formatting altered). These facts are presumed correct unless there is clear and convincing 

evidence to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner has not argued that the Court 

of Appeal committed any factual errors. 

II. Procedural History

In November of 2011, a jury convicted Petitioner of (i) conspiracy to commit 

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murder, Cal. Penal Code §§ 182(a)(1), 187(1); (ii) attempted murder through a conspiracy 

or aiding and abetting theory, Cal. Pen Code §§ 187(a), 664; (iii) solicitation of murder, 

Cal. Penal Code § 653f(b); and (iv) assault with a deadly weapon by a prisoner, Cal. Penal 

Code § 4501. (Doc. No. 32-13, Trial Tr., PageID 1667–69.) The San Diego County 

Superior Court sentenced Petitioner to 25 years to life plus 19 years determinate. (Doc. 

No. 8-11, Cal. Ct. App. Habeas Op’n, PageID 1307.)

Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence to the Fourth District Court of 

Appeal. On February 19, 2014, the Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s claims of 

instructional error and ineffective assistance of counsel, but agreed that the trial court had 

incorrectly calculated Petitioner’s sentence. Garcia, 2014 WL 630307, at *14. The 

California Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s petition for review on June 11, 

2014. (Doc. No. 32-22.) Petitioner was sentenced to 25 years to life plus 9 years

determinate on remand. (Doc. No. 8-11 PageID 1307.)

On December 29, 2014, Petitioned filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 

Superior Court, raising claims for: (i) insufficiency of the evidence; (ii) entrapment; 

(iii) juror bias and misconduct; (iv) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (v) ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel; (vi) erroneous imposition of fines and fees; (vii) cruel and 

unusual punishment; and (viii) cumulative error. (Doc. No. 32-23.) The Superior Court 

concluded that Petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing on any of his claims and 

denied all relief. (Doc. No. 32-25.)

Petitioner subsequently re-raised the same claims in habeas petitions filed before the 

Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court. The Court of Appeal held that all of 

Petitioner’s claims were untimely, and thus procedurally barred, and in the alternative 

rejected the claims on the merits. (Doc. No. 32-27.) The California Supreme Court 

summarily denied relief on October 14, 2015. (Doc. No. 32-29.)

On April 14, 2016, Petitioner filed the instant petition, which re-asserts the same 

claims that were denied three times by the California courts. (Doc. No. 1.) After initial 

motion practice, Respondent answered the petition on May 10, 2017. (Doc. No. 31.) 

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Although the Magistrate Judge granted Petitioner multiple extensions of time, (Doc. Nos. 

34, 37), Petitioner has not filed a traverse as of the date of this Order.

On February 20, 2018, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation 

concluding that Petitioner’s claims are untimely, procedurally defaulted, and otherwise fail 

on the merits. (Doc. No. 39.) Although objections to the Report and Recommendation 

were due by March 20, 2018, Petitioner has not filed any objections as of the date of this 

Order. 

III. Standard of Review

Petitioner’s claims are governed by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act (“AEDPA”). Under AEDPA, “a district court shall entertain an application for a writ 

of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court 

only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties 

of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). “An application for a writ of habeas corpus 

. . . shall not be granted unless it appears that (A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies 

available in the courts of the State.” Id. § 2254(b)(1)(A). Additionally, an “application for 

a writ of habeas corpus . . . shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was 

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; 

or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Id. § 2254(d)(1)–(2).

In determining whether to defer to a state court’s denial of a habeas petitioner’s 

claims, the Court reviews the reasoning of the last state court to have denied the claims on 

the merits. Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). In this case, the California 

Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s claims without explanation. (Doc. No. 32-29.) The 

Court must thus “‘look through’ the unexplained decision to the last related state-court 

decision that does provide a relevant rationale” and “then presume that the unexplained 

decision adopted the same reasoning.” Id. The Court therefore focuses its attention on the 

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California Court of Appeal’s denial of Petitioner’s application for post-conviction relief. 

(Doc. No. 32-27.) 

 The Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s state habeas petition as “untimely” and thus 

“procedurally barred” because Petitioner “waited more than two years after he was 

sentenced to assert” his claims, and “offered no explanation for the delay.” (Id. PageID

5094 (citing In re Reno, 55 Cal. 4th 428, 459 (2012), and In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 300, 302 

(1949)).) “In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state 

court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review 

of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual 

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to 

consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). The Supreme Court has held that California’s 

timeliness rule for state habeas petitions constitutes an independent and adequate state 

procedural ground barring subsequent habeas relief in federal court. See Walker v. Martin, 

562 U.S. 307, 317 (2011); see also Ayala v. Chappell, 829 F.3d 1081, 1095 (9th Cir. 

2016) (“Walker holds that California's timeliness rule is an independent and adequate state 

law ground sufficient to bar federal habeas relief on untimely claims.”). However, AEDPA 

gives district courts discretion to deny habeas petitions on the merits following de novo 

review notwithstanding any potential procedural default. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“An 

application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the 

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.”); 

Flournoy v. Small, 681 F.3d 1000, 1004 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (“While we ordinarily resolve 

the issue of procedural bar prior to any consideration of the merits on habeas review, we 

are not required to do so when a petition clearly fails on the merits.”); see also Berghuis v. 

Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 390 (2010) (“Courts can . . . deny writs of habeas corpus under 

§ 2254 by engaging in de novo review when it is unclear whether AEDPA deference 

applies, because a habeas petitioner will not be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus if his or 

her claim is rejected on de novo review.”).

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Discussion

After reviewing the petition de novo, the Court concludes that all of Petitioner’s 

claims fail on the merits. The Court thus exercises its discretion to sidestep any analysis 

of procedural default. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). The Court also agrees with the Report 

and Recommendation that Petitioner’s claims are time barred. 

I. Merits Analysis

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Petitioner first argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove his 

specific intent to kill Ortiz and Gonzalez beyond a reasonable doubt. (Doc. No. 1 PageID 

36–39.) In Jackson v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that “the critical inquiry on review 

of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must be not simply to 

determine whether the jury was properly instructed, but to determine whether the record 

evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U.S. 

307, 318 (1979) (footnote omitted). This “inquiry does not require a court to ‘ask itself 

whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt.’” Id. at 318–19 (emphasis in original) (quoting Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 282 

(1966)). “Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319 (emphasis in original).

At trial, the prosecution played audio recordings of Petitioner calling for Ortiz and 

Gonzalez’s deaths, and also presented evidence that Petitioner wanted to kill Ortiz and 

Gonzalez to establish control of the prison. (Doc. No. 32-13 PageID 3833–34.) Petitioner 

argues that this evidence is insufficient to prove his specific intent to kill because he was 

actually a confidential informant for the State, and that he was only pretending to cooperate 

in the conspiracy to further the objectives of law enforcement. (Doc. No. 1 PageID 38.) 

However, the prosecution put on evidence that Petitioner was specifically admonished not 

to commit any further crimes while acting as an informant, and that he was not authorized 

to participate in the murder conspiracy. (Doc. No. 32-13 PageID 3838–39.) A rational 

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jury could have believed the government’s evidence and found that Petitioner’s actions 

were outside the scope of his confidential informant relationship with the State. The Court 

therefore finds the evidence sufficient to support Petitioner’s convictions.

 B. Juror Bias

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a trial by an impartial jury comprised of 

“indifferent” jurors. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961); Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 

970, 973 (9th Cir. 1998). Jurors must decide the case solely on the evidence. Smith v. 

Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982). A defendant’s right to a fair trial is denied if even a 

single juror is biased. Dyer, 151 F.3d at 973.

Impartiality, however, does not require a lack of any preconceptions about the 

defendant or the case. A presumption of impartiality applies if jurors provide assurances 

that they can “lay aside [their] impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the 

evidence presented in court.” Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800 (1975) (quoting Irvin, 

366 U.S. at 723). “To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the 

guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a 

prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard.” Irvin, 366 

U.S. at 723. The presumption is overcome only “by demonstrating that the juror actually 

held a biased opinion.” Ybarra v. McDaniel, 656 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2011)

Moreover, “not every incident of juror misconduct requires a new trial.” United 

States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394, 396 (9th Cir. 1974). “The test is whether or not the 

misconduct has prejudiced the defendant to the extent that he has not received a fair 

trial.” Id. On habeas review, to obtain relief, a petitioner must show that the misconduct 

had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict. Henry v. Ryan, 

720 F.3d 1073, 1085 (9th Cir. 2013); Sassounian v. Roe, 230 F.3d 1097, 1108 (9th Cir. 

2000). Additionally, trial court determinations “on juror impartiality deserve a high 

measure of deference.” See Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 525 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

Petitioner alleges that a number of the jurors in his case were biased against him, 

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and that the state trial court erred in failing to excuse these jurors. The Court will address 

each claim of juror bias in turn.

1. Juror Nos. 4, 8, 9, and 10

Petitioner argues that Juror Nos. 4, 8, 9, and 10 were each impliedly biased against 

him. (Doc. No. 1 PageID 41–42.) The Ninth Circuit has explained that:

Implied bias is “bias conclusively presumed as a matter of law.” [United 

States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000)], quoting 47 

Am.Jur.2d Jury § 266 (1995). The inquiry here is “whether an average person 

in the position of the juror in controversy would be prejudiced.” Id. at 

1112, quoting United States v. Cerrato-Reyes, 176 F.3d 1253, 1260-61 (10th 

Cir. 1999) (emphases and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, we have 

presumed a challenged juror's bias “where the relationship between a 

prospective juror and some aspect of the litigation is such that it is highly 

unlikely that the average person could remain impartial in his deliberations 

under the circumstances.” Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 527 (9th Cir. 1990), 

quoting Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 664 (4th Cir. 1988). We have 

cautioned, however, that bias should be presumed only in “extreme” or 

“extraordinary” cases. Tinsley, 895 F.2d at 527, quoting Smith v. 

Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 222, 223 n. *, (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see 

also Fields, 503 F.3d at 770 (holding that bias should be presumed only in 

“extreme situations”).

United States v. Mitchell, 568 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir. 2009).

Petitioner argues that Juror Nos. 4, 8, 9, and 10 were all impliedly biased against 

him because they either worked in law enforcement (Juror No. 4 was a probation officer), 

had friends or family members in law enforcement or law school (Juror Nos. 4, 9, and 10), 

or had been jurors in past civil or criminal trials (Juror Nos. 4, 8, and 10). (Doc. No. 1 

PageID 41–42.) However, none of these benign and commonplace characteristics, without 

more, even arguably show that this is the “extreme or extraordinary” case “where the 

relationship between a prospective juror and some aspect of the litigation is such that it is 

highly unlikely that the average person could remain impartial in his deliberations under 

the circumstances.” Mitchell, 568 F.3d at 1151 (citation omitted); see also Cruz v. Ryan, 

No. CV-13-0389-TUC-JGZ, 2018 WL 1524026, at *38 (D. Ariz. Mar. 28, 2018) (“Courts 

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have declined to find implied bias when a juror works in law enforcement or is related to a 

police officer.”); Jill Gustafson et al., 47 Am.Jur.2d Jury § 245 n.2 (May 2018 Update) 

(collecting cases for the proposition that the “fact that prospective jurors have served on a 

jury in a criminal prosecution against another defendant charged with a similar offense 

does not require their disqualification”). Because Petitioner has put forward no evidence 

of actual bias, his juror bias claims against Juror Nos. 4, 8, 9, and 10 necessarily fail.

2. Juror No. 1

During Petitioner’s trial, a large man who Petitioner’s trial counsel suspected as 

being a member of the Mexican Mafia spoke with Juror No. 1, inquiring about the case. 

(Doc. No. 32-11 PageID 3641–51.) Juror No. 1 told the man that she could not discuss the 

case, and reported the contact to the trial court. (Id.) The trial court held a hearing outside 

of the presence of the jury to discuss the incident, and was told by court security staff that 

several jurors had expressed fear of the large man, who had been escorted out of the 

courthouse. (Id.) The trial court asked Juror No. 1 whether she could remain fair and 

impartial in light of the incident, and Juror No. 1 responded that she could. (Id.) The trial 

court then called the rest of the jury back into the courtroom, and asked if any among them 

had been affected by the incident, or otherwise could not continue to be fair and impartial. 

(Id.) No jurors indicated any concerns. (Id.) 

Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by failing to declare a mistrial. (Doc. No. 

1 PageID 65–76.) However, the trial court conducted a hearing inquiring into the incident, 

see Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954), thoroughly questioned Juror No. 

1, learned that the improper contact had not been detailed or extensive, and ascertained that 

Juror No. 1 (and the rest of the jurors) could continue to be fair and impartial going forward. 

The trial court’s findings are entitled to deference on habeas review. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 

at 1112 (“Because determinations of impartiality may be based in large part upon 

demeanor, this court typically accords deference to the [trial court’s] determinations, and 

reviews a court’s findings regarding actual juror bias ‘for manifest error’ or abuse of 

discretion.”). Petitioner has not made a sufficient showing to demonstrate that actual bias 

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infected the jury’s deliberations.

3. Juror No. 7

During trial, Juror No. 7 alerted the trial court that she found defense counsel’s sideconversations during the prosecution’s remarks irritating. (Doc. No. 1 PageID 58–65.) 

After this incident, defense counsel alleged that Juror No. 7 consistent gave the defense 

team “dirty looks.” (Id.) The trial court subsequently asked the jury whether anything had 

changed that had diminished their ability to be fair and impartial, and no juror indicated

any problems. (Id.) Later, Petitioner alleges that Juror No. 7 looked at the defense table 

and laughed/choked in the direction of defense counsel. (Id.) The trial court asked Juror 

No. 7 whether anything was amiss, and she indicated that she had choked on her gum. (Id.) 

Petitioner claims that Juror No. 7 exhibited actual bias in her “rude” behavior. 

However, the trial court was in the best position to observe Juror No. 7’s behavior and 

demeanor, and did not find her deportment problematic enough to warrant further 

exploration despite defense counsel’s objections. The record furnishes no basis for this 

Court to second-guess the trial court’s management of Juror No. 7. 

4. Alternate Juror No. 1

Finally, Petitioner alleges that Alternate Juror No. 1 was impliedly biased against 

him because she knew the prosecution’s gang expert socially through her husband’s 

employment. (Doc. No. 1 PageID 48.) However, Alternate Juror No. 1 did not participate 

in the jury’s deliberations, and the record discloses no evidence that Alternate Juror No. 1 

discussed the case with any of the deliberating jurors. Thus, even assuming that Alternate 

Juror No. 1 was biased against Petitioner, that bias cannot have tainted Petitioner’s trial. 

See Meza v. McDonald, No. CV 10–3682–JFW (PLA), 2012 WL 2159912, at *29 (C.D. 

Cal. May 18, 2012) (rejecting claim that alternate juror was biased where Petitioner did 

“not cite any evidence that any deliberating juror was prejudiced, improperly influenced, 

or exhibited any undue bias”); report and recommendation adopted 2012 WL 2159858 

(C.D. Cal. June 11, 2012).

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 C. Sentencing Fine

Petitioner argues that the trial court exceeded its authority under the California Penal 

Code when it imposed a restitution fine and other fees. (Doc. No. 1 PageID 85.) However, 

as Respondent notes and the Magistrate Judge correctly determined, the Ninth Circuit has 

“repeatedly recognized that the imposition of a fine, by itself, is not sufficient to meet 

§ 2254’s jurisdictional requirements.” Bailey v. Hill, 599 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Thus, “§ 2254 does not confer jurisdiction over a state prisoner’s in-custody challenge to a 

restitution order imposed as part of a criminal sentence.” Id. at 982. Accordingly, the 

Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s argument. 

 D. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Petitioner next argues that his sentence of twenty-five years to life plus various gang 

enhancements amounts to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment because it is grossly disproportionate to the offense for which it was imposed. 

(Doc. No. 1 PageID 87.) See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983). The Court 

disagrees. The Supreme Court has upheld a sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison 

for stealing a set of golf clubs under California’s three strikes law against an Eighth 

Amendment challenge. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003). By contrast, 

Petitioner was convicted of conspiring to commit murder—the most serious crime 

recognized in American law. This is not the “exceedingly rare” case where a sentence is 

“grossly disproportionate” to the crime. See Taylor v. Lewis, 460 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th 

Cir. 2006) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

 E. Entrapment

Petitioner additionally argues that he was entrapped by the government into entering 

the murder conspiracy. (Doc. No. 1 PageID 92–100.) Petitioner alleges that while working 

as a confidential information for the government, he was placed in the middle of a power 

struggle at Donovan without his consent and forced to play the role of a gang member to 

protect himself and his family. (Id.) He alleges that officers knew he would not be able to 

avoid detection as a confidential informant if he did not join the murder conspiracy. (Id.) 

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The Ninth Circuit has explained that:

While it can be slight, there still must be some evidence demonstrating the 

elements of the defense before an instruction must be given. 

The entrapment defense has two elements: “(1) the defendant was induced to 

commit the crime by a government agent, and (2) he was not otherwise 

predisposed to commit the crime.” United States v. Barry, 814 F.2d 1400, 

1401 (9th Cir. 1987). We have held that “[a] defendant is not entitled to have 

the issue of entrapment submitted to the jury in the absence of evidence 

showing some inducement by a government agent and a lack of predisposition 

by the defendant.” United States v. Rhodes, 713 F.2d 463, 467 (9th Cir.

1983); see also United States v. Busby, 780 F.2d 804, 806 (9th Cir.

1986) (“The trial court will instruct on entrapment only if the defendant 

presents some evidence of both elements of the entrapment defense.”).

United States v. Spentz, 653 F.3d 815, 818 (9th Cir. 2011) (footnote omitted). 

Here, Petitioner has put forward no evidence whatsoever that any government agent 

either encouraged or authorized Petitioner to enter into the murder conspiracy. To the 

contrary, the State introduced evidence at trial that officers specifically admonished 

Petitioner not to commit any crimes. (Doc. No. 32-13 PageID 3838–39.) Moreover, as the 

trial court observed, even “if there had been outrageous government misconduct in this 

case, which there was not, a normal law-abiding person would not resort to murder in an 

attempt to dominate and control prison gang activities.” (Doc. No. 32-25 PageID 4849–

50.) Petitioner’s entrapment claim is without merit. 

 F. Cumulative Error

Petitioner argues that each of the alleged errors discussed above, even if harmless in 

isolation, together rendered his trial unconstitutional. (Doc. No. 1 PageID 89.) See United 

States v. Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370, 1381 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining the cumulative error 

doctrine). However, “where there is no single constitutional error existing, nothing can 

accumulate to the level of a constitutional violation.” Fuller v. Roe, 182 F.3d 699, 704 (9th 

Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000). 

Because Petitioner has not identified any actual constitutional errors, there can be no 

cumulative error.

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 G. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Finally, Petitioner argues that his trial and appellate lawyers were ineffective for 

failing to press the alleged errors discussed above. (Doc. No. 1 PageID 76–84.) Because 

none of Petitioner’s claims identify actual errors, however, his lawyers were not ineffective 

for failing to press them. See, e.g., Sexton v. Cozner, 679 F.3d 1150, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(counsel was not ineffective “merely because he declined to raise meritless claims”).

II. Statute of Limitations

Although the Court concludes that Petitioner’s claims fail on the merits, the Court 

also agrees with Respondent and the Report and Recommendation that the claims are all 

time-barred. AEDPA requires state prisoners to file federal habeas claims within one year 

after receiving an adverse judgment from a state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Relevant 

here, the one year limitation clock began to run on “the date on which the judgment became 

final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 

review,” id. § 2244(d)(1)(A), but was tolled during the “time during which a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim [was] pending.” Id. § 2244(d)(2). This tolling does not operate “from 

the time a final decision is issued on direct state appeal and the time the first state collateral 

challenged is filed because there is no case ‘pending’ during that interval.” Nino v. Galaza, 

183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). Neither does this tolling apply during the period a 

state habeas petition is pending if that petition is ultimately rejected as untimely. Pace v. 

Diguglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005).

Here, the California Supreme Court denied review of Petitioner’s convictions on 

June 11, 2014, and his conviction became final 90 days later on September 10, 2014 when 

the time for filing a petition for certiorari expired. Petitioner did not submit the instant 

petition to prison officials to be filed until April 7, 2016—576 days later. During the 

intervening period, AEDPA’s statute of limitations was tolled for 28 days from December 

18, 2014 through January 14, 2015, while the trial court considered his state habeas 

petition. It was not tolled while the Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court 

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considered Petitioner’s claims, however, because the Court of Appeal rejected the petition 

as untimely, Pace, 544 U.S. at 417, and the Court must assume that the California Supreme 

Court rested its denial on the same basis. Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1192. Accordingly, 

Petitioner filed this action 183 days after AEDPA’s statute of limitations expired.

Petitioner argues that AEDPA’s statute of limitations should be equitably tolled 

because he and his jailhouse lawyer were transferred to different prisons while Petitioner 

was trying to put together his state habeas petitions, making coordination difficult. (Doc. 

No. 27 PageID 1658–59.) Equitable tolling of AEDPA’s statute of limitations is available 

only when a petitioner shows “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and 

(2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” 

Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418). The 

circumstances identified by Petitioner are not “extraordinary,” and do not justify equitable 

tolling. See, e.g., Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2010) (an inmate’s 

“reliance on helpers who were transferred or too busy to attend to his petitions” does not 

justify equitable tolling because “these circumstances are hardly extraordinary given the 

vicissitudes of prison life”); Lindsey v. Davis, No. EDCV 17–956–BRO (GJS), 2017 WL 

5198155, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2017) (“Reliance on the assistance of other inmates 

cannot meet the extraordinary circumstances requirement, because this is a common 

incident of prison life.”), report and recommendation adopted 2017 WL 5198157 (C.D. 

Cal. Nov. 8, 2017); Amavisca v. Scribner, No. CV F 05-1632 SMS HC, 2006 WL 3635461, 

at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2006) (no equitable tolling where petitioner claimed “that prison 

transfers interfered with his obtaining assistance for a jailhouse lawyer”).1

 

1

 The Federal Magistrates Act provides that: “Within fourteen days after being served with a copy, 

any party may serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as 

provided by rules of court. A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of 

the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1). “The statute makes it clear that the district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings 

and recommendations the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, 

but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) 

(emphasis in original); see also Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 939 (1991) (“[T]o the extent ‘de 

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Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that each of Petitioner’s claims fail 

on the merits under de novo review, and are otherwise time-barred. The Court accordingly 

adopts the Report and Recommendation as supplemented by the reasoning in this Order, 

dismisses the petition, and directs the Clerk to enter judgment in favor of Respondent. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 21, 2018

 

 MARILYN L HUFF, District Judge

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 

novo review is required to satisfy Article III concerns, it need not be exercised unless requested by the 

parties.’” (quoting United States v. Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1985) (Kennedy, J.))). Here, 

Petitioner has failed to file any written objections to the Report and Recommendation, and has thus waived 

his right to review. Although the Court has exercised its discretion to review Petitioner’s claims de novo, 

the Court does not excuse Petitioner’s waiver. 

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