Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01203/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01203-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MONICO J. QUIROGA,

Plaintiff,

v.

FOOD SERVICE, 

Defendant.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:15-cv-01203 DLB

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Monico J. Quiroga (“Plaintiff”), an inmate in the custody of the Kern County 

Sheriff’s Department, is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on August 4, 2015. 

On November 13, 2015, the Court screened the complaint and dismissed it with leave to 

amend. Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint on February 22, 2016. He names the “Staff 

Cook” at the “Donny Youngblood Facility” as the sole Defendant.1

A. SCREENING STANDARD

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

 

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Plaintiff consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge on November 2, 2015.

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“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall 

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or 

other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 

1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); 

Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff’s allegations must link the actions 

or omissions of each named defendant to a violation of his rights; there is no respondeat superior 

liability under section 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 

F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 

2009); Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. Plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a 

plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 

969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility 

standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

B. ALLEGATIONS IN COMPLAINT

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the Lerdo-Max Medical Facility in Bakersfield, 

California. The events at issue occurred while Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Lerdo Pre-Trial 

Facility in Lerdo, California.

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Plaintiff alleges that on July 12, 2015, at dinner, he was given half of a food portion. 

Plaintiff contends that this is an ongoing problem and that he has been deprived of his daily 

nutritional allowance.

On January 9, 2016, Plaintiff was not fed dinner. He contends that he keeps getting “half 

trays of main course- 6 oz. sometimes 5 oz. when it should be 8 oz.” ECF No. 15, at 4. 

A couple of times per month, Plaintiff receives a sack lunch for dinner, as he did on 

February 1, 2016. Plaintiff suggests that this does not meet his protein needs, and he is hungry as 

a result.

Plaintiff alleges that the Cook failed to serve full servings again on February 2, 2016, and 

he received a sack lunch for two nights in a row, rather than a hot meal. Plaintiff states that he lost 

twenty-nine pounds while in custody.

Plaintiff argues that the deprivation was cruel and unusual punishment, and contends that 

inmates should not be deprived of daily nutrition “by not receiving dinner or a hot meal.” ECF 

No. 15, at 5. 

C. DISCUSSION

In the prior screening order, the Court explained that it would consider Plaintiff to be a 

pretrial detainee at the time of the events and instructed Plaintiff to advise the Court if this was not 

the case. Plaintiff has not disagreed with the Court’s characterization.

As a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff is protected from conditions of confinement which amount 

to punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-36, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979); Simmons v. Navajo 

County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017-18 (9th Cir. 2010); Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 

F.3d 1232, 1244 (9th Cir. 2010). This right is violated if restrictions are “imposed for the purpose 

of punishment.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861. There is no constitutional infringement, 

however, if restrictions are “but an incident of some other legitimate government purpose.” Id. In 

such a circumstance, governmental restrictions are permissible. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 

739, 748, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (holding that the pretrial detention contemplated 

by the Bail Reform Act is regulatory in nature, and does not constitute punishment before trial in 

violation of the Due Process Clause).

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Plaintiff’s claim is based on his contention that he should not be denied dinner or a hot 

meal. He also takes issue with receiving less than a full portion on various occasions, and 

suggests that the sack lunches that he receives are not sufficient to meet his protein needs.

Certainly, inmates must be provided with food that is nutritionally adequate to maintain 

health. LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th Cir.1993). However, to rise to the level of a 

constitutional violation, the deprivation must amount to punishment. Not every disability imposed 

during pretrial detention constitutes “punishment” in the constitutional sense. Bell, 441 U.S. at 

537. To constitute punishment, the harm caused by the action or condition “must either 

significantly exceed, or be independent of, the inherent discomforts of confinement.” Demery v. 

Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1030 (9th Cir.2004) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff again fails to allege that the deprivation amounted to punishment, i.e., that the 

deprivation significantly exceeded, or was independent of, the inherent discomforts of 

confinement. While Plaintiff states that receiving a half portion of food was an ongoing problem, 

he identifies only one instance where he received a half portion, and one instance when he did not 

receive a meal. Plaintiff also suggested that on two occasions, he received a sack lunch with 

insufficient protein, rather than a hot meal. These alleged deprivations do not significantly exceed 

the inherent discomforts of confinement and do not amount to punishment. 

The Court also notes that Plaintiff’s allegation that he lost weight while in custody, alone, 

is not sufficient to constitute harm. Jayne v. Bosenko, 2014 WL 2801198, at *5 (E.D.Cal. 2014). 

Rather, weight loss leading to, or accompanied by, other maladies may suffice. Id. Plaintiff 

makes no such allegations.

For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.

D. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s complaint does not state any cognizable claims against any Defendant. Plaintiff 

will be given one final opportunity to amend, if he believes, in good faith, he can cure the 

identified deficiencies. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012); Lopez v. Smith, 

203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). 

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If Plaintiff amends, he may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated 

claims in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).

If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, it should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but under 

section 1983, it must state what each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights and liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under the mere 

theory of respondeat superior, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-07 

(9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2101 (2012). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual 

allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. . .” Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).

Finally, an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Lacey v. Maricopa 

County, 693 F.3d 896, 907 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be “complete in itself without 

reference to the prior or superceded pleading,” Local Rule 220. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must 

file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this 

order; 

4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed, without

prejudice, for failure to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 11, 2016 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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