Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00988/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00988-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Danielle Powers, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Arizona Department of Corrections, 

Defendant.

No. CV-13-00988-PHX-NVW

ORDER 

 Before the Court are Defendant Arizona Department of Corrections’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment (Doc. 41), Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition (Doc. 47), and 

Defendant’s Reply (Doc. 49). For the following reasons, Defendant’s Motion will be 

granted. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff Danielle Powers formerly served as a corrections officer for Defendant 

Arizona Department of Corrections. At all relevant times, Powers worked at the 

Department’s Eyman complex in Florence, Arizona. The Eyman complex comprises five 

separate units. In March 2011, Powers rotated into the Meadows Unit. Corrections officer 

Deonté Carter also worked in the Meadows Unit. Doc. 42 at 2–3. 

On August 21, 2011, the Department’s EEO liaison emailed the complex’s warden 

after overhearing Powers and a coworker discuss Carter’s sexually inappropriate behavior. 

Doc. 48 at 28. The next day, the warden transferred Carter to the Cook Unit and instructed 

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him not to work the Meadows Unit to prevent contact with Powers pending review. 

Subsequently, the Department ordered a fact-finding investigation to substantiate the 

liaison’s email. Id.; Doc. 42 at 4. On October 28, 2011, the Department suspended Carter 

for 40 hours leave without pay. The Department provided its reasons by letter: 

Two female staff members reported independently that in 2011, on 

several occasions, you had encroached on their personal space and touched 

them. 

On one occasion you sat in very close proximity to a female staff 

member when you reached out and touched her hand with your hand. On 

another occasion, it was reported by the same staff member that while she was 

trying to pass an inmate ID card through the center fence, you reached through 

the fence gap and stroked her arm with both your hands from the elbow to her 

hand. 

Another female officer reported that while engaged in a conversation 

with her you reached over and rubbed her knee and she told you to stop. This 

same officer reports that you then attempted to rub her shoulders and again 

was told to stop. You replied something to the effect “are you afraid you 

might like it?” It was also reported that while assigned at Mt. Vista hospital, 

you approached this same female staff member and suddenly embraced her. 

Once again, you were told to stop. This was witnessed by another staff 

member as well. You also engaged in persistent unwanted/unsolicited 

conversations with this female staff member regarding personal and sexual 

topics. You also sent unsolicited te[x]t messages to this female staff member. 

Your behavior constitutes insubordination, violation of standards of 

conduct for State employees. 

Doc. 42-1 at 88–89. This letter was subsequently rescinded and replaced with a December 

12, 2011 letter reducing Carter’s suspension to 24 hours leave without pay and including the 

following justification for the discipline: 

 On August 21, 2011 a complaint was filed that you had conducted 

yourself unprofessionally with female staff. You admitted that while assigned 

at Mt. Vista hospital, you approached a female staff member and suddenly 

embraced her. You were told to stop. This was witnessed by another staff 

member as well. You also engaged in persistent unwanted/unsolicited 

conversations with this female staff member regarding personal and sexual 

topics. You also sent unsolicited text messages to this female staff member. 

Your behavior constitutes insubordination, conduct unbecoming an employee 

of the Department not described elsewhere in the Department Order, rule or 

statute. 

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Id. at 91. 

 Although the parties dispute his motives, they agree Carter’s objectionable behavior 

stopped. Compare Doc. 42 at 5 with Doc. 48 at 8. Carter remained stationed in the Cook 

Unit, but he occasionally worked the Meadows Unit for overtime and cross-level shifts. 

Doc. 42 at 6. An employee serves “cross-level” duty when he alleviates an officer shortage 

in another unit. Id. at 6 n.1. Carter and Powers never worked the same shift at the Meadows 

Unit. Nonetheless, their paths sometimes crossed during a 15-minute overlap between shift 

changes. Powers testified she saw Carter at the Meadows Unit between three and five times 

following the investigation. Doc. 42-1 at 52–53. She testified Carter never made any 

attempt to contact her at work. Id. at 53. Indeed, Powers concedes the two never had any 

contact after August 21, 2011. Compare Doc. 42 at 6 with Doc. 48 at 8. 

 Powers proffers a declaration in which she elaborates on the schedule changes. 

Although she acknowledges estimating in her deposition testimony that she saw Carter 

“three or four times from November 2011 to May 2012,” she subsequently reviewed her time 

sheets and Carter’s calendar. From this, she determined Carter “worked in the Meadows 

Unit, either on overtime graveyard shift or cross-level, more than 25 times from December 

2011 through May 2012, and that of those 25 times, his shift overlapped with mine 13 times, 

including one time he was scheduled to relieve me of duty on the next shift.” Doc. 48-1 at 

11. Powers states she “avoided [Carter] on those shifts.” Doc. 48 at 8. She did not indicate 

whether they saw each other, but it is undisputed they had no contact. 

 Powers perceived changes in her coworkers’ attitudes toward her after the 

investigation. She testified that in particular African American officers—like Carter—

treated her differently. When asked to provide an example, Powers responded that 

coworkers avoided working with her: “In briefing one day, when post assignments were 

called, they switched posts, so I would presume that’s why.” Doc. 42-1 at 54. When pressed 

to described other officers’ behavior, she stated “mainly it’s either the avoidance or 

switching posts, or if you’re going to a transport run with someone, you would get—they can 

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switch you out saying they can’t go that day or rather go with someone else or whatever 

excuses come up.” Id. at 55. 

 Additionally, Powers learned someone described her as “being a prude, being a snob, 

being stuck up,” id. at 56, as well as “playing hard to get, a tease, a tight ass.” Doc. 48-1 at 5. 

She proffers several declarations of coworkers, who acknowledge hearing these statements 

from third-parties.1

 Although Powers never heard Carter make these comments, she 

presumed they began with him: “My perception, my belief is that Carter started it because it 

never happened before, so that’s my belief.” Doc. 42-1 at 56. 

 Powers also perceived changes among the inmates. She testified, 

the African American inmates would give me a harder time. What I mean by 

that is if I asked them to do something, they would blatantly disregard what 

they were asked to do. They would congregate outside of the building I was 

assigned to versus before I never noticed that the same way. . . . They were 

obviously, when I say obvious, meaning blatantly more, outwardly 

disrespectful. Simple rules, they would just disobey them. Then when 

redirected, just ignore it. 

Id. at 55. Powers learned Carter had described her to an inmate as a rat and “a prude who 

really wanted him, and was playing hard to get.”2

 Doc. 48-1 at 5. 

Powers complained to her supervisors about Carter’s “constant potential presence” in 

the Meadows Unit and about the other inmates’ and officers’ comments. She discussed these 

issues with the complex’s deputy warden, Edwin Lao. Sometime between August and 

November 2011, Powers saw Lao in the parking lot and informed him that she did not want 

Carter in the Meadows Unit. Id. at 49. Lao did not recall this. Id. at 137. Subsequently, 

Powers met with Lao in his office and informed him that she “was upset because [Carter] 

was still coming back into the unit.” Id. at 50. Lao did not recall discussing Carter in this 

meeting. Id. at 137. Finally, sometime in December 2011 or January 2012, she met with 

 

1

 Powers acknowledged that “[n]obody ever said them to my face. . . . It was all through others.” Doc. 48-1 at 49. As discussed below, the relevant statements constitute 

inadmissible hearsay. Powers’s deposition testimony suggests that these third parties in fact relayed these comments from some other, unnamed source. See id. 

2

 These statements are also inadmissible hearsay. 

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Lao again and informed him of the other inmates’ and officers’ negative comments. Id. at 

50. 

 Powers also complained to the assistant deputy warden, Theresa Hetmer, that Carter 

remained in the Meadows Unit despite her conversations with Lao. Id. Powers contacted 

the Department’s central office on Hetmer’s advice but was redirected to unit management. 

Hetmer did not recall providing such advice. Hetmer corroborated that Powers believed 

Carter was not allowed back in the Meadows Unit because there had been a complaint.3

 

Hetmer recalled Powers saying she and Carter had “crossed paths” and that this distressed 

her. Hetmer thought this could have been in January or February 2012. She also 

acknowledged this was sufficient to put the unit on notice that Carter’s presence in the 

Meadows Unit upset Powers. Doc. 48-1 at 150. Despite her complaints to Lao and Hetmer, 

the parties do not dispute that Powers never complained to the warden or the EEOC liaison 

about these post-investigation concerns. Compare Doc. 42 at 7 with Doc. 48 at 9. 

In April or May 2012, Powers received a job offer with another employer. She gave 

notice and served her last day on May 12, 2012. The parties dispute her motivation for 

leaving. Powers submitted to an exit interview the day before she left. Doc. 48 at 36–37. 

The exit form itself, which Hetmer completed during the interview, indicates Powers 

resigned to pursue a career in clinical psychology.4

 Indeed, Hetmer recorded that Powers’s 

“[r]esignation is not a result of any concerns. All concerns during tenure of the Department 

were adequately [a]ddressed.” Doc. 42-1 at 135. Finally Hetmer noted, “If there is 

employment opportunity Master Level Treatment Therapist position available that does not 

require license employee would stay.” Id. 

 

3

 Powers did not offer any evidence to support this belief. In contrast, Lao testified that the only instruction he ever received regarding Carter’s placement was reassignment “while this inquiry was still going on.” Doc. 48-1 at 135. He testified that 

Carter’s reassignment was for the duration of the administrative inquiry: “Our purpose for separating the complainant and the principal is to avoid tainting the investigation itself. There is no further action after the adjudication of this.” Id. at 138. Similarly, Lao testified that the Department never ordered Carter to stay away from Powers permanently. Id. at 145. 

4

 In fact, Powers had been taking doctoral classes in psychology since 2008 and completed the data review for her dissertation on May 11, 2012. Id. at 35. 

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 Powers offers a different interpretation of the exit interview. She testified that she 

expressed frustration to Hetmer about the Department’s response to her concerns: 

And then she asked me why I was leaving, and I told her that I was frustrated 

with the situation about—and I did emphasize, I’m not blaming you as a 

person. I’m blaming the situation, the company for not handling it, for the fact 

that I got the runaround, I went to you guys, I tried what I believed at the time 

to be the right thing. I went to the highest—in my opinion the highest person 

of our unit, and I felt that it just wasn’t taken seriously. 

Doc. 48-1 at 53. Powers further stated Hetmer “was writing down—there was a point when 

she did rip that [exit interview form] up. I asked her why. She said she made a mistake. I 

don’t know what she had written.” Id. Hetmer did not recall discussing the Department’s 

response to complaints about Carter or discarding any form during the interview. She 

testified Powers did not express disappointment or frustration over the Department’s 

response to her concerns. Id. at 151. 

In December 2012 Powers filed an EEOC charge of discrimination against the 

Department. After exhausting her administrative remedies, she filed a complaint in May 

2013 alleging sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII. The Department 

subsequently sought summary judgment. After the Department filed its motion, Powers 

stipulated to dismiss her sex discrimination claim (Doc. 43). Only her retaliation claim 

remains.

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

A motion for summary judgment tests whether the opposing party has sufficient 

evidence to merit a trial. At its core it questions whether sufficient evidence exists from 

which a reasonable jury could find in favor of the party opposing the motion. Summary 

judgment should be granted if the evidence reveals no genuine dispute about any material 

fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

A material fact is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing 

law, and a factual issue is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return 

a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

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(1986). The nonmoving party must produce evidence to support its claim or defense by 

more than simply showing “there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The Court 

must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, must not weigh 

the evidence or assess its credibility, and must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the 

nonmoving party. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Where the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational 

trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial. Matsushita, 

475 U.S. at 587. 

III. ANALYSIS

This case presents some conceptual difficulty because Powers attempts to use a 

retaliation theory to challenge the adequacy of the Department’s harassment remedies. Title 

VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits sex discrimination that manifests as sexual 

harassment, including behavior that subjects employees to “a discriminatorily hostile or 

abusive environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); see also Meritor 

Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986) (“[A] claim of ‘hostile environment’ sex 

discrimination is actionable under Title VII.”). As noted above, however, Powers has 

abandoned her sex discrimination claim. 

Title VII also proscribes retaliation. It “prohibits an employer from discriminating 

against an employee or job applicant because that individual opposed any practice made 

unlawful by Title VII or made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in a Title VII 

proceeding or investigation.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 56 

(2006) (alterations and quotation marks omitted). And it extends employer liability to 

discrimination “for co-worker retaliation that rises to the level of an adverse employment 

action.” Fielder v. UAL Corp., 218 F.3d 973, 985 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 

536 U.S. 919 (2002). 

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In her briefing, Powers largely criticizes the Department’s remedial efforts. Without 

more, this does not advance her remaining claim for retaliation. Whether an employer 

adequately remedies sexual harassment goes to its liability for sex discrimination. See 

Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Once an employer 

knows or should know of co-worker harassment, a remedial obligation kicks in. An 

employer is liable for the hostile work environment created by a co-worker unless the 

employer . . . takes adequate remedial measures in order to avoid liability.”) (alterations, 

citation, and quotation marks omitted). Powers has not offered authority for the proposition 

that an inadequate remedy alone also establishes actionable retaliation. Indeed, the case 

discussions to which she cites on this point involve claims for discrimination, not retaliation. 

See Yamaguchi v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1483 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(affirming denial of summary judgment on employer liability for sex discrimination because 

of material facts going to adequacy of employer’s remedies); Swenson v. Potter, 271 F.3d 

1184, 1192 (9th Cir. 2001) (evaluating employer’s remedial action in response to 

discrimination claim); Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1528 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); 

Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 882 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); Erickson v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 

469 F.3d 600, 608 (7th Cir. 2006) (same); Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 

343 (6th Cir. 2008) (discussing affirmative steps employers can take to avoid liability for 

coworker sexual harassment). 

 Powers must demonstrate retaliation, not just an inadequate remedy to the underlying 

harassment. “To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, an employee must show that (1) 

he engaged in a protected activity; (2) his employer subjected him to an adverse employment 

action; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action.” 

Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000). The Department concedes that 

Powers engaged in protected activity but contests that she suffered any consequential adverse 

employment action. Doc. 41 at 11. 

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A. Adverse employment action 

Title VII protects employees “from retaliation that produces an injury or harm.” 

White, 548 U.S. at 67. The challenged action must be “materially adverse, which in this 

context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting 

a charge of discrimination.” Id. at 68 (quotation marks omitted). “[O]nly non-trivial 

employment actions that would deter reasonable employees from complaining about Title 

VII violations will constitute actionable retaliation.” Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 

917, 928 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243). “Among those employment 

decisions that can constitute an adverse employment action are termination, dissemination of 

a negative employment reference, issuance of an undeserved negative performance review 

and refusal to consider for promotion.” Id. Similarly, the transfer of job duties, see Yartzoff 

v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987), lateral transfers, Ray, 217 F.3d at 1241, and 

the initiation of administrative inquiries may suffice. See Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 

1180 (9th Cir. 2007). On the other hand, “declining to hold a job open for an employee and 

badmouthing an employee outside the job reference context do not constitute adverse 

employment actions.” Brooks, 229 F.3d at 928–29. Similarly, “mere ostracism by coworkers” is insufficient. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1241. 

Powers concedes that, following the August 21, 2011 initiation of Carter’s EEO 

investigation, the Department never disciplined her, changed her schedule, negatively 

reviewed her, denied her annual leave, cut her pay, demoted her, denied her a promotion, or 

transferred her. Instead, she argues that allowing Carter to work the Meadows Unit (1) 

created a hostile environment which (2) led to her constructive discharge—both adverse 

employment actions. Her arguments are meritless. 

1. Hostile work environment 

Fostering a hostile work environment can constitute the adverse employment action 

necessary to support a retaliation claim. Just as an employer who facilitates a hostile work 

environment may be liable for discrimination under Title VII, “an employer may be liable for 

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a retaliation-based hostile work environment.” Ray, 217 F.3d at 1245. As in the 

discrimination context, however, retaliatory harassment is actionable only if it is “sufficiently 

severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive 

working environment.” Id. (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21). 

There are subjective and objective components to this standard. Whether an 

environment is objectively hostile or abusive is not “a mathematically precise test,” Harris, 

510 U.S. at 22, but such a determination can be made “only by looking at all the 

circumstances. These may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; 

whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and 

whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Id. at 23. “The 

required level of severity or seriousness varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency 

of the conduct.” Nichols, 256 F.3d at 872 (quotation marks omitted). Abusive, humiliating, 

or threatening sexual conduct is sufficient, see Craig v. M & O Agencies, Inc., 496 F.3d 

1047, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007), while “simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents 

(unless extremely serious)” are not enough “to amount to a change in the terms and 

conditions of employment.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) 

(citation and quotation marks omitted). Powers offers two manifestations of the hostile work 

environment: (1) “the failure of [the Department] to separate Carter from plaintiff (a COII 

Carter-free workplace) and the retaliation she suffered from COII Carter with his continued 

access to the Meadows Unit and [(2)] his retaliatory inflammatory comments about plaintiff 

to inmates and co-workers.” Doc. 48 at 9. 

 

 a. Threat of potential presence 

First, Powers argues that because she never knew when Carter would be working the 

Meadows Unit, she reasonably experienced anxiety and “had to take steps to avoid contact 

and requested male [coworkers] to escort her at work as protection.” Doc. 47 at 15. 

Powers’s statement of facts best captures her theory: 

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The threat of potential interactions, potential and actual crossing of 

paths, the fact that COII Carter was in the [Meadows] Unit, working the 

Control Room when their shifts overlapped, and visual sitting of him at the 

scanner in the control room5

 was intimidating to plaintiff and caused her 

distress and fear. . . . Carter’s presence and potential presence in the unit 

caused plaintiff a great deal of personal stress and strain on her interpersonal 

relationships. 

Doc. 48 at 31 (emphasis added). Similarly, Powers asserts, “If plaintiff went to work during 

the 15 minute overlap with Carter’s overtime shift, she could come in contact with him in the 

control room while going through security where she could be subject to sexually abusive 

comments and contact.” Doc. 47 at 15 (emphasis added). 

Powers’s fear of potential interaction lays bare the inescapable conclusion the 

evidence compels: On these facts, no reasonable juror could find an objectively hostile work 

environment despite Powers’s subjective fears. The Department’s remedial efforts largely 

kept Carter away from Powers. After August 2011 when the Department began its 

investigation, Carter never initiated any contact with Powers. The two never had any 

physical contact, Powers saw him only three or four times, and their shifts overlapped only 

thirteen times. There is no evidence of abusive, humiliating, or threatening sexual conduct. 

See Craig, 496 F.3d at 1056. Even resolving all factual disputes in her favor, Powers has 

not offered evidence that Carter directed at Powers even “mere offensive utterances,” Harris, 

510 U.S. at 23, “simple teasing,” or “offhand comments,” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788, let 

alone any actionable conduct. 

 Although “in some cases the mere presence of an employee who has engaged in 

particularly severe or pervasive harassment can create a hostile working environment,” 

Ellison, 924 F.2d at 883, the evidence here does not support such a finding. Even assuming 

 

5

 Powers explains this: “When Carter worked overtime graveyard in Meadows Unit, during the 15-minute overlap of plaintiff and Carter’s shift changes, COII Carter often operated the scanner, which is located at the entrance of the prison, and is a post that all staff, including plaintiff, had to go through to enter the unit. This post required COII Carter to search through all staff, including plaintiff’s personal belongings. When a staff member could not clear the scanner due to underwire bra or metal implant, etc., post-orders required COII Carter to use a hand want to clear the corrections officer.” 

Doc. 47 at 5–6. Powers did not offer evidence that Carter ever used the hand wand on 

her after the investigation. 

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Powers saw Carter multiple times between August 2011 and May 2012, this alone is 

insufficient to establish an objectively abusive work environment. See Swenson, 271 F.3d at 

1190 (finding no hostile work environment where victim’s contact with her harasser 

constituted sixteen sightings over a fourteen-month period, even assuming victim “may have 

been particularly sensitive to contact” with harasser); Fuller, 47 F.3d at 1528 (finding no 

hostile work environment during period when contact between victim and her supervisorharasser was routine despite finding earlier conduct sufficiently severe and pervasive to 

violate Title VII). Powers has not offered evidence that Carter’s conduct was sufficiently 

severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment; therefore, his “presence and 

potential presence” cannot constitute an adverse employment action for purposes of 

establishing retaliation. 

 b. Comments and attitudes 

Second, Powers asserts Carter’s negative remarks about her to coworkers and inmates 

prompted them to perceive her as a snitch. Doc. 47 at 15. This in turn caused her coworkers 

to avoid her and created a dangerous and abusive workplace. 

This theory fails for two reasons. First, Powers does not offer any admissible 

evidence to support it. For example, she offers her own declaration and the declaration of 

coworker Jason Shaffer to prove statements made by inmate Cox, who in turn informed the 

two officers about statements made by Carter. Doc. 48-1 at 5, 19. The statements attributed 

to Cox, and the statements Cox attributed to Carter, are all hearsay.6

 Powers’s evidence 

regarding Carter’s statements to other officers is similarly attenuated. Again, she offers 

declarations: hers and that of coworker Ryan Flowers. Each attests to statements made by 

other officers, who in turn describe negative comments Carter made to them about Powers. 

Id. at 5, 21. Powers offers no admissible evidence that Carter ever commented about her 

after the investigation. 

 

6

 And in any event, Shaffer’s declaration states only that Carter informed Cox that accusations of sexual harassment were false, not that Carter made any specific comments about Powers. See Doc. 48-1 at 19. 

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Even if she produced admissible evidence, however, her theory fails for a second 

reason: it establishes only that Powers was subject to nonactionable ostracism. See Strother 

v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp., 79 F.3d 859, 869 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Fisher v. San 

Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal. App. 3d 590, 615, 262 Cal. Rptr. 842, 856 (Ct. App. 1989) 

(“Ostracism, of course, does not amount to a hostile environment.”)); see also Brooks, 229 

F.3d at 929. That ostracism potentially poses a threat to corrections officers not present in 

other employment contexts, see Doc. 48 at 32–33, does not make it actionable or relieve 

Powers of her burden to prove that its severity and pervasiveness created an abusive 

environment. The hearsay statements Powers offers are inadmissible. But even if they were 

admissible they do not support finding a work environment sufficiently hostile to constitute 

an adverse employment action. 

 

 2. Constructive discharge 

Powers also asserts the Department constructively discharged her, constituting an 

adverse employment action. “Under the constructive discharge doctrine, an employee’s 

reasonable decision to resign because of unendurable working conditions is assimilated to a 

formal discharge for remedial purposes. The inquiry is objective: Did working conditions 

become so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt 

compelled to resign?” Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141 (2004) (citation 

omitted). A sexual harassment claim premised on a constructive discharge theory requires 

“something more,” however, than demonstrating an actionably hostile work environment. 

See id. at 147. Powers “must show that the abusive working environment became so 

intolerable that her resignation qualified as a fitting response.” Id. at 134; see also Poland, 

494 F.3d at 1184–85. 

 Because Powers has not demonstrated a hostile work environment, she cannot prove 

working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign. 

Thus, even crediting Powers’s testimony that she quit in frustration over her supervisors’ 

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inaction, her failure to establish an abusive work environment precludes finding a 

constructive discharge. 

B. Causal connection 

Because Powers cannot prove an adverse employment action, the Court need not 

evaluate whether any alleged adverse employment action, even if substantiated, resulted 

from Powers’s protected activity. See Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 

1064–65 (9th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff must show that “but for such activity” she would not have 

been subject to the challenged actions). Nonetheless, a short articulation of Powers’s 

argument reinforces the extent to which she has conflated a claim for retaliation with one for 

sexual harassment. 

 Powers asserts, “Once she reported the protected activity, [the Department] breached 

its duty to protect her, and as a result, caused her to suffer a hostile work environment, and 

suffer retaliation from Carter through his poisoning of the workplace with negative and 

damaging comments to inmates and co-workers.” Doc. 47 at 17. Putting aside her claim 

about Carter’s comments, which is not supported by any admissible evidence, Powers 

essentially argues that the Department created a hostile work environment by immediately 

investigating and then insufficiently punishing Carter for sexual harassment—in order to 

dissuade other employees from reporting sexual harassment. Her theory is inherently 

unlikely. That she does not offer a single fact supporting causation reinforces its 

implausibility. 

 Thus, this discussion returns to where it began. Powers’s failure to proffer facts 

supporting a causal connection illustrates that her real objection is to the Department’s 

response to the EEO investigation. But an inadequate remedy, without more, does not 

establish a claim for retaliation. The Court is mindful of the “high standard for the granting 

of summary judgment in employment discrimination cases.” Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., 

Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir. 1996). Here, however, no rational trier of fact could find 

for Powers on this record. 

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 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

(Doc. 41) is granted. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall enter judgment for the Defendant 

and that Plaintiff take nothing. 

 Dated this 29th day of July, 2014. 

 

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