Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01082/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01082-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 195
Nature of Suit: Contract Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity Action

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM LESSIN, CAROL 

SMALLEY, et al., on behalf of 

themselves and others similarly 

situated, 

 Plaintiffs, 

v.

FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware 

corporation; and Does 1 through 10, 

inclusive, 

 Defendant. 

Case No.: 19-cv-01082-AJB-AHG

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION

Presently before the Court is Defendant Ford Motor Co.’s motion for reconsideration 

of the Court’s Order granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs’ motion for class 

certification. (Doc. No. 204.) Plaintiffs filed an opposition (Doc. No. 210), to which Ford 

replied (Doc. No. 211). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART 

AND DENIES IN PART Ford’s motion. Accordingly, the Court VACATES the hearing 

set for February 27, 2025, at 2:00 p.m. 

I. BACKGROUND

The facts of this case have been recited in previous orders. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 202.)

Ford challenges the Court’s November 7, 2024 Order (1) granting in part and denying in 

part Ford’s motion for partial summary judgment, and (2) granting in part and denying in 

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part Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)

(the “November 7 Order”). (Doc. No. 204.) Specifically, Ford asserts the Court committed 

clear error as to several findings related to the motion for class certification. (Id.) 

As relevant to the instant motion, the Court granted summary judgment on Plaintiff 

Hamilton’s Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act (“MUTPA”) claim because the Court found 

Plaintiff Hamilton used her vehicle for business, not personal, use. (November 7 Order, 

Doc. No. 202, at 32–33.) Under MUTPA, a private right of action exists “only for those 

who have purchased goods, services or property ‘primarily for personal, family or 

household purposes.’” C-B Kentworth, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 706 F. Supp. 952, 957 

(D. Me. 1988) (citing Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5 § 213(1)). Here, Hamilton stated throughout 

her deposition that her F-250 was her business vehicle. (See November 7 Order at 33.)

Later, in analyzing Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, the Court held that Plaintiffs’ 

class definition—limited to persons who purchased or leased their vehicles for “personal, 

family or household purposes”—did not preclude a finding of predominance. (Id. at 51–

53.) The Court found that “commercial purchasers (fleet and chassis-cab purchasers) can

be excluded from the notice process using Ford’s data, leaving only retail purchasers to 

receive notice and an opportunity to submit proof that their vehicle purchases were 

primarily for personal use.” (Id. at 53.)

Next, the Court granted class certification of Plaintiffs’ implied warranty claims 

under Maine and South Carolina law. (Id. at 70–73.) The Court noted that manifestation of 

the alleged defect is an element for implied warranty claims under Maine and South 

Carolina law. (Id. at 71 (citing Lorfano, 569 A.2d at 197; Cole, 484 F.3d at 729).) 

Moreover, “[w]hile the Court in the instant case analyzes the substantive laws of Maine 

and South Carolina, they similarly require manifestation of the defect [as in California].” 

(Id. at 72.) Thereafter, applying the Ninth Circuit’s federal procedural law, the Court held 

that on class certification, the district court should not determine the merits of Plaintiffs’ 

claims. (Id.) The Court ultimately found the predominance factor met and granted class 

certification. The Court further found predominance met as to merchantability, as 

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“Plaintiffs have alleged from the beginning of litigation that the Class Vehicles contain a 

design defect that was inherent in all Class Vehicles at the time of sale.” (Id. at 73.) 

The Court also found Ford’s argument as to the varying rates of manifestation of the 

defect unavailing. (Id. at 57–58.) Ford argued that field performance differences exist 

across all dampers, and that there are “significant differences in performance across 

different platforms, models, and model years . . . .” (Doc. No. 136 at 27.) The Court noted 

that Ninth Circuit precedent forecloses this argument. (November 7 Order at 57.) As 

discussed in the November 7 Order, 

Where the injury alleged is a design defect, the Ninth Circuit has “held that 

proof of the manifestation of a defect is not a prerequisite to class 

certification.” Wolin, 617 F.3d at 1173. This is because the injury occurred at 

the point of sale—when a putative member drove her car off the lot—not 

when the vehicle experiences the Shimmy. See Butler, 2017 WL 1398316, at 

*6 (“In general, courts have found consumer fraud claims amenable to classwide treatment where the claims were premised on the existence of a common, 

class-wide defect present in all of the relevant products at the time of sale.”).

(Id. at 57–58.) 

 The Court further denied the motion for class certification as to the P131 (Model 

Year (“MY”) 2005–2007) and P538 (MY 2017–2019) models, finding that individual 

issues predominate over common questions as to Ford’s knowledge of a defect. (Id. at 61.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

District courts have the discretion to reconsider interlocutory rulings until a final 

judgment is entered. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1048–

49 (9th Cir. 2000). While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not set forth a standard 

for reconsidering interlocutory rulings, the “law of the case” doctrine and public policy 

dictate that the efficient operation of the judicial system requires the avoidance of rearguing questions that have already been decided. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of 

Indians v. Hodel, 882 F.2d 364, 369 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989).

///

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As such, most courts adhere to a fairly narrow standard by which to reconsider their 

interlocutory rulings. This standard requires: (1) an intervening change in the law; 

(2) additional evidence that was not previously available; or (3) that the prior decision was 

based on clear error or would work manifest injustice. Id.; Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. 

Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009); Sch. Dist. No. 1J v. 

ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993).

Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of 

finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 

F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). “A motion for reconsideration is not an opportunity to renew 

arguments considered and rejected by the court, nor is it an opportunity for a party to reargue a motion because it is dissatisfied with the original outcome.” FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 

No. 06–CV–1952–JLS JMA, 2009 WL 56130, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan.7, 2009) (quoting 

Devinsky v. Kingsford, No. 05 Civ.2064(PAC), 2008 WL 2704338, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 

10, 2008)).

Additionally, Civil Local Rule 7.1.i governs motions for reconsideration in this 

District. The rule provides that a party may apply for reconsideration “[w]henever any 

motion or any application or petition for any order or other relief has been made to any

judge and has been refused in whole or in part.” CivLR 7.1.i.1. The party seeking 

reconsideration under Civil Local Rule 7.1.i.1 must show “what new or different facts and 

circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist, or were not shown, upon such prior 

application.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Ford requests reconsideration of the Court’s class certification order on the ground 

that the Court committed clear error. (See generally Doc. No. 204.) Ford argues: (1) the 

Court clearly erred when it certified a Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim because 

the Court had previously dismissed that claim and Plaintiff did not seek certification of it; 

(2) the Court’s summary judgment order on Plaintiff Hamilton’s business usage shows that 

individualized issues predominate as to whether each class member purchased their vehicle 

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for personal, family, or household use; (3) the Court’s order certifying Maine and South 

Carolina implied warranty classes uses the incorrect standard for manifestation and 

conflicts with its summary judgment ruling regarding merchantability; and (4) Ford’s 

argument that differing rates of manifestation defeat class certification was not fully 

addressed by the Court. (See generally Doc. No. 204-1.) 

A. Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Claim

First, in the November 7 Order, the Court granted mistakenly granted certification 

of a Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim. (See November 7 Order at 85.) As noted 

by the Parties, this claim had previously been dismissed without leave to amend, (Doc. No. 

41 at 23–24), and Plaintiffs did not seek certification of this claim, (see Doc. No. 120 at 4). 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion for reconsideration as to this claim. 

B. Personal, Family, or Household Use of Class Vehicle

Next, as to the argument that Hamilton’s business usage shows that individualized 

issues predominate as to whether each class member purchased their vehicle for personal, 

family, or household use, Ford previously made this argument in its opposition to 

Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. (See Doc. No. 136 at 22–24.) The Court did not 

find it availing then, and Ford has not persuaded the Court it committed clear error, the 

initial decision was manifestly unjust, or there has been any relevant intervening law or 

newly discovered evidence the Court has not considered. Moreover, Ford’s argument that 

allowing class members to attest to their purchase of their trucks for personal use deprives 

Ford of an opportunity to cross-examine the class members has no basis in law. Case law 

has acknowledged that, “to comport with due process, the court must ‘preserve’ the 

defendant’s right ‘to raise any individual defenses it might have at the damages phase.’” 

Makaeff v. Trum Univ., LLC, 309 F.R.D. 631, 642 (S.D. Cal. 2015). However, courts have 

resolved this issue by permitting bifurcation of trial into a liability stage and a damages 

stage. Id. at 642–43 (citing Mahoney v. Farmers Ins. Exch., No. 4:09–cv–2327, 2011 WL 

4458513, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2011), and Jimenez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 765 F.3d 1161, 

1168 (9th Cir. 2014)). However, allowing such cross-examination of class members, as 

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Ford suggests, would be the death knell for class certification. As such, the Court rejects 

this claim.

C. Maine and South Carolina Implied Warranty Classes

Ford contends the Court used the incorrect standard for manifestation of defects for 

Maine and South Carolina implied warranty classes. (Doc. No. 204-1 at 9.) Ford asserts 

the Court applied California substantive law in finding Maine’s and South Carolina’s 

manifestation requirements did not defeat certification. (Id. at 9–10.) However, Ford 

misunderstands the Court’s previous ruling. In the November 7 Order, the Court first stated 

that “[m]anifestation of the alleged defect is an element for implied warranty claims under 

Maine and South Carolina law.” (November 7 Order at 71.) The Court went on to note that 

district courts within the Ninth Circuit, which apply a “substantial certainty” test under 

their substantive law, are split procedurally as to whether arguments as to manifestation of 

the defect is a “merits” issue that is suitable for class certification. (Id.) The Court did not 

apply the Ninth Circuit’s “substantial certainty” test in its November 7 Order, but rather 

held that “under federal procedural law on class certification, ‘the district court should not 

determine the merits of any claims.’” (November 7 Order at 72.) 

As to manifestation, Ford further asserts the Court should follow Chin v. Chrysler 

Corp., 182 F.R.D. 448 (D.N.J. 1998), and Payne v. FujiFilm U.S.A., Inc., No. 07–385 

(GEB), 2010 WL 2342388 (D.N.J. May 28, 2010), two out-of-circuit cases which have no 

binding on either this Court or the courts of Maine and South Carolina, which held that 

certification was not proper when individualized evidence was needed for every class 

member to prove that the defect manifested. (Doc. No. 204-1 at 10.) Ford previously made 

this argument in its opposition to the motion for class certification and has not identified 

any grounds for reconsideration. (See Doc. No. 136 at 37–38.)

Ford also argues the Court’s finding that the issue of merchantability can be proven 

with common evidence is irreconcilable with its summary judgment ruling. (Doc. No. 204-

1 at 11.) Specifically, Ford asserts that by certifying the implied warranty classes, “the 

Court is depriving Ford of its right to demonstrate that even if other class members 

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experienced steering oscillation, their individual vehicle uses could nevertheless 

demonstrate merchantability.” (Id. at 12.) However, Ford’s assertion merely attempts to 

litigate the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, and thus is improperly raised on a motion for 

reconsideration. Indeed, Ford’s argument as to merchantability are better suited for trial or 

a motion for summary judgment. The Court DENIES the motion for reconsideration as to 

these claims.

D. Differing Rates of Manifestation

Finally, Ford argues “the Court appears to have misunderstood, and therefore did 

not fully address, Ford’s arguments that differing manifestation rates of steering oscillation 

show that non-classwide issues predominate on the question of defect.” (Doc. No. 204-1 at 

12.) To this point, as in its opposition to class certification, Ford asserts that warranty and 

complaint claim rates varied significantly across the platforms and model years. (Id.) As 

noted above the Court denied the motion for class certification as to the P131 (MY 2005–

2007) and P538 (MY 2017–2019) models, with only the P356 (MY 2008–2010) and P473 

(MY 2011–2016) classes certified. While the Court noted that proof of a manifestation was 

not a prerequisite to class certification, it also stated that “the injury [as alleged by 

Plaintiffs] occurred at the point of sale—when a putative member drove her car off the 

lot—not when the vehicle experiences the Shimmy.” (November 7 Order at 57.) Thus, the 

Court did not find persuasive the differing manifestation rates across two of the four model 

year platforms. The Court considered, and rejected, Ford’s argument concerning differing 

rates of manifestation, and the Court does not find grounds for reconsideration.

Because Ford fails to demonstrate entitlement to reconsideration, the Court DENIES

its motion as to this claim. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART

Ford’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s November 7, 2024 order. (Doc. No. 204.)

The Court hereby AMENDS its November 7, 2024 Order to recognize that Plaintiffs’ 

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Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim was previously dismissed, and clarify that only 

a Breach of Express Warranty claim has been certified under Texas law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 14, 2025

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