Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_21-cv-00091/USCOURTS-azd-4_21-cv-00091-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Terry Dale James,

Petitioner,

v. 

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-21-00091-TUC-JCH

ORDER 

Petitioner Terry Dale James, proceeding pro se, filed an "Amended Petition Under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Non-Death 

Penalty)" ("Amended Petition"). Doc. 6. Respondents filed a Limited Answer. Doc. 21. On 

April 26, 2023, Magistrate Judge Eric J. Markovich issued a Report and Recommendation 

("R&R") in which he recommended this Court dismiss the Amended Petition. Doc. 30. 

Petitioner filed an objection to the R&R (Doc. 33), and Respondents filed a response to 

Petitioner's objection (Doc. 37). For the following reasons, the Court will overrule 

Petitioner's objections, adopt Judge Markovich's R&R in full, and dismiss the Amended 

Petition. 

I. Procedural History

The R&R details the extensive procedural history of this case. Doc. 30 at 2–27.

1

Neither party objected to this portion of the R&R, and the Court will adopt it in its entirety. 

In brief, the procedural history is as follows: after a four-day trial in 2015, a Pima County 

1 All document citations are to CMECF page number.

Case 4:21-cv-00091-JCH Document 45 Filed 09/28/23 Page 1 of 15
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

jury found Petitioner guilty of child molestation and sexual conduct with a minor under the 

age of twelve. See id. at 3; see also Doc. 21-1 at 63. The convictions related to a single 

episode involving T.H., Petitioner's step-granddaughter, occurring at some point between 

2002 and 2007, when T.H. was between six and ten years old. Doc. 30 at 2. The trial court 

imposed enhanced, consecutive sentences of twenty-one years and life with the possibility 

of release after thirty-five years, respectively. Id. at 3–4. 

A. Direct Appeal

In July 2016, Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences through counsel to 

the Arizona Court of Appeals. Doc. 6-3. Petitioner asserted three issues: (1) the trial court 

erroneously admitted Rule 404(c) other-act evidence, (2) the trial court provided erroneous 

jury instructions, and (3) Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated 

when his prior convictions were tried at a bench trial. Id. at 6. The appellate court affirmed 

the convictions and sentences, with correction. State v. James, 393 P.3d 467 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

2017).

In April 2017, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Arizona Supreme 

Court. The Arizona Supreme Court denied both the Petition and State's Cross-Petition for 

review. State v. James, No. CR-17-0181-PR, Mem. Decision (Ariz. Sept. 12, 2017).

B. First Post-Conviction Relief ("PCR") Proceeding 

In September 2017, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief. Doc. 30 at 

11. In November 2018, PCR counsel filed a notice under Montgomery v. Sheldon (I), 889 

P.2d 614 (Ariz. 1995), stating that he had "reviewed the record and consulted with 

Defendant, but f[ound] no issues." Id. Under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, 

Petitioner filed a pro se PCR Petition raising nine grounds for relief in the state's Rule 32 

court. Id. at 11–12.

In November 2019, the Rule 32 court issued its order summarily dismissing 

Petitioner's pro se PCR Petition and denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

State v. James, No. CR20141325-001, Ruling—In Chambers Ruling Re: Pet. for PCR 

(Pima Cnty. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2019).

Case 4:21-cv-00091-JCH Document 45 Filed 09/28/23 Page 2 of 15
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C. Instant Habeas Proceeding

In February 2021, Petitioner filed his Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1), 

and Petitioner filed an Amended Petition in March 2021 (Doc. 6). Petitioner asserts five 

grounds for relief: (1) "Actual innocence by the use of timeline evidence"; (2) "[j]ury 

tampering by a group of Hells Angels" in violation of his due process rights and ineffective 

assistance of counsel for ignoring the individuals; (3) "[t]he court erred by denying the 

motion to suppress the confrontation call" and ineffective assistance of counsel for 

allegedly failing to prepare to rebut reasons why the call was admissible; (4) "[t]he court 

allowed 'interested persons' to serve on the jury" in violation of his due process rights and 

ineffective assistance of counsel for an alleged failure to recognize and raise the issue prior 

to trial or during voir dire; and (5) "duplicitous" charges in violation of his Double Jeopardy 

rights. Id.

This matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Eric Markovich for a Report and 

Recommendation. The R&R recommends the District Court dismiss the Amended Petition 

(Doc. 6). Doc. 30 at 1.

II. Respondents' Motion to Strike Reply and Petitioner's Supplemental Motion

On May 15, 2023, Petitioner filed an objection to the R&R (Doc. 33), and 

Respondents filed a response on June 19, 2023 (Doc. 37). On June 26, 2023, Petitioner

filed a Reply to Respondents' Response. Doc. 38 (entitled "Response to respondants [sic] 

objection to R&R by petitioner"). Respondents filed a Motion seeking to strike the Reply 

as improper under Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 7.2 of the 

Local Rules of Civil Procedure. See Doc. 39. 

Rule 72 provides:

[w]ithin 14 days after being served with a copy of the [R&R], a party may 

serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and 

recommendations. A party may respond to another party's objections within 

14 days after being served with a copy.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The rule thus provides only for an objection by a party who 

disagrees with some aspect of the R&R, a response to that objection by the opposing party, 

Case 4:21-cv-00091-JCH Document 45 Filed 09/28/23 Page 3 of 15
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and nothing more. It does not allow for a reply to the response or supplemental briefing.

Because Petitioner's filings are not permitted by the Rules, the Court will grant 

Respondents' Motion and strike the Reply at Docket No. 38.

On July 5, 2023, Petitioner filed a "Motion to set aside all charges and sentences 

with prejudice to reprosecution [sic]." Doc. 40. The Court construes Plaintiff's Motion as 

a supplemental pleading under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) and so construed will deny the Motion 

as redundant and futile. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

III. R&R Standard of Review

This Court "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court "must 

review the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, 

but not otherwise." United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en 

banc). The Court is not required to conduct "any review at all ... of any issue that is not the 

subject of an objection." Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985). 

Some of Petitioner's objections are general in nature, reasserting arguments made in 

the petition rather than addressing the R&R. "[M]erely reasserting the grounds of the 

petition as an objection provides this Court with no guidance as to what portions of the 

R&R Petitioner considers to be incorrect." McDowell v. Richardson, No. CV-11-0716-

PHX-DGC, 2012 WL 393462, at *2 (D. Ariz. Feb. 7, 2012). Rule 72 requires more. The 

party seeking de novo review must provide "specific written objections to the proposed 

findings and recommendations" of the magistrate judge. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) (emphasis 

added). The clear purpose of this requirement is judicial economy—to permit magistrate 

judges to resolve matters not objectionable to the parties. See Thomas, 474 U.S. at 149. 

Because de novo review of the entire R&R would defeat the efficiencies intended by 

Congress and Rule 72, a general objection has the same effect as a failure to object. Warling 

v. Ryan, No. CV 12-01396-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 5276367, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 19, 2013); 

Eagleman v. Shinn, No. CV-18-2708-PHX-RM (DTF), 2019 WL 7019414, at *5 (D. Ariz.

///

Case 4:21-cv-00091-JCH Document 45 Filed 09/28/23 Page 4 of 15
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Dec. 20, 2019). As a result, the Court will adopt the portions of the R&R to which Petitioner

makes only general objections as though they were unobjected.

IV. Analysis 

The Amended Petition in this case was filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because 

Petitioner is incarcerated based on a state-court conviction. Section 2254 permits granting

a writ of habeas corpus in only specific circumstances. A petition must not be granted 

"unless ... the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State." Id.

§ 2254(b)(1)(A) (subject to certain exceptions that allow Petitioner to come overcome his 

failure to exhaust in state court). Even where the petitioner has exhausted state-court 

remedies, a district court cannot grant relief unless the state conviction "resulted in a 

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court." Id. § 2254(d)(1). An 

unreasonable application of law must be "objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong."

White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419 (2014). Instead, the state court's ruling must be "so 

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in 

existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id. at 420.

A. First Objection – Actual Innocence (Ground One)

In Ground One, Petitioner argues actual innocence because witness testimony at 

trial "narrowed the alleged crime timeline[,]" and "prove[d] there was no contact when [the 

victim] testified 'it' happened." Doc. 6-1 at 11–12.

The R&R first analyzed Petitioner's claim of actual innocence as a "freestanding"

actual innocence claim. Doc. 30 at 35; see also Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404–05 

(1993) (A "freestanding" actual innocence claim is a claim in which a petitioner argues that 

he is "entitled to habeas relief because newly discovered evidence shows that [his] 

conviction is factually incorrect."). The R&R concluded that the claim should be denied as 

not cognizable because "the evidence upon which Petitioner relies was presented at trial, 

and therefore can neither be considered 'new' or adequate to show that no reasonable juror 

would have convicted him." Doc. 30 at 35. Alternatively, the R&R concluded that the claim 

Case 4:21-cv-00091-JCH Document 45 Filed 09/28/23 Page 5 of 15
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

should be denied because it is procedurally defaulted for two reasons. Id. at 36–37. First, 

the R&R determined that Petitioner did not raise his actual innocence claim as a gateway 

for a due process violation on direct appeal or in his pro se PCR petition to the trial court.

Id. at 36. Second, the R&R determined that Petitioner failed to show cause and prejudice. 

See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state 

appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause 

and prejudice).

Petitioner objected to the R&R's conclusions that (1) a freestanding innocence claim 

must be based on new evidence, and (2) his claim is procedurally defaulted because it was 

not raised in his PCR petition. Doc. 33 at 5–6. Petitioner argues that he presented his 

innocence timeline evidence "in all three ... PCR Courts." Id. at 5.

Petitioner did not object to the R&R's conclusion that a claim of actual innocence

was not raised on direct appeal and is thus procedurally defaulted. Therefore, this Court

will adopt the R&R's recommendation on that issue. As for Petitioner's other two 

objections, upon de novo review of Petitioner's habeas petition exhibits—which include 

voluminous trial, appellate, and PCR materials—the Court reaches the same conclusions 

as the R&R.

First, Petitioner mistakenly asserts that "[i]t does not matter if the facts are new or 

old" and that the trial court did not properly consider the facts before it. Doc. 33 at 5. While 

a freestanding claim of actual innocence must allege an independent constitutional 

violation at the very least, it must also include newly discovered facts. See Collins, 506 

U.S. at 400. Petitioner admits the evidence of discrepancies between the state's timeline, 

the victim's testimony, and the last possible date of contact between Petitioner and the 

victim were already presented at trial. Doc. 33 at 5 ("The[se] facts in my case were spoken 

as truth at my trial."). Absent evidence of newly discovered facts, Petitioner's freestanding 

claim of actual innocence is non-cognizable.

Second, Petitioner did not raise his actual innocence claim as a gateway for a due 

process violation in his PCR petition to the trial court. See Doc. 21-1 at 17 ("Exh. B"

Case 4:21-cv-00091-JCH Document 45 Filed 09/28/23 Page 6 of 15
- 7 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(Appellant's Opening Br., State v. James, No. 2 CA-CR 2025-0447 (Ariz. Ct. App. July 7, 

2016))); Doc. 21-2 at 2 ("Exh. L1" (Petr.'s Pet. for PCR, State v. James, No. CR-20141325-

001 (Pima Cnty. Super. Ct. May 8, 2018))). Petitioner's first PCR petition claimed actual 

innocence based on contradictory timeline evidence and actual innocence based on 

insufficient evidence. Doc. 21-2 at 21. However, actual innocence based on contradictory 

timelines and insufficient evidence are not federal claims. A state prisoner must alert the 

state court "to the presence of a federal claim" in each petition to provide fair presentation 

of any potential federal claim. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 31–33 (2004). Petitioner 

raised his claim of actual innocence based on a violation of the Due Process Clause of the 

U.S. Constitution for the first time in the pendant habeas petition. Doc. 6-1 at 7. Thus, 

Petitioner's claim of actual innocence based on a due process violation is procedurally 

defaulted, absent a showing of cause and prejudice.

Petitioner did not object to the R&R's finding of no cause and prejudice to excuse 

the procedural default, and the Court will adopt the R&R's conclusion on that matter.

Even if Petitioner's claim of actual innocence were not procedurally defaulted, it is 

meritless. Petitioner argues the victim narrowed the timeframe of when the offense 

occurred to a time when Petitioner had no contact, making the offense a factual 

impossibility. See Doc. 6 at 11–12; Doc. 6-2 at 31–33. But Petitioner ignores the fact that 

the victim used approximating rather than exact language for that timeframe. See Doc. 21-

5 at 91–92 ("And was [the offense committed] during that timeframe of 2002 to 2007?"

"Yes ... I was on the older side of closer to 2007." "Okay. So close to around ten, nine or 

ten?" "Yes.") (emphasis added). Further, Petitioner ignores contradictory testimony from 

the victim that later placed the possible date of the offense back soundly within the time 

Petitioner still had contact with her. Id. at 108 ("And do you agree that you were probably 

around eight years old at that time?" "Yes."). It is the jury's prerogative to consider the 

weight and credibility given to all evidence—even contradictory evidence—presented at 

trial, and courts will not disturb such a function absent manifest and extreme abuse. Sartor 

v. Ark. Nat. Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 628 (1944).

Case 4:21-cv-00091-JCH Document 45 Filed 09/28/23 Page 7 of 15
- 8 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

B. Second Objection – Jury Tampering and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

(Ground Two)

In Ground Two, Petitioner argues that "[j]ury tampering [occurred] by a group of 

Hells Angels who wore leather jackets with the insignia Bikers Against Child Abuse."

Doc. 6 at 7. Petitioner asserted that the actions of these individuals deprived him of his 

rights to due process and a fair and impartial jury. Id. at 7. He further argues that his trial 

counsel was ineffective for ignoring the "men who tampered with the jury every day of 

trial." Id.

The R&R concluded that the jury tampering claim was procedurally defaulted 

because it was not raised on direct appeal. Further, the R&R concluded that because Rule 

32.2 provides an independent and adequate basis for denying relief, Petitioner's claims are 

procedurally defaulted and therefore barred from this Court's review. Stewart v. Smith, 536 

U.S. 856, 861 (2002) (holding that denials pursuant to Rule 32.2(a) are "independent of 

federal law"); Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 780 (9th Cir. 2014) ("Arizona's waiver rules 

are independent [nonfederal] and adequate bases for denying relief.") (internal citations 

omitted). As to the ineffective assistance of counsel ("IAC") claim, the R&R determined 

that Petitioner did not raise IAC related to the jury tampering on direct appeal or in his pro 

se PCR petition to the trial court. Doc. 30 at 39–41. The R&R also observed that the 

appellate court subsequently declined to consider Petitioner's IAC claim, citing Rule 

32.16(c)(2)(B), because the claim had been raised for the first time on review. Id. at 40. 

Lastly, the R&R determined that Petitioner failed to show cause and prejudice. Id. at 41. 

Petitioner first objects to the R&R's determination that he did not raise this IAC 

issue in his PCR appeal and insists that he did. Doc. 33 at 8. Petitioner further asserts this 

issue should not be precluded because he was not adequately involved in the preparation 

of his direct appeal. Id. Petitioner refers to "a case of Long v. Florida where ... men wearing 

BACA jackets" were found to be tampering with the jury and the "case was reversed and 

remanded." Id. (Petitioner's citation did not include a reporter number, and the Court was 

unable to locate a case matching this description.)

Case 4:21-cv-00091-JCH Document 45 Filed 09/28/23 Page 8 of 15
- 9 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner did not object to the R&R's determination that review by Arizona's Rule 

32 court provides an independent and adequate state law ground that precludes federal 

habeas review. See Doc. 33 at 8–9. Petitioner's earnest rehashing of the same jurytampering facts from his initial habeas petition lacks the kind of specificity required for an 

objection to the R&R's determination on that point. Further, Petitioner did not object to the 

determination that he did not show cause or actual prejudice from this claim being 

procedurally barred. Thus, the Court adopts that portion of the R&R.

Upon de novo review of all other materials, the Court reaches the same conclusions 

as the R&R: Petitioner's claim of IAC for failure to address the jury tampering is

procedurally defaulted, and Petitioner failed to show cause or prejudice. Petitioner 

concedes that he did not raise a claim for jury tampering during his direct appeal, but 

attributes this to his having little input in his direct appeal as it was largely handled by his 

appellate counsel. Doc. 33 at 8. However, the proper remedy to contest claims excluded 

from a direct appeal is an IAC claim at the next level of appeal or in the PCR petition.

See State v. Herrera, 905 P.2d 1377, 1382 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). Further, "appellate 

counsel's waiver of other possible issues binds the defendant, and those waived issues 

cannot be resurrected in post-conviction proceedings." Id. Petitioner should also note that 

counsel cannot be ineffective merely for failing to raise a meritless argument. Wilson v. 

Henry, 185 F.3d 986, 991 (9th Cir.1999).

Petitioner's PCR petition raised only one claim of IAC—for trial counsel failing to 

call witnesses to Petitioner's defense. Doc. 21-2 at 21. "As a general matter, each 'unrelated 

alleged instance [ ] of counsel's ineffectiveness' is a separate claim for purposes of 

exhaustion." Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 992 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Moormann 

v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005)) (alterations in original). Regarding this 

pendant IAC claim related to jury tampering, Petitioner failed to give the state courts the 

"opportunity to pass upon and correct" the alleged violation, as required for purposes of 

exhaustion. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365–66 (1995). Neither did Petitioner show

///

Case 4:21-cv-00091-JCH Document 45 Filed 09/28/23 Page 9 of 15
- 10 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

cause or prejudice for failing to bring this IAC claim sooner. As such, it is procedurally 

defaulted and precluded from habeas review.

C. Third Objection – Confrontation Call Evidence (Ground Three)

In Ground Three, Petitioner argues that "[t]he court erred by denying the motion to 

suppress the confrontation call because it was illegally intercepted and recorded by law 

enforcement then allowed to be played during trial." Doc. 6 at 8. Additionally, Petitioner 

argues ineffective assistance of counsel due to the alleged failure of his trial counsel to 

properly prepare for the suppression hearing and for the alleged failure of his appellate 

counsel to raise this issue on direct appeal. Doc. 6-1 at 21.

The R&R first analyzed the Fourth Amendment claim and determined it is 

precluded from habeas review because "Petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate 

any alleged Fourth Amendment violation in the state courts." Doc. 30 at 42–44. The R&R 

next determined that Petitioner did not raise his IAC claim pertaining to the confrontation 

call evidence on direct appeal or in his pro se PCR petition. Id. at 44. The R&R observed 

that the appellate court subsequently declined to consider Petitioner's IAC claim, citing 

Rule 32.16(c)(2)(B), because it had been raised for the first time on review. Id. at 44. Lastly, 

the R&R determined that Petitioner failed to show cause and prejudice. Id. at 45. 

Petitioner objects that "[t]his issue can not [sic] be precluded because it was brought 

up in a pretrial motion, on direct appeal and on PCR." Doc. 33 at 11. Petitioner alludes to

judicial misconduct on the part of his trial judge and asserts that the trial judge "refused to 

admit it was illegal" to allow the confrontation call. Id. at 12. Petitioner also makes a 

general objection that "[a]ll my attorneys and myself [sic] were ineffective assistance of 

counsel," id., with no further supporting information. A general objection having the same 

effect as no objection, the Court adopts the R&R's reasoning and conclusions related to this 

IAC claim.

Petitioner did, indeed, raise issues with the confrontation call at trial, on direct 

appeal, and in his PCR petition. Doc. 33 at 10–11; Doc. 21-2 at 21. Here, however, this

issue is not precluded for failure to bring the claim sooner, but rather because the claim, 

Case 4:21-cv-00091-JCH Document 45 Filed 09/28/23 Page 10 of 15
- 11 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

already properly raised, was fully and fairly litigated in the trial court, on appeal, and in 

the Rule 32 court. Petitioner characterizes his arguments as being "blocked ... at every 

stage of appeal," Doc. 33 at 11, but his dissatisfaction with the outcome does not mean

Petitioner was denied the opportunity to fully litigate this issue. Therefore, the Court adopts 

the R&R's recommendation on this point and finds Petitioner's confrontation call claim to 

be procedurally defaulted and barred from habeas review.

Even if petitioner's confrontation call claim were not procedurally defaulted, it is 

meritless. Petitioner contends that (1) the victim was a minor and could not consent to 

recording the confrontation call and (2) there is no written or oral recording of the victim's 

parents giving consent. Although the State of Arizona limits a minor's ability to consent to 

sexual activity, minors are generally competent to provide consent for other activities. 

See e.g., State v. Fischer, 199 P.3d 663, 669–70 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (minors are "too 

unsophisticated" to consent to sexual activity); Glenn H. v. Hoskins, 419 P.3d 567, 571 

(Ariz. Ct. App. 2018) (minors can consent or refuse consent for medical procedures); In re

Adoption of Holman, 295 P.2d 372, 375–76 (Ariz. 1956) (minor parent can consent to 

adoption); State v. Butler, 302 P.3d 609, 612–13 (Ariz. 2013) (many factors can affect 

minors' ability to consent in judicial proceedings). Not only is a minor's parent's consent 

not required, but there is also no requirement that any consent to record a phone call be 

written or recorded. See Ariz. Rev. Stats. Ann. § 13-3005. Moreover, neither the victim nor 

her parents ever challenged the use of confrontation call evidence at trial, further implying 

their consent.

D. Fourth Objection – Jury Composition (Ground Four)

In Ground Four, Petitioner argues that the jury in his trial contained six "interested 

persons," including the foreperson, whose occupations necessarily prevented them from 

being fair and impartial. Doc. 6-1 at 22–23. Petitioner further argues that his trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to "properly research[], investigat[e] and rais[e] this issue before 

and during initial jury selection." Id. at 24.

///

Case 4:21-cv-00091-JCH Document 45 Filed 09/28/23 Page 11 of 15
- 12 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The R&R determined that Petitioner's claims related to interested persons on the 

jury were procedurally defaulted and precluded from habeas review because they were not 

raised on direct appeal and Petitioner did not show that cause or actual prejudice prevented 

him from timely raising these issues. Doc. 30 at 47–48. The R&R further determined that 

Petitioner's claims that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to raise 

the jury composition issue are procedurally barred because Petitioner did not raise these 

specific claims on every level of review. Id. at 48–50.

Petitioner did not object to the R&R's determination regarding his IAC claims. See

Doc. 33 at 13–14. Nor did Petitioner object to Arizona's procedural rule barring federal 

habeas review on the jury composition issue. See id. Thus, the Court adopts the R&R's 

conclusions on those points.

Petitioner objects to the R&R's conclusion that his jury composition claim is 

procedurally defaulted for failure to raise the issue sooner because it was his attorney's 

decision not to raise this issue on direct appeal, not his own. Id. at 13. But the proper remedy 

to contest a claim excluded from direct appeal in Arizona is an IAC claim in the PCR 

petition. Herrera, 905 P.2d at 1382; see also State v. Bennett, 146 P.3d 63, 68 (Ariz. 2006);

State ex rel. Thomas v. Rayes, 153 P.3d 1040, 1044 (Ariz. 2007). Petitioner did not raise 

an IAC claim related to jury composition in his PCR appeal. See Doc. 21-2 at 21. Further, 

Petitioner did not show cause or prejudice for failure to bring this issue. Id. Thus, this issue 

is procedurally defaulted and precluded from habeas review.

E. Fifth Objection – Double Jeopardy (Ground Five)

In Ground Five, Petitioner argues that molestation is a lesser included offense of 

sexual conduct with a minor, and thus his conviction for both offenses arising from a single 

incident is duplicative and violates double jeopardy. Doc. 6 at 10.

The R&R determined that Petitioner's claim of double jeopardy is procedurally 

defaulted and precluded from habeas review because (1) it was not raised on direct appeal, 

(2) the state appellate court was explicit about the procedural bar, and (3) Petitioner did not 

///

Case 4:21-cv-00091-JCH Document 45 Filed 09/28/23 Page 12 of 15
- 13 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

show that cause or actual prejudice prevented him from timely raising this issue. Doc. 30 

at 51–52.

Petitioner objects to the R&R's conclusions because his only contact with his 

appellate counsel was through letters, which impeded his ability to give input on which 

claims to raise, and because he "did raise this issue in my PCR appeal." Doc. 33 at 15.

Again, the proper remedy to contest a claim excluded from direct appeal in Arizona

is an IAC claim in the PCR petition. Herrera, 905 P.2d at 1382. But also "appellate 

counsel's waiver of other possible issues binds the defendant, and those waived issues 

cannot be resurrected in post-conviction proceedings." Id. 

Even if Petitioner's claims were not procedurally barred, they are meritless. 

Petitioner claims both of his charges "arose from the same act" and are duplicative in 

violation of double jeopardy. Doc. 33 at 15. But multiple charges can stem from a single 

incident: "[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct 

statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or 

only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not."

Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). Petitioner's molestation charge 

required sexual contact, whereas his sexual conduct charge required oral sexual contact. 

Compare Ariz. Rev. Stats. Ann. § 13-1405, with Ariz. Rev. Stats. Ann. § 13-1410. The 

molestation charge arose from Petitioner touching the victim's vagina with his finger 

whereas the sexual conduct charge arose from Petitioner touching the victim's vagina with 

his tongue. See Doc. 21-5 at 97. These are two different kinds of sexual contact, which

were correctly charged as two separate offenses.

F. Miscellaneous Objections – "Additional Evidence"

Petitioner provides a narrative detailing the history of his relationship with his 

stepdaughter A.H., who is the mother of T.H. Doc. 33 at 17–23. Petitioner admits to being 

convicted in 1991 for touching A.H.'s breast when she was 14 years old, that A.H. was 

forced to move out of the home when Petitioner was released from jail a year later, and that

A.H. was "very angry" because her "mother picked [Petitioner] instead of [A.H.]." Id. at 

Case 4:21-cv-00091-JCH Document 45 Filed 09/28/23 Page 13 of 15
- 14 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18. Petitioner characterizes A.H. as a "very angry, manipulative, [and] screwed up person 

due to the lifestyle she was forced to live." Id.

Petitioner claims A.H. coached T.H. into making false allegations of abuse in 2006 

and 2014 to retaliate against Petitioner for cutting off financial support to A.H. Id. at 19–

20. Petitioner stated that both A.H. and T.H. were motivated by hate and revenge, and that 

they "would do and say anything and everything they could against me." Id. at 23.

Petitioner characterizes this narrative of A.H. and T.H.'s motivation to lie as "new 

evidence." Id.

As stated in the R&R, new evidence is not a ground for federal habeas relief without 

an independent constitutional violation alleged in the underlying state criminal proceeding.

Doc. 30 at 35 (quoting Collins, 506 U.S. at 400). Additionally, newly discovered evidence 

that is merely impeaching in character does not warrant a new trial. Balestreri v. U.S., 224 

F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1955).

V. Order 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED ADOPTING IN FULL the Report and Recommendation 

(Doc. 30). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DISMISSING the Amended Petition. (Doc. 6). The 

Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and close this case. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED GRANTING Respondents' "Motion to Strike"

(Doc. 39). The Clerk shall strike Petitioner's "Response to Respondents' Reply" filed at 

Doc. 38. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING Petitioner's "Motion to Set Aside All 

Charges and Sentences with Prejudice to Reprosecution" (Doc. 40).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED under Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases, in the event Petitioner files an appeal, the Court declines to issue a certificate 

of appealability because reasonable jurists could not "debate whether (or, for that matter, 

agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues

Case 4:21-cv-00091-JCH Document 45 Filed 09/28/23 Page 14 of 15
- 15 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

presented were 'adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.'" See Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal citation and quotation omitted).

Dated this 27th day of September, 2023.

Case 4:21-cv-00091-JCH Document 45 Filed 09/28/23 Page 15 of 15