Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01240/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01240-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RASHEED HILSON, SR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

JESSE ARNETT, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:15-cv-01240-MJS (PC)

ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO FILE 

A FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT OR 

NOTIFY THE COURT OF HIS 

WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED ON THE 

COGNIZABLE CLAIMS IN HIS ORIGINAL 

COMPLAINT 

(ECF No. 1)

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE 

WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS 

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His complaint is before the Court for 

screening. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff has consented to the undersigned’s jurisdiction. (ECF 

No. 7.) 

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I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The in forma pauperis statute provides, “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any 

portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if 

the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. PLEADING STANDARD

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) 

that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) 

that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law.

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 

1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

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III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff was detained at California State Prison (“CSP”) in Corcoran, California, 

when the acts giving rise to his complaint occurred. Plaintiff names as Defendants:

Correctional Sergeants (“CS”) Jesse Arnett and Helen Gamboa; Correctional Officers 

(“CO”) Hector Flores, Joseph Potzernitz, and Jesse Gonzales; and Correctional 

Lieutenants (“CL”) Marsh and Wentherford. Plaintiff brings suit against these Defendants 

in both their individual and official capacities.

By way of relief, Plaintiff seeks $10,000,000 in compensatory damages, $1 in 

nominal damages, and $10,000,000 in punitive damages. He also seeks a declaration 

from the California Department of Corrections (“CDCR”) that these Defendants did 

violate Plaintiff’s rights. 

Plaintiff’s allegations may be summarized essentially as follows:

A. Plaintiff’s Transfer to CSP

On June 25, 2013, Plaintiff was transferred from Salinas Valley State Prison 

(“SVSP”) to CSP. During the transfer, Plaintiff’s medically-authorized wheelchair was not 

transferred with him, in violation of the Americans with Disability Act.

B. The August 2, 2013 Attack

On August 2, 2013, while attempting to use the lavatory in his cell, Plaintiff fell

with such force (due to his weight, 266 pounds) that he cracked his skull on the edge of 

a locker.

Despite repeated “man-down” requests, Defendant CS Helen Gamboa delayed 

calling for help for 30 minutes, saying “You don’t wanta [sic] go man down I promise 

you,” and “I guess I’ma [sic] have to show you.” The blood on Plaintiff’s hands and head

and on the floor showed how seriously he was injured, but Defendant Gamboa ignored it 

and did not even enter his cell.

Eventually, custody staff came and found Plaintiff lying on the ground in pain. 

Rather than helping Plaintiff, Defendant Potzernitz asked the tower for riot gear. Five 

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minutes later, Jesse Arnett (or someone who resembles him) and Potzernitz, who by 

then was also in riot gear, jumped on top of Plaintiff and began to punch, kick and twist 

Plaintiff’s left leg at the ankle trying to break it. Potzernitz finally stopped when an 

unknown sergeant told him to stop. 

This unidentified sergeant directed staff to lift Plaintiff onto a stretcher. Before 

doing so, they placed Plaintiff in mechanical restraints behind his back. His weight 

applied pressure and cut off circulation, causing pain. The driver of the emergency 

vehicle drove fast and hit bumps on the road, causing Plaintiff extreme pain. Plaintiff 

yelled at him to drive slower and more carefully, but he did not. The restraints were 

finally taken off at the request of the doctor at the hospital. After examination, Plaintiff 

was given a clean bill of health and discharged. 

Upon his return to CSP, Lt. Wenthenford, and a mental health clinician and a 

psychologist each denied Plaintiff’s request to be placed in administrative segregation 

(“ASU”) because he feared further assaults from staff.

Plaintiff remained in pain and requested a wheelchair to get around. His request 

was denied, in violation of CDCR policy. Without a wheelchair, Plaintiff was unable to 

access food. Plaintiff was denied “any and all food” for six days.1

C. The August 10, 2013 Attack

On August 10, 2013, Plaintiff was interviewed by Defendant CS Gonzales 

regarding Plaintiff’s request for a cane and a wheelchair. During the interview, CS 

Gonzales said, “However, you already know how I feel about you. I think you’re a piece 

of shit. And, I’m denying your request.” CS Gonzales also rescinded a lower bunk chrono 

previously granted to Plaintiff. 

Later that day, Plaintiff was handcuffed and moved to another cell by Arnett, 

Gamboa, and Flores. Once in the new cell, Plaintiff brought his hand to the food port to 

be uncuffed. After one cuff was removed, Plaintiff turned slightly so that the other cuff 

 

1

Plaintiff admits, however, that he attended Muslim religious services to eat. See Compl. ¶ 19, ECF No. 1 

at 14.

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could be removed. Arnett and Gamboa then pepper sprayed Plaintiff, and unknown 

correctional officers entered the cell and recuffed Plaintiff. Flores and Potzernitz escorted 

Plaintiff out of the cell where they punched, kicked, choked, and stabbed him until he 

defecated on himself. Gamboa then sprayed Plaintiff again with pepper spray. CL Marsh

watched the assault and laughed. Plaintiff was later found guilty of battery on a peace 

officer, and the matter was referred to the District Attorney for criminal charges. That

case is pending.

As a result of the multiple assaults, Plaintiff became suicidal and was taken to 

High Desert State Prison for a crisis bed. There, he was placed in a rubber room for two 

days. He was then returned to CSP and ultimately transferred to California Substance 

Abuse and Treatment Facility (“CSATF”) on November 7, 2013. 

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Plaintiff's official capacity claims for damages against the Defendants are barred 

by the Eleventh Amendment and therefore dismissed with prejudice. See Kentucky v. 

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169-70 (1985) (Eleventh Amendment immunity from damages in 

federal court action against state remains in effect when state officials are sued for 

damages in their official capacity). Although the Eleventh Amendment immunity 

precludes an award of damages against Defendants in their official capacities, it “does 

not bar actions for declaratory or injunctive relief brought against state officials in their 

official capacity.” Austin v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 939 F.2d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Plaintiff's request for declaratory relief against the Defendants remains intact, as does 

Plaintiff's request for damages against the Defendants in their individual capacities. See

Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 25, 31 (1991) (Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits seeking 

to impose individual liability upon a government official for actions taken under color of 

state law). Therefore, Plaintiff’s damages request against Defendants in their official 

capacities will be dismissed.

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B. Eighth Amendment Claims

1. Deliberate Indifference

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment 

and “embodies ‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, 

and decency.’“ Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). A prison official violates the 

Eighth Amendment when he acts with “deliberate indifference” to the serious medical 

needs of an inmate. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). 

“To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a plaintiff must satisfy both an 

objective standard—that the deprivation was serious enough to constitute cruel and 

unusual punishment—and a subjective standard—deliberate indifference.” Snow v. 

McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012). To establish the objective prong, a plaintiff 

must show a serious medical need by demonstrating that “failure to treat a prisoner's 

condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction 

of pain.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations 

omitted).

To satisfy the deliberate indifference prong, a plaintiff must show “(a) a purposeful 

act or failure to respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need and (b) harm 

caused by the indifference.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. “Indifference may appear when 

prison officials deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be 

shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.” Id. (internal 

quotations omitted). When a prisoner alleges that a delay of medical treatment amounts 

deliberate indifference, the prisoner must show that the delay led to further injury. See

Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985) 

(holding that “mere delay of surgery, without more, is insufficient to state a claim of 

deliberate medical indifference”).

Plaintiff accuses Defendant Gamboa of delaying a response to Plaintiff’s “man

down” requests for 30 minutes. It is clear, though, that the delay did not worsen Plaintiff’s 

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condition – he was given a clean bill of health by an independent examining doctor. See

Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (where a plaintiff alleges delay that 

constitutes deliberate indifference, he must allege that the delay caused “significant 

harm and that Defendants should have known this to be the case.”). Plaintiff has not 

done that here, and thus his claim against Gamboa based on her failure to respond 

immediately must be dismissed.

Construing the complaint liberally, it appears that Plaintiff is also alleging 

deliberate indifference due to the Defendants’ failure to provide him with a wheelchair. 

Plaintiff, however, asserts no facts indicating he had a medical need for a wheelchair, 

that any Defendant was aware of that need, or that any Defendant’s failure to provide 

the same was sufficiently egregious to amount to deliberate indifference. Plaintiff does 

claim that CS Gonzales denied Plaintiff’s accommodation request for a cane and 

wheelchair, but he does not allege that this Defendant was aware of a medical need for 

these items. Additionally, while Plaintiff alleges that the denial of a wheelchair resulted in 

his reliance on unnamed staff members to bring him food, and they did not do so, 

Plaintiff admits that he was able to attend Muslim religious services and eat there. Thus, 

he has not alleged injury. There is therefore no constitutional violation on these facts. 

2. Excessive Force

“In its prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’ the Eighth Amendment 

places restraints on prison officials, who may not ... use excessive physical force against 

prisoners.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992)). 

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation 

of the [Eighth Amendment], the core judicial inquiry is ... whether force was applied in a 

good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause 

harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986)).

When determining whether the force was excessive, the court looks to the “extent 

of the injury suffered by an inmate . . . , the need for application of force, the relationship 

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between that need and the amount of force used, the threat ‘reasonably perceived by 

the responsible officials,’ and ‘any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful 

response.’” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321). While de minimis 

uses of physical force generally do not implicate the Eighth Amendment, significant 

injury need not be evident in the context of an excessive force claim, because “[w]hen 

prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary 

standards of decency always are violated.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (citing Whitley, 475 

U.S. at 327).

The extent of injury suffered by the plaintiff may indicate the amount of force 

applied. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010). “[N]ot ‘every malevolent touch by a 

prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.’” Id. (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9).

The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’ 

punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional 

recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that 

the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience 

of mankind. An inmate who complains of a ‘push or shove’ 

that causes no discernible injury almost certainly fails to state 

a valid excessive force claim. Injury and force, however, are 

only imperfectly correlated, and it is the latter that ultimately 

counts.”

Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37-38 (internal citations and some internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff here accuses Defendants Arnett and Potzernitz of attacking him in 

response to an emergency “man down” request while Plaintiff lay on the floor of his cell 

bloodied and in pain. Plaintiff also accuses Defendants Arnett, Gamboa, Flores, and 

Potzernitz of spraying him with pepper spray and brutally attacking him without 

provocation. These allegations are sufficient to state a claim.2

However, Plaintiff’s allegation that the mechanical restraints placed on him were 

too tight does not state a claim. “In general, in cases where tight handcuffing was found 

 

2 While the Court recognizes that people do at times maliciously and sadistically impose pain on another 

without justification, experience has shown that more often than not a prisoner Plaintiff has engaged in 

some activity which precipitated a responsive use of force, and the question becomes whether the force 

used was greater than necessary. If such is the case here, Plaintiff may be better served by setting out 

the circumstances in more detail and allowing the Court to focus in on the true issue.

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to constitute excessive force, the plaintiff was in visible pain, repeatedly asked the 

defendant to remove or loosen the handcuffs, had pre-existing injuries known to the 

defendant, or alleged other forms of abusive conduct by the defendant.” Reviere v. 

Phillips, 2014 WL 711002, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2014) (collecting cases). In order to 

properly assert a claim for excessive force for tight handcuffs, Plaintiff must identify 

those individuals who were aware that the handcuffs were so tight that they were 

causing Plaintiff pain and then did nothing to alleviate that pain. See Shaw v. City of 

Rendondo Beach, 2005 WL 6117549, at *7 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“In those tight handcuffing 

cases in which courts have found excessive force, the arrestee was either in visible pain, 

complained of pain, alerted the officer to pre-existing injuries, sustained more severe 

injuries, was in handcuffs for a longer period of time, asked to have the handcuffs 

loosened or released, and/or other forms of abusive conduct in conjunction with the tight 

handcuffing.”)

3. Failure to Protect

Prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from 

physical abuse. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832-33 (1994) (quotations omitted). To establish a 

violation of this duty, the prisoner must show first, that he was incarcerated under 

conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm; and second, that a prison official 

knew of and was deliberately indifferent to this risk. Id. at 834. Plaintiff here accuses CL 

Marsh of watching the August 10, 2013 assault on Plaintiff, having the power to stop it, 

and not doing anything to intervene. Plaintiff has thus asserted a viable claim against

this Defendant.

C. Fourteenth Amendment Claims

1. Equal Protection 

Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated 

individuals are treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state 

purpose. See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). Prisoners are 

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protected from invidious discrimination based on race. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 

539, 556 (1974). Racial segregation is unconstitutional within prisons save for the 

necessities of prison security and discipline. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) 

(per curiam). Prisoners are also protected from intentional discrimination on the basis of 

their religion. See Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997). Equal 

protection claims are not necessarily limited to racial and religious discrimination. See

Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686-67 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying minimal 

scrutiny to equal protection claim by a disabled plaintiff because the disabled do not 

constitute a suspect class); see also Tatum v. Pliler, 2007 WL 1720165 (E.D. Cal. 2007) 

(applying minimal scrutiny to equal protection claim based on denial of in-cell meals 

where no allegation of race-based discrimination was made); Hightower v. 

Schwarzenegger, 2007 WL 732555 (E.D. Cal. March 19, 2008). Strict scrutiny applies to 

equal protection claims alleging race-based or religious discrimination (i.e., where the 

plaintiff is member of a “protected class”); minimal scrutiny applies to all other equal 

protection claims. See Lee, 250 F.3d at 686-67.

To violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 

defendants have to act with intentional discrimination against plaintiff, or against a class 

of inmates which included plaintiff, and such conduct does not relate to a legitimate 

penological purpose. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) 

(holding that equal protection claims may be brought by a “class of one”); Reese v. 

Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren v. Harrington, 

152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 

465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985).

The nature of Plaintiff’s equal protection claim is unclear. Plaintiff does not identify 

to which class he belongs, and it is unclear how any of the Defendants’ conduct 

encroached upon Plaintiff’s equal protection rights. Therefore, this claim will be 

dismissed.

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2. Due Process: Falsified Charges

The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from “depriv[ing] any person of life, 

liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Although 

prisoners retain due process rights, those rights are limited “by the nature of the regime 

to which they have been lawfully committed.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 

(1974) (citations omitted). To the extent Plaintiff asserts a due process claim against any 

Defendant for falsifying disciplinary charges, he fails to state a claim. Buckley v. Gomez, 

36 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1222 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (prisoners have no constitutional right to be 

free from wrongfully issued disciplinary reports), aff'd without opinion, 168 F.3d 498 (9th 

Cir. 1999); Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989) (prisoner's claims 

based on allegedly false charges do not state a constitutional claim); Brown v. CMC, 

(C.D. Cal. May 18, 2010) (“allegations of a fabricated RVR, alone, do not support a 

cognizable due process claim”). 

D. Conspiracy

Conspiracy under § 1983 merely provides a mechanism by which to plead or 

prove a constitutional or statutory violation. Landrigan v. City of Warwick, 628 F.2d 736, 

742 (1st Cir. 1980). Although conspiracy claims are actionable under Section 1983, “it is 

necessary that there have been, besides the agreement, an actual deprivation of a right 

secured by the Constitution and laws.” Id. at 742. A pro se complaint containing only 

conclusory, vague, or general allegations of conspiracy to deprive a person of 

constitutional rights will not withstand a motion to dismiss. Zemsky v. City of New York, 

821 F.2d 148, 152 (2nd Cir. 1987).

Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to support a cognizable claim for a conspiracy 

to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff’s bare allegation that Defendants 

conspired “with a total disregard to Plaintiff’s numerous request [sic] for accommodations 

and/or stronger pain medication” is devoid of any suggestion of facts which might 

conceivably support it. This claim will therefore be dismissed. 

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D. Violation of CDCR Policies

Insofar as Plaintiff brings suit against any of the Defendants for violations of 

CDCR policy, he is advised that a violation of a prison regulation or policy is not a per se 

constitutional violation. See Davis v. Kissinger, 2009 WL 256574, *12 n.4 (E.D. Cal.

2009). Thus, complaints where prison officials violated prison policy will not support a 

Section 1983 claim. 

F. The Americans with Disabilities Act

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) “prohibit[s] discrimination on 

the basis of disability.” Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). “To 

establish a violation of Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) [he] is a qualified 

individual with a disability; (2) [he] was excluded from participation in or otherwise 

discriminated against with regard to a public entity's services, programs, or activities; 

and (3) such exclusion or discrimination was by reason of [his] disability.” Lovell, 303 

F.3d at 1052. Title II of the ADA applies to inmates in state prisons. Pennsylvania Dept. 

of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998); see also Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 

1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1997); see, Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 453–56 (9th Cir. 1996).

“To recover monetary damages under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must prove 

intentional discrimination on the part of the defendant,” and the standard for intentional 

discrimination is deliberate indifference. Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 

(9th Cir. 2001). “Deliberate indifference requires both knowledge that a harm to a 

federally protected right is substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that likelihood.” 

Id. at 1139. In the ADA context, a plaintiff must both “identify ‘specific reasonable’ and 

‘necessary’ accommodations that the state failed to provide” and show that defendant's 

failure to act was “a result of conduct that is more than negligent, and involves an 

element of deliberateness.” Id. at 1140.

The “alleged deliberate refusal of prison officials to accommodate [a prisoner's] 

disability-related needs in such fundamentals as . . . medical care . . . constitutes 

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exclusion from participation in or ... denial of the benefits of the prison's services, 

programs, or activities.” United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 157 (2006).

Plaintiff’s ADA claim fails. He has not identified his disability. He has also not 

asserted facts indicating he was excluded from or discriminated against with regard to 

services, program, or activities at CSP because of his disability. Though Plaintiff asserts 

that he was improperly denied a wheelchair upon his transfer to CSP, in violation of the 

ADA, he fails to link this claim to any Defendant. Therefore, this claim will be dismissed.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff states these claims against 

the following Defendants: (1) an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against 

Defendants Arnett, Gamboa, Potzernitz, and Flores; and (2) an Eighth Amendment 

failure to protect claim against Defendant CL Marsh. All other claims and Defendants are 

subject to dismissal for the reasons stated supra.

The Court will grant Plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended complaint 

consistent with the foregoing. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). If 

Plaintiff does not wish to file a first amended complaint, and he is agreeable to 

proceeding only on the claims found to be cognizable, he may file a notice informing the 

Court that he does not intend to amend, and he is willing to proceed only on his 

cognizable claims. The other Defendants then will be dismissed, and the Court will 

provide Plaintiff with the requisite forms to complete and return so that service of process 

may be initiated.

If Plaintiff opts to amend, he must demonstrate that the alleged acts resulted in a 

deprivation of his constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78. Plaintiff must set forth 

“sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Plaintiff must also demonstrate that each named 

Defendant personally participated in a deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 

F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 

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Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it 

is not for the purposes of adding new claims. George, 507 F.3d at 607. Plaintiff should 

carefully read this Screening Order and focus his efforts on curing the deficiencies set 

forth above.

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, 

an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 

55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no 

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an 

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be 

sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First

Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed 

under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations 

omitted).

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Within thirty (30) days from the service of this order, Plaintiff must either:

a. File a first amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the 

Court in this order, or

b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file a first amended 

complaint and that he is willing to proceed only on the claims found to 

be cognizable in this order;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff (1) a blank civil rights complaint form and 

(2) a copy of his complaint, filed August 6, 2015;

3. If Plaintiff fails to file a first amended complaint or notify the Court in writing 

that he wishes to proceed only on his cognizable claim, in compliance with this 

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order, the Court will dismiss this action, with prejudice, for failure to comply 

with a court order and failure to prosecute, subject to the “three strikes” 

provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 

1759, 1761 (2015).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 13, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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