Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_01-cv-01351/USCOURTS-cand-4_01-cv-01351-50/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

AND THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT COMPOSED OF THREE JUDGES 

PURSUANT TO SECTION 2284, TITLE 28 UNITED STATES CODE

RALPH COLEMAN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER,

et al.,

Defendants.

NO. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P

THREE-JUDGE COURT

MARCIANO PLATA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER,

et al.,

Defendants.

NO. C01-1351 TEH

THREE-JUDGE COURT

PROTECTIVE ORDER RE:

DEPOSITION OF THE

CALIFORNIA PRISON HEALTH

CARE RECEIVERSHIP

CORPORATION

The Court is in receipt of a notice of deposition of the California Prison Health Care

Receivership Corporation (“Receiver”), served by Defendant Arnold Schwarzenegger on

November 21, 2007, which notices the deposition of the person most knowledgeable at the

Receiver’s office on a variety of topics, to commence on December 17, 2007. The scope of

this notice of deposition is extremely broad and covers all of the Receiver’s reports in Plata

v. Schwarzenegger, as well as topics as expansive as “[t]he causes of the problems and

deficiencies in the delivery of medical care to inmates at CDCR’s adult institutions.” Notice

of Dep. Sch. A at 1. Schwarzenegger also asks the Receiver to produce a broad range of

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documents, including “[a]ny and all DOCUMENTS authored or prepared by [the Receiver’s

office] that refer, relate to, or describe the level of medical services provided inmates housed

in CDCR’s adult institutions from April 2006 to the present.” Id. at 3. For the reasons

discussed below, this Court now enters a protective order barring the noticed deposition from

proceeding.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), and in the inherent discretion of a court

to manage its own discovery, a court may sua sponte enter a protective order for good cause

shown. E.g., Lesal Interiors, Inc. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 153 F.R.D. 552, 558 n.4 (D.N.J.

1994); McCoy v. Southwest Airlines, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 381, 385 (C.D. Cal. 2002). A

protective order may include an order that “discovery not be had.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).

In this case, although neither the Receiver nor any party has formally objected to the

noticed deposition, the Court finds good cause to bar the deposition based on immunity. The

Receiver was “imbued with the power and authority to act in the name of the Court as the

Court’s officer.” Plata v. Schwarzenegger, Case No. C01-1351 TEH, 2005 WL 2932253, at

*33 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005). Thus, like court-appointed special masters, the Receiver

“assumed the duties and obligations of a judicial officer” when appointed, In re Gilbert, 276

U.S. 6, 9 (1928), and acts as a “surrogate[]” of the court, Cordoza v. Pac. States Steel Corp.,

320 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Louisiana v. Mississippi, 466 U.S. 921, 921

(1984)). Accordingly, just as quasi-judicial immunity applies to special masters appointed

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53, Atkinson-Baker & Assocs., Inc. v. Kolts, 7 F.3d

1452, 1454-55 (9th Cir. 1993), this Court concludes that the Receiver is also protected by

quasi-judicial immunity. See Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 436 (1993)

(explaining that “[w]hen judicial immunity is extended to officials other than judges, it is

because their judgments are functionally comparable to those of judges – that is, because

they, too, exercise a discretionary judgment as a part of their function” (citation, internal

quotations, and alterations omitted)). Not only does this conclusion follow from the case

law, but it also follows from the Plata court’s order that the Receiver and his staff “shall

have the status of officers and agents of this Court, and as such shall be vested with the same

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immunities as vest with this Court.” Plata v. Schwarzenegger, Case No. C01-1351 TEH,

Feb. 14, 2006 Order Appointing Receiver.

This Court therefore agrees with the result in Gary W. v. Louisiana, 861 F.2d 1366

(5th Cir. 1988), in which the court squarely held that a special master may not be deposed

regarding his or her findings. A hearing was scheduled before a magistrate judge in that case

regarding the suitability of the special master’s recommendations. Id. at 1367. 

Dr. Lyles [the special master] began the preparation of a report

on incidents of abuse and neglect to be submitted to the

magistrate at the hearing on the recommendations she had made

as special master. Seeking to discover the substance of this

report, the state noticed Dr. Lyles’ deposition and issued a

subpoena and a subpoena duces tecum to her. The [plaintiff]

classmembers moved to quash. The magistrate quashed the

subpoenas because of Dr. Lyles’ special relationship with the

court. The district court affirmed that ruling. Dr. Lyles

completed her report and, as ordered by the magistrate,

distributed copies to the parties before the scheduled hearing. 

Following the hearing the magistrate ordered implementation of

Dr. Lyles’ formal recommendations. The state appeals the ruling

on the motion to quash.

Id. at 1368. The appellate court affirmed the quashing of the subpoena, explaining that,

“Dr. Lyles was performing a quasi-judicial function when, as special master, she submitted

her formal recommendation. An examination of her mental processes in making that

recommendation would have been inappropriate and the magistrate and district court

correctly prevented such.” Id. at 1369 (citation omitted).

Likewise, in this case, the Receiver has filed numerous reports, as detailed by

Schwarzenegger in Schedule A of his notice of deposition listing subjects within the scope of

the desired testimony. These reports speak for themselves, and any testimony about the

reports, as well as testimony about or the production of underlying documents considered by

the Receiver in his preparation of the reports, would impermissibly intrude on the Receiver’s

mental processes. See, e.g., United States v. Roebuck, 271 F. Supp. 2d 712 (D.V.I. 2003)

(explaining that “[t]he overwhelming authority concludes that a judge may not be compelled

to testify concerning the mental processes used in formulating official judgments or the

reasons that motivated him in the performance of his official duties”).

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Accordingly, with good cause appearing, the Court hereby enters a protective order

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) barring the deposition of the California Prison

Health Care Receivership Corporation from proceeding.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 11/29/07 /s/ 

STEPHEN REINHARDT

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

Dated: 11/29/07 

LAWRENCE K. KARLTON

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Dated: 11/29/07 

THELTON E. HENDERSON

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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