Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_02-cv-01357/USCOURTS-azd-2_02-cv-01357-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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The only remaining Defendant is Edwin Lao, and the only remaining cause of action

concerns Lau's use of allegedly excessive force against Plaintiff.

WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael S. McDonald, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Deputy Warden Schuster; et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-02-1357-PHX-SRB

ORDER

Pro se Plaintiff Michael S. McDonald, a prisoner in the custody of the Arizona

Department of Corrections ("ADOC") filed this Section 1983 action, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

alleging that ADOC prison officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights by using

excessive force and by exhibiting deliberate indifference to his medical needs.1

 At issue

are the following motions: Defendant's Motion to Dismiss due to Plaintiff's alleged failure

to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to commencing this action (Doc. 66);

Plaintiff's Motion to Strike certain statements in Defendant's Reply in Support of his

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 73); and Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Declaration of Antonette

Lee (Doc. 80).

Case 2:02-cv-01357-SRB Document 85 Filed 02/21/06 Page 1 of 11
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ADOC Departmental Order 802 is attached to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as

Attachment A.

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I. BACKGROUND

The facts giving rise to Plaintiff's Complaint were fully set forth in the Court's

Order (Doc. 57) ruling on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 42) and need

not be reiterated here. The germane facts for the pending motions concern ADOC's

inmate grievance procedure and Plaintiff's alleged attempts to comply with that

procedure:

An inmate who wishes to grieve the behavior of an ADOC staff member must

comply with the procedure set forth in Departmental Order ("D.O.") 802.12.2

 Before

filing a formal grievance, the inmate must attempt to resolve his complaint informally by

submitting to his assigned C.O. III an Inmate Issue/Response Form within ten workdays

of the action that caused the complaint. D.O. 802.08(1.1); 802.12(1.1.1). The C.O. III

has a duty to investigate the complaint, and must notify the inmate by Issue/Response

Form within ten days of receiving the complaint whether it can be informally resolved. 

D.O. 802.08(1.3.1-1.2.2). If the inmate is unsatisfied with the resolution, or if there has

been no resolution, the inmate has ten days from his receipt of the Issue/Response form to

file a formal grievance. D.O. 802.12(1.1.2). Grievances are logged by the Grievance

Coordinator and forwarded to the Warden, Deputy Warden or Administrator, who have

thirty days to review the grievance and respond. D.O. 802.12(1.1.5-1.1.6). The inmate

may appeal to the ADOC Director, but must submit his appeal within ten days of

receiving the response to his grievance. D.O. 802.12(1.2.1). 

A grievance is considered exhausted when the ADOC Director denies the appeal. 

D.O. 802.12(1.2.4). If prison officials fail to respond to a grievance within the time

frames specified in the departmental order, the inmate is entitled to proceed to the next

level of review. D.O. 802.07(1.2.4).

Case 2:02-cv-01357-SRB Document 85 Filed 02/21/06 Page 2 of 11
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This statement apparently refers to the fact that, according to Defendant, Plaintiff

failed to attach his rejected informal complaint to his grievance. Plaintiff maintains that he

did attach his informal complaint to his grievance.

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Plaintiff alleges that he was injured when Defendant grabbed his testicles on April

13, 2002. On May 15, 2002, well beyond the ten-day window for the filing of informal

complaints, Plaintiff submitted an inmate letter in an attempt to informally resolve, among

other issues, his complaint against Defendant. (Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. C.) Plaintiff

alleges that the delay in filing his informal complaint is attributable to the fact that prison

officials did not supply him with the requisite forms. (Compl. at 4, ¶ 5; Doc. 15, Ex. A.) 

C.O. III Lee investigated the informal complaint, and advised Plaintiff on the

following day that the medical staff found "no evidence of injury" on his testicles. (Def.'s

Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. D.) 

Plaintiff then submitted a formal grievance on May 18, 2002. (Def.'s Mot. to

Dismiss, Ex. E-1.) That grievance was returned to Plaintiff as "unprocessed" because he

had not "documented [his] attempts to resolve the issue informally with [his] assigned CO

III,"3

 and because he was "past the time frames (10 calendar days) for filing a grievance." 

(Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. E.) Plaintiff did not appeal this response. He claims it is

because "[t]here is no appeal for an unprocessed grievance. Without a tracking number,

no appeal is accepted." (Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 3.)

On July 18, 2002, Plaintiff filed a complaint with this Court naming, among others,

Defendant Lao. The Complaint alleges that Defendant is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for violation of Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment. On June 6, 2003, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that

Plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to commencing this

action (Doc. 11.) Plaintiff responded, and included an affidavit in which he stated that he

"requested inmate letter forms, grievance forms, and medical forms from CB-3

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Plaintiff made a similar contention in his Complaint. (Compl. at 4, ¶ 5.)

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correctional staff and was denied said forms." (Doc. 15, Ex. A.)4

 Plaintiff also maintains

that he requested and was denied writing implements. (Doc. 15, Ex. A.) In lieu of a

reply, Defendant withdrew his motion to dismiss but "reserve[d] the right to re-urge this

basis for dismissal if discovery supports that Plaintiff failed to exhaust the prison

grievance procedures. At this time, however, Defendants are not able to evaluate and

respond to the documents attached to Plaintiff's response to the Motion [to Dismiss]." 

(Doc. 19.)

On August 10, 2005, Defendant filed a second motion to dismiss on the issue of

exhaustion (Doc. 66). That motion, which is now pending, argues that Plaintiff failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies because he did not appeal the denial of his grievance

before filing his Complaint. (Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 5.) Plaintiff responded that any

appeal would have necessarily been futile because "[t]here is no appeals process for an

unprocessed grievance." (Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 3.) Defendant disagreed,

replying that Plaintiff "could have resubmitted his grievance with the required

information or he could have appealed the fact that his grievance returned unprocessed." 

(Def.'s Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at 2.) Defendant also asserted that "McDonald

could have obtained some remedy from the Warden or Deputy Warden and/or from the

ADC Director by appealing the Grievance Coordinator's response." (Def.'s Reply in

Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at 2 n.3) (emphasis in original).

Plaintiff filed a motion to strike the statements in Defendant's reply that Plaintiff

could have appealed the fact that his grievance was returned unprocessed. (Doc. 73.)

Defendant responded by voluntarily withdrawing that statement, as well as the statement

that Plaintiff could have obtained some remedy by appealing the response. Defendant

stood by his argument that if Plaintiff had re-submitted his grievance with the informal

complaint that he allegedly forgot to include with the initial submission, he could have

obtained "some remedy." Defendant also contends that if the re-submission included an

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explanation as to why his informal complaint was untimely, "the Grievance Coordinator

would have further investigated his grievance." (Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s Mot. to Strike

Statements in Def.'s Reply at 2.) In support of that argument, Defendant attached to his

response a declaration by Lee, Plaintiff's then-Grievance Coordinator and C.O. III who

had returned his grievance as unprocessed. (Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s Mot. to Strike

Statements in Def.'s Reply, Ex. 2 ("Lee Declaration").) Lee states that if Plaintiff had resubmitted his grievance with both the informal complaint attached and an explanation as

to why his informal complaint had not been submitted within ten days of the alleged

assault, she "would have reviewed the grievance more carefully to determine if he had a

valid reason for being out of time frames." (Lee Declaration at 2.) 

Plaintiff replied, and also filed a motion to strike Lee's declaration. (Doc. 80.) It is

not a true motion to strike, as it simply takes issue with the factual statements in Lee's

declaration. For instance, Plaintiff contends that, despite Lee's statements to the contrary,

he did attach his informal complaint to his grievance, and even if he had not, Lee herself

had reviewed and signed the informal complaint two days before receiving the grievance. 

Plaintiff also points out that when Lee returned Plaintiff's grievance as unprocessed, she

violated D.O. 802.12(1.1.4), which requires her to include with the denial "instruction for

proper completion." According to Plaintiff, if Lee had really wanted Plaintiff to resubmit his grievance with the informal complaint attached, she should have said so when

she returned the grievance to him.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff's Motions to Strike

Both motions to strike are denied. The motion to strike certain statements in

Defendant's reply in support of his motion to dismiss simply expresses Plaintiff's

disagreement with Defendant's arguments. That is not a proper basis for a motion to

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) authorizes courts to strike from any pleading

"any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter."

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strike.5 Similarly, the motion to strike Lee's declaration does nothing more than take issue

with factual assertions in that declaration. That is also not a proper basis for a motion to

strike.

B. Timing

This lawsuit alleges that Plaintiff was a victim of Defendant's excessive force. 

Those allegations may or may not be true, but at a minimum, Plaintiff has been victimized

by Defendant's dilatory litigation tactics.

This simple case was filed on July 18, 2002, over three and a half years ago. The

original scheduling order imposed a dispositive motion deadline of August 29, 2003. 

Defendant filed its first motion to dismiss on June 6, 2003 and also asked for, and

received, a stay of discovery. Defendant withdrew his motion to dismiss on July 10,

2003, a new scheduling order was entered on September 8, 2003, re-setting the

dispositive motion deadline to May 14, 2004. On May 14, 2004, Defendant asked that

the dispositive motion deadline be pushed back one month, to June 14, 2004, and his

request was granted. On the last possible day to file a dispositive motion, Defendant did

so, a motion for summary judgment. Defendant asked for and received another extension,

this time to file a reply in support of his motion for summary judgment. The motion for

summary judgment was denied in part, and yet again, Defendant asked for an extension,

this time of one-hundred twenty days to file the joint pretrial statement. That was not

enough, and Defendant asked for, and received, a further sixty day extension.

Glaringly absent from this string of extensions is a request to file a dispositive

motion after June 14, 2004. Apparently, Defendant felt that he did not need permission to

file such a motion, because he did file one without permission, about fifteen months after

the dispositive motion deadline had passed. 

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But it does not end there. The Court is unaware of a case, and Defendant has not

pointed out any, where a defendant has been permitted to file a motion to dismiss on the

issue of exhaustion more than six months after a motion for summary judgment. Courts

are generally hesitant to allow exhaustion issues to be raised even at the summary

judgment phase, but do so when there has not been an allegation of prejudice. See

Panaro v. City of N. Las Vegas, 432 F.3d 949, 952 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted)

(citing Paine v. City of Lompoc, 265 F.3d 975, 981 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001)). Here, Plaintiff

has correctly alleged that he has been prejudiced by this motion's tardiness.

Next, when Defendant learned of the basis for Plaintiff's opposition to the original

motion to dismiss, Defendant withdrew the motion because he needed to conduct more

discovery to adequately respond. Defendant promised the Court that he would re-urge the

motion to dismiss only if discovery supported it. Discovery did not support it, as

Defendant's pending motion to dismiss does not rely on any facts obtained in discovery. 

Moreover, even if Defendant had somehow obtained an affidavit from the guards that

they had not withheld the grievance forms from Plaintiff, such an affidavit would have

been insufficient to overcome at that stage of the litigation Plaintiff's affidavit concerning

what the guards had allegedly done. In other words, even at the time that Defendant

withdrew his motion, it appears impossible that discovery could have yielded evidence

that would have supported a dismissal for failure to exhaust.

The delay is also needless because there is no fathomable reason why, if Defendant

wished to press the exhaustion issue, he could not have at least attempted to do so in his

motion for summary judgment. By that point, the discovery deadline had well passed.

And finally, as will be discussed below, the delay is especially needless because the

motion is baseless. 

C. Exhaustion

Section 1997e of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e,

provides that, "No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under Section

1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or

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other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted." (emphasis added).

"[A] remedy that prison officials prevent a prisoner from utilizing is not an

'available' remedy under § 1997e(a)." Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2001)

(citations and some internal punctuation omitted). See Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523,

529 (3d Cir. 2003) (denying motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust where prison

officials refused to provide inmate with necessary grievance forms, and as such, finding

that the inmate lacked "available" administrative remedies); O'Connor v. Featherston,

2002 WL 818085, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. April 29, 2002) (noting that "courts have held that

an inmate may nonetheless defeat a motion to dismiss even when the requirements of

administrative remedies have not technically been exhausted where . . . it is alleged that

corrections officers failed to file inmate's grievances or otherwise impeded or prevented

his efforts") (citations omitted). See, e.g., Johnson v. Wackenhut Corrs. Corp., 130

Fed.Appx. 947, 950 (10th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging that "courts have held that refusing

a prisoner grievance forms could raise an inference that the prisoner has exhausted

'available' administrative remedies"); Vega v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 2005 WL 2931841, at

*2 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2005) (acknowledging the rule that where prison officials "mislead"

or "otherwise prevent" an inmate from filing a timely grievance, inmate may be justified

in "not complying with administrative procedural requirements") (citing Brown v. Croak,

312 F.3d 109, 112-13 (3d Cir. 2002)); Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir.

2002); Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687 (8th Cir. 2001). Cf. Frank v. Days, 322 F.3d 863,

867 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that where injury prevented inmate from filing his grievance

in a timely manner, action could not be dismissed due to failure to exhaust, because, in

light of the inmate's injury, no remedies were "available" to him).

One way that prison officials can prevent an inmate from utilizing a remedy is by

denying him access to the requisite grievance forms until the window for filing

grievances has passed. Miller, 247 F.3d at 739-40 (denying motion to dismiss for failure

to exhaust where inmate had attempted to obtain administrative forms for filing a

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grievance but prison officials had refused to respond); Mitchell, 318 F.3d at 529 (citing

Miller, 247 F.3d at 740); O'Connor, 2002 WL 818085, at *1-2. See also Johnson, 130

Fed.Appx. at 950. 

In those situations, an inmate's administrative remedies can be considered

exhausted "without his claims being denied at the highest level of administrative review

specified by the relevant prison policies." Davis v. Arpaio, 2006 WL 269964, at *2 (D.

Ariz. Jan. 31, 1996) (citing Mitchell, 318 F.3d at 529; Miller, 247 F.3d ay 740). See also

Adkins v. Arpaio, 2006 WL 269965, at *2 (D. Ariz. Jan. 31, 2006) (citations omitted);

Cordova v. Arpaio, 2005 WL 3560621, at *1 (D. Ariz. Dec. 29, 2005); Neese v. Arpaio,

397 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1183 (D. Ariz. Nov. 9, 2005). See, e.g., Henderson v. Macias,

2005 WL 2709523, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2005) (holding that "exhaustion occurs when

prison officials fail to respond to a grievance within the policy time limits," and citing

supporting cases from the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits)

(citations omitted); Ellis v. Cambra, 2005 WL 2105039, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2005)

(citations omitted); Rowe v. Corcoran State Prison, 2005 WL 1344379 (E.D. Cal. May

27, 2005).

Here, Plaintiff has alleged that despite numerous requests, prison officials refused

to provide him with the forms used to initiate the grievance process until the ten-day

window for timely filing such grievances had passed. (Compl. at 4, ¶ 5; Doc. 15, Ex. A;

Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 3-4; Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Notice of Supplemental

Authority at 2; Pl.'s Mot. to Strike Decl. of Antonette Lee at 2.) Defendant provides no

evidence or argument to the contrary. Accordingly, because it is uncontested that prison

officials denied Plaintiff timely access to all available remedies, it cannot be said that he

failed to exhaust "available" remedies.

Defendant argues that even assuming prison officials impeded Plaintiff's access to

the grievance forms, Plaintiff's case should still be dismissed because he failed to appeal

the denial of his grievance. This argument is rejected in light of the above authority and

because even if Plaintiff had appealed, it was not possible for him to succeed, or for

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Defendant disputes the fact that Plaintiff had no remedy available to him. In his

response to Plaintiff's motion to strike certain statements in Defendant's reply, Defendant

states that Plaintiff "could have obtained some remedy if he had resubmitted his grievance

with the required information." (Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s Mot. to Strike Statements in Def.'s

Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 2.) Not so. Had Plaintiff submitted the "required

information," which was apparently a copy of the informal complaint, that submission would

not have affected the second reason stated in the response for denying Plaintiff's grievance:

the fact that his informal complaint was filed more than ten days after the alleged assault.

Even though Lee's declaration states that if Plaintiff had re-submitted his grievance with the

informal complaint attached, she "would have investigated the matter further," that statement

is inconsistent with her duty to comply with D.O. 802, which does not provide any prison

official with the authority to investigate untimely informal complaints. Also, despite faulting

Plaintiff for not re-submitting his grievance, Lee violated D.O. 802.12(1.1.4), which requires

her to return unprocessed grievances "with instruction for proper completion."

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prison officials to take any action on Plaintiff's grievance. See Booth v. Churner, 532

U.S. 731, 736, 121 S. Ct. 1819, 1822-1823 n.1 (2001) (implicitly acknowledging that no

remedy is "available" where "the relevant administrative procedure lacks authority to

provide any relief or to take any action whatsoever in response to a complaint" because

"without the possibility of some relief, the administrative officers would presumably have

no authority to act on the subject of the complaint, leaving the inmate with nothing to

exhaust."); Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[T]here can be no

'absence of exhaustion' unless some relief remains available") (citing Brown v. Croak, 312

F.3d 109, 112 (3d Cir. 2002)). D.O. 802 is unequivocal on this point: "Failure to submit

[an informal complaint] within ten working days of the action that caused the complaint

shall result in the inmate's forfeiture of the opportunity to pursue a formal grievance

through the Department's Inmate Grievance system." D.O. 802.08(1.1.1) (emphasis

added). There is no provision in D.O. 802 that permits prison officials to consider a

grievance if the informal complaint is untimely.6

 See Brown, 422 F.3d at 926 (noting that

"requiring entirely pointless exhaustion, when no possible relief is available, is more

likely to inflame than 'mollify passions'") (quoting Booth, 532 U.S. at 737, 121 S. Ct. at

1825) (emphasis in Brown). 

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While the untimely grievance in Ngo is referred to as an "appeal," it is procedurally

and substantively equivalent to the informal complaint that ADOC inmates are required to

file in order to commence the inmate grievance process.

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As a final note, the Court does not believe it is necessary to withhold ruling on this

motion until the United States Supreme Court renders its decision in the case of Ngo v.

Woodford, 2005 WL 3027720 (Nov. 14, 2005), which presents the question, answered in

the affirmative by the Ninth Circuit, 403 F.3d at 620, whether "a prisoner satisf[ies] the

Prison Litigation Reform Act's administrative exhaustion requirement by filing an

untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative appeal[.]" While the inmate

in Ngo, like Plaintiff, failed to file a timely informal complaint,7

 there is no allegation in

Ngo that the reason for the delay was attributable to factors outside of his control, such as

prison guards actively impeding inmate access to the grievance forms. As such, the Court

believes that however the Supreme Court may rule in Ngo, it would not have an impact on

the present action.

IT IS ORDERED denying Defendant Lao's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 66).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff's Motion to Strike certain

statements in Defendant's Reply in Support of his Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 73).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the

Declaration of Antoinette Lee (Doc. 80).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Joint Proposed Pretrial Order is due in

thirty days. No extensions will be given. Defendant has the responsibility to

communicate with Plaintiff regarding the preparation of that Order.

DATED this 16th day of February, 2006.

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