Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05128/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05128-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 6, 2001 Decided March 30, 2001

No. 00-5128

Center for Auto Safety,

Appellant

v.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cv01759)

Allison M. Zieve argued the cause for appellant. With her

on the briefs was Michael Tankersley.

Lisa S. Goldfluss, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration. With her on the brief were Wilma A. Lewis,

United States Attorney, R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant United

States Attorney, Lloyd S. Guerci, Assistant Chief Counsel for

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Litigation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,

and Enid Rubenstein, Attorney.

Erika Z. Jones argued the cause for appellees Volvo Cars

of North America, Inc., et al. With her on the brief were

Adam C. Sloane, Karen L. Manos, Paul Jackson Rice,

Christopher H. Grigorian, Scott T. Kragie, and Andrew W.

Cohen.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Ginsburg and Tatel,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.

Edwards, Chief Judge: In December 1997, the National

Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") issued an

Information Request to nine airbag manufacturers and importers seeking information on airbag systems used in years

1990-98. Subsequently, the Center for Auto Safety ("Center") sought access to the information pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. s 552 (1994).

NHTSA released some of the information to the Center, but

asserted that the remaining submissions were protected from

disclosure under Exemption 4 of FOIA, 5 U.S.C. s 552(b)(4)

(1994), which excludes from disclosure "trade secrets and

commercial or financial information obtained from a person

and privileged or confidential."

The Center filed suit in District Court, asserting that the

disputed documents were subject to disclosure under FOIA,

because the submissions to the Government had been mandatory and disclosure of the information would not cause impairment to the Government or substantial competitive harm to

the respondents. The Center also submitted evidence purporting to demonstrate that the intervenor-defendants had

customarily disclosed information of the same type at issue

here.

On summary judgment, the District Court found that,

because NHTSA's Information Request violated the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. s 3501 (1994), NHTSA had no

authority to enforce the request, and as a result the submissions should be considered voluntary. Center for Auto Safety

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v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., No. 99-1759, Mem.

Op. at 35-36 (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 2000) ("Mem. Op."). The

District Court found that some of the disputed documents

qualified as trade secrets, and therefore were protected as

such from disclosure. Analyzing the remaining information

as voluntary submissions, the District Court evaluated the

submissions under the standards laid out in Critical Mass

Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 975 F.2d

871 (D.C. Cir. 1992), and Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v.

United States Department of Energy, 169 F.3d 16 (D.C. Cir.

1999). Pursuant to Critical Mass, the District Court considered whether, in the past, the manufacturers and importers

had customarily disclosed the same type of information at

issue here, and determined that they had not.

We agree with the District Court that, because NHTSA

violated the Paperwork Reduction Act, the agency's Information Request was not enforceable. Accordingly, because

NHTSA lacked legal authority to enforce its request for

information, the submissions cannot be considered mandatory

even if the parties reasonably believed the Information Requests were mandatory at the time of submission. When an

agency obtains information from private entities by asserting

legal authority which it cannot enforce, private-party submissions are entitled to the same protection from disclosure as

voluntary submissions.

Although the District Court appropriately analyzed disclosure under the voluntary, rather than mandatory standard,

we find that the District Court misstated the appropriate

legal standard. In addressing customary disclosure, the trial

court appeared to indicate that the Center was required to

prove that intervenor-defendants have previously released

identical information. This is not a correct statement of the

law. As a result, questions remain as to whether certain of

the disputed information must be released because it has

been customarily disclosed in the past. Accordingly, we

remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings

consistent with the opinion.

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I. Background

This controversy dates back to December 17, 1997, when

NHTSA issued an Information Request to nine airbag manufacturers and importers: DaimlerChrysler Corporation, Ford

Motor Company, General Motors Corporation, American

Honda Motor Company, Mercedes-Benz USA, Nissan North

America, Toyota Technical Center USA, Volkswagen of

America, and Volvo Cars of North America. The companies

were directed to respond by February 17, 1998, and NHTSA

subsequently posted some of the information on the agency's

website. Mem. Op. at 2. On January 19, 1999, the Center

submitted a FOIA request for all material the agency had

received but not yet made public. On February 16, 1999,

NHTSA responded that Exemption 4 of FOIA barred disclosure of the disputed information. On March 10, 1999, the

Center appealed NHTSA's decision. Id. at 3. On June 18,

1999, NHTSA granted the appeal in part, and then released

some, but not all, of the disputed information. The Center

filed the underlying FOIA suit on June 29, 1999. Subsequent

to the filing, NHTSA released additional information. There

are now 33 items of information remaining in dispute. Id.

The items fall into six general categories, including airbag

deployment, airbag cover, airbag system components, seatbelts, crash sensors, and system performance.

The District Court determined that NHTSA did not have to

disclose any of the 33 items of information. The District

Court found that 10 of the information items were protected

from disclosure as trade secrets, including information regarding the tear pattern of the airbag, the fold pattern of the

airbag, the number and location of the tethers, the type of

inflator and gas generant, the number of inflation stages, the

various tank tests used to measure inflator characteristics,

and the engineering specifications provided to suppliers for

development of algorithms. Id. at 29-32. The District Court

explained that the remaining 23 information items were exempt from disclosure because the information was voluntarily

submitted and constituted confidential commercial information that was not customarily disclosed. The District Court

concluded that the information at issue had been disclosed in

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the past only when necessary, and always with a confidentiality agreement or protective order. Id. at 38.

The Center argued that the information was customarily

disclosed, because most of the information could be ascertained through physical inspection. The District Court rejected this claim; the time, expense and risk of gathering the

relevant information are substantial, and simply selling a

vehicle to the public does not constitute revealing the detailed

physical characteristics of airbags. Id. at 32.

The Center also argued that the manufacturers had previously disclosed the same type of information, and submitted

extensive, detailed evidence to the District Court of prior

instances of disclosure. The District Court rejected this

claim as well, and concluded that, in each instance highlighted

by the Center, the evidence indicated only discrete disclosures to entities requiring the information, not customary

disclosure. Furthermore, the information disclosed was general and merely approximated the information submitted to

NHTSA. Id. at 39. In addition, the District Court held that

the Center failed to show that the previously disclosed information was the same type of information that the Center now

seeks. On this latter point, the District Court noted that the

Center "must" demonstrate that the information is "identical." Id. Based on this analysis, the District Court granted

NHTSA's and intervenor-defendants' motion for summary

judgment. We review the District Court's grant of summary

judgment de novo. Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States

Dep't of Justice, 235 F.3d 598, 602 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

II. Analysis

A. Voluntary or Mandatory Submissions

FOIA expresses a fundamental commitment to full agency

disclosure of government documents. Public access, not secrecy, is the main purpose of FOIA. United States Dep't of

Defense v. Fed. Lab. Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 494 (1994)

(quoting Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361

(1976)). Although FOIA is intended to expose agency action

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to public scrutiny, FOIA permits an agency to withhold

information if it falls within any one of nine categories of

exempted material. McCutchen v. United States Dep't of

Health and Human Services, 30 F.3d 183, 184 (D.C. Cir.

1994).

NHTSA asserted that the information requested by the

Center was protected from disclosure under Exemption 4,

which excludes "trade secrets and commercial or financial

information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential." 5 U.S.C. s 552(b)(4). This court has on a number

of occasions addressed the standards governing determinations of whether information qualifies under Exemption 4.

The judgment of the court sitting en banc in Critical Mass is

our most significant statement on the subject.

In Critical Mass, the court held that material may be

withheld as "financial or commercial" information under Exemption 4 of FOIA under two circumstances. First, "financial or commercial information provided to the Government

on a voluntary basis is 'confidential' for the purpose of

Exemption 4 if it is of a kind that would customarily not be

released to the public by the person from whom it was

obtained." 975 F.2d at 879 (emphasis added). Second, financial or commercial information provided to the Government

on a mandatory basis is "confidential" if "disclosure would be

likely either '(1) to impair the Government's ability to obtain

necessary information in the future; or (2) to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom

the information was obtained.' " Id. at 878. "[W]hen dealing

with a FOIA request for information the provider is required

to supply, the governmental impact inquiry will focus on the

possible effect of disclosure on its quality." Id.

The decision in Critical Mass explains that, with respect

to information voluntarily submitted, the party opposing disclosure bears the burden of proving the information is confidential. Id. at 879. In addition, in assessing customary

disclosure, the court will consider how the particular party

customarily treats the information, not how the industry as

a whole treats the information. Id. at 872, 878-80. A

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party can voluntarily make protected disclosures of information, and as long as the disclosures are not made to the

general public, such disclosures do not constitute customary

disclosures. Id. at 874, 880.

The court further noted that disclosure under FOIA balances the public's interest in maintaining "an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society," with

the Government's interest in access to data in making "intelligent well informed decisions," and private interests in protection from the "competitive disadvantages" that would result

from disclosure. Id. at 872-73 (citations omitted). When the

Government obtains information as part of a mandatory

submission, the Government's access to the information normally is not seriously threatened by disclosure; the private

interest is the principal factor tending against disclosure, and

the harm to the private interest must be significant to prevent public access to information. Id. at 878. However,

when the Government receives information voluntarily, it has

a strong interest in ensuring continued access, and therefore

both the Government and private interests weigh against

overly broad disclosure. Id.

With this framework in mind, we agree with the District

Court that the submissions in this case should not be treated

as mandatory. At the same time, we note that this case does

not involve a typical voluntary information submission--it

involves a mistaken submission. NHTSA's request for information appeared mandatory on its face. The Information

Request stated that "NHTSA hereby requires" the recipient

to submit the information and explained that the recipient,

"must respond to the enclosed Information Request." Information Request, reprinted in Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 323.

Furthermore, the Information Request explained, "[f]ailure to

respond promptly and fully to this Information Request could

subject [recipient] to civil penalties pursuant to 49 U.S.C.

s 30165 or lead to an action for injunctive relief pursuant to

49 U.S.C. s 30163." Id. The language of the Information

Request clearly communicates to the recipient that submission of material was mandatory.

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Nevertheless, NHTSA's request was not enforceable as a

result of the Paperwork Reduction Act and, therefore, we find

that the submissions cannot be considered mandatory. Under the Paperwork Reduction Act, if NHTSA seeks to collect

information from 10 or more persons or entities, NHTSA

must obtain prior approval from OMB. 44 U.S.C.

s 3502(3)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 1998). If NHTSA fails to obtain

prior approval from OMB, the request for information can be

ignored without penalty. 44 U.S.C. s 3512(a) (Supp. IV

1998). OMB regulations specifically explain that "10 or

more" includes any "independent entities to which the initial

addressee may reasonably be expected to transmit the collection of information." 5 C.F.R. s 1320.3(c)(4) (2000).

On the record at hand, it is clear that NHTSA expected

that the Information Request would be submitted to 10 or

more entities. For example, the District Court pointed out

that Volkswagen of America, as an importer, had to submit

the Information Request to Volkswagen AG and Audi AG in

order to respond to the questions, and all nine manufacturers

who received the Information Request had to collect information from their suppliers. Mem. Op. at 36. This finding was

also supported by the declaration of the executive director of

NHTSA, L. Robert Shelton, who explained that NHTSA

expected the recipients to send the request to their foreign

parents, subsidiaries and affiliates. Declaration of L. Robert

Shelton, reprinted in J.A. 463-65.

Although NHTSA expected that the Information Request

would be submitted to 10 or more entities, NHTSA did not

get prior approval from OMB. As a result, NHTSA had no

authority to enforce the information request. Had the intervenor-defendants ignored the agency's request for information, NHTSA could not have compelled them to respond to

the request. Because NHTSA could not enforce its Information Request, the material submitted in response to the

Information Request cannot be considered mandatory.

In determining that the submission was not mandatory, we

hold that actual legal authority, rather than parties' beliefs or

intentions, governs judicial assessments of the character of

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submissions. We reject the argument that, in assessing

submissions for the purpose of Exemption 4 analysis, we

should look to subjective factors, such as whether the respondents believed that the Information Request was voluntary,

or whether the agency, at the time it issued the request for

information, considered the request to be mandatory. Focusing on parties' intentions, for purposes of analyzing submissions under Exemption 4, would cause the court to engage in

spurious inquiries into the mind. On the other hand, linking

enforceability and mandatory submissions creates an objective test; regardless of what the parties thought or intended,

if an agency has no authority to enforce an information

request, submissions are not mandatory.

In distinguishing between voluntary and mandatory submissions, the court in Critical Mass emphasized that the

Supreme Court has favored "the development of categorical

rules whenever a particular set of facts will lead to a generally predictable application of FOIA." Critical Mass, 975 F.2d

at 879 (discussing United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters

Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 779 (1989)).

We also noted the Court's suggestion of a "practical approach" in interpreting FOIA, and defended the voluntary

versus mandatory distinction as an objective test. Critical

Mass, 975 F.2d at 879 (quoting John Doe Agency v. John Doe

Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 157 (1989)). The distinction between

voluntary and mandatory submissions that was delineated in

Critical Mass was rooted in the importance of establishing

clear tests in interpreting FOIA, and we continue in that

tradition today.

We cannot accept the Center's argument that if recipients

do not assert that a submission is voluntary before submitting information in response to an agency's request, they

have implicitly waived their entitlement to subsequently assert that the submission was not mandatory. Critical Mass

emphasizes our concern with an agency's "continuing ability

to secure ... data on a cooperative basis." Critical Mass,

975 F.2d at 879. Although NHTSA in this case purported

to seek data pursuant to its statutory mandate, the response

by the manufacturers was certainly "cooperative" in the

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sense that they readily supplied the data without making

legal objections. Indeed, at least two of the manufacturers

acquiesced while maintaining that their responses were voluntary. Surely there is an important policy interest in minimizing resistance by a manufacturer to an agency's request

for information; insisting that a respondent identify and air

legal objections in response to any request in order to preserve its rights would tend to frustrate the "cooperati[on]"

that Critical Mass values. Beyond, that it would needlessly

waste resources to require that respondents identify legal

defects that have no practical bearing unless and until a

FOIA dispute materializes.

The Center also argues that intervenor-defendants have

waived their entitlement to assert a claim under the Paperwork Reduction Act because claims under the Paperwork

Reduction Act cannot be raised once the information is submitted. Permitting a party to raise a Paperwork Reduction

Act claim after having submitted information to an agency

does not support the purpose of the Paperwork Reduction

Act; after information is submitted, the Paperwork Reduction

Act's goal of reducing paperwork by mandating OMB review

is moot. We disagree.

The Paperwork Reduction Act directly addresses when a

claim can be raised. Although it does not expressly refer to

claims arising after submission of the information, the statute

provides that "[t]he protection provided by this section may

be raised in the form of a complete defense, bar, or otherwise

at any time during the agency administrative process or

judicial action applicable thereto." 44 U.S.C. s 3512(b)

(Supp. IV 1998). In Saco River Cellular, Inc. v. FCC, 133

F.3d 25, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1998), we explained that, by explicitly

allowing parties to raise a Paperwork Reduction Act claim at

any time during ongoing proceedings, the Paperwork Reduction Act "prevents an agency or court from refusing to

consider a [Paperwork Reduction Act] argument on the

ground that it is untimely."

Saco River is not directly on point, as it involved a Paperwork Reduction Act defense that was raised when the party

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had not submitted the information. However, the expansive

language of the Paperwork Reduction Act itself, along with

this court's explication in Saco River, militates against the

Center's position and supports our finding that a Paperwork

Reduction Act claim can be raised after information has been

submitted. In addition, the Center's argument ignores the

deterrence effect that permitting parties to raise their Paperwork Reduction Act claim can have on future agency actions.

Although the paperwork may already have been produced in

response to the particular Information Request, permitting

parties to raise their Paperwork Reduction Act claim, even

after submitting the information, further encourages agencies

to comply prospectively with the Paperwork Reduction Act.

B. Customary Disclosure

If this were an ordinary FOIA case involving the invocation

of Exemption 4 with respect to information that had been

voluntarily submitted to the Government, we would consider

whether the information at issue has been customarily disclosed. Here, however, we are confronted with information

that was submitted under false pretenses. That is, the

Government claimed that it had the authority to compel the

submission of the information when in fact no such authority

existed. As noted above, applications of Exemption 4 attempt

to balance private interests in protection from disclosure,

governmental interests in access to data, and public interest

in transparent governmental decision-making. In this case,

the agency essentially "flashed its badge" to gain entrance to

a private sphere when it had no legal authority to do so, and

this misrepresentation must tip the balance of interests in

favor of the private parties. Given this unusual situation--

i.e., submissions made under false pretenses--we cannot treat

the submissions as "mandatory." As a result, we apply the

same standard we use in evaluating voluntary submissions.

Thus, treating the information as having been submitted

voluntarily, we turn to the question of whether the information is customarily disclosed.

As a preliminary matter, we note that the District Court

found that 10 information items involved protected trade

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secrets. We have defined a trade secret as a "secret, commercially valuable plan, formula, process, or device that is

used for the making, preparing, compounding, or processing

of trade commodities and that can be said to be the end

product of either innovation or substantial effort." Pub.

Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1288

(D.C. Cir. 1983). On appeal, the Center argues that the

information at issue addressed the physical and performance

characteristics of airbags, not how airbags are manufactured,

and, therefore, the information cannot qualify as trade secrets. Intervenor-defendants defend the trade secrets ruling.

NHTSA does not defend the trade secrets ruling and instead

urges the court to find that the submissions were voluntary

and involved commercial information not customarily disclosed to the public. We agree with the Center that the

information at issue does not qualify as trade secrets, but also

agree with NHTSA that the information may nonetheless

qualify for protection under Critical Mass. Our Decision in

Public Citizen narrowly cabins trade secrets to information

relating to the "productive process" itself, see id. at 1288; yet

these 10 categories of information relate only to the end

product--what features an airbag has and how it performs--

rather than to the production process, how an airbag is made.

To be sure, the manufacturers persuasively argue that the

information is valuable to competitors and not readily obtained. That, however, goes to whether the information is

customarily disclosed. Therefore, the question to be decided

here is whether the information is independently protected

under Critical Mass. We therefore turn to that issue.

The Center asserts that with respect to 18 of the 33

disputed items of information, at least one of the companies

has customarily disclosed the same type of information in the

past. The Center also claims that, because the information at

issue relates to products that are sold on the public market,

most of the information can be ascertained by examining an

airbag, performing a routine test, or watching a publicly

accessible videotape.

We reject the Center's argument that the mere selling of a

product on the open market can constitute evidence of customary disclosure. The District Court correctly determined

that the fact that intervenor-defendants sold cars with airbags to the public does not constitute evidence of customary

disclosure. The District Court explained that dismantling

airbags is "dangerous, time-consuming and expensive," and

the information at issue in this case cannot be discovered

simply by looking inside a car or taking apart a steering

column or dashboard. Mem. Op. at 32. We agree--indeed,

to find otherwise would so dilute the meaning of customary

disclosure, as to render the requirement meaningless. The

Information Requests specified that respondents must submit

information for each vehicle, make, and model manufactured

or imported into the United States between 1990 and 1998.

Information Request, reprinted in J.A. 328. The fact that

airbags can be bought on the open market and inspected

certainly does not establish that information describing the

physical characteristics of every vehicle produced over many

years is customarily disclosed.

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Although we agree that the mere sale of a product to the

public does not constitute customary disclosure, there is one

aspect of the District Court's opinion that is flawed. In

Niagara Mohawk, this court held that information must be

disclosed if identical information is in the public domain. "[I]f

identical information is truly public, then enforcement of an

exemption cannot fulfill its purposes." Niagara Mohawk, 169

F.3d at 19. The "identical information" basis for disclosure

is, however, entirely distinct from the "customary disclosure"

standard. Under the former test, the party favoring disclosure has the burden of demonstrating that the information

sought is identical to information already publicly available;

under the latter test, the burden is on the party opposing

disclosure to prove that the information is of a kind that

would customarily not be released to the public. Critical

Mass, 975 F.3d at 879. In this case, the District Court

appeared to hold that the Center could obtain release of the

information only if information of that kind is customarily

disclosed and the identical information has been disclosed.

Mem. Op. at 39. This is not a correct statement of the law.

Despite this legal error, the District Court correctly rejected much of the Center's purported evidence of customary

disclosure. The Center contends that customary disclosure is

shown by the fact that many of the submissions to NHTSA

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had nothing more than detail to distinguish them from materials previously disclosed by the respondents. In other

words, the Center argues that a difference in level of detail is

inadequate to establish a difference in type of information.

This argument is unpersuasive. In truth, substantial differences in level of detail can produce a difference in type of

information. Thus, for example, a one time disclosure of

information regarding a single model in a particular year will

not likely create a genuine issue of material fact regarding

the customary disclosure of multi-year, multi-model information.

The fallacy of the Center's claim is manifest even in the

evidence that the Center itself highlights. The Center cites a

declaration by Tamio Arakawa as evidence that Toyota customarily disclosed information which Center now seeks. Arakawa explained,

The information contained in [Center for Auto Safety's

exhibit] is general information for a generic 1993-94

Toyota vehicle. Unlike the information contained in

Toyota's response to NHTSA's information request,

[Center for Auto Safety's exhibit] does not contain specific data for particular Toyota vehicles or for model years

1990-98. For example, the information described in

[plaintiff's exhibit] regarding sensor and deployment

thresholds is limited to head-on collisions. Deployment

thresholds are not determined by only head-on collision

data. The information that Toyota is seeking to protect

from disclosure in this litigation include threshold values

for various types of collisions for every 1990-98 Toyota

Vehicle.

Arakawa Supp. p 8, reprinted in J.A. 574-75. Contrary to

the Center's assumptions, it was eminently reasonable for the

District Court to conclude that the differences described by

Arakawa show that the difference between the disclosed

information and the submitted information is a difference in

type. The Center pointed to information Toyota disclosed

regarding a generic 1993-94 Toyota vehicle; the information

at issue covers data for every 1990-98 Toyota vehicle. The

former is not evidence of customary disclosure of the latter.

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In sum, most of the District Court's findings on customary

disclosure are supported by the record and consistent with

applicable law. However, as a result of the District Court's

misapplication of the Niagara Mohawk legal standard, some

questions still remain regarding whether the intervenordefendants customarily disclosed certain information at issue.

For example, the Center submitted evidence that "GM publicly disclosed a chart listing, by vehicle model for MY 1993-

1996, the driver and passenger airbag material and weave."

Appendix A, reprinted in J.A. 337. At oral argument, counsel for intervenor-defendants was unable to explain why this

multi-year, multi-model information should not constitute evidence of customary disclosure. Following argument counsel

submitted a letter to the court pointing to the supplemental

declaration of C. Thomas Terry in response. Terry's supplemental declaration asserted that GM's release of information

did not reflect a policy of customary disclosure of the type of

information GM provided in response to the Information

Request. According to Terry, the comments were an "isolated release of information" and differed in "specificity, measurement criteria, and other material respects." Supplemental Declaration of C. Thomas Terry, reprinted in J.A. 505, p 4,

507, p 14. Aside from these general claims, Terry presented

nothing concrete to support this position. Furthermore, Terry noted that "[a]ny information in the comments that was

identical to specific responses to the Information Requests

has been disclosed." Id. at 505, p 4. As we have explained,

however, the information need not have been identical to

constitute customary disclosure.

Applying the appropriate legal standard on remand, the

District Court must determine whether Terry's declaration,

and any other relevant responses by intervenor-defendants,

are adequate to defeat any claim of customary disclosure.

The same inquiry must be made with respect to the 10

information items the District Court held were trade secrets

and any other information item that is questionable due to the

District Court's error in applying Niagara Mohawk. On

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remand, the District Court need not retry the entire case, for,

as we have noted, most of the findings at issue easily survive

challenge. It will be up to the Center to identify any other

disputed material, like the aforecited material discussed in

the Terry Declaration, that may have been analyzed pursuant

to an incorrect legal standard by virtue of the District Court's

flawed application of Niagara Mohawk.

III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing analysis, the case is remanded to

the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

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