Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01065/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01065-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL GERARD CONGDON,

Plaintiff,

v.

OFFICER LENKE, OFFICER T. OLIVER, and

FAIRFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT, 

Defendants.

Case No. CIV 08-1065RJB

ORDER ON

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

TO DISMISS AND

MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This matter comes before the court on the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 29) and on the

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)) (Dkt. 35). The court has considered the

relevant pleadings and the file herein.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 5, 2008, plaintiff filed a civil case, pro se, against Officer Lenke, Officer Oliver, and the

City of Fairfield Police Department. Dkt. 1. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges that he suffered

injuries to his head and eye after Officer Lenke and Officer Oliver allegedly beat him while detaining and

arresting him. Dkt. 1. On January 21, 2009, the case was assigned to the undersigned judge. Dkt. 10. 

On May 4, 2009, the defendants filed their answer, which asserted 24 defenses. Dkt. 19.

1. MOTION TO DISMISS

On January 4, 2010, the defendants moved for dismissal on the basis that the plaintiff has failed to

respond to discovery. Dkt. 29. In the alternative, the defendants requested that the Court compel the

plaintiff to respond to discovery. Dkt. 29. The Court’s Scheduling Order required the parties to have

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completed discovery by October 15, 2009, and required any dispositive motions to be filed and served by

January 5, 2010. Dkt. 20. The plaintiff did not respond to the defendants’ discovery requests.

On October 28, 2009, the Court ordered the plaintiff to provide complete responses to Defendants’

Request for Production of Document[s] to Plaintiff Michael Gerard Congdon (Set One) [Dkt. 22-2, at 1-

7]; to Defendants’ Request for Production of Document[s] to Plaintiff Michael Gerard Congdon (Set One)

[Dkt. 22-2, at 9-21]; and to Defendants’ Special Interrogatories to Plaintiff Michael Gerard Congdon (Set

One) [Dkt. 22-2, at 23-27]. Dkt. 27. In that order, the Court further informed the plaintiff that if he failed

to properly and completely respond to the discovery requests by November 30, 2009, the Court would

consider a request by defendants to impose sanctions, which could include monetary sanctions or

dismissal of the case, or both. Dkt. 27. The plaintiff has never responded to the defendants’ discovery

and has failed to comply with the Court’s order. The Court should dismiss the plaintiff’s claims on this

basis alone.

The defendants requested that the Court dismiss the plaintiff’s claims because of the plaintiff’s

refusal to participate in discovery, and the defendants have also requested monetary sanctions against the

plaintiff in the amount of $600.00 for preparing and bringing the instant motion. Dkt. 29. Monetary

sanctions against the plaintiff are inappropriate because he has proceeded in forma pauperis (Dkt. 11) and

he appears to have decided not to prosecute his case. Therefore, the defendants’ request for monetary

sanctions should be denied; however, the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss should be granted. In the

alternative, the plaintiff’s case should be dismissed with prejudice on the Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment (Dkt. 35), as discussed below.

2. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 5, 2010, the defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgement (Dkt. 35), and

contended that (1) the defendants are not liable for violation of the plaintiff’s Eight Amendment rights

against “cruel and unusual punishment”; (2) Officer Lenke and Officer Oliver committed no constitutional

violation under the Fourth Amendment or are at least entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct

was reasonable; (3) the City of Fairfield is not liable to the plaintiff under the Fourth Amendment because the

plaintiff has not alleged a policy, custom, practice, or act of ratification that would give rise to respondeat

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superior liability; and (4) the plaintiff is barred from asserting any state law claims against the City of

Fairfield or its police officers because he has not complied with the California Government Claims Act. 

Dkt. 35. On January 8, 2010, this Court notified the plaintiff of his responsibility in responding to the

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. 42. The plaintiff has not responded; however, the

plaintiff claims generally in his complaint (Dkt. 1) and his deposition (Dkt. 37, Exhibit A) that the defendants

violated his constitutional rights and he seeks to recover damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

B. FAILURE TO RESPOND TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

When a party the plaintiff is suing makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly

supported by declarations (or other sworn testimony), plaintiff cannot simply rely on what his complaint

says. Instead, plaintiff must set out specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

or authenticated documents, as provided in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the

defendants’ declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If

plaintiff does not submit his own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be

entered against him. If summary judgment is granted, plaintiff’s case will be dismissed and there will be

no trial. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998).

Here, the defendants filed several declarations, including the Declaration of Officer Troy Oliver

(Dkt. 39), the Declaration of Officer Robert Lenke (Dkt. 38), and the Declaration of Matthew A.

Lavrinets. The plaintiff has not responded and has not set out specific contrary facts in declarations,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents. Because the plaintiff has not

followed the applicable procedure, his claims should be dismissed. Alternatively, his claims should also

be dismissed on the merits, the reasoning for which is discussed below.

C. FACTS

Robert Lenke and Troy Oliver are police officers employed by the City of Fairfield and both were

so employed on February 1, 2008. Dkt. 34, p. 2. On February 1, 2008, Officer Oliver initiated a

probation search of a mobile home located at 1427 West Texas Street, Unit 2, in Fairfield, California. 

Dkt. 34, p. 2. Prior to the probation search, Officer Oliver had received reports from an adjacent U-Haul

business and from the property manager at 1427 West Texas Street that there had been a large amount of

foot traffic surrounding Unit 2 during both day and night. Dkt. 34, p. 2. The property manager at 1427

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West Texas Street informed Officer Oliver that Unit 2 was leased to Lorry Berry, and Officer Oliver then

learned and confirmed that Ms. Berry was on probation and therefore subject to search and seizure. Dkt. 

34, p. 2.

When Officer Oliver and other Fairfield police officers arrived on the scene to search Ms. Berry’s

unit, Officer Oliver noticed a green Chevy Camaro parked in the driveway in front of Unit 2, California

license plate number 2WAE720. Dkt. 34, p. 2; Dkt. 37, Exhibit A, p. 41-2. The Chevy Camaro belonged

to Michael Congdon. Dkt. 34, p. 2. Upon arrival at Unit 2, the police officers knocked on the front door

and Ms. Berry and another person answered the door. Dkt. 34, p. 2. The officers had them come outside

and sit down. Dkt. 34, p. 2. The officers heard more people inside of the mobile home, and the officers

then opened the front door, announced themselves and directed everyone still in the mobile home to come

outside. Dkt. 34, p. 2. In response to the officers’ direction, Mr. Congdon and another person exited from

the rear of the mobile home, and the officers also seated them in front of the home. Dkt. 34, p. 2.

Officer Oliver then searched Ms. Berry’s mobile home pursuant to her probation search clause. 

Dkt. 34, p. 2. Inside the home the officers found various items of drugs and drug paraphernalia, including

methamphetamine, multiple syringes, a scale, and plastic bags. Dkt. 34, p. 2. During Officer Oliver’s

search, some of the people who had exited the home, including Mr. Congdon, filled out Field

Identification cards and were released from the scene. Dkt. 34, p. 2; Dkt. 37, Exhibit A, p. 49. After Mr.

Congdon was released from the scene, he walked across the street to a gas station and purchased

cigarettes. Dkt. 37, Exhibit A, p. 50. 

While at Unit 2, Officer Oliver noticed, in plain view, inside Mr. Congdon’s Chevy Camaro

parked in front of Unit 2, several large pieces of copper tubing in the back seat area, one of which was Ushaped and had a large valve in its center. Dkt. 34, p. 3. Officer Oliver determined that the size of the

pipes were consistent with commercial use, and, while at the scene, Fairfield Code Enforcement Officer

David James indicated he knew that similar copper piping had recently been stolen from a Chipotle

restaurant in Fairfield. Dkt. 34, p. 3.

Officer James then responded to the Chipotle restaurant and confirmed that the model number on

the pipe in the back of the Camaro matched the model number on the replacement pipe at the Chipotle

restaurant. Dkt. 34, p. 3. Officer Oliver then concluded that the copper tubing in the back of the Camaro

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could be stolen, and he entered the Camaro and removed three large pieces of the tubing with valves on

them. Dkt. 34, p. 3. Inside the Camaro, Officer Oliver also found a pair of bolt cutters, which he

determined were consistent with those used to cut chains and/or locks that secure copper pipes and valves

to commercial buildings. Dkt. 34, p. 3. At this pont, Mr. Congdon observed the officers investigating the

copper tubing in the rear of his Camaro, and he proceeded across the street with the intent of stopping the

investigation. Dkt. 37, Exhibit A, p. 51.

Mr. Congdon approached the officers at the Camaro and yelled, “You need a fucking warrant to

get in that car. Get out of my car.” Dkt. 34, p. 3; Dkt. 37, Exhibit A, p. 56-7. Officer Oliver then

immediately ordered Mr. Congdon to stop where he was, but Mr. Congdon continued to yell and taunt

Officer Oliver and the other officers, yelling, “You have no right to be in my car. Get out of my car, you

motherfuckers.” Dkt. 34, p. 3. 

Officer Oliver requested that Officer Lenke detain Mr. Congdon for further investigation. Dkt. 34,

p. 3. Officer Lenke then approached Mr. Congdon and told him to put his hands behind his back, saying

that he was going to be detained during the investigation, and Mr. Congdon replied, “Fuck that. You’re

not doing shit.” Dkt. 34, p. 3. Officer Lenke then placed his hand on Mr. Congdon’s left arm and began

to place him in a control hold. Dkt. 34, p. 3-4; Dkt. 37, Exhibit A, p. 58. As Officer Lenke attempted to

place Mr. Congdon in a control hold, Mr. Congdon clenched his right hand into a fist and began to swing

it forward. Dkt. 34, p. 4; Dkt. 37, Exhibit A, p. 58-60. Fearing for Officer Lenke’s safety, Officer Oliver

then opened his expandable baton and shouted several orders at Mr. Congdon, such as “Quit resisting,”

and “Get on the ground.” Dkt. 34, p. 4; Dkt. 37, Exhibit A, p. 58-61.

Meanwhile, Officer Lenke was trying to get Mr. Congdon under control but was unable to do so

because Mr. Congdon was jerking around and swinging his arms. Dkt. 34, p. 4; Dkt. 37, Exhibit A, p. 61. 

Officer Oliver delivered a strike to Mr. Congdon’s upper right thigh in an attempt to gain compliance

from him and ordered him again to “Get on the ground,” but Mr. Congdon failed to do so. Dkt. 34, p. 4;

Dkt. 37, Exhibit A, p. 62. Officer Lenke, fearing for his safety, grabbed Mr. Congdon’s arm and upper

body and took him to the ground. Dkt. 34, p. 4; Dkt. 37, Exhibit A, p. 62. Officer Oliver attempted to

deliver another strike to Mr. Congdon’s right thigh area as Officer Lenke attempted to take him to the

ground but, because Mr. Congdon was already headed toward the ground, Officer Oliver’s strike hit him

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in the right rib cage area. Dkt. 34, p. 4. As Officer Lenke brought Mr. Congdon to the ground, Mr.

Congdon brought both arms tight to his body, bringing both hands under his body. Dkt. 34, p. 4. 

Once Mr. Congdon was on the ground, he would not remove his right arm from underneath his

body, which made Officer Oliver fearful that Mr. Congdon might be concealing a weapon toward the

front of his body. Dkt. 34, p. 4. While he was on the ground, Mr. Congdon continued to thwart the

efforts of the other police officers to detain him by kicking them, despite several orders given to him to

stop resisting. Dkt. 34, p. 4. 

Finally, four officers, including Officers Oliver and Lenke, were able to remove Mr. Congdon’s

right arm from underneath his body and place him in handcuffs. Dkt. 34, p. 4. Mr. Congdon was then

handcuffed behind his back. Dkt. 34, p. 4. Mr. Congdon’s handcuffs were double-locked and checked

for tightness. Dkt. 34, p. 4. Mr. Congdon was then placed in the back of Officer Oliver’s patrol vehicle

and told that he was under arrest for resisting arrest and for interfering with the officers in an

investigation. Dkt. 34, p. 4-5; Dkt. 37, Exhibit A, p. 67.

As Officer Lenke placed Mr. Congdon in the back of Officer Oliver’s patrol vehicle, there was a

small amount of blood on Mr. Congdon’s forehead and scratches on his sunglasses. Dkt. 34, p. 5; Dkt.

37, Exhibit A, p. 67. Officer Lenke asked Mr. Congdon if he required medical treatment, and he

declined; however, Officer Lenke asked the Fairfield Fire Department to respond and render first aid. 

Dkt. 37, Exhibit A, p. 69. The officers then proceeded with their investigation, but, while doing so,

Officer Lenke saw Mr. Congdon attempting to slip his handcuffs under his feet and move his hands to the

front of his body. Dkt. 37, Exhibit A, p. 71-74. Officer Lenke and Officer Oliver stated in their

depositions that it is a serious officer safety issue to have an detainee with his hands cuffed in front of his

body. Dkt. 34, p. 5.

Officer Lenke opened the door to the patrol vehicle and told Mr. Congdon to stop moving his

hands to the front of his body and explained that he would have to remove Mr. Congdon from the patrol

car and have him place his hands behind his back. Dkt. 34, p. 5. However, Mr. Congdon responded by

saying, “No. Wait and minute,” and by moving his body towards the opposite end of the seat from

Officer Lenke. Dkt. 34, p. 5. Officer Lenke then attempted to pull Mr. Congdon from the car, but Mr.

Congdon planted his feet in an attempt to prevent Officer Lenke from removing him from the car. Dkt.

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34, p. 5. 

Based on Mr. Congdon’s continued efforts to prevent the officers from gaining control of him and

the fact that he moved his cuffed hands to the front of his body, the officers decided to place him in a leg

restraint. Dkt. 34, p. 5. The plaintiff continued to struggle, but, eventually, the officers were able to place

the plaintiff in a leg restraint and return him to the backseat of the patrol vehicle, fastened to the floor

board. Dkt. 34, p. 5. Officer Oliver then transported Mr. Congdon to Solano County Jail, to book him for

resisting arrest and for interfering in a police investigation. Dkt. 34, p. 5-6. All the force that Mr.

Congdon alleges that Officer Lenke and Officer Oliver used against him occurred before he arrived at the

jail. Dkt. 37, Exhibit A, p. 76. 

The plaintiffs’s version of the facts, as expressed in his sworn complaint (Dkt. 1) and his

deposition (Dkt. 37, Exhibit A), vary from the defendants’ version of the facts in several respects, which

are immaterial in this case. The plaintiff’s version of facts varies in the following ways:

First, the plaintiff agrees that when he initially approached the officers investigating his vehicle he

yelled, “You need a fucking warrant to get in that car. Get out of my car.” Dkt. 34, p. 3; Dkt. 37, Exhibit

A, p. 56-7. However, the plaintiff does not assert that in response to his yelling Officer Oliver then

immediately ordered him to stop where he was. The plaintiff does not assert that he ignored Officer

Oliver’s order and continued to yell and taunt Officer Oliver and the other officers, yelling, “You have no

right to be in my car. Get out of my car, you motherfuckers.” Dkt. 34, p. 3. Second, the plaintiff recalls

Officer Lenke placing his hand on the plaintiff’s left arm and placing the plaintiff into a control hold, but

the plaintiff does not recall the defendants’ verison of the facts that prior to the control hold maneuver

Officer Lenke approached the plaintiff and told him to put his hands behind his back, saying that he was

going to be detained during the investigation, and that the plaintiff replied, “Fuck that. You’re not doing

shit.” Dkt. 34, p. 3. Third, the plaintiff agrees with the defendants that as Officer Lenke executed the

control hold maneuver the plaintiff swung his fist; however, the plaintiff maintains that Officer Oliver

told him to make a fist in order to make it look like the plaintiff was “swinging on the officer,” but the

defendants contend that the plaintiff actually attempted to strike the officers. Dkt. 34, p. 4; Dkt. 37,

Exhibit A, p.58-60. Fourth, the plaintiff contends that as he was being taken to the ground he was not

resisting arrest and he brought his arms into his body only to protect the pain in his ribs after receiving

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Officer Oliver’s second baton blow. Dkt. 34, p. 4; Dkt. 37, Exhibit A, p. 66. Fifth, while on the ground

the plaintiff agrees that he refused to remove his right arm from underneath his body, but he contends that

he did so because he needed to protect himself. Dkt. 34, p. 4; Dkt. 37, Exhibit A, p. 62. Sixth, the

plaintiff asserts that once he was placed in the patrol vehicle it was necessary for him to move his cuffed

hands to the front of his body because his handcuffs were too tight. Dkt. 37, Exhibit A, p. 67. Finally,

the plaintiff’s complaint (Dkt. 1) and deposition (Dkt. 37, Exhibit A) do not reflect the interaction that

occurred when the officers decided to remove the plaintiff from the patrol vehicle to correct his front

handcuff position. Nevertheless, the plaintiff does contend that as he was removed from the patrol

vehicle the back of his head hit the ground. Dkt. 37, Exhibit A, p. 72-75. Due to his alleged head injury,

he claims to have little awareness of events after he was taken out of the patrol vehicle and placed in leg

restraints. Dkt. 37, Exhibit A, p. 75. 

The variations in the facts presented by the plaintiff are immaterial because they do not overcome

qualified immunity. The question of qualified immunity is determined from the perspective of a

reasonable police officer in Officer Lenke and Officer Oliver’s position, and the plaintiff’s variations do

not make the officers’ actions any less reasonable. (See discussion of qualified immunity below.)

STANDARD FOR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file,

and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). The purpose of summary judgement is to

isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323 (1985). The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its

motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if

any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. If the

moving party meets this burden, the moving party is then entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the

non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim in the case on

which the non-moving party has the burden of proof. Id. at 323. 

To avoid summary judgment, the non-moving party must set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 323. There is no genuine issue of fact for trial where the record,

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taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (non-moving party must present specific,

significant probative evidence, not simply “some metaphysical doubt”); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). 

Conversely, a genuine dispute over a material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence supporting the

claimed factual dispute, requiring a judge or jury to resolve the differing versions of the truth. Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 253 (1986); T.W. Elec. Service Inc. v. Pacific Electrical Contractors

Association, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). 

The court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, including

questions of credibility and of the weight accorded particular evidence. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 

Additionally, in civil rights cases where the plaintiff appears pro se, the court must construe the pleadings

liberally and must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't,

839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir.1988); see also Lucas v. Dep't of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir.1995)

(Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect, a pro se litigant is entitled to notice

of the complaint's deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.).

D. DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, the plaintiff requests compensation from Officer Lenke, Officer Oliver, and

the “Fairfield Police Department.” Dkt. 1. Because the Fairfield Police Department is not the proper

entity to bring as a defendant, this Court will assume that the plaintiff intended to bring the City of

Fairfield, of which the Fairfield Police Department is a part, as a defendant instead of the Fairfield Police

Department.

1. Eighth Amendment Claims for “Cruel and Unusual Punishment.”

The plaintiff seeks to recover for damages he claims to have suffered as a result of the “cruel and

unusual punishment” that Officer Lenke and Officer Oliver allegedly inflicted upon him when the officers

detained him during a search of his vehicle. Dkt. 1. The defendants contend that the officers’ actions are not

subject to Eight Amendment liability for “cruel and unusual punishment” because the relevant Eighth

Amendment protections apply only after a plaintiff’s arrest and conviction. Dkt. 34.

Where an excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest, detainment, or investigatory stop of

a citizen, it is properly characterized as a claim invoking Fourth Amendment protections of the right “to be

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secure in their persons...against unreasonable seizures” of the person. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394

(1989). It is after conviction that the Eighth Amendment serves as the primary source of substantive

protection where the use of force is challenged as excessive. Id. at 395, nt. 10.

Here, the plaintiff claims to have been injured only during his detainment, before arrest and

conviction. Dkt. 37, Exhibit A, p. 76. In that context, the plaintiff’s claims invoke Fourth Amendment

protections rather than Eighth Amendment protections. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

claims against Officer Lenke, Officer Oliver, and the City of Fairfield should be dismissed.

2. Qualified Immunity for Officer Lenke and Officer Oliver

The defendants’ motion is primarily based on their contentions that Officer Lenke and Officer

Oliver committed no constitutional violation or are at least entitled to qualified immunity for their

conduct. Dkt. 35. The plaintiff has not addressed the issue of qualified immunity directly, but claims

generally that Officer Lenke, Officer Oliver, and the City of Fairfield are liable for the force used to

detain him because that force was excessive. Dkt. 1; Dkt. 37, Exhibit A.

The plaintiff seeks to prove that the defendants violated his constitutional rights and he seeks to

recover damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to maintain an action for damages under § 1983,

a plaintiff must prove that (1) the plaintiff was deprived of a federally protected right (2) by the defendant

acting under color of state law, and (3) that as a proximate result of the deprivation (4) the plaintiff was

injured. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Defendant police officers in a § 1983 action are entitled to qualified immunity from damages for

civil liability as long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In

analyzing a qualified immunity defense, the Court must determine: (1) whether a constitutional right

would have been violated on the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the

injury; and (2) whether the right was clearly established when viewed in the specific context of the case. 

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). “The relevant dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is

clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the

situation he confronted.” Id. 

In determining the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct we balance “the nature and quality of

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the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental

interests at stake,” and ask whether, under the circumstances, “including the severity of the crime at issue,

the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, or whether he is actively

resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 

The privilege of qualified immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability, and

like absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. Saucier, 533

U.S. at 200-01. Qualified immunity also protects a defendant from having to bear the burdens of such

pretrial matters as discovery. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308 (1996); see also Act Up!/Portland v.

Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 872-73 (9th Cir. 1993).

In this case, Officer Lenke and Officer Oliver are immune from suit under the law of qualified

immunity because their use of reasonable force in detaining the plaintiff did not violate clearly established

law. Officer Lenke and Officer Oliver detained the plaintiff because they believed he was in possession of

stolen property and because he approached them with aggressive behavior. The plaintiff admitted in his

deposition that he swore at the officers and both verbally and physically attempted to avoid detainment. 

At that point, it was reasonable for the officers to view the plaintiff as a safety risk and use maneuvers to

detain him. As the plaintiff struggled, he was hit with a baton and claims he then stopped resisting

detainment and started protecting himself. Even if the plaintiff’s later resisting was due to pain from the

baton blow, the officers were nonetheless reasonable in interpreting the plaintiff’s continued struggle as

an attempt to resist arrest that presented a safety risk to themselves and others. 

Further, once the plaintiff transferred his handcuffs to the front of his body it was then reasonable

for the officers to see the plaintiff’s position as a safety risk and a flight risk that needed to be corrected by

placing the plaintiff in leg restraints. The plaintiff does not claim to have complied with the officers’

requests and commands during that stage of his detainment. The officers used a reasonable amount of

force to remove a noncompliant detainee from the patrol vehicle and to place him in leg restraints. It

would not have been clear to a reasonable officer in Officer Lenke and Officer Oliver’s position that their

conduct was unlawful in the situation they confronted. Accordingly, Officer Lenke and Officer Oliver are

immune from the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and those claims should

be dismissed.

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3. Fourth Amendment Claims against the City of Fairfield

The defendants argue that the City of Fairfield cannot be liable to the plaintiff because (1) the plaintiff

has not alleged a policy, custom, practice, or act of ratification that would give rise to respondeat superior

liability, and, alternatively, (2) because the individual officers did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional

rights and municipal liability is contingent on the underlying violation of the plaintiff’s rights. Dkt. 35. The

plaintiff does not directly address these legal issues, but argues in general that Officer Lenke and Officer

Oliver, employees of the City of Fairfield, used excessive force in detaining him and that the City should be

liable for the officers’ actions. Dkt. 1; Dkt. 37, Exhibit A.

“[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor - or, in other words, a

municipality cannot be held liable under Section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Dep’t of

Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1998) (emphasis in original). To state a valid claim

under § 1983 for municipal liability, the plaintiff must not only allege a constitutional violation caused by the

municipality, but must also allege either (1) that the violation occurred pursuant to a formal governmental

policy or longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local

government entity; or (2) that an official with final policy making authority committed or ratified the

constitutional tort. Id. at 690. 

Further, while the liability of municipalities does not turn on the liability of individual officers, the

liability of municipalities is contingent on a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Scott v. Henrich,

39 F.3d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1992); cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1159 (1995). If the plaintiff has not suffered a

constitutional violation at the hands of the individual police officers, the fact that departmental regulations or

customs might have authorized the officers’ acts is irrelevant. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796,

799 (1986).

Here, the City of Fairfield cannot be liable because the plaintiff has not alleged any facts to show the

City’s liability under a theory of respondeat superior. Further, the plaintiff has not alleged any facts that

would show that the alleged violations of his rights were caused by a formal policy or longstanding practice

or custom of the City of Fairfield, and he has not asserted that a City of Fairfield official with final policy

making authority committed or ratified the alleged violations of his rights. Finally, because there is no

liability of the individual officers, the City of Fairfield is not liable to the plaintiff. As a result, the plaintiff’s

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Fourth Amendment claims against the City of Fairfield should be dismissed.

4. Claims under State Law

The defendants contend that the plaintiff is barred from asserting any state law claims against the

City of Fairfield or its police officers because he has not complied with the California Government Claims

Act, which is a condition precedent to a suit against a public entity in California. The plaintiff has not

responded, and has not asserted that he has complied with the California Government Claims Act. 

California Government Code § 945.4 provides that a plaintiff may not bring a suit for money or

damages against a public entity until a written claim has been presented to the public entity and has been

acted upon by that entity. Cal. Gov. Code § 945.4. A plaintiff’s failure to present a timely written claim

to the public entity bars the plaintiff from bringing suit. Cal. Gov. Code §§ 911.2, 945.4. Additionally, a

cause of action against a public employee or former public employee for injury allegedly resulting from an

act or omission in the scope of his employment as a public employee is barred where an action against the

employing public entity for such injury is barred. Cal. Gov. Code § 950.2 (referring to Cal. Gov. Code §§

900 et seq., claim against public entities, Cal. Gov. Code §§ 945 et seq., actions against public entities). 

These requirements apply to all plaintiffs, including those who are incarcerated. Cal. Gov. Code §

945.9(c). 

In any action where the claims presentation requirement applies, the plaintiff’s complaint must

allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement. State of

California v. Superior Court, 90 P.3d 116, 122 (2004). If the plaintiff fails to do so, then his complaint is

subject to dismissal for failure to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. Id. 

Here, the plaintiff has not shown that he submitted a claim to the City of Fairfield for his injuries,

nor has the plaintiff alleged facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation

requirement. California law requires him to have done so in order to pursue any state law claims against

the City of Fairfield or its police officers. Accordingly, any claims asserting the liability of the City of

Fairfield, Officer Lenke, or Officer Oliver under state law tort principles should be dismissed.

Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 29) is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as follows: the defendants’ request that the claims be dismissed

is GRANTED and the plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED; however, the defendants’ request for monetary

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sanctions is DENIED. The Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)) (Dkt. 35) is

GRANTED and all of the plaintiff’s claims against defendants Officer Lenke, Officer Oliver, the City of

Fairfield, and the Fairfield Police Department are DISMISSED.

The Clerk is directed to send uncertified copies of this Order to all Counsel of record and to any

party appearing pro se at said party’s last known address.

DATED this 4th day of February, 2010.

ARobert J. Bryan

United States District Judge

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