Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-35253/USCOURTS-ca9-13-35253-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

AGRICULTURE; UNITED STATES

ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH

INSPECTION SERVICE, an agency of

the US Department of Agriculture;

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, an

agency of the US Department of

Agriculture; LESLIE WELDON, in her

official capacity as Regional Forester

of Region One of the US Forest

Service; UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR; UNITED

STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE

SERVICE, an agency of the US

Department of Interior; UNITED

STATES NATIONAL PARK SERVICE,

an agency of the US Department of

Interior; CHRISTIAN MACKAY, in his

official capacity as Executive

Director of the State of Montana

Department of Livestock,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

No. 13-35253

D.C. No. 

9:11-cv-00076-

CCL

OPINION

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2 ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. USDA

BILL MYERS,

Intervenor-Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Charles C. Lovell, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted 

November 8, 2013—Seattle, Washington

File November 20, 2014

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Richard A. Paez, and

Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Paez

SUMMARY*

Environmental Law / Standing / Mootness

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district

court’s judgment in favor of federal and Montana state

agencies and officials in an action brought by Alliance for the

Wild Rockies, challenging the decision to permit recurring,

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. USDA 3

low altitude helicopter flights to haze bison in the

Yellowstone Grizzly Bear Recovery Zone.

To minimize disease transfer between wild bison and

cattle in the Greater Yellowstone Area, the bison are

managed, in part, according to an Interagency Bison

Management Plan which includes using hazing operations to

move the bison. The Yellowstone grizzly bear also inhabits

the same area, and is listed as a threatened species under the

Endangered Species Act. Under Section 7 of the ESA, the

National Park Service prepared biological evaluations for the

management plan which were approved by the United States

Fish and Wildlife Service, and concluded that the helicopter

hazing operations would not adverselyaffect the Yellowstone

grizzly. Section 9 of the ESA prohibits the “taking” – which

can include harassing – of an endangered or threatened

species. 

The panel reversed the district court’s holding that

Alliance lacked standing to bring its ESA and National

Environmental PolicyAct claims. The panel also reversed the

district court’s ruling that Alliance failed to comply with the

ESA citizen suit 60-day notice provision. The panel affirmed

the dismissal of all of Alliance’s ESA claims against the

United States Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and

Fish and Wildlife Service because they were not included in

the 60-day notice on which Alliance relied. 

The panel held that Alliance’s ESA Section 7 claim was

moot because the federal defendants had already completed

a second biological evaluation consultation addressing the

impact of helicopter hazing on the Yellowstone grizzly bears,

and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment

to the federal defendants and grant of dismissal to Montana

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4 ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. USDA

on the claim. The panel also affirmed the district court’s

grant of summary judgment to the federal defendants and

grant of dismissal to Montana on Alliance’s ESA Section 9

claim because no genuine issues of material fact existed in

the record concerning whether a take of a Yellowstone

grizzly bear had occurred or was likely to occur. Finally, the

panel affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the federal

defendants on the NEPA and National Forest Management

Act claims.

COUNSEL

Rebecca K. Smith (argued), Public Interest Defense Center,

PC, Timothy M. Bechtold, Bechtold Law Firm, PLLC;

Missoula, Montana, for Plaintiff-Appellant Alliance for the

Wild Rockies.

Thekla Hansen-Young (argued), Trial Attorney, Robert G.

Dreher, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Andrew C.

Mergen, Trial Attorney, Robert J. Lundman, Trial Attorney;

Environment & Natural Resources Division, United States

Department of Justice; Washington D.C., for DefendantsAppellees United States Department of Agriculture, United

States Animal and Plant Health Inspection service, Leslie

Weldon in her official capacity as Regional Forester of

Region One of the United States Forest Service, United States

Department of the Interior, United States Fish and Wildlife

Service, and United States National Park Service.

Robert Stutz, Assistant Attorney General, Agency Legal

Service Bureau, Montana Department of Justice; Helena,

Montana, for Defendants-Appellees Montana Department of

Livestock and Christian Mackay.

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ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. USDA 5

John E. Bloomquist and Rachel A. Kinkie, Doney Crowley

Payne Bloomquist, P.C., Helena, Montana, for IntervenorDefendant-Appellee Bill Myers.

OPINION

PAEZ, Circuit Judge:

The grizzly bear is one of this country’s most majestic

creatures. Originally numerous throughout the American

west, including California and Texas, grizzly bear

populations were decimated in the nineteenth and twentieth

centuries through a combination of commercial trapping,

unregulated hunting and rapid habitat deterioration. Between

1800 and 1975, grizzly bear populations fell from estimates

of over 50,000 to less than 1,000.1 Today, they are present

only in Washington, Idaho, Montana and Wyoming. 

One sub-population of grizzly bear, central to the present

case, is the Yellowstone grizzly bear, which is protected

under the Endangered Species Act and monitored as part of

the Yellowstone Grizzly Bear Recovery Zone. The

Yellowstone grizzly bear shares its habitat with a variety of

other species, including the Yellowstone bison, which

migrates seasonally inside and outside of Yellowstone

National Park. Because the Yellowstone bison carries

brucellosis, a disease deadly to cattle, their migration patterns

are controlled through carefully selected “‘hazing, or

1

See Christopher Servheen, Grizzly Bear Recovery Plan, United

States Fish and Wildlife Service, 9 (Sept. 10 1993),

http://www.fws.gov/mountain-prairie/species/mammals/grizzly/

Grizzly_bear_recovery_plan.pdf. 

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6 ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. USDA

herding,” methods. Although these hazing methods

effectively limit encounters between Yellowstone bison and

cattle, environmental groups have become increasingly

concerned about the possibility for detrimental consequences

to the precarious maintenance of the Yellowstone grizzly bear

population. It is these concerns that are at issue in this case. 

Alliance for the Wild Rockies (“Alliance”) challenges the

decision of the United States Forest Service (“Forest

Service”), United States National Park Service (“Park

Service”), United States Department of Agriculture

(“USDA”), United States Animal and Plant Health Inspection

Service (“Inspection Service”), United States Department of

the Interior (“Interior”), and United States Fish and Wildlife

Service (“FWS”) (collectively, “federal defendants”), as well

as the Montana Department of Livestock (“MDOL”), to

permit recurring, low-altitude helicopter flights to haze bison

in the Yellowstone Grizzly Bear Recovery Zone. Alliance

alleges that these helicopter flights may harass Yellowstone

grizzly bears and constitute an unpermitted “‘take,’ as defined

by statute.” Alliance alleges that the federal defendants and

MDOL have violated the Endangered Species Act of 1973

(“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq., the National

Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C.

§§ 4321 et seq., and the National Forest Management Act of

1976 (“NFMA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600 et seq., because they

have failed to undertake the proper procedures for

reevaluating the effect of helicopter hazing on Yellowstone

grizzly bears and have not issued an incidental take permit for

the alleged harassment of Yellowstone grizzly bears. 

Before turning to the merits of Alliance’s claims, we must

first address the district court’s ruling that Alliance lacked

Article III standing to pursue its claims and that Alliance

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ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. USDA 7

failed to properly give notice of its ESA claims as required by

16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2)(A)(i). We also address whether

Alliance’s Section 7 claim under the ESA is moot. 

We affirm in part and reverse in part. 

I. Background

The Greater Yellowstone Area spans twentymillion acres

of land across parts of Idaho, Montana and Wyoming,

including Yellowstone National Park. It is inhabited by wild

bison and Yellowstone grizzly bears, both of which freely

migrate in and out of Yellowstone National Park. Some wild

bison in the Greater Yellowstone Area have a contagious

bacterial disease called brucellosis that can be transmitted to

cattle that graze in the region. To minimize disease transfer

between bison and cattle, the bison are managed, in part,

according to a 2000 interagency document entitled the

Interagency Bison Management Plan (“Management Plan”). 

The Management Plan aims to “maintain a wild, free ranging

population of bison and address the risk of brucellosis

transmission to protect the economic interest and viability of

the livestock industry in the state of Montana.” The

Management Plan allows bison to leave Yellowstone

National Park each winter to forage in lower elevations in

Montana’s Gallatin National Forest. In the middle of May of

each year, MDOL encourages the bison to return to

Yellowstone National Park via “hazing” operations. 

Approved hazing methods include using riders on horseback,

off-highway vehicles and helicopters to move the bison out

of Montana. 

The Park Service, Forest Service, Inspection Service,

Interior and USDA all signed and authorized the Record of

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8 ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. USDA

Decision implementing the Management Plan. The State of

Montana also signed a separate Record of Decision

committing to implementation of the Management Plan. 

A. Yellowstone Grizzly Bears

The Yellowstone grizzly bear is a sub-population of

grizzly bear, which is listed as a threatened species under the

ESA. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (2014). Consistent with their

obligations under NEPA, the Park Service, Forest Service and

Inspection Service completed a final environmental impact

statement (“final EIS”) prior to the approval of the

Management Plan. The final EIS analyzed the potential

effects of the Management Plan, including possible hazing

operations, on Yellowstone grizzly bears in the spring, when

they emerge from their dens to feed. It concluded that the

impacts of bison hazing on Yellowstone grizzly bears “would

be short term and negligible” because, “[a]lthough there is the

possibility of overlap in the fall and spring when the bears are

not in dens, during the majority of bison management

activities, bears would be in their dens.” The final EIS noted

that hazing operations would cease if there was evidence of

grizzly bear activity in the hazing area.

In compliance with Section 7 of the ESA, 16 U.S.C.

§ 1536(a)(2), the Park Service also prepared a Biological

Evaluation for the Management Plan, which was approved by

the FWS in 2000. The FWS concurred in the Park Service’s

finding that the Management Plan was “not likely to

adversely affect” Yellowstone grizzly bears, but opined that

reinitiation of consultation might be required if new

information became available suggesting possible effects on

the threatened grizzly bear population. The central basis for

the Biological Evaluation’s finding was that hazing activities

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ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. USDA 9

would primarily occur while grizzly bears are hibernating. 

The Biological Evaluation further noted that “[i]f grizzly

bears are active in the area, operations at the capture facilities

may have to cease.” 

Following the Management Plan’s approval in 2000,

helicopter hazing under the plan was gradually extended

beyond the original target of a mid-May completion date. In

2010, hazing operations were documented through the end of

July, and in 2011, they continued through June. Additionally,

both the Forest Service and independent observers reported

the presence of Yellowstone grizzly bears prior to and during

hazing operations. In 2012, the Park Service acknowledged

these changes and announced that:

Since the [FWS] issued its letter of

concurrence in 2000, additional information

regarding bison and grizzly bears has become

available. Through adaptive management

adjustments to the Interagency Bison

Management Plan, the hazing of bison now

occurs more often from December through

June than in the past. The hazing of bison

during spring and early summer may affect

threatened grizzly bears in a manner or to an

extent not considered in the 2000 Biological

Assessment. 

Shortly thereafter, while this case was pending in the district

court, the Park Service reinitiated consultation based on new

concerns regarding the impact of cutthroat trout reductions on

grizzly bears and the cumulative effects of the extended

helicopter hazing operations. The 2012 Biological Evaluation

ultimately concluded “that bison hazing activities do not

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10 ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. USDA

cause injury, decrease productivity, or significantly interfere

with normal behavior patterns of grizzly bears . . . .” The

FWS re-concurred with the Park Service’s conclusion. 

B. District Court Proceedings

On May 11, 2011, Alliance sent a “60-day Notice of

Intent to Sue Under the [ESA]” to the Forest Service, Park

Service, MDOL, USDA and Interior.2 The notice alleged that

the federal defendants violated the ESA by failing “to apply

the best available science and new information and reinitiate

Section 7 ESA consultation,” and failing “to comply with

ESA Section 9 by allowing/causing past and ongoing

unpermitted take of threatened Yellowstone grizzly bears

from harassment and harm related to helicopter hazing

operations . . . .”

Without waiting for the 60-day notice period to expire, on

May 18, 2011, Alliance filed a complaint under the

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et

seq., alleging violations of NEPA and NFMA, and

“challeng[ing] the U.S. Forest Service’s 2008 management

plan and 2011 annual decision to permit recurring, lowaltitude helicopter flights that harass Yellowstone grizzly

bears, during spring and summer bear season, over National

Forest lands in the Yellowstone Grizzly Bear Recovery

Zone.” The complaint also stated that Alliance would amend

the complaint to include ESA claims after the 60-day notice

period had expired.

2 Alliance later filed an amended notice on June 29, 2011, that added

FWS and Inspection Service.

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ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. USDA 11

On July 14, 2011, Alliance filed an amended complaint

alleging claims under Section 7 and Section 9 of the ESA. In

Fall 2012, the parties filed cross-motions for summary

judgment and, while the motions were pending, the federal

defendants notified the district court that, as noted above,

they had reinitiated, and completed, Section 7 consultation on

the impact of the Management Plan on Yellowstone grizzly

bears. 

The district court granted the federal defendants’ motion

for summary judgment in its entirety. The court dismissed

Alliance’s claims against the federal defendants for lack of

Article III standing, holding that the federal defendants did

not control, authorize or currently fund the helicopter hazing

operations. The court further concluded that Alliance failed

to comply with the ESA’s 60-day notice requirement and,

therefore, jurisdiction over Alliance’s ESA claims did not

exist. Finally, the court held that the Section 7 claim was

moot because the federal defendants had voluntarily

reinitiated and completed consultation on the impacts of

helicopter hazing under the Management Plan on

Yellowstone grizzly bears. 

The district court also addressed the merits of Alliance’s

claims other than its Section 7 claim. The district court

granted summary judgment to the federal defendants on

Alliance’s Section 9 claim on the ground that “there is simply

no evidence in this record that [Montana’s] helicopter hazing

constitutes a ‘take’ of the Yellowstone grizzly bear within the

meaning of ESA Section 9.” The district court also granted

summary judgment to the federal defendants on Alliance’s

NEPA claims, finding that the Management Plan’s 2000 final

EIS adequately analyzed the impacts of helicopter hazing on

grizzly bears, and the evidence in the record did not require

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12 ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. USDA

preparation of a supplemental EIS. Finally, the court rejected

the NFMA claim because Alliance failed to show that the

Forest Service violated any provision of the Gallatin National

Forest Plan.

Alliance timely appealed.3

II. Standing

As an initial matter, we first address whether Alliance has

standing to raise its ESA and NEPA claims. To establish

Article III standing, Alliance must show (1) an injury in fact,

which is an injury that is concrete and particularized, and

actual or imminent; (2) a causal connection between the

injury and the conduct; and (3) a likelihood that the injury

will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders

of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). Whether there is

an injury in fact is not contested here. Alliance has alleged,

through extensive declarations, that its members have vested

“esthetic, recreational, scientific, vocational, and educational

interests in the threatened Yellowstone grizzly bears and their

occupied habit,” and that these interests are threatened by the

federal defendants alleged failure to comply with the ESA

and NEPA. 

Instead, the federal defendants argue that because theydid

not authorize, control, or currently fund the helicopter hazing

operations, “no federal action underlies the complained-of

3 We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. 

Szajer v. City of Los Angeles, 632 F.3d 607, 610 (9th Cir. 2011). We also

review de novo a district court’s ruling on issues of standing and

mootness. Sierra Forest Legacy v. Sherman, 646 F.3d 1161, 1176 (9th

Cir. 2011). 

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ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. USDA 13

activity.” They contend they therefore did not cause

Alliance’s injury in fact and have no ability to redress the

alleged harm. Accordingly, they argue, Alliance cannot

establish the standing requirements of causation and

redressability.

Alliance’s response is that the Management Plan was

developed and approved by the federal defendants and that

the helicopter hazing program was in fact “authorized,

funded, or carried out, in whole or in part” by the federal

defendants. As Alliance explains it, the “harm is caused by

the [federal defendants’] failure to comply with the ESA [and

NEPA]; and the remedy is for the Court to order

reconsultation and promulgation of an incidental take permit

for the [Management Plan].” We hold that the district court

erred in dismissing Alliance’s ESA and NEPA claims for lack

of standing.

A. ESA

The ESA requires all federal agencies to “insure that any

action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . .

is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any

endangered species or threatened species or result in the

destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such

species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). “Action means all

activities or programs of any kind authorized, funded, or

carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies . . . .” 50

C.F.R. § 402.02. We have held that “[t]here is ‘little doubt’

that Congress intended agency action to have a broad

definition in the ESA.” Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest

Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 1020 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 

Consistent with the broad interpretation of “agency action,”

we have recognized that environmental management plans

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14 ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. USDA

constitute federal agency actions under the ESA. See Lane

Cnty. Audubon Soc’y v. Jamison, 958 F.2d 290, 293–94 (9th

Cir. 1992). 

As adoption of the Management Plan was an agency

action, the federal defendants are required to abide by certain

procedural and substantive requirements imposed under the

ESA. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(a)(2), 1538(a)(1)(B). It is the

alleged failure to comply with these requirements that is at

the heart of Alliance’s injury in fact and at the heart of the

relief it seeks in this action. Although the federal defendants

argue that Alliance ultimately seeks a “cessation of helicopter

hazing” as a remedy for its injury, and that they have no

ability to provide this relief, this argument misconstrues the

nature of Alliance’s complaint. 

Alliance argues that the federal defendants have violated

Section 7 of the ESA because “Defendants have failed to

provide a Biological Opinion and/or Incidental Take

Statement for the adverse impact and take of grizzly bears

from repeated low-altitude helicopter flights . . . ,” and have

“failed to comply with their ongoing obligation to reinitiate

ESA consultation for the 2000 management plan . . . .” 

Similarly, Alliance alleges that the federal defendants and

MDOL have violated Section 9 because “Defendants are

allowing and causing past and ongoing unpermitted take of

threatened Yellowstone grizzly bears” and “do not have an

Incidental Take Statement for this take.” 

There is a direct causal connection between these claims

of procedural injury and the federal defendants’ actions

concerning the Management Plan. The federal defendants

worked jointlywith MDOLto develop the Management Plan,

and ultimatelyauthorized and approved the Management Plan

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ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. USDA 15

after adopting a lengthy Record of Decision. The Forest

Service and Park Service then engaged in the development,

and completion, of consultation under Section 7 for the

Management Plan and retain ongoing responsibility to

reinitiate consultation as required. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.16(b). 

Because the Management Plan governs actions directed at

bison in the Greater Yellowstone Area, and those actions

have the capacity to affect threatened Yellowstone grizzly

bears, the Management Plan and the federal defendants’

related ongoing responsibilities constitute agency action

sufficient to establish causation for the ESA procedural

injuries Alliance alleges. 

Further, Alliance’s ESA claims are redressable by the

federal defendants. Indeed, they have now twice engaged in

the precise action that Alliance seeks, consultation under

Section 7 of the ESA. Moreover, we need not determine

whether the federal defendants’ reinitiation of consultation

under Section 7 and issuance of an Incidental Take Statement

would ultimately redress Alliance’s interest in the protection

of Yellowstone grizzly bears. It is enough that their

“procedural right [], if exercised, could protect [their]

concrete interests.” Natural Res. Def. Council v. Jewell, 749

F.3d 776, 783 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (emphasis in original,

internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, Alliance’s

ESA claims are redressable by the federal defendants, and

Alliance has standing to raise these claims.

B. NEPA

As with the ESA claims, the federal defendants argue that

Alliance lacks Article III standing to pursue its NEPA claim

because it cannot show that a federal action underlies the

NEPA claim sufficient to establish causation and

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16 ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. USDA

redressability. Because the Management Plan is a federal

action and Alliance’s NEPA claim is a procedural one, we

reverse and hold that Alliance has standing to bring its NEPA

claim. 

As previously discussed, under Article III, Alliance must

show that it has suffered an injury in fact that “is fairly

traceable” to the federal action of the defendant and “will be

redressed by a favorable decision.” See Friends of the Earth

v. Laidlaw Envt’l Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000). In

addition to these constitutional requirements, prudential

standing under NEPA also requires a showing that the alleged

injury “falls within the ‘zone of interests’ that NEPA was

designed to protect.” Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241

F.3d 674, 679 (9th Cir. 2001). The federal defendants do not

dispute that Alliance has established an injury in fact and

prudential standing. Accordingly, we consider only whether

the necessary causality and redressability exists.

Under NEPA, federal agencies are required to complete

an EIS as a component of any “major Federal actions

significantlyaffecting the qualityofthe human environment.” 

42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). The federal defendants argue that

their lack of direct involvement in the helicopter hazing

operations authorized by the Management Plan demonstrates

that there is no major federal action at stake in this case. This

argument again misconstrues the nature of Alliance’s claims.

Alliance’s claim under NEPA arises from the

Management Plan itself. Alliance challenges the federal

defendants’ “failure to conduct a NEPA analysis to assess the

direct, indirect and cumulative environmental effects on

threatened Yellowstone grizzlybears of annual recurringlowaltitude helicopter flights over occupied grizzly bear habitat.” 

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ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. USDA 17

As the flights were authorized by the Management Plan, this

injury is “fairly traceable” to the federal defendants’ actions

in approving the Management Plan. When viewed in this

manner, there can be little doubt that Alliance has alleged a

major federal action for purposes of NEPA. See Cold

Mountain v. Garber, 375 F.3d 884, 887 n.2, 893–94 (9th Cir.

2004) (finding the predecessor to the Management Plan to be

a major federal action for purposes of NEPA analysis). The

fact that the federal defendants have previously completed a

final EIS for the Management Plan belies their claim that

there is no federal action. Were the Management Plan not a

“major Federal action[] significantly affecting the quality of

the human environment,” the federal defendants would never

have been required to complete an initial final EIS. 42 U.S.C.

§ 4332(2)(C).

Moreover, as with Alliance’s ESA claims, the procedural

injury Alliance alleges under NEPA is also redressable by the

federal defendants. Here, Alliance seeks supplementation of

the EIS to consider the impacts of current helicopter hazing

operations on Yellowstone grizzly bears, a procedural right

which could protect its alleged substantive interests. See

Natural Res. Def. Council, 749 F.3d at 783. We therefore

hold that Alliance has standing to pursue its NEPA claim. 

III. Mootness and Section 7 of the ESA

Alliance argues that Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA, 16

U.S.C. § 1536(A)(2), requires the federal defendants to

reinitiate consultation on the effect of the Management Plan

on Yellowstone grizzly bears due to the extended duration of

helicopter hazing and increasing overlap between areas where

helicopter hazing occurs and grizzly bear denning areas. The

federal defendants argue that Alliance’s Section 7 claim is

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18 ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. USDA

moot because the federal defendants have already completed

a second Biological Evaluation consultation addressing the

impact of helicopter hazing on Yellowstone grizzly bears. 

We agree. 

Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA requires federal agencies to

ensure, in consultation with the appropriate wildlife agency,

that any action authorized or carried out by the agency “is not

likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any

endangered species or threatened species or result in the

destruction or adverse modification” of designated critical

habitat. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). The ESA implementing

regulations further require agencies to reinitiate consultation

if “new information reveals effects of the action that may

affect listed species or critical habitat in a manner or to an

extent not previously considered.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.16(b). 

The Park Service and FWS conducted a Biological

Evaluation in 2000 analyzing the potential effects of the

Management Plan on Yellowstone grizzly bears and

determined that the Management Plan was “not likely to

adversely affect the grizzly bear.” In September 2012, the

Park Service reinitiated consultation, focusing on the

Management Plan’s expansion of helicopter hazing

operations to the spring and early summer. In this new

Biological Evaluation, it concluded that bison hazing

operations “may affect, but are not likely to adversely affect

listed grizzly bears.” The new Biological Evaluation was

then forwarded to the FWS, which issued a re-concurrence

stating “[w]e have reviewed your November 1 biological

evaluation and concur with your determination that hazing

operations conducted under the Management Plan may affect,

but are not likely to adversely affect grizzly bears.” In

conducting a second consultation and Biological Evaluation

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ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. USDA 19

on the impact of the Management Plan on Yellowstone

grizzly bears, and obtaining a second concurrence from the

FWS, the federal defendants completed the reinitiation of

consultation required by the ESA. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.16(b). 

Reinitiation of consultation is the precise relief sought by

Alliance. Accordingly, Alliance’s Section 7 claim is moot. 

See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Bergland, 576 F.2d 1377,

1378–79 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that a challenge to a mining

plan was moot where the action sought to be enjoined had

been completed).4

IV. The ESA Claims

A. The 60-Day Notice Requirement

Pursuant to Section 11(g)(1)(A) of the ESA, citizen suits

are permitted to enjoin persons who are “alleged to be in

violation” of the ESA or the applicable regulations. 16

U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A). A plaintiff who seeks to pursue a

citizen suit must comply with a 60-day notice requirement

that “put[s] the agencies on notice of a perceived violation of

the statute and an intent to sue.” Sw. Ctr. for Biological

Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 143 F.3d 515, 520

(9th Cir. 1998). The notice requirement provides agencies

with “an opportunity to review their actions and take

corrective measures if warranted.” Id. Accordingly, it is a

4 Alliance asserts that under Forest Guardians v. Johanns, 450 F.3d 455

(9th Cir. 2006), it is still entitled to declaratory relief that the Park Service

and FWS have a continuing obligation to engage in reconsultation. Unlike

in Johanns, however, there is no evidence in the summary judgment

record to suggest that the Park Service has been uncooperative in the

Section 7 consultation process, nor that the Park Service is under any

annual obligation to undertake consultation absent new information. See

id. at 462. Accordingly, Johanns does not apply here.

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20 ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. USDA

“mandatorycondition[] precedent to commencing suit” under

the ESA, Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cnty., 493 U.S. 20, 31

(1989), and a failure to comply “acts as an absolute bar to

bringing suit under the ESA.” Sw. Ctr. for Biological

Diversity, 143 F.3d at 520.

The question here is whether Alliance complied with the

ESA’s 60-day notice requirement when it gave notice of its

intent to sue under the ESA but then filed a complaint

alleging non-ESA claims, later amending the complaint to

add ESA claims after the 60-day notice period had expired.5

We have not previously addressed that precise issue. In light

of the plain text of the statute and the persuasive reasoning of

other courts that have considered similar notice requirements,

we conclude that Alliance properly commenced its ESA suit

under § 1540(g)(2)(A)(i) when it filed the amended

complaint.

“[T]he starting point for interpreting a statute is the

language of the statute itself.” Consumer Prod. Safety

Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). 

Section 11(g)(1)(A) states:

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this

subsection any person may commence a civil

suit on his own behalf –

5 Alliance argues that our prior decision in Ecological Rights

Foundation v. Pacific Gas and Electric Company, 713 F.3d 502 (9th Cir.

2013), “recognizes that a plaintiff may amend a complaint to add claims

after a 60-day notice ripens.” In that case, both the original and the

amended complaints were filed more than sixty days after notice was

given. 713 F.3d at 506–7, 519. Accordingly, Ecological Rights did not

resolve the question raised here. 

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ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. USDA 21

(A) to enjoin any person, including the

United States and any other governmental

instrumentality or agency (to the extent

permitted by the eleventh amendment to the

Constitution), who is alleged to be in violation

of any provision of this chapter or regulation

issued under the authority thereof;

16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A). Under Section 11(g)(2)(A), 

[n]o action may be commenced under

subparagraph (1)(A) of this section . . . (i)

prior to sixty days after written notice of the

violation has been given to the Secretary, and

to any alleged violator of any such provision

or regulation . . . . 

16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2)(A). 

The plain language of § 11(g)(2)(A)(i) unambiguously

states that actions under the ESA may not commence until 60

days after a potential plaintiff has notified the Secretary and

any alleged violator of a purported ESA violation. In

considering the mandatory nature of a similar notice

requirement in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

(the “RCRA”) in Hallstrom, the Supreme Court concluded

that the statutory requirement “could not be clearer,” and the

notice requirement is a condition precedent that the plaintiff

must satisfy before commencing suit. Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at

26.6 

6 As the Supreme Court noted in Hallstrom, the language in the notice

and delay provision of the RCRA echos the 60-day notice provision in

Section 304 of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970. See Hallstrom, 493

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22 ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. USDA

The text of § 11(g)(2)(A)(i) also makes clear that the

notice requirement pertains only to actions commenced under

§ 11(g)(1)(A). Section 11(g)(2)(A)(i), like the RCRA notice

requirement, specifically limits the applicability of the notice

requirement to those actions commenced under Section

11(g)(1)(A) of the ESA and extends only to the citizen suit

provision contained in the statute. See Hallstrom, 493 U.S.

at 26; 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1) (1982 ed.). Although the

federal defendants urge that the legislative purpose of the

notice requirement is to afford agencies a complete “litigation

free window” in which to remedy alleged ESA violations,

they fail to identify any provision in the statute which

suggests that the ESA’s notice requirement should be

interpreted to preclude filing of a complaint alleging nonESA claims before the 60-day notice period expires. 

Moreover, the legislative purpose of the notice

requirement similarly fails to support the federal defendants’

arguments. The legislative history of the first citizen suit

statute, Section 304 of the Clean Air Act Amendments of

1970, “indicates an intent to strike a balance between

encouraging citizen enforcement of environmental

regulations and avoiding burdening the federal courts with

excessive numbers of citizen suits.” Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at

29 (citing 116 Cong. Rec. 32927 (1970)). In Hallstrom, the

Supreme Court emphasized that the notice requirement serves

this goal by “allow[ing] Government agencies to take

responsibility for enforcing environmental regulations,” and

“giv[ing] the alleged violator an opportunity to bring itself

U.S. at 23 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982 ed.)). Since the enactment of

Section 304, at least sixteen other federal environmental statutes have

incorporated almost identical notice provisions, including the ESA. Id. at

23 n.1. 

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ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. USDA 23

into complete compliance with the Act.” Id. at 29 (internal

quotation marks omitted). So too, here: notice of an alleged

ESA violation provides federal agencies with an opportunity

to “take responsibility” for enforcing the ESA and to correct

any violation short of litigation. However, there is nothing in

the ESA that remotely suggests that a potential ESA plaintiff

must refrain from commencing suit to pursue other non-ESA

claims before the 60-day period expires.

Indeed, despite incorporating notice requirements into

numerous environmental statutes, see Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at

23 n.1, Congress has thus far declined to include such a prefiling requirement in NEPA and NFMA. Were we to read

Section 11(g)(2)(A)(i) as encompassing claims under NEPA

and NFMA, we would be imposing a de facto notice

requirement for cases that also potentially raise ESA issues

where Congress has explicitly declined to do so. This we

decline to do. See Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 251

(1926) (holding that the courts will not read language into a

statute where it would result in “an enlargement of [the

statute] by the court, so that what was omitted . . . may be

included within its scope”).

Thus, although Alliance gave notice of its intent to file

suit under § 11(g)(1)(A), that notice did not limit its right to

file an action alleging non-ESA claims before the 60-day

notice period expired. Once the 60-daynotice period expired,

Alliance could properly commence its suit under the ESA by

amending its complaint to include claims under Sections 7

and 9 of the ESA. 

We are not the only court to read a provision similar to

§ 11(g)(2)(A)(i) in this manner. In Zands v. Nelson, 779 F.

Supp. 1254, 1257 (S.D. Cal. 1991), the district court

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24 ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. USDA

addressed whether the plaintiff had prematurely commenced

suit under the RCRA when the plaintiff amended the original

complaint to add a RCRA claim. The plaintiffs had filed their

initial complaint prior to giving the 60-day notice, but waited

until almost a year after the notice period expired to amend

the complaint. Id. The district court concluded that, “for

purposes of a notice and delay provision relating to a new

claim which appears for the first time in the pleadings in the

amended complaint, the Court will look to the filing of the

amended complaint to determine when the ‘action’ is

commenced.” Id. at 1259. In so holding, the district court

reasoned that where plaintiffs have claims that do not require

notice, they should not be required to forego raising those

claims in a timely manner, as “the [c]ourt [does not] believe

that Congress intended that the notice and delay provision . . .

would impede plaintiffs’ ability to bring claims that do not

have notice and delay provisions.” Id. at 1261. Accordingly,

the district court aptly noted, while the 60-day notice

requirement encourages voluntary compliance with the

requisite statute, “[t]his purpose in and of itself does not

warrant the creation of a ‘non-adversarial’ period that is not

explicitly in the statute.” Id. We agree with the reasoning of

Zands and hold that, for purposes of notice, we may look to

the filing of an amended complaint to determine when an

action is commenced under the ESA. See Zands, 779 F.

Supp. at 1259. Accordingly, Alliance properlycomplied with

the requirements of Section 11(g)(2)(A)(i) when it filed an

amended complaint alleging its ESA claims after the 60-day

notice period expired.7

7 The federal defendants and MDOL urge us to follow the reasoning of

Proie v. National Marine Fisheries Service, No. C11-5955BHS, 2012WL

1536756 at *4 (W.D. Wash. May 1, 2012), which held that the 60-day

notice period must be a “litigation-free window” precluding the filing of

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ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. USDA 25

Although we acknowledge the beneficial purposes of the

60-day notice period, these purposes do not outweigh

Alliance’s right to proceed on its other claims without any

waiting period. Had Alliance been unable to file its original

complaint while it waited for the notice period to expire, it

would have been precluded from seeking a temporary

restraining order and preliminary injunction on its NEPA

claims until after the ESA notice period had expired. Such a

delay could impose significant burdens on plaintiffs when

confronted with the need to seek immediate relief. See

Zands, 779 F. Supp at 1261. Accordingly, we hold that the

district court erred in concluding that Alliance could not

pursue its ESA claims for failure to comply with

§ 11(g)(2)(A)(i).8

any complaint. But Proie concerned a different situation. In Proie, the

plaintiffs gave notice of their intent to sue under the ESA but, 21 days

later, filed a complaint alleging claims under the APA seeking judicial

review of a purported ESA violation. Id. at *1, 3. After the 60-day notice

period expired, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding a claim

for relief directly under the ESA. Id. at *1. Because both the APA and

the ESA claims arose from the same alleged ESA violation, the district

court determined that the plaintiffs improperly attempted to circumvent

the ESA’s “litigation-free” period and, therefore, “failed to comply with

the requisite notice period.” Id. at *3–4 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Unlike in Proie, Alliance’s original complaint did not indirectly

raise an ESA claim, but instead alleged NEPA and NFMA claims distinct

from any ESA violations.

8 Alliance sent its original ESA 60-day notice letter to the Forest

Service, Park Service, MDOL, USDA and Interior. On July 8, 2011, it

served an amended ESA notice naming Inspection Service and FWS. 

Alliance has subsequently explained that the second ESA notice was “not

used by [Alliance] as the basis for litigation.” Because Inspection Service

and FWS were not given notice of the ESA claims in the original notice,

and that is the notice upon which Alliance relies, we affirm the district

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26 ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. USDA

B. Section 9

Alliance also alleges that the federal defendants and

MDOL have violated Section 9 of the ESA. Alliance

contends that the Management Plan’s helicopter hazing

program has so harassed Yellowstone grizzly bears as to

constitute a “take” under Section 9, and that the district court

therefore erred in granting the federal defendants summary

judgment on this claim and dismissing the claim against

MDOL.

Section 9 of the ESA prohibits the taking of an

endangered or threatened species. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B). 

The ESA defines “take” to mean “to harass, harm, pursue,

hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture or collect, or to attempt

to engage in any such conduct.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). 

“Harass” is further defined as “an intentional or negligent act

. . . which creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by

annoying it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt

normal behavioral patterns which include, but are not limited

to, breeding, feeding, or sheltering.” 50 C.F.R. § 17.3; see

also Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th

Cir. 1996). A take may involve a past or current injury, or the

prospect of an imminent threat of harm to a protected species. 

Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d

781, 784 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Viewing this record in the light most favorable to

Alliance, we hold that the district court did not err in granting

summary judgment to the federal defendants on the Section

9 claim and dismissing the claim against MDOL.

court’s dismissal of Alliance’s ESA claims against FWS and Inspection

Service. 

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ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. USDA 27

Alliance alleges that “[h]elicopter hazing operations cause

take because they displace grizzly bears, including female

bears, from critical spring and summer feeding activities.” 

Included in this record is a video Alliance obtained of a

“bison-hazing helicopter operation” which purportedly

depicts a “grizzly bear running away from the helicopter” on

May 12, 2010. The videographer, however, does not state

and the district court could not conclude that “the bear was

engaged in any feeding activity, whether before, during, or

after its contact with the helicopter.” 

Alliance also contends that current scientific evidence

supports a finding that the flight response of grizzly bears in

response to helicopters is not a normal physiological response

to being startled, but is indicative of significant disruption to

normal behavioral patterns. In support of this argument,

Alliance has submitted a report prepared by the Park Service

concerning the effects of overflights on wildlife in the parks,

including grizzly bears, and the Forest Service’s own “Guide

to Effects Analysis of Helicopter Use in Grizzly Bear

Habitat,” which acknowledges the negative effects of

helicopters on grizzly bears. Yet the record before the district

court at the time of summary judgment lacks evidence to

show that MDOL’s helicopter hazing is of the type that the

report and Guide link to significant disruption of grizzly bear

behavioral patterns. The federal defendants acknowledge that

the hazing can impact grizzly bears, but assert that hazing

operations “infrequently occurred in the presence of grizzly

bears” and “would cease if there was evidence of grizzlies

being active in the area.” Although there was evidence in the

summary judgment record that helicopters had flown over

bears, there was no evidence that helicopters had continued

hazing operations in areas with signs of grizzly bear presence

in violation of the instructions to stop. 

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28 ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. USDA

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that

on this record Alliance has failed to raise a triable issue as to

whether a take has occurred or is likely to occur under

Section 9 of the ESA. 

V. NEPA

In addition to its ESA claims, Alliance also seeks reversal

of the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the

federal defendants on its NEPA and NFMA claims.9

Under NEPA, federal agencies are directed to prepare an

EIS to analyze the environmental consequences of their

proposed actions. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). This requirement

“ensures that the agency, in reaching its decision, will have

available, and will carefully consider, detailed information

concerning significant environmental impacts.” Robertson v.

Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989). 

Although NEPA does not impose substantive obligations on

agencies, the EIS is a “procedural requirement[] designed to

force agencies to take a ‘hard look’ at environmental

consequences.” Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 351

F.3d 1291, 1300 (9th Cir. 2003). Once an original EIS has

been completed, NEPA requires that agencies perform a

supplemental EIS whenever “[t]he agency makes substantial

changes in the proposed action that are relevant to

environmental concerns or [] [t]here are significant new

circumstances or information relevant to environmental

9 Alliance’s only claim for relief under the NFMA is that, to the extent

there is any supplemental EIS prepared for the Management Plan, any

action conducted in part in the Gallatin National Forest must comply with

the Gallatin National Forest Plan under NFMA. Because a supplemental

EIS is not required, we do not further address the NFMA claim.

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ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. USDA 29

concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts.” 

40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1); see also Klamath Siskiyou

Wildlands Ctr. v. Boody, 468 F.3d 549, 560 (9th Cir. 2006). 

An impact on a threatened or endangered species is a factor

that can give rise to the requirement to perform a

supplemental EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(9). 

In support of its claim that the federal defendants are

required to prepare a supplemental EIS, Alliance alleges three

“significant new circumstances or information” pertaining to

the Management Plan. First, while the final EIS for the

Management Plan indicated that hazing impacts on

Yellowstone grizzly bears would end in April or May,

helicopter hazing now extends into June and July. Second,

although the final EIS contemplated that Yellowstone grizzly

bears would be denning, or at higher elevations, during

hazing operations, “most hazing now occurs after denning

and den emergence, and grizzly bears are consistently present

in the lower elevation areas where hazing occurs during most

hazing operations.” Third, the final EIS indicated that hazing

would be stopped if there was evidence of Yellowstone

grizzly bear activity in the hazing operation area, but hazing

operations remain ongoing despite such actions. Because the

federal defendants’ considered these issues during the initial

final EIS process, we affirm the district court’s grant of

summary judgment to the federal defendants.10

As the district court noted, the final EIS contemplated that

helicopter hazing might occur in varying time frames as

required to successfully migrate bison back to Yellowstone

10 We assume, without deciding, that the circumstances here constitute

ongoingmajor Federal action for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). See

Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 72 (2004).

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30 ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. USDA

National Park. Thus, the approval of the final EIS was not

tied to the complete absence of Yellowstone grizzly bears

from the hazing region. Rather, the final EIS acknowledged

that “the average emergence date for bears is in March . . . ,”

and, accordingly, some overlap between hazing operations

and Yellowstone grizzly bear presence might be inevitable. 

Indeed, the final EIS explicitly incorporated this “possibility

of overlap” it its ultimate determination that “[b]ison

management activities such as hazing,” “would not have

more than a negligible impact on grizzly bears.” Thus, while

the final EIS presumed that the majority of helicopter hazing

operations would occur while Yellowstone grizzlybears were

still in hibernation, the final EIS does not require that this be

the case. Instead, the final EIS considered the potential

impacts to Yellowstone grizzly bears even were encounters

to occur. To the extent that the final EIS contemplated that

evidence of grizzly bear activity in the area might force

helicopter hazing operations to cease, this remains the policy

of the Management Plan. Disputes may arise as to whether

this policy has been violated by the alleged harassment of

Yellowstone grizzly bears by helicopters, see supra Section

IV.B., but the final EIS clearly evaluated the Management

Plan’s policy toward encounters between hazing operations

and Yellowstone grizzly bears.

Although Alliance argues that the federal defendants

“have essentially already conceded this issue,” by engaging

in reconsultation under Section 7, these two procedural

requirements are distinct. Reconsultation under Section 7

does not imply that “significant new circumstances or

information” have arisen which would also require analysis

under NEPA. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1). Rather, they are

independent inquiries resulting in independent evaluations.

Moreover, to the extent that the 2012 Biological Evaluation

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ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. USDA 31

has any bearing on the need to complete a supplemental EIS,

the Biological Evaluation concluded that new information

available on the impact of helicopter hazing on Yellowstone

grizzly bears was not so significant as to change the original

determination concerning whether the Management Plan was

likely to adversely affect grizzly bears. 

Accordingly, we hold that the federal defendants

considered the possibility of extended helicopter hazing and

encounters with Yellowstone grizzly bears in the initial EIS

and, thus, the information presented by Alliance does not

establish a substantial change in the proposed action nor

significant new circumstances or information requiring the

federal defendants to supplement the EIS. See 40 C.F.R.

§ 1502.9(c)(1).

VI. Conclusion

We reverse the district court’s holding that Alliance

lacked standing to bring its ESA and NEPA claims. We also

reverse the district court’s ruling that Alliance failed to

comply with the ESA citizen suit 60-day notice provision. 

We affirm, however, the dismissal of all of Alliance’s ESA

claims against Inspection Service and FWS as they were not

included in the 60-day notice on which Alliance relies. We

affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the

federal defendants and grant of dismissal to MDOL on

Alliance’s ESA Section 7 claim as it is moot. We also affirm

the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the federal

defendants and grant of dismissal to MDOL on Alliance’s

Section 9 claim, as no genuine issues of material fact exist in

this record concerning whether a take of a Yellowstone

grizzly bear has occurred or is likely to occur. Finally, we

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32 ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. USDA

affirm the grant of summary judgment to the federal

defendants on the NEPA and NFMA claims. 

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. 

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

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