Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01152/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01152-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 560
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Civil Detainee - Conditions of Confinement
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES RICHARD RYAN II,

Plaintiff,

v.

LEO SIQUEIROS, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:15-cv-01152 DLB PC

FIRST SCREENING ORDER DISMISSING 

COMPLAINT, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, 

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 

UNDER SECTIONS 1983 AND 1985

I. Screening Requirement and Standard

Plaintiff James Richard Ryan II, a state civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 on July 24, 2015. He 

consented to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Judge on September 18, 2015. 

The Court is required to screen Plaintiff’s complaint and dismiss the case, in whole or in 

part, if the Court determines it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 

(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)), and 

courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 

Case 1:15-cv-01152-SAB Document 7 Filed 05/18/16 Page 1 of 8
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F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual 

allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Pro se litigants are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any 

doubt resolved in their favor, Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121-23 (9th Cir. 2012); Hebbe 

v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010), but Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible to 

survive screening, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer 

that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation 

marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer 

possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability 

falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks 

omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

II. Discussion

A. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff was detained at Coalinga State Hospital (“CSH”) at the time the events giving rise 

to this action occurred. Plaintiff brings this action against the following Defendants: Psychiatric 

Technicians Leo Siqueiros, Marcelina Rodriguez, and Sandy Gallarza; Hospital Administrator 

Brandon Price; Unit Supervisor Barbara Rodriguez; Executive Director Audrey King; and Does 1 

to 5.

Plaintiff alleges as follows. On June 26, 2015, at 9:00 a.m., Plaintiff attended his regularly 

attended crocheting class at CSH. On his way to the class, Plaintiff was required to travel through 

a “work change” station where he was screened by a metal detector. He was also subjected to a 

search of his bag. Departmental Services Officer Francisco Moreno searched the bag and found a 

manual pencil sharpener and dental floss which he claimed was contraband and confiscated. 

Plaintiff claims the items are not contraband. Plaintiff then attended the class.

A short time later, Defendants Siqueiros and Gallarza came to the class, collected Plaintiff, 

and stated his level was on “hold.”

1

 Plaintiff expressed his distress at having his level “pulled.” 

 

1

Plaintiff states that placing a resident on “hold” means that the resident is actually imprisoned in his housing unit 

insofar as he/she may not leave unless permitted to attend meals. Placing a resident on hold is a procedure allegedly 

done without due process of any sort.

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Plaintiff alleges that instead of assembling a Wellness and Recovery Team to resolve the problem 

immediately, as required, Plaintiff’s level would remain on “hold” through the weekend until at 

least Monday, June 29, 2015. Plaintiff complained that if he were to remain on hold through the 

weekend, he would lose his job. Plaintiff claims that Defendants Siqueiros, Marcelina Rodriguez, 

and Gallarza directly retaliated against Plaintiff for complaining when Defendants advised him 

that they were going to search his bed area and property for contraband.

Defendants Siqueiros, Marcelina Rodriguez, and Gallarza conducted a search of Plaintiff’s 

bed area leaving it a shambles. Defendants seized Plaintiff’s USPS mailing boxes, envelopes, and 

factory boxes stating they were cardboard and contraband. Plaintiff states they were not 

contraband. Defendants also seized Plaintiff’s replacement screen for a media player stating it 

was contraband because it was modified since it had tape on it and was therefore altered.

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Barbara Rodriguez conspired to violate Plaintiff’s civil 

rights through intentional, malicious and sadistic enforcement of draconian policies and 

procedures meant to enhance punishment on Plaintiff. Plaintiff claims he filed many written 

complaints to Defendants Price and King complaining about Defendant Barbara Rodriguez’s 

punitive procedures. Defendants Price and King did not respond.

Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment right to privacy through 

their unreasonable searches and seizures of his property. He further claims Defendants Siqueiros, 

Marcelina Rodriguez, and Gallarza retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment. 

Finally, Plaintiff claims Defendants conspired together to deprive Plaintiff of his rights and 

privileges guaranteed by the Constitution.

Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive 

damages.

B. Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 

558, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979); Byrd v. Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, 629 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th 

Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 2964 (2011); Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 332 (9th 

Cir. 1988). For the Fourth Amendment to apply, there must be a “reasonable expectation of 

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privacy in the area invaded.” Espinosa v. City and County of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 533 

(9th Cir. 2010); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525, 104 S.Ct. 3194 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 

U.S. 520, 556-57, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979). 

In this instance, items were determined to be contraband and seized from Plaintiff’s bag 

upon entry to a class. Based on this seizure, Plaintiff’s room at CSH was searched based on the 

suspicion that he had contraband. Certain items were seized as contraband, although some items 

were later returned. Plaintiff contends that the items were not contraband and his rights under the 

Fourth Amendment were therefore violated.

While Plaintiff is not a convicted criminal, he is involuntarily serving a civil commitment 

term at a secure facility; he is not a free individual with a full panoply of rights. Civil detainees 

are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose 

conditions of confinement are designed to punish, Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322, 102 

S.Ct. 2452 (1982) (quotation marks omitted), but maintaining facility security and effectively 

managing the facility are unquestionably legitimate, non-punitive government interests, Jones v. 

Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted).

The contours of an involuntarily confined civil detainee’s right to privacy in his room in a 

secure treatment facility are unclear, but assuming Plaintiff retains any reasonable expectation of 

privacy at all in his room at CSH, it would necessarily be of a diminished scope given Plaintiff’s 

civil confinement. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 556-57 (discussing detainee’s expectation of privacy in 

cell or room at detention facility). Here, Plaintiff’s claim arises from a room search which was 

initiated based on the suspicion that Plaintiff had contraband in light of the previous seizure of 

contraband at his class. Whatever diminished expectation of privacy Plaintiff may have in his 

room at CSH, it cannot extend so far as to encompass an expectation of privacy in remaining free 

from suspicion-based contraband searches. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 557. Plaintiff acknowledges that 

Defendants stated their intent to search was based on suspicion of contraband, but he contends 

their actual motivation was retaliatory because he had complained about a previous search and 

seizure. Nevertheless, there are no facts to support this allegation of a retaliatory motive. The 

mere fact that the search was conducted after Plaintiff complained of the initial search is 

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insufficient. Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2000) (post hoc, ergo propter 

hoc - or after this, therefore because of this - is a logical fallacy) (quotation marks omitted).

Other courts which have considered the issue have concluded that no Fourth Amendment 

claim lies because civil detainees do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their rooms. 

See Houx v. Koll, No. 1:15-CV-00146-LJO, 2015 WL 4138967, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 8, 2015) 

(bare allegation that detainee’s living area and property were subjected to searches is insufficient 

to support a viable claim under the Fourth Amendment); Osolinski v. Bigo, No. 1:14-CV-01895-

AWI, 2015 WL 403793, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2015) (same); Pesci v. Budz, No. 2:12-cv-227-

FtM-29SPC, 2012 WL 4856746, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2012) (civil detainee did not have a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in his dormitory); Rainwater v. Bell, No. 2:10-cv-1727 GGH P, 

2012 WL 3276966, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2012) (finding, on summary judgment, that civil 

detainee did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his jail cell); Pyron v. Ludeman, Nos. 

10-3759 (PJS/JJG), 10-4236 (PJS/JJG), 2011 WL 3293523, at *6 (D. Minn. Jun. 6, 2011) (finding 

motion to dismiss should be granted because a search of a civil detainee’s personal items in his 

cell does not violate the Fourth Amendment), report and recommendation adopted in full, 2012 

WL 1597305 (D. Minn. Jul. 29, 2011); Riley v. Doyle, No. 06-C-574-C, 2006 WL 2947453, at *5 

(W.D. Wis. Oct. 16, 2006) (civil detainee denied leave to proceed on Fourth Amendment claim 

arising out of repeated contraband searches because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy 

in avoiding routine cell inspections and searches); but see Stearns v. Stoddard, No. C11-5422-

BHS-JRC, 2012 WL 1596965, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 11, 2012) (recognizing that whether a civil 

detainee housed in a secure facility has any expectation of privacy in his room is an open question 

and finding entitlement to summary judgment on Fourth Amendment claim based on qualified 

immunity), report and recommendation adopted in full, 2012 WL 1597305 (W.D. Wash. May 7, 

2012). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff does not have a reasonable expectation of 

privacy in his room at CSH under the circumstances alleged and he fails to state a cognizable 

Fourth Amendment claim. Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend.

C. Retaliation

With respect to civil detainees, “a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five 

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basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) 

because of (3) that [inmate's] protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's 

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

[government] goal.” Endsley v. Luna, No. CV 06-04100 DSF (SS), 2009 WL 3806266, at *15 

(C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2009), aff'd, 473 F. App'x 750 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Rhodes v. Robinson, 

408 F.3d 559, 567–68 (9th Cir.2005) and adapting Rhodes prison standard to civil detainee case); 

see also Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir.2003); Vignolo v. Miller, 120 F.3d 1075, 

1077–78 (9th Cir.1997); Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267 (9th Cir.1997); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 

F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir.1995); Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 461 (9th Cir.1995); Barnett v. 

Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815–16 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam). Here, Plaintiff offers no factual 

allegations supporting the claim that Defendants acted out of retaliatory intent.

D. Conspiracy

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Barbara Rodriguez conspired to violate his civil rights 

through intentional, malicious and sadistic enforcement of draconian policies and procedures 

meant to enhance punishment on Plaintiff and other inmates, under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. He further 

claims Defendants Price and King conspired to violate Plaintiff’s rights by ignoring Plaintiff’s and 

other inmates’ written complaints concerning Defendant Barbara Rodriguez’s punitive procedures. 

To establish a claim for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, a plaintiff must demonstrate a 

conspiracy for the purpose of depriving another of the equal protection of the laws and an act in 

furtherance of that conspiracy, causing injury to a person or property or the deprivation of a legal 

right. Federer v. Gephardt, 363 F.3d 754, 757–58 (8th Cir.2004). “‘The language requiring intent 

to deprive [another] of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means that there must 

be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the 

conspirators' action.’” Id. ¶ at 758 n. 3 (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, 91 S.Ct. 

1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971)) (alteration added). “It implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or 

reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ . . . its adverse effects upon an 

identifiable group.” Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 271–72, 113 S.Ct. 

753, 122 L.Ed.2d 34 (1993). 

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Here, Plaintiff does not allege invidious discrimination or any deprivation of the equal 

protection of the laws, or equal privileges and immunities; therefore, he fails to state a claim for 

conspiracy under § 1985.

III. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any cognizable claims 

under sections 1983 or 1985. Plaintiff has not previously been provided with notice of the 

deficiencies in his claims and the Court will provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to file an 

amended complaint, if he believes, in good faith, he can cure the identified deficiencies. Akhtar v. 

Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 

2000); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff amends, he may not 

change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George 

v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what 

each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and 

liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under the theory of mere respondeat 

superior, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Starr, 652 F.3d at 1205-07. Although accepted as true, the 

“[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. . . .” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). 

Finally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Lacey, 693 F.3d at 907 

n.1, and it must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading,” 

Local Rule 220. 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state any 

claims;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file an 

amended complaint, not to exceed twenty-five (25) pages, excluding exhibits; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, this

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action will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 17, 2016 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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