Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02074/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02074-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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 It is noted that SSI benefits are not payable for a period prior to the application. Cruse 1

v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1183, 1185 (8th Cir.1989). 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

ROBERT NARDINI PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 05-2074

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, 

Commissioner, Social 

Security Administration DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Factual and Procedural Background:

The plaintiff in this case has appealed the final decision of the Commissioner of the

Social Security Administration (hereinafter "Commissioner"), denying his claim for a period of

disability and disability insurance benefits (hereinafter “DIB”), and supplemental security

income benefits (hereinafter “SSI”), pursuant to §§ 216(i) and 223 of Title II of the Social

Security Act (hereinafter "the Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i) and 423, and § 1602 of Title XVI, 42

U.S.C. § 1381a, respectively. Although both parties were afforded the opportunity to file an

appeal brief, only the defendant chose to do so (Doc. #8). In this judicial review, the court must

determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the

Commissioner's decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

The history of the administrative proceedings is contained in the respective appeal briefs

and will not be recounted here except as necessary. However, to put the undersigned’s decision

in proper perspective, we note that plaintiff received a favorable decision on his application for

SSI. For purposes of DIB, however, his insured status expired on December 31, 2000, while

1

his onset date for DIB is allegedly April 26, 1998 (T. 53-56). Thus, the relevant analysis is

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whether the plaintiff was actually disabled prior to the expiration of his insured status. Hinchey

v. Shalala, 29 F.3d 428, 431 (8th Cir.1994). Accordingly, what remains at issue in this matter

is only the ALJ’s denial of plaintiff’s DIB application, and the relevant time period begins on

April 26, 1998, and end on December 31, 2000. 

The plaintiff asserts disability due to: dilated non-ischemic cardiomyopathy; chronic

atrial fibrillation; hypertension; and, degenerative disc disease. The issue before this Court is

whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial record evidence. Because the

plaintiff did not file an appeal brief raising specific issues, the defendant attempted to generally

submit that there is substantial evidence of record to support the ALJ’s decision that plaintiff

did not meet the disability requirements of the Social Security Act (Doc. #8, p. 3). 

 The Commissioner has established, by regulation, a five-step sequential evaluation for

determining whether an individual is disabled.

The first step involves a determination of whether the claimant is involved in substantial

gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If the claimant is, benefits are denied; if not, the

evaluation goes to the next step.

Step 2 involves a determination, based solely on the medical evidence, of whether the

claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments. Id., § 404.1520(c); see 20

C.F.R. § 404.1526. If not, benefits are denied; if so, the evaluation proceeds to the next step.

Step 3 involves a determination, again based solely on the medical evidence, of whether

the severe impairment(s) meets or equals a listed impairment which is presumed to be

disabling. Id., § 404.1520(d). If so, benefits are awarded; if not, the evaluation continues.

Step 4 involves a determination of whether the claimant has sufficient residual

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 In the ALJ’s decision, findings numbered 5-7, 11 and 12 erroneously report the onset 2

date as April 28, 1998. This error has no effect on the undersigned’s decision.

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functional capacity, despite the impairment(s), to perform past work. Id., § 404.1520(e). If so,

benefits are denied; if not, the evaluation continues.

Step 5 involves a determination of whether the claimant is able to perform other

substantial and gainful work within the economy, given claimant's age, education and work

experience. Id., § 404.1520(f). If so, benefits are denied; if not, benefits are awarded. 

The plaintiff’s DIB application was protectively filed on March 28, 2003 and alleges an

onset date for disability of April 26, 1998. An administrative hearing was held on April 5, 2

2004 (T. 173-198), after which the ALJ issued his written decision, dated August 10, 2004,

containing the following relevant findings, with respect to his DIB application:

1. The claimant meets the non-disability requirements for a period

of disability and [DIB] set forth in Section 216(i) of the Social

Security Act and is insured for benefits through December 31,

2000.

 

3. The claimant’s impairments are considered “severe” based on the

requirements in Regulations 20 CFR §§ 404.1520(c) and

416.920[c]. 

4. These medically determinable impairments do not meet or equal

one of the listed impairments in Appendix 1, Subpart P,

Regulations No. 4. 

5. The claimant’s present allegations of an inability to sustain a

regular work schedule are found credible; however, from April

[26], 1998 through December 31, 2000, his allegations regarding

his limitations are not totally credible for the reasons set forth in

the body of the decision. 

6. From April [26], 1998 through December 31, 2000, the claimant 

had the residual functional capacity to perform the exertional and

non-exertional requirements of the full range of sedentary work

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on a sustained basis. However, from March 28, 2003, through

the date of this decision, the claimant had and continues to have

an inability to sustain work activities in an ordinary work setting

on a regular and continuing basis. A “regular and continuing

basis” consists of 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week or an

equivalent work schedule (Social Security Ruling 96-8). 

7. From April [26], 1998 through December 31, 2000, the claimant

was unable to perform any of his past relevant work (20 CFR §§

404.1565 and 416.965). Additionally, from March 28, 2003, the

claimant is also unable to perform any of his past relevant work. 

11. From April [26], 1998 through December 31, 2000, the claimant

had the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of

sedentary work (20 CFR §§ 404.1567 and 416.967). 

12. Based on an exertional capacity for sedentary work, and the

claimant’s age, education, and work experience, a finding of “not

disabled” is directed by Medical-Vocational Rules 201.28 and

201.29 from April [26], 1998 through December 31, 2000. 

However, from March 28, 2003, through the date of this decision,

the undersigned finds the claimant’s substantial loss of ability to

maintain a regular and continuing work schedule significantly

erodes the unskilled sedentary job base and the number of jobs

the claimant is able to perform is reduced to fewer than

significant numbers (Social Security Ruling 96-9p). 

13. The claimant has been under a disability as defined in the Social

Security Act, since March 28, 2003, and through the date of the

decision, but not prior thereto (20 CFR §§ 404.1520(g) and

416.920(g)). 

(T. 21-22).

Applicable Law:

This court's review is limited to whether the decision of the Commissioner to deny

disability benefits to the plaintiff is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 

Lorenzen v. Chater, 71 F.3d 316, 318 (8th Cir.1995). Substantial evidence is less than a

preponderance, but enough so that a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to support a

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conclusion. Pickney v. Chater, 96 F.3d 294, 296 (8th Cir.1996). The undersigned must

consider both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's

decision, but the denial of benefits shall not be overturned even if there is enough evidence in

the record to support a contrary decision. Johnson v. Chater, 87 F.3d 1015, 1017 (8th

Cir.1996) (citing Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir.1993). The decision should not

be reversed "merely because substantial evidence would have supported an opposite

conclusion." Harris v. Shalala, 45 F.3d 1190, 1193 (8th Cir.1995) (citation omitted). 

Moreover, the court's review is not simply "a rubber stamp for the [Commissioner's]

decision and involves more than a search for evidence supporting the [Commissioner's]

findings." Tome v. Schweiker, 724 F.2d 711, 713 (8th Cir.1984). Indeed, "[t]o determine

whether existing evidence is substantial, '[the court] must consider evidence that detracts from

the [Commissioner's] decision as well as evidence that supports it.' " Warburton v. Apfel, 188

F.3d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir.1999) (quoting Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir.1993)).

In addition, the court's review of the decision must include a determination as to whether the

proper legal standards were applied. See Nettles v. Schweiker, 714 F.2d 833, 835-36 (8th

Cir.1983). Thus, this court’s review is both limited and deferential to the agency. See

Ostronski v. Chater, 94 F.3d 413, 416 (8th Cir.1996). 

The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that he is unable to engage in substantial

gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which is

expected to last for at least 12 months or result in death. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). See also,

Ingram v. Chater, 107 F.3d 598, 601 (8th Cir.1997); Nettles v. Schweiker, 714 F.2d 833, 836

(8th Cir.1983). Further, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that he is not able to perform

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his past relevant work. Barrett v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 1019, 1024 (8th Cir.1994). Thus, the

plaintiff has a responsibility to present the strongest case possible. See Thompson v. Sullivan,

928 F.2d 255, 260 (8th Cir.1991).

Because the ALJ determined that this plaintiff was unable to return to his past relevant

work during the relevant time period, the burden of persuasion shifted to the Commissioner to

show that plaintiff was able to engage in work in the national economy. Sanders v. Sullivan,

983 F.2d 822, 823 (8th Cir.1992). 

Further, the ALJ may discredit subjective complaints which are inconsistent with the

record as a whole. Ownbey v. Shalala, 5 F.3d 342, 344 (8th Cir.1993). The law on this issue is

clear. Under Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1321-22 (8th Cir.1984), "an ALJ must look at

five factors when determining the credibility of a claimant's subjective allegations of pain: (1)

the claimant's daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency and intensity of the pain; (3)

aggravating and precipitating factors; (4) dosage, effectiveness and side effects of medication;

and (5) functional restrictions." Harris v. Shalala, 45 F.3d 1190, 1193 (8th Cir.1995); see also

Baker v. Sec. of HHS, 955 F.2d 552, 555 (8th Cir.1992). The absence of an objective medical

basis which supports the subjective complaints of pain is just one factor to be considered in

evaluating the credibility of a plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain. Polaski v Heckler, 751

F.2d 943, 948 (8th Cir.1984); see also, Chamberlain v. Shalala, 47 F.3d 1489, 1494 (8th

Cir.1995). The ALJ must "discuss" these factors in the hearing decision. Herbert v. Heckler,

783 F.2d 128, 131 (8th Cir.1986)(citing Polaski v. Heckler, 751 F.2d 943, 948-950 (8th

Cir.1984)). Consideration must also be given to all the evidence presented related to the

claimant’s prior work history, and the observations of non-medical third parties, as well as

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treating and examining physicians related to the above matters. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929; Social

Security Ruling 96-7p; Polaski v. Heckler, 751 F.2d 943 (8th Cir.1984)(subsequent history

omitted).

"While the claimant has the burden of proving that the disability results from a

medically determinable physical or mental impairment, direct evidence of the cause and effect

relationship between the impairment and the degree of claimant's subjective complaints need

not be produced." Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d at 1322. 

To determine whether the ALJ properly applied the factors listed in Polaski, we must

determine whether the ALJ took into account all the relevant evidence, and whether that

evidence contradicted the claimant's own testimony so that the ALJ could discount the

testimony for lack of credibility. Benskin v. Bowen, 830 F.2d 878, 882 (8th Cir.1987). The

ALJ's credibility assessment must be based on substantial evidence. Rautio v. Bowen, 862 F.2d

176, 179 (8th Cir.1988). 

Implicit in the ALJ’s task of making a credibility determination is the requirement that

he "discuss" the Polaski factors. Herbert v. Heckler, 783 F.2d at 130 (the Polaski cases and the

Social Security Disability Reform Act of 1984 require that the Commissioner set forth the

inconsistencies in the objective medical evidence presented and discuss the factors set forth in

the Polaski settlement when making "credibility" determinations concerning claimant’s

subjective complaints of pain).

In summary, the ALJ must discuss and point out the inconsistencies in the record, in

order to make a credibility determination. Cline v. Sullivan, 939 F.2d 560, 565 (8th Cir.1991)

("it is not enough that inconsistencies may be said to exist, the ALJ must set forth the

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inconsistencies in the evidence presented and discuss the factors set forth in Polaski when

making credibility determinations"); Herbert v. Heckler, 783 F.2d at 131 (even though

evidence with respect to Polaski factors is in the record, those factors must be discussed in the

decision). 

"Nonexertional limitations are limitations other than on strength but which nonetheless

reduce an individual's ability to work." Asher v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 825, 827 n. 2 (8th Cir.1988).

Examples include "mental, sensory, or skin impairments, as well as impairments which result in

postural and manipulative limitations or environmental restrictions." Id.; See 20 C.F.R., Pt.

404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, §§200.00(e).

Residual functional capacity is what a plaintiff can do despite his limitations, and it

must be determined on the basis of all relevant evidence, including medical records, physician's

opinions, and the plaintiff’s description of his limitations. Dunahoo v. Apfel, 241 F.3d 1033,

1039 (8th Cir.2001); see also, Anderson v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 777, 779 (8th Cir.1995); 20 C.F.R.

§§416.945(a). 

When a plaintiff suffers from exertional and nonexertional impairments, as asserted

here, and the exertional impairments alone do not warrant a finding of disability, the ALJ must

consider the extent to which the nonexertional impairments further diminish the plaintiff's work

capacity. Thompson v. Bowen, 850 F.2d 346, 349 (8th Cir.1988). If the claimant's

characteristics do not differ significantly from those contemplated in the Medical-Vocational

Guidelines, the ALJ may rely on the Guidelines alone to direct a finding of disabled or not

disabled. Id. That is to say, "an ALJ may use the Guidelines even though there is a

nonexertional impairment if the ALJ finds, and the record supports the finding, that the

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nonexertional impairment does not diminish the claimant's residual functional capacity to

perform the full range of activities listed in the Guidelines." Id. at 349-50. The United States

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has explained as follows: 

In this context, "significant" refers to whether the claimant's nonexertional

impairment or impairments preclude the claimant from engaging in the full

range of activities listed in the Guidelines under the demands of day-to-day life.

Under this standard isolated occurrences will not preclude the use of the

Guidelines, however persistent nonexertional impairments which prevent the

claimant from engaging in the full range of activities listed in the Guidelines will

preclude the use of the Guidelines to direct a conclusion of disabled or not

disabled.

Id. at 350. See also, Holz v. Apfel, 191 F.3d 945, 947 (8th Cir.1999); Foreman v. Callahan,

122 F.3d 24, 26 (8th Cir.1997); Lucy v. Chater, 113 F.3d 905, 908 (8th Cir.1997). 

Discussion:

At the outset, we note that during a portion of the relevant time period, the plaintiff

moved, with his family, to Mexico (T. 175). He testified that he was treated by a “good”

cardiologist there, who had been trained in the United States, and that she “kept him on his

feet.” (T. 180-181). This is important because the administrative transcript does not contain

any medical records from the plaintiff’s treatment period while in Mexico. In fact, plaintiff’s

attorney testified that he had unsuccessfully attempted to obtain the medical records from that

time period (T. 175). Plaintiff testified that while in Mexico, he fished and sat on the beach,

and followed the doctor’s instructions (T. 180). To the contrary, the evidence of record

indicates that plaintiff was often in non compliance with his treating doctor’s recommendations

and orders, while living in the United States (T. 145-146, 143, 142, 140, 141, 129-130, 138,

121, 117, 91, 118). 

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 Sacralization is defined as an anomalous fusion of the fifth lumbar vertebra to the first

3

segment of the sacram, so that the sacrum consists of six segments. Dorland’s Medical

Dictionary, p. 1593 (29th Ed.2000). 

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Although the plaintiff testified that he suffered from back pain, and that this condition

contributed to his alleged disability, the record belies this. While the plaintiff was hospitalized

for an acute lumbar sprain from December 1, 1997, through December 5, 1997, objective

medical evidence showed only a small central disc herniation at the L4-5 level and some

degenerative disc disease (T. 95). An x-ray of the lumbar spine revealed narrowing of the

intervertebral disc space at L4-5 and L5-S1, with attempted sacralization of L5 (T. 101). The 3

only restriction placed on plaintiff by Dr. Paul Pradel, was to remain off work for two weeks. 

He was to return to Dr. Pradel for a recheck, but the record contains no evidence that plaintiff

ever followed up with the doctor (T. 91). The defendant asserts:

The ALJ noted that at the time of Plaintiff’s alleged onset date, he was not on

any pain medications, he had no ongoing treatment for his back, and he was

engaging in heavy work activities (Tr. 14). The ALJ also noted that no

restrictions were ever placed on Plaintiff’s activities due to his back pain (Tr.

14).

(Doc. #7, p. 6). We find that the record supports this assertion and the ALJ’s apparent finding

that plaintiff’s back condition is not severe, as that term in contemplated in the regulations. 

With respect to the plaintiff’s congestive heart failure (hereinafter “CHF”), secondary to

dilated non-ischemic cardiomyopathy and chronic atrial fibrillation, his treating cardiologist,

Dr. Taylor A. Prewitt, recommended after a hospitalization in 1998, that he remain off work for

one (1) month, but plaintiff was advised he could engage in house and yard activities, some

walking and range of motion exercises (T. 146, 141, 102). As has been noted, the ALJ found

that, during the relevant time period herein, the plaintiff retained the RFC to perform the full

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range of sedentary work. Dr. Prewitt’s findings are consistent with the ALJ’s determination. 

Further, postural limitations related to activities such as climbing, balancing, kneeling,

crouching or crawling would not ordinarily erode the occupational base for the full range of

unskilled sedentary work. Social Security Ruling 96-9p. In fact, the plaintiff’s own report to

Dr. Prewitt on May 26, 1998, indicated that plaintiff “gets up at 6:00 every morning but at

about 2:00 he has to sit down.” (T. 143). The Disability Supplemental Interview Outline

completed by the plaintiff on April 2, 2003, and other evidence of record, demonstrates that the

plaintiff was able to: bathe; dress himself; shave; care for his hair; launder; wash dishes;

change sheets; vacuum/sweep; take out the trash; wash the car; shop for groceries and clothes;

bank; go to the post office; prepare sandwiches and frozen dinners several times per week; pay

bills; use a checkbook; drive; watch television; listen to the radio; and, read (T. 70-71). 

On March 29, 1999, plaintiff reported spending long hours managing two restaurants (T.

128). On May 26, 1998, plaintiff related that he was coaching a girls’ softball team, and on

June 5, 1998, he stated that he had entered and won a “bronco busting competition”, breaking a

couple of ribs and injuring his right hip, in the process (T. 143, 142). On September 9, 1998,

the plaintiff told Dr. Prewitt that he had “worked 90 head of cattle” the previous weekend (T.

142). The ALJ properly focused on plaintiff’s ability to function despite his impairments,

rather than on his diagnoses. Trenary v. Bowen, 898 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir.1990). 

Plaintiff’s activities, by his own account, indicate a relatively normal level of functioning which

undermines his complaints of pain and limitation. The United States Court of Appeals for the

Eighth Circuit has consistently held that the ability to perform such activities contradicts a

plaintiff’s subjective allegations of disabling pain. See Cruze v. Chater, 85 F.3d 1320, 1324

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(8th Cir.1996); see also, Black v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 383, 386 (8th Cir.1998); Johnston v. Shalala,

42 F.3d 448, 451 (8th Cir.1994; Qualls v. Apfel, 158 F.3d 425, 428 (8th Cir.1998). 

Accordingly, the undersigned finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC

assessment to the effect that, during the relevant time period at issue herein, plaintiff was

capable of performing the full range of sedentary work. 

Additionally, the undersigned has carefully considered the ALJ’s evaluation of the

plaintiff’s subjective complaints in light of Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.1984),

and found that they lacked credibility, and we find the determination to be supported by

substantial evidence of record. The ALJ made express credibility findings and gave his reasons

for discrediting the testimony (T. 14-18). E.g., Shelton v. Chater, 87 F.3d 992, 995 (8th

Cir.1996); Reynolds v. Chater, 82 F.3d 254, 248 (8th Cir.1996); Hall v. Chater, 62 F.3d 220,

224 (8th Cir.1995). 

We must affirm if substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the

Commissioner’s decision. This inquiry requires us to give appropriate weight to evidence

contrary to the ALJ's findings. Turley v. Sullivan, 939 F.2d 524, 528 (8th Cir.1991). However,

"the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an

administrative agency's findings from being supported by substantial evidence." Cruse v.

Bowen, 867 F.2d 1183, 1184 (8th Cir.1989). After careful review of the administrative record,

we conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision. Russell v. Sullivan 950 F.2d

542, 544 (8th Cir.1991).

Finally, while the task of conducting a de novo review is made more complex when no

specific issues for reversal or remand are formally raised by the plaintiff, the undersigned has

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carefully considered the administrative record, and the defendant’s appeal brief, and finds that

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination, at step five of the sequential evaluation

process, that the finding of “not disabled”, directed by Medical-Vocational Rules 201.28 and

201.29, is supported by substantial evidence of record. . 

Conclusion:

Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that the decision of the ALJ, denying benefits

to the plaintiff, is supported by substantial evidence of record and should be affirmed. The

Court also finds that the plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. 

ENTERED this 6 day of June, 2006. th

/s/ Bobby E. Shepherd 

HONORABLE BOBBY E. SHEPHERD 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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