Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01130/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01130-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Willie Lee Parker,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-15-1130-PHX-JAT (JFM)

Report & Recommendation 

on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

and Motion for Release

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Phoenix, 

Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on June 

19, 2015 (Doc. 1). On August 19, 2015 Respondents filed their Limited Answer (Doc. 

11). Petitioner filed a Reply on September 21, 2015 (Doc. 14). Petitioner supplemented 

the record on September 4, 2015 (Doc. 13), Respondents supplemented on December 8, 

2015 (Doc. 19) and February 11, 2016 (Doc. 36). Petitioner again supplemented on 

March 4, 2016 by filing his own Affidavit (Doc. 40). Respondents supplemented their 

Limited Answer and the record on April 1, 2016 (Doc. 42). Petitioner filed a 

supplemental Reply (Doc. 49) on May 6, 2016 (referencing records appended to an 

earlier supplemental reply (Doc. 47)). 

In addition, on May 11, 2016 Petitioner filed a Motion for Release Pending 

Review (Doc. 50), to which Respondents responded (Doc. 51).

The Petitioner's Petition and motion are now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, 

the undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and 

recommendation pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 

72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local 

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Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

In disposing of Petitioner’s Petition for Review in his post-conviction relief 

proceedings, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarized Petitioner’s convictions as 

follows:

Parker pled guilty to one count of aggravated driving under 

the influence ("DUI") in three separate cases; the trial court 

sentenced him to stipulated, concurrent terms of ten years' 

imprisonment for each count. The counts were aggravated because 

Parker committed each DUI while his driver's license or privilege to 

drive was suspended, canceled, revoked, or refused, or while a 

restriction was placed on his license as a result of a prior DUI.

(Exhibit VV, Order 4/1/14.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 11, are referenced herein as 

“Exhibit ___.”) (See Exhibits D, E, H, I, L (Complaints and Indictments); Exhibits F, J 

(Alleg. of Priors); Exhibits V, Plea Agreements; Exhibit A, M.E. 1/7/11.) 

The three prosecutions related to DUI offenses on July 9, 2008 (Exhibit L), 

October 17, 2008 (Exhibits D, E), and March 5, 2009 (Exhibits H, I).

Sentence was issued in the three cases on February 8, 2011. (Exhibit B, Sentence 

CR2008-165225-001 DT, Sentence CR2009-180397-001 DT, and Sentence CR2010-

005826-001 DT.) 

B. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 2.) 

Moreover, as a pleading defendant, Petitioner had no right to file a direct appeal. 

See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 17.1(e); and Montgomery v. Sheldon, 181 Ariz. 256, 258, 889 P.2d 

614, 616 (1995).

C. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On May 6, 2001, 87 days after being sentenced, Petitioner filed with the trial 

court a Motion for Extension of Time to File Rule 32 (Exhibit W), seeking an 

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unspecified extension of time to file a petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”). That 

motion was never ruled upon.

On July 11, 2011, some 153 days after being sentenced, Petitioner filed with the 

trial court a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit X). That Notice was dated July 7, 

2011 (id. at 2.) 

Counsel was appointed (Exhibit Y, M.E. 7/13/11), who ultimately filed a Notice 

of Completion (Exhibit Z) evidencing an inability to find an issue for review. On 

September 16, 2011, the PCR court granted leave for Petitioner to file a pro per petition, 

and set a deadline of 45 days, i.e. by Monday, October 31, 2011. (Exhibit AA, M.E. 

9/16/11.) Petitioner did not do so, and the proceeding was dismissed on November 1, 

2011. (Exhibit CC, M.E. 11/1/11.) 

On November 2, 2011, Petitioner filed his pro per PCR petition (Exhibit EE), 

dated October 28, 2011. The PCR court sua sponte vacated the dismissal, and set a 

briefing schedule on the petition. (Exhibit DD, M.E. 11/3/11.) 

On February 8, 2012, the PCR court dismissed the PCR petition as untimely, 

rejecting arguments that the claim was founded upon newly discovered evidence. 

(Exhibit HH, M.E. 2/8/12.) 

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Rehearing (Exhibit II) and Motion for 

Reconsideration (Exhibit LL), seeking reconsideration of the court’s dismissal. The 

motions were denied. (Exhibit KK, M.E. 5/16/12; Exhibit MM, M.E. 6/12/12.) 

On July 2, 2012, Petitioner filed a Motion to Extend Time for Filing Petition for 

Review (Exhibit NN). The motion was denied. (Exhibit OO, M.E. 7/30/12.) Petitioner 

sought reconsideration (Exhibit PP) and the PCR court granted an extension of time 

(through November 29, 2012) for Petitioner to file a delayed “notice of appeal.” (Exhibit 

RR, M.E. 11/9/12.) 

On December 5, 2012, Petitioner filed his “Notice of Delayed Appeal” (Exhibit 

SS), again requesting an extension of time. The Arizona Court of Appeals granted 

Petitioner an extension through February 21, 2013. (Exhibit TT, Order 1/8/13.) 

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Petitioner ultimately filed a Petition for Review (Exhibit UU), arguing his PCR petition 

had been wrongly deemed untimely. On April 1, 2014, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

filed a Memorandum Decision (Exhibit VV) granting review but denying relief. The 

court concluded that Petitioner “could have raised his claims regarding the factual bases 

for the pleas and ineffective assistance of counsel in a timely petition for post-conviction 

relief.” The court further opined that the documents asserted failed to establish the 

merits of his claims, and that additional claims had been raised for the first time on 

petition for review.

Petitioner then sought reconsideration, which was denied, did not seek further 

review, and on September 25, 2014, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its mandate. 

(Exhibit ZZ, Appellate Docket.)

D. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition – Almost nine months later, Petitioner commenced the current case by 

filing his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on June 19, 

2015 (Doc. 1). Petitioner includes a declaration under penalty of perjury that he placed 

the petition in prison mailing system on June 17, 2015. (Id.at “11”.) Petitioner’s 

Petition asserts the following three grounds for relief:

(1) Petitioner’s plea bargain and convictions violated the Fourth, 

Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments because his 

driving privileges were not suspended, revoked, or cancelled; 

(2) Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation 

of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments 

because “his driving record(s) and license(s) should have been 

obtained before counsel considered any plea negotiations”; and 

(3) Petitioner’s Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights were violated because there is “newly discovered 

material evidence” showing that he was “licensed on the date he 

was cited.”

(Order 7/10/15, Doc. 4 at 1-2.) 

Response - On August 19, 2015, Respondents filed their Response (“Limited 

Answer”) (Doc. 11). Respondents argue that the petition is untimely, Grounds 1 and 2 

are procedurally defaulted, and Grounds 1 and 3 are precluded by Petitioner’s guilty 

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plea.

Reply - On September 21, 2015, Petitioner filed a “Limited Reply” (Doc. 14). 

Petitioner argues, in pertinent part, that he relied upon his motion to extend the time to 

file his PCR petition in delaying filing, he was diligent in pursuing his state remedies, the 

state court’s delay beyond the permitted time in ruling caused his delay, and thus he is 

entitled to equitable tolling. (Id. at 1-2.) Petitioner further argues his pro se status 

entitles him to be held to less stringent standards in construing his filings. (Id. at 2.) He 

further argues that his allegations show that the state rules were inconsistently applied, 

and thus are inadequate. (Id. at 4.) He asserts counsel was ineffective for failing to 

advise Petitioner to file a protective habeas petition and motion to stay, and thus he 

should be entitled to statutory tolling. (Id) He argues that he was required to first 

exhaust his state remedies. (Id. at 5.) Petitioner further argues the merits of his claims.

Motions to Expand Record – On September 4, 2015, Petitioner filed his 

“Motion to Expand the Record and Extend the Petition” (Doc. 13). Petitioner sought to 

expand the record with additional documents from the Motor Vehicle Department in 

support of a procedural claim that he is actually innocent of the March 5, 2009 offense. 

The Court directed a supplementation of the record to include records from the MVD on 

the then applicable status of Petitioner’s license. (Order 11/17/15, Doc. 16.) On 

December 8, 2015, Respondents supplemented the record with an Affidavit (Doc. 19, 

Exhibit) of an MVD manager avowing that Petitioner’s license was in good standing on 

March 5, 2009. 

Based upon this information, the Court directed Respondents to supplement their 

Answer to address the merits of at least the March 5, 2009 offense. (Order 12/10/15, 

Doc. 20 (vacated).) 

Petitioner then moved to again expand the record (Doc. 22), this time arguing that 

his license was also in good standing at the time of the July 9, 2008 offense. The request 

was granted. (Order 1/20/16, Doc. 26.) 

On February 11, 2016, Respondents filed a second Affidavit (Doc. 36) in which 

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the MVD employee related that having been advised that Petitioner utilized an alias of 

Maurice Davis (license B12374523), a search of records revealed a suspension in 1992, 

which remained in effect through the present. Respondents also filed a Motion for 

Affidavit (Doc. 29), seeking an affidavit from Petitioner regarding his use of the aliases. 

On March 4, 2016, Petitioner filed an “Affidavit” (Doc. 40) reasserting his claims

that Respondents were improperly amending or supplementing their brief, and appearing

to avow that “he have [only] in his ‘personal name,’ applied for a drivers license.” (Doc.

40 at 1 (brackets in original).) He avows he had “never obtained a license under another

[name], ‘in this United States nor abroad,’” that he has only utilized a date of birth of “7-

9-55, not any other date of birth,” and that he only had a drivers license from the state of

Arizona. (Id. at 1-2.) He expressly denied obtaining a license under his nickname of 

Billy Parker in another state.

The Court found Petitioner’s avowals to be less than clear, and granted 

Respondents leave to conduct discovery. (Order 3/17/16, Doc. 41.) 

In response, Respondents argued (Doc. 42) inter alia that the police reports and 

pre-sentence reports for the March 5 offense (Exhibit B) shows that the license and 

MVD record under the name of Maurice Davis (B12374523) was Petitioner’s license and 

record, and that the police report from the July 8, 2009 offense included reports of 

fingerprint matches between Petitioner and Maurice Davis (B12374523). In addition, 

Respondents provide an Affidavit of the fingerprint technician avowing that Petitioner 

(Willie Lee Parker) is the same person whose fingerprints to whom the Maurice Davis 

license (B12374523) had been issued “with a possible chance of error of 0%.” (Doc. 42, 

Exhibit B at 1.) Respondents argue that Petitioner’s procedural actual innocence claim 

must in any event fail because: (1) he fails to present any “newly discovered” evidence; 

(2) his guilty plea forecloses such a claim; (3) Petitioner fails to show his innocence of 

the other charges foregone, including equally serious (class 4 felony) related charges of 

aggravated DUI based on having drugs in his body. And finally, Respondents argue that 

Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance is, in any event, without merit because any 

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deficient investigation would have revealed Petitioner’s guilt based upon the existence of 

the Maurice Davis license, and in any event it is likely counsel’s advice would not have 

been changed nor would Petitioner have accepted the plea agreement.

On April 20, 2016, Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 47) arguing that Respondents’ 

Response (Doc. 42) was untimely, and proffering an MVD report from November 2008, 

reporting in response to a record request for “Maurice Davis” that “No license or 

identification card was issued.” (Exhibit A at “0000026”.) However, the included

records also included an MVD report from 2009 in response to a similar request, 

reporting “Record destroyed per approved Records Retention and Disposition Schedule. 

Only computer record is available.” (Id. at “0000047”.) 

The Court rejected Petitioner’s timeliness objections, concluded that the Court 

would not consider Petitioner’s filings on April 8, 2016 (Doc. 44) or that of April 20, 

2016 (Doc. 47) in evaluating the procedural actual innocence claim, and directed 

Petitioner to file a “single reply to Respondents’ Response (Doc. 42).” (Order 4/26/16, 

Doc. 48 at 2.) The Court further cautioned Petitioner that a mere disparity in names was 

not sufficient to establish his actual innocence, “Rather, Petitioner bears the burden of 

showing it was not Petitioner - - again regardless of the names used.” (Id. at 3-4.) 

On May 6, 2016, Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 49), again complaining that 

Respondents’ Response (Doc. 42) was delinquent, and arguing that Petitioner had 

presented “direct evidence of Maurice Davis never been issued a drivers license from 

M.V.D.”, pointing to the exhibits to his earlier response (Doc. 47). (Doc. 49 at 2.) 

Petitioner further argues that Respondents failed to meet their burden to prove Petitioner 

obtained a license under that name, and that records from November 7, 2008 show no 

license had been issue to Maurice Davis. (Id. at 2-3.)

Motion for Release – On May 11, 2016, Petitioner filed a Motion for Release 

Pending Review (Doc. 50). Respondents have responded (Doc. 51), arguing no basis for 

release has been shown. Petitioner has not replied, and the time to do so has expired.

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III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. MOTION FOR RELEASE

In his Motion for Release Pending Review (Doc. 50), Petitioner argues that 

because of the merits of his claims and procedural actual innocence, he should be 

released pending the resolution of this case. Respondents argue the request is without 

merit (Doc. 51). 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 23 governs the release of a prisoner 

collaterally attacking a conviction through a habeas petition. See United States v. Mett, 

41 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 1994) (attacking a federal sentence); and Marino v. 

Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 507 (9th Cir. 1987) (attacking a state court sentence). In 

connection with a habeas corpus petition, “this court has reserved bail for ‘extraordinary 

cases involving special circumstances or a high probability of success.’” Mett, 41 F.3d at 

1282 (quoting, in part, Land v. Deeds, 878 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1989)). “Special 

circumstances” have been found to include such things as: 

 (1) “a serious deterioration of health while incarcerated, and unusual delay in 

the appeal process”, Salerno v. United States, 878 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1987); and

 (2) situations where “the sentence was so short that if bail were denied and the 

habeas petition were eventually granted, the defendant would already have served 

the sentence”, Landano v. Rafferty, 970 F.2d 1230, 1239 (3rd Cir. 1992); and 

 (3) continued civil detention of an alien for a three year period without a 

likelihood of removal, Tam v. I.N.S., 14 F.Supp.2d 1184 (E.D.Cal. 1998). 

Here, Petitioner proffers no special circumstances.

Nor, for the reasons discussed hereinafter, can the undersigned find a “high 

probability of success.” 

Accordingly, this motion should be denied.

/ /

/ /

/ /

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B. TIMELINESS

1. One Year Limitations Period

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. As part of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-

year statute of limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and sentences rendered by state courts. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitions filed beyond the one year limitations period are barred and 

must be dismissed. Id.

2. Commencement of Limitations Period

a) Conviction Final

The one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions generally begins to run on 

"the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the 

expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).1 

For an Arizona noncapital pleading defendant, the conviction becomes “final” at 

the conclusion of the first “of-right” post-conviction proceeding under Rule 32. 

“Arizona's Rule 32 of-right proceeding for plea-convicted defendants is a form of direct 

review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).” Summers v. Schriro, 481 

F.3d 710, 717 (9th Cir. 2007). “To bring an of-right proceeding under Rule 32, a pleaconvicted defendant must provide to the Arizona Superior Court, within 90 days of 

conviction and sentencing in that court, notice of his or her intent to file a Petition for 

Post-Conviction Review.” Id. at 715 (citing Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.4(a)). 

Having been sentenced on February 8, 2011, Petitioner had through Monday, May 

9, 2011 to file his PCR notice.2 It is true that on May 6, 2011 Petitioner filed a Motion to 

 

1

Later commencement times can result from a state created impediment, newly 

recognized constitutional rights, and newly discovered factual predicates for claims. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). Except as discussed hereinafter, Petitioner proffers no 

argument that any of these apply.

2 Arizona applies Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 1.3 to extend “the time to file an 

appeal by five days when the order appealed from has been mailed to the interested party 

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Extend (Exhibit W) the time to file his PCR petition. But, that motion was never ruled 

upon, and no extension was ever granted. Accordingly, Petitioner’s time to file expired 

on May 9, 2011. 

Petitioner’s only Notice of Post-Conviction Relief was that filed July 11, 2011 

(Exhibit Y). That Notice was not accepted as timely, and was ultimately ruled by the 

Arizona Court of Appeals to have been untimely. (Exhibit VV, Order on Pet.Rev.) 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s time for review expired on May 9, 2011.

b) Discovery of Factual Predicate

Although the conclusion of direct review normally marks the beginning of the 

statutory one year, section 2244(d)(1)(D) does provide an alternative of “the date on 

which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered 

through the exercise of due diligence.” Thus, where despite the exercise of due diligence 

a petitioner was unable to discover the factual predicate of his claim, the statute does not 

commence running on that claim until the earlier of such discovery or the elimination of 

the disability which prevented discovery. Thus, the commencement is not delayed until 

actual discovery, but only until the date on which it “could have been discovered through 

the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). 

Petitioner’s claims originate from assertions that he had a valid driver’s license at 

the time of one or more of his offenses. However, Petitioner proffers nothing to show 

that he only discovered the factual predicate of this claim some time after May 9, 2011. 

Indeed, he asserts that he had argued to trial counsel Kristopher Califano at the time of 

trial that he had a valid drivers license. (Reply, Doc. 14 at 12.) 

 

and commences to run on the date the clerk mails the order.” State v. Zuniga, 163 Ariz. 

105, 106, 786 P.2d 956, 957 (1990). However, that rule does not apply to in-court 

rulings. “We again stress that in most criminal cases, the defendant and counsel for both 

sides will be present in court when the appealed order, judgment, or sentence is entered 

and that in this opinion we deal only with cases in which notice is, in fact, given by 

mail.” Id. at 957, n. 2. Petitioner was present when his sentence was issued. (Exhibit B, 

Sentence 2/8/11 at 1.) Accordingly, no additional time would apply.

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To the extent that Petitioner refers to recently discovered evidence, i.e. records 

regarding his license, such evidence is not the “factual predicate” of his claims, but 

rather the evidence of those facts. See Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 198-99 (5th 

Cir.1998) (receipt of trial counsel’s affidavit irrelevant where knowledge of facts 

supporting claim of ineffectiveness previously known to defendant). Moreover, even if 

such records amounted to the factual predicate, Petitioner’s PCR Notice related that he 

had obtained those records as of June 28, 2011. (Exhibit X, PCR Notice, Exhibit A, at 

1.) The difference of 40 days (after May 9, 2011) would not be sufficient to make his 

petition timely.

c) Conclusion re Commencement

Therefore, Petitioner’s one year began running on May 10, 2011, and without any 

tolling expired on May 9, 2012. 

3. Timeliness Without Tolling

Petitioner’s Petition (Doc. 1) was filed on June 19, 2015. 

However, “[i]n determining when a pro se state or federal petition is filed, the 

‘mailbox’ rule applies. A petition is considered to be filed on the date a prisoner hands 

the petition to prison officials for mailing.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958 (9th 

Cir. 2010). The declaration in Petitioner’s Petition reflects that his Petition was delivered 

to prison officials for mailing on June 17, 2015. (Petition, Doc. 1 at “11.”) Respondents 

proffer nothing to counter that declaration. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the 

Petition was delivered to prison officials for mailing on June 17, 2015, and thus should 

be deemed filed as of that date.

As determined in subsection (1) above, without any tolling Petitioner’s one year 

habeas limitations period expired no later than May 9, 2012, making his June 17, 2015 

Petition over three years delinquent.

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4. Statutory Tolling 

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). This provision only applies to 

state proceedings, not to federal proceedings. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001).

Petitioner’s only PCR proceeding was that arising from his PCR notice filed July 

11, 2011 (Exhibit X). However, that proceeding was dismissed as untimely. (See 

Exhibit HH, M.E. 2/8/12; Exhibit VV Mem. Dec. 4/1/14.) 

Statutory tolling of the habeas limitations period only results from state 

applications that are “properly filed,” and an untimely application is never “properly 

filed” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005).3 

It is true that the Arizona Court of Appeals addressed alternative grounds for 

disposing of the Petitioner’s PCR proceeding, e.g. preclusion, the merits, etc. However, 

even if the state court provides alternative grounds for disposing of the state application, 

a ruling that the application was untimely precludes it from being “properly filed” and 

tolling the limitations period. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 225-26 (2002). 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s only PCR proceeding was not “properly filed” for 

purposes of statutory tolling, and thus did not result in any such tolling.

5. Equitable Tolling

"Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is 

available in our circuit, but only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's 

control make it impossible to file a petition on time' and ‘the extraordinary circumstances 

 

3 On the other hand, the fact that the application may contain procedurally barred claims 

does not mean it is not “properly filed.” “[T]he question whether an application has been 

‘properly filed’ is quite separate from the question whether the claims contained in the 

application are meritorious and free of procedural bar.” Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 9 

(2000). Thus, Petitioner’s arguments that Arizona’s rules are not consistently applied, 

which might be relevant to the independence and adequacy of state procedural bar relied 

upon to preclude habeas review of a timely claim, has no application to application of the 

tolling provisions under § 2244(d)(2). 

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were the cause of his untimeliness.'" Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 

2003). 

To receive equitable tolling, [t]he petitioner must establish two 

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 

that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. The 

petitioner must additionally show that the extraordinary 

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness, and that the 

extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it impossible to file a petition 

on time.

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] 

is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’ ” Miranda v. Castro,292 F.3d 1063, 

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.).

Petitioner bears the burden of proof on the existence of cause for equitable tolling. Pace 

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th

Cir. 2006) (“Our precedent permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations 

on habeas petitions, but the petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling 

is appropriate.”).

Petitioner addresses four bases for equitable tolling: (1) the state court’s delay in 

ruling on his motion to extend the time for filing his PCR (Reply, Doc. 14 at 1-2); (2) his 

pro se status (id. at 2); (3) ineffectiveness of counsel was ineffective for failing to advise 

Petitioner to file a protective habeas petition and motion to stay (id.); and (4) the 

requirement that he first exhaust his state remedies (id. at 5).

Delay in Ruling on Motion to Extend – The failure of the state court to rule on 

Petitioner’s motion to extend is not an extraordinary circumstance. Litigants filing 

eleventh hour motions to extend routinely face the option of either rushing to meet the 

deadline or assuming the risk that the motion will ultimately be denied and the delayed 

filing found untimely. Petitioner does not suggest that it was impossible for him to file 

his PCR notice by May 9, 2011, merely that he relied upon his motion to extend. That 

was not an extraordinary circumstance beyond Petitioner’s control. 

Moreover, Petitioner was not diligent in the face of the PCR court’s delay. He did 

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not proceed to file within the un-extended deadline. He did not promptly file his habeas 

petition upon discovering that the motion had not been granted, and his PCR petition was 

untimely. Instead, he persisted through the state proceeding for the next three and a half 

years after the prosecution filed its PCR Response arguing untimeliness (Exhibit FF at 

4), and over 3 years after the PCR court dismissed the proceeding as untimely (Exhibit 

KK, M.E. 5/16/12), and then waited over 16 months after the Arizona Court of Appeals 

ruled the petition untimely (Exhibit VV, Mem. Dec. 4/1/14) before filing his federal 

petition. 

Pro Se Status – Petitioner points to his pro se status. “It is clear that pro se 

status, on its own, is not enough to warrant equitable tolling.” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 

964, 970 (9th Cir. 2006). A prisoner's “proceeding pro se is not a ‘rare and exceptional’ 

circumstance because it is typical of those bringing a § 2254 claim.” Felder v. Johnson, 

204 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 2000). See also Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 

(9th Cir. 2006) (“a pro se petitioner's lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an 

extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling”). "[I]gnorance of the law, even 

for an incarcerated pro se petitioner, generally does not excuse prompt filing." Fisher v. 

Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (5th Cir.1999). 

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – Petitioner complains that counsel failed to 

advise him to file a protective habeas petition and a motion to stay. In the face of the 

questions regarding the timeliness of Petitioner’s PCR proceeding, such an approach was 

likely Petitioner’s only hope of having his habeas claims heard. Presumably, failure to 

advise Petitioner to do so was negligent.

However, although an attorney's behavior can establish the extraordinary 

circumstances required for equitable tolling, mere negligence or professional malpractice 

is insufficient. Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir.2001). A “garden variety 

claim of excusable neglect,’ such as a simple ‘miscalculation’ that leads a lawyer to miss 

a filing deadline does not warrant equitable tolling.’ ” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 

651-652 (2010). Rather, the attorney’s misconduct must rise to the level of extraordinary 

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circumstances. Id. See e.g. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2564 (2010) (habeas 

attorney’s repeated failures to respond over a period of years to a client’s inquiries, and 

demands for timely action, might establish equitable tolling). 

Petitioner points to no such extraordinary misconduct by his counsel.

Exhaustion Requirement – Petitioner argues that he was required to first exhaust 

his state remedies before proceeding with his federal habeas petition. In Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005), the Supreme Court analyzed the potential catch-22 

between the habeas limitations period and the exhaustion requirement, where a state 

petitioner has filed a state post-conviction relief proceeding which may ultimately be 

deemed untimely, thus not properly filed, and resulting in the expiration of his habeas 

limitations period. “A prisoner seeking state postconviction relief might avoid this 

predicament, however, by filing a ‘protective’ petition in federal court and asking the 

federal court to stay and abey the federal habeas proceedings until state remedies are 

exhausted.” Id. at 416. Apart from the insufficient complaint of ineffective assistance 

of counsel, Petitioner proffers no reason why this avenue was not available to him.

Conclusion re Equitable Tolling – Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned 

finds no basis for equitable tolling.

6. Actual Innocence 

Applicable Standard - To avoid a miscarriage of justice, the habeas statute of 

limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) does not preclude “a court from entertaining an 

untimely first federal habeas petition raising a convincing claim of actual innocence.” 

McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1935 (2013). To invoke this exception to the 

statute of limitations, a petitioner “’must show that it is more likely than not that no 

reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.’” Id. at 1935 

(quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). This exception, referred to as the 

“Schlup gateway,” applies “only when a petition presents ‘evidence of innocence so 

strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is 

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also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error.’ ” Id. at 1936 

(quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316). 

Petitioner’s Claim - Petitioner’s claim of actual innocence turns on whether he 

had a suspended, etc. license on the dates of his DUIs. He pled guilty to violating Ariz. 

Rev. Stat. § 28-1383(a)(1), Aggravated Driving Under the Influence. That statute 

provides:

A person is guilty of aggravated driving...while under the influence 

of intoxicating liquor or drugs if the person [drives under the 

influence] while the person's driver license or privilege to drive is 

suspended, canceled, revoked or refused or while a restriction is 

placed on the person's driver license or privilege to drive as a result 

of violating [the DUI statutes].

A.R.S. § 28-1383(A)(1). Petitioner does not dispute that he was driving under the 

influence, but simply argues that his license was not suspend, canceled, or revoked, etc. 

at the time of two of his offenses. Petitioner’s DUI offenses were committed on July 9, 

2008, October 17, 2008 and March 5, 2009. He argues that at the time of the March 5, 

2009 offense and July 9, 2008 offense, his license was not suspended or revoked, and 

thus he could not have been convicted of the felony of aggravated DUI for his actions on 

those dates. 

New, Reliable Evidence Required - Moreover, an actual innocence analysis does 

not invite a simple reconsideration of the evidence at trial, but requires the presentation 

of evidence that is new and reliable. The petitioner must present “new reliable 

evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness 

accounts, or critical physical evidence,” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537 (2006), that 

will support a credible claim of procedural actual innocence.

“To meet this standard, [the Petitioner] must first furnish ‘new reliable evidence 

... that was not presented at trial.’ ” Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). 

Respondents argue that to be “new” the evidence cannot be merely newly 

presented, but must be newly discovered. (Response, Doc. 42 at 5, et seq.) Because the 

undersigned ultimately concludes that the evidence presented by Petitioner does not 

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qualify as reliable evidence affirmatively showing Petitioner’s innocence, the level of 

required newness of the evidence need not be resolved.

Proof of Actual Innocence - Further, a petitioner may not simply allege that such 

evidence exists, but must present it to the habeas court, through affidavit of the witness, 

etc. See Weeks v. Bowersox, 119 F.3d 1342, 1352-1353 (8th Cir. 1997). It is not 

sufficient for a petitioner to claim actual innocence if he fails to proffer anything other 

than conclusory allegations to support a claim of actual innocence. See James v. Borg, 

24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir.1994) (stating that unsupported, conclusory allegations do not 

warrant habeas relief). 

Moreover, in the context of a claim of procedural actual innocence, the Court is 

not bound by the normal rules of evidence (e.g. hearsay, etc.), but by its own evaluation 

of the trustworthiness of evidence. “Schlup makes plain that the habeas court must 

consider ‘ ‘all the evidence,’ ‘ old and new, incriminating and exculpatory, without 

regard to whether it would necessarily be admitted under ‘rules of admissibility that 

would govern at trial.’ House, 547 U.S. at 538 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327–328).

Applicability to Pleading Defendants - It is unclear whether the actual 

innocence gateway applies to defendants who were not convicted at trial, but pled not 

guilty or no contest. See Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1140 (9th Cir. 2007). But see 

Bousley v. U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 624 (1998) (remanding for development of actual 

innocence to excuse procedural default of pleading federal defendant). Respondents 

argue it does not. For purposes of this Report and Recommendation, the undersigned 

presumes that the actual innocence gateway applies to Petitioner’s guilty plea 

convictions.

Showing on Dismissed Counts Not Required - It is true that, "[i]n cases where 

the Government has forgone more serious charges in the course of plea bargaining, 

petitioner's showing of actual innocence must also extend to those charges." Bousley, 

523 U.S. at 624. Here, Petitioner’s plea resulted in dismissal of other charges of 

aggravated assault and resisting arrest, and of charges of aggravated DUI based upon 

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drugs. 

The aggravated assault charge was under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1204(A)(8) 

(intentional, knowing or reckless assault on person known to be a peace officer engaged 

in executing duties). (Exhibit I, Indictment at 2.) Because the indictment alleged 

physical injury, to the officer, the offense was a Class 5 felony. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-

1204(E) (2009). See 2008 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch. 301 (H.B. 2207), Ariz. Sess. Laws 

2008, Ch. 301, § 52 (eff. January 1, 2009). Cf. 2010 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch. 97 (H.B. 

2062), Ariz. Sess. Laws 2010, Ch. 97, § 1 (adopted April 21, 2010) (modifying 

aggravated assault on officer with physical injury to Class 4 felony). The resisting arrest 

charge was under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2508, which is, at most, a class 6 felony. See 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2508(B). 

Thus, these dismissed charges were a Class 5 felony and a Class 6 felony. In 

contrast, the charges to which Petitioner plead guilty were Class 4 felonies. (See Exhibit 

V, Plea Agreements; Exhibit B, Sentence.) Thus, Petitioner need not also show his 

actual innocence of the less serious charges of aggravated assault and resisting arrest. 

Respondents further argue that Petitioner should be required to make a showing of 

actual innocence of the equally serious charges of aggravated DUI based on the presence 

of drugs in his body, pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 28-1381(A)(3) and 28-1383(A)(1). 

(Response, Doc. 42 at 11 et seq.) (See Indictments, Exhibits E, I, L.) Because guilt on 

those counts would also have depended upon Petitioner’s driving on a suspended or 

revoked license, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 28-1383(A)(1), this Court need not resolve 

whether innocence of those charges would also be required to resolve Petitioner’s claims 

of procedural actual innocence.

Relief Only Applies to Claims for which Innocence Shown - Although 

deciding the issue as “a question of first impression,” the Ninth Circuit has concluded 

“both as a matter of law and of common sense, that a demonstration of actual innocence 

under Schlup cannot excuse a petitioner's procedural default for more than the counts as 

to which he has shown actual innocence.” Vosgien v. Persson, 742 F.3d 1131, 1136 (9th 

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Cir. 2014). See Alvarez v. Gipson, 2014 WL 1017607, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2014) 

(applying Vosgien to actual innocence gateway to statute of limitations). 

Thus, because Petitioner only proposes his innocence of the March 5, 2009 and 

July 9, 2008 offenses, those would be the only convictions upon which he could now 

receive relief. 

Evidence of Actual Innocence Considered by State Court - Respondents argue 

that this is a finding of fact entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d)(2). (Answer, Doc. 11 at 17.) 

In the state courts, Petitioner presented records with his PCR Petition (Exhibit 

EE) showing that on March 27, 2009 the Motor Vehicle Division issued a rejection of 

the order of suspension served by law enforcement on March 5, 2009, based upon the 

insufficiency of the affidavit submitted in support of the suspension. (Id. at Exhibits.) 

That, of course, fails to establish that his license was not otherwise suspended on March 

5, 2009, the date of the offense Petitioner challenges. However, he also presented what 

appears to be an Arizona MVD report showing that he had a license issued on December 

2, 2009, and on January 13, 2009, the suspension of his license was deemed “satisfied.”

In rejecting Petitioner’s PCR Petition for Review, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

opined: “Further, the documents Parker asserts are newly discovered do not prove that 

his license was not suspended, canceled, revoked, refused, or otherwise restricted at the 

time of the offenses.” (Exhibit VV, Mem. Dec. at 3.) 

Respondents argue that this is a finding of fact entitled to a presumption of 

correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). However, § 2254(d) only applies to “any 

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings.” Here, Petitioner 

does not make a “claim” of actual innocence. Instead he proffers his actual innocence as 

cause to excuse his untimely petition. C.f. In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952 (2009) (discussing 

applicability of § 2254(d)(1) to substantive claim of actual innocence). 

While Section 2254(d) (deference to state court decision on merits) has no 

application in the context of a Schlup claim because it pertains only to a “claim that was 

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adjudicated” in state court, Section 2254(e)(1) does come into play because it refers to 

the “determination of a factual issue”-that is, to a state court's findings of fact, rather than 

its conclusions of federal law.” Sharpe v. Bell, 593 F.3d 372, 378 (4th Cir. 2010). See 

also Reed v. Stephens, 739 F.3d 753, 773 n. 8 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 435

(2014) (listing similar decisions from 3rd 6

th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, albeit some unpublished). 

Under § 2254(e)(1), “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be 

presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption 

of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 

However, “the reach of the presumption of correctness in new § 2254(e)(1) is 

restricted to pure questions of historical fact. State decisions applying law to facts are 

governed by § 2254(d)(1); however, factual findings underlying the state court's 

conclusion on the mixed issue are accorded a presumption of correctness.” Lambert v. 

Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 976 (9th Cir. 2004). “Consequently, a federal court reviewing a 

state court conclusion on a mixed issue involving questions both of fact and law must 

first separate the legal conclusions from the factual determinations that underlie it.” Id.

at 977-78. “Forging the precise distinction between a ‘factual’ and a ‘mixed’

determination has proven difficult and contentious.” Id. at 976. “ ‘[A]n issue does not 

lose its factual character merely because its resolution is dispositive of the ultimate 

constitutional question.’” Id. (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985)). 

Here, the Arizona appellate court made no specific, express findings of fact. 

Instead, it simply stated its conclusion that Petitioner’s document did “not prove” his 

license was not suspended “at the time of the offenses.” (Exhibit VV, Mem. Dec. 4/1/14 

at 3.) Nonetheless, “[i]mplicit factual findings are presumed correct under § 2254(e)(1) 

to the same extent as express factual findings.” Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 433 (3rd 

Cir.2007). Implicit in the Arizona court’s conclusion was a finding that the records 

supplied by Petitioner in that proceeding did not credibly show his license was in good 

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standing at the time of any of the offenses.4 

Although Petitioner now presents new evidence he contends shows the license in 

his name (Willie Parker) was in good standing, he proffers nothing to show that the state 

court’s rejection of the evidence before it was wrong, particularly after considering the 

evidence concerning the Maurice Davis license. He certainly fails to present clear and 

convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of correctness which applies to such 

finding of fact.

Accordingly, if Petitioner is to now establish his actual innocence, he must do so 

on the basis of evidence not before the state court.

Ability to Consider New Evidence – Respondents imply that this Court’s review 

of Petitioner’s procedural claim of actual innocence is limited to the record before the 

trial court. If § 2254(d) applied, e.g. if this court were considering a substantive claim of 

actual innocence, then the question would be limited to the evidence before the state 

court. But this is not such a claim.

Moreover, while the presumption of correctness under § 2254(e)(1) applies, the 

limits on evidentiary hearings (and other forms of “new” evidence) on claims established 

in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) do not apply to Petitioner’s assertions of procedural actual 

innocence. 

Its applicability is limited by the introductory language of 

subsection (2), which states that “[i]f the applicant has failed to 

develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the 

court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless [the 

requirements of subsections (A) and (B) are met].” 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(e)(2) (emphases added). We reject the Commonwealth's 

argument that the plain meaning of this introductory language 

encompasses evidence that might establish cause and prejudice or a 

miscarriage of justice and that Cristin's failure to develop that 

evidence before the state courts now bars an evidentiary hearing on 

the subject.

Cristin v. Brennan, 281 F.3d 404, 413 (3d Cir. 2002). See also Teleguz v. Pearson, 689 

 

4 Although the Arizona court was considering Petitioner’s innocence of all the offenses, 

(Exhibit VV, Mem. Dec. at 2), there is nothing to suggest that the court would not have 

acted if innocence of less than all, or even one, conviction had been shown. 

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F.3d 322, 331 (4th Cir. 2012) (“Our sister circuits considering whether the limitation on 

evidentiary hearings in § 2254(e)(2) applies to Schlup claims have overwhelmingly 

found that it does not.”); Sibley v. Culliver, 377 F.3d 1196, 1207 n.9 (11th Cir.2004); and 

Coleman v. Hardy, 628 F.3d 314, 320 (7th Cir. 2010). See generally Griffin v. Johnson, 

350 F.3d 956, 966 (9th Cir.2003) (acknowledging but declining to address the issue of 

whether § 2254(e)(2) governs a request for a hearing on actual innocence); Jaramillo v. 

Stewart, 340 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2003) (same). But see Morris v. Dormire, 217 F.3d 556, 

560 (8th Cir.2000) (rejecting argument that district court abused its discretion in failing 

to hold an evidentiary hearing on claim of actual innocence where petitioner made no 

attempt to satisfy § 2254(e)(2)). Thus, Petitioner remains free to proffer additional 

evidence in support of his claim of actual innocence, notwithstanding any failure to 

adequately develop the state court record.

New Evidence of Innocence – The new evidence Petitioner originally 

presented in support of his claim of procedural actual innocence consisted of the MVD 

reports from August, 2014 tending to show his license in his own name being in good 

standing on March 5, 2009 and July 9, 2008, and then the MVD employee affidavits 

supplied by Respondents affirming those facts.

Respondents have since provided police reports and pre-sentence reports showing 

that Petitioner had also been issued a license under the name of Maurice Davis, which 

has been suspended since 1992. 

To rebut those reports, Petitioner has provided his own ambiguous denials, and a 

single MVD records search report from 2008 denying the issuance of a license in the 

name of Maurice Davis. (Doc. 47 at Exhibit A.) Such evidence is not the kind of “new 

reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness 

accounts, or critical physical evidence,” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537 (2006), that 

will support a credible claim of procedural actual innocence.

Perhaps, if the burden of proof lay upon Respondents, as Petitioner argues it does, 

the Court would be inclined to: (1) adopt a favorable view of Petitioner’s filings as 

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asserting he never obtained a license in the name of Maurice Davis; and (2) rely upon the 

2008 MVD report as creating a reasonable doubt as to whether a license had ever been 

issued in the name of Maurice Davis.

But with a claim of procedural actual innocence, the burden of proof lies with 

Petitioner. “A petitioner's burden at the gateway stage is to demonstrate that more likely 

than not, in light of the new evidence, no reasonable juror would find him guilty beyond 

a reasonable doubt.” House, 547 U.S. at 538. 

Here, there is substantial and trustworthy evidence showing that: (1) a license had 

been issued in the name of Maurice Davis, and subsequently revoked (i.e. the recent 

MVD Affidavit and the police reports and presentence reports); and (2) that such license 

had been issued to the person who is now the Petitioner in this case (the police reports 

and presentence reports). The trustworthiness of that evidence derives from the lack of 

personal bias, and the fact that it was derived on disparate occasions by different people 

(e.g. in the 2008 prosecution, in the 2009 prosecution, and in the most recent MVD 

Affidavit). 

Moreover, Petitioner’s own disavowal of the Maurice Davis license is not 

credible. Aside from his bias, Petitioner’s credibility is diminished by his failure to 

make a plain statement that he never obtained a license in that name, as opposed to 

obtusely arguing that the “Maurice Davis license was never issued to Willie Lee Parker.” 

(Doc. 49 at 3.) See House, 547 U.S. at 537 (“the District Court need not ‘test the new 

evidence by a standard appropriate for deciding a motion for summary judgment,’ but 

rather may ‘consider how the timing of the submission and the likely credibility of the 

affiants bear on the probable reliability of that evidence’”) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 

331-332). 

Under these circumstances, the undersigned finds no basis to conclude that no 

reasonable juror would have convicted Petitioner in light of his disavowals of the 

Maurice Davis license and the single records request response denying the issuance of a 

license to Maurice Davis. 

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Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner has failed to 

show his procedural actual innocence.

7. Summary re Statute of Limitations

Taking into account the available statutory tolling, Petitioner’s one year habeas 

limitations period commenced running on May 10, 2011, and expired on May 9, 2012, 

making his June 19, 2015 Petition over three years delinquent. Petitioner has shown no 

basis for additional statutory tolling, and no basis for equitable tolling or actual 

innocence to avoid the effects of his delay. Consequently, the Petition must be dismissed 

with prejudice.

C. OTHER DEFENSES

Because the undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s Petition is plainly barred by 

the statute of limitations, Respondents other defenses are not reached.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges 

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

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constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. Under the 

reasoning set forth herein, jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether the 

district court was correct in its procedural ruling. 

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Motion for Release 

Pending Review, filed May 11, 2016 (Doc. 50) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED the Petitioner's Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus, filed June 19, 2015 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

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Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: June 8, 2016

15-1130r RR 15 11 12 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:15-cv-01130-JAT Document 52 Filed 06/08/16 Page 26 of 26