Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02060/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02060-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CAMERON BAKER,

Plaintiff,

v.

JASON ENSIGN,

Defendants. 

AND RELATED COUNTER-CLAIM

AND THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No. 11cv2060 JAH (WVG)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART THIRD

PARTY DEFENDANTS CITY OF

SAN DIEGO, WILLIAM

LANSDOWNE AND DAVID

SPITZER’S MOTION TO DISMISS

[Doc. No. 26]

INTRODUCTION

On June 24, 2011, Jason Ensign, Defendant/Counter-claimant, filed a counterclaim

against Cameron Baker and a third party complaint against City of San Diego, San Diego

Police Chief William Lansdowne, David Spitzer, Elite Show Services, Inc., Parham HirariMoghaddam, Tyler Wenbourne, Matthew Keasler, Joel Brase, Jason Biggers, Sifakis, and

Does 1-100. Third Party Defendant City of San Diego (“the City”) removed the action

to federal court on September 6, 2011. Ensign filed an amended counterclaim and third

party complaint (“FATPC”) on December 6, 2011, asserting claims for violation of civil

rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Monell, malicious prosecution, assault and battery, false

arrest/false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and

negligent employment, supervision and training.

Thereafter, City of San Diego, Lansdowne, and Spitzer (“Movants”) filed a motion

11cv2060

Case 3:11-cv-02060-BAS-WVG Document 51 Filed 03/21/13 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

to dismiss the third party complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

After seeking additional time to do so, Ensign filed an opposition to the motion. Movants

filed a reply.

LEGAL STANDARD

Defendant seeks dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim. Rule

12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint. See Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732

(9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) where the complaint lacks

a cognizable legal theory. See Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530,

534 (9th Cir. 1984); see Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989) (“Rule 12(b)(6)

authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law.”). 

Alternatively, a complaint may be dismissed where it presents a cognizable legal theory yet

fails to plead essential facts under that theory. Robertson, 749 F.2d at 534. While a

plaintiff need not give “detailed factual allegations,” he must plead sufficient facts that,

if true, “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547). A claim is facially

plausible when the factual allegations permit “the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In other words, “the nonconclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be

plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Service,

572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible

claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950.

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the

truth of all factual allegations and must construe all inferences from them in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. See Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir.

2 11cv2060

Case 3:11-cv-02060-BAS-WVG Document 51 Filed 03/21/13 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2002); Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). However,

legal conclusions need not be taken as true merely because they are cast in the form of

factual allegations. See Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003);

Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). When ruling on

a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents

attached to the complaint, documents relied upon but not attached to the complaint when

authenticity is not contested, and matters of which the Court takes judicial notice. See

Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001). If a court determines

that a complaint fails to state a claim, the court should grant leave to amend unless it

determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts. 

See Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995).

DISCUSSION 

Third party defendants seek an order dismissing the action against them with

prejudice. They contend the amended third party complaint which asserts nine causes of

action appears to assert only the first two, the claim for violation of civil rights under

section 1983, and the Monell claim, against the moving parties. However, the Movants

address the state causes of action in addition to the first two causes of action in their

motion. 

I. Request for Judicial Notice 

Movants seek judicial notice of documents in support of their motion to dismiss.

A. Legal Standard

 Generally, “a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in

ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Lee v. Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001)

(citation omitted). “When matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not

excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and

disposed of as provided in Rule 56. . . .” Id. (citation omitted). A court, however, may

look to facts proper for judicial notice without converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to one

for summary judgment even though those facts are beyond the complaint. See Mack v.

3 11cv2060

Case 3:11-cv-02060-BAS-WVG Document 51 Filed 03/21/13 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

S. Bay Beer Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir.1986), abrogated in part on other

grounds by Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991).

Federal Rule of Evidence 201 allows a court to take judicial notice of an

adjudicative fact “not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is . . . capable of accurate and

ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably

questioned.” “Adjudicative facts are those to which the law is applied in the process of

adjudication. They are the facts that normally go to the jury in a jury case.” Grason Elec.

Co. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 571 F. Supp. 1504, 1521 (E.D. Cal. 1983) (citation

omitted).

B. Analysis

Defendant asks the Court to take judicial notice of two documents, attached as

Exhibits 1 and 2 to their request for judicial notice. See Doc. No. 26-2. Exhibit 1 is a

court order filed in People of the State of California v. Jason Ensign, Superior Court of

California, County of San Diego dated May 9, 2011. Exhibit 2 is a court order containing

factual findings filed August 5, 2011, in the same case. In response, Ensign argues the

documents may not be used for the truth of the factual findings contained therein. 

Movants do not respond to this argument. 

Here, the Court first notes that, unless Movants intended to request that this Court

take judicial notice of the fact that the documents attached as Exhibits 1 and 2 merely

exist, it appears Movants misapprehend the concept of judicial notice. Movants’ request

fails to list the adjudicative facts as to which Movants would like this Court to take judicial

notice. Nevertheless, upon review of the motion to dismiss, it is clear Movants seek the

Court take judicial notice of the findings of facts set forth in the orders. While a court

may take judicial notice of the fact that a case has been filed in another court, “[a]s a

general rule, a court may not take judicial notice of proceedings or records in another cause

so as to supply, without formal introduction of evidence, facts essential to support a

contention in a cause then before it.” M/V Am. Queen v. San Diego Marine Constr.

Corp., 708 F.2d 1483, 1491 (9th Cir.1983); see also Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108,

4 11cv2060

Case 3:11-cv-02060-BAS-WVG Document 51 Filed 03/21/13 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1114 n.5 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Factual findings in one case ordinarily are not admissible for

their truth in another case through judicial notice”). As such, the Court denies Movants’

request for judicial notice.

II. First Cause of Action for Violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983

Movants argue Ensign fails to state a claim under section 1983 against either

Spitzer or Lansdowne. To state a claim for violation of constitutional rights under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must allege facts to show that (1) a right secured by the

Constitution or the laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the alleged violation

was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See Long v. County of Los

Angeles, 442F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006).

A. Lansdowne

Movants maintain that although the first cause of action excludes Lansdowne, the

prayer for punitive and exemplary damages included in the first cause of action does not

specifically exclude him. However, upon review of the third party complaint, it is clear the

first cause of action is not asserted against Lansdowne, as Ensign sets forth no factual

allegations involving Lansdowne and specifically excludes him in the heading. The failure

to exclude him from the prayer from damages appears inadvertent. Accordingly, the

motion to dismiss the claim against Lansdowne is DENIED as moot.

B. Spitzer

Movants contend Ensign’s section 1983 claim fails because Spitzer did not violate

Ensign’s constitutional rights and Spitzer is entitled to qualified immunity. As an initial

matter, the third party complaint fails to succinctly and clearly present the elements of

each section 1983 claim so as to provide fair notice to the defendants. See Jones v.

Community Redevelopment Agency of City of Los Angeles, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir

1984). In the poorly drafted complaint, Ensign’s first cause of action includes all claims

sought under section 1983, including excessive force; false arrest; First Amendment,

freedom of speech and First Amendment, retaliation. The allegations contained in the

section entitled “First Cause of Action” are conclusory allegations against Spitzer and

5 11cv2060

Case 3:11-cv-02060-BAS-WVG Document 51 Filed 03/21/13 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

others. Ensign, however, “refers and repleads each and every allegation contained” in the

previous paragraphs. This requires the parties and this Court to choose which facts

support the particular alleged constitutional violation in support of the first cause of

action. While this may be grounds for dismissing the first cause of action in its entirety,

this Court will address the specific claims as to Defendant Spitzer to determine whether

Ensign states a claim.

Ensign alleges San Diego City Council approved San Diego City Municipal

Ordinance 590202(a)(7), which makes it unlawful to “behave in so noisy, boisterous or

rowdy a manner as to disturb spectators at any event” and authorizes San Diego Police

Department and Qualcomm security to eject an individual who behaves in such a manner

from the stadium. FATPC ¶ 12. According to Ensign’s allegations asserted against

Spitzer, he was arrested by Elite security staff at Qualcomm Stadium after he was evicted

from the stadium for waving his middle finger at a large aggressive crowd. See id. ¶¶ 20,

21. He was beaten, kicked, pummeled, pinned to the ground and handcuffed by the Elite

staff. Id. ¶ 20. The Elite staff handed Ensign over to Spitzer, the San Diego Police Officer

on duty, and Hirari, an Elite staff member, told Spitzer he evicted Ensign for using his

middle finger towards a crowd and Hirari admitted to physically grabbing Ensign before

Ensign grabbed a railing. Id. ¶ 21. Three Charger fans told Spitzer that Ensign did

nothing to provoke the beating meted out by the Elite staff. Id. Ensign further alleges

Spitzer, along with others, fabricated reports to create a picture of an out of control Ensign

resisting arrest and committing battery., and Baker, an employee of Elite, additionally

reported that Ensign punched him in the jaw without provocation causing serious injury

and asserted to law enforcement and others that he had no prior existing injury to his jaw. 

Id. ¶¶ 23, 24. 

1. First Amendment

Movants argue the claims for violation of Ensign’s First Amendment rights fails

because Ensign had no constitutionally protected right to “flip off” the crowd and Spitzer

was not present when Ensign was removed from the stands by Elite staff. They further

6 11cv2060

Case 3:11-cv-02060-BAS-WVG Document 51 Filed 03/21/13 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

argue the retaliation claim fails because Spitzer had no duty to release Ensign under

California Penal Code Section 849(b). They maintain this code section provided Spitzer

the discretion to release Ensign and it contains no private right of action.

In opposition, Ensign argues Spitzer retaliated against Ensign for exercising his First

Amendment rights and the causes of action flow from the retaliation. 

Movants include a small discussion of public forum and speech while Ensign

prefaces his opposition with an extensive discussion regarding freedom of speech and the

unconstitutionality of the ordinance and Charger’s Fan Code of Conduct which lead to

Ensign’s arrest. The Court finds it is unnecessary to analyze those First Amendment issues

which would require consideration of facts outside the complaint. As currently pled,

Ensign fails to state a claim for violation of his First Amendment rights against Spitzer

under section 1983.

To state a claim for violation of his first amendment rights, Ensign must allege facts

showing (1) he engaged in speech or conduct protected under the First Amendment; (2)

the defendant took action against him, and (3) the protected speech or conduct or the

chilling of the speech or conduct was a substantial motivating factor for the defendant’s

actions. See Sloman v. Tadlock, 21 F.3d 1462 (9th Cir. 1994). To state a claim for

retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) he engaged in constitutionally protected

activity; (2) as a result, he was subjected to adverse action by the defendant that would

chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected activity; and

(3) there was a substantial causal relationship between the constitutionally protected

activity and the adverse action.” Blair v. Bethel School Dist., 608 F.3d 540, 543 (9th Cir.

2010).

As alleged, Ensign fails to show Spitzer’s failure to release him after he was

“arrested” by Elite staff was done to prevent Ensign from engaging in protected conduct

or speech and, thereby, fails to demonstrate a causal relationship as required to properly

assert a claim for violation of his First Amendment rights against Spitzer. Accordingly,

the First Amendment clam is dismissed as to Spitzer.

7 11cv2060

Case 3:11-cv-02060-BAS-WVG Document 51 Filed 03/21/13 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2. Fourth Amendment

Movants argue Spitzer did not violate Ensign’s Fourth Amendment rights as it is

clear from the facts alleged that Spitzer conducted an independent investigation and based

on the investigation, which included talking with Elite security personnel, there was

probable cause to take Ensign into custody and “arrest” him.

Ensign argues Spitzer had no right to arrest Ensign when he defended himself from

an unlawful attack and Spitzer had an independent duty to determine probable cause.

A warrantless arrest must be supported by probable cause. See United States v.

Bueno-Vargas, 383 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2004). “The long-prevailing standard of

probable cause protects ‘citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy

and from unfounded charges of crime,’ while giving ‘fair leeway for enforcing law in the

community’s protection.’” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (quoting

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)). For purposes of the Fourth

Amendment,“[p]robable cause exists when, under the totality of the circumstances known

to the arresting officers, a prudent person would have concluded that there was a fair

probability that [the suspect] had committed a crime.” Peng v. Mei Chin Penghu, 335

F.3d 970, 976 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Buckner, 179 F.3d 834, 837 (9th

Cir. 1999) (citations and quotations omitted)). “Arresting officers have probable cause

to make warrantless arrests if, at the moment of arrest, facts and circumstances within

their knowledge and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient

to warrant a prudent man in believing that the arrested person had committed or was

committing an offense.” United States v. Hillison, 733 F.2d 692, 697 (9th Cir. 1984).

Looking to the circumstances known to Spitzer at the time of Ensign’s arrest as

alleged in the complaint and construing all inferences in Ensign’s favor, this Court finds

Ensign sufficiently alleges Spitzer did not have probable cause to arrest Ensign. The

motion to dismiss the claim for violation of Ensign’s Fourth Amendment rights is

DENIED.

8 11cv2060

Case 3:11-cv-02060-BAS-WVG Document 51 Filed 03/21/13 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3. Fourteenth Amendment

Movants argue Spitzer did not violate Ensign’s Fourteenth Amendment rights

because nothing in the factual allegations demonstrate actions by Spitzer that shocks the

conscience. Substantive due process protects from conduct by the government that

“shocks the conscience.” See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987). Intent

to inflict harm unrelated to a legitimate law enforcement objective “shocks the conscience”

and gives rise to liability. See Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1140 (9th Cir. 2008).

There are no allegations that Spitzer used any force on Ensign much less that he inflicted

harm that shocks the conscience. 

Accordingly, Ensign fails to properly allege his First Amendment and Fourteenth

Amendment section 1983 claims against Spitzer and they are dismissed. The motion is

DENIED as to the section 1983 claim for violation of Ensign’s Fourth Amendment rights.

4. Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue Spitzer is shielded by qualified immunity. Specifically,

Defendants argue there was no constitutional violation as Spitzer did not violate Ensign’s

First, Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights, Ensign did not have a First Amendment

right to free speech, and Spitzer had probably cause to arrest Ensign. Defendants’

argument in support of their assertion of qualified immunity relies almost entirely on the

findings of Judge Kaneshiro in the orders filed in People of the State of California v. Jason

Ensign, Superior Court of California, County of San Diego dated May 9, 2011. As

discussed above, these documents are outside the pleadings and not subject to judicial

notice. As such, the Court will not consider them when addressing Defendants’ motion. 

Accordingly, Defendants fail to demonstrate Spitzer is entitled to qualified immunity.

III. Second Cause of Action, Monell Claim

Movants argue Plaintiff fails to state a Monell claim against the City of San Diego

and Lansdowne. Municipalities, their agencies, and their supervisory personnel may be

held liable for deprivations of constitutional rights resulting from their formal policies or

customs. See Monell v. New York Dept. Of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-93 (1978). 

9 11cv2060

Case 3:11-cv-02060-BAS-WVG Document 51 Filed 03/21/13 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

A plaintiff may establish liability pursuant to Monell in one of three ways, (1)

demonstrating an employee committed a constitutional violation through a policy, practice

or custom of a local governmental entity; (2) showing the employee that committed the

constitutional violation “was an official with policy-making authority and that the

challenged action itself thus constituted an act of official governmental policy”; or (3)

demonstrate “an official with policy-making authority ratified a subordinate’s

unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911,

918 (9th Cir. 1996). “In this circuit, a claim of municipal liability under section 1983 is

sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss ‘even if the claim is based on nothing more

than a bare allegation that the individual officers’ conduct conformed to official policy,

custom or practice.” Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th

Cir. 1988) (quoting Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

 A. City of San Diego

Movants argue the second cause of action fails to state a claim against the City of

San Diego, because it consists of conclusory allegations. They specifically argue there are

no nonconclusory facts alleging Spitzer, Lansdowne or the City initiated the prosecution

against Ensign with malice to support a malicious prosecution claim. Ensign does not

specifically address the City in his opposition.

In the third party complaint, Ensign alleges Spitzer was acting under the City’s and

Lansdowne’s “direction and control, knowingly and intentionally promulgated,

maintained, applied, enforced, and suffered the continuation of policies, customs, practices

and usages in violation of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments respectively to

the United States Constitution.” FATPC ¶ 37. Ensign also alleges the City unlawfully

provided Elite personnel with police power when it enacted Municipal Code

59.0202(a)(7). By doing so, Ensign alleges, the City engaged in a custom, policy, practice

of violating sports fans’ First Amendment rights and retaliating by evicting, battering and

arresting them. Id. ¶¶ 12, 13. Ensign further alleges the City engaged in a practice and

pattern of violating sports fans’ constitutional rights when it unlawfully provided Elite

10 11cv2060

Case 3:11-cv-02060-BAS-WVG Document 51 Filed 03/21/13 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

personnel police power by assisting in the enforcement of the Chargers’ “Fan Code of

Conduct” which is based on the municipal ordinance at issue. Ensign alleges the City had

knowledge the municipal ordinance and “Code of Conduct” were unconstitutionally vague

and overbroad and was, therefore, unenforceable but continued to enforce the ordinance

and code authorizing officers to assault, batter and wrongfully arrest fans attending

Chargers games. Id. 

Ensign also alleges the City maintains policies or customs of permitting the kinds

of wrongs that he alleges happened to him by its deliberate indifference to police abuses

and failing to fairly and impartially investigate, and discipline or prosecute peace officers

who commit acts of felonious dishonesty and crimes of violence. Specifically, Ensign

alleges the City had knowledge of repeated allegations of abuse and assaultive misconduct

towards Chargers’ fans at Qualcomm stadium, but refused to protect the public by failing

to discharge and prosecute Spitzer and others. Id. ¶ 39. He further alleges the City

refused to enforce established administrative procedures to insure the safety of detainees

and arrestees, and has a custom and practice of failing to discipline officers and employees

who have committed acts of abuse. Id. Ensign further alleges the City knew of and

sanctioned the practice of falsely arresting, booking and charging victims of abuse by

officers with violations of the California Penal Code. Id. Ensign also argues the City failed

to adequately train and educate officers in the use of reasonable force, failed to enforce the

department’s written regulations with respect to use of force and failed to adequately

supervise the actions of officers under their control. Id. Ensign further alleges the City

condoned and participated in a practice of prosecuting groundless criminal charges to

insulate the City and its officers from civil liability and encouraged a conspiracy of silence

among its employees to conceal and further wrongful and illegal conduct by its employees. 

Id. Ensign further alleges the City engaged in a custom and practice of refusing to provide

public prosecutors and criminal defendants exculpatory and impeaching evidence. Id.

Although not entirely clear, it appears the constitutional violation Ensign asserts is

the security personnel’s use of the authority provided by the City resulted in the violation

11 11cv2060

Case 3:11-cv-02060-BAS-WVG Document 51 Filed 03/21/13 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of sports fans’ right to freedom of speech and retaliation against a sports fan for engaging

in freedom of speech. While this alone is insufficient to allege a Monell claim, Ensign’s

additional allegations regarding the City’s policy and practice are sufficient to allege a

Monell claim against the City.

B. Lansdowne

Movants argue Ensign fails to state a Monell claim against Lansdowne. They argue

Plaintiff alleges Lansdowne failed to engage in an administrative investigation in violation

of regulations that require California agencies to deal with citizen’s complaints but the

third party complaint fails to allege the timely submission of any claim prior to filing the

lawsuit. They further argue Ensign’s rights were not violated when he was taken into

custody because Spitzer had probable cause to arrest him for battery. Movants also argue

the third party complaint fails to allege any personal participation by Lansdowne or that

Lansdowne knew about the arrest or prosecution or that they were constitutionally

deficient in some way. 

In opposition, Ensign argues Lansdowne’s failure to carry out statutory

requirements to investigate the complaint lays personal liability at his feet. Although not

entirely clear, Ensign seems to argue Lansdowne’s failure to sanction Spitzer for his

misconduct ratifies the wrongful acts and subjects Lansdowne to liability.

Ensign’s argument that Lansdowne’s failure to carry out the investigation appears

to suggest Lansdowne himself committed a constitutional violation by not investigating

a complaint as required by California. As noted by Movants, there is no allegation that

a complaint was filed prior to this lawsuit for Lansdowne to investigate. As such, Ensign

fails to allege Lansdowne violated his due process rights.

However, Ensign alleges Spitzer was acting under Lansdowne’s direction and control

when he engaged in the unconstitutional conduct. Additionally, Ensign alleges Lansdowne

engaged in a custom of failing to discipline officers who committed acts of abuse and

misconduct. As such, Ensign alleges a Monell claim against Lansdowne. Movants’ motion

to dismiss the Monell claim is DENIED.

12 11cv2060

Case 3:11-cv-02060-BAS-WVG Document 51 Filed 03/21/13 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IV. State Law Causes of Action

Movants argue the state law causes of action are barred because Ensign failed to

comply with the Claims Act. Ensign admits he did not file a government tort claim and

“submits on City’s request to dismiss City from the pendant state claims.” Opposition at

2. Accordingly, to the extent the state law claims are asserted against the Movants, the

causes of action are dismissed.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the City of San Diego,

Lansdowne, and Spitzer’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN

PART. The motion is GRANTED as to the First Amendment and Fourteenth

Amendment claims against Spitzer. The claims are dismissed without prejudice. To

the extent the state law claims are asserted against Movants, the motion is GRANTED as

to the state law claims. The state law claims are dismissed with prejudice. The motion

is DENIED as to the remaining claims.

DATED: March 20, 2013

JOHN A. HOUSTON

United States District Judge

13 11cv2060

Case 3:11-cv-02060-BAS-WVG Document 51 Filed 03/21/13 Page 13 of 13