Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02845/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02845-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

DAVID ANTHONY STOKES, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIV 04-02845 PHX DGC (MEA)

)

JOSEPH ARPAIO, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

)

Defendant. )

____________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL:

This matter is before the Magistrate Judge on referral

from the District Judge, and the determination of the Magistrate

Judge is dispositive of some of Plaintiff’s claims.

Accordingly, the following proposed findings of fact, report,

and recommendation, are made pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, and 28 U.S.C. § 28(b)(1)(B) and (C).

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend his

complaint (Docket No. 22). 

Background

Plaintiff, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State

Prison in Florence, Arizona, filed a pro se complaint pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on December 9, 2004. Docket No. 1. On

October 14, 2005, the Court ordered Defendant to answer

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Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant violated Plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment rights by serving him inadequate meals, given

his medical condition, and by subjecting him to overcrowded and

unsanitary living conditions at the Towers Jail facility while

Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee. See Docket No. 4. The

Court dismissed the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office and the

“Towers Jail” as defendants in the order of October 14, 2005.

Id. On June 14, 2006, the Court denied Defendant’s motion to

dismiss based on a failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

See Docket No. 16.

The parties have engaged in limited discovery.

Discovery is to be completed by December 1, 2006. The deadline

for filing dispositive motions is December 29, 2006. See Docket

No. 17. Pursuant to a scheduling order issued by the Court on

June 16, 2006, Plaintiff was allowed until September 22, 2006,

to amend his complaint. See id. Plaintiff’S proposed First

Amended Complaint was docketed as lodged September 28, 2006, and

was signed September 22, 2006. See Docket No. 24. Defendant

Arpaio has not responded to Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file

an amended complaint, but filed an answer to the original

complaint on November 3, 2006. See Docket No. 25. 

Plaintiff’s lodged amended complaint seeks to amend his

complaint to add defendants. See Docket No. 24. Plaintiff

seeks to add as defendants, Fulton Brock, Don Stapley, Andrew

Kunasek, Max Wilson, and Mary Rose Wilcox, as individuals and in

their capacities as the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors.

Id. at 2. Plaintiff contends these individuals, as “the final

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policy-makers for Maricopa County [are] the officials most

responsible for the operation, management and control of the

MCSO.” Id. 

Plaintiff also seeks leave to amend to plead

“improperly pled factual allegations and legal claims for

relief.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff seeks to assert both Eighth

Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims. Plaintiff asserts

that, in addition to failure to provide him with an adequate

diet, Defendants otherwise failed to provide Plaintiff with

“reasonably adequate medical care,” in violation of his right to

be free of cruel and unusual punishment and in violation of his

right to due process.

Analysis

Rule 15(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides

that a plaintiff should be given leave to amend his complaint

when justice so requires. See, e.g., United States v. Hougham,

364 U.S. 310, 316, 81 S. Ct. 13, 17 (1960); Howey v. United

States, 481 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1973). Leave to amend a

complaint should be granted if it appears at all possible that

the plaintiff can correct a defect in his complaint. See Lopez

v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). “Thus Rule 15’s

policy of favoring amendments to pleadings should be applied

with extreme liberality. This policy is applied even more

liberally to pro se litigants.” Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d

1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal citations and quotations

omitted). 

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In screening pro se prisoner complaints the Court is

obliged to liberally construe the complaint:

The handwritten pro se document is to be

liberally construed. . . . [A] pro se

complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,” must

be held to “less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can

only be dismissed for failure to state a

claim if it appears “‘beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claim which would entitle him

to relief.’” 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct. 285, 292 (1976)

(quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S. Ct. 594,

596 (1972)). 

In exercising its discretion with regard to a motion to

amend a complaint filed after a responsive pleading, the Court

should consider the prejudice to the opposing party and the

futility of allowing the amendment. See Schlachter-Jones v.

General Tele., 936 F.2d 435, 443-44 (9th Cir. 1991). “[T]he

policy of allowing the amendments of pleadings must be tempered

with considerations of undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive

on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies

by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the

opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility

of amendment, etc.” Id. at 443 (internal quotations omitted).

The Court would have to dismiss a claim added to a complaint if

the plaintiff raised a claim that was legally frivolous or

malicious, that failed to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that sought monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1997(c)(1) (2003 & Supp.

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2006).

Only defendants which are “persons” can be sued

pursuant to section 1983. To state a claim against a government

unit pursuant to section 1983, the plaintiff must establish an

affirmative causal link between a governmental policy or

practice and the alleged constitutional violation. See City of

Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385-85, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1203

(1989); Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,

690-95, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2035-38 (1978). While a county is a

“person” for purposes of section 1983, counties are liable only

for rights deprivations pursuant to official custom or policy.

See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-95, 98 S. Ct. at 2035-38.

In order to hold the County liable under §

1983, [the plaintiff] must show “(1) that he

possessed a constitutional right of which he

was deprived; (2) that the [County] had a

policy; (3) that the policy ‘amounts to

deliberate indifference’ to [the plaintiff’s]

constitutional right; and (4) that the policy

is the ‘moving force behind the

constitutional violation.’” Oviatt v.

Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992)

(quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.

378, 389-91, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 103 L. Ed. 2d

412 (1989)).

Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006).

Additionally, there is no respondeat superior liability

pursuant to section 1983. To state a claim against a government

official, the civil rights plaintiff must allege the official

personally participated in the constitutional deprivation or

that a governmental supervisory official was aware of the

widespread abuses and acted with deliberate indifference to the

plaintiff’s constitutional rights or failed to take action to

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prevent further misconduct. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362,

377 (1976); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 568 (9th Cir. 1987).

 Plaintiff contends the Board of Supervisors:

intentionally, deliberately, and with gross

disregard, delayed or denied adequate funding

to Defendant Arpaio in order for Defendant

Arpaio to relieve the overcrowded conditions

at the TJF in a timely manner or fashion.

Further, due to the long standing-nature of

these conditions created as a direct result

of the policies, practices and procedures of

Defendant Arpaio, Defendant Maricopa County

Board of Supervisors knew or should have

known that the TJF was so grossly overcrowded

as to amount to an infringement of

Plaintiff’s constitutionally secured rights

and intentionally, deliberately and with

gross disregard, failed to provide adequate

resources to alleviate them.

Id. at 6.

Plaintiff contends these actions resulted in the wanton

infliction of unnecessary pain, proscribed by the Eighth

Amendment. Plaintiff contends his liberty interest in being

free of the intentional, wanton infliction of pain without due

process of law, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, was

violated by Defendants. Id. at 7. The amended complaint seeks

declaratory relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and

Plaintiff’s fees in litigating this matter. Id. at 8.

The Board of Supervisors is not a proper defendant to

this action. Local government bodies, such as Arizona counties,

are persons under § 1983 and may be sued for constitutional

injuries. However, liability may only be imposed on the county

if the plaintiff establishes that his injuries were inflicted

pursuant to an official county policy or custom, or by

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deliberate indifference rising to a level of official custom.

See Anderson, 451 F.3d at 1070; Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290

F.3d 1175, 1185-86 (9th Cir. 2002); Thompson v. City of Los

Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). A section 1983

claim against an Arizona county “cannot succeed as a matter of

law” unless the plaintiff: (1) contends that the county

maintains a policy or custom pertinent to his alleged injury;

and (2) alleges how the policy or custom caused the plaintiff’s

injury. See Sadoski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2864 (2006). 

Official county policy may only be set by an official

with “final policymaking authority.” Thompson, 885 F.2d at

1443. To identify those officials with “final policymaking

authority,” the Court looks to state law. Id. In Arizona, the

responsibility of operating jails is placed by law upon the

sheriff, not on the county’s Board of Supervisors. See Ariz.

Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 11-441(A)(5) & 31-101. Therefore, the Board

of Supervisors is not liable to Plaintiff under § 1983 because

it lacks authority to establish an official policy with respect

to the operation of the jail. Further, the Board of Supervisors

cannot be held liable for the actions of the sheriff or his

deputies on a theory of respondeat superior liability. See

Thompson, 885 F.2d at 1443. Accordingly, Plaintiff should not

be allowed to amend his complaint to name the members of the

Maricopa County Board of Supervisors as defendants in this

matter.

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1

If a claim implicates a specific constitutional right, then

the claim should be analyzed under the standard that

governs that right, and not under the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment.[]. Moreover, prison inmates, in

contrast with pretrial detainees or persons with

unrestricted liberty, are protected against unjustified

force by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the

Eighth Amendment and gain no greater protection from the

Fourteenth Amendment. []. Thus, the district court was

correct in analyzing [the plaintiff’s] cruel and unusual

punishment allegations exclusively under the Eighth

Amendment.

(internal citations omitted).

-8-

A claim that the defendants failed to provide a

pretrial detainee with adequate medical care and that they

subjected him to improper living conditions is properly asserted

as a Fourteenth Amendment claim, and not as a claim regarding

cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to the Eighth Amendment.

See Robinson v. Pickett, 16 Fed. App. 577, 579 (9th Cir. 2001)1;

Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998); Estate of

Cole by Pardue v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 259 & n.1 (7th Cir. 1996).

Cf. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting

the “more restrictive” Fourteenth Amendment provisions apply to

pretrial detainees, and the Eighth Amendment applies to those

who have been convicted of a crime), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.

351 (2005). Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion to amend his

complaint to state a claim that his Eighth Amendment right was

violated by Defendants should be denied for failure to state a

claim on which relief may be granted.

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Conclusion

Plaintiff should not be allowed to amend his complaint

to add improper defendants to this suit. Additionally,

Plaintiff should not be allowed to amend his complaint to add an

Eighth Amendment claim, when Plaintiff asserts that, at all

times relevant to his complaint, he was a pre-trial detainee.

Plaintiff’s claim does not appear to allege facts not included

in the original complaint.

 

THEREFORE, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT Plaintiff’s motion to

amend his complaint (Docket No. 22) be denied.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

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328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S.

900 (2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of

fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 6th day of November, 2006.

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