Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-01811/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-01811-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 385
Nature of Suit: Property Damage - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Property Damage

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PHILADELPHIA INDEMNITY INSURANCE 

COMPANY,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

BROAN-NUTONE, L.L.C.; et al.,

 Defendants.

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Case No. 12-cv-01811-SC

ORDER DENYING CROSS RULE 702 

MOTIONS AND DENYING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Now before the Court are Defendants Broan-Nutone, L.L.C. 

("Broan-Nutone") and A.O. Smith Corporation's ("AO Smith") motions 

to exclude (ECF No. 57) and for summary judgment (ECF No. 53), and 

Plaintiff Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company's ("Philadelphia 

Indemnity") motion to exclude (ECF No. 75). All three motions are 

fully briefed.1

 The Court held hearings regarding the motions to 

 

1 ECF Nos. 54 ("SJ Mot."), 67 ("SJ Opp'n"), 70 ("SJ Reply"), 58 

("Defs.' 702 Mot."), 66 ("Pl.'s 702 Opp'n"), 69 ("Defs.' 702 

Mot."), 75 ("Pl.'s 702 Mot."), 81 ("Defs.' 702 Opp'n"), 82 ("Pl.'s 

702 Reply").

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exclude on February 20, 2015, and deems the motion for summary 

judgment appropriate for determination without further oral 

argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). For the reasons set 

forth below, all three motions are DENIED.

II. BACKGROUND

This insurance action is essentially a product liability case. 

In April of 2011, a fire severely damaged an apartment building, 

known as Franciscan Towers, in the Tenderloin District of San 

Francisco. Plaintiff Philadelphia Indemnity insured the owner of 

the building and paid a multimillion dollar claim. Philadelphia 

Indemnity alleges that the fire was caused because a ventilation 

fan wired into the ceiling of the bathroom of one of the apartments 

overheated and started the fire. The fan that Philadelphia 

Indemnity suspects started the fire (the "subject fan") was 

manufactured by Defendant Broan-Nutone.

It is undisputed in this case that the subject fan did not 

work properly for at least sixteen months before the fire. 

Philadelphia Indemnity's theory of the case is that the blades of 

the fan were locked in place by debris that collected in the fan. 

This is known as a "locked rotor condition." Because the fan was 

wired to the light switch in the bathroom, whenever the tenants 

turned on the light, the motor in the fan began running, even 

though the blades could not turn. Philadelphia Indemnity asserts 

that as the motor struggled to turn the locked fan blades, the 

motor overheated and ignited. According to Philadelphia Indemnity, 

the motor got hot enough to ignite lint that had collected on the 

motor or plastic parts of the motor itself. Defendants dispute 

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that the fan was in a locked rotor condition, but they argue that 

even if the motor were in a locked condition, it could not have 

gotten hot enough to start the fire.

Each party has retained an expert to testify about the heat of 

the subject motor. Defendants have moved under Federal Rule of 

Evidence 702 to exclude the testimony of Philadelphia Indemnity's 

expert, and Philadelphia Indemnity has moved, pursuant to the same 

rule, to exclude the testimony of Defendants' expert. See Defs.'

702 Mot., Pl.'s 702 Mot. Defendants have also moved for summary 

judgment on the grounds that, were the Court to exclude 

Philadelphia Indemnity's expert, Philadelphia Indemnity would be 

unable to prove its claims for product liability and negligence. 

See SJ Mot.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Summary Judgment

Entry of summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). Summary judgment should be granted if the evidence would 

require a directed verdict for the moving party. Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986). "A moving party 

without the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial -- usually, but 

not always, a defendant -- has both the initial burden of 

production and the ultimate burden of persuasion on a motion for 

summary judgment." Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz 

Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000).

"In order to carry its burden of production, the moving party 

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must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the 

nonmoving party's claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party 

does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its 

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial." Id. "In order to carry 

its ultimate burden of persuasion on the motion, the moving party 

must persuade the court that there is no genuine issue of material 

fact." Id. "The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and 

all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

B. Admissibility of Expert Opinions

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 permits an expert qualified by 

knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to testify in 

the form of an opinion if (1) his scientific, technical, or other 

knowledge will be helpful to the trier of fact; (2) the testimony 

is based on sufficient facts or data; (3) the testimony is the 

product of reliable principles and methods; and (4) the expert has 

reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the 

case. The Supreme Court has established a two-part test for 

determining the admissibility of expert testimony: (1) the trial 

court must make a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning 

or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and 

of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to 

the facts in issue; and (2) the court must ensure that the proposed 

expert testimony is relevant and will serve to aid the trier of 

fact. See United States v. Finley, 301 F.3d 1000, 1008 (9th Cir.

2002).

Expert testimony, therefore, must be both relevant and 

reliable. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 

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(1993). When considering evidence proffered under Rule 702, the 

district court must act as a gatekeeper by making a preliminary 

determination that the expert's proposed testimony is reliable. 

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141, 150 (1999). The 

Ninth Circuit's policy on admissibility is liberal, though the 

district court must focus on the proposed evidence's scientific 

reliability and relevance instead of its persuasiveness. See Ellis 

v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 982 (9th Cir. 2011). The 

district court has broad latitude in both determining whether an 

expert's testimony is reliable and deciding how to determine the 

testimony's reliability. Id.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Defendants' Motion to Exclude

Defendants move to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff's 

expert, Ramaswami Vasudevan. Mr. Vasudevan is a forensic engineer 

with over forty years of experience in the field. ECF No. 66-2 

("Vasudevan Decl.") ¶¶ 3-5. He used finite element analysis 

("FEA") to estimate the temperature that the motor in the subject 

fan likely reached. FEA is a mathematical modeling technique that 

engineers use to measure values that are difficult to ascertain 

through physical testing. Defendants raise two main issues with

Mr. Vasudevan's application of FEA in this case.

1. FEA Generally

Defendants attack FEA generally as a reliable method. Their 

criticism is based solely on a Sixth Circuit case that affirmed a 

district court's exclusion of an expert who had used FEA. See

Defs.' 702 Mot. at 19-20; Coffey v. Dowley Mfg., Inc., 89 F. App'x 

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927, 930 (6th Cir. 2003). However, the Sixth Circuit's problem 

with the expert testimony in Coffey was not with FEA itself, but 

that the expert had failed to conduct any physical testing. See

id. at 930-31 ("Dr. Wilson has not performed any actual physical 

testing to evaluate the results of his second finite element 

analysis."). Here, Mr. Vasudevan did verify his FEA modeling 

system with actual physical testing.

2. Testing and Verification

The computer model that an engineer uses to estimate variables 

through FEA must be verified against real-world testing. In this 

case, the subject fan was severely damaged in the fire and could 

not be tested. So Mr. Vasudevan used a different fan (the 

"workshop fan") that he found in a workshop in the basement of the 

Franciscan Towers. ECF No. 59-3 ("Vasudevan Depo. I") at 66:4-16. 

Defendants argue that the workshop fan was too dissimilar from the 

subject fan to provide adequate verification. Defendants point out 

that the workshop fan was 10-15 years old, and its motor drew a 

different wattage than the subject fan, and drew 60 watts of power 

in a locked rotor condition (compared to 52 watts for the subject 

motor). Mr. Vasudevan, however, testifies that the subject fan was 

substantially similar to the workshop fan. See Vasudevan Depo. I

at 64:13-23, 66:4-7. Mr. Vasudevan also makes it clear that he 

accounted for differences in size, wattage, material, and other 

variables in the motors when he conducted his FEA. ECF No. 66-3 

("Vasudevan Depo. II") at 92:25-94:21. Essentially, the workshop 

fan was not intended to be identical to the subject fan; its 

purpose was merely to verify Mr. Vasudevan's model. Defendants'

expert, James Finneran, testified at his deposition that "fans are 

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not complicated" and that it is possible for an experienced 

engineer to transfer knowledge about one model of fan to another. 

ECF No. 66-4 ("Finneran Depo.") at 50:23-51:25.2

Defendants also take issue with the convection coefficient 

that Mr. Vasudevan calculated. The convection coefficient, also 

known as the heat transfer coefficient, is a characteristic of the 

heat transfer between the motor and the surrounding air. As the 

motor transfers more of the heat it produces to the surrounding 

air, the convection coefficient increases, and the fan runs cooler. 

Mr. Vasudevan conducted a test with the workshop motor by putting 

the motor in a ceramic box and then draping a blanket over the box. 

The purpose of the box and blanket was to reduce airflow to the 

motor, because increased airflow could increase the convection 

coefficient. ECF No. 96 ("Tr.") at 52:7-21. Mr. Vasudevan's test 

revealed a convection coefficient of 23.75, but he used a 

convection coefficient of 20 in his FEA model as the value for a 

brand new motor of the type of the subject motor. Id. at 56:13-

57:25. Defendants argue that that makes no sense, because removing 

the blanket should increase airflow and therefore increase the 

convection coefficient. See Defs.' 702 Mot. at 21-22. They claim 

 

2 In its opposition brief, Plaintiff makes some very specific 

allegations regarding Mr. Finneran's statements at his deposition, 

including that he agreed that Mr. Vasudevan's workshop motor was 

"similar" and "close" to the subject motor and that Mr. Finneran 

did not object to Mr. Vasudevan's use of the subject motor. 

However, the citations Plaintiff provides are to a section of the 

deposition in which Mr. Finneran appears to be listing other cases 

in which he served as an expert. See Pl.'s 702 Opp'n at 10-11; 

Finneran Depo. at 47:10-25, 48:1-11. The more specific statements 

Plaintiff discusses do not appear anywhere in the excerpt of the 

deposition provided. See Finneran Depo. The Court admonishes the 

parties not to make such assertions unless they can be supported 

with evidence.

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that "Vasudevan's selection of a convection coefficient value is 

nothing more than a guess." Id. at 22.

Defendants misunderstand Mr. Vasudevan's intentions. First of 

all, the figure of 20 was for a brand new motor of the type of the 

subject motor with static airflow. Tr. at 59:24-60:10. Thus 

airflow that managed to enter the ceramic box despite the presence 

of the blanket would have increased the convection coefficient of 

the workshop motor, as did remnants from the high-speed tests that 

Mr. Vasudevan conducted. Id. at 52:3-12, 59:1-20. Second, the 

subject motor drew less power than the workshop motor. Finally, 

Mr. Vasudevan, testified that his use of 20 as the convection 

coefficient for the subject fan was not a guess, but an inference 

based on engineering literature, peer reviewed papers, the 

Mechanical Engineer's Handbook, and other textbooks. Id. at 60:4-

10.

3. Assumptions of the Existence of Lint

Defendants also repeatedly argue that there are problems with 

Mr. Vasudevan's assumption of the existence of lint on the subject 

motor. Defendants point out that Mr. Vasudevan determined that the 

subject motor operated with a convection coefficient of between 

13.5 and 10 at the time of the fire. Defendants argue that each of 

those figures assumes at least some unknown amount of lint on the 

fan, but Mr. Vasudevan has no opinion as to how much lint was on 

the fan. Therefore, Defendants argue, Mr. Vasudevan's results are 

based on an unwarranted assumption, and his tests are not 

reproducible. Defendants also point out that the temperatures that 

correspond to these convection coefficients -- 279o C (534o F) for 

a coefficient of 13.5 and 368o C for a coefficient of 10 (694o F) 

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-- span a range of almost 100o C.

Defendants' argument is again based on a misunderstanding of 

Mr. Vasudevan's testimony. Mr. Vasudevan explains that the 

convection coefficients he used correspond to a range of no, or 

negligible, lint (at 13.5) to lint that almost completely impedes 

heat transfer (at 10). Tr. at 61:24-62:18, 68:22-69:13, 91:12-21. 

Defendants argue that Mr. Vasudevan apparently testified at his 

deposition that the 13.5 coefficient assumes the presence of some

lint on the fan. But Mr. Vasudevan explained at the hearing that 

the 13.5 figure was derived from the Underwriters' Laboratories 

("UL") tests, which use fans on which lint has not built up. Id.

at 63:6-17. However, even a brand new fan can collect a negligible 

amount of lint during the manufacturing, shipping, and handling 

process. Id. at 7:8-16. Accordingly, Mr. Vasudevan's statement 

that the 13.5 coefficient might have accounted for some amount of 

lint is explained because even the brand new fans used in UL 

testing may have had a negligible amount of lint on them.3

 

Regardless, Mr. Vasudevan made it clear, repeatedly, that his 

temperature range corresponds to a minimum that assumes no (or a 

negligible amount of) lint and a maximum that assumes a large 

buildup of lint. Thus, Mr. Vasudevan's conclusions do not require 

an assumption that lint was present, nor are they based on 

unsubstantiated assumptions.

///

 

3 The difference between the 13.5 figure that Mr. Vasudevan derived 

for the subject motor and the 20 figure he used for a brand new 

motor of the same type is explained by the "other conditions" he 

accounted for, including the age of the subject motor and the 

degradation he observed. See Tr. at 68:11-14; 20:9-18, 29:4-20.

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4. Conclusion as to Mr. Vasudevan

For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that Mr. 

Vasudevan used reliable methodology and applied it reliably in this 

case. Moreover, his testimony is relevant. His opinion is that 

the subject motor reached a temperature high enough to start the 

fire at issue in this case. Defendants' motion to exclude his 

testimony is DENIED.

B. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendants' motion for summary judgment is premised upon the 

Court's exclusion of Mr. Vasudevan's testimony. Because the Court 

denied Defendants' motion to exclude, the motion for summary 

judgment is also DENIED.

C. Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude

Plaintiff moves to exclude the testimony of Defendants'

expert, James Finneran. Mr. Finneran is an electrical engineering 

technologist. He has over thirty years of experience examining 

electrical equipment for defects and failures. ECF No. 81-2 

("Finneran Decl. I") ¶¶ 1, 6, 8. Mr. Finneran followed the UL 

protocols for testing overheating protection for motors. He found 

that none of the motors he tested reached temperatures high enough 

to ignite when they were placed in a locked rotor condition.

1. Untimely Supplemental Disclosures

Plaintiff first objects that Mr. Finneran's second expert 

report was untimely. Defendants argue that Mr. Finneran's second 

report was a supplemental report and therefore not untimely. The 

Court agrees that the report was a supplemental report, but is 

mystified as to why Defendants would think that that fact makes the 

report timely. The Court's scheduling order of March 18, 2014 set 

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a deadline of September 30, 2014 for supplemental expert reports, 

and Mr. Finneran's supplemental report was not produced until 

October 20, 2014. See ECF No. 43 ("Scheduling Order"); Finneran

Decl. I ¶ 3.

That said, an untimely supplemental report need not be 

excluded if its late production is harmless. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

37(c)(1); Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 

1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001) ("The information may be introduced if 

the parties' failure to disclose the required information is 

substantially justified or harmless."). Defendants have explained 

that Mr. Finneran's supplemental report contains no new opinions; 

it only provides additional testing data. Mr. Finneran conducted 

the additional testing to determine whether his test motors would 

reach hotter temperatures if held in a locked rotor condition for a 

longer time period. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any 

prejudice as a result of the untimely disclosure. For example, 

Plaintiff asserts that "[t]he strategic decision not to properly 

disclose [Mr. Finneran's supplemental report] is not harmless 

because it violated the Court's scheduling order and Rule 26." 

Pl.'s 702 Mot. at 9. It is unclear why violation of the Court's 

scheduling order in and of itself harms Plaintiff. The only 

prejudice Plaintiff claims as a result of Mr. Finneran's untimely 

report is that the report was disclosed after Plaintiff deposed Mr. 

Vasudevan. But Mr. Vasudevan is Plaintiff's own expert. It is 

unclear why Plaintiff would need to depose its own expert to 

ascertain his thoughts on Mr. Finneran's supplemental report.

Thus even though Mr. Finneran's supplemental report was 

untimely, the Court will not exclude it.

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2. Compliance with UL Testing Procedures

Mr. Finneran conducted tests according to procedures 

prescribed by UL. Plaintiff argues that Mr. Finneran deviated from 

the UL requirements in several important ways. First, Plaintiff 

points out the Mr. Finneran did not document that he conducted a 

dielectric voltage withstand test. However, Mr. Finneran testified 

that he did conduct the test, and that his notes reflect that the 

resistance of the motor coil -- what the dielectric voltage 

withstand test measures -- was fine. ECF No. 81-12 ("Finneran 

Depo.") at 158:18-156:14.

Second, the UL protocols specify that the tester should lock 

all three motors used in the test and then proceed to test the 

motor with the highest wattage. Mr. Finneran instead only measured

the combined total wattage of the motors he used and calculated the 

average (which assumes that the wattage of all the motors was the 

same). This deviation from the UL standards is easily explained. 

First, Mr. Finneran used six motors rather three. Second, he 

proceeded to test all six motors. As a result, it is unclear why 

Plaintiff takes issue with Mr. Finneran's failure to identify the 

highest wattage motor. See Finneran Depo. at 157:7-158:20. 

Because Mr. Finneran tested all six motors, there was no need to 

identify the motor using the highest wattage and test only that 

motor.

Third, Plaintiff argues that Mr. Finneran failed to properly 

document how he measured the interior temperatures of his test 

motors. However, Mr. Finneran has testified as to how he attached 

the thermocouples (which he used to measure the temperature) to the 

coils. Id. at 160:21-162:16.

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Fourth, Plaintiff argues that Mr. Finneran was required to rub 

the insulation on the motors to determine whether the insulation 

had degraded. The UL test, however, does not require the tester to 

rub the insulation with his thumb; it merely provides flaking of 

material upon rubbing as an example of deterioration. See ECF No. 

77-5 ("UL Protocols") at 12C. Instead, Mr. Finneran visually 

inspected the insulation and determined that no deterioration had 

occurred. Finneran Depo. at 170:21-171:11.

Fifth, Plaintiff argues that Mr. Finneran covered the test 

motors with two layers of cheesecloth, rather than one, and did not 

document the specifications of the cheesecloth he used. Mr. 

Finneran has testified that the cheesecloth he used met the UL 

specifications, and that he still has the packaging from the 

cheesecloth used in the testing. See Finneran Depo. at 176:3-15. 

Additionally, Mr. Finneran put one layer of cheesecloth on two of 

the motors and two layers on the other four. Finneran Depo. at 

177:3-15. Plaintiff also argues that Mr. Finneran does not know 

why the UL standards call for cheesecloth to be placed around the 

motor. It is not clear exactly why Plaintiff finds that 

problematic; indeed Mr. Finneran recognizes that the effect of the 

cheesecloth is to inhibit heat transfer and cause the motor to run 

hotter. Id. at 177:3-15. Consequently, two layers of cheesecloth, 

as opposed to one, would cause Mr. Finneran's tests to be more 

likely to find that the subject motor could have started the fire.

Plaintiff argues that Mr. Finneran's alleged errors in 

conducting the UL tests "paint a staggering picture of

unreliability as errors compound upon one another and the test 

becomes truly impossible to reproduce." Pl.'s 702 Mot. at 13. 

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That statement rings as strident hyperbole. Two of the "errors" 

Plaintiff alleges were actually the result of Mr. Finneran 

conducting more thorough tests than the UL protocols require. Two 

were minor gaps in Mr. Finneran's documentation; Plaintiff 

apparently desired more detailed documentation than Mr. Finneran 

provides (though it is not explicitly required by the UL 

standards); and one resulted from Plaintiff's misinterpretation of 

the UL standards. None of these supposed errors suggest that Mr. 

Finneran applied the UL tests unreliably to this case.

3. Mr. Finneran is a Technologist

Next, Plaintiff points out that Mr. Finneran's undergraduate 

degree is in electrical engineering technology ("EET"), as opposed 

to electrical engineering ("EE"). A degree in engineering 

technology confers the title of "technologist" rather than 

"engineer." See ECF No. 77 ("Bauman Decl.") Ex. D. Plaintiff also 

argues that Mr. Finneran has not taken any courses in 

thermodynamics and that he has not memorized the laws of 

thermodynamics (though Mr. Finneran testified to his familiarity 

with the principles of thermodynamics via his work experience). 

Armed with the fact that Mr. Finneran is a technologist, Plaintiff 

proceeds to cast various aspersions on Mr. Finneran's ability to 

understand Mr. Vasudevan's conclusions. See Pl.'s 702 Mot. at 14-

15.

The standard set by Rule 702 is permissive and flexible. It 

permits an expert to be qualified by his "knowledge, skill, 

experience, training, or education." Fed. R. Evid. 702. The 

difference between a degree in EET and one in EE is that an EET 

degree is algebra-based, while EE is based on calculus. Tr. at 

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182:17-24. At the outset, it is important to note that Rule 702 

does not require any particular degree (or any degree at all, for 

that matter) for an expert to be qualified. Plaintiff states no 

reason why the fact that Mr. Finneran's college degree was grounded 

in algebra rather than calculus should disqualify him. Moreover, 

Mr. Finneran's extensive experience and professional certifications 

certainly qualify him to offer the opinions he has provided in this 

case. He has spent over thirty years analyzing various electrical 

devices, including motors and fans, for laboratories and consulting 

firms. See ECF No. 81-2 ("Finneran Decl. II") ¶¶ 4-8. Moreover, 

Mr. Finneran took additional mathematics courses in college beyond 

those required for his EET degree. Tr. at 183:2-5. The Court 

finds that Mr. Finneran's knowledge, skill, experience, training, 

and education are sufficient to qualify him as an expert in this 

case.

4. Mr. Finneran as a "Hired Gun"

Next, Plaintiff argues that Mr. Finneran's testimony should be 

excluded because "it is tailor-made junk science on demand." Pl.'s 

702 Mot. 15. Plaintiff does not acknowledge during its rant 

against Mr. Finneran that Plaintiff, too, hired experts -- in fact 

at least four experts -- for this case. Plaintiff's argument, in 

those rare places where it is grounded in law rather than namecalling and ad hominem attacks, is based on two facts. First, Mr. 

Finneran has testified on behalf of Broan-Nutone ten times in the 

last three years. Second, a portion of Mr. Finneran's testimony 

was excluded by the United States District Court for the Northern

District of Iowa in 2004 because the attorneys for the party that 

hired him consulted with him in violation of a pretrial order 

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prohibiting him from communicating with others about what occurred 

in the courtroom. See Pl.'s Rule 702 Mot. at 16; Zeigler v. 

Fisher-Price, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1011 (N.D. Iowa 2004). 

Neither of these facts is persuasive. It is unclear to what extent 

the blame for the violation of the order in Fisher-Price lies with 

Mr. Finneran or with the attorneys who hired him. Even if it was 

Mr. Finneran's fault, that impropriety from 2004 does not preclude 

him from testifying as an expert ever again. Nor does Mr. 

Finneran's history of testifying for Broan-Nutone. While that may 

be a possible area for cross-examination, it does nothing to show 

Mr. Finneran is unqualified, that his methods were unreliable, or 

that he applied those methods unreliably in this case. Even 

applying the "extra rigor" that Plaintiff urges is warranted, the 

Court cannot find that Mr. Finneran's testimony is barred by Rule 

702. See Pl.'s 702 Mot. at 15-16; Edmons v. Home Depot, U.S.A., 

Inc., No. CIV. 09-987-AC, 2011 WL 127165, at *6 (D. Or. Jan. 14, 

2011).

5. The Relevance of Mr. Finneran's Testimony

Finally, Plaintiff argues that Mr. Finneran's testimony is 

irrelevant. In his tests, Mr. Finneran used new and unused motors 

that had been in a locked rotor condition for fifteen days (without 

cycling the power on and off) and free of lint accumulation. By 

contrast, Plaintiff alleges that the subject fan was old and used, 

in a locked rotor condition for sixteen months (with power cycles 

as the tenants turned on and off the bathroom lights), and covered 

with lint. Additionally, Mr. Finneran's test motors had 

ventilation openings around the circumference of the motor, while 

the subject motor had ventilation openings on the end shields. At 

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least two of those conditions are disputed: Defendants claim that 

the subject motor was not in a locked rotor condition and was not 

covered with lint. Thus the fact that Mr. Finneran did not account 

for those conditions does not necessarily render his findings 

irrelevant.

With respect to the age of the motor, Mr. Finneran testified 

that the subject motor was found to have a resistance of 50 ohms 

and that the majority of its insulation was intact, even after the 

fire. Tr. at 130:15-131:5; 132:17-133:10. Mr. Finneran also 

testified that degradation alone does not increase temperature, but 

if the insulation degrades to such a point that short circuits 

result, the resistance decreases and the motor runs hotter. 

Because there was no evidence of decreased resistance, the age of 

the subject motor may not have caused it to run hot. Id. at 

157:23-158:12.

As for the lint on the motor, Mr. Finneran's opinion is that 

the subject motor had actually not collected lint at all. Id. at 

138:13-139:22, 159:14-23. That opinion is based on the fact that 

there was no evidence on the subject motor (Mr. Vasudevan's theory 

is that the lint burned up in the fire) and that the motors from 

fans pulled from other apartments in the building did not have lint 

on them. Because Mr. Finneran's tests were based on his opinion 

that there was no lint on the motor, the decision not to account 

for lint in the tests does not render them irrelevant.

Regarding the length of time for which the rotor was locked, 

this again may be an area for cross-examination, but it does not 

make Mr. Finneran's findings irrelevant to this case. Power 

cycling, too, may be an area for cross-examination. But as neither 

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party has any idea how frequently the motor was turned on and off 

during the sixteen months when its rotor was allegedly locked, this 

seems to be a weakness that would affect any conceivable attempt to 

duplicate the conditions under which the subject motor operated.

Finally, the Court addresses the differences in the location 

of the ventilation openings. Mr. Finneran testified that the 

different locations, in and of themselves, do not cause changes in 

the operating temperature of the motor. Tr. at 168:17-169:13. 

However, the UL test calls for putting cheesecloth around the 

motor. Because the ventilation openings on Mr. Finneran's test 

motors were located around the circumference of the motors, the 

cheesecloth covered the openings and caused the motors to run 

hotter. Tr. 167:3-168:16. Had he performed exactly the same tests 

on the subject motor, the results would have differed, because the 

cheesecloth would not have covered the ventilation openings on the 

end shield. This difference, therefore, does not invalidate Mr. 

Finneran's methodology.

6. Conclusion as to Mr. Finneran

The Court finds that Mr. Finneran is qualified as an expert by 

his knowledge, training, experience, and education. He used 

reliable methods and applied them reliable in this case. Despite 

the differences (both undisputed and alleged) in the conditions 

under which Mr. Finneran conducted his tests and under which the 

subject motor offered, Mr. Finneran's opinion have "a valid 

connection to the pertinent inquiry." Primiano v. Cook, 598 F.3d 

558, 565 (9th Cir. 2010), as amended (Apr. 27, 2010). Plaintiff's 

motion to exclude Mr. Finneran's testimony is DENIED.

///

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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, both motions to exclude

expert testimony are DENIED. Defendants' motion for summary 

judgment is also DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 27, 2015

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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