Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-05370/USCOURTS-caDC-03-05370-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 4, 2005 Decided June 3, 2005

No. 03-5370

MILTON JOSEPH TAYLOR,

APPELLANT

v.

UNITED STATES PROBATION OFFICE, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

(USDC) for the District of Columbia

(No. 03cv02134)

Paul S. Berman, appointed by the court, argued the cause as

amicus curiae in support of appellant.

Milton J. Taylor, pro se, was on the briefs of appellant.

Megan L. Rose, Assistant Attorney General, argued the

cause for appellee United States Probation Office. With her on

the brief were Kenneth L. Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, and Michael

J. Ryan, Assistant U.S. Attorney. R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant

U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance. 

Stacy L. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of

the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the

cause for appellee M.L. Brown. With her on the brief were

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Robert J. Spagnoletti, Attorney General for the District of

Columbia, and Edward E. Schwab, Deputy Attorney General.

Before: EDWARDS, ROGERS, and ROBERTS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Circuit Judge: Milton J. Taylor appeals from

the District Court’s dismissal of his civil rights action for

damages arising out of his allegedly unlawful confinement at the

District of Columbia Central Detention Facility (“CDF”).

Taylor does not challenge any conviction or sentence. Rather,

he contends that his placement at CDF was unlawful in light of

orders of the federal District Court and the local Superior Court

prescribing that he be confined at a halfway house.

Before responsive pleadings were filed, the District Court,

on its own motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (2000),

dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The court

concluded that Taylor had failed to satisfy the so-called

“favorable-termination” or “prior-invalidation” requirement of

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), which bars

actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) seeking “damages for

allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for

other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render

a conviction or sentence invalid,” unless the plaintiff “can

demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been

invalidated.”

We reverse. Heck and subsequent Supreme Court decisions

make it clear that Heck ’s application is limited to suits that, if

successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of the

plaintiff’s conviction or sentence, i.e., suits challenging the fact

or duration of confinement. Because Taylor’s complaint

challenges only the fact that he was confined at one facility

rather than another and, thus, does not challenge the fact or

duration of his confinement, the rule of Heck is inapplicable.

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I. BACKGROUND

In June 2001, following an allegation that Taylor had

violated the terms of his supervised release imposed after a prior

criminal conviction, see United States v. Taylor, Crim. No. 97-

0035 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 1997), the District Court revoked the

supervised release and sentenced Taylor “to be imprisoned for

a term of . . . SIX (6) months to be served in Hope Village

Halfway House for intensive residential drug counselling and

treatment.” United States v. Taylor, Crim. No. 97-0035 (D.D.C.

June 19, 2001), reprinted in App. of Court-Appointed Amicus

Curiae (“App.”) at 3. Taylor was directed to surrender himself

to the halfway house when space became available and to report

to his probation officer for drug testing in the interim. Id.

On July 31, 2001, before space had become available at the

halfway house, Taylor was arrested and charged in the District

of Columbia Superior Court with an unrelated drug offense.

Three days later, the Superior Court ordered that Taylor be

released to a halfway house on work release pending trial.

Pursuant to this order, Taylor was transferred from CDF (where

he had been confined since his arrest) to a local halfway house.

On August 14, while Taylor was at the halfway house, the

United States Marshals Service issued a detainer against Taylor

to the District of Columbia Department of Corrections. See

United States Marshals Service Detainer of 8/14/2001, reprinted

in App. for Appellee Brown (“Supp. App.”) at 1. “A detainer is

a request filed by a criminal justice agency with the institution

in which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking the institution either

to hold the prisoner for the agency or to notify the agency when

release of the prisoner is imminent. Detainers generally are

based on outstanding criminal charges, outstanding parole- or

probation-violation charges, or additional sentences already

imposed against the prisoner.” Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S.

716, 719 (1985) (citations omitted).

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The detainer at issue in this case requested the Department

of Corrections to notify the Marshals Service when Taylor was

released from the Department’s custody, so that the Marshals

could take Taylor into custody. See Detainer, Supp. App. at 1.

The detainer referenced the docket number of Taylor’s criminal

case in the District Court and included the following notation:

“6 Mths Halfway House.” See id. On August 15, however, the

day after the detainer was issued, Taylor was removed from the

halfway house and taken to CDF, where he remained until

January 2002. It is unclear whether Taylor was taken from the

halfway house by the U.S. Marshals, local authorities, or others.

Nor is it clear at whose direction and on what authority Taylor

was moved.

In October 2001, Taylor filed two actions in the District

Court challenging his confinement at CDF as inconsistent with

the Superior Court’s order that he be placed in a halfway house

pending his local trial and the District Court’s order that he

serve his federal sentence at a halfway house. Taylor sought

damages as well as his release back to the halfway house. The

District Court construed both actions as petitions for habeas

corpus, and, because Taylor had been released by the time the

petitions were considered, dismissed the petitions as moot on

September 27, 2002. See Taylor v. U.S. Prob. Office, Civil Nos.

01-2132, 01-2133 (D.D.C. Sep. 27, 2002), reprinted in App. at

5-8. It appears that Taylor did not appeal these dismissals.

In September 2003, Taylor commenced the instant civil

action for money damages against the CDF warden, the U.S.

Probation Office, and his federal probation officer. Taylor’s

complaint alleges that the defendants unlawfully detained him

at CDF in violation of the orders of the District Court and

Superior Court.

Before responsive pleadings were filed, the District Court

dismissed the case on its own motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (requiring court to dismiss in forma pauperis

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action “at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . .

fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted”). The

court concluded that Taylor’s claim “goes to the fact or duration

of his confinement,” and was therefore barred under Heck

because Taylor had not established prior invalidation.

See Taylor v. United States Prob. Office, Civil No. 03-2134

(D.D.C. Oct. 16, 2003), reprinted in App. at 14-16.

This appeal followed. Professor Paul Schiff Berman was

appointed by the court as amicus curiae to present arguments in

support of Taylor’s position. 

II. ANALYSIS

As noted above, the District Court dismissed Taylor’s

action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a

claim on which relief may be granted. We review such

dismissals de novo. See Davis v. Dist. of Columbia, 158 F.3d

1342, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Dismissal for failure to state a

claim is appropriate only if “it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-

46 (1957). We must accept all of the factual allegations in the

complaint as true and give Taylor the benefit of all inferences

that can reasonably be drawn from those allegations. Kaempe

v. Myers, 367 F.3d 958, 963 (D.C. Cir. 2004). We also remain

mindful that complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs, like Taylor,

are “h[e]ld to less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972) (per curiam).

The gravamen of Taylor’s complaint is that his confinement

at the CDF location rather than at a halfway house was unlawful,

because it contravened the orders of the District Court and the

Superior Court. The District Court concluded that this claim

“goes to the fact or duration of his confinement” and, thus, that

Taylor was required under Heck to establish that his “conviction

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or sentence ha[d] already been invalidated,” see Heck, 512 U.S.

at 487. Because Taylor made no such showing, the District

Court dismissed the case. We hold that the District Court erred

in dismissing this action, because, as we explain below, Taylor’s

claim is not subject to Heck’s prior-invalidation requirement.

* * * *

In Heck, a state prisoner brought an action for damages

pursuant to § 1983, challenging the conduct of state officials

who, the prisoner alleged, had unconstitutionally caused his

conviction by improperly investigating his crime and destroying

evidence. Heck, 512 U.S. at 478-79. Pointing to “the hoary

principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for

challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments,” the

Court held:

[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by

actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or

sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state

tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called

into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of

habeas corpus.

Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted); see also Williams v. Hill, 74

F.3d 1339, 1340-41 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (holding that

the Heck rule also applies to claims under the cause of action

created in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau

of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)). 

The Heck Court made it clear that this requirement of prior

invalidation in § 1983 actions applies only if “a judgment in

favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of

his conviction or sentence.” 512 U.S. at 487. If, on the other

hand, “the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not

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demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment

against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed.”

Id.

This limitation on Heck’s applicability has been preserved

by subsequent Supreme Court decisions. Just last year, the

Supreme Court reaffirmed that “Heck’s requirement to resort to

state litigation and federal habeas before § 1983 is not . . .

implicated by a prisoner’s challenge that threatens no

consequence for his conviction or the duration of his sentence.”

Muhammad v.Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751 (2004) (per curiam); see

also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 125 S. Ct. 1242, 1248 (2005) (“Heck

specifies that a prisoner cannot use § 1983 to obtain damages

where success would necessarily imply the unlawfulness of a

(not previously invalidated) conviction or sentence.”). And we

have observed that this limitation creates a “clear line between

challenges to the fact or length of custody,” which amount to a

collateral attack on the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence, “and

challenges to the conditions of confinement,” which have no

implication regarding the lawfulness of the plaintiff’s conviction

or sentence. Brown v. Plaut, 131 F.3d 163, 168 (D.C. Cir.

1997); see also Dotson, 125 S. Ct. at 1248 (stating that Heck

bars a state prisoner’s § 1983 action, absent prior invalidation,

only if “success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the

invalidity of confinement or its duration”).

* * * *

Applying these principles, it is abundantly clear that Heck’s

favorable-termination requirement is not implicated by Taylor’s

complaint. If Taylor succeeds in his action, this will

demonstrate nothing more than the unlawfulness of his

placement at the CDF location instead of a halfway house.

Success in this case will in no way imply that any confinement

of Taylor was invalid or that the duration of his confinement

should have been shorter. Thus, Heck’s concerns regarding

collateral attacks on criminal judgments are not in play here.

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Indeed, far from attacking the federal and local court orders

sentencing and remanding him to a halfway house, Taylor

argues that his placement in CDF was unlawfully inconsistent

with those orders. He is not challenging the validity of the

orders themselves.

It does not matter that the claims underlying Taylor’s

action, although not implying the invalidity of the court orders,

might imply the invalidity of whatever administrative

determination prompted his removal from the halfway house to

CDF, for it is clear that “the incarceration that matters under

Heck is the incarceration ordered by the original judgment of

conviction.” Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 751 n.1; see also Brown,

131 F.3d at 168 (“One of the Court’s principal concerns in Heck

was to limit collateral attacks on final judgments; but a

proceeding that is incapable of giving rise to collateral estoppel,

like that at issue in this case, hardly needs to be insulated from

collateral attack.” (citation omitted)). Thus, Taylor’s action is

properly characterized as a challenge to a condition (namely, the

location) of his confinement, and not its fact or duration. 

Appellees argue at length that a challenge to Taylor’s

confinement would have been properly cognizable in habeas.

This is obviously beside the point. It may well be that habeas is

available where a prisoner alleges that he “is unlawfully

confined in the wrong institution,” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411

U.S. 475, 486 (1973) (citing In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894),

and Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972)), or “is being

unlawfully detained by the Executive,” id. (citing Parisi v.

Davidson, 405 U.S. 34 (1972)), but this is not the question under

Heck. Rather, Heck specifically limited its application to

damages actions that, if successful, “would necessarily imply the

invalidity of [the plaintiff’s] conviction or sentence.” Heck, 512

U.S. at 487 (emphasis added); cf. also Brown, 131 F.3d at 168-

69 (“Habeas corpus might conceivably be available to bring

challenges to such prison conditions . . . but requiring the use of

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habeas corpus in such cases would extend Preiser far beyond the

‘core’ of the writ that Preiser set out to protect.”). 

Finally, there is no merit to appellees’ argument that

Taylor’s use of phrases like “illegal confinement” and

“unconstitutional sentence” in his pleadings suggests that he is

challenging the fact of his confinement. Taylor’s pro se

complaint is more faithfully read as challenging only the fact

that he was confined at CDF instead of a halfway house. The

complaint challenges neither the legality of any conviction or

sentence, the fact of his incarceration, nor the length of his

incarceration. Rather, the complaint challenges a condition of

confinement – i.e., placement at the CDF location rather than at

a halfway house – so his action is not subject to Heck. See

Brown, 131 F.3d at 168 (noting the clear “distinction between

challenges to the fact or length of custody and challenges to

conditions of confinement”). 

In sum, on the record at hand, we hold that Taylor’s

complaint lies outside of Heck’s ambit. There appears to be no

dispute that the judgment of the District Court, the order of the

Superior Court, and the U.S. Marshals Service Detainer all

specified that Taylor was to be in custody at a halfway house,

but that he was removed from a halfway house and confined at

CDF. Taylor alleges that he suffered cognizable injury as a

result of this action. Appellees may have valid defenses to these

claims. For example, the federal appellees claim that the

Probation Office played no role in the issuance or execution of

the detainer. But any such defenses are properly addressed upon

consideration of the merits of Taylor’s action. We express no

view on the merits. We hold only that, in light of Heck’s

inapplicability, there is nothing on the face of Taylor’s

complaint that justified the District Court’s summary dismissal

of the case at this stage of the proceedings.

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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District

Court is reversed. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

So ordered.

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