Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-07048/USCOURTS-ca10-92-07048-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

WILLIAM KNIGHT, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

SEP ~ 1992 

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No. 92-7048 

LOUIS W. SULLIVAN, M.D., 

Secretary, Department of Health 

and Human Services, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

(D.C. No. CIV-91-164-S) 

( E. D. Okla. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellant William Knight appeals from an order of the 

district court affirming the denial of his application for social 

security benefits by the Secretary of Health and Human Services 

(the Secretary). On appeal, Knight contends that the findings of 

the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who affirmed the Secretary's 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 92-7048 Document: 010110309486 Date Filed: 09/09/1992 Page: 1
decision, were not based on substantial evidence. We exercise 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. 

In this case, the parties agree that because appellant does 

have impairments, the Secretary bears the burden of showing that 

appellant "retains the ability to do other work activity and that 

jobs the claimant could perform exist in the national economy." 

Ray Y..=.. Bowen, 865 F.2d 222, 224 (10th Cir. 1989). In such cases, 

we will uphold decisions of the Secretary denying benefits if that 

decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id. 

Appellant first argues that the ALJ failed to appropriately 

consider the pain aspect of his physical condition in making a 

disability determination and failed to give proper weight to the 

findings of his treating physician. We have held that "'[t]o be 

disabling, pain must be so severe, by itself or in conjunction 

with other impairments, as to preclude any substantial gainful 

employment.'" Brown~ Bowen, 801 F.2d 361, 362-63 (10th Cir. 

1986) (quoting Dumas~ Schweiker, 712 F.2d 1545, 1552 (2d Cir. 

1983)). When determining whether a claimant's pain is disabling, 

"'the claimant is entitled to have his nonmedical objective and 

subjective testimony of pain evaluated by the ALJ and weighed 

alongside the medical evidence.'" Talley Y..=.. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 

585, 587 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting Huston~ Bowen, 838 F.2d 1125, 

1131 (10th Cir. 1988)). However, the Secretary may evaluate the 

claimant's credibility in conjunction with the record, and "'a 

claimant's subjective complaint of pain is by itself insufficient 

to establish disability.'" Id. (quoting Brown, 801 F.2d at 363). 

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Appellant contends that the ALJ failed to consider norunedical 

objective factors, such as those suggested in Luna~ Bowen, 834 

F.2d 161, 165-66 (10th Cir. 1987), when evaluating whether his 

pain was disabling. We disagree. The record indicates that the 

ALJ considered both medical and norunedical objective evidence, as 

well as subjective evidence, related to appellant's pain. The ALJ 

stated that Dr. Temple, appellant's treating physician, released 

appellant to light work on April 28, 1988 and continued seeing him 

for several months thereafter. 1 However, the ALJ specifically 

noted that "claimant has not returned to Dr. Temple since March, 

1989." See id. (objective norunedical factors include "claimant's 

persistent attempts to find relief for his pain and his 

willingness .to try any treatment prescribed, regular use of 

crutches of a cane, regular contact with a doctor, and the 

possibility that psychological disorders combine with physical 

problems") (emphasis added). The record also indicates that 

appellant opted not to undergo a complete physical examination 

recommended by one physician and a pain treatment recommended by 

another. Moreover, the objective medical evidence in the record 

clearly supports the ALJ's assessment that appellant's pain is not 

disabling. Appellant underwent several different diagnostic 

studies, all of which found his condition to be within "normal" 

1 Appellant suggests that the ALJ failed to give sufficient 

weight to the findings of his treating physician, C.A. Temple. 

However, Dr. Temple found only that appellant "is not able to 

return to work that he was doing and he is not able to return to 

manual labor." Dr. Temple's assessment is not inconsistent with 

the ALJ's determination that appellant is able to perform light 

and sedentary types of jobs. 

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limits and which failed to show any evidence of nerve root 

compression. Therefore, we hold that substantial evidence exists 

to support the ALJ's conclusion that appellant's pain is not of a 

disabling severity. 

Appellant also contends that the ALJ failed to ask 

sufficiently probing questions regarding his drinking of alcohol. 

However, the record indicates that appellant did not represent to 

the ALJ that his drinking was disabling. When the ALJ asked 

appellant whether he drinks, appellant responded, "Every once in a 

while," and stated that he "[t]ake[s] a sip now and then." His 

"testimony, taken as true, did not establish the presence of a 

[disability]." Ray, 865 F.2d at 226. Given appellant's responses 

to the ALJ's questions, we conclude that the ALJ was justified in 

not pursuing a more probing line of questions regarding whether 

appellant's drinking renders him disabled. 

Appellant argues that the ALJ erroneously relied on the 

medical-vocational guidelines -- the "grids" -- to find that 

appellant was not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 

2, § 200.00(e)(2). He asserts that application of the grids was 

inappropriate because he suffered from several nonexertional 

impairments -- namely, pain, postural limitations, and alcoholism. 

We have held that "[t]he presence of nonexertional impairments 

precludes reliance on the grids only to the extent that such 

impairments limit the range of jobs available to the claimant." 

Ray, 865 F.2d at 226. In Ray, we upheld the ALJ's application of 

the grids because he found that no nonexertional impairment was 

severe enough to limit the range of sedentary jobs available to 

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the claimant. Id.; see also Gossett~ Bowen, 862 F.2d 802 (10th 

Cir. 1988). Likewise, in this case, the ALJ found 

independently of his application of the grids -- that appellant 

has "residual functional capacity to engage in light and sedentary 

types of work." We already have concluded that substantial 

evidence supports the ALJ's finding that appellant's pain and 

appellant's drinking were not disabling. 

With respect to appellant's postural limitations, the ALJ 

considered Dr. Temple's recommendation that appellant "avoid work 

requiring lifting, twisting, bending or stooping." During the 

same general time period, however, Dr. Temple released appellant 

to perform light duty. In conjunction with Dr. Temple's comments, 

the ALJ also considered that Dr. Young Stokes III -- who examined 

appellant for the Social Security Administration -- stated that 

appellant was "unimpaired" as to sitting and had "minimal 

impairments" with respect to standing, moving about, and carrying. 

Based on the record as a whole, we conclude that there was 

substantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding that appellant's 

nonexertional impairments did not make him "disabled" as defined 

in the relevant statute, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). Consequently, 

the ALJ did not err in applying the grids based on appellant's 

residual functional capacity, age, work experience, and education. 

Finally, appellant contends that the ALJ committed reversible 

error by asking narrow, incomplete, and misleading questions to 

the vocational expert who testified at the hearing. Appellant 

asserts that the ALJ failed to present all of appellant's alleged 

impairments when posing hypothetical questions to the vocational 

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expert regarding appellant's ability to find work. Appellant 

points particularly to the following question posed by the ALJ to 

the expert: 

Assuming that I should find from the evidence of record, 

including the medical evidence as well as Mr. Knight's 

testimony, that he is able to perform sedentary work, 

are there jobs of a sedentary nature that he would be 

able to perform based on his age, education and past 

work experience? 

Asking the expert to assume appellant could perform "light" work, 

the ALJ then repeated the same question. Based on the record as a 

whole, we conclude that the ALJ's questioning was not deficient. 

First, we note that the vocational expert was present during 

appellant's hearing and thus heard testimony concerning 

appellant's impairments. See Diaz Y...!... Secretary of Health~ Human 

Servs., 898 F.2d 774, 777 (10th Cir. 1990). Second, the testimony 

of the vocational expert certainly was not the only evidence 

relied upon by the ALJ in deciding that appellant is not disabled. 

In fact, the ALJ's Summary and Evaluation of the Evidence suggests 

that he relied on the expert only for an estimation of whether 

jobs exist in the national economy given the fact that appellant 

could perform light and sedentary work. The ALJ obviously relied 

on other evidence in the record and not on the vocational 

expert's testimony -- to arrive at the conclusion that appellant 

could perform light and sedentary work. Because substantial 

evidence independent of the expert's testimony supports the ALJ's 

finding that appellant could perform light and sedentary work, his 

question to the vocational expert was not error. See Jordan Y...!... 

Heckler, 835 F.2d 1314, 1316 (10th Cir. 1987) (ALJ's limited 

reliance on testimony of vocational expert was proper where other 

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substantial evidence supported conclusion that claimant could 

perform light and sedentary work). 

In summary, we conclude that the ALJ's finding that appellant 

has not been disabled is supported by substantial evidence. 

AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

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ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

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