Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00639/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00639-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Robert Carrasco Gamez Jr., 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, 

 Respondent. 

 CV 12-0639-TUC-RM (JR) 

 REPORT AND 

 RECOMMENDATION 

 

 Pending before the Court is Roberto Carrasco Gamez Jr.’s Amended Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 17) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In 

accordance with the Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the 

District of Arizona and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this matter was referred to the 

Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation. As explained below, the 

Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after an independent review of 

the record, dismiss the Petition with prejudice. 

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 A. Trial 

 In its Memorandum Decision affirming Gamez’s convictions and sentence, the 

Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the factual background as follows:1

In March 2002, two Tucson police officers answered a call about 

“unknown trouble” at an apartment complex, where someone 

reportedly was kicking a third-story apartment door. The officers 

approached the apartment and noticed the door was damaged. They 

knocked on the door and announced their presence. While he was 

knocking, one of the officers saw someone inside the apartment. After 

some delay, a man partially opened the door, stepped outside, and said 

only he and two girls were inside. 

 While one officer questioned the man, the other officer entered 

and performed a protective sweep of the apartment. He opened a 

bedroom door and saw an empty shoulder holster on the floor; the man 

at the door had told the officers no guns were in the apartment. With 

his gun drawn, the officer entered the bedroom and saw a man standing 

in the closet aiming an assault rifle at him. The man pulled the trigger, 

but the gun did not fire, and the officer left the room. Shots were fired 

through the bedroom door into the living area, and the officer fired 

back. The officers then fled the apartment, and another man came 

outside and continued firing at them. 

 Additional police units arrived at the scene, and special weapons 

and tactics (SWAT) officers took over. The man at the door was 

arrested and three other people, two girls and a man, were found in the 

apartment. Gamez and another man were apprehended near the 

apartment. At trial, Gamez testified that he had been in the closet when 

he heard one of the other men in the apartment screaming that he had 

been shot. Gamez further testified he had seen a hand with a gun and 

that he started shooting toward what he claimed to be an unknown 

intruder. 

 

1

 The factual summary of the Arizona Court of Appeals is accorded a presumption of 

correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 746 n. 1 (9th Cir. 

2009) (citing Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1135 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

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 Police later determined that some of the apartment occupants, 

driving a Maxima, had been stopped by officers approximately an hour 

earlier. The officers had found several weapons in the car, but the men 

occupying it had escaped. Gamez had not been in the Maxima at the 

time because, according to one of the girls, he had been “too messed 

up” on drugs to leave the apartment. 

 The two girls found in the apartment testified that when the 

officers had arrived there, the men in the apartment had panicked, 

apparently believing the police had located them. One of the girls 

testified that the men had then begun loading weapons and that Gamez 

had said he was going to “shoot the cops . . . [b]ecuase he hates cops 

and he wasn’t going to go to jail.” Ultimately, however, the men had 

decided that one of them would open the door and talk to the officers. 

The girls also testified that Gamez and the other men had told them 

they would be killed if they talked about what had happened. 

Ex. G, pp. 3-4 (copy of decision).2

 Based on these facts, the jury found Gamez guilty 

of two counts each of attempted first-degree murder, aggravated assault with a deadly 

weapon and endangerment. Id., p. 2. The jury also found that the aggravated assault 

offenses were of a dangerouns nature and had been committed against peace officers. 

Id. The trial court sentenced Gamez to aggravated, concurrent and consecutive 

prison terms totaling 46 years. Id.; Ex. A (sentencing order). 

B. Direct Appeal 

In his opening brief on appeal, Gamez, through appointed counsel, argued that 

trial erred by allowing other act evidence, by denying his motion to suppress, and by 

denying his motion to sever the trial from that of his co-defendants. Ex. D. The 

 

2

 Unless otherwise indicated, all exhibit references are to the exhibits attached to the 

Respondents’ Answer to Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 49). 

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United States Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington ̧ 542 U.S. 296 

(2004), was issued four days before Gamez filed his opening brief and was not 

addressed in the opening brief. However, the State mentioned Blakely in its 

answering brief and Gamez raised a Blakely claim in his reply brief. Ex. E, n. 5. In 

addition to the claims raised in the opening brief, the Court of Appeals also addressed 

Gamez’s Blakely claim. Id. The court affirmed Gamez’s convictions, but finding 

Blakely error, vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing. Ex. E, pp. 8-15. 

The Arizona Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for review and 

remanded the case back to the Arizona Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light 

of the then-recent decisions in State v. Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578 (2005), and State v. 

Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561 (2005). Ex. F (Arizona Supreme Court Minutes). On 

remand, relying inter alia on Martinez, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial 

court properly found Gamez’s prior convictions as an aggravating factor and could 

thus consider other aggravating factors without first submitting them to a jury. Ex. 

G, pp. 9-10. Based on the reconsideration and denial of Gamez’s Blakely claim, the 

Court of Appeals vacated its prior decision, replaced it with the reconsidered 

decision, and affirmed Gamez’s convictions and sentences. Id., pp. 2, 8-11. The 

court filed its mandate on April 18, 2006. Ex. H. 

C. First PCR Proceeding

 On October 26, 2006, Gamez filed a pro se Notice of Post Conviction Relief 

(“PCR”) pursuant to Rule 32.1, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Ex. I. The 

trial court appointed attorney Jacqueline Rohr to represent Gamez. Ex. J. The trial 

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court then granted Rohr’s motion to appoint new counsel and appointed Anne 

Elsberry. Ex. K. The trial court granted Elsberry’s two motions for extensions of 

time. Exs. M (motion), N (order), O (motion), P (order). Elsberry then notified the 

court that upon “review of the record and the transcripts of the trial, sentencing and 

direct appeal, counsel has determined that she can find no issues for review,” and 

requested that Gamez be given additional time to file a pro se PCR petition. Ex. Q. 

On December 6, 2007, the trial court granted Elsberry’s request and gave Gamez 45 

days from his receipt of the PCR record to file a pro per petition. Exs. R, S. The 

deadline passed on February 28, 2008, without Gamez filing a petition and, on March 

25, 2008, the trial court dismissed his PCR notice without prejudice. Ex. T. After 

Gamez inquired about the status of the PCR proceedings, the trial court, by order 

dated April 2, 2008, reinstated the proceedings and ordered Gamez to file his PCR 

petition by July 1, 2008. Ex. V. 

 Gamez filed his pro se petition on July 1, 2008, arguing that his trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to renew the severance motion, appellate counsel was 

ineffective for failing to argue that trial counsel’s failure to renew the severance 

motion constituted fundamental error due to the “spill over effect” of the evidence 

admitted at trial. Ex. W. In a ruling dated December 8, 2008, the trial court denied 

relief, finding that the Court of Appeals had already reviewed and denied the 

substance of Gamez’s claims. Ex. X, pp. 2-3. Gamez did not appeal the trial court’s 

decision. Amended Petition, p. 4. 

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D. Second PCR Proceeding 

 On March 15, 2010, Gamez filed a second PCR notice and the trial court 

reappointed Elsberry to represent him. Exs. Y, Z. The trial court subsequently 

granted Elsberry’s request to withdraw and appointed attorney Ronald Zack to 

represent Gamez. Ex. AA. Zack filed a notice informing the trial court that he had 

reviewed the record and trial transcripts, consulted with trial counsel, and considered 

Gamez’s input, but found no good faith basis for post-conviction relief. Ex. BB. The 

court granted Zack’s request to allow Gamez additional time to file a pro se petition. 

Ex. CC. The trial court granted Gamez an additional 45 days from the receipt of the 

record to file his PCR petition. Ex. CC. 

 Gamez filed a 35-page PCR petition which was rejected by the trial court 

because it exceeded the 25-page limit prescribed by Rule 32.5, Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure. Ex. EE. On February 10, 2011, Gamez filed a revised petition, 

arguing that 2006 changes to the statutes defining self-defense and defense of others 

and reallocating the burden of proving affirmative defenses should be applied 

retroactively to his case. Ex. FF, pp. 1-5. He also raised claims that his trial and 

appellate counsel were ineffective, that the trial court had erred, the he was subjected 

to prosecutorial misconduct, and that newly discovered material facts entitled him to 

relief. Id., pp. 6-21. In a ruling filed on July 8, 2011, the trial court concluded that 

change in the self-defense statute did not retroactively apply to Gamez’s case, that his 

claims of ineffective assistance, prosecutorial misconduct, and newly discovered 

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evidence were precluded because they were resolved, or could have been raised, on 

direct appeal or in his first PCR proceeding. Ex. HH, pp. 4-7. 

 Gamez appealed the trial court’s denial, raising the same arguments and 

adding an additional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and two more newlydiscovered evidence claims. Ex. II. The Court of Appeals granted review, but 

denied relief. Ex. JJ. In doing so, the court largely adopted the trial court’s decision, 

but noted that the substantive claims denied on the merits on direct review were not 

necessarily precluded when subsequently raised in PCR proceedings as claims for 

ineffective assistance of counsel. The court nevertheless found the claims fitting that 

description were precluded because Gamez could have raised them in his first 

petition for post-conviction relief. Ex. JJ, pp. 3-4. Gamez then sought and was 

denied review by the Arizona Supreme Court. Ex. KK. 

 E. Third PCR Proceeding 

 On March 23, 2012, Gamez filed his third PCR notice and the trial court 

appointed attorney Brick Storts to represent him. Exs. MM, NN. Storts notified the 

trial court that he could find no issues that could be raised in a successive PCR 

petition and noted that Gamez wished to file a pro per petition. Ex. OO. The court 

granted an extension and Gamez filed a pro per petition raising claims of actual 

innocence, significant change in the law, trail court error, newly discovered evidence, 

ineffective assistance of counsel, and prosecutorial misconduct. Exs. PP, QQ. The 

trial court concluded that all but Gamez’s claim of newly-discovered evidence were 

precluded under Rule 32.2(a). Ex. RR. The court also denied the newly-discovered 

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evidence claims, finding Gamez had not satisfied the requirements of Rule 32.1(e). 

Id. 

 Gamez sought review, raising the same claims and arguing that the trial court 

improperly found his claims to be precluded. Ex. SS. The Arizona Court of Appeals 

granted review, adopted the trial court’s ruling, and denied relief. Ex. TT. Gamez 

did not seek further review. Ex. UU (mandate). 

F. Habeas Petition 

 Gamez commenced this action with the filing of his original petition on 

August 27, 2012. (Doc. 1). He subsequently filed the now pending amended petition 

on June 4, 2013. (Doc. 8). Gamez subsequently requested a stay be entered to allow 

him to exhaust the unexhausted claims raised in the amended petition. (Doc. 18). 

By order filed March 4, 2014, Gamez stay request was denied as moot without 

objection. (Doc. 43). On June 2, 2014, Respondent filed their answer to the petition. 

(Doc. 49). On June 27, 2014, Gamez filed his reply. (Doc. 58). 

II. TIMELINESS 

A. The Petition is Untimely 

 The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) 

provides for a one year statute of limitations to file a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitions filed beyond the one-year limitations 

period must be dismissed. Id. The statute provides in pertinent part that: 

(1) A 1–year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ 

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 

State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest ofCase 4:12-cv-00639-RM Document 65 Filed 02/02/15 Page 8 of 16
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(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time 

for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an 

application created by State action in violation of the 

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if 

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State 

action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was 

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has 

been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made 

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or 

claims presented could have been discovered through the 

exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of 

limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

 Applying these standards, Gamez’s petition is clearly untimely. The trial 

court sentenced Gamez on June 13, 2003. Ex. A. Gamez filed a timely notice of 

appeal on June 16, 2003. Ex. C; 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). After the case went to the 

Arizona Supreme Court and was remanded back to the Arizona Court of Appeals, 

Gamez’s convictions and sentences were affirmed and the Court of Appeals court 

filed its mandate on April 18, 2006. Exs. G, H. Gamez then had 30 days from the 

date the Court of Appeals issued its mandate, until May 18, 2006, to file a timely 

PCR notice. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a) (“In a Rule 32 of-right proceeding, the notice 

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must be filed within . . . thirty days after the issuance of the order and mandate in the 

direct appeal . . . .”). Gamez did not file his first PCR notice until October 26, 2006. 

Ex. I; Isley v. Arizona Department of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 

2004) (noting that in Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of 

post-conviction relief is filed even though the petition is not filed until later). 

Because Gamez did not have a “properly filed application for State post-conviction 

or other collateral review application” pending between the filing of the mandate on 

direct appeal and the filing of his first PCR notice, the statute of limitations ran for 

161 days. The trial court dismissed Gamez’s PCR petition on December 8, 2008. 

Ex. X. He then had 30 days to file a petition for review in the appellate court. 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.9(c). Because Gamez did not seek review of his PCR petition, his 

conviction became final on January 8, 2009. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, -- U.S. --, 132 

S.Ct. 641, 656 (2012) (for a state prisoner who does not seek review in the state’s 

highest court, the judgment becomes final on the date that the time for seeking such 

review expires); but see Samaniego v. Ryan, 2011 WL 7109366, *3 (D.Ariz. Dec.1, 

2011) (petition for post-conviction relief remained pending until the date the trial 

court summarily dismissed the proceeding and because petitioner did not appeal 

dismissal, the statute of limitations began to run the day after dismissal). The 

deadline for Gamez to file the instant petition came 204 (365-161) days later, on 

August 1, 2009. The instant action was filed on August 27, 2012, more than three 

years after the expiration of the AEDPA statute of limitations had expired. 

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 As Respondents note, Gamez’s second and third PCR petitions do not impact 

the limitations calculation because both were filed after the AEDPA deadline expired 

and were not properly filed. Gamez’s second PCR petition was filed on March 15, 

2010, and his third was filed on March 23, 2012. Exs. Y, MM. An untimely state 

post-conviction peititon does not restart an already expired AEDPA statute of 

limiations. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). Moreover, the 

Arizona Court of Appeals found the claims precluded under Arizona law. Exs. JJ, 

TT. As such, the petitions were not “properly filed.” See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 

U.S. 408, 414 (2005). Thus, absent equitable tolling, the petition is untimely. 

B. Equitable Tolling is Unavailable 

 Gamez does not contend that his petition was timely filed under the AEDPA. 

However, he does argue that he is entitled to equitable tolling and that his untimely 

filing is excused by Martinez v. Ryan, -- U.S. --, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012). Gamez is 

entitled to equitable tolling if he can demonstrate “’(1) that he has been pursuing his 

rights diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way’” to 

prevent him from timely filing his petition. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 130 

S.Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). 

To qualify as extraordinary, a circumstance must be one that is “beyond a prisoner’s 

control,” that “make[s] it impossible to file a petition on time.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 

F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Moreover, an extraordinary circumstance must be 

attributable to “external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence[.]” Id. 

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 In his reply, Gamez offers several justifications for his late filing. He claims 

that the prison’s paralegal would not assist him and that he was functioning under 

“systemic deprivation of access to court.” Reply, p. 5. He also alleges that during the 

relevant periods, he was suffering from a serious mental disability. The Court notes, 

however, that these purported extraordinary circumstances did little to hamper his 

pursuit of other claims. For example, from August 2010 through December 2012, 

Gamez actively litigated at least two civil rights claims. See Gamez v. Ryan, CV 10-

2663-PHX-JWS; Gamez v. Ryan, CV 10-1743-PHX-JWS. He has also pursued 

habeas relief in relation to another state court conviction. See Gamez v. Ryan, CV 

13-687-TUC-JGZ. Moreover, the records filed in this case reflect that he was 

pursuing relief in the state courts in 2010 through 2013 and filing extensive and fullyresearched briefs. See Exs. DD, QQ, SS. Gamez’s able pursuit of this case and the 

others identified above undermines any claim that it was impossible for Gamez to file 

his petition at least three years before he finally did. His actions cannot be 

characterized as diligent and he is therefore not entitled to equitable tolling of the 

AEDPA’s limitations period. See Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2562. 

 Moving on to Gamez’s main contention, he claims that his claims are saved by 

the rule announced in Martinez v. Ryan, -- U.S. --, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012). In 

Martinez, the Supreme Court held that in certain circumstances ineffective assistance 

of counsel claims that were procedurally barred in state court could nevertheless be 

considered when raised in a habeas petition. See Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1314; 

Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. --, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 195 (2013) (extending Martinez rule 

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to state procedural systems that make it “virtually impossible” for an ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim to be presented on direct review). However, as the 

Eleventh Circuit recently explained: 

the Martinez rule explicitly relates to excusing a procedural default of 

ineffective-trial-counsel claims and does not apply to AEDPA's statute 

of limitations or the tolling of that period. The § 2254 ineffective-trialcounsel claims in Martinez and Trevino were not barred by AEDPA's 

one-year limitations period. Instead, those § 2254 claims were 

dismissed under the doctrine of procedural default because the 

petitioners never timely or properly raised them in the state courts 

under the states' procedural rules. At no point in Martinez or Trevino

did the Supreme Court mention the “statute of limitations,” AEDPA's 

limitations period, or tolling in any way. 

Arthur v. Thomas, 739 F.3d 611, 630 (11th Cir. 2014). 

 As in Arthur, Gamez’s case does not turn on a showing of “cause” under the 

procedural default doctrine. Gamez’s petition is subject to dismissal because it was 

filed well after the expiration of the AEDPA statute of limitations. As he is unable to 

establish grounds for equitable tolling, it is the AEDPA limitations period, and not a 

state procedural rule, that bars his petition under section 2244(d)(1). The Martinez

rule provides no grounds to avoid that result. 

III. ACTUAL INNOCENCE

 In his reply, Gamez also argues that under the equitable exception to the 

statute of limitations for actual innocence recognized in Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 

929, 932 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), he is entitled to the gateway around the statute of 

limitations. Reply, p. 16-18. The Court in Lee, relying on the United States Supreme 

Court decision in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), held “that a credible claim of 

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actual innocence constitutes an equitable exception to AEDPA’s limitations.” Lee, 

653 F.3d at 932. To meet the equitable exception of the actual innocence gateway, 

Gamez must “support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable 

evidence . . . that was not presented at trial.” Id. at 939 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 

324). “The evidence of innocence must be ‘so strong that a court cannot have 

confidence in the outcome of the trial.’” Id. at 938 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. 316). 

The Court must then determine whether “it is more likely than not that no reasonable 

juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Id. at 938 (quoting 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). 

 Here, Gamez does not present any new facts or law that would allow him to 

pass through the actual innocence gateway. His argument is that cell phone records 

exist that prove “the Pima County Attorney’s Office and the Tucson Police 

Department suborned police perjury during the search and seizure hearing and at 

trial.” Reply, p. 16. Gamez does not explain how these cell phone records might 

prove his actual innocence. Moreover, his claim of actual innocence is undermined 

by his claim that contamination at his elementary school caused him to commit his 

crimes. See Amended Petition, pp. 16-18. In any case, his arguments are not the sort 

that establish legal error and do not constitute “new reliable evidence . . . that was not 

presented at trial.” Lee, 653 F.3d at 939 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). 

Therefore, Gamez has not presented new evidence establishing that “it is more likely 

than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new 

evidence.” Id. at 938 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). Accordingly, Gamez cannot 

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pass through the actual innocence gateway around the AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations, and his petition is untimely. 

IV. RECOMMENDATION

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the 

District Court, after its independent review, deny Gamez’s Amended Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 17). 

 This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), 

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District 

Court’s judgment. 

 However, the parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of 

this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the District 

Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to 

file a response to the objections. Replies shall not be filed without first obtaining 

leave to do so from the District Court. If any objections are filed, this action should 

be designated case number: CV 12-0639-TUC-RM. Failure to timely file objections 

 . . . . 

 . . . . 

 . . . . 

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to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a 

waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. See United States v. 

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003)(en banc). 

 Dated this 30th day of January, 2015. 

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