Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-00327/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-00327-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgement

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HUMU, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

HULU, LLC,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-00327-HSG 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 30

On January 18, 2019, Plaintiff Humu, Inc. (“Humu”) brought suit against Defendant Hulu, 

LLC (“Hulu”) seeking declaratory judgments of: (1) no likelihood of confusion, trademark 

infringement, or unfair competition; and (2) no dilution. Dkt. No. 1. Defendant subsequently

provided Plaintiff a covenant not to sue, after which Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. See 

Dkt. Nos. 30-1 Ex. 2 (“Covenant”), 25 (“FAC”). 

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint, 

briefing for which is complete. See Dkt. Nos. 30 (“Mot.”), 43 (“Opp.”), 44 (“Reply”). Defendant 

contends that the Court lacks jurisdiction in light of Defendant’s provision of a covenant not to 

sue. The Court finds the disputed covenant does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction and thus

DENIES Defendant’s motion.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to actual “cases” 

and “controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. And “[t]he rule in federal cases is that an actual 

controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.” 

Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 n.10 (1974). “A case becomes moot—and therefore no 

longer a ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ for purposes of Article III—‘when the issues presented are no 

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longer “live” or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.’” Already, LLC v. 

Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013) (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982) (per 

curiam)). A defendant, however, “cannot automatically moot a case simply by ending its unlawful 

conduct once sued.” Id. The measure for when voluntary cessation deprives the tribunal of power 

to hear and determine a case is whether the defendant has carried its “formidable burden of 

showing that it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be 

expected to recur.” Id. (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 

528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)). As concerns a covenant not to sue, courts consider, “in addition to 

other factors: (1) the language of the covenant, (2) whether the covenant covers future, as well as 

past, activity and products, and (3) evidence of intention or lack of intention, on the part of the 

party asserting jurisdiction, to engage in new activity or to develop new potentially infringing 

products that arguably are not covered by the covenant.” ChromaDex, Inc. v. Elysium Health, 

Inc., No. SACV 16-02277-CJC(DFMx), 2017 WL 7080237 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2017) (quoting 

Nike, Inc. v. Already, LLC, 663 F.3d 89, 96 (2d Cir.), aff’d 568 U.S. 85 (2013)).

II. DISCUSSION

The parties dispute turns on whether Defendant’s covenant not to sue here sufficiently 

tracks the covenant not to sue provided in Nike, which mooted the actual controversy there. 

Defendant contends that its proffered covenant “mirrors the covenant that the Supreme Court held 

mooted the Nike case and thus meets each of the facts identified by the Nike [C]ourt.” Mot. at 8. 

Most important, Defendant claims that “like the Nike covenant, Hulu agrees to refrain from 

‘making any claim(s) or demand(s)’ on account of any possible cause of action based on or 

involving trademark infringement, unfair competition, or dilution based on Humu’s use of the 

HUMU mark as alleged in the Original Complaint.” See Mot. at 8. But Defendant 

mischaracterizes the covenant at issue here. Unlike the covenant in Nike, Defendant’s covenant 

contains a critical proviso, omitted from Defendant’s just-cited description, and underlined in the 

following:

Hulu . . . hereby unconditionally and irrevocably covenants to refrain 

from making any claim(s) or demand(s) . . . on account of any 

possible cause of action based on or involving trademark 

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infringement, unfair competition, or dilution, under state or federal 

law in the United States relating to the Hulu Marks based on Humu’s 

use of the HUMU mark in the manner described in the Complaint in

connection with the Humu Services offered to the Humu Customers, 

or in connection with any other goods or services similar to the Humu 

Services marketed directly to the Humu Customers . . . .

See Covenant at 1–2 (emphasis added). 

As is relevant to the pending motion, Defendant articulates its own definitions of “Humu 

Services” and “Humu Customers” for purposes of the covenant, which Plaintiff maintains do not 

encompass all of Plaintiff’s existing or imminently planned activities. See id. at 1 (defining the 

terms “Humu Services” and “Humu Customers”); Opp. at 9–13.

1 For example, Defendant’s 

definition of “Humu Customers” in the covenant encompasses “large business enterprises and 

organizations interested in implementing researched-based tools to motivate employees across the 

organization to take small steps to improve employee happiness, which in turn drives high morale 

and employee retention.” See Covenant at 1. But Plaintiff notes that while it “tends to be retained 

by large organizations and employers,” it offers its services to “individual users.” See Opp. at 11–

12. Further, the covenant’s limitation to services “marketed directly to the Humu Customers”

plausibly does not cover general marketing activities, in which Plaintiff has engaged and intends 

to continue to engage. See Covenant at 2 (emphasis added); Opp. at 14. 

The totality of the circumstances shows there remains a controversy for the Court to 

exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment claims. Given the critical proviso 

language, and contrary to Defendant’s arguments, the disputed covenant not to sue differs in 

material ways from the covenant at issue in Nike, or in any other case the parties identified. Based 

on the language of the covenant itself, the Court thus cannot conclude that it is “absolutely clear” 

that Defendant’s covenant eliminated all potential infringement disputes related to Plaintiff’s 

actual and imminently planned uses of the HUMU mark. See Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S.

at 91.

//

 

1 Although Defendant relies on language from the initial complaint for its defined terms, it is not 

clear that Plaintiff meant for those particular high-level descriptions of its business to be an

exhaustive description of its actual and potential services and customer base.

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III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

 7/17/2019

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