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Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-10426

Summary Calendar

BRADY HICKS, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

Deputy/Jailer LINGLE, Tarrant County Sheriff,

Defendant-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:06-CV-311

Before JOLLY, WIENER, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff-Appellant Brady Hicks, Jr., Texas prisoner # 1254510, appeals

the district court’s final judgment granting Defendant-Appellee’s motion to

dismiss Hick’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies. Hicks contends that the district court improperly went

beyond the pleadings and failed to accept the facts alleged in his amended

complaint as true, and that he exhausted all administrative remedies available

to him in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). We affirm.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

March 17, 2010

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

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No. 09-10426

2

We review the grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P.

12(b)(6) de novo. Shanbaum v. United States, 32 F.3d 180, 182 (5th Cir. 1994).

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we accept all well-pleaded facts as true,

viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. In re Katrina Canal

Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007). “However, conclusory

allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not

suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.” Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass’n,

987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993). Generally, when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss, the district court may not look beyond the pleadings. Cinel

v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1341 (5th Cir. 1994). That court may, however, refer

to matters of public record, as well as to documents attached to the complaint.

Id. at 1343 n.6 (public records); Lovelace v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 78 F.3d

1015, 1017 (5th Cir. 1996) (documents attached to complaint). In addition,

“[d]ocuments that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss are considered

part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are

central to [the] claim.” Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, 394 F.3d 285, 288

(5th Cir. 2004). 

In May 2004, while a pretrial detainee in the Tarrant County Jail (TCJ),

a fellow inmate assaulted Hicks while he was restrained in a restraint chair. In

his amended complaint, Hicks alleged that the defendants violated his Eighth

and Fourteenth Amendment rights by (1) failing to protect him from being

assaulted, (2) failing to train deputies on ways to protect pretrial detainees, (3)

failing to enact or follow TCJ policies on protecting restrained inmates from

assaults by fellow inmates and from other injuries, (4) failing to provide proper

medical treatment following the assault, and (5) placing him in a restraint chair.

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, inmates must exhaust “such

administrative remedies as are available” prior to bringing a civil action.

§ 1997e(a). Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, and “inmates are not

required to specifically plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.”

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Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Dismissal may be appropriate, however,

when, on its face the complaint establishes the inmate’s failure to exhaust. See

Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2007). 

The TCJ provides a two-step procedure for presenting a grievance, viz., (1)

an inmate must send a written statement directly to the Grievance Board, which

should respond within 60 days, then (2) if an inmate is dissatisfied with the

Grievance Board’s response, he may appeal in writing to the Inmate Grievance

Appeal Board within five days after receiving the written response to his

grievance. In his amended complaint, Hicks alleged that he filed grievances

complaining of the assault and attached copies of three grievances he filed with

the TCJ. The attached grievances arise from and mention the May assault while

restrained. Considering that § 1997e does not indicate how specific a prisoner’s

administrative grievance must be, see Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 516

(5th Cir. 2004), and that under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard of review all

well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true, we accept Hicks’s allegation that he

filed a proper grievance for the assault. Therefore, he is deemed to have

exhausted the first step of the two-step grievance procedure after the 60-day

time period for response expired. See Underwood v. Wilson, 151 F.3d 292, 295

(5th Cir. 1998) (overruled on other grounds). 

Even so, Hicks admittedly did not file appeals to the Inmate Grievance

Appeal Board prior to instituting his § 1983 suit. Hicks contends that the

exhaustion requirement was satisfied because TCJ officials never responded to

his grievances, but courts may no longer read a futility exception into the

exhaustion requirement. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739-41 & n.6 (2001).

We have held that “available administrative remedies are exhausted when the

time limits for the prison’s response set forth in the prison Grievance 

Procedures have expired,” Underwood, 151 F.3d at 295. In Underwood, however,

the inmate had “timely filed his grievances and appeals at each step of the . . .

process.” 151 F.3d at 295. Therefore, our holding in Underwood stands for the

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No. 09-10426

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proposition that an inmate has exhausted administrative remedies when he

follows each step of the prison grievance process without ever having received

a response from the prison. Here, however, the TCJ grievance process explicitly

sets out two steps, and Hicks failed to comply with the second step.

Consequently, Hicks’s failure to pursue his grievance remedy to conclusion

constitutes a failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Wright v.

Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d 357, 358 (5th Cir. 2001). 

Hicks also contends that the district court erred when it failed to rule on

his objections to Deputy Lingle’s prejudicial statements and to Deputy Lingle’s

attempt to reserve the right to file a subsequent motion to dismiss on the basis

of qualified immunity. Having determined that Hicks failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies, the district court was not required to address these

issues. See § 1997e(a). 

Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. Hicks’s motions

to tax costs to the losing party and for the appointment of counsel are DENIED.

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