Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-03886/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-03886-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

J. EDWARDS JEWELRY DISTRIBUTING, LLC., 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

WELLS FARGO & COMPANY, ET AL., 

Defendants.

CASE NO. 18-cv-03886-YGR 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 56 

Plaintiff J. Edwards Jewelry Distributing, LLC (“J. Edwards”) brings this action 

individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated against defendants Wells Fargo & 

Company, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (collectively, “Wells Fargo”) and Does 1-10 for violating the 

California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq. (“UCL”). (Dkt. No. 

55 (“SAC”) at 1-2, 36-37.) Specifically, plaintiff alleges that Wells Fargo “has created and 

maintains a credit card program through which it actively encourages retailers to build the ‘fees’ 

that these merchants must pay Wells Fargo into the regular price of goods and services, while 

representing to retail customers that the goods and services that they purchase are being financed 

at zero percent interest[,]” (the “Program”) and, thereby, “misled [plaintiff and class members] 

into promoting [d]efendants’ illegal financing scheme, and into paying unnecessary sales taxes.” 

(Id. at 2, 36-37.) 

On November 19, 2018, the Court granted Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s 

initial complaint and provided plaintiff leave to amend. (Dkt. No. 39 (“MTD Initial Order”).) 

Plaintiff filed its first amended complaint (“FAC”) on December 6, 2018. (Dkt. No. 40.) On 

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February 8, 2019, following oral argument by counsel on February 5, 2019, the Court granted 

Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s FAC and provided plaintiff a second opportunity to 

amend. (Dkt. No. 50 (“MTD FAC Order”).) On March 22, 2019, plaintiff filed a second amended 

complaint (“SAC”). 

Now before the Court is Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s SAC for failure to 

state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).1 (Dkt. No. 41 (“MTD”).) Having carefully considered the 

pleadings and the papers submitted, and for the reasons set forth more fully below, the Court 

hereby GRANTS Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss.2

I. BACKGROUND

The background giving rise to this action is well-known, and the Court will not repeat it 

here. (See MTD Initial Order at 2-3 (summarizing plaintiff’s allegations); see also MTD FAC 

Order at 2-4 (summarizing plaintiff’s additional allegations alleged in the FAC).) Plaintiff’s SAC 

adds a new section to its recitation of facts, “F. Defendants Have Retained and Are Currently in 

Possession of at Least $842 in Sales Taxes that Are Owed to Named Plaintiff J. Edwards Jewelry 

Distributing, LLC.” (SAC at 29.) Therein, plaintiff includes the following additional allegations: 

The tables below detail the Named Plaintiffs’ Jewelry sales transactions which 

were consummated through the Wells Fargo Program within four years of the 

filing of the Original Complaint, and reveal the corresponding amounts of sales 

tax collected by Wells Fargo, the portion of those sales taxes that were remitted to 

Named Plaintiff, and the portion of those sales taxes that remain in Wells Fargo’s 

possession: 

 1

 The Court has reviewed the papers submitted by the parties in connection with 

defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Court has determined that the motion is appropriate for 

decision without oral argument, as permitted by Civil Local Rule 7-1(b) and Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 78. See also Lake at Las Vegas Investors Group, Inc. v. Pacific Malibu Dev. Corp., 

933 F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, the Court VACATES the hearing scheduled for 

June 4, 2019. 

2

 In support of its motion, Wells Fargo requests that the Court take judicial notice of four 

New Mexico state court documents. (See Dkt. No. 57 (“RJN”).) The Court previously took 

judicial notice of these documents in its orders dismissing plaintiff’s initial complaint (see MTD 

Initial Order at 8 n. 7) and dismissing plaintiff’s FAC (see MTD FAC Order at 2 n. 2) and finds 

judicial notice appropriate here for the same reasons as stated in those orders. Accordingly, the 

Court GRANTS Wells Fargo’s request for judicial notice of these public records. The Court will 

afford them their proper evidentiary weight. 

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Plaintiff states affirmatively that none of the transactions tabulated in Table #1 

and Table #2 above were undertaken or consummated in violation of the consent 

decrees entered into by Plaintiff with the New Mexico Attorney General because 

(1) paragraphs 9 and 17 of the August 28, 2012 Partial Stipulated Consent Decree 

(Doc 42-1, Exh. C pp. 5 & 7) specifically allowed Plaintiff to offer financing 

through the Wells Fargo and other third party programs; and (2) paragraph 14 of 

the August 28, 2012 Partial Stipulated Consent Decree (Doc 42-1, Exh. C, p. 6) 

specifically deferred “the question of whether credit card payments may be 

accepted by JED when discounting from the sticker price”; if the parties 

themselves could not resolve that issue, it was – according to the terms of 

paragraph 14 – to be “submitted to the Court for its determination.” This precise 

issue was neither resolved by the parties nor submitted to the Court. Thus, it was 

not addressed in the Amended and Final Consent Decree entered on August 20, 

2013. (Doc 42-1, Exh. D.) 

The New Mexico Attorney General specifically allowed Plaintiff to continue 

utilizing the Wells Fargo Program and its associated discounts that are at issue in 

this case because the New Mexico Attorney General simply did not understand 

Table #1: El Paso Location Sales 

Date of 

Sale 

Name of Customer Gross 

Amount of 

Sale 

Sales Tax Remitted from 

Wells Fargo to Plaintiff 

Portion of Sales Tax 

Retained by Wells 

Fargo 

6/28/14 [Redacted] 1,104.00 62.21 18.93 

6/28/14 [Redacted] 1,288.18 76.09 22.09 

6/28/14 [Redacted] 3,068.89 181.26 52.63 

6/30/14 [Redacted] 151.55 8.95 2.60 

7/2/14 [Redacted] 7,252.76 428.39 124.37 

7/3/14 [Redacted] 595.37 35.16 10.21 

7/5/14 [Redacted] 1,182.09 69.82 20.27 

TOTALS $14,642.84 $ 861.88 $ 251.10 

Table #2: Albuquerque Location Sales 

Date of 

Sale 

Name of Customer Gross 

Amount of 

Sale 

Sales Tax Remitted from 

Wells Fargo to Plaintiff 

Portion of Sales Tax 

Retained by Wells 

Fargo 

6/28/14 [Redacted] 2,833.36 160.21 46.51 

6/30/14 [Redacted] 2,209.55 124.93 36.27 

7/18/14 [Redacted] 6,723.88 380.18 110.38 

7/19/14 [Redacted] 208.65 11.80 3.42 

7/29/14 [Redacted] 2,922.17 165.23 47.97 

8/1/14 [Redacted] 4,999.04 282.66 82.06 

8/15/14 [Redacted] 8,702.00 492.03 142.85 

8/16/14 [Redacted] 4,257.53 240.73 69.89 

8/16/14 [Redacted] 3172.55 179.38 52.08

TOTALS $36,028.73 $2,037.15 $ 591.43

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that the Wells Fargo Program was violative of the federal Truth in Lending Act. 

And – until its sales taxes were audited in 2016 – neither did Plaintiff. Indeed, the 

discounting that the New Mexico Attorney General took issue with, and which 

were the subject of the New Mexico consent decrees, were separate and distinct 

discounts from those discounts at issue in this case offered through the Wells 

Fargo program. 

(SAC at 29-32.) 

Additionally, and relevant to the instant motion, plaintiff adds the following in support of 

his UCL cause of action: “More specifically, for purposes of damages and the statute of 

limitations, each of the transactions referenced in section VII.F. of this complaint, standing alone 

resulted in a separate and independent violation of Unfair Competition Law Cal. Bus. & Prof. 

Code §§ 17200, et seq.” (SAC at 37.) 

Plaintiff’s SAC also eliminates the FAC’s discussion of the investigation of J. Edwards by 

the Albuquerque office of the New Mexico Attorney General (compare FAC at 24-25 with SAC 

at 24-25) as well as the FAC’s sections titled “Fraudulent Concealment Allegations” and “Tolling 

of the Statue of Limitations” (compare FAC at 30-34 with SAC at 27-29). Otherwise, plaintiff’s 

SAC is identical to the FAC filed on December 6, 2018. 

Plaintiff’s SAC also attaches six exhibits, identical to Exhibits 1-4 and 6-7 attached to the 

FAC as well as the initial complaint. (See Dkt. Nos. 1-1, 40-1, 55-1.) The SAC eliminates 

Exhibit 5 to the FAC as well as the initial complaint, an email from Lori Chavez of the New 

Mexico Attorney General’s Office to Steven D. Looney regarding “J. Edwards Question of Law” 

dated October 11, 2012. (Dkt. No. 40-1, Ex. 5.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Dismissal for failure to state a claim 

under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper if there is a “lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 

1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 

Cir. 1988)). The complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim [for] relief that is plausible 

on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its 

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face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678 (2009). If the facts alleged do not support a reasonable inference of liability, stronger than a 

mere possibility, the claim must be dismissed. Id. at 678-79; see also In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 

536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that a court is not required to accept as true 

“allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable 

inferences.”). 

If a court dismisses a complaint, it should give leave to amend unless “the pleading could 

not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. 

Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990). 

III. DISCUSSION

A claim for violation of the UCL must be brought within four years of the date the cause of 

action accrues. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17208. Under California law, a “cause of action accrues 

when [it] is complete with all of its elements—those elements being wrongdoing, harm, and 

causation.” Aryeh v. Canon Bus. Solutions, Inc., 55 Cal. 4th 1185, 1191 (2013) (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted). Said another way, “a UCL deceptive practices claim should accrue 

only when a reasonable person would have discovered the factual basis for a claim.” Id. at 1195. 

As in its FAC, plaintiff’s SAC alleges that Wells Fargo “has created and maintains a credit 

card program through which it actively encourages retailers to build the ‘fees’ that these merchants 

must pay Wells Fargo into the regular price of goods and services, while representing to retail 

customers that the goods and services that they purchase are being financed at zero percent 

interest[,]” and, thereby, “misled [plaintiff and class members] into promoting [d]efendants’ illegal 

financing scheme, and into paying unnecessary sales taxes.” (SAC at 2, 36-37.) 

In its Order on defendants’ previous motion to dismiss, the Court found that as of October 

2012, plaintiff had notice that Wells Fargo’s credit card Program constituted an illegal financing 

scheme under the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) and the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (“EFT”). 

Based thereon, plaintiff reasonably could have discovered, and seemingly did discover, the factual 

basis for its UCL claim that it had been misled regarding the nature of that financing scheme and 

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therefore the statute of limitations on plaintiff’s UCL claims against Wells Fargo regarding the 

alleged illegal financing scheme expired in October 2016. (MTD FAC Order at 6 (citing Aryeh, 

55 Cal. 4th at 1195; Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17208; Rivera v. Peri & Sons Farms, Inc., 735 F.3d 

892, 901 (9th Cir. 2013).) The Court based this determination on (1) allegations in the FAC that 

the Attorney General’s office contacted J. Edwards in October of 2012 and informed plaintiff of 

the office’s position that although the TILA and EFT do not apply to J. Edwards, “the application 

of discounts, previously utilized by J. Edwards, constitutes a hidden finance charge” as defined by 

those statutes (MTD FAC Order at 6 (citing FAC at 24-25)); and (2) the exhibits attached to the 

FAC show that plaintiff learned of the allegedly illegal nature of Wells Fargo’s credit card 

Program as a result of the New Mexico Attorney General’s investigation and lawsuit (Id. (citing 

FAC, Ex. 6 at ECF 53; Ex. 7 at ECF 57)). 

The fact that plaintiff has now eliminated these allegations and this exhibit from its SAC 

does not impact the Court’s analysis. See Stanislaus Food Products Co. v. USS-POSCO 

Industries, 782 F.Supp.2d 1059, 1075 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (“The Court does not ignore prior 

allegations in determining the plausibility of current pleadings.”); see also Cole v. Sunnyvale, No. 

C-09-05017 RMW, 2010 WL 532428, *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010) (noting that a court may 

“consider the prior allegations [from earlier complaints] as part of its ‘context-specific’ inquiry 

based on its judicial experience and common sense to assess whether the Third Amended 

Complaint plausibly suggests an entitlement to relief, as required under Iqbal”). In other words, 

J. Edwards cannot avoid application of the statute of limitations by simply deleting from its 

amended complaint allegations evidencing its discovery of the factual basis of its UCL claim. 

As it did in opposition to the previous motion to dismiss, plaintiff again avers that Wells 

Fargo’s conduct subjects it to the “continuous wrong” and “continuous accrual” principles of 

statutes of limitation and, therefore, that plaintiffs incurred an injury in fact under the UCL within 

four years of the initiation of this action. (Dkt. No. 58 (“Opp.”) at 6-9.) Although plaintiff’s SAC 

responds to the Court’s footnote that “the FAC does [not] include any information or allegation 

regarding transactions occurring within the four-year window immediately preceding filing of the 

initial complaint” (MTD FAC Order at 7 n. 5) by including allegations of “jewelry sales 

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transactions which were consummated through the Wells Fargo Program within four years of the 

filing of the Original Complaint” (SAC at 29-32), plaintiff still fails to provide any persuasive 

authority for finding that compliance with federal, or state, law constitutes a continuing obligation 

for UCL purposes within the meaning of the continual accrual principle as opposed to that 

applying to consumers or contracts.3 

Plaintiff asserts TILA as the sole basis for finding a continuing obligation to support a 

finding of continual accrual of its UCL claim. (See Opp. at 6-9.) However, every federal court to 

consider the issue has determined that consumers are the only persons who have a cause of action 

under TILA. See, e.g., Johnson v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, 374 F.App’x 868, 874 (11th Cir. 2010). 

(See Opp. at 7 (citing Bilyue v. Guy, No. CV 17-4546 FMO (ASx), 2017 WL 7066400, at *1 (C.D. 

Cal. 2017) (applying the theory of continuous accrual to plaintiffs’ UCL claims and finding that 

plaintiffs may recover under a recording contract for the four years preceding the filing of the 

 3

 Plaintiff’s citation to Small Axe Enterprises, Inc. v. Amscan, Inc., does not persuade. 

(Opp. at 8 (citing Small Axe, No. 16-cv-00981-BEN-WVG, 2017 WL 1479236, at * 6 (S.D. Cal. 

Apr. 25, 2017)).) In Small Axe, the court found that the continuous accrual doctrine applied where 

plaintiff had alleged that defendants had engaged in the continuous sale of their products in 

violation of the Lanham Act. Small Axe, 2017 WL 1479236, at *6. In support of this conclusion, 

the court cites only to the California Supreme Court’s decision in Aryeh. Id. (citing 292 P.3d at 

875-881). In Aryeh, the California Supreme Court explained that “[t]o determine whether the 

continuous accrual doctrine applies . . . , [a court] look[s] not to the claim’s label as a UCL claim 

but to the nature of the obligation allegedly breached.” Aryeh, 292 P.3d at 881 (emphasis 

supplied). There, the court found that because pursuant to the applicable rental agreement 

between the parties the defendant, Canon, billed plaintiff Aryeh on a recurring monthly basis, “the 

duty Canon owed—the duty not to impose unfair charges in monthly bills—was a continuing one, 

susceptible to recurring breaches[,]” Aryeh was not foreclosed from seeking recover for charges to 

the extend they fall within the four-year statute of limitations period. Id. Here, plaintiff has not 

alleged a duty or obligation arising out of a contractual obligation. (See, generally, SAC.) 

Moreover, plaintiff’s claim is factually distinct from that in Small Axe. In Small Axe, the 

plaintiff’s allegations included a claim for violation of the Lanham Act, the continuous nature of 

which formed the basis of the court’s finding that the continuous accrual doctrine applied. Here, 

plaintiff asserts, as the sole basis for a continuing obligation, the fact that defendants were 

obligated to comply with the TILA. (See Opp. at 6-9.) Although the Court did not address the 

sufficiency of plaintiff’s TILA claim, found in the initial complaint, in its November 18, 2018 

Order granting defendants’ first motion to dismiss (MTD Initial Order at 7 (noting that plaintiff 

conceded that its TILA claims were time-barred)), TILA is a consumer protection statute. See 15 

U.S.C. § 1601(a) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit 

terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available 

to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and 

unfair credit billing and credit card practices.”) (emphasis supplied). 

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complaint).)4 Accordingly, plaintiff again fails to allege any continuing obligation underlying 

that harm of which it was a party.5 (See Opp. at 12.) 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff 

requests leave to amend “to address any pleading issues the Court raised for the first time in its 

Order on Defendants’ second Motion to Dismiss.”6 (Opp. at 29-30.) In support of this request, 

plaintiff explains that it did not address in the FAC the statute of limitations issue the Court 

addressed in its Order on defendants’ second motion to dismiss, because the Court’s first order did 

not address did not address this issue. (Id. at 30.) 

Because this Order is again based upon the statute of limitations issue addressed in the 

Court’s February 8, 2019 Order on defendants’ second motion to dismiss, plaintiff has already had 

multiple opportunities to amend its complaint, including an opportunity to respond to the Court’s 

February 8 Order addressing the statute of limitations issue addressed herein. See MTD FAC 

Order; see also Nat’l Council of La Raza v. Chegavske, 800 F.3d 1032, 1041 (9th Cir. 2015). 

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES plaintiff’s SAC with prejudice. 

 4

 See, by contrast, cases regarding ongoing contractual obligations: Tsemetzin v. Coast 

Fed’l Sav & Loan Ass’n, 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1344 (1997) (finding that the statute of limitations 

commenced under a rental agreement for each month when the increased payment was due 

pursuant to rental contract and not paid); Armstrong Petroleum Corp. v. Tri-Valley Oil & Gas Co., 

116 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1388-89 (2004) (finding that because performance of underlying 

contractual obligations is severable due to monthly payment obligation and therefore created a 

recurring obligation); Walker v. Blackground Records, LLC, 2017 WL 8186040, *4 (E.D. Cal. 

2017) (finding continuous accrual where defendants allegedly failed to make “periodic” payments 

owed under various recording contracts). 

5

 As the Court previously noted in its February 8, 2019 Order, the Program dealer 

agreement, which plaintiff attached to each of its complaints, provides for termination by either 

party at any time, specifying that the agreement “will remain effective until one party gives the 

other party written notice of its decision to terminate” the agreement. (Dkt. No. 55-1, Ex. 1 

(“Agreement”) ¶ 10(a); see also MTD FAC Order at 8 n. 7.) Once again, plaintiff has not alleged 

that it was forced to remain a party to the agreement. Nor has plaintiff alleged that the customer’s 

use of the Program resulted in a recurring payment scheme that might create a continuing 

obligation. (See SAC at 18-21 (describing a Program transaction as a one-time exchange between 

customer, Wells Fargo, and plaintiff); see also MTD FAC Order at 8 n. 7.) 

6

 The Court notes that this appears to be a typographical error and that, based upon 

plaintiff’s explanation of the basis of its request, it intended to ask for an opportunity to address 

any issues raised for the first time in the Court’s order on the instant motion to dismiss, which is 

defendants’ third such motion. 

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This Order terminates Docket Number 56. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 31, 2019 

 YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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