Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00017/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00017-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC MEYER,

Plaintiff,

vs.

WORLD BANK; INT’L MONETARY 

FUND; EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-00017-GPC-JLB

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

AND DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

AS FRIVOLOUS PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)

[ECF Nos. 3, 5]

ERIC MEYER (“Plaintiff”), a psychiatric patient at Chicago Read Mental Health 

Center in Chicago, Illinois, and proceeding pro se, filed this civil action using the Court’s 

form Complaint pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and naming the 

World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Central Bank as 

Defendants on January 4, 2019. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.)

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fee at the time he submitted his Complaint,

and did not file a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). Therefore, on January 30, 2019, the Court dismissed the case pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1914(a), but granted Plaintiff leave to file an IFP motion. (See ECF No. 2.) The 

Court further noted that it was unclear whether Plaintiff was a prisoner as defined by 28 

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U.S.C. § 1915(h), but advised that if he is, he would be subject to the trust account 

certification requirements in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), and required to pay the full civil 

filing pursuant to the installment payment provisions set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). (Id.

at 2-3.) 

Plaintiff responded by filing two separate IFP motions—one in which he claims to 

be “incarcerated” and another in which he answers that question with a “?” (See ECF No. 

3 at 1; ECF No. 5.) Also attached to one of these Motions are dozens of handwritten, 

rambling claims involving Hillary Clinton, Planned Parenthood, Chicago tattoo parlors, 

Jamie Lyn Spears, “DHS,” Supreme Court justices, food poisoning, illegal drugs, and 

describing various sexually explicit and obviously delusional scenarios. (See ECF No. 5 

at 11-34.)

II. Motions to Proceed IFP

As the Court noted in its January 30, 2019 Order, all parties instituting any civil 

action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United States, except an application for 

writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).1 An action 

may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee only if he is granted 

leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 

1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). Section 1915(a)(2) requires all persons seeking to proceed 

without full prepayment of fees to file an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets 

possessed and demonstrates an inability to pay. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 

1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015).

Plaintiff claims to be “imprisoned” and “locked up” at “Read Hospital,” see ECF 

No. 5 at 19, but it remains unclear whether he is “accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, 

 

1

In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June. 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of 

parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h); Taylor

v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

2 Therefore, the Court will presume 

Plaintiff is not subject to those provisions of § 1915 that apply only to prisoners, and 

review his IFP applications just as it would those filed by any other person. See e.g., 

Agyeman v. I.N.S., 296 F.3d 871, 886 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he statutory term ‘prisoner’ is 

limited to an individual who is ‘currently detained as a result of accusation, conviction, or 

sentence for a criminal offense,’” and therefore “does not encompass a civil detainee for 

purposes of the PLRA.”) (citing Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2000)

(emphasis original).

Based on the affidavits Plaintiff has now provided, the Court finds he is unable to 

pay the fees or post securities required to maintain this action, and GRANTS his Motions

to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF Nos. 3, 5).

III. Sua Sponte Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

A. Standard of Review

Nevertheless, because he is proceeding IFP, Plaintiff’s Complaint is still subject to 

sua sponte review, and mandatory dismissal, if it is “frivolous, malicious, fail[s] to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek[s] monetary relief from a defendant 

immune from such relief.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. 

Ct. 1759, 1763 (2015) (pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) “the court shall dismiss the 

case at any time if the court determines that—(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or 

(B) the action or appeal—(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or] (ii) fails to state a claim on 

which relief may be granted.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 

 

2

 Chicago Read is a state mental hospital that operates under the authority of the Illinois 

Department of Health Services and serves the citizens of Cook County, Illinois. See

https://www.dhs.state.il.us/page.aspx?item=61890 (last visited May 6, 2019).

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banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an in 

forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 

845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (holding that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”).

The purpose of § 1915’s screening provisions are “‘to ensure that the targets of 

frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. 

Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health 

Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

The allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint, as well as those included in various 

supplemental documents he has submitted both together with and separate from his IFP 

Motions, are disjointed, rambling, and irrational. For example, Plaintiff names the World 

Bank, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund as Defendants, 

see Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1-2, and he seeks to sue them for violating his “right to a 

reasonable and wholesome world.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff appears to object to Defendants’ 

ownership of “1/3 [of the] earth,” and their “predatory loan” and banking policies as a 

matter of “international law.” (Id.)

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He also claims the International Bank “gave [him] white flour wheat to hurt [his] 

immune system,” and that unidentified cooks and dietitians at Read are poisoning him 

 

3 As the Court noted in its previous Order, even if Plaintiff’s Complaint were not factually 

frivolous, it also lacks an arguable basis in law. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 

(1989); Crowley v. Nevada ex rel. Nevada Sec’y of State, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(“Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any person who, under the color of state 

law, abridges rights ‘unambiguously’ created by the Constitution or laws of the United 

States.”) (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002)) (emphasis added); see 

also Knapp v. Cate, No. 1:08-CV-01779-BAM PC, 2011 WL 5416342, at *7 (E.D. Cal. 

Nov. 8, 2011) (“Plaintiff does not possess any rights enforceable in this section 1983 suit 

for violations of international law.”); accord Washington v. Richard J. Donovan Corr. 

Facility, No. 3:17-CV-01615-MMA-PCL, 2017 WL 8944750, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 

2017).

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with cow’s milk, “Monsanto tomato soup,” and a “yucky salad of sliced cucumbers in 

vinegar.” (Id.) He further wishes to hold Defendants, as well as Supreme Court Justices 

Sonia Sotomayor and Clarence Thomas, former President Barack Obama, Elizabeth 

Warren, Janet Yellen, and Ben Bernanke liable for failing to protect him from a “crisis 

[of] economics” and the “torture” of Haldol injections, when “drug-free healing,” herbs, 

therapeutic touch, and high-energy radio beams “can alter mood better than drugs.” (Id. at 

4-5.)

C. Discussion

These allegations show Plaintiff’s suit is subject to sua sponte dismissal pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) because his claims are obviously frivolous. 

A pleading, like Plaintiff’s Complaint here, is “factual[ly] frivolous[]” under 

§ 1915 if “the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, 

whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Denton 

v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 25-26 (1992). “[A] complaint, containing as it does both 

factual allegations and legal conclusions, is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis 

either in law or in fact.... [The] term ‘frivolous,’ when applied to a complaint, embraces 

not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation.” Neitzke 

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). When determining whether a complaint is 

frivolous, the court need not accept the allegations as true, but must “pierce the veil of the 

complaint’s factual allegations,” id. at 327, to determine whether they are “‘fanciful,’ 

‘fantastic,’ [or] ‘delusional,’” Denton, 504 U.S. at 33 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328). 

The Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations meet these standards because they “rise to 

the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 33. Therefore, 

Plaintiff’s Complaint requires sua sponte dismissal as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and without leave to amend. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127 (noting that 

if a claim is classified as frivolous, “there is by definition no merit to the underlying 

action and so no reason to grant leave to amend.”); see also Waldrop v. Dep’t of Corr., 

No. CIV S-06-1260 DFL EFB P, 2006 WL 2926754, at *1–2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2006) 

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(dismissing as frivolous claims that prison placed radio transmitters in plaintiff’s ears and 

used satellite transmissions to monitor him as an experiment for a web site because they 

“describ[ed] fantastic or delusional scenarios.”). “No matter how sincerely believed by 

Plaintiff, these allegations are simply too fantastic to warrant the expenditure of further 

judicial and private resources.” Athans v. Starbucks Coffee Co., No. CV-06-1841-PHXDGC, 2007 WL 1673883, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 11, 2007) (sua sponte dismissing as 

frivolous pro se litigant’s complaint alleging a conspiracy of “illegal surveillance, 

undercover ‘sting’ operations, and [the] unlawful ‘doping’ of [Starbucks] beverages.”).

IV. Conclusion and Orders

Accordingly, the Court:

(1) GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motions to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a) (ECF Nos. 3, 5); 

(2) DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint sua sponte as frivolous and without 

leave to amend pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i); 

(3) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal of this Order would not be taken in good 

faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); and

(4) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to enter a final judgment of dismissal and 

to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 7, 2019

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