Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02098/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02098-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:427 Social Security Benefits

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gregory J. Hostrawser, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of the

Social Security Administration,

Defendant. 

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No. CV-07-2098-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. §

406(b). 

I. Background and Procedural History

The Court has previously recounted the history of this case as follows:

On October 1, 2004, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance

benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. (Doc. #36 at 1). The

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denied his benefits claim, finding that

“although Plaintiff ha[d] severe impairments of obesity, hypertension, a history

of a shoulder disorder, a back disorder, and lack[ed] residual functional

capacity to perform his past work, he [was] able to perform other light work.”

(Doc. #36 at 2). Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Court seeking judicial

review of the ALJ’s final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. #36

at 2). 

On September 5, 2008, the Court affirmed the ALJ’s final decision to deny

Plaintiff’s disability benefits. (Doc. # 36 at 26). The Court specifically held

that the ALJ’s decision was adequately supported by evidence on the record

and was not in legal error. (Doc. #36 at 26). The United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed that decision on appeal and remanded

for an award of benefits. (Doc. #50-1 at 1). 

Doc. 60.

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II. Discussion

Plaintiff and his counsel entered into a contingency fee agreement which stated that

counsel would receive 25 percent of past-due benefits awarded to Plaintiff as a result of

counsel’s representation of Plaintiff. Doc. #57-2. The agreement also stated that the award

of fees in this case would be governed by 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Id. Counsel seeks $18,492.00

in fees, which represents 25 percent of the past-due benefits that were awarded. Doc. 57 at

1-2. The Government responded and provided a memorandum of law of the legal standard

this Court is to apply in awarding fees, but took no position on whether the fees requested

in this case are reasonable. Doc. 61.

Section 406 establishes “the exclusive regime for obtaining fees for

successful representation of Social Security benefits claimants.” Gisbrecht v.

Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 795-96 (2002). “The statute deals with the

administrative and judicial review stages discretely: § 406(a) governs fees for

representation in administrative proceedings; § 406(b) controls fees for

representation in court.” Id. at 794. Section 406(b) provides that “[w]henever

a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant . . . who was represented

before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of

its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25

percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by

reason of such judgment[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A).

In Gisbrecht, the Supreme Court discussed the meaning of the term

“reasonable fee” in § 406(b). The Court concluded that “§ 406(b) does not

displace contingent-fee agreements as the primary means by which fees are set

for successfully representing Social Security benefits claimants in court.

Rather, § 406(b) calls for court review of such arrangements as an independent

check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in particular cases.” 535 U.S.

at 807. The Court noted that “Congress has provided one boundary line:

Agreements are unenforceable to the extent that they provide for fees

exceeding 25 percent of the past-due benefits.” Id.

Sloan v. Astrue, CV 05-0841-PHX-DCG, 2-3 (D. Ariz April 24, 2007).

Thus, this Court must first “respect the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee

agreements.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (internal

quotations omitted). While looking first to this agreement, this Court must still test the

resulting award for reasonableness. Id. at 1149. In other words, “the district court must first

look to the fee agreement and then adjust downward if the attorney provided substandard

representation or delayed the case, or if the requested fee would result in a windfall.” Id. at

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 “In the event the court chooses not to give effect to the terms of the agreement, it

should state for the record the deduction being made and the reasons therefor[].” Crawford,

586 F.3d at 1151 (quoting Rodriquez v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 739, 746 (6th Cir. 1989)(en banc)).

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 Indeed, courts have found much higher hourly rates to be reasonable. See Sloan,

CV 05-841 at 3 (awarding $566 per hour and collecting cases: Hearn v. Barnhart, 262 F.

Supp. 2d 1033, 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (awarding counsel nearly three times the amount of

his normal hourly rate); Grunseich v. Barnhart, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1035 (C.D. Cal. 2006)

(awarding hourly rate of $600); Yarnevic v. Apfel, 359 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1365-67 (N.D. Ga.

2005) (awarding hourly rate of $643); Claypool v. Barnhart, 294 F. Supp. 2d 829, 833-34

(S.D. W. Va. 2003) (awarding fee equivalent to $1,433 hourly rate); Brown v. Barnhart, 270

F. Supp. 2d 769, 772-73 (W.D. Va. 2003) (awarding fee equivalent to $977 hourly rate)).

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1151.1 In considering reasonableness this Court should consider the following nonexhaustive factors: the character of the representation, the results achieved, performance,

delay, whether the benefits were proportionate to the time spent on the case, and, as an aid

if necessary, the lodestar calculation. Id.

In this case, counsel performed 96.6 hours of work. This results in an hourly rate of

$191.43. Having considered the reasonableness factors summarized in Crawford, the Court

finds $191.43 per hour to be reasonable. Accordingly, the Court will award counsel $18,492

for his representation of Plaintiff.2

III. Conclusion

IT IS ORDERED that the motion for attorney’s fees (Doc. 56) is granted pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Counsel is awarded $18,492 in attorney’s fees, to be paid out of the

sum withheld by Defendant from Plaintiff’s past-due benefits.

DATED this 2nd day of August, 2010.

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