Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00226/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00226-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

 “Doc.” refers to the docket number of filings in this case.

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WO SC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Karl L. Guillen, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Quincy Owens, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 10-0226-PHX-MHM (LOA)

ORDER

Plaintiff Karl L. Guillen, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison ComplexEyman, Special Management Unit I (SMU I), in Florence, Arizona, filed a pro se civil rights

Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and paid the filing fee. (Doc. 9, 11.)1

 The Court

dismissed the Complaint with leave to amend. (Doc. 14.) Plaintiff has filed a First Amended

Complaint and a motion for injunctive relief. (Doc. 17, 18.) The Court will order

Defendants Ryan, Crabtree, Baca, Larson, Owens, Wilson, Fisher, Yielding, Berger,

O’Brien, Putnam, Roberts, Mendoza, Aragon, Hatfield, Renault, White, and Carrillo to

answer Counts I (in part), II (in part), III (in part), and V (in part) of the First Amended

Complaint and will dismiss the remaining claims and Defendants without prejudice. The

Court will deny the motion for injunctive relief. 

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

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a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does not

demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual

allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there

are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 1951. But as the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts must “continue

to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, No. 07-17265, 2010 WL 4673711 at *3

(9th Cir. Nov. 19, 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)).

II. First Amended Complaint

Plaintiff alleges seven counts for violation of due process and 42 U.S.C. § 1981,

unconstitutional conditions of confinement or threats to his health, and retaliation. Plaintiff

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2

 Herpes zoster is “characterized by an eruption of vesicles on one side of the body

following the course of a nerve due to inflammation of ganglia and dorsal nerve roots

resulting from activation of the virus, which in many instances has remained latent for years

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sues the following current or former employees of the Arizona Department of Corrections

(ADC), who worked at the Central Office: Current Director Charles Ryan and former

directors, Terry Stewart and Dora Schriro; Appeals Unit Administrator Hauser; Offender

Services Administrator Stacey Crabtree; and Corrections Officer (CO) IV Baca. He also sues

the following ADC employees who work or worked at the Lewis Complex at relevant times:

Complex Warden Berry Larson; Deputy Warden Quincy Owens; Captains Wilson, Richard

Fisher, and John Yielding; Lieutenants Paula Berger and Michelle O’Brien; Sergeants

Putnam and Smith; CO IV Roberts; CO IIIs Mendoza and Shannon Aragon; CO IIs Hatfield

and Cristina Renault. Plaintiff also sues the following current or former ADC employees

who work or worked at the Eyman Complex: Warden W. White; Deputy Warden Deleena

Carrillo; Assistant Deputy Warden Tuersbuns; Sergeant Sturm; and CO III Cioni. Plaintiff

seeks declaratory, injunctive, compensatory, and punitive relief. 

Plaintiff’s claims relate to (a) his transfer from the Rast Unit in the Lewis Complex

to the Rast Detention Unit (RDU); and (b) his subsequent transfer from the RDU to SMU I,

in the Eyman Complex. Plaintiff challenges the propriety of the transfers, the consequences

flowing from the transfers, and his prolonged confinement in supermax units, such as SMU

I or SMU II. Although not a model of clarity, the following facts appear in the First

Amended Complaint, except as otherwise indicated: 

From January 1, 1996 until June 6, 2006, Plaintiff was held in supermax units. While

in supermax units, Plaintiff’s contact with other inmates and staff was extremely limited, he

was confined for 23 hours a day, and he was allowed only one to five hours of recreation per

week in a concrete bunker with a wire mesh ceiling. (Doc. 17 at 4.) About 10 years ago,

Plaintiff began suffering from herpes zoster (shingles) and has since suffered from postherpetic neuralgia, which Plaintiff states is exacerbated by environmental conditions and

stress.2

 Plaintiff contends these conditions resulted in or were aggravated by his long-term

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following a primary chickenpox infection; the condition is self-limited but may be

accompanied by or followed by severe postherpetic pain.” Stedman’s Medical Dictionary,

180030 (27th ed. 2000). Neuralgia is “[p]ain of a severe, throbbing, or stabbing character

in the course or distribution of a nerve.” Id. at 271340.

3

 Plaintiff may have been classified as a close custody inmate because he had

previously renounced any gang affiliation. On September 13, 1999, Plaintiff pleaded no

contest to the second degree murder of another inmate. See State v. Guillen, No. 2-CA-CR

2009-0411-PR, 2010 WL 1511555 at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2010); see also Guillen v.

Stewart, No. CV01-1337-PHX-MHM (D. Ariz. Dec. 28, 2005) (order denying Rule 60(b)

motion from denial of habeas petition). Plaintiff claims the killing was wrongly

characterized as gang-related by prison officials, rather than self-defense, but he debriefed,

i.e., renounced, any gang affiliation in 2004. (See doc. 17 at 4B.) 

4

 “Verbal harassment or abuse . . . is not sufficient to state a constitutional

deprivation[.]’” Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Collins

v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1979)); Machin v. Costas, No. Civ. 09-444-IEG

(WVG), 2009 WL 3839325 at *15 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2009).

5

 Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support how he knows that these Defendants planted

the evidence. 

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isolation and the lack of exposure to sunlight. Plaintiff also suffered from allergies and

asthma.

On June 6, 2006, Plaintiff was transferred from supermax to the Rast Unit, ADC’s

only close custody unit.3

 On July 10, 2008, Plaintiff commenced a civil rights case, Guillen

v. Thompson, No. CV08-1279-PHX-MHM, in this district. 

In February 2009, Plaintiff was charged by Defendants Berger, Yielding, Owens, and

Larson with threatening staff after he filed or gave staff a notice of intent to sue. (Id. at 5.)

Plaintiff claims that Sergeant Smith received a telephone call during Plaintiff’s disciplinary

hearing ordering Smith to find him guilty. Smith found Plaintiff guilty of a minor violation

but did not impose any sanction. 

On May 7, 2009, Berger and Wilson “threatened” Plaintiff; Plaintiff does not describe

the threat or the surrounding circumstances.4

 While Plaintiff was absent, Defendants Larson,

Owens, Wilson, Hatfield, Putnam, and Fisher planted unspecified incriminating evidence in

his cell or during a subsequent undocumented inventory search.5

 (Id. at 5A.). The next day,

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6

 Allodynia is defined as a “[c]ondition in which ordinarily nonpainful stimuli evoke

pain.” Stedman’s Medical Dictionary, 14080 (27th ed. 2000). Hyperalgesia is defined as

“[e]xtreme sensitivity to painful stimuli.” Id. at 190850.

7

 Plaintiff asserts that he knew that Owens was permitting inappropriate relations

between staff and inmates and that Owens perceived Plaintiff as a threat to his career. (Id.

at 5C.) These assertions are vague and unsupported by factual allegations. 

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Plaintiff was “arrested” for gambling and taken to a “hot cell”– so-called because

temperatures exceeded 90E during the day – in RDU pending an investigation. According

to Plaintiff, Defendants Larson, Owens, Roberts, Wilson, Hatfield, Berger, O’Brien,

Renault, Yielding, and Aragon caused him to be moved to the hot cell knowing that

temperature extremes in the cell could or would seriously aggravate his post-herpetic

neuralgia, allodynia, and hyperalgesia.6

 (Id. at 3, 5C.) For the first four days in the hot cell,

Plaintiff was denied medications until he passed out and had to receive emergency care,

including an injection for pain, and other medications. (Id. at 5C.) Only after he received

emergency care did he receive bedding and toiletries in the hot cell. (Id.) Plaintiff continued

to be held in that cell for two and half months.

While in RDU, Plaintiff was charged with a disciplinary infraction for gambling.

Such infractions are usually treated as minor and information from confidential informants

(CI) is not considered. However, in this instance, information from a CI– Inmate Arnold–

was considered, and Plaintiff was found guilty of a minor infraction for which no sanction

was imposed.7

 According to Plaintiff, information from Arnold was considered in deciding

the disciplinary charge in order to justify adding Arnold to Plaintiff’s “Do Not House With”

(DNHW) list, which was in turn used to support an administrative override to justify moving

Plaintiff from the only close custody unit back to supermax. Plaintiff was not afforded notice

that a CI would provide evidence against him or an opportunity to contest the addition of

Arnold to his DNHW list. Defendants Ryan, Hauser, and Fisher denied Plaintiff’s appeals

from the disciplinary charge. (Id. at 5A.) 

 On July 21, 2009, Defendants Larson, Owens, Renault, Roberts, Baca, Crabtree,

Mendoza, Wilson, and Berger transferred Plaintiff from RDU back to supermax pursuant to

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the administrative override and despite Plaintiff’s classification at a lower custody level than

that for supermax. According to Plaintiff, conditions in supermax have and are again

exacerbating his medical conditions by causing stress, which in turn causes him to suffer

severe pain. 

IV. Failure to State a Claim

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting that (1) the

conduct about which he complains was committed by a person acting under the color of state

law and (2) the conduct deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right. Wood v.

Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he

suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must

allege an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976).

A. Time-Barred Allegations 

Plaintiff makes allegations against various Defendants for events that occurred more

than two years before the lodging of his Complaint in this case, including claims against

former ADC director Stewart. The failure to state a claim includes circumstances where a

defense is complete and obvious from the face of the pleadings. Franklin v. Murphy, 745

F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 1984) (applying former § 1915(d) now codified at 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)). Further, a court may raise the defense of statute of limitations sua sponte.

See Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 687 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Hughes

v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1163 (11th Cir. 2003) (appropriate to dismiss prisoner’s complaint

sua sponte as time-barred under § 1915(e)(2)(B)); Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of

Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 956 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (same); Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d

Cir. 1995) (same); Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994) (same); Johnson

v. Rodriguez, 943 F.2d 104, 107-08 (1st Cir. 1991) (same). 

In § 1983 actions, the Court applies the statute of limitations of the forum state for

personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266, 274-76 (1985); TwoRivers v.

Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999); Vaughan v. Grijalva, 927 F.2d 476, 478 (9th Cir.

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8

 See http://www.azcorrections.gov/Prisca_Divisions_Director_History.aspx (viewed

November 4, 2010).

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1991). The Arizona statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. See A.R.S.

§ 12-542(1); Madden-Tyler v. Maricopa County, 943 P.2d 822, 824 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997);

Vaughan, 927 F.2d at 478. The Court must also apply any state rule for tolling to actions

brought under § 1983. Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 544 (1989); TwoRivers , 174 F.3d

at 992. Arizona provides for tolling of the statute of limitation after a cause of action accrues

for the period during which a plaintiff was less than 18 years old or of unsound mind. A.R.S.

§ 12-502. 

Plaintiff in part alleges claims concerning his conditions of confinement in supermax

facilities between 1996 and 2006. These claims accrued more than two years before Plaintiff

lodged his Complaint in this action, and are therefore time-barred. “[A] claim generally

accrues when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his

action.” Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 379 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff

knew of the conditions in supermax contemporaneously with his confinement there and any

claim concerning his supermax confinement, and conditions thereof, accrued

contemporaneously with such confinement. Plaintiff lodged his Complaint in this case on

January 29, 2010. Therefore, Plaintiff’s allegations concerning his confinement in supermax,

and conditions thereof, occurring prior to January 29, 2008, are time-barred and will be

dismissed. 

Plaintiff’s claims against Stewart will also be dismissed. Stewart left ADC in 2002.8

Accordingly, all of Plaintiff’s allegations against him are time-barred and will be dismissed.

B. Schriro

Plaintiff generally alleges that Schriro knew that long-term confinement in supermax

facilities presented a substantial threat to Plaintiff’s physical and mental health but she

“carried on” former Director Stewart’s expressed lack of concern about the psychological

well-being of inmates in supermax facilities. Plaintiff also asserts that Schriro created too

many supermax or maximum security cells and too few medium and close-custody cells,

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which resulted in Plaintiff being confined in maximum security units despite being classified

at lower custody levels. 

Schriro served as ADC’s Director between 2003 and January 2009. See supra, n.11.

Plaintiff was transferred out of supermax in 2006, while Schriro was Director. Plaintiff was

not transferred back to supermax until July 2009, months after Schriro left ADC. To the

extent that Plaintiff’s claims against Schriro are predicated on his confinement in supermax

between 2003 and 2006, his claims are time-barred. To the extent that his claims against

Schriro are predicated on his transfer back to supermax confinement in 2009, Schriro was

no longer the Director. Plaintiff’s general contention that Schriro failed to appropriately

allocate the number of maximum and medium cells is not sufficient to state a constitutional

claim against her. For these reasons, Schriro will be dismissed. 

C. Sturm

Plaintiff names Eyman Sergeant Sturm as a Defendant in his First Amended

Complaint. Plaintiff fails to allege any facts against Sturm. Accordingly, Sturm will be

dismissed. 

D. Conspiracy Allegations

The First Amended Complaint is replete with assertions that Defendants conspired to

violate Plaintiff’s rights. In addition, in Count VII, Plaintiff alleges a conspiracy to violate

his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Conclusory allegations of a conspiracy are insufficient to state a claim. See Franklin

v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining the requirements of a conspiracy claim

under § 1983); Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.) (a court need

not accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, deductions of fact, or unreasonable

inferences), amended on other grounds, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001); Woodrum v.

Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that conclusory allegations

of conspiracy do not support a § 1983 claim). Further, to state a conspiracy claim under

§ 1981, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting that he suffered discrimination based upon

his race. See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1487 (9th Cir. 1995); see

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also Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, 7 F.3d 1085, 1087 (2d Cir. 1993); accord, Morris

v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411, 433 (7th Cir. 1996); Green v. State Bar of Texas, 27 F.3d

1083, 1086 (5th Cir. 1994). 

Plaintiff does not allege any facts to support discrimination or a conspiracy motivated

by his race. He therefore fails to state a claim under § 1981 and Count VII will be dismissed.

Plaintiff’s other conspiracy allegations are vague and conclusory and are insufficient to state

a claim. Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff asserts a claim for conspiracy against any

Defendant, such claim will be dismissed. 

E. Count II (in part)

In Count II (in part), Plaintiff alleges that Ryan is disciplining him by serving him

only one hot meal per day in supermax. (Doc. 17 at 4A.) This allegation does not rise to the

level of a constitutional violation and will be dismissed. See LeMaire v. Maass, 121 F.3d

1444, 1456 (9th Cir. 1993).

Plaintiff also alleges that Ryan, White, and Carrillo denied him adequate medical care

by making him wait for six and a half months for a medical examination and treatment of

unspecified serious physical injuries. (Doc. 17 at 4A.) He further alleges that they have

denied him a medical furlough to Italy or to his mother’s home in Oro Valley. (Id.) These

allegations are vague and conclusory. Accordingly, these allegations will also be dismissed.

F. Count III (in part)

Plaintiff designates Count III as a claim for violation of his due process rights.

Liberty interests that entitle an inmate to due process are “generally limited to freedom from

restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give

rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical

and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (internal citations omitted). In analyzing

whether a hardship is atypical and significant, three guideposts to consider are: (1) the

conditions of confinement; (2) the duration of the condition and the degree of restraint

imposed; and (3) whether the disciplinary sanction will affect the duration of the prisoner’s

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sentence. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d

1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1996). Courts have found the existence of atypical and significant

hardships in a very limited circumstances. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221-

24 (2005) (holding inmates’ liberty interests were implicated by their indefinite confinement

in highly restrictive “supermax” prison, where the inmates were deprived of almost all human

contact and were disqualified from parole consideration); Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071,

1078-79 (9th Cir.2003) (placing disabled inmate, without his wheelchair, in segregation unit

not equipped for disabled persons gave rise to a liberty interest); Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 861

(directing district court to consider two-year duration of administrative segregation in

determining whether placement imposed atypical and significant burden). “As long as the

conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence

imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause

does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.”

Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976). Thus, a claim that prison officials “added

things” to an appeal to mask procedural errors does not, for example, meet this standard

because inmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance

procedure. Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860 (citing Mann, 855 F.2d at 640). 

In Count III, Plaintiff alleges in part that in February 2009, Larson, Owens, Berger,

and Yielding disciplined him for filing a notice of intent to file a § 1983 or tort claim against

them. Plaintiff does not allege that he was subjected to atypical and significant hardship as

a result of such discipline. This portion of Count III will be dismissed. 

Plaintiff also alleges that Smith found him guilty of a minor infraction after being

ordered to do so. Plaintiff acknowledges that he was not sanctioned as a consequence. He

therefore fails to state a claim against Smith on this basis and this allegation will be

dismissed. 

Plaintiff also alleges that Ryan, Hauser, and Fisher violated due process by denying

his appeal. Where a defendant’s only involvement in allegedly unconstitutional conduct is

the denial of administrative grievances, the failure to intervene on a prisoner’s behalf to

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remedy the alleged unconstitutional behavior does not amount to active unconstitutional

behavior for purposes of § 1983. Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999);

accord Mintun v. Blades, No. CV-06-139-BLW, 2008 WL 711636 at *7 (D. Idaho Mar. 14,

2008); Stocker v. Warden, No. 1:07-CV-00589LJODLBP, 2009 WL 981323 at *10 (E.D.

Cal. Apr. 13, 2009). Consequently, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Ryan, Hauser, or

Fisher based upon their denial of his appeal in this portion of Count III and it will be

dismissed. 

G. Count IV

In Count IV, Plaintiff contends that Ryan, Larson, Owens, Wilson, Roberts, Fisher,

Smith, Berger, Hatfield, Putnam, Mendoza, and Hauser transferred him to supermax in

retaliation for filing Guillen v. Thompson, CV08-1279-PHX-MHM. To state a constitutional

claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant acting under color of state law

took adverse action against him because he engaged in protected conduct, the adverse action

was not narrowly tailored to advance legitimate goals, and the adverse action chilled the

plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment rights or caused him to suffer more than minimal

harm. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-58 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Hines v. Gomez,

108 F.3d 265, 267 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Plaintiff’s assertion that he was transferred to supermax in retaliation for filing his

earlier case is conclusory. Further, although Plaintiff sued some of the same persons in

CV08-1279 against whom he now asserts retaliation, i.e., Berger, Yielding, Mendoza,

Hatfield, and Smith, each of those persons was dismissed from that suit prior to service.

Plaintiff otherwise fails to set forth facts to support that any Defendant caused his transfer

in retaliation for filing that case. Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged that the transfer in any

way chilled the exercise of his First Amendment or other constitutional rights. Accordingly,

Plaintiff fails to state a claim in Count IV and it will be dismissed. 

H. Count V (in part)

In Count V (in part), Plaintiff alleges that Ryan, Larson, Owens, Hatfield, Roberts,

Wilson, Carrillo, and Renault caused him to be transported to supermax with another inmate

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who had previously threatened to assault protective segregation (close custody) inmates.

(Doc. 17 at 5D.) Plaintiff asserts they did so in the hope that the inmate would assault him

and rid them of a troublesome litigator. Plaintiff claims their plan failed because Plaintiff

had previously assisted that inmate. These allegations are vague and conclusory and

insufficient to state a claim. This portion of Count V will be dismissed. 

I. Count VI

In Count VI, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Ryan, Crabtree, Baca, Carrillo,

Tuersbuns, and Cioni violated his due process rights by failing to comply with ADC policies

and procedures when transferring him to indefinite supermax confinement. Non-compliance

with prison procedures or policies does not, absent more, rise to the level of a constitutional

violation. See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 222-23. As stated below, the Court will require a

response to Plaintiff’s claims in other counts for denial of due process and/or unconstitutional

conditions of confinement based on Plaintiff’s indefinite confinement in supermax. But

Plaintiff does not otherwise state a constitutional claim in Count VI based on the mere failure

to comply with prison procedures or policies. Accordingly, Count VI will be dismissed. 

V. Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required

In Count I (in part), Plaintiff adequately alleges that Defendants Larson, Owens,

Roberts, Wilson, Hatfield, Berger, O’Brien, Mendoza, and Renault caused him to be

transferred to RDU absent a legitimate penological reason in violation of due process and

thereby subjected him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement that jeopardized his

health. In Counts II (in part), III (in part), and V (in part), Plaintiff adequately alleges that

Ryan, Crabtree, Baca, Larson, Owens, Renault, Roberts, Mendoza, Wilson, Aragon, O’Brien,

Yielding, and Berger caused him to be transferred to supermax for an indefinite period and

under conditions posing a serious risk to health in violation of due process and the Eighth

Amendment. Defendants Ryan, Crabtree, Baca, Larson, Owens, Wilson, Fisher, Yielding,

Berger, O’Brien, Putnam, Roberts, Mendoza, Aragon, Hatfield, Renault, White, and Carrillo

will be required to respond to Counts I (in part), II (in part), III (in part), and V (in part). 

IV. Motion for Injunctive Relief

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As noted above, Plaintiff has filed a motion for injunctive relief seeking to require

prison officials to transfer him out of supermax. (Doc. 18.) Plaintiff contends that prison

officials used administrative overrides to justify transferring him back to supermax for

retaliatory purposes. Citing Austin v. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. 209 (2005), Plaintiff contends

that the transfer without notice and an opportunity to be heard violated his due process rights.

To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show “that he is likely to

succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in

the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008);

Am. Trucking Assoc., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009). The

moving party has the burden of proof on each element of the test. Environmental Council

of Sacramento v. Slater, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1027 (E.D. Cal. 2000). In addition, the

“serious questions” version of the sliding scale test for preliminary injunctions remains viable

after the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 622

F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 2010). Under that test, after Winter, a preliminary injunction is

appropriate when a plaintiff demonstrates that “serious questions going to the merits were

raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in [plaintiff’s] favor,” so long as the plaintiff

also shows a likelihood of irreparable injury and that an injunction is in the public interest.

Id. at 1053 (citing Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)).

At this juncture, no Defendant has yet been served or ordered to respond to the First

Amended Complaint. In addition, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he is likely to succeed

on the merits, to suffer irreparable harm, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that

an injunction is in the public interest. He also has not demonstrated that the balance of

hardships tip sharply in his favor. Plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief will be denied. 

V. Warnings

A. Address Changes

Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule

83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other

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relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this

action.

B. Copies

Plaintiff must serve Defendants, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a copy

of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a certificate

stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, Plaintiff must submit

an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 5.4. Failure to comply

may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to Plaintiff.

C. Possible Dismissal

If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these

warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to

comply with any order of the Court).

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Counts I (in part), II (in part), III (in part), IV, V (in part), VI, and VII and

Defendants Stewart, Schriro, Tuerbuns, Sturm, Cioni, Smith, and Hauser are dismissed

without prejudice.

(2) Defendants Ryan, Crabtree, Baca, Larson, Owens, Wilson, Fisher, Yielding,

Berger, O’Brien, Putnam, Roberts, Mendoza, Aragon, Hatfield, Renault, White, and Carrillo

must answer Counts I (in part), II (in part), III (in part), and V (in part). (Doc. 17.)

(3) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the First

Amended Complaint, this Order, and both summons and request for waiver forms for

Defendants Ryan, Crabtree, Baca, Larson, Owens, Wilson, Fisher, Yielding, Berger,

O’Brien, Putnam, Roberts, Mendoza, Aragon, Hatfield, Renault, White, and Carrillo. (Doc.

17.)

(4) Plaintiff must complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court

within 20 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not provide

service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order.

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(5) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or

complete service of the Summons and First Amended Complaint on a Defendant within 120

days of the filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, whichever

is later, the action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m);

LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(I).

(6) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the First

Amended Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use.

(7) The United States Marshal must notify Defendants of the commencement of

this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendants must include a copy of this Order. The

Marshal must immediately file requests for waivers that were returned as undeliverable and

waivers of service of the summons. If a waiver of service of summons is not returned by a

Defendant within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was sent by the Marshal, the

Marshal must:

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, First Amended Complaint, and

this Order upon Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure; and

(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of service

for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of service of the

summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service upon Defendant.

The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service form (USM-285) and

must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for photocopying additional copies of

the Summons, First Amended Complaint, or this Order and for preparing new process

receipt and return forms (USM-285), if required. Costs of service will be taxed

against the personally served Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the Court.

(8) A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons and First

Amended Complaint must return the signed waiver forms to the United States Marshal,

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not the Plaintiff.

(9) Defendants must answer the First Amended Complaint or otherwise respond

by appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(10) Any answer or response must state the specific Defendant by name on whose

behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other motion or paper that

does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed.

(11) Plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief is denied. (Doc. 18.)

(12) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Lawrence O. Anderson pursuant to

Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as

authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

DATED this 29th day of November, 2010. 

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