Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-35114/USCOURTS-ca9-11-35114-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSHUA JAMES FROST,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

MARGARET GILBERT,

Superintendent,*

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 11-35114

D.C. No.

2:09-cv-00725-

TSZ

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Thomas S. Zilly, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted En Banc

June 26, 2013—Seattle, Washington

Filed March 21, 2016

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and Stephen

Reinhardt, Alex Kozinski, Kim McLane Wardlaw, Richard

A. Paez, Richard C. Tallman, Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Jay S.

Bybee, Consuelo M. Callahan, Milan D. Smith, Jr. and

Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Kozinski;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Tallman

* We substitute Superintendent Margaret Gilbert for Patrick Glebe as

the respondent-appellee on our own motion. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).

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2 FROST V. GILBERT

SUMMARY**

Habeas Corpus

On remand from the Supreme Court, the en banc court

affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas corpus relief to

Washington state prisoner Joshua Frost, who challenges his

conviction on charges stemming from his participation in a

spree of armed robberies and a burglary.

The en banc court held that the King County Superior

Court’s erroneous refusal to allow defense counsel to make

alternative arguments during summation – that the state

hadn’t met its burden of proof, and that Frost committed the

crimes under duress – was harmless because the jury heard

overwhelming evidence that Frost committed the charged

offenses and any argument that the prosecution failed to meet

its burden of proof would have fallen on deaf ears.

The en banc court granted a certificate of appealability as

to Frost’s claims that the prosecution withheld material,

exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland and

that the prosecution called witness Edward Shaw to testify

falsely about the existence of that evidence in violation of

Napue v. Illinois. 

The en banc court held that Frost demonstrated cause for

failing to raise the Brady and Napue claims in his 2008

personal restraint petition. But the en banc court held that

Frost cannot show prejudice. The en banc court explained

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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FROST V. GILBERT 3

that given the evidence of guilt presented at trial, there is no

reasonable likelihood that Shaw’s false testimony about

having only one plea agreement could have affected the

judgment of the jury, and there is no reasonable likelihood

that the jury could have acquitted Frost based on his duress

defense, even if they had learned of an undisclosed signed

version of Shaw’s plea agreement in a firearm-and-drug

possession case or an undisclosed plea agreement in Shaw’s

domestic-violence case.

In Section II C (in which Judge Nguyen did not join),

Judge Kozinski wrote that he and the four joining judges

found the facts giving rise to the Brady and Napue claims

most troubling. He wrote that there is cause to believe that

the King County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office violated

Brady and Napue by willfully withholding evidence of

Shaw’s domestic-violence plea deal and by permitting Shaw

to lie on the stand, and that subsequent to the trial, the office

stonewalled in providing Frost this information when he

doggedly requested it.

Judge Tallman, joined by Judges Rawlinson, Bybee,

Callahan, and M. Smith, concurred in part, dissented in part,

and concurred in the judgment denying habeas relief. Judge

Tallman wrote that the majority’s decision to reverse the en

banc court’s prior decision declining to certify Frost’s

remaining claims for appeal, only to deny his meritless Brady

and Napue claims, exceeds the Supreme Court’s remand

instructions and is a blatant disregard of binding Supreme

Court precedent enforcing procedural bars and a lamentable

waste of precious judicial resources. He wrote that Section

II C, which is not the judgment of this court, launches a

groundless, personal attack against several King County

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4 FROST V. GILBERT

employees who have no way to defend themselves from the

defamation.

COUNSEL

Erik B. Levin (argued), Law Office of Erik Levin, Berkeley,

California, for Petitioner-Appellant.

John Joseph Samson (argued), Assistant Attorney General,

Corrections Division;Robert W. Ferguson, AttorneyGeneral,

Olympia, Washington, for Respondent-Appellee.

David M. Porter, Co-Chair, NACDL Amicus Committee,

Sacramento, California; Jon M. Sands, Federal Public

Defender and Keith J. Hilzendeger, Assistant Federal Public

Defender, Phoenix, Arizona, for Amici Curiae Ninth Circuit

Federal Public and Community Defenders and National

Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

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FROST V. GILBERT 5

OPINION

KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge:

In 2003, Joshua Frost was charged in state court with

participating in an eleven-day spree of armed robberies and

a burglary. Frost’s attorney wanted to argue during

summation that the state hadn’t met its burden of proof and,

in the alternative, that Frost committed the crimes under

duress. The KingCounty Superior Court erroneously refused

to allow counsel to make these alternative arguments, so he

chose to argue duress. The Washington Supreme Court held

that the superior court’s error was harmless. State v. Frost,

161 P.3d 361, 370–71 (Wash. 2007) (en banc). In a previous

en banc opinion, we held that the restriction on Frost’s

closing argument was structural error. Frost v. Van Boening,

757 F.3d 910, 918–19 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). The

Supreme Court reversed. Glebe v. Frost, 135 S. Ct. 429, 432

(2014) (per curiam). We must now decide whether Frost is

nevertheless entitled to habeas relief because the error,

though not structural, was prejudicial. In addition, we

consider Brady and Napue issues that the district court did not

certify for appeal.

DISCUSSION

I. The Harmless Error Issue

Our reviewoftheWashington Supreme Court’s harmlesserror decision is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (requiring

petitioners to demonstrate that a state court’s decision on the

merits is “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established [f]ederal law” to obtain

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6 FROST V. GILBERT

habeas relief). We may reverse the state supreme court’s

harmlessness determination only if Frost experienced “actual

prejudice,” that is, where we have “grave doubt about

whether a trial error of federal law had ‘substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict.’” See Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2197–98

(2015) (quoting O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436

(1995) and Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637

(1993)); see also id. at 2198–99 (explaining that the Brecht

standard “subsumes” the requirements of AEDPA, which

“sets forth a precondition to the grant of habeas relief”

(quoting Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119–20 (2007))). 

Specifically, the inquiry is whether, in light of the record as

a whole, the improper limitation on defense counsel’s closing

argument substantially influenced the verdict. Brecht,

507 U.S. at 638–39.

The jury heard overwhelming evidence that Frost

committed the charged offenses. The prosecution introduced

Frost’s recorded confessions, and he testified that he

participated in the robberies and the burglary. The

prosecution also linked evidence found in Frost’s home to the

crimes. On this record, any argument that the prosecution

failed to meet its burden of proof would have fallen on deaf

ears. Accordingly, Frost wasn’t prejudiced by the superior

court’s error in denying him the right to make that argument. 

See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637–38; see also Davis, 135 S. Ct. at

2199.

II. The Brady and Napue Issues

Frost maintains that the prosecution withheld material,

exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland,

373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). He claims that the evidence would

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FROST V. GILBERT 7

have undermined the testimony of Edward Shaw, a key

prosecution witness. He also argues that the prosecution

called Shaw to testify falsely about the existence of that

exculpatory evidence in violation of Napue v. Illinois,

360 U.S. 264, 269–70 (1959).

Shaw wasn’t involved in the robberies and burglary at the

heart of the prosecution’s case. Rather, he was an

acquaintance who testified about how Frost interacted with

ringleader Matthew Williams, who Frost claimed coerced him

into participating in the crimes. In April 2003, Shaw met

with detectives to discuss what he knew about Frost’s

involvement. At that time, Shaw had pending charges for

unlawful possession of drugs and a firearm. Shaw asked for

favorable treatment in exchange for information about Frost’s

criminal activity but the prosecution refused to make a deal. 

Nevertheless, Shaw disclosed what he knew. Frost was

arrested the same day. State v. Frost, 161 P.3d at 364.

Subsequently, but before Frost’s trial, Shaw was charged

with second-degree assault with a deadlyweapon growing out

of a domestic-violence incident. In November 2003, a few

weeks before Frost’s trial, Shaw signed two plea agreements. 

He received a nine-month sentence for all his crimes,

conditioned on his testifying truthfully against Frost.

At trial, Shaw testified that Frost was “giggling” when

Shaw asked whether he was involved in the robberies and

burglary. The prosecution highlighted this testimony in its

closing: “When Mr. Shaw talked to the defendant about his

involvement in these robberies, the defendant was giggling. 

Does that sound like duress?”

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Shaw also testified about the plea agreement for his

unlawful-possession case. The prosecution introduced an

unsigned version of that agreement. Shaw testified that the

signed version was the same as the one the state presented at

trial. Shaw didn’t mention that he signed a separate

agreement resolving his domestic-violence charges, which

provided that the sentence for that offense would run

concurrently with that for unlawful possession. The

prosecution did not disclose the existence of Shaw’s

domestic-violence plea agreement or otherwise correct his

testimony.

Nor was the signed version of Shaw’s unlawfulpossession plea agreement identical to the unsigned version;

it contained a handwritten reference to his domestic-violence

case number. The prosecution didn’t produce the annotated

version of the unlawful-possession plea agreement or the

domestic-violence plea agreement. Rather, the prosecution

waited until two days after Frost was convicted to file both

plea agreements in Shaw’s state-court cases. The state

doesn’t dispute that the prosecution was required by Brady to

turn over both plea agreements before Frost’s trial.

In March 2008, shortly after exhausting his direct appeal,

Frost sent a letter requesting “any documentation that could

be used to establish the credibility and or expierance [sic] Mr.

Shaw has or had as a Police Informant.” The public records

officer responded by identifying several docket numbers

involving Shaw, including his domestic-violence case. The

records officer estimated that there were “1000 pages of

documents” responsive to Frost’s request, which would cost

$195.00 to copy and ship. In his reply, Frost explained that

he wasn’t “looking for complete case files, as that would be

quite expensive.” Rather, he sought “any documents” that

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FROST V. GILBERT 9

could show “any special treatment [Shaw] was given in

regards to . . . cooperation with [the prosecuting attorney’s]

office or the King County Police Department.” The records

officer responded that she did not “find any records

responsive to [Frost’s] request.”

Frost persisted: He wrote back that he knew Shaw had

given statements in a particular case, which he identified by

number. He asked the records officer to “please try and comb

through the above-mentioned case files” for Shaw’s

statements and “please send [Frost] a list of any and all King

County Police Case Numbers brought up in those files.” The

records officer responded by identifying two docket

numbers—neither of which was the domestic-violence

case—and informing Frost that she found a statement that

Shaw made in the unlawful-possession case file. No

documents were provided pertaining to the domestic-violence

case. Frost filed a personal restraint petition shortly

afterward in which he raised a number of claims for relief, but

didn’t allege any Brady or Napue violations.

The undisclosed plea agreements first came to light in

2009 when the Federal Public Defender for the Western

District of Washington, appointed by the district court to

represent Frost in his federal habeas proceeding, searched

Shaw’s records at the King County Superior Court Clerk’s

Office. Counsel quickly filed another personal restraint

petition based on this evidence, but the Washington Supreme

Court denied it as untimely. The federal magistrate judge

found that the supreme court relied on a valid procedural rule

in dismissing Frost’s Brady and Napue claims and that Frost

hadn’t shown cause to overcome this default.

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10 FROST V. GILBERT

In objecting to the magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation, Frost argued that the prosecution’s

continued failure to disclose the domestic-violence plea

agreement frustrated his ability to raise timely Brady and

Napue claims. He presented his 2008 communications with

the King County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office. 

Accordingly, he asserted that he had cause for his procedural

default.

The district judge adopted the magistrate judge’s report

and recommendation in full. He concluded that Frost’s

evidence didn’t demonstrate that the prosecuting attorney’s

office engaged in “persistent efforts to suppress”

impeachment evidence. The district judge also found that

Shaw’s testimony wasn’t pivotal in light of the prosecution’s

ample evidence establishing Frost’s involvement in the

charged crimes. The district judge declined to grant

certificates of appealability on Frost’s Brady and Napue

claims.

A.

The standard for granting a certificate of appealability is

low. Shoemaker v. Taylor, 730 F.3d 778, 790 (9th Cir. 2013)

(as amended). All that’s required is that “reasonable jurists

could debate” whether the petition states a “valid claim of the

denial of a constitutional right” and whether the district court

“was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel,

529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). As explained below, these issues

are at least debatable and implicate Frost’s constitutional

rights. Accordingly, Frost has met the standard for granting

a certificate of appealability, and we do so here.

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FROST V. GILBERT 11

B.

Because the Washington Supreme Court held that Frost

defaulted on his Brady and Napue claims, he must overcome

the default by showing cause and prejudice. See Strickler v.

Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 282 (1999).

Cause. Frost started researching his Brady and Napue

claims well before the deadline for filing a personal restraint

petition had passed. The Supreme Court denied Frost’s

petition for certiorari on January 14, 2008, see Frost v.

Washington, 552 U.S. 1145 (Jan. 14, 2008), so he had until

January 14, 2009 to seek relief through collateral review. See

Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.090(2), (3)(c) (2008). Frost made

his first inquiry to the King County Prosecuting Attorney’s

Office about documents that would call Shaw’s credibility

into question in March 2008. The dissent faults Frost for not

promptly discovering all the documents he was looking for,

noting that his federal habeas counsel was able to do so later

with ease. Diss. at 28. But federal habeas counsel reviewed

Shaw’s felony files at the King County Superior Court

Clerk’s Office. Unlike his federal habeas counsel, Frost was

incarcerated, and so had to write to the prosecuting attorney’s

office to request information. Had the prosecuting attorney’s

office—which was guilty of hiding the information in the first

place—responded accuratelytoFrost’s document requests, he

could have filed a timely petition.

Frost first asked for “any documents . . . that could be

used to establish the credibility . . . Mr. Shaw has or had as a

Police Informant.” The records officer represented that she

could provide complete case files for $195 or that Frost could

narrow his search. It is hardly fair for the dissent to fault

Frost for “declining” to buy the entire case files, Diss. at 31,

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as $195 is a tremendous amount for an indigent prison

inmate. Frost reasonably chose the second option (narrowing

the search) by asking for “any documents . . . in regards to

any special treatment [Shaw] was given in regards to . . . 

cooperation with your office or the King County Police

Department.” Rather than disclosing either of Shaw’s plea

agreements, the officer responded that she did “not find any

records responsive to [Frost’s] request.” When Frost

rephrased his query as for “information . . . that would show

[Shaw’s] reliability,” the records officer again failed to turn

anything over. The dissent analyzes the same correspondence

between Frost and the King County Prosecuting Attorney’s

Office but ignores how the public records department’s false

answers misled Frost about the contents of the files in its

possession and thus prevented Frost from obtaining evidence

to support his claims. Diss. at 30–32.

The dissent criticizes Frost for abandoning his pursuit of

impeachment evidence, Diss. at 31, but he diligently asked

for this information on multiple occasions. He was

reasonable in abandoning his investigation after the

prosecution falsely advised him on repeated occasions that it

had no information supporting his Brady and Napue claims.

That Shaw’s plea agreements were not filed until two

days after Frost was convicted, even though they had been

signed weeks earlier, seems like more than carelessness on

the prosecution’s part. And its later failure to disgorge

Shaw’s plea agreements, despite Frost’s repeated requests,

may amount to “interference by officials” that supplies cause

to excuse Frost’s procedural default. Murray v. Carrier,

477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.

443, 486 (1953)). At the least, it shows “some objective

factor external to the defense” that prevented Frost from

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FROST V. GILBERT 13

complying with Washington’s rule setting time limits for

bringing personal restraint petitions. Id.; accord Amadeo v.

Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 222 (1988).

Frost filed a personal restraint petition in 2008 raising

multiple claims for relief. No doubt, he would have presented

allegations of Brady and Napue violations in that petition, had

he been aware of the facts supporting those arguments. 

“[T]he reason for [Frost’s] failure to develop facts in [s]tatecourt proceedings was the [s]tate’s suppression ofthe relevant

evidence.” Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004) (citing

Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282). Accordingly, Frost has

demonstrated cause for failing to raise his Brady and Napue

claims in his 2008 personal restraint petition. See, e.g.,

Amadeo, 486 U.S. at 222 (finding “ample cause to excuse [a

petitioner’s] procedural default” where county officials

concealed a key document and counsel had no tactical reason

for failing to raise the claim); Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d

1288, 1327 (11th Cir. 2002) (petitioner demonstrated cause

where state failed to disclose Brady material in its possession

despite multiple requests from counsel); Crivens v. Roth,

172 F.3d 991, 995 (7th Cir. 1999) (petitioner had cause to

overcome procedural default of Brady claim where

prosecution didn’t provide the criminal record of its witness

until after the habeas petition was filed).

Prejudice. While Frost has shown cause, he cannot show

prejudice. Given the evidence of guilt presented at trial, there

is no “reasonable likelihood” that Shaw’s false testimony

about only having one plea agreement could have “affected

the judgment of the jury.” Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d 898,

912, 914 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d

1057, 1076 (9th Cir. 2008)) (finding no prejudice at trial from

a Napue violation where the defendant’s own testimony and

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14 FROST V. GILBERT

physical evidence “pointed to his guilt”). Had the jury

learned of Shaw’s second plea agreement, there is no

“reasonable probability” that the outcome would have been

different. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 296.

Shaw’s undisclosed domestic-violence offense carried a

maximum sentence of five years—the same as his unlawfulpossession offenses. It is unlikely that the prosecution could

have put pressure on Shaw to change his testimony by

threatening to seek consecutive sentences for his offenses. In

Washington, there is a presumption that sentences imposed at

the same time will be served concurrently. Wash. Rev. Code

§ 9.94A.589(1)(a); State v. Vance, 230 P.3d 1055, 1058–59

(Wash. 2010) (en banc). Nothing in the record suggests that

the state could have overcome this presumption. Neither of

Shaw’s crimes were “serious violent offenses.” Wash. Rev.

Code § 9.94A.030(37) (2002) (defining “serious violent

offense”); id. § 9.94A.589(1)(b) (requiring consecutive

sentences for defendants who’ve committed two or more

serious violent offenses). Nor is there evidence of any other

factor that Washington courts normally rely on in justifying

consecutive sentences, such as the use of a “high degree of

sophistication or planning,” or an abuse of a “position of

trust.” See id. § 9.94A.535(2)(e)(v)–(vi).

While Frost could have shown that Shaw was a bad guy

because he not only unlawfully possessed a firearm and drugs

but also assaulted his girlfriend, it wouldn’t have gotten him

far. The jury already knew that Shaw received benefits in

exchange for his testimony. The jury also heard that Shaw

gave information about Frost’s crimes to the police even after

they declined a deal on his pending unlawful-possession

charges. And the jury was aware that Shaw approached

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FROST V. GILBERT 15

authorities with information about Frost in April, well before

he committed the assault in August.

Any impact of this impeachment evidence would have

been vitiated by Frost’s own testimony, which cast doubt on

his duress defense. Frost didn’t have a good answer for why

he didn’t attempt to escape from Williams when he had a

chance. He admitted that he was left alone in the car when

his accomplices committed one of the robberies. Frost also

admitted that he picked up Williams on several occasions, as

Williams didn’t have a car. Frost acknowledged that he never

tried to get his mother and brother to a safe place in response

to Williams’s alleged threats against them. Nor did he call

911, although he’d previously done so when he felt

threatened by others. Finally, Frost admitted that, during his

first interview with the police, he didn’t say that he had been

threatened by Williams, even though the officer twice urged

him to say “anything” he wanted. There’s no reasonable

likelihood that the jury could have acquitted Frost based on

his duress defense, even if they had learned of the

undisclosed plea agreements.

C.***

Although we conclude that Frost is not entitled to relief,

we find the facts giving rise to his Brady and Napue claims

most troubling. As the matter has been presented to us, there

is cause to believe that the King County Prosecuting

Attorney’s office violated Brady and Napue by willfully

withholding evidence of Shaw’s domestic-violence plea deal

and by permitting Shaw to lie on the stand. That this was a

deliberate tactic rather than an oversight is demonstrated by

 

*** Judge Nguyen does not join this section of the opinion.

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the fact that the prosecution kept Shaw’s signed plea

agreements secret until two days after Frost was convicted,

even though they had been signed well before Frost’s trial

commenced and thus should have been turned over to the

defense at once. Moreover, subsequent to the trial, the office

stonewalled in providing Frost this information when he

doggedly requested it.

So far as we are aware, the individuals involved have

never been held to account for their conduct. As the dissent

acknowledges, the deputy prosecuting attorney in Frost’s

case, ZacharyWagnild, introduced into evidence an unsigned

plea agreement that he suffered the witness to testify was

identical to the signed version. Diss. at 23. The difference

between the two documents was material, as the signed

version revealed the existence of the second plea deal. The

dissent chalks this all up to a case of “the left hand [not

knowing] what the right hand was doing” in a busy office

with multiple prosecuting attorneys. Diss. at 34–35. But it’s

more akin to one hand washing the other. We know that

Wagnild was aware of the domestic-violence case because he

signed the plea agreement in the unlawful-possession case,

which referred to Shaw pleading guilty in his domesticviolence case. The unlawful-possession agreement was dated

November 26, 2003—before Frost’s trial. There was thus no

reason to use an unsigned version where the signed version

was available and had, in fact, passed through Wagnild’s

hands. Yet Wagnild did not produce the signed plea

agreement as required by Brady, and he failed to correct

Shaw’s representation that the two versions were identical

(but for the signature). Having himself signed the original, he

was charged with knowledge of its contents; he certainly

knew how to get the original to confirm that the documents

were indeed identical. Allowing a prosecution witness to

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FROST V. GILBERT 17

testify falsely when the truth is easily verifiable not only

violates Napue but would also amount to professional

misconduct.

We are also troubled by the conduct of Gary Ernsdorff,

the deputy prosecuting attorney who handled Shaw’s

domestic-violence case. Shaw’s plea agreement in the

domestic-violence case referenced his unlawful-possession

plea agreement, which obligated him to testify truthfully in

Frost’s case. It is possible, though unlikely, that filing the

plea agreement in Shaw’s domestic-violence case two days

after the jury returned its verdict in Frost’s case was mere

coincidence. But filing it on the same day as the unlawfulpossession plea agreement bespeaks coordination and

planning. The domestic-violence plea agreement had been

signed on November 3, a month before Frost’s trial even

began, but it was kept secret until it was too late for Frost to

use it in his defense. The state has offered no explanation for

delaying the filing of both plea agreements until after the jury

returned its verdict in Frost’s case. The dissent sees this all

as innocent carelessness, but to us it’s at least one

coincidence too far. The sequence of events raises the

inference that Ernsdorff collaborated with Wagnild to conceal

the agreement from Frost until Wagnild had secured a guilty

verdict. If so, this would be shameful misconduct on the part

of both prosecuting attorneys, which not even the dissent

denies.

Finally, we are concerned by the actions of Kelli

Williams, the public records officer for the King County

Prosecuting Attorney’s office at the time Frost sought

information about Shaw. Frost asked that office, in every

way he knew how, for the information that would have

supported his Brady and Napue claims. Yet Williams

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provided incorrect or misleading information in response to

his requests. Her failure to identify and disclose either plea

agreement to Frost may be the result of incompetence or

indolence, but it may also reflect a deliberate effort to prevent

disclosure of the deception committed by her office.

Although the Washington courts presumably have been

aware of these facts for some time, we have been apprised of

no sanctions against these individuals, nor any inquiry

conducted by the courts. Nor have we heard of any effort to

hold Shaw accountable for the perjury he almost certainly

committed in his testimony in Frost’s case or to determine the

degree to which he may have been aided in that endeavor by

prosecuting attorney Wagnild.

We are mindful that there may be circumstances of which

we are unaware that cast the matter in a different light. Yet,

unlike the dissent, we do not believe this is a sufficient reason

to keep silent. The individuals we have named may wish to

furnish a copy of this opinion to the state bar and seek to clear

their names by providing an explanation for its consideration. 

This would seem to be the prudent course.

* * *

Because Frost can’t show prejudice as a result of the

errors committed at his trial, he is entitled to no relief in

federal court.

AFFIRMED.

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TALLMAN, Circuit Judge, joined by RAWLINSON,

BYBEE, CALLAHAN, M. SMITH, Circuit Judges,

concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the

judgment denying habeas relief:

Part II of today’s opinion is an imprudent exercise of

Article III judicial power. It is all the more so because the

Supreme Court reversed our previous en banc decision in

Frost’s case and held that the trial court’s restriction on

Frost’s closing argument was not structural error as we had

declared. Glebe v. Frost (Frost IV), 135 S. Ct. 429, 431–32

(2014) (per curiam). The Supreme Court remanded the case,

directing us to conduct a harmlessness analysis. See id. at

432 (“The Court of Appeals did not address [whether the state

court was unreasonable to find harmlessness] when sitting en

banc, and it is not before us today. . . . We reverse the

judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and

remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.”). In Part I, we now all agree that the trial court’s

error did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict” in light of the

overwhelming evidence of Frost’s guilt for the numerous

crimes he committed in his eleven-day crime spree. Davis v.

Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2198 (2015) (quoting O’Neal v.

McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995)); see Maj. Op. at 5–6.

That should have been the end of the matter. The

mandate should have issued promptly after affirming the

district court’s denial of Frost’s petition for habeas corpus. 

Yet, Part II exceeds the Supreme Court’s remand instructions

and now resurrects Frost’s procedurally defaulted Brady and

Napue claims when three courts, including this same en banc

panel, previously declined to certify Frost’s remaining claims

for appeal. See Frost v. Van Boening (Frost I), No.

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C09–725Z, 2011 WL 486198, at *1–2 (W.D. Wa. Feb. 4,

2011) (denying a certificate of appealability as to claims 1, 2,

and 4 of Frost’s amended habeas petition); Frost v. Van

Boening (Frost II), 692 F.3d 924, 927 n.3 (9th Cir. 2012),

superseded on reh’g en banc, 757 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2014)

(“Having considered Frost’s arguments, we are satisfied that

none of his other claims meet [the standard to obtain a

certificate of appealability].”); Frost III, 757 F.3d 910, 919

(9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“[We] decline to expand the

certificate of appealability.”).

All eleven judges on this en banc panel previously

considered Frost’s procedurally defaulted claims. We could

not have been more clear in our previous en banc decision. 

Frost III, 757 F.3d at 919. Frost did not file his own petition

for certiorari challenging this ruling, and the Supreme Court

did not grant certiorari on this issue. Our decision not to

expand the certificate of appealability to consider Frost’s

procedurally defaulted claims is now the “law of the case,”

and the majority errs by “reconsider[ing] an issue that has

already been decided by the same court or a higher court in

the same case.” Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 390 n.4

(9th Cir. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Arizona v. Inter Tribal

Council of Arizona, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013). The

majority’s untimely and injudicious attempt to rewrite history

to now consider Frost’s Brady and Napue claims greatly

“compromise[s] the orderly, decorous, rational traditions that

[we] rely upon to ensure the integrity of [our] own

judgments.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 197

(2010).

By my count, this is Frost’s fifth effort to collaterally

attack what we all agree is a valid conviction for crimes

committed in April 2003. This latest sua sponte “endless

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repetition of inquiry” into the facts surrounding Frost’s

conviction disrupts congressional intent in enacting the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA) to conserve judicial resources, avoid piecemeal

litigation, and eliminate delays in the federal habeas review

process. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 492 (1991);

Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 650 (2012) (“Congress’s

intent in AEDPA [was] ‘to eliminate delays in the federal

habeas review process.’”) (quoting Holland v. Florida,

560 U.S. 631, 648 (2010)).

Section II C of Judge Kozinski’s opinion—for which

there is no majority—launches a groundless, personal attack

against several King County employees who have no way to

defend themselves from the defamation. Judge Kozinski’s

quiver is full, and Section II C of his “opinion” loosens

several arrows directed at the King County Prosecutor’s

Office and the Sheriff’s Department. The attack in Section II

C is mounted notwithstanding the ultimate conclusion that

Frost still loses because he cannot establish prejudice from

the revived constitutional violations. Article III of the United

States Constitution is not a roving commission permitting

federal judges to use their opinions as a platform to launch

such ad hominem attacks. Section II C of Judge Kozinski’s

opinion is not the judgment of this court.

I

The crux of Frost’s Brady and Napue claims is that the

prosecutor knowingly elicited false testimony and suppressed

impeachment evidence relating to a trial witness, Edward

Shaw. Prior to Frost’s arrest, Shaw had learned about Frost’s

involvement in the robberies and reported this knowledge to

law enforcement. At the time of his meeting with law

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enforcement, Shaw had been charged with: (1) unlawful

possession of a firearm in the first degree and (2) possession

for sale of a controlled substance (the “gun and drugs” case). 

Shaw asked the State for leniency on these two charges in

exchange for information about Frost, but the State refused to

make a deal. Shaw, nonetheless, told sheriff’s detectives

what he knew about Frost’s criminal activities. Frost was

arrested, incriminating evidence was seized, and he confessed

(three times).

Shaw was subsequently charged with a third crime,

second-degree assault with a deadly weapon stemming from

a domestic violence incident (the “domestic violence” case). 

Before Frost’s trial, Shaw entered into a plea agreement in the

gun and drugs case. After trial, Shaw also pled to the

domestic violence charge. The state agreed to reduce Shaw’s

charges in the gun and drugs case in exchange for his

testimony at Frost’s trial. In the space marked “Other” on

Shaw’s gun and drugs plea agreement, dated November 3,

2003, the following was handwritten: “Testify truthfully in

State v. Frost . . . as set forth in agreement. Plead guilty to

03-1-02187-0 (domestic violence assault case).” Shaw’s plea

agreement in the domestic violence case, also dated

November 3, 2003, provides: “This plea is part of a two-case

offer.” The State also recommended that Shaw’s nine-month

sentence in the domestic violence case be imposed

concurrently with the sentence imposed on the gun and drugs

charges.

At Frost’s trial, Shaw testified about a conversation he

had with Frost the night before Frost’s arrest. In this

particular conversation, Shaw asked Frost whether he had

committed the recent robberies in the area. Shaw testified

that Frost “started giggling” in response. Shaw further

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testified that he was motivated to contact the police after this

conversation “[b]ecause what they were doing was not right. 

They beat old people, and after somebody gives them what

they want they would shoot them. That is not right by me.” 

In addition, the prosecution introduced an unsigned version

of the prosecution’s plea offer letter in the gun and drugs

case, which did not reference Shaw’s domestic violence case. 

Shaw did not mention his domestic violence agreement at

trial and also testified that the unsigned letter was identical to

the offer letter that he had signed. Therefore, the details of

Shaw’s domestic violence agreement were never disclosed to

Frost at trial. It was not until two days after Frost’s

conviction that Shaw’s plea agreement and the prosecutor’s

sentencing recommendation in both the gun and drugs case

and the domestic violence case were finalized on December

18, 2003. On that day, Shaw pled guilty and the fully signed

plea agreements were filed in open court before a superior

court judge different from the judge presiding over Shaw’s

criminal cases.

On May 26, 2009, after two unsuccessful rounds of

collateral state habeas litigation (called “personal restraint

petitions” in Washington), Frost raised his Brady and Napue

claims for the first time. Then Frost got new lawyers, federal

public defenders in place of state criminal counsel. Frost’s

third personal restraint petition was filed in state court after

his investigator at the Federal Public Defender’s Office

reviewed Shaw’s criminal history and discovered the

undisclosed plea agreement in the domestic violence case. 

Frost argued that the State knowingly elicited the false

testimony of Shaw at trial and that the suppression of Shaw’s

domestic violence plea agreement precluded him from

impeaching Shaw’s credibility. The Washington State

Supreme Court dismissed Frost’s five-year-old claims as time

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barred under Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.090, Washington’s

one-year time limit for petitioning for a “collateral attack on

a judgment and sentence in a criminal case.” It held that

Frost failed to meet the exception for “newly discovered

evidence” because he had not acted with “reasonable

diligence” in discovering the impeaching evidence, which had

been publicly available since December 18, 2003.

On February 26, 2010, Frost filed an amended federal

habeas petition and raised a number of grounds for relief,

including for the first time here that he was denied due

process under the Fourteenth Amendment when the State

knowingly withheld material exculpatory evidence and that

his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated

when the State knowingly elicited the false testimony of

Shaw. On October 5, 2010, United States Magistrate Judge

Brian A. Tsuchida issued a Report and Recommendation,

which recommended that the district court deny Frost’s

amended habeas petition. The Report and Recommendation

concluded that Frost’s Brady and Napue claims were

procedurally defaulted and should be dismissed for that

reason.

On February 4, 2011, United States District Judge

Thomas S. Zilly adopted the Report and Recommendation

and dismissed the habeas petition with prejudice. In addition,

the district court denied a certificate of appealability as to

Frost’s Brady and Napue claims. Frost I, 2011 WL 486198

at *1–2. Likewise, our prior three judge panel and this en

banc court denied Frost’s request that we expand the

certificate of appealability to address these issues. Frost II,

692 F.3d at 927 n.3; Frost III, 757 F.3d at 919. As a result,

Frost was not permitted to appeal the dismissal of his Brady

and Napue claims. Part II of today’s opinion now reverses

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FROST V. GILBERT 25

course and expands the certificate of appealability to

resuscitate these claims, concluding that “reasonable jurists

could debate” whether the district court “was correct in its

procedural ruling.” Maj. Op. at 10. I disagree.

Frost presents a classic case of procedural default. We do

violence to principles of comity and federalism by failing to

stand by our previous rulings. See Edwards v. Carpenter,

529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000) (“The procedural default doctrine

and its attendant ‘cause and prejudice’ standard are ‘grounded

in concerns of comity and federalism.’”) (citing Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730 (1991)); see also Murray v.

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 491 (1986).

II

Frost’s right to appeal the dismissal of his Brady and

Napue claims “is governed by the certificate of appealability

(COA) requirements now found at 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000). Specifically,

Frost is entitled to a COA on these issues only if he “has

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Frost “satisfies this standard

by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with

the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or

that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate

to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003).

However, the inquiry becomes “somewhat more

complicated where, as here, the district court dismisses the

petition on procedural grounds.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. In

such cases, the Supreme Court has instructed:

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When the district court denies a habeas

petition on procedural grounds without

reaching the prisoner’s underlying

constitutional claim, a COA should issue

when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists

of reason would find it debatable whether the

petition states a valid claim of the denial of a

constitutional right and that jurists of reason

would find it debatable whether the district

court was correct in its procedural ruling. . . .

Where a plain procedural bar is present and

the district court is correct to invoke it to

dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could

not conclude either that the district court

erred in dismissing the petition or that the

petitioner should be allowed to proceed

further. In such a circumstance, no appeal

would be warranted.

Id. (emphasis added).

It follows that determining whether a COA should issue

on Frost’s procedurallydefaulted claims has two components,

“one directed at [his] underlying constitutional claims and

one directed at the district court’s procedural holding.” Id. at

484–85. The Supreme Court has encouraged us to first

resolve the procedural issues, especially if that inquiry would

end the case. Id. at 485. For this reason, I initially address

the second component of the § 2253(c) inquiry, “whether

jurists of reason could conclude that the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s

dismissal on procedural grounds was debatable or incorrect.” 

Id.

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III

The district court dismissed Frost’s Brady and Napue

claims as procedurally defaulted. Frost I, 2011 WL 486198

at *1–2, adopting No. C09–725–TSZ–BAT, 2010 WL

5775657 at *4 (W.D. Wa. Oct. 5, 2010) (report and

recommendation). More specifically, the district court found

that Frost’s failure to raise these claims within one year after

his judgment, as required by Washington law, provided an

“independent and adequate state ground to bar habeas

review.” Id.; see also Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 920

(9th Cir. 2004) (“We have already determined that this timerelated procedural statute, Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.090,

provides an independent and adequate state ground to bar

federal review.”). The district court’s decision was absolutely

correct and, therefore, no further consideration on appeal is

warranted.

A

To show cause, Frost must show the existence of “some

objective factor external to the defense [that] impeded

counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.” 

Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. Frost fails to show that “the reason

for his failure to develop facts in state-court proceedings was

the State’s suppression of the relevant evidence.” Banks v.

Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004).

Frost provides no justification as to why he failed to raise

his Brady and Napue claims during the five-and-a-half years

between when Shaw’s plea deal was made publicly available

and when he filed his third state habeas petition. How could

he? The information was available on the public docket two

days after the jury found him guilty in 2003. Frost fails to

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explain why he could not have raised these issues on direct

appeal or in either of his first two state habeas petitions. 

While Frost may not have been able to raise his Brady and

Napue claims before his conviction, he could have done so in

a timely post-conviction proceeding when the information

became part of the public record. See McCleskey, 499 U.S.

at 497 (“That [petitioner] did not possess, or could not

reasonably have obtained, certain evidence fails to establish

cause if other known or discoverable evidence could have

supported the claim in any event.”).

In fact, when Frost’s investigator finally got around to

reviewing Shaw’s complete court files in 2009, he easily

found Shaw’s domestic violence plea deal. The ease by

which Frost’s investigator obtained the impeaching evidence

trenchantly demonstrates that Frost could have brought his

Brady and Napue claims as early as 2003 if he had conducted

a “reasonable and diligent investigation.” Id. at 498. His

failure to do so does not constitute cause. See id.; see also

Henry v. Ryan, 720 F.3d 1073, 1083 (9th Cir. 2013) (no cause

established when petitioner suspected and had evidentiary

support for his Brady claim prior to federal habeas

proceedings); Matthews v. Ishee, 486 F.3d 883, 891 (6th Cir.

2007) (“Where, like here, ‘the factual basis for a claim’ is

‘reasonably available to’ the petitioner or his counsel from

another source, the government is under no duty to supply

that information to the defense.”) (quoting Strickler v.

Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 283 n.24 (1999)).

Two Supreme Court cases Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S.

263 (1999), and Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004),

demonstrate why Frost has not established cause. In both

Strickler and Banks, the Court held that cause existed after

the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence at trial and

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throughout state post-conviction proceedings. Strickler,

527 U.S. at 273–75; Banks, 540 U.S. at 675. In Strickler, the

petitioner did not seek discovery of possible exculpatory

evidence because the prosecutor maintained an “open file

policy,” which purportedly gave the petitioner access to all of

the prosecutor’s files. 527 U.S. at 276–78. The prosecution

in Strickler then withheld investigative notes and letters that

would have “cast serious doubt” on a key trial witness’s

testimony. Id. at 273. Similarly, in Banks, the State advised

the defense that there “would be no need to litigate discovery

issues,” because the State would “without the necessity of

motions, provide [the defense] with all discovery to which

[the defense was] entitled.” 540 U.S. at 675 (internal

alternation omitted). However, the prosecution in Banks

failed to disclose that an essential prosecution witness was a

paid police informant and that another key witness had been

intensively coached by prosecutors. Id.

Frost’s case is inapposite in several important respects. 

First, unlike the “long-suppressed evidence” in Strickler and

Banks, the impeaching evidence Frost now relies on was not

suppressed during Frost’s post-conviction proceedings. Cf.

Banks, 540 U.S. at 675. Importantly, the prosecution never

“assert[ed] during state habeas proceedings that [Frost] had

already received everything known to the government.” 

Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289; Banks, 540 U.S. at 692–93. And

unlike investigative notes or memoranda that are in the

exclusive possession of the government, Shaw’s plea deals

were part of the public record beginning in December 2003

shortly after the jury returned its verdict against Frost. Cf.

Strickler, 527 U.S. at 273–75. The State had no duty to

provide this reasonably available information to Frost. See

Matthews, 486 F.3d at 890–91. Finally, Frost knew during

trial that Shaw had entered into an agreement for a reduced

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sentence on the gun and drugs charges in exchange for his

testimony at Frost’s trial. Frost says he suspected that the

prosecution withheld information regarding its agreement

with Shaw. If Frost would have reviewed Shaw’s plea deal

in the gun and drugs case, he would have learned of Shaw’s

domestic violence plea agreement. His failure to do so “was

his own failure, and not a failure caused by the [prosecution]

or some other external factor.” Id. at 891.

The majority suggests that the King County Prosecutor’s

Office deliberately withheld Shaw’s plea deals from Frost in

2008. The majority’s brazen accusations are entirely

unsupported by the record, and the letters between Frost and

the Prosecutor’s Office tell a much different story than the

majority strains to tell. Lest there be any doubt on this issue,

I discuss each letter exchanged between Frost and the King

County Prosecutor’s Office in response to his subsequent

public records requests.

On March 22, 2008, five years after his conviction, Frost

first wrote to the Prosecutor’s Office to request “any

documents, statements, and/or reports that purtain [sic] to

EDWARD G. SHAW.” The Public Records Officer, Kelli

Williams, promptly informed Frost on April 1, 2008, that she

had “located four (4) case files for Edward G. Shaw that [she]

believed [were] responsive to [Frost’s] request.” The letter

provided Frost with the criminal charge and court case

number associated with each of these four cases and offered

to photocopy the complete case files at a cost of $195. 

Notably, Shaw’s domestic violence case was included in this

list of cases. Frost declined to look at it.

On April 3, 2008, Frost wrote that he was “not looking for

[Shaw’s] complete case files” and limited his request solely

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to documents “that could be used to ‘DETERMINE

WHETHER OR NOT MR. SHAW HAS WORKED AS A

STATE OR POLICE INFORMANT.’” [Emphasisin original]

By letter dated April 14, 2008, Williams clarified that she was

“unable to search [the] files by names of witnesses or

informants” but she offered to search through any particular

case files if Frost could provide her with the “police incident

number” or “court cause number.”

By reply letter the next day, Frost further limited his

public records request to just two case files: (1) documents

contained in his own case file from his 2003 trial, and

(2) documents contained in Shaw’s gun and drugs case file. 

In this April 15 letter, Frost further narrowed his request to

“statements given by Eddy Shaw” and “any and all King

County Police Case Numbers brought up in those files.” On

April 28, 2008, Williams wrote back to confirm her

understanding of Frost’s now twice-amended records request

for “Eddie Shaw’s statements and King County Sheriff

(Police) case numbers” in the case files associated with

Frost’s 2003 trial and Shaw’s gun and drugs case. Finally, on

May 8, 2008, Williams wrote Frost that she was able to locate

“one statement of Eddie Shaw” in the gun and drugs case file.

After receiving this last letter, Frost ceased all

communication with the Prosecutor’s Office. He does not

explain why he abandoned his search or why he declined to

pay for copying to review any documents associated with

Shaw’s domestic violence case. In addition, Frost provides

no justification as to why he limited his request solely to

Shaw’s police statements and declined to review Shaw’s plea

deal in the gun and drugs case. If Frost had reviewed the gun

and drugs plea deal, he would have discovered Shaw’s

domestic violence case referenced therein. It was certainly

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not hidden. While the majority tries to paint a nefarious

picture of deliberate prosecutorialmisconduct and complicity,

the record currently before us instead tells a different story. 

It shows that the Prosecutor’s Office responded promptly and

accurately to all of Frost’s record requests. It shows that the

Prosecutor’s Office offered to send Frost all of the documents

associated with Shaw’s criminal history, including Shaw’s

plea deals in the gun and drugs case and in the domestic

violence case. Frost, however, declined to review these

documents. Therefore, Frost has not shown cause to excuse

his procedural default, and the majority errs by concluding

otherwise.

B

But even if Frost could show cause, he certainly cannot

show prejudice. To show prejudice for his Brady claim, Frost

must show a “‘reasonable probability’ that the result of the

trial would have been different if the suppressed documents

had been disclosed to the defense.” Strickler, 527 U.S. at

289. To show prejudice for his Napue claim, Frost must

show a “reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could

have affected the judgment of the jury.” Sivak v. Hardison,

658 F.3d 898, 912 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal citation and

quotation omitted).

The majority agrees that Frost cannot show such

prejudice. Maj. Op. at 13–15. This is not surprising

considering the evidence of guilt at Frost’s trial was

overwhelming. Frost gave three taped confessions, all of

which were entered into evidence at trial, and Frost testified

in detail about his involvement in the eleven-day home

invasion and commercial robbery spree. Further, as the

majority observes, Shaw’s undisclosed plea deal in the

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domestic violence case added little impeachment value

considering the jury was already informed that Shaw had

received leniency from sentencing on other serious felonies

in exchange for his testimony against Frost. Maj. Op. at 14. 

The majority correctly concludes that “there is no ‘reasonable

likelihood’” that Shaw’s false testimony about only having

one plea agreement could have ‘affected the judgment of the

jury,’” and that “there is no ‘reasonable probability’ that the

outcome [at Frost’s trial] would have been different” had the

jury learned of Shaw’s second plea agreement, which had not

yet been accepted by a different judge. Maj. Op. at 13–14.

In other words, the majority agrees that the district

court’s dismissal of Frost’s Brady and Napue claims was

correct. In these instances—“[w]here a plain procedural bar

is present and the district court is correct to invoke it to

dispose of the case”—the Supreme Court has clearly

instructed that “no appeal [is] warranted.” Slack, 529 U.S. at

484. The majority’s decision to reverse our prior opinion and

to now expand the COA only to deny these meritless claims

is a blatant disregard of binding Supreme Court precedent

enforcing procedural bars and a lamentable waste of precious

judicial resources.

IV

Section II C of Judge Kozinski’s opinion launches a

groundless, personal attack against named employees of the

King County Prosecutor’s Office. Indeed, he has not

garnered support from a majority of the court to support it. 

Section II C is not the ruling of our en banc court; it is merely

hortatory.

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The Section accuses several King County employees of

“professional misconduct,” providing “incorrect or

misleading information,” and “stonewall[ing]” Frost. Op. at

15–18. Incredibly, no discovery has been conducted on these

issues; nor has an evidentiary hearing taken place. That’s not

surprising given the undisputed fact that the claim was ruled

procedurally defaulted by both state and federal courts. 

Nonetheless, Judge Kozinski engages in sheer speculation

without any factual basis to support raw supposition. But

what we do have in the record thus far provides no support

for this unwarranted assault. Sadly, Judge Kozinski elects

himself finder of fact in order to hold the individuals “to

account for their conduct” and then exhorts these individuals

to “seek to clear their names” with the state bar. Op. at 16,

18.

The Section accuses Zachary Wagnild, the deputy

prosecuting attorney in Frost’s case and Shaw’s gun and

drugs case, of willfully and deliberately withholding Shaw’s

domestic violence plea agreement and permitting Shaw to lie

on the stand. Op. at 15–17. It also accuses Gary Ernsdorff,

the deputy prosecuting attorney in Shaw’s domestic violence

case, of engaging in complicity to keep Shaw’s domestic

violence plea deal secret. Op. at 17.

These reckless accusations are made without any

knowledge of the actual facts. Section II C fails to consider

the possibility that Wagnild did not know about Shaw’s

domestic violence plea deal at the time of Frost’s trial or the

possibility that Shaw’s plea deals were not signed or fully

completed until entered in open court on December 18, 2003,

after Frost’s trial. It is also likely that Shaw’s gun and drugs

case and domestic violence case were handled by two

different units in Washington State’s largest county

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prosecutor’s office, resulting in a classic case of “the left

hand didn’t know what the right hand was doing.” The

bottom line is, we just don’t know what happened. Yet, the

Section automatically assumes the worst of these two King

County prosecutors and, as a result, brands them with a

scarlet letter.

Section II C also accuses Kelli Williams, a non-attorney

Public Records Officer, of providing “incorrect or misleading

information,” and declares Williams to be either incompetent,

indolent, or deliberately deceptive. Op. at 17–18. Nonsense. 

As shown by the 2008 letters, Williams promptly and

accuratelyresponded to Frost’s record requests and offered to

provide Frost with all of the information he needed. Williams

may not have even known Wagnild or Ernsdorff or even been

a King County employee at the time of Frost’s trial. It is

highly likely that she had absolutely no prior knowledge of

Frost’s case, especially considering that Frost’s public

records request came five years after his conviction. Yet,

once again, the author assumes the worst: that Williams

deliberately hid “the deception committed by her office.” Op.

at 17–18.

Ultimately, Section II C is used as a platform to offer the

author’s “two-cents” on the supposed inner-workings of

Washington’s criminal justice system. Along the way, the

character and integrity of several public employees is

tarnished. Thankfully, a majority of the court has refused to

join in this indefensible and intemperate attack.

I respectfully dissent as to Part II of the majority opinion. 

I concur as to Part I and in the judgment denying habeas

relief.

 Case: 11-35114, 03/21/2016, ID: 9908259, DktEntry: 101-1, Page 35 of 35