Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02343/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02343-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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1 09cv02343 JLS(RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROSIE PRECIADO,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner

of Social Security,

Defendant. 

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Civil No. 09cv02343 JLS(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[ECF NO. 25]

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 27, 2006, Plaintiff, Rosie Preciado, filed an

application for supplemental security income benefits alleging a

disability onset of November 22, 2006. (Admin. R. Attach. #2, 17,

ECF No. 16.) The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied her

claim on February 27, 2007, and again upon reconsideration on

September 11, 2007. (Id. Attach. #4, 59-63, 65-70; see id. Attach.

#2, 17.) Preciado then filed a written request for a hearing,

which is dated October 15, 2007. (Id. Attach. #4, 73; see id. at

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74.) A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)

Edward D. Steinman on April 20, 2009. (Id. Attach. #2, 28.) He

issued a written decision on May 14, 2009, finding that Preciado

was not disabled. (See id. at 14-27.) The denial of benefits

became final when the Appeals Council declined to review the

decision on August 27, 2009. (Id. at 2-4.)

On October 21, 2009, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Review of

Final Decision of the Commissioner of Social Security against

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security, challenging the

denial of Preciado’s claim for supplemental income benefits [ECF

No. 1]. Defendant filed an Answer [ECF No. 15] and the

Administrative Record [ECF No. 16].

On March 3, 2011, Preciado’s Motion for Summary Judgement with

an attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities was filed [ECF No.

20]. Defendant filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and

Memorandum of Points and Authorities on April 25, 2011 [ECF Nos.

25-26]. Preciado’s Opposition to Defendant’s Cross-Motion for

Summary Judgment was filed along with a Memorandum of Points and

Authorities on May 3, 2011 [ECF No. 28]. In her Opposition to

Defendant’s Cross-Motion, Plaintiff conceded that the Court should

deny Preciado’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Pl.’s Opp’n 1, ECF

No. 28.) As a result, this Court recommended that the district

court deny her Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 31]. 

On May 9, 2011, Defendant filed an Opposition to Plaintiff

Rosie Preciado’s Opposition to Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary

Judgment with an exhibit, which the Court construes as Defendant’s

Reply [ECF No. 30].

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3 09cv02343 JLS(RBB)

The Defendant’s Cross-Motion [ECF No. 25] is suitable for

resolution on the papers pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). 

S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1). The Court has reviewed Astrue’s

Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Preciado’s Opposition to

Defendant’s Cross-Motion, and Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s

Opposition. For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends

GRANTING Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. 

II. MEDICAL EVIDENCE

Plaintiff is sixty-year-old female with a level of education

between eighth and tenth-grade. (Admin. R. Attach. #3, 57, ECF No.

16; id. Attach. #2, 52.) Prior to her alleged disability onset in

November 2006, Preciado worked as a care giver. (Id. at 31.) 

A. Examining Physicians

1. Dr. Ajit Raisinghani, Internal Medicine Evaluation

In February 2007, Plaintiff underwent an internal medicine

evaluation by Dr. Ajit Raisinghani at Seagate Medical Group

(“Seagate”) for the Disability Evaluation Department of the

Department of Social Services. (Id. Attach. #7, 275, 278.) 

Despite Preciado’s complaints of stress, depression, hypertension,

diabetes, and back pain, Dr. Raisinghani determined that Plaintiff

had essentially a normal examination and that she required no

special physical limitations. (Id. at 278.) 

2. Dr. Mounir Soliman, Consultative Psychiatric Evaluation

Preciado underwent a complete psychiatric evaluation at

Seagate in February 2007. (Id. at 281.) She complained of

depression and stress. (Id.) Dr. Mounir Soliman evaluated

Preciado’s level of functioning by analyzing her living situation,

daily activities, transportation situation, relationships, as well

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as her concentration and task completion. (Id. at 282-83, 285.) 

The report notes that the Plaintiff is able to cook, clean, drive a

car, shop, run errands, practice personal hygiene, and can account

for her financial responsibilities. (Id. at 282-83.) It also

provides that Preciado can “get along well” with her family,

friends, and neighbors, but she cannot concentrate on her daily

activities. (Id. at 283.) 

Dr. Soliman diagnosed Preciado with major depression, mild to

moderate. (Id. at 284.) Dr. Soliman determined that Preciado’s

Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) level was sixty-six, and

he described her prognosis as “fair.” (Id. at 284.) The doctor

also concluded that the Plaintiff was able to understand and carry

out complex instructions, interact with coworkers, supervisors, and

the public, and she could withstand the pressures of an eight-hour

workday. (Id.) 

3. Dr. Valerie C. Altavas, Internist, Residual Functional 

 Capacity Questionnaire

On March 16, 2009, Dr. Valerie C. Altavas, an internist,

completed a Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) Questionnaire

regarding Preciado’s condition. (See id. at 348-51.) Altavas is

Preciado’s primary care physician. (See id. Attach. #2, 44-45.) 

Dr. Altavas diagnosed Preciado with anxiety, depression,

hypertension, and diabetes. (Id. Attach. #7, 348.) Dr. Altavas

deemed that Plaintiff was “incapable of even ‘low stress’ jobs”

because she was “[e]xtremely anxious [and] fidgety.” (Id. at 349.) 

The doctor opined that Preciado could not sit or stand without a

break for more than ten minutes at a time. (Id.) Plaintiff could

not sit, stand, or walk for more than two hours in an eight-hour

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1

 In his decision denying benefits, the administrative law

judge identified the vocational expert as “Nelly Katsell, M.S. and

Certified Rehabilitation Counselor,” but the transcript of the

administrative hearing identified her as “Ms. Castle.” (Compare

id. at 25, with id. at 28, 52.) The Court will assume that the ALJ

correctly identified the vocational expert and will also refer to

her as Nelly Katsell.

5 09cv02343 JLS(RBB)

work day. (Id.) Dr. Altavas previously concluded, on February 1,

2009, that Plaintiff was unable to work due to severe depression

and anxiety. (Id. at 352.) The doctor noted that for these

conditions, Preciado was under the care of a psychiatrist. (Id.) 

B. Nonexamining Physicians

On February 23, 2007, a disability examiner made a disability

determination based upon the case analysis of Preciado’s medical

condition contained in her file. (Id. Attach. #3, 57; id. Attach.

#7, 298-300.) The reviewing physician determined that Preciado

displayed nonsevere physical and mental conditions. (Id. Attach.

#7, 300.) On April 5, 2007, the Plaintiff applied for

reconsideration, and the initial conclusion was confirmed on

September 10, 2007. (Id. Attach. #3, 64-65; id. Attach. #7, 317-

18.)

III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING

A hearing was held before ALJ Steinman on April 20, 2009. 

(Id. Attach. #2, 17.) Preciado appeared in person and was

represented by counsel. (Id.) A medical expert, Dr. Sidney

Bolter, and a vocational expert, Nelly Katsell, were present and

testified. (Id.)1

 

A. Preciado’s Testimony

The ALJ examined the Plaintiff on her employment history,

psychiatric condition and treatment, alleged physical impairments,

living situation, and daily activities. (See generally id. at 31-

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42.) Judge Steinman’s initial questions addressed Preciado’s

employment history; the Plaintiff confirmed she had previously

worked as a care provider and a janitor. (Id. at 31.) Next, the

ALJ questioned the Plaintiff about her psychiatric condition. (Id.

at 32-33.) Preciado claimed that her primary emotional problems

were nervousness and depression, and she felt the urge to isolate

herself. (Id.) 

The ALJ asked the Plaintiff about her diabetes and

hypertension before asking whether “any physical problems” 

interfered with her ability to function. (Id. at 33-34.) Preciado

answered that only her depression and nervousness affected her. 

(Id. at 34.) Nevertheless, the Plaintiff denied that her physical

condition was satisfactory, stating that she had asthma and pain in

her back and legs. (Id.) Picking up an object weighing five to

ten pounds would trigger her back pain. (Id. at 35.) The

Plaintiff stated that her back pain prohibits her from sitting; she

can stand and walk, but not for extended periods. (Id. at 36.) 

Preciado expressed that turning is difficult for her, and her

capacity for lifting and carrying objects is limited to five to ten

pounds. (Id. at 36-37.) The Plaintiff acknowledged that these

conditions would not allow her to “be at a worksite eight hours a

day, five days a week.” (Id. at 37.) She testified that she did

not require the use of an assistive device, such as a cane, to

walk. (Id. at 36.) 

According to Preciado, she lives with her son and daughter,

and has lived with her son since November 2006. (Id. at 37.) She

confirmed that she can dress herself, but stress keeps her from

preparing food for herself because she cannot hold objects with her

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hands. (Id. at 38.) The Plaintiff does not perform any chores,

and she predominantly remains in her room throughout the day. (Id.

at 38-39.) Preciado has a driver’s license, but she told the ALJ

that she cannot drive due to her panic and anxiety attacks. (Id.

at 39.) 

Preciado’s attorney examined her regarding her psychiatric

treatment, weight, education, and sleep pattern. (See generally

id. at 43-47.) The Plaintiff testified that her medication helped

her to sleep, but it only relieved her anxiety “once in a while.” 

(Id. at 43.) 

According to the Plaintiff, Dr. Altavas prescribed Celexa and

Xanax to alleviate Preciado’s anxiety, but Preciado stopped using

them because she did not have the money to pay for them. (Id. at

44-45.) The Plaintiff explained that Dr. Altavas told her that she

could not work. (Id. at 44.) Preciado also stated that her son

and daughter provide her with living expenses. (Id. at 45.) 

B. Medical Expert Testimony

Medical expert, Dr. Sidney Bolter testified that Preciado’s

medical record supported a diagnosis of “deficient disorder, NOS

[not otherwise specified],” “depression NOS,” a “significant

anxiety disorder,” as well as a “partner relational problem.” (Id.

at 47, 49.) Dr. Bolter reviewed and described Dr. Soliman’s

report, which assessed Preciado with a GAF of sixty-six and opined

that she did not have significant limitations to any kind of

activity, as “universally overdone.” (Id. at 48-49.) Dr. Bolter

then advised restricting Preciado’s workplace activities to simple,

repetitive, nonpublic tasks with minimal contact with peers or

supervisors. (Id. at 50.) The doctor did not describe any

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exertional limitations. (See id.) He concluded by telling

Plaintiff’s counsel that Preciado was “not really getting

treatment” for a “treatable condition.” (Id. at 52.) 

C. Vocational Expert Testimony

The ALJ presented the vocational expert, Nelly Katsell, M.S.,

with five hypothetical scenarios to assess the Plaintiff’s

potential for returning to work. (See id. at 52-55.) Katsell

informed the ALJ that Preciado’s previous occupation as a care

provider carried a medium occupational profile. (Id. at 31-32.)

For the first hypothetical, the ALJ presented Katsell with the

DDS analysis, which determined that the Plaintiff had nonsevere,

medical and mental impairments. (Id. at 52.) Katsell testified

that based on this evaluation, Preciado could return to her prior

work as a child care attendant. (Id.) 

The ALJ questioned the vocational expert on the second

hypothetical, comprised of the internal medicine and psychiatric

examinations conducted in February 2007. (Id. at 52-53.) Neither

report identified any limitations to the Plaintiff’s activities. 

(Id.) Katsell maintained that Preciado could return to work as a

child care provider under this hypothetical. (Id. at 53.) 

The third hypothetical consisted of Dr. Altavas’s March 2009

assessment. (Id.) The ALJ stated that Dr. Altavas’s assessment of

the Plaintiff’s functional limitations was that Preciado was

limited to “less than sedentary work.” (Id.) Katsell recognized

that Dr. Altavas’s statement essentially concludes that Preciado’s

anxiety and depression would be disabling. (Id.) In this

hypothetical, the vocational expert testified that there would be

no work that the Plaintiff could perform. (Id.)

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Fourth, ALJ Steinman asked the vocational expert to consider

Dr. Bolter’s assessment that Preciado could engage in simple,

repetitive, nonpublic tasks requiring “minimal contact with peers

and supervisors.” (Id. at 53-55.) From this hypothetical, Katsell

testified that Preciado could not return to her prior occupation. 

(Id. at 53.) 

Despite Preciado’s psychiatric limitation, Katsell explained

that the Plaintiff could perform approximately forty percent of the

900 medium exertion job titles. (Id.) The vocational expert

identified three medium-exertion-level occupations, a final

assembler, a bakery racker, and a hand packager. (Id. at 53-54.) 

She stated that in San Diego County, 2,500 final assembler,

Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) number 806.684-010, jobs

exist, and 820,000 exist in the national economy. (Id. at 53-54.) 

There are 4,300 bakery racker, DOT number 524.687-018, positions in

San Diego County and 699,000 in the national economy. (Id.) 

Finally, Katsell indicated 3,500 hand packager, DOT number 920.587-

018, jobs exist in San Diego County and 567,000 nationally. (Id.

at 54-55.)

The fifth hypothetical presented the vocational expert was

Preciado’s assessment of her limitations. (Id. at 55.) The

Plaintiff testified that she could lift five to ten pounds

occasionally, could not sit at all or stand for an extended period,

would need frequent rest breaks, and could not work full time. 

(Id.) Katsell explained that under this hypothetical, there would

not be any work the Plaintiff could perform. (Id.)

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IV. THE ALJ’S DECISION

After considering the record, ALJ Steinman concluded that

Preciado suffers from the severe impairment of depressive disorder. 

(Id. at 19 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c)).) The ALJ concluded

that the Plaintiff’s capacity to work had been compromised by nonexertional impairments. (Id. at 26.) He also made the following

relevant findings:

1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since November 27, 2006, the application date

(20 CFR 416.971 et seq.).

2. The claimant has the following severe impairment:

depressive disorder (20 CFR 416.920(c)).

. . . .

3. The claimant does not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that meets or medically

equals one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.925 and

416.926).

. . . .

4. After careful consideration of the entire record,

the undersigned finds that the claimant has the

residual functional capacity to perform a full range of

work at all exertional levels but with the following

non-exertional limitations: she would be limited to

simple, repetitive tasks in a non-public work

environment with minimal contact with peers and

supervisors.

. . . . 

. . . [I]n reviewing this record, substantial

persuasive weight, was not accorded the claimant's

treating and examining physicians (except where

specifically noted herein). Normally, it is presumed

that they would have the best available knowledge and

evaluation of her impairments and would be in the best

position to determine the degree to which these

impairments would hamper her in the performance of job

related tasks and duties. But, due to inconsistencies

in the record, controlling weight could not be granted

to Valerie C. Altavas, M.D., (20 CFR § 416.927(d) and

SSR 96-2p).

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The undersigned Administrative Law Judge acknowledges

the opinions expressed by Dr. Altavas in her March 16,

2009, completion of the physical residual functional

capacity questionnaire. However, there are

inconsistencies in the opinions expressed by Dr.

Altavas in that report. First it is noted that Dr.

Altavas reports the claimant's physical impairments

were hypertension and diabetes, for which she assesses

significant physical limitations for the claimant. Yet,

when the claimant underwent the consultative internist

evaluation on February 6, 2007, by Dr. Raisinghani, the

claimant reported that she had never been hospitalized

or had any complications from the hypertension, but she

does take medication for her hypertension, which

appears to keep it under good control. It was also

noted during that evaluation, that with regards to her

diabetes, she didn't know what her blood sugars were

running and she could not provide any evidence of end

organ damage or any symptoms. Additionally, there is no

evidence in the claimant's medical records report [of]

any significant limitations due to either her

hypertension or her diabetes. Therefore, the physical

limitations assessed by Dr. Altavas are not consistent

with the medical evidence in the record.

Additionally, it is noted that in a note dated February

1, 2009, Dr. Altavas reported that the claimant was

unable to work due to her depression and anxiety, not

due to her hypertension and depression. However, Dr.

Altavas is an internist and not a psychiatrist; and

therefore, her opinions regarding limitations due to a

psychiatric limitation would carry no special

significance.

Accordingly, the undersigned has given less weight to

the opinion of Dr. Altavas, than it may otherwise

merit.

. . . .

However, to the extent that it is alleged that the

claimant cannot perform work at the residual functional

capacity as recited above, the Administrative Law Judge

finds those allegations are not totally credible for

the following clear and convincing reasons.

First, the claimant's activities of daily living

include[] independently caring for her own personal

hygiene; cooking; cleaning; shopping and running

errands; and taking care of financial responsibilities

(Exhibit 5F). These activities do not indicate a

disabling level of impairment of the claimant's

residual functional capacity.

Second, during the February 6, 2007, consultative

internist evaluation by Dr. Raisinghani, the claimant

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reported that she had never been hospitalized or had

any complications from the hypertension; she reported

that she does take medication for this, which appears

to keep it under good control. Third, with regards to

her diabetes, it was also noted during the February 6,

2007, consultative internist evaluation by Dr.

Raisinghani, that the claimant didn't know what her

blood sugars were running, as she didn't follow it

regularly, and she could not provide any evidence of

end organ damage or any symptoms.

Fourth, when the claimant was taken to the San Diego

County Psychiatric Hospital on December 30, 2006, by

the San Diego police department, the claimant

reluctantly admitted that she was upset because she

found out that her husband was cheating on her again.

While it was noted that she had superficial lacerations

on both wrists, the claimant acknowledged that she did

it more to get her husband's attention and that she did

not want to die and that he was not worth harming

herself over. Fifth, during the December 30, 2006,

admission to the San Diego County Psychiatric Hospital,

the claimant did state that she had not been sleeping

well and that she has had a poor appetite; however, she

denied being suicidal and she denied any other symptoms

of depression, stating that she was just very upset

about her husband's behavior. Sixth, it was also noted

during the hospital admission that the claimant denied

any previous psychiatric care.

Seventh, when discussing the claimant's impairments, no

physician, neither any of the claimants treating

physicians or a State Agency physician ever opined that

listing level limitations were ever met or equaled.

Eighth, the objective evidence of the claimant's

medical record does not establish impairments likely to

produce disabling pain or other limitations as alleged

for any period of 12 or more continuous months.

. . . .

. . . [T]he Administrative Law Judge finds Dr. Bolter's

opinions are persuasive and adopts them.

The objective medical evidence and the claimant's

acknowledged activities are consistent with the ability

to perform activities at the above stated residual

functional capacity levels and inconsistent with the

inability to do any work activity.

5. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant

work (20 CFR 416.965).

. . . .

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9. Considering the claimant's age, education, work

experience, and residual functional capacity, there are

jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national

economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 416.969

and 416.969a).

. . . .

The claimant's ability to perform work at all

exertional levels has been compromised by non

exertional limitations. . . .

. . . .

Based on the testimony of the vocational expert, the

undersigned concludes that, considering the claimant's

age, education, work experience, and residual

functional capacity, the claimant is capable of making

a successful adjustment to other work that exists in

significant numbers in the national economy. A finding

of "not disabled" is therefore appropriate under the

framework of section 204.00 in the Medical-Vocational

Guidelines and Social Security Ruling 85-15.

10. The claimant has not been under a disability, as

defined in the Social Security Act, since November 27,

2006, the date the application was filed (20 CFR

416.920(g)).

(Id. at 19-21, 23-27.)

Based on all of the above, ALJ Steinman determined that

Preciado was not disabled and not entitled to supplemental security

income. (Id. at 27.) 

V. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

To qualify for supplemental security income under the Social

Security Act, an applicant must show two things: (1) He or she

suffers from a medically determinable impairment that can be

expected to last for a continuous period of twelve months or more,

or would result in death; and (2) the impairment renders the

applicant incapable of performing the work that he or she

previously performed or any other substantially gainful employment

that exists in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 432 (d)(1)

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(A), (2)(A) (West Supp. 2010). An applicant must meet both

requirements to be classified as “disabled.” Id.

Sections 205(g) and 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act

allow applicants whose claims have been denied by the SSA to seek

judicial review of the Commissioner’s final agency decision. 42

U.S.C.A. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3) (West Supp. 2010). The Court should

affirm the decision unless “it is based upon legal error or is not

supported by substantial evidence.” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d

1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d

599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999)). Substantial evidence means “‘more than

a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance’” of the evidence. 

Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1214 n.1 (quoting Tidwell, 161 F.3d at 601). 

“‘[T]he court must consider both evidence that supports and the

evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion . . . .’” Frost

v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 359, 366-67 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Jones v.

Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985).

To determine whether a claimant is “disabled,” the Social

Security regulations use a five-step process outlined in 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.920 (2010). If an applicant is found to be “disabled” or

“not disabled” at any step, there is no need to proceed further. 

Bray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir.

2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)). Although the ALJ must

assist the applicant in developing a record, the applicant bears

the burden of proof during the first four steps. Bray, 554 F.3d at

1222; Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1999). 

If the fifth step is reached, however, the burden shifts to the

Commissioner. Id. at 1098. The steps for evaluating a claim are

as follows:

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Step 1. Is the claimant presently working in a

substantially gainful activity? If so, then the claimant

is “not disabled” within the meaning of the Social

Security Act and is not entitled to disability insurance

benefits. If the claimant is not working in a

substantially gainful activity, then the claimant’s case

cannot be resolved at step one and the evaluation

proceeds to step two.

Step 2. Is the claimant’s impairment severe? If

not, then the claimant is “not disabled” and is not

entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the

claimant’s impairment is severe, then the claimant’s case

cannot be resolved at step two and the evaluation

proceeds to step three.

Step 3. Does the impairment “meet or equal” one of

a list of specific impairments described in the

regulations? If so, the claimant is “disabled” and

therefore entitled to disability insurance benefits. If

the claimant’s impairment neither meets nor equals one of

the impairments listed in the regulations, then the

claimant’s case cannot be resolved at step three and the

evaluation proceeds to step four.

Step 4. Is the claimant able to do any work that he

or she has done in the past? If so, then the claimant is

“not disabled” and is not entitled to disability

insurance benefits. If the claimant cannot do any work

he or she did in the past, then the claimant’s case

cannot be resolved at step four and the evaluation

proceeds to the fifth and final step.

Step 5. Is the claimant able to do any other work? 

If not, then the claimant is “disabled” and therefore

entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the

claimant is able to do other work, then the Commissioner

must establish that there are a significant number of

jobs in the national economy that claimant can do. There

are two ways for the Commissioner to meet the burden of

showing that there is other work in “significant numbers”

in the national economy that claimant can do: (1) by the

testimony of a vocational expert, or (2) by reference to

the Medical-Vocational Guidelines at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,

subpt. P, app. 2. If the Commissioner meets this burden,

the claimant is “not disabled” and therefore not entitled

to disability insurance benefits. If the Commissioner

cannot meet this burden, then the claimant is “disabled” and therefore entitled to disability benefits.

Id. at 1098-99 (footnotes and citations omitted).

Section 405(g) permits this Court to enter a judgment

affirming, modifying, or reversing the Commissioner’s decision. 42

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U.S.C.A. § 405(g). The matter may also be remanded to the Social

Security Administration for further proceedings. Id. After a case

is remanded and an additional hearing is held, the Commissioner may

modify or affirm the original findings of fact or the decision. 

Id. 

“If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or

reversing the Secretary’s conclusion, the court may not substitute

its judgment for that of the Secretary.” Flaten v. Sec’y Health &

Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995). Instead, it must

uphold the denial of benefits if the evidence is susceptible to

more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the

ALJ’s decision. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir.

2005). 

VI. DISCUSSION

A. The ALJ’s Application of the Medical Vocational Guidelines

In his Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Astrue charges that

the Plaintiff is not subject to the special “no work experience”

presumption of disability because she mistakenly limits her

reliance to her earnings in 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007, to

demonstrate that she has no prior relevant work experience. 

(Def.’s Cross-Mot. Summ. J. Mem. P. & A. 1, 5, 6, ECF No. 25.) The

Defendant asserts that the measure for determining past relevant

work experience is whether the Plaintiff engaged in substantial

gainful activity (“SGA”) at any time in previous fifteen years. 

(Id. at 1.) The Court addressed these arguments in a separate

Report and Recommendation Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment [ECF No. 31].

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In Preciado’s Opposition to Defendant’s Cross-Motion for

Summary Judgment, Plaintiff argues that Astrue’s Motion should be

denied and her case should be remanded to the SSA to permit the ALJ

to utilize Table Two of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (“grids”)

as the proper framework. (Pl.’s Opp’n Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 3,

ECF No. 28.) Preciado states that when a particular grid does not

direct a decision, the ALJ should use the grids as a framework for

“adjudicative guidance.” (Id. at 3 (quoting SSA, POMS § DI

25001.001.B.33 (2010)).) Because of the significant erosion of

Plaintiff’s ability to perform the full range of medium work,

Preciado insists that the ALJ should have referred to a less

demanding exertional rule to make the disability determination. 

(Id. (citing SSA, POMS § DI 25001.001.B.71 (2010)).) 

Specifically, Preciado contends that the ALJ improperly relied

upon Rule 204.00. (Id. at 2.) She asserts that because the

vocational expert identified only medium and light-exertion

occupations, the ALJ should have started his analysis with Table

Three of the grids, which governs medium-level exertion. (Id.) 

Plaintiff states that Rule 203.12 of Table Three directs a finding

of disabled if the plaintiff can establish each element. (Id. at

3.) Further, because the ALJ accepted that “significant erosion”

of Plaintiff’s ability to perform medium exertion-level work, he

should have referred to the light exertional guidelines in Table

Two and Rule 202.02 of the grids. (Id. at 3.) Preciado asserts

that as “an individual of advanced age, limited education, semiskilled work history without transferable skills,” and significant

erosion of her ability to perform the full range of availablemedium

work, Rule 202.02 would support a finding of disabled. (Id.)

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Defendant opposes Preciado’s arguments advanced in her

Opposition and titles his pleading as an Opposition to Plaintiff

Rosie Preciado’s Opposition. (Opp’n Pl.’s Opp’n 1, ECF No. 30.) 

The Commissioner argues that the Court should not consider

arguments not addressed in Plaintiff’s opening brief and should

affirm the Commissioner’s decision. (Id.) Moreover, Defendant

contends that Preciado’s arguments lack merit. (Id. at 2.) The

Commissioner states that even if Preciado met all elements of Rule

203.12 in Table Three, the rule would nonetheless direct a finding

that he is not disabled. (Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404 subpt. P,

app. 2, Rule 203.12).) Defendant asserts that the ALJ’s ruling

was proper because he found that the Plaintiff could perform at all

exertion levels and consulted a vocational expert, who found that a

“person with Plaintiff’s age, education, vocational profile, and

RFC could perform thousands of jobs in the national economy.” (Id.

at 3.) 

 1. Whether Plaintiff’s Argument Should Be Considered

The Commissioner incorrectly characterizes Plaintiff’s

Opposition to Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment as a

reply brief. (Opp’n Pl.’s Opp’n 2, ECF No. 30.) Preciado’s

Opposition to Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is

properly filed as an opposition to the Commissioner’s Motion and

not as a reply brief. (See Pl.’s Opp’n 1, ECF No. 28.) Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local Rule 7.1 permit the Plaintiff

to challenge the Commissioner’s version of the facts and his

supporting arguments in her opposition. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56;

S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1 (f)(3); see also 11 James Wm. Moore et al.,

Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.80 [1], at 178 (3d ed. 2011). 

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This Court has already recommended denying Plaintiff’s Motion

for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 31], and Preciado has an opportunity

to respond to Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. 

Accordingly, the Court will consider the merits of Plaintiff’s

arguments.

2. Merits

An ALJ typically must apply the grids when the plaintiff’s

impairments consist of exertional limitations. See Desrosiers v.

Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576-77 (9th Cir.

1988). When the plaintiff’s impairments reflect significant nonexertional limitations, however, “the grids are only a framework

and a [vocational expert] must be consulted.” Moore v. Apfel, 216

F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Desrosiers, 846 F.2d at 579

(“If a claimant has an impairment that limits his or her ability to

work without directly affecting his or her strength, that claimant

is said to have a non-exertional (not strength-related) limitation

that is not covered by the grids.”) (Pregerson, J. concurring). 

When the grids are not fully applicable, the ALJ must consult

a vocational expert to determine whether jobs for the plaintiff

exist in the national economy, despite her impairment. Moore, 216

F.3d at 869-70. In that situation, careful consideration of an

individual’s residual functional capacity is required. See Social

Security Ruling (“SSR”) No. 85-15 (1985). The ALJ may base a

finding of not disabled “on the fact that a claimant can perform

some, although not all, . . . work only if such a finding is

supported by both the medical evidence and the testimony of a

vocational expert.” Desrosiers, 846 F.2d at 580. To better assess

the plaintiff’s limitations and restrictions, the ALJ must present

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a vocational expert with a hypothetical or series of hypothetical

scenarios that are derived from the RFC. Valentine v. Comm'r Soc.

Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). The vocational

expert must identify a substantial occupational base to sustain a

finding of not disabled. See SSR No. 85-15 (“If, despite the

nonexertional impairment(s), an individual has a large potential

occupational base, he or she would ordinarily not be found disabled

in the absence of extreme adversities in age, education, and work

experience.”). 

The ALJ may consider any of the plaintiff’s daily activities

that “may be seen as inconsistent with the presence of a condition

which would preclude all work activity.” Curry v. Sullivan, 925

F.2d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding the ALJ’s denial of

disability benefits where the plaintiff could “take care of her

personal needs, prepare easy meals, do light housework, and shop

for some groceries[]”); see also Burch, 400 F.3d at 681 (upholding

the decision to deny benefits that was based, in part, on the fact

that the plaintiff performed daily activities transferable to a

work setting). 

Where the medical testimony of treating and examining

physicians is contradictory, the ALJ “‘must determine credibility

and resolve the conflict.’" Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947,

956-57 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016,

1019 (9th Cir. 1992)). If the ALJ disregards a treating

physician’s opinion when forming the hypothetical, the ALJ must

“‘make [] findings setting forth specific, legitimate reasons for

doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the record.’” 

Valentine, 574 F.3d at 692 (quoting Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957). 

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Here, contrary to Preciado’s contention that the ALJ

improperly applied the grids to support a finding of nondisability

when the number of available jobs for Preciado had decreased, the

ALJ’s determination was supported by substantial evidence. See

Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1214 n.1. ALJ Steinman found that Preciado’s

ability to work was compromised by nonexertional limitations. 

(Admin. R. Attach. #2, 26, ECF No. 16.) Thus, he properly utilized

a vocational expert to determine if, after assessing the

hypothetical scenarios, the Plaintiff could successfully perform

substantial gainful activity and adjust to a new work situation. 

(See id.); see also Moore, 216 F.3d at 871. The ALJ expressly

adopted the medical expert’s RFC assessment and was convinced by

the vocational expert’s identification of three specific

occupations available to Preciado that “other work exists in

significant numbers in the national economy.” (Admin. R. Attach

#2, 25, 27, ECF No. 16.) In addition, ALJ Steinman heard and

reviewed evidence from examining and nonexamining physicians who

opined that Preciado had no physical or medical impairments

contributing to exertional limitations. (Id. at 25.) 

The ALJ discounted examining physician Dr. Altavas’s testimony

because Judge Steinman determined that it was inconsistent with the

Plaintiff’s medical record. (Id. at 23); see Valentine, 574 F.3d

at 692; Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957. ALJ Steinman also found that Dr.

Altavas’s specialization as an internist limited the value of her

opinion concerning the Plaintiff’s psychiatric condition. (Id. at

24.) In particular, the ALJ was troubled by the discrepancy

between Dr. Altavas’s report, which noted significant physical

limitations from Preciado’s diabetes and hypertension, and the

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Plaintiff’s medical records, which do not “report any significant

limitations due to either her hypertension or diabetes.” (Id. at

23.) 

As required by SSR No. 96-7p and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c), the

ALJ considered the Preciado’s assessment of her capacity to perform

work and her social functioning, daily living activities,

concentration, and episodes of decompensation. (Id. at 24.) ALJ

Steinman concluded that Preciado’s allegations were “not totally

credible,” and articulated eight specific reasons for discounting

the Plaintiff’s contentions. (Id. at 23-24); see Curry, 925 F.2d

at 1130. 

The ALJ followed procedure required to make a disability

determination involving nonexertional mental impairments. Here,

the “evidence in the record was ‘such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion’

that [Preciado] was [not disabled].” Curry, 925 F.2d at 1130

(quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)); see also

Burch, 400 F.3d at 679; Flaten, 44 F.3d at 1457 (holding that a

court must uphold the Commissioner’s decision if the evidence in

the record reasonably supports his determination). Consequently,

the district court should GRANT Defendant’s Cross-Motion for

Summary Judgment and affirm the Commissioner’s decision.

VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

 For the reasons stated above, the district court should GRANT

Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 26]. 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

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objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before December 21, 2011. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before January 6, 2012. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: November 30, 2011 ___________________________

 Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Sammartino

All Parties of Record 

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