Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01565/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01565-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

 Because Perea has attached additional pages to his Second Amended

Petition, the Court will cite this document using the page numbers assigned by

the Court’s electronic filing system.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAIME TAPIA PEREA, Civil No. 10cv1565 RBB

Petitioner,

vs.

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

SHERIFF RAY LOERA, et al.,

Respondents.

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Jaime Tapia Perea has filed a Second Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254,

challenging his conviction for second degree burglary in Imperial

County Superior Court case number JCF22575. (Second Am. Pet. 1,

ECF No. 9.1

) Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss Second

Amended Petition, arguing that it was filed beyond the statute of

/ / /

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limitations and is unexhausted. (Mot. Dismiss 1-2, ECF No. 12; id.

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 2-9.)

The Court has considered the Second Amended Petition,

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in Support of the Motion to Dismiss, Petitioner’s

Opposition to the Motion, the lodgments submitted by Respondent,

and all other supporting documents submitted by the parties. For

the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Perea pleaded no contest to second degree burglary on October

20, 2008. (See Lodgment No. 1, People v. Perea, No. JCF22575

(Imperial Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 2008) (plea of guilty/no contest --

felony).) On November 19, 2008, he was sentenced in accordance

with the plea agreement to the middle term of two years in state

prison, the execution of which was suspended, and placed on three

years of formal probation. (Id. (superior court minutes, Nov. 19,

2008).) As conditions of probation, Perea was ordered to serve

ninety days in the county jail and pay restitution in the amount of

$3,000.00. (Id. at 16.) A restitution hearing was set for

December 17, 2008. (Id. at 17.)

The court minutes from the December 17, 2008 hearing reflect

that a memorandum from the probation department was submitted to

the court; Perea asked for and received a continuance of the

restitution hearing until January 21, 2009. (Id. (superior court

minutes, Dec. 17, 2008).) Another continuance of the restitution

hearing was granted on January 21, 2009; the continued hearing was

set for March 5, 2009. (Id. (superior court minutes, Jan. 21,

2009).)

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On March 5, 2009, the superior court noted it had received a

“court order filed on 3/2/09, in defendant’s habeas writ proceeding

in Superior Court case EHC01114 . . . .” (Id. (superior court

minutes, Mar. 5, 2000).) The order reads as follows:

Petitioner initiated this action by a petition filed

January 15, 2009. Petitioner seeks to withdraw a plea of

no contest entered in this court on October 20, 2008 in

case No. JCF 22575. Petitioner alleges perjury by the

victim.

Petitioner was sentenced pursuant to his plea on

November 10, 2008. A restitution hearing is scheduled

for March 11, 2009 at the jail division of this Court.

The Court finds that petitioner has failed to make

out a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief under

habeas corpus law. For that reason, the petition is

DENIED. 

The matter is referred to the trial court for a

determination as to whether the petition may be treated

as a motion pursuant to Penal Code section 1118.

(See Second Am. Pet. Attach. #1, Ex. C (order denying petition at

1-2), ECF No. 9.) The court calendared Perea’s case for March 11,

2009, and set a “Review of Defendant’s Plea” and “Restitution

Hearing.” (Lodgment No. 1, People v. Perea, No. JCF22575 (superior

court minutes, Mar. 11, 2009).) Counsel was appointed for Perea,

and the case was continued until April 15, 2009. (Id.) 

At the April 15, 2009, hearing, Perea was appointed a new

attorney who was to determine whether there was any legal basis for

Perea to withdraw his plea. (Id. (superior court minutes, Apr. 15,

2009).) The matter was continued to May 13, 2009, for a

“Restitution (evidentiary) Hearing and Review of Defendant’s Plea.” 

(Id.) On that date, it was continued again until May 27, 2009. 

(Id. (superior court minutes, May 13, 2009).) Because a witness

was unavailable for the May 27, 2009 hearing, the matter was reset

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for June 10, 2009. (Id. (superior court minutes, May 27, 2009).) 

At the hearing, Perea’s counsel told the court he had found no

grounds upon which to move to withdraw Perea’s plea. (Id.

(superior court minutes, June 10, 2009).) The prosecutor and

defendant reached an agreement to reduce the amount of restitution;

the court accepted the stipulation and ordered restitution in the

amount of $300.00. (Id.) The court modified the November 19, 2008

minutes to reflect the change. (Id.)

Petitioner did not file a direct appeal, but six months later,

on December 11, 2009, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

in the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District, Division

One. (Lodgment No. 2, Perea v. County of Imperial, No. D056411

(Cal. Ct. App. filed Dec. 11, 2009) (petition).) The appellate

court denied the petition in a written, unpublished opinion filed

December 23, 2009. (Lodgment No. 3, In re Perea, No. D056411, slip

op. (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2009).) Perea then attempted to file a

petition for review of the appellate court’s decision with the

California Supreme Court. That document was rejected by the court

as untimely. (Second Am. Pet. Attach. #1, Ex. 15, ECF No. 9.))

Perea filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2241 in this Court on July 23, 2010. (See Pet., ECF

No. 1.) The Court construed the Petition as one filed pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254 because Perea sought to challenge the validity of

his state court conviction. (Order Construing Pet. 1-2, ECF No. 4;

see White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1006-07 (9th Cir. 2004)

(holding that § 2254 is the proper jurisdictional basis for a

habeas petition brought by an individual “in custody pursuant to a

state court judgment”). Petitioner failed to name a proper

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respondent. (See id. at 2-3.) The Court dismissed the case

without prejudice and with leave to amend, giving Perea until

November 15, 2010, to file a First Amended Petition. (Id. at 3.)

On September 23, 2010, Petitioner filed a document which the

Court construed as a First Amended Petition. (See First. Am. Pet.,

ECF No. 6.) The Court again dismissed the case without prejudice

and with leave to amend because Perea had failed to use the proper

form, name the proper respondent, and allege exhaustion of his

claims. (See Order Dismissing Case Without Prejudice 1-5, ECF No.

7.) Petitioner was given leave to file a Second Amended Petition. 

(Id. at 4.)

Perea submitted a Second Amended Petition, which was filed

nunc pro tunc to the date received, December 7, 2010. (Second Am.

Pet., ECF No. 9); see Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988)

(holding that a notice of appeal by a pro se prisoner is deemed

filed when the prisoner delivers it to prison authorities for

forwarding to the court); Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 575 (9th

Cir. 2000) (applying the Houston mailbox rule to pro se prisoners’

federal habeas petitions). The Court issued an order setting a

briefing schedule, notifying Respondents of Petitioner’s consent to

magistrate judge jurisdiction, and directing Respondents to

indicate whether they consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction

[ECF No. 10]. 

On February 4, 2011, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss and

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion. (See

Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 1-9, ECF No. 12.) Perea

submitted an opposition to the motion on February 23, 2011, which

/ / /

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he titled a “Traverse.” (See Notice Traverse Mot. Dismiss, ECF No.

15.)

On April 4, 2011, the Court ordered Respondent to submit a

supplemental brief addressing two questions: 

(1) whether and why Petitioner’s conviction became final

on March 2, 2009, when the state habeas corpus petition

he filed in the Imperial County Superior Court was

denied, or on June 10, 2009, when Petitioner’s courtappointed counsel determined there was no basis for the

withdrawal of Petitioner’s plea and the superior court

modified the original restitution award . . . . and (2)

whether and why the effective filing date of Petitioner’s

federal petition is July 23, 2010, the date of the first

petition he filed in this Court, September 23, 2010, the

date the First Amended Petition was filed, or December 6,

2010, the date the Second Amended Petition was filed. 

(See Order Directing Resp’ts 3, Apr. 4, 2011, ECF No. 17.) 

Respondent Loera consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. (See

Notice, Consent & Reference 1, ECF No. 18.) The Respondent filed a

Supplemental Brief on April 14, 2011. (Resp’t’s Supplemental Br.,

ECF No. 19.) Although not provided for, Perea filed an Opposition

to Respondent’s Supplemental Brief [ECF No. 20].

III. DISCUSSION

Respondent argues that Perea’s Petition is both untimely and

unexhausted. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 2-9, ECF No.

12.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes the

Petition is timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) and is exhausted.

Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

A. Timeliness

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), a petitioner has one year from the

date his or her conviction is final to file a petition for writ of

habeas corpus in federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (West 2006). The statute of limitations,

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however, is subject to both statutory and equitable tolling. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Holland v. Florida, __ U.S. __, 130 S.Ct.

2549, 2560 (2010).

1. Effective Filing Date of the Petition in Federal 

 Court

Respondent contends that the effective filing date for

purposes of AEDPA’s statute of limitations is December 6, 2010,

when Petitioner constructively filed his Second Amended Petition. 

(See Mot. Dismiss Attach #1 Mem. P. & A. 5-6, ECF No. 12.) When a

district court has expressly or impliedly retained jurisdiction

over an action, however, the amended petition relates back to the

filing date of the original petition. See Henry v. Lungren, 164

F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing former Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(c)(2); Ramirez-Salgado v. Scribner, No. 08cv562 WQH (WMc), 2009

WL 211117, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009). 

Petitioner submitted his original federal habeas Petition on

July 22, 2010. (See Pet., ECF No. 1.) Although Perea used a 28

U.S.C. § 2241 form, the Petition challenged the validity of Perea’s

state court conviction and was construed as one filed pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254. (See Order Construing Petition 1-2, Sept. 21,

2010, ECF No. 4.) The case was dismissed without prejudice and

with leave to file a First Amended Petition. (Id. at 2.) 

Petitioner filed a First Amended Petition. (See Notice Doc.

Discrepancy 1, ECF No. 5; First Am. Pet., ECF No. 5.) It was also

dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend; Perea was

given until December 6, 2010, to file a Second Amended Petition. 

(See Order Dismissing Case 4, ECF No. 7.) On December 6, 2010,

Petitioner mailed his Second Amended Petition to the Court, which

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2

 Petitioner states his conviction became final on August 9, 2009, a

Sunday. Therefore, under Perea’s calculation, the actual date the conviction

became final is August 10, 2009, the following Monday. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro.

6(a)(1)(C).

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was filed nunc pro tunc to the date received, December 7, 2010. 

(See Second Am. Pet, ECF No. 9.)

Each time Perea’s habeas petition was dismissed, the Court

expressly retained jurisdiction. In addition, the claims Perea

raises in his Second Amended Petition were included in the original

Petition filed on July 22, 2010. (Compare Pet., ECF No. 1, with

Second Am. Pet., ECF No. 9.) Accordingly, the Second Amended

Petition relates back to the Petition Perea filed on July 22, 2010,

and that is the operative filing date in federal court.

2. Commencement of the Statute of Limitations

This Court must determine when AEDPA’s statute of limitations

began running. When a defendant does not appeal his conviction,

the statute of limitations begins to run sixty days after the time

for seeking review of the conviction has expired. Roberts v.

Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 771 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(A) and Cal. R. Ct. 8.308(a)). Respondent argues that

Perea’s conviction became final on January 18, 2009, sixty days

after he was sentenced on November 19, 2008. (Mot. Dismiss Attach.

#1 Mem. P. & A. 3-4, ECF No. 12.) Perea contends that the state

trial court resolved the amount of restitution and the withdrawal

of his no-contest plea on June 10, 2009, so his conviction did not

become final until sixty days later. (Notice Traverse Mot. Dismiss

2–5, ECF No. 15.) Under Perea’s calculation, the statute of

limitations did not begin running until August 10, 2009.2

/ / /

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In California, “an order granting probation is deemed to be a

final judgment for the limited purpose of taking an appeal

therefrom.” People v. Vournazos, 198 Cal. App. 948, 952, 244 Cal.

Rptr. 82, 84 (1988). The determination of restitution can also

affect when a conviction is final. In Vournazos, the defendant was

granted probation on March 5, 1986, and, as a condition thereof,

ordered to pay restitution “through the probation officer in such

amount and manner as the latter prescribed.” Id. at 952, 244 Cal.

Rptr. at 84. A supplemental hearing regarding restitution was set

for October 24, 1986. Id. At the hearing, the trial court fixed

the amount of restitution and ordered Vournazos to pay the amount

through his probation officer. The appellate court stated, “[T]he

judgment in effect was not a final judgment until the details of

the restitution were supplied by the order of October 24, 1986.” 

Id. at 953, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 85. An appeal before that order

would have been premature. Id.

Perea’s case is similar to Vournazos. Although the judge set

restitution in the amount of $3,000.00 at the November 19, 2008

sentencing hearing, the matter was also set for a restitution

hearing on December 17, 2008. (Lodgment No. 1, People v. Perea,

No. JCF22575 (superior court minutes, Nov. 19, 2008).) The hearing

was continued. (Id. (superior court minutes, Dec. 17, 2008).) The

restitution hearing was continued additional times, at least twice

because witnesses were unavailable. (Id. (superior court minutes,

May 13, 2009).) 

On June 10, 2009, the amount of restitution and whether to

permit Perea to withdraw his no-contest plea were resolved. The

prosecutor and defendant counsel stipulated to restitution in the

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amount of $300.00, reduced from $3,000.00. The court accepted the

stipulation and modified the restitution amount. (Id. (superior

court minutes, June 10, 2009).) The amount of restitution Perea

would pay was at issue from November 19, 2008, until June 10, 2009.

On January 15, 2009, while awaiting his restitution hearing,

Perea filed a state habeas corpus petition seeking to withdraw the

no-contest plea he entered on October 20, 2008. (See Second Am.

Pet. Attach. #1, Ex. C (order denying petition at 1-2), ECF No. 9.) 

The superior court denied Perea’s petition and referred the matter

back to the trial judge to determine “whether the petition may be

treated as a motion pursuant to Penal Code section 1118 [sic].” 

(Id. at 11.) Penal Code § 1118, however, does not apply to motions

to withdraw a plea. The section is titled, “Trial by court without

jury; entry of judgment of acquittal upon not guilty finding.” 

Cal. Penal Code § 1118 (West 2004). It provides as follows:

In a case tried by the court without a jury, a jury

having been waived, the court on motion of the defendant

or on its own motion shall order the entry of a judgment

of acquittal of one or more of the offenses charged in

the accusatory pleading after the evidence of the

prosecution has been closed if the court, upon weighing

the evidence then before it, finds the defendant not

guilty of such offense or offenses. If such a motion for

judgment of acquittal at the close of the evidence

offered by the prosecution is not granted, the defendant

may offer evidence without first having reserved that

right.

Id. 

The citation to section 1118 appears to be in error. First,

the section applies to court trials, not to pleas of no contest. 

Perea filed his state habeas petition to withdraw a no-contest

plea. It is clear that the state court intended to refer to Penal

Code section 1018, which applies to motions made by a defendant to

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withdraw a plea. That statute reads, in pertinent part, as

follows:

On application of the defendant at any time before

judgment or within six months after an order granting

probation is made if entry of judgment is suspended, the

court may, and in case of a defendant who appeared

without counsel at the time of the plea the court shall,

for a good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty to be

withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted.

Cal. Penal Code § 1018 (West 2008); see also People v. Ramirez, 141

Cal. App. 4th 1501, 1505-06, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 272, 275 (2006)

(applying Penal Code section 1018 to pleas of no contest).

The trial judge understood his task was to determine whether

Petitioner should be able to withdraw his plea. (See Lodgment No.

1, People v. Perea, No. JCF22575 (superior court minutes, Mar. 5,

2009).) “Pursuant to the court order filed 3/2/09 [denying Perea’s

petition], . . . this matter is calendared for Review of

Defendant’s Plea on March 11, 2009 in Dept. 5 at 8:30 a.m.” (Id.) 

Thus, this Court concludes that the Imperial Superior Court

intended to cite California Penal Code § 1018, and not § 1118, in

its order. 

The trial judge’s reference to a review of the defendant’s

plea indicates that the superior court believed judgment had not

been entered or, at least, was suspended. As noted, a motion

pursuant to Penal Code section 1018 may be made either before

judgment or within six months of an order granting probation if

entry of judgment is suspended. Cal. Penal Code § 1018. In

California, “[p]robation is the ‘suspension of the imposition or

execution of a sentence and the order of conditional and revocable

release in the community under the supervision of a probation

officer.’” People v. Minor, 189 Cal. App. 4th 1, 9, 116 Cal. Rptr.

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3d 228, 232 (2010) (quoting California Penal Code section 1203(a).) 

“When the trial court suspends imposition of sentence, no judgment

is then pending against the probationer . . . .” People v. Howard,

16 Cal. 4th 1081, 1087, 946 P. 2d 828, 832, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 870,

874 (1997). The judge in Perea’s case did not suspend imposition

of sentence, but he imposed a sentence of two years in prison and

suspended execution of that sentence. (See Lodgment No. 1, People

v. Perea, 16-17, No. JCF22575 (superior court minutes, Nov. 19,

2008).) 

Even if judgment in Perea’s case for purposes of AEDPA was

entered on November 19, 2008, the date Perea was sentenced, on June

10, 2009, the court modified the restitution amount and accepted

Perea’s counsel’s conclusion that there was no constitutional basis

to withdraw Perea’s no-contest plea. (Id. (superior court minutes,

June 10, 2009).) Thus, June 10, 2009, is the date Perea’s request

to withdraw his no-contest plea was denied. In his supplemental

brief, Respondent overlooks the trial court’s review of Perea’s

plea and contends the modification of the restitution amount did

not change the date final judgment was entered because the court

simply modified the minutes of the November 19, 2008 sentencing. 

(See Resp’t’s Supplemental Br. 4, ECF No. 19.) Nonetheless, until

June 10, 2009, Perea’s request to withdraw his no-contest plea,

originally filed as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, was

pending. Petitioner did not appeal his November 19, 2008

sentencing or the June 10, 2009 modification of restitution and 

denial of Perea’s request to withdraw his plea. Instead, on

December 11, 2009, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

with the California Court of Appeal. (Lodgment No. 2, Perea v.

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3

 As previously noted, sixty days from June 10, 2009, is August 9, 2009,

which is a Sunday. Thus, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 6(a)(1)(C), the sixty

days ran out on August 10, 2009, the following Monday.

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County of Imperial, No. D056411 (filed Dec. 11, 2009) (habeas

corpus petition).) 

The cases cited by Respondent in support of his argument are

not compelling. They concern situations where a petitioner argued

the statute of limitations was restarted or tolled by various postjudgment actions or motions. See Caldwell v. Dretke, 429 F.3d 521,

529 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding a grant of probation is final when

pronounced, not when it is revoked and an appeal from that

revocation is dismissed); Lozano v. Frank, 424 F.3d 554, 555-56

(7th Cir. 2005) (concluding that a motion for modification of

sentence filed almost eight years after the state supreme court

denied Lozano’s petition for review did not “reset” AEDPA’s statute

of limitations and was not part of the direct review process);

Bethea v. Girdich, 293 F.3d 577, 578 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that a

motion to extend time to file state appeal does not “restart”

AEDPA’s statute of limitations); Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799,

804 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding that no statutory tolling applies for

the gap period between when the time for appeal has expired and

when the state appellate court granted a motion to file a late

appeal because nothing was “pending” before a state court).

Considering all the evidence in the record, the Court

concludes that the June 10, 2009 order denying Perea’s motion to

withdraw his no-contest plea and reducing his restitution amount

was a final judgment for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Perea’s conviction became final sixty days after June 10, 2009, or

on August 10, 2009.3

 Absent any statutory or equitable tolling,

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Perea had until August 10, 2010, to file his federal habeas

petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d

1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 6(a), which states “[i]n computing any period of time

prescribed . . . by any applicable statute, the day of the act,

event, or default from which the designated period of time begins

to run shall not be included” to AEDPA). Perea filed his Petition

in this Court on July 22, 2010. Accordingly, it was timely. 

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Petition is

untimely is DENIED.

B. Exhaustion

Habeas petitioners who wish to challenge either their state

court conviction or the length of their confinement in state

prison, must first exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 2254(b), (c) (West 2006); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-

34 (1987). Ordinarily, to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a

petitioner must “‘fairly present[]’ his federal claim to the

highest state court with jurisdiction to consider it, or . . .

demonstrate[] that no state remedy remains available.” Johnson v.

Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). 

Moreover, to properly exhaust state court remedies a petitioner

must allege, in state court, how one or more federal rights have

been violated. For example, “[i]f a habeas petitioner wishes to

claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him

the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he

must say so, not only in federal court, but in state court.” See

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995). 

/ / /

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Respondent argues the Petition must be dismissed because the

claims it contains are unexhausted. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem.

P. & A. 12-14, ECF No. 12.) On January 22, 2010, Perea attempted

to file a petition for review of the order denying the habeas

corpus petition he filed in the California appellate court. (See

Second Am. Pet. 15, ECF No. 9.) The California Supreme Court

rejected the petition as untimely. (Id.) 

A claim is considered to be exhausted “if it is clear that the

claims are now procedurally barred under [state] law.” Gray v.

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162 (1996); Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d

742, 770 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that a claim may be considered

exhausted if it is obviously procedurally barred). Here, no state

remedy is available to Petitioner because were he to return to

state court, his claims would be procedurally barred as untimely. 

See In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 784, 959 P.2d 311, 320, 77 Cal.

Rptr. 153, 162 (1998); In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 759, 855 P.2d

729, 734, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509, 514 (1993); see also Walker v.

Martin, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1131 (2011) (holding that

California’s timeliness rule is clearly established and

consistently applied). Accordingly, the Court DENIES Respondent’s

Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Perea’s claims are

unexhausted.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes Perea’s

petition is both timely and technically exhausted. Respondent’s

Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED.

DATED: June 13, 2011 _____________________________ Hon. Ruben B. Brooks

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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