Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-2_20-cv-00059/USCOURTS-ared-2_20-cv-00059-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

DELTA DIVISION 

CORDELL NICHOLS PETITIONER 

Reg. #29494-044 

V. CASE NO. 2:20-CV-59-JM-BD 

DEWAYNE HENDRIX, Warden, 

Federal Correctional Institution, 

Forrest City, Arkansas RESPONDENT

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION 

I. Procedure for Filing Objections:

This Recommendation for dismissal has been sent to Judge James M. Moody, Jr. 

Either party may file objections with the Clerk of Court within 14 days if they disagree 

with the findings or conclusions in the Recommendation. Objections should be specific 

and should include the factual or legal basis for the objection. 

By not objecting, the parties may waive the right to appeal questions of fact. And, 

if no objections are filed, Judge Moody can adopt this Recommendation without 

independently reviewing the record. 

II. Background: 

 In 2003, Cordell Nichols was found guilty by a jury of one count of possession 

with intent to distribute approximately 4.6 kilograms of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a), and one count of conspiracy to distribute in excess of one kilogram of heroin, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. United States v. Nichols, 410 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 2005) 

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 The district court sentenced Mr. Nichols to 360 months’ imprisonment, followed by ten 

years of supervised release. Id. Mr. Nichols filed a direct appeal of his conviction and 

sentence, but the Tenth Circuit affirmed. United States v. Nichols, 374 F.3d 959 (10th 

Cir. 2004), vacated by, 543 U.S. 1113 (2005). 

 The United States Supreme Court summarily reversed and remanded Mr. 

Nichols’s case for further consideration under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 

(2005). Nichols v. United States, 543 U.S. 1113 (2005). On remand, the Tenth Circuit 

reinstated its opinion affirming Mr. Nichols’s conviction and remanded the case to the 

district court for resentencing. United States v. Nichols, 410 F.3d 1186 (2005). The 

district court again sentenced Mr. Nichols to 360 months’ imprisonment, followed by ten 

years of supervised release.1 United States v. Nichols, 219 F. App’x 770, 772 (10th Cir. 

2007). (Doc. No. 14-1) 

 Mr. Nichols appealed the new sentence, and the Tenth Circuit again affirmed. 

United States v. Nichols, 219 F. App’x. 770, 773 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 

934 (2007). The court declined to consider arguments Mr. Nichols raised under Brady v. 

1 At his resentencing hearing, Mr. Nichols objected to the two-level enhancement of his 

base offense level for possession of a firearm, which was proposed in the presentence 

report. He further objected to an enhancement for obstruction of justice. United States v. 

Nichols, 219 F. App’x 770, 772 (10th Cir. 2007). The district court noted the objections 

but overruled them for the same reasons it had overruled them at Mr. Nichols’s first 

sentencing. Id. The district court then calculated Mr. Nichols’s total offense level as 

thirty-eight, which, with a criminal history category of IV, yielded an advisory sentencing 

range under the United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, of 324 to 405 

months. Id.

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Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) on appeal, because the issues were beyond the scope of its 

remand. Id. 

 Mr. Nichols filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 with the sentencing court 

raising Brady issues as ineffective-assistance-of-counsel and prosecutorial misconduct 

claims. United States v. Nichols, 447 F. App’x 13, 18 (10th Cir. 2011). The district court 

denied § 2255 relief and denied a certificate of appealability. Id. at 19. Mr. Nichols 

sought, but was denied, a certificate of appealability from the Tenth Circuit. Id. at 22. 

 In 2016, Mr. Nichols sought authorization from the Tenth Circuit to file a second 

or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to challenge his 2003 convictions. The 

court denied the request, finding that neither of his claims relied on a new rule of 

constitutional law made retroactive or cited newly discovered evidence that would be 

sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder 

would have found him guilty. Order, at pp. 3-4, In re Cordell Nichols, No. 16-3072 (May 

3, 2016). 

 Mr. Nichols, an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution in Forrest City, 

Arkansas, filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. No. 

1) He claims that, under the First Step Act, a prior conviction the sentencing court 

considered in applying a sentencing enhancement no longer qualifies as a “serious drug 

felony.” (Doc. No. 1 at p. 4) Mr. Nichols claims that his sentence, therefore, is “now 

unconstitutional and should be immediately vacated.” (Doc. No. 1 at pp. 4, 5) 

 Warden Hendrix asks the Court to deny the petition because, “Section 401 of the 

[First Step] Act changed the description of qualifying convictions and the penalties in the 

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drug trafficking statute” but only for sentences imposed after December 21, 2018. (Doc. 

No. 14 at p. 3) He argues that courts that have considered the issue have held that section 

401 of the First Step Act does not apply retroactively. (Doc. No. 3) 

III. Jurisdiction: 

 The Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Mr. Nichols’s petition. Generally, a federal 

inmate may challenge his conviction or sentence only with the sentencing court through a 

motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence, under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Lopez-Lopez v. 

Sanders, 590 F.3d 905, 907 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Abdullah v. Hedrick, 392 F.3d 957, 

959 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1147 (2005)). A federal district court cannot 

entertain a petition for habeas corpus under § 2241, “if it appears that the applicant has 

failed to apply for relief, by [§ 2255] motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that 

such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by [§ 2255] 

motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255(e) (emphasis added). The last clause is a provision generally referred to as 

§ 2255’s “savings clause.” Abdullah, 392 F.3d at 959. 

 To invoke the savings clause, Mr. Nichols must demonstrate that seeking relief 

from the sentencing court would be inadequate or ineffective. Lopez-Lopez, 590 F.3d at 

907 (citing Abdullah, 392 F.3d at 959). This exception, however, is a “narrowly 

circumscribed safety valve.” United States ex rel. Perez v. Warden, FMC Rochester, 286 

F.3d 1059, 1061-62 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 869 (2002). The fact that an 

individual is barred from filing a § 2255 motion for procedural reasons does not render 

the remedy inadequate or ineffective so as to permit an inmate to file under § 2241. 

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Lopez-Lopez, 590 F.3d at 907. Moreover, a remedy under § 2255 is not deemed 

inadequate or ineffective merely because the claim was previously raised in a § 2255 

motion and rejected as a second or successive § 2255 petition, or because a § 2255 

petition was time-barred. Id. 

 In this petition, Mr. Nichols clearly challenges his sentence. His direct appeal was 

successful, and he was resentenced. But his first § 2255 motion was not successful, and 

both the district court and the Tenth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. 

Nonetheless, Mr. Nichols’s unsuccessful § 2255 motion does not render a § 2255 motion 

an inadequate or ineffective remedy for him. See Hill v. Morrison, 349 F.3d 1089, 1091 

(8th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Lurie, 207 F.3d 1075, 1077 (8th Cir. 2000)) 

(§ 2255 motion is not inadequate or ineffective merely because the sentencing court 

denied relief, or because the court denied permission to file a second or successive 

petition). 

Additionally, a § 2255 motion is not inadequate or ineffective merely because a 

new law or constitutional doctrine that could reduce a federal prisoner’s sentence cannot 

be applied retroactively.2 U.S. ex rel. Perez v. Warden, FMC Rochester, 286 F.3d 1059, 

1062 (8th Cir. 2002). 

2 Mr. Nichols claims relief under Section 401 of the First Step Act, but several courts 

have held that Section 404 is the only section of the First Step Act that applies 

retroactively. See United States v. Fields, No. 02-CR-02262 JAP, 2019 WL 1900373, at 3 

(D.N.M. Apr. 29, 2019) (acknowledging that section 401 reduced the mandatory 

minimums that apply when there is an enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 851 and amended 

the definition “serious drug felony,” but rejecting petitioner’s claim for relief because, 

“unlike Section 404 of the First Step Act, Section 401 does not apply retroactively, and 

the enhancement stands.”); United States v. Bagby, No. 10-CR-0134-CVE, 2020 WL 

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 Mr. Nichols’s § 2241 petition is a successive § 2255 motion. Because he has 

already challenged his sentence through an earlier § 2255 motion, he is advised that, 

before he is eligible to file another motion, he must seek and receive an order from the 

Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals authorizing the sentencing court to consider the motion. 

28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). 

 Because the Court lacks jurisdiction, it should not address Mr. Nichols’s claim that 

his sentence is unconstitutional. 

IV. Conclusion:

 The Court recommends that Judge Moody DISMISS, without prejudice, Cordell 

Nichols’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. No. 1) for lack of jurisdiction and deny 

his motion to expand the record (Doc. No. 16) as moot. 

 DATED this 10th day of June, 2020. 

 

 ___________________________________ 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

1527984, at FN1 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 31, 2020) (same); United States v. Amphavannasouk, 

No. CR 03-40111-4, 2019 WL 6895946, at 2 (D.S.D. Dec. 18, 2019) (citing United States 

v. Gonzalez-Oseguera, 2019 WL 1270916, at 1 (D. Haw. March 19, 2019)) (“Section 404 

is the only provision that applies retroactively to defendants who have already been 

sentenced”). 

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