Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02721/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02721-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Ulyesses Moran Taylor, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-02721-PHX-SPL (JZB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE STEVEN P. LOGAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT JUDGE: 

I. Summary 

 Petitioner pleaded guilty to burglary, but later asserted he was innocent of the 

offense because he resided at the burglary residence. Petitioner now alleges ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel, a claim he never raised in the Arizona courts. This claim is 

unexhausted and procedurally defaulted, and Petitioner does not present cause and 

prejudice to excuse the default. Petitioner also fails to establish cause under Martinez v. 

Ryan. Petitioner’s actual innocence argument under Herrera v. Collins, if cognizable, 

also fails for the same reasons, mutatis mutandis, as his argument under Schlup v. Delo: 

Petitioner fails to prove that no reasonable juror would have convicted him. Therefore, 

the Court will recommend that the Petition be denied. 

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II. Factual and Procedural Background 

a. Facts of the Crimes 

On May 30, 2010, Petitioner found his ex-girlfriend with another man in her 

residence. (Doc. 10-1, Ex. B, at 17.)1

 Petitioner gained entry into the residence by 

kicking-in the back door. (Doc. 10-1, Ex. I, at 96.) Petitioner previously lived at the 

residence, but his ex-girlfriend told police at the scene that he moved out of the residence 

a month prior to the incident. (Id. at 97.) Once inside, Petitioner stabbed the victim, his 

ex-girlfriend, in the abdomen with a kitchen knife. (Id.) Petitioner fled the scene. The 

police found Petitioner hiding nearby and arrested him. (Id. at 96–97.) 

b. Trial Proceedings, Guilty Plea, and Sentencing 

On June 7, 2010, Petitioner was charged with first degree burglary, a class 2 

dangerous felony, and aggravated assault, a class 3 dangerous felony. (Doc. 10-1, Ex. A,

at 2-3.) Petitioner waived his preliminary hearing and pleaded guilty to first degree 

burglary. (Doc. 10-1, Ex. B, at 13-15.) Petitioner admitted that he entered his exgirlfriend’s house with a knife, at which time he stabbed her. (Id. at 17.) The court found 

the plea was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made. (Id. at 19.) 

On June 30, 2010, Petitioner filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 

(Doc. 10-1, Ex. C, at 23–28.) Petitioner argued in the motion that he had been “coerced 

into signing a plea agreement without the benefit of being able to read and review the 

police report.” (Id. at 24.) Petitioner asserted that he “did in fact reside in the home he 

was charged with burglarizing.” (Id.) Petitioner’s motion was supported by a letter from 

the victim. (Doc. 10-1, Ex. D, at 30–31.) In the letter, the victim stated she lied to the 

police and also asserted that at the time of the burglary, Petitioner did in fact live with 

her. (Id.) 

On July 7, 2010, the court heard arguments on the motion to withdraw. (Doc. 10-

1, Ex. E, at 33-50.) The court found that Petitioner had agreed to the factual basis at the 

 

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 For ease of reference, all citations to page numbers of docketed items are to the page numbers assigned by the Court’s case management and electronic case filing (CM/ECF) system. 

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time of his initial plea and admitted guilt, therefore there was no manifest injustice. (Id. 

at 47–48.) As such, the court denied the motion to withdraw. 

On August 6, 2010, the court sentenced Petitioner to the stipulated term of seven 

years imprisonment. (Doc. 10-1, Ex. F, at 62.) At the sentencing, Petitioner was 

notified of his rights for post-conviction relief (PCR). (Id.) 

c. Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings 

On October 8, 2010, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief (PCR) (Doc. 

10-1, Ex. G, at 65–67), and then a petition for PCR on November 10, 2011 (Doc. 10-1, 

Ex. H, at 69–80). Petitioner raised two issues in his petition: (1) his plea was not 

supported by a sufficient factual basis, and (2) he was actually innocent of the convicted 

offense. (Id. at 69.) 

On August 17, 2012, the court held an evidentiary hearing on the PCR petition. 

(Doc. 10-2, Ex. J, at 1, 4.) The court found no basis for actual innocence under Arizona 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(h).2

 (Id. at 63.) The court also found that the victim 

failed to object to the factual basis of the plea when she had the opportunity at his change 

of plea hearing. (Id. at 65-66.) Accordingly, the court denied the PCR petition. (Id.) 

On October 25, 2012, Petitioner filed, with the Arizona Court of Appeals, a 

petition for review of the order denying his petition for PCR. (Doc. 10-2, Ex. K, at 69.) 

Again, Petitioner raised two claims: (1) that there was an insufficient factual basis for his 

guilty plea, and (2) that he was actually innocent. On February 21, 2014, the court of 

appeals granted review but denied relief. (Doc. 10-2, Ex. L, at 91–98.) 

On April 18, 2014, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for review the Arizona 

Supreme Court. (Doc. 10-2, Ex. M, at 100-03.) Here, Petitioner alleged only that there 

 

2

 Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(h): “Grounds for relief are: The defendant demonstrates 

by clear and convincing evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish that no reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant guilty of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the court would not have imposed the death penalty.” 

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was an insufficient factual basis for his guilty plea. (Id.) On November 6, 2014, the 

court denied review. (Doc. 10-2, Ex. N, at 105.) 

d. Petitioner’s Habeas Claims 

 On December 18, 2014, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

(Doc. 1.) Petitioner alleges (1) ineffective assistance of counsel based upon trial 

counsel’s failure to adequately advise him prior to his guilty plea (id. at 6), and (2) actual 

innocence of first degree burglary (id. at 7). 

III. Application of Law 

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

a. The Petition is timely. 

 The AEDPA imposes a one-year limitation period, which begins to run “from the 

latest of . . . the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A). The Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s pro se petition for 

review on November 7, 2014. (Doc. 10-2, Ex. N, at 105.) The Petition was filed 

December 18, 2014. (Doc. 1.) The Petition is timely. 

b. Ground One is procedurally barred. 

Petitioner alleges he received “deficient advice with regard to the plea” because 

“counsel failed to review with his client the elements of the statute; relevant case law; the 

evidence in the State’s possession,” or defenses to the crime. (Doc. 1 at 6.) Petitioner 

did not raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his PCR petition, or in his 

petitions for review before the Arizona Court of Appeals and Arizona Supreme Court. 

i. Law 

 Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless a petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

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exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) 

(“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly 

present’ his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the 

federal nature of the claim”). 

 A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative 

facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 

33. A “state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must 

read beyond a petition or brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim 

in order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id.at 

31–32. Thus, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes 

of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum . 

. . (2) through the proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal 

basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(internal citations omitted). 

 The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes 

comity by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged 

violations of a state prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 

(2001); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also 

require federal courts to respect state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s 

claims. See Coleman, 501 at 731-32. Pursuant to these principles, a habeas petitioner’s 

claims may be precluded from federal review in two situations. 

 First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas 

corpus review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but 

returning to state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such 

as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297–99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th 

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Cir. 2002). If no state remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, 

but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1. 

 Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raised a claim in 

state court, but the state court found the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See 

Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 59 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet 

the State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claim has deprived the state 

courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. 

at 731–32. In this situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded if the state court 

opinion relies “on a state-law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the 

federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 

255, 260 (1989). 

A procedurally defaulted claim may not be barred from federal review, however, 

“if the petitioner can demonstrate either (1) ‘cause for the default and actual prejudice as 

a result of the alleged violation of federal law,’ or (2) ‘that failure to consider the claims 

will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Jones, 691 F.3d at 1101 (quoting 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. See also Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 

1998) (the cause and prejudice standard applies to pro se petitioners as well as to those 

represented by counsel). To establish “cause,” a petitioner must establish that some 

objective factor external to the defense impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s 

procedural rules. Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1027 (9th Cir. 2008). “Prejudice” is 

actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 

741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show that the 

alleged error “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial 

with error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 

(1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1996). Where a petitioner fails to 

establish either cause or prejudice, the court need not reach the other requirement. See 

Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1105 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999); Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 n.13. 

Lastly, “[t]o qualify for the ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice’ exception to the 

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procedural default rule” a petitioner “must show that a constitutional violation has 

‘probably resulted’ in the conviction when he was ‘actually innocent’ of the offense.” 

Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 496). See also Schlup v. Delo, 513 

U.S. 298, 329 (1995) (petitioner must make a credible showing of “actual innocence” by 

“persuad[ing] the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting 

reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”). “To be 

credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error 

with new reliable evidence-whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy 

eye-witness accounts, or critical physical evidence-that was not presented at trial.” 

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.

ii. Application 

 Ground One is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted because Petitioner raises it 

for the first time. Claims raised for the first time on habeas review are not exhausted 

because they were not fully and fairly presented to state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). 

Petitioner did not claim in state court that he received “deficient advice with regard to the 

plea.” (Doc. 1 at 6.) He did not argue that “counsel failed to review with his client the 

elements of the statute; relevant case law; the evidence in the State’s possession,” or 

defenses to the crime. In his PCR petition, Petitioner argued his conviction “must be 

vacated because the factual basis was inadequate and because the facts show that in fact 

Defendant resided at the apartment he was accused of ‘burglarizing.’” (Doc. 10-1, Ex. H, 

at 76.) To the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner argued the trial court erred in 

denying his request to vacate his conviction because “the evidence introduced at the 

evidentiary hearing shows that Defendant resided at the apartment that he allegedly 

burglarized.” (Doc. 10-2, Ex. K, at 70.) To the Arizona Supreme Court, Petitioner argued 

his conviction must be vacated because “the facts subsequently showed that he resided at 

the apartment he was accused to have burglarized.” (Doc. 10-2, Ex. M, at 100.) 

 Here, Petitioner’s allegation is entirely new. Petitioner’s claim that his attorney 

failed to review the elements of the offense, case law, the evidence in the State’s 

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possession, and defenses to the crime was never litigated in state court. The failure to 

fairly present this ground has resulted in procedural default because Petitioner is now 

barred from returning to state courts. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a), 32.4(a). See also 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n. 1 (1991) (“[I]f the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies 

and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to 

meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred . . . there 

is a procedural default for purposes of federal habeas.”). 

 Petitioner offers no grounds to excuse the procedural default by a showing of 

cause and prejudice. Pursuant to the “cause and prejudice” test, a petitioner must point to 

some external cause that prevented him from following the procedural rules of the state 

court and fairly presenting his claim. “A showing of cause must ordinarily turn on 

whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded 

[the prisoner’s] efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule. Thus, cause is an 

external impediment such as government interference or reasonable unavailability of a 

claim’s factual basis.” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(citations and internal quotations omitted). Petitioner incorrectly asserts he presented this 

argument in the state courts, and offers no ground to excuse the default. 

iii. Martinez v. Ryan

Petitioner asserts that the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel constitutes cause and 

prejudice to excuse the presentation of his procedurally defaulted claims, pursuant to 

Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012). (Doc. 11 at 1-4.) Under Martinez, a 

petitioner may establish cause for the procedural default of an ineffective assistance claim 

by demonstrating two things: (1) ‘counsel in the initial review collateral proceeding, 

where the claim should have been raised, was ineffective under the standards of 

Strickland3

 . . .’ and (2) ‘the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a 

substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has 

some merit.’” Cook v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 598, 607 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Martinez, 132 

 

3 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 

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S.Ct. at 1318). See also Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1248 (9th Cir. 2013) (“We 

therefore read Martinez to allow new claims of trial-counsel IAC, asserted for the first 

time on federal habeas . . .”). 

 Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by the principles set forth 

in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 674. To prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must show that 

(1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that 

(2) the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687–88. The inquiry under Strickland is 

highly deferential, and “every effort [must] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to 

evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689. With respect to 

Strickland’s second prong, a petitioner must affirmatively prove prejudice by “show[ing] 

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. 

 Petitioner does not demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective and, therefore, 

Martinez does not aid Petitioner in establishing cause and prejudice for his procedural 

default. Petitioner asserts trial counsel failed to review the elements of the offense, case 

law, evidence, and meritorious defenses, “which would have exonerated Defendant with 

respect to the charge.” (Doc. 1 at 6.) Petitioner asserts he would have gone to trial 

because the “operative and undisputed fact that Defendant also lived at the residence was 

an essential defense . . . .” (Id.) Petitioner’s claim, similar to his claim in trial court and 

in the Arizona Court of Appeals,4

 is that counsel was deficient in advising him to plead 

guilty to burglary of a residence “where Defendant also resided.” (Id.) 

 Petitioner was aware of the elements of the offense, and the facts do not 

 

4

 “The gravamen of Taylor’s claim in this proceeding is that he was living with the victim at the time of the offenses and could not, therefore, have committed first-degree burglary, in violation of A.R.S. §§ 13-1507 and 13-1508. He relies primarily on State v. 

Altamirano, 166 Ariz. 432, 803 P.2d 425 (App.1990), for the proposition that one cannot burglarize one’s own home.” State v. Taylor, No. 2 CA-CR 2013-0468-PR, 2014 WL 

708472, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2014), review denied (Nov. 6, 2014). 

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demonstrate he had a meritorious defense. The elements of the offense were contained in 

the Information. (Doc. 10-2, Ex. A.) Petitioner agreed to a factual basis that mirrored the 

charges in the Information. (Doc. 10-2, Ex. B, at 13.) The Arizona Court of Appeals 

determined that “at the time Taylor entered the plea, the record did not show Taylor had 

‘an absolute and unconditional right’ to enter the victim’s apartment.” Taylor, 2014 WL 

708472, at *3. The court of appeals also found that “any permission Taylor may have 

had to enter the residence at some time would not extend to stabbing the victim.” Id. at 

*4. Because the record demonstrates that his claim of residence would not have provided 

him an “essential defense,” counsel did not provide ineffective assistance if counsel 

advised him to plead guilty. 

 The Court also considers that Petitioner kicked in the door to the residence, which 

would have belied his claim of residence. The victim also told police he had moved out 

of the residence. Petitioner admitted he had five prior felony convictions. (Doc. 10-2, Ex. 

B at 11.) Petitioner also stipulated to a mitigated sentence of seven years for a charge 

that had a prison range of seven to twenty-one years imprisonment. (Id. at 12.) The state 

also agreed to dismiss the stabbing charge, which is substantiated by significant, 

undisputed evidence. Considering all of the factors in this case, this Court does not find 

“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Therefore, 

Petitioner fails to establish cause under Martinez for his procedural default. 

iv. Schlup Gateway 

 Petitioner can still avoid the procedural default if he can demonstrate that a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from this Court’s failure to reach the 

merits of the claim. The “miscarriage of justice” exception is limited to petitioners who 

can show that “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one 

who is actually innocent.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. “A petitioner need not show that he 

is ‘actually innocent’ of the crime he was convicted of committing; instead, he must show 

that ‘a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial.’” Majoy v. Roe, 296 

F.3d 770, 776 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 478 (9th 

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Cir.1987) (en banc)) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316). The Ninth Circuit has not 

decided “whether the Schlup actual innocence gateway always applies to petitioners who 

plead guilty.” Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1140 n.9 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We are aware 

of a potential incongruity between the purpose of the actual innocence gateway 

announced in Schlup and its application to cases involving guilty (or no contest) pleas.”). 

In any event, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s gateway claim fails. 

 Petitioner fails to satisfy the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception relating 

to the stabbing charge. In Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 624 (1998), the 

Supreme Court wrote: “In cases where the Government has forgone more serious charges 

in the course of plea bargaining, petitioner’s showing of actual innocence must also 

extend to those charges.” See also Vosgien v. Persson, 742 F.3d 1131, 1134 (9th Cir. 

2014) (“If the State dismissed [more serious] charges, Vosgien must also demonstrate 

actual innocence for those charges.”).5

 Petitioner does not contend he is innocent of the 

stabbing charge, and the record demonstrates he admitted this offense when he spoke to 

arresting officers. (Doc. 10-1, Ex. I, at 97.) Importantly, prosecutors dismissed an 

aggravated assault charge regarding the stabbing in exchange for Petitioner’s plea of 

guilty to the burglary charge. Petitioner does not satisfy his burden to excuse procedural 

default regarding the stabbing charge. 

 The Court also finds Petitioner would not satisfy this standard related to the 

burglary conviction. Petitioner has not shown that it is more likely than not that no 

reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of First Degree 

Burglary, or that this Court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the proceedings. 

Majoy, 296 F.3d at 776; Schlup, 513 U.S. at 314–15. Petitioner asserts that he could not 

have committed this offense because he was a resident of the apartment. At the time of 

the stabbing, the victim told police that Petitioner was not a resident. (Doc. 10-2, Ex. J, 

at 14.) Petitioner also “kicked in the door to gain entry,” which is inconsistent with 

 

5

 Here, Petitioner pleaded to the more serious charge, and the lesser (albeit serious aggravated assault charge) was dismissed. The Court therefore addresses actual 

innocence regarding the burglary charge. 

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Petitioner being a resident of the apartment. Petitioner avowed at his change of plea that 

he “entered the residential structure of his ex-girlfriend” to commit a felony therein. 

(Doc. 10-1, Ex. B, at 17.) Petitioner’s avowals at a plea hearing, as well as any findings 

made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a “formidable barrier in any subsequent 

collateral proceedings.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73–74 (1977). “Solemn 

declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” Id.; see also Muth v. 

Fondren, 676 F.3d 815, 821 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Petitioner’s statements at the plea colloquy 

carry a strong presumption of truth.”). 

 At the PCR evidentiary hearing, the victim testified that Defendant lived in the 

apartment and that she lied to police when she told them that he had moved out of the 

apartment one month before the stabbing. (Doc. 10-2, Ex. J, at 15.) She testified that she 

was afraid her landlord would increase the rent if the landlord learned Defendant was 

residing in the apartment. (Id. at 29.) She also testified she was on pain medication when 

she spoke with police, and was angry with Petitioner due to the stabbing. (Id. at 15.) She 

testified that Petitioner forgot his keys when he left the apartment before he returned and 

kicked in the door. (Id. at 14.) Petitioner testified that he resided at the residence. (Id. at 

43.) Petitioner’s aunt testified that after Petitioner’s arrest, boxes of his property were 

delivered to her residence. (Id. at 38.) The trial court noted that the victim was present at 

the change of plea, and she did not object to the factual basis or advise the court 

Petitioner lived at the residence. (Id. at 66.) 

 Petitioner must demonstrate that no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to 

find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 314–15; Jones v. Taylor, 

763 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding recantation testimony insufficient under the facts 

of the case “because we cannot say that every juror would credit her recantation 

testimony over her trial testimony”). Here, the Court is left with conflicting statements 

from the victim regarding Petitioner’s residence at the time of the stabbing. The Court is 

also presented with Petitioner’s admission during a plea avowal but a denial at a 

subsequent evidentiary hearing. Petitioner kicked in the door of the residence, but he 

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may have forgotten his keys. Petitioner had clothing and property at the residence, but 

those items may have remained from his prior residency. Ultimately, there are two 

competing versions of the truth. These are classic credibility determinations typically left 

for a jury to resolve. This Court cannot say that no juror, acting reasonably, could find 

Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

 Petitioner offers no grounds to excuse his procedural default, and he does not 

satisfy the ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice’ exception to the procedural default rule. 

c. Ground Two: Freestanding Actual Innocence Claim 

 Petitioner claims there was “insufficient evidence to convict and Defendant is 

actually innocent” of the offense because “no reasonable trier of fact could convict 

beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .” (Doc. 1 at 7.) Assuming that Petitioner’s freestanding 

actual innocence claim, presumably under Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993), is 

cognizable in these proceedings,6

 the Court finds that Petitioner has not met his burden 

under this claim. “[T]he Herrera majority’s statement that the threshold for a 

freestanding claim of innocence would have to be extraordinarily high, contemplates a 

stronger showing than insufficient of the evidence to convict.” See Carriger v. Stewart, 

132 F.3d 463, 476 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (internal citations omitted). Petitioner failed 

to meet the lower standard of actual innocence under the Schlup gateway (supra, at 8-10), 

and, therefore, does not meet his burden to proceed on his Herrera claim. 

IV. Evidentiary Hearing 

 The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not find that an 

evidentiary hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 

F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). 

CONCLUSION

 

6

 The United States Supreme Court has not explicitly held that a “freestanding” claim of factual innocence, i.e., one unaccompanied by a substantive claim of constitutional error in trial proceedings, provides a basis for federal habeas relief in a 

non-capital case. See Jones v. Taylor, 763 F.3d 1242, 1246 (9th Cir. 2014) (“We have 

not resolved whether a freestanding actual innocence claim is cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding in the non-capital context, although we have assumed that such a claim is viable.”). 

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 Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claims are 

unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. Petitioner also cannot satisfy his burden 

regarding a freestanding actual innocence claim. The Court will therefore recommend 

that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed with 

prejudice. 

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable, and because Petitioner has not satisfied his burden regarding 

a freestanding actual innocence claim. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of 

the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of 

/// 

/// 

/// 

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the findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

Report and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 8th day of December, 2015. 

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

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