Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01677/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01677-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Brandon Lassley, )

)

Plaintiff, ) 2:14-cv-1677 JWS

)

vs. ) ORDER AND OPINION

)

Secura Supreme Ins. Co., ) [Re: Motions at docs. 26 & 29]

)

Defendant. )

)

I. MOTIONS PRESENTED

At docket 26 plaintiff Brandon Lassley (“Lassley”) moves for a protective order

providing that he need not produce an authorization allowing defendant Secura

Supreme Ins. Co. (“Secura”) to obtain Lassley’s drug treatment records. Secura’s 

response at docket 29 includes a motion asking the court to order Lassley to provide

the requested medical records authorization, and also to order Lassley to produce

documents relating to Lassley’s contacts with the United States Navy. Lassley’s

combined reply in support of his motion and response to Secura’s motion is at

docket 33. Secura replies in support of its motion at docket 35. Oral argument was

requested, but the motions are well briefed, and oral argument would not assist the

court.

II. BACKGROUND

Lassley was a passenger in an automobile operated by his intoxicated friend

Cody Murphy. Murphy lost control of the vehicle. Lassley was injured in the ensuing

crash. Lassley settled with Murphy for the limits of his insurance policy. In this lawsuit,

Case 2:14-cv-01677-JWS Document 39 Filed 08/18/15 Page 1 of 8
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Lassley seeks additional compensation from Secura pursuant to the under-insured

motorist coverage in the policy Secura issued to Lassley. Lassley seeks damages for

breach of the insurance contract and bad faith in the adjustment of his claim. He seeks

compensatory and punitive damages. The auto accident occurred in Arizona, and

Lassley filed his lawsuit in Arizona state court. Secura removed the litigation to this

court relying on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.

III. DISCUSSION

1. Drug Rehabilitation Records Are Privileged

Lassley has a history of drug abuse. He obtained substance abuse treatment on

four occasions, two before the accident and two after the accident. Secura seeks an

authorization that would enable it to review Lassley’s substance abuse treatment

records. Lassley is not seeking to recover any damages from Secura that relate to his

substance abuse problems. 

Lassley claims that the drug rehabilitation records are privileged. Under the

Federal Rules of Evidence, any health-care provider/patient privilege available to

Lassley derives from the law or Arizona.1

 Lassley correctly points out that under

Arizona law, except as otherwise provided by law, a health care provider may not

1Fed. R. Evid. 501’s state law proviso: “But in a civil case, state law governs privilege

regarding a claim or defense for which state law applies the rule of decision.” As explained in

the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 501, the rationale underlying the proviso “is that federal

law should not supersede that of the States in substantive areas such as privilege absent a

compelling reason. The Committee believes that in civil actions in the federal courts where an

element of a claim or defense is not grounded upon a federal question, there is no federal

interest strong enough to justify departure from State policy.” Fed. R. Evid. 501, Advisory

Committee Notes, H.R. Rep. No. 93–650.

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disclose anything in a patient’s medical records without the patient’s written consent.2

 

The records Secura seeks are subject to Arizona’s health care provider/patient

privilege. 

2. Protective Order For Drug Rehabilitation Records

To obtain a protective order, Lassley must show “good cause” for sheltering the

drug treatment records from disclosure.3 The Arizona legislature has concluded that

the contents of health care records such as those Secura seeks are “privileged and

confidential.”4 That being so, Lassley has established the good cause required by

Rule 26(c) for a protective order. As elaborated below, this is evident from the

distinction drawn by Rule 26(b)(1) between privileged and non-privileged information. It

may be added that both parties look to inapposite case law. Both cite Phillips v. GM

Corp.5

 That case arose in an entirely different context. The question in Phillips was

whether information already produced in the course of discovery could be shielded from

disclosure to the public.

Secura argues that the burden, nevertheless, remains on Lassley to show

“specific prejudice or harm that would result if no protective order is granted.”6 Secura

has it backwards. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may obtain

discovery of material which is relevant to any claim or defense if the material sought is

2A.R.S. § 12-2292.

3Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).

4A.R.S. § 12-2292 A.

5307 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2002).

6Doc. 29 at 2.

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“nonprivileged.”7

 Where a privilege applies, the discovery may be had only upon a

showing of good cause.8 Lassley having established that the material sought is

privileged, the burden is on Secura to show good cause for its production. A protective

order is appropriate unless Secura is entitled to an order requiring production of the

information, despite its privileged status.

3. Request to Compel Production of Drug Rehabilitation Records

The privilege claimed by Lassley is not absolute. It is subject to both statutory

and judicially created exceptions.9 One commonly recognized exception to the health

care provider/patient privilege arises when the patient has placed his condition at issue

in litigation. However, Lassley makes, and the court relies upon and will enforce, the

following representation:

Lassley has never asserted his drug treatment expenses form any portion

of his claim—and his complaint certainly does not do so. In short, Lassley

hasn’t ever, is not now, nor ever will assert that his drug-rehabilitation

treatment was necessitated due to the accident, or that those expenses

should be considered as a portion of his breach-of-contract and bad-faith

damages.10

The drug treatment records are subject to discovery in this lawsuit only if they have

probative value relating to an issue before the court, or their production is reasonably

7Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

8

Id.

9Benton v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1352, 1354 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).

10Doc. 33 at 7 (emphasis in original).

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calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and Secura can show “good

cause.”11

Secura first contends that the drug rehabilitation records are relevant to its

defense that Lassley was drunk when he accepted a ride from Murphy, because the

records would “probably” contain a recommendation to Lassley that he not consume

alcohol.12 Assuming that Lassley’s intoxication would provide a defense or establish

contributory fault, the relevant question is whether he was sober, not whether someone

told Lassley to stay sober. This contention lacks merit.

Secura offers additional reasons why the drug treatment records might be

discoverable. Secura contends that the drug rehabilitation records might show some

reason for the condition of Lassley’s knee other than the auto accident, they might

show Lassley said something in the course of the drug therapy that would show he was

drunk at the time he accepted the ride from someone he knew was intoxicated, they

might have an impact on Lassley’s damage claim by showing that he was not obtaining

appropriate care when he relapsed, and they might show something about falsehoods

told by others regarding Lassley’s involvement in the accident.13 The pivotal issue is

whether Secura’s speculation about what might be in the drug treatment records shows

that its request for production is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of

admissible evidence.

11Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

12Doc. 29 at 5.

13

Id. at 5-6.

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Reason, of course, does not exist in a vacuum. Something is reasonably

possible when there is some objective basis for believing it would be true. Here, it is

known from Lassley’s deposition testimony that he had shoulder surgery prior to the

accident, took opiate pain relievers as a result, and began to abuse opiate pain

medications.14 It is also known that he was prescribed pain medications as a result of

the accident and went on to abuse the drugs again. Lassley’s testimony shows that he

sought drug treatment both before and after the accident, and that he sought it in

Phoenix, San Diego, and Denver over a period of time. There is nothing else to support

Secura’s speculation that the drug treatment records would lead to admissible evidence

relating to issues in the pending lawsuit.

The burden is on Secura to show good cause for production of the drug

treatment records. Given what is known about Lassley’s drug treatment and the highly

speculative nature of the proposition that the records actually do contain or would lead

to discoverable information, the court concludes that Secura has not carried its burden. 

Lassley will not be required to authorize disclosure of the drug treatment records.

4. Request to Compel Production of Navy Recruitment Records

According to Secura, for a substantial period of time, Lassley was contending

that his damages included the loss of his career prospects in the United States Navy,

but Lassley abandoned that proposition when confronted with the fact that persons with

a history of drug abuse are not acceptable to the Navy.

15

 Whatever potential relevance

14Deposition of Brandon Lassley, doc. 26-1 at 10-11.

15Doc. 36 at 9.

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the Navy recruitment records might have (Secura argues that they bear on Lassley’s

credibility), the record reflects that, aside from an undated letter already produced,

neither Lassley nor his mother possess any Navy recruitment records. The record also

discloses that Secura made no Rule 34 request for production of the Navy recruitment

records. The record further reflects that Secura has not provided a certificate showing

that counsel met and conferred regarding Secura’s motion to compel production of the

Navy recruitment records.16

Secura’s motion to compel production of the Navy recruitment records lacks

merit for several reasons. First, it is pointless, because Lassley has no such records. 

Second, a request for production of documents and an inadequate response to that

request is a necessary predicate to a motion to compel.17 Finally, the local rules require

a certificate attesting to a personal consultation between counsel before a motion to

compel may be filed.18

5. Award of Attorneys’ Fees

Lassley asks the court to award him his attorneys’ fees. Lassley’s motion was

brought pursuant to Rule 26(c). That rule contemplates the award of expenses

pursuant to Rule 37(a)(5).19 When the moving party obtains a protective order,

16Although Secura’s certificate ambiguously states that its counsel “conferred or

attempted to confer with” Lassley’s counsel, Doc. 29 at 11, Secura does not dispute Lassley’s

contention that no personal consultation ever took place.

17See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(iv).

18LRCiv 7.2(j) (“No discovery motion will be considered or decided unless a statement of

moving counsel is attached thereto certifying that after personal consultation and sincere efforts

to do so, counsel have been unable to satisfactorily resolve the matter.”).

19Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(3).

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Rule 37(a)(5) requires an award of expenses, including reasonable attorneys’ fees.20

Lassley also asks for fees relating to Secura’s motion to compel. When such a motion

fails, as it has here, the defending party is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’

fees.21 Secura will be required to pay Lassley his reasonable attorneys’ fees.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above:

(1) The motion at docket 26 is GRANTED as follows: Lassley shall not be

required to authorize the release of his drug treatment records;

(2) The motion at docket 29 is DENIED; and 

(3) Lassley shall file a motion for attorneys’ fees within 14 days. It must be

supported as required by the local rules. Secura shall respond within 14 days after the

motion is filed. The response may contest the amount sought, but not Lassley’s right to

recover a reasonable amount. No reply may be filed unless requested by the court.

DATED this 18th day of August 2015.

 /S/ 

JOHN W. SEDWICK

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

20Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A).

21Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(B).

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