Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-05330/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-05330-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 15:1126 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DSS TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT, 

INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

APPLE, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-05330-HSG 

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER

Re: Dkt. Nos. 72, 157

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff DSS Technology Management, Inc. filed its complaint against Defendant Apple, 

Inc. on November 26, 2013 in the Eastern District of Texas, alleging infringement of U.S. Patent 

Nos. 6,128,290 (the “’290 patent”) and 5,699,357 (the “’357 patent”). Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff later 

withdrew all infringement allegations as to the ’357 patent, so presently only the ’290 patent is at 

issue. See Dkt. No. 96 at 2, 4. On November 7, 2014, the Eastern District of Texas granted 

Defendant’s motion to transfer the case to the Northern District of California. Dkt. No. 85. On 

February 13, 2015, the case was reassigned to this Court. 

On December 4, 2014, Defendant filed two petitions for inter partes review (IPR) of the 

’290 patent. Dkt. No. 99 at 1. All of the ’290 patent claims asserted by Plaintiff were covered by 

Defendant’s petitions. Id. at 3. On May 1, 2015, the Court stayed this case pending results of the 

IPRs. Dkt. No. 122. Both IPRs resulted in a final decision in Plaintiff’s favor, and the Court lifted 

the stay on July 27, 2018. Dkt. No. 145. 

Plaintiffs currently assert claims 1 through 4 of the ’290 patent, and the parties propose 

seven claim terms for construction. Dkt. No. 165. This order follows claim construction briefing, 

a technology tutorial, and a claim construction hearing.

Case 4:14-cv-05330-HSG Document 175 Filed 12/06/18 Page 1 of 13
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II. LEGAL STANDARD

Claim construction is a question of law to be determined by the Court. Markman v. 

Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996). “The purpose of claim construction is to 

determine the meaning and scope of the patent claims asserted to be infringed.” O2 Micro Int’l 

Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation

marks omitted). 

Generally, claim terms should be “given their ordinary and customary meaning”—in other 

words, “the meaning that the term[s] would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question

at the time of the invention.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en 

banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). There are only two circumstances where a claim is not 

entitled to its plain and ordinary meaning: “1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his 

own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the 

specification or during prosecution.” Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 

1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

When construing claim terms, the Federal Circuit emphasizes the importance of intrinsic 

evidence such as the language of the claims themselves, the specification, and the prosecution 

history. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–17. The claim language can “provide substantial guidance as 

to the meaning of particular claim terms,” both through the context in which the claim terms are 

used and by considering other claims in the same patent. Id. at 1314. The specification is likewise 

a crucial source of information. Id. at 1315–17. Although it is improper to read limitations from 

the specification into the claims, the specification is “the single best guide to the meaning of a 

disputed term.” Id. at 1315 (noting that “the specification is always highly relevant to the claim 

construction analysis,” and that “[u]sually, it is dispositive” (internal quotation marks

omitted)); see also Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 347 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 

2003) (explaining that “claims must be construed so as to be consistent with the specification”).

Despite the importance of intrinsic evidence, courts may also consider extrinsic evidence—

technical dictionaries, learned treatises, expert and inventor testimony, and the like—to help 

construe the claims. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317–18. For example, dictionaries may reveal what 

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the ordinary and customary meaning of a term would have been to a person of ordinary skill in the 

art at the time of the invention. Frans Nooren Afdichtingssystemen B.V. v. Stopaq Amcorr 

Inc., 744 F.3d 715, 722 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Terms generally carry their ordinary and customary 

meaning in the relevant field at the relevant time, as shown by reliable sources such as 

dictionaries, but they always must be understood in the context of the whole document—in 

particular, the specification (along with the prosecution history, if pertinent).”). Expert testimony 

can also help “to ensure that the court’s understanding of the technical aspects of the patent is 

consistent with that of a person of skill in the art, or to establish that a particular term in the patent 

or the prior art has a particular meaning in the pertinent field.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318. 

Extrinsic evidence is, however, “less significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally 

operative meaning of claim language.” Id. at 1317 (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. PERSON OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART

The parties agree that a “person of ordinary skill in the art” of the ’290 patent is: “a person 

with a bachelor of science in electrical engineering and at least two years of experience in the area 

of wireless communication or similar experience.” Dkt. No. 72 at 6; Dkt. No. 74 at 3

1

.

IV. AGREED TERMS

Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the Court will not construe the claim terms “local 

oscillator” and “controlled by said oscillator,” appearing in claims 9 and 10, which are no longer 

asserted in this matter. Dkt. No. 165 at 2. The parties also agreed during the Markman hearing 

that the construction of the term “adapted to operate within a short range of [said server unit]” 

should be: “within a range in which the accuracy of synchronization is not appreciably affected by 

transit time delays, including at least the range of within 20 meters.” Id. at 2–3.

//

//

 

1 Defendant’s proposed definition of person of ordinary skill in the art states that work experience 

should be one to two years.

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V. DISPUTED TERMS

A. “code sequence” (claims 1 & 3)

Plaintiff’s Construction Defendant’s Construction

“information specifying the time at 

which a communication may occur”

“a series of values, where each value in the series 

represents a time slot within a frame interval 

where a unit’s transmitter is energized or a time 

slot where a unit’s transmitter is depowered”

The Court adopts Plaintiff’s construction modified as follows: “a series of values 

specifying the time at which a communication between a server and a peripheral unit may 

occur”

Claim 1 states, in relevant part: “said server and peripheral transmitters being energized in 

low duty cycle RF bursts at intervals determined by a code sequence which is timed in relation to 

said synchronizing information.” Dkt. No. 72-1 (“’290 Patent”) at claim 1 (emphasis added). 

Claim 3 states, in relevant part: “wherein a code sequence for a given one of said units is 

transmitted within a respective time slot.” Id. at claim 3 (emphasis added).

Defendant contends that “code sequence” is a coined term that would have no meaning to a 

person of skill in the art without further definition in the specification. Dkt. No. 74 at 6. 

Defendant’s construction therefore limits the term to the single embodiment found in column 7 of

the specification. See ’290 Patent at 7:18–43. That embodiment describes the use of Optically 

Orthogonal Codes (OOCs), which act as the code sequences of the claims. Id. These OOCs

contain “codewords” that are sequences of many zeroes, “with three scattered ones representing 

the locations of the slots in which RF bursts are to be transmitted or received.” Id. at 7:27–29. 

Defendant cites two Federal Circuit cases to support its proposition that “code sequence” is 

a coined term that would have no independent meaning to a person of skill in the art. Id. (citing 

Irdeto Access, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 383 F.3d 1295, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2004) and MyMail, 

Ltd. v. Am. Online, Inc., 476 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). Neither case supports 

Defendant’s proffered construction. In MyMail, “[b]oth parties agree[d] that the term” was “a 

coined term, without a meaning apart from the patent.” MyMail, Ltd. v. Am. Online, Inc., 476 F.3d

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1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007). And Irdeto Access notes that “if a disputed term has no previous 

meaning to those of ordinary skill in the prior art[,] its meaning, then, must be found [elsewhere] 

in the patent.” Irdeto Access, 383 F.3d at 1300 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the 

record does not establish that “code sequence” had no other accepted meaning to persons of 

ordinary skill of the art at the time of the patent. Plaintiff notes that the term was used commonly 

at the time of the ’290 patent, including in at least one patent cited on the face of the ’290 patent. 

Dkt. No. 82 at 3 (citing U.S. Pat. No. 5,371,734). 

Where, as here, “guidance is not provided in explicit definitional format, the specification 

may define claim terms ‘by implication’ such that the meaning may be ‘found in or ascertained by 

a reading of the patent documents.’” Irdeto Access, 383 F.3d at 1300 (quoting Bell Atl. Network 

Servs., Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1268 (Fed.Cir.2001)) (some 

internal quotation marks omitted). The term “code sequence” is not defined explicitly in the 

specification, nor is it defined by implication. In fact, the defining embodiment to which 

Defendant points never recites the phrase “code sequence.” See ’290 Patent at 7:18–43. Further, 

because Defendant has not established that the term “code sequence” is a coined term, and 

therefore defined by the specification, the Court must apply the “heavy presumption” that the term 

be given its ordinary meaning to a person of skill in the art at the time of invention. Aylus 

Networks, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 856 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2017).

Defendant’s construction is too narrow to encompass the plain meaning of “code 

sequence.” Defendant’s construction imports the terms “time slot” and “frame interval” from the 

specification and dependent claims, and adds from the OOC embodiment the condition that certain 

elements of the code sequence must correspond to time periods when the transmitter is 

“depowered.” The plain meaning of “code sequence” does not include these limitations.

Plaintiff’s construction, as Defendant points out, does not capture the plain meaning of the 

terms “code” or “sequence.” See Dkt. No. 74 at 3. “Information,” on its own, does not limit the 

term to its plain meaning, as it encompasses values that are not encoded, as well as values that are 

not sequential (e.g., a single digit). Defendant proffers several dictionary definitions of the term 

“sequence,” all of which connote a series of items or objects. Dkt. No. 74 at 6 n.4; Dkt. No. 74-2 

Case 4:14-cv-05330-HSG Document 175 Filed 12/06/18 Page 5 of 13
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¶ 29. 

The Court therefore adopts the following construction, which incorporates the plain 

meaning of the term without incorporating narrowing elements from the specification: “a series of 

values specifying the time at which a communication between a server and a peripheral unit may 

occur.”

B. “which is timed in relation to” (claim 1)

Plaintiff’s Construction Defendant’s Construction

“occurring at a specified interval of time 

relative to”

“the values of the code sequence are aligned to 

correspond to time slots in a frame interval” 

The Court adopts Plaintiff’s construction.

Claim 1 reads, in relevant part: “said server and peripheral transmitters being energized in 

low duty cycle RF bursts at intervals determined by a code sequence, which is timed in relation to

said synchronizing information.” ’290 Patent at claim 1 (emphasis added).

Defendant’s proposed construction again unnecessarily imports certain limitations of the 

column 7 embodiment into the claims. Because the clause “which is timed in relation to” modifies 

the term “code sequence,” Defendant’s construction tracks the language and functionality from the 

same column 7 embodiment discussed above with respect to the term “code sequence.” See Dkt. 

No. 74 at 10; ’290 Patent at 7:18–43. But given the Court’s construction of “code sequence,” the 

plain meaning of the phrase “timed in relation to” does not limit the claim to “time slots” within a 

“frame interval.” 

Further, the doctrine of claim differentiation creates a presumption that “an 

independent claim should not be construed as requiring a limitation added by a dependent claim.” 

Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 

Although neither “time slot” nor “frame interval” appears in the text of claim 1, each of those 

terms is written into dependent claims that depend on claim 1. See ’290 Patent at claim 2, 3. 

Plaintiff’s proffered construction neither improperly limits that scope of the claim term nor 

expands the term beyond its plain meaning. The Court therefore adopts Plaintiff’s proposed 

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construction: “occurring at a specified interval of time relative to.”

C. “time slots” (claim 2)

Plaintiff’s Construction Defendant’s Construction

“intervals of time”

“a fixed period of time within a predetermined 

frame interval where a respective peripheral unit 

or server microcontroller unit is to transmit or 

not, and whether it will receive or not”

The Court adopts Plaintiff’s construction.

Claim 2 reads, in relevant part: “wherein said server and peripheral units are allocated 

respective time slots within a predetermined frame interval for transmitting.” ’290 patent at claim

2 (emphasis added).

Defendant’s construction: (1) superfluously repeats the limitation “within a predetermined 

frame interval”; and (2) adds without any apparent basis a limitation wherein the server or 

peripheral unit will either “receive or not.” Both parties agree that the time slots described in the 

specification “represent periods of times in which a peripheral device . . . may be assigned to 

transmit or receive data.” Dkt. No. 72 at 16 (citing ’290 patent at 5:44–63, Fig. 6); Dkt. No. 74 at 

13. However, Defendant offers no evidence that a person of skill in the art at the time of the 

invention would read the phrase “time slots within a predetermined frame interval for 

transmitting” to mean “time slots within a predetermined frame interval for either transmitting or 

receiving.” The Court finds no reason to read elements found in the specification into the 

language of these claims.

Plaintiff’s proposed construction neither improperly limits that scope of the claim term nor 

expands the term beyond its plain meaning. The Court therefore adopts Plaintiff’s proposed 

construction: “intervals of time.”

//

//

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D. “RF synchronizing beacons” (claim 4)

Plaintiff’s Construction Defendant’s Construction

“transmissions used to establish or 

maintain synchronization”

“RF bursts that are nonuniformly spaced in time 

and define a unique frame interval for a server 

microcomputer unit”

The Court adopts Defendant’s construction.

Claim 4 reads, in relevant part: “wherein said server microcomputer unit transmits RF 

synchronizing beacons at times within each of a predetermined sequence of frames which times 

vary in accordance with a code unique to the particular server microcomputer unit.” ’290 patent at 

claim 4 (emphasis added).

Both parties agree that “RF synchronizing beacons” is a term that was not well-known to a 

person of skill in the art at the time of the patent without further definition in the specification. 

See Dkt. No. 72 at 18; Dkt. No. 74 at 16. Both parties point to the embodiment in columns 7 and 8 

of the specification as an illuminating definition of the term. Dkt. No. 72 at 18 (citing ’290 patent 

at 7:63–8:8); Dkt. No. 74 at 16 (citing ’290 patent at 7:63–8:20). The relevant disclosure in the 

specification states:

As will be understood by those skilled in the art, the TDMA system 

is greatly facilitated by the establishment of a common frame time 

base between PEA and PDA. In establishing this common time 

base, the present invention employs timing or synchronization 

beacons (SBs) transmitted by the PDA. Each SB consists of eight 

RF bursts spread out over 252 slots. One of the SBs arbitrarily starts 

a frame. The positions of the remaining seven SBs are selected 

pseudo-randomly with two restrictions. First the maximum interval 

between two successive SBs is less than 6.144 milliseconds. 

Secondly, the positions must allow a unique frame determination 

based on the intervals between SBs. Thus for example, equidistantly 

spaced SBs are not allowed.

’290 patent at 7:62–8:8 (emphasis added). 

Plaintiff contends that, because the individual words “RF,” “synchronizing,” and “beacon” 

were known in to those of skill in the art, the term “RF synchronizing beacon” was known, and 

therefore is not subject to limitation by the specification. Dkt. No. 82 at 6. Plaintiff argues that 

“stringing together several well-known words does not suddenly transform the phrase comprised 

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of those words into a ‘coined term.’” Id. 

The Court disagrees. Here, although the claim language strings well-known words 

together, Plaintiff acknowledges that the resulting phrase was not known in the art outside of the 

patent. Dkt. No. 72 at 18. The phrase is therefore potentially subject to limitations outlined in the 

specification. See Irdeto Access, 383 F.3d at 1300 (“[I]f a disputed term has ‘no previous meaning 

to those of ordinary skill in the prior art[,] its meaning, then, must be found [elsewhere] in the 

patent.’”).

Plaintiff’s proposed construction does not capture the specification’s description that the 

synchronization beacons must be spaced such that “the positions . . . allow a unique frame 

determination based on the intervals between SBs.” ’290 patent at 8:6–7. Defendant’s proposed 

construction successfully captures this description from the specification without importing 

additional limitations not found in the specification’s embodiment. The Court therefore adopts 

Defendant’s proposed construction: “RF bursts that are nonuniformly spaced in time and define a 

unique frame interval for a server microcomputer unit.”

E. “[RF bursts at] intervals determined by a code sequence” (claim 1)

Plaintiff’s Construction Defendant’s Construction

“a plurality of periods of time determined 

by a code sequence [information 

specifying the time at which a 

communication may occur]”

“periods between time slots where the 

transmitters are energized are preset by a code 

sequence” 

The Court adopts Plaintiff’s construction.

Claim 1 reads, in relevant part: “said server and peripheral transmitters being energized in 

low duty cycle RF bursts at intervals determined by a code sequence, which is timed in relation to

said synchronizing information.” ’290 Patent at claim 1 (emphasis added).

Defendant’s proposed construction, similar to its proposed constructions for “code 

sequence” and “timed in relation to,” improperly imports the term “time slot” into claim 1. See 

Sections V(A) and V(B), supra. Further, Defendant defines “determined” to mean “predetermined 

or preset,” Dkt. No. 74 at 19 (emphasis added), a proposal that has no basis in the plain meaning 

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of the claim language or in the specification.

Plaintiff’s proposed construction simply defines “intervals” as “periods of time.” 

Defendant does not contend that this definition fails to encompass the embodiments in the 

specification, and simply argues that Plaintiff’s definition “does not assist the jury.” Dkt. No. 74 

at 19. Given the clear deficiencies in Defendant’s construction and no substantive objection to 

Plaintiff’s proposed construction, the Court adopts Plaintiff’s proposed construction: “a plurality 

of periods of time determined by a code sequence.”

F. “a server microcomputer” (claim 1)

Plaintiff’s Construction Defendant’s Construction

plain meaning, or: “a host computer 

acting as the hub of a local network” 

“a portable device used to effect bidirectional 

wireless data communication with peripheral 

units”

The Court adopts Plaintiff’s construction.

Defendant contends that “server microcomputer” was a coined term with no understood 

meaning at the time of the invention, and therefore must be limited to the descriptions in the 

specification. Dkt. No. 74 at 25–28. Because all of the embodiments in the specification describe 

a portable server, Defendant reads that limitation into its construction for this term. Id. 

Defendant cites Nystrom v. TREX Co., Inc. as an example of a claim term (“board”) that 

was limited to the scope of the embodiments in the specification (boards made of wood), despite 

no clear disavowal of claim scope. Nystrom v. TREX Co., 424 F.3d 1136, 1142–1146 (Fed. Cir. 

2005). The term at issue here is different from the term “board” in Nystrom for several reasons. 

First, in Nystrom, “both parties acknowledge[d] the ordinary meaning of ‘board’ as ‘a piece of 

sawed lumber.’” Id. at 1145. Here, neither party contends that the ordinary meaning of “server 

microcomputer” requires portability. Further, the prosecution history in Nystrom included a 

statement distinguishing the invention from prior art on the basis that the prior art was not directed 

to wooden boards. Id. at 1144.

Here, Plaintiff invokes the doctrine of claim differentiation and points to a parent patent to 

the ’290 patent whose claims are limited to portable sever microcomputer units. Dkt. No. 72 at 29 

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(citing Dkt. No. 72-6 at claims 1, 6, 11, 12, 15, and 18). The ’357 patent (parent to the ’290 

patent) explicitly uses the word “portable” to describe a “server microcomputer” in each of its 

independent claims. See Dkt. No. 1-2 (“’357 patent”) at claims 1, 6, 11, 12, 15, 18. The ’357 

patent specification is nearly identical to the ’290 patent specification. One of the few notable 

differences lies in column 3 of each patent. The ’357 patent reads:

These devices include a server microcomputer which is battery 

powered and portable so as to be carried on the person of a user

and a plurality of peripheral units which are also battery powered 

and portable and which provide input information from the user or 

output information to the user.

’357 patent at 3:17–21 (emphasis added). In contrast, the ’290 patent reads:

These devices include a server microcomputer and a plurality of 

peripheral units which are battery powered and portable and which 

provide input information from the user or output information to the 

user.

’290 patent at 3:22–25.

The explicit inclusion of the “portable” limitation in the specification and in each claim

describing a “server microcomputer” in the ’357 patent is evidence that portability is not an 

inherent characteristic of a server microcomputer. The absence of the term “portable” as a 

descriptor of the server microcomputer in the specification and claims of the ’290 patent, and the

use of the word “portable” in several independent claims—including claim 1—to describe 

peripheral units, also weighs in favor of a construction that differentiates between the claim term 

at issue here and other claim terms in the intrinsic record. See ’290 patent at claims 1, 5, and 6. 

Defendant’s contention that “server microcomputer” had no understood meaning in the art 

is not based on any evidence that the term was not prevalent at the time of the invention. Rather, 

Defendant relies on the lack of evidence presented by Plaintiff that the term “server 

microcomputer” was well-known. Dkt. No. 74 at 26. The mere absence of evidence is not 

sufficient to overcome the “heavy presumption” that the term be given its ordinary meaning to a 

person of skill in the art at the time of invention. Aylus Networks, 856 F.3d at 1358.

Defendant’s proffered construction improperly limits that scope of the claim term. The 

Court therefore adopts Plaintiff’s proposed construction: “a host computer acting as the hub of a 

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local network.”

VI. CONCLUSION

The Court CONSTRUES the disputed terms as follows:

Claim(s) Claim Term Construction

1, 3 “code sequence”

“a series of values specifying the time at 

which a communication between a 

server and a peripheral unit may occur”

1 “which is timed in relation to” “occurring at a specified interval of time 

relative to”

2 “time slots” “intervals of time”

4 “RF synchronizing beacons”

“RF bursts that are nonuniformly spaced 

in time and define a unique frame 

interval for a server microcomputer 

unit”

1

“[RF bursts at] intervals determined by a 

code sequence”

“a plurality of periods of time 

determined by a code sequence”

1 “a server microcomputer” “a host computer acting as the hub of a 

local network”

1

“adapted to operate within a short range of 

[said server unit]”

“within a range in which the accuracy of 

synchronization is not appreciably 

affected by transit time delays, including 

at least the range of within 20 meters”

//

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//

//

//

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In addition, the Court SETS a further case management conference (“CMC”) for January 

8, 2019 at 2:00 p.m. The Court DIRECTS the parties to meet and confer before the CMC to 

discuss a proposed case schedule through trial and to submit a joint CMC statement by January 3, 

2019.

2

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

 

2

In its responsive claim construction brief, Apple relies on the testimony of Phillip Carvey, the 

named inventor of the ’290 patent. See Dkt. No. 74-1. Plaintiff filed a motion to strike this 

testimony. Dkt. No. 157. The Court does not rely on the Carvey testimony and DENIES

the Motion to Strike as moot.

12/6/2018

Case 4:14-cv-05330-HSG Document 175 Filed 12/06/18 Page 13 of 13