Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00555/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00555-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1 Because the Complaint and attachments are not consecutively

paginated, the Court will cite to the Complaint using the page

numbers assigned by the Court’s electronic case filing system.

2 During the course of this action, Easter has been in and

out of prison.

1 09cv555 LAB(RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES EASTER,

Plaintiff,

v.

CDC, State of California; B.

MORRIS, Captain; L. PANICHELLO,

Lieutenant; E. PEREZ,

Correctional Officer,

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 09cv555 LAB(RBB)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL

DISCOVERY AND REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION DENYING

DEFENDANTS MORRIS, PANICHELLO,

AND PEREZ’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 52]

Plaintiff Charles Easter, a former state prisoner proceeding

pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a civil rights complaint on

March 18, 2009, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [ECF No. 1].1 The

events giving rise to the allegations in the Complaint, however,

occurred approximately two and one-half years earlier, while Easter

was housed at R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“Donovan”). 

(Compl. 1, ECF No. 1.)2

 In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts

Defendants violated his rights protected by the Fifth, Eighth, and

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3 Although initially sued as Lieutenant Panchello,

Defendant’s name has been corrected to Lieutenant L. Panichello, to

add his first-name initial. (See Report & Recommendation 2 n.1,

ECF No. 29 (citing Compl. 1-2, 4, ECF No. 1; Mot. Dismiss Attach.

#2 Mem. P. & A. 1-2, ECF No. 15).)

2 09cv555 LAB(RBB)

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States and the California

Constitutions when they placed Easter in a prison yard where he had

been assaulted by other inmates on a previous occasion, which

caused him to be assaulted a second time. (Id. at 3-6.)

United States District Court Judge Larry A. Burns dismissed

Defendant “CDC State of California” sua sponte on June 1, 2009 [ECF

No. 7]. Then, on August 14, 2009, the remaining three Defendants,

Officer E. Perez, Lieutenant L. Panichello,3 and Captain B. Morris

filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for Failure to

State a Claim [ECF No. 15]. On February 1, 2010, this Court

recommended that the district court grant in part and deny in part

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and on March 9, 2010, Judge Burns

adopted the recommendation in its entirety [ECF Nos. 29-30]. 

Specifically, the monetary claims against Defendants Perez,

Panichello, and Morris in their official capacities were dismissed

without leave to amend, as were the supplemental state law claims

against Defendants in their official capacities. (Order Adopting

Report & Recommendation 2, ECF No. 30; see also Report &

Recommendation 24-25, ECF No. 29.) Easter’s claim under the

Fourteenth Amendment was dismissed without leave to amend, and his

Fifth Amendment claim was dismissed with leave to amend. (Id.)

Finally, Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief was stricken. 

(Order Adopting Report & Recommendation 3, ECF No. 30; see also

Report & Recommendation 25, ECF No. 29.) Plaintiff did not amend

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4

 The Memorandum of Points and Authorities indicates that it

is in support of “Defendant Morales’s Motion for Summary Judgment.” 

(See Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 1, ECF No. 52.) The

Court construes this as a typographical error and will consider the

document as supporting Defendant Morris, Panichello, and Perez’s

Motion for Summary Judgment. (See Mot. Summ. J. 1, ECF No. 52.) 

5

 The Court will also cite to all documents in support of

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment using the page numbers

assigned by the Court’s electronic case filing system.

3 09cv555 LAB(RBB)

his Complaint, and on May 14, 2010, the three Defendants filed an

Answer [ECF No. 32]. 

On January 3, 2011, Defendant Morris, Panichello, and Perez’s

Motion for Summary Judgment was filed, along with a Memorandum of

Points and Authorities,4 a Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts,

and an Appendix of Evidence [ECF No. 52].5 The next day, Plaintiff

was given notice, pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th

Cir. 1988) (en banc), and Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th

Cir. 1988), of his opportunity to submit additional evidence in

opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 53]. 

The Court instructed that any opposition must be filed by January

24, 2011, and any reply must be filed by January 31, 2011. 

(Klingele/Rand Notice 2-3, ECF No. 53.) 

Easter’s fluctuating mailing addresses have challenged the

Clerk of Court’s ability to ensure that he receives copies of court

documents. Since the Defendants filed their Motion for Summary

Judgment, Plaintiff has filed five notices of change of address in

an attempt to keep the Court apprised of his current mailing

address [ECF Nos. 54-55, 58, 65, 67]. Easter sought an extension

of time to oppose Defendants’ Motion on February 1, 2011, which the

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6

 The corresponding Minute Order, as well as the Klingle/Rand

Notice, were later returned to the clerk of the court as

undeliverable [ECF Nos. 59, 69].

4 09cv555 LAB(RBB)

Court granted [ECF No. 56-57].6 On March 2, 2011, Plaintiff filed

a two-page letter titled, “Opposition to the Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment,” in which he stated that he had not received a

copy of Defendants’ Motion and requested an opportunity to respond

[ECF No. 66]. Easter also mailed to the Court a second document

titled, “Opposition to the Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment,” which was filed nunc pro tunc to March 7, 2011 [ECF Nos.

72, 73]. This three-page document, however, lacks substantive

arguments and evidence in opposition. 

During a telephonic conference on March 9, 2011, Easter

informed the Court that despite Defendants’ efforts, he still had

not received a copy of their Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No.

70]. The Court confirmed Plaintiff’s mailing address and

instructed defense counsel to forward Easter another copy of the

Motion as well as a copy of the Court’s Klingle/Rand Notice. 

(Mins., Mar. 9, 2011, ECF No. 70.) Plaintiff was given another

extension of time to respond to the Motion; any opposition was to

be filed by March 25, 2011, and any reply was to be filed by April

1, 2011. (Id.) That same day, defense counsel filed a Proof of

Service indicating that a copy of the Motion for Summary Judgment

and related documents, as well as a copy of the Klingele/Rand

Notice, were mailed yet again to Plaintiff [ECF No. 71].

On March 30, 2011, before Easter’s substantive opposition was

filed and two days before Defendants’ deadline to file a reply,

Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to the Motion for

Summary Judgment was filed [ECF No. 74]. The Reply responds to the

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28 7 The Court will also cite to the oppositions using the page

numbers assigned by the Court’s electronic case filing system.

5 09cv555 LAB(RBB)

three-page Opposition filed nunc pro tunc to March 7, 2011. (See

Reply 1, Mar. 30, 2011, ECF No. 74.) Plaintiff then mailed a third

document titled, “Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment” with exhibits that was docketed on April 1, 2011, but

filed nunc pro tunc to March 24, 2011 [ECF Nos. 75-76]. This third

“Opposition” is a substantive response to Defendants’ Motion and

includes additional evidence in opposition. (See Opp’n 1, 5-23,

Mar. 24, 2011, ECF No. 76.) On April 7, 2011, Defendants’ Reply to

Plaintiff’s Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment was

filed, along with the Declaration of K. Cunningham [ECF No. 77],

which responds to Plaintiff’s March 24th Opposition. 

As explained above, Plaintiff’s third Opposition with

exhibits, filed nunc pro tunc to March 24, 2011, is his substantive

response to the Motion for Summary Judgment. (Opp’n 1, 5-11, Mar.

24, 2011, ECF No. 76.) Defendants’ Reply filed on April 7, 2011,

responds to this Opposition. (Reply 1-7, Apr. 7, 2011, ECF No.

77.) Therefore, the Court construes these documents as the

Opposition and the Reply, but will also consider any relevant

arguments raised in Plaintiff’s second Opposition [ECF No. 73], and

in the Defendants’ first Reply [ECF No. 74], that are not also

addressed in the substantive Opposition [ECF No. 76] and Reply [ECF

No. 77], respectively.7 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This lawsuit is a renewal of the § 1983 action that Easter 

commenced on January 29, 2007. See Easter v. CDC (Easter I), No.

07-cv-00187 L(RBB) (S.D. Cal. filed Jan. 29, 2007), ECF No. 1. 

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6 09cv555 LAB(RBB)

There, Easter maintained that Defendants CDC State of California,

Morris, Panichello, Perez, and Hilton violated his Eighth Amendment

rights by placing him in the same prison yard where he had

previously been assaulted, causing him to be assaulted again. Id.

Defendants Perez, Panichello, and Morris filed a motion to dismiss

for failing to exhaust administrative remedies. Easter I, No. 07-

CV-00187 L(RBB) (motion to dismiss), ECF No. 18. 

This Court issued a report and recommendation that the claims

against defendants Perez, Panichello, and Morris be dismissed

without prejudice. Id. (report and recommendation), ECF No. 30. 

On November 20, 2008, United States District Court Judge James

Lorenz adopted in part, and modified in part, the report and

recommendation. Id., slip op., ECF No. 32. He granted the

defendants’ motions and dismissed the complaint without prejudice. 

Id. at 3. As to exhaustion, Judge Lorenz held that Easter had

filed the lawsuit on January 29, 2007, but he did not submit his

administrative grievance to prison officials until February 7,

2007. Id. at 2 (citation omitted). 

The district court explained:

[T]he court is troubled by the prison authorities’

unresponsiveness in processing Plaintiff’s grievance

after February 7, 2007. The Magistrate Judge found that

the prison authorities had not at any level or at any

time rejected Plaintiff’s grievance as untimely. He

therefore found that Plaintiff could still complete the

appeal of his grievance, and recommended that the

complaint be dismissed without prejudice. As of January

19, 2008, Plaintiff’s second level appeal had been

pending before the prison authorities at RJ Donovan state

prison for some time, however, when he filed his

objections to the Report and Recommendation on March 17,

2008, he still had not received a response. As of that

time, the prison authorities’ twenty working days to

respond to the second level appeal had long passed.

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Id. (internal citations omitted). Nonetheless, Judge Lorenz

dismissed the action without prejudice for failure to exhaust;

Easter had not submitted his grievance until after filing the

lawsuit. Id. at 1-3. The court therefore concluded that as of the

date of its order, November 20, 2008, the grievance process was

ongoing. Id.

The Complaint in this case, filed on March 18, 2009, is a

resumption of the civil rights allegations Easter attempted to

litigate in his January 29, 2007 complaint. 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff’s Complaint

Plaintiff is an African-American who was incarcerated at

Donovan when the events giving rise to the Complaint occurred. 

(See Compl. 1, ECF No. 1.) On August 27, 2006, while Easter was

housed in yard four of building seventeen in Donovan, he was

assaulted by a group of Caucasian prisoners. (See id. at 1, 3.) 

An incident report was completed that same day, which noted

Easter’s enemies. (See id. at 3, 5.) He was placed in the

administrative segregation unit (“AS”) because of his involvement

in the fight. (Id. at 3-5; id. Attach. #1, at 11.) Plaintiff was

later released from administrative segregation and placed in yard

two because he had enemies in yard four. (See Compl. 3-5, ECF No.

1; id. Attach. #1, at 11.) Easter was subsequently rehoused with

his inmate enemies again in yard four. (Id.) Then, on November

14, 2006, Plaintiff was attacked again, stabbed; he ultimately was

sent to the hospital with “life threatening injuries.” (Compl. 3,

ECF No. 1.)

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8 09cv555 LAB(RBB)

Plaintiff contends that Correctional Officer Perez made the

decision to move Easter back to yard four even though she knew he

had been previously attacked on that yard on August 27, 2006. (Id.

at 2.) As a result, Plaintiff was attacked a second time by

approximately fifteen “skin heads with knives.” (Id.) Lieutenant

Panichello knew that Easter had enemies on prison yard four, yet he

nonetheless escorted Plaintiff back to the yard even though

Plaintiff “told him that [he] wasn’t suppossed to go back to that

yard” and there was other housing available for Easter. (Id. at

4.) Finally, Defendant Captain Morris had prior knowledge of

Easter’s enemy concerns in facility four from incident reports

created in response to the August 27, 2006 riot. (Id. at 2.) 

Easter seeks $15,000,000 in monetary damages, $10,000,000 in

punitive damages, and an order requiring Defendants to pay the

costs Plaintiff incurred litigating this action. (Id.) 

B. Facts Not Subject to Dispute

The Defendants have included with their Motion a statement of

facts they contend are not in dispute with a citation to supporting

evidence. (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #2 Separate Statement Undisputed

Facts 1-7, ECF No. 52.) On August 27, 2006, there was a racial

riot in facility four involving African-American and Caucasian

inmates. (Id. at 1 (citing id. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. A, at

4, Ex. J Decl. Morris 63-64).) A large group of prisoners ignored

officials’ repeated orders to cease fighting. (Id.) Several

inmates who were not already participating in the fight attempted

to get involved, but ultimately chose to lie down on the ground

when officials used a thirty-seven millimeter gas gun. (Id. at 1-

2.) Easter was one of these African-American prisoners who tried

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to participate in the riot but chose not to. (Id. at 2 (citing id.

Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. A, at 4, Ex. J Decl. Morris 64, Ex. P,

at 91).) It appears that Easter was not assaulted or injured in

the riot; the medical report indicates that he had no visible

injuries. (Id. (citing id. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. B, at 6,

Ex. J Decl. Morris 64).)

As a result of his attempt to participate in the riot,

Plaintiff was disciplined for engaging in conduct that “may lead to

violence.” (Id. (citing id. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. J Decl.

Morris 64).) Easter was placed in administrative segregation in

facility two with numerous inmates who participated in the August

27, 2006 riot. (Id. (citing id. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. C, at

8, Ex. J Decl. Morris 64.) On September 28, 2006, Easter’s Notice

of Critical Case Information -- Safety of Persons List (“enemy

list”) was updated by R. Velo; under the column “nonconfidential

enemies,” “none noted” was written. (Id. (citing id. Attach. #3

App. Evidence Ex. D, at 10, Ex. J Decl. Morris 64).) 

Defendants state that prison officials learn of threats to a

particular inmate’s safety is when the inmate to communicates the

threat to the staff. (Id.) The prisoner must identify the

specific individual enemy and describe why he believes the

individual poses a threat; officials then document the enemy in a

CDC Form 128B chrono. (Id.) Inmates are not permitted to place an

entire ethnicity or race on an enemy list because prison officials

believe it would be impracticable to segregate by ethnicity. (Id.

at 2-3.) Prison authorities may also learn of threats to a

prisoner’s safety when the official learns that the inmate is

involved in mutual combat or another incident with an identifiable

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prisoner. (Id. at 3.) Because Plaintiff did not participate in

the August 27, 2006 riot, unless he directly communicated to prison

officials that a certain inmate posed a threat to his safety, the

Defendants would not add any enemies to Plaintiff’s enemy list. 

(Id.) Easter never told prison officials that a particular person

posed a threat to his safety. (Id. (citing id. Attach. #3 App.

Evidence Ex. J. Decl. Morris 64-65).)

When a prisoner is housed in administrative segregation, the

Institutional Classification Committee (“ICC”) meets with the

inmate and reviews his central file to determine whether he should

be transferred back to the general prison population. (Id. (citing

id. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. J Decl. Morris 65, Ex. K Decl.

Panichello 70).) According to Captain Morris, on September 29,

2006, the committee met with Easter and concluded that he was no

longer a threat to prison security, and the committee noted that

Plaintiff did not have any safety concerns. (Id.) If Easter

expressed any concerns at this time, ICC would have addressed them. 

(Id. (citing id. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. E, at 12, Ex. J.

Decl. Morris 65).) Plaintiff was released from facility two to the

reception center in facility four. (Id. (citing id. Attach. #3

App. Evidence Ex. F, at 14-16, Ex. J Decl. Morris 65); see also,

id. Ex. L Decl. Perez 73.) 

Defendant Perez is a Correctional Officer in Housing

Assignments, and her duty is to find cell placements for prisoners

housed in facility four. (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #2 Separate

Statement Undisputed Facts 3, ECF No. 52.) The classification

committee takes all considerations into account when selecting

housing assignments for inmates, including the location of any

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enemies. (Id.) Perez relies entirely on the committee’s

determinations regarding cell placements whenever a prisoner is

removed from administrative segregation. (Id. at 3-4 (citing id.

Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. L Decl. Perez 73).) Perez’s office is

not located on facility two or facility four, and she does not

speak with the prisoners. (Id.) At no time did Easter inform

Perez that he was hesitant about being housed in facility four. 

(Id.) According to Perez, she was not notified of any potential

enemies in facility four that posed a threat to Easter’s safety or

of any reason why he should not be placed there. (Id. at 4 (citing

id. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. L Decl. Perez 73).) Easter

concedes that he has not had any conversations with Officer Perez

in more than ten years and had no written communication with her

after the August riot. (Id. (citing id. Attach. #3 App. Evidence

Ex. P, at 98-99, 101).)

Defendant Panichello states that he does not remember Easter

expressing any concern that being transferred back to facility four

posed a risk to Plaintiff’s safety; had he done so, Panichello

would have investigated Plaintiff’s claims and taken appropriate

action. (Id. (citing id. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. K Decl.

Panichello 70).)

After Easter was transferred to facility four, he informally

asked Defendant Morris to transfer him back to facility two. (Id.

(citing id. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. J Decl. Morris 65-66).) 

Morris specifically asked Easter if remaining in facility four

posed a threat to his safety, and Plaintiff denied having enemy

concerns. (Id.) Captain Morris does not recall Easter giving any

reason for his request to be transferred back to facility two,

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therefore, there was no basis for Morris to conclude that

Plaintiff’s safety would be in jeopardy in facility four. Id.

During his deposition, Plaintiff testified that he did not

communicate with Defendant Morris regarding threats to his safety

prior to the November 14, 2006 prison riot. (Id. at 4-5.) Easter

stated, “‘I never talked to Captain Morris after the——[sic] I only

talked to Captain Morris after the second incident. Never before

the first one. Or after the first one.’” (Id. at 5 (quoting id.

Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. P, at 93-95).) Plaintiff subsequently

altered his statement by testifying that the did express his safety

concerns to Morris before the second riot. (Id. (citing id.

Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. P, at 96-97).) Easter also testified

that he did not give Defendants the names of potential enemies in

facility four because he did not know the specific identity of 

potential enemies in that yard. (Id. (citing id. Attach. #3 App.

Evidence Ex. P, at 100).)

On November 14, 2006, another riot between African-American

and Caucasian inmates occurred in facility four, causing Plaintiff

and numerous other prisoners serious injuries. (Id. (citing id.

Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. G, at 18-43, Ex. J Decl. Morris 66).) 

Prisoner Hill, CDC V-35354, was identified as the individual who

stabbed Easter during this fight. (Id.) Hill was added to

Plaintiff’s enemy list on November 14, 2006, and again on April 16,

2007. (Id. (citing id. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. H, at 45, Ex.

J Decl. Morris 66).) Inmate Hill did not, however, participate in

the August 27, 2006 riot, and there is no suggestion that he was

ever a threat to Easter’s safety prior to the November 14, 2006

riot. (Id.) According to Captain Morris, unless Plaintiff

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specifically communicated to prison officials that Hill was an

enemy, it would have been impossible for staff to know that he

posed a threat to Easter. (Id. (citing id. Attach. #3 App.

Evidence Ex. G, at 18-43, Ex. I, at 47-61, Ex. J Decl. Morris 66).) 

During his deposition, Plaintiff admitted that Hill was not on his

enemy list when the November 14, 2006 riot occurred, and he was

unsure whether Hill was also involved in the August 27, 2006 riot. 

(Id. at 5-6 (citing id. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. J Decl. Morris

65-67, Ex. K Decl. Panichello 70, Ex. L Decl. Perez 73-74).)

III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides, “The court

shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Like the

standard for a directed verdict, judgment must be entered for the

moving party “if, under the governing law, there can be but one

reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (citing Brady v. S. Ry. Co.,

320 U.S. 476, 479-80 (1943)). “If reasonable minds could differ,”

judgment should not be entered in favor of the moving party. Id.

at 250-51; see also Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463,

470 (9th Cir. 2007).

The parties bear the same substantive burden of proof that

would apply at a trial on the merits, including plaintiff’s burden

to establish any element essential to his case. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. at 252; Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526

U.S. 795, 805-06 (1999); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322 (1986); Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 252; see also Taylor

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v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). “When the nonmoving

party bears the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is

warranted if the nonmovant fails to ‘make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to [its] case.’” 

Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590 (1993) (quoting Celotex

Corp., 477 U.S. at 322). The absence of a genuine issue of

material fact on a single element of a claim is sufficient to

warrant summary judgment on that claim. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at

322-23.

The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying the

pleadings and evidence it “believes demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323; Adickes v. S.H. Kress

& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d

1178, 1182-83 (9th Cir. 2003). The burden then shifts to the

nonmoving party to establish, beyond the pleadings, that there is a

genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. To

successfully rebut a defendant’s properly supported motion for

summary judgment, the plaintiff “must point to some facts in the

record that demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact and, with

all reasonable inferences made in the plaintiff[’]s[] favor, could

convince a reasonable jury to find for the plaintiff[].” Reese v.

Jefferson School Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323; Liberty

Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249). Material issues are those that “might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Liberty

Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Chevron USA, Inc. v. Cayetano, 224

F.3d 1030, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2000); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d

1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1982). More than a “metaphysical doubt” is

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required to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 

In deciding whether any genuine issue of material fact remains

for trial, courts must “view[] the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party . . . .” Fontana v. Haskin, 262

F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image

Technical Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456 (1992) (stating that the

nonmoving party’s evidence is to be believed and all reasonable

inferences drawn in the nonmoving party’s favor). “When opposing

parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly

contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could

believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for

purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v.

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). While the district court is not

required to search the entire record for an issue of fact, the

court may nevertheless exercise its discretion to consider

materials in the record that are not specifically referred to. 

Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031

(9th Cir. 2001); Forsberg v. Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d

1409, 1417-18 (9th Cir. 1988).

When the nonmoving party is proceeding pro se, the court has a

duty to consider “all of [the nonmovant’s] contentions offered in

motions and pleadings, where such contentions are based on personal

knowledge and set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence,

and where [the nonmovant] attested under penalty of perjury that

the contents of the motions or pleadings are true and correct.” 

Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 922-23 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations

omitted). 

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IV. EXHAUSTION

The Defendants move for summary judgment under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 56 for nonexhaustion as well as on the merits. 

Perez, Panichello, and Morris argue that Easter failed to exhaust

his nonjudicial remedies before filing this lawsuit, as required by

the Prison Litigation Reform Act, because he did not appeal his

inmate grievance through the third level of review. (Mot. Summ. J.

2, ECF No. 52; id. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 5.) 

A. The Rule of Exhaustion

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”) states: “No action shall be brought with respect to

prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983] or any other Federal

law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a) (West 2003). The

exhaustion requirement applies regardless of the relief sought. 

Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (citation omitted). 

“‘[A]n action is “brought” for purposes of § 1997e(a) when the

complaint is tendered to the district clerk[]’ . . . .” Vaden v.

Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Ford v.

Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 400 (7th Cir. 2004)). Therefore, prisoners

must “exhaust administrative remedies before submitting any papers

to the federal courts.” Id. at 1048 (emphasis added).

Section 1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement creates an

affirmative defense. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th

Cir. 2003). “[D]efendants have the burden of raising and proving

the absence of exhaustion.” Id. (footnote omitted). Defendants in

§ 1983 actions properly raise the affirmative defense of failure to

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exhaust administrative remedies through an unenumerated motion to

dismiss under Rule 12(b). Id. (citations omitted).

Unlike motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim for

which relief may be granted, “[i]n deciding a motion to dismiss for

failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies, the court may look beyond

the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact.” Id. at 1119-20

(citing Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837

F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988)) (footnote omitted). Courts have

discretion regarding the method they use to resolve these factual

disputes. Ritza, 837 F.2d at 369 (citations omitted). “A court

ruling on a motion to dismiss also may take judicial notice of

‘matters of public record.’” Hazleton v. Alameida, 358 F. Supp. 2d

926, 928 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250

F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted)). But “if the

district court looks beyond the pleadings to a factual record in

deciding the motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust[,] . . . the

court must assure that [the plaintiff] has fair notice of his

opportunity to develop a record.” Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 n.14. 

If the district court concludes that the prisoner has not

exhausted nonjudicial remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal of

the claim without prejudice.” Id. at 1120 (citing Ritza, 837 F.2d

at 368 n.3). 

B. The California Administrative Grievance Process

“The California Department of Corrections [‘CDC’] provides a

four-step grievance process for prisoners who seek review of an

administrative decision or perceived mistreatment: an informal

level, a first formal level, a second formal level, and the

Director’s level.” Vaden, 449 F.3d at 1048-49 (citing Brown v.

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8 The regulations governing the prison administrative

grievance process were amended on December 17, 2010, effective

January 28, 2011. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084 - 3084.8

(amended 2011). Because Easter filed the Complaint on March 18,

2009, the Court will use the regulations in effect at that time. 

(See Compl. 1, ECF No. 1); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084 -

3084.8 (2009) (current version at Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084

- 3084.8 (2011)); see also Shepard v. Cohen, No. 1:09-cv-01628,

2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6838, at *4 n.1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2011).

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Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 929-30 (9th Cir. 2005)). The administrative

appeal system can be found in title 15, sections 3084.1, 3084.5,

and 3084.6 of the California Code of Regulations (“CCR”).8 See

Brown, 422 F.3d at 929-30 (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§

3084.1(a), 3084.5(a)-(b), (e)(1)-(2), 3084.6(c) (amended 2011)). 

To comply with the CDC’s administrative grievance procedure,

an inmate must file his grievance at the informal level within

fifteen working days of the event being appealed. Cal. Code Regs.

tit. 15, § 3084.6(c) (2009); see also Brown, 422 F.3d at 929. An

inmate must proceed through all levels of the administrative

grievance process before initiating a § 1983 suit in federal court. 

See Vaden, 449 F.3d at 1051.

A prisoner’s grievances must be “sufficient under the

circumstances to put the prison on notice of the potential claims

and to fulfill the basic purposes of the exhaustion requirement.” 

Irvin v. Zamora, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1135 (S.D. Cal. 2001). 

Exhaustion serves several important goals, including “allowing a

prison to address complaints about the program it administers

before being subjected to suit, reducing litigation to the extent

complaints are satisfactorily resolved, and improving litigation

that does occur by leading to the preparation of a useful record.” 

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007) (citing Woodford v. Ngo,

548 U.S. 81, 88-91 (2006); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524

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(2002)).

C. Dismissal Versus Summary Judgment

The Defendants raise the affirmative defense of nonexhaustion

as part of their Motion and argue that summary judgment should be

granted. (Mot. Summ. J. 2, ECF No. 52; id. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A.

10-12.) “[P]laintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies,

this failure alone is grounds for the Court to grant this motion in

its entirety.” (Mot. Summ. J. 2, ECF No. 52.) 

The Ninth Circuit has held that the proper pretrial vehicle

for challenging a prisoner’s failure to comply with the exhaustion

requirement is to file an unenumerated motion to dismiss under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), rather than a motion for

summary judgment. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119 (citing Ritza, 837 F.2d

at 368); see Janis v. Ashcroft, 94 F. App’x 564, 566-67 (9th Cir.

2004); Cox v. Harris, 60 F. App’x 685, 686 (9th Cir. 2003). The

general rule is that the “failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies

is a matter in abatement, not going to the merits of the claim, and

as such is not properly raised in a motion for summary judgment.” 

Ritza, 837 F.2d at 368; see Stauffer Chem. Co. v. FDA, 670 F.2d

106, 108 (9th Cir. 1982). “The appropriate procedure for raising

the failure-to-exhaust defense under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a),

therefore, is by a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss.” Janis, 94 F.

App’x at 566-67 (citing Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119).

When a failure to exhaust defense is included in a motion for

summary judgment, courts should treat it as if it were raised in a

motion to dismiss. Ritza, 837 F.2d at 368-69 (“[Exhaustion] should

be raised in a motion to dismiss, or be treated as such if raised

in a motion for summary judgment.”); see Stauffer Chem. Co., 670

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F.2d at 108 (finding that the motion for summary judgment for

failure to exhaust should have been treated as a motion to

dismiss); Studio Elec. Technicians Local 728 v. Int’l Photographers

of the Motion Picture Indus. Local 659, 598 F.2d 551, 552 (9th Cir.

1979) (explaining that courts should treat these matters as a

motion to dismiss even if they are brought by summary judgment).

Accordingly, this Court construes Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment because of Easter’s failure to exhaust as a

nonenumerated motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b). See Davitt v. Centric, No. 3:06-cv-00502-

HDM(RAM), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73430, at *9-10 (D. Nev. May 25,

2010) (recommending that plaintiff’s claims be dismissed without

prejudice for failure to exhaust after treating motion for summary

judgment as motion to dismiss); Boren v. Bocca, No. 3:08-CV-00174-

LRH-VPC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124937, at *22-23 (D. Nev. Nov. 13,

2009) (treating summary judgment motion as a Rule 12(b) motion). 

1. Plaintiff’s Failure to Exhaust

In both their Answer and their current Motion, Perez,

Panichello, and Morris assert Easter has not properly exhausted his

administrative remedies. (Answer 4, ECF No. 32; Mot. Summ. J.

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 10, ECF No. 52); see Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(h)(2)(A) (providing that if the defense of failure to state a

claim is omitted from the initial motion to dismiss, it may be

raised in the answer); Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a); see also Panaro v.

City of North Las Vegas, 432 F.3d 949, 952 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating

that the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust is waived if the

defendant does not raise it); Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1171

(9th Cir. 2005) (same). Although Defendants failed to raise

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9

 Because the Court construes Defendants’ Motion as a motion

to dismiss with regard to exhaustion, it will consider the events

relating to Easter’s appeal that Defendants outline in their

statement of undisputed facts. See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119-20

(allowing courts to look beyond the pleadings when resolving

exhaustion issues). 

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exhaustion in their initial Motion to Dismiss filed on August 14,

2009, they subsequently plead it in their Answer. (See Mot.

Dismiss Pl.’s Compl. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 3-8, ECF No. 15;

Answer 4, ECF No. 32.) The defense is therefore not waived, and

the Court will consider it when ruling on this Motion. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(h)(2)(A); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a). 

To support their assertion that Plaintiff failed to exhaust

his nonjudicial remedies, Defendants include in their Motion a

statement of facts that they contend are not in dispute.9 (Mot.

Summ. J. Attach. #2 Separate Statement Undisputed Facts 6, ECF No.

52.) Defendants state that in Appeal No. RJD-08-00385, Easter

alleged that on several occasions he submitted Appeal No. RJD-07-

0491, the grievance in which he argued that Defendants’ decision to

place him in facility four caused him to be assaulted a second

time. (Id. (citing id. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. M, at 77).) 

In the 08-00385 grievance, Plaintiff complains that the Appeals

Coordinator failed to properly process his 07-0491 grievance

challenging the Defendants’ decision to rehouse him in yard four. 

(Id. (citing id. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. M, at 78, Ex. N, at

80-81).) The Defendants argue:

Regarding Appeal Log No. RJD-08-00385, D. Foston

determined that Plaintiff received a First Level response

to Log No. RJD-07-0491 on April 27, 2007, but that he did

not appeal the decision to the Second Level until August

15, 2007, which was untimely. Accordingly, Appeal Log

No. RJD-07-0491 was returned to plaintiff on August 16,

2007, and screened out, as Plaintiff exceeded the

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prescribed time constraints for requesting Second Level

review.

(Id. (citing id. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. M, at 78, Ex. N, at

80-81).) 

Defendants maintain that inmates who do not complete every

step of the prison’s grievance process are barred from bringing a

civil rights action. (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 11,

ECF No. 52.) They submit that Plaintiff never appealed the

grievance containing the deliberate indifference allegations to the

third level of review or received a decision from the director. 

(Id. at 12; id. Attach. #2 Separate Statement Undisputed Facts 7

(citing id. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. M, at 79).) Therefore,

Defendants explain, Easter failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies. (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 12, ECF No. 52.)

In response, Plaintiff contends that he has complied with the

exhaustion requirements. (Opp’n 5, Mar. 24, 2011, ECF No. 76.) He

refers to his initial civil rights complaint that was filed in

January 2007 and ultimately dismissed without prejudice for failure

to exhaust because the grievance process was still ongoing. (Id.);

see also Easter I, No. 07-cv-00187 L(RBB) (slip op.), ECF No. 32. 

Easter explains, “[I]t is on file that I was able to come back to

court once I finish exhausting my remidies [sic].” (Opp’n 5, Mar.

24, 2011, ECF No. 76.) He states that he was then able to refile

this civil rights action in March 2009. (Id.) 

Plaintiff argues that the level three appeals tracking form

that was filed as an attachment to Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment establishes that Easter’s appeal was denied at the third

level. (Id. (citing id. Ex. F, at 21); see Mot. Summ. J. Attach.

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#3 App. Evidence Ex. Q, at 104.) Plaintiff concedes, however, that

the tracking sheet only identifies the 08-00385 grievance, but he

insists that prison officials never returned his 07-0491 grievance

to him. (Opp’n 11, Mar. 24, 2011, ECF No. 76.) The 07-0491

grievance was pending when Easter filed his first complaint; it

dealt with Defendants’ decision to reassign him to facility four. 

(Id.) Plaintiff alleges he informed the court in the previous

lawsuit that prison officials were “playing games” with the

processing of grievance 07-0491; Easter argues that the court

ultimately agreed with him. (Id.) Plaintiff explains that his

prior lawsuit was dismissed without prejudice until he was able to

finish exhausting the 07-0491 appeal. (Id.) 

In their Reply, Defendants counter that Plaintiff’s “rambling

explanation as to how he allegedly exhausted administrative

remedies” does not rebut their evidence of nonexhaustion. (Reply

2, Apr. 7, 2011, ECF No. 77.) They point out that Easter never

addresses the fact that the appeal relating to this incident,

Appeal Log No. RJD-07-0491, was screened out at the second level as

untimely. (Id. at 2-3.) Defendants assert that the evidence

Plaintiff attaches to his Opposition — a copy of his third level

appeals history — actually confirms that the 07-0491 appeal was

never exhausted. (Id. at 3.) 

“Exhaustion of administrative remedies serves two main

purposes.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 89 (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan,

503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992)). “First, exhaustion protects

‘administrative agency authority’” by giving an agency “‘an

opportunity to correct its own mistakes . . . before it is hauled

into federal court’” and by discouraging “‘disregard of [the

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agency’s] procedures.’” Id. (quoting McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145). 

“Second, exhaustion promotes efficiency . . . . [and] ‘may produce

a useful record for subsequent judicial consideration.’” Id.

(quoting McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145). These two purposes are best

served when civil rights plaintiffs are forced to properly exhaust

administrative remedies and comply with the deadlines set by the

administrative agency. Id. at 95-96. Therefore, § 1997e(a)’s

exhaustion requirement has not been satisfied if the plaintiff

filed an administrative grievance that was rejected at the second

level of review as untimely. Id.

The defendant bears the initial burden of proof, in part,

because “‘it is considerably easier for a prison administrator to

show a failure to exhaust than it is for a prisoner to demonstrate

exhaustion.’” Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119 (quoting Ray v. Kertes, 285

F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002)). If the defendant has pled and

proved a failure to exhaust, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to

present evidence that he did exhaust administrative remedies. Ming

Ching Jin v. Hense, No. 1:03-CV-5282-REC-SMS-P, 2005 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 28083, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2005).

a. Consideration of public records

Courts may consider “matters of public record” when ruling on

a motion to dismiss, which includes pleadings, orders, and other

papers that are filed with a court. Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg,

593 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010); Lee v. City of Los Angeles,

250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001); Mack v. South Bay Beer

Distribs., Inc., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986); see Thomas v.

Walt Disney Co., 337 F. App’x 694, 695 (9th Cir. 2009). But courts

may not take judicial notice of disputed facts stated in those

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public records. Brown, 422 F.3d at 931 n.7 (quoting City of

Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1224 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004));

Lee, 250 F.3d at 689-90; Hunt v. Rodriguez, No. CIV S-06-0141 MCE

GGH P, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8184, at *8-9 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23,

2009).

As discussed above, Easter previously sought relief for these

Defendants’ purported deliberate indifference in a separate § 1983

action that was also before this Court. See Easter I, No. 07-cv00187 L(RBB) (complaint), ECF No. 1. At issue in that lawsuit,

among other things, was whether Easter exhausted Appeal Log No. 07-

0491, the grievance that challenged Defendants’ decision to rehouse

him in yard four. See id., (motion to dismiss), ECF No. 25,

(report and recommendation), ECF No. 30; id., slip op., ECF No. 32. 

This Court explicitly reconstructed the chronology of events

relating to the submission and processing of this particular

grievance. Id., (report and recommendation), ECF No. 30. The

recommendation was adopted by the district court judge. Id., slip

op., ECF No. 32. Because Easter had filed the lawsuit on January

29, 2007, which was before he submitted the grievance at the first

level on February 7, 2007, the court found that Easter could still

complete the grievance process and therefore dismissed the

complaint without prejudice. Id. at 2.

Previous court orders discussing the exhaustion of Easter’s

grievance may be considered when ruling on this Motion because the

Complaint refers to the grievance, and the authenticity of court

orders is not questioned. See Stone v. Writer’s Guild of Am. W.,

Inc., 101 F.3d 1312, 1313-14 (9th Cir. 1996). In his Complaint,

Plaintiff alleges he exhausted his administrative remedies as to

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his Eighth Amendment claim. (Compl. 6, ECF No. 1.) He

specifically argues, “I followed the administrative remedies --

completing up to step 3. No relief obtained, the reason for this

filing.” (Id.) To support this contention, Plaintiff attaches to

the Complaint the prison’s response to the grievance relevant to

the Court’s inquiry – Appeal No. RJD-07-0491 – in which Easter

accuses the Defendants of failing to protect him from a substantial

risk of harm. (See id. Attach. #1, at 11-12.) Although the first

level appeal response to this grievance was issued by authorities

at Donovan, the form also bears a stamp dated may 25, 2007, from

the Ironwood State Prison (“ISP”) appeals office. (Id.) Plaintiff

additionally attaches to the Complaint copies of the grievance he

subsequently filed and appealed through the third level – Appeal

No. RJD-08035 – challenging prison officials’ failure to process

his earlier 07-0491 grievance. (Id. at 2-10.) Therefore, this

Court will consider previous court orders addressing the processing

of Easter’s 07-0491 appeal as referred to in the Complaint. (See

Easter I, No. 07-cv-00187 L(RBB) (report and recommendation), ECF

No. 30; id., slip op., ECF No. 32; see also In re Stac Elecs. Secs.

Litig., 89 F.3d at 1405 n.4; Fecht, 70 F.3d at 1080 n.1; Cortec

Industries, Inc., 949 F.2d at 47-48. 

Moreover, court orders relating to Easter’s initial lawsuit

may also be considered to the extent they are matters of public

record and contain facts that are not in dispute. See Brown, 422

F.3d at 931 n.7; Lee, 250 F.3d at 689-90; see also Fed. R. Evid.

201(c) (“A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or

not.”). In his Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment,

Plaintiff asserts that the Court has already addressed whether his

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07-0491 grievance has been exhausted. (See Opp’n 5, 11, Mar. 24,

2011, ECF No. 76); see also Easter I, No. 07-cv-00187 L(RBB)

(report and recommendation), ECF No. 30; id., slip op., ECF No. 32. 

Plaintiff argues that in his previous lawsuit, he informed the

court that prison officials were thwarting the processing of his

grievance, and the court agreed. (Opp’n 11, Mar. 24, 2011, ECF No.

76); see also Easter I, No. 07-cv-00187 L(RBB) (report and

recommendation), ECF No. 30; id., slip op., ECF No. 32. He

reiterates that the initial action was dismissed without prejudice

until he could finish exhausting the 07-0491 inmate appeal. (Opp’n

5, 11, Mar. 24, 2011, ECF No. 76); see also Easter I, No. 07-cv00187 L(RBB) (slip op.), ECF No. 32. Plaintiff contends he has

still not received a response from the prison regarding his 07-0491

grievance. (Opp’n 11, Mar. 24, 2011, ECF No. 76.)

Defendants Perez, Panichello, and Morris were defendants in

Easter I. See Easter I, No. 07-cv-00187 L(RBB) (complaint), ECF

No. 1. Although they had the opportunity to do so in their Reply,

Defendants do not dispute the chronology of events relating to

Plaintiff’s grievance previously discussed by the court. (See

Reply 2-3, Apr. 7, 2011, ECF No. 77; see also Opp’n 5, 11, Mar. 24,

2011, ECF No. 76.) Nor do the Defendants dispute the facts stated

in the prior court opinions. (See Reply 2-3, Apr. 7, 2011, ECF No.

77); see also Easter I, No. 07-cv-00187 L(RBB) (report and

recommendation), ECF No. 30; id., slip op., ECF No. 32. In fact,

Defendants do not even acknowledge Plaintiff’s contention that the

court has already dealt with the exhaustion issue. (See Reply 2-3,

Apr. 7, 2011, ECF No. 77; see also Opp’n 5, 11, Mar. 24, 2011, ECF

No. 76.)

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In Easter I, this Court concluded that the motion to dismiss

for failure to exhaust should be dismissed without prejudice

because the defendants “failed to meet their burden of showing that

[Easter] can no longer properly exhaust his administrative

remedies.” Easter I, No. 07-cv-00187 L(RBB) (report and

recommendation at 15, ECF No. 30). Defendants Perez, Panichello,

and Morris “produced no evidence that Plaintiff’s appeal [grievance

RJD-07-0491] was rejected as untimely, which would end his right to

appeal further.” Id. The district court agreed with this

assessment. Id., slip op. at 2, ECF No. 32. Judge Lorenz

continued, “As of January 19, 2008, Plaintiff’s second level appeal

had been pending before the prison authorities at RJ Donovan state

prison for some time, however, when he filed his objections to the

Report and Recommendation on March 17, 2008, he still had not

received a response.” Id.

Defendants again contend that Easter has failed to exhaust his

Eighth Amendment claim. (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 5,

8, ECF No. 52.) They maintain that Plaintiff received a first

level response to grievance RJD-7-0491 on April 27, 2007, but did

not appeal the decision to the second level of review until August

15, 2007. (Id. at 8.) This time, Defendants assert that Easter’s

grievance was returned to him on August 16, 2007, and screened out

as untimely. (Id.)

The Court considered Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust in Easter

I. The Defendants are not collaterally estopped from relitigating

whether Easter exhausted his administrative remedies. “[A] prior

judgment does not have preclusive effect unless it is a decision on

the merits.” Farmer v. McDaniel, 98 F.3d 1548, 1562 (9th Cir.

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1996) (Schroeder, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 

In Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d at 1119, the court noted that

dismissing a complaint for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies is not a judgment on the merits. Consequently, collateral

estoppel does not apply. 

Because the court opinions relating to Easter’s previous §

1983 complaint against these three Defendants are matters of public

record and recite evidence that is not disputed by the parties,

this Court will consider the opinions. See Coto Settlement, 593

F.3d at 1038; Lee, 250 F.3d at 689-90; Ostrander v. HSBC Bank

United States, N.A., No. CIV S-09-1255 JAM EFB PS, 2010 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 2747, at *2-3, n. 2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2010) (taking

judicial notice of virtually identical complaints that were filed

in different court cases); Khangura v. Am. Mortg. Express, No.

2:09-cv-0720 LKK JFM PS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47391, at *4 (E.D.

Cal. June 5, 2009); see also Fed. R. Evid. 201(c).

b. Discussion

Plaintiff’s 07-0491 grievance, dated November 29, 2006, was

accompanied by an addendum. (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #3 App.

Evidence Ex. N, at 81-83.) There, Easter stated that on August 27,

2006, he was attacked by a group of skin heads; prison officials

then rehoused Plaintiff in the same yard as the skin heads, causing

him to be attacked a second time by the same gang. (Id. at 81,

83.)

The grievance was stamped as received by the Donovan appeal

office approximately two months later, on February 7, 2007, and was

assigned to Correctional Lieutenant C. P. Franco on February 15,

2007. (Id. at 81-82) Thus, the prison’s response was due no later

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10 The Director’s Level Appeal Decision indicates that the 07-

0491 appeal was returned to Easter on April 27, 2008. (Mot. Summ.

J. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. O, at 85, ECF No. 52.) The Court

construes this as a typographical error, and finds that the appeal

was returned to Plaintiff on April 27, 2007. (Id. Ex. M, at 78,

Ex. N, at 82; see Compl. Attach. #1, at 11-12, ECF No. 1.) 

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than March 23, 2007, but Lieutenant Franco did not interview Easter

until April 11, 2007. (Compl. Attach. #1, at 11, ECF No. 1; Mot.

Summ. J. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. N, at 81-82); see Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.8(c)(2). The grievance was partially granted

at the first level, and the staff response was dated April 14,

2007, signed April 17, 2007, and “returned” to Easter on April 27,

2007. (Compl. Attach. #1, at 11-12, ECF No. 1; Mot. Summ. J.

Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. N, at 81-83.)10 

D. Foston, the current Chief of Inmate Appeals Branch, states

that Plaintiff did not appeal the decision to the second level

until August 15, 2007; the grievance was therefore screened out as

untimely on August 16, 2007. (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #3 App.

Evidence Ex. M, at 78, ECF No. 52 (citing id. Ex. O, at 85-86).) 

The lapse in time between April 27, 2007, and August 15, 2007, is

the crux of Defendants’ contention that Easter failed to exhaust

because his appeal was properly screened out as untimely.

The chronology of events surrounding the 07-0491 inmate

grievance was analyzed in the Court’s prior report and

recommendation, which was affirmed by the district court. Easter

I, No. 07-cv-00187 L(RBB) (report and recommendation), ECF No. 30;

id., slip op., ECF No. 32. Easter was transferred from Donovan to

Ironwood State Prison on April 18, 2007; he did not receive the

prison’s first level response on April 27, 2007; that was merely

the date the response was “returned.” Id. (report and

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recommendation at 14-15), ECF No. 30 (“The evidence supports

Plaintiff’s contention that he did not receive the first level

response until May 22, 2007.”); see also id., slip op. at 2, ECF

No. 32; (but see Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. M, at

78 (citing id. Ex. O, at 85-86).) Easter had fifteen working days

from May 22, 2007, to appeal to the second level of review. See

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(c). Plaintiff submitted the

second level appeal to the Ironwood State Prison appeals office on

May 25, 2007. Easter I, No. 07-cv-00187 L(RBB), at 14 (report and

recommendation), ECF No. 30; see id., slip op., ECF No. 32; (see

also Compl. Attach. #1, at 11-12, ECF No. 1 (bearing an ISP appeals

office stamp dated May 25, 2007).) 

Although the prison had twenty working days to respond to this

second level appeal, Easter did not receive the August 4, 2007

response until August 9, 2007, which was well beyond the twenty-day

requirement. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(b)(3); Easter

I, No. 07-cv-00187 L(RBB) (report and recommendation at 15), ECF

No. 30; see also id., slip op. at 2, ECF No. 32. The prison

returned Easter’s second level appeal to him, not because it was

untimely, but because he should have submitted it directly to

Donovan. Easter I, No. 07-cv-00187 L(RBB) (report and

recommendation at 15), ECF No. 30; see also id., slip op. at 2, ECF

No. 32.

In his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss in Easter I,

Plaintiff submitted a letter from the Ironwood State Prison Appeals

Coordinator that stated, “This appeal needs to be forward [sic]

directly to RJD from the appellant. Appeal dated 11/29/06.” 

Easter I, No. 07-cv-00187 L(RBB) (Pl.’s Opp’n 26, ECF No. 26). 

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Easter’s appeal was not rejected. Section 3084.3 of the Rules and

Regulations of the Director of Corporations lists eight reasons an

inmate appeal may be rejected. Cal. Code Regs. title 15, § 3084.3. 

Exceeding the time limit for submitting the appeal when the

appellant had the opportunity to file within the prescribed time

constraints is a recognized ground for rejection. Id. Submitting

the appeal to the wrong institution is not. Id.

Plaintiff resubmitted the appeal to Donovan. (Mot. Summ. J.

Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. M, at 78 (citing id. Ex. O, at 85-

86)); see Easter I, No. 07-cv-00187 L(RBB) (report and

recommendation at 15), ECF No. 30; see also id., slip op. at 2, ECF

No. 32. The second level appeal was received on August 15, 2007,

and screened out as untimely the next day, August 16, 2007. (Mot.

Summ. J. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. M, at 78 (citing id. Ex. O,

at 85-86)); see Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.3(c)(6),

3084.6(c).

 Even with his transfer to ISP and the corresponding delays in

the prison’s processing and transmission of his grievance, each of

Easter’s appeals was timely submitted in accordance with title 15,

section 3084.6 of the California Code of Regulations. He received

the first level response on May 22, 2007, and appealed the decision

three days later; the appeal was returned to him on August 9, 2007,

because he should have submitted it directly to Donovan. Easter I,

No. 07-cv-00187 L(RBB) (report and recommendation at 14-15), ECF

No. 30; see also id., slip op. at 2, ECF No. 32. Plaintiff then

resubmitted the second level appeal to Donovan, which received it

six days later, on August 15, 2007, but the prison screened it out

the next day as untimely. (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #3 App. Evidence

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Ex. M, at 78 (citing id. Ex. O, at 85-86).) Therefore, Plaintiff’s

appeal was screened out in error because it was submitted on time. 

“[I]mproper screening of an inmate’s administrative grievances

renders administrative remedies ‘effectively unavailable’ such that

exhaustion is not required under the PLRA. If prison officials

screen out an inmate’s appeals for improper reasons, the inmate

cannot pursue the necessary sequence of appeals, and administrative

remedies are therefore plainly unavailable.” Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623

F.3d 813, 823 (9th Cir. 2010). To fall within this exception, an

inmate must demonstrate (1) he actually filed a grievance that, if

pursued through all levels, would have properly exhausted the claim

he seeks to pursue in federal court, and (2) prison officials

screened the grievance for reasons unsupported by their

regulations. Id. at 823-24.

Here, the first requirement is satisfied because the 07-0491

grievance would have properly exhausted Easter’s Eighth Amendment

if it had been pursued through all levels. See id. Defendants do

not dispute that this grievance adequately put the prison on notice

of the problem Easter now seeks to address. Id. The second

requirement is also met because prison authorities improperly

screened out the 07-0491 grievance. See id. at 825. The appeal

was deemed untimely based on the mistaken assumption that Easter

received the response on April 27, 2007, but did not appeal it

until August 15, 2007. In the meantime, Easter was transferred to

ISP; he submitted his appeal there, and then forwarded the appeal

to Donovan. Easter took appropriate steps to exhaust and was

prohibited from doing so, not because of his delay, but because of

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the prison’s mistake. See Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1224

(9th Cir. 2010).

Defendants have not shown that Plaintiff received notification

that his grievance was screened out. (See Opp’n 11, Mar. 24, 2011,

ECF No. 76.) Despite raising and briefing this exact issue in

their motion to dismiss in Easter I, this is the first time the

Defendants have asserted that the second level grievance was

screened out as untimely on August 16, 2007. Easter I, No. 07-cv00187 L(RBB) (report and recommendation at 15), ECF No. 30

(“Although the Defendants filed their Reply to Plaintiff’s

Opposition on October 22, 2007, they have produced no evidence that

Plaintiff’s appeal was rejected as untimely, which would end his

right to appeal further.”); see also id., slip op. at 2, ECF No. 32

(“The Magistrate Judge found that the prison authorities had not at

any level or at any time rejected Plaintiff’s grievance as

untimely.”). At the time of Judge Lorenz’s opinion, dated November

20, 2008, there was no evidence that Easter had received any

response from Donovan officials regarding his appeal. Easter I,

No. 07-cv-00187 L(RBB), slip op. at 2, ECF No. 32 (“[T]he court is

troubled by the prison authorities’ unresponsiveness in processing

Plaintiff’s grievance after February 7, 2007.”). 

Plaintiff continues to assert he never received a response to

his second level appeal. (Opp’n 11, Mar. 24, 2011, ECF No. 76

(“[T]hey never return[ed] my other appeal Log # 07-491.”); see also

Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119 (citing law indicating that courts should

liberally construe pro se litigants’ pleadings, especially

regarding issues involving technical requirements). In fact, on

February 6, 2008, Plaintiff filed a second appeal complaining of

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the prison’s processing of his initial grievance and inquiring

about its status. (Compl. Attach. #1, at 2-10, ECF No. 1; Mot.

Summ. J. Attach. #2 Separate Statement Undisputed Facts 6, ECF No.

52; id. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. M, at 78, Ex. O, at 85.) 

The Defendants do not provide the Court with a copy of the

prison’s response to Easter’s second level appeal in #RJD-07-0491,

screening it out as untimely. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.3(d)

(stating that when rejecting an appeal, the appeals coordinator

must issue a written rejection explaining why the appeal is

unacceptable.) The only evidence that this screened-out grievance

was returned to Plaintiff consists of one sentence in the responses

to the subsequent 08-00385 grievance. Without tracing the

chronology of Appeal #RJD 07-0491, prison authorities simply

concluded that the second level appeal was submitted on August 15,

2007, and returned to Easter. (See Compl. Attach. #1, at 4

(informal response to RJD 08-385); id. at 9-10 (second level appeal

response to RJD 08-0385); (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #3 App. Evidence

Ex. M, at 78, Ex. O, at 85 (director’s level appeal response to RJD

08-0385). The director’s level decision in 08-0385 states that a

review was conducted, and it was determined that Easter’s appeal

rights were not violated. (Id. Ex. O, at 85.) The Defendants have

submitted minimal evidence of the screened appeal, and the evidence

is insufficient to meet their burden of proving nonexhaustion. 

Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. 

Several courts have found exceptions to the PLRA’s exhaustion

requirement in light of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ngo v.

Woodford. Nunez, 591 F.3d at 1224. The PLRA only requires that a

prisoner exhaust administrative remedies that “are available.” 42

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U.S.C. 1997e(a). When circumstances render an inmate’s remedies

“effectively unavailable,” he is excused from the exhaustion

requirement. Nunez, 591 F.3d at 1226; see id. at 1224 (quoting

Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1085 (11th Cir. 2008); see also

Viet Mike Ngo v. Woodford, 539 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2008))

(suggesting that an inmate can be excused from any failure to

exhaust remedies when prison staff obstructs the grievance

process). The burden rests on the defendants to show what remedies

were indeed available to the inmate and how he failed to take

advantage of the remedies. Williams v. Cate, No. 1:09-cv-00468 OWW

JLT (PC), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30834, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 24,

2011). 

The Defendants have not provided the Court with proof that

Easter received the second level appeal response from the prison on

August 16, 2007. They do not address Easter’s contention that he

never received the screened-out second level appeal, and they

provide insufficient proof that it was returned to Plaintiff. 

(Opp’n 11, Mar. 24, 2011, ECF No. 76; Reply 2-3, Apr. 7, 2011, ECF

No. 77; see Burrows v. Gifford, No. 1:06-CV-0602-AWI-WMW-PC, 2007

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72077, at *6-8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2007) (finding

defendants did not meet their burden of proving nonexhaustion when

they failed to rebut plaintiff’s claim that officials did not

properly process his appeal). 

The Defendants have not carried their burden of proving

nonexhaustion. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119; Ming Chin Jin, 2005 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 28083, at *6; see Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v.

Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995) (construing the

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). For all

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of these reasons, Defendants’ request that the Court dismiss

Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims for failure to exhaust

should be DENIED.

V. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Perez, Panichello, and Morris also move for summary judgment

on the merits. The Defendants assert Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

claim against each of them fails as a matter of law because each

was unaware that Plaintiff would be assaulted in the second prison

riot. (Mot. Summ. J. 2, ECF No. 52; id. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A.

5.) Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified

immunity because that their actions were made in good faith and

with a reasonable belief that they were lawful. (Mot. Summ. J. 2,

ECF No. 52; id. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 5.)

Most of Plaintiff’s original claims did not survive

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (See Order Adopting Report &

Recommendation 2, ECF No. 30; see also Report & Recommendation 24-

25, ECF No. 29.) Therefore, Plaintiff may only pursue his Eighth

Amendment claim against Perez, Panichello, and Morris for failing

to protect him from harm, and Easter may only seek compensatory and

punitive damages against Defendants in their individual capacities. 

(See Order Adopting Report & Recommendation 2-3, ECF No. 30; see

also Report & Recommendation 10, 15, 24, ECF No. 29.) The

Plaintiffs’s other claims and requests for relief have been

dismissed. (Order Adopting Report & Recommendation 2-3, ECF No.

30; see also Report & Recommendation 24-25, ECF No. 29.)

A. The Plaintiff’s Request for Additional Discovery

As an initial matter, the Plaintiff opposes the Motion, in

part, with a claim that he needs additional discovery. In its June

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9, 2010 Case Management Conference Order Regulating Discovery and

Other Pretrial Proceedings, this Court ordered that all discovery

shall be completed by December 6, 2010 [ECF No. 35]. Although this

deadline has passed, Easter argues intermittently throughout his

opposition papers that he should be given time to take additional

discovery. (See Opp’n 1-2, Mar. 2, 2011, ECF No. 66; Opp’n 3, Mar.

7, 2011, ECF No. 73; Opp’n 2, Mar. 24, 2011, ECF No. 76.) For

example, Plaintiff briefly contends that the depositions of other

officers would support the facts he has alleged. (Opp’n 2, Mar. 24,

2011, ECF No. 76.) Easter appears to assert that he communicated

his safety concerns to Defendant Morris by complaining to the

housing officer Morris sent to talk to Plaintiff; Easter explains

that the “building 16 officer” would testify that this occurred. 

(Id. at 8.) Further, Plaintiff alleges he needs to obtain the

remaining facts from Defendants, like “154, video’s tape’s [sic] and

some officer’s statements” that were “hard for [him] to get” because

he is incarcerated. (Id. at 11.)

When a nonmoving party requests additional discovery to oppose

summary judgment, it bears the burden of showing that “additional

discovery would uncover specific facts which would preclude summary

judgment,” and that the evidence sought indeed exists. Maljack

Prods., Inc. v. Goodtimes Home Video Corp., 81 F.3d 881, 888 (9th

Cir. 1996) (under Rule 56(f)); see Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015,

1018 (9th Cir. 1991); Garrett v. City and County of San Francisco,

818 F.2d 1515, 1518 (9th Cir. 1987). The plaintiff must do more

than make vague assertions that additional discovery would reveal

“needed, but unspecified, facts.” In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation

Litig., 894 F. Supp. 1436, 1452 (E.D. Wash. 1995).

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Easter has not shown that any of the mentioned discovery would

uncover specific facts precluding summary judgment. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(d); Maljack Prods., Inc., 81 F.3d at 888; In re Hanford

Nuclear Reservation Litig., 894 F. Supp. at 1452. Nor has the

Plaintiff established good cause for amending the current scheduling

order to reopen discovery. (See Case Management Conference Order 1,

6, ECF No. 35 (“The dates and times set forth herein will not be

modified except for good cause shown.”).) Easter was given six

months to obtain discovery in support of his case. (See id. at 1.)

The nonmoving party seeking additional time to obtain discovery

to oppose summary judgment must show that it has been diligent in

pursuing discovery; it must specify the facts sought and explain

their reference; and it must explain why, despite its diligence, the

facts are currently unavailable. See 11 James Wm. Moore, et al.,

Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.100[4], at 56-262 (3d ed. 2011)

(discussing relief under Rule 56(d)). Easter’s request for

additional discovery pursuant to Rule 56(d) falls short and is

DENIED. See also S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 16.1(b) (requiring that pro se

plaintiffs proceed with diligence and take necessary steps to

prepare their cases). The Court will consider Defendants’ Motion

for Summary Judgment based on the record currently before it.

B. Eighth Amendment Claim: Failure to Protect

“[T]he treatment a prisoner receives and the conditions under

which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth

Amendment.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). The

Eighth Amendment “requires that inmates be furnished with the basic

human needs, one of which is ‘reasonable safety.’” Id. at 33

(quoting Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S.

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189, 200 (1989)). Therefore, a plaintiff has a right to be

protected from violence while in custody. Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 833 (1994); Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir.

2000); Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir.

1989). “Prison officials must take reasonable steps to protect

inmates from physical abuse.” Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250

(9th Cir. 1982). When the state takes a person into custody, the

Constitution imposes a duty to assume some responsibility for his

safety and well-being. Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 1005. 

To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a plaintiff must

show that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to a

substantial risk of serious harm to the prisoner’s safety. Farmer,

511 U.S. at 834; see Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir.

1995); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1267-68 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 

The prison official is only liable when two requirements are met;

one is objective, and the other is subjective. Farmer, 511 U.S. at

834; see Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812 (9th Cir. 2009). 

First, the purported violation must be objectively “sufficiently

serious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501

U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must

subjectively “know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate

health or safety.” Id. at 837.

In their Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendants contend

they were not aware of any threat to Easter’s safety because there

was no evidence demonstrating he was at risk of being attacked, and

Plaintiff did not put Defendants on notice of any safety concerns. 

(Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 12, ECF No. 52.) Assuming

they knew that Easter had been previously attacked in yard four, the

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Defendants argue, they would not be precluded from housing Plaintiff

in yard four in the future unless they knew the identities of

Easter’s specific enemies. (Id. at 14.) 

1. Objective Requirement: Sufficiently Serious Deprivation

To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, the alleged deprivation

must be “objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at

834 (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298). In cases alleging prison

authorities’ failure to prevent harm, the inmate may satisfy the

“sufficiently serious” requirement by showing that “he is

incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious

harm” to him. Id. Courts must consider the seriousness of the

potential harm and whether society deems the risk to be so grave

that it violates standards of decency. Helling, 509 U.S. at 36; see

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992).

Defendants Perez, Panichello, and Morris do not explicitly

address this standard. Instead, they repeatedly assert they were

not “deliberately indifferent” because there was “no identifiable

threat to plaintiff’s safety,” which is, in fact, responsive to the

subjective element. (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 12-16,

ECF No. 52); see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 837 (explaining that an

inmate must first show the purported violation was objectively

“sufficiently serious,” and then must demonstrate that the prison

officials were subjectively “deliberately indifferent”). 

The Defendants argue that they lacked the requisite subjective

intent. (See Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 12, 14-16, ECF

No. 52 (“Defendants were not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s

safety.”); see also id. at 15 (“[The record] does not demonstrate

that the defendants were aware of an identifiable risk to

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plaintiff’s safety.”); id. at 16 (citing Del Raine v. Williford, 32

F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 1994), to argue that “the subjective component

is not established and the suit fails.”); id. at 20 (“Further,

defendants were not deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s safety

by transferring him to facility in which he had no enemies or

identifiable safety concerns.”).)

Nonetheless, it could be inferred that Defendants are

suggesting that because each of them was unaware Easter would be

assaulted in the second riot, Plaintiff did not face a substantial

risk of harm. (See Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 12-16, ECF

No. 52); but see Broadway, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21132, at *15-16. 

Regardless of the manner in which the Court construes Defendants’

arguments, a genuine issue of fact exists as to the objective

element of the Eighth Amendment inquiry.

The Defendants argue at length that there was no “identifiable”

threat to Easter’s safety in yard four on November 14, 2006. (Mot.

Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 5, 12, ECF No. 52.) They submit

that Plaintiff did not participate in the August 27, 2006 riot. 

(Id.; see Reply 3, Apr. 7, 2011, ECF No. 77.) Defendants rely on

the medical examiner’s conclusion that Plaintiff had “no seen

injury” after the fight, as well as the Rules Violation Report

showing Plaintiff was ultimately disciplined for “behavior which may

lead to violence.” (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 5, 12,

ECF No. 52 (citing id. Attach. #2 Separate Statement Undisputed

Facts 2); see Reply 3, Apr. 7, 2011, ECF No. 77 (citing id. Attach.

#1 Decl. Cunningham 3).) Defendants further maintain that Plaintiff

had no enemies on September 28, 2006, when his enemy list was

updated before the November 17, 2006 riot. (Mot. Summ. J. Attach.

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#1 Mem. P. & A. 5, 12, ECF No. 52.) Also, the classification

committee evaluated Easter on September 29, 2006, to determine

whether he should be released from AS back to the general prison

population, and Easter did not mention any safety concerns about

facility four. (Id. at 14-15 (citing id. Attach. #2 Separate

Statement Undisputed Facts 3).) Defendants argue that inmate Hill,

the prisoner who stabbed Plaintiff during the second riot, was not

involved in the first fight. (Id. at 8-9 (citing id. Attach. #2

Separate Statement Undisputed Facts 5).) Because neither Plaintiff

nor Hill participated in the August 2006 riot, and Hill was never an

identified as an enemy of Easter’s, Defendants state there was no

known threat to Plaintiff’s safety in yard four. (Id. (citing id.

Attach. #2 Separate Statement Undisputed Facts 2, 5-6).)

In his Opposition, Plaintiff essentially contends that his

placement back to yard four subjected him to a substantial risk of

harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144,

1150 (9th Cir. 2010) (construing the filings of pro se inmates

liberally). Easter asserts he was attacked by approximately fifteen

skin heads during the August 27, 2006 riot. (Compl. 2, 5, ECF No.

1; Opp’n 1, 5-6, Apr. 1, 2011, ECF No. 76.) The medical report

reveals that Plaintiff was “rushed by the white race,” and the

chrono indicates he was sent to administrative segregation for

“participating in a riot.” (Opp’n 1, 5-6, Apr. 1, 2011, ECF No. 76

(citing id. Ex. A, at 13, Ex. B, at 15); see Mot. Summ. J. Attach.

#3 App. Evidence Ex. B, at 6, Ex. E, at 12, ECF No. 52.) The

classification committee sent Easter and the other African-American

inmates to AS because they were “involved” in the riot; thirty days

later, they were released from AS to yard two due to security

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11 On several occasions throughout his Opposition, Easter

references the events as they apply to him and to other AfricanAmerican prisoners. To the extent Plaintiff attempts to assert the

legal rights of these third-party inmates, he lacks standing to do

so. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410-11 (1991). The Court

will only consider Easter’s allegations as they apply to him as an

individual. See id.

44 09cv555 LAB(RBB)

reasons, as the Caucasian prisoners were still in yard four. (Opp’n

6, Mar. 24, 2011, ECF No. 76; see also Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #3 App.

Evidence Ex. P, at 100, ECF No. 52.)11 Plaintiff maintains that his

CDC 128-B chrono reveals that he was “targeted to be hit” in the

November riot due to his participation in the August 2006 riot. 

(Opp’n 6, Mar. 24, 2011, ECF No. 76 (citing id. Ex. C, at 17); see

Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. H, at 45, ECF No. 52.)

Easter argues that it would have been impossible for him to

have specifically identified inmate Hill as a threat before the

November 2006 riot because he did not know who Hill was until Hill

stabbed him. (Opp’n 8-9, Apr. 1, 2011, ECF No. 76.) Therefore,

Plaintiff submits that he had no way of alerting officials that Hill

posed a threat before the second riot; he was concerned for his

safety because of the general “ties” the gang had. (Id.) “It was

‘no coincidence’” that once [Plaintiff] was moved back into building

seventeen of yard four, he was attacked again by members from the

same gang. (Id. at 10.)

The parties dispute whether Plaintiff participated in the first

riot. According to the medical report, Easter “stated he was

talking to the sergeant, then they were rushed by the white race.” 

(Id. Ex. A, at 13.) The CDC-128G chrono sheet indicates Easter was

“placed in AS on 8-27-06 for security concerns, due to him

participating in a riot.” (Id. Ex. B, at 15.) The chrono, which

was prepared before Easter’s disciplinary hearing, also states his

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offense of “Participation in a Riot” is pending adjudication. (Id.) 

One incident report shows Plaintiff was a “suspect” in the riot but

sustained no injuries, and another report lists Plaintiff as a

“witness.” (Compl. 44, 57, ECF No. 1; Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #3 App.

Evidence Ex. I, at 49, ECF No. 52.) A reporting officer wrote,

“After ‘Code 4' was established I escorted [Easter] to Facility #4

Dining Hall for a medical evaluation.” (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #3

App. Evidence Ex. I, at 57, ECF No. 52.) Easter was placed in

administrative segregation because he “was involved in a riot with

weapon requiring the use of force on the Facility IV Yard,” and

Plaintiff was a threat to the safety of other inmates and to prison

security. (Id. Ex. C, at 8.) 

There is some evidence that Plaintiff merely attempted to

participate in the riot, but was not involved. (Mot. Summ. J.

Attach. #2 Separate Statement Undisputed Facts 1, ECF No. 52.) The

Rules Violation Report attached to Defendants’ Motion states that

Easter “attempted to get involved, but decided to get down after the

37MM was used.” (Id. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. A, at 4, ECF No.

52.) The medical report indicates that Easter was not injured. 

(Id. Ex. B, at 6.) Defendant Morris acknowledges, “Plaintiff was

found guilty of ‘behavior which may lead to violence.’” (Id. Ex. J,

at 64.) 

The Defendants submitted new material, the September 16, 2006

Rules Violation Report, with their Reply. “It is improper for a

moving party to introduce new facts or different legal arguments in

the reply brief than those presented in the moving papers.” United

States ex rel. Giles v. Sardie, 191 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1127 (C.D.

Cal. 2000) (citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 894-

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95 (1990)); see Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007)

(“The district court need not consider arguments raised for the

first time in a reply brief.”). Further, Civil Local Rule 7.1

provides, “[C]opies of all documentary evidence which the movant

intends to submit in support of the motion, or other request for

ruling by the court, must be served and filed with the notice of

motion.” S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7.1(f)(2)(a). Therefore, Defendants

improperly submitted new evidence in their Reply, depriving

Plaintiff of his opportunity to respond. The report, however, does

not prejudice Easter. 

The parties also dispute the extent of prisoner Hill’s

involvement in the first riot, if any. Easter testified that

although he did not know their specific names, some of the inmates

were involved in both riots. (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #3 App.

Evidence Ex. P, at 92.) (“You have to go through the paperwork to

find out these individuals, but there was some that was involved in

the first [riot], the reason why the second [riot] happened.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff further testified that inmate Hill could have been

involved in the first riot, but he was not sure because he did not

know who everyone was. (Id. at 94.) Defendants, on the other hand,

cite to the crime incident reports for both riots and to Defendant

Morris’s Declaration to argue Hill was not involved in the first

fight. (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #2 Separate Statement Undisputed

Facts 5, ECF No. 52.) 

Although the August 27, 2006 incident report does not mention

inmate Hill, the November 14, 2006 report lists Hill as a

participating prisoner and reveals that he did not arrive at Donovan

until October 31, 2006. (See Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #3 App. Evidence

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Ex. G, at 18, 22, Ex. I, at 47-61, ECF No. 52.) Based on this

evidence, there is no issue of material fact as to whether Hill was

involved in the first riot. The record shows he was not housed at

Donovan on August 27, 2005, and Easter presents no evidence to the

contrary. (Id.)

Two of Plaintiff’s subsequently-identified enemies were

involved in both riots. The Defendants allege Easter’s enemy list

was updated “on the date of the incident,” November 14, 2006, and

again on April 16, 2007, yet they only provide the Court with the

April 16, 2007 “safety/enemy concerns” general chrono. (Id. Attach.

#1 Mem. P. & A. 5 (citing id. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. H, at

45).) The chrono reveals the names of fifteen Caucasian inmates who

posed a threat to Easter’s safety. (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #3 App.

Evidence Ex. H, at 45, ECF No. 52.) The evidence demonstrates that

enemy-inmates Bondurant, T. (V-40228) and Morain, Greggory (T-76999)

were involved in both riots. (Id.; compare id. Ex. I, at 50, 54

(showing that Bondurant and Morain, or “Morgan,” participated in the

August 27, 2006 riot), with id. Ex. G, at 24, 27 (reflecting

Bondurant’s and Morain’s involvement in the November 14, 2006 riot);

see also Compl. 44, ECF No. 1.) 

Easter repeatedly contends he feared members of the Caucasian

prison gang, the skin heads, that purportedly attacked him on both

occasions. (Compl. 2, ECF No. 1; Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #3 App.

Evidence Ex. N, at 81, 83, ECF No. 52; Opp’n 1, 8-10, Apr. 1, 2011,

ECF No. 76 (stating that members of the skin heads hate “torch

blacks”); contra Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 15-16, ECF

No. 52 (asserting that Plaintiff states a general concern for

inmates of the white race at large).) In his grievance, the

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Plaintiff stated that on August 27, 2006, he was attacked by twentyfive to thirty skin heads, and on November 14, 2006, fifteen skin

heads rushed him again with knives. (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #3 App.

Evidence Ex. N, at 81, 83, ECF No. 52.) Based on officers’ reports

attached to the Complaint, there were approximately thirty Caucasian

inmates involved in the first riot and fifteen Caucasian prisoners

in the second riot. (See Compl. 36, 38-39, 42, 44, 63, 68, 95, ECF

No. 1.) Moreover, prison officials subsequently noted on April 16,

2007, that Easter was “targeted to be hit” in the November 17, 2006

riot and that numerous Caucasian inmates posed serious risks of

threat to Plaintiff’s safety. (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #3 App.

Evidence Ex. H, at 45, ECF No. 52.) “Only I/M Hill . . . was

identified as the assailant in the stabbing; however, other white

inmates were also involved and care should be taken when placing

them in the facility yard . . . .” (Id.) 

The record establishes that there was a large number of white

and black prisoners fighting, the riots were racially-motivated, and

the participating prisoners were potential gang members. A trier of

fact could reasonably find that more than just inmate Hill posed a

threat to Easter’s safety. (See Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #3 App.

Evidence Ex. H, at 45, ECF No. 52.) Viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to Plaintiff, an issue of fact exists as to

whether Easter was confined under conditions that posed a

“substantial risk of serious harm.” See Thomas, 611 F.3d at 1150

(“[C]ourts should construe liberally motion papers and pleadings

filed by pro se inmates and should avoid applying summary judgment

rules strictly.”); Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916,

922 (9th Cir. 2004).

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2. Subjective Requirement: Deliberate Indifference

After an inmate has shown a triable issue as to whether he

suffered a deprivation that was objectively, “sufficiently serious,”

he must also establish a triable issue regarding whether the prison

officials had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” acting with

deliberate indifference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see Thomas, 611

F.3d at 1151. “[D]eliberate indifference entails something more

than mere negligence . . . [but] is satisfied by something less than

acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with

knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. 

Liability materializes if the defendant knew the inmate faced a risk

of harm and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable

measures to abate it. Id. at 847. Therefore, demonstrating

subjective deliberate indifference involves a two-part inquiry: (1)

whether the defendant was subjectively aware of a risk of serious

harm to the prisoner’s safety, and (2) whether the official had a

reasonable justification for the deprivation. Thomas, 611 F.3d at

1150-51.

“First, the inmate must show that the prison officials were

aware of a ‘substantial risk of serious harm’ to an inmate’s health

or safety. Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837) (footnote omitted). 

This may be satisfied if the prisoner establishes that the risk

posed by the violation was “obvious.” Id. A plaintiff need not

show that an “individual prison official had specific knowledge that

harsh treatment of a particular inmate, in particular circumstances,

would have a certain outcome.” Id. “Rather, [courts] measure what

is ‘obvious’ in light of reason and the basic general knowledge that

a prison official may be presumed to have obtained regarding the

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type of deprivation involved.” Id. at 1151 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 842). For example, if a substantial risk of inmate attacks was

“longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by

prison officials in the past,” and the defendant “had been exposed

to information concerning the risk and thus ‘must have known’ about

it,” a trier of fact could find defendant had actual knowledge of

the risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (quotations omitted); see also

Thomas, 611 F.3d at 1151. Housing an African-American inmate in a

yard with Caucasian skin heads within weeks of a race riot is one

example of an “obvious” risk. Whether a defendant had the requisite

knowledge is a question of fact subject to substantiation in the

usual ways, including inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence. 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. 

“Second, the inmate must show that the prison officials had no

‘reasonable’ justification for the deprivation, in spite of that

risk.” Thomas, 611 F.3d at 1150-51 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at

844). “[P]rison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk

to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they

responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was

not averted.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. 

Captain Morris explains that officials may learn of safety

threats if the prisoner communicates to staff the identity of the

specific individual who poses a threat and explains why the inmate

is believed to be a concern; officials then document the enemy in a

“CDC Form 128B” chrono. (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #2 Separate

Statement Undisputed Facts 2, ECF No. 52 (citing id. Attach. #3 App.

Evidence Ex. J Decl. Morris 64-65).) Morris contends that a

prisoner may not place an entire ethnicity on an enemy list. (Id.

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Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. J Decl. Morris 65.) An enemy can be

identified if a prisoner is involved in a fight and staff can

determine which individuals were involved. (Mot. Summ. J. Attach.

#2 Separate Statement Undisputed Facts 3, ECF No. 52.) The

Defendants allege that because Plaintiff did not participate in the

August 27, 2006 riot, they would have no knowledge of a risk unless

Easter directly communicated to them that a certain prisoner posed a

threat to Plaintiff’s safety, but he never did. (Id. (citing id.

Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. J. Decl. Morris 64-55).)

As discussed above, at a minimum, the record contains facts

presenting a genuine issue of fact as to whether Easter participated

in the August 2006 riot. Defendants’ argument that the only way

they could have known of a threat to Easter is if he directly

communicated to them a specific risk of harm is not compelling. 

(Id. (describing that an enemy can be identified if the prisoner is

involved in a mutual combat or other incident).) 

At his deposition, the Plaintiff testified that he was released

from administrative segregation directly to prison yard two, and

approximately one month later, he was unexpectedly transferred to

yard four and asked Captain Morris about the transfer. (Opp’n 6,

Apr. 1, 2011, ECF No. 66; Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex.

P, at 97, ECF No. 52.) Easter argues there was no need to express

his safety concerns about facility four to prison officials because

he was not released from administrative segregation to yard four,

where he had enemies; rather, he was released to yard two, where he

did not have any enemies. (Opp’n 6, Apr. 1, 2011, ECF No. 76.) 

Easter urges that he did his best to informally communicate his

worries to prison staff about being on yard four, but they showed no

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concern. (See id. at 8.) Plaintiff claims he was moved back to the

yard that housed members of the skin heads, a well-known, dangerous

prison gang that hated “torch blacks.” (See id.)

According to Defendant Morris, Easter was initially released

from administrative segregation on yard two; Officer Perez

acknowledges that Easter was transferred from facility two to the

reception center of facility four in October 2006, and she assigned

him to building seventeen shortly thereafter. (Mot. Summ. J.

Attach. #2 Separate Statement Undisputed Facts 3, ECF No. 52; see

id. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. J Decl. Morris 65, Ex. L Decl.

Perez 73.) 

The Defendants claim that prison policies require inmates to

identify their specific enemies and explain why they are a threat

before officials will add them to an enemy list. (Mot. Summ. J.

Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. J Decl. Morris 64-65, ECF No. 52.) 

Defendants also allege Donovan polices prohibit prisoners from

placing all inmates of a certain ethnicity or race on his enemy

list, because “it would be impracticable to segregate the prison by

ethnicity.” (Id. at 65.) Other than Morris’s Declaration, however,

the Defendants submit no evidence of these practices. 

The Notice of Critical Case Information -- Safety of Persons,

describes the purpose of the document.

This non-confidential form is used to document

[inmates] or potential inmates who should be kept separate

and [inmates] suspected of affiliation with a prison gang

or disruptive group. If an [inmate] is identified with a

prison gang, a Notice of Critical Information -- Prison 

Gang Identification (Form CDC812-A) shall also be

completed. A form CDC 812-B shall be completed on

Disruptive Group Affiliates.

(Id. Ex. D, at 10) (emphasis added). As noted on December 22, 2006,

the form describes Plaintiff’s “suspected gang affiliation” as a

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“member” of the “59 Brim (Blood) prison gang.” (Id.) The “primary

supporting documentation” for Easter’s supposed prison gang

association was a “POR dtd 6-26-06 pg 12.” (Id.)

Even if Defendants’ assertion that after a race riot, the

prison could not segregate Easter from Caucasian prisoners was a

defense, the Complaint is more specific than Defendants suggest. 

Easter alleges he was attacked by twenty-five to thirty skin heads

in the first riot and fifteen skin heads in the second riot, and he

contends both fights occurred in prison yard four. (Compl. 2, ECF

No. 1; Opp’n 1, 8-10, Apr. 1, 2011, ECF No. 76; see also Mot. Summ.

J. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. N, at 81, 83, Ex. D, at 10.)

Plaintiff repeatedly references the “skin heads,” a gang that

is associated with condoning racially-motivated, white power

beliefs. (See Compl. 2, ECF No. 1; Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #3 App.

Evidence Ex. N, at 81, 83, ECF No. 52; Opp’n 1, 8-10, Apr. 1, 2011,

ECF No. 76; see also Opp’n 8, Apr. 1, 2011 (describing that members

of the skin head gang hate “torch blacks”), ECF No. 76. The

Plaintiff’s statements are not that the entire Caucasian race was an

enemy, just members of the skin heads. 

The Court will consider the subjective component of the Eighth

Amendment inquiry as it applies to each Defendant separately. See

Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The prisoner

must set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s

deliberate indifference.”).

a. Officer Perez

The Plaintiff alleges Defendant Perez made the decision to

transfer Easter from facility two back to facility four even though

she could have assigned him to any yard, and his previous fight with

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skin heads in yard four was documented in his file. (Compl. 2, ECF

No. 1; see Opp’n 2, Mar. 11, 2011, ECF No. 73; Opp’n 7, Mar. 24,

2011, ECF No. 76.)

As a Housing Assignment Officer, Defendant Perez states that

her duty is to find available cells to house inmates in yard four. 

(Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 16, ECF No. 52 (citing Compl.

5, ECF No. 1).) The ICC evaluates special conditions relevant to an

inmate’s housing assignment, such as the location of any enemies,

and Perez relies on these determinations when she selects yard

assignments for prisoners recently released from administrative

segregation. (Id. (citing id. Attach. #2 Separate Statement

Undisputed Facts 3-4).) Easter admits he has not communicated with

Perez in more than ten years. (Id. (citing id. Attach. #2 Separate

Statement Undisputed Facts 4).)

The Plaintiff argues that although Officer Perez was the

housing officer in yard four, she could have assigned Plaintiff to

any prison yard she chose. (Opp’n 7, Mar. 24, 2011, ECF No. 76.) 

Plaintiff also contends that he never signed any forms agreeing to

go back to yard four, and everything was documented regarding where

he was supposed to be housed after his release from administrative

segregation. (Opp’n 2, Mar. 11, 2011, ECF No. 73.) Easter explains

that he never attempted to communicate his safety concerns about

yard four to Defendant Perez because she does not speak with

prisoners and therefore would not have listened to him anyway. 

(Opp’n 7, Mar. 24, 2011, ECF No. 76; Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem.

P. & A. 7, ECF No. 52).)

//

//

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I. Sufficiently obvious risk 

Easter must show that Officer Perez was aware of a “substantial

risk of serious harm” to Plaintiff. Deliberate indifference

requires an actual perception of risk. Thomas v. Hernandez, No. C

01-4685 THE (pr), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11272, at *17 (N.D. Cal.

June 30, 2003); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 840. 

The standard does not require that the guard or official

“‘believe to a moral certainty that one inmate intends to

attack another at a given place at a time certain before

that officer is obligated to take steps to prevent such an

assault. But, on the other hand, he must have more than a

mere suspicion that an attack will occur.’”

Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting State

Bank of St. Charles v. Camis, 712 F.2d 1140, 1146 (7th Cir. 1983)). 

Advance notification is not a necessary element of an Eighth

Amendment failure-to-protect claim. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 849.

Easter was transferred to administrative segregation after the

August 27, 2006 riot and was interviewed by the classification

committee on August 30, 2006. (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #2 Separate

Statement Undisputed Facts 1-2, ECF No. 52; see Compl. 5, ECF No. 1;

Opp’n 1,6, ECF No. 76.) On September 29, 2006, the committee met

with Easter again and reviewed his central file before determining

that he could return to the general population; Plaintiff was

transferred to yard two without expressing safety concerns regarding

enemies in yard four. (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #2 Separate Statement

Undisputed Facts 3, ECF No. 52; id. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. K

Decl. Panichello 70; see also id. Ex. J Decl. Morris 65; Opp’n 6-7,

Apr. 1, 2011, ECF No. 76.) The record does not contain a copy of

the chrono from the committee’s September 29, 2006 review, although

a copy of the chrono from the committee’s August 30, 2006 interview

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of Easter is before the Court. (See Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #2

Evidence Ex. E, at 12.)

In October 2006, Easter was removed from facility two and

transferred to the reception center in yard four where he stayed

temporarily until Perez determined where he should be located. 

(Compl. 3, ECF No. 1; Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #2 Separate Statement

Undisputed Facts 3, ECF No. 52; id. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. L

Decl. Perez 73; Opp’n 5-6, Apr. 1, 2011, ECF No. 76.) According to

Perez, “The purpose of the Reception Center is to provide short-term

housing for inmates while they are processed and classified. After

an inmate is evaluated, and an appropriate institutional placement

has been made, the inmate is then moved to a non-temporary housing

unit or endorsed.” (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. L

Decl. Perez 73, ECF No. 52.) Soon after Plaintiff was transferred

to the reception center, Perez assigned him to housing in facility

four. (Id. Attach. #2 Separate Statement Undisputed Facts 3, ECF

No. 52; id. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. L Decl. Perez 73.) 

Easter alleges that Officer Perez had control over Plaintiff’s

yard assignment and could have assigned him to any yard she chose. 

(Opp’n 7, Mar. 24, 2011, ECF No. 76; see Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1

Mem. P. & A. 16, ECF No. 52.)

Defendant Perez explains that since 2006, she has been a

Correctional Officer assigned to “Inmate Housing Assignments” at

Donovan. (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. L Decl. Perez

72, ECF No. 52.) She states, “I am responsible for transferring

inmates from the Reception Center at Building No. 16, to housing

units 17-20, and the dormitory (Facility IV), once they are

processed and space becomes available.” (Id. at 72-73.) Inmates

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are “processed and classified” while they are held in the reception

center. (Id. at 73.) A triable issue of fact exists as to whether

Perez had the authority to assign Easter to a yard other than yard

four. Even if she had the authority to transfer Easter to a

different facility and yard, the trier of fact must determine

whether Perez knew that keeping Plaintiff in facility four and on

yard four would subject him to a risk of harm. See Thomas, 611 F.3d

at 1151.

Plaintiff insists that his inmate file contained incident

reports documenting the first racial riot as well as instructions as

to where he and other African-American inmates should be housed upon

their release from administrative segregation. (Compl. 2, ECF No.

1; Opp’n 2, Mar. 11, 2011, ECF No. 73.) A prisoner’s central file

contains “documents and entries in documents pertaining to an inmate

that are prepared at or near the time of the occurrence by persons

with knowledge of the circumstances or events.” (Reply Apr. 7,

2011, Attach. #1, at 1, ECF No. 77.)

A trier of fact could also find that after reviewing

Plaintiff’s central file, the risk to Easter’s safety in prison yard

four would have been “obvious” to Perez. She was responsible for

locating appropriate housing for Easter, and if Perez reviewed his

central file, she would have been aware that Plaintiff was recently

disciplined for participating in a large-scale, racially-motivated

riot in facility four approximately one month earlier. (Mot. Summ.

J. Attach. #2 Separate Statement Undisputed Facts 1, ECF No. 52; see

Compl. 5, ECF No. 1; Opp’n 1, ECF No. 76); see Swan v. United States

of America, 159 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1182 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (“[T]urning

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a blind eye to the relevant surrounding facts will not shield a

prison official from liability.”)

Easter’s involvement in the racial riot with Caucasian, skin

head inmates in facility four was well documented. Officer Perez

does not allege she was unaware of the racial riot at facility four,

that Plaintiff was disciplined for participating in the first riot,

or that the Caucasian inmates still remained in facility four. See

also Bejarano v. NDOC, No. 3:08-CV-00256-RAM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

6180, at *19 (D. Nev. Jan. 19, 2011) (denying defendants summary

judgment when the evidence suggested that plaintiff’s involvement in

a prior assault with members of the Sureno gang was documented, and

other Sureno members had been transferred to the same facility along

with plaintiff). The minimal time between the August 27, 2006 riot

and Perez’s decision to keep Easter in the same yard in October 2006

is additional evidence that creates a triable issue of material

fact. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (finding issue of fact when

evidence illustrated that a risk of inmate attacks was welldocumented or expressly noted by prison officials in the past, and

that defendant had been exposed to information concerning the

attacks); see also Thomas, 611 F.3d at 1151 (explaining that in

determining whether a risk to an inmate’s health is obvious, a

prison official is deemed to have the general knowledge of an

individual performing the functions of that job). 

Perez’s assertion that there were no enemies on Easter’s enemy

list before the second riot is insufficient to entitle her to

summary judgment. The chrono that shows Easter had no enemies up

through March 1, 2007, which is more than three months after the

November 2006 attack, also shows that Easter had a suspected gang

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affiliation with “59 Brim (Blood).” (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #3 App.

Evidence Ex. D, at 10, ECF No. 52.)

Moreover, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected Defendants’

argument that Easter was required to alert them of a threat from a

specific individual. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 849.

Because the District Court may have mistakenly

thought that advance notification was a necessary element

of an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim, we think

it proper to remand . . . for application of the Eighth

Amendment principles explained above.

The District Court’s opinion is open to the reading

that it required not only advance notification of a

substantial risk of assault, but also advance notification

of a substantial risk of assault posed by a particular

fellow prisoner. See App. 124 (referring to “a specific

threat to [a prisoner’s] safety”). The Eighth Amendment,

however, imposes no such requirement.

Id.; id. at n.10 (citation omitted).

Easter was disciplined for his involvement in the prior race

riot. Incident reports and related documents were in Plaintiff’s

central file. “Although the obviousness of a risk is not

conclusive,” Defendant Perez does not avoid liability if she merely

“declined to confirm inferences of risk that [she] suspected to

exist . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 n.8.

Reasonable minds could differ as to whether Perez was

deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk leaving Easter at

facility four could lead to serious harm.

ii. No reasonable justification

Defendant Perez does not acknowledge there was a risk or threat

to Plaintiff’s safety and does not argue that she responded

reasonably to the risk. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. From her

declaration, it is unclear whether Officer Perez maintains that she

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lacked the authority to reassign Easter to a different yard if he

had enemies at facility four. (See Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #3 App.

Evidence Ex. L Decl. Perez 72-74, ECF No. 52.) Assuming she lacked

that authority, at a minimum, a reasonable response to a serious

safety concern would be to refer Easter’s request to others. See

Longoria v. State of Texas, 473 F.3d 586, 594 (5th Cir. 2006). The

reasonableness of her response raises issues of material fact that

cannot be resolved by summary judgment. A finder of fact could

determine that Perez’s decision not to transfer Plaintiff from yard

four was unreasonable. See Thomas, 611 F.3d at 1150; see also

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844-45. 

For all of these reasons, Officer Perez’s Motion for Summary

Judgment regarding Easter’s Eighth Amendment claim against her

should be DENIED.

b. Lieutenant Panichello

Easter contends that Lieutenant Panichello escorted Plaintiff

from facility two to facility four despite Plaintiff’s verbal

statements to the lieutenant that he should not be transferred back

to that prison yard. (Opp’n 2, Mar. 11, 2011, ECF No. 73; Opp’n 2,

6-7, Mar. 24, 2011, ECF No. 76.) 

In his Motion, Defendant Panichello submits that he does not

recollect Plaintiff communicating even a general safety concern

about being rehoused in yard four. (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem.

P. & A. 17, ECF No. 52.) Even if this occurred, the lieutenant

contends Easter has not identified a specific threat to his safety. 

(See id.) He asserts that Easter does not elaborate as to what he

“expressed” to the lieutenant, and there was no reason for him to

knew that for safety reasons, Plaintiff should not be moved to

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facility four. (Reply 5-6, Apr. 7, 2011, ECF No. 77.) The

Defendant argues that to be liable, he must have had more than a

mere suspicion that an attack would occur. (Id. at 6 (citing Berg,

794 F.2d at 459).) 

In his Opposition, the Plaintiff contends he informally

expressed his concerns to Panichello about being rehoused in yard

four, but Defendant’s response was “we have no where el[s]e to put

[you].” (Opp’n 2, Mar. 11, 2011, ECF No. 73; see Opp’n 6, Mar. 24,

2011, ECF No. 76.) Easter alleges that Panichello’s lack of

recollection confirms that the lieutenant walked Easter to yard

four. (Opp’n 7, Mar. 24, 2011, ECF No. 76.)

i. Sufficiently obvious risk 

The parties dispute the extent to which Plaintiff spoke to

Panichello about Easter’s reluctance to be transferred back to yard

four. Plaintiff testified in his deposition that he told the

lieutenant that he should not be moved, and even though Panichello

had the authority to stop the transfer, he did nothing. (Opp’n 2,

Mar. 11, 2011, ECF No. 73; Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #3 App. Evidence

Ex. P, at 95, ECF No. 52.) Panichello knew Easter was concerned

about being rehoused in facility four, but the lieutenant said that

he was just following the rules. (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #3 App.

Evidence Ex. P, at 95, ECF No. 52.) The Defendant was joined by a

few other officers who helped escort Plaintiff and the other

African-American inmates to yard four; the prisoners did not want to

go there because their enemies were still there. (Id.) “[W]e was

[sic] forced to go, because officers came up to our door and said

you guys are going to move. You gotta move.” (Id.)

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The Defendant does not recollect this exchange, but even if it

did occur, he asserts Easter did not specify a particular risk of

threat. (Id. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 17.) Plaintiff testified in

his deposition that he was unable to give Panichello names of

enemies in yard four because he did not know them. (Mot. Summ. J.

Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. P, at 100, ECF No. 52.) Easter had

been told that the Caucasian inmates remained in yard four, but

Plaintiff and other African-American inmates had been placed in yard

two. (Id.)

The Supreme Court has held:

The question under the Eighth Amendment is whether

the prison officials, acting with deliberate indifference,

exposed a prisoner to a sufficiently substantial “risk of

serious damage to his future health,” and it does not

matter whether the risk comes from a single source or

multiple sources, any more than it matters whether a

prisoner faces an excessive risk of attack for reasons

personal to him or because all prisoners in his situation

face such a risk.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 (internal quotations omitted); contra

Williams v. Wood, 223 F. App’x 670, 671 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming

dismissal because plaintiff did allege that he had been assaulted or

threatened by other prisoners; his “speculative and generalized

fears” of other inmates did not constitute a substantial risk of

serious harm).

Although the lieutenant asserts Easter’s allegations are

inconsistent with Panichello’s recollection, a trier of fact may

believe Plaintiff’s version of the events and find that Defendant

had knowledge of and disregarded the risk of moving Easter to

facility four. See Bejarano, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6180, at *19

(finding issue of fact where defendants’ claim that plaintiff said

he “did not have any enemies” conflicted with plaintiff’s statements

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in a prison grievance). “Credibility determinations, the weighing

of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the

facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling

on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict.” 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255. 

Moreover, as discussed above, plaintiff need not specifically

alert the defendant of the danger posed by a specific inmate to

establish an issue of fact. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 849; Harper v.

Sheppard, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 2365, at *7 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2000)

(finding defendants’ argument that plaintiff could not identify a

specific enemy inmate without merit); see also Broadway, 2009 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 21132, at *18-19 (recommending denial of summary

judgment because prison official refused to confirm inferences of

risk that he suspected existed).

A prisoner may establish a serious risk of harm by

demonstrating he belongs to an identifiable group of inmates who are

frequently singled out by other inmates for violent attacks. 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843. Given the facts, rational minds could

differ as to whether a substantial risk to Plaintiff’s safety was

obvious to Panichello.

ii. No reasonable justification

Prison officials who know of a substantial risk to the inmate’s

safety may escape liability if they responded reasonably. Thomas,

611 F.3d at 1150 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). Staffing

considerations may constrain the options available to prison

officials. Berg, 794 F.2d at 461. “In deciding how to protect a

prisoner, officials may face a number of choices, each posing

potential dangers to the prisoner and others.” Id. The record does

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not establish, and Defendant Panichello does not allege, any

justifications for his conduct.

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Easter, a

material issue of fact exists as to whether this Defendant was aware

of a substantial risk to Plaintiff’s safety and disregarded that

risk. Therefore, Lieutenant Panichello’s Motion for Summary

Judgment regarding Easter’s Eighth Amendment claim against him

should also be DENIED.

c. Captain Morris

The Plaintiff maintains that after he was transferred to yard

four, he repeatedly asked Captain Morris, both directly and

indirectly, to be transferred from facility four and assigned to a

different yard because Easter had enemies in that yard. (Opp’n 2,

Mar. 11, 2011, ECF No. 73; Opp’n 8, 10, Mar. 24, 2011, ECF No. 76.) 

Additionally, Plaintiff contends that yard four was Morris’s

assigned yard, and he knew that Plaintiff was never supposed to be

placed back in that yard. (Opp’n 2, Mar. 11, 2011, ECF No. 73.) 

Captain Morris argues that when Easter requested that he be

transferred back to yard two, Morris asked if Plaintiff had safety

concerns in yard four, and Easter “denied having any safety issues.” 

(Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 18, ECF No. 52.) The captain

states that Plaintiff acknowledges that he did not communicate the

names of potential enemies to the Defendant. (Id.) Easter also

conceded that he “did not speak to defendant Morris in between the

two riots.” (Reply 6, Apr. 7, 2011, ECF No. 77.) Finally, Morris

argues that “a generalized fear is insufficient to establish

liability.” (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 18, ECF No. 52

(citing Robinson v. Cavanaugh, 20 F.3d 892, 893 (8th Cir. 1994)).) 

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In response, Plaintiff asserts Morris has admitted that Easter

asked him to move Plaintiff out of yard four before the November

2006 riot. (Opp’n 8, Mar. 24, 2011, ECF No. 76.) Easter explains

that Morris refused to talk to him directly; instead, Morris would

send the housing officer to relay messages to the inmates. (Id.) 

Plaintiff states, “That’s why I said that I didn’t talk to [Morris]

before the second riot.” (Id.) When he talked to Morris to explain

that he and other inmates should be moved back to yard two where

they had “no enemies,” the Defendant told Easter that Officer

William would talk to them. (Opp’n 2, Mar. 11, 2011, ECF No. 73.) 

Plaintiff contends that William told Easter that he would be moved,

but William did not know where. (Id.) 

I. Sufficiently obvious risk

The record suggests that on August 30, 2006, and again on

September 19, 2006, Captain Morris had actual knowledge of

Plaintiff’s involvement in the first riot. The CDC-128G chrono

sheet dated August 30, 2006, lists Defendant Morris as a member of

the institutional classification committee and recounts the events

from Easter’s in-person hearing with the committee. (Mot. Summ. J.

Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. E, at 12, ECF No. 52.) The chrono

states that Plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation on

August 27, 2006, because he participated in the riot. (Id.) The

chrono also states that Easter was assigned to a mixed exercise yard

with only African-American and Northern Hispanic inmates, and

Plaintiff had no enemy concerns on this yard. (Id.) On September

19, 2006, Captain Morris reviewed the rules violation report and the

action taken against Easter for his involvement in the August 2006

riot. (Reply Attach. #1, at 3, Apr. 7, 2011, ECF No. 77.)

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 Although Plaintiff did not specifically tell Morris that

inmate Hill posed a particular threat, the circumstances of the

August race riot were well known, and Easter’s concerns should have

prompted Morris to take reasonable measures to protect Easter. See

Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842) (“The series of planned attacks and

religious-related violence at Calipatria State Prison was

‘longstanding, pervasive, [and] well-documented.’”). Plaintiff was

not required to specifically identify the inmates who posed a threat

to present a genuine issue of fact. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843; see

Hearns, 413 F.3d at 1041-42 (drawing the inference that defendants

were deliberately indifferent because they knew a group of Muslim

inmates had previously attacked plaintiff). A jury could find that

because Morris knew Easter was involved in the August 2006 riot on

yard four, ignoring Plaintiff’s pleas to be moved created a

substantial risk of serious harm.

ii. No reasonable justification

Once a defendant becomes aware of a substantial risk of serious

harm, he must take the risk seriously and conduct appropriate

inquiries. See Madrid, 889 F. Supp at 1267 n.213. A prison

official is liable if he merely “declined to confirm inferences of

risk that he strongly suspected to exist . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 843 n.8. There is no evidence that Morris asked Easter why he

should not be placed in yard four or that he checked Plaintiff’s

inmate file to determine whether Easter had been involved in

altercations with inmates in yard four before. See Broadway, 2009

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21132, at *18-19 (denying summary judgment to two

defendants who failed to take action in response to plaintiff’s

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safety concerns); see also Knight v. Lea, No. CIV S-07-0751-FCD-GMKP, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58513, at *18-29 (E.D. Cal. July 9, 2009)

(granting summary judgment where plaintiff expressed his safety

concerns to defendants and they took reasonable steps to address the

concerns by removing plaintiff from the general population, placing

him in administrative segregation, and conducting an investigation

into the safety concerns). 

The reasonableness of Captain Morris’s justification for

failing to investigate Plaintiff’s safety concerns or refusing to

remove Easter from facility four raises material issues of fact. 

Accordingly, Defendant Morris’s Motion for Summary Judgment should

also be DENIED.

C. Qualified Immunity

Defendants Perez, Panichello, and Morris argue that they are

each entitled to qualified immunity because they reasonably believed

that their conduct was lawful. (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. &

A. 18, ECF No. 52.) Assuming Easter has adequately alleged an

Eighth Amendment claim against them, Defendants contend that

“reasonable officers in [their] positions would not have been on

notice that their conduct was unlawful.” (Id. at 18-19.) They

believed their actions were lawful because Easter never expressed

safety concerns to any of them, neither Plaintiff nor inmate Hill

were involved in the August 2006 riot, and Hill was not identified

as an enemy of Easter. (Id. at 19.) The Defendants conclude that

it is “unclear how defendants would have been aware of this safety

concern.” (Id.) 

The correctional officers claim that their mental state is an

element of the purported constitutional deprivation. (Id. at 19-20

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(citing Jeffers v. Gomez, 240 F.3d 845, 854 (9th Cir. 2001)).) 

Easter must present facts illustrating that they acted, or failed to

act, with knowledge of a substantial risk of harm, and were

deliberately indifferent to that risk. (Id. at 20.) Defendants

contend, “There is no evidence that any of [us] acted with

deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s safety, or with any intent

other than good faith, as demonstrated above.” (Id.) Therefore,

Defendants Perez, Panichello, and Morris assert they are each

entitled to qualified immunity. (See id. at 18-20.) 

In Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 1992), the

Ninth Circuit previously held that “[a] finding of deliberate

indifference precludes a finding of qualified immunity.” Id. The

Supreme Court subsequently ruled that the qualified immunity inquiry

is independent from the constitutional inquiry. Saucier v. Katz,

533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001), overruled on other grounds by Pearson, 555

U.S. 223, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009). The Ninth Circuit has reconsidered

Hamilton in light of Saucier. “[W]e conclude that Hamilton, which

collapses the deliberate indifference part of the constitutional

inquiry into the qualified immunity inquiry, has been undermined by

Saucier. Instead, courts must follow the Saucier framework.” Ford

v. Ramirez-Palmer (Estate of Ford), 301 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir.

2002). Therefore, “Courts may not simply stop with a determination

that a triable issue of fact exists as to whether prison officials

were deliberately indifferent; instead, the qualified immunity

inquiry is separate from the constitutional inquiry, and courts must

undertake the qualified immunity analysis separately.” Id. at 1053.

“[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions,

generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as

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their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified

immunity is immunity from suit for monetary damages, but it is not

immunity from suit for declaratory or injunctive relief. Hydrick v.

Hunter, 449 F.3d 978, 992 (9th Cir. 2006). It protects “all but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley

v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).

When considering a claim for qualified immunity, courts engage

in a two-part inquiry: Do the facts show that the defendant

violated a constitutional right, and was the right clearly

established at the time of the defendant’s purported misconduct? 

Delia v. City of Rialto, 621 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2010)

(quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, ___, 129 S. Ct. 808,

815-16 (2009)). Courts consider whether, “[t]aken in the light most

favorable to the party asserting the injury, . . . the facts alleged

show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right.” 

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. A right is clearly established if the

contours of the right are so clear that a reasonable official would

understand that what he is doing violates that right. Id. at 202

(quotation omitted). This standard ensures that government

officials are on notice of the illegality of their conduct before

they are subjected to suit. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739

(2002) (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206). “This is not to say that

an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the

very action in question has previously been held unlawful . . . .” 

Id.

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The Supreme Court recently found that the sequence of this twostep inquiry is no longer “an inflexible requirement.” Pearson, 555

U.S. at ___, 129 S. Ct. at 818. Thus, it is within the court’s

discretion to decide which step to address first. Id.; see Delia,

621 F.3d at 1075 (citing Brooks v. Seattle, 599 F.3d 1018, 1022 n.7

(9th Cir. 2010); Bull v. City & County of San Francisco, 595 F.3d

964, 971 (9th Cir. 2010)). “If the Officers’ actions do not amount

to a constitutional violation, the violation was not clearly

established, or their actions reflected a reasonable mistake about

what the law requires, they are entitled to qualified immunity.” 

Brooks, 599 F.3d at 1022 (citing Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485

F.3d 463, 471 (9th Cir. 2007)); see James v. Rowlands, 606 F.3d 646,

651 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at ___, 129 S. Ct. at

816, 818).

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment based on qualified

immunity, the court must decide the “‘purely legal’ issue of

‘whether facts alleged by the plaintiff support a claim of violation

of clearly established law.’” Lytle v. Wondrash, 182 F.3d 1083,

1086 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528

n.9 (1985)). The court must view the facts in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether the movant is

nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. Id.

(citing Moran v. State of Washington, 147 F.3d 839, 844 (9th Cir.

1998)).

1. Violation of a Constitutional Right

The Plaintiff maintains that Defendants Perez, Panichello, and

Morris violated his Eighth Amendment right to reasonable safety and

to be protected from violence while in custody. See Helling, 509

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U.S. at 33. If the Defendants disregarded the known risk that

Easter would be attacked by skin heads in facility four,

nevertheless reassigned him to yard four, physically escorted him to

facility four, and ignored Plaintiff’s safety concerns once in yard

four, the Defendants failed to safeguard Easter from the attack. 

See, e.g., Estate of Ford, 301 F.3d at 1050. A triable issue of

fact exists as to whether the Defendants each deprived Easter of his

Eighth Amendment rights. Even so, whether Easter’s right to

reasonable protection from attack was “clearly established” controls

the qualified immunity inquiry.

2. Whether the Right Was Clearly Established

“Whether a right is clearly establishes turns on the ‘objective

legal reasonableness of the action, addressed in light of the legal

rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken.’” 

Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1241 (9th Cir.

2010) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at ___, 129 S. Ct. at 822). “This

is ‘a two-part inquiry: (1) Was the law governing the state

official’s conduct clearly established? (2) Under that law could a

reasonable state official have believed his conduct was lawful?’” 

Estate of Ford, 301 F.3d at 1050 (quoting Jeffers, 267 F.3d at 910);

Browning v. Vernon, 44 F.3d 818, 822 (9th Cir. 1995). 

First, the law governing the Defendants’ conduct was clearly

established. “Whether the right is clearly established in a

particular case is judged as of the date of the incident alleged,

and is a pure question of law.” Phillips v. Hust, 338 F. Supp. 2d

at 1162 (citing Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th

Cir. 1993)). “[T]he right alleged to have been violated must not be

so broadly defined as to ‘convert the rule of qualified that our

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cases plainly establish into a rule of virtually unqualified

liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract

rights.’” Cunningham, 229 F.3d at 1288 (quoting Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987)). “On the other hand, . . . the

right can not be so narrowly construed so as to 'define away all

potential claims.’” Id. (quoting Kelley v. Borg, 60 F.3d 664, 667

(9th Cir. 1995)).

A prisoner’s right to be protected from a substantial risk of

assault by other prisoners was clearly announced in Farmer, if not

before. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842-43. There, the Supreme Court

made clear that if a prison official knows of an excessive risk to

inmate safety, or infers from known facts that a substantial risk of

serious harm exists, he violates the law by disregarding the risk. 

Id. at 835-36. In 2002, the Ninth Circuit reiterated that the right

was established by Farmer. Estate of Ford, 301 F.3d at 1050. Thus,

the right was clearly established.

Second, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

Easter, a reasonable prison official in the Defendants’ positions

would believe that his or her conduct was unlawful. See id. at

1045. “The relevant, dispositive inquiry . . . is whether it would

be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in

the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. “If the

law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be

clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is

appropriate.” Id.

The Defendants argue that the law does not clearly define at

what point a risk of inmate assault becomes sufficiently substantial

for Eighth Amendment purposes. (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. &

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A. 19, ECF No. 52.) Defendants analogize this case to Estate of

Ford, where the Ninth Circuit held that it would not be clear to a

reasonable official when the risk of harm from double-celling

psychiatric inmates increases from “some” risk of harm to a

“substantial risk of serious harm.” (Id. (citing Estate of Ford,

301 F.3d at 1051).) “Because plaintiff did not have an identified

safety concern on Facility IV, defendants reasonably believed they

could house plaintiff in that facility, and their actions were

lawful.” (Id.)

“[G]ranting summary judgment on the ground of qualified

immunity is ‘improper if, under the plaintiff’s version of the

facts, and in light of the clearly established law, a reasonable

officer could not have believed his conduct was lawful.’” Martinez

v. Bryant, No. CV 06-5344-GW(AGR), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11258, at

*26 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2008) (quoting Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d

1187, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000)). Moreover, this case is distinguishable

from Estate of Ford, which involved assigning two mentally ill

prisoners to the same cell, and one inmate eventually killed the

other. Estate of Ford, 301 F.3d at 1052-53. There, the two inmates

were not enemies, had no gang-related conflict, were not a

“predator” and “victim,” had been previously celled together without

incident, and both inmates wanted to be celled together again. Id.

at 1052. The defendants did not ignore facts suggesting that

placing these two prisoners in the same cell posed a substantial

risk of serious harm to the deceased plaintiff. The Ninth Circuit

held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Id.

at 1053. In light of the circumstances each defendant faced, it

would not have been clear to a reasonable prison official that

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double-celling the two inmates posed such a substantial risk of

serious harm that doing so would be unconstitutional. Id.

Here, in contrast, Easter’s version of the facts illustrates

that he was not supposed to be housed with the Caucasian prisoners

in facility four. Plaintiff alleges, and the Defendants do not

produce evidence to rebut, that after the August 27, 2006 racial

riot, prison officials placed the Caucasian inmates in facility four

and placed the African-American inmates in facility two. (Mot.

Summ. J. Attach. #3 App. Evidence Ex. E, at 12, Ex. P, at 100, ECF

No. 52.) These inmates were segregated in response to the first

racial riot in yard four and should not have been routinely rehoused

together in that yard again. Cf. Estate of Ford, 301 F.3d at 1052. 

Easter contends that these Defendants knew, either by reviewing his

central file or by communicating with him, that being assigned to

yard four with the skin head inmates who participated in the August

2006 riot posed a serious risk. Defendants’ attempt to analogize

these facts to those in Estate of Ford is not persuasive.

“[I]n resolving a motion for summary judgment based on

qualified immunity, a court must carefully examine the specific

allegations against each individual defendant . . . .” Cunningham

v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1287 (9th Cir. 2000). “Reasonable

extrapolations of prior law to circumstances where it would have

been apparent to reasonable officers will suffice to determine

reasonableness in the particular circumstances.” Barnes v. Denney,

No. CIV S-07-1380 GGH P, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25251, at *61 (E.D.

Cal. Mar. 17, 2010) (citing Burke v. City of Alameda, 586 F.3d 725,

734 (9th Cir. 2009)).

//

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a. Officer Perez

As to Officer Perez, summary judgment on the ground of

qualified immunity is only proper if, under Easter’s version of the

facts, a rational officer in Perez’s position could not have

believed her conduct was unlawful. Martinez, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

11258, at *26.

After considering “all pertinent information,” a rational

officer would have understood that keeping Easter in yard four with

purported members of the skin heads gang was unconstitutional. See

Swan, 159 F. Supp. 2d at 1182 (turning a blind eye to relevant facts

does not allow an official to escape liability); see also Farmer,

511 U.S. at 842 (finding defendant must have known about risk when

the risk of inmate attacks was documented and defendant was exposed

to the information).

A reasonable housing assignment officer would have known that

assigning Plaintiff to housing in the same prison yard in which a

racial riot had taken place roughly one month before with a large

number of Caucasian inmates, some of which were still housed in yard

four, would pose a substantial risk of serious harm. Cf. Estate of

Ford, 301 F.3d at 1052. Likewise, failing to transfer Easter from

yard four would pose a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. It

would also have been clear that Easter was entitled to protection

from inmates with whom he allegedly had a gang-related conflict. 

Officer Perez is not entitled to qualified immunity.

b. Lieutenant Panichello

Defendant Panichello is also not entitled to summary judgment

on this ground. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

Easter, a reasonable official would know it was unlawful to ignore

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an inmate’s express reluctance to be moved to a certain prison yard

and to refuse to investigate the prisoner’s concerns. See Madrid,

889 F. Supp at 1267 n.213 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 n.8)

(explaining that once a defendant becomes aware of a risk, he must

consider the risk seriously and conduct appropriate inquiries). At

the time the conduct occurred, the law was that a prison official is

liable if he refused to verify facts he suspected were true, or

declined to confirm inferences of risk that he thought existed. Id.

Moreover, the law clarified that an inmate need not identify the

specific enemy that posed the particular threat. Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 843; Harper, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 2365, at *7. While escorting

Easter and others to facility four and in response to Easter’s

express concerns, Defendant Panichello did nothing beyond informing

Plaintiff that the prison had nowhere else to place him. This was

insufficient to confer qualified immunity.

c. Captain Morris

Finally, a reasonable officer in Captain Morris’s position

would know that failing to respond to a prisoner’s pleas to be

removed from a prison yard where he had been implicated in a racial

riot without investigating the inmate’s concerns was unlawful. See

Madrid, 889 F. Supp at 1267 n.213 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829

n.8).

Captain Morris admits Easter communicated his safety concerns. 

Defendant asked Plaintiff for the names of those who threatened his

safety, but Morris concedes he did nothing further when Easter was

unable or unwilling to provide the names of specific enemies housed

in facility four. Under these circumstances, Defendant Morris

should not be entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. 

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See Broadway, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21132, at *6, 28-29

(recommending qualified immunity be denied where, in 2005, a prison

officer merely asked plaintiff for names of inmates he feared and

failed to investigate further).

d. Conclusion

The general law regarding claims arising under the Eighth

Amendment for the failure to protect was clearly established at the

time of the Defendants’ alleged violations. The purpose of summary

judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials when there is no dispute

over the facts before the court. Northwest Motorcycle Ass’n v. U.S.

Dep’t of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). Upon

resolution of the factual issues in dispute, the Defendants may be

relieved of liability. But if Plaintiff’s version of events

prevails at trial, a jury might conclude that the Defendants knew of

and disregarded substantial risks of harm to Easter. Under such

circumstances, the Defendants’ actions are not protected by

qualified immunity, and summary judgment on this ground is

inappropriate. The district court should DENY the Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment based on qualified immunity.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Court construes Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on

exhaustion grounds as a nonenumerated motion to dismiss under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). The Defendants’ request that

the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for failure to exhaust should

be DENIED. The Plaintiff’s request to conduct additional discovery

to oppose Defendants’ Motion is DENIED.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,

a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Easter was

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confined under conditions that posed a substantial risk of serious

harm. An issue of fact also exists as to whether each Defendant was

aware of a serious risk to Plaintiff’s safety and disregarded that

risk. The district court should DENY Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment as to Easter’s Eighth Amendment claim. Additionally, the

Defendants contend that they should be shielded from liability on

the basis of qualified immunity. For the reasons stated, their

Motion for Summary Judgment based on qualified immunity should also

be DENIED.

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before July 22, 2011. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the objections shall be

served and filed on or before August 12, 2011. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the district court's order. Martinez

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: June 29, 2011

 Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Burns

All Parties of Record 

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