Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00633/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00633-19/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Labor/Mgmnt. Relations

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A

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM RAY JONES, SR.,

 Plaintiff,

 

 vs.

LEHIGH SOUTHWEST CEMENT 

COMPANY, INC., a California Corporation; 

And DOES 1-50,

 

 

 Defendant. 

1:12-CV-0633 AWI JLT

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S SECOND 

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 

JUDGMENT

Doc. # 104

On May 16, 2014, the court issued a memorandum opinion and order granting the motion 

of defendant Lehigh Southwest Cement Co., Inc. (“Defendant”) for summary judgment on the 

second amended complaint of plaintiff William Ray Jones, Sr. (“Plaintiff”). Plaintiff’s second 

amended complaint (“SAC”) alleged a single claim for relief pursuant to Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The court’s order of May 16 (hereinafter, the 

May 16 Order”) granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff 

had failed to produce evidence to show that his termination of employment by Defendant was 

the result of unlawful racial discrimination. On July 28, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion for relief 

from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Doc. # 102. 

That motion was denied by the court’s order filed on September 30, 2014. Doc. # 103. 

Case 1:12-cv-00633-AWI-JLT Document 106 Filed 06/30/15 Page 1 of 3
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On June 19, 2015, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for reconsideration, again pursuant to 

Rule 60(b). The legal standard for determination of a motion for relief under Rule 60 was set 

forth in the court’s order of September 30, 2014, and need not be repeated here. 

As has been the case with prior pleadings by Plaintiff, it is somewhat difficult to discern 

precisely the alleged grounds for reconsideration. It appears to the court that Plaintiff’s second 

motion for reconsideration alleges two bases for relief. The first appears to be a collection of 

complaints about how the court ignored certain facts pertaining to the conduct of Defendant after 

Plaintiff’s termination, including the firing of a number of former employees who were 

participants and/or witnesses in Plaintiff’s termination, and ignored Plaintiff’s request for a 

hearing after taking the prior motion for relief under submission. An additional complaint, 

expressed for the first time in the current motion for reconsideration, is that Plaintiff only had 

three days to file an opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 

The first two “complaints” were dealt with in the court’s prior order denying 

reconsideration. In summary, the court did not ignore the additional facts proffered by Plaintiff; 

the court simply found those facts not relevant to the determination of whether Plaintiff was 

terminated as a result of unlawful discrimination. With regard to not providing a hearing, the 

court has explained that it considers most matters, including motions for consideration, suitable 

for decision without oral argument. Plaintiff’s prior motion for reconsideration was no 

exception. In any event, the court must assume that by now Plaintiff has articulated all the facts 

available to him to support his request for reconsideration on the merits. It remains the case that 

the court can find no factual basis warranting reconsideration.

The complaint regarding the lack of time for preparation of an opposition to Defendant’s 

motion for summary judgment appears to have been a result of a misunderstanding regarding the 

local rules of procedure. Plaintiff alleges that the Scheduling Order in effect at the time required 

that all dispositive motions be filed by March 4, 2014. Plaintiff alleges Defendant filed its 

opposition on February 28, 2014, leaving Plaintiff only three days to file an opposition. Since an 

opposition to a motion is not the motion itself, it need not be filed by the deadline established by 

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A

the scheduling order but may be filed anytime within the fourteen days allowed by Local Rule 

78-230. The court regrets Plaintiff’s misunderstanding of the rules but must conclude that, given 

the absence of any fact or allegation of any fact that would tend to show that Plaintiff suffered 

unlawful discrimination, the misunderstanding was harmless.

The final ground for relief asserted by Plaintiff is new. It is Plaintiff’s contention that 

Judge Ishii did not sign or file an order granting summary judgment to Defendant; but that the 

order that was filed was written by opposing counsel and/or that Judge Ishii’s chambers staff 

colluded to forge the Judge’s electronic signature on a document that was not reviewed or 

approved by the Judge. This contention is untrue and lacks merit.

The court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to show that he is entitled to 

relief under Rule 60 from the court’s May 16 Order granting summary judgment to Defendant. 

Plaintiff’s second motion for relief from judgment is therefore DENIED. The case remains 

CLOSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 30, 2015 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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