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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-7491

DAVID M. FRIZZELL,

Petitioner – Appellant,

v.

CHADWICK DOTSON, Director, Department of Corrections,

Respondent – Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at 

Roanoke. James P. Jones, Senior District Judge. (7:20-cv-00685-JPJ-PMS)

Argued: September 26, 2024 Decided: December 17, 2024

Before NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge, and Kenneth D. BELL, 

United States District Judge for the Western District of North Carolina, sitting by 

designation.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Bell wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge 

Niemeyer joined. Judge Floyd wrote a dissenting opinion. 

ARGUED: David Benjamin Smith, DAVID B. SMITH, PLLC, Alexandria, Virginia, for 

Appellant. Liam Alexander Curry, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 

VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Jason S. Miyares, Attorney 

General, Charles H. Slemp, III, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Donald E. Jeffrey, III, 

Senior Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 

VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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BELL, District Judge:

In 2016, a Virginia state court jury convicted David Frizzell of the attempted capital 

murder of a police officer and the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. At trial, 

Frizzell’s sole defense was that he was too intoxicated from alcohol and marijuana to form 

the premeditation necessary to be convicted. Following an unsuccessful appeal, he filed a 

pro se habeas petition with the Virginia Supreme Court, in which he alleged numerous 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. When that petition was dismissed, he filed a 

petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in federal district court, asserting new ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims. 

Specifically, he alleged that his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to or 

request curative instructions in response to the prosecutor making several statements in his 

rebuttal closing argument that Frizzell claimed impermissibly shifted the burden of proof 

to him on (1) intent, and (2) voluntary intoxication as a defense to premeditation. Further,

he argued that the court should consider the cumulative prejudicial effect of counsel’s 

errors. The district court dismissed the petition, and declined to issue a certificate of 

appealability, finding that all but one of the claims were not “substantial” under Martinez 

v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 14 (2012), and that cumulative prejudice analysis in this context is 

impermissible. With respect to the lone claim the district court found to be substantial –

Frizzell’s claim concerning the prosecutor’s allegedly improper argument on the 

intoxication defense – it later dismissed that claim on the merits, finding that Frizzell had 

not been prejudiced under the governing standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668 (1984). Frizzell timely appealed. 

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As explained herein, we conclude that Frizzell’s claims related to trial counsel’s 

failure to object to the prosecutor’s rebuttal arguments allegedly shifting the burdens of 

proof on intent and voluntary intoxication are insubstantial under Martinez, and thus still 

subject to procedural default because they were not raised in state court. Additionally, this 

Court has long held that cumulative prejudice analysis is not available for ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims. As such, we AFFIRM the district court’s ruling. 

I. BACKGROUND 

a. Factual History 

David Frizzell is a retired air force veteran and police officer. After retiring from 

police work, he grew depressed and began drinking. On October 30, 2015, Pittsylvania 

County Deputy Sheriff Jason Woods responded to a report that a white SUV was doing 

doughnuts in the grass at a park. Based on the description of the driver and vehicle in the 

report, Woods surmised that it was David Frizzell, with whom Woods was familiar from 

previous interactions. Woods located and followed the SUV, which was being driven by 

Juanita Haley, Frizzell’s then girlfriend (who also happened to be Woods’ former landlord). 

Frizzell was sitting in the back, and another man, later identified as Steven Holland, sat in 

the front passenger seat. 

The SUV and Woods’ patrol car ultimately pulled off the road. Frizzell got out of 

the car, grabbed Haley’s arm, and pulled her out of the driver’s seat, ignoring Woods’ 

commands to get back in the vehicle. Haley pulled away from Frizzell and rushed up to 

Woods, telling him, “I don’t know what’s wrong with him. He’s drunk.” Haley later 

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testified that Frizzell had consumed a bottle of Jim Beam and smoked marijuana that day. 

Woods ordered Frizzell to step away from the vehicle, noticing that Frizzell had a beer in 

his hand, a “blank” expression, and bloodshot eyes.

Frizzell moved away from the SUV and began to walk toward Woods, ignoring

Woods’ commands to stop approaching. When Frizzell was within approximately six feet

of Woods, Woods tased him. Tased but unfazed, and still holding his beer, Frizzell began 

backing away toward the SUV. He put his free hand in his pocket and according to 

testimony from Woods and Holland, either stated, “Jason, you’ve done fucked up now,” or 

“Jason, don’t fuck up now, brother.”

Woods drew his gun and ordered Frizzell to remove his hand from his pocket four 

or five times. Frizzell did not comply, and after about eight seconds pulled a revolver out 

of his pocket. He aimed at Woods and fired until the revolver was empty, pulling the trigger 

between three and five times. Woods returned fire, hitting Frizzell in the thigh, before 

dropping his service weapon and seeking cover nearby. Frizzell, meanwhile, tossed his gun 

into the SUV, and stood beside the car with his leg bleeding, drinking his beer.

Backup arrived and ordered Frizzell to get on the ground with his hands in the air. 

Frizzell did not respond to the commands other than to say, “Do you know who I am?” 

Ultimately, Frizzell was tased again, causing him to fall to the ground. After fighting cuff 

placement and being tased for a third time, he became compliant. Frizzell was then 

transported to the hospital for medical treatment, where he tested positive for marijuana 

and his blood alcohol level was measured at 0.20%. 

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b. Procedural History

After a three-day jury trial, Frizzell was found guilty of attempted capital murder of 

a police officer and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. The jury recommended 

a sentence of twenty-three years imprisonment, the lowest they could recommend based 

on the convictions.1

 At sentencing, the trial court adopted the recommendation and 

sentenced Frizzell to twenty-three years in prison. 

Frizzell directly appealed his conviction, alleging that the trial court erred in denying 

his motion to suppress, excluding expert testimony about his ability to premeditate, and in 

declining to give three jury instructions he requested. The Virginia Court of Appeals 

affirmed the convictions, and the Supreme Court of Virginia denied review. 

Frizzell next filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of 

Virginia, alleging numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Two months after 

Frizzell filed his petition, an attorney entered an appearance on Frizzell’s behalf, but moved 

to withdraw after the State moved to dismiss Frizzell’s petition. The court allowed the 

attorney to withdraw, and six months later dismissed Frizzell’s habeas petition. 

Frizzell then filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition with the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Virginia, alleging several new ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims and cumulative prejudice due to trial counsel’s errors. He alleged that his counsel 

was ineffective because counsel failed to make proper objections to the Commonwealth’s 

1

 The jury recommended twenty years for attempted capital murder and three years 

for use of a firearm during the commission of a felony. 

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rebuttal argument, including argument that was beyond the scope of rebuttal, and he did 

not request an opportunity for surrebuttal. Specifically, Frizzell argues that his counsel 

should have objected to: (1) the Commonwealth arguing the natural and probable 

consequences of one’s actions as if the inference of intent were a mandatory presumption; 

(2) the Commonwealth shifting the burden of proof to the defendant on the issue of 

voluntary intoxication; and (3) various misstatements of fact and speculation about facts 

not in evidence.

In addition, Frizzell alleged that while his counsel asked the jury to find Frizzell 

“not guilty” of capital murder, counsel did not ask for a lesser included offense; counsel 

did not discuss malice, the element that distinguishes murder from manslaughter, nor its 

requirement that the offender’s mind was “under the control of reason” at the time of the 

offense; and counsel never related the trial evidence to the jury instruction on intoxication 

to explain how the law applied to the facts. 

For reasons discussed further below, the district court found against Frizzell on all 

his claims. The court declined to issue a certificate of appealability and granted the 

Appellee’s motion to dismiss. 

Frizzell timely appealed the dismissal to this Court, which granted a partial 

certificate of appealability on three issues: (1) whether Frizzel’s claim that trial counsel 

provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object or request a curative

instruction to the Commonwealth’s closing argument, relating to Instruction 10, and the 

shifting of the burden of proof on intent, is substantial under Martinez to excuse procedural 

default; (2) whether the district court’s conclusion that Frizzell failed to demonstrate 

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prejudice from trial counsel’s failure to object or request a curative instruction to the 

Commonwealth’s closing argument, relating to Instruction 21, and the shifting of the 

burden of proof on Frizzell’s intoxication defense to the premeditation element of 

attempted capital murder, is contrary to, or an unreasonable determination of, federal law 

or an unreasonable determination of the facts; and (3) whether the district court’s 

determination that Frizzell failed to demonstrate cumulative error is contrary to, or an 

unreasonable determination of, federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Review of a district court’s denial of a state prisoner’s § 2254 petition is de novo.

Witherspoon v. Stonebreaker, 30 F.4th 381, 392 (4th Cir. 2022). Although the Antiterrorism 

and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) requires us to give substantial deference to a 

state court’s review of habeas claims, the “highly deferential standard does not apply” in 

this action where the claims were not raised to the state court. Sigmon v. Stirling, 956 F.3d 

183, 191 (4th Cir. 2020). Further, when a claim is not raised in state court, that claim is 

procedurally defaulted, and “federal review is generally foreclosed.” Gray v. Zook, 806 

F.3d 783, 798 (4th Cir. 2015). However, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Martinez, where, as here, “under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar 

a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, 

in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that 

proceeding was ineffective.” 566 U.S. at 17. For a claim to qualify as “substantial” under 

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Martinez such that we may reach it despite procedural default, “the prisoner must 

demonstrate that the claim has some merit.” Id. at 14. 

III. DISCUSSION 

Before a federal habeas court will consider a procedurally defaulted claim, the 

prisoner must show both cause for the default and actual prejudice because of the claimed 

federal violation. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 746-47 (1991). In establishing 

cause for default, Martinez requires a petitioner to show: “(1) the underlying ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claim is ‘substantial’; (2) the prisoner was not represented or 

had ineffective counsel during the state PCR [post-conviction relief] proceeding; (3) the 

state PCR proceeding was the initial review proceeding; and (4) state law required the 

prisoner to bring the claim in the initial-review collateral proceeding.” Moore v. Stirling, 

952 F.3d 174, 185 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413, 423 (2013)); 

see also Martinez, 566 U.S. at 1, 14, 17 (2012). Under this test, when state post-conviction 

proceedings are the first place one can raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims (as is 

the case in Virginia),2 then absence of counsel or ineffective assistance of counsel 

essentially establishes the cause for default. 

In his pro se petition in state court, Frizzell raised ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims (albeit not the same claims as are found in this matter). Despite having an attorney 

2 See generally Hall v. Commonwealth, 515 S.E.2d 343, 347 (Va. Ct. App. 1999)

(noting that, “in 1990, the legislature repealed Code § 19.2-317.1 which provided for direct 

appeal of certain ineffective assistance claims”). 

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very briefly, the attorney played no substantive role in his habeas case, so Frizzell acted

pro se for all practical purposes. Taken together, prongs two through four of Martinez are 

met for his claims. 

Remaining is prong one of Martinez. Under that element, a claim is substantial when 

it has merit. 566 U.S. at 14. Substantiality does not mean a petitioner “automatically 

prevails”; rather it means that “part of the gateway for considering an otherwise defaulted 

claim for ineffective assistance of counsel” has been met. Frizzell v. Clarke, No. 

7:20CV00685, 2021 WL 4261519, at *7 (W.D. Va. Sept. 20, 2021). This requires showing 

both that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the 

defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 

To show prejudice under Strickland, Frizzell must first show that counsel’s 

performance was so deficient that counsel essentially failed to function as the “counsel” 

guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment. Id. The objective standard for attorney 

performance is that of “reasonably effective assistance.” Id. at 683, 687 (quoting Trapnell 

v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 151-52 (2d Cir. 1983)). And any deficiency must have 

prejudiced the defense to the extent that it is reasonably likely that, “but for counsel's 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Harrington 

v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 111 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). This does not 

require a showing that counsel’s actions “more likely than not altered the outcome,” but 

the possibility must be more than just conceivable; it must be substantial. Id. at 111-12 

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693). 

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To summarize, for Frizzell to use Martinez to excuse the procedural default of his 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, he must show that they are meritorious. This 

includes a showing that trial counsel’s errors, such as they were, prejudiced his defense 

under Strickland—meaning that, but for those alleged errors, there is a substantial 

possibility that the outcome of the trial would have been different. For the reasons 

discussed below, we conclude that Frizzell cannot demonstrate a reasonable possibility that

the outcome of the trial would have been different but for defense counsel actions and 

inactions; accordingly, under Martinez, his claims remain defaulted. 

a. Failure to Object on Presumption of Intent 

Frizzell contends that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object 

to, or request curative instruction when, during the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument – which 

was given after the court had instructed the jury – he stated, “You have an instruction that 

says you intend the natural and probable consequences of your actions.” Frizzell argues 

that this transformed Jury Instruction 10, which stated, “You may infer that every person 

intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts,” from a permissible inference to 

a mandatory one. 

Frizzell argues that this violated his due process rights under Sandstrom v. Montana, 

442 U.S. 510 (1979) and Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985), which differentiate 

between inferences that the jury must make, and those that the jury may make. Mandatory 

inferences “violate the Due Process Clause if they relieve the State of the burden of 

persuasion on an element of an offense.” Francis, 471 U.S. at 314. As a result, inferences 

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relating to burdens should be expressed using permissive language that “does not relieve 

the State of its burden of persuasion because it still requires the State to convince the jury 

that the suggested conclusion should be inferred based on the predicate facts proved.” Id. 

However, in Sandstrom and Francis, unlike in this case, the court gave erroneous 

jury instructions regarding a mandatory presumption of intent. 442 U.S. at 513; 471 U.S. 

at 309. Here, the trial judge properly instructed the jury, “You may infer that every person 

intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts.” This instruction does not relieve 

the State of its burden of persuasion. In addition, while Frizzell focuses on the prosecutor’s 

rebuttal, when first referencing Jury Instruction 10 during closing, the prosecutor stated, 

“[The instruction] says you may infer that every person intends the natural and probable 

consequences of his acts.” (emphasis added). This is a correct statement of law. 

Further, jury instructions from the court carry greater weight with jurors than do 

arguments of counsel. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 384 (1990). Just prior to sending 

the jury off to deliberate, the court reminded the jury that, “[Y]our verdict must be based 

solely on the evidence that you’ve heard in the courtroom, and the law that I have instructed 

you on.” Also, in addition to the jury receiving correct oral instructions from the court, they 

were sent back to deliberate with correctly written jury instructions. 

Moreover, when the prosecutor’s statement is considered in context, he clearly was 

not attempting to suggest the inference was mandatory; rather, he was emphasizing the 

inferences that could be made from the evidence in support of his conclusion that Frizzell 

intended to kill. As previously noted, the prosecutor correctly stated, “Instruction number 

10. That says that you may infer that every person intends the natural and probable 

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consequences of his acts.” He later followed this up with the alleged burden shifting 

statement: 

You have an instruction that says you intend the natural and probable 

consequences of your actions. We don’t have a statement from this defendant 

that says Jason, I’m going to kill you now. And then starts shooting at him. 

We never have those. People almost never say that. But they get convicted 

because the law says you intend the natural and probable consequences of 

your actions. If somebody comes in and says well, I, I was just trying to scare 

him when I was putting the bullet holes in him. No, we know what the intent 

was . . . . [Y]ou can now come in and try to say what your intent is but the 

intent is that you tried to kill him. So you look at the natural and probable 

consequences of their actions. 

Then, shortly thereafter, the prosecutor again correctly argues that he carries the 

burden of proof on intent:

We [the prosecution] have to prove that this defendant intended to kill. You 

don’t pull out a gun and point it at somebody and fire shots at them when 

they’re standing here, and then when they dodge fire another shot over here, 

and then fire three more shots that we never found, without having an intent 

to kill somebody. 

Including his statements above, the prosecutor also spent a substantial portion of his 

rebuttal arguing why the jury should conclude that Frizzell intended to kill Woods, 

implicitly refuting any argument that such intent should be presumed:

A bullet comes whizzing by . . . . [Woods is] standing right here . . . . That’s 

an intent. He’s not just shooting to celebrate, or shooting to scare, or shooting 

as [an] instinctive reaction . . . . [H]e’s trying to shoot [Woods] . . . . You got 

to pull this trigger every single time. This is not a . . . fully automatic machine 

gun . . . . How many times he pulls the trigger, five times.

Given the full scope of the prosecutor’s argument and the governing law, defense 

counsel may have viewed an objection as unnecessary or a tactical move. See, e.g., United 

States v. Basham, 789 F.3d 358, 386 (4th Cir. 2015) (“Experienced trial counsel learn that 

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objections to each potentially objectionable event could actually act to their party’s 

detriment. Learned counsel . . . use objections in a tactical manner.”) (quoting Lundgren v. 

Mitchell, 440 F.3d 754, 774 (6th Cir. 2006)). Under Virginia law, the intent to kill “need 

only exist for a moment.” Peterson v. Commonwealth, 302 S.E.2d 520, 524 (Va. 1983); see

also Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 266 S.E.2d 94, 100 (Va. 1980) (noting that “seconds” 

is “ample time” to form “a design and purpose to kill”). Here, witness testimony established 

that after being tased, Frizzell put his hand in his pocket and stated either “Jason, you’ve 

done fucked up now,” or “Jason, don’t fuck up now, brother.” Then, despite four or five 

commands to remove his hand from his pocket, he did not comply. Instead, after eight 

seconds, he pulled a loaded revolver out of his pocket, aimed at Deputy Woods, and pulled 

the trigger between three and five times, until the gun was empty. Therefore, an objection 

of counsel to the prosecutor’s arguments on intent might reasonably have been viewed as 

unnecessary or unwise. 

Also, for the same reasons, even if Frizzell’s claim could meet the first prong of 

deficient performance under Strickland, it would be difficult to show that it is reasonably 

likely that the outcome of trial would have been different had defense counsel objected.

Indeed, even absent the prosecutor’s alleged misstatement, with the evidence presented, it 

is more than likely that the jury would still have rendered a guilty verdict.

In sum, when taken as a whole, the prosecutor’s statements, the evidence, and the 

court’s instructions did not “so infec[t] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting 

conviction a denial of due process.” Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987) (quoting 

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). As a result, we affirm the district 

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court’s holding that Frizzell’s ineffective assistance claim relating to intent is not 

substantial under Martinez and does not overcome the procedural default. 

b. Failure to Object on Burden of Proof on Intoxication 

Frizzell next contends that his counsel provided ineffective assistance when he 

failed to object to the prosecutor’s thrice repeated rebuttal arguments that Frizzell had to 

prove he was so intoxicated that he was incapable of premeditation. Specifically, Frizzell 

believes the following prosecutorial rebuttal statements improperly shifted the burden of 

proof on intoxication to the defendant: (1) “[T]he law in Virginia says . . . you have to 

prove, you have the burden now of proving that you were so drunk . . . that [you were] 

incapable of making any decisions”; (2) “He’s aware of it. He’s not making wise decisions, 

but he’s aware of what he is doing . . . he has to prove that he’s so incapable he’s unaware 

of what he’s doing”; and (3) “And it was not voluntary intoxication because he cannot 

prove that he was incapable of doing it, incapable of premeditating.” Also, he suggests that 

the prosecutor distorted the burden to such that he had to almost prove insanity, by stating 

“[H]e has to prove he’s so incapable he’s unaware of what he’s doing.” 

Deficient Performance 

As previously stated, under Strickland, Frizzell must prove both deficient 

performance and prejudice to prove ineffective assistance of counsel. 466 U.S. at 687. 

Deficient performance requires a showing that counsel’s performance fell below an 

objective standard of “reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Id. at 688. The 

reviewing court must not rely upon “the distorting effects of hindsight,” but must presume 

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that counsel’s decisions and actions fell within the wide range of reasonable strategy 

decisions. Id. at 689, 699. This is especially true when reviewing counsel’s failure to object 

to the prosecutor’s closing argument, given the numerous recognized “tactical” reasons for 

choosing not to object to an improper argument. Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336, 1349 

(4th Cir. 1996).

However, the court is not required to consider a decision as a tactical choice when 

there is no reasonable tactical explanation for not objecting. See Vinson v. True, 436 F.3d 

412, 419 (4th Cir. 2006). “When a defendant’s lawyer is confronted with error during a 

judicial proceeding, he has the responsibility to object contemporaneously,” so that the trial 

court can take appropriate corrective action. United States v. Carthorne, 878 F.3d 458, 464 

(4th Cir. 2017). 

Premeditation and Voluntary Intoxication in Virginia

While there are many definitions of malice under Virginia law, a common theme is 

the requirement that a wrongful act be done “wilfully or purposefully.” Essex v. 

Commonwealth, 322 S.E.2d 216, 220 (Va. 1984) (quoting Williamson v. Commonwealth, 

23 S.E.2d 240, 241 (Va. 1942)). Relatedly, premeditation is “an intent to kill that needs to 

exist only for a moment.” Kirby v. Commonwealth, 653 S.E.2d 600, 604 (Va. Ct. App. 

2007) (quoting Coles v. Commonwealth, 621 S.E.2d 109, 112 (Va. 2005) (citation 

omitted)). Thus, premeditation is an element of malice. 

In Virginia, voluntary intoxication is not an affirmative defense to any crime, but it 

may negate deliberation and premeditation in capital and first-degree murder cases. See, 

e.g., Morgan v. Commonwealth, 646 S.E.2d 899, 902, 904 (Va. Ct. App. 2007) (“[E]xcept 

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in cases of first degree and capital murder, where proof of voluntary intoxication may 

negate deliberation and premeditation, such intoxication, whether from drugs or alcohol, is 

no defense to a criminal charge,” and “[V]oluntary intoxication does not constitute an 

affirmative defense unless it produces a permanent insanity.”). “However, proof of mere 

intoxication is insufficient; the defendant must establish intoxication so great it rendered 

him incapable of premeditation.” Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 738 S.E.2d 847, 871 (Va. 

2013) (citing Giarratano, 266 S.E.2d at 99). “[E]ven testimony that the defendant was 

drinking on the day of the offense is insufficient to establish that he was too intoxicated to 

form the requisite intent.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Waye v. Commonwealth, 251 

S.E.2d 202, 211, cert. denied, 442 U.S. 924 (1979)). Further, 

[T]he defendant’s degree of intoxication, however great, neither enhances 

nor impairs the set of facts relied upon to establish . . . malice. In making the 

determination whether malice exists, the fact-finder must be guided by the

quality of the defendant’s conduct, its likelihood of causing death . . . , and 

whether it was volitional or inadvertent; not by the defendant’s blood-alcohol 

level. 

Essex, 322 S.E.2d at 221.

Burden Shifting

As previously stated, during rebuttal, the prosecutor made the following statements: 

(1) “[T]he law in Virginia says . . . you have to prove, you have the burden now of proving 

that you were so drunk . . . that [you were] incapable of making any decisions”; (2) “He’s 

aware of it. He’s not making wise decisions, but he’s aware of what he is doing . . . he has 

to prove that he’s so incapable he’s unaware of what he’s doing”; and (3) “And it was not 

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voluntary intoxication because he cannot prove that he was incapable of doing it, incapable 

of premeditating.”

Frizzell characterizes these statements as the prosecutor shifting the burden of proof 

on intoxication impermissibly to the defendant, relying on two cases where the court found 

prejudice after a prosecutor made a misstatement of law. However, those cases are easily 

distinguished because of the prosecutors’ conduct beyond the statements. In Hodge v. 

Hurley, the prosecutor also made inappropriate and derogatory statements about witnesses’ 

characters. 426 F.3d 368, 383-84 (6th Cir. 2005). And, in Zapata v. Vasquez, the prosecutor 

made false statements that were totally unsupported by evidence. 788 F.3d 1106, 1114 (9th 

Cir. 2015). In both cases, the only curative instruction provided by the court was that 

arguments of counsel “are not evidence.” Hodge, 426 F.3d at 384 n.24; Zapata, 788 F.3d 

at 1123.

In contrast, when considered in context, the prosecutor’s statements here are 

different. The prosecutor clearly stated that he carried the burden of proof as to 

premeditation, argued that he had clearly demonstrated premeditation, and that to negate 

it, the defendant could show intoxication so great that he was incapable of doing so. In so 

arguing, the prosecutor made correct statements of the law in Virginia.

First, in his closing, the prosecutor stated, correctly:

If you find that the defendant was so greatly intoxicated by the voluntary use 

of alcohol, that he was incapable . . . of deliberating or premeditating, then 

you cannot find him guilty of any offense greater than attempted second 

degree murder . . . . Again, it’s not that he was intoxicated . . . . It’s that he 

was incapable of forming that intent.

Later, in rebuttal, the prosecutor states:

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[T]he law in Virginia says . . . [if you are going to argue intoxication then] 

you have to prove, you have the burden now of proving that you were so 

drunk . . . . The standard is incapable, not that he’s impaired, that he’s making 

bad decisions, that he’s incapable of making any decisions . . . . [I]t’s not the 

question of whether it’s something we think is a good or bad idea, it’s 

whether he was able to form the idea at all. 

He then goes on to say, “If you find that he can’t formulate that idea, that he’s 

incapable . . . to have thought I’m going to kill that deputy, and start pulling, and start 

shooting at him, then it is attempted second degree murder.” 

When considered all together, the prosecutor’s statements correctly reflect Virginia

law in substance. For example, when the prosecutor used the phrase “incapable of making 

any decisions,” he quickly clarifies that he means whether Frizzell was able to form the 

idea to kill at all – which is a correct statement of the law. 

Again, the overall thrust of the prosecutor’s argument is appropriate, if perhaps 

exaggerated in part. See United States v. Sutherland, 921 F.3d 421, 429 (2019) (“Closing 

arguments are . . . prone to exaggeration; we rely on juries and the adversarial process to 

place them in perspective.”). The prosecutor states:

[T]he defendant is aware that he’s been tased . . . . He’s aware of it. He’s not 

making wise decisions, but he’s aware of what he is doing. And that’s the 

standard that we’ve got . . . . [H]e has to prove that he’s so incapable he’s 

unaware of what he’s doing. 

He compares the “awareness” required for premeditation with the “unawareness” or 

“instinct” to swat and kill a bee when it stings you. Thus, it is clear the prosecutor is using 

exaggeration to delineate the line between premediated and non-premeditated.

The prosecutor also argued all of the reasons why he believed Frizzell both had the 

ability to and actually did premeditate, including having a conversation with a witness 

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[Holland] and his wife just prior to his arrest; recognizing and identifying Deputy Woods 

by his first name, and making a threatening statement to him after being tased; putting his 

hand in his pocket for eight seconds, ignoring commands to remove it; pulling the revolver 

from his pocket, aiming it at Deputy Woods, and individually pulling the trigger 

somewhere between three and five times until the gun was empty; noting that the bullet 

hole in the garage was head level and behind where Deputy Woods had been standing; and 

finally that he was able to communicate well enough with police to tell them to remove the 

taser probes from his back after being tased. 

Finally, the prosecutor wrapped up by saying: 

We have to prove that this defendant intended to kill . . . . I’m telling you 

we’ve proven attempted capital murder . . . . It was an intent to kill. It was 

willful, deliberate and premeditated . . . . And it was not voluntary 

intoxication because he cannot prove he was incapable of doing it, incapable 

of premeditating. 

This, too, is a correct statement of law. As cited above, Virginia law holds that once 

premeditation has been shown by the prosecution, the burden of showing intoxication so 

great as to be incapable of premeditation falls to the defendant. See, e.g., Giarratano, 266 

S.E.2d at 871 (citation omitted) (noting a defendant who has become “so intoxicated as to 

be unable to deliberate and premeditate cannot commit any class of murder that is defined 

as a wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing,” and that “mere intoxication from drugs or 

alcohol” is not enough to negate premeditation); Essex, 322 S.E.2d at 220 (stating the 

“defendant may negate the specific intent requisite for capital or first-degree murder by 

showing that he was so greatly intoxicated as to be incapable” of premeditation); see also 

Lawlor, 738 S.E.2d at 871; Waye, 251 S.E.2d at 211. 

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Burden Distorting

As noted, Frizzell also contends that the prosecutor’s single statement that, “[H]e 

has to prove that he’s so incapable he’s unaware of what he’s doing,” is akin to insanity 

rather than the proper standard of “incapability.” We disagree. 

On this point, our case McHone v. Polk is instructive. McHone, charged with first 

degree murder after killing his mother and stepfather, asserted a defense of voluntary 

intoxication. 392 F.3d 691, 696 (2004). McHone presented the testimony of two friends 

who reported that after ingesting alcohol and acid, McHone was staggering and had slurred 

speech. Id. at 696. The prosecution, however, presented evidence that despite drug and 

alcohol consumption, McHone was drunk but coherent, able to walk, and his speech was 

not slurred. Id. at 700-02 (majority opinion), 717-18 (Gregory, J., concurring). 

During closing arguments, the prosecution misstated the law in a way that shifted 

the burden of proof to McHone, stating McHone had to show he was “utterly incapable of 

forming a deliberate and premeditated purpose to kill” due to intoxication. Id. at 707

(majority opinion). However, we found this error was not prejudicial because the trial court 

provided correct and comprehensive jury instructions on the legal standards for voluntary 

intoxication and the jury was properly instructed on how to consider the intoxication 

defense. Id. at 707-08. We also noted that the Supreme Court “teach[es] that juries are 

presumed to follow . . . instructions.” Id. at 711. Thus in McHone, we presumed that the 

jury followed their instructions, which mitigated any confusion caused by the prosecutor’s 

misstatements. Id. at 711-12.

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As in McHone, Frizzell presented evidence of intoxication, and during the trial there 

was conflicting information as to whether he was coherent [and thus able to premeditate]. 

In both cases, the prosecutor alluded to the defendant needing to show more than just being 

incapable of premeditating.3 Id. at 707. But, in both cases, the jury instructions were 

correct. Frizzell’s jury was instructed that it was the prosecution’s responsibility alone to 

prove premeditation and deliberation. The prosecutor then stated several times during the 

trial that the State bore the burden of proof, and this was reiterated by the trial judge just 

before closing arguments began. The prosecutor also correctly stated that once 

premeditation was shown, the defendant then bore the burden of proving he was so 

intoxicated as to be unable to premeditate. The prosecutor spoke at length as to the evidence 

supporting his argument that Frizzell did premeditate. Further, the trial judge stated twice 

to the jury that “what the lawyers say ... is not evidence”; rather it is their “recollection of 

the evidence.” Moreover, just prior to receiving jury instructions, the court instructed the 

jury that all instructions from the court were to be followed. Finally, the jury was correctly 

instructed on voluntary intoxication, and the court noted that copies of the jury instructions 

(including the instruction on voluntary intoxication) would be available in the jury room 

during deliberations. 

As noted by the district court, “deficient performance alone is not enough to prevail 

on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Frizzell, 2021 WL 4261519, at *14. 

Frizzell must also prove prejudice, [meaning] that there exists “a reasonable probability 

3 Specifically, in McHone, the prosecution said, “utterly incapable” and in Frizzell, 

the prosecution stated, “unaware of what he’s doing.”

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that, but for counsel’s [deficiency], the results . . . would have been different.” Id. Here, 

Frizzell, as in McHone, cannot prove that a single misstatement overcomes all the other 

evidence to support a finding of prejudice. In sum, we do not find a reasonable probability 

that the outcome would have been different had counsel objected to the statement. Thus, 

we will affirm the district court’s decision to dismiss Frizzell’s petition. 

c. Cumulative Prejudice 

This Court has foreclosed cumulative error analysis in certain instances. 

Specifically, we have stated that “ineffective assistance of counsel claims . . . must be 

reviewed individually, rather than collectively.” Fisher v. Angelone, 163 F.3d 835, 852 (4th 

Cir. 1998). As such, even if Frizzell had demonstrated prejudice under Strickland, no 

cumulative analysis would have been possible under this binding precedent. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Frizzell’s habeas claim. 

AFFIRMED

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FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting from 

the judgment: 

The Court today holds that a defendant bears the burden of disproving an element 

of an offense. More specifically, the majority finds that, under Virginia law, “once 

premeditation has been shown by the prosecution, the burden of showing intoxication so 

great as to be incapable of premeditation falls to the defendant.” Majority Op. 20. In this 

way, perhaps more accurately, the Court today holds that a defendant must disprove 

premeditation after the prosecution proves premeditation. This defies both logic and due 

process. I therefore respectfully dissent from Part III.B, which affirms the dismissal of 

Frizzell’s ineffective assistance claim relating to voluntary intoxication. I concur with the 

remaining Parts of the opinion.

I.

To secure Frizzell’s conviction for attempted capital murder, the Commonwealth 

was required to prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: “(1) That 

Mr. Frizzell attempted to kill Jason Woods; and (2) That the attempt to kill was willful, 

deliberate, and premeditated; and (3) That the attempt to kill was malicious; and (4) That 

the attempt to kill was of a law enforcement officer and for the purpose of interfering with 

the performance of his official duties.” JA 132.1

 

1 I disagree with the majority that “premeditation is an element of malice” (Majority 

Op. 16); malice and premeditation are separate elements. 

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Under Virginia law, “[t]o premeditate means to adopt a specific intent to kill.” Smith 

v. Commonwealth, 389 S.E.2d 871, 879 (Va. 1990) (quoting Rhodes v. Commonwealth, 

384 S.E.2d 95, 98 (Va. 1989)). More precisely, the Supreme Court of Virginia has

instructed: “The exact state of the defendant’s mind at the time of killing is the crucial 

factor in determining intent. It is the will and purpose to kill, not necessarily the interval 

of time, which determine the grade of the offense.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 261 S.E.2d 

550, 553 (Va. 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). Also under Virginia law, while 

not an affirmative defense, “[e]vidence of intoxication may ...be used to negate the specific 

intent for capital or first-degree murder.” Emmett v. True, No. 7:05-CV-00329, 2006 WL 

482417, at *6 (W.D. Va. Feb. 27, 2006), aff’d sub nom. Emmett v. Kelly, 474 F.3d 154 (4th 

Cir. 2007) (citing Essex v. Commonwealth, 322 S.E.2d 216, 220–22 (Va. 1984)); see also

Morgan v. Commonwealth, 646 S.E.2d 899, 902, 904 (Va. Ct. App. 2007).

2

Where I depart from the majority is in its conclusion that a defendant’s ability to 

negate premeditation amounts to a burden to disprove premeditation. Our Circuit has 

continually recognized that a state must “shoulder the burden of proving beyond a 

reasonable doubt all of the elements of a crime.” Morris v. State of Md., 715 F.2d 106, 110 

(4th Cir. 1983). Virginia courts have, of course, recognized the same. See, e.g., McGhee 

v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 808, 810 (1978) (“It can be safely said that in Virginia there 

is no principle more firmly imbedded in the body of the law, or one that has been more 

2 It is true that states need not permit a voluntary intoxication defense, see Montana 

v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996), but Virginia has opted to do so. 

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often stated, than the principle that in every criminal case the evidence of the 

Commonwealth must show, beyond a reasonable doubt, every material fact necessary to 

establish the offense.... This burden of proof never shifts.”). 

Relevant here, we have held that such a foundational due process principle 

“necessarily forbids the state to put the burden of proving the negation of one of those 

elements on the defendant, for that is but another way of requiring the defendant to disprove 

an element of the offense.” Morris, 715 F.2d at 110. Proof of negation would also impose 

“conflicting and inconsistent burdens,” creating a serious risk that “the jury would rely on 

a presumption of [the element], arising from the defendant’s failure to prove [the defense].” 

Id. Nearly every circuit has had occasion to hold the same. See, e.g., United States v. LealCruz, 431 F.3d 667, 671 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[W]hen a defense negates the element of a crime, 

it is unconstitutional to place the burden of proving the defense on the defendant”—i.e., 

the “negate the required elements test.”) (citing Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 234 (1987));

United States v. Deleveaux, 205 F.3d 1292, 1298 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[I]f a defendant asserts 

a defense that has the effect of negating any element of the offense, the prosecution must 

disprove that defense beyond a reasonable doubt.”).

Virginia courts have followed suit, finding that defenses that negate an element of 

an offense must be treated differently than those that do not. See, e.g., McGhee, 248 S.E.2d 

at 810 (“The defense that a killing was accidental presents a different issue from a claim 

that a killing was done in self-defense. For the Commonwealth to establish murder it must 

show those elements which completely negate an accidental killing, [i].e., that the killing 

was willful, deliberate and malicious. Self-defense in Virginia is an affirmative defense, 

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the absence of which is not an element of murder.”); Myers v. Commonwealth, 857 S.E.2d 

805, 809 (Va. 2021) (“The Commonwealth’s burden of proving an intentional homicide 

necessarily requires it to disprove any reasonable doubt that the killing was an accident,” 

but statutory exceptions “are not ‘negative’ elements” as they render the statue 

“inapplicable, not inaccurate.”); Calokoh v. Commonwealth, 883 S.E.2d 674, 681 (Va. Ct. 

App. 2023) (An alibi “is not an affirmative defense, but a denial of an essential element of 

the offense.... With these types of defenses, the burden of proof remains on the 

prosecution, and the defendant need only offer enough evidence (e.g., of an alibi) to create 

a reasonable doubt as to guilt.”) (cleaned up).

In Smith, the Supreme Court confirmed that an element-focused test determines the 

due process violation. See Smith v. United States, 568 U.S. 106, 110 (2013). Smith held 

that “[a]llocating to a defendant the burden of proving withdrawal does not violate the Due 

Process Clause” because, like with self-defense, the elements of conspiracy and withdrawal 

“[do not] overlap in the sense that evidence to prove the latter will often tend to negate the 

former.” Id. (quoting Martin, 480 U.S. at 234). As a result, it is only when a defense 

“excuse[s] conduct that would otherwise be punishable, but does not controvert any of the 

elements of the offense itself, [that] the Government has no constitutional duty to overcome 

the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (cleaned up). 

As applied to voluntary intoxication, this Court has expressly held that when a jury 

is instructed that the defendant must prove that “he was so intoxicated as to be incapable 

of entertaining the specific intent or of possessing the mental state which is an essential 

element of the crime for which he is being prosecuted,” the issue “need not concern us 

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long” as the “violat[ion] of [the defendant’s] constitutional rights ... is beyond dispute.” 

Guthrie v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 683 F.2d 820, 822–23 (4th Cir. 1982) (A state 

cannot “impose[] on the defendant the burden of negating criminal intent by proving that 

he acted under the heat of passion or in a state of extreme intoxication.”). 

This holding does not stand alone. See, e.g., McHone v. Polk, 392 F.3d 691, 707 

(4th Cir. 2004) (prosecutor made incorrect statements of law which “could have led a 

rational jury to believe that defendant bore the burden of persuading the jury that he was 

so intoxicated as to be unable to form a deliberate and premeditated intent to kill”); Brown 

v. McDaniel, No. 3:09-CV-00557, 2018 WL 1567839, at *3 (D. Nev. Mar. 30, 2018), aff’d 

sub nom. Brown v. Filson, 769 F. App’x 494 (9th Cir. 2019) (the following instruction 

“improperly shifted the burden of proving intoxication” and “dilute[d] the State’s burden 

of proving each and every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt”: “[t]he burden 

of proof is upon the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was 

intoxicated to such an extent that he did not premeditate or deliberate”).

3

As a result, in order to comply with fundamental due process rights, Virginia’s 

voluntary intoxication defense must be read as imposing only a burden of production upon 

3 Before Smith, a minority of courts permitted defendants to prove voluntary

intoxication, but, even then, some acknowledged that the holding defied logic. See Long 

v. Brewer, 667 F.2d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 1982) (“We too have some difficulty, in the abstract, 

with the distinction between requiring a defendant to disprove what was in substance an 

element of the crime ... and requiring him to prove a defense (here intoxication) that may 

negative an element of the crime.”). 

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defendants.

4

 Here, the prosecutor clearly and repeatedly stated that Frizzell maintained a 

burden of persuasion to prove intoxication and negate premeditation: “the law in Virginia 

says ... you have to prove, you have the burden now of proving that you were so drunk ... 

that [you were] incapable of making any decisions” (J.A. 91–92); “he has to prove that he’s 

so incapable he’s unaware of what he’s doing” (J.A. 104); and “it was not voluntary 

intoxication because he cannot prove that he was incapable of doing it, incapable of 

premeditating” (J.A. 119–20). These statements plainly misstate the burden of proof and 

should be analyzed accordingly.

II.

After excusing procedural default for this second ineffective assistance claim, the 

district court assessed the merits and found only deficient performance. The court reasoned 

that “[f]ailing to object to repeated unconstitutional misstatements of the burden of proof 

falls below an objective standard of reasonable performance,” but Frizzell was not 

prejudiced because “[j]urors likely view statements of counsel as advocacy,” and the 

4 The majority finds that Virginia defendants can bear a burden to disprove 

premeditation after the Commonwealth proves premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt 

(Majority Op. 20), but (a) I do not read Virginia case law as expressly imposing such an 

order of operations, (b) if it does, this jury was not instructed accordingly, and (c) it remains 

inherently contradictory that premeditation could be both proved and disproved in the same 

case. Virginia practitioners recognize the same. See Intoxication, Va. Prac. Criminal 

Offenses & Defenses I21 n.11 (2023) (“The [voluntary intoxication] burden is procedural 

only. The jury should not be instructed on it because to instruct creates a risk that the jury 

will understand that the defense has a burden of persuasion.”).

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statements must be evaluated in the context of the entire trial, including instructions from 

the court. J.A. 179–80. 

I agree that trial counsel’s performance was deficient because I see “no strategic 

reasons that could have justified counsel’s failure to object” to repeated misstatements of 

the law, particularly misstatements that lowered the Commonwealth’s burden of proof. 

United States v. Carthorne, 878 F.3d 458, 469 (4th Cir. 2017). However, I disagree that 

Frizzell did not suffer prejudice. As outlined below, unlike the lesser included offenses, 

attempted capital murder required a finding of premeditation, and the prosecutor clearly 

and repeatedly misinformed the jury about how to make this finding. In light of the 

substantial evidence of Frizzell’s intoxication, had trial counsel addressed the prosecutor’s 

misstatements, there is a “reasonable probability” that the jury would not have found 

premeditation, and “the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).

In at least three sections of his rebuttal, the prosecutor distorted the premeditation 

burden and thereby mislead the jury about the findings necessary to convict Frizzell of 

attempted capital murder. See, e.g., J.A. 104 (“[H]e has to prove that he’s so incapable 

he’s unaware of what he’s doing.”). The prosecutor never corrected these misstatements, 

and, although we assume that they were viewed as “matters of argument,” this assumption

has never been powerful enough to prevent all prejudice—hence, the use of curative 

instructions. See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 384 (1990) (“Arguments of counsel 

which misstate the law are subject to objection and to correction by the court.”).

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The failure to object or request a curative instruction was especially meaningful here 

because, unlike in McHone (see Majority Op. 22–23), the prosecutor explicitly stated that 

Frizzell had a “burden of proof.” Compare J.A. 91–92, 104, 119–20 (“[T]he law in 

Virginia says ... you have the burden now of proving”; “he has to prove”; and “he cannot 

prove”), with McHone, 392 F.3d at 707 (“Evidence must show.”). The impact of these 

statements is only emphasized by the fact that they were the final words the jury heard 

about intoxication before deliberating. Compare Frizzell’s Opening Br. 7 (“jury 

instructions were given before the closing arguments”), with McHone, 392 F.3d at 708 

(“[T]he trial court’s clear, particularized, correct instruction followed almost immediately 

upon the prosecutor’s closing statement.”). 

Moreover, even if we assume, as we should, that the jury followed the earlierprovided jury instructions, those instructions did not specifically address the intoxication 

burden. The jury instructions did not expressly state that it was the Commonwealth that 

must disprove sufficient intoxication in order to prove premeditation. See J.A. 143; see 

also United States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Smith v. 

United States, 568 U.S. 106 (2013) (“[W]hen a defendant raises (by meeting his burden of 

production) a defense that negates an element of the charged offense, the government bears 

the burden of persuasion to disprove the defense.”).

Without a proper instruction on the intoxication burden, the jury was bound to 

misapply the law. Because Frizzell presented substantial evidence of intoxication, this 

misapplication likely had a meaningful effect on the jury’s “finding” of premeditation. 

Frizzell’s intoxication evidence included testimony from multiple witnesses that he was 

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“in an alcoholic blackout,” urinated on himself, had bloodshot eyes and a “thousand-yard 

stare,” made “off the wall” comments, was actively drinking beer, did not notice that he 

had been shot in the thigh, and, more generally, had been drinking “daily, often to the point 

of passing out ... and becoming non-communicative.” J.A. 150–59. Frizzell also presented 

two experts, a forensic toxicologist and a clinical psychologist, who explained how his 

intoxication level (from both alcohol and marijuana) would cause “severe impairment” and 

“significantly and adversely” affect his decision-making and self-control. J.A. 159–60. 

But ultimately, all such evidence meant little if the jury applied an unconstitutionally 

high burden to assess it (i.e., if the jury believed that Frizzell had a burden to disprove 

premeditation rather than a burden to produce intoxication evidence). As a result, had trial 

counsel addressed the improper burden shift, I find that there is a “reasonable probability” 

that the jury would not have found premeditation and convicted Frizzell of attempted 

capital murder. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. As the Supreme Court has instructed, “when 

there exists a reasonable possibility that the jury relied on an unconstitutional 

understanding of the law in reaching a guilty verdict, that verdict must be set aside.” 

Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.8 (1985). I therefore would reverse the district 

court’s finding of no prejudice and hold that Frizzell’s second Strickland claim succeeds. 

III.

Based on the foregoing, I would affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of 

the district court and remand with instructions to issue a habeas writ unless the 

Commonwealth elects to retry Frizzell within ninety days of this opinion.

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