Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00141/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00141-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 Plaintiff’s filed notices of change of address, on December 26, 2006, and on January 9, 1

2007, indicating that he had paroled; subsequently, he filed on September 26, 2007, and October

16, 2007, notices of change of address indicating that he was again incarcerated. As of February

1, 2008, however, he indicates that he has paroled again. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ZACKERY HUNT,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-06-0141 MCE GGH P

vs.

R. RODRIGUEZ, et al., 

Defendants ORDER &

 / FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

Plaintiff, a former state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 1

U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is 1) defendants’ August 20, 2007, motion to dismiss

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), to which plaintiff filed an opposition, after which defendants

filed a reply; and 2) plaintiff’s September 26, 2007, motion for summary judgment, a completely

deficient filing wherein plaintiff only seeks permission in a sentence to move for summary

judgment and does not actually file a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.

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Background

Plaintiff initially filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254, which was dismissed by Order filed on February 27, 2006, with leave to amend, pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By Order, filed on October 27, 2006, the complaint was found appropriate

for service upon defendants Parole Agent R. Rodriguez, B. Buford, J. Iniguez; and, on December

21, 2006, service of the complaint was ordered. On March 27, 2007, the court granted

defendants a 45-day extension of time to file a response to the complaint. By Order, filed on July

9, 2007, the court, noting that the defendants’ May 2, 2007, motion for more definite statement

was unopposed, granted the motion and upon re-screening the complaint, also found that plaintiff

had failed to state a claim as to the defendants. The complaint was dismissed with leave to

amend. 

In the prior order, the undersigned set forth the following:

Plaintiff contends that defendant Rodriguez, his parole agent,

placed a parole hold on him, following his arrest, on 5/31/05,

considering him to be a parole violator with a new commitment. 

Complaint, pp. 4-5. Plaintiff maintains that the hold was beyond

his discharge date, which plaintiff discovered on 2/25/06 (and,

confusingly, on 1/31/06). Id., at 5. He claims that he found that he

had discharged from three years of parole on 4/17/05, thus, before

his initial parole hold date. Id. Plaintiff thus served an additional

ten months. Id. Plaintiff then received a new prison term of 16

months, with 14 months credit, making his release date on 8/18/05,

at which time he was not released. Plaintiff’s claim is that the new

prison term should have overridden the 10-month parole violation

term. However, he alleges that defendants Buford and Iniguez

required plaintiff to complete the 10-month violation, extending

his parole release date until 3/27/06, with another 3-year parole

term, based on the new commitment. Plaintiff seeks money

damages. He also seeks an order stating that he discharged from

the prior commitment on 4/17/05.

Plaintiff’s initial filing, in the form of a petition, was dismissed

with leave to amend because plaintiff, then petitioner, had failed to

exhaust state court remedies. See Order, filed on February 27,

2006. Plaintiff was granted leave to amend in the form of an action

under § 1983, to state what appeared to be colorable due process

claims. However, in re-screening the complaint, it appears to the

court that plaintiff has not set such claims forth. It appears that

plaintiff is simply making claims of violations of his rights under

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state law. Wayne v. DHL Worldwide Express, 294 F.3d 1179,

1183 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S.

386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425 (1987) (“The presence or absence of

federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded

complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only

when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s

properly pleaded complaint”; White v. White, 731 F.2d 1440, 1442

(9th Cir. 1984) (“Federal jurisdiction exists if a complaint claims a

right to recover under the Constitution and laws of the United

States and the claim is not wholly insubstantial and frivolous”). In

this case, plaintiff’s complaint is neither “well-pleaded,” nor is a

federal question presented on the face of it. The complaint will be

dismissed but plaintiff will be granted thirty days’ leave to amend.

Order, filed on July 9, 2007, pp. 4-5. An amended complaint was filed on July 23, 2007.

First Amended Complaint

Plaintiff claims a violation of his right to due process, also setting forth a claim he

denominates “lost of liberty,” by which he no doubt intends to set forth that he has been

unconstitutionally deprived of his freedom in violation of due process (under the Fourteenth

Amendment); plaintiff also claims a violation of his right to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment (under the Eighth Amendment) and asserts these claims as to all defendants. First

Amended Complaint (FAC), pp. 4-6.

Plaintiff alleges that defendant R. Rodriguez, a parole agent, on about July 12,

2006, placed a parole hold on plaintiff in San Jose County Jail, although plaintiff had discharged

from parole “during the event.” FAC, pp. 2, 4. In addition, plaintiff suffered eight months of

incarceration due to the parole hold placement by defendant Rodriguez and the other defendants. 

FAC, p. 4.

On or around December 23, 2006, defendant B. Buford, an Acting Parole Board

Hearing Commissioner, sentenced plaintiff to ten months flat time in prison, which plaintiff

served at Corcoran State Prison but plaintiff had discharged from parole. FAC, pp. 2, 5.

On or around December 23, 2006, defendant Iniguez, a Parole Board Commission

sentenced plaintiff to ten months flat time in prison although plaintiff had discharged from

parole. FAC, pp. 2, 6.

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Plaintiff seeks money damages.

Motion to Dismiss

Defendants move for dismissal for failure to state a claim on the grounds that

plaintiff’s sparse allegations are insufficient to state a claim; that he has not alleged facts to

support a claim of violation of his due process rights or a claim of deliberate indifference; and

that defendants Buford and Iniguez are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Motion to Dismiss

(MTD), pp. 1-6.

Legal Standard

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),

a complaint must contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;”

it must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative

level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, __ U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). “The pleading

must contain something more...than...a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a

legally cognizable right of action.” Id., quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004). 

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of

the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740, 96 S.

Ct. 1848, 1850 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the

motion and resolve all doubts in the pleader’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421,

89 S. Ct. 1843, 1849, reh’g denied, 396 U.S. 869, 90 S. Ct. 35 (1969). The court will “‘presume

that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.’”

National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 256, 114 S.Ct. 798, 803

(1994), quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1992). 

Moreover, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. 

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596 (1972).

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The court may consider facts established by exhibits attached to the complaint. 

Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir. 1987). The court may also

consider facts which may be judicially noticed, Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Ct., 828 F.2d

1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987); and matters of public record, including pleadings, orders, and other

papers filed with the court, Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir.

1986). The court need not accept legal conclusions “cast in the form of factual allegations.” 

Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). 

A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an

opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F. 2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987).

Discussion

As to defendants’ argument that defendants Buford and Iniguez, Parole Board

commissioners, are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity (MTD, pp. 5-6), they are correct,

notwithstanding plaintiff’s contention otherwise (Opposition (Opp.), p. 3. 

In Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102

(1981), the Ninth Circuit addressed the question of whether parole board officials are entitled to

qualified or absolute immunity from civil rights suits. The court considered the fact that

“absolute immunity for parole board officials does leave the genuinely wronged prisoner without

civil redress against the official whose malicious or dishonest actions deprive the prisoner of

liberty.” Id. at 1303. But the court reasoned that because “parole board officials perform

functionally comparable tasks to judges when they decide to grant, deny, or revoke parole,” the

broader public interest would best be served by granting parole board officials the absolute

immunity given to judges, in order to keep them free from fear of litigation. See also, Swift v.

California, 384 F.3d 1184, 1189 (9 Cir. 2004) (“[a]bsolute immunity has also been extended to th

parole officials for the ‘imposition of parole conditions’ and the ‘execution of parole revocation

procedures,’ tasks integrally related to an official’s decision to grant or revoke parole” [internal

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 In essence, plaintiff violates as well Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, by failing to set forth “sufficient 2

allegations to put defendants fairly on notice of the claims against them.” McKeever v. Block,

932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991)). Accord Richmond v. Nationwide Cassel L.P., 52 F.3d 640,

645 (7th Cir. 1995) (amended complaint with vague and scanty allegations fails to satisfy the

notice requirement of Rule 8.)

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citation omitted]). Here, plaintiff seeks to implicate defendants Buford and Iniguez for

performing a quasi-judicial function of Parole Board members, that is, for rendering a sentencing

decision, evidently arising from a parole violation. Even if these defendants were wrong as to

when plaintiff was to have been discharged from parole, they are immune from a civil suit for

money damages by plaintiff. Therefore, the court must recommend dismissal of defendants

Buford and Iniguez from this action with prejudice.

As to defendant Rodriguez, a parole agent, however, there is no such immunity

(nor do defendants make any such argument). As the Ninth Circuit has stated:

Under California’s system of parole, a parole agent acts as a law

enforcement official when investigating parole violations and

executing parole holds... Both the California Supreme Court and

the United States Supreme Court have observed that as “peace

officers,” parole officers perform a “law enforcement function.”

People v. Willis, 28 Cal.4th 22, 40, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 105, 118, 46

P.3d 898, 909 (2002) (quoting Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S.

432, 443-44, 102 S.Ct. 735, 70 L.Ed.2d 677 (1982))...

We have held that prosecutors are not entitled to quasi-judicial

immunity when “performing investigatory or administrative

functions, or [when] essentially functioning as a police officer or

detective.” Broam, 320 F.3d at 1028. Given that prosecutors are

not entitled to absolute immunity when performing investigatory or

law enforcement functions, we hold that parole officers cannot be

entitled to absolute immunity when performing the same functions. 

Swift, supra, at 1191.

Because, therefore, plaintiff is alleging that defendant Rodriguez placed an

improper parole hold upon him while evidently performing the function of a law enforcement

officer, this defendant is not absolutely immune from suit. On the other hand, defendants are

correct that plaintiff’s allegations remain both too sparse and vague. The court will recommend 2

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dismissal on the ground that plaintiff has failed to state a claim as to the allegations he has set

forth against defendant Rodriguez, but plaintiff will be granted one final opportunity to amend

within thirty days. His second amended complaint against defendant Rodriguez must set forth at

a minimum, in addition to the date of the parole hold allegedly placed by this defendant upon

plaintiff, explicitly the date upon which plaintiff believes he was previously discharged from

parole prior to the placement of the parole hold and the basis for this allegation of a prior parole

discharge. 

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms

how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless

there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed

deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir.

1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, vague and conclusory

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board

of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in

order to make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an

amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is

because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v.

Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently

alleged. 

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss, filed on August 20, 2007 (# 27), is granted

with leave to amend only as to defendant Rodriguez, within thirty days; plaintiff’s failure to file a

timely second amended complaint, as set forth above, will result in a recommendation of

dismissal of this action; and 

2. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, filed on September 26, 2007 (# 30),

is disregarded as wholly defective.

IT IS RECOMMENDED that defendants’ motion to dismiss, filed on August 20,

2007 (# 27), be granted with prejudice as to defendants Buford and Iniguez, and these defendants

be dismissed from this action.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fifteen

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: 02/28/08

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

hunt0141.mtd

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