Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03945/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03945-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3945

___________

Elliott A. Anderson, a retiree of Case *

Corporation on January 1, 1993; on *

behalf of themselves and a similarly *

situated class.; William W. Hightower, *

a retiree of Case Corporation on August *

1, 1992; on behalf of themselves and a *

similarly situated class.; Clarence M. *

Cole, a retiree of Case Corporation on *

February 1, 1992; on behalf of *

themselves and a similarly situated *

class.; William E. Brown, a retiree of *

Case Corporation on February 1, 1992, * Appeal from the United States

on behalf of themselves and a * District Court for the 

similarly situated class.; James Boldt, a * Southern District of Iowa. 

retiree of Case Corporation on October *

1, 2002; on behalf of themselves and a *

similarly situated class.; John Wolter, a *

retiree of Case Corporation on January *

1, 2000; on behalf of themselves and a *

similarly situated class.; William Stice, *

Jr., a retiree of Case Corporation on *

April 1, 2000; on behalf of themselves *

and a similarly situated class, *

*

Appellants, *

*

v. *

*

CNH U.S. Pension Plan, now known *

as CNH Global N.V., an employee *

pension benefits plan within the *

meaning of Section 3(2)(A) of ERISA, *

Appellate Case: 06-3945 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/07/2008 Entry ID: 3399835
-2-

29 U.S.C. Section 1002 (2)(A), with *

offices in the city of Racine, Wisconsin *

of Case Corporation.; Pactiv Retirement *

Plan, now known as CNH Global N.V., *

an employee pension benefit plan *

within the meaning of Section 3(2)(A) *

of ERISA, 29 U.S.C., Section 1002 (2) *

(A), with offices in the city of *

Lincolnshire, Illinois of Case *

Corporation, * 

*

Appellees. * 

___________

Submitted: September 28, 2007

Filed: February 7, 2008

___________

Before COLLOTON, ARNOLD, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

This is a putative class action brought by several retirees of Case Corporation

against two entities that administer the company’s pension and retirement plans. The

district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification on June 30, 2006.

The defendants and the named plaintiffs reached a settlement agreement shortly

thereafter. The plaintiffs now appeal the district court’s denial of class certification.

We conclude that the case is moot, and that the appeal should be dismissed.

Appellate Case: 06-3945 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/07/2008 Entry ID: 3399835
-3-

I.

The plaintiffs are five retirees of Case Corporation and the estate of a deceased

retiree. They brought suit on behalf of themselves and similarly situated retirees,

alleging that defendants CNH U.S. Pension Plan (“CNH”) and Pactiv Retirement Plan

(“Pactiv”) had violated the terms of the retirees’ pension plan by failing to make

certain payments the month after each retiree turned 62 years old. Plaintiffs pointed

to Section 3.3 of the plan, which reads as follows:

3.3. Special Payment of Supplemental Allowance. The supplemental

allowance referred to in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 shall be payable for one

month beyond age 62 for retirees . . . whose Old Age Pension under the

Federal Social Security Act is delayed by one month beyond age 62

pursuant to the provisions of said Act.

After the complaint was filed, the defendants conceded that they had mistakenly

violated this provision, and agreed to tender the missed payment (plus interest) to both

the named and unnamed members of the putative class. By the time the plaintiffs had

filed their motion for class certification, the parties had entered into settlement

negotiations. Pactiv then began making payments to retirees covered by the plan.

Although the plaintiffs accepted the payments, they challenged the accuracy of

the amounts. For example, Plaintiff Elliott Anderson submitted a declaration claiming

that his restitution payment was some $300 less than his normal monthly payments

under the plan. It was later discovered that Anderson was referring to a $350 “special

voluntary supplement” that had been paid out monthly with the section 3.3

supplemental allowance, but was due pursuant to a different part of the plan, section

B1.4(b)(1)(c). The special voluntary supplement, like the supplemental allowance,

was supposed to be paid to qualifying retirees up through the month after each

retiree’s 62nd birthday. Although neither the special voluntary supplement nor the

relevant provision of the pension plan was raised in the complaint, Pactiv

Appellate Case: 06-3945 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/07/2008 Entry ID: 3399835
-4-

acknowledged the error, and began paying the special voluntary supplement along

with the supplemental allowance. Separate checks were mailed to those retirees who

had received the supplemental allowance but not the special voluntary supplement. 

By the time the district court ruled on the plaintiffs’ motion for class

certification, Pactiv had paid the supplemental allowance and interest to all of the

named plaintiffs, and paid the special voluntary supplement and interest to all but one

of the qualifying named plaintiffs. Pactiv also had paid most of the putative class

members in full. Defendant CNH had expressed an intention to make payments, but

had not done so at the time of the court’s order denying class certification. 

Taking both the past and planned payments into consideration, the district court

denied the plaintiffs’ motion, concluding that class certification was “unnecessary and

inappropriate at this time.” The court reasoned that it was likely that all retirees had

received the supplemental allowance or would soon receive the allowance. The court

thought that if the named plaintiffs had been offered the missing payments, but other

retirees had not, then the claims of the named plaintiffs would not be typical of the

other class members, and the plaintiffs would not be adequate class representatives.

After directing the defendants to file a complete report of payments by March 13,

2006, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion without prejudice, allowing for renewal

of the motion on or before April 3, 2006.

The defendants made additional payments and submitted detailed records of all

payments made by the deadline of March 13. Although the plaintiffs missed the April

3 deadline to renew their motion for class certification, the court allowed the plaintiffs

to renew the motion on May 12, 2006. On June 30, 2006, the district court again

denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, this time with prejudice. The court

cited its January 19 order and concluded that “defendants’ reports of payments show

that defendants have now attempted in good faith to pay all retirees any Supplemental

Allowance benefits they have been owed.”

Appellate Case: 06-3945 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/07/2008 Entry ID: 3399835
-5-

The parties reached a settlement agreement in October 2006 that allowed the

district court to enter final judgment. The agreed final judgment explained that all

individual benefits sought by the named plaintiffs pursuant to the complaint had been

paid, with interest, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The judgment

awarded thirty thousand dollars in attorneys’ fees from the defendants to the plaintiffs,

stating that this amount resolved all claims for fees and costs in the proceedings in the

district court as of the date of the judgment. The judgment provided that the plaintiffs

could move in the district court for additional attorneys’ fees and costs if the orders

denying class certification were reversed on appeal, and said that nothing in the

judgment “precludes Plaintiffs’ right to appeal” the orders denying certification of the

class.

II.

We first consider whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal. Defendants

contend that there is no pending case or controversy within the meaning of Article III

of the Constitution. We conclude that the plaintiffs have no remaining personal stake

in the litigation, and that the appeal must be dismissed as moot.

In general, a plaintiff’s claim becomes moot at the time he no longer has “a

legally cognizable interest in the outcome” – that is, when he no longer has a personal

stake in the claim. U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396 (1980)

(internal quotation omitted). In a class action, dismissal on mootness grounds

normally is required when the named plaintiffs’ claims become moot prior to a

decision on class certification. Hechenberger v. W. Elec. Co., 742 F.2d 453, 455 (8th

Cir. 1984); Inmates of Lincoln Intake and Det. Facility v. Boosalis, 705 F.2d 1021,

1023 (8th Cir. 1983). In this case, it is likely that all claims against Pactiv were moot

before the district court even ruled on class certification. Plaintiffs Anderson,

Hightower, Wolter, and Cole received and accepted payment from Pactiv for the

disputed supplemental allowance, plus interest, well before the district court ruled on

Appellate Case: 06-3945 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/07/2008 Entry ID: 3399835
-6-

the class certification motion. Plaintiff William Brown also received his supplemental

allowance, plus interest, several months prior to the district court’s ruling. As a result,

the individual claims against Pactiv were satisfied, and the named plaintiffs lost any

continuing interest in the litigation.

Plaintiffs argue that Brown’s claim was not moot, because he did not receive

his special voluntary supplement until nearly two months after the decision on class

certification. The special voluntary supplement, however, is due pursuant to a

different section of the retirement plan than the special allowance, and the complaint

made no allegation regarding failure of Pactiv to pay the special voluntary

supplement. Although Pactiv presented information to the district court regarding the

special voluntary supplement, Pactiv did so while asserting that the special voluntary

supplement was not part of the case, (J.A. 216), and the district court’s rulings focused

only on payments of the supplemental allowance. (J.A. 191, 423-24). Accordingly,

we do not believe that Pactiv impliedly consented to trying any claims concerning the

special voluntary supplement in this case. Cf. Excalibur Group, Inc. v. City of

Minneapolis, 116 F.3d 1216, 1223 n.5 (8th Cir. 1997).

Notwithstanding full payment to the named plaintiffs before a decision on

certification, the decision on certification may be deemed to “relate back” to the filing

of the complaint in limited circumstances, when the underlying merits of any given

plaintiff’s case would “evade review” by a declaration of mootness. Gerstein v. Pugh,

420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11 (1975); Hechenberger, 742 F.2d at 455. There is nothing in

this case, however, that would preclude any retiree from bringing an action against

Pactiv if for some reason Pactiv failed to make full payment of the special allowance

and interest due to the retiree. Therefore, because the claims of all named plaintiffs

against Pactiv were satisfied before the district court’s ruling on class certification,

and there is no showing that any future claims by retirees would evade review, it

appears that the case against Pactiv should have been dismissed by the district court.

See Hechenberger, 742 F.2d at 455.

Appellate Case: 06-3945 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/07/2008 Entry ID: 3399835
-7-

In any event, the voluntary settlement reached by the named plaintiffs with both

defendants leads us to conclude that the entire case is now moot. The Supreme Court

has held that where judgment is entered in favor of named plaintiffs over their

objection, Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 340 (1980), or where a

named plaintiff’s claim “expires” while an appeal is pending, Geraghty, 445 U.S. at

404, the named plaintiffs continue to have sufficient “personal stake” in the question

of class certification to avoid mootness. The Court declined to address, however,

whether named plaintiffs who voluntarily settle their individual claims after denial of

class certification may, consistent with Article III, appeal from the adverse ruling on

class certification. Id. at 404 n.10.

Since Geraghty, our court has held that a named plaintiff who settles his

individual claims must retain a “continuing interest in the litigation” in order to appeal

a denial of class certification. Potter v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc., 329 F.3d 608, 613-14

(8th Cir. 2003). We emphasized that a stipulation in a settlement agreement, by which

a plaintiff reserves the right to appeal the denial of certification, is not sufficient in and

of itself to satisfy Article III. Id. at 614 n.3. Rather, we said that when individual

claims are fully satisfied, the court of appeals, in determining whether a case or

controversy remains, “need only address whether [the plaintiff] retains an interest in

shifting costs and attorney fees to the putative class members.” Id. at 614. But cf.

Cameron-Grant v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1240, 1246-47 (11th Cir.

2003) (per curiam) (holding that a named plaintiff’s appeal was not moot, despite the

absence of any “economic interest” in shifting costs or attorneys’ fees, because the

plaintiff had a personal stake in pursuing his “procedural right” to represent a class).

Here, applying Potter, we see no continuing interest of the plaintiffs in shifting

costs and attorneys’ fees to putative class members. The stipulated judgment provides

that the plaintiffs received 100 percent of the benefits sought in this lawsuit – that is,

the supplemental allowance plus interest. The defendants agreed to pay a separate

amount, above and beyond the amounts due to the named plaintiffs, to cover

Appellate Case: 06-3945 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/07/2008 Entry ID: 3399835
-8-

attorneys’ fees, and it was agreed that this amount resolved all claims for fees to that

point of the litigation. While the judgment did provide that plaintiffs could move for

additional attorneys’ fees in the district court if the ruling on class certification were

reversed, any additional award of fees would not shift the responsibility for fees from

the named plaintiffs to putative class members. An additional award of fees from the

defendants would accrue to the benefit of plaintiffs’ counsel, to be sure, but nothing

in the record demonstrates that an additional award would relieve any burden

presently borne by the named plaintiffs themselves. Accordingly, as in Potter, we

conclude that the named plaintiffs lack a personal stake in the litigation sufficient to

satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III. For these reasons, the

appeal is dismissed as moot.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 06-3945 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/07/2008 Entry ID: 3399835