Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00312/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00312-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEWIS PERRY,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOHN GARCIA, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:12-cv-00312-AWI-SKO PC

ORDER DIRECTING SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT BE FILED, FINDING 

SERVICE OF SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT APPROPRIATE ON EIGHTH 

AMENDMENT CLAIM AGAINST 

NGUYEN, AND DISMISSING OTHER 

CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS, WITH 

PREJUDICE

(Doc. 20)

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff Lewis Perry, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this 

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on February 21, 2012. The matter was referred to 

a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. 

On October 3, 2012, the Magistrate Judge dismissed Plaintiff‟s complaint, with leave to 

amend, for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on October 31, 2012, and

on January 23, 2013, the Magistrate Judge issued findings and recommendations recommending 

dismissal of this action, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim. On May 16, 2013, after 

obtaining two extensions of time, Plaintiff filed objections and submitted a proposed second 

amended complaint, which was lodged.

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Case 1:12-cv-00312-AWI-SKO Document 21 Filed 11/06/13 Page 1 of 8
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At this juncture in the proceedings, Plaintiff has the right to amend once as a matter of 

course and therefore, his second amended complaint shall be filed, rendering moot his objections 

and the findings and recommendations to which those objections were directed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

15(a)(1).

II. Screening Order

A. Statutory Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that 

seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 

(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court 

shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

B. Eighth Amendment Claim

1. Allegations

Plaintiff seeks to impose liability on Doctors Nguyen, Garcia, and Freeman; Chief Medical 

Officer Lonigro; Warden Trimble; and Does 1-25 for violating his right to medical care under the 

Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. At the time of the events in question, 

Plaintiff was incarcerated at Pleasant Valley State Prison in Coalinga, California. Plaintiff is now 

at California Medical Facility in Vacaville, California.

As recognized by the Magistrate Judge in both prior screening orders, Plaintiff‟s allegation 

that he suffers from chronic, painful boils which become infected and fail to heal is sufficient to 

support the existence of a serious medical condition. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 

(9th Cir. 2012). However, to state a viable Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff must also allege 

facts showing that each of the named defendants knew of and disregarded Plaintiff‟s medical 

needs, causing him harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994); Estelle 

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v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-06, 97 S.Ct. 285 (1976); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122; Jett v. Penner, 

439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006).

At the time Plaintiff was transferred to Pleasant Valley State Prison, he was suffering from 

chronic, painful boils which would open and drain pus. After prison physicians were unsuccessful 

in treating Plaintiff conservatively via topical ointments and dressing changes, they referred 

Plaintiff to Defendant Garcia at San Joaquin Community Hospital. Defendant Garcia found that 

Plaintiff was presenting with chronic perineal infection, and on March 30, 2010, Defendant Garcia 

performed surgery on Plaintiff in an attempt to clear up the boils. 

Several months later, Plaintiff was readmitted to the hospital after he failed to heal from 

the surgery and the area around the surgical site became infected. Plaintiff was kept at the prison‟s 

hospital for several more months, where he continued to develop painful, infected, open boils.

Plaintiff was then seen and treated by Defendant Freeman, a contract physician. However, 

a week after Defendant Freeman attempted to re-suture Plaintiff‟s wounds, the wounds opened up 

again and became infected, causing Plaintiff additional pain and suffering.

Plaintiff alleges that his treating physician, Defendant Nguyen, did nothing more than 

order dressing changes on a regular basis. Bloody pus continued to drain from the open wounds 

and boils. Plaintiff‟s medical problems were beyond “the defendants‟” medical training and 

experience, but they did nothing further for him for twelve months. (2nd Amend. Comp., ¶33.)

Plaintiff was finally seen in September 2011 at the University of California, San Francisco, 

where he was informed his condition could be treated but it would require major surgery and 

extensive recovery. Approximately nine months later, Plaintiff was informed that he would not be 

getting the surgery because it was too costly.

Plaintiff alleges that he continued suffer from his medical condition. Finally, on January 

31, 2013, Plaintiff was transferred to California Medical Facility for treatment, where the pattern 

continues.

2. Defendants Garcia and Freeman

With respect to outside physicians Garcia and Freeman, Plaintiff‟s second amended 

complaint is devoid of any facts supporting his claim that they acted with deliberate indifference 

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to his medical needs.1 The fact that the surgeries or procedures they performed failed to achieve 

the desired results does not support a claim against them and they are entitled to dismissal. Snow 

v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation and quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 

680 F.3d at 1122.

3. Defendants Lonigro and Trimble

Likewise, there are no facts supporting a claim against Defendants Lonigro and Trimble. 

Defendants may not be held liable based solely on their positions of authority at the prison: section 

1983 requires personal involvement in the violation at issue and liability may not be imposed 

under a theory of respondeat superior. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011), 

cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2101 (2012); Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 

(9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 

297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The conclusory assertion that Defendants Lonigro and Trimble are “directly and legally 

responsible” is not a substitute for factual allegations linking them to the violation at issue. Doe I 

v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009). (2nd Amend. Comp., ¶¶16, 18.) The

Court is mindful that prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their 

pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 

F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010), but the standard is not so lenient as to “unlock the doors of 

discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678-79, 129 S.Ct. 662 (2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully 

does not suffice and Defendants Lonigro and Trimble are entitled to dismissal. Id. at 678 

(quotation marks omitted). 

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1 The presumption is that “conduct by private actors is not state action,” Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, 

N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1000 (2012), but “„state action may be found if . . . 

there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly 

treated as that of the State itself,‟” Florer, 639 F.3d at 924 (quoting Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary 

School Athletic Assoc., 531 U.S. 288, 295, 121 S.Ct. 924 (2001)). For purposes of screening, the Court will assume 

these outside physicians were acting under color of state law by virtue of their contract with the state. West v. Atkins, 

487 U.S. 42, 54, 108 S.Ct. 2250 (1988) (citations omitted). 

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4. Defendant Nguyen

Finally, Defendant Nguyen was Plaintiff‟s primary care physician at the prison. A 

complete denial of medical care is not required to show deliberate indifference. Lopez v. Smith, 

203 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000). “The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials 

provide a system of ready access to adequate medical care.” Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 

1253 (9th Cir. 1982), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-

84, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995). “[M]edical staff must be competent to examine prisoners and diagnose 

illnesses,” and must either “be able to treat medical problems or to refer prisoners to others who 

can.” Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1253.

In light of Plaintiff‟s serious medical condition, a condition which presented challenges 

prison medical staff acknowledged being unequipped to address, the allegation that Defendant 

Nguyen, Plaintiff‟s primary care physician, failed to take any action beyond regular dressing 

changes for one year is sufficient to support a claim under the Eighth Amendment. 

C. Conspiracy Claim

Plaintiff also alleges a conspiracy claim under section 1985, which provides a cause of 

action for conspiracy to deny equal protection of the laws. Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027-

28 (9th Cir. 1985). Given the nature of Plaintiff‟s claim, which has been consistent across three 

pleadings, there is no support his reliance on section 1985 for redress. There are no facts pled, nor 

have there ever been, which even hint at the possibility of racial or class-based discrimination

against Plaintiff. Bretz, 773 F.2d at 1028-1030. Accordingly, Plaintiff‟s section 1985 conspiracy

claim fails as a matter of law.2

D. IIED Claim

Plaintiff next alleges a claim under California law for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress (IIED). The Government Claims Act requires that a tort claim against a public entity or 

its employees be presented to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board 

no more than six months after the cause of action accrues. Cal. Gov‟t Code §§ 905.2, 910, 911.2, 

 

2 To the extent Plaintiff‟s claim should be construed as brought under section 1983, there are still no facts pled, nor 

have there ever been, supporting the existence of a conspiracy to violate Plaintiff‟s rights. Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 

583, 592 (9th Cir. 2010); Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2001).

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945.4, 950-950.2. Presentation of a written claim, and action on or rejection of the claim are 

conditions precedent to suit; and to state a tort claim against a public employee, Plaintiff is 

required to allege in his complaint facts demonstrating compliance with the Government Claims 

Act. Shirk v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist., 42 Cal.4th 201, 208-09 (Cal. 2007); State v. Superior Court 

of Kings Cnty. (Bodde), 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239 (Cal. 2004); Mangold v. California Pub. Utils. 

Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995); Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 

F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff‟s bald assertion that he complied with the Government 

Claims Act does not suffice to demonstrate he timely presented a claim or that compliance with 

the claims statute was excused. 3 Shirk., 42 Cal.4th at 209. 

In addition to that deficiency, Plaintiff‟s second amended complaint contains no facts 

which support a claim for IIED, the elements of which are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by 

the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, 

emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff‟s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual 

and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant‟s outrageous conduct. Corales 

v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 571 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted); Tekkle v. United States, 

567 F.3d 554, 855 (9th Cir. 2007); Simo v. Union of Needletrades, Industrial & Textile Employees, 

322 F.3d 602, 621-22 (9th Cir. 2003). The crux of Plaintiff‟s claims is and has been the denial of 

adequate treatment for his challenging medical condition, and the facts set forth in Plaintiff‟s 

second amended complaint do not support the existence of an IIED claim. 

E. Relief Sought

Finally, in addition to damages, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that his rights were violated 

and an injunction requiring he be provided with proper medical care. Because Plaintiff‟s claim for 

damages necessarily entails a determination whether his rights were violated, his separate request 

for declaratory relief is subsumed by that claim. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 565-66 n.8 

(9th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted). Further, because Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at

Pleasant Valley State Prison, he lacks standing to pursue a claim for injunctive relief against 

 

3 The Court notes that Plaintiff‟s prior two pleadings alleged only compliance with the prison grievance system and 

his original complaint was supported with prison grievance system documents.

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Defendant Nguyen. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (1992); 

Alvarez v. Hill, 667 F.3d 1061, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 2012); Nelson v. Heiss, 271 F.3d 891, 897 (9th 

Cir. 2001); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (“Prospective relief in any civil action with respect 

to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal 

right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective 

relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to 

correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the 

violation of the Federal right.”) 

Accordingly, Plaintiff is limited to seeking damages for the past violation of his rights at 

Pleasant Valley State Prison.

III. Order

This action for damages shall proceed on Plaintiff‟s second amended complaint against 

Defendant Nguyen for violation of the Eighth Amendment. All other claims and defendants are

dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff was twice provided with detailed 

screening orders and the events giving rise to his legal claims - the denial of adequate medical care

for his challenging condition - have been consistent across three pleadings. As a result, further 

leave to amend to cure the deficiencies identified in this order is not warranted. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 

1130.

Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY ORDERS as follows:

1. Plaintiff‟s second amended complaint, lodged on May 16, 2013, shall be filed;

2. Plaintiff‟s Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Garcia, Freeman, 

Longoria, and Trimble are dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim;

3. Plaintiff‟s conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims are 

dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim; 

4. This action, which is limited to damages, shall proceed on Plaintiff‟s Eighth 

Amendment medical care claim against Defendant Nguyen; and

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5. This matter is referred back to the Magistrate Judge to initiate service of process.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 5, 2013 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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