Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_00-cv-01228/USCOURTS-cand-3_00-cv-01228-43/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CURTIS LEE ERVIN, ) CASE NO. CV 00-1228 LHK

)

Petitioner, ) DEATH PENALTY CASE

)

v. )

) ORDER 

RON DAVIS, Warden, )

California State Prison at San Quentin, )

)

Respondent.1)

 )

____________________________________ )

I. INTRODUCTION

Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to all 37 claims contained 

in Petitioner’s amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner opposes Respondent’s 

motion and requests an evidentiary hearing on 15 claims. This Order addresses Petitioner’s claims 

1 through 6, which pertain to severance and jury selection issues. For the reasons discussed 

below, Respondent’s motion with respect to claims 1 through 5 is GRANTED, and ruling on claim 

6 is deferred. The remainder of Petitioner’s claims shall be addressed in subsequent Orders. 

 

1Ron Davis, acting warden of the California State Prison at San Quentin, is substituted as

Respondent for his predecessor in that position pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure.

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II. BACKGROUND

The following recitation of the factual background of this case is based on the California 

Supreme Court’s opinion on Petitioner’s direct appeal. People v. Ervin, 22 Cal. 4th 48 (2000). 

The state court’s factual determinations are presumed to be correct pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 

2254(e)(1).

Petitioner was convicted in the Superior Court of Alameda County of first degree murder 

with the special circumstance finding of murder for financial gain for the November 7, 1986 

killing of Carlene McDonald. Evidence at Petitioner’s trial established that Robert McDonald, the 

victim’s former husband, hired Petitioner and Arestes Robinson, to kill Carlene for $2,500.00. 

Petitioner’s acquaintance, Armond Jack, drove Petitioner and Robinson to the victim’s apartment 

in El Sobrante on the night of the murder. Petitioner and Robinson then abducted Carlene. Using 

Carlene’s vehicle, Petitioner and Robinson took Carlene to Tilden Park and stabbed Carlene to 

death and left her body. The men were armed with a BB gun that looked like a .45 caliber pistol 

as well as the knife used to kill Carlene. A patrol officer found Carlene’s body the next afternoon. 

Petitioner and Robinson met with Robert McDonald the day after the murder. They 

presented Carlene’s driver’s license as proof of the killing. McDonald paid them $2,500.00, 

which Petitioner shared with Robinson and others to buy cocaine. McDonald paid Petitioner an 

additional $1,700.00 a couple of weeks after the murder. Sharon Williams, Petitioner’s girlfriend, 

testified that Petitioner gave her a watch and a ring later identified as belonging to Carlene. Jack 

testified under a grant of immunity that he had driven with Petitioner to meet with McDonald to 

negotiate the price for killing Carlene. Jack was also present when Petitioner and Robinson 

searched for Carlene’s car in a Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) parking lot. According to Jack, 

while he, Petitioner and Robinson were driving to Carlene’s apartment on the night of the murder, 

Petitioner asked for and received a knife from Robinson. The knife looked like the 13-inch 

kitchen knife the prosecutor showed Jack.

Ample physical evidence linked Petitioner to the crime, including his possession of 

Carlene’s watch, ring, car and a BB gun found in the house of Petitioner’s acquaintance, David 

Willis. The BB gun resembled the weapon Petitioner used to kidnap Carlene. 

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Additionally, Petitioner admitted various incriminating aspects of the crime to David 

Willis, Zane Sinnott, Gwyn Willis, and the investigating officer, Sergeant Dana Weaver. 

According to these witnesses, Petitioner admitted that he and Robinson confronted Carlene, 

pointed the BB gun at her, forced her into her car and drove her to Tilden Park, where Petitioner 

stabbed her to death while Robinson held her. The prosecutor also introduced the prior testimony 

of Robinson’s girlfriend, Gail Johnson, who stated that Robinson admitted participating in the 

murder. 

Robinson, McDonald and Petitioner were tried together. Petitioner made no claims of 

innocence, but sought to impeach or discredit the testimony of prosecution witnesses Jack, Sinnott 

and David Willis. Additionally, Dr. Fred Rosenthal, a psychiatrist, testified that cocaine 

consumption may have impaired Petitioner’s thought processes.

During the penalty phase, the prosecution introduced evidence of Petitioner’s prior bank 

robbery conviction and some minor jail disciplinary problems. The prosecutor also introduced 

evidence of uncharged assaults involving Robinson as perpetrator. Petitioner introduced 

mitigating evidence regarding his character, employment, family, drug use, religious involvement 

and musical skills. Codefendants McDonald and Robinson also introduced mitigating evidence.

The jury returned death verdicts for Petitioner and McDonald, but chose life imprisonment 

without parole for Robinson. 

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 6, 2000, the California Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and 

sentence. Ervin, 22 Cal. 4th at 66. The United States Supreme Court denied his application for a 

writ of certiorari on October 2, 2000. Ervin v. California, 531 U.S. 842 (2000). 

On November 12, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with this 

Court. (ECF Doc. No. 32) On January 22, 2003, Petitioner filed a substitute corrected petition for 

a writ of habeas corpus. (ECF Doc. No. 45) That same day, the Court stayed the federal habeas 

proceedings so that Petitioner could return to state court to exhaust claims. Petitioner filed a state 

habeas petition on October 1, 2003, and on December 14, 2005, the California Supreme Court 

denied that petition.

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Respondent filed an answer on November 2, 2006. (ECF Doc. No. 70) On September 7, 

2007, Petitioner filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus raising thirty-seven claims. 

(ECF Doc. No. 97) On March 7, 2008, Respondent filed a response to the amended petition. 

(ECF Doc. No. 110) Petitioner filed a traverse on November 13, 2008. (ECF Doc. No. 133) 

On May 29, 2009, petitioner filed a motion for discovery. (ECF Doc. No. 143) This 

motion was granted in part and denied in part on March 22, 2010. (ECF Doc. No. 161) Petitioner 

filed a request to depose a dying witness, as well as a supplemental motion for discovery on June 

6, 2011. (ECF Doc. Nos. 178,179). On September 8, 2011, Petitioner's request to conduct a 

deposition was granted, and his supplemental discovery motion was granted in part and denied in 

part. (ECF Doc. No. 189)

Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment on February 14, 2012. (ECF Doc. No. 

213) Petitioner filed a motion to re-open discovery on March 5, 2012. (ECF Doc. No. 217) This 

motion was granted on April 11, 2012. (ECF Doc. No. 220) 

On January 8, 2013, Petitioner filed an opposition to respondent’s motion for summary 

judgment and a request for an evidentiary hearing. (ECF Doc. No. 249) Respondent filed a reply 

on May 10, 2013. (ECF Doc. No. 259). Petitioner filed a reply to Respondent’s opposition to 

Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing on August 16, 2013. (ECF Doc. No. 266) The case 

was transferred to the undersigned Judge on January 7, 2015. (ECF Doc. No. 268)

On March 16, 2015, the Court stayed Petitioner’s penalty-phase claims pending the Ninth 

Circuit’s resolution of an appeal filed in Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp.3d 1050 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 

2014). (ECF Doc. No. 269) The Ninth Circuit decided Jones on November 12, 2015, reversing 

the district court’s grant of relief on a claim that California’s post-conviction system of review 

violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Jones v. 

Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015). All of Petitioner’s claims are now ripe for review.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT (“AEDPA”)

Because Petitioner filed his original petition in 2002, well after AEDPA’s effective date of 

April 24, 1996, the standards of AEDPA apply to this case. See Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 

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202, 206 (2003). Pursuant to AEDPA, a district court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus with 

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s 

adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court 

of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

In determining whether a petitioner is entitled to relief under this provision, a federal court’s 

review “is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the 

merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180 (2011).

The “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” prongs of section 2254(d)(1) have 

separate and distinct meanings. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000). A state court’s 

decision is “contrary to” clearly established U.S. Supreme Court law if that decision fails to apply 

the correct controlling authority or if it applies the controlling authority to a case involving facts 

materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different 

result. Id. at 412–13. A decision is an “unreasonable application” of U.S. Supreme Court law if 

“the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle . . . but unreasonably applies that 

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. Importantly, “an unreasonable

application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410). A state court’s 

determination that a claim lacks merit is not unreasonable “so long as ‘fairminded jurists could 

disagree’ on [its] correctness.” Id. (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 653, 664 (2004)).

Holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision are the only 

definitive source of clearly established federal law under section 2254(d)(1). See Williams, 529 

U.S. at 412; see also Lopez v. Smith, 135 S. Ct. 1, 4 (2014) (per curiam) (“AEDPA permits habeas 

relief only if a state court’s decision is ’contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Federal law’ as determined by this Court, not by the courts of appeals.”). 

While a federal court may “look to circuit precedent to ascertain whether [the circuit] has already 

held that the particular point in issue is clearly established by Supreme Court precedent,” Marshall 

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v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013) (per curiam), “[c]ircuit precedent cannot refine or 

sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that [the 

Supreme] Court has not announced,” Lopez, 135 S. Ct. at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).

To find under section 2254(d)(2) that a state court’s decision was based on “an 

unreasonable determination of the facts,” a federal court “must be convinced that an appellate 

panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not reasonably conclude that the 

finding is supported by the record before the state court.” Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 778 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 710 (2014). In other words, 

“a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court 

would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15 

(2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). That said, “where the state courts plainly 

misapprehend or misstate the record in making their findings, and the misapprehension goes to a 

material factual issue that is central to petitioner’s claim, that misapprehension can fatally 

undermine the fact-finding process, rendering the resulting factual finding unreasonable.” Taylor

v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004).

In the event that a federal court “determine[s], considering only the evidence before the 

state court, that the adjudication of a claim on the merits resulted in a decision contrary to or 

involving an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or that the state court’s 

decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts,” the federal court evaluates the 

petitioner’s constitutional claim “de novo.” Hurles, 752 F.3d at 778. If constitutional error is 

found, however, habeas relief is warranted only if that error “had substantial and injurious effect 

or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993). 

Under this standard, petitioners “may obtain plenary review of their constitutional claims, but they 

are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in 

‘actual prejudice.’” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (quoting United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 

(1986)); accord Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2198 (2015).

B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable 

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inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are no genuine disputes of 

material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986). At the summary judgment stage, the Court 

“does not assess credibility or weigh the evidence, but simply determines whether there is a 

genuine factual issue for trial.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 559–60 (2006). A fact is “material” 

if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and a dispute as to a material 

fact is “genuine” if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to decide in favor of 

the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “Bald 

assertions that genuine issues of material fact exist,” however, “are insufficient.” Galen v. Cnty. of 

L.A., 477 F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2007); see also United States ex rel. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics 

C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1061 (9th Cir. 2011) (“To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff 

must set forth non-speculative evidence of specific facts, not sweeping conclusory allegations.”). 

“If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be 

granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted).

V. DISCUSSION

A. Claim 1 

In claim 1, Petitioner asserts that the trial court deprived him of his constitutional rights by 

failing to order separate trials when conflicts arose during jury selection and trial. In June 1988, 

the prosecution moved to consolidate the case against Petitioner, Robinson and McDonald. Over 

Petitioner’s objection, the counts against the three defendants were consolidated. Later, in 

February 2009, Petitioner moved to sever his case from those of his codefendants. His motion 

was denied. Petitioner contends that the joinder of the cases was prejudicial. He asserts that 

jurors qualified to judge Petitioner were eliminated due to their inability to return a death verdict 

for McDonald—because of his lack of physical involvement in the murder and spotless criminal 

record—resulting in a death-leaning jury. (ECF Doc. No. 249 at 28) Additionally, Petitioner 

alleges that the trial judge’s repeated instructions that evidence which was admissible against one 

or two of the defendants was not admissible against another defendant resulted in a strong 

likelihood of jury confusion. (ECF Doc. No. 249 at 29)

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Respondent alleges that the California Supreme Court reasonably denied this claim on 

direct appeal. The California Supreme Court found that in contesting the trial court’s denial of his 

motion to sever, Petitioner improperly relied on “supposed conflicts,” such as the removal of 

jurors who indicated that they might be unable to return a death verdict for McDonald, that 

occurred after the court had denied severance. Ervin, 22 Cal. 4th at 68. The California Supreme 

Court noted that “a motion to sever must be supported by adequate grounds existing at the time the 

motion is heard.” Id. The California Supreme Court also rejected Petitioner’s claim that the trial 

court had a sua sponte duty to sever once grounds for severance developed, as follows:

[Petitioner’s] point lacks merit. We have held that, in light of the 

statutory preference for joint trials, (see § 1098), severance remains 

largely within the trial court’s discretion. Nonetheless, we have also 

stated that a reviewing court may reverse a conviction when, 

because of consolidation, “a gross unfairness” has deprived the 

defendant of a fair trial. The record in the present case, however, 

fails to show that the jurors in this joint trial were unable or 

unwilling to assess independently the respective culpability of each 

codefendant or were confused by the limiting instructions. Indeed, 

their verdicts (imposing death for McDonald and defendant, but life 

without parole for Robinson) indicate the contrary was true. 

Defendant points to no “gross unfairness” resulting from the trial 

court’s failure to sever. He merely cites “the possibility of juror 

confusion.” We find no abuse of discretion, denial of due process, 

or other error in the court’s ruling denying severance, or in its 

subsequent failure to order severance sua sponte.

Id. at 69 (internal citations omitted).

On habeas, a federal court’s review of a state court’s denial of a severance motion is not 

governed by state laws relating to severance. Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 370 (9th Cir. 

1997) (“We do not depend on the state law governing severance in state trials”). Nor is it 

governed by federal rules addressing severance in federal trials. Id.; see Collins v. Runnels, 603 

F.3d 1127, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that United States Supreme Court decisions 

addressing severance under federal rules do not apply to analysis of whether joinder in state courts 

was constitutional). Rather, its inquiry is limited to the petitioner’s right to a fair trial under the 

United States Constitution. Grisby, 130 F.3d at 370. To prevail, a petitioner must demonstrate 

that the state court’s joinder or denial of his severance motion resulted in prejudice great enough to 

render his trial fundamentally unfair. Id.

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Here, Petitioner fails to establish that the trial court’s joinder rendered his trial 

fundamentally unfair. Only one course of criminal conduct was involved, the evidence 

incriminating Petitioner was straightforward, and the roles of the defendants could easily be 

compartmentalized, as evidenced by the differing verdicts, i.e. the death penalty for Petitioner and 

McDonald, and life without parole for Robinson. As the California Supreme Court noted, no 

“gross unfairness” resulted from the trial court’s failure to sever. Ervin, 22 Cal. 4th at 69.

Petitioner argues, nonetheless, that the jury could have been confused by the fact that some 

evidence was admissible only against certain defendants. For example, he refers to Gwyn Willis’s 

statement that Petitioner said he was going to collect money from McDonald on the day after the 

murder. (ECF Doc. No. 249 at 29) Petitioner asserts that this statement was initially admitted 

only against Petitioner, but later deemed to be admissible against McDonald as well. Petitioner 

fails, however, to explain how he could have been prejudiced by these evidentiary rulings.

Petitioner also argues that joinder led to the jury hearing Gail Johnson’s preliminary 

examination testimony that she saw Petitioner, Jack and Robinson at her home the night of the 

murder, that they left together, and that the next day, Robinson possessed a large sum of money. 

(ECF Doc. No. 249 at 29) She also testified about Robinson’s comments about being involved in 

murder for hire. Petitioner contends that the jury heard this evidence only because trial had not 

been severed. The California Supreme Court, however, concluded that this evidence was 

admissible against Petitioner. Ervin, 22 Cal. 4th at 84-85. Gail Johnson’s testimony thus would 

have been admitted even if the cases had been severed.

Petitioner further contends that his right to an impartial jury was violated because 

prospective jurors who would have been qualified to sit on his jury were eliminated solely because 

they were deemed unqualified to sit as jurors in his codefendant McDonald’s case. Petitioner does 

not cite to any authority supporting the proposition that excluding such jurors renders a joint trial 

fundamentally unfair, and the Court has found none. 

Finally, Petitioner argues that the trial court’s limiting instructions were futile in the face of 

the confusion allegedly suffered by the jury, and that the resulting prejudice violated the principles 

enunciated in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). In Bruton, the United States Supreme 

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Court held that the use of the out-of-court confession (or inculpatory statements) of a codefendant 

who did not testify at trial violates the nonconfessing defendant’s right of cross-examination 

secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and this violation is not cured by a 

jury instruction that the confession should be disregarded in determining the nonconfessing 

defendant’s guilt or innocence. 391 U.S. at 134-37. In claiming alleged confusion caused by the 

statements of various witnesses who are not co-defendants, however, Petitioner’s contentions go 

beyond the scope of the rule in Bruton, which is limited to incriminating statements made by a 

nontestifying codefendant. See 391 U.S. at 135-36; accord Davidson v. Vasquez, No. 09-56691, 

2011 WL 1748349 (9th Cir. May 9, 2011). Thus, Petitioner’s claim 1 cannot rely on Bruton. 

Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim 

was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by 

the United States Supreme Court. Accordingly, the Court grants Respondent’s motion for 

summary judgment as to claim 1. 

B. Claim 2 

In claim 2, Petitioner alleges that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by 

improperly excusing for cause four prospective jurors, Joseph Pontes, Marilyn Pyle, Kathryn Kane 

and Jean Graham. He asserts that their views would not have substantially impaired their ability 

to be neutral and follow the court’s directions in contravention of Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 

412 (1985). Petitioner further alleges that these jurors were improperly asked to prejudge the 

evidence. Respondent contends that the California Supreme Court reasonably denied this claim.

On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court addressed this claim as follows:

Defendant next contends that several prospective jurors were 

improperly excused because they expressed inability to render a 

death verdict against codefendant McDonald. In each case, the 

prosecutor outlined the general charges against the three 

codefendants, observing that McDonald had no prior criminal record 

and was charged with hiring his ex-wife’s actual killers, defendant 

and Robinson. In each instance, the trial court found, based on the 

prospective jurors’ demeanor and voir dire responses, that their 

views would prevent or substantially impair their ability to be 

neutral and follow the court’s instructions. (See Wainwright v. Witt

(1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 [105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841].) 

Because prospective jurors frequently give “halting, equivocal, or 

even conflicting” voir dire responses in capital cases, we usually 

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defer to the trial court’s evaluation of their states of mind and 

qualifications to serve. (People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 

1094 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 321, 875 P.2d 36].)

Defendant argues that the prosecutor erred in framing his voir dire 

examination by outlining or previewing the actual case to be tried, 

disclosing facts about McDonald’s lack of criminal record and 

nonparticipation in the actual killing, and concealing or 

“whitewashing” aggravating facts about McDonald later used 

against him at the penalty phase. Defendant relies, in part, on 

authorities suggesting that prospective jurors may not be excluded 

under the “automatic vote” rule of Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 

391 U.S. 510, 522, footnote 21 [88 S.Ct. 1770, 1777, 20 L.Ed.2d 

776], merely because they expressed an inability to vote for death 

under the facts in the case before them. (See People v. Fields (1983) 

35 Cal.3d 329, 358, fn. 13 [197 Cal.Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680].) As 

we observed in People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583 [268 Cal.Rptr. 

399, 789 P.2d 127], under Fields, “excusing a juror for cause 

because he would vote against the death penalty based on evidence 

to be presented would violate Witherspoon,” presumably because 

that vote would not constitute an automatic vote against death 

regardless of the facts in the case. (People v. Clark, supra, 50 Cal.3d 

at p. 597, fn. 4; see also People v. Fudge, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 

1094-1095.)

As previously indicated, Witherspoon’s “automatic vote” test has 

been replaced by a different formulation asking whether the 

prospective jurors’ views on capital punishment would prevent or 

substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors. 

(Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424 [105 S.Ct. at p. 852].) 

Exposing prospective jurors to the general facts surrounding the case 

will not inevitably preclude their disqualification under that 

formulation. As we stated in People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 

988, 1005 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248], “A prospective juror 

who would invariably vote either for or against the death penalty 

because of one or more circumstances likely to be present in the 

case being tried, without regard to the strength of aggravating and 

mitigating circumstances, is therefore subject to challenge for cause, 

whether or not the circumstance that would be determinative for that 

juror has been alleged in the charging document. [Citations.]”

Thus, we have recently indicated that the court properly may 

exclude prospective jurors who have expressed an inability to 

impose the death penalty in any felony-murder case. (See People v. 

Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 916-917.) As we stated in 

Pinholster, “Each juror’s reluctance to impose the death penalty was 

based not on an evaluation of the particular facts of the case, but on 

an abstract inability to impose the death penalty in a felony-murder 

case.” (Id. at p. 916; see also People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 

1044, 1114 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384] [exclusion proper for 

prospective jurors unable to consider all sentencing alternatives, 

including death].) Pinholster reached its conclusion even though the 

trial court had permitted the prosecutor to question the prospective 

jurors regarding their attitudes toward the specific facts of the case. 

(People v. Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 918.)

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Pinholster controls here. The record in this case discloses that each 

of the prospective jurors in question expressed a similar abstract 

inability to impose death on the hirer in a murder-for-hire case. 

Paraphrasing Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at page 917, the people of 

the State of California have determined that murder for hire is a 

category of crime for which a defendant may be subject to death, 

depending on the circumstances. We should defer to the trial court’s 

finding, based on their voir dire responses, that the prospective 

jurors at issue here were unable to follow the law in this respect. 

(See People v. Fudge, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1094.) Accordingly, the 

exclusions were proper under Wainwright and Pinholster. We note 

that none of the foregoing authorities suggest that, for voir dire 

purposes, the prosecutor must disclose all facts, aggravating or 

otherwise, that comprise the People’s case.

In any event, it seems doubtful defendant could demonstrate he was 

prejudiced by the exclusion of prospective jurors who indicated they 

could not impose the death penalty on a person such as McDonald 

but expressed no difficulty with a death sentence for actual killers 

such as defendant or Robinson.

Ervin, 22 Cal. 4th at 69-71.

A prospective juror must be removed for cause if his views or beliefs would prevent or 

substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions 

and his oath. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424. “Even if only one juror is unduly biased or 

prejudiced, the defendant is denied his constitutional right to an impartial jury.” Tinsley v. Borg, 

895 F.2d 520, 523-34 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). Federal habeas relief 

may be granted for a state trial court’s failure to strike a juror for cause only when there is no fair 

support in the record for the trial court’s determination that the juror was unbiased. Wainwright, 

469 U.S. at 434. The state court’s determination of juror partiality is entitled to a presumption of 

correctness on federal habeas review. Id. at 429; Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 (1984); see 

also United States v. Alexander, 48 F.3d 1477, 1484 (9th Cir.) (determination of impartiality 

particularly within province of trial judge), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 878 (1995).

Petitioner’s contention that the prosecutor improperly asked the jurors to prejudge the 

evidence is unavailing. The disclosure of facts relating to McDonald’s lack of a criminal record 

and non-participation in the killing were aimed at determining whether the prospective jurors 

would invariably decline to vote for death in a murder-for-hire case. See, e.g., questioning of 

Pontes, RT 1821 (“If . . . you have concluded that . . . the defendant McDonald hired people to kill 

his former wife . . . murder for hire, if you will . . . for that type of crime . . . do you really think 

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that you’d have an open mind . . . as to both sentencing choices?”); questioning of Pyle, RT 2490-

91 (“If, in the guilt phase of trial, you. . . decided that Mr. McDonald hired two people to kill his 

former wife and the other two defendants participated in her murder. Basically, . . . a murder for 

hire. Do you think you’d have an open mind in beginning the penalty trial as to both sentencing 

options?”); questioning of Kane, RT 3261 (“The facts . . . are that Mr. McDonald . . . sought to 

have . . . [his wife] murdered and he hired two others to do that . . . Is that a type of crime that you 

think is serious enough in which the death penalty could possibly apply?”) The record thus 

supports the California Supreme Court’s determination that the dismissed jurors’ reluctance to 

impose the death penalty was based not on an evaluation of the specific facts of the case, but on an 

“abstract inability to impose death on the hirer in a murder-for-hire case.” Ervin, 22 Cal. 4th at 

70-71. 

Noting that murder-for hire is a capital crime in California, the California Supreme Court 

proceeded to defer to the trial court’s finding that the jurors in question would be unable to follow 

the law and concluded that their exclusions were proper under Wainwright. Id. at 71. As 

discussed below, the California Supreme Court’s decision is supported by the record. Although 

the California Supreme Court referred to the excused jurors collectively, this Court will address 

each in turn.

1. Joseph Pontes

The record supports the California Supreme Court’s determination that Pontes’ dismissal 

was proper. The prosecutor asked Pontes:

If, in the penalty phase, it is shown that Mr. McDonald has never 

been in trouble in his whole life prior to this particular crime, and 

you hear mitigating evidence on his behalf, would you ever be able, 

in that situation, to impose the death penalty based on the crime 

itself?

RT 1827. Pontes answered “no.” Id.

After the prosecutor finished questioning Pontes, Spencer Strellis, McDonald’s attorney, 

questioned Pontes as follows:

Q: My client is accused of the crime that we’re talking about. Now 

all I am asking you: is that the kind of crime, in and of itself, where 

you could make, intelligently, a decision between life and death or is 

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that the kind of crime it’s either so bad that you would always vote 

for death or it’s just not bad enough that that would bring you within 

the spectrum where you could conceive of yourself returning a death 

penalty?”

A: It’s not that kind of crime.

Q: When you are talking of the death penalty, you are thinking of 

children, mutilating, and hundreds of thousands of people killed and 

stuff like that?

A: Possibly, yes.

Q: In any instance, if I understand what you are telling me, this is 

not a crime that reaches that threshold for badness, for want of 

another word?

A: Yeah.

RT 1827-28. After this response, the trial court made the determination that based on Wainwright, 

Pontes’ views would “substantially impair his ability to be neutral and follow the court’s 

instructions.” RT 1828. 

In light of Pontes’ statement that the crime at issue was not the “kind of crime” that would 

warrant the death penalty, the record supports the California Supreme Court’s determination that 

Pontes expressed an “abstract inability to impose death on the hirer in a murder-for-hire case” and 

would therefore be unable to follow California law categorizing murder-for-hire as a death-eligible

crime. Ervin, 22 Cal. 4th at 70-71. The record confirms that Pontes’ views would impair his 

ability to perform his duties in contravention of Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424 (prospective juror 

may be excluded for cause if the juror’s views would prevent or substantially impair the 

performance of his duties in accordance with his instructions and oath). Furthermore, Respondent 

has failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence that the factual determination by the trial court 

was erroneous. Id. at 427, 435 (question of challenge of prospective juror for bias is factual issue 

entitled to presumption of correctness). The California Supreme Court reasonably denied this 

claim. 

2. Marilyn Pyle

The record supports the California Supreme Court’s determination that Pyle’s dismissal 

was proper. The prosecutor questioned her as follows:

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Q: My question to you is this: if it is shown that the hirer, Mr. 

McDonald, has never been arrested before, had no prior contacts 

with the law other than this particular case, and the only thing we 

have is he hired two other people to kill his ex-wife, could you ever 

see yourself returning a death penalty on this person? He is the 

hirer, was nowhere near the murder victim, never been in trouble 

with the law before and this is his only contact. Could you ever see 

yourself returning a verdict of death on such a person?

RT at 2517-18. Pyle replied that she did not think that she could vote for death given that 

scenario. RT 2518. 

Shortly after the above conversation, Pyle engaged in the following exchange with the trial 

court:

The Court: I take it, basically, what you are telling us, Mrs. Pyle, 

that at least with respect to Mr. McDonald, who is alleged to have 

been the hirer and not have participated in the actual killing himself, 

that you have essentially ruled out the death penalty as to him, am I 

correct?

Prospective Juror Pyle Witness: Yes, I guess so.

The Court: All right. The matter being submitted, I will indicate, 

first of all, that there has been some inconsistency in the witness’s 

answers. I say that, by the way, not as any criticism of you, Mrs. 

Pyle. But there has been some inconsistencies in her answers. 

However, I’ve been carefully observing the prospective juror, and 

based on Wainwright v. Witt, having in mind the witness’s responses 

and her demeanor, I’ll find that she does have a state of mind which 

is going to prevent her from acting with complete impartiality and 

being able to follow the instructions of the court. 

RT 2519. In light of Pyle’s confirmation that she had ruled out the death penalty with respect to 

McDonald, the record supports the California Supreme Court’s determination that Pyle’s views 

would impair her ability to perform her duties in contravention of Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424. 

Respondent has failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence that the factual determination by 

the trial court was erroneous. Id. at 427, 435. Accordingly, the California Supreme Court 

reasonably denied this claim.

3. Kathryn Kane

A review of the record reveals that the California Supreme Court reasonably determined 

that Kane’s dismissal was proper. The prosecutor questioned her as follows:

Q. Given the circumstances that I have indicated, that he hired two 

others to kill his ex-wife—and you will have found that to be true 

beyond a reasonable doubt—and we got to the penalty phase, the 

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evidence shows that he has never ever been arrested before, not even 

for a traffic ticket, okay, do you think—could you foresee yourself 

voting to execute a person under those circumstances? 

RT 3267. Kane replied that under those specific circumstances she could not apply the death 

penalty. Id. 

After the prosecutor finished his questioning, the trial court questioned Kane as follows:

Q. I take it that you are, then essentially telling us that as to a 

person who hired others to commit a murder, that you basically 

would have ruled out the death penalty, am I correct, a person didn’t 

actually participate in the murder?

A. Yes.

Q. And that’s without regard to whatever other aggravation might 

be presented. Basically, if the person did not actually participate in 

the killing, you could not vote to have that person put to death, that’s 

what your telling me?

A. Yes. . . .

The Court: I have been carefully observing this particular juror, and 

I will find, pursuant to Wainwright vs. Witt, from her demeanor and 

her responses that her views are going to prevent or substantially 

impair the performance of her duties as a juror in accordance with 

the Court’s instructions and her oath.

RT 3268. In light of Kane’s statement that she would rule out the death penalty for a person who 

hired others to commit a murder irrespective of any aggravating evidence that may be presented, 

the record supports the California Supreme Court’s determination that Kane’s views would impair 

her ability to perform her duties in contravention of Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424. Here too, 

Respondent has failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence that the factual determination by 

the trial court was erroneous. Id. at 427, 435. Accordingly, the California Supreme Court 

reasonably denied this claim.

4. Jean Graham

A review of the record reveals that the California Supreme Court reasonably determined 

that Graham’s dismissal was proper. The prosecutor engaged in the following exchange with

Graham:

Q. . . . Do you suppose you can, with somebody never convicted 

before . . . and it was a murder for hire, could [you] send someone to 

the gas chamber?

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A. Not really, if he didn’t kill it, two friends do it, it was over their 

minds to do it, if they was stupid enough to do it. He didn’t have to 

do it.

Q. He did not kill his ex-wife. Could you sentence somebody to die 

when he did not kill anybody?

A. No, I wouldn’t.

RT 1404. Graham later reiterated her position, pointing out that the hirer (McDonald), “didn’t do 

nothing. He just rolled out the program.” RT 1407. In light of these statements, the record 

supports the California Supreme Court’s determination that Graham’s views would impair her 

ability to perform her duties in contravention of Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424. Respondent again 

has failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence that the factual determination by the trial court 

was erroneous. Id. at 427, 435. The California Supreme Court reasonably denied this claim.

For the above mentioned reasons, the Court grants Respondent’s motion for summary 

judgment as to claim 2. 

C. Claim 3 

Petitioner’s third claim alleges that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by 

refusing to dismiss for cause nine jurors who demonstrated clear bias against the defense that 

arose either from their pro-death penalty views or prejudice against a nontestifying defendant. 

Petitioner asserts that he was forced to use his peremptory challenges to excuse six of the nine 

jurors, which left on the jury three allegedly “pro-death penalty” jurors: Robert Vanwagner, Dovie 

Cambra and Stanley Wyke.

2

 Petitioner claims that he did not exhaust his remaining peremptory 

challenges to remove the allegedly biased jurors for fear of potentially drawing even worse jurors. 

(ECF Doc. No. 249 at 41) Respondent counters that Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted, 

and also lacks merit because it was reasonably denied by the California Supreme Court.

On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court addressed this claim as follows:

Defendant next asserts the court erred in failing to excuse for cause 

nine prospective jurors who either were predisposed to a death 

verdict, or expressed reservations about applying the presumption of 

innocence to a nontestifying defendant. Defendant and his 

 

2

Petitioner also contends that juror Stephen Higgins was “too fatigued” to pay close attention to 

the trial. (ECF Doc. No. 249 at 42) 

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codefendants exercised peremptory challenges to exclude six of 

these prospective jurors, but defendant failed to exhaust his 

available challenges to exclude the remaining ones. Under settled 

law, his failure to exhaust peremptory challenges or to justify his 

omission bars defendant from claiming that his challenges for cause 

were improperly denied. (E.g., People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 

Cal.4th 1223, 1238 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 784, 947 P.2d 1321]; People v. 

Danielson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 691, 713-714 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 838 

P.2d 729].)

Defendant claims he reserved three peremptory challenges for 

tactical reasons, fearing the eventual seating of even more 

objectionable prospective jurors. (See People v. Danielson, supra, 3 

Cal.4th at pp. 713-714; People v. Box (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 461, 

464-466 [199 Cal.Rptr. 532].) But defendant’s counsel implicitly 

accepted the jury as constituted by passing without using his 

remaining challenges or requesting additional ones. Accordingly, 

defendant waived his right to complain about the court’s failure to 

excuse any remaining prospective jurors for cause. (See People v. 

Danielson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 714; see also People v. Fairbank, 

supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1239 [rejecting similar “after-the-fact 

justifications” for failing to exhaust peremptory challenges].) 

In any event, we have reviewed the record, and it supports the

court’s rulings as to each of the three prospective jurors left 

unexcused by peremptory challenges. Although these persons stated 

either that they distrusted defendants who elected not to take the 

witness stand to testify, or that they were predisposed to impose 

death for murders for hire, they eventually affirmed their ability to 

follow the law and give defendant a fair trial. We should defer to 

the trial court’s finding, based on their voir dire responses, that these 

three prospective jurors were able to follow the law in this respect. 

(See People v. Fudge, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1094.)

Ervin, 22 Cal. 4th at 71-72.

Respondent contends that Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted because the state 

court concluded that defense counsel’s failure to exhaust his peremptory challenges resulted in a 

waiver of the claim. Under the doctrine of procedural default, federal courts will not review “a 

question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law 

ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). In the interest of efficiency, the Court will 

assume that Petitioner’s claim is not defaulted and will address the merits of his claim. See

Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2002) (“procedural bar issues are not 

infrequently more complex than the merits issues . . . so it may well make sense in some instances 

to proceed to the merits”); Carranza v. Long, No. CV 13-5555-R (JPR), 2014 WL 580240 at *10 

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(C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2014) (“[b]ecause it is easier to dispose of this [defaulted] claim on the merits . 

. . the Court resolves it solely on that basis. ”) 

The right of peremptory challenge is not guaranteed by the United States Constitution. See 

United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 311 (2000). Rather, it is an important statutory 

right that courts have considered vital to the Sixth Amendment guarantee of an impartial jury trial. 

Id. It is clear, however, that as long as the jury that sits is impartial, the loss of a peremptory 

challenge does not violate the Sixth Amendment. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. at 313; Ross v.

Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988). 

Petitioner’s alleged loss of peremptory challenges resulting from the trial court’s refusal to 

dismiss purportedly biased jurors did not violate his Sixth Amendment rights because Petitioner 

fails to demonstrate that the seated jury was impartial. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. at 313. After 

reviewing the voir dire transcripts of the four disputed jurors — Robert Vanwagner, Dovie 

Cambra, Stanley Wyke3and Stephen Higgins — the Court concludes that the California Supreme 

Court’s determination that these jurors demonstrated an ability to “follow the law and give 

defendant a fair trial” was reasonable. Ervin, 22 Cal. 4th at 72. 

To the extent that Petitioner argues that the trial court’s erroneous refusal to dismiss 

allegedly biased jurors for cause violated his right to due process by depriving him of the full 

complement of peremptory challenges available to him, this claim too fails because Petitioner fails 

to establish that he did not receive all that state law afforded him. The “right to peremptory 

challenges is denied or impaired [in violation of a defendant’s due process rights] only if the 

defendant does not receive that which state law provides.” Ross, 487 U.S. at 89 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Here, Petitioner does not allege that he did not receive all the 

peremptory challenges allowed under state law. To the contrary, Petitioner failed to exhaust his 

available peremptory challenges. Petitioner fails to establish a due process violation.

 

3

Petitioner’s allegation that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by failing to dismiss 

Wyke, who expressed racial animus towards Petitioner’s African American lead trial counsel, is 

unavailing. Wyke’s remarks were made during an interview with an investigator long after the 

verdict. (Pet’r’s App., Ex. 6 at 2-3) Therefore, the trial judge did not err by not excusing Wyke 

during jury selection.

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The California Supreme Court reasonably denied this claim. Accordingly, the Court 

grants Respondent’s motion for summary judgment as to claim 3.

D. Claim 4 

In claim four, Petitioner alleges that by allowing the attorneys to dismiss more than 600 

jurors in extrajudicial proceedings conducted without his presence, the trial court denied him his 

constitutional right to be present at a critical stage of his proceedings and abdicated its obligation 

to empanel an impartial jury. With the agreement of counsel, the trial court developed a screening 

procedure that allowed counsel to jointly review the prospective jurors’ questionnaires and by 

stipulation screen out the “strong candidates for excusal, i.e., those whose questionnaire answers 

clearly showed they (1) would automatically vote for death, (2) would never vote for death, or 

(3) suffered a financial or physical hardship preventing jury service.” Ervin, 22 Cal. 4th at 72. 

Under the agreement approved by the trial court, these persons could be excused without 

conducting any individual voir dire examination. Although the trial court initially reviewed the 

excused prospective jurors’ questionnaires, it ultimately left counsel to stipulate as to particular 

excusals. Petitioner was not present when counsel discussed the questionnaires. The parties 

stipulated to the excusal of over 600 prospective jurors, and the trial court then allowed the parties 

to conduct voir dire of the remaining prospective jurors. Id.

Petitioner argues that the above jury screening process violated his right to be present at all 

critical stages of his proceedings, produced a pro-death penalty jury because many jurors were 

excluded based on their feelings about the death penalty without any determination of whether 

their views impaired their ability to be neutral and follow the law, and that this error mandates an 

automatic reversal of his death sentence. (ECF Doc. No. 249 at 46-47) Respondent contends that 

Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted, and also lacks merit because it was reasonably denied 

by the California Supreme Court.

The California Supreme Court addressed and rejected Petitioner’s claim on direct appeal as 

follows:

Defendant first contends the excusal procedure tended to produce a 

“pro-death” jury because it allowed counsel to stipulate to excuse 

prospective jurors based on vague or conflicting questionnaire 

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responses, without conducting the usual probing voir dire needed to 

accurately “death qualify” a jury. According to defendant, the 

stipulated procedure resulted in excusing at least 150 prospective 

jurors whose questionnaire responses were insufficient to justify 

their exclusion under Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at page 

424 [105 S.Ct. at page 852].

Defendant also argues that the questionnaires were inadequate bases 

for excusing prospective jurors because of hardship, and that an 

examination of the individual questionnaires shows that many of 

these persons were excused without meeting any of the “death 

views” or hardship criteria of the stipulated agreement. Further, 

defendant suggests the trial court “abdicated its responsibility” and 

violated statutory procedures (see Code Civ. Proc., §§ 223, 230) and 

“analogous federal standards” by delegating to counsel the task of 

screening out possibly biased or “hardshipped” prospective jurors.

Finally, defendant argues that the procedure employed for excusing 

prospective jurors took place outside his presence, violating his 

statutory and constitutional right to be personally present at all 

“critical stages” of the proceedings unless he has executed a written 

waiver of that right. (See §§ 977, subd. (b), 1043; Cal. Const., art. I, 

§ 15; cf. Gomez v. United States (1989) 490 U.S. 858, 872 [109 

S.Ct. 2237, 2246, 104 L.Ed.2d 923] [voir dire is critical stage of 

criminal proceeding].)

None of these arguments have merit. The Attorney General first 

observes that defendant, through his counsel, stipulated to every 

aspect of the challenged procedure and further agreed to excuse 

every prospective juror he now asserts was improperly excused. 

Accordingly, defendant is barred from raising on appeal defects in 

the procedure in which he acquiesced. (See, e.g., People v. Cudjo

(1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 627-628 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635] 

[waiver of defects in death-qualifying voir dire]; People v. Visciotti

(1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 38, 41-42 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388] 

[acquiescence in capital case jury selection procedure]; People v. 

Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 664-665 [286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 

84] [waiver of defects in personal hardship excusal procedures].) As 

we stated in Visciotti, “counsel acquiesced in the [voir dire] 

procedure of which defendant now complains.... [ ] ... [ ] ... While 

the parties are not free to waive, and the court is not free to forego, 

compliance with the statutory procedures which are designed to 

further the policy of random selection, equally important policies 

mandate that criminal convictions not be overturned on the basis of 

irregularities in jury selection to which the defendant did not object 

or in which he has acquiesced. [Citations.]” (People v. Visciotti, 

supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 37-38; see also Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13 [no 

reversal for procedural errors absent a “miscarriage of justice”].)

The Attorney General also notes that the stipulated procedure 

benefited all parties by screening out overzealous “pro-death” as 

well as “pro-life” venirepersons, and by substantially expediting the 

jury selection process, “culling out” prospective jurors who probably 

would have been unable to serve as jurors in any event. We also 

observe that, once the preliminary screening process had concluded, 

the court and counsel then conducted the usual voir dire examination 

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of the remaining prospective jurors in selecting the actual jurors who 

would serve on defendant’s jury. 

As for defendant’s absence during a preliminary portion of the jury 

selection process, and his failure to execute a written waiver of his 

presence, we have held that generally “the accused is not entitled to 

be personally present during proceedings which bear no reasonable, 

substantial relation to his opportunity to defend the charges against 

him, and the burden is upon him to demonstrate that his absence 

prejudiced his case or denied him a fair and impartial trial. 

[Citation.]” (People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 103 [279 

Cal.Rptr. 276, 806 P.2d 1311].) Defendant’s presence at counsels’

jury screening discussions at issue here would have served little 

purpose. (Ibid.; see People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1357; 

People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 706-707 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 

937 P.2d 213]; People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 377-378 

[63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708]; People v. Grant (1988) 45 Cal.3d 

829, 846 [248 Cal.Rptr. 444, 755 P.2d 894]; but cf. U.S. v. Gordon

(D.C. Cir. 1987) 829 F.2d 119, 125-127 [264 App.D.C. 334] 

[defendant’s absence from entire jury voir dire deemed reversible 

error].) Moreover, sections 977 and 1043 do not require the 

defendant’s presence, or a written waiver, unless the standard 

referred to in Beardslee has been met. (People v. Bradford, supra, 

15 Cal.4th at p. 1357.) 

Ervin, 22 Cal. 4th at 72-74.

Respondent contends that Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted because the 

California Supreme Court concluded that Petitioner was barred from challenging on appeal the 

validity of procedures to which he stipulated. Id. at 73. As discussed below, assuming that 

Petitioner’s claim is not defaulted, it fails on the merits. 

Voir dire is a critical stage of the criminal proceedings during which a defendant has a 

constitutional right to be present. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 873 (1989); United 

States v. Sherwood, 98 F3d 402, 407 (9th Cir. 1996). The Constitution however, is not implicated 

every time a defendant is excluded from a trial stage. United States v. Reyes, 764 F.3d 1184, 1193 

(9th Cir. 2014). In Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106-08 (1934), overruled on other 

grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), the United States Supreme Court held that a 

defendant has a due process right to be present at a proceeding “whenever his presence has a 

relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge . . . . 

[T]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing 

would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.” With respect to voir dire, the United 

States Supreme Court noted that the “defense may be made easier if the accused is permitted to be 

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present at the examination of jurors . . . for it will be in his power, if present, to give advice or 

suggestion or even to supersede his lawyers altogether and conduct the trial himself.” Id. at 106. 

However, the Court also observed that nowhere in the decisions of the United States Supreme 

Court is there a ruling that “the Fourteenth Amendment assures the privilege of presence when 

presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow.” Id. at 106-107. The exclusion of a 

defendant from a trial proceeding should be considered in light of the whole record. Id. at 115. In 

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975), the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed 

the holding of Snyder, and observed that “an accused has a right to be present at all stages of the 

trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings.” 

Here, although Petitioner was absent from counsel’s screening discussions, Petitioner was 

present during the remainder of the jury selection process and had ample opportunity to observe 

jurors during voir dire and assist his attorneys in evaluating prospective jurors. Petitioner fails to 

establish that his absence during the screening of the jurors’ questionnaires frustrated the fairness 

of his proceedings. Id.; see also Reyes, 764 F.3d at 1196 (district court’s exclusion of defendant 

from side bar voir dire of prospective juror did not violate defendant’s right to be present at every 

stage of trial). The California Supreme Court reasonably concluded that Petitioner’s presence at 

the screening discussions would have served little purpose. Ervin, 22 Cal. 4th at 74. 

Moreover, as the California Supreme Court pointed out, Petitioner stipulated to every 

aspect of the challenged jury screening procedure and further agreed to excuse every prospective 

juror he now claims was improperly excused. Ervin, 22 Cal. 4th at 73. The California Supreme 

Court has upheld such waivers. See, e.g., People v. Cudjo, 6 Cal. 4th 585, 627-28 (1993) (through 

stipulation of counsel, capital defendant waived his right to voir dire every prospective juror 

individually and in sequestration); People v. Visciotti, 2 Cal. 4th 1, 37-38 (1992). Petitioner fails 

to cite any authority establishing his waiver to be inadequate. 

Finally, Petitioner’s contention that the procedure resulted in an impartial jury is 

unavailing as he fails to establish that it actually resulted in the seating of a biased juror. As 

Respondent points out, the fact that some prospective jurors were excused by stipulation has no 

bearing on the beliefs or prejudices of those who actually served.

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For the above-mentioned reasons, the Court grants Respondent’s motion for summary 

judgment as to claim 4.

E. Claim 5 

In claim 5, Petitioner alleges that the prosecutor improperly used 9 of his 15 exercised 

peremptory challenges to excuse African American prospective jurors in violation of Batson v. 

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). He asserts that 9 of 11 African Americans drawn to serve were 

improperly challenged, which left just one African American, Harvey Hendrix, seated on the jury, 

and one African American, Rudolph Wilson, seated as an alternate. (ECF Doc. No 97 at 99-101). 

Petitioner argues that in response to defense counsel’s challenge under Batson and its California 

analog, People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258 (1978), overruled in part by Johnson v. California, 545 

U.S. 162 (2005), the prosecutor offered pretextual justifications for his challenges, and that a 

comparative juror analysis, which the California Supreme Court erroneously declined to conduct 

on direct appeal, reflects the prosecutor’s differential treatment of comparably situated jurors. 

Respondent counters that Petitioner’s claim was reasonably denied by the California Supreme 

Court.

On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court addressed this claim as follows:

The prosecutor used nine of his 15 exercised peremptory challenges 

to excuse African-American prospective jurors. Defendant made a 

Batson/Wheeler motion (Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 

[106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69]; People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 

Cal.3d 258 [148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748]), asserting the 

prosecutor was improperly using peremptory challenges to exclude 

African-Americans from the jury. The trial court, without expressly 

finding that defendant had stated a prima facie case of improper 

discrimination under these cases, permitted the prosecutor to explain 

his reasons for each exclusion. After hearing the prosecutor’s 

explanations and defense counsel’s responses, the court denied 

defendant’s motion, expressly finding that the prosecutor’s 

explanations were “reasonably specific and neutral” and sufficiently 

related to the case, and that defendant demonstrated no prosecutorial 

“group bias.”

Defendant’s actual jury included only one African-American juror 

and one African-American alternate juror. Defendant now contends 

the trial court erred in denying his Batson/Wheeler motion. We find 

no error.

As we recently stated, we review a trial court’s determination 

regarding the sufficiency of a prosecutor’s justifications for 

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exercising peremptory challenges “with great restraint. The party 

seeking to justify a suspect excusal need only offer a genuine, 

reasonably specific, race or group-neutral explanation related to the 

particular case being tried. (People v. Fuentes [(1991)] 54 Cal.3d 

707, 718 [286 Cal.Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75]; People v. Johnson

[(1989)] 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1216 [255 Cal.Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047]; 

People v. Hall (1983) 35 Cal.3d 161, 167-168 [197 Cal.Rptr. 71, 

672 P.2d 854]; see Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 97-98, & 

fn. 20 [90 L.Ed.2d 69, 88-89, 106 S.Ct. 1712].) The justification 

need not support a challenge for cause, and even a ‘trivial’ reason, if 

genuine and neutral, will suffice. (People v. Montiel [(1993)] 5 

Cal.4th 877, 910, fn. 9 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277]; 

Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1218.) [ ] ‘If the trial court makes a 

“sincere and reasoned effort” to evaluate the nondiscriminatory 

justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to deference on 

appeal....’ [Citation.]” (People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 136 

[51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980]; see also People v. Williams

(1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 188-189 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710] 

[upholding prosecutor’s explanation that he had made a “mistake” in 

challenging African-American prospective juror]; People v. 

Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1216-1222 [255 Cal.Rptr. 569, 767 

P.2d 1047]; Tolbert v. Page (9th Cir. 1999) 182 F.3d 677, 683-685.) 

The determination whether substantial evidence exists to support the 

prosecutor’s assertion of a nondiscriminatory purpose is a “purely 

factual question.” (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 197 [58 

Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365].)

Initially, we observe that, although the trial court failed to find 

expressly that defendant had presented a prima facie case of 

improper group discrimination, and indeed expressed doubts such a 

showing had been made as to six specific prospective jurors, that 

finding was probably implicit in the court’s remarks regarding three 

other excluded African-Americans and in its invitation to the 

prosecutor to state his reasons for each of his challenges. (See

People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 135; People v. Fuentes, 

supra, 54 Cal.3d 707, 716-717, & fn. 5 [286 Cal.Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 

75].)

As the trial court ruled, the prosecutor expressed reasonably specific 

and neutral reasons, although not particularly logical or substantial 

ones, for excusing each prospective juror. For example, regarding 

the three excusals on which the trial court focused, the prosecutor 

observed that (1) the defense accepted Roslyn R. without asking her 

a single question, drawing the prosecutor’s suspicions regarding her 

neutrality; (2) Caroline M. was nervous and shaking during her 

interrogation, indicating the possibility she might be taking drugs; 

also, her occupation as juvenile counselor with a belief in 

rehabilitation might induce her to reject the death penalty; and (3) 

Eloise K. was a Bible college student who, at one point in her voir 

dire examination, indicated reluctance to impose the death penalty.

Defendant disputes the sufficiency of these explanations and 

likewise questions the adequacy or plausibility of the prosecutor’s 

responses regarding several other excluded prospective jurors, 

including (1) Alfred H., whom the prosecutor characterized as “an 

NRA member” with a “deeply religious bent,” not likely to favor the 

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death penalty; (2) JoAnn W., who also supposedly also had a 

“religious bent” that might preclude her favoring the death penalty; 

(3) Lionel J., who had a “drug history” and was “weak” on the death 

penalty; (4) Lisa K., who the prosecutor believed was too young 

(age 25) and who seemed too sympathetic to defendant McDonald; 

and (5) James T., also too young (age 21) and appearing too eager to 

remain on the jury despite both holding a job and attending classes.

Although defendant asserts that the prosecution’s reasons for 

excluding these persons were inadequate, a sham, or unsupported by 

the record, nevertheless, as we previously explained, if the trial court 

makes a ‘sincere and reasoned effort’ to evaluate the 

nondiscriminatory justifications the prosecutor offers, the court’s 

conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal if supported by 

substantial evidence. (People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 136.) 

Our examination of the record convinces us the court made such an 

effort.

Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly excused prospective 

jurors Alfred H., JoAnn W., and Eloise K. based on a “blanket 

characterization regarding religious persons” amounting to invidious 

discrimination. To the contrary, as the prosecutor explained, he 

excused these persons because he perceived they had a “religious 

bent” or bias that would make it difficult for them to impose the 

death penalty, a proper, nondiscriminatory ground for making a 

peremptory challenge. (See, e.g., People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 

119, 164-165 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 386, 931 P.2d 960]; People v. Pride

(1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 230 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643].)

Defendant, citing cases from other jurisdictions employing a 

“comparative analysis” approach, maintains that several of the 

prosecutor’s explanations for excusing African-Americans were 

inconsistent with his actions in accepting various non-AfricanAmericans who gave similar voir dire responses as prospective 

jurors. The rule is clear in this state, however, that in evaluating the 

sufficiency of the prosecutor’s explanations, a reviewing court will 

not engage in such a comparative analysis regarding persons the 

prosecutor accepted. (People v. Jones, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 162; 

People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 136, fn. 16; People v. 

Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1221.) We see no compelling reason 

to reconsider those holdings here.

Defendant also complains that the trial court “supplemented” the 

prosecutor’s explanations regarding several other excused 

prospective jurors with additional justifications drawn from their 

voir dire testimony. (See People v. Fuentes, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 

720 [prosecutor’s explanations must be found to have “actually 

prompted” exercise of peremptory challenge].) We agree with 

defendant that ordinarily the court should not attempt to bolster a 

prosecutor’s legally insufficient reasons with new or additional 

factors drawn from the record, but we are not convinced the 

prosecutor’s stated reasons in this case were legally insufficient.

Even seemingly “‘highly speculative’” or “‘trivial’” grounds may 

support the exercise of a peremptory challenge. (People v. Williams,

supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 191; People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 

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1218; see Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 768 [115 S.Ct. 1769, 

1771, 131 L.Ed.2d 834].) As we stated in Johnson, “What is 

required are reasonably specific and neutral explanations that are 

related to the particular case being tried.” (People v. Johnson, supra, 

47 Cal.3d at p. 1218.) Here, the trial judge saw and heard the entire 

voir dire proceedings and found the prosecutor made no improper 

use of peremptory challenges. As in Johnson, “Under these 

circumstances we see no good reason to second-guess his factual 

determination.” (Id. at p. 1221, fn. omitted.) In sum, as we noted in 

People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at page 190, “The trial judge’s 

findings ..., largely turning on evaluations of credibility, are entitled 

to great deference. [Citations.]”

Ervin, 22 Cal. 4th at 74-77.

In Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, the United States Supreme Court held that “the Equal Protection 

Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the 

assumption that black jurors as a group would be unable impartially to consider the State’s case 

against a black defendant.” A Batson challenge has a three-step inquiry. First, the trial court must 

determine whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a 

peremptory challenge on the basis of race by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives 

rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. Id. at 93-94. Second, if the showing is made, the 

burden shifts to the prosecutor to present a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in 

question. Id. at 97. “The second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is 

persuasive, or even plausible.” Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-78 (1995). Unless a 

discriminatory intent is inherent in the explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race-neutral. 

Id. Third, the court must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving 

purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. “It is not until the third step that the 

persuasiveness of the justification becomes relevant.” Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768. To decide 

whether the defendant has met his burden, the court must “undertake a sensitive inquiry into such 

circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 93. This 

inquiry includes comparing African-American panelists who were struck with those non-African 

American panelists who were allowed to serve. Briggs v. Grounds, 682 F.3d 1165, 1170 (9th Cir. 

2012). “If a prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an 

otherwise similar non-black who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful 

discrimination to be considered at Batson’s third step.” Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 

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(2005).

A state court’s finding that the prosecutor did not engage in purposeful discrimination is 

reviewed under the deferential standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Jamerson v. Runnels, 

713 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir. 2013). “Thus, the state court’s decision will be upheld unless it was 

‘based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding.’” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)). In evaluating Batson claims presented in 

habeas petitions, a “doubly deferential standard” applies: “unless the state appellate court was 

objectively unreasonable in concluding that a trial court’s credibility determination was supported 

by substantial evidence, we must uphold it . . . This is because the question of discriminatory 

intent largely will turn on evaluation of credibility and evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind 

based on demeanor and credibility evidence lies peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.” Id. at 

1225 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Where a state court declined to conduct a comparative juror analysis, the evaluation of the 

state court’s disposition proceeds in two steps:

To begin, we must perform in the first instance the comparative 

analysis that the state court declined to pursue. Then, we must

reevaluate the ultimate state decision in light of this comparative 

analysis and any other evidence tending to show purposeful 

discrimination to decide whether the state was unreasonable in 

finding the prosecutor’s race-neutral justifications to be genuine. In 

essence, we must assess how any circumstantial evidence of 

purposeful discrimination uncovered during comparative analysis 

alters the evidentiary balance and whether, considering the totality 

of the evidence, the state court’s credibility determination 

withstands our doubly deferential review.

Id. at 1225-26.

Here, Petitioner alleges that the prosecutor improperly challenged prospective jurors 

Caroline Mullen, Lionel Jackson, Pamela Blake, Alfred Hudnall, JoAnn White, Eloise Knox, Lisa 

Kelley, James Thomas III and Roslyn Roberts based on race. In particular, he asserts that a 

comparative juror analysis reveals that the prosecutor’s explanations for challenging three jurors, 

Lisa Kelley, James Thomas III and Roslyn Roberts, were inconsistent with his actions in accepting 

non-African Americans who gave similar responses. (ECF Doc. No. 249 at 50-51)

The prosecutor justified his peremptory challenges, by stating at the outset, that his 

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challenges of all of the jurors, were based on their specific “attitudes regarding the death penalty.” 

RT 9064. He then proceeded to provide additional individual justifications as follows:

1) Lisa Kelley, age 25, was characterized as “too young.” The prosecutor believed that 

getting her to impose the death penalty would be an “uphill battle.” RT 9065.

2) James Thomas, age 21, was also deemed young and appeared too eager to remain on the 

jury despite holding a job and attending classes. RT 9065-66.

3) Caroline Mullen was suspected of being on drugs because she appeared nervous and 

shook during questioning. RT 9066. Additionally, the prosecutor believed that her 

occupation as a juvenile counselor with a belief in rehabilitation might lead her to reject 

the death penalty. Id. She had “this look about her” that the prosecutor could not figure 

out. Id.

4) Pamela Blake, the vice president of Richmond High School, was characterized as an 

arrogant woman who probably wouldn’t get along with the rest of the jury. RT 9067. She 

also failed to appear in court for traffic tickets, leading the prosecutor to state: “[S]omeone 

who is not able to take care of traffic violations and lets them go to 408 traffic warrants 

shows to me she is not the type of juror I want on the jury and would be a potential hang 

on the death penalty.” Id.

5) Lionel Jackson concealed an arrest, had a drug history and was “weak” on the death 

penalty. RT 9067.

6) Eloise Knox was described as a “biblical college student”, who the prosecutor believed 

would never “gas anybody.” RT 9067. She and Mother Theresa would “fit hand in hand.” 

Id.

7) Roslyn Roberts was not asked a single question by Petitioner’s counsel, so the 

prosecutor was worried that Petitioner’s counsel saw something in Roberts that the 

prosecutor did not. RT 9067-68.

8) Alfred Hudnall was characterized as a “43 year old wild card . . . a guy who owns 

weapons and belongs to the NRA, but he has also a deeply religious bent. He is not pro 

death penalty.” RT 9068.

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9) JoAnn White indicated in her questioning that she would listen to factors in mitigation 

and make her decision “partly upon what she heard in the penalty phase.” Id. The 

prosecutor worried that by “partly,” she meant that her religious conviction would prevent 

her from voting for the death penalty. Id.

As noted above, in reviewing Petitioner’s Batson challenge on direct appeal, the California 

Supreme Court noted that even speculative or trivial grounds may support the exercise of a 

peremptory challenge, and observed that the trial judge, after hearing the entire voir dire, found 

that the prosecutor did not raise any improper challenges. Ervin, 22 Cal. 4th at 77. Under the 

circumstances, the California Supreme Court saw no good reason to second-guess the trial judge’s 

factual determinations. Id.

With respect to 6 of the 9 challenged African American jurors, namely Caroline Mullen, 

Lionel Jackson, Pamela Blake, Alfred Hudnall, JoAnn White and Eloise Knox, Petitioner broadly 

alleges that the prosecutor improperly challenged them, but fails to advance specific arguments. 

In fact, his opposition does not even address the challenges of these six jurors. (ECF Doc. No. 

249 at 48-53). As previously noted, state court factual findings are presumed correct; the 

petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption by “clear and convincing evidence.” Rice v. 

Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338-39 (2006); Briggs, 682 F.3d at 1171. Here, Petitioner fails to meet this 

burden. Petitioner thus fails to establish that the state trial court was unreasonable to credit the 

prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations for the peremptory challenges of the 6 jurors at issue. Rice, 

546 U.S. at 338-39 (federal habeas court can only grant petition if it was unreasonable to credit the 

prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations for Batson challenge). 

Petitioner instead focuses his arguments on the challenges of James Thomas III, Lisa 

Kelley and Roslyn Roberts. Petitioner claims that a comparative analysis of these jurors 

demonstrates that the prosecutor’s justifications were pretextual. As discussed below, Petitioner’s 

arguments with respect to these three jurors are also unavailing.

1. James Thomas

Petitioner argues that the prosecutor’s justification for the challenge of James Thomas —

namely that he was “too young” and appeared too eager to forsake work and school to serve on the 

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jury—was pretextual because the prosecutor did not express the same concern when white jurors 

indicated they would work evenings or not attend school in order to accommodate jury service. 

(ECF Doc. No. 249 at 50) Petitioner also states that a number of young non-African American 

jurors expressed a desire to be on the jury, and some were seated. Id. 

The record confirms that Thomas was a full-time college student whose classes started at 

around 9:00 a.m. and ended at 1:50 or 2:00 p.m., and that he worked at Macy’s as a junior 

executive in the evenings. RT 1334-35, 1365. Petitioner fails, however, to identify any of the 

non-African American jurors he claims were also too young and would have had to juggle school 

and work in order to accommodate jury service, let alone demonstrate that they faced an equally 

busy schedule. Petitioner merely raises conclusory allegations that unspecified jurors who were 

similarly situated to Thomas were seated. Petitioner fails to meet his burden of rebutting the state 

court’s factual findings. See Briggs, 682 F.3d at 1171 (burden of disproving state court’s factual 

findings by clear and convincing evidence rests with petitioner). 

Furthermore, Thomas stated that on the prosecutor’s “Rambo” scale of 1-10, with one 

being “not very pro death penalty,” and ten representing “Rambo, somebody who’d shoot up 

everything,” he gave himself a three. RT 1348. This supports the prosecutor’s stated reason that 

his challenges of all of the jurors, were based on their specific “attitudes regarding the death 

penalty.” RT 9064. Indeed, the trial judge, in finding the prosecutor’s justification valid, stated: 

James Thomas, again, full-time student, very young. 3 on a scale of 

10, as I recall on [the prosecutor’s] Rambo scale. Again, no 

disrespect intended, but from the court’s point of view, not even 

close. 

RT 9075. Based on this Court’s review of the record, it was not unreasonable for the California 

Supreme Court to find that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s determination that the 

prosecutor challenged Thomas for race-neutral, legitimate reasons. See Briggs, 682 F.3d at 1172

(based on review of record, California Court of Appeal’s finding that substantial evidence 

supported trial court’s determination that prosecutor challenged prospective juror for legitimate 

reasons was reasonable).

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2. Lisa Kelley

Petitioner further alleges that the prosecutor’s justification for the challenge of Lisa 

Kelley—particularly that it would be an uphill battle to get her to impose the death penalty on 

McDonald—was pretextual because the prosecutor did not challenge Kimberly Goodman, even 

though she was similarly disinclined to impose death on McDonald. (ECF Doc. No. 249 at 51) 

The record reveals that Kelley expressed equivocal views vis a vis the death penalty on 

voir dire. While Kelley asserted a general ability to impose the death penalty, see, e.g., RT 2746 

(“Q: Do you think you could ever vote to impose the death penalty on another person . . . ? A: 

Yes, generally speaking”), see also RT 2762, Kelley equivocated when asked whether it was 

possible for her to vote for death in a murder-for-hire situation where the hirer had no prior 

criminal history and did not participate in the murder. She twice stated that she was uncertain as 

to whether she could vote for death in such a situation, see RT 2765 (“Q: Do you think that you

. . . could ever, knowing that Mr. McDonald did not personally kill his ex-wife, could you ever 

consider the death penalty as to him? A: I don’t know. I’d have to know more”), see also RT 

2767. Kelley changed her mind, however, on further questioning. See, e.g., RT 2769 (“Q: Are 

you saying that in considering that evidence, even though there were no other aggravating 

circumstances, that all you had . . . [was] the fact that he hired two people to kill his wife, are you 

saying that based on that evidence by itself . . . that you could consider the death penalty as to Mr. 

McDonald? A: Yes.”) Additionally, Kelley expressed some misgivings about the criminal justice 

system, stating that: “I feel that it is effective except that not everyone gets the punishment or even 

gets caught for things that they do.” RT 2778.

In assessing the prosecutor’s justification of his challenge of Kelley, the trial judge stated:

As far as Kelley is concerned, that was a close call on the cause 

challenge, and it was out of an abundance of caution that I denied it. 

And I think she clearly was—at least she was very shaky as to 

whether she could vote for the death penalty. I have in mind Mr. 

Anderson’s comments. Nothing more need be said about her.

RT 9075.

Similarly to Kelley, Goodman initially expressed doubt about her ability to impose death 

on someone like McDonald, who did not participate in the actual killing of the victim. See, e.g., 

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RT 3405 (“Q: Can you see yourself voting for death for Mr. McDonald? A: No . . .”), see also RT 

3407. On further questioning, however, Goodman repeatedly and firmly reaffirmed her ability to 

impose death on the hirer in a murder for hire case. See RT 3411 (“The Court: We don’t want to 

know how you would vote. We want to know if . . . [the death penalty] would remain an option. 

Prospective Juror Goodman: It would remain an option.”); see also RT 3409-3413. Moreover, 

Goodman stated that if the death penalty were on the ballot during an election, she would vote for 

it because it serves as a deterrent and promotes safety. RT 3400-02. Additionally, Goodman 

stated that her father was a highway patrol officer. RT 3415. This may have made her a desirable 

juror for the prosecution.

Overall, when the totality of the evidence is considered, the state court’s credibility 

determination with respect to the prosecutor’s justification for striking Kelley withstands the 

applicable doubly deferential standard of review. Jamerson, 713 F.3d at 1225-26 (“we must 

assess how any circumstantial evidence of purposeful discrimination uncovered during 

comparative analysis alters the evidentiary balance and whether, considering the totality of the 

evidence, the state court’s credibility determination withstands our doubly deferential review.”) 

As explained by the Ninth Circuit in Aleman v. Uribe, 723 F.3d 976, 983 (9th Cir. 2013), “[o]ne 

level of deference arises from the broad power of a trial court to assess credibility of the 

prosecutor's statements that were made in open court. Another level of deference arises from the 

AEDPA context where we defer to state court decisions that are not objectively unreasonable.” 

Here, Petitioner has not set forth sufficient evidence to supercede the trial court’s credibility 

determination. Jamerson,713 F.3d at 1230 (even though prosecutor’s reason for excusing juror 

was not compelling, evidence was insufficient to supercede trial court’s credibility determination 

under doubly deferential standard).

3. Roslyn Roberts

Petitioner argues that the prosecutor’s justification for the challenge of Roslyn Roberts, 

namely that he struck her because Petitioner’s counsel did not ask her any questions, is pretextual 

because the prosecutor did not challenge white jurors, such as Robert Kelleher and Robert 

Vanwagner, who similarly were not questioned by the defense. (ECF Doc. No. 249 at 51, Doc. 

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No. 97 at 124). Kelleher and Vanwagner were eventually seated as jurors.

Roberts, a registered nurse who dealt with crack babies, RT 8264-65, rated herself a “5” on 

the prosecutor’s “Rambo” scale. RT 8256. The prosecutor justified his challenge of Roberts as 

follows:

She said claimed she could gas, if we ever got to the penalty. But I 

noticed that [Petitioner’s counsel] asked her not one single question. 

I don’t know whether they figured they had her locked up or 

whether they saw something in her I didn’t. That’s a situation I 

can’t possibly take a chance, ergo the challenge as to Miss Roberts.

RT 9068. The trial court assessed the prosecutor’s justification as follows:

Roberts, I think I probably would have asked for an explanation as 

to Roslyn Roberts. We have one and I think it has been satisfactory. 

I do note, initially—that was a person who was, initially, 20 minutes 

late. That may or may not mean anything, may not play any role in 

Mr. Anderson’s challenge. She was 20 minutes late. We had to 

wait for her.

She, among other things, indicated that she deals with crack babies. 

Might have—she might discount testimony from a crack user simply 

because they are users. Those are my words. But that’s what I take 

from her answers. 

Again, I may have required an explanation. I feel that the 

explanation that the district attorney gave, his reasons, I find are 

satisfactory and I’m just supplementing it with my own 

observations.

RT 9078. 

The record reveals that Petitioner’s counsel, Thomas Broome and Gail Brewster Hardy, 

indeed declined to ask Roberts questions. RT 8253-54 (Mr. Broome: “You wouldn’t be terribly 

offended if I didn’t ask you any questions?”) Roberts was, however, amply questioned by 

Petitioner’s codefendants’ counsel. The record further confirms that Petitioner’s counsel similarly 

declined to question Vanwagner and Kelleher. RT 8695, 7024. 

It is questionable, however, whether Kelleher and Vanwagner were similarly situated 

jurors as Roberts. See, e.g., Jamerson, 713 F.3d at 1230-31 (two jurors not similarly situated

where prosecutor was aware of the conviction of the siblings of one of the jurors, but not the 

other). Vanwagner had been the head teacher in juvenile hall, an insurance executive and a writer 

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for television. RT 7030. Kelleher had been a salesman and also worked for New York Life as 

manager of accounting. RT 8706-07. Neither one of them worked in occupations involving the 

provision of medical treatment to crack babies, or dealt intimately with users of cocaine such as 

Petitioner, as did Roberts. See, e.g., RT 8255. The prosecutor could have reasonably viewed 

Petitioner’s counsel’s failure to ask Kelleher and Vanwagner questions differently from their 

failure to ask Roberts questions. In fact, the prosecutor himself asked Roberts whether her 

experience with users of cocaine would influence her views of the testimony of witnesses who 

used cocaine. RT 8265-66. These jurors may reasonably not have been similarly situated from 

the prosecutor’s perspective.

Even if the prosecutor’s justification for the lack of questioning by Petitioner’s counsel 

were to be discredited, his alternate justification, namely the challenged jurors’ “attitudes 

regarding the death penalty” remains. RT 9064. While Roberts, in many instances, asserted an 

ability to impose the death penalty, see, e.g., RT 8246, 8247, and as noted above, rated herself a 

“5” on the prosecutor’s “Rambo” scale, she also made statements that qualified her views. 

Roberts stated that she would accept as a mitigating factor that the defendant “had a life prior to 

that incident. Sometimes turn of events cause people to just flip [out].” RT 8250. This statement 

suggests that she may have proved to be receptive to a defense theory that Petitioner “flipped out” 

as a result of his cocaine addiction, or that she might be reluctant to impose the death penalty on 

McDonald, whose conduct was likely to be portrayed as an aberration from an otherwise 

exemplary life. Roberts also stated that a person’s use of cocaine has psychological ramifications 

that have to be taken into account: “. . . [U]nderstanding the psychological ramifications of coke 

—I don’t mean coke—crack cocaine, you have to kind of take that into account; not saying that 

that person is totally irresponsible to the fact, but, you know, you really have to take it into 

account.” RT 8265. This response suggests receptivity to the defense’s likely mitigation theory.

Overall, even though the prosecutor’s reasons for challenging Roberts may not have been 

compelling, Petitioner has not set forth sufficient evidence to supercede the trial court’s credibility 

determination under the applicable doubly-deferential standard of review. Jamerson, 713 F.3d at 

1230 (although reasonable minds may disagree about prosecutor’s credibility, evidence was 

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insufficient to supercede trial court’s credibility determination under doubly deferential standard). 

Considering the totality of the evidence, the state court’s credibility determination withstands 

doubly deferential review. Id. at 1225-26. The California Supreme Court was not unreasonable in 

concluding that the prosecutor’s justification for challenging Roberts was genuine. 

For the above-mentioned reasons, summary judgment on claim 5 is granted.

F. Claim 6 

In claim 6, Petitioner alleges that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by failing 

to voir dire jurors regarding a sensational news article appearing in the Oakland Tribune on the 

morning of final jury selection regarding the exorbitant cost of his trial. In his opposition, 

Petitioner references, without citation to the record, two juror affidavits submitted in support of 

this claim, which purportedly demonstrate prejudice resulting from the lack of voir dire regarding

the article. (ECF Doc. No. 249 at 54) Respondent similarly references these affidavits without 

citation to the record, stating instead that the affidavits accompanied the habeas petition that 

Petitioner submitted to the California Supreme Court. (ECF Doc. No. 213 at 41) Based on the 

Court’s review of the record, these affidavits do not appear to have been filed in support of 

Petitioner’s federal habeas petition.

As further directed below, the Court defers ruling on claim 6 until after Petitioner files a 

copy of these affidavits. 

VI. CONCLUSION

The Court hereby ORDERS as follows:

(1) Summary judgment with respect to claims 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 is GRANTED.

(2) Within 21 days of the date of this Order, Petitioner shall file a statement clarifying 

whether the affidavits mentioned in claim 6 have, in fact, been filed in support of his 

federal petition, and if so, shall provide a full citation to the record. Petitioner shall also 

file another copy of the affidavits. The Court defers ruling on claim 6 until after the 

affidavits are filed.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 11, 2015

_____________________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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