Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02058/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02058-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 -

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John Leonard Harris,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents

CV-09-2058-PHX-JAT (JRI)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

On Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Florence,

Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on

September 30, 2009 (Doc. 1). On February 26, 2010, Respondents filed their Answer (Doc.

11), asserting a statute of limitations and procedural default/procedural bar defenses. 

Petitioner filed a Reply on March 26, 2010 (Doc. 12).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned

makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule

8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28

U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On January 6, 2003, Petitioner was indicted in the Maricopa County Superior Court

on 4 counts of molestation of a child, three counts of sexual conduct with a minor, and two

counts of sexual abuse, arising out of Petitioner’s sexual conduct with his girlfriend’s 11 year

old daughter over a two week period. (Exhibit C, Indictment; Exhibit B, Presentence

Case 2:09-cv-02058-JAT Document 14 Filed 02/08/11 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Petitioner appends to his Petition (Doc. 1) Reply (Doc. 12) copies of some of the

same exhibits appended to the Answer (Doc. 11). Petitioner points to no differences in the

exhibits. For simplicity, the undersigned references only the latter.

- 2 -

Investigation) (Exhibits to the Answer (Doc. 11) are referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.”)1

Petitioner entered into a written Plea Agreement (Exhibit D) wherein he agreed to

plead to one count of molestation and one count of attempted molestation. Petitioner

subsequently pled guilty and on June 20, 2003 was sentenced to 19 years in prison on the

molestation count, and lifetime probation on the attempted molestation count. (Exhibit E,

Sentence 6/20/03.) 

B. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Having pled guilty, Petitioner had no right under Arizona law to a direct appeal.

C. PROCEEDINGS ON FIRST POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On June 26, 2003, Petitioner filed his first Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit

F). Counsel was appointed, but subsequently filed a “Notice of Completion of PostConviction Review by Counsel; Request for 45-Day Extension of Time to Allow Defendant

to File Pro Per Petition for Post Conviction Relief” (Exhibit G). On February 17, 2004,

counsel’s motion was granted, counsel was directed to remain in an advisory capacity, and

Petitioner was given 45 days to file a pro per petition for post-conviction relief. (Exhibit H,

M.E. 2/17/04.) Petitioner failed to do so, and 56 days later, on April 14, 2004, Petitioner’s

PCR proceeding was dismissed. (Exhibit I, M.E. 4/14/04.)

Petitioner did not seek further review. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 6.) 

D. PROCEEDINGS ON SECOND POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Almost four years later, on April 4, 2008, Petitioner filed his second Notice of PostConviction Relief (Exhibit J), arguing: (1) his plea was not voluntary because entered under

duress and coercion; (2) his sentence was improperly enhanced in violation of Blakely v.

Case 2:09-cv-02058-JAT Document 14 Filed 02/08/11 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (right to jury trial on facts increasing maximum sentence)

Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007) (applying Blakely to California’s

determinate sentencing law) etc.; (3) the state had suppressed unspecified exculpatory

evidence; (4) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (5) his sentence was cruel and

unusual. On June 5, 2008, Petitioner’s PCR proceeding was summarily dismissed as

untimely, his claims were precluded because not raised earlier, and Blakely et al. were not

retroactively applicable on collateral review. (Exhibit I, M.E. 4/14/04.)

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review (Exhibit K), repeating his claims. On September

15, 2009, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied review. (Exhibit M, Order

9/15/09.) Petitioner did not seek review by the Arizona Supreme Court. (Petition, Doc. 1

at 5.) 

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, dated September 30, 2009, on September 30,

2009 (Doc. 1). Petitioner’s Petition asserts the following three grounds for relief:

(1) violation of his federal due process and double jeopardy rights because he

received multiple consecutive sentences;

(2) violation of his federal due process rights and ineffective assistance of counsel

in connection with his decision to plead guilty; the judge sentenced him to 19

years rather than 10 years; and absent a jury finding of guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt; and 

(3) violation of his federal due process and equal protection rights based on the

State’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, such as the victim’s capacity

to consent to sexual advances and DNA evidence, and selective prosecution

of sexual offenders.

Service and a response was ordered on November 18, 2009 (Doc. 4).

Response - On February 26, 2010, Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”)

Case 2:09-cv-02058-JAT Document 14 Filed 02/08/11 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 Respondents cast their response in terms of “procedural default” but assert the actual

application of a “procedural bar” by the state courts. There is a distinct but related nature

between the concepts of exhaustion and procedural default on the one hand, and the

"adequate and independent state procedural grounds" doctrine and procedural bar on the

other. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-732 (1991). In the latter, it is a "state

judgment" that is being treated with comity, id. at 730, while the exhaustion doctrine is a

matter of treating the state courts themselves with comity by allowing them "the first

opportunity" to address the federal claim, id. at 731.

- 4 -

(Doc. 11). Respondents argue that the petition is untimely, barred by the statute of

limitations, and Petitioner’s claims were procedurally barred in his second PCR proceeding.2

Reply - On March 26, 2010, Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 12). Petitioner argues that

AEDPA’s statute of limitations is an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas

corpus, and that he properly exhausted his claims.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. TIMELINESS

1. One Year Limitations Period

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. As part of the

Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a

1-year statute of limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and sentences rendered by state courts. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d). Petitions filed beyond the one year limitations period are barred and must be

dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

2. Commencement of Limitations Period

Conviction Final - The one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions generally

begins to run on "the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review

or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

For an Arizona noncapital pleading defendant, the conviction becomes "final" at the

conclusion of the first "of-right" post-conviction proceeding under Rule 32. See Summers v.

Case 2:09-cv-02058-JAT Document 14 Filed 02/08/11 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 717 (9th Cir. 2007). "To bring an of-right proceeding under Rule 32,

a plea-convicted defendant must provide to the Arizona Superior Court, within 90 days of

conviction and sentencing in that court, notice of his or her intent to file a Petition for

Post-Conviction Review.” Summers, 481 F.3d at 715 (citing Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.4(a)). 

Here, Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding was an “of-right” post-conviction proceeding.

Petitioner was convicted upon a plea of guilty on June 20, 2003. (Exhibit E, Sentence.) His

first PCR notice (Exhibit F) was filed 6 days later, on June 26, 2003. Thus, Petitioner’s

direct review ended and his conviction became “final” when his first PCR proceeding

concluded. That occurred 30 days after the April 14, 2004 dismissal of Petitioner’s PCR

proceeding (Exhibit I, M.E. 4/14/04), when Petitioner’s time to seek review of that dismissal

expired. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c) (“[w]ithin thirty days after the final decision of the trial

court”).

Thus, barring any tolling, Petitioner’s one year began to run after May 14, 2004, and

would have expired on May 14, 2005. 

New Claims - While the finality of the conviction is the normal commencement date

for the habeas limitations period, the statute does provide an exception for changes in the

law. Section 2244(d)(1)(C) provides that the period can run from “the date on which the

constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has

been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review.”

The Petition alleges that Petitioner’s sentences were imposed in violation of Blakely

v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), which was not decided until June 24, 2004, after

Petitioner’s conviction became final. Blakey was derived from the Court’s holding in

Apprendi v. New Jersey,530 U.S. 466 (2000). In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that,

with the exception of prior convictions, any fact which increases the maximum possible

punishment must be determined by the jury and not a judge. In Blakely, the Supreme Court

applied Apprendi to a state sentencing guidelines system, and found that the Washington

state sentencing scheme violated the defendant's right to a jury because a judge determined

Case 2:09-cv-02058-JAT Document 14 Filed 02/08/11 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

questions of fact necessary to the application of a sentencing enhancement. Cunningham

simply applied Blakely to California’s sentencing laws, and did not create any new

constitutional rights. 549 U.S. 270. 

Here, Petitioner’s conviction became final on May 14, 2004, when the time for review

on his of-right PCR proceeding expired. This was long after the June 26, 2000 decision in

Apprendi and before the 2004 decision in Blakely and 2007 decision in Cunningham.

Because Cunningham did not establish a new constitutional right, but merely applied Blakely

to California’s law, it does not affect Petitioner’s limitations period Because Petitioner’s

conviction was final long after Apprendi, Petitioner’s reliance on that case does not affect his

limitations period. Because it was before Blakely, it could serve to provide a later

commencement date, but only if Blakely has been “made retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). 

In Rees v. Hill, 286 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit concluded that

Apprendi was not retroactively applicable on habeas review, under the retroactivity standards

established by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308-310 (1989) (decisions establishing new

rules of criminal procedure are not to be applied retroactively on habeas review, absent

certain circumstances). Similarly, in Cook v. U.S., 386 F.3d 949, 950 (9th Cir. 2004), the

Ninth Circuit drew upon its decision in Rees to conclude that Blakely was not retroactively

applicable on habeas.

Therefore, based upon Rees and Cook, Petitioner’s claims under Blakely and its

progeny are not retroactively cognizable on habeas, and thus he is not entitled to the delayed

commencement date under section 2244(d)(1)(C). 

Newly Discovered Evidence - Section 2244(d)(1)(D) also provides an alternative

commencement date of “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” Thus, where

despite the exercise of due diligence a petitioner was unable to discover the factual predicate

of his claim, the statute does not commence running on that claim until the earlier of such

discovery or the elimination of the disability which prevented discovery. At times, a

Case 2:09-cv-02058-JAT Document 14 Filed 02/08/11 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

petitioner will attempt to point to his discovery of evidence to support his claim as the

relevant time to begin the statute of limitations. In such cases, an attempt by Petitioner to

rely on section 2244(d)(1)(D) would conflate knowledge of the “factual predicate” of a claim

with the development of sufficient evidentiary support to prove the claim. See Flanagan v.

Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 198-99 (5th Cir.1998) (receipt of trial counsel’s affidavit irrelevant

where knowledge of facts supporting claim ineffectiveness previously known to defendant).

Here, Petitioner suggests in his Ground Three for relief that there may have been

exculpatory evidence which could have been developed by competent counsel or otherwise,

e.g. DNA evidence, evidence of capacity to consent, or evidence of selective prosecution.

(Petition, Doc. 1 at 8.) However, Petitioner does not assert that he has in fact discovered

such evidence. His conjecture is not sufficient to trigger section 2244(d)(1)(D). 

Summary - Petitioner’s one year limitations period began running on May 15, 2004,

and expired on May 14, 2005.

3. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The statutory tolling applies during

the entire time during which the application is pending, including interludes between various

stages of appeal on the application. The “AEDPA statute of limitations is tolled for ‘all of

the time during which a state prisoner is attempting, through proper use of state court

procedures, to exhaust state court remedies with regard to a particular post-conviction

application.’ ” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Barnett v.

Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir.1999)). See also Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214,

217 (2002). 

However, once the statute has run, a subsequent post-conviction or collateral relief

filing does not reset the running of the one year statute. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482

(9th Cir. 2001); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). By the time

Case 2:09-cv-02058-JAT Document 14 Filed 02/08/11 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

Petitioner filed his second PCR notice (Exhibit K) on June 5, 2008, his limitations period had

been expired for over three years.

Moreover, only “properly filed” post-conviction applications count. In Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005), the Supreme Court made clear that a petition which is

rejected on timeliness grounds is not “properly filed.” Accordingly, the rejection of

Petitioner’s second PCR proceeding on timeliness grounds precludes this Court from

applying statutory tolling on the basis of its pendency. 

4. Equitable Tolling

"Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is available

in our circuit, but only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make

it impossible to file a petition on time' and ‘the extraordinary circumstances were the cause

of his untimeliness.'" Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003). 

To receive equitable tolling, [t]he petitioner must establish two

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that

some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. The petitioner must

additionally show that the extraordinary circumstances were the cause

of his untimeliness, and that the extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it

impossible to file a petition on time.

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations

omitted). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is

very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’ ” Miranda v. Castro,292 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.). 

Petitioner proffers nothing to explain his failure to file his habeas petition during the

limitations period. The undersigned finds no grounds for equitable tolling.

5. Timeliness of Federal Habeas Petition

Petitioner’s conviction became final on May 14, 2004 upon conclusion of his “of

right” PCR proceeding. His one year began running May 15, 2004, and expired May 14,

2005. His second PCR proceeding did not revive the limitations period, and his September

Case 2:09-cv-02058-JAT Document 14 Filed 02/08/11 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 In the section of his Petition related to timeliness, Petitioner argues that he did not

have sufficient notice of state court procedures for them to be an independent and adequate

state bar. (Doc. 1 at 11.) While that might preclude a finding of procedural bar, which the

undersigned does not reach, it does not affect the timeliness of Petitioner’s Petition.

- 9 -

30, 2009 Petition is untimely and barred by the statute of limitations.

6. Suspension of the Writ

Petitioner does not dispute his petition is untimely, but argues that all of this is

irrelevant because the habeas limitations period is an unconstitutional suspension of the writ

of habeas corpus. (Reply, Doc. 12 at 6-7.) That argument has been disposed of long ago.

Green contends that the one-year time limitation of AEDPA

unconstitutionally suspends the writ of habeas corpus. We disagree.

The one-year limitations period violates the Suspension Clause

if it renders the remedy of habeas corpus “inadequate or ineffective.”

We join the other circuits that have considered this issue and hold that

AEDPA's one-year limitation does not constitute a per se violation of

the Suspension Clause.

Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 2000).3

B. PROCEDURAL DEFAULT/PROCEDURAL BAR

Because the undersigned finds Petitioner’s Petition clearly barred by the statute of

limitations, Respondents’ claims of procedural default and/or procedural bar are not reached.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires that in

habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters

a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in cases concerning

detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges detention

pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will result in

Case 2:09-cv-02058-JAT Document 14 Filed 02/08/11 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a decision on a

certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on

procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA

should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists

of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural

ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. To the extent that

Petitioner’s claims are rejected on procedural grounds, under the reasoning set forth herein,

the undersigned finds that “jurists of reason” would not “find it debatable whether the district

court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts

this Report & Recommendation as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability should be

denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus, filed September 30, 2009 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that to the extent the reasoning of this Report

& Recommendation is adopted, that a certificate of appealability BE DENIED.

Case 2:09-cv-02058-JAT Document 14 Filed 02/08/11 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall

have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules Governing

Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to

file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.2(e)(3), unless otherwise

permitted by the Court, an objection to a Report and Recommendation shall not exceed ten

(10) pages. Failure to timely file objections to any findings or recommendations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of

the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc),

and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an

order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins

v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

DATED: February 8, 2011 _____________________________________

JAY R. IRWIN 

S:\Civil Cases\Active Cases\Harris 2-09CV2058\09-2058-001r RR 11 02 03 re HC.wpd United States Magistrate Judge 

Case 2:09-cv-02058-JAT Document 14 Filed 02/08/11 Page 11 of 11