Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-01142/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-01142-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVE FEGAN,

Petitioner,

v.

ERIC ARNOLD, Warden, California State 

Prison-Solano,

Respondent.

No. 1:16-cv-01142-SKO HC

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION 

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

SCREENING ORDER

Petitioner, Steve Fegan, is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.1 The petition (1) requests that the Court order the 

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to grant him a parole hearing, and (2) 

repeats his previously submitted claim that the evidence concerning his head injuries presented in 

his trial violated his rights to due process and assistance of counsel under the Fifth, Sixth, and 

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Because the District Court lacks 

jurisdiction over both claims, it dismisses the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), Petitioner consented, in writing, to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate 

Judge to conduct all further proceedings in this case, including the entry of final judgment.

Case 1:16-cv-01142-SKO Document 7 Filed 08/30/16 Page 1 of 4
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I. Preliminary Screening

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases requires the Court to conduct a preliminary 

review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court must dismiss a petition "[i]f it 

plainly appears from the petition . . . that the petitioner is not entitled to relief." Rule 4 of the 

Rules Governing 2254 Cases; see also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990). 

A petition for habeas corpus should not be dismissed without leave to amend unless it appears 

that no tenable claim for relief can be pleaded were such leave to be granted. Jarvis v. Nelson, 

440 F.2d 13, 14 (9th Cir. 1971).

II. Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Order a Parole Hearing

In his first claim for relief, Petitioner asks this Court to order the CDCR to grant him a 

parole hearing as an elderly inmate who has served over twenty-five years of his sentence. 

Petitioner has not exhausted his state remedies regarding this claim. The petition contends only 

that Petitioner has fully pursued his administrative remedies.

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his incarceration 

by a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(b)(1). The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state 

court the initial opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 

854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988).

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court 

with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. 

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); 

Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state 

court was given a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the 

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highest state court with the claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365; Kenney v. 

Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 8 (1992).

The petitioner must also have specifically informed the state court that he was raising a 

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 

(9th Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 

1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). In this case, claim one does not 

assert any constitutional claim to a parole hearing under the provisions of the California state 

program for early parole of inmates over sixty years of age. He claims only that the parole board 

erred in denying his claim as untimely. As such, Petitioner has not only failed to exhaust his 

administrative remedies, but he has also failed to assert a constitutional claim. 

III. Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Petitioner’s Second or Successive Claim

The second claim contends that Petitioner’s rights to due process and assistance of counsel 

were violated by insufficient evidence of Petitioner’s impaired reasoning, judgment, and decision 

making as a result of a head injury. Petitioner has challenged the same conviction, specifically 

including this claim, in many prior petitions. See, e.g., Fegan v. Frauenheim (1:14-cv-01022-

AWI-SMS HC); Fegan v. Brazelton (1:14-cv-00967-JLT HC); Fegan v. Warden (1:11-cv-01863-

LJO-JLT HC); Fegan v. Warden, California State Prison (1:10-cv-01690-AWI-JLT HC); Fegan 

v. Warden, Corcoran State Prison (1:08-cv-01373-JLT HC); Fegan v. California (1:08-cv-01140-

DLB HC); Fegan v. Scribner, Warden (1:06-cv-00531-OWW-DLB HC); and Fegan v. Roe (1:99-

cv-06427-OWW-LJO HC).

The circuit court of appeals, not the district court, must decide whether a second or 

successive petition satisfies the statutory requirements to proceed. 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(3)(A) 

("Before a second or successive petition permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the 

applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court 

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to consider the application"). This means that a petitioner may not file a second or successive 

petition in district court until he has obtained leave from the court of appeals. Felker v. Turpin, 

518 U.S. 651, 656-57 (1996). In the absence of an order from the appropriate circuit court, a 

district court lacks jurisdiction over the petition and must dismiss it as a second or successive 

petition. Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1277 (9th Cir. 1997). 

IV. Conclusion and Order

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court is 

directed to enter judgment for Respondent.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 30, 2016 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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