Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02681/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02681-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 140
Nature of Suit: Negotiable Instruments
Cause of Action: 28:1331(a) Fed. Question: Real Property

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MAURICIO MANZANO; NEL T.

MANZANO,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 10-CV-2681 JLS (WVG)

ORDER: (1) DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE

APPLICATION FOR A

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

ORDER; (2) SETTING HEARING

FOR PRELIMINARY

INJUNCTION

(Doc. No. 2)

vs.

MISSON FEDERAL CREDIT UNION;

FIRST AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY;

T.D. SERVICE COMPANY; et al.,

Defendants.

In October 2005, Plaintiffs obtained a $515,000 loan from Defendant Mission Federal Credit

Union secured by a deed of trust on the property located at 818 Belle Crest Way, San Diego,

California (the property). (See Doc. No. 1 (Compl.) Exs. B, C.) “On or about May 27, 2010,”

Defendant TD Service Company recorded a notice of default and election to sell against the property.

(Doc. No. 4 (Decl. ISO TRO Appl.) ¶ 4.) A trustee’s sale was scheduled for December 29, 2010 at

10:30 a.m. (Id. ¶ 5.) On December 29, 2010 at 9:43 a.m., Plaintiffs filed a complaint against

Defendants alleging sixteen causes of action related to the loan transaction and subsequent

foreclosure. (See Compl.) Concurrently therewith, Plaintiff filed the instant ex parte application for

a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction. (Doc. No. 2 (TRO Appl.).) Plaintiffs

have yet to serve process on Defendants.

Case 3:10-cv-02681-JLS-WVG Document 5 Filed 12/29/10 Page 1 of 4
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1. Temporary Restraining Order

Temporary restraining orders are governed by the same standard applicable to preliminary

injunctions. See New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1347 n.2 (1977)

(Rehnquist, J.). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to

succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,

that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter

v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. (NRDC), — U.S. —, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008) (citing Munaf v.

Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2218–19 (2008)); see also Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of

L.A., 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009). This is an “extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded

upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” NRDC, 129 S.Ct. at 376. This “clear

showing” requires Plaintiff to show more than a mere “possibility” of irreparable harm, but instead

he must “demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.” Id. at 375

(emphasis in original); Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 559 F.3d at 1052.

When a plaintiff has not provided notice of her application to the defendant, Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 65(b)(1) imposes specific requirements prior to the issuance of a temporary

restraining order.

The court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the

adverse party or its attorney only if: (A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified

complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will

result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the

movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons

why it should not be required.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). “The stringent restrictions imposed . . . by Rule 65[] on the availability of

ex parte temporary restraining orders reflect the fact that our entire jurisprudence runs counter to the

notion of court action taken before reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard has been granted

both sides of a dispute.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 438–39

(1974) (footnote omitted).

Accordingly, “courts have recognized very few circumstances justifying the issuance of an ex

parte TRO.” Reno Air Racing Ass’n v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2006). “For example,

an ex parte TRO may be appropriate ‘where notice to the adverse party is impossible either because

the identity of the adverse party is unknown or because a known party cannot be located in time for

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a hearing.’” Id. (quoting Am. Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 322 (7th Cir. 1984)).

Alternatively, “[i]n cases where notice could have been given to the adverse party, courts have

recognized a very narrow band of cases in which ex parte orders are proper because notice to the

defendant would render fruitless the further prosecution of the action.’” Id. (quoting Am. Can Co., 742

F.3d at 322).

Here, Plaintiff has met the first requirement for a temporary restraining order without notice.

Plaintiff’s counsel has certified in writing that “the plaintiffs . . . will be deprived of their home”

without a temporary restraining order. (Decl. ISO TRO Appl. ¶ 6; see Alcaraz v. Wachovia Mortg.

FSB, 592 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1301 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“‘Losing one’s home through foreclosure is an

irreparable injury.’” (quoting Wrobel v. S.L. Pope & Asscos., 2007 WL 2345036, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug.

15, 2007))).) And the trustee’s sale was scheduled for December 29, 2010, a scant forty-seven

minutes after Plaintiffs filed their complaint and application. (Decl. ISO TRO Appl. ¶ 5; see Fed. R.

Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A).) 

However, Plaintiffs have failed to meet the second requirement of Rule 65(b)(1). Although

Plaintiff’s counsel has certified in writing that “[g]reat and/or irreparable injury will result to plaintiff

[sic] before the matter can be heard on notice,” neither Plaintiff nor Plaintiff’s counsel has certified

in writing any efforts to give notice to Defendants. (Decl. ISO TRO Appl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiffs have also

not demonstrated that notice is impossible or would render further prosecution of the action fruitless,

as is required for an ex parte TRO. Reno Air Racing, 452 F.3d at 1131.

Because Plaintiffs have not met the second requirement for a TRO without notice, Plaintiffs’

application is DENIED.

2. Preliminary Injunction

Plaintiff’s application also requests a preliminary injunction. (See TRO Appl. 4.) Under Rule

65(a)(1), “[t]he court may issue a preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1). Accordingly, to have their request for a preliminary injunction set for hearing,

Plaintiffs must serve Defendants with all documents they have filed in this matter, including the

complaint, the application, counsel’s declaration, and this Order by January 10, 2011. Plaintiffs must

electronically file proof of service by January 14, 2011.

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If Plaintiffs timely serve and file all documents, the request for a preliminary injunction will

be set for hearing on Friday, March 11, 2011 at 3:00 p.m. Briefing shall comply with Local Civil Rule

7.1. S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1. If all documents are not served as directed, the matter will not be heard on

March 11, 2011. Rather, Plaintiff must obtain the next available hearing date from chambers under

Local Civil Rule 7.1(b).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, Plaintiffs’ ex parte application for a temporary restraining order is

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 29, 2010

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

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