Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00243/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00243-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 690
Nature of Suit: Other Forfeiture and Penalty Suits
Cause of Action: 28:1345 Complaint for Forfeiture

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28 1/ 18 U.S.C. §983.

WO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, 

 v.

110 FIREARMS,

Defendant.

CV-09-243-PHX-MHB

AMENDED ORDER

This matter comes before the court upon consideration of Plaintiff’s First Motion to Strike

Claim and Answer of Thomas Lang (Doc. #18). Claimant Thomas Lang has filed a Response

(Doc. #27), and Plaintiff has filed a Reply (Doc. #33). This Court ordered an evidentiary

hearing on the sole issue of the standing of Claimant pursuant to the Civil Asset Forfeiture

Reform Act (“CAFRA”) 1/ to contest forfeiture, indicating as follows in its Order:

As set forth in the 2006 Advisory Committee Notes for Rule G(8)(c)(ii): 

Paragraph (c)(ii) further identifies three procedures for addressing claim standing.

If a claim fails on its face to show facts that support claim standing, the claim can

be dismissed by judgment on the pleadings. If the claim shows facts that would

support claim standing, those facts can be tested by a motion for summary

judgment. If material facts are disputed, precluding a grant of summary judgment,

the court may hold an evidentiary hearing. The evidentiary hearing is held by the

court without a jury. The claimant has the burden to establish claim standing at

a hearing; procedure on a government summary judgment motion reflects this

allocation of the burden.

Advisory Committee Notes to Rule G(8)(c)(ii). (Doc. #39.) The Court found that “the material

facts as to claim standing are sufficiently disputed.” (Id.)

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The evidentiary hearing took place on January 20, 2010. Defendant presented the

testimony of one witness, the Claimant Thomas Lang. (Doc. #49.) Plaintiff presented the

testimony of the following witnesses: Dennis Kirsner, Don McPhee, and Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) agents Carmelo Perez and Clayton Merrill. (Id.) The Court

received and admitted Plaintiff’s exhibits 1, 2, and 3, and Claimant’s exhibits 50, 51, 52, and 53.

(Id.) Both Plaintiff and Claimant subsequently filed Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law. (Docs. ##56, 57, and 59.) Based upon consideration of all of the above, the Court

issues the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. An investigation was commenced on September 24, 2008, by ATF Special Agent

Clayton Merrill, into the reported sale on September 10, 2008, of Defendant property, 10 Ruger

Ranch Rifles and one-hundred Glock 19 handguns (hereinafter “the firearms”) by Saba’s

Western Wear, a licensed firearms dealer in Chandler, Arizona.

2. The firearms were originally sold by Davidsons, a firearms distributer, on or about

September 8, 2008, through Saba’s Western Wear. The sale was brokered by Dennis Kirsner,

a former employee of Davidsons.

3. Dale Bell had solicited Kirsner to acquire the firearms. Kirsner then contacted

Davidsons to obtain a price quote and communicated that quote back to Dale Bell.

4. Kirsner received cash and a check for the purchase of the firearms from Spencer

Bell, the son of Dale Bell, and deposited the money into his personal account. 

5. On September 8, 2008, Kirsner picked up the firearms from Davidsons and

transferred them into his pickup truck. Kirsner paid for the firearms with a cashiers check drawn

on his personal account in the amount of $49,597.10. Kirsner advised Donald McPhee, an

employee of Davidsons, that he was purchasing the firearms for a friend of his in Queen Creek

who was starting a security camp, and that he expected some of the firearms would stay in

Queen Creek and some would go to a security camp in South Dakota. Kirsner testified that he

believed the firearms were destined for resale through a pawn shop owned by Dale Bell in South

Dakota.

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6. On September 10, 2008, Kirsner, Claimant and Spencer Bell arrived at Saba’s

Western Wear to complete the transaction.

7. Claimant advised the clerk that he was the purchaser of firearms, provided his

drivers license and signed AFT Form 3310.04, indicating he was the “transferree” of the

property.

8. The firearms were not delivered to Saba’s Western wear and Claimant told the

clerk that he already had possession.

9. After the transaction, Claimant left the area without the firearms. Kirsner and

Spencer Bell transported the firearms to a casita at the San Tan Flats Restaurant. Spencer Bell

opened a gun safe therein and locked the firearms inside.

10. The San Tan Flats Restaurant is owned by Dale Bell, and Spencer Bell works as

the manager of the restaurant. Claimant was a long-term patron and employee of the restaurant

and through that association became close to the Bell family. 

11. On September 25, 2008, at approximately 1:00 p.m. ATF agents Perez and Merrill

arrived on Claimant’s residential property in Queen Creek, Arizona, to confront Claimant about

the purchase of the firearms.

12. Claimant was at home working outside on restoring an old wagon, and cooperated

by answering the questions posed by the agents. The agents carried an audio recorder and taped

the conversation with Claimant.

13. Claimant advised the agents that he had purchased the firearms for his friend Dale

Bell and that Dale Bell had contacted him and told him that Spencer would contact him about

using Claimant’s drivers license and information. Claimant stated that Dale Bell was purchasing

the firearms for the “end of the world” and that Bell was building a compound in South Dakota

waiting for “when all hell breaks loose.”

14. Claimant advised that his only role in the purchase was to arrive at Saba’s Western

Wear and complete the necessary paperwork to complete the sale. He never saw the firearms

or the money advanced to purchase them. Initially he advised the agents that the firearms were

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driven up to South Dakota by Dale Bell, and then later advised that Spencer Bell had taken them

to either his house or his dad’s house.

15. During the meeting with the agents, Claimant made a telephone call to a person

who identified himself to agent Merrill as Dale Bell. Bell told agent Merrill that he was in

Wyoming and that the firearms were in a safe, and that he was keeping the firearms for

Claimant. When agent Merrill informed Bell that Claimant had told him to the contrary that the

firearms were purchased for Bell, Bell hung up the phone.

16. At the request of the ATF agents, Claimant agreed to have the firearms delivered

to his residence, but needed time to get them because getting them would be “complicated.” He

agreed to have them brought to his house within twenty-four hours. 

17. The meeting lasted approximately 37 minutes. The audio recording reflects that

Claimant was articulate in his answers to the agents’ questions, and repeatedly denied that he

had purchased the firearms for himself, asserting that he had purchased the firearms for Dale

Bell.

18. Later the same day, ATF agent Merrill called Claimant to check on the status of

the firearms and Claimant responded that he was still working on retrieving them. Claimant

suggested the agent call back the next morning. ATF agent Merrill called back the next day and

Claimant advised that he would have the firearms at his residence at 1:30 p.m. On September

26, 2008, ATF agents went back to Claimant’s residence to retrieve the firearms.

19. ATF agents followed Claimant to a back computer room where ten cardboard

boxes containing the firearms were located.

20. Claimant confirmed that the firearms were the ones he had obtained for Dale Bell

using his own personal information. 

21. Claimant also advised the ATF agents that he picked the firearms up at Dale Bell’s

residence in Scottsdale, Arizona, and brought them back to his residence. 

22. ATF agents then seized the firearms as evidence.

23. On November 10, 2008, Claimant submitted a seized asset claim form for the

firearms to ATF. 

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24. The Civil Forfeiture Complaint in this action was filed by the government on

February 6, 2009, and alleged an in rem action, brought to enforce the provisions of 18 U.S.C.

§924(d) for the forfeiture of the firearms, involved in a violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(a)(1)(A), that

is a knowing false statement or representation made with respect to information required to be

kept in the records of a Federal Firearm Licensee.

25. The firearms are currently in the custody of ATF in Phoenix, Arizona.

26. This Court has jurisdiction over an action commenced by the United States under

28 U.S.C. § 1345 and an action for forfeiture under 28 U.S.C. § 1355(a). 

27. This Court has in rem jurisdiction over the Defendant Property pursuant to the

service of an arrest warrant in rem pursuant to Supplemental Rule G(3)(b), which the Plaintiff

has executed upon the Defendant Property pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1355(d) and Supplemental

Rule G(3)(c).

28. Venue is proper in this District.

29. In Claimant’s Responses to Discovery he claimed, contrary to what he had told

the ATF agents on September 25, 2008, that the firearms were obtained for himself as a financial

investment, and identified Dale Bell as the source of the funds, and that Dale Bell had presented

the firearms as a gift. Claimant did not have the funds himself to acquire the firearms.

30. In Claimant’s Responses to Discovery he claimed, contrary to what he had

previously told the ATF agents, that the firearms were retrieved by him and Spencer Bell on

September 26, 2008 from the gun safe at the San Tan Flats Restaurant, and transported by them

in Claimant’s truck to the computer room at his house. Claimant also indicated that he has a key

to the casita where the safe was located and knows the combination to the gunsafe.

31. Claimant also admitted he had no money himself to purchase the firearms, that the

money to purchase the firearms was never in his possession, that the money was delivered to the

wholesaler by Dennis Kirsner, the same individual who had been asked by Dale Bell to find a

deal on firearms, and that after the firearms were seized, Dale Bell provided the funds to retain

Claimant’s counsel to litigate this forfeiture action.

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32. Claimant did not deny telling ATF agents on September 25, 2008, that he had

purchased the firearms on behalf of Dale Bell, but had no “personal recollection” of making such

a statement.

33. Claimant has a long-standing close, personal friendship with the Bell Family,

particularly Dale Bell, as the result of the association with the San Tan Flats Restaurant. Dale

Bell is the owner of the restaurant, and therefore, as an employee, Claimant is financially

dependent upon Bell. A banquet room at the restaurant, called the “Tom Lang Room” is named

after Claimant.

34. Claimant is not a licensed firearms dealer and cannot operate a business required

to sell a large number of firearms in the event he were required to liquidate the firearms in the

future.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Summary Judgment.

A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents, viewed

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, "show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P.

56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Jesinger v. Nevada Federal

Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994). Substantive law determines which facts are

material. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Jesinger, 24 F.3d

at 1130. "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The

dispute must also be genuine, that is, the evidence must be "such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.; see Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130. There must be

sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Nidds

v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1996).

A principal purpose of summary judgment is "to isolate and dispose of factually

unsupported claims." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. Summary judgment is appropriate against

a party who "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential

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to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. at 322; see

Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 1994). The moving party need not

disprove matters on which the opponent has the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S.

at 323-24. The party opposing summary judgment need not produce evidence "in a form that

would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment." Id. at 324. However, the

nonmovant "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [the party's] pleadings, but ...

must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e);

see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-88 (1986)

(Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.). The court views the facts in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Martin, 872 F.2d 319, 320

(9th Cir. 1989).

Whether there is a genuine issue of fact for trial depends on the substantive law of the

underlying case and the evidentiary burdens that law places on each party. See Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 252-56 (noting that “the judge must view the evidence presented

through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden”). Summary judgment procedures must

necessarily be “construed in light of the statutory law of forfeitures, and particularly the

procedural requirements set forth therein.” United States v. One 56-Foot Motor Yacht Named

Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276, 1281 (9th Cir.1983). 

B. Standing.

Standing is a threshold issue on which the claimant bears the burden of proof in civil

forfeiture cases. United States v. Real Property Located at 5208 Los Franciscos Way, 385 F.3d

1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 2004). To establish Article III standing, the claimant must demonstrate by

a preponderance of the evidence an interest in the property sufficient to satisfy the “case and

controversy” requirement. Id.; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972) (A claimant

must possess a “sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial

resolution of that controversy.”). A claimant must show “actual or imminent injury-not

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2/ In Claimant’s Memorandum Regarding Conclusions of Law, he argues that the Court

should not strike his claim because his Fifth Amendment rights were violated by law

enforcement agents. (Doc. #57, at 6.) Although the exclusionary rule may be applicable to civil

forfeiture actions, there is no pending motion with respect to this issue. United States v.

$181,416.00 in U.S. Currency, 590 F.3d 942, 947 (9th Cir. 2010) (after the government filed a

complaint for forfeiture, UMCC filed a motion to suppress).

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hypothetical, conjectural, or abstract injury” in order to establish standing. United States v.

Lazarenko, 476 F.3d 642, 649 (9th Cir. 2007).

Establishing ownership of property, without an exercise of “dominion and control over

the property is insufficient” to establish standing to challenge a forfeiture. United States v. One

Parcel of Land, Known as Lot 111-B, 902 F.2d 1443, 1444 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (citation

omitted). “Due to concerns about ‘straw man’ transfers, ‘naked possession’ claims are

insufficient to establish standing.” United States v. $515,060.42, 152 F.3d 491, 498 (6th Cir.

1998). “When confronted with mere physical possession of property as a basis for standing, we

require some explanation or contextual information regarding the claimant’s relationship to the

seized property.” Id. (citing United States v. $191,910.00 in U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d 1051, 1058

(9th Cir. 1994)). Because the danger of false claims in civil forfeiture action is substantial,

courts “demand more than conclusory or hearsay allegations of some ‘interest’ in the forfeited

property.” United States v. $100,348 in U.S. Currency, 354 F.3d 1110, 1118-1119 (9th Cir.

2004) (citation omitted).

C. Application of law to facts.

Claimant has asserted that he is the owner of the firearms. 2/ Plaintiff counters that

Claimant’s assertion of ownership is without merit and disingenuous, and that therefore Claimant

has failed to establish Article III standing. Subsection 983(d)(6)(A) of CAFRA defines “owner”

as “a person with an ownership interest in the specific property sought to be forfeited, including

a leasehold, lien, mortgage, recorded security interest, or valid assignment of an ownership

interest.” The sole basis for Claimant’s assertion of ownership is his claim in the forfeiture

proceedings that the firearms were a gift to him from Dale Bell. Claimant did not call Dale Bell

or anyone else as a witness to corroborate his claim. He also did not present any documentary

evidence of the gifting. Nor did he describe any personal history or circumstance that would

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make his sudden acquisition of 110 firearms understandable or sensible. He did not take

possession of the firearms after their purchase, did not handle the purchase money, was not

involved in the selection of the quality or number of firearms purchased, and did not possess the

capability of selling the firearms, despite his proclamation that the firearms were acquired as an

investment. When the ATF agents returned to Claimant’s house the day after their initial

interview to seize the firearms from Claimant, he told them he had retrieved the weapons from

Dale Bell’s house.

On the other hand, the evidence strongly suggests that the firearms were purchased by

Dale Bell, and that Dale Bell involved Claimant in order to utilize his identification in the

purchase. The facts fit this scenario neatly. When ATF agents first interviewed Claimant, this

was the story he told. During his evidentiary hearing testimony, Claimant stopped short of

admitting that he had lied to the ATF agents, and instead claimed that he is a diabetic and was

suffering from low blood sugar at the time of the interview, and was therefore not feeling well

and was confused. He also claimed that the ATF agents were loud and abusive, and that he was

frightened by the agents. Claimant did not seek medical attention after the interview, and did

not produce any medical evidence to support his claim. The Court has carefully reviewed the

audio tape of the ATF interview, and has found that there is no indication in the 37 minute audio

recording that the ATF agents were loud or abusive, or that Claimant was anything but lucid,

articulate, and consistent in his answers to their questions. Furthermore, Claimant maintained

his initial story the next day when ATF agents came to his home to seize the firearms. The

testimony of Dennis Kirsner also supports Claimant’s initial story.

Contrary to what he told the ATF agents, Claimant asserted in the forfeiture proceedings

that he had possession of the firearms after they were purchased because they were stored at the

San Tan Flats restaurant in a safe to which he had access. If the firearms were accessible to

Claimant as he claims, he could have retrieved them for the ATF agents on September 25, 2008.

Claimant’s story that the firearms were intended as an investment also makes little sense, as he

does not possess a license to sell them. 

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The cases cited by the parties are distinguishable factually from this case, in that they

address the question of the Claimant’s ability to demonstrate a possessory, AND an ownership

interest. Compare, United States v. $191,910.00 in U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d at 1058 (claimant

was in physical possession of the res, and did not disclaim ownership) and United States v.

$148,840.00 in U.S. Currency, 521 F.3d 1268, 1277 (10th Cir. 2008) (claimant was in physical

possession of the res and consistently asserted ownership); with, United States v. Vacant Land

Located at 10th St. and Challenger Way in Palmdale, Ca., 15 F.3d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1993)

(claimant had legal title, but didn’t exercise dominion and control of land, the transfer of title

was “without consideration,” claimant was merely a “strawman holding nominal title as a

subterfuge for a drug trafficker”). 

In Claimant’s case, he was not in possession of the firearms after the purchase, and denied

ownership. He never took possession of the firearms he purportedly was given, until the ATF

agents directed him to produce the firearms. Even if it were true that the firearms were located

at the San Tan Flats Restaurant, because several others had access to the firearms, Claimant did

not have “sole possession,” or at least not possession that would be considered hostile to any

other possessory or ownership right. Claimant also did not assert any right of ownership until

November 10, 2008, forty five (45) days after the firearms were seized. 

The Court finds that Claimant’s assertion of ownership fails on the facts presented. A

reasonable juror could not conclude that Claimant has Article III standing, based upon his

contradictory, unsupported, and nonsensical claim of ownership in the firearms. Compare

United States v. Lot 4, Block 5 of Eaton Acres, 904 F.2d 487 (9th cir. 1990) (Claimant’s “bare

assertion” of ownership contradicted only by confidential informant) with United States v.

$42,500, 283 F.3d 977, 984 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that a “reasonable person” could not return

a verdict in favor of Claimant, based upon her “ever-expanding, contradictory, sophistical, and

impenetrable story.”) Claimant has not established Article III standing by a preponderance of

the evidence, such that he will suffer a constitutional injury if the firearms are not returned to

him.

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CONCLUSION

Based upon the above findings of facts and conclusions of law, and upon consideration

of the totality of the circumstances presented, Plaintiff has established that the res is subject to

forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(d) which constitutes firearms involved in a violation of

18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) and § 924(a)(1)(A). See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274-77,

122 S.Ct. 744, 751–52 (2002); United States v. $22,474, 246 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 2001); and

United States v. $42,500, 283 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2002).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Claim and Answer of

Thomas Lang (Doc. #18) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that judgment of forfeiture shall be entered in favor of

plaintiff and the Defendant 110 firearms shall be disposed of according to law. 

DATED this 6th day of April, 2010.

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