Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_10-cv-00828/USCOURTS-almd-3_10-cv-00828-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

DEMITRIA BUTLER, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

vs. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:10cv828-WHA

 ) (wo)

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., )

PROTECTION ONE SYSTEMS, et al., ) 

 )

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This cause is before the court on the Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand and Request for

Attorney Fees, Expenses, and Costs (Doc. #14).

The Plaintiff, Demitria Butler (“Butler”), filed her case on August 27, 2010, in the Circuit

Court of Macon County, Alabama, bringing state law claims against Charter Communications,

Inc. (“Charter”); Protection One Systems (“Protection One”); and fictitious defendants. The

Plaintiff is a citizen of Alabama. 

The Plaintiff’s claims arise from a fire which resulted in a total loss of her residence and

its contents. She brings claims for negligence/wantonness against Charter (Count One), breach

of contract against Charter (Count Two), negligence/wantonness against Protection One (Count

Three), and breach of contract against Protection One (Count Four). The Complaint seeks an

unspecified amount in compensatory damages for the loss of the house, its contents, and the

Plaintiff’s emotional distress, as well as punitive damages.

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The Defendants removed the case to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) on

September 29, 2010, on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.1

 The Plaintiff seeks remand of the

case to state court, stating that the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000. The

Plaintiffs also initially disputed that there is a complete diversity of parties.

For reasons to be discussed, the Motion to Remand is due to be DENIED.

II. REMAND STANDARD

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.,

511 U.S. 375 (1994); Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (1994); Wymbs v.

Republican State Exec. Comm., 719 F.2d 1072, 1076 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.

1103 (1984). As such, federal courts only have the power to hear cases that they have been

authorized to hear by the Constitution or the Congress of the United States. See Kokkonen, 511

U.S. at 377. Because federal court jurisdiction is limited, the Eleventh Circuit favors remand of

removed cases where federal jurisdiction is not absolutely clear. See Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095.

III. DISCUSSION

A federal district court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a civil action in

which only state law claims are alleged if the civil action arises under the federal court's

diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). The diversity statute confers jurisdiction on

the federal courts in civil actions "between citizens of different states," and the amount in

controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. Id. 

1

 The Defendants originally removed the case under both the first and second paragraph

of §1446(b), but have now made it clear that they seek to have the court consider attached copies

of public records in support of a § 1446(b), first paragraph removal. 

2

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Butler stated in her Motion to Remand that this case lacks complete diversity of parties. 

The Defendants have alleged that they are companies incorporated in states other than Alabama

with principal places of business other than Alabama. The Defendants have also attached copies

of records from the office of the Alabama Secretary of State to support these allegations. In her

Reply, Butler does not challenge these allegations or the evidence supporting them. 

Accordingly, the court concludes that complete diversity of citizenship exists and that the only

remaining issue is whether the requisite amount is in controversy.

When an ad damnum clause includes a demand for a specific amount of damages which

is less than the jurisdictional amount, the defendant is "required to prove to a legal certainty that

plaintiff, if she prevailed,” would not recover less than the jurisdictional amount. Burns v.

Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1097 (11th Cir.1994). To sustain federal removal jurisdiction

based on diversity of citizenship in a case in which the complaint as filed in a state court seeks

an unspecified amount of damages, however, the burden is on the defendant to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs,

exceeds $75,000.00. See, e.g., Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1357 (11th

Cir.1996), abrogated on other grounds by Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir.

2000). 

As stated above, in this case, Butler filed a Complaint seeking unspecified compensatory

and punitive damages for the loss of her home, the contents of her home, and mental anguish. 

See Complaint at p. 7. 

The Defendants removed the case arguing that it was obvious from the allegations of the

Complaint that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, pointing out that Butler seeks

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punitive and compensatory damages. In arguing that the court can ascertain from the face of the

Complaint that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, the

Defendants rely on Roe v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 613 F.3d 1058 (11th Cir. 2010). This court

agrees with another district court within this circuit, however, that Roe, an Alabama wrongful

death case, should not be extended to non-wrongful death cases merely on the basis that punitive

damages are sought. See SUA Ins. Co. v. Classic Home Builders, LLC, No. 10-0388-WS-C,

2010 WL 4664968, at *9 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 17, 2010). As in SUA, this court “is not free to simply

assume,” that Butler is likely to be awarded substantial punitive damages. Id.

The Defendants also seek to demonstrate that the value of the property for which Butler

seeks compensation exceeds the jurisdictional amount by attaching to the Notice of Removal a

copy of a record purported to be from the Macon County Revenue Commissioner’s office. The

attached document indicates that the year before the fire which destroyed her home, Butler’s

home and land together were appraised at $ 114,000. The land alone was appraised at $4,000. 

Charter Communications, in its separately-filed opposition to the Motion to Remand, also

presents an appraisal document to establish that the value of the land after the fire was appraised

at $4,000. 

 Butler originally took the position that this court is limited to consideration of evidence

provided by her, relying on Lowery v. Alabama Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2007). As

Butler has seemingly acknowledged in her reply, however, the court can consider documents

proffered by the Defendants pursuant to the holding in Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608

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F.3d 744 (11th Cir. 2010), because this case was removed under the first paragraph of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1446 (b).2

In Pretka, the Eleventh Circuit clarified the law regarding cases removed pursuant to the

first paragraph of § 1446(b), distinguishing those cases from Lowery, which was a § 1446(b),

second paragraph case. Id. at 757. The court explained that language in Lowery, which restricts

the evidence to be considered to evidence provided by the plaintiff, was dicta because Lowery

itself was a § 1446(b), second paragraph case. Id. at 762. The court explained that evidence

provided by the defendant can be considered by a court in determining whether the requisite

amount in controversy existed at the time of removal in a § 1446(b), first paragraph case, and the

court is not limited to considering evidence provided the defendant by the plaintiff or the court. 

Id. at 768. In Pretka, the court considered the allegations of the complaint, contracts attached to

it, and a declaration attached to the notice of removal. Id. at 770. The Pretka court went on to

state that a court may consider both the evidence attached to a notice of removal, as well as postremoval evidence, to establish the facts present at the time of removal. Id. at 772-73.

2

 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (b) provides as follows:

The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within thirty

days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of

the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or

proceeding is based, or within thirty days after the service of summons upon the

defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not required

to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.

If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may

be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or

otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from

which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become

removable, except that a case may not be removed on the basis of jurisdiction

conferred by section 1332 of this title more than 1 year after commencement of

the action.

5

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Although Butler concedes in her Reply that the court can consider evidence in this case,

Butler argues that the property appraisal records provided by the Defendants should not be

considered by this court because they are unsworn and unauthenticated, and have handwritten

notes on them. Butler cites no authority for the proposition that this court cannot consider the

documents provided in ruling on a Motion to Remand, nor does Butler challenge the accuracy of

the appraisal amounts on the copied records.

In a case favorably cited in Pretka for another proposition, a district court in this circuit

concluded that documents do not have to strictly comply with all prerequisites of admissibility to

be considered on a motion to remand. See Spottswood v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., No. 10-0109,

2010 WL 1539993, at *4 n.11 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 16, 2010); see also Pretka, 608 F.3d at 765. The

court reasoned that a court’s ruling on a motion to remand is not an evidentiary finding, but a

preliminary ruling. Id. Other district courts within this circuit also have concluded the failure to

authenticate a document is not a sufficient ground to exclude it from consideration in a motion to

remand. See Katz v. J.C. Penney Corp., Inc., No. 09cv60067, 2009 WL 1532129, at *2 (S.D.

Fla. June 1, 2009) (considering a county property report); Davenport v. Ford Motor Corp., No.

1:05cv3047, 2006 WL 2048308, at *4 n. 5 (N.D. Ga. July 20, 2006) (considering bill of sale). 

In Pretka, the court made it clear that it is permissible for Defendants to make “specific

factual allegations establishing jurisdiction and . . . support them (if challenged by the plaintiff or

the court) with evidence combined with reasonable deductions, reasonable inferences, or other

reasonable extrapolations.” Pretka, 608 F.3d at 754. The Defendants are not required to “prove

the amount in controversy beyond all doubt or to banish all uncertainty about it.” Id. Pretka also

re-affirmed the idea that the remand determination may require “summary-judgment-type”

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evidence. Id. at 755. A court can consider otherwise inadmissible evidence in ruling on a Rule

56 motion for summary judgment as long as that evidence is reducible to admissible form.

Rowell v. BellSouth Corp., 433 F.3d 794, 800 (11th Cir.2005). 

In view of these authorities, the court is persuaded that it may properly consider the

copied documents presented by the Defendants in ruling on the instant Motion to Remand. The

copies of records, which are stated to be from the Macon County Revenue Commissioner’s

office, indicate that Butler has suffered a property loss of approximately $110,000, even without

consideration of the contents of the dwelling. Notably, Butler does not dispute the accuracy of

these appraisals. Therefore, the specific facts alleged by the Defendants, and supported by the

attachments to the Notice of Removal and opposition to remand, along with the request for

additional damages for emotional distress and punitive damages, sufficiently establish that the

amount in controversy in this case exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 

V. CONCLUSION

As discussed above, the court concludes that the Defendants have met their burden to

demonstrate that the requisite amount is in controversy, so that this court has diversity subject

matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Motion to Remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is

hereby ORDERED DENIED. The Motion to Remand having been denied, it is further

ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s request for costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees is DENIED.

DONE this 15th day of December, 2010.

/s/ W. Harold Albritton 

W. HAROLD ALBRITTON

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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