Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-01579/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-01579-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OAKLAND DIVISION

MELVIN LEE MORRIS, SR.,

Petitioner,

 vs.

MATTHEW KRAMER, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 08-1579 PJH (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS AND DENYING

CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY 

This is a habeas corpus case filed pro se by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. The court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. 

Respondent has filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of

it, and has lodged exhibits with the court. Petitioner has responded with a traverse. For

the reasons set out below, the petition is denied.

BACKGROUND

The following is taken from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal on

petitioner’s direct appeal from revocation of his probation:

In the year 2000, Morris entered a negotiated plea of no contest to the

offense of transporting a controlled substance (Health & Saf.Code, § 11352,

subd. (a)) and admitted two prior convictions. The trial court suspended

imposition of sentence and placed him on five years' probation with, inter alia,

the standard obey-all-laws condition.

On October 1, 2004, a complaint and petition to revoke probation were filed,

alleging the commission of six new offenses on September 29. [FN1. The

documents are file-stamped September 1, but dated October 1, which would

appear to be the correct date, given that they allege offenses committed on

September 29.] At the preliminary hearing, the trial court announced that

Morris's probation revocation hearing would “go on the same date” as the

trial. Three of the six counts were dismissed during trial. A jury found Morris

guilty of unlawful use of a license ( Veh.Code, § 14610, subd. (a)(1)) and not

guilty on the two remaining counts.

Case 4:08-cv-01579-PJH Document 19 Filed 04/16/10 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

After excusing the jurors, the trial court announced “further proceedings on

the probation violation petition.” When asked if, in regard to that matter, there

was “[a]nything further from the defense,” counsel replied that he was

“assuming” the trial court was going to find Morris in violation. After

discussion about a sentencing date, the trial court asked, “Was there anything

further in terms of evidence or argument on the probation violation?” to which

defense counsel answered, “No.”

The trial court then stated that the probation violation hearing was held at the

same time as the jury trial. It found that Morris had violated the Vehicle Code,

as found by the jury. It further found, by a preponderance of the evidence

(People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 437, 442), that he violated Penal Code

sections 530 .5, subdivision (d) (fraudulent possession of personal

information) as alleged in count 5, of which the jury found him not guilty, and

12021, subdivision (a)(1) (possession of firearm by felon-priors) as alleged in

dismissed count 1. Finally, the court found Morris in violation of a probation

condition imposed after a previous revocation petition that he not possess

anyone else's identification. Probation was revoked, and Morris was

sentenced to 10 years in prison. Morris filed a timely notice of appeal.

People v. Morris, 2007 WL 2171467, *1 (Cal. App. 2007).

The revocation of petitioner’s probation was affirmed by the court of appeal and the

supreme court denied review. Petitioner also has filed state habeas petitions, all of which

were denied.

In its initial review order, this court dismissed the petition with leave to amend,

saying that it was not possible to determine what issues petitioner wished to raise. 

Petitioner amended. The court, reviewing the amended petition, dismissed his second

issue, having to do with bail, and issued an order to show cause on his claim that his

lawyer was ineffective in failing to investigate and present the facts supporting petitioner’s

argument that he was not on probation when picked up. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on

the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's

adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to

Case 4:08-cv-01579-PJH Document 19 Filed 04/16/10 Page 2 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

mixed questions of law and fact, Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000),

while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the

first clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application

of” Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly

identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

“unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The

federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that court concludes

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must

be “objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322 at

340; see also Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000).

When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the

petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079, n. 2 (9th

Cir.2000). 

DISCUSSION

Petitioner contends that his counsel should have investigated his claim that he was

not on probation when he was arrested, and should have made that argument to the court. 

I. Standard

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim of denial of the

Case 4:08-cv-01579-PJH Document 19 Filed 04/16/10 Page 3 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only assistance, but effective

assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). In order to

prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim, petitioner must establish

that counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an "objective standard of

reasonableness" under prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687-88. Second, he must

establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, i.e., that "there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.

It is unnecessary for a federal court considering a habeas ineffective assistance

claim to address the prejudice prong of the Strickland test if the petitioner cannot even

establish incompetence under the first prong. Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 737

(9th Cir. 1998). Similarly, a court need not determine whether counsel's performance was

deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as the result of the

alleged deficiencies. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

II. Analysis

Petitioner’s claim that his counsel was ineffective as to the probation revocation is

based on his contention that when he was placed on probation in 2000, the term was five

years, with 297 days credit for time he had spent in jail prior to sentencing, not five years

plus the 297 days he had spent in jail. If is was the former, the term of probation had

expired before it was revoked; if the latter, he was still on probation when it was revoked. 

Respondent contends that the 297 day term was a condition of probation, a

condition that the court found satisfied by time served at the time of sentencing, and thus

did not reduce the number of days to be served on probation. 

The evidence is conflicting. The sentence imposed on March 3, 2000, pursuant to a

plea bargain is the source of the probation at issue. Pet., Ex. 2. It is recorded in a minute

order. The relevant portion of the order reads: 

The Court having read and considered the report of the Probation Officer: 

Imposition of sentence is suspended for a period of Five (5) years during

Case 4:08-cv-01579-PJH Document 19 Filed 04/16/10 Page 4 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

which time the defendant is placed under the care, custody and control of the

Probation Officer of Alameda County, subject to the following terms and

conditions, to-wit: Defendant shall:

[checkmarked box] Serve the first 297 days of said probationary period in

the Alameda County Jail with credit for time served: 297 Total days

([checkmarked box] actual 198 days + GT/WT 99 days; [checkmarked box]

including GT/WT); and upon release therefrom;

[checkmarked box] Report forthwith to the Probation Officer .....

Id. (emphasis in original).

At sentencing, the court said this in regard to the time petitioner had served in jail:

THE COURT: Imposition of sentence is suspended for five years. . . .

THE COURT: . . . you’re subject to the standard conditions of probation

 . . . . In addition to that, you’re to serve 297 days in the Alameda County

Jail.

You get credit for 198 actual, plus 99, for a total of 297 days. I just

gave you time served. . . .

Those are the conditions.

Pet’r Ex. 6 (exhibits filed in support of traverse).

Respondent contends that petitioner’s interpretation of the minute order – that he

was being given credit for 297 days that should be deducted from his five-year probation –

is “strained,” and that the sentence actually was a five-year period of probation, with a

condition of probation that he serve an additional 297 days in jail, with credit of 297 days

time served. Resp’t P. & A. 7. The minute order, however, says that the 297 days are “of

said probationary period,” and the words “probationary period” seem to refer back to the

five years’ probation imposed above the reference to the 297 day jail term. On the other

hand, the quotation above from the sentencing hearing clearly shows that the court

imposed a 297-day jail sentence that is additional to the five years of probation; that is, the

courts used the words “in addition to that,” after imposing five years of probation and before

saying that petitioner was required to serve 297 days in jail.

A lawyer need not file a motion that he or she knows to be meritless on the facts and

the law. Trial counsel cannot have been ineffective for failing to raise a meritless motion. 

Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2005); Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445

Case 4:08-cv-01579-PJH Document 19 Filed 04/16/10 Page 5 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

(9th Cir. 1996); see, e.g., Hebner v. McGrath, 543 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding

counsel's failure to object to admission of defendant's prior sexual misconduct as

propensity evidence not ineffective where evidence would have been admitted in any event

to show common plan or intent); Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d at 346 (failure to file suppression

motion not ineffective assistance where counsel investigated filing motion and no

reasonable possibility evidence would have been suppressed). See also Wilson v. Henry,

185 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 1999) (to show prejudice under Strickland from failure to file a

motion, petitioner must show that (1) had his counsel filed the motion, it is reasonable that

the trial court would have granted it as meritorious, and (2) had the motion been granted, it

is reasonable that there would have been an outcome more favorable to him).

Under California law, an oral sentencing pronouncement by the judge controls over

the ministerial record of the minutes. See People v. Zackery, 147 Cal. App. 4th 380, 385

(2007) (“Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and

the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.”); People v.

Wilshire Insurance Co., 67 Cal. App. 3d 521, 532-33 (1977). The consequence is that if

petitioner’s counsel had made the argument petitioner claims he should have, that

petitioner was not still on probation when he committed the violation, that objection or

motion would have been denied, because the oral pronouncement, which made the 297

days additional to the five-years probation, is controlling.

Counsel was not ineffective, so the rejections of the claim by the state appellate

courts were not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly-established United

States Supreme Court authority.

III. Appealability

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners have recently

been amended to require a district court that denies a habeas petition to grant or deny a

certificate of appealability in the ruling. See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28

U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (effective December 1, 2009). 

A petitioner may not appeal a final order in a federal habeas corpus proceeding

Case 4:08-cv-01579-PJH Document 19 Filed 04/16/10 Page 6 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

without first obtaining a certificate of appealability (formerly known as a certificate of

probable cause to appeal). See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). A judge shall

grant a certificate of appealability "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of

the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The certificate must indicate

which issues satisfy this standard. See id. § 2253(c)(3). “Where a district court has

rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is

straightforward: the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v.

McDaniel, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 1604 (2000). 

Because California law is clear that petitioner’s counsel would not have succeeded

had he raised the issue petitioner says he should have, this was not a close case. For the

reasons set out above, jurists of reason would not find the result debatable or wrong. A

certificate of appealability will be denied. Petitioner is advised that he may not appeal the

denial of a COA, but he may ask the court of appeals to issue a COA under Rule 22 of the

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. 

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. A Certificate of Appealability

also is DENIED. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (eff. Dec. 1,

2009). 

The clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 16, 2010. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

P:\PRO-SE\PJH\HC.08\MORRIS1579.RUL.wpd

Case 4:08-cv-01579-PJH Document 19 Filed 04/16/10 Page 7 of 7