Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01163/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01163-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1 

16-cv-1163-CAB-AGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

Amy L. WADE, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

Nancy A. BERRYHILL, 

Defendant.

Case No.: 16-cv-1163-CAB-AGS 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

MOTIONS (ECF Nos. 19 & 25-1) 

 Life is full of controversial calls: NFL fans still debate whether a famous catch—the 

“Immaculate Reception”—was a legal play; Citizen Kane, sometimes called the greatest 

film of all time, lost the Best Picture Oscar; Mahatma Gandhi had five Nobel Peace Prize 

nominations, but no awards. Does this social security case present yet another contentious 

result? No. The Administrative Law Judge gave five convincing reasons for rejecting the 

claimant’s testimony, which doomed her disability application. The record supports those 

reasons—overwhelmingly. 

BACKGROUND 

 At the time of her disability hearing, plaintiff Amy Wade was working part-time in 

a grocery store for $8.25 per hour. (AR 12, 15.) Wade is unable to work more, she asserts, 

because of her bipolar disorder, Type 1 diabetes, and cervical spine fusion. (AR 12, 15-

16.) In denying her disability application, the Administrative Law Judge found that Wade’s 

Case 3:16-cv-01163-CAB-AGS Document 28 Filed 01/17/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 7
2 

16-cv-1163-CAB-AGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

testimony was not “entirely credible” and that she had “exaggerated her symptoms.” 

(AR 24, 26.) In this appeal, Wade challenges only the ALJ’s credibility finding. 

DISCUSSION 

A. Subjective Testimony on Severity of Symptoms 

In evaluating the credibility of subjective symptom testimony, “the ALJ must 

determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying 

impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms 

alleged.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). If so, 

and absent evidence of malingering, “the ALJ can only reject the claimant’s testimony 

about the severity of the symptoms if [the ALJ] gives ‘specific, clear and convincing 

reasons’ for the rejection.” Id. (citations omitted). “General findings are insufficient; rather, 

the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the 

claimant’s complaints.” Id. (citation omitted). These adverse credibility findings must be

“sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily 

discredit claimant’s testimony.” Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 613 F.3d 1217, 1224 n.3 

(9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). In weighing that testimony, the ALJ may consider all the 

typical credibility factors, such as prior inconsistent statements, falsehoods, and 

discrepancies between the claimant’s statements and conduct. Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1163. 

The ALJ’s reasons for rejecting Wade’s symptom testimony are evaluated below.1

1. Objective Medical Evidence

The ALJ found that the medical evidence suggested that Wade could do a “wide 

range of unskilled light work” and that her testimony to the contrary was not credible, 

 1

 Defendant identifies several other reasons that support the ALJ’s adverse 

credibility finding. For instance, Wade once admitted that she was “applying for Disability 

not because she [i]s unable to work but because she needs some Medi-Cal insurance to help 

pay for her medications.” (ECF No. 25-2, at 6; AR 347.) But the ALJ did not raise these 

arguments. And this Court “may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not 

rely.” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 675 (9th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). Thus, the 

Court will not consider these post-hoc justifications. 

Case 3:16-cv-01163-CAB-AGS Document 28 Filed 01/17/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 7
3 

16-cv-1163-CAB-AGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“especially in light of the paucity of clinical deficit[s] noted upon physical examinations 

and diagnostic studies.” (AR 23-24.) Wade argues that her testimony cannot be rejected on 

this ground alone. While true, the ALJ did not err in mentioning it as one of several reasons. 

See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that “medical 

evidence is still a relevant factor in determining the severity of the claimant’s pain and its 

disabling effects,” though it cannot be “the sole ground” for rejecting “subjective pain 

testimony” (citation omitted)). 

2. Conservative Treatment

Wade also does not contest the ALJ’s finding that she received “relative[ly] 

conservative treatment” and showed “improvement with treatment and/or medications.” 

(AR 23.) “[E]vidence of conservative treatment is sufficient to discount a claimant’s 

testimony regarding severity of an impairment.” Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 751 

(9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). And a favorable “response to conservative treatment 

undermines [a claimant’s] reports regarding the disabling nature of his pain.” Tommasetti 

v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008). The ALJ pointed out that Wade was “seen 

repeatedly in the hospital for complaints of abdominal pain,” but her examinations yielded 

“few abnormalities” and mostly “unremarkable findings that support a light work 

restriction.” (AR 17-18.) And even when Wade reported acute symptoms, conservative 

treatment provided rapid improvement. (See, e.g., AR 18 (noting that Wade was “treated 

successfully and discharged” after a hospitalization for diabetic complications); AR 19 

(remarking that Wade was effectively stabilized with an insulin drip and then a transition 

“to Lantus and [an] insulin sliding scale”); AR 20 (finding that “treatment proved helpful 

as the claimaint was admitted with a [GAF] score of 45” and six days later discharged 

“with a GAF score of 58”).) This rationale is clear and convincing. See Parra, 481 F.3d at 

750 (upholding adverse credibility finding, when the ALJ referred to “specific evidence in 

the record, including numerous medical reports,” that contradicted the plaintiff’s 

“subjective complaint”). 

Case 3:16-cv-01163-CAB-AGS Document 28 Filed 01/17/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 7
4 

16-cv-1163-CAB-AGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3. Daily Activities

According to the ALJ, Wade’s “active lifestyle” was also “inconsistent” with her 

complaints of “limitations that would preclude sustained work activity.” (See AR 19.) The 

ALJ’s daunting list of Wade’s daily activities includes: “personal care and hygiene, prepare 

simple meals on a daily basis, wash dishes by hand, clean, vacuum, water plants, pull 

weeds, sweep, drive, go shopping, watch television all day long, wash dishes, do laundry, 

cook, do yard work, read, use a computer, help her parents with housework, and take care 

of her daughter.” (Id.) A claimant “need not vegetate in a dark room” to be eligible for 

benefits, but these sorts of everyday activities “may be grounds for discrediting the 

claimant’s testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating 

impairment” and indicate “capacities that are transferable to a work setting.” Molina v. 

Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). 

Wade does not dispute the ALJ’s daily-activity catalog, but instead complains that 

she “testified” that she can only perform those activities “for short periods of time before 

needing to rest.” (ECF No. 19-1, at 13.) But Wade provided no citation for this claim in 

her papers, nor does the hearing transcript reveal any such testimony. (See AR 33-55.) At 

oral argument, Wade’s counsel relied on an adult function report, in which Wade wrote 

that she needs to rest for “a few minutes” after walking 50 yards. (See AR 234.) Yet the 

ALJ’s analysis did not focus on Wade’s walking habits. (Compare AR 19 (ALJ’s dailyactivity explanation) with AR 16 (summarizing Wade’s testimony, including that she “tries

to walk half an hour in the morning and sometimes half an hour after work”).) And the 

cited report does not address any of the activities the ALJ did focus on. (See AR 19.) 

Moreover, Wade herself contradicted the claim that she rests every 50 yards. At her 

hearing, she testified that she only had problems if she “walk[s] for long periods of time 

and my pain medication wears off. . . . But if I have my pain medication, . . . I’m all right.” 

(AR 45; see also AR 15 (ALJ noting this testimony).) Thus, Wade’s significant daily 

activities are an appropriate basis for discounting her symptom testimony. 

Case 3:16-cv-01163-CAB-AGS Document 28 Filed 01/17/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 7
5 

16-cv-1163-CAB-AGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4. Noncompliance with Treatment

 The ALJ also determined that Wade’s “failure to take her prescribed medications 

may have contributed to her symptoms.” (AR 20.) In the ALJ’s analysis, he noted that one 

“factor in her noncompliance” was that she was often unable “to afford medication” or “to 

access her medications in a timely fashion.” (Id.; see also AR 16.) Yet the ALJ found these 

financial constraints were ultimately not dispositive and that she failed to adhere “to her 

diabetic diet and eats whatever her parents provide her with.” (AR 20.) While claimants 

may not be penalized for their poverty, an “ALJ may properly rely on [an] unexplained or 

inadequately explained failure . . . to follow a prescribed course of treatment.” Molina, 674 

F.3d at 1113 (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 

664, 681 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that when a claimant was “noncompliant with medication 

because she could not afford it,” the ALJ could not discount her credibility, but 

noncompliance that is unrelated to poverty “may properly be weighed against finding [the 

claimant’s] testimony to be believable”). 

Because the ALJ accounted for Wade’s financial difficulties in his analysis, he 

properly faulted her for voluntary noncompliance with her treatment regimen. 

5. Post-Onset Work Activity

 Wade’s “work activity after the alleged onset date” led the ALJ to believe “that the 

claimant’s daily activities have, at least at times, been somewhat greater than the claimant 

has generally reported.” (AR 21.) At the time of the hearing, Wade was “working for 

Albertson’s as a deli service worker 3-5 days per week, and 3-8 hours per day mostly at 

night.” (AR 15.) She admitted that she “sometimes works consecutive eight-hour shifts” 

by taking them “an hour at a time.” (AR 16.) But she testified that her current job leaves 

her in too much pain, and she would only be able to go on working if she is transferred to 

a different department that involves “no heavy lifting.” (Id.) 

 Post-onset work activity is a proper credibility consideration when it contradicts 

claims of disabling pain or other physical limitations. See Trisdale v. Astrue, 334 F. App’x 

85, 87 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that “work activity after the accident” was a “clear and 

Case 3:16-cv-01163-CAB-AGS Document 28 Filed 01/17/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 7
6 

16-cv-1163-CAB-AGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

convincing reason[] supporting the ALJ’s” adverse credibility conclusion); Casas v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 16-cv-08082-PCT-JAT, 2017 WL 2222613, at *6 

(D. Ariz. May 22, 2017) (upholding negative credibility finding in which “the ALJ cited to 

specific work activity to discredit” the plaintiff’s assertions about “disabling pain”). At 

least sometimes, Wade was able to work for 16 hours straight (AR 16), which was a clear 

and convincing basis to disbelieve her testimony about the severity of her symptoms. 

6. Unemployment Benefits 

 Next, the ALJ concluded that Wade’s complaints could not be reconciled with her 

acceptance of “unemployment benefits since the alleged onset date,” because 

unemployment-benefits applicants “must certify they are willing and able to work.” 

(AR 20.) “[R]eceipt of unemployment benefits can undermine a claimant’s alleged 

inability to work full[-]time,” but only if the claimant “held himself out as available for 

full-time” work. Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 

2008) (citations omitted and emphasis added). An unemployment-benefits application that 

merely certified an ability to work part-time would not undermine a disability claim. See 

id. The record does not disclose the basis of Wade’s unemployment claim. (See, e.g., 

AR 193-95.) So, this justification for the ALJ’s credibility finding is not supported by 

substantial evidence. See Attmore v. Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding 

that courts cannot accept an “ALJ’s findings” which “are not supported by substantial 

evidence in the record” (citation omitted)). 

7. Lack of Regular Psychiatric Treatment

 Finally, the ALJ disbelieved Wade’s symptom testimony because she had not sought 

regular psychiatric treatment “throughout much of the period under adjudication.” (AR 19, 

23.) But Wade testified that she was too poor to schedule regular treatment. (See, e.g.,

AR 47.) Unlike his thorough analysis of Wade’s treatment noncompliance, in discussing 

the gaps in her mental-health treatment history, the ALJ did not grapple with the issue of 

her poverty. An ALJ may not fault the claimant for a “lack of treatment when the record 

establishes that the claimant could not afford it.” Regennitter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Case 3:16-cv-01163-CAB-AGS Document 28 Filed 01/17/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 7
7 

16-cv-1163-CAB-AGS 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Admin., 166 F.3d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1999). Thus, Wade’s spotty psychiatric treatment 

record does not provide any grounds to reject her symptom testimony. 

B. Harmless Error Analysis 

Because the ALJ relied on two invalid reasons—and five valid ones—for 

disbelieving the severity of Wade’s symptoms, this Court must review for harmless error. 

“So long as there remains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusions on 

credibility and the error does not negate the validity of the ALJ’s ultimate credibility 

conclusion, such [error] is deemed harmless and does not warrant reversal.” Carmickle, 

533 F.3d at 1162 (alterations and citations omitted). The five remaining reasons here are 

specific, clear, convincing, and supported by substantial evidence in the record—indeed, 

two of them are undisputed. They justify the ALJ’s credibility finding by themselves, so 

the erroneous employment-benefits and psychiatric-treatment rationales were harmless. 

See id. at 1162-63 (holding two invalid reasons for an adverse credibility finding were 

harmless error in light of the remaining reasoning); Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 

554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that one erroneous reason “amounts to 

harmless error,” when the ALJ “presented four other independent bases for discounting 

[the claimant’s] testimony”). 

CONCLUSION 

The Court recommends that Wade’s summary judgment motion (ECF No. 19) be 

DENIED and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 25-1) 

be GRANTED. The parties must file any objections to this report by January 31, 2018. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Any responses must be filed by February 14, 2018. See id.

Dated: January 17, 2018 

Case 3:16-cv-01163-CAB-AGS Document 28 Filed 01/17/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 7