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Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

–————

Filed On: July 22, 2003

No. 01–5373

RANCHO VIEJO, LLC,

APPELLANT

v.

GALE A. NORTON, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

–————

BEFORE: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and EDWARDS,

SENTELLE, HENDERSON, RANDOLPH, ROGERS, TATEL, GARLAND,

and ROBERTS, Circuit Judges.

O R D E R

Appellant’s petition for rehearing en banc and the response

thereto have been circulated to the full court. The taking of

a vote was requested. Thereafter, a majority of the judges of

the court in regular, active service did not vote in favor of the

petition. Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is

ORDERED that the petition be denied.

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

 BY:

 Michael C. McGrail

 Deputy Clerk

USCA Case #01-5373 Document #761926 Filed: 07/22/2003 Page 1 of 7
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Circuit Judge SENTELLE and Circuit Judge ROBERTS would

grant the petition for rehearing en banc.

Separate statements of Circuit Judge SENTELLE and Circuit

Judge ROBERTS dissenting from the denial of rehearing en

banc are attached.

USCA Case #01-5373 Document #761926 Filed: 07/22/2003 Page 2 of 7
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SENTELLE, Circuit Judge, dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc: The court’s opinion in this case continues a

divergence from contemporary Supreme Court Commerce

Clause jurisprudence begun, or at least evidenced, in National Association of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041

(D.C. Cir. 1997) (NAHB). Indeed, it broadens that divergence. At least at the time of NAHB, the Supreme Court

had not yet entered its decision in United States v. Morrison,

529 U.S. 598 (2000), underlining and explaining its decision in

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). This time we

uphold the order of the Fish and Wildlife Service to a

developer to remove a fence from its own property in order to

accommodate the movement of arroyo toads, a species of

neither migratory habit nor commercial use. Thus, as in

NAHB, this Circuit holds that the intrastate ‘‘taking’’ of a

non-commercial species of fauna may be constitutionally regulated by the federal government under the authority of the

Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, which empowers Congress ‘‘[t]o regulate Commerce TTT among the several

statesTTTT’’

Once again, this Circuit upholds under the rubric of the

interstate commerce power the regulation of ‘‘an activity that

is neither interstate nor commerceTTTT’’ NAHB, 130 F.3d at

1061 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). As in NAHB, the panel’s

reasoning runs athwart the Supreme Court’s analysis of the

reach of the Commerce Clause in Lopez, and now in Morrison. Under the Lopez analysis, Congress may regulate (1)

‘‘the use of the channels of interstate commerce’’; (2) ‘‘the

instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things

in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come

only from intrastate activities’’; and (3) ‘‘those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.’’ Lopez,

514 U.S. at 558–59 (citations omitted). The arroyo toad is not

a channel of commerce nor is it in one. It is not an

instrumentality of commerce, nor is it a person or thing in

interstate commerce. The ‘‘taking’’ of that toad (especially by

land preparation) does not have any substantial relationship

to interstate commerce. The protection of a non-commercial,

purely local toad is not within any of the Lopez categories.

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As I understand the court’s rationale in the present opinion, because the ‘‘taking’’ of the toad is done by an entity

engaging in commercial activity, Congress can regulate that

taking under the third category. I disagree. In analyzing

the parameters of the third category in Lopez, the Supreme

Court examined whether:

—the regulation controls a commercial activity, or an

activity necessary to the regulation of some commercial

activity;

—the statute includes a jurisdictional nexus requirement

to ensure that each regulated instance of the activity

affects interstate commerce; and

—the rationale offered to support the constitutionality of

the statute (i.e., statutory findings, legislative history,

arguments of counsel, or a reviewing court’s own attribution of purposes to the statute being challenged) has a

logical stopping point so that the rationale is not so broad

as to regulate on a similar basis all human endeavors,

especially those traditionally regulated by the states.

NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1064 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (citing

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559–65; other citations omitted). Protecting a toad from a land owner pinning a fence on its own

property does not become commercial under any of the three

elements of that examination. The point of Lopez, as further

explained in Morrison, is not that Congress can regulate any

activity if the act of regulating catches an entity or an action

that is itself commercial independent of the noncommercial

nature of the regulated entity and activity. It is rather that

‘‘ ‘[w]here economic activity substantially affects interstate

commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.’ ’’ Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S.

at 560). As the Morrison Court went on to explain, ‘‘a fair

reading of Lopez shows that the noneconomic, criminal nature

of the conduct at issue was central to our decision in that

case,’’ the decision to strike down the Gun–Free School Zones

Act as beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause. Id.

Despite the valiant efforts of my colleagues on the panel, the

notion that the rationale of the present decision has a stopUSCA Case #01-5373 Document #761926 Filed: 07/22/2003 Page 4 of 7
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ping point fails. It is at odds, most importantly, with the

Supreme Court. It is also conspicuously in conflict with

another circuit. The Fifth Circuit has explicitly rejected the

claim that federal regulation protecting a noncommercial

species is permissible if the activity constituting the ‘‘take’’

was itself economic.

Neither the plain language of the Commerce Clause, nor

judicial decisions construing it, suggest that, concerning

substantial effect vel non, Congress may regulate activity

(here, Cave Species takes) solely because non-regulated

conduct (here, commercial development) by the actor

engaged in the regulated activity will have some connection to interstate commerceTTTT To accept [such an]

analysis would allow application of otherwise unconstitutional statutes to commercial actors, but not to noncommercial actors. There would be no limit to Congress’

authority to regulate intrastate activities, so long as

those subjected to the regulation were entities which had

an otherwise substantial connection to interstate commerce.

GDF Realty Inv., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 634 (5th Cir.

2003).

In fact, even if it were constitutionally sufficient that the

take, although not required by the terms of the statute,

coincidentally constituted activity in interstate commerce,

that does not match the facts of this case. Ground preparation and erection of a fence are not commerce, and certainly

not interstate. Even the construction of houses hardly constitutes interstate commerce. In short, because this decision

of the court continues a line of cases in conflict with Supreme

Court jurisprudence, and is in conflict with at least one other

circuit, I would en banc this cause so that the full court might

bring the jurisprudence of the Circuit in harmony with the

Supreme Court.

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ROBERTS, Circuit Judge, dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc: The panel’s opinion in effect asks whether the

challenged regulation substantially affects interstate commerce, rather than whether the activity being regulated does

so. Thus, the panel sustains the application of the Act in this

case because Rancho Viejo’s commercial development constitutes interstate commerce and the regulation impinges on

that development, not because the incidental taking of arroyo

toads can be said to be interstate commerce. See Rancho

Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1071–73.

Such an approach seems inconsistent with the Supreme

Court’s holdings in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549

(1995) and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).

The Court in those cases upheld facial Commerce Clause

challenges to legislation prohibiting the possession of firearms

in school zones and violence against women. Given United

States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), such a facial challenge

can succeed only if there are no circumstances in which the

Act at issue can be applied without violating the Commerce

Clause. Under the panel’s approach in this case, however, if

the defendant in Lopez possessed the firearm because he was

part of an interstate ring and had brought it to the school to

sell it, or the defendant in Morrison assaulted his victims to

promote interstate extortion, then clearly the challenged regulations in those cases would have substantially affected

interstate commerce, and the facial Commerce Clause challenges would have failed.

That is precisely what the Fifth Circuit concluded recently

in rejecting the approach the panel took in this case. See

GDF Realty Inv., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 634–35 (5th

Cir. 2003). As the Fifth Circuit explained, ‘‘looking primarily

beyond the regulated activity TTT would ‘effectually obliterate’

the limiting purpose of the Commerce Clause,’’ and, under

such an approach, ‘‘the facial challenges in Lopez and Morrison would have failed.’’ Id.

The panel’s approach in this case leads to the result that

regulating the taking of a hapless toad that, for reasons of its

own, lives its entire life in California constitutes regulating

‘‘Commerce TTT among the several States.’’ U.S. CONST. art.

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I, § 8, cl. 3. To be fair, the panel faithfully applied National

Association of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C.

Cir. 1997). En banc review is appropriate because the approach of the panel in this case and NAHB now conflicts with

the opinion of a sister circuit – a fact confirmed by that

circuit’s quotation from the NAHB dissent. See GDF Realty,

326 F.3d at 636 (quoting NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1067 (Sentelle,

J., dissenting)). Such review would also afford the opportunity to consider alternative grounds for sustaining application

of the Act that may be more consistent with Supreme Court

precedent. See Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d at

1067–68 n.2.

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