Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-3_05-cv-00260/USCOURTS-ared-3_05-cv-00260-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1446 Breach of Contract- Insurance

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Said agreement was filed with the Court upon Defendant’s request pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(B).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

JONESBORO DIVISION

GLORIA WARREN PLAINTIFF

v. CASE NO. 3:05-CV-260 GTE

STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY DEFENDANT

ORDER

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees. On March 26, 2007,

the Court entered Judgment for Plaintiff for $49,757.07 for the loss of her dwelling after setoff,

personal property damages, and additional living expenses, and $8,588.88 in statutory penalties

under Arkansas Code Annotated § 23-79-208. However, in the Court’s opinion, the Court noted

that the total amount awarded Plaintiff, before setoff, was $71,574. 

In the present motion, Plaintiff requests an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to Arkansas

Code Annotated § 23-79-208, which the Court previously found applied in this case. Thus, it is

clear that an award of attorneys’ fees is proper. Specifically, Plaintiff requests $36,830.00 based

upon 112.10 hours at an hourly rate of $200.00 per hour for services rendered by Joe M. Rogers

($22,400.00) and 144.3 hours at an hourly rate of $100.00 per hour for services rendered by J.

Matthew Coe ($14,430.00) for prosecution and collection of her loss. Plaintiff states that she

entered into a one-third contingency fee agreement1

 with Mr. Rogers and Mr. Coe to represent

her with regard to her claims. 

Case 3:05-cv-00260-GTE Document 109 Filed 04/25/07 Page 1 of 3
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Although Defendant acknowledges the Court’s prior ruling on the issue of eighty-percent,

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s counsel is not entitled to fees because Plaintiff did not recover

eighty-percent (80%) of the amount for which she sued for purposes of preserving the issue. 

Alternatively, Defendant asserts that the amount requested is not reasonable, as it is “well-over

two-thirds” of the Plaintiff’s award of $49,757.07. 

“The following factors are relevant in determining reasonable fees: 1) the experience and

ability of the attorney; 2) the time and labor required to perform the service properly; 3) the

amount in controversy and the result obtained in the case; 4) the novelty and difficulty of the

issues involved; 5) the fee customarily charged for similar services in the local area; 6) whether

the fee is fixed or contingent; 7) the time limitations imposed upon the client in the

circumstances; and 8) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular

employment will preclude other employment by the attorney.” Phelps v. U.S. Credit Life Ins.

Co., 340 Ark. 439, 442, 10 S.W.3d 854, 856 (2000). “While the courts should be guided by the

foregoing factors, there is no fixed formula in determining the reasonableness of an award of

attorney’s fees.” Id. 

In Phelps v. U.S. Credit Life Ins. Co., 340 Ark. 439, 443, 10 S.W.3d 854, 856 (2000), the

Arkansas Supreme Court stated that “the fee provided for in section 23-79-208 ‘is allowed only

to reimburse an insurance policyholder or beneficiary for expenses incurred in enforcing the

contract and to compensate him in engaging counsel thoroughly competent to protect his

interests.’ The fee is not the property of the attorney; instead, it is indemnity to the litigant.” Id. 

The Court further stated that “the fee awarded should not exceed the amount that the client is

responsible for paying, otherwise the statute would be susceptible to abuse. The purpose of the

Case 3:05-cv-00260-GTE Document 109 Filed 04/25/07 Page 2 of 3
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statute is not to provide a windfall to attorneys; rather, it is to permit the insured to obtain

competent representation.” Id. 

As discussed by the Court in its previous Order, Plaintiff did not receive the full benefit

of her insurance policy under its own terms until she prevailed on the arson defense because her

obligations simply shifted from one creditor to another. Therefore, the Court finds that the

appropriate amount of recovery to consider in awarding attorneys’ fees is $71,574–the total

amount awarded Plaintiff, before setoff. One-third of the total amount awarded Plaintiff, before

setoff, equals $23,619.42. The Court finds that this amount constitutes a reasonable attorneys’

fee.

Accordingly,

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (Dkt.

#101) be, and it is hereby, GRANTED. Attorneys’ fees in the amount of $23,619.42 are hereby

awarded to Plaintiff.

Dated this 25th day of April, 2007.

/s/Garnett Thomas Eisele___________

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:05-cv-00260-GTE Document 109 Filed 04/25/07 Page 3 of 3