Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-04113/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-04113-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Melvin Boor, )

)

 Plaintiff, )

) 

v. ) CV 05-4113 PHX VAM

)

Jo Anne B.Barnhart,Commissioner,) ORDER

Social Security Administration, )

)

 Defendant. )

Pending before the Court are plaintiff's Motion for Summary

Judgment (Docs. 11, 12 and 13) and defendant's Cross-Motion for

Summary Judgment. (Docs. 14, 15 and 21).

BACKGROUND

Melvin Boor, ("plaintiff") filed for benefits under Title

XVI (supplemental security income benefits) of the Social Security

Act on October 21, 2002, alleging a disability onset date of

September 1, 2000. (Administrative Transcript ("TR") at p. 17). 

At the administrative hearing, plaintiff moved to amend the

alleged onset date to July 1, 2002. (Id.)

Plaintiff's claim was denied initially and a hearing was

held before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") on February 2,

2004. (TR at p. 17). Plaintiff testified at the hearing as did

David A. Janus, M.A., a vocational expert under contract with the

Social Security Administration ("Agency"). (Id.)

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Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a decision denying

plaintiff's application for benefits. (TR at pp. 17-23). This

decision was upheld on appeal by the Agency Appeals Council on

October 18, 2005. (TR at pp. 4-6). Plaintiff then brought this

action in the District Court seeking to overturn the Agency

decision. (Doc. 1).

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant shows "there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c),

Fed.R.Civ.P.; California Architectural Building Products, Inc. v.

Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987),

cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988). There is a genuine issue of

material fact "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party

bears the burden of demonstrating that there is no material fact

precluding summary judgment. Adickes v. S.H. Kress and Company,

398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). 

 Substantive law determines which facts are material. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Jessinger v. Nevada Federal Credit

Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994). "Only disputes over

facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary

judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

 A principal purpose of summary judgment is "to isolate and

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dispose of factually unsupported claims." Celotex Corporation v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Summary judgment is

appropriate against a party who "fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to

that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of

proof at trial." Id. at 322; see also Citadel Holding Corporation

v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 1994).

 Furthermore, the party opposing summary judgment "may not

rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [the party's]

pleadings, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial." Rule 56(e), Fed.R.Civ.P.;

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 585-88 (1986); Brinson v. Lind Rose Joint

Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995). There is no issue

for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party. If the evidence is merely colorable or if not

significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. However, "the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be

drawn in his favor." Id. at 255.

II. General Statutory Authority

42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1) defines disability as the "inability to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected

to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months

..." In addition, subsection (d)(2)(A) provides:

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 An individual shall be determined to be under a

disability only if his physical or mental impairment or

impairments are of such severity that he is not only

unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering

his age, education, and work experience, engage in any

other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in

the national economy, regardless of whether such work

exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or

whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or

whether he would be hired if he applied for work ....

Subsection (d)(3) of section 423 states:

... a "physical or mental impairment" is an impairment

that results from anatomical, physiological, or

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by

medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic

techniques.

II. Standard of Review

The Court must affirm the Commissioner's findings if the

findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and

are free of legal error. See Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172,

174 (9th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence means more than a mere

scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is "such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support

a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971);

see also Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998).

In determining whether substantial evidence supports a

decision, the Court considers the record as a whole, weighing both 

the evidence that supports and that which detracts from the ALJ's

conclusions. See Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720; Tylitzki v. Shalala,

999 F.2d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 1993). The ALJ is responsible for

resolving conflicts, determining credibility, and resolving

ambiguities. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.

1995); Margallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). 

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If there is sufficient evidence to support the ALJ's

determination, the Court cannot substitute its own determination. 

See Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 184 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Therefore, if on the whole record before the Court substantial

evidence supports the Commissioner's decisions, the Court must

affirm it. See Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir.

1989); 42 U.S.C. §405(g).

Under the Social Security Act, a "disability" is defined as

an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by

reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not

less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). An individual is

determined to be under a disability if "his physical or mental

impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only

unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age,

education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of

substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 

42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A). The claimant bears the initial burden of

proving that he is disabled. See 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(5); Reddick,

157 F.3d at 721. If the claimant shows that he was unable to

perform past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner

to show that the claimant "can perform other substantial gainful

work that exists in the national economy." Reddick, 157 F.3d at

721.

An ALJ determines an applicant's eligibility for disability

benefits by following the five stages listed below:

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(1) determine whether the applicant is engaged in

"substantial gainful activity;"

(2) determine whether the applicant has a "medically

severe impairment or combination of impairments;"

(3) determine whether the applicant's impairment equals one

of a number of listed impairments that the Commissioner

acknowledges as so severe as to preclude the applicant from

engaging in substantial gainful activity;

(4) if the applicant's impairment does not equal one of the

"listed impairments," determine whether the applicant is

capable of performing his or her past relevant work;

(5) if the applicant is not capable of performing his or

her past relevant work, determine whether the applicant

"is able to perform other work in the national economy

in view of his [or her] age, education, and work

experience."

See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-41 (1987)(citing 20 C.F.R.

§404.1520(b)-(f)). At the fifth stage, the burden of proof shifts

to the Commissioner. See Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th

Cir. 1993).

III. Hearing Testimony

An administrative hearing before the ALJ was held on 

February 2, 2004. At the hearing plaintiff testified he had

suffered severe back pain since July, 2002. He stated the pain

was mostly in his lower back but also in his upper. He stated his

back "aches" when he wakes up in the morning and later the pain

begins to "burn" when he starts moving around or if he tries to

lift more than 20 pounds at once. (TR at pp. 461-72).

Plaintiff testified he could work about 1-2 hours at one time

but then needed to lay down for an hour. He stated he could

repeat this cycle again but over an 8 hour day would need to lay

down for about 3 hours of that time. (TR at pp. 461-72). 

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Petitioner contended he takes about 7-8 tylenol4 capsules each day

as well as various prescription medicines prescribed by a Dr.

Laurel at the Veterans Administration ("VA"). She has been

treating him since 1995. Plaintiff also stated that he has had

several "epidural steroidal blocks" since the summer of 2003 (the

hearing was held in February, 2004). He is not allowed more than

three such treatments a year. (Id.). Petitioner testified he had

considered surgery in consultation with doctors but did not

believe it would help.

Under questioning from the ALJ, plaintiff stated he still

drives but qualified this by saying that he shouldn't. In

addition, he testified he could bathe, dress himself and do some

shopping "a little at a time." He stated he sometimes used a

cane. (TR at pp. 461-72). 

Plaintiff testified that he only worked as an EMT from May to

July, 2000 and that his certification has expired. (TR at pp.

461-72). He stated he can pick up about 15 pounds on a regular

basis but that holding any position, whether standing, sitting or

laying down, becomes painful if maintained too long. Plaintiff

stated he has not had any retraining or schooling. He stated he

wants to work if he could. (Id.)

David Janus, an agency-contracted vocational expert, also

testified at the hearing. Janus was presented with hypotheticals

from the ALJ concerning plaintiff's ability to work. Janus found

plaintiff's jobs as an EMT and a handyman to be semiskilled. 

Because plaintiff's time as an EMT was so short, Janus found it

not to be transferrable. (TR at pp. 473-78). Given a

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hypothetical in which plaintiff could lift 50 pounds occasionally

and 25 pounds frequently and in which plaintiff could sit, stand,

or walk 6 plus hours a day with occasional bending, stooping,

etc., Janus opined plaintiff could not perform his previous work

as either an EMT or handyman but could perform other jobs such as

a linen room attendant or janitor. (Id.) 

Adding an alternative of permitting plaintiff to stand/walk

at his option on the job, Janus opined that plaintiff could

perform other work, for example, as an assembler. (TR at pp. 473-

78). Given a further restriction of lifting only 20 pounds

occasionally and 10 pounds frequently with the sit/stand and/or

walk option, Janus opined plaintiff could do light work such as

"plumbing assembler" or office helper. (Id.)

Finally, given a scenario in which plaintiff's impairments

caused him to miss 4-5 days of work a month and could not complete

assigned tasks in an 8 hour day, Janus opined plaintiff could

perform no work. (TR at p. 478).

IV. The ALJ's Decision (Agency Decision)

The ALJ determined that plaintiff has degenerative disc

disease and mild spinal stenosis. (TR at p. 18). He noted that

an EMG in October, 2002, indicated no evidence of lumbrosacral

radiculopathy but did note mild evidence of sensory motor

neuropathy which was worse on plaintiff's right side. (Id.).

The ALJ also cited a CT of the lumbar spine which revealed a

disc bulge at L4 - L5 and signs of degenerative arthritis changes

from L1 down to S1 but with no root involvement. (TR at p. 18). 

The ALJ also noted a history of right knee pain and a diagnosis of

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a strained right knee dating from September, 2000. (Id. at p.

19). The ALJ also noted that plaintiff did not use an ambulatory

device and has a steady gait. (Id.).

The ALJ noted that plaintiff satisfied Steps 1 and 2 of the

sequential evaluative process, in that he has is not engaged in

substantial gainful activity since the date of alleged onset

(July, 2002) (Step 1) and also found that he suffers impairments

from degenerative disc disease and right knee strain/weakness

which are severe (Step 2). (TR at p. 19). However, at Step 3,

the ALJ determined that the severity of these impairments did not

meet or exceed the Listings found in Appendix 1, Subpart P,

Regulations No. 4. (Id.).

The ALJ next evaluated plaintiff's residual functional

capacity ("RFC") which the ALJ defined as "the most an individual

can do after considering the effects of physical and/or mental

limitations that affect the ability to perform work-related

tasks." (TR at p. 19; see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.945). The ALJ

stated that in making this assessment he "must consider all

symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which these symptoms 

can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective

medical evidence and other evidence based on the requirements of

20 C.F.R. § 416.929, Social Security Ruling 96-7p, and Bunnell v.

Sullivan, 945 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1991)." (TR at p. 19). 

Based on his examination of the "total record," the ALJ found

plaintiff's "subjective complaints, including complaints of pain

and work-related functional limitations, less than credible." (TR

at p. 19). In making this assessment the ALJ cited plaintiff's

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The ALJ noted that plaintiff "worked for a short time [in the

summer of 2002] as a truck driver but found "this work activity did

not rise to the level of a substantial gainful activity" because he

worked at this job for such a short time. (TR at p. 18).

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characterization of his back pain as fluctuating between 1-2 and

5-6 (on a 10 scale). The ALJ also cited the following: (1) the

observation of his treating physician on August 29, 2003 that

plaintiff "mov[ed] around without too much discomfort" and "had no

areas of back tenderness ..."; (2) plaintiff is able to drive and

travel; (3) plaintiff needs no ambulatory "device"; (4) plaintiff

fixes his own meals and shops; and (5) plaintiff's acknowledgment

he is able to lift 15 pounds frequently and, for a brief period in

the summer of 2002 while working as a water truck driver, lifted

objects weighing as much as 100 pounds on occasion.1

 (Id. at pp.

19-20). 

At Step 4, citing the hearing testimony of vocational expert

David Janus, the ALJ found that plaintiff's impairments prevented

him from performing his past relevant work either as a handyman or

EMT. However, at the final step, Step 5, the ALJ concluded that

plaintiff's RFC, taking into account his impairments, did not

prevent him from performing other "light work" in the national and

local economy. The ALJ relied on the factors already cited and

noted that with these limitations, the vocational expert found

plaintiff capable of performing "light work" such as "office

helper and plumbing parts assembler." (TR at p. 21). For these

reasons, the ALJ found plaintiff "capable of making a successful

adjustment to work that exists in significant numbers in the

national economy" to support a finding of not disabled. (Id. at

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pp. 21-22). 

V. Plaintiff's Claims of Error

Plaintiff raises several claims of error. First, he asserts

the ALJ erred by giving a "boilerplate" conclusion at Step 3 of

the sequential evaluation process when he determined that

plaintiff's impairments did not meet or exceed the listed criteria

outlined in Listing 1.04. Such a finding would have resulted in a

finding of disabled. (Doc. 13 at pp. 2-3).

The rest of plaintiff's claims of error relate to the process

used by the ALJ in concluding that petitioner retained the RFC to

perform other "light work" in the national economy (Step 5 of the

sequential evaluation) and, thus, was not disabled. (Doc. 13 at

pp. 5-15). Specifically, plaintiff alleges the ALJ erred in: (1)

rejecting the finding's of plaintiff's treating physician, Maria

Teresa Laurel, M.D.; (2) in relying on the opinions of nonexamining state agency physicians as a basis for the RFC

determination; (3) failing to make a determination of plaintiff's

credibility; and (4) failing to assign any weight to the

disability determination of the Veterans Administration ("VA"). 

VI. Merits 

The ALJ's basis for concluding that plaintiff was not

disabled rested upon his determination at Step 5 of the sequential

evaluation that plaintiff's RFC, after accounting for his

impairments, permitted him to perform other "light work" in the

economy and, thus, he was not disabled. (TR at pp. 19-22).

Plaintiff contends this conclusion amounted to error for

several reasons. First, the ALJ improperly discounted the opinion

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of plaintiff's treating physician. Second, the ALJ improperly

relied on the opinions of nonexamining agency physicians in making

his RFC determination. Third, the ALJ failed to make a

credibility determination and, to the extent he did, the reasons

were "inadequate under the clear and convincing standard." 

Finally, plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by failing to assign any

weight to a disability determination by the VA. (See Doc. 13 at

pp. 5-15).

A. Expert Opinions

Plaintiff first asserts that the ALJ improperly discounted

the opinion of his treating physician, Maria Teresa Laurel, M.D., 

and relied upon opinions of nonexamining agency physicians. 

Questionnaires were filed by two agency-contracted physicians

in this case. The physicians based their conclusions on a review

of the medical records but did not examine plaintiff. (See TR at

pp. 129, 137). One questionnaire was signed on December 30, 2002,

and the other on April 10, 2003. (TR at pp. 136, 144). In both

instances, the physicians opined that petitioner could stand for 6

hours in an 8 hour workday and also sit for 6 hours in an 8 hour

workday with only normal breaks. (Id. at pp. 130, 138). Both

doctors also concluded plaintiff could push and pull without

limitations, and had no postural, manipulative or environmental

limitations. Both doctors also concluded that although plaintiff

suffered symptoms attributable to his maladies (back and knee

impairments), the severity alleged was "disproportionate" to the

"expected severity" given their opinion of plaintiff's condition. 

(See id. at pp. 134, 142). 

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Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Malcolm McPhee at the direction

of the Arizona Department of Economic Security on December 20,

2002. Dr. McPhee observed in his examination that plaintiff had a

"normal-appearing gait" and could "tandem walk," stand on his

heels and on his toes, side bend his trunk 20 degrees, bend

forward from a standing position and touch his toes and resume

standing again. (TR at p. 125). Dr. McPhee also observed

plaintiff could squat, hop, remove his shoes and socks and

transfer onto the examination table without difficulty. (Id.). 

He also noted a "normal range of motion of the neck, shoulders,

elbows, hands, wrist, hips, knees, ankles and feet." (Id.). 

Based on his observations, as well as "x-ray reports and

other records," Dr. McPhee opined plaintiff "could ... lift 50

pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently." (TR at p. 126). 

Dr. McPhee also concluded plaintiff should be able to stand or

walk about six hours of an eight-hour workday. He would be able

to sit for six hours in an eight hour workday with the "usual"

breaks. He could occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel,

crouch or crawl with no upper extremity or environmental

restrictions. (Id.).

Also included in the record is a vast number of progress and

other notes from plaintiff's treating physician, Maria-Teresa

Laurel, M.D. Dr. Laurel is employed by the VA and treated

plaintiff on a regular basis going back to at least 1998. 

Plaintiff claims she treated him as far back as 1995. (See TR at

pp. at 227, 249; see also p. 463). 

Dr. Laurel's progress and other notes indicate plaintiff was

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treated by her and other VA doctors for chronic back and knee pain

on a continuing basis at least back to 1998. During this time, a

CT scan, Magnetic Resonance Imaging ("MRI") and EMG data showed

plaintiff suffered from a disc bulge at the L4 - L5 region, and

suffered knee pains as well as spinal stenosis and degenerative

arthritis. (See e.g., TR at pp. 174-75, 179-80, 366-67). Dr.

Laurel documented repeated "impressions" of chronic low back pain

and knee pain throughout this period. On January 29, 2004, in

anticipation of the Agency hearing, Dr. Laurel filed an RFC

Questionnaire indicating plaintiff suffered a "severe" level of

pain which could be "expected to result from objective clinical

and diagnostic findings, which have been documented by [her]," and

others. (Id. at p. 452). Dr. Laurel indicated her opinion that

this pain interfered with plaintiff's attention and concentration

on a constant basis and also opined that the "severe" pain

suffered by plaintiff would "constantly" interfere with his

ability to complete work-related and other tasks in a timely

manner during a workday. (Id. at p. 453).

B. Analysis

The ALJ assigned "little weight" to Dr. Laurel's findings. 

In doing so, the only specific reasons cited by the ALJ are that

she "did not provide any medical records to support [her] [RFC]

assessment" and she "does not cite any specific clinical or

diagnostic findings on which to base [her] medical opinions." (TR

at p. 20). In concluding plaintiff was not disabled at Step 5,

the ALJ noted that progress notes showed that plaintiff estimated

his back pain at various times between 1-2 and 5-6 on a 10 scale. 

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The ALJ's characterization does not relay the whole picture.

A closer look indicates this was not an impression formed by Dr.

Laurel but rather a nurse who saw plaintiff as part of an ongoing

regimen for monitoring and managing his pain. (See TR at pp. 435-

37). The nurse's note from October 8, 2003 also note that

plaintiff's indications of less pain follow closely upon an

epidural injection. (See id. at pp. 436-37). However, the specific

progress note of August 29, 2003, cited by the ALJ, apparently done

prior to the epidural, shows plaintiff indicated his "chronic low

back pains ... [have] gotten worse." (Id. at p. 437). 

15

(TR at pp. 429-42). The ALJ also noted that after spinal epidural

injections plaintiff rated his pain as zero. (See id. at p. 434). 

To support his finding of "not disabled" at Step 5, the ALJ

also cited an observation by Dr. Laurel in an August 29, 2003

progress note, stating that in spite of "ongoing complaints of

back pain," plaintiff moved well "without too much discomfort and

no areas of back tenderness ..."2 (TR at pp. 20, 437). Finally,

the ALJ noted that plaintiff could drive and travel (citing a trip

to California in November 2003), uses no ambulatory device, fixes

his own meals, shops and has acknowledged being able to lift 15

pounds frequently. (TR at pp. 20-21). 

It is of note that the ALJ only passingly mentioned medical

expert opinions in support of his conclusion that petitioner

retained the RFC to perform other "light work" (Step 5 of the

sequential evaluation). He did not cite Dr. McPhee's findings

specifically, or those of the two nonexamining agency physicians. 

Instead he stated "that findings of fact made by State agency

medical consultants and other program physicians regarding the

nature and severity of an individual's impairment(s) ... are

assigned weight to the degree they are consistent with the medical

evidence and findings herein." 

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Upon review, the Court believes the ALJ improperly discounted

the opinion of plaintiff's long-time treating physician, Dr.

Laurel. The ALJ may not discount the uncontradicted opinions of

examining physicians, and particularly long-time treating

physicians, unless he cites "'clear and convincing' reasons

supported by substantial evidence in the record." Reddick v.

Chater, 157 F.3d at 725. Even if the treating doctor's opinion is

contradicted by another doctor, the ALJ must still provide

"specific and legitimate reasons' supported by substantial

evidence in the record." Id.

The assessments of Dr. McPhee (who examined plaintiff on one

occasion in December, 2002) and the non-examining Agency

physicians clearly differ from the opinion of Dr. Laurel, the

treating physician. Dr. McPhee and the non-examining experts all

conclude that plaintiff has the RFC to perform some work in the

economy, findings which support the ALJ's determination at Step 5

of the sequential evaluation that plaintiff could perform limited

"light work." (See TR at pp. 125-26, 129-36, 138-44). 

Conversely, Dr. Laurel's RFC statement clearly indicates that

plaintiff's "severe" pain prevents him from completing workrelated tasks in a timely manner. (TR at p. 453). 

As noted, the ALJ's findings must be supported by substantial

evidence in the record. However, the Court is cognizant of the

fact that Dr. Laurel's observations occurred over years, while Dr.

McPhee's conclusions are based upon one examination and the agency

experts never examined plaintiff at all. Absent specific and

legitimate reasons, supported by substantial evidence, much

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greater weight should be given to Dr. Laurel's findings if those

findings are supported by the record. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(d)(2). 

The Court believes the ALJ erred in concluding that Dr.

Laurel cited no medical evidence to support her opinion. The

questionnaire itself does not request such support. However, the

questionnaire does ask if Dr. Laurel's opinions are based on

"objective clinical or diagnostic findings." (TR at p. 452). Dr.

Laurel responded that her opinions are so based and medical

evidence, in particular, the progress notes from several years of

treating plaintiff, support this conclusion. 

From at least 1998 on (if not before), plaintiff received

constant care for his back and knee pain. The notes reveal a CT

scan, as well as an MRI and an EMG. These notes and procedures

provide objective evidence of conditions such as spinal stenosis,

degenerative arthritis, and a disc bulge at the L4 - L5. 

Particularly, in Dr. Laurel's notes from October 21, 2002, she

characterized the MRI as showing:

1. INTRASPINAL 1 CM CYSTIC LESION AT THE LEVEL OF S-2,

PROBABLY TARLOV CYST. THIS ABUTS THE IPSILATERAL

DESCENDING NERVE ROOT AND IMPINGES ON THE RIGHT LATERAL

RECESS.

2. MULTILEVEL FACT DJD. IN COMBINATION WITH MILD

DIFFUSE DISC BULGING AT L4 - L5, THERE IS SEVERE

PROXIMAL NEUROFORAMEN COMPROMISE, LEFT GREATER THAN

RIGHT. THERE IS MODERATE PROXIMAL FORAMINAL NARROWING

ON THE RIGHT AND MILD NARROWING ON THE LEFT AT L3 - 4

NOTED ALSO.

(TR at pp. 180, 366-67).

These findings by Dr. Laurel constitute objective evidence of

an impairment of plaintiff's lower back capable of supporting her

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conclusion that he suffers a "severe" impairment that would

"constantly" hamper his ability to perform work-related tasks in a

timely fashion. Dr. Laurel's "impressions" based on the MRI are

not refuted by Dr. McPhee or the non-examining experts.

The ALJ cited no other specific basis for assigning "little

weight" to Dr. Laurel's opinion. However, the ALJ did note that

plaintiff only characterized his pain as between 1-2 and 5-6 in

the treating progress notes. (TR at p. 20). The Court has

examined these notes and believes this summary conclusion is

incomplete at best. 

These notes appear are characterized as "nursing nerve block

record" and "pain management session" notes created by nurses for

follow-on checkups referred by Dr. Laurel to help plaintiff deal

with his chronic pain. Notes from October 24, 2003, show

plaintiff characterized his pain as 6. (TR at p. 429). In

addition, plaintiff also indicated his pain was a 10 when he

attempted specific activities such as sleeping, walking, physical

activity, and normal daily activity. (Id. at p. 430). In

progress notes from October 8, 2003, plaintiff characterized his

pain as a 5. (Id. at p. 434). In a previous examination by Dr.

Laurel, plaintiff characterized his pain at 5-6 on a 10 scale. 

(Id. at p. 437). Again, when connected with simple activities

such as sleeping, walking, etc., plaintiff invariable indicated

his pain was a 10. (Id. at p. 442). The ALJ appears to have

ignored certain reports of pain and emphasized others. 

Finally, the ALJ's citation to the facts that plaintiff

drives and travels on occasion, fixes meals and shops, admits he

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can lift up to 15 pounds frequently and uses no device for

ambulation is not evidence sufficient to contradict the findings

of Dr. Laurel, or discount plaintiff's credibility with respect to

pain testimony. Plaintiff is 6'3" tall and weighs more than 230

pounds. The fact he lifts 15 pounds frequently and attempts to

perform other functions of routine daily living does not provide

sufficient evidence to discount Dr. Laurel's findings. 

"Occasional symptom-free periods and even sporadic ability to work

are not inconsistent with disability." Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d

821, 833 (9th Cir. 1996). Nor should claimants be "penalized for

attempting to lead normal lives in the face of their limitations." 

Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722; Cooper v. Brown, 815 F.2d 557, 561 (9th

Cir. 1987) ("a disability claimant need not 'vegetate in a dark

room' in order to be eligible for benefits"); Fair v. Bowen, 885

F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Many home activities are not

easily transferrable to ... the more grueling environment of the

workplace, where it might be impossible to periodically rest or

take medication.").

In sum, none of the reasons cited by the ALJ, either singly

or in total, rise to the level of substantial evidence, let alone

clear and convincing evidence, necessary to justify discounting

the opinion of plaintiff's treating physician. When her opinion

is given proper weight, establishing plaintiff suffers from

medically significant impairments that even the ALJ found "severe"

at Step 2 of the sequential evaluation, plaintiff's pain testimony

should be credited. If that testimony is credited, the vocational

expert indicated plaintiff could not work. (TR at p. 478).

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As already noted, the ALJ further erred in discrediting

plaintiff's pain testimony. At the hearing, plaintiff testified

his "back hurts so much that every couple hours or so if I do any

type of work at all that I have to lay down for an hour or so

throughout the day." (TR at p. 461). Plaintiff further testified

his primary pain was in his lower back but that it sometimes runs

down his legs. He testified that after he wakes up his pain

becomes "sharp" once he starts moving or functioning. (Id. at p.

462). He stated that during an 8-hour workday he would need to

lie down for at least 3 hours. (Id.). This testimony, combined

with Dr. Laurel's opinion, constitutes strong evidence supporting

the view plaintiff is precluded from performing any work and the

vocational expert agrees. (TR at p. 478). 

With respect to plaintiff's credibility, the ALJ stated only

that "[t]he evidence of record simply does not substantiate the

intensity of pain alleged by the claimant. Progress notes

estimated back pain to fluctuate between 1-2 and 5-6. [Citation

omitted]. After epidural injections, ... his pain rating has been

zero." (TR at p. 20).

Plaintiff contends this finding is inadequate. He argues

"[t]he ALJ's view of the 'evidence of record' ... was misplaced"

and that the ALJ does not possess the expertise to make an

independent determination of the medical evidence. (Doc. 13 at p.

12). The Court agrees. The Ninth Circuit has held that "[o]nce

the claimant produces medical evidence of an underlying

impairment, the Commissioner may not discredit the claimant's

testimony as to the severity of symptoms merely because they are

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unsupported by objective medical evidence." Reddick, 157 F.3d at

722 (citing Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1991)(en

banc)). The court also stated that "[u]nless there is affirmative

evidence showing that the claimant is malingering, the

Commissioner's reasons for rejecting the claimant's testimony must

be 'clear and convincing.'" [Citation omitted]. 'General findings

are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identity what testimony is

not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant's

complaints." Reddick, 157 at 722.

Applying this standard, the ALJ's assessment of plaintiff's

credibility falls short. His cursory findings are not based on

specifics, let alone "clear and convincing" reasons. To the

extent discernible, the ALJ appears to conclude that the objective

medical evidence does not support plaintiff's pain testimony. 

However, as noted in Reddick, absent evidence of malingering, and

there is none here, this is an insufficient basis for discounting

plaintiff's credibility once, as here, plaintiff has produced

medical evidence of an underlying impairment. In fact, based on

the progress notes and Dr. Laurel's conclusions, plaintiff's pain

testimony is credible and the ALJ erred in discounting it.

Providing due weight to Dr. Laurel's findings and plaintiff's

pain testimony requires reversal of the ALJ's determinations. The

overall evidence produced supports a finding that plaintiff cannot

perform full-time work in the economy and he is entitled to a

finding of disabled.

 Finally, the Court notes another factor which must be

weighed in plaintiff's favor. The VA determined in June, 2003,

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that plaintiff was entitled to VA benefits due to disabilities

based, inter alia, on his "degenerative disc disease of your

lumbar spine and internal derangement of your right knee ..." (TR

at p. 117). A VA determination of disability "although not

necessarily compel[ling] the SSA to reach an identical result,

..., must [be] consider[ed] ..." McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d

1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002). In fact, "an ALJ must ordinarily give

great weight to a VA determination of disability." Id. In this

case, the ALJ failed to address the VA determination of disability

altogether. This was error.

The question now is whether remand is appropriate for an

award of benefits or for further determinations and a new finding

by the Agency. The standard for making this determination was

laid out in Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587 (9th Cir. 2004). In

Benecke, the court held that "where the record has been developed

fully and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful

purpose, the district court should remand for an immediate award

of benefits." Id. at 593. Specifically, a reviewing court

should:

... credit evidence that was rejected during the

administrative process and remand for an immediate award

of benefits if (1) the ALJ failed to provide legally

sufficient reasons for rejecting the evidence; (2) there

are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a

determination of disability can be made; and (3) it is

clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to

find the claimant disabled were such evidence credited.

Benecke, 379 F.3d at 593.

Here, the Court believes the ALJ did not provide legally

sufficient reasons for discounting Dr. Laurel's findings and

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plaintiff's pain testimony. If this evidence is credited, and in

light of the vocational experts' conclusion that the limitations

indicated by this evidence support a finding of disabled, no

purpose will be served by a remand for further findings. In light

of Benecke and noting that plaintiff's application has been

pending for nearly four years, remand for an award of benefits is

appropriate.

Finally, in light of the Court's finding of error at Step 5,

its further conclusion that plaintiff is unable to perform work in

the economy and is disabled, and its determination to remand for

an award of benefits, the Court need not address plaintiff's

additional claim that the ALJ erred at Step 3 when it concluded

that plaintiff's impairments did not meet or exceed the Listing of

Impairments, 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 1.04.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion for Summary

Judgment (Docs. 11, 12 and 13) is granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant's Cross-Motion for

Summary Judgment (Docs. 14, 15 and 21) is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter

judgment in this matter accordingly.

 DATED this 21st day of September, 2006.

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