Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00868/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00868-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DALE CRAWFORD,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-06-0868 GEB GGH P

vs.

WARDEN CAREY, et al., 

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

I. Introduction

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In 1989 petitioner was convicted of second degree murder

and sentenced to 15 years to life. Petitioner challenges the 2004 decision by the California Board

of Prison Terms (BPT) finding him unsuitable for parole. This was petitioner’s third suitability

hearing. After carefully reviewing the record, the court recommends that the petition be denied.

II. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) applies to this

petition for habeas corpus which was filed after the AEDPA became effective. Neelley v. Nagle,

138 F.3d 917 (11th Cir.), citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997). The

AEDPA “worked substantial changes to the law of habeas corpus,” establishing more deferential

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standards of review to be used by a federal habeas court in assessing a state court’s adjudication

of a criminal defendant’s claims of constitutional error. Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263

(9th Cir. 1997). 

In Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000), the Supreme

Court defined the operative review standard set forth in § 2254(d). Justice O’Connor’s opinion

for Section II of the opinion constitutes the majority opinion of the court. There is a dichotomy

between “contrary to” clearly established law as enunciated by the Supreme Court, and an

“unreasonable application of” that law. Id. at 1519. “Contrary to” clearly established law applies

to two situations: (1) where the state court legal conclusion is opposite that of the Supreme

Court on a point of law, or (2) if the state court case is materially indistinguishable from a

Supreme Court case, i.e., on point factually, yet the legal result is opposite.

“Unreasonable application” of established law, on the other hand, applies to

mixed questions of law and fact, that is, the application of law to fact where there are no factually

on point Supreme Court cases which mandate the result for the precise factual scenario at issue. 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 407-08, 120 S. Ct. at 1520-1521 (2000). It is this prong of the

AEDPA standard of review which directs deference to be paid to state court decisions. While the

deference is not blindly automatic, “the most important point is that an unreasonable application

of federal law is different from an incorrect application of law....[A] federal habeas court may not

issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather,

that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 410-11, 120 S. Ct. at

1522 (emphasis in original). The habeas corpus petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating the

objectively unreasonable nature of the state court decision in light of controlling Supreme Court

authority. Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S. Ct. 357 (2002).

The state courts need not have cited to federal authority, or even have indicated

awareness of federal authority in arriving at their decision. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 123 S.

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Ct. 362 (2002). Nevertheless, the state decision cannot be rejected unless the decision itself is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, established Supreme Court authority. Id. An

unreasonable error is one in excess of even a reviewing court’s perception that “clear error” has

occurred. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003). Moreover, the

established Supreme Court authority reviewed must be a pronouncement on constitutional

principles, or other controlling federal law, as opposed to a pronouncement of statutes or rules

binding only on federal courts. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. at 9, 123 S. Ct. at 366.

However, where the state courts have not addressed the constitutional issue in

dispute in any reasoned opinion, the federal court will independently review the record in

adjudication of that issue. “Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the

constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent state

court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

2003).

Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition in the Shasta County Superior Court

raising the claims raised in the instant petition. Respondent’s Answer, Exhibit D. The Superior

Court issued a reasoned decision denying the petition. Id., Exhibit E. Petitioner filed habeas

petitions in the California Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court which were summarily

denied. Id., Exhibits G and I. When reviewing a state court’s summary denial of a claim, the

court “looks through” the summary disposition to the last reasoned decision. Shackleford v.

Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2000). 

III. Background

The factual background of petitioner’s offense is relevant to the analysis of

petitioner’s claims. A factual summary is contained in the transcript from petitioner’s 2004

suitability hearing. 

On February 6, 1988, Shasta County detectives responded to Clear Creek Road in

regards to a possible homicide victim. Upon arrival, detectives were informed

that a female victim–found under a mound of tires [sic]. The victim wore only

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blue pants and officers observed obvious head wounds. The body was taken to

the coroner’s office and on February 7, 1988, an autopsy was conducted. The

cause of death was multiple injuries to the head inflicted by a blunt, rolled-edged

instrument. The corner [sic] stated that the victim could have lived from one hour

up to 12 hours and the victim was not killed at the crime scene. On February 8,

1988, the victim was identified as Theresa, and it’s spelled T-H-E-R-E-S-A, Lynn,

L-Y-N-N, Crawford, C-R-A-W-F-O-R-D. The victim’s most recent address was

1437 Spruce Street. She shared this address with her husband Dale Crawford, the

defendant. On February 8, 1988, detectives interviewed Dale Crawford at his

place of work and informed him of Theresa’s death. The defendant stated that the

last time he saw Theresa Crawford was for about 10 minutes around 5 p.m. on

Friday, February 5, 1988, at their apartment on Spruce Street. The defendant

stated Theresa was drunk and that he wanted her to sober up so that she could go

to a job interview, instead she got mad and left the residence. A search of the

defendant’s residence was conducted and several type O bloodstains were found

in the residence. The defendant’s pickup was searched and a pair of work gloves

were found which had type O bloodstains and fibers which matched the victim’s

jeans, fibers from her bedspread and rubber fibers consistent (indiscernible). The

bloodstains were analyzed by the Serological Research Institute which concluded

that the blood could have originated from Theresa Crawford but not from Dale

Crawford. The work gloves were examined by the Forensic Science Associates

which concluded that the fibers from the victim’s pants and fibers on the gloves

could have originated from the victim’s pants. The bedspread fibers and those

from the gloves were the same. Dale Crawford was interviewed several times by

Shasta County detectives. He denied killing his wife. On May 2, 1988, Dale

Crawford was arrested and booked into the Shasta County jail and charged with

violation of Penal Code section 187.

Respondent’s Answer, Exhibit B, pp. 11-13. 

IV. Discussion

The petition raises three claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence finding

petitioner unsuitable for parole. 

Respondent first argues that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider

the petition because petitioner has no liberty interest in being released on parole. Respondent

confuses the subject matter jurisdiction of the court with failure to state a cognizable claim. 

Clearly, the court has subject matter jurisdiction over petitioner’s habeas corpus claim pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Federal question jurisdiction exists if the complaint (or petition) purports to

state a claim under federal law regardless of the validity of the claim. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373

U.S. 647, 83 S. Ct. 1441, 1444 (1963). Only if the stated federal claim is so wholly insubstantial

that even a preliminary review of the merits is not required does the federal court not have

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jurisdiction. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S. Ct. 773 (1946). It is not every arguably failed

claim that deprives the district court of jurisdiction. Here, petitioner properly invoked § 2254 for

the basis of his habeas claim. His contentions that he was denied due process in the parole

setting process are not so insubstantial so as to deprive the court of jurisdiction. 

Respondent next argues that California law does not give rise to a federally

protected liberty interest in parole release. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument. Sass v.

California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2006). 

In the parole context, the requirements of due process are met if “some evidence”

supports the decision.” Id. at 1128-1129. In reviewing the BPT decision, the court analyzes

whether the factors relied on by the BPT, set forth in the relevant regulations, are supported by

some evidence. 

Cal. Code of Regulations, section 2402(c), sets forth the circumstances tending to

show unsuitability. The court lists those of significance here:

(1) Commitment Offense. The prisoner committed the offense in

an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner. The factors to be

considered include:

(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed in the same or separate

incidents.

(B) The offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated

manner, such as an execution-style manner.

*****

(D) The offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an 

exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering.

(E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in

relation to the offense.

(2) Previous Record of Violence. The prisoner on previous

occasions inflicted or attempted to inflict serious injury on a

victim, particularly if the prisoner demonstrated serious assaultive

behavior at an early age. 

(3) Unstable Social History. The prisoner has a history of unstable

or tumultuous relationships with others.

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*****

*****

(6) Institutional Behavior. The prisoner has engaged in serious misconduct in 

prison or jail.

Section 2402(d) sets forth the circumstances tending to indicate suitability:

(1) No Juvenile Record. The prisoner does not have a record of

assaulting others as a juvenile or committing crimes with a

potential of personal harm to the victims.

(2) Stable Social History. The prisoner has experienced reasonably

stable relationships with others.

(3) Signs of Remorse. The prisoner performed acts which tend to

indicate the presence of remorse, such as attempting to repair the

damage, seeking help for or relieving suffering of the victim, or

indicating that he understands the nature and magnitude of the

offense.

(4) Motivation for the Crime. The prisoner committed his crime as

the result of significant stress in his life, especially if the stress has

built over a long period of time.

(5) Battered Woman Syndrome . . .

(6) Lack of Criminal History. The prisoner lacks any significant

history of violent crime.

(7) Age. The prisoner’s present age reduces the probability of

recidivism.

(8) Understanding and Plans for Future. The prisoner has made

realistic plans for release or has developed marketable skills that

can be put to use upon release.

(9) Institutional Behavior. Institutional activities indicate an

enhanced ability to function within the law upon release.

In Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2003) the Ninth Circuit indicated that

a continued reliance on an unchanging factor such as the circumstances of the offense could

result in a due process violation. Biggs was serving a sentence of twenty-five years to life

following a 1985 first degree murder conviction. In the case before the Ninth Circuit, Biggs

challenged the 1999 decision by the BPT finding him unsuitable for parole despite his record as a

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model prisoner. 334 F.3d at 913. While the Ninth Circuit rejected several of the reasons given

by the BPT for finding Biggs unsuitable, it upheld three: 1) petitioner’s commitment offense

involved the murder of a witness; 2) the murder was carried out in a manner exhibiting a callous

disregard for the life and suffering of another; 3) petitioner could benefit from therapy. 334 F.3d

at 913.

The Ninth Circuit cautioned the BPT regarding its continued reliance on the

gravity of the offense and petitioner’s conduct prior to the offense:

As in the present instance, the parole board’s sole supportable

reliance on the gravity of the offense and conduct prior to

imprisonment to justify denial of parole can be initially justified as

fulfilling the requirements set forth by state law. Over time,

however, should Biggs continue to demonstrate exemplary

behavior and evidence of rehabilitation, denying him a parole date

simply because of the nature of his offense would raise serious

questions involving his liberty interest.

334 F.3d at 916.

In finding petitioner unsuitable for parole, the BPT relied on several factors

related to petitioner’s commitment offense. Because petitioner had been incarcerated for 15

years on his 15 year to life sentence, and because this was only his third parole suitability

hearing, the court does not find that the BPT’s reliance on these unchanging factors alone

violated petitioner’s right to due process. Accordingly, the court will consider the merits of each

of these unchanging factors. 

The BPT first found that petitioner’s offense was committed in a “dispassionate”

manner. Answer, Exhibit B, p. 65. As stated above, a circumstance tending to show

unsuitability is if the offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner, such as an

execution style killing. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(1)(B). 

In In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 104 (2002), the California

Supreme Court found sufficient evidence to support a finding that the offense was carried out in

dispassionate and calculated manner, such as execution style. The evidence showed that the

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petitioner murdered the victim after “a full week of careful preparation, rehearsal and execution.” 

29 Cal. 4th at 678, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157. The petitioner fired ten shots at close range from an

assault weapon and fired three or four shots into the victim’s head as he lay on the pavement. Id. 

In In re Lowe, 130 Cal. App. 4th 1405, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (2005) the California Court of Appeal

found sufficient evidence of an execution style murder where the petitioner purchased the gun

shortly before the murder, entered the victim’s bedroom in the middle of the night while he was

asleep, and shot him five times in the head and chest. 130 Cal. App. 4th at 1414, 31 Cal. Rptr.

3d at 5.

The record in the instant case does not contain sufficient evidence that petitioner

killed his wife in a dispassionate and calculated manner, such as an execution style murder. The

record contains no evidence that petitioner planned to kill his wife. Nor does the record contain

any evidence that the killing was dispassionate. In fact, the record contains no evidence

regarding the circumstances leading up to the murder. The BPT’s inference that the killing was

dispassionate and calculated based on the fact that petitioner hit his wife in the head several times

and then attempted to conceal her body is unreasonable. Rather, it is very possible that petitioner

killed his wife in the heat of an argument. Accordingly, this finding is not supported by some

evidence.

The BPT next found that the offense was carried out in a manner which

demonstrated an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering. Answer, Exhibit B, p. 65. 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(1)(D). As stated above, the coroner found that petitioner’s

wife could have lived for one to twelve hours after infliction of the injuries, and that she was not

killed at the crime scene. Based on these circumstances, the court finds that the BPT’s finding

that the offense was carried out in a manner demonstrating an exceptionally callous disregard for

human suffering is supported by some evidence. See In re Burns, 136 Cal. App. 4th 1318, 1327,

40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 6 (2006) (offense carried out in a manner demonstrating exceptionally callous

disregard for human suffering where petitioner did not summon help for victim; petitioner had

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one to two hours to reconsider disregard for victim’s suffering and life, but failed to do so). 

The BPT next found that the motive for the crime was inexplicable. Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(1)(E). The California Court of Appeal has explained what is meant by

“inexplicable motive”:

The epistemological and ethical problems involved in the ascertainment and

evaluation of motive are among the reasons the law has sought to avoid the

subject. As one authority has stated, “[h]ardly any part of penal law is more

definitely settled than that motive is irrelevant.” (Hall, General Principles of

Criminal Law (2d ed. 1960) at p. 88; see also Husak, Motive and Criminal

Liability (1989) vol. 8, No. 1, Crim. Justice Ethics 3.) An “inexplicable” motive,

as we understand it, is one that is unexplained or unintelligible, as where the

commitment offense does not appear to be related to the conduct of the victim and

has no other discernible purpose. A person whose motive for a criminal act

cannot be explained or is unintelligible is therefore unusually unpredictable and

dangerous. 

In re Scott, 119 Cal. App. 4th 871, 892, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 32, 47 (2004). 

In the instant case, the record (as discussed at the 2004 suitability hearing)

contained no evidence regarding the circumstances of the murder, other than how it was actually

committed. The record contained no evidence regarding the conduct of petitioner or his wife

leading up to the murder. Without knowing any information regarding the circumstances of the

killing, the court cannot find that petitioner’s motive was inexplicable. It is not reasonable for

the BPT to infer, based on a lack of evidence, that petitioner’s motive could not be explained or

was unintelligible. Accordingly, the court does not find this factor to be supported by some

evidence. 

The BPT next found petitioner unsuitable on grounds that he had an unstable

social history. Answer, Exhibit B, pp. 66-67. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(3) (unstable or

tumultuous relationships tend to show unsuitability). The BPT stated that while petitioner had a

relatively stable social history with his family, he “apparently had an unstable social history in

regards to the victim who was his wife of–he said–two months.” Id., p. 67.

Based on the BPT’s reasoning in this case, every prisoner convicted of murder

would have an unstable social history based on the fact that they killed someone. This

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interpretation of the regulation is not reasonable. In any event, there is no evidence in this record

describing petitioners relationship with his wife prior to the murder. It is possible, for example,

that petitioner had a stable relationship with his wife, but killed her after she admitted to having

an affair. This circumstance would not support a finding of unstable social history. For these

reasons, the court finds that the BPT’s finding of unstable social history is not supported by some

evidence.

The BPT next found that petitioner was unsuitable because he had programmed in

a limited manner. Answer, Exhibit B, p. 67. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(d)(9) (institutional

activities indicate an enhanced ability to function within the law upon release). In particular, the

BPT noted petitioner’s failure to upgrade educationally and vocationally, and his failure to

participate in any self-help programs. Answer, Exhibit B, p. 67.

The psychological report prepared in anticipation of petitioner’s 2000 suitability

hearing by Dr. Clair, and relied on by the 2004 panel, stated that petitioner had no current mental

health treatment needs. Petition, Exhibit G. Dr. Clair concluded that petitioner was highly

unlikely to be a threat to the public order if released. Id. Based on Dr. Clair’s report, the court

finds that the BPT’s finding that petitioner’s failure to participate in self-help programs

demonstrated unsuitability was not supported by some evidence.

Petitioner graduated from high school prior to his incarceration, but had not

participated in any educational programs during his incarceration. Petition, Exhibit F. Petitioner

had also not participated in any vocational training during his incarceration. Id. While petitioner

may not believe he needed any additional educational or vocational training, his failure to

participate in these programs demonstrated a lack of desire for self-improvement. For this

reason, the BPT’s finding that petitioner’s failure to participate in educational and vocational

programs supported a finding of unsuitability was supported by some evidence.

For the reasons discussed above, the court finds that the 2004 decision by the BPT

finding petitioner unsuitable for parole was supported by some evidence: 1) the murder was

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 The time is close, however, that continued reliance on this unchanging factor may well 1

violate due process. Biggs, supra.

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carried out in a manner demonstrating an exceptionally callous disregard for human life; 2) 1

petitioner’s failure to participate in educational and vocational training did not demonstrate an

enhanced ability to function within the law upon release. Because the denial of this claim by the

Shasta County Superior Court was not an unreasonable application of clearly established

Supreme Court authority, the petition should be denied.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for

a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 2/20/07

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

craw868.157

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