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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Uniood States Court or Ap;,~a19 

Tenth Circuit 

NEIL G. DODSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE 

COMPANY, et al . , 

Defendant-Appellee. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

SEP 10 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-4057 

Before TACHA AND SETH, Circuit Judges, and BRATTON, District 

Judge.** 

Plaintiff Neil Dodson sued defendant New York Life Insurance 

Co., Inc. (NYL) for wrongful discharge in violation of the Age 

Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 u.s.c. §§ 621 et seq. (ADEA), 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and § 510 

of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act, 29 u.s.c. § 1140 

(ERISA). The complaint also stated six causes of action under 

state law. The district court granted summary judgment to NYL on 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** The Honorable Howard c. Bratton, Senior District Judge for 

the District of New Mexico, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-4057 Document: 010110090096 Date Filed: 09/10/1991 Page: 1 
all counts. Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his ADEA, ERISA, 

negligent misrepresentation, fraud, promissory estoppel and breach 

of contract claims. We affirm. 

Mr. Dodson was a Training Supervisor in NYL's Utah General 

Office. He had been with NYL for 26 years and was 57 years old 

when the company terminated his employment during a reduction-inforce (RIF). 

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment 

de novo, applying the legal standard used by the district court 

under Fed. R. civ. P. 56(c). Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa. Okl., 

896 F.2d 1228, 1230 (10th cir. 1990). The court must grant summary 

judgment where "there is no genuine issue of material fact and 

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(c). Although the court must view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the non-moving party, Gray v. Phillips Petroleum 

Co., 858 F. 2d 610, 613 ( 10th Cir. 1988) , the court must grant 

summary judgment if the non-moving party does not set forth 

specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; see also Sullivan v. Secular Grain Co. 

of Utah, 930 F.2d 798, 800 (10th Cir. 1991). 

Although plaintiff established his prima facie case of age 

discrimination under the ADEA, the district court correctly granted 

summary judgment to NYL. Mr. Dodson failed to rebut NYL's evidence 

that the company made its decision to terminate for valid business 

reasons and not as a pretext for discrimination. See Merrick v. 

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Appellate Case: 90-4057 Document: 010110090096 Date Filed: 09/10/1991 Page: 2 
Northern Natural Gas Co., 911 F.2d 426, 429 (10th Cir. 1990); Healy 

v. New York Life Ins. Co., 860 F.2d 1209 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. 

denied, 490 U.S. 1098 (1989). 

When an ADEA plaintiff establishes his prima facie case, the 

burden of production shifts to the defendant-employer to show 

legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the discharge. Merrick, 

911 F. 2d at 429. NYL met its burden by setting forth several 

reasons why Mr. Dodson was selected for termination: Mr. Ashby, 

a Training Manager who worked with Mr. Dodson was better qualified 

than Dodson to manage the office and had better performance ratings 

than Dodson; Mr. Dodson had poor relationships with Agents he was 

supposed to train and supervise, he was often unavailable to them, 

and he was not really a good trainer; and Mr. Dodson's performance 

ratings were inadequate in several areas. NYL also introduced 

evidence showing that Mr. Dodson was unwilling to improve in these 

areas, and he was above average only in areas not related to his 

ability to perform after the RIF. 

When the defendant meets its burden to produce legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's termination, the 

plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion that the proffered reason 

was a pretext for age discrimination. Merrick, 911 F.2d at 429. 

Although a plaintiff need not submit direct evidence of 

discrimination, he must present at least some specific evidence 

that casts doubt on the employer's reasons for the discharge. Id. 

Mr. Dodson produced no evidence to refute NYL's explanations. 

He points to NYL's attempts to fill his position and to the fact 

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Appellate Case: 90-4057 Document: 010110090096 Date Filed: 09/10/1991 Page: 3 
he was replaced thirteen months later by a younger man. He also 

points to his adequate job performance and two certificates 

indicating his proficiency in the field of insurance. 

These facts do not cast doubt on NYL's articulated reasons. 

First, NYL's managers' efforts to replace Mr. Dodson do not 

indicate they did not discharge Dodson because they believed he 

would not be able to perform adequately after the RIF. Second, 

NYL submitted ample undisputed evidence that Mr. Dodson's 

performance was not as good as he may have believed. Third, Mr. 

Dodson submitted no evidence that persons with lower ratings in 

similar situations were retained or any other like evidence which 

would allow a jury to find NYL's reasons pretextual. 

The district court also correctly granted summary judgment to 

NYL on plaintiff's ERISA claim. Section 510 of ERISA prohibits 

employers from taking action against an employee who participates 

in a pension benefit plan for "the purpose of interfering with the 

attainment of any right to which such participant may become 

entitled under the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982). To recover 

under § 510 the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendantemployer had the specific intent to violate ERISA and that this 

illegitimate motive was one of the factors in the employer's 

decision to terminate the plaintiff. Gavalik v. Continental Can 

Co., 812 F.2d 834, 851 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Continental 

Can Co. v. Gavalik, 484 U.S. 979 (1987). Although a plaintiff can 

use circumstantial evidence to prove his claim, the evidence must 

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Appellate Case: 90-4057 Document: 010110090096 Date Filed: 09/10/1991 Page: 4 
be specific and must allow the reasonable factfinder to find that 

one of the employer's motives was to violate ERISA. Id. at 852. 

Mr. Dodson has submitted nothing more than speculative 

evidence to show that NYL intended to interfere with his pension 

rights. He contends that NYL needed to save 20% overall in costs, 

that NYL saved pension costs by terminating him, and that he was 

better qualified than younger persons NYL did not terminate. The 

fact is that Mr. Dodson is receiving a pension, although it may be 

lower than he might have received had he retired some time in the 

future. There is no specific evidence showing that NYL discharged 

Mr. Dodson with the intent to interfere with his pension rights 

under ERISA. See Clark v. Resistoflex Co., 854 F.2d 762, 771 (5th 

Cir. 1988). 

The district court was also correct to grant summary judgment 

to NYL on plaintiff's state law claims for negligent 

misrepresentation, fraud, and promissory estoppel. This court 

reviews interpretations of state law de novo. See Salve Regina 

College v. Russell, 111 s. ct. 1217, 1221 (1991). 

Plaintiff claims he was damaged by not opting for early 

retirement because (1) his supervisors had a duty to tell him his 

performance evaluations for the years 1981 through 1984 were 

inflated; (2) his supervisors inflated his 1985 performance 

evaluation; (3) his supervisor told him his poor evaluation from 

1980 was purged and would not be used in the decision to terminate 

him; and (4) his supervisor told him he was rated in the middle of 

the 26 persons in his position in the region. 

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First, NYL had no duty to tell Mr. Dodson his evaluations were 

more favorable than they should have been. See Healy, 860 F.2d at 

1216 ("from a legal perspective managers are not compelled to 

convey their dissatisfaction to employees"). 

Second, to prove negligent misrepresentation or fraud, Mr. 

Dodson would have to show he reasonably relied on the 

representations. Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 18 Utah 2d 378, 381, 

423 P.2d 659, 662 (negligent misrepresentation); Condor v. A.L. 

Williams & Assoc., 739 P.2d 634, 639 (Utah App. 1987) (fraud). 

No one ever assured Mr. Dodson his job was secure or promised 

him he would not be terminated in the RIF if he elected not to take 

early retirement. Indeed, the record shows that the supervisor 

told Mr. Dodson he could not give him "guidance" on what course of 

action to take. Mr. Dodson could not have reasonably relied on the 

statements about his performance because there is no evidence he 

was ever aware of the criteria NYL would use to terminate employees 

during the RIF. Mr. Dodson has failed to submit any evidence to 

rebut NYL's contention that his reliance was not reasonable. 

Third, in Utah "[t]he doctrine of promissory estoppel has 

application when a promise is made which can reasonably be expected 

to induce action or forbearance and which in fact induces action 

or f orebearance from which a detriment is suffered. " Topik v. 

Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Utah 1987). There is no evidence in 

the record that NYL promised Mr. Dodson he would not be terminated 

in the RIF. 

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. . . 

The district court, relying on Caldwell v. Ford. Bacon & 

Davis Utah. Inc. , 777 P. 2d 483 (Utah 1989) , properly granted 

summary judgment to NYL on plaintiff's breach of contract claim. 

In Caldwell, the Utah Supreme Court held that a company does not 

have to follow its procedures for terminating an employee for cause 

during a RIF even if it does not use arbitrary reasons for the 

employee's termination. 

Dodson's case. 

Caldwell is indistinguishable from Mr. 

For the above reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's grant 

of summary judgment in favor of defendant, New York Life Insurance 

Co., Inc. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Howard c. Bratton 

Senior District Judge 

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