Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00095/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00095-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL THOMAS,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-08-0095 FCD GGH P

vs.

JAMES A. YATES, et al., 

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

I. Introduction

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 1995 conviction for shooting at

an inhabited dwelling and felon in possession of a firearm. Pursuant to the Three Strikes Law,

petitioner is serving a sentence of 32 years to life. 

This action is proceeding on the original petition filed January 14, 2008, raising

four claims. First, petitioner alleges that the sentencing court improperly imposed the upper term

in violation of Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 127 S.Ct. 856 (2007). Second,

petitioner alleges that the sentencing court violated the plea agreement by imposing the third

strike sentence. Third, petitioner alleges that his sentence violates California Penal Code § 654. 

Fourth, petitioner alleges that his appellate counsel was ineffective for losing his transcripts.

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2

Pending before the court is respondent’s March 3, 2008, motion to dismiss on

grounds that this action is barred by the statute of limitations. After carefully reviewing the

record, the court recommends that respondent’s motion be granted.

II. Discussion

The statute of limitations for federal habeas corpus petitions is set forth in 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1):

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of–

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

On July 31, 1997, the California Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner’s conviction. 

Respondent’s Lodged Document 2. Petitioner did not seek review in the California Supreme

Court. Therefore, petitioner’s conviction became final when the time for seeking review expired

forty days later on September 9, 1997. See former Cal. Rules of Court 24, 28. Petitioner had one

year from September 9, 1997, to file a timely federal petition. 

In his opposition, petitioner argues that a later trigger date for the statute of

limitations runs from the date Cunningham was decided pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). 

However, in Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 639 (9th Cir. 2008) the Ninth Circuit concluded that

Cunningham did not announce a new rule:

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 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000) held that other than the 1

fact of a prior conviction, any fact increasing the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory

maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 

 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 542 S.Ct. 296 (2004) held that the relevant 2

statutory sentencing maximum is the maximum sentence a judge may impose soley based on the

facts reflected in the jury’s verdict or admitted by defendant. 

 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), in addressing the 3

constitutionality of the federal sentencing guidelines, held that if a fact necessarily results in a

mandated higher sentence, the fact must be admitted by the defendant or found by the jury. 

3

Apprendi , Blakely and Booker made “courts throughout the land’ aware that 1 2 3

sentencing schemes that raise the maximum possible term based on facts not

found by a jury violate the constitutional rights of defendants. [Citation omitted.]

No principles of comity or federalism would be served by refusing to apply this

rule to functionally indistinguishable state sentencing schemes on collateral

review. Cunningham thus did not announce a new rule of constitutional law and

may be applied retroactively on collateral review.

Butler, 528 F.3d at 639.

In Butler, 528 F.3d at 634 n. 9, the Ninth Circuit identified the key question:

Whether Butler asks us to apply to him a Supreme Court decision issued after his

conviction became final, or to announce the very holding that the Supreme Court

arrived at in a case decided after his conviction became final, we must determine

whether the result he requests was “dictated” by precedent before his conviction

was final. See Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 395-96, 114 S.Ct. 948, 127

L.Ed.2d 236 (1994)(determining whether the result that the petitioner was arguing

for in his collateral review proceeding would require creation of a new rule in

violation of Teague). The pivotal question is thus the same either way: did

Apprendi, Blakely or Booker compel the conclusion that California’s DSL law

violates the Sixth Amendment?

In Butler, 528 F.3d at 628, in determining that Cunningham was “clearly dictated

by the Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment case law, in particularl Blakely ...,” the Ninth Circuit

expressly noted that Blakely had been decided before Butler’s conviction had become final. In

the instant case, this court has found that petitioner’s conviction was final on September 9, 1997,

the statute of limitations expiring one year later. Assuming either Blakely’s or Apprendi’s

applicability to the instant action, neither saves this claim as those cases were decided after

petitioner’s conviction became final, i.e. on June 24, 2004, and June 26, 2000. 

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 See Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236, 1246 (9th Cir.)(Apprendi not 4

retroactive), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 944, 126 S.Ct. 442 (2005); Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025,

1033-1038 (9th Cir. 2005)(Blakely is not retroactive); U.S. v. Cruz, 423 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir.

2005)(Booker not retroactive). 

4

More importantly, petitioner mistakes the usual rule for applying law retroactively

to the merits of an issue with the statute of limitations analysis of § 2244(d)(1)(C). The latter

analysis has a dual requirement: 1) a newly recognized rule; and 2) made retroactive to cases on

collateral review. Apprendi, Blakely and Booker were determined to be new rules, but not

retroactive, thereby not satisfying the second requirement. Cunningham has been determined to 4

be retroactive to cases on collateral review, but not a new rule, thereby not satisfying the second

requirement. Therefore, the alternative start date of subsection (C) for petitioner’s case is not

implicated by any of the cases. The statute of limitations analysis is governed by the “usual” rule

– subsection (A). 

Accordingly, the instant petition is untimely unless petitioner is entitled to

statutory or equitable tolling.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) provides that the time during which a properly filed

application for state post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

section.

Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition in the Sacramento County Superior

Court on April 10, 2007. Respondent’s Lodged Document 3. Because petitioner did not begin

his post-conviction challenges until after the statute of limitations ran, he is not entitled to

statutory tolling. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478 (9th Cir. 2001).

The court now considers whether petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling. The

one year statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition may be equitably tolled if 

“extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on

time.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). The prisoner must show that the

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“extraordinary circumstances” were the cause of his untimeliness. Stillman v. LaMarque, 319

F.3d 1199, 1203 (9 Cir. 2003). “Indeed, the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling th

[under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d

1063, 1066 (9 Cir. 2002). Petitioner “bears the burden of showing that this extraordinary th

exclusion should apply to him.” Id. Determining whether equitable tolling applies is a “factspecific” inquiry. Fry v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9 Cir. 2001). th

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling because this court failed to

stay a habeas petition he previously filed in this court, CIV S-98-2109 LKK GGH P. Petitioner

argues that had this earlier petition been stayed, then the claims raised in the instant action would

not be barred by the statute of limitations.

None of the claims raised in CIV S-98-2109 LKK GGH P were exhausted. 

Respondent’s Lodged Document No. 10. This court had and has no authority to stay a federal

petition containing only unexhausted claims. In Rhines v. Weber, 554 U.S. 269, 125 S.Ct. 1528

(2005) the Supreme Court found that district courts had the authority to stay mixed petitions in

limited circumstances. Prior to that time, district courts could stay exhausted petitions while the

petitioner exhausted additional claims. Calderon v. U.S.D.C. (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981, 984-85

(9th Cir. 1998). Therefore, this court did not err by not authorizing a stay of CIV S-98-2109

LKK GGH P.

Petitioner also argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling because his state

appellate counsel lost his transcripts. Attached to the petition as an exhibit is a letter to petitioner

from his appellate counsel dated April 21, 1998. Court file no. 1, p. 43 of 111. In this letter,

counsel states that she mailed the transcripts to petitioner on August 11, 1997, but they were

refused by prison authorities and returned to counsel. Id. The letter goes on to state that counsel

sent them to petitioner again on September 10, 1997. Id. She does not know where the

transcripts are if petitioner did not receive them. Id.

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 It is not clear who is responsible for the transcripts being lost, i.e. appellate counsel, the 5

prison, the U.S. Postal Service. The court need not reach this issue. 

6

Also attached to the petition as an exhibit is a letter to petitioner from the Central

California Appellate Project (CCAP) dated June 14, 1998. This letter states that CCAP sent

petitioner his transcripts:

Normally we would not be able to help you with your request except to get you a

copy of the opinion (which is enclosed). However, since the transcripts Ms.

Reber sent you appear to have been lost in the mail and we were able to view and

copy the AG’s copy before they went to archives, we have sent you another copy. 

This is the only copy we will be able to provide. Good luck.

Id., p. 47 of 111.

The letter to petitioner from CCAP indicates that petitioner received his

transcripts in June 1998. Petitioner must have had these transcripts in his possession when he

filed CIV S-98-2109 on September 24, 1998. Respondent’s Lodged Doc. No. 9 (docket sheet for

CIV S-98-2109). However, after this court dismissed CIV S-98-2109 for being unexhausted,

petitioner did not file his first state habeas petition until April 2007. Petitioner does not explain

this delay. Because petitioner inexplicably waited approximately nine years to exhaust his claims

in state court after receiving the transcripts from CCAP, the court does not find that the loss of

the transcripts prevented petitioner from filing a timely federal petition. 

5

Petitioner also argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling because he is a

paraplegic who has been wheelchair bound for twenty-three years with various health problems. 

However, petitioner does not explain how his medical problems prevented him from filing a

timely federal petition. Petitioner does not address why he was able to file CIV S-98-2109, but

then waited approximately nine years to file his first state petition. 

Physical disabilities alone do not warrant equitable tolling where other evidence

shows that petitioner could still have filed a timely federal petition. See Gaston v. Palmer, 417

F.3d 1030, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2005) (petitioner not entitled to equitable tolling based upon

physical disabilities since he prepared and filed a state habeas petition while suffering from the

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alleged disabilities). Accordingly, the court finds that petitioner is not entitled to equitable

tolling based on his conclusory claim of medical disability. See also Roberts v. Cockrell, 319

F.3d 690, 695 (5th Cir. 2003) (petitioner’s conclusory equitable tolling claim is without merit

when petitioner provided no information, such as medical records, necessary to properly address

the equitable tolling issue).

Petitioner also argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling because he is not

trained in the law. Ignorance of the law is not grounds for equitable tolling. Raspberry v. Garcia,

448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). 

For the reasons discussed above, the court finds that petitioner’s application for a

writ of habeas corpus is barred by the statute of limitations.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that respondent’s March 3,

2008, motion to dismiss (# 8) be granted.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 09/03/08

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

thom95.157

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