Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_93-cv-00243/USCOURTS-cand-5_93-cv-00243-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, AND GRANTING IN

PART AND DENYING IN PART CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

C-93-0243 RMW 1

*E-FILED - 11/17/06*

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

DOUGLAS SCOTT MICKEY,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ROBERT L. AYERS, Warden of California

State Prison at San Quentin,

Respondent.

No. C-93-0243 RMW

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS, AND GRANTING

IN PART AND DENYING IN PART

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Douglas Scott Mickey challenges his state murder conviction and death sentence by way of

a petition for writ of habeas corpus. On May 6, 2002 the court issued its Order Granting in Part and

Denying in Part Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. The court granted summary judgment

in favor of respondent on all of petitioner's claims except on Claim 1 alleging ineffective assistance

of counsel, Claim 9 alleging that petitioner was incompetent to waive his rights when he gave a

statement to the police during extradition from Japan, and Claim 10 asserting that he was incompetent

to stand trial. In a notice dated November 4, 2003, petitioner withdrew Claim 10 and that portion of

Claim 1 that alleges counsel were ineffective for not raising a doubt as to petitioner's competence at

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, AND GRANTING IN

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trial.

An evidentiary hearing on the remaining portion of Claim 1 and Claim 9 was conducted

beginning on April 27, 2004 and continuing through April 30, 2004. The court hereby denies the

petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the guilt phase claims but grants it on the penalty phase claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

I. PETITIONER'S CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AND DIRECT REVIEW

Petitioner was tried and convicted by a San Mateo County jury of the first degree murders of

Eric Hanson and Catherine Blount. He was sentenced on September 23, 1983 to death for both

murders. On October 31, 1991, the California Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and several

of the special circumstance findings, as well as the death sentence. People v. Mickey, 54 Cal. 3d 612

(1991). Petitioner sought a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court. The application

was denied on October 5, 1992. Mickey v. California, 506 U.S. 612 (1992). 

II. REQUESTS FOR HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF

Petitioner applied for appointment of counsel in this court on January 22, 1993. His appointed

counsel filed his federal petition for habeas corpus relief on December 1, 1995. That petition included

unexhausted claims, and the case was stayed pending exhaustion in state court. On June 10, 1996,

Mickey filed a state petition in the San Mateo County Superior Court. It was denied on June 19, 1996

without prejudice to its being refiled in the California Supreme Court. The petition was then refiled

on July 8, 1996 in the state supreme court. It was denied on December 18, 1996. 

On January 31, 1997, petitioner filed again in the California Supreme Court contending that

he had not received a fair and constitutionally adequate review of his death sentence. That petition

was denied on February 19, 1997.

On December 18, 1997, petitioner filed an amended petition in this court. 

III. THE MURDERS

In September 1980 Mickey was living in Japan with his wife and her two children at an

Air Force Base where his wife worked as a nurse. They were having financial and marital difficulties

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, AND GRANTING IN

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and on September 17, 1980, Mickey returned to California. He stayed in Concord with Edward

Rogers, a longtime friend. Mickey disclosed several reasons to Rogers for his visit. Primarily, he

intended to rob and murder Eric Lee Hanson, a former friend, who lived in Placer County, and then

to possibly travel to Alaska and kill his wife's former husband for the proceeds of a life insurance

policy. 

Hanson dealt in marijuana and hashish and had a business partner named Randy Hoehne.

Hanson lived with his lover, Catherine Blount, in a house in a rural community. Hoehne also lived

there but slept in a tent some distance away in order to guard his and Hanson's marijuana crop.

Although Mickey had in the past been a friend of Hanson, he apparently carried a grudge against

Hanson because he thought Hanson had stolen certain items from his family. In 1979, Mickey had

raided Hanson's marijuana crop in retaliation. 

After Mickey arrived in California in September of 1980, he retrieved the marijuana from

the place where he had hidden it. He thereafter regularly consumed marijuana along with alcohol.

He discussed his planned revenge against Hanson with Rogers.

On September 22, 1980, Mickey traveled to Hanson's home in a car he had borrowed

from Rogers in order to carry out his plan. He arrived about 11 p.m. He was armed with a rifle

belonging to Rogers, which he had fitted with a homemade silencer. Blount was alone in the house;

Hanson and Hoehne were out on the property. Blount invited defendant in. Hanson returned and the

three visited. Hanson left the next day. During his time at the property, Mickey observed Hanson

counting "a good size stack of money." Mickey tried to sell Hanson some of the marijuana he had

stolen the year before but was unsuccessful.

On September 28, 1980, Mickey traveled with Rogers back to Hanson's home in

Rogers's pickup truck. They drove to the property where Rogers left Mickey off at about

midnight. Mickey was armed with a knife which belonged to him and a pistol belonging to Rogers.

Hanson and Blount were alone in the house; Hoehne was in his tent. Hanson and Blount greeted

Mickey at the door and invited him in.

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, AND GRANTING IN

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During the early hours of September 29, 1980, evidently after Hanson and Blount went

to sleep, Mickey killed them. He bludgeoned Hanson with a baseball bat and slit his throat from ear

to ear down to the spinal cord. He stabbed Blount seven times in the chest in a close pattern, piercing

her heart with three of the blows. Immediately thereafter, he removed a substantial quantity of

property from the house, loaded it into Hanson's Volkswagen, and departed to a spot where he had

agreed to meet Rogers. Some distance away from the meeting place, Mickey and Rogers transferred

the goods to the truck Rogers had brought, wiped the Volkswagen clean of fingerprints and abandoned

it there. Mickey said he wanted to go back and burn the house but Rogers persuaded him otherwise.

On September 30, 1980, Mickey fled the country from Travis Air Force Base and

returned on October 3 to the Air Force Base in Japan. On October 2, 1980, Rogers made a statement

to officers at the Placer County Sheriff's Department implicating himself and Mickey in the murders

and related activities. Mickey was arrested in Japan on October 14, 1980 for the murders of Hanson

and Blount. He was advised of his Miranda rights and in response said he did not want to decide at

that time whether he would speak to law enforcement. On January 16, 1981, Mickey departed Japan

for the United States in the custody of several law enforcement officers.

IV. GUILT PHASE ISSUES

A. Mickey's Alleged Incompetence to Waive Rights with Respect to Statements Made During

Extradition From Japan (Claim 9)

Mickey was flown from Tokyo to Honolulu and after an overnight stay in Honolulu brought

to San Francisco. During the Tokyo-Honolulu flight and later in Honolulu, Mickey made inculpatory

statements to Detective Curtis Landry. During the Tokyo-Honolulu flight Mickey and Detective

Landry initially engaged in small talk but about three hours into the flight, after a lull in their

conversation, Mickey asked about the burial of Hanson and Blount. After Detective Landry answered,

Mickey became emotional and made comments suggesting the murders never should have happened

and that Hanson should have listened to him. Landry remained passive during this period and said

nothing. Thereafter, Mickey regained his composure and chatted about his family, his wife and her

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, AND GRANTING IN

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children, his hobbies and politics. However, when Mickey was getting off the plane, he told Detective

Landry that he wanted to continue their conversation. After conversing with his superior, Detective

Landry met with Mickey at the jail and advised him again of his Miranda rights. Mickey waived his

rights and then Landry asked questions about the murders. Mickey gave answers implicating himself

and became emotional on several occasions. However, he seemed alert and aware and never

suggested that he wanted the conversation to stop.

 At trial Mickey unsuccessfully moved to suppress his statements. The trial court held a

hearing and found that Mickey had been given his Miranda rights before he was extradited and

transported to the United States, that he effectively invoked his right to counsel in Japan, and that he

again was given a Miranda warning in Honolulu. However, the trial court concluded that the

statements at issue were knowing and voluntary, not the result of any "softening up," and not coerced.

In its review of the trial court decision, the California Supreme Court concluded that

petitioner's statements were made knowingly and voluntarily and were admissible. 

Having carefully scrutinized the record, we are of the opinion that the trial

court did not err by denying Mickey's motion to suppress the "inflight" and "Honolulu

admissions."

First, after independent review we believe that Mickey's "inflight admissions"

were voluntary under the due process clauses of both the federal and state

Constitutions.

The requisite coercive activity by the state or its agents is absent . . . . [Mickey]

opened discussion and directed its course . . . . So far as the challenged statements are

concerned, Landry hardly acted at all---and manifestly did not "overreach" in any way . . . . * * *

[Mickey] claims he experienced ["psychological and physiological pressure"]

as a result of such factors as his extended incarceration in a foreign detention facility,

his longing for his family, and the demands of travel.

There was no state coercion . . . . [The "pressure's"] direct and substantial

source was Mickey's decision to flee from California to Japan in an attempt to avoid

apprehension for the murder of Hanson and Blount—a decision for which the state

cannot be held responsible.

* * *

In the course of his argument, defendant urges strenuously that . . . Detective

Landry intended to "soften" him up-i.e., to "coerce" a statement out of him by cajolery-

--and that [he] succeeded in doing so. The trial court made a determination to the

contrary---soundly in our judgment . . . .

Second, after independent review we believe that defendant's "inflight

admissions" were voluntary under Miranda.

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, AND GRANTING IN

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* * *

. . . To be sure, defendant was in custody. But he was simply not interrogated.

Plainly, there was no express questioning by any of the officers, including Detective

Landry. Nor, in our view, were there any words or actions on their part that they

should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response . . . .

Miranda . . . does not "prohibit the police from merely listening to . . . voluntary,

volunteered statements" uttered by a person, whether or not in custody, "and using

them against him at the trial."

* * * 

Third, after independent review we believe that defendant's "Honolulu

admissions" were voluntary under the due process clauses of both the federal and state

Constitutions . . . . We find absent both the requisite coercive activity by the state or

its agents and the necessary causal connection between such activity and the statements

in question . . . .

Fourth, after independent review we believe that defendant's "Honolulu

admissions" were voluntary under Miranda. We recognize the prophylactic rule . . . [that] "an accused, . . . having expressed

his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further

interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless

the accused initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the

police." There was no violation here. Defendant initiated further discussion . . . .

Mickey, 54 Cal.3d at 649-652 (internal citations omitted)

Under the law applicable at the time the instant petition was filed, findings of the state court

were generally entitled to a presumption of correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(former); Neuschaffer

v. McKay, 870 F.2d 839, 841 (9th Cir. 1987) ("In federal habeas corpus proceedings, deference must

be granted to the findings of state appellate courts as well as state trial courts.") None of the

circumstances stated in section 2254(d)(1) to (7) which except findings from the presumption of

correctness have been established here. Petitioner has not met the burden of persuading the court by

clear and convincing evidence that the trial court's conclusion that the statements were freely and

voluntarily given was erroneous. See Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 526 (9th Cir. 1990).

Petitioner contends that his statements were not made knowingly, voluntarily or intelligently.

His contention is based primarily on the testimony of Dr. Donald Stonefeld, a psychiatrist and

neurologist practicing in Wisconsin who was retained by petitioner's current counsel. Dr. Stonefeld

opined that Mickey was incompetent to waive his rights as a result of the effect of his isolation in a

cell in Japan, his desire to identify with his captors and his longing for human contact. Under these

circumstances it is easy, according to Dr. Stonefeld, to get someone to confess. Dr. Stonefeld believes

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, AND GRANTING IN

PART AND DENYING IN PART CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

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Mickey is a paranoid schizophrenic and that one with this illness tries to hide the degree of his illness

and "would try to act as normal as possible, and if he thought a confession looked normal, that's what

he'd do." Evidentiary Hearing 228:2-10 ("EH _____").

Dr. Stonefeld's conclusion that Mickey's statements were involuntary is not supported by the

evidence. Mickey displayed no signs of delusions or hallucinations during his inculpatory

conversations with Landry. There is no evidence that Mickey was mistreated during his detention in

Japan. His wife, Allison, and her three children visited three or four times, and he wrote them on

numerous occasions. There is no evidence that law enforcement attempted to interrogate Mickey

during the flight from Tokyo to Honolulu. 

Although Dr. Stonefeld diagnosed petitioner as a paranoid schizophrenic, he did not testify as

to the extent that this condition made him more likely to confess than one who did not have the illness.

Dr. Stonefeld presented no facts to support a finding that Mickey's statements were other than

knowingly and voluntarily made. 

The circumstances existing at the time Mickey made his statements do not suggest he was

incompetent to make them. The evidence shows that Mickey's comments made to Landry during the

flight were volunteered by Mickey and not the result of any inquiry by Landry. The statements made

in Honolulu were made after a second Miranda warning. There is no evidence of coercion or an

attempt to "soften-up" Mickey so he would confess. There is also no evidence that Mickey did not

make his statements knowingly.

Claim 9 is denied.

B. Alleged Ineffectiveness of Counsel (Claim 1)

1. Standard for Determining Whether Counsel Was Ineffective 

The test for evaluating whether counsel was ineffective is set forth in Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668 (1984). The petitioner must establish that: (1) counsel's representation "fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness," and (2) that such performance prejudiced the defendant. Id.

at 688, 694. To establish prejudice the petitioner "must show that there is a reasonable probability

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, AND GRANTING IN

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that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.

A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at

693. Therefore, in the guilt phase the essential question is whether there is a reasonable probability

that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt. Hendricks

v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1995). There is a strong presumption "that counsel's

conduct falls within the wide range of professional assistance because it is all too easy to conclude that

a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable in the harsh light of hindsight." Bell v. Cone,

535 U.S. 685, 702 (2002). 

 Petitioner was represented at trial by appointed lead counsel Fred Tuttle, the former

Public Defender of Placer County, and Lyle Shattuck. Both attorneys apparently had good

reputations. Tuttle died in 1999 and Shattuck is currently unable to testify or provide information

concerning the case.

2. Failure to Investigate and Present Mental Health Diminished Capacity Guilt Phase

Defense

There is no question that Mickey committed the two brutal murders. Petitioner, however, is

critical of counsels' handling of the guilt phase for essentially ignoring an allegedly viable mental

health defense. Specifically, petitioner contends counsel's performance was deficient because: (a)

counsel chose not to call David Axelrad, M.D., a psychiatrist, who held the opinion that Mickey was

insane and suffered from diminished mental capacity; (b) counsel did not undertake an adequate

mental health investigation, and an adequate one would have resulted in persuasive evidence that

petitioner suffered from schizophrenia, paranoid type, and had a viable diminished capacity defense;

and c) counsel presented a self-defense theory that was neither accurate nor believable and conflicted

with the mitigation case.

a. Failure to Call Dr. Axelrad, M.D., a Psychiatrist

Attorney Tuttle requested and obtained court authorization to hire an investigator and 

psychiatrist, which he did. Tuttle had Mickey examined before the preliminary hearing by Frederick

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, AND GRANTING IN

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Whipple, M.D., a forensic psychiatrist. Dr. Whipple's notes reflect that he found Mickey oriented,

somewhat depressed, but not anxious. Dr. Whipple reported no compulsions, obsessions or

hallucinations. After Dr. Whipple's examination of Mickey prior to the preliminary hearing, Dr.

Whipple did not have any further involvement with the case. Defense attorney Tuttle thereafter

retained David Axelrad, M.D., a forensic psychiatrist. Dr. Axelrad then associated Grant Hutchinson,

Ph.D., a neuropsychologist, and Tom Morrison, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist, to assist in the

evaluation of petitioner. Dr. Hutchinson's testing disclosed no evidence of a major affective or

psychotic disorder and no evidence of organic brain dysfunction. He found Mickey to be fully

oriented as to time, place and person and to have an IQ of 106 (within a normal range). None of the

experts working with Dr. Axelrad diagnosed Mickey as being a paranoid schizophrenic.

Dr. Axelrad, who examined petitioner three times before trial made a principal diagnosis of

organic delusional syndrome. He also found that Mickey had isolated explosive disorder and a

borderline personality disorder. He concluded that Mickey was delusional and psychotic at the time

of the murders and was unable to premeditate or deliberate and thus suffered from a diminished

capacity.

Despite Dr. Axelrad's opinion that Mickey suffered from diminished capacity at the time of

the murders, defense counsel made the tactical decision not to call Dr. Axelrad as a trial witness. The

evidence establishes a number of reasons for this decision. The overriding concern was to not lose

credibility, because the primary focus was on saving Mickey from the death penalty. The specific

reasons for not calling Dr. Axelrad included: (1) that Mickey, in Dr. Axelrad's opinion, had a good

memory and was a reliable reporter, however, he gave Dr. Axelrad a description of the murders which

was inconsistent with his statement to Landry and which potentially suggested premeditation and

deliberation and included a profit motive; (2) Dr. Axelrad recognized a risk that the story Mickey gave

him could suggest premeditation and deliberation; (3) Dr. Axelrad was negative and defensive when

asked hard questions; (4) Dr. Axelrad believed that given the right circumstances, Mickey could kill

again; (5) Dr. Axelrad knew about Mickey's incestuous relationship with his mother which counsel

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wanted kept from the jury; and (6) Dr. Axelrad would probably be perceived as a defense-oriented

witness—he had testified for the defense in four capital cases and all four defendants had received the

death penalty.

Defense counsel's decision not to call Dr. Axelrad was a tactical decision to which deference

must be accorded. Counsel had legitimate reasons for their decision. 

b. Failure to Undertake an Adequate Mental Health Investigation Which Would

Have Provided Evidence That Petitioner Suffered from Schizophrenia, Paranoid

Type, and Thus Had a Viable Diminished Capacity Defense

Petitioner argues that although defense counsel retained Jules Burstein, Ph.D., a clinical and

forensic psychologist, and David Smith, M.D., an extraordinarily qualified and experienced specialist

in the study of diseases produced by drugs and the study and treatment of addictive diseases, they were

retained only for the penalty phase and not in time to be prepared for the guilt phase. Petitioner asserts

that had Dr. Burstein and Dr. Smith been retained earlier and had they been provided available

materials (which counsel, to a large extent, had failed to obtain), the defense, through Dr. Burstein and

Dr. Smith, would have been able to present a persuasive diminished capacity defense in the guilt

phase.

California had a judicially created diminished mental capacity defense until it was abolished

in 1982. The theory of the diminished responsibility defense was that

since deliberation and premeditation are necessary elements by definition of the crime

of first degree murder, the defendant should be permitted to introduce evidence of an

abnormal mental condition, although not sufficient to establish legal insanity as a

complete defense to or excuse for the crime, for the purpose of showing either that he

did not have the capacity to, or in fact did not, deliberate or premeditate the act at the

time the homicide was committed, and that for this reason only murder in the second

degree was in fact committed. In support of this theory some courts have pointed out

that voluntary intoxication is admissible for the purpose of negating a certain state of

mind, and have stated that evidence of an abnormal mental condition should be no less

pertinent to the existence of a specific state of mind.

22 ALR § 5; see People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716 (1959); People v. Ford, 65 Cal. 2d 41 (1966). 

On June 8, 1982 the defense of diminished capacity was eliminated by Initiative Measure,

approved by the people.

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, AND GRANTING IN

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The defense of diminished capacity is hereby abolished. In a criminal action, as well

as any juvenile court proceeding, evidence concerning an accused person's

intoxication, trauma, mental illness, disease, or defect shall not be admissible to show

or negate capacity to form the particular purpose, intent, motive, malice aforethought,

knowledge, or other mental state required for the commission of the crime charged.

Cal. Penal Code § 25(a). Mickey, therefore, committed his murders when the diminished mental

responsibility defense was available but he was tried at a time when, although he could assert it, the

defense was no longer available to persons then committing crimes. In fact, the public as a whole in

California at the time Mickey was tried was hostile to mental defenses to murder charges and

frustrated with the California Supreme Court's perceived hostility to implementation of the death

penalty. On November 7, 1978 seventy-two percent of the voters approved the Briggs Initiative which

expanded the circumstances that called for the death penalty. In that year Dan White shot and killed

San Francisco Mayor George Moscone and Supervisor Harvey Milk and was successful, to the dismay

of many, in his 1979 trial of asserting the diminished mental capacity defense (popularly referred as

the "twinkie defense"). As previously noted, in 1982 the voters passed the initiative abolishing the

defense. Shortly after Mickey's trial, Chief Justice Rose Bird and two of her colleagues were rejected

for retention at the November 4, 1986 general election, based primarily on their perceived efforts to

frustrate the implementation of the death penalty. Less than forty percent of the voters supported

Chief Justice Bird's retention.

Since the diminished mental responsibility defense was available to Mickey, see

People v. Pensinger, 52 Cal. 2d 1210, 1241 (1991), the question here is whether his counsel was

ineffective for failing to develop and present it more effectively. Petitioner contends that the jury

would have been significantly more receptive to a diminished capacity defense if Mickey's acts

occurred during a psychotic episode resulting from schizophrenia, paranoid type as opposed to during

a period of drug and alcohol psychosis.

Dr. Burstein now suggests that had he been retained earlier and provided with certain available

information which he was not given at the time he was retained by defense counsel, it is "quite

probable" that he would have diagnosed Mickey as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia and been

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, AND GRANTING IN

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able to support a diminished capacity defense. EH 765:19-766:5. The information which he did not

have but was available includes the results of a September 15, 1981 MMPI administered to Mickey

consistent with a diagnosis of paranoia schizophrenia, information from Mickey's ex-wife Rochelle

Packard that when she and Mickey were together from 1973-1978 he convinced himself after reading

books of a spiritual nature that he was a spiritual warrior and had spiritual powers, and the report of

Ronald Bruce, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist at San Quentin who examined Mickey in 1983,

diagnosing Mickey as a paranoid schizophrenic. Dr. Burstein testified that this information and other

information reflecting a long history of bizarre behavior by Mickey tend to support the conclusion that

Mickey suffered from an underlying mental disease of schizophrenia, paranoid type, and this disease

substantially contributed to his psychotic episodes. Therefore, the psychotic episode during which

Mickey committed the murders is best explained by a combination of his toxic psychosis caused by

drug and alcohol abuse and his underlying paranoid schizophrenia.

Dr. Burstein's testimony at the evidentiary hearing and in his declaration in support of the

petition was extraordinarily critical of Mickey's trial counsel. 

In sum, I believed and still believe that the performance by Mr. Mickey's two

attorneys was a mockery of justice. They were shockingly disorganized, impervious

to the advice of experts, unwilling to provide their experts with critical information,

with little or no working knowledge of the facts and issues in the case. Every aspect

of the ordeal became a source of profound frustration . . . . both attorneys remained

unavailable to me at every step, and they consistently failed to provide the materials

necessary for me to provide meaningful assistance. They were wholly uninterested in

learning fundamental mental health principles, without which they were incapable of

effectively utilizing expert testimony. 

Burstein declaration dated August 4, 2000, ¶ 39 ("Burstein decl. ¶ ____"). 

The court, however, is reluctant to give substantial weight to Dr. Burstein's criticism of counsel

because it seems unreasonably exaggerated and appears to involve opinions beyond those for which

Dr. Burstein had an adequate foundation. He came across at the evidentiary hearing as an advocate

and not as an expert impartially evaluating the evidence pertaining to mental health issues. However,

essentially all the members of the defense side were critical of the defense counsels' lack of interest

in and preparation of mental health issues. 

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Dr. Smith states in a declaration filed supporting Mickey's petition for a writ of habeas corpus

that "[i]t was and still is my opinion that Mr. Mickey had significant psychological problems that

predated his multiple drug abuse. However, it was not within my realm of expertise to put a label on

those problems." Smith declaration dated August 4, 2003, ¶ 4 ("Smith decl. ¶ ____"). Dr. Smith only

renders diagnoses on drug-induced psychiatric disorders. In cases where the defendant appears to

have significant psychological problems apart from drug usage and a dual diagnosis is appropriate,

Dr. Smith defers to the appropriate psychiatric expert to render a diagnosis as to the defendant's

underlying psychopathology. If he had been asked to testify in the guilt phase of Mickey's trial, he

would have testified that Mickey's long-standing abuse of alcohol and drugs, in combination with his

profound thought disorder that pre-dated his drug use, contributed to a diminished mental state at the

time of the murders and that

Mr. Mickey lacked the capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law,

he was unable to rationally and meaningfully premeditate or deliberate, he was unable

to meaningfully and maturely reflect upon the gravity of his actions . . . . Mr. Mickey

did not have the capacity to make reasoned, rational choices about his behavior;

instead, his actions resulted from irrational, compelling thoughts.

Smith decl. ¶ 14. 

If Mickey's trial counsel had retained Dr. Smith and Dr. Burstein for the guilt phase of

Mickey's trial to support a diminished mental capacity defense and had given them access to all

available relevant evidence including a detailed life history such as that later prepared by David Lisak,

Ph.D. for Mickey's habeas counsel, evidence pertaining to Mickey's long term drug and alcohol abuse

and probably his deviant sexual behavior would have come into evidence. The court finds that trial

counsel's decision to not call them in the guilt phase was not the decision that most competent counsel

would have made had they known the full scope of the evidence and expert opinions available. 

However, the decision not to present a fully developed, diminished capacity defense must be

evaluated based upon what trial counsel knew, or should have known, about Mickey's background and

mental health as they prepared for trial. Before counsel made the decision not to call witnesses to

support a diminished capacity defense, Mickey had been evaluated at counsels' request by several

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mental health professionals (Dr. Wipple, Dr. Hutchinson, Dr. Morrison, and Dr. Axelrad). To hold

that counsels' performance fell below the standard of care because they should have hired additional

mental health experts before making a decision on the approach to be taken in the guilt phase would

be unreasonable. As pointed out in Strickland:

A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to

eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of

counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective

at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must

indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the

presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered

sound trial strategy.

466 U.S. at 689. 

The decision not to call witnesses and to limit the guilt phase defense to cross-examination of

the People's witnesses avoided opening up areas (e.g. long history of drug abuse, sexual misconduct,

liklihood of future violent acts) which may not have been well-received by the jury given the

environment of the time. Counsels' approach was not outside the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance. 

More significantly, counsels' performance did not prejudice Mickey—Mickey has not shown

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged unprofessional errors, the result of

the guilt phase of the trial would have been different. See id. at 694. The evidence of Mickey's guilt

was overwhelming. If Dr. Smith had testified in the guilt phase, he would have faced, as he did in the

penalty phase, the difficulty of explaining Blount's murder.

Q. I gather from your interview with him you could not determine whether

or not his killing of Blount fit into the scheme of separate reality or

material reality, is that true.

A. It would be hard—this religious statement ["now be with God, my

child"] would suggest that it fit into the separate reality, but she was

not— I talked about that in some detail. She was not a central focus of

his paranoid delusional system; Eric was.

Q. In fact, she was not a focus of his delusional system at all, isn't

that true?

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A. That was the perception that I was given in the interview. The central

focus of the delusional system was Eric.

Reporter's Transcript on Appeal, ¶ 3105:2-3109:2 ("RT ______"). In addition, the People would have

undoubtedly questioned whether Mickey was even under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time

of the murders and thus strengthened the premeditated aspect of the crimes.

The court concludes that although a persuasive argument can be made that counsel should have

presented a diminished capacity defense, counsel was not ineffective because they made the decision

not to do so.

c. Presentation of Self-Defense Theory that Was Neither Accurate nor

Believable and Conflicted with Mitigation Case

As noted by the California Supreme Court, Mickey offered little evidence in his defense and

did not testify. He argued that the People failed to meet their burden of proof and pointed out why

certain witnesses should not be believed. He argued that the prosecution failed to prove any requisite

criminal intent, that he acted in self-defense and that he had diminished capacity as a result of

voluntary intoxication. His defense was not persuasive as there was overwhelming evidence that he

killed Hanson and Blount, and the only evidence of self-defense came from Mickey's extrajudicial

statements introduced by the People. 

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel were ineffective because they tried to argue self-defense

and failed to put on a diminished capacity case based upon Mickey's underlying mental diseases

(paranoid schizophrenia and toxic psychosis) and that the self-defense claim was inconsistent with the

mitigation case. However, it does not appear that defense counsels' guilt phase argument increased

the probability of Mickey's conviction as charged. Additionally, as stated above, the decision not to

put on a diminished capacity defense beyond that which was presented, was not outside the wide range

of reasonable professional assistance.

3. Defense Counsels' Guilt Phase Performance Was Not Ineffective

For the reasons stated above, the court concludes that defense counsels' decision to not present

a diminished capacity defense of the type now urged by petitioner did not result in a violation of

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Mickey's constitutional right to effective representation primarily because the failure did not result in

prejudice. Claim 1 is, therefore, denied as to petitioner's claim that he was denied effective assistance

of counsel in the guilt phase.

V. PENALTY PHASE ISSUES

A. Alleged Ineffectiveness of Counsel (Claim 1)

1. Counsel Has a Duty to Conduct a Thorough Investigation of Defendant's Background

and Present and Explain All Mitigating Evidence

In Correll v. Ryan, the Ninth Circuit set forth the duty of defense counsel with respect to

the penalty phase of a capital case. Although the trial in Correl took place in 1984, the same duty

existed when Mickey was tried in 1983: 

Counsel has a duty at penalty phase to conduct a thorough investigation of the

defendant's background. To perform effectively in the penalty phase of a capital case,

counsel must conduct sufficient investigation and engage in sufficient preparation to

be able to present and explain the significance of all the available evidence. When it

comes to the penalty phase of a capital trial, it is imperative that all relevant mitigating

information be unearthed for consideration.

---- F.3d ----, 2006 WL 2796489 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

2. Trial Counsels' Alleged Failure to Investigate and Present Substantial

Mitigating Evidence

Petitioner is highly critical of trial counsel's penalty phase presentation claiming that

substantial mitigating evidence was not presented because trial counsel failed to timely

investigate Mickey's entire life history and failed to uncover available mitigating evidence.

"'[A] penalty phase ineffective assistance claim depends on the magnitude of the discrepancy

between what counsel did investigate and present and what counsel could have investigated and

presented.'" Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 929-830 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Stankewitz v.

Woodford, 365 F.3d 706, 716 (9th Cir. 2004)).

a. What Trial Counsel Presented in the Penalty Phase

Petitioner's trial counsel called thirty lay witnesses and two experts, Dr. Burstein and

Dr. Smith, in the penalty phase. The essence of the defense mitigation case was that Mickey

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was a decent, gentle and caring child up until approximately the time his mother died. His good

character was attested to by family, teachers and friends. After his mother died he engaged in

heavy drug use, and he began associating with those involved in the drug culture including

Rochelle Schriber, whom he married in 1973. Schriber introduced Mickey to Hanson. Dr.

Burstein explained that Mickey had a borderline personality disorder which combined with his

multiple drug use caused him to become delusional. Mickey believed Hanson was robbing him

of his power and that he needed to contain Hanson's soul in a gourd so Hanson could not hurt

him. Dr. Smith explained Mickey acted in a state of toxic psychosis when he committed the

murders. The defense also called two correctional officers who attested to Mickey's good

behavior during pretrial incarceration. The implication was that Mickey was a different person

away from drugs.

Dr. Burstein explained in his testimony that "I was asked to conduct a psychological

evaluation of Doug Mickey and to provide feedback to counsel on whether or not he had any

psychological problems; if so, what were the nature of those problems.” RT 3088:10-13. Dr.

Burstein interviewed Mickey on three separate occasions, obtained a life history, administered

four mental health tests and had information that was passed on to him from Dr. Smith. In the

course of Dr. Burstein's explanation of the tests administered to Mickey, counsel asked and Dr.

Burstein replied:

Q. What does that profile [overall profile from MMPI] show you as

far as Doug Mickey's personality or problems are concerned?

A. It strongly suggests to me that he's a man with very severe

psychological problems in many realms, including the ones that

are indicated there. And the two that were of most concern to me

were the Sc scale and the Pa scale. The Sc scale is the

schizophrenia scale, the Pa scale is a paranoia scale.

He's considerably elevated beyond what any person free of

psychological problems would score on both of those scales and

I've picked out some items which he answered . . . .

[Dr. Burstein read a number of Mickey's answers to questions

from the schizophrenia and paranoia scales].

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Q. Did you tell us what [the schizophrenia scale] measures?

A. Well, I gave some sample responses, and if I didn't what I meant

to imply is that it is a measure of distorted perceptions, false

beliefs, delusions, hallucinations, various things that a person is

fearful of that tend to be irrational social alienation, and so so

(sic). All of those things that typifies (sic) schizophrenic

individuals.

* * *

Q. [W]ould you tell us what [the paranoia scale] shows as far as –

A. The paranoia scale is a scale that measures a phenomenon that

I think jurors generally are familiar with is the unwarranted

suspiciousness people have, groundless beliefs that people are

following them with the intent to do them harm, have wired their

homes, and so on . . . . 

RT 3105:2-3109:2. 

Dr. Smith explained that Mickey had major psychological problems that predated his

use of drugs. Dr. Smith said the interaction between Mickey's underlying psychological

problems and his history of abuse of drugs, combined with his reading of Hindu religious

material and later the Carlos Castenada series, popular in the drug culture, established the

foundation for an elaborate and long standing psychotic delusional system. He started believing

that Hanson was robbing him of the power he needed to become a spiritual warrior. Dr. Smith

concluded that at the time of the murders, Mickey "was a psychiatrically disturbed polydrug

abuser, abusing at the time of the crime alcohol and marijuana, and that he had a polydrug

induced paranoid schizophrenic like reaction." RT 2927:9-12. "[H]is mental capacity was

severely impaired as a consequence . . . ." RT 2927:19-20.

No evidence was offered suggesting that Mickey grew up in a dysfunctional family 

or that any of his family members were abusive, were alcoholics or suffered from mental

illnesses.

Defense counsel summarized the mitigation case for Mickey in their penalty closing

argument.

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These tragic killings were an isolated incident . . . . They weren't part of

a pattern of violent behavior. 

The evidence in the penalty phase is all to the contrary. Before he

became involved in the use of alcohol and drugs, he was described by more than

a dozen witnesses . . . that said he was a good boy, a hard worker, he was

reliable and helpful, courteous, friendly, considerate, trustworthy, artistic,

sensitive, gentle, and that he avoided violence.

What happened to that boy? What changed his personality and led to

these tragic killings?

The evidence was presented by the defense, and it showed that he had

many tragic experiences in his family. His half brother, Randall, was killed

when he was very young. His mother, Dorothy, was killed when he was about

18. He suspected that she committed suicide, and he felt responsible even

though he was not there. His brother Ron committed suicide some time later,

after the mother died.

* * *

Now, the evidence clearly showed that, after his mother died, he started

to drink alcohol. One of the witnesses testified that he showed shock and

blamed himself for her death.

Now, shortly after that, he started using marijuana, and from time to time

he let his hair and beard grow. Then he'd shave it off and let it grow again, and

he began to take up with the drug culture, counter-culture that's so familiar to

all of us.

Now, his wife Rochelle introduced him to Eric Hanson, and he regressed

further from marijuana and knew such dangerous drugs as, LSD, commonly

known as acid; PCP, angel dust; psilocybin, which comes out of mushrooms;

and peyote, which, I think, also comes out of mushrooms. He continued his use

of hashish and marijuana.

The evidence showed that he became more and more involved with Eric;

that they went---tried to go into business together to grow a million dollars

worth of marijuana. They were engaged in a woodcutting enterprise. They had

discussions of religion and far-eastern beliefs, but Doug used these drugs not for

recreation, but for mind expansion, to seek the truth, sort of semi-religious, I

guess. His personality was fairly altered by those drugs, and his release became

delusional.

Now, our experts have testified that he became delusional because of the

toxic effects that these drugs had on his body and brain.

Why doesn't everyone who takes that type of drug develop toxic

psychosis?

Dr. Burstein indicated that the toxic psychosis was added to a

personality---I think he called it borderline personality disorder, which is a

condition independent of toxic psychosis; that is to say, if he hadn't already had

the borderline personality disorder, the toxic psychosis would not have had such

a marked effect on his conduct or on his thinking. Now, he developed delusions

of false beliefs which contributed to the case of this present story.

* * *

. . . [Dr. Burstein] described some of the beliefs that Doug had developed

as a result of his toxic psychosis and borderline personality disorder.

Doug thought that Eric Hanson had stolen his marijuana crop the year

before; that he was responsible for his clothes being stolen after making a

telephone call to either Japan or Hawaii. He thought Eric was responsible for

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the failure of his restaurant job in Alaska and had the deluded belief that Eric

was commanding him to come to California, to leave his family and come to

California.

[Dr. Bernstein] said Doug thought he could control pain, thought he

could stop bleeding with his own mind. He thought he could run sideways on

a hill, in defiance of gravity, and he thought Eric as somehow draining his

energies at long range, using him for some nefarious purpose, and that

somewhere along this line, Doug got to thinking he had to kill Eric Hanson to

protect himself and his family.

That's sort of delusional psychic self-defense, if you please. That made

it easier for him to lie to Curtis Landry and give a self-serving statement of selfdefense, which you will remember we did not urge.

He said that Doug told him he believed he was a spiritual apprentice and

that Eric betrayed him, and he couldn't give any evidence of what that betrayal

consisted of. He began to collect shells and obtained the necklace of power.

* * * 

He said he performed rituals. He had a gourd with eyes on it with which

he was going to contain Eric's soul so he couldn't harm Doug.

Now, that indicates that his personality disorder, independent of toxic

psychosis, was serious and probably still is serious as far as his thinking was

concerned.

* * * 

Dr. Burstein thought that robbery and financial gain were probably

secondary because of Doug's toxic psychosis and because of his borderline

personality disorder at the time.

RT 3925:7-3931:21. Based upon the evidence outlined in counsels' argument, the defense

requested that Mickey's life be spared. 

b. What Trial Counsel Could Have Investigated and Presented

Petitioner asserts a multitude of complaints about his counsels' penalty phase

preparation. He contends that the investigation for the mitigation case was a last-minute,

inadequate one which was in large part delegated to non-lawyers. Petitioner maintains that

relevant, available mitigating evidence was not obtained and the experts worked with

incomplete information. Petitioner argues that trial counsel were therefore unable to explain

the significance of his background and make a compelling mitigation presentation. 

Many of petitioner's complaints constitute second-guessing defense counsels'

performance in light of the fact that the verdict was a death sentence. "Judicial scrutiny of

counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to

second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for

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a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a

particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. As aptly

put in Smith v. Mitchell, the court's role on habeas review "is not to nitpick gratuitously

counsel's performance. After all, the constitutional right at issue here is ultimately the right to

a fair trial, not to perfect representation." 348 F.3d 177, 206 (6th Cir. 2003). 

Two aspects of defense counsels' performance, however, "fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness": (1) counsels' failure to marshal and present evidence that Mickey

grew up in a dysfunctional family where he was abused and surrounded by individuals with

alcohol and mental health problems and that Mickey himself was a psychiatrically disturbed

individual who suffered delusions before he began abusing drugs; and (2) counsels' failure to

effectively utilize the expertise of their mental health experts, Dr. Burstein and Dr. Smith, in

both the preparation and presentation of petitioner's mitigation case and in rebutting the

People's case.

I. Failure to Marshal and Present Evidence That Mickey Grew up in a

Dysfunctional Family and Was a Psychiatrically Disturbed Individual with

Profound Thought Disorder Predating His Drug Abuse

Mickey needed to present some mitigating explanation for his actions given the brutality

and apparent motives for the murders. Counsel faced a difficult challenge because a

presentation that Mickey was a long-time poly-drug abuser would likely result in little

sympathy for Mickey. Therefore, to effectively represent Mickey in the penalty phase,

Mickey's life story had to be told in a way that would gain some sympathy with the jury and

explain why he committed the murders. To some extent, Mickey's trial counsel argued what

could have been a significant part of an effective mitigation presentation, specifically that

Mickey was psychiatrically disturbed before he began his long standing drug abuse. 

Why doesn't everyone who takes that type of drug develop toxic

psychosis?

Dr. Burstein indicated that the toxic psychosis was added to a

personality---I think he called it borderline personality disorder, which is a

condition independent of toxic psychosis; that is to say, if he hadn't already had

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the borderline personality disorder, the toxic psychosis would not have had such

a marked effect on his conduct or on his thinking.

RT 3926:19-3927:2. 

The problem, however, with the argument that counsel made is that the only evidence

presented that Mickey was psychiatrically disturbed before the onset of his drug abuse came

from the doctors who had only Mickey as their source of evidence. On cross-examination, Dr.

Burstein testified:

Q. Doctor, have you been able to ever find in sources outside

Mickey, any witnesses, such as Mr. Mickey's former wives,

friends, or even in the interview with Detective Landry,

evidence of this alleged thought or delusion that Eric Hanson

 was in some way controlling him?

A. I had a problem with that. This is one of the few cases in which

I've not been able to interview significant others. It's typical for

me to interview parents, children, lovers, wives. In this case I was told that most of his immediate relatives, if not al of them, had died, and I

was told that the three wives, or at least the one, Allison, was in Japan. So it was my

impression that there was no one available locally for me to interview that could have been

useful in confirming or disconfirming what Doug had told me.

* * * 

Q. Did you think that that was something that would be important

in determining whether or not you should rely on Mr. Mickey's

say so suffering delusional beliefs, to try to find some evidence

for it in external sources?

A. Oh yes. Absolutely.

RT 3191:14-3192:1.

Dr. Smith was asked on cross-examination: ''What information did you have, if any,

about the existence of any delusional beliefs or paranoid delusional system of beliefs by Mr.

Mickey before you interviewed him? A[nswer] None." RT 2959:11-14. This crossexamination was particularly devastating since the prosecutor was able to show many examples

of information obtained from Mickey that were inconsistent with other evidence in the case.

For example, Dr. Burstein assumed from the information he had that Mickey had consumed

large quantities of alcohol and marijuana immediately before the time of the murders. The

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prosecution asked Dr. Burstein many questions about Mickey's acts on the night of the murder

that suggested Mickey was not highly intoxicated. Dr. Burstein had to admit he was not aware

of those acts and that if Mickey had not consumed large amounts of marijuana and alcohol "[i]t

would certainly preclude the diagnosis of toxic psychosis." RT 3180:26-28.

However, if counsel had conducted a thorough investigation, they would have

uncovered substantial, independent evidence that Mickey was a psychiatrically disturbed

individual before he began to abuse drugs and that he had suffered delusions years before the

murders. They would also have learned that Mickey grew up in an abusive, dysfunctional

family with members who had significant mental health issues. If Dr. Burstein and Dr. Smith

had been provided that information, they would have been able to cite evidence that came other

than from Mickey in support of their opinions. In fact, Dr. Burstein who has reviewed available

evidence that he was not provided before he testified now believes that Mickey probably suffers

from and did suffer from paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the murders. 

Both Dr. Burstein and Dr. Smith were frustrated by counsels' failure to provide

necessary information to them. Counsel has an affirmative duty to provide mental health

experts with information needed to develop an accurate profile of the defendant's mental health.

See Caro v. Calderon, 280 F.3d 1247, 1255 (9th Cir. 2002). Dr. Burstein states in his

declaration that defense counsel, despite requests, failed to provide police reports and records

of key witness interviews such as the statement of Ed Rogers and the names and addresses of

Mickey's ex-wives. Counsel also failed to provide the results of an MMPI conducted in 1981.

Although Dr. Burstein does not identify anything specific in the police reports or statements

of Rogers that would have been helpful except that they would have shed light on Mickey's

behavior on the night of the crimes and over time, he would not have been so vulnerable on

cross-examination to questions that showed that he based his opinion on questionable facts

obtained from Mickey and lacked information he agreed would have been helpful. The

prosecution persuasively suggested that Dr. Burstein's and Dr. Smith's opinions were based

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upon uncorroborated information obtained from Mickey himself and that Mickey was a drug

abuser whose testimony was not reliable or truthful.

Dr. Burstein declares that information available from Mickey's second wife, Rochelle

Schreiber [Packard], whom he was not advised was available for interview, would have been

very significant to him. Schreiber could have provided :

. . . insights and observations that not only corroborate some of Mr. Mickey's

self-reports, but also reveal his ongoing emotional struggles, functional and

emotional deterioration and, in some instances, evidence of disturbed thought

processes. In particular, Ms. Packard's knowledge of Mr. Mickey's bizarre

behavior and drug use, which she observed several years prior to the offense and

trial, would have been critically important to my evaluation and testimony. Her

knowledge and observations would have confirmed the nature and extent, as

well as the longevity, of Mickey's drug abuse, disturbed thought processes, and

bizarre behavior and buttressed my testimony at the penalty phase. Her

knowledge and observations were especially critical in demonstrating the

longevity of his impairments, thus providing essential information about the

course of his illness.

Burstein decl. ¶ 13.

Dr. Smith in his declaration in support of the current petition explains that he was given

very limited materials to review although he had asked for objective verification of Mickey's

drug use but was told there was none available. He has since learned that Navy discharge

records showed Mickey received a medical discharge from the Navy after admitting drug use.

He also asked counsel to obtain external, objective verification of Mickey's delusional thought

processes. He did not have such evidence at trial but has now learned that letters written by

Mickey between October 21, 1980 and January of 1981 were available and contained pictures

Mickey had drawn of gourds with differing facial expression to symbolize himself and capture

his moods. A photograph was also available that shows a home-made altar with candles,

figures of animals, shells and several necklaces arranged in a purposeful fashion. The

photograph corroborates Mickey's descriptions to Dr. Smith of the rituals Mickey engaged in

and his delusion that gourds could hold an individual's spirit. 

The prosecution presented the testimony of Kate B. Yago, M.D., a psychiatrist, who

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explained that she reviewed the packet of letters written by Mickey dating from October of

1980 through the end of January of 1981 (the ones Dr. Smith did not have when he testified)

and spoke with Mickey's then wife Allison and found no evidence of delusional thinking. In

fact, Dr. Yago testified that the evidence suggested Mickey seemed quite lucid. Dr. Smith at

the time he testified did not have the letters or know Dr. Yago's opinion and thus had no

opportunity to rebut Dr. Yago's testimony.

Trial counsel portrayed Mickey as essentially a good, hard-working boy who had a

healthy and close relationship with his mother and grew up in an essentially normal

environment. Available evidence would have shown otherwise. Trial counsels' last minute

preparation failed to uncover the evidence. Beth Bonora and Lois Heaney of the National Jury

Project were retained in January of 1983 to assist with jury selection. When they first met

Mickey they felt he had serious mental and emotional problems. When Bonora and Heaney met

with counsel for the first time on March 18, 1983, they realized that little had been done to

prepare the penalty phase. Trial was scheduled to start in May 1993. They urged counsel to

prepare a social history of petitioner's life and background from which a penalty phase theme

could be developed and witnesses identified and chosen. 

In April 1983, Mickey's trial counsel retained Jeanette Gurevich, a social worker intern,

to prepare a social history. Counsel told Gurevich to get the social history from Mickey and

give the names of any potential witnesses to Milton Moeschler, the defense investigator, rather

than interview them herself.

Defense counsel made several largely unsuccessful motions to continue the trial

acknowledging that they were not prepared for the penalty phase. Just prior to the start of jury

selection, trial counsel gave Milton Moeschler, their investigator, a list of potential witnesses

for the penalty phase and told him to locate and interview them. On May 15, 1983, trial counsel

gave Moeschler the State's list of thirty-four trial witnesses and asked him to interview them.

On June 6, 1983, Gurevich gave Moeschler a list of thirty-nine potential penalty phase

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witnesses. Moeschler was unable to contact all of the witnesses, in part because he was injured

in an automobile accident. Petitioner contends that a number of witnesses were not contacted

who could have provided relevant information for the penalty phase, including Sheila Roberts,

the former wife of Ronnie Mickey, petitioner's brother who committed suicide, and Nancy Tall,

petitioner's first wife. Petitioner asserts that counsel did not personally interview some

witnesses, and, in particular, failed to obtain an abundance of available important social history

information from petitioner's second wife, Rochelle Packard Schreiber.

Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel did not obtain a detailed social history which

could have been relied upon by Dr. Smith and Dr. Burstein to support their opinions. Such a

life history was prepared by David Lisak, Ph.D., who was retained by petitioner's counsel in

1995. Dr. Lisak is a forensic psychologist who teaches at the University of Massachusetts and

also has a clinical practice. He focuses on the relationship between child abuse and the impact

of abuse on males later in life. He has been retained by the defense in thirty-six capital cases.

Dr. Lisak was asked "to identify and assess the social, development, psychiatric, familial, and

life experience factors that shaped Doug Mickey's personality and emotional development, and

that influenced his behaviors and mental states at critical stages in his adult life." Lisak

declaration dated June 3, 1995, ¶ 6 . Dr. Lisak compiled a social history of Douglas Mickey.

Based on interviews with Mickey, reviews of interviews with many people acquainted with

Mickey and a review of numerous documents relating to Mickey's life, Dr. Lisak concluded

that the Mickey family was profoundly dysfunctional. Both parents were alcoholic. There was

a history of neglect. Mickey and his mother suffered from depression. His father was distant,

violent and unpredictably abusive. Mickey's mother died unexpectedly as a result of an

accident or suicide when Mickey was 17 years old. Acquaintances including a high school

teacher report that Mickey was devastated. Mickey's father remarried within less than five

months and when his new wife and her daughter moved in, Mickey's bedroom was given to the

daughter. Within fifteen months of Mickey's mother's death, Mickey's grandfather died and

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then less than two years later, his brother Ronnie committed suicide. 

Mickey had an abnormal, sexualized relationship with his mother that crossed over at

one point to an incestuous act. Dr. Lisak noted Mickey's history of deviant sexual behavior,

including exposing himself and molesting girls who were left in his charge. He believes that

this behavior is consistent with Mickey's own history of abuse and corroborates Mickey's

incestuous relationship with his mother. 

Dr. Lisak did not make any diagnosis of Mickey's mental health at the time of the

murders of Eric Hanson and Cathy Blount. Nevertheless, he believes that Mickey viewed

Hanson in the same way that petitioner viewed his mother—the relationship was based on a

similar power struggle. He believes that Mickey's incestuous relationship with his mother

contaminated all of his other relationships—it was the origin of his relationship with Hanson.

Because his mother died when he was only 17, Mickey was never able to differentiate himself

from her.

Whether defense counsel should have presented Dr. Lisak's theory that Mickey viewed

Hanson in the same way as he viewed his mother and that Mickey's incestuous relationship with

his mother contaminated all of his other relationships seems problematic. Counsel had chosen

to keep from the jury evidence of the sexual misconduct of Mickey and that decision was a

reasonable tactical one even though Dr. Lisak felt it was an illustration of how Mickey's

mother's conduct had affected him. Mickey's sexual conduct could have alienated a jury even

if it was caused in part by his mother's incestuous behavior. However, what Dr. Lisak did

provide was a wealth of information showing that through no fault of his own, Mickey grew

up in a dysfunctional, abusive household. This information would have enabled Dr. Smith to

explain that:

Studies confirm a strong correlation between a genetic history of addictive

disorders and predisposition to developing addictions. In fact, if one or more

parents is an alcoholic, an individual's chances of developing an addictive

disorder increases four times . . . . Dr. Lisak's social history . . . offers insight

into the severity of the addictions within Mr. Mickey's family and the manner

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in which the family dynamics were distorted by alcohol and drug abuse. The

social history also documents the dysfunctional and unstable environment that

contributed to or caused Mr. Mickey's own mental impairments and alcohol and

drug use. Mr. Mickey's genetic loading, combined with his family environment

and underlying mental illness, caused him to be predisposed to alcohol and drug

dependency.

Smith decl. ¶ 20.

In summary, what defense counsel presented was a mitigation case that essentially

portrayed Mickey as one who had a relatively normal childhood, was a good young man until

he started to abuse alcohol and drugs following the death of his mother to whom he was very

close. Although the defense mental health experts opined that Mickey had an underlying

psychiatric condition that pre-dated his drug abuse, there was little, if any, evidence offered to

support that opinion except for information related by Mickey himself to Dr. Burstein and Dr.

Smith. Counsel's argument that Mickey had an underlying psychiatric disease and that the

murders were committed by Mickey in a state of toxic psychosis was effectively challenged by

the cross-examination of Dr. Burstein and Dr. Smith showing that they did not have facts to

corroborate their opinions other than some coming from Mickey himself, were missing

important types of information, and had some facts that appeared to be in error such as the state

of Mickey's sobriety at the time of the murders.

What could have been presented was a portrayal of Mickey's childhood in a

dysfunctional family giving specific examples of dysfunctional behavior. The defense could

have presented a mitigation case that Mickey was a psychiatrically disturbed individual who

was exposed to abuse and surrounded by family members who had psychiatric problems

themselves. Counsel could have explained through witnesses why Mickey got to a point where

he was in an unreal, delusional state and committed the murders, as Dr. Smith declared, "during

a major break with reality" when he was subject to delusions, paranoia with ideas of reference,

distorted thinking and a loss of contact with reality." Smith decl. ¶ 13. The magnitude of the

discrepancy between what defense counsel did investigate and present and what counsel could

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have investigated and presented was substantial. Counsel's performance fell below the standard

of care defined in Hovey, supra.

ii. Failure to Effectively Utilize the Expertise of Their Mental Health

Experts

Although Dr. Smith and Dr. Burstein were aware of each other's involvement in the

case, counsel made no effort to have them work as a team. As explained by Dr. Smith:

My standard approach was then, and still is, much different than the way

work was done in the Mickey case. My standard is a team approach where I and

the other experts, such as psychologists and psychiatrists, work together. We

consult with each other and discuss our separate findings so that each member

of the team learns from other members and knows what each other is doing. I

have found, during my extensive career, that this type of collaborative approach

is the best way to present expert testimony. The interchange of ideas in this

kind of collaborative effort provides a greater arena of knowledge which

facilitates the presentation of each expert's opinion in his or her area of

expertise. This type of approach is especially important in a case such as Mr.

Mickey's where the individual suffers both substance abuse and psychiatric

disorders.

Smith decl. ¶ 9. Dr. Burstein and Dr. Smith never even spoke to one another during their

involvement on Mickey's case. Since Dr. Smith does not testify outside his area of expertise

and defers to another psychiatric expert with respect to the diagnosis of psychological problems

apart from those resulting from drug usage, a team effort was particularly important. The

presentation of Mickey's mitigation case could have been substantially improved by providing

all available materials to the two doctors and coordinating a team effort between them because

a critical factor in Mickey's case was the dual nature of his mental health issues.

The defense case was particularly devastated by the unrebutted testimony of the People's

psychiatric expert, Dr. Yago. The prosecution had provided Dr. Yago with statements and

testimony that were available to defense counsel but never seen by Dr. Burstein or Dr. Smith.

The prosecution had Dr. Yago sit through the testimony of Dr. Burstein and Dr. Smith. In

contrast, defense counsel not only failed to have either Dr. Burstein or Dr. Smith listen to Dr.

Yago's testimony, they never even consulted with either of them about their views on her

opinions. Therefore, Dr. Yago's testimony was not effectively challenged. Dr. Burstein has

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now reviewed her testimony and strongly disagrees with much of it. Mickey's defense counsel

clearly failed to meet the standard of care by failing to utilize their own experts to rebut and

challenge the prosecution case. 

Dr. Yago testified that she had reviewed Mickey's letters written between October 1980

through June of 1981 and found no evidence of delusional thinking—Dr. Smith has now seen

the letters and disagrees ("Mr. Mickey's correspondence . . . corroborates his delusions,

specifically his ideas regarding the use of gourds to hold an individual's spirit. Throughout his

letters, Mr. Mickey drew pictures of gourds with differing facial expressions to symbolize

himself and capture his mood or feelings." (Smith decl. ¶ 19)). 

Dr. Yago had spoken with Allison, Mickey's third wife, and she denied that Mickey was

heavily involved with drugs between January 1979 and October 1980. Dr. Burstein was told

Allison was not available. Further, Dr. Burstein has now seen Dr. Lisak's report and the

declarations of other significant people in Mickey's life which reveal, with specific examples,

Mickey's psychological deterioration from his early adult years through the time of his arrest.

The report and declarations show Mickey's troubled and abusive childhood, his longstanding

dependence on alcohol, marijuana, LSD and other mind-altering drugs, and his increasingly

bizarre and ritualistic behaviors. This information would have corroborated the testimony of

Dr. Burstein and Dr. Smith and contradicted Dr. Yago's opinions and the bases therefore. It

also would have raised doubt about the accuracy of the report from Allison that Mickey's drug

usage was somewhat limited.

Dr. Yago claimed that Dr. Smith's description of Mickey as having a "schizophrenic-like

reaction" was a description made up by Dr. Smith but not one that is generally accepted or used

by psychiatrists to describe a recognized syndrome. She further stated that she disagreed with

Dr. Smith's appraisal that Mickey was suffering from a poly-drug abuse induced paranoid

schizophrenic-like reaction at the time of the murders. "[I]t is extremely rare, if not totally

unheard of, that no one would hear about his symptoms, or no one would hear from him

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directly, meaning family, friends, acquaintances." RT 3333:10-13. "I can find no evidence . .

. to indicate to me that he ever had that delusional belief system in the years he has stated that

he did have it." RT 3333:18-24. "It is also extremely rare that someone who was that greatly

impaired would not end up in a hospital at some point." RT 3334:12-14. 

Dr. Burstein could have rebutted Dr. Yago's assertion that Mickey's alleged failure to

display evidence of delusional thinking before the murders casts doubt on Dr. Smith's

assessment of Mickey's condition. However, he was not asked to do so. If he had been asked

and properly prepared, he could have explained that Mickey spent most of his adult life

somewhat removed from society living in rural areas within various subcultures surrounded by

others with their own drug abuse and other problems. "Mr. Mickey's lifestyle made it far more

likely that his condition would go undetected or be dismissed as simply odd." Burstein decl.

¶ 14. Dr. Burstein also would have been able to describe Dr. Yago's view that a psychotic

individual will reveal his delusions as simplistic, inaccurate and not substantiated. Finally, Dr.

Burstein could have pointed out, as he learned when contacted concerning Mickey's habeas

claim, that Mickey did reveal both delusional thinking and bizarre behavior to Rochelle

Packard. 

Dr. Yago also pointed out an inconsistency between Dr. Smith and Dr. Burstein as to

whether Mickey had to have been acutely intoxicated at the time of the murders to be properly

diagnosed as suffering with toxic psychosis at the time of the murders. This conflict could have

been avoided, or at least explained, if Dr. Smith and Dr. Burstein had worked as a team.

Although Dr. Yago agreed with Dr. Smith that acute intoxication was not necessary for the

diagnosis, she disagreed that Mickey was so suffering at the time of the crimes. She explained

that the "meticulous way in which he went about this crime, the preplanning of the crime, the

elaborate lengths he took to protect himself once he committed the crime" all suggest he was

not suffering from toxic psychosis. RT 3336:26-3337:3. 

Dr. Yago also explained that she does not believe that Mickey had a borderline

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personality disorder as originally suggested by Dr. Burstein but rather an atypical personality

disorder. Regardless of the correct personality disorder, Dr. Yago testified that such disorders

do not mean that one's ability to judge right and wrong is impaired or that the person is

suffering from severe emotional distress. It rather means that they are likely to have

"difficulties with their personality function which impairs them . . . usually at work or at home

. . . ." RT 3349:10-14.

In light of information obtained in connection with the current habeas proceedings, Dr.

Burstein believes that Mickey probably suffered from paranoid schizophrenia at the time of his

offenses.

The question is whether I think it's still toxic psychosis or more

clearly paranoid schizophrenia.

I think it's much more likely to be schizophrenia, and I think he

did have a borderline personality then, and still has one now.

Q. So what is---what would your current diagnosis be?

A. Well, . . . to say what my diagnosis would be of a man I haven't

seen in 21 years, so this would be a provisional diagnosis.

But I've been very persuaded . . . that it's quite probable that I

would more likely find it paranoid schizophrenia . . . .

RT 765:5-21. Although Dr. Burstein's diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia is only provisional

and based in part on Dr. Stonefeld's diagnosis which was not available to Dr. Burstein at the

time of Mickey's trial, the bottom line is that the defense mitigation evidence presented

portrayed Mickey as one who probably induced his own psychotic symptoms, when there was

significant available evidence which had not been gathered to support a conclusion that Mickey

was a delusional individual burdened by a mental sickness. A jury is certainly more likely to

be sympathetic with one who has an illness for which he is not responsible than one who

induces his own psychotic symptoms by ingestion of drugs. Defense counsel's failure to

provide their experts with all reasonably available background material, failure to work with

them as a team, and failure to have them listen to and rebut the prosecution mental health expert

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fell below acceptable standards.

c. Prejudice to Petitioner

Although Mickey's defense counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness, Mickey's constitutional rights were not violated unless such performance

prejudiced him. There must be a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

appropriateness of a death sentence. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. The Ninth Circuit has

observed that "[e]vidence regarding social background and mental health is significant, as there

is a 'belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are

attributable to a disadvantaged background or to emotional and mental problems, may be less

culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.'" Allen v. Woodford, 395 F. 3d 979,1005

(9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F. 1079, 1090 (quoting Boyde, 494 U.S. at

382, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 810 (2003)). In Allen, the failure of trial counsel to prepare for the

sentencing phase until a week before that phase began, and his resulting failure to thoroughly

investigate and present Allen's mitigation case, was constitutionally deficient. However, while

counsel erred in failing to investigate and present the potential mitigation testimony of many

family members, friends, and associates of Allen's that Allen could be pleasant, the court found

no prejudice. There was not a reasonable probability that had trial counsel presented the

potential mitigation evidence, the jury would have weighed the evidence in favor of a life

sentence for Allen whom it had just convicted of murdering three people and conspiring to

murder four others while he was serving a life sentence for yet another murder. In contrast

here, the potential mitigating evidence would have shown that Mickey's crimes could be

attributable to a disadvantaged background and to emotional and mental problems.

Mickey's jury may not have been persuaded by the potential mitigating evidence that

Mickey should have received a life sentence. The People offered significant evidence of

premeditation and the potential mitigating evidence leaves little explanation for Blount's

murder. Nevertheless, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Strickland, "[t]he result of a

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proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors

of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the

outcome." 466 U.S. at 694.

 Trial counsels' representation of Mickey in the penalty phase fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness and that representation prejudiced Mickey. 

3. Defense Counsels' Penalty Phase Representation Was Ineffective

For the reasons stated above, the court concludes that defense counsels' penalty phase

representation was ineffective and prejudicial. Claim 1 is, therefore, granted as to petitioner's

claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in the penalty phase.

VI. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

An appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from the final order in a habeas

corpus proceeding in which the detention arises from a state court judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2253.

A certificate of appealability may issue only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of

the denial of a constitutional right. Id. The court must indicate which specific issue or issues

satisfy the showing required. Id.

In this case, the court finds that Mickey has made a substantial showing of the denial

of a constitutional right on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims set forth in Claim 1 with

respect to both the guilt phase (failure to raise diminished mental capacity defense) and penalty

phase (failure to investigate and present substantial mitigating evidence). In order to obtain a

certificate of appealability, the petitioner must show only that reasonable jurists could debate

whether the petition should have been resolved differently or that the issues presented deserve

encouragement to proceed further. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); Beardslee

v. Brown, 393 F.3d 899, 901 (9th Cir. 2004). That showing has been made with respect to

Claim 1. It has not been made with respect to Claim 9 or any of the claims for which summary

adjudication was granted by the Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Respondent's

Motion for Summary Judgment filed May 6, 2002. This current order and the May 6, 2002

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, AND GRANTING IN

PART AND DENYING IN PART CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

C-93-0243 RMW 35

summary judgment order explain why petitioner's claims other than Claim 1 lack merit and thus

do not call for a certificate of appealability.

The court orders that this case be remanded to the Superior Court for the County of San

Mateo for a new trial on the penalty phase. The remand order, however, is stayed pending

appeal. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 11/17/06

__________________________________ 

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

Case 5:93-cv-00243-EJD Document 207 Filed 11/17/06 Page 35 of 36
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, AND GRANTING IN

PART AND DENYING IN PART CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

C-93-0243 RMW 36

Copy of Order Mailed to and E-Filed on 11/17/06:

J. Frank McCabe

500 Sansome Street, Ste.212

San Francisco, CA 94111

Dane R. Gillette

Senir Assistant Attorney General

455 Golden Gate Avenue, Ste. 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Case 5:93-cv-00243-EJD Document 207 Filed 11/17/06 Page 36 of 36