Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-01905/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-01905-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 15:1051 Trademark Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Although Plaintiff initially moved the Court for reconsideration without filing a

motion for leave to file such a motion, because Plaintiff has apparently re-filed the motion

properly, the Court will overlook the initial filing. Civil L.R. 7-9(a).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT JACOBSEN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MATTHEW KATZER and KAMIND

ASSOCIATES, INC.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 06-01905 JSW

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION; DENYING

MOTION FOR STAY; AND,

DENYING REQUEST FOR

CLARIFICATION

Now before the Court is the motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration, a

motion for stay and a request for clarification filed by Plaintiff Robert Jacobsen.1 Plaintiff

requests reconsideration of the Court order issued on October 20, 2006 granting the motions by

defendants to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and special

motions to strike. Having carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s papers and considered the relevant

legal authority, and good cause appearing, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for

leave to file a motion for reconsideration; DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for a stay; and, DENIES

Plaintiff’s request for clarification.

A. Motion for Reconsideration.

A motion for reconsideration may be made on one of three grounds: (1) a material

difference in fact or law exists from that which was presented to the Court, which, in the

exercise of reasonable diligence, the party applying for reconsideration did not know at the time

of the order; (2) the emergence of new material facts or a change of law; or (3) a manifest

Case 3:06-cv-01905-JSW Document 121 Filed 10/30/06 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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failure by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments presented before

entry of the order. Civ. L.R. 7-9(b)(1)-(3). In addition, the moving party may not reargue any

written or oral argument previously asserted to the Court. Civ. L.R. 7-9(c). 

Although unclear from Plaintiff’s filing, Plaintiff ostensibly moves for reconsideration

for the Court to consider dispositive legal arguments that it failed to consider initially. Plaintiff

contends that the Court failed to consider that in order to merit the protection of California Code

of Civil Procedure § 425.16, Defendants must show that their pre-litigation activity, i.e., the

filing of the Freedom of Information Act request, was made in serious and good faith

contemplation of litigation. (Motion at 2.) Plaintiff also contends that he suffered antitrust

damages in the amount of $203,000 in licensing fees, and that he should succeed on a libel per

quod theory raised at the oral argument on Defendants’ motions. The Court considered the

arguments now raised when considering Plaintiff’s oppositions to the motions to dismiss and

special motions to strike and found them unpersuasive. It finds them similarly unpersuasive in

the context of the motion to reconsider. In addition, Plaintiff may not move for reconsideration

on the basis of any written or oral argument previously asserted to the Court. Civ. L.R. 7-9(c). 

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

B. Motion to Stay.

Plaintiff requests a “stay of execution” of the Court’s order until the Court conducts a

claim construction. Plaintiff argues that he will be able, by virtue of the strength of his

arguments in this litigation, to demonstrate the merits of his claims and the lack of merit of

Defendants’ purportedly anticipated claims. The Court does not deem it necessary to stay its

ruling simply because Plaintiff believes he will ultimately prevail and that Defendants’

substantive contentions will ultimately not prevail. The presumption binding this Court, unless

demonstrated otherwise by clear and convincing evidence, is that having survived a full patent

examination process, including all potential invalidity challenges, the patents at issue are

entitled to a presumption of validity pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 282. See, e.g., Abbott Lab. v.

Geneva Pharm., Inc., 182 F.3d 1315 (Fed Cir. 1999). There is no indication in the current

Case 3:06-cv-01905-JSW Document 121 Filed 10/30/06 Page 2 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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record that such an allegedly anticipated infringement lawsuit would have been objectively

meritless such that no reasonable litigant could expect success on the merits. 

There is no indication in the record before the Court that Defendants acted in bad faith

when asserting that they sent the Freedom of Information Act request in anticipation of

litigation. There is no indication from the record that the anticipated litigation was

contemplated in bad faith. (See Declaration of Matthew Katzer in support of special motion to

strike, ¶ 7.) Plaintiff’s belief that he will ultimately prevail in this lawsuit does not change

either the presumption of the patents’ validity or the Defendants’ stated good faith belief in

anticipating possible infringement litigation against Plaintiff or his affiliates. Therefore,

Plaintiff’s motion to stay the effect of the Court’s ruling is DENIED. Due to the delay in

Plaintiff’s filing of the motion for reconsideration and the late hour, the Court HEREBY

extends the deadline for payment of attorney’s fees until Wednesday, November 1, 2006.

C. Request for Clarification.

Plaintiff requests that the Court provide a clarification of its ruling and “seeks the

Court’s views on whether the anti-SLAPP ruling constitutes a finding of fact or conclusion of

law that affects the inequitable conduct claim.” (Motion at 5.) The inequitable conduct claim

was not before the Court when it ruled on Defendants’ motions to dismiss and special motions

to strike. The Court refuses to give an advisory opinion on the effect of its ruling on Plaintiff’s

remaining claims. Therefore, Plaintiff’s request for clarification is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 30, 2006 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:06-cv-01905-JSW Document 121 Filed 10/30/06 Page 3 of 3