Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01204/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01204-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441er Removal- Employment Discrimination (Race)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHEIDA HUKMAN, pro se

Plaintiff,

vs.

SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO.,

Defendant.

Case No.: 18-CV-1204-GPC-RBB

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

[ECF No. 42]

Before the Court is Southwest Airlines Co.’s (“Defendant” or “SWA”) Motion for 

Summary Judgment. ECF No. 42. The motion has been fully briefed. On May 1, 2019, 

Sheida Hukman (“Plaintiff”), who is appearing pro se, filed her first response in 

opposition to the motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 58. Plaintiff filed an amended 

response in opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on May 6, 2019. 

ECF No. 53. Defendant filed a reply in support of the motion for summary judgment on 

July 24, 2019, ECF No. 57, and Plaintiff subsequently filed a second amended opposition 

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to the motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 59. In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, 

the Court allowed Plaintiff to file several amended oppositions and permitted a sur-reply 

from Defendant, which was lodged with the Court on August 5, 2019. ECF No. 63.1 

Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), the Court finds the matter suitable for 

adjudication without oral argument. Upon consideration of the moving papers and for the 

reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant Southwest Airlines’ motion for 

summary judgment in its entirety. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUD2

A. Plaintiff’s Employment and Job Duties with Defendant

Plaintiff Sheida Hukman identifies as a Middle Eastern female of Kurdish descent 

from Iraq. ECF No. 1; Complaint. In May of 2016, Hukman applied to work for

Defendant Southwest Airlines in the positions as a Customer Service Agent and 

Customer Service Supervisor. ECF No. 57-2 at 4; Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed 

Facts. Subsequently, Plaintiff interviewed with Shawn Hulette for the Customer Service 

Agent position on May 20, 2016 and with recruiter Patricia Lyson, Chad Larimore, and 

Mr. Hulette for the Customer Service Supervisor position on May 27, 2016. 

Plaintiff was not offered the role of Customer Service Supervisor. Instead, on June 

30, 2016, Plaintiff received a contingent offer of employment with Defendant for a FullTime Customer Service Agent position at the San Diego Airport. Id. Plaintiff accepted 

the offer on June 30, 2016 with a hire date of July 18, 2016. Id. On her hire date, 

 

1 The Court is aware that Plaintiff filed a joint motion to strike Defendant’s sur-reply on August 19, 

2019. ECF No. 67. Plaintiff does not legally sufficient articulate reasons for Defendants’ sur-reply to 

be stricken. Given that Defendants’ sur-reply was timely and expressly permitted by this Court in 

accordance to the Court’s order granting Plaintiff’s motion to file a second amended opposition, the 

Court will DENY Plaintiff’s motion to strike. 

2 The facts as recited in this order are for the purpose of disposing of the current motion and are not to be 

construed as findings of fact that the parties may rely on in future proceedings. The Court has set forth 

these facts based on the Defendant’s statement of undisputed facts and has made note, when applicable, 

of Plaintiff’s material opposition to these facts. 

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Plaintiff acknowledged that her employment and position included a 180-day 

probationary period, which was intended to evaluate whether new employees fit in. Id. To 

graduate into the role of a Full-Time Customer Service Agent, Plaintiff was required to 

satisfactorily complete the 180-day probationary period, which included training and 

multiple evaluative steps throughout the process. Id. 

During the probationary period, Plaintiff’s employment was governed by the 

Collective Bargaining Agreement between Southwest Airlines and the International 

Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (“IAM”), AFL-CIO (“CBA”). As a 

probationary employee, Plaintiff was expressly excluded from the CBA’s grievance 

procedures in accordance with the bargaining agreement, which provided that “nothing in 

this Agreement shall extend grievance rights concerning discipline or discharge to an 

employee during his probationary period.” Id. 

In her role as a probationary Customer Service Agent, Plaintiff’s job duties 

included: providing friendly service to and maintaining positive relationships with all 

internal and external Customers, working in a cooperative spirit to ensure the success of 

SWA, providing legendary Customer Service to people desiring to travel, use cargo, or 

baggage service by attending to their needs, greeting and handling Customers in a polite 

and friendly manner, dealing with mishandled Customers as a result of oversales, delayed 

or cancelled flights, lost, delayed, or damaged luggage and resolving such problems 

quickly and within guidelines established by SWA. Id; ECF No. 42-5 at 293-94; Ex. 13. 

Customer Service Agents were also required to possess the “ability to work well with 

others as part of a team, meet the public, and work under stressful situations.” Id. at 146-

47. Plaintiff also acknowledged receipt and review of SWA’s Basic Principles of 

Conduct. Id. at 266-67; Ex. 23. According to the SWA Basic Principles of Conduct, 

Plaintiff could be penalized and terminated for violations of the prohibition against 

“[i]nsubordinate conduct or refusing to follow a work order or any act of 

insubordination.” Id. at 266; Ex. 23. 

B. Plaintiff’s New Hire Training with Defendant

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Upon her hiring, Plaintiff was provided with training at both the San Diego Airport 

and in Dallas, TX, where SWA is headquartered. ECF No. 42 at 11; ECF No. 42-5 at 

148-52. SWA employee training lasts approximately six weeks and includes classroom 

instruction at Southwestern Adventist University (“SWAU University”), followed by on 

the job training with a trainer, training at Defendant’s Dallas headquarters, and additional 

follow-up training at the station. Id. at 11-12. During the training process, new hires 

receive training on topics that include employee policies, hazmat, station emergency 

programs, and customer service security measures. Id. at 12. It was common practice at 

SWA to first provide employees a week of training at SWAU University and then 

provide two weeks of “on-the-job” training with a trainer at the airport. Id. See also ECF

No. 42-5 at 499-500.

During her training at the San Diego Airport, which began on July 24, 2016,

Plaintiff was assigned to trainer Michael Klatt. Id. By her own accord, Plaintiff contends 

that Mr. Klatt was a “really good” trainer “for me.” Id. As part of the training process, 

Mr. Klatt provided training for new hires with respect to the “mechanisms of the 

computer, policies of the company, how to execute the customer service, the check-in 

process, and the customer service skills needed to facilitate [Southwest Airlines’] 

customers.” Id. Mr. Klatt trained Plaintiff during her first week of work at the airport. 

On the second week of on-the-job training, Plaintiff worked at the ticket counter. Id. 

During the third week of Plaintiff’s training, she was assigned as a “counter assist,” a

different portion of the training that is not linked with a trainer. Id. Plaintiff alleges that 

Mr. Klatt was also assigned to train another employee, who Plaintiff contends was 

Hispanic. ECF No. 57-1, SWA Undisputed Statement of Facts at 11. 

C. Plaintiff’s Performance and Interpersonal Challenges at SWA

During her introductory period of contingent employment with Southwest Airlines, 

Hukman was involved in interpersonal disputes with other employees which were cited 

as a contributing factor for her termination. 

i. The Uniform Incident

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The first incident occurred fifty-seven days into Plaintiff’s employment and related 

to Southwest’s uniform ordering process. Id. at 12. New hires at SWA are typically

given a set of standard uniform pieces which are ordered from Lands End. Id. In 2016,

the standard set included six bottoms, six tops, two belts, and a jacket. Id. ECF No. 42-

5. Additional items were to be ordered at the new hires’ expense. Id. On September 12, 

2016, Plaintiff ordered her uniform from SWA employee Taylor Farson, who entered the 

orders for new hires. When Plaintiff attempted to exchange and order several optional 

pieces via e-mail, Ms. Farson informed Plaintiff that she would be responsible for paying 

for the items, since Southwest would only pay for the required uniform pieces. ECF No. 

42-5 at 134-36. In response, Plaintiff remarked to Ms. Farson, “If you don’t want to 

order than then it’s OK. I am not going to back and forth ... I will see you on Thursday to 

explain.” Id. Hukman Depo. II, 366:17-367:13; Ex. 12.

Following the email interaction, Ms. Farson reported the issue to Chad Larimore 

and requested a meeting with Plaintiff and another manager. As a result, on September 

15, 2016, Plaintiff, Ms. Farson, and Frank McGinley met and discussed the approved and 

allotted uniform quota outlined in the Ground Ops Employee Handbook. ECF No. 42-5 at 

269; Ex. 32. At this time, Plaintiff raised concerns about her co-worker, Jules Alviz, 

claiming that Ms. Alviz threatened her by telling Plaintiff to be careful because Plaintiff 

was on probation. ECF No. 42-1 at 13; ECF No. 42-3 at 10-11. Plaintiff described this 

comment as “threatening’ because Plaintiff believed that Ms. Alviz could terminate her 

employment. ECF No. 42-3 at 10-11. 

During this conversation, Mr. Larimore informed Plaintiff that although Ms. Alviz 

was a senior agent, she could not terminate Plaintiff’s employment. Id. Plaintiff 

proceeded to say that she thought Ms. Alviz was a “bad agent” and described Ms. Alviz 

as a poor performer. Id. Mr. Larimore informed Plaintiff that claims of threatening 

behavior are taken very seriously at SWA and encouraged Plaintiff to work harmoniously 

and professionally with Ms. Alviz. Id; Larimore Decl., ¶ 10. 

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On September 16, 2016, another meeting took place between Plaintiff, Mr. 

Larimore, and IAM representative Lorena Todd to follow-up on the concerns that 

Plaintiff had voiced the day prior about Ms. Alviz. ECF No. 42-3. at 10-11. Plaintiff 

proceeded to insist that the meeting with Ms. Farson took place because Ms. Alviz had 

turned Ms. Farson against Plaintiff. Plaintiff also “made it clear that she didn’t care for 

Jules [Alviz] and that she felt that this whole incident came about only because Jules 

created it.” Id. Plaintiff also repeatedly contended that Ms. Alviz was “a problem,” a 

“bad agent,” and “not a good person.” Id. Because Plaintiff incorrectly believed that the 

conversation about the uniform understanding was a product of Ms. Alviz’s doing, Mr. 

Larimore reiterated that the meeting that occurred with Ms. Farson “was set up only 

because of the uniform misunderstanding and not because of anything to do with [Ms. 

Alviz].” Id. Plaintiff did not agree and continued to assert that “this all came about 

because of [Ms. Alviz].” Id. 

Following the meeting, Mr. Larimore discussed the interaction with SWA’s 

Employee Relations and based on the information provided by Plaintiff, determined no 

further action was needed. Id. ¶ 10. At no time during either meeting did Plaintiff 

complain of any allegedly discriminatory or harassing conduct on the basis of her 

national origin. 

ii. Plaintiff’s Response to Performance Feedback

SWA requires audits, including Soft Skills Audits, for all customer service 

employees with the goal of performing one audit per employee per month. ECF No. 42-

5., Riddle Depo. at 451-453. These Soft Skills Audits are carried out by Customer 

Service Supervisors who observe the employee from different vantage points, including 

standing next to or on the other side of the employee or walking in front of the employee 

to read body language and to listen to the employee. Id. In conducting the audits, 

Customer Service Supervisors evaluate if employees are smiling, outgoing, and friendly. 

Id. The ultimate purpose of the Soft Skills audit was to provide coaching and feedback to 

employees on interpersonal areas. Id.

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On September 25, 2016, Randall Riddle conducted a Soft Skills Audit of Plaintiff’s 

job performance. Id. at 451. During the Soft Skills Audit, Mr. Riddle observed that 

Plaintiff was “not outgoing, not friendly, and did not smile.” Id. at 451-54. Following 

the completion of the Soft Skills Audit, Plaintiff was presented with the Counter and 

Curbside Soft Skills Audit that was completed by Mr. Riddle. Id. at 270. Mr. Riddle 

reviewed the document with Plaintiff after he observed her job performance. The 

document provided in part that:

[Plaintiff] did not display a welcoming, friendly demeanor and rarely smiled. Her 

eye contact with our customers is not consistent. She does not acknowledge each 

customer as they approach her position nor does she try using their names. At the 

end of each transaction she does not use any pleasantries or thank them. Check in 

process is efficient. Would like to see her confirm # of bags and destination. In 

full uniform and looks professional. Please discontinue wearing your sweater over 

the shoulders. 

Id. After reviewing the document, Plaintiff began to speak loudly and argue with Mr. 

Riddle, accusing of him of being a “liar” and claiming that it was “not a valid 

documentation.” ECF No. 42-3 at 13-14; Hukman Depo. II, 408:11-17; 409:13-410:19; 

Ex. 33. Employee Wendy Meinung was brought in to intervene because of Plaintiff’s 

agitated response and Hukman ultimately refused to sign the document. Id. at 14; Riddle 

Depo. 16:21-13; Hukman Depo. II, 408:3-10. 

iii. Termination of Plaintiff’s Employment with SWA

Because of these incidents – and because Plaintiff was not open to constructive 

criticism, refused to acknowledge the feedback provided to her through the Soft Skills 

Audit process, and did not work well in a team environment, Plaintiff’s employment with 

Defendant ended on September 26, 2016 after seventy-one days with SWA. ECF No. 42-

3 at 13; Adams Depo. 10:20-11:1; 15:23-16:7; Larimore Decl. ¶ 11; Ex. C. On the 

morning of her termination, Mr. Larimore detailed the concerns and incidents in an email 

to other SWA employees:

All –

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We have had a series of incidents with New Hire CSA Sheida Hukman that 

have led us to determine she is not fit for Southwest Airlines. There have been 

some concerns almost from the start of her employment, which included concerns 

from her Instructor in DAL for Initial Training. 

Here are a list of issues to date:

• She had a series of emails back and forth with SAN SWAU Instructor 

Taylor regarding uniforms. Sheida was dismissive and disrespectful with 

Taylor during these emails and subsequent conversations. MCS Frank & 

Taylor met with Sheida to discuss and clarify the uniform issues. A DLE 

was issued to document the conversation. She was not receptive to the 

conversation was questions why she was being addressed. 

• During the presentation of her 50-day evaluation, she was (sic) did not agree 

with the comments of the evaluation. She was defiant with CSSII Bruce 

who delivered the eval, and refused to sign the evaluation. I met with her 

following the refusal to sign. I when (sic) over the eval point-by-point and 

explained where each area she needs improvement had merit. Her main 

sticking point was that we included the feedback we had received from the 

DAL SWAU Instructor. She felt that because it didn’t happen here, it 

should have (sic) included. I explained that it was all part of her 50-day 

evaluation period. She stated that she still disagreed with the eval. I have 

notes from our conversation saved in a document at work.

• She has falsely accused another CSA of threatening her. She went to IAM 

Rep Lorena and requested a meeting with me. Sheila, Lorena, MCS Julie 

and myself met with her. Her claims of threats were not found to be 

credible. I contacted Christine Stewart from ER to discuss her claims, she 

agreed that there were baseless and no further investigation was necessary. 

Notes from that meeting are attached as well. 

Based on her behavior and attitude, past and present, we will be releasing her from 

probation as soon you are able to review the documentation and we have your 

approval. Thanks. 

ECF No. 42-3 at 13-14. That same day, Plaintiff met with employees Irvin Adams, 

Manager of Customer Service, and Theresa Nolten. ECF No. 42-3; Hukman Depo. II, 

416:16-417:11. During the meeting, Plaintiff was presented with, but refused to sign the 

acknowledgement of receipt of, a Failure to Pass Probation document, which confirmed 

the reason for the conclusion of her employment:

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As you are aware, the Contract provides that a new Employee must serve a 

probationary period of a predetermined length of time in order that the Employee 

has the opportunity to demonstrate his or her qualifications and ability to adapt to 

Company policies and procedures. The probationary period affords the Company 

an opportunity to evaluate your qualifications and ability to perform tasks 

assigned, as well as your commitment to the goals of Southwest Airlines.

Based on observations of your job performance, we have concluded that you are 

not suitable for this job. Your employment is terminated as a result of your failure 

to pass probation. 

ECF No. 42-5 at 271; Ex. 34. Mr. Adams also told Plaintiff “[a]nd it’s not working. And 

we have to let you go.” ECF No. 42-5 at 114. During this meeting, Plaintiff began 

speaking louder and she repeatedly threatened to sue Mr. Adams in federal court for 

harassment and discrimination because Mr. Adams was a “white American” and the 

supervisors were “white Americans” as well. ECF No. 42-5 at 473-74. Plaintiff also 

demanded to speak with Station Manager Tom Starr, but was told that Mr. Starr was 

unavailable. Id. Plaintiff also claimed that SAN Above the Wing supervisor Bruce 

Christmas was discriminatory towards her and called her a “shish kabob” the other night. 

Id. Enraged, Plaintiff further alleged that Customer Service Agents Al Alviz and Jules 

Alviz called Plaintiff a “shishkabob” once or twice at the ticket counter. 

Plaintiff admits that Mr. Adams made no comments about Plaintiff’s national 

origin, accent, or race during the exit interview. ECF No. 42-5 at 114-16. Plaintiff also 

acknowledges that Ms. Nolten made no comments about Plaintiff’s national origin or 

accent in the interview. During her employment with SWA, Id. Plaintiff further 

confirms that no one at the meeting said anything to Plaintiff about being Middle Eastern. 

During her employment with SWA, Plaintiff did not raise any complaints about any 

unalleged unfair or inappropriate treatment because of her national origin or race. Id. 

After Plaintiff’s agitated reaction during the termination meeting, she was escorted out. 

iv. Plaintiff’s Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Charge and 

Filing of the Present Lawsuit

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On November 19, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination against SWA 

with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”) and the 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging discrimination based 

on national origin and retaliation. ECF No. 42-5 at 272; Ex. 35. On March 27, 2017, the 

EEOC issued Plaintiff a Dismissal and Notice of Rights, contending that “[b]ased upon 

its investigation, the EEOC is unable to conclude that the information obtained 

establishes violations of the statutes.” ECF No. 42-5 at 272; Ex. 36. The Dismissal and 

Notice of Rights confirms that for Title VII claims, Plaintiff “may file a lawsuit against 

the respondent(s) under federal law based on this charge in federal or state court” and that 

Plaintiff’s lawsuit “must be filed within 90 days of [ ] receipt of this notice; or your 

right to sue based on this charge will be lost.” Id. (Emphasis in original). Id. The Notice 

of Suit Rights also provides that “this will be the only notice of dismissal and of your 

right to sue that we will send you” and noted that the “time limit for filing suit based on a 

claim under state law may be different.” Id. Plaintiff received the notice on April 7, 

2017. Id. 

Plaintiff commenced this action on November 27, 2017 in state court. Defendants

removed the action to this court on June 8, 2018. In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges eight 

causes of action: (1) Discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 

(“Title VII”); (2) Retaliation in violation of Title VII; (3) Retaliation in violation of the 

California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”); (4) Denial of hiring as a 

supervisor in violation of Title VII; (5) Denial of proper training as a customer service 

agent in violation of Title VII; (6) Harassment in violation of Title VII; (7) Failure to stop 

discrimination and harassment; and (8) Wrongful termination in violation of public 

policy. See generally, ECF No. 1-2, Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A) Summary Judgment Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56 empowers courts to enter summary 

judgment on factually unsupported claims or defenses, and thereby “secure the just, 

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speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 

U.S. 317, 325, 327 (1986). Summary judgment should be granted if the “pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

A fact is material when it affects the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The “mere existence of some alleged factual 

dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for 

summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” 

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). A 

genuine issue of material fact exists if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party.” United States v. Arango, 670 F.3d 988, 992 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986)). Conversely, “[w]here the 

record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving 

party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. 

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any 

genuine issues of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party can satisfy 

this burden by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing 

sufficient to establish an element of his or her claim on which that party will bear the 

burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322-23. If the moving party fails to bear the initial burden, 

summary judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving 

party’s evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970). 

Once the moving party has satisfied this burden, the nonmoving party cannot rest 

on the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must “go beyond the pleadings and 

by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions 

on file’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex, 

477 U.S. at 324. The non-moving party must “do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Sluimer v. Verity, Inc., 606 F.3d 584, 

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587 (9th Cir. 2010). If the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing of an 

element of its case, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 

325. 

When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court must “view[ ] the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Fontana v. Haskin, 262 

F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2001). The court may not, however, engage in credibility 

determinations, weighing of evidence, or drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts

as those functions are for the trier of fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Accordingly, if 

“reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence,” summary judgment will 

be denied. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 250-51 (1986). 

B) Special Considerations for Pro Se Litigants 

The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly cautioned that pro se litigants must be treated 

with liberality. See, e.g., Waters v. Young, 100 F.3d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1996) (“As a 

general matter, this court has long sought to ensure that pro se litigants do not unwittingly 

fall victim to procedural requirements that they may, with some assistance from the court, 

be able to satisfy.”) As such, courts have often “held pro se pleadings to a less stringent 

standard than briefs by counsel and reads pro se pleadings generously, ‘however 

inartfully pleaded.’” Davis v. Silva, 511 F.3d 1005, 1009 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus, pro 

se litigants are afforded the benefit of the doubt in order to “ensure[ ] meaningful access 

to the courts.” Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 

Nonetheless, pro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure and 

substance that govern other litigants. King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 55, 567 (9th Cir. 1987); 

see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). And in giving liberal 

interpretation to a pro se complaint, the court is not permitted to “supply essential 

elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of 

Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Nor is the court required to provide a nonprisoner pro se litigant with notice of the summary judgment rules. Bias v. Moynihan, 

508 F.3d 1212, 1223 (9th Cir. 2007). “Ignorance of court rules does not constitute 

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excusable neglect, even if the litigant appears pro se.” Swimmer v. IRS, 811 F.2d 1343, 

1345 (9th Cir. 1987). As with pleadings drafted by lawyers, a court need not accept as 

true unreasonable inferences or conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual 

allegations. W. Min. Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).

DISCUSSION

A) Plaintiff’s Federal Claims Under Title VII

Plaintiff brings her first, second, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action under Title 

VII on the basis that she was discriminated against because of her national origin during 

her hiring, employment, and subsequent termination with Defendant. See ECF No. 1-2;

Complaint at 11. SWA challenges these causes of action on statute of limitations 

grounds and on the merits. The Court addresses these arguments in turn.

i) Statute of Limitations for Plaintiff’s Title VII Claims 

Defendant contends that all of Plaintiff’s causes of actions premised on Title VII 

are time-barred due to Plaintiff’s failure to timely file her Complaint. Specifically, 

Defendant avers that “[f]or Title VII [. . .] claims, a Plaintiff must file within 90 days of 

receipt of a right-to-sue letter.” Gamble v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 348 F.

Supp. 3d 1003, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2018). Moreover, Defendant notes that Plaintiff’s EEOC 

notice, which issued on March 29, 2017, and marked as received on April 7, 2017, 

provided that Plaintiff’s Title VII claims “must be filed within 90 days of [ ] receipt of 

this notice; or your right to sue based on this charge will be lost.” Id. (Emphasis in 

original). Based on the Dismissal of Notice of Rights from the EEOC, Defendant 

proffers that Plaintiff was required to file her lawsuit by June 28, 2017. Since Plaintiff 

commenced this action in state court on November 27, 2017, Defendant avers that 

Plaintiff’s late filing is inexcusably fatal to her Title VII claims. 

Plaintiff does not dispute that she received a right to sue notice from the EEOC that 

was issued on March 29, 2017. Plaintiff also does not contest that her right to sue notice 

instructed her to file a lawsuit within 90 days of her receipt of the notice if she intended 

to bring to bring any Title VII claims. Plaintiff further agrees that she filed her complaint 

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on November 27, 2017. However, Plaintiff argues that her Title VII claims are timely 

because she filed her complaint in state court and was therefore not subject to the statute 

of limitations set forth in the EEOC right to sue notice. As such, Plaintiff submits that 

her claims cannot be time-barred because she had brought them in state court within one 

year of the notice. 

The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff’s Title VII claims are time-barred. 

The Dismissal and Notice of Rights that Plaintiff received from the EEOC made clear 

through multiple unambiguous instructions, in all-capital letters and underlined with bold 

typeface, that Plaintiff was required to file her lawsuit within ninety days of receipt of the 

notice to comply with the statute of limitations for Title VII claims. ECF No. 42-5 at 

274-75; Ex. 36. The notice further clarifies that “in order to avoid any question that you

did not act in a timely manner, it is prudent that your suit be filed within 90 days of the 

date this Notice was mailed to you (as indicated where the Notice is signed) or the date 

of the postmark, if later.” Id at 275. (Emphasis in original). Thus, Plaintiff cannot argue 

that she had inadequate notice of the ninety-day deadline to file her lawsuit. In addition, 

it appears that Plaintiff has filed at least three additional Title VII lawsuits that entail the

same administrative requirements as here. ECF No. 42-1 at 18. See Hukman v. U.S. 

Airways/American Airlines, et al. 2:17cv-00742-JS (E.D. Penn.); see also Hukman v. 

Communication Worker of America, et al. 2:17-cv-00741-JS (E.D. Penn.); Hukman v. 

Alaska Airlines CV18-01104-PHX-DLR (D. Az.). A review of the evidentiary record 

uncovers no basis for equitable tolling and Plaintiff has not put forth this argument. And 

finally, Plaintiff is mistaken that her Title VII claims are timely simply because she filed 

her action in state court. Since Plaintiff elected to bring claims under Title VII, she was 

required to comply with the statute of limitations applicable to Title VII claims, 

regardless of the forum in which she chose to initiate her lawsuit. 

The law is clear on this matter. In Iniguez v. Boyd Corp., 2009 WL 2058529, *5-6 

(E.D. Cal. July 13, 2009), a plaintiff’s Title VII claims filed in state court were time 

barred because Plaintiff filed his complaint more than ninety days after receipt of the 

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right to sue notice. See also Ioane v. Hawaii, 2001 WL 399465 (9th Cir. Apr. 18, 2001). 

This limitations period has been strictly enforced against pro se and represented litigants 

alike. See Payan v. Aramark Management Service Ltd. Partnership, 495 F.3d 1119, 1127 

(9th Cir. 2007) (where the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision to grant

summary judgment for defendant against a pro se plaintiff on the basis that plaintiff’s 

claims on the basis were untimely because they were filed three days beyond the ninetyday period). Here, Plaintiff similarly chose to bring claims under Title VII, which are 

strictly bound by the deadline prescribed in her EEOC right to sue letter. The fact that 

Plaintiff filed her complaint in state court – and that it was later removed to this court –

does not alter the federal nature of her claims. Although Plaintiff arguably had until July 

6, 2017 to bring a lawsuit based on the letter’s date received stamp,3she did not file her 

complaint until November 27, 2017. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s delay in 

bringing her lawsuit – nearly eight months after her right-to-sue notice was issued –

constitutes independent grounds to render her Title VII claims incurably time-barred. As 

such, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to 

Plaintiff’s first, second, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action under Title VII.

ii) The Merits of Plaintiff’s Causes of Action for Discrimination Under

Title VII Based on National Origin (Count 1)

Even if Plaintiff’s Title VII claims were not time barred, the Court also finds that 

Plaintiff’s Title VII causes of action fail as a matter of law. To establish a prima facie 

case of discrimination on the basis of national origin, Plaintiff must prove that: (1) [s]he 

belongs to a protected class; (2) [s]he was qualified for the position; (3) [s]he was subject 

 

3 When it is unclear as to when a Plaintiff’s received her right-to-sue notice, some courts have used 

three-day, five-day, or seven-day presumption periods after the date of issuance to establish the date of 

receipt. See Payan v. Aramark Management Services Ltd. Partnership, 495 F.3d 1119, 1124-26 (9th 

Cir.) (2007). In the briefing papers, Defendant appears to suggest that the date of issuance of the EEOC 

notice – March 29, 2017 – also serves as the date of receipt. However, in this case, the Court will use 

the “received” stamp marked on the letter of April 7, 2017 – a full nine days after the issuance of the 

letter and the interpretation most generous to the Plaintiff – to calculate the statute of limitations.

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to an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside [her] 

protected class were treated more favorably.” Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, Bd. Of 

Trustees, 225 F.3d 1115, 1123 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). If a Plaintiff fails to allege “specific facts” to establish a 

prima facie case for discrimination, a Defendant is entitled to summary judgment. 

Palmer v. U.S., 794 F.2d 534, 536-39 (9th Cir. 1986). But if Plaintiff establishes a prima 

facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to SWA to articulate “some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action.” Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1123-1124. If 

SWA again meets this burden, then Plaintiff must show that the articulated reasons were 

pretext for another discriminatory motive.

To support her claims, Plaintiff points to several instances of conduct: (1) that she 

was not hired as a supervisor because of her ethnicity; (2) that she was “purposely” 

provided with the wrong uniform size as a result of discrimination; (3) that her 

supervisor, Mr. Randall Riddle, conducted a “false” audit of her work that was based on

discrimination and “his own opinion;” (4) that Plaintiff was treated differently from other 

similar situated probationary employees; (5) that she was harassed and threatened by 

other employees based on her national origin; (6) and that she was terminated “without an 

investigation” in retaliation for protected actions.” Id.

Turning to the substance of Plaintiff’s Title VII national origin discrimination 

claims, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to present specific and sufficient evidence 

of national origin discrimination. The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is a member of 

a protected class with respect to her national origin. However, the parties disagree 

whether Plaintiff has established the remaining elements of a prima facie case of 

discrimination. Plaintiff’s claims of discrimination are confounding, unsupported and 

warrant summary judgment in favor of Defendant. 

1. Defendant’s Decision Not to Hire Plaintiff as a Customer Service 

Supervisor 

Beginning with SWA’s decision not to hire Plaintiff as a Customer Service 

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Supervisor, there is no genuine issue of material fact that Defendant’s actions were not 

motivated by Plaintiff’s national origin. In her Complaint, Plaintiff contends that she was 

denied employment by Defendant as a supervisor because of her national origin. See

ECF No. 1-2; Complaint at 13. This discrimination claim in Count I overlaps with 

Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action – denial of hiring in violation of Title VII. As such, 

the Court will address them together. 

Without providing any factual support, Plaintiff contends that she was not selected 

for the supervisor position because “they don’t like somebody who has an accent.” ECF 

No. 42-5 at 16; Hukman Depo. I, 179:16-180:6. Plaintiff bases this theory on the belief 

that her interview “went very well” and she “answered all the questions accurately as a 

successful customer service supervisor who had a lot of experience.” ECF No. 1-2 at 4. 

Moreover, Plaintiff asserts that she was qualified for the position because she “Belong to 

a Racial Minority” and that SWA discriminated against her when they – despite allegedly 

informing her that they typically promoted supervisors internally – “hired individuals 

from outside the company who doesn’t have an Airline experience and was not qualified 

for the position.” Id. 

As a starting point, SWA maintains that Plaintiff’s claims lack any factual support 

whatsoever. In addition, SWA notes that Plaintiff has admitted that no one at SWA told 

her they did not like her accent. SWA also points to Hukman’s candidate evaluation for 

the SAN CSSII – or San Diego Customer Service Supervisor – position, which states: 

“Sheida has a lot of experience – but very low key – unable to really sell herself as a 

leader at SWA. She never had challenges with her senior employees. Anything she 

would request of them, they would comply. She appeared very nervous, soft spoken, and 

timid in her interview. She wasn’t as competitive as our other candidates.” ECF No. 42-

5 at 277, Ex. 39. In that same evaluation form, interviewer Pat Lyson also unequivocally 

chose not to recommend her for the position. Id. Defendant notes that the evaluation 

review was utterly silent as to Plaintiff’s national origin. Id. Defendant argues that 

Plaintiff has failed to offer any support for her claim that she was qualified for the 

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Customer Service Supervisor position, subjected to an adverse employment action, or 

presented any “specific facts” that SWA’s decision not to hire her as a supervisor was 

motivated by her national origin. Accordingly, Defendant avers that summary judgment 

is warranted. 

Assuming that Plaintiff was qualified to serve as customer service supervisor, she 

has failed to offer facts to show that she was treated differently from similarly situated 

individuals. She offers no facts to support the claim that SWA hired unqualified or lessqualified individuals for the supervisor position. Plaintiff’s bald contentions are 

thoroughly unsupported and are textbook examples of conclusory allegations. Plaintiff’s 

mere belief that her interview “went very well” and her subjective conviction that her 

background was suitable for the position are insufficient to establish that she was entitled 

to the supervisory position or discriminated against based upon national origin. Cf. Arya 

v. CalPERS, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1070 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (plaintiff’s “subjective belief 

that defendant’s agents intentionally misrepresented his eligibility for [a retirement 

program] because they identified his accent and last name as being Iranian and sought to 

discriminate against him based on his national origin is entirely speculative.”) In 

addition, Plaintiff’s admissions that no one at SWA made any comments about Plaintiff’s 

accent, ethnicity, or national origin during the hiring process cut against her attempts to 

establish any discriminatory basis for Defendant’s actions. Thus, summary judgment on 

the merits is warranted on this claim.

2. Plaintiff’s Cause of Action for Denial of Proper Training

Next, Plaintiff contends that Defendant denied her proper training as required for 

her role as a Customer Service Agent because of her Iraqi national origin. ECF No. 1-2; 

Complaint at 13. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that she was forced to work by herself 

at the ticket counter during her second week of training and did not receive the same 

amount of “one-on-one” training time as other new hires. Plaintiff suggests this was 

“done purposely, you know, by Southwest Airlines, so I could make a mistake or 

something so they could fire me immediately.” ECF 42-5 at 79. This discrimination 

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claim embedded in Count One is the same as Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action – that she 

was denied proper training as a customer service agent in violation of Title VII – and as 

such, the Court will address them simultaneously.

Once again, Defendant submits that Plaintiff has “proffered no evidence to 

establish that she was provided any training that was different or less than training 

provided to other new hires.” ECF No. 42 at 27.

The Court agrees. Plaintiff has not provided any evidence showing that her training 

was qualitatively less or different than the training provided to others. Nothing in the 

record shows that Plaintiff received training that was outside the norm of the standard 

training process at SWA. Plaintiff’s own training schedule shows that she was provided 

classroom training at SWAU University, on-the-job training at San Diego Airport, and 

training at Defendant’s Dallas headquarters for approximately six weeks. And in the 

parties’ statements of undisputed facts, Plaintiff agrees that Mr. Klatt “provided training 

for new hire employees regarding the ‘mechanisms of the computer, policies of the 

company, how to execute customer service, the check-in process, and the customer 

service skills needed to facilitate the customers of Defendant.’” ECF No. 57-1 at 22-23; 

see also EF No. 42-5 at 428-429. Plaintiff has also offered no evidence – beyond her 

unsubstantiated belief that another Hispanic employee4 was provided more training –

which shows that other new hires had more favorable training schedules or received more 

training time than she did. And finally, there is absolutely no evidence that could support 

Plaintiff’s meritless allegation that SWA purposefully conspired and forced her to work 

without a trainer – simply so that they could orchestrate her termination when she made 

mistakes. As such, Plaintiff has failed to proffer evidence creating a genuine issue of 

material fact that she was denied proper training due to her national origin and summary 

 

4 The Court notes that Plaintiff reached a conclusion about the other employee’s ethnicity based on her 

perception that the woman did not have an accent when she spoke Spanish. As such, the Court is 

uncertain as to the national origin of the other employee, but recognizes that this fact is immaterial to the 

legal analysis. 

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judgment on this claim is warranted on the merits. 

3. Plaintiff’s Discrimination Claims Based on Her Termination

Plaintiff claims that she was discriminated against based on her national origin 

when her employment with Defendant was terminated. See ECF No. 1-2; Complaint at 

11. However, Hukman has failed to present evidence creating a genuine issue of material 

fact that her termination was due to discrimination.

a. Whether Plaintiff Was Qualified for Her Position 

As a probationary Customer Service Agent, Plaintiff was required to maintain a 

positive relationship with customers, work in a cooperative spirit to ensure the success of 

SWA, and greet customers in a polite and friendly manner. The undisputed record shows 

that Plaintiff actively did not demonstrate the ability to “work well with others as part of 

a team [ . . . ] and work under stressful situations,” skills required by the job description 

for a Customer Service Agent. ECF No. 42-5 at 98; Hukman Depo. II, 377:16-378:14; 

Ex. 13. Moreover, Plaintiff’s concerning interactions with Ms. Farson and Mr. Riddle –

which resulted in disciplinary meetings and write-ups – suffice as examples of Plaintiff’s 

inability to work well with others, maintain positive relationships, and work 

cooperatively with others. See Pivirotto v. Innovative Systems, Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 353 

(3rd Cir. 1999) (“If a plaintiff cannot prove that she was qualified for a position [ . . . ] it 

is clear why her discrimination case should fail.”) 

The above facts support the conclusion that Plaintiff was not qualified to perform 

the responsibilities of a Customer Service Agent. 

b. Whether Plaintiff was Treated Differently from Similarly 

Situated Individuals Outside of Her Protected Class

Assuming Plaintiff could establish that she was qualified for her position, her 

prima facie for discrimination would still fail because she has offered no evidence 

supporting that other similarly situated individuals outside of her protected class were 

treated differently. In the context of termination, Plaintiff must show that her termination 

“occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.’” Coleman 

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v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1281 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Rose v. Wells Fargo &

Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1421 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Plaintiff has provided no evidence that other probationary employees with different 

national origins were treated better than she was. The Court can identify only one 

instance where Plaintiff suggests that she was treated differently from any individuals. 

Specifically, Plaintiff claims that “Ms. Farson been going around investigating the 

Plaintiff, to set her up for a permanent termination to help the flight attendant Ms. 

Williams-Anderson to continue to commit illegal activity, because She is Caucasian and 

the Plaintiff is Kurdish and not allowed to complain about Caucasian even if she is 

involved in committing illegal activity.” ECF No. 1-2; Complaint at 7. However, this 

assertion is just one in a string of allegations involving an individual Laura WilliamsAnderson who is referred to throughout the Complaint as someone who had “Learned the 

art of invisibility” and was informing SWA employees that Plaintiff was a “terrorist.” Id. 

at 4, 6. Other than these fanciful claims, there is no evidence suggesting that Hukman was 

treated less favorably than others based on her national origin. 

c. Whether Defendant Terminated Plaintiff’s Employment for 

Legitimate Non-Discriminatory Reasons

If Plaintiff were able to establish a prima facie case of discrimination – which, as 

discussed above, she cannot – the burden shifts to SWA to articulate “some legitimate 

non-discriminatory reason for the challenged action.” Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1123-1124. 

If Defendant meets this burden, then Plaintiff must show that the articulated reasons were 

pretext for another discriminatory motive. Defendant has presented two categories of 

reasons for Hukman’s termination: (1) her inability to work with others in accordance 

with her job performance requirements; and (2) her insubordination and unprofessional 

behavior in response to constructive criticism. 

There is no genuine issue of material fact that SWA’s actions were not motivated 

by Hukman’s national origin. The record shows that SWA terminated Plaintiff following 

her failure to pass probation because of her poor job performance, insubordination, and 

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repeated unprofessional incidents with other employees. Courts have long recognized 

that inadequate job performance constitutes a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for 

terminating an employee’s employment. Aragon v. Repub. Silver State Disposal, Inc., 

292 F.3d 654, 660-61 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming summary judgment in favor of an 

employer that chose to terminate a plaintiff’s employment for working too slowly in a 

Title VII discrimination case); see also Bradly v. Harcourt, Brace and Co., 104 F.3d 267, 

270 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming summary judgment in favor of an employer that provided 

evidence of plaintiff’s poor performance). 

Defendant relies on a number of documented and undisputed examples which 

substantiate Plaintiff’s poor job performance. First, Plaintiff was called in for a meeting 

with supervisors to address her interactions with Ms. Farson about the uniform 

purchasing policy. ECF No. 42-3 at 13-14. During that meeting, Plaintiff was dismissive 

and blatantly unreceptive to feedback about the interpersonal issues and repeatedly 

sought to blame others who were uninvolved. She also began accusing other employees 

– without support – of threatening her. Next, Plaintiff was defiant and argumentative in 

response to her 50-day evaluation. She openly disagreed with the supervisor and refused 

to sign the evaluation. Id. After her Soft Skills Audit, Plaintiff refused to acknowledge 

any suggested areas of improvement and reacted unprofessionally to any constructive 

feedback and criticism in the audit. During the meeting, Plaintiff reacted 

unprofessionally, raised her voice and accused the supervisor of being a liar, and refused 

to change her demeanor when another supervisor was brought in to intervene. Once 

again, Plaintiff refused to sign the audit report, claiming that it was not a valid 

documentation. Id. And finally, Plaintiff admits that she had interpersonal issues and 

altercations with other staff members, including Taylor Farson and Jules Alviz, which 

resulted in multiple meetings with management. Over the course of these proceedings, 

Plaintiff has never denied any of these incidents. And although Plaintiff was 

reprimanded and reminded repeatedly of her duty to work professionally with her coworkers, Plaintiff continued to have insubordinate interactions with her coworkers. 

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Despite these numerous infractions, Hukman alleges that she was terminated for 

her national origin alone. She argues that she received accolades for her job performance 

and “excellent performance evaluations” that “Southwest Airlines refused to Produce.” 

ECF No. 53 at 17-18. In addition, Hukman “denies ever not being Friendly,” and 

“worked well with all passengers and Co-workers.” Id. To illustrate her argument, 

Plaintiff avers that “no Complaint was filed” against her and that she was never given 

negative feedback. Id. 

The Court finds that the record comprehensively contradicts Plaintiff’s 

unsupported assertions about her job performance. Conversely, there is an abundance of 

evidence that suggests that Defendant had “concerns [about Plaintiff] almost from the 

start of her employment.” ECF No. 42-3 at 13. Moreover, courts have found that a 

Plaintiff’s “subjective personal judgments of [her] own competence alone do not raise a 

genuine issue of material fact.” Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1285 (9th 

Cir. 2000). As such, Plaintiff’s unsubstantiated claims about her performance cannot 

stack up against the heavy weight of the evidence supporting Plaintiff’s repeated 

instances of poor performance and insubordinate behavior. And finally, Plaintiff herself 

acknowledges that no one gave her any reasons for her termination other than she was not 

a “good fit” and could not pass the probationary period. ECF No. 42-5, Hukman Depo. 

II, 444:14-19. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendant has articulated legitimate 

non-discriminatory performance-based reasons for Plaintiff’s discharge. 

d. Pretext for Discrimination Claims

As discussed above, Defendant has met its burden by articulating a legitimate 

reason for Plaintiff’s termination. In such circumstances, the presumption of unlawful 

discrimination “simply drops out of the picture,” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 

U.S. 502, 511 (1993), and under the McConnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework, 

Hukman would now bear the burden of persuading the Court that the stated reason for the 

discharge was false and the true reason for the discharge was discrimination on the basis 

of her national origin. To do so, Plaintiff must “do more than establish a prima facie case 

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and deny the credibility of the [defendant’s] witnesses.” Walls v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 

F.3d 885, 890 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). While the Court has found that Plaintiff 

has failed to establish her prima facie case, for the sake of completeness, the Court also 

concludes that Hukman has failed to offer sufficient evidence of pretext. 

To establish pretext, Plaintiff must present “specific and substantial evidence that 

[Defendant’s] reasons are really a pretext for [national origin] discrimination.” Aragon, 

292 F.3d at 661. However, Plaintiff cannot prove pretext by showing that Defendant’s 

acts were “foolish or trivial or even baseless.” Johnson v. Nordstrom, Inc., 260 F.3d 27, 

733 (9th Cir. 2001). Courts only require that “an employer honestly believed its reason 

for its action.” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(internal quotations omitted). And “[m]ere assertions of discriminatory motive and intent 

[. . .] are inadequate” to support a claim of disparate treatment on the basis of national 

origin.” Foster v. Arcata Assocs., Inc., 772 F.2d 1453, 1459 (9th Cir. 1985), overruled

on other grounds by Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1991); Ray v. 

Tandem Computers, Inc., 63 F.3d 429, 434 (5th Cir. 1995). In keeping with all 

discrimination cases, “[p]roof of discriminatory motive is critical.” Int’l Bhd. Of 

Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 325, 344 n.15 (1977). 

Hukman has produced no meaningful evidence indicating either that SWA’s 

explanation was false or that her superiors at SWA harbored discriminatory animus 

towards her because of her national origin. Hukman’s claims that she had been 

performing her job adequately and that she worked well with her co-workers are not 

supported by the record. Moreover, an employee’s subjective personal judgments of her 

own competence alone do not raise a genuine issue of material fact. Schuler v. Chronicle 

Broadcasting Co., Inc., 793 F.2d 1010, 1011 (9th Cir. 1986). In addition, Plaintiff does 

not dispute the occurrence of any of the incidents that Defendant identified. When asked 

to explain the ways she felt discriminated against or treated inappropriately, Plaintiff 

offers – in both her Complaint and deposition testimony – vague conclusory conjectures, 

suspicions, and references to the woman named Laura Williams Anderson: “They 

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discriminated against me because – because not what Laura Williams what she told them 

because of my national origin, because they are – you know, they discriminate. That’s in 

their head and in their mind.” ECF No. 42-5 at 85. Plaintiff further opines that if Laura 

Williams Anderson had not said anything about her being “a terrorist,” she would still be 

working at Southwest Airlines. Id. at 4-5.5 

 

5 The Court is aware that Plaintiff has filed lawsuits against three different airlines for actions that she 

alleges involve a former coworker named Laura Williams Anderson. Plaintiff contends that she 

previously worked at U.S. Airways with Ms. Williams Anderson and believes that Ms. Williams

Anderson was also employed by Defendant when Plaintiff began her probationary employment. 

Plaintiff has accused Ms. Williams Anderson of “Attempted Murder right after filling the Lawsuit 

Against SouthWest Airline in November 2017” and has unsuccessfully demanded information about 

Ms. Williams Anderson from the FBI. ECF No. 50 at 34. On November 29, 2017, Plaintiff filed a 

police report about Ms. Williams Anderson, which stated: 

“Hukman claimed her former co-worker Laura Williams-Anderson has put tracking device on her car to 

track her everywhere she goes. On 11/28/17 she left work around 0610 hours and pulled into 

Wholefood grocery store because she was falling asleep at the wheel and woke up at 1245 hours and 

noticed Williams-Anderson in her car. She claimed Williams-Anderson put something in her car that 

made her sleepy. She said she doesn’t know exactly what Williams-Anderson did to her. She said said 

Williams-Anderson carry around fake court order that she has guardianship over her, talks to her

employer which created problems and issue at work.” ECF No. 59-8 at 46. 

Here, Plaintiff’s Title VII, retaliation, and harassment claims derive in large part from her belief that Ms. 

Williams Anderson conspired with employees at SWA to discriminate against her for previously 

reporting that Ms. Williams Anderson – and other employees at American Airlines – practiced, among 

other things, the “Art of Invisibility.” ECF No. 1-2 at 5. Throughout her deposition testimony, Plaintiff 

argues that Ms. Williams-Anderson “contacted the agents” to tell them that Plaintiff was a terrorist and 

also contends that Ms. Laura Williams-Anderson specifically showed up at Plaintiff’s gate to call her a 

“terrorist” at the San Diego Airport. ECF No. 42-5 at 86-87. In her Complaint, Plaintiff makes other 

numerous references to Ms. Williams Anderson: 

(1) “[Taylor Farson] was instructed by the Station Manager Mr. Tom Starr to intentionally 

discriminate, retaliate, and terminate the Plaintiff employment with Southwest Airline because 

Mr. Tom Starr was a Friend of a Southwest Airline Flight Attendant “ Ms. Laura WilliamsAnderson,” Caucasion “who committed Illegal Activity by smuggling herself, friends and family 

members without listing Them in the manifest and introduce the Iranian to Airline Employees so, 

they could get the airline and airport information from the Airline Employee” worked for the 

Iranian” , and Learned the art of invisibility.” Id. at 5. 

(2) “The Senior agent Ms. Jules Alvis Knew the policy and [ . . . ] in a threatening manner ‘be 

careful You are in a probation , they are going to terminate your employment , because you took 

the Flight Attendant Ms. Laura Williams-Anderson to court to get an order of protection.’” Id. at 

7. 

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None of Plaintiff’s beliefs are supported by the record. In Arya v. CalPERS, an 

Iranian employee alleged that his surname and accent gave rise to an inference of 

discriminatory animus. 943 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1070 (C.D. Cal. 2013). There, the Court 

found that the plaintiff’s “subjective belief that defendant’s agents intentionally 

misrepresented his eligibility for [a retirement program] because they identified his 

accent and last name as being Iranian and sought to discriminate against him based on his 

national origin is entirely speculative.” Id. As such, the Court granted the defendant’s 

motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). 

Id. Here, there is no evidence that shows Hukman was treated less favorably because of 

her national origin or that her national origin played any role in SWA’s decision-making 

process with regard to her termination. Plaintiff’s conjectures and suspicions about the 

reasons for her termination strain credulity and are wholly devoid of evidentiary support. 

The Court further notes that Plaintiff has provided no evidence to rebut SWA’s showing 

that Plaintiff was fired for nondiscriminatory reasons. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff 

cannot establish the reasons for her termination were pretextual. 

iii. Plaintiff’s Second and Third Causes of Action for Retaliation Under Title 

VII and FEHA

Plaintiff also brings retaliation claims under Title VII and the FEHA. Both Title 

 

(3) “Mr. McGinley stated that Ms. Farson has been going around investigating the Plaintiff , to set 

her up for a permanent termination to help the flight attendant Ms. Williams-Anderson to 

continue to commit illegal activity, because She is Caucasian and the Plaintiff is Kurdish and not 

allowed to complain about Caucasian even if she is involved in committing illegal activity.” Id. 

None of Hukman’s assertions about Ms. Williams Anderson have any evidentiary basis in the record. In 

fact, there is no evidence that suggests that any of the individuals involved in this matter are at all 

acquainted with Ms. Williams Anderson. And moreover, the Court finds that many of Plaintiff’s claims 

regarding invisibility and Ms. Williams Anderson cannot be construed as true, as they are fantastic and 

“defy reality as we know it.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (finding that “claims 

about little green men, or the plaintiff’s recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel” constitute 

fantastic allegations). As such, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not presented any genuine issue of 

material fact as to these implausible and wholly unsupported claims. Accordingly, the Court also 

GRANTS summary judgment with respect to these claims. 

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VII and the FEHA prohibit retaliation against an employee for opposing any practices 

forbidden by these statutes. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(h). To 

establish a prima facie case for retaliation under both federal and state law, Hukman must 

prove that she (1) engaged in a protected activity; (2) suffered an adverse employment 

action, and (3) can demonstrate the existence of a causal link between the protected 

activity and the adverse action. Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prds., Inc., 

212 F.3d 493, 506 (9th Cir. 2000); Lewis v. City of Benicia, 224 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 1533 

(2014). Here, Plaintiff is unable to establish a prima facie case because she has shown 

neither that she engaged in a protected activity nor that a causal nexus exists between any 

alleged protected activity and her termination. 

1. Whether Plaintiff Engaged in Protected Activity

To prevail on a claim of Title VII retaliation, Plaintiff must first demonstrate that 

she engaged in a “statutorily protected expression.” E.E.O.C. v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 

720 F.2d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 1983). “Protected activity encompasses participation in 

enforcing one’s rights under Title VII or opposition to an employer’s discriminatory 

conduct under Title VII.” Arya, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 1071 (citing Learned v. City of 

Bellevue, 860 F.2d 929, 932-933 (9th Cir. 1988)). Hukman must also prove “but-for” 

causation, or in other words, that “the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the 

absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. 

Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360-61 (2013). If Hukman is able to establish this 

prima facie case, the burden would shift back to SWA to articulate a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 

Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).

Defendant argues that neither Plaintiff’s complaint – nor her deposition testimony 

– offer any facts to suggest that she opposed any allegedly unlawful employment 

practices in violation of Title VII throughout the course of her employment with 

Defendant. According to SWA, Plaintiff’s admits that she did not complain prior to the 

termination of her employment and rather that she only complained of harassment and 

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discrimination after she was advised of her termination. Absent any protected activity, 

Defendant surmises that Plaintiff’s termination cannot be considered retaliatory as a 

matter of law. 

Plaintiff counters that she she “complained of Harassment and Retaliation Based 

on National Origin to Mr. Larimore on September 15th, 2016 Various Times and also 

complained various Times and also complained to Mr. irv Adams.” ECF No. 53 at 27. 

In addition, Plaintiff points to her documented complaints about Ms. Jules Alviz on 

September 15, 2016, when Plaintiff claims that Ms. Alviz threatened her by saying that 

“You are on probation and you need to be careful of what you say.” Plaintiff also notes 

that after she was informed of her termination, she notified Defendant that she had been

discriminated against and allegedly called a “shishkabob” by multiple co-worker. ECF 

No. 42-5, Hukman Depo. II, 317:23-318:6. 

Once again, the Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff cannot establish that she 

engaged in a statutorily protected expression. First, it is well-established that “complaints 

about personal grievance or vague or conclusory remarks that fail to put an employer on 

notice as to what conduct it should investigate will not suffice to establish protected 

conduct.” Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1047 (2005). Similarly, 

“where there is no evidence the employer knew that the employee’s opposition was based 

upon a reasonable belief that the employer was engaging in discrimination,” an 

employee’s unarticulated belief that an employer has engaged in discrimination cannot 

serve as grounds to establish protected conduct for a prima facie case of retaliation. Id. at 

1046. 

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s own testimony conclusively confirms that she never 

complained about any allegedly discriminatory conduct during the duration of her 

employment. ECF No. 42-5 at 116-20. Although it is undisputed that Plaintiff 

complained about Ms. Alviz on September 15, 2016, the record shows that Plaintiff did 

not allege until after her termination that Ms. Alviz’s statements were discriminatory in 

nature. The record also proves that Plaintiff’s assertions about being called a 

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“shishkabob” did not occur until after her September 15, 2016 meeting with with Mr. 

Larimore. See ECF No. 42-5, Hukman Depo. II, 317:23-318:6. As such, there is no 

evidence that SWA was ever placed on notice about Plaintiff’s concerns or grievances 

about possible discrimination until after she was advised of her termination. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish that she engaged in protected activity during 

the course of employment. Thus, Plaintiff’s prima facie case for retaliation fails on the 

first prong.

6

2. Whether Plaintiff Can Establish Pretext of Retaliation

Under Title VII, a plaintiff must prove that Defendant’s retaliation was the “but 

for” cause of the adverse employment action. In other words, the Plaintiff must establish 

“unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful 

action or actions of the employer.” Univ. of Texas Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 

S. Ct. 2517, 2532-34 (2013); Stilwell v. City of Williams, 831 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2016). 

If an employer proves that it would have taken the same adverse action regardless of a 

retaliatory motive, then Plaintiff’s case for retaliation would still fail. 

The FEHA similarly requires the plaintiff to prove either that the employer’s 

legitimate, non-retaliatory reason is pretextual or that the challenged action resulted from 

retaliatory animus. Joaquin v. City of Los Angeles, 202 Cal. App. 4th 1207, 1226 (2012). 

Moreover, any circumstantial evidence of pretext must be “specific” and “substantial.”. 

Bergene v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 272 F.3d 1136, 1142 

(9th Cir. 2001). 

The Court has already found that Defendant’s proffered reasons for terminating her 

employment cannot be construed as pretextual under her Title VII discrimination claims. 

 

6 Although Plaintiff’s prima facie case for discrimination fails on the first element of the claim – for 

failure to prove that she engaged in protected activity, the Court has already found that Defendant 

articulated legitimate and non-retaliatory reasons for terminating Plaintiff’s employment. These 

legitimate and non-retaliatory reasons have already been identified and discussed at length in the Court’s 

analysis of Plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination claims, which begin on page 21 of this order. 

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That same analysis is equally applicable here. Even if the Court were to assume in the 

alternative that Plaintiff had engaged in protected activity, Hukman has not offered any 

evidence – direct or circumstantial – that Defendant’s motivations in terminating her 

employment for poor job performance gave rise to an inference of discrimination. As 

discussed above, Plaintiff’s subjective disagreements with Defendant’s assessment of her 

performance are insufficient to defeat summary judgment on this issue absent additional 

evidence of pretext. Since there is no evidence to support a causal connection between 

her alleged complaints and the termination of her employment, Plaintiff’s state and 

federal retaliation claims cannot survive summary judgment as a matter of law. 

iii. Plaintiff’s Sixth Cause of Action for Harassment 

Plaintiff also raises harassment claims under Title VII and FEHA. To prevail, 

Plaintiff must show not only that she was subjected to unwelcome verbal or physical

conduct of a protected characteristic, but also that the the conduct was severe or 

pervasive enough to actually alter the conditions of Plaintiff’s employment such that they 

created an abusive work environment. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 

7786 (1998) (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); Vasquez 

v. County of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming the dismissal of hostile 

work environment claims on summary judgment). Although commonly alleged in 

connection with sex and gender, a hostile work environment claim may also be based on 

other protected characteristics such as race. Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 942 (considering 

racially based harassment that created hostile work environment). Title VII hostile work 

standards are equally applicable to claims under the FEHA. Lelaind v. City and Cnty. of 

San Francisco, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (N.D. Cal 2008). 

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s harassment claims derive 

in part from her belief that the aforementioned Ms. Williams-Anderson engaged in a 

conspiratorial effort with SWA to encourage other employees to harass Plaintiff for 

reporting that Ms. Williams-Anderson practiced the “Art of Invisibility” and illegal 

activity. The Court has already addressed why Plaintiff’s allegations should be denied on 

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their fantastical and unrealistic basis alone. However, in analyzing the remainder of 

Plaintiff’s harassment claims, the Court will attempt to extricate her harassment claims 

from those involving invisibility and the wholly unsubstantiated illegal activity of others. 

Plaintiff points to several specific instances of alleged harassment throughout her 

employment with SWA. First, Plaintiff alleges that Customer Service agents Al Alviz 

and Jules Alviz called Plaintiff a “shishkabob” two times and one time respectively. ECF

No. 42-5 at 90. In addition, Plaintiff claims that on one occasion after the uniform 

incident, Ms. Alviz pointed her finger at Plaintiff while stating, “You are on probation 

and you need to be careful of what you say.” ECF No. 42-5 at 272. Next, Plaintiff 

asserts that the day before the termination of her employment, Customer Service 

Supervisor Randall Riddle mocked Plaintiff’s accent by “talking like” Plaintiff to 

passengers while observing her for a Soft Skills Audit. ECF No. 42-5 at 23. And finally, 

Plaintiff claims – for the first time in her opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment – that another supervisor, Mr. Christman, referred to her as a “shishkabob” 

when she refused to sign her audit review. ECF No. 53 at 10, 24. 

Plaintiff has provided shifting and vacillating accounts of when these statements 

were made, by whom they were made, and exactly what was said.7 Plaintiff has 

presented no corroborating evidence for any of these allegations. But even taking 

Plaintiff’s disputed allegations as true, Plaintiff’s allegations do not rise to the level of 

severe or pervasive harassment that would alter the conditions of her employment. 

 

7

It is also established that “the general rule in the Ninth Circuit is that a party cannot create an issue of 

fact by an affidavit [or statement] contradicting his prior deposition testimony.” Yeager v. Bowlin, 693 

F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2012); Van Asdale v. International Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 

2009). During Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, she stated that she had already described all incidents of 

discrimination and did not identify that Mr. Christman used the term “shishkabob” in her deposition 

testimony. ECF No. 42-5 at 85-86. Plaintiff’s statement that Mr. Christman also used the term 

“shishkabob” in her opposition improperly contradicts the relevant deposition testimony. And 

moreover, the Court finds that conclusory and speculative testimony is insufficient to raise genuine 

issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publ’g Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 

738 (9th Cir. 1979). 

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To determine whether conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive enough to 

warrant liability, courts look to all the circumstances including the frequency of the 

discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or 

a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s 

work performance. Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 

2001) (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)). In addition, the 

working environment must be both objectively hostile, as perceived by a reasonable 

person, and subjectively hostile, as perceived by the plaintiff herself. Id. at 872-73 (citing 

Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787 (1998). The law is well-settled that offhand comments and 

isolated incidents, unless extremely serious, do not typically rise to the level of 

discriminatory animus that would change the “terms and conditions” of a victim’s 

employment. Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2002); 

Faragher, 524 U.S. at 778; Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 37 F.3d 884, 893 (9th Cir. 

2002). Rather, a plaintiff pursuing a harassment claim must show a pattern of repeated, 

routine, or generalized harassment. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787. 

Plaintiff’s allegations of harassment do not rise to the standard for legally 

actionable harassment under either Title VII or FEHA. Some of Plaintiff’s claims – such 

as the accusation about Ms. Alviz’s cautionary words and Mr. Randall’s observations 

during her audit – do not necessarily indicate animus based on Hukman’s national origin. 

Even when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Hukman, all identified 

instances of national origin harassment taken together show that Hukman was subjected 

only to two or three offhand comments and isolated incidents of offensive conduct. 

Based on the legal standards under Title VII and FEHA, no reasonable jury could find 

that Plaintiff’s workplace was so “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, 

and insult [so] severe or pervasive [as] to alter the conditions of her employment and 

create an abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19-21 

(1993); see Robles v. Agreserves, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 3d 952 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (finding that 

plaintiff’s allegations that a Mexican supervisor called him a “stupid Mexican” almost 

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every day and asserting that he was “above all Mexicans” was not sufficiently severe or 

pervasive enough to interfere with a “a reasonable employee’s work performance” and 

seriously affect the “psychological well-being of an reasonable employee); see also 

Manatt v. Bank of America, 339 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that co-workers’ 

derogatory comments about Chinese people and communism, references to plaintiff as 

“China woman,” imitations and mockery of the appearance of Asians by pulling their 

eyes back with their fingers, and laughter at Plaintiff’s mispronunciations on account of 

her Chinese ethnicity did not constitute conduct severe, repeated, or pervasive enough to 

alter the conditions of Plaintiff’s employment); Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 307 

F.3d 884, 893 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding no hostile environment discrimination where the 

employee was told he had a “typical Hispanic macho attitude,” that he should work in the 

field because “Hispanics do good in the field,” and was yelled at in front of others); 

Kortan v. Cal. Youth Auth., 217 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding no hostile work 

environment where the supervisor referred to females as “castrating bitches,” 

“Madonnas,” or “Regina” in front of plaintiff on several occasions and directly called 

plaintiff “Medea”). Compare Kang, 295 F.3d at 817 (finding that a Korean plaintiff 

suffered national origin harassment where the employer verbally and physically abused 

the plaintiff because of his race); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 872-73 

(9th Cir. 2001) (finding a hostile work environment where a male employee was called 

“faggot” and “fucking female whore” by co-workers and supervisors at least once a week 

and often several times per day).

As a matter of law, the isolated claims in this instant case that Plaintiff attributes to 

her national origin animus do not come close to the type of pervasive and severe conduct 

required under Title VII and FEHA that would change the terms and conditions of her 

employment. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s 

claims of harassment. 

B. Plaintiff’s Seventh Cause of Action for Failure to Stop Discrimination and 

Harassment

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Employers must take “all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and 

harassment from occurring.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(k); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1) (under Title VII). However, an employer is not liable to an employee for failing 

to take reasonable steps to prevent discrimination unless the employee establishes that he 

or she actually suffered discrimination. See Tritchler v. Cnty. of Lake, 358 F.3d 1150, 

1154-55 (9th Cir. 2004) (“a finding of discrimination is required before a failure to 

investigate a discrimination complaint would become actionable [. . . ] if there is no 

discrimination, then the failure to investigate has no effect on the existence of a 

discrimination-free workplace.”) (citing Trujillo v. N. Cnty. Transit Dist., 63 Cal. App. 4th

280, 288-89 (1998); Cozzi v. Cnty. of Marin, 787 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 

2011) (granting summary judgment on plaintiff’s failure to prevent harassment and 

discrimination claim where plaintiff “has established no viable claim of discrimination or 

harassment.”) 

As discussed above, Plaintiff has not established viable discrimination or 

harassment claims. SWA cannot be liable for preventing discrimination or harassment in 

the absence of actual discrimination or harassment. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS 

summary judgment in favor of the Defendant on Plaintiff’s causes of action for failure to 

prevent discrimination or harassment.

C. Plaintiff’s Eighth Cause of Action for Wrongful Termination in Violation of 

Public Policy 

Plaintiff also raises a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. 

Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Defendant violated Title VII and the FEHA by 

discriminating, harassing, and retaliating against her. Defendant counters by asserting 

that since Plaintiff’s underlying claims for discrimination and harassment fail, her public 

policy claims must necessarily fail. 

Since the Court has already found that Plaintiff was not subject to unlawful 

discrimination, harassment, or retaliation, Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful termination in 

violation of public policy fails as a matter of law because no violation of public policy 

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occurred. See De Horney v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Assoc., 879 F.2d 459, 465 

(9th Cir. 1989) (finding that when plaintiff’s underlying FEHA claim fails, the claim for 

wrongful termination also fails). Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant is entitled 

to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s public policy claim.

D. Plaintiff’s Claim for Punitive Damages

Lastly, Plaintiff contends that she is entitled to punitive damages. To state a claim 

for punitive damages, Plaintiff must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that an 

officer, director, or managing agent of SWA acted with oppression, fraud, or malice, or 

ratified such conduct. Cal. Civ. Code § 3294; Basich v. Allstate Ins. Co., 87 Cal. App. 

4th 1112, 1118-19 (2001). Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages are founded largely 

through two assertions: (1) that Mr. Larimore, a station manager, committed “fraud” by 

submitting a “false declaration to the Court, and (2) that Ms. Laura Williams-Anderson 

“committed malice.” ECF No. 53 at 36. 

Plaintiff’s punitive damages claims cannot survive summary judgment. First, 

Plaintiff has offered no evidence that either Mr. Larimore or Ms. Williams Anderson are 

officers, managing agents, or directors of SWA. Rather, the uncontroverted record 

demonstrates that Mr. Larimore works at the local level at the San Diego Airport and has 

never been an officer or director of SWA. ECF No. 42-3, Larimore Decl., ¶ 12. Mr. 

Larimore does not set corporate policy, salaries, or salary raises and is not involved in 

any managerial decisions at SWA. Id. Similarly, Plaintiff has provided even less 

evidence about Ms. Williams-Anderson. Beyond an unsubstantiated police report and 

fantastical personal allegations, Plaintiff not provided any proof that Ms. WilliamsAnderson has any involvement whatsoever with Plaintiff’s employment. And finally, the 

standard for awarding punitive damages requires that “the evidence be so clear as to leave 

no substantial doubt” and “sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of 

every reasonable mind.” Mock v. Mich. Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 4 Cal. App. 4th 306, 332-

33 (1992). In Real v. The Continental Group, Inc., the federal district court, applying 

California law, held that an employee was not entitled to punitive damages because he 

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had failed to show that his employer – despite having willfully discriminated against her 

and terminating her employment – was unable to establish the requisite malice, 

oppression, or fraud required under California law. 627 F. Supp. 434, 448-49 (N.D. Cal. 

1986). The Court finds that Plaintiff cannot come close to meeting this stringent 

standard. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages cannot withstand 

summary adjudication. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to proffer 

any genuine or triable issues as to any material fact for each of her claims. Accordingly, 

the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety. The 

Court also DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike the Sur-Reply, ECF No. 67, and 

DENIES AS MOOT the Joint Motion to Continue Hearing, ECF No. 66. The Clerk of 

Court is hereby directed to close this case.

Dated: August 22, 2019

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