Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01661/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01661-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:2671 Federal Tort Claims Act

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1 All further references to a “Rule” are to the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise noted.

2 On March 8, 2007, the parties stipulated that Olive

Graves is no longer a party to this action by reason of her death

on December 9, 2006, and that Gay Graves, Trustee of the Olive

Graves Family Trust, is substituted as a party to this action in

place of Olive Graves. (Stipulation and Order, Docket #32, filed

Mar. 8, 2007).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

OLIVE GRAVES,

NO. CIV S-05-1661 FCD GGH

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on defendant United States

of America’s (“defendant”) motion to dismiss for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure,1 or in the alternative, for summary

judgment pursuant to Rule 56. Plaintiff Olive Graves2

///

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3 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

4 The parties do not dispute the essential facts of this

case. (See Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, filed Mar. 5,

2007, at 2 (“Pl.’s Opp’n”)).

Defendant objects to the only evidence cited by

plaintiff in the opposition, the declaration of Richard Schell, a

liability expert, and his accompanying expert report. Defendant

argues that the expert report was never filed, and only a draft

version was served on defendant a month after the completion of

expert discovery. Therefore, defendant moves to strike

plaintiff’s liability expert. The court declines to rule on

defendant’s motion to strike plaintiff’s expert because even

considering this evidence, it fails to raise a triable issue of

fact sufficient for plaintiff to withstand summary judgment. 

2

(“plaintiff”) opposes the motion. For the reasons set forth

below,3

 defendant’s motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND4

Plaintiff filed this complaint on August 18, 2005, against

the United States of America under the Federal Tort Claims Act,

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). Plaintiff’s claims arise out of a backfire

set by employees of defendant on plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff

alleges that defendant was negligent in that it “should not have

started [a] backfire on plaintiff’s property and that no

reasonable fire fighter would have done so in light of the

attendant facts and circumstances that [defendant] should have be

aware of before they started the back fire.” (Compl., filed Aug.

18, 2005, ¶ 7). 

The Cannon Fire wildfire ignited on June 15, 2002 on lands

administered by the Bridgeport District of the Humboldt-Toiyabe

National Forest. It consumed a total 20,020 acres before

firefighters extinguished it on June 19, 2002. Suppressing the

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fire required the efforts of approximately 1500 personnel, 44

crews, and over 100 fire engines.

On June 15, 2002, Bridgeport District Ranger Kathleen Lucich

determined that the Cannon Fire’s sprawling northerly advance had

the potential to threaten the town of Walker, California. The

following day, Ms. Lucich appointed Pat Murphy (“Murphy”) as the

Incident Commander, responsible for overall management of the

Cannon Fire suppression effort. By June 17, 2002, the fire’s

eastern edge was burning the western boundary of Plaintiff’s 142

acre property to Highway 395 and the Walker River, which parallel

each other and bisect plaintiff’s land. Winds from the south

carried and deposited burning embers east of the highway,

creating new fires.

Defendant asserts that Commander Murphy concluded from these

developments that the Cannon Fire presented a clear and present

danger to plaintiff’s home and that he further determined that

the only way to save her home, protect life, and stall the fire’s

north-easterly expansion was to burnout the fuels (native

vegetation) around the home to stop the advancing flame front. 

Defendant also asserts that under these circumstances, burning

out the fuels around structures is a common and effective

suppression technique, and accordingly, Murphy ordered the

burnout. Defendant contends that the burnout went as planned and

likely saved Plaintiff’s home.

Plaintiff asserts that defendant erroneously characterizes

the fire ordered by Murphy as a “burnout.” Plaintiff also

asserts that the burning of plaintiff’s property was unneccessary

and that the government employee who reported the facts to the

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command center “either intentionally made false representations

or made representations with no possible belief that they were

true.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 2). Plaintiff contends that plaintiff’s

home was never in danger, and that the fire ordered by Murphy

caused unnecessary damage. (Id. at 3). 

STANDARD

When considering dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, “the

trial court may proceed as it never could under Fed R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) or Fed R. Civ. P. 56. . . . No presumptive truthfulness

attaches to plaintiff’s allegations, and the existence of

disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from

evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.” 

Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d 730,

733 (9th Cir. 1979) (quotations omitted). Further, plaintiff

bears the burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction does in fact

exist. Id. “In ruling on a challenge to subject matter

jurisdiction, the district court is ordinarily free to hear

evidence regarding jurisdiction and to rule on that issue prior

to trial, resolving factual disputes where necessary.” Augustine

v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983). 

However, where jurisdiction is so intertwined with the

merits that its resolution depends on the resolution of the

merits, “the trial court should employ the standard applicable to

a motion for summary judgment.” Id.; see also Careau Group v.

United Farm Workers of America, 940 F. 2d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir.

1990). “[T]he question of jurisdiction and the merits of an

action will be considered intertwined where . . . ‘a statute

provides the basis for both the subject matter jurisdiction of

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the federal court and the plaintiff’s substantive claim for

relief.” Sun Valley Gasoline, Inc. v. Ernst Enters., Inc., 711

F.2d 138, 139-40 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting Timberlane Lumber Co.

v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 602 (9th Cir. 1976). 

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

157 (1970).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis of its motion, and

identifying those portions of "the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any," which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Summary

judgment should be entered against a party who fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear

the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322. In such a

circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the

standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule

56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

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253, 288-289 (1968). In attempting to establish the existence of

this factual dispute, the opposing party is required to tender

evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or

admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that

the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party

must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a

fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party, id. at 251-52. The “purpose of summary judgment

is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to

see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 587 (quoting Rule 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963

amendments).

ANALYSIS

Defendant argues that it is immune from suit under the

“discretionary function” exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act

(“FTCA”). The FTCA waives sovereign immunity and allows tort

claims to be brought against the government that arise out of the

negligent conduct of government agents acting within the scope of

their employment. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (West 2007); Miller v.

United States, 163 F.3d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1998). However, that

waiver is limited by § 2680 of the FTCA, which provides:

The provisions of this chapter . . . shall not apply to

[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an

employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the

execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not

such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the

exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or

perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of

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a federal agency or an employee of the Government,

whether or not the discretion involved be abused.

28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (West 2007). This exception covers “acts

that are discretionary in nature, acts that ‘involve in element

of judgment or choice.’” United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315,

322 (1991) (quoting Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536

(1988)). It is intended “to prevent judicial ‘second-guessing’

of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social,

economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in

tort.” Id.

“The applicability of the discretionary function exception

is determined by a two-part test.” Miller, 163 F.3d at 593. The

court must first determine “whether the action is a matter of

choice for the acting employee.” Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536. 

This requires an element of judgment or choice. Id. “Thus, the

discretionary function exception will not apply when a federal

statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course

of action for an employee to follow.” Id. If discretion is

involved, the court must next determine “whether that judgment is

of the kind that the discretionary function exception was

designed to shield.” Id. The focus of this inquiry is “on the

nature of the actions taken and on whether they are susceptible

to policy analysis.” Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325. “When

established governmental policy, as expressed or implied by

statute, regulation, or agency guidelines, allows a Government

agent to exercise discretion, it must be presumed that the

agent’s acts are grounded in policy in exercising that

discretion.” Id. at 324. 

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The government bears the ultimate burden of proving the

applicability of an exception to the FTCA. Prescott v. United

States, 973 F.2d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 1992). However, “plaintiff

bears the burden of coming forth with sufficient evidence to

establish there are genuine issues of material fact regarding the

applicability of the discretionary function exception.” Miller,

163 F.3d at 594.

1. Discretion

Considering the first prong of the two-part test, the court

must determine whether there was a federal statute, regulation,

or policy in place that specifically prescribed a particular

course of action by the government regarding the Canon Fire and

the subsequent fire set on plaintiff’s property. If the

government was required to take a certain course of action, there

can be no discretion. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536; Miller, 163

F.3d at 594.

Plaintiff contends that the Forest Service Manual (“FSM”)

imposes “mandatory objectives” on defendant, and thus, the

conduct is not discretionary. Specifically, plaintiff cites (1)

§ 5106.01 of the FSM, which provides that an objective is “to

minimize fire loss and damage to structures, other human

development, and wildland resources;” and (2) § 5130.3(2) of the

FSM, which provides that “[r]esponsible officials shall onduct

fire suppression in a timely, effective, and efficient manner,

giving first priority to firefighter and public safety.” (Opp’n

at 4-5; Forest Service Manual as in effect in June 2002 (“FSM”),

attached as Ex. A-1 to Def.’s Mot., filed Feb. 1, 2007).

///

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Plaintiff’s argument fails on its face. The FSM provides

objectives and policies for fighting forest fires, not “a course

of action for an employee to follow.” Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at

536. An objective or policy is not “the kind of ‘specific and

mandatory regulation or statute [or policy] which creates clear

duties incumbent upon the governmental actors.’” Parsons v.

United States, 811 F. Supp. 1411, 1416 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (quoting

Kennewick Irr. Dist. v. United States, 880 F.2d 1018, 1026 (9th

Cir. 1989) (emphasis in original) (“A general statutory duty to

promote safety . . . would not be sufficient.”).

Rather, the Ninth Circuit has specifically held that “the

Forest Service retained considerable discretion in deciding how

to allocate suppression resources” in regards to fire control, as

at issue in this case. Miller, 163 F.3d at 595. The Miller

court also held that even where federal and state laws outline

certain requirements for fire suppression, “they do not eliminate

discretion because they do not tell firefighters how to fight the

fire.” Id. They do “not tell the Forest Service to suppress the

fire in a specific manner and within a specific period of time. .

. . The existence of some mandatory language does not eliminate

discretion when the broader goals sought to be achieved

necessarily involve an element of discretion.” Id. (citations

omitted). 

As such, in this case, the action of defendant setting fire

to plaintiff’s property in an effort suppress the Cannon Fire and

defend plaintiff’s home involved an element of choice. 

Therefore, defendant has satisfied the first prong of the twopart discretionary function analysis. 

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2. Policy Considerations

Considering the second prong of the two-part test, the court

must determine whether the government’s decision to set the fire

on plaintiff’s property is “susceptible to a policy analysis

grounded in social, economic, or political concerns.” Miller,

163 F.3d at 595.

Defendant points to the FSM, beginning at § 5100, which

addresses fire management and sets forth the agency’s authority,

objective, policies, responsibilities, definitions and

references. The pertinent objectives and policies for fighting

forest fires are stated in the FSM as follows:

Section 5102 - Objectives.

Forest service fire management activities should result

in safe, cost-effective, fire management programs that

protect, maintain and enhance National Forest System

lands.

* * *

5106.01 - Objectives.

The objectives of wildland/urban interface fire

management are:

1. To facilitate interagency fire prevention and

protection to minimize fire loss and damage to

structures, other human development, and wildland

resources. (FSM, Ex. A-1 to Def.’s Mot.). The FSM provides objectives and

policies relating to fire suppression: 

5130.2 - Objective.

Safely suppress wildfires at minimum cost consistent

with land and resource management objectives and fire

management direction as stated in Fire Management

Plans.

5130.3 - Policy.

1. Line Officers are expected to ensure that

suppression planning, operations, and personnel

comply with Service-wide wildfire suppression

principles and practices as set out in the

Fireline Handbook, FSH 5109.32a, the Firefighters

Guide (FSM 5108), and the Health and Safety

Handbook, FSH 6709.11.

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2. Responsible officials shall conduct fire

suppression in a timely, effective, and efficient

manner, giving first priority to firefighter and

public safety.

3. In making decisions about how to organize and

conduct suppression operations (suppression

strategies), line officers shall minimize both

suppression cost and resource loss consistent with

the resource management objectives for the values

to be protected. Consider fire behavior, the

availability of suppression resources, the values

of natural resources and property at risk,

direction in the land and resource management

plan, and the potential cost of suppression. Use

a Wildland Fire Situation Analysis to document

suppression strategy decisions.

(FSM 5131.1).

The FSM also directs agency employees to use a decisionmaking process, the Wildland Fire Situation Analysis (“WFSA”),

before choosing a particular course of action against a wildfire

(FSM § 5131.1 et seq.). The WFSA “documents the decision-making

process for determining the appropriate suppression action”

following the development of alternatives that incorporate

certain evaluation criteria. (FSM §§ 5131.1, 5131.12). Each

suppression alternative must:

a. Focus on firefighter and public safety, 

b. Be implementable, 

c. Be accompanied by a strategic plan of action, 

d. Calculate the forces required in consideration of

those available, 

e. Assess the probability of success and consequences

of failure (using a decision tree), and 

f. Estimate the time of containment and control,

acres burned, suppression cost, and resource

damage.

(FSM 5131.12.2). Finally, the FSM allows the delegation of

responsibility to fight the fire to an Incident Commander, in

this case Murphy. (FSM § 5131.03). The delegation letter

provided that Murphy had “the full authority to implement the

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5 Plaintiff disputes that Murphy’s appointment granted

him authority to protect structures until June 18, 2002. (Pl.’s

Opp’n to Undisp. Facts, filed Mar. 5, 2007, ¶ 6). The underlying

expert report cited to by plaintiff states that this authority

was only delegated through the delegation letter to Incident

Commander Joe Stuttler, Ex. B-3 to Def.’s Mot. However, this

delegation was also granted to Murphy. (Delegation Letter, Ex.

B-2 to Def.’s Mot., at 2) (“Hold/construct line to keep fire from

reaching and involving CDFG and private [] structures in . . .

the community of Walker.”). As such, this is not a genuine

dispute of fact. 

12

selected [WFSA] alternative and responsibility for management of

all aspects of the suppression effort.” (Delegation Letter, Ex.

B-2 to Def.’s Mot, filed Feb. 1, 2007, at 1). The delegation

later emphasized key suppression points and listed priority

considerations for implementing the selected alternative. (Id.

at 1-3). These priorities included: (1) insuring personnel and

public safety; (2) protection of non-Federal lands and associated

structures;5 (3) avoiding impacts to the threatened Lahontan

Cutthroat Trout and Yosemite Toad in Mill Creek; (4) protecting

the riparian meadow habitat of Mountain yellow-legged frog; (5)

protecting wilderness character and values, using minimum impacts

tools and strategies; (6) avoiding a historic immigrant trail;

(7) maintaining regular communication with affected non-Federal

in-holders; (8) rehabilitation of fire suppression impact areas;

(9) demanding a high level of ethical conduct; (10) efficiency

and cost-effectiveness; and (11) completing standard, mandatory

forms. (Id. at 2-3). 

The Ninth Circuit has specifically held that the FSM, and

the stated objectives and policies therein, “demonstrate that the

Forest Service’s decision regarding how to attack a fire

involve[s] a balancing of consideration, including cost, public

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safety, firefighter safety, and resource damage.” Id. In

Miller, the court considered the same objectives and policies at

issue in this case, including one identified by plaintiff as

establishing a mandatory duty. Id. The court found that the

considerations in the FSM “reflect the type of economic, social

and political concerns that the discretionary function exception

is designed to protect.” Id.

In this case, the objectives and policies set forth in the

FSM, along with the criteria evaluated in formulating the WFSA,

as well as the priorities to be considered by the Incident

Commander as set forth in the delegation letter, clearly reflects

that the decision in how to suppress the Cannon Fire requires a

balancing of numerous objectives and interests. These

considerations are expansive in breadth, and implicate economic,

social, and political concerns. “Where the government is forced,

as it was here, to balance competing concerns, immunity shields

the decision.” See Miller, 163 F.3d at 595-96; Parsons, 811 F.

Supp. at 1417-19; Defrees v. United States, 738 F. Supp. 380, 385

(D. Or. 1990). As such, under the two-step approach, defendant

has demonstrated that its conduct in setting fire to plaintiff’s

land in an effort to suppress the Cannon Fire was a discretionary

function and thus, the government is immune from suit. 

/////

/////

/////

/////

/////

///// 

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6 Defendant presents evidence that Kathleen Lucich

prepared the WFSA for the Cannon Fire on June 15, 2002, at

approximately 5:46 p.m. (Decl. of Kathleen Lucich, Ex. B to

Def.’s Mot., filed Feb. 1, 2007, ¶ 5). The WFSA is attached as

Exhibit B-1. 

7 Plaintiff also disputes that the fire set by defendants

was a “burn-out.” Plaintiff contends that the firing operation

on the property does not fall within the definition of “burning

out” because there was no evidence of a control line in place. 

(continued...)

14

3. Negligence

Plaintiff does not dispute that the Wildlife Fire Situation

Analysis was performed.6 Rather, plaintiff contends that the

WFSA was not and could not be properly implemented because of

misinformation that was provided. (Opp’n at 5). In other words,

plaintiff argues that the government employees operated on a

false or incomplete information, and thus, failed to carry out

their objectives. This is the heart of plaintiff’s negligence

claims.

However, the Ninth Circuit has made clear that “negligence

is simply irrelevant to the discretionary function inquiry.” 

Kennewick, 880 F.2d at 1029. Section 2680(a) offers immunity for

discretionary functions “whether or not the discretion involved

be abused.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a); Kennewick, 880 F.2d at 1029. 

“[I]f the presence of negligence were allowed to defeat the

discretionary function exception, the exception would provide a

meager shield indeed against tort liability.” Id.

Therefore, because the discretionary function exception

applies to defendant’s actions in this matter, defendants’

arguments and evidence relating to alleged misinformation and

negligence are irrelevant.7 

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7(...continued)

(Expert Report, Ex. 3 to Decl. of Stephen A. Cain in Opp’n to

Def.’s Mot. (“Cain Decl”), filed Mar. 5, 2007, at 7, 9). 

Plaintiff’s expert fails to indicate how the firing operation

should be classified or why this classification is relevant to

this case. Further, plaintiff’s present no evidence to dispute

defendant’s evidence that, regardless of the classification, the

firing operation was conducted in order to suppress the fire and

defend plaintiff’s home. (Decl. of Pat Murphy in Supp. of Def.’s

Mot, filed Feb. 1, 2007, ¶¶ 9-11). As such, this “factual

dispute” does not raise a genuine issue of material fact

regarding the applicability of the discretionary function

exception. 

15

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss

under 12(b)(1) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment is

GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 12, 2007

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