Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-md-01486/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-md-01486-147/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 15:1 Antitrust Litigation

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In re DYNAMIC RANDOM ACCESS

MEMORY (DRAM) ANTITRUST 

LITIGATION No. M 02-1486 PJH

_______________________________/

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’

This Document Relates to: MOTION TO DISMISS

State of New York v. Micron et al. 

(C 06-6436 PJH)

_______________________________/

Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint came on for hearing before this

court on February 27, 2008. Plaintiff, the State of New York (“plaintiff State”) acting

through its Attorney General, appeared through its counsel, Richard L. Schwartz. 

Defendants appeared through their counsel, Steven Bergman, Tim Martin, Joel S. Sanders,

Joshua Hess, David C. Brownstein, Jonathan Swartz, and Catherine Lui. Having read all

the papers submitted and carefully considered the relevant legal authority, the court hereby

DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss, for the reasons stated at the hearing, and as

follows.

BACKGROUND

This action is part of a broader multidistrict litigation. Like various other plaintiffs in

the MDL action, plaintiff State here generally alleges a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy in

the U.S. market for dynamic random access memory (“DRAM”), carried out by numerous

manufacturer defendants.

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff State filed its original complaint against defendants on July 13, 2006. The

original complaint asserted four causes of action against defendants: (1) a federal antitrust

claim for violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act; (2) a state antitrust claim for violation of

Case 4:02-md-01486-PJH Document 1851 Filed 04/15/08 Page 1 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

New York’s Donnelly Act; (3) a claim pursuant to New York’s Executive Law § 63(12),

which allows the State Attorney General to enjoin “fraudulent or illegal acts” in the “carrying

on, conducting or transaction of business”; and (4) a claim pursuant to California’s state

antitrust statute, the Cartwright Act. See, e.g., Complaint at ¶¶ 81-86, 87-92, 93-95, 96-

101.

 On February 7, 2007, the court heard defendants’ motion to dismiss portions of the

original complaint. Defendants specifically sought dismissal of (1) the Sherman Act claim

to the extent it sought recovery on behalf of unnamed government entities and indirect

purchasers; (2) plaintiff State’s claim for a civil penalty under the Donnelly Act; (3) claims

under New York’s Executive Law § 63(12); and (4) the Cartwright Act claim.

The court granted the motion in part, and denied it in part, on August 31, 2007. 

First, with respect to the Sherman Act claim for relief, the court dismissed all claims seeking

recovery on behalf of indirect purchasers, and dismissed all representative claims on behalf

of unnamed government entities, although leave to amend these latter claims was granted. 

See August 31, 2007 Order (“August 31 Order”) at 4-10. The court also dismissed plaintiff

State’s Donnelly Act claim on behalf of government entities on the same grounds as the

Sherman Act claim, again with leave to amend. Id. at 11-12. Plaintiff State’s Donnelly Act

claim for monetary damages on behalf of natural persons was also dismissed. Id. at 12-15. 

With respect to plaintiff State’s claim under New York Executive Law § 63(12), the court

denied the motion to dismiss the claim on timeliness and procedural grounds, but

dismissed plaintiff State’s request for treble damages under the act, and all claims on

behalf of government entities. Order at 17-20. Finally, the court dismissed with prejudice

plaintiff State’s Cartwright Act claim. Id. at 20. The court’s order also made clear, in

closing, that leave to amend would be permitted “only as specified [t]herein.” Amendment

as to additional matters would not be permitted without prior leave of court. Id. at 21-22.

B. The Amended Complaint and Instant Motion

On October 1, 2007, plaintiff State duly filed its amended complaint. The amended

Case 4:02-md-01486-PJH Document 1851 Filed 04/15/08 Page 2 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 The Amended Complaint refers to local entities who are not part of the State as

“non-State Public Entities” throughout the amended complaint generally. This is a shift from

the original complaint, which included these local entities and municipalities together with State

entities within the definition of “State Entities.”

3

complaint once again asserts four causes of action, albeit slightly different ones than

before. Those causes of action are: (1) a federal antitrust claim under the Sherman Act

(First Claim for Relief); (2) a state antitrust claim under New York’s Donnelly Act (Second

Claim); (3) a second state antitrust claim under New York’s Donnelly Act (Third Claim); and

(4) a claim under New York’s Executive Law § 63(12). See generally Amended Complaint

(“Amended Complaint”).

The Amended Complaint also clarifies that plaintiff State is bringing suit on behalf of:

(a) the State itself, including all of its branches, departments, agencies or other parts

thereof (as to all claims for relief); (b) the non-State entities listed on an attached Schedule

A (referred to as the “Requesting non-State Public Entities”)(as to the first, second, and

third claims for relief);1

 and (c) natural persons in New York who purchased DRAM

indirectly from defendants (as to the fourth claim for relief only). See Amended Complaint,

¶ 10. 

Defendants now move to dismiss once again. They challenge all four claims, either

in whole or in part. 

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

A. Legal Standard

In evaluating a motion to dismiss, all allegations of material fact are taken as true

and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Burgert v.

Lokelani Bernice Pauahi Bishop Trust, 200 F.3d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 2000)(citations omitted). 

In order to survive a dismissal motion, however, a plaintiff must allege facts that are

enough to raise his/her right to relief “above the speculative level.” See Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, --- U.S. ---, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007). While the complaint “does not

Case 4:02-md-01486-PJH Document 1851 Filed 04/15/08 Page 3 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 In the August 31 Order, the court dismissed plaintiff’s claim under Executive Law

§ 63(12), to the extent it sought relief on behalf of unnamed government entities, as well as

plaintiff’s claim for treble damages. The order did not address the viability of a claim on behalf

of natural persons for regular damages. 

4

need detailed factual allegations,” it is nonetheless “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the

‘grounds' of his ‘entitlement to relief’ [which] requires more than labels and conclusions,

and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. In short, a

plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” not

just conceivable. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974. 

B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Resolution of defendants’ motion to dismiss requires, in turn, resolution of the

following issues: (1) whether plaintiff State’s claim for damages on behalf of natural

persons under Executive Law 63(12) should be dismissed; (2) whether plaintiff State’s

amended Sherman Act claim should be dismissed; and (3) whether plaintiff State’s claims

for damages under the Donnelly Act should be dismissed. 

1. Plaintiff State’s Claim for Damages on Behalf of Natural Persons Under

Executive Law 63(12)

Defendants seek dismissal of plaintiff State’s claim under Executive Law § 63(12). 

See Amended Complaint, ¶ 103.2 Specifically, defendants argue that (a) plaintiff’s claim is

barred under the Sherman Act and Donnelly Act – two of the predicate statutes claimed by

plaintiff as a basis for plaintiff’s claim for damages under Executive Law § 63(12); and (b)

plaintiff State cannot otherwise recover on behalf of indirect purchasers under Executive

Law § 63(12), because the indirect purchasers’ injuries are too remote from the alleged

violation. 

Plaintiff responds with two arguments. First, plaintiff State contends that Executive

Law § 63(12) authorizes the Attorney General to seek damages under the statute,

independent of the remedies or procedures provided under any predicate statute, where –

as here – the predicate law is a state or federal law or regulation that has been violated. 

Case 4:02-md-01486-PJH Document 1851 Filed 04/15/08 Page 4 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 The Amended Complaint also contains a reference to defendants’ alleged

violations of “state antitrust laws throughout the United States.” See Amended Complaint, ¶

102. However, as defendants point out, this allegation is too vague and insubstantial to

provide independent support for plaintiff’s § 63(12) claim. 

5

Second, plaintiff State contends that defendants have misinterpreted the case law imposing

remoteness limitations under New York General Business Law § 349, by concluding that

such limitations also apply to Executive Law § 63(12). 

With respect to the former issue, both parties preliminarily agree that § 63(12)

comes into play where there is a predicate violation of some state or federal statute or

regulation at issue. They further agree that plaintiff State alleges that the predicate

violations include violations of the Sherman Act and the Donnelly Act, in addition to §

63(12).3

 The parties’ disagreement is whether relief in the form of damages sought by

plaintiff State pursuant to § 63(12) is permissible, in view of the fact that the predicate

statutes – i.e., the Sherman Act and the Donnelly Act – would not allow such relief on

behalf of the indirect purchasers on whose behalf plaintiff State brings suit. Plaintiff State

points to case law that permits certain types of relief under § 63(12), even where the

predicate laws themselves do not provide for the same relief. Defendants, by contrast,

invoke contrary case law to point out that, regardless whether the predicate laws are silent

as to a particular type of relief, § 63(12) cannot be used to obtain relief that is expressly

prohibited by the predicate laws. 

On balance, the court finds plaintiff State’s argument more persuasive. The court is

persuaded on this point by the reasoning expressed by the Southern District of New York in

New York v. Feldman, 210 F. Supp. 2d 294, 302-03 (S.D. N.Y. 2002). In Feldman, the

district court considered a motion to dismiss the Attorney General’s claim for restitution

under § 63(12), where the predicate statute for the claim was the Donnelly Act. In denying

the motion to dismiss, the Feldman court held that “damages available under the Donnelly

Act are irrelevant when proceeding under section 63(12) because New York courts have

consistently held that restitution sought pursuant to section 63(12) is available for

Case 4:02-md-01486-PJH Document 1851 Filed 04/15/08 Page 5 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

misconduct covered by other laws which do not provide for restitution.” See id. at 302. 

While the Feldman court was considering a claim for restitution under § 63(12), and not

damages, the Feldman court nonetheless allowed such a claim to go forward, despite the

court’s recognition that the Donnelly Act itself limits the Attorney General to injunctive relief

and civil penalties in actions brought on behalf of natural persons, and does not permit

damages (including restitution). Id. at 302, fn. 4. This holding is instructive here, and leads

the court to conclude that, notwithstanding the Donnelly Act’s prohibition on the Attorney

General’s pursuit of damages on behalf of natural persons, the Attorney General may seek

such damages and restitution as are permitted by § 63(12), even though the § 63(12) claim

is based on a violation of the Donnelly Act. 

Defendants have noted the apparent contradiction in allowing such a claim to go

forward under § 63(12), when a parens patriae damages claim cannot be asserted under

the Donnelly Act itself. Indeed, the parties’ arguments in connection with the first motion to

dismiss alluded to this issue, when the parties debated whether § 63(12) could provide the

Attorney General with authority to seek parens patriae damages under the Donnelly Act. 

See August 31 Order at 14-15. However, neither the parties – nor the court’s order –

actually addressed head-on the issue now before the court here – i.e., whether the

Attorney General may recover on behalf of natural persons pursuant to the remedial

scheme provided by § 63(12) specifically. And in addressing the issue here, defendants

have cited no authority affirmatively holding that the remedies prescribed by § 63(12) are

unavailable when a claim brought under § 63(12) is based on a predicate statute with a

remedial scheme that prohibits the very remedies allowable under § 63(12). Accordingly,

the court finds plaintiff State’s claim for damages under § 63(12) permissible. 

 As to the latter issue raised by the parties – whether recovery on behalf of indirect

purchasers under Executive Law § 63(12) is barred for remoteness – plaintiff ultimately has

the better argument. The gist of defendants’ argument is that New York state courts have

firmly established that New York General Business Law § 349 – a consumer protection

Case 4:02-md-01486-PJH Document 1851 Filed 04/15/08 Page 6 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 Defendants also argue, for the first time on reply, that plaintiff’s claim for

restitution on behalf of indirect purchasers should also be viewed as too remote, based on

standing principles similar to those espoused by Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State

Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 535 (1983). As this is a new argument which plaintiff

was not given an opportunity to brief in response, the court rejects the argument here. 

7

statute – does not permit claims arising solely as a result of derivative injuries, and that

since § 349 and Executive Law § 63(12) are to be construed in harmony with one another,

the remoteness concerns applicable to a § 349 claim prohibit plaintiff State’s indirect

purchaser claims under Executive Law § 63(12). See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Colorado State

Christian College of the Church of the Inner Power, Inc., 76 Misc. 2d 50, 59 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.

1973); Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Philipp Morris USA, 3 N.Y. 3d 200, 207 (N.Y. Ct App

2004); New York v. Daicel Chems., 42 A.D.3d 301 (1st Dept 2007). 

As plaintiff State points out, however, defendants rely almost exclusively on case law

that discusses claims brought pursuant to § 349, which plaintiff does not allege here. 

Moreover, defendants have failed to point to any case law that expressly states that the

remoteness considerations applicable to § 349 claims applies to claims brought under §

63(12), let alone case law that affirmatively dismisses on remoteness grounds indirect

purchaser claims brought under Executive Law § 63(12). In addition, New York’s Donnelly

Act – one of the predicate statutes for plaintiff State’s § 63(12) claim – is an Illinois Brick

repealer statute. As such, a finding of remoteness, based on the indirect purchaser status

of the persons and entities whom plaintiff State represents does not follow. 

In sum, the court DENIES defendants’ request to dismiss plaintiff State’s fourth claim

for relief, on grounds that all relief sought on behalf of indirect purchasers is barred under

either the predicate statutes, or on remoteness grounds.4 

2. Amended Sherman Act Claim (First Claim for Relief)

In their first motion to dismiss, defendants challenged the viability of plaintiff State’s

Sherman Act claim, in part, based on the argument that plaintiff was impermissibly

attempting to assert representative claims on behalf of state and local government entities,

which plaintiff was not permitted to do under the Sherman Act. In its August 31 Order, the

Case 4:02-md-01486-PJH Document 1851 Filed 04/15/08 Page 7 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 Plaintiff originally alleged that “various State Entities made substantial purchases”

under a “Centralized Contract” between the State of New York and certain OEMs, that “all

purchases of DRAM-containing products by State Entities, made pursuant to the Centralized

Contract,” were “direct, and not indirect, purchases of price-fixed DRAM,” and that “by virtue

of the Assignment Clause” contained within the Centralized Contract, “the State of New York,

on behalf of all State Entities that purchased DRAM or DRAM-containing products under the

Centralized Contract, stands in the shoes of the OEMs and other direct purchasers of pricefixed DRAM for purposes of alleging federal and state antitrust claims. See Original

Complaint, ¶¶ 73, 80.

8

court agreed with defendants on this point, noting that a State and its entities are

considered “persons” capable of suing for damages under the Clayton Act only as long as

such relief is requested via proprietary suits, and that the Clayton Act does not otherwise

permit representative claims by the Attorney General “on behalf of” other government

entities. See August 31 Order at 5-6. While the court further noted that authority to bring a

representative suit on behalf of the government entities in question could alternatively be

rooted in state law authority, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that such authority

existed by virtue of the assignment clause contained within the Centralized Contract.5

Specifically, the court found that plaintiff had not cited any authority establishing that

assignment of a federal antitrust claim from government entities to plaintiff State confers

standing to bring a representative suit on behalf of those government entities, and under

the alleged terms of the Centralized Contract, it was the OEMs who had assigned their

claims to the State, not the government entities on whose behalf plaintiff purported to sue. 

See Order at 7-8. The court allowed plaintiff State to amend its complaint, however, in

order to re-state its Sherman Act claim to establish that plaintiff State’s representative

authority to assert claims on behalf of government entities could be rooted in the Donnelly

Act. 

Now, defendants claim that, while plaintiff has duly amended its Sherman Act claim

following the court’s August 31 Order, plaintiff State’s amended allegations still fail to set

forth any valid Sherman Act claim for purchases by the non-State Entities (i.e., local entities

Case 4:02-md-01486-PJH Document 1851 Filed 04/15/08 Page 8 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 Defendants note in footnote 1 to their reply brief that they are not choosing to

challenge at this time, those Sherman Act claims premised on purchases by the State Entities.

9

and municipalities).6

 According to defendants, this is because plaintiff State has altered its

claim with new allegations that completely change plaintiff’s theory of recovery. In

essence, plaintiff State now alleges for the first time that it may bring suit for purchases by

the non-State Entities by virtue of the OEMs’ direct assignments to the State under the

Centralized Contract, not by virtue of the non-State Entities’ direct assignments to the

State. This belated change of course in argument is prejudicial, claim defendants, and

plaintiff State should not be permitted to take another bite at the apple by arguing that the

Centralized Contract supports plaintiff State’s Sherman Act claim. 

Plaintiff State defends itself by stating that its allegations in the amended complaint

are only meant to clarify that the State is seeking to bring direct purchaser claims that were

assigned to it by the OEMs themselves, not by the non-State Public Entities. Plaintiff

admittedly recognizes “with hindsight,” however, that it “could have been more helpful to

the Court in explaining that the Assignment Clause operated to transfer the OEM’s antitrust

claims – not claims of the non-State Public Entities.” See Opp. Br. At 5:22-24. At any rate,

plaintiff continues, the direct assignments are purely a matter of contract under the

Centralized Contract, and do not implicate any requirement that plaintiff meet any

requirements of the Donnelly Act or otherwise in asserting a representative claim on behalf

of government entities. 

Defendants have a legitimate gripe. Plaintiff State has drastically altered the scope

of its argument. In essence, plaintiff now argues that it does not assert a representative

claim at all; rather, it simply asserts a straightforward proprietary claim against defendants,

based on the OEMs’ contractual assignment of their direct purchaser claims directly to the

State. To the extent that either State Entities or non-State Public Entities are at issue,

plaintiff State asserts that they are actually irrelevant to plaintiff’s ability to allege direct

claims against defendants. 

Case 4:02-md-01486-PJH Document 1851 Filed 04/15/08 Page 9 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

This was not the argument that plaintiff State advanced on this issue the first time

around. Indeed, a review of the papers filed by plaintiff State in opposition to defendants’

first motion to dismiss confirms this conclusion. Moreover, were plaintiff State truly seeking

to “clarify” here the same arguments made previously, plaintiff was surely made aware,

upon receipt and review of the August 31 Order, that the court’s understanding of plaintiff

State’s argument was entirely different than plaintiff’s. Yet plaintiff never sought

reconsideration of the court’s order, and never sought leave to amend. In short, and based

on the facts presented, the court is of the opinion that plaintiff State has, in fact, materially

changed the premise of its arguments in support of its Sherman Act claim. 

Notwithstanding this fact, the court will allow plaintiff State’s arguments to stand,

albeit grudgingly. For had plaintiff State made the same arguments the first time around,

plaintiff State would have stated a viable claim, as the right to contractually assign antitrust

claims is generally well-established. Accordingly, and for the reasons stated at the hearing

on defendants’ motion, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff State’s Sherman Act claim on

grounds stated herein, is DENIED. 

The court will, however, take steps to alleviate any prejudice to defendants that

might result from the court’s ruling, particularly in view of the fact that discovery is closed. 

Specifically, the court hereby orders that discovery be re-opened, to allow defendants to

discover the necessary information regarding plaintiff State’s assignment theory, including

the exact identity of any and all relevant contracts pursuant to which plaintiff State asserts a

contractually assigned claim, the identity of any State and Non-State Entities subject to

those contracts, and the details of all relevant transactions executed pursuant to such

contracts. The re-opening of discovery is unilateral, and defendants are permitted the

reasonable time necessary in order to effectuate the discovery they seek. 

3. Plaintiff’s Claim for Damages under the Donnelly Act

Finally, defendants have also challenged plaintiff State’s claims under the Donnelly

Act, as stated in the second and third claims for relief, to the extent these claims seek

Case 4:02-md-01486-PJH Document 1851 Filed 04/15/08 Page 10 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

damages on behalf of government entities. The second claim for relief asserts a claim

brought by the State in its proprietary capacity, as “owner of the assigned claims.” See

Amended Complaint, ¶ 92. The third claim for relief asserts a claim brought by the State on

its own behalf, and on behalf of the non-State Public Entities. See id. at ¶¶ 98-99. 

Beginning with plaintiff’s second claim for relief, this claim asserts only a direct

proprietary claim by the State. See id. at ¶ 92. This is permissible under the Donnelly Act. 

Indeed, defendants’ only objections to this claim are based on the same objections that

defendants raise regarding plaintiff’s new “assignment clause” theory in connection with

plaintiff State’s Sherman Act claim. For the reasons already discussed above, however,

the court will allow plaintiff State’s amended arguments to proceed. Accordingly, the court

DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss the second claim for relief.

 With respect to the third claim for relief, defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to

cure certain deficiencies highlighted by the court in its August 31 Order. Namely, the

court’s instruction to plaintiff State that it revise its allegations to state that the non-State

Public Entities specifically requested that the Attorney General bring suit on their behalf,

and that the plaintiff allege “the specific nature of the purchases made by the government

entities” with respect to “the specific entities on whose behalf plaintiff brings suit, and the

direct or indirect nature of those entities’ DRAM purchases.” See August 31 Order at 10.

The court is of the opinion, however, that plaintiff State has sufficiently cured these

deficiencies. Plaintiff has attached Schedule A to the Amended Complaint, setting forth the

non-State Public Entities on whose behalf the Attorney General brings suit (with address

and zip code). In addition, plaintiff State has segregated its Donnelly Act claim into two

claims for relief, in order to make clear that one is brought on behalf of the State as direct

purchaser, and the other is brought in an indirect purchaser capacity. See Amended

Complaint, ¶¶ 87-100. While true enough that plaintiff has not done a masterful job of

alleging the specific types of products for which recovery is being sought, the court finds

that plaintiff State’s amendments comply with court’s minimum instructions. See August 31

Case 4:02-md-01486-PJH Document 1851 Filed 04/15/08 Page 11 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

Order at 10. Accordingly, the court furthermore DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss

plaintiff State’s third claim for relief. 

C. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 15, 2008 ______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

Case 4:02-md-01486-PJH Document 1851 Filed 04/15/08 Page 12 of 12