Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00350/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00350-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition For Removal--Other Contract

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28 This matter is deemed to be suitable for decision without oral *

argument. E.D. Cal. R. 230(g).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL LOURIM, )

)

Plaintiff, ) 2:10-cv-00350-GEB-EFB

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, FA; )

WASHINGTON MUTUAL HOME LOANS; )

GEORGE SANDERS; MARK SHELTON; and )

DOES 1-20, inclusive, )

)

Defendants. )

)

On February 16, 2010, JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, as an

acquirer of certain assets and liabilities of Washington Mutual Bank,

and Mark Shelton (collectively, “defendants”), filed a motion under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss Plaintiff’s

complaint. However, on March 5, 2010, Plaintiff timely filed a first

amended complaint, which is now the operative pleading. See Hal Roach

Studios, Inc., v. Richard Feiner and Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546

(9th Cir. 1989) (stating an amended complaint supercedes the prior

complaint); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B) (stating that “[a]

party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within . . .

Case 2:10-cv-00350-GEB-EFB Document 17 Filed 03/23/10 Page 1 of 3
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21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b)”). Since the

pending dismissal motion does not address the operative pleading, it

is denied as moot.

However, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint alleges six

claims all under California law and specifically pleads that “[t]his

is an action asserting violations of California State law.” (First

Amended Compl. ¶ 1.) Since Plaintiff is no longer pursuing any

federal claim, the Court may sua sponte decide whether to continue 

exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law

claims. See Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th

Cir. 1997) (en banc). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court

“may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a [state]

claim” if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it

has original jurisdiction . . . .” “While discretion to decline . . .

supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims is triggered by the

presence of one of the conditions in § 1367(c), it is informed by the

. . . values of economy, convenience, fairness and comity” as

delineated by the Supreme Court in United Mine Workers of Am. v.

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Acri, 114 F.3d at 1001. “Since

state courts have the primary responsibility to develop and apply

state law, . . . the Gibbs values do not favor continued exercise of

supplemental jurisdiction over [Plaintiff’s] state claims . . . .” 

Anderson v. Countrywide Fin., No. 2:08-cv-01220-GEB-GGH, 2009 WL

3368444, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2009); see also Acri, 114 F.3d at

1001 (stating that “in the usual case in which all federal-law claims

are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors will point towards

declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law

claims” (quotations and citation omitted)). Therefore, Plaintiff’s

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state law claims are dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3). This case shall be closed.

Dated: March 22, 2010

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 2:10-cv-00350-GEB-EFB Document 17 Filed 03/23/10 Page 3 of 3