Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02730/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02730-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Personal Injury

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD KA’ANOI,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-06-2730 RBB EFB PS

vs.

UNITED STATES, FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

Defendant. 

 /

This case, in which plaintiff is proceeding in propria persona, was referred to the

undersigned under Local Rule 72-302(c)(21), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Defendant has

filed a motion to dismiss, which this court deemed suitable for submission without oral

argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h). Plaintiff has failed to file an opposition to the motion. 

Having considered all submitted materials, the undersigned issues the following findings and

recommendations. 

I. BACKGROUND

This action is proceeding on the amended complaint, entitled “Torts Personal Injury 320

Assault, Libel and Slander or US Code - Title 18>PART I CAHPTER 7> &111,” filed

December 7, 2006. Plaintiff alleges that individual employees and officers of the United States

Defense Reutilization Marketing Service (“DRMS”) committed, or allowed others to commit,

slander, libel and assault against him. See Amended Complaint, at p.1. Plaintiff also alleges a

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claim for emotional distress as a result of these alleged torts. Plaintiff names as defendants

Clifford R. Kerr, Roger Warin, Steve Bury, and the DRMS. On February 26, 2007, the United

States Attorney for the Eastern District of California, acting through David Shelledy, Chief of

the Civil Division, filed a certification that defendants Kerr, Warin, and Bury were acting within

the scope of their office and employment with the DRMS, at all times pertinent to plaintiff’s

claims in the action. Accordingly, the United States was substituted for these parties as the

proper defendant by operation of 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2). See Notice of Substitution. 

In its motion to dismiss, the United States also moves to dismiss the named federal

agency, DRMS, on the basis that plaintiff’s claims arise under the Federal Tort Claims Act

(“FTCA”). For claims arising under the FTCA, the only proper defendant is the United States. 

Kennedy v. United States Postal Serv., 145 F.3d 1077, 1078 (9th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, a

federal agency is not subject to suit eo nomine unless authorized by Congress in explicit

language. Shelton v. United States Customs Serv., 565 F.2d 1140, 1141 (9th Cir. 1977). 

Construing plaintiff’s claims as arising under the FTCA, the court finds that the United

States is the only proper defendant and that the federal agency, DRMS, should be dismissed. 

II. MOTION TO DISMISS

Construing plaintiff’s complaint as alleging tort claims under the FTCA, the United

States moves to dismiss on two grounds: (1) failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the

FTCA; and (2) claims for libel/slander and assault are expressly precluded under the FTCA.

The court recommends that this action be dismissed due to lack of subject matter

jurisdiction resulting from plaintiff’s apparent failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.

Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, actions against the United States may not be

maintained except by its express consent. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976);

Doe v. Attorney General of U.S., 941 F.2d 780, 788 (9th Cir. 1991). Although Congress has

consented to suit against the United States under the FTCA, the administrative claims

requirement is an express limitation on that waiver of immunity. Prior to litigating a tort claim

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 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and a case presumably lies outside the

jurisdiction of the federal courts unless proven otherwise. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of

America, 511 U.S. 375, 376-78 (1994). Plaintiff bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does

in fact exist. See, e.g., Sopcak v. Northern Mountain Helicopter Serv., 52 F.3d 817, 818 (9th

Cir.1995); Gingo v. United States Dep’t of Educ., 149 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1200 (E.D. Cal. 2000). 

As noted below, plaintiff has not met his burden in establishing subject matter jurisdiction here.

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against the United States, a plaintiff must first file an administrative claim with the appropriate

federal agency. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). 

The administrative claim requirement under the FTCA is jurisdictional and cannot be

waived.1

 Cadwalder v. United States, 45 F.3d 297, 300 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, the exhaustion

requirement is strictly construed. Vacek v. United States Postal Serv., 447 F.3d 1248, 1250 (9th

Cir. 2006). “Section 2675(a) establishes explicit prerequisites to the filing of suit against the

Government in district court. It admits of no exceptions. . . . We are not allowed to proceed in

the absence of fulfillment of the conditions merely because dismissal would visit a harsh result

upon the plaintiff.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 

Plaintiff has not alleged exhaustion in either of his original or amended complaint, nor

has he filed any documents in opposition to defendant’s motion, nor any other documents

otherwise demonstrating exhaustion. Failure to allege exhaustion under the FTCA is grounds for

dismissal. See Reynolds v. Husk, 273 F. Supp. 2d 11, 13 (D.D.C. 2002); Russo v. Glasser, 279 F.

Supp. 2d 136, 146 (D. Conn. 2003). His apparent failure to exhaust those remedies deprives this

court of its jurisdiction to hear his claims.

Moreover, even if plaintiff had exhausted the administrative claims process the complaint

nonetheless fails to invoke subject matter jurisdiction. The allegations of the complaint are

difficult to discern, but the complaint is clear that the plaintiff is attempting to sue for libel,

slander, and assault. Congress, in enacting the Federal Tort Claims Act, expressly refused to

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 The Act does not apply to:

Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,

malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit,

or interference with contract rights . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)

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waive the immunity of the United States for those very claims.2

III. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss be granted and this action be order dismissed for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction; and

2. The Clerk be directed to close this case. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten (10)

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) days after service of the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: August 20, 2007.

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