Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01794/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01794-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CURTIS HARRIS, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

KELLY SANTORO, Warden, 

Defendant.

 Case No.: CV-15-1794-GPC (PCL) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION RE: 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS 

I. INTRODUCTION 

A jury convicted Petitioner Curtis Harris (“Petitioner”) of assault by means likely 

to cause great bodily injury, Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(1), and battery with serious bodily 

injury, Cal. Penal Code § 243(d), and found true an allegation that Petitioner inflicted 

great bodily injury, Cal. Penal Code §12022.7(a). (Lodgment 1, at 124-25.) Challenging 

his conviction, Petitioner seeks federal habeas corpus relief on the basis of seven 

grounds: 1) Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective for various reasons; 2) the 

prosecutor committed a pattern of misconduct; 3) the trial court improperly denied 

Petitioner’s motion to suppress evidence under California Penal Code section 1538.5; 4) 

the trial court improperly applied the standard for substitution of appointed counsel; 5) 

the trial court improperly answered a jury question and Petitioner’s trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to challenge the trial court’s answer; 6) the trial court erred in 

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denying Petitioner’s motion for new trial; and 7) Petitioner’s appellate counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise issues on appeal. (Doc. 1, at 31-71.) 

Respondent filed an answer to the petition, arguing for its denial. (Doc. 13.) 

Petitioner did not file a traverse. For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends 

that the petition be denied. 

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

On April 7, 2011, a San Diego jury found Petitioner guilty of assault by means 

likely to cause great bodily injury, Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(1), and battery with serious 

bodily injury, Cal. Penal Code § 243(d). (Lodgment 1, at 124-25.) Petitioner admitted 

two prior-conviction allegations, Cal. Penal Code §§667(a)(1), 667(b)-(i), 1170.12. 

(Lodgment 1, at 369.) After the jury verdict, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to 

fourteen years in state prison. (Lodgment 1, at 393.) 

Petitioner appealed his conviction on the ground that he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to advocate for the the jury instruction that 

emotional trauma does not constitute “serious bodily injury” in response to a jury note. 

(Lodgment 5.) Additionally, he contended that the trial court violated its instructional 

duty under Cal. Penal Code §1138 and his due process rights by failing to provide a 

proper response to the jury’s question regarding whether psychological harm could 

constitute serious bodily injury. (Id.) On January 16, 2014, the California Court of 

Appeal affirmed his conviction. (Lodgment 5.) Petitioner then filed a petition for review 

in the California Supreme Court, and on March 26, 2014, the California Supreme Court 

denied the petition for review. (Lodgment 7.) 

On March 5, 2015, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

California Supreme Court. (Lodgment 8.) On July 8, 2015, the California Supreme Court 

denied the habeas petition. (Lodgment 9.) 

On August 13, 2015, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this 

Court. (Doc. 1.) Respondent filed an answer on December 21, 2015, addressing the 

seven claims that were raised in the petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 13.) 

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Petitioner did not file a traverse. For the reasons discussed below, the Petition should be 

DENIED. 

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be 

correct; Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and 

convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1); see also Summer v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 

550 (1981) (holding in part: findings of historical fact, including inferences properly 

drawn from these facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness.) The 

following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal opinion: 

While at a party, Harris punched Jodi Tannehill in the face, causing her to fall to the 

floor. While Tannehill was unconscious on the floor, Harris poured beer on her, 

unzipped his pants and urinated on her. The emergency doctor who treated Tannehill 

after the attack testified that she suffered a hematoma (bleeding under the skin) on 

her forehead and an abrasion and bruising on the front of her head. He diagnosed her 

with a closed-head injury, an abrasion, and possible “GHB” poisoning. The doctor 

explained that a “close-head injury” is commonly referred to as a “concussion.” 

 

Tannehill testified that her injuries remained black, blue and painful for several 

weeks. As a result, she could not bite or chew and ate only soft foods. The bump on 

her head lasted for three to five months, and she had to have blood drained from her 

head twice after the attack. She suffered daily headaches for several months. Because 

of her headaches and the treatment, she had to take time off from school. She also 

suffered panic attacks that affected her ability to work as a hairdresser. 

 

During deliberations, the jury sent a note requesting a “clearer definition of ‘battery 

causing serious bodily injury.’ Does that include emotional suffering, such as 

inability to perform job duties due to the emotional trauma caused by an injury?” 

Upon stipulation of the parties, the court responded, “The definition of ‘serious 

bodily injury’ is contained in Instruction 925, the final paragraph.” The relevant 

portion of CALCRIM No. 925 instructed the jury: “A serious bodily injury means a 

serious impairment of physical condition. Such an injury may include, but is not 

limited to: . . . loss of consciousness/concussion/bone fracture/protracted loss or 

impairment of function of any bodily member or organ.” Twenty minutes later, the 

jury found Harris guilty. 

(Lodgment 5.) 

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IV. DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

A federal court “shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf 

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of state court only on the ground he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 

U.S.C. §2254(a). Federal habeas courts may not “reexamine state-court determinations on 

state-law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). “[A] state court’s 

interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged 

conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.” Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 

74, 76 (2005); see Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2000) (“a 

violation of state law standing alone is not cognizable in federal court on habeas”). 

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). 

Under ADEPA, a habeas petition will not be granted with respect to any claim 

adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless that adjudication: 1) resulted in a 

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law; or 2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. §2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). In deciding a state prisoner’s 

habeas petition, a federal court is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with the 

state court’s determination; rather, the court applies an extraordinary deferential review, 

inquiring only whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. See 

Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877(9th 

Cir. 2004). 

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state 

court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or 

if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may grant 

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relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the state court correctly identified 

the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applied 

those decisions to the facts of a particular case. Id. Additionally, the “unreasonable 

application” clause requires that the state court decision be more than incorrect or 

erroneous; to warrant habeas relief, the state court’s application of clearly established 

federal law must be “objectively unreasonable.” See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 

(2003). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court 

“looks through” to the underlying appellate court decision and presumes it provides the 

basis for the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See Y1st v. Nunnemaker, 501 

U.S. 797, 805-06 (1991). If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for 

its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to 

determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established Supreme Court Law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 

(9th Cir. 2000)(overruled on other grounds by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76); accord Hines 

v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court need not cite 

Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. See Early, 537 U.S. at 

8. “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts 

[Supreme Court precedent,]” id., the state court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly 

established federal law. Id. Clearly established federal law, for purposes of §2254(d), 

means “the governing principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time 

the state court renders its decision.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72. 

Where the state court did not reach the merits of a claim because of the imposition 

of a state procedural bar, “there is no state court decision. . . . to which to accord 

deference.” Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167. Thus, this court must review those claims de novo. 

Id. However, AEDPA “does not require a state court to give reasons before its decision 

can be deemed to have been ‘adjudicated on the merits.’” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S 

86, 100 (2011). “Rather, as [the Supreme Court] has explained, ‘[w]hen a federal claim 

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has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be 

presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any 

indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.’” Johnson v. Williams, U.S. 

U, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1094 (2013) (quoting Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 785). 

B. Analysis 

1. Claim 1: Petitioner was Deprived of his Sixth Amendment Rights Because 

Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffectrive Assistance. 

Petitioner argues that trial counsel was unconstitutionally ineffective. (Doc.1, at 

32.) Petitioner presents five instances in which his trial counsel was ineffective: 1) failing 

to adequately prepare for trial; 2) failing to call alibi witnesses; 3) failing to object to 

several violations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); 4) failing to retain a 

DNA expert and retest DNA evidence; and 5) essentially admitting Petitioner’s guilt in 

closing arguments. Petitioner raised this claim in state court, and the claim was 

summarily denied by the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment 8; Lodgment 9.) 

In order to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must 

show: 1) that the counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 

“counsel” guaranteed to the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment; and 2) such errors were 

prejudicial to Petitioner. Stickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Even 

further, a petitioner must demonstrate that errors made by counsel are such that fall below 

an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. A petitioner must overcome the presumption 

that, under all the circumstances of the case, the challenged action “might be considered 

sound trial strategy.” Id. at 689. Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of 

law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable. Wiggins v. 

Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91). Lawyers are 

allowed considerable discretion to make strategic decisions about what to investigate, but 

only after those lawyers “gathered sufficient evidence upon which they base their tactical 

choices.” Duncan v. Ornoski, 528 F.3d 1222, 1235 (9th Cir. 2008)(quoting Jennings v. 

Woodford, 290 F. 3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2002)(emphasis omitted)). Under part two of 

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the Strickland test, even if a petitioner shows that particular errors of counsel were 

unreasonable, they must also demonstrate that the result of the proceeding would have 

been different had the errors not occurred. Id. at 693-94. A failure by a petitioner to 

illustrate both the deficient performance and sufficient prejudice results in a denial of a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 700. 

a. Sub-Claim a: Trial Counsel Failed to Adequately Prepare for Trial. 

Petitioner argues that trial counsel was not prepared for trial. (Doc. 1, at 32.) 

Petitioner claims that trial counsel did not do sufficient research into his background and 

into the context of the facts in the case. (Doc. 1, at 34.) Petitioner maintains that trial 

counsel was unprepared to present mitigating material evidence at the sentencing hearing, 

which was prejudicial to his case. (Id.) 

Petitioner’s claim fails the Strickland standard. In his Petition, Petitioner failed to 

show support for counsel’s alleged deficient performance and failed to show how this 

lack of preparation prejudiced him at trial. The Court of Appeal stated that although trial 

counsel participated in various other trials while preparing for his case, trial counsel was 

adequately prepared for Petitioner’s trial. (Lodgment 2, at 1533.) The Court of Appeal 

also stated that trial counsel was well prepared and exhibited extensive knowledge of the 

facts of the case: “I don’t have any question about the preparation of Ms. Von Helms and 

Mr. Valencia as far as this case and for purposes of trying the case.” (Lodgment 2, at 

1534.) Because Petitioner failed to prove both deficient performance and sufficient 

prejudice due to inadequate preparation, the state court’s decision that trial counsel was 

adequately prepared for trial is reasonable and must be upheld. The Court finds that 

habeas relief is not available with respect to claim one, sub-claim a. 

b. Sub-Claim b: Trial Counsel Failed to Call Witnesses that Petitioner 

Requested. 

Petitioner maintains that his trial counsel failed to call three alibi witness: Joyce 

Jones, Michelle Gothard, and Robert Whaley. (Lodgment 1, at 289; Lodgment 2, at 1991-

93.) Additionally, Petitioner claims that he was unfairly influenced to refrain from 

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testifying. (Doc. 1, at 40-41.) Petitioner raised this claim to the state courts in his writ of 

habeas corpus which was denied by the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment 8; 

Lodgment 9.) 

Here, Petitioner failed to overcome the presumption that not calling Joyce Jones, 

Michelle Gothard, and Robert Whaley as alibi witnesses was a reasonable tactical 

decision. Joyce Jones would have testified that shortly after 2:30 a.m. on the date of the 

incident, Petitioner arrived at her niece’s house and remained there until 4:30 or 5:00 a.m. 

(Lodgment 1, at 286.) Petitioner provided an interview report of Michelle Gothard, where 

Gothard claimed that she picked up Petitioner around 2:30 a.m. from military housing 

and drove him home. (Lodgment 1, at 289.) Trial counsel interviewed all three of the 

alibi witnesses before the tactical decision was made not to call them in compliance with 

Duncan, 528 F.3d at 1235. (Lodgment 2, at 1287,1305.) “[I]n the reporter’s transcript of 

April 6th of last year, 2011. . . Ms. Von Helms indicated to the court the fact that these 

potential alibi witnesses had been gone over and discussed in particular, Mr. Harris . . . I 

think that’s certainly an important indication that this was a tactical decision made with 

the defendant’s consent that we rarely have a record of.” (Lodgment 2, at 1534:26- 

1535:7.) The court also stated that the proposed testimony that was not presented as alibi 

evidence would have the effect of supporting the prosecution and prejudicing Petitioner. 

(Lodgment 2, at 1534.) Additionally, Petitioner failed to provide factual support that he 

was coerced into refraining from testifying on his own behalf. On the record, Petitioner 

never indicated that he wanted to testify or that he was prevented from doing so by 

counsel. Lastly, Petitioner did not establish how these alleged errors of trial counsel 

prejudiced his case. Therefore, the state court was not unreasonable in ruling that trial 

counsel was not ineffective for failing to call witnesses, including Defendant, to the 

stand. The Court finds that habeas relief is not available with respect to claim one, subclaim b. 

/// 

/// 

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c. Sub-Claim c: Trial Counsel Failed to Object to Several Violations Under 

Brady v. Maryland. 

Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge an 

alleged Brady violation involving Detective Medina’s failure to include in her report that, 

prior to identifying Petitioner as a suspect, she showed an initial photographic lineup to a 

witness which did not contain Petitioner’s photograph. (Lodgment 1, at 243.) Petitioner 

raised this claim to the state courts in his writ of habeas corpus which was denied by the 

California Supreme Court. (Lodgment 8; Lodgment 9.) 

The suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon 

request violates due process where the evidence is material either to the question of guilt 

or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). To prevail on a Brady claim, “[t]he evidence at issue 

must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is 

impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or 

inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Hovery v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 916 (9th 

Cir. 2006)(quoting Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004)). “Evidence is material if 

there is a probability that, had it been disclosed to the defense, the outcome of the trial 

would have been different.” Belmontes v. Brown, 414 F.3d 1094, 1113 (9th Cir. 2005). 

What is important is “whether, after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the 

undisclosed evidence, the remaining evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s 

conclusions.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 290 (1999). 

Here, Petitioner did not provide reasons as to why his trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to bring a Brady claim regarding the photographic lineup. Detective Medina 

showed various witnesses two lineups during her investigation. (Lodgment 1, at 243.) 

The first lineup did not contain a picture of Petitioner, while the second lineup did. (Id.) 

The information on the first photographic lineup was available to Petitioner’s counsel at 

least by the time of trial. (Lodgment 1, at 243-245.) Also, even had this purported 

impeachment evidence been presented at trial, Petitioner still would have been convicted 

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due to the several other witnesses at trial who testified that they witnessed Petitioner 

“punch,” “stomp,” and “urinate” on the victim. (Lodgment 2, at 125, 412, 413.) 

Therefore, the state court’s decision that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to 

object to potential Brady violations is reasonable. The Court finds that habeas relief is not 

available with respect to claim one, sub-claim c. 

d. Sub-Claim d: Trial Counsel Failed to Retain a DNA Expert and Retest DNA 

Evidence. 

Petitioner claims that trial was counsel was ineffective for failing to retain an 

expert on DNA analysis and for not having the DNA re-analyzed by the defense’s own 

expert. (Doc. 1, at 32.) Additionally, Petitioner contends that because the DNA evidence 

was a key part of the prosecution’s case, defense counsel had a duty to retain expert 

witnesses to advise her on whether to re-analyze the DNA evidence. (Id.) As a result of 

his trial counsel’s ineffective assistance in regards to the DNA evidence, Petitioner 

argues that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated. (Id.) Petitioner raised this claim to 

the state court in his petition for writ of habeas corpus which was denied by the 

California Supreme Court. (Lodgment 8; Lodgment 9.) 

Here, Petitioner failed to overcome the presumption that not retaining a DNA 

expert and not requesting the DNA to be re-analyzed was a strategic move. Mere 

speculation by a petitioner that an expert witness could have been found whose testimony 

would have supported the defense theory that someone else committed the assault is not 

enough to support an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Gallegos v. 

Schriro, 583 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1068 (D. Ariz. 2008). Petitioner did not provide support 

as to how he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to retain a DNA expert and retest 

DNA evidence. Therefore, the state court’s decision that trial counsel was not ineffective 

for failing to retain a DNA expert and failing to retest DNA evidence is reasonable. The 

Court finds that habeas relief is not available with respect to claim one, sub-claim d. 

/// 

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e. Sub-Claim e: Trial Counsel Essentially Admitted Petitioner’s Guilt in 

Closing Arguments. 

Petitioner argues that trial counsel’s closing argument was deficient because she 

essentially declared Petitioner guilty. (Doc. 1, at 32.) Petitioner claims that his Sixth 

Amendment rights were violated as a result of trial counsel’s comments during closing 

argument. (Id.) Petitioner raised this claim to the state courts in his writ of habeas corpus 

which was denied by the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment 8; Lodgment 9.) 

For the defense, closing argument is the last clear chance to persuade the trier of 

fact that there is reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. Herring v. New York, 422 

U.S. 853, 862 (1975). During closing arguments, trial counsel must present arguments to 

the jury about the weaknesses in the prosecution’s case and strengths in the defense that 

help the defendant’s position. See Gentry v. Roe, 320 F.3d 891, 900-902 (9th Cir. 2003). 

To not do so is ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. At 902. 

Here, Petitioner failed to establish that trial counsel improperly conceded his guilt 

during closing arguments. Petitioner, again, failed to provide factual support as to what 

trial counsel said that essentially argued for Petitioner’s guilt. During closing arguments, 

trial counsel stated the following: 

Mr. Curtis Harris is not guilty of these fabrications, accusations against him. 

Jodi Tannehill, I feel bad for her . . . She doesn’t really remember anything. She 

certainly doesn’t say Mr. Harris hit me or punched me. 

 [I]f you recall, she was shown lineup pictures with his picture in it, and she didn’t 

pick him out at that time. 

Lashonna tries to paint herself as the heroine. “I went and pushed the male off—to 

Officer Hall. I went and physically pushed him.” Now, she can’t keep her facts 

straight, which is why the truth never changes. This showed it’s a lie. 

(Lodgment 2, at 1345:25-26 - 1349:3-6.) 

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It is clear from the above that counsel was arguing for Petitioner’s innocence. All 

of the arguments cast at least some doubt on the prosecutor’s case. As Petitioner fails to 

cite any particular portion of trial counsel’s closing argument that he claims to be 

improper or damaging to his case, the state court’s decision that trial counsel was not 

ineffective for the closing argument is reasonable. The Court finds that habeas relief is 

not available with respect to claim one, sub-claim e. 

2. Claim 2: Prosecutor Committed a Pattern of Misconduct Which Violated 

Petitioner’s Due Process Rights. 

Petitioner contends that the prosecutor improperly elicited hearsay testimony and 

that he improperly shifted the burden of proof during closing argument. (Doc. 1, at 47-

55.) This, Petitioner argues, violated Petitioner’s due process rights under the United 

States Constitution. (Doc. 1, at 47.) Petitioner complains that the prosecutor told the jury 

that Petitioner had assaulted and urinated on the victim without laying a proper 

foundation. (Doc. 1, at 48.) Petitioner raised this claim to the state court in his petition for 

writ of habeas corpus which was denied by the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment 8, 

at 39-46; Lodgment 9.) 

In order to establish prosecutorial misconduct, a prosecutor’s comments must have 

“so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 

process.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). It “is not enough that the 

prosecutor’s remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned.” Darden v. 

Wainwright, 699 F.2d 1031, 1036 (11th Cir. 1983). Prosecutorial misconduct violates due 

process only if the evidence presented, taken as a whole, gives a jury a “‘false 

impression.’” Downs v. Hoyt, 232 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2000)(citation omitted). 

a. Sub-Claim a: The Prosecutor Improperly Elicited Inadmissible Hearsay 

Evidence 

Petitioner claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he elicited 

inadmissible hearsay testimony in violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 

Amendment. (Doc. 1, at 49-50.) The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment 

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provides that the accused has the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” 

U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Confrontation Clause is designed to require the use of live 

testimony and cross examination questioning at trial to increase “the accuracy of 

factfinding by reducing the risk that a witness will wrongfully implicate an innocent 

person.” Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990). 

Petitioner states that the prosecution put on numerous witnesses who claimed that 

they witnessed Petitioner assault and urinate on the victim. (Doc. 1, at 49.) Petitioner 

characterized this evidence as inadmissible hearsay. (Id.) However, because the 

statements were made by witnesses who testified at trial, the evidence is not hearsay and 

is admissible according to Federal Rule of Evidence §801(c). Even further, the testimony 

provided by the witness who claimed that they witnessed Petitioner assault and urinate on 

the victim does not otherwise violate the Sixth Amendment, as defense counsel had the 

opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and their testimony. As there was no 

prosecutorial misconduct for eliciting this testimony, the state court was reasonable in its 

rejection of this claim. The Court finds that habeas relief is not available with respect to 

claim two, sub-claim a. 

b. Sub-Claim b: The Prosecutor Shifted the Burden of Proof During Closing 

Argument. 

Petitioner argues that the prosecutor shifted the burden of proof during closing 

arguments which violated his right to due process. (Doc. 1, at 53, 55.) 

 Prosecutors have considerable leeway to strike “‘hard blows’” based on the 

evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence during closing arguments. 

United States v. Tucker, 641 F.3d 1110, 1120 (9th Cir. 2011)(quoting United States v. 

Henderson, 241 F.3d 638, 652 (9th Cir. 2000)). Comments intended to highlight the 

weaknesses of a defendant’s case do not shift the burden of proof to the defendant during 

closing arguments “where the prosecutor does not argue that a failure to explain them 

adequately requires a guilty verdict.” United States v. Vaandering, 50 F.3d 696, 701-02 

(9th Cir. 1995). In order to determine whether comments made during closing arguments 

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resulted in prosecutorial misconduct, federal courts in habeas cases must review 

prosecutor’s conduct to determine whether that conduct “so infected the trial with 

unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Hall v. Whitley, 

935 F.2d 165, 165 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 

(1974)). 

Petitioner objects to the following closing arguments because they resulted in a 

denial of his due process rights: 

The bitch deserved it, she shouldn’t have been talking shit.” You have a lot of 

evidence talking about what Curtis Harris did about a lot of people who saw what 

he did . . . What did he do? He knocked out Jodi Tannehill. He dragged her into the 

kitchen. He poured his drink on her. He stepped on her chest, causing a bruise as she 

lay on her back, eyes fluttering, flopping like a fish, he pulled down his pants and he 

urinated on her, a full urination. 

Then what did he do? He called her a bitch a couple more times, punched her in the 

face as she lay unconscious, knocked out cold, and walked away. “The bitch 

deserved it.” And why? Why did he do that? Because she was talking shit. She was 

disrespecting Curtis Harris. 

Now let’s think about Mr. Harris. He’s a 32-year-old at a party with a bunch of 

teenagers. These people were 18, 19, 20. People that couldn’t buy booze. But he’s 

the big man, the big 32-year-old hanging out with people 10, 12 years younger than 

him. He’s the respected one. He’s the hard one at this party. 

He gets to the party, they can’t buy booze, so he takes Larry and Brandy, who is 

throwing the party, to go get some booze because he is the big guy. They go to the 

store, they get booze, they come back. Now we have a bunch of 18, 19, 20-year-olds 

drinking beer because of Mr. Harris. We don’t know where the weed came from, but 

we know where the booze came from. 

Ms. Von Helms has done a great job in this case because there aren’t witnesses for 

Mr. Harris. There aren’t facts for Mr. Harris. It is clear as day. We have got DNA 

evidence proving that he was a contributor to the sweatshirt. There is no facts, good 

facts for them to argue. 

(Doc. 1, at 52-53.) 

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Despite the graphic picture painted by the prosecutor during closing arguments, the 

language does not rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct that would violate due 

process. The prosecutor highlighted the weakness of Defendant’s case when he said: 

“There aren’t facts for Mr. Harris. It is clear as day.” (Doc. 1 at 52-53.) This verbiage 

does not shift the burden of proof to Petitioner as the prosecutor did not argue that lack of 

witnesses or facts for Petitioner’s case required a guilty verdict. Also, the colorful 

language used by the prosecutor during closing arguments did not “so infect the trial with 

unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process,” Darden, 477 U.S. 

at 181, but was merely used in order to persuade, and not require, the jury to convict 

Petitioner. Because Petitioner failed to establish that the prosecutor shifted the burden of 

proof during closing arguments, the state court’s decision that the prosecutor’s conduct 

was proper is reasonable. The Court finds that habeas relief is not available with respect 

to claim one, sub-claim b. 

3. Claim 3: Trial Court Improperly Denied Petitioner’s Motion to Suppress 

Evidence under Cal. Penal Code § 1538.5, Thereby Requiring a Reversal of 

Petitioner’s Conviction. 

Petitioner contends that the following evidence should have been suppressed by the 

trial court in accordance with California Penal Code §1538.5: 1) identification testimony, 

2) the victim’s sweatshirt, and 3) DNA testimony. (Doc. 1, at 55.) Due to an improper 

denial of his Motion to Suppress Evidence, Petitioner claims that his current conviction 

should therefore be reversed. (Id.) Petitioner raised this claim to the state court in his 

petition for writ of habeas corpus which was denied by the California Supreme Court. 

(Lodgment 8, at 39-46; Lodgment 9.) 

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects “the right of the 

people to be secure in their houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 

seizures.” U.S. Const. amend IV. The rule used to exclude illegally obtained evidence 

from being used in court was created in order compel respect for this constitutional 

guaranty by removing the incentive to disregard it. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 

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217 (1960). However, the constitutional protections accorded to criminal defendants 

under the exclusionary rule are not absolute. Stone v Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 488 (1976). 

Where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth 

Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the 

ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at 

trial. Id. at 494. A court should consider whether petitioner had the opportunity to litigate 

his claim, not whether he did in fact do so or even whether the claim was correctly 

decided, when determining whether to grant habeas corpus relief on a Fourth Amendment 

claim. Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996). 

California provides such an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate a Fourth 

Amendment claim through a motion to suppress evidence filed pursuant to California 

Penal Code §1538.5. See Gordon v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding 

Cal. Penal Code §1538.5 provided the full and fair opportunity required under Stone). 

“The releveant inquiry is whether petitioner had the opportunity to litigate his claim, not 

whether he did in fact do so or even whether the claim was correctly decided.” Ortiz, 81 

F.3d at 899. Consequently, as Petitioner’s counsel could have, and in fact did try to 

suppress the evidence in question, the state court was reasonable in denying Petitioner’s 

Fourth Amendment claim. 

4. Claim 4: Trial Court Erred by Denying Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment Right to 

Obtain Counsel of His Choice 

Petitioner maintains that the trial court denied him his Sixth Amendment right to 

obtain the counsel of his choice when the trial court improperly applied the standard for 

substitution of counsel articulated in People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118 (1970). (Doc. 1, at 

58.) Petitioner presented this claim to the state court which was denied by the California 

Supreme Court. (Lodgment 8; Lodgment 9.) 

The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 

shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const. 

amend. VI. If a defendant cannot afford to have the counsel of his choice, then he has a 

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constitutional right to have counsel appointed for him or to represent himself. Faretta v. 

California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975). When a petitioner claims a trial court erred in 

denying a motion for substitution of counsel, violating his constitutional rights, a court 

must consider whether the conflict between the petitioner and his appointed counsel had 

become so great that it resulted in a “total lack of communication or other significant 

impediment that resulted [] in an attorney-client relationship that fell short of that 

required by the Sixth Amendment.” Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir. 

2000). However, the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee that trial counsel and the 

accused have a meaningful relationship, but rather that counsel “function[s] in the active 

role of an advocate.” Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748, 751 (1967). 

During court proceedings on April 1, 2011, Petitioner asked his trial counsel, 

Guadalupe Valencia, to inform the court that he did not want Mr. Valencia to be his 

counsel. (Lodgment 2, at 1290.) On April 6, 2011 the court asked Petitioner, “[I]s it 

correct that you are no longer seeking different counsel . . . [A]m I correct that you are 

no longer asking the court to change your attorney?” (Lodgment 2, at 1304:11-17.) 

Petitioner replied, “Yes.” (Lodgment 2, at 1304:18.) Petitioner abandoned his request to 

change attorneys, showing that there must have been some communication between him 

and his trial counsel and that Petitioner was at least somewhat satisfied with trial counsel. 

Also during court proceedings on April 1, 2011, trial counsel stated that he discussed 

with Petitioner whether or not he wished to testify at trial and that Petitioner requested 

that he call various alibi witnesses. (Lodgment 2, at 1286-87.) Trial counsel then asked 

the court for a continuance so that he could interview the witnesses, further 

demonstrating an open line of communication between Petitioner and his trial counsel. 

(Id.) Not only did Petitioner abandon his Marsden motion to replace his attorney, 

Petitioner did not exhibit a “total lack of communication or other significant 

impediment” between himself and his trial counsel. Schell, 218 F.3d at 1026. Thus, the 

state court was not unreasonable for ruling that the trial court did not deny Petitioner’s 

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Sixth Amendment right to obtain counsel of his choice. The court finds that habeas relief 

is not available with respect to claim four. 

5. Claim 5: Petitioner’s Constitutional Rights were Violated when Trial Court 

Improperly Answered a Jury Question and Petitioner’s Trial Counsel was 

Ineffective for Failing to Challenge the Trial Court’s Answer. 

Petitioner argues that his constitutional rights were violated when the trial judge 

responded to a jury note during jury deliberation. (Doc. 1, at 60-61.) The jury wrote the 

following note: “Clearer definition of ‘battery causing serious bodily injury.’ Does that 

include emotional suffering, such as inability to perform job duties due to the emotional 

trauma caused by injury?” (Lodgment 1, at 122.) The trial judge responded, “[t]he 

definition of ‘serious bodily injury’ is contained in Instruction 925, the final paragraph.” 

(Lodgment 1, at 123.) The final paragraph of the instructions as given to the jury read: 

“[A] serious bodily injury means a serious impairment of physical condition. Such an 

injury may include, but is not limited to: loss of consciousness/concussion/bone 

fracture/protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ[.]” 

(Lodgment 1, at 108.) Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

challenge the trial court’s response to the jury note. (Doc. 1, at 59-63.) Petitioner 

presented this claim on direct appeal and it was summarily denied by the California 

Supreme Court. (Lodgment 8; Lodgment 9.) 

While it is true that a trial court should clarify the jury’s difficulties in 

understanding the jury instructions with concrete accuracy, the precise manner by which 

the court fulfills this obligation is left to the trial judge’s discretion. See Arizona v. 

Johnson, 351 F.3d 988, 994 (9th Cir. 2003). In order to prevail on a claim that a trial 

court improperly answered a jury question, a petitioner must demonstrate that the court’s 

error so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates the petitioner’s due 

process rights. See Beardslee v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 560, 573-74 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Additionally, the petitioner must show that the jury relied on the faulty instruction to 

convict. Ficklin v. Hatcher, 177 F.3d 1147, 1149-51 (9th Cir. 1999). 

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Petitioner failed to establish that the trial judge improperly responded to the jury 

note. Petitioner did not describe how the trial court improperly answered the jury note 

and did not provide any support that the jury applied California Criminal Jury Instruction 

925 in a way that violated the Constitution. Moreover, the trial court did not make an 

error in its response that so infected the entire trial that Petitioner’s resulting conviction 

was a denial of due process. The trial judge responded to the jury note appropriately 

when he simply responded, “[t]he definition of ‘serious bodily injury’ is contained in 

Instruction 925, final paragraph. (Lodgment 1, at 108.) 

Additionally, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the trial 

court’s answer to the jury question. Petitioner stated in his petition that, “[t]rial counsel 

has a duty to ensure that the jury has a proper understanding of the law.” (Doc. 1, at 

59:19-20). The trial court responded to the jury note by having the jury refer back to the 

law. Trial counsel’s objection to this response would have been properly overruled.The 

Court finds that habeas relief is not available with respect to claim five. 

6. Claim 6: Trial Court Erred in Denying Petitioner’s Motion for New Trial in 

Violation of Petitioner’s Due Process Rights. 

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in denying his Motion for New Trial 

pursuant to Cal. Penal Code §1181(5), (6) and (7). (Doc. 1, at 63.) A new trial should 

have been granted, Petitioner claims, because the facts provided at trial did not support a 

finding that Petitioner carried out the accused act of criminal assault. (Doc. 1, at 65.) As a 

result of the trial court’s error, Petitioner claims that his due process rights were violated. 

(Doc. 1, at 66.) Petitioner presented this claim to the state courts which was summarily 

denied by the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment 8; Lodgment 9.) 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “protects the accused 

against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary 

to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 

(1970). A petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief when “it is found that upon the 

record evidence adduced at trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt 

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beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979). Once a state 

court fact finder has found a defendant guilty, federal habeas courts must consider the 

evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. In 

making this determination, federal habeas courts must respect the province of the jury to 

determine the credibility of witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, and draw reasonable 

inferences from proven facts by assuming the jury resolved all conflicts in a manner that 

supports the verdict. Id. “Although it might have been possible to draw a different 

inference from the evidence, [a federal habeas court is] required to resolve that conflict in 

favor of the prosecution.” Ngo v. Giurbino, 651 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2011). Federal 

habeas courts also must analyze Jackson claims “with explicit reference to the substantive 

elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law.” Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 

978, 983 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16). Finally, “[a]n 

additional layer of deference is added to this standard by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which 

requires [a petitioner] to demonstrate that the state court’s adjudication entailed an 

unreasonable application of the quoted Jackson standard.” Briceno v. Scribner, 555 F.3d 

1069, 1078 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Viewing the evidence “in light most favorable to the prosecution,” this Court finds 

that sufficient evidence was adduced at trial to support the assault charge. Jackson, 443 

U.S. at 319. In order to sustain an allegation of assault by means likely to produce great 

bodily injury under Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(1), the prosecution must prove that 

Petitioner committed an assault upon Jodi Tannehill with a deadly weapon or instrument 

other than a firearm. Cal. Pen. Code §245(a)(1). Eye witness Lashonna Williams 

testified at trial that she saw Petitioner speaking to the victim and witnessed an altercation 

take place between Petitioner and the victim. (Lodgment 2, at 121,124.) “He punched 

her. He punched her, and I guess she, like, stumbled right there in the kitchen or he 

[dragged] her in the kitchen, but I’m pretty sure they were fighting, and she just got 

knocked out cold.” (Lodgment 2, at 125:5-8.) Lashonna Williams also testified to having 

seen Petitioner punch the victim in the face. (Lodgment 2, at 125.) Next, Lashonna 

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Williams saw the victim fall to the floor and Petitioner unzip his pants, pull out his penis, 

and urinate on the victim. (Id.) Brandy Williams testified that she also saw Petitioner and 

the victim speak to each other the night in question: “What happened next? I went to the 

garage to get her daughter once again. When I came back in this time, Jodi was on the 

floor, and Mr. Harris was peeing on Jodi.” (Lodgment 2, at 412: 4-6.) Brandy Williams 

then testified that the victim’s eyes were rolling back into her head while she lay on the 

floor and that she was nonresponsive. (Lodgment 2, at 413.) 

The testimony given at trial was more than sufficient to support the allegation of 

assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. The trial court did not violate 

Petitioner’s due process rights because it reasonably denied Petitioner’s motion for a new 

trial under California Penal Code §1181(5), (6) and (7) based on the evidence. This Court 

finds that habeas relief is not available with respect to claim six. 

7. Claim 7: Petitioner’s Appellate Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance of 

Counsel for Failing to Raise Issues on Appeal. 

Petitioner claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on 

appeal the issues he now presents in his habeas corpus petition. (Doc. 1, at 67-71.) Had 

appointed appellate counsel raised these issues on appeal, Petitioner contends, the 

appellate court would have overturned his current conviction. (Doc. 1, at 70.) 

Additionally, Petitioner claims that appellate counsel’s errors were so great that it lead to 

an appeal that was fundamentally unfair. (Id.) Petitioner presented this claim to the state 

courts in his petition for writ of habeas corpus which was denied by the California 

Supreme Court. (Lodgment 8; Lodgment 9.) 

Appellate counsels are to support their clients’ appeals to the best of their abilities. 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). However, nothing in the Constitution 

suggests that an appellate counsel has a duty to raise every “colorable” claim suggested 

by a client, but rather may select from among the issues at hand in order to maximize the 

likelihood of success on appeal. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 754 (1983). A petitioner 

must show that appellate counsel was ineffective using the Strickland v. Washington two 

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prong test. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000). First, it must be shown that 

appellate counsel was objectively unreasonable in failing to discover nonfrivolous issues 

and raise them on appeal. Id. Second, a petitioner must demonstrate that a reasonable 

probability exists that, but for the counsel’s unreasonable failure to raise issues, the 

petitioner would have succeeded on appeal. Id. at 286. 

Appellate counsel raised three issues on appeal: 1) trial counsel provided 

ineffective assistance by failing to object to the court’s response to the jury’s question of 

whether psychological harm could constitute serious bodily injury, thereby violating 

appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel; 2) trial court violated its instructional duty 

and appellant’s due process rights by failing to provide a proper response to the jury 

question regarding whether psychological harm could constitute serious bodily injury; 

and 3) that the abstract of judgment must be modified to reduce the 1202.4(B) fine from 

$33,660 to $3,360. (Lodgment 5.) The fact that appellate counsel only raised these three 

issues on appeal is acceptable under Jones because these are the claims that the appellate 

counsel felt would lead to success on appeal. And Petitioner, in fact, did succeed on issue 

three as the restitution fine was reduced to $3,360. (Lodgment 5, at 6.) However, 

Petitioner failed to establish that raising the other issues that he currently raises in his 

petition in this court would have resulted in a successful appeal in state court. Therefore, 

the state court was not unreasonable in ruling that appellate counsel did not render 

ineffective assistance. The Court finds that habeas relief is not available with respect to 

claim seven. 

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District 

Judge Curiel under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States 

District Court for the Southern District of California. For the reasons outlined above, IT 

IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: (1) approving and 

adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment be entered 

DENYING the Petition. 

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any party to this action may file written 

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties no later than September 5, 2016. 

The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Reply to the Objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than September 15, 2016. The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s Order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 

449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATE: August 15, 2016 

Peter C. Lewis

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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