Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01945/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01945-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Job Discrimination (Race)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY GOETHE, No. 2:07-CV-01945-MCE-GGH

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff seeks monetary and injunctive relief against

Defendant, the State of California, Department of Motor Vehicles,

(“Defendant”) for racial discrimination claims arising under

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et

seq., California Constitution Art. I, § 8, and California

Government Code §§ 12900 et seq. and 12940 et seq. Defendant now

moves to dismiss the First Cause of Action, Plaintiff’s disparate

impact claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1) on grounds that this Court lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction over the claim. 

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2

Defendant also requests dismissal of the Third Cause of Action,

Plaintiff’s racial discrimination claim, in its entirety, and the

Fourth Cause of Action, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, to the

extent it arises under state law, for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated below,

Defendant’s motion to dismiss will be GRANTED. 

BACKGROUND

On September 29, 2007, Plaintiff filed Charge of

Discrimination number 555-2006-01115 (“Charge”) with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Plaintiff checked

boxes on the Charge indicating that while he was employed by

Defendant he was subject to discrimination based on “race” and

“retaliation.” He stated the pertinent facts as follows in that

Charge: 

I was hired on or about November 30, 1987. My

current job title is Staff Services Manager I in the

Business Consulting Group. 

In or about 1995, I filed a discrimination lawsuit

against Respondent. Since winning my lawsuit, I have

been denied numerous promotions and lateral transfers. 

These include: 

On or about March 6, 2006: Manager V, Customer

Service/Technology and Manager V, Program Support

Manager. On or about May 24, 2006: Manager V,

International Registration Plan Policy Section Manager. 

On or about June 15, 2006: Manager V, Revenue and

Compliance Unit. All the selectees for the above

positions were Caucasian. 

On or about August 21, 2006: Manager V, Motor

Carrier Permit Policy Section Manager. The selectee

for this position is Black, but she has never

complained of discrimination, to my knowledge.

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In or about April 2006, I was denied a lateral

transfer to Staff Services Manager I FOD Sacramento

Headquarters Staff, Position number 438-4800-001,

Bulletin number 2-06-0400. The selectee was Caucasian.

I believe I have been discriminated against

because of my race, Black, and for engaging in

protected activity. 

Def.’s Req. for Judicial Notice, Ex. 1. At Plaintiff’s request,

the EEOC issued a Right-to-Sue Notice on August 9, 2007. 

Plaintiff filed his original Complaint in this Court on

September 17, 2007, and, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 15(a), filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on

December 5, 2007. 

Plaintiff alleges four causes of action in his FAC:

1) Disparate Impact Discrimination based on Race in Violation of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et

seq.; 2) Disparate Treatment Discrimination based on Race in

Violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e et seq.; 3) Racial Discrimination in Violation of the

California Constitution Art. I, § 8 and California Government

Code §§ 12900 et seq. and 12940 et seq.; and 4) Retaliation in

Violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and California Government Code §§ 12900

et seq. and 12940 et seq. Pl.’s First Am. Compl. p. 5-9. 

On December 26, 2007, Defendant filed its current Motion to

Dismiss. Defendant challenges the First Cause of Action in its

entirety arguing that this Court lacks jurisdiction because

Plaintiff failed to exhaust all available administrative

remedies. 

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P. & A. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss p. 2. Defendant

further challenges the Third Cause of Action in its entirety, and

the portion of the Fourth Cause of Action that arises under state

law, arguing that those claims are barred by the Eleventh

Amendment. Id. In connection with its motion, Defendant

simultaneously requests that the Court take judicial notice of

Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge.

Defendant does not challenge Plaintiff’s federal disparate

treatment or retaliation claims. 

Plaintiff filed his Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss on January 17, 2007.

STANDARD

1. Rule 12(b(1)

In moving to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the challenging party may either make

a “facial attack” on the allegations of jurisdiction contained in

the complaint or can instead take issue with subject-matter

jurisdiction on a factual basis (“factual attack”). Thornhill

Publishing Co. v. General Tel. & Elect. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733

(9th Cir. 1979); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549

F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). If the motion constitutes a facial

attack, the Court must consider the factual allegations of the

complaint to be true. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412

(5th Cir. 1981); Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. 

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5

If the motion constitutes a factual attack, however, “no

presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s allegations, and

the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the

trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of

jurisdictional claims.” Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733 (quoting

Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891).

2. Rule 12(b)(6)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted

as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336,

337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)

requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds

upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.

Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957). While a complaint attacked by a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual

allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the “grounds” of

his “entitlement to relief” requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127

S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (internal citations and quotations

omitted). Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to

relief above the speculative level. 

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6

Id. at 1965 (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004) (“The pleading must

contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that

merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of

action”).

If the court grants a motion to dismiss a complaint, it must

then decide whether to grant leave to amend. The court should

“freely give[]” leave to amend when there is no “undue delay, bad

faith[,] dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of . . . the amendment,

[or] futility of the amendment. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a);

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Generally, leave to

amend is only denied when it is clear that the deficiencies of

the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. DeSoto v. Yellow

Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992).

ANALYSIS

1. Failure to Exhaust

Title VII requires Plaintiff to exhaust his administrative

remedies prior to seeking relief in this Court. Equal Employment

Opportunity Comm’n, v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891, 899 (9th

Cir. 1994). However, this Court does have jurisdiction over

claims not included in the administrative charge if they are like

or reasonably related to included claims. B.K.B. v. Maui Police

Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2002). 

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 “The exhaustion requirement consists of two elements: 1

1) the jurisdictional non-waivable requirement of presentment of

the claim ... (presentment); and 2) the waivable requirement of

exhaustion of administrative remedies (exhaustion).” Id.

(internal quotations and citations omitted). “In the context of

Title VII, the jurisdictional presentment requirement is met when

the employee/plaintiff presents [his] claims to the

employer/agency or an appropriate administrative review body such

as the MSPB or EEOC, even if the claims are not timely presented. 

However, the presentment requirement is not met and the court

lacks jurisdiction when the plaintiff’s claims have never been

presented for agency or administrative review.” Id. at 357

(internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 

7

Jurisdiction extends to claims that “[fall] within the scope of

the EEOC’s actual investigation or an EEOC investigation which

can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of

discrimination.” Farmer Bros. at 899 (internal quotations and

citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The administrative

charge is intended to provide notice to the charged party, to

“narrow[] the issues for prompt adjudication and decision,” and

to encourage attempts at informal and voluntary conciliation. 

B.K.B. at 1099 (internal quotations and citations omitted); See

also Brown v. Puget Sound Elec. Apprenticeship & Training Trust,

732 F.2d 726, 729 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Exhaustion is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a

civil suit. Macy v. Dalton, 853 F. Supp. 350, 356-357 (E.D. Cal.

1994). Therefore, this Court will treat Defendant’s motion as a 1

Rule 12(b)(1) challenge to its subject-matter jurisdiction. The

Court is not limited “to the face of the pleadings” and can

consider any evidence. McCarthy v. U.S., 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th

Cir. 1988). 

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 “A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to 2

reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known

within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or

(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to

sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned...A court

shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied

with the necessary information...Judicial notice may be taken at

any stage of the proceeding.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b), (d), (f). 

8

Plaintiff admits he bears the burden of proving this Court

has jurisdiction over his claims. P. & A. in Opp’n of Def.’s

Mot. to Dismiss p. 3; Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. Of Am.,

511 U.S. 375 (1994). Despite this, he failed to file a copy of

his EEOC Charge with his FAC. Nevertheless, since the Court may

consider any evidence, and since Plaintiff has not objected to

Defendant’s request that the Court take judicial notice of

Plaintiff’s Charge, the Court will consider that critical

document in its analysis. Defendant’s request that this Court

take judicial notice of Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge is GRANTED

pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. 

2

This Court must “construe the language of EEOC charges ‘with

utmost liberality since they are made by those unschooled in the

technicalities of formal pleading.’” Id. at 1100 (citing Kaplan

v. Int’l Alliance of Theatrical & Stage Employees, 525 F.2d 1354,

1359 (9th Cir. 1975) abrogated on other grounds by Laughon v.

Int’l Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 248 F.3d 931 (9th

Cir. 2001)). However, “there is a limit to such judicial

tolerance when principles of notice and fair play are involved.” 

Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 291 F.3d 632, 636 (9th

Cir. 2002). Nevertheless, “[i]t is sufficient that the EEOC be

apprised, in general terms, of the alleged discriminating parties

and the alleged discriminatory acts.” Kaplan at 1359. 

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9

“The crucial element of a charge of discrimination is the

factual statement contained therein.” B.K.B. at 1100. In

reaching its decision, this Court can properly consider: 1) the

alleged basis of the discrimination; 2) dates of discriminatory

acts specified within the charge; 3) perpetrators of

discrimination named in the charge; 4) any locations at which

discrimination is alleged to have occurred; and 5) consistency of

the new charge with the Plaintiff’s original theory of the case. 

Id. at 1100. The Ninth Circuit applies the same analysis to

allegations not included in the original charge regardless of

whether they stem from facts that arose before or after the

filing of that charge. See Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1457

n.2 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Plaintiff raises three federal claims in his FAC:

1) Disparate Impact, 2) Disparate Treatment, and 3) Retaliation. 

The only question before this Court is whether his disparate

impact claim is like or reasonably related to either his

disparate treatment or retaliation claims. 

The Ninth Circuit has had only one occasion to address

whether a Title VII disparate impact claim was exhausted. See

Paige v. State of Cal., 102 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 1996). However,

in that case, the court accepted without discussion that the

disparate impact claim was raised in the administrative charge. 

The court concerned itself only with whether it should certify a

class. Id. at 1041-1042. 

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10

In Paige, the plaintiff’s charge alleged that “an examination was

biased, discriminatory, non job-related, non valid and not in

conformance with all applicable federal and state laws, rules and

regulations ... in that the examination was conducted without

consideration of an effective affirmative action program.” Id.

at 1041. That charge was clearly sufficient to provide notice of

the underlying disparate impact theory to an investigative body,

so it did not require the focus of the court’s attention.

The Ninth Circuit has also had occasion to consider whether

a disparate treatment claim was reasonably related to the

disparate impact claim included in the charge. See Brown v.

Puget Sound Electrical Apprenticeship & Training Trust, 732 F.2d

726 (1984). In that case, the appellees filed complaints with

the EEOC alleging that a veteran age credit had a disparate

impact on women. Id. at 728. Subsequently in federal court, in

addition to the disparate impact claim, one of the appellees

filed a discriminatory treatment claim that had arisen after the

initial charges. Id. The Brown court asked whether a new EEOC

investigation into disparate treatment would be redundant. Id.

at 730. Brown determined that “[a]ny investigation of whether

[the appellee’s] application was rejected as the result of

disparate impact would not have encompassed her subsequent claim

that when she reapplied to the program she was subjected to

intentional sex discrimination.” Id. at 730 (emphasis in

original). 

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11

Other circuit courts have weighed in as well. Their

decisions inevitably turn on the factual pleadings in the

claimants’ initial administrative complaints and whether those

pleadings provided notice to the investigative body of a

disparate impact claim. See Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 792

(5th Cir. 2006) (disparate impact claim not reasonably related to

administrative charge because the charge: 1) facially alleged

only disparate treatment; 2) identified no neutral employment

policy; and 3) complained of past incidents of disparate

treatment only); Noreuil v. Peabody Coal Co., 96 F.3d 254, 258

(7th Cir. 1996) (disparate impact claim not exhausted when the

plaintiff only addressed retaliation in the administrative

charge, the court had previously held “that retaliation and age

discrimination claims are sufficiently dissimilar that an

administrative charge of one fails to support a subsequent civil

suit for the other,” and the court determined “disparate impact

is even more conceptually distinct from a claim of retaliation

than an ordinary discrimination charge of disparate treatment”)

(internal citations omitted). But see Gomes v. Avco Corp., 964

F.2d 1330, (2d Cir. 1992) (disparate impact claim would

reasonably have flowed from disparate treatment investigation

when plaintiff pled that 1) he was a Portuguese male; 2) he

applied for open positions; 3) a specific rule governed promotion

to those positions; 4) plaintiff believed he satisfied the

applicable rule; 5) a less qualified employee was promoted

instead; 6) the union refused to pursue a grievance because it

found that plaintiff didn’t satisfy the applicable rule; and

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 See Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 381, 390 3

(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (disparate impact claim not exhausted when “the

substance of [the] EEOC charge [was] that Defendants’ [sic] were

motivated by illicit consideration of age,” which “is

substantively distinct from an allegation that Defendants

promulgated neutral policies that had the effect of

disadvantaging older employees”); Donaldson v. Microsoft Corp.,

205 F.R.D. 558, 570-571 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (disparate impact claim

not reasonably related to disparate treatment claim because the

original charge alleged only that the plaintiff had individually

been the victim of discrimination); McKinney v. Eastman Kodak

Co., 975 F. Supp. 462, (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (disparate impact claim

not exhausted when plaintiff’s charge alleged only that she had

been discharged in retaliation for complaining about employment

discrimination and did not mention any process or policy by which

the firm made its termination decisions); Murray v. John D.

Archbold Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 1368, (M.D. Ga. 1999)

(disparate impact claim not allowed when original charge alleged

only individual discrimination); Butler v. Matsushita Commc’n

Indus. Corp. of U.S., 203 F.R.D. 575, 582 (N.D. Ga. 2001)

(disparate impact claim not exhausted because it was “not

reasonable to expect the EEOC to investigate any neutral

employment policy when all that [was] raised [was] intentional

discrimination”); Gordon v. Peters, 489 F. Supp. 2d 729, 736

(S.D. Tex. 2007) (disparate impact claim not exhausted because

plaintiff originally complained only of past instances of

disparate treatment, alleged only individual intentional

discrimination, sought only individual remedies, and failed to

challenge any neutral policy); Leisen v. City of Shelbyville, 968

F. Supp. 409, 422 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (disparate impact claim not

related to original charge because “the mere fact that the

allegations of disparate treatment described in [the] initial

EEOC charge and the disparate impact and harassment claims ...

all allege various forms of sex discrimination [was] not enough

(continued...)

12

7) plaintiff was the only Portuguese employee in his job

classification); Brown v. Coach Stores, Inc., 163 F.3d 706, 712

(2d Cir. 1998) (disparate impact claim reasonably related to

failure to promote claim because the EEOC investigation “would

have assessed Coach’s promotion policies and their effect on

minority employees”). 

Likewise, the majority of district court cases have held

that complainants’ disparate impact claims were not reasonably

related to properly exhausted discrimination claims. 

3

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(...continued) 3

to bring the latter claims within the scope of [the] EEOC

charge); McNamara v. City of Chicago, 867 F. Supp. 739, 748 (N.D.

Ill. 1994) (disparate impact claim challenging the widespread

adverse impact of an examination was distinct from disparate

treatment claim, which involved individual discrimination).

 See DiPompo v. West Point Military Acad., 708 F. Supp. 4

540, 547-548 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (administrative charge could have

led the EEOC to investigate disparate impact claim because

plaintiff complained that a neutral rule operated to discriminate

against him); Alford v. City of Montgomery, Ala., 879 F. Supp.

1143, 1148-1149 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (disparate impact claim

exhausted when employee pled that policy allowing only “Community

Center Director III” directors to apply for promotions, despite

others being equally qualified, was discriminatory); Watkins v.

City of Chicago, 992 F. Supp. 971, (N.D. Ill. 1998) (disparate

impact claim reasonably related to disparate treatment claim

because plaintiff alleged that she was prevented from promoting

due to the city’s policy of disqualifying individuals arrested

for felonies and because plaintiff’s charge would have led to an

investigation into whether such a policy existed). 

13

While several district courts have held to the contrary, the

original charges in those cases almost all included facts

specifically supporting the elements of disparate impact.4

Regardless of outcome, the crux of each court’s analysis was

whether an investigation into an after-filed claim would

reasonably be expected to grow out of the facts pled in the

original charge. This analysis necessarily requires an

examination of the elements of the relative causes of action. 

In order for Plaintiff to claim disparate treatment, he must

allege an employment action that “treat[s] some people less

favorably than others because of their race, color, religion,

sex, or national origin.” Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. U.S., 431

U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). A discriminatory motive is required. 

Id. 

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To prove retaliation, Plaintiff must show that he was subject to

an adverse employment action because he engaged in protected

activity. Porter v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 894 (9th

Cir. 2005). Finally, to prove disparate impact, Plaintiff must

plead “that a facially neutral employment practice has a

significantly discriminatory impact upon a group protected by

Title VII.” Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 481

(9th Cir. 1983). This last claim does not require discriminatory

intent. Id. 

Plaintiff pled no facts within his EEOC Charge that would

have reasonably led to an investigation of a disparate impact

claim. Plaintiff alleged only that he suffered from instances of

individual racial discrimination and that he was denied

promotional opportunities in retaliation for prior complaints. 

He stated that he had been treated less favorably because of his

race and implied that his superiors operated with discriminatory

intent. Though despicable if true, Plaintiff’s original claims

only support his current disparate treatment and retaliation

claims. 

Unlike those plaintiffs who were ultimately allowed to raise

untimely disparate impact claims, Plaintiff did not allude to any

specific policy or procedure that adversely affected AfricanAmericans as a group. To the contrary, he alleged that an

African-American woman was promoted in lieu of him because she

had never complained of discrimination. This allegation

undermines any possible finding that Plaintiff’s Charge

challenged the discriminatory impact of facially neutral

policies. 

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 Plaintiff’s argument that Congress abrogated the states’ 5

sovereign immunity in Title VII actions is irrelevant. See Pl.’s

P. & A. In Opp. To Def.’s Mot. To Dismiss p. 9. While Plaintiff

is correct, Defendant challenges only Plaintiff’s state claims,

not his federal claims. 

15

Because Plaintiff pled only facts that would reasonably have

led to an investigation of disparate treatment or retaliation, he

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and this Court

lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action, his

disparate impact claim. Hence Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action is GRANTED with leave to amend.

2. Sovereign Immunity

Defendant challenges Plaintiff’s Third and Fourth Causes of

Action, which allege racial discrimination and retaliation in

violation of both the California Constitution and California

Government Code, on Eleventh Amendment grounds. The Eleventh 5

Amendment is an affirmative defense and dismissal pursuant to the

doctrine is not based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 

Elwood v. Drescher, 456 F.3d 943, 949 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing

Miles v. California, 320 F.3d 986, 988-989 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

Therefore, this Court will address Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See

Stoner v. Santa Clara County Office of Educ., 502 F.3d 1116 (9th

Cir. 2007). 

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Case 2:07-cv-01945-MCE-GGH Document 24 Filed 02/20/08 Page 15 of 17
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 Since the parties do not dispute that DMV is an arm of the 6

state, and since this Court agrees under ITSI T.V. Productions,

Inc. v. Cal. Exposition and State Fair, no more extensive

analysis is necessary. 3 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993)

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Even when all allegations of material fact are taken as true

and construed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, this

Court is precluded from hearing those claims. Though the

Eleventh Amendment expressly applies only to suits against a

state by citizens of another state, it is well established that

suits against a state by its own citizens are prohibited as well. 

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98

(1984). States inherently retained their pre-ratification

sovereign immunity from the latter cases because “federal

jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States ‘was not

contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial

power of the United States.’” Id. (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134

U.S. 1, 15 (1890)). Suits in which a state agency or department

“is named as the defendant [are also] proscribed by the Eleventh

Amendment.” Id. at 100. This Court cannot allow Plaintiff to 6

bring an unconsenting state into federal court. 

Plaintiff’s attempt to seek refuge under supplemental

jurisdiction is futile. “Neither pendent jurisdiction nor any

other basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment. 

A federal court must examine each claim in a case to see if the

court’s jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the Eleventh

Amendment...[T]his principle applies as well to state-law claims

brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction.” 

Pennhurst at 121; see also Bair v. Krug, 853 F.2d 672, 675-676

(9th Cir. 1988). 

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 7

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefing. E.D.

Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h). 

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Hence Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Cause

of Action in its entirety and his Fourth Cause of Action to the

extent it arises under state law is GRANTED with leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Cause of

Action is GRANTED with leave to amend under Rule 12(b)(1). 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action

in its entirety and Fourth Cause of Action to the extent it

arises under state law is GRANTED with leave to amend under Rule

12(b)(6). Plaintiff is directed to file a Second Amended 7

Complaint, should he choose to do so, not later than thirty (30)

days following the date of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 19, 2008

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:07-cv-01945-MCE-GGH Document 24 Filed 02/20/08 Page 17 of 17