Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-00941/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-00941-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Housing Discrimination

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

RON STEPHEN REDHEAD, et al., 

Plaintiffs. 

v. 

MERCY HOUSING, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 16-cv-00941-YGR 

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS 

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND 

Re: Dkt. Nos. 7, 10 

Plaintiff Ron Stephen Redhead (“Plaintiff”) filed his original complaint on February 25, 

2016. On March 16, 2016, Defendants Mercy Housing California 53, LP (erroneously sued herein 

as “Mercy Housing”) and Karen Zhou (collectively, “Defendants”) filed their Motion to Dismiss 

the Complaint. (Dkt. No. 7.) On March 30, 2016, Redhead filed a document headed “Amended 

Complaint.” (Dkt. No. 8.) Thereafter, on April 4, 2016, Plaintiff filed a document entitled 

“Amendment to the Amended Complaint.” (Dkt. No. 9.) Defendants then filed a Second Motion 

to Dismiss addressed to the Complaint, Amended Complaint, and Amendment to the Amended 

Complaint, on April 13, 2016. (Dkt. No. 10.) 

Defendants move to dismiss the amended complaint on the grounds of: (1) failure to plead 

a basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction; (2) failure to state a claim on which relief can be 

granted; (3) failure to serve defendants properly. Redhead filed a response on May 2, 2016 (Dkt. 

No. 13) along with a declaration in support of opposition to the motion (Dkt. No. 14). 

The Court having carefully considered the papers submitted and the pleadings in this 

action, and for the reasons set forth below, the Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED WITHOUT 

LEAVE TO AMEND. Because Plaintiff has already filed an amended complaint, does not offer a 

cognizable basis for the action or for amending to cure any defects in his response to the motion to 

dismiss, the Court finds dismissal without further opportunity to amend is appropriate. 

I. BACKGROUND 

The nature of Plaintiff’s complaint is not altogether clear. From what the Court can 

discern, it appears the action concerns a dispute between Redhead and his neighbor, Defendant 

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Tim Giangiobbe. Redhead and Giangiobbe reside at Madonna Residence located at 350 Golden 

Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California (“Madonna Residence”). Defendant Mercy Housing 

California 53, LP owns and operates Madonna Residence, and Defendant Karen Zhou is the 

Senior Property Manager at Madonna Residence. Redhead alleges that Giangiobbe left “racist 

letters and notes” on his door, and a confrontation (or confrontations) ensued between them. 

Redhead’s handwritten amendments to his original complaint are largely incomprehensible 

and, in parts, illegible. Documents attached to the “Amended Complaint” indicate that 

Giangiobbe obtained a restraining order against Redhead and that Mercy Housing staff sent 

Redhead notices of lease violation based upon altercations with Giangiobbe. Redhead also alleges 

that Mercy Housing, Zhou, and Giangiobbe have conspired with one another to have Redhead 

jailed and to violate his civil rights. 

Redhead asserts a wide array of legal violations arising from these facts. In the original 

complaint, Redhead cited several California Penal Code Sections and federal criminal statutes,1

 a 

California Assembly Bill relating to unlawful employment practices, and various local and federal 

statutes and ordinances. He appears to allege, in a general and conclusory way, that he has been 

discriminated against in his housing situation based on race, sex, and veteran status, and that 

Mercy Housing is engaged in violations of the San Francisco Health and Safety Code, violation of 

his lease agreement, and harassment/threats in violation of various California Penal Code sections. 

The Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 8) does not actually allege any of these claims, but instead 

indicates that Giangiobbe obtained a restraining order against Redhead, and that Mercy Housing 

permanently “86[’]d” Redhead’s girlfriend and 9-year-old daughter, sometime after the filing of 

the original complaint. It attaches a copy of the restraining order, various letters and notices, and 

incident reports apparently submitted by Redhead to Mercy Housing. The “Amendment to 

 1

 Among the discernible criminal violations alleged in the original complaint are: (1) 

California Penal Code Section 422.56 regarding definitions to be applied to California Penal Code 

Title 11.6 Civil Rights; (2) "Article #299 Of the Criminal Code" apparently referring to California 

Penal Code Section 299 related to expungement of information in California’s DNA and Forensic 

Identification Database; (3) California Penal Code section 1001.80 concerning former members of 

the United States military charged with misdemeanor offenses; and (4) California Penal Code 

section 528, which states that it is a felony to falsely impersonate another and, in that assumed 

character, marry another person. 

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United States District Court 

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Complaint” does not state any claims but instead adds Redhead’s demands for relief in the form 

of: (1) a payment of $450,000,000.00; (2) apologies from several people; (3) the eviction and 

arrest of Giangiobbe “in front of” Redhead; (4) the arrest and/or firing of several Madonna 

Residence staff members, including Zhou, in front of Redhead; (5) ownership rights to the 

Madonna Residence building; and (6) an order that “the whole building has to move [out] 

immediately or go to prison or tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth.” (Amendment to 

Amended Complaint, Dkt. No. 9.) 

II. APPLICABLE STANDARD 

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in 

the complaint. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1199–1200 (9th Cir. 2003). “Dismissal can be 

based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a 

cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiffs. Johnson v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 653 F.3d 1000, 1010 (9th Cir. 2011). To survive a 

motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). This “facial plausibility” standard requires 

the plaintiffs to allege facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. While courts do not require “heightened fact pleading of 

specifics,” a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative 

level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his 

‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

In deciding whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the 

court must assume that the plaintiff’s allegations are true and must draw all reasonable inferences 

in the plaintiff’s favor. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). 

However, the court is not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, 

unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 

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F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). 

III. DISCUSSION 

Redhead has failed to allege a basis for jurisdiction in the federal court and has failed to 

allege a cognizable claim under federal or state law. His claims must be dismissed. 

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They have no power to consider claims 

for which they lack subject-matter jurisdiction. See Chen-Cheng Wang ex rel. United States v. 

FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1415 (9th Cir. 1992). While California superior courts are courts of 

general, unlimited jurisdiction and can render enforceable judgments in practically any type of 

case, federal courts can only adjudicate cases that the Constitution or Congress authorizes them to 

adjudicate. Cases where the federal court has jurisdiction are those where there is a diversity of 

citizenship (where the parties are from different states), a federal question (arising under the 

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States), or in which the United States is a party. See, 

e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insur. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994). Federal courts are 

presumptively without jurisdiction over civil cases and the burden of establishing jurisdiction rests 

upon the party asserting it. Id. at 377. If the Court determines that subject matter jurisdiction is 

lacking, the Court must dismiss the case. Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th 

Cir. 1983); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

Even given a generous reading, and taking the allegations in all the various “complaint” 

documents together, Redhead fails to set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required by Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Redhead fails to allege that any defendant was acting on behalf of the federal or state government, 

as would be required to state a claim for a federal civil rights violation. See West v. Adkins, 487 

U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988) (a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires constitutional violations 

committed by persons acting under color of state law). For example, Redhead simply includes an 

allegation of “The 1968 Civil Rights Act: Discrimination[¶] Harassment[¶] Racism[¶] Sexism,” 

without specifying any right that was violated or any facts about any violation or whose conduct 

caused that violation. (Complaint at 2.) 

Redhead’s declaration in opposition to the motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 14) is difficult to 

decipher, but appears to state, in a conclusory way, that he is being discriminated against and 

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treated unfairly on the basis of “the color of skin, sex, age, gender and creed,” as well being a 

victim of entrapment and a conspiracy to have him arrested. The declaration does not offer any 

more facts or basis than his other filings that would establish defendants’ liability under any 

federal statute or provision of the United States Constitution. 

Further, to the extent Redhead’s allegations rely on violations of the California Penal 

Code, they cannot state a claim since a private plaintiff generally cannot bring a complaint for 

relief based upon violation of criminal code sections. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 

316 (1979) (the courts “ha[ve] rarely implied a private right of action under a criminal statute” and 

only when there was some statutory basis for finding a civil cause of action); Ellis v. City of San 

Diego, 176 F.3d 1183, 1189 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming dismissal of claims under California Penal 

Code sections because they did not create enforceable individual rights). And, to the extent that 

Redhead is challenging a notice of violation of the terms of his lease or steps towards his eviction, 

he offers no apparent basis for jurisdiction over such a claim in the federal court. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

In sum, Redhead has not alleged a viable basis for a claim against Mercy Housing or Zhou, 

and therefore has not alleged a basis for jurisdiction in federal court. The Court’s reading of the 

complaint and amendments, as well as Redhead’s response to this motion, confirm that any 

additional opportunities to amend would be futile. 

Therefore, the Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

2

 This 

case is DISMISSED in its entirety. 

This Order terminates Docket Nos. 7 and 10. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 6, 2016 

_________________________________ 

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge 

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 Because the Court dismisses the action on jurisdictional and pleading grounds, it need not 

and does not reach Defendants’ arguments regarding insufficiency of service. 

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