Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05191/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05191-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SHAWN HEATON, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SOCIAL FINANCE, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-05191-TEH 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' 

MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION 

UNDER 28 USC § 1292(B)

This matter came before the Court on January 11, 2016 for oral argument on 

Defendants’ motion to certify for interlocutory appeal the Court’s November 4, 2015 order 

denying Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Having carefully considered the 

parties’ written and oral arguments, the Court now DENIES Defendants’ motion for the 

reasons set forth below.

BACKGROUND 

Defendant SoFi and its wholly-owned subsidiary SoFi Lending (collectively 

“Defendants”) seek review of the Court’s November 4, 2015 order denying Defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment by way of a discretionary interlocutory appeal pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Plaintiffs oppose the motion, arguing that an interlocutory appeal is 

not warranted. 

Plaintiffs Shawn Heaton (“Heaton”) and Anna Ahlborn (“Ahlborn”) (collectively 

“Plaintiffs”) each had hard inquiries performed on their credit as a result of activity on 

Defendants’ website. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants performed the hard inquiries 

without a permissible purpose; therefore Defendants violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act 

(“FCRA”), California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (“CCRAA”), and 

California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq. (“UCL”).

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In the Court’s November 4, 2015 order (“MSJ Order”), the Court denied 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding that there were triable issues of 

material fact as to whether Defendants violated the applicable statutes. (Docket No. 94-1). 

Notably, the Court rejected Defendants contention that there could be no willful violation 

of the FCRA when Defendants’ interpretation of a “permissible purpose” under the FCRA 

for performing hard inquiries was not objectively unreasonable, because the Court 

concluded that Defendants had offered no evidence of their actual interpretation of the 

statute. Id. at 10-12. The Court also rejected Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs had not 

demonstrated a loss of money or property to constitute standing under the UCL, finding 

that in cases such as this one, a decrease in credit score can be sufficient for UCL standing. 

Id. at 12-13. 

The Court also denied Defendants’ motion for leave to file a motion for 

reconsideration, but amended its order to ensure that all of Defendants’ arguments were 

addressed sufficiently. (Docket No. 94.) Defendants now request that the Court certify the 

MSJ Order for interlocutory appeal. (Docket No. 96.) 

LEGAL STANDARD 

Generally, the United States Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction over appeals from 

“final decisions of the district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. However, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) 

(“Section 1292(b)”) is an exception to the final judgment rule, where “litigants can bring 

an immediate appeal of a non-final order upon the consent of both the district court and the 

court of appeals.” In re Cement Antitrust Litig. (MDL No. 296), 673 F.3d 1020, 1025-26 

(9th Cir. 1982) (en banc).

A party may bring an interlocutory appeal of a district court’s order where the order 

“involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for 

difference of opinion and [] an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance 

the ultimate termination of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). “[T]his section [is] to be 

used only in exceptional situations in which allowing an interlocutory appeal would avoid 

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protracted and expensive litigation.” Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.3d at 1026; see also

United States v. Woodbury, 263 F.2d 784, 788 (9th Cir. 1959) (“[I]n passing [§1292(b)] 

Congress did not intend that the courts abandon the final judgment doctrine and embrace 

the principle of piecemeal appeals.”).

“The decision to certify an order for interlocutory appeal is committed to the sound 

discretion of the district court.” United States v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 2004 WL 

3030121, at *1 (C.D.Cal. Dec. 27, 2004) (citing Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 514 

U.S. 35, 47, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 131 L.Ed.2d 60 (1995)). As such, “[e]ven when all three 

statutory criteria are satisfied, district court judges have ‘unfettered discretion’ to deny 

certification.” Brizzee v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 2008 WL 426510, at *3 (D.Or. Feb. 13, 

2008) (quoting Ryan, Beck & Co., LLC v. Fakih, 275 F.Supp.2d 393, 396 (E.D.N.Y. 

2003)). By the same token, “[e]ven where the district court makes such a certification, the 

court of appeals nevertheless has discretion to reject the interlocutory appeal, and does so 

quite frequently.” James v. Price Stern Sloan, Inc., 283 F.3d 1064, 1068 n.6 (9th Cir. 

2002) (citation omitted). 

Defendants, as the party seeking certification, have the burden of showing that 

exceptional circumstances justify a departure from the basic policy of postponing appellate 

review until after the entry of a final judgment. See Villarreal v. Caremark LLC, 85 F. 

Supp. 3d 1063, 1067 (D. Ariz. 2015). 

DISCUSSION 

Defendants identify two questions of law that they wish to certify: 

(1) Whether a defendant must provide evidence of its express, pre-litigation 

interpretation of the FCRA before a court is obliged to conduct the 

“objectively reasonable” analysis announced in Safeco with respect to claims 

for willful violation of the FCRA; and/or 

(2) Whether a diminished credit score alone constitutes a loss of “money or 

property” under California’s Unfair Competition Law. 

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Courts must consider three factors when determining whether an order is suitable 

for interlocutory review: (1) whether the order involves a controlling question of law; (2) 

whether there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion; and (3) whether immediate 

appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. 28 U.S.C. § 

1292(b). “All three requirements must be met for certification to issue[]” under Section 

1292(b). Kight v. Eskanos & Adler, P.C., No. 05-CV-1999-L, 2007 WL 173825, at *2 

(S.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2007) (citation omitted). 

I. FIRST GROUND: Whether a defendant must provide evidence of its express, 

pre-litigation interpretation of the FCRA before a court is obliged to conduct 

the “objectively unreasonable” analysis announced in Safeco with respect to 

claims for willful violations of the FCRA 

The parties and the Court are familiar with Safeco Insurance Company v. Burr. 551 

U.S. 47 (2007). The Safeco Court held that, as used in the FCRA, the term “willful” 

included objectively reckless violations, and that a company “does not act in reckless 

disregard of [FCRA] unless the action is not only a violation under a reasonable reading of 

the statute’s terms, but shows that the company ran a risk of violating the law substantially 

greater than the risk associated with a reading that was merely careless.” Id. at 69. 

Applying this standard, the Court held that the defendants did not “willfully” violate the

FCRA where their “reading of the statute, albeit erroneous, was not objectively 

unreasonable . . . and so [fell] well short of raising the ‘unjustifiably high risk’ of violating 

the statute necessary for reckless liability.” Id. at 69-70. 

Notably, the Court in Safeco rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that evidence of 

subjective bad faith must be considered in order to find a “willful” violation. Id. at 70 

n.20. The Court explained, “Where, as here, the statutory text and relevant court and 

agency guidance allow for more than one reasonable interpretation, it would defy history 

and current thinking to treat a defendant who merely adopts one such interpretation as a 

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knowing or reckless violator.” Id.

Courts in this district have applied Safeco to grant both motions to dismiss and 

motions for summary judgment where a defendant’s statutory interpretation was not 

objectively unreasonable. E.g., Andrade v. Desert Champions, LLC, No. 15-CV-1394, 

2015 WL 4150695, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2015); Banga v. First USA, N.A., 29 F. Supp. 

3d 1270, 1278 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2014); but see Dunford v. Am. DataBank, LLC, 64 F. 

Supp. 3d 1378, 1394-95 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2014) (considering, but denying, motion for 

summary judgment, where factual disputes prevented court from determining that policy 

was not objectively unreasonable). Here, in its order denying summary judgment, the

Court did not decide whether the interpretation was objectively unreasonable, but rather 

focused on whether Defendants could use their purported interpretation at all without 

providing evidence that it was their actual interpretation. MSJ Order at 11. The Court 

found that material facts were disputed as to whether Plaintiffs “requested credit” such that 

Defendants reasonably believed there was a permissible purpose for performing hard 

inquiries; thus, summary judgment was not warranted. Id.; see, e.g., Smith v. HireRight 

Sols., Inc., 711 F. Supp. 2d 426, 434 (E.D. Pa. 2010) ([The Safeco Court] was operating 

under a summary judgment standard of review. It found no genuine issue of material fact 

as to whether the defendant’s interpretation of the statute – albeit erroneous – was 

objectively unreasonable.”).

A. The Safeco question is not a controlling question of law. 

Under § 1292(b), the first factor the Court must consider is whether the order to be 

appealed involves “a controlling question of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Congress did not 

specify what it meant by “controlling” for purposes of Section 1292(b). Cement Antitrust 

Litig., 673 F.3d at 1026. “[A]ll that must be shown in order for a question to be 

‘controlling’ is that resolution of the issue on appeal could materially affect the outcome of 

litigation in the district court.” Id. A “question of law” is interpreted as being a pure legal 

question, such that the court of appeals could decide the question “quickly and cleanly 

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without having to study the record.” Matsunoki Grp., Inc. v. Timberwork Or., Inc., No. 

08-CV-04078, 2011 WL 940218, *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2011) (citing Ahrenholz v. Bd. 

Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 219 F.3d 674, 676-77 (7th Cir. 2000). 

Questions of law that are considered “controlling” are usually fundamental issues, 

such as who are proper parties, whether a court has jurisdiction, and whether state or 

federal law should apply. Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d at 1026 (citing Woodbury, 263 

F.2d at 787). In Rollins v. Dignity Health, this Court found it convincing that Defendants’ 

estimated costs that would be incurred to respond to “currently pending and expected 

discovery requests” and motions were upwards of $500,000 – costs that would not be 

incurred if the Ninth Circuit reversed the order. No. 13-CV-1450, 2014 WL 6693891, at 

*2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2014). Here, Defendants provided no such figures. 

Defendants appear certain that even if their purported interpretation were 

established, it would be considered objectively reasonable. However, while the Court did 

reject Defendants’ contention that the inquiry would mirror a qualified immunity analysis 

(that absent any clear precedent from the Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit, it could not be 

objectively unreasonable), it did not reach the objective reasonableness of the purported 

interpretation. Even if the Ninth Circuit on interlocutory appeal were to find for 

Defendants on the issue of whether Safeco allows their inference to be considered as their 

interpretation of the FCRA, the objective reasonableness would still remain to be 

determined – either by this Court on remand or by the Ninth Circuit itself.1

 Thus, the 

Ninth Circuit finding in favor of Defendants on this legal question would not, as 

Defendants contend, necessarily be dispositive.2 

 

1 At oral argument, defense counsel asserted that the Ninth Circuit would determine this 

issue sua sponte, as the Supreme Court did in Safeco itself, and the Seventh Circuit did in 

Van Straaten v. Shell Oil Prods., Co., 678 F.3d 486 (7th Cir. 2012). However, the Court is 

not convinced that the Ninth Circuit would do so, as it may find (as this Court did in the 

MSJ Order), that disputed facts remained as to the basis for Defendants’ purported 

interpretation. See Dunford, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 1394 (summary judgment inappropriate 

when factual disputes remained as to actual interpretation and surrounding circumstances). 

2

Plaintiffs also contend that even if either court found Defendants’ purported 

interpretation to be objectively reasonable under Safeco, such a finding would not be 

dispositive because a “willful” violation of the FCRA encompasses both knowing and 

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For these reasons, Defendants have not met the burden of showing that the issue is 

controlling such that it constitutes an “exceptional situation” warranting interlocutory 

review. While the absence of one factor is sufficient to deny certification under Section 

1292(b), the Court will address the remaining factors for completeness. 

B. There are substantial grounds for difference of opinion on the Safeco

question. 

The second Section 1292(b) factor is whether there are substantial grounds for 

difference of opinion on the question at issue. Courts traditionally will find this factor 

exists where “the circuits are in dispute on the question and the court of appeals of the 

circuit has not spoken on the point, if complicated questions arise under foreign law, or if 

novel and difficult questions of first impression are presented.” 3 Federal Procedure, 

Lawyers Edition § 3:212 (2010) (footnotes omitted). “However, just because a court is the 

first to rule on a particular question or just because counsel contends that one precedent 

rather than another is controlling does not mean there is such a substantial difference of 

opinion as will support an interlocutory appeal.’” Couch v. Telescope, Inc., 611 F.3d 629, 

633 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“One of the best indications that there are substantial grounds for disagreement on a 

question of law is that other courts have, in fact, disagreed.” Rollins, 2014 WL 6693891, 

at *3 (citing Couch, 611 F.3d at 633); see also Reese v. BP Expl. (Alaska) Inc., 643 F.3d 

681, 688 (9th Cir.2011) (“[W]hen novel legal issues are presented, on which fair-minded 

jurists might reach contradictory conclusions, a novel issue may be certified for 

interlocutory appeal.”); AsIs Internet Servs. v. Active Response Grp., No. 07–cv–06211, 

2008 WL 4279695, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 16, 2008) (substantial ground for difference of 

opinion existed where there was an “intra-district split” on a novel legal issue).

 

reckless violations; Safeco only dealt with reckless. Opp’n at 3. The Court need not reach 

this argument, as it has already determined that the question is not controlling; however, 

the argument bolsters the contention that further briefing and/or argument would be 

necessary before the Court were to dispose of the FCRA claims. 

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Here, there is a clear split of authority. Some courts find that the “objectively 

reasonable” determination cannot be made without knowing what the interpretation or 

reading of the statute actually was. E.g. Gillespie v. Equifax Info. Servs., No. 05-CV-0138, 

2008 WL 4316950, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2008) (denying motion for summary 

judgment where, among other reasons, defendant had not offered evidence that it “actually 

adopted a particular construction” of the relevant statutory section); Dunford, 64 F. Supp. 

3d at 1394 (defendants cannot use attorney-client privilege as a sword and a shield, saying 

that they used an interpretation that was objectively reasonable, but not showing evidence 

of the interpretation because it is attorney work product). Other courts expressly foreclose 

requiring a pre-litigation interpretation. E.g., Long v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., 671 F.3d 

371, 377 (3d Cir. 2012) (defendant did not need to actually interpret the FCRA prior to 

commencement of a lawsuit in order to be sheltered by the “safe harbor” of Safeco); Fuges 

v. Sw. Fin. Svcs., Ltd., 707 F.3d 241, 250-51 (3d Cir. 2012) (argument that a defendant 

should not be allowed to seize upon a post hoc objectively reasonable interpretation to 

avoid liability would be an “assertion about the defendant’s intent or bad faith,” which was 

“expressly foreclosed by Safeco”).

For this reason, the Court finds that Defendants have sufficiently shown that there is 

a substantial ground for difference of opinion on the Safeco question. Defendants have 

identified a split of authority, and that other circuit courts have decided the issue contrary 

to this Court’s decision. Cf. Union County v. Piper Jaffray & Co., 525 F.3d 643, 647 (8th 

Cir. 2008) (“‘While identification of a sufficient number of conflicting and contradictory 

opinions would provide substantial ground for disagreement,’ the County offered no such 

Iowa opinions, statutes or rules, and ‘a dearth of cases’ does not constitute ‘substantial 

ground for difference of opinion.’”) (quoting White v. Nix, 43 F.3d 374, 378 (8th 

Cir.1994)).

///

///

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C. Certifying an interlocutory appeal would not materially advance the 

ultimate termination of litigation. 

The third factor for the Court to consider is whether an interlocutory appeal would 

materially advance the termination of the litigation. “Given the standard for a ‘controlling 

question of law’ ... the considerations of [the third] factor overlap significantly with the 

first one.” Rollins, 2014 WL 6693891, at *4. The third factor is directed to the very 

purpose of § 1292(b) as an exception to the final judgment rule: to “facilitate disposition of 

the action by getting a final decision on a controlling legal issue sooner, rather than later 

[in order to] save the courts and the litigants unnecessary trouble and expense.” Leite v. 

Crane Co., No. 11-CV-00636, 2012 WL 1982535, at *6-7 (D. Haw. May 31, 2012) (citing 

United States v. Adam Bros. Farming, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2004)). 

As discussed with regard to the first factor, the Safeco issue is not necessarily 

dispositive, and even if decided in Defendants’ favor, would still require a determination 

as to objective reasonableness. See In re Related Asbestos Cases, 23 B.R. 523, 532 (N.D. 

Cal. 1982) (“Certification under 1292(b) is intended to be used in the few situations where 

an immediate appeal ... would more speedily terminate the litigation.”) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). Defendants contend, and the Court agrees, that if the Ninth 

Circuit concluded that Defendants’ assertion of their interpretation was sufficient without 

further evidence and either this Court or the Ninth Circuit found that the purported 

interpretation was objectively reasonable, there could be no willful violation of the FCRA 

or CCRAA. It therefore would follow that the only claims that would remain in this case 

would be the FCRA false pretenses claim3and UCL (fraudulent prong) claims, which 

would greatly shorten the discovery and trial process. 

However, the Ninth Circuit has concluded that time saving is not enough to meet 

 

3

The Court notes that having an objectively reasonable interpretation under Safeco would 

not absolve Defendants of liability under 15 U.S.C. § 1681q, as Safeco did not involve a 

false pretenses claim. The Court finds untenable the argument that merely articulating a 

post hoc objectively unreasonable interpretation could excuse Defendants in the face of 

evidence that they knowingly and willfully obtained information from Plaintiffs under 

false pretenses.

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the burden of Section 1292(b) certification, because it “would not materially affect the 

outcome of [the] litigation, but only its duration.” Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d at 

1027; see also Rollins, 2014 WL 1048637, at *2. Furthermore, it is unclear how much 

time would necessarily be saved by an interlocutory appeal. If the Court certified the 

interlocutory appeal and stayed the proceedings, the trial would be delayed for months 

while the Court waited for a ruling. Even if the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the 

Defendants, this matter would still have to be tried, experts would need to be deposed, and 

the litigation would proceed in a substantially similar fashion. 

Cases where courts find the third Section 1292(b) factor often are large, multidistrict litigation cases where Ninth Circuit review and resolution of an issue would clarify 

the issue for not only the instant case, but also other cases already pending before the 

Court or in other courts. See Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 921 F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir. 

1990) (“[T]he impact that an appeal will have on other cases is a factor that we may take 

into account in deciding whether to accept an appeal that has been properly certified by the 

district court.”); Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 620 F.Supp.2d 51, 55 (D.D.C. 2009) 

(“[I]nterlocutory appeal is warranted where the jurisdictional determination will impact 

numerous cases.”); In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 399 

F.Supp.2d 320, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that courts consider, in part, whether the 

certified issue has precedential value for a large number of cases); Krangel v. Crown, 791 

F. Supp. 1436, 1449 (S.D. Cal. 1992) (“Certification for appeal may also materially 

advance the conclusion of other cases involving this same legal issue.”). Here, Defendants 

made no such showing that other cases would be affected by review of this issue. 

For these reasons, the Court finds that Defendants have not met their burden of 

showing that certification of interlocutory appeal on the Safeco question would materially 

advance the termination of this litigation.

///

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II. SECOND GROUND: Whether a diminished credit score alone constitutes loss 

of “money or property” under California’s Unfair Competition Law.

California’s Unfair Competition Law prohibits “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent 

business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. 

& Prof. Code § 17200. Standing under California’s UCL is “substantially narrower” than 

Article III standing: the plaintiff must demonstrate a loss of money or property. Kwikset 

Corp. v. Super. Ct., 246 P.3d 877, 885-86 (Cal. 2011). In its November 4 order, the Court 

found: 

It is true that hypothetical and non-particularized injury is 

insufficient for UCL standing, and that in some cases, a drop in 

credit score is too hypothetical. See Birdsong v. Apple, Inc., 

590 F.3d 955, 960-61 (9th Cir. 2009). However, the majority 

of courts4 in this Circuit have found that in some cases a 

decreased credit score can be sufficient for UCL standing, and 

the Ninth Circuit has cited this with approval. Rubio v. Capital 

One Bank, 613 F.3d 1195, 1204 (9th Cir. 2010).5 

MSJ Order at 13. As with the Safeco question above, the Court will address the three 

Section 1292(b) factors in turn. 

A. The UCL standing question is not a controlling question of law. 

Here, as with the first issue presented by Defendants, the question of law is not 

controlling. While it is true that a finding for Defendants on this issue would dispose of 

the UCL claims at least as to Plaintiff Ahlborn (because Ahlborn did not allege any injury 

besides the drop in credit score in the Second Amended Complaint), such a decision would 

 

4

E.g. White v. Trans Union, LLC, 462 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1084 (C.D. Cal. 2006); 

Venugopal v. Digital Fed. Credit Union, No. 12-6067-ED, 2013 WL 1283436, at *5 (N.D. 

Cal. Mar. 27, 2013); Aho v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 10-CV-1373, 2011 WL 

2292810, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 9, 2011). 

5 While the Rubio case did not have analogous facts (it involved a loss of a credit account, 

not a drop in credit score), it cites with approval to White v. Trans Union LLC, which said 

“[t]he perpetration of Credit Reports containing inaccurate erroneous information 

regarding “due and owing” debts is sufficient injury to grant Plaintiffs standing.” 462 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1084.

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only dispose of one claim, not the entire suit. As the resolution of this claim on appeal 

would have some impact on the case but would not be dispositive, the proposed appeal 

does not concern a controlling issue of law. See Mateo v. M/S KISO, 805 F. Supp. 792, 

800 (N.D. Cal. 1992). Defendants do not identify any exceptional circumstances that 

would convince this Court that the issue is controlling. Rather, Defendants claim that 

resolution of this on interlocutory appeal will “simplify” litigation. Section 1292(b) was 

not intended “merely to provide review of difficult rulings in hard cases.” U.S. Rubber Co. 

v. Wright, 359 F.2d 784, 785 (9th Cir. 1966). For these reasons, the Court finds that the 

UCL standing issue is not a controlling question of law.

B. There are substantial grounds for difference of opinion on the UCL 

standing issue. 

“[A] party's strong disagreement with the Court's ruling is not sufficient for there to 

be a substantial ground for difference. That settled law might be applied differently does 

not establish a substantial ground for difference of opinion.” Couch, 611 F.3d at 633 

(internal marks omitted) (citing Bush v. Adams, 629 F.Supp.2d 468, 475 (E.D. Pa. 2009); 

see also Hansen v. Schubert, 459 F.Supp.2d 973, 1000 (E.D. Cal. 2006); Judicial Watch, 

Inc. v. Nat'l Energy Policy Dev. Grp., 233 F.Supp.2d 16, 19–20 (D.D.C. 2002)). 

Similar to the Safeco issue above, there is a split among courts as to whether a mere 

drop in credit score is sufficient to establish standing under the UCL. However, 

Defendants’ showing on this factor is weaker here than their showing on the Safeco issue, 

because the Ninth Circuit in Rubio cited with approval the idea that in some cases a 

decreased score can be sufficient for UCL standing. 613 F.3d at 1204. Furthermore, the 

Court must keep in mind that interlocutory appeal is reserved for exceptional 

circumstances. Deciding an issue on either side of a split of authority is precisely the 

function of the district courts. For these reasons, the Court finds that Defendants have not 

met their burden of showing substantial grounds for difference of opinion such that 

interlocutory review would be necessary. 

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C. Certifying an interlocutory appeal would not materially advance the 

ultimate termination of litigation. 

“Where a substantial amount of litigation remains in the case regardless of the 

correctness of the Court’s ruling ... arguments that interlocutory appeal would advance the 

resolution of the litigation are unpersuasive.” Lillehagen v. Alorica, No. 13-CV-0092, 

2014 WL 2009031, at *7 (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2014) (quoting Friedman v. 24 Hour Fitness 

USA, Inc., No. 06-CV-6282, 2009 WL 545783, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2009)) (internal 

marks and other citation omitted). Because the Court resolved the question at issue in this 

motion, finding that a drop in credit score alone is sufficient in the instant case, the 

litigation is now moving forward. Plaintiffs plan to move for class certification, and the 

Court has set a schedule for expert discovery relating to the class certification motion. 

(Docket No. 95). With this plan in place for these remaining matters, an interlocutory 

appeal of the Court’s order – with the unavoidable delay in having to stay matters pending 

the appeal – would not materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation. For 

these reasons, the Court finds that certifying the UCL standing issue for interlocutory 

appeal would not materially advance the ultimate termination of litigation.

CONCLUSION 

Considering Defendants’ motion according to the requirements of Section 1292(b), 

for the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Defendants have failed to demonstrate an 

exceptional need for interlocutory appeal of this Court’s order denying summary judgment. 

Accordingly, the motion for certification of an interlocutory appeal is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 01/20/16 _____________________________________ 

THELTON E. HENDERSON 

United States District Judge

Case 3:14-cv-05191-TEH Document 107 Filed 01/20/16 Page 13 of 13