Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02415/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02415-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

All documents filed in CV-10-02415 will be designated as “CVDoc” and all

documents filed in the related criminal action, CR-07-01217, will be designated as “CRDoc.”

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Respondent/Plaintiff, 

vs.

Gregory Thomas Young, Jr., 

Movant/Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-10-2415-PHX-ROS (MHB)

CR-07-01217-PHX-ROS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

This matter comes before this Court upon consideration of a Motion to Vacate

Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255 (hereinafter, “§2255 motion”), filed on November 8,

2010, by Movant Gregory Thomas Young, Jr. (CVDoc. 1.)1

 Respondent, the United States

of America, filed a Response on March 11, 2011 (CVDoc. 6), and on September 14, 2011,

Movant filed a Reply (CVDoc. 10). 

BACKGROUND

On November 7, 2007, in the related criminal matter, CR-07-01217, Movant was

charged by indictment with one count of Assault with a Dangerous Weapon, in violation of

18 U.S.C. §1153 and §113(a)(3) (Count 1), and one count of Assault Resulting in Serious

Case 2:10-cv-02415-ROS Document 11 Filed 11/21/11 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

Bodily Injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1153 and §113(a)(6) (Count 2). (CRDoc. 1.)

Movant’s first trial ended in a hung jury, and a mistrial was declared by the court. (CRDoc.

36.) Movant’s second trial commenced on May 6, 2008. (CRDoc. 71.) Evidence was

introduced at trial that on the date of the offense, February 17, 2007, Movant, his fiancee

Effie Rhoades, his sister Donna Baca, Donna’s husband Ruben Baca (the victim), and

Movant’s uncle all lived together in the double wide trailer of Movant’s mother, Hazel

Lewis, in Sacaton, Arizona, on the Gila River Indian Reservation. (CRDoc. 91, at 65, 100,

141.) In the late afternoon, Movant and Effie were having a barbeque cookout at Hazel’s

house to celebrate their birthdays. (Id., at 65-66, 100-01, 111, 141.) Donna and Ruben’s two

friends, Tiana Peters and Tracy Thompson, also were present at the cookout. (Id., at 134,

146.)

During the evening, Movant and Ruben got into an argument. (CRDoc. 91, at 67.)

Movant fired a gun twice in the air and then hit Ruben on the back of the head with it,

leaving no injuries. (Id., at 67-68.) Upon hearing what sounded like “popping noises,”

Donna, Tiana, Tracy and Hazel went outside and observed Movant and Ruben arguing. (Id.,

at 101, 134, 147.) Donna and Hazel separated them. (Id., at 102.) Donna started yelling at

Movant, and Hazel told everyone to leave. (Id., at 72, 102.)

As Ruben and Donna were leaving, and getting into their truck, Movant came toward

them, and stabbed Ruben in his left side with a knife. (CRDoc 91, at 70-71, 103-04.) Ruben

saw the black handle of the knife, but did not see the blade. (Id., at 71.) Movant then took

off running. (Id., at 71, 104.) After Ruben was stabbed, he yelled, “He stabbed me. He

stabbed me.” (Id., at 104.) Donna then ran to Hazel’s trailer yelling that Movant had stabbed

Ruben. (Id., at 71, 137.) Donna then drove Ruben to the hospital, where he was “air-evac’d”

to Good Samaritan Hospital for treatment. (Id., at 72-73, 97, 105-106.) The trauma surgeon

who examined Ruben saw what appeared to be a stab wound that penetrated Ruben’s

abdominal cavity on his left side just below the rib line. (Id., at 121-22.) Through the

laparotomy that was performed, the surgeon discovered that the stab wound went through

and through the large intestine, or colon. (Id., at 123-24.) The surgeon closed the wound and

Case 2:10-cv-02415-ROS Document 11 Filed 11/21/11 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

Ruben spent 11 days in the hospital before he was discharged. (Id., at 66-67, 99, 106.) 

Both Ruben and Donna admitted to having used illegal drugs that day, and Ruben also

admitted to drinking 6-8 beers and a shot of Crown Royal that evening. (CR91, at 66-67,

175.) Movant did not testify, but a detective who interviewed him following his arrest

testified that Petitioner admitted to having punched Ruben in the face which resulted in Ruben

falling to the ground. (Id., at 159.) At the close of the Government’s case, Movant’s counsel

made an oral motion for judgment of acquittal. (Id., at 182.) He renewed that motion

following the close of evidence, and the motion was denied. (CRDoc. 93, at 193.) Following

a two-day jury trial, Movant was convicted of Count 2, and the jury was unable to reach a

verdict on Count 1. (CRDoc. 72.) After trial, Movant filed a motion for mistrial, judgment

of acquittal, and/or a new trial, claiming that the verdicts were fundamentally inconsistent and

logically irreconcilable, that there was insufficient evidence to convict Movant, and that a

juror committed misconduct. (CRDoc. 89.) The court denied Movant’s motion. (CRDoc.

105.) On November 18, 2008, Movant was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment, followed

by a 3-year term of supervised release. (CRDoc. 137.)

On appeal, Movant, through counsel, raised two issues: (1) whether the district court

abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial on the basis of inconsistent verdicts

rendering the evidence insufficient to sustain a conviction on Count 2, prosecutorial

misconduct, and the court’s answer to a jury question; and (2) whether the district court

abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial for juror misconduct. (CVDoc. 6,

Exh. 1.) The Ninth Circuit denied relief, finding that the verdicts were not logically

inconsistent, that the prosecutor’s statement to the jury did not constitute reversible error, that

the court’s answer to a jury question was not plain error, that the district court did not abuse

its discretion in its response to a second juror note, and that there was sufficient evidence

before the jury to sustain the guilty verdict on Count 2. (CRDoc. 151-1, Memorandum

Decision.) The mandate was issued on December 10, 2009. (CRDoc. 151.)

Movant filed his §2255 motion on November 8, 2010. (CVDoc. 1.) In his motion,

Movant lists four grounds for relief: 

Case 2:10-cv-02415-ROS Document 11 Filed 11/21/11 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

Ground One: ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth

Amendment, based upon his attorney’s failure to file pre-trial motions for

severance, and other motions to suppress statements;

Ground Two: ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth

Amendment based upon his attorney failure to call defense witnesses, in

particular his mother and Alphonso G. Pablo;

Ground Three: ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Fifth, Sixth,

and Fourteenth Amendments based upon his attorney’s failure to raise on

appeal the denial of his motion for mistrial on the basis of insufficiency of the

evidence to support his conviction and his attorney’s failure to appeal based

upon a claim of insufficiency of the evidence;

Ground Four: ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the First, Fifth,

Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, based upon his attorney’s failure to raise

as error during trial or on appeal the prosecutor’s improper argument to the

jury.

(Id.) 

Movant requests an evidentiary hearing to present evidence in support of his claims.

(CVDoc. 1, at 9.)

In their Answer, Respondent contends that each of Movant’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claims fail on their merits. As such, Respondent requests that the Court deny and

dismiss Movant’s §2255 motion with prejudice.

LAW

Movant claims that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance

of counsel at trial and on appeal. The two-prong test for establishing ineffective assistance

of counsel was established by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984). In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a convicted defendant must

show (1) that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and

(2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different. See id. at 687-88.

Regarding the performance prong, a reviewing court engages a strong presumption that

counsel rendered adequate assistance, and exercised reasonable professional judgment in

making decisions. See id. at 690. “[A] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that

every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

perspective at the time.” Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 833 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting

Case 2:10-cv-02415-ROS Document 11 Filed 11/21/11 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Moreover, review of counsel’s performance under Strickland

is “extremely limited”: “The test has nothing to do with what the best lawyers would have

done. Nor is the test even what most good lawyers would have done. We ask only whether

some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel

acted at trial.” Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir.), judgment rev’d on other

grounds, 525 U.S. 141 (1998). Thus, a court “must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s

challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s

conduct.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.

If the prisoner is able to satisfy the performance prong, he must also establish

prejudice. See id. at 691-92; see also Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (burden is

on defendant to show prejudice). To establish prejudice, a prisoner must demonstrate a

“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable

probability” is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. A court

need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining whether

prejudice resulted from the alleged deficiencies. See Robbins, 528 U.S. at 286 n.14. “If it is

easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice,

which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” Id. (quoting Strickland,

466 U.S. at 697).

CLAIMS

Ground One: 

Movant claims that his attorney was ineffective because he did not file a motion to

sever the two counts against him. He claims that he was prejudiced by the joinder because

the jury was presented evidence during trial of the facts supporting a conviction on Count 1,

even though the jury was ultimately unable to reach a verdict on that Count, and a mistrial was

declared.

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits joinder of offenses in the

same indictment, if they are (1) of the same or similar character, (2) based on the same act or

Case 2:10-cv-02415-ROS Document 11 Filed 11/21/11 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

transaction, or (3) based on acts or transactions that are connected with, or constitute parts of

a common scheme or plan. Fed.R.Crim.P.8(a). Joinder of offenses promotes judicial

economy. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993); United States v. Lopez, 477

F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 2007). Based upon the fact that the two counts charged against

Movant arose out of the same act or transaction, joinder was proper.

Severance is governed by Fed.R.Crim.P. 14, which requires a showing of prejudice.

Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511, 514 (1960). Severance is not prejudicial if the

evidence relating to all counts would have been admissible in each case even if the counts had

been severed. United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 963 (9th Cir. 2007). In the instant

case, the victim’s wounds were described as stab wounds, and thus the evidence relating to

the use of a knife by Movant was inextricably intertwined with the evidence of the victim’s

injury. See also, United States v. Anderson, 642 F.2d 281, 284 (9th Cir. 1981)(“When the

joined counts are logically related, and there is a large area of overlapping proof, joinder is

appropriate.”). Furthermore, it is clear from the jury’s verdicts - convicting Movant on Count

2, but not reaching a verdict on Count 1 - that the jury analyzed the counts separately.

Movant has suffered no prejudice by the joinder of Counts 1 and 2 at trial.

Movant does not set forth the specifics of his claim that his attorney failed to file other

pretrial motions. He vaguely asserts that “the facts and statements told to the defense attorney

during the pre-trial stages and trial and appeal are not (ALL ON RECORD),” so he is entitled

to an evidentiary hearing. Movant fails, however, to allege or otherwise identify those

statements. Movant has not established that his counsel was ineffective in failing to file a

motion to sever or in failing to file other, unidentified pretrial motions, or that he suffered any

prejudice as a result.

Ground Two:

Movant claims that his attorney should have called witnesses Hazel Lewis (his

mother), and Alphonso G. Pablo, and that he “knows that these witnesses would’ve provided

a favorable account of what happened during the time the victim [], claimed he was

assaulted.” He furthermore claims that “Mrs. Hazel Lewis would’ve been able to state where

Case 2:10-cv-02415-ROS Document 11 Filed 11/21/11 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

the [Movant] was at the time the victim had stated he was ‘just stabbed by the [Movant],’” and

that both Lewis and Pablo “would’ve been able to discredit the alleged victim/witness as

being untruthful and very intoxicated on multiple drugs and alcohol.” (CVDoc. 1, at 6.)

Movant does not provide an affidavit or any statement from witness Pablo supporting his bare

assertion. In his Reply, however, Movant submits an affidavit of Hazel Lewis. (Doc. 10,

Exh. 1.) 

Ms. Lewis avows therein that she was home on the evening of February 17, 2007

“watching television when she heard two loud pops, [she] ran out to find [her] daughter

Donna Young-Baca and her friend Tracie Thompson in the living room. Donna and [Hazel]

both ran out the back door, [and] Tracie immediately left [] thru the front door.” (CVDoc. 10,

Exh. 1.) Hazel observed her son-in-law, Ruben Baca (the victim), in a “verbal disagreement”

with her son Greg (Movant). She then “went to find out what this was about & [her daughter]

Donna immediately sided with her spouse Ruben to hurl names and obscenities degrading

[her] son Greg. He was angry and told [Hazel] they were leaving for [her] newphew’s home

in Casa Grande where they would continue a birthday party for his girlfriend Effie Rhoades.

[Hazel] saw no gun so [did] not know where pops came from.” (Id.)

Hazel then “carried Effie’s gifts inside to their room. . . . [and] last seen [her] son Greg

standing wit Effie about 15 feet on the west side of [her] home. Ruben & Donna were alone

near their pickup truck about 30 feet on the east side of [her] home, on the far side of their

truck parked beyond two mesquite trees. After taking the gifts inside, which took no more

than 40 seconds, [Hazel] again went outside. Donna came running to [her] yelling Greg had

stabbed Ruben where they had been standing & Ruben was lying on the ground. She was

yelling at Greg, name calling him again, he was still standing on the west side where [she] last

saw him with Effie.” (CVDoc. 10, Exh. 1.) Ms. Lewis’s affidavit does not contain any

statements about the victim/witnesses being untruthful or intoxicated. 

Hazel Lewis’s version of events is consistent with other witnesses’ accounts, and is

inconsistent with the statement given by Movant to police upon his arrest. Effie Rhoades,

Movant’s fiancee at the time of the incident, testified that she was getting ready to leave the

Case 2:10-cv-02415-ROS Document 11 Filed 11/21/11 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

party, and while trying to get into the truck, she heard a commotion. (CRDoc. 91, at 143.)

Movant was not with her at the time. When she looked back to see people were yelling, she

lost her grip and fell backwards from the truck. (Id., at 143; CRDoc. 61, at 151.) After her

fall, Movant appeared next to her and helped her get back up. (Id.) Both witnesses Tracy

Thompson and Tiana Peters corroborate that there was arguing or fighting between Movant

and the victim, and that they heard the popping noises. (CRDoc. 91, at 147, 151.) Detective

Romo Lewis of the Gila River Indian Community testified that Movant admitted to him that

he had punched the victim in the face, which caused the victim to fall to the ground. (Id., at

159.)

Even if Movant were able to demonstrate that his counsel’s failure to call Hazel Lewis

as a witness at trial falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, Movant can not

demonstrate prejudice. He can not demonstrate that a reasonable probability exists that, had

Ms. Lewis testified, the result would have been different. Her statement regarding the events

do not contradict the testimony of other witnesses on the seminal fact of Movant’s presence

near the victim at the time of the assault. Movant’s fiancee at the time testified that Movant

was not with her when she heard the commotion, but arrived right after. This is consistent

with Ms. Lewis’s account that when she came out of the house she observed Movant standing

by Movant’s fiancee at the time her daughter was yelling that Movant had just stabbed the

victim. In addition, the admission by Movant that he had punched the victim in the face, and

that the victim had fallen to the ground, is inconsistent with Ms. Lewis’s account of a “verbal

disagreement.” Movant has failed to establish that his trial counsel was ineffective in not

calling Hazel Lewis as a witness, or that he suffered any prejudice as a result.

Ground Three:

Movant claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial

counsel did not appeal the denial of his motion for mistrial on the basis of insufficient

evidence, and because his appellate counsel did not raise the claim on appeal. (CVDoc. 1, at

6.) At the conclusion of Movant’s trial, his counsel filed a motion for mistrial, for judgment

of acquittal, and/or for new trial, arguing among other things, that the evidence was

Case 2:10-cv-02415-ROS Document 11 Filed 11/21/11 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

insufficient to support his conviction on Count 2. (CRDoc. 89.) The district court denied the

motion. (CRDoc. 105.) Movant’s counsel raised on appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for mistrial, arguing that Movant’s due

process rights were violated because he was “either convicted based on insufficient evidence,

or [] was convicted based on a fictitious assault with an imaginary weapon to which [Movant]

was never placed on notice.” (CRDoc. 6-1, at 32.) The appellate court denied relief, finding

in part, that “there is sufficient evidence to sustain the guilty verdict on Count 2.” (CRDoc.

151-1, at 2.) Movant has not established that his appellate counsel did not raise the issue of

insufficiency of the evidence on appeal, and even if he had neglected to raise the issue,

Movant has not demonstrated prejudice.

Ground Four:

 Movant claims that his counsel was ineffective by failing to raise as error during trial

or on appeal the prosecutor’s improper argument to the jury. (CVDoc. 1, at 7.) Movant

argues that the prosecutor’s statement during closing argument “that the defendant can be

found guilty on count two for assault resulting in serious bodily injury, if the defendant

engaged in a altercation w/the victim, and in the course of the fight the victim fell over and

impaled himself by falling on a knife or whatever.” (Id.) Movant’s counsel did not object at

the time the comment by the prosecutor was made, but in his closing statement, Movant’s

counsel argued that there was no evidence to support the prosecutor’s hypothetical. (CRDoc.

93, at 31.) The prosecutor, in her rebuttal made it clear that she had not intended to introduce

an alternative theory to the government’s case, and that she had used the hypothetical to

demonstrate the distinction between Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment, insofar as Count 1

required a finding that a knife was used, and Count 2 did not. (Id., at 40.) She then stressed

that there was only one theory, which was that the victim suffered a serious bodily injury - a

knife wound-that was delivered by Movant. (Id.)

In trial counsel’s motion for mistrial, for judgment of acquittal, and/or for a new trial,

he argued, in part, that Movant’s due process rights were violated because of the prosecutor’s

use of the hypothetical during closing argument. (CRDoc. 89.) The district court denied the

Case 2:10-cv-02415-ROS Document 11 Filed 11/21/11 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

motion. (CRDoc. 105.) On appeal, Movant again raised the issue, arguing that the

hypothetical was improper and prejudicial, and caused inconsistent verdicts. (CVDoc. 5, Exh.

1.) The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found no reversible error in the prosecutor’s

statement. (CRDoc. 151-1, at 3.) Although, because trial counsel did not object to the

statement at the time it was made, the appellate court reviewed the issue for plain error, it

found that “even if there is error, there is no evidence that it affected the outcome of the

district court proceedings, because the verdict is not inconsistent and is supported by the

evidence.” (Id.) Movant has not established that his appellate counsel was ineffective in not

raising the issue the prosecutor’s improper argument at trial and on appeal, because the issue

was raised, and in any event, Movant has not established prejudice.

CONCLUSION

Movant has not alleged specific facts, if true, that would entitle him to relief, and thus

he has not earned the right to an evidentiary hearing. United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d

1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 1996). The motion and the files and records of Movant’s case

“conclusively show that [Movant] is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. §2255. Movant’s

request for a hearing, and request to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence should be denied.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Movant’s Motion Under 28 U.S.C. §

2255 to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (Doc. 1) be

DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because jurists of reason would not find

it debatable whether the motion states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right.

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Case 2:10-cv-02415-ROS Document 11 Filed 11/21/11 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file

a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report

and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72.

DATED this 18th day of November, 2011.

Case 2:10-cv-02415-ROS Document 11 Filed 11/21/11 Page 11 of 11