Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01598/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01598-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 130
Nature of Suit: Miller Act
Cause of Action: 28:1352 Miller Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

The United States of America )

for the use and benefit of )

U.S. Prefab, Inc., an Arizona )

corporation, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV 06-1598-PHX-RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

Norquay Construction, Inc., )

an Arizona corporation; and )

Safeco Insurance Company of )

America, dba Safeco Surety, a )

foreign corporation, )

)

Defendants. ) )

After prevailing on their motion for summary judgment, 

defendants Norquay Construction Company (“Norquay”) and Safeco

Surety (“Safeco”) filed the present motion in accordance with

LRCiv. 54.2 seeking $20,140.00 in attorneys’ fees. Mot. (doc. 35)

at 7. Defendants are relying upon a contractual attorneys’ fees

provision. Alternatively, they are relying upon A.R.S. § 12-

341.01(A) which authorizes an award of attorneys’ fee to “the

successful party . . . [i]n any contested action arising out of a

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contract[.]” Id. (West 2003). Plaintiff, U.S. Prefab, opposes this

motion asserting that it is “not properly supported[;]” and the

amount sought is “unreasonable[.]” Resp. (doc. 37) at 1. 

Defendants counter, in sum, that plaintiff’s “objections are

undeserving of consideration by the Court[,]” and they request an

additional $1,400.00 for attorneys’ fees incurred in replying to

plaintiff’s objections. Reply (doc. 38) at 8. 

For the reasons set forth below, the court does not find

convincing either of plaintiff’s opposition arguments. Therefore,

the court awards defendants the full amount of the fees which they

are seeking by this motion.

Background

Norquay and Prefab entered into a subcontract on July 12,

2005, wherein Prefab agreed to install carports at the United

States Bureau of Reclamations’ Phoenix area office headquarters. 

Defs’. Statement of Facts (“DSOF”) (doc. 18), exh. 1 thereto at 1. 

When Prefab was nearing completion of that project, a dispute arose

between it and Norquay over charges of $18,675.36 in excess of the

base contract price due to alleged “hard dig” conditions

encountered by Prefab while drilling in the parking areas. Id.,

exh. 5 thereto at 3. The parties attempted to resolve this dispute

short of litigation, but were not successful.

On June 22, 2006, Prefab commenced the present action against

Norquay alleging breach of contract. Pursuant to the Miller Act,

40 U.S.C. § 3131 et seq., Prefab further alleged that defendant

Safeco was liable as Norquay’s surety. Prefab sought to recover

“the principal sum of $30,053.61” for “materials and services

furnished[.]” Co. (doc. 1) at 2, ¶ 4. Prefab also sought interest

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1 Judgment was entered on June 26, 2007 (doc. 34), and defendants filed

this motion on July 10, 2007 (doc. 35), within the 14 day time frame set forth in

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B). 

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on that amount “at the rate of two percent . . . per month from

April 15, 2006, until paid[.]” Id. at 5, ¶ 1. In accordance with

the terms of the bond, Safeco tendered the defense of the bond

claim to Norquay, which Norquay accepted, as it had an obligation

to under the bond. After engaging in some discovery, defendants

moved for summary judgment. The court granted that motion and

entered judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety. 

Defendants then filed the present motion seeking the attorneys’

fees incurred in the defense of this action. 

Discussion

I. Procedural Requirements

Before turning to the merits of defendants’ fee motion, the

court observes that they have complied with the mandatory

procedural requirements of LRCiv. 54.2. See Societe Civile

Succession Richard Guino v. Beseder Inc., 2007 WL 3238703, at *7

(D.Ariz. 2007) (“These requirements [of LRCiv. 54.2] are not

advisory, but mandatory to support an award of attorneys’

fees[.]”). As LRCiv. 54.2(c)(1)-(3) requires, defendants timely1

filed this motion which includes a memorandum of points and

authorities discussing, in the required sequence and with the

required corresponding headings, the following: (1) “eligibility,”

(2) “entitlement,” and (3) “reasonableness of requested award.” 

See Mot. (doc. 35) at 2-7. Defendants also submitted the following

“supporting documentation” as LRCiv. 54.2(d) and (e) mandates: (1)

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2 In his “Statement of Consultation” dated June 29, 2007, attorney

Diekemper indicates that he “attempted to consult with opposing counsel . . . on

July 27, 2007[.]” Mot. (doc. 35), exh. B thereto (doc. 35-3). Presumably the

latter date is a typographical error given the date of the Statement, and the

attempted consult was actually on June 27, 2007.

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a statement of consultation;2 (2) an attorney affidavit explaining

the oral fee agreement between defense counsel and Norquay; (3) a

task-based itemized statement of fees in chronological order; (4)

and an affidavit of moving counsel. Mot. (doc. 35), exhs. B (doc.

35-3); C (doc. 35-4); and D (doc. 35-5) thereto. Further,

defendants’ “Task-Based Itemized Statement of Attorneys’ Fees”

comports with LRCiv. 54.2(e) as to format and in terms of the

“description of services rendered.” Likewise, the fee application,

as it must, “adequately describe[s] the services rendered so that

the reasonableness of the charge can be evaluated.” LRCiv.

54.2(e)(2); see also Hummingbird Defense Systems, Inc., 2007 WL

4200751, at *4 (D.Ariz. 2007) (quoting Schweiger v. China Doll

Restaurant, Inc., 673 P.2d at 932) (“‘In order to make a

determination that the hours claimed are justified, the fee

application must be in sufficient detail to enable the court to

assess the reasonableness of the time incurred.’”). 

II. “Eligibility”

F.D. Rich Co. V. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417

U.S. 116, 94 S.Ct. 2157, 40 L.Ed.2d 703 (1974), “serves as the

starting point for consideration of attorneys’ fees in Miller Act

cases.” United States ex rel. Reed v. Callahan, 884 F.2d 1180,

1185 (9th Cir. 1989). Noting that the Miller Act does not provide

for the recovery of attorneys’ fees, the Supreme Court in F.D. Rich

applied the “American Rule” which “generally precludes an award of

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3 Because the court has determined that the subcontract governs the

attorneys’ fee issue herein, it is not essential to consider defendants’

alternative argument that they are entitled to recover those fees under A.R.S. §

12-341.01(A). The court observes, however, that in F.D. Rich the Supreme Court

“thought it best ‘to extricate the federal courts from the morass’ of state law

regarding attorneys’ fees.” U.S. ex rel. EPC Corp. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co.

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attorneys’ fees absent statutory authorization or an enforceable

contractual fees provision[.]” Golden Pisces v. Fred Wahl Marine

Const., 495 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). 

Based upon that rule, the F.D. Rich Court held that although

successful, the plaintiff was not entitled to an attorneys’ fee

award because neither the Miller Act nor the contract provided for

such an award. F.D. Rich, 417 U.S. at 127-131, 94 S.Ct. at 2162-

2164. 

Factually distinguishing F.D. Rich, the Ninth Circuit in

Callahan held that because the subcontract at issue included a

specific clause authorizing an award of attorneys’ fees, the

successful Miller Act litigant was entitled to recover those fees. 

Callahan, 884 F.2d at 1185. Similarly, the subcontract between

Norquay and Prefab included a provision expressly allowing for the

recovery of attorneys’ fees. That provision states in relevant

part as follows:

 Should either party employ an attorney to institute 

suit . . . to enforce any of the provisions hereof, 

to protect its interest in any matter arising under 

this Agreement, or to collect damages for the breach 

of the Agreement or to recover on a surety bond 

given by a party under this Agreement, the prevailing

party shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s

fees, costs, charges and expenses expended 

over [sic] incurred therein. 

DSOF, exh. 1 (doc. 18-2) thereto at 10, Article 14.4 (emphasis

added). Thus, the present case falls into the contract exception

to the American Rule pertaining to the recovery of attorneys’ fees.3

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of America, 423 F.Supp.2d 1016, 1025 (D.Ariz. 2006) (quoting F.D. Rich, 417 U.S.

at 128, 94 S.Ct. 2157). Employing that rationale, the court in EPC Corp. held that

even if it was “ultimately successful at trial[,]” a subcontractor in a Miller Act

case was not entitled to an attorneys’ fee award under that Act. Id. That

rationale applies with equal force here. Consequently, there is, in any event, no

basis for defendants’ alternative argument. 

4 In an effort to show the unreasonableness of the hours expended,

plaintiff mistakenly states that there were “five billing professionals” on this

case, when, in fact, there were only four. See Resp. (doc. 37) at 3. This

disparity probably comes from the fact that attorney Blunck is listed twice due to

her differing hourly rates. 

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The Ninth Circuit has “long held that state law controls the

interpretation of Miller Act subcontracts to which the United

States is not a party[,]” such as the subcontract between Norquay

and Prefab. See Callahan, 884 F.2d at 1185 (citation and footnote

omitted). Thus, “[l]like a court sitting in diversity, . . . the

law of the forum state” governs the construction of this

subcontract. See Callahan, 884 F.2d at 1185. Therefore, the court

must apply Arizona law here. See Palmer Constr., Inc. v. Cal State

Elec., Inc., 940 F.2d 1260, 1264 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted)

(Miller Act case applying California law to subcontract authorizing

attorney fee award to prevailing party). 

III. “Entitlement”

Norquay asserts that it is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees

for the 107.20 hours expended by three attorneys and one paralegal4

because it “was 100% successful in defeating plaintiff’s claims.” 

Mot. (Doc. 35) at 3. Approximately 13 of those hours were devoted

to preparation of this fee motion. See id., exh. A thereto (doc.

35-2) at 17-18. Defendants also are seeking $1,400.00 in fees for

time expended in preparing a reply to plaintiffs’ response. See

Resp. (doc. 38) at 8; and exh. A thereto (doc. 38-2) (itemized

billing statement). Putting aside for the moment the issue of the

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reasonableness of the requested fees, the court agrees that

defendants’ fee request properly includes fees for preparing this

motion, as well as fees for preparing the reply. See Dahn World

Co. Ltd. v. Chung, 2006 WL 3313951, at * 6 (D.Ariz. 2006)

(awarding, inter alia, $4,000.00 “in attorney fees for the work

performed on the motion for attorney fees and expenses[]”); and

Foraker v. Apollo Group, Inc., 2007 WL 2081465, at *2 (D.Ariz.

2007) (awarding $641 for fees “incurred [in] submitting the

response to Defendants’ objection to Plaintiff’s supplemental fee

application[]”).

IV. “Reasonableness of Requested Award”

Having found that defendants are eligible for and entitled to

an award of attorneys’ fees, the court must next decide whether the

requested amount is reasonable. Reasonableness has two parts. 

First, the court must determine the reasonableness of the hourly

billing rate. Schweiger, 138 Ariz. at 187, 673 P.2d at 931 (“The

beginning point in a development of a reasonable fee is the

determination of the actual billing rate which the lawyer charged

in the particular matter.”) Second, it must determine the

reasonableness of the hours expended on the case. Id. at 188, 673

P.2d at 932. Informing this inquiry is the general proposition

that “[t]he prevailing party . . . is ‘entitled to recover a

reasonable attorney’s fee for every item of service which, at the

time rendered, would have been undertaken by a reasonable and

prudent lawyer to advance or protect his client’s interest[.]’” Id.

(quoting Twin City Sportservice v. Charles O. Finley & Co., 676

F.2d 1291, 1313 (9th Cir. 1982)). It is against this legal backdrop

which the court has carefully reviewed the parties’ respective

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motion submissions, paying particular attention to defendants’

“Task-Based Itemized Statement of Attorneys’ Fees.”

A. Hourly Billing Rate

As to the hourly billing rate, “[u]nder Arizona law, ‘in

corporate and commercial litigation between fee-paying clients,

there is no need to determine the reasonable hourly rate prevailing

in the community for similar work because the rate charged by the

lawyer to the client is the best indication of what is reasonable

under the circumstances of the particular case.’” Hummingbird

Defense Systems, Inc. v. Ye, 2007 WL 4200751, at *4 (D.Ariz. 2007)

(quoting Schweiger, 138 Ariz. at 187-188, 673 P.2d at 931-932). 

Here, attorney Kent A. Lang avers that the firm of Lang & Baker,

PLC has an “oral fee agreement” with defendant Norquay, and has

represented it “for more than five years.” Aff. of Kent A. Lang

(doc. 35-4) at 1, ¶¶ 1 and 2. Attorney Lang further explains that 

“[t]he firm’s bills to Norquay are based upon the prevailing hourly

rates of the individual attorneys who render services.” Id. at 1-

2, ¶ 2. 

Three defense attorneys worked on this litigation, each with

different billing rates. Mr. Lang’s hourly rate is $275.00. Mot.

(doc. 35) at 4. Mr. Diekemper’s hourly rate is $200.00. Id. A

portion of Ms. Blunck’s time was billed at $170.00 per hour, and a

portion at $150.00. Id. One paralegal also worked on this action

and her hourly rate is $70.00. Id. A review of attorney Blunck’s

affidavit detailing her own legal education and experience, as well

as that of attorneys Lang and Diekemper, combined with the court’s

independent knowledge of hourly rates in the Phoenix area for

lawyers with comparable education and experience, performing

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5 Of attorney Blunck’s hours, 9.6 were billed at an hourly rate of

$150.00, while the remaining 7.5 were billed at an hourly rate of $170.00. Mot.

(doc. 35) at 4. 

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comparable tasks, readily supports a finding that these hourly

rates are reasonable. The fact that Norquay “has actually paid or

agreed to pay all attorneys’ fees . . . incurred in this litigation

by . . . Norquay and Safeco, including all those itemized in the

task-based itemization[,]” bolsters this finding of reasonableness.

Mot. (doc. 35), exh. C thereto (Lang Aff.) at 2, ¶ 4. Evidently

plaintiff agrees as it is not contesting the hourly billing rates. 

Therefore, any fees awarded herein will be based upon the rates

which defendants are seeking. 

B. Hours Reasonably Expended

The bulk of the time for which defendants are seeking to

recover was expended by attorney Diekemper - 83.0 hours. Mot.

(doc. 35) at 4. Additionally, attorney Blunck expended a total of

17.15 hours, attorney Lang expended 1.6 hours, and a paralegal

expended 5.5 hours on this case. Id. Multiplying the total number

of hours billed (107.20) by the hourly rates specified above,

initially defendants sought $20,140.00 in attorneys’ fees. Since

then however, as mentioned earlier, now defendants are also seeking

$1,400.00 for the 7 hours attorney Diekemper expended in preparing

defendants’ reply. 

Plaintiff’s primary objection to this fee request is that

defense counsel spent “an inordinate amount of time . . . on

several tasks[,]” and thus the hours expended were not reasonable. 

Resp. (doc. 37) at 4. Contending that defendants did not address

some of the reasonableness factors mentioned in Schweiger, 138

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Ariz. at 187, 673 P.2d at 931, (many of which are also listed in

LRCiv. 54.2(c)(3)), plaintiff further asserts that the court should

“discount the attorneys fees” sought on that basis alone. Id.

Finally, by plaintiff’s estimation “the fees sought exceed the

amount in dispute.” Id. at 5. Thus plaintiff asserts that there

is a danger of “the attorney fees becoming the tail wagging the

dog.” Id. In light of the foregoing, plaintiff maintains that a

reasonable fee here is “no greater than $5,000.” Id. 

Describing plaintiff’s objections as “broad” and

“insufficiently specific[,]” defendants retort that those

“criticisms” do not support denying or reducing the requested fees. 

Reply (doc. 38) at 3. Defendants add that in part because

plaintiff “bypassed several opportunities” to settle its claim,

seemingly it “was proceeding not on the strength of its claim, but

rather on the commonly-held but wrongheaded theory that a

defendant, even with knowledge that it will likely win the lawsuit,

will pay at least a portion of the plaintiff’s claim if it appears

the [defense] fees . . . will exceed the amount to settle.” Id. at

2. This tactic should not be countenanced by denying or reducing a

fee award, defendants argue. 

Plaintiff’s attacks on the reasonableness of defendants’

requested fees fail on several counts. First, it is true that

defendants did not address all of the factors which LRCiv.

54.2(c)(3) lists. Defendants’ failure to address all of those

factors is not dispositive of this motion, however. Nor, despite

plaintiff’s assertion, does that failure provide a sufficient basis

for reducing the requested attorneys’ fees. 

LRCiv. 54.2(c)(3), like Schweiger, contemplates a flexible

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approach to the reasonableness inquiry. More specifically, that

Rule expressly states that when discussing the “[r]easonableness of

[a] [r]equested [a]ward[,]” counsel “should discuss, as

appropriate, the various factors bearing on the reasonableness of

the requested attorneys’ fee award[.]” LRCiv. 54.2(c)(3) (emphasis

added). Plainly not every fee application implicates every one of

the 13 factors set forth in LRCiv. 54.2(c)(3). In their supporting

memorandum and reply, defendants did discuss the various, relevant

“factors bearing on the reasonableness of the requested attorneys’

fee award. See Mot. (doc. 35) at 4-6; and Reply (doc. 38) at 7-8.

Thus, there is no basis for plaintiff’s assertion that the court

should deny or at least reduce the fees requested herein because

defendants did not address all of the LRCiv. 54.2(c)(3) factors. 

Second, the court agrees with defendants that plaintiff’s

objections are not sufficiently specific so as to warrant denying

or reducing the requested fees. “Once a party submits an itemized

list of fees with sufficient detail and establishes entitlement to

fees,” as defendants have done here, “the burden shifts to the

party challenging the fees to show that the fees are unreasonable.” 

Best Western International, Inc. v. Patel, 2008 WL 544820, at *4

(D.Ariz. 2008) (citing Nolan v. Starlight Pines Homeowners Ass’n,

216 Ariz. 482, 167 P.3d 1277, 1286 (Ariz.Ct.App. 2007)). 

Significantly, “[a]n opposing party does not meet [that] burden

merely by asserting broad challenges to the application.” Nolan,

216 Ariz. at 491, 167 P.3d at 1286 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). Therefore, “[i]t is not enough . . . simply to

state, for example, that the hours claimed are excessive and the

rates submitted too high.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

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citations omitted). Rather, as the party opposing this fee

request, it is incumbent upon plaintiff to “present specific

objections to the reasonableness of the fees requested.” See id.

(emphasis added). Indeed, quite recently, the court in Best

Western awarded “Defendants the full amount of attorney’s fees

sought[]” where “[p]laintiff . . . failed to meet th[is] burden[.]” 

Best Western, 2008 WL 544820, at *5; see also Nolan, 216 Ariz. at

491, 167 P.3d at 1286 (no abuse of discretion in awarding

attorneys’ fees where, inter alia, plaintiffs “argued generally

that [defense] counsel spent excessive time defending the case and

questioned the necessity of various aspects of counsel’s work[]”). 

Plaintiff did not specifically object to any single billing

entry in defendants’ 18 page Task-Based Itemized Statement of

Attorneys’ Fees. Instead, plaintiff’s main objections are framed

in terms of blocks of billing time. To illustrate, rather than the

8.3 hours supposedly expended in preparing an answer, plaintiff

asserts that “no greater than 3 hours[]” should have been expended

on that task. Resp. (doc. 37) at 4. In a similar vein,

interpreting defense counsel’s billing records as expending “more

than 40 hours . . . primarily” preparing a summary judgment motion,

plaintiff asserts that “[a] more reasonable time . . . is not more

than 10 hours.” Id. Likewise, plaintiff claims that the

expenditure of “12 plus hours” on this fee motion “is more than 3

times what was called for.” Id. at 5. 

These broad challenges to the reasonableness of the hours

expended does not, in this court’s view, satisfy plaintiff’s burden

in opposing this fee motion. In the first place, plaintiff offers

no rationale for why its suggested times for the completion of a

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given task are reasonable, while the time actually expended is not. 

Therefore, it strikes the court that not only are plaintiff’s

objections not specific enough, the times which it is assigning to

a given task are somewhat arbitrary. 

Second, by focusing on blocks of time rather than upon single

billing entries, plaintiff has mischaracterized defendants’ billing

records. Between September 21, 2006 and February 7, 2007,

defendants did not, as plaintiff puts it, “log[] . . . more than 40

hours . . . , primarily in connection with . . . prepar[ing] . . .

the Motion for Summary Judgment.” Resp. (doc. 37) at 4. Close

scrutiny of the billing records during that timeframe shows that

defense counsel were not only preparing a summary judgment motion,

but they also were performing a host of other legal “service[s] 

which, at the time rendered, would have been undertaken by a

reasonable and prudent lawyer to advance or protect his client’s

interest[.]’” Schweiger, 138 Ariz. at 188, 673 P.2d at 932 

(quoting Twin City Sportservice, 676 F.2d at 1313). Following is a

representative sampling of some of the non-summary judgment related

tasks which defense counsel performed during the relevant time

frame: preparing the initial disclosure statement and attendant

tasks, see, e.g., mot. (doc. 35), exh. A thereto (doc. 35-2) at 4

(entries for 9/27/06 and 9/28/06); reviewing the subject contract

regarding limits on assignment and transferability of mediation

rights, id., exh. A thereto (doc. 35-2) at 5 (entry 10/9/06); and

engaging in various aspects of discovery such as document

production and scheduling depositions, id., exh. A thereto (doc.

35-2) at 9 (entry 11/21/06); at 11 (entry 2/1/07); and at 12

(entries 2/5/07; and 2/6/07). In short, as just shown, not only

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are plaintiff’s objections lacking in the requisite specificity,

but they are somewhat misleading. Accordingly, plaintiff has not

provided a sufficient basis for reducing, much less denying,

defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees.

Even if the court were to deem plaintiff’s objections

sufficiently specific, the result would be the same: defendants are

entitled to recover the full amount of the attorneys’ fees which

they are seeking. Defendants are entitled to that full recovery

because when the court reviews defense counsel’s billing entries

one-by-one, instead of grouping them as did plaintiff, it finds

reasonable the fees which defendants incurred in successfully

defending this action. 

Finally, the court observes that while fee requests do have

the potential for becoming the proverbial “tail wagging the dog,”

this is not such a case. Defendants successfully defended this

action. Norquay and Prefab entered into a contract well before

this litigation, expressly authorizing the “prevailing party” to

recover its attorneys’ fees. DSOF, exh. 1 (doc. 18-2) thereto at

10, Article 14.4. What is more, the fees incurred were reasonable. 

Therefore, for the reasons set forth above,

IT IS ORDERED that “Defendants’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees”

(doc. 35) is GRANTED in the amount of $21,540.00. 

DATED this 8th day of May, 2008.

Copies to counsel of record

Case 2:06-cv-01598-RCB Document 40 Filed 05/09/08 Page 14 of 14