Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02519/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02519-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Anthony Wayne Chui, 

Petitioner,

vs.

Katrina Kane, 

Respondent.

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No. CV 07-2519-PHX-DGC (GEE)

ORDER

Pro se Petitioner Anthony Wayne Chui has filed a motion for reconsideration

(Dkt. #16) of the Court’s August 11, 2008 order denying Magistrate Judge Glenda E.

Edmonds’s report and recommendation (“R&R”) and dismissing his petition for writ of

habeas corpus. The Court will deny the motion.

I. Legal Standard.

Motions for reconsideration are disfavored and are not the place for parties to make

new arguments or to ask the Court to rethink its analysis. See Northwest Acceptance Corp.

v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925-26 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Rezzonico,

32 F.Supp.2d 1112, 1116 (D. Ariz. 1998). Courts in this district have identified four

circumstances where a motion for reconsideration will be granted: (1) the moving party has

discovered material differences in fact or law from those presented to the Court at the time

of its initial decision, and the party could not previously have known of the factual or legal

differences through the exercise of reasonable diligence; (2) material factual events have

occurred since the Court’s initial decision; (3) there has been a material change in the law

Case 2:07-cv-02519-DGC Document 18 Filed 09/02/08 Page 1 of 3
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since the Court’s initial decision; or (4) the moving party makes a convincing showing that

the Court failed to consider material facts that were presented to the Court at the time of its

initial decision. Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mech. Contractors, Inc., 215 F.R.D. 581, 586

(D. Ariz. 2003). Petitioner’s motion fails to satisfy any of these limited circumstances. 

III. Discussion.

Judge Edmonds recommended that the Court grant the habeas petition because, under

the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2005), Petitioner’s

detention for more than two years and eight months was not permissible. See Dkt. #11 at 3.

The Ninth Circuit in Tijani declined to apply the Supreme Court’s decision in Demore v.

Kim, 528 U.S. 510 (2003), because the petitioner in Tijani had not conceded his removability

as had the petitioner in Demore. See Dkt. #13 at 4 (quoting Tijani, 430 F.3d at 1242). This

Court rejected the R&R because Petitioner did concede that he was removable, a concession

that made Demore, not Tijani, the controlling authority. See Dkt. #13 at 4. The Court

considered whether Petitioner’s continued detention was tolerable under Demore and held

that it was because only nine months of Petitioner’s confinement could be attributed to the

government, while the rest was the result of Petitioner’s appeal, including an appeal that was

dismissed for lack of prosecution. See id. at 4-5. 

Petitioner argues that his concession of removability “was based on a misapprehension

of the law.” Dkt. #16 at 1. Petitioner did not raise this argument in the underling petition

and failed to respond to the objections to the R&R. The argument therefore cannot be

presented in a motion for reconsideration. See Motorola, Inc., 215 F.R.D. at 586. 

 Petitioner claims that while he may have conceded that he was removable because he

committed a deportable offense, he did not specifically concede that he committed a crime

involving moral turpitude. See Dkt. #16 at 2. Again, because Petitioner clearly could have

made this argument in a response to the objection filed by Respondent (Dkt. #12), but instead

chose to file no response, he may not raise it now in a motion for reconsideration. See

Motorola, Inc., 215 F.R.D. at 586.

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Petitioner argues that the Court erred in relying on Arnold v. Crawford, 554 F.Supp.2d

987 (D. Ariz. 2008) and Makaj v. Crowther, No. 07-0342, 2007 WL 3224539 (D. Ariz. Oct.

29, 2007), and attempts to distinguish the facts of those cases. See Dkt. #16 at 3. Arnold

recognized that Demore applies where a petitioner has conceded removability, and that Tijani

applies where a petitioner has not. Makaj recognized that the period of confinement

attributable to a petitioner’s appeal is not counted in determining whether the period of

detention is permissible under section 1226(c). The Court looked to Arnold and Makaj for

these legal principles, not because they were factually identical to this case.

Finally, Petitioner claims that his detention for more than two years and six months

is indefinite and otherwise unlawful. See Dkt. #16 at 3-4. But only nine months of his

detention can be attributed to the government. Petitioner himself is responsible for the

remaining period of his detention because of his choice to pursue an appeal, including his

failure to prosecute the first appeal. See Demore, 518 U.S. at 531 n.14.

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration (Dkt. # 16) is denied.

DATED this 2nd day of September, 2008.

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