Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00595/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00595-24/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

OBESITY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 

LLC, 

 Plaintiff, 

Case No. 15-cv-595-BAS(MDD) 

ORDER OVERRULING ORI’S 

OBJECTION TO MAGISTRATE 

JUDGE’S APRIL 8, 2016 AND 

JUNE 7, 2016 ORDERS 

[ECF No. 287] 

 v. 

FIBER RESEARCH 

INTERNATIONAL, LLC, et al., 

 Defendants. 

AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIM. 

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Obesity Research Institute, LLC’s 

(“ORI”) meritless objection to the magistrate judge’s April 8, 2016 and June 7, 2016 

Orders. (ECF Nos. 205, 272.) The latter is the magistrate judge’s ruling on ORI’s 

motion to reconsider portions of the April 8, 2016 Order. 

In the April 8, 2016 Order, the magistrate judge considered FRI’s motion to 

strike ORI’s first amended supplemental disclosures, which added 14 witnesses and 

18 categories of documents to ORI’s initial Rule 26(a)(1)(A) disclosures, on the 

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grounds that these additions are untimely and unjustified. The magistrate judge 

determined the amended disclosures to be untimely, and engaged in the arduous task 

of parsing the parties’ briefing because “[n]either party considered that it may be 

useful to present a list of the supplemental witnesses juxtaposed with whether they 

previously were disclosed or were deposed.” (April 8, 2016 Order 5:8-15, ECF No. 

205.) The magistrate judge ultimately granted in part and denied in part FRI’s motion 

to strike, concluding that ORI is “precluded . . . from using Brian Salerno, other than 

as a non-retained expert witness, Wendy Wang, Ron Ovadia, Steven Snyder, Gayle 

Bensussen, Certain 30(b)(6) Witnesses, Patience Hannah, Angela Emmerson, 

Bradley Sutton, or Jamie Stein to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a 

trial in this case.” (Id. at 10:6-10.) 

Unsurprisingly, on June 21, 2016, ORI moved for reconsideration, but only as 

to Brian Salerno, Wendi Wang, Ron Ovadia, and Steven Snyder. (ECF No. 249.) The 

magistrate judge reconsidered his determination only as to Wendi Wang in the June 

7, 2016 Order, but confirmed the April 8, 2016 Order is all other respects. (June 7, 

2016 Order 4:18-20, ECF No. 272.) 

Though ORI suspiciously filed its objection as only directed at the magistrate 

judge’s June 7, 2016 Order, there is no doubt that the substance of the objection 

attacks the magistrate judge’s underlying April 8, 2016 Order as well. For the 

following reasons, the Court OVERRULES ORI’s objection. 

I. LEGAL STANDARD 

A party may object to a non-dispositive pretrial order of a magistrate judge 

within fourteen days after service of the order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). The 

magistrate judge’s order will be upheld unless it is “clearly erroneous or contrary to 

law.” Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). The “clearly erroneous” standard applies to 

factual findings and discretionary decisions made in connection with non-dispositive 

pretrial discovery matters. F.D.I.C. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 196 F.R.D. 375, 

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378 (S.D. Cal. 2000); Joiner v. Hercules, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 695, 697 (S.D. Ga. 1996) 

(reviewing magistrate judge’s order addressing attorney-client issues in discovery for 

clear error). Review under this standard is “significantly deferential, requiring a 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Concrete Pipe & 

Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. of S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 623 

(1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 On the other hand, the “contrary to law” standard permits independent review 

of purely legal determinations by a magistrate judge. See, e.g., Haines v. Liggett Grp., 

Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 91 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[T]he phrase ‘contrary to law’ indicates plenary 

review as to matters of law.”); Gandee v. Glaser, 785 F. Supp. 684, 686 (S.D. Ohio 

1992), aff’d, 19 F.3d 1432 (6th Cir. 1994); 12 Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal 

Practice and Procedure § 3069 (2d ed., 2010 update). “Thus, [the district court] must

exercise its independent judgment with respect to a magistrate judge’s legal 

conclusions.” Gandee, 785 F. Supp. at 686. “A decision is contrary to law if it fails 

to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.” United 

States v. Cathcart, No. C 07-4762 PJH, 2009 WL 1764642, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 18,

2009). 

II. ANALYSIS 

A. Scope of ORI’s Objection 

Procedural oddities require the Court to first determine whether the arguments 

presented in ORI’s objection are properly before this Court. Dispositive or not, 

parties may file objections to a magistrate judge’s orders within 14 days after being 

served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), (b)(2). Applying the 14-Day Rule, ORI must have filed 

objections to the April 8, 2016 Order no later than April 22, 2016 to be timely. See 

id. Rather than pursuing a Rule 72 objection, ORI opted to file a motion for 

reconsideration outside of Rule 72’s 14-day window on May 6, 2016 (ECF No. 249). 

Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(i)(2), but mindfully recognizing the tension with 

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Rule 72, the magistrate judge determined that ORI’s motion for reconsideration was 

timely. 

Because ORI did not move for reconsideration of the entire April 8, 2016 

Order, there is a dispute between the parties as to what issues are currently properly 

before this Court in ORI’s objection. FRI argues: (1) ORI’s objection is untimely 

because it was filed 74 days after the April 8, 2016 Order; (2) ORI’s objection is 

untimely because ORI did not seek reconsideration sufficiently early to toll Rule 72’s 

14-day requirement; and (3) if the Court reaches the merits of ORI’s objection, it 

should be limited to issues raised in ORI’s reconsideration motion. (FRI’s Opp’n 

8:18-11:6.) ORI responds, arguing the objections are “timely without exception” 

because “[i]n the Ninth Circuit, no time limit constrains a challenge to a Magistrate 

Judge’s conclusions of law.” (ORI’s Reply 4:17-24.) 

“Non-dispositive matters include ‘evidentiary rulings, pretrial discovery 

matters, and the imposition of sanctions for discovery abuses.’” Estakhrian v. 

Obenstine, No. CV 11-03480 GAC(CWx), 2012 WL 12884889, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 

Nov. 9, 2012) (quoting Kounelis v. Sherrer, 529 F. Supp. 2d 503, 518 (D.N.J. 2008)); 

see also Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1414 (9th Cir. 1991) 

(“Nondispositive issues include discovery sanctions”); Grimes v. City & Cnty. of San 

Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 240 (9th Cir. 1991) (discovery sanctions are nondispositive pretrial matters that are reviewed for clear error under Rule 72(a)); Hoar 

v. Sara Lee Corp., 900 F.2d 522, 525 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Matters concerning discovery 

generally are considered ‘nondispositive’ of the litigation”); F.D.I.C. v. Fid. & 

Deposit Co. of Md., 196 F.R.D. 375, 378 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (Whelan, J.) (“The ‘clearly 

erroneous’ standard applies to factual findings and discretionary decisions made in 

connection with non-dispositive pretrial discovery matters[.]”). There is no doubt that 

the dispute currently before the Court involves a pretrial-discovery matter because it 

is based on ORI’s noncompliance with pretrial-disclosure requirements governed by 

Rule 26. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). 

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ORI places considerable significance on the distinction between a magistrate 

judge’s legal conclusions and factual determinations. (ORI’s Reply 5:7-21.) It 

suggests that this distinction is important because legal conclusions are not subject 

to any time limits when seeking review. (Id. at 4:25-5:6 (“In the Ninth Circuit, no 

time limit constrains a challenge to a Magistrate Judge’s conclusions of law.”).) To 

support this extreme proposition, ORI relies on three Ninth Circuit decisions: Jones 

v. Wood, 207 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 2000); Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449 (9th Cir. 

1998); and Britt v. Simi Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 708 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1983). 

Without delving too deeply into the nuances of these decisions, which do not 

appear to support ORI’s proposition, Jones and Britt are distinguishable because they 

involve objections brought under Rule 72(b)(2), which governs dispositive motions 

brought before the magistrate judge, rather than Rule 72(a). See Jones, 207 F.3d at 

559 (“After considering the magistrate judge’s report and recommendations, the 

district court granted a writ of habeas corpus.”); Britt, 708 F.2d at 453 (“A magistrate 

recommended that appellees’ motion to dismiss be granted.”). Turner could also be 

distinguished on similar grounds, but more importantly, nothing in Turner suggests 

that the district court is compelled to consider untimely objections to legal 

conclusions. See Turner, 158 F.3d at 455. “Rather, a failure to object to such a 

conclusions is a factor to be weighed in considering the propriety of finding waiver 

of an issue on appeal.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In Turner, the mixed 

question of law and fact considered was determined to be “usually left to the 

discretion of the district courts to decide on a case by case basis.” Id.

Having determined that the April 8, 2016 Order involves non-dispositive 

matters, the Court applies Rule 72(a), which states that “[a] party may not assign as 

error a defect in the order not timely objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) (emphasis 

added). At the time ORI filed its objection, it no longer retained the right to “assign 

as error a defect” in the April 8, 2016 Order because the objection is untimely. See 

id.; Greenhow v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 863 F.2d 633, 638-39 (9th Cir. 

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1988), overruled on other grounds in United States v. Hardesty, 977 F.2d 1347, 1348 

(9th Cir. 1992) (en banc). That said, ORI’s objection to the June 7, 2016 Order, ruling 

on ORI’s reconsideration motion, is timely under Rule 72. Therefore, the Court 

reviews ORI’s objection only in so far as it challenges the magistrate judge’s 

reasoning in the June 7, 2016 Order. 

B. Magistrate Judge’s June 7, 2016 Order 

ORI only challenges the order striking Brian Salerno, Ron Ovadia, and Steven 

Snyder in the June 7, 2016 Order. The magistrate judge reconsidered his 

determination with respect to Wendi Wang, but confirmed the April 8, 2016 Order 

with respect to the three other aforementioned witnesses. As previously mentioned, 

he also admonished the parties failing to “present a list of the supplemental witnesses 

juxtaposed with whether they previously were disclosed or deposed,” instead 

requiring the magistrate judge to “parse the joint motion to create its own list.” (April 

8, 2016 Order 5:8-15.) Upon reviewing the parties’ briefing of the underlying 

discovery dispute (ECF Nos. 171, 202), the magistrate judge’s admonishment is 

generously stated. 

Focusing on ORI’s briefing specifically as the objecting party, ORI asserted 

broad arguments that were meant to cover 14 witnesses and 18 categories of 

documents. (See April 8, 2016 Order 1:24-26.) These arguments, which did not 

specifically identify the relevance to particular witnesses, include, among others: (1) 

the supplemental disclosures are presumptively timely; (2) the content of the 

supplemental disclosures are of no surprise to FRI; and (3) Rule 26(e) “must 

necessarily” account for the complexities of each case. Interestingly, ORI literally 

identifies Brian Salerno by name only three times in its briefing, though twice in 

footnotes, and does not specifically identify Ron Ovadia or Steven Snyder at all. The 

magistrate judge then laboriously parsed the arguments as applied to the relevant 

witnesses. 

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With respect to Brian Salerno, the magistrate judge provided the following 

analysis: 

Mr. Salerno was disclosed by Plaintiff as a non-retained 

expert in this case and has been deposed, apparently in that 

context. Plaintiff unsuccessfully requested that this Court 

deem Mr. Salerno a functional employee of Plaintiff and 

his company, Nutralliance, Inc., engaged in common 

cause with Plaintiff. In its supplemental disclosures, 

Plaintiff now identifies Mr. Salerno as a fact witness. The 

Court finds this supplementation untimely and prejudicial. 

Plaintiff must have known, considering the relationship, 

that Mr. Salerno had more to offer than his expert opinion. 

He should have been disclosed timely and, applying the 

Lanard Toys factors, the failure is not substantially 

justified or harmless. The failure to disclose an individual 

as a fact witness, even if disclosed for another purpose, is 

not harmless. 

(April 8, 2016 Order 6:11-24 (citations omitted).) And the analysis provided as to 

Ron Ovadia is as follows: 

Mr. Ovadia apparently is associated with a company called 

West Coast Laboratories, Inc. He has not previously been 

the subject of disclosures nor been deposed. According to 

Plaintiff, he was identified in an interrogatory response by 

Plaintiff. Plaintiff has not asserted that the interrogatory 

response provided the functional equivalent of the 

information required under Rule 26(a)(1)(A). The 

supplementation was untimely and, considering the 

Lanard Toys factors, is not substantially justified or 

harmless. Moreover, the disclosure of the subject of his 

information is too general to provide any value. 

(Id. at 7:9-18.) The magistrate judge incorporated the analysis for Ron Ovadia in 

addressing Steven Snyder, finding that “Mr. Snyder is identified as with 21st Century 

Healthcare, Inc.” and “[h]e is similarly situated to Mr. Ovadia and will be considered 

as such.” (Id. at 7:19-21.) 

// 

// 

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 Based on the analysis provided, the magistrate judge ultimately precluded ORI 

from “using Brian Salerno, other than as a non-retained expert witness, . . . Ron 

Ovadia, [and] Steven Snyder . . . to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at 

a trial in this case. (April 8, 2016 Order 10:3-10.) 

C. Brian Salerno, Ron Ovadia, and Steven Snyder 

 Rule 26(e)(1)(A) requires a party who has made a disclosure under Rule 26(a) 

to “supplement or correct its disclosure or response . . . in a timely manner if the party 

learns that in some material respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or 

incorrect, and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made 

known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing[.]” “The 

obligation to supplement disclosures and discovery responses applies whenever a 

party learns that its prior disclosures or responses are in some material respect 

incomplete or incorrect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (Notes of Advisory Committee on 

Rules—1993 Amendment, Subdivision (e)). “There is, however, no obligation to 

provide supplemental or corrective information that has been otherwise made known 

to the parties in writing or during the discovery process, as when a witness not 

previously disclosed is identified during the taking of a deposition or when an expert 

during a deposition corrects information contained in an earlier report.” Id. 

 That said, the mere fact that a person is described during a deposition or in 

other discovery in a way that suggests that the person may possess relevant 

information does not take the place of a disclosure that the disclosing party may use 

that person to support its claims or defenses. See Fed. R. Civ. P. (Notes of Advisory 

Committee Rules—1993 Amendment, Subdivision (a)); Ollier v. Sweetwater Union 

High Sch. Dist., 267 F.R.D. 339, 343 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (Lorenz, J.). For example, “the 

mere mention of a name in a deposition is insufficient to give notice to the opposing 

party that defendants intend to present that person at trial.” Ollier, 267 F.R.D. at 343. 

“To suggest otherwise flies in the face of the requirements of Rule 26(a) and (e).” Id.

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Furthermore, “the untimely disclosure of witnesses potentially impacts decisions 

already made during the course of litigation[,]” which imposes “financial costs to 

[the opposing party]” and an “unreasonably high” disruption on the Court’s and 

opposing party’s schedules. Id. 

 With respect to Mr. Salerno, ORI argues that he was previously “made known” 

within the definition of Rule 26(e) when he was designated as a non-retained expert 

through ORI’s expert disclosure on October 16, 2015, supplemental expert disclosure 

on December 21, 2015, and a Mr. Salerno’s deposition taken on February 11, 2016. 

ORI failed to submit the October 16, 2015 expert disclosure with its objection. 

Without having the opportunity to review the contents of that expert disclosure, the 

Court cannot conclude that Mr. Salerno was adequately “made known” to FRI 

through the October 16, 2015 expert disclosure. Also, the deposition testimony that 

ORI emphasizes—“Q: You’re here today to testify in your individual capacity as Mr. 

Salerno; is that right? A: Yes.” (Salerno Dep. 14:7-9)—merely suggests that Mr. 

Salerno may possess relevant information and does not take the place of a disclosure 

that the ORI may use that person to support its claims or defenses. See Ollier, 267 

F.R.D. at 343. Lastly, using the untimely supplemental disclosure to invoke the Rule 

26(e)’s “made known” rule is rather dishonest. Not only would that invite parties to 

abuse the “made known” rule by presenting opposing parties with untimely 

information regarding potential witnesses and evidence, it also would negate the need 

for disclosure deadlines imposed either by the Rules of Civil Procedure or court 

order. See Plumley v. Mockett, 836 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2010); see also 

Salgado v. General Motors Corp., 150 F.3d 735, 743 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming 

exclusion of expert witness testimony where, inter alia, “information contained in 

the supplemental report must have been available before the missed deadline”); 

Metro Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 145 F.3d 320, 324 (5th Cir. 1998) 

(supplemental disclosures “are not intended to provide an extension of the expert 

designation and report production deadline”); Akeva LLC v. Mizuno Corp., 212 

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F.R.D. 306, 310 (M.D.N.C. 2002) (rejecting “a definition of supplementation which 

would essentially allow for unlimited bolstering of expert opinions” and noting that 

Rule 26(e) “does not cover failures of omission because the expert did an inadequate 

or incomplete preparation”). Needless to say, the Court rejects ORI’s contention that 

an untimely supplemental expert disclosure can be used to circumvent the deadlines 

ORI had missed through its own negligence. 

 With respect to Messrs. Ovadia and Snyder, ORI inaccurately argues that the 

magistrate judge provided “no analysis or explanation” to exclude these witnesses, 

and adds that these witnesses were “identified in ORI’s interrogatory responses early 

in this case.” (ORI’s Objection 9:14-21.) The magistrate judge determined that 

Messrs. Ovadia and Snyder had not previously been the subject of disclosures nor 

been deposed. And acknowledging ORI’s position that these witnesses had been 

identified in an interrogatory response, the magistrate judge concluded that no 

assertion had been made that “the interrogatory response provided the functional 

equivalent of the information required under Rule 26(a)(1)(A).” That failure remains. 

ORI fails to demonstrate that it satisfied the defects identified by the magistrate judge 

at any point before the magistrate judge or this Court. Curiously, ORI also suggests 

that FRI’s issuance of subpoenas to Messrs. Ovadia and Snyder somehow absolves 

it of its Rule 26(a) obligations. ORI presents no legal authority to support this 

position. Moreover, this deflects ORI’s responsibilities under Rule 26(a) to the 

opposing party, which is a bit contradictory, when the rule places the responsibility 

squarely on the disclosing party. 

Rule 26(e) “creates a ‘duty to supplement,’ not a right.” Luke v. Family Care 

& Urgent Med. Clinics, 323 F. App’x 496, 500 (9th Cir. 2009). Supplementation 

“means correcting inaccuracies, or filling the interstices of an incomplete report 

based on information that was not available at the time of the initial disclosure.” Id.

It is not “a loophole through which a party who submits partial expert witness 

disclosures, or who wishes to revise her disclosures in light of her opponent’s 

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challenges to the analysis and conclusions therein, can add to them to her advantage 

after the court’s deadline for doing so has passed.” Id. In sum, Rule 26(e) “does not 

give license to sandbag one’s opponent with claims and issues which should have 

been included in the expert witness’ report[.]” Plumley, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 1062. To 

allow these types of supplemental reports 

would create a system where preliminary reports could be 

followed by supplementary reports and there would be no 

finality to expert reports, as each side, in order to buttress 

its case or position, could “supplement” existing reports 

and modify opinions previously given. This practice 

would surely circumvent the full disclosure requirement 

implicit in Rule 26 and would interfere with the Court's 

ability to set case management deadlines, because new 

reports and opinions would warrant further consultation 

with one's own expert and virtually require new rounds of 

depositions. That process would hinder rather than 

facilitate settlement and the final disposition of the case. 

Beller ex rel. Beller v. United States, 221 F.R.D. 689, 695 (D.N.M. 2003); see also

Plumley, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 1062; Keener v. United States, 181 F.R.D. 639, 641 (D. 

Mont. 1998) (“To countenance a dramatic, pointed variation of an expert’s disclosure 

under the guise of Rule 26(e)(1) supplementation would be to invite the proverbial 

fox into the henhouse. The experienced expert could simply ‘lie in wait’ so as to 

express his genuine opinions only after [the opposing party] discloses hers.”). 

Where a supplemental expert report does not comply with Rule 26(e), courts 

turn to Rule 37(c) to determine whether sanctions are appropriate for the party’s noncompliance. Lindner v. Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc., 249 F.R.D. 625, 640-41 (D. Haw. 

2008). Rule 37(c) “gives teeth” to Rule 26(e)’s requirements. Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. 

Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001). “The party facing 

sanctions bears the burden of proving that its failure to disclose the required 

information was substantially justified or is harmless.” R & R Sails, Inc. v. Ins. Co. 

of Penn., 673 F.3d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 2012). 

// 

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ORI has failed to heed the warnings of other courts regarding the potential 

abuses of Rule 26(e). See, e.g., Luke, 323 F. App’x at 500, Plumley, 836 F. Supp. 2d 

at 1062. Its surreptitious tactics appear to be the precise conduct probhibited in cases 

such as Luke, Plumley, and Beller ex rel. Beller. Moreover, ORI not only fails to 

present an arguably meritorious justification for sustaining its objection, it also fails 

to adequately address whether its failure to timely disclose the aforementioned 

witnesses was substantially justified or harmless. See R & R Sails, 673 F.3d at 1246. 

Consequently, the Court cannot reach a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake 

has been committed” by the magistrate judge, and concludes that the magistrate 

judge’s May 12, 2016 Order is not clearly erroneous. See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 

623. 

III. CONCLUSION & ORDER 

In light of the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES ORI’s objection to the 

magistrate judge’s April 8, 2016 and June 7, 2016 Orders in its entirety. (ECF No. 

287.) 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: August 4, 2017 

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