Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02281/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02281-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 29:185 Labor/Mgt. Relations (Contracts)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RYDER INTEGRATED LOGISTICS, INC., a

Delaware corporation

Plaintiff,

 v.

DONNA M. DELL, in her official capacity as

Labor Commissioner and Chief, Division of

Labor Standards; Enforcement, Department of

Industrial Relations, Labor and Workforce

Development Agency, State of California,

Defendant. /

No. C 05-02281 WHA

ORDER GRANTING

MOTION TO DISMISS AND

VACATING HEARING

INTRODUCTION

In this labor dispute, defendant now moves to dismiss the action for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, or in the alternative, for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff simultaneously

moves for a preliminary injunction. Because this order finds the matter not yet ripe for

adjudication, defendant’s motion is GRANTED.

STATEMENT

This action revolves around state administrative proceedings pending before defendant

Donna Dell, in her official capacity as State Labor Commissioner. Patrick McLeskey, David

Barber, Charles Thompson and Michael Sullivan each filed claims against plaintiff Ryder

Integrated Logistics, Inc., their former employer, alleging violations of California Labor Code

§ 201 and seeking penalties under California Labor Code § 203. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and

Case 3:05-cv-02281-WHA Document 45 Filed 10/27/05 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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injunctive relief, to prevent defendant “from conducting a hearing or making any determination

on liability and/or penalties” in these four cases.

Plaintiff is in the business of providing logistics and transportation services (Compl.

¶ 7). From August 16, 1999, to August 16, 2003, plaintiff had a contract to service a Ralph’s

Grocery facility in Stockton, California (id. ¶ 9). McLeskey, Barber, Thompson and Sullivan

were all employed by plaintiff as drivers (id. ¶ 12). The terms and conditions of their

employment were set forth in a collective-bargaining agreement (“CBA”) negotiated between

plaintiff and General Teamsters Local Union No. 439 (Padilla Exh. 1). As described in

Schedule A of the CBA, drivers were compensated “based on miles driven, delivery stops

made, pallets handled, trailers dropped and hooked, and time they were delayed from delivering

product” with a minimum weekly guarantee, in lieu of an hourly wage (Compl. ¶ 11; Padilla

Exh. 1 at 16).

California Labor Code § 201 requires employers to pay all outstanding wages

immediately upon discharge. Accordingly, on August 16, 2003, when all bargaining-unit

drivers were discharged because the contract with Ralph’s Grocery was not renewed, plaintiff

paid them for their earned, unused vacation (Compl. ¶ 12). These payments were initially

“based on rates derived from dividing average weekly earnings by actual average hours worked

per week” (id. ¶ 13). In other words, plaintiff used an average hourly wage to calculate the

value of accrued vacation time. Due to complaints by some drivers that they had been

underpaid, plaintiff voluntarily “recalculated the vacation payments, this time dividing average

weekly earnings by a fictional 5-day week, 8 hours per day” — i.e., an average daily wage —

and paid additional amounts on or about September 10, 2003 (id. ¶ 14). Notwithstanding this

additional payments, plaintiff contends that its original calculations were correct under the

terms of the CBA (id. ¶ 15).

Plaintiff acknowledges that the CBA “does not expressly state how to calculate unpaid

vacation, other than to recite that ‘[v]acation pay shall be calculated at one fifty-second

(1/52nd) of the employee’s annual earnings for each week of vacation’” (id. ¶ 12). Calculating

vacation pay by the week is consistent with other provisions concerning vacation time. The

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For the Northern District of California

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CBA provides that drivers earn either one, two or three weeks of paid vacation each year,

depending on how long they have been employed; moreover, “[v]acations shall be selected and

used in full-week increments” (See Padilla Exh. 1 at 5). Plaintiff admits that the CBA is

otherwise silent as to how vacation pay “is to be allocated for periods of less than a full week”

(Opp. to Motion to Dismiss at 10).

The complaint alleges that after plaintiff was invited to demonstrate that the Labor

Commissioner was preempted from hearing the four drivers’ claims, the staff attorney assigned

to those cases determined that no interpretation of the CBA was necessary (Compl. ¶ 21). 

Plaintiff asserts that this determination is binding (ibid.). Plaintiff further alleges that the staff

attorney refused to reconsider the matter and that the Labor Commissioner has not yet

responded to its request for review of the staff attorney’s opinion (id. at ¶¶ 22–23).

Plaintiff now seeks a preliminary injunction to prevent the Labor Commissioner from

conducting any administrative hearings until after the above-captioned action has been resolved

on the merits. (The parties have already stipulated that the hearings may not be scheduled any

earlier than sixty days after the Court’s ruling on the pending motions.) It argues that the

drivers’ claims under California Labor Code § 201 are pre-empted by federal labor law because

an interpretation of the CBA is necessary to determine how drivers should be compensated for

unused vacation periods shorter than one week.

Defendant simultaneously moves to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction, on the basis that this action is not yet ripe for adjudication. In the alternative,

defendant moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim, asserting that the parties do not dispute

how one week of vacation pay is calculated as per the CBA and there are no other relevant

provisions in the CBA to be interpreted.

ANALYSIS

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), the Court shall dismiss an action if

it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Where a claim is not yet ripe for judicial review, the

complaint must be dismissed. S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 502

(9th Cir. 1990). Because a final determination on whether the drivers’ claims before the Labor

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Commissioner can be resolved without interpreting the CBA has not yet been made, this action

is not yet ripe for review.

The parties agree that whether the drivers’ claims are preempted depends on whether

any interpretation of the CBA — beyond a mere need to “look to” and apply its terms — is

required. Lividas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 125 (1994). Putting aside the merits of this

dispute, however, defendant correctly argues that Interpretive Bulletin 94–4 provides that the

staff attorney’s opinion is not binding because the “final determination will rest with the Labor

Commissioner.” See Lividas v. Bradshaw, 865 F.Supp. 642, 645 (N.D. Cal. 1994)(reproducing

these guidelines as Exhibit A). Plaintiff admits that the Labor Commissioner has not yet

rendered a final decision (Compl. ¶ 23). It merely speculates what her view might be, based on

her responsive filings in this lawsuit. Should it become clear during the administrative hearings

that the CBA must be interpreted to determine how much vacation pay the drivers were entitled

to receive upon discharge, the Labor Commissioner would simply hold their claims in abeyance

pending arbitration of the wage-rate issue. Lividas, 865 F.Supp. at 644, Example B at 648.

As to the specific question of whether the drivers’ unpaid vacation time should have

been calculated based on an average hourly wage or an average daily wage, the Court will not

render an advisory opinion.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. As such, this

order need not rule on plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Because it was not

necessary to rely on any evidence to which objections were raised (i.e., Ms. Hipshman’s

declaration), this order declines to rule on those objections. The hearing on these motions,

currently scheduled for NOVEMBER 17, 2005 AT 8:00 A.M., is VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 27, 2005 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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