Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01285/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01285-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

Thomas R. WOODSON, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

R.N. ORTIZ, et al., 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 15-cv-1285-WQH-AGS 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO GRANT DEFENDANTS’ 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION 

(ECF No. 48) 

 Plaintiff fell in his prison cell and broke his hand. He later sued the defendants—

four members of the prison medical staff—for delaying his treatment and other misdeeds, 

which he says caused him permanent injury. But the undisputed medical evidence 

establishes that any treatment delays had no effect on plaintiff’s post-surgical outcome. 

Regardless, as to three defendants, the evidence is entirely lacking. And the final defendant 

has qualified immunity. Defendants are, therefore, entitled to summary judgment. 

BACKGROUND 

 On May 27, 2014, plaintiff Thomas Woodson, an inmate at Calipatria State Prison, 

fell from his cell bunk and fractured his left thumb. (See Compl., ECF No. 1, at 4; ECF 

No. 48-4, at 24, 33.) Two days later, the triage nurse—defendant Ortiz—received and 

initialed three urgent medical-request forms about the injury. (ECF No. 48-4, at 21-23.) 

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A. The First Week After the May 27, 2014 Injury—Nurse Ortiz’s Response 

The parties dispute what happened after May 29, when nurse Ortiz learned of 

Woodson’s medical requests. According to the hospital records and nurse Ortiz, she 

promptly scheduled a face-to-face clinic appointment with Woodson for the next day. (ECF 

No. 48-4, at 24; Ortiz Decl., ECF No. 48-8, at 2.) At that May 30 clinic visit, she examined 

Woodson, “urgently referred” him for further assessment, and ensured that he was seen by 

a doctor within an hour. (ECF No. 48-4, at 24-28; Ortiz Decl., ECF No. 48-8, at 2.) Ortiz 

had no further treatment role, but the doctor immediately obtained and reviewed an X-ray. 

(ECF No. 48-4, at 26, 30, 35; Ortiz Decl., ECF No. 48-8, at 2.) That same day the doctor 

prescribed a thumb splint and Tylenol with codeine, and recommended Woodson for an 

“urgent” orthopedic consultation. (ECF No. 48-4, at 26-29, 31, 33.) 

Woodson, on the other hand, swears that he “did not see anyone until June 3, 2014,” 

when he says Ortiz conducted his “initial assessment” and referred him to the doctor who 

ordered the X-rays. (Pl. Resp., ECF No. 53, at 2-3.) Luckily, Woodson already had an 

existing three-month prescription for the anti-inflammatory pain medication Naproxen. 

(ECF No. 48-4, at 28, 33-34; see also id. at 24, 26.) 

B. Month-Long Wait for Surgery 

In either event, on June 5, 2014, Woodson had his initial consultation with the 

orthopedic surgeon , who reviewed the X-rays and recommended surgery. (ECF No. 48-4, 

at 35-36, 38.) The surgeon cautioned Woodson, however, that the planned surgical repair 

would “not give a normal thumb” and that he would have “reduced range of motion . . . 

permanently.” (Id. at 36.) 

 The following day, defendant Dr. Kim had his only interaction with Woodson, at a 

follow-up visit. Dr. Kim placed Woodson on temporary limited duty and ordered “Bottom 

Bunk” and “No left hand use” accommodations. (ECF No. 48-4, at 40-41; Kim Decl., ECF 

No. 48-7, at 2.) On the top of the form, he handwrote “Time Sensitive.” (ECF No. 48-4, 

at 40; Kim Decl., ECF No. 48-7, at 2.) 

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 On Monday, June 9, 2014, another defendant, Dr. Stepke, completed the surgeryrequest paperwork. (ECF No. 48-4, at 42.) Consistent with the surgeon’s written 

evaluation, Dr. Stepke recommended that the surgery be scheduled in a “Routine” 

timeframe (meaning “within 90 days”), but he handwrote “ASAP” next to that. (ECF 

No. 48-4, at 42; Stepke Decl., ECF No. 48-6, at 2-3, 3 n.3.) Within days of Woodson’s 

signing the necessary consent form, the scheduling nurse—defendant Orduño1

—

calendared the surgery for July 11, 2014, which was the surgeon’s first available date. (ECF 

No. 1, at 39; Orduño Decl., ECF No. 48-9, at 2.) 

C. Prognosis of Permanent Joint Impairment

 Although Woodson was warned that the July 11, 2014 surgery would not restore his 

thumb to normal (see ECF No. 48-4, at 36), he was still unhappy with his recovery and 

“blam[ed] his results on the delay of surgery.” (ECF No. 48-4, at 61.) In the surgeon’s 

expert opinion, however, the “surgery date had no effect on the efficacy of the surgery or 

the post-surgical outcome.” (Foerster Decl., ECF No. 48-5, at 3; see also ECF No. 48-4, 

at 61 (surgeon “thought that [Woodson’s] function is actually to be expected whether or 

not the surgery was delayed. . . .”); cf. Foerster Decl., ECF No. 48-5, at 6 (“The postsurgical results were as expected for this sort of injury, and consistent with repeated preand post-surgical discussions with the patient.”).) 

 Woodson’s thumb never fully recovered, so he sued the prison medical staff under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for delaying his care and being deliberately indifferent to his medical 

needs. Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that no reasonable jury 

could find in Woodson’s favor and that they each have qualified immunity. 

                                               

1

 Although listed in the complaint as “Orduna” (Cmpl., ECF No. 1, at 1), apparently 

this defendant’s last name is actually spelled “Orduño.” (Orduño Decl., ECF No. 48-9, 

at 2.) The Court will uniformly refer to her as Orduño. 

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DISCUSSION 

A. Summary Judgment Standard 

 When reviewing a summary judgment motion, the Court must take “the evidence 

and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” and may only grant it after concluding “there are no genuine issues of 

material fact.” Lowry v. City of San Diego, 858 F.3d 1248, 1254 (9th Cir. 2017). The only 

requirement “to defeat summary judgment is simply evidence such that a reasonable juror 

drawing all inferences in favor of the respondent could return a verdict in the respondent’s 

favor.” Fuller v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr., 865 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation 

omitted). When evidence is “genuinely disputed on a particular issue—such as by 

conflicting testimony—the issue is inappropriate for resolution on summary judgment.” Id. 

(citation omitted). 

B. Deliberate Indifference 

For inadequate medical care to reach constitutional dimensions, the prisoner must 

prove two elements: (1) “the existence of a serious medical need,” that is, a condition that 

left untreated “‘could result in further significant injury’ or cause ‘the unnecessary and 

wanton infliction of pain’”; and (2) the prison official’s “deliberate indifference” to that 

need. Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). 

Because defendants do not dispute that a broken hand is a “serious medical need,” 

the only issue is the second element. Deliberate indifference is a formidable standard, akin 

to criminal recklessness: the prison official must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive 

risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 839-40 (1994). 

“[I]solated occurrences of neglect,” as well as “mere malpractice, or even gross 

negligence,” may be inexcusable, but they do not amount to deliberate indifference. Wood 

v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted); see also Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (“Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional 

violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.”). The plaintiff “‘must show that the 

course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances’ 

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and that the defendants ‘chose this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to the 

plaintiff’s health.’” Hamby v. Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2016) (citations 

omitted). 

1. Delay of Medical Care

(a) First Delay—One Week Until Initial Treatment

Woodson contends that the initial weeklong delay—from when he broke his hand to 

the day medical staff first saw him—constituted deliberate indifference. While he could 

arguably make that case against defendant Ortiz, as discussed below, there is no evidence 

that defendants Orduño, Dr. Kim, or Dr. Stepke knew of or were in any way responsible 

for this delay. Thus, these three defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this basis 

of liability. See Fairley v. Shelton, 664 F. App’x 616, 617 (9th Cir. 2016) (affirming 

summary judgment because the prisoner “failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact 

as to whether these defendants were personally involved in a constitutional violation or 

whether their conduct caused any such violation.”). 

 Nurse Ortiz, on the other hand, was involved in Woodson’s initial medical 

scheduling. On May 29, 2014, Ortiz learned that Woodson had been suffering with a 

broken hand for two days. Although she claims that she promptly scheduled him for the 

clinic and saw him the very next day—a claim supported by multiple medical records, 

notes, and other sources—Woodson swore under penalty of perjury that Ortiz first saw him 

on June 3. For summary judgment purposes, the Court must draw “all inferences in favor 

of” Woodson and thus must accept his testimony on this disputed point. See Fuller, 865 

F.3d at 1161. So, at this stage, the Court must presume that on May 29 Ortiz discovered 

that Woodson had a two-day-old injury, yet waited five more days to treat him. 

 Typically, “delay in providing a prisoner” with medical care, “standing alone, does 

not constitute an eighth amendment violation.” Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 

(9th Cir. 1989). Medical delay supports a constitutional claim only if it “was harmful.” 

Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985) (citation 

omitted). Woodson’s records certainly show he was in significant discomfort. At the initial 

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appointment with Ortiz, Woodson described his pain as an 8 out of 10. (ECF No. 48-4, 

at 24.) And the treating doctor apparently agreed, immediately prescribing a splint and 

Tylenol with codeine, even though Woodson was already on Naproxen. (Cmpl., ECF No. 1, 

at 5; ECF No. 48-4, at 26, 28, 31, 33-34.) Thus, drawing all inferences in Woodson’s favor, 

this Court concludes that a reasonable jury could find that Ortiz’s delay in providing 

Woodson care amounted to deliberate indifference. But Ortiz may still have qualified 

immunity, a subject addressed at the end of this opinion. 

(b)Second Delay—Month-Long Wait for Surgery

 Next, Woodson complains of the delay between the June 5, 2014 referral for surgery 

and the July 11, 2014 surgery itself. There is no evidence, however, that defendants Ortiz 

or Dr. Kim had any involvement with the surgery’s timing, so they should receive summary 

judgment on all claims arising from this second delay. See Fairley, 664 F. App’x at 617. 

 The other two defendants—Dr. Stepke and nurse Orduño—helped schedule 

Woodson’s surgery, but there are many obstacles to finding that any surgery-related delay 

was unconstitutional. First, Woodson has not shown that his surgery was in fact delayed. 

The surgery took place 36 days after the referral, on “the first date that [the surgeon’s] 

office had available,” which was “well within the 90-day window for a routine surgery.” 

(Orduño Decl., ECF No. 48-9, at 2.) While he awaited his operation, Woodson continued 

to receive medication and care. (See ECF No. 48-4, at 33, 43.) It is difficult to imagine how 

this “course of treatment” could be deemed “medically unacceptable under the 

circumstances.” See Hamby, 821 F.3d at 1092 (citation omitted). 

Second, even assuming a 36-day wait was medically unacceptable, Dr. Stepke and 

nurse Orduño can hardly be faulted for the surgeon’s busy calendar. Woodson received the 

first available date. He argues, however, that defendants should have emphasized the 

seriousness of his condition. In the surgery order’s scheduling section, Dr. Stepke circled 

“routine,” which requires action “within 90 days,” and he handwrote “ASAP” next to that. 

(Stepke Decl., ECF No. 48-6, at 2-3, 3 n.3.) Woodson criticizes him for not instead circling 

“urgent” or “emergent”—categories requiring action within “14 days” or “4 hours,” 

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respectively. (See Pl. Resp., ECF No. 53, at 4; Stepke Decl., ECF No. 48-6, at 2-3 n.3.) 

Also, Woodson recalls that at the initial consultation, the surgeon verbally recommended 

“immediate” surgery. (Pl. Resp., ECF No. 53, at 12.) The surgeon denies this, swearing 

instead that the “scheduled surgery date was medically reasonable and appropriate.” (See

Foerster Decl., ECF No. 48-5, at 3.) But even if the surgeon had supported immediate 

surgery, there is no evidence that Dr. Stepke knew that. So, he could not have been 

deliberately indifferent to such contrary advice. Regardless, “[a] difference of opinion 

between a physician and the prisoner—or between medical professionals—concerning 

what medical care is appropriate does not amount to deliberate indifference.” Hamby, 821 

F.3d at 1092 (citation omitted). 

A third problem is that Woodson has not shown that his surgery’s timing impaired 

his long-term recovery. “[M]ere delay of surgery, without more, is insufficient to state a 

claim of deliberate medical indifference . . . unless the denial was harmful.” Shapley, 766 

F.2d at 407 (citation omitted). The only medical evidence on this point affirms that the 

waiting period had no effect. Specifically, the operating surgeon—who is a witness and not 

a defendant—declared under penalty of perjury that the “surgery date had no effect on the 

efficacy of the surgery or the post-surgical outcome.” (Foerster Decl., ECF No. 48-5, at 3; 

see also id. at 6 (“The post-surgical results were as expected for this sort of injury, and 

consistent with repeated pre- and post-surgical discussions with the patient.”); ECF 

No. 48-4, at 61 (Woodson’s six-month post-operative “function is actually to be expected 

whether or not the surgery was delayed. . . .”).). 

 Finally, even assuming the wait was harmful, nurse Orduño does not appear to bear 

any responsibility for it. Dr. Stepke asked her to schedule this “routine” surgery “ASAP,” 

and Orduño dutifully secured the next available date on the surgeon’s calendar. In other 

words, she did exactly as ordered. She can hardly be blamed for failing to countermand the 

treating doctor’s instructions, especially when she had never seen the injury herself. No 

evidence suggests that Orduño was negligent, let alone reckless enough to qualify as 

deliberately indifferent. 

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 In short, there is no evidence that defendants’ course of treatment “was medically 

unacceptable under the circumstances,” nor that any defendant “chose this course in 

conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health.” See Colwell, 763 F.3d at 

1068 (citation omitted). Summary judgment is therefore proper for all defendants as to any 

claims regarding delay in scheduling Woodson’s surgery. 

2. Rudeness and Failing to Inform 

 In his complaint, Woodson compiles a hodgepodge of other deliberate-indifference 

theories. Most of these allegations fall under the rubric of rudeness: nurse Ortiz was 

“agitated” and “rolled her eyes and sucked her teeth” (Compl., ECF No. 1, at 4); Dr. Kim 

“did not seem in the least bit interested” and “stoically dismissed plaintiff without an 

adequate response” (id. at 6); Dr. Stepke “shrugged his shoulders with apathy” (id. at 7). 

Also, he claims that Dr. Kim “refused to provide plaintiff with information pertaining to 

scheduling or [the] waiting period for off-site treatment.” (Id. at 2.) But the Constitution 

does not compel prison medical staff to be informative or polite; they must simply provide 

the minimum care required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Stiles ex rel. 

D.S. v. Grainger Cty., Tenn., 819 F.3d 834, 849 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Plaintiffs’ allegations 

that Defendants made rude or critical comments, offered unhelpful suggestions, and acted 

disrespectfully do not undercut the reasonableness of Defendants’ concrete actions taken 

in response to Plaintiffs’ complaints.”); Alcon v. Bright, No. C14-01927 SI (pr), 2016 WL 

795489, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2016) (“[R]udeness is not the same thing as deliberate 

indifference.”). So, these accusations are not a basis for relief. 

3. Falsifying Medical Records 

 Finally, Woodson charges Dr. Kim with falsifying medical documents. (Cmpl., ECF 

No. 1, at 2, 11.) Although many hospital records show that Woodson was X-rayed on 

May 30, 2014, he maintains that he had no medical procedures or examinations until June 3. 

(Compare, e.g., id. at 19, 69-70 (reports) with id. at 11 (Woodson’s allegations).) He 

accuses Dr. Kim of falsely reporting the earlier X-ray date on a notification form (see id. 

at 11), but he offers no evidence that this alleged error denied or delayed his medical care. 

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Similarly, he complains that the X-ray report itself falsely noted: “No definite fracture is 

identified.” (Id. at 11, 70.) But it appears that the report was written by a radiologist, not 

Dr. Kim, and Dr. Kim is merely listed as the “Referring Physician.” (See id. at 70.) At any 

rate, it is not clear how this statement delayed or denied Woodson any treatment. Woodson 

was promptly referred to an orthopedic specialist, who reviewed the X-rays himself on 

June 5, 2014, and found that “in my opinion these [X-rays] showed a fracture.” (See ECF 

No. 48-5, at 2.) The surgeon then recommended surgery. (Id.) 

 Indeed, Woodson does not dispute Dr. Kim’s declaration that he had no “role in 

scheduling [Woodson’s] off-site surgery . . . or control over the schedules or actions of offsite medical providers.” (Kim Decl., ECF No. 48-7, at 2.) And Dr. Kim’s undisputed 

actions suggest anything but indifference. Dr. Kim personally saw Woodson only once, on 

June 6, 2014, after his first surgical consultation. Although Woodson already had a splint 

and pain medication—and apparently without any request from the primary care physician 

Dr. Stepke—Dr. Kim ordered that Woodson receive limited duty status, a bottom-bunk 

permit, and a “No left hand use” accommodation. (See id.) Plus, he marked these orders 

“Time Sensitive” to ensure they were put into effect quickly. (Id.) Nothing suggests 

Dr. Kim was deliberately indifferent. 

C. Qualified Immunity 

As discussed above, in the light most favorable to Woodson, he could sustain his 

deliberate-indifference case against only one defendant—Ortiz—for her alleged five-day 

delay in treating him. But the analysis doesn’t end there; Ortiz may be immune from suit. 

“Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability 

unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at 

the time of the challenged conduct.” Taylor v. Barkes, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 

(2015) (citation omitted). “To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear that 

every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” 

Id. (citation omitted). The plaintiff need not have “a case directly on point” to obtain relief, 

but existing Supreme Court precedent or a “robust consensus of cases of persuasive 

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authority” must “have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id.

(citations omitted). 

 The treatment-delay case law in the Ninth Circuit is, at best, mixed. Many courts 

have found no deliberate indifference for delays that were similar or longer than the one 

here. See, e.g., Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998) (“alleged delays in 

administering [plaintiff’s] pain medication, in treating his broken nose, and in providing 

him with a replacement crutch” were not deliberate indifference); Wood v. Housewright, 

900 F.2d 1332, 1333. 1335 (9th Cir. 1990) (“several days” of delay after inmate “broke 

one of the pins in his shoulder” was not deliberate indifference); Carr v. Cal. Dep’t of 

Corr., No. 14-cv-02074-LJO-BAM (PC), 2016 WL 6648639, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 

2016) (23-day delay in “receiving pain medication and treatment for a broken rib” was not 

deliberate indifference); Lambert v. Soto, No. 10cv1976-AJB (BLM), 2012 WL 5878503, 

at *5-6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2012) (16-day delay in treating plaintiff’s “swelling and 

bleeding,” “serious injuries to [plaintiff’s] back,” “difficulty breathing,” “a dislocated 

shoulder,” and an inability “to bear any weight on his leg due to a severe knee sprain” was 

not deliberate indifference); Cammon v. Washington Cty. Jail, No. 12-cv-00339-MO, 2012 

WL 1758622, at *2 (D. Or. May 15, 2012) (three-and-a-half-day delay until first 

examination of broken thumb was not deliberate indifference); cf. Mayfield v. Craven, 433 

F.2d 873, 874 (9th Cir. 1970) (11-day delay before surgery on “serious facial bone 

fractures” was not deliberate indifference). Also, Woodson’s access to prescribed 

painkillers—at a minimum, Naproxen (ECF No. 48-4, at 28, 33-34;see also id. at 24, 26)—

weighs against a deliberate-indifference finding. See, e.g., Martin v. Hedgpeth, No. C 12-

3771 YGR (PR), 2014 WL 4756597, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2014) (5-day and 11-day 

delays for broken hand were not deliberate indifference, when plaintiff “had been 

prescribed ibuprofen and Tramadol for the pain”). 

 On the other hand, courts within our Circuit have also held such delays created a 

triable issue of fact, especially when the delay caused lasting damage. See, e.g., Jett v. 

Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1094-95, 1097 (9th Cir. 2006) (nearly 2-month wait for a doctor 

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and 19-month delay before seeing a hand specialist, as well as the complete failure to set 

and cast the inmate’s badly-fractured thumb, during which it “healed improperly,” created 

a triable issue on deliberate indifference); Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200-01 

(9th Cir. 1989) (“delay of more than three months” before offering dental care to repair 

plaintiff’s “bleeding gums, breaking teeth and . . . inability to eat properly,” resulting in 

“severe pain and . . . permanent damage to his teeth,” created a triable issue on deliberate 

indifference); Schafer v. Curry, No. 08-1881 RMW (PR), 2009 WL 1562957, at *9 (N.D. 

Cal. June 3, 2009) (seven-day delay in treating broken foot); cf. Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 

622 F.2d 458, 459-60 (9th Cir. 1980) (six-day delay after hepatitis diagnosis with “no 

medical care” may or may not support deliberate-indifference claim, depending on 

additional facts; case remanded “with instructions that [plaintiff] be given an opportunity 

to amend his complaint”). 

 Looking to the appellate courts outside the Ninth Circuit provides no clearer answer. 

Compare, e.g., Bruederle v. Louisville Metro Gov’t, 687 F.3d 771, 778-79 (6th Cir. 2012) 

(collecting cases for the proposition that “an inmate who complains that delay in medical 

treatment rose to a constitutional violation must place verifying medical evidence in the 

record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay” to succeed on a deliberateindifference claim); Johnson v. Hamilton, 452 F.3d 967, 973 (8th Cir. 2006) (one-month 

delay in treating a broken finger not deliberate indifference); with Smith v. Knox Cty. Jail, 

666 F.3d 1037 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[e]ven a few days’ delay in addressing a severely painful 

but readily treatable condition suffices”); Hunt v. Sandhir, M.D., 295 F. App’x 584, 586 

(4th Cir. 2008) (nine-day delay coupled with other allegations of neglect concerning a 

broken elbow sufficient to state claim for deliberate indifference); Farrow v. West, 320 

F.3d 1235, 1247 (11th Cir. 2003) (“a few hours’ delay in receiving medical care for 

emergency needs such as broken bones . . . may constitute deliberate indifference”). 

In sum, the courts have no “robust consensus” that the five-day delay here—which 

caused no lasting damage—so obviously violated the Constitution that the issue is “beyond 

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debate.” See Taylor, 135 S. Ct. at 2044. Thus, Ortiz has qualified immunity and, like the 

other defendants, merits summary judgment. 

CONCLUSION 

Woodson’s complaint boils down to only one triable claim of deliberate 

indifference: that nurse Ortiz waited five days before treating him, though it caused no 

permanent damage. But she has qualified immunity on that claim. Thus, the Court 

recommends that defendants’ motion for summary judgment be GRANTED. 

Upon being served with a copy of this report, the parties have 14 days to file any 

objections to it. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Upon being served with any objections, the 

party receiving them has 14 days to file any response. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 

Dated: January 21, 2018 

Case 3:15-cv-01285-WQH-AGS Document 58 Filed 01/21/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of

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