Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02558/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02558-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John Henry Gonzales,

Petitioner

-vsEdward Bartos, et al.,

Respondent(s)

CV-06-2558-PHX-EHC (JI)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

On Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Florence,

Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on October

26, 2006 (#1), and supplemented the record on November 6, 2006 (#5), December 22, 2006

(#16) and on March 9, 2007 (#32). On February 15, 2007 Respondents filed their Answer

(#30), and supplemented it on March 17, 2008 (#54 and 55). Petitioner filed a reply on

March 19, 2007 (#33) and supplemented it on March 26, 2007 (#34), May 11, 2007 (#42),

April 7, 2008 (#61) and July 14, 2008 (#62).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned

makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule

8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Trial Proceedings - On March 10, 1999, Petitioner was indicted on two counts of

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1

 Exhibits to the Answer (#30) and Supplemental Answer (#54) are referenced herein

as “Exhibit ___.” Corrected Exhibits H and L are attached to the Notice of Refiling (#55).

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molestation of a child. (Exhibit B, Indictment.)1 Petitioner eventually entered into a written

Plea Agreement (Exhibit C), and pled guilty to two counts of attempted child molestation.

Sentence was suspended and Petitioner was placed on lifetime probation on both counts, and

ordered to serve 12 months jail time as a condition of probation on one of the counts.

(Exhibit D, Order 11/30/99.) 

Probation Revocation - On September 27, 2004, a Petition to Revoke Probation was

submitted, alleging that Petitioner had failed to report to the probation office, failed to obtain

approval to relocate, failed to abide by the sex offender special conditions of probation, etc.

(Supplement #5 at 35, Exhibits, Petition 11/17/04.) Petitioner was apprehended, and

appeared with counsel on October 7, 2004 for a revocation hearing. Counsel cross-examined

Erick Marmont, the probation officer who appeared on behalf of the prosecution, and

questioned him about the failure of Petitioner’s assigned probation officer, Dora Gomez, to

appear and about contacts between Petitioner and Gomez. (Exhibit E, R.T. 10/7/04 at 10-15.)

The probation officer testified on the basis of the probation department’s file that Petitioner

had failed to report after October, 2003. (Id. at 20.) The trial court found that Petitioner

violated the conditions of probation by failing to report. (Id. at 38.)

Petitioner appeared for sentencing on November 5, 2004, and was sentenced to a

mitigated term of eight years on count one, and reinstated on lifetime probation as to count

two. (Exhibit #, R.T. 11/5/04 at 71-72.)

B. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal challenging the revocation of his probation, and

counsel filed an Opening Brief (Exhibit F) pursuant to Anders v. California, and related state

authorities, asserting an inability to divine a basis for appeal, but noting that Petitioner

wished to raise the following issues:

1. Defense counsel was ineffective because he failed to present

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evidence that the defendant was on Interstate Compact in

California for five years.

2. Defendant’s Federal Constitutional rights were violated.

3. The judge illegally changed the charges on November 5, 2004.

4. Blakely v. Washington was violated.

5. Laws were illegally applied retroactively to defendant.

6. Defendant’s probation should not have been violated because he

committed no new crime.

7. The basis for the probation violation was a clerical error of the

probation officer.

8. Double Jeopardy was violated when the defendant’s probation

was revoked.

9. Insufficient evidence was presented to prove the probation

violation.

10. The constitutional right to confront Dora Gomez was violated.

11. The right to a fair hearing was violated.

12. Unreliable hearsay was improperly admitted.

(Exhibit F at 5-6.)

Petitioner filed a Supplemental Brief in propria persona (Exhibit G), arguing that: (1)

the states’ witness at the revocation hearing (probation officer Eric Marmont) was not his

probation officer; (2) Marmont testified to unreliable hearsay concerning Petitioner’s

residence; (3) Marmont had a meeting with Petitioner without notifying defense counsel; (4)

Petitioner’s probation officer, Gomez, did not testify; and (5) not all documents from the

probation department were disclosed. (Exhibit G at 6-7.) Petitioner also argued that his

appellate counsel was a member of the same public defender firm as revocation counsel, and

thus had a conflict of interest, and had failed to provide Petitioner with copies of the record

and rules. (Id. at 9.) Petitioner further argued that the Court of Appeals had failed to respond

to his request for records. (Id.)

According to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Petitioner also argued that “the probation

office acted with malice, falsified documents, and is manipulating state and federal laws.”

(Exhibit H, Mem. Dec. 5/10/05 at 4.) These arguments, as well as his claims that the

probation officer was unreliable, were found to be unsupported. (Id. at 4-5.) The appellate

court summarily rejected the remainder of Petitioner’s claims, including those noted by

counsel.

Petitioner did not seek further review. (Exhibit I, Order & Mandate 6/28/05.)

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C. PROCEEDINGS ON FIRST POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On January 25, 2005, during the pendency of his direct appeal, Petitioner filed a pro

per Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit J). Counsel moved to dismiss the proceeding

without prejudice, in light of the then pending direct appeal. (Exhibit K.) That motion was

granted, and the proceeding was dismissed. (Exhibit L, M.E. 4/26/05.) 

D. PROCEEDINGS ON SECOND POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Before PCR Court - After conclusion of his direct appeal, Petitioner filed a Notice

of Post Conviction Relief dated July 7, 2005 (Exhibit M). Counsel was appointed (Exhibit

N, M.E. 7/15/05), who filed a Notice of Completion of Post Conviction Review (Exhibit O),

asserting an inability to find an issue for review. The trial court ordered counsel to remain

in an advisory capacity, and gave Petitioner 45 days to file a Pro Per Petition. (Exhibit P,

M.E. 8/29/5.)

Petitioner filed his Pro Per Supplement to Petition (Exhibit Q), arguing that:

(1) the plea agreement stipulated to a one year jail term, and his sentence was a

violation of that agreement;

(2) the probation officer made false allegations, and mailed them to Petitioner at

a wrong address, depriving Petitioner of his Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth

Amendment rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard;

(3) probation officer Gomez’ failure to appear at his revocation hearing deprived

Petitioner of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, as well his state

constitutional rights of confrontation;

(4) probation officer Marmont’s interview of Petitioner after his arrest, and after

appointment of counsel, was a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to

counsel; and

(5) probation officer Marmont’s failure to disclose documentation in the probation

file was a violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due

process, and his federal rights to disclosure of exculpating evidence.

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2

 The PCR Court’s minute order (Exhibit T) identified the reply as having been

labeled as “Defendant’s Pro Per Supplement to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.” This

appears to be a misnomer by the PCR court. That court’s docket reflects that the only filing

by Petitioner between the response to the petition and the order dismissing it was a motion

identified as “Form, Content and Right of Reply.” (Exhibit EE.) 

3

 The record offers no explanation why the PCR court found that the claims were

previously argued on direct appeal when the state was arguing that they were precluded

because they had not been raised on direct appeal. 

4

 Petitioner apparently improperly submitted his petition for review directly to the

Arizona Supreme Court, which forwarded it to the Arizona Court of Appeals with a letter

dated May 2, 2006. (Reply, #33, Exhibit A.)

5

 On April 20, 2007, the Arizona Court of Appeals entered a second Order denying

review of this petition. (Petitioner’s Supplemental Exhibits #42, Order in CA-CR 06-0307.)

That Order was vacated by an Order entered August 24, 2007 (Exhibit GG), which

acknowledged the April 19, 2006 dismissal order, and found that the April 20, 2007 order

was entered “inadvertently.” 

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The state responded (Exhibit R), arguing that Petitioner’s claims were precluded by

his failure to raise them on direct appeal. Petitioner filed a reply, entitled “Motion: Form,

Content and Right of Reply.”2

 

The PCR court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the claims raised by

Petitioner were “identical to those claims raised by the Defendant in his direct appeal.” 3

(Exhibit T, M.E. 12/8/5.) Thus, the court determined that the claims had “been previously

litigated and therefore are precluded.” (Id.)

On Petition for Review - On April 3, 2006, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review

with the Arizona Court of Appeals (Exhibit U1), arguing Petitioner was denied his right of

confrontation when probation officer Gomez refused to appear at the revocation hearing.4

That Petition was dismissed as untimely. (Exhibit V, Order 4/19/06.)5

Petitioner then sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court (Exhibit W), which was

summarily denied on October 12, 2006 (Exhibit X). 

/ /

/ /

/ /

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E. PROCEEDINGS ON THIRD POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Before PCR Court - On February 28, 2006 (prior to filing his petition for review on

his second PCR petition), Petitioner filed his third Petition for Post Conviction Relief

(Exhibit Y). Petitioner again argued that his confrontation rights were denied, and he was

denied his right to counsel when interviewed by the probation officer.

The PCR court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the petition was

untimely, and the claims were precluded because they either were or should have been raised

on direct appeal. (Exhibit Z M.E. 4/11/06.) 

Petitioner subsequently filed a Motion to Submit Supplemental (Exhibit AA), which

was denied on the basis of the earlier dismissal of the petition (Exhibit BB, M.E. 5/15/6). 

Before Court of Appeals - Petitioner filed with the Arizona Supreme Court a Petition

for Review (Exhibit CC), arguing the issues presented in his third PCR petition. Although

originally submitted to the Arizona Supreme Court, the petition was ultimately filed with the

Arizona Court of Appeals. (Exhibit DD, Docket.) The petition was summarily denied on

April 26, 2007 (Exhibit GG; Petitioner’s Supplemental Exhibits #42, Order in CA-CR 06-

0444.).

F. HABEAS CORPUS / CORAM NOBIS PROCEEDINGS 

In ruling on Petitioner’s third PCR petition, the PCR court also dismissed a “Motion

to Petition for ‘Habeas Writ’”. (Exhibit Z, M.E. 4/11/06.) The parties have not identified

such a writ, although Respondents speculate that it was not Petitioner’s “Motion for Writ

to Seek Relief Coram Nobis,” discussed below, but some other filing submitted directly to

the judge. (See Supplemental Answer, #54 at 2.)

 On February 28, 2006, at the time of his third PCR petition, Petitioner filed a “Motion

for Writ to Seek Relief Coram Nobis” (Exhibit FF). That motion did not set out any specific

grounds for relief other than “errors of facts on the face of the record.” (Id.) There is no

record of a ruling on this motion, unless it is the “Motion to Petition for ‘Habeas writ’”

referred to by the court in dismissing Petitioner’s third PCR petition. (See Exhibit Z, M.E.

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4/11/06.) 

G. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner instituted the present federal habeas proceeding by filing his

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (#1) on October 26, 2006, during the pendency of his

petition for review on his third PCR petition. Petitioner’s Petition asserts four grounds for

relief:

(1) Right of Confrontation - In Ground 1, Petitioner claims that his Sixth

Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him was violated when his

probation officer did not testify. 

(2) Right to Counsel - In Ground 2, Petitioner alleges a Sixth Amendment

violation because probation officer Marmont contacted Petitioner without

notifying Petitioner’s attorney or getting permission to speak with Petitioner.

(3) Failure to Disclose - In Ground 3, Petitioner alleges that his Fifth Amendment

Due Process rights were violated when the Probation Department did not

disclose its records.

(4) Due Process - In Ground 4, Petitioner alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment

rights were violated by the acts alleged in Grounds 1, 2, and 3.

Supplements - Petitioner filed a Supplement to Petition on October 27, 2006 (#3),

providing the final certification page which had been omitted from the original petition. On

November 6, 2006, Petitioner filed a series of exhibits to his Petition (#5).

On December 22, 2006, Petitioner filed a Motion to Supplement (#16) which was

granted to the extent of allowing Petitioner to supplement the record with the appended

records. (Order 1/16/07, #25.) 

On March 9, 2007, Petitioner filed a Supplement (#32), appending copies of a

transcript page.

Original Answer - Respondents filed their Answer (#30) on February 15, 2007,

arguing that Petitioner failed to exhaust his state remedies, and that his claims are now

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procedurally defaulted.

Reply - Petitioner filed a Reply on March 19, 2007 (#33), arguing:

(1) The fair presentation of his claims in his second PCR proceeding is shown by

the trial court’s ruling that the claims raised by Petitioner were “identical to

those claims raised by the Defendant in his direct appeal.” (See Exhibit T,

M.E. 12/8/5.) 

(2) Having presented his claims on direct appeal, he cannot be faulted for being

untimely in presenting them to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his PCR

proceeding. 

(3) Petitioner’s untimely filing with the Arizona Court of Appeals was caused by

the trial court’s delays in forwarding him notice of the denial of his petition.

(4) Petitioner requested that appellate counsel raise his claims, and the failure to

do so was ineffective assistance of counsel.

(5) Petitioner’s claims are meritorious.

Petitioner again filed a motion to supplement on March 26, 2007 (#34), which was granted.

(Order 5/23/7, # 45.) That supplement argues the merits of Petitioner’s Confrontation

Clause claim. Petitioner then filed a Motion to Supplement on May 11, 2007, seeking to

supplement the record with copies of records relating to Petitioner’s petitions for review on

his state PCR proceedings. That motion was also granted. (Order 9/28/7, #47.) 

Supplemental Answer - On February 14, 2008, the Court noted some discrepancies

in the record, and directed Respondents to supplement the record and provided an

opportunity for the parties to supplement their briefs. In response, on March 17, 2008,

Respondents filed their Supplemental Answer (#54). In that Supplemental Answer,

Respondents acknowledge that Petitioner’s Grounds 1, 2, and 3 were raised in his second

PCR petition, and that in finding the claims procedurally barred, the PCR Court had found

that the claims had been presented on direct appeal. Although disagreeing with that

conclusion, Respondents acknowledge that the state court’s finding is binding, and thus

withdraw their claim that these grounds are procedurally barred, and precluded from habeas

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review. Respondents maintain their argument that Ground 4 is procedurally defaulted.

Respondents also respond to the merits of Ground 1, 2 and 3. They argue that

Ground 1 (Right of Confrontation) is without merit because the Sixth Amendment right of

confrontation does not apply in probation revocation proceedings, and Petitioner has not

based his claim in the Petition upon the conditional right of confrontation under due process.

Finally, Respondents argue that such a due process claim would be without merit because

the testimony presented against Petitioner was reliable hearsay under an applicable

exception. 

With regard to Ground 2 (Right to Counsel), Respondents argue that there is no Sixth

Amendment right to counsel in probation violation proceedings. Further, any such right

would not have accrued at the time of Petitioner’s interview by the probation officer, because

revocation proceedings had not yet been commenced. Finally, any error was harmless

because no statements obtained were used at the hearing.

With regard to Ground 3 (Failure to Disclose), Petitioner’s claim is without merit

because the record reflects that he had access to the disputed computer log, is not entitled to

Brady disclosure and thus was only entitled to evidence used against him which the logs were

not. Even if Brady applied, no violation occurred because the log was ultimately introduced

into evidence, was not exculpatory, and was not material and therefore not prejudicial.

Supplemental Reply - On April 7, 2008, Petitioner filed his Supplemental Reply

(#61) (styled as a “Motion for Petitioner to Submit Answer to Respondents Supplemental

Request”). With regard to Ground 1 (Right of Confrontation), Petitioner argues that he had

a due process right to confront his probation officer, who would have exonerated Petitioner.

He further argues that the hearsay was unreliable because the testifying probation officer had

never met the officer who handled Petitioner’s case. As to Ground 2 (Right to Counsel),

Petitioner argues that not only had the proceedings commenced at the time of his interview,

but counsel had already been appointed.

On July 14, 2008, Petitioner file supplemental exhibits regarding a purported violation

of probation in May, 2000, asserting that no such violation was found.

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6

 It is unclear that harmlessness would defeat Petitioner’s claim if the Confrontation

Clause were found to apply. Cases analyzing due process in revocation proceedings often

refer to the lack of controverting evidence. See e.g. U.S. v. Walker, 117 F.3d 417, 421 (9th

Cir. 1997). However, in applying the Confrontation Clause, the Supreme Court has

identified the proper harmlessness inquiry is the change in the outcome had the evidence

been properly excluded, taking into account such things as other evidence available to

establish the same facts. See e.g. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986). Here,

the only other evidence on Petitioner’s failure to report was his testimony that he had

reported. (See Exhibit G, R.T. 10/7/04 at 22-25, 33-34.) 

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III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. GROUND 1 (RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION)

For Ground 1 of his Petition, Petitioner argues that his Sixth Amendment right of

confrontation was violated when the probation officer, Dora Gomez, who had been handling

Petitioner’s case since his transfer to California and who had filed the revocation petition,

failed to testify against him, and instead another probation officer, Eric Marmont, testified

against him on the basis of Gomez’ file. (Petition, #1 at 5.) 

Respondents concede exhaustion of this claim, and argue that Petitioner had no Sixth

Amendment right to confrontation in these probation revocation proceedings, and Petitioner

has not based his claim in the Petition upon the conditional right of confrontation under due

process. Respondents argue that such a due process claim would be without merit because

the testimony presented against Petitioner was reliable hearsay under an applicable

exception. Finally, Respondents assert that any error was harmless.6

 (Supplemental

Answer, #54 at 8-11.)

Sixth Amendment Right of Confrontation - By its own terms, the Sixth Amendment

applies to “criminal prosecutions.” U.S.Const. Amend. VI. Revocation procedures are not

criminal prosecutions, and thus not subject to the full panoply of rights afforded in such

prosecutions. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972) (parole revocation); Gagnon

v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (probation revocation). Thus, in U.S. v. Hall, 419

F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit held that the purview of the Sixth Amendment did

not extend to a revocation of supervised release. In so doing, they noted that “[p]arole,

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7

 Moreover, the hearsay testimony was used at Petitioner’s revocation proceeding.

Varying the rules on admission of evidence at bifurcated revocation and sentencing

proceedings would not have the same practical difficulties as attempting to vary the right to

counsel in such a situation. 

8

 Respondents devote some energy to arguing the limitations on habeas relief wrought

by the AEDPA, i.e. that relief can only be granted where a state court’s decision was

“contrary to or an unreasonable application of” Supreme Court law or an “unreasonable

determination of the facts.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Here, however, Petitioner’s claims are

deemed exhausted only by the fluke of the trial court’s determination that they had been

presented on direct appeal. Thus there is no reasoned state court decision for this Court to

evaluate. In such instances, this habeas court is ordinarily left to evaluating the claims de

novo and then comparing the state court’s results. See Wilson v. Czerniak, 355 F.3d 1151,

1154 (9th Cir. 2004). However, here there are no state court determinations of any kind on

the merits of the Petitioner’s claims, not even a simple denial. Nonetheless, because the

undersigned finds the claims to be without merit, there is no need to apply the limitations of

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probation and supervised release revocation hearings are constitutionally indistinguishable

and are analyzed in the same manner.” Id. at 985, n. 4. See also Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782,

n. 3 (noting commentators’ agreement of no difference, at least “where sentence has been

imposed previously”). 

While there might be an argument under Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967),

discussed infra, that the combination of the probation proceeding with the completion of the

deferred sentencing subjected Petitioner’s proceeding to the protections of the Sixth

Amendment. However, Mempa dealt only with the right to counsel, and did not extend the

full protections of the Sixth Amendment to such proceedings. Consequently, a contrary

decision would not be “contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C.

§2254(d)(1), and therefore habeas relief would not be allowed. Moreover, the protections

of the Confrontation Clause do not extend to sentencing. Rather, hearsay is admissible at

sentencing, so long as it is “accompanied by some minimal indicia of reliability.” U.S. v.

Littlesun, 444 F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 2006). 7

 

Thus, Petitioner had no Sixth Amendment right of confrontation in his probation

revocation proceedings.8

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§ 2254(d).

9

 The undersigned presumes that the probation office records qualify as nontestimonial hearsay. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 (recognizing business records as type of

hearsay which is non-testimonial). But see U.S. v. Martin, 984 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1993)

(finding denial of due process based upon revocation of supervised release in reliance upon

written results of urinalysis test without testimony of collecting officer or analyst). 

10 Perhaps Petitioner conflates a right of confrontation with the Sixth Amendment

right of compulsory process. To the extent that Petitioner had a right to compel Officer

Gomez to testify, he offers nothing to show that he in fact attempted to obtain such testimony

and was thwarted. The State had no duty to anticipate and call witnesses on Petitioner’s

behalf.

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Even if such a right applied, Respondents argue and Petitioner does not refute, that

insofar as Petitioner’s claim is based solely upon the use of the probation records, that

evidence was subject to a hearsay exception. A non-testimonial hearsay statement is

admissible if it falls within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception.” Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S.

805, 816 (1990); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).9

Insofar as Petitioner simply complains that Officer Gomez did not testify, Petitioner

fails to make out a violation. “The Confrontation Clause provides two types of protections

for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face those who testify against him, and the

right to conduct cross-examination.” Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987).

Beyond the extent to which her records were relied upon by Officer Marmont, Officer

Gomez did not testify against Petitioner. Accordingly, no right of physical confrontation and

cross-examination attached.10

No Due Process Claim Properly Raised - A probationer is not without protections

with regard to confrontation. The Due Process Clause provides “the right to confront and

cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for

not allowing confrontation).” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489. Respondents argue that

Petitioner’s Petition did not assert such a claim. However, as pointed out in his Reply (#33),

Petitioner asserted in Ground 4 of the Petition that his due process rights were violated based

upon the facts presented in Ground 1. 

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11 Because it does not affect the outcome, the undersigned presumes that Mempa

cannot be distinguished on the basis that Petitioner’s actual hearings on the sentencing and

revocation were eventually bifurcated and heard on separate dates. Allowing such a

distinction could make the existence of a right to counsel depend upon after-the-fact vagaries

of court scheduling, and likely render the protections for the later sentencing meaningless.

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Still, as discussed hereinafter, the due process claims raised in Ground 4 are

unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. Accordingly, this Court cannot, and the

undersigned will not, address the merits of a claim based upon a due process right of

confrontation.

B. GROUND 2 (RIGHT TO COUNSEL)

In his Ground 2, Petitioner argues that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated

because, on September 25, 2004, nine days after his arraignment and appointment of counsel,

probation officer Marmont interviewed Petitioner without notifying Petitioner’s attorney or

getting permission to speak with Petitioner. (Petition, #1 at 6.) 

Respondents argue that there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in probation

violation proceedings. Further, any such right would not have accrued at the time of

Petitioner’s interview by the probation officer, because revocation proceedings had not yet

been commenced. Finally, any error was harmless because no statements obtained were used

at the hearing. (Supplemental Answer, #54 at 11-12.)

As discussed above in connection with Ground 1, the protections of the Sixth

Amendment generally do not extend to Petitioner in his probation revocation proceedings.

However, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends to all “critical stages” of a criminal

prosecution. In Mempa v. Rhay, the Supreme Court “concluded that the imposition of the

‘deferred’ sentence after probation was revoked triggered the Sixth Amendment because

sentencing is a ‘stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused

may be affected.’” U.S. v. Stocks, 104 F.3d 308, 311 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Mempa, 389

U.S. 128, 134 (1967)). Thus, the Court held that “the defendant-probationer had a Sixth

Amendment right to counsel at the combined probation revocation and sentencing hearing.”11

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Id. Here, the court had “suspend[ed] imposition of sentence and plac[ed] the Defendant on

probation.” (Exhibit D, Order 11/30/99.) Accordingly, Petitioner had a Sixth Amendment

right to counsel in the subsequent combined revocation and sentencing proceedings. 

Further, contrary to Respondents’ assertion, the proceedings had already commenced

at the time his probation officer interviewed him in violation of his right to counsel. 

 Q [Defense counsel] Does your file reflect the date that you

met with Mr. Gonzales?

A [Probation Officer Eric Marmont] Yes.

Q What was that date?

A The date that the new petition was submitted, that would be,

September 25th.

Q You met with him on September 25th?

A Yeah. It was a Tuesday of that week.

Q And, at that point, this witness violation hearing had

already been set, is that correct?

A No, it had not.

Q No, I think if you check your file, you'll see that it was set

September 16, 2004.

A I was not aware of that.

Q Okay. Were you aware that Mr. Gonzales was represented

by counsel on September 25th?

A No.

Q Did you notify counsel that you were going to contact his

client?

A No.

Q I'm sorry?

A No.

Q Do you see anything wrong with that, Mr. Marmont?

A No.

(Exhibit E, R.T. 10/7/04 at 9.) Indeed, the record reflects that Petitioner had been arraigned

on September 16, 2004, and was represented by counsel at least from that time. (Suppl. Pet,

#5, Exhibits, M.E. 9/16/04.) It is true that a “person's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right

to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been

initiated against him,” but it is also clear that at the least “the right attaches at the time of

arraignment.” Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972). 

This Court has held that the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth

Amendment applies at the first appearance before a judicial officer at

which a defendant is told of the formal accusation against him and

restrictions are imposed on his liberty. 

Rothgery v. Gillespie County, Tex., - - - S.Ct. - - -, 2008 WL 2484864, 3 (June 23, 2008)

(citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398-399 (1977); and Michigan v. Jackson, 475

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U.S. 625, 629, n. 3 (1986)).

 Officer Marmont interviewed petitioner nine days after his arraignment and

appointment of counsel, and did so in violation of Petitioner’s right to counsel.

However, Respondents are correct in noting that claims of denial of counsel are

subject to harmless error analysis. Although, in cases of a complete denial of counsel,

harmless error analysis does not apply, where the denial is limited to a discrete portion of the

proceeding, the analysis does apply. Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 257-258 (1988).

Under such analysis, “if the prosecution can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a

constitutional error did not contribute to the verdict, the error is harmless and the verdict may

stand.” Id. at 256. Here, Respondents argue that the prosecution did not rely upon or offer

any statements made by Petitioner during his interview with Officer Marmont. (Supp. Ans,

#54 at 12.) Petitioner does not respond to this argument, and the undersigned finds nothing

in the record to suggest that any information obtained from Petitioner by Officer Marmont

was used against Petitioner. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Respondents have met

their burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the denial of Petitioner’s right to

counsel by Officer Marmont was harmless.

Accordingly, Petitioner’s Ground 2, based upon a denial of counsel, is without merit.

And, as with Ground 1, any assertion of a due process right to counsel asserted in Ground

4 is procedurally defaulted.

C. GROUND 3 (FAILURE TO DISCLOSE)

In Ground 3, Petitioner alleges that his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights were

violated when the Probation Department did not disclose records, including: (1) the

computerized log of contacts with probationers (Exhibit E, R.T. 10/7/04 at 15); and (2) an

interstate agreement and various probation documents, all of which he identifies as being

filed with the court. (Petition, #1 at 7.)

Respondents argue that this claim is without merit because the record reflects that

Petitioner had access to the disputed computer log and the other documents were public

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12 As with Ground 1 (Confrontation) there might be an argument under Mempa v.

Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), discussed supra, that the combination of the probation

proceeding with the completion of the deferred sentencing subjected Petitioner’s proceeding

to the protections of the Sixth Amendment. However, Mempa dealt only with the right to

counsel, and did not extend the full protections applicable in criminal prosecutions to such

proceedings. Consequently, a contrary decision would not be “contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1), and therefore habeas relief would not

be allowed. However, unlike the right of confrontation, the right of disclosure extends to

the sentencing phase, and requires disclosure of evidence “material either to guilt or

punishment.” U.S. v. Nagra, 147 F.3d 875, 881 (9th Cir. 1998). On the other hand, like the

right of confrontation, it would be practicable to differentiate between disclosure based on

whether the evidence related to the revocation phase or the completion of deferred sentencing

phase.

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record, he was not entitled to Brady disclosure and thus was only entitled to evidence used

against him, which the logs were not. Even if Brady applied, no violation occurred because

the log was ultimately introduced into evidence, was not exculpatory, and was not material

and therefore not prejudicial. (Supp. Ans. #54 at 13-16.)

In his original Reply, Petitioner simply argues that he had a due process right to

disclosure. (#33 at 11.) He does not directly address this claim in his Supplemental Reply

(#61).

No Right to Brady Disclosure - In Brady v. Maryland, the Court held that “the

suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due

process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the

good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). However, as noted above,

probation revocation proceedings are not criminal prosecutions, and thus are not subject to

the strictures of Brady. See Welcoming Brady to Probation Proceedings, 16 No. 7 Crim.

Prac. Rep. 5 (2002) (discussing limited case law on application of Brady in probation

proceedings but noting Ninth Circuit authorities to the contrary).12

No Violation of Limited Right to Disclsoure under Morrissey - Again, however,

a probationer is not without protections. Although the requirement of disclosure of

exculpatory evidence in Brady does not apply, the Court in Morrissey held that due process

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required “disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him.” 408 U.S. at 489. Here,

however, Petitioner does not complain of a failure to disclose evidence used against him.

With regard to the prior probation petitions for modification, the petitions would have

been public record, easily accessible to Petitioner through his counsel. Similarly, the

interstate compacts for supervision of probations would have been a matter of public record,

and are codified in Arizona by statute. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-467, et seq. (Interstate

Compact on Supervision of Adult Offenders). Accordingly, there was no obligation on the

part of the prosecution to disclose those records. See U.S. v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 764 (9th

Cir. 1991) (applying Brady). 

The only non-public information introduced at trial was the computer log of phone

contacts. Petitioner argues that the “State did provide as evidence one record of one phone

message.” (Supp. Reply, #61 at 14.) However, those records were not introduced by the

state against Petitioner, but by his own counsel. 

BY MR. SCANLAN [defense counsel]:

Q. The question is, aren’t all contacts of Mr. Gonzales to the

probation department, particularly to Dora Gomez, relevant?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you have the computerized log of all of the contacts with Mr.

Gonzales with you - - 

A. Yes.

Q. - - now on the stand?

A. Yes.

Q. May I see ‘em?

Q. I’m looking at the third entry date March 24 of 2004. That was

entered by Dora Gomez, is that correct?

A. That’s correct.

 (Exhibit E, R.T. 10/7/04 at 17-18.) Like Petitioner, the probationer in U.S. v. Donaghe, 924

F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1991), complained that the government had not disclosed portions of its

file. The court concluded:

The only use of these records occurred on cross-examination, when

defense counsel asked questions of the probation officer that required

him to refer to these records. We have held that failure to allow a

probationer to view his probation file prior to a revocation hearing

violates neither Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.1(a)(2)(B) nor due process if the

government does not use it as evidence against the probationer. In this

case, such evidence was not used by the government against appellant.

Donaghe, 924 F.2d at 944 (citations omitted). See also U.S. v. Guardino, 972 F.2d 682, 689

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13 Moreover, counsel had obtained the records by the time of hearing, and made use

of them. Even under Brady, disclosure prior to trial is not required, there being no violation

if disclosure is made at a time when the documents are “still of substantial value at trial.”

U.S. v. Gordon, 844 F.2d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir. 1988). Petitioner makes no suggestion what

additional use might have been made from an earlier disclosure.

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(6th Cir. 1992) (government required “to disclose such evidence only if it was actually used

against the probationer”).13

Petitioner argues in his Reply that his right to a fair trial was violated when the state

withheld “evidence that could prove innocence.” (Reply, #33 at 11.) “Essentially, [the

probationer’s] argument attempts to equate evidence that might be useful to the defense with

evidence that actually was used by the Government in making its case. Morrissey requires

disclosure of the second category, but not the first.” U.S. v. Neal, 512 F.3d 427, 436 (7th Cir.

2008).

Having failed to point to any evidence used against him by the state which was not

disclosed or otherwise available to him, Petitioner’s Ground 3 is without merit.

D. GROUND 4 (DUE PROCESS) AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

In his Ground 4, Petitioner alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due

process were violated by the acts alleged in Grounds 1, 2, and 3. (Petition, #1 at 8.)

Respondents characterize this as a claim that the errors in Ground 1 through 3 “combined”

to deny him due process, and that this “precise” claim was not presented to the state courts,

is unexhausted, and procedurally defaulted. (Answer, #30 at 18.) 

1. Nature of Ground 4

Respondents characterize Ground 4 as asserting a claim of cumulative error. This

Court, however, is required to liberally construe Petitioner’s pro se Petition. Zichko v. Idaho,

247 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2001). With or without such a liberal construction, the undersigned

understands Petitioner’s Ground 4 to assert 3 separate violations of due process, not a single

claim of cumulative error. Petitioner makes no reference to “cumulative error,” and

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14 To the extent that Ground 4 could be read as asserting a claim of cumulative error,

it would be unexhausted, as Petitioner never asserted a claim of cumulative error to the state

courts.

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individually lists the “issues” in Grounds 1 through 3 as the source of the due process

violation. (Petition, #1 at 8.) In that regard, the re-assertion of Ground 3 (Failure to

Disclose), would be duplicative inasmuch as that claim is already based on due process

grounds.14

2. Exhaustion, Procedural Default, and Procedural Bar

Exhaustion - Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s

claims only if available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S.

1, 3 (1981) (per curiam); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the

burden is on the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright

v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023

(1982).

Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must first

raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir.

1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before bringing a habeas

petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 1211

(9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S.

1059 (1989). “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, ‘claims of Arizona

state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of

Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir.

2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.1999)).

To result in exhaustion, claims must not only be presented in the proper forum, but

must be "fairly presented." That is, the petitioner must provide the state courts with a "fair

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opportunity" to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional

claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276-277 (1971). A claim has

been fairly presented to the state's highest court if the petitioner has described both the

operative facts and the federal legal theory on which the claim is based. Kelly v. Small, 315

F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003) (overruled on other grounds by Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d

1143 (9th cir. 2007)).

Procedural Default - Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice.

Johnson v. Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed

to properly exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are

now no longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally

defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice of

a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper absent a “miscarriage of justice”

which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). 

Procedural Bar - Federal habeas review of a federal claim is also precluded for

procedurally barred claims, i.e. those which have actually been presented to the state court,

but were disposed of on a procedural ground "that is both 'independent' of the merits of the

federal claim and an 'adequate' basis for the court's decision." Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255,

260 (1989); Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 580 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991)). But see, Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002)

(“assum[ing]” independence standard applies on habeas). “Once the state has adequately pled

the existence of an independent and adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative

defense, the burden to place that defense in issue shifts to the petitioner.” Bennett v. Mueller,

322 F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir.2003). 

3. Presentation of Claims

If Petitioner were to have properly presented his state claims, it must have been in his

direct appeal. His first PCR proceedings were voluntarily dismissed at the trial court, his

second PCR proceedings were dismissed by the Arizona Court of Appeals on the basis that

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his Petition for Review was untimely (Exhibit V), and his third PCR proceedings were

dismissed as procedurally barred, both under Arizona’s timeliness rules, and under its

preclusion bar. 

Petitioner makes no argument that the procedural bars applied in his second and third

PCR proceedings are not independent and adequate state grounds. Accordingly, to the extent

that his claims may have been raised in those proceedings, federal review would be

precluded. Harris, 489 U.S. at 260.

Ground 1 - With regard to Ground 1 (Right of Confrontation), Petitioner never

presented this claim as a violation of due process. In his counsel’s Opening Brief on direct

appeal, he simply argued that his “constitutional right to confront Dora Gomez was violated.”

(Exhibit F at 5.) In his Supplemental Brief, Petitioner simply argued that officer Marmont

testified to hearsay which was not reliable, and that officer Gomez did not testify. (Exhibit

G at 6.) No reference to a federal right to due process was made in connection with those

claims.

In his Petition for Review on his second PCR petition, Petitioner cited only the Sixth

Amendment, and the only federal case he cited was Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,

42 (2004), which was squarely based on the “Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause.” 

Neither of the state cases he cited discuss a due process right of confrontation. See Mannel

v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona, 42 Ariz. 153, 155, 688 P.2d 1045, 1047 (App.1984) (no

reference to due process or right of confrontation); and State v. Correll,148 Ariz. 468, 472,

715 P.2d 721, 725 (1986) (applying Sixth Amendment to hearing on competency to stand

trial). (See Exhibit U1, Pet. Rev. at 3-4; and Exhibit U2, Supp. Pet. Rev. at 4-6.) 

Petitioner’s only reference to a denial of his right to due process under the 14th Amendment

was his argument that the notices of violation were inadeqately addressed, thus depriving him

of “adequate notice of accusation.” (Exhibit U2, Supp. Pet. Rev. at 2-3.)

Again, when arguing the confrontation claim to the Arizona Supreme Court,

Petitioner relied solely on the Sixth Amendment and related authorities. (Exhibit W, Pet.

Rev. at 3-4.) Petitioner added citations to two Arizona cases, neither of which discussed

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federal due process claims. See State v. Fleming, 117 Ariz. 122, 125, 571 P.2d 268, 271

(1977) (Sixth Amendment discussed); and State v. Altman, 107 Ariz. 93, 95, 482 P.2d 460,

462 (1971) (discussing confrontation right under State v. Narten, 99 Ariz. 116, 407 P.2d 81

(1965), a Sixth Amendment case).

In his Petition for Review on his third PCR petition, Petitioner again argued only that

the denial of his right of confrontation was a violation of his state and Sixth Amendment

rights. (Exhibit CC Opening Brief at 9.) He added citations to various additional cases, none

of which establish a due process claim based on a right of confrontation. (Id. at 4-5.) See

Mannel v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona, 142 Ariz. 153, 688 P.2d 1045 (App. 1984)

(worker’s compensation case); State v. Correll, 148 Ariz. 468, 715 P.2d 721 (1986) (Sixth

Amendment confrontation case); and California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (same).

Ground 2 - With regard to Ground 2 (Denial of Counsel), Petitioner argued in the

factual background of his Supplemental Brief on direct appeal that Officer Marmont had met

with him without counsel’s permission. (Exhibit G, Supp. Brief at 5.) He did not, however,

assert that this was a violation of due process or any other constitutional provision.

In his Pro per Supplement to his First PCR Petition he did explicitly argue the denial

of counsel, but argued only that it was a violation of “the United States Constitutional [sic]

the 6th Amendment the Right to Assistance of Counsel [and] the Arizona Constitutional

Rights Art 2 Sec § [sic] 24 the right to defend by counsel.” (Exhibit Q, Suppl. PCR Pet. at

7.) Petitioner did not, however, assert that the denial of counsel was a due process violation.

Moreover, Petitioner did not even repeat his 6th Amendment denial of counsel claim to the

Arizona Court of Appeals (see Exhibit U1, Petition). In his Petition for Review on his third

PCR petition, Petitioner again argued only that the denial of counsel was a violation of his

state and Sixth Amendment rights. (Exhibit CC Opening Brief at 9.)

Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Petitioner never presented to the state courts

those portions of the due process claim in Ground 4 founded upon the facts of Grounds 1

(Confrontation) and 2 (Counsel). Accordingly, these claims are unexhausted. 

/ /

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4. Procedural Default of Unexhausted Claims

Respondents correctly assert that Petitioner’s unexhausted claims are now

procedurally defaulted. 

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a direct

appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. The Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure do not provide for a successive direct appeal. See generally

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31. Accordingly, direct appeal is no longer available for Petitioner’s

unexhausted claims. 

Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief - Petitioner can no longer seek review of his due

process issues by way of a subsequent PCR Petition. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that

petitions for post-conviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed “within

ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance

of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See State v. Pruett,

185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive petition, and noting

that first petition of pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for purposes of the rule). That

time has also long since passed.

While Rule 32.4(a) does not bar dilatory claims if they fall within the category of

claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h), Petitioner has not asserted that any

of these exceptions are applicable to him. Nor does it appears that such exceptions in Rule

32.1 would apply to Petitioner. The rule defines the excepted claims as follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence imposed has

expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such facts

probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing the newly

discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not merely cumulative or

used solely for impeachment, unless the impeachment evidence

substantially undermines testimony which was of critical significance

at trial such that the evidence probably would have changed the verdict

or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction relief ofright or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was without fault on

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15 Moreover, it is likely that Petitioner’s claims are barred under Arizona’s rules of

preclusion. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a). Because of the limited development of Arizona law

on the exception for claims of “sufficient constitutional magnitude,” see Stewart v. Smith,

536 U.S. 856 (2002), and the applicability of other clear procedural bars, the undersigned

does not reach Respondents’ argument on the preclusion bar.

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the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if determined to

apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the defendant's

conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that

the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish that no

reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant guilty of the

underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the court would

not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

 Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Petitioner has

asserted no"newly discovered evidence" and therefore paragraph (e) has no application.

Paragraph (f) has no application where the petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal, and the

notice of post-conviction relief of-right applies only to petitions filed following a guilty or

nolo contendre plea. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 (defining when petition of-right). See also

Moreno v. Gonzalez, 192 Ariz. 131, 962 P.2d 205 (1998) (on certified question holding that

“notice of appeal” in 32.1(f) is direct appeal only, and not appeal from denial of postconviction relief). Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a

change in the law occurring since his last state PCR petition. Finally, paragraph (h) has no

application because Petitioner’s claims do not assert his actual innocence. Accordingly, the

undersigned must conclude that review through Arizona’s post-conviction relief process is

no longer possible.15

4. Cause and Prejudice

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain federal

habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient to excuse

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16 Petitioner also argued in his original Reply that any failure to exhaust as a result

of his untimely petition for review in his PCR proceedings should be excused because his

claims were presented on direct appeal. To the extent that the Respondents and the

undersigned have relied upon the PCR court’s determination that his claims were raised on

direct appeal, Petitioner’s argument is moot. 

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the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). Petitioner argues in his Reply that his

failure to exhaust should be attributed to the trial court’s delays in sending him notice of the

denial of his petition; and the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.16 

Petitioner’s argument that his Petition for Review on his second PCR proceeding was

delinquent would be compelling, if he had, in fact raised his procedurally defaulted claims

in that petition for review. As discussed above, however, he did not. Thus, any delay in

notice by the trial court cannot be said to have prevented him from presenting his

procedurally defaulted claims.

Petitioner cannot now assert any ineffective assistance of counsel as cause for a

procedural default. Ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute cause for failing to

properly exhaust claims in state courts and excuse procedural default. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149

F.3d 923, 932, (9th Cir. 1998). However, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

showing "cause" is itself subject to the exhaustion requirements. Murray v. Carrier, 477

U.S. 478, 492 (1986); Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000). Accordingly, "[t]o the

extent that petitioner is alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as cause for the

default, the exhaustion doctrine requires him to first raise this ineffectiveness claim as a

separate claim in state court." Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988).

Petitioner did not assert such a claim of ineffective assistance. His only attack on

appellate counsel was the claim in his Supplemental Brief on direct appeal that appellate

counsel had a conflict of interest. (Exhibit G at 9.)

Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned finds no “cause” to excuse Petitioner’s

procedural default or the effect of the state’s procedural bar.

/ /

/ /

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5. Actual Innocence

The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion intended to be flexible and

yielding to exceptional circumstances. Hughes v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800

F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, failure to establish cause may be excused “in

an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction

of one who is actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis

added). It is not sufficient that the petitioner point to some legal insufficiency. Bousley v.

United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623(1998) (“‘actual innocence’ means factual innocence , not

mere legal insufficiency”). Petitioner proffers no such showing of actual innocence.

6. Summary re Exhaustion

Petitioner’s Ground 4 asserts a denial of due process based upon the facts underlying

Grounds 1, 2 and 3. The portion based on Ground 3 is duplicative of Ground 3 (which is

itself based on a denial of due process), and as discussed above is without merit. The

remaining due process claims were not fairly presented to the state courts, are now

procedurally defaulted, and Petitioner has failed to show cause to excuse such procedural

default. Accordingly, the balance of Ground 4 must be dismissed with prejudice.

E. SUMMARY

Petitioner’s Grounds 1 (Confrontation), 2 (Counsel), 3 (Disclosure) and the duplicate

portion of Ground 4 (Due Process) founded upon the facts underlying Ground 3, are without

merit and should be denied. The remainder of Ground 4 is procedurally defaulted and must

be dismissed with prejudice.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the portions of Ground 4 (Due

Process) of Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed October 26, 2006 (#1),

founded upon denials of rights of confrontation and counsel, be DISMISSED WITH

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PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the remainder of Petitioner's Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed October 26, 2006 (#1), be DENIED.

V. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall

have ten (10) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which

to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules Governing

Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have ten (10) days within which to file

a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to de

novo consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th

Cir. 2003)(en banc).

DATED: July 15, 2008 _____________________________________

JAY R. IRWIN 

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