Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01279/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01279-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID RAY CABLE, No. CIV S-06-1279-LKK-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

HOREL, et al.,

Respondents.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court is respondents’ motion to

dismiss (Doc. 12) filed September 8, 2006, and petitioner’s opposition (Doc. 19) filed November

13, 2006.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 14, 1998, following a plea of no contest to second degree murder,

petitioner was convicted and sentenced to 15 years to life in state prison. Petitioner did not file a

direct appeal. Between October 28, 2004, and May 12, 2005, petitioner filed five postconvictions actions in the California state courts, all of which were denied. The instant federal

habeas petition was filed on June 12, 2006. 

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II. DISCUSSION

Respondents argue that the instant petition is untimely. The court agrees. 

Federal habeas corpus petitions must be filed within one year from the later of:

(1) the date the state court judgment became final; (2) the date on which an impediment to filing

created by state action is removed; (3) the date on which a constitutional right is newlyrecognized and made retroactive on collateral review; or (4) the date on which the factual

predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Typically, the statute of limitations will begin to run when the state court

judgment becomes final by the conclusion of direct review or expiration of the time to seek

direct review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The one-year limitations period begins running the

day after expiration of the 90-day time within which to seek review by the U.S. Supreme Court. 

See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The limitations period is tolled, however, for the time a properly filed application

for post-conviction relief is pending in the state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). To be

“properly filed,” the application must be authorized by, and in compliance with, state law. See

Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4 (2000). Imposition of a state procedural bar, however, does not

necessarily render the application improperly filed. See id. at 9. For example, California’s rule

governing the timeliness of bringing an application for post-conviction relief is subject to

numerous exceptions. See In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750 (1993). Because the state court would be

required to examine the merits of a petition before deciding whether an exception applies, it

should be considered by the federal court to have been properly filed, even if untimely. See

Dictado v. Ducharme, 244 F.3d 724, 728 (9th Cir. 2001). A state court application for postconviction relief is “pending”during all the time the petitioner is attempting, through proper use

of state court procedures, to present his claims. See Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th

Cir. 1999). Where the petitioner unreasonably delays between state court applications, however,

there is no tolling for that period of time. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002). If the state

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court does not explicitly deny a post-conviction application as untimely, the federal court must

independently determine whether there was undue delay. See id. at 226-27. 

There is no tolling for the interval of time between post-conviction applications

where the petitioner is not moving to the next higher appellate level of review. See Nino, 183

F.3d at 1006-07; see also Dils v. Small, 260 F.3d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 2001). There is also no

tolling for the period between different sets of post-conviction applications. See Biggs v.

Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2003). Finally, the period between the conclusion of direct

review and the filing of a state post-conviction application does not toll the limitations period. 

See Nino, 1983 F.3d at 1006-07. 

In this case, petitioner’s conviction and sentence became final on December 13,

1998 – the date on which the time to seek direct review expired. The limitations period began to

run the following day and ended one year later on December 13, 1999. Because all of

petitioner’s post-convictions challenges in state court were filed well after this date, they did not

toll running of the limitations period. The instant petition filed June 12, 2006 – more than six

years after expiration of the statute of limitations – is untimely. 

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that:

1. Respondents’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 12) be granted;

2. This petition be dismissed; 

3. All other pending motions (Docs. 17 & 18) be denied as moot; and

4. The Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment and close this file.

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 20 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: November 16, 2006.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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