Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00767/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00767-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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1 09cv00767 BEN(RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS A. MOORE,

Plaintiff,

v.

DEBRA LACY; PAULA M. JARNECKE;

ROBERT F. MCFADDEN; R.D. WOODS;

VILLASENOR, 

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 09cv00767 BEN(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT [ECF NO. 30]

Defendants Debra A. Lacy, Paula M. Jarnecke, Robert F.

McFadden, R. D. Woods, and Villasenor filed their Motion to Dismiss

This Action. (Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 30.) Plaintiff Thomas A.

Moore has not filed an opposition to the Motion.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff Thomas A. Moore, a former federal inmate proceeding

pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action on

April 13, 2009, pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Fed.

Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) [ECF Nos. 1, 5]. On July 16,

2009, the Court sua sponte dismissed the Complaint without

prejudice for failure to state a claim but granted Plaintiff leave

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to amend [ECF No. 5]. Moore then filed a motion requesting an

extension of time to amend his Complaint, which the Court granted

on August 6, 2009, giving him until October 19, 2009, to amend [ECF

Nos. 8, 9]. On August 17, 2009, Plaintiff filed a notice of change

of address [ECF No. 10]. 

Moore’s First Amended Complaint was filed nunc pro tunc to

October 26, 2009 [ECF Nos. 11, 12]. Plaintiff alleges that his

constitutional rights were violated when he was incarcerated at

Metropolitan Correctional Institution in San Diego. (Am. Compl. 1,

ECF No. 12.) In count one of the Amended Complaint, Moore contends

his rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and to

receive adequate medical care were violated when prison officials

failed to properly treat cuts and sores in his mouth. (Id. at 2-

4.) In count two, Plaintiff asserts Defendants’ actions amounted

to a deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. (Id. at

4-5.) 

Summonses were returned unexecuted for Defendants McFadden,

Woods, and Jarnecke, but were returned executed for Defendants

Villasenor and Lacy [ECF Nos. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19]. On February 5,

2010, all five Defendants filed a Notice of Failure to Complete

Service on any Defendant [ECF No. 20]. Defendants subsequently

filed a Notice of Plaintiff’s Non-Compliance With Civ. L.R.

83.11.b, failure to provide the Court with a current address [ECF

No. 21]. On June 2, 2010, this Court ordered that a telephonic

case management conference be held on July 1, 2010; the Clerk of

Court mailed the order to Plaintiff’s last known address, but it

was returned undelivered [ECF Nos. 23, 24]. Defendants filed a

Notice of Returned Mail, indicating that the order setting the

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conference had not been delivered [ECF No. 25]. Moore did not

participate in the case management conference [ECF No. 26, 28]. 

The Court’s Case Management Conference Order set another telephonic

conference for December 2, 2010. (Case Mgmt. Conference Order 3,

July 1, 2010, ECF No. 27.) The corresponding minute order and

order regulating discovery were mailed to Plaintiff; they, too,

were returned to the clerk as undeliverable [ECF No. 29]. 

On July 27, 2010, all named Defendants filed this Motion to

Dismiss [ECF No. 30]. The motion hearing was originally set for

September 13, 2010, before United States District Court Judge Roger

Benitez [see ECF No. 3]. It was vacated and reset for the same day

before this Court [ECF No. 31]. The minute order reflecting this

change was mailed to Plaintiff, but it was returned as

undeliverable as well [ECF No. 32]. 

On August 27, 2010, the Court found Defendants’ Motion

suitable for decision without oral argument, pursuant to Southern

District of California Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1) [ECF No. 33]. 

Moore did not file an opposition to the Motion, and on September 1,

2010, Defendants filed a notice that they had not received any

opposition to their Motion [ECF No. 34]. Defendants subsequently 

flied an Ex Parte Request to Vacate All Discovery Dates [ECF No.

35]. The Court granted Defendants’ request, vacating all discovery

dates and converting the December 2, 2010 telephonic settlement

conference to a telephonic status conference [ECF No. 36]. On

December 2, 2010, the Court held a telephonic conference with

counsel for Defendants; Plaintiff again did not participate. 

(Mins. Dec. 2, 2010, ECF No. 37.)

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II. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants Lacy, Jarnecke, McFadden, Woods, and Villasenor

move to dismiss the First Amended Complaint for Plaintiff’s failure

to prosecute. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 1, ECF No.

30.) In support of their Motion, they argue that Moore has failed

to pursue this action because (1) Plaintiff did not appear at the

case management conference, (2) he terminated communication with

the Court by failing to provide a current mailing address, and (3)

Moore has not properly served any Defendant in accordance with

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. (Id.) Defendants urge the

Court to dismiss the Amended Complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 41(b). (Id. at 9.)

Although Civil Local Rule 7.1(f)(3)(c) provides that failure

to oppose a motion may constitute consent to granting it, this

Court will evaluate the merits of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 

See S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7.1(8)(3)(c). The Court has reviewed the

Amended Complaint, Defendants’ Motion and attachments, and

Defendants’ Notice of Non-Receipt of any Opposition to the Motion

to Dismiss this Action and attachment. For the reasons set forth

below, the district court should GRANT Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss. 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Failure to Attend Conferences 

Defendants’ Motion was filed on July 27, 2010. Consequently,

it only addresses Moore’s failure to attend the July 1, 2010 case

management conference. (See Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A.

1-5, ECF No. 30.) Where appropriate, the Court will also refer to

Plaintiff’s failure to attend the December 2, 2010 telephonic

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conference. (See Mins., Dec. 2, 2010, ECF No. 37.)

On June 2, 2010, the Court scheduled a telephonic case

management conference for July 1, 2010, and ordered that defense

counsel make arrangements for Plaintiff, who was in custody at the

time, to appear telephonically. (Case Mgmt. Conference Order 1,

ECF No. 23.) The order was returned to the clerk undelivered, and

Moore was not a party to the July telephonic conference. (Mail

Returned Undeliverable Case Mgmt. Conference Order, ECF No. 24;

Case Mgmt. Conference Order 1, ECF No. 27.) The Court noted in its

scheduling order that Plaintiff did not appear and set another

telephonic conference for December 2, 2010. (Am. Case Mgmt.

Conference Order 1, 3, ECF No. 28.)

The minute order setting the December 2, 2010 telephonic

conference was returned as undeliverable [ECF Nos. 26-29]. On

December 2, 2010, counsel for Defendants participated in the

telephonic conference; Plaintiff did not. (Mins., Dec. 2, 2010,

ECF No. 37.)

Defendants argue that Moore was on notice of the July 1, 2010

conference because the Court mailed its scheduling order to Moore. 

(Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 4, ECF No. 30.) “The

Defendants also sent by mail an offer to facilitate the Plaintiff’s

participation in the [July 1, 2010] telephonic Case Management

Conference.” (Id. at 5.) Nonetheless, Plaintiff failed to

participate. (Id. at 4.) Defendants argue that local rules

require that “[t]he parties who have responsibility over the

litigation and the counsel who is responsible for the case, will be

present at the case management conference.” (Id. at 5.) 

//

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Both the Southern District of California Local Rules and the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a district court to dismiss

an action for failure to comply with a court order. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 41(b); S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 41(b); see also Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370

U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962) (holding that the court has inherent power

to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases by

dismissing actions for failure to prosecute). Even a pro se

litigant must follow the orders of the court. Ghazali v. Moran, 46

F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Moore has failed to comply with the Court’s orders requiring

that he appear telephonically at the July 1, 2010 case management

conference and December 2, 2010 settlement conference. Because the

orders setting the conferences were returned as “undeliverable,”

the Court will consider Plaintiff’s failure to notify the Court of

any new address in conjunction with his failure to prosecute. 

B. Failure to Provide a Current Mailing Address

Every litigant has an obligation to keep the Court apprised of

his or her correct address. Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1441

(9th Cir. 1988). Although courts must construe pro se pleadings

liberally, a pro se litigant must follow the rules of the court. 

Ghazali, 46 F.3d at 54; see also Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362,

1364-65 (9th Cir. 1986). 

The failure to follow a district court’s local rules is a

proper ground for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

41(b) and local rules. See also S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 41.1(b); 

Ghazali, 46 F.3d at 53. Civil Local Rule 83.11(b) provides, “A

party proceeding pro se must keep the court and opposing parties

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advised as to current address.” S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 83.11(b). 

Additionally, the Court may dismiss a case when the plaintiff does

not inform the Court of his current address. Id. When the clerk

directs mail to a pro se plaintiff’s last designated address and it

is returned as undeliverable, the Court may dismiss the case for

failure to prosecute, unless the plaintiff provides a current

address within sixty days. S.D. Cal. Civil L.R. 83.11(b).

Plaintiff has advised the Court of a new address in the past. 

On August 17, 2009, Moore filed a notice of change of address. 

(See Mot. Dismiss Attach. #2 Ex. A, ECF No. 30.) Plaintiff was

released from custody on February 4, 2010. (Id. Attach. #1 Mem. P.

& A. 3 (citing id. Attach. #2 Ex. F).) On February 5, 2010,

Defendants filed a notice that Plaintiff did not complete service

and mailed it to the address Plaintiff provided on August 17, 2009,

but Defendants’ notice was returned undelivered. (Id. Attach. #2

Ex. B.) On March 10, 2010, Defendants notified the Court of

Moore’s failure to provide the Court with a current address. (Id.

at Ex. C.) The clerk sent other court documents to Moore that were

returned undelivered on June 10, July 12, and August 11, 2010 [ECF

Nos. 24, 29, 32]. To date, Moore has not updated his address.

Defendants claim, “Despite his demonstrated knowledge of how

to advise the Court of an address change, [citation], Plaintiff has

failed to advise the Court of his current address.” (Mot. Dismiss

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 5, ECF No. 30.) Also, they argue that this

“inhibits the orderly handling of this case, prevents the Court

from communicating with Plaintiff, and evidences Plaintiff’s loss

of interest in this case now that he is out of prison.” (Id. at

4.) 

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Since the first undelivered mail was returned to the clerk on

June 10, 2010, more than six months have passed, and Plaintiff has

not updated his address. “A party, not the district court, bears

the burden of keeping the court apprised of any changes in his

mailing address.” See Carey, 856 F.2d at 1441. Moore’s failure to

keep the Court and opposing counsel informed of his whereabouts

leaves no realistic alternative but to dismiss the action without

prejudice. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 83.11(b) (permitting dismissal

for failure to provide current address within sixty days of mail

being returned undelivered); Carey, 856 F.2d at 1441.

C. Failure to Prosecute

Defendants allege that Plaintiff has failed to prosecute this

matter, and it should be dismissed. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem.

P. & A. 4, 6, ECF No. 30.) They assert Moore’s unreasonable delays

have prejudiced them. (Id. at 4.) “The prolonged continuation of

their status as individual defendants compromises their credit

ratings (due to the possibility of an adverse civil judgment),

causes emotional upset and uncertainty, prevents predictably

planning personal financial matters, and is fundamentally unfair.” 

(Id.) 

A district court’s authority to dismiss a plaintiff’s action

because of his failure to prosecute is well established. Link, 370

U.S. at 629; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Moneymaker v. CoBen (In re

Eisen), 31 F.3d 1447, 1451 (9th Cir. 1994). “The power to invoke

this sanction is necessary in order to prevent undue delays in the

disposition of pending cases and to avoid congestion in the

calendars of the district courts.” Link, 370 U.S. at 629-30.

//

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Moore’s failure to participate in two conferences and provide

the Court with a current address suggests that he has no interest

in prosecuting this case. Exhibit one to the Declaration of Nellie

T. Klein shows that as of July 13, 2010, Moore’s “release

destination” was Rosarito, Mexico. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #2 Ex. F

Klein Decl., ECF No. 30.) The combination of factors is compelling

evidence that Moore no longer intends to pursue this action. 

In determining whether to dismiss a case for failure to

prosecute, the district court should consider five factors: “(1)

the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2)

the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to

the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases

on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic

sanctions.” Moneymaker v. CoBen (In re Eisen), 31 F.3d at 1451

(citing Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986). 

“A dismissal may be affirmed where ‘at least four factors support

dismissal, or where at least three factors strongly support

dismissal.’” Mohtadi v. Terayon Commc’ns Sys. Inc., 100 F. App’x

691, 693 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191

F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

The first and second factors support dismissal. When

analyzing the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of

litigation and the court’s interest in docket control, the Ninth

Circuit has noted, “It is incumbent upon us to preserve the

district courts’ power to manage their dockets without being

subject to the endless vexatious noncompliance of [certain]

litigants.” Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261. This lawsuit has been

pending since April 13, 2009; Moore last acted to prosecute his

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case on October 28, 2009, when he filed his First Amended Complaint

(ECF Nos. 1, 12.) Plaintiff’s lack of involvement over the past

year has hindered the Court’s ability to efficiently manage its

docket. 

The third factor weighs in favor of dismissal as well. When

considering the risk of prejudice to a defendant, courts examine

whether the plaintiff’s actions impair the defendant’s ability to

prepare for trial or interfere with the rightful decision of the

case. See Malone v. United States Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 131

(9th Cir. 1987) (finding prejudice where government complied with

court order in timely manner but plaintiff did not, and plaintiff’s

excuse was groundless). Unless the plaintiff can give a “nonfrivolous excuse for [unreasonable] delay,” prejudice to defendants

is presumed. Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 400-01

(9th Cir. 1998); Moore v. Telfon Commc’ns Corp., 589 F.2d 959, 967-

68 (9th Cir. 1978); Anderson v. Air West, Inc., 542 F.2d 522, 524

(9th Cir. 1976). Here, Defendants have consistently complied with

court orders in a timely manner. Plaintiff’s absence has

frustrated Defendants’ ability to effectively litigate. See

Malone, 833 F.2d at 131. They have expended time and resources

defending a case that is not being litigated by Moore. There is no

evidence that rebuts the presumption that Plaintiff’s unreasonable

delay has prejudiced Defendants. Hernandez, 138 F.3d at 400-01. 

Another factor, a consideration of alternatives, also favors

dismissal. This factor may be satisfied by the court’s use and

consideration of less drastic alternatives. See Valley Eng’rs Inc.

v. Elec. Eng’g Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing

dismissal as a sanction for a discovery violation); see, e.g.,

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Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262 (finding alternatives employed when court

gave plaintiff an opportunity to avoid dismissal by amending his

complaint to comply with federal rules); Nevijel v. North Coast

Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981) (explaining that

less drastic alternatives for failing to comply with pleading rules

include allowing further amended complaints) Furthermore, the

requirement can be satisfied by a court warning that the failure to

obey the court’s order will result in dismissal. Valley Eng’rs

Inc., 158 F.3d at 1057; Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262; Malone, 833 F.2d

at 132; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. 

In this case, a telephonic conference was set for July 1,

2010, and although Plaintiff did not participate, a second

telephonic conference was scheduled for December 2, 2010. (Case

Mgmt. Conference Order 1, June 2, 2010, ECF No. 23; Case Mgmt.

Conference Order 3, July 1, 2010, ECF No. 27.) Furthermore, the

Court’s recommendation is that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint be

dismissed without prejudice. Moore is being given thirty days from

this Report and Recommendation to file any objections and explain

why his action should not be dismissed. The Court has employed

alternatives less drastic than a simple dismissal. 

Although the remaining factor, the public policy in favor of

resolving cases on their merits, weighs against dismissal, it may

be outweighed if the other factors strongly support dismissal. See

Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1263 (finding dismissal appropriate where only

three factors supported dismissal); see also Valley Eng’rs Inc.,

158 F.3d at 1057 (noting that the five-factor test provides the

district court with flexibility in its determination, not with

strict conditions precedent to dismissal).

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When Plaintiff’s failure to participate in this litigation is

viewed as a whole, dismissal without prejudice is appropriate. 

D. Inadequate Service of Process

All five Defendants assert they have not properly been served

in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. (Mot.

Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 7-9, ECF No. 30.) Moreover, they

argue that Plaintiff disregarded their notice to him of his

improper service. (Id. at 9.) “Notice of this deficiency was

filed February 5, 2010, well within the time for Plaintiff to cure

the deficiency before the 120-day period expired on February 25,

2010. However, Plaintiff did nothing.” (Id.) Defendants claim

that despite multiple court filings and Plaintiff’s release from

custody, Moore never corrected his defective service. (Id. at 1.)

“[S]ervice of process is the means by which a court asserts

its jurisdiction over the person.” SEC v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130,

1138 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Benny v. Pipes, 799 F.2d 489, 492 (9th

Cir. 1986)). For a federal court to obtain personal jurisdiction,

the Ninth Circuit requires that service of process be in

“substantial compliance” with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344, 1347 (9th Cir.

1982). A plaintiff is responsible for ensuring that the summons

and complaint are served on each defendant within the time required

by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, he is

entitled to have the summons and Complaint in his case served by

the United States Marshal. Puett v. Blandford, 912 F.2d 270, 273

(9th Cir. 1990) (citing Romandette v. Weetabix Co., 807 F.2d 309,

310 n.1 (2d Cir. 1986); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(B)(I). 

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The “officers of the court shall issue all service of process.” 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). “Although a plaintiff . . . proceeding in

forma pauperis may rely on service by the Marshal, such plaintiff

‘may not remain silent and do nothing to effectuate such service;’

rather, ‘[a]t a minimum, a plaintiff should request service upon

the appropriate defendant and attempt to remedy any apparent

defects of which [he] has knowledge.’” Jenkins v. Caplan, No. C

02-5603 RMW (PR), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11275, at *11 (N.D. Cal.

Feb. 13, 2009) (quoting Rochon v. Dawson, 828 F.2d 1107, 1110 (5th

Cir. 1987)). A plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis may face

dismissal where he fails to instruct the United States Marshal to

serve the necessary parties. See Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415,

1422 (9th Cir. 1994) (overruled on other grounds by Sandin v.

Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995)). 

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i) –- Serving the

United States and Its Agencies, Corporations, Officers,

or Employees

Defendants claim Plaintiff’s service was inadequate because he

did not comply with Rule 4(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 8, ECF No. 8.) 

Specifically, Defendants Lacy and McFadden, sued in their official

capacity, assert Plaintiff did not serve a copy of the summons and

Amended Complaint on the United States Attorney or the Attorney

General of the United States. (Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.

4(i)(1).) Defendant Lacy also contends that “[p]artial service on

[her] under Rule 4(d) was incorrect and incomplete.” (Id. (citing

Waiver Serv. Returned Executed Debra Lacy [ECF No. 19]).) McFadden

claims he, too, was never served because the summons was returned

because the address was invalid. (Id. (citing Summons Returned

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Unexecuted Robert F. McFadden [ECF No. 15]).) Defendants Jarnecke

and Woods argue that Moore attempted to serve each of them by mail,

but the corresponding summonses were returned for invalid

addresses. (Id. (citing Waiver Serv. Returned Unexecuted R.D.

Woods [ECF No.16]; Waiver Serv. Returned Unexecuted Paula M.

Jarnecke [ECF No. 17]).) Lastly, Defendant Villasenor alleges

Moore never served the United States Attorney or the Attorney

General of the United States, and he complains that “partial

service” on him was “incorrect and incomplete” under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 4(d). (Id. (citing Waiver Serv. Returned

Executed Villasenor [ECF No. 18]).) 

Under Bivens, a plaintiff can bring an action for money

damages against “federal agents acting under color of their

authority for injuries caused by their unconstitutional conduct.” 

Vaccaro v. Dobre, 81 F.3d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Bivens,

403 U.S. 388). To serve a federal officer or employee sued only in

an official capacity, the party must “serve the United States and

also send a copy of the summons and of the complaint by registered

or certified mail to the [officer or employee].” Fed. R. Civ. P.

4(i)(2). Effective service on a federal officer or employee who is

sued in an individual capacity for conduct relating to duties

performed on behalf of the United States, regardless of whether he

is also sued in an official capacity, requires that the party

“serve the United States and also serve the officer or employee

under Rule 4(e), (f), or (g).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(3). 

Rule 4(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides the

manner in which a plaintiff must effect service of process when

suing the United States. The plaintiff must deliver a copy of the

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summons and complaint to (1) the United States attorney for the

district in which the action is brought, (2) send the summons and

complaint by registered or certified mail to the Attorney General

of the United States at Washington, D.C., and (3) if a non-party

agency ruling is challenged, send the summons and complaint to the

agency that took the complained of actions. Fed. R. Civ. P.

4(i)(1)(A)-(C), (2). 

The Ninth Circuit has concluded that service upon the United

States is not necessary in a Bivens action. Vaccaro, 81 F.3d at

856-57. In Vaccaro, the court held that although plaintiff did not

serve the United States Attorney or the Attorney General, service

was nonetheless sufficient because plaintiff had not sued the

United States; rather, he had “sued its officers as individuals,

not in their official capacity.” Id. at 856. The court reasoned

that, by definition, Bivens claims are brought against defendants

in their individual capacities. Id. at 856-57. “‘[A] Bivens

action can be maintained against a defendant in his or her

individual capacity only, and not in his or her official

capacity[.]’” Id. at 857 (quoting Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d

348, 355 (9th Cir. 1988); see FDIC v. Mayer, 510 U.S. 471, 484-86

(1994) (refusing to expand the scope of liability under Bivens from

individual federal agents to actions against federal agencies);

Logan v. United States, No. 96-55042, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 32872,

at *3 (9th Cir. Dec. 6, 1996); Mayben v. Barnes, 290 F. Supp. 2d

1169, 1172-73 (E.D. Cal. 2003); see also Cato v. United States, 70

F.3d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding that “no Bivens-type

claim” may be asserted against the United States).

//

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Moore brought this Bivens action against Defendants Lacy and

McFadden only in their official capacities. (Am. Compl. 1-2, ECF

No. 12.) He directed his allegations against Jarnecke, Woods, and

Villasenor in both their individual and official capacities. (Id.

at 2.) Claims against these Defendants in their official

capacities were improperly asserted. See Vaccaro, 81 F.3d at 856-

57 (explaining that in a Bivens action plaintiff can only sue the

officers in their individual capacities); see also Morgan v. United

States, 323 F.3d 776, 780 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that

plaintiff cannot assert Bivens claim against defendants in their

official capacities); Wheeler v. United States Dep’t of Educ., No.

1:09-CV-01631-LAO-SMS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72399, at *6 (E.D.

Cal. July 19, 2010) (same); Pinson v. Norwood, No. EDCV 08-0660-AHS

(JTL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95082, at *9-10 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21,

2008) (concluding that plaintiff’s Bivens allegations against

defendants in their official capacities were improper when

defendants were sued in both their individual and official

capacities).

A Bivens claim for damages cannot be asserted against

Defendants Lacy and McFadden for acts performed in their official

capacities. The provisions of Rule 4(i)(2) do not apply to service

on them. Because Moore’s Bivens allegations against Jarnecke,

Woods, and Villasenor can only be brought against them as

individuals, Plaintiff was not required to serve the government

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i). Vaccaro, 81 F.3d at

856-57; Mayben, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1174-75.

//

//

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2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) –- Serving an

Individual

In a Bivens suit, plaintiffs must comply with Rule 4(e), not

Rule 4(i), to effect service. Wannsee Lao v. Ashcroft, No. C 08-

2776 P.H., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23741, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11,

2009); see also Vaccaro 81 F.3d at 856 (finding service sufficient

when correctional officers and physicians named as defendants were

served, but not the United States Attorney and Attorney General);

Callas v. United States Postal Serv., No. C 06-00006 SBA, 2006 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 90734, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2006). “Because

Bivens claims may be asserted only against federal officials in

their individual capacity, plaintiff is required to serve

[Defendant] personally, in accordance with the rules for individual

service . . . .” Wannsee Lao, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23741, at *21;

see Vaccaro 81 F.3d at 856; Callas, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90734, at

*15. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(2), service can be

accomplished by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to

the individual personally or by leaving copies at the individual’s

residence. 

Moore did not serve Defendants Jarnecke or Woods in accordance

with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e). The summonses for them

were returned unexecuted because neither Defendant was located at

the address listed on the summons [ECF Nos. 16, 17]. 

Defendants Lacy and Villasenor state that partial service on

them was “incorrect and incomplete” under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 4(d), which pertains to “waiving service.” (Mot. Dismiss

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 8, ECF No. 30.) They do not explain why

service was deficient and do not argue that service was not in

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substantial compliance with Rule 4(d). (Id.); see Jackson, 682

F.2d at 1347. Defendants’ Notice of Failure to Complete Service on

Any Defendant also does not explain why Lacy’s and Villasenor’s

waiver forms were “incorrect”; rather, it states that service was

incomplete because Plaintiff failed to also serve the United States

[ECF No. 20]. 

Rule 4(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires

that the notice and request for waiver (1) be in writing and

addressed to the defendant, (2) name the court where the complaint

was filed, (3) be accompanied by the complaint, copies of a waiver

form and a prepaid means of return, (4) inform the defendant of

consequences of waiver, (5) include the date the request was sent,

(6) give defendant a at least 30 days to return the waiver, and (7)

be sent by first-class mail or other reliable means. 

The docket shows that Villasenor’s waiver of service was

returned executed. (See Waiver Serv. Returned Executed Villasenor,

ECF No. 18.) The Court’s docket reflects: “WAIVER OF SERVICE

Returned Executed by Thomas A Moore. Villasenor waiver sent on

11/17/2009, answer due 1/19/2010.” (Id.) Moreover, the actual

waiver form that the United States Marshals Service mailed to

Villasenor at the correctional facility states the following: 

“11/17/09 - Mailed [summons] & [complaint] to M.C.[.] 1/22/10 -

Received Waiver of Service of Summons. Copy to Court & Plaintiff.” 

(Id. at 1.) Defendant Villasenor signed and dated that waiver of

service of summons form. (Id. at 2.) Villasenor has not shown why

his waiver of service should be disregarded. His contention that

he was improperly served is not convincing. 

//

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Likewise, the docket shows that Lacy executed a waiver of

service. (See Waiver Serv. Returned Executed USMS, ECF No. 19.) 

Lacy also signed and dated the waiver form. (Id.) She has not

demonstrated why her waiver of service is ineffective.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not completed personal service on

Defendants Jarnecke and Woods, and formal service on Lacy and

Villasenor has been waived. 

3. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) –- Time Limit for

Service

A plaintiff has 120 days from the date a complaint is filed

within which to serve the defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). “If

service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant

within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, the court, upon

motion or on its own initiative after notice to the plaintiff,

shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that defendant or

direct that service be effected within a specified time.” Id.; see

Brunette v. Barbette, 923 F.2d 754, 757 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming

dismissal of complaint for failure to timely serve the summons and

complaint); Tensile v. County of Contra Costa, 820 F.2d 319, 320

(9th Cir. 1987).

Plaintiff had 120 days from October 26, 2009, the date the

Amended Complaint was filed, to serve every Defendant. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 4(m). As noted above, Moore did not properly serve

Jarnecke and Woods in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 4(e). Moore was unable to serve McFadden by mail or

personally [ECF No. 15]. More than one year has elapsed since the

Amended Complaint was filed. Thus, Moore has not complied with

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).

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Nonetheless, the Court must extend the 120-day time period for

service of process if the plaintiff can show “good cause” why

service was not made within that time. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); see

S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 4.1(a); Mann v. American Airlines, 324 F.3d

1088, 1090 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Henderson v. United States,

517 U.S. 654, 662 (1996); Efaw v. Williams, 473 F.3d 1038, 1040

(9th Cir. 2007). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing

good cause. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). “At a minimum, ‘good cause’

means excusable neglect. A plaintiff may also be required to show

the following: (a) the party to be served personally received

actual notice of the lawsuit; (b) the defendant would suffer no

prejudice; and (c) plaintiff would be severely prejudiced if his

complaint were dismissed.” Brunette, 923 F.2d at 756 (citing Hart

v. United States, 817 F.2d 78, 80-81 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

“[I]nadvertent error or ignorance of governing rules alone will not

excuse a litigant’s failure to effect timely service.” Hamilton v.

Endell, 981 F.2d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 1992); Tensile, 820 F.2d at

320. Additionally, a plaintiff’s status as an unrepresented party

does not, by itself, establish good cause. Brunette, 923 F.2d at

757. 

After Moore filed the Amended Complaint, he made some effort

to serve the summons and Amended Complaint on the Defendants within

the 120-day limit. He attempted to effect service on each

Defendant one time. The docket shows Lacy and Villasenor waived

service. Activity regarding attempted service of the summonses

spanned from November 9, 2009, to January 26, 2010 [ECF Nos. 14-

19]. Since then, however, Moore has not prosecuted the case. He

failed to participate in two court-ordered conferences and did not

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provide the Court with a current mailing address. Plaintiff has

not opposed this Motion and has not requested an extension of time

to serve the three Defendants who have not waived service. 

But even without good cause, a court has the discretion to

grant an extension. Mann, 324 F.3d at 1090 n.2; Oyama v. Sheehan,

253 F.3d 507, 513 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted) (“Courts have

discretion under Rule 4(m), absent a showing of good cause, to

extend the time for service or to dismiss the action without

prejudice[]”); Efaw, 473 F.3d at 1040. When deciding whether to

grant a discretionary extension of time, “a district court may

consider factors ‘like a statute of limitations bar, prejudice to

the defendant, actual notice of a lawsuit, and eventual service.’” 

Efaw, 473 F.3d at 1041 (quoting Troxell v. Fedders of N. Am., Inc.,

160 F.3d 381, 383 (7th Cir. 1998)). 

Here, the facts do not weigh in favor of granting a

discretionary extension of time. Plaintiff has not responded to

Defendants’ Motion and has not offered any explanation for his

failure to properly serve McFadden, Jarnecke, and Woods. 

Moore was released from custody of the Federal Bureau of

Prisons on February 4, 2010. (Id. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 3

(citing id. Attach. #2 Ex. F.) Prior to that date, Plaintiff was

actively pursuing this action. He filed for in forma pauperis

status, requested leave to amend his Complaint, moved for an

extension of time to amend, and notified the Court of a change to

his mailing address [ECF Nos. 2, 3, 8, 10, 12]. The last document

Plaintiff filed was his Amended Complaint, which was filed on

October 26, 2009; he was released from custody approximately three

months later. (See id.) Since then, both the Clerk of Court and

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defense counsel have been unable to deliver court-related documents

to Plaintiff by mail. Without some indication that Moore intends

to pursue his claims, the record suggests that he lost interest in

the matter when he was released from custody. Plaintiff’s failure

to oppose Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss weighs against any

suggestion that the Court should unilaterally grant an extension of

time to serve these Defendants.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss because of Moore’s failure to

complete service on the Defendants should be granted as to

Defendants McFadden, Woods, and Villasenor, but the Motion should

be denied as to Defendants Lacy and Jarnecke.

III. CONCLUSION

Moore has not provided the Court with a current mailing

address, in violation of the local rules. Other than filing his

First Amended Complaint on October 28, 2009, he has done nothing to

prosecute this action in the last thirteen months. Furthermore,

Plaintiff’s failure to attend the July 1, 2010 case management

conference and the December 1, 2010 telephonic conference was in

violation of the Court’s orders. Moore’s failure to prosecute

warrants dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) and

S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 41.1, 83.11(b). Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

should be GRANTED, and the Amended Complaint should be DISMISSED

without prejudice. 

In addition, Moore has failed, without good cause, to

effectuate proper service on Defendants McFadden, Jarnecke, and

Woods within the 120-day time period proscribed in Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 4(m), and there are no circumstances that would

justify an extension of time to serve them. Their Motion to

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K:\COMMON\BROOKS\CASES\1983\PRISONER\MOORE767\R&R re Mot. Dismissv3.wpd 23 09cv00767 BEN(RBB)

Dismiss for failure to properly serve them should be GRANTED. 

Defendants Lacy and Villasenor’s Motion to Dismiss for failure to

properly serve them should be DENIED. 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written 

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before January 14, 2011. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before January 28, 2011. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 17, 2010 ______________________________

Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Benitez

All parties of record

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