Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00212/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00212-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL DAYNE BRIDGEMAN,

Petitioner,

v.

MICHAEL STAINER, Warden,

Respondent.

CASE NO. 12cv0212 IEG (PCL)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION OF U.S.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE: 

DENYING PETITIONER’S FIRST

AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS [Doc. 5]

I.

INTRODUCTION

Michael Dayne Bridgeman, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his San Diego Superior Court conviction

in case No. SCD223385 for assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury and dissuading

a witness by force or threat. (Doc. 5.) The court sentenced him to 11 years in state prison.

(Lodgment 16, at 1.) 

Petitioner alleges he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth

Amendment right to counsel, and that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his three

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Marsden1/ motions. (Doc. 5.) The Court has considered the First Amended Petition, Respondent’s

Answer and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support thereof, Petitioner’s Traverse, and

all the supporting documents submitted by the parties. For the reasons set forth below, the Court

recommends that the Petition be DENIED. 

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be correct.

Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The facts of the underlying crime, as found by the state appellate court,

are as follows:

 On October 11, 2009, multiple witnesses saw Bridgeman punch Robert

Taylor numerous times in the head and then stomp on his head as he lay

unconscious on the ground. When Taylor’s girlfriend attempted to call the

police, Bridgeman chased after her and threatened to kill her. Witnesses then

observed Bridgeman drag Taylor, who was still unconscious, onto a sleeping

bag in an attempted coverup. 

(Lodgment 16, at 2.)

The state appellate court’s findings as to Petitioner’s first Marsden motion are as follows:

On March 23, 2010, the court conducted a hearing on Bridgeman’s first

Marsden motion. During the hearing, Bridgeman contended his attorney, Bruce

Kotler, failed to adequately represent him in a number of ways. First, he stated

Kotler showed up late to a preliminary hearing and when Bridgeman began

talking to him he said: “Please be quiet. I need to hear what’s going on.” He

stated that Kotler was generally unavailable and did not visit him while in

custody to discuss his case with him. He expressed dissatisfaction with the plea

bargain Kotler had obtained and requested Kotler further investigate by taking

photographs of the scene of the crime and procuring witnesses to testify to his

good character. In summary, Bridgeman contended that Kotler did not devote

enough time to his case to effectively represent him. 

Kotler responded by pointing out that he had discussed Bridgeman’s case

with him at “various court hearings” and had visited him in jail for “a couple of

hours” the week prior. Kotler further stated that he had only recently learned of

Bridgeman’s request for Kotler to seek character witnesses and was willing to

do so. He indicated that he had cross-examined the prosecution’s four witnesses

and negotiated a plea bargain of five years, when Bridgeman faced up to 20,

which Bridgeman rejected. 

1. People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118 (1970).

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(Id. at 3-4.)

As to the second Marsden motion, the state appellate court found:

On May 17, 2010, the court conducted a second Marsden hearing. During the

hearing, Bridgeman stated that he believed Kotler had not “given [him] the best

of his (Kotler’s) ability” in that he had not followed up with potential witnesses,

he had failed to obtain court records that Bridgeman requested, and he was not

optimistic about Bridgeman’s case. Bridgeman concluded he felt like he and

Kotler did not see eye-to-eye on his case. 

(Id. at 5.)

As to the third Marsden motion, the state appellate court found:

At Bridgeman’s third and final Marsden hearing, the court explicitly asked him

what new grounds for the motion, if any, he had that he had not brought up at

his previous motion hearings. Bridgeman admitted he had none. The court then

denied his motion.

(Id. at 6.)

III.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A jury convicted Michael Dayne Bridgeman of assault by means likely to produce great

bodily injury, a violation of Pen. Code § 245 subd. (a)(1), and dissuading a witnesses by force

or threat, a violation of Pen. Code § 136.1 subd. (c). (Lodgment 10, at 505-510.) There was a

prior strike alleged, but it was not found to be true. (Lodgment 12, at 715.) The court sentenced

Bridgeman to a term of eleven years. (Id. at 717.) 

Bridgeman filed a timely appeal, claiming the trial court abused its discretion in denying

his Marsden motions in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. (Lodgment 16, at 1.)

The appellate court affirmed. (Id.) On September 15, 2011 Bridgeman petitioned the Supreme

Court of the State of California for review, arguing the same grounds. (Lodgment 17, at 1, 3.)

The petition for review was summarily denied on October 19, 2011. (Lodgment 18.)

Arguing the same grounds raised in state court, Bridgeman filed his First Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with this Court on March 12, 2012. (Doc. 5.) Respondents

answered on July 11, 2012. (Doc. 11-1.) Petitioner filed a traverse on August 28, 2012. (Doc.

17.)

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///

IV.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

A federal court "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground he is in custody

in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

Federal habeas courts may not "reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions." 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). "[A] state court’s interpretation of state law,

including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court

sitting in habeas corpus." Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005); see Park v. California,

202 F.3d 1146, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2000) ("a violation of state law standing alone is not

cognizable in federal court on habeas").

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") governs review of

Bridgeman's claims because he filed his federal habeas petition after that statute's 1996 effective

date. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1997). AEDPA imposes a “‘highly deferential

standard for evaluating state-court rulings,’” requiring “that state-court decisions be given the

benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at

333 n.7). Habeas corpus is a "'guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice

systems,' not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Harrington v. Richter,

562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5

(1979) (Stevens, J., concurring)). "As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal

court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in

federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id. at 786-

87. 

"AEDPA prevents defendants – and federal courts – from using federal habeas corpus

review as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts." Renico v. Lett,

559 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1866 (2010). "By its terms § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any

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claim 'adjudicated on the merits' in state court, subject only to the exceptions in §§ 2254(d)(1)

and (d)(2)." Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. Habeas relief is available under the first exception if the

state court result "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1); see Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73-76 (2003); see also Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000) (distinguishing the 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) "contrary to" test from

its "unreasonable application" test). To be found an "unreasonable application" of the 

precedent, the state court decision must have been "more than incorrect or erroneous;" it "must

have been 'objectively unreasonable.'" Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003) (citations

omitted). The lack of holdings from the Supreme Court on the issue presented precludes relief

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006). "[W]hen a Supreme

Court decision does not 'squarely address[]' the issue . . . it cannot be said, under AEDPA, there

is 'clearly established' Supreme Court precedent addressing the issue," and the federal habeas

court "must defer to the state court's decision." Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 754 (9th Cir.

2009). "Circuit precedent may provide 'persuasive authority' for purposes of determining

whether a state court decision is an 'unreasonable application' of Supreme Court precedent", but

"only Supreme Court holdings are binding on state courts, and 'only those holdings need be

reasonably applied.'" Rodgers v. Marshall, 678 F.3d 1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation

omitted). 

Under the second AEDPA exception, relief is available only if the state court based its

result "on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). "Factual determinations by state courts are

presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, § 2254(e)(1), and a

decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based on a factual determination will not

be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence

presented in the state court proceeding, § 2254(d)(2)." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340

(2003); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007) (The question "is not whether a federal

court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was

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unreasonable – a substantially higher threshold").

In applying these standards, the Court looks to the last reasoned state court decision. See

Delgadillo v. Woodford, 527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir.2008); see also Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501

U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). To the extent no such reasoned opinion exists, as where a state court

rejected a claim in an unreasoned order, this Court must conduct an independent review to

determine whether the decisions were contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

“clearly established” Supreme Court precedent. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th

Cir.2000). If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal

habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state

court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court law. Id. at 981-82.

V.

ANALYSIS

Petitioner claims his federal constitutional rights were violated on two grounds: (1) trial

counsel was ineffective; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his three

Marsden motions. (Doc. 5, at 22.) These claims are related, but will be discussed separately.

Respondent argues that the “AEDPA precludes relief on Bridgeman’s claim the trial court

abused its discretion in denying his Marsden motions ... because it was rejected on the merits by

the state court in a decision that is not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme

Court law.” (Doc. 11, at 6.)

Petitioner responds, in his Traverse, that the conflict between Petitioner and his counsel

resulted in a total lack of communication, precluding an adequate defense. (Doc. 17, at 1, 3.) 

A. Ineffectiveness of Trial Counsel

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel under federal law, Petitioner must prove: (1)

counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 697 (1984). A reasonable

probability of a different result “is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

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outcome.” Id. at 694. The Court may reject the claim upon finding either that counsel's

performance was reasonable or the claimed error was not prejudicial. Id. at 697; see also Rios v.

Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test

obviates the need to consider the other.”).

Review of counsel's performance is “highly deferential” and there is a “strong

presumption” that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional

judgment. Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 610 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. at 689). The Court must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s conduct “on the facts of the

particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. The

Court may “‘neither second-guess counsel’s decisions, nor apply the fabled twenty-twenty

vision of hindsight ....’” Matylinsky v. Budge, 577 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal

citation omitted); see Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (“The Sixth Amendment

guarantees reasonable competence, not perfect advocacy judged with the benefit of hindsight.”).

Petitioner bears the burden to “overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the

challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689

(internal quotations omitted). Moreover, “an irreconcilable conflict in violation of the Sixth

Amendment occurs only where there is a complete breakdown in communication between the

attorney and client, and the breakdown prevents effective assistance of counsel.” Stenson v.

Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 886 (9th Cir. 2007). “Disagreements over strategical or tactical

decisions do not rise to the level of a complete breakdown in communication.” Id. Appointed

counsel is in charge of trial tactics and theory of defense. U.S. v. Wadsworth, 830 F.2d 1500,

1509 (9th Cir. 1987). There is no Sixth Amendment right to a meaningful relationship between

an attorney and his client. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983). The purpose of providing

assistance of counsel is to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial; a Sixth

Amendment claim should focus on the adversarial process, not the attorney and client

relationship. Wheat v. U.S., 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988). With respect to the prejudicial element

of the Strickland test, “a challenger must demonstrate ‘a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Premo

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v. Moore, ––– U.S. –––, 131 S. Ct. 733, 739 (2011) (citation omitted).

The ineffective assistance of counsel claim was exhausted by timely appeal in the state

appellate court, and subsequently in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment 13; Lodgment

17.) The appellate decision was the last reasoned state opinion. That court rejected all of

Petitioner’s claims. As to the first Marsden hearing, the appellate court held:

As the [trial] court expressly found, Bridgeman failed to meet the requisite

burden of proof in his March 23 Marsden motion. Kotler had met with

Bridgeman at various court hearings and discussed his case with him for at least

a few hours in total and offered to conduct the investigation Bridgeman desired.

Kotler also obtained a plea bargain sentence significantly lighter than the one

Bridgeman otherwise faced.

The foregoing record does not show that Bridgeman’s constitutional right

of counsel was substantially impaired by the court’s denial of his first Marsden

motion. We thus conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in denying that

motion. 

(Lodgment 16, at 4.)

As to the second Marsden hearing, the appellate court held:

The court properly denied Bridgeman’s second Marsden motion. The

record adequately demonstrates that Kotler had simply given Bridgeman his

honest professional assessment with which Bridgeman disagreed. At the time of

the hearing, Kotler had interviewed the witnesses Bridgeman indicated he

believed would have helped his case, but Kotler did not find their testimony

helpful. Similarly, Kotler found the court records Bridgeman requested

unnecessary and unhelpful to his case. The court therefore was well within its

discretion in concluding that the situation did not involve ineffective assistance

of counsel, but rather “a defendant who thinks that there should be a different

outcome than the one that is likely to occur.”

(Id. at 5-6.)

Lastly, as to the third Marsden hearing, the appellate court held:

At Bridgeman’s third and final Marsden hearing, the court explicitly asked

him what new grounds for the motion, if any, he had that he had not brought up

at his previous motion hearings. Bridgeman admitted he had none. The court

then denied his motion.

The court properly denied Bridgeman’s third Marsden motion because the

court did not abuse its discretion in denying his first two and his third was

baseless. We thus conclude Bridgeman fails to prove the court’s denial of his

three Marsden motions substantially impaired his constitutional right to

effective assistance of counsel. 

(Id. at 6.)

In his habeas petition, Petitioner fashions his ineffective assistance claim from a plethora

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of inconsequential and unsupported statements. In particular, Petitioner claims that counsel: did

not make himself available to Petitioner (Doc. 5, at 24); did not listen to Petitioner’s remarks

(Id.); “did not have the time to represent [Petitioner] competently” (Id. at 25); only spent “a few

moments” with Petitioner before court hearings (Id.); “did not have time to devote to the case”

(Id. at 26); and did not call certain witnesses or “follow up” on them (Id. at 26-27). Petitioner

offers no evidence in support of his claims besides these bare assertions. Similarly, Petitioner’s

Traverse provides no evidence to buttress his arguments. (Doc. 17.)

In his first Marsden hearing according to the state court record, Petitioner complained that

his attorney was too busy, did not conduct the preliminary hearing appropriately, and negotiated

an unsatisfactory plea deal. (Lodgment 16, at 3.) In his second Marsden hearing, Petitioner told

the state judge that he did not see “eye to eye” with counsel and that his attorney had “no legal

terms (sic) to stand on.” (Lodgment 7, 3A RT 153.) In his third Marsden hearing, Petitioner

reiterated the above and admitted that he had no new grounds for moving for a new attorney.

(Lodgment 16, at 6.) Although the record shows that Petitioner and his attorney differed in their

views of the legal issues, Petitioner’s statements to the trial court at the March 23, 2010

Marsden hearing demonstrated that he did not dispute the core factual circumstances of the

prosecution’s case. (Lodgment 3, 1A RT 7-9.) At the second hearing, in response to the judge’s

question as to whether Petitioner’s attorney understood what Petitioner was attempting to

communicate to the trial court, Petitioner’s attorney indicated that he had many conversations

with Petitioner and he was able to understand what Petitioner was asking of him. (Lodgment 7,

3A RT 167.) Petitioner acknowledged to the judge at the May 17, 2010 hearing that he speaks

with his attorney about certain matters. (Lodgment 7, 3A RT 154.) Although Petitioner and his

counsel had a disagreement as to the legal viability of using a self-defense theory, self-defense

instructions were given and self-defense was argued by Petitioner’s attorney in closing.

(Lodgment 10, 6 RT 485-487, 493-494.) Petitioner’s attorney did follow up on witnesses that

Petitioner wanted him to pursue but none of the witnesses were deemed to be of assistance to

Petitioner’s defense. (Lodgment 7, 3A RT 159-161, 164-167; Lodgment 9, 5 RT 376-399, 408-

420.) Petitioner’s attorney also followed up on Petitioner’s request for nonrelevant transcripts.

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(3 RT 157-159, 167.) In sum, the record shows Petitioner’s attorney was responsive to his client

and that there wasn’t a total breakdown in communication between Petitioner and his attorney

such that Petitioner was constructively denied effective counsel. 

Perhaps the alleged shortcomings of Petitioner’s trial counsel, even if true, could establish

a less than perfect attorney-client relationship; but they would only go to the first Strickland

prong. To wit, Petitioner has failed to explain or allege how there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel's supposed errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different,

and has thereby failed to also meet his burden under Strickland’s second prong. The problem

with Petitioner's conclusory assertions, that his trial counsel failed to adequately investigate the

case and prepare for trial, is that the he has identified no exculpatory evidence or additional

defensive theories that would have been discovered or developed had his counsel investigated

the case more thoroughly. Nowhere in his petition does Petitioner identify any potential defense

witnesses who could have testified at petitioner's trial, explain what helpful testimony any of

those witnesses could have provided, or otherwise identify any exculpatory evidence

then-available that could have been discovered or developed by a more thorough investigation

by his trial counsel. Thus, Petitioner has not satisfied the prejudice prong of Strickland.

This Court recommends that Ground One regarding his ineffective assistance of counsel

claim be DENIED in its entirety.

B. The Marsden Motions

A denial of a Marsden motion is an abuse of discretion only if the defendant showed that a

failure to replace ineffective counsel would substantially impair his or her right to counsel.

Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, as Petitioner has not shown that his

counsel was ineffective, this Court cannot find that the state court abused its discretion in

denying Petitioner’s Marsden motions. The state appellate court gave reasoned opinions,

supported by the facts. (Lodgment 16, at 4-6.) There was no misapplication of Supreme Court

law. 

This Court recommends that Ground Two be DENIED in its entirety.

///

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VI.

CONCLUSION

This report and recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Irma E. Gonzalez, the

United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or before January

17, 2013. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed on or before January 29, 2013. The parties

are advised that failure to file objections within the specific time may waive the right to appeal

the district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE: December 26, 2012

 

Peter C. Lewis

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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