Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-01818/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-01818-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID LEON DEW,

Petitioner, No. C 07-01818 PJH

v.

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

BEN CURRY, Warden,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

Before the court is the petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoner, David

Leon Dew (“Dew”), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The court ordered respondent to show

cause why the writ should not be granted. Respondent filed an answer, supported by a

memorandum of points and authorities, and also provided exhibits for the court. Petitioner

filed a traverse along with a memorandum of points and authorities. Having reviewed the

parties’ papers, the record, and having carefully considered their arguments and the

relevant legal authorities, the court hereby DENIES the petition. 

BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

On April 14, 1983, Dew pled guilty to second degree murder and was sentenced to

fifteen years to life in state prison, a term which he continues to serve. Dew originally filed

his first habeas petition with the state court on April 17, 1989, claiming that his plea was not

knowing and voluntary. See Petitioner’s Appendix Exhibit W (“Pet.’s Exh. W”) at 1. That

petition was denied. Id. On April 22, 1997, Dew filed his second habeas petition

contending that he should be allowed to withdraw his plea. Id. That petition was also

denied. Id.

Dew’s current habeas petition challenges the California Board of Parole Hearings’

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 The Board relied on the statement of facts from its September 2004 Board Report.

Resp. Exh. 2 at 16. However, the factual background is somewhat muddled because Patton

had originally implicated Dew, claiming Dew brought the rope and held the victim down during

the murder. Id. at 56-57. Patton later retracted that statement, admitting that he had lied. Id.

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(“Board”) denial of his application for parole following a parole consideration hearing on

May 12, 2005. Pet.’s Exh. W at 1. The 2005 parole hearing resulted in Dew’s eighth (8th)

parole denial. Dew’s Petition at 2-3.

Dew filed his most recent state habeas petition in the San Diego County Superior

Court, which was denied in a written opinion on June 14, 2006. See Pet.’s Exh. W. Dew

proceeded to file a habeas petition with the California Court of Appeal, which was also

denied, on November 20, 2006. Pet.’s Exh. X. The California Supreme Court denied

Dew’s subsequent petition for review on February 7, 2007. Pet.’s Exh. Y.

On March 30, 2007, Dew filed the current federal habeas petition. 

B. Factual History

Dew’s conviction stems from the following facts, a more complete version of which

may be found in the Board’s Parole Consideration Hearing transcript from May 12, 2005. 

See Respondent’s Exhibit 2 (“Resp. Exh. 2"). On November 25, 1982, Dew and other coconspirators showed up at victim Claude County’s apartment. Resp. Exh. 2 at 16. One of

Dew’s co-conspirators, Roy Patton, was a former roommate and homosexual partner of Mr.

County. Id. at 18. In his plea, Dew stated that the plan was for Mr. Patton to occupy Mr.

County while Dew and the other co-conspirators burglarized Mr. County’s residence. Id. at

19.

Mr. County got into a verbal confrontation with Mr. Patton that escalated into a fight. 

Id. Dew claims at this point that he was frightened, so he fled the apartment and waited in

the van. Id. Dew indicates that his co-conspirators exited the apartment a short time

thereafter carrying the victim’s property. Id. Dew claimed that he did not know of the

victim’s death until the following day. Id.1

The San Diego Police Department responded to a radio call at the victim’s residence

and found Mr. County dead in his apartment, lying face down, his hands and ankles tied

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behind his back and his pants pulled down below his waist. Resp. Exh. 2 at 19. There

were bloodstains all over the room, including on parts of a trophy, a knife, and a stick. Id.

According to the autopsy report, Mr. County died from cardio-respiratory failure due to head

injury. Id.

C. State Court Decisions

1. Parole Board

At Dew’s parole hearing on May 12, 2005, the Board questioned Dew about both his

acts prior to being imprisoned, and his acts during his prison term. The Board went through

Dew’s prior criminal acts which included: (1) 1970 - possession of stolen property

(acquitted); (2) 1975 - offense against property; (3) 1978 - aggravated assault with a

weapon during a felony; (4) 1980 - false imprisonment and battery on a person; and (5)

1981- pimping. Id. at 20-23. The Board provided Dew an opportunity to explain the

circumstances surrounding some of these offenses. Id.

The Board then proceeded to review and consider Dew’s family history. Id. at 25-33. 

According to the Board report, Dew’s family was unhealthy, dysfunctional, and severely

abusive. Id. at 31. When he was young, Dew had an undiagnosed learning disability and

his father beat him when he performed poorly in school. Id. at 31-33. Dew has three

children of his own, including two sons with whom he has a good relationship and a

daughter with whom he recently reconciled. Id. at 26-27. Dew has been married twice, but

is currently divorced. Id. at 27-29.

Subsequently, the Board examined Dew’s post-conviction activity. Dew received

many positive reports for the different jobs he performed while serving his term. Id. at 35-

38. Dew was awarded a Certificate of Completion in Vocational Graphic Arts from

Atascadero State Hospital in 1989 and received his General Education Development

(“GED”) certificate in 1990. Id. at 35-38, 40. Dew participated in Alcoholic’s Anonymous

(“AA”) throughout different points of his prison term. Id. at 35-38. Dew spent three years of

his term at Atascadero State Hospital in psychotherapy, but did not participate in therapy

during his most recent years of imprisonment. Id. at 35-38.

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In its decision to deny parole, the Board pointed to several factors. Resp. Exh. 2 at

99-105. First, the Board pointed out the brutality of Dew’s commitment offense in relation

to the trivial nature of the motivated crime (burglary). Id. at 100.

Second, the Board referred to Dew’s psychiatric reports. Id. at 101. Although Dew

received a positive report in his most recent psychiatric evaluation in 2003, the Board

remained concerned about the problems Dew had when he first entered the institution. Id. 

The Board did not have any reports that demonstrated Dew’s resolution of his initial

psychiatric problems when he began his term, including hearing voices and a lifelong

hostility towards women. Id. The Board requested that Dew obtain a new psychiatric

report addressing these specific issues prior to his next parole hearing. Id. at 101, 105.

In addition, the Board cited Dew’s parole plans as being insufficiently specific,

including: his proposed place to live; place to work; and a place to follow up with substance

abuse treatment. Id. Dew did provide two different options that he had for places to live,

but he was unable to establish a residence as to either option until after his release. Id. at

67, 72-74.

The Board commended Dew for being disciplinary-free since 1998, and for receiving

several positive reports for good work completed while incarcerated. Id. at 103-104. The

Board did not, however, consider his behavior to be sufficient to outweigh the “especially

cruel manner” of his crime. Id. at 104. The Board denied Dew’s parole with the next

hearing to take place after three (3) years. Id.

2. San Diego County Superior Court

The San Diego County Superior Court denied Dew’s habeas petition on June 14,

2006. Pet.’s Exh. W at 10. Dew petitioned the court based solely on his May 12, 2005

parole denial. Id. at 1. The court reasoned that Dew failed to meet his burden of proof. Id.

at 2. The court cited California Penal Code § 3041 that provides that when the Board

considers an inmate’s suitability, the Board “shall set a release date unless it determines

that . . . the timing and gravity of a current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such

that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for

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this individual.” Pet.’s Exh. W at 2; Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). 

The court reasoned that according to the California Code of Regulations, it may use

all relevant information available to determine a prisoner’s suitability for release. Pet.’s

Exh. W at 3-4. The Code of Regulations includes a list of general factors that tend to show

suitability and unsuitability for parole when weighed and balanced. Id. The list of factors

demonstrating unsuitability for parole included the following: motive, level of abuse and

other circumstances of the commitment offense; previous record of violence; unstable

social history; sadistic sexual offenses; psychological factors; and institutional behavior. 

15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c). Factors showing suitability include: lack of juvenile record;

stable social history; signs of remorse; motivation for crime; lack of criminal history; age;

future plans; and institutional behavior. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(d). The Board is

afforded great deference in how it chooses to weigh the factors. Pet. Exh. W at 4. The

overriding factor for the Board determining a prisoner’s suitability for parole is the risk he

poses to public safety. Cal. Penal Code § 3041; In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1084

(2005).

The court reviewed the Board’s decision regarding Dew’s unsuitability for parole for

“some evidence.” Pet. Exh. W at 5; In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 677 (2002). It

noted that the factual basis for the Board’s decision had to be supported by some evidence

with some indicia of reliability. In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th at 677. It is within the

Board’s discretion to give different weight to each suitability factor and in how it chooses to

resolve conflicts in evidence. Id. at 656, 677. 

The court found that there was some evidence to support the Board’s decision. 

Pet.’s Exh. W at 5-7. The court reasoned that the Board’s balancing of the suitability and

unsuitability factors was sufficient to satisfy the some evidence standard. Id.

The court rejected Dew’s contention that the Board denied his liberty interest in

parole by relying solely on the unchanging facts of his commitment offense. Id. at 5. The

decision to deny parole can be based on the prisoner’s underlying offense, so long as the

parole board considers all applicable factors regarding suitability for parole. In re

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Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th at 677, 682-683.

In addition, the court denied Dew’s remaining claims, including that the Board erred

by considering the underlying facts as more serious than stipulated at plea; that a

preponderance of the evidence standard of review should have applied; that the Board’s

failure to provide uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity was an abuse of discretion;

that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the legislature’s actions in Dannenberg and

Rosenkrantz was unconstitutional; and that the Board’s practice of denying parole to

indeterminate prisoners violates due process. Pet.’s Exh. W at 7-10.

3. State Appellate Court Decisions

The California Court of Appeals denied Dew’s petition on November 20, 2006. 

Pet.’s Exh. X at 1. The court found that, while the Board could not automatically exclude

individuals from parole based on a certain type of offense, it could weigh the degree of

violence used and the amount of viciousness shown by the defendant. Id. at 1-2. In

addition, the court referred to Dew’s plea agreement and the fact that Dew was not

promised parole under the plea agreement. Id. Dew acknowledged the possibility of

spending the rest of his life in prison under the plea agreement. Id. The appellate court

affirmed that the superior court was correct in following the law declared by the California

Supreme Court. Id.

The California Supreme Court denied Dew’s petition for review. Pet.’s Exh. V.

ISSUES

Dew raises many issues in his habeas petition, several of which are actually

duplicative of others. Review of the briefs demonstrates that Dew is essentially raising the

following three claims:

1) that the state court’s decision to uphold the Board’s denial of parole was not

supported by sufficient evidence and was an unreasonable application of

clearly established United States Supreme Court law; 

2) that the unsuitability criteria the Board relied on to find him unsuitable for

parole are unconstitutionally vague; and

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3) that the Board violated the terms of his plea agreement by failing to set his

parole date.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”) apply to this petition since it was filed after the Act’s effective date. Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). Under AEDPA, a district court may not grant a petition

challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the

merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, and satisfies the

requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite

to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a

case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Williams(Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-413 (2000). A state court decision is an

“unreasonable application” of Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of §

2254(d)(1), if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the from

[the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The federal court, on habeas review, may not issue the writ

“simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant statecourt decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. 

The court must instead determine it was objectively unreasonable to support granting a

writ. Id. at 409.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537

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The California Court of Appeals’ denial of Dew’s state habeas petition was the highest

state court opinion of this case. 

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U.S. 322, 340 (2003); see also Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1007 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Section 2254(d) applies to a state prisoner’s habeas petition challenging the denial of

parole. Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1126-1167 (9th Cir. 2006).

When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the

petitioner’s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion2

 to ensure that the state

courts decided the case on the merits. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-806

(1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079, n. 2 (9th Cir. 2000). A federal court

in a habeas case should apply the following presumption: “Where there has been one

reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that

judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground.” Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803.

DISCUSSION

 I. Clearly Established Federal Law - “Some Evidence” Standard

Dew challenges the Board’s decision finding him unsuitable for parole. There is "no

constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the

expiration of a valid sentence." Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex,

442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). However, if a state's statutory parole scheme uses mandatory

language, it may create a presumption that parole release will be granted when or unless

certain designated findings are made, thereby giving rise to a constitutionally protected

liberty interest. See Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 376-78 (1987). In such a

case, a prisoner has a legitimate expectation in parole that cannot be denied without

adequate procedural due process protections. Id. at 373-381; Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-

16.

California’s parole scheme uses mandatory language and is largely parallel to the

schemes found in Allen and Greenholtz, giving rise to a protected liberty interest in release

on parole. Allen, 482 U.S. at 373-381; Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-16; Cal. Penal Code §

3041(b). Pursuant to California Penal Code § 3041(b), the Board will set a release date

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unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense, or the timing and

gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the

public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for the individual. Cal. Penal

Code § 3041(b). If that is the case, a parole date cannot be fixed at that meeting. Id. The

Ninth Circuit has held that California’s parole scheme creates a presumption that parole

release will be granted unless the statutorily defined determinations are made. McQuillion

v. Duncan, 306 F. 3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The United States Supreme Court has clearly established that a parole board’s

decision deprives a prisoner of due process if the board’s decision is not supported by

“some evidence in the record,” or is “otherwise arbitrary.” Irons v. Casey, 479 F.3d 658,

662 (9th Cir. 2002) (adopting “some evidence” standard for disciplinary hearings outlined in

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985)); see McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904

(same); Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129 (recognizing “some evidence” standard is required to

uphold Board’s decision, but denying petition where Board’s reliance on gravity of offenses

in combination with prior offenses was sufficient); Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915-17

(9th Cir. 2003) (finding several grounds for denial of parole release date lacked evidentiary

support, but denying habeas relief because three other grounds were supported by some

evidence). The “some evidence” standard identified in Hill is clearly-established federal law

in the parole context for AEDPA purposes. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29. 

In addition, the evidence underlying the Board's decision must have some “indicia of

reliability.” McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904; Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389,

1390 (9th Cir. 1987). A relevant factor in determining whether the evidence underlying the

Board’s decision has some indicia of reliability is whether the prisoner was afforded an

opportunity to appear before, and present evidence to the Board. See Pedro v. Oregon

Parole Bd., 825 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, if the Board’s determination

of parole suitability is to satisfy due process, there must be some evidence, with some

indicia of reliability, to support the decision. Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th

Cir. 2005); McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904.

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 The court cautioned that if “Biggs continue[d] to demonstrate exemplary behavior and

evidence of rehabilitation, denying him a parole date simply because of the nature of Biggs’

offense and prior conduct would raise serious questions involving his liberty interest in parole.”

Biggs, 334 F.3d at 917; Rosas, 428 F.3d at 1232.

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When assessing whether the Board’s suitability determination was supported by

“some evidence,” the court’s analysis is framed by the statutes and regulations governing

parole suitability determinations in the relevant state. Irons, 479 at 662. Accordingly, in

California, the court must first look to California law to evaluate the findings necessary to

deem a prisoner unsuitable for parole. Then, the court must review the record in order to

determine whether the state court’s determination that the Board’s decision was supported

by “some evidence,” itself constituted an unreasonable application of the “some evidence”

principle articulated in Hill. Id. 

Determining whether the “some evidence” standard is met “does not require

examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or

weighing of the evidence.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. The "some evidence” standard is

minimally stringent, such that a decision will be upheld if there is any evidence in the record

that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Powell v. Gomez, 33

F.3d 39 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-456). The main purpose of this

standard is to ensure that the Board’s findings were not “without support or otherwise

arbitrary.” Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 457).

The Ninth Circuit has recently focused on the Board’s reliance on the circumstances

surrounding the commitment offense as the sole grounds for denying parole. In Biggs, the

court reasoned that “continued reliance in the future on an unchanging factor, the

circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs contrary to the

rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result in a due process

violation.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-917. In Biggs however, the Ninth Circuit did uphold the

initial denial of a parole release date based solely on the nature of the crime and the

prisoner’s conduct before incarceration. Id. at 917.3

 

The Ninth Circuit’s subsequent decision in Sass questioned its prior decision in

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Biggs. The court noted specifically that, “[u]nder AEDPA it is not our function to speculate

about how future parole hearings could proceed.” Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129 (determining that

it is not a due process violation for the Board to determine parole suitability based solely on

the immutable circumstances of the commitment offense). Even more recently, in Irons,

the Ninth Circuit reiterated its reasoning in Biggs, stressing the court’s desire that “the

Board will come to recognize that in some cases, indefinite detention based solely on an

inmate’s commitment offense, regardless of the extent of his rehabilitation, will at some

point violate due process, given the liberty interest in parole that flows from relevant

California statutes.” Irons, 479 F.3d at 665. However, despite the Ninth Circuit’s

intimations that parole denial based solely on the commitment offense could result in a due

process violation, it has not created a standard to enable the trial courts to identify such a

violation.

A. Parole Board’s Weighing of Unsuitability Factors

Dew argues that a “preponderance of the evidence” standard should apply to this

court’s review of the Board’s decision, as opposed to the “some evidence” standard relied

on by the state courts. It is clearly established federal law that the requirements of due

process are satisfied so long as some evidence supports the decisions made by the Board. 

Hill, 472 U.S. at 454. “This standard is met if there was some evidence from which the

conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced.” Id. (citing United States ex re.

Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927)). Thus, the relevant

issue is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the decision of the

Board in denying Dew’s parole. Id. 

1. Parole Board Factors Satisfying “Some Evidence” Standard

The Board considered several factors, including the circumstances of Dew’s

commitment offense, in determining that he still posed an unreasonable risk of danger to

society or a threat to public safety if released, thus making him unsuitable for parole. It is

not the duty of this court to re-weigh the unsuitability factors weighed by the Board. 

Instead, the court is limited to determining whether there was some evidence to support the

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 This is a difficult question because of the lack of clarity in the record. Dew claims that

he was not involved in the actual beating and murder of the victim; however one of his coconspirators (Patton) testified that Dew brought the rope and the knife used to bind and kill the

victim. Resp. Exh. 2 at 56-57. He also claimed that Dew handed him the knife and told him

to “finish it.” Id. at 57. Dew claimed that Patton later changed his story while in prison, stating

that he lied about Dew’s involvement and that Dew had left before the murder as he said. The

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Board’s decision.

a. Commitment Offense

Dew claims that his right to due process was violated because he was denied parole

based on the unchanging facts of his commitment offense. The Board may consider the

gravity of the commitment offense in assessing an inmate’s suitability for parole. Cal.

Penal Code § 3041(b). The circumstances of the commitment offense may support

unsuitability for parole if the “prisoner committed the offense in an especially heinous,

atrocious, or cruel manner.” 15 Cal. Code of Regs. § 2402(c)(1). 

The Board reflected on the circumstances surrounding Dew’s commitment offense,

including the fact that the victim was tied up, beaten, and abused in a manner that

demonstrated “complete disregard for human suffering.” Resp. Exh. 2 at 99. The Board

described the circumstances surrounding the crime as being “extremely cruel” and “very

callous.” Id. The Board also recognized that while it might not have been Dew’s and his

co-conspirators’ plan to kill the victim, the crime was calculated and pre-planned to remove

the victim’s property, during commission of which, the victim was killed. Id. Therefore, the

Board was correct in recognizing that the motive for the crime was very trivial in relation to

the offense. 15 Cal. Code of Regs. § 2402(c)(1)(E).

The Board is free to consider the circumstances surrounding the commitment

offense as one of several unsuitability factors. 15 Cal. Code of Regs. § 2402(c)(1). Dew

argues that it is error for the Board to consider his acts to be “exceptionally callous” and

“cruel” because he was not even present during the murder. Dew’s Points and Authorities

(“DP&A’s”) at 52. The difficulty for Dew is that he pled guilty to Second Degree Murder for

his participation in the offense, an offense which was itself was “exceptionally callous” and

“cruel.”4

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Dew’s circumstances closely parallel the prisoner’s situation in Biggs. In Biggs’, the

petitioner did not commit the murder himself, but was “intertwined with the conspiracy from

the very beginning.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916. Like Dew, Biggs also had a positive record of

behavior while in prison and a record of vocational and educational achievements. Id. The

court does note however, that Biggs was serving a sentence of 25 years to life and the

case constituted his first parole denial, unlike Dew, who is contesting his eighth denial. Id.

Like Biggs, Dew’s participation, in whatever role, in the commitment offense makes

him “intertwined with the conspiracy.” Id. As a result, Dew was forced to deal with the

consequences of his participation and with the “atrocious” results of the crime. Id. The

Board properly relied on Dew’s commitment offense as a central factor weighing in support

of unsuitability for parole.

2. Additional Unsuitability Factors

In addition to the circumstances of the commitment offense, the Board may use a

number of general factors when weighing a prisoner’s suitability for parole. 15 Cal. Code

Regs. § 2402(c)-(d). The weight given to each factor and the way the factors are balanced

is within the Board’s broad discretion, but a decision to deny parole cannot be arbitrary or

capricious. In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th at 656-657, 677. Other unsuitability factors the

Board may consider include: the defendant’s prior record of violence; psychological

factors; unstable social history; and institutional behavior. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c). 

The Board may rely on some of the unsuitability factors more than others, but the some

evidence standard is minimal and does not require overwhelming evidence in support of

the Board’s decision. Hill, 445 U.S. at 454. The factors are discussed below.

a. Prior History of Violence

Here, the Board considered Dew’s prior violent criminal offenses as an unsuitability

factor in denying his parole. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c)(2). In the Board’s decision, it

cited Dew’s prior arrests for battery on a person in 1980, pimping in 1981, and attempted

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burglary. Resp. Exh. 2 at 100-101. 

Dew attempted to explain the 1980 battery and false imprisonment offense by

claiming that he was protecting the female victim from an abusive boyfriend who showed

up at his residence. Id. at 22. 

To Dew’s credit, he has not committed any violent acts during his 24 years in prison

and his other priors, aside from the battery charge in 1980, were minor, non-violent

offenses. Id. at 22, 25. While the Board cited Dew’s history of violent crimes as a factor

supporting parole unsuitability, the weight accorded this factor could not have been

significant, given the age and relatively minor nature of that history. However, it is

important to note that this was just one of several suitability factors the Board considered. 

Even though Dew’s prior history of violence, taken alone, may not have substantially

supported a finding of unsuitability, it could have contributed to such a finding. 15 Cal.

Code Regs. § 2402(b). 

b. Psychological Factors

Another unsuitability factor the Board considered included Dew’s psychological

reports. The Board is permitted to look at a prisoner’s history of mental problems as a

factor weighing in favor of an unsuitability finding. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(b). Dew

spent three years of his prison term at Atascadero State Hospital, where the physicians

identified Dew’s prior history of hearing voices and hostility towards women. Resp. Exh. 2

at 102. 

In 2003, Dr. Gamard evaluated Dew, which resulted in a positive report. Id. The

Board found this report supportive of release, but the Board was concerned because Dr.

Gamard’s report did not specifically address Dew’s issues identified at Atascadero State

Hospital. Id. In its decision denying parole, the Board requested a new psychiatric report

for Dew’s next parole hearing, specifically identifying and evaluating his past problems with

hearing voices and his lifelong hostility towards women. Id.

Although the Board acknowledged Dr. Gamard’s report as a factor weighing in favor

of Dew’s release, the court finds that the Board’s concerns about Dew’s potentially

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unresolved psychological issues from earlier in his prison term were legitimate. Because

the purpose of parole is to determine whether or not the prisoner poses a present risk to

society, the Board properly determined that Dew’s failure to demonstrate having overcome

previously diagnosed psychiatric problems weighed in favor of an unsuitability finding. 

Resp. Exh. 2 at 102. 

c. Unstable Social History

Dew claims that the Board misinterpreted the unsuitability criteria to require an

unstable social history generally, when unsuitability criteria should only apply where a

prisoner has “a history of unstable or tumultuous relationships with others.” Traverse

Points & Authorities (“TravP’s&A’s”) at 12. Furthermore, Dew interprets unstable or

tumultuous relationships with others as addressing only Dew’s contribution to the

relationship. Id. Dew reads the California Code of Regulations too narrowly. The Board

can properly consider Dew’s past and present relationships as a factor in determining

unsuitability for parole. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(b). 

The Board cites to Dew’s “history of unstable relationships with others” and rough

childhood during which his father abused him. Resp. Exh. 2 at 101. Dew’s father abused

him because he received poor grades due to his undiagnosed learning disabilities. Id.

Dew argues that the abuse inflicted by his father is completely beyond his control, does not

demonstrate his social instability, and should not have been considered by the Board. 

TravP’s&A’s at 12. The Board is allowed, however, to consider possible effects that Dew’s

past relationships had on his past and current relationships.

Additionally, the Board considered that Dew used alcohol, LSD, marijuana and

cocaine, in addition to indicating his preference for “being a street person.” Resp. Exh. 2 at

101. Dew also gave one child (his daughter) up for adoption. Id. Dew has since

reconciled with his daughter while in prison, which the Board indicated was “favorable.” Id.

The Board also cited Dew’s history of hatred towards women and how that

manifested itself in his arrest for pimping. Id. at 101-102. This is another reason the Board

requested a more specific psychiatric work-up from Dew. 

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The 128 “counseling chronos” were citations for being late to work and the 115

“disciplinaries” were all nonviolent and did not involve weapons. Resp. Exh. 2 at 49; Pet.’s

Exh. W at 6. 

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Without question, Dew had a tragic upbringing during which his father abused him,

and he lived in an all around “unhealthy, dysfunctional, and severely abusive” family

environment. Resp. Exh. 2 at 31. Contrary to Dew’s argument, the Board did not judge his

social relationships based solely on factors outside his control. Instead, it looked at later

relationships and potential residual effects that his upbringing may have had on those

relationships. The Board did take into account the positive strides he made by reconciling

with his daughter and participating in AA and NA Substance Abuse Programs. Overall,

however, the Board’s decision that Dew’s social history was a factor weighing in support of

his unsuitability was supported by some evidence in the record.

d. Institutional Behavior

Another factor the Board can consider to support a finding of unsuitability for parole

is any misconduct by the prisoner while serving his prison term. 15 Cal. Code Regs. 

§ 2402(b). The Board pointed to Dew’s lack of participation in institutional programs in

more recent years and the fact that he has not participated in his vocational training since

the late 1980's. Resp. Exh. 2 at 101. The Board also took into account Dew’s history of

minor and more serious disciplinary actions while incarcerated, including nine 128(a)

“counseling chronos” and six 115 “disciplinaries.” Id. at 101.5

 The Board did recognize and

commend Dew for the fact that he had remained disciplinary-free since 1998. Id. at 101-

102.

In addition to commending Dew for being disciplinary-free since 1998, the Board

also noted that none of his prior disciplinaries were violent or involved drugs or alcohol

abuse. Id. at 102-103. The Board also cited Dew’s good work in a number of different jobs

while incarcerated. It specifically pointed to the fact that Dew had participated in AA and

NA Substance Abuse Programs in addition to completing educational and vocational

courses. Id.

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Nevertheless, the Board concluded that consideration of both Dew’s positive and

negative institutional behavior over the duration of his term supported a determination that

he was unsuitable for parole. Due to Dew’s lack of serious discipline for any type of violent

infractions and his commended behavior over the last several years, this factor should not

have weighed heavily in support of denying Dew’s parole. However, even if some grounds

lack evidentiary support, the Board’s decision would still be upheld if other grounds were

supported by some evidence. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915-917.

e. Conclusion

The Board’s decision to deny parole was on the whole, quite balanced. The Board

recognized several significant positive factors, while not unduly emphasizing several

negative factors. The Board’s decision was supported by the factors discussed above,

including the nature of Dew’s commitment offense, his social history, his institutional

behavior, and his unresolved psychiatric issues. Although the Board’s evidence for some

of the enumerated factors was not overwhelmingly convincing, the evidence supporting the

commitment offense, social history and psychiatric issues provided some evidence to

support the Board’s decision. Id.

Dew argues that following Biggs, the Board’s reliance solely on his commitment

offense violated his due process rights. Id. at 917. Because of the factual similarity

between this case and Biggs, combined with the fact that this is Dew’s eighth denial, it is

arguable that Dew’s circumstances present a set of facts that could fit into the due process

door left open by the Ninth Circuit. Id. The Ninth Circuit stated in Biggs that, “[a] continued

reliance in the future on an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the offense and conduct

prior to imprisonment, runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison

system and could result in a due process violation.” Id. Therefore, although the court

upheld the parole denial in Biggs, the court recognized that a set of circumstances similar

to those in Biggs, but demonstrating repeated reliance based solely on the commitment

offense despite evidence of rehabilitation, could amount to a due process violation.

Here, the Board did provide supplemental unsuitability factors, in addition to its

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consideration of the commitment offense, that offered some additional supporting evidence

for the decision to deny Dew’s parole. Because the Board’s decision is due a great deal of

deference, the evidence it provided was sufficient to deny Dew’s parole without violating his

right to due process. Thus, there was no constitutional violation and the state courts’

rejection of Dew’s claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established United States Supreme Court law.

II. Unsuitability Criteria are Not Unconstitutionally Vague

Dew argues that the regulatory language used by the Board to determine that he

was unsuitable for parole was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. Dew primarily

challenges the regulation set forth in title 15 section 2402(c)(1) of the California Code of

Regulations, which the Board uses to determine whether “[t]he prisoner committed the

offense in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner.” 15 Cal. Code Regs. 

§ 2402(c)(1). 

The “Commitment Offense” unsuitability factor includes five further sub-factors which

help to clarify the “heinous, atrocious, and cruel” language of the commitment offense

factor. Id. The sub-factors are as follows: 

(A) whether multiple victims were attacked; 

(B) whether the offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner; 

(C) whether the victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during the offense; 

(D) whether the offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an

exceptionally callous disregard for human life; 

(E) whether the motive for the crime is very trivial in relation to the offense.

15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c)(1)(A)-(E). Dew claims that these sub-definitions provide little

guidance because they, too, are too general and do nothing to clarify the “heinous,

atrocious, or cruel” language. TravP’s&A’s at 18. 

In Arave v. Creech, the United States Supreme Court considered an Idaho death

penalty statute in evaluating whether the Idaho Supreme Court’s adoption of a limiting

construction, with regards to the statutory phrase “utter disregard for human life,” rendered

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 The Court found the following limiting construction was sufficient to meet constitutional

requirements: “[A]cts or circumstances surrounding the crime which exhibit the highest, the

utmost, callous disregard for human life, i.e., the cold-blooded pitiless slayer.” Arave, 507 U.S.

at 468, 471.

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the statute unconstitutionally vague. 507 U.S. 463, 471 (1993). The Court held that the

language of the statute would not be unconstitutionally vague unless it was “too vague to

provide any guidance.” Id. The Arave Court concluded that the aggravating factor of “utter

disregard for human life” was not unconstitutionally vague because one of its clarifying subdefinitions was sufficient to clarify the language of the statute. Id. at 471-474.6

 Given this,

the California regulation’s five sub-definitions, which together clarify the seriousness of the

commitment offense for parole purposes, provide sufficient clarity as to what specific

factors the Board is permitted to rely on to support its decision. 

In addition, the Board’s application of the sub-factors in this case should be more

than adequate to satisfy any vagueness concerns. The Board considered all the evidence

surrounding Dew’s offense and found that factors (B) through (E) all applied to his case. 15

Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c)(1)(A)-(E). The Board explained that the crime was pre-planned,

the victim was both abused and mutilated during the “brutal” offense, the manner of the

offense showed a callous disregard for human life, and that the motive was trivial in relation

to the offense. Resp. Exh. 2 at 102-103.

Dew fails to provide any authority holding or even intimating that the language in the

regulation is unconstitutionally vague. Applying Arave, the sub-factors clarifying the

language of the commitment offense provide more than the “some guidance” necessary. 

Arave, 507 U.S. at 471. The unsuitability criteria are not unconstitutionally vague, and the

Board’s application of the factors provided sufficient explanation regarding how they

applied to the facts of Dew’s case.

III. Breach of Plea Agreement

Dew also argues that the Board violated his plea agreement by not setting his parole

release date. Dew claims that he pled guilty to second degree murder, accepting the

consequences, but also entitling him to the benefits of the lesser offense (as opposed to

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first degree murder). DP’s&A’s at 23. Dew asserts that the plea agreement he entered

was a binding contract, and that he was denied the “reciprocal benefit” of the contract by

being denied parole. Id. at 21. 

A criminal defendant has a due process right to enforce the terms of a plea

agreement. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261-262 (1971). To determine whether

a plea agreement was breached, the court must look to what the parties reasonably

understood to be the terms of the agreement. Buckley v. Terhune, 441 F.3d 688, 696-697

(9th Cir. 2006). 

In the agreement, Dew acknowledged that he could spend the rest of his life in

prison. Resp. Exh. 2 at 56. Dew received a fifteen year to life sentence, not a fifteen-year

fixed sentence. The reciprocal benefit of the agreement was that Dew received an earlier

opportunity for parole than he would have had if he had convicted of a greater offense (i.e.,

first degree murder). The opportunity for an earlier parole hearing was not a guarantee that

parole would be granted. Dew received the benefit of earlier parole consideration and that

was all he was entitled to under the agreement. The Board did not breach the terms of the

agreement, and there was no constitutional violation. Thus, the state courts’ rejection of

petitioner’s claim was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established United States Supreme Court authority.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Dew’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 26, 2007

____________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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