Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00518/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00518-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NICOLAS GONZALEZ-CAYETANO,

Plaintiff,

v.

CORRECTIONS CORPORATION

OF AMERICA, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:05-CV-00518-OWW-LJO-P

ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO EITHER

FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT OR NOTIFY

COURT OF WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED

ONLY ON COGNIZABLE CLAIMS

(Doc. 1)

I. Screening Order

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff Nicolas Gonzalez-Cayetano (“plaintiff”) is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se and

in forma pauperis in this civil action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which provides a remedy for violation of civil rights by

federal actors. Plaintiff filed this action on April 20, 2005.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall 

///

Case 1:05-cv-00518-OWW -LJO Document 9 Filed 11/07/05 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467

U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citingConley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt

Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under this

standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg.

Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395

U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

B. Summary of Plaintiff’s Complaint

The events at issue in the instant action allegedly occurred at the California City Correctional

Center in California City, California, where plaintiff is presently incarcerated. Plaintiff names

Corrections Corporation of America, the California City Correctional Center, J. Robertson, K. Pluta,

L. Carpenter, A. Wong, Juarez, Garcia,Gilkey, Ramos, L. Carpenter, Lujano and various unspecified

Does as defendants. Plaintiff is seeking money damages and injunctive relief.

C. Plaintiff’s Claims

1. Corrections Corporation of America and the California City Correctional

Center as Defendants

Plaintiff names Corrections Corporation of America and the California City Correctional

Center as defendants. However, plaintiff’s Bivens claims against these entities fail as a matter of

law because plaintiff may not recover damages against private corporations. Correctional Serv.

Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63 (2001) (declining to extend Bivens damages action to allow for

recovery against private corporation). 

2. Claim One - Excessive Force

Plaintiff alleges that on October 1, 2004, defendant Robertson forced him to attend a

disciplinary hearing. After plaintiff stood up due to excessively tight handcuffs, defendant took him

Case 1:05-cv-00518-OWW -LJO Document 9 Filed 11/07/05 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

outside and beat him, causing him to lose consciousness and sustain multiple injuries. Plaintiff

alleges that defendant Garcia participated in the beating and that defendant Juarez, a supervising

officer, knew about the beating but failed to intervene and stop subordinate officers Robertson and

Garcia.

“Whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of

the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause [of the Eighth Amendment], the core judicial inquiry is

. . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously

and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992) (citing Whitley v.

Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)). “In determining whether the use of force was wanton and

unnecessary, it may also be proper to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship

between the need and the amount of force used, the threat ‘reasonably perceived by the responsible

officials,’ and ‘any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.’” Hudson, 503 U.S.

at 7. “The absence of serious injury is . . . relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not

end it.” Id. 

Not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action. Id. at

9. “Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s

chambers, violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights.” Id. (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028,

1033 (2nd Cir. 1973) (cert. denied sub nom. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)). “The Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments necessarily excludes from

constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of

a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’” Id. at 9-10.

The court finds that plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to give rise to a claim for relief

against defendants Robertson, Garcia, and Juarez for use of excessive force, in violation plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment rights. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-

15 (2002); Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004). In claim one, in addition to

alleging excessive force, plaintiff alleges claims based on cruel and unusual punishment, assault

while handcuffed, being held hostage, and intentional torture. Plaintiff’s allegations give rise to a

claim for relief for excessive force, in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the

Case 1:05-cv-00518-OWW -LJO Document 9 Filed 11/07/05 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Eighth Amendment. There are no separate and distinct claims for relief under federal law available

to plaintiff for cruel and unusual punishment, assault while handcuffed, being held hostage, and

intentional torture. Therefore, plaintiff’s claim one shall be treated as one claim for excessive force.

3. Claim Two - Retaliation and Failure to Report Incident of Force

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Robertson falsely charged him with attempted assault, in

violation of prison rules, in retaliation for plaintiff’s attempts to seek medical care and petition staff

members for surgery. Plaintiff further alleges that defendants Robertson, Garcia, and Juarez failed

to report the incident of excessive force and plaintiff’s resulting injuries.

As with his other claims, plaintiff includes as separate and distinct claims items which are

not claims under federal law. Based on plaintiff’s allegations, plaintiff’s claims are properly

construed as claims for failure to report the incident and for retaliation. Plaintiff’s description of his

claim as one for “Malicious Incident Report and/or Reckless Disregard of the Truth and/or

Fraudulent Concealment of the Truth and/or False Assertion/Defamation to Pursuing a False Charge

in Retaliation for Frequents [sic] Medical Request of Plaintiff. Failure to Report the Exccesive [sic]

Force Used” is disregarded.

a) Failure to Report Excessive Force Incident

Plaintiff’s allegations that defendants failed to report the incident of excessive force and

failed to document his injuries do not give rise to a claim for relief under federal law. Plaintiff does

not have a constitutionally protected right to any particular documentation or investigation. 

b) Retaliation

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to petition

the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir.

1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65

F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment

retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action

against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled

the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance

a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005).

Case 1:05-cv-00518-OWW -LJO Document 9 Filed 11/07/05 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Plaintiff’s allegation that defendant Robertson filed a false disciplinary report against him in

retaliation for speaking out about his medical problems and seeking staff assistance is sufficient to

state a claim for retaliation under federal law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A.,

534 U.S. 506, 512-15 (2002); Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004).

4. Claim Three - Medical Care

Plaintiff alleges an Eighth Amendment medical care claim against defendants Ramos, Pluta,

Carpenter, Bilkey, and various Does. To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the

Eighth Amendment, prison conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.”

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does

not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the

prisoner of the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted

with deliberate indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004)

(quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). A prison official

does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an

excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Deliberate

indifference may be manifested “when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with

medical treatment,” or in the manner “in which prison physicians provide medical care.” McGuckin

v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v.

Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Where a prisoner is alleging a delay in

receiving medical treatment, the delay must have led to further harm in order for the prisoner to

make a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060

(citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

Plaintiff’s general allegations concerning his medical care are insufficient to give rise to an

Eighth Amendment medical care claim. “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi

v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not

only ‘be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious

harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 837). “‘If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has

Case 1:05-cv-00518-OWW -LJO Document 9 Filed 11/07/05 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Plaintiff is cautioned about including claims in this action that were not exhausted prior to filing suit. This

suit was filed on April 20, 2005, and plaintiff was allegedly denied insulin on March 16, 2005. Although the court

cannot say it is impossible, the court finds it highly unlikely that plaintiff fully exhausted this claim prior to filing this

action. Exhaustion must occur prior to filing suit. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1201 (9th Cir. 2002). 

If plaintiff included unexhausted claims in this action and either defendants raise the issue via a motion to dismiss or

it becomes apparent to the court from the record, the unexhausted claims will be dismissed. There is no exception to

the rule that claims must be fully exhausted prior to filing suit. 

 

6

not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County

of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)). Plaintiff’s allegations do not support a

claim that each of the named defendants “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to

[plaintiff’s] health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. Plaintiff may not state a claim

by naming numerous defendants and then complaining generally about various medical issues.

Plaintiff is required to allege specific facts linking each named defendant, including Doe defendants,

to acts or omissions that violated plaintiff’s rights. With respect to the more specific allegation

against defendant Lujano, the allegation that Lujano denied plaintiff his insulin injection on March

16, 2005 is not sufficient to state a claim.1

5. Claim Four - Oppression, Fraud, and Misrepresentation

Plaintiff alleges state law claims for oppression, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation.

“Oppression” is not a common law tort and plaintiff has provided no authority for the proposition

that there is a separate and distinct legal claim under California for law for “oppression.” 

Fraud and misrepresentation is one claim rather than two, as pled by plaintiff. The elements

of fraudulent misrepresentation are: “(1) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or

nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity (scienter); (3) intent to induce reliance; (4) justifiable

reliance; and (5) resulting damages. Okun v. Morton, 250 Cal.Rptr. 220, 235 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).

All elements must be present and the absence of any one element is fatal to recovery. Id. Plaintiff

may not pursue a claim for relief for fraudulent misrepresentation because to the extent that a false

report was prepared by defendant Robertson, plaintiff was aware of its falsity from the onset and did

not rely on report.

///

///

Case 1:05-cv-00518-OWW -LJO Document 9 Filed 11/07/05 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

6. Claim Five - Conspiracy

Plaintiff alleges a claim for relief for conspiracy. A complaint must “allege [some] facts to

support the existence of a conspiracy among the defendants.” Buckey v. County of Los Angeles, 968

F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992); Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Department, 839 F.2d 621, 626

(9th Cir. 1988). Further, plaintiff must allege that defendants conspired or acted jointly in concert

and that some overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy. Sykes v. State of California, 497

F.2d 197, 200 (9th Cir. 1974).

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts supporting the existence of a conspiracy between

defendants, and the conclusory assertion that defendants acted in concert is insufficient to state a

claim for relief. 

7. Claim Six - Failure to Investigate, Supervise, and Train

Plaintiff alleges that defendants failed to investigate, supervise, or train. As previously

stated, plaintiff does not have a constitutionally protected right to an investigation. Therefore, the

allegation that defendants failed to investigate does not give rise to a claim for relief.

With respect to the failure to train, in City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989),

the Supreme Court held that under certain circumstances, a municipality may be held liable based

on the failure to train its employees. This court finds no authority for the extension of City of Canton

and its progeny to prison officials being sued in their personal capacities. It appears to this court,

following a review of the relevant case law, that the cases involving failure to train are limited to

suits against city and county entities. This is not to say that plaintiff cannot allege facts involving

the failure to train that are sufficient to state a claim under a theory of supervisory liability. For

instance, it is possible that the failure to train employees in a particular respect may amount to a

policy or practice of failing to provide employees with adequate training, and that the policy or

practice of failing to provide adequate training amounts to deliberate indifference.

With respect to supervisory liability, supervisory personnel cannot be held liable in a Bivens

action for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. Terrell v. Brewer,

935 F.2d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 1991). When the named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the

causal link between the defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically

Case 1:05-cv-00518-OWW -LJO Document 9 Filed 11/07/05 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438,

441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief for supervisory

liability, plaintiff must allege some facts indicating that the defendant either: personally participated

in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent

them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation

of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black,

885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045

(9th Cir. 1989). 

Plaintiff has alleged no facts that give rise to a claim for relief based on supervisory liability.

The conclusory assertion that defendants failed to supervise does not provide a basis upon which to

impose liability. Further, plaintiff does not allege which defendants failed to supervise. Plaintiff is

suing numerous defendants. Plaintiff must allege facts linking specifically identified defendants to

acts or omissions that violated his rights.

D. Conclusion

The court finds that plaintiff’s complaint contains cognizable claims for relief pursuant to

Bivens against defendants Robertson, Garcia, and Juarez for use of excessive force, and against

defendant Robertson for retaliation. However, the court finds that plaintiff’s complaint does not

contain any other claims upon which relief may be granted. The court will provide plaintiff with the

opportunity to file an amended complaint, if plaintiff wishes to do so.

If plaintiff does not wish to file an amended complaint and wishes to proceed against

defendants Robertson, Garcia, and Juarez for use of excessive force, and against defendant

Robertson for retaliation only, plaintiff may so notify the court in writing. The court will then issue

Findings and Recommendations recommending that the remaining claims and defendants be

dismissed from this action, and will forward plaintiff three summonses and three USM-285 forms

to fill out and return to the court. Upon receipt of these documents, the court will direct the United

States Marshal to initiate service of process on defendants Robertson, Garcia, and Juarez.

In the event that plaintiff does wish to amend his complaint, plaintiff is advised Local Rule

15-220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior

Case 1:05-cv-00518-OWW -LJO Document 9 Filed 11/07/05 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux

v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions

complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy,

625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named

defendant is involved. There can be no liability unless there is some affirmative link or connection

between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976);

May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.

1978). 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a Bivens complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff must either:

a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in

this order, or

b. Notify the court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended complaint

and wishes to proceed only against defendants Robertson, Garcia, and Juarez

for use of excessive force, and against defendant Robertson for retaliation;

and

3. If plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure to

obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 7, 2005 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00518-OWW -LJO Document 9 Filed 11/07/05 Page 9 of 9