Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-01005/USCOURTS-ca10-93-01005-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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fEB 2 6 1994 

UNITRD STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

THNTH CIRCUIT 

MARTHA GRIFFITH, 

Plaintiff-appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF COLORADO, DIVISION OF 

YOUTH SERVICES, 

Defendant-appellee. 

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20BE2T L HOEC::ER 

"'l- ~ \. •I. . : 

No. 93-1005 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 91-K-1581) 

George c. Price of Miles & Epstein, Denver, Col orado, for 

appellant. 

Simon P. Lipstein (Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Raymond T. 

Slau ghter, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Timothy M. Tymkovich, 

Solicitor General, Timothy R. Arnold, Deputy Attorney General, 

Gregg E. Kay, Fi rst Assistant Attorney General, with him on the 

brief}, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for 

appellee. 

Before KELLY and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and ROGERS*, District 

Judge. 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge. 

*The Honorable Richard D. Rogers, Senior Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designati on. 

Appellate Case: 93-1005 Document: 01019662895 Date Filed: 02/28/1994 Page: 1 
This Title VII, 42 u.s.c. § 2000e, ~ seg., case is before us 

on appeal from the district court's grant of summary judgment in 

favor of the defendant, State of Colorado, Division of Youth 

Services (DYS) . The plaintiff-appellant, Martha Griffith, 

hereinafter referred to as Griffith or plaintiff, claimed that she 

was subjected to actionable racial and sexual discriminati on and 

harassment and retaliatory actions while employed by DYS. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

The Pleadings 

In her complaint, Griffith alleged that she, as a five year 

white employee of DYS at the Adams County, Colorado, Youth 

Services Center, was subjected to ongoing and continuous sexual 

and racial discrimination and harassment by Mr. John Grier, a 

black, who served as her immediate supervisor and as Assistant 

Director of the Center. Griffith further alleged that she was the 

subject of continuing discrimination and retaliatory actions even 

after Grier was terminated, including denials of promotion. She 

prayed that judgment be entered in her favor indicating that 

defendant violated Title VII. (Plaintiff-Appellant's Appendix, 

pp. 113-15}. 

In its answer, the DYS alleged, inter alia, that there had 

been an accord and satisfaction or a settlement and release of 

Griffith's claims, that Griffith had not been discriminated 

against by .the DYS, that if anyone in the employ of the DYS had 

engaged in discrimination or harassment toward Griffith, 

appropriate actions had been taken toward those persons, and that 

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Griffith's complaint should be dismissed with prejudice for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

(Plaintiff-Appellant's Appendix, pp. 124-25). 

The Facts 

Griffith was employed by DYS for eight years, serving as a 

Youth Service Worker B, the last five years having been served at 

the Adams County, Colorado, Youth Services Center. From 1987 

until April 3, 1990, Griffith's immediate supervisor was Grier. 

On March 5, 1990, Griffith met with Madline Sa Bell, the 

personnel administrator of DYS, and informed Sa Bell that Grier 

had sexually harassed her. Sa Bell informed Griffith that she 

could proceed with either a charge of discrimination or an 

internal grievance. Griffith informed Sa Bell that she would 

proceed with an internal grievance after she returned from her 

vacation. In an affidavit executed by Griffith on August 13, 

1990, {Plaintiff-Appellant's Appendix, pp. 116-20), Griffith 

stated that Grier had: criticized her approach to kids who were 

having behavior problems and told her to cuff and shackle them, in 

contradiction to DYS procedures; threatened to write her up; 

admonished her for hugging the kids and told her that he would 

write her up if he ever saw her hugging them; hollered at her in 

the presence of the kids; made statements about her physical 

appearance as ugly and overweight, and called her a stupid white 

woman; and cussed and used words such as fucking, God~damn and 

shit while professing to be a wonderful Christian. Griffith 

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further alleged that when she told Grier that he was intimidating 

and overbearing, Grier remarked that Griffith would not say that 

if he were white. Grier talked about helping "his people" and 

made it plain he was speaking of black people, and he picked on 

mostly white females. Griffith saw Grier put his arm around a 

female worker's waist and kiss her on the neck, which she 

considered obscene; she also had heard rumors that Grier had 

affairs with others. 

On April 3, 1990, following her return from her vacation, 

Griffith met with Larry Johnson, Director of DYS, and grieved that 

she had been sexually harassed by Grier. Johnson phoned Sa Bell 

immediately following his meeting with Griffith and within an hour 

after the meeting, Johnson suspended Grier from his employment 

pending an investigation and instructed Grier to leave the 

workplace. Following an investigation, Grier was terminated. 

Immediately after her meeting with Johnson on April 3, 1990, 

Griffith was placed on administrative leave with full pay through 

August a, 1990. Griffith worked part time for three weeks in 

July, 1990, in DYS's Planning and Evaluation Unit. As part of her 

worker's compensation claim settlement, Griffith retained all 

benefits due her while she was on administrative leave, including 

the shift differential pay rate she would have earned. In 

addition, DYS paid all costs of her therapy and DYS provided her 

worker's compensation benefits for her alleged job-related stress. 

When Griffith indicated that she was ready to return to work on a 

part-time basis in July, 1990, she was provided work at another 

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facility until August 8, 1990, when she felt she was ready to 

return to the Adams Youth Services Center. 

The District Court Order 

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of DYS 

via a Memorandum Opinion and Order of December 7, 1992. The court 

found, from undisputed facts, that: Griffith was given 

administrative leave from April 3, 1990, to August 8, 1990; she 

suffered no loss of wages, benefits or tenure; and DYS paid all of 

her therapy bills and provided her with worker's compensation 

benefits to cover her job-related stress. 

The court further found that Title VII permits a court to 

order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, other than 

compensatory and punitive damages, including reinstatement or 

hiring of employees with or without back pay, and that Griffith 

had been made whole and had not demonstrated any actual damages. 

As to the award of nominal damages, the co~rt recognized a split 

among the circuits but ruled that nominal damages are compensatory 

in nature, and since Title VII provides for equitable, not legal 

relief, Griffith could not be awarded nominal damages. 

As to Griffith's retaliatory discrimination and denial of 

promotion claim, the court held that Griffith had failed to point 

to a specific position or promotion she could have succeeded to in 

view of a state-wide hiring freeze resulting in no promotions or 

open competitive announcements for DYS counselors since 1990. 

Noting that Griffith's EEOC charge was filed on April 4, 1990, the 

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court found that it was uncontroverted that no promotions nor open 

competitive (new positions} for DYS counselors took place after 

that date. Accordingly, the court held that Griffith was not the 

victim of retaliation. Concluding that Griffith had not raised a 

question of material fact, the court granted judgment in favor of 

DYS. 

Contentions on Aqpeal 

On appeal, Griffith contends that the district court erred 

(1) in refusing to grant nominal damages because nominal damages 

are an appropriate equitable relief under Title VII and are also 

necessary to effectuate its purposes, (2) in granti ng summary 

judgment because DYS's motion did not address the availability of 

other equitable relief, and (3) in granting summary judgment on 

her retaliation/continuing discrimination claim because there 

remains an unresolved factual dispute. 

Standard of Review 

"We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. 

We apply the same legal standard used by the district court under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c) . n Ap,plied Genetics, Int' l ·, Inc. v . 

First Affiliated Sec .. Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (~Oth Cir. 1990) 

(citation omitted). 11Summary Judgment in appropriate when there 

is no genuine dispute over a material fact and the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.n Russillo v. 

Scarborough, 935 F.2d 1167, 1170 (lOth Cir. 1991}. 

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Appellate Case: 93-1005 Document: 01019662895 Date Filed: 02/28/1994 Page: 6 
I. 

A. 

Griffith argues that because her allegations concerning a 

hostile work environment at DYS have not been challenged, she 

stated an actionable sexual harassment claim and cause of action 

under Title VII. She contends that she complained about Grier's 

abusive conduct to superiors months before the situation came to a 

head in the spring of 1990 and that the facts enumerated in her 

affidavit concerning Grier's conduct could hardly have escaped the 

DYS administration. While acknowledging that Congress did limit 

the scope of remedies under Title VII, Griffith contends that 

Congress did not thereby obliterate the cause of action. She 

states that "At the very least, the courts must fashion remedies 

to cure violations of the law within the limits set by Congress 11 

and that " an equitable remedy of some sort was both 

necessary and appropriate here." (Plaintiff-Appellant's Opening 

Brief, pp. 11-12). On that predicate, Griffith argues that the 

district court erred in rejecting the holdings of those courts to 

the effect that one in Griffith's position is entitled, at least, 

to nominal damages. Id. at p. 4. 

Griffith points to Baker v. Weyerhaeuser Company, . 903 F.2d 

1342 (lOth Cir. 1990) and Derr v. Gulf Oil CotP., 796 F.2d 340, 

344 (lOth Cir. 1986) for the proposition that while no statements 

in those cases represent holdings that nominal damages are 

available under Title VII, still "· the language in Derr 

should be read as a fairly strong indication that this court is 

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Appellate Case: 93-1005 Document: 01019662895 Date Filed: 02/28/1994 Page: 7 
likely to find an award of nominal damages appropriate." 

(Plaintiff-Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 4). 

In Baker, we simply affirmed the district court's award of 

$1.00 nominal damages on the Title VII claim after the jury 

returned verdicts of $45,000 actual damages and $45,000 punitive 

damages on a pendent Oklahoma common law t .ort claim of intentional 

infliction of emotional distress by outrageous conduct. No 

challenge was raised in that case to the nominal damage award and 

there was no discussion by the court relative thereto. In Derr, 

a Title VII case, the court found that Gulf Oil Corp. 

discriminated against Derr because of her sex when it demoted her. 

She was awarded nominal damages. The case was remanded to 

determine whether Derr had been constructively discharged. The 

court did not discuss the issue as to whether nominal damages are 

legal or equitable in nature, because it concluded that Ms. Derr 

was the "prevailing party" inasmuch as she had succeeded in a 

"significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the 

benefit [she] sought in bringing suit.n Id. at 344. The Derr 

court concluded: 

••• As we stated in Nephew v. City of Aurora, 766 

F.2d 1464 (10th Cir. 1985), "[w]e have no trouble 

finding that the plaintiffs in the instant case a-re the 

prevailing parties even though they won only nominal 

damages. Id. at 1466. Although we held in Nephew that 

the trial court abused its discretion by not discounting 

the fee award, we stated that our holding did not imply 

that "an award of nominal damages necessarily means that 

a corresponding fee award must also be nominal." Id. at 

1467. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides for damages, both compensatory and 

punitive, and injunctive relief. ~Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 

1313 (lOth Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085 (1987) 

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Appellate Case: 93-1005 Document: 01019662895 Date Filed: 02/28/1994 Page: 8 
(affirming award of both compensatory and punitive damages); 

Jackson v. Albugyergye, 890 F.2d 225 (lOth Cir. 1989) (recognizing 

reinstatement of discharged black employee and award of front 

pay). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., armed the courts with equitable 

power to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of 

unlawful employment discrimination, Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 

422 u.s. 405, 418 (1975), including reinstatement or hiring and 

back pay. Id. at 419 n.ll. The district court in the instant 

case analyzed a number of cases dealing with the subject whether 

nominal damages are appropriate as an equitable remedy under Title 

VII. 

Cases holding that nominal damages are not an equitable 

remedy under Title VII include Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 968 

F.2d 427, 431 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. granted in part, 113 S.Ct. 

1250 (1993), (nominal damages are legal, not equitable relief and 

are therefore outside the scope of remedies available under Title 

VII); King v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis . System, 898 F.2d 

533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990) (compensatory, nominal, and punitive 

damages are not available under Title VII); Swanson v. Elmhurst 

Ch~sler Plymouth. Inc., 882 F.2d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1989), 

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036 (1990) (where reinstatement, back pay, 

and any other sources of compensatory damages are not available, 

the defendant must prevai l; nominal damages are not available as 

equitable relief); Bohen v . City of East Chicago. Ind., 799 F.2d 

1180, 1184 (7th Cir. 1986) (damages are not equitable relief; if 

Congress wishes to amend the provisions of Title VII to provide a 

remedy of damages, it can do so). 

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Some of the au~horities relied upon by Griffith for the award 

of nominal damages under Title VII emphasize that such an award 

would authorize an award of attorneys' fees to the plaintiff, as 

the prevailing party. Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet. Inc., 

845 F.2d 900, 905 (11th Cir. 1988}; Maney v. Brinkley Municipal 

Waterworks and Sewer Dept., 802 F.2d 1073, 1076 (8th Cir. 1986) 

(award of nominal damages will support award of reasonable 

attorneys' fees); Katz v. Dole, 109 F.2d 251, 253 n.1 {4th Cir. 

1983} (even if Katz does not regain her job, she might be entitled 

to nominal damages and attorneys fees); T & S Service Associates. 

Inc. v. Crenson, 666 F.2d 722, 728 n.a (1st Cir. 1981) (where 

compensatory damages are not available, court should consider 

award of nominal damages with attorneys' fees) . 

We are persuaded that the district court was correct in 

ruling that nominal damages are compensatory in nature and since 

Title VII provides for equitable, not legal relief, nominal 

damages must not be awarded under Title VII. 

The word "damages" is commonly understood to connote payment 

in money for plaintiff's losses caused by defendant's breach of 

duty. United States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916, 928 (7th Cir. 

1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (1993). Nominal damages are a 

mere token, signifying that the plaintiff's rights were 

technically invaded even though he could not prove any loss or 

damage. Magnett v. Pelletier, 488 F.2d 33, 35 (1st Cir. 1973). 

In Manders v. Okl. Ex. Rel. Dept. of Mental Health, 875 F.2d 

263 {lOth Cir. 1989), we rejected plaintiff's motion for 

attorneys' fees of $6,500 for services rendered during a state 

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grievance procedure undertaken prior to filing a Title VII action. 

We concluded that allowing the fees n would tend to 

discourage private employers like the defendants in this case, 

from instituting potentially ameliorative procedures." ,Ig. at 

267. In the same vein, we observe that in the instant case the 

DYS acted promptly in suspending and terminating Grier, placing 

Griffith on four months of administrative leave with full pay, 

paying Griffith's therapy bills and providing her with worker's 

compensation benefits to cover job related stress. 

B. 

The plaintiff-appellant's opening brief in this case is dated 

April 8, 1993. The Answer Brief of defendant- appellee is dated 

May 21, 1993. No supplemental briefs or authorities have been 

filed. The parties have not cited or otherwise referred us to the 

United States Supreme Court opinion entitled Farrar ~ Hobby, 

u.s. 113 S. Ct. 566 (December 14, 1992) which, we conclude, 

also mandates an affirmance of the district court's order granting 

summary judgment on behalf of DYS, although upon grounds other 

than those relied upon by the district court. 

We may affirm on any ground adequately presented to the 

district court, Medina v. City & County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 

1500 {lOth Cir. 1992), or on a ground not raised in the district 

court provided that the record is sufficiently clear to permit us 

to do so if both parties had an adequate opportunity to develop 

the record on the issue. Seibert v. University of Oklahoma, 867 

F.2d 591, 597 (lOth Cir. 1989). 

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In Farrar, a 42 u.s.c. § 1983 civil rights case, the Supreme 

Court construed 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to determine whether a plaintiff 

who is awarded nominal damages is a "prevailing party" entitled to 

an attorney fee award. In that case, the district court awarded 

attorney's fees of $280,000. 

42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) in pertinent part, provides that in any 

action brought to enforce 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983, 1985, 1986 and 

20 U.S.C. § §§ 1681, et seq. [Title IX] or 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, et 

seq. [Title VI], 11 the court, in its discretion may allow 

the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable 

attorney's fee as part of the costs." 

42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5{k) provides that "In any action or 

proceeding under this title [Title VII] [42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et 

seq.], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing 

party, other than the Commission or the United States, a 

reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees) as part of the 

costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable 

for costs the same as a .private person." 

The standard for the award of attorneys' fee under§ 1988(b} 

is the same as that under § 2000e-S{k). Proctor v . Consolidated 

Freightways Corp., 795 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1986). In Swanson v. 

Elmhurst Chrysler Plymouth. Inc., 882 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1989), 

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036 {1990), the court refused to grant 

nominal damages under Title VII simply to make the plaintiff a 

"prevailing party 11 entitled to attorney fees. But see Derr, 796 

F.2d at 344. 

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We conclude that there is no difference between the two 

statutes inasmuch as the linchpin for recovery of a reasonable 

attorney's fee is simply that the plaintiff qualify as the 

"prevailing party." However, Farrar teaches that even though a 

nominal damage award qualifies a plaintiff as the "prevailing 

party," ~- at 573, still in a§ 1983 action seeking monetary 

relief, "when the plaintiff fails to prove an essential element of 

his claim for monetary relief, . the only reasonable fee is 

usually no fee at all." Id. at 575. 

In Farrar, the only remedy accorded the plaintiff in the 

district court was an award of nominal damages. That became the 

vehicle for the court's subsequent award of plaintiff's attorney's 

fees of $280,000. In the instant case, as in Farrar, the 

plaintiff did not succeed in any manner on the merits. 

In Farrar, 1 the court held: 

Although the "technical" nature of a nominal damage 

award or any other judgment does not effect the 

prevailing party inquiry, it does bear on the propriety 

of fees awarded under § 1988. Once civil rights 

litigation materially alters the legal relationship 

between the parties, "the degree of plaintiff's overall 

success goes to the reasonableness" of a fee award under 

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 76 

L. Ed.2d 40 (1983}; Garland, sypra [Texas State 

Teachers A£sn. v. Garland Independent School Dist., 489 

U.S. 782, 109 s. Ct. 1486 (1989)], 489 u.s. at 793., 109 

S . Ct. at 1493. Indeed, "the most critical factor" in 

determining the reasonableness of a fee award "is the 

degree of success obtained." Hensley, supra, 461 U.S. 

1 The court, in footnote 2, p. 571, observed the conflict in 

the circuits on the issue as to whether an award of nominal 

damages confers prevailing party status on a civil rights 

plaintiff, entitling the plaintiff to attorneys' fees. The Court 

cited Nephew v. Aurora, 830 F.2d 1547 (lOth Cir. 1987) (en bane) 

(Barrett, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 976 (1988) 

wherein this court affirmed an attorney fee award of $12,500 as 

reasonable, based only upon an award of nominal damages. 

Appellate Case: 93-1005 Document: 01019662895 Date Filed: 02/28/1994 Page: 13 
at 436, 103 s. Ct. at 1941. Accord, Marek v. Chesny, 

473 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S. Ct. 3012, 3017, 87 L. Ed. 2d 1 

(1985) . In this case, petitioners received nominal 

damages instead of the $17 million in compensatory 

damages that they sought. 

This litigation accomplished little beyond giving 

petitioners "the moral satisfaction of knowing that a 

federal court concluded that [their] rights had been 

violated" in some unspecified way. Hewitt, supra, 

[Hewitt v. Helms, 482 u.s. 755, 107 s. Ct. 2672, 96 L. 

Ed.2d 654 (1987)] 482 u.s. at 762, 107 s. Ct. at 2676. 

We have already observed that if a "plaintiff has 

achieved only partial or limited success, the product of 

hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole 

times a reasonable hourly rate may be an excessive 

amount." Hensley, supra, 461 U.S. at 436, 103 S. Ct. at 

1941. 

* * * 

When a plaintiff recovers only nominal 

damages because of his failure to prove an essential 

element of his claim for monetary relief, (or, in the 

instant case injunctive or equitable relief] see Carey, 

supra, [Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 98 S. Ct. 1042, 

55 L. Ed.2d 252 (1978)] at 256-257, 264, 98 S. Ct. at 

1048-1049, 1052, the only reasonable fee is usually no 

fee at all. In an apparent failure to heed our 

admonition that fee awards under § 1988 were never 

intended to 11 'produce windfalls to attorneys,' 11 

Riv~rside v. Rivera, supra, 477 u.s. at 580, 106 S. Ct. 

at 2697 ... the District Court awarded $280,000 in 

attorneys' fees without 0 consider[ing] the relationship 

between the extent of success and the amount of the fee 

award." Hensley, supra, 461 U.S. at 438, 103 s. Ct. at 

1941. (Emphasis supplied). 

113 S . Ct. at 574-75. 

Guided by Farrar, we hold that in light of the failure by 

Griffith to accomplish any success in this litigation, she would 

not be entitled to any attorney fee award. 

II. 

Griffith contends that the district court erred in granting 

summary judgment to DYS because the DYS motion did not address the 

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availability of other equitable relief. Griffith argues that 

although the district court noted that 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-S{g} {1) 

allows for "any other equitable relief as the Court deems 

appropriate, 11 the Court ignored that language after disposing of 

the nominal damages question. {Plaintiff-Appellant's Opening 

Brief, p. 9). Griffith claims that other equitable relief, 

whether affirmative or injunctive, would be appropriate in this 

case because: 

Griffith complained that Mr. Grier's abusive 

conduct to superiors several months before the situation 

came to a head in the spring of 1990 . . . . It also 

appears that the head of the facility, Larry Johnson, 

may have witnessed harassment of Griffith by Grier more 

than two years before any action was taken . . . In 

any event, the facts enumerated in Griffith's Affidavit, 

App. at pp. 116-120, could hardly have escaped the 

attention of even a minimally concerned administration. 

It can hardly be argued that there is no need to require 

some affirmative equitable relief because DYS finally 

got rid of the perpetrator. Grier left but not without 

a parachute made, if not of gold, then of some 

comforting fabric. And this was not before Griffith was 

forced into therapy and some months of leave for a 

stress-related workers compensation claim, after which 

she had to struggle with DYS to be made financially 

whole. App. at pp. 73-75. 

Id. at p. 10. 

The district court found and the record reflects that in 

addition to the immediate suspension imposed on Grier, DYS paid 

Griffith her full wages for four months while she was on 

administrative leave and that DYS also paid her therapy bills and 

provided her with worker's compensation benefits to cover her jobrelated stress. Furthermore, after Griffith utilized OYS's 

grievance procedure, Grier was promptly suspended. 

The employer is not always liable for sexual harassment 

committe~ by its supervisors, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 

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u.s. 57, 72 (1986), but may be liable under agency principles set 

forth in Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Department, 916 F.2d 

572, 576-79 (lOth Cir. 1990), where the court held that the 

employer may be liable for sexual harassment if {1) the harasser 

acted within the scope of his employment, (2) the employer failed 

to remedy a hostile work environment brought about by the sexual 

harassment of which the employer knew or should have known, or {3} 

the harasser acted under apparent authority from the employer. 

See also, Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3rd 1122, 1125 {lOth 

Cir. 1993); Summers v. State of Utah, 927 F.2d 1165, 1170 {lOth 

Cir. 1991); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406 {lOth Cir. 

1987) • 

•• For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be 

sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the 

victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment.',. 

Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. 

Although the equitable remedy of front pay may be awarded 

where an employer has created such a hostile work environment that 

reinstatement is not a reasonable remedy, Fitzgerald v. Sirloin 

Stockade. Inc., 624 F.2d 945, 956-57 {lOth Cir. 1980), the record 

shows that Griffith returned to work with DYS without an 

atmosphere of hostility. Also, there is no evidence here that DYS 

had any policy, custom or habit of condoning or permitting sexual 

harassment to occur in the workplace which might justify 

injunctive relief. DYS promptly acted to eliminate the sexuallyracially hostile work environment when informed of Grier's 

conduct. Thus, injunctive relief was not justified. In Bstate of 

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Pitre v. Western ~lectric Co., 975 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1992), we 

recognized that injunctive relief was proper inasmuch as the 

evidence demonstrated that the defendant employer had established 

and maintained over a period of years a continuing sexually 

(female) discriminatory policy respecting promotions and 

downgrades of a salaried class. 

A search of Griffith's affidavit discloses only possible 

isolated instances, entirely speculative, that the employer might 

have become aware of: a meeting called by Grier in February of 

1990 of his shift workers when Grier used the word "fucking" once, 

and rumors of possible affairs Grier was having with staff 

members. Nothing therein can fairly be read to constitute facts 

which the employer knew or should have known of or which, standing 

alone, create a hostile work environment. Furthermore, nothing in 

the statement of Pat Kirk, formerly employed as a diagnostician at 

the Adams Detention Center, in anywise reflects any information 

concerning Grier which can fairly invoke DYS liability. In 

effect, the matters related by Griffith are so isolated, 

infrequent in terms of total employment service, or so 

questionable in relation to sexual harassment of Griffith that we 

agree with the district court that the record contains only 

conclusory and speculative allegations, none of which meet the 

Hirschfeld test. There is nothing in this record demonstrating 

that the district court erred in refusing to grant Griffith 

declaratory, injunctive or other equitable relief. 

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III. 

Griffith argues that the district court erred in granting 

summary judgment to DYS on her retaliation, continuing 

discrimination claim because of unresolved disputed facts. 

An examination announcement was issued by DYS in July, 1990, 

to establish a list of employees eligible for promotion. Griffith 

took the examination on August 21, 1990, and was ranked twelfth on 

the October 5, 1990, list with a score of 80. Sa Bell's affidavit 

asserted that Griffith was not referred for positions from that 

list because of her rank, score, and availability of BFOQ (bona 

fide occupational qualification) (male only positions) . In Sa 

Bell's affidavit, she further stated that the October 5, 1990, 

list expired on October 5, 1991, and that because of a state-wide 

freeze on state employment "· .. there have been no promotional 

nor open competitive announcements for youth Services Counselors 

since 1990." (Appendix, p. 49}. 

We agree with DYS that Griffith's argument that DYS must 

establish the necessity for a BFOQ (male only position) is nothing 

but a red herring. (Answer Brief of Defendant-Appellee, p. 13). 

The record is uncontroverted that there were no positions, male 

only, female only, or gender neutral available for Griffith or any 

other employee eligible for promotion because of a state-wide 

freeze on promotions since 1990. Thus, we agree with the district 

court's conclusion that Griffith has not raised a question of 

material fact and that she "· .. points to no specific position 

or promotion that could form the basis of her retaliation claim." 

(Appendix, p. 16). 

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Appellate Case: 93-1005 Document: 01019662895 Date Filed: 02/28/1994 Page: 18 
In Archuleta v. Colorado Dept. of Institutions, 936 F.2d 483, 

486 (lOth Cir. 1991), we held that a plaintiff alleging that she 

was retaliated against for filing a prior sex discrimination claim 

must show, in order to establish a prima facie claim for 

retaliation, (1) she engaged in a protected opposition to 

discrimination or participation in a proceeding arising out of the 

discrimination, (2) adverse action by the employer subsequent to 

the protected activity, and (3) a causal connection between the 

employee's activity and the adverse action. 

Here, Griffith has failed to point to any adverse action by 

DYS after she filed her complaint with the EEOC . For the 

foregoing reason, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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Appellate Case: 93-1005 Document: 01019662895 Date Filed: 02/28/1994 Page: 19