Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02812/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02812-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY McGINNIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

A.T. RAMOS,

Defendant.

Case No.: 15-cv-2812 JLS (JLB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION GRANTING 

IN PART AND DENYING IN PART

MOTION TO DISMISS

[ECF No. 9]

Plaintiff Anthony McGinnis, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis, filed the operative complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant 

A.T. Ramos, a Correctional Officer at Calipatria State Prison, on December 8, 2015.

1

 

(ECF No. 1.) Presently before the Court is Defendant Ramos’s motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s complaint. (ECF No. 9.) 

 

1

 Pursuant to the mailbox rule, the Court deems the date Petitioner delivered his complaint to 

prison authorities for mailing as the date the document was filed. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 

(1988) (holding a notice of appeal by a pro se prisoner was deemed filed at the moment the prisoner 

delivered it to prison authorities for forwarding to the clerk of court because prisoners are unable to control 

the time of delivery of their documents).

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The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge 

Janis L. Sammartino pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1 of the 

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

California. After a thorough review of Plaintiff’s complaint, Defendant’s motion to 

dismiss, the record in this case, and the applicable law, the Court hereby 

RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 9) be GRANTED IN 

PART and DENIED IN PART. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

Plaintiff is a state prisoner currently located at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional 

Facility in San Diego, California. (ECF No. 1 at 1.)3 At the time of the events alleged in

Plaintiff’s complaint, Plaintiff was located at Calipatria State Prison. (Id. at 3.) 

On December 11, 2012, Defendant transported Plaintiff to an optometry 

appointment outside of the prison. (Id.) When Plaintiff and Defendant returned to the 

prison, Defendant instructed Plaintiff to exit the transport van while Plaintiff was 

restrained by leg shackles. (Id. at 3–4.) Because the floor of the transport van was too 

far above the ground for Plaintiff to safely exit the vehicle, Plaintiff requested that 

Defendant remove Plaintiff’s leg restraints and place a stable step in front of the van’s 

sliding door. (Id. at 4.) Defendant did not remove Plaintiff’s leg shackles, and he placed 

a milk crate on the ground in front of the van’s door. (Id.) 

Plaintiff, noticing the milk crate was not placed on level ground, communicated to 

Defendant that the milk crate was an inappropriate and dangerous means to exit the van, 

especially while Plaintiff’s legs were constrained. (Id.) Defendant instructed Plaintiff to 

exit the van without further delay. (Id.) When Plaintiff stepped onto the milk crate to 

 

2

 Plaintiff’s allegations contained in the operative complaint are accepted as true for purposes 

of assessing Defendant’s motion to dismiss only. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per 

curiam) (holding that for purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss, all factual allegations contained in the 

complaint must be accepted as true). 

3

 All page number citations in this Report and Recommendation refer to the page numbers 

generated by the Court’s CM/ECF system.

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exit the van, the crate slipped from under Plaintiff’s foot and Plaintiff fell onto his left 

knee. (Id. at 5.) The fall caused injuries to Plaintiff’s left knee and thigh, and it aggravated

pre-existing injuries to Plaintiff’s left lower back and hip. (Id.) 

After the fall, Defendant grabbed Plaintiff and pulled him up from the ground 

forcefully, causing Plaintiff further pain. (Id.) Defendant then forced Plaintiff to walk to 

the prison’s Central Infirmary to seek medical attention while injured, limping, and still 

restrained by leg shackles. (Id.) When the prison’s medical staff asked Defendant why 

he did not use the stepping stool designated for assisting inmates in exiting transportation 

vans, Defendant responded that he “didn’t have time to get it,” thus indicating that 

Defendant knew of the stepping stool’s existence, availability, and intended purpose. (Id.

at 5–6.) 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff initiated the present action by filing a complaint with this Court on 

December 8, 2015. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Defendant’s actions

discussed above amount to violations of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights, and to 

assault and “intentional negligence” under California law. (Id. at 3–5.)

Defendant filed his motion to dismiss the complaint on April 26, 2016. (ECF No. 

9.) Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) on the basis that Plaintiff failed to timely file both his federal and state 

law claims. (Id.) 

The Court ordered Plaintiff to file an opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss 

by May 27, 2016. (ECF No. 10.) Upon Plaintiff’s request, the Court extended this date 

twice, first to July 15, 2016, and then to August 15, 2016. (ECF Nos. 13, 19.) Despite 

receiving two extensions of time to file an opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss, 

Plaintiff did not file an opposition. Plaintiff filed a motion for appointment of counsel on 

November 25, 2016 (ECF No. 21), which the Court denied on December 9, 2016 (ECF 

No. 22). 

///

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal 

sufficiency of a plaintiff’s claim. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 

common sense.” Id. at 679. The court does not look at whether the plaintiff will 

“ultimately prevail but whether the [plaintiff] is entitled to offer evidence to support the 

claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 

When ruling on a motion to dismiss, courts may generally consider only the 

allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters 

properly subject to judicial notice. Outdoor Media Group, Inc. v. City of Beaumont, 506 

F.3d 895, 899–900 (9th Cir. 2007). Courts must accept all factual allegations in the 

complaint as true and construe all inferences from the pleadings in the light most favorable 

to the nonmoving party. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); 

Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). With respect to an 

inmate who proceeds pro se, his complaint “must be held to less stringent standards than 

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. 

A claim may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that it is barred by the 

applicable statute of limitations only when “the running of the statute is apparent on the 

face of the complaint.” Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 

954, 969 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 997 (9th 

Cir. 2006)). “A complaint cannot be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the 

plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would establish the timeliness of the claim.” Id.

(quoting Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

///

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IV. DISCUSSION

A. Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice

In support of his motion to dismiss, Defendant requests that the Court take judicial 

notice of: (1) Plaintiff’s complaint in this action; (2) the abstract of judgment from 

Plaintiff’s state court action; and (3) Plaintiff’s claim filed with the Victim Compensation 

and Government Claims Board and the Claims Board’s rejection of Plaintiff’s claim. 

(ECF No. 9-1.)

Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs judicial notice. Rule 201 states, 

in relevant part, that “[t]he court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to 

reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial 

jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy 

cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). A court may take judicial notice 

of its own records, United States v. Author Services, 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986),

overruled on other grounds by United States v. Jose, 131 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 1997), of 

other courts’ proceedings—both within the federal judiciary and without—if the 

proceedings relate directly to matters presently before the court, United States ex rel. 

Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992), 

and of records of an administrative body, including the California Victim Compensation 

and Government Claims Board, Lucarelli v. Dillard, No. C-05-1590 MMC, 2005 WL 

2397520, at *2 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2005) (citing Oregon Ass’n of Homes for the 

Aging, Inc. v. Oregon, 5 F.3d 1239, 1243 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993)). Further, a court may “take 

judicial notice of matters of public record outside the pleadings” and consider them for 

purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss. Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 

649 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Here, Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of its own records, the 

records of a state court that relate directly to the instant action, and the records of the 

California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board. As noted above, this 

Court may take judicial notice of these records and consider them for purposes of ruling 

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on Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Defendant’s 

requests for judicial notice be GRANTED. 

B. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

1. Plaintiff’s § 1983 Claims

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims filed pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 should be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to file them within the twoyear period provided by the applicable statute of limitations. (ECF No. 9-2 at 5–6.) 

a. Accrual of Plaintiff’s Claims

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims accrued on December 11, 2012. (ECF No. 

9-2 at 5.) The Court agrees. Under federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows 

or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the action. TwoRivers v. Lewis, 

174 F.3d 987, 991–92 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 

1996)). Here, the complaint demonstrates that Plaintiff knew of his injuries giving rise to 

his claims on December 11, 2012, the day that Plaintiff fell while exiting the prison 

transport van. Plaintiff asserts that the prison’s medical staff assessed his injuries

resulting from the fall almost immediately after the fall occurred. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) 

Accordingly, Plaintiff knew of his injuries, and therefore his claims accrued, on 

December 11, 2012. 

b. Applicable Statute of Limitations

Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contains no specific statute of limitations, federal courts 

apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for a personal injury claim in § 1983 actions. 

Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004). California’s statute of limitations for 

a personal injury claim is two years. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1; Jones, 393 F.3d at 

927. Therefore, absent any tolling, Plaintiff was required to file his claims brought under 

§ 1983 within two years of December 11, 2012. 

c. Applicable Tolling Provisions 

When applying state statutes of limitations in § 1983 actions, federal courts also 

apply corresponding state law tolling provisions. TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 992. Section 

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352.1 of the California Code of Civil Procedure provides tolling for the disability of 

imprisonment. Specifically, § 352.1 states, 

If a person entitled to bring an action, mentioned in Chapter 3 

(commencing with Section 335), is, at the time the cause of action accrued, 

imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of a 

criminal court for a term less than for life, the time of that disability is not a 

part of the time limited for the commencement of the action, not to exceed 

two years. 

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a).4 

Here, Plaintiff is serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole. (ECF No.

9-1 at 4.) Therefore, Defendant argues, the tolling benefit of § 352.1 does not apply to 

Plaintiff. (ECF No. 9-2 at 6.) The Court agrees. 

By its plain language, § 352.1 provides tolling only for inmates serving “a term less 

than for life,” which would seem to exclude prisoners sentenced to life terms. However, 

in Grasso v. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc., the California Court of Appeal ruled 

that prisoners serving life sentences with the possibility of parole should receive the 

benefit of the tolling provision. 70 Cal. Rptr. 458, 460–61 (1968). The court reasoned 

that, at the time the predecessor statute to § 352.15 was passed, parole did not exist and a 

life sentence “was literally a life sentence.” Id. at 460. However, the court reasoned, with 

the introduction of parole and indeterminate sentences, a defendant sentenced to life with 

the possibility of parole is actually sentenced to “a term less than for life” as that phrase 

was understood at the time the statute was enacted. Id. at 460–61. The California Court 

of Appeal recently confirmed that Grasso remains good law and also clarified that under 

 

4

 Section 352.1(c) of the California Code of Civil Procedure specifically excludes from this 

tolling § 1983 actions relating to the conditions of confinement, except for actions to recover damages. 

Because Plaintiff seeks damages (ECF No. 1 at 8), § 352.1(c) does not apply here. 

5

 At the time Grasso was decided, California Code of Civil Procedure § 352.1 was numbered as 

§ 352(a)(3) and provided for tolling of a statute of limitations for the entirety of a prisoner’s sentence. See 

Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1999). Section 352.1 became effective on January 1, 1995, 

and limited the tolling available to prisoners to only two years. See id. 

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Grasso, “a term less than for life” excludes from this tolling provision only prisoners 

sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Brooks v. Mercy Hosp., 1 Cal. App. 

5th 1, 6–7 (2016) (emphasis added). Accordingly, under California law, the two-year 

tolling period provided by § 352.1 does not apply to Plaintiff. 

However, even though § 352.1 does not apply to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims,

Defendant’s motion to dismiss must still be denied because Defendant has not shown that

it is apparent on the face of the complaint that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are untimely. The 

Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires that a state prisoner exhaust his available

prison administrative remedies before proceeding to federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 

The Ninth Circuit has specifically held that the applicable statute of limitations must be 

tolled while a prisoner completes this mandatory exhaustion process. Brown v. Valoff, 

422 F.3d 926, 942–43 (9th Cir. 2005).

Here, Plaintiff asserts in his complaint that he “brought each of the claims raised in 

this complaint in an administrative appeal, which he exhausted through the Third and 

Final level of Review on an Inmate/Parolee Appeal Form.” (ECF No. 1 at 7.) For 

purposes of ruling on Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true 

Plaintiff’s statement that he exhausted his administrative remedies. See Erickson, 551 

U.S. at 94. Accordingly, the two-year statute of limitations applicable to Plaintiff’s 

§ 1983 claims was tolled during the period that Plaintiff exhausted his prison 

administrative remedies.

Plaintiff neither appended to his complaint copies of his administrative appeal 

forms nor asserted in the complaint the dates on which he filed and received responses to 

his prison administrative appeals. Therefore, the specific tolling period that applied to 

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims is not apparent on the face of the complaint. It is plausible that 

it took Plaintiff approximately one year to complete the exhaustion process mandated by 

the PLRA and that Plaintiff was therefore entitled to tolling of the applicable two-year

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statute of limitations during that period.

6

 Accordingly, this Court cannot conclude that it 

is “beyond doubt that [Plaintiff] can prove no set of facts that would establish the 

timeliness of [his] claim.” Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 969. For this reason, the Court 

recommends that Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims be DENIED. 

2. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s state law claims of assault and negligence should 

be dismissed on the ground that Plaintiff did not timely comply with the requirements of 

the California Government Claims Act. (ECF No. 9-2 at 6–8.) 

The California Tort Claims Act, commonly referred to as the California 

Government Claims Act, requires a person asserting a tort claim against a California 

governmental entity or employee to present his claim to the California Victim 

Compensation and Government Claims Board before filing an action for damages against 

that entity or employee. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 905.2, 911.2, 945.4, 950–950.2. 

The California Government Claims Act has strict time limits for both presenting a 

claim to the Claims Board and filing a court action after the Claims Board rejects the 

claim. First, a person must present his tort claim to the Claims Board within six months 

of the accrual of the claim. Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.2. Presentation of a written claim, and 

action on or rejection of the claim by the Claims Board, are conditions precedent to filing 

a suit. Shirk v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist., 42 Cal. 4th 201, 208–09 (2007). Thereafter, any 

suit based on the claim presented to the Claims Board must be commenced within six 

months from the date the Claims Board’s written notice of rejection is deposited in the 

mail. Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.6(a)(1); Clark v. Upton, 703 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1043 (E.D. 

Cal. 2010). The statutes of limitations that are applicable to tort claims against private

 

6

 While the Court acknowledges that prison officials are ordinarily required to respond promptly 

to a prisoner’s administrative appeal, see Cal. Code. Regs., tit. 15, §§ 3084.5(a)(3), 3084.6(b), for purposes 

of ruling on Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Court cannot assume that the prison officials who 

responded to Plaintiff’s administrative appeal did not delay in doing so. See Cahill, 80 F.3d at 337–38 

(noting that courts must construe all inferences from the pleadings in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party). 

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defendants under California law do not apply to tort claims that require presentation to 

the Claims Board. Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Sup. Ct., 127 Cal. App. 4th 1263, 1267 (2005). 

Here, Plaintiff submitted a claim to the Claims Board on or around February 15, 

2013. (ECF No. 9-1 at 11–12.) He supplemented his claim on or around March 6, 2013. 

(Id. at 9.) He was informed that the Claims Board rejected his claim in a letter dated 

March 29, 2013. (Id. at 7.) The Claims Board’s rejection letter specifically advised 

Plaintiff that he had “only six months from the date th[e] notice was personally delivered 

or deposited in the mail to file a court action on this claim.” (Id.) Thus, absent any tolling, 

Plaintiff had six months from March 29, 2013, to file his state law claims. 

California tolling statutes for prisoners that exist for statutes of limitations 

applicable to claims against private defendants do not apply to the filing deadlines set 

forth by the California Government Claims Act. California Code of Civil Procedure 

§ 352.1(b) explicitly states that the two-year tolling period provided to prisoners under

§ 352.1(a)

does not apply to an action against a public entity or public employee upon a 

cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented in accordance 

with Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 900) or Chapter 2 (commencing 

with Section 910) of Part 3, or Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 950) of 

Part 4, of Division 3.6 of Title 1 of the Government Code.

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(b). And, even if § 352.1(a) did apply to Plaintiff’s state law 

claims, Plaintiff is not entitled to the tolling provision because he is serving a life sentence 

without the possibility of parole. See Brooks, 1 Cal. App. 5th at 6–7. 

In addition, while the Court concluded above that Plaintiff was entitled to tolling 

of the statute of limitations applicable to his § 1983 claims while he exhausted his prison 

administrative remedies, Plaintiff is not entitled to this tolling with respect to his state law 

claims. Plaintiff’s obligation to exhaust his administrative remedies under the PLRA

applies only to his § 1983 claims and “is independent of the obligation to comply with the 

Government Claims Act.” McPherson v. Alamo, No. 15-cv-3145 EMC, 2016 WL 

7157634, at * (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2016) (quoting Parthemore v. Col, 221 Cal. App. 4th 

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1372, 1376 (2013)); see also Martinez v. Tilton, No. 1:10-cv-01501-SKO PC, 2013 WL 

5670869, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2013). Plaintiff could have filed his state law claims 

in state court at any time after March 29, 2013, including while he exhausted his prison 

administrative remedies with respect to his § 1983 claims. 

Plaintiff was required to file his state law claims within six months of March 29, 

2013, the date the Claims Board placed Plaintiff’s rejection letter in the mail. Plaintiff’s 

complaint was not filed until December 8, 2015, over two years after the expiration of the 

applicable six-month period. Based on the allegations contained in the complaint, no 

reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Plaintiff filed his state law claims not later 

than six months after the Claims Board’s rejection notice was mailed to Plaintiff. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s state law claims are untimely and 

recommends that Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims be 

GRANTED. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Court 

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and (2) 

directing that Defendant Ramos’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED IN PART and 

DENIED IN PART. 

IT IS ORDERED that any party may file written objections with the court and 

serve a copy on all parties no later than January 24, 2017. The document shall be 

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than January 31, 2017. 

///

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The parties are advised that a failure to file objections to this Report and 

Recommendation within the specified time may waive their rights to raise objections on 

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 445, 449 (9th Cir. 1998). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 3, 2017

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