Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01632/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01632-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN BELLETTI, Civil No. 14-cv-1632 H (JMA)

Petitioner, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING RESPONDENTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS AND

DENYING THE PETITION ON

THE MERITS

[Doc. No. 12]

(2) DENYING PETITIONER’S

MOTION FOR DECLARATORY

JUDGMENT

[Doc. No. 9]

(3) ADOPTING THE

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT

AND RECOMMENDATION 

[Doc. No. 22]

vs.

W.L. MONTGOMERY, Warden, et al.,

Respondents.

On July 8, 2014, John Belletti (“Petitioner”), at that time a prisoner incarcerated at

Calipatria State Prison and proceeding pro se, filed a petition for habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner is now out of custody.1

 On October 22,

2014, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition. (Doc. No. 12.) On November

6, 2014, Petitioner filed an opposition. (Doc. No. 15.) Petitioner also filed a motion for

declaratory judgment. (Doc. No. 9.) On January 29, 2015, the magistrate judge issued a

1

The parties did not raise any issues regarding mootness.

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report and recommendation to grant Respondents’ motion to dismiss and deny Petitioner’s

motion. (Doc. No. 22.) On January 30, 2015, the Court requested supplemental briefing

in connection with the motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 23.) On February 17, 2015, the

government filed a supplemental brief. (Doc. No. 24.) Petitioner has neither filed

objections to the report and recommendation nor responded to the Court’s request for

supplemental briefing.

Background

Petitioner was determined guilty of fighting with another inmate in violation of the

California Code of Regulations after a hearing on the charge. (Doc. No. 16-1 at 1,

Lodgment No. 1, Rules Violation Report.) On December 20, 2012, Petitioner was

assessed a ninety day credit loss and ninety day forfeiture of certain privileges such as use

of the gym and telephone. (Id.)

Petitioner filed an appeal of the disposition three months later, on March 14, 2013. 

An inmate appeal must be submitted within thirty calendar days of the disposition. Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.8(b). Accordingly, the appeal was cancelled as untimely. (Doc.

No. 16-3, Lodgment No. 3.) On April 2, 2014, Petitioner submitted his appeal for thirdlevel review. (Doc. No. 16-2, Lodgment No. 2.) That appeal was rejected for failing to

obtain review at the lower level. (Doc. No. 16-4, Lodgment No. 4.) 

On April 5, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Fresno 

County Superior Court. (Doc. No. 16-5, Lodgment No. 5.) The Fresno County Superior

Court denied the petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and failure to show

why the exhaustion requirement should not apply. (Doc. No. 16-6, Lodgment No. 6.) 

Petitioner next filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Fifth District Court of

Appeal. (Doc. No. 16-7, Lodgment No. 7.) The Court of Appeal denied the petition for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (Doc. No. 16-8, Lodgment No. 8.) On August

26, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme

Court. (Doc. No. 16-9, Lodgment No. 9.) On November 12, 2013, the California

Supreme Court denied the petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, citing

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In re Dexter, 25 Cal. 3d 921 (1979). (Doc. No. 10, Lodgment No. 10.) Petitioner then

filed additional petitions for habeas review in state court that were denied as successive. 

(Doc. Nos. 16-11–16-16, Lodgment Nos. 11-16.) 

On July 8, 2014, Petitioner filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner contends he was denied due process at the

hearing where he was found guilty of fighting. (Doc. No. 1 at 22-31.) Petitioner argues

that he acted in self-defense and that the senior hearing officer failed to consider a DVD

recording of the incident that supported his self-defense argument. (Id.) On October 22,

2014, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that Petitioner failed to exhaust

his administrative remedies by failing to timely appeal the decision of the senior hearing

officer. (Doc. No. 12.) On January 29, 2015, the magistrate judge issued a report and

recommendation to grant Respondent’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 22.) On January 30,

2015, the Court ordered supplemental briefing on whether sufficient evidence supports

the disposition for fighting and whether Petitioner suffered any prejudicial constitutional

violations. (Doc. No. 23.) On February 17, 2015, Respondents filed supplemental

briefing. (Doc. No. 24.) The Court has not received any objections from Petitioner nor

has Petitioner filed supplemental briefing. 

Discussion

I. Legal Standards

A. Standard of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

A federal court may review a petition for writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to a state court judgment “only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a);

accord Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 n.7 (2000). Habeas corpus is an

“extraordinary remedy” available only to those “persons whom society has grievously

wronged . . . .” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633-34 (1993)). Because Petitioner filed this petition after

April 24, 1996, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)

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governs the petition. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997); Chein v. Shumsky,

373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). “When a federal claim has been presented

to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court

adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural

principles to the contrary.” Id. Federal habeas relief is available only if the result reached

by the state court on the merits is “contrary to,” or “an unreasonable application” of

Supreme Court precedent, or if the adjudication is “an unreasonable determination” based

on the facts and evidence. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1)-(d)(2).

A federal court may grant habeas relief only if a state court either “applies a rule

that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases” or “confronts

a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court’s] precedent.” Early v. Packer,

537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06 (distinguishing the “contrary

to” and the “unreasonable application” standards). “[R]eview under 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim

on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). “Although the Supreme

Court has declined to decide whether a district court ‘may ever choose to hold an

evidentiary hearing before it determines that § 2254(d) has been satisfied,’ an evidentiary

hearing is pointless once the district court has determined that § 2254(d) precludes habeas

relief.” Sully v. Ayers, 725 F.3d 1057, 1075 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Pinholster, 131 S. Ct.

at 1411 n. 20).

A federal court may grant habeas relief under the “unreasonable application” clause

of § 2254(d)(1) if the state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the

Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state

prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. A federal court may also grant habeas relief

“if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court]

precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend

that principle to a new context where it should apply.” Id. The state court’s “unreasonable

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application” of binding precedent must be objectively unreasonable to the extent that the

state court decision is more than merely incorrect or erroneous. Wiggins v. Smith, 539

U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003) (citation omitted); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-

76 (2003). Additionally, even if a state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court

precedent or rests on an “unreasonable determination” of facts in light of the evidence, the

petitioner must show that such error caused substantial or injurious prejudice. Penry v.

Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637-38); see also Fry v.

Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121-22 (2007); Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 977 (9th Cir. 2000). 

AEDPA creates a highly deferential standard toward state court rulings. Woodford v.

Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002).

In determining whether a state court decision is contrary to clearly established

federal law, the court looks to the state’s last reasoned decision. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d

911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where there is an unexplained decision from the state’s highest

court, the court “looks through” to the last reasoned state judgment and presumes that the

unexplained opinion rests upon the same ground. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 891-

06 (1991).

A district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). If a party objects to any

portion of the report, the district court “shall make a de novo determination of those

portions of the report . . . to which objection is made.” Id.

B. Standard of Review for Due Process Claim

Under the Fourteenth Amendment “a prisoner is entitled to certain due process

protections when he is charged with a disciplinary violation.” Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d

1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Wolff v. Donnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-71 (1974). The

protections include “the rights to call witnesses, to present documentary evidence and to

have a written statement by the fact finders as evidence relied upon and the reasons for the

disciplinary action taken.” Serrano, 345 F.3d at 1077; see also Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-71. 

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But prison disciplinary proceedings need not afford the prisoner the “full panoply” of

rights due in a criminal proceeding. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556.

Due process protections adhere only when the “disciplinary action implicates a

protected [liberty] interest in some unexpected matter or imposes an atypical and

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”

Serrano, 345 F.3d at 1078 (citing Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). A liberty

interest “may arise from the Constitution itself” or from “an expectation or interest created

by state laws or policies.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 546 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). Good-time

credits are a protected liberty interest when the “State [has] created the right to good time

and itself recogniz[es] that its deprivation is a sanction authorized for major misconduct.”

Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557.

A district court will uphold a prison disciplinary board’s judgment that affects a

protected liberty interest so long as “the findings of the prison disciplinary board are

supported by some evidence in the record.” Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v.

Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); see also Bruce v. Ylst, 351, F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir.

2003). The “some evidence” standard prevents “arbitrary deprivations without threatening

institutional interests or imposing undue administrative burdens.” Walpole, 472 U.S. at

455. This standard does not require “examination of the entire record, independent

assessment of the credibility of the witness, or weighing of the evidence.” Id. at 455; see

also Bruce, 351 F.3d 1287. Instead, the central question is “whether there is any evidence

in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Bruce,

351 F.3d at 1287 (citing Walpole, 472 U.S. at 455-56).

II. Analysis 

On November 28, 2012, correctional officers observed Petitioner “engaged in a

fight” with another inmate. (Doc. No. 16-1 at 1, Lodgment No.1.) Two correctional

officers observed Petitioner “striking each other in the head and upper torso with their

fists.” (Id.) Petitioner fell to the ground and both inmates “continued to strike each other.” 

(Id.) Petitioner was charged with fighting in violation of Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §

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3005(d)(1). (Id.)

2

 On December 4, 2012, Petitioner received the Rules Violation Report. 

(Id. at 3.) On the same day, Petitioner viewed the DVD recording of the incident. (Doc.

No. 1 at 40; Doc. No. 24-1, Lodgment No. 17.) 

On December 7, 2012, the senior hearing officer held a hearing. (Doc. No. 16-1 at

1, Lodgment No. 1.) Petitioner was informed of the fighting charge and pleaded not

guilty. (Id. at 4.) Petitioner then stated: “So if I fight back, I’m going to be written up for

fighting even though I received serious injuries. It was self defense.” (Id.) The senior

hearing officer determined that Petitioner was guilty of fighting. (Id. at 1.)

A district court will uphold a prison disciplinary board’s judgment that affects a

protected liberty interest so long as it is “supported by some evidence in the record,”

Walpole, 472 U.S. at 454; see also Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1287, and does not violate

procedural due process requirements. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-71. In this case, the

evidence brought before the disciplinary hearing satisfies the “some evidence” standard. 

The senior hearing officer found that the evidence supported the disposition for fighting. 

The senior hearing officer relied on the report of a correctional officer who observed

Petitioner and another inmate “engaged in a fight on the track area.” (Id. at 4.) The

officer reported that “[b]oth inmates were striking each other in the head and upper torso

with their fists.” (Id.) He noted that even though Petitioner fell the ground, “both inmates

continued to strike each other.” (Id.) The senior hearing officer also reviewed an

additional report in which a second correctional officer observed Petitioner and another

inmate “engaged in a physical altercation” and stated that the inmates were “striking each

other about the head and torso.” (Id. at 5.) The second correctional officer further

reported that Petitioner fell to the ground and that the inmates “continued to punch at each

other.” (Id.) The senior hearing officer also relied on Petitioner’s partial admission of

guilt at the hearing where Petitioner stated, “So if I fight back, I’m going to be written up

2

The code requires that “[i]nmates shall not willfully commit or assist another person in the commission of an assault or battery to any person or persons, nor attempt or threaten the use of force or violence upon another person.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3005(d)(1). 

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for fighting even though I received serious injuries. It was self defense.” (Id. at 4. ) The

senior hearing officer also considered Petitioner’s medical report issued after the incident

detailing injuries to his right jaw . (Id.) The senior hearing officer concluded that the

“injuries [were] consistent with fighting.” (Id.) Accordingly, there is at least “some

evidence” to support the disposition for fighting. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 454. 

Moreover, Petitioner received all of the limited process afforded in a disciplinary

proceeding. In a prison disciplinary proceeding where a liberty interest is at stake, as here,

due process protections include “the rights to call witnesses, to present documentary

evidence and to have a written statement by the fact finders as evidence relied upon and

the reasons for the disciplinary action taken.” Serrano, 345 F.3d at 1077. Petitioner

received the rules violation report within fifteen days of the incident and the hearing was

conducted within 30 days of the incident. (Doc. No. 16-1 at 3.) Petitioner understood the

charge against him and timely received the documents to be used against him at the

hearing. (Id.) Petitioner viewed the DVD recording of the incident before the hearing. 

(Doc. No. 1 at 40; Doc. No. 24-1.) Petitioner did not request any witnesses or evidence

be presented at the hearing. (Doc. No. 16-1 at 3-4.) Petitioner received a written

statement of reasons for the disciplinary action and the evidence against him. On the

record before the Court, Petitioner has not suffered any violation of due process. See

Serrano, 345 F.3d at 1077.

Petitioner contends that the senior hearing officer should have considered the DVD

recording of the incident as support of Petitioner’s claim of self defense. (Doc. No. 1 at

22-31.) But Petitioner does not show that the video would have changed the outcome of

the proceeding. Petitioner does not explain how the video, which supposedly shows that

he acted in self defense, would have altered the disposition for fighting. To the contrary,

a document in Petitioner’s file regarding the DVD states that the “videotape [is]

incriminating evidence against [Petitioner].” (Doc. No. 1 at 40; Doc. No. 24-1.) 

Because at least some evidence supported the disposition for fighting, and because

Petitioner did not suffer prejudice from a constitutional violation, the Court does not reach

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the arguments regarding procedural default. See Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 864

(9th Cir. 1982).3

Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court adopts the magistrates judge’s report and

recommendation, grants Respondents’ motion to dismiss the petition for habeas corpus,

and denies the petition on the merits. The Court also denies Petitioner’s motion for

declaratory relief. Additionally, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability.

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 18, 2015

_______________________________

Marilyn L. Huff, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

3

Petitioner’s inmate appeal also appears to be untimely. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.8(b). Furthermore, Petitioner has not shown good cause for the delay. 

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