Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01650/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01650-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Movant Julio Cesar Feliciana, Jr., who is confined in the U.S. Penitentiary-Big 

Sandy in Inez, Kentucky, has filed a pro se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct 

Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (CRDoc. 482, 

CVDoc. 1).1

 

BACKGROUND 

 On August 19, 2008, a federal grand jury indicted Movant for conspiracy to 

commit armed bank robbery, armed bank robbery, and use of a firearm during a crime of 

violence. (CRDoc. 19.) A federal grand jury returned a third superseding indictment 

against Movant on May 5, 2009, charging him with thirteen felony counts. (CRDoc. 111.) 

 1

 Documents filed in CV-12-01650-PHX-DGC will be referred to as “CVDoc.” 

Documents filed in the related criminal action, CR-08-00932-1-PHX-DGC, will be 

referred to as “CRDoc.” Documents filed in the related direct appeal, 9th Cir. No. 10- 10186, will be referred to as “9th Cir. Doc.” 

United States of America, 

 

 Plaintiff/Respondent, 

vs. 

Julio Cesar Feliciano, Jr., 

 Defendant/Movant. 

 

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No. CV-12-01650-PHX-DGC (SPL)

(No. CR-08-00932-1-PHX-DGC) 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

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In the third superseding indictment, Movant and six co-defendants were alleged to have 

been part of a group2

 which committed a series of armed bank robberies in the Phoenix 

metropolitan area in 2008. (CRDoc. 111.) On August 31, 2009, Counts 12 and 13 were 

dismissed (CRDoc. 213), and on September 10, 2009, Count 5 was dismissed (CRDoc. 

225). The armed bank robberies, as charged in the remaining counts, were as follows: 

Counts Robbery 

1-3 August 12, 2008: Bank of America, 11455 W. Buckeye Road, Avondale

4 June 17, 2008: First Credit Union, 5770 W. Thunderbird Road, Glendale

6-7 July 3, 2008: First Credit Union, 5770 W. Thunderbird Road, Glendale

8-9 July 21, 2008: First Credit Union, 803 E. Devonshire Avenue, Phoenix

10-11 July 24, 2008: Meridian Bank, 1675 N. 95th Lane, Phoenix 

 Jury trial commenced on these charges on November 10, 2009. (CRDoc. 305.) 

After seven days of trial, on November 20, 2009, the jury found Movant guilty of all 

charges: Conspiracy to Commit Armed Bank Robbery, Use of a Firearm During a Crime 

of Violence and Aiding and Abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2113 (a) and (d), 

924(c)(1)(A) (i, ii) and 2 (Count 1); Armed Bank Robbery and Aiding and Abetting, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d) and 2 (Counts 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12); and Use of a 

Firearm During a Crime of Violence and Aiding and Abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i, ii) and 2. (CRDoc. 313, 412.) On April 16, 2010, the District Court 

imposed sentences totaling in combination of 1,277 months of imprisonment, followed 

by five years of supervised release. (CRDoc. 412.) 

 On April 21, 2010, Movant filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (CRDoc. 413.) 

Movant raised one issue on appeal, whether Movant received ineffective assistance when 

trial counsel conceded Movant’s guilt to one of the armed robberies. (9th Cir. Doc. 14.) 

Movant’s convictions and sentences were affirmed, and on January 18, 2012, the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit) entered its formal mandate. 3 (CRDoc. 481.)

 2

 The group was commonly dubbed as the “Wig Bandits.” (CVDoc. 5 at 3.) 

3

 The Ninth Circuit declined to review this claim on direct appeal “because the record is insufficiently developed and the legal representation was not so inadequate that it obviously denied Feliciano his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed “the district court’s judgment without prejudice to Feliciano raising this issue in 

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 On August 2, 2012, Movant timely filed the instant Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or 

Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (CVDoc. 

1, CRDoc. 482). Respondent filed a Response on September 17, 2012. (CVDoc. 5, 

CRDoc. 484.) Movant filed a Reply on December 7, 2012. (CVDoc. 11.) 

DISCUSSION 

 In his Motion, Movant raises four grounds for relief. In Ground One, Movant 

alleges that he received ineffective assistance when trial counsel: (1) rejected two plea 

offers without first consulting Movant; (2) admitted Movant’s guilt to one count at trial; 

(3) did not advise Movant of sentencing consequences; (4) failed to present an adequate 

defense; and (5) did not investigate an allegation of witness perjury before sentencing. In 

Ground Two, Movant alleges that he received ineffective assistance when trial counsel 

represented Movant although a conflict of interest existed. In Ground Three, Movant 

alleges that he received ineffective assistance when appellate counsel failed to raise 

nonfrivolous claims on direct appeal and refused to petition for writ of certiorari to the 

Supreme Court. Lastly, in Ground Four, Movant alleges that the government failed to 

establish that the banks robbed were federally insured. Respondent contends that 

Movant’s claims are either patently false or otherwise lack merit. 

I. Expansion of the Record and Evidentiary Hearing 

 To refute the allegations that trial counsel failed to communicate or distorted 

material issues, Respondent submits letters of correspondence which purport to be written 

by Movant to his wife Sabrina Feliciano prior to or during trial. Movant challenges the 

authenticity of these letters, and requests that the Court hold an evidentiary hearing on the 

issue.4

 

 On habeas review, the record may be expanded to include additional materials 

 a collateral attack on the conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” (CRDoc. 481.) 

4

 The Court notes that in addition to Movant’s letters, Respondent also submits two defense counsel affidavits and a letter authored by trial counsel. Movant does not challenge the authenticity of these documents. 

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submitted by the parties, including documents, exhibits, affidavits, and letters predating 

the filing of the motion. See Rule 7, Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings. See 

also, Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567 (9th Cir. 2004) (a Court need not conduct full 

evidentiary hearing, but may instead “expand the record ... with discovery and 

documentary evidence.”). A party against whom additional materials are offered must be 

afforded “an opportunity to admit or deny their correctness.” Rule 7(c). However, the 

court may, but need not, require the authentication of any materials proffered for 

inclusion in the record. See Rule 7(a), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings. 

 While Movant argues that some form of authentication must be presented in order 

to consider the content of the letters,5

 he does not assert that the letters are, in fact, 

unreliable, inaccurate or erroneous. Rather, Movant only contends that the record is 

deficient of proof of the chain of custody for the letters since their time of seizure. 

Because Movant does not specify any basis upon which to question the reliability or 

accuracy of the letters, nor is any revealed on review by the Court, further authentication 

is unnecessary. Respondent asserts 

As the “Wig Bandits” case progressed, the incoming and 

outgoing mail of all defendants who were in federal custody, including co-defendant Sabrina Feliciano (Defendant’s wife), 

was monitored. Undersigned counsel received copies of those letters pursuant to subpoena and has retained those letters. 

The letters include ones written by Defendant (who also goes by “Junior” or “Jr”) to his wife (who also goes by “Nena” and 

“Bree”) during the pendency of his case between April 2009 and December 2009; those that are pertinent to the Motion before this Court are attached to this filing as Exhibit A. 

(CVDoc. 5 at 3-4.) 

 Outside of his own allegations, Movant has not offered any evidence which 

undermines the reliability of these letters, such as contradictory affidavits. Nor has 

Movant identified a portion of the criminal transcripts which controvert the letters’ 

 5

 In arguing that Respondents must demonstrate the letters’ authenticity, Movant cites to Rules 901 and 1002 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. While the Court may apply the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is 2255 proceedings, is it not required to do so. See Rule 12, Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings. 

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content. Preceding each of the letters which are attached to the Response (CVDoc. 5-1) 

is a copy of the corresponding envelope. Each envelope indicates the mailing date, the 

mailing address of the recipient, and the mailing address of the sender (i.e., the mailing 

address of Movant). There is no visible indication that the letters have been manipulated 

or otherwise altered. The letters’ content is consistent with the other evidence in the 

record, including the affidavits submitted by Robert Kavanagh and Marc Victor. The 

Court finds there is no basis upon which to question the authenticity of these letters in the 

first instance. Therefore, the Court finds it proper to consider these letters on review 

without holding an evidentiary hearing on the matter. 

 The Court also concludes that an evidentiary hearing would not otherwise aid in 

the resolution of Movant’s claims. The testimony of Movant or his trial counsel would 

add little or nothing to the written submissions. “Section 2255 itself ‘recognizes that there 

are times when allegations of facts outside the record can be fully investigated without 

requiring the personal presence of the prisoner.’” Watts v. United States, 841 F.2d 275, 

277 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 495 (1962)). 

Although the Court recognizes “that when the issue is one of credibility, resolution on the 

basis of affidavits can rarely be conclusive... this is one of those cases in which an issue 

of credibility may be conclusively decided on the basis of documentary testimony and 

evidence in the record.” See Watts v. United States, 841 F.2d at 277 (internal citation and 

quotation marks omitted)(noting “[w]hen section 2255 motions are based on alleged 

occurrences entirely outside the record, which if true would support relief, the court must 

conduct a hearing on those allegations ‘unless, viewing the petition against the record, its 

allegations do not state a claim for relief or are so patently frivolous or false as to warrant 

summary dismissal.’”) Here, because there is no evidence to support Movant’s claims 

and the evidence in the record is contrary to his allegations, including his own writings, 

this Court “is able to determine without a hearing that the allegations are without 

credibility.” United States v. Navarro-Garcia, 926 F.2d 818, 822 (9th Cir. 1991). 

 To earn the right to a hearing, Movant must “allege specific facts which, if true, 

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would entitle him to relief.” United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 

1996). For the reasons that follow, “the motion and the files and records of the case 

conclusively show that [Movant] is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). Therefore, 

finding that the issues can be conclusively decided on the basis of documentary testimony 

and evidence in the record, and that Movant is entitled to no relief, the Court concludes 

that Movant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. 

II. Grounds One through Three 

 The two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel was established by the 

Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on an 

ineffective assistance claim, a convicted defendant must show: (1) deficient performance, 

in that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and 

(2) prejudice, in that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 687-88. “The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be 

whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial 

process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 686. 

 Under the first prong, “[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that 

every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 

counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. There is a strong 

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable assistance. 

Id. A defendant “must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the 

challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Id. (citing Michael v. 

Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). 

 Under the second prong, a “reasonable probability” is “a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The court need not 

determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining whether 

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prejudice resulted from the alleged deficiencies. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 286 

n.14 (2000). “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 

sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” 

Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). 

 1. Trial Counsel’s Rejection of Plea Offers 

Movant first argues in Ground One that he received ineffective assistance when 

trial counsel rejected two plea offers. Movant alleges that “on two separate occasions the 

government expressed their willingness to enter into plea negotiations, however counsel 

[] rejected both invitations without consulting me... Counsel first mentioned that the 

government had offered 32 years but said that he had refused the offer. Some time 

afterwards, he mentioned that the government again made an offer, this time for 25 years 

but he again rejected the offer.” (CVDoc. 1-2 at 2.)6

 “[D]efense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the 

prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the 

accused.” Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012). Where defense counsel allows 

an offer “to expire without advising the defendant or allowing him to consider it,” 

ineffective assistance of counsel may be found. Id. “To show prejudice from ineffective 

assistance of counsel where a plea offer has lapsed or been rejected because of counsel’s 

deficient performance, defendants must demonstrate a reasonable probability they would 

have accepted the earlier plea offer had they been afforded effective assistance of 

counsel.” Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. at 1409. See also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 

(1985) (to establish prejudice, defendant must show “a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to 

trial.”). 

 Movant’s contention that defense counsel failed to advise him of the plea offers is 

 6

 Respondent asserts that the first plea offer was extended to Movant in early 2009, under which Movant would have been sentenced to a term of 32 years’ imprisonment. Respondent further contends that in July 2009, it extended a revised plea offer, which would stipulate to a range of 25-30 years’ imprisonment. (CVDoc. 5 at 3, 5.) 

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completely unsupported by the record. Movant provides no affidavits or other factual 

support for his assertions. During a status hearing held on February 17, 2009, the parties 

addressed plea discussions and the role of discovery as it related to those discussions. 

(CRDoc. 453 at 6-7.) However, Movant did not question the existence of a plea offer at 

that time or at subsequent hearings, nor did he raise the issue at the time he alleges he 

became aware of Counsel’s rejection of the plea offers. Movant’s contentions, instead, 

are clearly contradicted by the record. In an affidavit, trial counsel attests that he 

informed Movant of both plea offers, and rejected those offers at the direction of Movant. 

(CVDoc. 5-2 at 2.) In a letter addressed to Movant, dated February 12, 2009, trial 

counsel memorialized the fact that a plea bargain offer was made, that Defendant was 

advised of the offer and its precise terms, and that Defendant declined the plea bargain 

offer. (CVDoc. 5-2 at 6.) Cf. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1410 (finding deficient performance 

where the “record [was] void of any evidence of any effort by trial counsel to 

communicate the formal offer to Fyre during the offer window, let alone any evidence 

that Frye’s conduct interfered with trial counsel’s ability to do so.”). 

 Undoubtedly, Movant would prefer a lesser sentence than the one he received, and 

he would have achieved that had he accepted one of the plea offers instead of going to 

trial. However, for same reasons which the Court cannot find Counsel’s performance 

deficient, Movant has likewise not demonstrated prejudice. Prior to sentencing, Movant 

objected to all sentencing calculations because “he pled not guilty and maintain[ed] his 

innocence.” (CRDoc. 390 at 3.) At the time of sentencing, Movant maintained his 

innocence; “I was found guilty, Your Honor, of a lot of crimes. I didn’t commit all these 

crimes... I have no excuse for a lot of these things. I don’t know. I didn’t do all these 

things I was found guilty for, Your Honor. That’s basically what I got to say.” (CRDoc. 

at 10.) Beyond Movant’s letters and counsel’s affidavits, the record does not compel that 

there was a reasonable probability that Movant would have accepted the plea offers. 

Based on these facts, the Court cannot conclude that counsel’s performance fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness or that different actions by trial counsel would likely 

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have resulted in a different outcome. Therefore, Movant does not assert a viable claim for 

ineffective assistance of counsel and the Court will recommend that it be denied.7

 2. Trial Counsel’s Admission of Guilt 

 Next, Movant claims in Ground One that he received ineffective assistance when 

counsel conceded Movant’s guilt at trial. During trial counsel’s opening and closing 

statements, he conceded that Movant had participated in the August 12, 2008 robbery. 

Trial counsel set forth a defense theory that, while the evidence of Movant’s guilt of 

August 12th robbery was strong, there was no such evidence to prove that he was guilty of 

the remaining robberies. (CRDoc. 476 at 36.) Movant contends trial counsel failed to 

consult and obtain his consent prior to conceding his guilt at trial, and that counsel’s 

concession served to convict him of the offense without holding the government to its 

burden. 

 “An attorney undoubtedly has a duty to consult with the client regarding 

‘important decisions,’ including questions of overarching defense strategy.” Florida v. 

Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S., at 688). A defendant “has 

the ultimate authority to determine whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or 

her own behalf, or take an appeal. Concerning those decisions, an attorney must both 

consult with the defendant and obtain consent to the recommended course of action.” Id. 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Under this reasoning, it follows that an 

attorney’s “concession of guilt without consultation or consent is deficient.” United 

States v. Thomas, 417 F.3d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005). Such deficient performance is 

also necessarily prejudicial where defense counsel “concedes that there is no reasonable 

doubt concerning the only factual issues in dispute, [and] the Government has not been 

held to its burden of persuading the jury that the defendant is guilty.” United States v. 

Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 1991). 

 7

 As discussed by Respondent in length (see CVDoc. 5), Movant’s assertions are 

also controverted by his own statements. Movant repeatedly expressed in his letters to his wife the terms of the plea offers he had received, and his insistence on proceeding to trial and rejecting his plea offer. (CVDoc. 5-1.) 

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 As noted by the District Court, Movant’s “participation in the August 12 robbery 

is virtually undisputed – he was observed by law enforcement preparing for and 

committing the robbery, and he was arrested while fleeing.” (CRDoc. 187 at 3.) At trial, 

the prosecution presented that Movant’s DNA evidence was found on a wig used in the 

July 3, 2008 robbery, which prompted law enforcement officers to begin surveillance of 

Movant’s residence. (CRDoc. 457 at 13-14.) The prosecution further presented that 

Movant and others were under that police surveillance when they committed the robbery 

on August 12, 2008. (CRDoc. 457 at 15 – 64; 98-118; CRDoc. 458 at 8-40.) Video 

surveillance of the bank robbery was shown at trial. (CRDoc. 457 at 75.) Testimony was 

presented that Movant was pursued by law enforcement after the robbery and he was 

apprehended while fleeing from the vehicle in which he had been traveling. (CRDoc. 457 

at 15-64; 98-118; CRDoc. 458 at 8-40.) Evidence of the crime was found in the vehicle, 

in Movant’s possession, and in and around the field through which he fled, including a 

firearm. (CRDoc. 458 at 144 – 157; CRDoc. 468 at 48-87.) 

 In reviewing this claim, the Court agrees with Respondent that United States v. 

Thomas, 417 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005) is the relevant authority. Counsel’s conduct 

is not presumptively prejudicial and is subject to Strickland's performance and prejudice 

requirements. As in Thomas, in the instant case, 

Given the multiple charges that [Movant] faced, [trial 

counsel] could rationally decide to focus on the charges that were more defensible and consequential. [Trial counsel’s] concession was not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea, nor did it abandon all meaningful adversarial testing of the prosecution's case, such that it would be Cronic error. His 

failure to consult and obtain consent in and of itself does not 

render [trial counsel’s] strategic decision presumptively 

prejudicial. The government was put to its burden of proving [Movant’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on all charges, and counsel by no means entirely failed to serve as his advocate. 

Thomas, 417 F.3d at 1058-1059 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984)). 

 In light of that evidence, it was reasonable for trial counsel to concede Movant’s 

participation in the August 12th robbery in order to enhance his credibility when arguing 

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that the prosecution had not satisfied its burden to prove Movant guilty of the other 

robberies. Cf. Thomas, 417 F.3d at 1058 (finding counsel “had a sensible reason for not 

contesting Thomas’s participation in the UPS robbery: it was, for all practical purposes, 

incontestible, and he believed that doing so would enhance his credibility on counts 

where the evidence was somewhat less clear and the penalties significantly greater”). 

Trial counsel’s strategy “attempted to expose the deficiencies in the prosecution’s case” 

with regard to the June and July robberies. Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 907 (9th Cir. 

2006). Trial counsel argued that because of Movant’s known participation in the August 

12th robbery, the government failed to investigate other viable leads for the remaining 

robberies and prosecuted Movant with “tunnel vision” and speculation, rather than 

evidentiary support. (CRDoc. 462 at 110.) 

 Although the record does not compel that trial counsel failed to obtain Movant’s 

consent prior to conceding his participation (see CVDoc. 5-2 at 3), it is not necessary for 

the Court to resolve this issue because it is clear that Movant cannot satisfy Strickland’s 

prejudice prong. It certainly cannot be said that but for counsel’s concession, the outcome 

of the proceeding would have been different. Given the overwhelming evidence of 

Movant’s participation in the August 12th robbery that was presented a trial, there was not 

a reasonable probability that the jury would have returned a different verdict if counsel 

had adopted a different defense theory or used different tactics. 

 In light of these considerations, the Court concludes that Movant has failed to 

satisfy the Strickland standard for this ineffective assistance claim, and will therefore 

recommend that it be denied. 

 3. Trial Counsel’s Failure to Advise of Sentencing Enhancements 

 In Ground One, Movant next claims that trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance when he failed to inform Movant “of the affect multiple 924(c) convictions 

would have at sentencing after a trial jury rendered a guilty verdict for such offenses.” 

(CVDoc. 1-2 at 2.)8

 This claim is simply unsupported and contrary to the record. Movant 

 8

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has presented nothing beyond his own after the fact assertion to show that counsel failed 

to advise him regarding potential sentencing consequences should he go to trial. See 

Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 881 (9th Cir. 2002) (a “self-serving statement,” alone, 

is insufficient... “[i]f the rule were otherwise, every rejection of a plea offer, viewed 

perhaps with more clarity in the light of an unfavorable verdict, could be relitigated upon 

the defendant’s later claim that had his counsel better advised him, he would have 

accepted the plea offer.”). In a letter addressed to Movant, dated February 12, 2009, trial 

counsel states in explicit terms: 

Count 1, conspiracy, carries a penalty of not [m]ore than five years. Counts 2, 4, 6 and 8, armed bank robbery, carry a maximum penalty of 25 years each. Count 3, use of a firearm 

during crime of violence, carries a minimum mandatory term 

of 7 years. Counts 5, 7 and 9, use of a firearm during crime of violence, each carry a minimum mandatory term of 25 years. The time for each count of use of a firearm during crime of violence must be consecutive to all other counts. All 

sentences could be consecutive. It appears that you could receive 187 years if convicted of all counts. 

(CV Doc. 5-2 at 6.) In his affidavit, trial counsel asserts that on February 11, 2009, during 

a jail visit, he verbally advised Mr. Feliciano of the maximum penalty if convicted of all 

counts, including the effect of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). (CVDoc. 5-2 at 3.) At the time of 

sentencing, the Court inquired with Movant whether he understood the sentence that was 

imposed, to which Movant responded affirmatively. (CRDoc. 466 at 26.) While Movant 

expressed his thoughts on counsel’s performance, he did not assert that he had not been 

informed of the potential sentencing consequences of going to trial at that time. (Id.) 

 Nevertheless, Movant cannot demonstrate, nor does he even allege, that if trial 

counsel had adequately explained the impact of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) at sentencing if he 

 indictment, each additional count is to be treated as a ‘second or subsequent conviction’ for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i) and therefore carries a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years. Because § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) requires that ‘no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed,’ each independent § 924(c) count in the indictment imposes a consecutive sentence in addition to any other sentence imposed, either under § 924(c) or under any other counts for which the defendant has been convicted.” United 

States v. Beltran-Moreno, 556 F.3d 913, 915 (9th Cir. 2009). 

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were found guilty at trial, he would have accepted a plea offer and avoided trial. Finding 

that Movant has not established that trial counsel’s performance was objectively deficient 

or that the alleged deficiency was prejudicial, the Court will recommend that this claim 

be denied. 

4. Trial Counsel’s Failure to Present Defenses

 Next, in Ground One, Movant argues that trial counsel failed to present an 

adequate defense. While “counsel must investigate relevant defenses... counsel must 

reasonably select and present a defense.” Mickey v. Ayers, 606 F.3d 1223, 1236 (9th Cir. 

2010). “The law does not require counsel to raise every available nonfrivolous defense.” 

Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 127 (2009). This Court’s inquiry is not on what 

“defense counsel could have presented, [but] whether counsel’s actions were reasonable.” 

Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 877 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 First, Movant asserts that his defense was inadequate because counsel failed to call 

an eye-witness to testify at trial. He claims that “at one robbery there was a witness (man) 

who[] saw both robbers exit the bank after robbing it... This man had not identified me as 

one of the two culprits he saw, instead he identified two other people as the bank 

robbers.” (CVDoc. 1-2 at 2-3.) This claim consists of nothing more than a vague 

assertion that is unsupported by the record. Movant does not point to the portion of the 

record which corroborates his allegation, nor specifies the facts to support this claim. For 

example, Movant has not identified the purported eye-witness or specified which bank 

robbery he observed. In his affidavit, trial counsel states that he “called to trial as 

witnesses all known witnesses who [he] believed would be helpful to Mr. Feliciano’s 

defense.” (CVDoc. 5-2 at 3.) Thus, without more, Movant has not negated the strong 

presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable assistance. 

Mere conclusory allegations are insufficient to prove that counsel was ineffective. Shah 

v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1989). Likewise, a tactical decision by 

counsel with which Movant may simply disagree also cannot form the basis of a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. See Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 

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2001). 

 Second, Movant argues that his defense was inadequate because counsel failed to 

present an alibi defense. Movant contends that “counsel did not present the alibi defense 

that [he] had accompanied [his] wife to the doctor’s office for her hand, and that [he] was 

there during one of the robberies.” (CVDoc. 1-2 at 3.) Trial counsel’s choice to forgo this 

defense was reasonable given the lack of evidentiary support. Counsel states “[t]hat court 

appointed investigator Joseph Gorden, at [his] request and direction, thoroughly 

investigated Mr. Feliciano’s alibi claim that he was at the doctor’s office (physical 

therapist) with his wife during the time of one of the bank robberies, but investigator 

Gordon was unable to corroborate Mr. Feliciano’s alibi.” (CVDoc. 5-2 at 3.) The 

testimony of Movant’s wife alone would have been unavailing; she was also charged as a 

party to the armed bank robberies. Movant does not allege that there were other avenues 

counsel could have investigated to support such defense. Because the only minimal 

evidence supporting Movant’s alibi was his own claim and that of his co-defendant, 

counsel’s decision not to present this defense was not objectively unreasonable. 

 Third, Movant argues that his defense was inadequate because counsel failed to 

argue that there was insufficient evidence establishing that the banks were federally 

insured at the time of the robberies. See United States v. Holloway, 259 F.3d 1199, 1201-

02 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that evidence of credit union’s federal insurance 

constituted “an essential element of the [federal] crime” of bank robbery). See also 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (there is sufficient evidence to support a 

conviction if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt). Agent Kevin Killigrew, special agent of the FBI, testified at trial on 

November 20, 2009, that in his investigation of the robberies, he “found out that all those 

banks in question – or financial institutions in question were insured by the Federal 

Deposit Insurance Corporation or the National Credit Union Association.” (CRDoc. 462 

at 33.) See United States v. Hicks, 217 F.3d 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000) (“‘uncontradicted 

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testimony of a bank’s insured status can sufficiently support the jury’s conclusion that 

this element was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’”) (quoting United States v. Corbin, 

972 F.2d 271, 272 (9th Cir. 1992); U.S. v. Ware, 416 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(Where there is an absence of passage of a substantial period of time, the jury can 

properly make an inference of coverage may be drawn as to the time of the offenses from 

the evidence of contemporary coverage). During Killigrew’s testimony, the government 

offered into evidence the certificate of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for the 

Meridian Bank, the National Credit Union Administration certificate for the First Credit 

Union, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation certificate for the Bank of 

America. (CRDoc. 462 at 32 -36.) See United States v. Bellucci, 995 F.2d 157, 160 (9th 

Cir. 1993) (holding that a bank’s FDIC certificate of insurance was sufficient to establish 

that the bank was insured by the FDIC). Killigrew testified as to which certificate was 

applicable to each robbery, and affirmed that they were fair and accurate replicas of the 

insurance certificates that he obtained through his investigation. (CRDoc. 462 at 32-36.) 

Viewing this record as a whole, there was sufficient evidence to support the element that 

the banks were federally insured at the time of the robberies. Consequently, Counsel’s 

failure to challenge the sufficiency of this evidence was not clearly unreasonable. Movant 

has not pointed to any evidence which contradicts Killigrew’s testimony or the 

certificates produced. Because Movant has not shown that the result at trial would have 

been different had counsel challenged the validity of each bank’s certificate, he has not 

demonstrated that prejudice resulted. 

 Accordingly, because Movant has failed to satisfy the Strickland standard for this 

ineffective assistance claim, the Court will recommend that it be denied.

5. Trial Counsel’s Failure to Investigate 

 Lastly, in Ground One, Movant argues trial counsel provided ineffective assistance 

when he failed to conduct a thorough investigation into a perjury claim prior to 

sentencing. In December of 2009, the Court received a letter which purported to have 

been written by Jamie Hall. The Court held a hearing on the correspondence on January 

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7, 2010. (CRDoc. 350.) Movant contends that 

after trial but before sentence was imposed, the district court ordered Mr. Kavanagh to investigate the claim that a 

government’s witness (Julie Castillo) confided in a person named Jaime Hall that she had testified falsely against me at trial. Instead, counsel did not adhere to the court’s order 

since he did not conduct an adequate investigation into this 

matter. 

(CVDoc. 1-2 at 3.) Movant asserts that Julie Castillo confided in Mr. Hall that her 

“boyfriend was threatening her to make her testify falsely against [Movant] so that they 

would get a cooperation-agreement.” (CVDoc. 1-2 at 3.) 

 Defense counsel has a “duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 

reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 691. This includes a duty to investigate the defendant’s “most important defense.” 

Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1457 (9th Cir. 1994). “A lawyer who fails adequately to 

investigate, and to introduce into evidence, records that demonstrate his client’s factual 

innocence, or that raise sufficient doubt as to that question to undermine confidence in 

the verdict, renders deficient performance.” Hart v. Gomez, 174 F.3d 1067, 1070 (9th 

Cir. 1999). 

 Movant has not demonstrated that counsel failed to make a reasonable 

investigation of this claim, nor that his decision not to pursue this matter further 

constituted deficient performance. In his affidavit, trial counsel states “[t]hat in response 

to the Court’s direction, [he] investigated the circumstances described in Mr. Jamie Hall’s 

December 11, 2009 letter to the Court; on February 17, 2010, [he] interviewed Mr. Jaime 

Hall for approximately two hours at the Lower Buckeye Jail; based on information that 

Mr. Hall provided to [him], [he] believed that Mr. Hall was clearly lying.” (CVDoc. 5-2 

at 3.) Counsel arrived at this conclusion because Hall’s accounts of the purported contacts 

with Movant’s co-defendants were not plausible. “Mr. Hall was positive that the contact 

with the defendant occurred while the defendants were out of custody in December 2008; 

the defendants were in custody in December of 2008; Mr. Hall described to [counsel] his 

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methamphetamine addiction, mental health issues, and lengthy criminal history.” (Id.) 

 Movant also fails to show that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s alleged failure 

to conduct a thorough investigation or present a post-trial defense. At trial, counsel 

vigorously cross-examined Julie Castillo to challenge the veracity of her testimony before 

the jury. Castillo testified regarding the charges against her in the indictment, her drug 

use, her history of domestic violence with co-defendant Francisco Serrano, and most 

significantly, she testified that her testimony was pursuant to her cooperation plea 

agreement which led to the dismissal of all but one criminal count against her. (CRDoc. 

468 at 109-174; 458 at 33- 88.) Castillo also testified that she had previously lied 

regarding facts in this case, and that she had been receiving threats prior to testifying. 

(CRDoc. 468 at 169, 174.) Because there was ample reason presented at trial with which 

to question the truth of Castillo’s testimony, Movant has not shown that but for counsel’s 

alleged deficiency that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. 

Therefore, Movant does not assert a viable claim for ineffective assistance of counsel and 

the Court will recommend that it be denied. 

6. Trial Counsel’s Conflict of Interest

 In Ground Two, Movant alleges that he received ineffective assistance when trial 

counsel represented Movant although a conflict of interest existed. Movant claims that 

trial counsel had a conflict of interest because two of the police detectives involved in the 

investigation of his case were counsel’s former clients.9

 

 The right to effective assistance of counsel includes an attorney who does not have 

a conflict of interest. United States v. Baker, 256 F.3d 855, 859–60 (9th Cir. 2001). In the 

context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on a conflict of interest, 

prejudice is presumed if Movant “demonstrates that his counsel labored under an ‘actual 

conflict of interest.’” United States v. Rodrigues, 347 F.3d 818, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980)). An “actual conflict of interest” 

 9

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means “a conflict that affected counsel’s performance—as opposed to a mere theoretical 

division of loyalties.” Id.; Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171 (2002) (emphasis in 

original). 

 In his affidavit, trial counsel states that he spoke with the government witnesses 

who he had “previously represented and disclosed the potential conflict; both witnesses 

waived any potential conflict.” (CVDoc. 5-2 at 4.) In his letter to Movant, trial counsel 

memorialized that he had informed Movant of the potential conflict, and that Movant 

“nonetheless consent[ed] to [his] continued representation.” (CVDoc. 5-2 at 6.) While 

Movant concedes that the potential conflict was disclosed to him, he claims that he 

informed counsel that he “did not think he should represent [him] because [he] did not 

feel he would be capable of alleviating any conflict that exist[ed]...” (CVDoc. 1-2 at 4.) 

Movant contends that he allowed the representation to continue because counsel 

“professed that he had everything under control.” (Id.) 

 Movant has not demonstrated that Counsel was laboring under an actual conflict 

of interest that adversely affected his performance. The record does not show that 

“counsel was influenced in his basic strategic decisions” by a divided loyalty to his 

former clients. See United States v. Rodrigues, 347 F.3d at 823 (quoting United States v. 

Shwayder, 312 F.3d 1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 2002)). Detective Montangna did not testify at 

trial, nor does Movant claim that his testimony would have been beneficial to the defense. 

On the second day of trial, November 12, 2009, the prosecution called Detective Hovatter 

to testify, a detective with the Glendale Police Department’s special investigations unit. 

(CRDoc. 457 at 27.) Detective Hovatter testified regarding his surveillance prior to the 

August 12, 2008 robbery. (CRDoc. 457 at 27 - 64.) Movant does not claim, nor does the 

record show, that any conflict which existed impacted the nature of the Detective’s 

testimony. Trial counsel states that he had “no information about that officer that could 

be used to his detriment and that could assist [Movant’s] case.” (CVDoc. 5-2 at 5.) Trial 

counsel “was not ethically restricted from vigorously cross-examining” Detective 

Hovatter. See United States v. Rodrigues, 347 F.3d at 824. Detective Hovatter’s 

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testimony was consistent with his police report (CVDoc. 5-3 at 2), to which Movant 

“agreed that the description of the activities just prior to the August 12, 2008 bank 

robbery was accurate” (CVDoc. 5-2 at 5). Detective Hovatter’s testimony was consistent 

with the evidence otherwise presented regarding the August 12, 2008 robbery. Under 

these circumstances, counsel’s relationship with his former client cannot be said to have 

had an adverse effect on his ability to advocate on behalf of Movant. 

 Movant simply alleges that trial counsel had a conflict of interest. He does not 

offer specific facts which, if true, would indicate that counsel’s former relationship with 

the detectives influenced him “not to pursue a particular litigation strategy” or that a 

“foregone litigation strategy would have been a viable alternative.” See United States v. 

Rodrigues, 347 F.3d at 824. Because Movant has not shown deficient performance or 

resulting prejudice, the Court will recommend that Ground Two be denied. 

 7. Appellate Counsel’s Ineffective Assistance 

In Ground Three, Movant alleges that appellate counsel provided ineffective 

assistance when he failed to raise “nonfrivolous issues” on direct appeal and failed to 

petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.10 In his affidavit, appellate counsel 

states that his representation and choice of issues to raise were those which were “fully 

supported” and “represented the best chance of success for Mr. Feliciano in his appeal.” 

(CVDoc. 5-3 at 2.) He further provides that he did not petition certiorari to the Supreme 

Court because he did not find that there were nonfrivolous claims to raise. (Id.) 

 “A hallmark of effective appellate counsel is the ability to weed out claims that 

have no likelihood of success, instead of throwing in a kitchen sink full of arguments 

with the hope that some argument will persuade the court.” Pollard v. White, 119 F.3d 

1430, 1435 (9th Cir. 1997). Counsel “does not have a constitutional duty to raise all 

nonfrivolous issues,” Pollard v. White, 119 F.3d at 1435, or to “raise every ‘colorable’ 

claim.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 754 (1983). There is no attorney error in refusing 

 10 On appeal, Movant was represented by Marc Victor. The Court notes that in 

Movant’s supporting memorandum, however, he refers to appellate counsel as “Mr. Campbell.” (CVDoc. 1-2 at 4- 5, 15.) 

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to raise issues on appeal that have little or no chance of success. Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 

1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996). “ 

 Movant claims that he received ineffective assistance when appellate counsel 

failed to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that the banks were federally insured. 

For the same reasons that this Court found no ineffective assistance by trial counsel for 

not arguing that there was insufficient evidence establishing that the banks were federally 

insured at the time of the robberies, it also finds no ineffective assistance by appellate 

counsel for not presenting this claim on appeal. Therefore, appellate counsel’s 

performance was not objectively deficient. Because of the improbability of success on 

appeal, Movant also cannot meet the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. 

 Furthermore, appellate counsel’s performance was not objectively deficient 

because he otherwise failed to challenge trial counsel’s performance. “Claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel are generally inappropriate on direct appeal. Such claims 

normally should be raised in habeas corpus proceedings, which permit counsel to develop 

a record as to what counsel did, why it was done, and what, if any, prejudice resulted.” 

United States v. Ross, 206 F.3d 896, 900 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations and quotation 

marks omitted).11

 Lastly, Defendant argues that appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance of 

counsel because he failed to file a petition for certiorari. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit 

denied a motion by appellate counsel to withdraw, stating 

The motion of appellant’s appointed counsel, Marc J. Victor, 

to be relieved as appellant’s counsel of record is denied 

without prejudice to renewal accompanied by a sufficient statement that there are no grounds upon which to seek a petition for a writ of certiorari. See 9th Cir. R. 4-1(e). Counsel 

is advised that after he advises a client of the right to initiate 

 11 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals generally reviews “ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal under two circumstances: (1) when the record on appeal is sufficiently developed to permit review and determination of the issue, or (2) when the 

legal representation is so inadequate that it obviously denies a defendant his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” United States v. Ross, 206 F.3d 896, 900 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In the instant case, the Ninth Circuit 

declined to review Movant’s claim on direct appeal because neither prong had been met. (CRDoc. 481.) 

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further review, he need not move to be relieved unless the 

client insists on filing a petition for a writ of certiorari and 

counsel concludes that there are no non-frivolous grounds for seeking Supreme Court review. See 9th Cir. R. 4-1(e). 

(9th Cir. Doc. 31.) Movant sent a letter to appellate counsel,12 stating that he was aware 

of the request for appointment of new counsel, but nonetheless asked that appellate 

counsel submit a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court on his behalf. 

(CVDoc. 1-2 at 44.) 

 There is no constitutional right to counsel for discretionary appeals. Murray v. 

Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 19 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987); Miller v. 

Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1431-33 (9th Cir. 1989). However, Ninth Circuit Rule 4-1(e) 

provides, in pertinent part, that in post-appeal criminal proceedings, 

If the decision of [the Ninth Circuit] is adverse to the client, 

in part or in full, counsel, whether appointed or retained, shall, within 14 days after entry of judgment or denial of a petition for rehearing, advise the client of the right to initiate further review by filing a petition for a writ of certiorari in the 

United States Supreme Court. See Sup. Ct. R. 13, 14. If in counsel’s considered judgment there are no grounds for seeking Supreme Court review that are non-frivolous and 

consistent with the standards for filing a petition, see Sup. Ct. R. 10, counsel shall further notify the client that counsel intends to move this Court for leave to withdraw as counsel of 

record if the client insists on filing a petition in violation of 

Sup. Ct. R. 10. 

 Even assuming appellate counsel failed to inform Movant of his right to seek 

certiorari, or that counsel found no nonfrivolous grounds and would again move to 

withdraw as counsel, Movant has not shown that he was prejudiced by counsel’s inaction. 

Review by the Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of 

judicial discretion, and will be granted only for compelling reasons. Sup. Ct. R. 10. The 

Ninth Circuit’s brief memorandum decision in Movant’s case unlikely falls within the 

“character of the reasons” that the Supreme Court grants review. See id. Movant does not 

 12 The Court notes that Movant addressed the letter to the attention of Scott 

Campbell, Esq.. (CVDoc. 1-2 at 44.) 

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argue prejudice and, perhaps more importantly, provides no argument or evidence to 

suggest he would have had meritorious claims to raise in a petition for writ of certiorari. 

 Accordingly, because Movant has failed to satisfy the Strickland standard for this 

ineffective assistance claim, the Court will recommend Ground Three be denied. 

III. Ground Four 

 In Ground Four, Movant challenges his convictions on the basis that the 

government did not present sufficient evidence to prove that the banks which were 

robbed were federally insured. For the reasons previously stated, the Court finds that if 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 

fact could have found the essential element that the banks were federally insured at the 

time of the robberies. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Therefore, the 

Court finds this claim is without merit and will recommend that Ground Four be denied. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the claims presented in the Motion 

fail on the merits. Movant has not raised facts or issues that entitle him to an evidentiary 

hearing on his claims. Accordingly, the Court will recommend that the Motion Under 28 

U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody 

be denied. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 

2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (CRDoc. 

482, CVDoc. 1) be DENIED and that CV-12-01650-PHX-DGC (SPL) be DISMISSED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Movant has not made 

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

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within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within 

which to file a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of 

the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of 

the findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 29th day of March, 2013. 

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