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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 6, 1996 Decided November 1, 1996

No. 95-5375

PATRICK A. TUITE, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

MARK HENRY, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 94ms00268)

Courtney C. Nottage argued the cause for appellants, with whom William J. Harte was on the briefs.

John P. Schnitker, Attorney, U.S. Department ofJustice, argued the cause for appellee, with whom

Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, and

Leonard Schaitman, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, were on the brief.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, WILLIAMS and GINSBURG, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Chief Judge: The Office of Professional Responsibility of the Department of

Justice ("OPR") conducted an investigation into allegations that someone had illegally taped

privileged attorney-client conversations during the preparation of the clients' defense to charges that

they had engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity. The results of the OPR investigation were

placed under seal and not released to the parties during the criminal trial. After the criminal trial

ended, the lawyers whose conversations had been taped filed a civilsuit in federal district court in the

Northern District of Illinois against some employees of the Department of Justice, claiming that the

taping violated federal law and their constitutional rights. Tuite v. Henry, No. 93-C-3248 (N.D. Ill.

filed May 28, 1993).

In the course of the civil case, the lawyers subpoenaed the documents relating to the OPR's

investigation of the taping. Relying on the law enforcement investigatory privilege, a qualified

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privilege that protects against the release of documents whose disclosure might reveal law

enforcement investigative techniques orsources, the OPR refused to complywith the subpoena. The

lawyers then filed a motion in the federal district court in Washington, D.C., to compel the OPR to

produce the documents. Plaintiffs' Motion to Comply with Subpoena Dated July 20, 1994, Tuite v.

Henry, Misc. No. 94-268 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 1995),reprinted in Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 4. The District

Court upheld the OPR's claim of privilege, finding: (1) that it had been properly raised; and (2) that

appellants did not make the requisite showing of need to overcome the Government's claim of

privilege. Tuite v. Henry, Misc. No. 94-268 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 1995), reprinted in J.A. 161-66.

We affirm as reasonable the District Court's determination that the Government properly

raised its claim of privilege. On the record before us, it is clear that the Government objected to the

subpoena within fourteen days after service, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

45(c)(2)(B), and then filed a claim of privilege supported by a detailed description of the documents

withheld, asrequired by FederalRule ofCivil Procedure 45(d)(2). However, we find that the District

Court abused its discretion in holding that the documents are protected fromdisclosure under the law

enforcement investigatory privilege. In reaching this conclusion, the District Court appears to have

misunderstood appellant's need for the documents. More importantly, the trial court accorded too

much weight to a narrowly defined "need" factor and failed to address other relevant factors. See In

re Sealed Case, 856 F.2d 268, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339,

344 (E.D. Pa. 1973), cited in Friedman v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 738 F.2d 1336, 1342-

43 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Infelise Case and the OPR Investigation

This case arises out of a civil case pending in the United States District Court for the Northern

District of Illinois. Tuite v. Henry, 93-C-3248 (N.D. Ill. filed May 28, 1993). Appellants, defense

lawyers and plaintiffs in that case, are suing appellees, employees of the Department of Justice,

claiming that appellees violated federal wiretapping law and the Constitution by recording or

attempting to record conversations between appellants and their clients.

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At the time the taping occurred, appellants were serving as defense counsel in a criminal

action in the Northern District of Illinois before United States District Court Judge Ann Williams.

See United States v. Infelise, 835 F. Supp. 1466 (N.D. Ill. 1993). During their preparations for the

criminal trial, appellants and their imprisoned clients were given access to a private room at the

Chicago Metropolitan Correctional Center ("MCC") to discuss trial strategy. Despite appellees'

assurances to the contrary, appellants discovered that someone was monitoring their "private"

conversations at the MCC. This discovery was made when an unidentified person provided appellants

with recordings of attorney-client conversationsin the MCC room. See United States v. Infelise, No.

90 CR 87, 1991 WL 246575, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 1991) (mem.). In response to appellants'

complaints, the OPR investigated the taping and prepared reports that are now the subject of this

subpoena-enforcement action. In the criminal action, Judge Williams ordered the OPR's reports

sealed, rejecting disclosure requests by appellants,see, e.g., United States v. Infelise, 90CR87 (N.D.

Ill. May 23, 1994) (order), reprinted in J.A. 132-33, and she determined that "the report [did] not

contain anyevidence that [was] favorable to the defense or the prosecution," United States v. Infelise,

90 CR 87, slip op. at 9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 1992) (mem.), reprinted in J.A. 79, 87. The Seventh

Circuit agreed that the investigation had been "totally inconclusive." United States v. DiDomenico,

78 F.3d 294, 298-99 (7th Cir. 1996).

B. The Chicago Civil Action and the Subpoenas

After their clients were convicted, appellants filed a civil action in the Northern District of

Illinois. Appellants claimed that the taping violated their rights under the Constitution and federal

wiretapping law. During discovery, appellants first served a subpoena on the principal legal advisor

to the Chicago office of the FBI, requesting documents related to the taping of attorney-client

conversations at the MCC. The legal advisor provided some documents, but otherwise indicated that

he could not furnish most of the materialsought by appellants, because the reports at issue were part

of an investigation file controlled by the OPR in Washington, D.C.

On July 1, 1994, Michael Shaheen, counsel to the OPR, received, via certified mail, a request

for documents relating to the alleged taping. Shaheen rejected this subpoena, because it was served

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1 The relevant portion of the letter reads:

Although a final assessment of every document requested has not been

made due to the time constraints imposed by the subpoena, it appears that the

documents requested are privileged or otherwise not subject to disclosure. See

FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3). All responsive documents are contained within the

investigative files of OPR, and are protected by the law enforcement investigatory

privilege. Numerous of these documents make reference to, or would otherwise

reveal, confidential sources. Certain documents, reflecting drafts, internal notes,

and internal correspondence, are also protected by the deliberative process

privilege in that they are pre-decisional and reflect the deliberative processes of

agency personnel.

Moreover, the report which forms the bulk of responsive documents

appears to have been sealed by Judge Williams in the United States v. Rocco

Infelise, et al., 90-CR-87 (N.D. Ill.), litigation.

Letter from Peter D. Coffman, Attorney, Civil Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to William J. Harte

(Aug. 3, 1994), reprinted in J.A. 77. 

via mailrather than in person. On July 21, 1994, appellants personally served Shaheen with a second

subpoena requesting the same documents. In a letter dated August 3, 1994, an OPR attorney advised

appellants that "it appears that the documents requested are privileged or otherwise not subject to

disclosure. See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)." Letter from Peter D. Coffman, Attorney, Civil Div., U.S.

Dep't ofJustice, to William J. Harte (Aug. 3, 1994), reprinted in J.A. 77. This August 3 letter relied

on "the law enforcement investigatory privilege" and the "deliberative process privilege" as the

reasons for the OPR's failure to comply with the subpoena.1

On August 19, 1994, appellants filed a motion in the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia to compel compliance with the subpoena. Plaintiffs' Motion to Comply with

Subpoena Dated July 20, 1994, Tuite, Misc. No. 94-268, reprinted in J.A. 4. On September 9, in

opposition to the motion to comply, appellees filed a reply that included "the Shaheen Declaration,"

describing each document withheld and the type of privilege the Government claimed. Office of

Professional Responsibility's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Comply with Subpoena Dated July

20, 1994, Tuite, Misc. No. 94-268, reprinted in J.A. 90.

The District Court denied the motion to comply, finding that the Government had properly

raised its claims of privilege and that appellants had not demonstrated sufficient need to overcome

the Government's defenses against disclosure. Tuite, Misc. No. 94-268, reprinted in J.A. 161-66.

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The trial court dismissed appellants' action without prejudice, indicating that appellants could renew

their claim upon a more fully developed showing of need. Id. at 166.

C. The Appellants' Motion to Strike Portions of Appellees' Brief or Alternatively to Consider

Declarations

When appellants filed their reply brief with this court, they also filed a motion to strike

portions of appellees' brief or, in the alternative, to consider declarations. Motion to Strike Portions

ofBrief, or AlternativelyConsider Declarations, Tuite v. Henry, No. 95-5375 (D.C. Cir. motion filed

July 16, 1996). Appellants claimed that appellees made the following two factual errors in their brief:

first, appellees asserted that appellants, in the course of the criminal proceeding, had been supplied

a list of people who had access to their "private" room at the MCC; second, appellees stated that

appellants had failed to conduct even "the most rudimentary discovery." Id. at 1-4 (citing Brief for

OPR at 7, 12, 23-26). Appellants' motion demonstrates that the Government's claims on these points

are erroneous. Accordingly, appellants ask this court to strike the errors or, alternatively, to accept

their declarationsto show (1) that no list was ever provided to appellants and (2) their futile attempts

at discovery. Appellees oppose the motion to strike as a tardy attempt to introduce new evidence.

Opposition to Motion to Strike Portions of Brief or, Alternatively, to Consider Declarations, Tuite

v. Henry, No. 95-5375 (D.C. Cir. opposition filed July 23, 1996). This court deferred decision on

the motion pending oral argument on this appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

A district court's discovery order is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. In re

Sealed Case, 856 F.2d at 271. Such a "ruling [is] "arbitrary,' regardless of how well- reasoned it

might be, if it proceeds from a misapprehension of the relevant legalstandard." Schreiber v. Society

for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 11 F.3d 217, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1993). In this case, we find no abuse of

discretionintheDistrictCourt's determination that appellees' claims of privilege were properlyraised.

We find, however, an abuse of discretion in the District Court's determination that the documents are

protected from disclosure under the law enforcement investigatory privilege. On this score, we hold

that the District Court failed to follow the correct legal standard in assessing the appellants' request

for relevant documents as against the Government's claim of privilege. Accordingly, we remand the

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case for further proceedings.

A. Stating a Claim of Privilege

The first matter to consider here is whether appellees properly raised a claim of privilege in

response to a subpoena. We hold that the District Court committed no error in finding that the OPR

properly raised its claims of privilege, asrequired by FederalRule of Civil Procedure 45(c)(2)(B), by

sending a letter of objection within fourteen days after service of the subpoena. We also hold that

the District Court was correct in ruling that the OPR's subsequent submission of a privilege log,

detailing each document withheld and the reason, fully complied with the requirements of Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d)(2).

Rule 45(c)(2)(B) provides:

Subject to paragraph (d)(2) of thisrule, a person commanded to produce and permit

inspection and copying may, within 14 days after service of the subpoena or before

the time specified for compliance if such time is less than 14 days after service, serve

upon the party or attorney designated in the subpoena written objection to inspection

or copying of any or all of the designated materials or of the premises.

FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Rule 45(d)(2) mandates:

[T]he claim shall be made expressly and shall be supported by a description of the

nature ofthe documents, communications, or things not produced that issufficient to

enable the demanding party to contest the claim.

FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(2). "One problem presented by Rule 45(d)(2) is that it fails to provide any

guidance as to when the claim of privilege or work product must be asserted by the person

subpoenaed." 9A CHARLESA.WRIGHT&ARTHURR.MILLER, FEDERALPRACTICEAND PROCEDURE

§ 2464 (1995). This confusion has led more than one court to conclude that Rule 45(d)(2) permits

the assertion of the privilege at the time for compliance with the subpoena regardless of whether an

objection or motion to quash has been filed prior to the time of compliance. See Ventre v. Datronic

Rental Corp., No. 92 C 3289, 1995 WL 42345, *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 1995) (mem.); Winchester

Capital Management Co., Inc. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 144 F.R.D. 170, 175-76 (D.

Mass. 1992). We think this approach is misguided.

In our view, a party objecting to a subpoena on the basis of privilege must both (1) object to

the subpoena and (2) state the claim of privilege within fourteen days ofservice, as required by Rule

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45(c)(2)(B). The language in Rule 45(c)(2)(B) making it "subject to" Rule 45(d)(2) does not alleviate

the responsibilityof objecting partiesto assert their objections based on privilege within fourteen days

of service of the subpoena. Rather, we believe the "subject to" language merely clarifies the type of

information that the objecting party will eventually be expected to provide.

Common sense and the purpose of the rule dictate that the "subject to" language of Rule

45(c)(2)(B) does not mandate that the full description required by Rule 45(d)(2) be provided at the

time the initial objection is asserted. Although Rule 45(d)(2) does not contain a specific time limit

within which objecting parties must supply the requisite privilege log, the AdvisoryCommittee Notes

indicate that the purpose of the Rule "is to provide a party whose discovery is constrained by a claim

of privilege ... with information sufficient to evaluate such a claimand to resist ifit seems unjustified."

FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(2) advisory committee's note. Consistent with this purpose, the responsibility

rests with the district court to ensure that the information required under the Rule is provided to the

requesting party within a reasonable time, such that the claiming party has adequate opportunity to

evaluate fully the subpoenaed documents and the requesting party has ample opportunity to contest

that claim. District courts must then take account of the information provided under Rule 45(d)(2)

in ruling on a motion to comply. In this case, we find that the District Court did not abuse its

discretion in concluding that the Rule's purpose was served where the privilege log required by Rule

45(d)(2) was filed within a reasonable time in response to appellants' motion to comply.

In addition, to sustain a claimof privilege, this circuit requires: (1) a formal claim of privilege

by the head of the department having control over the requested information; (2) assertion of the

privilege based on actual personal consideration by that official; and (3) a detailed specification of

the information for which the privilege is claimed with an explanation why it properly falls within the

scope of the privilege. In re Sealed Case, 856 F.2d at 271. Again, we find that the District Court

committed no error in concluding that the Shaheen Declaration submitted in response to the motion

to comply meetsthese requirements. Mr. Shaheen, who is counsel to the OPR, indicated that he had

personally reviewed the documents under subpoena, specified the privilege claimed with respect to

each document, and provided an explanation of the reasons for each claim of privilege. See Office

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ofProfessionalResponsibility'sOpposition to Plaintiffs'Motion to Complywith Subpoena Dated July

20, 1994, Tuite, Misc. No. 94-268, reprinted in J.A. 90, 113.

B. Evaluating a Claim of Privilege

Having found that appellees properly asserted their claims of privilege, we now face the more

difficult question focused on the merits of appellants' discovery request as against appellees' claim of

privilege. In addressing this question, the District Court was required to weigh "[t]he public interest

in nondisclosure ... against the [appellants'] need ... for access to the privileged information." In re

Sealed Case, 856 F.2d at 272. To achieve this end, a number of factors must be considered,

including:

(1) the extent to which disclosure willthwart governmentalprocesses bydiscouraging

citizens from giving the government information; (2) the impact upon persons who

have given information of having their identities disclosed; (3) the degree to which

governmentalself-evaluation and consequent programimprovement willbe chilled by

disclosure; (4) whether the information sought is factual data or evaluative summary;

(5) whether the party seeking discovery is an actual or potential defendant in any

criminal proceeding either pending or reasonably likely to follow from the incident in

question; (6) whether the police investigation has been completed; (7) whether any

interdepartmental disciplinary proceedings have arisen or may arise from the

investigation; (8) whether the plaintiff's suit is non-frivolous and brought in good

faith; (9) whether the information sought is available through other discovery or from

other sources; (10) the importance of the information sought to the plaintiff's case.

Id. (citing Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339, 344 (E.D. Pa. 1973), cited in Friedman, 738 F.2d

at 1342-43)).

In other words, a party's "need" for subpoenaed documents is determined by weighing

numerous factors. In this case, however, the trial court found that appellants had shown no "need"

for disclosure solely because they failed to demonstrate that they were unable to elicit the disputed

information through discovery. This one factor simply cannot be determinative. Need in the context

of the law enforcement investigatory privilege is meant to be an elastic concept that does not turn

only on the availability of the information from an alternative source.

There are two problems with the District Court's analysis. First, it appears that the District

Court may have misunderstood the nature of appellants' particular need for the documentsin light of

its assumptions about previousinformation provided to appellants and the effectiveness of alternative

sources of information. The District Court opinion states that appellants "have not shown that they

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2 We assume that the District Court's statement was intended merely to be a shorthand version

of Frankenhauser factor number "(9)""whether the information sought is available through

other discovery or from other sources"and not a more stringent version of that factor. 

are unable to elicit the information through discovery."2 Tuite, Misc. No. 94-268, slip op. at 6,

reprinted in J.A. 166. The foundation for the trial court's statement is unclear. In their brief to this

court, appellees claimed that appellants were given a list of people who had accessto the MCC room

during the time when the taping occurred. Brief for OPR at 7 n.4, 12, 23-25. Appellees also

contended that appellants failed to seek discovery from these people at the MCC. Brief for OPR at

12, 23-26. Declarations submitted by appellants in response to these claims indicate that appellees'

statements are both wrong and misleading. Motion to Strike Portions of Brief, or Alternatively

Consider Declarations, Tuite, No. 95-3575 (D.C. Cir. motion filed July 16, 1996). If the District

Court relied on these apparently mistaken assertions, then its judgment was infected by a

misunderstanding of appellants' particular need for the documents. On the record at hand, we simply

cannot discern the basis for the District Court's judgment on this point.

Second, and more importantly, the District Court clearly erred in relying almost exclusively

on a narrowly defined notion of appellants' "need" for the documents. In this regard, the District

Court held that,

[o]nce the privilege has been claimed, it becomes the duty of the "demanding party

to show his or her need for disclosure." In this case, plaintiffs have not adequately

met that burden.... [P]laintiffs have not shown that they are unable to elicit the

information through discovery.

Tuite, Misc. No. 94-268, slip op. at 6 (citation omitted), reprinted in J.A. 166. The trial court cited

the Frankenhauser decision in a footnote, id. at 6 n.9, reprinted in J.A. 166, but provided no other

indication that it had considered the numerous factors outlined in Frankenhauser. We have made it

clear that exclusive reliance on one factor does not satisfy the "essential balancing process." See In

re Sealed Case, 856 F.2d at 272.

A principal problem with the District Court's opinion is the suggestion that, as a threshold

matter, plaintiffs carry the burden of showing that the information they seek cannot otherwise be

elicited through discovery, and that failure to satisfy this burden isfatal as against a claimof privilege.

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3 We recognize that the court in Friedman, 738 F.2d at 1336, held that "[w]hether the

materials are available from other sources is a factor in determining the degree of the litigant's

need to obtain it from the governmental agency or officer claiming the privilege." Id. at 1341. 

But this is a far cry from the District Court's suggestion in this case that plaintiffs must show, as a

threshold matter, that they are unable to elicit the information through discovery. Friedman also

indicates that a plaintiff may be required to "make a strong showing of unavailability from

alternative sources." Id. Nothing in Friedman, however, can be read to negate the "essential

balancing process" required by In re Sealed Case. See 856 F.2d at 272. In other words, under

both Friedman and In re Sealed Case, "[t]he process of identifying and weighing the competing

interests cannot be avoided," id., and "need" is but one factor to be considered in the balancing

process. 

However, it is clear that there is no such threshold requirement under the established case law. As

we have already noted, "need," understood asthe availabilityofinformation fromalternative sources,

is but one among manyfactorsto be weighed in assessing a demand for relevant documents as against

a claim of privilege.3

The simple point here is the one that we made in In re Sealed Case:

[T]he law enforcement investigatory privilege is qualified. The public interest in

nondisclosure must be balanced against the need of a particular litigant for access to

the privileged information.... The process of identifying and weighing the competing

interests cannot be avoided.

856 F.2d at 272 (citations omitted). The court in In re Sealed Case citesten different factors, drawn

from Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. at 344, "as illustrative of the factors the district court must

consider," 856 F.2d at 272 (emphasis added). So it is clear that "the need of a particular litigant" to

which the court refers in In re Sealed Case is not "need" in the narrow sense described by the trial

court here. It is also clear that the District Court in the instant case failed to weigh the competing

interests cited in In re Sealed Case.

Because the District Court's decision does not reflect the "essential balancing process"

required by In re Sealed Case, we are constrained to remand the case for further consideration. On

remand, the information contained in appellants' declarations testifying to the fact that they never

received a list of people with accessto the MCC roomand to the ineffectiveness of alternative means

of obtaining the desired information should be considered bythe trial court, along with any other facts

that will facilitate a weighing of the competing interests in this case.

III. CONCLUSION

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We hereby remand the case for a determination of whether the subpoenaed documents are in

fact protected by the law enforcement investigatory privilege in light of a full consideration of the

Frankenhauser factors.

So ordered.

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