Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_06-cv-00229/USCOURTS-almd-2_06-cv-00229-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

In March of 2002, a Pike County Grand Jury indicted Johns for first degree kidnapping in violation of Ala.

Code § 13A-6-43(a)(2) for the abduction of Peggy Scott, a court security officer, with the intent to use Scott as

a shield or hostage. Respondents’ Exhibit F - Court Doc. No. 8-6 at 33. However, after hearing the evidence, a

duly empaneled jury convicted Johns of the lesser included offense of kidnapping in the second degree. Under

the applicable code section “[a] person commits the crime of kidnapping in the second degree if he abducts

another person.” Ala. Code § 13A-6-44(a) (emphasis added). As relevant to this case, the term “abduct” is

defined as follows: “To restrain a person with intent to prevent his liberation by ... [u]sing or threatening to use

deadly physical force.” Ala. Code § 13A-6-40(2)(b). In accordance with well established law, the State may

establish kidnapping in the second degree by “‘show[ing] that the accused prevented the liberation of the victim

... by the use of deadly ... physical force....’” Henderson v. State, 612 So.2d 1256, 1261 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992),

quoting Newton v. State, 540 So.2d 800, 801 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988). Although a defendant may present a defense

that “the abduction [was] not coupled with intent to use [deadly force] or [a] threat[] to use deadly force,” Ala.

Code § 13A-6-44(b)(1), it is clear beyond cavil that utilization of a firearm to procure the abduction of another

person constitutes the use of deadly physical force and the abductor’s intent with respect to the use deadly physical

force can be inferred by the jury from the use of such force and/or other relevant circumstances. Jones v. State,

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

CHARLES KELVIN JOHNS, )

AIS #154434, )

)

 Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:06-CV-229-WHA 

) [WO]

)

J. C. GILES, et al., )

)

 Respondents. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This cause is before the court on a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for writ of habeas

corpus filed by Charles Kelvin Johns [“Johns”], a state inmate, on March 8, 2006. In this

petition, Johns challenges a conviction for second degree kidnapping imposed upon him

by the Circuit Court of Pike County, Alabama on March 13, 2003.1

 The trial court

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591 So.2d 569, 574 (Ala.Cr.App. 1991) (“‘[T]he element of intent, being a state of mind or mental purpose, is

usually incapable of [direct] proof, [and] it may be inferred from ... the use of a deadly weapon and other attendant

circumstances.’ Johnson v. State, 390 So.2d 1160, 1167 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 390 So.2d 1168 (Ala.

1980).”); Bishop v. State, 482 So.2d 1322, 1326 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985) (intent presumed from use of deadly weapon);

Seaton v. State, 645 So.2d 341, 343 (Ala.Cr.App.1994), quoting McCord v. State, 501 So.2d 520, 528-529

(Ala.Cr.App.1986) (“‘Intent, ... being a state or condition of the mind, is rarely, if ever, susceptible of direct or

positive proof, and must usually be inferred from the facts testified to by witnesses and the circumstances as

developed by the evidence.’”). “‘The intent of a defendant at the time of the offense is a jury question.’” C. G.

v. State, 841 So.2d 281, 291 (Ala.Cr.App.2001), aff’d, 841 So.2d 292 (Ala.2002), quoting Downing v. State, 620

So.2d 983, 985 (Ala.Cr.App.1993). Intent or lack thereof must be determined by the jury and a finding of requisite

intent “‘may be inferred from the facts and circumstances attending the whole transaction.’” Owens v. State, 531

So.2d 2, 13 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986), quoting Doss v. State, 23 Ala.App. 168, 180, 123 So. 237, 248 (1929). 

 2In his appellate brief, Johns specifically stated “he does not make an argument under Brady v. Maryland, 373

U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963). The statements attributed to Mr. Johns by Sheriff Thomas were not material or

relevant to the elements of the crime charged. The statements were, however, very unfavorable to Mr. Johns [as

they undercut his defense] that he ... was acting out of character and under duress of weighty issues ... [and refuted

his prior testimony] that he only wanted attention. His entire Defense was aimed at mitigating the effects of his

actions. The introduction of his purported statements by Sheriff Thomas, were severely prejudicial if in no other

facet than in the sentencing portion of the trial.” Respondents’ Exhibit G (Johns’ Brief on Direct Appeal) - Court

Doc. No. 8-7 at 25-26. Appellate counsel’s concession that Johns’ intent to cause harm does not constitute an

element of the first degree kidnapping charge contained in the indictment is correct, as the requisite intent for such

charge requires that the abduction occur only with the intent to use the abducted individual as a shield or hostage.

Moreover, the accused’s intent to cause physical harm is likewise not an element of second degree kidnapping,

as this offense occurs upon abduction with either the use of deadly physical force or with a threat of such force.

Henderson, 612 So.2d 1261. Moreover, the lack of intent to use deadly force or threaten the use of deadly force

only presents a potential defense to second degree kidnapping. At trial, Johns testified he abducted a court security

officer and used a firearm in the commission of this abduction. The alleged lack of intent to cause harm to the

victim or anyone else by actually firing the weapon on the day of the abduction is irrelevant, as Johns admitted

2

sentenced Johns as an habitual felony offender to life imprisonment for this conviction.

Johns filed a direct appeal of his kidnapping conviction in which he argued that the

State failed to provide the defense notice of a post-arrest oral statement made by Johns to

the Sheriff of Pike County regarding Johns’ intent to kill someone on the day of the

abduction. Specifically, Johns complained that this omission by the State violated Rule

16.1 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure and deprived him of a fair trial in

violation of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Respondents’

Exhibit G (Johns’ Brief on Direct Appeal) - Court Doc. No. 8-7 at 19.2

 On March 19, 2004,

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use of deadly force to commit the offense. As previously noted, the intent to use deadly force can be inferred from

the undisputed fact that Johns used a deadly weapon to commit the abduction. 

3

the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Johns’ kidnapping conviction in an

unpublished memorandum opinion issued on rehearing. Respondents’ Exhibit B - Court

Doc. No. 8-2. The appellate court’s opinion, in relevant part, reads as follows:

 The facts adduced at trial indicate the following: On January 14,

2002, Johns, apparently disgruntled over the probate office’s treatment of his

real property, entered the Pike County Courthouse armed with a gun. [Johns

identifies the weapon as a .32 caliber revolver.] As he approached the metal

detector, [Johns] jumped through it and grabbed Security Officer Peggy Scott

around the neck. Johns pointed the gun at [Scott’s] head and pulled her

toward the office of the Probate Judge. Officer Scott was unarmed. Pike

County Probate Judge Bill Stone heard shouting and stepped out of his office

to investigate. He saw Johns holding Officer Scott at gunpoint. Judge Stone

tried to convince Johns to drop the gun. Deputy Sheriff Douglas Wheeler

then appeared on the scene and convinced Johns to drop the gun. Johns was

placed in handcuffs and taken into custody by Sheriff Russell Thomas. Johns

was taken to the Sheriff’s office where he and the Sheriff talked. 

Johns’s defense at trial centered around his assertions that he was

“stressed out” and that he was very sorry the episode had occurred. 

On appeal, Johns argues that the State failed to abide by Rule 16.1,

Ala. R. Crim. P., when it did not provide to defense counsel the substance of

Johns’s oral statement made to the Sheriff after his arrest. This failure, Johns

contends, substantially prejudiced his defense and deprived him of a fair trial.

At trial, Johns testified that he had not intended to hurt anyone when

he went down to the courthouse on the day in question. [Upon hearing this

testimony, the prosecutor dispatched one of his employees to speak with the

Sheriff. Thus, the prosecutor at this time learned that Johns advised the

Sheriff he had gone to the courthouse that day to kill someone.] On crossexamination, over defense counsel’s objection regarding the fact that Johns’s

alleged statement had never been provided to defense counsel, the prosecutor

questioned Johns about whether he had stated to the Sheriff ... he “came to

kill somebody today.” Johns denied making the statement. The State

recalled the Sheriff to the stand for rebuttal testimony. The Sheriff testified

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that Johns stated that he “came [to the courthouse] to kill somebody” on the

day in question.

Rule 16.1 states:

“Upon written request of the defendant, the prosecutor

shall, within fourteen (14) days after the request has been filed

in court ... [or within such time] as may be ordered by the

court....

“... Disclose the substance of any oral statements made

by the defendant, before or after arrest, to any law enforcement

officer, official, or employee which the state ... intends to offer

in evidence at the trial.” 

 Assuming, without deciding, that the prosecutor erred by failing to

turn over to defense counsel the substance of Johns’s statement to the Sheriff,

this error was harmless. Johns was indicted [for first degree kidnapping] for

abducting Officer Scott “with the intent to use her as a shield or hostage....”

See § [1]3A-6-43(a)(2). Johns was ultimately convicted of second-degree

kidnapping, which required proof only that he abducted Officer Scott. Johns

admitted during his testimony that he was armed [with a deadly weapon] and

that he “grabbed” Officer Scott and “carr[ied] her all the way into the probate

judge’s office.” Officer Scott testified that she was in fear for her life as

Johns removed her from her seat, restrained her at gunpoint, and forced her

to go to the probate judge’s office. Other credible eyewitnesses, including

the probate judge, confirmed Officer Scotts’ testimony that she was

restrained by Johns with his weapon and that she was forced to walk with

him to the probate judge’s office. Johns’s testimony alone, but in particular

combined with the testimony of Officer Scott and the other eyewitnesses,

proved the State’s prima facie case that [Johns] abducted Officer Scott. Even

without the statement that Johns had gone to the courthouse in question to

kill somebody, “the evidence overwhelmingly proved [Johns’s] guilt....” Ex

“No judgment may be reversed or set asid parte Hunter, 777 So.2d 60, 61 (Ala. 2000). e,nor new trial granted in any civil

or criminal case on the ground of misdirection of the jury, the giving or

refusal of special charges or the improper admission or rejection of evidence,

nor for error as to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the opinion

of the court to which the appeal is taken or application is made, after an

examination of the entire cause, it should appear that the error complained of

has probably injuriously affected substantial rights of the parties.”

Rule 45, Ala. R. App. Because of the existence of overwhelming evidence

supporting the conviction for second-degree kidnapping, and because the

statement did not serve to establish an element of the crime for which Johns

Case 2:06-cv-00229-WHA-SRW Document 29 Filed 11/26/08 Page 4 of 24
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Thomas K. Brantley represented Johns at trial and filed the initial brief on direct appeal. Johns states that

Brantley withdrew after submitting this brief and the appellate court appointed Thomas H. Claunch to represent

Johns. The record demonstrates that Johns acted pro se in filing both an application for rehearing with the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and a petition for writ of certiorari with the Alabama Supreme Court. 

5

had been indicted, the admission of the statement did not probably

injuriously affect his substantial rights. [Although Johns argues the statement

of his intent affected the trial court in sentencing him to the maximum

sentence for a Class B felony with five prior felony convictions, the court

denied any reliance on the statement of intent and, instead, stated its

sentencing of Johns to the maximum constituted an effort to set an example

and preserve the sanctity of the courthouse.] 

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the trial court is

affirmed. 

Respondents’ Exhibit B - Court Doc. No. 8-2 at 2-4. Johns filed a petition for writ of

certiorari in which he again challenged the State’s failure to provide him notice of the

substance of the oral statement made to the Sheriff as violating state procedural law and the

Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Respondents’ Exhibit H - Court

Doc. No. 16-2 at 5, 11. The Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari on May 14, 2004.

Respondents’ Exhibit D - Court Doc. No. 8-4 -- Ex parte Johns, 916 So.2d 638 (Ala. 2004).

In May of 2005, Johns filed a pro se state post-conviction petition pursuant to Rule

32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure with the Circuit Court of Pike County,

Alabama in which he alleged that: (1) the Constitution of the United States and/or the State

of Alabama required a new trial, new sentencing or other relief from conviction because

counsel failed to provide effective assistance at trial and on direct appeal;3

 (2) the trial court

lacked jurisdiction to render judgment or impose sentence as the grand jury improperly

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issued an indictment for first degree kidnapping when, based on all the evidence presented

at trial, it should have issued the indictment for second degree kidnapping; (3) the

indictment is based on perjured testimony and government misconduct for the sole purpose

of denying a jury instruction on those lesser included offenses relevant to second degree

kidnapping; (4) the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law; and (5) the

conviction for second degree kidnapping violates the Due Process Clause of the

Constitution. In support of his claims of ineffective assistance, Johns argues that trial and

appellate counsel, Thomas K. Brantley, (i) failed to challenge the validity of the indictment

issued for first degree kidnapping, (ii) did not disclose the conspiratorial efforts of judicial

officers and a city official regarding the theft of property from petitioner’s ancestors as an

explanation for petitioner’s actions, (iii) failed to challenge the sufficiency of the arrest

warrant and supporting affidavit, (iv) allowed continuance of the preliminary hearing which

resulted in issuance of an indictment prior to such hearing, (v) did not conduct an adequate

investigation as he failed to make any attempt to locate several witnesses present at the

courthouse on the day of the incident, and (vi) denied petitioner a meaningful direct appeal

by raising only one issue. Respondents’ Exhibit F (Rule 32 Petition of Charles K. Johns) -

Court Doc. No. 8-6 at 8-17. 

On December 15, 2005, the trial court entered an order denying Johns’ Rule 32

petition. In this order, the court deemed the substantive claims raised in the post-conviction

petition “precluded under the operative provisions of said rule” and determined “that the

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allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel [was] without merit.” Respondents’ Exhibit

F - Cour Doc. No. 8-6 at 4. Johns did not appeal this order. 

Johns initiated this 28 U.S.C. § 2254 action on March 8, 2006, in which he asserts

the following claims for relief:

1. The trial court acted in violation of the United

States Constitution when it erroneously admitted

into evidence a statement allegedly made by

petitioner to the Sheriff of Pike County because

(i) the prosecutor failed to disclose the statement

to the defense prior to trial in violation of state

procedural law, federal due process and Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), (ii) petitioner

never made any such statement, i.e., the Sheriff

fabricated the statement, (iii) law enforcement

elicited the statement without advising petitioner

of his constitutional right to an attorney and his

right to remain silent as required by Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 466 (1966), and (iv) the trial

court failed to instruct the jury the statement

could only be used to determine petitioner’s

credibility at trial. 

2. Petitioner was unconstitutionally indicted for a

crime which state law prohibits a conviction

under the circumstances presented by the defense

at trial. Specifically, the indictment for first

degree kidnapping could only have been

obtained under false pretenses, fictitious

testimony, misreading of the statute or

prosecutorial misconduct as eyewitnesses

testified petitioner released the victim alive, in a

safe place, without serious physical injury after

confrontation with law enforcement but prior to

actual physical apprehension of petitioner which

release constitutes a defense to first degree

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kidnapping under Ala. Code § 13A-6-43(b). 

3. The trial court erred by placing the case before

the jury on the charge of first degree kidnapping

after petitioner satisfied elements of the statutory

defense regarding release in a safe place without

serious physical injury and prior to actual

physical apprehension of petitioner, i.e., arrest or

placement in custody, as the trial court

improperly deemed the question of whether

petitioner released the victim prior to

apprehension a question for the jury. 

4. Petitioner was not guilty of second degree

kidnapping and his actions constituted only

unlawful imprisonment, reckless endangerment

or menacing. 

5. The evidence fails to support a conviction for

second degree kidnapping as petitioner presented

a defense to the charge showing he did not intend

to use or threaten to use deadly force. “The

evidence in this case was clearly an abduction,

and Petitioner gave testimony at trial that he was

the abductor. However, ... no witness testified

that a threat of deadly force was made or

evidence that Petitioner intended to cause any

type of harm to the abductee or anyone on or

around the scene.” Petition for Habeas Corpus

Relief - Court Doc. No. 1 at 21. The only direct

testimony regarding an intent to cause harm was

the alleged fictitious statement that the Sheriff

claimed petitioner made to him. 

6. The trial court erred by refusing to instruct the

jury on lesser included offenses associated with

kidnapping in the second degree, i.e., unlawful

imprisonment in the first degree, reckless

endangerment and menacing. 

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7. The trial court was without jurisdiction to render

judgment or impose sentence (i) because the

indictment for first degree kidnapping is

defective, and (ii) due to the court’s failure to

instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses

associated with kidnapping in the second degree

as the jury would have convicted petitioner on

one of these lesser included offenses, all

misdemeanors, thereby resulting in a sentence of

only one year. 

8. Thomas K. Brantley provided ineffective

assistance at trial and on direct appeal when he

(i) failed to attack the validity of the indictment,

(ii) did not challenge the sufficiency of the

evidence, (iii) prevented petitioner from giving a

full of account of why he undertook the actions

against Ms. Scott, (iv) failed to challenge the trial

court’s failure to instruct the jury on the lesser

included offenses associated with second degree

kidnapping, (v) did not challenge the jurisdiction

of the trial court, and (vi) failed to present

Miranda and Brady challenges to the statement

petitioner made to the Sheriff. 

9. Thomas H. Claunch provided ineffective

assistance on direct appeal when he refused to

amend the brief submitted by Brantley. 

10. Any purported procedural default arising during

trial or on direct appeal is due to ineffective

assistance of trial and appellate counsel.

Petitioners’ Response - Court Doc. No. 2 at 32.

 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - Court Doc. No. 1 at 9-25; Petitioner’s Response -

Court Doc. No. 25 at 1-32. 

In their answers to the petition, the respondents argue that the claims pending before

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this court entitle Johns to no relief. Specifically, the respondents contend that all of Johns’

claims for federal habeas relief, with the exception of the claim regarding admission of his

statement to the Sheriff as presented on direct appeal, are procedurally barred from review

because Johns failed to present these claims to the state courts in accordance with the

State’s procedural rules either at trial, on direct appeal or on appeal from the trial court’s

order denying the Rule 32 petition. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S.Ct.

1728, 1732-1733 (1999) (“[S]tate prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity

to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s

established appellate review process,” including review by the state’s court of last resort,

even if review in that court is discretionary.); Pruitt v. Jones, 348 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir.

2003) (“Nothing in Boerckel’s reasoning suggests that a different rule should apply in state

post-conviction appeals as opposed to direct appeals.”); Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135,

1140 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1136, 122 S.Ct. 1081, 151 L.Ed.2d 982 (2002)

(“Alabama’s discretionary direct review procedures bring Alabama prisoner habeas

petitions within the scope of the Boerckel rule.”); Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1065

(11th Cir. 2002); Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1254 n. 9 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 531

U.S. 1017 (2000); Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir. 1999); Atkins v.

Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 955 (11th Cir. 1992); Collier v. Jones, 901 F.2d 770, 773 (11th Cir.

1990). It is likewise clear that the evidentiary submission claim, to the extent it is the same

claim as the one raised on direct appeal, does not entitle Johns to federal habeas relief as

Case 2:06-cv-00229-WHA-SRW Document 29 Filed 11/26/08 Page 10 of 24
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the state courts properly adjudicated this claim on the merits. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S.

634, 123 S.Ct. 1848, 1852 (2003); Williams v. Taylor,529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000).

In addition to the foregoing arguments, the respondents likewise argue that Johns’ claims

based on alleged violations of state law – i.e., the statement to Sheriff Thomas was

admitted in violation of state procedural rules, the indictment fails to state a crime under

state law, and the trial court failed to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses as

permitted by state law – present issues of state law which provide no basis for federal

habeas relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991); Beverly v. Jones, 854 F.2d 412 (11th

Cir. 1988). With respect to Johns’ claim that he did not commit the crime of second

degree kidnapping, the respondents construe this claim as an assertion of actual innocence

in an effort by Johns to establish a fundamental miscarriage of justice and thereby excuse

the procedural defaults applicable to the vast majority of claims raised in the instant

petition. The respondents maintain that Johns has failed to meet the requisite burden of

proof on his fundamental miscarriage of justice claim as he has presented no new, reliable

evidence not available to him at the time of trial demonstrating his factual innocence, and

instead relies on the same evidence and arguments presented in his defense at trial. Bousley

v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623-624 (1998); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995).

Upon review of the § 2254 petition, the answers of the respondents, Johns’ responses

to the answers, the state court record, opinions issued by the state courts and applicable

federal law, this court finds that no evidentiary hearing is required, Rule 8(a), Rules

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Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District Courts, and concludes that the

petition is due to be denied.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Actual Innocence - Independent Claim

Throughout the pleadings filed in this case, Johns presents arguments asserting his

actual innocence of second degree kidnapping. Johns bases these arguments on testimony

he provided at trial which indicated that he did not intend to cause harm to anyone during

his abduction of the court security officer, nor did he verbally threaten the use of deadly

force during the abduction. The law is well settled “that ‘[c]laims of actual innocence ...

have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent

constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding.’ Herrera v.

Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400, 113 S.Ct. 853, 860, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993). It is not our role

to make an independent determination of a petitioner’s guilt or innocence based on

evidence [presented at trial or] that has emerged since the trial. ‘This rule is grounded in

the principle that federal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in

violation of the Constitution--not to correct errors of fact.’ Id.” Brownlee v. Haley, 306

F.3d 1043, 1065 (11th Cir. 2002). In accordance with the foregoing, Johns is entitled to no

relief from this court on any independent claim of actual innocence. 

B. Admission of Petitioner’s Statement to Sheriff Thomas - Alleged Violation of 

State Procedural Rules and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution

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Johns complains the trial court erred when it admitted a statement attributed to him

by Sheriff Thomas regarding Johns’ intent on the day of the abduction. Johns asserts that

the admission of this statement violated Rule 16.1, Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure,

and deprived him of due process as secured by the Fifth Amendment of the United States

Constitution. 

The instant petition for federal habeas relief is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as

amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. “A habeas petitioner

whose claim was adjudicated on the merits in state court is not entitled to relief in federal

court unless he meets the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).” Price, 538 U.S. 634, 638,

123 S.Ct. 1848, 1852; Williams, 529 U.S. 362, 402, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518. Under the

requisite provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), with respect to a claim adjudicated on the

merits in state court, federal habeas relief from a state court judgment may not be granted

unless the adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.

In Williams, the Supreme Court held:

Under the “contrary to” clause a federal court may grant the

writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court

decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of

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materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable

application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ

if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.

529 U.S. at 412-413, 120 S.Ct. at 1523. 

The Court subsequently explained that habeas relief is appropriate when a petitioner

demonstrates “that a decision by a state court is ‘contrary to’ ... clearly established

[Supreme Court] law if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the

Supreme Court’s] cases’ or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable

from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from

[Supreme Court] precedent.’ Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406, 120 S.Ct. 1495,

146 L.Ed. 2d 389 (2000).” Price, 538 U.S. at 640, 123 S.Ct. at 1853. Additionally, federal

review in a habeas action “is limited to whether the state court’s decision was objectively

unreasonable in the light of clearly established federal law. Williams, [529 U.S. at 409],120

S.Ct. at 1521.” Hawkins v. Alabama, 318 F.3d 1302, 1310 (11th Cir. 2003); Parker v.

Head, 244 F.3d 831, 835 (11th Cir. 2001), citing Williams, supra (“[F]ederal habeas relief

[is] available under the ‘unreasonable application’ standard only if the state court’s

application of clearly established federal law was ‘objectively unreasonable.’”). Thus, a

federal court is not to decide “the correctness per se ... of the state court decision” but only

the “objective reasonableness” of such decision. Brown v. Head, 272 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th

Cir. 2001). Moreover, “an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an

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incorrect application of federal law.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 410, 120 S.Ct. at 1522

(emphasis in original). “Under § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause, ... a

federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.”

529 U.S. at 411, 120 S.Ct. at 1522. 

Federal district courts are likewise directed to determine whether the state court

based its findings on “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A state court’s

determinations of fact shall be “presumed to be correct,” and the habeas petitioner “shall

have the Johns of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing

evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). However, even when the state court addresses a

question of law, this court is not authorized “to evaluate [a petitioner’s] claim de novo

rather than through the lens of § 2254(d).” Price, 538 U.S. at 639, 123 S.Ct. at 1852. The

Supreme Court admonishes that such de novo evaluation “exceeds the limits imposed on

federal habeas review by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)....” 538 U.S. at 636, 123 S.Ct. at 1851. 

Johns presented his challenges to the admission of his statement on direct appeal.

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals determined that his claims provided no basis for

relief. Respondents’ Exhibit B - Court Doc. No. 8-6. The state court did not decide Johns’

challenges to the admission of his statement “differently than [the Supreme] Court has [in

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To the extent Johns argues the state appellate court erred in finding no violation of a state procedural rule, the

claim arises solely under the purview of state law and, therefore, likewise fails to provide a basis for federal habeas

relief as such action does not implicate the Constitution. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (a federal

court has no authority to re-examine state court determinations on questions of state law and, therefore, “federal

habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.”); Beverly v. Jones, 854 F.2d 412 (11th Cir. 1988); Pulley

v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984) (“A state court’s interpretation of its own laws and rules are not grounds for

relief in a federal habeas proceeding.”); Walton v. Attorney General for the State of Alabama, 986 F.2d 472, 475

(11th Cir. 1993) (federal court is bound by decision of state court that no state law has been violated); McCullough

v. Singletary, 967 F.2d 530, 535 (11th Cir. 1992 (“[A] state court’s interpretation of its own laws or rules provides

no basis for federal habeas relief, since no question of a constitutional nature is involved.”); Carrizales v.

Wainwright, 699 F.2d 1053, 1054-1055 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Questions of pure state law do not raise issues of

constitutional dimension for federal habeas corpus purposes.... A state’s interpretation of its own laws or rules

provides no basis for federal habeas corpus relief, since no question of a constitutional nature is involved.”).

16

a case based] on a set a of materially indistinguishable facts” nor did the state courts apply

a rule that contradicts governing federal law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413, 120 S.Ct. at 1523.

Consequently, the state appellate court’s rejection of the challenges to the statement was

not contrary to actual Supreme Court decisions. Further, a thorough review of the

evidentiary materials submitted in this case establishes that the state court’s rejection of

Johns’ arguments was objectively reasonable and likewise constituted a reasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented by the parties. Thus, Johns is

not entitled to relief from this court on his challenges to the trial court’s admission of his

statement as violating a state procedural rule and his federal constitutional right to due

process.4

 

 C. Procedurally Defaulted Claims

 The remaining claims presented by Johns in his petition for habeas corpus relief are

procedurally defaulted as Johns failed to present these claims to the state courts in

accordance with the State’s applicable procedural rules. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, supra.;

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Henderson, 353 F.3d 880, 891 (11th Cir. 2003); Pruitt v. Jones, 348 F.3d at 1358-1359.

Upon thorough review of the answers filed by the respondents and the state court records

submitted by the parties, the court finds the relevant procedural defaults as follows:

(a) The claims challenging admission of petitioner’s statement to Sheriff Thomas

as fictitious, absent proper instruction to the jury, and in violation of Miranda and Brady,

all claims attacking the validity of the indictment, the allegations of trial court error with

respect to submission of the case to the jury and provision of jury instructions, petitioner’s

denial of guilt, the claims regarding lesser included offenses, the challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence, and the claim attacking the jurisdiction of the trial court are

procedurally defaulted because Johns did not present these claims during trial and/or on

direct appeal of his conviction. With respect to these defaults, the last state court to render

judgment on such issues determined that Johns procedurally defaulted these claims under

applicable state rules. Atkins v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 955 (11th Cir. 1992) (citations

omitted) (“Federal review of a petitioner’s claim is barred by the procedural-default

doctrine if the last state court to review the claim states clearly and expressly that its

judgment rests on a procedural bar, and that bar provides an adequate and independent state

ground for denying relief.”). Specifically, upon review of Johns’ Rule 32 petition, the

Circuit Court of Pike County, Alabama deemed the claims precluded under the relevant

provisions of Rule 32.2(a). Respondents’ Exhibit F - Court Doc. No. 8-6 at 4.

Additionally, these claims are procedurally barred from review as Johns failed to appeal

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the trial court’s denial of his Rule 32 petition. 

(b) The claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel are

procedurally defaulted either because Johns failed to raise the specific claim of ineffective

assistance in his Rule 32 petition or he raised the claim in the Rule 32 petition but did not

file an appeal from the trial court’s denial of his post-conviction petition.

 This court may reach the merits of Johns’ procedurally defaulted claims “only in two

narrow circumstances. First, a petitioner may obtain federal review of a procedurally

defaulted claim if he can show both ‘cause’ for the default and actual ‘prejudice’ resulting

from the default. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2644, 91

L.Ed.2d 397 (1986); [Wainwright v.] Sykes, 433 U.S. [72,] 87 [(1977)].... Second, a federal

court may also grant a habeas petition on a procedurally defaulted claim, without a showing

of cause or prejudice, to correct a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Murray, 477 U.S.

at 495-96, 106 S.Ct. at 2678. A ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice’ occurs in an

extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has resulted in the conviction of

someone who is actually innocent. Id.” Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892. 

1. Cause and Prejudice.

“To establish ‘cause’ for procedural default, a petitioner must

demonstrate that some objective factor external to the defense impeded the

effort to raise the claim properly in the state court.” Wright v. Hopper, 169

F.3d 695, 703 (11th Cir.1999). To establish “prejudice,” a petitioner must

show that there is at least a reasonable probability that the result of the

proceeding would have been different. Id.; Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d

1288, 1327-28 (11th Cir.2002). 

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Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892. In an attempt to meet this burden, Johns complains that he

received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. Johns also alleges

that his pro se and lack of legal knowledge should excuse any defaults arising from his

failure to present his claims properly during the Rule 32 proceedings. 

As previously determined, Johns procedurally defaulted his claims of ineffective

assistance of trial and appellate counsel, as he failed to pursue these claims properly in the

state courts in available state proceedings. Ineffective assistance of counsel will excuse a

procedural default only when the ineffective assistance claim itself has been independently

and properly raised in the state courts. Murray, 477 U.S. at 489 (“a claim of ineffective

assistance [must] be presented to the state courts as an independent claim before it may be

used to establish cause for a procedural default.”); Hill v. Jones, 81 F.3d 1015, 1030 (11th

Cir. 1996) (a procedurally defaulted claim of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot serve

as cause to excuse the default of a separate claim). Thus, such claims cannot constitute

cause necessary to excuse Johns’ procedural defaults. Moreover, the court finds that none

of the allegations of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel in any way justify

Johns’ failure to exhaust the procedurally defaulted claims during the Rule 32 proceedings.

Johns’ reliance on his pro se status and lack of legal knowledge as cause likewise

provide no basis for relief from the applicable procedural bars, as neither an inmate’s lack

of legal knowledge, his failure to understand legal principles, or his inability to recognize

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potential claims for relief at an earlier juncture constitute an extraordinary circumstance

sufficient to warrant such relief. Harmon v. Barton, 894 F.2d 1268 (11th Cir. 1990)

(ignorance of the law fails to establish cause for a procedural default); Smith v. Newsome,

876 F.2d 1461 (11th Cir. 1989); Spencer v. Kemp, 781 F.2d 1458, 1462 (11th Cir. 1986);

Barksdale v. Lane, 957 F.2d 379, 385-386 (7th Cir. 1992) (petitioner’s pro se status does

not constitute adequate grounds for cause); see also Wakefield v. Railroad Retirement

Board, 131 F.3d 967, 969 (11th Cir. 1997) (ignorance of the law is not a factor which

warrants relief from procedural bars); Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir.

2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1194, 121 S.Ct. 1195, 149 L.Ed.2d 110 (2001) (“[I]t is well

established that ‘ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se petitioner, generally

does not excuse prompt filing.’ Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (5th Cir. 1999).”);

Kreutzer v. Bowersox, 231 F.3d 460, 463 (8th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 863, 122

S.Ct. 145, 151 L.Ed.2d 97 (2001) (lack of legal knowledge or legal resources, even in a

case involving a pro se inmate, does not warrant equitable relief from a procedural bar);

Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998) (equitable relief from procedural bar not

justified by fact that petitioner did not understand the law). 

The record is devoid of any “objective factor external to the defense that prevented

[Johns] from raising the claim[s] and which cannot be fairly attributable to his own

conduct.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). In light of the fact that Johns

raised his claims for federal relief while proceeding pro se in both this court and the state

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As previously noted, infra. at n.1, Johns’ intent at the time of the abduction is a jury question and may be

inferred from the totality of the facts and circumstances which occurred during his commission of the offense.

21

courts, it is clear that such claims are not issues “intrinsically beyond [a] pro se petitioner’s

ability to present.” Harmon, 894 F.2d at 1275. 

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that Johns has failed to demonstrate

cause for his failure to present his federal habeas claims to the state courts in compliance

with applicable procedural rules. Furthermore, Johns has presented nothing which

establishes the existence of actual prejudice emanating from infringement of federal law.

Nevertheless, this court may still reach the merits of Johns’ procedurally defaulted claims

in order to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice

2. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice. Throughout his pleadings in this court,

Johns argues he is not guilty of second degree kidnapping and maintains that this court

should therefore address his procedurally defaulted claims based on the exceptional

circumstances of his case in order to avoid a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The basis

for this claim is Johns’ assertion that he did not intend to cause physical harm to anyone

during his abduction of the victim. Specifically, Johns maintains he did not intend to fire

the weapon, nor did he ever threaten the use of deadly force during his actions at the

courthouse. Johns, however, concedes that he abducted the victim while armed with a

deadly weapon and acknowledges use of the weapon against the victim to accomplish the

abduction.5

 

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The miscarriage of justice standard is directly linked to actual innocence. Schlup

v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995). Actual innocence is not an independent claim; rather,

it is the “gateway” through which a petitioner must pass before a court may consider

constitutional claims which are defaulted. Id. at 315. This exception applies where a

petitioner establishes that “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction

of one who is actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986); Schlup v.

Delo, supra. “To establish actual innocence, [a habeas petitioner] must demonstrate that

... ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.’ Schlup

v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327-328, 115 S.Ct. 851, 867-868, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995).” Bousley

v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). “[T]he Schlup standard is demanding and

permits review only in the ‘“extraordinary’” case.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538, 126

S.Ct. 2064, 2077 (2006). Thus, “[i]n the usual case the presumed guilt of a prisoner

convicted in state court counsels against federal review of defaulted claims.” 547 U.S. at

537, 126 S.Ct. at 2077. “It is important to note in this regard that ‘actual innocence’ means

factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339,

112 S.Ct. 2514, 2518-2519, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992).” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623-624; Doe

v. Menefee, 391 F.3d 147, 162 (2nd Cir. 2004) (“As Schlup makes clear, the issue before [a

federal district] court is not legal innocence but factual innocence.”). Schlup observes that

“a substantial claim that constitutional error has caused the conviction of an innocent

person is extremely rare.... To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his

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allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence -- whether it be exculpatory

scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence -- that

was not presented at trial. Because such evidence is obviously unavailable in the vast

majority of cases, claims of actual innocence are rarely successful.” 513 U.S. at 324

(emphasis added).

The instant claim of innocence is based on the same defense and evidence presented

by Johns at trial. The jury rejected this argument and found Johns guilty of second degree

kidnapping. Johns has failed to make the requisite showing of actual innocence, as he has

presented no “new reliable evidence” nor do his allegations suggest that any such evidence

exists which could satisfy the stringent standard set forth in Schlup. Johns’ procedurally

defaulted claims are therefore foreclosed from federal habeas review.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The petition for habeas corpus relief filed by Charles Kelvin Johns be DENIED.

2. This case be DISMISSED with prejudice. 

It is further 

ORDERED that on or before December 9, 2008 the parties may file objections to

the Recommendation. Objections must specifically identify the findings in the

Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive or general

objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that this

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Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings in this Recommendation

shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Court of issues covered in

the Recommendation and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual findings in

the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of

plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); see

Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); Bonner v. City of Prichard,

661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, en banc) (adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the

 former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to September 30, 1981.)

DONE, this 26th day of November, 2008.

/s/ Susan Russ Walker 

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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