Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-02190/USCOURTS-ca10-94-02190-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

NEW MEXICANS FOR BILL RICHARDSON, 

BILL RICHARDSON, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

/FILED . "altedSTtiMttf~.~ tft . A~ 

SEP u 6 1995 

PATRICK FISHER -- Clerk 

v. No. 94-2190 

STEPHANIE GONZALES, Secretary of 

State; TOM UDALL, Attorney General 

of the State of New Mexico; HENRY 

VALDEZ, District Attorney, First 

Judicial District, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CIV-93-1135-JP) 

Henry Mark Holzer (Mel E. Yost with him on the briefs) of Scheuer, 

Yost & Patterson, Santa Fe, New Mexico, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

John H. Clough (Torn Udall, Attorney General of the State of New 

Mexico, and Robert T. Booms, Assistant Attorney General, with him 

on the brief), Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, New Mexico, 

for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before BRORBY, LOGAN and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 94-2190 Document: 01019276723 Date Filed: 09/06/1995 Page: 1 
The sole question presented by this appeal is whether 

plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to New Mexico's restriction 

on the use of contributions solicited for or received in a federal 

election campaign for purposes of a state election campaign is 

ripe for review. We hold that it is, and accordingly, we reverse 

the district court's order to the contrary. 

BACKGROUND 

In 

campaign 

1993, New Mexico enacted 

related legislation. That 

comprehensive 

legislation 

election and 

provides, in 

pertinent part: 

federal election 

campaign. 11 N.M. 

"No contributions solicited for or received in a 

campaign may be used in a state election 

Stat. Ann.§ 1-19-29.1B (1994 Cum. Supp.) (the 

"statute"). Violation of this provision constitutes a crime. 

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 1-19-36.A (1994 Cum. Supp.). The plaintiffs, 

Congressman Bill Richardson, the elected Representative to the 

United States Congress from the State of New Mexico's Third 

Congressional district, 

( "NMFBR 11 ) , a principal 

raise funds to support 

and New Mexicans for Bill Richardson 

campaign committee whose purpose is to 

various political candidacies of Bill 

Richardson and which currently possesses approximately $500,000 in 

federal campaign funds for that purpose (referred to collectively 

as "Congressman Richardson"), filed suit in federal district court 

seeking a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction of this 

portion of the statute on the grounds it constitutes a facial 

violation of the First Amendment and is preempted by federal 

election law legislation. The suit named Stephanie Gonzales, 

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Secretary of State of the State of New Mexico, Tom Udall, Attorney 

General of the State of New Mexico, and Henry Valdez, District 

Attorney of the First Judicial District of the State of New Mexico 

as defendants (referred to collectively as "New Mexico"). 

In response to Congressman Richardson's complaint, New Mexico 

filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (1} 

arguing the claim presented was not yet ripe for review. More 

specifically, it argued that "until such time as Congressman 

Richardson can represent to the Court that he intends to run for a 

state elective office, this matter is not ripe for adjudication. 

Neither he nor New Mexicans for Bill Richardson can demonstrate 

any concrete hardship until his plans concerning state elective 

office are more definite." 

The facts and allegations before the district court bearing 

on ripeness stemmed from Congressman Richardson's complaint, 

affidavit, and answers to interrogatories, NMFBR's answers to 

interrogatories, a collection of newspaper articles, the affidavit 

of the treasurer of NMFBR, and the affidavit of a Congressman 

Richardson contributor. These documents established, inter alia, 

the following facts. 

NMFBR's purpose "is to raise funds to support various 

political candidacies, past, present and future of Bill 

Richardson," it has nearly $500,000 on hand, and "Bill Richardson 

has been, and is, the beneficiary of [its] fund raising efforts." 

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Congressman Richardson has not raised funds upon any 

representation that they would be used for "any specific purpose 

or in any particular campaign, state or federal." In his 

affidavit, Congressman Richardson stated: 

[S]ome donors have made it clear that they would be less 

prone to contribute if there were any restrictions on 

the use of their contributions, for a state campaign or 

for any other purpose .... Since the challenged statute 

was enacted last spring, this attitude has caused me to 

be reluctant to solicit campaign funds for unrestricted 

purposes, including specifically for the purpose of 

running for state elective office.... Indeed, with 

regard to running for state elective office, from the 

beginning of my political career I have made it clear 

that I had an interest, one day, in serving in such a 

capacity.... In that connection, I can state 

categorically that at this time I have not foreclosed 

the possibility of running for state elective office at 

the next general election. 

These same statements were given in response to New Mexico's 

interrogatories. Also before the district court were a number of 

newspaper articles spanning the last several years in which 

Congressman Richardson's aspirations to hold state office are 

apparent. 

The affidavit of the treasurer of NMFBR made many of the same 

points: NMFBR raised funds on behalf of Congressman Richardson 

with no state/federal distinction; Congressman Richardson has made 

no such distinction in his fund raising efforts; and potential 

contributors would be less prone to donate if there were 

limitations on the use of their contributions. 

The affidavit of John Loehr, a Congressma~ Richardson 

supporter, stated: 

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When my contributions to [NMFBR] were solicited, no 

representations were made to me that they would be used 

solely for a federal election campaign(s) or that they 

would not be used for a state election campaign(s). 

When I made my contributions to [NMFBR] , I did so 

without restriction and in the belief that my donations 

could, and might well, be used for a state election 

campaign -- which I had long been aware Bill Richardson 

was interested in running some day. Indeed, I would 

have been less prone to make a political contribution to 

[NMFBR] if restrictions were placed on the use of that 

contribution(s) because I want Bill Richardson to run 

for state office. My contributions to [NMFBR] have been 

made, in part, in order to make it easy and practical 

for him to do so. To put the point another way: I made 

my contributions to Bill Richardson through [NMFBRJ in 

contemplation of his running for state office some day. 

[H]ad I known in advance that my contributions to 

[NMFBR] could not be used by Bill Richardson to run for 

state office, I probably would not have made those 

contributions. Indeed, if the challenged statute is 

held constitutional, I probably will not contribute any 

further sums to [NMFBR] . 

(Emphasis in original.) 

After considering the arguments of counsel and the facts 

before it, the district court declined to reach the merits of 

Congressman Richardson's claims and instead, granted New Mexico's 

motion to dismiss on the ground that the controversy was not yet 

ripe for review. More specifically, the district court held: 

Because plaintiffs have expressed no firm interest in 

spending money in connection with a state election 

campaign and Congressman Richardson has shown no 

definite interest in running for state elective office, 

plaintiffs are not currently forced to choose between 

violating the law and pursing their first amendment 

rights. There is no impact on plaintiffs which is 

"sufficiently direct and immediate." In its current 

posture this case fails to portray plaintiffs suffering 

substantial hardship as a result of my withholding 

judicial review. Of course, if plaintiffs sometime in 

the future present a more detailed and solid factual 

record regarding their intentions to expend funds in 

connection with a state election campaign, plaintiffs 

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would not be precluded from again seeking relief in this 

court. 

Congressman Richardson brings this appeal seeking review of the 

district court's order concluding the challenge to New Mexico's 

law is not yet ripe for review. 

DISCUSSION 

Standard and Scope of Review 

The question of whether a claim is ripe for review bears on a 

court's subject matter jurisdiction under the case or controversy 

clause of Article III of the United States Constitution. See, 

e.g., ACORN v. Tulsa, 835 F.2d 735, 738 (lOth Cir. 1987). The 

question of ripeness, like other challenges to a court's subject 

matter jurisdiction, is treated as a motion under Rule 12(b) (1). 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (1); St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d 

199, 201 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 993 (1989); 5 Wright & 

Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure; Civil 2d § 1350 (1969). It 

is the burden of the complainant to allege facts demonstrating the 

appropriateness of invoking judicial resolution of the dispute. 

Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 317 (1991). A Rule 12(b) (1) motion 

can challenge the substance of a complaint's jurisdictional 

allegations in spite of its formal sufficiency by relying on 

affidavits or any other evidence properly before the court. "It 

then becomes necessary for the party opposing the motion to 

present affidavits or any other evidence necessary to satisfy its 

burden of establishing that the court, in fact, possesses subject 

matter jurisdiction." St. Clair, 880 F.2d at 201. Ripeness is a 

question of law, which we review de novo. Powder River Basin 

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Resource Council v. Babbitt, 54 F.3d 1477, 1483 (lOth Cir. 1995). 

With these principles in mind, we turn to the question of 

ripeness. 

Ripeness and the First Amendment 

In order for a claim to be justiciable under Article III, it 

must be shown to be a ripe controversy. "[R]ipeness is peculiarly 

a question of timing," Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 

U.S. 102, 140 (1975), intended "to prevent the courts, through 

avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in 

abstract disagreements," Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 

148 (1967) . In short, the doctrine of ripeness is intended to 

forestall judicial determinations of disputes until the 

controversy is presented in "'clean-cut and concrete form.'" 

Renne, 501 U.S. at 322 (quoting Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of 

Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 584 (1947)). 

As a general rule, determinations of ripeness are guided by a 

two-factor test, "'requiring us to evaluate both the fitness of 

the issue for judicial resolution and the hardship to the parties 

of withholding judicial consideration.'" Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 

911 F.2d 1405, 1415 (lOth Cir. 1990) (quoting Abbott Labs., 387 

U.S. at 149). In determining whether an issue is fit for judicial 

review, the central focus is on "whether the case involves 

uncertain or contingent 

anticipated, or indeed 

Practice & Procedure, § 

future events that 

may not occur at 

3532 at 112. To 

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may not occur as 

all." 13A Federal 

this end, courts 

Appellate Case: 94-2190 Document: 01019276723 Date Filed: 09/06/1995 Page: 7 
frequently focus on whether a challenged government action is 

final and whether determination of the merits turns upon strictly 

legal issues or requires facts that may not yet be sufficiently 

developed. See Sierra Club, 911 F.2d at 1415; El Dia, Inc. v. 

Hernandez Colon, 963 F.2d 488, 495 (1st Cir. 1992). In assessing 

the hardship to the parties of withholding judicial resolution, 

our inquiry "'typically turns upon whether the challenged action 

creates a "direct and immediate" dilemma for the parties.'" El 

Dia, 963 F.2d at 495 (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. United States 

EPA, 959 F.2d 360, 364 (1st Cir. 1992)). 

The customary ripeness analysis outlined above is, however, 

relaxed somewhat in circumstances such as this where a facial 

challenge, implicating First Amendment values, is brought. E.g. I 

ACORN, 835 F.2d at 739; Martin Tractor Co. v. Federal Election 

Comm'n, 627 F.2d 375, 380 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 954 

(1980). Thus, while it is true that "the mere existence of a 

statute is ordinarily not enough to sustain a judicial 

challenge, even by one who reasonably believes that the law 

applies to him and will be enforced against him according to its 

terms, " National Student Ass'n v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103, 1110 

(D.C. Cir. 1969), in the context of a First Amendment facial 

challenge, "[r]easonable predictability of enforcement or threats 

of enforcement, without more, have sometimes been enough to ripen 

a claim," Martin Tractor, 627 F.2d at 380. See also Babbitt v. 

United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298-99 (1979). The 

primary reasons for relaxing the ripeness analysis in this context 

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is the chilling effect that potentially unconstitutional burdens 

on free speech may occasion: 

First Amendment rights of free expression and 

association are particularly apt to be found ripe for 

immediate protection, because of the fear of 

irretrievable loss. In a wide variety of settings, 

courts have found First Amendment claims ripe, often 

commenting directly on the special need to protect 

against any inhibiting chill. 

Federal Practice and Procedure § 3532.3 at 159, see also ACORN, 

835 F.2d at 740. 

Thus, our ripeness inquiry in the context of this facial 

challenge to New Mexico's election law statute focuses on three 

elements: (1) hardship to the parties by withholding review; ( 2) 

the chilling effect the challenged law may have on First Amendment 

liberties; and (3) fitness of the controversy for judicial review. 

Our ripeness inquiry is not to be applied mechanically but rather, 

with flexibility, Sierra Club, 911 F.2d at 1416. 

Ripeness of the Controversy 

In assessing the hardship of forestalling judicial resolution 

of the constitutionality of the New Mexico statute, our inquiry 

must focus on whether the "'challenged action creates a "direct 

and immediate" dilemma for the parties.'" El Dia, 963 F.2d at 495 

(quoting W.R. Grace & Co., 959 F.2d at 364). We have no doubt 

that the statute has a direct and immediate effect on Congressman 

Richardson's exercise of his First Amendment liberties. See 

United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990) (solicitation 

of funds is a form of expression protected by the First 

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Appellate Case: 94-2190 Document: 01019276723 Date Filed: 09/06/1995 Page: 9 
Amendment) . 

The facts presented to the district court undoubtedly show 

the existence of the New Mexico statute has created a direct and 

immediate dilemma with respect to Congressman Richardson's 

exercise of his First Amendment liberties. The affidavits 

submitted indicate that in the past, Congressman Richardson has 

solicited campaign contributions on an "unrestricted" basis, and 

as the affidavit of John Loer demonstrates, the lack of such 

restrictions have been beneficial to Congressman Richardson in 

obtaining contributions. Congressman Richardson has, however, as 

a result of the statute, grown reluctant to solicit funds in the 

usual manner, i.e., for unrestricted purposes. This has had the 

further effect of reducing the likelihood that Congressman 

Richardson will be able to obtain funds from contributors due to 

the limited use for which those funds could be put under the 

statute. The dilemma thereby 

Richardson is to either inform 

statutorily imposed restrictions 

donations can be put, or if 

generalized intent of following 

created is this: If Congressman 

potential contributors of the 

on the use to which their 

the Congressman expresses a 

all applicable laws regarding 

campaign contributions and expenditures, he will at the same time 

be impairing his ability to effectively exercise his First 

Amendment liberties. 

New Mexico argues, however, that the statute creates no such 

dilemma because it does not directly affect Congressman 

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Richardson's ability to raise funds per se, but only to spend 

those funds in a state election campaign. Thus, the harm created 

by the statute only could be realized once the need or desire to 

spend arises. This in turn, according to New Mexico, can only 

occur once Congressman Richardson announces his intention to run 

for state elective office. 

It is true the statute is directed, at least by its terms, at 

expenditures and not fund raising. It does not follow from this, 

however, that the hardship it creates can only be strictly 

expenditure-related. Clearly, as shown above, the manner in which 

campaign contributions may be spent can have a direct impact on 

how, and the extent to which, those contributions are raised. 

Thus, regardless of whether the statute's effect on fund raising 

is characterized as a "direct" restriction or something else, it 

is clear to us that the mere existence of the New Mexico statute 

has caused Congressman Richardson to engage in the activity of 

fund raising differently than he has in the past, rendering his 

ability to raise funds, and thus exercise his constitutionally 

protected rights, less effective. 

While the extent 

been impaired cannot be 

approaching precision, 

to which his fund raising activities have 

quantified or estimated with anything 

there is no doubt that the statute has 

created a direct and immediate dilemma regarding Congressman 

Richardson's fund raising activities. Consequently, this case is 

clearly distinguishable from those in which courts have declined 

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review on the ground that the harm sought to be avoided was 

contingent 

E.g.,Toilet 

There is, 

upon 

Goods 

on the 

uncertain or speculative future events. 

Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 163-64 (1967). 

record before us, nothing speculative or 

uncertain about the harm to Congressman Richardson's fund raising 

activities brought about by the limitations on spending imposed by 

the statute. 

Furthermore, we disagree with the proposition that no direct 

or immediate dilemma is faced by the Congressman until and unless 

he announces his candidacy for state office. "When contesting the 

constitutionality of a criminal statute, 'it is not necessary that 

[the plaintiff] first expose himself to actual arrest or 

prosecution to be entitled to challenge [the] statute that he 

claims deters the exercise of his constitutional rights.'" 

Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 

452, 459 (1974)). The principle that"' [o]ne does not have to 

await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive 

relief,'" id. (quoting Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 

553, 593 (1923)), "is particularly true in the election context, 

where we [the Supreme Court] often have allowed preenforcement 

challenges to restrictions on speech," Renne, 501 U.S. at 332 

(White, J., dissenting). On the other hand, the threat of 

prosecution must be a credible one, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 

188 (1973), for "'persons having no fears of state prosecution 

except those that are imaginary or speculative, are not to be 

accepted as appropriate plaintiffs,'" Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298 

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(quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971)). 

For example, in Babbitt, the Supreme Court considered whether 

an action brought by The United Farmworkers Union challenging the 

constitutionality of the Arizona Agricultural Employment Relations 

Act was ripe for review. Particularly relevant is the Court's 

analysis of the statute's publicity provision requiring that 

consumer publicity not be dishonest, untruthful, or deceptive. 

The union had shown it had engaged in such publicity in the past 

and pleaded that erroneous statements would inevitably occur in 

the future. Given that the State had not disavowed its intention 

of invoking criminal penalties, the Court concluded the union was, 

therefore, "not without some reason in fearing prosecution," in 

spite of the fact that no actual threats of prosecution had been 

made. "In effect, a reasonable fear as to the possible future 

application of an ambiguous statute was found enough," Federal 

Practice & Procedure, § 3532.5 at 181, to support the conclusion 

that the claim was ripe for review. 

Guided by the Supreme Court's analysis in Babbitt,1 we 

1 In its analysis, the district court here relied heavily on 

the case of Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312 (1991). While Renne 

involved a First Amendment challenge to an election law provision, 

we find the case distinguishable for myriad reasons. Most 

importantly, in terms assessing the threat of future prosecution, 

we regard Renne as finding no such threat under the facts 

presented based, in large part, on the dubiousness of plaintiffs' 

standing to bring the case. 

The Renne plaintiffs, a group of individual voters, sought a 

declaration that the California Constitution's prohibition on 

political party or central committee endorsements of candidates 

for nonpartisan office violated the First and Fourteenth 

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conclude Congressman Richardson's fears of prosecution are 

reasonable and support a finding of ripeness. The record before 

us contains no affirmative evidence that prosecution for violating 

the statute is imminent. However, New Mexico has not 

affirmatively disavowed any intention of bringing criminal 

prosecution against Congressman Richardson should he spend 

federally raised money for pre-announcement activities for state 

elective office or if he should spend federally raised money in 

support of another individual's state campaign.2 In this regard, 

Amendments. After expressing "serious" questions as to the 

plaintiffs' standing -- given that the law regulated political 

parties and central committees whereas the plaintiffs were a group 

of individual voters -- the Court turned to the issue of ripeness. 

The Court found the controversy to be unripe based, in part, on 

the fact that the record before it contained "no evidence of a 

credible threat that [the California Constitution would] be 

enforced, other than against candidates in the context of voter 

pamphlets." Id. at 322 (emphasis added). In short, the 

controversy was deemed to be unripe in part because there was no 

evidence the constitution would have been enforced against 

individual voters, but only candidates. In our judgment, no such 

threat existed that the plaintiffs did not, in fact, have standing 

to challenge this constitutional provision. Because the provision 

contained no enforcement mechanism against individual voters and, 

indeed, did not even regulate the conduct of individual voters, it 

follows logically that they faced no threat of prosecution by 

virtue of that provision. 

This reading of Renne is bolstered by Justice Stevens' 

concurring opinion. After expressing his reservations concerning 

the ripeness of the voters' claim, Justice Stevens stated: "If 

such a challenge had been brought by a political party or a party 

central committee, and if the complaint had alleged that these 

organizations wanted to endorse, support, or oppose a candidate 

for nonpartisan office but were inhibited from doing so because of 

the constitutional provision, the case would unquestionably be 

ripe." Renne, 501 U.S. at 325 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing 

Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214 

(1989)). 

2 We note, however, that even if such representations had 

made, it is unlikely they would alter our conclusion here. 

Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 154. 

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been 

See 

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it is critical to note Congressman Richardson has presented public 

records to this court demonstrating that he has made a number of 

campaign contributions in support of officials who hold or have 

run for state elective office, including the Mayor of Albuquerque, 

since enactment of the New Mexico statute.3 Because such 

contributions might constitute a violation of the statute, we 

conclude that the risk of prosecution faced by the Congressman is 

indeed credible. In fact, unlike the claimants in Babbitt, who 

could only assure the Court that violations of the statute would 

occur in the future, the Congressman has shown that possible 

statutory violations already have occurred which might subject him 

to criminal prosecution. 

An added difficulty in focusing our ripeness inquiry, as New 

Mexico has done, on whether and when Congressman Richardson 

announces his candidacy for state office, ia the problem 

encountered in trying to figure out what the New Mexico statute 

prohibits. As the district court appropriately observed, it is 

3 New Mexico argues we should not consider these contributions in 

our deliberations on the ground this evidence was not presented to 

the district court. In response, counsel for Congressman 

Richardson represented to this court at oral argument that this 

evidence was before the district and directed our attention to a 

specific page in the record on appeal. However, that citation 

contains no reference to these contributions. Nevertheless, 

"since ripeness is peculiarly a question of timing, it is the 

situation now rather than the situation at the time of the 

District Court's decision that must govern" our consideration of 

this case. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 

140. The record of Congressman Richardson's contributions are 

public and have been pointed out to this court, and New Mexico has 

had a full opportunity to address the significance of them. 

Accordingly, we find it appropriate to consider these 

contributions in our deliberations. 

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not a model of clarity. For instance, does the statute simply 

govern the expenditures of federally raised campaign funds of a 

candidate when that same candidate runs for state elective office, 

as New Mexico urges, or does the statute proscribe spending any 

federally raised funds for any state election? Could Congressman 

Richardson use his campaign funds to support the state election 

campaigns of others? If so, then clearly the district court's and 

New Mexico's focus on the fact that Congressman Richardson has 

evinced no firm plans to run for state elective office would not 

be dispositive, for he could face criminal prosecution even if he 

never runs for state office but contributes to the campaigns of 

other state officials. 

Another manifest difficulty with the statute is the meaning 

of the term "election campaign." How does one distinguish, 

assuming that such a distinction is possible, between an election 

campaign and activities of a potential candidate who has not 

declared his or her intention to seek office? Does the statute 

regulate only the expenditures of declared candidates for state 

office, as New Mexico argues, or are pre-declaration expenditures 

also covered? For example, would Congressman Richardson expose 

himself to potential criminal prosecution if he commissioned a 

poll to test the waters for a state election campaign? 

We do not, of course, raise these questions in order to 

answer them here, since the constitutionality of the statute and 

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its application in specific contexts is not before us.4 Rather, 

we point out these difficulties because they have, in our 

judgment, a direct bearing on the question of the chilling effect 

the statute has on the Congressman's First Amendment rights and 

also casts considerable doubt on the efficacy of focusing on 

Congressman Richardson's post-announcement election expenditures. 

It is generally accepted that the arguable vagueness of a 

statute greatly militates in favor of finding an otherwise 

premature controversy to be ripe. E.g., Martin Tractor, 627 F.2d 

at 384 ("the extent of the chill upon First Amendment rights 

induced by vague or overbroad statutes is the most significant 

factor in determining whether an otherwise premature or abstract 

facial attack ... is ripe for decision"). The reason being, 11 [i]f 

the provision were truly vague, 11 then the party challenging its 

constitutionality in a facial attack 11 should not be expected to 

pursue their collective activities at their peril. 11 Babbitt, 442 

4 New Mexico has taken the position that in the event we find 

this dispute ripe for review, we should go on to address the 

merits in the interest of judicial economy. We decline to do this 

for two reasons. First, Congressman Richardson has appealed the 

district court's order dismissing the suit as unripe. It is that 

ruling Congressman Richardson has addressed in his briefs to this 

court, not the substantive First Amendment and preemption claims 

raised below. As such, we believe it would be manifestly unfair 

to reach the substantive issues when Congressman Richardson has 

not taken the opportunity (and justifiably so) to present his 

arguments on these issues to the court. Second, because the 

district court dismissed the suit as unripe, we do not have the 

benefit of its analysis of the New Mexico statute or the problems 

the parties might see in any such analysis. Thus, while the 

substantive issues presented are strictly legal ones which we 

would review de novo, we are of the opinion that any benefits 

regarding judicial economy do not outweigh the prudential 

justifications for withholding judgment on the merits of the case 

at this time. 

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U.S. at 303. 

Nowhere can the justification for this rule be seen more 

clearly than in the present case. New Mexico has argued 

Congressman Richardson's claims are not yet ripe because he has 

yet to declare his candidacy for state office. Yet it is far from 

clear whether the statute governs the expenditures of the 

Congressman irrespective of whether he ever becomes a candidate 

for state office. Likewise, it is not clear whether preliminary, 

pre-election campaign expenditures would be covered by the 

statute's restrictions. These ambiguities leave Congressman 

Richardson in the perilous position of guessing at the meaning the 

state authorities or courts will impute to the statute, and either 

spending his federally raised campaign funds and risking 

prosecution or taking a more cautious approach and foregoing the 

exercise of his constitutionally protected liberties. Blind 

adherence to the possible meaning of the statute could prove, and 

apparently has proved, costly. The alternative to compliance, 

with its attendant possibility of criminal prosecution, may prove 

even more costly to a potential state political candidate and 

sitting member of Congress. The very facts that Congressman 

Richardson has money to spend, has indicated a desire to spend it 

in state election campaigns by both words and deeds, see, supra 

p. 14, and there is no way for him to know with any degree of 

certainty which expenditures are permissible and which carry the 

threat of prosecution, all weigh heavily in favor of finding this 

case ripe for review. 

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In short, we find that the statute has created a direct and 

immediate dilemma for Congressman Richardson and that he should 

not have to risk prosecution, under a statute whose scope is 

unclear, before his challenge to the constitutionality of that 

statute is ripe. 

Finally, we turn to whether the issues presented are fit for 

review. In doing so, we focus on whether the challenged law turns 

upon strictly legal issues or requires facts that may not yet be 

sufficiently developed. See Sierra Club, 911 F.2d at 1415.5 

Congressman Richardson's challenge to the New Mexico statute 

presents a strictly legal question. "[A] first amendment 

challenge to the facial validity of a statute is a strictly legal 

question; it does not involve the application of the statute in a 

specific factual setting." ACORN, 835 F.2d at 740. In light of 

our prior conclusions, we also deem this dispute sufficiently 

concrete as it neither hinges on uncertain future events nor is 

5 Many ripeness cases require finality of the government action 

that is challenged. This requirement is intended, in part, to 

guard against courts passing on the legality of agency actions 

that do not, in and of themselves, alter or burden the rights, 

duties or obligations of the claimant. See Abbott Laboratories, 

387 u.s. at 151-52; Sierra Club, 911 F.2d at 1417; El Dia, 963 

F.2d at 496. For example, orders that merely embody a precursor 

to the later formulation of actual regulations will, as a general 

rule, not support a finding of ripeness. E.g., id.; Roosevelt 

Campobello Int'l Park Comm'n v. United States EPA, 684 F.2d 1034, 

1040 (1st Cir. 1982) (declining to review, as unripe, a directive 

for "'further administrative action'" which, in and of itself, 

"makes no change in the status quo"). There is no doubt that New 

Mexico's election law statute is final. The challenged provision 

itself delineates the proscribed conduct and neither directs nor 

requires further administrative or legislative enactments for its 

effect. In short, it is definitive, having the status of law 

mandating its immediate compliance. 

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Appellate Case: 94-2190 Document: 01019276723 Date Filed: 09/06/1995 Page: 19 
further factual development required. 

Therefore, the order of the district court finding this case 

unripe for review is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED for such 

further and necessary consideration as is appropriate. 

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Appellate Case: 94-2190 Document: 01019276723 Date Filed: 09/06/1995 Page: 20 
No. 94-2190, New Mexicans for Bill Richardson, et al. v. 

Stephanie Gonzales, Secretary of State, et al. 

KELLY, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

I would affirm the district court's judgment dismissing the 

action for lack of ripeness. Aplt. App. 168. Although this case 

involves potential First Amendment issues, what is completely 

lacking is any actual or imminent enforcement of the challenged 

provision, N.M. Stat. Ann. § l-19-29.l(B) (1994 Supp.). The court 

acknowledges as much, Ct. Op. at 14, but then finds a credible 

threat of prosecution. 

Merely because the state has not "affirmatively disavowed any 

intention of bringing criminal prosecution against Congressman 

Richardson," Ct. Op. at 14, does not satisfy Plaintiff's burden of 

showing a credible threat of prosecution; at this point, any fears 

of prosecution are imaginary and speculative. Likewise, the 

affidavits submitted by Congressman Richardson and the Treasurer 

of New Mexicans for Bill Richardson (NMFBR) contain vague, 

unsubstantiated, and wholly speculative hearsay about the adverse 

effect of the statute on fundraising ability: 

To the best of my recollection, although I do not 

recall the details, some donors have made it clear that 

they would be less prone to contribute if there were any 

restrictions on the use of their contributions, for a 

state campaign or for any other purpose. 

Aplt. App. 51-52 (Richardson affidavit ,, 6); 67 (Baca affidavit 

,, 6) • The affidavit of Congressman Richardson's supporter 

contains similar, equivocal statements: 

Indeed, if the challenged statute is held 

constitutional, I probably will not contribute any 

further sums to New Mexicans for Bill Richardson--and 

Appellate Case: 94-2190 Document: 01019276723 Date Filed: 09/06/1995 Page: 21 
thus my contributions can no longer be used to foster 

and support a state election campaign for Bill 

Richardson. 

Aplt. App. 71 (Loehr affidavit ,! 7). No one has claimed that 

Congressman Richardson is somehow precluded from raising funds for 

a future state election campaign through another vehicle. 

Moreover, adjudication of this lawsuit cannot guarantee 

contributors an absence of any restrictions, federal or state, on 

the use of their contributions. 

The apparent restriction of the statute certainly could be 

challenged when, and if, Congressman Richardson decides to run for 

state office in the next general election, which will occur in 

1998. Requiring this case to be decided so far in advance, 

without any concrete facts, rules out the possibility that state 

courts will supply a narrowing construction of the statute and 

will result in a wholly advisory opinion. See Renne v. Geary, 501 

U.S. 312, 323 (1991) (citing Longshoreman v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 

224 (1954)). I respectfully dissent. 

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