Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00148/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00148-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1 Jones v. State of California, 1:04-cv-6566, was

voluntarily dismissed by Plaintiff on February 28, 2005; Jones v.

Strangio, 1:04-cv-6567, was dismissed with prejudice on March 16,

2005; Jones v. Strangio, 1:05-cv-00410, was also dismissed with

prejudice on April 20, 2005. Neither of the latter two cases

stated claims cognizable in federal court.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MELVIN JONES, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL A. TOZZI et al., 

Defendants.

______________________________

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1:05-CV-0148 OWW DLB

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GRANTING DEFENDANTS JENSEN

AND HOLLENBACK’S MOTION TO

DISMISS.

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the court for decision is a motion to dismiss filed

by Defendants Leslie Jensen and John Hollenback. This case, the

fourth filed in this court by Plaintiff Melvin Jones concerning a

family law dispute previously heard in state court,1 was

transferred to the undersigned judge on March 16, 2005, as a

related case. See Doc. 15, filed March 21, 2005. A memorandum

opinion and order dated May 11, 2005 dismissed Defendants Tozzi

and Silveria, denied Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment

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against Defendants Jensen and Hollenback, and denied Plaintiff’s

motion for leave to amend the complaint a second time. Doc. 47. 

Accordingly, the currently operative complaint is the “first

amended complaint,” filed March 3, 2003. Doc. 7, filed Mar. 3,

2005. 

Plaintiff filed three documents in opposition to Jensen and

Hollenback’s motion to dismiss. In the first, Plaintiff argues

that he was not properly served with the instant motion. Doc.

44, filed May 10, 2005. In the econd, Plaintiff asserts that

dismissal of his claims based on “doctrines, immunities, judge

made law, and cases cited by defendants...has the same effect and

gravity as the Dread [sic] Scott Decision.” Doc. 49, filed May

19, 2005. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that he was threatened by

Defendant Hollenback in a manner that interfered with Plaintiff’s

access to the judicial process. Doc. 50, filed May 20, 2005.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on February 3, 2005. 

Doc. 1. Then, prior to the filing of any responsive pleading by

Defendant, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on March 3,

2005. Doc. 7. The first amended complaint names as defendants: 

Michael A. Tozzi, the Executive Officer of Stanislaus County

Superior Court; Superior Court Judge Marie Sovey-Silveria; and

attorneys Leslie Jensen and John Holenback. The first amended

complaint generally alleges that Defendants’ conduct in

connection with his family law dispute in state court violated

Plaintiff’s constitutional and statutory rights in violation of

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2 As discussed below, Plaintiff filed several proposed

amended complaints that attempt to set forth claims under 42

U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, and 1986. However, Plaintiff was denied

leave to file any of these proposed amended complaints. 

3

42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 Defendants Tozzi and Silveria moved to

dismiss this complaint on March 9, 2005. Doc. 8. 

On March 18, 2005, the district court issued an order

dismissing Plaintiffs related case, Jones v. Strangio. See Doc.

72, 1:04-cv-06567. In light of that dismissal, the district

court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why this case should not be

dismissed as well. Doc. 18, filed Mar. 29, 2005. Plaintiff

responded to the order to show cause on April 20, 2005. Doc. 29. 

At the same time, Plaintiff filed yet another proposed amended

complaint intended to supercede the complaint lodged on March 24,

2005. See Proposed Second Amended Complaint lodged Apr. 20,

2005. This complaint contained numerous new allegations that

Defendants made racially derogatory remarks to plaintiff as part

of a conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights in 

contravention of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, and 1986. 

Plaintiff then responded to the order to show cause, relying

heavily on the allegations contained within the second amended

complaint. See Doc. 29, at 1. Oral argument was heard on May 3,

2004, concerning the order to show cause, Defendants’ Tozzi and

Silveria’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff’s motion for default

judgment against Defendants Jensen and Hollenback, and

Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint. A memorandum opinion

and order dated May 11, 2005, discharged the order to show cause,

granted Tozzi and Silveria’s motion to dismiss, denied

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4

Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment, and denied Plaintiff’s

motion to amend. Doc. 47. 

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The Child Custody Dispute

This case arises out of a child custody dispute between

Plaintiff and Kea Chhay, the mother of Plaintiff’s minor child. 

Although the record contains limited information about the

underlying family law case, it appears to have first been filed

in Santa Clara Superior Court. During a hearing held on November

15, 2001, the presiding judge in Santa Clara warned Plaintiff

that he would be declared a vexatious litigant if he filed

additional motions in that case. The case was subsequently

transferred to Stanislaus County

Don Strangio, formerly a defendant in Jones v. Strangio,

1:04-CV-06567, and Jones v. Strangio, 1:05-CV-00410, is a

licensed psychologist and marriage and family therapist in the

state of California. Strangio was appointed, as required by law,

by the court to mediate the child custody dispute between

Plaintiff and Chhay. During the initial mediation session, held

July 9, 2002, Plaintiff requested a private child custody

evaluation. Three potential evaluators, including Steven

Carmichael, also formerly a defendant in the Jones v. Strangio

cases, were identified to the parties. Of the three, only

Carmichael was agreeable to both parties at the initial

mediation. The state court then issued an order referring the

parties to Carmichael, who was appointed to conduct a private

custody evaluation.

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5

B. The Alleged Conflict of Interest

It is not disputed that Carmichael rents office space, along

with a number of other mental health professionals, in a building

in which Dr. Strangio has a partial ownership interest. 

Carmichael and Strangio, with several other professionals, share

this office space, a common telephone number, and support staff. 

Outside the common office is a sign that reads “Psychological

Associates.” Their practices are independent; there is no comingling of any business-related accounts; they do not file joint

tax returns; Carmichael has no ownership interest in the

building; and the income Strangio realizes from his private

practice is in no way affected by the income Carmichael earns

from his own practice. 

Leslie Jensen served as Ms. Chhay’s attorney in the family

law case. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Strangio counseled Jensen

on at least one occasion regarding personal matters. 

Plaintiff apparently raised some or all of his conflict of

interest objections with the state court. In response to a

letter sent by Plaintiff on May 12, 2003, Defendant Michael A.

Tozzi, the Executive Officer of the Stanislaus Superior Court,

wrote:

It is common for mental health professionals in this

community to rent communal office space and share

overhead expenses/ phone numbers/ and addresses. 

Psychological Associates [is] in an office with ten

professionals including Dr. Carmichael and Dr.

Strangio. However, their practices are independent

from each other. They do not benefit from the work

that the other does. The Court has no concern about a

potential conflict of interest in the situation you

question, nor any other referral by Dr. Strangio. 

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6

When the Court refers a case for private child custody

evaluation, the list of qualified evaluators is limited

to those licensed mental health professionals who have

the specific training required by law.... That list

currently consists of approximately five psychologists,

Licensed Clinical Social Workers, and Marriage and

Family Therapists in addition to the ten independent

contract mediators. Dr. Carmichael is one of those

five who are not associated with the court. 

Dr. Strangio and Dr. Carmichael are publicly listed in

the phone book and had you accepted the referral for

Dr. Carmichael to perform the child custody evaluation

as ordered on October 8, 2002, you would have likely

observed both in the office. There is no attempt to

hide this relationship. 

I trust that this resolves the questions you had. 

Doc. 1, Ex. C. 

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review for a Motion to Dismiss

In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, a court

must “take all of the allegations of material fact stated in the

complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party.” Rodriguez v. Panayiotou, 314 F.3d 979,

983 (9th Cir. 2002). In general, “a pro se complaint will be

liberally construed and will be dismissed only if it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Pena v.

Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992). However, “a liberal

interpretation of a [pro se] complaint may not supply essential

elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Id. 

//

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7

B. Threshold Issue: Improper Service

Plaintiff’s address of record is:

Melvin Jones

P.O. Box 579392

Modesto, CA 95357

Plaintiff points out that all the certificates of service filed

by Defendants Jensen and Hollenback bear the following, slightly

different, address: 

Melvin Jones

P.O. Box 579393

Modesto, CA 95357

Plaintiff asserts that, as a result of the one digit error, he

has not received any of Defendants’ filings, including the

pending motion to dismiss. See Doc. 44 at 2. 

The record supports Plaintiff’s assertions on this issue. 

Under these circumstances, the district court could order

Defendants Hollenback and Jensen to reserve their motion to

dismiss upon Plaintiff, and give Plaintiff an additional period

of time to respond to their motion. However, Hollenback and

Jensen’s motion to dismiss raises the same legal issues as

Defendants Tozzi and Silveria’s previous motion to dismiss. 

Plaintiff has already been informed in the decision granting

Tozzi and Silveria’s motion, Doc. 47, that his claims are not

viable under federal law. For the reasons set forth below, the

first amended complaint (Doc. 7, the currently operative

complaint in this case) also fails to properly state any claims

under federal law against Defendants Jensen and Hollenback. 

Rather than order Plaintiff to defend a complaint that must be

dismissed for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff will instead be

given one last opportunity to amend his complaint to attempt to

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3 Plaintiff has also filed a motion for sanctions against

Defendants Jensen and Hollenback regarding their conduct in

serving documents upon Plaintiff. Doc. 43, filed May 9, 2005. 

That motion is set for hearing on June 27, 2005. 

8

set forth viable claims under federal law against Defendants

Jensen and Hollenback.3

C. Plaintiff’s Claims

In the first amended complaint, Plaintiff makes the

following allegations:

(1) There existed potential conflicts of interest between

several of the Defendants. The failure of Defendants to

disclose these conflicts violated Plaintiff’s procedural due

process rights. Id. at ¶15. 

(2) Defendants’ conduct throughout the family law proceedings

interfered with Plaintiff’s liberty interests and/or rights

as a parent. Id. at ¶7. 

(2) Defendants’ conduct violated various provisions of the

California Rules of Court, State Bar Ethical Standards, and

provisions of the California Code of Civil Procedure. As a

result, Plaintiff’s due process rights under the Fourteenth

Amendment were violated. Id. at ¶¶ 16-33. 

D. Plaintiff’s Procedural Due Process Claims Fail as a

Matter of Law

As explained in previous memorandum opinions in this case

and related cases, Plaintiff has attempted to set forth

procedural due process claims twice before. Specifically, he

alleges that conflicts of interests existed between Defendants

and that these conflicts interfered with the fair adjudication of

his family law case. These allegations are strikingly similar,

if not identical, to those alleged and dismissed in his

Plaintiff’s previous lawsuits. As the district court explained

in Jones v. Strangio:

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4 Defendants Jensen and Hollenback also argue that the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine demands dismissal of this entire case. 

As explained in the May 11, 2005 memorandum opinion and order

issued in this case and in orders issued in related cases,

Rooker-Feldman bars a district court from hearing “challenges to

state court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial

proceedings” or deciding questions “inextricably intertwined”

with state court proceedings. Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals

v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983). However, it is a close

question whether Rooker-Feldman operates as a bar to this court’s

jurisdiction under the specific facts alleged in this case. As

the claims against Defendants Jensen and Hollenback may be

dismissed on other grounds, Rooker-Feldman will not be discussed

herein.

9

In the context of Plaintiff’s factual allegations, it

appears that he is essentially arguing that Defendants’

alleged conflict of interest (and Defendants’ failure

to disclose these alleged conflicts) amounts to a

violation of his procedural due process rights under

the United States Constitution. 

***

To state such a claim, plaintiff must demonstrate that

no “meaningful postdeprivation remedy” is available

under state law. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,

531 (1984) (holding a claim under § 1983 for

deprivation of property without due process invalid

absent a showing that no meaningful postdeprivation

remedy was available). In California, appellate and

post-judgment tort remedies can provide a meaningful

remedy for the violations alleged in Plaintiff’s

complaint. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 900. Plaintiff’s

complaint contains no allegation he has pursued any

state judicial review of those claims or why such

remedies would be inadequate. 

Jones v. Strangio, 1:04-CV-6567, Doc. 72 at 28-29. Plaintiff has

again failed to state a procedural due process claim. He has

utterly failed to plead any facts that suggest he exhausted his

state remedies. As such, Plaintiff’s procedural due process

claims, if any are stated, are DISMISSED for failure to state a

claim.

E. Plaintiff’s Claims Concerning his Liberty Interests

and/or Rights as a Parent are Barred by the Domestic

Relations Exception4

Plaintiff also appears to allege that Defendants’ conduct

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deprived him of liberty interests and/or rights he possesses as a

parent. As was explained in the May 11, 2005 memorandum opinion

and order, any such claims are directly related to the underlying

child custody dispute and are therefore barred by the domestic

relations exception:

The domestic relations exception is a judicially

created doctrine that “divests the federal courts of

power to issue divorce, alimony and child custody

decrees.” Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703

(1992). In the Ninth Circuit, district courts must

refuse jurisdiction over claims where the primary issue

concerns child custody issues or the status of parent

and child or husband and wife. See Coats v. Woods, 819

F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1987); Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d

134, 136-37 (9th Cir. 1982).

The Coats case is most directly on point. In a

series of complaints filed in federal court, the

plaintiff in Coats named as defendants her former

husband, his new wife, their attorney, the

court-appointed attorney for their two children, a

court-appointed psychologist, two court commissioners,

two Superior Court judges, the Orange County Superior

Court, the County of Orange Costa Mesa Police

Department, the Newport-Mesa School District, and an

organization called United Fathers. 819 F.2d at 236-

37. Coates sued these individuals under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, alleging that defendants wrongfully deprived

her of the custody of her two children. The district

court abstained from hearing the cases on the ground

that “the actions, involving child custody, implicated

domestic relations issues, traditionally an area of

state concern.” Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed,

approving the district court’s reliance “on the

abstention doctrine under which federal courts

traditionally decline to exercise jurisdiction in

domestic relations cases when the core issue involves

the status of parent and child or husband and wife.” 

The Ninth Circuit went on to reason that: 

This case, while raising constitutional issues, is

at its core a child custody dispute....If the

constitutional claims in the case have independent

merit, the state courts are competent to hear

them. Given the state courts' strong interest in

domestic relations, we do not consider that the

district court abused its discretion when it

invoked the doctrine of abstention.

Id. at 237. 

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5 Plaintiff argues that dismissal of his claims “has the

same effect and gravity as the Dread [sic] Scott Decision.” Doc.

49. In the Dred Scott case, an African-American man was denied

relief in part because the Supreme Court did not (at the time)

consider freed African-Americans to be “citizens” within the

meaning of the Constitution. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393

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The issue presented is whether Plaintiff’s new

allegations, all arising from his child custody dispute

in state court, change the nature of the case to one

that is not at its core a child custody dispute. 

Reading Plaintiff’s pro se complaint liberally,

Plaintiff arguably alleges that Defendants violated his

substantive due process rights: “The Supreme Court has

long protected, under substantive due process

principles, the integrity of the family unit and the

right of parents to raise their children.” Abebe v.

Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 755, 763 (9th Cir. 2004)(citing

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)). 

However, if any such claim is contained in any of the

filed or lodged versions of Plaintiff’s complaints, a

district court would be barred from hearing such a

claim by the domestic relations exception because, in

Plaintiff’s case, it directly concerns child custody

issues. 

F. Plaintiff’s § 1983 Claims Must Be Dismissed Because

Defendants Jensen And Hollenback Are Not State Actors. 

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint also attempts to set

forth an additional basis for relief under § 1983 -- suggesting

that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s right to equal protection by

impeding Plaintiff’s access to the judicial system because of his

race. This claim is not barred by the domestic relations

exception, as it concerns Plaintiff’s access to the judicial

system, rather than the subject matter of the underlying family

law dispute. However, the statute under which Plaintiff brings

his claim in the first amended complaint, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

applies only to individuals acting under color of state law. 

Jensen and Hollenback are private individuals, not state actors,

and therefore cannot be liable under § 1983.5

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(1856). Plaintiff may rest assured that Dred Scott is no longer

the law of the land. See United States Const. amend XIV. 

However, a federal district court is a court of limited

jurisdiction. Plaintiff, like any other litigant, must state a

valid claim under federal law. Thus far, he has been unable to

do so. 

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G. Plaintiff’s Previous Attempts to Set Forth Claims under

§§ 1981, 1985 and 1986.

Plaintiff has established a pattern of filing multiple

complaints without leave to amend and without providing

justification for the amendment. In these proposed amended

complaints, Plaintiff has attempted to evade dismissal by set

forth additional claims, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985 and 1986.

The May 11, 2005 memorandum opinion and order denied Plaintiff

leave to amend on the grounds that these claims, as presented in

his several proposed amended complaints, would fail to properly

state a claim under any federal law. 

Defendants Jensen and Hollenback correctly point out that

participants in the court process are immune from civil liability 

for damages in the context of a § 1983 claim. See Briscoe v.

LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335 (1983). However, such immunity would

not protect them from liability in the context of a properly

alleged claim that they conspired with a judge to violate

Plaintiff’s civil rights. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 164-65

(1992).

H. Leave to Amend

A district court shall grant leave to amend freely "when

justice so requires,” unless the amendment (1) would be futile,

(2) is proposed in bad faith, or would result in (3) undue delay

or (4) prejudice to the opposing party. Forsyth v. Humana, Inc.,

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114 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1997).

In this case, Plaintiff has filed numerous proposed amended

complaints aimed at evading dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

Although Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1985, and

1986 are of dubious merit, he will be afforded one final

opportunity to amend to properly allege claims under §§ 1981,

1985, and 1986. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

(1) Defendants Jensen and Hollenback’s motion to dismiss (Doc.

32/36) is GRANTED;

(2) Plaintiff’s motion to strike (Doc. 44) is DENIED;

(2) Plaintiff is afforded one final opportunity to amend his

complaint. Plaintiff shall file his amended complaint

within twenty (20) days of service of this order. 

SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 21, 2005

/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER

 

 Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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