Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_20-cv-00013/USCOURTS-azd-2_20-cv-00013-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO MDR

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Alfred E. Caraffa,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Maricopa County Sheriff’s Department, 

et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV 20-00013-PHX-MTL (ESW)

ORDER

On January 2, 2020, Plaintiff Alfred E. Caraffa, who is confined in a Maricopa 

County Jail, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an 

Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. In a January 15, 2020 Order, the Court granted 

the Application to Proceed and dismissed the Complaint because Plaintiff had failed to 

state a claim. The Court gave Plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint that cured the 

deficiencies identified in the Order. 

On February 3, 2020, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint. In a February 6, 

2020 Order, the Court dismissed the First Amended Complaint because Plaintiff had failed 

to state a claim. The Court gave Plaintiff 30 days to file a second amended complaint that 

cured the deficiencies identified in the Order.

On February 21, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Default Judgment pursuant to 

Rule 55(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc. 9), a Motion for Appointment of 

Case 2:20-cv-00013-MTL--ESW Document 12 Filed 03/03/20 Page 1 of 6
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Pro Bono Counsel (Doc. 10), and a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 11). The Court will 

dismiss the Second Amended Complaint and this action and will deny Plaintiff’s Motions.

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 

not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 

allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 

are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681.

But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts 

must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 

(9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent 

Case 2:20-cv-00013-MTL--ESW Document 12 Filed 03/03/20 Page 2 of 6
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 

U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

II. Second Amended Complaint

In his one-count Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages 

from Defendants Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO), MCSO Inmate Legal 

Services, and MCSO Deputies B1300, B0429, and B3638. Plaintiff contends the three 

MCSO Deputies denied him access to the courts “to file motions and court documents in 

open civil action and criminal cases” while working for Defendant MCSO in MCSO’s 

Inmate Legal Services Department. Plaintiff claims this caused delays in his civil actions 

and a “miscarriage of justice” in his criminal cases.

III. Failure to State a Claim

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 

520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey 

v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, a 

liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the 

claim that were not initially pled. Id. 

A. Defendants MCSO and MCSO Inmate Legal Services

The Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office is not a proper defendant because it is a “nonjural entity.” Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254, 1260 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Braillard 

v. Maricopa County, 232 P.3d 1263, 1269 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010)). In Arizona, the 

responsibility of operating jails and caring for prisoners is placed by law upon the sheriff. 

See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-441(A)(5); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-101. A sheriff’s office is simply 

an administrative creation of the county sheriff to allow him to carry out his statutory duties 

and is not a “person” amenable to suit pursuant to § 1983. Accordingly, the Court will 

dismiss Defendant MCSO. 

Defendant MCSO Inmate Legal Services is a subdivision of the Maricopa County 

Sheriff’s Office. Like the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, it is simply an administrative 

creation of the county sheriff to allow him to carry out his statutory duties and not a 

Case 2:20-cv-00013-MTL--ESW Document 12 Filed 03/03/20 Page 3 of 6
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“person” amenable to suit pursuant to § 1983. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss 

Defendant MCSO Inmate Legal Services.

B. Defendants B1300, B0429, and B3638

Plaintiff has simply made vague and conclusory allegations against Defendants

B1300, B0429, and B3638 collectively, without any factual specificity as to what any 

particular Defendant did or failed to do. This is insufficient. See Marcilis v. Township of 

Redford, 693 F.3d 589, 596 (6th Cir. 2012) (upholding dismissal of Bivens complaint that 

referred to all defendants “generally and categorically” because the plaintiff had failed to 

“‘allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the 

asserted constitutional right.’” (quoting Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 

2008))); Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Given the 

complaint’s use of either the collective term ‘Defendants’ or a list of the defendants named 

individually but with no distinction as to what acts are attributable to whom, it is impossible 

for any of these individuals to ascertain what particular unconstitutional acts they are 

alleged to have committed.”). Moreover, Plaintiff’s vague allegations do not support a 

conclusion that he suffered an “actual injury” as a result of any Defendant’s conduct, which 

is necessary to state an access-to-the-courts claim. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348

(1996) (As a matter of standing for an access-to-courts claim, a plaintiff must show that he 

suffered an “actual injury”—i.e., “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing 

litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” ) (citation 

omitted); see also Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 352 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Mere ‘delay in being 

able to work on one’s legal action or communicate with the courts does not rise to the level 

of a constitutional violation.’”) (citations omitted); cf. Silva v. DiVittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 

1104 (9th Cir. 2011) (actual injury alleged where plaintiff claimed pending lawsuits had 

been dismissed as the result of defendants’ actions). Thus, the Court will dismiss 

Defendants B1300, B0429, and B3638.

. . . .

. . . .

Case 2:20-cv-00013-MTL--ESW Document 12 Filed 03/03/20 Page 4 of 6
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IV. Dismissal without Leave to Amend

Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim in his Second Amended Complaint, the 

Court will dismiss his Second Amended Complaint. “Leave to amend need not be given 

if a complaint, as amended, is subject to dismissal.” Moore v. Kayport Package Express, 

Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989). The Court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is 

particularly broad where Plaintiff has previously been permitted to amend his complaint. 

Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 90 F.3d 351, 355 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Repeated failure to cure deficiencies is one of the factors to be considered in deciding 

whether justice requires granting leave to amend. Moore, 885 F.2d at 538. 

Plaintiff has made three efforts at crafting a viable complaint and appears unable to 

do so despite specific instructions from the Court. The Court finds that further 

opportunities to amend would be futile. Therefore, the Court, in its discretion, will dismiss 

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint without leave to amend.

V. Motion for Default Judgment

Plaintiff seeks oral argument “under Rule 55(d) for Default Judgment.” First, 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(d), which states that a “default judgment may be 

entered against the United States, its officers, or its agencies only if the claimant establishes 

a claim or right to relief by evidence that satisfies the court,” is inapplicable because the 

United States, its officers, or its agencies are not parties to this lawsuit. Second, an entry 

of default is only appropriate “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative 

relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Defendants 

have not been served and, therefore, were not required to file a response. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 12(a). Thus, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment.

VI. Motion for Appointment of Pro Bono Counsel

In light of the Court’s dismissal of this action, the Court will deny as moot the 

Motion for Appointment of Pro Bono Counsel.

. . . .

. . . .

Case 2:20-cv-00013-MTL--ESW Document 12 Filed 03/03/20 Page 5 of 6
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 11) and this action are 

dismissed for failure to state a claim, and the Clerk of Court must enter judgment 

accordingly.

(2) The Clerk of Court must make an entry on the docket stating that the 

dismissal for failure to state a claim may count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

(3) Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 9) is denied.

(4) Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Pro Bono Counsel (Doc. 10) is denied 

as moot.

(5) The docket shall reflect that the Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) 

and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(3)(A), has considered whether an appeal 

of this decision would be taken in good faith and finds Plaintiff may appeal in forma 

pauperis.

Dated this 2nd day of March, 2020.

Case 2:20-cv-00013-MTL--ESW Document 12 Filed 03/03/20 Page 6 of 6