Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00856/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00856-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are derived from the exhibits submitted

with Doc. 25 – Respondents’ Answer.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robert Joseph Pilgrim, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Arizona Department of Corrections, et al.,

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CIV 15-0856-PHX-DGC (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT:

Petitioner Robert Joseph Pilgrim, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison

Complex, filed a pro se Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 (Doc. 14) and Memorandum of Law in Support (Doc. 15). Respondents filed an

Answer (Doc. 25), and Petitioner has filed multiple pleadings that the Court construes as

supplements to his habeas petition and/or a reply to Respondents’ Answer.

BACKGROUND1

On June 22, 2012, the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office charged Petitioner, by

information, with theft of means of transportation, a class 3 felony. (Exh. A.) The factual

background is as follows:

On June 19, 2012, police responded to an auto accident. Witnesses reported

Mr. Pilgrim was the only occupant of the vehicle and he initially tried to run

Case 2:15-cv-00856-DGC Document 32 Filed 02/29/16 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

from the scene. Citizens re-directed him back to the scene. Investigation

revealed the vehicle he was driving was stolen and belonged to Aim Right

Ministries.

Mr. Pilgrim told police he was a passenger and the driver hit another vehicle.

He complained of injuries. He told the fire department he smoked

methamphetamine earlier and consumed alcohol. A records check showed his

driver license was revoked.

(Exh. D at 1.)

On September 24, 2012, the State and Petitioner entered into a stipulated plea

agreement, whereby he agreed to plead guilty to theft of means of transportation, as charged.

(Exhs. B, C.) Pursuant to the agreement, however, the State agreed that it would not pursue

the allegations that Petitioner had multiple prior felony convictions and committed the

present offense while on probation. (Exh. B at 2.) The State also agreed that it would not

pursue any felony aggravated DUI charges. (Id.)

Before entering into the agreement, Petitioner acknowledged that he understood he

would receive an 8-year prison term. (Id. at 1; Exh. C.) Petitioner then formally pleaded

guilty, pursuant to the agreement, which the trial court accepted. (Exh. C.) On October 24,

2012, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to 8 years’ imprisonment, in accordance with the

terms of the plea agreement. (Exh. B at 1; Exh. E at 1-2.)

At sentencing, Petitioner acknowledged that he had the right to file a notice of

post-conviction relief (“PCR”) within 90 days. (Exh. F.) Petitioner, however, chose not file

his PCR notice until April 11, 2014. (Exh. G.) The superior court subsequently dismissed the

PCR notice on June 3, 2014, concluding that it was both untimely and failed to state a

colorable claim. (Exh. H.) Petitioner did not appeal the dismissal by filing a petition for

review with the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Exh. I at 1.)

In Ground One of his amended habeas petition, Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel

was ineffective because she failed to conduct adequate investigation and consult with

Petitioner’s doctors about his mental illness. As a result, Petitioner claims, he was forced to

sign a plea without “proper counsel,” and he received a longer sentence than he would have

if trial counsel had collaborated with his doctors to present mitigating evidence. In Ground

Case 2:15-cv-00856-DGC Document 32 Filed 02/29/16 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

Two, Petitioner appears to allege that his plea was involuntary. He claims that, while in jail,

he was “prescribed medication that [a]ffected [his] mental state and decision making skills.”

He also alleges that detention officers “used GPS and radio telem[e]try” to abuse him while

he was detained. As a result, Petitioner was “co[erc]ed ... into wanting out of county jail.”

In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective because she failed

to request a competency evaluation, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure. In Ground Four, Petitioner alleges that he was not on medication when he waived

his right to an evidentiary hearing and that his due process rights were violated as a result of

his unknowing waiver.

DISCUSSION

In their Answer, Respondents contend that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely

and, as such, must be denied and dismissed.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a

statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,

if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

An “of-right” petition for post-conviction review under Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32, which is available to criminal defendants who plead guilty, is a form of “direct

review” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). See Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d

710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007). Therefore, the judgment of conviction becomes final upon the

Case 2:15-cv-00856-DGC Document 32 Filed 02/29/16 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding, or upon the expiration of the time for seeking

such review. See id.

Additionally, “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Lott

v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). A post-conviction petition is “clearly pending

after it is filed with a state court, but before that court grants or denies the petition.” Chavis

v. Lemarque, 382 F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 2004). A state petition that is not filed, however,

within the state’s required time limit is not “properly filed” and, therefore, the petitioner is

not entitled to statutory tolling. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005). “When

a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for

purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” Id. at 414.

In Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief

is filed even though the petition is not filed until later. See Isley v. Arizona Department of

Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). An application for post-conviction relief

is also pending during the intervals between a lower court decision and a review by a higher

court. See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Carey v. Saffold, 536

U.S. 214, 223 (2002)). However, the time between a first and second application for postconviction relief is not tolled because no application is “pending” during that period. See id.

Moreover, filing a new petition for post-conviction relief does not reinitiate a limitations

period that ended before the new petition was filed. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d

820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

The statute of limitations under the AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling in

appropriate cases. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645-46 (2010). However, for

equitable tolling to apply, a petitioner must show “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights

diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way’” and prevented

him from filing a timely petition. Id. at 2562 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418).

Case 2:15-cv-00856-DGC Document 32 Filed 02/29/16 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

The Court finds that Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is

untimely. On October 24, 2012, the trial court sentenced Petitioner pursuant to the terms set

forth in the plea agreement. By pleading guilty, Petitioner waived his right to a direct appeal,

and had 90 days – or until January 22, 2013 – to file an “of-right” petition for post-conviction

relief under Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, Petitioner filed

his PCR notice on April 11, 2014. The superior court dismissed the PCR notice on June 3,

2014, concluding that it was both untimely and failed to state a colorable claim. Thus,

Petitioner’s case became final on January 22, 2013 – the day the time expired for filing a

PCR petition. Petitioner was required to file the instant habeas petition on or before January

22, 2014. Petitioner did not initiate his habeas proceedings petition until May 11, 2015.

Accordingly, absent any tolling, his habeas petition is one year and three months too late.

Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. Petitioner’s subsequent untimely PCR

notice was filed after the limitations period had expired, and, thus, did not toll the limitations

period. See Ferguson, 321 F.3d at 823 (“[S]ection 2244(d) does not permit the re-initiation

of the [federal 1-year] limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed.”);

see also Pace, 544 U.S. at 413-17 (“Because the state court rejected petitioner’s PCRA

petition as untimely, it was not ‘properly filed,’ and he is not entitled to statutory tolling

under § 2244(d)(2).”)

In sum, Petitioner filed the instant amended habeas petition one year and three months

after the 1-year limitations period expired. The Amended Petition is therefore untimely.

The Ninth Circuit recognizes that the AEDPA’s limitations period may be equitably

tolled because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. See Calderon v. United

States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other

grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998).

Tolling is appropriate when “‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a [petitioner’s] control

make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Id.; see Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule”) (citations omitted). “When

Case 2:15-cv-00856-DGC Document 32 Filed 02/29/16 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a

timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must

establish two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Petitioner must also

establish a “causal connection” between the extraordinary circumstance and his failure to file

a timely petition. See Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir.

2007).

Petitioner asserts no valid reason for the untimeliness of his amended habeas petition,

and therefore demonstrates no entitlement to equitable tolling. There is nothing in the record

that suggests an external force prevented Petitioner from timely filing the Amended Petition.

And, Petitioner’s pro se status, indigence, limited legal resources, ignorance of the law, or

lack of representation during the applicable filing period do not constitute extraordinary

circumstances justifying equitable tolling. See, e.g., Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154

(9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an

extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”). Moreover, Petitioner has not

shown that his mental disorders constituted an extraordinary circumstance, warranting

equitable tolling. Petitioner fails to specify exactly what mental disorder he has, and fails to

demonstrate how his alleged impairments: (1) prevented him from understanding the need

to timely file a habeas petition; or (2) rendered him unable to personally prepare a habeas

petition and effectuate its filing. See, e.g., Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1099-1100 (9th Cir.

2010).

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling and his amended habeas

petition is untimely.

\\\

\\\

\\\

\\\

Case 2:15-cv-00856-DGC Document 32 Filed 02/29/16 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

CONCLUSION

Having determined that Petitioner’s amended habeas petition is untimely, the Court

will recommend that Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and

Memorandum of Law in Support be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Amended Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 14) and Memorandum of Law in Support (Doc. 15) be

DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s pleadings entitled motion for

an evidentiary hearing and motion for a determination of direct appeal (Docs. 29, 31) be

DENIED;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of

Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections

to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result

in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without further

review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure

timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order

Case 2:15-cv-00856-DGC Document 32 Filed 02/29/16 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 26th day of February, 2016.

Case 2:15-cv-00856-DGC Document 32 Filed 02/29/16 Page 8 of 8