Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00088/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00088-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

TOMMY BASS, #122 504, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:13-CV-88-WHA 

 ) [WO] 

KIM THOMAS, DIRECTOR ADOC, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

 

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 

Plaintiff brings this pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against former Commissioner of the 

Alabama Department of CorrectionsKim Thomas, Warden Gary Hetzel, the Executive Director 

of the Alabama Board of Pardons and ParolesCynthia Dillard, and Attorney General for the 

State of AlabamaLuther Strange. This action proceeds on Plaintiff’s amended complaint filed 

February 28, 2013, in which he alleges a violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free 

from cruel and unusual punishment due to overcrowded conditions at the Easterling Correctional 

Facility [“Easterling”]. Plaintiff complains the overcrowded conditions are exacerbated by the 

enactment of “get tough on crime” legislation which has resulted in lengthy prison sentences and 

elimination of good time credits. Plaintiff also challenges a denial of medical parole due to his 

multiple medical problems which he claims are made worse by the overcrowded conditions at 

Easterling. For relief, Plaintiff requests that the Alabama Department of Corrections [“ADOC”] 

relieve the overcrowded conditions by reducing the inmate population by almost half, to include 

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his release via a medical parole, and that the ADOC provide him with physical and medical 

therapy and medicine when released from custody.1

 Doc. No. 5. 

Defendants filed special reports and supporting evidentiary materials addressing 

Plaintiff’s claims for relief. In these documents, Defendants deny they acted in violation of 

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Doc. Nos. 13, 179. The court granted Plaintiff an opportunity to 

file a response to Defendants’ reports and he did so. Doc. No. 19. The court deems it appropriate 

to treat Defendants’ reports as motions for summary judgment. This case is now pending on 

Defendants’ dispositive motions. 

I. DISCUSSION2

A. Defendants Thomas and Hetzel

Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at the Easterling Correctional Facility, which is where 

he was incarcerated when he filed the complaint. Since filing this action he has been transferred 

to the Limestone Correctional Facility in Harvest, Alabama. Based on Plaintiff’s amended 

complaint and the specific relief sought, the undersigned concludes Plaintiff’s complaint against 

Defendants Thomas and Hetzel is due to be dismissed as moot. 

Plaintiff complains that Defendants Thomas and Hetzel subjected him to unconstitutional 

conditions of confinement in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights by “holding [him] 

illegally in [an] overcrowded facility.” Doc. No. 1 at 3. Courts do not sit to render advisory 

opinions. North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971). An actual controversy must exist 

                                                            

1

 In his opposition to Defendants’ dispositive motions, Plaintiff reiterates that he is not seeking damages. 

Doc. No. 19 at 1. 

2 Although Plaintiff does not state the capacity in which he sues Defendants, for liability purposes, a suit 

against a public official in his official capacity is considered a suit against the local government entity he 

or she represents. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Therefore, a suit against Defendants in 

their official capacities is in reality a suit against the state of Alabama. Thus, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims 

against the named defendants brought against them in their official capacities would be barred by the 

Eleventh Amendment. 

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when the case is pending. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 459 n.10 (1974). Where the only 

relief requested is injunctive, it is possible for events subsequent to filing the complaint to make 

the matter moot. National Black Police Assoc. v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 346, 350 (D.C. 

Cir. 1997) (change in statute); Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991) (transfer of 

prisoner); Tawwab v. Metz, 554 F.2d 22, 23 (2d Cir. 1977) (change in policy). 

A claim becomes moot when the controversy between the parties is no longer alive 

because one party has no further concern in the outcome. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 

(1975); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (“Where the question sought to be adjudicated 

has been mooted by developments subsequent to filing of the complaint, no justiciable 

controversy is presented.”). Article III of the United States Constitution confers jurisdiction on 

the district courts to hear and determine “cases” or “controversies.” U.S. Const. Art. III, 2. 

Federal courts may not rule upon questions hypothetical in nature or which do not affect the 

rights of the parties. Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 US. 472, 477 (1990). “Article III 

requires that a plaintiff's claim be live not just when he first brings suit, but throughout the 

litigation.” Tucker v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1034 (11th Cir. 1987). Because mootness is 

jurisdictional, dismissal is required when an action is moot, as a decision in a moot action would 

be an impermissible advisory opinion. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 

2001). 

In Saladin v. Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687, 693 (11th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted), the 

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined “[a] case is moot when the issues presented are no 

longer “live” or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of the litigation, such 

as where there is no reasonable expectation that the violation will occur again or where interim 

relief or events have eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.” See also Darring v. 

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Kincheloe, 783 F.2d 874, 876-77 (9th Cir. 1986) (after an inmate is transferred, there is neither a 

“reasonable expectation” nor a “demonstrated probability” that the inmate will return to the 

prison against which he sought injunctive relief and therefore claim for injunctive relief is moot). 

“This case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, 

trial and appellate . . . [I]t is not enough that a dispute was very much alive when the suit was 

filed.” Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477. 

“Equitable relief is a prospective remedy, intended to prevent future injuries.” Adler v. 

Duval County School Bd., 112 F.3d 1475, 1477 (11th Cir. 1997). For that reason, “[w]hen the 

threat of future harm dissipates, the plaintiff's claims for equitable relief become moot because 

the plaintiff no longer needs protection from future injury.” Id.; Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 

F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 1994) (“Logically, ‘a prospective remedy will provide no relief for an 

injury that is, and likely will remain, entirely in the past.’ ” (citation omitted)). In the context of 

a § 1983 action filed by a prisoner, such as this, a prayer for declaratory or injunctive relief 

becomes moot upon the transfer or release of that prisoner from the facility where his cause of 

action arose. See, e.g., Spears v. Thigpen, 846 F.2d 1327, 1328 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n inmate’s 

claim for injunctive and declaratory relief in a § 1983 action fails to present a case or controversy 

once the inmate has been transferred.”); Wahl v. McIver, 773 F .2d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 1985) 

(“[A] n inmate’s claim for injunctive and declaratory relief in a section 1983 action fails to 

present a case or controversy once the inmate has been transferred.”). 

Plaintiff is no longer an inmate at Easterling, having been transferred to another 

correctional institution during the pendency of this action. He is, therefore, no longer subject to 

the conditions about which he complains when he filed the instant matter.3

 There is no indication 

                                                            

3 Even if Plaintiff may be heard to argue that he seeks to litigate claims regarding the conditions to which 

other inmates are subjected in facilities throughout the state prison system, he lacks standing to assert the 

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that Plaintiff will be returned to Easterling, much less be returned in the immediate future. “ ‘Past 

exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a pending case or controversy regarding 

injunctive relief if unaccompanied by any continuing, present injury or real and immediate threat 

of repeated injury.’ ” Cotterall v. Paul, 755 F.2d 777, 780 (11th Cir. 1985), quoting Dudley v. 

Stewart, 724 F.2d 1493, 1494 (11th Cir. 1984). Absent is any showing of a “continuing, present 

injury or real and immediate threat of repeated injury” to Plaintiff. See id. (finding that a transfer 

of the plaintiff back to the county jail if he was again incarcerated at a minimum security facility 

and charged with a disciplinary infraction was too speculative to satisfy the required injury 

element). 

In light of the foregoing, the court finds that Plaintiff's complaint against Defendants 

Thomas and Hetzel is now moot. Because there is no present case or controversy to support the 

court’s jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims against these defendants, his complaint against 

Defendants Hetzel and Thomas is due to be dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. 

B. Defendant Dillard

Plaintiff alleges a violation of his constitutional rights based on Defendant Dillard’s 

refusal to grant him release on a “medical parole.” Defendant Dillard, as executive director for 

the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles, is not involved in the parole decision-making 

process. Doc. No. 13, Exh. B. Even had Plaintiff named a proper defendant, however, he would 

                                                                                                                                                                                               

constitutional rights of other persons. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429 (1961), citing United 

States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960) (“[A] litigant may only assert his own constitutional rights or 

immunities.”); Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 218-219 (1974) 

(plaintiff must assert a legally cognizable injury in fact before federal courts have jurisdiction); Saladin, 

812 F.2d 687, 690 (11th Cir. 1987); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 320 (1981). While a pro se inmate 

may “plead and conduct” his own claims in federal court, 28 U.S.C. § 1634, he has no concomitant right 

to litigate the claims of other individuals. The competence of a layman is “clearly too limited to allow 

him to risk the rights of others.” Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975); Hummer v. 

Dalton, 657 F.2d 621 (4th Cir. 1981); Ethnic Awareness Organization v. Gagnon, 568 F. Supp. 1186 

(E.D. Wis. 1983); Inmates, Washington County Jail v. England, 516 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Tenn. 1980), 

affirmed, 659 F.2d 1081 (6th Cir. 1981). 

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not be entitled to relief on this claim as he possesses no liberty interest in being granted parole 

protected by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, Monroe v. Thigpen, 932 F.2d 1437, 

1441 (11th Cir. 1991) (inmates have no liberty interest in being granted parole protected by the 

Due Process Clause); Heard v. Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles, 222 Fed. Appx. 

838, 840 (11th Cir. 2007) (same), nor does a refusal to grant him parole constitute cruel and 

unusual punishment. See Damiano v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 785 F.2d 929, 

933 (11th Cir. 1986) (a denial of parole does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment 

violation as such action is “merely a disappointment rather than a punishment of cruel and 

unusual proportions.”). 

C. Defendant Strange 

Plaintiff complains that Alabama Attorney General Strange’s enactment of “get tough on 

crime” legislation violates his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights because it has resulted 

in longer prison terms for both violent and non-violent offenders which, in turn, has led to 

overcrowded prison conditions. Defendant Strange, as the chief law enforcement officer of the 

State of Alabama, is not responsible for enacting legislation. To the extent Plaintiff’s claim 

against Defendant Strange seeks to challenge his actions in performing his functions as an 

advocate for the government regarding enforcement of state laws, Plaintiff is entitled to no relief. 

While “prosecutors do not enjoy absolute immunity from [declaratory and injunctive relief] 

claims,” see Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010, 1012 (5th Cir. 1981), to receive declaratory or 

injunctive relief against Defendant Strange, Plaintiff must establish there was a violation, that 

“there is a serious risk of continuing irreparable injury if the relief is not granted, and the absence 

of an adequate remedy at law.” See Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing 

Newman v. Alabama, 683 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1982)). Because Plaintiff has failed to show an 

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absence of an adequate remedy at law, he is not entitled to equitable relief against Defendant 

Strange in this § 1983 action. Id.

II. CONCLUSION 

In light of the foregoing, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that: 

1. Plaintiff’s complaint against Defendants Thomas and Hetzel be DISMISSED without 

prejudice for lack of jurisdiction; 

2. Defendants Dillard’s and Strange’s motions for summary judgment (Doc. Nos. 13, 17) 

be GRANTED; 

3. This case be DISMISSED with prejudice; 

4. Costs be taxed against Plaintiff. 

 It is further 

 ORDERED that on or before March 3, 2016, the parties may file any objections to the 

Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the factual findings and legal 

conclusions in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the parties object. Frivolous, 

conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. 

 Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the 

Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of 

factual findings and legal issues covered in the report and shall “waive the right to challenge on 

appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions” except 

upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see 

Resolution Trust Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993); Henley 

v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989). 

 

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 Done, this 18th day of February 2016. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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