Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06299/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06299-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH FILED 'ted States Court of Appeals 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Um Tenth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JAMES W. LEWIS, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

ART BEELER, Warden; and the 

UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION, 

Defendant-Appellees. 

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NOV 13 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-6299 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. CIV-90-689-W) 

Donald v. Morano, Chicago, Illinois for Petitioner-Appellant. 

Michael A. Stover, General Counsel, United States Parole 

Commission (Kristie K. Stafford, Attorney, United States Parole 

Commission, Chevy Chase, Maryland, with him on the brief, and 

Timothy D. Leonard, United States Attorney, and Ronny D. Pyle, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, of 

counsel) for Defendant-Appellees. 

Before SEYMOUR and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and KATSCH, District 

Judge.* 

* The Honorable Richard P. Matsch, of the United States 

District Court for the District of Colorado, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-6299 Document: 010110096930 Date Filed: 11/13/1991 Page: 1 
EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

This appeal raises the following four questions: 

1. Can evidence that was known by investigative agencies 

but not by the United States Parole Commission ("the 

Commission") at the time of a prisoner's initial parole 

determination be considered "new information" sufficient for 

the Commission to reopen the prisoner's case under 28 C.F.R. 

§ 2.28(f)? 

2. Once a prisoner's case is reopened, can the Commission 

consider information in a sentencing transcript where 

A. the transcript, though previously unseen by the 

Commission, was not the basis for reopening; 

B. the information pertains to a crime for which the 

prisoner was not charged but which was related to the 

crime for which he was convicted; and 

C. the district judge declined to consider the 

information at sentencing? 

3. Was the district judge's statement during sentencing 

that there was not a "shred of evidence" that the PetitionerAppellant (Lewis) committed the Tylenol murder merely a 

reiteration of his assurance that he was not going to 

consider any evidence of that crime since Lewis was not so 

charged, rather than a finding on the merits of such an 

allegation pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 

32(c) (3) (D) (i)? 

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4. Did the Commission act within its discretion in 

determining that the Lewis committed murder by lacing Tylenol 

capsules with cyanide? 

We answer all of these questions in the affirmative. 1 

FACTS 

Following the deaths of seven people from the ingestion of 

Tylenol capsules laced with cyanide, Lewis mailed a letter to 

Johnson & Johnson, Inc., the makers of Tylenol, threatening to 

continue lacing Tylenol with cyanide unless the company wired $1 

million to a specified bank account. Although not charged with 

the killings, Lewis was charged with and convicted of extortion on 

the basis of that letter. 2 He received a ten year sentence which 

was to run consecutively to two concurrent ten year sentences that 

he received for other federal crimes. At sentencing, the 

prosecutor suggested that Lewis was a· suspect in the Tylenol 

murder case, to which the judge responded that he would not 

consider that suggestion because Lewis had not been charged for or 

convicted of the Tylenol murders and there was not "a shred of 

1 Lewis has filed a motion to supplement the 

we find nothing in his proposed supplement that 

Commission which is not already in the record. 

motion to supplement the record is DENIED. 

record. However, 

was before the 

Accordingly, the 

2 Although Lewis wrote the letter to Johnson & Johnson, he 

signed it in the name of his wife's ex-boss and requested that the 

money be wired to the ex-boss's account. Lewis claimed that he 

wrote the letter to get revenge for a bad check that the ex-boss 

wrote to Lewis's wife. Thus, the prosecutors apparently did not 

view the letter as a sufficiently clear admission of the Tylenol 

murders to charge Lewis with those murders. 

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evidence" before him linking Lewis to the Tylenol murders. 

Record, Doc. 13, Ex. Tat 16, 54 (hereinafter "Tr."). 

The Parole Commission ultimately received Lewis's case. On 

January 6, 1988, after an initial hearing, the Commission informed 

Lewis that it would presumptively grant parole after he had served 

his minimum sentence of eighty months. Thus, Lewis was due to be 

released on August 27, 1989. This determination was affirmed by a 

"no change" notice of March 9, 1989 signed by Victor Reyes, the 

Regional Commissioner for the South Central Region in Texas. 

On February 17, 1989, however, one of Lewis's prosecutors, 

Anton Valukas, sent a letter to the Commission Chairman, Benjamin 

Baer, in Maryland urging an extension of Lewis's parole date. 

Attached to Valukas's letter was a letter written by Lewis to 

President Reagan essentially threatening to kill more people with 

cyanide-laced Tylenol and to kill Reagan with a radio controlled 

airplane bomb if income taxes were increased or payroll taxes were 

not abated. 3 On March 9, 1989, a second of Lewis's prosecutors, 

Jeremy Margolis, sent a letter to Baer urging an extension of 

Lewis's parole date. Baer forwarded these letters to Reyes, the 

Regional Commissioner in Texas. Reyes apparently had no access to 

these letters prior to his issuance of the March 9, 1989 "no 

change" notice. 

Based on these letters, on April 13, 1989, Reyes recommended 

that the National Commissioners reopen Lewis's case. The National 

Commissioners ordered the case reopened on the basis of new and 

3 Like Lewis's letter to Johnson & Johnson, his letter to 

President Reagan was signed in the name of his wife's ex-boss. 

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adverse information on April 27, 1989, but failed to specify the 

information to which they referred. On July 20, 1989, the 

Commission corrected its order to specify the letters from the 

prosecutors and the letter to Reagan as new and adverse 

information. 

At a hearing on August 21, 1989 the Commission acknowledged 

the delay in correcting its order. The Commission also informed 

Lewis that it intended to rely on information in the transcript 

from his sentencing, which had been submitted to the Commission by 

Lewis, to determine whether he committed the Tylenol murders. For 

these reasons the Commission offered Lewis the option of asking 

for a continuance. Both Lewis and his attorney explicitly 

declined to request a continuance and elected to proceed with the 

h . 4 earing. 

Following the hearing, the Commission determined that Lewis 

was indeed the Tylenol murderer and accordingly raised his Offense 

Severity Level from Category 6 (for extortion) to Category 8 (for 

murder). Placing Lewis in Category 8 permitted the Commission to 

deny him parole, forcing him to serve his full sentence. 

Lewis appealed this decision to the Full Commission, which 

affirmed it. Subsequently he petitioned the district court for 

habeas corpus, which was denied. He now appeals the district 

court's denial of his petition based on four grounds. 

4 Because Lewis explicitly declined to request a continuance, 

we do not consider his argument on appeal that either the time 

between the corrected notice and his hearing, which was below the 

statutory minimum notice time, or the Commission's reliance on 

information not contained in the notice, violated his due process 

rights under the Fifth Amendment. 

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First, Lewis argues that neither the letters from the 

prosecutors nor his letter to President Reagan constitute new 

evidence as required for the Commission to reopen his case. 

Second, he argues that the Commission, after reopening his case, 

improperly considered evidence in his sentencing transcript of an 

uncharged crime. Third, he argues that the Commission was 

precluded from finding that he was the Tylenol murderer by a 

statement by the sentencing judge that there was not "a shred of 

evidence that he is guilty of the Tylenol murders •. 

54. And Fourth, he argues that the evidence provided an 

It Tr. at 

insufficient basis for the Commission's conclusion that he was the 

Tylenol murderer. We disagree with all of these arguments. 

DISCUSSION 

I. 

Lewis's threatening letter to President Reagan, which the 

Commission had not seen prior to its initial determination 

regarding Lewis, provided a sufficient basis for reopening his 

case.

5 The Commission can reopen a prisoner's case when it 

receives "new and significant adverse information." 28 C.F.R. 

§ 2.28(f). Lewis's letter to President Reagan was both new and 

significant. 

5 Because we find that one of the bases on which the Commission 

relied in reopening Lewis's case (his letter to President Reagan) 

was sufficient, we do not need to decide whether the other two 

bases (the letters from the prosecutors) would also suffice. 

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For purposes of§ 2.28(f), information is new if it was not 

received by the Commissioner prior to the decision that is to be 

revisited. Mcclanahan v. Mulcrome, 636 F.2d 1190, 1191 (10th Cir. 

1980) (per curiam); Fox v. United States Parole Comm'n, 517 F. 

Supp. 855, 859 (D. Kan.), aff'd, No. 81-1432 (10th Cir. Nov. 23, 

1981). Lewis does not contradict the Commission's assertion that 

the Regional Commissioner had not received his letter to President 

Reagan prior to either the initial decision regarding his parole 

or the "no change" determination. 6 Thus, the letter can be 

considered new for purposes of§ 2.28(f). 

Lewis cites Ready v. United States Parole Comm'n, 483 F. 

Supp. 1273, 1276-77 (M.D. Pa. 1980), for the proposition that 

information cannot be considered new for purposes of reopening a 

parole decision where the Commission was aware of the allegations 

that the information is used to support but declined at the time 

of the initial parole decision to seek such information regarding 

those allegations. In Ready the Commission was aware during its 

6 Lewis points out that the National Commissioner in Maryland 

had received Lewis's letter to President Reagan prior to the date 

on which the Regional Commissioner in Texas issued a "no change" 

notice. However, the relevant party in this case, for purposes of 

§ 2.28, was not the National Commissioner but the Regional 

Commissioner. Section 2.28(f) is clearly designed to ensure that 

parole decisions are based on all available, relevant information. 

See Fox, 517 F. Supp. at 859. Thus, the relevant party for 

purposes of that regulation must be the actual decisionmaker. The 

Regional Commissioner issued the "no change" notice and must 

therefore be considered the relevant party with respect to that 

notice. Because he did not see the letter, it was new with 

respect to the "no change" notice for purposes of§ 2.28(f). 

Because both the Commission's initial determination and its 

"no change" determination were made without the benefit of Lewis's 

letter to President Reagan, we do not need to decide which of 

these two decisions was the relevant one for purposes of 

§ 2.28(f). 

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initial hearing that the prisoner had allegedly engaged in prison 

misconduct but thought the evidence before it insufficient to 

support these allegations and did not seek additional information 

on the matter. The court held that the Commission could not 

subsequently reopen the case based on new evidence supporting the 

same allegations. Id. 

Unlike the situation in Ready, there is no indication in 

Lewis's case that the Commission knew of allegations that he was 

the Tylenol murderer at the time it made its initial parole 

determination. He was convicted only of extortion and neither his 

presentence report nor the pre-hearing report for his first parole 

determination made any allegation that he was the Tylenol 

murderer. 

Further, even if the Commission were aware of these 

allegations, we respectfully disagree with the reasoning of Ready. 

The Commission is not like a court. See Fox, 517 F. Supp. at 859. 

It does not get only one chance to review allegations against a 

prisoner. Rather, its function.is to make the best possible 

determination of a prisoner's parole risk based on a continuing 

evaluation. Because the Commission is not primarily an 

investigative body and must depend largely on interested parties 

for relevant information, it will sometimes need to review 

previously considered allegations in light of newly received 

information. It is for this reason that the Commission is given 

the power to reopen cases. Ready, to the extent it gives the 

Commission only one chance to evaluate any particular allegation, 

would turn the Commission into both a court and an investigator. 

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We cannot agree that these were its intended functions. Cf. 

Mcclanahan, 636 F.2d at 1191 (mistake in parole calculation new 

when brought to attention of Commissioner). 7 

Thus, we hold that information is new for purposes of 

§ 2.28(f) where it has not been considered by the Commissioner who 

made the decision which the Commission seeks to reopen. 

Accordingly, Lewis's letter to President Reagan was new. 

Additionally, it is clear that the extortionate letter was 

significant to Lewis's case, as he was serving a sentence for 

extortion. Hence, the Commission was justified in reopening its 

decision to grant him parole. 

II. 

Lewis next advances three arguments suggesting that the 

Commission could not consider evidence in his sentencing 

transcript. First, he argues that the Commission cannot consider 

the transcript because it was not one of the bases for opening the 

hearing. Next, he argues that it was improper to consider 

evidence from the transcript of crimes with which he was not 

charged. Finally, he argues that the Commission could not 

consider evidence regarding the Tylenol murder because the 

sentencing judge declined to consider this information. We 

disagree with all of these arguments. 

7 At least two other circuits and one district court in this 

circuit have explicitly rejected Ready's narrow definition of 

newness. See Torres-Macias v. United States Parole Comm'n, 730 

F.2d 1214, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 1984); Fardella v. Garrison, 698 F.2d 

208, 211 (4th Cir. 1982); Fox, 517 F. Supp. at 858-9. No court 

besides Ready appears to have adopted its definition. 

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Section 2.28(f), which authorizes the Commission to reopen a 

case based on new and significant adverse information, does not 

limit the Commission's attention to the information that was the 

basis for the reopening. In fact,§ 2.28(f) explicitly requires 

that the reopened hearing be conducted pursuant to§ 2.13, which 

sets out the procedure for the initial hearing. Thus, we can 

infer that the procedure at the reopened hearing must be the same 

as that at the initial hearing, where there is no restriction on 

the information that the Commission can consider. 8 We have no 

doubt that at the initial hearing the Commission could have 

considered the transcript had it been submitted. Here, Lewis 

cannot argue that the Commission should not have considered the 

sentencing transcript and the recommendations and information 

contained therein, especially given the fact that it was Lewis who 

submitted the transcript to the Commission. 

We also have no doubt that the Commission properly considered 

evidence relating to a crime with which Lewis was not charged. We 

have recently upheld the right of the Commission to consider 

conduct for which a prisoner was not charged so long as there is a 

connection between the uncharged behavior and the crime with which 

the prisoner was sentenced. See Fiumara v. O'Brien, 889 F.2d 254, 

257-58 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2563 (1990). 

8 Because the sentencing transcript and the information in it 

that formed the basis for the Commission's decision in Lewis's 

case was new to the Commission, we do not decide here whether the 

Commission can revisit or base a new determination on previously 

considered information after reopening a case on the basis of 

other new information. 

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There was clearly such a connection between Lewis's extortion 

conviction and the Tylenol murders. 

Finally, it is clear that the Commission can consider 

information that the sentencing judge declined to consider. Id. 

Thus, to the extent that the sentencing judge declined to consider 

evidence linking Lewis to the Tylenol murders, the Commission was 

entitled to draw its own conclusion from that information. 

III. 

Lewis argues that the judge's statement at his sentencing 

hearing that there was not "a shred of evidence that [Lewis] is 

guilty of the Tylenol murders," Tr. at 54, precluded the 

Commission from finding to the contrary. We disagree. 

This statement by the district court was not a finding under 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3)(D) as to any 

allegation in a pre-sentence report that Lewis was the Tylenol 

murderer. No such allegations appeared in any pre-sentence report 

and, consequently, Lewis had no occasion to request (nor did he 

request) a Rule 32(c)(3)(D) determination regarding whether he 

was, in fact, the Tylenol murderer. Rather, this statement, when 

considered with other statements made by the sentencing judge, was 

simply an assurance to Lewis that the court was not going to allow 

or consider any evidence regarding whether Lewis committed the 

Tylenol murders. Tr. at 16, 54. This, of course, could not 

preclude the Commission from considering the matter because the 

Commission has a broader mission: to consider matters related to 

the charged offense even though they go beyond the charge itself. 

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Even if we were to treat the "shred of evidence" statement as 

a Rule 32(c)(3)(D) determination, however, we would conclude that 

it did not constitute a finding that Lewis did not commit the 

Tylenol murders. Instead, it would more properly be considered a 

determination under Rule 32(c)(3)(D)(ii) that the court simply 

would disregard that evidence for purposes of its sentence. A 

judge may treat information which is disputed in a pre-sentencing 

report in one of two ways: The judge can "make (i) a finding as 

to the allegation, or (ii) a determination that no such finding is 

necessary because the matter controverted will not be taken into 

account in sentencing." Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c) (3) (D). 

Whatever may be the impact of a finding of fact under Rule 

32(c)(3)(D)(i), the judge's decision not to consider evidence 

under Rule 32(c)(3)(D)(ii) cannot bind the Commission. "After 

all, the judge has not found the [Rule 32(c)(3)(D)(ii)] 

allegations false; he has simply found them questionable or 

irrelevant for the purpose of sentencing." Kramer v. Jenkins, 803 

F.2d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 1986). 

While this circuit does not yet appear to have decided this 

issue, at least five other circuits have reached the conclusion 

that the Commission may consider information that the sentencing 

judge determined, pursuant to Rule 32(c)(3)(D)(ii), to exclude 

from his or her sentencing consideration. See Coleman v. Honsted, 

908 F.2d 906, 907-08 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Blue v. Lacy, 

857 F.2d 479, 481 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); Hackett v. United 

States Parole Comm'n, 851 F.2d 127, 131 (6th Cir. 1987) (per 

curiam); Ochoa v. United States, 819 F.2d 366, 372 (2d Cir. 1987); 

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Kramer, 803 F.2d at 900. We find their reasoning persuasive. 

Further, no circuit appears to take a contrary position. 

Notwithstanding the strength of the sentencing judge's 

language, we find that his statement that there was not "a shred 

of evidence that [Lewis] is guilty of the Tylenol murders," Tr. at 

54, was a not a finding under Rule 32(c)(3)(D)(i) as to whether 

Lewis, in fact, committed the Tylenol murders. The statement was 

made in the context of the Judge's assurance to Lewis that he 

would not consider this evidence for sentencing. 9 Throughout the 

sentencing hearing, the judge made similar assurances to Lewis, as 

Lewis contested information that was in the pre-sentence report or 

offered by the prosecutor. See Tr. at 16, 31, 35, 40, 54, 59. 

Essentially, the judge was simply assuring Lewis that he was not 

going to consider, in the proceedings before him, the allegation 

that Lewis was the Tylenol murderer: 

9 

I have made a very deliberate effort, both during the trial 

with the jury and in my own mind, to discount any suggestion 

that you [Lewis] may be connected with the Tylenol murders. 

Mr. Webb [the prosecutor] has his own views and his own 

concerns on the matter. But I regard it as my duty to 

consider, in this sentencing, only evidence of such crimes as 

you have been convicted of. Since you have not been charged 

or convicted of the Tylenol murders I will not consider any 

suggestion that your possible connection with those is a 

factor I should consider in this sentencing. So for that 

reason you can accept my assurance that I won't consider that 

The entire sentence was: 

The emotional associations that go with the word Tylenol in 

connection with this case cannot be allowed to rub off on Mr. 

Lewis since there is no shred of evidence that he is guilty 

of the Tylenol murders and no suggestion along those lines 

should be allowed to influence my judgment in this matter. 

Tr. at 54. 

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and need not take time to comment on Mr. Webb's suggestions 

along those lines. 

Tr. at 16-17. 

Thus, the "shred of evidence" statement was not a finding, 

but rather a further assurance that the judge had declined to take 

evidence on that issue. Accordingly, the Commission was not 

precluded by that statement from finding that Lewis was indeed the 

Tylenol murderer. 

IV. 

Lewis's final argument is that even if the conclusion that he 

was the Tylenol murderer was not precluded, it was insufficiently 

supported by the evidence. We disagree. 

Lewis's sufficiency of evidence argument rests, in large 

part, on an erroneous conclusion about the appropriate standard of 

review: Lewis asserts that we must overturn a Commission finding 

that is not supported by "substantial evidence." For this 

proposition he cites NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 

306 U.S. 292, 299 (1939) and Dayton Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 591 

F.2d 566, 569 (10th Cir. 1979). These cases, however, explain the 

standard for reviewing findings made by the NLRB--a standard that 

is prescribed in a statute specific to that agency. The 

appropriate standard of review for the Parole Commission, in 

contrast, is "whether the decision is arbitrary and capricious or 

is an abuse of discretion." Fiumara, 889 F.2d at 257 (citing, 

among other authorities, Misasi v. United States Parole Comm'n, 

835 F.2d 754, 758 (10th Cir. 1987)). 

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In Misasi we discussed the appropriate standard for reviewing 

Commission decisions: 

A court of review need only determine whether the information 

relied on by the Commission is sufficient to provide a 

factual basis for its reasons. The inquiry is not whether 

the Commission's decision is supported by the preponderance 

of the evidence, or even by substantial evidence; the inquiry 

is only whether there is a rational basis in the record for 

the Commission's conclusions embodied in its statement of 

reasons. 

835 F.2d at 758 (quoting Solomon v. Elsea, 676 F.2d 282, 290 (7th 

Cir. 1982)). 

The record provides a rational basis for the Commission's 

conclusion that Lewis was the Tylenol murderer. The sentencing 

transcript indicates that Lewis provided detailed explanations to 

investigators of how the crime might have been perpetrated, albeit 

for purposes of aiding their investigation. Tr. at 13-14. 

Further, his letter to President Reagan constitutes an inferential 

admission, however suspect, that he was the Tylenol murderer. 

While we might not have concluded that Lewis was the Tylenol 

murderer based on this evidence, it provides a rational basis for 

the Commission's finding to that effect. Thus, the Commission did 

not abuse its discretion in finding that Lewis was the Tylenol 

murderer. 

Accordingly, the district court's denial of Lewis's petition 

is AFFIRMED. 

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4. Did the Commission act within its discretion in 

determining that the Lewis committed murder by lacing Tylenol 

capsules with cyanide? 

We answer all of these questions in the affirmative. 1 

FACTS 

Following the deaths of seven people from the ingestion of 

Tylenol capsules laced with cyanide, Lewis mailed a letter to 

Johnson & Johnson, Inc., the makers of Tylenol, threatening to 

continue lacing Tylenol with cyanide unless the company wired $1 

million to a specified bank account. Although not charged with 

the killings, Lewis was charged with and convicted of extortion on 

the basis of that letter. 2 He received a ten year sentence which 

was to run consecutively to two concurrent ten year sentences that 

he received for other federal crimes. At sentencing, the 

prosecutor suggested that Lewis was a· suspect in the Tylenol 

murder case, to which the judge responded that he would not 

consider that suggestion because Lewis had not been charged for or 

convicted of the Tylenol murders and there was not "a shred of 

1 Lewis has filed a motion to supplement the 

we find nothing in his proposed supplement that 

Commission which is not already in the record. 

motion to supplement the record is DENIED. 

record. However, 

was before the 

Accordingly, the 

2 Although Lewis wrote the letter to Johnson & Johnson, he 

signed it in the name of his wife's ex-boss and requested that the 

money be wired to the ex-boss's account. Lewis claimed that he 

wrote the letter to get revenge for a bad check that the ex-boss 

wrote to Lewis's wife. Thus, the prosecutors apparently did not 

view the letter as a sufficiently clear admission of the Tylenol 

murders to charge Lewis with those murders. 

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adverse information on April 27, 1989, but failed to specify the 

information to which they referred. On July 20, 1989, the 

Commission corrected its order to specify the letters from the 

prosecutors and the letter to Reagan as new and adverse 

information. 

At a hearing on August 21, 1989 the Commission acknowledged 

the delay in correcting its order. The Commission also informed 

Lewis that it intended to rely on information in the transcript 

from his sentencing, which had been submitted to the Commission by 

Lewis, to determine whether he committed the Tylenol murders. For 

these reasons the Commission offered Lewis the option of asking 

for a continuance. Both Lewis and his attorney explicitly 

declined to request a continuance and elected to proceed with the 

hearing. 4 

Following the hearing, the Commission determined that Lewis 

was indeed the Tylenol murderer and accordingly raised his Offense 

Severity Level from Category 6 (for extortion) to Category 8 (for 

murder). Placing Lewis in Category 8 permitted the Commission to 

deny him parole, forcing him to serve his full sentence. 

Lewis appealed this decision to the Full Commission, which 

affirmed it. Subsequently he petitioned the district court for 

habeas corpus, which was denied. He now appeals the district 

court's denial of his petition based on four grounds. 

4 Because Lewis explicitly declined to request a continuance, 

we do not consider his argument on appeal that either the time 

between the corrected notice and his hearing, which was below the 

statutory minimum notice time, or the Commission's reliance on 

information not contained in the notice, violated his due process 

rights under the Fifth Amendment. 

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For purposes of§ 2.28(f), information is new if it was not 

received by the Commissioner prior to the decision that is to be 

revisited. Mcclanahan v. Mulcrome, 636 F.2d 1190, 1191 (10th Cir. 

1980) (per curiam); Fox v. United States Parole Comm'n, 517 F. 

Supp. 855, 859 (D. Kan.), aff'd, No. 81-1432 (10th Cir. Nov. 23, 

1981). Lewis does not contradict the Commission's assertion that 

the Regional Commissioner had not received his letter to President 

Reagan prior to either the initial decision regarding his parole 

or the "no change" determination. 6 Thus, the letter can be 

considered new for purposes of§ 2.28(f). 

Lewis cites Ready v. United States Parole Comm'n, 483 F. 

Supp. 1273, 1276-77 (M.D. Pa. 1980), for the proposition that 

information cannot be considered new for purposes of reopening a 

parole decision where the Commission was aware of the allegations 

that the information is used to support but declined at the time 

of the initial parole decision to seek such information regarding 

those allegations. In Ready the Commission was aware during its 

6 Lewis points out that the National Commissioner in Maryland 

had received Lewis's letter to President Reagan prior to the date 

on which the Regional Commissioner in Texas issued a "no change" 

notice. However, the relevant party in this case, for purposes of 

§ 2.28, was not the National Commissioner but the Regional 

Commissioner. Section 2.28(f) is clearly designed to ensure that 

parole decisions are based on all available, relevant information. 

See Fox, 517 F. Supp. at 859. Thus, the relevant party for 

purposes of that regulation must be the actual decisionrnaker. The 

Regional Commissioner issued the "no change" notice and must 

therefore be considered the relevant party with respect to that 

notice. Because he did not see the letter, it was new with 

respect to the "no change" notice for purposes of§ 2.28(f). 

Because both the Commission's initial determination and its 

"no change" determination were made without the benefit of Lewis's 

letter to President Reagan, we do not need to decide which of 

hese two decisions was the relevant one for purposes of 

2.28(f). 

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We cannot agree that these were its intended functions. Cf. 

Mcclanahan, 636 F.2d at 1191 (mistake in parole calculation new 

when brought to attention of Commissioner). 7 

Thus, we hold that information is new for purposes of 

§ 2.28(f) where it has not been considered by the Commissioner who 

made the decision which the Commission seeks to reopen. 

Accordingly, Lewis's letter to President Reagan was new. 

Additionally, it is clear that the extortionate letter was 

significant to Lewis's case, as he was serving a sentence for 

extortion. Hence, the Commission was justified in reopening its 

decision to grant him parole. 

II. 

Lewis next advances three arguments suggesting that the 

Commission could not consider evidence in his sentencing 

transcript. First, he argues that the Commission cannot consider 

the transcript because it was not one of the bases for opening the 

hearing. Next, he argues that it was improper to consider 

evidence from the transcript of crimes with which he was not 

charged. Finally, he argues that the Commission could not 

consider evidence regarding the Tylenol murder because the 

sentencing judge declined to consider this information. We 

disagree with all of these arguments. 

7 At least two other circuits and one district court in this 

circuit have explicitly rejected Ready's narrow definition of 

newness. See Torres-Macias v. United States Parole Comm'n, 730 

F.2d 1214, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 1984); Fardella v. Garrison, 698 F.2d 

208, 211 (4th Cir. 1982); Fox, 517 F. Supp. at 858-9. No court 

besides Ready appears to have adopted its definition. 

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t 

There was clearly such a connection between Lewis's extortion 

conviction and the Tylenol murders. 

Finally, it is clear that the Commission can consider 

information that the sentencing judge declined to consider. Id. 

Thus, to the extent that the sentencing judge declined to consider 

evidence linking Lewis to the Tylenol murders, the Commission was 

entitled to draw its own conclusion from that information. 

III. 

Lewis argues that the judge's statement at his sentencing 

hearing that there was not "a shred of evidence that [Lewis] is 

guilty of the Tylenol murders," Tr. at 54, precluded the 

Commission from finding to the contrary. We disagree. 

This statement by the district court was not a finding under 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3)(D) as to any 

allegation in a pre-sentence report that Lewis was the Tylenol 

murderer. No such allegations appeared in any pre-sentence report 

and, consequently, Lewis had no occasion to request (nor did he 

request) a Rule 32(c)(3)(D) determination regarding whether he 

was, in fact, the Tylenol murderer. Rather, this statement, when 

considered with other statements made by the sentencing judge, was 

simply an assurance to Lewis that the court was not going to allow 

or consider any evidence regarding whether Lewis committed the 

Tylenol murders. Tr. at 16, 54. This, of course, could not 

preclude the Commission from considering the matter because the 

Commission has a broader mission: to consider matters related to 

the charged offense even though they go beyond the charge itself. 

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Kramer, 803 F.2d at 900. We find their reasoning persuasive. 

Further, no circuit appears to take a contrary position. 

Notwithstanding the strength of the sentencing judge's 

language, we find that his statement that there was not "a shred 

of evidence that [Lewis] is guilty of the Tylenol murders," Tr. at 

54, was a not a finding under Rule 32(c)(3)(D)(i) as to whether 

Lewis, in fact, committed the Tylenol murders. The statement was 

made in the context of the Judge's assurance to Lewis that he 

would not consider this evidence for sentencing. 9 Throughout the 

sentencing hearing, the judge made similar assurances to Lewis, as 

Lewis contested information that was in the pre-sentence report or 

offered by the prosecutor. See Tr. at 16, 31, 35, 40, 54, 59. 

Essentially, the judge was simply assuring Lewis that he was not 

going to consider, in the proceedings before him, the allegation 

that Lewis was the Tylenol murderer: 

9 

I have made a very deliberate effort, both during the trial 

with the jury and in my own mind, to discount any suggestion 

that you [Lewis] may be connected with the Tylenol murders. 

Mr. Webb [the prosecutor] has his own views and his own 

concerns on the matter. But I regard it as my duty to 

consider, in this sentencing, only evidence of such crimes as 

you have been convicted of. Since you have not been charged 

or convicted of the Tylenol murders I will not consider any 

suggestion that your possible connection with those is a 

factor I should consider in this sentencing. So for that 

reason you can accept my assurance that I won't consider that 

The entire sentence was: 

The emotional associations that go with the word Tylenol in 

connection with this case cannot be allowed to rub off on Mr. 

Lewis since there is no shred of evidence that he is guilty 

of the Tylenol murders and no suggestion along those lines 

should be allowed to influence my judgment in this matter. 

Tr. at 54. 

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In Misasi we discussed the appropriate standard for reviewing 

Commission decisions: 

A court of review need only determine whether the information 

relied on by the Commission is sufficient to provide a 

factual basis for its reasons. The inquiry is not whether 

the Commission's decision is supported by the preponderance 

of the evidence, or even by substantial evidence; the inquiry 

is only whether there is a rational basis in the record for 

the Commission's conclusions embodied in its statement of 

reasons. 

835 F.2d at 758 (quoting Solomon v. Elsea, 676 F.2d 282, 290 (7th 

Cir. 1982)). 

The record provides a rational basis for the Commission's 

conclusion that Lewis was the Tylenol murderer. The sentencing 

transcript indicates that Lewis provided detailed explanations to 

investigators of how the crime might have been perpetrated, albeit 

for purposes of aiding their investigation. Tr. at 13-14. 

Further, his letter to President Reagan constitutes an inferential 

admission, however suspect, that he was the Tylenol murderer. 

While we might not have concluded that Lewis was the Tylenol 

murderer based on this evidence, it provides a rational basis for 

the Commission's finding to that effect. Thus, the Commission did 

not abuse its discretion in finding that Lewis was the Tylenol 

murderer. 

Accordingly, the district court's denial of Lewis's petition 

is AFFIRMED. 

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