Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-03624/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-03624-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

STACY PENNING, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL 

UNION, LOCAL 1021, ET AL., 

Defendants.

CASE NO. 19-cv-03624-YGR 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS;

GRANTING LEAVE TO FILE STATEMENTS 

OF RECENT DECISION

Re: Dkt. No. 22, 31, 32 

Presently pending before the Court is the motion of defendants Service Employees 

International Union, Local 1021, and Service Employees International Union to dismiss plaintiff 

Stacey Penning’s complaint. (Dkt. No. 22.) Having considered the papers and underlying 

evidence filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, the arguments of the parties on 

December 10, 2019, and the recently issued authorities,1 and for the reasons set forth herein, the 

Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

Plaintiff alleges, on behalf of himself and a putative class of non-members of the union 

defendants, claims for: (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983; (2) the federal Declaratory 

Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201; (3) state law conversion, and (4) a state law common count for 

restitution of money had and received. Plaintiff alleges that his employer, the San Francisco 

Public Utilities Commission, withheld fair-share fees from his wages and forwarded them to Local 

1021, the exclusive collective bargaining representative for public sector employees in his unit, to 

pay for Local 1021’s collective bargaining activities. Plaintiff contends that the compulsory 

collection of fair-share fees violates his constitutional rights under Janus v. AFSCME Council 31, 

 1

 Defendants’ requests to file statements of recent decisions (Dkt. Nos. 31 and 32) are 

GRANTED. 

Case 4:19-cv-03624-YGR Document 33 Filed 01/16/20 Page 1 of 3
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United States District Court 

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138 S.Ct. 2448 (2018) (“Janus”) and seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against compulsory 

fair-share fees, retrospective refunds of fees previously collected. 

Defendants move under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. (“FRCP”) 12(b)(1) to dismiss plaintiff’s claims 

on three separate grounds. First, they move to dismiss claims for declaratory and injunctive relief 

on the ground that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over those claims. Next, they move 

to dismiss plaintiff’s claim for retrospective monetary relief under Section 1983 pursuant to the 

“good faith” defense. Finally, defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s state law claims on the 

grounds that those claims are preempted by the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act and barred by 

California Government Code §1159. 

Plaintiff’s claims for prospective relief fail because they are moot. All fair-share fee 

deductions from plaintiff and the putative class members ceased when the United States Supreme 

Court issued its decision in Janus, i.e. nearly one year before plaintiff filed his complaint. 

Accordingly, there is no reasonable likelihood of such deductions recurring since Janus declared 

them unconstitutional. “[E]very other district court to consider this issue has found claims for 

prospective relief moot after Janus.” Babb v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 378 F. Supp. 3d 857, 871 

(C.D. Cal. 2019) (citing cases), appeal pending, No. 19-55692 (9th Cir.); Danielson v. AFSCME 

Council 28, 340 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1084 (W.D. Wash. 2018), affirmed Danielson v. Inslee, No. 18-

36087, 945 F.3d 1096, __, 2019 WL 7182203 at *2 n.2 (9th Cir. Dec. 26, 2019) (noting that 

plaintiffs do not contest the dismissal of their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief). This 

Court agrees that the claims for prospective relief are moot. 

With respect to the claims for repayment of fair-share fees previously deducted before 

Janus, the good faith doctrine precludes such relief under section 1983. As the Ninth Circuit 

recently held last month, affirming dismissal of a similar post-Janus action: 

a union defendant can invoke an affirmative defense of good faith to retrospective 

monetary liability under section 1983 for the agency fees it collected pre-Janus, where its conduct was directly authorized under both state law and decades of 

Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Union was not required to forecast changing 

winds at the Supreme Court and anticipatorily presume the overturning of Abood. 

Instead, we permit private parties to rely on judicial pronouncements of what the 

law is, without exposing themselves to potential liability for doing so. 

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United States District Court 

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The ability of the public to rely on the courts’ pronouncements of law is integral 

to the functioning of our judicial system. After all, “[i]t is emphatically the 

province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. 

Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). If private parties could 

no longer rely on the pronouncements of even the nation’s highest court to steer 

clear of liability, it could have a destabilizing impact on the judicial system. 

Because the Union’s action was sanctioned not only by state law, but also by 

directly on-point Supreme Court precedent, we hold that the good faith defense 

shields the Union from retrospective monetary liability as a matter of law. In so 

ruling, we join a growing consensus of courts across the nation 

Danielson, 945 F.3d 1096, __, 2019 WL 7182203, at *3, 7. Consequently, the Court finds that 

plaintiff’s claims for retrospective relief pursuant to section 1983 fail as a matter of law. 

Finally, with respect to plaintiff’s claims for retrospective relief under state law, such 

claims are preempted by the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act, Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 3500-11, and barred 

by California Government Code § 1159. See Babb, 378 F. Supp. 3d at 877, 878 (claims must be 

dismissed based both on preemptive effect of state’s public employee collective-bargaining statute 

over state common law refund claims, and on Government Code § 1159 expressly barring such 

claims). 

Because the Court finds all of plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed as a matter of law and 

any amendment would be futile, no leave to amend is permitted. 

This action is DISMISSED and the Clerk is directed to close the file. 

This Order terminates Docket No. 22, 31, and 32. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 16, 2020 

 YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Case 4:19-cv-03624-YGR Document 33 Filed 01/16/20 Page 3 of 3