Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02378/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02378-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAMMY LEE MORRIS, 

CDCR #C-80345, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

G.A. GONZALES; D. TAMAYO; 

LAFLER DOMINIC; A. AGUIRRE; 

J. DURAN; C. MARTINEZ, 

Defendants. 

 Case No.: 3:19-cv-02378-MMA (AGS) 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS; 

[Doc. No. 2] 

DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND § 1915A(b) 

Plaintiff Sammy Lee Morris, currently incarcerated at California Health Care 

Facility (“CHCF”) located in Stockton, California has filed a civil rights complaint 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims Defendants, all correctional officers at the 

Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) violated his constitutional rights when 

he was previously housed at RJD on January 19, 2019. See Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 10-12. 

Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Doc. No. 2. 

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I. IFP Motion 

 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite the plaintiff’s failure to prepay the 

entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, if the plaintiff is a 

prisoner and is granted leave to proceed IFP, he nevertheless remains obligated to pay the 

entire fee in installments, regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act 

(“PLRA”), a prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must also submit a “certified copy of 

the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the six-month period 

immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. 

King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, 

the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the 

account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the 

past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner then 

collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any 

month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and forwards them to the Court until 

the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 

 In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his prison 

certificate issued by a CHCF accounting official, along with a certified copy of his 

inmate trust account statement. See Doc. No. 2 at 6-9. Plaintiff’s statements show that 

he has had no monthly deposits and has carried an average balance of zero in his account 

during the 6-month period preceding the filing of this action and had no available funds 

to his credit at the time of filing. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no 

event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action 

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or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by 

which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case 

based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when 

payment is ordered.”). 

 Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP and assesses no 

initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350 balance of 

the filing fees due for this case must be collected by the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court 

pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 

II. Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) 

A. Standard of Review 

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preAnswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford 

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

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12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations 

On January 19, 2019, Plaintiff claims Defendant Gonzalez, the “Control Booth 

Officer,” said she observed Plaintiff “standing at his door masturbating with the light on.” 

Compl. at 12. A rules violation report (“RVR”) was issued and “reviewed” by 

Defendants Martinez and Duran. Id. Plaintiff alleges Martinez and Duran “conspired” 

with Gonzalez to “push the report forward” and convinced Defendants Aguirre and 

Tamayo to classify the RVR as “serious.” Id.

Plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation (“ad-seg”) “where he had a 

‘yellow placard’ covering the outside of his cell door window for other inmates and staff 

to recognize the occupant of the cell was some type of a sex offender.” Id. Plaintiff was 

also “forced to wear a specialized known ‘indecent exposure control jumpsuit.’” Id. A 

“padlock” was attached to the back of the jumpsuit which required Plaintiff to find a staff 

member “with a key to the padlock” in order for Plaintiff to use the bathroom. Id. at 13. 

Plaintiff was required to wear this jumpsuit “every time he left his cell to go to therapy 

groups, medical, and dental appointments.” Id. Plaintiff also wore the jumpsuit on the 

exercise yard where other inmates “viewed him as a sexual offender” and called him 

“nasty names.” Id. 

On March 15, 2019, Plaintiff was found guilty by Senior Hearing Officer 

Lieutenant Valdez.1

 See id. Plaintiff filed a grievance appealing this decision and was 

later found “not guilty” and the RVR was ordered to be “reissued and reheard.” Id. 

Plaintiff claims Defendant Dominic conspired with Aguirre to “push the mental 

health assessment forward to have it heard” so that Plaintiff would be found guilty and 

                                               

1

 Valdez is not a named defendant. 

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“to send [Plaintiff] to the indecent exposure pilot program at California State Prison, 

Corcoran.” Id. Dominic also stated that Plaintiff has “prior RVRs for the same offense 

and as such is aware of the potential for disciplinary consequences.” Id. Plaintiff alleges 

Dominic’s “acts were willful, intentional, malicious, wanton, and despicable in conscious 

disregard for Plaintiff’s rights.” Id.

Plaintiff has now been placed in the “high level care, the California Health Care 

Facility Psychiatric Inpatient Program (“CHCH-PIP”). Id. Plaintiff seeks $300,000 in 

compensatory damages, $450,000 in punitive damages, and $5000 in nominal damages. 

See id. at 20. 

 C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for the “deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 

Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must 

allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the 

United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person 

acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Long v. Cty. of 

Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). 

 D. Eighth Amendment Claim 

 Plaintiff alleges that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated by Defendants 

when they “requir[ed] him to wear a control jumpsuit identifying him as a ‘sexual 

predator-offender’” and also subjecting him to “degrading name calling and threats of 

violence and death.” Compl. at 15-16. Plaintiff does not allege that he was actually 

physically assaulted while housed at RJD and at the time he filed this action he was no 

longer housed at RJD. See id. at 1, 16. 

To state an Eighth Amendment claim based on a deprivation of humane conditions 

of confinement, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to satisfy two requirements. Farmer 

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “First, the deprivation 

alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 

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U.S. 294, 298 (1991)); see also Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1091 (9th Cir. 2014).

Prison conditions are not objectively serious unless they amount to “unquestioned and 

serious deprivations of basic human needs,” or of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s 

necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298-

300; Grenning v. Miller-Stout, 739 F.3d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 

“After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain ... constitutes 

cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” Watison v. Carter, 

668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)) 

(internal quotations omitted). “[A]mong unnecessary and wanton inflictions of pain are 

those that are totally without penological justification.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 

737 (2002) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

Second, Plaintiff’s Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter” to 

demonstrate that Defendants acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind, that of 

“deliberate indifference.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303; Peralta, 744 

F.3d at 1091. A prison official acts with deliberate indifference if he “knows of and 

disregards an excessive risk to the prisoner’s health and safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

837. In other words, the prison official “must both be aware of facts from which the 

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists [to the prisoner], 

and [the prison official] must also draw the inference.” Id.

Plaintiff fails to identify any Defendant who was purportedly responsible for 

deciding to place him in the jumpsuit, for labelling him as a sex offender, or that they had 

any knowledge of the circumstances Plaintiff alleges he faced on the exercise yard. “The 

inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities 

of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a 

constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988), citing 

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976); Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 460 (9th 

Cir. 1986); Estate of Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(“Causation is, of course, a required element of a § 1983 claim.”). A person deprives 

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another “of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an 

affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act 

which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff 

complains].” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Plaintiff has not 

stated an Eighth Amendment claim against the Defendants because he fails to identify 

how any of the named Defendants were the cause of, or even aware of, the actions 

Plaintiff alleges occurred. 

 D. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claims 

 Plaintiff claims he has an “equal protected right to be treated equally and fairly as 

similarly situated others as provided within the ‘Equal Protection Clause.’” Compl. at 18. 

 The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause requires that persons 

similarly situated be treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 

U.S. 432, 439; Hartmann v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1123 

(9th Cir. 2013); Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013); Shakur v. 

Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir. 2008). An equal protection claim may be 

established in two ways. The first method requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant 

has intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of his membership in a 

protected class. Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1123; Furnace, 705 F.3d at 1030; Serrano v. 

Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003); Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 

1158, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2005); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 

2001). Under this theory of equal protection, Plaintiff must allege that Defendants’ 

actions were a result of his membership in a suspect class such as race, religion, or 

alienage. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Here, Plaintiff does not allege to be a member of any suspect class, and he fails to 

allege Defendants have denied him any rights based on his membership in any suspect 

class. 

To the extent his claims do not involve a suspect classification, Plaintiff may 

establish an equal protection claim only if he alleges facts sufficient to plausibly show 

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Defendants intentionally treated similarly situated inmates differently without a rational 

basis for doing so. See Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 

601-02 (2008); see also Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); San 

Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972); Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 

546 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2008); North Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 

486 (9th Cir. 2008). But to state an equal protection claim under this “class of one” 

theory, he must allege facts to plausibly show that: (1) he is a member of an identifiable 

class; (2) he was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated; and (3) 

there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 

1087, 1098 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Village of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564). He must 

further allege discriminatory intent. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-240 

(1976); Serrano, 345 F.3d at 1081-82; Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 

1997). 

In support of this claim, Plaintiff claims that he was treated differently than other 

inmates who were housed in administrative segregation. See Compl. at 18. However, 

Plaintiff is clearly not “similarly situated” to all other inmates housed in administrative 

segregation who are housed there for a variety of different reasons. Plaintiff does not 

allege that Defendants treated him differently from other inmates who were also 

designated sexual offenders and placed in administrative segregation. The Court finds 

that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts that are insufficient to plead an equal protection 

claim. Thus, Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims must be 

DISMISSED for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 

E. Leave to Amend 

In light of his pro se status, however, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an 

Amended Complaint in order to address the pleading deficiencies identified in this Order.

See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district court should not 

dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)] unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint 

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could not be cured by amendment.’”) (quoting Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th 

Cir. 2012)). 

III. Conclusion and Orders 

Good cause appearing, the Court: 

 1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(Doc. No. 2). 

 2. DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing 

monthly payments from her account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the 

preceding month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each 

time the amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION. 

 3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Ralph 

Diaz, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001. 

 4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b); and 

5. GRANTS Plaintiff 45 days leave from the date of this Order in which to file 

an Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted, if he can. 

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to his 

original pleading. Defendants not named and any claims not re-alleged in the Amended 

Complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. 

v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended 

pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an 

amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”). 

If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within 45 days, the Court will enter 

a final Order dismissing this civil action based both on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim 

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upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b), 

and his failure to prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring amendment. See 

Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take 

advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the 

dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”). 

6. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail Plaintiff a court approved civil rights 

complaint form for his use in filing his amended complaint. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE: January 29, 2020 _______________________________________ 

 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 

 United States District Judge 

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