Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_96-cv-20060/USCOURTS-cand-5_96-cv-20060-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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*E-FILED 10/11/07*

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

RODGER M. CRIPE, et al., 

Plaintiffs,

 v.

CITY OF SAN JOSE, et al.,

Defendants. /

NO. C 96-20060 RS

ORDER DENYING “MOTION”

FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE

On August 23, 2007, San Jose Police Officer Timothy Gall, appearing pro se, submitted a

motion to modify and enforce the consent decree entered in this action on June 21, 2005. Gall is not

a party, but as a San Jose Police Officer, was a beneficiary of the terms of the consent decree and he

arguably has an interest in ensuring that the City abides by its terms. Accordingly, in light of Gall’s

pro se status, the Court deemed his submission to include a motion for leave to intervene, and

provided defendants an opportunity to oppose intervention.

Defendants filed written opposition and Gall filed a reply, and the matter has now been

submitted for decision without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7-1 (b) and the Court’s

order entered August 24, 2007. 

Case 5:96-cv-20060-RS Document 290 Filed 10/11/07 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Rule 24(a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action . . . when

the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the

subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action

may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that

interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.

The Ninth Circuit has set forth four requirements that must be met by a party seeking to

intervene as of right: (1) the applicant must timely move to intervene; (2) the applicant must have a

significantly protectable interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the

action; (3) the applicant must be situated such that the disposition of the action may impair or

impede the party’s ability to protect that interest; and (4) the applicant’s interest must not be

adequately represented by existing parties. Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1083 (9th

Cir.2003); see also California ex rel. Lockyer v. United States, 450 F.3d 436, 440 (9th Cir.2006).

A proposed intervenor “bears the burden of showing that all the requirements for

intervention have been met.” United States v. Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir.2004).

Courts “generally interpret the requirements broadly in favor of intervention.” United States v.

Washington, 86 F.3d 1499, 1503 (9th Cir.1996); see also Lockyer, 450 F.3d at 440 (“We construe

Rule 24(a) liberally in favor of potential intervenors.”). In considering a motion to intervene, the

district court must accept as true nonconclusory allegations of the motion and proposed complaint in

intervention “absent sham, frivolity or other objections.” Southwest Center for Biological Diversity

v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 819 (9th Cir.2001).

Analysis of whether Gall has met these standards here is complicated by the fact that he filed

neither a motion to intervene nor a proposed complaint in intervention per se. Nevertheless, no right

to intervene appears on this record. The consent decree was entered over two years ago, effectively

“disposing of” the matters raised in this action as of that time. It is far too late for Gall to seek other

or different relief than the plaintiffs obtained in this action. 

Gall is correct that the consent decree envisioned that the parties might need to seek further

Court intervention either to enforce the consent decree or to modify its terms in light of changed or

Case 5:96-cv-20060-RS Document 290 Filed 10/11/07 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER

C 96-20060 RS

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evolving circumstances. Nothing in the consent decree, however, created a mechanism by which

any individual, non-party, member of the San Jose Police force would be permitted to seek Court

resolution of his or her individual grievances. See Consent Decree ¶ 17 (requiring the parties to

present certain types of disputes to the Court, but stating that where an individual officer contends

the decree is being improperly applied to his or her circumstances, “the ordinary MOA grievance

procedures shall be followed.”)

To the extent Gall is contending that the City of San Jose is failing to comply with the

consent decree in its present form, there appears to be no basis to permit a non-party to assert such a

claim where none of the parties to the action are so contending.

To the extent that Gall may contend that his individual rights under federal law are being

violated, nothing in the consent decree precludes him from seeking to vindicate those rights in a

separate action. This is not to suggest, however, that Gall should resort to such action, particularly

given the representations by the City of San Jose in its opposition to this motion that it is willing to

work with Gall to address his concerns. The point remains, however, that at this juncture, there is no

basis to permit Gall to intervene in a closed case. If his rights are being violated, his remedy lies

elsewhere. For similar reasons, to the extent Gall might seek permissive intervention under Rule 24

(b), the motion must be denied.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 10, 2007 

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 5:96-cv-20060-RS Document 290 Filed 10/11/07 Page 3 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER

C 96-20060 RS

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT NOTICE OF THIS ORDER HAS BEEN GIVEN TO:

Denise Sequeira Bazzano cao.main@sanjoseca.gov

Joan R. Gallo jgallo@hopkinscarley.com, jfernandez@realtylawllp.com

Clifford S. Greenberg cao.main@ci.sj.ca.us

Marc Henry Greenberg mgreenberg@ggu.edu

Frank A. Jelinch frank@jelinchlaw.com, roberta@jelinchlaw.com

Walter K. Pyle walt@wfkplaw.com

John Charles Stein boccardo@boccardo.com, jstein@boccardo.com, tracey@boccardo.com

John Roger Tennant generalcounsel@sjpoa.com, betty@sjpoa.com

Ronald Yank ryank@cbmlaw.com

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel who have not

registered for e-filing under the Court's CM/ECF program. 

AND THAT A COPY OF THIS ORDER WAS MAILED TO:

Timothy L. Gall

15435 La Jolla Drive

Morgan Hill, CA 95037

Dated: 10/11/07 Chambers of Judge Richard Seeborg

By: /s/ BAK 

Case 5:96-cv-20060-RS Document 290 Filed 10/11/07 Page 4 of 4