Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00265/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00265-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

CESAR F. SILVAS, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

GMAC MORTGAGE, LLC;

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC

REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.;

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF

ARIZONA; RESIDENTIAL FUNDING

COMPANY, LLC; RESIDENTIAL

ACCREDIT LOANS, INC.; GMAC-RFC

SECURITIES; RALI SERIES 2007-QA3

TRUST; DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST

COMPANY AMERICAS; HSBC BANK

USA, N.A.; EXECUTIVE TRUSTEE

SERVICES, LLC; JOHN DOES AND

JANE DOES 1–1000; ABC

CORPORATIONS I–XX; AND XYZ

PARTNERSHIPS I–XX, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-09-265-PHX-GMS

AMENDED ORDER

Six motions are pending before the Court: (1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider Set

Aside Foreclosure Proceeding and Void any Granting and Conveyance of Plaintiff’s Property

(Dkt. # 62); (2) Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s “Response/Rebuttal to Defendants’

Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint With Prejudice”

(Dkt. # 61); (3) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint With

Prejudice (Dkt. # 45). (4) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Join Necessary and Indispensable

Case 2:09-cv-00265-GMS Document 68 Filed 01/05/10 Page 1 of 25
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1

 Eight Defendants have filed the applicable motions: GMAC Mortgage, LLC,

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., Residential Funding Company, LLC,

Residential Accredit Loans, Inc., GMAC-RFC Securities, RALI Series 2007-QA3 Trust,

Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, and Executive Trustee Services, LLC. However,

two Defendants have not joined in any motions: First National Bank of Arizona and HSBC

Bank USA, N.A.

Without the Court’s leave, Plaintiff listed Rex E. Carpenter and 402 NOW LLC in his

motions’ captions, but this Order addresses whether joinder of those parties is appropriate.

2

 The parties’ request for oral argument is denied because the parties have had an

adequate opportunity to discuss the law and evidence and oral argument will not aid the

Court’s decision. See Lake at Las Vegas Investors Group, Inc. v. Pac. Malibu Dev., 933 F.2d

724, 729 (9th Cir. 1991).

3

 Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss states the loan was issued to

First National “c/o GMAC Mortgage Corporation” (“GMAC”), but the Second Amended

Complaint (“Complaint”) does not state as such. Plaintiff, however, does offer other

documents stating the lender as “First National . . . c/o GMAC.”

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Third Parties (Dkt. # 54); (5) Plaintiff’s First Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (Dkt.

# 57); (6) Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions (Dkt. # 61).1

 For the following reasons, the

Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider, grants Defendants’ Motion to Strike, grantsin-part and denies-in-part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, denies Plaintiff’s Motion for

Leave to Join Third Parties, denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend with permission

to refile, and denies Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions.2

BACKGROUND

In January 2006, Plaintiff refinanced a home in Chandler, Arizona. He applied for a

fixed rate loan and received a proposed mortgage payment of $972.22 per month. At closing,

however, the mortgage included a variable rate feature, interest for only five years, monthly

payments of $2,112.99 for initial 60-month interest only, monthly payments of $3,171.30 for

the remaining 239 months of the loan term, and a Yield Spread Premium of $1,408.65.

Plaintiff then executed an Adjustable Rate Note (Dkt. # 45, Ex. A) and Deed of Trust

(Dkt. # 39, Ex. 10). The Note listed First National Bank of Arizona (“First National”) as the

“Lender,”3

 and the Deed of Trust listed Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.

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4

 Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss asserts that Residential

Accredit Loans, Inc., through its affiliate, Residential Funding, purchased Plaintiff’s loan.

However, because this fact was not alleged in the Complaint or otherwise incorporated

thereto, the Court does not consider this fact for purposes of the Motion to Dismiss.

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(“MERS”) as the “beneficiary of this Security Instrument (solely as nominee for Lender and

Lender’s successors and assigns) and the successors and assigns of MERS.” (Dkt. # 45, Ex.

A at 2; Dkt. # 39, Ex. 10 at 3.) 

At some point, First National issued an Allonge to the Note for the subject loan in the

amount of $375,641.00 to an unspecified entity.4

 Defendants then placed Plaintiff’s

mortgage in a mortgage loan pool along with many other investors, and Defendants also

created cross-collateralization agreements regarding Plaintiff’s loan.

For purposes of context only, it appears from other pleadings before the Court that,

in September 2008, MERS issued a Statement of Breach or Non-Performance and that

Executive Trustee Services, LLC recorded a notice of trustee’s sale. Plaintiff filed suit in

state court in January 2009, and the lawsuit was later removed to this Court. During this

lawsuit’s pendency, the Chandler home was non-judicially foreclosed.

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider

On August 21, 2009, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Set Aside Foreclosure

Proceedings and Vacate Forcible Detainer Judgment and Void Any Granting and

Conveyance. (Dkt. # 58.) On October 15, 2009, Plaintiff moved to reconsider that Order.

(Dkt. # 61.) The Court denies the Motion.

Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.2(g)(2) provides,“Absent good cause shown, any

motion for reconsideration shall be filed no later than ten (10) days after the date of the filing

of the Order that is the subject of the motion.” Here, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration

is untimely because it was filed nearly two months after the Court issued its order. 

Plaintiff also has not shown good cause for the delay. “Good cause” primarily

considers a party’s diligence in filing the motion. See Johnson v. Mammoth Recreation, Inc.,

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975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992) (analyzing good cause in the context of Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 16). Plaintiff addresses neither the good cause standard nor his diligence in

meeting the filing deadline set forth in Local Rule 7.2(g)(2). The Court accordingly denies

the Motion as untimely. That Plaintiff is pro se does not, by itself, relieve Plaintiff from

showing good cause where his motion is well over a month late. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d

565, 567 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Pro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that

govern other litigants.”).

Even if Plaintiff had shown good cause for the delay, reconsideration would still be

inappropriate. Local Rule 7.2(g)(1) states, “The Court will ordinarily deny a motion for

reconsideration of an Order absent a showing of manifest error or a showing of new facts or

legal authority that could not have been brought to its attention earlier with reasonable

diligence.” In its original order, the Court found that Plaintiff improperly moved pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which allows a party to seek relief from a final

judgment, not from a nonjudicial trustee’s sale. (Dkt. # 58.) Because the Court concluded

Plaintiff’s motion was procedurally unsound, the Court did not address Plaintiff’s other

arguments. (Id.) Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider does not cite any new law or facts, much

less any new law or facts that could not have been cited earlier, that show why Federal Rule

60(b) would have permitted the Court to grant the relief sought (Dkt. # 61.) Plaintiff instead

recites many of the same legal arguments from his Complaint about transferring beneficial

interests, enforcing promissory notes, cancellation of security interests, and default. (Id.) To

the extent any of these arguments have merit, the Court will address them when considering

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider is denied.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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II. Defendants’ Motion to Strike

Defendants have moved to strike Plaintiff’s “Response/Rebuttal to Defendant’s Reply

in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint With Prejudice.” The

Court grants the Motion. After Defendants had filed their Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. # 45),

Plaintiff filed a Response (Dkt. # 47), and Defendants filed a Reply (Dkt. # 48). Without

seeking the Court’s leave, Plaintiff filed his “Response/Rebuttal,” which the Court construes

as a surreply (Dkt. # 61).

The Local Rules do not authorize filing a surreply. See L. R. Civ. P. 7.2 (providing

for responsive and reply memoranda only); Productive People, LLC v. Ives Design, 2009 WL

1749751 (D. Ariz. June 18, 2009) at *3 n. 6 (granting motion to strike a surreply). Moreover,

nothing in the surreply could be construed as a motion for leave to file a surreply. Because

“[p]ro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants[,]”

King, 814 F.2d at 567, the Court will not consider Plaintiff’s surreply in deciding

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

III. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

A. Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss 

To survive a dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain more than “labels and conclusions” or a

“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”; it must contain factual allegations

sufficient to “raise the right of relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “The pleading must contain something more . . . than

. . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of

action.” Id. While “a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations . . . it must

plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Clemens v.

DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

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alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

The plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s

liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to

relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal citations omitted).

When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “[a]ll

allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party.” Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996). In addition, the

Court must assume that all general allegations “embrace whatever specific facts might be

necessary to support them,” Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 521 (9th

Cir. 1994), but the Court will not assume that the plaintiff can prove facts different from

those alleged in the complaint, see Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council

of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983); Jack Russell Terrier Network of N. Cal. v. Am.

Kennel Club, Inc., 407 F.3d 1027, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005). Similarly, legal conclusions

couched as factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness, and “conclusory

allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to

dismiss.” Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). The Court considers only the

“contents of the complaint” and “evidence on which the complaint ‘necessarily relies’” if:

(1) the complaint refers to the document; (2) the document is central to the plaintiff’s claim;

and (3) no party questions the copy’s authenticity. Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th

Cir. 2006); see also Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other

grounds, Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002), (“[D]ocuments

whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but

which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered . . . .”).

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B. Compliance With the Court’s April 23, 2009 Order

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In April 2009, the Court granted Defendants’ Motion for a More Definite Statement,

ordering Plaintiff to follow certain procedures when filing a second amended complaint.

(Dkt. # 28.) The Order required Plaintiff do the following:

(1) present all material allegations in short, plain statements with each claim

for relief identified in separate numbered paragraphs and sections, each limited

as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances; 

(2) specifically allege each legal right Plaintiff believes was violated, the

specific defendant who violated the right, a sufficient factual context under

Twombly to give the defendant notice of what conduct gives rise to the

violation and how the defendant’s conduct is connected to the violation of

Plaintiff’s rights, and the injuries Plaintiff suffered because of that defendant’s

conduct or omission;

(3) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9, plead all allegations of fraud

with specificity including the time, place, and specific conduct of EACH

defendant accused of fraud;

(4) otherwise cure the deficiencies noted in this Order. (Id.) 

The Order further explained that “allegations of legal rights arising under state or federal law

also require Plaintiff to plead the specific sections and, if necessary, subsections of relevant

statutes that grant such rights.” (Id.) Finally, the Order warned Plaintiff that the Court could

dismiss Plaintiff’s second amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b)

if Plaintiff failed to comply with the Order. (Id.)

Defendants now assert Plaintiff’s second amended Complaint failed to comply with

this Order, but the Court will not grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss solely on this ground.

First, Defendants contend Plaintiff improperly alleges claims against “defendants” generally,

as opposed to specifying which defendants undertook the particular conduct of which

Plaintiff complains. Plaintiff, however, specifies the applicable defendants in bold typeface

beneath each claim for relief. The term “defendants” can be read to include only those

defendants applicable to each claim. Second, Defendants assert Plaintiff did not specify

enough facts or law, such as applicable sections and subsections of statutes, to state a claim

for relief. Similarly, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s fraud-based claims fail to comply with

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). To the extent Plaintiff has failed to comply with the

Order by alleging insufficient facts or law, the Court will take this failure into account when

considering whether Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. But the

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Court will not terminate Plaintiff’s entire case under Rule 41 solely because individual parts

of his Complaint might not survive a motion to dismiss.

C. Plaintiff’s Specific Claims for Relief

Claim I: Breach of Contract

Plaintiff alleges all Defendants breached the Note and Deed of Trust with Plaintiff.

To state a breach of contract claim, “the complaint must allege an agreement, the right to

seek relief, and breach by the defendant.” Commercial Cornice & Millwork, Inc. v. Camel

Constr. Servs. Corp., 154 Ariz. 34, 38, 739 P.2d 1351, 1355 (Ct. App. 1987) (citing City of

Tucson v. Superior Ct., 116 Ariz. 322, 324, 569 P.2d 264, 266 (Ct. App. 1977)). 

Plaintiff states two reasons for breach. First, Defendants placed Plaintiff’s Note in a

mortgage loan pool with many other investors, making it “impossible . . . to identify the ‘note

Holder[,]’ the only person or entity entitled to enforce Plaintiff’s obligation,” which

“inherently violates and breached Plaintiff’s contractual rights under his Note obligation.”

(Dkt. # 39 at 5.) Second, “Defendants created cross-collateralization agreements, swapping

agreements and over-collateralization of the pool assets, which applied Plaintiff’s payments

on his Note obligation to the obligation of others, in direct breach to the terms and conditions

set forth in the Plaintiff’s Deed of Trust and the Promissory Note.” (Id. at 6.)

Defendants first state, “The breach of contract claim is based upon ‘[t]he Adjustable

Rate Note and Deed of Trust’ with ‘First National Bank of Arizona.’” Although the Motion

is slightly unclear, it appears Defendants argue that no contractual liability exists against

them because First National (which did not join in this motion) and Plaintiff were the only

original parties to the Note and Deed of Trust. Plaintiff does not respond to this argument,

nor does Plaintiff comply with the April 23 Order because he fails to allege how each

Defendant is liable on a contract that appears to be between Plaintiff and First National.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim fails.

Even if all Defendants were parties to the contract, Plaintiff still has not stated a claim

for relief. First, the Complaint does not highlight any clause in either the Note or the Deed

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of Trust requiring Defendants to identify the “note holder.” The Court finds nothing in either

document, and Plaintiff’s Response does not point to any contractual language, requiring this.

Plaintiff’s Response quotes a section of the Note, which states, “Lender or anyone who takes

this Note by transfer and who is entitled to receive payments under this Note is called the

‘Note Holder.’” This clause, which refers to a transfer of the note, does not require

identifying the note-holder upon Plaintiff’s request. Plaintiff makes no other legal argument,

statutory or otherwise, explaining why failure to identify the note holder is a breach of

contract. Especially in light of the Court’s April 23 Order, more specificity is required to

survive a motion to dismiss. 

Second, the Complaint did not cite contract language prohibiting crosscollateralization agreements. The Complaint asserts, “Defendants created crosscollateralization agreements, swapping agreements and over-collateralization of the pool

assets, which applied Plaintiff’s payments on his Note obligation to the obligation of others,

in direct breach to the terms and conditions set forth in the Plaintiff’s Deed of Trust and the

Promissory Note.” Again, the April 23 Order requires more specificity. The Response cites

the Deed of Trust, which states, “[A]ll payments accepted and applied by Lender shall be

applied in the following order of priority: (a) interest due under the Note; (b) Principal due

under the note; [etc.].” Plaintiff then for the first time cites Defendants’ “Swapping

Agreement,” which states that “all or a disproportionately large percentage of principal

payments on the mortgage loans will be allocated” to certain certificate holders. Even if the

Court considered this evidence, which was referenced for the first time in Plaintiff’s

Response, the quoted language alone does not explain what actions actually occurred and

how that breached any contract term. In fact, the quoted terms in the swapping agreement

refer only to distribution of payments to certificate-holders, not affecting how payments are

distributed on Plaintiff’s loan. Accordingly, the Motion is granted on the breach of contract

claim.

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Claims II, IV, and XIII: Injunctive Relief, Quiet Title, and Declaratory Relief

Plaintiff asserts a claim for “Injunctive Relief” against MERS, GMAC, and Executive

Trust Services, LLC (“ETS”), and claims for “Declaratory Relief” and “Quiet Title”against

all Defendants only to the extent Plaintiff asserts these as independent claims. Injunctions

and declaratory judgments are remedies for underlying causes of action, but they are not

separate causes of action as Plaintiff alleges. See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor,

Inc., 218 Ariz. 172, 187, 181 P.3d 219, 234 (Ct. App. 2008) (“An injunction is an equitable

remedy . . . .”) (internal quotations omitted); McMann v. City of Tucson, 202 Ariz. 468, 473,

47 P.3d 672, 678 (Ct. App. 2002) (noting that a declaratory judgment “remedy” is available

“‘to declare the rights, status, and other legal relations’”) (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-

1831); Land Dept. v. O’Toole, 154 Ariz. 43, 47, 739 P.2d 1360, 1364 (Ct. App. 1987) (“The

declaratory judgment procedure is not designed to furnish an additional remedy where an

adequate one exists.”). 

Similarly, a quiet title action seeks the Court’s equitable ruling that an individual is

the rightful owner of real property. See In re Roca, 404 B.R. 531, 539 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009)

(“Under Arizona law, a court may, in equity, quiet title in the individual that is the rightful

legal and equitable owner of real property.”); Chantler v. Wood, 6 Ariz. App. 134, 138, 430

P.2d 713, 717 (1967) (finding that a quiet title action “is one of equitable cognizance and that

every interest in the title to real property, whether legal or equitable, may be determined in

the action”). But Plaintiff must assert some legal or equitable theory for why he is the

rightful owner, and thus his quiet title claim depends on his success on one of his other

claims for relief. In the “Quiet Title” section of the Complaint, Plaintiff does not give any

independent reasons for quieting title, but instead notes only that “Plaintiff has more than

equitable interest in the property and [is], in fact, the owner of the property,” that “Plaintiff

will be successful on the merits,” and that “Plaintiff is the only party that has been able to

prove that he is the owner.” (Dkt. # 39 at 12.)

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5

 Defendants assert Plaintiff lacks standing to assert these equitable remedies because

Plaintiff has not offered to tender the full amount owing on the property. See Abdallah v.

United Savings Bank, 43 Cal. App.4th 1101, 1109 (1996) (requiring a showing of tender of

the amount to maintain a cause of action for irregularity in a sale procedure); Farrell v. West,

57 Ariz. 490, 491, 114 P.2d 910, 911 (1941) (finding courts should refuse to quiet title to

property unless plaintiff does equity by tendering the amount owed). Although one factor

is the fact that Plaintiff has not stated that he has offered to tender the amount owed, the

Court must weigh all the equities to determine whether a particular equitable remedy is

available. Because this may require evidence outside the pleadings, the Court may better

analyze the issue on a motion for summary judgment.

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Thus, if any of the above remedies are appropriate for any of Plaintiff’s claims that

survive the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff may seek them as remedies only, but not as separate

claims for relief.5

Claims III and IX: Conspiracy to Commit Fraud Using the MERS System;

Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices, Arizona Consumer Fraud Act, “Fraud

in the Factum,” and “Fraud in the Inducement”

Plaintiff asserts several fraud-based claims against First National and GMAC. These

include a statutory claim for violation of the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act and common law

claims for “fraud in the factum” and “fraud in the inducement.” Plaintiff also asserts

conspiracy to commit fraud against all defendants, except Deutsche Bank and HSBC. These

fraud-based claims fail, however, because Plaintiff has not alleged fraud with particularity.

The Consumer Fraud Act prohibits any “deception, deceptive act or practice, fraud,

false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or concealment, suppression or omission of

any material fact with intent that others rely . . . in connection with the sale or advertisement

of any merchandise whether or not any person has in fact been misled.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-

1522. Meanwhile, common law fraud requires showing:

1) a representation; 2) its falsity; 3) its materiality; 4) the speaker’s knowledge

of the representation’s falsity or ignorance of its truth; 5) the speaker’s intent

that it be acted upon by the recipient in the manner reasonably contemplated;

6) the hearer’s ignorance of its falsity; 7) the hearer’s reliance on its truth;

8) the right to rely on it; and 9) his consequent and proximate injury.

Echols v. Beauty Built Homes, 647 P.2d 629, 631 (Ariz. 1982). 

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Federal Rule Civil Procedure 9(b) requires a heightened pleading standard for fraud

claims: “In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances

constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s

mind may be alleged generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see also Grismore v. Capital One

F.S.B., 2007 WL 841513 at *6 (D. Ariz. Mar. 16, 2007) (applying Rule 9(b)’s particularity

requirement to the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act). A plaintiff “must state the time, place, and

specific content of the false representations as well as the identities of the parties to the

misrepresentation.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401

(9th Cir. 1986); see also Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“Averments of fraud must be accompanied by the who, what, when, where, and how of the

misconduct charged.”) “[A] plaintiff must set forth more than the neutral facts necessary to

identify the transaction. The plaintiff must set forth what is false or misleading about a

statement, and why it is false.” Vess, 317 F.3d at 1106 (internal quotations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff has not pled facts sufficient to maintain a fraud claim as required by

Rule 9(b) and as instructed by the Court’s April 23 Order. First, the Complaint does not set

forth the content of the alleged misrepresentations or the reasons the alleged omissions are

fraudulent. The Complaint asserts that Defendants’ purported violations of various federal

statutes are violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1), and are

therefore, per se violations of ACFA. The Complaint, however, does not explain how any

purported violations of those statutes are false statements or material omissions. Even so,

as stated later in this Order, each of Plaintiff’s claims based on federal statutes fails as a

matter of law (except for the Fair Housing Act claim, which Plaintiff does not contend has

any connection to ACFA liability). The Complaint also mentions a failure to “disclose [the]

disadvantageous cost or nature of the loan,” the “conceal[ment] [of] the identity of the true

lender,” “sham intermediary companies” and “kickbacks,” knowledge that “Plaintiff had

neither the income nor the assets to repay [the loan],” and “inflat[ion] of Plaintiff’s property

value by i) misrepresenting the condition of the property or ii) by comparing sales that are

not comparable and/or iii) comparing to values of properties being ‘flipped.’” These

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allegations, however, are too broad to explain how Defendants’ statements or omissions were

false or inherently misleading. It is unclear why these actions necessarily inflated Plaintiff’s

property value (and if so, to what extent); it also is unclear how these allegations related to

sham companies, kickbacks, or the entire alleged fraudulent scheme. The Complaint also

does not allege other critical surrounding facts, such as when and how such statements were

made, whether First National, GMAC, or another party made particular statements or

omissions, or how each alleged misconduct harmed Plaintiff. For example, Plaintiff does not

explain what the “disadvantageous” terms of the loan are, other than the fact that Plaintiff

had to pay certain principal and interest payments, or how Defendants concealed any terms

from Plaintiff. Similarly, while Plaintiff alleges Defendants concealed the lender’s true

identity, Plaintiff does not explain how this occurred other than to say (in another part of the

Complaint) that Defendants transferred the mortgage into a large market. Likewise, Plaintiff

alleges neither how Defendants created “sham intermediary companies” to receive kickbacks

nor how that affected Plaintiff. Finally, although Plaintiff contends Defendants

misrepresented the property’s condition and improperly determined the property’s value, the

Complaint does not state how or when that occurred.

Regarding conspiracy to commit fraud using MERS, Plaintiff does not make any

specific allegations regarding what MERS did that was fraudulent. Rather, the Complaint

discusses whether MERS qualifies as a beneficiary to the Deed of Trust and Defendants’

authority to foreclose without possessing the original promissory Note. These facts not only

are insufficient to show a conspiracy to commit fraud under Rule 9(b), but also these

allegations are incorrect. 

Plaintiff agreed to empower MERS to foreclose because the Deed of Trust designates

MERS as the beneficiary and authorizes MERS to take any action to enforce the loan,

including the right to foreclose and sell the property. (Dkt. # 39, Ex. 10) Faced with a similar

clause, In re Roberts held that “MERS was empowered to act on behalf of whoever was the

equitable owner of the rights in the Deed of Trust” because “the Deed of Trust itself makes

clear that MERS . . . may, if necessary, exercise all of the substantive rights of the . . . party

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who holds the beneficial ownership of the Deed of Trust.” 367 B.R. 677, 684 (Bankr. D.

Colo. 2007). Furthermore, Arizona law does not require parties to produce an original note

to perform non-judicial foreclosure. Mansour v. Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp., 618 F.

Supp.2d 1178, 1181 (D. Ariz. 2009).

Claim X: Civil Conspiracy

Plaintiff asserts a claim for “civil conspiracy” against all defendants, except Executive

Trustee Services. The Complaint alleges that Defendants agreed to engage in a Ponzi scheme

involving unregulated securities, undisclosed insurance, and overcollateralization agreements

to apply payments on the Plaintiff’s obligation Note to the obligations of others.

In Arizona, there is no independent tort of conspiracy. Hansen v. Stoll, 130 Ariz. 454,

460, 636 P.2d 1236, 1242 (Ct. App. 1981). “A civil conspiracy requires an underlying tort

which the alleged conspirators agreed to commit.” Baker ex rel. Hall Brake Supply, Inc. v.

Stewart Title & Trust of Phoenix, Inc., 197 Ariz. 535, 545, 5 P.3d 249, 259 (Ct. App. 2000).

Although the Complaint is unclear, it appears the underlying tort here is fraud. However, as

stated above, Plaintiff has not properly alleged fraud in compliance with Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 9(b). Plaintiff’s Response offers many explanations, but none are in the

Complaint. For this reason, the claim for civil conspiracy (to commit fraud) fails. 

Claims V and VI: Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) and Home Ownership and

Equity Protection Act (“HOEPA”)

Plaintiff asserts claims against First National and GMAC for various nondisclosures

in violation of TILA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1635, 1638, and for extending a mortgage to a consumer

unable to pay in violation of HOEPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602(aa), 1639. Plaintiff has failed to

state a claim under TILA or HOEPA.

Generally, only “creditors” are subject to TILA disclosure requirements. See, e.g., 15

U.S.C. § 1635(a) (“The creditor shall clearly and conspicuously disclose . . . the rights of the

obligor . . . . The creditor shall also provide . . . appropriate forms for the obligor to exercise

his right to rescind . . . .”); § 1638(a) (“[T]he creditor shall disclose . . . [t]he ‘finance charge’

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. . . .”); 12 C.F.R. § 226.15 (“[A] creditor shall deliver two copies of the notice of the right

to rescind.”). Similarly, HOEPA amended TILA, and is subject to the same requirement that

defendant be a “creditor.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1639(h); Cetto v. LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 518

F.3d 263, 271 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting that HOEPA amended TILA and affirming dismissal

because a mortgage broker was not a “creditor”).

Section 1602(f) defines a “creditor” as:

a person who both (1) regularly extends, whether in connection with loans,

sales of property or services, or otherwise, consumer credit which is payable

by agreement in more than four installments or for which the payment of a

finance charge is or may be required, and (2) is the person to whom the debt

arising from the consumer credit transaction is initially payable on the face of

the evidence of indebtedness or, if there is no such evidence of indebtedness,

by agreement.” 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f).

This requires both that the defendant regularly extend consumer credit and be the person to

whom the debt is initially payable on the face of the evidence or by agreement. Cetto, 518

F.3d at 269 (4th Cir. 2008). The statutory scheme also demonstrates that servicers are treated

differently from creditors because separate sections address how a servicer may be liable as

an assignee. See 15 U.S.C. § 1641(e)–(f).

Multiple courts have dismissed cases against servicers because they were not

creditors. See, e.g., Harris v. Option One Mortgage Corp., — F.R.D. —, 2009 WL 2168882

at *5 (D.S.C. July 17, 2009) (dismissing claim against servicer because “[t]here [was] no

allegation that Plaintiffs’ obligation under the loan was initially payable to [the servicer].”);

Mulato v. WMC Mortgage Corp., 2009 WL 3561536 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2009) (dismissing

claim against servicer because it was not a creditor and had never owned the loan); Boles v.

Merscorp, Inc., 2009 WL 734133 at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2009) (dismissing TILA claim

because the plaintiff alleged in its complaint that the defendant was a “servicer” and alleged

no independent facts to the contrary).

Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that GMAC is a “servicer.” In his TILA claim,

however, Plaintiff states a contradictory legal conclusion, “The transaction between Plaintiff

and Defendants was a ‘credit sale’ on which Defendants were ‘creditor’ and Plaintiff was

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‘consumer’ as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1602.” (Id.) Similarly, in his HOEPA claim, the

Complaint says only that “Defendants were ‘creditor[s].’” (Id. at 14.) These references to

“Defendants” fail to differentiate between First National and GMAC and to explain how

GMAC specifically is a creditor, despite Plaintiff’s more specific allegations to the contrary.

Plaintiff cites the HUD-1 and Settlement Instructions, which were attached as exhibits

to his Response; these documents say the lender is “First National . . . c/o GMAC.” These

documents were not included with or explicitly referred to in the Complaint, however, and

Plaintiff fails to explain why these documents should be incorporated into the Complaint. See

Marder, 450 F.3d at 448 (explaining what the court may consider in a motion to dismiss);

Branch, 14 F.3d at 454 (same). Even if the Court considered these documents, however, they

do not establish that GMAC was a creditor under TILA and HOEPA. To the contrary, to say

the lender is “First National . . . c/o GMAC” suggests First National is the lender and GMAC

is the servicer “caring” for First National’s loan.

Alternatively, Plaintiff’s Response suggests, but does not specifically argue, that

GMAC is liable as a creditor’s assignee. This argument also fails. A servicer may be liable

under TILA as an assignee if it is apparent on the face of the disclosure statement that the

servicer once owned the obligation. See 15 U.S.C. § 1641(a)(stating that an assignee isliable

“only if . . . the violation for which such action or proceeding is brought is apparent on the

face of the disclosure statement provided in connection with such transaction . . . and . . . the

assignment to the assignee was voluntary”); 15 U.S.C. § 1641(f) (“A servicer . . . shall not

be treated as an assignee of such obligation” for purposes of assignee liability “unless the

servicer is or was the owner of the obligation.”). Plaintiff, however, does not assert facts

showing assignee liability in theComplaint, or at least Plaintifffailsto highlight any relevant

facts in his Response. Even if he had done so, Plaintiff offers nothing “on the face of the

disclosure statement” to establish TILA liability. Nor does Plaintiff offer any specific facts

about how GMAC owned the obligation.

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6

 Defendants correctly assert that Plaintiff does not cite specific FHA sections, which

the April 23 Order required; however, the Complaint not only specifies the general sections

for the FHA, but also it refers to discrimination in a “real estate related transaction,” which

has a clearly-labeled corresponding section in the FHA entitled “Discrimination in residential

real estate-related transactions,” 42 U.S.C. § 3605. These are sufficient legal and factual

allegations to put Defendants on notice of the claim.

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Claim VII: Fair Housing Act of 1968 (“FHA”)

Plaintiff has properly stated a claim by asserting that First National and GMAC

violated the FHA by intentionally targeting him for predatory loans based on his Latino

heritage. The FHA prohibits “any person or other entity whose business includes engaging

in residential real-estate related transactions to discriminate against any person . . . in the

terms or conditions of such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap,

familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a). The Complaint cites “42 U.S.C. §

3601, et seq.” and alleges, among other things, that the “loan transaction subject to this action

is a ‘real estate related transaction’” and that “Defendants intentionally targeted Plaintiff

based on Plaintiff[‘s] race and/or national origin . . . making Plaintiff susceptible to deceptive

. . . lending practices, including, but not limited to violations alleged [elsewhere in the

Complaint].” (Dkt. # 39 at 16.)

Defendants first move for dismissal because Plaintiff did not specify sufficient facts

or law. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Defendants targeted Plaintiff

because of his race in order to get him to agree to predatory lending terms. Whether Plaintiff

can prove these allegations is an issue for summary judgment, not a motion to dismiss.6

 

Defendants also contend GMAC is not liable because it was not the originator on

Plaintiff’s loan. Defendants explain that because Plaintiff’s FHA claim is based on targeting

Plaintiff for discriminatory lending, and thus is based on events prior to execution of the

Note and Deed of Trust, GMAC cannot be liable if it was not the originator. Defendants’

factual assertion about its relative involvement at each stage is a factual determination for

summary judgment, however, not for a motion to dismiss. The Complaint need assert only

that GMAC engaged in residential real estate-related transactions and discriminated against

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7

 Claim XIII also lists TILA statutes and regulations, but those issues are addressed

earlier in this Order.

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Plaintiff in making the transaction. Plaintiff did so, and it is plausible that GMAC in the loan

at an early stage in some capacity.

Claim VIII: Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”)

In Claim VIII, Plaintiff asserts a RESPA, 12 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq., claim against First

National and GMAC.7 This includes a section 2604 claim for failure to give required

disclosures, a Section 2605(e) claim for failure to respond to Plaintiff’s qualified written

request, and a Section 2607(a) claim for acceptance of kickbacks and referral fees. (Dkt. #

39 at 17–18.)

Plaintiff’s Section 2604 claim fails because RESPA does not provide a private right

of action for disclosure violations. RESPA does not explicitly authorize a section 2604 right

of action. See 12 U.S.C. § 2614 (creating rights of action only for sections 2605, 2607, and

2608). Plaintiff also does not contend an implied right of action exists, and, even so, other

courts have found no such right. Collins v. FMHA-USDA, 105 F.3d 1366, 1367–68 (11th Cir.

1997) (finding no implied right of action for section 2604); Bloom v. Martin, 865 F. Supp.

1377, 1385 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (same).

Plaintiff’s Section 2607 claim also fails because Plaintiff has alleged no facts

supporting such a claim. The Complaint states only that “RESPA and Reg. X prohibit

kickbacks and referral fees under 12 U.S.C. § 2607 and 24 C.F.R. § 3500.14(b) respectively.”

(Dkt. # 39 at 18.) This statement is a legal conclusion; it does not specify who accepted

kickbacks, what those kickbacks were, or the circumstances surrounding the transaction.

Even after the Court’s April 23 Order explained the importance of alleging specific facts,

Plaintiff has failed to do so sufficiently to survive a motion to dismiss, and the Court need

not address Defendants’ other arguments regarding section 2607.

Plaintiff’s Section 2605 claim, however, survives the motion to dismiss. Section

2605(e) requires, in pertinent part, that “[i]f any servicer of a federally related mortgage loan

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8

 The Court considers this for the motion to dismiss because the Complaint refers to

the document, the document is central to Plaintiff’s RESPA claim, and neither party

questions its authenticity. See Marder, 450 F.3d at 448; Branch, 14 F.3d at 454.

9

 Claim XI also lists claims that should have been listed under Plaintiff’s claims for

RESPA, and this Order addresses those arguments in the applicable section.

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receives a qualified written request from the borrower (or an agent of the borrower) for

information relating to the servicing of such loan, the servicer shall provide a written

response” and “provide the borrower with a written explanation or clarification that includes

. . . information requested by the borrower . . . and . . . the name and telephone number of an

individual employed by, or the office or department of, the servicer who can provide

assistance to the borrower.” 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e). The Complaint asserts (1) GMAC is a

servicer subject to section 2605 requirements, (2) that Plaintiff sent a letter to GMAC on

August 27, 2008, (3) that the letter was a “qualified written request” under RESPA, (4) that

GMAC received the letter on September 2, 2008, (5) that Foreclosure Defense Group sent

another qualified written request to GMAC on November 3, 2008, and 6) that GMAC failed

to respond to these inquiries, including the “name [and] address of the owner of the

obligation.” (Dkt. # 39 at 19.) This is sufficient factual support to put GMAC on notice of

the claims against it. Although the Complaint does not list the contents of the “qualified

written requests” to demonstrate that the letters were actually qualified written requests,

Plaintiff submitted a copy of the August 27 letter, which is labeled “qualified written

request.”8

 (Dkt. # 47, Ex. 10.) Even absent that document, the Complaint identifies the

letters’ senders, recipients, and dates of dispatch sufficiently to raise a plausible claim for a

section 2605 violation.

Claim XI: Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”)

Plaintiff asserts an FDCPA claim against GMAC, but the claim fails.9 The applicable

sections of the FDCPA apply only to actions taken to collect a debt. See e.g., 15 U.S.C. §

1692(d)–(g); Mansour, 618 F. Supp.2d at 1182. Multiple courts in this Circuit have held that

non-judicial foreclosure is not the collection of a “debt” under the FDCPA. Mansour, 618

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10 Claim XII makes allegations relating to UDAP and the FTC; those arguments are

addressed in the applicable sections.

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F. Supp.2d at 1182 (“[N]on-judicial foreclosure is not the collection of a ‘debt’ . . . .”); Hulse

v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 195 F. Supp.2d 1188, 1204 (D. Or. 2002) (distinguishing foreclosure

of interest in property from efforts to collect funds from debtor). Here, Plaintiff does not

assert any legal authority showing that the nonjudicial foreclosure of the Deed of Trust in this

case is the collection of a debt. The Court thus grants the Motion on the FDCPA claim.

Claim XII: Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”)

Plaintiff has not asserted enough facts to properly allege that GMAC violated the

FCRA.10 The Complaint states that “Plaintiff disputed the completeness or accuracy of

information furnished by Defendants to a consumer reporting agency” and that “Defendants

have not reported the disputes to any or the entire consumer reporting agencies to which they

furnish or have furnished the information.” (Dkt. # 39 at 26.) The Complaint continues by

contending that “Defendants[’] illegal and negligent submittal of information to reporting

agencies has slander[ed] Plaintiff’s credit,” and that “[t]he acts and practices described above

constitute violations to 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(3).”

Plaintiff has merely restated the elements of a Section 1681s-2(a)(3) claim. Plaintiff

does not assert what information GMAC supplied that was incomplete or inaccurate, in what

way Plaintiff disputed any information, who the consumer reporting agencies are, or any

other surrounding facts. This is insufficient to put GMAC on notice of how it allegedly

violated FCRA.

D. Dismissal Is With Prejudice

As discussed further in section V, infra, dismissal is with prejudice. 

IV. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Join New Defendants and Motion for Leave to

Amend

Plaintiff moves for leave to join two parties, Rex E. Carpenter (“Carpenter”) and 402

NOW LLC (“402 Now”). Plaintiff alleges that, during this lawsuit’s pendency, Carpenter

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obtained a forcible detainer judgment against Plaintiff and that 402 Now LLC received the

property at the foreclosure sale. Because Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Join is necessary

linked to his Motion for Leave to Amend, the Court analyzes the Motions together.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend, however, is procedurally deficient. Local Rule 15.1(a)

provides that “[a] party who moves for leave to amend a pleading must attach a copy of the

proposed amended pleading as an exhibit to the motion, which shall indicate in what respect

it differs from the pleading which it amends, by bracketing or striking through the text to be

deleted and underlining the text to be added.” L. R. Civ. P. 15.1(a). Local Rule 15.1(b) also

requires that a party seeking amendment “must lodge with the Clerk of Court an original of

the proposed amended pleading.”Id. at R. 15.1(b). Here, Plaintiff failed to do both, and the

Court requires this pro se litigant to “follow the same rules of procedure that govern other

litigants.” See King, 814 F.2d at 567. Plaintiff must provide a text of the proposed

amendment so that the Court may evaluate whether the proposed amendment is proper.

In filing its Motion to Amend, however, Plaintiff also seeks leave to amend, yet again,

his existing claims. The Court will not allow amendment for any existing claims against

existing parties. All of the claims that the Court dismisses in this Order are dismissed with

prejudice. Plaintiff has already amended his Complaint twice, once with the Court’s

direction. See Allen v. City of Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 369, 373 (9th Cir. 1990) (denying leave

to amend where plaintiff previously amended and amendment would be futile); Ascon

Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The district court’s

discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously

amended the complaint.”). Allowing Plaintiff to do so again could also prove costly and

prejudicial to all parties and to the Court, especially given the extent of the briefing that has

already occurred. 

VI. Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions

Based on Plaintiff’s improperly-filed surreply, Defendants have moved for sanctions

of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred incident to asserting the Motion to Strike and

the Motion for Sanctions. (Dkt. # 61.) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c) states that if a

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Rule 11(b) violation has occurred, the Court “may impose an appropriate sanction on any .

. . party that violated [Rule 11(b),” and upon a motion for sanctions, the Court “may award

. . . reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred for the motion” (emphasis

added); see also Hudson v. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 836 F.2d 1156, 1163 (9th Cir. 1987)

(“The district court has wide discretion in determining the appropriate sanction for a Rule 11

violation.”).

Defendants do not cite which subsection of Rule 11(b) Plaintiff supposedly violated,

but Defendants do contend Plaintiff’s actions have “needlessly driven up the costs of this

litigation.” (Dkt. # 61 at 3.) It is mere speculation, however, to say that this pro se Plaintiff

filed the surreply “for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or

needlessly to increase the cost of litigation” in violation of Rule 11(b). Fed. R. Civ. P.

11(b)(1). It is equally plausible that Plaintiff merely misunderstood the Local Rules. 

More importantly, even if a Rule 11(b) violation occurred (which the Court need not

decide), monetary sanctions would be inappropriate because “[a] sanction imposed . . . must

be limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by

others.” Id. at 11(c)(4). “[N]onmonetary directives,” such as admonishment, may be

appropriate alternatives to monetary sanctions because “the basic principle governing the

choice of sanctions is that the least severe sanction adequate to serve the purpose should be

imposed.” Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 878 (5th Cir. 1988). Although

pro se litigants must follow the same rules as attorneys do, the Court is especially reluctant

to sanction pro se litigants if less drastic alternatives exist.

 Thus, the Court instructs Plaintiff to familiarize himself with both the Federal and

Local Rules of Civil Procedure. This includes, but is not limited to, understanding Local

Rules 7.2(b)–(d), which do not authorize filing surreplies, and following Local Rule 7.2(e),

which limits motions and responses to seventeen pages and limits reply briefs to eleven

pages. The Court will not hesitate to strike future filings that fail to comply with these rules,

nor will it hesitate to impose monetary sanctions in the future. 

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The Court, however, finds no reason why monetary sanctions are required against a

pro se plaintiff at this stage. Accordingly, to the extent Defendants have moved for monetary

sanctions, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider Set Aside

Foreclosure Proceeding and Void any Granting and Conveyance of Plaintiff’s Property (Dkt.

# 62) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s

“Response/Rebuttal to Defendants’ Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Second

Amended Complaint With Prejudice” (Dkt. # 61) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second

Amended Complaint With Prejudice (Dkt. # 45) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN

PART.

1. Regarding Claim I (Breach of Contract), the Motion is granted.

2. Regarding Claims II (Injunctive Relief), the Motion is granted to the extent

Plaintiff alleges this as a separate cause of action. This remedy may be

available for other underlying legal theories, however.

3. Regarding Claim III (Conspiracy to Commit Fraud Using the MERS System),

the Motion is granted.

4. Regarding Claim IV (Quiet Title), the Motion is granted to the extent Plaintiff

alleges this as a separate cause of action. This remedy may be available for

other underlying legal theories, however.

5. Regarding Claim V (TILA), the Motion is granted.

6. Regarding Claim VI (HOEPA), the Motion is granted.

7. Regarding Claim VII (FHA), the Motion is denied.

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11 This Amended Order clarifies that the Court only partially dismisses the RESPA

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8. Regarding Claim VIII (RESPA), the Motion is granted-in-part and denied-inpart.11

9. Regarding Claim IX (UDAP, ACFA, Fraud in the Factum and Fraud in the

Inducement), the Motion is granted.

10. Regarding Claim X (Civil Conspiracy), the Motion is granted.

11. Regarding Claim XI (FDCPA), the Motion is granted.

12. Regarding Claim XII (FCRA), the Motion is granted.

13. Regarding Claim XIII (Declaratory Relief), the Motion is granted to the extent

Plaintiff alleges this as a separate cause of action. This remedy may be

available for other underlying legal theories, however.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Join Necessary

and Indispensable Third Parties (Dkt. # 54) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s First Motion for Leave to Amend

Complaint (Dkt. # 57) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions (Dkt. # 61) is

DENIED.

DATED this 4th day of January, 2010.

Case 2:09-cv-00265-GMS Document 68 Filed 01/05/10 Page 25 of 25