Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00222/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00222-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Jason Murphy (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his application for supplemental security 

income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The matter is currently before the Court 

on the parties’ briefs, which were submitted, without oral argument, to Magistrate Judge Barbara A. 

McAuliffe. 

The Court finds the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to be supported by 

substantial evidence in the record as a whole and based upon proper legal standards. Accordingly, this 

Court affirms the agency’s determination to deny benefits.

///

///

JASON MURPHY,

 Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No.: 1:15-cv-00222-BAM

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S

SOCIAL SECURITY COMPLAINT

Case 1:15-cv-00222-BAM Document 20 Filed 09/02/16 Page 1 of 16
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

On October 17, 2012, Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental security income. AR 152-

58.

1

 Plaintiff alleged that he became disabled on January 25, 2012, due to a heart attack, five stents in 

his heart and asthma. AR 168-79. Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and on reconsideration. 

AR 70-74, 78-82. Subsequently, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge 

(“ALJ”). ALJ Trevor Skarda held a hearing on October 22, 2013, and issued an order denying 

benefits on November 14, 2013. AR 7-17, 22-45. Plaintiff sought review of the ALJ’s decision, 

which the Appeals Council denied, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. AR

1- 3, 138, 140. This appeal followed.

Hearing Testimony

The ALJ held a hearing on October 22, 2013, in Stockton, California. AR 22-45. Plaintiff 

appeared and testified. He was represented by attorney Negin Mohajeri. AR 24, 129. Impartial 

Vocational Expert (“VE”) Lorian Ink Hyatt also testified. AR 24.

In response to questioning from his counsel, Plaintiff testified that he currently builds and 

repairs bicycles and then sells them on Craigslist. He is not making more than $1,000 per month or 

working 40 hours per week. He estimated working three hours a month and selling two or three bikes 

a month. He is not constantly working to find bikes to fix. AR 28-30. 

Plaintiff reported that he last had a full-time position in 2005 as a security guard. He did not 

work from 2005 to January 2012 because of a family situation involving his nephew, who was born 

premature and drug addicted. Plaintiff was taking care of the baby. AR 31-32. Since his heart attack 

in January 2012, Plaintiff believed that his constant fatigue would keep him from working, and he has 

a hard time concentrating. AR 32-33.

Plaintiff sees his cardiologist, Dr. Do, every three to four months. In August 2012, Plaintiff’s 

doctor thought that his medications were making him tired, so he changed the medications. Plaintiff 

did not notice any improvement in his energy level or fatigue even with the change in medication. 

 

1 References to the Administrative Record will be designated as “AR,” followed by the appropriate page number.

Case 1:15-cv-00222-BAM Document 20 Filed 09/02/16 Page 2 of 16
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff last saw his doctor in April before the hearing and reported that nothing had changed. AR 33-

34. 

When questioned about passing out, Plaintiff testified that he had an episode about three and a 

half months before the hearing. Plaintiff described dizziness, light-headedness and hot and cold 

flashes. He did not know if he passed out. AR 34-35.

When asked about his daily activities, Plaintiff testified that he watches TV and tries to do 

things outside, like yard work. Plaintiff also works on bikes. Some days he is more fatigued than 

others, and he naps or sleeps between three and six hours a day. AR 35-36. 

When asked about his physical condition, Plaintiff testified that he suffers from asthma, but 

“[f]or the most part it’s okay.” AR 37. Plaintiff has days that he wheezes a lot mainly due to dust in 

the air and allergies. Plaintiff also admitted to smoking between four or five cigarettes a day. Both of 

his doctors told him that he needs to quit. AR 37-38. 

When asked about his mental condition, Plaintiff testified that he was having issues with his 

dad. He recently started seeing a counselor because his emotions “were running a little weird.” AR 

38. Plaintiff explained that his emotions included lack of caring and being depressed about having a 

lack of energy. AR 38. 

In response to questioning by the ALJ, Plaintiff testified that he does not have a driver’s 

license and has not driven in the last two years. He sometimes cooks, but does not grocery shop very 

often. He will put dishes in the dishwasher, but will not do laundry very often. His father’s girlfriend 

does most of the cleaning. Plaintiff helps with taking care of his nephew. Whenever his nephew is 

not in school, Plaintiff is outside watching him play with his friends. AR 39-40.

Plaintiff reported that he has never had any problems with drugs or alcohol. He also does not 

have any new side effects from his medications. He just has fatigue and a constant lack of energy. He 

does not take any antidepressant medication. AR 40. 

Following Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ elicited testimony from the vocational expert (“VE”)

Lorian Hyatt. AR 41. The VE testified that Plaintiff’s past work was classified as security guard. AR 

42. The ALJ also asked the VE hypothetical questions. For the first hypothetical, the ALJ asked the 

VE to contemplate a person of Plaintiff’s age education and work experience limited to light work. 

Case 1:15-cv-00222-BAM Document 20 Filed 09/02/16 Page 3 of 16
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

This individual must avoid concentrated exposure to pulmonary irritants, such as fumes, odors, dusts, 

gases and poorly ventilated areas. The VE testified that this person could perform Plaintiff’s past 

work as a security guard. AR 42.

For the second hypothetical, the ALJ asked the VE to assume the person was limited to 

sedentary work, may never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds and must avoid concentrated exposure to 

pulmonary irritants and concentrated exposure to operation or control of dangerous moving machinery 

and unprotected heights. The VE testified that this person could not perform Plaintiff’s past work, but 

there would be other jobs for this person, such as interviewer and order clerk. AR 42-43. If this 

person also was limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks, this would not change the VE’s response. 

If this person were limited to never lifting ten pounds, then there would be no work this person could 

perform. If this person could sit, stand, and walk less than eight hours in an eight-hour day, this would 

preclude all work. If this person were absent more than two times per month on an ongoing basis, this 

would preclude all work as well. AR 43. 

In response to questioning from Plaintiff’s counsel, the VE testified that if a person had to take 

up to 15 minute break every two hours, it would preclude all work. The VE confirmed that three 

breaks are typically permitted by employers, but any more than that would not be acceptable. AR 44. 

Medical Record

The entire medical record was reviewed by the Court. AR 227-418. The relevant medical

evidence, summarized here, will be referenced below as necessary to this Court’s decision. 

On January 25, 2012, Plaintiff presented to the hospital with a myocardial infarction. Plaintiff 

received five drug-eluting stents and was discharged on January 28, 2012. AR 227-28. 

Plaintiff received follow-up treatment with Dr. Peter Gaines at the Paradise Medical Office in 

February, March, May and December 2012. AR 268-81, 297-306. 

On March 7, 2012, Plaintiff presented to Dr. Dat Do at Valley Heart Associates for a posthospital follow-up visit. Since his hospital discharge, Plaintiff was noted to be doing well without 

chest pain or shortness of breath. Plaintiff was compliant with medication, and was noted to be active, 

performing hard labored work regularly. Plaintiff was encouraged to exercise daily for at least 30 

minutes. Dr. Do discussed the importance of tobacco cessation. AR 263-65.

Case 1:15-cv-00222-BAM Document 20 Filed 09/02/16 Page 4 of 16
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On August 30, 2012, Plaintiff sought follow-up treatment with Dr. Do. Although Plaintiff had 

been stable since the last office visit, and he denied having chest pain, Plaintiff complained of 

shortness of breath with walking 2-3 blocks and feeling easily fatigued. Plaintiff was noted to be 

active, but not exercising regularly. He still smoked about 5 cigarettes per day. Dr. Do suspected that 

Plaintiff’s fatigue might be due to medication, and switched him from metoprolol to a selective betablocker. Dr. Do also noted that since his myocardial infarction, Plaintiff had not been feeling well 

enough to perform hard labored jobs. Dr. Do thought it was reasonable for Plaintiff to file for 

disability. Dr. Do again encouraged Plaintiff to exercise daily and discussed the importance of 

tobacco cessation. AR 287-89.

On October 29, 2012, Dr. Do completed a Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire form. 

Dr. Do diagnosed Plaintiff with coronary artery disease with a fair prognosis. Plaintiff’s symptoms 

included shortness of breath with walking 2-3 blocks and fatigue from taking heart medication. Dr. 

Do indicated that Plaintiff symptoms were severe enough to interfere frequently with the attention and 

concentration required to perform simple work-related tasks. Plaintiff was taking metoprolol, which 

could cause fatigue and dizziness. Dr. Do opined that Plaintiff would need to recline or lie down 

during a hypothetical 8-hour workday in excess of the typical 15-minute break in the morning, the 30-

60 minute lunch, and the typical 15-minute break in the afternoon. Dr. Do further opined that Plaintiff 

could walk less than one block without rest or significant pain. Plaintiff could sit 30 minutes at one 

time and stand/walk 30 minutes at one time. He could sit four hours in an 8-hour day and stand/walk 

two hours in an 8-hour day. Plaintiff would need a job that permitted shifting positions at will. He 

also would need to take unscheduled breaks every two hours for 15 minutes each. Dr. Do believed 

Plaintiff could lift and carry less than 10 pounds occasionally and could never lift 10, 20 or 50 pounds. 

Dr. Do estimated that Plaintiff likely would be absent from work more than four times a month. AR 

313-14. 

On December 5, 2012, Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital due to a syncopal episode 

preceded by dizziness and hot flashes. The most likely cause of his syncopal episode was vasovagal. 

Plaintiff underwent a psych consult after expressing increasing anxiety and stress frustration with his 

relationship with his father and multiple stressors at home. AR 338-90. Anika Godhwani, D.O., 

Case 1:15-cv-00222-BAM Document 20 Filed 09/02/16 Page 5 of 16
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

diagnosed Plaintiff with major depressive disorder, which likely began after his myocardial infarction. 

Plaintiff was noted to have irritable mood and excessive sleepiness. It was recommended that Plaintiff 

try exercises and Cymbalta. If his symptoms did not improve after a month or two, it was 

recommended that Risperdal be added, and that his metoprolol heart medication be changed to help 

with fatigue. Additionally, it was recommended that the doctor speak with Plaintiff’s father to explain 

that Plaintiff had limitations after his heart attack. Dr. Godhwani also assessed psychological disorder 

secondary to drug side effect plus/minus decreased cardiac output. AR 344-46. Plaintiff was 

discharged from the hospital on December 6, 2012. AR 338-90. 

On December 20, 2012, Plaintiff sought follow-up treatment with Dr. Do. Plaintiff was active, 

but did not exercise regularly, and continued to smoke a few cigarettes a day. Dr. Do again 

encouraged Plaintiff to exercise daily. He also discussed the importance of tobacco cessation. AR 

309-11.

On April 3, 2013, Plaintiff sought follow-up treatment with Dr. Do. Plaintiff had been stable 

in the last 3-4 months, but his shortness of breath had worsened and he was having symptoms with 

walking a block. Plaintiff had not been active due to shortness of breath. He also had not quit 

tobacco. Plaintiff had class II-III heart failure symptoms. Plaintiff also reported feeling depressed and 

wanted to see a psychologist. Dr. Do diagnosed Plaintiff with coronary artery disease, hyperlipidemia, 

COPD with current tobacco abuse and depression. Dr. Do noted that because of having dyspnea with 

minimal exertion, Plaintiff had not been able to find a job that was suitable for him. Dr. Do supported 

Plaintiff’s decision to apply for disability. AR 321-24.

On July 1, 2013, Dr. Do completed a Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire form. Dr. 

Do diagnosed Plaintiff with coronary artery disease status post myocardial infarction with a fair 

prognosis. Plaintiff’s symptoms included shortness of breath with walking a block. Dr. Do indicated 

that Plaintiff’s symptoms were severe enough to interfere frequently with the attention and 

concentration required to perform simple work-related tasks. Plaintiff’s medications caused fatigue 

and dizziness. Dr. Do opined that Plaintiff would need to recline or lie down during a hypothetical 8-

hour workday in excess of the typical 15-minute break in the morning, the 30-60 minute lunch, and the 

typical 15-minute break in the afternoon. Dr. Do further opined that Plaintiff could walk one block 

Case 1:15-cv-00222-BAM Document 20 Filed 09/02/16 Page 6 of 16
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

without rest or significant pain. Plaintiff could sit 30 minutes at one time and stand/walk 15 minutes 

at one time. He could sit four hours in an 8-hour day and stand/walk two hours in an 8-hour day. 

Plaintiff would need a job that permitted shifting positions at will. He also would need to take 

unscheduled breaks every 2 hours for 10 minutes each. Dr. Do believed Plaintiff could lift and carry 

less than 10 pounds occasionally and could never lift 10, 20 or 50 pounds. Dr. Do estimated that 

Plaintiff likely would be absent from work more than four times a month. Dr. Do concluded that 

Plaintiff was not physically capable of working an 8-hour day, 5 days a week on a sustained basis. AR 

401-02. 

On August 20, 2013, Dr. Gaines noted that Plaintiff had mild depression. AR 409. 

On September 23, 2013, Plaintiff met with David Sandoval, LCSW, following a referral from 

Dr. Gaines. Plaintiff reported no ambition, no energy, stress, anger and problems sleeping. Plaintiff 

also indicated that he helped take care of his nephew. The treatment plan was to get more history. AR 

404. 

The ALJ’s Decision

Using the Social Security Administration’s five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ 

determined that Plaintiff did not meet the disability standard. AR 7-17. More particularly, the ALJ 

found that Plaintiff had not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since October 16, 2012, his 

application date. AR 12. Further, the ALJ identified asthma and heart attack/heart disease as severe 

impairments. AR 12. Nonetheless, the ALJ determined that the severity of Plaintiff’s impairments 

did not meet or equal any of the listed impairments. AR 12-13. Based on his review of the entire 

record, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform 

sedentary work, but could never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, should avoid concentrated exposure 

to pulmonary irritants and should avoid concentrated exposure to hazards, such as operational control 

of dangerous moving machinery and unprotected heights. AR 13-16. The ALJ found that Plaintiff 

could not perform his past relevant work, but there were other jobs existing in significant numbers in 

the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. AR 16-17. The ALJ therefore concluded that 

Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. AR 17. 

///

Case 1:15-cv-00222-BAM Document 20 Filed 09/02/16 Page 7 of 16
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision to 

deny benefits under the Act. In reviewing findings of fact with respect to such determinations, this 

Court must determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence. 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla,” Richardson v. Perales, 

402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 

1119, n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975). It is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. The record as a whole must be 

considered, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the 

Commissioner’s conclusion. Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). In weighing the 

evidence and making findings, the Commissioner must apply the proper legal standards. E.g., 

Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). This Court must uphold the Commissioner’s 

determination that the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards, 

and if the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. See Sanchez v. Sec’y of 

Health and Human Servs., 812 F.2d 509, 510 (9th Cir. 1987).

REVIEW

In order to qualify for benefits, a claimant must establish that he or she is unable to engage in 

substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which has 

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 

1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant must show that he or she has a physical or mental impairment of such 

severity that he or she is not only unable to do his or her previous work, but cannot, considering his or 

her age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which 

exists in the national economy. Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th Cir. 1989). The 

burden is on the claimant to establish disability. Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 

1990).

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by failing to properly analyze Plaintiff’s mental 

impairments and by according inadequate weight to the opinion of Dr. Do, Plaintiff’s treating 

Case 1:15-cv-00222-BAM Document 20 Filed 09/02/16 Page 8 of 16
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

cardiologist. Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ’s credibility determination and his step five finding 

are not supported by substantial evidence. 

DISCUSSION2

A. Step Two

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ failed to properly analyze Plaintiff’s mental impairments at 

step two of the sequential evaluation. (Doc. 16 at p. 14). 

At step two, the ALJ determines whether a claimant has a medically severe impairment or 

combination of impairments. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 1996). The “steptwo inquiry is a de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims.” Id. at 1290; see also 

Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2007) (step-two determination is “merely a threshold 

determination of whether the claimant is able to perform his past work;” finding a claimant severe at 

step two “only raises a prima facie case of a disability”). However, an impairment may be found not 

severe “only if the evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has no more than a minimal effect on 

an individual[’]s ability to work.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Here, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s mental impairment non-severe, reasoning as follows: 

The record also mentions complaints of depression. The claimant was treated at Paradise 

Medical Office Behavioral Health Department on September 26, 2013, for an “initial” 

consultation. The claimant reported that he has no energy and was emotionally beat. He 

stated that housework takes him longer than [in] the past. He reported that he lived with 

his father and helped care for his nephew. He reported that he lacks ambition, energy and 

is stressed. The claimant reported difficulty sleeping. He reports problems sleeping. He 

also complained of getting mad at times. The examiner noted that more information 

would be needed from the claimant. The number of recommended intervals was noted as 

“to be determined” [Exhibit 14F]. Although the claimant is alleging depression, the 

record does not contain significant objective evidence to support a severe impairment. In 

fact, the claimant only recently sought mental care in September 2013. The record does 

not contain documentation of the claimant’s symptoms, corroboration of his allegations 

by a medically acceptable source, or a report regarding severity by a diagnosing source. 

For these reasons, the undersigned finds that the claimants’ depression is non-severe. 

AR 12. 

 

2

The parties are advised that this Court has carefully reviewed and considered all of the briefs, including 

arguments, points and authorities, declarations, and/or exhibits. Any omission of a reference to any specific argument or 

brief is not to be construed that the Court did not consider the argument or brief.

Case 1:15-cv-00222-BAM Document 20 Filed 09/02/16 Page 9 of 16
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff primarily argues that that the ALJ failed to properly analyze Plaintiff’s mental 

impairment through the psychiatric review technique. At step two of the sequential evaluation, the 

ALJ is required to determine whether an applicant has a medically determinable mental impairment, 

rate the degree of functional limitation for four functional areas, determine the severity of the mental 

impairment (in part based on the degree of functional limitation), and then, if the impairment is severe, 

proceed to step three of the disability analysis to determine if the impairment meets or equals a 

specific listed mental disorder. Keyser v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 

2011). In this instance, the ALJ’s decision did not include explicit application of the psychiatric 

review technique. Rather, the ALJ considered the lack of medical source statements or medical 

records regarding the severity of Plaintiff’s condition to determine that his depression was non-severe. 

AR 12. This was not reversible error. 

According to the record, Plaintiff was diagnosed with a major depressive disorder and 

prescribed medications by Anika Godhwani, D.O., (and Grace C. Nadolny, M.D.) on December 5, 

2012. However, Dr. Godhwani did not identify any work-related functional limitations resulting from 

Plaintiff’s depression, and attributed any sleepiness or fatigue to Plaintiff’s heart-related medications.

AR 344-46. Similarly, Dr. Do diagnosed Plaintiff with depression on April 3, 2013, but the treatment

records did not identify any allegations or evidence of functional limitations attributable to Plaintiff’s 

depression. AR 321-24. On August 20, 2013, Dr. Gaines also noted that Plaintiff had mild 

depression, but did not ascribe any functional limitations. AR 409. 

Although Plaintiff was diagnosed with depression, this alone is insufficient to warrant a finding 

of a severe impairment at step two. See Hinkle v. Apfel, 132 F.3d 1349, 1352 (10th Cir.1997) (citing 

Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 153 (1987)) (“[T]he claimant must show more than the mere 

presence of a condition or ailment.”); see also Holaday v. Colvin, No. 2:14-cv-1870-KJN, 2016 WL 

880971, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2016) (“The mere fact that plaintiff was diagnosed with such 

conditions is, by itself, insufficient to demonstrate that they were ‘severe’ for step two purposes.”); 

Mahan v. Colvin, 2014 WL 1878915, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 2014) (“[A] mere diagnosis does not 

establish a severe impairment.”). Here, there is no evidence that Plaintiff’s depression had any impact 

on his ability to work. See Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) (an impairment is not 

Case 1:15-cv-00222-BAM Document 20 Filed 09/02/16 Page 10 of 16
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

severe if it is merely a slight abnormality that has no more than a minimal effect on one’s ability to do 

basic work activities). Therefore, the ALJ properly determined that Plaintiff’s depression did not 

represent a severe impairment. 

Even if the ALJ did err in evaluating Plaintiff’s depression, the Court finds that any such error 

is harmless because the medical records are devoid of any evidence that Plaintiff’s depression imposed 

any functional work limitations. See Sanchez v. Colvin, 2016 WL 3219861, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Jun. 8, 

2016) (given lack of any medical source statements or medical records suggesting that Plaintiff had

any work-related mental functional limitations, ALJ’s failure to find severe mental impairment 

harmless); Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007) (reversible error occurs only when a 

severe impairment excluded at step two causes functional limitations not accounted for in the RFC.); 

see also Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 2015) (“ALJ errors in social security cases are 

harmless if they are inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination”); Stout v. Comm’r, 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006) (error harmless where mistake was nonprejudicial to the claimant or irrelevant to the ALJ’s ultimate disability conclusion). 

B. Treating Physician Opinion 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ had no rational basis for rejecting the opinion of his treating 

physician, Dr. Dat Do. The Commissioner counters that the ALJ gave sufficient reasons for rejecting 

Dr. Do’s opinion, arguing that the Court should affirm the ALJ’s decision to give significant weight to 

the opinions of the non-examining state agency physicians and to reject the opinion of Plaintiff’s 

treating physician. (Doc. 18 at pp. 9-10). 

Cases in this circuit distinguish among the opinions of three types of physicians: (1) those who 

treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant 

(examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant (nonexamining 

physicians). Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Generally, a treating physician’s 

opinion should be accorded more weight than opinions of doctors who did not treat the claimant, and 

an examining physician’s opinion is entitled to greater weight than a non-examining physician’s 

opinion. Id. Where a treating physician’s opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, the 

Commissioner must provide “clear and convincing” reasons for rejecting the treating physician’s 

Case 1:15-cv-00222-BAM Document 20 Filed 09/02/16 Page 11 of 16
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ultimate conclusions. Id. If the treating doctor’s medical opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the 

Commissioner must provide “specific and legitimate” reasons for rejecting that medical opinion, and 

those reasons must be supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id. at 830–31. The ALJ can 

meet this burden by setting forth a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical 

evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 

1041 (9th Cir. 2008). 

In assigning weight to the opinions of the state agency physicians and Dr. Do, the ALJ 

reasoned as follows:

The undersigned has considered the above State agency opinions finding that they are 

somewhat supportive of the evidence. However, the undersigned gives the claimant the 

benefit of doubt in restricting him to a sedentary position. Dr. Do’s opinion is highly 

conservative and not supported by his own treatment notes. Dr. Do repeatedly notes 

“[n]o symptoms concerning for cerebral vascular accident” and “stable.” Although the 

claimant complains of fatigue, he also reports good activities of daily living.

AR 15-16. An ALJ may rely on the medical opinion of a non-treating doctor instead of the contrary 

opinion of a treating doctor if he provides “specific and legitimate” reasons supported by substantial 

evidence in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830.

Here, the ALJ proffered specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence to 

discount Dr. Do’s opinion. First, the ALJ rejected Dr. Do’s conservative opinion of Plaintiff’s 

functional limitations because such limitations were not supported by Dr. Do’s treatment notes. An 

ALJ may properly discount a treating physician’s opinion that is not supported by the medical record, 

including his own treatment notes. Valentine v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 692-93 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (contradiction between treating physician’s opinion and his treatment notes constitutes 

specific and legitimate reason for rejecting treating physician’s opinion); Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that “an ALJ may discredit treating 

physicians’ opinions that are conclusory, brief, and unsupported by the record as a whole, ... or by 

objective medical findings”); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The ALJ need 

not accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, 

conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings.”). As indicated by the ALJ, Dr. Do 

repeatedly noted that Plaintiff did not have symptoms for a “cerebral vascular accident” and that 

Case 1:15-cv-00222-BAM Document 20 Filed 09/02/16 Page 12 of 16
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff was “stable.” AR 263-64 (“doing well,” “No symptoms concerning for cerebral vascular 

accident.”); 287-89 (“stable,” “No symptoms concerning for cerebral vascular accident.”); 321-23 

(“stable,” “No symptoms concerning for cerebral vascular accident.”). Dr. Do’s examination notes 

included no other abnormal findings on examination. Although Dr. Do documented medicationinduced fatigue on August 30, 2012, Dr. Do changed Plaintiff’s medication. Following the change, 

Dr. Do did not identify symptoms of fatigue in his treatment notes. AR 287-89.

Second, the ALJ discounted Dr. Do’s opinion regarding Plaintiff’s functional limitations 

because they conflicted with Plaintiff’s reported activities of daily living. An ALJ properly may 

consider conflicts between a treating physician’s opinion and a claimant’s daily activities. See

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 754 (9th Cir. 1989) (conflicts between treating physician’s 

opinion and claimant’s own testimony properly considered by ALJ in rejecting treating physician’s 

opinion); Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 601-02 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding 

rejection of physician’s conclusion that claimant suffered from marked limitations in part on basis that 

claimant’s reported activities of daily living contradicted that conclusion). In this instance, the ALJ 

considered not only Plaintiff’s report that he completes general household chores, but also that he 

helps care for a minor child, builds and repairs bicycles and sells things on the internet to make 

money. AR 15. 

C. Credibility

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s credibility determination is not supported by substantial 

evidence. In deciding whether to admit a claimant’s subjective complaints, the ALJ must engage in a 

two-step analysis. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1196. First, the claimant must produce objective medical 

evidence of his impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce some degree of the symptom 

or pain alleged. Id. If the claimant satisfies the first step and there is no evidence of malingering, the 

ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of his symptoms only if he makes 

specific findings and provides clear and convincing reasons for doing so. Id. The ALJ must “state 

which testimony is not credible and what evidence suggests the complaints are not credible.” Mersman 

v. Halter, 161 F.Supp.2d 1078, 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (“The lack of specific, clear, and convincing 

reasons why Plaintiff’s testimony is not credible renders it impossible for [the] Court to determine 

Case 1:15-cv-00222-BAM Document 20 Filed 09/02/16 Page 13 of 16
14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

whether the ALJ’s conclusion is supported by substantial evidence.”). Factors an ALJ may consider 

include: (1) the applicant’s reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements or other 

inconsistent testimony; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to 

follow a prescribed course of treatment; and (3) the applicant’s daily activities. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 

1284.

At the first step of the analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable 

impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms.” AR 14. At the second 

step, however, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s statements about the intensity, persistence and limiting 

effects of his symptoms were not entirely credible. In so doing, the ALJ provided clear and 

convincing reasons for finding Plaintiff not fully credible. AR 14-15. 

Initially, the ALJ properly determined that the objective medical evidence did not support 

Plaintiff’s allegations. An ALJ is entitled to consider whether there is a lack of medical evidence to 

corroborate a claimant’s alleged symptoms so long as it is not the only reason for discounting a 

claimant’s credibility. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680–81 (9th Cir. 2005); Batson, 359 F.3d at 

1196-97 (ALJ properly relied on objective medical evidence and medical opinions in determining 

credibility). As discussed above, the ALJ considered Dr. Do’s treatment notes indicating Plaintiff had 

no symptoms concerning for a cerebral vascular accident and was stable. AR 15-16. The ALJ also 

considered the absence of record evidence regarding limitations from his depression. AR 12. 

Additionally, the ALJ properly considered that treatment for Plaintiff’s allegedly disabling 

impairment had been essentially routine and conservative in nature. AR 15. Evidence of conservative 

treatment is sufficient to discount a claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of an impairment. See 

Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008) (response to conservative treatment

undermined claimant’s reports regarding disabling nature of pain); Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750-

51 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir.

2006) (impairments that are effectively controlled with medication are not disabling). Here, the record 

reflects that following his receipt of stents, Plaintiff’s heart condition was treated with medication, and 

he was encouraged to exercise and to stop smoking. AR 263-65, 287-89, 309-11, 321-23.

Case 1:15-cv-00222-BAM Document 20 Filed 09/02/16 Page 14 of 16
15

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The ALJ also properly considered Plaintiff’s activities of daily living to be inconsistent with 

his alleged limitations. An ALJ’s credibility finding may consider a claimant’s daily activities which 

are inconsistent with allegations of disability. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1040 (9th Cir. 

2007). In this instance, the ALJ considered not only Plaintiff’s report that he completed general 

household chores, such as vacuuming, mopping and cleaning the bathrooms, but also that Plaintiff 

helped care for a minor child, built and repaired bicycles, sold items on the internet, and walked as 

often as he could. AR 15, 28-30, 35-36, 39-40, 182. The ALJ reasonably found that these activities 

were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s allegations of total disability. See Stubbs–Danielson v. Astrue, 539 

F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008) (claimant's “normal activities of daily living, including cooking, 

house cleaning, doing laundry, and helping her husband in managing finances” was sufficient 

explanation for rejecting claimant’s credibility); Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959 (claimant’s ability to 

perform various household chores such as cooking, laundry, washing dishes and shopping, among 

other factors, bolstered “the ALJ's negative conclusions about her veracity).

Further, the ALJ properly considered that Plaintiff’s work history showed that he worked “only 

sporadically prior to the alleged disability onset date.” AR 15. An ALJ may properly consider a 

claimant’s work history in making a negative credibility determination. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959 

(affirming a credibility finding based in part on the fact that the claimant’s “work history was spotty, 

at best, with years of unemployment between jobs, even before she claimed disability in June of 

1993”); Williams v. Colvin, No. 1:14-cv-0366-BAM, 2015 WL 5546920, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 

2015). Plaintiff testified that he had not worked since 2005, and left his job as a security guard in 

order to help raise his nephew. AR 31. The ALJ was not precluded from considering the fact that 

Plaintiff was unemployed for reasons other than his disability. See Bruton v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 

824, 828 (9th Cir. 2001) (ALJ properly found claimant’s alleged disability not credible based in part 

on the fact that the claimant left work for economic rather than medical reasons).

Plaintiff correctly notes that the ALJ’s credibility determination appears to include statements 

cut and pasted from another decision regarding use of extremities. (Doc. 16 at p. 21; AR 15). 

However, this error is not sufficient to undermine the remainder of the ALJ’s credibility 

Case 1:15-cv-00222-BAM Document 20 Filed 09/02/16 Page 15 of 16
16

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

determination, which is based on proper reasons supported by substantial evidence. Batson, 359 F.3d

at 1197 (upholding ALJ’s credibility determination even though one reason may have been in error).

D. Step Five

As a final matter, Plaintiff argues that “due to the ALJ’s error at Step 2, his failure to properly 

incorporate Dr. Do’s opinion into the hypothetical question, and his error in determining Plaintiff’s 

credibility as described above, the hypothetical question relied upon was necessarily incomplete.” 

Doc. 16 at p. 22. It is unnecessary to reach this argument because the Court does not find that the ALJ 

committed reversible error at step two, in the credibility determination, or in evaluating Dr. Do’s 

opinion.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial 

evidence in the record as a whole and is based on proper legal standards. Accordingly, this Court 

DENIES Plaintiff’s appeal from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. 

The Clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, and against Plaintiff Jason Murphy. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 1, 2016 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:15-cv-00222-BAM Document 20 Filed 09/02/16 Page 16 of 16