Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00510/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00510-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Algene Louis Brown, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Laura Escapule, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-00510-PHX-DJH (JZB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 TO THE HONORABLE DIANE J. HUMETEWA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE: 

 Petitioner Algene Louis Brown has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) 

I. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION 

Petitioner’s post-conviction proceedings concluded on May 21, 2007. The statute 

of limitations on Petitioner’s habeas claims began to run on May 22, 2007, and expired 

on May 22, 2008. Petitioner’s second, successive PCR petition does not merit additional 

tolling. The instant Petition was filed on March 20, 2015. No equitable tolling is merited 

because Petitioner cannot justify delays after 2008. Insufficient evidence is presented to 

merit an actual innocence exception under Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). For the 

reasons that follow, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s claims are untimely. Therefore, 

the Court will recommend that the Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

 

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II. BACKGROUND

 Petitioner was indicted by the State of Arizona in two separate cases, CR 

2002−080581 and CR 2004−036553. Petitioner’s cases proceeded to separate jury trials, 

where he was found guilty in both cases. On March 4, 2005, the trial court sentenced 

Petitioner in both cases. 

a. Facts of CR 2002-080581 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals found the following facts as true:1

 Police executed a search warrant on a residence in which Defendant 

lived with his family, including four children. In the course of the search, police found a laboratory for manufacturing methamphetamine in the garage. While methamphetamine was not being manufactured at the time of the search, some of the equipment tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine. Chemicals used and/or produced in the manufacture of methamphetamine were found in the garage, inside the residence, and in a vehicle parked at the residence. Documents which showed that Defendant 

had attempted to purchase forty kilograms of chemicals used in the 

manufacture of methamphetamine were also found in the vehicle. More 

documents regarding methods to manufacture methamphetamine were found in the residence, including “step-by-step” instructions. Paraphernalia used for smoking methamphetamine was found in the residence, as was 

packaging material that contained methamphetamine residue. 

... 

After a six-day jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of manufacture of 

dangerous drugs, possession of dangerous drugs, and four counts of child abuse. He was sentenced to the presumptive term of imprisonment on each count, with all sentences to be served concurrently. Defendant does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. 

(Doc. 8-1, Ex. G, at 43-45.)2

 

b. Facts of CR 2002-036553

The Arizona Court of Appeals found the following facts as true: 

In January 2004, an undercover police officer went to Defendant’s 

1

 The Arizona Court of Appeals’ recitation of the facts is presumed correct. See 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), (e)(1); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 763 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting argument that statement of facts in state appellate court’s opinion should not be afforded the presumption of correctness). 

2

 Petitioner cannot seek habeas relief in CR 2002-080581 because he is no longer in custody in that case. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Petitioner’s five-year sentence in that case expired at least six years ago. (Doc. 8-1, Ex. F, at 36.) The Court includes the 

information related to this case because Petitioner refers to this case in Ground One. 

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apartment to purchase methamphetamine. Defendant sold the officer an 

eighth of an ounce of methamphetamine. 

 A couple of weeks later, the officer gave Defendant $200 to purchase red phosphorus, a key ingredient in the manufacturing of methamphetamine. Defendant told the officer that he would provide her with methamphetamine by the weekend. 

 A week later, the sheriff’s department conducted surveillance of 

Defendant’s apartment. Through the window, officers observed two 

children on a couch, watching television. Defendant opened the door to 

leave the apartment. One of the officers detected an odor related to the 

manufacturing of methamphetamine. The officer then entered the 

apartment, and removed the children from the apartment. Inside the locked 

bedroom, the officer found a heating mantel with a dish on it that contained 

red phosphorus that was boiling and emitting gas. 

 Defendant was charged with one count of possession of chemicals for the manufacture of dangerous drugs, a class three felony, one count of manufacture of dangerous drugs, a class two felony, two counts of sale of dangerous drugs, class two· felonies, one count of conspiracy to manufacture dangerous drugs, a class two felony, and two counts of child abuse, class four felonies. The State also alleged that Defendant had a prior felony conviction. The State dismissed the possession of chemicals for the manufacture of dangerous drugs charge and one count of sale of dangerous drugs. 

 A jury convicted Defendant of the remaining counts: one count of manufacture, one count of sale, one count of conspiracy to manufacture, and two counts of child abuse. The jury did not specifically find any aggravating factors. However, Defendant testified at trial that he had six 

previous felony convictions. 

 At sentencing, the judge found, based on Defendant’s admission 

while testifying at trial, that Defendant had prior felony convictions. The court sentenced Defendant to a super aggravated term of 23.25 years for the manufacture of dangerous drugs, a presumptive term of 9.5 years for the sale of dangerous drugs, a presumptive term of 9.5 years for the conspiracy to manufacture dangerous drugs, and presumptive terms of 4.5 years for each of the child abuse convictions. The court ordered that the sentences 

run concurrently with 383 days of presentence incarceration credit. 

(Doc. 1 at 18.) 

c. Sentencing of Petitioner 

 On March 4, 2005, Petitioner was sentenced in both cases. (Doc. 8-1, Ex. F, at 34; 

Doc. 8-1, Ex. M, at 77.) 

d. Petitioner’s Direct Appeals

 On April 18, 2006, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions 

and sentences in CR 2004-036553. (Doc. 1 at 23.) On May 11, 2006, the Arizona Court 

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of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences in CR 2002-080581. (Doc. 8-

1, Ex. G, at 53.) 

 Petitioner did not seek review, in either case, with Arizona Supreme Court. 

e. Petitioner’s First Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding

 On July 10, 2006, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief in CR 2002-

080581. (Doc. 8-1, Ex. H, at 55.) On July 5, 2007, the trial court dismissed the 

proceeding because Petitioner did not file a petition. (Doc. 8-1, Ex. I, at 60.) 

 On January 3, 2007, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in 

CR 2004-036553. (Doc. 8-1, Ex. P, at 92.) On May 21, 2007, the trial court denied 

Petitioner’s PCR petition. (Doc. 8-1, Ex. Q, at 131.) Petitioner did not file for review with 

the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 1 at 5.) 

f. Petitioner’s Second Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding 

 On April 18, 2012, Petitioner filed a second notice of post-conviction relief in CR 

2004-036553. (Doc. 8-1, Ex. Q, at 132.) On October 31, 2012, the trial court dismissed 

the PCR petition in CR 2004-036553 after finding his claims failed. (Doc. 1 at 53.) 

 Petitioner sought review of the dismissal with the Arizona Court of Appeals. State 

v. Brown, No. 1 CA-CR 13-0029 PRPC, 2014 WL 1232596, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 

25, 2014). On March 25, 2014, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review but denied 

relief. (Id.) Petitioner did not seek further review. (Doc. 1 at 5.)

g. Petitioner’s Federal Habeas Petition 

 On March 20, 2015, Petitioner filed this habeas Petition. (Doc. 1.) On May 19, 

2015, Respondents filed a Limited Answer to the Petition. (Doc. 8.) On September 23, 

2015, Petitioner filed an “Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Order,” which included as an 

attachment a “Limited Reply to ‘Limited Answer.’” (Doc. 15 at 8-17.) 

 In his Petition, Petitioner raises the following grounds for relief: 

1. Petitioner’s counsel were ineffective for failing to “inform the court of” exculpatory evidence and informing “Petitioner of the existence of a favorable plea agreement”; 

2. The indictment was improperly amended, the jury instructions were “defective,” and the trial judge was not impartial; 

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3. Petitioner’s sentence was improperly aggravated; and, 

4. Petitioner was actually innocent, and was entrapped. 

 (Doc. 1.) 

III. THE PETITION 

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Petitions for Habeas Corpus are governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

a. THE PETITION IS UNTIMELY.

i. Time Calculation 

 The AEDPA imposes a one-year limitation period, which begins to run “from the 

latest of . . . the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A). 

 On April 18, 2006, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions 

and sentences in CR 2004-036553. (Doc. 1 at 23.) Petitioner had 30 days to seek review 

of this decision by the Arizona Supreme Court. Accordingly, Petitioner’s convictions 

and sentences became final on May 18, 2006. See, e.g., Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 

1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007). The one-year statute of limitations on Petitioner’s habeas 

action expired on May 18, 2007, unless statutorily or equitably tolled. 

ii. Statutory Tolling 

 The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a “properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Arizona, post-conviction 

review is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief is filed. See Isley v. Arizona 

Dep’t of Corr., 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). See also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) 

(“A proceeding is commenced by timely filing a notice of post-conviction relief with the 

court in which the conviction occurred.”). 

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 On May 9, 2006, Petitioner initiated a timely action for post-conviction relief 

pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 8-1, Ex. N, at 83.) 

On January 3, 2007, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in CR 

2004-036553. (Doc. 8-1, Ex. P, at 92.) On May 21, 2007, the trial court denied 

Petitioner’s PCR petition. (Doc. 8-1, Ex. Q, at 131.) Petitioner did not seek further 

review. Therefore, the statute of limitations on Petitioner’s habeas claims began to run 

on May 22, 2007, and expired on May 22, 2008. The instant Petition was filed on March 

20, 2015. 

 The statute of limitations was not tolled by Petitioner’s second state action for 

post-conviction relief. This second Rule 32 action was not a “properly filed” state action 

for post-conviction relief. Once the AEDPA limitations period expires, a subsequently 

filed state post-conviction proceeding cannot restart the statute of limitations. See 

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that an application for 

state post-conviction relief filed after expiration of the AEDPA statute of limitations did 

not reinitiate the limitations period). 

 Petitioner is not entitled to gap tolling. In his second PCR petition, Petitioner 

“raised the same claim of ineffective assistance” that he raised in his first petition for 

post-conviction relief. Brown, 2014 WL 1232596, at *1. Petitioner would be entitled to 

gap tolling for the period between the disposition of his first petition and the initiation of 

his second petition in the same court only if the second petition is “limited to an 

elaboration of the facts relating to the claims in the first petition.” King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 

821, 823 (9th Cir.2003) (per curiam), overruled on other grounds by Evans v. Chavis, 

546 U.S. 189 (2006). Here, Petitioner’s claim in his second PCR petition was that 

Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012) and Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012) 

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constituted “significant changes in the law.” Brown, 2014 WL 1232596, at *1.3 

Petitioner’s claim was not “limited to an elaboration of the facts” and gap tolling does not 

apply. 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief because [a]ny claim a defendant raised 

in an earlier post-conviction relief proceeding is precluded. Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.2(a).” 

(Id.) The court also found that Petitioner raised new arguments in the second PCR 

proceeding, but dismissed them because a “petition for review may not present issues not 

first presented to the trial court.” (Id.) Gap tolling does not apply for any of Petitioner’s 

claims in his second PCR proceeding. Accordingly, statutory tolling does not apply for 

Petitioner’s second PCR proceeding. 

iii. Equitable Tolling 

 “A petitioner who seeks equitable tolling of AEDPA’s 1–year filing deadline must 

show that (1) some ‘extraordinary circumstance’ prevented him from filing on time, and 

(2) he has diligently pursued his rights. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649, 130 S.Ct. 

2549, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010).” Luna v. Kernan, 784 F.3d 640, 646 (9th Cir. 2015). The 

petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling should apply. EspinozaMatthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005). Equitable tolling is only 

appropriate when external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for 

the failure to file a timely habeas action. Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048–49 (9th 

Cir. 2010). Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g., Waldron–Ramsey v. 

Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009). Petitioner must show that “the 

extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary 

circumstances made it impossible to file a petition on time.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 

 

3

 The AEDPA provides that its one-year limitation period may begin to run on “the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (C). Frye and Lafler did not create a newly-recognized right that has been made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. See Buenrostro v. United States, 697 F.3d 1137, 

1140 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Because the Court in Frye and Lafler repeatedly noted its application of an established rule to the underlying facts, these cases did not break new ground or impose a new obligation on the State or Federal Government.”). 

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952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling 

[under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’” Miranda, 292 F.3d 

at 1066 (quoting Marcello, 212 F.3d at 1010). 

 Here, Petitioner provides no argument for equitable tolling. Petitioner asserts his 

Petition is timely because it was filed within a year of the Arizona Court of Appeals 

ruling on his second PCR petition. Petitioner has not established that equitable tolling 

should apply in this case. The statute of limitations on Petitioner’s habeas claims began 

to run on May 22, 2007, and expired on May 22, 2008. The instant Petition was filed on 

March 20, 2015. Petitioner had access to documents and has a clear memory of the events 

that transpired in his case. Petitioner has not demonstrated he was unable to file this 

Petition in a timely manner. See Waldron–Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1014 (stating that 

petitioner “could have prepared a basic form habeas petition and filed it to satisfy the 

AEDPA deadline.”); United States v. Battles, 362 F.3d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004) (even 

without access to his case file, petitioner must “at least consult his own memory of the 

trial proceedings.”). 

iv. Actual Innocence 

 To avoid a miscarriage of justice, the statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1) does not preclude this Court from entertaining an untimely first federal habeas 

petition raising a convincing claim of actual innocence. “Actual innocence, if proved, 

serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a 

procedural bar . . . [or] expiration of the statute of limitations.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 

133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013). “When an otherwise time-barred habeas petitioner 

‘presents evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the 

outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error,’ the Court may consider the petition on the merits. See 

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S. Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995).” Stewart v. Cate, 

757 F.3d 929, 939 (9th Cir. 2014). 

 To invoke this exception to the statute of limitations, a petitioner “‘must show that 

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it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light 

of the new evidence.’” Perkins, 133 S. Ct. at 1935 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). 

Such a claim must be founded upon “new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory 

scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that 

was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. Significantly, “[t]his is a high 

threshold that is rarely met.” Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 945 (9th Cir. 2011). See also 

Perkins, 133 S. Ct. at 1928 (“tenable actual-innocence gateway pleas are rare”). 

 Here, Petitioner presents no new evidence of actual innocence in CR 

2004−036553.4

 Schlup instructed that a claim of actual innocence must be supported by 

“new reliable evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. Petitioner did not contest his 

innocence on direct appeal. Now, Petitioner asserts his offense was the result of a “staged 

raid” and the work of an informant. (Doc. 1 at 9.) At the time of his arrest, an “officer 

found a heating mantel with a dish on it that contained red phosphorus that was boiling 

and emitting gas.” (Doc. 1 at 18.) The remainder of the evidence demonstrates Petitioner 

was a willing participant in the offense. Petitioner fails to satisfy the “demanding” 

standard for a miscarriage-of-justice exception to the procedural bar. 

 Additionally, Petitioner’s claim regarding entrapment is insufficient to establish 

actual innocence. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998) (“Actual 

innocence means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency”). A claim of 

entrapment does not establish actual innocence. See Eaglin v. Welborn, 57 F.3d 496, 501 

(7th Cir. 1995) (“[E]ntrapment is an excuse for, not a denial of, crime. A defendant 

prevented from asserting the defense in violation of state law cannot complain that the 

violation created a peril of convicting an innocent person.”). 

CONCLUSION

 The record is sufficiently developed and the Court does not find that an 

evidentiary hearing is necessary for resolution of this matter. See Rhoades v. Henry, 638 

 

4

 As noted above, Petitioner cannot seek habeas relief in CR 2002-080581 because 

he is no longer in custody in that case. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

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F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). Based on the above analysis, the Court finds that 

Petitioner’s claims are untimely. The Court will therefore recommend that the Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

ruling debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days 

within which to file a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 14th day of April, 2016. 

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

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