Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_03-cv-00276/USCOURTS-casd-3_03-cv-00276-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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03cv276

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESUS BUSTAMANTE,

Petitioner,

v.

S. GARCIA,

Respondent.

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Civil No. 03-CV-276-L(CAB)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION;

OVERRULING OBJECTIONS;

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS and DIRECTING

ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

Petitioner Jesus Bustamante filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 that has been fully briefed. The matter was referred to United States Magistrate

Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo, for a Report and Recommendation ("Report") under 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(B) and Civil Local Rule 72.3. The magistrate judge issued a Report recommending

the petition be denied in its entirety. Petitioner timely filed objections. Respondent did not file

an objection or a response to petitioner’s objections.

A. Standard of Review

A federal court may not grant an application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in state custody with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim: (1) “resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States”; or (2) “resulted in a decision that was based on an

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1 The Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be

correct. Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing

evidence. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1)(West 2007); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36

(1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including inferences properly drawn from such facts,

are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). 

2 03cv276

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). However, the state court need not cite or even be aware of

the controlling Supreme Court cases, “so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the

state-court decision contradicts them.” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002).

Before a federal court may overturn a conviction resulting from a state trial . . . it

must be established not merely that the [State's action] is undesirable, erroneous, or

even ‘universally condemned,’ but that it violated some right which was

guaranteed to the defendant by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973)

Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), in reviewing a magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation, the district court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the

report . . . to which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part,

the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Under this statute, "the district

judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is

made, but not otherwise." United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en

banc) (emphasis in original); see Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1225-26 & n.5 (D.

Ariz. 2003) (applying Reyna-Tapia to habeas review). As previously noted, petitioner filed

objections (“Obj.”) to the Report.

B. Discussion

1. Factual and Procedural Background

Petitioner does not object to the factual and procedural background contained within the

California Court of Appeals decision1

 (Lodgment 5) and as set forth in the Report. The facts as

found by the state appellate court are as follows:

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I. Factual Background

A. The Witnesses’ Relationships

The principal prosecution witnesses were Tina Carranza (Tina),

Nathan Truehitt (Nathan) and Sherry Jacobson (Sherry). These three

persons and the victim [Kevin Schaum] were involved in a web of

relationships.

In the late spring of 1992 Tina met Nathan. At that time Tina had

been dating [Kevin]. However, on meeting Nathan she broke up with

[Kevin] and a week later began seeing Nathan. Shortly thereafter, Tina

began living with Nathan. She lived with Nathan until approximately one

week before the August 15, 1992 murder. Nathan threw Tina out of the

Wardlow house because he was jealous of her continued relationship with

[Kevin] and because Tina was unable to get along with Sherry, who was to

move into the Wardlow house. [footnote 2: Tina conceded she and [Kevin]

had been intimate while Nathan was in jail during July 1992 and had also

spent the night with [Kevin] the night prior to Nathan’s throwing her out. 

Sherry had reported her suspicions of Tina’s infidelity to Nathan while

Nathan was in jail, and Nathan and Tina had violent arguments over Tina’s

relationship to [Kevin].]

Sherry was a friend of Nathan’s daughter, became close to Nathan

and viewed him as an uncle. Sherry was a methamphetamine user. Nathan

provided her with a home, money and drugs; in return she sold drugs for

Nathan.

Sherry first met [Kevin] through Tina in June 1992 when Tina

requested [Kevin] to repair Sherry’s car. Although Sherry at first liked

[Kevin], she became antagonistic when convinced [Kevin] had stolen

property belonging to Nathan and her. [footnote 3: During July 1992

Nathan was jailed for possession of methamphetamine. While Nathan was

in jail, Tina and [Kevin] packed and moved Nathan’s belongings from his

old house and stored them in a U-Haul truck at a friend’s home. Sherry

believed [Kevin] had stolen some of the property while it was being stored. 

Sherry enlisted the help of Bustamante and Mr. Jacobo to try to convince

[Kevin] to return the property. After [Kevin] refused, Bustamante used a

small knife to puncture the tire of the U-Haul.] Sherry also disliked [Kevin]

because she suspected he was sleeping with Tina while Nathan was in jail. 

Sherry reported her suspicions of the Tina-victim relationship to Nathan.

B. The Relationship of the Codefendants

Sherry met Bustamante through a Mr. Jacobo and began dating

Bustamante in the summer of 1992. [footnote 4: Mr. Jacobo and Nathan

were business acquaintances in the drug business.] Bustamante introduced

[co-defendant] Gonzalez to Sherry about 10 days before the murder, stating

Gonzalez was like a brother to him and that he (Bustamante) would die for

Gonzalez. Bustamante also introduced [co-defendant] Flores to Sherry

about a week before the murder, stating Flores was like a brother to him. 

Sherry saw Bustamante give Flores a knife as a gift.

Sherry introduced Bustamante to Nathan sometime during the two

weeks prior to the murder. Bustamante was staying at the Wardlow house

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(with Nathan and Sherry) for several days prior to the murder. Nathan met

the other codefendants at the Wardlow house when Nathan arrived home on

the day of the murder and found them and many others at the house.

C. The Shooting

On the evening of August 15, 1992, Nathan, Tina, Sherry, Jacobo, a

Ms. Morris, a Mr. Pagel, the three codefendants and others were at the

Wardlow house. During the day, Bustamante was drinking with his friends. 

Several people, including Gonzalez and Nathan, were ingesting drugs.

During the same day, Sherry saw Gonzalez in the living room of the

Wardlow house showing off a large revolver and heard Gonzalez comment: 

“Imagine what this can do with a hollow point bullet.” Jacobo was present

while Gonzalez and Bustamante examined the gun and Jacobo looked at it

before returning it to Gonzalez. Jacobo later told police he had seen some

hollow point bullets Gonzalez had for the revolver and that the revolver was

a .44 caliber special. [footnote 5: Jacobo was testifying under a grant of

immunity. At trial, he denied seeing any hollow point ammunition in

Gonzalez’s possession and claimed that his statement to police about the

ammunition was untruthful. He claimed to have told police what they

wanted to hear because he feared being charged in the murder. However,

police testified Jacobo told them of the hollow point ammunition before

they had revealed to him the type of ammunition recovered at the scene. 

Sherry confirmed seeing Jacobo holding hollow point bullets prior to the

shooting.] Another person present, Mr. Guadiana, saw Gonzalez lift his

shirt to display the gun tucked in Gonzalez’s waistband. Jacobo also told

police he had seen Flores with a knife earlier that day and Flores would

occasionally pull it from his pocket and play with it. Jacobo told police the

knife was “legal” because the blade was less than three inches long.

At approximately 8 p.m., [Kevin] unexpectedly arrived at the

Wardlow house and pulled his car into the driveway. Ms. Morris went

outside to see what [Kevin] wanted and then returned to the house to tell

Tina that [Kevin] wanted to see her. When Tina did not go outside, Sherry

went out, spoke with [Kevin] and then returned inside to tell Tina that

[Kevin] was waiting for her. Sherry then went back outside to tell [Kevin]

that Tina would be right out.

Tina, accompanied by Nathan, went outside. Tina went to the

passenger side window, began screaming at [Kevin] and asked, “What are

you doing here? How did you know where I lived?” While Tina was

yelling, Nathan went to the driver’s side and told [Kevin] to leave. Sherry

heard the yelling from inside and came back outside.

Sherry then saw Bustamante, followed by Flores and Gonzalez,

emerge from the house and walk toward the car. Sherry, seeing they had

angry looks on their faces, told them not to do anything stupid or crazy, but

Flores had a smirk on his face and rolled his eyes. Sherry testified Flores

and Bustamante went to the passenger side window, leaned through it and

made striking motions at [Kevin]. Nathan testified that he saw Bustamante

on the passenger side attacking [Kevin] and that Gonzalez was leaning in

through the driver’s side window. Nathan saw someone inside the car

wielding a bottle but could not tell who it was.

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Tina screamed at Sherry to tell them to stop. Ten to twenty seconds

after the codefendants began their attack a shot rang out. Sherry heard the

gunshot, saw the flash and ran inside. Tina saw the car jerk as if the clutch

pedal had been released. Nathan saw the flash of the shot, saw [Kevin]’s

head go forward and immediately thereafter saw a gun in Gonzalez’s hand.

When Tina heard the shot she turned and saw Nathan standing near

the left front wheel of [Kevin]’s car holding his hands in the air and saying,

“Oh, my god, they shot him.” Sherry came back outside and saw Nathan

holding his head and saying, “I can’t believe they did this” and saw Tina

crying hysterically and yelling, “Oh, my god, they shot him.” Nathan

almost immediately told Sherry that Gonzalez had been the shooter.

Jacobo, who was inside when the shot was fired, ran out and saw

Nathan, Bustamante, Gonzalez and Flores standing around the car. Jacobo

heard someone say, “Let’s get out of here.” Then Jacobo (along with

Flores, Bustamante and Guadiana) got into Jacobo’s car and left. As he and

the others left the scene, Jacobo saw Gonzalez putting a gun into his

waistband. Gonzalez left in his own car.

D. Post Shooting Events

Nathan remained at the Wardlow house waiting for police to arrive,

cleaning up beer bottles and disposing of the drugs around the house. 

Nathan instructed Sherry and Tina not to go near the car because they might

disturb the fingerprints.

Jacobo, accompanied by Flores and Bustamante, drove to a house

owned by Bustamante’s brother, Sergio Bustamante (Sergio). During the

trip, Flores was laughing and bragging that Flores “stuck him.” Flores also

told Bustamante: “You’re my family. I’d kill for you.” While at Sergio’s

house, Flores told Gonzalez: “I got him.” He also told Gonzalez: “If you

want, I’ll do time for it.” Bustamante stated he had struck [Kevin] in the

face with a beer bottle and had left a beer bottle at the scene, saying,

“Damn, they got my fingerprints.” 

Sergio later told police Gonzalez said he had hit [Kevin] and the gun

accidentally discharged. Sergio also told police Gonzalez said he had used

a .44 or .45 caliber revolver.

Bustamante told police he was one of the first to come out of the

Wardlow house and he had a beer bottle in his hands which may have

dropped inside [Kevin]’s car. Bustamante also told police the shooter was

pistol-whipping [Kevin] when the gun discharged by accident.

E. Physical Evidence

Police recovered beer bottles from around the car and inside the car. 

A palm print taken from the passenger side door of [Kevin]’s car matched

Flores’s prints.

The bullet retrieved from [Kevin] was a hollow point .44 caliber, which

only one company manufactures. The bullet could only have been fired from a 

.44 caliber revolver and the criminalist explained that because of the design of the

revolver it cannot fire by accident; firing requires that someone pull the trigger.

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The pathologist found [Kevin] had suffered three stab wounds in the

right chest area consistent with a single-edged folding knife of less than

three inches in length. [Kevin] also had a gunshot wound to his head that

indicted the gun had been fired at very close range. [Kevin] also had cuts

on the right side of his face. The cause of death was the gunshot wound to

the head and two of the three stab wounds which had punctured the lungs.

F. The Defense Theory

Gonzalez denied owning a gun or showing a gun around the

Wardlow house. He claimed he saw a gun at the house that day when

Nathan opened a drawer to retrieve drugs for them to consume. Gonzalez’s

version was as follows:

Gonzalez came out of the bathroom and saw Nathan pacing back and

forth. Gonzalez then went outside and saw Tina arguing with someone as

she stood next to the driver’s window of a car. Nathan then ran up to Tina,

pulled her away and began yelling at [Kevin] and poking [Kevin] with his

finger. As the fight escalated Bustamante pulled Tina away. Gonzalez saw

Nathan lean into the car and then saw a flash and heard a gunshot. 

Bustamante jumped back from the car. Gonzalez heard someone say,

“Let’s get out of here.” Gonzalez then left. Later the next morning

Gonzalez learned, through Jacobo, that Nathan was accusing Gonzalez of

the shooting.

The defense also relied on Tina’s testimony that Nathan was a

violent person and had a tendency to become angry after ingesting

methamphetamine. Nathan was under the influence of methamphetamine

that day and was behaving irrationally. Jacobo claimed Nathan had

threatened violence against [Kevin] prior to the shooting. After the

shooting, Nathan threatened Tina with “the same thing done to you that was

done to Kevin.”

(Lodgment No. 5 at 3-9; Report at 2-5.)

The procedural background provided in the Report is as follows:

On July 28, 1993, the San Diego County District Attorney’s Office filed a

second amended second consolidated information charging Ernesto Gonzalez,

Philip Antonio Flores and Jesus (Jesse) Ramirez Bustamante with one count of

murder, a violation of Penal Code section 187(a). (See Lodgment No. 1, Vol. 1 of

2 at 0093-95.) The information also alleged that Bustamante was armed with a

firearm, within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022(b) and that Bustamante

had suffered a prior felony conviction which made him ineligible for probation,

within the meaning of Penal Code section 1203(e)(4). (Id.) A jury found

Bustamante guilty of second degree murder and found the Penal Code section

12022(b) allegation to be true. (Lodgment No. 1, Vol. 1 at 0210.)

Bustamante filed a direct appeal challenging his conviction in the California

Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One. (Lodgment Nos. 3, 4.) 

On January 30, 1996, the state appellate court affirmed Bustamante’s conviction in

an unpublished opinion. (Lodgment No. 5.) He did not file a Petition for Review

in the California Supreme Court.

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2 Claims to which petitioner has no objection include: Claim 1: the trial court

improperly denied his motion to dismiss (see Objection at 1, n.1); Claim 2: the trial court

improperly instructed the jury with respect to felony murder (see Obj. at 1 n.1, at 3, n.4) and the

failure to give a pinpoint instruction on aiding and abetting (see Obj. at 3 n.4) but petitioner

objects to the lack of a lesser included offense, accomplice and assault/aggravated assault

instructions; Claim 3: the trial court failed to rule on an objection during closing argument (see

Obj. at 3, n.4); Claim 4: the trial court improperly denied his severance motion (see Obj. at 3,

n.4); Claim 5: the trial court was biased against him (see Obj. at 3, n.4); Claim 7: ineffective

assistance of trial counsel but only to the issue of the failure to pursue the writ of mandamus (see

Obj. at 11); and Claim 9: insufficiency of the evidence (see Obj. at 7). As to these claims, the

Court adopts the Report and Recommendation without further review.

7 03cv276

Bustamante next filed a habeas corpus petition in the California Court of

Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, which that court denied in a brief

unpublished opinion on February 21, 2001. (Lodgment Nos. 6, 7.) He filed

another habeas corpus petition, together with a Motion for Production of

Documents, in the San Diego Superior Court, which was denied in an unpublished

opinion on November 21, 2001. (Lodgment Nos. 8, 9.) Bustamante then filed a

second habeas corpus petition in the state appellate court, which was denied in an

unpublished opinion on April 4, 2002. (Lodgment Nos. 10, 11.) Finally,

Bustamante filed a habeas corpus petition in the California Supreme Court, which

that court denied without citation of authority on January 29, 2003. (Lodgment

Nos. 12, 13.)

Bustamante then filed a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254 (West 2007) in this Court on February 10, 2003 [doc. no. 1]. Respondent

filed a motion to dismiss on May 28, 2003, which was granted on February 23,

2004 [doc. nos. 12, 13, 18, 24]. Bustamante appealed the dismissal to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals, which vacated the dismissal order and remanded the case

to this Court for further proceedings [doc. nos. 26, 31, 36, 37].

An order setting a briefing schedule on the merits of the petition was filed

on August 26, 2005, and Respondent filed an Answer on December 20, 2005 [doc.

nos. 52, 53]. Bustamante filed a Traverse on April 10, 2006, and a Supplemental

Traverse on May 23, 2006 [doc. nos. 61, 64].

(Report at 5-6.)

2. Objections to Report

Petitioner brought nine claims in his petition all of which the magistrate judge addressed

in her Report. In response to the Report, petitioner objects to portions of the findings of the

magistrate judge but has indicated that he has no objection to the disposition of certain claims.2

Petitioner objects to the Report with respect to his Claim 2 concerning three particular

jury instructions; Claim 6 – prosecutorial misconduct; Claim 7 – ineffective assistance of trial

counsel: and Claim 8 – ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

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a. Jury Instructions

Bustamante contends that the trial court failed to properly instruct on the elements of

assault and assault with a deadly weapon (aggravated assault); to sua sponte instruct the jury that

they could consider manslaughter as a lesser included offense; and to instruct on accomplice

testimony. 

1. Assault/Assault with a Deadly Weapon

Petitioner asserts that the jury instructions on assault and aggravated assault were

improper because these crimes require the specific intent to commit a battery. In other words,

petitioner contends an element of each of the crimes was deleted from the instructions which is a

violation of his due process rights.

Under the Fourteenth Amendment, due process requires that “every fact necessary to

constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is charged” be proved beyond a reasonable

doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). If a trial court fails to properly instruct the jury

regarding an element of the charged crime, the court commits a constitutional error that deprives

the defendant of due process. See, e.g., Conde v. Henry, 198 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 1999).

Under California law, battery and assault are general intent crimes. See People v.

Williams, 26 Cal. 4th 779, 788 (2001); People v. Colantuono, 7 Cal. 4th 206, 217 (1994). 

Although petitioner contends otherwise, the intent to commit battery is not an element of the

crimes of assault or aggravated assault. 

The trial court instructed the jury on both aggravated assault, CALJIC No. 9.02; and

assault, CALJIC No. 9.00. The standard California instructions used in petitioner’s case

included all the elements of assault and aggravated assault. Because the instructions given were

not erroneous, i.e., they contained all the elements of the crimes, the Court cannot find that the

instructions violated petitioner’s due process rights. 

2. Lesser Included Offense Instruction

Petitioner contends that the trial court failed to instruct, sua sponte, on the lesser included

offense of manslaughter. Voluntary manslaughter is “the unlawful killing of a human being

without malice [and] upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion” while involuntary manslaughter

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is “the unlawful killing of a human being without malice [and] in the commission of an unlawful

act, not amounting to a felony; or the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in

an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection.” (CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(a)

and (b).)

There is no clearly established federal law that requires a state trial court to give a lesser

included offense instruction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638

& n. 7 (1980) (holding that the failure to instruct on a lesser included offense in a capital case is

constitutional error if there was evidence to support the instruction but expressly reserving

“whether the Due Process Clause would require the giving of such instructions in a non-capital

case”); Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (in non-capital case,

failure of state court to instruct on lesser included offense does not alone present a federal

constitutional question cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding), cert. denied, 534 U.S.

839 (2001); Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1106 (9th Cir. 1998) (failure of state trial court

to instruct on lesser included offenses in non-capital case does not present federal constitutional

question), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 950 (2004)).

But “the defendant's right to adequate jury instructions on his or her theory of the case

might, in some cases, constitute an exception to the [foregoing] general rule [that the failure to

give a lesser included offense instruction constitutes only a state law issue].” Solis, 219 F.3d at

929; see Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2006) (state court's jury instructions violate

due process if they deny the criminal defendant “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete

defense”), cert. denied by Ayers v. Clark, 549 U.S. 1027 (2006) (quoting California v.

Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)). 

Notwithstanding petitioner’s statement to the contrary, the record shows that petitioner

and his counsel made a strategic decision not to request a manslaughter instruction based upon

petitioner’s insistence that he did not participate in the events giving rise to the charges. Thus, a

manslaughter defense was inconsistent with petitioner's trial strategy and theory of the defense. 

Further, petitioner was not constitutionally entitled to the lesser included offense instructions

because there was no substantial evidence supporting the giving of such an instruction either at

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28 3 Accomplice instructions are found in CALJIC 3.11-3.14 and 3.18. 

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the request of counsel or by the court sua sponte. 

Finally, even if petitioner could establish that the trial court constitutionally erred in

failing to sua sponte give the lesser included offense instruction, the error was harmless. See

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993); see also Clark, 450 F.3d at 905 (habeas

petitioner must show that the alleged instructional error had substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining jury's verdict). The evidence adduced at trial against petitioner in

support of the second degree murder conviction was sufficient and therefore, the failure to give

the lesser included offense instruction, which had no factual basis, could not have had a

substantial or injurious effect on the jury's verdict. Accordingly, there is no basis for habeas

relief on the claim of instructional error regarding a lesser included offense.

3. Accomplice Instruction 

Because Jacobo was granted immunity and “Truehitt had the victim’s blood on his pants,”

petitioner argues “they had to have been present next to the victim and/or shooting the victim”

thereby making them accomplices. (Obj. at 3.) Petitioner goes on to argue that because

Truehitt and Sergio Jacobo were accomplices to the killing, the trial court should have instructed

the jury to view their testimony with caution or to require corroboration to support his

conviction.3

 

Under California law, an accomplice is defined as “a person who is subject to prosecution

for the identical offense charged . . . against the defendant on trial by reason of aiding and

abetting or being a member of a criminal conspiracy.” (CALJIC No. 3.10.) To be liable as an

accomplice under California law, the individual must aid, promote, encourage or instigate a

crime, knowing of the unlawful purpose and intending to assist in the commission of a crime.

See People v. Beeman, 35 Cal.3d 547, 560 (1984). An accessory to a crime is not an accomplice

under California law. See People v. Snyder, 112 Cal. App. 4th 1200, 1220-21 (2003). 

Defendant has the burden of proof to establish that an individual is an accomplice. (CALJIC

3.19.) 

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As noted above, habeas relief based on an erroneous instruction is available when ‘the

ailing instruction by itself so infect[s] the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due

process,” Cupp, 414 U.S at 147, not merely when “the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or

even ‘universally condemned.” Id., at 146. Further, the lack of or an incomplete instruction is

less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145,

154 (1977).

“The Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid a state court to construe and apply its laws

with respect to the evidence of an accomplice.” Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 227

(1941); see also Harrington v. Nix, 983 F.2d 872, 874 (8th Cir. 1993) (“state laws requiring

corroboration do not implicate constitutional concerns that can be addressed on habeas review”);

Brown v. Collins, 937 F.2d 175, 182 n. 12 (5th Cir. 1991) (“the prosecution's failure to satisfy

the requirements of the accomplice-witness sufficiency rule, and a state court's failure to enforce

that purely state rule, simply would not warrant constitutional attention”); Takacs v. Engle, 768

F.2d 122, 127 (6th Cir. 1985) (“If uncorroborated accomplice testimony is sufficient to support a

conviction under the Constitution, there can be no constitutional right to instruct the jury that it

must find corroboration for an accomplice's testimony.”).

Even if Truehitt and Jacobo were accomplices as petitioner contends, other witnesses

corroborated the facts supporting Bustamante’s conviction, Truehitt’s and Jacobo’s testimony

was strongly challenged by the defense, the prosecutor acknowledged during his closing

argument that Jacobo’s testimony was inconsistent, and other jury instructions informed the jury

that they must view contradictory testimony with care. 

Petitioner has not shown that the jury's determination would have been different had the

jury been instructed that it could not rely on Truehitt's and Jacobo's testimony in the absence of

corroboration. Additionally, petitioner fails to explain how an instruction to view their

testimony with caution because they were accomplices would have had a greater impact than the

general credibility instructions that told the jury that in assessing a witness's credibility, it must

consider the existence of a bias, interest or other motive. 

The lack of an accomplice instructions did not so infect petitioner's trial as to result in a

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violation of due process. The state courts' denial of petitioner's instructional error claim was not

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d).

b. Prosecutorial Misconduct

A defendant's due process rights are violated when a prosecutor's misconduct renders a

trial “fundamentally unfair.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). Under Darden,

the court first determines whether the prosecutor's remarks or acts were improper; if so, the next

consideration is whether the conduct infected the trial with unfairness. Tan v. Runnels, 413 F.3d

1101, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005). A prosecutorial misconduct claim is decided “on the merits,

examining the entire proceedings to determine whether the prosecutor's remarks so infected the

trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Johnson v.

Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). 

As the Supreme Court has noted: “Past decisions of this Court demonstrate that the

touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of

the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). 

Prosecutorial misconduct alone does not require a new trial. Id. at 220. Instead, the effect on

the trial is of paramount importance. 

1. Threat to defense counsel

Petitioner contends that he suffered severe prejudice based upon a threat to his counsel

made by the prosecutor. Prior to the trial, the prosecutor and defense counsel had a verbal

exchange concerning defendants’ motion to dismiss based upon vindictive prosecution that the

court denied. The prosecutor said to defense counsel: “People create their own jacket.” 

Although petitioner contends that “it is a fair assumption” that defense counsel no longer felt

that he could effectively defend his client after hearing the remark, there is no evidence

whatsoever to support this assertion. The entire record in this case demonstrates that counsel

actively and appropriately offered petitioner a reasonable defense based upon petitioner’s

unequivocal position that he was not involved in the killing and evidence introduced at trial. 

Further, petitioner has not demonstrated that the statement had any impact on the relationship

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between defense counsel and petitioner. Thus, there is no showing of unfairness constituting a

denial of due process. 

2. Questioning of Witness Jacobo

According to petitioner, during the questioning of prosecution witness, Sergio Jacobo, the

prosecutor mischaracterized the evidence, argued facts not in evidence, and used improper

arguments and comments to the jury which demonstrates prosecutorial misconduct. At a bench

conference, the trial judge advised the prosecutor to lay a proper foundation and to confront the

witness with prior inconsistent statements if Jacobo contradicted what he had told police in his

statements. Even after this admonishment, the prosecutor continued to try to impeach Jacobo

with improper methods. The trial court consistently warned the prosecutor of his use of

improper questioning. 

Defense counsel sought to have stricken all of Jacobo’s testimony based on the

impropriety of the questions the prosecutor asked. Recognizing that the prosecutor had placed

some inadmissible and potentially prejudical information before the jury by assuming facts not

in evidence, improperly characterizing prior testimony, improperly eliciting testimony about codefendants’ statements and improperly posing a question that the prosecutor knew would elicit

prejudicial hearsay, the trial judge sought to determine a remedy other than striking Jacobo’s

testimony or declaring a mistrial for the prosecutor’s errors. The jury was admonished to

disregard certain testimony and asked if they could do so. They responded that they could. 

Having reviewed Jacobo’s testimony, it is clear that his testimony was anything but clear. 

For example, Jacobo failed to recall much of what happened the day of the killing, he gave

conflicting testimony about seeing Gonzalez with a gun and hearing Flores making a statement

about striking the victim. The jury would be unlikely to come to any decision about petitioner’s

guilt or innocence based upon Jacobo’s testimony. Further, Jacobo was merely one of several

prosecution witnesses that the state relied upon. Other witnesses provided material testimony

pointing to petitioner’s guilt. 

Notwithstanding the prosecutor’s misconduct and placing that misconduct within the

context of the entire trial, his actions did not impair the jury’s ability to render a fair and

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4 The mistrial occurred because a prosecution witness failed to appear for a second

day of examination at trial.

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impartial verdict. Petitioner’s due process rights were not violated by prosecutorial misconduct

in the questioning of Sergio Jacobo. 

3. Failure to Provide Information Prior to Trial

Petitioner contends that the prosecution withheld material, exculpatory evidence by

failing to disclose that Nathan Truehitt, a prosecution witness, was a confidential informant.

Delay in disclosure does not deprive an accused of due process where disclosure is made at

pretrial conference, see Reiger v. Christensen, 789 F.2d 1425, 1432 (9th Cir. 1986), or during

trial where the disclosure, though tardy, is still of value to the accused, see U.S. v. Vgeri, 51 F.3d

876, 880 (9th Cir. 1995). Due process requires only that the disclosure of exculpatory material

is made in sufficient time to permit defendant to make effective use of the material. See LaMere

v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 625 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Here, the information concerning Truehitt’s confidential informant status was disclosed to

the defense, at the latest, during the beginning of petitioner’s first trial. Because of the mistrial,4

it is undisputed that defense counsel had knowledge of Truehitt’s confidential informant status

prior to the second trial and had sufficient time to prepare to challenge Truehitt’s testimony. The

record demonstrates that defense counsel decided not to question Truehitt about his confidential

informant status at trial for strategic reasons. 

Petitioner has not made any showing that the delayed disclosure of Truehitt’s status

violated petitioner’s constitutional due process rights. There was sufficient time after the

disclosure of the information at the commencement of the first trial for defense counsel to

consider the implications of Truehitt’s confidential informant status and to decide whether they

did or did not want that information admitted during the second trial. The Court concludes that

petitioner has not shown that the delayed disclosure violated his due process rights. 

4. Vindictive prosecution

Initially petitioner was arrested on a murder charge. He was released but later rearrested

and charged with conspiracy to commit assault. Petitioner was prepared to enter a guilty plea to

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that offense at the preliminary hearing; however, the prosecutor sought permission from the

court to amend the charges by adding a count of murder. The court granted the motion and

consequently, petitioner was not permitted to enter a plea to the conspiracy to commit assault

charge.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the amended murder count on the basis of

prosecutorial vindictiveness. The trial court denied petitioner’s motion finding that the decision

to amend the charges was made in good faith because, inter alia, the prosecutor believed

petitioner was responsible for the murder. Petitioner contends in his habeas petition that the

prosecutor demonstrated vindictive prosecution by amending the charge.

 “In our system, so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused

committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what

charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.” 

Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). The Bordenkircher Court continued:

Within the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of

chargeable offenses, “the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is

not in itself a federal constitutional violation” so long as “the selection was [not]

deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other

arbitrary classification.” 

Id. (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).

Here, petitioner has neither alleged or made a showing that the amended charges were

based upon any impermissible ground and petitioner therefore is not entitled to habeas relief on

this claim. 

5. Testimony of Sergio Jacobo & Sergio Bustamante 

At trial, Sergio Jacobo (“Jacobo”) and petitioner’s brother, Sergio Bustamante (“Sergio”)

testified under grants of immunity. During the investigation of the killing, Jacobo spoke to

detectives and told them that he had seen Gonzalez, one of petitioner’s co-defendants, with a gun

earlier in the day of the incident. Jacobo also testified at a preliminary hearing and identified

defendants and their involvement in the killing. However, at trial, Jacobo recanted his earlier

statements and made inconsistent statements. Under examination by defense counsel, Jacobo

explained his earlier statements. He stated that during his interview with the detectives, they

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told him he could be liable for the victim’s murder and the detectives slammed their hands on

table and screamed at him which caused him to say whatever the detectives wanted to hear. 

Petitioner argues that Jacobo’s testimony was coerced, and the trial court violated his due

process rights by permitting the testimony. Although petitioner lacks standing to complain about

infringements of Jacobo's constitutional rights, he may be entitled to habeas relief if the trial

court's admission of Jacobo's testimony rendered petitioner’s trial so fundamentally unfair as to

violate due process. Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 593 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations

omitted).

The acts or statements petitioner contends were coercive are insufficient to show that

Jacobo’s trial testimony was involuntary. The threat of potential liability for the killing is not an

improper inducement and raised voices do not suggest coercion. Further, petitioner did not lack

the opportunity at trial to test the voluntariness and veracity of Jacobo's testimony through

cross-examination as shown during defense counsel’s questioning, Nor did defense counsel seek

to exclude Jacobo’s testimony as involuntarily made as was their prerogative to do. 

Petitioner has not made a factual showing to demonstrate that Jacobo’s testimony was

involuntary and that its admission rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate due

process. 

With respect to Sergio, defense counsel sought to exclude Sergio’s testimony as

involuntarily made. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the issue of

voluntariness. The court and counsel listened to the tape of the detectives’ interview with Sergio

and heard the testimony of both Detective Torgersen and Sergio Bustamante. Torgersen testified

that he did not advise Sergio of his rights and told Sergio that he thought Sergio was lying and 

could be charged as an accessory to murder. Sergio testified that he asked to have counsel but

Detective Thill said he did not need one. He further testified that he thought he was a suspect

and was afraid he would lose his job in the city attorney’s office.

After listening to the interview tape and hearing Torgensen’s and Sergio’s testimony, the

trial judge found Sergio’s statements voluntarily made: “I don’t find it involuntary. I don’t find

it coerced. I think it’s a product of his own will, albeit that I think that he lied consistently

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throughout this entire tape any time he had an opportunity.” (Lodgment 2, Vol.VII at 1105.) 

“The question of the voluntariness of a confession is a legal issue that requires an

independent federal determination.” Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1444 (9th Cir. 1997)(citing 

Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110 (1985)). But a factual conclusion is entitled to a

presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Miller, 474 U.S. at 117 (subsidiary

questions, such as the length of the interrogation or defendant's prior experience with the legal

system, are factual matters on which we defer to the state court). 

After examining the statements in context, reviewing the tape of the interview and finding

that there were no threats or promises, the trial court made its determination that Sergio’s

statements were not coerced. The Court accords this factual finding presumptively correct. 

Further the record is devoid of any suggestion that the detectives resorted to physical or

psychological pressure to elicit Sergio’s statements. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on

the ground that Sergio’s statements were coerced.

6. False Evidence

Petitioner contends that the prosecutor knowingly permitted Detective Ronald Thill to lie

when he testified at trial that he did not threaten Sergio Bustamante during his interview with

him. 

“A criminal defendant is denied due process of law when a prosecutor either knowingly

presents false evidence or fails to correct the record to reflect the true facts when unsolicited

false evidence is introduced at trial.” Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 (9th Cir. 2005).

In order to establish a claim for prosecutorial misconduct based on false testimony, petitioner

must show that the testimony was actually false, that the prosecutor knew the testimony was

actually false, and that the false testimony was material. United States v. Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d

886, 889 (9th Cir. 2003), citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-71 (1959); see also Hayes v.

Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 (9th Cir. 2005). 

At trial detective Thill’s testified that he did not threaten Sergio during the interview. 

Petitioner contends this testimony was false because the prosecutor heard the tape of the

interview between Sergio and the detectives wherein Thill threatened Sergio, and Detective

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Torgersen testified at the evidentiary hearing that Thill raised his voice to Sergio during the

interview. Petitioner’s contention does not establish that Thill’s statement was false. At most,

the jury heard conflicting versions of the incident and it is for the jury to resolve the disputed

testimony. See United States v.Geston, 299 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2002). Further, Thill’s

statement cannot be considered material to petitioner’s conviction. There was ample evidence to

convict petitioner even if the jury found that Thill’s testimony was false. Finally, the trial court

found that Sergio’s testimony was not coerced but instead was voluntary. 

Based on the above, the prosecutor did not present false testimony and consequently,

petitioner was not denied due process based on alleged false testimony presented by the

prosecutor.

7. Improper Closing Argument

Petitioner complains that the prosecutor made a variety of improper remarks in closing

argument including telling the jury to credit some statements made to police but not trial

testimony, mischaracterizing certain testimony, and pointing out petitioner’s prior statements.

As discussed above, federal habeas review of prosecutorial misconduct claims is limited

to the narrow issue of whether the alleged misconduct violated due process. See Donnelly v.

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642-43 (1974). “It is not enough that the prosecutors' remarks

were undesirable or even universally condemned.” Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 997 (9th

Cir.2004) (as amended) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Misconduct is reviewed in

light of the entire trial record, and relief will be granted only if the misconduct infected the trial

with unfairness. See Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 639-43; see also Darden, 477 U.S. at 181; Greer v.

Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765-66 (1987).

In determining whether due process was violated, the Court considers: (1) whether the

prosecutor's comments manipulated or misstated the evidence; (2) whether the trial court gave a

curative instruction; and (3) the weight of the evidence against the accused. See Darden, 477

U.S. at 181-82. Here, even assuming that the prosecutor committed misconduct during his

closing argument, a review of the record establishes that this misconduct did not violate due

process. See Drayden, 232 F.3d at 713 (prosecutor engaged in misconduct by delivering closing

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argument in voice of the victim, but it did not so infect trial with unfairness as to violate due

process).

The court of appeal's finding that the prosecutor’s argument did not violate due process is

objectively reasonable and supported by the record. In each of petitioner’s contentions of

misconduct, the prosecutor did not manipulate or misstate the evidence, the prosecutor's

statements were supported by the evidence and reasonable inferences that could be drawn from

the evidence, and the court provided proper and appropriate jury instructions concerning prior

consistent or inconsistent statements, discrepancies in testimony, credibility of witness, and

weighing conflicting testimony. Therefore, the court of appeal's finding that the prosecutor's

closing argument did not violate due process is objectively reasonable and supported by the

record. Habeas relief is unavailable because there is no showing that the closing argument

infected the trial with unfairness.

c. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

As applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment of the

United States Constitution guarantees a state criminal defendant the right to effective assistance

of counsel at trial. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985). To warrant habeas relief based upon

ineffective assistance of trial counsel, petitioner must show both that counsel's representation fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel's deficient performance

prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). A court may

reject an ineffective assistance claim upon finding either that counsel's performance was

reasonable or that the alleged error was not prejudicial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 697; United

States v. Thomas, 417 F.3d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1121 (2006).

Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test obviates the need to consider the other. Rios

v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 2002).

Review of counsel's performance is “highly deferential” and there is a “strong

presumption” that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional

judgment. Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 610 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 934

(2005) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Courts judge the reasonableness of an attorney's

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conduct “on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. The court may “neither second-guess counsel's decisions, nor apply

the fabled twenty-twenty vision of hindsight.” Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117, 1130 (9th Cir.

2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003) (citation and quotations omitted); see Yarborough v.

Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (“The Sixth Amendment guarantees reasonable competence, not

perfect advocacy judged with the benefit of hindsight.”) (citations omitted); Morris v.

California, 966 F.2d 448, 456-57 (9th Cir.) (if court can conceive of reasonable tactical purpose

for counsel's action or inaction, court need not determine actual explanation), cert. denied, 506

U.S. 831 (1992). A habeas petitioner bears the burden to overcome the presumption that, under

the circumstances, the challenged action constituted competent representation. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 689.

To prove prejudice, it is not enough to show that counsel's errors had some conceivable

effect on the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. A habeas petitioner has the burden of

showing a reasonable probability, i.e., “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome,” that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Id. at 694-95; see also, Lord v. Wood, 184 F.3d 1083, 1085-86 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528

U.S. 1198 (2000).

In his objections to the Report, petitioner states: “Petitioner objects to all aspects of

Magistrate’s rejection of ineffective assistance, however, will only expand on the one crucial

aspect which is so erroneous it needs to be fully explained.” (Obj. at 6.)

1. Voluntary Intoxication as a Defense

Here, petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to investigate

voluntary intoxication as a defense. Petitioner acknowledges that he and counsel discussed the

defense of involuntary intoxication but nevertheless argues that the tactical decision was based

upon counsel’s inadequate investigation of such a defense. Petitioner also states there is no

rational, reasonable tactical decision not to have pursued the involuntary intoxication defense. 

But as discussed above in reference to a jury instruction on intoxication, such a defense would

have created conflicting and irreconcilable defenses. A voluntary intoxication defense would

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vitiate the defense that petitioner was not involved in the killing at all. Additionally, although

the record indicates that petitioner had been drinking for several days prior to and on the day of

the killing, there is no evidence that petitioner was intoxicated to the point where voluntary

intoxication could provide a defense. 

In reviewing counsel's performance, petitioner has made no showing that counsel failed to

render adequate assistance or exercise reasonable professional judgment with respect to whether

voluntary intoxication was available as a defense. 

2. Other Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Petitioner does not provide specific objections to the magistrate judge’s Report

concerning other instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Instead, petitioner generally

objects to the Report’s finding that counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to Jacobo and

Sergio’s testimony as coerced, to object to Thill’s testimony as false, to effectively present

closing argument, to request favorable jury instructions, and to competently argue motion for

new trial. 

As discussed above, the Court has found no basis for granting habeas relief on these same

claims. Thus there can be no errors that had some conceivable effect on the outcome of

petitioner’s case because of trial counsel’s failure to raise them on direct appeal.

d. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (CLAIM 8)

The Strickland test also applies to claims of ineffective assistance by appellate counsel.

See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536 (1986); see also Smith, 528 U.S. at 285-86 (“the proper

standard for evaluating [a petitioner's] claim that appellate counsel was ineffective . . . is that

enunciated in Strickland” ). The test for deficient performance is the same as for trial counsel.

Id. at 285 (petitioner “must first show that his counsel was objectively unreasonable”). To

establish prejudice, a petitioner “must show a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's

[error], he would have prevailed on his appeal.” Id. Appointed appellate counsel is not required

“to press nonfrivolous points requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of professional

judgment, decides not to present those points.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983); see

also Pollard v. White, 119 F.3d 1430, 1435 (9th Cir. 1997)(Appellate counsel has no

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constitutional obligation to raise all non-frivolous issues on appeal.)). Appellate counsel's

failure to raise an issue on direct appeal cannot constitute ineffective assistance when “the appeal

would not have provided grounds for reversal.” Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 840 (9th Cir.

2001) (citation omitted).

Petitioner focuses his objections on appellate counsel’s failure to challenge the restitution

order but continues to generally object to the Report concerning other aspects of appellate

counsel’s performance. 

1. Fine/restitution

Petitioner contends that his appellate counsel's failure to object to the trial court's

imposition of a restitution fine of $10,000 constituted ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 

because petitioner could have demonstrated that he was unable to pay any such fine. 

The restitution fine was imposed pursuant to California Penal Code § 1202.4(b). Under

Penal Code § 1202.4(c), “[t]he court shall impose the restitution fine unless it finds compelling

and extraordinary reasons for not doing so . . . A defendant's inability to pay shall not be

considered a compelling and extraordinary reason not to impose a restitution fine.” But in

setting a fine in excess of the statutory minimum of $200 for a felony conviction, the statute

provides, in relevant part, that the court “shall consider any relevant factors including . . . the

defendant's inability to pay, the seriousness and gravity of the offense and the circumstances of

its commission.” CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE § 1202.4(d).

The trial court enjoyed wide discretion in determining the amount of the restitution fine.

People v. Urbano, 128 Cal. App.4th 396, 406 (2005). “[W]hen the circumstances of a particular

case are such that imposition of the upper term of imprisonment for a particular crime is

justified, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in imposing the maximum restitution fine

provided by law.” People v. McGhee, 197 Cal. App.3d 710, 717 (1988). The Excessive Fines

Clause of the Eighth Amendment is implicated only where a forfeiture is “grossly

disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's offense.” Id. (quoting United States v. Bajakajian,

524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998)). 

Given that petitioner was convicted of second degree murder with the jury finding as true

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an allegation of armed with a firearm under Penal Code § 12022(b), and had a prior felony

conviction, the restitution fine was not “grossly disproportional” under the Constitution.

Accordingly, petitioner has not demonstrated that a different outcome would have resulted if

counsel had objected to the amount of the restitution fine and, therefore, has not shown prejudice

under Strickland. 

2. Other Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Petitioner contends that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue instructional

error, to challenge denial of a severance motion, to challenge the introduction of false testimony,

and to argue trial counsel was ineffective.

Appellate counsel's decision to press only issues on appeal that she believed, in her

professional judgment, had more merit than the claims suggested by petitioner is “within the

range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” McMann v. Richardson, 397

U.S. 759, 771. Petitioner's appellate counsel had no obligation to raise meritless issues on

appeal. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. 

For the reasons set forth above, this court has found that petitioner failed to show any

constitutional violations with respect to instructional error, prosecutorial misconduct and

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Because these claims are without merit, appellate

counsel's failure to present them on appeal cannot constitute a deficient performance and

petitioner has not and cannot show that the claims would have prevailed on appeal. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his claims of ineffective assistance by

appellate counsel.

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C. Conclusion

 Based on the foregoing:

1. Petitioner’s objections are OVERRULED;

2. The Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED in its entirety;

3. Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus in DENIED; and

4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in accordance with this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 8, 2009

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

HON. CATHY ANN BENCIVENGO

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

Case 3:03-cv-00276-L-CAB Document 74 Filed 09/09/09 Page 24 of 24