Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_04-cv-00540/USCOURTS-azd-4_04-cv-00540-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Job Discrimination (Race)

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Plaintiff having not filed a response, the facts as set forth in Defendants' Statement of

Facts are not disputed. The Court's recitation of the factual background is taken from those facts.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

LEONOR DEVEGA,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

ARIZONA BOARD OF REGENTS, et al.,

Defendants. 

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 No. CIV 04-540-TUC-CKJ

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 28].

Plaintiff has not filed a response. The Court does not find scheduling this matter for oral

argument to be appropriate.

Factual and Procedural Background1

Leonor DeVega ("DeVega") is employed by the University of Arizona as a Dining

Services Attendant ("DSA"). DeVega, born in Mexico and having grown up speaking only

Spanish, was repeatedly told during performance appraisals that she needed to improve her

English skills.

In 2002, DeVega was assigned to the beverage and dessert area of the Cactus Grill

under the supervision of Lupita Lopez. Lopez did not believe that DeVega had the versatility

to handle other DSA jobs in the Cactus Grill because the other jobs would involve more

Case 4:04-cv-00540-CKJ Document 29 Filed 07/31/06 Page 1 of 7
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communication with customers. David Galbraith ("Galbraith"), the Director of Dining

Services, became aware of complaints regarding DeVega regarding communication with

customers. When another position opened in the Park Student Union ("PSU"), Galbraith

reassigned DeVega to the PSU where DeVega would not be required to communicate with

customers. With Lopez interpreting, Galbraith informed DeVega that the transfer to PSU

was not permanent and that she would be reassigned again when she improved her English.

The August 22, 2002, reassignment did not affect DeVega's salary and did not change her

job classification.

DeVega filed a discrimination complaint with the University's Equal

Opportunity/Affirmative Action Office ("EO/AA"). The office made a finding that there was

sufficient evidence to support the allegation of national origin discrimination. Although

Galbraith did not agree with the finding, he did agree to return DeVega to her former

assignment in the Cactus Grill. On October 29, 2002, Galbraith issued a memorandum

placing her back in that assignment. In the summer of 2003, DeVega was reassigned to the

On Deck Deli. In her deposition, DeVega indicated that the On Deck Deli reassignment was

fine with her.

On October 29, 2002, DeVega filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and the

ACRD. The EEOC issued a reasonable cause determination on the charge.

On October 8, 2004, this matter was removed from the Superior Court in the Pima

County, Arizona. The First Amended Complaint alleges Disparate Treatment Discrimination

in violation of the Arizona Civil Rights Act ("ACRA"), A.R.S. § 41-1463, Disparate

Treatment Discrimination in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., Discrimination on its face in violation of the ACRA, A.R.S. § 41-

1463, Discrimination on its face in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rghts Act, as

amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, and National

Origin Discrimination in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

On May 26, 2006, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff has

not filed a response.

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Summary Judgment Standard

A party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden to demonstrate, "with

or without supporting affidavits[,]" the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that

judgment as a matter of law should be granted in the moving party's favor. Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986), quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. A

material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct.

2505, 2510 (1986). The facts material in a specific case are to be determined by the

substantive law controlling a given case or issue. Id.

Once the moving party has met the initial burden, the opposing party must "go beyond

the pleadings" and "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine [material] issue

for trial." Id., internal quotes omitted. In opposing summary judgment, plaintiff is not

entitled to rely on the allegations of her complaint, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), or upon conclusory

allegations in affidavits. Cusson-Cobb v. O'Lessker, 953 F.2d 1079, 1081 (7th Cir. 1992).

Further, "a party cannot manufacture a genuine issue of material fact merely by making

assertions in its legal memoranda." S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig

Airlines) v. Walter Kiddle & Co., 690 F.2d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 1982). Because DeVega will

bear the burden of proof at trial as to some of the elements essential to her case, DeVega can

withstand Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment only by making a showing sufficient

to establish a genuine issue of fact regarding those elements and showing that the dispute

properly may be resolved only by the fact-finder because it could reasonably be resolved in

favor of either party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 321, 106 S.Ct. at 2551-52. DeVega must present

specific facts in support of her contentions and must support these facts by proper evidentiary

material, which show that a fact-finder could reasonably find in DeVega's favor; DeVega

cannot merely rest on her pleadings. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). See also T.W. Elec. Service, Inc.

v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir.1987) (citations omitted). 

The Court is not to make credibility determinations with respect to the evidence

offered and is required to draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving

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party. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630-31 (9th

Cir. 1987), citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587

(1986). Summary judgment is not appropriate "where contradictory inferences may

reasonably be drawn from undisputed evidentiary facts[.]" Hollingsworth Solderless

Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1980). By failing to present any evidence

in opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, DeVega has failed to make any

showing of genuine issues of fact. 

Title VII and the Arizona Civil Rights Act

DeVega claims that she was discriminated against based on national origin in

violation of Title VII and the ACRA. The ACRA being patterned after Title VII, Title VII

case law guides the application of both statutes. Smith v. ITT Corp., 918F.Supp. 304, 308

n. 1 (D.Ariz. 1995); see also Lutz v. Glendale Union High School, 403 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir.

2005) (Title VII caselaw is persuasive in interpreting ACRA); Higdon v. Evergreen Int'l

Airlines, Inc., 138 Ariz. 163, 673 P.2d 907, 909 n. 3 (1983). 

DeVegas' claims are based on disparate treatment based on national original. To

establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment, DeVega must show that "(1) she belongs

to a protected class; (2) she was performing according to her employer's legitimate

expectations; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) other employees with

qualifications similar to her own were treated more favorably." Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc.

150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998); Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634 (9th

Cir. 2004). 

An adverse employment action is shown where the employer's decision imposed a

"material change in the terms and conditions of a person's employment." Chuang v. Univ.

of Cal., 225 F.3d 1115, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113

F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that transfer with no reduction in compensation did

not constitute an adverse employment action); Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d

1459, 1465 n. 6 (9th Cir. 1994) (questioning whether transfer from swing shift to day shift

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was adverse employment action where employee "was not demoted, or put in a worse job,

or given any additional responsibilities"); Yates v. AVCO Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 638 (6th

Cir.1987) (no adverse employment action where transfer did not result in loss of salary or

benefits). The United States Supreme Court has clarified that "a plaintiff must show that a

reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse[.]"

Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. —, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006).

Here, DeVega was given a change of assignment that was specifically authorized under the

University policy. Although her duties were changed, both the initial and changed duties

were within the scope of the DSA position. DeVega has made no showing that the alternate

duties constituted a "worse job" rather than simply different duties within the DSA position.

Furthermore, DeVega has not made a showing that she was subject to a reduction in

compensation or given any additional responsibilities. A reasonable employee would not

have found the challenged action materially adverse.

Moreover, DeVega has not suffered a final or lasting adverse employment action.

DeVega was reassigned back to her original position after less than three months. This

modification of DeVega's assignment after her complaint to the EO/AA office indicates that

the alleged adverse employment action was not sufficiently final to create a prima facie case

of employment discrimination. See Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 929-30 (9th

Cir. 2000). Indeed, "[t]o rule otherwise would be to encourage litigation before the employer

has an opportunity to correct through internal grievance procedures any wrong it may have

committed." Id. at 930, quoting Dobbs-Weinstein v. Vanderbilt Univ., 185 F.3d 542, 546 (6th

Cir. 1999).

Assuming arguendo that DeVega had established a prima facie case of discrimination,

it would then be Defendants' burden to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for

its decision. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36

L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Defendants' Statement of Facts indicate that Galbraith was aware of

complaints from customers regarding communicating with DeVega, DeVega's performance

appraisals repeatedly advised her to improve her English skills, DeVega has acknowledged

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that she needed to improve her English skills, Spanish is spoken regularly and openly by the

employees in dining services, and another bilingual employee was asked to speak English

with DeVega in order to help DeVega improve her English. There is no showing of a

discriminatory motive by Defendants. See e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480,

1489-90 (9th Cir. 1993).

Because DeVega has failed to make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine issue

of fact regarding an adverse employment action, summary judgment in favor of Defendants

is appropriate on claims one through four.

Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Arizona law provides, with certain exceptions, that workers' compensation is the

exclusive remedy for negligence claims against employers. A.R.S. § 23-1022; Swichtenberg

v. Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 82, 828 P.2d 1218, 1223 (App. 1991). DeVega has made no

showing that her claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress falls within the

exceptions. Summary judgment in favor of Defendants on count five is appropriate. 

42 U.S.C. § 1981

42 U.S.C. § 1981 has been construed to forbid all racial discrimination in the making of

private as well as public contracts. Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 107 S.

Ct. 2022, 95 L. Ed. 2d 582 (1987); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 96 S. Ct. 2586, 49 L. Ed.

2d 415 (1976). However, there is no jurisdiction in the federal courts to consider suits under 42

U.S.C. § 1981 which are based solely on a claim of national origin discrimination. Bullard v.

OMI Georgia, Inc. 640 F.2d 632, 634 (5th Cir. 1981) ("discrimination purely on the basis of

national origin does not create a cause of action under section 1981"); Gradillas v. Hughes

Aircraft Co., 407 F.Supp. 865 (D.Ariz. 1975). DeVega's claim of discrimination based on

national origin in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 must fail. Summary judgment in favor of

Defendants is appropriate.

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Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 28] is GRANTED;

2. Summary judgment in favor of Defendant is GRANTED, and;

3. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly and shall then close its

file in this matter.

DATED this 28th day of July, 2006.

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