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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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- FILED .... UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALsJnited States Court of Appea.lG Tenth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT OCT 1 f 1991 

LINDA M. BROWN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant and 

Cross Appellee, 

vs. 

FORD, BACON & DAVIS, INC., 

a New Jersey Corporation, 

and FORD, BACON & DAVIS 

UTAH, INC., a Utah 

Corporation, 

Defendants-Appellees 

and Cross Appellants. 

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ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Nos. 89-4119, 89-4124, 

89-4151 & 90-4000 

(D.C. No. C-83-667 J) 

(D. Utah) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McWILLIAMS, BALDOCK and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

In 1982, defendant-appellee Ford, Bacon & Davis, Utah, Inc. 

terminated plaintiff-appellant Linda M. Brown from its employ. 

Plaintiff brought this action, seeking damages for federal civil 

rights violations and for breach of contract. After a bench 

trial, the district court found no federal civil rights violations 

but awarded damages for breach of contract. In a prior appeal, we 

affirmed in all respects except for the breach of contract issue. 

See Brown v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, Utah, Inc., 850 F.2d 634 (10th 

Cir. 1988) (Brown I). On the latter issue, we remanded, 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-4119 Document: 010110090800 Date Filed: 10/11/1991 Page: 1 
instructing the district court to make specific findings. Id. at 

633-34. This is an appeal from the remand judgment. 

The employment contract at issue provided for progressive 

discipline procedures before an employee could be terminated for 

cause. On the other hand, the contract required only that 

severance pay be given to employees terminated in a reduction in 

force. In this case, defendant claimed that plaintiff's 

termination resulted from a reduction in force. Accordingly, it 

gave her severance pay but did not give her notice. After the 

bench trial, the district court found that defendant was motivated 

by both a reduction in force and cause when it terminated 

plaintiff. It interpreted the contract to require progressive 

discipline under these circumstances. Therefore, it awarded 

damages equal to plaintiff's accrued salary during the time it 

would have taken for defendant to comply with the progressive 

discipline procedures. It cut the damages off at the end of this 

period, however, finding that defendant would have been terminated 

anyway because of a lack of work, i.e. a reduction in force. 

In the prior appeal, we stated: 

By finding that plaintiff was discharged both for cause 

and as part of a reduction in force, the district court 

has created an unintended dilemma. If plaintiff was 

discharged as part of a reduction in force, there was no 

breach of contract and plaintiff is entitled to no 

damages whatsoever. If plaintiff was discharged for 

cause, however, defendants breached her contract by 

failing to afford her the 'progressive discipline' 

procedures her contract required as a precondition to 

discharge for cause. 

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Appellate Case: 89-4119 Document: 010110090800 Date Filed: 10/11/1991 Page: 2 
The district court's efforts to forge a just and 

equitable result have produced an unsupportable 

judgment. 

850 F.2d at 633-34. On remand, the district court referred to the 

above quotation, stating that "[d]ual motives do not necessarily 

create a dilemma." Brown v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, Inc., No. 

C-83-667-J, unpub. memo., (D. Utah Aug. 3, 1989). The court then 

awarded damages, adopting its previous finding that both factors 

motivated the termination. Id. Although the second damage award 

is higher than the first, the court used the same analysis. 

We fully understand that a termination decision may be 

motivated by more than one reason; however, we have interpreted 

the contract in this case and have found as a matter of law that 

plaintiff is not entitled to a damage award unless cause was the 

determinative or preponderant, see Webster's Third New 

International Dictionary 1791 (unabr. ed. 1981), factor in her 

termination. Under these circumstances, a termination primarily 

motivated by a reduction in force cannot support an award of 

contract damages. Conversely, if the termination was motivated 

primarily by cause, the contract has been breached and damages are 

appropriate. We think our interpretation is supported by 

subsequent Utah case law interpreting the same contract. See 

Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., 777 P.2d 483, 486 

(Utah 1989) (summary judgment granted to FB & D when reduction in 

force triggered the decision to terminate). Dispositively, 

however, our interpretation in Brown I represents the law of the 

case, and the district court is required to effectuate the prior 

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Appellate Case: 89-4119 Document: 010110090800 Date Filed: 10/11/1991 Page: 3 
. ...., 

mandate. See United States v. Monsisvais, No. 90-2254, 1991 WL 

194590 (10th Cir. Oct. 3, 1991). 

We again remand for a determination of which motivation was 

the preponderant factor in this termination. If cause was the 

preponderant factor, the district court is instructed to award 

damages in accordance with our prior remand. This award should 

include front pay equalling the amount of accrued salary plaintiff 

would have received during the time it would have taken FB & D to 

afford her progressive discipline. See Brown I, 850 F.2d at 

633-34 & n.2 (citing Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 

636 P.2d 1063, 1067-69 (Utah 1981)). The award should also 

include back pay. Id. If, however, a reduction in force was the 

preponderant factor, "plaintiff is entitled to no damages 

whatsoever." Id. at 633. We have already determined that 

plaintiff cannot have it both ways; if the district court cannot 

determine whether cause was the preponderant factor, plaintiff has 

failed to prove a contract breach, and the district court is 

instructed to enter judgment in favor of defendant. The remand 

judgment of the district court is VACATED, and on REMAND the 

district court is instructed to enter judgment consistent with our 

prior opinion and this order and judgment. 

SO ORDERED. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

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