Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-17-17351/USCOURTS-ca9-17-17351-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ENIGMA SOFTWARE GROUP USA,

LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MALWAREBYTES, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-17351

D.C. No.

5:17-cv-02915-

EJD

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Edward J. Davila, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 15, 2019

San Francisco, California

Filed September 12, 2019

Before: Mary M. Schroeder and Johnnie B. Rawlinson,

Circuit Judges, and Robert S. Lasnik,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Schroeder;

Dissent by Judge Rawlinson

* The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.

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2 ENIGMA SOFTWARE V. MALWAREBYTES

SUMMARY**

Communications Decency Act

The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal, as barred

by § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, of claims

under New York law and the Lanham Act’s false advertising

provision.

Enigma Software Group USA, LLC, and Malwarebytes,

Inc., were providers of software that helped internet users to

filter unwanted content from their computers. Enigma

alleged that Malwarebytes configured its software to block

users from accessing Enigma’s software in order to divert

Enigma’s customers.

Section 230 immunizes software providers from liability

for actions taken to help users block certain types of

unwanted online material, including material that is of a

violent or sexual nature or is “otherwise objectionable.” 

Distinguishing Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d

1169 (9th Cir. 2009), the panel held that the phrase

“otherwise objectionable” does not include software that the

provider finds objectionable for anticompetitive reasons. As

to the state-law claims, the panel held that Enigma’s

allegations of anticompetitive animus were sufficient to

withstand dismissal. As to the federal claim, the panel further

held that § 230’s exception for intellectual property claims

did not apply because this false advertising claim did not

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ENIGMA SOFTWARE V. MALWAREBYTES 3

relate to trademarks or any other type of intellectual property. 

The panel remanded the case for further proceedings.

Dissenting, Judge Rawlinson wrote that § 230 is broadly

worded, and Enigma did not persuasively make a case for

limitation of the statute beyond its provisions.

COUNSEL

Terry Budd (argued), Budd Law PLLC, Wexford,

Pennsylvania; Christopher M. Verdini and Anna Shabalov,

K&L Gates LLP, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Edward P.

Sangster, K&L Gates LLP, San Francisco, California; for

Plaintiff-Appellant.

Tyler G. Newby (argued), Guinevere L. Jobson, and Sapna

Mehta, Fenwick & West LLP, San Francisco, California, for

Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:

OVERVIEW

This dispute concerns § 230, the so-called “Good

Samaritan” provision of the Communications DecencyAct of

1996, enacted primarily to protect minors from harmful

online viewing. The provision immunizes computer-software

providers from liability for actions taken to help users block

certain types of unwanted, online material. The provision

expressly describes material of a violent or sexual nature, but

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4 ENIGMA SOFTWARE V. MALWAREBYTES

also includes a catchall for material that is “otherwise

objectionable.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). We have previously

recognized that the provision establishes a subjective standard

whereby internet users and software providers decide what

online material is objectionable. See Zango Inc. v. Kaspersky

Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2009).

The parties to this dispute are both providers of software

that help internet users filter unwanted content from their

computers. Plaintiff-Appellant Enigma Software Group

USA, LLC has alleged violations of New York state law and

a violation of the Lanham Act’s false advertising provision. 

Each claim is based on the allegation that defendant,

Malwarebytes Inc., has configured its software to block users

from accessingEnigma’s software in order to divert Enigma’s

customers. The district court, relying on Zango, dismissed

the action as barred by § 230’s broad recognition of

immunity. We did not hold in Zango, however, that the

immunity was limitless.

This case differs from Zango in that here the parties are

competitors. In this appeal Enigma contends that the

“otherwise objectionable” catchall is not broad enough to

encompass a provider’s objection to a rival’s software in

order to suppress competition. Enigma points to Judge

Fisher’s concurrence in Zango warning against an overly

expansive interpretation of the provision that could lead to

anticompetitive results. We heed that warning and reverse

the district court’s decision that read Zango to require such an

interpretation. We hold that the phrase “otherwise

objectionable” does not include software that the provider

finds objectionable for anticompetitive reasons.

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ENIGMA SOFTWARE V. MALWAREBYTES 5

Malwarebytes contends that it had legitimate reasons for

finding Enigma’s software objectionable apart from any

anticompetitive effect, and that immunity should therefore

apply on Enigma’s state-law claims, even if the district court

erred in its interpretation of Zango. We conclude, however,

that Enigma’s allegations of anticompetitive animus are

sufficient to withstand dismissal.

Enigma’s federal claim warrants an additional analytical

step. The CDA’s immunity provision contains an exception

for intellectual property claims, stating that “[n]othing in this

section shall be construed to limit or expand any law

pertaining to intellectual property.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2). 

Enigma has brought a false advertising claim under the

Lanham Act, a federal statute that deals with trademarks. 

Enigma contends that the false advertising claim is one

“pertaining to intellectual property” and thus outside the

scope of § 230 immunity.

Although it is true that the Lanham Act itself deals with

intellectual property, i.e. trademarks, Enigma’s false

advertising claim does not relate to trademarks or any other

type of intellectual property. The district court therefore

correctly held that the intellectual property exception to

immunity does not apply to the false advertising claim. The

district court went on to hold that under Zango’s application

of § 230 immunity, Malwarebytes was immune from liability

for false advertising. As with Enigma’s state law claims, we

hold that the district court read Zango too broadly in

dismissing the federal claim. We therefore reverse the

judgment on this claim as well.

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6 ENIGMA SOFTWARE V. MALWAREBYTES

STATUTORY BACKGROUND

This appeal centers on the immunity provision contained

in § 230(c)(2) of the Communications DecencyAct (“CDA”),

47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1996). The CDA, which was enacted as

part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, contains this

“Good Samaritan” provision that, in subparagraph B,

immunizes internet-service providers from liability for giving

internet users the technical means to restrict access to the

types of material described in the subparagraph A. Id.

§ 230(c)(2)(B). The material, as described in that

subparagraph, is “material that the provider or user considers

to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,

harassing, or otherwise objectionable.” Id. § 230(c)(2)(A).1

1 Section 230(c) is entitled “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking

and screening of offensive material.” The relevant subsection (2), “Civil

liability,” states, in full, as follows:

“No provider or user of an interactive computer service

shall be held liable on account of –

(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict

access to or availability of material that the provider or

user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,

excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise

objectionable, whether or not such material is

constitutionally protected; or

(B) any action taken to enable or make available to

information content providers or others the technical

means to restrict access to material described in

paragraph [A].”

47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A), (B).

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ENIGMA SOFTWARE V. MALWAREBYTES 7

This grant of immunity dates back to the early days of the

internet when concerns first arose about children being able

to access online pornography. Parents could not program

their computers to block online pornography, and this was at

least partially due to a combination of trial court decisions in

New York that had deterred the creation of online-filtration

efforts. In the first case, Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., a

federal court held that passive providers of online services

and content were not charged with knowledge of, or

responsibility for, the content on their network. See 776 F.

Supp 135, 139–43 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Therefore, if a provider

remained passive and uninvolved in filtering third-party

material from its network, the provider could not be held

liable for any offensive content it carried from third parties. 

See id.

The corollary of this rule, as later articulated by a New

York state trial court, was that once a service provider

undertook to filter offensive content from its network, it

assumed responsibility for any offensive content it failed to

filter, even if it lacked knowledge of the content. See Stratton

Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710, *5

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (“Prodigy’s conscious choice,

to gain the benefits of editorial control, has opened it up to a

greater liability than CompuServe and other computer

networks that make no such choice.”), superseded by statute,

Communications Decency Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110

Stat. 137, as recognized in Shiamili v. Real Estate Group of

N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011 (2011). Representative Chris

Cox warned during debates on proposed legislation aimed at

overruling Stratton Oakmont, that premising liability on

providers’ efforts to filter out offensive material was

deterring software companies from providing the filtering

software and tools that could help parents block pornography

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8 ENIGMA SOFTWARE V. MALWAREBYTES

and other offensive material from their home computers. See

141 Cong. Rec. 22,045 (1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).

The Stratton Oakmont decision, along with the increasing

public concern about pornography on the internet, served as

catalysts for legislators to consider greater internet regulation. 

Congress considered, in early 1995, two different

amendments to the Telecommunications Act. The first,

called the Exon-Coats amendment, targeted pornography at

the source by prohibiting its dissemination. See id. at 16,068. 

Proponents of this bill argued that parents lacked the

technological sophistication needed to implement onlinefiltration tools and that the government therefore needed to

step in. Id. at 16,099. The second proposal, entitled the

Online Family Empowerment Act (“OFEA”), targeted

internet pornography at the receiving end by encouraging

further development of filtration tools. Id. at 22,044. 

Proponents of this bill pointed out that prohibiting

pornography at the source raised constitutional issues

involving prior restraint, and argued that parents, not

government bureaucrats, were better positioned to protect

their children from offensive online material. Id. at 16,013.

On February 1, 1996, Congress enacted both approaches

as part of the CDA. The Exon-Coats amendment was

codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223, but was later invalidated byReno

v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 877–79 (1997). Before us is OFEA’s

approach, enacted as § 230(c)(2) of the CDA. See Pub L. No.

104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 56, 137–39. By immunizing

internet-service providers from liability for any action taken

to block, or help users block offensive and objectionable

online content, Congress overruled Stratton Oakmont and

thereby encouraged the development of more sophisticated

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ENIGMA SOFTWARE V. MALWAREBYTES 9

methods of online filtration. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-

879, at 194 (1996).

The history of § 230(c)(2) shows that access to

pornography was Congress’s motivating concern, but the

language used in § 230 included much more, covering any

online material considered to be “excessively violent,

harassing, or otherwise objectionable.” See 47 U.S.C.

§ 230(c)(2)(A)–(B). Perhaps to guide the interpretation of

this broad language, Congress took the rather unusual step of

setting forth policy goals in the immediately preceding

paragraph of the statute. See id. § 230(b). Of the five goals,

three are particularly relevant here. These goals were “to

encourage the development of technologies which maximize

user control”; “to empower parents to restrict their children’s

access to objectionable or inappropriate online content”; and

“to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that

presently exists for the Internet and other interactive

computer services.” See id. § 230(b)(2)–(4).

This court has decided one prior case where we

considered the scope of § 230, but were principally concerned

with which types of online-service providers Congress

intended to immunize. See Zango, 568 F.3d at 1175. We

acknowledged that providers of computer security software

can benefit from § 230 immunity, and that such providers

have discretion to identify what online content is considered

“objectionable,” id., but we had no reason to discuss the

scope of that discretion. The separate concurrence in Zango

focused on the future need for considering appropriate

limitations on provider control. See id. at 1178–80 (Fisher,

J. concurring). District courts have differed in their

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10 ENIGMA SOFTWARE V. MALWAREBYTES

interpretations of Zango and the extent to which it

encouraged providers to block material. What is clear to us

from the statutory language, history and case law is that the

criteria for blocking online material must be based on the

characteristics of the online material, i.e. its content, and not

on the identity of the entity that produced it.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff-appellant Enigma Software Group USA, LLC, is

a Florida company that sells computer security software

nationwide. Malwarebytes Inc., a Delaware corporation

headquartered in California, also sells computer security

software nationwide. Malwarebytes and Enigma are

therefore direct competitors.

Providers of computer security software help users

identify and block malicious or threatening software, termed

malware, from their computers. Each provider generates its

own criteria to determine what software might threaten users. 

Defendant Malwarebytes programs its software to search for

what it calls PotentiallyUnwanted Programs (“PUPs”). PUPs

include, for example, what Malwarebytes describes as

software that contains “obtrusive, misleading, or deceptive

advertisements, branding or search practices.” Once

Malwarebytes’s security software is purchased and installed

on a user’s computer, it scans for PUPs, and according to

Enigma’s complaint, if the user tries to download a program

that Malwarebytes has determined to be a PUP, a pop-up alert

warns the user of a security risk and advises the user to stop

the download and block the potentially threatening content.

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ENIGMA SOFTWARE V. MALWAREBYTES 11

Malwarebytes and Enigma have been direct competitors

since 2008, the year of Malwarebytes’s inception. In their

first eight years as competitors, neither Enigma nor

Malwarebytes flagged the other’s software as threatening or

unwanted. In late 2016, however, Malwarebytes revised its

PUP-detection criteria to include any program that, according

to Malwarebytes, users did not seem to like.

After the revision, Malwarebytes’s software immediately

began flagging Enigma’s most popular programs—

RegHunter and SpyHunter—as PUPs. Thereafter, anytime a

user with Malwarebytes’s software tried to download those

Enigma programs, the user was alerted of a security risk and,

according to Enigma’s complaint, the download was

prohibited, i.e. Malwarebytes “quarantined” the programs. 

Enigma alleges that Malwarebytes’s new definition of a PUP

includes subjective criteria that Malwarebytes has

“implemented at its own malicious whim” in order to identify

Enigma’s programs as threats. Enigma characterizes the

revision as a “guise” for anticompetitive conduct, and alleges

that its programs are “legitimate”, “highly regarded”, and

“pose no security threat.” As a result of Malwarebytes’s

actions, Enigma claims that it has lost customers and revenue

and experienced harm to its reputation.

Enigma brought this action against Malwarebytes in early

2017, in the Southern District of New York. Enigma claimed

that Malwarebytes has used its PUP-modification process to

advance a “bad faith campaign of unfair competition” aimed

at “deceiving consumers and interfering with [Enigma’s]

customer relationships.”

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12 ENIGMA SOFTWARE V. MALWAREBYTES

Enigma’s complaint alleged four claims, three under New

York state law and one under federal law. The first state-law

claim accused Malwarebytes of using deceptive business

practices in violation of New York General Business Law

§ 349. Enigma’s second and third state-law claims alleged

tortious interference with business and contractual relations

in violation of New York state common law. The federal

claim accused Malwarebytes of making false and misleading

statements to deceive consumers into choosing

Malwarebytes’s securitysoftware over Enigma’s, in violation

of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B).

Malwarebytes sought a change of venue. Although

Enigma maintained that venue was proper in New York

because Malwarebytes’s conduct affected users and

computers within that state, the conduct at issue had national

reach. The district court therefore granted Malwarebytes’s

motion to transfer the case to the Northern District of

California, where Malwarebytes is headquartered.

Malwarebytes then moved to dismiss for failure to state

a claim, arguing that it was immune from liability under

§ 230(c)(2) of the CDA. The district court granted the

motion, finding that under the reasoning of our decision in

Zango, Malwarebytes was immune under § 230 on all of

Enigma’s claims. The district court interpreted Zango to

mean that anti-malware software providers are free to block

users from accessing any material that those providers, in

their discretion, deem to be objectionable. Given

Malwarebytes’s status as a provider of filtering software, and

its assertion that Enigma’s programs are potentially

unwanted, the district court held that Malwarebytes could not

be liable under state law for blocking users’ access to

Enigma’s programs.

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ENIGMA SOFTWARE V. MALWAREBYTES 13

With respect to the federal claim, the district court had to

consider the intellectual property exception to the CDA’s

immunity provision set forth in 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2). The

somewhat opaque exception states that § 230 immunity “shall

not be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to

intellectual property.” Id. Enigma’s federal claim alleged

false advertising under the Lanham Act, and Enigma

contended that immunity did not apply because that statute

deals with intellectual property, i.e. trademarks. The district

court reasoned, however, that although the Lanham Act itself

deals with intellectual property, Enigma’s false advertising

claim did not relate to any type of intellectual property and

therefore § 230 immunity encompassed that claim as well. 

Having concluded that Malwarebytes was immune on all four

claims, the district court dismissed the complaint and granted

judgment for Malwarebytes.

On appeal, Enigma primarily contends that the district

court erred in interpreting our Zango opinion to give online

service providers unlimited discretion to block online content,

and that the Good Samaritan blocking provision does not

provide such sweeping immunity that it encompasses

anticompetitive conduct.

DISCUSSION

I. Scope of § 230(c)(2) Immunity as Applied to StateLaw Claims

The district court held that our opinion in Zango

controlled, and interpreted Zango to mean that an onlineservice provider cannot be liable for blocking internet users

from accessing online content that the provider considers

objectionable, regardless of the provider’s motivations or the

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14 ENIGMA SOFTWARE V. MALWAREBYTES

harmful effects of the blocking. The scope of the statutory

catchall phrase, “otherwise objectionable,” was not at issue in

Zango, however. The central issue in Zango was whether

§ 230 immunity applies to filtering software providers like

the defendant Kaspersky in that case, and both parties in this

case. See 568 F.3d at 1173, 1176. We held such providers

had immunity. Id. at 1177–78. At the end of our majority

opinion, we emphasized the relevant statutory language in

stating that § 230 permits providers to block material “that

either the provider or the user considers . . . objectionable.” 

See id. at 1177 (original emphasis). The district court focused

on that sentence and reasoned that Malwarebytes had

unfettered discretion to select what criteria makes a program

“objectionable” under § 230, and further, that the court was

not to analyze Malwarebytes’s reasons for doing so.

The majority in Zango did not, however, address whether

there were limitations on a provider’s discretion to declare

online content “objectionable.” No such issue was raised in

the appeal. We noted that Zango “waived” the argument that

its software was not “objectionable.” See id. at 1176–77. We

therefore held that § 230 immunity covered Kaspersky’s

decision to block users from accessing the type of content at

issue in that case and concluded that § 230 permits providers

to block material that “the provider considers . . .

objectionable.” Id. at 1177.

It was Judge Fisher’s concurring opinion in Zango that

framed the issue for future litigation as to whether the term

“objectionable” might be construed in a way that would

immunize providers even if they blocked online content for

improper reasons. See id. at 1178–80 (Fisher, J. concurring). 

Judge Fisher warned that extending immunity beyond the

facts of that case could “pose serious problems,” particularly

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ENIGMA SOFTWARE V. MALWAREBYTES 15

where a provider is charged with using § 230 immunity to

advance an anticompetitive agenda. See id. at 1178. He said

that an “unbounded” reading of the phrase “otherwise

objectionable” would allow a content provider to “block

content for anticompetitive purposes or merely at its

malicious whim.” Id.

District courts nationwide have grappled with the issues

discussed in Zango’s majority and concurring opinions, and

have reached differing results. Like the district court in this

case, at least two other federal district courts have relied on

Zango to dismiss software-provider lawsuits against

Malwarebytes where the plaintiff claimed that Malwarebytes

improperly characterized the plaintiff’s software as a PUP. 

See PC Drivers Headquarters, LP v. Malwarebytes Inc.,

371 F. Supp. 3d 652 (N.D. Cal. 2019); PC Drivers

Headquarters, LP v. Malwarebytes, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-234-

RP, 2018 WL 2996897, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2018).

Other district courts have viewed our holding in Zango to

be less expansive. See Song fi Inc. v. Google, Inc., 108 F.

Supp. 3d 876, 884 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (noting that just because

“the statute requires the user or service provider to

subjectively believe the blocked or screened material is

objectionable does not mean anything or everything YouTube

finds subjectivelyobjectionable is within the scope of Section

230(c),” and concluding that, “[o]n the contrary such an

‘unbounded’ reading . . . would enable content providers to

‘block content for anticompetitive reasons[.]’”) (quoting

Judge Fisher’s concurrence in Zango); Sherman v. Yahoo!

Inc., 997 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1138 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (same);see

also Holomaxx Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 783 F. Supp. 2d

1097, 1104 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2011) (acknowledging that a

provider’s subjective determination of what constitutes

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16 ENIGMA SOFTWARE V. MALWAREBYTES

objectionable material under § 230(c)(2) is not limitless, but

finding that the harassing emails in that case were reasonably

objectionable).

We find these decisions recognizing limitations in the

scope of immunity to be persuasive. The courts interpreting

Zango as providing unlimited immunity seem to us to have

stretched our opinion in Zango too far. This is because the

focus of that appeal was neither what type of material may be

blocked, nor why it may be blocked, but rather who benefits

from § 230 immunity. The issue was whether § 230

immunity applies to filtering-software providers. See Zango,

568 F.3d at 1173. We answered that question in the

affirmative, explaining that Kaspersky was the type of

“interactive computer service” to which § 230(c)(2) expressly

referred, and that Kaspersky was engaged in the type of

conduct to which § 230(c)(2) generally applies. Id.

at 1175–76.

As relevant here, the majority opinion in Zango

establishes only that Malwarebytes, as a filtering-software

provider, is an entity to which the immunity afforded by

§ 230 would apply. The majority opinion does not require us

to hold that we lack the authority to question Malwarebytes’s

determinations of what content to block. We must therefore

in this case analyze § 230 to decide what limitations, if any,

there are on the ability of a filtering software provider to

block users from receiving online programming.

The legal question before us is whether § 230(c)(2)

immunizes blocking and filtering decisions that are driven by

anticompetitive animus. The majority in Zango had no

occasion to address the issue, and the parties in that case were

not competitors. See 568 F. 3d at 1170 (explaining

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ENIGMA SOFTWARE V. MALWAREBYTES 17

Kaspersky is a security software provider; Zango provides an

online service for users to stream movies, video games, and

music). This is the first § 230 case we are aware of that

involves direct competitors.

In this appeal, Enigma alleges that Malwarebytes blocked

Enigma’s programs for anticompetitive reasons, not because

the programs’ content was objectionable within the meaning

of § 230, and that § 230 does not provide immunity for

anticompetitive conduct. Malwarebytes’s position is that,

given the catchall, Malwarebytes has immunity regardless of

any anticompetitive motives.

We cannot accept Malwarebytes’s position, as it appears

contrary to CDA’s history and purpose. Congress expressly

provided that the CDA aims “to preserve the vibrant and

competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet

and other interactive computer services” and to “remove

disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking

and filtering technologies.” § 230(b)(2)–(3). Congress said

it gave providers discretion to identify objectionable content

in large part to protect competition, not suppress it. Id. In

other words, Congress wanted to encourage the development

of filtration technologies, not to enable software developers

to drive each other out of business.

In the infancy of the internet, the unwillingness of

Congress to spell out the meaning of “otherwise

objectionable” was understandable. The broad grant of

protective control over online content may have been more

readily acceptable in an era before the potential magnitude of

internet communication was fullycomprehended. Indeed, the

fears of harmful content at the time led Congress to enact, in

the same statute, an outright ban on the dissemination of

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18 ENIGMA SOFTWARE V. MALWAREBYTES

online pornography, a ban which the Supreme Court swiftly

rejected as unconstitutional a year later. See Reno v. ACLU,

521 U.S. at 877–79 (striking down 47 U.S.C. § 223).

We must today recognize that interpreting the statute to

give providers unbridled discretion to block online content

would, as Judge Fisher warned, enable and potentially

motivate internet-service providers to act for their own, and

not the public, benefit. See 568 F.3d at 1178 (Fisher, J.,

concurring). Immunity for filtering practices aimed at

suppressing competition, rather than protecting internet users,

would lessen user control over what information they receive,

contrary to Congress’s stated policy. See § 230(b)(3) (to

maximize user control over what content they view). Indeed,

users selecting a security software provider must trust that the

provider will block material consistent with that user’s

desires. Users would not reasonably anticipate providers

blocking valuable online content in order to stifle

competition. Immunizing anticompetitive blocking would,

therefore, be contrary to another of the statute’s express

policies: “removing disincentives for the utilization of

blocking and filtering technologies.” Id. § 230(b)(4).

We therefore reject Malwarebytes’s position that § 230

immunity applies regardless of anticompetitive purpose. But

we cannot, as Enigma asks us to do, ignore the breadth of the

term “objectionable” by construing it to cover only material

that is sexual or violent in nature. Enigma would have us

read the general, catchall phrase “otherwise objectionable” as

limited to the categories of online material described in the

seven specific categories that precede it. See 47 U.S.C.

§ 230(c)(2) (describing material that is “obscene, lewd,

lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing or otherwise

objectionable.”). Enigma argues that its software has no such

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ENIGMA SOFTWARE V. MALWAREBYTES 19

content, and that Malwarebytes therefore cannot claim

immunity for blocking it.

Enigma relies on the principle of ejusdem generis, which

teaches that when a generic term follows specific terms, the

generic term should be construed to reference subjects akin

to those with the specific enumeration. See, e.g., Norfolk &

W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117, 129

(1991). But the specific categories listed in § 230(c)(2) vary

greatly: Material that is lewd or lascivious is not necessarily

similar to material that is violent, or material that is harassing. 

If the enumerated categories are not similar, they provide

little or no assistance in interpreting the more general

category. We have previously recognized this concept. See

Sacramento Reg’l Cty. Sanitation Dist. v. Reilly, 905 F.2d

1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Where the list of objects that

precedes the ‘or other’ phrase is dissimilar, ejusdem generis

does not apply”).

We think that the catchall was more likely intended to

encapsulate forms of unwanted online content that Congress

could not identify in the 1990s. But even if ejusdem generis

did apply, it would not support Enigma’s narrow

interpretation of “otherwise objectionable.” Congress wanted

to give internet users tools to avoid not only violent or

sexually explicit materials, but also harassing materials. 

Spam, malware and adware could fairly be placed close

enough to harassing materials to at least be called “otherwise

objectionable” while still being faithful to the principle of

ejusdem generis. Several district courts have, for example, 

regarded unsolicited marketing emails as “objectionable.” 

See, e.g., Holomaxx, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1104; e360Insight,

LLC v. Comcast Corp., 546 F. Supp. 2d 605, 608–610 (N.D.

Ill. 2008); see also Smith v. Trusted Universal Standards In

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20 ENIGMA SOFTWARE V. MALWAREBYTES

Elec. Transactions, Inc., No.CIV09-4567-RBK-KMW, 2010

WL 1799456, at *6 (D.N.J. May 4, 2010). But we do not, in

this appeal, determine the precise relationship between the

term “otherwise objectionable” and the seven categories that

precede it. We conclude only that if a provider’s basis for

objecting to and seeking to block materials is because those

materials benefit a competitor, the objection would not fall

within any category listed in the statute and the immunity

would not apply.

Malwarebytes’s fallback position is that, even if it would

lack immunity for anticompetitive blocking, Malwarebytes

has found Enigma’s programs “objectionable” for legitimate

reasons based on the programs’ content. Malwarebytes

asserts that Enigma’s programs, SpyHunter and RegHunter,

use “deceptive tactics” to scare users into believing that they

have to download Enigma’s programs to prevent their

computers from being infected. Enigma alleges, however,

that its programs “pose no security threat” and that

Malwarebytes’s justification for blocking these “legitimate”

and “highly regarded” programs was a guise for

anticompetitive animus.

The district court interpreted our holding in Zango to

foreclose this debate entirely, implicitly reasoning that if

Malwarebytes has sole discretion to select what programs are

“objectionable,” the court need not evaluate the reasons for

the designation. Because we hold that § 230 does not provide

immunity for blocking a competitor’s program for

anticompetitive reasons, and because Enigma has specifically

alleged that the blocking here was anticompetitive, Enigma’s

claims survive the motion to dismiss. We therefore reverse

the dismissal of Enigma’s state-law claims and we remand for

further proceedings.

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ENIGMA SOFTWARE V. MALWAREBYTES 21

II. The Federal Claim and the CDA’s Intellectual

Property Exception

Enigma’s fourth claim is a claim for false advertising

under the Lanham Act, a statute dealing with a form of

intellectual property, i.e. trademarks. Enigma alleges that

Malwarebytes publicly mischaracterized Enigma’s programs

SpyHunter and RegHunter as potentially unwanted or PUPs,

and it did so in order to interfere with Enigma’s customer

base and divert those customers to Malwarebytes.

Section 230(e)(2) of the CDA contains an exception to

immunity for intellectual property claims. See 47 U.S.C.

§ 230(e)(2). This exception, known as the intellectual

property carve out, states that § 230 immunity shall not “limit

or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.” Id. In

light of that exception, Enigma contends that immunitywould

not bar Enigma’s Lanham Act claim, even if immunity is

available to Malwarebytes on the state law claims. Although

Enigma’s claim does not itself involve an intellectual

property right, Enigma characterizes its federal false

advertising claim as one “pertaining to intellectual property”

within the meaning of § 230(e)(2) because the Lanham Act

deals with intellectual property. The district court rejected

this argument, and rightly so.

This is because even though the Lanham Act is known as

the federal trademark statute, not all claims brought under the

statute involve trademarks. The Act contains two parts, one

governing trademark infringement and another governing

false designations of origin, false descriptions, and dilution. 

Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (trademark infringement) with id.

§ 1125 (the rest). The latter, § 1125, creates two bases of

liability, false association and false advertising. Compare

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22 ENIGMA SOFTWARE V. MALWAREBYTES

§ 1125(a)(1)(A) (false association) with § 1125(a)(1)(B)

(false advertising). Thus, although “much of the Lanham Act

addresses the registration, use, and infringement of

trademarks and related marks, . . . § 1125(a) is one of the few

provisions that goes beyond trademark protection.” Dastar

Corp. v. Twentieth Cent. Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 28–29

(2003).

In this appeal, we must decide whether the exception to

immunity contained in § 230(e)(2) applies to false advertising

claims brought under the Lanham Act. Our court has not

addressed the issue, although we have considered the

exception as it would apply to state law claims. See Perfect

10 v. CCBill, LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2009)

(concluding that the intellectual property exception in

§ 230(e)(2) was not intended to cover intellectual property

claims brought under state law); see also Gen. Steel Domestic

Sales, L.L.C. v. Chumley, 840 F.3d 1178, 1182 (10th Cir.

2016) (declining to analyze the intellectual property

exception; explaining that because “§ 230 does not contain

the grant of immunity from suit contended for, it is

unnecessary to discuss its applicability to the Lanham Act

false advertising claims”).

We have observed before that because Congress did not

define the term “intellectual property law,” it should be

construed narrowly to advance the CDA’s express policy of

providing broad immunity. See Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1119. 

One of these express policy reasons for providing immunity

was, as Congress stated in § 230(b)(2), “to preserve the

vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for

the Internet and other interactive computer services,

unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” 47 U.S.C.

§ 230(b)(2). The intellectual property exception is a

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ENIGMA SOFTWARE V. MALWAREBYTES 23

limitation on immunity, and the CDA’s stated congressional

purpose counsels against an expansive interpretation of the

exception that would diminish the scope of immunity. If the

intellectual property law exception were to encompass any

claim raised under the Lanham Act—including false

advertising claims that do not directly involve intellectual

property rights—it would create a potential for new liability

that would upset, rather than “preserve” the vibrant culture of

innovation on the internet that Congress envisioned. Id.

We therefore hold that the intellectual property exception

contained in § 230(e)(2) encompasses claims pertaining to an

established intellectual property right under federal law, like

those inherent in a patent, copyright, or trademark. The

exception does not apply to false advertising claims brought

under § 1125(a) of the Lanham Act, unless the claim itself

involves intellectual property.

Here, Enigma’s Lanham Act claim derives from the

statute’s false advertising provision. Enigma alleges that

Malwarebytes mischaracterized Enigma’s most popular

software programs in order to divert Enigma’s customers to

Malwarebytes. These allegations do not relate to or involve

trademark rights or any other intellectual property rights. 

Thus, Enigma’s false advertising claim is not a claim

“pertaining to intellectual property law” within the meaning

of § 230(e)(2). The district court correctly concluded that the

intellectual property exception to immunity does not

encompass Enigma’s Lanham Act claim.

The district court went on to hold, however, as it did with

the state law claims, that Malwarebytes is nevertheless

immune from liability under our decision in Zango. As we

have explained with respect to the state law claims, Zango did

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24 ENIGMA SOFTWARE V. MALWAREBYTES

not define an unlimited scope of immunity under § 230, and

immunity under that section does not extend to

anticompetitive conduct. Because the federal claim, like the

state claims, is based on allegations of such conduct, the

federal claim survives dismissal. We therefore reverse the

district court’s judgment in favor of Malwarebytes and

remand for further proceedings on this claim as well.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is reversed and the case

is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

In his concurring opinion in Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky

Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1179–80 (9th Cir. 2009), Judge

Fisher acknowledged that “until Congress clarifies the statute

or a future litigant makes the case for a possible limitation,”

the “broadly worded” Communications Decency Act (the

Act) afforded immunity to a distributor of Internet security

software. Congress has not further clarified the statute and

Enigma Software has not persuasively made a case for

limitation of the statute beyond its provisions.

The majority opinion seeks to limit the statute based on

the fact that the parties are competitors. See Majority

Opinion, p. 4. However, nothing in the statutory provisions

or our majority opinion in Zango supports such a distinction. 

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ENIGMA SOFTWARE V. MALWAREBYTES 25

Rather the “broad language” of the Act specifically

encompasses “any action voluntarily taken [by a provider] to

restrict access to . . . material that the provider . . . considers

to be . . . otherwise objectionable.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A)

(emphasis added). Under the language of the Act, so long as

the provider’s action is taken to remove “otherwise

objectionable” material, the restriction of access is

immunized. See id. The majority’s real complaint is not that

the district court construed the statute too broadly, but that the

statute is written too broadly. However, that defect, if it is a

defect, is one beyond our authority to correct. See Baker

Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2169 (2015).

In particular, the majority holds that the criteria for

blocking online material may not be based on the identity of

the entity that produced it. See Majority Opinion, p. 10. 

Unfortunately, however, that conclusion cannot be squared

with the broad language of the Act. Under the language of

the statute, if the blocked content is “otherwise objectionable”

to the provider, the Act bestows immunity. Zango, 568 F.3d

at 1173 (“[T]he statute plainly immunizes from suit a

provider of interactive computer servicesthatmakes available

software that filters or screens material that the user or the

provider deems objectionable.”) (emphasis in the original);

1174 (“According protection to providers of programs that

filter adware and malware is also consistent with the

Congressional goals for immunity articulated in [47 U.S.C.]

§ 230 itself.”). Although the parties were not direct

competitors, the plaintiff in Zango asserted similar anticompetition effects. See id. at 1171–72. The majority’s

policy arguments are in conflict with our recognition in

Zango that the broad language of the Act is consistent with

“the Congressional goals for immunity” as expressed in the

language of the statute. Id. at 1174. As the district court

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26 ENIGMA SOFTWARE V. MALWAREBYTES

cogently noted, we “must presume that a legislature says in

a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says

there.” Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249,

253–54 (1992) (citations omitted).

I respectfully dissent.

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