Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01103/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01103-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 The initial petition named only Robert A. Horel, 1

then Warden of the facility in which Young is

incarcerated, as respondent. The Court's docket

incorrectly reflected this case as proceeding against

Horel "et al." In its Answer, the State has requested

the Court substitute current warden, D.K. Sisto as

Respondent, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 25(d)(1). The

Court hereby GRANTS the request.

 On May 18, 2006, Petitioner was one of thirty-two 2

state prisoners who filed a joint "class action" petition

for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging alleged

(continued...)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLARENCE YOUNG,

Petitioner,

v.

D.K. SISTO,

Respondent.

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Case No. CIV S-06-1103 VAP

(HC)

[Petition filed on May 22,

2006]

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FILED

BY A STATE PRISONER

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner Clarence Young is a state prisoner. 

Proceeding in pro se, he filed a habeas corpus action

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 22, 2006.1

Respondents filed an Answer on February 13, 2007, and

Petitioner filed a Traverse on March 21, 2007. On

2

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(...continued) 2

due process violations by the California Board of Prison

Terms ("BPT") (now the "Board of Parole Hearings") in

proceedings during which each petitioner was denied

release on parole. (No. CIV S-06-1083.) On November 21,

2006, Magistrate Judge Moulds determined that "the claims

at bar arise from individual denials of parole, they are

personal to each petitioner and each petitioner must file

his own individual habeas corpus action," and ordered

each prisoner's claim severed. The Court thus ordered

the Clerk to open a new action for each prisoner, and for

each petitioner to file an individual habeas petition

within thirty days. Petitioner failed to do so, and thus

his petition in that matter was dismissed without

prejudice by order of Judge Damrell on April 9, 2007. 

(No. CIV S-06-2645, Dkt No. 5.) 

2

January 5, 2009, the action was transferred to this Court

pursuant to an Order of Designation of Judge to Serve in

Another District within the Ninth Circuit.

For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the

Petition.

A. Statement of Facts

A jury in the Superior Court of California, County of

Fresno, convicted Petitioner of second degree murder

under California Penal Code section 187. On September 15,

1987, the court sentenced him to a prison term of fifteen

years to life, plus an enhancement of two years for using

a firearm during the offense and an enhancement of five

years for having prior convictions, resulting in a total

term of twenty-two years to life. (Ans. Ex. 1 at 1-2.)

That conviction was affirmed by the California Court of

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Appeal, Fifth Appellate District on September 21, 1989. 

(Ans. Ex. 3.) 

Since his conviction, Petitioner has appeared before

the BPT on three occasions. At the first two hearings,

on August 21, 2000 and August 25, 2003, the BPT denied

parole, and set a further hearing dates. (Pet. Ex. B,

Ex. C.) At the first two hearings, the BPT made several

recommendations to Petitioner, including that he attend

Alcoholics Anonymous ("AA") meetings, maintain a clean

disciplinary record, finish his vocational training and

obtain employment offers. (Pet. Ex. B at 4:12-7:15, Ex.

C at 3:5-7:16.) The allegations in this petition concern

the BPT's denial of parole after the third hearing on

December 6, 2004 ("the hearing"). The Court summarizes

the record before the BPT at that time below.

1. The Underlying Crime and Petitioner's Acceptance

of Responsibility

Fresno police officers responded to a call from an

apartment complex at about 4:49 p.m. on July 31, 1986,

where there had been a "serious disturbance . . . between

white and black men armed with guns and baseball bats." 

(Ans. Ex. 4 ("Hearing Trans.") at 10:7-18.) A crowd had

formed around a Dodge two-door coupe. The officers found

a woman in the car, holding Vernon Witcher ("the victim")

in her lap, who was unconscious and bleeding in the face.

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(Id. at 10:21-11:3.) Witcher was transported to a local

hospital, where he later died as a result of a gunshot to

the head. (Id. at 11:6-10.)

An investigation of the incident revealed that it was

the culmination of a day-long series of confrontations

"between a group of white and black persons who had been

drinking," in which Petitioner, a black man, had stood

one step back from the victim, a white man, and fired one

shot directly into his face. (Hearing Trans. at 11:14-

23.)

At trial, Petitioner maintained that it was his

friend Ronnie Louis ("Louis"), and not him, who shot the

victim - an assertion he has maintained throughout his

imprisonment. (Hearing Trans. at 12:7-13, 13:1-4; 44:7-

45:15.) Although Louis initially denied to police that

he shot the victim, Louis later testified that, during

the encounter, he pointed a gun at the victim and the gun

discharged accidentally. (Ans. Ex. 3 at 14, 16.) 

Several trial witnesses also testified that Louis was the

actual shooter. (Ans. Ex. 3 at 14, 16.) In affirming

his conviction, though, the state Court of Appeal noted

testimony from several other witnesses who identified

Petitioner as the shooter. (Id. at 7, 9-10, 12-13.) In

addition, a July 1987 Probation Report indicated that

witnesses had identified Petitioner as the shooter in a

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photograph line-up. (Ans. Ex. 2 at 5; Hearing Trans. at

43:16-23.) 

Despite his assertions that he was not the actual

shooter, Petitioner acknowledged that he was

"responsible" for the death of the victim in the sense

that he had been the one arguing with the victim, and

"had [he] dealt with it some kind of way different, that

it probably wouldn't of [sic] got to the point that it

got. . . ." (Hearing Trans. at 12:14-27, 14:23-26.) He

admitted he borrowed a gun on the night in question,

because "it looked like it was going to get serious." 

(Id. at 13:13-16.)

At the hearing, Petitioner was asked his thoughts on

the impact of the victim's death on the victim's family

and he responded that he thought it had a "tremendous

impact." (Hearing Trans. at 15:22-25.) He stated he had

read the letters submitted by the victim's family, and

understood their anger. (Id. at 15:26-16:2.) Petitioner

was also asked what, over the course of his

incarceration, he had learned that might prevent him from

"repeating a situation like this." (Id. at 16:16-19.) 

He explained that he realized he had "to watch who [he]

associate[d] [him]self with," and that his education and

job training while in prison would help him "live a

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productive life" and "not hang around all those negative"

influences. (Id. at 16:20-17:4.) He stated:

I've learned that in order to live a successful

life out there I have to have a job, I have to

do the things that don't lead you down the road

of crime and things of that nature. And that's

what I've been doing all the time that I've been

locked up. I've been working on change,

changing myself to be a better person.

(Id. at 47:7-13.)

2. Petitioner's Prior Criminal History

In 1980, Petitioner was arrested for and pled guilty

to theft of a moped. (Hearing Trans. at 17:19-27.) He

received 90 days of jail time and three years probation

for this offense. 

In 1981, Petitioner was arrested and convicted for

his involvement in an armed robbery. (Hearing Trans. at

18:15-17.) Petitioner was sentenced to three years'

imprisonment, and served 241 days before being released

on probation. (Id. 18:18-19:5.) At the hearing,

Petitioner admitted that he was involved with the robbery

and was armed on the day in question, although Petitioner

did not brandish the gun and no one was injured in the

robbery. (Ans. Ex. 2 at 10-11.) 

At some time after his 1981 conviction, Petitioner

was arrested for assault with a deadly weapon under Penal

Code section 245 arising out of an altercation in an

adult bookstore, where he brandished a buck knife. 

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(Hearing Trans. at 20:6-25.) Petitioner pled guilty to a

reduced charge of drawing, exhibiting, or using a deadly

weapon under Penal Code section 417. (Id. at 20:6-10.)

In 1986, Petitioner pled guilty to a charge of giving

false identification to a peace officer, and was

sentenced to probation. (Hearing Trans. at 21:2-6.) At

the hearing, Petitioner explained that he "had no

business driving the vehicle" and did not have his

identification on him at the time, so gave his brother's

name. (Id. at 21:7-22.)

At the hearing, BPT Presiding Commissioner Daly also

asked Petitioner about several vehicle code violations,

along with failures to appear in response to traffic

tickets. Petitioner had little recollection of these

violations. (Hearing Trans. at 21:23-23:2.) 

Petitioner also admitted to having violated the

Health and Safety Code by selling methamphetamine to an

undercover officer prior to his commitment offense.

(Hearing Trans. at 23:3-10.) He denied ever using

methamphetamine, or any other drugs besides occasional

marijuana use. (Id. at 23:10-24:24.) 

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3. Petitioner's Social History

At the hearing, BPT Presiding Commissioner Daly

explored Petitioner's social history, noting that his

parents separated when he was around age 14, and that he

attended school until the last semester of twelfth grade.

(Hearing Trans. at 25:10-14.) Petitioner indicated he

was married to his wife, Rhonda, but they were "not as

close right now" and that "[t]hings are not going too

good." (Id. at 25:25-27.) He had not had a visit from

her in several years. (Id. at 26:1-4.) Petitioner has

three children with Rhonda Young, and five other children

from prior relationships. (Id. at 25:17-19, 40:16-

41:18.) He maintains contact with all of them except one

child in Alabama. (Id. at 41:19-26.) He noted that his

ex-wife, brothers, and sisters all sent him money, and

support him "a hundred percent." (Id. at 27:2-4.)

4. Petitioner's Prison Record

In his seventeen years in prison beforethe December

2004 hearing, Petitioner had only been reported for one

serious instance of misconduct (a "CDC 115"), for a fight

in 1996, a record that BPT Deputy Commissioner Smith

noted was "excellent." (Hearing Trans. at 27:25-28:1.) 

Petitioner had been cited for nine minor instances of

misconduct ("CDC 128As"), with the most recent in July

2000 for "tenting [his] bunk area." (Id. at 28:1-3.) 

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While incarcerated, Petitioner completed his general

equivalency diploma ("GED"), as well as programs in

stress management, parenting, anti-violence, anger

management, and youth-adult awareness. (Hearing Trans.

at 28:3-5, 32:23-27.) Petitioner also participated in

numerous vocational training programs, although he only

completed one (in electronics). (Id. at 28:18-26; 38:7-

39:3.) Petitioner's failure to finish at least some of

the vocational programs was apparently due to prison

transfers, rather than any problems on Petitioner's part.

(Pet. Ex. B at 48:18-22, Ex. C at 61:5-17.) At the time

of the hearing, he was working as a clerk in the prison's

music program and receiving average work reports, was

doing volunteer work in the law library, and was enrolled

in a community college history course. (Id. at 28:5-17,

29:18-30:1, 31:8-32:7.) Petitioner had also been

attending Alcoholics Anonymous ("AA") meetings for

approximately one year in response to BPT Presiding

Commissioner Daly's suggestion at his 2003 hearing. (Id.

at 29:9-17; 39:18-40:9.)

5. Petitioner's Psychological Evaluation

In a report dated July 20, 2004, a psychologist or

psychiatrist named Dr. Rouse concluded that Petitioner

had "made the most appropriate personal, social, and

behavioral adjustments in this institutional setting,"

presented "a low risk of danger to the community," and

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that Petitioner had no mental illness or health

conditions relevant to a parole determination. (Hearing

Trans. at 32:13-33:12.)

6. Petitioner's Plans for Parole and Indicia of

Support

If released on parole, Petitioner stated he planned

to live with his mother in Fresno. (Hearing Trans. at

33:13-18.) Petitioner produced letters from two

potential employers, who both wrote they would and could

provide him with employment. (Id. at 33:19-35:1.)

Petitioner also provided multiple letters of support

from friends and family members. BPT Deputy Commissioner

Smith noted that these included "very positive" letters

from Petitioner's aunt, cousin, sister and a long-time

family friend (Hearing Trans. at 35:1-36:7, 36:10-12, 17-

24); a letter from another sister stating she supports

parole and would offer Petitioner a place to live in

Fresno (Id. at 36:10-14); a letter from Petitioner's

defense attorney (Id. at 36:21-22); a letter from

Petitioner's mother, who confirmed that Petitioner could

live with her and she supported his parole plan (Id. at

36:25-26); a "very supportive" letter from Petitioner's

father (Id. at 36:26-27); and a letter from the mother of

one of Petitioner's daughters. (Id. at 37:1-9.)

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7. Submissions Opposing Parole

The BPT also received three submissions opposing

parole. The District Attorney's office for Fresno

County, which had prosecuted the underlying offense,

submitted a letter opposing a grant of parole. (Hearing

Trans. at 37:16-20.) Also, the mother and brother of the

victim of the underlying offense submitted letters

indicating they were "strongly opposed" to parole. (Id.

at 37:20-26.)

The Court has reviewed the letters submitted by the

victim's family. Both letters include racial epithets

and insults, and express a clear desire for retribution.

The letters suggest Petitioner should never be released

from prison or should be executed. (Pet. Exs. D-E.) 

8. The BPT's Denial and Reasoning

The BPT concluded that Petitioner was "not suitable

for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of danger

to society or a threat to public safety if released from

prison." (Hearing Trans. at 52:10-13.)

In explaining its decision, the BPT focused primarily

on the nature of the underlying offense. Speaking for

the BPT, Presiding Commissioner Daly explained:

The offense was carried out in an extremely

callous and actually very reckless manner.

Multiple victims were present when they -- one

individual was killed as a result of a gunshot

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wound to the face. And the offense was carried

out in a manner that showed a total disregard

for the human suffering of what was going -- and

that after the victim was shot everybody ran.

Nobody sought to give aid. And the motive for

the crime was most trivial in relation to the

offense in that this offense started out as an

altercation between two groups and it escalated

into the victim being shot in the face.

(Hearing Trans. at 52:14 - 53:1.)

The BPT acknowledged that some witnesses testified

that the Petitioner was the actual shooter, and that

other witnesses testified that he was not, but quoted the

portion of the state Court of Appeals' decision that

explained this was an issue considered by the jury.

(Hearing Trans. at 53:1-54:6.)

In addition to the underlying offense, the BPT panel

noted Petitioner's prior criminal history (Hearing Trans.

at 54:6-12, 22-26), his prior use of alcohol and

marijuana, (Id. at 54:20-21), and that he had "failed to

profit from society's previous attempts to correct his

criminality, and that included adult probation." (Id. at

54:18-20.) The BPT panel also cited the opposition

letters submitted by the Fresno County District Attorney

and the victims' family members. (Id. at 55:16-22). The

panel also concluded that Petitioner had a "history of

unstable relationships with others in that he has

fathered eight children without the benefit of marriage

and without the benefit of thinking about his

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 This statement was inaccurate. Petitioner was

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formerly married to the mother of three of these

children, and is currently married to the mother of three

of his other children. (Hearing Trans. at 40:16-26.)

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responsibilities to these children at the time." (Id. 3

at 54:6-17.) 

The BPT did note several factors weighing in favor of

a positive suitability determination, including his good

disciplinary record, participation in self-help programs,

his psychiatric reports, and "sufficient" parole plans. 

(Hearing Trans. at 55:2-16.) Reviewing Petitioner's

significant work and education record while in prison,

Presiding Commissioner Daly noted: "The Panel finds that

the prisoner should be commended." (Id. at 55:22-56:16.)

The Panel found, though, that "these positive aspects

of his behavior do not outweigh his factors of

unsuitability," and denied parole for another year.

(Hearing Trans. at 56:20-23.) The Panel instructed

Petitioner to "remain disciplinary-free," "continue

trying to get a second vocation and continue to

participate in self-help" programs and AA. (Id. at

56:23-57:2.) Presiding Commissioner Daly also expressed

"concern" that Petitioner's work reports were only

"average," "it's not bad, but we do see a lot better

reports." (Id. at 57:2-6.)

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B. Procedural History

Petitioner challenged the BPT's denial of parole by

filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Superior Court, County of Fresno, on February

22, 2005. (Ans. Ex. 6.) The Superior Court summarily

denied the petition on March 14, 2005, noting only that

it found "that sufficient evidence exists to support the

parole decision made in this case." (Id. at 1.)

Petitioner then filed a subsequent petition for writ

of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court on April

19, 2005. (Cal. Supreme Court Case No. S133156.) That

petition was denied on March 22, 2006, with the notation

"See In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal. 4th 616, 653-654,

658, 682-686; In re Dannenberg (2005) 34 Cal. 4th 1061,

1084, 1087." (Id.) Petitioner filed a second petition

on July 29, 2005, which was also denied on March 22,

2006, with a notation "See In re Dannenberg (2005) 34

Cal. 4th 1061, 1097." (Cal. Supreme Court Case No.

S135968.) 

C. Petitioner's Claims

Petitioner filed this petition on May 22, 2006, and

asserts the following grounds for federal habeas corpus

relief:

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1. The BPT violated Petitioner's state and federal

constitutional rights to due process by denying him

parole without "some evidence" to support its decision;

2. The BPT was obligated under Cal. Penal Code §§

3041 and 1170.2 to set his term when he reached his

minimum parole date, but failed to do so, in violation of

his state and federal constitutional rights; and

3. The BPT violated Petitioner's rights under the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution by allowing his victim's next of kin to

submit "opposition letters containing bigotry and

allegations of other crimes." 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 ("AEDPA") governs the Court's review of this

Petition, as the petition was filed after AEDPA's

effective date. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), "a district

court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas

corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States."

When considering a properly exhausted claim under

AEDPA, a federal court must defer to a state court's

holding unless it "'was contrary to, or involved an

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unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States,' or if the state court decision 'was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.'"

Smith v. Curry, 580 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2009),

quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1)-(2). When a state court

does not explain its reasoning, a federal court "must

conduct an independent review of the record to determine

whether the state court's decision was objectively

unreasonable." Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms,

461 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Lewis v.

Mayle, 391 F.3d 989, 996 (9th Cir. 2004)).

"Clearly established Federal law" is defined as "the

governing legal principle or principles set forth by the

Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its

decision." Curry, quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.

63, 71-72 (2003). "[I]t is not 'an unreasonable

application of clearly established Federal law' for a

state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule

that has not been squarely established by [the Supreme]

Court." Knowles v. Mirzayance, --- U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct.

1411, 1419 (2009). However, "the Supreme Court need not

have addressed an identical fact pattern to qualify as

clearly established law, as 'even a general standard may

be applied in an unreasonable manner.'" Jones v. Ryan,

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583 F.3d 626, 635 (9th Cir. 2009), quoting Panetti v.

Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007). 

III. DISCUSSION

As a preliminary matter, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), a

federal court may only entertain a habeas petition on the

ground that a petitioner "is in custody in violation of

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States." Therefore, insofar as they allege deprivations

of his rights under the California Constitution,

Petitioner's claims are not cognizable on federal habeas

review. See Sperling v. Clay, No. EDCV 08-944-ODW (RNB),

2009 WL 62433, at *5 n.4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2009) (citing

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991)). 

Similarly, the Court only examines Petitioner's

allegations that the BPT violated Cal. Penal Code §§

1170.2 and 3041 insofar as this conduct violated

Petitioner's federal constitutional rights. 

A. Petitioner's First Claim

Petitioner's first claim is that the BPT's denial of

parole was not supported by "some evidence," and thus

deprived him of his right to due process under the Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution.

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1) The Due Process Standard of Review

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the

government from depriving a person of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law. In determining

whether the government has violated a prisoner's due

process rights, courts are to conduct a two-step

analysis. Kentucky Dep't of Corrs. v. Thompson, 490 U.S.

454, 460 (1989). The first step asks whether the

challenged action implicates a constitutionally protected

liberty or property interest. Id. If so, then the court

is to examine "whether the procedures attendant upon that

deprivation were constitutionally sufficient." Id.

Under well-established Supreme Court precedent,

although "the presence of a parole system by itself does

not give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty

interest in parole release," a prisoner has a protected

liberty interest in parole when the relevant statute or

regulations require release if a parole board "determines

(in its broad discretion) that the necessary

prerequisites exist." Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482

U.S. 369, 373, 376 (1987). See also Greenholtz v.

Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1,

11-12 (1979). 

California's parole scheme has been held to vest

California prisoners with such a protected interest,

based on language in Penal Code section 3041 that states

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that the parole board "shall normally set a parole

release date." Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 850 (9th

Cir. 2007); Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461

F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 2006); Biggs v. Terhune, 334

F.3d 910, 914-15 (9th Cir. 2003); McQuillion v. Duncan,

306 F.3d 895, 902-03 (9th Cir. 2002). 

In Hayward v. Marshall, No. 06-55392 (9th Cir. Apr.

22, 2010) (en banc), the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc,

overruled these cases insofar as they "might be read to

imply that there is a federal constitutional right

regardless of whether state law entitles the prisoner to

release." Slip Op. at 18. The court did not expressly

state, though, whether it was overruling the holding of

these cases that California's particular parole scheme

establishes such a protected liberty interest under

federal due process. But since the Hayward majority

concluded that, on habeas review, federal courts are to

examine whether California state courts reasonably

applied California's "some evidence" standard, there must

be a federal due process right at issue. If there were

not, there would be no basis for federal habeas review. 

See Cooper v. Brown, 510 F.3d 870, 1001 (9th Cir. 2007)

(citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) and

noting "the well-established rule that federal habeas

corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law, and

that it is not the policy of the federal courts to

re-examine state court determinations of state law

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 Penal Code § 3041 also mandates that the board 4

consider certain aspects of the underlying crime,

including the number of victims of the crime, "the

gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or

the timing and gravity of current or past convicted

offense or offenses," and "other factors in mitigation or

(continued...)

20

questions.") See also Hayward, concurring slip op. at 13

(Berzon, J., (concurring in part and dissenting in part)

(explaining that application of California "some

evidence" standard is an issue of federal due process)). 

In determining whether a prisoner has been deprived

of this liberty interest by a denial of parole, though,

this Court's inquiry is extremely limited. California

law requires that a denial of parole be supported by

"some evidence in the record," "based upon the factors

specified by statute and regulation." In re Rosenkrantz,

29 Cal. 4th 616, 659 (2002). In Hayward, the en banc

Ninth Circuit held that a federal habeas court's sole

inquiry in analyzing a due process challenge is whether

the California court's application of this standard was

"unreasonable" or "based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence." Slip Op. at 37.

The factors which may support a determination that a

life prisoner convicted of murder is unsuitable for

parole are set forth in Cal. Admin. Code tit. 15, § 2402.

Factors weighing against a grant of parole are certain

characteristics of the commitment offense, a previous 4

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(...continued) 4

aggravation of the crime." Penal Code §§ 3041(a)-(b).

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record of violence, an unstable social history, a history

of sadistic sexual offenses, a history of "severe mental

problems related to the offense," and "serious

misconduct" while imprisoned. Cal. Admin. Code tit. 15,

§ 2402(c). 

Factors weighing in favor of parole include the lack

of a juvenile record, a stable social history, signs of

remorse or understanding of the significance of the

crime, whether the crime was committed as the result of

"significant stress" in the prisoner's life or while the

prisoner suffered from Battered Woman Syndrome, a lack of

significant history of violent crime, advanced age,

"understanding and plans for future," and participation

in institutional activities while incarcerated. Cal.

Admin. Code tit. 15, § 2402(d). Regardless of time

served, a life prisoner is to be deemed "unsuitable for

and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the

prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to

society if released from prison." Cal. Admin Code tit.

15, § 2402(a).

In reaching its determination, the BPT is to consider

"[a]ll relevant, reliable information available,"

including:

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the circumstances of the prisoner's social

history; past and present mental state; past

criminal history, including involvement in other

criminal misconduct which is reliably

documented; the base and other commitment

offenses, including behavior before, during and

after the crime; past and present attitude

toward the crime; any conditions of treatment or

control, including the use of special conditions

under which the prisoner may safely be released

to the community.

Cal. Admin. Code tit. 15, § 2402(b).

2) Analysis of the Record

Since neither the California Superior Court nor the

California Supreme Court explained its reasoning, the

Court conducts an independent review of the record in

order to determine whether the state courts' conclusions

that some evidence supported the BPT's decision was

objectively reasonable based on the record before it. 

Sass, 461 F.3d at 1127.

Under the California "some evidence" standard, "the

relevant inquiry is whether some evidence supports the

decision of the Board or the Governor that the inmate

constitutes a current threat to public safety, and not

merely whether some evidence confirms the existence of

certain factual findings." In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th

1181, 1212 (2008). 

The BPT's decision here was primarily based upon

Petitioner's pre-incarceration history: the nature of

the underlying offense, his pre-incarceration substance

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 The same standard also applies to the consideration

5

of other aspects of pre-incarceration criminal history. 

See Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th at 1214.

 In re Lawrence was decided after the California 6

courts reviewed Petitioner's case, but provides the

standard by which this Court must analyze this Petition

under Hayward. 

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abuse, his having fathered children out of wedlock, and

his criminal record prior to entering prison. Under

California law, pre-incarceration history may provide

"some evidence" for a denial of parole only if, "when

considered in light of other facts in the record, [they]

are such that they continue to be predictive of current

dangerousness many years after commission of the offense.

This inquiry is, by necessity and by statutory mandate,

an individualized one, and cannot be undertaken simply by

examining the circumstances of the crime in isolation,

without consideration of the passage of time or the

attendant changes in the inmate's psychological or mental

attitude." Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th at 1221 (2008). See 5

also Hayward, slip op. at 36. 

Here, there were no facts before the BPT that the

state court could have reasonably interpreted as

indicating that Petitioner's pre-incarceration history

remained predictive of Petitioner's dangerousness at the

time of his hearing. Compare Hayward, slip op.

(majority) at 37, concurring op. (Berzon, J.) at 16

(noting negative psychological reports). Petitioner

6

had a positive psychological evaluation, an "excellent"

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disciplinary record, a record of pro-social activities

while incarcerated, and "sufficient" post-parole plans,

including a place of employment and a place to live. 

There is no evidence that Petitioner has used drugs or

alcohol during his time in prison. This record in no way

shows that Petitioner's pre-incarceration conduct,

twenty-four years ago, "continue[s] to be predictive of

current dangerousness," as California law requires. Slip

Op. at 37. 

The only evidence beyond pre-incarceration factors

that Respondent cites to as support of the BPT's decision

are the submissions of the District Attorney and victims'

family members as some evidence in support of the BPT's

decision. (Ans. at 3.) Under California law, the BPT is

required to consider "all pertinent information and input

about the particular case from the inmate's victims, the

officials familiar with his or her criminal background,

and other members of the public who have an interest in

the grant or denial of parole to this prisoner." In re

Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1086 (2005). The District

Attorney's opposition was based solely on the nature of

the offense, and is thus insufficient, for the reasons

explained above, to constitute some evidence in support

of an unsuitability determination. The submissions of

the victim's family provide no reason for the denial of

parole other than the nature of the underlying crime,

accounted for above; unsupported, speculative, and

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hearsay character attacks on Petitioner; and racist

invective. To give weight to such letters would run

counter to well-settled Supreme Court precedent: "Private

biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law

cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect." 

Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). 

There was no evidence on the record before the Board

which reflected "that the inmate constitutes a current

threat to public safety" under California law. Thus, the

contrary determination was an unreasonable application of

California's "some evidence" standard, and thus a denial

of due process. See Hayward, slip op. at 37. 

Petitioner is thus entitled to habeas relief on his first

claim.

B. Petitioner's Second Claim

Petitioner's second claim appears to be that the BPT

improperly applied California Penal Code sections 1170.2

and 3041 in denying him parole, in that those provisions

require prison terms to be fixed at a number of years

proportionate to individual culpability. (Pet. at 13.) 

He argues the BPT is refusing to enforce those statutes

as written. (Id. at 14.) Since no state court provided 

any reasoning with respect to its denial of this claim,

the Court "independently review[s] the record on this

issue to determine whether the state court clearly erred

in its application of controlling federal law and whether

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its decision was "objectively reasonable." Delgado v.

Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

As noted above, the Court does not consider

Petitioner's claims that the BPT's actions violate

California statute or the California Constitution. The

Court notes, though, that, under California law, the BPT

"does not have a 'mandatory duty to set a release date

for all indeterminate life inmates, or any particular

such prisoner,' because 'an inmate must be found suitable

before a release date is set. . . .'" Karr v. Sisto, No.

2:07-cv-00510-RSL-JLW, 2010 WL 1135873, at *12 (E.D. Cal.

Mar. 22, 2010), quoting In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th

1087-88 (2005). 

In addition to his argument that the BPT violated

California law, Petitioner also contends that the BPT

violated numerous provisions of the United States

Constitution in denying him parole. These include the

provisions in Article I, Sections 9 and 10 that prohibit

bills of attainder or ex post facto laws; the Eighth

Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment; and the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Court concludes none of these allegations state a

cognizable constitutional claim. 

Petitioner argues that the BPT's denial of parole was

a bill of attainder. Since Petitioner was sentenced to a

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total term of twenty-two years to life, with the

possibility, not the guarantee of parole, "the denial of

parole does not impose an additional or more onerous

punishment for his commitment offense" and "is not a

punishment in addition to that which he faced when he was

convicted in judicial proceedings." Woo v. Powers, No.

EDCV 05-375-SJO (JC), 2008 WL 4361246, at *11 n.12 (C.D.

Cal. Sept. 15, 2008), citing Guzman v. Morris, 644 F.2d

1295, 1299 (9th Cir. 1981). As such, the denial of

parole cannot constitute a bill of attainder. Id.

Petitioner contends that the Board's denial of parole 

violates the prohibition on ex post facto laws. Inasmuch

as this is a challenge to the enactment of California

Penal Code sections 1168, 1170, and 1170.2, Petitioner

does not identify any provision of these statutes that

was enacted after his conviction, and thus has no ex post

facto claims. See United States v. George, 579 F.3d 962,

968 (9th Cir. 2009). See also California Dep't of

Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 (1995). Inasmuch as

Petitioner is challenging the Board's denial of parole

more generally, this claim fails for the same reason as

his bill of attainder claim. "While petitioner might

have had a subjective expectation that he would be

released from prison sooner, the Board's decision to deny

him a parole release date because he presents an

unreasonable risk of danger to society has not enhanced

or otherwise 'converted' petitioner's punishment." Karr,

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2010 WL 1135873 at *14. See also Gilman v. Davis, No.

CIV. S-05-830 LKK, 2010 WL 434215 at *3-*4 (E.D. Cal.

Feb. 4, 2010), citing Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 250

(2000).

Although Petitioner invokes the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, he does not identify

any way in which he was treated differently from

similarly situated prisoners, and thus fails to state a

cognizable equal protection claim. See, e.g., Caswell v.

Calderon, 363 F.3d 832, 837-38 (9th Cir. 2004); Lam v.

Hartley, No. 1:08-CV-01747 LJO JMD HC, 2010 WL 1286799,

at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2010). 

Finally, Petitioner fails to state a claim for cruel

and unusual punishment. A sentence of imprisonment may

be "cruel and unusual" under the Eighth Amendment if it

is "extreme" or "grossly disproportionate." Plascencia

v. Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1204 (9th Cir. 2006), citing

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996-97 (1991). "In a

particular case, if no term has been explicitly set by

the Board because the prisoner has not yet been found

suitable for parole, the prisoner's term is presumed to

be the statutory maximum of his sentence for the purposes

of cruel and unusual punishment analysis." Karr, 2010 WL

1135873 at *12, citing People v. Wingo, 14 Cal. 3d 169,

184 (1975); In re Rodriguez, 14 Cal. 3d 639, 654 n. 18

(1975). The maximum for Petitioner's sentence was life

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imprisonment, and a life sentence for second-degree

murder is not so disproportionate as to constitute cruel

and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. See,

e.g., Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1106-07 (9th Cir.

1998); Rhodes v. Kirkland, No. C 06-5252 JF, 2010 WL

291781, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2010); Svelund v.

Sisto, No. 2:06-CV-00500-RSLJLW, 2010 WL 234861, at *13

(E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2010).

C. Petitioner's Third Claim

Petitioner's third claim is that the BPT violated his

due process rights by considering the opposition letters

submitted by the family of his victim. This claim has

been encompassed in the Court's discussion of

Petitioner's First Claim. The fact that these letters

were submitted and considered by the Board would not give

rise to an independent due process claim had "some

evidence" beyond the racially prejudicial letters

supported the Board's decision. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS the

Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. The Board shall

find Petitioner suitable for parole at a hearing to be

held within 30 days of the finality of this decision,

unless new evidence of his conduct in prison or change in

mental status subsequent to the December 6, 2004 parole

consideration hearing is introduced that is sufficient to

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support a finding that Petitioner currently poses an

unreasonable risk of danger to society if released on

parole; and in the absence of any such new evidence

showing Petitioner's unsuitability for parole, the Board

shall calculate a prison term and release date for

Petitioner in accordance with California law. Further,

if the release date already has lapsed, Respondent shall,

within 10 days of the Board's hearing, either release

Petitioner forthwith if his release date lapsed more than

three years earlier, or release Petitioner on parole for

that period of his three year parole term that remains if

the release date lapsed less than three years earlier.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 20, 2010 

VIRGINIA A. PHILLIPS 

 United States District Judge

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