Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02562/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02562-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DWAYNE LOWERY,

CDCR # D-08018 Civil No. 10cv2562 JLS (NLS)

Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)

vs.

GEORGE A. NEOTTI, Warden;

WALKER, Doctor,

Defendants.

I. Procedural History

On December 14, 2010, Plaintiff, a state inmate currently incarcerated at the Richard J.

Donovan Correctional Facility, California, and proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights Complaint

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”)

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP and

dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) &

1915A(b). See Jan. 19, 2011 Order at 6. Plaintiff was granted leave to file an Amended

Complaint in order to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified by the Court. Id. On March

11, 2011, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). 

/ / /

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II.

SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

As the Court stated in its previous Order, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)’s

amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons

proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility

[and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the

terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Under these

provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any prisoner civil action and all other IFP

complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which

seek damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A;

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v.

Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A).

Before amendment by the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte

dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. However, 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A now mandate that the court reviewing an IFP or prisoner’s suit

make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing that the Complaint be served by the

U.S. Marshal pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). Id. at 1127 (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits,

but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a

claim.”); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing

§ 1915A). 

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194.

A. Eighth Amendment claims

Once again, Plaintiff alleges that he has been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment

by Defendant Walker whom Plaintiff alleges refuses to provide him with “an effective painkiller

for all of his pains.” (FAC at 3.) “The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain upon

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incarcerated individuals under color of law constitutes a violation of the Eighth Amendment.”

Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992)). A violation of the Eighth Amendment occurs when prison officials

are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s medical needs. Id.; see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 105 (1976).

To allege an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must “satisfy both the objective

and subjective components of a two-part test.” Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir.

2002) (citation omitted). First, he must allege that prison officials deprived him of the “minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. (citation omitted). Second, he must allege the prison

official “acted with deliberate indifference in doing so.” Id. (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted).

A prison official acts with “deliberate indifference ... only if [he is alleged to] know[] of

and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Gibson v. County of Washoe,

Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Under this standard, the official must be alleged to “be aware of facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed],” and must also be alleged to

also have drawn that inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “If a [prison

official] should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the [official] has not violated the

Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.” Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1188 (citation

omitted). This “subjective approach” focuses only “on what a defendant’s mental attitude

actually was.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839. “Mere negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical

condition, without more, does not violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights.” McGuckin,

974 F.2d at 1059 (alteration and citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is nearly devoid of any specific allegations.

Plaintiff claims that he is “dying and he wants just a simple pill to mitigate his pain.” (FAC at

4.) Plaintiff fails to identify what is the underlying nature of his serious medical need. It is also

not clear whether Plaintiff is receiving any medical attention or treatment as opposed to a

complete deprivation. With such vague facts and conclusory statements, the Court is simply

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unable to find any sufficient allegations to find that Plaintiff has stated a claim of deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need. Moreover, it is unclear whether he is receiving any pain

medication at all. In fact, it appears that he disagrees with the medication prescribed by Dr.

Walker. A “difference of medical opinion” between a prisoner and his physicians concerning

the appropriate course of treatment is “insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish deliberate

indifference.” Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). Instead, to allege

deliberate indifference regarding choices between alternative courses of treatment, a prisoner

must allege that the chosen course of treatment “was medically unacceptable under the

circumstances,” and was chosen “in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [the prisoner’s]

health.” Id. (citation omitted). Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts from which the Court

could find that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.

B. Respondeat Superior

Once again, Plaintiff names Warden Neotti as a Defendant in this matter but fails to set

forth any specific factual allegations with regard to Defendant Neotti in the body of Plaintiff’s

First Amended Complaint. Thus, it appears that Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant Neotti liable

in his supervisory capacity. However, there is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993). Instead, “[t]he inquiry into

causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual

defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer

v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71

(1976)). In order to avoid the respondeat superior bar, Plaintiff must allege personal acts by each

individual Defendant which have a direct causal connection to the constitutional violation at

issue. See Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 483 (9th Cir. 1986); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040,

1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Supervisory prison officials may only be held liable for the allegedly unconstitutional

violations of a subordinate if Plaintiff sets forth allegations which show: (1) how or to what

extent they personally participated in or directed a subordinate’s actions, and (2) in either acting

or failing to act, they were an actual and proximate cause of the deprivation of Plaintiff’s

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constitutional rights. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). As currently pleaded,

however, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails to set forth facts which might be liberally

construed to support an individualized constitutional claim against Defendant Neotti.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails to state a

section 1983 claim upon which relief may be granted , and is therefore subject to dismissal

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). The Court will provide Plaintiff with an

opportunity to amend his pleading to cure the defects set forth above. Plaintiff is warned that

if his amended complaint fails to address the deficiencies of pleading noted above, it may be

dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend. 

III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED for failing to state a claim

upon which relief could be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). However,

Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this Order is “Filed” in which

to file a Second Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted above.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the superseded

pleading. See S. D.CAL. CIVLR. 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in

the Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565,

567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

 Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint still fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter be

counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79

(9th Cir. 1996).

2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a form civil rights Complaint to Plaintiff.

DATED: April 28, 2011

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

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