Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-02204/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-02204-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AE, a minor, by and through his CASE NO. CV F 09-2204 LJO DLB

Guardian ad Litem, MARIBEL

HERNANDEZ, ORDER ON TULARE COUNTY

DEFENDANTS’ F.R.Civ.P. 12 MOTION TO

Plaintiff, DISMISS THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

(Doc. 72.)

vs.

YADIRA PORTILLO, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

INTRODUCTION

Three defendant CountyofTulare (“County”) social workers seek to dismiss as lacking sufficient

facts minor plaintiff AE’s (“AE’s”) deliberate indifference and negligence claims arising out of failure

to remove AE from a foster care home prior to alleged sexual abuse by an older boy in foster care with

AE. AE contends that his claims survive in that they allege “more than a sheer possibility” that the

social workers “acted unlawfully” and enough facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discoverywill

reveal evidence” to prove his claims. This Court considered the defendant social workers’ F.R.Civ.P.

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the record and VACATES the July 12, 2010 hearing, pursuant to Local

Rule 230(g). For the reasons discussed below, this Court DENIES dismissal of AE’s claims against the

defendant County social workers.

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BACKGROUND1

The Relevant Parties

AE is a boy and was born in 1998. He was age nine at the time of the events at issue. Maribel

Hernandez (“Ms. Hernandez”) is AE’s mother and guardian ad litem for this action.

Defendants Yadira Portillo (“Ms. Portillo”), Courtney Wampler (“Ms. Wampler”) and Adele

Felix (“Ms. Felix”) are County social workers and will be referred to collectively as the “County 2

defendants.”

AE’s Foster Care

On September 4, 2008, the Countytook “legal and physical custody and control” of AE from Ms.

Hernandez. Former defendant Family Builders Foster Care, Inc., a California-licensed foster family

agency, placed AE with foster father Doe 51 and foster mother Doe 52 in their home where a then 17-

year-old boy (“older boy”) resided in Doe 51 and 52's foster care. Defendant Heidi Williams was the

social worker for the older boy and knew that the older boy “was a dependent of the Court and on

probation” and “resided in the same foster home and had the same foster parents” as AE.

The Older Boy’s Abuse Of AE

On November 5, 2008, a “reporting party” informed Ms. Portillo and Ms. Wampler that the older

boy had hit AE on the chest and that AE had a 31⁄2 by five-inch bruise on his left shoulder. At that time,

AE informed Ms. Felix that two weeks prior, AE had witnessed the older boy stealing money from a

foster parent and reported the theft to the foster parent. AE furtherinformed Ms. Felix that the older boy

“socked” AE in the face and “threatened” AE.

Ms. Portillo and Ms. Wampler photographed AE’s bruise. A foster parent informed Ms. Portillo

and Ms. Wampler that the older boy “was a dependent of the Court and on probation.” The foster parent

also informed Ms. Portillo and Ms. Wampler that on November 4, 2008, AE had informed the foster

parent that the older boy “was taking too long in the shower.” When the foster parent wiggled the

The factual recitation is derived generally from AE’s operative Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”), the

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target of the defendant social workers’ challenges.

The TAC identifies Ms. Felix as “CWA Felix.” The TAC merely identifies the County defendants as

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County employees without identifying their positions. Based on the County defendants’ papers, this Court surmises that the

County defendants are social workers.

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bathroom door, the older boy “cursed her because he believed it was Plaintiff who was wiggling the

door.”

On November 20, 2008, AE’s mother Ms. Hernandez stated to Ms. Felix that her two younger

children (who apparently were placed in a different foster home) “were dressed nicely all of the time,

but that Plaintiff was not” and that AE “did not want to talk to her about what was really going on in the

foster placement.” Ms. Hernandez requested “that she would like Plaintiff to be moved from his current

foster placement to different foster placement.”

On November 25, 2008, former defendant Crystal Soto, M.D. (“Dr. Soto”), informed social

worker supervisor Prudence Morris (“Ms. Morris”), a former defendant, by telephone that during an

SCIU evaluation, AE stated to Dr. Soto that the older boy “would enter the bathroom [as AE used it],

tell Plaintiff to hurry up, and curse Plaintiff.” AE informed Ms. Portillo and Ms. Wampler that the older

boy “would unlock the bathroom door using his nail and threatened to ‘kick [AE’s] ass’” and that the

foster parent “was aware of this because he had talked to the older boy.” Ms. Portillo and/or Ms.

Wampler’s “remedy was to instruct Plaintiff to use the bathroom downstairs.” 

Ms. Portillo and Ms. Wampler denied AE’s request to telephone Ms. Hernandez and informed

AE that he could write Ms. Hernandez but that his letters would be reviewed before they were sent. As

such, AE “believed that any letter he might write to his mother would be reviewed by his foster parents.”

On November 26, 2008, Ms. Portillo “followed up” with defendant Adrian Marquez (“Mr.

Marquez”), AE’s therapist, and provided to Mr. Marquez and his employer defendant Tulare Youth

Service Bureau, Inc. (collectively the “Tulare Youth defendants”) “all of the facts, information,

knowledge and notice that she had learned.” The Tulare Youth defendants knew of the older boy’s

treatment of AE through AE’s disclosure during therapy sessions with Mr. Marquez. Mr. Marquez

“stated that he felt there was a need to place more responsibility on the foster mother in supervising the

actions of the children in the home.” Mr. Marquez “indicated that he did not believe Plaintiff had been

making allegations to seek attention, but was instead minimizing the behavior of the alleged perpetrator,

the 17 year old boy.”

On December 5 or 6, 2008, the older boy “assaulted, battered, and sexually abused Plaintiff.”

At all “relevant times,” the older boy “threatened Plaintiff and instructed and ordered Plaintiff not to tell

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anyone what had happened and not to report the assault, battery and sexual abuse.” AE “did not report

assaults, batteries and sexual abuse until on or about December 12 and 15, 2008” because AE feared for

his safety.

AE’s Claims Against The County Defendants

The TAC alleges that “Defendants, and each of them, had a special relationship under both 3

federal and sate law with Plaintiff AE such that Defendants had a ministerial and non-delegable duty to

protect AE.” The TAC alleges that despite knowledge of the above facts, “Defendants failed and refused

to remove Plaintiff from the foster home, but instead deliberately and intentionally chose to maintain

and retain Plaintiff with said foster home.”

The TAC alleges a (first) deliberate indifference claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section

1983") that the County defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause and “had

a special relationship with Plaintiff AE such that Defendants had a duty to protect AE.” The TAC

alleges a (second) negligence claim that the County defendants “are legally responsible” for damages

pursuant to California Government Code section 820(a). The TAC alleges that AE “suffered and

incurred physical, sexual, mental, and emotional injuries, medical and counseling expenses, future

medical and counseling expenses, continuing and future emotional injury and trauma, lost earning

capacity, and harm to and loss of reputation.”

DISCUSSION

F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) Motion To Dismiss Standards

The County defendants fault TAC’s absence of facts “to cross the threshold from conceivable

to plausible” to support the deliberate indifference and negligence claims.

A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleadings set

forth in the complaint. “When a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint, before the reception

of any evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not

whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to

support the claims.” Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683 (1974); Gilligan v. Jamco

The TAC neither identifies nor defines “Defendants,” which presumably refers collectively to all defendants

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which the TAC names.

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Development Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9 Cir. 1997). A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper where

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there is either a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a

cognizable legal theory.” Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9 Cir. 1990); Graehling th

v. Village of Lombard, Ill., 58 F.3d 295, 297 (7 Cir. 1995). th

In resolving a F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion, a court must: (1) construe the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff; (2) accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true; and (3) determine

whether plaintiff can prove any set of facts to support a claim that would merit relief. Cahill v. Liberty

Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-338 (9th Cir. 1996). Nonetheless, a court is not required “to accept as

true allegations that aremerelyconclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.”

In re Gilead Sciences Securities Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9 Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). A court th

“need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations,” U.S. ex rel.

Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643, n. 2 (9 Cir.1986), and a court must not “assume that the th

[plaintiff] can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated . . . laws in ways

that have not been alleged.” Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State

Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526, 103 S.Ct. 897 (1983). A court need not permit an attempt

to amend if “it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by an amendment.” Livid Holdings Ltd.

v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 946 (9 Cir. 2005). th

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual

allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554,127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (internal citations omitted). 

Moreover, a court “will dismiss any claim that, even when construed in the light most favorable to

plaintiff, fails to plead sufficiently all required elements of a cause of action.” Student Loan Marketing

Ass'n v. Hanes, 181 F.R.D. 629, 634 (S.D. Cal. 1998). In practice, “a complaint . . . must contain either

direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under

some viable legal theory.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562, 127 S.Ct. at 1969 (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v.

Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7 Cir. 1984)). “Conclusory allegations of law . . . are th

insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9 Cir. 2001). th

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In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1937,1949 (2009), the U.S. Supreme Court recently

explained:

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” . . . A

claim has facial plausibilitywhen the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

. . . The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. (Citations omitted.) 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has summarized:

But Twombly and Iqbal do not require that the complaint include all facts necessary to

carry the plaintiff’s burden. “Asking for plausible grounds to infer” the existence of a

claim for relief “does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it

simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal

evidence” to prove that claim.

Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 977 (9 Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. th

1955.

“In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’

and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the

plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 989 (9 Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, __ U.S. th

__, 129 S.Ct. at 1949).

The U.S. Supreme Court applies a “two-prong approach” to address a motion to dismiss:

First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in

a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. . . . Second,

only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. . .

. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience

and common sense. . . . But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer

more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not

“show[n]”-“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).

In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss can

choose to begin byidentifying pleadings that, because theyare no more than conclusions,

are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the

framework of a complaint, theymust be supported by factual allegations. When there are

well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-1950.

With these standards in mind, this Court turns to the County defendants challenges to AE’s

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claims. 

Deliberate Indifference

The County defendants fault the TAC’s failure to allege conduct to establish their “plausible

deliberate indifference.” The County defendants attribute the TAC to allege that they deprived AE of

his Fourteenth Amendment rights because they “erroneously retained AE in a home that put him at risk

of molest” by the older boy.

AE responds that dismissal of the deliberate indifference claim “at the pleading stage would be

inappropriate given the circumstantial evidence alleged” in the TAC.

“Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person

acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived the

claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United

States.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 632-633 (9 Cir. 1988). th

 “Section 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for

vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807,

811 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2694, n. 3 (1979)). 

Section 1983 and other federal civil rights statutes address liability “in favor of persons who are deprived

of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured’ to them by the Constitution.” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S.

247, 253, 98 S.Ct. 1042 (1978) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417, 96 S.Ct. 984, 996

(1976)). “The first inquiry in any § 1983 suit, therefore, is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of

a right ‘secured by the Constitution and laws.’” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 99 S.Ct. 2689

(1979). Stated differently, the first step in a section 1983 claim is to identify the specific constitutional

right allegedly infringed. Albright, 510 U.S. at 271, 114 S.Ct. at 811. “Section 1983 imposes liability

for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of

tort law.” Baker, 443 U.S. at 146, 99 S.Ct. 2689.

The County defendants rely on DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489

U.S. 189, 195-197, 109 S.Ct. 998 (1989), where the U.S. Supreme Court held that a state owed no duty

to child whose abuse it was investigating to protect him from beating by his father:

But nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State

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to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.

The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of

certain minimal levels of safety and security. It forbids the State itself to deprive

individuals of life, liberty, or property without “due process of law,” but its language

cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that

those interests do not come to harm through other means. Nor does history support such

an expansive reading of the constitutional text. Like its counterpart in the Fifth

Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to

prevent government “from abusing [its] power, or employing it as an instrument of

oppression,” Davidson v. Cannon, supra, 474 U.S., at 348, 106 S.Ct., at 670; see also

Daniels v. Williams, supra, 474 U.S., at 331, 106 S.Ct., at 665 (“‘“to secure the

individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government,”’” and “to prevent

governmental power from being ‘used for purposes of oppression’”) (internal citations

omitted); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 549, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1919, 68 L.Ed.2d 420

(1981) (Powell, J., concurring in result) (to prevent the “affirmative abuse of power”).

Its purpose was to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State

protected them from each other. The Framers were content to leave the extent of

governmental obligation in the latter area to the democratic political processes.

. . . If the Due Process Clause does not require the State to provide its citizens

with particular protective services, it follows that the State cannot be held liable under

the Clause for injuries that could have been averted had it chosen to provide them.

As a general matter, then, we conclude that a State's failure to protect an individual

against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process

Clause. (Bold added.)

Nonetheless, there are exceptions to the general rule that a state’s failure to protect against

private violence does not violate the due process clause. The “special relationship” exception provides

that “when a State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution

imposes some responsibility for [that person’s] safety and general well-being.” Huffman v. County of

Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 1054, 1058-1059 (9 Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1038, 119 S.Ct. 1333 th

(1999); see Estate of Amos ex rel. Amos v. City of Page, Az., 257 F.3d 1086, 1090 (9 Cir. 2001). In

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addition, the second exception to the DeShaney rule – the “danger creation” exception – “exists where

the state affirmatively places the plaintiff in a dangerous situation.” Huffman, 147 F.3d at 1059; see

Estate of Amos, Az., 257 F.3d at 1091. The “‘danger creation’ basis for a claim . . . necessarily involves

affirmative conduct on the part of the state in placing the plaintiff in danger.” L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d

119, 121 (9 Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951, 113 S.Ct. 2442 (1993). th

To examine whether a state actor “affirmativelyplaces an individual in danger,” a court examines

whether the state actor “left the person in a situation that was more dangerous than the one in which they

found him.” Munger v. City of Glasgow, 227 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9 Cir. 2000); see Kennedy v. City of th

Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1062 (9 Cir. 2006). A court determines whetherthe state actor’s affirmative th

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conduct placed the plaintiff “in danger that she otherwise would not have faced.” Kennedy, 439 F.3d

at 1063. In addition, a court must “decide related issues of whether the danger to which [the state actor]

exposed [plaintiff] was known or obvious, and whether he acted with deliberate indifference to it.” 

Kennedy, 439 F.3d at 1064. “‘[D]eliberate indifference’ is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof

that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his actions.” Bryan County v.

Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410, 117 S.Ct. 1382 (1997). “Whether [an] official had the requisite knowledge

of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference

from circumstantial evidence.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994). 

The County defendants challenge the TAC’s allegations of a “special relationship,” “danger

creation theory,” or that the County defendants “otherwise exposed AE to the foster home.” The County

defendants argue that the TAC’s allegations are limited to that the County defendants “knew that AE

had been removed from custody, and that they each transferred AE to the foster home.” The County

defendants argue that the TAC fails to allege that they were deliberately indifferent in failing to remove

AE from the foster home prior to the older boy’s December 5 or 6, 2008 abuse in the absence of

allegations that AE was placed in an unlicensed foster home, minimum contacts were not made, or there

was a failure to respond to problems in the foster home. The County defendants summarize that the

TAC alleges merely that they “were on notice that there may have been issues” between AE and the

older boy.

The County defendants fault the TAC’s reliance on allegations that on November 5, 2008, Ms.

Portillo and Ms. Wampler were informed that the older boy had bruised AE and that AE told Ms. Felix

that the older boy had “socked” AE in the face after AE reported the older boy’s theft of a foster parent. 

The County defendants note that the bruising occurred two months after AE’s placement in the foster

home, Ms. Portillo and Ms. Wampler investigated the incident, photographed AE’s bruise, and spoke

to the foster parent, and AE did not request removal from the foster home. The County defendants

characterize the bruise as “an isolated incident” and argue an incorrect decision to retain AE in the foster

home does not equate to deliberate indifference.

The County defendants further fault the TAC’s allegation that on November 25, 2008, AE

informed Ms. Portillo and Ms. Wampler that the older bov unlocked the bathroom door and threatened

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to “kick [AE’s] ass.” The County defendants attempt to mitigate the allegations by noting that Ms.

Portillo and Ms. Wampler spoke to AE and to his therapist Mr. Marquez. The County defendants take

solace in allegations that AE talked to the County defendants “about problems in the home” and in the

absence of allegations that Mr. Marquez indicated that AE risked sexual abuse or that AE should be

removed from the foster home.

As to the County defendants, the TAC’s salient allegations are:

1. As of November 5, 2008, Ms. Portillo and Ms. Wampler knew that:

a. The older boy had hit AE on the chest and that AE had a 31⁄2 by five-inch bruise

on his left shoulder;

b. The older boy was on probation and a court dependent; and

c. The older boy had cursed a foster parent thinking it was AE;

2. As of November 5, 2008, Ms. Felix knew that the older boy had “socked” AE in the face

and had “threatened” AE;

3. As November 20, 2008, Ms. Felix knew that AE did not want to talk to Ms. Hernandez

about what occurred in the foster home and that Ms. Hernandez requested that AE be

moved to a different foster home; 

4. As of November 25, 2008, Ms. Portillo and Ms. Wampler knew that the older boy had

unlocked the bathroom door and threatened to kick AE’s “ass”; and

5. As of November 26, 2008, Ms. Portillo knew from Mr. Marquez that AE did not make

allegations to seek attention but minimized the older boy’s conduct.

AE provides no alleged factual or legal support that the County defendants’ roles or conduct

created a special relationship with AE. There are no allegations that the County defendants acted as

therapists or in a similar position of heightened trust with AE. As such, attention turns to whether the

TAC raises inferences that the Countydefendants left AE is a more dangerous position than he otherwise

would not have faced or where deliberately indifferent to a known or obvious danger facing AE.

The gist of the TAC is that the County defendants knew of the older boy’s escalating misconduct

toward AE but refrained to limit his exposure to such conduct, including AE’s removal from the foster

care home. The TAC raises inferences that the older boy continued to threaten and menace AE to

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suggest that AE faced increasing exposure to physical harm, although perhaps not sexual abuse. The

TAC alleges facts of an increasing perceived danger to AE and the absence of the County defendants’

action to address it. With their nitpicks, the County defendants unreasonably attempt to hold AE to an

unsubstantiated standard to allege “all facts necessary to carry the plaintiff’s burden.” See Al-Kidd, 580

F.3d at 977. Whether the County defendants are guilty of deliberate indifference will depend on 4

development of the facts but at this stage, the TAC alleges just enough to avoid dismissal of the

deliberate indifference claim against the County defendants. 

Negligence

The County defendants challenge the TAC’s failure to allege breach of a mandatory duty and

“source for a duty to move AE from his foster home.” The County defendants also invoke discretionary

immunity.

AE argues that the County defendants are not entitled to discretionary immunity and urges this

Court to apply the same analysis to deny dismissal of the claims against the Tulare Youth defendants.

Discretionary Immunity

Under the California Government Claims Act (“Claims Act”), Cal. Gov. Code, §§ 810, et seq.,

“a public employee is liable for injury caused by his act or omission to the same extent as a private

person,” “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute (including Section 820.2).” Cal. Gov. Code, §

820(a). A public employee’s liability under the Claims Act “is subject to any defenses that would be

available to the public employee if he were a private person.” Cal. Gov. Code, § 820(b). “[S]tatutory

liabilities are subordinated to statutory immunities.” Universal By-Products, Inc. v. City of Modesto,

43 Cal.App.3d 145, 154, 117 Cal.Rptr. 525 (1974).

California Government Code section 820.2 addresses a public employee’s exercise of discretion

and provides:

Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an

injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the

exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.

The County defendants argue that they are entitled to “discretionary immunity for their actions

Moreover, the County defendants’ apparent reliance on qualified immunity is unavailing without sufficient

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in connection with the provision of child welfare services.” The County defendants note that the TAC

admits that they “spoke to AE, spoke to the foster parents, took pictures, spoke to AE’s therapist, and

offered solutions.” 

AE argues that section 820.2 discretionary immunity applies to “policy making decisions,” not

“operational” or “ministerial” decisions at issue here. AE points to Caldwell v. Montoya, 10 Cal.4th

972, 981, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 842 (1995), where the California Supreme Court explained:

. . .a “workable definition” of immune discretionary acts draws the line between

“planning” and “operational” functions of government. (Johnson, supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp.

793, 794.) Immunity is reserved for those “ basic policy decisions [which have] ... been

[expressly] committed to coordinate branches of government,” and as to which judicial

interference would thus be “unseemly.” ( Id. at p. 793, italics in original.) Such “areas

of quasi-legislative policy-making . . . are sufficiently sensitive” (id. at p. 794) to call for

judicial abstention from interference that “might even in the first instance affect the

coordinate body's decision-making process” (id. at p. 793).

On the other hand, said Johnson, there is no basis for immunizing lower-level,

or “ministerial,” decisions that merely implement a basic policy already formulated.

(Johnson, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 796.) Moreover, we cautioned, immunity applies only

to deliberate and considered policy decisions, in which a “[conscious] balancing [of]

risks and advantages . . . took place. The fact that an employee normally engages in

'discretionary activity' is irrelevant if, in a given case, the employee did not render a

considered decision. [Citations].” ( Id. at p. 795, fn. 8.)

AE analogizes the County defendants’ conduct to that of a public defender in Barner v. Leeds,

24 Cal.4th 676, 691-692, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 97 (2000), where the California Supreme Court affirmed

reversal of summary judgment for a public defender sued for malpractice:

In sum, the actions of a deputy public defender in representing an assigned client

in a criminal action generally do not involve the type of basic policy decisions that our

past decisions have held are within the scope of the immunity afforded by section 820.2.

Although such legal representation entails difficult choices among complex alternatives

and the exercise of professional skill, for purposes of section 820.2 the attorney's actions

ordinarily involve operational judgments that implement the initial decision to provide

representation to the client. Holding deputy public defenders accountable at law for legal

malpractice in this context does not result in unwarranted judicial interference in the

affairs of the other branches of government, but rather simply subjects these public

employees to the same principles of tort law applicable to private attorneys performing

identical professional services in the same type of proceedings.

A fellow judge of this Court has explained that “for § 820.2 to apply, the employee must have

actually exercised discretion and must have made a considered decision.” Garcia ex rel. Shepard v.

Gonzalez, 2006 WL 3457227, at *10 (E.D. Cal. 1006). “Where the allegations do not affirmatively

show a considered decision, dismissal of the complaint is not appropriate.” Garcia, 2006 WL 3457227,

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at *10. “There is no immunity ‘if the injury . . . results, not from the employee’s exercise of discretion

vested in him to undertake the act, but from his negligence in performing it after having made the

discretionary decision to do so.’” Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1379 (9 Cir. 1998) th

(quoting McCorkle v. City of Los Angeles, 70 Cal.2d 252, 261, 74 Cal.Rptr. 389, 396 (1969)).

AE argues that at this pleading stage, there is no allegation that the County defendants “actually

exercised any discretion.” AE continues that the County defendants’ “overly broad interpretation of

section 820.2" would apply immunity to conduct for which the California Supreme Court does not

intend.

At this pleading stage, this Court is not prepared to conclude that California Government Code

section 820.2 provides discretionary immunity to the County defendants given the TAC’s reference to

the Countydefendants’lower-level, ministerial actions rather than policymaking decisions. The County

defendants point to no on-point authority to extend discretionary immunity to the extent they seek. In

Alicia T. v. County of Los Angeles, 222 Cal.App.3d 869, 882-883, 271 Cal.Rptr. 513 (1990), the

California Court of Appeal considered alleged wrongful removal of a child from parental custody, not

retention of a foster child in a particular foster home. Although Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz, 68

Cal.App.4th 1450, 1466, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 165 (1998), addressed, in limited part, failure to discontinue

foster placement, its facts are dissimilar to those at hand and did not remotely address foster child on

foster child violence, a situation unique to the facts alleged here. Moreover, the County defendants’

reliance on cases addressing mandated services (includingCounty of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 102

Cal.App.4th 627, 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 637 (2002)), is misplaced, especially given the mandated reporting

duties of California Penal Code section 11166 and related statutes to defeat the County defendants’

points as to absence of duty. In short, the County defendants’ points on discretionary immunity are

unavailing. AE raises meritorious points that the County defendants’ position is akin to Mr. Marquez’

to impose similar duties and responsibilities on the County defendants to prevent dismissal of AE’s

negligence claim against them. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Forthe reasons discussed above, this Court DENIES dismissal of AE’s claims against theCounty

defendants and ORDERS the County defendants, no later than July 20, 2010, to file an answer to the

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TAC.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 6, 2010 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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