Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-02114/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-02114-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH GIBBS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

T. FARLEY, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 13-02114 TEH (PR)

THIRD ORDER OF SERVICE

Docket No. 60

Plaintiff Kenneth Gibbs, a state prisoner presently

incarcerated at California State Prison–Sacramento, filed the

instant pro se prisoner complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 regarding

incidents that took place at Pelican Bay State Prison (PBSP), where

he was previously incarcerated. This action continues against

several Defendants for claims of excessive force. Plaintiff was

provided leave to amend to file a second amended complaint (SAC) to

provide more information regarding his claim of retaliation. 

Plaintiff has filed a second amended complaint and also added a due

process claim with respect to his disciplinary hearing. 

I

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of

cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or

officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A

(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the

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complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint “is

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). Pleadings filed by pro

se litigants, however, must be liberally construed. Hebbe v.

Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010); Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must

allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting

under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48

(1988). 

Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under

§ 1983 if the plaintiff can show that the defendant proximately

caused the deprivation of a federally protected right. Leer v.

Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988); Harris v. City of

Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1981). A person deprives

another of a constitutional right within the meaning of § 1983 if

he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative

act or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do,

that causes the deprivation of which the plaintiff complains. 

Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. 

II

In his SAC, Plaintiff asserts the following allegations.

On April 24, 2013, PBSP Officers T. Farley and R. Graham came to

Plaintiff’s cell to escort him to the Interdisciplinary Treatment

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Team (IDTT). Officer J. Andersen was also present. After

Plaintiff and Officer Farley exchanges some hostile words, Officers

Farley and Andersen handled Plaintiff aggressively, making him feel

that his welfare and security were at stake. Upon exiting the

building and out of sight of other inmates, these Officers slammed

Plaintiff against the wall and told him that “if he moved, they

were going to take him down.” The Officers then reversed direction

and began escorting Plaintiff back to his cell. Within a few feet

of his cell, someone placed their foot before Plaintiff, causing

him to fall. While Plaintiff was falling, Officer Andersen placed

his knee upon Plaintiff’s back, causing Plaintiff’s handcuffs to

tighten so that he felt excruciating pain. While Plaintiff was on

the ground, Officers Andersen and Farley jammed their elbows into

Plaintiff’s neck, causing him more pain. During this entire time,

Plaintiff was not resisting the Officers. Other Officers arrived

at the scene. Officer Chisman kicked Plaintiff in his loins.

As a result of the Officers’ use of excessive force,

Plaintiff suffered a swollen eye, a swollen knee, and a sprained

wrist. The Officers also filed a Rules Violation Report (RVR)

against Plaintiff, falsely asserting that he was resisting a peace

officer. Plaintiff was found guilty. Plaintiff alleges that the

hearing officer, Defendant Lt. Diggle, violated his due process

rights at the hearing by not allowing Plaintiff to call witnesses

and not providing a staff assistant to help Plaintiff with his

defense.

On August 5, 2013, Plaintiff was released from PBSP’s

Administrative Segregation Unit (Ad-Seg) and returned to the

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general population. On August 10, 2013, Officer Andersen

approached Plaintiff’s new cell with Plaintiff’s personal property

and informed Plaintiff that he could not have his clippers,

batteries, chess board, soap dish, playing cards, and prayer oil. 

Officer Andersen asked whether Plaintiff wanted to donate the items

or send them home. Plaintiff informed Officer Andersen that he

would file a lawsuit, and Officer Andersen walked away. On

September 7, 2013, Officer Andersen again approached Plaintiff’s

cell with Plaintiff’s personal property and asked Plaintiff what

Plaintiff wanted to do with the items that he was not allowed to

have. Plaintiff told Officer Andersen that he would donate the

items but then asked to have his CD-player, ten CDs, rechargeable

batteries, battery charger, and headphones. Officer Andersen

informed Plaintiff that the requested items had been confiscated

from his prior Ad-Seg cell because Plaintiff was not supposed to

have them.

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff alleges the

following claims: (1) an Eighth Amendment claim against Officers

Farley, Andersen, and Chisman based on their use of excessive force

against Plaintiff; (2) an Eighth Amendment claim against Officers

Graham and Chisman based on the fact that they were present when

the other Officers violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights and

did nothing to stop them; (3) a claim that Lt. Diggle violated his

due process rights at the disciplinary hearing; and (4) a First

Amendment claim against Officer Andersen on the ground that he

confiscated Plaintiff’s personal property in retaliation for

Plaintiff filing the instant action.

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III

A

In its prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment,” the

Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison officials, who may

not, for example, use excessive force against prisoners. Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). Where a prisoner claims that

prison officials used excessive force, he must show that the

officials applied force maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.

Id.; Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013).

Although the Eighth Amendment protects against cruel and unusual

punishment, this does not mean that federal courts can or should

interfere whenever prisoners are inconvenienced or suffer de

minimis injuries. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10. In determining

whether the use of force was for the purpose of maintaining or

restoring discipline, or for the malicious and sadistic purpose of

causing harm, a court may evaluate the need for application of

force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force

used, the extent of any injury inflicted, the threat reasonably

perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to

temper the severity of a forceful response. Id., 503 U.S. at 7;

LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1454 (9th Cir. 1993); see also

Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 195 (9th Cir. 1979) (guards may

use force only in proportion to need in each situation).

Construing the allegations liberally, Plaintiff states

an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Farley, Graham,

Andersen, and Chisman as discussed above.

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B

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) established five

procedural requirements at prison disciplinary hearings. First,

"written notice of the charges must be given to the

disciplinary-action defendant in order to inform him of the charges

and to enable him to marshal the facts and prepare a defense." 

Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564. Second, "at least a brief period of time

after the notice, no less than 24 hours, should be allowed to the

inmate to prepare for the appearance before the [disciplinary

committee]." Id. Third, "there must be a 'written statement by

the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons' for the

disciplinary action." Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.

471, 489 (1972)). Fourth, "the inmate facing disciplinary

proceedings should be allowed to call witnesses and present

documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so

will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or

correctional goals." Id. at 566; see also Bartholomew v. Watson,

665 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1982) (right to call witnesses is

basic to fair hearing and decisions to preclude should be on case

by case analysis of potential hazards of calling particular

person). Fifth, "[w]here an illiterate inmate is involved . . . or

where the complexity of the issues makes it unlikely that the

inmate will be able to collect and present the evidence necessary

for an adequate comprehension of the case, he should be free to

seek the aid of a fellow inmate, or . . . to have adequate

substitute aid . . . from the staff or from a[n] . . . inmate

designated by the staff." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 570. The Court

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specifically held that the Due Process Clause does not require that

prisons allow inmates to cross-examine their accusers, see id. at

567-68, and does not give rise to a right to counsel in the

proceedings, see id. at 569-70.

Plaintiff first argues that he was denied a staff

assistant to aid in his defense. However, a staff assistant is

only assigned when the plaintiff is illiterate or there are complex

issues. There are no such allegations here, and Plaintiff has

adequately litigated this case pro se. Moreover, Plaintiff states

he was provided an investigate employee to help in the

investigation. For all these reasons, there was no due process

violation.

Plaintiff also argues that he was denied witnesses for

his defense who observed the incident. Construing this allegation

liberally, Plaintiff states a due process violation against Lt.

Diggle.

C

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First

Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An

assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an

inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and

that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First

Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a

legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559,

567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). The plaintiff must show

that the type of activity he was engaged in was protected by the

First Amendment and that the protected conduct was a substantial or

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motivating factor for the alleged retaliatory acts. See Mt Healthy

City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). Retaliation

is not established simply by showing adverse activity by a

defendant after protected speech; rather, the plaintiff must show a

nexus between the two. See Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d

893, 899 (9th Cir. 2000) (retaliation claim cannot rest on the

logical fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc, i.e., “after this,

therefore because of this”). See generally Reichle, et al. v.

Howards, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 2097-98 (2012) (Ginsburg, J. concurring)

(finding no inference of retaliatory animus from Secret Service

agents’ assessment whether the safety of the person they are

guarding is in danger); Dietrich v. John Ascuaga's Nugget, 548 F.3d

892, 901 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding no retaliation where plaintiff

presented no evidence that defendants gave her a traffic citation

after defendants read a newspaper article about her First Amendment

activities, rather than because she drove past a police barricade

with a “road closed” sign on it); Huskey, 204 F.3d at 899 (summary

judgment proper against plaintiff who could only speculate that

adverse employment decision was due to his negative comments about

his supervisor six or seven months earlier).

Plaintiff claims that Officer Andersen confiscated his

property in retaliation for his having filed the instant lawsuit,

but fails to allege any facts that elevate his allegations to the

level of a plausible retaliation claim. The confiscation of

property does not alone imply retaliation. There are no facts

alleged suggesting that Officer Andersen denied Plaintiff’s request

for his property because of Plaintiff’s protected conduct rather

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1

 To the extent Plaintiff argues there was a due process

violation in the confiscation of his property, any such claim is

denied. Neither the negligent nor intentional deprivation of property

states a due process claim under § 1983 if the deprivation was random

and unauthorized, however. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527,

535-44 (1981) (state employee negligently lost prisoner's hobby kit),

overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,

330-31 (1986). The availability of an adequate state post-deprivation

remedy, e.g., a state tort action, precludes relief because it

provides sufficient procedural due process. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128 (1990) (where state cannot foresee, and therefore

provide meaningful hearing prior to, deprivation statutory provision

for post-deprivation hearing or common law tort remedy for erroneous

deprivation satisfies due process). California law provides such an

adequate post-deprivation remedy. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d

813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Cal. Gov't Code §§ 810-895).

9

than for departmental reasons. Plaintiff was provided leave to

amend but has failed to cure the deficiencies described by the

Court and demonstrate a viable retaliation claim. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is dismissed without leave to amend.1

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby orders as

follows:

1. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claims

against Farley, Graham, Andersen, and Chisman are cognizable. 

Plaintiff’s due process claim against Lt. Diggle is also

cognizeable. Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is DISMISSED without

leave to amend. Plaintiff’s motion to add a claim (Docket NO. 60)

is GRANTED. No further amendments will be permitted. 

2. The Clerk shall issue summons and the United States

Marshal shall serve, without prepayment of fees, copies of the

second amended complaint in this matter and all attachments thereto

and copies of this order on the following PBSP employee: Lt. J.

Diggle (or D. Diggle). The Clerk shall also mail a copy of this

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2

 If Defendants assert that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

available administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a),

Defendants must raise such argument in a motion for summary judgment,

pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s recent opinion in Albino v. Baca, 747

F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (overruling Wyatt v. Terhune, 315

F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003), which held that failure to exhaust

available administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform

Act, should be raised by a defendant as an unenumerated Rule 12(b)

motion). Such a motion should also incorporate a modified Wyatt

notice in light of Albino. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120,

n.14 (9th Cir. 2003); Stratton v. Buck, 697 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir.

2012).

10

order to Plaintiff and mail a courtesy copy of this Order and the

complaint to the California Attorney General’s Office in San

Francisco. 

3. To expedite the resolution of this case, the Court

orders as follows:

a. No later than 91 days from the date this order

is filed, Defendants must file and serve a motion for summary

judgment or other dispositive motion. A motion for summary

judgment also must be accompanied by a Rand notice so that

Plaintiff will have fair, timely and adequate notice of what is

required of him in order to oppose the motion. Woods v. Carey, 684

F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 2012) (notice requirement set out in Rand

v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998), must be served

concurrently with motion for summary judgment).2 

If Defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be

resolved by summary judgment, Defendants must so inform the Court

prior to the date the motion is due. 

b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the summary judgment

or other dispositive motion must be filed with the Court and served

upon Defendants no later than 28 days from the date the motion is

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filed. Plaintiff must bear in mind the notice and warning

regarding summary judgment provided later in this order as he

prepares his opposition to any motion for summary judgment. 

c. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later

than 14 days after the date the opposition is filed. The motion

shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. 

No hearing will be held on the motion. 

4. Plaintiff is advised that a motion for summary

judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

will, if granted, end your case. Rule 56 tells you what you must

do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally,

summary judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue of

material fact – that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact

that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for

summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which

will end your case. When a party you are suing makes a motion for

summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or

other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your

complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in

declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or

authenticated documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict

the facts shown in the defendants’ declarations and documents and

show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If

you do not submit your own evidence in opposition, summary

judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary

judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be

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no trial. Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998)

(en banc) (App. A).

(The Rand notice above does not excuse Defendants’

obligation to serve said notice again concurrently with a motion

for summary judgment. Woods, 684 F.3d at 939).

5. All communications by Plaintiff with the Court must

be served on Defendants, or Defendants’ counsel once counsel has

been designated, by mailing a true copy of the document to

Defendants or Defendants’ counsel.

6. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this

case. Plaintiff must keep the Court and all parties informed of

any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a

timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of

this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 03/11/2015 

THELTON E. HENDERSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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