Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06572/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06572-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALVIN R. ROSS,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. R. BUSBY, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:03-CV-06572 LJO P

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR RECONSIDERATION

(Doc. 92) 

Plaintiff Alvin R. Ross (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On September 21, 2006, plaintiff

filed an objection to the Court’s order granting in part and denying in part defendants’ motion for

summary judgment, which was filed on August 17, 2006. (Docs. 84 and 92.) Defendants Busby and

Chatham did not file a response. The Court construes the motion to be one for reconsideration.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) governs the reconsideration of final orders of the

district court. The Rule permits a district court to relieve a party from a final order or judgment on

grounds of: “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (3) fraud . . . of an adverse

party, . . . or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 60(b). The motion for reconsideration must be made within a reasonable time, in any event “not

more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.” Id.

Motionsto reconsider are committed to the discretion of the trial court. Combs v. Nick Garin

Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 441 (D.C.Cir. 1987); Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 460 (9th Cir. 1983)

(en banc). To succeed, a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce

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the Court to reverse its prior decision. See e.g., Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634

F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D.Cal. 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015, 108 S.Ct. 1752, 100 L.Ed.2d 214 (1988). The Ninth Circuit

has stated that “[c]lause 60(b)(6) is residual and ‘must be read as being exclusive of the preceding

clauses.’” LaFarge Conseils et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement, 791 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986)

(quoting Corex Corp. v. United States, 638 F.2d 119 (9th Cir. 1981)). Accordingly, “the clause is

reserved for ‘extraordinary circumstances.’” Id. When filing a motion for reconsideration, Local

Rule 78-230(k) requires a party to show the “new or different facts or circumstances claimed to exist

which did not exist or were not shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the

motion.”

In the order at issue, the Court, in relevant part, dismissed plaintiff’s claim that he was placed

in administrative segregation in retaliation for filing a group appeal, and dismissed defendants Ortiz

and Stockman because no other claims were pending against them. (Doc. 84, 12:9-13 & 27:4-10.)

In his motion for reconsideration, plaintiff contends that defendant Busby placed him in

administrative segregation and defendant Chatham retained him in administrative segregation in

retaliation against him, and he believes the Court erred in overlooking that claim. (Doc. 92, pg. 2.)

The Court did not overlook a viable retaliation claim against defendants Busby and Chatham

stemming from plaintiff’s placement and retention in administrative segregation. “Within the prison

context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion

that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s

protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment

rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v.

Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff’s complaint does not state a claim against

defendant Busby for placing plaintiff in administrative segregation in retaliation for filing an inmate

appeal or against defendant Chatham for retaining plaintiff in administrative segregation in

retaliation for filing an inmate appeal. In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that on November 9, 2001,

defendant Busby signed the lock-up order and placed plaintiff in administrative segregation because

he was ordered to do so by defendant Ortiz and had no choice in the matter. (Doc. 1, 8:21-10:4.)

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 Notably, plaintiff does not cite to his complaint in support of his assertion that he was pursuing this claim 1

against Busby and Chatham. Rather, plaintiff cites to evidence submitted in support of defendants’ motion for

summary judgment and to his pretrial statement. Plaintiff may not create a claim not pled in his complaint.

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These allegations do not give rise to a retaliation claim against defendant Busby, and defendant

Chatham is not even mentioned with respect to these events.

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Further, plaintiff’s retaliation claims stemming from his confinement in administrative

segregation were dismissed, with prejudice, on the ground that they are barred by the statute of

limitations. (Doc. 84, 12:9-12 & 27:4-7.) Thus, it is ultimately irrelevant whether the claim was

intended to be stated against only defendants Ortiz and Stockman, or whether it was intended to be

stated against defendants Ortiz, Stockman, Busby, and Chatham. The statute of limitations ran on

the claim before this suit was filed and the claim may not be pursued against any defendant.

Based on the foregoing, plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, filed September 21, 2006, is

HEREBY DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 21, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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