Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-06079/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-06079-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JULIETA FLORES,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAFEWAY INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-06079-NC 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART SAFEWAY’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS; GRANTING 

LEAVE TO AMEND

Re: Dkt. No. 11

In this disability discrimination case, defendant Safeway moves to dismiss plaintiff 

Julieta Flores’s two claims for violations of the ADA and the FMLA. Dkt. No. 11. 

Finding that Flores did not fail to exhaust her administrative remedies because the 

additional allegations in her complaint are reasonably related to the allegations in her 

EEOC charge, the Court DENIES the motion to dismiss the ADA claim. Finding that 

Flores has not alleged any violation of the FMLA during her period of eligibility, that is, 

after she had worked at Safeway for twelve months, the Court GRANTS the motion to 

dismiss the FMLA claim. The Court GRANTS leave to amend that claim because Ms. 

Flores could allege violations of FMLA occurring after her twelfth month of work at 

Safeway that are reasonably related to the allegations of her EEOC charge.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts Alleged in the Complaint

Plaintiff Julieta Flores began working at a Safeway store in Mountain View, 

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California on March 5, 2019. Dkt. No. 1, Complaint, at ¶ 6. She originally sought work as 

a cake decorator and pastry chef, but because there were no positions available in the 

bakery department, she was hired as a clerk in that department instead. Id. Her job 

responsibilities as a clerk included stocking shelves, customer service, answering phones, 

taking orders, delivering cakes, and cleaning. Id. ¶ 7. Over time, however, her 

responsibilities increased and included pastry and baking work in addition to her clerk 

duties. Id. ¶ 8. This substantial increase in her responsibilities led to the development of 

injuries in her hands. Id. ¶ 9. Specifically, her right wrist became swollen, a growth 

protruded from her wrist, and she developed trigger finger on her left hand. Id. The 

injuries began to impact her ability to work during the busy Thanksgiving season in 2018. 

Id. 

Ms. Flores saw a doctor, who recommended that she take time off work to allow her 

wrist to heal. Id. ¶ 10. She requested time off to rest. Id. Her doctor had recommended 

that she take two weeks off, but her managers called her and told her to return to work 

after only three days. Id. Afraid to lose her job, she returned. Id. Her injury worsened as 

a result. Id. 

Ms. Flores’s managers at Safeway began harassing her about her injury. Id. ¶ 11. 

They yelled at her frequently and ignored the limitations that her injury imposed. Id. They 

told her to come to work on a Sunday, which was her day off. Id. They threatened that 

there would be consequences if she did not come in on Sunday. Id. Ms. Flores’s managers 

also gave her inconsistent instructions about doctors’ notes, reprimanding her for not 

providing the correct information from her doctors. Id. ¶ 12. She followed their 

instructions but was still reprimanded on multiple occasions. Id. She continued working, 

and continued exacerbating her injuries by doing so. Id.

B. Procedural Background

Ms. Flores brought claims through workman’s compensation that have partially 

resolved. Id. ¶ 13. She also filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC on February 

26, 2019. Dkt. No. 1, Att. 1. The EEOC issued a Right to Sue notice on June 27, 2019. 

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Dkt. No. 1, Att. 2. Proceeding pro se, Ms. Flores filed this case on September 25, 2019, 

alleging two causes of action: discrimination based on disability in violation of the 

Americans with Disabilities Act, and violation of the Family Medical Leave Act. Dkt. No. 

1. She also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. Dkt. No. 2. Accordingly, 

the Court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Dkt. No. 8. In its screening 

order, the Court granted the IFP application and held that the complaint sufficiently stated 

a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Id. Safeway filed a motion to dismiss. 

Dkt. No. 11. Both parties consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge under 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c). Dkt. Nos. 6, 12. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal 

sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). On a 

motion to dismiss, all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the 

light most favorable to the non-movant. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-

38 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court, however, need not accept as true “allegations that are 

merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re 

Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). Although a complaint need 

not allege detailed factual allegations, it must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 

true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when it “allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

If a court grants a motion to dismiss, leave to amend should be granted unless the 

pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts. Lopez v. Smith, 203 

F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant Safeway moves to dismiss on two grounds: first, that the Complaint’s 

ADA claim includes allegations that go beyond the allegations of the EEOC charge, 

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meaning that Ms. Flores failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to that claim; and 

second, that Ms. Flores was not eligible for FMLA leave at the time she was allegedly 

denied it because she had worked for Safeway for fewer than twelve months. Dkt. No. 11. 

The Court addresses each argument in turn.

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

A plaintiff bringing a claim of disability discrimination against her employer under

the ADA must first file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and receive a Right to 

Sue notice. Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890, 901 (9th Cir. 2001). “When an 

employee seeks judicial relief for incidents not listed in his original charge to the EEOC, 

the judicial complaint nevertheless may encompass any discrimination like or reasonably 

related to the allegations of the EEOC charge, including new acts occurring during the 

pendency of the charge before the EEOC.” Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corp., 

482 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir.1973) (emphasis added).

“[T]he primary function of an EEOC charge is to set in motion an EEOC 

investigation and conciliation, rather than to give notice to the employer of the claims 

against it.” Id. The federal court’s “subject matter jurisdiction extends over all allegations 

of discrimination that either fell within the scope of the EEOC’s actual investigation or an 

EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of 

discrimination.” Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 291 F.3d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 

2002) (emphasis in original); see also Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir.1990) 

(noting that the court “must inquire whether the original EEOC investigation would have 

encompassed the additional charges made in the court complaint but not included in the 

EEOC charge itself”). 

 The Ninth Circuit construes the language of EEOC charges “with utmost liberality 

since they are made by those unschooled in the technicalities of formal pleading.” B.K.B. 

v. Maui Police Dep't, 276 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2002); cf. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 

U.S. 522, 527 (1972) (stating that “technicalities are particularly inappropriate in a 

statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process”); see 

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also Rodriguez, 265 F.3d at 897 (holding that EEOC “charges must be construed with 

great liberality.”).

In determining whether the exhaustion requirement has been satisfied, “it is 

appropriate to consider such factors as the alleged basis of the discrimination, dates of 

discriminatory acts specified within the charge, perpetrators of discrimination named in the 

charge, and any locations at which discrimination is alleged to have occurred . . . [t]he 

crucial element of a charge of discrimination is the factual statement contained therein.” 

Freeman, 291 F.3d at 636. “Courts generally find judicial pleadings outside the scope of 

an administrative charge where a plaintiff alleges an entirely different theory of 

discrimination.” Baird v. Office Depot, No. C-12-6316 EMC, 2014 WL 2527114, at *4 

(N.D. Cal. June 4, 2014). For instance, if a charge only alleges gender discrimination, then 

the plaintiff has not exhausted a claim for age or race discrimination. Yurick v. Superior 

Court, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1116, 1122 (1989); see, e.g., Okoli v. Lockheed Tech. Operations 

Co., 36 Cal. App. 4th 1607, 1615 (1995) (stating that “a complaint alleging race 

discrimination is neither like or related to nor likely to be discovered in a reasonable 

investigation of a charge of sex discrimination”) (internal quotations omitted).

Here, Safeway identifies the following primary differences between Ms. Flores’s 

EEOC charge and her complaint: 

1. Ms. Flores’s EEOC charge indicates that the alleged disability discrimination took 

place from January 28, 2019, at the earliest, through February 25, 2019 (the day 

before the charge was filed), at the latest. Dkt. No. 1, Att. 1, at 1. In the 

complaint, Ms. Flores describes events beginning around the Thanksgiving season 

of 2018, several months earlier than January 2019. Compl. ¶ 9.

2. Ms. Flores alleges in her Complaint that she requested two weeks off per her 

doctor’s recommendation and that her managers instructed her to return to work 

after three days. Compl. ¶ 10. In the EEOC charge, Ms. Flores only states that 

“my primary doctor has placed me out of work until March 7, 2019,” which is 

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fewer than two weeks, and she does not mention being told to return after three 

days.1

3. Ms. Flores describes harassment—including being yelled at by her managers—in 

the Complaint, but does not mention being harassed in her EEOC charge. Compl. 

¶ 10.

Based on these discrepancies, Safeway moves to dismiss for failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies. Safeway acknowledges that Ms. Flores could amend the 

complaint to bring it in line with the allegations of the EEOC charge. Dkt. No. 17 at 3. 

However, the Court finds that Ms. Flores need not amend her complaint. Though Ms. 

Flores provides a few months’ more historical background on the cause of her injuries and 

alleges some additional detail, she does not introduce any new discrimination which 

Safeway’s investigation of her EEOC charge should not have already uncovered. 

Freeman, 291 F.3d at 636. This information all “can reasonably be expected to grow out 

of the charge of discrimination.” Id. Furthermore, most facts alleged in the charge and 

Complaint are the same: the basis for discrimination (disability), the perpetrators named 

(Flores’s managers, Honario Mendoza and Enisa Sehic), the location where it occurred 

(Safeway’s Mountain View Store), and the bulk of the facts describing her injuries and the 

discrimination itself. The additional allegations, such as that Ms. Flores was yelled at by 

her managers for her injuries, is “like or reasonably related to the allegations of the EEOC 

charge.” Oubichon, 482 F.2d at 571.

The motion to dismiss Ms. Flores’s claim for violation of the ADA is DENIED.

B. Eligibility for Family Medical Leave Act

An employee is only eligible for leave under FMLA if they have been employed by 

the employer for at least twelve months prior to commencement of the leave. 20 CFR § 

825.110. Safeway argues that Ms. Flores was not eligible for FMLA leave at the time that 

it was allegedly denied because she had not worked at Safeway for a full year when she 

1 Of course, it is possible that the instruction to return to work after three days had simply 

not yet occurred. 

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requested leave. Dkt. No. 11 at 6. Ms. Flores began work at Safeway in March 2018 and 

requested leave in February 2019. Dkt. No. 1. However, Ms. Flores’s opposition to the 

motion to dismiss suggests that she might have asked for, and been denied, leave after 

March 2019. Dkt. No. 16 at 4. The language of the opposition is unclear as to whether 

this actually occurred. Hypothetical argument in the opposition does not constitute 

additional pleaded facts.

As pleaded, the Complaint does not state a valid claim for violation of FMLA. 

However, Ms. Flores could plead additional facts—such as denial of FMLA leave after 12 

months of work for Safeway—to cure this deficiency. As such, the Court GRANTS the 

motion to dismiss the second claim and GRANTS Ms. Flores leave to amend.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court DENIES the motion to dismiss Ms. Flores’s claim for violation of the 

ADA. The Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss Ms. Flores’s claim for violation of the 

FMLA, with leave to amend. An amended complaint must be filed in thirty days, by 

March 4, 2020. If no amended complaint is filed by that date, Safeway must answer the 

complaint by fourteen days later, March 18, 2020.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 3, 2020 _____________________________________

NATHANAEL M. COUSINS

United States Magistrate Judge

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