Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00298/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00298-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 240
Nature of Suit: Torts to Land
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH MARION RIMAC,

Plaintiff,

v.

RANDY DUNCAN, RANDY CRAWFORD,

COUNTY OF DEL NORTE, and FORT DICK

FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT,

Defendants. ___________________________________

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No. 07-0298 SC

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS' 

MOTIONS TO DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court are three Motions to Dismiss respectively

filed by Defendant Randy Duncan ("Duncan"); Randy Crawford

("Crawford") and the Fort Dick Fire Protection District

("District"); and the County of Del Norte ("County"). See Docket

Nos. 4, 7, 9. Plaintiff Joseph Marion Rimac ("Rimac" or

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"Plaintiff") has submitted an opposition to each motion. See

Docket Nos. 12, 13, 14.

The Court FINDS that the Complaint fails to allege facts

sufficient to support the existence of a state action and thus

DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE the action for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

II. BACKGROUND

This action arises out of a dispute between two neighbors,

Rimac and Duncan, regarding a tree. See Compl. The tree in

question is a redwood which formerly formed an archway over a

private drive on Rimac's property. Id. at 2. Duncan was unhappy

about the tree because it would prevent him from driving a large

mobile home to his property. See id. Duncan requested that Rimac

remove the tree. Id. Rimac refused. Id. Duncan then removed the

tree and surrounding trees sometime between January 17, 2006 and

January 24, 2006, and a couple weeks later Duncan removed the wood. 

Id. at 8. 

Marginally complicating the situation, and providing the bases

upon which Rimac attempts to transform this dispute into a federal

case, Duncan is a corrections officer at Pelican Bay, see id. at 4,

and Crawford, who is fire chief of the District, was tangentially

involved in the dispute. See id. at 4, 8-9. 

In the runup to the trees' destruction, Duncan let it be known

to Rimac that, as a corrections officer, he "always gets his way." 

Id. at 7. He also told Rimac that "due to his status in the local

community[,] . . . no jury in Del Norte County would rule against

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him after he cut down the trees." Id. at 8.

Crawford's involvement appears to have been meeting with

Duncan on Rimac's property, on January 17, 2006, to discuss

removing the trees and providing a letter to Duncan, on January 24,

2006, which opined that the tree in question should be removed. 

See id. at 8. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Defendants' 12(b)(1) Motions facially attack the Court's

subject matter jurisdiction. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373

F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004) ("In a facial attack, the

challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint

are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.") 

Thus, the Court is obligated to accept all well-pleaded factual

allegations in the Complaint as true and construe them in a light

most favorable to the Plaintiff. See Warren v. Fox Family

Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003). Nonetheless,

Plaintiff, as the party seeking to invoke the Court's jurisdiction,

"has the burden of proving the actual existence of subject matter

jurisdiction," and the Complaint will be dismissed if he fails to

carry it. Thompson v. McCombe, 99 F.3d 352, 353 (9th Cir. 1996).

Section 1983 states:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory

or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other

person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other

proper proceeding for redress.

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42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, in order to invoke this Court's

jurisdiction under Section 1983, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331,

Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to establish both a

deprivation of a right, privilege or immunity guaranteed to him by

the law and that a state action was the source of that deprivation. 

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 47 (1988). 

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff offers two theories for finding the required state

action: 1) Duncan's invocation of his position as a California

State corrections officer in the course of the dispute ("Correction

Officer Theory"); and 2) Crawford's involvement in the dispute

("Crawford Involvement Theory"). See Docket No. 12 ("Opp.") at 4. 

Both fail.

Plaintiff's Correction Officer Theory is purportedly based on

the formulation of "state action" articulated in Screws v. United

States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) and Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92

F.3d 831 (9th Cir. 1996). See Opp. at 5. In Van Ort, the Ninth

Circuit stated:

[A party] also might have been acting under color of law

if he had purported to or pretended to act under color of

law, even if his goals were private and outside the scope

of authority. 

92 F.3d at 838 (citing Screws, 325 U.S. at 111). However, in order

to prove a state action under this pretense of authority theory, a

plaintiff must prove either: that the alleged pretense of

authority "related to the provision of services pursuant to [the

party's governmental] employment"; or that the party "used his

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government position to exert influence and physical control over

the [plaintiff], particularly if [the plaintiff was] in awe of

government officials." Id. (internal quotations omitted). 

The Complaint contains neither allegations that Duncan made

any pretense of authority to cut down the trees that was related to

his provision of services as a corrections officer nor that Duncan

used his position as a corrections officer to exert influence and

physical control over Rimac. See Compl. Rather, the most that can

be said of the statements regarding his position is that they were

pompous and obnoxious. The fact that Duncan chose to base his

bombast on his position in state government does not make the

dispute a federal case.

Plaintiff's Crawford Involvement Theory is based on the

doctrine of "joint action," articulated in Dennis v. Sparks,

449 U.S. 24, 187 (1980). See Compl. at 5-6. In Dennis, the Court

stated that a party who is not a State official may still be

subject to liability under Section 1983 if "he is a willful

participant in joint action with the State or its agents." 449

U.S. at 187. However, it is not sufficient to participate jointly

with a state's agents in any act, but rather it must be "an

official act." Id. In Dennis, the official act was an injunction

from a state court judge, which was procured through "a corrupt

conspiracy." Id. In other words, the joint action must be of a

type which would subject the state agent to liability under Section

1983. It must be an action done "within the scope of [the State

agent's] employment or under color of state law." Van Ort, 92 F.3d

at 835. Otherwise, the state agent "acts as a private citizen" and

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is not subject to Section 1983 liability. Id. Obviously, and

consequently, a non-state actor acting jointly with a state agent

who acting as a private citizen is not subject to Section 1983

liability. 

In the instant case, the act in question is manifestly

unofficial and private: the unauthorized destruction of trees by a

disgruntled neighbor. Crawford did not commit this act under the

color of law or otherwise. Duncan destroyed the trees, and he did

so as a private citizen. Thus, despite Plaintiff's vague

suggestion that there was a conspiracy afoot between Duncan and

Crawford, any such conspiracy had as its goal an unofficial act,

and thus Crawford's involvement in it, does not make this a federal

case. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES the instant

action WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 4, 2007

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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