Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01591/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01591-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

3:17-cv-01591-DMS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

REGINALD WAYNE WHATLEY,

CDCR #AG-2464,

Plaintiff,

vs.

A. GRAY, Correctional Supervising 

Cook,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-01591-DMS-NLS

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

[ECF No. 2]

AND

2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND § 1915A(b)

REGINALD WAYNE WHATLEY (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Richard 

J. Donovon Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro 

se, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1). 

Plaintiff claims RJD’s Supervising Cook, Defendant A. Gray, violated his “right to 

be free from racial discrimination” when she uttered a racial epithet in reference to him 

on January 27, 2017. (Id. at 8-11.) He seeks declaratory relief, nominal, general, punitive 

and “emotional and psychological damages.” (Id. at 11-12.) 

Case 3:17-cv-01591-DMS-NLS Document 4 Filed 10/26/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 10
2

3:17-cv-01591-DMS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff has not paid the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead 

he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF 

No. 2), accompanied by a prison certificate and CDCR Inmate Statement Report pursuant 

to 28 U.SC. § 1915(a)(2) (ECF No. 3).

I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner granted leave to proceed 

IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. 

Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 

1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

 

1

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

Case 3:17-cv-01591-DMS-NLS Document 4 Filed 10/26/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 10
3

3:17-cv-01591-DMS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a prison certificate authorized 

by an RJD accounting official and a copy of his CDCR Inmate Statement Report. See 

ECF No. 3; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. 

These documents shows that while Plaintiff carried an average monthly balance of 

$16.70 and had average monthly deposits of $10.33 to his account over the 6-month 

period immediately preceding the filing of his Complaint, he had an available balance of 

only $.04 at the time of filing. See ECF No. 3 at 1, 3. Thus, the Court assesses Plaintiff’s 

initial partial filing fee to be $3.34 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), but acknowledges 

he may be unable to pay that initial fee at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) 

(providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action 

or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no 

assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 

630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” 

preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to 

the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2), 

declines to exact any initial filing fee because his prison certificate indicates he may have 

“no means to pay it,” Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629, and directs the Secretary of the CDCR, or 

his designee, to instead collect the entire $350 balance of the filing fees required by 28 

U.S.C. § 1914 and forward them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment 

payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See id.

II. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s IFP status or the payment of any partial filing fees, the 

Case 3:17-cv-01591-DMS-NLS Document 4 Filed 10/26/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 10
4

3:17-cv-01591-DMS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP 

and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] 

accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the 

terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as 

soon as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under 

these statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, 

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from 

defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. 

Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining whether 

a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires 

the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere 

possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also 

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that 

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). 

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, 

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 

Case 3:17-cv-01591-DMS-NLS Document 4 Filed 10/26/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 10
5

3:17-cv-01591-DMS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir.

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not 

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of 

Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff claims that on January 27, 2017, he and Defendant Gray, who is a 

supervising cook, “had a disagreement” about Plaintiff’s job assignment. See ECF No. 1 

at 8. After Correctional Officer Hurm “put [Plaintiff] on the line as [a] line server,” Gray 

approached him, and admonished him for giving out too many french fries. Id. at 8-9. 

“After that[,] [Plaintiff] went back to pots and pans” because he felt Gray was “picking at 

[him],” but Hurm demanded his ID and told him Gray was “sending [him] back to [his] 

cell.” Id. at 9. When Plaintiff asked Gray for an explanation, she became “upset,” walked 

away, and said: “I’m tired of this black ass nigger.” Id. Plaintiff admits he felt 

“disrespected” and “called her a bitch” in return, but claims he later apologized to Gray 

“so she would let [him] work when she [wa]s there.” Id.

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting 

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. 

Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) 

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) 

that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. 

Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

D. Racial Discrimination

First, to the extent Plaintiff claims Gray committed an act of “racial 

discrimination” based on her slur, the Court finds he has failed to allege facts sufficient to 

Case 3:17-cv-01591-DMS-NLS Document 4 Filed 10/26/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 10
6

3:17-cv-01591-DMS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

support a plausible Fourteenth Amendment claim. Under the Equal Protection Clause, 

Plaintiff must allege facts showing or intimating he was discriminated against because of 

his race, religion, or national origin. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 681. Allegations of 

discrimination need be “plausible,” not merely “conceivable.” Id. “A pleading that offers 

labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will 

not do.”” Id. at 678 (internal citation and punctuation omitted).

“To state a claim under § 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment plaintiff must show that the defendant[] acted with an intent or 

purpose to discriminate against [him] based on membership in a protected class.” 

Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation and citation 

omitted). To support such a claim, Plaintiff must allege facts to plausibly show 

discriminatory intent. Id.; see also Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 

2003); FDIC v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991) (essential element of an 

equal protection claim is to allege that officials intentionally acted in a discriminatory 

manner, and with a discriminatory purpose). Verbal harassment alone, however, is not 

enough to constitute a discriminatory act or a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 

requirement of equal protection under the law. Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 738 

(9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (footnote omitted); id. at 738 n.6 (“Although not itself rising to the level of a 

constitutional violation, prison officials’ use of abusive language directed at an inmate’s 

religion may be evidence that prison officials acted in an intentionally discriminatory 

manner,” but the verbal abuse alone is “not sufficient to state a constitutional violation.”).

Here, Plaintiff’s entire Complaint rests on one alleged offensive utterance by 

Defendant Gray, which arose in the heat of a culinary dispute and invoked Plaintiff’s 

race. Critically, however, his pleading contains no additional facts to show that Gray took 

some further intentional action to discriminate against Plaintiff based on his race. 

Specifically, Plaintiff must allege that Gray took some course of action against him 

“because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of’ [the action’s] adverse effects upon an identifiable 

Case 3:17-cv-01591-DMS-NLS Document 4 Filed 10/26/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 10
7

3:17-cv-01591-DMS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

group,” Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279, and that she did so “not for a neutral ... reason but for 

the purpose of discriminating on account of race.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. 

“[P]urposeful discrimination requires more than ‘intent as volition or intent as 

awareness of consequences.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (quoting Personnel Administrator of 

Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). To state an equal protection claim, 

Plaintiff’s Complaint must contain sufficient “factual content” to plausibly show his 

treatment was “invidiously dissimilar to that received by other inmates.” Seals v. Russell, 

No. C 04-1569 SBA, 2007 WL 1697319 *7 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2007). The

discriminatory act must be purposeful. Id. And while racial epithets are “thoroughly 

offensive, and it is particularly reprehensible for a government official to utter them in 

the course of h[er] official duties,” “the use of racially derogatory language, unless it is 

pervasive or severe enough to amount to racial harassment, does not not by itself violate 

the Fourteenth Amendment.” Blades v. Schuetzle, 302 F.3d 801, 805 (8th Cir. 2002); 

DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2000); Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 

705-06 (5th Cir. 1999).

Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment discrimination 

allegations fail to state a claim upon which § 1983 can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); § 1915A(b)(1); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 

1004.

F. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Plaintiff also claims Gray’s behavior violated the Eighth Amendment. See ECF 

No. 1 at 11. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual 

punishments” on those convicted of crimes. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991). 

Only those deprivations denying “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” are 

sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. at 298. Prison 

officials must provide prisoners with adequate “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, 

medical care and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 

1986). To be cruel and unusual, conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all 

Case 3:17-cv-01591-DMS-NLS Document 4 Filed 10/26/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 10
8

3:17-cv-01591-DMS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety. 

Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298-99.

“Although courts do not condone name-calling, ‘the exchange of verbal insults 

between inmates and guards is a constant, daily ritual observed in this nation’s prisons.’” 

Buckley v. Gomez, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1221 (S.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d, 168 F.3d 498 (9th 

Cir. 1999) (quoting Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 622 (9th Cir. 1997)). While racial 

slurs are deplorable, verbally abusive or offensive behavior by itself does not violate the 

Eighth Amendment. See Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(allegations that correctional counselor told plaintiff that he would transfer him to a 

higher custody status unit if he tried to go to the law library and that he would be sorry if 

he filed a class action suit were not actionable under § 1983); Freeman, 125 F.3d at 738 

(abusive language directed at prisoner’s religious and ethnic background not actionable); 

Zavala v. Barnick, 545 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (simple verbal 

harassment does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment); see also Puckett v. Seely, 

No. 2:16-CV-0726-CMK, 2017 WL 1519360, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2017) (dismissing 

complaint sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and noting that “[w]hile the use of 

racial epithets is offensive, without more such verbal harassment is insufficient to state a 

claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment.”).

Thus, because he has pleaded no facts to plausibly suggest Gray took some 

additional action against him that posed a substantial risk to Plaintiff’s health or personal 

safety, her racial epithet, even if overheard by other correctional officers and other

inmates, does not by itself constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Zavala, 545 F. Supp.

2d at 1060; Oltarzewski, 830 F.2d at 139; Nicholas v. Ada Cty., No. 1:17-CV-00289-

CWD, 2017 WL 4517966, at *2-3 (D. Idaho Sept. 20, 2017) (recommending dismissal of 

prisoner’s racial epithet claims on both Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds for 

failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)), adopted, 2017 WL 4517962 

(D. Idaho Oct. 10, 2017).

///

Case 3:17-cv-01591-DMS-NLS Document 4 Filed 10/26/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 10
9

3:17-cv-01591-DMS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

III. Conclusion and Orders

For the reasons explained, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2);

2. DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing 

monthly payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the 

preceding month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each 

time the amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL 

PAYMENTS MUST BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION;

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001;

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b), and 

GRANTS him forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in which to file an 

Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted, if he can.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to his 

original pleading. Defendants not named and any claim not re-alleged in his Amended 

Complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. 

v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended 

pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an 

amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within the time provided, the Court 

will enter a final Order dismissing this civil action based both on Plaintiff’s failure to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) 

and 1915A(b), and his failure to prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring 

Case 3:17-cv-01591-DMS-NLS Document 4 Filed 10/26/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 10
10

3:17-cv-01591-DMS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

amendment. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does 

not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the 

dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 26, 2017

Case 3:17-cv-01591-DMS-NLS Document 4 Filed 10/26/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of 10