Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-55800/USCOURTS-ca9-14-55800-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TIMOTHY O., individually;

AMY O., individually; L. O.,

Timothy O. as guardian ad

litem for his minor,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

PASO ROBLES UNIFIED

SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 14-55800

D.C. No.

2:12-cv-06385-JGB-JEM

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Jesus G. Bernal, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 7, 2015

Pasadena, California

Filed May 23, 2016

Before: Stephen Reinhardt, John T. Noonan,

and Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Reinhardt

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SUMMARY*

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

The panel reversed the district court’s judgment in favor

of the defendant school district in an action brought under the

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.

The panel held that the school district violated the

procedural requirements of the IDEA by failing to formally

assess a student for autism, even though this was an area of

suspected disability. As a result, the school district was

unable to design an educational plan that addressed the

student’s unique needs, and it denied him a free appropriate

public education. The panel remanded for determination of

an appropriate remedy.

COUNSEL

Marcy J.K. Tiffany (argued), Tiffany Law Group, Torrance,

California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Diane Beall (argued), Kronick, Moskovitz, Tiedmann &

Girard, Sacramento, California, for Defendant-Appellee.

Sarah Erickson André, Michael P. Curtis, and Irene

Tatevosyan, Nixon Peabody LLP, Los Angeles, California,

for Amicus Curiae Learning Rights Law Center.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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Maureen R. Graves, Fountain Valley, California, as and for

Amicus Curiae California Association of Parent-Child

Advocacy.

Selene Almazan-Altobelli, Towson, Maryland, as and for

Amicus Curiae Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates.

Jan E. Tomsky and Chad J. Graff, Fagen Friedman & Fulfrost

LLP, Oakland, California, for Amicus Curiae California

School Boards Association’s Education Legal Alliance.

OPINION

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

The Center for Disease Control and Prevention estimates

that nearly one in sixty-eight children has autism spectrum

disorder, a neurodevelopmental disorder that is characterized,

in varying degrees, by difficulty communicating and

socializing and byrestricted repetitive behavior, interests, and

activities.1 The disorder is present from birth, or very early

in development, and affects children’s abilityto communicate

ideas and feelings, to use their imagination, and to develop

relationships with others. Every individual with autism

spectrumdisorder is unique, although the main characteristics

in children—behavioral deficits in eye contact, responding to

one’s name, joint attention behavior, pretend play, imitation,

1

See CDC Autismand Developmental Disabilities Monitoring Network,

Prevalence of Autism Spectrum Disorder Among Children Aged 8

Years (Mar. 28, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/

ss6302a1.htm?s_cid=ss6302a1_w.

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nonverbal communication, and language development—are

measurable by eighteen months of age.

2

Early diagnosis and intervention is critical for the

education of children with autism. In fact, with early and

appropriate intervention, as many as 25% of children with

early autism will, at an early age, no longer meet the criteria

for that disorder. For the remaining children, intervention in

the child’s preschool years greatly increases the likelihood

that the child will learn to verbally communicate. Indeed, the

success of early intervention techniques has lowered the

number of autistic children who will remain non-verbal

throughout their lifetime to fewer than 10%, down from

roughly 50% in the 1980s. Early intervention also minimizes

the secondary symptoms and disruptive behavior, such as

aggression, tantrums, and self-injury, that are displayed by

children with the disorder. If left untreated, however,

symptoms of autism spectrum disorder can become more

severe and require extensive and expensive therapeutic

interventions.3

2

See Amanda J. ex rel. Annette J. v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877,

882–83 (9th Cir. 2007).

3

See Lynn Kern Koegal et al., The Importance of Early Identification

and Intervention for Children with or at Risk for Autism Spectrum

Disorders, 16.1 INT’L J. OF SPEECH-LANGUAGE PATHOLOGY 50, 51–52

(2014). See also Gary E. Marchant & Jason S. Robert, Predictive Health

Technologies: Genetic Testing for Autism Predisposition: Ethical, Legal

and Social Challenges, 9 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 203, 208–11

(Spring 2009).

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Luke4is a child with autism.5 Under the Individuals with

Disabilities Education Act ( “IDEA” or “the Act”), 20 U.S.C.

§§ 1400–1487, the defendant Paso Robles Unified School

District (“Paso Robles”) became responsible for providing

Luke with a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”)

when he turned three years old. In order to ensure that

children with disabilities receive an appropriate education

tailored to their unique condition, the IDEA requires that

when a school district is afforded reason to suspect that a

child has a disability, it “conduct a full and individual initial

evaluation” that ensures the child is assessed for “all areas of

suspected disability,” using a variety of reliable and

technically sound instruments. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(a)(1),

(b)(2)–(3). At the time of Luke’s initial evaluation, Paso

Robles was aware that Luke displayed signs of autistic

behavior, and therefore, autism was a suspected disability for

which it was required to assess him. It chose, however, not

to formally assess him for autism because a member of its

staff opined, after an informal, unscientific observation of the

child, that Luke merely had an expressive language delay, not

a disorder on the autism spectrum. We hold that, in so doing,

Paso Robles violated the procedural requirements of the

4

In the caption, Luke is named “L.O.” In his brief on appeal, as in this

opinion, he is referred to as Luke.

5 At the time this case was filed, “autism spectrum disorder” was not

recognized as a single disorder, but rather, as subgroups associated with

the severity of the person’s symptoms: Autistic Disorder, Asperger’s

Disorder, Childhood Disintegrative Disorder, and Pervasive

Developmental Disorder Not Otherwise Specified. Since the 2013

revisions to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,

however, these subgroups have been replaced by the umbrella term

“autism spectrum disorder.” Throughout this opinion, the original

subgroups will generally be referred to individually and collectively as

“disorders on the autism spectrum” or “autism.”

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IDEA and, as a result, was unable to design an educational

plan that addressed Luke’s unique needs. Accordingly, we

hold that Paso Robles denied Luke a free appropriate public

education, and remand for the determination of an appropriate

remedy.

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

(originally the Education for All Handicapped Children Act),

was designed to reverse a history of educational neglect for

disabled children. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast,

546 U.S. 49, 52 (2005) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-332, p. 2

(1975)). At the time of its passage, the need for institutional

reform was pervasive: millions of children with a multitude

of disabilities were entirely excluded from public schools,

and others, while present, could not benefit from the

experience because of undiagnosed—and therefore

unaddressed—disabilities. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2).

With the goal of remedying these systemic problems, the

Act conditions the receipt of federal funds on States’

maintenance of policies and procedures ensuring that a “free

appropriate public education” is available to all children with

disabilities between the ages of three and twenty-one. Id.

§ 1412(a)(1)(A).6 A free appropriate public education

requires the provision of “specially designed instruction, at

6 A “child with a disability” is one who has either intellectual

disabilities, hearing impairments, speech or language impairments, visual

impairments, serious emotional disturbance, orthopedic impairments,

autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific

learning disabilities, and who, by reason thereof, needs special education

and related services. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A).

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no cost to the parents, to meet the unique needs of a child

with a disability,” id. § 1401(9) & (29), as well as

transportation, developmental, corrective and other

supportive services required to ensure that the child benefits

from that special education, id. § 1401(26).

Identification and Evaluation of Children with

Disabilities

In order to provide a free appropriate public education to

all children with disabilities States must, of course, first

identify those children and evaluate their disabling

conditions. Accordingly, the IDEA requires that every State

have procedures in place that are designed to identify children

who may need special education services. Id.

§ 1412(a)(3)(A). Once identified, those children must be

evaluated and assessed for all suspected disabilities so that

the school district can begin the process of determining what

special education and related services will address the child’s

individual needs. See id. §§ 1412(a)(7), 1414(a)–(c).

That this evaluation is done early, thoroughly, and

reliably is of extreme importance to the education of children. 

Otherwise, many disabilities will go undiagnosed, neglected,

or improperly treated in the classroom. See id. § 1400(c). 

For this reason, the IDEA requires that local school districts7

must “conduct a full and individual initial evaluation” of a

7 Specifically, the statute requires that the initial evaluation be conducted

by a “State educational agency, other State agency, or local educational

agency.” A State educational agency is the State agency primarily

responsible for the State supervision of public schools. 20 U.S.C.

§ 1401(32). Generally, a “local educational agency” is synonymous with

the local school district. See id. § 1401(19). Thus, for simplicity’s sake,

this opinion will refer simply to “school districts,” or “the district.”

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child “before the initial provision of special education and

related services” to that child. Id. § 1414(a)(1)(A) (emphasis

added).8 Furthermore, the IDEA and its accompanying

regulations contain an extensive set of procedural

requirements that are designed to ensure that this initial

evaluation (as well as any subsequent reevaluations) achieves

a complete result that can be reliably used to create an

appropriate and individualized educational plan tailored to the

needs of the child.

First, the initial evaluation must be designed not only to

determine whether the child has a disability, but also “to

gather relevant functional, developmental, and academic

information about the child,” that can be used to determine

the child’s individual educational needs. 34 C.F.R.

§ 300.304(b)(1); 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(C). The school

district must, therefore, “ensure that– . . . the child is assessed

in all areas of suspected disability.” 20 U.S.C.

§ 1414(b)(3)(B) (emphasis added). Anything less would not

provide a complete picture of the child’s needs.

Second, the local school district must provide notice to

the child’s parents that describes “any evaluation procedures”

8 Any parents who have reason to suspect their child may have a

disability may request such an initial evaluation. 34 C.F.R. § 300.301(b). 

If the school district wishes to deny the request, it must provide written

notice to the parents explaining that it refuses to conduct an initial

evaluation and provide an explanation as to why it does not suspect the

child has a disability and what records or evaluations it used as the basis

for its decision. 34 C.F.R. § 300.503(a) & (b). A parent may then

challenge this decision by requesting a due process hearing under

34 C.F.R. § 300.507 or filing a State complaint under 34 C.F.R.

§ 300.153. The school district may also initiate an evaluation sua sponte

if it seeks and receives parental consent. 34 C.F.R. § 300.301(b).

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that the district proposes to conduct, as well as why it has

made those decisions. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(1) (emphasis

added); 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(a). The statute further requires,

inter alia, that in conducting the evaluation, school districts

must:

1. Use a “variety of assessment tools and

strategies” without relying on “any single

measure or assessment as the sole

criterion for determining whether a child

is a child with a disability or determining

an appropriate educational program for

the child,” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2)(A) &

(B);

2. Use “technically sound instruments that

may assess the relative contribution of

cognitive and behavioral factors, in

addition to physical or developmental

factors,” id. § 1414(b)(2)(C); and

3. Ensure that all assessments are conducted

by trained and knowledgeable personnel,

in accordance with instructions provided

by the producer of the assessment, and for

purposes which the assessments or

measures are valid and reliable, id.

§ 1414(b)(3)(A).

Upon completion of this full and individual initial evaluation,

the school district shall provide a copy of the evaluative

report to the child’s parents. Id. § 1414(b)(4)(B). If the

parents disagree with the school district’s evaluation of their

child, they have a right to “obtain an independent educational

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evaluation” or “IEE” at public expense. 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(b)(1); 34 C.F.R. § 300.502.

Creation of an Individualized Education Program

(“IEP”)

The results of the initial evaluation are critical to the next

step of the process: the creation of an individualized

education program or “IEP.” The IEP is a written document

that states the child’s present levels of academic achievement

and functional performance, creates measurable annual goals

for the child, describes the child’s progress toward meeting

the annual goals, and explains the services that will be

provided to the child to help him advance toward attaining his

particular goals. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A). It is created by

a child’s “IEP Team”—which consists of the child’s parents,

teachers, evaluators, and administrators, see generally

Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist.,

550 U.S. 516, 524 (2007)—after the team has considered the

child’s strengths, the parents’ concerns about the child’s

education, and the results of the school district’s initial

evaluation of the child, which (if done appropriately)

provides a complete picture of the child’s specific academic,

developmental, and functional needs. See 20 U.S.C.

§ 1414(d)(3)(A)(iii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(b)(1).

Although the IDEA gives discretion to school districts to

create and execute appropriate educational programs for

children with disabilities, the IDEA requires that parents be

afforded a significant and collaborative role in the

development of a child’s IEP. Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 524. 

To that end, the IDEA contains a significant number of

procedural safeguards that are designed to ensure that the

child’s parents have sufficient information to understand and

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participate meaningfully in all aspects of that discussion. See

M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 842, 851 (9th Cir.

2014). It requires, among other things, that school districts

provide copies of the initial evaluative report to the parents,

20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(4), thoroughly document all information

used to evaluate the educational needs of the child, 34 C.F.R.

§ 300.306(c)(1), and provide parents with an opportunity to

examine all of their child’s records. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1).

It also requires that parents be given formal, written

notice whenever the school district intends to change or

refuses to change the identification, evaluation, or educational

placement of their child. Id. § 1415(b)(3). That notice must

not only describe the action proposed or refused by the

agency, but also explain why the agency proposes or refuses

to take the action, as well as the records or assessments that

the agency used as a basis for its decision. 34 C.F.R.

§ 300.503(a) & (b).

Further, any parent who is dissatisfied with the

identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the

child must have the opportunity to present a formal

complaint. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). Whenever a complaint

is filed, the school district must convene a meeting with the

parents and members of the IEP Team during which the

parents may discuss the complaint and give the school district

the opportunity to resolve it. Id. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i). If the

school district does not resolve the complaint to the

satisfaction of the parents within thirty days, the parents have

the right to an impartial due process hearing before an

administrative law judge. Id. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii). Any party

aggrieved by the findings and decision rendered at the

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hearing may appeal to the state educational agency or may b

ring a civil action in federal court. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A).9

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Luke, an autistic child, was five years old when this case

was originally filed. He displayed symptoms of a

developmental disorder early in life, and in March 2009,

when he was twenty-seven months old, he began to receive

speech, language, and occupational therapy at the TriCounties Regional Center (“Tri-Counties”). Tri-Counties,

like all regional centers in California, is a nonprofit private

corporation that contracts with the Department of

Developmental Services to provide earlyintervention services

for at-risk infants and toddlers.10 California children under

the age of three qualify for services at regional centers if they

have a “developmental delay in one or more of the following

five areas: cognitive development; physical and motor

development, including vision and hearing; communication

development; social or emotional development; or adaptive

development” or if they suffer from “conditions of known

etiology or conditions with established harmful

developmental consequences.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 95014.

After the age of three, local school districts become

responsible for the education of children with disabilities. 

20 U.S.C. § 1412. In California, however, children can also

9 To ensure that parents are aware of these rights, school districts are

required to provide parents an explanation ofthese procedural safeguards.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(1)(C).

10 Cal. Dep’t Dev. Serv., Information About Regional Centers,

http://www.dds.ca.gov/RC/Home.cfm.

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continue to receive services at private regional centers if they

have “mental retardation, autism, epilepsy, cerebral palsy, or

a condition that is similar to mental retardation or requires

similar treatment.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 4512. At least

at the time of the events in this case, that meant that children

with Autistic Disorder, but not any other disorder on the

spectrum, were eligible for continued regional center

services.11In contrast, under the IDEA and the California law

that supplements that Act, local school districts have at all

times been required to provide special education services to

a much broader category of children, including any child who

manifests autistic-like behavior, regardless whether he or she

has been formally diagnosed with Autistic Disorder. See

34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(1); Cal. Educ. Code § 56846.2(a).12

11 As noted supra note 3, at the time of the events in this case, “autism

spectrum disorder” was not yet recognized as a single disorder. Although

the California Department of Developmental Services did not take a

formal position as to whether ‘autism’ in the California statute regarding

regional centers referred to any disorder on the spectrum or merely

Autistic Disorder, it filed briefs supporting the decisions of regional

centers not to offer continued services to children with disorders other

than Autistic Disorder. This ultimately resulted in the California Court of

Appeal concluding, in an unpublished decision, that “autism” in this

statute was synonymous with Autistic Disorder. See Brian S. v.

Delgadillo, 2010 WL 2933624 (Cal. App. 2010) (unpublished). It is not

clear what effect, if any, the recent changes to the Diagnostic and

Statistical Manual would have on this interpretation.

12 The IDEA requires that local school districts provide special education

services to children with autism, but allows the States to define what

qualifies as autistic for the purpose of special education. Some states, for

example, follow the medical definition found in the Diagnostic and

Statistical Manual. In California at the time of the events in this case, any

child who displayed two of seven listed types of autistic-like behavior

qualified as ‘autistic’ for the purpose of receiving special education

through local school districts, regardless whether the child had been

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After three months of Luke’s receiving services at TriCounties, his parents had a meeting with staff from TriCounties and Paso Robles to discuss what would happen

when Luke turned three years old. During that meeting, Paso

Robles scheduled a date on which it would conduct an initial

assessment to determine whether Luke was a child with a

disability and therefore qualified for special education and

related services under the IDEA. Paso Robles’ notes of that

meeting reflect that the group discussed how Luke seemingly

had no health needs, but that there were concerns about his

speech, and that Tri-Counties would perform a psychological

assessment of Luke—presumably to test for Autistic

Disorder—in order to determine whether he qualified for

further regional center services.13

On October 30, 2009, a few weeks before Luke’s third

birthday, Paso Robles conducted Luke’s initial evaluation. 

formally diagnosed with any disorder on the spectrum. 5 C.C.R.

§ 3030(g) (2009).

13 Although Paso Robles’ records do not state precisely what TriCounties wanted to test Luke for, Autistic Disorder seems to be the only

true possibility. If Luke had “no health needs,” he certainly would not

qualify for further regional center services as a child with either epilepsy

or cerebral palsy. Further, nothing in the record suggests that he displayed

any signs of mental retardation “or a condition that is similar to mental

retardation,” which are the only other conditions, aside from autism, that

would have qualified him for continued regional center services. The

conclusion that Tri-Counties wanted to perform a psychological

assessment for Autistic Disorder, and, in fact, discussed that possibility

with Paso Robles at the June 2009 meeting is also made clear by the fact

that (1) Paso Robles conceded in the district court that it “was aware” that

the Regional Center suspected Luke was autistic before it conducted its

own assessment, and (2) Tri-Counties ultimately assessed Luke for autism

but not for any other disabilities.

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According to the notice provided to Luke’s parents, Luke was

to be assessed byChristie Youngdale, a resource specialist for

Paso Robles, and Lisa Stinson, a speech and language

therapist, for academic/pre-academic achievement, sensorymotor development, communication development, and health

issues. He was not, the notice reflected, to be given any

assessments underthe categoryof “social/adaptive behavior,”

the category covering disorders on the autism spectrum.

Youngdale and Stinson observed Luke and tried to engage

him in play, but their attempts to utilize standard assessment

tools were unsuccessful because of his “compliance” issues. 

During the assessment, William Peck, a Paso Robles

psychologist, stopped by and observed Luke for

approximately thirty to forty minutes. Although the notice to

Luke’s parents mentioned nothing about Peck’s involvement,

Peck later testified that he came to observe in order to

“consult with the staff in terms of possible handicapping

conditions which may be – may have or may not have been

present.” Specifically, he later admitted, “there was a

possibility of looking at autism as a handicapping condition.” 

Rather than schedule a formal assessment for that condition,

however, Peck merely observed Luke in order to advise Paso

Robles’ staff whether it needed to conduct a full and formal

test for autism. This was, apparently, his standard practice. 

Peck at no point explained the purpose of his visit to Luke’s

parents. Indeed, during the observation, he did not

communicate at all with either Luke or his parents, who were

present while the tests were administered.

From his cursory observation, during which he did not

utilize any standard assessment tools, Peck concluded that

there was no need for Paso Robles to formally assess Luke

for any disorder on the autism spectrum because he saw Luke

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use a “variety of facial expressions,” display emotions, and

demonstrate his “skill at turn-taking.” In Peck’s opinion, this

was uncharacteristic of a child with a disorder on the autism

spectrum. Relying on this informal advice, Paso Robles

concluded that Luke had only an expressive language

impairment—not autism—and without taking any steps to

assess Luke for autism or autistic-like behaviors, or to ensure

that he would be so assessed, it scheduled an initial IEP

meeting for early December 2009.14 At no point, however,

did Paso Robles explain to Luke’s parents that it had thought

about assessing Luke for autism, and indeed, had called Peck

in to observe for that reason. Nor did it explain that it had

decided not to formally assess Luke for autism based on

Peck’s recommendation.

On November 18, 2009, Tri-Counties performed a

psychological assessment of Luke to determine whether he

had Autistic Disorder and therefore qualified for continued

regional center services after the age of three. Dr. Linda

Griffin’s final report concluded that:

Luke has some autistic symptoms which are a

concern. He has significantly delayed

expressive language; he is also not exhibiting

varied and frequent social pretend play, with

the exception of transportation toys. He

prefers to play alone much of the time. His

joint attention to adult directed tasks is poor

14 On November 10, Paso Robles called Tri-Counties asking if it had

assessed Luke. Tri-Counties told Paso Robles that it had not yet received

consent from Luke’s parents to conduct an assessment. That same day,

Paso Robles sent invitations to the IEP meeting, demonstrating its intent

to proceed to the IEP meeting without an assessment for autism.

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generally speaking, however there are

exceptions seemingly dependent on the nature

of the activity . . . It is difficult to get his

attention. . . . With the exception of his

expressive language delay which is very

pronounced, the severity of the other

symptoms above are mild in my opinion;

however, taken together, theystand in contrast

to a child with only a language disorder.

She provisionally diagnosed Luke with Pervasive

Developmental Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified (“PDDNOS”), a disorder on the autism spectrum, and opined that

potentially, with “therapeutic intervention[]” Luke might no

longer meet the criteria for that disorder, but that “[i]t is very

important that he receive appropriate interventions that

address his areas of concern” because “mild symptoms may

become more pronounced over time.”

Tri-Counties sent a copy of Dr. Griffin’s report

(hereinafter “Griffin Report”) to Paso Robles, which received

it on December 2, 2009, two days before the initial IEP

meeting. Despite its diagnosis and recommendation, the

report was not discussed at the IEP meeting; nor did Paso

Robles reevaluate its decision not to assess Luke for autism.15

15 Paso Robles argues that the Griffin Report was “considered,” at the

IEP meeting, and indeed, the administrative law judge so found. The sole

support for this statement is a single question asked at the administrative

hearing. Peck, who was a member of the IEP Team, was asked “So did

you consider that assessment at the 12/4/2009 IEP meeting?” and he

responded “Yes.” Regardless whether Peck himself considered the Griffin

Report at the meeting, there is no evidence that the assessment was

discussed at the meeting as part of the collaborative process mandated by

the IDEA. The IEP itself does not mention the GriffinReport, and another

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Indeed, Paso Robles contends that Dr. Griffin’s diagnosis was

insufficient to even create suspicion that Luke had a disorder

on the autism spectrum because Peck’s earlier observation of

Luke had dispelled any suspicion that Luke had such a

disorder and because Dr. Griffin’s “provisional” diagnosis

was not conclusive.

The IEP that was created as a result of the meeting

identified Luke’s disability as a “speech or language

impairment,” and set several goals for Luke to achieve in

those areas, including a goal that he would begin speaking in

small phrases, have a limited vocabulary of fifteen to twenty

words, and use other nonverbal means to communicate. Luke

was offered group speech and language services for twentyfive minutes, seven times a month, as well as placement in a

preschool classroom that met two days a week for 1.5 hours

each day. The IEP contained no mention of any disorder on

the autism spectrum or even any possibility of such a

disorder.

The 2009–2010 School Year

Luke exhibited signs of extreme difficulty in his first year

of school. He often refused to leave his mother’s side and,

according to her, displayed other problems in his classroom

behavior. In February, Youngdale suggested that Luke

should be transferred to a more intensive program. 

Ultimately, however, neither Paso Robles nor Luke’s parents

member of Paso Robles’ staff who testified at length about what was

considered during the IEP meeting never once mentioned the Griffin

Report. Further, Luke’s mother testified that she did not know that the

school district had received a copy of the report because it was never

mentioned during the meeting.

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called an IEP meeting to discuss such a change. Luke’s

mother also expressed concerns about aggressive and

obsessive behavior outside the school, and asked his other

teacher, Stinson, whether Luke might be autistic. Without

scheduling an assessment, Stinson assured Luke’s mother that

he was not, but also suggested that Luke might make better

progress in a more intensive program.

In May, another IEP meeting was held. The team agreed

that Luke would attend a more intensive preschool program

in the next year, but that he would not receive extended

school year services over the summer.

The 2010–2011 School Year

During the summer of 2010, Luke’s parents had him

privately evaluated by a speech and language pathologist, an

occupational therapist, and a neurologist. Subsequently, his

parents determined that he would not return to Paso Robles

for preschool, and that instead, he would be educated at home

utilizing the private services of a behaviorist. In October

2010, however, in part due to the cost of the private services,

Luke returned to school.

Luke’s IEP was amended to reflect that he would attend

a preschool class taught by Noah Cooper. This class, which

met three hours a day, had approximately eight students with

mild to moderate language and social skill defects, some of

whom had autism or exhibited autistic-like behavior. Luke

began attending the class in November. While in Cooper’s

class, Luke would occasionally whisper to his peers, but

would immediately stop speaking when an adult approached.

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At an IEP meeting in December 2010, staff expressed

concern that Luke was not talking to either adults or peers

and suggested that he might have “selective mutism.” Luke’s

parents reported that he was having tantrums at home,

including crying and aggressive behavior. According to

Peck, it was apparent from these complaints that Luke

displayed several types of autistic-like behavior, which would

ordinarily qualify him to receive special education services

for autism, but he did not mention that possibility at the IEP

meeting because:

[W]e didn’t have an assessment to address

that disability. In other words, off the top of

my head, I’m not going to be at an IEP

meeting and say a kid has autism when I

haven’t done an assessment specifically using

instruments standardized and developed to

make that particular determination. I’m just

not going to make that diagnosis off the top of

my head.

Despite having previously expressed the view that Paso

Robles did not need to assess Luke for disorders on the

autism spectrum, Peck did not inform the IEP Team of his

new concern or suggest that Luke should now be assessed for

autism.16

16 Peck at no point explained why he was previously able to make a

diagnosis “off the top of [his] head” as to why Luke did not have autism

without doing an assessment, but because he could not know the answer

without an assessment, would not advise the participants at the IEP

meeting that he now believed that Luke might have such a disability.

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As the year progressed, Cooper continued to try to

accommodate Luke’s refusal to speak, and Luke’s mother

continued to communicate her concerns that Luke was

demonstrating aggressive behavior at home. In January, her

attorney sent a letter to Paso Robles informing the District

that Luke had obtained legal representation and that his

parents requested that the school fund an independent

educational evaluation of Luke for autism. His parents also

retained the services of Genevieve Sullivan, a behavior

specialist, to observe Luke in class and had him privately

assessed for autism by Dr. B.J. Freeman, a well-respected

national expert on autism and autism-like disorders.

Dr. Freeman diagnosed Luke with Autistic Disorder. She

determined that Luke needed a positive behavior support plan

to address his problems, including his refusal to talk. Luke’s

mother testified that she told several members of Paso

Robles’ staff, including Luke’s teacher, about this diagnosis. 

The next month, Paso Robles announced that it would finally

do a formal and comprehensive evaluation of Luke,

motivated by his parents seeking “some type of outside

assessment.” Paso Robles did not complete the assessment

for almost an entire year, until January 2012, after which

Peck opined for the first time that Luke had autistic-like

behavior.

In the meantime, Luke’s parents arranged for him to

receive behavioral therapy from Sullivan’s agency. Within

a few short weeks, Luke began speaking to unfamiliar adults,

and a few months later he was speaking in multi-word

sentences to therapists, his parents, and non-family members

who had never before heard him speak.

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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 6, 2011, Luke’s parents filed a request for a due

process hearing with the Office of Administrative Hearings,

alleging in relevant part that Paso Robles violated the

procedural and substantive requirements of the IDEA and the

California Education Code by (1) failing to assess Luke in all

areas of suspected disability, specifically autism; and

(2) failing to appropriately address his behavioral issues, such

as refusing to speak, tantrums, and non-compliance, during

the 2010–2011 school year.17 They further alleged that, by

violating these requirements, the school denied Luke a free

appropriate public education during the 2009–2010 and

2010–2011 school years. They requested, as a remedy for

these violations, that Paso Robles pay for the private

assessments and private behavioral services that Luke

received, that it provide Luke with compensatory behavioral

and speech services, and that it include the behavioral therapy

recommended by Dr. Freeman as part of Luke’s ongoing

educational program. His parents also withdrew Luke from

school in a letter dated July 15, 2011.

17 Plaintiffs raise both of these issues on appeal. Because we hold that

Paso Robles denied Luke a free appropriate public education by failing to

assess him for autism, we do not reach the second question

presented—whether the school district denied Luke a free appropriate

public education by failing to address his behavioral issues. The plaintiffs

also presented a host of other issues before the administrative law judge,

including whether Luke should have been made eligible for special

education under the category of “autistic-like,” none of which is raised on

this appeal. Amicus Curiae California Boards Association’s Education

Legal Alliance asks us to hold that neither the IDEA nor California law

entitles special education students to a particular diagnosis or “eligibility

classification.” That question, however, is different from the question

whether a school district must assess a child for all areas of suspected

disability and, as noted, is no longer at issue in this case.

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A multi-day hearing was held in March and April of

2012. On July 6, 2012, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”)

denied all of Luke’s claims. Most relevant to the current

appeal, the ALJ declined to address whether Paso Robles’

October 2009 initial evaluation of Luke was deficient, and

instead found that, “[b]ecause Dr. Griffin’s report was so

thorough, the District saw no need to conduct further

assessments of [Luke], and relied heavily on the report.” 

Without citing any authority, she held that Luke “failed to

meet his burden of proof that the District should have

assessed him in the areas of autism and behavior.” Even if

Paso Robles was required to assess for autism, the ALJfound,

that failure was harmless because Paso Robles relied heavily

on Dr. Griffin’s assessment when creating Luke’s IEP. The

ALJ also concluded that Paso Robles did not need to assess

Luke for autism or behavioral functioning in the 2010–2011

school year because Luke did not display any serious autisticlike behavior at school.

Luke’s parents appealed the ALJ’s decision to the United

States District Court for the Central District of California. 

The district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision, but adopted a

different rationale. The district court concluded that Paso

Robles “knew” that Tri-Counties suspected Luke might be

autistic, but it did not need to formally assess Luke for autism

because Peck observed him at his initial evaluation on

October 30, 2009 and did not observe obvious characteristics

of a child with autism. The district court also agreed with the

ALJ that, even if Paso Robles was required to perform an

assessment of Luke for autism, any failure to do so was

harmless because Paso Robles “made appropriate

recommendations” based on Dr. Griffin’s report which

assessed Luke for autism. Further, the court asserted, Paso

Robles did not need to reassess Luke in 2010 because Luke’s

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parents never requested a reassessment, and because his

teacher reasonably wanted to observe Luke for a longer

period of time to determine what testing needed to be done. 

This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case requires us to review both the decision of the

district court and that of the administrative law judge. We

review de novo the question whether a school district’s

proposed individualized education program provided a free

appropriate public education. Amanda J., 267 F.3d at 887. 

In doing so, we may review a district court’s findings of fact

only for clear error. Id. Further, we must offer “due weight”

to the decisions of the state’s administrative bodies, a

standard which is far less deferential than judicial review of

other agency actions, but rather, requires us to refrain from

substituting our “own notions of sound educational policy for

those of the school authorities which [we] review.” Id.

(quoting Rowley v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982)).

ANALYSIS

School districts may deny a child a free appropriate public

education by violating either the substantive or procedural

requirements of the IDEA. M.M., 767 F.3d at 852. A school

district denies a child a free appropriate public education by

violating the IDEA’s substantive requirements when it offers

a child an IEP that is not reasonably calculated to enable the

child to receive educational benefits. J.W. ex rel. J.E.W. v.

Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 431, 432–33 (9th Cir.

2010). The school district may also, however, deny the child

a free appropriate public education by failing to comply with

the IDEA’s extensive and carefully drafted procedures. See

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Doug C. v. Hawaii Dep’t of Educ., 720 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th

Cir. 2013). While some procedural violations can be

harmless, procedural violations that substantially interfere

with the parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP

formulation process, result in the loss of educational

opportunity, or actually cause a deprivation of educational

benefits “clearly result in the denial of a [free appropriate

public education.]” Amanda J., 267 F.3d at 892.

Luke’s primary contention on this appeal is that Paso

Robles violated the IDEA’s essential procedural requirement

that it conduct an initial evaluation to assess a child “for all

areas of suspected disabilities” when it failed to formally

assess him for autism or autistic-like behavior. We agree and

reject the district court’s holding that, although Paso Robles

was aware that Tri-Counties suspected Luke might be

autistic, it did not need to assess him for autism because one

of the District’s staff members, William Peck, informally

observed Luke and did not see him exhibit any such behavior. 

The IDEA requires that, if a school district has notice that a

child has displayed symptoms of a covered disability, it must

assess that child in all areas of that disability using the

thorough and reliable procedures specified in the Act. School

districts cannot circumvent that responsibility by way of

informal observations, nor can the subjective opinion of a

staff member dispel such reported suspicion. Further, we

reject the ALJ’s equivocal and unsupported statement that

Paso Robles may not have needed to assess Luke for autism

because it “knew” that Tri-Counties was going to assess him. 

There is no support for this finding in the record and, even if

there were, Paso Robles took no steps to ensure that any

assessment by Tri-Counties complied with the requirements

of the IDEA imposed on the District. Under these

circumstances, the potential Tri-Counties assessment could

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not satisfy Paso Robles’ obligation to conduct an IDEAcompliant individual initial evaluation prior to developing

Luke’s IEP and providing special education services to Luke.

Finally, we hold that Paso Robles’ fundamental

procedural violations denied Luke a free appropriate public

education during the 2009–2010 and 2010–2011 school years

because the District’s failure to assess Luke for all areas of

suspected disability deprived his IEP Team of critical

evaluative information about his developmental abilities as an

autistic child. That deprivation made it impossible for the

IEP Team to consider and recommend appropriate services

necessaryto address Luke’s unique needs, thus depriving him

of critical educational opportunities and substantially

impairing his parents’ ability to fully participate in the

collaborative IEP process. In so holding, we reject the

argument advanced by both the district court and the ALJthat

any failure to assess Luke for autism was rendered harmless

by Paso Robles’ reliance on the Griffin Report in creating

Luke’s IEP. There is no evidence in the record that Dr.

Griffin’s assessment was conducted with the intent of helping

Luke’s IEP Team to develop an appropriate educational plan

or to gather all the necessary information required by the

IDEA for that purpose. Nor is there any evidence that the

Griffin Report was actually considered by Luke’s team as

part of the collaborative process mandated by the IDEA, or

that the information it collected or its findings were

incorporated into Luke’s IEP. In fact, all the evidence is to

the contrary. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the

district court and remand for the determination of an

appropriate remedy.

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I. Paso Robles Failed to Conduct an Assessment for

Autism, as Required by the IDEA

Under the IDEA, the school district must conduct a “full

and individual initial evaluation,” one which ensures that the

child is assessed in “all areas of suspected disability,” before

providing that child with any special education services. 

20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(a)(1)(A), 1414(b)(3)(B). The California

Education Code, which incorporates the requirements of the

IDEA into state law, similarly requires that the child be

assessed “in all areas related to the suspected disability.” See

Cal. Educ. Code § 56320(f). As described earlier, this

requirement serves a critical purpose: it allows the child’s

IEP Team to have a complete picture of the child’s

functional, developmental, and academic needs, which in turn

allows the team to design an individualized and appropriate

educational plan tailored to the needs of the individual child.

Our precedent establishes that a disability is “suspected,”

and therefore must be assessed by a school district, when the

district has notice that the child has displayed symptoms of

that disability. In Pasatiempo by Pasatiempo v. Aizawa,

103 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 1996), for example, we held that the

“informed suspicions of parents, who may have consulted

outside experts,” trigger the requirement to assess, even if the

school district disagrees with the parent’s suspicions because

“[t]he identification [and assessment] of children who have

disabilities should be a cooperative and consultative process.” 

Id. at 802. Once either the school district or the parents

suspect disability, we held, a test must be performed so that

parents can “receive notification of, and have the opportunity

to contest, conclusions regarding their children.” Id.

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Similarly, in N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary School District,

541 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2008), we held that the requirement

to assess may be triggered by the informed suspicions of

outside experts. There, a young child was assessed by a

professional for speech and language problems before the

child began school. Id. at 1205–06. The professional

concluded that an “autistic component” was complicating the

child’s performance, although the professional did not

diagnose the child with a disorder on the autism spectrum. 

Id. at 1209. The child’s parents delivered these records to the

school district’s special education director and discussed the

evaluation with him, but the school district never arranged for

the child to be assessed for autism. Id. at 1205–06. Instead,

it referred the child’s parents to a third party which would

perform a free autism test for the parents. Id. at 1206. The

school district, like Paso Robles, later claimed that it did not

arrange for the child to be tested because it did not suspect

that the child had autism. Id. at 1209. We held that the

district’s assertion of ignorance was plainly contradicted by

the record because the school was aware (due to the prior

evaluation) that autism was a possibility. Id. at 1209–10.

Here, the record shows that Paso Robles had notice that

Luke displayed symptoms of autism. Both the ALJ and the

district court found that Paso Robles was aware, before its

initial evaluation of Luke in October 2009, that Tri-Counties

believed that he might have a disorder on the autism

spectrum.18Indeed, Peck admitted at the administrative

18 Paso Robles now asserts that there is no basis to conclude that TriCounties told the District that it suspected Luke had autism. While the

notes from the June 2009 meeting between Luke’s parents, Tri-Counties,

and Paso Robles do not specifically mention “autism,”they do establish

that Tri-Counties wanted to give Luke a psychological examination to see

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hearing that autism was a suspected disability when he stated

that he had been called to informally observe Luke’s initial

evaluation because there was a possibility of looking at

autism as a disabling condition.

Despite this knowledge, when creating a plan for Luke’s

initial assessment, Paso Robles did not include any of the

standard assessments for autism. Rather, the notice sent to

Luke’s parents reflected that he would not be given any

assessment for social/adaptive behavior, which would be

necessary in order to determine whether Luke had autisticlike symptoms. Instead, during the October 2009 initial

assessment, Paso Robles attempted to assess Luke for several

other disorders, but was unable to complete its tests of him

because of Luke’s “compliance” issues. At no point during

its examination did Paso Robles conduct or attempt to

conduct any form of standard or reliable assessment for

autism or autistic-like behavior.

Moreover, even if Paso Robles had not had notice of

Luke’s autistic symptoms at the time of the October 30, 2009

initial assessment, it obtained such notice when it received

the Griffin Report, which “provisionally” diagnosed Luke

with a disorder on the autism spectrum and noted that he

displayed troubling autistic behavior. Peck testified that he

did not give much weight to Dr. Griffin’s assessment because

it was only a “provisional” diagnosis. Regardless of Paso

if he qualified for further regional center services, which he would qualify

for only if he had mental retardation, epilepsy, cerebral palsy, or autism. 

The only plausible such disorder in Luke’s case was autism. In any event,

Paso Robles conceded in the district court that it was aware that TriCounties suspected Luke was autistic before it conducted its own

assessment.

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Robles’ subjective opinion about the validity of Dr. Griffin’s

diagnosis, however, the “informed suspicions of . . . [a]

consulted outside expert[]”—here, Dr. Griffin, whose report

stated that Luke displayed troubling autistic

behavior—establishes the statutory requirement of suspicion

thus necessitating a full assessment for autism. See

Pasatiempo, 103 F.3d at 802. Paso Robles still did not do so,

and instead, two days later, held an IEP meeting during which

neither autism nor the Griffin Report were ever discussed. 

Further, neither the possibility of autism nor the

recommendations of the Griffin Report were incorporated

into Luke’s IEP.

Even more troubling, by the time of the December 2010

IEP, it was clear from parent and teacher complaints that

Luke displayed autistic-like behavior at home and at school. 

Even then, Paso Robles did not suggest that Luke should be

provided services to address his autistic-like behavior or even

that Luke should be assessed for autism. This complete

failure to assess Luke for all areas of suspected disability

clearly and substantially violated the IDEA’s procedural

requirements.

A. Peck’s Informal Observation of Luke Could Not

Satisfy Paso Robles’ Obligation to Assess for Autism

Despite its clear notice of Luke’s autistic-like behavior,

Paso Robles argues that autism was not a “suspected

disability” either at the time of its October 2009 initial

assessment or after it received Dr. Griffin’s assessment. The

district court agreed, and held that while Paso Robles “knew

that [Tri-Counties] suspected that [Luke] may be autistic,” it

did not need to formally assess Luke because it had requested

that its staff member, Peck, observe informally Luke’s

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assessment for other disorders and determine whether

additional testing was needed. According to Peck, he saw

Luke display behavior that was not characteristic of a child

with autism, and therefore advised the district that no

additional assessment was necessary. Specifically, the

district court wrote, it was “not aware of any authority that

supports that where the school district is on notice that a

student may be on the autism spectrum, observes the student,

and determines that he did not exhibit any characteristics of

autism, that the district is still required to complete additional

testing.”

That conclusion, however, is directly contrary to the

provisions of the IDEA and our precedent, which establish

that if a school district is on notice that a child may have a

particular disorder, it must assess that child for that disorder,

regardless of the subjective views of its staff members

concerning the likely outcome of such an assessment. That

notice may come in the form of expressed parental concerns

about a child’s symptoms, as in Pasatiempo, of expressed

opinions by informed professionals, as in Hellgate, or even

by other less formal indicators, such as the child’s behavior

in or out of the classroom. A school district cannot disregard

a non-frivolous suspicion of which it becomes aware simply

because of the subjective views of its staff, nor can it dispel

this suspicion through informal observation. Rather, such

notice automaticallytriggers mandatorystatutoryprocedures: 

the school district must conduct an assessment for all areas of

the suspected disability using the comprehensive and reliable

methods that the IDEA requires. In this case, it is particularly

egregious that in conducting Luke’s initial evaluation which

assessed him for other possible disorders, Paso Robles

deliberately refused to include an assessment of the one

suspected disability of which it had clear notice—autism.

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Peck, of course, did not conduct an assessment for autism,

let alone one that complied with the IDEA. Not only was his

involvement in Luke’s initial evaluation not included within

the original notice provided to Luke’s parents, but he did not

use a variety of standard or reliable methods. 20 U.S.C.

§ 1414(b)(3)(A). Rather, he used only one, generally

unreliable method—informal observation—or to use a phrase

later employed by him, observation “off the top of my head.” 

While the record reflects that a complex form of structured

observation may be used as a tool to identify autistic-like

behavior, Peck was not certified at that time to perform that

kind of testing, and in fact did not do so or even purport to

have attempted to do so.

To hold that Peck’s informal observation could overcome

Paso Robles’ statutory obligation to formally assess Luke for

a suspected disability would allow school districts to

disregard expressed and informed concerns about a child’s

disabilities on the basis of prejudicial stereotypes about what

certain disabilities look like, rather than on the objective

evidence and the thorough and reliable standardized testing

that the IDEA requires. This result would be particularly

devastating for children with autism because, as Dr. Freeman

explained at the administrative hearing, the condition “can be

very subtle” and manifest itself in many different ways. It

would likely be missed by an informal observation, resulting

in many children remaining undiagnosed, untreated, and

unable to reach their full educational potential. The effect,

moreover, would be felt most heavily by children from

disadvantaged families without the sophistication or

resources to obtain outside professional opinions.

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B. The Griffin Report Cannot Qualify as an Assessment

that Satisfies Paso Robles’ Obligations Under the

IDEA

Although Paso Robles does not advance the argument on

appeal, the ALJ equivocally expressed an alternate theory as

to why Paso Robles did not need to assess Luke for autism. 

Without citing any legal or factual support, the ALJ said that 

“[t]he District knew that [Luke] was to be formally assessed

by a psychologist through Tri-Counties,” and the Griffin

Report “was so thorough, the District saw no need to conduct

further assessments of [Luke].” There is no support in the

record for this finding. The Griffin Report was conducted

explicitly for the purpose of assisting Tri-Counties in

determining whether Luke qualified for continued regional

center services, not to gather information about him that

could be used to determine his individual educational needs

or to determine whether he qualified for special education

under the IDEA. Further, Paso Robles took absolutely no

steps to ensure that this assessment would occur or that it

would be conducted and considered in a manner that

complies with the IDEA. It also did not inform Luke’s

parents that it intended to rely, or did in fact rely, on the

Griffin Report in creating Luke’s IEP. Accordingly, the

Griffin Report cannot qualify as an assessment that satisfies

Paso Robles’ obligations under the IDEA.19

19 Amicus Curiae Learning Rights Law Center asks that we hold that

school districts are never allowed to rely on the assessments performed by

regional centers as a substitute for conducting their own. According to the

amicus, the regional center’s assessment is performed strictly for the

purpose of diagnosing a child to determine eligibility to receive continued

regional center services, whereas, in contrast, school districts must

perform assessments not only to diagnose children’s medical disability,

but also to assess the child’s strengths and needs for educational planning,

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As an initial matter, there is no support for the ALJ’s

suggestion that Paso Robles did not assess Luke for autism

because it “knew” that he was going to be assessed by TriCounties or for the finding that Paso Robles believed the

Griffin Report to be comprehensive and thorough. To the

contrary, the record clearly establishes that the reason Paso

Robles did not assess Luke for autism was because it did not

subjectively believe that he was autistic and because Peck had

not observed any autistic-like behavior during his informal

observation of Luke. Had Paso Robles truly intended to rely

on Tri-Counties’ assessment of Luke, it surely would have

taken steps to ensure that the assessment occurred when, on

November 10, 2009, it learned that Tri-Counties had not yet

received parental consent to conduct an assessment. Instead,

Paso Robles sent invitations to Luke’s December IEP meeting

that same day, signaling its intent to proceed without any

assessment for autism by Tri-Counties or otherwise. 

Testimonyfrom the administrative hearing, moreover,reveals

that Paso Robles’ staff believed the Griffin Report to be

unreliable and inaccurate and that the District therefore

disregarded it entirely. Peck criticized Dr. Griffin’s

methodology, and explained that he understood the

“provisional” diagnosis to mean the results of the test were

non-conclusive. Similarly, Stinson testified that she believed

that Paso Robles could ignore the provisional diagnosis

because the school district received a lot of reports of PDDNOS when the child had only a severe language impairment.

Moreover, even were we to accept the ALJ’s clearly

erroneous factual findings, we would still be compelled to

conclude that Paso Robles violated the IDEA because it took

including helping in the creation of an IEP. We express no view on this

question.

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absolutely no steps to “ensure” that the Tri-Counties

assessment occurred or was conducted and considered in a

manner that complies with the Act. See Hellgate, 541 F.3d at

1209 (holding that a school district may not “abdicate” its

responsibilities under the IDEA and that merely referring a

child’s parents to a third party for testing violates the

statutory requirement that the school district “ensure” that the

child is assessed). Paso Robles did not explain to Luke’s

parents that it intended to rely on Tri-Counties to assess Luke

for autism or include an assessment for autism in Luke’s

initial evaluation plan. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(1) & (c)(1). 

It also did not take any steps to ensure that the Tri-Counties

assessment actually took place, nor did it give Luke’s parents

notice that the Griffin Report would be considered in creating

Luke’s IEP, as it would be required to do if it were part of

Paso Robles’ initial evaluation. See 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1414(d)(3)(A)(iii) (requiring that the IEP Team consider

“the results of the initial evaluation”); 34 C.F.R. § 300.503

(prior notice requirement). Finally, as described below in

Part II, the report was never discussed or considered by

Luke’s IEP Team when creating his initial IEP.

In short, the record clearly reflects that Paso Robles was

on notice that Luke might have a disorder on the autism

spectrum before it developed and provided him with special

educational services. It was therefore required by the IDEA

to ensure that an assessment for that disability was conducted

using the sound and reliable methods that the Act demands

and to consider the results of that assessment when creating

Luke’s IEP and providing him special education services. It

failed to do so, which in itself constituted a substantial

procedural violation of the IDEA.

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II. Paso Robles’ Violation of the IDEA’s Procedural

Requirements Denied Luke a Free Appropriate

Education

Having concluded that Paso Robles violated the

procedural requirements of the IDEA, we must determine

whether the violations are “sufficient to support a finding that

[Luke] was denied a [free appropriate public education].” 

Amanda J., 267 F.3d at 892. While some procedural

violations of the IDEA may be harmless, such errors

constitute a denial of a free appropriate public education if

they seriously impair the parents’ opportunity to participate

in the IEP formulation process, result in the loss of

educational opportunity for the child, or cause a deprivation

of the child’s educational benefits. Id.; see also M.L. v. Fed.

Way Sch. Dist., 394 F.3d 634, 652 (9th Cir. 2005) (Gould, J.,

concurring). A loss of an educational opportunity occurs, for

example, when there is a “strong likelihood” that, but for the

procedural error, an alternative placement “would have been

better considered.” Doug C., 720 F.3d at 1047 (quoting M.L.,

394 F.3d at 657 (Gould, J., concurring)). As we have

previously held, to succeed on a claim that a child was denied

a free appropriate public education because of a procedural

error, the individual need not definitively show that his

educational placement would have been different without the

error. Id.

On more than one occasion, we have held that the

provision of a free appropriate public education is

“impossible” when the IEP Team fails to obtain information

that might show that the child is autistic. See, e.g., Hellgate,

541 F.3d at 1210 (“The failure to obtain critical medical

information about whether a child has autism ‘render[s] the

accomplishment of the IDEA’s goals—and the achievement

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of a free appropriate public education—impossible.’”);

Amanda J., 267 F.3d at 894 (“The IEP team could not create

an IEP that addressed Amanda’s special needs as an autistic

child without knowing that Amanda was autistic.”).20

We reaffirm that holding today. As in Hellgate and

Amanda J., any goals set forth in Luke’s IEP were likely

inappropriate because they were made without sufficient

evaluative information about Luke’sindividual capabilities as

an autistic child. Indeed, testimony from Paso Robles’ staff

indicates that any ostensible progress that Luke made was

likely attributable to an “underestimation of his abilities” at

the outset.21 Further, this lack of information denied Luke

20 Weissburg v. Lancaster School District, 591 F.3d 1255 (9th Cir.

2010), cited by the amicus in support of the school district, does not

undermine these cases. There, we noted that the IDEA does not give a

student the legal right to a proper disability classification. Whether Luke

should have been given a different eligibility classification, however, is

not the basis of the plaintiffs’ appeal. Instead, the question is whether the

IEP Team could have properly created an individualized education plan

tailored to Luke’s particular needs without having before it the statutorily

required assessment of him for autism.

 

21 Although not essential to our holding that Luke was denied a FAPE,

some evidence in the record suggests that Luke did not actually make

meaningful progress toward even the limited goals in his IEP. There were

conversations between Luke’s parents and teachers during the 2009–2010

school year to the effect that Luke was not making adequate progress

toward his goals and required a more intensive program. Further, Luke’s

assessment score dropped significantly between November 2009—when

he was assessed by Dr. Griffin before he received any special education

from Paso Robles—and January 2012—when he was assessed by Dr.

Freeman. As Dr. Freeman explained, if Luke had made “meaningful

progress,” the score would have remained the same or increased. A

significant drop suggested that Luke was “not keeping pace.”

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educational opportunities and substantially hindered his

parents’ ability to participate in the IEP process.

Here, there is strong reason to believe that alternative

services would have at least been more seriously considered

during the collaborative IEP process if the school district had

formally assessed Luke for autism. See Doug C., 720 F.3d at

1047. Because Luke was never formally so assessed, several

members of Paso Robles’ staff treated him as if he had

selective mutism, an anxiety disorder. Rather than engaging

in positive interventions to encourage Luke to talk, the staff

strove to create an environment that would minimize his

supposed anxiety. As Luke’s private behaviorist explained,

these actions should not have been taken in the case of an

autistic child and may actually have reinforced Luke’s refusal

to speak. Similarly, as Erika Castro, a Paso Robles speech

therapist, testified, had she been aware that Luke had been

diagnosed by Dr. Griffin as having a disorder on the autism

spectrum, she would not have suggested that he was

selectively mute. Indeed, because she was under the

misperception that Luke’s refusal to speak was due to an

anxiety disorder, she never suggested to Luke’s teacher that

he needed to be seen and possibly be treated by a

behaviorist—a recommendation that she might have

otherwise made. Such a referral would likely have been of

immense benefit with respect to Luke’s education, as

evidenced bythe tremendous improvement in his speech once

he began receiving such services.

Further, by failing to assess Luke for autism, Paso Robles

deprived Luke’s parents of vital information necessary for

them to meaningfully participate in the IEP process. It is

clear from the record that Paso Robles considered assessing

Luke for autism but decided not to do so after Peck’s

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informal and procedurally inadequate observation. It did not,

however, explain this to Luke’s parents. Without this

information, his parents—who were not represented by

counsel at the time—had no reason to question the initial

evaluation report and had no basis to request an independent

educational evaluation.

Paso Robles argues that it provided Luke with a free

appropriate public education because its staff would have

made the same recommendations as to the specialized

services Luke required regardless whether he had been

diagnosed as autistic. Peck, for example, testified that he

would have made the same recommendations during the

December 2009 IEP.22 This argument is plainly contradicted

by the fact that Paso Robles’ staff treated Luke as if he were

selectively mute, which they certainly would not have done

if they had an assessment for autism. Even if true, however,

this argument misses a central concern of our inquiry. The

creation of an IEP is not a unilateral enterprise by the school

district, but rather, a collaborative process that necessitates

parents’ input. Regardless whether Paso Robles staff might

have made identical recommendations in the absence of

informed parental participation in the collaborative process,

the failure to obtain necessary information about Luke’s

disorder prevented an informed discussion with his parents

22 Regardless of the veracity of this statement, the record strongly

suggests that Peck would at least have made different recommendations

at the December 2010 IEP. As he admitted during the administrative

hearing, he did not suggest that Luke had autism or needed treatment for

autistic behavior during that meeting because he had not yet “done an

assessment” for autism. We need not further comment on how his

testimony that he would not do so “off the top of [his] head” comports

with the role he played in 2009 when he ruled out the need for an autism

assessment on the basis of a casual observation.

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about his specific needs as an autistic child. Thus, Paso

Robles’ violation of the statutory requirement deprived Luke

of educational opportunities and substantially hindered his

parents’ participation in the process. So that there may be no

similar misunderstanding in the future, we will say it once

again: the failure to obtain critical and statutorily mandated

medical information about an autistic child and about his

particular educational needs “‘render[s] the accomplishment

of the IDEA’s goals—and the achievement of a

FAPE—impossible.’” Hellgate, 541 F.3d at 1210 (emphasis

added) (quoting Amanda J., 267 F.3d at 894). Because the

school district failed to conduct the statutorily mandated

assessment of “all areas of suspected disability” it necessarily

deprived Luke of a free appropriate public education.

Finally, in so holding, we reject the argument of the ALJ

and the district court that any failure by Paso Robles to assess

Luke for autism was harmless because Paso Robles relied

heavily on the Griffin Report when creating Luke’s IEP. 

There are three substantial problems with this argument: 

(1) there is no evidence that Paso Robles took any steps to

ensure that the Griffin Report was conducted in a manner that

complied with the IDEA’s procedural requirements, (2) the

determination that Paso Robles relied on the Griffin Report

is entirely unsupported by, indeed is contrary to, the evidence

in the record, and (3) any reliance on the Griffin Report was

without notice to or discussion with Luke’s parents, which

would have substantially hindered their ability to fully and

fairly participate in the IEP process, thus exacerbating the

denial to Luke of a free appropriate public education.

First, as discussed supra Section I.B, Paso Robles took

absolutely no steps to “ensure” that the Tri-Counties

assessment occurred or that it was conducted in a manner that

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complies with the procedural requirements of the Act. See

Hellgate, 541 F.3d at 1209. Second, there is absolutely no

evidence that the Griffin Report was actually discussed at

Luke’s December 2009 IEP meeting or that it was relied on

at any point during the development of the IEP. The only

evidence that it was considered at all is a single statement

made by Peck at the administrative hearing that he considered

it during the initial IEP meeting. When asked “So did you

consider that assessment at the 12/4/2009 IEP meeting?” he

responded “Yes.” The fact that Peck “considered” the Griffin

Assessment, however, does not suggest that it was relied

upon when creating Luke’s IEP or that it was carefully

considered by the entire IEP Team. Rather, the argument is

directly contrary to the unrefuted evidence that Paso Robles

considered the report to be unreliable: Peck read the report,

believed the “provisional” diagnosis meant that the results

were non-conclusive, disregarded it, and did not even

mention it during the IEP meeting. Similarly, none of Paso

Robles’ other staff members mentioned the Griffin Report

when describing what the IEP Team discussed at the IEP

meeting, and indeed, Luke’s mother testified that she did not

even know that the school district had received a copy of the

report because it was never mentioned. The IEP, of course,

makes absolutely no mention of the report. Finally, Paso

Robles has maintained throughout these proceedings that the

Griffin Reportmobook was of so little significance as not

even to warrant a suspicion of autism.

Third, even if we were to accept the clearly erroneous

factual finding that the report was “considered,” that

consideration would have constituted a further procedural

violation that would only have exacerbated the denial of a

free appropriate public education to Luke. That is because

any purported reliance on the Griffin Report would have

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occurred without notice to Luke’s parents that the assessment

was being considered in creating the IEP, as required by

34 C.F.R. § 300.503(a) & (b). The notice requirement

provides parents with information necessary to an

understanding of the rationale behind the school district’s

proposal, thus ensuring the “meaningful participation by

parents and informed parental consent” that the IDEA was

designed to afford. M.M., 767 F.3d at 851. If Paso Robles

had given Luke’s parents written notice that the Griffin

Report would be considered in drafting the IEP, it would have

been required to explain to them why it disagreed with Dr.

Griffin’s diagnosis and to state whether it was making any

recommendations for Luke’s education based on her report. 

In the absence of such notice, however, Luke’s parents were

left without critical information. Because they did not have

Paso Robles’ relative sophistication, they could not be

expected to understand how Tri-Counties’ test results could

affect Luke’s special education eligibility or what services

needed to be provided in light of Dr. Griffin’s diagnosis. 

Accordingly, they could not give informed consent or

participate meaningfully in the creation of the IEP, a separate

statutory violation in itself.

Because we hold that the failure to assess Luke for autism

constituted a substantial procedural violation of the IDEAthat

denied him a free appropriate public education during the

2009–2010 and 2010–2011 school years, we need not address

the separate question raised by him on this appeal: whether

the school district’s failure to take appropriate steps to

address his refusal to speak denied him a free appropriate

education during those same years.

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CONCLUSION

Well before creating an individual education plan for

Luke, Paso Robles had notice that he might have a disorder

on the autism spectrum. Under the IDEA, the school district

had an affirmative obligation to formally assess Luke for

autism using reliable, standardized, and statutorily proscribed

methods. Paso Robles, however, ignored the clear evidence

requiring it to do so, and instead determined that Luke was

not autistic based on the view of a staff member who opined,

after a casual observation, that Luke did not display signs of

autism. This failure to formally assess Luke’s disability

rendered the provision of a free appropriate education

impossible and left his autism untreated for years while Paso

Robles’s staff, because of a lack of adequate information,

took actions that may have been counter-productive and

reinforced Luke’s refusal to speak. We hold, therefore, that

Paso Robles violated the IDEA and denied Luke a free

appropriate public education during the 2009–2010 and

2010–2011 school years. We reverse the decision of the

district court and remand for a determination of the

appropriate remedy.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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