Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00022/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00022-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 Plaintiff’s original complaint was filed on January 4, 2007. By Order, filed on January 1

19, 2007, the court directed plaintiff to file a completed affidavit for in forma pauperis status. 

After doing so, plaintiff then filed an amended complaint, which superseded the original

complaint. See Order, filed on May 11, 2007.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY RICHARDO TURNER, 

Plaintiff, No. CIV S 07-0022 GGH P

vs.

OFFICER SPENCE, et al., ORDER

Defendants.

 /

Background

By Order, filed on May 11, 2007, this court found plaintiff’s amended complaint,

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filed on March 29, 2007, appropriate for service upon ten (10) defendants: Woodland Police

Officer Luke A. Spence; and the following Yolo County Sheriff’s Department employees:

Commander Ed Prieto; Lieutenant (Lt.) T. Day; Sergeant (Sgt.) D. Hunter; Deputy Chaud;

Deputy Gibson; Deputy Jamolodin; Deputy Duvall; Deputy Madden; as well as, Registered

Nurse (R.N.) Tony. 

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 Or any other person the sheriff or his legal counsel designated as appropriate. 2

 See concurrently filed Order re: unserved or non-answering defendants.

3

 The undersigned observes that, in addition to the consent forms signed and filed by the 4

parties noted in the Order, filed on April 3, 2008, reassigning this matter, the voluminous case

docket of this action indicates plaintiff had originally consented to the jurisdiction of the

undersigned earlier in a signed consent form filed on January 9, 2007 (#5). 

2

By Order, filed on June 5, 2007, the court directed a Mr. Purcell, not a defendant, 2

pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), within twenty days, to respond to plaintiff’s

May 23, 2007, filing wherein plaintiff averred that he was being denied copies of his amended

complaint which were necessary for service of process. The court’s docket does not indicate that

anyone ever responded to the order and the Yolo County Sheriff’s Dept. is cautioned in future

not to disregard any court order. The court will not sanction Mr. Purcell or the defendant sheriff

(aka “Commander Prieto”) at this time, but will note that the show cause order was not properly

discharged. When plaintiff returned his documents without the full complement of copies, the

court elected to provide the remaining necessary copies to streamline the process in its service

order. See Order, filed on July 9, 2007, n. 1. 

By Order, filed on October 3, 2007, Judge Karlton related two other cases,

formerly No. CIV S 07-0078 GEB CMK P and No. CIV S 07-1362 LEW DAD P, now

denominated No. CIV S 07-0078 LKK GGH P and No. CIV S 07-1362 LKK GGH P, to No. CIV

S 07-0022 LKK GGH P. By Order, filed on October 11, 2007, the undersigned directed

defendants to file their responsive pleading within twenty days, and defendants Prieto, Day, Chan

(corrected from the misspelling “Chaud” by defendants’ counsel), Duvall, Madden, Hunter and

Gibson, filed their answer on November 1, 2007. The parties having consented to the 3

jurisdiction of the magistrate judge for all further proceedings in this case, by Order, filed on 4

April 3, 2008, this matter was reassigned for all purposes, including trial and entry of final

judgment, to the undersigned, now denominated No. CIV S 07-0022 GGH P.

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26 See concurrently filed Scheduling Order. 5

3

Pending before the court in No. CIV S 07-0022 GGH P are numerous

requests/motions brought by the plaintiff: 1) two inapposite “petitions for writ of

mandate/mandamus,” filed by plaintiff on June 15, 2007 (#17), and on October 30, 2007 (#38),

both of which will be disregarded; 2) plaintiff’s request for status report, filed on July 9, 2007 (#

20), which will be denied as moot; 3) plaintiff’s inapposite motion for “expansion of the 5

record,” filed on August 24, 2007 (#23), which will be denied.

 4) Plaintiff’s request for production of documents, filed on August 29, 2007 (#

24), and his first set of interrogatories served on defendant Spence, filed on March 21, 2008

(#69), neither of which document should have been filed until such time as plaintiff became

dissatisfied with a response to the requests/interrogatory and intended to seek relief from the

court pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: discovery requests between the parties

shall not be filed with the court unless, and until, they are at issue. These requests/interrogatories

will be disregarded, although by Order, filed on October 12, 2007 (# 33), defendants were

directed to serve their responses to plaintiff’s previously served requests for production of

documents. 

5) As to plaintiff’s motions for appointment of counsel, filed on October 23, 2007

(# 36), and on February 4, 2008 (# 60): the United States Supreme Court has ruled that district

courts lack authority to require counsel to represent indigent prisoners in § 1983 cases. Mallard

v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In certain exceptional circumstances, the

court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Terrell

v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36

(9th Cir. 1990). In the present case, the court does not find the required exceptional

circumstances. Plaintiff’s requests for the appointment of counsel will therefore be denied. 

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 Defendants were directed to file a response pursuant to the Order, filed on February 4, 6

2008. 

 As defendants’ second opposition filing, without expressly so stating, appears to be an 7

amended and more complete opposition, the court will consider only the opposition filed on Feb.

22, 2008 (#65).

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6) Plaintiff’s inapposite requests for entry of default, filed on November 9, 2007

(#41), and on November 12, 2007 (#42), as well as the putative petition for writ of habeas

corpus, filed on November 16, 2007 (#45), which will be disregarded; 7) plaintiff’s inadequately

supported and inapposite motion for a default judgment, filed, on November 26, 2007 (#46), will

be denied; 8) plaintiff’s four motions to compel discovery, filed on November 28, 2007 (#49), on

December 20, 2007 (#53), on February 4, 2008 (#59), and on February 15, 2008 (#63) (see

discussion below).

9) As to plaintiff’s requests for appointment of an investigator, filed on November

28, 2007 (#50), and on March 4, 2008(# 68), the court informs plaintiff that the expenditure of

public funds on behalf of an indigent litigant is proper only when authorized by Congress. 

Tedder v. Odel, 890 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1989). The in forma pauperis statute does not authorize

the expenditure of public funds for investigators. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Therefore, these

requests will be denied.

 10) As to plaintiff’s “motion for preliminary and/or permanent injunction and

TRO,” filed on January 28, 2008 (#55), to which defendants filed their opposition, both on 6

February 21, 2008 (#64), and on February 22, 2008(#65), see discussion below. 7

Amended Complaint

Plaintiff alleges that on December 11, 2006, defendant Officer Spence subjected

him to excessive force in arresting plaintiff, twisting plaintiff’s wrists and left arm and slamming

the left side of plaintiff’s face into a concrete wall. Amended Complaint (AC), p. 8. Plaintiff

claims that his circulation was cut off and his wrists went numb when he was handcuffed by

defendant Spence. Id. Plaintiff avers that he was arrested without probable cause but as a result

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26 At page 11, plaintiff describes the “detour” as taking an hour and a half. 8

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of racial profiling, that Spence threatened to taser plaintiff even after plaintiff informed Spence

he was a “disabled cardiac patient.” Id. According to plaintiff, defendant Spence called him

“discriminatory names,” and refused to read plaintiff his Miranda rights, claiming also that he

was engaged in no unlawful conduct when arrested, nor did he resist arrest. Id. Plaintiff

contends that Spence searched him without contacting plaintiff’s parole agent and without

plaintiff’s consent, removing various items of personal property worth $1,020.00, including $120

in cash; two gift cards with a total value of $200; watches with a value of $400, and other items. 

AC, pp. 8-9. Plaintiff contends that defendant Spence, after dropping the items on the ground in

the rain, scooped the items into a paper bag that plaintiff never saw again. Id. at 9. Plaintiff

avers that he has been subjected to a deprivation of his property by defendant Spence without due

process and that he was never given a receipt for the items. Id.

Plaintiff claims that defendant Spence “unlawfully interrogated” plaintiff in the

back of his patrol car for “1 / 2 hours [sic],” as he drove around Woodland without taking 8

plaintiff to the Woodland Police Station to be charged or booked, as plaintiff requested, and

despite plaintiff’s having refused to make a statement, and having asked to be able to make a call

for his lawyer. AC, pp. 9-10. On the detour away from the police station, defendant Spence told

plaintiff of having “busted” various “dope fiends and druggies” and turned them into “snitches”

to whom he gave breaks. Id. at 10. Plaintiff informed Spence that he did not know any of his

“dope fiend snitches,” that he did not hang out with such people and did not live in Woodland,

but in Dunnigan with his mother. Id. Plaintiff asked for the restraints, which were cutting into

his skin and causing abrasions, to be loosened, but defendant Spence refused. Id. 

Defendant Spence drove plaintiff across town to the Woodland Parole Office,

where an unnamed heavy set Latino parole officer called plaintiff degrading names, and along

with defendant Spence compelled plaintiff to sign a prepared statement which he did not have a

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 Although, as noted, plaintiff identifies this individual as “Chaud,” defendants’ counsel 9

has corrected this spelling to “Chan.”

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chance to read. AC, pp. 10-11. In doing so, defendant Spence put pressure on and twisted the

handcuffs on plaintiff’s wrists which were already in severe pain, after the parole officer told

Spence to uncuff one hand so that plaintiff could sign the prepared statement. Id. at 11. When

plaintiff protested being called a “piece of shit” and asked to be able to call his lawyer, both men

told him: “You don’t have any fucking rights” and “to shut the fuck up about a lawyer. You are

not getting one!” Id. Spence twisted plaintiff left wrist, while the parole office shoved a pen in

his hand and ordered plaintiff to sign the paper. Id.

Plaintiff was then taken to the jail at the Monroe & Leinberger Detention Centers

of the Yolo County Sheriff’s Dept. in Woodland. Id. When plaintiff showed defendant R.N.

Tony his “swollen red and purple wrists,” requesting that he file # 7219 medical report

documenting plaintiff’s injuries, defendant Tony refused, telling him he would do nothing for

him. Id. Plaintiff suffered pain without receiving adequate medical care. Id. 

Defendant Sgt. Hunter told defendant Deputies Chan and Gibson to remove 9

plaintiff’s gold wedding band and 1 / 4 karat diamond “chip ear,” and designer belt, for which

property plaintiff did not receive a receipt and of which he has been deprived without due

process. AC, p. 12. While plaintiff was being uncuffed and searched by the defendant deputies,

plaintiff asked defendant Hunter for a citizen’s complaint form against law enforcement

personnel to complain about the alleged excessive force for which he claims a permanent injury

in his left hand middle finger, but Hunter stated that she could not find the forms. Id. In

retaliation for plaintiff’s having asked to file a complaint, defendants Chan and Gibson put

plaintiff in a small holding cell by himself. Id. 

Defendants Hunter, Duvall, Chan, Gibson and Jamolodin, also in retaliation,

deprived plaintiff of lunch and dinner, while feeding other detainees in the jail booking area,

stating that they would mark down that they had fed him, and laughing at him, while taunting

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him by saying he should write about it in his complaint, if he ever got one. Id. Plaintiff was kept

in the holding tank with no bedding or grooming implements from Dec. 11, 2006 to Dec. 12,

2006, and his booking was delayed for 13 hours after his arrest. Id. 

The delay in booking him resulted in plaintiff being deprived of his right to bail

and to be arraigned in 48 hours, to a speedy trial and to “fundamental, substantive and procedural

due process rights and equal protection of law under the 4 , 6 , 13 and 14 Amendments.” AC,

th th th th

p. 13. Plaintiff alleges that he was physically threatened by defendant Hunter and “her klan [sic]

of deputies” and subjected to further retaliation and punishment for three and a half months, from

the day of his Dec. 11, 2006 arrest until March 27, 2007, while he remained in the ad seg

(administrative segregation) unit without due process. Id. 

TRO/Preliminary Injunction

TRO Standard

 The purpose in issuing a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo

pending a fuller hearing. The cases contain limited discussion of the standards for issuing a

temporary restraining order due to the fact that very few such orders can be appealed prior to the

hearing on a preliminary injunction. It is apparent, however, that requests for temporary

restraining orders which are not ex parte and without notice are governed by the same general

standards that govern the issuance of a preliminary injunction. See New Motor Vehicle Bd. v.

Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1347 n.2 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.); Los Angeles Unified Sch.

Dist. v. United States Dist. Court, 650 F.2d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 1981) (Ferguson, J. dissenting);

Century Time Ltd. v. Interchron Ltd., 729 F. Supp. 366, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). In many cases the

emphasis of the court is directed to irreparable harm and the balance of hardships because the

merits of a controversy are often difficult to ascertain and adjudicate on short notice. 

Preliminary Injunction Standard

 The legal principles applicable to a request for injunctive relief are well established. 

To prevail, the moving party must show either a likelihood of success on the merits and the

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possibility of irreparable injury, or that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships

tips sharply in the movant’s favor. See Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692,

700 (9th Cir. 1997); Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th

Cir. 1985). The two formulations represent two points on a sliding scale with the focal point

being the degree of irreparable injury shown. Oakland Tribune, 762 F.2d at 1376. “Under any

formulation of the test, plaintiff must demonstrate that there exists a significant threat of

irreparable injury.” Id. In the absence of a significant showing of possible irreparable harm, the

court need not reach the issue of likelihood of success on the merits. Id.

In cases brought by prisoners involving conditions of confinement, any

preliminary injunction “must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the

harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to

correct the harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2).

PI Motion

Plaintiff, who is African American, has brought a motion for a TRO/preliminary

injunction, averring that for the past 12 months defendants have subjected him to racial

discrimination, inadequate medical care, punitive ad seg placement and retaliation. Preliminary

Injunction (PI) Motion, pp. 1-2. Plaintiff claims to have been deprived of ten hours a week of

exercise outside his cell as similarly situated white inmates/detainees are permitted. Id. at 2.

Plaintiff alleges that he has been kept in solitary confinement for 12 months in an extremely

small cell without a reasonable amount of exercise which has resulted in his suffering permanent

damage to a bone spur deformity in his right foot, and that he has an infection which has not been

treated medically. Id. Plaintiff claims he has been placed in a contaminated cell with poor

ventilation, “causing eye irritation and breathing complications.” Id. Plaintiff claims that he is

subjected to irreparable harm as a result of the violation of his Eighth Amendment rights and

seeks an order compelling defendants to “perform their preexisting duties” under the federal and

state constitutions and “state common law.” Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff goes on to posit other

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CAL. CODE REGS. tit.xv, § 1065: “(a) The facility administrator of a Type II or III facility 10

shall develop written policies and procedures for an exercise and recreation program, in an area

designed for recreation, which will allow a minimum of three hours of exercise distributed over a

period of seven days. Such regulations as are reasonable and necessary to protect the facility's

security and the inmates' welfare shall be included in such a program. In Type IV facilities, such

a program can be either in-house or provided through access to the community. 

(b) The facility administrator of a Type I facility shall make table games and/or television

available to inmates.”

 Captain and Commanding Officer of the Monroe Detention Center since February 25, 11

2007. Cecchettini Dec, ¶ 1. 

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allegations, that defendants have devised a scheme to circumvent the rights of pretrial detainees

by precluding their reaching state and federal courts (id. at 7), a claim that, at least in the instant

case, the court is compelled to observe in light of plaintiff’s voluminous filings does not appear

to adequately supported on the face of it. Plaintiff claims that defendants keep stamped

envelopes sent from post offices, stores, vendors, family and friends from reaching him on

grounds of security concerns that are not justified. Id. at 7-8. Plaintiff claims that defendants

keep pretrial detainees from receiving two books of stamps a week, but refuse to sell U.S.

postage stamps at the commissary. Id. at 8. He alleges that defendants do not provide enough

“regular size (8x11) legal paper” or 5x12 envelopes. Id. Among the exhibits he attaches are no

less than six inmate grievances he has filed at Monroe/Leinberger Centers.

In opposition, defendants point out that plaintiff in alleging a lack of exercise fails

to identify the dates of the alleged deprivation and who denied him out-of-cell exercise time. 

Opposition (Opp.), p. 3. Defendants contend that plaintiff was provided exercise in compliance

with CAL. CODE REGS. tit.xv, § 1065, which provides that there will be written procedures/policies 10

allowing a minimum of three hours of exercise over a seven day period. Opp., pp. 3-4. 

According to defendants, plaintiff was provided time outside his cell to exercise for “a minimum

of three times a week on a rotational basis, unless he had an appointment with the public

defender, the court or [] the jail was on lockdown.” Opp., p. 4, citing the declaration of nondefendant Captain Larry Cecchettini (Cecchettini Dec) ¶ 5. The jail activity log, attached to the 11

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declaration as Exhibit A, shows that plaintiff was provided yard time at least 150 times during

the last year. Id. The lockdown periods are identified as having occurred for three days in

March, 2007, for about a week beginning on January 8, 2008, and for about four days beginning

on January 18, 2008. Opp., n.2, Cecchettini Dec, ¶ 6. 

Defendants concede that plaintiff has been in ad seg for much of the past year, but

aver that the placement has been as a result of his behavior and for his protection. Opp, p. 4,

Cecchettini Dec, ¶ 7. Captain Cecchettini declares under oath that, while at Monroe Detention

Center:

Plaintiff destroyed jail property including the television set

provided for inmates to watch the superbowl. Plaintiff has also

made threats verbally and physically to other inmates, including

gang members, housed at the jail. A search of plaintiff’s cell in

January 2008 revealed plaintiff in possession of potential [sic]

weapon, a sharpened pencil with a metal object protruding from

the eraser. A recent search of plaintiff’s cell by officers revealed

plaintiff in possession of feces inside small [] milk containers,

known by the inmates as “shit-bombs.” These items are commonly

placed by inmates in front of the cell doors of other inmates. When

stomped on, feces is then shot into the cells of other inmates. Due

to the degrading nature of this item, as well as the potential

biohazard exposure, inmates consider this item one of the worst

weapons that can be used in a jailhouse setting. Inmates inside the

jail facility have filed complaints that plaintiff has used these

devices toward them. As a result of his behavior, plaintiff has been

housed in administrative segregation for his protection much of the

past year.

Cecchettini Dec, ¶ 7.

Capt. Cecchettini goes on to aver that plaintiff, while in ad seg, has been

“provided a minimum of one hour of yard time to exercise every other day.” Cecchettini Dec, ¶

8, & Exhibit B, the “Monroe Detention Facility Disciplinary/Ad-Seg/Medical/Special Housing

Log” for plaintiff. Defendants contend that plaintiff is unable to meet the objective and

subjective requirements for an Eighth Amendment violation on his allegation of a deprivation of

outside physical exercise, referencing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S. Ct. 1970

(1994). Opp., pp. 4-5. Defendants also argue that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he is

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subject to irreparable injury. Opp., p. 5.

Plaintiff filed no reply.

Discussion

Plaintiff identifies himself as a pretrial detainee. The Fourteenth Amendment, and

not the Eighth Amendment, applies to pretrial detainee cases. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535

n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1872 (1979). However, pretrial detainees’ Fourteenth Amendment rights

are analogized to the rights of prisoners under the Eighth Amendment. Redman v. County of San

Diego, 942 F.3d 1435, 1441-1445 (9 Cir. 1991) (en banc). th

The deprivation of prisoners’ outdoor exercise by prison officials can constitute 

cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Spain v. Procunier, 600

F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979) (upholding district court decision that inmates confined with almost

total lack of outdoor exercise for period of years was cruel and unusual punishment, and

requiring they be allowed one hour of outdoor exercise, five days a week, absent poor weather,

unusual circumstances). “[S]ome form of regular outdoor exercise is extremely important to the

psychological and physical well being of the inmates.” Id. at 199. The longterm deprivation of

outdoor exercise is a denial of a basic need in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Allen v.

Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087-1088 (9th Cir. 1994); see also, Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1090

(9th Cir. 1996) (defendants not entitled to summary judgment where plaintiff produced evidence

showing deprivation of outdoor exercise for six-month period in administrative segregation). 

Thus, regular outdoor exercise is necessary “unless inclement weather, unusual circumstances, or

disciplinary needs ma[k]e that impossible.” Spain, supra, at 199. In Hayward v. Procunier, 629

F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1980), the Ninth Circuit found that the deprivation of outdoor exercise

and a five-month lockdown in response to a genuine emergency did not violate the Eighth

Amendment; however, plaintiffs therein “were allowed approximately the minimum exercise

mandated in Spain within a month after imposition of the lockdown.” 

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Therefore, although a temporary denial of exercise does not per se constitute an

Eighth Amendment violation, denial of all outdoor exercise for an extended period may. May v.

Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997) (temporary deprivation of 21 days without outdoor

exercise with no medical effects not a substantial deprivation); Hayward v. Procunier, 629 F.2d

599, 603 (9th Cir. 1980) (30-day emergency lockdown period was an unusual circumstance

justifying denial of outdoor exercise); see also LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457-1458 (9th

Cir. 1993) (while exercise is “one of the basic human necessities protected by the Eighth

Amendment,” where restriction from outdoor exercise arose from inmate’s abuse of the privilege

and posing a security risk, plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim for deprivation thereof failed);

but see, Spain v. Procunier, supra, 600 F.2d at 199-200 (9th Cir. 1979). The Ninth Circuit has

clarified the elements necessary to state a deprivation that would rise to the level of an Eighth

Amendment violation:

An Eighth Amendment claim that a prison official has deprived

inmates of humane conditions must meet two requirements, one

objective and one subjective. Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087

(9th Cir.1995). “Under the objective requirement, the prison

official’s acts or omissions must deprive an inmate of the minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities. The subjective requirement,

relating to the defendant’s state of mind, requires deliberate

indifference.” Id. (citations omitted).

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132-1133 (9th Cir. 2000).

In Lopez, the Ninth Circuit found that plaintiff’s claim that he was denied all

outdoor exercise for six and a half weeks met the objective requirement for an Eighth

Amendment claim. 1132-1133. The Lopez court noted that:

The clear implication of May is that temporary denials of outdoor

exercise must have adverse medical effects to meet the Eighth

Amendment test, while long-term deprivations are substantial

regardless of effects. 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d at 1133 n. 15 (see May v. Baldwin, supra). 

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Defendants are correct that plaintiff’s conclusory and generalized allegations of a

deprivation of outdoor exercise are not sufficient to demonstrate that plaintiff is being subjected

to a violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. After reviewing the exhibits submitted

in support of, and in opposition to the motion, it is clear that plaintiff has not met his burden to

show that he is under an imminent threat of irreparable harm. His attached inmate grievances

raise the same issues set forth in his inadequate motion. In one example, in response to

plaintiff’s generic complaint about being deprived of, inter alia, access to showers,

grooming/hygiene supplies, and exercise, the third level review response was: 

Mr. Turner– You are not being deprived of your rights and none of

the detention staff is treating you inhumanely. In fact, I am in

possession of 8 separate DFs, written by 6 separate officers,

regarding your problem performance while in custody.

See Exhibit to PI Motion, p. 18.

Defendants’ exhibits demonstrate that, taking the limited lockdown periods into

account, plaintiff has, indeed, generally had adequate opportunities to exercise, and also

demonstrates that it has been plaintiff who, on occasion, has refused to shower. See Opp.,

Exhibits A & B to Cecchettini Dec. As to plaintiff’s various allegations concerning his medical

condition, poor cell ventilation and his mailing supplies, plaintiff simply provides inadequate

support for such claims and to meet his burden to show that he is under a threat of irreparable

harm. Plaintiff’s motion for a TRO/preliminary injunction will be denied. 

Motions to Compel

Plaintiff purports to have brought four motions to compel discovery; no response

has been filed by defendants. Any party has the right to discovery of “any matter, not privileged,

that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party....” ; thus, the scope of discovery under Fed.

R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1) is broad. Discovery may be sought of relevant information not admissible at

trial “if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible

evidence.” Id. The court, however, may limit discovery if it “....is unreasonably cumulative or

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duplicative,” or can be obtained from another source “that is more convenient, less burdensome,

or less expensive; or if the party who seeks discovery “has had ample opportunity by discovery

...to obtain the information sought”; or if the proposed discovery is overly burdensome. Fed.

R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2)(i)(ii) and (iii).

Motion to Compel, filed on 11/28/07 

The court’s review of this motion reveals that plaintiff has essentially set forth

requests for production of documents, seeking generally personnel/discovery records of the

defendants. What plaintiff has failed to make clear is whether these requests were properly

served upon defendants and, if so, what if any response/documents defendants provided. This

motion must be denied as defective. See Discovery Order, filed on 11/19/07.

Motion to Compel, filed on 12/20/07

In this motion, plaintiff once again fails to attach any discovery requests he has

served upon defendants to which he objects to their responses, or lack of same. Plaintiff must

make clear that he has properly served discovery requests and must inform the court, once the

time for any responses has expired, that defendants have either failed to respond altogether, or

that he is dissatisfied with the responses and/or production and the basis therefore. On the other

hand, if defendants have been served with discovery requests, they must respond as appropriate

within the guidelines of the Discovery Order, filed on 11/19/07. In addition, defendants must not

fail to permit service of the requests via the U.S. Mail, which plaintiff appears to be indicating

might be occurring, although it is not entirely clear. This motion will be denied without

prejudice to plaintiff’s filing an adequately supported discovery motion, upon which defendants

must file a response.

Motion to Compel, 2/ 4/08 

By this motion, plaintiff appears to be asking the court to conduct an in camera

review of “all information that the defendants’ attorneys will be using at the civil trial to ‘defend’

the defendants....” Plaintiff also seeks Pitches [sic] and Brady material. A Pitchess motion, a

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vehicle by which a criminal defendant, under certain circumstances, may seek a peace officer’s

personnel records may be appropriate only if brought by a defendant in the context of a state

criminal trial, not by a plaintiff in a federal civil rights action. See, e.g., City of Santa Cruz v.

Municipal Court, 49 Cal.3d 74, 86, 260 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1989), citing Pitchess v. Superior Court,

11 Cal.3d 531, 537, 113 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1974). 

As to his request, pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194,

1197 (1963), wherein the U.S. Supreme Court held “that the suppression by the prosecution of

evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is

material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the

prosecution,” the motion is equally inapposite in the context of the present litigation. 

Finally, to the extent plaintiff seeks otherwise to circumvent or short circuit the 

federal civil discovery process by making a direct appeal to the court for material to be produced

to the court that is in the custody, control or possession of the defendants, without plaintiff

having first properly sought discovery, pursuant to the Discovery Order in this case, and the

applicable Local Rules and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the motion is also inappropriate. 

This motion must be denied.

Motion to Compel, filed on 2/15/08

In this motion, plaintiff asks the court to direct defendant Spence to produce his

personnel records, etc., directly to the court again circumvents the appropriate discovery

procedure and will be denied.

Conclusion

Plaintiff’s serial filings constitute an abuse of process and are unfairly

burdensome to defendants as well as this court. In future, plaintiff must await the court’s ruling

on any motion he has pending before filing another, absent an emergency for which he

must show good cause. This, of course, is in no way is intended to limit plaintiff’s ability to

respond to any motion filed by the defendants. 

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Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:

1. Although the show cause order, issued on 6/05/07 (#16), pursuant to the All

Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), was not properly discharged, no sanctions will be imposed at this

time;

2. Plaintiff’s “petitions for writ of mandate/mandamus,” filed by plaintiff on June

15, 2007 (#17), and on October 30, 2007 (#38), are disregarded as inappposite; 

3. Plaintiff’s request for status report, filed on July 9, 2007 (# 20), is denied as

moot; 

4. Plaintiff’s inapposite motion for “expansion of the record,” filed on August 24,

2007 (#23), is denied; 

5. Plaintiff’s request for production of documents, filed on August 29, 2007 (#

24), and his first set of interrogatories served on defendant Spence, filed on March 21, 2008

(#69), are disregarded; 

6. Plaintiff’s motions for appointment of counsel, filed on October 23, 2007 

(# 36), and on February 4, 2008 (# 60) are denied;

7. Plaintiff’s inapposite requests for entry of default, filed on November 9, 2007

(#41), and on November 12, 2007 (#42), as well as the putative petition for writ of habeas

corpus, filed on November 16, 2007 (#45), are disregarded; 

8. Plaintiff’s inapposite and inadequately supported motion for a default

judgment, filed on November 26, 2007 (#46) is denied; 

9. Plaintiff’s four motions to compel discovery, filed on November 28, 2007

(#49), on December 20, 2007 (#53), on February 4, 2008 (#59), and on February 15, 2008 (#63),

as set forth above, are denied.

10. Plaintiff’s requests for appointment of an investigator, filed on November 28,

2007 (#50), and on March 4, 2008(# 68), are denied;

\\\\\

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11. Plaintiff’s “motion for preliminary and/or permanent injunction and TRO,”

filed on January 28, 2008 (#55) is denied; 

12. While plaintiff remains without restriction to respond appropriately to any

motion by defendants, in future, plaintiff must not file any additional motion, while he has one

pending before the court, absent an emergency or exigent circumstances for which he must show

good cause. 

DATED: 04/04/08 /s/ Gregory G. Hollows

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

turn0022.ord2

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