Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02198/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02198-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DIANNE KNOX; WILLIAM L.

BLAYLOCK; ROBERT A. CONOVER;

EDWARD L. DOBROWOLSKI, JR.;

KARYN GIL; THOMAS JACOB HASS;

PATRICK JOHNSON; and JON

JUMPER, On Behalf of

Themselves and the Class They

Seek to Represent,

NO. 2:05-CV-2198-MCE-KJM

Plaintiffs,

v. ORDER

STEVE WESTLY, Controller,

State of California; and

CALIFORNIA STATE EMPLOYEES

ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 1000,

SERVICE EMPLOYEES

INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIOCLC,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Through the present action, Plaintiffs, state employees,

have sued Defendants Steve Westly and California State Employees

Association, Local 1000, Service Employees International Union,

AFL-CIO, CLC (“CSEA” or “the union”).

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 In its Answer, Defendant CSEA denies Plaintiffs’ 1

characterization of the employment status of Plaintiffs Thomas

Hass and William Blaylock. Because this Motion seeks dismissal

of only Plaintiff Conover, the Court need not address this

difference at the present time. 

 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 2

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h).

2

Plaintiff Conover was a member of CSEA until he resigned his

membership on October 1, 2005. All other named Plaintiffs are

and have been non-members of CSEA. Plaintiffs allege that 1

Defendants violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by, inter alia, using Plaintiffs’ monies

to support political causes without providing the procedural

safeguards required by Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S.

292 (1986). 

Before the Court is Defendant CSEA’s Motion for Judgment on

the Pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). For

the reasons stated below, Defendant’s Motion is granted with

respect to Plaintiff Conover. 

2

BACKGROUND

Pursuant to the State Employer-Employee Relations Act

(“SEERA”), Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 3512-3524, Defendant CSEA is the

exclusive bargaining agent for Plaintiffs and other state

employees in Bargaining Units 1, 3, 4, 11, 14, 15, 17, 20, and

21. CSEA acts as exclusive bargaining agent between the state

and all state employees whether or not those employees elect to

become union members.

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3

Because both union and non-union state employees reap the

benefit of CSEA’s collective bargaining activities, the

legislature has statutorily authorized CSEA to collect monthly

fees from all state employees irrespective of their union

affiliation. Cal. Gov’t Code § 3515.7. As a result of this

authority, CSEA collects a monthly fee from non-union state

employees commonly known as a “fair share fee.” This fair share

fee is generally less than the membership fee paid by union

employees. 

SEERA also prescribes the mechanism for collecting both

membership dues and fair share fees. Defendant Westly, in his

capacity as State Controller, deducts these sums directly from

all state employees’ paychecks and submits the monies to CSEA on

a monthly basis. 

On or about August 27, 2005, CSEA delegates approved a

“temporary dues increase” of one-fourth of one percent of state

workers’ salaries. Plaintiffs allege that CSEA levied this

assessment solely to oppose certain ballot propositions in the

November 8, 2005, statewide special election. On or about August

31, 2005, CSEA notified “Local 1000 Members and Fair Share Fee

Payers” of the assessment via letter. The assessment began with

the September 30, 2005, pay period; the amount of $66.77 was

deducted from Plaintiff Conover’s September paycheck.

On November 1, 2005, Plaintiffs brought this action,

alleging, inter alia, that Defendants violated their First

Amendment right of free speech by compelling them to subsidize

political speech with which they disagreed.

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4

The non-union Plaintiffs assert that CSEA failed to give them an

adequate opportunity to object to the assessment, as

constitutionally required. Plaintiff Conover, the only Plaintiff

who was a member of CSEA at the time the special assessment was

levied, asserts that CSEA failed to give him an adequate

opportunity to resign and, as a non-member, to object to the fee

increase. 

On November 3, 2005, this Court granted Plaintiffs’

Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and ordered that

sums collected as a result of the special assessment be held in

trust pending the Court’s review of the merits of Plaintiffs’

claims. On November 8, 2005, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion

for a Preliminary Injunction and ordered that the sums in trust

be immediately released.

Here, Defendant CSEA seeks partial judgment on the pleadings

with respect to Plaintiff Conover. CSEA argues that, because it

is a private organization and membership is voluntary, its

alleged behavior toward Conover cannot, as a matter of law,

constitute action under color of state law for purposes of 42

U.S.C. § 1983. In opposition, Plaintiffs contend that union

membership is not truly voluntary, and that CSEA is so closely

intertwined with the State that it acted under color of state law

even with respect to its own members.

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5

STANDARD

A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule

12(c) challenges the legal sufficiency of the opposing party's

pleadings. E.g. Westlands Water Dist. v. Bureau of Reclamation,

805 F. Supp. 1503, 1506 (E.D. Cal. 1992). Any party may move for

judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are closed but

within such time as to not delay trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). 

The standard for evaluating a motion for judgment on the

pleadings is essentially the same as the standard applied to a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867

F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989). A motion for judgment on the

pleadings should only be granted if, accepting as true all

material allegations contained in the nonmoving party’s

pleadings, the moving party “clearly establishes that no material

issue of fact remains to be resolved and that he [or she] is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Doleman v. Meiji Mut.

Life Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 1480, 1482 (9th Cir. 1984); Hal Roach

Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th

Cir. 1989). 

Judgment on the pleadings is also proper when there is

either a “lack of cognizable legal theory” or the “absence of

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

1988).

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6

Courts have discretion to grant leave to amend in

conjunction with motions made pursuant to Rule 12(c). Moran v.

Peralta Cmty. Coll. Dist., 825 F. Supp. 891, 893 (N.D. Cal. 1993)

(citing Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1038 (6th

Cir. 1979). Generally, leave to amend a complaint is denied only

if it is clear that the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be

cured by amendment. DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957

F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992).

ANALYSIS

A cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may arise against

any person “who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage of any State,” deprives another of a

constitutional right. Section 1983’s “color of state law”

requirement is equivalent to the requirement of “state action”

for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,

457 U.S. 922, 935 (1982). Therefore, as a matter of law a party

must allege some “state action” to sustain its § 1983 claim. 

Although most rights secured by the Constitution are

protected only against infringements by the government, in

certain circumstances § 1983 liability extends to a private party 

where the private party engaged in state action and thereby

deprived a plaintiff of a constitutional right. Brunette v.

Humane Soc’y of Ventura County, 294 F.3d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir.

2002).

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 In its Motion, Defendant does not challenge Plaintiffs’ 3

legally cognizable claim that actions of a union vis-a-vis nonmembers may be state action.

7

A private party engages in state action if “there is such a

close nexus between the State and the challenged action that

seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the

State itself.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic

Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (internal citations omitted). 

The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that constitutional

standards are applied only when “the State is responsible for the

specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.” Blum v.

Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).

Neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has decided

the precise issue of whether a public employee union’s

interactions with its own members can constitute “state action.”3

However, courts have created a number of general tests to

determine whether private behavior may be treated as that of the

government. See, e.g., Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 296 (identifying a

“host” of factors used by the Supreme Court in evaluating whether

private conduct is state action). Defendant correctly advances

three tests adopted by the Ninth Circuit: the “joint action”

test, the “symbiotic relationship” test, and the “public

function” test. Brunette, 294 F.3d at 1210. Alternatively,

Plaintiffs urge the Court to employ the “coercive

power/significant encouragement” test from Blum v. Yaretsky, 457

U.S. 991 (1982). This test is also appropriate, as it has been

used in the Ninth Circuit post-Brentwood. See Single Moms, Inc.,

v. Mont. Power Co., 331 F.3d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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8

A plaintiff need not prove that the defendant meets all the

foregoing tests for “state action” to be found. Satisfaction of

a single test is sufficient, so long as no countervailing factors

exist. Lee v. Katz, 276 F.3d 550, 554 (9th Cir. 2002). In

addition, the determination of a private-public nexus is

“necessarily [a] fact-bound inquiry,” Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 298;

as noted above, for the purposes of this Motion, all facts are

construed in favor of Plaintiffs.

Despite viewing all facts in a light most favorable to

Plaintiff Conover, Plaintiff Conover’s claims as a union member

cannot stand. Under none of the four tests presented can a

union’s internal decision to raise fees be a “state action” for

constitutional purposes.

1. Joint Action Test

Private conduct may be joint action if private parties are

willful participants with the government in an activity which

deprives others of constitutional rights. See Brunette, 294 F.3d

at 1211; Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980). For the

private party to be liable, its particular actions must be

“inextricably intertwined” with those of the government; there

must be “substantial cooperation” between the party and the

government. Brunette, 294 F.3d at 1211 (citations omitted).

Plaintiffs do not allege any “substantial cooperation”

between the government and the union that would satisfy the joint

action test.

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9

Plaintiffs do not aver any sort of conspiracy between CSEA and

the State in the discretionary decision to levy the temporary

assessment. Instead, Plaintiffs argue that the Controller’s

ministerial role in deducting the temporary assessment

necessarily constitutes sufficient entwinement with the union to

find state action. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. J. Plead. at

11.

The Court is not persuaded. SEERA explicitly authorizes

CSEA, as the exclusive unit representative, to calculate a fair

share fee. Cal. Gov’t Code § 3515.7(b). SEERA also mandates

that Defendant Westly, representing the state, “shall” deduct the

fee and remit it to the union. Id. By carrying out the

increase, Defendant Westly was executing his ministerial duty to

collect union and fair share fees. Plaintiffs do not present any

evidence that Defendant Westly was involved in CSEA’s decision to

raise fees, suggesting a purposive attempt to violate Plaintiffs’

constitutional rights. Because a bare allegation of joint action

without more will not overcome a motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs’

claim of joint action cannot stand. DeGrassi v. City of

Glendora, 207 F.3d 636, 647 (9th Cir. 2000).

2. Symbiotic Relationship Test

A private entity may be liable as a state actor if the

entity is in a “symbiotic relationship” with the government:

“substantial coordination and integration between the private

entity and the government are the essence of a symbiotic

relationship.” Brunette, 294 F.3d at 1213.

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10

Significant financial integration may indicate a symbiotic

relationship, especially if the private party confers

“indispensable” financial benefits to the government. Id. 

Similarly, a symbiotic relationship may arise when the government

exercises excessive control over the actions of an ostensibly

private party. Id.

Plaintiffs do not allege, and the Court does not find, that

CSEA conveys “indispensable” financial benefits to the state

government. Nor is there any allegation of state interference in

core union activities. Government officials do not participate

in the union’s key decisions, including the decision to levy the

temporary assessment. The State does have regulatory authority

over the union, but the fact that a private entity is subject to

state regulation does not transform the entity’s conduct into

state action. See Single Moms, Inc., v. Mont. Power Co., 331

F.3d 743, 748 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the Court does not

find the symbiotic relationship test met.

 

3. Public Function Test

A private party may become a state actor if it performs a

public function, if that function is both traditionally and

exclusively governmental. Lee v. Katz, 276 F.3d 550, 555 (9th

Cir. 2002). Traditional state prerogatives might include holding

elections, serving as an international peacekeeping force, or

regulating free speech within a public forum, but do not include

repairing fighter jets, educating youth, or resolving credit

disputes. Brunette, 294 F.3d at 1214; Lee, 276 F.3d at 555.

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11

CSEA’s temporary assessment does not rise to the level of

becoming a public function. Specifically, internal union

activities, such as dues assessments, are traditionally private,

not public, functions. There is no tradition of government

officials dictating internal union policy. Nor is the decision

to levy union fees an exclusive governmental function. Instead,

union affairs are often, though not always, dealt with

internally. Union members who have an internal grievance may

participate in union elections or may resign, as did Plaintiff

Conover. Consequently, Accordingly, the Court does not find the

public function test met.

 

4. Coercive Power/Significant Encouragement

Plaintiffs urge the Court to employ the “coercive power”

test of state action from Blum v. Yaretsky. That test provides

as follows: “A State normally can be held responsible for a

private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has

provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert,

that the choice must in law be deemed that of the State.” Blum

v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982); see also Single Moms,

Inc., v. Mont. Power Co., 331 F.3d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 2003).

Plaintiffs’ reliance on this test is unfounded. Plaintiffs

make the novel argument that, because the government has conveyed

certain privileges to CSEA by statute, all of CSEA’s actions bear

the imprimatur of state action. See Pls.’ Opp’n Def.’s Mot. J.

Pleadings at 12. Plaintiffs’ interpretation is overly broad.

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12

Rather, the coercive power must be applied to the specific

“private decision” for it to educe state action. Plaintiffs

present no evidence suggesting that the State of California

coerced or encouraged CSEA to levy a temporary fee assessment. 

Instead, Plaintiffs contend that the agency fee statutes

constitute such “significant encouragement” to CSEA that state

action must be found. By Plaintiffs’ logic, any action by any

entity with state-delegated power or privileges would constitute

state action. As a matter of law, Plaintiffs’ argument cannot be

sustained. There is no evidence that CSEA’s decision to raise

fees was coerced or significantly encouraged by the State of

California.

 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant CSEA’s Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings is granted with respect to Plaintiff

Conover.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 15, 2006

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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