Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04064/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04064-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NUNEZ,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

 BARNHART,

Defendant. /

No. C05-04064 MJJ

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

DENYING DEFENDANT’S CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion For Summary Judgment Or Remand (Docket No. 6),

and the Commissioner’s Cross-Motion For Summary Judgment (Docket No. 7.)

For the following reasons, the Court the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART

Plaintiff’s Motion by REMANDING this matter for further consideration by the Commissioner as

set forth below. The Court DENIES Defendant’s Cross-Motion.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On December 17, 2002, Plaintiff Maria Nunez (“Plaintiff”) applied for benefits pursuant to

Titles XIV and XVI of the Social Security Act. (Tr. at 63.) Plaintiff alleged disability beginning

June 2, 2002 due to orthopedic problems. After serial denials, a hearing was held on January 14,

2004 (Tr. at 332), resulting in an unfavorable decision issued August 13, 2004. (Tr. at 17-25.) 

Plaintiff timely filed a request for review with the Appeals Council, which denied review on August

8, 2005. (Tr. at 7-9.) This action was then timely filed on October 7, 2005. 

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LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment will be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. of Civ.

Proc. 56©. 

Any individual may obtain judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of Social

Security. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The district court’s scope of review is limited to the pleadings and

record. Id. The district court shall have the power to affirm, modify, or deny the Commissioner’s

decision with or without remanding the case for rehearing. Id. However, the Commissioner’s

decision must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal

standards. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance, such that “a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039

(9th Cir. 1995). Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one interpretation, one of which

supports the ALJ’s decision, the decision of the ALJ should be affirmed. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881

F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989).

ANALYSIS

A. Five-Step Sequential Evaluation For Disability.

To qualify for Title II and Title XVI benefits, a claimant must establish a medically

determinable physical or mental impairment that is expected to result in death or last for a

continuous period of at least twelve months that prevents her from engaging in substantial gainful

activity. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). In addition, to establish a disability, an individual “must show

that he is precluded from engaging not only in his ‘previous work,’ but also from performing ‘any

other kind of substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy.” Matthews v. Shalala, 10

F.3d 678, 680 (9th Cir. 1993); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A); 1382c(a)(3)(B).

In order to determine whether or not a claimant is disabled, an ALJ is required to apply a

five-step sequential process. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). Step one determines whether the claimant is

currently involved in any substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(I). If the claimant

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is, the claimant will not be considered disabled, regardless of medical findings. Id. Step two

assesses whether the claimant has a severe impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). A claimant

who does not have a severe impairment will not be considered disabled. Id. Step three determines

whether a claimant who is not currently involved in any substantial gainful activity and has a severe

impairment meets or equals a listed impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant is

not working and suffers from a severe impairment that satisfies the duration requirement and meets

or equals a listed impairment, the claimant will be considered disabled without considering

vocational factors. Id. Step four determines whether the claimant is capable of doing past work. 20

C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant is capable of performing past work, the claimant will not

be considered disabled. Id. If the claimant is not capable of doing past work, in, step five

determines whether the claimant is capable of performing other work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v). 

If, at any point in the process, the claimant is or is not found to be disabled, a determination is made

and the analysis will cease. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4).

In the instant case, the ALJ applied the five-step sequential process as outlined above. The

ALJ’s residual functional capacity finding was that:

Claimant is able to lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 frequently;

stand and walk six out of eight hours a day; sit 6 hours of eight hours a

day with a sit or stand optional; claimant cannot use left foot controls;

she can occasionally climb (but not use a rope ladder or scaffold); she

can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl. Claimant

should avoid lifting weights about shoulder height with the left

non-dominant arm. Claimant is able to perform simple, repetitive

tasks, deal with the public and withstand pressures associated [sic]

daily work. 

 (Tr. at 24.) 

In step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is able to perform her past relevant work as an

order clerk. In the alternative, the ALJ determined in step five, that Plaintiff is able to perform other

work as identified by the vocational expert. Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not

disabled. (Tr. at 24.) As part of that determination, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s subjective complaints

as to the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her impairments to be “not fully credible.” (Tr.

at 24.) 

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 Bermudez did not testify live at the ALJ hearing, and her completed questionnaire is not signed under penalty of

perjury. However, the formal rules of evidence do not apply to proceedings before the ALJ. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(c)

(“The administrative law judge may receive evidence at the hearing even though the evidence would not be admissible in

court under the rules of evidence used by the court.”); HALLEX I-2-6-58. Given that the ALJ accepted the Bermudez

questionnaire as evidence, this Court sees no reason to treat the questionnaire differently from sworn testimony under the

rule established by the Ninth Circuit in Stout.

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 Plaintiff fails to cite authorities that support her contention a harmless error rule is inapplicable in this situation.

Moreover, the Court is troubled that Plaintiff inaccurately presents both Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273 (9th Cir. 1996) and

Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587 (9th Cir. 2004) to the Court in its reply brief. Smolen does not, as Plaintiff represents

(Reply at 3: 2-3), purport to overrule Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1984). Benecke does not, as Plaintiff

represents (Replay at 3:3-5), state that “failure to consider lay testimony is legal error mandating reversal.”

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B. The Questionnaire Completed By Plaintiff’s Daughter.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to consider, as lay evidence, a September 2002

questionnaire (Tr. at 101-06) completed by Plaintiff’s daughter, Beatrice Bermudez. Plaintiff

contends that the Bermudez questionnaire supported the credibility of Plaintiff, and that the ALJ

improperly found Plaintiff not to be credible without any mention or analysis of the questionnaire.

“In determining whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ must consider lay witness testimony

concerning a claimant’s ability to work.” Stout v. Commissioner, 454 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir.

2005). Lay testimony regarding how an impairment affects a claimant’s ability to work “cannot be

disregarded without comment.” Id. Here, the ALJ made no reference in her decision to the

questionnaire completed by Bermudez. Under Stout, the ALJ’s failure to address this lay testimony

constitutes error. Id. at 1053-54.1

 

The Commissioner urges the Court to treat the ALJ’s failure to discuss the questionnaire as

harmless error. Although harmless error analysis does apply in the Social Security context, “where

the ALJ’s error lies in a failure to properly discuss competent lay testimony favorable to the

claimant, a reviewing court cannot consider the error harmless unless it can confidently concluded

that no reasonable ALJ. when fully crediting the testimony, could have reached a different disability

determination.” Id. at 1056.2

 

With respect to the ALJ’s credibility determination regarding Plaintiff, the Court finds the

ALJ’s failure to discuss the Bermudez questionnaire constitutes harmless error. Given the

inconsistencies that exist between the Bermudez questionnaire and Plaintiff’s own testimony, even if

Bermudez’s descriptions of her mother’s impairments were fully credited, no reasonable ALJ could

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find that the credibility of Plaintiff’s own testimony was strengthened as a result. Almost every

substantive statement made by Bermudez about her mother’s residual capabilities is flatly

contradicted by Plaintiff’s own testimony at the ALJ hearing. Statements made by Bermudez that

are directly contradicted by her mothers testimony include claims that her mother does not go

shopping (compare Tr. at 102 with Tr. at 358), that her mother does no household chores (compare

Tr. at 103 with Tr. 357-58), that her mother does not cook (compare Tr. at 102 with Tr. at 352), that

her mother has problems grooming, dressing and cleaning herself (compare Tr. at 102 with Tr. at

357), and that her mother does not use public transportation (compare Tr. at 103 with Tr. at 352-53).

Nonetheless, the Court is unable to find that the ALJ’s failure to discuss the Bermudez

questionnaire constitutes harmless error with respect to the overall disability determination. Taken

at face value, the Bermudez questionnaire potentially indicates that Plaintiff has more extensive

impairments that the ALJ found in her residual functional capacity finding. Were a reasonable ALJ

to fully credit the Bermudez questionnaire (despite the many ways in which it directly conflicts with

Plaintiff’s own testimony), the representations that Bermudez makes could lead a reasonable ALJ to

reach a different residual functional capacity finding. The ALJ’s failure to discuss the Bermudez

questionnaire therefore cannot be considered harmless error under controlling Ninth Circuit

precedent. Stout, 454 F.3d at 1056.

Because the ALJ’s error in failing to discuss the Bermudez questionnaire cannot be

disregarded as harmless, the Court REMANDS this action for further proceedings and will require

the Commissioner to conduct a new evaluation of the Bermudez questionnaire and its impact, if any,

on the disability analysis. To the extent the Commissioner, on remand, determines that the

questionnaire answers should not be credited, the Commissioner must state specific, legitimate

findings based on substantial evidence in the record. To the extent the Commissioner, on remand,

credits the Bermudez questionnaire, the Commissioner is specifically DIRECTED to evaluate

whether the Bermudez testimony results in different outcome in step 4 (and if so, in step 5) of the

sequential disability analysis.

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 For the same reasons, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ erred by failing to state that a

combination of obesity and knee arthritis were considered in determining Plaintiff’s impairments.

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B. The ALJ’s Failure To Explicitly Consider Obesity Was Not Reversible Error.

Plaintiff contends that, although she did not explicitly raise obesity as an issue, the ALJ

nonetheless erred by failing to consider her obesity when making a determination of residual

functional capacity. The Court disagrees, and finds that the ALJ’s failure to consider obesity in the

sequential analysis is not reversible error under controlling precedent.

Plaintiff relies heavily on Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, (9th Cir. 2003), in which the

Ninth Circuit reasoned that the ALJ should have considered obesity as a disabling factor in the

sequential analysis, even though not explicitly raised by the claimant. However, as the Ninth

Circuit’s subsequent decision in Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 682 (9th Cir. 2003) makes clear,

Celaya is distinguishable from the record before this Court.

As in Burch – and unlike Celaya – the record here does not indicate that Plaintiff’s obesity

exacerbated her other impairments, nor does it indicate that Plaintiff’s obesity was at least close to

the listing criterion considered in step three of the sequential analysis. Plaintiff points to nothing in

her medical records to suggest that her weight deserves special consideration when determining her

functional capacity. The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s knee pain in her decision, and concluded that

Plaintiff was able to perform sedentary work with some limitations, despite that impairment. 

Though there is one reference in Plaintiff’s medical record to her being “obese”, those records do

not link such obesity to any functional limitations. (Tr. at 168.) 

Also as in Burch – and unlike Celaya – Plaintiff was represented by counsel before the ALJ. 

Under such circumstances, the ALJ’s burden to develop the record on her own did not extend to sua

sponte evaluation of Plaintiff’s obesity in the sequential analysis. Accordingly, the ALJ did not

commit reversible error by omitting reference to Plaintiff’s obesity in her ruling. See Burch, 400 at

682 (discussing and distinguishing Celaya).3

 

C. The ALJ’s Credibility Determinations Are Supported By Substantial Evidence.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s credibility determinations regarding Plaintiff’s testimony

are not supported by substantial evidence. The Court finds this contention unavailing. The ALJ

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properly provided specific and clear reasons that she rejected Plaintiff’s allegations of subjectively

disabling symptoms. In particular, the ALJ explained that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints as to the

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her impairments were not credible because Plaintiff

continued to work after her alleged onset date of June 2002 by working for four to five hours, six

days a week, at a store she and her family owned from March 2002 to February 2003 (Tr. at 22, see

also Tr. at 340-42). The ALJ’s findings on credibility are “sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing

court to conclude that the adjudicator rejected the claimant’s testimony on permissible grounds and

did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s testimony.” Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345-46 (9th

Cir. 1991) (en banc).

Plaintiff specifically contests the ALJ’s credibility finding to the extent it was based on the

finding that she failed to disclose the fact that she worked at a family-owned store. However,

Plaintiff’s lack of candor on this point served as only one basis for the ALJ’s credibility finding. 

More importantly, the ALJ’s finding on this specific point is substantially supported by the record. 

Plaintiff testified that the store was only open for one year, from March 2002 to February 2003. 

(Tr. at 341-42). This testimony conflicts by several months with the seller’s permit dated July 2002

(Tr. at 128), as well as other evidence that the store had been open for three years (Tr. at 90). 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s new attempt to explain this discrepancy by the possibility that someone else

could have run the store before her is flatly contradicted by her testimony before the ALJ that no one

ran the store before her family did. (Tr. at 340). 

Finally, Plaintiff contends that the credibility decision is defective as a matter of law because

the decision was made without reference to the Bermudez questionnaire. As discussed above,

however, while the ALJ’s failure to refer to the Bermudez questionnaire was legal error, this Court

has found such error to be harmless with respect to the ALJ’s credibility determination. 

Accordingly, the ALJ’s credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence, and

will not be disturbed by this Court. 

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4

 As noted above, to the extent the Commissioner credits the Bermudez questionnaire on remand, the Bermudez

questionnaire may alter the ALJ’s residual functional capacity finding and, as a result, the ALJ’s step 4 analysis. 

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 Because the Court finds no independent source of error in the ALJ’s step 4 analysis if the residual functional

capacity finding was correct, the Court need not reach the ALJ’s alternative step 5 decision.

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D. The ALJ’s Determination That Plaintiff Can Return To Her Past Work Was

Not Error.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff can return to her past work is

erroneous in light of medical testimony that Plaintiff should avoid lifting above the shoulder or waist

with her left arm. (Tr. at 307.) Assuming the ALJ’s residual functional capacity finding was

correct, the Court finds no independent source of error in the ALJ’s determination.4 The ALJ

included the limitation that she could not lift above the shoulder with her left arm in the residual

functional capacity finding, and the ALJ’s determination was supported by substantial evidence

including the testimony of the vocational expert. (Tr. at 364-65).5

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiff’s

Motion by REMANDING this matter for further consideration by the Commissioner as set forth in

Part B above. The Court DENIES Defendant’s Cross-Motion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 16, 2007 

MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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