Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_17-cv-01084/USCOURTS-caed-2_17-cv-01084-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL TYRONE SHANNON,

Plaintiff,

v.

RALPH DIAZ, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:17-CV-1084-JAM-DMC

ORDER

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (ECF No. 28). 

Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment 

by allowing female inmates to have a selection of seven different alarm clocks to choose from 

and purchase but denying the same choice to male inmates. 

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT AND STANDARD

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require complaints contain a “...short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See McHenry v. 

Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)). Detailed factual 

allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s 

allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. 

Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their 

pleadings liberally construed and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 

338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be 

facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer 

that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation 

marks omitted); Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The 

sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with 

liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks 

omitted); Moss, 572F.3d at 969.

II. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff has named four Defendants: (1) Ralph Diaz, (2) Sgt. Swan, (3) C. 

Tileston, and (4) Robert W. Fox. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his right to equal 

protection under the Fourteenth Amendment because female inmates in the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation are able to purchase seven different kinds of alarm 

clocks and male inmates are not. It is unclear the role any of the named Defendants played in this 

alleged constitutional violation. 

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III. ANALYSIS

Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated 

individuals are treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See

San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). Prisoners are protected from 

invidious discrimination based on race. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). 

Racial segregation is unconstitutional within prisons save for the necessities of prison security 

and discipline. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (per curiam). Prisoners are also 

protected from intentional discrimination on the basis of their religion. See Freeman v. Arpaio, 

125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997). Equal protection claims are not necessarily limited to racial 

and religious discrimination. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686-67 (9th Cir. 

2001) (applying minimal scrutiny to equal protection claim by a disabled plaintiff because the 

disabled do not constitute a suspect class) see also Tatum v. Pliler, 2007 WL 1720165 (E.D. Cal. 

2007) (applying minimal scrutiny to equal protection claim based on denial of in-cell meals 

where no allegation of race-based discrimination was made); Hightower v. Schwarzenegger, 2007 

WL 732555 (E.D. Cal. March 19, 2008).1 

In order to state a § 1983 claim based on a violation of the Equal Protection Clause 

of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that defendants acted with intentional 

discrimination against plaintiff, or against a class of inmates which included plaintiff, and that 

such conduct did not relate to a legitimate penological purpose. See Village of Willowbrook v. 

Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (holding that equal protection claims may be brought by a “class 

of one”); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren v. 

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Henderson, 940 

F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985).

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1 Error! Main Document Only.Strict scrutiny applies to equal protection claims 

alleging race-based or religious discrimination (i.e., where the plaintiff is member of a “protected 

class”); minimal scrutiny applies to all other equal protection claims. See Lee v. City of Los 

Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686-67 (9th Cir. 2001).

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Here, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim sufficient to pass screening. 

Plaintiff’s allegations relate to female inmates being able to purchase several different kinds of 

alarm clocks and male inmates not being able to do the same. It is unclear if this is an official 

policy that Plaintiff is challenging or if there is some other reason for the difference in availability 

of alarm clocks. Further, even if it were an official policy there are no facts that allege the policy 

functions as an intentional discrimination against men or that it was implemented for the purpose 

of discriminating against men. Additionally, Plaintiff fails to identify how any of the named 

Defendants are related to his deprivation of alarm clock selection. In other words, there are no 

facts that indicate how any of the named Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis 

of his gender in violation of the equal protection clause. For these reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint 

cannot pass screening. 

IV. AMENDING THE COMPLAINT

Because may be possible that some of the deficiencies identified in this order may 

be cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of 

the entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original 

complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following 

dismissal with leave to amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged 

in the amended complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Therefore, if plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order 

to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint 

must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the 

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 

each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 

between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 

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164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the 

time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 

1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply 

with Rule 8 may, in the court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). 

See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and

2. Plaintiff shall file a second amended complaint within 30 days of the date 

of service of this order.

Dated: April 8, 2019

____________________________________

DENNIS M. COTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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