Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02875/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02875-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

ALVIN W. DODSON, JR., 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

FILED 

United Statal Court of Appeall Tenth etreuit 

OCT 2. 3 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

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No. 88-2875 

COLONEL GORDON N. ZELEZ, 

Commandant, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 87-3193-0) 

Kathleen J. Purcell of Remcho, Johansen & Purcell, San Francisco, 

California (Joseph Remcho and Martin Buchanan of Remcho, Johansen 

& Purcell, San Francisco, California, and David J. Waxse of Sho9k, 

Hardy & Bacon, Overland Park, Kansas, with her on the briefs);, for 

Petitioner-Appellant. 

Robert C. Barber, Captain, u.s. Marine Corp, Office of Judge 

Advocate General, Alexandria, Virginia (Benjamin L. Burgess, Jr., 

United States Attorney, and Alleen S. Castellani, Assistant United 

States Attorney, District of Kansas, on the brief), for 

Respondent-Appellee. 

Before McKAY, ANDERSON, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 88-2875 Document: 01019311196 Date Filed: 10/23/1990 Page: 1 
This case involves a military prisoner's petition for habeas 

corpus that was denied by the district court. 

I. Facts 

Defendant was one of three marines charged with attempted 

robbery, conspiracy to rob, premeditated murder, felony murder, 

and robbery in connection with events occurring on May 31, 1981 

and June 1, 1981. Defendant's case was initially set to be heard 

on September 1, 1981. However, due to continuances sought by the 

government, defendant's court-martial did not take place until 

December 11, 1981. The court-martial convicted defendant on all 

charges by a two-thirds vote. A conviction of premeditated murder 

or felony murder carries a mandatory sentence of death or life 

imprisonment. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment when 

the court-martial did not unanimously vote for death. The military judge did not require three-fourths of the court-martial to 

concur in the life sentence. 

The convening authority approved the findings and sentence of 

the court-martial. Defendant then presented seven allegations of 

error to the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review. Defendant repeats four of those claims of error here. Defendant now 

claims: One, that the voting procedure of the court-martial violated due process; two, that the composition of the court-martial 

combined with the voting procedures violated due process; three, 

that he was denied a speedy trial; and four, that exclusion of 

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expert witness testimony violated due process. The Court of Military Review found no error in the proceedings, after specifically 

reviewing defendant's claims regarding speedy trial and exclusion 

of expert witness testimony. The court summarily denied defendant's claims regarding the three-fourths voting procedures and the 

composition of the jury. See United States v. Dodson, 16 M.J. 921 

(N.M.C.M.R. 1983). The United States Court of Military Appeals 

then affirmed the conviction. See United States v. Dodson, 21 

M.J. 237 (C.M.A. 1986), on rehearing, 22 M.J. 257 (C.M.A. 1986). 

The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on December 8, 

1986. See Dodson v. United States, 479 U.S. 1006 (1986). 

On June 30, 1987, defendant filed a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus in the district court. After fully reviewing the 

voting procedures claim and refusing to review the other three 

suggestions of error, the district court denied the writ. Defendant now appeals the denial of the writ to this court. 

II. Federal Court Review of Military Courts-Martial 

When reviewing military courts-martial on habeas corpus 

grounds, the Supreme Court historically simply looked to see if 

the court-martial had jurisdiction. See Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 

13, 23 (1879). See also Collins v. McDonald, 258 u.s. 416, 418 

(1922); McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U.S. 49, 69 (1902); Johnson v. 

Sayre, 158 U.S. 109, 117 (1895). Over time the Court began to 

look more carefully at the merits of the claims while still calling its review a search for jurisdiction. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 

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304 u.s. 458 (1938). Finally, in Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 

(1953), the Supreme Court noted that Congress had given the federal courts the power to review courts-martial on habeas corpus 

applications. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 139 (1957). The 

Burns Court then explained the limitations on federal court review 

of military habeas corpus cases. "[T]hese provisions do mean that 

when a military decision has dealt fully and fairly with an allegation raised in that application, it is not open to a federal 

civil court to grant the writ simply to re-evaluate the evidence." 

Burns, 346 U.S. at 142. The Court went on to state that "[i]t is 

the limited function of the civil courts to determine whether the 

military have given fair consideration to each of these claims." 

Id. at 144. 

The federal courts' interpretation--particularly this court's 

interpretation--of the language in Burns has been anything but 

clear. Probably a majority of our cases have simply quoted the 

Burns language and held that no review of a petition for habeas 

corpus was possible when the defendant's claims were fully and 

fairly considered by the military courts. See Watson v. McCotter, 

782 F.2d 143, 144 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 (1986); 

King v. Moseley, 430 F.2d 732, 734 (lOth Cir. 1970); Bennett v. 

Davis, 267 F.2d 15, 17 (lOth Cir. 1959); Dickenson v. Davis, 245 

F.2d 317, 320 (lOth Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 918 (1958); 

Easley v. Hunter, 209 F.2d 483, 486-87 (lOth Cir. 1953). A few of 

our cases were more specific and held that we could not review 

factual disputes if they had been fully and fairly considered by 

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Appellate Case: 88-2875 Document: 01019311196 Date Filed: 10/23/1990 Page: 4 
the military courts. See Kennedy v. Commandant, United States 

Disciplinary Barracks, 377 F.2d 339, 342 (lOth Cir. 1967); 

Mendrano v. Smith, 797 F.2d 1538, 1542 n.6 (lOth Cir. 1986). 

Still other of our cases have held that review of constitutional 

claims in habeas corpus petitions was proper without really saying 

when and why. See Wallis v. O'Kier, 491 F.2d 1323, 1325 (lOth 

Cir.), cert. denied, 419 u.s. 901 (1974); Day v. Davis, 235 F.2d 

379, 384 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 352 u.s. 881 (1956). Another 

of our recent cases held that review was proper when the constitutional claim was both "substantial and largely free of factual 

questions." Monk v. Zelez, 901 F.2d 885, 888 (lOth Cir. 1990) 

(quoting Mendrano, 797 F.2d at 1542 n.6). See also Lundy v. 

Zelez, 908 F.2d 593 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

Apparently because of the confusing state of our cases, the 

district court looked to a.Fifth Circuit case for guidance in 

determining when to review·a claim made in a habeas corpus petition. See Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. 

denied, 425 u.s. 911 (1976). We agree that the Calley case identifies four factors--also found in our prior cases, although not 

so clearly expressed--helpful in determining whether review of a 

military conviction on habeas corpus is appropriate. The four 

factors from Calley and the Tenth Circuit cases articulating the 

same principles are: 

1. The asserted error must be of substantial constitutional dimension. . . . [See Mendrano, 797 F.2d at 1542 

n. 6.] 2. The issue must be one of law rather than of 

disputed fact already determined by the military tribunals .... [See Mendrano, 797 F.2d at 1542 n. 6.] 3. 

Military considerations may warrant different treatment 

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of constitutional claims. . . . [See Dickenson v. 

Davis, 245 F.2d 317, 320 (lOth Cir. 1957)] 4. The military courts must give adeguate consideration to the 

issues involved and apply proper legal standards. [See 

King v. Moseley, 430 F.2d 732, 734-35 (lOth Cir. 1970); 

Watson v. McCotter,782 F.2d 143, 145 (lOth Cir. 1986).] 

Calley, 519 F.2d at 199-203. We recognize that these factors 

still place a large amount of discretion in the hands of the federal courts. Nevertheless, we believe that they provide a concise 

statement of the factors normally relied on by the federal courts 

in deciding whether to review military habeas corpus petitions. 

Applying these four factors to the four claims asserted by defendant, we hold that only the voting procedures claim is subject to 

our review. We hold that the remaining claims were fully and 

fairly reviewed by the military courts. 

A. Voting Procedures 

We affirm the district court's decision to review defendant's 

claim that the voting procedures used at his court-martial violated due process. This claim involves a'substantial constitutional issue, that defendant was incarcerated without due process 

of law. In addition, in its brief the government conceded that 

this issue was one of law rather than of disputed fact. There is 

no contention that unique military considerations apply to this 

issue. Finally, although this issue was raised before the military courts of review, it was summarily affirmed without discussion. This factor alone is not sufficient to justify our review 

of this issue. See Watson v. McCotter, 782 F.2d 143, 145 (lOth 

Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 (1986). However, when the military courts' summary affirmance is considered with the other 

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three factors in Calley, we hold that this claim fulfills the four 

requirements for our review. 

B. Jury Composition 

We hold that defendant's jury composition claim was fully and 

fairly considered by the military courts. Defendant points to 

seven court-martial procedures followed in this case which he 

claims denied him due process of law in the totality of the circumstances. Three of these procedures involve the voting procedures that we have already agreed to review above. The remaining 

four claims deal only with the composition of the court-martial. 

Defendant seeks to apply Supreme Court requirements concerning 

civilian juries to his court-martial. Defendant's suggestion has 

been squarely rejected by the Supreme Court itself. 

Petitioner can gain no support from the analogy of trial 

by jury in the civil courts. The right to trial by jury 

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment is not applicable to 

trials by courts-martial or military commissions. 

Courts-martial have been composed of officers both 

before and after the adoption of the Constitution. The 

constitution of courts-martial, like other matters 

relating to their organization and administration, is a 

matter appropriate for congressional action. 

Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 u.s. 122, 126-27 (1950) (citations and 

footnotes omitted). 

We have been consistent in refusing to apply the sixth amendment right to a jury trial in the court-martial setting. See 

Mendrano, 797 F.2d at 1544; King, 430 F.2d at 734; De War v. 

Hunter, 170 F.2d 993, 997 (lOth Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 337 u.s. 

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908 (1949) (footnote omitted) ("The right of trial by jury guaranteed by the 6th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 

is not applicable in a trial by military court-martial. Hence, 

decisions respecting the right to trial by one's peers in civil 

courts are inapplicable."). Other federal courts have also 

refused to apply the constitutional right to a jury trial to 

court-martial proceedings. See Betonie v. Sizemore, 496 F.2d 

1001, 1007 (5th Cir. 1974); Daigle v. Warner, 490 F.2d 358, 364 

(9th Cir. 1974); Stanford v. United States, 413 F.2d 1048, 1049 

(5th Cir. 1969); Wright v. Markley, 351 F.2d 592, 593 (7th Cir. 

1965). 

Clearly, defendant makes no substantial constitutional claim 

regarding court-martial composition under the sixth amendment jury 

cases. In addition, in light of the Supreme Court's explicit 

statement that court-martial composition is a matter for Congress, 

we hold that defendant makes no substantial constitutional claim 

that due process was violated. Defendant points to no specific 

instance in which his court-martial denied him due process rights 

merely because of its composition. Therefore, we hold that the 

Court of Military Appeals' summary affirmance was appropriate on 

this issue and fulfilled the full and fair consideration requirement. We affirm the district court's refusal to review the jury 

composition issue. 

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C. Speedy Trial 

We next hold that defendant's speedy trial claim was fully 

and fairly considered by the military courts. Although this claim 

presents a substantial constitutional issue, we hold that it is 

not open to our review because it is essentially a factual question and was fully and fairly considered by the military courts. 

The speedy trial issue was tried on stipulated facts. However, 

the essential question for the court to answer was whether the 

reasons given by the government were sufficient to justify the 

delay in defendant's trial. This is a factual question, and if we 

granted review it would require us to merely reevaluate the evidence. Burns clearly prohibits this type of review. "[W]hen a 

military decision has dealt fully and fairly with an allegation 

raised in that application, it is not open to a federal civil 

court to grant the writ simply to re-evaluate the evidence." 

Burns, 346 U.S. at 142. This issue was also carefully considered 

by the Court of Military Review in a lengthy discussion, and it 

was summarily affirmed by the Court of Military Appeals. We hold 

that defendant's speedy trial claim was fully and fairly considered by the military courts, and we affirm the district court's 

refusal to review the issue. 

D. Expert Testimony 

Finally, we hold that defendant's claim concerning the exclusion of expert testimony was also fully and fairly considered by 

the military courts. This claim raises a substantial constitutional issue of due process. However, we believe that it was a 

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factual issue fully considered by the military courts. The question of whether the expert testimony would be based on findings 

generally accepted in the scientific community was a factual question to be determined by weighing the evidence presented at trial. 

Again, the Burns case does not allow us to reweigh the evidence. 

The Court of Military Review specifically dealt with this issue in 

its opinion. Thus, we believe that this issue was fully and 

fairly considered by the military courts, and we affirm the district court's refusal to review the issue. 

III. Teague v. Lane 

The next threshold issue we must face is whether the relief 

sought by plaintiff would create a new rule in violation of Teague 

v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989). A plurality of the Supreme Court 

created what ironically could be considered a new rule in Teague 

when it held that federal court habeas corpus review of state 

court decisions could not create new constitutional rules of criminal procedure. Teague, 109 s. Ct. at 1075. The Teague Court 

defined a "new rule" as one that "breaks new ground or imposes a 

new obligation on the States or the Federal Government. . . . To 

put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was 

not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's 

conviction became final." Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1070. Supreme 

Court interpretation of Teague continues to set a very high standard for holding that a court ruling is not "new." In Sawver v. 

Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990), the Court held that prior decisions 

that inform, or even control or govern, the analysis of a claim do 

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not necessarily compel the rule that the petitioner sought. !d. 

at 2828. The Court held that in order to create a new rule prior 

cases must "compel" the rule sought by a petitioner. !d. 

In spite of the high standard set up by the Supreme Court for 

holding that a requested rule is not a new rule, we are firmly 

convinced that the relief sought by plaintiff in this case concerning the three-fourths voting requirement for sentencing does 

not require the creation of a new rule. As we discuss in section 

V.B., the requirement of three-fourths concurrence in a life 

sentence--even if mandatory--is "compelled" and "dictated" by 

prior precedent and statutory law. 1 In light of this conclusion, 

we proceed to the merits of plaintiff's claims on the voting procedures issue. 

IV. Standard of Review 

The district court's interpretation of the Constitution, 

statutes, or regulations is subject to de novo review. In re 

Ruti-Sweetwater, Inc., 836 F.2d 1263, 1266 (lOth Cir. 1988). In 

conducting a de novo review, we make an independent determination 

of the issues, giving no special weight to the district court's 

determination. Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d 1458, 

1464 (lOth Cir. 1988). 

1 Because we can so easily conclude that the rule we announce 

in this case is not a violation of Teague, we have not fully 

considered whether Teague is applicable to the review of military 

courts. We express no opinion on that issue. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2875 Document: 01019311196 Date Filed: 10/23/1990 Page: 11 
V. Court-Martial Voting Procedures 

Defendant makes four separate arguments challenging the voting procedures used in this case. Defendant first claims that 

requiring only two-thirds of the court-martial to vote for conviction violates due process. Second, defendant claims that the 

court-martial violated due process by failing to require a threefourths vote to sentence him to life imprisonment. Third, defendant claims that the lack of a three-fourths vote denied him equal 

protection. Finally, defendant claims that existing Supreme Court 

civilian jury cases do not allow a conviction by five members of a 

seven member "jury. " 

A. Two-thirds Vote for Conviction 

Defendant's first argument that a two-thirds vote for conviction violates due process is based on a belief that three-fourths 

of the court-martial must vote to convict for a crime with a mandatory life sentence. Defendant bases his argument on the fact 

that the Uniform Code of Military Justice requires a three-fourths 

vote to impose any sentence over ten years. "No person may be 

sentenced to life imprisonment or to confinement for more than ten 

years, except by the concurrence of three-fourths of the members 

present at the time the vote is taken." 10 u.s.c. § 852(b)(2) 

(1988). Defendant argues that because his life sentence was mandatory, he was entitled to a three-fourths vote on his conviction. 

Although defendant's suggested requirement might be a sensible solution to a possible statutory inconsistency, we are 

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constrained by the explicit language of the statute. The statute 

requires only a two-thirds vote to convict for any crime for which 

the death penalty is not mandatory. "No person may be convicted 

of any (crime for which the death penalty is not mandatory], 

except . by the concurrence of two-thirds of the members 

present at the time the vote is taken." 10 u.s.c. §852(a)(2) 

(1988). 2 Thus, conviction for a crime with a mandatory life sentence requires only a two-thirds vote, regardless of any requirements imposed by the sentencing statute. Sentencing and conviction are separate acts, based on separate facts and issues. 

"These (conviction and sentencing] provisions of the Code are 

plain and clear, and set out the number of votes required to conviet and to sentence under different subsections. This is appropriate, for findings and sentence are separate functions, a courtmartial being unique in that the court members perform both." 

United States v. Walker, 7 C.M.A. 669, 23 C.M.R. 133, 137 (1957). 

See also Stout v. Hancock, 146 F.2d 741, 744 (4th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 325 U.S. 850 (1944); In re Campo, 71 F. Supp. 543, 545 

(S.D.N.Y. 1947), aff'd, 165 F.2d 213 (2nd Cir. 1947); Hurse v. 

Caffey, 59 F. Supp. 363, 365 (N.D. Tex. 1945). 

This court has specifically upheld the two-thirds requirement 

necessary for conviction on at least two previous occasions. In 

2 The 1969 Manual for Courts-Martial--in use when defendant was 

tried and sentenced--contains nearly identical instructions for 

conviction by a two-thirds vote. Manual for Courts-Martial, 

United States, 1969, 1174d(3) at 13-6 (Rev. ed. 1969). See also 

Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984, R.C.M. 

921(c)(2)(B) at II-137 (1984). 

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Mendrano v. Smith, 797 F.2d 1538 (lOth Cir. 1986), we considered a 

due process challenge to the two-thirds requirement. "[W]e conelude that the two-thirds rule of Article 52 satisfies the 

requirements of due process in this case." Mendrano, 797 F.2d at 

1544. In an earlier case we concluded that where "the charge is 

murder and the sentence is life imprisonment . . • it is sufficient if two-thirds or more of the members of the court concur 

in the conviction II Anderson v. Hunter, 177 F.2d 770, 771 

(lOth Cir. 1949). 

We recognize the inconsistency created by a statute that 

requires a two-thirds vote to convict for a crime carrying a mandatory life sentence and that also requires a three-fourths vote 

to sentence an individual to life imprisonment. Indeed, we 

believe that a sensible statutory scheme would require the same 

percentage vote for conviction and sentence where the sentence is 

mandatory. 3 Unfortunately, we do not have the power to rewrite 

the statute. Only Congress can change the existing voting 

requirements. 

Merely because we might believe that consistent percentages would be desirable does not clothe us with power to 

change the statute to make them correspond. While criminal statutes covering the same general subject should 

be construed so as to make them harmonize, courts are 

not legislative bodies and that canon of statutory construction cannot be employed to construe an act contrary 

to a clearly expressed Congressional intent. 

3 The statute currently requires a unanimous vote both to 

convict and to sentence for crimes that carry a mandatory death 

penalty. See 10 u.s.c. § 852(a)(l) and (b)(1) (1988). 

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Walker, 23 C.M.R. at 138. Thus, the conviction by the courtmartial requiring only a two-thirds concurrence is affirmed. Such 

a vote does not violate due process. 

B. Three-fourths Vote for Sentencing 

Defendant next claims that no three-fourths vote was taken on 

his sentence and that the statute requires a three-fourths vote, 

even on mandatory sentences. The government's response that a 

three-fourths vote for a mandatory sentence is unnecessary appears 

logical at first glance. However, when we consider that the military court could refuse to impose any sentence if the required 

number of votes are not cast, we then understand why a separate 

vote is necessary for sentencing even in mandatory sentence cases. 

Section 852(b)(2) contains a blanket requirement of a threefourths vote for any sentence over ten years. "No person may be 

sentenced to life imprisonment or to confinement for more than ten 

years, except by the concurrence of three-fourths of the members 

present at the time the vote is taken." 10 U.S.C. § 852(b)(2) 

(1988). There is no exception to section 852(b)(2) for mandatory 

sentences. Nevertheless, any ambiguity in the Uniform Code of 

Military Justice created by the Code's requirement of a mandatory 

life sentence for defendant must be resolved in favor of the 

accused. See Jackson v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 569, 576 (1957). In 

this case, we must resolve any ambiguity in favor of the accused 

by requiring a three-fourths vote on even a mandatory sentence. 

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Strong additional authority for requiring a three-fourths 

vote on a mandatory sentence, and a source helpful in resolving 

any ambiguity in the Code, is the 1969 Manual for Courts-Martial 

in effect during defendant's court-martial. The 1969 Manual for 

Courts-Martial specifically required a vote on sentencing, even in 

cases with mandatory sentences. 

It is the duty of each member to vote for a proper sentence for the offense or offenses of which the accused 

has been found guilty, without regard to his opinion or 

vote as to the guilt or innocence of the accused. Any 

sentence, even in a case where the punishment is mandatory, must have the concurrence of the required number 

of members. . . . No person may be sentenced to life 

imprisonment or to confinement for more than ten years, 

except by the concurrence of three-fourths of the members present at the time the vote is taken. 

Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969, ,!76b(2) at 13-14 

(Rev. ed. 1969) (emphasis added). 4 The Manual for Courts-Martial 

is written by the President of the United States under authority 

granted to the President by the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 

4 

Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including 

modes of proof, for cases arising under this chapter 

triable in courts-martial, military commissions and 

other military tribunals, and procedures for courts of 

inquiry, may be prescribed by the President by regulations which shall, so far as he considers practicable, 

apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence 

generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in 

the United States district courts, but which may not be 

contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter. 

The 1984 Rules for Court Martial contain similar language. 

"A sentence which includes confinement for life or more than 10 

years may be adjudged only if at least three-fourths of the 

members present vote for that sentence." Manual for CourtsMartial, United States, 1984, R.C.M. 1006(d)(4)(B) at II-154. 

"When a mandatory minimum is prescribed under Article 118 the 

members shall vote on a sentence in accordance with this rule 

[R.C.M. 1006(d)]." Id. at R.C.M. 1006(d) (5) at II-154 (1984). 

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10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (1988). Thus, the President may prescribe 

rules as long as they are not inconsistent with the Uniform Code. 

The rule promulgated in Manual paragraph 76b(2) is not inconsistent with the Code. At worst the rule clarifies an existing ambiguity. 

We must emphasize that the Manual for Courts-Martial has the 

force of statutory law. This court has affirmed a district court 

within our circuit that held the Manual for Courts-Martial to have 

the force of statutory law. "Congress, by enacting Article 36, 

UCMJ (10 U.S.C.A. § 836), granted to the President the power to 

prescribe rules for the military courts. Pursuant to this authority, the President by executive order prescribed the Manual for 

Courts-Martial (MCM) which has the force of statutory law." ~ 

v. Dillon, 286 F. Supp. 593, 596 (D. Kan. 1968), aff'd, 415 F.2d 

1263 (lOth Cir. 1969) (emphasis added). See also Harper v. Jones, 

195 F.2d 705, 707 (lOth Cir. 1952) ("The President is authorized 

to make and publish regulations for the government of the army 

which shall be enforced and obeyed until altered or revoked by the 

same authority."); Billings v. Truesdell, 321 u.s. 542, 551 (1944) 

(War Department regulations have the force of law). The Manual--

which has the force of law--specifically requires a three-fourths 

vote for a life sentence, even in cases of mandatory sentences. 

Thus, we now hold that a military court would be "compelled" by 

the Manual alone to require a three-fourths majority to sentence 

defendant to life imprisonment. 

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We note that our prior holding that the Manual has the force 

of law agrees with the holdings of the military courts themselves. 

As far back as 1951 the Court of Military Appeals held that "[f]or 

the purposes of this case we can and do hold that the act of 

Congress (the Code) and the act of the Executive (the Manual) are 

on the same level and that the ordinary rules of statutory 

construction apply." United States v. Lucas, 1 u.s.c.M.A. 19, 1 

C.M.R. 19, 22 (1951). Subsequent military court cases have consistently upheld the Manual as having the force of law. 

Similar to its grant of authority to the Supreme Court 

to prescribe rules of practice and procedure in Federal 

civilian cases, which have the force of statutory law, 

the Congress, by Article 36 of the Code, supra, 10 USC § 

836, granted to the President the parallel power to make 

such rules for the military courts. 

Levy v. Resor, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 135, 37 C.M.R. 399, 403 (1967). 

Article 36(a), UCMJ, 10 u.s.c. § 836(a), empowers the 

President to prescribe rules of procedure for cases 

before courts-martial. Pursuant thereto he has promulgated the Manual. His authority in that regard is 

limited only by the requirement that the rules be consistent with the Constitution or other laws .... A 

valid Manual provision, therefore, has the force and 

effect of law. 

United States v. Kelson, 3 M.J. 139, 140-41 (C.M.A. 1977). 

The (Manual for Courts-Martial] was promulgated by the 

President of the United States in Executive Order 12473 

pursuant to the authority vested in him by the U.S. 

Constitution and Article 36 of the UCMJ (10 U.S.C. § 

836). Executive rules falling properly within the valid 

delegation of power by Congress have the force and 

effect of law. 

United States v. Daniels, 20 M.J. 648, 649 (N.M.C.M.R. 1985) 

(footnotes omitted). Again we point out that a Manual provision 

having the force and effect of law was binding on the military 

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courts in this case. 

The government claims that this issue is settled by our 

Mendrano opinion and the published opinions of every other court 

that has addressed this issue. We believe that the government 

misreads these cases. This is an area in which the majority of 

circuit cases are from this court. Although our cases clearly 

uphold the two-thirds requirement for convictions, our cases do 

not create any exception from the three-fourths requirement for 

sentencing. 

In Anderson we first pointed out that the record indicated 

there was a three-fourths vote for both conviction and sentence. 

We then went on to state: "In a case [in which the charge is murder and the sentence is life imprisonment] it is sufficient if 

two-thirds or more of the members of the court concur in the conviction and three-fourths or more concur in the sentence." 

Anderson, 177 F.2d at 771. In another case we held: "[W]hen the 

charge is [rape] and the sentence life imprisonment it is sufficient if two-thirds or more concur in the conviction and threefourths or more in the sentence." McKinney v. Warden, 273 F.2d 

643, 644 (lOth Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 816 (1960). 

These cases at least imply support for the three-fourths vote 

requirement in mandatory sentence cases. 

In the Mendrano case, relied on heavily by the government, we 

simply held that the two-thirds conviction rule did not violate 

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due process. Mendrano, 797 F.2d at 1544-47. There is no discussion on mandatory sentences or the three-fourths voting requirement. Thus, Mendrano does not provide the basis for a holding 

that an exception exists to the three-fourths voting requirement 

for sentencing in cases carrying a mandatory sentence. 

Two district court cases support our prior holdings. In 

Brown v. Hiatt, 81 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ga. 1948), the court noted 

in dicta: 

[W]hile the death penalty might have been imposed, it 

was not mandatory and . . . therefore the vote of 

"three-fourths of all of the members present at the time 

the vote is taken" concurring was sufficient to support 

the sentence, although the finding of guilty was by a 

vote of two-thirds of the members present. 

Brown, 81 F. Supp. at 650. Another district court noted: 

The vote on conviction and the vote for the proper sentence for the offense of which the accused had been 

found guilty by the court are separate steps in the proceeding before the court-martial. A vote on a proper 

sentence for the offense is entirely distinct from a 

vote on the charges. There is no inconsistency in 

requiring a two-thirds vote for conviction and a threefourths vote for sentencing. 

In re Campo, 71 F. Supp. 543, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). 

We acknowledge that dicta in two other non-binding cases 

could be construed to hold that no three-fourths vote on sentencing was required in mandatory sentence cases. See Stout v. 

Hancock, 146 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1944); Hurse v. Caffey, 59 F. 

Supp. 363 (N.D. Tex. 1945). However, the facts of these cases 

both include sentencing by at least a three-fourths vote. In 

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addition, their holdings do not concern the three-fourths sentencing vote issue. Nevertheless, to the extent these cases stand for 

the proposition that no three-fourths vote is necessary on a mandatory life sentence, we simply disagree. 

The only other circuit case to discuss this issue is Stout v. 

Hancock, 146 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1944). The Stout case contains a 

facially troubling statement. 

[A]fter conviction has been voted in a prosecution for 

murder or rape, the only punishments permissible under 

the law are death and life imprisonment. The vote on 

punishment, therefore, is but a choice between these 

two; and, unless there is a unanimous vote in favor of 

the death penalty, life imprisonment necessarily 

follows. 

Stout, 146 F.2d at 744. However, this statement is mere dicta. 

The holding in Stout was only that a unanimous vote for conviction 

is not required unless the death penalty is a mandatory punishment. Id. In fact, the Stout court went on to note the inconsistency of the statutes and the court's lack of power to fix the 

problem. 

Nor do we feel impelled to put a different interpretation upon article 43 because of the possibility that in 

voting punishment under article 92 the court-martial, 

while failing to vote unanimously for death, might fail 

to give a three-fourths vote for life imprisonment ... 

If there is any real difficulty in sentencing under 

that article, the matter is one which addresses itself 

to Congress and not to the courts. 

Id. In addition, the Stout court stated that the conviction was 

"by more than two-thirds and sentence by three-fourths of the members of the court-martial, which is all that the law requires." 

Id. at 745. Therefore, although the Stout case contains some 

troubling language, we believe that the remaining language in the 

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case and its underlying facts make it weak authority for the proposition that no three-fourths vote on sentencing is required in a 

mandatory sentence case. 

A district court adopted the troubling language of the Stout 

court in a case the year after Stout. "[A]fter conviction has 

been voted in a prosecution for murder, the only punishment permissible under the law is death or imprisonment. The vote on 

imprisonment, therefore, is but a choice between those two; and 

unless there is an unanimous vote in favor of the death penalty, 

imprisonment necessarily follows." Hurse v. Caffey, 59 F. Supp. 

363, 365 (N.D. Tex. 1945) (emphasis in original). However, this 

statement is at least partially dicta since the facts of the case 

included a two-thirds vote for conviction--under an old statute 

allowing a two-thirds vote in cases involving mandatory death 

sentences--and later a unanimous vote for the death penalty. In 

addition, the holding of the case was simply that a two-thirds 

vote for conviction when the death penalty is imposed is proper 

under the old statute. We believe that Hurse is very weak authority for the proposition that no three-fourths vote on sentencing 

is necessary in cases involving mandatory sentences. 

Although the military courts have been less clear, they also 

appear to have generally interpreted the statute to require a 

three-fourths vote on sentencing. For example, in a case holding 

that only a two-thirds majority must vote to convict for a crime 

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involving a mandatory life sentence, the court quoted the troubling language of Stout, but also quoted the language supportive 

of our disposition of the case from Campo. See United States v. 

Morphis, 7 u.s.c.M.A. 748, 23 c.M.R. 212, 217 (1957). 

In United States v. Walker, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 669, 23 C.M.R. 133 

(1957), the court quoted the requirements for voting on guilt and 

sentence in the Code. The court then stated that "[t]hese provisions of the Code are plain and clear, and set out the number of 

votes required to convict and to sentence under different subsections. This is appropriate, for findings and sentence are separate functions II Id. at 137. The Walker court then went 

on to quote the precise language of the Manual for Courts-Martial 

that states that even mandatory sentences must have the concurrenee of the required number of court-martial members. Id. 

Although the holding in Walker was that only two-thirds were 

required to vote for conviction, the court certainly intimated 

that three-fourths would be required to sentence, even on a mandatory sentence. In another case, the Court of Military Appeals 

actually questioned the propriety of a court-martial which did not 

require a three-fourths vote on a mandatory life sentence. 

It is open to question whether the procedure followed at 

either hearing was proper. Long ago, this Court decided 

that the President, through the Manual, "may place an 

additional burden upon the ... [military judge] and 

the president of courts-martial not expressly imposed by 

the Code, but [which] ... is not prohibited by the 

Code." United States v. Lucas, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 19, 22, 1 

C.M.R. 19, 22 (1951). It seems possible, though, that 

the voting requirement in paragraph 76b(2) of the 1969 

Manual might on occasion conflict with the Code's mandatory life imprisonment for felony-murder----~, if 

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three-fourths of the members refused to vote for a sentence which included life imprisonment. 

In any event, no issue in this connection was 

raised by defense on appeal, so we need not address this 

question any further. 

United States v. Garrett, 24 M.J. 413, 419 (C.M.A. 1987). 

A recent Court of Military Appeals case contains some language that on its face might be interpreted to state a rule that 

no three-fourths vote is required to sentence in a mandatory sentence case. In United States v. Shroeder, 27 M.J. 87 (C.M.A. 

1988), the court identified the first issue for review: 

Whether the military judge erred by failing to instruct 

the members, as required by R.C.M. 1006(d)(5), that a 

sentence which includes confinement for life may only be 

adjudged if at least three-fourths of the members 

present vote for that sentence. 

Id. at 88. The court then stated that it decided this issue 

against appellant. Id. However, in reality the court's formulation of the issue misstates the actual question before the court. 

On the same page as the formulation of the issues the court states 

that the military judge "further instructed [the court-martial 

members] that the sentence in its entirety had to receive the 

votes of three-fourths of the members--five out of six." Id. 

Since the military judge actually instructed the court-martial 

that a three-fourths vote was required, the court's formulation of 

the issue as asking whether the judge's failure to so instruct was 

in error is not a correct statement of the issue in the case. The 

actual issue before the court is identified by its holding. "[W]e 

think it was entirely appropriate for the military judge to 

instruct--as required by R.C.M. 1005(e)(1)--that, because Shroeder 

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had been found guilty of felony murder, any sentence adjudged by 

the court members must include confinement for life." Id. at 90. 

The court was addressing whether the military judge could instruct 

the court-martial that their sentence must include life imprisonment, not whether the sentence must be supported by a threefourths vote. In fact, the Shroeder court's opinion never questioned the military judge's instruction requiring the threefourths vote. In addition, the court continually cited with 

approval its prior Walker opinion that at least impliedly supported the three-fourths vote. Therefore, we conclude that, 

although the military courts have not been entirely clear on this 

issue, they seem to support our interpretation of the current 

statutory structure requiring a three-fourths vote for a mandatory 

sentence. 

Thus, we hold that a three-fourths vote is required on all 

sentences of life imprisonment, even if the sentence is mandatory. 

This holding is supported by the Manual for Courts-Martial. The 

Manual obviously contemplates just such a vote and provides for a 

remedy if three-fourths do not vote for a mandatory life sentence. 

After discussing the requirement that a concurrence of the 

required number of votes is required even for mandatory sentences, 

the Manual states: "If the required proportion of the court members are conscientiously unable to reach agreement on a sentence, 

this fact shall be announced in open session and a mistrial 

declared. The convening authority may thereafter direct a rehearing on the sentence before a different court." Manual for Courts-

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Martial, United States, 1969, 1176(b) (2) at 13-14 (Rev. ed. 1969) 

(emphasis added). We believe that the use of the word "may" indicates that the convening authority had discretion whether to order 

rehearing on the sentence. This means that the convening authority also had the discretion to order no punishment as the sentence. This implicit interpretation is made clear by the clarifying language of the current manual. "If the required number of 

members do not agree on a sentence after a reasonable effort to do 

so, a mistrial may be declared as to the sentence and the case 

shall be returned to the convening authority, who may order a 

rehearing on sentence only or order that a sentence of no punishment be imposed." Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984, 

R.C.M. 1006(d)(6) at II-154 (1984). See also United States v. 

Miller, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 296, 27 C.M.R. 370 (1959). 

The military judge in this case did not require a threefourths vote on punishment~ The judge gave the following instructions: 

The voting on the part relating to confinement at hard 

labor for life or death will follow the following procedures: 

When the Court has completed its discussion, the members 

shall vote first on the sentence of confinement at hard 

labor for life, that is, the less severe of the two punishments. The Court will vote by secret ballot as to 

the sentence of confinement at hard labor for 

life. . . . If the ballot results in one or more votes 

for a sentence to confinement at hard labor for life, 

then there will be no need to go forward and vote on a 

sentence of death, since a sentence of death requires a 

unanimous vote of the members. The logic is as follows: 

If one person votes for confinement at hard labor for 

life, obviously, there cannot be a unanimous vote on 

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death. So, if you have one or more votes for confinement at hard labor for life, then you need not go forward and vote for the sentence of death, that is, vote 

on the sentence of death. In other words, if the ballot 

has resulted in a sentence of confinement at hard labor 

for life, and if there is one or more votes for sentence 

of confinement at hard labor for life--if the ballot 

results in no vote for a sentence of confinement at hard 

labor for life, then the members proceed to vote on a 

sentence of death. That is, if there are no votes for a 

sentence to confinement for life, then you can go on and 

consider the sentence of death and vote thereon. 

Record, vol. 4, at 837-38. The judge's instructions did not 

require the court to reach a three-fourths majority vote in order 

to impose life imprisonment. We hold that these instructions do 

not fulfill the requirement of a three-fourths vote on a sentence 

of over ten years imprisonment contained in 10 u.s.c. § 852(b)(2) 

(1988). 

In the context of this case, we hold that the court-martial's 

failure to follow the statutory requirements was a violation of 

defendant's right to due process. It is clear that military 

courts-martial are not held to the exact due process requirements 

created for civil courts. "[W]hat constitutes due process in a 

trial by a military tribunal is gauged by the principles of military law exacted by the Congress . . . II De War v. Hunter, 170 

F.2d 993, 997 (lOth Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 337 u.s. 908 (1949) 

(citing Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 u.s. 296 (1911); French v. Weeks, 

259 u.s. 326 (1922)). Thus, the Supreme Court's cases striking 

down a unanimous jury of only five persons, Ballew v. Georgia, 435 

U.S. 223 (1978), and holding that a six-person jury must be unanimous, Burch v. Louisiana, 441 u.s. 130 (1979), are not applicable 

to military courts-martial. However, the lower due process rights 

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accorded to military defendants are the exception to the general 

rules. As such, we hold the military courts to the specific statutory requirements created by Congress and the President as an 

exception to general due process jurisprudence. Because the military court failed to follow "the principles of military law 

enacted by Congress," De War, 170 F.2d at 997, we hold that 

defendant's due process rights were violated in this case. There 

can be no question that the congressional standard and the authorized regulations clearly mandated at the time of defendant's sentence the results we set out here. Therefore, we reverse the district court's holding on this issue and order the case remanded to 

the convening authority to either order rehearing on sentencing or 

to order no punishment entered consistent with the provisions of 

Rule for Court Martial 1006(d)(6) of the 1984 Manual for CourtsMartial. 

c. Equal Protection 

Our resolution of the statutory interpretation issue makes it 

unnecessary to reach defendant's third argument concerning equal 

protection. 

D. Supreme Court Jury Voting Requirements 

Finally, defendant argues that a vote of conviction from five 

out of seven members of a court-martial violates the Supreme 

Court's cases concerning jury voting requirements. This claim is 

controlled by our prior Mendrano opinion. We refuse to disturb 

our holding in Mendrano that a two-thirds vote for conviction by a 

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military court-martial is constitutional. See Mendrano, 797 F.2d 

at 1542-47. We fully considered the Supreme Court's civilian jury 

cases in reaching our holding in Mendrano. We see no reason to 

reconsider the issue now. 

VI. Conclusion 

We hold that the writ of habeas corpus should issue based on 

the court-martial's failure to require a three-fourths vote in 

favor of the life sentence imposed. Therefore, we REVERSE and 

REMAND the voting procedure issue to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We AFFIRM the district court's refusal to review the three remaining claims under 

the petition for habeas corpus. 

REVERSED and REMANDED in part; AFFIRMED in part. 

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88-2875, Alvin w. Dodson, Jr. v. Gordon Zelez 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

I respectfully disagree with the majority's treatment of 

court-martial voting procedures in imposing mandatory minimum life 

sentences. The majority opinion improperly extends the jurisdiction of this court in disregard for the independent military 

justice system established and supervised by Congress. The majority also misapprehends the limited nature of the review we are 

called upon to undertake in this case and seeks to announce and 

apply a new rule of constitutional procedure that is not within 

the relief we can properly provide on collateral review. Finally, 

in resolving the apparent conflict in the statutes relating to 

court-martial voting procedures the majority ignores Congress' 

recognized policy preference for efficient judicial resolution of 

criminal proceedings as interpreted by the military courts. 

I. JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THE HABEAS PETITION 

Just as the Constitution empowers Congress to establish 

lesser civil courts and to define the jurisdiction thereof, so 

"[t]he Framers expressly entrusted" to Congress the task of 

protecting the rights of men and women in the armed forces within 

the framework of discipline and duty demanded of the military. 

Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 ( 1953). "Military law . . . is 

a jurisprudence which exists separate and apart from the law which 

governs in our federal judicial establishment. [Civil courts 

exert] no supervisory power over the courts which enforce 

it . . " Id. Congress has taken great care to provide a 

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complete system of review within the military justice system. 

Just as its counterparts in the civil courts: 

As an independent tribunal, the Court of Military 

Appeals renders vital decisions on the constitutional 

rights of servicemembers and the prerogatives of commanders. It has demonstrated a willingness to strike 

down provisions of the Manual for Courts-Martial and 

departmental regulations, and to interpret provisions of 

the Uniform Code of Military Justice in a manner that 

adds to or detracts from procedural requirements or 

regulations. It regularly applies decisions of the 

Supreme Court in resolving appellate issues. 

H.R. Rep. No. 549, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1983 u.s. 

Code Cong. & Admin. News 2177, 2182. The military justice system 

affords military prisoners the opportunity for collateral, as well 

as direct review of their convictions by military courts. See Ct. 

Mil. Rev. R. Pract. & P. 20, reprinted in 10 u.s.c.A. fell. § 866. 

Congress now provides for direct review of military decisions by 

writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. 10 u.s.c. 

§ 867a. 

The appellate decisions of military courts are "final and 

conclusive;" such decisions are "binding" upon all courts of the 

United States. 10 u.s.c. § 876. Although this provision does not 

entirely displace civil courts' jurisdiction over an application 

for a writ of habeas corpus from a military prisoner, United 

States v. Augenblick, 393 u.s. 348, 349-50 (1969), "these provisions do mean that when a military decision has dealt fully and 

fairly with an allegation raised in that application, it is not 

open to a federal civil court to grant the writ simply to reevaluate the evidence." Burns, 346 U.S. at 142. 

Under the majority's approach, apart from considering four 

"helpful" factors in analyzing the scope of our jurisdiction on 

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habeas, the federal courts would be left with "a large amount of 

discretion" to determine whether review is appropriate. Supra, at 

6. I believe this standard is too broad; the law in this circuit 

is not so imprecise: 

Federal civil courts have jurisdiction only over 

military habeas petitions which allege that petitioners 

have been imprisoned "as a result of proceedings which 

denied them basic rights guaranteed by the 

Constitution." Id. [Burns v. Wilson, 346 u.s. 137, 139 

(1953).] We then review this issue only to determine 

"whether the military have given fair consideration" to 

petitioner's claim. Id. at 144, 73 S.Ct. at 1050. If 

such consideration has been given, we may only review 

the issue if it is both "'substantial and largely free 

of factual questions.'" 

Lundy v. Zelez, 908 F.2d 593, 594 (lOth Cir. 1990) (quoting Burns, 

346 U.S. at 139; Monk v. Zelez, 901 F.2d 885, 888 (lOth Cir. 

1990)). 1 

1 The majority of cases in this circuit have held that 

constitutional issues fully and fairly considered by the military 

court generally cannot be reviewed on habeas. See, ~' Mendrano 

v. Smith, 797 F.2d 1538, 1542 n.6 (lOth Cir. 1986) ("[T]his 

circuit has refused to review military courts' determinations of 

constitutional issues where the issues were fully and fairly 

litigated before the military tribunals."); Watson v. McCotter, 

782 F.2d 143, 144 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 476 u.s. 1184 (1986); 

Wolff v. United States, 737 F.2d 877, 879 (lOth Cir.), cert. 

denied, 469 U.S. 1076 (1984); Kehrli v. Sprinkle, 524 F.2d 328, 

331 (lOth Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 u.s. 947 (1976); King v. 

Moseley, 430 F.2d 732, 734 (lOth Cir. 1970); McKinney v. Warden, 

273 F.2d 643 (lOth Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 u.s. 816 (1960); 

Bennett v. Davis, 267 F.2d 15, 17 (lOth Cir. 1959); Dickenson v. 

Davis, 245 F.2d 317, 320 (lOth Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 

918 (1958); Easley v. Hunter, 209 F.2d 483, 486-87 (lOth Cir. 

1953). Other opinions have proceeded to review the merits of 

constitutional claims where no significant factual issues exist 

and no full consideration had been given to the claim by the 

military courts. See Mendrano v. Smith, 797 F.2d at 1542 n.6 

("Here the record indicates that the military courts gave at least 

some consideration to petitioner's .•. claims [but] the Government does not argue that full and fair consideration by the 

military courts makes judicial review inappropriate."). Likewise, 

where the claim asserted is viewed as "substantial," review is 

permitted even if already considered by the military courts. See 

[footnote continued] 

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As a threshold matter, Dodson's claim relating to the appropriate voting procedure in sentencing him to life imprisonment 

does allege a violation of his constitutional right to due process. But merely alleging a due process violation does not suffice 

to establish jurisdiction where the military courts have already 

fully and fairly considered the constitutional claim. In this 

case, Dodson briefed the issue of voting procedures before the 

military appellate courts, which rejected his argument after full 

and fair consideration; Dodson does not contend that the military 

review procedure was in any way lacking on this issue. 2 

[footnote continued] 

id. ("[W]e will [review the claim] here, since the constitutional 

issues raised are substantial and largely free of factual 

questions •... ");Kennedy v. Commandant, U.S. Disc. Barracks, 

377 F.2d 339, 342-43 (lOth Cir. 1967) (reviewing claim stemming 

from denial of legally trained counsel). 

Only two cases, Wallis v. O'Kier, 491 F.2d 1323, 1325 (lOth 

Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 901 (1974); and Day v. Davis, 235 

F.2d 379, 384 (lOth Cir.),· cert. denied, 352 u.s. 881 (1956), 

purported to reach the mer.i ts of a habeas petitioner's consti tutional claims without explaining why jurisdiction was proper. In 

both cases, the court quickly and easily dismissed the claims as 

meritless. To the extent that the majority reads these cases to 

support the proposition that civil courts have unfettered 

discretion to review military habeas petitions involving any legal 

issue of constitutional law, I do not share that interpretation. 

2 The majority views the exercise of habeas jurisdiction as an 

appropriate means of policing the military courts: "the military 

courts must give adequate consideration to the issues involved and 

apply proper legal standards." Thus, despite the fact that Dodson 

thoroughly briefed and argued this issue to both the United States 

Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review and the Military Court 

of Appeals, because both courts summarily rejected the argument 

without discussion the majority believes we have jurisdiction to 

review the correctness of those affirmances. That viewpoint is 

directly contrary to this circuit's existing precedent. Watson v. 

McCotter, 782 F.2d at 145 ("When an issue is briefed and argued 

before a military board of review, we have held that the military 

tribunal has given the claim fair consideration, even though its 

opinion summarily disposed of the issue with the mere statement 

[footnote continued] 

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Because Dodson raises a constitutional issue which was fully 

and fairly considered by the military courts, we have no jurisdiction to review his petition unless the issue is a "substantial" 

one. In a decision relied on heavily by the majority, the Fifth 

Circuit specifically cautioned: "We emphasize that only 

s~bstantial constitutional questions should be cognizable in 

habeas corpus proceedings. As Judge Friendly has commented in a 

different context, 'Today it is the rare criminal appeal that does 

not involve a "constitutional" claim,' because there 'has been a 

vast expansion of the claims of error in criminal cases for which 

a resourceful lawyer can find a constitutional basis.'" Calley v. 

Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 200 n.23 (5th Cir. 1975) (quoting 

Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal 

Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 156 (1970)), cert. denied, 425 

u.s. 911 (1976). 

The majority cites as the only reason why Dodson's petition 

raises a substantial constitutional issue his claim that he "was 

incarcerated without due process of law." Judge Friendly's 

observation holds equally true of claims alleging a deprivation of 

due process in the criminal proceeding. To conclude that this 

issue is "substantial" simply because it raises due process 

concerns is to render meaningless any limitation on our habeas 

jurisdiction. Every claim asserting a deprivation of any 

constitutional right can easily be recast in terms of due process. 

[footnote continued] 

that it did not consider the issue meritorious or requiring 

discussion."). The fact that the military courts dealt with this 

issue in summary fashion rather than at great length does nothing 

to expand our jurisdiction over this habeas petition. 

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Likewise, every infraction of procedural rules or misapplication 

of substantive law can be said to implicate due process; it 

requires no great skill or intelligence on the part of defense 

counsel to add those two words to what may be at best a marginal 

constitutional argument. As this case demonstrates, were we to 

regard every allegation of denial of due process as "substantial," 

we would quickly begin to exercise essentially supervisory control 

over every legal decision rendered by the military courts with 

which we may disagree. That result is certainly not in accordance 

with the elaborate framework established by Congress for an independent and self-contained military justice system. 3 

I do not view Dodson's claim as raising a "substantial" issue 

of constitutional law. As the majority concludes, Congress, in 

protecting the rights of armed services personnel, may constitutionally provide for a conviction by two-thirds of the courtmartial members even where the sentence under law carries a 

minimum mandatory life term. It seems no great leap to conclude 

that Congress is equally empowered to provide for a life sentence 

in such circumstances without requiring concurrence by threefourths of the members, and that such a scheme would pass 

3 A constitutional claim is all that is necessary for a United 

States court to review a state court conviction on habeas. If 

there is any single legal concept applied and adopted uniformly in 

every case on this issue, it is that our review of military court 

decisions on habeas is more limited than our review of state 

proceedings. ~' Burns, 346 u.s. at 142; Watson v. McCotter, 

782 F.2d at 145 n.3. The military courts' determination of 

constitutional issues, unlike that of state courts, is entitled to 

deference. We defeat that deference by reviewing every military 

court decision relating to the constitution; therefore, only those 

constitutional issues which are truly "substantial" are properly 

reviewable in civil courts. 

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constitutional scrutiny. Dodson's only real claim, as the majority views it, is not that a two-thirds sentencing vote is 

fundamentally unfair or otherwise inherently improper, but rather 

that Congress and the President have in fact prescribed a threefourths vote on the sentence. 

Significantly, Dodson makes no effort to demonstrate how, 

even if such a technical voting requirement exists for the imposition of a mandatory sentence, he was prejudiced by its violation. 

As to this troubling absence of any real prejudice to Dodson, the 

majority can only conjecture that there might be some theoretical 

possibility that the convening authority, having obtained a valid 

conviction for premeditated murder, might choose not to proceed 

with a rehearing on the sentence, the only legal outcome of which 

would be a life sentence identical to the one Dodson has already 

received. Instead, the convening authority might simply let the 

conviction go unaccompanied by any punishment. Not only does such 

a fanciful scenario ignore the realities of law enforcement and 

the criminal justice system everywhere, it effectively duplicates 

the provisions for clemency and pardon already extant in the 

military justice system to which Dodson has full recourse. 

Although a claim that a procedural safeguard exists and was 

violated may raise a question of constitutional magnitude, 

Dodson's assertion of a technical defect, the remedy of which 

would have absolutely no effect on his term of incarceration, does 

not justify this court's interjection of its own interpretation of 

Congress' intent; it is simply not a "substantial" constitutional 

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issue. 4 I conclude that the issue Dodson raises does not render 

jurisdiction proper in this case, and I would dismiss the petition 

on that basis. 

II. LIMITATION OF REMEDY UNDER TEAGUE V. LANE. 

Even if we have jurisdiction to consider his petition for 

relief, and assuming that his claim has merit, Dodson is not 

before us on direct appea1. 5 We must first determine, therefore, 

whether the relief sought would create a new rule of constitutional procedure under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 

1060 (1989). 6 "If so, we [may] neither announce nor apply the new 

4 The cases in this circuit which have dealt with "substantial" 

constitutional issues involved much more serious allegations of 

fundamental unfairness in the criminal proceeding than does 

Dodson's petition. For instance, in Mendrano v. Smith, 797 F.2d 

at 1542, the habeas petitioner claimed denial of his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury in that he had been convicted by only 

two-thirds of a six-member court martial panel. In the civil 

context, the right to trial by jury is so fundamental and 

essential in criminal cases that it implicates the inherent fairness of the proceeding. Likewise, in Kennedy v. Commandant, 377 

F.2d at 339, the petitioner alleged an effective denial of his 

Sixth Amendment right to counsel when he was refused a law-trained 

defense counsel. Such a deprivation, if true, would likely be 

viewed as a breach of a "watershed" constitutional right. By 

contrast, under the majority's analysis, Dodson's sentence was not 

fundamentally unfair, but merely lacked procedural symmetry in the 

method of voting on conviction and the imposition of the minimum 

mandatory life term. 

5 As I discuss below, I view Dodson's constitutional due 

process claim to be meritless. Even were I to accept the 

majority's analysis, however, the rule Dodson seeks and the one 

which the majority adopts would be barred under Teague v. Lane. 

Because Teague bars this court from even announcing a new rule on 

collateral review, I address the Teague issue prior to analyzing 

the constitutional standard which the majority announces. See 109 

S.Ct. at 1069 ("Retroactivity is properly treated as a threshold 

question .... "). 

6 Although Teague v. Lane involved collateral review of a state 

[footnote continued] 

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Appellate Case: 88-2875 Document: 01019311196 Date Filed: 10/23/1990 Page: 37 
rule [on collateral review] . . . unless it falls into one of two 

narrow exceptions." Saffle v. Parks, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 1259-60 

(1990). 

A "new rule" is one which "was not 'dictated by precedent 

existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final.'" 

Saffle, 110 S.Ct. at 1260 (quoting Teague, 109 S.Ct. at 1070 

(emphasis in original)). Because the underlying purpose for 

habeas review is to ensure compliance with constitutional requirements as they existed at the time of trial, the Supreme Court has 

recognized that "'The "new rule" principle ... validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents . . . even 

though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions.'" 

Saffle, 110 S.Ct. at 1260 (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 110 S.Ct. 

1212, 1217 (1990)). Where the relief sought does not involve any 

specific prior precedent, but rather seeks to extend the reasoning 

of prior case law, "our task is to determine whether a [military 

court] considering [Dodson's] claim at the time his conviction 

[footnote continued] 

court decision, I believe that it applies equally to any 

collateral review of a final judgment, including a habeas petition 

from a military prisoner. The same considerations of comity and 

finality cited by the Court in Teague are equally important in 

cases involving military courts-martial. In defining a "new 

rule," the Teague Court specifically stated that "a case announces 

a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation 

on the States or the Federal Government." 109 S.Ct. at 1070 

(emphasis added). Accord, United States v. Ayala, 894 F.2d 425, 

429 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("To be sure, not all postjudgment 

changes in law may be raised in a [federal prisoner's] section 

2255 proceeding.") (citing Teague v. Lane); Callanan v. United 

States, 881 F.2d 229, 232 n.1 (6th Cir. 1989) (limiting the 

holding in Teague to new constitutional rules of procedure, 

implying that Teague otherwise applies to federal prisoners' 

petitions for collateral review), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1816 

(1990). 

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became final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to 

conclude that the rule [he] seeks was required by the 

Constitution." Saffle, 110 S.Ct. at 1260. 

I believe that the three-fourths voting requirement which the 

majority now establishes as a constitutional prerequisite in 

mandatory sentencing cases such as this is a new rule not 

compelled or dictated by any prior precedent. The majority cites 

no case which has reversed or vacated a mandatory life sentence on 

the basis of such a rule. Instead, it relies on dicta to the 

effect that a three-fourths concurrence in a mandatory life 

sentence passes constitutional muster as support for its conclusion that a less-than-three-fourths concurrence necessarily fails 

constitutional scrutiny. See Anderson v. Hunter, 177 F.2d 770, 

771 (lOth Cir. 1949) ("[I]t is sufficient if two-thirds or 

more . . . concur in the conviction and three-fourths or more 

concur in the sentence.") (emphasis added); McKinney v. Warden, 

273 F.2d 643, 644 (lOth Cir. 1959) (identical language), cert. 

denied, 363 u.s. 816 (1960). 7 These cases do not dictate or 

compel the result reached by the majority; just because one ratio 

is sufficient does not mean that a lesser ratio is not. 

7 In a general discussion of court-martial procedure, one prior 

opinion cites the general statutory provision that "no person may 

be sentenced to life imprisonment or confinement for more than ten 

years except with the concurrence of three-fourths of the members 

present when the vote is taken." Mendrano v. Smith, 797 F.2d 

1538, 1541 & n.3 (lOth Cir. 1986) (citing 10 u.s.c. § 852(b)(l) 

and (2)). As the majority acknowledges,the issue in Mendrano did 

not involve the voting requirements relating to the sentence after 

conviction, nor did the court discuss the effect of a mandatory 

minimum life sentence on the general sentencing requirement of 

section 852(b). Although very broad language in Mendrano might 

suggest a minimum voting concurrence in the sentence, nothing 

therein compels such a requirement. 

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The majority opinion "acknowledge[s] that dicta in two other 

non-binding cases could be construed to hold that no three-fourths 

vote on sentencing was required in mandatory sentence cases." 

Supra, at 20. Indeed, the language of Stout v. Hancock, 146 F.2d 

741 (4th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 u.s. 850 (1945), appears to 

reject any constitutional requirement for three-fourths concurrenee in a mandatory life sentence. 

[A]fter conviction has been voted in a prosecution for 

murder or rape, the only punishments permissible under 

the law are death and life imprisonment. The vote on 

punishment, therefore, is but a choice between these 

two; and, unless there is a unanimous vote in favor of 

the death penalty, life imprisonment necessarily 

follows. 

146 F.2d at 744 (emphasis added); 8 see also O'Callahan v. Parker, 

395 U.S. 258, 263 (1969) ("A court-martial is tried, not by a jury 

of the defendant's peers which must decide unanimously, but by a 

panel of officers empowered to act by a two-thirds vote."), overruled on other grounds, Solorio v. United States, 483 u.s. 435 

(1987); Brown v. Hunter, 172 F.2d 487, 489 (lOth Cir.) ("The 

mandatory provisions . . . imposed a compulsory duty upon the 

board to sentence petitioner to death or life imprisonment upon a 

finding of guilt. It had no alternative but to comply with the 

legislative direction."), cert. denied, 336 U.S. (1949). 

The statutory provisions relating to courts-martial generally 

do not compel any rule establishing a minimum concurrence in a 

8 The majority "simply disagree[s]" with the holding of Stout 

insofar as it may be read to permit less than a three-fourths 

concurrence in the sentence. It is difficult to understand, if 

the majority's rule actually conflicts with existing case law from 

our sister circuit, how it could be promulgating anything but a 

new rule. Cf. Saffle, 110 S.Ct. at 1260 ("The explicit overruling 

of an earlier holding no doubt creates a new rule .... "). 

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Appellate Case: 88-2875 Document: 01019311196 Date Filed: 10/23/1990 Page: 40 
mandatory life sentence. The statutory provision prescribing a 

minimum life sentence can easily be read as obviating the need for 

any fixed number of concurrences where the death penalty is not 

imposed. Indeed, the majority opines: "The government's (position] that a three-fourths vote for a mandatory sentence is unnecessary appears logical at first glance." Thus the Court of 

Military Appeals, writing in 1987, after Dodson's conviction had 

become final, noted that "It is open to question whether the 

procedure followed •.. was proper. . . . It seems possible 

... that the voting requirement in paragraph 76(b) of the 1969 

Manual might on occasion conflict with the Code's mandatory life 

imprisonment for felony-murder -- ~' if three-fourths of the 

members refused to vote for a sentence which included life imprisonment." United States v. Garrett, 24 M.J. 413, 419 (C.M.A. 

1987). Even if the majority's resolution of the apparent ambiguity in the statutes is correct, its reasoning is not so apparent 

as to compel that result. The constitutional voting requirement 

is a new rule which the majority seeks to announce and apply in 

this habeas proceeding. 

Finally, the majority's heavy reliance on the voting 

procedure enumerated in the Manual for Courts-Martial is no answer 

to the "new rule" analysis of Teague. Within the broad limits of 

the constitution itself, the specific requirements of due process 

in military tribunals are established and defined by Congress. 

The interstitial rules of procedure established by the Executive 

are void insofar as they conflict with such duly enacted legislation. See United States v. Garrett, 24 M.J. 413, 419 (C.M.A. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2875 Document: 01019311196 Date Filed: 10/23/1990 Page: 41 
1987) ("Long ago, this Court decided that the President, through 

the Manual, 'may place an additional burden upon the 

[military judge] and the president of courts-martial not expressly 

imposed by the Code, but [which] . . . is not prohibited by the 

Code.'") (quoting United States v. Lucas, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 19, 22, 1 

C.M.R. 19, 22 (1951)). Depending on the resolution of the apparent conflict between the statutes involved, the provision of the 

Manual requiring a minimum concurrence in mandatory sentences may 

or may not conflict with the statutory scheme. Although the 

majority concludes that the minimum concurrence provision does not 

conflict with the statutory requirement of a mandatory life 

sentence, nothing compels that result. As I discuss below, the 

statutes can easily be read as limiting the discretion of the 

court-martial panel in imposing a prescribed sentence so that the 

provision of the Manual conflicts with the legislative scheme and 

is void. See w. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 390 (2d ed. 

1920) (Where Congress has mandated a sentence, "the office of the 

court simply is to cause the legal sentence to be entered of 

record by the judge advocate, no discretion being allowed and no 

deliberation or vote being called for."). I am not the first to 

reach such a conclusion. United States v. Garrett, 24 M.J. 413, 

419 (C.M.A. 1987) ("the voting requirement in [the] Manual might 

on occasion conflict with the Code's mandatory life imprisonment . . II) . 

The majority's reliance on the provision of the Manual as 

compelling the conclusion that a minimum concurrence is required 

in mandatory sentencing cases is an exercise in circular 

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Appellate Case: 88-2875 Document: 01019311196 Date Filed: 10/23/1990 Page: 42 
reasoning. The majority resolves the question of whether the 

voting requirement in the Manual is invalid under the mandatory 

sentencing scheme by citing the voting requirement in the Manual. 

In the context of "new rule" analysis under Teague, the Manual's 

provision compels, in the majority's view, the conclusion that the 

Manual's provision is valid. Not only does the majority place the 

regulatory cart before the ox of statutory interpretation, but by 

virtue of the novel positioning it concludes that it must be so 

arranged. 

When Congress prescribed a mandatory life sentence for 

military personnel convicted of premeditated murder who are not 

sentenced to death, it is perfectly reasonable to conclude that it 

meant what it said. No provision of the Manual could alter such a 

congressional mandate, much less bind a reviewing court to 

conclude that the statute means something else entirely. The 

majority's conclusion otherwise is unsupportable. 

Having concluded that the three-fourths sentencing requirement constitutes a "new rule" for purposes of Teague, I would not 

apply the rule under either of the two narrow exceptions. The 

first exception, relating to rules which place a class of private 

conduct beyond the power of the State to proscribe, is inapplicable. The second exception, involving "'watershed rules of 

criminal procedure' implicating the fundamental fairness and 

accuracy of the criminal proceeding," does not encompass a rule 

such as the voting requirement adopted by the majority. Saffle, 

110 S.Ct. at 1263 (quoting Teague, 109 S.Ct. at 1075). 

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Appellate Case: 88-2875 Document: 01019311196 Date Filed: 10/23/1990 Page: 43 
'. 

The Supreme Court has rejected the contention that a rule 

which merely "preserve[s] the accuracy and fairness of ... 

sentencing judgments" qualifies under the second Teague exception. 

Rather, such a rule "must not only improve accuracy, but also 

'alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements' 

essential to the fairness of a proceeding." Sawyer v. Smith, 58 

U.S.L.W. 4905, 4909 (June 21, 1990) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 

311) (emphasis in original)). Given the extremely narrow scope of 

this second exception, I cannot conclude that the majority's 

three-fourths voting requirement is "an 'absolute prerequisite to 

fundamental fairness'" so as to qualify as an exception to 

Teague. 9 Sawyer, 58 u.s.L.W. at 4910. I would therefore dismiss 

Dodson's petition as requesting relief which we are powerless to 

grant on collateral review. 

III. STATUTORY VOTING SCHEME IN COURTS-MARTIAL 

Alternatively, assuming that we have jurisdiction to consider 

the petition and that the relief requested is not barred on collateral review, I would deny the petition as meritless. Article 

118 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides that any 

person who is found guilty of premeditated murder "shall suffer 

death or imprisonment for life as a court-martial may direct." 10 

9 Nor do I read the majority op~n~on to adopt such a view. 

Nowhere does the majority suggest that the requirement of a threefourths voting concurrence in a mandatory life sentence is so 

fundamental that even absent any apparent conflict in the statutory scheme such a rule must be applied. I find it impossible to 

conclude that a three-fourths vote on the life sentence is 

"fundamental" to fairness given the majority's view that a twothirds vote of conviction suffices even under a mandatory minimum 

life sentence scheme. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2875 Document: 01019311196 Date Filed: 10/23/1990 Page: 44 
,• 

u.s.c. § 918. An apparent ambiguity exists, however, because the 

Code permits conviction upon a concurrence of two-thirds of the 

court-martial members, id. § 852(a)(2), but generally requires 

agreement by three-fourths of the members in imposing a life 

sentence. Id. § 852(b)(2). Logically, where a bare two-thirds 

have convicted, concurrence by three-fourths in a life sentence 

may not always be forthcoming; nevertheless, a lesser sentence is 

not within the court-martial's power to impose. In such a case, 

the majority concludes that a convicted murderer should undergo 

successive and repetitive sentencing hearings before different 

panels until eventually one court agrees in the life sentence by 

at least a three-fourths majority. Alternatively, the majority 

reasons that the convening authority may choose not to proceed, 

whereupon no sentence is imposed and the statute's requirement for 

a mandatory minimum life sentence is effectively ignored. I do 

not believe that Congress intended such an illogical and inefficient process once the defendant has been duly convicted. 

The majority violates a fundamental rule of statutory 

interpretation. Dodson's petition does not state a constitutional 

claim if the statute does not require three-fourths concurrence in 

a life sentence in cases where a minimum mandatory life term is 

prescribed by law. The facially troubling statute, section 

852(b)(2), does not specifically apply to mandatory sentences; 10 

10 I recognize that the otherwise unambiguous language of a 

statute is generally conclusive. In re Roberts, 906 F.2d 1440, 

1442 (lOth Cir. 1990) (citing Miller v. Commissioner, 836 F.2d 

1274, 1283 (lOth Cir. 1988)). Here however, the relevant statutes 

read together cannot be reconciled without interpreting either the 

provision for mandatory life sentence upon conviction by two-

[footnote continued] 

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Appellate Case: 88-2875 Document: 01019311196 Date Filed: 10/23/1990 Page: 45 
rather, the majority interprets the voting language broadly as 

encompassing all sentences, mandatory or otherwise. This 

interpretation ignores the basic rule: 

It is our settled policy to avoid an interpretation of a 

federal statute that engenders constitutional issues if 

a reasonable alternative interpretation poses no 

constitutional question. 

Gomez v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 2237, 2241 (1989) (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841 (1986); 

United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 45 (1953); Crowell v. 

Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)). Thus I would interpret section 

852(b)(2), requiring a three-fourths concurrence in a life 

sentence, so as to limit its application to imposition of 

discretionary life sentences; no such concurrence is necessary 

where the life term is prescribed by law. 11 

[footnote continued] 

thirds vote or the general voting scheme requiring a three-fourths 

concurrence in a life sentence. 

11 Military authorities have recognized that the court martial 

panel generally has discretion to impose any sentence within an 

acceptable range dictated by Congress. See D. Schlueter, Military 

Criminal Justice,§ 15-17 (2d ed. 1987). Historically, however, 

military law has taken a very different view of the courtmartial's role in imposing a mandatory sentence. Where Congress 

has mandated a sentence, "the office of the court simply is to 

cause the legal sentence to be entered of record by the judge 

advocate, no discretion being allowed and no deliberation or vote 

being called for." W. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 390 

(2d ed. 1920). A vote is required only where "the sentence is 

left by the Code to the discretion of the court .... " Id. As 

early as 1863 William DeHart observed: 

In cases not within the discretion of the court to affix 

the punishment, it inevitably follows that the 

punishment is in accordance with the law, and the 

finding of the court, and cannot be modified by any 

individual opinion of a member .... The oath which 

every member takes, requires and obliges him to 

"administer justice according to the articles of war," 

[footnote continued] 

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Appellate Case: 88-2875 Document: 01019311196 Date Filed: 10/23/1990 Page: 46 
The need for informality and expediency in the military 

court-martial requires that it remain relatively free of 

procedural inefficiency. Thus we have recognized "that in the 

military context [there is an] obvious policy preference by 

Congress for lessening the hung-jury problem in courtsmartial . . II Mendrano v. Smith, 797 F.2d 1538, 1547 (lOth 

Cir. 1986). The majority's solution to the apparent ambiguity in 

the statutory voting scheme does little to further the underlying 

goal of efficiency in the military justice system. See Curry v. 

Secretary of the Army, 595 F.2d 873, 877 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("[T]he 

fundamental function of the armed forces is 'to fight or be ready 

to fight wars.'") (quoting Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 

(1955)). Such a succession of duplicative sentencing hearings 

defeats the military's primary purpose: 

[T]rial of soldiers to maintain discipline is merely 

incidental to an army's primary fighting function. To 

the extent that those responsible for performance of 

this primary function are diverted from it by the necessity of trying cases,· the basic fighting purpose of 

armies is not served. 

[footnote continued] 

and of course, it follows, that upon conviction of a 

prisoner for a particular offense, every member must 

vote the punishment which the law has prescribed. Such 

cases do not admit of an appeal to the conscience for 

the solution of any doubts which may exist, for where 

the law has prescribed a rule, no doubt can be 

entertained. 

W.C. DeHart, Observations on Military Law, 189-90 (1863); see also 

id. at 191-92 (discussing duty of every panel member, upon failure 

to agree on death penalty to vote for imposition of some legal 

sentence). Thus the vote on mandatory life imprisonment where the 

court fails to agree unanimously on the death penalty pursuant to 

10 U.S.C. § 852(a) is largely ceremonial, and does not require due 

process safeguards which must ordinarily accompany the exercise of 

sentencing discretion. 

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Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. at 17. 

Likewise, the majority's approach ignores the "balance" which 

Congress has already drawn between the military's primary objective and the rights of service personnel. By requiring no more 

than a two-thirds concurrence in the conviction, and by providing 

for acquittal upon failure to convict, Congress has already 

provided the appropriate balance. See Mendrano, 797 F.2d at 1546 

(discussing the two-thirds conviction-or-acquittal rule, concluding that "This balancing does not seem constitutionally impermissible"). The majority's plan effectively raises the number of 

votes necessary for conviction and punishment to three-fourths; 

failure to sentence by a three-fourths vote results in a sort of 

"mistrial," with either no punishment or a new hearing to follow. 

The majority opinion affords no deference to the considered 

judgment of the military courts in interpreting the statutory 

provision in question, despite the fact that we exercise no supervisory power over those courts. In United States v. Shroeder, 27 

M.J. 87 (C.M.A. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1121 (1989), the 

Court of Military Appeals framed the issue thus: 

WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED BY FAILING TO INSTRUCT 

THE MEMBERS, AS REQUIRED BY R.C.M. 1006(d)(5), THAT A 

SENTENCE WHICH INCLUDES CONFINEMENT FOR LIFE MAY ONLY BE 

ADJUDGED IF AT LEAST THREE-FOURTHS OF THE MEMBERS 

PRESENT VOTE FOR THAT SENTENCE. 

The court's decision: "We decide [the] issue against appellant." 

27 M.J. at 88. The court was very specific: "Likewise, we 

conclude that the requirement in Article 52(b)(2) that there must 

be a three-fourths vote of the members in favor of a sentence 'to 

life imprisonment or to confinement for more than ten years' was 

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Appellate Case: 88-2875 Document: 01019311196 Date Filed: 10/23/1990 Page: 48 
not intended to negate the mandatory minimum confinement for life 

prescribed by Article 118 .... " Id. at 89 (emphasis added). 

The Shroeder court anticipatorily rejected the majority's approach 

of conducting additional sentencing hearings: 

If, as here, the military judge instructs the court 

members that they must adjudge a minimum sentence of 

life imprisonment, as prescribed by Article 118, the 

need is greatly reduced for utilizing a rehearing on 

sentence or a reconsideration of sentence as a means to 

impose the mandatory sentence which Congress prescribed. 

While these means are available to effectuate the 

requirements of Article 118, we have no doubt that 

Congress preferred that the mandatory sentence be 

adjudged initially -- rather than for an illegal 

sentence to be adjudged and then corrected by a rehearing or reconsideration. 

Id. Finally, the court acknowledged that under the statute, 

"Admittedly, since the court members must vote on the sentence, 

they can engage in 'jury nullification' and can adjudge a sentence 

of less than the minimum confinement prescribed by the Code. Of 

course, such action -- which the military judge's instruction was 

intended to forestall -- would be irresponsible as well as unlawful and certainly should not be encouraged." Id. at 90 (emphasis 

added). 12 

12 The majority cites the Shroeder decision, but asserts: 

"However the [Shroeder] court's formulation of the issue misstates 

the actual question before the court. . . • The court was 

addressing whether the military judge could instruct the courtmartial that their sentence must include life imprisonment, not 

whether the sentence must be supported by a three-fourths vote." 

The majority apparently would find comfort in a three-fourths 

concurrence that results from an instruction to the panel members 

that they must reach this result. I am unable to find the 

distinction between a ceremonial vote, the outcome of which is 

mandated by the court prior to deliberations, and no vote at all. 

The voting procedure used by the military judge in Dodson's 

sentencing was simply an effective means of taking the sentencing 

discretion away from the panel members insofar as the term of 

imprisonment was concerned -- the same effect achieved by the 

approved instruction in Shroeder. 

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The majority primarily relies on the 1969 Manual for CourtsMartial, in effect at the time of Dodson's conviction, as supporting its view. Given the specificity of the Shroeder court's holding, I conclude that the Court of Military Appeals was correct in 

surmising that "the voting requirement in paragraph 76b(2) of the 

1969 Manual might on occasion conflict with the Code's mandatory 

life imprisonment II United States v. Garrett, 24 M.J. 413, 

419 (C.M.A. 1987). Accordingly, because the provision of the 

Manual conflicts with the statutory minimum life sentence in cases 

of premeditated murder, I conclude that the statutory provision, 

not the Manual, should be enforced. 

I find no support for the majority's conclusion that Congress 

intended a three-fourths concurrence in a mandatory minimum life 

sentence. Indeed, I consider the judgment of the Court of 

Military Appeals to the contrary to settle the issue. It is not 

the place of this court to supervise or correct erroneous 

statutory interpretations by military courts relating to the 

operation of the military justice system. 

346 u.s. 137, 140 (1953); 10 u.s.c. § 876. 

~' Burns v. Wilson, 

I would therefore 

defer to the military courts' interpretation of the statutory 

scheme as it has been applied in this and other cases. 

CONCLUSION 

I would affirm the district court's refusal to grant habeas 

relief on the basis that we lack jurisdiction to review the petition, and that the petition requests relief which is barred on 

collateral review. Alternatively, I would conclude that the 

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voting procedure followed by the court-martial in imposing 

sentence complied with the express statutory requirements. For 

the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent. 

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