Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00415/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00415-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SARAH JEAN DOUGLAS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Case No.: CV-04-415-BH-B

)

STATE OF ALABAMA DEPARTMENT )

OF MENTAL HEALTH AND MENTAL )

RETARDATION, et al. )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matteris before the Court onDefendants’ Motion(Doc. 14) for SummaryJudgment. Plaintiff

has filed a Response (Doc. 19) in opposition to the Motion and Defendants have filed a Reply (Doc. 21)

to Plaintiff’sResponse. Upon reviewing the above filings and all relevant evidence submitted therewith, the

Court finds that Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 14) for Summary Judgment is due to be GRANTED.

FACTS

1. In2003, SearcyHospital was one of ten inpatient facilities operated by the Alabama Department

of Mental Health and Mental Retardation (hereinafter, DMH/HR). The Claudette Box Nursing

Facility(hereinafter,CBNF) waslocated on the Searcy Hospital campus and was part of Searcy

Hospital. (McLean Aff. ¶2).

2. Beatrice McLean, anAfrican-American female, has beenthe FacilityDirectorfor SearcyHospital

since October 20, 2001 and she is the only person at Searcy with the authority to terminate an

individual’s employment. Id. 

3. On September 22, 2002, David Grimes, a Caucasian male, became administrator ofCBNF until

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its closure on August 31, 2003. Id. 

4. Grimes became administrator of CBNF on September 22, 2002 after the facilitycame under the

scrutiny of the Alabama Department of Public Health and U.S. Department of Justice for an

allegation of patient abuse and tardy investigation occurring in March, 2002. Id. at ¶3.

5. In December, 2002, in an attempt to enhance the staff at CBNF, Lydia Williams, an AfricanAmerican female, was detailed to the facility as supervisor of the CBNF therapeutic

recreation/activity staff. Ms. Williams has been employed at Searcy Hospital since 1989 as a

recreational therapist. She has a BS and MS degrees in Therapeutic Recreation from the

University of South Alabama. (Russell Aff. ¶4; Williams Aff. ¶2).

6. Lydia Williams’simmediate supervisor was Searcy Hospital’s Director ofRehabilitative Services,

Melcina Russell, an African-American female. (Russell Aff. ¶3). 

7. While at CBNF, Williamsremainedunderthe formalsupervisionofRussell, but also worked under

the functional supervision of Grimes. Id.

8. Plaintiff, Sarah Douglas, was hired for the position of Activity Aid I for CBNF on January 11,

2003. (Williams Aff. ¶4).

9. Williams was Plaintiff’s rating supervisor and Russell and Grimes were her reviewing supervisors.

(Russell Aff. ¶3).

10. Plaintiff was one ofthree activityaides underWilliams’ssupervision. The other two were Takarra

Craig, an African-American female, and Eda Harville, a Caucasian female. (Williams Aff. ¶11).

11. Plaintiff was hired on a probationary status with a probationaryperiod of6 months. (Tolbert Aff.

¶4).

12. Plaintiff attended and successfully completed her employee orientation prior to performing direct

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1

 Plaintiff’s Deposition commenced on February 18, 2005. At the request of Plaintiff’s counsel,

the deposition was continued until February 22, 2005. For the purposes of citation in this Order, the

transcript for the earlier date will noted as “Pl.’s Dep.” and the later date as “Pl.’s Dep. (cont.).”

2

 The Court’s findings of fact are extracted from the relevant depositions and affidavits

submitted by Defendants. Though she claims to dispute all of Defendant’s factual statements

concerning any criticisms of her work performance, Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence to

contradict the documentation and properly sworn statements submitted by Defendants in support of

their recitation of the facts.

care duties with patients. (Pl.’s Dep. p. 20-21; Williams Aff. ¶5).1

13. Incidents of Reprimand2

a. After a CBNF Service Team meeting on January 29, 2003, Plaintiff was orally

reprimanded byWilliamsforinappropriatelaughterata questionposed bya patient. (Pl.’s

Dep.(cont.) p. 8; Williams Aff.,Ex. WA-1). Such behavior is in violation of DMH/MR’s

policy regarding respect for patient dignity. (Doc. 15, Ex. 10, Pl.’s Dep., Def. Ex. 5).

b. Due to safety considerations for elderly patients, activity aides at CBNF were not

permitted to carrybags or purses withthemwhenperforming therapeutic activities. (Doc.

15, Ex.11, Pl.’s Dep., Def. Ex. 10). Plaintiff, though instructed as to this policy, ignored

the regulation on more thanone occasion. (Pl.’s Dep.(cont.) p. 11; Def. Req. for Admis.,

Pl.’s Resp. to Req. for Admis. ¶¶ 6,7,8).

c. On April 25, 2003, Williams issued a staff-wide memo reminding the Activity Staff at

CBNF of the no bag/purse policy and why it was in effect. (Williams Aff., Ex. WA-2).

d. On May 15, 2003, Williams issued a written reprimand to Plaintiff citing her failure to

adhere to the no bag/purse policy. (Williams Aff., Ex. WA-3).

14. Weekend Work Schedules

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a. Because it was necessaryto provide coverage to the facility seven days per week, at least

one of the activity staff members had to work on the weekend. (Williams Aff. ¶11).

b. Only one instance is noted in which Plaintiff was unhappy with the weekend scheduling.

As a result of that complaint by Plaintiff onApril 11, 2003, Williams and Russell met with

Plaintiff. At that time, the schedule was amended to Plaintiff’s satisfaction. (Id.; Pl.’s

Dep., p. 96-102).

c. Plaintiff claims that after her meeting with Russell and Williams she felt as though her job

performance was being scrutinized byWilliams and thatWilliamsthreatenedherbystating,

“I will not show favoritism when I do your evaluation.” (Pl.’s Dep., p. 97, 99).

15. Report of Patient Abuse

a. In the early afternoon of May 15, 2003, Mental Health Worker Michelle Williams and

Activity Aide TakarraCraig told Lydia Williamsthat theyhad seenPlaintiffwake a patient

who was sitting in a recliner by striking him in the back of the head. (Williams Aff. ¶7).

b. Lydia Williams directed Craig and Michelle Williams to speak with Grimes. Id.

c. Grimes ordered that the matter be investigated and immediately removed Plaintiff from

direct patient care duties pending resolution of the allegation. (Grimes Aff. ¶7).

16. Because she was not permitted to have direct patient contact, Plaintiff was detailed to perform

clerical duties at the Moorer Center. (Russell Aff. ¶7).

17. The Moorer Center is onthe SearcyHospitalcampus and housesthe officesfor some of Searcy’s

recreational and educational staff. (Collette Aff. ¶2).

18. Patient Abuse Investigation

a. The allegation made against Plaintiff was initially investigated by Annie Adams, Clinical

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Investigator. (Doc. 15, Ex. 10, Pl.’s Dep., Def. Ex. 8; Tolbert Aff. ¶7).

b. On May 21, 2003, after Ms. Adams had completed her investigation, her report was

reviewed by the Searcy Investigation Review Committee. (McLean Aff., Ex. MA-5).

c. Adams concluded that the allegationwas notsubstantiated and the investigationcommittee

agreed. The committee concluded that Plaintiff most likely tapped the patient on the

shoulder to awaken him, startling him and causing him to flinch. Id.

d. Nevertheless, based on her existing record of inappropriate demeanor with residents at

CBNF, the investigation committee recommended that Plaintiff not be returned to direct

patient care duties. Id.

e. The investigation report was then forwarded on to McLean. Id.

f. McLean was not convinced that the abuse was unsubstantiated and requested additional

informationfromthe investigatorand thata pre-disciplinaryconference be set up. (McLean

Aff. ¶4).

g. A pre-disciplinary conference was scheduled for August 21, 2003 between Plaintiff and

Eleanor Tolbert, Searcy Director of Human Resources. Id.; Tolbert Aff. ¶8.

h. At this conference Plaintiff denied the allegation of abuse and asked to meet withMcLean

personally. Id.

i. Plaintiffwas granted a second pre-disciplinaryconference that was set for September 29,

2003. Id.

j. This conference was tape recorded and Plaintiff suggested that the abuse allegation was

a retaliationforPlaintiff’searlier complaints about weekend scheduling. (McLean Aff., Ex.

MA-7).

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k. Plaintiff did not allege that the retaliation was race motivated, rather, it had to do with

Craig’s animosity towards her resulting from inconveniences with the scheduling. Id.

l. After personally meeting with Plaintiff, McLean directed that the investigation be closed

with a finding that patient abuse not be substantiated. (McLean Aff. ¶11).

19. Probationary Employment Policy

a. Pursuant to the State of Alabama Personnel Procedure Manual, all new employees are

typically required to serve a six month probationary period at the beginning of their

employment. (McLean Aff., Ex. MA-3)

b. The employee’s work performance is evaluated and graded through a formal written

“performance appraisal” process. Id.

c. The performance appraisal process is supposed to consist of 3 stages: a pre-appraisal

session and report, a mid-appraisal session and report and a final probationary

performance appraisal. Id.

d. If the employee receives a satisfactory score in the final performance appraisal, the

employee is promoted to non-probationarystatus. Otherwise, the employee’s probation

may be extended or the employee may be recommended for termination. Id.

e. The pre-appraisaland mid-appraisal sessions are designed to make the employee aware

of their work duties and responsibilities and give feedback as to their performance. The

finalappraisalisto gradethe employee’s performance overthe entire probationaryperiod.

Id.

20. On July 21, 2003, before the first pre-disciplinaryconferenceregardingthe patient abuse allegation

was set up, Plaintiff’s probationary performance appraisal was submitted to McLean for review.

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3

 Plaintiff does seem to have received a pre-appraisal report which appears to have been

completed on the same day as her second probationary evaluation.

(McLean Aff., Ex. MA-2)

21. Plaintiff’s performance was appraised by Lydia Williams, her rating supervisor, and Melcina

Russell, her reviewing supervisor. Id. 

22. Based on that report, McLean claims she determined then that Plaintiff’s employment should be

terminated. (McLean Aff. ¶6).

23. As Tolbert notified McLean, Plaintiff’s probationary performance appraisal should have been

submittedpriorto July 10, 2003, the end ofPlaintiff’ssixmonthprobationaryperiod. Id.; McLean

Aff., Ex. MA-3. 

24. Under State Personnel Board rules, because the appraisalwas not dealt withbefore the six month

expiration date, McLeanhad no choice but to appoint Plaintiff to a permanent position or extend

her probationary period for three months. (McLean Aff., Ex. MA-3)

25. McLean, because she had alreadydecided to terminate Plaintiff, chose to extend the probationary

period to October 10, 2003 ratherthanhire her onas a permanent Activity Aide. (Id. at Ex. MA4).

26. Plaintiff did notreceive either a timely pre-appraisal3 or mid-appraisal session and report. (Def.’s

Mot. Summ. J., at 10).

27. Defendants admit that it was in error that Plaintiff did not receive a timely pre-appraisal report or

mid-appraisal report. Id. 

28. Defendants also concede that they erred bynotrendering Plaintiff’sfirst performance appraisalon

time. Id.

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29. Plaintiffreceivedhersecond performance appraisalat the end ofher extended probationaryperiod

on September 24, 2003. (McLean Aff., Ex. MA-6).

30. Plaintiff’s appraisal was prepared by Lydia Williams, her rating supervisor, and Melcina Russell,

her reviewing supervisor. Id.

31. Plaintiff’s second performance appraisal was approved on October 2, 2003 by McLean. Id.

32. OnOctober 3,2003,McLeanadvisedPlaintiffofherterminationbased onthe unsatisfactoryscore

on her second performance appraisal. (Id. at Ex. MA-8).

33. McLean determined that Plaintiff had not met the standards for employment as an Activity Aide

because: she had only been able to perform as an Activity Aide from January until May, she had

beenreprimandedforlaughingatapatient and she had beenreprimanded severaltimesfor violating

the policy of not carrying bags while performing therapeutic duties. (McLean Aff. ¶13). 

34. Though Plaintiff’s performance of clerical duties had been acceptable, McLean felt as though

Plaintiff could not adequately perform the duties of Administrative Aide. Id. at ¶14.

35. Plaintiff filed a complaint with the EEOC on October 24, 2003. (Doc. 15, Ex. 11, Def. Ex. 17).

36. Plaintiff filed a complaint with this Court on June 24, 2004. (Complaint, Doc. 1)

37. On June 28, 2004, Searcy Hospital hired an Activity Aide, Janet Mitchell, an African-American

female. (Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Interrog. #15).

38. Plaintiff alleges Defendants DMH/HR, Searcy Hospital, Lydia Williams and Melcina Russell

terminated her on the basis of her race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

(hereinafter, Title VII). (Complaint, ¶13).

39. Plaintiff further claims that DMH/MR and Searcy Hospital have knowingly engaged in a pattern

or practice of reverse race discrimination favoring African-American employees regarding

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employment practices. Id. at ¶14.

40. Plaintiff also allegesthat herterminationwasinretaliationfor exercisingherfederallyprotected right

to voice complaints regarding discriminatory job treatment. Id. at ¶16.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summaryjudgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue asto anymaterial

fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

 An issue of fact is "material" if, under the applicable substantive law, it might affect the outcome

of the case. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing

Allen v. Tyson Foods, 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11thCir. 1997); Anderson v. LibertyLobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986)). An issue of fact is "genuine" if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier

of fact to find forthe nonmoving party. Id. A court must decide "whether the evidence presents a sufficient

disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as

a matter of law." Id. 

The moving partybears "the initialresponsibilityofinforming the ... court ofthe basis foritsmotion,

and identifying those portions of'the pleadings, depositions, answersto interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the nonmoving partybears

the burdenofproof at trial, the moving party may discharge its "initial responsibility" by showing that there

is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case or by showing that the nonmoving party

will be unable to prove its case at trial. United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428,

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4

 There are two theories of intentional discrimination under Title VII: disparate treatment and

pattern or practice discrimination. E.E.O.C. v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1286 (11th

Cir. 2000).

1437-38 (11thCir. 1991). To survive summaryjudgment, the nonmoving partybearing the ultimateburden

of proof at trial must then come forward with evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion.

Fitzpatrick v. Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 1993).

On summary judgment, "the district court should resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in

favor of the non-movant, and draw all justifiable inferences ... in his favor." Four Parcels, 941 F.2d at

1428 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

II. Plaintiff’s Claims

As put forth in the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have violated herrights pursuant to

Title VII byengaging in reverse race discrimination and retaliation. However, in her Response (Doc. 19)

to Defendants’ Motionfor SummaryJudgment, Plaintiff concedesthat the claimofretaliation and all claims

against the individualdefendants Lydia Williams and Melcina Russell are due to be dismissed. The Court

agrees. Therefore, the portion of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment relevant to those claims is

due to be GRANTED.

With the dismissal of the above claims, Plaintiff acknowledges that she is only left with her

allegations of reverse race discrimination (more properly characterized as “disparate treatment”) against

State of Alabama DMH/MR as proffered in Count I ofPlaintiff’sComplaint. However, in the Complaint

Plaintiff also assertsthat Defendants DMH/MRand SearcyHospitalhave engagedinapatternand practice

of reverse discrimination.4 As this Circuit has held, “a patternand practice claimeithermaybe brought by

the EEOC if there is ‘reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a

Case 1:04-cv-00415-BH-B Document 22 Filed 06/14/05 Page 10 of 16
pattern or practice’ of discrimination, or by a class of private plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq.

In such suits, the plaintiffs must establish that [race] discrimination wasthe company's standard operating

procedure.” E.E.O.C. v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1286 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations

omitted). Here, Plaintiff does not attempt to make such an assertion in any of the responsive pleadings.

Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as it applies to the claims of pattern or practice

discrimination is due to be GRANTED. 

The Court, therefore,findsthat Plaintiff’ssole remaining claimisthe alleged disparate treatment by

Defendants DMH/HR and Searcy Hospital resulting from her termination of employment on October 3,

2003.

A. Plaintiff’s Claims of Disparate Treatment 

In order to support a claim intentionaldiscriminationunder Title VII based on disparate treatment

“the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving that the employment action at issue was taken because

of the plaintiff's [race].” Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1275. Such claims, the Eleventh Circuit has

stated, “require proofofdiscriminatoryintent eitherthrough director circumstantialevidence.” Id. at 1286.

In the instant case, Plaintiff does not submit any direct evidence that “establishes the existence of

discriminatoryintent behind the employment decisionwithout any inference or presumption." Id. However,

it haslong beenheld that absent direct evidence a plaintiff may still establisha prima facie case ofdisparate

treatment via the framework laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 (1973).

Under this paradigm, the plaintiff must demonstrate four factors: (1) she is a member of a protected class;

(2)she wassubjectedtoadverse employment action; (3) her employertreated similarly situated employees

more favorably; and (4) she was qualified to do the job. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d at 1286

(citations omitted). However, once a plaintiff’s prima facie case has been established, the defendant has

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the burden of proffering a non-discriminatory, legitimate reason for the adverse employment action. Id.

If sucha reason is produced, the burden is then shifted onto the plaintiff to demonstrate that the reason is

not legitimate, rather, simply a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id. 

1. Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case

Inregardsto the four prongMcDonnellDouglasstandard,Defendantsconcede that Plaintifffulfills

the first two elements of belonging to a protected class and being subjected to an adverse employment

action (here, termination). The remaining two issues, however, Defendants dispute. 

a. Treatment of Similarly Situated Employees or Replaced by a

Person Outside the Protected Class

As already stated, the third prong of the McDonnell Douglas test requires that a plaintiff

demonstrate thatshe wastreated less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside ofher protected

class. However, this Circuit has also held that this element may be met when the plaintiff can demonstrate

that they were replaced by a person outside the protected class. Kelliher v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1270,

1275 (11th Cir. 2002). 

Inthe instant case, Plaintiff contendsthatshe meetsthe third standard for establishing a prima facie

case because she was replaced by an employee outside of her protected class. In support of this

contention, Plaintiffsubmitsthat Defendantsreplaced her withJanetMitchell, anAfricanAmerican. Though

Defendants did hire Mitchell as an Activity Aide after Plaintiff was terminated, the Court finds that this

particular “replacement” does not indicate discriminatoryintent. Plaintiff was removed from direct patient

care dutiesinCBNF inMayof2003 and wasterminated inOctober ofthatsame year. While Plaintiff was

assigned to clerical duties in the Moorer Center, the CBNF closed onAugust 31, 2003. Therefore, when

Plaintiffwasfired, the positionnumberforthe positionshe filled revertedbacktoSearcyHospital. (Tolbert

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5

 The Court finds that the position Plaintiff held was at the specialized CBNF and the position

Mitchell filled, though titled the same, was essentially a different position because it was at the main

Searcy Hospital. 

6

 This standard was established by the First Circuit in Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003,

1014 (1st Cir.1979) and several Circuits have adopted it, however, it is not unanimously accepted. 

See,e.g., O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 84 F.3d 718, 719 (4th Cir. 1996),

Cicero v. Borg-Warner Automotive, Inc., 280 F.3d 579, 585 (6th Cir. 2002) (accepting this

approach, but noting a court must evaluate whether a plaintiff established his qualifications independent

of the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for discharge), Marinich v. The Peoples Gas

Light and Coke Co., 45 Fed.Appx. 539, 545 (7th Cir. 2002); But see Bienkowski v. American

Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503, 1505-06 (5th Cir. 1988) (Expressly rejecting the Loeb approach as “an

unnecessary redundancy.”) The Eleventh Circuit has held, “the fourth prong may be established by

evidence that the plaintiff has performed her responsibilities for several years without complaint.” 

Aff. ¶11). Eight months later, in June 2004, the position number was reassigned to an Activity Aide

positionat Searcy, and was filled on June 28, 2004.5 Id. The eight month lapse of time between Plaintiff’s

termination and the hiring of Mitchell and the fact that the specialized facility where Plaintiff worked was

now closed indicates that Plaintiff, as Tolbert stated in her affadavit, was not functionally or physically

replaced. The Court finds that Defendants’ hiring of Janet Mitchell was not related to Plaintiff’s termination

and does not satisfy Plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating discriminatory intent. 

b. Plaintiff was Qualified to do the Job

Though the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the third element necessary to establish a

prima facie case, we will, nevertheless, complete our McDonnell Douglas analysis and examine the final

prong. 

Plaintiff claims qualificationmaybe based ontheir actualperformance and whetherit was at a level

which met their employer’s legitimate expectations. Vickers v. Federal Express Co., 132 F.Supp.2d

1371, 1379 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (citing McDonald v. Union Camp Corp., 898 F.2d 1155, 1160 (6th Cir.

1990).6 Though Plaintiff cites it in apparent support of its case, the Court in Vickers held that the well

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Baker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 903 F.2d 1515, 1520 (11th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added). Absent

an express rejection of the Loeb standard, the Eleventh Circuit’s language indicates that its approach is

not exclusive and that there is room for other methods of proving this element. 

7

 Upon review, Defendants found that Takarra Craig, who worked as an Activity Aide from

October 2002 to June 2003, also had not received a pre-appraisal or mid-appraisal during her

probationary period. (Tolbert Affidavit, ¶6).

documented record of infractions cited by the defendant indicates a dissatisfaction with Plaintiff’s

performance. Id. The Court went on to state, “Whether these deficiencies were trumped up ... raises the

issue ofpretext.” Id. Similarly, in the instant case, Defendants have presented well documented accounts

ofPlaintiff’smisconduct. Plaintiff was cited by CBNF personnel, both verbally and in writing, for violations

ofDMH/MR’s policyregarding respect for patient dignityand failure to adhere to the no bag/purse safety

policy. As noted by both the investigation committee and McLean, these were the reasons she was not

returned to direct patient care and ultimately terminated. 

Plaintiff, in rebuttal, claims that the unsatisfactory performance appraisals, from which McLean

became aware of Plaintiff’s misconduct, are useless and fatally flawed because they were prepared in

violation of the State’s personnel appraisal policy. Defendants admit that the pre-established appraisal

policywas not being adhered to at the time ofPlaintiff’s hiring.7 Though Defendants’ appraisal process was

flawed, it does not erase the fact that the incidences of Plaintiff’s misconduct existed and are well

documented. The Court recognizes that Defendants determine whether or not to terminate an employee

at the end of the probationary period based on the score on their probationary performance report.

However,there is no indicationthat Defendants’ mis-administrationofthe probationaryprocessinanyway

compromised the validity of the scores in a way that was erroneously detrimental to the Plaintiff.

Defendants’ documentationofPlaintiff’smisconduct clearly shows that Plaintiff’s performance did not live

Case 1:04-cv-00415-BH-B Document 22 Filed 06/14/05 Page 14 of 16
up to their legitimate expectations. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has also failed to meet the fourth

prong of the McDonnell Douglas test necessary to establish a prima facie case. 

2. Legitimate Reason and Pretext

The Court finds that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment and our

analysis could end there. However, in order to thoroughly address all aspects of the parties’ responsive

pleadings, we also examine whether Defendants offer a legitimate, non-discriminatoryreason for Plaintiff’s

termination and whether that reason was actually a pretext for discrimination. Defendants submit that

Plaintiff was terminated for the legitimate and non-discriminatory reason of failing to meet the standards

necessary for permanent employment. More specifically, Plaintiff’s prior instances of reprimand led her

supervisorsto rate her performance as unsatisfactory. Though Plaintiff feels that the performance appraisal

process was unfair or incorrect, there is no indication that her poor evaluations were racially motivated.

In fact, in her depositions, Plaintiff only claims that poor performance appraisals stemmed from a dispute

regarding weekend scheduling. Other than the fact that her supervisors were African-American, Plaintiff

has not presented one scintilla of evidence pointing to racial animus as the reason for her termination.

Therefore, even if Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case for racial discrimination, the Court finds that

she cannot prove that Defendants’ otherwise legitimate and non-discriminatory reason for terminating her

employment was pretextual. 

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has conceded that her claims against Defendants Melcina Russell and Lydia Williams and

her claimofRetaliationinviolation of Title VII against all Defendants are due to be dismissed. The Court

also findsthat Plaintiff’sclaimof a patternor practice ofracialdiscriminationagainst Defendants DMH/MR

and Searcy Hospital is unsupported in the pleadings. Finally, based on the above facts and analysis, the

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Court findsthat Plaintiff cannot meet the burden of establishing a prima facie case of Disparate Treatment

in violation of Title VII regarding her termination. 

Therefore, the Courtfinds that Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 14) for Summary Judgment is hereby

GRANTED.

So ORDERED, this 14th day of June, 2005. 

CLERK IS ORDERED TO CLOSE THIS CASE.

s/ W. B. Hand

SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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