Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00174/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00174-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAMUEL EDWARDS, Case No. 15cv0174-LAB (JMA)

Plaintiff, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE RE GRANTING 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S SECOND

AMENDED COMPLAINT 

vs.

AMY MILLER, Warden, et al.,

Defendants.

 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge

Larry A. Burns pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.3 of the United

States District Court for the Southern District of California.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Samuel Edwards (hereinafter “Plaintiff”), is a state prisoner proceeding

pro se and in forma pauperis with a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 10.) Plaintiff alleges his federal due process rights were

violated in connection with prison disciplinary proceedings which arose when he received

a package of legal mail containing marijuana. (SAC at 6.) He alleges he spent a total of

five months and thirteen days in administrative segregation (“Ad-Seg”) awaiting a

decision from the District Attorney whether to file criminal charges, was released from

Ad-Seg about a month after the District Attorney declined to prosecute due to insufficient

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evidence, and was then found not guilty at a prison disciplinary hearing of possession of

a controlled substance with intent to distribute. (Id. at 15-20.) Plaintiff alleges his

Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated because he did not receive the

procedural protections to which he was entitled regarding his placement and retention in

Ad-Seg, and because he did not receive a timely disciplinary hearing. (Id.) He names as

Defendants the Warden of the prison in both her official and individual capacities, as well

as an Associate Warden and eleven Correctional Officers in their official capacities only. 

(Id. at 2-5.) He seeks an injunction preventing Defendants “from taking any retaliatory

action against Plaintiff,” compensatory damages in the amount of two million dollars, and

punitive damages to be determined by the Court. (Id. at 12.) 

Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint

pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 36.) Defendants contend: (1) they are

entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because they are named in their official

capacities; (2) Plaintiff has not stated a due process claim because he has not identified

a protected liberty interest in remaining free of a temporary stay in Ad-Seg; and (3) even

if he could identify such a liberty interest, he received all the process he was due in

connection with his placement and retention in Ad-Seg and in his disciplinary hearing. 

(Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [“MTD”] at 6-20.) 

Plaintiff has filed an Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, to which he has

attached his declaration. (ECF No. 39.) Plaintiff concedes that all Defendants, except

the Warden in her individual capacity, are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity,

and requests they be dismissed from this action. (Plaintiff’s Opposition [“Opp.”] at 21.) 

He argues that he has sufficiently alleged a protected liberty interest in remaining free of

Ad-Seg, and argues that he has sufficiently alleged he was deprived of that liberty interest

without due process of law by the Warden acting in her individual capacity. (Opp. at 22-

31.) Defendants requested and were granted an extension of time to file a Reply to

Plaintiff’s Opposition (ECF No. 40-41), but have not done so.

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For the following reasons, the Court finds all Defendants, except the Warden in her

individual capacity, are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and should be

dismissed from this action. The Court also finds Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient

to show he was deprived of a protected liberty interest in remaining free of his temporary

stay in Ad-Seg, but even if he could so allege, it is clear he was provided all the process

he was due with respect to the deprivation of that liberty interest and in connection with

his disciplinary hearing. The Court therefore recommends granting Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss. In addition, because it is clear Plaintiff cannot further amend his complaint

to allege a violation of his federal due process rights, the Court recommends dismissing

the Second Amended Complaint with prejudice.

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff was housed at Centinela State Prison at all relevant times. (SAC at 1.) 

On November 7, 2013, he was called to receive his legal mail. (Id. at 6, 14-15.) 

Defendant Correctional Officer Trujillo opened a box of legal mail addressed to Plaintiff,

and found what appeared to be small plastic packets containing marijuana and tobacco

hidden between the cardboard flaps at the bottom of the box. (Id. at 6, 15.) Plaintiff was

then placed in handcuffs and escorted to Ad-Seg without receiving or signing the required

CDCR 114-D Ad-Seg placement notice. (Id.) An Institutional Classification Committee

(“ICC”) hearing was held seven days later, on November 14, 2013, at which Plaintiff was

not allowed to have an investigative employee assigned to assist him in investigating the

case, and was not allowed “to postpone the hearing in order to make a proper defense.” 

(Id.) He alleges that the denial of those procedural protections were caused by Warden

Miller, who appeared at the hearing and told the members of the ICC those procedures

were not available to Plaintiff because the case was submitted to the District Attorney’s

office for criminal prosecution. (Id.) 

A second CDCR 114-D Ad-Seg placement notice was issued on December 23,

2013, which Plaintiff refused to sign, which notified him he was being retained in Ad-Seg

pending investigation into the charge of conspiracy to introduce a controlled substance

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into the prison with intent to distribute. (Id. at 15.) On March 18, 2014, the District

Attorney decided not to pursue criminal charges due to insufficient evidence. (Id. at 15-

16.) Plaintiff was released from Ad-Seg on April 16, 2014, and a disciplinary hearing

was held on April 18, 2014, where he was found not guilty of the charge of possession

of a controlled substance with intent to distribute due to insufficient evidence. (Id. at 6,

16.) He alleges the disciplinary hearing took place one day late in violation of prison

regulations which require the hearing to take place within 30 days of the decision not to

prosecute. (Id.) Plaintiff thereafter unsuccessfully sought monetary compensation

through the prison grievance procedures and from the Victim Compensation and

Government Claims Board. (Id. at 6, 11.)

Plaintiff alleges the conditions of his confinement in Ad-Seg differed from those

in the general population, and therefore gave rise to a liberty interest protected by the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because: (1) many of his personal items

were confiscated and some were never returned; (2) family contact visits were not

available; (3) he was removed from a vocational program where he had been earning

custody credits and lost the privilege of participating in a self-help group for veterans; (4)

the conditions were unsanitary; (5) security measures were harsher; and (6) he was denied

adequate medical and mental health care for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder arising from

his military service in Iraq. (Id. at 18-20.) He alleges his due process rights were

violated by: (1) Warden Miller, who is named in both her official and individual

capacities, for denying him procedural protections at the November 14, 2013, ICC

hearing; (2) Associate Warden Sidhu and Correctional Officers Gibson, Courtnier,

Carranza and Castillo, all named in their official capacities only, for “failing to act” while

members of the ICC; and (3) Correctional Officers Hill, Trujillo, Greenwood, Mendez,

Hopper and Lam, all named in their official capacities only, for “unlawfully confining

him into administrative segregation.” (Id. at 7-8.) There are no specific allegations

against the only remaining Defendant, Correctional Officer Daubach, who is named only

in his official capacity. (Id. at 5, 17.)

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III. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Defendants seek dismissal pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) on the grounds they

are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit because they are sued in their

official capacities; that Plaintiff has failed to state a due process claim because he has not

alleged he was deprived of a protected liberty interest in remaining free of a temporary

stay in Ad-Seg; and that even if he could, he was given all the process he was due in

connection with his placement and retention in Ad-Seg, and in his disciplinary hearing. 

(MTD at 9-24.)

Plaintiff concedes all Defendants, other than Warden Miller in her individual

capacity, should be dismissed on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, but argues he

has sufficiently alleged a protected liberty interest in avoiding placement in Ad-Seg

because the conditions there severely deviated from the conditions in the general

population, and that he has sufficiently alleged he did not receive all the process he was

due in connection with his placement there and in his subsequent disciplinary hearing. 

(Opp. at 21-31.)

A. FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) Standard of Review

“A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a ‘lack of a cognizable legal

theory’ or ‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’” 

Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare System, LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2008),

quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A motion

to dismiss should be granted if plaintiff fails to proffer “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Factual allegations asserted by pro se petitioners, “however inartfully pleaded,” are

held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Because “Iqbal incorporated the Twombly

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pleading standard and Twombly did not alter courts’ treatment of pro se filings, [courts]

continue to construe pro se filings liberally when evaluating them under Iqbal.” Hebbe

v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010).

B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits federal

jurisdiction over federal claims against a state or state agency unless the state or agency

consents to the suit. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 53-54 (1996). 

The California Department of Corrections is a state agency entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity. Bennett v. California, 406 F.2d 36, 39 (9th Cir. 1969). Although

a limited exception to this doctrine applies to claims for prospective injunctive relief

regarding ongoing violations of federal law, see Verizon Maryland Inc. v. Public Service

Commission of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002), there are no allegations that the

alleged constitutional violation of which Plaintiff complains is ongoing.

While the Eleventh Amendment bars a prisoner’s section 1983 claims against state

actors sued in their official capacities, Will v. Michigan, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989), it does

not bar damage actions against state officials in their personal or individual capacities. 

Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991); Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472-73 (9th Cir.

1992). When a state actor is alleged to have violated federal law and is sued for damages

under section 1983 in his or her individual or personal capacity, there is no Eleventh

Amendment bar, even if state law provides for indemnification. Ashker v. California

Department of Corrections, 112 F.3d 392, 395 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Here, Plaintiff clearly indicates an intent to sue Defendant Warden Miller in both

her individual and official capacities, and the remaining Defendants in their official

capacities only. (SAC at 2-5.) Plaintiff concedes all Defendants, other than Warden

Miller in her individual capacity, are immune from suit because he has named them in

their official capacities, and requests their dismissal. (Opp. at 21.) 

The Court agrees with the parties that Plaintiff cannot maintain an action against

Defendants for money damages in their official capacities. Although Plaintiff seeks an

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injunction against the Defendants to prohibit future retaliatory actions against him, there

are no allegations the Defendants have or intend to retaliate against him, and such an

unsupported and speculative claim cannot form the basis for injunctive relief. See

Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (“To seek injunctive relief,

a plaintiff must show that he is under threat of suffering ‘injury in fact’ that is concrete

and particularized; the threat must be actual and imminent, not conjectural or

hypothetical; it must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and it

must be likely that a favorable judicial decision will prevent or redress the injury.”)

Thus, Plaintiff has sued all Defendants, other than Warden Miller, in their official

capacities only, and seeks only monetary damages. The Court recommends granting in

part the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, and dismissing Plaintiff’s claim for money

damages on Eleventh Amendment grounds against all Defendants other than Defendant

Warden Miller in her individual capacity. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (a motion to

dismiss should be granted if plaintiff fails to proffer “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.”); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”)

The Court has “an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil

rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of

any doubt.” Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985). Even assuming

that under a liberal construction of the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s

allegations could be read as having been directed against all Defendants in their

individual capacities as well as their official capacities, the Court would still recommend

dismissal of this action. For the reasons set forth below, it is evident Plaintiff has not

plausibly alleged, and cannot further amend the Second Amended Complaint to plausibly

allege, a federal due process claim, because it is clear he received all the process he was

due in connection with his placement and retention in Ad-Seg and in his disciplinary

hearing.

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C. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from

“depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without the due process of law.” U.S.

CONST. AMEND. XIV. The procedural guarantees of due process apply only when a

constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest is at stake. Wolff v. McDonnell,

418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974). In order to invoke the protection of the Due Process

Clause, Plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest. Sandin v. Conner,

515 U.S. 472 (1995). Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or

from state law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466–68 (1983). While a liberty interest

can arise from state law or prison regulations, due process protections are implicated only

if Plaintiff plausibly alleges facts showing the Defendants: (1) restrained his freedom in

a manner not expected from his sentence, and (2) “impose[d] atypical and significant

hardship on [him] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S.

at 484. 

1. Plaintiff has not alleged a liberty interest in remaining free of Ad-Seg

“Typically, administrative segregation in and of itself does not implicate a

protected liberty interest.” Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003),

citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486 (“disciplinary segregation, with insignificant exceptions,

mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative segregation and

protective custody.”) “Rather than invoking a single standard for determining whether

a prison hardship is atypical and significant, we rely on a ‘condition or combination of

conditions or factors (that) requires case by case, fact by fact consideration.’” Id., citing

Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court looks to: “(1) whether the

challenged condition ‘mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative

segregation and protective custody,’ and thus comported with the prison’s discretionary

authority, (2) the duration of the condition, and the degree of restraint imposed, and (3)

whether the state’s action will invariably affect the duration of the prisoner’s sentence.” 

Id., quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87. 

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In Sandin, the United States Supreme Court held that a thirty-day confinement in

disciplinary segregation did not work a major disruption in the inmate’s environment,

despite the inmate having to remain in his cell wearing leg irons and waist chains other

than 50 minutes per day for exercise and shower, because that degree of confinement was

“within the range of confinement normally expected for one serving an indeterminate

term of 30 years to life,” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487, and did not “present a dramatic

departure from the basic conditions of [the inmate’s] sentence.” Id. at 485. Ten years

after Sandin was decided, the Supreme Court noted that, “the Courts of Appeal have not

reached consistent conclusions for identifying the baseline from which to measure what

is atypical and significant in any particular prison system.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545

U.S. 209, 223 (2005). The Court in Wilkinson found an inmate’s assignment to a

“Supermax facility . . . with highly restrictive conditions, . . . designed to segregate the

most dangerous prisoners from the general prison population,” and which included

prohibitions on “all human contact” including conversation between cells, limitations on

exercise to an hour a day in a small indoor room, disqualified inmates from parole

eligibility, was indefinite in duration, and permitted only one initial 30-day review and

annual reviews thereafter, “impose[d] an atypical and significant hardship under any

plausible baseline.” Id. at 223-24.

Plaintiff alleges the conditions in Ad-Seg were atypical of his ordinary prison life,

and imposed significant hardships on him, so as to give rise to a protected liberty interest,

because: (1) his personal items were confiscated; (2) family contact visits were

unavailable; (3) he was prevented from working, earning custody credits and participating

in a self-help group; (4) the conditions were unsanitary; (5) security measures were

harsher; and (6) he was denied adequate medical and mental health care for PostTraumatic Stress Disorder arising from his military service. (SAC at 18-20.) Defendants

argue Plaintiff has not identified any “atypical and significant hardship” as it relates to

the “ordinary incidents of prison life” as required by Sandin so as to give rise to a

protected liberty interest. (MTD at 11-14.)

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For the following reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations regarding his

temporary placement in Ad-Seg are much closer to conditions regarding the Sandin

temporary stay, which did not give rise to a protected liberty interest, than they are to the

conditions regarding the Wilkinson permanent and restrictive stay, which did.

a) confiscation of personal items

Plaintiff alleges his “hot pot to cook his food with; fan; headphones; open food

item; shower equipments; certain legal material, and personal letters, were either lost or

damaged” while he was in Ad-Seg. (SAC at 18.) Plaintiff has not shown the deprivation

of his personal items while in Ad-Seg amounted to a “major disruption in his

environment,” or “a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of [his] sentence.” 

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485-86 (placement in Ad-Seg for 30 days where prisoner had to

remain alone in his cell wearing leg irons and waist chains, with the exception of 50

minutes per day for exercise and shower, were not “the type of atypical, significant

deprivation [that] might conceivably create a liberty interest.”); see also Resnick v.

Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 448 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding placement in Ad-Seg was “within the

range of confinement to be normally expected by prison inmates in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life,” even with limited access to showers and the library, and

limited recreational opportunities.) In addition, there are no plausible allegations that the

confiscation of Plaintiff’s property, or any of his allegations regarding the conditions of

his confinement (other than the ability to earn custody credits discussed below), “will

invariably affect the duration of his sentence.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487.

b) contact family visitation

Plaintiff alleges inmates in the general population “have contact visitation with

family and friends, can hug and kiss in greeting for a brief period at the beginning and

end of the visit,” but Ad-Seg inmates are not permitted contact visitation. (SAC at 19.) 

The Supreme Court has recognized that while the right to visitation or freedom of

association is not “altogether terminated by incarceration or is always irrelevant to claims

made by prisoners,” it is expected that “some curtailment of that freedom” will happen

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in the prison context. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131-32 (2009). The curtailment

of contact visitation during Plaintiff’s stay in Ad-Seg does not give rise to a protected

liberty interest under Sandin because the Supreme Court has specifically found that the

“withdrawal of visitation privileges for a limited time . . . as a regular means of effecting

prison discipline” is not a “dramatic departure from accepted standards for conditions of

confinement.” Id. at 137, citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485; see also Gerber v. Hickman,

291 F.3d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (“[I]t is well-settled that prisoners have no

constitutional right while incarcerated to contact visits.”) 

c) prison work/earning custody credits

Plaintiff alleges he was prevented from working and therefore unable to earn

custody credits during his stay in Ad-Seg, and lost the ability to participate in a self-help

group for veterans. (SAC at 18.) Plaintiff does not have a constitutionally-protected

liberty interest in earning custody credits. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557. Plaintiff has not

shown that California law has created a liberty interest in earning work credits. See Cal.

Penal Code § 2933(c) (stating that the ability to earn work time custody credits “is a

privilege, not a right.”) Even if Plaintiff could make such a showing, a loss of the ability

to earn custody credits is too attenuated to find that his placement in Ad-Seg “will

invariably affect the duration of [his] sentence.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487. In addition,

the Ninth Circuit has consistently held that “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment ‘does not create a property or liberty interest in prison employment.’” 

Walker v. Gomez, 370 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004), quoting Ingram v. Papalia, 804 F.2d

595, 596 (10th Cir. 1986), and citing Baumann v. Arizona Dep’t of Corrections, 754 F.2d

841, 846 (9th Cir. 1985).

d) unsanitary conditions

Plaintiff alleges that the cells in Ad-Seg are “either too cold or too hot,” and that

the “showers are unsanitary. Cockroaches are rampant. Chemicals used in the only

drinking water leaves your mouth dry. . . . [and the food is handled] without the use of

hairnets and sanitary gloves.” (SAC at 19-20.) Although excessively or prolonged

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unsanitary conditions in a prison have been found to be unconstitutional, Plaintiff’s

allegations do not rise to that level. Conditions of an unsanitary cell are not

unconstitutional where there is no showing of a risk of physical harm caused by the

unsanitary conditions, and where the alleged unsanitary conditions were not severe and

prolonged. Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1995) (“lack of

sanitation that is severe or prolonged can constitute an infliction of pain within the

meaning of the Eighth Amendment.”) Plaintiff has failed to allege the sanitation in AdSeg caused him any physical harm or was severe enough to constitute a significant

departure from the range of ordinary confinement so as to give rise to a protected liberty

interest. Id.; c.f. Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 783 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The health

hazard caused by vermin at the penitentiary is exacerbated by the plumbing and

ventilation inadequacies. Such vermin infestation, properly considered in the light of

unsanitary conditions such as standing water, flooded toilets and sinks, and dank air, is

an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.”)

e) medical and mental health care

Plaintiff alleges he “was denied treatment to see an Neurologist for possible

traumatic brain injuries received in Iraq during service,” referring to Exhibit B to the

SAC. (SAC at 20.) Exhibit B consists of documents indicating Plaintiff was seen by a

medical doctor on December 5, 2012, in response to a request that he had been suffering

headaches since 2004 due to his service in Iraq. (SAC Ex. B at 1 [ECF No. 10 at 23].) 

The record indicates Plaintiff did not have symptoms when he was examined by the

doctor during that visit, was offered Tylenol or Motrin which he declined, and was

referred for mental health treatment for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. (Id. at 2-3 [ECF

No. 10 at 24-25].) The same sequence of events occurred on May 13, 2013, but without

a referral for mental health treatment. (Id. at 5-7 [ECF No. 10 at 27-30].)

Defendants contend that these documents do not support Plaintiff’s allegation that

he was not provided medical or mental health services while in Ad-Seg because they

reference events prior to his November 2013 placement there. (MTD at 14.) Defendants

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also point out that Plaintiff does not allege that any named Defendant in this action was

personally responsible for denying him medical or mental health services while he was

in Ad-Seg. (Id.) Finally, Defendants indicate that the California Code of Regulations

provides that medical and mental health services are available to all prisoners regardless

of their housing designation. (Id.)

“Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the

‘unecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Here, however, Plaintiff has alleged that he

was provided with medical attention and was referred for mental health services for

complaints of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, albeit prior to his placement in Ad-Seg. 

To the extent Plaintiff intended the documents attached to the SAC to show that such

treatment was available to him in general population but not in Ad-Seg, there are no

plausible allegations that he requested and was denied medical or mental health services

while in Ad-Seg or because of his placement in Ad-Seg. His Opposition merely repeats

the unsupported allegation that his requests for medical and mental health attention while

in Ad-Seg were ignored, and in fact show he was offered but refused mental health

services when he was first placed in Ad-Seg. (See Opp. at 28-29 & Exs. B-D [ECF No.

39 at 47-114]; Plaintiff’s Decl. at ¶ 16 [ECF No. 39 at 155].) Plaintiff has not alleged that

Defendants failed to abide by prison regulations which make medical and mental health

services available to prisoners in Ad-Seg, and has set forth no specific allegations

regarding when he requested and was refused medical attention while housed in Ad-Seg. 

f) enhanced security measures

Plaintiff alleges that “[a]ll movements outside the cell are in restraints escorted by

prison officials holding clubs in their hand. . . . Prison officials subject inmates to nude

searches in front of female staff. Prison officials prepare and serve inmates below the

required servings of 2500 calories. . . . All incoming inmates are placed on suicide watch

for 21 days, which staff only monitored at night from 8:30 p.m. to 5:30 a.m. Inmates are

startled throughout the night by prison officials waking out of their sleep to turn off the

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20 minute alarm clock buzzer, so they can count the inmates on intake suicide watch by

using an electronic sensor device that they often jab into cell door hard and the sensor

beeps, disturbing sleep and causing anxiety and restlessness.” (SAC at 19-20.) Plaintiff

has failed to plausibly allege that these conditions caused a “major disruption in his

environment” or “a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of [his] sentence.” 

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485-86.

g) summary

Plaintiff has failed to allege the conditions of his confinement in Ad-Seg were not

“within the range of confinement normally expected,” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487, or

presented “a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of [his] sentence.” Id. at 485. 

Nor has he shown the conditions failed to comport “with the prison’s discretionary

authority,” that “the duration of the condition(s)” or “the degree of restraint imposed”

were unusually harsh, or that “the state’s action will invariably affect the duration of the

[his] sentence.” Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1089, quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to allege he was deprived of a liberty interest in

remaining free of his temporary stay in Ad-Seg, and has consequently failed to allege a

violation of his federal due process rights. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485-87. The Court

recommends granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint

on this basis. Johnson, 534 F.3d at 1121-22 (“A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based

on . . . ‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’”), quoting

Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 699. 

2. Plaintiff received all the process he was due

Finally, assuming arguendo Plaintiff has alleged, or could amend the Second

Amended Complaint to allege, conditions in Ad-Seg which represent such a dramatic

departure from the basic conditions of his sentence so as to give rise to a liberty interest

in remaining free of his temporary placement there, it is clear he received all the process

he was due in connection with the deprivation of any such liberty interest.

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Plaintiff alleges he was initially placed in Ad-Seg without receiving or signing the

required CDCR 114-D Ad-Seg placement notice. (SAC at 6.) He alleges an ICC hearing

was held seven days later, on November 14, 2013, at which he was denied his right to

have an investigative employee assist him in investigating the case, and that he was

denied his right to postpone the hearing in order to prepare a proper defense. (Id.) 

Finally, he alleges his disciplinary hearing took place one day late under prison

regulations which require the hearing to be held within 30 days of the decision not to

prosecute. (Id.)

Defendants contend due process protections are minimal for placement and

retention in Ad-Seg, and that all that is required is an informal, non-adversarial hearing

held within a reasonable time where the prisoner is informed of the reason for his

placement and is allowed to present his views. (MTD at 15.) Defendants contend

Plaintiff’s allegation that he did not receive the required CDCR 114-D Ad-Seg placement

notice form is refuted by Plaintiff’s own allegation, and his own exhibit, indicating the

form was issued, but that he refused to sign the document. (Id. at 16, citing SAC Ex. A

at 9 [ECF No. 10-1 at 10].) Defendants contend Plaintiff’s allegations reveal he was

provided a hearing seven days after his initial placement in Ad-Seg, and that he cannot

plausibly allege he was not aware of why he was placed in Ad-Seg because he was

escorted there in handcuffs by Defendant Correctional Officer Trujillo immediately after

Trujillo had Plaintiff sign for a package of legal mail which appeared to contain

marijuana. (Id. at 15-16.) Defendants contend that although Plaintiff alleges he was

denied his right to postpone the hearing and denied the right for staff assistance, he had

no such rights, but that in any case he did not request staff assistance. (Id. at 16-18.) 

Finally, Defendants contend that although the April 18, 2014 disciplinary hearing was

held one day late under prison regulations which required it to be held within 30 days of

the decision not to criminally prosecute Plaintiff, all federal due process requirements

were provided in connection with the hearing. (Id. at 18-20.)

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a) initial placement in Ad-Seg

When a prisoner is segregated for administrative reasons, prison officials are

required to: (1) conduct an informal nonadversary review of the evidence justifying the

decision to segregate the prisoner within a reasonable time after placing the prisoner in

administrative segregation; (2) provide the prisoner with some notice of the charges or

their reasons for placing him in segregation; and (3) give the prisoner an opportunity to

present his views in response to his placement. Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080,

1100 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. 472. Here,

Plaintiff’s own allegations and exhibits attached to the SAC show that he received these

procedural protections in regard to his initial placement in Ad-Seg. 

Plaintiff acknowledges he was present at the initial ICC review hearing which took

place within seven days of his placement in Ad-Seg, and acknowledges he was informed

he was to remain there due to marijuana having been found in a package of legal mail

delivered to him pending a decision of the District Attorney whether to file criminal

charges. (SAC at 6, 15; Opp. at 12.) He argues he was initially confused as to why he

was placed in Ad-Seg, and was not officially notified of why he was there until his

December 23, 2013 transfer from the Facility A Ad-Seg to the Facility C Ad-Seg. (Opp.

at 26-28.) However, he admits he was present at the initial ICC review, spoke at the

hearing, and prepared a written defense. (Id. at 12; SAC at 6, 15.) Rather than allege he

was denied an opportunity to respond to the charge against him, he alleges he was not

allowed to postpone the hearing in order to “make a proper defense,” and was not

provided with the assistance of an investigating employee in order to investigate the

charge. (Id.) Those procedural protections were not required at that time. Toussaint, 801

F.2d at 1100-01 (holding prisoner is not entitled to “detailed written notice of charges,

representation of counsel or counsel-substitute, an opportunity to present witnesses, or

a written decision describing the reasons for placing the prisoner in administrative

segregation.”) Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged, and cannot plausibly allege, a violation

of due process in connection with his initial placement in Ad-Seg.

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Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of the administrative record of the

initial ICC hearing which is attached to the Motion to Dismiss as Exhibit A. (MTD at

17.) Defendants argue this is the only documentation regarding Plaintiff’s disciplinary

proceedings which Plaintiff did not attach to the Second Amended Complaint, and that

the document shows Plaintiff did not request staff assistance at the initial ICC hearing,

that he was informed of the reason why he was placed in Ad-Seg, and that an

investigating employee was not assigned because no additional witness or documentation

were requested. (Id.; MTD Ex. A at 1 [ECF No. 36-1 at 1].) It is not necessary for the

Court to take judicial notice of this document for the resolution of this matter, because

Plaintiff’s own allegations and exhibits clearly demonstrate he received all the process

he was due regarding his initial placement in Ad-Seg. The Court therefore recommends

denying Respondent’s request for judicial notice.

Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged, and cannot further

amend the Second Amended Complaint to plausibly allege, that he was denied due

process in connection with his initial placement in Ad-Seg.

b) retention in Ad-Seg pending disciplinary hearing

Plaintiff alleges that Warden Miller appeared at the initial ICC hearing and

informed the ICC that Plaintiff was not entitled to assignment of an investigating

employee or a postponement of the hearing in order to prepare a proper defense because

the matter had been submitted to the District Attorney to determine whether he would be

criminally prosecuted. (SAC at 6.) Plaintiff alleges that on December 23, 2013, he was

transferred from the Ad-Seg unit on Facility A to the Ad-Seg unit on Facility C, and at

that time was issued, but refused to sign, a CDCR 114-D form which indicated he was

placed in Ad-Seg pending an investigation into a conspiracy to introduce marijuana into

the prison. (Id. at 15.) He states the District Attorney decided on March 18, 2014 not to

prosecute due to insufficient evidence, and that he was released from Ad-Seg on April 16,

2014. (Id. at 15-16.)

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Following placement in segregated housing, prisoners are entitled to have prison

authorities engage in some sort of periodic review of their confinement. See Hewitt v.

Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 477 n.9 (1983). Plaintiff was in Ad-Seg for 7 days before his first

ICC review, and remained there 154 additional days after that initial review until he was

released following the District Attorney’s decision not to file criminal charges. The

Ninth Circuit has held that there is no set constitutionally-required time limit between AdSeg placement reviews, but that a review every 120 days satisfies federal due process. 

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 926 F.2d 800, 803 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[N]othing in the Constitution

invests the district court with discretion to overrule the discretion of the prison officials

on this administrative point.”) Plaintiff acknowledges that on December 23, 2013, he was

issued a revised CDCR 114-D notice which clarified and confirmed the reason for his

placement in Ad-Seg, and that the prison officials were not informed by the Department

of Justice until March 6, 2014 that the contraband found in Plaintiff’s legal mail tested

positive for marijuana. (Opp. at 13-14, 24.) Thus, Plaintiff admits he was granted a

review within 7 days of his placement in Ad-Seg, was issued a revised CDCR 114-D

notice 39 days later, and was released 115 days later. The Court finds Plaintiff has not

alleged a due process violation arising from the failure to provide a review of his

placement in Ad-Seg for: (1) the 7 days from his initial placement in Ad-Seg on

November 7, 2013 to his first ICC hearing on November 14, 2013; or (2) the 39 days

between his initial ICC hearing and the December 23, 2013, revised CDCR 114-D

placement notification clarifying the reason for his placement in Ad-Seg; or (3) the 73

days from that revised placement notification until the suspected contraband was

confirmed to be marijuana on March 6, 2014; or (4) even the 154 days between the initial

ICC hearing and his release from Ad-Seg, because none of those intervals constituted an

unreasonable length of time between reviews. Id.; see also Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477 n.9

(“[T]he decision to continue confinement of an inmate pending investigation of

misconduct charges depends upon circumstances which prison officials will be well

aware of - most typically, the progress of the investigation.”)

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Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged, and cannot further

amend the Second Amended Complaint to plausibly allege, that he was denied due

process in connection to his retention in Ad-Seg.

c) disciplinary hearing

When a liberty interest has been implicated as the result of a disciplinary charge,

the Fourteenth Amendment requires prison officials to provide the prisoner with: (1)

written notice of the charges at least 24-hours before the hearing; (2) the opportunity to

appear in person at the hearing, to call witnesses, and to present rebuttal evidence; and

(3) a written statement by the factfinders of the evidence relied on for their decision and

the reasons for the action taken by the committee. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-66; Freeman

v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 952 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Although prisoners are entitled to be free

from arbitrary action and conduct of prison officials, the protections against arbitrary

action are the procedural due process requirements as set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell.”)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Once these protections have been provided, due

process is satisfied if there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion

reached by the officials. Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1104-05.

Plaintiff’s own documents show he was given 24-hours advance notice of the

hearing and was informed of the charge. (SAC Ex. A at 27-29 [ECF No. 10-1 at 28-30].) 

His documents also show he: (1) appeared in person at the hearing; (2) was granted his

request to question reporting Correctional Officer Trujillo, who had opened the box of

legal mail containing the marijuana and who testified at the hearing that Plaintiff never

took possession of the legal mail or the contraband it contained; and (3) was allowed to

present rebuttal evidence in the form of his sworn, written declaration. (Id.) Finally, the

documents attached to the SAC show Plaintiff was given a written statement by the

factfinders of the evidence relied on for their decision, and the reason why he was found

not guilty, i.e., “the written and material evidence presented at this hearing is insufficient

to support the charge.” (Id.) Accordingly, Plaintiff was provided all the process he was

due in connection with his disciplinary hearing. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-66. 

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Plaintiff alleges the disciplinary hearing was not held within 30 days of the

decision not to charge him with a criminal offense as required by prison regulations. 

(SAC at 6.) Defendants acknowledge prison regulations required the hearing to be held

within 30 days of the decision not to charge him with a criminal offense, and that the

hearing was held on the 31st day after that decision, one day late. (MTD at 19-20.) 

Defendants correctly argue that the one-day delay does not implicate or violate federal

due process. See Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that

a prison’s failure to meet its own requirement that a hearing is to be held within eight

days of charge would not alone constitute a denial of due process).

Accordingly, because it is clear Plaintiff was provided with all the procedural

protections due him in connection with his disciplinary hearing, the Court finds he has

not plausibly alleged, and cannot further amend the Second Amended Complaint to

plausibly allege, that he was denied due process in connection with his disciplinary

hearing.

d) summary

The Court finds that assuming Plaintiff has or could allege facts which give rise

to a liberty interest in remaining free of his temporary stay in Ad-Seg, he has not

plausibly alleged facts showing his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was

violated in connection with the deprivation of such a liberty interest or in his disciplinary

hearing. The Court therefore recommends granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the

Second Amended Complaint on this ground. Johnson, 534 F.3d at 1121-22 (“A Rule

12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on . . . ‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a

cognizable legal theory.’”), quoting Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 699. Plaintiff has already

twice amended his complaint in this action after twice being informed of the required

pleading standards (ECF Nos. 7-10), and it is now clear he is unable to further amend his

complaint to plausibly allege a deprivation of due process in connection with his

placement and retention in Ad-Seg, or in his subsequent disciplinary hearing. The Court 

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therefore recommends the Second Amended Complaint be dismissed with prejudice and

without further leave to amend. 

IV. Conclusion and Recommendation

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the

Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and

(2) directing that judgment be entered granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and

dismissing Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint with prejudice.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than March 11, 2016 any party to this action may

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with

the Court and served on all parties no later than March 18, 2016. The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections with the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449,

455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATE: February 23, 2016 _________________________________________

 JAN M. ADLER

 United States Magistrate Judge 

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