Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-06199/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-06199-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:6901 Environmental Cleanup Expenses

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HOWARD McCONNELL, LEAF G. HILLMAN;

ROBERT ATTEBERY, FRANKIE JOE MYERS;

TERANCE J. SUPAHAN, MICHAEL T. HUDSON,

BLYTHE REIS, and KLAMATH RIVERKEEPER,

a project of KLAMATH FOREST ALLIANCE, a

California nonprofit corporation, 

Plaintiffs,

 v.

PACIFICORP, INC., an Oregon Corporation, 

Defendant. /

KLAMATH RIVERKEEPER, a nonprofit public

benefit corporation, HOWARD McCONNELL,

LEAF G. HILLMAN, ROBERT ATTEBERY,

and BLYTHE REIS, 

Plaintiffs,

 v.

PACIFICORP, INC., an Oregon Corporation, 

Defendant. /

No. C 07-02382 WHA

(Master File)

ORDER PROVISIONALLY

CONSOLIDATING

RELATED CASES AND

DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

DUPLICATIVE SUIT

No. C 07-06199 WHA

INTRODUCTION

In this environmental-tort action, defendant PacifiCorp, Inc., moves to dismiss this

action as duplicative of another action currently before this Court, McConnell v. PacifiCorp,

Case 3:07-cv-06199-WHA Document 27 Filed 02/22/08 Page 1 of 9
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For the Northern District of California

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Inc., C 07-02382 WHA. This order agrees that the current action is duplicative, but holds that

consolidation of the two cases, rather than dismissal of the current action, is the appropriate

relief. Accordingly, this order DENIES defendant’s motion to dismiss this action, and

consolidates the current action with C 07-02382 WHA, subject to the undertaking described

below.

STATEMENT

Defendant PacifiCorp is an Oregon corporation that owns and operates the Klamath

Hydroelectric Project. This project uses river and creek water to produce electric power under a

federal license. PacifiCorp owns and operates the Iron Gate, Copco 1, Copco 2, John C. Boyle,

and Keno dams located on the Klamath River. PacifiCorp also operates Link dam on the

Klamath River (McConnell v. PacifiCorp, Inc., Action No. C 07-02382 WHA, Dkt. 10 ¶ 5, 10). 

The Klamath watershed is home to the Yurok and Karuk Native American tribes. 

Plaintiffs Howard McConnell and Robert Attebury are members of the Yurok tribe. 

Leaf Hillman is a member of the Karuk tribe. Blythe Reis co-owns and operates the Sandy Bar

Ranch, which provides cabin rentals for visitors in the area. Klamath RIVERKEEPER is a

nonprofit public benefit corporation organized under the laws of California. Members of

RIVERKEEPER use the Klamath River for recreation and study (Compl. ¶¶ 2, 15–20;

C 07-02382 WHA, Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 2, 14–21). 

The basic allegation is that the dam operations pollute the Klamath River. The dams

raise water temperatures above natural levels, which allegedly promotes the growth of

blue-green algae (Microcystis aeruginosa) and an associated toxin, microsystin, or so it is

alleged (Compl. ¶¶ 5–6; C 07-02382 WHA, Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 5–6). These toxins have allegedly caused

a number of harms specific to plaintiffs as well as harms to the general public. The algae has

allegedly exposed plaintiffs, their customers, and the public to microsystin, a potent liver toxin

and tumor promoter. It has also allegedly reduced the fishery population, jeopardizing the

economic survival of fishermen. And it has made the water unsightly and unsafe, and has

reduced plaintiffs’ property values, the complaint says (Compl. ¶¶ 5–9; C 07-02382 WHA,

Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 5–7). 

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In the first action, defendant asserted that Microcystis aeruginosa is a common species

of algae that is common in the Klamath River basin and in other watersheds throughout

California and the world. While defendant admitted that the algae may exist in the Iron Gate

and Copco reservoirs during parts of the year, defendant contended that the algae also exists

upstream of its project in, for example, Agency Lake and Upper Klamath Lake (C 07-02382

WHA, Dkt. 10 ¶ 23).

1. THE FIRST ACTION: MCCONNELL V. PACIFICORP, INC.

On May 2, 2007, Howard McConnell, Leaf G. Hillman, Robert Attebery, Frankie Joe

Myers, Terance J. Supahan, Michael T. Hudson, Blythe Reis, and Klamath RIVERKEEPER

filed suit against PacifiCorp, Inc., for private and public nuisance, trespass, negligence, and

unlawful business practices (C 07-02382 WHA). An order dated August 16, 2007, granted in

part and denied in part defendant’s motion to dismiss the first action (id. at Dkt. 15). The

August 16 order dismissed the claims for injunctive relief, finding that the Federal Power Act

preempted plaintiffs’ state-law claims for injunctive relief, but allowed the claims for damages

to proceed (ibid.). On the same day, a case management conference was held. In the parties’

joint case management conference statement, plaintiffs stated their intent to seek leave to amend

their complaint to assert a claim under the Federal Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. 6901

et seq. (also known as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, “RCRA”), which would

ripen on September 27, 2007 (id. at Dkt. 44). The case management order provided that leave

to amend pleadings must be sought by September 27, 2007 (id. at Dkt. 48). Plaintiffs never

sought leave to amend their complaint.

2. THE CURRENT ACTION: RIVERKEEPER V. PACIFICORP, INC.

 On December 6, 2007, five of the eight McConnell plaintiffs, Klamath

RIVERKEEPER, Howard McConnell, Leaf G. Hillman, Robert Attebery, and Blythe Reis, filed

the instant action against PacifiCorp, Inc., for violations of the RCRA. On December 20, 2007,

PacifiCorp moved to dismiss this action as duplicative of the McConnell action.

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1

 Unless indicated otherwise, internal citations are omitted in all cites.

2

 It is of no moment that the McConnell action presented state-law claims, and the instant action

presents federal-law claims under the RCRA. In Adams, the plaintiff brought both state-law and federal-law

claims in both actions. In the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, however, the issue was never addressed, and therefore is

irrelevant in determining whether the claims are the same for the purpose of determining whether an action is

duplicative.

4

ANALYSIS

1. DUPLICATIVE ACTION.

Plaintiffs generally have “no right to maintain two separate actions involving the same

subject matter at the same time in the same court and against the same defendant.” Adams v.

Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 2007). The Ninth Circuit articulated

the test for determining whether a suit is duplicative in Adams: In order to determine whether

an action is duplicative of an earlier-filed suit, a court must examine whether “the causes of

action and relief sought, as well as the parties or privies to the action, are the same.” Id. at 689.1

A. Same Claims.

In order to determine whether two successive claims are the same, the Ninth Circuit uses

the transaction test, borrowed from the context of claim preclusion.2

 In applying the transaction

test, the Ninth Circuit examines four criteria: 

(1) whether rights or interests established in the prior judgment

would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second

action; 

(2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in the

two actions;

(3) whether the two suits involve infringement of the same right;

and 

(4) whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional

nucleus of facts. 

The Ninth Circuit stated that the last criterion, whether the two suits arise out of the same

transactional nucleus of facts, is the “most important.” Adams, 487 F.3d at 689.

(1) Arising From the Same Transactional Nucleus of Facts.

Beginning with the fourth and most important criterion, as did the Ninth Circuit in

Adams, the claims in both McConnell and the instant action arise from the same transactional

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nucleus of facts, namely that PacifiCorp’s operation of the dams has polluted the Klamath River

by raising water temperatures above natural levels and thereby promoting the growth of

blue-green algae (Microcystis aeruginosa) and the associated toxin microsystin. Plaintiffs do

not argue otherwise, and concede that “the transactional facts in [McConnell] and [the instant

action] are substantially similar” (Opp. 4). This order thus finds that the two actions arise from

the same transactional nucleus of facts.

(2) Rights or Interests Established in Prior Judgment 

Would Be Destroyed or Impaired by Second Action.

The rights or interests adjudicated in each action could destroy or impair those in the

other action, as both actions pertain to PacifiCorp’s liability for allegedly polluting the Klamath

River by raising water temperatures above natural levels and thereby promoting the growth of

blue-green algae (Microcystis aeruginosa) and the associated toxin microsystin. 

Plaintiffs appear to argue that, because the legal tests for nuisance and imminent and substantial

endangerment under the RCRA are not the same, the rights and interests of the parties in

McConnell would be unaffected by adjudication of the RCRA claim in the instant action, and

vice-versa. Different legal standards, however, do not control the inquiry, but rather whether

they are the same rights or interests at issue in both actions. Adams, 487 F.3d at 690 (finding

that rights and interests would be destroyed or impaired in related actions arising out of a

disputed employment background investigation, where the same issues relating to the legality of

reopening the plaintiff-employee’s background investigation were raised in both actions, with

no discussion of the differences between the legal theories in each action). For example, a

finding that the dams run by PacifiCorp in fact contributed to the growth of blue-green algae

and the associated toxin microcystin would be common to the causation elements of both the

RCRA claims in the instant action as well as the nuisance causes of action in the McConnell

action.

(3) Substantially the Same Evidence Presented.

The evidence will be substantially the same in both actions, as the evidence in both

actions will focus on the presence, causes, and effects of blue-green algae in the Klamath River. 

Plaintiffs concede that there will be “overlapping evidence . . . relating to concentration,

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volume, and discharge locations of the microcystin algae and the associated toxin, as well as

impacts to human health and the environment from those discharges” (Opp. 7). 

Additionally, the McConnell plaintiffs argued in their motion to consider whether the

McConnell action and the instant action should be related that the evidence would be

substantially similar in the two actions and thus the same judge should hear both cases

(C 07-02382 WHA, Dkt. 60 (emphasis added)): 

Whether Microcystis aeruginosa and microcystin toxin are

pollutants causing environmental degradation that is harming

Plaintiffs is the central factual issue in each case. Thus, the Judge

in each case will be presented with substantially similar

information on these pollutants. . . . The legal issues presented in

each case are unique. However, as explained above, the factual

issues are so closely related that a factual determination in one

case may conflict with a factual determination in a second case.

Thus, by plaintiffs’ own concessions, as well as by the McConnell plaintiffs’

explanation, it is clear that the evidence in the two actions will be substantially the same. 

The argument that the evidence required to prove the claims in each case will be substantially

different is unpersuasive. The relevant inquiry is whether the evidence will be substantially the

same, not whether the legal standards are the same, in the two actions. The argument that the

standing and subject-matter jurisdiction requirements in each case will be different is likewise

unpersuasive. Although standing and subject-matter jurisdiction must be established in each of

the suits, such inquiries have little effect on the bulk of the evidence.

(4) Involving Infringement of the Same Right.

The two actions involve infringement of the same rights, as both actions pertain to

PacifiCorp’s liability for allegedly polluting the Klamath River by operating dams that allegedly

raise water temperatures above natural levels and thereby promote the growth of blue-green

algae (Microcystis aeruginosa) and the associated toxin microsystin, as well as plaintiffs’ and

the public’s right to a clean and uncontaminated river. This order finds plaintiffs’ conclusory

statements that, because the two actions involve different legal theories, the same rights are not

at issue to be unpersuasive.

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B. Same Remedy.

In the McConnell action, plaintiffs sought both injunctive relief and money damages

(C 07-02382 WHA, Dkt. 1). The August 16 order, however, dismissed the claims for injunctive

relief, finding that the Federal Power Act preempted plaintiffs’ state-law claims for injunctive

relief (ibid.). In the instant action, plaintiffs seek both injunctive relief and civil penalties under

the RCRA (Compl. at pages 20–21). Plaintiffs argue that, because injunctive relief is not

available in the McConnell action, the remedies sought in the two actions are not the same. 

This argument is unpersuasive. A claim for injunctive relief began with the McConnell case

and met its fate. That was via a court order. It is true that the McConnell action no longer

portends injunctive relief, and that the current RCRA action was provoked by that circumstance

(Opp. 5). This difference in available remedies weighs against dismissing the instant action and

in favor of consolidating the two actions. 

C. Same Parties.

In the instant action, five of the eight McConnell plaintiffs brought suit against the same

defendant, PacifiCorp. Although three of the McConnell plaintiffs are not parties to this suit,

the parties are nonetheless the same for the purposes of claim preclusion because all of the

parties to the instant action are parties to the McConnell action. Plaintiffs do not contend

otherwise, and in fact the McConnell plaintiffs concede that the actions have the same parties

(C 07-02382 WHA, Dkt. 60).

2. APPROPRIATE RELIEF.

Although the instant action is duplicative of the McConnell action, the question remains

what is the appropriate relief. District courts have broad discretion to control their dockets. 

After determining an action is duplicative of an earlier-filed action, and after weighing the

equities of the case, a district court may use its discretion to dismiss the later-filed action, to

stay the action pending resolution of the previously-filed action, to enjoin the parties from

proceeding with the later-filed action, or to consolidate both actions. Adams, 487 F.3d at 688.

Subject to the undertaking described below, this order will consolidate this action with

the earlier-filed McConnell action and allow the RCRA claim to go forward. It is true that

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counsel should have moved for leave to amend the McConnell complaint by September 27, as

previously set forth in the August 16 case management order. After that date, leave to amend

the complaint could still have been granted but only with a showing of good cause. At the

hearing, plaintiffs’ counsel candidly admitted that they dropped the ball and let the deadline

pass, a result of miscommunication between the two firms handling the plaintiffs’ case. 

Ordinarily, this oversight would weigh against allowing a new claim. But the first action has

made only snail-like progress. No depositions have been taken. Counsel are still fighting over

interrogatories. The difference between allowing the claim to be added now versus last fall is

slight in terms of prejudice. Plaintiffs will stand by the existing case schedule. Because we

cannot rule out the possibility of prejudice from the delay, however, plaintiffs’ counsel (who

admit the snafu was their fault) should be responsible for all reasonable defense costs and fees

attributable to the delay. This does not mean they should pay all expenses for defending the

new claim, but they should be responsible for all incremental costs and fees incurred by reason

of the two-and-a-half month delay. The accounting for such costs and fees shall be at the end of

the case. Defense counsel should keep records in such a way as to make the accounting

practical. This obligation of counsel, of course, should not be traded off against any settlement

achieved for the named plaintiffs.

If within seven calendar days all plaintiffs’ counsel sign and file a written undertaking to

be jointly and severally responsible for all such incremental costs and fees attributable to the

delay, then consolidation shall be allowed. One signature per plaintiffs’ firm will be adequate. 

In that event, the new complaint shall be deemed consolidated with C 07-02382 WHA and

defendant’s answer or response thereto shall be due on March 13, 2008. In that event, the

master file shall be C 07-02382 WHA and all filings should be made only in that action, and

shall be deemed to apply in both actions, using the above caption for this order. If plaintiffs’

counsel do not so agree, then this action shall be dismissed. The case schedule shall remain

unchanged subject only to a motion to amend by the defense, which motion should be made, if

at all, within 28 days.

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CONCLUSION

For all of the above-stated reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED. 

The instant action is hereby consolidated with C 07-02382 WHA, subject to the undertaking

discussed above. This being provisional only, this order shall be filed in both actions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 22, 2008. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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