Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01772/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01772-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Labor/Mgmnt. Relations

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Although Defendant was evidently sued erroneously as Johnson

Control World Services, Inc., rather than as IAP World Services,

Inc., the parties consistently refer to Defendant as "Johnson" or

"Johnson Control," and so will the Court for the purposes of this

Order. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OLANDO GRAVES,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JOHNSON CONTROL WORLD SERVICES,

INC. et al.,

Defendants.

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. C-05-1772 SC

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT'S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Olando Graves ("Plaintiff" or "Graves") filed this

action on July 29, 2004 in the Superior Court for Alameda County,

asserting five causes of action against Defendant Johnson Control

World Services, Inc.1 ("Defendant" or "Johnson Control") stemming

from Defendant's alleged racial discrimination against Plaintiff

during Plaintiff's employment with Johnson Control from September

1999 to June 2003. Defendant removed the action to Federal

District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), and now moves for

summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 62 Filed 03/13/06 Page 1 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 This is because the memorandum states that the extension of

the initial probationary period was to last 90 days, yet the

memorandum also states that the extension was to commence on

January 24, 2000 and conclude on May 30, 2000. See Nalley Decl. ¶4

2

("FRCP"). For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant's motion is

hereby GRANTED and JUDGMENT entered in its favor. 

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, an African-American male, began his employment

with Defendant in September 1999 as an alarm technician. See

Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment

at 1 ("Def.'s Mem."). Upon his hiring, Plaintiff signed documents

entitled (1) "Johnson Controls Acknowledgment of a Drug-Free

Workplace"; (2) "Informed Consent and Release of Liability"; and

(3) "Conditions of Employment." See Declaration of Stan Nalley 

¶4 Exhibits 1-3 ("Nalley Decl."). In accordance with Defendant's

companywide policy, the first 90 days of Plaintiff's employment

were considered a training and probationary period. See Nalley

Decl. ¶5. At the conclusion of Plaintiff's initial probationary

period, however, Defendant renewed the probationary period for a

second 90-day period. See id. Exhibit 4 ("Ex."). According to a

January 20, 2000 memorandum addressed to Plaintiff, Defendant's

reasons for reinitiating the probationary period included

Plaintiff's persistent tardiness, failure to communicate with

supervisors, and perceived abuse of sick leave and vacation time. 

See id. Plaintiff apparently satisfied the conditions of his

second probationary period, although it is not clear from

Defendant's January 20, 2000 memorandum when that period was to

have ended.2

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 62 Filed 03/13/06 Page 2 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Ex. 4. 

3

On June 8, 2000, Graves was suspended from work for three

days and placed on "Conditional Employment status" for a period of

six months as a result of an alleged failure to follow company

"lockout/tagout" procedures that were required of employees

responding to alarm malfunctions. See id. Ex. 5. Graves, in

contrast, asserts that he was not the employee responsible for

executing those procedures with respect to the alarm malfunction

at issue, and alternatively contends that a supervisory employee

refused to instruct Plaintiff on the particulars of the

lockout/tagout procedures even after that employee had assigned

Plaintiff to perform the lockout/tagout tasks. See Plaintiff's

Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at 3

("Pl.'s Mem."); Declaration of Olando Graves ¶10 ("Graves Decl.").

On January 20, 2003, Defendant changed its drug testing

policy to mandate a drug test of any employee involved in a

reportable accident. See Nalley Decl., Ex. 12-13. While the

parties dispute the severity of events that took place on and

around June 4, 2003, both Plaintiff and Defendant agree that

Graves responded to a trouble call that morning, and that during

the course of his activities, water splashed in Plaintiff's eye. 

See Graves Decl. ¶¶ 3, 6; Def.'s Mem. at 6. The parties further

agree that shortly thereafter, Plaintiff notified his supervisor,

Mike Turpin, of the status of the trouble call. Id. Although

Plaintiff insists that he was not reporting an accident when he

mentioned during that call that water had splashed in his eye and

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 62 Filed 03/13/06 Page 3 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

was burning, see Pl.'s Mem. at 4, Defendant evidently considered

Plaintiff's mention of a "bad" burning in his eye and his

speculation that the liquid in his eye might have contained acid

to be a report of a work-related accident. See Nalley Decl. ¶ 20. 

Accordingly, Defendant asked Graves to visit the medical clinic to

have his eye checked out by Defendant's medical staff. See

Declaration of Jill Moudy ¶3 ("Moudy Decl."). While there,

Defendant sought to administer a drug test to Plaintiff in

accordance with Defendant's company policy, however Plaintiff

refused. Id. ¶4. When subsequent efforts to perform the drug

test were rebuffed, Plaintiff was dismissed from his position with

Johnson Control for refusing to comply with company policy. 

Nalley Decl. ¶22. 

Graves asserts that he was not notified of the change in

company drug-testing policy, that an unnamed clinic receptionist

told him that supervisory personnel had made a special request

that Graves be tested for controlled substances, and that other,

non-African-American employees were not drug tested following

work-related accidents. See Pl.'s Mem. at 4. Graves has not

provided any evidence to substantiate these claims, however,

outside of his own declaration.

In addition to the foregoing, Graves has set forth a number

of allegations in the Complaint that he contends evidence

Defendant's anti-African-American animus. For example, Graves

alleges that (1) Defendant provided more comprehensive training to

other, non-African-American employees, and then used the lack of

training provided to Plaintiff as a reason for denying him

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 62 Filed 03/13/06 Page 4 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

promotions; (2) Defendant denied Plaintiff a promotion to the

position of Level II alarm technician because of his race; 

(3) Defendant took certain higher-paying work away from Plaintiff

and assigned it to other non-African-American employees; 

(4) Defendant refused to give Plaintiff a key to a certain area

because of his race even though keys were provided to other, nonAfrican-American employees; (5) Defendant stopped giving Plaintiff

"lead pay" for his role as the lead technician in responding to

service calls because of his race; (6) Defendant changed its

policy with respect to compensation known as "call back pay" but

selectively enforced its new policy against Plaintiff while

failing to enforce it against other, non-African-American

employees; and (7) Defendant refused to offer Plaintiff certain

training provided to all Level II technicians despite Plaintiff's

request to receive such training. Complaint ¶¶ 27-38 ("Compl."). 

Aside from the allegations contained in the Complaint and repeated

in Plaintiff's declaration, however, no evidence has been set

forth to substantiate any of these claims. 

Graves filed an administrative complaint with the California

Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH") in August 2003,

alleging that Johnson Control discriminated against him because of

his race by terminating his employment. See Deposition of Olando

Graves, Ex. 2 ("Graves Depo."). Graves filed a second

administrative complaint with DFEH in April 2004, which made the

same allegations yet included the claim that he was discriminated

against with respect to his lack of training. See id., Ex. 1. 

DFEH issued right to sue letters dated July 29, 2003, and August

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 62 Filed 03/13/06 Page 5 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

2, 2004. Compl., Ex. A; Graves Decl., Ex. D. 

Discovery has been completed and the matter is set for trial

beginning April 3, 2006. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine issue of fact exists when the

non-moving party produces evidence on which a reasonable trier of

fact could find in its favor viewing the record as a whole in

light of the evidentiary burden the law places on that party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252-56 (1986). 

However, the adverse party may not rest upon the mere

allegations or denials of his or her pleadings, and rather must

present admissible evidence showing there is a genuine issue for

trial. See Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044,

1049 (9th Cir. 1995). Summary judgment is therefore appropriate

against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to the party's

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial." Celotex 477 U.S. at 322-23. The more implausible the

claim or defense asserted by the opposing party, the more

persuasive its evidence must be to avoid summary judgment, see

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.

574, 587 (1986), but "[t]he evidence of the non-moving party is to

be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 62 Filed 03/13/06 Page 6 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 Although the Court reviewed the argument and authority

presented with respect to Johnson Control's statute of limitations

defense, the Court finds that it is not necessary to render a

decision as to that defense given the Court's analysis as set forth

herein. Accordingly, the Court expresses no opinion as to the

validity of a defense based on the statute of limitations.

7

favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

IV. DISCUSSION

Graves has alleged five bases for relief: (1)discrimination

in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act,

Cal. Gov. Code § 12940 et seq.; (2) termination, discipline, or

demotion in violation of public policy; (3) breach of implied

and/or express contract of continued employment; (4) breach of

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and 

(5) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Compl. ¶¶ 11-

69. Johnson Control has asserted a variety of defenses in its

motion, including defenses based on the statute of limitations,3

inability to demonstrate disparate treatment or adverse employment

action, inability to prove the existence of a contract

guaranteeing employment, and inability to prove that Defendant's

conduct was beyond all bounds of decency. Plaintiff has filed an

opposition to Defendant's motion. 

A. California Fair Employment and Housing Act

The California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA")

prohibits discrimination against a person based on race in

connection with the "terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment." Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a). Although the law does

not speak to the question of precisely which terms and conditions

of employment are covered, courts have interpreted the language of

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 62 Filed 03/13/06 Page 7 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

the statute to mean that the alleged discrimination must

constitute an "adverse employment action," where changes in the

terms of employment are "substantial and detrimental." Horsford

v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ., 132 Cal. App. 4th 359,

373 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); see Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 36

Cal. 4th 1028, 1054-55 (Cal. 2005). As the Supreme Court of

California recently noted, "adverse treatment that is reasonably

likely to impair a reasonable employee's job performance or

prospects for advancement or promotion falls within the reach of

the antidiscrimination provisions of sections 12940(a) and

12940(h)." Yanowitz, 35 Cal. 4th at 1055. 

In assessing claims brought under FEHA, California courts

have looked to the framework established by Federal Courts

applying federal antidiscrimination laws. See Guz v. Bechtel

National, Inc., 100 Cal. 4th 317, 354 (Cal. 2000). In particular,

California courts have adopted the three-stage burden-shifting

test for weighing claims of disparate treatment as set forth by

the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Id. That test requires a plaintiff

to first establish a prima facie case of discrimination, which

will generally require evidence sufficient to support a finding

that "(1) the plaintiff was a member of a protected class; (2) he

was qualified for the position he sought or was performing

competently in the position he held; (3) he suffered an adverse

employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an

available job; and (4) some other circumstance suggests

discriminatory motive." Id. at 355. The burden then shifts to

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 62 Filed 03/13/06 Page 8 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 9

the employer to provide evidence that its action was taken for a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Id. at 355-56. If the

employer is successful in making that showing, the burden then

shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the stated reason is a

mere pretext, or to offer additional evidence of discriminatory

motive. Id. at 356.

At the summary judgment stage, the "burden is reversed,"

meaning that the defendant bears the initial burden of

demonstrating that the action has no merit. See Martin v.

Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 29 Cal. App. 4th 1718, 1730-31

(Cal. Ct. App. 1994). In practice, an employer will meet its

burden by "present[ing] admissible evidence either that one or

more of plaintiff's prima facie elements is lacking, or that the

adverse employment action was based on legitimate,

nondiscriminatory factors." See Caldwell v. Paramount Unified

School Dist., 41 Cal. App. 4th 189, 203 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). In

such situations, summary judgment for the employer will be

appropriate unless the plaintiff is able to "demonstrate a triable

issue by producing substantial evidence that the employer's stated

reasons were untrue or pretextual, or that the employer acted with

a discriminatory animus, such that a reasonable trier of fact

could conclude that the employer engaged in intentional

discrimination or other unlawful action." See Cucuzza v. City of

Santa Clara, 104 Cal. App. 4th 1031, 1038 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)

(emphasis original). To carry that burden, the plaintiff must

produce "substantial responsive evidence." Hanson v. Lucky

Stores, Inc., 74 Cal. App. 4th 215, 224 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 62 Filed 03/13/06 Page 9 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 10

quoting Lockheed Missles, 29 Cal. App. 4th at 1735. 

In this case, the Court finds that Johnson Control has met

its burden of providing evidence to demonstrate either that its

actions were taken because of legitimate, non-discriminatory

reasons, or that the action or decision Plaintiff complains of is

not substantial enough to constitute an "adverse employment

action." In contrast, the Plaintiff has submitted no evidence

whatsoever outside of his own declaration that would establish

that Defendant's proffered non-discriminatory reasons are

pretextual, and has not introduced any other evidence that

supports, even circumstantially, his theory that his former

employer's decisions were the product of a discriminatory motive.

i. Extended Probationary Periods 

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant's decision to terminate his

employment on two occasions - decisions that were subsequently

reversed - and place him on extended probationary periods

constituted discrimination. See Compl. ¶¶ 24-26. However,

Defendant has proffered evidence showing that the reasons for

taking disciplinary action were not discriminatory, but rather

were motivated by Defendant's concern over Plaintiff's

professional performance, specifically his persistent tardiness,

perceived abuse of vacation and sick leave, and a failure to

follow applicable safety procedures. See Nalley Decl. ¶¶ 5-6, 

Ex. 4-5. In response, Plaintiff has not introduced evidence

demonstrating that Defendant's reasons are pretextual, but rather

has chosen to rely on bald assertions that "the first employment

issue...began as a discharge proceeding based on false and

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 62 Filed 03/13/06 Page 10 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 11

unfounded accusations of absenteeism and tardiness," and "[the

suspension and second probationary period] was given to me for

something that I did not do and for which I was not responsible." 

Graves Decl. ¶¶ 9-10. However, aside from these statements,

Plaintiff has not referred the Court to any deposition, document,

or other piece of evidence that would help substantiate his claim. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to carry

his burden under the shifting approach set forth in McDonnell

Douglass and as implemented by Caldwell and Cacuzza, and that

these two disciplinary proceedings do not therefore lend any

support to his claim that he was the victim of unlawful

discrimination.

ii. Failure to Provide Training

Similarly, Plaintiff claims that Defendant refused to provide

Plaintiff with different types of professional training, including

training on a "card access system" and specific training for 

Level II technicians. See Compl. ¶¶ 27-28, 38. With respect to

Plaintiff's claim that he received less training than other

similarly situated non-African-American employees, Defendant has

proffered records demonstrating that Johnson Control paid more for

Defendant's off-site training than for other non-African-American

employees, and that Plaintiff attended at least as many training

classes as other non-African-American employees, if not more. See

Nalley Decl. ¶¶ 10-11 Ex. 7-10. As for Graves's claim that he did

not receive card access training, when presented with a record

that indicated he had been present at a training for "card key

field hardware installation/configuration" on March 5, 2002,

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 62 Filed 03/13/06 Page 11 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 12

Plaintiff testified that he was not sure whether that was the

training to which he referred in the Complaint. See Graves Depo.

at 151:7-21. Graves further testified that he does not know how

much training his co-workers received and how much money was spent

on their training. See id. at 152:3-23. Finally, with respect to

Plaintiff's claim that he did not receive training appropriate for

all Level II technicians, Plaintiff testified that he does not

know precisely how much training was provided to other Level II

technicians, and that, in fact, the information regarding time and

money spent on employee training is maintained by Defendant. See

id. at 152:3-154:4. Those records, however, demonstrate that

Plaintiff was accorded as much or more training time than other

non-African-American Level II technicians. See Nalley Decl. 

¶¶ 10-11, Ex. 7-10. Plaintiff further acknowledged that Defendant

had scheduled additional training for Plaintiff that was to take

place sometime after Plaintiff's employment was terminated in June

2003. See Graves Depo. at 145:15-17.

In response, Plaintiff has again not proffered evidence to

demonstrate that Defendant's nondiscriminatory reasons are

pretextual, but rather relies on a reiteration of the allegations

contained in the complaint and his assertion that, despite what

the official records show, Plaintiff did not spend more time in

training classes than his non-African-American peers. See Graves

Decl. ¶ 12. This assertion stands in some contrast to Plaintiff's

deposition testimony that Defendant is actually the entity that

would maintain records of time spent in training classes, but in

any event, is wholly insufficient to carry the burden imposed on

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 62 Filed 03/13/06 Page 12 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 13

Plaintiff following Defendant's evidentiary showing. Accordingly,

the Court finds that the purported lack of training offers no

support to Plaintiff's claim of discriminatory treatment.

iii. Promotion to Level II Technician

Plaintiff also alleges that he applied for a promotion to

Level II technician, but was denied the promotion because of his

race. Compl. ¶ 32. In response, Johnson Control has proffered

Plaintiff's deposition testimony demonstrating that he was awarded

the promotion after the employee originally promoted was

discharged. See Graves Depo. at 85:7-87:5. Additionally,

Plaintiff admits that, upon granting Graves the promotion,

Defendant caused the salary and seniority adjustments to be

retroactive, taking effect March 20, 2002, which coincided with

the approximate date on which Plaintiff informally expressed his

interest in the promotion. See id. at 85:22-86:1; see also Nalley

Decl., Ex. 6. 

In response, Plaintiff asserts that the promotion was granted

only because of his complaints of discrimination, and that he was

"forced to endure obstacles that were not imposed on...the

Caucasian man from outside the company who was first given the

position." Graves Decl. ¶ 11. Plaintiff has not identified what

"obstacles" were placed before him, and has not offered any

evidence that would substantiate his claim that Johnson Control

awarded him the promotion solely because of his complaints of

discrimination. In any event, however, Plaintiff admits that he

received the promotion, and that Defendant caused the benefits to

be retroactively effective. See Graves Depo. at 76:6-87:5. Given

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 62 Filed 03/13/06 Page 13 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 14

these facts, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not proffered any

evidence tending to show that Defendant's actions were

discriminatory, and further finds that Defendant's actions do not

rise to the level of an adverse employment action as a matter of

law. See Yanowitz, 35 Cal. 4th at 1055. Accordingly, Plaintiff's

allegations with respect to his promotion to Level II technician

do not offer any support to his FEHA claim.

iv. Refusal to Provide Plaintiff With a Key

Similarly, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant refused to

provide Plaintiff with a key to certain areas that remained

locked, and that Defendant provided a key to other, non-AfricanAmerican employees. Compl. ¶ 34. However, Plaintiff has not

supported this allegation with any evidence, nor explained why the

denial of a key to certain areas constituted an adverse employment

action within the meaning of that term as it has been defined by

California courts. Those decisions make clear that, in order to

be actionable, an employer's action must have a "substantial and

material adverse effect on the terms and conditions of the

plaintiff's employment." Akers v. County of San Diego, 95 Cal.

App. 4th 1441, 1456 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). Decisions that amount

to "a mere inconvenience or alteration of job responsibilities"

are generally not actionable under FEHA. See Thomas v. Department

of Corrections, 77 Cal. App. 4th 507, 511 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 

Because Plaintiff has not even alleged that the denial of a key

adversely affected the terms or conditions of his employment, and

because the Court finds that such action, even if proved, does not

rise to the "substantial and material adverse effect" standard,

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 62 Filed 03/13/06 Page 14 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 15

this allegation does not lend support to Plaintiff's claim.

v. Defendant's Policy Regarding Delivery Order Work, Lead

Pay, and Call Back Pay

Graves has also alleged that Defendant discriminated against

him with respect to (1) assigning higher-paying delivery order

work; (2) designating employees to serve as the "technical lead"

on calls, thereby qualifying them to receive "lead pay," and (3)

by selectively enforcing its policy with respect to computation of

"call back" pay. Compl. ¶¶ 33, 35-37. In response, Defendant has

set forth legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the changes in

policy, and has proffered evidence demonstrating that other, nonAfrican-American employees were treated equally or less favorably

than Plaintiff. 

For instance, with respect to assignment of delivery order

work, Defendant asserts that a decision was made, as a company

policy, to shift responsibility for that work from the Trouble

Call and Preventative Maintenance Department to the Engineering

Department. See Nalley Decl. ¶¶ 13-14. Defendant has further

proffered a comparison of the delivery order hours worked between

Plaintiff and three other technicians in the Trouble Call

department. Id. That comparison demonstrates that Plaintiff

worked significantly more delivery order hours from the time of

the reorganization to the time of his termination than any of his

three co-workers, at least two of whom are Caucasian. Id. In

response, Plaintiff has contested whether two of the co-workers

used in Defendant's comparison of delivery order hours worked were

working in the same department as Plaintiff during the relevant

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 62 Filed 03/13/06 Page 15 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 16

period, but has not alleged that they were subject to a different

policy with respect to assignment of delivery order work,

regardless of when they started. See Graves Decl. ¶ 13. 

Furthermore, Graves has not challenged the hours comparison

proffered by Defendant, nor has he challenged the fact that a

policy shift occurred within Johnson Control regarding the manner

in which delivery order work was to be assigned. While Graves

maintains that delivery order work was "taken away [from him] as a

result of [his] race," he has failed to direct the Court to any

evidence, direct or circumstantial, that would support this

allegation.

With respect to lead pay policy, Defendant has proffered

evidence showing that its policy concerning the assignment of

technical leads was changed in December 2002. See Nalley Decl. 

¶ 15, Ex. 11. Defendant has further proffered evidence to

demonstrate that other, non-African-American employees were

subjected to the policy. See Nalley Decl. ¶ 16. In response,

Plaintiff has chosen not to introduce any evidence demonstrating

pretext or other discriminatory motive, but rather relies on his

bald assertion that "the reason [the lead pay policy] was changed

was because of me and in a further successful effort to reduce my

pay because of my race." Graves Decl. ¶ 15. At this stage of the

proceedings, however, reliance on bald, unsupported assertions are

wholly insufficient to meet the burden imposed on the plaintiff

following a defendant's successful showing of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. See Cucuzza, 104 Cal. App.

4th at 1038; Hanson, 74 Cal. App. 4th at 224. Accordingly,

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 62 Filed 03/13/06 Page 16 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 17

Plaintiff's allegation that Defendant's change in lead pay policy

was discriminatory lends no support to his claim.

Similarly, with respect to call back pay policies, Johnson

Control issued a clarification of company policy in December 2002. 

See Nalley Decl. ¶ 17, Ex. 12. Defendant has set forth a raceneutral reason for the clarification - to prevent abuses and

eliminate ambiguity - and has further asserted that the policy

affected up to fifteen employees of all different races at any

given point after the update. Id. Furthermore, Plaintiff himself

asserted that the only manner in which the policy clarification

affected his employment was by requiring him to report arrival and

departure times to a designated entity. See Graves Depo. 122:1-9.

In response, Plaintiff asserts only that the "reason [the

call back policy] was changed was because of me and in a further

successful effort to reduce my pay because of my race." Graves

Decl. ¶ 16. Even aside from the fact that Plaintiff again has not

bothered to introduce any evidence to refute Defendant's showing

of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action, the

Court finds that the change in call back policy does not

constitute an adverse employment action because it does not rise

to the level of having a "substantial and material adverse effect

on the terms and conditions of the plaintiff's employment." See

Akers, 95 Cal. App. 4th at 1456. Accordingly, Plaintiff's

allegation with respect to Defendant's change in call back

policies does not support Plaintiff's claim.

//

//

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 62 Filed 03/13/06 Page 17 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 18

vi. Defendant's June 2003 Termination of Plaintiff

Finally, Plaintiff claims that Defendant discriminated

against him by wrongfully terminating his employment following

Defendant's refusal to submit to a drug test. Compl. ¶¶ 42-43. 

While Plaintiff acknowledges that Defendant changed its drug

testing policy to broaden the circumstances in which an employee

could be tested, see Compl. ¶ 42, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant

intentionally failed to notify Plaintiff of the change because of

his race, and that, in any event, the circumstances that required

Plaintiff to visit the company medical clinic on June 4, 2003, did

not constitute a "work related injury" such that a mandatory drug

test would be triggered under the terms of the revised policy. 

See Compl. ¶ 43.

In response, Defendant has proffered evidence demonstrating

that the revised drug testing policy was placed in effect,

company-wide, on January 20, 2003. See Nalley Decl. ¶ 19, Ex. 13. 

Johnson Control asserts that the policy was posted in areas

accessed by employees, and that the terms of the policy were

discussed with employees. Id. According to Defendant, the two

voice messages Plaintiff left for his supervisor notifying him of

the status of the trouble call Plaintiff was responding to on the

morning of June 4, 2003, constituted a report of a work-related

injury because, Defendant asserts, Plaintiff related that a

liquid, possibly containing acid, splashed in his eye and was

causing substantial irritation. See Declaration of Mike Turpin ¶¶

4-5 Ex. 1. In accordance with the revised drug policy, Defendant

insisted that Plaintiff submit to a test for controlled

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 62 Filed 03/13/06 Page 18 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 19

substances, and following Plaintiff's repeated refusals, decided

to terminate Plaintiff's employment after a review of Plaintiff's

actions was conducted by a human resources employee and the

General Manager. See id. ¶ 21. Defendant has further proffered

evidence demonstrating that other, non-African-American employees

have been required to submit to drug tests following a wide

variety of workplace accidents. See Declaration of Jill Moudy ¶ 9

Ex. 2-6 ("Moudy Decl.")(documenting drug tests following a finger

injury, lower back strain, and a bug bite).

In response, Graves asserts that Defendant's initial request

that Plaintiff submit to a drug test was not the result of

adherence to company policy, but rather was undertaken upon

special request of the Manager of the Environmental Health,

Quality and Safety Department. Graves Decl. ¶ 18. Graves

contends that his source of information on this point was the

receptionist at the clinic, yet for reasons unknown to this Court,

Plaintiff evidently declined to seek a sworn declaration from the

receptionist to substantiate this assertion, and apparently did

not take her deposition. Plaintiff has not proffered any evidence

that would challenge Defendant's documentation with respect to the

effective date of the revised drug testing policy, its

requirements, or Defendant's contention that drug tests were

administered to employees of different races following a variety

of workplace accidents and injuries.

Once again, Graves has chosen to forego the traditional

method of defeating a motion for summary judgment - that of

proffering evidence that creates material issues of fact

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 62 Filed 03/13/06 Page 19 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 20

appropriate for resolution at trial - in favor of exclusive

reliance on his own declaration, which is comprised of assertions

based on Plaintiff's own beliefs yet devoid of any reference to

actual evidence that might support his contentions. While such

allegations may well suffice to defeat a motion to dismiss, this

matter is long past that stage - indeed, discovery has closed -

and it is time for the Court to examine what genuine issues of

material fact have been generated by clashes in the evidence on

record. Because Plaintiff has utterly failed to marshal any kind

of evidence that would tend to support his allegations, even

circumstantially or inferentially, the Court finds that there are

no genuine issues of fact for trial, and that Defendant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's FEHA claim.

B. Violation of Public Policy

Graves has alleged that Defendant's actions, detailed above,

constitute a violation of the public policy of the State of

California. Compl. ¶¶ 45-53. Plaintiff relies on Article I,

Section 8 of the California State Constitution as furnishing the

legal basis for his claim. Id. ¶ 52. That section prohibits

"disqualif[ying] [a person] from entering or pursuing a business,

profession, vocation, or employment because of sex, race, creed,

color, or national or ethnic origin." CAL. CONST. art. I § 8.

However, because Plaintiff has not alleged any additional

facts or set forth any evidence specific to his claim for a

violation of public policy, the Court's analysis of Graves's FEHA

claim indicates that there are no genuine issues of material fact

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 62 Filed 03/13/06 Page 20 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 21

with respect to Plaintiff's Second claim that would warrant

preservation for trial. Cf. Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 74 Cal.

App. 4th 215, 229 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that "because

[plaintiff's] FEHA claim fails, his claim for wrongful termination

in violation of public policy fails."). Although a claim for

violation of public policy could theoretically implicate different

substantive or procedural elements than claims brought under FEHA,

the point remains that, at bottom, Plaintiff bears the burden of

proffering some evidence that would rebut Defendant's evidentiary

showing, thereby creating a genuine issue of fact precluding

summary judgment. As set forth in Section A, supra, this Court

finds that Defendant has set forth evidence either demonstrating

legitimate, race-neutral reasons for its actions, or has

introduced proof that Plaintiff was not treated less favorably

than other, similarly-situated non-African-American employees. In

response, Plaintiff has not proffered evidence that would create a

dispute for resolution at trial, but rather has relied on his own

declaration, which is rife with allegations of improper racial

motive behind Defendant's actions, yet devoid of any reference to

other evidence, of any kind, that would support these allegations.

At this stage of the proceedings, and where Defendant has set

forth a great deal of evidence negating essential elements of

Plaintiff's case, exclusive reliance on a declaration of

Plaintiff's own opinion disputing Defendant's evidence is plainly

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 62 Filed 03/13/06 Page 21 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 22

insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact. See FRCP 56(e)

("an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations and

denials of the adverse party's pleading, but...by affidavits or as

otherwise provided...must set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial."). Accordingly, the Court

finds that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment in its favor

on Plaintiff's claim for violation of public policy.

C. Breach of Implied and/or Express Contract of Continued

Employment and Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair

Dealing

Plaintiff's Third and Fourth claims assert that Defendant's

allegedly discriminatory conduct violated a contract of continued

employment and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 

Compl. ¶¶ 55-64. 

In response, Defendant has set forth evidence demonstrating

that, upon beginning his employment with Johnson Control, Graves

signed a "Conditions of Employment" letter, which provided that:

No employment contract exists between the Company and me and

nothing in this document, any Company policy, Standard

Practice Instruction (SPI), handbook, or any other Company

document implies that any contract exists. No supervisor,

manager, or other representative of the company, other than

the President or the President's designee, has the authority

to enter into any agreement for employment for any specified

period of time. Either the Company or I may terminate the

employment relationship, at any time, without notice.

Graves Depo. at 189:17-190:12, Ex. 17. Plaintiff does not contend

that any other document provided that he could only be terminated

for cause, but rather asserts that a human resources employee

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 62 Filed 03/13/06 Page 22 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 The Court is aware that Plaintiff was a member of a union

with which Johnson Control entered into a Collective Bargaining

Agreement ("CBA"). That agreement certainly affected the terms and

conditions of employment, however, Plaintiff does not and cannot

assert that his Fourth claim for breach of implied covenant of good

faith and fair dealing is based on Defendant's breach of the CBA,

as that agreement designates a specific and exclusive procedure for

resolution of grievances. In fact, Plaintiff has already filed a

23

responsible for Plaintiff's orientation mentioned to him that his

employment could only be terminated for just cause. See Graves

Depo. at 130:13-131:3. However, Plaintiff does not assert that

Defendant's President or his designee ever entered into an

agreement with him that would modify the terms of the Conditions

of Employment letter, and, in any event, as the Court has noted

above, Plaintiff's termination occurred because of his refusal to

submit to a drug test as provided for by Defendant's internal

policies. Accordingly, for both of these reasons, the Court finds

that Defendant has negated an essential element of Plaintiff's

Third claim, and that Defendant is therefore entitled to summary

judgment in its favor on that claim.

Similarly, Plaintiff's Fourth claim for relief is based on

Defendant's alleged failure to "perform the terms and conditions

of the agreement fairly and in good faith." Compl. ¶ 61. 

However, because Plaintiff cannot establish that the parties ever

entered into an agreement concerning the terms and conditions of

employment other than the "Conditions of Employment" letter

discussed above, Plaintiff cannot establish that Johnson Control

failed to carry out its obligations in good faith.4 Rather, the

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 62 Filed 03/13/06 Page 23 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

motion to remand in this case, in which Plaintiff specifically

argued that his Fourth claim is not based on the CBA, and does not

even require interpretation of the terms of that agreement. See

Docket #6 at 2. Plaintiff has apparently already exhausted his

remedies under the CBA.

24

evidence on record demonstrates that Defendant acted within its

authority in terminating Plaintiff's employment for refusing to

submit to a drug test following the June 4, 2003 incident. As

discussed above, Plaintiff's failure to introduce any evidence to

refute the record established by Defendant renders judgment as a

matter of law in Defendant's favor appropriate.

D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Plaintiff's Fifth claim is for intentional infliction of

emotional distress. Compl. ¶¶ 65-69. Aside from realleging the

facts already set forth in other sections of the complaint,

Plaintiff additionally asserts that Defendant was aware that

Plaintiff was in a vulnerable position; that Defendant occupied a

much stronger bargaining position with respect to Plaintiff; and

that Defendant deprived Plaintiff of his feeling of self-worth and

security even though Defendant was aware of Plaintiff's weakened

position. Id. Plaintiff claims that Defendant's conduct was

outrageous and intentional, and that it was beyond all bounds of

decency. Id. ¶ 68.

In response, Johnson Control argues that Graves cannot

prevail on this cause of action because, as a matter of law,

personnel management decisions are not "outrageous conduct beyond

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 62 Filed 03/13/06 Page 24 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 25

the bounds of human decency." Def.'s Mem. at 21, quoting Janken

v. GM Hughes Electronics, et al., 46 Cal. App. 4th 55, 80 (Cal.

Ct. App. 1996). The court in Janken went on to note that the

remedy for personnel management decisions, even where improperly

motivated, is "a suit against the employer for discrimination." 

46 Cal. App. 4th at 80. 

However, Defendant overstates the reach of the Court's

decision in Janken to the extent that it argues that any decision

affecting personnel management is not actionable under an

intentional infliction of emotional distress theory, no matter

what the motivation. See Def.'s Mem. at 21. That proposition is

far too broad for the Janken decision to bear, and, in fact,

courts considering intentional infliction of emotional distress

claims have clearly ruled that such claims can be brought where

the "distress is engendered by an employer's illegal

discriminatory practices." Accardi v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.

App. 4th 341, 353 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), disapproved on other

grounds by Richard v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 26 Cal. 4th 798 

(Cal. 2001); see also Hamilton v. Signature Flight Support Corp.,

No. C-05-409, 2005 WL 1514127 at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2005).

In order to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress, the conduct must be extreme and outrageous and

beyond all bounds of human decency. See 5 Witkin, Summary of

California Law, Torts § 451 (10th Ed. 2005). In this case, Graves

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 62 Filed 03/13/06 Page 25 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 26

has alleged illegal conduct motivated by improper racial

discrimination, which, if substantiated, could theoretically rise

to the level to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress. However, as explained above, Graves has done

nothing to counter Defendant's evidence that either demonstrates

race-neutral reasons for its conduct or proves that Graves was not

treated differently than other, non-African-American employees. 

Because Defendant's evidence refuting charges of discriminatory

conduct is unrebutted, the Court concludes that Defendant's

actions were not extreme and outrageous and beyond the bounds of

human decency, but were rather reasonable and proper management

decisions not actionable through a claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress. See Janken, 46 Cal. App. 4th at

80. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to

summary judgment on this claim.

V. CONCLUSION

In this case, Plaintiff has simply failed to present any

evidence that could create a genuine issue of material fact for

resolution at trial. The Court GRANTS Defendant's motion and

enters JUDGMENT in Defendant's favor. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 13, 2006 ____________________________

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:05-cv-01772-SC Document 62 Filed 03/13/06 Page 26 of 26