Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02125/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02125-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 05:552 Freedom of Information Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PENIFOTI TAEOTUI,

CDCR #G-46032,

Civil No. 13cv2125 LAB (DHB)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTIONS TO PROCEED 

IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[ECF Doc. Nos. 2, 4] 

AND

(2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 

AND § 1915A(b)

[ECF Doc. No. 3]

vs.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY REGISTRAR OF

RECORDS DEPARTMENT,

Defendant.

Penifoti Taeotui (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Kern Valley State Prison

(“KVSP”) in Delano, California, and proceeding pro se, has initiated this civil action

seeking “federal injunctive relief” pursuant to the FreedomofInformation Act (“FOIA”),

5 U.S.C. § 552a, and FED.R.CIV.P. 60(b). 

Plaintiff seeks “to be released from prison,” on grounds that Rule 60(b)(5)

provides him with a mechanism by which he may “attack judgments already deemed

/ / /

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final.” See Amend. Compl. (ECF Doc. No. 3) at 2. While altogether unclear, it appears 1

Plaintiffseeks the disclosure of “criminal bond information” fromthe San Diego County

Registrar of Records related to the state court proceedings which resulted in his

conviction. Id. at 1, 3 (citing San Diego Superior Court Case No. SCN 222540).

Plaintiff has not prepaid the $400 civil filing fee required to commence a civil

action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead he has filed a Motion to Proceed In

Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF Doc. No. 2), as well as

a Supplemental Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF Doc. No. 4), which includes the certified

trust account certification required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).

I. MOTIONS TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite the plaintiff’s failure to prepay the

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entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, if the plaintiff is a

prisoner and is granted leave to proceed IFP, he nevertheless remains obligated to pay

the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir.

2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”), a prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must also submit a “certified copy

of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the six-month

Plaintiff submitted an Amended Complaint (ECF Doc. No. 3) as a matter of course 1

pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 15(a)(1) before the Court had an opportunity to screen his original

pleading. While an amended pleading supersedes the original, both Plaintiff’s original

Complaint (ECF Doc. No. 1) and his Amended Complaint (ECF Doc. No. 3) are identical. See

Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989).

In addition to the $350 statutory fee, all parties filing civil actions on or after May 1, 2

2013, must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), (b); Judicial

Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule (eff. May 1, 2013). However,

the additional $50 administrative fee is waived if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP. 

Id.

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period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2);

Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account

statement, the Court must assess an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly

deposits in the account for the pastsix months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the

account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of

the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding

month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and forward

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(2).

In support of his IFP motions, Plaintiff has submitted the certified copies of his

trust account statements required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. 

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s trust account statements,

as well as the attached certificate of funds issued by a trust account official at KVSP

where he is currently incarcerated verifying his account history and available balances. 

Plaintiff’s statements show an average monthly balance of $5.89, average monthly

deposits of $49.49, and an available balance of $1.17 at the time it was submitted to the

Court for filing. Based on this financial information, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s

Motions to Proceed IFP (ECF Doc. Nos. 2, 4) and assesses an initial partial filing fee of

$9.89 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

However, the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation, or his designee, shall collect this initial fee only if sufficient funds in

Plaintiff’s account are available at the time this Order is executed pursuant to the

directions set forth below. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event

shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or

criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which

to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based

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solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is

ordered.”). The remaining balance of the $350 total owed in this case shall be collected

and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions

set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. INITIAL SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) AND 1915A(b)(1)

Notwithstanding IFP status or the payment of any partial filing fees, the PLRA

also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by

those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of,

sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these

provisions of the PLRA, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions

thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damagesfrom

defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v.

Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement ofthe claimshowing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.

The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. 

Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000)

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(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). 

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se,

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir.

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not, in

so doing, “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board

of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and

conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient

to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

A. Freedom of Information Act

Plaintiff first invokes jurisdiction in this case under the “Freedom of Information

Act” (FOIA) and pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B). See Amend. Compl. (ECF Doc.

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No. 3) at 1.

The FOIA “provides for the mandatory disclosure of information held by federal

agencies, unless the requested material is exempt from mandatory disclosure.” NLRB v.

Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 220-21 (1978). Upon request, FOIA

mandates disclosure of records held by a federal agency unlessthe documentsfall within

certain enumerated exemptions. Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective

Assoc., 532 U.S. 1, 8 (2001). 

In this case, Plaintiff’s attempt to seek injunctive relief under the FOIA against the

“San Diego County Registrar of Records Department” necessarily fails to state a claim

because the statute only applies to federal agencies. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(a)(1), 552(f). 

Neither the County of San Diego, the County Clerk, or the Clerk of Court, any of which

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), the district court has jurisdiction “to enjoin the 3

agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records

improperly held from the complainant.” 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B) (West 2010).

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might retain the “criminal bond information” Plaintiff seeks, is a federal agency. The 4

definition of “agency” under the FOIA simply does not encompass state agencies or

bodies, even if they are alleged to receive federal funds subject to federal regulation. See

St. Michael’sConvalescent Hosp. v. California, 643 F.2d 1369, 1373-74 (9thCir. 1981);

see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1) (providing that “‘agency’ as defined in section 551(1) of

this title includes any executive department, military department, Government

corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive

branch of the Government (including the Executive Office of the President), or any

independent regulatory agency.”); Hammerlord v. City of San Diego, 2012 WL 5388919

at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2012) (unpub.) (dismissing FOIA claims because “[n]either the

City of San Diego nor the SDPD (San Diego Police Dept.) is a federal agency.”). 

B. FED.R.CIV.P. 60(b)(4) & (5)

Plaintiff also cites FED.R.CIV.P. 60(b) as a basis for “discharg[ing] [him] from his

current ... obligation” and “releas[ing] [him] from prison.” See Amend. Compl. at 2. 

Rule 60 is a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that, under certain circumstances, can

provide a party in a federal civil action relief from a judgment or order. FED.R.CIV.P.

60(a), (b). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, by their own terms, apply only to civil

actions. See FED.R.CIV.P. 1 (stating that “these rules govern the procedure ... in all suits

of a civil nature”). “[A]n action under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure cannot be used to collaterally attack a criminal conviction.” Dubin v. Real,

191 Fed. Appx. 528, 530, 2006 WL 1876846 at *1 (9th Cir. 2006) (unpub. table disp.)

(noting that “[e]very circuit that has addressed the question has agreed that a defendant

may not bring an action for fraud upon the court to collaterally attack a criminal

Prior to amendment by the California legislature in 2002, Section 4, Art. VI of the 4

California Constitution provided that the “county clerk is ex officio clerk of the superior court

in the county.” See Zumwalt v. Superior Court of San I Diego, 49 Cal.3d 167, 175 (Cal. 1989)

(in bank) (citing former CAL. GOV’T CODE § 69898). Effective January 1, 2003, § 69898 was

superseded by CAL. GOV’T CODE § 69840, which relieved the county clerk of the “powers,

duties, and responsibilities required or permitted to be exercised by the county clerk in

connection with judicial actions, proceedings, and records” and vested those powers, duties, and

responsibilities in the clerk of court instead. See 2 WITKIN, CAL. PROC. 5TH, COURTS, § 360 at

460 (2008).

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conviction.”) (citing United States v. O’Keefe, 169 F.3d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting

that Supreme Court precedent “certainly does not require or contemplate that Rule

60(b)(6) [for fraud upon the court] ... be applied in criminal cases”); United States v.

Mosavi, 138 F.3d 1365, 1366 (11th Cir. 1998) (“We hold that the defendant cannot

challenge the criminal forfeiture orders at issue under the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.... Rule 60(b) simply does not provide for relief from judgment in a criminal

case ....”); see also United States v. Diaz, 2003 WL 22434557 (6th Cir. 2003) (same);

United States v. Gross, 2003 WL 21978748 (4th Cir. 2003) (same); United States v.

Ramsey, 106 F.3d 404, 1997 WL 14152 (7th Cir. 1997) (same). 

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motions to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF

Doc. Nos. 2, 4) are GRANTED.

2. The Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation, or his designee, shall collect the $9.89 initial filing fee assessed by this

Order from Plaintiff’s prison trust account, and shall forward the remaining $340.11

balance of the full fee owed by collecting monthly payments from Plaintiff’s account in

an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and shall

forward payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds

$10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE

CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS

ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Jeffrey

A. Beard, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, P.O. Box

942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (ECF Doc. No. 3) is DISMISSED without

prejudice for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and

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1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this

Order is entered into the Court’s docket in which to re-open the case by filing a Second

Amended Complaint. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint must identify an

appropriate basis for federal jurisdiction, and if possible, address the deficiencies of

pleading noted in this Order. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint must also be

complete in itself without reference to either his original or his First Amended

Complaint. See S.D.CAL.CIVLR15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 896 F.2d at 1546 (“[A]n

amended pleading supersedesthe original.”); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.

1987) (citation omitted) (“All causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are

not alleged in an amended complaint are waived.”).

Should Plaintiff fail to file a Second Amended Complaint within the time

provided, this case shall remain closed and the action shall remain dismissed without

prejudice based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b).

 DATED: March 3, 2014

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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