Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01482/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01482-26/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 28:1338 Patent Infringement

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VINEYARD INVESTIGATIONS, 

Plaintiff,

v.

E. & J. GALLO WINERY, 

Defendant.

Case No. 1:19-cv-01482-JLT-SKO

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

TO DISQUALIFY VINEYARD 

INVESTIGATIONS’ EXPERT DR. MARK 

GREENSPAN

(Docs. 135 & 137)

I. INTRODUCTION

On October 11, 2024, Defendant E. & J. Gallo Winery (“Defendant”) filed a “Motion to 

Disqualify Vineyard Investigations [“Plaintiff”]’s Expert Dr. Mark Greenspan” (“Motion to 

Disqualify”). (Doc. 135). The parties submitted their “Joint Statement Re: [Defendant’s] Motion 

to Disqualify [Plaintiff’s] Expert Dr. Mark Greenspan” (the “Joint Statement”) pursuant to this 

Court’s Local Rule 251 on November 13, 2024. (See Docs. 137, 149).

1

 On November 21, 2024, 

the Court ordered the matter submitted pursuant to E.D. Local Rule 230(g). Having considered the 

Motion, Joint Statement, and supporting exhibits, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court 

DENIES the Motion to Disqualify.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Posture

Plaintiff initiated this action in October 2019, asserting that Defendant infringed two patents

(the “’834 and ’810 patents”) through its use of certain variable rate drip irrigation (“VRDI”) 

systems.

2

 (Doc. 1.)

A scheduling conference was held in this case in May 2021. (Doc. 40.) Following the 

conference, the Court issued a Scheduling Order that set deadlines for, among other things, the

1 The unredacted Joint Statement is filed under seal; the redacted version was filed on the docket on November 27, 

2024. (Doc. 149, see also Doc. 148)

2 Plaintiff later amended its complaint to assert a third patent (“the ’881 patent”) in October 2021 (Doc. 52), but that 

patent was subsequently construed to be indefinite (see Docs. 94 & 124) and is not relevant to the present motions.

Case 1:19-cv-01482-JLT-SKO Document 150 Filed 12/02/24 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

deadline to exchange the parties’ respective experts. (Doc. 41.) The Court then entered several 

orders modifying the case schedule (see Docs. 51, 93, 98, 104, 111, 131), based on an amendment 

of the complaint (see Doc. 51) multiple stipulations from the parties (see Docs. 92, 97, 103, 110, 

130). Under the operative case management schedule (Doc. 131), the parties must disclose their 

respective experts by December 13, 2024.

On July 19, 2021, the parties stipulated to a protective order (Doc. 42), which the Court 

entered on July 21, 2021. The protective order includes a provision that defines an “Expert” as:

a person with specialized knowledge or experience in a matter pertinent to the 

litigation who (1) has been retained by a Party or its Counsel to serve as an expert 

witness or as a consultant in this action, (2) is not a current employee of a Party or 

of a Party’s competitor, and (3) at the time of retention, is not anticipated to become 

an employee of a Party or of a Party’s competitor.

(Id. at 5 (“Section 2.8”).) On September 26, 2024, Plaintiff disclosed to Defendant that it intended 

to use Dr. Mark Greenspan as an expert witness. (Doc. 149 at 4.) Dr. Greenspan worked for 

Defendant for nine years, between 1996 and 2005, as an irrigation specialist and Winegrowing 

Research and Development Manager. (Doc. 137-3 at 2–3). He now works as an independent 

consultant to wineries and winegrape growers. (Id. at 2).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant seeks to exclude Plaintiff’s witness Dr. Greenspan because he was formerly 

employed by Defendant—in a role during which he had access to nonpublic information Defendant 

alleges is relevant to the current action—and because Dr. Greenspan is a current consultant to 

Defendant’s competitors. There are two relevant bases on which Defendant moves Dr. Greenspan

be disqualified: (1) an exercise of a trial court’s inherent discretion and (2) pursuant to Section 2.6

of the protective order (Doc. 43). 

A. Legal Standards

A trial court has the inherent power to disqualify expert witnesses, consistent with its broad 

discretion “to protect the integrity of the adversary process, protect privileges that otherwise may 

be breached, and promote public confidence in the legal system.” Ziptronix, Inc. v. Omnivision 

Case 1:19-cv-01482-JLT-SKO Document 150 Filed 12/02/24 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Techs., Inc., No. C -10-05525 SBA EDL, 2013 WL 146413, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2013); see

also Koch Ref. Co. v. Jennifer L. Boudreaux MV, 85 F.3d 1178, 1181 (9th Cir. 1996); Campbell 

Indus. v. M/V Gemini, 619 F.2d 24, 27 (9th Cir. 1980). However, “disqualification is a drastic 

measure that courts should use reluctantly and rarely.” United States v. Kernen Constr., No. 

217CV01424WBSDMC, 2018 WL 5023411, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2018) (citing HewlettPackard Co. v. EMC Corp., 330 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1092 (N.D. Cal. 2004)). 

While there is no brightline rule, Hewlett-Packard Co., 330 F. Supp. 2d at 1092 (citing Koch

Ref. Co., 85 F.3d at 1181), courts commonly require the party seeking disqualification to bear the 

burden of showing that “(1) the adversary had a confidential relationship with the expert and (2) 

the adversary disclosed confidential information to the expert that is relevant to the current 

litigation.” Jones v. Toft, No. 2:11-CV-0192 MCE EFB, 2013 WL 2102972, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 

14, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:11-CV-0192 MCE EFB, 2013 WL 4010315 

(E.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2013); see also Est. of Michael Wilson by & through Jackson v. Cnty. of San 

Diego, No. 320CV00457RBMDEB, 2023 WL 8313230, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2023); Chan v. 

ArcSoft, Inc., No. 19-CV-05836-JSW, 2023 WL 5068495, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2023). 

As to the first factor, the focus of the inquiry is on “whether there was a relationship that 

would permit the litigant reasonably to expect that any communications would be maintained in 

confidence.” Hewlett-Packard Co., 330 F. Supp. 2d at 1093. As to the second factor, “confidential 

information” is that which is “of either particular significance or [that] which can be readily 

identified as either attorney work product or within the scope of the attorney-client privilege.”

Hewlett-Packard, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 1094 (quoting Paul By & Through Paul v. Rawlings Sporting 

Goods Co., 123 F.R.D. 271, 279 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (alteration in original)). The burden is on the 

party seeking disqualification to “point to specific and unambiguous disclosures [of litigationrelevant confidential information] that if revealed would prejudice the party.” Id.

“Generally, both factors must be present for disqualification to be appropriate.” Chan, 2023 

WL 5068495 at *4. Additionally, courts take into account “whether disqualification would be fair 

to the affected party and would promote the integrity of the legal process.” Id. (quoting HewlettPackard Co., 330 F. Supp. 2d at 1093). 

Case 1:19-cv-01482-JLT-SKO Document 150 Filed 12/02/24 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Independent of the court’s broad discretion to disqualify an expert, courts have also 

disqualified experts based on a determination that a protective order precludes the sharing of 

confidential information necessary for the formulation of an expert opinion with a parties’ proposed 

expert. See, e.g., GPNE Corp. v. Apple Inc., No. 512CV2885LHKPSG, 2014 WL 1027948, at *1 

(N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2014); Symantec Corp. v. Acronis Corp., No. 11-5310 EMC JSC, 2012 WL 

3582974, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2012).

B. Analysis

a. The Court declines to exercise its discretion to disqualify Dr. Greenspan3

As to the first factor, the Plaintiff’s primary argument is that Defendant has not 

carried its burden to establish a confidential relationship between Defendant and Dr. Greenspan

because Defendant has not produced an original copy of any confidentiality agreement Defendant 

claims Dr. Greenspan “would have signed” upon his employ. (Doc. 149 at 19, see also id. at 11). 

But Plaintiff also acknowledges that “[i]n an abundance of caution and good, ethical practice, 

[Plaintiff] and its counsel have treated Dr. Greenspan as if he was under an obligation not to talk 

about confidential information learned at Gallo twenty years ago.” Id. 19. In light of the Court’s 

analysis as to the second factor, which the Court finds dispositive, the Court assumes without 

deciding that Dr. Greenspan’s prior employment by Defendant constituted a prior confidential 

relationship sufficient to establish the first factor.

As to the second factor, the parties disagree as to whether the information Dr. Greenspan 

obtained through his prior employment by Defendant constitutes “confidential information” for the 

purposes of disqualification. And indeed, the parties’ disagreement maps onto an existing split in 

the case law as to whether prior disclosures of purely technical information constitute “confidential 

information” for the purposes of the second factor. While there are cases that do not agree, see, 

e.g., Tabaian v. Intel Corp., No. 3:18-CV-00326-HZ, 2018 WL 4566257, at *5 (D. Or. Sept. 22, 

2018); Oracle Corp., 2012 WL 2244305, at *7; Pellerin v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., No. 11CV1278-

BEN CAB, 2012 WL 112539, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2012), Space Sys./Loral v. Martin Marietta 

3

In a prior order, the court declined to seal several documents in toto. (Doc. 148). The Court notes that its decision 

here would not be affected by its consideration of those additional documents.

Case 1:19-cv-01482-JLT-SKO Document 150 Filed 12/02/24 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Corp., No. CIV. 95-20122 SW, 1995 WL 686369, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 1995), the majority 

view is “that prior disclosure, not made in preparation for the then-pending litigation, of 

confidential technical information to a proposed expert witness does not justify disqualifying the 

expert, at least not when the confidential technical information is otherwise discoverable.” 

Edwards Vacuum LLC v. Hoffman Instrumentation Supply, Inc., No. 3:20-CV-1681-AC, 2020 WL 

7360682, at *7 (D. Or. Dec. 15, 2020); see also Nina A. Vershuta, New Rules of War in the Battle 

of the Experts Amending the Expert Witness Disqualification Test for Conflicts of Interest, 81 

BROOK. L. REV. 733, 747 (2016) (“Under the majority view, unless the disclosed information meets 

this stringent standard, courts will deny a motion to disqualify an expert.”). The Court adopts the 

majority view. 

Courts that have adopted the majority view of “confidential information” have offered 

several rationales that the Court finds persuasive contrasting the reasons for finding a conflict of 

interest where an expert was made privy to “discussions of the retaining party's strategies in the 

litigation, the kinds of expert the party expected to retain, the party's views of the strengths and 

weaknesses of each side, the role of each of the party's witnesses to be hired, [or] anticipated 

defenses”—most often situations where a party has consulted with, but not retained an expert who 

is then hired by an adverse party—but not where an expert had a previous confidential relationship 

with an opposing party in which the expert was made privy to technical information. Edwards 

Vacuum LLC, 2020 WL 7360682, at *8 (quoting U.S. ex rel. Cherry Hill Convalescent, Ctr., Inc. 

v. Healthcare Rehab Sys., Inc., 994 F. Supp. 244, 250 (D.N.J. 1997)).

First, technical information, unlike privileged attorney work product information, is 

discoverable. See, e.g., In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., No. C-02-1486 CW (EDL), 2006 

WL 2845212, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2006); accord Sarl v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. 09-2269-

CM/DJW, 2013 WL 501783, at *6–*7 (D. Kan. Feb. 8, 2013); Chrisjulbrian Co. v. Upper St. Rose 

Fleeting Co., No. CIV. A. 93-1879, 1994 WL 673440, at *2 (E.D. La. Dec. 2019). 

Second, courts have consistently considered the policy implications of the second factor, 

and in so doing, have been primarily concerned about a rule that would “encourage[e] an attorney 

to consult with many experts in an attempt to preclude an adversary from finding an expert.” 

Case 1:19-cv-01482-JLT-SKO Document 150 Filed 12/02/24 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Edwards Vacuum LLC, 2020 WL 7360682, at *7; see also see Sarl, 2013 WL 501783, at *7 (“the 

expert disqualification doctrine derives from legal principles surrounding attorney conflicts of 

interest and cases where its purpose is to protect privileges such as the attorney-client privilege”). 

These concerns justify disqualifying an expert where the expert has “received attorney work 

product or been given access to information protected by the attorney-client privilege,” Edwards 

Vacuum LLC, 2020 WL 7360682, at *7 (citing Sarl, 2013 WL 501783, at *6–7), in order to avoid

(1) “incentivizing experts to ‘sell their opinions to the opposing parties or the highest bidder without 

concern about the potential confidentiality of their previous consultations’” or (2) “encouraging 

attorneys to ‘create relationships with numerous potential experts at a nominal fee hoping to 

preempt the ability of their adversaries to obtain expert assistance.’” Id. (quoting Hewlett-Packard 

Co., 330 F. Supp. 2d at 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2004)). But these policy concerns are not implicated by 

cases where, like here, an expert’s previous confidential relationship involved disclosures of only 

technical information. 

And while it is true that some courts have considered the policy implications of letting a 

former employee testify as an expert for an opposing party—in particular, that the former employee 

will “be unable to segregate information obtained in the context of the confidential relationship, 

and opinions based on that information, from information produced in discovery,” Tabaian, 2018 

WL 4566257, at *5—in the present case, this concern is mitigated by (1) the opportunity for direct 

and cross examination, (2) Plaintiff’s assurances that they have treated Dr. Greenspan as being 

subject to a binding confidentiality agreement as to any non-discoverable confidential technical 

information, (Doc. 149 at 19), and (3) the fact that Defendant has not identified any relevant nontechnical confidential information known to Dr. Greenspan that is not otherwise discoverable. See 

Edwards Vacuum LLC, 2020 WL 7360682, at *7 n.4 (explaining the reasons why that court did not 

find Oracle Corp. and Tabaian persuasive).

Because the Defendant has not established that Dr. Greenspan became privy to any relevant

confidential non-discoverable information during the course of his former employment as an 

irrigation specialist and Winegrowing Research and Development Manager, the Court finds that 

the Defendant has not established the second factor. Therefore, the Court is not persuaded that this 

Case 1:19-cv-01482-JLT-SKO Document 150 Filed 12/02/24 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

is one of those “rare” instances in which it is appropriate for the Court to exercise its discretion to 

disqualify Dr. Greenspan.4 United States v. Kernen Constr., No. 217CV01424WBSDMC, 2018 

WL 5023411, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2018); see also Chan, 2023 WL 5068495 at *4 (“Generally, 

both factors must be present for disqualification to be appropriate.”).

b. The terms of the Protective Order do not provide a basis for the disqualification

of Dr. Greenspan.

Defendant contends, in the alternative, that section 2.6 of the Protective Order 

provides an independent ground to disqualify Dr. Greenspan. (Doc. 149 at 17–18). Specifically, 

Defendant contends that “consulting for [Defendant]’s competitors is no different than being an 

employee of [Defendant]’s competitors,” and therefore the protective order precludes Plaintiff from 

designating Dr. Greenspan as an expert under section 2.6 of the protective order because he 

currently works as a consultant for Defendant’s competitors. Id. at 17 (stipulating that an expert 

must not be “a current employee of a Party or of a Party’s competitor or “anticipated to become an 

employee of a Party or of a Party’s competitor [at the time of retention]”). Plaintiff counters that 

there is a legally significant difference between “employee” and “independent consultant,” such 

that section 2.6 of the Protective Order is immaterial to the present dispute. Id. at 26–27. The 

Court agrees with Plaintiff.

Despite pointing to the “plain text” of the Protective Order, the substance of Defendant’s 

arguments is based on many of the concerns that are already taken into account through the 

considerations discussed supra. Those considerations are not material to the Court’s interpretation 

of the plain text of the Protective Order.

“[A] protective order based on a written agreement between the parties is subject to the 

rules of contractual interpretation, including that the agreement should be enforced in accordance 

with the ordinary meaning of the language used in the agreement.” Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V. 

4 The Court observes that, by Defendant’s own admission, most of the confidential technical information that Dr. 

Greenspan was made privy to in his former employ is subject to discovery in the present action. (Doc. 149 at 13–14). 

The only confidential non-discoverable information that Defendant has identified as being disclosed to Dr. 

Greenspan during the course of his prior employ is information allegedly relevant to additional infringement 

contentions Plaintiff sought to add by amending its Preliminary Infringement Contentions. (Doc. 149 at 14). But the 

Court has stricken the Plaintiff’s Amended Preliminary Infringement Contentions, meaning this information is no 

longer relevant. (See Doc. 146). 

Case 1:19-cv-01482-JLT-SKO Document 150 Filed 12/02/24 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

v. KXD Tech., Inc., No. 205CV-01532-RLH-GWF, 2007 WL 2407038, at *2 (D. Nev. Aug. 16, 

2007). Here, the plain meaning of employee does not include self-employed independent 

consultants, who—by definition—are independent and self-employed.

5

 Cf. Arellano v. Benov, No. 

1:13-CV-00558 AWI, 2014 WL 1271530, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2014) (citing favorably 

language from the Ninth Circuit that “[a] significant difference exists between employees and 

independent contractors” in considering the “plain meaning” of “employee” (quoting Arredondo–

Virula v. Adler, 510 Fed. Appx. 581, 582 (9th Cir. 2013)). 

Because the plain meaning of the Protective Order does not prohibit parties from 

designating a person who is anticipated to be retained as an independent consultant by a competitor

as an expert, the Court determines that the Protective Order does not provide a valid ground for 

disqualifying Dr. Greenspan.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendant Gallo’s Motion to Disqualify Plaintiff 

Vineyard Investigations’ Expert Dr. Mark Greenspan (Docs. 135, 137).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 2, 2024 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

5 This is not to say that the parties could not have agreed to define “employee” differently or otherwise written 

section 2.8 more broadly apply to independent consultants as well as “employees.” See, e.g., Codexis, Inc. v. 

EnzymeWorks, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-00826-WHO, 2017 WL 5992130, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2017), aff’d and 

remanded, 759 F. App’x 962 (Fed. Cir. 2019), and vacated, No. 3:16-CV-00826-WHO, 2019 WL 5257936 (N.D. 

Cal. Aug. 22, 2019) (resolving a dispute involving a stipulated protective order provision similar to that which is at 

issue here, but that differed in its express inclusion of consultants). But the parties did not do so here.

Case 1:19-cv-01482-JLT-SKO Document 150 Filed 12/02/24 Page 8 of 8