Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_17-cv-00533/USCOURTS-ared-4_17-cv-00533-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement

---

1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

WESTERN DIVISION 

STAR BUFFET, INC. and 

SOUTHERN BARNS, INC. 

 PLAINTIFFS 

 COUNTERDEFENDANTS 

 

V.

TGB GLORY, LLC d/b/a BARNHILL’S 

STEAKS and BUFFET, and STEVEN C. 

BARNHILL 

 DEFENDANTS 

 COUNTERCLAIMANTS 

* 

* 

* 

* 

* 

* 

* 

* 

*

* 

* 

* 

* 

*

 

 CASE NO. 4:17CV00533 SWW

 

ORDER

 Plaintiffs Star Buffet, Inc. (“Star Buffet”) and Southern Barns, Inc.,1 filed this 

trademark/service mark2

 infringement action pursuant to the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1116, against TGB Glory, LLC (“TGB”), doing business as Barnhill’s Steaks and 

Buffet, and Steven C. Barnhill (“Steven Barnhill”). Before the Court are Defendants’ 

first and second motions for summary judgment [ECF Nos. 17, 18, 19, 30, 31, 32], 

Plaintiffs’ responses in opposition [ECF Nos, 22, 23, 37, 41 (under seal)], and 

 

1

 Southern Barns, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Star Buffet, Inc. See Am. Compl., ¶ 1. 2

 The marks at issue are technically “service marks,” but the use of the term “trademark” is also appropriate. Under 

the Lanham Act, the term “trademark” includes any word, name, symbol, device or combination thereof used by a 

person in commerce to identify or distinguish goods, and the term “service mark,” means any word, name, symbol, 

device or combination thereof used by a person to identify or distinguish services. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127. The 

Lanham Act provides that service marks are registerable in the same manner and with the same effect as are 

trademarks and entitled to the same protections. See 15 U.S.C. § 1053. 

Case 4:17-cv-00533-SWW Document 45 Filed 03/29/19 Page 1 of 21
2 

Defendants’ replies [ECF Nos. 24, 42]. After careful consideration, and for reasons that 

follow, the motions for summary judgment are denied. 

I. Summary Judgment Standard 

 Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). As a prerequisite to summary judgment, a moving party 

must demonstrate “an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the moving party has properly 

supported its motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must “do more than 

simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita 

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) 

The non-moving party may not rest on mere allegations or denials of his pleading 

but must come forward with ‘specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 587. 

“[A] genuine issue of material fact exists if: (1) there is a dispute of fact; (2) the disputed 

fact is material to the outcome of the case; and (3) the dispute is genuine, that is, a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party.” RSBI Aerospace, Inc. v. Affiliated 

FM Ins. Co., 49 F.3d 399, 401 (8th Cir. 1995). 

II. Background 

 In 1991, Defendant Steven Barnhill opened the first Barnhill’s restaurant in 

Florida through his company, Barnhill’s Country Buffet, Inc. (“BCB”). BCB used 

various service marks in connection with the restaurant that featured the word 

Case 4:17-cv-00533-SWW Document 45 Filed 03/29/19 Page 2 of 21
3 

“Barnhill’s” as the dominate feature. BCB’s enterprise quickly grew to include seven 

restaurants. 

 In 1993, BCB granted Charles Barnhill, Steven Barnhill’s father, permission to use 

Barnhill’s service marks in connection with a restaurant in Nacogdoches, Texas, called 

“Barnhill’s Steaks & Buffet.” From that time until the present, Charles has used 

Barnhill’s marks at the Nacogdoches restaurant. 

 In 1995, Lovett’s Buffet, Inc. (“Lovett’s”) purchased BCB, and Steven Barnhill 

stayed on as an employee. After the purchase, Lovett’s changed its name to Barnhill’s 

Buffet, Inc. (“BBI”) and expanded the business to include 45 restaurants, in several 

states, that used the Barnhill’s service marks. From 1999 through 2006, BBI obtained 

five federal trademark registrations for the Barnhill’s name and logos (“the BBI marks”).3

 

 On December 2, 2007, BBI and Star Buffet Management, Inc. (“SBM”), a 

wholly-owned subsidiary of Star Buffet, entered an agreement whereby SBM would 

purchase Barnhill’s restaurants from BBI. The next day, BBI filed a voluntary petition 

for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District 

of Tennessee. 

 According to a motion filed on December 4, 2007 in the bankruptcy case, BBI was 

then operating 29 buffet style restaurants under the name “Barnhill’s Buffet.”4

 The 

bankruptcy record shows that when BBI filed its Chapter 11 petition, it sought to sell 

substantially all of the company’s assets and originally planned to sell 21 restaurants to 

 

3

 ECF 18-14 (United States Patent and Trademark Office electronic search printouts). 4 See In re: Barnhill’s Buffet, Inc., No. 3:07BK08948 (Bank. M.D. Tenn. February 28, 2008), ECF No. 9. 

Case 4:17-cv-00533-SWW Document 45 Filed 03/29/19 Page 3 of 21
4 

SBM.5

 However, BBI and SBM entered an amended purchase agreement stating that 

SBM would purchase only sixteen BBI restaurants for $5 million. The bankruptcy court 

approved the amended agreement and sale on January 31, 2008. 

 On February 4, 2008, BBI sought permission to sell four of its remaining 

restaurants to Starlite Holdings, Inc., another wholly-owned Star Buffet subsidiary, for 

the sum of $1 million. 6 The bankruptcy court initially denied the proposed sale but 

eventually found that it met the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) and granted 

approval.7

 

 The approved asset purchase agreements by which Star Buffet’s wholly-owned 

subsidiaries purchased a total 20 restaurants from BBI contained the following provision: 

Perpetual License of Trade names. At the Closing but effective as of the 

Effective Time, Seller shall grant to Buyer a perpetual license to use any 

trade names, trademarked names, or graphics owned by Seller for purposes 

of operating the Restaurants (the “License”).8

 

There is no indication in the record that the seller retained any right to control 

the licensee or that the buyer had exclusive rights to use the marks. 

 On April 28, 2008, BBI voluntarily converted the Chapter 11 proceeding to 

Chapter 7.9

 On January 5, 2010, for consideration of $2,000, the Chapter 7 bankruptcy 

trustee transferred to Steven Barnhill “all of the bankruptcy estate’s rights and interests in 

the Barnhill’s trademark, name and logos including associated trademarks under which 

 

5 Id., ECF No. 307, at 2 (February 28, 2008 Order Approving Sale). 6 Id., ECF No. 307, at 3. 7 Id., ECF No. 307. 

8

 ECF No. 10-1, at 25, ECF No. 10-2, at 4. 

9 In re:Barnhill’s Buffet, Inc., No. 3:07BK08948 (Bank. M.D. Tenn April 28, 2008), ECF No. 441. 

Case 4:17-cv-00533-SWW Document 45 Filed 03/29/19 Page 4 of 21
5 

the debtor operated its restaurant businesses.”10 Plaintiffs filed no objection to this sale. 

The bill of sale provided that the assets were conveyed “‘as is, where is’ without any 

express or implied warranties . . . .”11 When Steven Barnhill made this purchase, two of 

the five BBI marks had been cancelled for non-use, and by September 20, 2013, they had 

all been cancelled.12 

 On April 21, 2014, Star Buffet’s wholly-owned subsidiary, CC Starts, Inc. (“CC 

Starts”), submitted an application in the United States Patent and Trademark Office 

(“PTO”) to register the service mark BARNHILL’S SALADS BUFFET DESSERTS. On 

December 9, 2014, the mark was registered as United States Trademark Registration No. 

4,652,229, and on August 8, 2017, CC Starts assigned the registration to Star Buffet. 

 Star Buffet has continuously used the BARNHILL’S SALADS BUFFET

DESSERTS mark on signs, menus, and other materials at the Barnhill’s Country Buffet 

in Jonesboro, Arkansas, one of the restaurants it purchased from BBI in 2008. 

Defendants Steven Barnhill and TGB operate Barnhill’s Steaks Buffet, a restaurant 

located in Jacksonville, Arkansas that opened for business in 2017. Defendants promote 

their Jacksonville restaurant with the service mark BARNHILL’S STEAKS BUFFET, 

which Plaintiffs contend is confusingly like BARNHILL’S SALADS BUFFET 

DESSERTS. After making unsuccessful demands that Defendants cease alleged 

trademark infringement, Plaintiffs commenced this action charging willful infringement 

 

10 ECF No. 10-11. 

11 Id. 12 ECF No. 18-14. Section 8 of the Lanham Act provides that a trademark registration shall be cancelled unless at 

time periods specified in the statute, the owner of the registration files an affidavit regarding the mark’s use. See 15 

U.S.C. § 1058(a). 

Case 4:17-cv-00533-SWW Document 45 Filed 03/29/19 Page 5 of 21
6 

of a trademark, trademark infringement and false designation of origin, and unfair 

competition. 

 Defendants counterclaimed, seeking (1) a declaration that Defendants do not 

violate Plaintiffs’ rights by using the service mark BARNHILL’S STEAKS BUFFET 

service mark and (2) cancellation of Star Buffet’s trademark registration for 

BARNHILL’S SALADS BUFFET DESSERTS. Defendants assert that pursuant to the 

2008 asset purchase agreements, Star Buffet acquired only a license to use the BBI 

Barnhill’s service marks and that BBI retained ownership of the marks. Defendants 

further assert that pursuant to the bill of sale entered in BBI’s Chapter 7 proceeding on 

January 7, 2010, Defendant Steven Barnhill is the owner of the mark BARNHILL’S 

SALADS BUFFET DESSERTS. In answer to the counterclaim, Plaintiffs assert, among 

other things, Defendants’ abandonment of all rights in any mark relevant to this case. 

III. Defendants’ First Motion for Summary Judgment 

 Defendants move for summary judgment, claiming they have superior rights in the 

mark BARNHILL’S SALADS BUFFET DESSERTS based on prior use. Specifically, 

Defendants argue that (1) Star Buffet used the BBI marks in the capacity of a licensee 

and such use inured to the benefit of the licensor, BBI, and then to Steven Barnhill after 

he purchased the BBI marks from the bankruptcy trustee, (2) Star Buffet, as a licensee, is 

estopped from making any adverse claims against Defendants, (3) the continued use of 

Barnhill’s marks by Steven Barnhill’s father, Charles Barnhill, inured to the benefit of 

Steven Barnhill, and (4) Star Buffet’s PTO registration for the BARNHILL’S SALADS 

BUFFET DESSERTS marks should be cancelled. 

Case 4:17-cv-00533-SWW Document 45 Filed 03/29/19 Page 6 of 21
7 

The Court finds that this motion must be denied because there are material 

questions of fact. First and foremost is the question whether the Defendants lost priority 

in their marks when their registrations were cancelled or when defendants failed to use 

them following the purchase agreements approved by the bankruptcy court. 

The Lanham Act provides that a mark shall be deemed to be “abandoned” if either of the 

following occurs: 

(1) When its use has been discontinued with intent not to resume such use. 

Intent not to resume may be inferred from circumstances. Nonuse for 3 

consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence of abandonment. “Use” of a 

mark means the bona fide use of such mark made in the ordinary course of 

trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark. 

(2) When any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omission as 

well as commission, causes the mark to become the generic name for the 

goods or services on or in connection with which it is used or otherwise to 

lose its significance as a mark. Purchaser motivation shall not be a test for 

determining abandonment under this paragraph. 

15 U.S.C.A. § 1127. 

 A party claiming abandonment under § 1127(1),13 formerly § 1127(a), must prove 

(1) discontinued use and (2) intent not to resume use, which may be inferred from the 

circumstances. Id.; Hiland Potato Chip Co. v. Culbro Snack Foods, Inc., 720 F.2d 981, 

983-84 (8th Cir. 1983). Proof of nonuse for three consecutive years creates a rebuttable 

presumption of abandonment, which shifts the burden of production to the mark owner to 

 

13Subsection 1127(2), formerly § 1127(b), delineates unintentional abandonment, including but not limited to 

abandonment due to “naked” or “uncontrolled” licensing. Heaton Distributing Co. v. Union Tank Car Co., 387 

F.2d 477, 484 (8th Cir.1967). “The generally accepted meaning of ‘uncontrolled licensing’ is where a trademark 

owner has licensed someone else to make or manufacture its products and then fails to control the quality of the 

products made by the licensee, thus permitting a deception of the public.” Heaton, 387 F.2d at 485(citing Dawn 

Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2nd Cir. 1959)). 

Case 4:17-cv-00533-SWW Document 45 Filed 03/29/19 Page 7 of 21
8 

show use within the relevant period or an intent to resume use. See Cumulus Media, Inc. 

v. Clear Channel Commc'ns, Inc., 304 F.3d 1167, 1176 (11th Cir. 2002)(surveying cases 

regarding the effect of the three-year presumption). 

 Plaintiffs point to the following statement by the bankruptcy trustee appointed in 

BBI’s Chapter 7 case: “Following the closing of the sale . . . on February 29, 2008, the 

Debtor was no longer operating any restaurants.”14 Plaintiffs also note that in December 

2009, when the Chapter 7 trustee was administering the bankruptcy estate, the PTO 

began cancelling BBI’s trademark registrations for failure to file affidavits of continued 

use.15 The record is void of any information indicating that the bankruptcy trustee took 

any action with respect to perpetual licenses that BBI granted in connection with the sale 

of restaurants. After Stephen Barnhill purchased the bankruptcy estate’s rights in 

Barnhill’s marks, “as is,” the PTO cancelled the remaining BBI registrations,16 and 

Barnhill’s own testimony indicates that he did not use the BBI marks from 2011 until 

January 2017, when he opened the Jacksonville Barnhill’s restaurant. 

 Plaintiffs contend that the bankruptcy trustee abandoned the BBI marks and that 

Stephen Barnhill’s nonuse of the marks between 2011 and 2017 creates a rebuttable 

presumption that he abandoned the marks before Star Buffet’s 2014 trademark 

registration. Defendants counter that the “bankruptcy trustee entered into perpetual 

licenses with Plaintiffs’ related companies[,]” and “the licensee’s use inures to the benefit 

 

14 ECF No. 22-1, at 25. 

15 ECF No. 18-14, at 5-10 (Reg. Nos. 2715683, 1275386 cancelled December 19, 2009). 

16 ECF No. 18-14, at 1-2 (Reg. No. 2734399 cancelled February 13, 2010), 3 (Reg. No. 235514 cancelled January 7, 

2011), 9-10 (Reg. No. 3208292 cancelled September 20, 2013). When CC 

Case 4:17-cv-00533-SWW Document 45 Filed 03/29/19 Page 8 of 21
9 

of the trademark owner.”17 Contrary to Defendant’s account of events, the record shows 

that BBI as a debtor in possession, not the Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee, entered 

agreements with Star Buffet’s subsidiaries. 

 Defendants claim that Charles Barnhill’s use of the marks shows that they never 

abandoned their use, but the record is unclear concerning the nature of Charles’s license 

and how the operation of his business in Texas was sufficient to overcome Defendants’ 

non-use of the marks, registrations for which were all cancelled prior to the time 

Plaintiffs registered their marks in 2014. “A trademark owner may grant a license and 

remain protected, provided [that] quality control of the goods and services sold under the 

trademark by the licensee is maintained.” Moore Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Ryu, 960 F.2d 486, 

489 (5th Cir. 1992). However, “uncontrolled” or “naked” licensing, which occurs when 

an owner licenses a mark and fails to control the type or quality of the licensee’s goods or 

services, may result in abandonment of the mark.18 See Heaton Distrib. Co. v. Union 

Tank Car Co., 387 F.2d 477, 485 (8th Cir. 1967)(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127). 

A related question of fact is whether the bankruptcy trustee’s sale of the marks to 

Steven Barnhill in 2010 was a transfer in gross. Plaintiffs contend that the bankruptcy 

trustee conveyed Barnhill’s marks to Steven Barnhill in the abstract, without an 

association to assets used to generate goodwill. The Lanham Act provides that a 

registered mark shall be assignable with the goodwill of the business in which the mark is 

 

17ECF No. 24, at 2. 

18“Naked” licensing is the second form of abandonment referenced in the Lanham Act, which states that a trademark 

shall be deemed abandoned “[w]hen any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omission as well as 

commission, causes the mark to become the generic name for the goods or services on or in connection with which it 

is used or otherwise to lose its significance as a mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127(2). 

Case 4:17-cv-00533-SWW Document 45 Filed 03/29/19 Page 9 of 21
10 

used. See 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1). This requirement recognizes that “[t]here is no such 

thing as property in a trademark except as a right appurtenant to an established business 

or trade in connection with which the mark is employed.” United Drug Co. v. Theodore 

Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97, 39 S. Ct. 48, 50–51 (1918); see also Mid-List Press v. 

Nora, 374 F.3d 690, 693 (8th Cir. 2004)(noting that property in a trade name exists only 

when associated with an ongoing business). The transfer of a trademark without its 

associated goodwill is an “assignment in gross” that gives the assignee no rights in the 

mark. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Grapette Co., 416 F.2d 285, 288 (8th Cir. 1969).19

If the finder of fact should determine that Defendants did not lose rights to the 

marks, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs, as licensees, are estopped from asserting that 

their rights in the marks have priority over the Defendants’ rights. Under Eighth Circuit 

precedent, the existence of a present and valid licensing agreement makes operative that 

“‘long settled principle of law that a licensee of a trademark . . . may not set up any 

adverse claim in it as against its licensor.’” Seven-Up Bottling Co. v. Seven-Up Co., 561 

F.2d 1275, 1279–80 (8th Cir. 1977)(quoting Pacific Supply Cooperative v. Farmers 

Union Central Exchange, 318 F.2d 894, 908-9 (9th Cir. 1963)); see also John C. Flood of 

Virginia, Inc. v. John C. Flood, Inc., 642 F.3d 1105, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Plaintiffs 

might be estopped as well from claiming that the Defendants lost their rights by failing to 

control the licensee during the term of the license. See Seven-Up Bottling Co., 561 F.2d 

1275, 1279–80 (8th Cir. 1977)(“The establishment of an existing licensor-licensee 

 

19 Requiring the transfer of goodwill protects against consumer deception because “any assignment of trademark and 

its good will . . . requires the mark itself be used by the assignee on a product having substantially the same 

characteristics.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. Grapette Co., 416 F.2d 285, 288 (8th Cir. 1969). 

Case 4:17-cv-00533-SWW Document 45 Filed 03/29/19 Page 10 of 21
11 

relationship . . . effectively constitutes an insuperable bar to recovery . . . with regard to 

its trademark claims.”). 

 Defendants’ counterclaim for cancellation of Star Buffet’s registration mark will 

fail if the finder of fact determines that Defendants have lost their claim that their marks 

have priority. The issues concerning whether the Plaintiffs’ registration is void, including 

whether CC Starts was an improper registrant, and whether the registration was obtained 

by fraud, present questions of fact that remain outstanding. 

IV. Defendants’ Second Motion for Summary Judgment 

 With Defendants’ second motion for summary judgment, they assert that Plaintiffs 

have no evidence to establish a likelihood of confusion, entitlement to injunctive relief, or 

damages. Defendants also contend that they are entitled to attorney’s fees. Plaintiffs 

respond that (1) Defendants have made a binding judicial admission that there is a 

likelihood of confusion between Defendants’ accused mark and Star Buffet’s registered 

mark, (2) genuine issues of fact preclude summary judgment as to likelihood of confusion 

and entitlement to monetary relief, and (3) Defendants’ requires for attorney’s fees, prior 

to the entry of judgment, is premature. 

 A. Likelihood of Confusion

 The Court first considers Plaintiffs’ argument that Defendants have made a 

binding, judicial admission regarding likelihood of confusion. “A judicial admission is a 

formal admission before a court that “acts as a substitute for evidence in that it does away 

with the need for evidence [as to] the subject matter of the judicial admission.” Warner 

Bros. Entm't v. X One X Prods., 840 F.3d 971, 978 (8th Cir. 2016)(citing State Farm Mut. 

Case 4:17-cv-00533-SWW Document 45 Filed 03/29/19 Page 11 of 21
12 

Auto. Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 405 F.2d 683, 686 (8th Cir. 1968)). Plaintiffs correctly 

note that Defendants seek cancellation of Star Buffet’s registration under alternative 

theories, including prior use, which requires proof of a likelihood of confusion. See 15 

U.S.C. § 1052(d). However, the Court finds no allegation, stipulation or admission by 

Defendants that specifically admits likelihood of confusion. Defendants’ assertion of 

prior use, without more, does not amount to a formal admission regarding a likelihood of 

confusion. 20 

 The crucial question at this point is whether genuine issues exist for trial. To 

succeed with claims for trademark infringement, false designation of origin, and unfair 

competition, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that a likelihood of confusion exists as result of 

Defendants’ use of the accused mark. To determine the likelihood of confusion, six 

factors are relevant: (1) the strength of the owner's mark; (2) the similarity between the 

owner's mark and the alleged infringer's mark; (3) the competitive proximity of the 

parties’ products; (4) the alleged infringer's intent to confuse the public; (5) incidents of 

actual confusion; and (6) whether the kind of product, its cost, and the conditions of 

purchase can eliminate the likelihood of confusion that would otherwise exist. SquirtCo. 

v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1089 (8th Cir. 1980). The Eighth Circuit has explained: 

“These factors do not operate in a mathematically precise formula; rather, we use them at 

 

20Although it is not clear, Defendants appear to argue that a likelihood of confusion is not an element of their claim 

for cancellation based on prior use because they are asserting priority in the same mark claimed by Star Buffet. 

Although Star Buffet uses its mark in connection with a farmhouse logo, the service mark as registered consists only 

of the words “BARNHILL’S SALADS BUFFET DESSERTS.” Defendants’ claim priority as to the BBI marks, 

which are similar but not identical to Star Buffet’s registered word mark. 

Case 4:17-cv-00533-SWW Document 45 Filed 03/29/19 Page 12 of 21
13 

the summary judgment stage as a guide to determine whether a reasonable jury could find 

a likelihood of confusion.” Frosty Treats Inc. v. Sony Computer Entm't Am. Inc., 426 

F.3d 1001, 1008 (8th Cir. 2005)(quoting Duluth News–Tribune v. Mesabi Publ'g Co., 84 

F.3d 1093, 1096 (8th Cir.1996)). “Factual disputes regarding a single factor are 

insufficient to support the reversal of summary judgment unless they tilt the entire 

balance in favor of such a finding.” Id.

Strength. A trademark is measured in terms of both conceptual and commercial 

strength. Conceptual strength is measured according to increasing levels of 

distinctiveness: (1) generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; or (5) fanciful. 

ZW USA, Inc. v. PWD Sys., LLC, 889 F.3d 441, 448 (8th Cir. 2018). Generic marks, 

which refer to the common name of a product, are not entitled to protection, and 

descriptive marks are only entitled to protection if they have acquired a secondary 

meaning. Id. at 448-449. Suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful marks, however, garner 

protection regardless of whether they have acquired secondary meaning. Id. 

 Defendants argue that the service mark BARNHILL’S SALADS BUFFET 

DESSERTS is primarily a surname and conceptually weak. However, as depicted below, 

Star Buffet displays the words BARNHILL’S SALADS BUFFET DESSERTS with a 

logo that features a farmhouse barn and a rooster. 

 

Case 4:17-cv-00533-SWW Document 45 Filed 03/29/19 Page 13 of 21
14 

Considering the service mark as actually used, the word Barnhill’s arguably denotes a 

farmhouse barn rather than a surname and suggests the qualities or characteristics of 

Plaintiffs’ country buffet restaurant. The Court finds that where the mark falls on the 

distinctiveness spectrum is a question of fact for trial. See Anheuser–Busch Inc. v. Stroh 

Brewery Co., 750 F.2d 631, 635 (8th Cir.1984)(“These categories are like colors in a 

spectrum, and tend to blur at the edges and merge together. . . . The correct categorization 

. . . is a question of fact.”). 

 As for commercial strength, Star Buffet presents evidence of significant 

advertising expenditures and revenue for the Jonesboro Barnhill’s restaurant from 2009 

through 2018. Defendants correctly note that Star Buffet offers no evidence showing a 

direct link between advertising expenditures and public recognition of the Barnhill’s 

mark. Although the record is sparse on the question of commercial strength, the 

likelihood of confusion “does not hinge on a single factor but requires a consideration of 

numerous factors to determine whether under all the circumstances, there is a likelihood 

of confusion.” SquirtCo v. The Seven–Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th 

Cir.1980)(citation omitted). 

 

Case 4:17-cv-00533-SWW Document 45 Filed 03/29/19 Page 14 of 21
15 

Similarity. Plaintiffs offer the following comparison of the parties’ marks:

 Star Buffet’s Use Defendant’s Use 

Defendants acknowledge that the marks are similar, but they argue that this fact cannot 

benefit Star Buffet because “it would reward Plaintiffs’ wrongful conduct.”21 

Defendants’ argument presumes that they have priority based on prior use and deviates 

from the question before the Court. The undisputed evidence shows that the parties’ 

marks are nearly identical, and given that the parties use the marks in the same state to 

provide the same class of services, the similarity factor tips in Plaintiffs’ favor. See 

Community of Christ Copyright Corp. v. Devon Park Restoration, 683 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 

1014 (W.D. Mo. 2010), aff'd sub nom. Community of Christ Copyright Corp. v. Devon 

Park Restoration Branch of Jesus Christ's Church, 634 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 

2011)(citations omitted)(“Numerous courts have concluded that “when identical marks 

are used in the same geographic area for the same class of goods or services, likelihood 

of confusion is presumed.”) 

 

21 ECF No. 42, at 4. 

Case 4:17-cv-00533-SWW Document 45 Filed 03/29/19 Page 15 of 21
16 

Competitive Proximity. Star Buffet presents evidence that the parties use nearlyidentical Barnhill’s marks in connection with their respective all-you-can-eat, buffet 

restaurants that both offer country-style fare for under $10. 

 Relief from trademark infringement is available in the absence of direct 

competition. “Confusion, or the likelihood of confusion, not competition, is the real test 

of trademark infringement. Whether or not direct competition exists is but one of the 

elements to be considered in determining whether there is or will be a likelihood of 

confusion.” Cont'l Motors Corp. v. Cont'l Aviation Corp., 375 F.2d 857, 861 (5th Cir. 

1967). Furthermore, “[w]here products are related, . . . it is reasonable for consumers to 

think that the products come from the same source, and confusion, therefore, is more 

likely.” Kemp v. Bumble Bee Seafoods, Inc., 398 F.3d 1049, 1056 (8th Cir. 

2005)(citation omitted). 

 Plaintiffs assert that given the high degree of similarity between the Jonesboro and 

Jacksonville restaurants, “[a] customer who has patronized Plaintiffs’ buffet restaurant in 

Jonesboro, Arkansas would almost certainly be confused when it came upon Defendants’ 

restaurant less than two hours away in the Little Rock suburb of Jacksonville.”22 

Defendants contend that the parties operate restaurants in “geographically isolated” 

markets, and they point out that Star Buffet offers no evidence as to whether or how often 

consumers encounter both restaurants. The effect of the geographic separation between 

Jacksonville and Jonesboro is relevant, and Plaintiffs shoulder the burden to show that 

 

22 ECF No. 37, at 18. 

Case 4:17-cv-00533-SWW Document 45 Filed 03/29/19 Page 16 of 21
17 

despite the 115-mile distance between restaurants, consumers are likely to be confused. 

See Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan's Restaurant, L.L.C., 360 F.3d 125, 69 (2d Cir. 

2004)(affirming denial of preliminary relief where plaintiff’s famous “Brennan's” 

restaurant in New Orleans and defendant’s “Terrence Brennan's” restaurant in New York 

City were geographically disparate). However, it remains a question for trial whether the 

restaurants operate in geographically separate markets. 

 Alleged Infringer’s Intent. The fourth factor asks whether the alleged infringer 

intended to pass off its goods as the trademark owner’s goods. Frosty Treats Inc. v. Sony 

Computer Entm't Am. Inc., 426 F.3d 1001, 1008 (8th Cir. 2005). Proof of intent is not 

required for success in a trademark infringement or unfair competition claim, but if 

present, it creates an inference of likelihood of confusion. SquirtCo. v. Seven-Up Co., 

628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980). 

 Plaintiffs argue that Defendants set out to copy Star Buffet’s Jonesboro restaurant 

when they opened their Jacksonville restaurant in 2017. It is undisputed that before 

Stephen Barnhill opened the Jacksonville restaurant, he was well familiar with the 

Jonesboro restaurant. By affidavit, Barnhill acknowledges that when he worked for 

Lovetts, which became BBI, he was personally involved in converting the Jonesboro 

restaurant into a Barnhill’s restaurant. Additionally, Star Buffet presents evidence that 

Defendants copied Star Buffet’s mark and “even the look and feel of Plaintiff’s 

restaurant.”23 While an intent to copy is not the same as an intent to confuse, given the 

 

23 ECF No. 37, at 19. 

Case 4:17-cv-00533-SWW Document 45 Filed 03/29/19 Page 17 of 21
18 

stark similarities between the restaurants and viewing the evidence in a light most 

favorable to Star Buffet, the Court finds questions for trial as to whether Defendants 

intended to have consumers associate their restaurant with Plaintiffs’. 

Actual Confusion. Like intent to confuse, actual confusion is not essential to a 

finding of trademark infringement, but it is positive proof of a likelihood of confusion. 

SquirtCo., 628 F.2d at 1091. Star Buffet seeks to prove actual confusion with a copy of 

attorney’s demand letter regarding an incident that occurred at Defendants’ Jacksonville 

restaurant. The attorney apparently mailed the letter to Co-Plaintiff Southern Barns, Inc., 

Star Buffet’s wholly-owned subsidiary. Star Buffet asserts that the misdirected letter is 

evidence of actual confusion. Because the letter is unauthenticated,24 the Court declines 

to assess whether it qualifies as proof of actual confusion. 

Product Type. The sixth factor asks whether the type of product, the price, and 

the conditions of purchase are such that the degree of care exercised by consumers can 

eliminate the likelihood of confusion that would otherwise exist. SquirtCo., 628 F.2d at 

1091; see also Frosty Treats, 426 F.3d at 1010(noting that the sixth factor “is more 

important in confusion-of-source cases where the degree of care that the purchaser 

exercises in purchasing a product can eliminate the confusion, that might otherwise 

exist.”) “‘In considering this factor, we must stand in the shoes of the ordinary purchaser, 

buying under the normally prevalent conditions of the market and giving the attention 

such purchasers usually give in buying that class of goods.’” Sensient Techs. Corp. v. 

 

24 Exhibits in support of or in response to a summary judgment motion must be properly authenticated or verified by 

affidavit. See Country Club Estates, L.L.C. v. Town of Loma Linda, 213 F.3d 1001, 1006 (8th Cir.2000) 

(unverified and unauthenticated letter was a “legal nullity.”).

Case 4:17-cv-00533-SWW Document 45 Filed 03/29/19 Page 18 of 21
19 

SensoryEffects Flavor Co., 613 F.3d 754, 769 (8th Cir. 2010)(quoting Luigino's, Inc. v. 

Stouffer Corp., 170 F.3d 827, 831 (8th Cir. 1999)). 

 Here, the parties offer moderately-priced food at buffet-style restaurants—the type 

of product or service associated with a relatively low degree of consumer care in 

purchase decisions. This factor weighs in Plaintiffs’ favor. 

 Based on the foregoing analysis of relevant factors, the Court finds that the 

likelihood of confusion remains a genuine issue of fact. 

 B. Injunctive Relief

 Defendants argue that because Plaintiffs have no “market penetration in 

Defendants’ market,” Plaintiffs cannot obtain an injunction enjoining Defendants from 

using a Barnhill’s mark. The Eighth Circuit has held that “to enjoin a geographically 

remote infringer, the registered owner must prove that its trademarked products and the 

infringing products are being sold in the same geographic area, or that or that the owner 

has concrete plans to expand into the infringer's trade area.” Minnesota Pet Breeders, 

Inc. v. Schell & Kampeter, Inc., 41 F.3d 1242, 1246 (8th Cir.1994). For reasons 

previously stated, it remains a question for trial whether the parties operate in distinctly 

separate geographic markets. 

 C. Monetary Relief

 Injunctive relief is generally the preferred remedy to resolve a trademark dispute, 

but the Lanham Act also permits an accounting of profits as a remedy for unfair 

infringement. See Masters v. UHS of Del., Inc., 631 F.3d 464, 471 (8th Cir. 2011). “A 

circuit split exists concerning whether a Lanham Act plaintiff must prove willful 

Case 4:17-cv-00533-SWW Document 45 Filed 03/29/19 Page 19 of 21
20 

infringement, rather than mere infringement, to be eligible for monetary damages under 

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)[,]” id. at 472, and the Eighth Circuit has “assume[d] without 

deciding, that willful infringement is a prerequisite of monetary relief “for trademark 

infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). Id. at 472 n.2. Willful infringement may be 

found with evidence that raises a reasonable inference that the defendant knowingly 

infringed the mark in question. Id. at 471-72. 

 Defendants assert that Plaintiffs are unable to show willfulness because Steven 

Barnhill purchased the Barnhill’s marks from a bankruptcy trustee, which they contend 

makes it “impossible for Plaintiffs to prove willful infringement when Defendants 

obtained permission to use the Barnhill’s marks from another federal court.”25 Assuming 

that a showing of willfulness is required to recover monetary relief under the Lanham 

Act, the Court disagrees that Stephen Barnhill’s purchase of service marks on an “as is” 

basis precludes a finding that he knowingly infringed Star Buffet’s registered mark. The 

Court finds that questions of fact preclude summary judgment on this issue. 

 D. Attorney Fees 

 Defendants charge that Plaintiffs’ behavior in this case warrants that the Court 

award Defendants attorney’s fees and costs. Defendants’ prejudgment request for 

attorney’s fees is denied as premature. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B). 

 

25 ECF No. 31, at 10. 

Case 4:17-cv-00533-SWW Document 45 Filed 03/29/19 Page 20 of 21
21 

V. Conclusion 

 For the reasons stated, Defendants’ motions for summary judgment [ECF Nos. 17 

& 30] are DENIED. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 29th DAY OF MARCH, 2019

 /s/Susan Webber Wright

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 4:17-cv-00533-SWW Document 45 Filed 03/29/19 Page 21 of 21