Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00672/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00672-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:1383 Review of HHS Decision (regarding payment of benefits)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC LEON MASERANG,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 18-cv-0672-BAS-NLS

ORDER:

(1)DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT (ECF No. 16);

AND

(2)GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT (ECF No. 19)

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

Plaintiff Eric Leon Maserang seeks judicial review of a final decision by the 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security denying his application for disability 

insurance benefits and supplemental security income under the Social Security Act 

(“the Act”). Presently before the Court are the parties’ cross motions for summary 

judgment. The Court finds these motions suitable for determination on the papers 

submitted and without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). 

For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (ECF No. 16 (“Pl.’s Mot.”)) and GRANTS the Commissioner’s CrossMotion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 19 (“Def.’s Mot.”)). 

//

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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 23, 2013, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance 

benefits under Title II and Part A of Title XVIII of the Act, alleging disability since 

November 6, 2013. (Certified Administrative Record (“AR”) 267-81, ECF No. 10.) 

On January 11, 2014, Plaintiff also filed an application for supplemental security 

income under Title XVI of the Act. (AR 286-89.) After his applications were denied 

initially and upon reconsideration, (AR 161-62, 191-92), Plaintiff requested an 

administrative hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), (AR 209-10). An 

administrative hearing was held July 18, 2016. (AR 74-111.) Plaintiff appeared at 

the hearing with counsel, and testimony was taken from him, a medical expert, and a 

vocational expert (“VE”). (Id.)

As reflected in his December 23, 2016, hearing decision, the ALJ found that 

Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Act, from his alleged onset 

date through March 31, 2016—the date last insured. (AR 23-36.) The ALJ’s 

decision became the final decision of the Commissioner on February 5, 2018, when 

the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (AR 1-6.) This timely 

civil action followed.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

I. Treatment Records

Plaintiff claims he suffers from depression and anxiety, chiari malformation,

and severe pain caused by knee and spinal disorders. (AR 133-34, 270.) However,

this order focuses on Plaintiff’s knee and spinal issues.1

In late 2013, Plaintiff visited a neurological specialist named Dr. Aung for an

evaluation of his neck and back pain. (AR 413.) Dr. Aung ordered an 

 1

 The ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s mental impairments are nonsevere, and Plaintiff does 

not challenge this determination on appeal. In addition, Plaintiff’s physicians concluded that he 

does not meet the criteria for chiari malformation. (AR 390, 419, 426.) Plaintiff does not argue 

otherwise in his Motion. (See Pl.’s Mot. 2:14-13:15.) Therefore, the Court does not expand on 

these items.

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electromyogram (“EMG”), which showed “changes consistent with prior nerve root 

irritation in the left C7 and chronic nerve root irritation of [the] L5 and S1 level.” 

(Id.) Dr. Aung noted “no evidence of acute denervating changes,” and referred 

Plaintiff to neurosurgery for consultation regarding his lower back pain. (Id.)

In May 2014, Plaintiff visited an orthopedic surgery center for a consultation 

on his neck and back pain. (AR 477-79.) Physician Assistant Skropeta reviewed Xrays of Plaintiff’s spine and recommended he also undergo magnetic resonance 

imaging (“MRI”) of his spine. (AR 479.) During this consultation, Plaintiff 

described his pain as “severe with a rating of 10/10,” and mentioned that his 

“symptoms are made worse with [a] home exercise program.” (AR 477.)

In June 2014, Plaintiff returned to P.A. Skropeta after undergoing the 

recommended MRI. (AR 474.) P.A. Skropeta’s physical examination of Plaintiff’s 

spine revealed a normal cervical alignment, no evidence of tenderness, a normal 

range of motion, and no motor deficits. (AR 474-75.) Upon reviewing the MRI, 

P.A. Skropeta noted it revealed cervical spondylosis “most notable at C5-C6 and C6-

C7 levels,” “mild central stenosis at the C5-C6 and C6-C7 levels,” “mild right CSC6 foraminal stenosis,” and “mild bilateral foraminal stenosis at the C6-C7 level.”2

 

(AR 475.) P.A. Skropeta diagnosed Plaintiff with cervical spondylosis, without 

myelopathy. (Id.) P.A. Skropeta recommended that Plaintiff undergo physical 

therapy to treat his cervical spondylosis. (Id.)

In treatment notes from a July 2014 follow-up appointment, P.A. Skropeta

stated that although Plaintiff’s MRI reveals he has a disc bulge “that is abutting [a] 

nerve root,” Plaintiff’s “MRI and subjective and physical exam findings do not 

match.” (AR 970.) At a second follow-up appointment in September 2014, Plaintiff 

stated that recent physical therapy had not improved his neck pain. (AR 967.) P.A. 

 2

 MRI results from 2012 also showed minimal to mild disk bulging in Plaintiff’s cervical 

spine. (AR 480.)

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Skropeta therefore recommended Plaintiff undergo epidural steroid injections to 

manage his neck and back pain. (Id.)

Further, Dr. Alassil treated Plaintiff’s mental and physical issues eight times 

from November 2013 through June 2015. (AR 390-95, 456-58, 466-68.) She noted 

the EMG and MRI findings described above when she referred Plaintiff to physical 

therapy and pain management for further treatment. (Id.) Dr. Sporrong, a primary 

care provider who practiced in the same clinic as Dr. Alassil, also treated Plaintiff 

beginning in October 2015. (AR 772.) In treatment notes from a January 2016 

appointment, Dr. Sporrong indicated that he had previously consulted the clinic’s 

behavioral health group about the possibility that Plaintiff was malingering or having 

somatic symptoms. (AR 764.) Then, in February and March 2016—several months 

before the administrative hearing—Plaintiff saw Dr. Sporrong for treatment of a 

groin injury. (AR 755, 758.) Plaintiff reported that working out and walking 

significant distances exacerbated pain caused by the groin injury. (AR 758.) Dr. 

Sporrong also noted that Plaintiff suffered a previous ankle injury, and that Plaintiff 

reported it “[h]urts to run and walk longer distances.” (AR 755.)

Plaintiff also received specialty treatment for pain management from 

November 2014 through July 2015. He was given a trigger point injection to his 

coccyx in December 2014, and another to his lumbar spine in January 2015.

(AR 726-28.) Plaintiff received a caudal epidural injection in April 2015, followed 

by a ganglion impar injection in July 2015. (AR 731-34, 739-41.) As the ALJ noted, 

Plaintiff had been treated by at least three pain management specialists and received 

at least ten injections by August 2015. (AR 776.)

In addition to outpatient care, Plaintiff sought emergency medical treatment 

for neck and back pain five times between October 2013 and September 2014.3

 

(AR 614-618, 621-22, 625-28.) Physical examinations during each visit showed 

 3

 Hospital records also indicate he visited the emergency room for tooth pain in June 2014. 

(AR 619-20.)

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unremarkable to minimal tenderness along his spine. (Id.) During two trips to the 

emergency room in September and October 2014, Plaintiff reported that his neck and 

back pain had worsened after helping his sister move and lifting heavy furniture. (AR 

614, 617.)

II. Medical Opinions

Aside from treatment notes, the record includes several opinions regarding the 

effects of Plaintiff’s physical impairments. Initially, the state disability agency sent 

Plaintiff to Dr. Sabourin, a board-certified orthopedic surgeon, for an independent 

orthopedic consultation in March 2014. (AR 446-50.) The doctor interviewed 

Plaintiff, reviewed his records, and conducted a detailed physical examination of his

spine and extremities. (Id.) Dr. Sabourin diagnosed Plaintiff with mild-to-moderate 

degenerative disk disease in his lumbar spine, minimal degenerative changes in his 

thoracic spine, minimal disk changes in his cervical spine, and “[i]nternal 

derangement of his bilateral knees, status post bilateral knee arthroscopies with 

residual mild varus deformities.” (AR 450.) Dr. Sabourin believed that, while EMG 

results showed that Plaintiff’s spinal problems had improved somewhat, he still 

suffers from “some significant limitations” due to the nature of his back and knee 

problems. (Id.) Dr. Sabourin opined that Plaintiff could: (1) lift twenty pounds 

occasionally and ten pounds frequently; (2) stand and walk up to six hours and sit for 

up to six hours of an eight-hour workday; and (3) climb, stoop, kneel, and crouch 

occasionally. (Id.) Dr. Sabourin did not believe Plaintiff had either manipulative 

limitations or a “need for assistive devices to ambulate.”4

 (Id.)

After Dr. Sabourin’s evaluation, two state agency disability consultants 

reviewed Plaintiff’s claim in March and August 2014. (AR 142-44, 173-176.) They

 4

 Plaintiff requested a prescription for a cane during a February 2016 visit to his primary 

care provider where he sought treatment for nausea and acid reflux. (AR 761.) He used the cane 

during the ALJ hearing in July 2016. (AR 82.)

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completed residual functional capacity (“RFC”) assessments and opined that Plaintiff 

is not disabled because he can still work despite his physical limitations. (Id.)

In September 2014, at Plaintiff’s request, a physical medicine and 

rehabilitation specialist named Dr. Dulin completed an evaluation. (AR 515-18; see 

also AR 779-80.) Dr. Dulin stated that Plaintiff was limited to: (1) occasionally 

lifting twenty pounds and frequently lifting ten pounds; (2) standing or walking less 

than two hours in an eight-hour workday; and (3) sitting less than six hours in an 

eight-hour workday. (AR 515-18.) Dr. Dulin also concluded that Plaintiff’s history 

of cervical stenosis and bilateral knee arthroscopy limited his ability to push and pull 

with his upper and lower extremities, prevented him from ever climbing ramps or 

stairs, and meant he could never kneel, crouch, or crawl. (Id.)

In October 2014, Dr. Alassil authored a brief letter in which she restates 

Plaintiff’s conditions and notes, “his chronic pain is affecting his daily activities and 

quality of life.” (AR 484.) Dr. Alassil’s letter does not, however, further describe 

how Plaintiff’s impairments may impact his ability to work.5

 (Id.)

Finally, in June 2016, Dr. Sporrong completed a medical source statement. 

(AR 980-82.) The doctor concluded that Plaintiff’s chronic spine and knee pain 

rendered him incapable of working eight hours a day, five days a week on a sustained 

basis. (Id.) Dr. Sporrong opined that Plaintiff would need to take unscheduled fiveto-ten-minute breaks every fifteen minutes during an eight-hour workday and would 

need to frequently change positions from sitting to standing or walking. (Id.) 

Notably, Dr. Sporrong stated that Plaintiff is not a malingerer. (Id.) Accordingly, 

 5

 Plaintiff mentions in his Motion that Dr. Alassil’s examination notes from March 14, 

2014, include reference to Plaintiff’s apparent “significant limitations,” and a statement that he is 

“able to lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently.” (Pl.’s Mot. 4:1-13 (citing 

AR 457, 466).) However, those two statements were included in an addendum section of Dr. 

Alassil’s notes (time stamped March 24, 2014), which restates the findings of a March 3, 2014, 

opinion by a third-party consultative examiner, Dr. Sabourin. (AR 457, 466; see also AR 450 (“I 

feel he does have some significant limitations”).) The Court does not agree with Plaintiff’s reading 

of Dr. Alassil’s March 14, 2014, notes and declines to infer from the evidence that the referenced 

language constitutes Dr. Alassil’s own qualitative determination of Plaintiff’s physical limitations.

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both Dr. Dulin and Dr. Sporrong opined that Plaintiff has more severe limitations 

than those expressed by the state agency consultants and the third-party evaluator, 

Dr. Sabourin. (Compare AR 515-18, and AR 981-82, with AR 142-44, 173-176, and 

AR 450.)

LEGAL STANDARD

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), an applicant for social security disability benefits 

may seek judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner in federal district 

court. “As with other agency decisions, federal court review of social security 

determinations is limited.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 

1098 (9th Cir. 2014). A federal court will uphold the Commissioner’s disability 

determination “unless it contains legal error or is not supported by substantial 

evidence.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Stout v. 

Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

“‘Substantial evidence’ means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a 

preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th 

Cir. 2007). When reviewing whether the Commissioner’s determination is supported 

by substantial evidence, the court must consider the record as a whole, “weighing 

both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the 

Commissioner’s conclusion.” Id. (quoting Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th 

Cir. 1998)). “Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, 

the ALJ’s decision should be upheld.” Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 

1198 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, the 

court “review[s] only the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability determination 

and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” Garrison, 759 

F.3d at 1010 (citation omitted).

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ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION

I. Standard for Determining Disability

The Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any substantial 

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 

impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of 

not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Under the Act’s implementing 

regulations, the Commissioner applies a five-step sequential evaluation process to 

determine whether an applicant for benefits qualifies as disabled. See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4). “The burden of proof is on the claimant at steps one through four, 

but shifts to the Commissioner at step five.” Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 

554 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2009).

At step one, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is engaged in 

“substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is 

not disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step two. 

At step two, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a severe medical 

impairment, or combination of impairments, that meets the duration requirement in 

the regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant’s impairment or 

combination of impairments is not severe, or does not meet the duration requirement, 

the claimant is not disabled. If the impairment is severe, the analysis proceeds to step 

three.

At step three, the ALJ must determine whether the severity of the claimant’s 

impairment or combination of impairments meets or medically equals the severity of 

an impairment listed in the Act’s implementing regulations. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is disabled. If not, the analysis proceeds to 

step four.

At step four, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant’s RFC—that is, the 

most he can do despite his physical and mental limitations—is sufficient for the 

claimant to perform his past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). The ALJ 

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assesses the RFC based on all relevant evidence in the record. Id. § 416.945(a)(1), 

(a)(3). If the claimant can perform his past relevant work, he is not disabled. If not, 

the analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step. 

At step five, the Commissioner bears the burden of proving that the claimant 

can perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, 

taking into account the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(1), (c)(2); see also id. § 404.1520(g)(1). The ALJ usually meets 

this burden through the testimony of a vocational expert, who assesses the 

employment potential of a hypothetical individual with all of the claimant’s physical 

and mental limitations that are supported by the record. Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 

1162 (9th Cir. 2012). If the claimant is able to perform other available work, he is 

not disabled. If the claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work, he is disabled. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).

II. ALJ’s Disability Determination

On December 23, 2016, the ALJ issued a written decision concluding that 

Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. (AR 23-36.) At step one, the 

ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the onset 

of his alleged disability in November 2013. (AR 26.) 

At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s coccydynia and spinal disorders

qualify as severe medically determinable impairments under 20 C.F.R 

§§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c). (AR 26.) In addition, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s 

medically determinable mental impairments to be “depression” and “posttraumatic 

stress disorder,” but determined those impairments do not cause “more than a 

minimal limitation in [Plaintiff’s] ability to perform basic mental work activities and 

are therefore nonsevere.” (Id.) Plaintiff also has a history of cannabis and opioid 

abuse that the ALJ determined is well-controlled with ongoing treatment. (AR 27.)

The ALJ did not consider Plaintiff’s single psychiatric hospital admission to be 

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significant enough to support finding that Plaintiff has a medically determinable 

mental impairment. (Id.)

After determining that Plaintiff’s severe impairments are limited to his

physical ailments, the ALJ found at step three that Plaintiff’s spine disorders and 

coccydynia do not meet or medically equal the severity of the impairments listed in 

20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (AR 29.)

Next, the ALJ assessed that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform “light work” as 

defined in the social security regulations.6

 (AR 29.) His opinion was based on 

consideration of “all symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can 

reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other 

evidence,” including opinion evidence. (Id.) He concluded that Plaintiff’s spinal 

disorders and coccydynia “could reasonably be expected to cause [Plaintiff’s] alleged 

symptoms,” but found Plaintiff to be not fully credible, determining instead that his 

“statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [Plaintiff’s 

pain] are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the 

record.” (AR 30.) In particular, the ALJ noted contradictions in Plaintiff’s medical 

record that suggest Plaintiff has repeatedly engaged in strenuous physical activity 

even though he testified that his physical impairments limit him to performing at 

most minimal physical exertion. (Id.; see also AR 614, 617, 755, 758.)

The ALJ’s RFC determination relied heavily on objective medical findings and 

Dr. Sabourin’s evaluation. He noted the October 2013 EMG, which “showed nerve 

irritation on the left side of C7 and chronic nerve root irritation at L5-S1.” (AR 31.) 

 6

 As defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a):

Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting 

or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may 

be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or 

standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling 

of arm or leg controls. . . . If someone can do light work, we determine that he or 

she can also do sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting factors such as 

. . . [an] inability to sit for long periods of time.

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In addition, the ALJ considered the X-rays ordered and reviewed by P.A. Skropeta 

in May 2014, which “showed reversal of cervical lordosis, and mild spondylosis 

present.” (Id.) The ALJ also highlighted the MRI ordered and reviewed in June 

2014, which revealed “cervical spondylosis at C5-6 and C6-7; mild central stenosis 

at the C5-6 and C6-7 levels; mild right C5-6 foraminal stenosis; and mild bilateral 

foraminal stenosis at the C6-7 levels.” (Id.) Furthermore, the ALJ noted the clinical 

findings from numerous examinations by several of Plaintiff’s examining and 

treating physicians. (AR 31-32.)

The ALJ assigned great weight to the March 2014 opinion of Dr. Sabourin, the

third-party consultative examiner, because it was “based on a physical examination 

of [Plaintiff], and is consistent with the objective findings in the record.” (AR 33.) 

However, the ALJ assigned little weight to the other opinions on Plaintiff’s physical 

impairments. (AR 32-33.) Little weight was assigned to Dr. Dulin’s September 2015

medical source statement because it was not supported by the objective medical 

evidence, including the imaging studies and physical examinations that revealed 

“little in the way of clinical findings.” (AR 33.) Similarly, the ALJ assigned little 

weight to Dr. Sporrong’s June 2016 medical source statement because it was based 

on Plaintiff’s complaint of chronic pain and not supported by “objective medical 

evidence in the record.” (Id.) Additionally, the ALJ assigned little weight to Dr. 

Alassil’s October 2014 letter because “while it broadly states that [Plaintiff]’s pain 

affects his activities, it does not describe the degree to which his activities are 

affected.”7

 (AR 32.)

Finally, the ALJ assigned partial weight to statements submitted by Plaintiff’s 

mother, sister, and friend. As the ALJ noted, all three statements corroborated 

 7

 The ALJ also assigned little weight to the opinions of the state medical consultants. The 

consultative examiners opined that Plaintiff could perform “medium work,” but the ALJ 

determined that a medium work rating is “not sufficiently restrictive” because it does not comport 

with the “objective findings, diagnoses, and subjective complaints.” (AR 33-34.)

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Plaintiff’s subjective claims of pain. (AR 34.) The ALJ acknowledged that the three 

individuals were able to “observe [Plaintiff] on a day-to-day basis,” but he again 

cautioned that “clinical studies have demonstrated only mild physical findings.” (Id.)

At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform certain past 

relevant work as a “Recreation Facility Attendant” and a “Supervisor, Cashiers.”

(AR 34.) And for good measure, the ALJ had asked the VE if other work existed in 

the national economy for someone capable of performing only sedentary work—

limited further by mental impairments to simple, repetitive tasks with no public 

contact and “only occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors.” (AR 109.)

The VE testified that a person with those limitations would still be able to perform 

jobs such as a printed circuit board taper, a lens inserter, or a table worker. (Id.) 

Therefore, even if Plaintiff can perform only sedentary work, which would rule out 

his past relevant work, the ALJ concluded he is still not disabled because sufficient 

jobs exist in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform with his limitations.8

 

(AR 35.)

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues in his Motion that the ALJ improperly discounted Dr. Dulin’s

and Dr. Sporrong’s medical source statements.

9 (Pl.’s Mot. 19:14-27.) He contends 

 8

 At the ALJ hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel asked the VE if jobs existed in the national 

economy for an individual with the severe limitations Dr. Dulin and Dr. Sporrong described in their 

medical source statements. (AR 109-10.) The VE stated that an individual with those limitations 

would be unable to perform “structured work” such as would be required of a circuit board taper, 

lens inserter, or table worker. (AR 110.)

9

 Plaintiff also summarily objects to the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s testimony was 

not credible. (Pl.’s Mot. 21:4-14.) A plaintiff may “fail[] to demonstrate error” where “[he] does 

not explain why the ALJ’s finding is erroneous.” Williams v. Berryhill, 728 Fed. App’x 709, 711 

(9th Cir. 2018); see also Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 930 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(providing generally that the court “require[s] contentions to be accompanied by reasons”). The 

Court declines to consider Plaintiff’s undeveloped claim regarding the ALJ’s credibility 

determination.

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that the ALJ’s error was harmful, and that consequently the resulting RFC 

determination was not supported by substantial evidence.10 (Id.)

Generally, courts “distinguish among the opinions of three types of physicians: 

(1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do 

not treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor 

treat the claimant (nonexamining physicians).” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 

(9th Cir. 1995). “The opinions of treating doctors should be given more weight than 

the opinions of doctors who do not treat the claimant.” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725. 

Further, the Ninth Circuit has explained:

Where the treating doctor’s opinion is not contradicted by another 

doctor, it may be rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons 

supported by substantial evidence in the record. Even if the treating 

doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the ALJ may not 

reject this opinion without providing “specific and legitimate reasons” 

supported by substantial evidence in the record. This can be done by 

setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting 

clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making 

findings. The ALJ must do more than offer his conclusions. He must 

set forth his own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the 

doctors’, are correct.

Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). In addition, the 

“ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if 

that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings.” 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002).

 10 Notably, as mentioned above, Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s determination at 

step two that his mental impairments were nonsevere, and the Court finds no reason to make 

Plaintiff’s case for him. See Indep. Towers, 350 F.3d at 930. Moreover, the ALJ included his 

analysis of Plaintiff’s mental impairments in his RFC determination and asked the VE to consider 

Plaintiff’s alleged mental impairment symptoms at step five. (See AR 29, 34-35, 108-09.) Even if 

the ALJ improperly determined the medically-determinable mental impairments to be nonsevere, 

his error would be harmless because he adequately considered those factors in his analysis at steps 

three, four, and five. Cf. Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that, where 

an ALJ might have erroneously deemed a medical impairment as nonsevere at step two, the error 

was harmless because the ALJ extensively discussed the medical impairment at later steps in the 

analysis); see also Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009) (“The burden of showing that an 

error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.”).

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I. Dr. Sporrong

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to provide specific and legitimate reasons 

supported by substantial evidence for assigning little weight to Dr. Sporrong’s 

opinion. (See Pl.’s Mot. 19:14-15, 19:21-22.) Dr. Sporrong’s medical source 

statement conflicted with examining physician Dr. Sabourin’s opinion. As Plaintiff 

suggests, the ALJ therefore could not assign little weight to Dr. Sporrong’s opinion 

in favor of relying on Dr. Sabourin’s opinion unless he proffered “specific and 

legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record” to do so. See 

Orn, 495 F.3d at 632. In fact, the ALJ tendered two reasons for assigning “little 

weight” to Dr. Sporrong’s medical source statement. The Court must analyze

whether either of the ALJ’s rationales is a specific and legitimate reason supported 

by substantial evidence in the record. See, e.g., Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 659 F.3d 1228, 1233 (9th Cir. 2011).

First, the ALJ found that Dr. Sporrong’s medical source statement “is not 

supported by objective medical evidence in the record, which, despite [Plaintiff’s]

ongoing complaints of chronic pain, show little in the way of clinical findings.” (AR 

33.) The background summary, supra, details the relevant facts. To support his 

disability determination, the ALJ specified the clinical findings in the record, which 

consisted of several imaging reports, an EMG, and treatment notes from several 

sources that discuss primarily mild or unremarkable findings from physical 

examinations. (AR 29-32.) Dr. Sporrong’s medical source statement claimed that 

the imaging was “objectively consistent with [Plaintiff’s] pain,” (AR 980); however, 

the ALJ noted that the clinical findings show only minimal to mild changes in 

Plaintiff’s spine, which orthopedic and imaging specialists concluded signified “no 

evidence” of acute denervating changes, (AR 30-31). 

The ALJ therefore met his burden to set out a detailed summary of the facts 

and conflicting evidence, state his interpretation thereof, and make findings. See 

Orn, 495 F.3d at 632; see also Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir.

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1995) (“The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in 

medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.”). And the record supports the 

ALJ’s finding that Dr. Sporrong’s restrictive opinion is inconsistent with the 

objective medical evidence, including physical examinations and imaging studies.

(See AR 413, 474-75, 480-82, 614-18, 621-22, 625-28, 897-99, 901-04, 970.)

Plaintiff highlights portions of the record to argue the ALJ needed to provide “further 

explanation of his assessment,” (see Pl.’s Mot. 18:5-19:20, 19:21-23), but this 

argument is unconvincing. Plaintiff essentially disagrees with the ALJ’s summary 

of the medical evidence and rational interpretation of the record. The Court, 

however, “must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are supported by inferences 

reasonably drawn from the record.” See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th 

Cir. 2012); see also Thomas, 278 F.3d at 954 (“Where the evidence is susceptible to 

more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the 

ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.”). Accordingly, the ALJ’s first justification for 

rejecting Dr. Sporrong’s medical source statement is a specific and legitimate reason 

that is supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 

533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (providing an ALJ may reject a physician’s

opinion when it is not consistent with the medical evidence).

The ALJ further rationalized that Dr. Sporrong’s medical source statement 

conflicted with his own treatment notes. (See AR 33.) The ALJ highlighted that Dr. 

Sporrong “previously raised concerns . . . over possible malingering” because 

Plaintiff’s complaints were not supported by objective findings. (Id.) This second 

rationale is a specific and legitimate reason for discounting Dr. Sporrong’s opinion, 

but the Court finds it is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. A 

January 2016 treatment note from Dr. Sporrong that mentions malingering reads,

“Followed by Heartland Center - received paperwork stating diagnosis: MOD, severe 

w/psychotic features, opioid dependence, MJ dependence, PTSD. I’ve actually 

discussed [Plaintiff] with behavioral here at FHCSD CH, and some concern of 

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malingering . . . or somatization?” (AR 764.) The ALJ inferred from this treatment 

note that Dr. Sporrong believed Plaintiff might have feigned his pain symptoms. 

However, a plain reading of the treatment note indicates that malingering was 

mentioned as conjecture without any indication as to who specifically raised the issue 

or which medical problem was being referenced. Plaintiff similarly argues that the 

note was unclear, positing instead that it “questioned the psychiatric symptoms, not 

the physical ones.” (Pl.’s Mot. 20:20-21.) Furthermore, Dr. Sporrong subsequently 

checked a box in his June 2016 medical source statement that provides Plaintiff is 

not a malingerer. (AR 981.) Given that the single treatment note at issue is 

inconclusive and conflicts with the clear statement in Dr. Sporrong’s subsequent 

medical source statement, the Court concludes this note does not rationally 

substantiate the ALJ’s second ground for assigning “little weight” to Dr. Sporrong’s 

medical source statement.

Though the Court rejects the ALJ’s second reason, the ALJ did not err in 

assigning “little weight” to Dr. Sporrong’s medical source statement because his first 

rationale is a specific and legitimate reason that is supported by substantial evidence

in the record. See Orn, 495 F.3d at 632.

II. Dr. Dulin

Plaintiff similarly contends that the ALJ improperly discounted Dr. Dulin’s 

medical source statement. (Pl.’s Mot. 17-19.) Acting under the presumption that Dr. 

Dulin is a treating source, the ALJ reasoned that the doctor’s medical source 

statement is contradicted by the objective medical evidence in the record as well as 

by the results of Dr. Sabourin’s third-party evaluation. (AR 33.) Plaintiff asserts that 

Dr. Sabourin’s opinion “could not adequately counter” Dr. Dulin’s medical source 

statement because Dr. Dulin was a treating source. (Pl.’s Mot. 19:14-20); see 

Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725. As a preliminary matter, the Court disagrees with the 

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ALJ’s designation of Dr. Dulin as a treating source. The Act’s implementing 

regulations specifically define a treating source:

Treating source means your own acceptable medical source who 

provides you, or has provided you, with medical treatment or evaluation 

and who has, or has had, an ongoing treatment relationship with you. 

Generally, we will consider that you have an ongoing treatment 

relationship with an acceptable medical source when the medical 

evidence establishes that you see, or have seen, the source with a 

frequency consistent with accepted medical practice for the type of 

treatment and/or evaluation required for your medical condition(s) . . . . 

We will not consider an acceptable medical source to be your treating 

source if your relationship with the source is not based on your medical 

need for treatment or evaluation, but solely on your need to obtain a 

report in support of your claim for disability. In such a case, we will 

consider the acceptable medical source to be a nontreating source.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2).

Plaintiff visited his primary healthcare provider, Dr. Alassil, on June 25, 2015, 

“frustrated” that the clinic was “not helping him” mitigate his chronic pain. (AR 

779.) He told Dr. Alassil that he “was not happy with [Dr. Sabourin’s orthopedic 

opinion],” and requested that Dr. Alassil refer him to another consultative examiner 

for a “recheck.” (Id.) According to Dr. Alassil’s treatment notes, she obliged 

Plaintiff’s request and referred him to Dr. Dulin to fill out a “functional capacity 

form.” (AR 780.) At the hearing, the ALJ asked Plaintiff to elaborate on Dr. Dulin, 

to which Plaintiff replied, “He’s a rehab specialist, a pain rehab and physical 

therapist.” (AR 107.) When asked if he still sees Dr. Dulin, Plaintiff stated that “he 

left Heartland.” (Id.) At one point during the hearing, while “trying to remember 

[Dr. Dulin’s] name,” Plaintiff stated that Dr. Dulin “did an evaluation on [Plaintiff’s] 

knees.” (AR 83.)

The record demonstratesthat Plaintiff sought out Dr. Dulin for the sole purpose 

of filling out the medical source statement. Plaintiff was dissatisfied with Dr. 

Sabourin’s opinion, which found Plaintiff’s impairments not severely limiting, and 

in response, Plaintiff set out to “obtain a report in support of [his] claim for 

disability.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2). Thus, Dr. Dulin was not a “treating 

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source” as defined by the regulations, but rather a “nontreating source” who Plaintiff

was referred to by Dr. Alassil. See id.; see also Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958 (finding

that a physician who was consulted for completion of a medical source statement was 

not a “treating source” even though the consulting physician was acting at the request 

of the claimant’s treating physician).

However, even when an examining physician’s opinion is contradicted by 

another doctor’s opinion, “an ALJ may only reject it by providing specific and 

legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.” Garrison, 759 F.3d 

at 1012 (quoting Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198). Essentially, examining doctors’ opinions 

are “still owed deference.” Id. In assigning little weight to Dr. Dulin’s opinion, the 

ALJ reasoned that Dr. Dulin’s opinion was not supported by the objective medical 

evidence in the record, which showed “little in the way of clinical findings.” (AR 

33.) The ALJ also referred to his prior discussion of the physical examinations and 

imaging studies in the record, which revealed “mild objective findings.” (Id.) 

Therefore, the ALJ pointed to the same objective medical evidence that he considered 

in his handling of Dr. Sporrong’s medical source statement, which the Court has

determined to be an appropriate basis for rejecting the treating physician’s opinion. 

(See Dr. Sporrong, supra.) The Court finds this rationale similarly serves as a 

specific and legitimate reason that is supported by substantial evidence to assign 

“little weight” to Dr. Dulin’s medical source statement. The ALJ thus did not err by 

discounting Dr. Dulin’s opinion and assigning greater weight to Dr. Sabourin’s 

evaluation. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012.

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the ALJ did not commit legal error because he 

provided specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence to 

discount the medical source opinions at issue. See Orn, 495 F.3d at 632. And the 

Court will not disturb the Commissioner’s disability determination because it is 

supported by substantial evidence. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1009. Accordingly, 

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the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 16) and 

GRANTS the Commissioner’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 19). 

It is hereby ORDERED that judgment be entered affirming the decision of the 

Commissioner and dismissing this action with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 7, 2019

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