Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00452/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00452-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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1 See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 532 (2003) (holding that § 2255's one-year

limitations period begins to run when the time for seeking certiorari review expires). The time

for filing a petition for writ of certiorari expires 90 days after entry of judgment by the Ninth

Circuit, which is about 69 days after the mandate issues. See id. at 527–32.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11cv452-LAB/05cr2078

ORDER DENYING MOTION

vs. PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255

JOSE ARTURO CISNEROS-RAMIREZ,

Defendant.

Defendant Jose Cisneros-Ramirez pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to

distribute 50g or more of methamphetamine, and one count of laundering monetary

instruments, and was sentenced to 240 months on each count, to run concurrently.

After an unsuccessful appeal to the Ninth Circuit, see United States v. CisnerosRamirez, 329 Fed.Appx. 735 (9th Cir. 2009), Cisneros-Ramirez did not file a petition for

certiorari. The clock for § 2255's limitations period began to run when the time expired for

filing a petition for certiorari, in this case in late October, 2009.1

 

On March 4, 2011, over a year and four months after his conviction was final,

Cisneros-Ramirez filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking to vacate his

sentence, which he argued violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. The motion is not

Case 3:11-cv-00452-LAB Document 2 Filed 12/16/11 Page 1 of 3
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2

 One obvious reason why his attorney would not have filed a § 2255 motion or told

him to do so is that the Ninth Circuit on appeal ruled that his sentence was not unreasonable,

and that this Court did not procedurally err. Cisneros-Ramirez, 329 Fed. Appx. 735. Asking

this Court to reverse the Ninth Circuit’s affirmance would have been futile.

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specific about what exactly the constitutional violations were, though it has something to do

with his allegedly not having any opportunity to deny or explain facts recited in the

presentence report. He also argued that the Court failed to consider his objections to the

presentence report. He also objects to his sentence as unreasonable, a claim already

adjudicated and rejected by the Ninth Circuit. Because the motion appeared to be timebarred under § 2255(f), the Court ordered him to show cause why it should not be summarily

denied as time-barred. The order cautioned him that if he failed to show cause, his motion

would be denied as time-barred.

Cisneros-Ramirez then filed a response, which is being accepted for filing by

discrepancy order issued concurrently with this order. First, he argues that his sentence was

tainted by a “fundamental defect” which will go uncorrected if his motion is time-barred. In

essence, his argument is that because his claim is meritorious, it should be adjudicated on

the merits. This is a frivolous argument, however. A time-barred motion is barred without

regard to the merits of the claims. If only unmeritorious claims were time-barred, AEDPA’s

one-year limitations period would be toothless.

Cisneros-Ramirez next raises (for the first time) an “actual innocence” claim as a

means of circumventing the time bar. His § 2255 motion did not, however, raise this issue

nor has he ever argued his guilty plea was anything but knowing and voluntary.

Finally, he argues for equitable tolling because, he claims, his counsel failed to file a

§ 2255 motion or advise him to file such a motion. He does not, however, explain why his

counsel should have either filed the motion or advised him to do so.2

 And even assuming,

arguendo, that such a motion should have been filed, his counsel’s failure to either file it or

advise him to file it does not constitute the kind of extraordinary circumstances beyond

Cisneros-Ramirez’s control, which would be required for equitable tolling. See United States

v. Park, 2009 WL 3806247, slip op. at *4–*5 (E.D.Cal., Nov. 12, 2009) (citing, inter alia,

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Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2002)) (discussing authority for the principle that

attorney error in failing to advise a defendant to file a § 2255 motion does not warrant

equitable tolling). Cisneros-Ramirez makes a general reference to “securing his transcripts

and trial documents to file his section 2255 motion,” but this does not show he was diligent

or explain why he could not have filed his motion earlier. The only transcript request he

made was on October 1, 2008 and the transcripts he requested were filed November 13,

2008. See Allen v.Lewis, 2255 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 2001 (per curiam) (holding that, to

qualify for equitable tolling, a petitioner must show that “extraordinary circumstances” caused

petition to be untimely).

Because it is time-barred under AEDPA, Cisneros-Ramirez’s § 2255 motion is

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 16, 2011

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

Case 3:11-cv-00452-LAB Document 2 Filed 12/16/11 Page 3 of 3