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Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-30733

cons. w/ 09-30958

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY; HELMSMAN

MANAGEMENT SERVICES LLC; EMPLOYER INSURANCE OF WAUSAU,

Plaintiffs–Appellees

v.

CLARK A. GUNDERSON; LAKE CHARLES MEMORIAL HOSPITAL;

GEORGE RAYMOND WILLIAMS MD, ORTHOPAEDIC SURGERY, A

PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL LLC; FRANK W. LOPEZ; JOSEPH TURK;

BARCZYK CLINIC; FAYEZ K. SHAMIEH; BEUTLER-ENGLAND

CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC,

Defendants–Appellants

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:04-CV-2405

Before WIENER, PRADO, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

*

Appellants, a group of medical providers (the “Providers”), appeal two

interlocutory rulings made by the district court for the Western District of

Louisiana. The Providers appeal the district court’s grant of partial summary

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

July 21, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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Nos. 09-30733 & 09-30958

judgment in favor of Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., Helmsman Management

Services LLC, and Employer Insurance of Wausau (collectively, the “Liberty

Entities”), which the district court certified as final under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 54(b). The Providers also appeal the district court’s grant of a

permanent injunction to enforce the summary judgment. The Liberty Entities

move to dismiss the appeal of the grant of partial summary judgment for lack of

appellate jurisdiction because the Providers seek to have this Court decide

abstention issues which extend beyond the scope of the claim the district court

certified as final.

We conclude that we have appellate jurisdiction over the appeal of the

grant of partial summary judgment because the Providers’ request that we

certify the merits of the summary judgment to the Louisiana Supreme Court

falls within the claim certified by the district court. However, the Providers do

not argue that the district court erred in its determination of the merits of the

summary judgment claim, and we decline to certify the merits of the summary

judgment to the Louisiana Supreme Court. We therefore affirm the grant of

partial summary judgment. Additionally, we hold that the permanent injunction

is proper under the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act and merely

enforces the partial summary judgment. Therefore, we also affirm the district

court’s grant of the permanent injunction.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The Liberty Entities insure various Louisiana employers in connection

with Workers’ Compensation claims made against them. The Liberty Entities

entered into contracts with First Health Group Corp., a Preferred Provider

Organization, whereby First Health agreed to make various medical providers

available to the Liberty Entities at discounted rates. The Providers all signed

contracts with First Health (the “Provider Agreements”), agreeing to deliver

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medical services at discounted rates to patients covered by various payors,

including the Liberty Entities. The Providers have treated numerous employees

of the Liberty Entities’ insureds in connection with those employees’ Workers’

Compensation claims.

The Liberty Entities paid the Providers at the rates the Providers agreed

to in the Provider Agreements. The Providers, however, filed numerous claims

in the Louisiana Office of Workers’ Compensation (“OWC”), asserting that the

rates negotiated in the Provider Agreements are invalid under the Louisiana

Workers’ Compensation Act (“LWCA”), LA.REV.STAT. § 23:1021 et seq., and that

1

Liberty Mutual violated the Any Willing Provider Act (“AWPA”), LA. REV. STAT.

§ 40:2201 et seq., and seeking additional compensation.

2

B. Procedural Background

Liberty Mutual originally filed this declaratory action against only Lake

Charles Memorial Hospital (“LCMH”) and Gunderson. Liberty Mutual sought

a declaration that the Provider Agreements are valid and enforceable and that

it owed LCMH and Gunderson no additional money. The district court granted

3

partial summary judgment in favor of Liberty Mutual because it found that the

Provider Agreements are valid and enforceable and that Liberty Mutual and

First Health are not group purchasers under the AWPA. After the district court

The LWCA provides a reimbursement schedule for medical providers seeking 1

compensation for services performed for Workers’ Compensation claimants. SeeLA.REV.STAT.

§ 23:1034.2. The Providers argue that they are entitled to the scheduled amount and that the

Provider Agreements are invalid to the extent they discount services below that amount.

The Providers claim that the Provider Agreements are invalid under the AWPA 2

because they violate the AWPA’s notice requirements. The Liberty Entities claim that First

Health is not a group purchaser, and are thus exempt from the AWPA’s notice requirements.

Liberty Mutual also sought damages for breach of contract based on its status as a

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third party beneficiary of the Provider Agreements. In addition, Liberty Mutual later added

First Health as a declaratory defendant, seeking a declaration that First Health would owe

indemnity for any money the Providers recovered from Liberty Mutual. First Health is not

a party to this appeal.

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certified the partial summary judgment as final under Rule 54(b), Gunderson

and LCMH appealed, but this Court dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate

jurisdiction after Gunderson and LCMH failed to brief the merits of the grant of

partial summary judgment. Liberty Mutual later obtained a permanent

injunction from the district court that prohibited LCMH and Gunderson from

relitigating the issues decided in the summary judgment in Louisiana state

courts or before the OWC against Liberty Mutual, First Health, or other

authorized payors.

LCMH and Gunderson appealed the grant of the permanent injunction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), and we affirmed the district court’s order.

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gunderson, 305 F. App’x 170 (5th Cir. 2008)

(unpublished) (per curiam), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 61 (2009). This Court found

that the district court’s order was a proper exercise of the relitigation exception

to the Anti-Injunction Act. Id. at 175–77. Upon remand, Liberty Mutual

amended its complaint to add the remaining Providers as declaratory

defendants, and added Helmsman and Wausau, two of its subsidiaries, as

plaintiffs.

The Providers moved the district court to dismiss or abstain, and the

district court denied the motion. The Liberty Entities then moved for partial

summary judgment, which the district court granted to the extent that it found

(1) the Provider Agreements are valid and enforceable because neither First

Health nor the Liberty Entities are group purchasers and thus they are exempt

from the AWPA’s notice provisions; and (2) the LWCA does not prevent

discounting below its reimbursement schedule. The district court found that the

partial summary judgment disposed of some but not all claims against the

Providers and, there being no just reason to delay entry of judgment, certified

the order as final under Rule 54(b). The Providers timely filed a notice of appeal

of the order granting partial summary judgment; the order certifying the partial

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Nos. 09-30733 & 09-30958

summary judgment; and interlocutory orders, including the district court’s

denial of the Providers’ motion to dismiss or abstain.

After the Providers filed their notice of appeal, the Liberty Entities moved

for a permanent injunction enforcing the partial summary judgment. The

district court enjoined the Providers from

pursuing any claims before any court or administrative agency in

the State of Louisiana against [the Liberty Entities] in which the

Providers allege that they are entitled to additional monies from the

Liberty [E]ntities for medical services beyond the terms set forth in

their Provider Agreements . . . and/or allege that their Provider

Agreements are invalid and/or unenforceable because they run afoul

of the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation law; and any claims before

any court of or administrative agency in the state of Louisiana

against the Liberty [E]ntities in which the Providers seek penalties

pursuant to Title 40 and allege that the payment provisions of the

Provider Agreements are null and void because the Providers were

not provided with a benefit card or other written notice as required

by Louisiana Revised Statute 40:2203.1.

The Providers timely appealed the permanent injunction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(a)(1). We consolidated the appeal of the permanent injunction and the

appeal of the partial summary judgment for oral argument.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

“When an action presents more than one claim for relief . . . the court may

direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or

parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for

delay.” FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). We may entertain an appeal of a partial summary

judgment that does not dispose of the entire litigation if the district court

certifies the judgment as final under Rule 54(b). Kelly v. Lee’s Old Fashioned

Hamburgers, Inc., 908 F.2d 1218, 1222 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc). Under 28

U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), we have jurisdiction over “[i]nterlocutory orders of the

district courts of the United States . . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing

or dissolving injunctions.”

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“‘We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same

criteria as the district court.’” United States v. Loftis, 607 F.3d 173, 176 n.2 (5th

Cir. 2010) (quoting In re Hinsley, 201 F.3d 638, 642 (5th Cir. 2000)). Although

the district court’s application of the relitigation exception of the Anti-Injunction

Act is reviewed de novo, Harvey Specialty & Supply, Inc. v. Anson Flowline

Equip., Inc., 434 F.3d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 2005), we review “the district court’s

decision to render an injunction for abuse of discretion” Moore v. State Farm

Fire & Cas. Co., 556 F.3d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Newby v. Enron Corp.,

302 F.3d 295, 301 (5th Cir. 2002)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Partial Summary Judgment Appeal

The district court decided in its grant of partial summary judgment that

the Provider Agreements are valid and enforceable under Louisiana law

notwithstanding the fee schedule in the LWCA and the notice requirements in

the AWPA. In the partial summary judgment appeal, the Providers argue that

the district court should have abstained from hearing the case because of the

pendency of multiple claims in the OWC and Louisiana state courts and the

importance of the state law issues to Louisiana. The Providers argue in the

alternative that we should certify the merits of the partial summary judgment

to the Louisiana Supreme Court. The Providers do not argue that we should

reverse the district court on the merits of the district court’s partial summary

judgment.

We only have jurisdiction to consider the claim certified by the district

court. See United Indus. v. EIMCO Process Equip. Co., 61 F.3d 445, 448 (5th

Cir. 1995) (finding that this Court has “no jurisdiction to consider orders of the

district court outside the scope of certification”). Here, the district court certified

the Liberty Entities’ declaratory judgment claims as final under Rule 54(b),

finding the Provider Agreements valid under Louisiana law. The abstention

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issues argued by the Providers are relevant to claims still pending before the

district court, and the parties may obtain review of these issues from a future

panel of this Court upon final resolution of the litigation. We have no appellate

jurisdiction over the abstention issues still pending before the district court.

However, we have jurisdiction to consider the Providers’ request for certification

to the Louisiana Supreme Court because the Providers’ request relates only to

the claim certified by the district court under Rule 54(b).

“[T]he decision of whether to certify a question lies within our sound

discretion.” Patterson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 335 F.3d 476, 487 (5th Cir. 2003)

(citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., 283

F.3d 650, 656 (5th Cir. 2002)). “[T]he absence of a definitive answer from the

state supreme court on a particular question is not sufficient to warrant

certification.” Jefferson v. Lead Indus. Assoc., Inc., 106 F.3d 1245, 1247 (5th Cir.

1997).

We decline to certify the question of whether the Provider Agreements are

valid and enforceable under the AWPA and the LWCA. The Providers only

briefly discuss the merits of the district court’s summary judgment, citing a

concurrence from a Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal judge, who stated

that discounting of Workers’ Compensation medical providers’ services is not

allowed under the LWCA. Beutler England Chiropractic Clinic v. Mermentau

Rice, Inc., 931 So. 2d 553, 559–61 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (Peters, J., concurring). A

panel of the same court has since adopted Judge Peters’ interpretation of the

LWCA. Agilus Health v. Accor Lodging N. Am., 32 So. 3d 1120, 1121–22 (La. Ct.

App. 2010). The Louisiana Supreme Court recently agreed to review that case,

and will hear oral argument later this year. Agilus Health v. Accor Lodging N.

Am., No. 2010-C-0800, 2010 WL 2595306 (La. June 18, 2010). The Providers fail

to cite a single Louisiana case regarding the interpretation of the AWPA.

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The merits of the summary judgment appeal are not so unsettled that we

should certify the question to the Louisiana Supreme Court. In fact, the issue

of whether the LWCA prohibits discounting of Workers’ Compensation medical

providers’ services is likely to be resolved by the Louisiana Supreme Court soon.

Because the Providers do not argue that we should reverse the merits of the

district court’s judgment, and we decline to certify the merits to the Louisiana

Supreme Court, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

B. Permanent Injunction Appeal

4

The district court issued the permanent injunction pursuant to the All

Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). However, the Anti-Injunction Act generally

prohibits federal courts from enjoining state proceedings, except for three

enumerated exceptions. 28 U.S.C. § 2283. One such exception—the relitigation

exception—allows the district court to enjoin state proceedings in order “to

protect or effectuate [the district court’s] judgments.” Id. We hold that the

relitigation exception applies because the district court closely tailored its

injunctive relief to apply only to those issues decided in the partial summary

judgment. But, before discussing the application of the relitigation exception,

we must satisfy ourselves that the district court had jurisdiction to issue the

injunction.

1. Jurisdiction to Issue the Injunction

The Providers argue that the district court no longer had jurisdiction to

issue the injunction once they filed their notice of appeal of the partial summary

judgment. The district court exercised its jurisdiction, suspecting that the

To the extent that the Providers argue the abstention issues as part of their appeal 4

of the permanent injunction, we find that review of the abstention issues is not necessary to

ensure meaningful review of the order granting a permanent injunction. See Byrum v.

Landreth, 566 F.3d 442, 449 (5th Cir. 2009) (stating that appellate jurisdiction over

interlocutory rulings may only exist if it is inextricably intertwined with an independently

appealable order). Therefore, we do not reach those issues.

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Providers appealed the partial summary judgment for delay purposes and

finding that it retained jurisdiction over the case so that it could act to protect

its judgment.

“If an appeal is taken from a judgment which determines the entire action,

the district court loses power to take any further action in the proceeding upon

the filing of a timely and effective notice of appeal . . . .” Nicol v. Gulf Fleet

Supply Vessels, Inc., 743 F.2d 298, 299 (5th Cir. 1984). Where the order on

appeal does not dispose of the entire case, however, the district court may still

proceed with matters not involved in the appeal. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v.

Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 233 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Alice L. ex rel. R.L. v.

Dusek, 492 F.3d 563, 564–65 (5th Cir. 2007)). The district court also retains

jurisdiction to “enforce its judgment so long as the judgment has not been stayed

or superseded.” Ross v. Marshall, 426 F.3d 745, 751 (5th Cir. 2005) (quotation

omitted). We have previously held that a district court may rule on whether to

hold a party in contempt for violating an injunction while the merits of the

injunction are on appeal. Farmhand, Inc. v. Anel Eng’g Indus., Inc., 693 F.2d

1140, 1145–46 (5th Cir. 1982).

We conclude that the district court maintained jurisdiction to issue the

injunction despite the Providers’ notice of appeal. The breach of contract claims

remained pending before the district court despite the resolution of the partial

summary judgment. Therefore, the instant case is distinguishable from the

cases cited by the Providers which involved injunctions against state court

proceedings after the dismissal of an entire case. See Am. Town Center v. Hall

83 Assocs., 912 F.2d 104, 110–11 (6th Cir. 1990) (upholding a district court’s

refusal to enjoin state court proceedings when the district court’s dismissal of the

lawsuit was on appeal); Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1240

(7th Cir. 1986) (reversing an injunction against state court proceedings granted

by the district court after dismissal of the federal lawsuit).

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The district court’s injunction merely enforced the partial summary

judgment. American Town Center involved an expansion, not merely an

enforcement, of the district court’s judgment because the injunction requested

in that case extended to parties not involved in the federal litigation. 912 F.2d

at 111. We do not hold that whenever the relitigation exception applies, the

injunction is necessarily a valid enforcement of the district court’s judgment.

However, in this case, where the district court has not completely disposed of the

case, and, where the injunction granted is so narrowly tailored to the precise

issue decided, was necessary given the Providers’ conduct, and only applies to

the parties in the federal action, we hold that the district court had jurisdiction

to enter the injunction.

2. Application of Religitation Exception

We have developed a four-part test to determine whether a particular

injunction falls under the relitigation exception:

(1) parties in the later action must be identical to or in privity with

the parties in the previous action; (2) judgment in the prior action

must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3)

the prior action must have concluded with a final judgment on the

merits; and (4) the same claim or cause of action must be involved

in both suits.

Moore, 556 F.3d at 273 (citing New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gillispie, 203 F.3d 384,

387 (5th Cir. 2000)). We examine each prong in turn.

Here, the injunction applies only to parties to the federal case: the

Providers and the Liberty Entities. Therefore, the first prong is satisfied. With

regard to the second prong, we have already found that the district court is a

court of proper jurisdiction in the appeal of the permanent injunction against

Gunderson and LCMH, Liberty Mut. Ins., 305 F. App’x at 177, and, as counsel

for the Providers admitted at oral argument, we are bound by our previous

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decision. As to the third prong, there is no dispute that the partial summary

judgment is a final judgment on the merits.

The Providers take issue with the fourth prong: whether the action

enjoined involves the same claim or cause of action as this case. The Providers

argue that the injunction is too broad because there are issues relating to the

Provider Agreements that the district court did not decide on summary

judgment and that may entitle the Providers to state court damages against the

Liberty Entities. The Providers seek recovery from the Liberty Entities for late

payments, improper down-coding, nonpayment of covered expenses, application

of erroneous discount rates, and failure to comply with other specific provisions

of the Provider Agreements.

The injunction, however, is not as broad as the Providers claim. We hold

that the injunction is tailored to apply only to those issues decided in the partial

summary judgment. The injunction merely prevents the Providers from

relitigating that the LWCA or the AWPA renders the Provider Agreements

invalid or unenforceable. The injunction does not prevent the Providers from

pursuing their other claims against the Liberty Entities in the OWC and

Louisiana state courts. Therefore we conclude the district court properly applied

the relitigation exception to enjoin the state court action.

3. Propriety of Injunction

The Providers maintain that, even if the district court had jurisdiction to

issue the injunction and properly applied the relitigation exception, the district

court abused its discretion by granting the injunction. We find no merit in this

argument. The district court felt that the injunction was necessary to prevent

the Providers’ state court delay tactics and unnecessary expenditures, and we

will not disturb that ruling on appeal.

IV. CONCLUSION

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Because the Providers failed to brief the merits of the partial summary

judgment appeal and we reject their request to certify the merits to the

Louisiana Supreme Court, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of partial

summary judgment in favor of the Liberty Entities. We also AFFIRM the

district court’s permanent injunction against the Providers, enjoining them from

relitigating the issues decided in the partial summary judgment before the OWC

or in Louisiana state courts. We DENY the Liberty Entities’ motion to dismiss

for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

AFFIRMED.

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