Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00897/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00897-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

POWAY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 10CV897-GPC(DHB)

ORDER DENYING

COUNTERCLAIMANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AS TO IDEA CLAIM

AND SUA SPONTE STAYS THE

CASE 

[Dkt. No. 54.]

vs.

K.C. by and through her Guardian Ad Litem,

Anna Cheng,

Defendant

____________________________________

AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIM

K.C., a high school student with profound hearing loss, filed a counterclaim against Poway

Unified School District challenging the ALJ’s decision on remand concluding that the District was not

required to provide K.C.withCommunicationAccessReal-Time Translation (“CART”) transcription 1

service under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). On August 22, 2012, K.C.

filed a motion for summary judgment on all causes of action in the first amended counterclaim. (Dkt.

No. 54.) Based on the reasoning below, the Court DENIES K.C.’s motion for summary judgment on

CART, also known as a “word-for-word” system, “involves a stenographer who uses a

1

stenographic (or court reporting machine) to create a verbatim transcript on a laptop viewed by the

pupil. The transcript appears almost simultaneously as the words are spoken.” (Supp. AR 567.) 

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the IDEA claim and sua sponte STAYS the remainder of the case pending resolution of the issues in

K.M. v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., No. SACV 10-1011, 2011 WL 2633673 (C.D. Cal. July 5, 2011);

and D.H. v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., No. 09cv2621-L(NLS) (S.D. Cal. June 12, 2012) currently on

appeal with the Ninth Circuit. 

Procedural Background

On April 28, 2010, Plaintiff Poway Unified School District (“District”) filed a complaint for

reversal of due process decision against Defendant K.C., byand through her Guardian Ad Litem, Anna

Cheng pursuant to the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (Dkt. No. 1.) District sought judicial review

of Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Robert Helfand’s decision, dated January 29, 2010, requiring

District to provide K.C. with CART. On June 25, 2010, K.C. filed a counterclaim alleging violations

of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”); and violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. (Dkt. No. 7.) The parties filed cross motions

for summary judgment. (Dkt. Nos. 22, 23.) On September 26, 2011, District Judge Larry A. Burns

issued an order vacating the ALJ’s decision and referred the matter back to the ALJ for further

proceedings. (Dkt. No. 40.) The parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment were denied without

prejudice. (Id.) 

On May 21, 2012, on remand, ALJ Marian Tully found in favor of District and concluded that

K.C. failed to show that CART was required to provide her with a free appropriate public education

(“FAPE”). The parties returned to this Court. On June 20, 2012, K.C. filed a motion to amend her

counterclaim which was granted. (Dkt. Nos. 46, 47.) On July 13, 2012, K.C. filed an amended

counterclaim alleging claims under the ADA, Unruh Civil Rights Act, Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and reversal of the Office of Administrative Hearing (“OAH”) decision. 

(Dkt. No. 50.) On August 3, 2012, K.C. filed a motion for preliminary injunction requiring District

to continue to provide her with CART while her appeal under the IDEA is pending. (Dkt. No. 52.) 

On August 18, 2012, the parties filed a stipulation where District agreed to provide K.C. with CART

while her IDEA claim is pending in this Court. (Dkt. No. 53.) On August 22, 2012, K.C. filed a

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motion for summary judgment on all claims in the amended counterclaim. (Dkt. No. 54.) On October 2

22, 2012, the case was transferred to the undersigned judge. (Dkt. No. 55.) District filed an opposition

on November 30, 2012. (Dkt. No. 57.) K.C. filed a reply on December 14, 2012. (Dkt. No. 59.) 

Factual Background

At the time of the due process hearing, in December 2009, K.C. was a 15 year old girl, with

profound hearing loss in both ears, attending general education classes in the Poway Unified School

District. K.C.’s hearing loss occurred at the age of five months as a result of meningitis. K.C.

received a cochlear implant in her right ear at 22 months. She wore a hearing aide in the left ear until 3

she received a cochlear implant in her left ear around the end of April 2009. In July 2009, K.C.’s

audiologist concluded that K.C. hears about 52 percent of what is said in real-life situations.

On May 18, 2009, and continuing again on June 9, 2009, an individualized education program

(“IEP”) meeting was convened to discuss K.C.’s transition from middle school to high school. In

attendance at the meeting were parents, program specialists Jodie Payne and Geralyn Murray; Deaf

and Hard of Hearing (“DHH”) itinerant teachers Carol Reeves and Ms. Simpson; Ms. Suennen; Ms.

Mehaffie; Ms. Ugalde; and Kelly Burke, an assistant principal at the High School. (Supp. AR 570;

AR 187.) At the meeting, parents requested CART transcription service. (Supp. AR 570.) After

discussing K.C.’s performance in school, her goals, needs, services, accommodations, supplemental

aids and services, assistive technological devices and services, communication strategies, teacher

comments, and parent comments and requests, (AR 187-97), the May 18, 2009 IEP offered the

following: DHH Language and Speech, Resource Specialist Program Learning Strategies class;

preferential seating; a second set of text books for the home; copies of teacher’s notes when necessary;

In her motion for summary judgment, K.C. states she is no longer pursuing her claim under 2

§ 504 and requests that it be dismissed without prejudice. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS K.C.’s

request and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE her § 504 claim.

“A cochlear implant is an electronic device, part of which is surgically implanted in the head 3

of the deaf individual. Sound is picked up by an external processor, converted to energy and sent into

the implanted computer chip. Based on the energy received, the device stimulates the nerves in the

inner ear, which then transmit information to the brain. Unlike a hearing aid, the cochlear implant

stimulates the ear itself; it does not merely make the sounds louder.” (Supp. AR 565.)

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closed captioning for media; peer note taker in Health class; personal auditory FM system ; laptop for 4

streaming closed captioned videos; closed caption decoder; visual presentation of new materials and

vocabulary; and directions to teachers to face K.C. when speaking. (Supp. AR 570.) It also

determined transcription would be provided in English, Geometry and Biology; however, it did not

specify which program it would utilize. (Supp. AR 570.) Parents refused to consent to the IEP and

requested that the type of transcription service be designated in the IEP. 

On June 9, 2009, the IEP meeting was reconvened to discuss which type of transcription

system would be provided to K.C. (Supp. AR 571.) Parents sought CART for K.C. Ms. Simpson

informed parents with District had communicated with other school districts about CART and

described a student from one district who switched from CART to “meaning-for-meaning” system

because he was overwhelmed by the amount of information presented in the verbatim format. (Supp.

AR 571.) Ms. Simpson concluded “meaning for meaning” system was appropriate for K.C. (Supp.

AR 571.) District concluded that K.C. would benefit from transcription services but IEP team did not

specify the modality or specific program. (AR 198.) Parents did not consent to the IEP. (AR 200.) 

K.C. filed a due process complaint with Office of Administrative Hearing (“OAH”) against

District pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415 and California Education Code section 56500 et. seq. An

administrative hearing was held and evidence presented. On January 29, 2010, ALJ Helfand granted

the student’s request and ordered that District provide the student with CART services in English,

Health, Geometry and Biology classes immediately. (AR 120-134.) District appealed the ALJ’s

decision and filed a complaint in this Court on April 28, 2010. District Judge Burns vacated the ALJ’s

decision and remanded the matter for further proceedings. On remand, ALJ Tully concluded that 5

given the information the District had at the time of the offer of FAPE, District reasonably concluded

“An FM system uses radio frequencies to transmit audio signals directly to hearing aides and 4

cochlear implants. It consists of a wireless microphone the speaker wears close to his mouth and the 

desired acoustic signal is transmitted directly into the hearing device.” (Supp. AR 565.)

In her decision, she explained that normally, the remanded case would be assigned to the ALJ

5

who presided at the hearing; however, at the time the case was remanded, ALJ Helfand was not

available. (Supp. AR 564 n.1.) Therefore, ALJ Tully was assigned the matter. 

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that TypeWell would provide the student some educational benefit within the meaning of Rowley . 

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The student, therefore, failed to show that CART transcription was required to provide her a FAPE. 

 (Supp. AR 580.)

Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Judicial review under the IDEA is less deferential than in most administrative cases. J.L. v.

Mercer Isl. Sch. Dist., 592 F.3d 938-949 (9th Cir. 2010). The IDEA allows the reviewing court to hear

evidence that goes beyond the scope of the administrative record and based on a preponderance of the

evidence grant such relief as the court deems is appropriate. Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. M.P., 689 F.3d

1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)) . However, a complete de novo review

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is inappropriate. Id. (citing Amanda J. ex rel. Annette J. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 887

(9th Cir 2001)). The Court may not substitute its “own notions of sound educational policy for those

of the school authorities which they review.” Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist.,

Westchester County v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982). Because states have the primary

responsibilityof formulating each child’s education, the administrative proceedings are accorded “due

weight” and the reviewing court must consider the findings carefully. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 689 F.3d

at 1053. Aftersuch consideration, the court is free to accept or reject the findings in part or in whole. 

Ash v. Lake Oswego Sch. Dist., No. 7J, 980 F.2d 585, 587–88 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). 

Ultimately, the weight accorded the administrative findings is a matter within the discretion of the

reviewing court. Id.; Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1471 (9th Cir. 1993). A court

should give deference to the administrative findings when they are thorough and careful. Id. The

burden is on the party challenging the hearing officer’s determination to persuade the Court that the

hearing officer was incorrect. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1 v. B.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1498 (9th Cir.1996).

/ / / / 

Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist., Westchester County v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 6

176, 206 (1982). 

According to IDEA, the Court “shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings; 7

(ii) shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party; and (iii) basing its decision on the

preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.” 20

U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C). 

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B. IDEA

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), enacted in 1990, originated in 1970

as part of the Education of the Handicapped Act. Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 928 (9th Cir.

2008). In enacting the IDEA, Congress sought “to ensure that all children with disabilities have

available to them a free appropriate public education [“FAPE”] that emphasizes special education and

related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education,

employment, and independent living[.]” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). The IDEA defines a FAPE as: 

special education and related services that-(A) have been provided at public

expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge; (B) meet the

standards of the State educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool,

elementary school, or secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) are

provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under

section 1414(d) of this title.

20 U.S.C. § 1401(9).

To provide a FAPE under the IDEA, a state educational agency receiving federal funds must

evaluate a student, determine whether that student is eligible for special education and services,

conduct and implement an IEP, and determine an appropriate educational placement of the student. 

20 U.S.C. § 1414. An IEP is a written statement for each child with a disability that is developed,

reviewed, and revised by an IEP team consisting of the local educational agency, the student’s

teachers and parents. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B). An IEP is tailored to the unique needs of the

handicapped child. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(29). An IEP must include, among other things, “statement of

the special education and related services and supplementaryaids and services, based on peer-reviewed

research to the extent practicable, to be provided to the child, or on behalf of the child, and a statement

of the program modifications or supports for school personnel that will be provided for the child.” 20

U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV). Moreover, an IEP is to be evaluated based on information available

at the time it was developed. Adams v .State of Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141, 1149 (9th Cir. 1999). An IEP

is a “snapshot, not a retrospective.” Id. at 1149. 

In Rowley, the United States Supreme Court set the controlling standard for defining a FAPE

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under the IDEA. 458 U.S. 176 (1982). Despite amendments to the IDEA, the standard in Rowley 8

is still controlling in the Ninth Circuit. J.L. v. Mercer Island Sch. Dist., 592 F.3d 938, 951 & n.10 (9th

Cir. 2010). The United States Supreme Court concluded that the IDEA does not require school

districts to provide special education students with the best education available or to provide

instruction that maximizes the student’s ability commensurate with the opportunities provided other

children. Id. at 198, 200-01. Instead, school districts must give students with disabilities a “basic floor

of opportunity” which “consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are

individually designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child.” Id. at 200-01

(emphasis added); see also Mercer Island Sch. Dist., 592 F.3d 938, 951 & n.10 (9th Cir. 2010)

(“educational benefit,” “some educational benefit,” or a “meaningful educational benefit” all refer to

the same standard). The IEP should be reasonably calculated to enable the student “to achieve passing

marks and advance from grade to grade.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203-04. 

The choice of methodology in providing special education services is the prerogative of the

school district. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208 (“once a court determines that the requirements of the [IDEA]

have been met, questions of methodology are for resolution by the States.”); see also C.P. v. Prescott

Unified School District, 631 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that IDEA allows educators the

discretion to select from various methods in orderto meet the individualized needs of a student if those

practices are reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit); B.M. ex rel. R.M. v. Encinitas

Union Sch. Dist., 2013 WL 593417, *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2013); Carlson v. San Diego Unified Sch.

Dist., 380 Fed. Appx. 595, 597 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming district court’s holding that school district

provided student with FAPE as the case boiled down to a disagreement over the proper methodology). 

Parents cannot dictate the particular methodology to be used. See Rowley, 458 U.S. 207-08; see also

Gregory K. V.v Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987) (parents believed Lois

Lewis’s tutoring helped student learn; however, court must focus primarily on District’s proposed

Rowley involved an eight-year old deafstudent. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 184. Parents requested 8

a qualified sign-language interpreter in all her academic classes for first grade. Id. The student had

successfully completed her kindergarten year with the use of a FM hearing aid. Id. The Court held

that the student, who was performing better than the average child in her class and was advancing

easily from grade to grade, was receiving personalized services and related services to meet her

educational needs. Id. at 209-10. Therefore, the school district did not violate FAPE in not providing

student with sign-language interpreter. Id. 

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placement, not the alternative that the family preferred). 

Rowley requires courts to conduct a two-step inquiry as to whether a child has received a

FAPE. First, the Court must determine whether the state has complied with the procedural

requirements of the IDEA. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206–07. Second, the Court must determine whether

the state has met the substantive component of the IDEA, namelythe requirement that the state provide

an “appropriate” education. Id. In this case, the parties dispute the substantive component of the

IDEA. 

In the prior order on summary judgment in this case, Judge Burns asserted that state standards

are also a part of the IDEA analysis and that California Education Code section 56000(e) explicitly

9

states that it “does not set a higher standard of educating individuals with exceptional needs than that

established by Congress under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et

seq.).” (Dkt. No. 40 at 3.) 

California Education Code section 56000.5(b)(7) provides that deaf children should have

“direct and appropriate access to all components of the educational process, be able to communicate

directly with their peers and that their unique communication mode is respected, utilized and

developed.” Cal. Educ. Code § 56000.5(b)(7). Deaf children should be able to “communicate

directly” with their peers and that their “unique communication mode is respected, utilized, and

developed to an appropriate level of proficiency.” Id. § 56000.5(b)(4); (b)(2). Moreover, the IEP team

“shall consider the related services and program options that provide the pupil with an equal

opportunity for communication access.” Id. § 56345(d). 

California Education Code section 56341.1(b)(4) provides that an IEP shall: 

[c]onsider the communication needs of the pupil, and in the case of a pupil who is

deaf or hard of hearing, consider the pupil’s language and communication needs,

opportunities for direct communications with peers and professional personnel in

the pupil’s language and communication mode, academic level, and full range of

needs, including opportunities for direct instruction in the pupil’s language and

communication mode.

Judge Burns wrote that “[t]he Court hesitates to say this and no more” concerning his 9

statement that “[s]tate standards are also part of the IDEA analysis.” (Dkt. No. 40 at 3.) In a footnote,

Judge Burns questions the application of the Court’s assertion in Rowley’s that FAPE “must meet the

State’s educational standards”and the interplay between state and federal standards. (Id. at 3-4.)

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Cal. Educ. Code § 56341.1(b)(4). 

Similarly, the IDEA provides that the IEP Team 

shall consider the communication needs of the child, and in the case of a child who

is deaf or hard of hearing, consider the child’s language and communication needs,

opportunities for direct communications with peers and professional personnel in

the child’s language and communication mode, academic level, and full range of

needs, including opportunities for direct instruction in the child’s language and

communication mode.

20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(iv). The parties do not dispute that the California Education Code section

56000 et seq. does not provide a heightened standard than the one expressed in Rowley. (Dkt. No. 57-

1 at 17; Dkt. No. 54-1 at 24.)

In the prior order, Judge Burns concluded that ALJ Helfand did not apply the “some

educational benefit” standard under Rowleyand instead compared the relative merits of CART against

the merits of TypeWell concluding that CART would benefit K.C. more than TypeWell. Judge Burns

vacated the decision and remanded the matter back to the ALJ. On remand, ALJ Tully concluded that

the District complied with FAPE when it offered TypeWell. 

K.C. argues that at the time of the IEP, K.C.’s grades were declining , she could not do 10

independent work because of concerns with her reading, she had vocabulary and summarization skills

deficits and these problems were a result of her hearing loss. She also alleges that the Tully decision

did not address K.C.’s communication needs and only focused on whethershe was passing from grade

to grade. She further contends that ALJ Tully deviated from Helfand’s finding with no explanation

even though she did not observe live witness testimony. As to this argument, K.C. does not provide

any legal authority to support her claim that an ALJ on remand cannot add or delete facts from a prior

decision. Lastly, K.C. asserts that ALJ Tully assessed the IEP on K.C.’s academic performance after

the IEP and not at the time the IEP plan was implemented. As to this argument, the Court notes that

the ALJ addressed K.C.’s academic performance in the fall of 2009 which is after the IEP meeting

date of May/June 2009. To the extent that the ALJrelied on these facts to support her conclusion, they

are disapproved. 

Judge Burns noted that it was unclear from the record whether all of K.C.’s grades were

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declining or only some of them. (Dkt. No. 40 at 8 n. 8.) 

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In opposition, District does not directly address K.C.’s numerous arguments but contends that 

state standards only require District to consider and discuss the services and program options to

provide the student with an equal opportunity and that there was no evidence by K.C., at the time of

the IEP meeting, that she would not benefit from the District’s offer. 

Two district court cases, with factually similar background held that the IDEA did not require

the school district to provide CART as part of FAPE. See D.H. v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist.,

09cv2621-L(NLS), 2011 WL 883003 (S.D. Cal. March 14, 2011); K.M. v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist.,

No. SACV 10-1011 DOC(MLGx), 2011 WL 2633673 (C.D. Cal. July 5, 2011). 

In D.H., District Judge Lorenz, upheld the ALJ’s conclusion that a deaf student was provided

with FAPE and CART services was not required under the IDEA. D.H., 2011 WL 883003, at *7. 11

In the case, the student received

an FM amplification system for classroom and school assemblies, including a passaround microphone to capture the input of her peers. She also received access to

close captioning for video presentations at school. With these services she earned

excellent grades, predominantly As and some Bs. She also received access to close

captioning for video presentations at school. In addition, she was provided with

preferential seating away from noise, access to copies of her peers’ or teacher’s

lecture notes, written directions, an extra set of textbooks as needed, access to a

quiet work environment, and extra time for some assignments. Finally, her teachers

were provided with information packets and training regarding Plaintiff's hearing

loss and the necessary accommodations, including the need to face Plaintiff when

giving instruction, pass the microphone around the class during other students’

participation, and repeating or rephrasing other students’ responses. Plaintiff was

also provided with specific deaf and hard of hearing services and speech and

audiological services.

Id. at 6 (citations omitted). Parents requested CART but the district declined. Id. The court concluded

that the district complied with California education standards for hearing-impaired students. Id. at 5. 

California Education Code does not require any particular service or technology be provided but that

the “IEP team consider Plaintiff’s needs and assistive services and programs to provide her with an

equal opportunity for communication access and that they discuss her needs and necessary services

in their effort to comply with the requirement of a free appropriate public education.” D.H., 2011 WL

883003 at *4 (emphasis in original). D.H. did not dispute that the district considered her needs and

While District offered a transcription service which would summarize the words spoken in 11

class as a response to the parents’ request for CART, it was not a necessary service and not included

in the student’s IEP. 

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assistive services and programs. Accordingly, the court held that the ALJ did not err in concluding

that the IEP complied with the IDEA. 

In K.M., the district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision that the school district was not required

to provide the student with CART services under the IDEA. K.M., 2011 WL 2633673 at *13. K.M.

is a deaf, sixteen year old student with bilateral cochlear implants. Id. at 1. She relies on lip-reading

and observations of social cues to communicate with others. Id. K.M. expressed difficulty hearing

what is said in the classroom especially when other students are speaking. She needs to concentrate

and focus more intently which causes her to be mentally exhausted by the end of the day and causes

her to be emotionally very tired. Id. Despite her difficulty, student has earned average to aboveaverage grades. Id. at 2. 

She receives weekly auditory-visual therapy (“AVT”), preferential seating in class, has student

comments repeated, is provided closed captioning at times on videos and provided copies of notes. 

Id. In middle school, she was provided with an FM system in the classroom but she did not like it as

it picked up a lot of static and would distract her when hearing private conversations between the

teachers and other students. Id. at 3. She stopped using it in eighth grade since it gave her headaches

and picked up distracting background noises which impeded her ability to focus. Id. K.M.’s mother

requested CART because of student’s inability to hear class discussions but the district refused. Id. 

The district raised the possibility of Typewell but the mother opposed. Id. at 4. The District Judge

concluded that “the fact that CART services would ‘maximize’ K.M.’s potential does not mandate the

District to provide them so long as the District was providing sufficient accommodations for K.M. to

offer her a reasonable educational benefit.” Id. at 13. 

In this case, on remand, ALJ Tully provided a thorough, detailed analysis of the law and

relevant factual findings. She acknowledged the legal elements of an IEP with specific consideration

for DHH students and the IDEA’s provision of the IEP team to “consider the communication needs”

for DDH students and to consider “opportunities of direct communication with peers and professional

personnel.” In her discussion, she also noted the student’s need. She noted that K.C. is often unable

to hear when her classmates participate in class discussion and misses or misunderstands instructions

and assignments. (Supp. AR 572.) Frequently, she misses what is said in class. (Supp. AR 572.) She

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must concentrate intensely to understand what is said in class which causes her frequent headaches. 

(Supp. AR 572.) Tully also noted that student’s grades decreased as the school year progressed which

her Language Arts and Social Studies teacher, Ms. Ugalde, attributed to the lack of specialized

vocabulary which negatively impacted her learning. (Supp. AR 568-69.) Ms. Ugalde stated that she

graded K.C. differently than her other students by taking into account her hearing difficulties so she

actually received higher grades than she actually earned. (Supp. AR 569.) As her eighth grade year

progressed, K.C.’s writing became more organized, had better insight into literature and understood

more concepts in social studies. (Supp. AR 569.)

In explaining the District’s offer to provide TypeWell, rather than CART, the ALJ stated that 

she was a very good auditory learning and supplemented her understanding of classroom instruction

with a variety of strategies and was very successful. The IEP team was aware that K.C. had recently

received her second cochlear implant and it could take up to a year for hearing to adjust. District also

listened and considered Parents’ and student’s preference for CART, read Parent’s report, researched

CART, observed meaning-for-meaning transcription services in use at another high school and

communicated with other districts. (Supp. AR 579.) District’s expert, who was familiar with both

CART and Type Well, and observed K.C. in three classes, concluded that she did not need CART and

that TypeWell would be “fine.” (Supp. AR 575.) After consideration of the issues raised in the IEP,

the District offered TypeWell transcription services for Biology, English and Geometry. 

Moreover, besides transcription services, the IEP team came up with a comprehensive scheme

to address K.C.’s needs. These included DHH Language and Speech; Resource Specialist Program

Learning Strategies class; preferential seating; a second set of text books for the home; copies of

teacher’s notes when necessary; closed captioning for media; peer note taker in Health class; personal

auditory FM system; laptop for streaming closed captioned videos; closed caption decoder; visual

presentation of new materials and vocabulary; and directions to teachers to face K.C. when speaking. 

(Supp. AR 570.) At the time of the IEP, K.C. was performing at an A or B in all of her classes and

progressing on her IEP goals and advancing from grade to grade. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203-04. 

Based on the information available to it in May 2009, the District offered K.C. an IEP which

included transcription service. District does not dispute that transcription services are needed. K.C.

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objects to the type of transcription service offered. In essence, the disagreement is over the proper

methodology or modality. School districts have the prerogative to determine the choice of

methodology and parents are not allowed to select service providers or compel a district to provide a

particular education program or methodology when the one offered constitutes FAPE. See Rowley,

458 U.S. 207-08; see also Gregory K. V.v Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987)

(parents believed Lois Lewis’s tutoring helped student learn; however, court must focus primarily on

District’s proposed placement, not the alternative that the family preferred). Accordingly, the Court

affirms the ALJ’s decision in this matter as careful, reasoned and supported by the preponderance of

the evidence. 

C. Title II of the ADA and Unruh Civil Rights Act

K.C. argues that District’s failure to provide K.C. with CART is a violation of Title II of the

ADA and its implementing regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 35.160. She contends that the standard to provide 12

a FAPE under the IDEA is distinct from providing “effective communication” under the ADA. 

District contends that the ADA claim fails since the ALJ concluded there was a denial of FAPE under

the IDEA.

The Tustin and D.H. cases are currently on appeal with the Ninth Circuit. The issue in both

cases is whether a school district’s provision of a FAPE under the IDEA establishes full compliance

with its obligation under Title II of the ADA to provide “effective communication.” The Unruh Civil

Rights Act claim is also on appeal in the Tustin case. Plaintiff’s counsel in this case is also counsel

in the Tustin and D.H. cases. Defendant’s counsel is also counsel in the D.H. case. Tustin and D.H.

were consolidated on appeal for purposes of oral argument and argued before the Ninth Circuit on

The ADA prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. 12

§ 12132. The regulations implementing Title II specifically provide that: 

(a) A public entity shall take appropriate steps to ensure that communications with

applicants, participants, and members of the public with disabilities are as effective

as communications with others.

(b)(1) A public entity shall furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where

necessary to afford an individual with a disability an equal opportunity to

participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, a service, program, or activity conducted

by a public entity.

28 C.F.R. § 35.160 (emphasis added). 

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December 3, 2012. 

“The District Court has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to

control its own docket.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997) (citing Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299

U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). In determining whether to grant a motion to stay, “the competing interests

which will be affected by the granting or refusal to grant a stay must be weighed.” Lockyer v. Mirant

Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing CMAX Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir.

1962)). These interests include: “(1) the possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay,

(2) the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward, and (3) the

orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and

questions of law which could be expected to result from a stay.” Id. 

In this case, there would be no damage, hardship or inequity from the granting of a stay. A stay

would avoid inconsistent rulings and contribute to the interests of justice and efficiency. The Court

exercises its discretion and sua sponte stays the proceedings pending a ruling on the Tustin and D.H.

cases by the Ninth Circuit. 

D. Requests for Judicial Notice

District filed a request for judicial notice on December 12, 2012. (Dkt. No. 58.) District seeks

the Court to take judicial notice of Gatto v. County of Sonoma, 98 Cal. App. 4th 744 (2002). K.C. also

filed a request for judicial notice on March 1, 2013. (Dkt. No. 60.) She seeks the Court to take

judicial notice of Argenyi v. Creighton Univ., No. 11-3336/3461 (8th Cir. Jan. 15, 2013) concerning

a claim for CART by a hearing impaired medical student under Title III of the ADA. 

The Court DENIES both parties’ requests for judicial notice as they were not relied upon in

ruling on the instant motion for summary judgment. 

/ / / /

/ / / /

/ / / /

/ / / /

/ / / /

/ / / /

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Conclusion

Based on the above, the Court DENIES Defendant/Counterclaimant’s motion for summary

judgment as to the IDEA claim and sua sponte STAYS the remainder of the case pending a ruling by

the Ninth Circuit in K.M. v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., No. SACV 10-1011, 2011 WL 2633673 (C.D.

Cal. July 5, 2011); and D.H. v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., No. 09cv2621-L(NLS) (S.D. Cal. June 12,

2012). The Court VACATES the hearing set for March 15, 2013. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 13, 2013

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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