Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_89-mc-00185/USCOURTS-caed-1_89-mc-00185-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 999
Nature of Suit: 
Cause of Action: Civil Miscellaneous Case

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26 The court considers both supplemental briefs. 1

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

R.E. FRASCH, et al., )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. Misc. CV-F-89-185 REC

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART ROBERT WILEY

LOVELESS'S MOTION FOR SALE

OF REAL PROPERTY 

On June 27, 2005, the court heard the Motion for Sale of

Real Property "Dwelling" filed by judgment creditor Robert Wiley

Loveless (hereinafter referred to as Loveless). This motion was

opposed by the current owners of the property, Gerald E. Schaefer

and Deena L. Schaefer (hereinafter referred to as the Schaefers). 

Following oral argument, the Schaefers filed a supplemental

opposition to the motion and Loveless filed a supplemental

reply. The court then ordered Loveless to file copies with the 1

Case 1:89-mc-00185-REC Document 53 Filed 08/05/05 Page 1 of 18
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court of (1) Notice of Pendency of Action recorded on June 8,

1999 as Instrument No. 0199081437 in the Kern County Records; (2) 

Loveless's motion to reinstate appeal filed in the

Ninth Circuit appeal No. 00-15770 on April 24, 2001; and (3)

Loveless and Frasch stipulation to dismiss Ninth 

Circuit appeal No. 00-15770 filed in the Ninth Circuit on April

24, 2001.

All briefing now being complete, the court hereby grants in

part and denies in part the Motion for Sale of Real Property

"Dwelling" filed by Loveless.

Loveless moves the court for an order allowing and directing

the levy and sale of real property commonly referred to as 412

Vista Verde Way, Bakersfield, California to satisfy the

$2,188,978.13 money judgment previously entered and renewed

against Judgment Debtor Constance Frasch. 

A. Background.

On March 13, 1989, a Judgment was entered in the United

States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma in

favor of Loveless and against Constance Frasch. An Abstract of

Judgment was filed in this court on August 15, 1989 and was

recorded by the Kern County Recorder on August 22, 1989.

1. Bankruptcy No. 89-14197. 

On January 4, 1993, Frasch filed a bankruptcy petition in

the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of

California, Case No. 89-14197. On July 24, 1995, the Bankruptcy

Court issued its Order Approving Trustee’s No Asset Report,

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Discharging Trustee and Closing Case. 

On May 6, 1999, upon Frasch’s motion to reopen the

bankruptcy to avoid Loveless’s lien on the real property, the

bankruptcy was reopened. On June 6, 1999, the Bankruptcy Court

issued its Order Granting Motion to Avoid Lien of Robert Wiley

Loveless. 

On June 8, 1999, Loveless recorded a Notice of Pendency of

Action in Kern County. The Notice of Pendency of Action 

refers to “Bk. No. 189-04197B-7K” in the United States Bankruptcy

Court for the Eastern District of California. The Notice of

Pendency of Action states in pertinent part:

NOTICE IS GIVEN that the above action was

commenced on June 8, 1999, in the above court

by Robert Wiley Loveless, Movant; the action

is now pending in the above court. 

The above action alleges a Judgment Lien

claim affecting certain real property that is

situated at 412 Vista Verde Way, Bakersfield,

in Kern County .... 

The Notice of Pendency of Action was filed in the Bankruptcy

Court on August 19, 1999. 

Loveless then filed a motion to reconsider in the Bankruptcy

Court, which motion was denied by the Bankruptcy Court on August

11, 1999. 

On August 19, 1999, Loveless filed an appeal, which appeal

was heard by this court. See Loveless v. Frasch, No. CV-F-99-

6239 REC. By Opinion filed on April 14, 2000, the court affirmed

the Bankruptcy Court. 

Loveless then appealed this court’s affirmance of the

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At oral argument in connection with the instant motion, 2

Loveless asserted that he did not prosecute the appeal because

Frasch had filed another bankruptcy petition in the United States

Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California, Bk. No.

00-15423 on July 10, 2000 and he could not prosecute the appeal

because of the automatic stay. While it appears that Loveless

could not have prosecuted the appeal without obtaining a lifting of

the automatic stay from the Bankruptcy Court, see In re Tampa Chain

Company, Inc., 835 F.2d 54 (2 Cir. 1987), the docket in Bk. No. nd

00-15423, of which the court takes judicial notice, establishes

that the bankruptcy was dismissed on March 22, 2001, with a formal

order of dismissal being entered on April 6, 2001. Furthermore,

Mr. Mullen’s declaration in support of re-opening the appeal filed

in the Ninth Circuit makes no mention that the appeal was not

prosecuted because of the automatic stay.

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Bankruptcy Court’s ruling to the Ninth Circuit. On April 1,

2001, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal because of

Loveless’s failure to prosecute it. A certified copy of the

Order dismissing the appeal was filed in the Bankruptcy Court on

April 25, 2001. However, on April 24, 2001, Loveless filed a

motion in the Ninth Circuit to vacate the order dismissing the

appeal and to reinstate the appeal. In support of this motion 2

was filed the Declaration of Ray T. Mullen, who averred in

pertinent part:

3. On April 3, 2001, the parties to this

appeal reached a tentative settlement of this

matter which provided, inter alia, for the

dismissal of the within appeal with a remand

to the underlying Bankruptcy Court to vacate

its prior Order Avoiding Lien which was the

basis of this appeal.

4. While the Stipulation and Order were

being prepared by Appellee’s counsel,

Appellant’s counsel became ill and was absent

from the office when the corrected draft of

the Stipulation and Order arrived and was

unable to timely advise the Court of the

pending resolution. After returning to work

on April 23, 2001, I confirmed with counsel

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for Appellee that he had indeed received the

previously executed Stipulation and Order

thereon and that he would forward the

pleadings to the within Court by overnight

mail, and that he had no opposition to the

granting of the within Motion to vacate the

order dismissing the case and reinstating the

appeal subject to the submission of the

Stipulation and Order previously negotiated

between the parties.

5. Therefore this Court is requested to

grant this motion to vacate its prior Order

dismissing the appeal, and to reinstate the

within appeal, subject to the Stipulation

being separately submitted to the within

Court by Appellee’s counsel.

Attached to Mr. Mullen’s declaration was a copy of the

Stipulation to Dismiss Appeal as Moot:

1. The above captioned appeal has become

moot by virtue of the Appellee’s imminent

probable loss of her interest in and to the

real property that is the subject of the

order from which the appeal was taken.

2. The above captioned appeal should be

dismissed as moot and remanded to the United

States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of

California, with instructions to vacate its

order from which this appeal was taken ....

On September 17, 2001, the appeal was reinstated and the Ninth

Circuit, pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, remanded the

matter to this court for consideration of the parties’

stipulation to remand the matter to the bankruptcy court. The

mandate was not issued by the Ninth Circuit until October 11,

2001. On February 28, 2002, this court issued its “Order

Remanding Case to Bankruptcy Court After Dismissal of Appeal

Based on Mootness”, wherein the court ruled:

Based on the representations and

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stipulations, in open court, of counsel, and

good cause appearing, IT IS ORDERED that this

matter is remanded to the United States

Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of

California, Fresno Division, and the

Bankruptcy Court is instructed to vacate the

‘Order Avoiding Judicial Liens’ that it

entered on June 11, 1999.

The Bankruptcy Court complied by Order filed on September 6,

2002.

2. No. Misc. CV-F-89-185 REC

On July 7, 1999, Loveless filed an Application for Renewal

of Judgment with this court, which application was filed in No.

Misc. CV-F-89-185. When Loveless filed the application to renew

the judgment, the Bankruptcy Court had already issued its Order

Granting Motion to Avoid Lien of Robert Wiley Loveless, a fact

not disclosed to this court by Loveless. By Order filed on July

9, 1999, the court granted that application and a Judgment was

entered on July 9, 1999 renewing the prior judgment. However,

also on July 9, 1999, the court, having learned of the Bankruptcy

Court’s ruling, issued an Order staying execution of the renewed

judgment pending further court order. A hearing was held on July

19, 1999 and an order to show cause why the renewed judgment

should not be vacated and sanctions was issued against Loveless

and/or Mr. Mullen. Thereafter, Frasch filed a motion to vacate

the renewed judgment and for sanctions. Frasch’s motion was

continued a number of times and eventually was heard on January

24, 2000 and taken under submission. However, it does not appear

that any ruling was issued by the court. On February 27, 2002,

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another Order to Show Cause why the renewed judgment should not

be vacated was issued and eventually heard on March 11, 2002. 

The minute order for March 11, 2002 states that the matter has

been resolved and that a proposed order is to be submitted. On

September 5, 2002, the court issued its Order Dismissing Order to

Show Cause, ruling in pertinent part:

Defendant’s counsel, David R. Jenkins,

represented to the Court that the legal

grounds upon which the Defendants had

objected to the renewal of the judgment had,

with the passage of time, become

inapplicable. Based on such representations,

and by consent of the parties, the Order to

Show Cause issued on February 27, 2002 is

dismissed.

In support of the instant motion is filed the Declaration of

Ray T. Mullen. Mr. Mullen avers in pertinent part:

5. An Abstract of Judgment in the amount of

the original Judgment was duly recorded in

the Kern County Records against the Judgment

Debtor’s real property, including the Subject

Real Property, on August 22, 1989 ...; the

Renewed Judgment was also recorded against

the Subject Property on July 12, 1999 as

Document number: 1099099222. Thus, there was

no gap in the continuation of the priority of

the Judgment Lien.

6. At a point in time prior to the renewal

of the Loveless Abstract of Judgment [on July

9, 1999], the Judgment Debtor refinanced the

debt on the Subject Real Property; however,

no payment was made to the Judgment Creditor,

nor was any subordination requested or

provided concerning said Judgment Lien. 

Instead, the senior deed of Trust was

reconveyed and replaced by a new deed of

Trust junior in time and priority to the

Judgment Lien of Loveless.

7. Declarant is informed and believes and

thereon declares that subsequent thereto, the

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new Deed of Trust beneficiary commenced, and

eventually completed, non-judicial

foreclosure proceedings against the Judgment

Debtor and the Subject Real Property. 

Subsequent thereto, a Trustee’s deed was

recorded terminating the Judgment Debtor’s

interest in the Subject real Property [sic],

but leaving the Loveless Judgment Lien in

place.

8. On or about June 22, 1999, Judgment

Debtor, after having reopened her prior

bankruptcy proceeding, caused to be recorded

in the Kern County Records, as Document

number: 0199088823, an Order Avoiding Liens

purportedly avoiding the Judgment Lien of

Judgment Creditor pursuant to 11 USC §522(f);

said Order was appealed and on June 8, 1999 a

Notice of Pending Action was recorded in the

Kern County Records, as Document number:

0199081437; after further appeal and an

eventual stipulation among the parties, on

September 6, 2002, the United States

Bankruptcy Court issued an Order Vacating

Order Avoiding Liens, thereby leaving in

place the Loveless Judgment Lien, which was

recorded in the Kern County Records on August

6, 2004 as Instrument Number 0204185410.

9. On or about October 25, 2001, the current

owners: Gerald E. Schaefer and Deena L.

Schaefer, Husband and Wife, as Joint Tenants,

received title to the Subject Real Property

still encumbered by the Loveless Judgment

Lien. 

10. No payment to the Judgment Creditor or

satisfaction of the Judgment has ever been

provided to the Judgment Creditor including

as part of the transfer of the encumbered

Subject Real Property. Thus, there have been

no payments made or credits applied to the

Total Judgment of $2,188,978.13.

11. The Judgment Debtor, Constance Jean

Frasch, has received a discharge of her

personal obligations under the Loveless

Judgment; however, said Judgment remains a

valid Judgment Lien against the Subject Real

Property, now owned by [the Schaefers]. 

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12. Based upon the Litigation Guarantee

obtained from First American Title Company

..., there are no senior liens to the

Loveless Judgment Lien against the Subject

Real Property.

13. Declarant believes that neither the

Judgment Debtor nor the current owners are

entitled to a homestead exemption pursuant to

CCP §704.710© senior to the Loveless Judgment

Lien.

14. Declarant further believes and thereon

declares that neither the Judgment Debtor,

nor the Schaefers, have any exempt equity in

the Subject Real Property; that there are no

laws, case decisions, nor statutes that

prevent the Judgment Creditor, and/or the

Sheriff of Kern County as his levying agent,

from proceeding with and completing the levy

and sale of the Subject Real Property for

satisfaction of the above-described Judgment;

and that proceeding with said levy and sale

is proper.

15. Finally, Declarant is unaware of any

reason or good cause why the requested levy

and sale cannot proceed at this time with the

proceeds thereof to be distributed to the

Judgment Creditor, Robert Wiley Loveless.

In opposition to this motion is filed the Declaration of

Gerald E. Schaefer, wherein Mr. Schaefer avers in pertinent part:

3. With my wife, I am the current owner, in

fee simple, of certain real property located

at 412 Vista Verde Way, Bakersfield ....

4. As evidenced by the Grant Deed, my wife

and I purchase [sic] the Property in October

2001, and in doing so we paid thousands of

dollars to the then record owner, Bankers

Trust Company of California.

5. At the time of our purchase of the

Property neither my wife, nor I, had any

personal or actual knowledge that Loveless

had ever recorded an Abstract of Judgment, or

that Loveless ever claimed a lien interest in

the Property. Indeed, until we were served

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Loveless requests that the court strike Mr. Kummer’s 3

declaration on various grounds. This request is denied. 

10

with the Loveless Motion, we never even knew

that Loveless even had a judgment against

Constance Frasch or that he was claiming a

lien on our property.

6. When we purchased the Property, we

believed that we were the sole and exclusive

owners of a fee simple in the Property and

that there were no other liens, encumbrances,

etc., actual or claimed as pertaining to the

Property. We believed, that since we paid

cash for the Property, that we held free and

clear title in our name only, and that no

other entity or person had any right, title,

lien or other interest, whatsoever, in the

Property.

Also filed in opposition to Loveless’s motion is the Declaration

of Dixon G. Kummer, counsel for the Schaefers, who avers in

pertinent part:3

16. At the time of the Trustee’s Sale, the

conveyance of the Trustee’s Deed and at the

time of the conveyance to the Schaefers the

public ‘Record’ at the Kern County Recorders’

Office was such that no other encumbrance or

lien existed against the property.

17. When the Schaefers took record title to

the property in question, it was free and

clear of any and all liens, including the

Loveless Abstract of Judgment Lien.

18. In September 2002, approximately a year

after Frasch lost the real property through

the Trustee’s Sale, (and nearly two years

from the closing of the Bankruptcy

proceedings), Frasch and Loveless, once

bitter enemies, stipulate to the reopening of

the Bankruptcy proceedings and further

stipulate to an ‘Order Vacating the Order

Avoiding Lien.’ An additional two years then

pass, when Loveless causes the ‘Order’ to be

recorded.

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19. After being retained by the Schaefers, I

contacted Loveless’ counsel. During my

initial conversation with Loveless’ counsel,

it was stated that Loveless’ purpose in

bringing the pending Motion and pursuing the

Writ, was not to actually force the sale of

the real property and damaged [sic] the

Schaefers, but to locate and obtain

‘insurance,’ monies [sic] from either the

lender or a title insurance company.

20. I also contacted Frasch’s Bankruptcy

Counsel, and during my conversation with him

it was communicated that Frasch and Loveless

has [sic] reach an agreement, by which in

exchange for Frasch’s stipulation to set

aside the Order Avoiding Liens, (which no

longer benefitted her, having lost the real

property through foreclosure), Frasch would

receive some of the monies, if any, that

Loveless would recover from either the

lending institution, the title insurance

company or the current homeowners, the

Schaefers.

21. The existence of an agreement by which

Frasch would receive money in exchange for

her stipulation to set aside the Order

Avoiding Liens, was confirmed by Loveless’

counsel on May 16, 2005. On that date,

Loveless’ counsel stated to me that an

agreement has been entered into between

Loveless and Frasch, by which Frasch would

receive up to $45,000 of any monies obtained

by Loveless in exchange for her stipulation

setting aside the Order Avoiding Liens.

In reply, Mr. Mullen submits a declaration in which he avers

in pertinent part:

2. I have never attempted to conceal any

relevant information related to this Motion

from this Court or opposing counsel, as would

appear by his unfortunate reliance upon my

candor to accuse me of attempting to ‘pull

the wool over the eyes of the Court.’ To the

contrary, both myself, and counsel for Frasch

have fully disclosed to Mr. Kummer the entire

background of the case so that he would be

educated in his defense of the Respondents

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and properly represent them. Instead he has

chosen to impugn me with his false

accusations and insinuations.

...

5. Contrary to Paragraph 18, Movant and Mrs.

Frasch were not ‘bitter enemies’; they hardly

knew each other. Furthermore, no stipulation

to ‘re-open’ Mrs. Frasch case [sic] was

necessary since it had not been completely

closed due the pending appeal and the

intervening Chapter 13 case of Mrs. Frasch. 

6. I never stated that Loveless purpose

[sic] in bringing the pending motion was not

to force the sale of the Respondents’ house;

that was precisely the purpose. I told Mr.

Kummer that it was unfortunate that the

Respondents were the current owners and that

it was hoped on their behalf that they had a

policy of title insurance which could and

should provide relief to them rather than

have their residence sold. I expressed my

concern that the Litigation Guaranty had

failed to disclose a lender on the Subject

Real Property and asked Mr. Kummer if such a

policy existed in order that he might obtain

redress from them on behalf of the

Respondents without the need for the

completion of a sale. To date, despite the

existence of an escrow indicating the

Respondents’ purchase from the foreclosing

lender, no such information has been

provided.

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

The court sua sponte concludes that it has subject matter

jurisdiction.

As noted, this miscellaneous action was opened in 1999 in

order to process Loveless’s application to renew the judgment. 

After Loveless and Frasch stipulated to the remand of the

bankruptcy appeal to the Bankruptcy Court and then stipulated to

vacate the Bankruptcy Court’s order vacating Loveless’s judgment

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lien, this miscellaneous action became moot. Of course, the

Schaefers were not named as parties to this miscellaneous action

because, until 2001, they had no interest in the property. In

fact, the Schaefers are not named as parties to this

miscellaneous action, having only been given notice of the

pending motion by Loveless. Rule 69(a), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, provides in pertinent part:

Process to enforce a judgment for the payment

of money shall be a writ of execution, unless

the court directs otherwise. The procedure

on execution, in proceedings supplementary to

and in aid of a judgment, and in proceedings

on and in aid of execution shall be in

accordance with the practice and procedure of

the state in which the district court is

held, existing at the time the remedy is

sought, except that any statute of the United

States governs to the extent that it is

applicable. In aid of the judgment or

execution, the judgment creditor or a

successor in interest when that interest

appears of record, may obtain discovery from

any person, including the judgment debtor, in

the manner provided in these rules or in the

manner provided by the practice of the state

in which the district court is held.

As explained in Wright, Miller & Marcus, 12 Federal Practice and

Procedure, § 3013, pp. 158-159 (1997):

The federal court has ancillary or

supplemental jurisdiction for supplementary

proceedings to enforce its judgment. As the

Supreme Court recognized a century and a

quarter ago, ‘[p]rocess subsequent to

judgment is as essential to jurisdiction as

process antecedent to judgment, else the

judicial power would be incomplete and

entirely inadequate for the purposes for

which it was conferred by the Constitution.’ 

Recently, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed

the federal court’s ‘inherent power to

enforce its judgments,’ and noted that it has

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The court was concerned that Loveless had committed fraud on 4

this court when he applied to renew the abstract of judgment

without advising this court that the Bankruptcy Court had

previously issued an order vacating his judgment lien. The court

obviously discovered this attempted fraud almost immediately

because the court stayed execution of the renewed abstract of

judgment pending further order of the court. That order was issued

on July 9, 1999. Notwithstanding the stay order and according to

the Litigation Guarantee submitted with the instant motion,

Loveless then proceeded to record the Renewed Judgment in a Civil

Action on July 12, 1999. Apparently, Loveless did not record the

stay order and clearly did not comply with it. By recording the

Renewed Judgment, Loveless not only violated this court’s stay

order, he also ignored the Bankruptcy Court’s Order Vacating Liens.

However, the court concludes that these events have no impact on

the resolution of this motion because of the recording by Loveless

of the lis pendens.

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‘approved the exercise of ancillary

jurisdiction over a broad range of

supplementary proceedings involving third

parties to assist in the protection of

federal judgments - including attachment,

mandamus, garnishment, and the prejudgment

avoidance of fraudulent conveyances.’ But

this power is limited to efforts to enforce

the federal court’s judgment in a case over

which it has jurisdiction, and it does not

extend to new lawsuits filed to impose

related liabilities on others.

Here, the court does have subject matter jurisdiction to

enforce Loveless’s judgment pursuant to the instant motion. The

Schaefers are the successors in interest to Frasch of the real

property on which Loveless asserts he has a judgment lien. 

Therefore, the instant motion is ancillary to Loveless’s

application to renew the judgment.4

C. Effect of Notice of Pendency of Action.

As noted, Loveless recorded a lis pendens in Kern County

with respect to the property on June 8, 1999. 

Bankers Trust Company of California acquired the real

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property on September 26, 2001 at a trustee’s sale. The

Schaefers purchased the real property from Bankers Trust on

October 17, 2001. 

“The purpose of a lis pendens is to give constructive notice

of an action affecting real property to persons who subsequently

acquire an interest in that property, so that the judgment in the

action will be binding on such persons even if they acquire their

interest before the judgment is actually rendered.” Bishop Creek

Lodge v. Scira, 46 Cal.App.4th 1721, 1733 (1996); see also La

Paglia v. Superior Court, 215 Cal.App.3d 1322, 1326 (1989). 

The Schaefers argue that Loveless cannot rely on the lis

pendens. In so arguing, they note that the appeal to the Ninth

Circuit from this court’s affirmance of the Bankruptcy Court’s

Order Granting Motion to Avoid Lien of Robert Wiley Loveless was

dismissed on April 1, 2001 and a certified copy of that dismissal

was filed in the Bankruptcy Court on April 25, 2001. The

Schaefers refer the court to Garcia v. Pinhero, 22 Cal.App.2d

194, 197 (1937):

The lis pendens notice that may properly be

recorded in an action which in some manner

affects the title or right of possession to

real property is purely incidental to the

action wherein it is filed. It refers

specifically to such action, and has no

existence apart from it. Its sole object is

to afford constructive notice that this

particular action is pending. When,

therefore, the action has been terminated by

the entry of a judgment and by expiration of

the statutory time within which an appeal

from the judgment may be taken, the notice of

lis pendens has fully served its purpose. 

The action of which it was an incident has

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The allegations that counsel for Loveless and for Frasch are 5

colluding to defraud the Schaefers and/or a title insurance company

are discounted by the court. The relevant inquiry is whether the

Notice of Pendency of Action gave the purchasers of the real

property constructive notice of the litigation concerning the

Bankruptcy Court’s order vacating the Loveless lien. In addition,

the court notes that there is no evidence that the Schaefers

conducted a title search before purchasing the property or that the

Schaefers obtained title insurance before they purchased the

property. 

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come to an end. It is no longer pending. 

However, as noted, Loveless moved in the Ninth Circuit to

reinstate the appeal. The Ninth Circuit reinstated the appeal on

September 17, 2001. The sale of the real property to Banker’s

Trust and Banker’s Trust’s sale to the Schaefers occurred after

the Ninth Circuit reinstated the appeal. Consequently, at the

time the Schaefers acquired the property, the action to which the

Notice of Pendency of Action was incident was not terminated. 

Therefore, the Schaefers had constructive notice of the appeal to

the Ninth Circuit from the Bankruptcy Court’s Order Granting

Motion to Avoid Lien of Robert Wiley Loveless. 

Consequently, the court concludes that Loveless is entitled

to sell the real property to satisfy the judgment lien recorded

against the property.5

D. Homestead Exemption.

Loveless contends that because Frasch has not lived on the

property since it was sold to the Frasch’s in foreclosure in

October 2001, the homestead exemption is not applicable. 

Loveless argues:

Since the Judgment debtor is no longer in

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possession of the Subject Real Property, as

either an occupant or owner, and the

Schaefers are not the Judgment Debtor herein

but merely obtained title to the Subject real

Property subject to the Loveless Judgment

Lien, there would appear to be no need for

any further determination of any homestead

exemption applicability or amount thereof.

California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 704.710© and 704.730

define the “homestead exemption” in terms of a judgment debtor or

the spouse of a judgment debtor. California Code of Civil

Procedure § 704.740(a) provides in pertinent part:

(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b),

the interest of a natural person in a

dwelling may not be sold under this division

to enforce a money judgment except pursuant

to a court order for sale obtained under this

article and the dwelling exemption shall be

determined under this article.

Therefore, by California statute, the Schaefers’ interest in the

real property is not subject to a homestead exemption and, to

that extent, Loveless’s motion has merit and is granted. 

However, it is clear that Frasch will be receiving the benefit of

the homestead exemption from Loveless after the satisfaction of

the judgment lien by the sale of the real property. Asking this

court to issue an order that Frasch is not entitled to the

homestead exemption essentially is asking this court to state

something that is not in fact true - Frasch will be receiving the

equivalent of the homestead exemption from Loveless after the

sale. Therefore, to the extent that Loveless moves the court to

rule that Frasch is not entitled to the homestead exemption, the

motion is denied.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 4, 2005 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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