Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01874/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01874-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Hearman Lee Newton, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

City of Phoenix, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-13-01874-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Magistrate Judge Mark Aspey has filed a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) 

(Doc. 18) regarding Plaintiff Hearman Lee Newton’s motion for leave to file an amended 

complaint (Doc. 12). Plaintiff has filed objections to the R&R (Doc. 22) and Defendant 

Michael Myers has responded (Doc. 24). For the reasons that follow, the Court declines 

to accept the R&R and will grant Plaintiff leave to amend. 

I. Background. 

Plaintiff filed this case in September of 2013 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

asserting claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Doc. 1. The Court 

granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis, dismissed the claims under the 

Fourteenth Amendment, and required Defendant to answer Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment 

excessive force claim. Doc. 5 at 5. Plaintiff filed a proposed amended complaint on 

March 6, 2014, alleging that Defendant used excessive force while arresting him in 

violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. Doc. 10, ¶¶ 16-17. Plaintiff’s 

proposed amended complaint alleges that Defendant shot him with a Taser without 

warning or provocation, again used the Taser while Plaintiff was lying unconscious on 

the ground, picked up Plaintiff and “slammed him to the ground,” “dragged him at least 

Case 2:13-cv-01874-SPL-MEA Document 27 Filed 06/13/14 Page 1 of 4
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

twenty feet by the handcuffs,” “slashed” Plaintiff with a “taser dart,” and refused to 

provide him with medical assistance. Id., ¶¶ 6-13. Plaintiff also filed a motion for leave 

to amend his complaint on March 17, 2014, requesting that he be allowed to amend his 

amended complaint “to advance his claims under both the Fourth Amendment and the 

Eighth Amendment.” Doc. 12 at 2. Judge Aspey entered an R&R on April 21, 2014, in 

which he recommends that the Court deny Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend on the 

ground that Plaintiff’s amended complaint would be futile. Doc. 18 at 4. 

II. Legal Standard. 

A party may file specific, written objections to an R&R within ten days after being 

served with a copy the R&R. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 

The Court must undertake a de novo review of those portions of the R&R to which 

specific objections are made. See id.; Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); United 

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court may accept, 

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the 

magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

 Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure declares that courts should “freely 

give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Although “this 

mandate is to be heeded,” the Court may deny a motion to amend if there is a showing 

of undue delay or bad faith on the part of the moving party, undue prejudice to the 

opposing party, or futility of the proposed amendment. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 

182 (1962). Generally, however, “this determination should be performed with all 

inferences in favor of granting the motion.” Griggs v. Pace Am. Group, Inc., 170 

F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 A district court does not err in denying leave to amend where the amendment 

would be futile or subject to dismissal. Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 843 (9th 

Cir. 1991) (citations omitted); see Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th 

Cir. 1988). A proposed amendment is futile only if no set of facts can be proved under 

the amendment that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense. Miller, 845 

Case 2:13-cv-01874-SPL-MEA Document 27 Filed 06/13/14 Page 2 of 4
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

F.2d at 214; see Foman, 371 U.S. at 182 (stating that “[i]f the underlying facts or 

circumstances relied upon by a [movant] may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be 

afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits”); DCD Programs, Ltd. v. 

Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that “a motion to make an 

‘[a]mendment is to be liberally granted where from the underlying facts or circumstances, 

the plaintiff may be able to state a claim’”) (quoting McCartin v. Norton, 674 F.2d 1317, 

1321 (9th Cir. 1982)). 

III. Analysis. 

Judge Aspey concluded that Plaintiff’s requested amendment would be futile 

under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Doc. 18 at 4. In Heck, the Supreme 

Court considered whether § 1983 permits a damages claim that calls into question the 

lawfulness of the plaintiff’s conviction or confinement. 512 U.S. at 483. The Supreme 

Court held that a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that his conviction or sentence has been 

reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by the issuance of a writ of 

habeas corpus “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or 

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a 

conviction or sentence invalid[.]” Id. at 486-87. Judge Aspey found that “Heck bars 

Plaintiff’s excessive force claim because Plaintiff was convicted of aggravated assault on 

Defendant.” Doc. 18 at 4. Judge Aspey appears to have concluded that a ruling in favor 

of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim would necessarily suggest that his conviction was invalid. 

 Plaintiff cites Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689 (9th Cir. 2005), for the 

proposition that he is not precluded from relief. Doc. 22 at 3. In Smith, the Ninth Circuit 

held that “a § 1983 action is not barred under Heck unless it is clear from the record that 

its successful prosecution would necessarily imply or demonstrate that the plaintiff’s 

earlier conviction was invalid.” Smith, 394 F.3d at 699 (emphasis original). The Smith 

court concluded that there was nothing in the record to inform it as to the factual basis of 

the plaintiff’s plea agreement. Id. at 698. As a result, the court noted, it was unable to 

determine whether the plea agreement was based on conduct that occurred before the 

Case 2:13-cv-01874-SPL-MEA Document 27 Filed 06/13/14 Page 3 of 4
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

plaintiff was arrested, while the plaintiff was being arrested, or both. Id. The court found 

that Heck would not bar an excessive force claim based on conduct that occurred before 

or after the conduct for which a plaintiff pleaded guilty, and concluded that the plaintiff’s 

§ 1983 claim was therefore not barred by Heck. Id. Defendant argues that Smith is 

distinguishable because “Plaintiff alleges only a single continuous series of events in each 

version of his complaint” and “is not actually arguing that his assault and the excessive 

force are temporally distinct.” Doc. 24 at 4. 

 The Court does not agree. It is not clear from the record that Plaintiff’s successful 

prosecution of this action would suggest the invalidity of his conviction. Plaintiff did 

plead guilty to aggravated assault on Defendant (Doc. 8-2 at 2), but, like Smith, the 

record does not reveal the factual basis for Plaintiff’s guilty plea. Plaintiff’s proposed 

amended complaint alleges that he was shot with a Taser while lying on the ground in 

handcuffs, slammed to the ground twice while unconscious, and dragged twenty feet by 

the handcuffs while unconscious, and that Defendant cut him with a “taser dart.” See

Doc. 10. Accepting these allegations as true for purposes of this motion, it appears 

highly unlikely that Plaintiff’s aggravated assault conviction was based on conduct that 

occurred while he was lying on the ground in handcuffs, being slammed to the ground 

while unconscious, or being dragged twenty feet while unconscious. Thus, it is possible 

that Plaintiff could prove a § 1983 violation that is temporally distinct from the events 

that led to his assault conviction. The Court cannot determine, on this record, that 

Plaintiff’s proposed amendment would be futile under Heck. 

 IT IS ORDERED that Judge Aspey’s R&R (Doc. 18) is rejected. Plaintiff’s 

motion for leave to file an amended complaint (Doc. 12) is granted. Plaintiff shall file 

an amended complaint by July 11, 2014. 

 Dated this 13th day of June, 2014. 

Case 2:13-cv-01874-SPL-MEA Document 27 Filed 06/13/14 Page 4 of 4