Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-09-99015/USCOURTS-ca9-09-99015-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TEOFILO MEDINA, JR.,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

KEVIN CHAPPELL, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 09-99015

D.C. No.

2:94-CV-01892-

RSWL

TEOFILO MEDINA, JR.,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

R. K. WONG,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 09-99016

D.C. No.

2:97-CV-07062-

RSWL

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Ronald S.W. Lew, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

March 19, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed March 26, 2015

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2 MEDINA V. CHAPPELL

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and Kim McLane

Wardlaw, and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Wardlaw

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus / Death Penalty

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Teofilo

Medina, Jr.’s habeas corpus petitions challenging his murder

convictions and two death sentences, one of which was

imposed in Orange County, the other in Riverside County.

Affirming the district court’s denial of the petition arising

out of the Orange County case, the panel rejected Medina’s

contention that trial counsel’s performance was deficient in

his investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence

relating to Medina’s childhood, and held that Medina did not

establish prejudice. The panel rejected Medina’s contention

that he is entitled to habeas relief because trial counsel

provided ineffective assistance at the penalty phase by failing

to obtain and present relevant mitigation evidence of

Medina’s possible mental and emotional impairments. The

panel held that counsel performed deficiently by failing to

object, during cross-examination of a doctor during the sanity

phase, to the prosecutor’s use of a study to remind the jury

that people are capable of faking schizophrenia and fooling

mental health workers. But the panel held that the failure to

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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MEDINA V. CHAPPELL 3

object was not prejudicial during the penalty phase, and that

counsel’s performance was not deficient with respect to the

doctor’s testimony at the sanity phase. 

The panel explained that the Supreme Court’s holding in

Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696 (2013), that 18 U.S.C.

§ 3599(a)(2) does not provide a statutory right to competency

in federal habeas proceedings, is not limited to post-AEDPA

cases, but that the portion of the Gonzales opinion

constraining the discretion of district courts to issue stays is

inapplicable to pre-AEDPA petitions such as the Orange

County petition. The panel concluded that the district court

nonetheless acted within its discretion in denying Medina’s

request for a stay of his habeas proceedings due to his

incompetency.

Affirming the district court’s denial of the petition arising

out of the Riverside County case, the panel rejected Medina’s

contention that counsel’s failure to investigate Medina’s

psychiatric history during the competency phase of the trial,

and his resulting failure to provide this information to the

experts who evaluated Medina’s competency, constituted

ineffective assistance. Assuming without deciding that

counsel performed deficiently by failing to investigate and

present mitigation evidence at the penalty phase, and by

failing to investigate a potential insanity defense, the panel

denied relief because fairminded jurists could disagree as to

whether any such deficient performance prejudiced Medina.

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4 MEDINA V. CHAPPELL

COUNSEL

Robert B. Amidon (argued), Tarzana, California, and Wayne

C. Tobin (argued), Newbury Park, California; David L.

Bernstein, Studio City, California, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Holly D. Wilkens (argued), Supervising Deputy Attorney

General; GaryW. Schons, Senior Assistant AttorneyGeneral;

and Adrianne S. Denault, Deputy Attorney General, Office of

the California Attorney General, San Diego, California;

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of California; Dane R.

Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General; Office of the

California Attorney General, San Francisco, California, for

Respondent-Appellee.

Jon M. Sands, Federal Public Defender; Therese Day,

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Phoenix, Arizona; SeanK.

Kennedy, Federal Public Defender; Mark R. Drozdowski and

C. Pamela Gómez, Deputy Federal Public Defenders, Los

Angeles, California, for Amici Curiae the California

Appellate Project, the Federal Public Defenders of the

District of Arizona, Central District of California, Eastern

District of California, District of Nevada, and the Federal

Defender Services of Idaho.

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MEDINA V. CHAPPELL 5

OPINION

WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:

Teofilo Medina, Jr., a California death row inmate,

appeals the district court’s denial of his petitions for a writ of

habeas corpus. Medina killed four people in a month-long

crime spree in 1984. For these murders, the California courts

imposed two death sentences: one in Orange County, the

subject of the habeas petition in No. 09-99015, and one in

Riverside County, the subject of the petition in No. 09-99016. 

The Orange County proceedings became final first. Medina

filed his federal habeas petition in the Orange County case

before the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Medina’s Riverside

County petition was filed after the effective date and is

therefore subject to AEDPA review.1

The petitions allege ineffective assistance of counsel at

various phases of each trial, with a focus on claims of

deficient performance at the penalty phases. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. Because

counsel in the Orange County trial did not render deficient

performance, and because the California Supreme Court

could have reasonably concluded that any deficient

performance in the Riverside County trial failed to prejudice

Medina, we affirm the district court’s orders denying

Medina’s habeas petitions. In addition, we conclude that the

district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a stay to

determine Medina’s competency while the Orange County

petition was pending.

1 Contemporaneous with this decision, we file an order consolidating

these appeals for purposes of disposition.

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6 MEDINA V. CHAPPELL

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The factual circumstances of Medina’s crimes are

undisputed. Shortly after his August 1984 release from

prison in Arizona, Medina returned to California. From

October 13 through November 7, 1984, Medina engaged in a

crime spree in Orange County, which included stealing a gun

and holding up a drive-in dairy and two gas stations. At the

location of each robbery, he shot and killed an employee of

the business from which he stole. People v. Medina

(“Medina I”), 799 P.2d 1282, 1287 (Cal. 1990). During this

same period, he committed a fourth robbery-homicide, this

time at a gas station in Riverside County. People v. Medina

(“Medina II”), 906 P.2d 2, 16 (Cal. 1995).

Medina was apprehended on November 7, 1984 after he

attempted another robbery. During the course of that

robbery, he shot at, but missed, two civilian witnesses. The

witnesses gave police Medina’s license plate number, and

officers apprehended Medina at his sister’s home. The

evidence linking Medina to the crimes included the gun used

in each of the crimes and his fingerprint on a bottle at the

scene of one crime. Medina’s sister found the gun in

Medina’s shaving kit. Bullets recovered from the murder

victims matched the gun.

Medina’s history of abuse as a child is relevant to his

habeas claims. Declarations from family members describe

Medina’s troubled and troubling past. These declarations,

obtained by habeas counsel, provide the details of the

physical abuse Medina suffered growing up, details that were

not obtained by trial counsel in either case. Medina was

whipped by nuns while attending Catholic school, hit with a

belt by his father to the point where the belt left marks, and

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MEDINA V. CHAPPELL 7

hit by his mother with a tree switch, a belt, or her hand. In

addition to his own physical abuse, Medina’s father was an

alcoholic who sometimes hit Medina’s mother, and on one

occasion chased her around the house with a knife.

Medina also suffered from numerous accidental injuries

as a child. When Medina was born, the physician had to use

forceps to facilitate the delivery, which left Medina with two

black eyes and bruises on his head. Excessive anesthetization

of Medina’s mother may have exacerbated this trauma. At

age 5 or 6, Medina fell and hit his head on a concrete floor,

leaving a scar on his forehead. When he was 6 or 7 years old,

he let his cousins use his head for target practice with BB

rifles. One summer when the family was in Utah, Medina

“fell into a river or a canal and almost drowned.” As a boy,

Medina spent hours assembling model airplanes in his room. 

When familymembers complained about glue fumes, Medina

stuffed towels under his door to confine the fumes to his

room. Finally, at age 14, Medina was hit by a car while

riding a bicycle. His leg was badly broken, and several

family members noticed that he became more violent

afterwards. None of this information was uncovered by his

trial attorneys.

Habeas counsel also discovered that Medina has a

documented history of mental illness. During Medina’s

previous periods of incarceration in California and Arizona,

Medina was diagnosed at least eleven times as suffering from

paranoid schizophrenia or related conditions. From a young

age, Medina talked to himself and would clench and unclench

his fists when upset. He also pulled out all of his eyelashes

when he was 11 or 12 years old. As an adult, Medina

frequently made delusional references to being under

surveillance, spied upon, and persecuted by neighbors and

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8 MEDINA V. CHAPPELL

fellow inmates. Of the nineteen members of Medina’s

extended family, as many as four suffered from

schizophrenia, and others may have had different mental

illnesses.

II. THE ORANGE COUNTY PETITION

A. Procedural Background and Standard of Review

Prior to his jury trial in Orange County, Medina moved

for a competency hearing, at which lay witnesses, various

psychiatrists, psychologists, and other experts testified about

his violent behavior, attempted suicide, possible

schizophrenia, and inability to cooperate with counsel. 

Medina I, 799 P.2d at 1288. The testimony of the five

psychological and psychiatric experts was contradictory:

some doctors concluded that Medina was competent to stand

trial and others opined that he was not. Id. The mental health

professionals also provided markedly different

diagnoses—some found him schizophrenic, while others

doubted that diagnosis or concluded that Medina was

malingering. Following the competency hearing, the jury

concluded that Medina was competent to stand trial. Id.

At trial, Medina asserted an insanity defense. During the

sanity phase, various mental health professionals again

testified, to much the same effect. Id. Medina and a number

of lay witnesses also testified about Medina’s background,

“including his prior offenses and convictions, prison terms,

drug use, violent and aberrant behavior, attempted suicide,

confinement in a state mental hospital, and attempted escape

therefrom.” Id. The jury found Medina legally sane at the

time of the charged offenses. Id.

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MEDINA V. CHAPPELL 9

After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the penalty phase

commenced. Defense counsel called four mental health

experts who had previously testified. Their testimony was

consistent with testimony adduced at the sanity and

competency phases. Id. at 881. Medina’s father testified that

Medina sniffed glue as a child, that Medina’s brother, John,

committed suicide, that Medina had been hit by a car while

delivering newspapers, and that Medina’s behavior had been

strange when he was driving back to California after his

release from prison in Arizona.

On December 3, 1986, after deliberating for seven and a

half hours, the jury concluded that the appropriate penalty

was death. On February 26, 1987, Medina was sentenced to

death.

The California Supreme Court affirmed Medina’s

convictions and death sentence on direct appeal. Medina I,

799 P.2d at 1310. The United States Supreme Court granted

certiorari to determine the constitutionality of California

Penal Code § 1369(f), which placed the burden on the

defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence his

competence to stand trial. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S.

437 (1992). The Court upheld the statute and affirmed the

California Supreme Court’s decision. Id. at 452–53.

Medina filed his habeas petition in federal court on

October 2, 1995, and, after returning to state court to exhaust

several claims, he filed an amended petition on November 19,

1997. The district court granted an evidentiary hearing on

several claims, and received evidence including declarations,

deposition transcripts, and exhibits.

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10 MEDINA V. CHAPPELL

On June 5, 2003, Medina filed a state court petition

arguing that he was mentally retarded and as such, under

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), could not be

executed. The California Supreme Court denied the petition,

and the district court granted Medina’s motion to amend his

federal habeas petition to include his Atkins claim. On June

16, 2008, the district court denied federal habeas relief on all

claims presented in Medina’s petition. On January 23, 2009,

the district court entered final judgment.

Because Medina filed his federal habeas petition in the

Orange County case before the effective date of AEDPA, its

substantive provisions do not apply. See Phillips v. Ornoski,

673 F.3d 1168, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 2012). “We therefore

review de novo questions of law or mixed questions of law

and fact decided by the district court or by the state courts.” 

Id. at 1179. “We review the district court’s factual findings

for clear error, and accord state court factual findings a

presumption of correctness.” Id.

We review counsel’s conduct in a capital sentencing

proceeding under the same standards used for judging

ineffective assistance at trial. Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 686–87 (1984). To prevail, Medina must first

show that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. In making this

determination, we “must indulge a strong presumption that

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome

the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged

action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. at 689

(internal quotation marks omitted). Second, Medina “must

show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.

This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as

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MEDINA V. CHAPPELL 11

to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is

reliable.” Id. at 687.

B. Failure to Investigate and Present Mitigating

Evidence

Medina argues that his trial counsel in the Orange County

case rendered ineffective assistance by failing to properly

investigate Medina’s childhood. According to Medina, such

a failure meant that his counsel lacked information that could

have been used in mitigation during the penalty phase. 

Because counsellacked sufficient knowledge, argues Medina,

he could not have made a reasoned tactical decision about

what to present at the penalty phase. We disagree, and

conclude that counsel’s performance was not deficient.

Counsel has a duty to investigate, but this duty is not

without limits. Strickland clarified that “counsel has a duty

to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable

decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In

any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to

investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all

the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to

counsel’s judgments.” 466 U.S. at 691. We “conduct an

objective review of [counsel’s] performance, measured for

reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, which

includes a context-dependent consideration of the challenged

conduct as seen from counsel’s perspective at the time.” 

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (citations

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As the district court correctly concluded, Medina’s

defense team conducted a thorough investigation of his

childhood and family background—actions that stand in

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12 MEDINA V. CHAPPELL

sharp contrast to the conduct of defense counsel in cases

relied upon by Medina in support of his ineffective assistance

argument. In Ainsworth v. Woodford, 268 F.3d 868 (9th Cir.

2001), for example, trial counsel’s “preparation” for the

penalty phase proceedings consisted of interviewing one

defense witness for ten minutes on the morning she was to

testify, and failing to examine Ainsworth’s employment,

medical, prison, probation, or military records, all of which

were readily available. Id. at 874. In Silva v. Woodford,

279 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 2002), we concluded that counsel’s

complete abandonment of all investigation into Silva’s

background was not objectively reasonable when Silva

instructed counsel simply that he did not want his parents

used as witnesses and that he preferred they be left alone. Id.

at 838. In Libberton v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2009),

we found ineffective assistance at the penalty phase where

defense counsel failed to interview any witnesses for trial and

only a very few for sentencing. Id. at 1169.

In the Orange County case, the district court credited

counsel’s declaration that his investigator interviewed family

members and briefed him regarding the interviews, and that

counsel had questioned the family members himself. In

crediting counsel’s declarations, the district court relied upon

billing records and trial documents showing the amount of

time investigators spent speaking with witnesses and

conferring with counsel. Given the supporting evidence, the

district court did not clearly err by crediting counsel’s

declaration.

Nor does counsel’s failure to uncover Medina’s childhood

abuse render his performance deficient. The district court

credited counsel’s sworn statement that neither Medina nor

his family members divulged to counsel the abuse to which

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MEDINA V. CHAPPELL 13

he was subjected, and Medina does not directly challenge this

finding. As Medina argues, “counsel has a duty to

investigate, even if his or her client does not divulge relevant

information.” Vega v. Ryan, 757 F.3d 960, 969 (9th Cir.

2014). Our decision in Vega does not, however, impose upon

counsel a duty to conduct a perfect investigation that reaches

every recess of a client’s mind. “A fair assessment of

attorney performance requires that every effort be made to

eliminate the distorting effect of hindsight, to reconstruct the

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to

evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Unlike the situation in Vega,

Medina’s counsel conducted an adequate investigation of his

client’s history. The evidence counsel sought and reviewed

suggested that Medina experienced an average childhood. 

Prison records, Medina’s own testimony under oath, and

discussions with Medina’s familymembers,

2

all indicated that

Medina’s childhood was relatively unremarkable.

Medina nonetheless asserts that counsel’s investigation

was unreasonable because he failed to ask the “right

questions.” Medina’s sisters claim that no one ever explained

to them what sort of evidence could be considered in

mitigation. Medina’s trial counsel, however, reported that he

supervised the investigators who questioned Medina’s family

and ensured that the family was informed of the defense

team’s needs. Counsel’s assessment is corroborated by

billing records, credited by the district court, that showed the

2 Trial counsel’s billing records further reflect a six-hour period in which

he spoke with Medina’s sister early in the case on February 9, 1985. 

During that six-hour time-frame, counsel discussed several matters

including the “bizarre behavior of Medina during the time period [in]

which these incidents took place.”

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14 MEDINA V. CHAPPELL

amount of time the defense team spent with Medina’s family

and the quantity of evidence the team gathered. “[A]pplying

a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments,” id. at

691, we cannot conclude that counsel’s performance was

deficient.

Medina also relies on a letter to counsel, dated September

4, 1985, from Dr. Klatte, a psychiatrist who evaluated

Medina’s mental health prior to trial, to argue that counsel

possessed information that “would lead a reasonable attorney

to investigate further” into Medina’s childhood. Wiggins,

539 U.S. at 527. But, this letter’s “tantalizing indication” that

not all was as it seemed consists of two inapposite passages. 

The first mentions that Medina loved his father, but also

feared him when he would get drunk and chase the kids out

of the house.3 The second recounts a bizarre memoryMedina

has of his mother, but it is a memory completely devoid of

any indication of abuse.4

3

“[Medina] recalls as a child feeling his father was a superman. He

loved him but feared him when he would get drunk and chase the kids out

of the house.”

4

“[Medina] describes a very complex and pathological relationship with

his mother. On the one hand he indicates he was very close to her and she

was a very loving maternal woman. On the other hand his most vivid

memory from childhood still haunts and upsets him, bringing tears to his

eyes as he recounts it. He was about 7 to 9 years of age, he went to his

mother’s bedroom and saw her lying on her bed. They looked at each

other and ‘she looked like a smiling conniving harlot as described in the

old testament.’ She then said ‘I prayed to the Virgin Mary for a

homosexual.’ Suddenly he started crying and got angry, screaming at his

mother ‘I’m going to go straight to hell for that.’ He then ran out of the

room. He now does not know what he meant by what he said.”

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MEDINA V. CHAPPELL 15

By contrast, in Wiggins, ample evidence in records

available to counsel indicated that further investigation would

very likely have unearthed mitigating evidence. The

Department of Social Services’ records and the pre-sentence

report demonstrated that Wiggins’s mother was an alcoholic

who left him and his siblings alone for days without food on

at least one occasion, and that Wiggins went from foster

home to foster home where he displayed emotional

difficulties and had frequent long absences from school. 

539 U.S. at 525. The Court concluded that counsel

unreasonably ceased its investigation and failed to pursue

mitigating evidence.

Here, counsel interviewed Medina’s family members but

found no evidence of physical abuse. The investigation was

adequate and thorough. Counsel’s decision not to interview

additional family members was also reasonable. In Bobby v.

Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4 (2009) (per curiam), the Supreme

Court reversed a grant of habeas relief based on an ineffective

assistance claim at the penalty phase in a pre-AEDPA case,

holding that counsel had reached that point at which

“evidence from more distant relatives can reasonably be

expected to be only cumulative, and the search for it

distractive from more important duties.” Id. at 11. So too

here. The vague allusions to dysfunctional familial

relationships related in Dr. Klatte’s letter did not alert counsel

that he should conduct more interviews and further

investigation, particularly when Medina himself reported an

unremarkable childhood.

In addition, while not foundational to our analysis, it is

nevertheless significant that counsel originally intended to

call more family members at the penalty phase, but Medina

refused to allow counsel to call any family members other

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16 MEDINA V. CHAPPELL

than his father. While a defendant’s refusal to allow a

witness to testify does not excuse counsel from interviewing

that witness as part of a reasonable investigation into possible

mitigating evidence, Stankewitz v. Wong, 698 F.3d 1163,

1170 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that “supposed opposition to

mitigating evidence” does not end the inquiry into the

adequacy of counsel’s performance), here counsel did

thoroughly interview other familymembers despite Medina’s

refusal to allow them to testify.

Nor has Medina established prejudice, i.e., “a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. To evaluate whether Medina was

prejudiced by counsel’s failure to investigate, if any, we

“reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of

available mitigating evidence.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534.

In mitigation, Medina’s father testified that Medina was

hit by a car while riding a bicycle as a child and was exposed

to glue fumes when he built model airplanes, and about an

incident in which Medina pulled out all of his eyelashes. He

also testified that Medina had been close to his now-deceased

mother, that Medina’s brother had used drugs heavily after

his divorce and was in and out of mental hospitals before

finally committing suicide, and that Medina behaved

strangely upon his release from prison in Arizona. Medina

offered testimony from Richard Negrete, his parole officer,

and from James Hicks, an employee of the Orange County

District Attorney’s office, who had prosecuted a defendant

for stabbing Medina approximately twenty-eight times.

Medina also presented the testimony of several mental

health experts. Dr. Pierce testified that Medina did poorly on

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MEDINA V. CHAPPELL 17

cognitive tests, that he was not malingering, and that although

sane, he suffered from a mental impairment. Dr. Sharma

testified that Medina was suffering from symptoms indicating

mental problems, and he noted four possibilities:

schizophrenia, “organic brain disorder due to the use and

abuse of mind-altering drugs he had used in the past,

including, for example, cocaine and PCP,” epilepsy caused by

a short circuiting of the brain tissue, or antisocial personality

disorder. He further testified that he saw mitigation in

Medina’s mental problems. Dr. Sakurai testified that Medina

had been placed in the rubber rooms in the Orange County

jail several times, that Dr. Sakurai had met with Medina on

thirty to forty occasions, and that he had prescribed Medina

medication. Finally, Dr. Klatte testified that Medina was a

disturbed person with a diagnosis of schizotypal personality

disorder and antisocial personality disorder, and noted that

Medina “had a brother who suicided and had a wellestablished diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia.”

Declarations from Medina’s family members obtained by

habeas counsel describe additional mitigating evidence that

could have been, but was not, presented to the jury during the

penalty phase of the Orange County trial. As detailed in Part

I, these declarations from family members describe physical

abuse that Medina suffered growing up. This potentially

mitigating evidence, while substantial, was not

overwhelming. The abuse Medina suffered as a child falls

short of the horrific violence and deprivation that courts have

recognized as convincing mitigation evidence. Compare

Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535–36 (holding that counsel’s failure

to investigate and present evidence of petitioner’s “physical

torment, sexual molestation, and repeated rape” established

prejudice), with Samayoa v. Ayers, 649 F.3d 919, 929 (9th

Cir. 2011) (observing that petitioner’s evidence of “harsh

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18 MEDINA V. CHAPPELL

discipline, poverty, drug abuse, and violence and sexual

abuse among extended family members” was “not so

dramatic or unusual” that it would have affected the death

penalty verdict). Moreover, unlike in Stankewitz v.

Woodford, where we found prejudice based on counsel’s

failure to present evidence that the defendant “suffered from

organic brain damage, to the point of being borderline

mentally retarded,” 365 F.3d 706, 723 (9th Cir. 2004), there

was no strong evidence that Medina suffered permanent brain

damage as a result of his childhood head injuries.

For its part, the prosecution presented a litany of

aggravating factors at the penalty phase. The prosecution

relied on Medina’s prior convictions for rape, assault,

kidnapping, burglary, and discharging a firearm into an

occupied building, as well as Medina’s repeated attacks on

other inmates and prison staff while incarcerated. The

prosecution also elicited testimonyfrom the victims’ relatives

about the victims’ non-violent nature.

The mitigating evidence that was presented failed to

persuade the jury in light of this strong aggravating evidence. 

And the potential mitigating evidence was weaker than the

array of mitigating evidence actually presented. Reweighing

the aggravating evidence against all mitigating evidence,

Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534, we conclude that comparatively

weak additional mitigating evidence would not likely have

altered the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, Medina was not

prejudiced within the meaning of Strickland. 466 U.S. at

694–96.

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MEDINA V. CHAPPELL 19

C. Evidence of Mental and Emotional Impairments

Medina alternatively claims that he is entitled to habeas

relief because trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at

the penalty phase by failing to obtain and present relevant

mitigating evidence of Medina’s possible mental and

emotional impairments. Specifically, Medina argues that

counsel rendered ineffective assistance by: failing to obtain

medical records reflecting the hospitalization of Medina’s

brother and maternal aunt, which showed that both were

hospitalized with diagnosed schizophrenia; failing to provide

EEG and CT scan results to an expert who requested them;

and failing to retain an expert to explain to the jury the

possible mitigating effect of Medina’s exposure to

neurotoxins in glue when he was young.

At the penalty phase, counsel has “a professional

responsibility to investigate and bring to the attention of

mental health experts who are examining his client, facts that

the experts do not request.” Wallace v. Stewart, 184 F.3d

1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 1999). “Regardless of whether a defense

expert requests specific information relevant to a defendant’s

background, it is defense counsel’s duty to seek out such

evidence and bring it to the attention of the experts.” Hovey

v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 925 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Medina argues that counsel’s failure to obtain his

brother’s and aunt’s medical records and subsequent failure

to turn them over to the experts who testified during the

penalty phase constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Medina asserts that had counsel obtained and relayed this

information, it could have strengthened his claim that he, too,

was schizophrenic. His argument is unpersuasive.

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20 MEDINA V. CHAPPELL

First, trial counsel did obtain information about Medina’s

brother’s diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. During the

penalty phase, Dr. Klatte testified that Medina’s brother “had

a well-established diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia.” 

Although Dr. Sharma testified in a deposition that he was

never given information about Medina’s brother’s mental

illness as a “confirmed diagnosis,” he was made aware of the

mental illness and he “had assumed or inferred from what

[he] was told at that time that more likely than not the

diagnosis would have been schizophrenic disorder for his

brother.” The “failure” to provide Dr. Sharma with the

confirmed diagnosis, even if it constitutes deficient

performance, certainly does not meet Strickland’s prejudice

requirement, given that Dr. Sharma assumed the diagnosis.

Second, Medina is correct that his aunt’s diagnosis of

paranoid schizophrenia was never provided to Dr. Sharma,

but counsel’s failure to provide this information was not

deficient performance. The district court credited counsel’s

account that he was unaware of the aunt’s mental problems at

the time of the penalty phase because neither Medina nor any

family member had disclosed the problems. Counsel cannot

be faulted for not having information about a second degree

relative’s hospital records when his investigation was

reasonable and none of Medina’s familymembers with whom

he spoke alluded to the aunt’s mental health problems. See

Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 1998)

(holding that counsel’s failure to discover an alleged family

history of mental illness was not unreasonable where counsel

spoke with familymembers and friends who would have such

information but none of them indicated there was any history

of mental illness).

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MEDINA V. CHAPPELL 21

Medina argues that counsel’s failure to provide Dr.

Sharma with Medina’s EEG and CT scan results despite Dr.

Sharma’s requests for them constituted ineffective assistance

of counsel. Trial counsel should have provided the test

results to Dr. Sharma, but his failure to do so did not

prejudice Medina under the second prong of Strickland. Dr.

Sharma had been made aware that “Mr. Medina had

undergone a CAT scan, an EEG, brain x-rays, and a

neurological examination yielding results within the normal

limits.” Dr. Sharma further stated that he had been relying

upon a “broken brain” theory during the penalty phase of

Medina’s trial, and he conceded that if he had been shown the

test results, which were within the normal range, the results

would have the potential to contradict the “broken brain”

defense. It is thus unclear how Medina would have benefitted

at the penalty phase had Dr. Sharma obtained the test results;

if anything, Dr. Sharma’s testimony would have been less

helpful to Medina had the results been provided.

Finally, Medina argues that counsel performed deficiently

by failing to request a neurological examination to assess

possible brain damage resulting from years of substance

abuse. Counsel was aware of Medina’s use of drugs and

history of glue sniffing. The district court credited counsel’s

account that he passed on information regarding Medina’s

glue sniffing to the doctors. Moreover, counsel intended to

follow up on the issue with an expert who would do more

testing, but Medina refused to see any more experts. As

counsel must respect a defendant’s wishes about whether to

undergo additional psychological testing, a failure to conduct

additional testing is not deficient performance on the part of

counsel in such circumstances. Gerlaugh v. Stewart,

129 F.3d 1027, 1034–35 (9th Cir. 1997). And even if Medina

were now to present neurological test results bringing some

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new mental deficiency to light, evidence produced after the

fact is not necessarily relevant to whether counsel’s actions

were reasonable at the time. See Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d

560, 584 (9th Cir. 2005), amended by 430 F.3d 1220 (denying

habeas relief because “[Petitioner’s] argument turns on a

latter-day battle of experts; however, the question is whether

counsel did all that he was constitutionally required to do at

the time”). Counsel’s investigation into Medina’s brain

damage was not deficient.

D. Error With Respect to Dr. Gold’s Testimony 

Medina points to two mistakes made by counsel at the

sanityphase involving Dr. Gold’s testimony: counsel’sfailure

to object to cross-examination of Dr. Gold based on the

Rosenhan study,

5

and counsel’s failure to adequately prepare

Dr. Gold to testify at the sanity hearing. Medina contends

that these deficiencies further prejudiced him at the penalty

phase, rendering his death sentence unreliable. We have

recognized that “prejudice may result from the cumulative

impact of multiple deficiencies.” Harris ex rel. Ramseyer v.

Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Trial counsel’s failure to object to the use of the Rosenhan

study during the prosecutor’s cross-examination of Dr. Gold

was deficient performance. The prosecution’s purpose in

5

In the Rosenhan study, eight individuals who were not suffering from

any mental illness visited a mental institution and complained they were

hearing voices. D. L. Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places,

13 Santa Clara Law. 379 (1973). All of them were admitted and

diagnosed as schizophrenic or manic-depressive despite their lack of

mental illness. Id. at 384.

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mentioning this study was to remind the jury that people are

capable of faking schizophrenia and fooling mental health

workers into rendering that diagnosis.

California Evidence Code section 721(b)(1) prohibits

cross-examination of expert witnesses regarding scientific

journal articles unless the expert considered or relied upon

that article in forming his opinion. California courts have

also held that the prosecutor’s reference to the Rosenhan

study during cross-examination, specifically, is improper. 

People v. Visciotti, 825 P.2d 388, 435 (Cal. 1992).

Counsel’s failure to object, however, did not prejudice

Medina during the penalty phase within the meaning of

Strickland. The prosecutor’s reference to the study was only

a small piece of the evidence admitted at the competency

hearing. Additionally, the prospect that Medina was

malingering and had fooled mental health experts was

suggested by more than the Rosenhan study. On direct

examination at the sanity phase, Dr. Gold stated that many

prisoners malinger and, in response to a question about

whether Medina was malingering, testified: “It’s possible, but

it’s not probable.” Thus, the reference to the Rosenhan study

was cumulative of other, more direct evidence of possible

malingering and, therefore, was not prejudicial.

Medina also contends that counsel’s failure to prepare Dr.

Gold to testify at the sanity phase of his trial was deficient

performance. In his declaration, Dr. Gold asserts that defense

counsel failed to provide him with “relevant medical records

and reports relating to petitioner,” and that counsel spent only

about an hour with him prior to the presentation of his

testimony. However, counsel is entitled to rely upon the

opinion of experts, and, outside of the penalty phase, is not

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24 MEDINA V. CHAPPELL

required to provide experts with relevant information they do

not request. See Wallace, 184 F.3d at 1117 (distinguishing

between ineffective assistance claims for failure to provide

experts with information at the penalty and guilt phases).

In sum, although counsel performed deficiently by failing

to object to the Rosenhan study, that error was not prejudicial

under Strickland during the penalty phase. And counsel’s

performance was not deficient with respect to Dr. Gold’s

testimony at the sanity phase.

E. Request for Stay Due to Incompetency

Finally, we affirm the district court’s denial of Medina’s

request for a stay of his habeas proceedings due to his

incompetency. In Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696 (2013),

the Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2) does not provide

a statutory right to competency during federal habeas

proceedings, and the Court constrained the discretion of

district courts to issue stays when there is no reasonable hope

of a petitioner regaining competence in the foreseeable future. 

Medina asserts that Gonzales has no applicability to his preAEDPA petition. We disagree.

As an initial matter, the Supreme Court’s holding that

18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2) does not provide a statutory right to

competency in federal habeas proceedings is not limited to

post-AEDPA cases. Indeed, Gonzales expressly overruled

our decision in Rohan v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803 (9th Cir.

2003), a pre-AEDPA case in which we held that “‘where an

incompetent capital habeas petitioner raises claims that could

potentially benefit from his ability to communicate rationally,

refusing to stay proceedings pending restoration of

competence denies him his statutory right to assistance of

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MEDINA V. CHAPPELL 25

counsel, whether or not counsel can identify with precision

the information sought.’” Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. at 701

(quoting Rohan, 334 F.3d at 819).

The pre-AEDPA/post-AEDPA distinction is relevant,

however, as to Part III of Gonzales, in which the Court went

on to “address only [the] outer limits” “of the district court’s

discretion to issue stays.” Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. at 708. This

portion of the Court’s opinion relies heavily upon Congress’s

intent in enacting AEDPA and the practical consequences of

stays for cases subject to AEDPA. See id. at 708–09. 

Consequently, the Court’s conclusion that “[w]here there is

no reasonable hope of competence, a stay is inappropriate and

merely frustrates the State’s attempts to defend its

presumptively valid judgment,”6id. at 709, is inapplicable to

pre-AEDPA petitions such as this one.

But the inapplicability of this portion of the Court’s

holding does not aid Medina’s case. As the Court noted,

defining the outer limits of district courts’ authority to grant

stays does not affect our analysis in those cases, like

Medina’s, in which the district court has denied a stay. In

such a case, to grant relief, “we would have to conclude that

the District Court abused its discretion in denying the stay.” 

Id. at 707 n.13. The district court did not abuse its discretion

here.

6 Although the Court did not cabin its analysis to AEDPA, it roots its

analysis in the congressional purpose in enacting AEDPA. Gonzales,

133 S. Ct. at 709 (“Without time limits [on stays], petitioners could

frustrate AEDPA’s goal of finality by dragging out indefinitely their

federal habeas review.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

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Medina claimed that his competent assistance was

relevant to his Marsden, court shackling, and ineffective

assistance of counsel claims. The district court appropriately

concluded that the first two claims were record based, and

therefore, even under the statutory right to competence

framework, no stay was necessary. See Blair v. Martel,

645 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2011). With respect to the

ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the district court

correctly concluded that Medina failed to specifywhich of his

ineffective assistance of counsel claims required his input. 

Further, Medina finds himself in the same position as the

petitioner in Blair. He has not put forth a showing that there

was evidence concerning his family background, not already

in the record and which he could assist in uncovering if he

were competent, that would support his claim that counsel

conducted an inadequate investigation at the penalty phase. 

Thus, although the district court may have acted within its

discretion had it issued a stay, it did not abuse its discretion

in declining to do so.

III. THE RIVERSIDE PETITION

A. Procedural Background and Standard of Review

In 1987, following the conclusion of Medina’s Orange

County trial, the Riverside County District Attorney charged

Medina with special circumstances murder, robbery, and

burglary arising from the Riverside County homicide. The

trial court impaneled a jury to decide whether Medina was

competent to stand trial. Medina II, 906 P.2d at 17. After

hearing testimony from four experts, the jury found that

Medina was competent. Id. In early 1989, proceedings were

temporarily suspended in light of disruptive conduct by

Medina, and a second competency determination was

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MEDINA V. CHAPPELL 27

ordered. Id. After competency experts filed reports, the trial

court terminated the competency proceedings and ordered

Medina to stand trial with waist chains and leg shackles. Id.

During the guilt phase of the trial, which began on August

14, 1989, Medina attempted to relitigate his competence to

stand trial, but otherwise did not present any evidence. Id. 

The jury found Medina guilty. Id. During the penalty phase,

Medina’s counsel presented testimony from Irene McIntosh,

one of Medina’s sisters. Id. at 17, 46. Medina’s counsel

offered no other mitigating evidence. The prosecution

introduced a range of aggravating evidence, including

Medina’s Orange County murder convictions as well as

convictions for numerous other violent offenses. Id. at 17. 

The jury recommended and the trial court imposed a sentence

of death. Id. at 16.

The California Supreme Court affirmed Medina’s

conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Id. The United

States Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of

certiorari. Medina v. California, 519 U.S. 854 (1996).

Medina filed a state petition for habeas corpus, which the

California Supreme Court denied “on the merits” in a onepage summary order. Medina then initiated his federal

proceedings by requesting appointment of counsel and a stay

of execution. He filed his federal habeas petition on

September 1, 1998, after the effective date of AEDPA.

On April 25, 2000, the district court held an evidentiary

hearing on several of Medina’s claims. On June 17, 2008, the

court issued a sealed order denying all of Medina’s habeas

claims. Roughly seven months later, the court unsealed the

order, and granted a limited certificate of appealability.

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While Medina’s appeal was pending before us, the

Supreme Court held in Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388

(2011), that federal habeas review under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1) is “limited to the record that was before the state

court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Id. at 1398. 

We remanded Medina’s case so that the district court could

reconsider its denial of habeas relief in light of Pinholster. 

On May 3, 2012, the district court reaffirmed its denial of

habeas relief.

ADEPA governed the district court’s resolution of

Medina’s Riverside County petition. Under AEDPA, federal

courts may not grant a writ of habeas corpus with respect to

any claim that was:

adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Medina’s state habeas petition, which

the California Supreme Court denied in a one-page summary

order, was “adjudicated on the merits” within the meaning of

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MEDINA V. CHAPPELL 29

§ 2254(d). See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 97–100

(2011).7

Just as in the Orange County case, all of Medina’s

certified claims in the Riverside County case allege

ineffective assistance of counsel. As discussed at the outset

of Part II, Strickland requires the petitioner to demonstrate

that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness,” 466 U.S. at 688, as well as “a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different,” id. at 694. When we view a Strickland claim

through the lens of AEDPA, “the question is not whether

counsel’s actions were reasonable,” but “whether the state

court’s application of the Strickland standard was

unreasonable.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105, 101. In the absence

of any reasoned state court decision on Medina’s ineffective

assistance claims, we “must determine what arguments or

theories . . . could have supported” the state court’s summary

denial, and then “ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists

could disagree that those arguments or theories are

inconsistent with” Strickland and its progeny. Richter, 562

U.S. at 102.

7 Medina argues that applying Richter to his petition violates the Eighth

Amendment because state procedural rules deprive California death row

prisoners of the opportunity to obtain at least one reasoned state decision

on the merits of their habeas claims. According to Medina, these rules

prevent death row prisoners from filing state habeas petitions in Superior

Court, where—if the petition is denied—they are guaranteed at least a

“brief statement of the reasons for the denial.” Cal. R. Ct. 4.551(g). 

However, Medina has identified no authority prohibiting death row

prisoners from filing their state habeas petitions in Superior Court.

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B. Competency Phase Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Claims

Medina argues that defense counsel’s failure to

investigate Medina’s psychiatric history during the

competency phase of the Riverside trial, and his resulting

failure to provide this information to the experts who

evaluated Medina’s competency, constituted ineffective

assistance. We disagree.

Medina bore the burden of establishing his incompetence

to stand trial. See Medina, 505 U.S. at 452–53 (affirming the

constitutionality of California’s presumption of competence). 

At Medina’s Riverside County competency trial, Drs. Rath,

Oshrin, and Sharma testified for the prosecution that Medina

was competent to stand trial, and Dr. Kania testified for the

defense that he was incompetent. Medina II, 906 P.2d at 17. 

All three prosecution experts testified that they believed

Medina was malingering. Id.

Dr. Kania has since declared that defense counsel “never

met with me or called me to discuss my opinions and

conclusions before I testified in the 1988 competency jury

trial.” He also declared that if he had been given additional

information about Medina’s medical and social history, his

“opinions and conclusions regarding Mr. Medina’s severe

psychosis would have been greatly strengthened.” Dr. Rath

stated that defense counsel “never made any written or oral

contact with me,” and that “it was my custom and practice to

contact both the district attorney and defense counsel to seek

their input in the preparation of my written evaluation.” 

However, neither Dr. Kania nor Dr. Rath asserted that they

actually contacted defense counsel to request information.

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MEDINA V. CHAPPELL 31

That omission is fatal to Medina’s claim. Although

defense counsel have a general obligation to investigate, see

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91, the Supreme Court has never

held that they have an affirmative duty to provide psychiatric

information to experts who will be evaluating their clients for

purposes of determining competency to stand trial.

Although Dr. Rath declared that it was his “custom and

practice” to request information from defense counsel, he did

not state that he actually made such a request. Therefore, the

California Supreme Court’s determination that Medina’s

counsel did not perform deficiently during the competency

phase because Dr. Rath never made a specific request for

information was not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1).

C. Failure to Pursue Mitigation Evidence in the Penalty

Phase

Medina contends that his Riverside County trial counsel,

a different attorney than in the Orange County trial, rendered

ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present

meaningful mitigation evidence at the penalty phase. We

need not decide whether counsel’s performance was deficient,

as we hold that any such error was harmless. We therefore

turn directly to the question of prejudice and conclude that

“fairminded jurists could disagree” as to whether counsel’s

deficient performance—assuming without deciding that

counsel’s performance was deficient—prejudiced Medina. 

Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. Accordingly, we affirm the district

court’s denial of habeas relief.

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During the penalty phase, defense counsel presented only

one mitigation witness: Medina’s sister Irene McIntosh. 

McIntosh testified that Medina was a “normal, responsible

child,” but that after he was released from prison, he was

“sick in the head” and “not the brother [that she] grew up

with.” On cross-examination, McIntosh admitted that she

was afraid of Medina and that she feared she could have been

his next victim. She explained that two days before Medina

was arrested, he told her he dreamt that he saw her bleeding

from scratches on her back. Although one of Medina’s other

sisters was present in the courtroom and available to testify,

counsel decided not to call her after hearing McIntosh’s

testimony.

Medina identifies three types of evidence that defense

counsel should have investigated and presented in mitigation:

his family background, including his history of abuse as a

child; his head injuries and possible brain damage; and his

psychiatric history. Habeas counsel obtained the declarations

from family members regarding evidence of physical abuse,

childhood injuries, and mental illness, none of which was

presented at trial.8

Nor did counsel call any medical experts, even though

several had testified earlier in the penalty phase of Medina’s

Orange County trial. Dr. Sharma, who testified during

Medina’s Riverside County competency hearing, declared

that if he had been privy to the information regarding

Medina’s history of mental illness, he would have been

prepared to testify at the penalty phase regarding Medina’s

“mental impairment and longstanding psychiatric illness.” 

8 These declarations were before the state habeas court and therefore

may be considered on federal habeas under Pinholster, 131 S. Ct 1388.

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MEDINA V. CHAPPELL 33

Dr. Gold, who had been Medina’s treating psychiatrist in

Arizona state prison, also stated that he would have testified

as a mitigation witness.9 Other psychiatrists who

subsequently reviewed Medina’s full psychiatric and social

history also declared that they would have testified as

mitigation witnesses on the basis of that evidence.

To succeed in his ineffective assistance claim, Medina

must establish that “there is a reasonable probability that,

absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that

the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did

not warrant death.” Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1408 (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Thus, “we reweigh the evidence in aggravation

against the totality of available mitigating evidence,”

Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534, and then ask whether it would have

been unreasonable for the California Supreme Court to

conclude based on this evidence that Medina failed to

establish prejudice.

As discussed in Part II.B., supra, Medina was not

prejudiced within the meaning of Strickland in the Orange

County case by counsel’s failure to investigate and discover

the abuse Medina suffered as a child. Unlike in the Orange

County case, counsel in the Riverside County case also failed

to present evidence of Medina’s psychiatric history, which

suggested that he suffers from paranoid schizophrenia. Yet

as the Supreme Court recently noted, evidence of mental

illness is “by no means clearly mitigating, as the jury might

have concluded that [petitioner] was simply beyond

9 Dr. Gold’s declaration explicitly mentions his willingness to testify at

the Orange County trial, but there is no reason to doubt that he would have

been willing to do so at the Riverside County trial as well.

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34 MEDINA V. CHAPPELL

rehabilitation.” Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1410. Indeed,

Medina’s OrangeCounty counsel presented much of the same

psychiatric evidence during the penalty phase of that trial, yet

the jury there voted for the death penalty. Moreover, just as

in the Orange County trial, the prosecution presented

unusually strong aggravating evidence at the penalty phase,

which included multiple murder and rape convictions as well

as numerous assaults that Medina committed while in

custody.

Reweighing this evidence against all available mitigating

evidence, and deferring as we must under AEDPA, we

conclude that fairminded jurists could disagree as to whether

defense counsel’s alleged failure to investigate and present

additional mitigating evidence prejudiced Medina. See

Richter, 562 U.S. at 102 (reiterating that “even a strong case

for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion

was unreasonable”). We therefore affirm the district court’s

denial of relief on this claim.

D. Failure to Present an Insanity Defense

Medina argues that his Riverside County counsel

rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to

investigate Medina’s mental state at the time of the crimes

and consequently failing to present an insanity defense. We

have found deficient performance where defense counsel was

“on notice about [his client’s] mental health and drug abuse

problems,” yet failed to investigate a potential mental state

defense. Jennings v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1006, 1015–16 (9th

Cir. 2002) (citing Seidel v. Merkle, 146 F.3d 750, 755–57 (9th

Cir. 1998)).

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MEDINA V. CHAPPELL 35

At the Riverside County trial, Medina’s counsel did not

present an insanity defense, and he has since declared that he

“never investigated nor pursued in any way an insanity

defense.” He was, however, aware that in Orange County

Medina had a separate trial to determine whether he was not

guilty by reason of insanity when he committed the crimes,

pursuant to California Penal Code § 1026, which provides for

a separate trial on “the question whether the defendant was

sane or insane at the time the offense was committed.” He

was found to be legally sane at the time all the charged crimes

were committed.

Assuming without deciding that Medina’s counsel

performed deficiently by failing to investigate a potential

insanity defense, it would not have been unreasonable for the

California Supreme Court to conclude that Medina failed to

establish prejudice. Medina’s Orange County counsel

pursued an insanity defense, but it failed, despite Dr. Gold’s

testimony that Medina was probably insane at the time he

committed those murders. While the circumstances of the

Riverside County murder and Medina’s contemporaneous

Orange County crimes might not be per se incompatible with

an insanity defense, his careful planning and attempts to

avoid apprehension would have made an insanity defense

difficult. As a result, “fairminded jurists could disagree” as

to whether Medina met Strickland’s prejudice requirement,

Richter, 562 U.S. at 102, and the district court correctly

denied habeas relief.

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36 MEDINA V. CHAPPELL

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

denial of Medina’s habeas petitions.

AFFIRMED.

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