Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-04105/USCOURTS-ca10-89-04105-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 870
Nature of Suit: Tax Suits
Cause of Action: 

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.. ~ , 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

L. SHYRL BROWN and ILA DEL ) 

BROWN, ) 

No. 89-4105 

FILrtO 

v~Jiced SritQs C9tuf f.)f Appea 

Tenth Ci!'ruit 

JAN 2 ~ 1990 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 

) 

v. ) 

D.C. No. 89-C-155J 

( D. Utah) 

) 

CALVIN GOULD, ALDON J. ) 

ANDERSON, DAVID SAM, and ) 

JOHN DOES 1 through 25 as ) 

they appear, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MCKAY, ANDERSON and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

As the attached excerpts from the record in this case 

disclose, the appellants have continued, through variations on a 

single theme, to litigate and relitigate their federal 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-4105 Document: 01019961643 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 1 
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tax controversy to the point of abuse of the judicial process. 

Sanctions have previously been imposed against them both in the 

district court and in this court and those sanctions remain 

unpaid. 

Undeterred, the appellants filed suit in state court against 

three federal judges based upon actions taken by these judges 

relative to the underlying tax controversy. That suit was 

properly removed to federal court and dismissed. Appellants 

appeal that dismissal. 

Appellants' convoluted arguments, both jurisdictional and 

otherwise, are wholly without merit. Their suit is deficient for 

multiple reasons, not the least of which is that these judges are 

absolutely immune from suit. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 

355-57 (1978); Van Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431, 1434-35 

(10th Cir. 1986). 

The appellees have not asked for sanctions to be imposed in 

this case, but on what is presently before us, this appeal is 

frivolous and vexatious. Appellants are granted 15 days within 

which to show cause, in writing, why monetary sanctions should not 

be imposed, Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504 (10th Cir. 1987), 

and why the clerk of this court should not be directed to refuse 

to file any further appeals in suits filed by L. Shyrl Brown and 

Ila Del Brown relating to this tax controversy, 

Beaman, 878 F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 1989), unless: 

see Tripati v. 

(a) they provide 

satisfactory proof that they have paid all sanctions previously 

imposed by this court, plus any outstanding bills for costs; or 

(b) in the absence of such proof, upon an order of a judge of the 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-4105 Document: 01019961643 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 2 
Tenth Circuit permitting such filing on the grounds that the 

appeal is not frivolous or an improper attempt to further 

relitigate aspects of their federal tax controversy which are res 

judicata. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The mandate 

shall issue forthwith. 

3 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 89-4105 Document: 01019961643 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 3 
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No~ 26 2 ss ?H '~l\ 

F J. u L L. . :; ;\ C G ( R 

CLERK 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

CENTRAL DIVISION 

IN THE MATTER OF THE TAX 

INDEBTEDNESS OF 

L. SHYRL BROWN 

: ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT 

:· BROWN'S MOTION TO VACATE 

: WRIT OF ENTRY 

C-84-651A 

C. William Ryan for the United States. 

L. Shyrl Brown, prose. 

This order will constitute the Court's findings of fact 

and conclusions of law pursuant to rule 52. In this case 

defendant Brown sought to vacate a writ of entry which allowed 

the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") to enter Mr. Brown's 

place of business, seize his personal property and padlock Mr. 

J 

Brown's building in order to secure the personal property. 

I. FACTS 

Mr. Brown failed to file a tax return for the calendar 

years of 1971 th~ough 1983. Under applicable statute when a 

taxpayer fails to file, the IRS can assess the taxes due. 26 

U.S.C. 6020. On October 1, 1982 the Service determined Mr. 

Brown's tax liability for the years 1971, 1972, 1973. On 

October 4, 1982, the service notified Mr. Brown that he had a 

deficiency and that Mr. Brown had 90 days to file a petition 

~t-'n {~~ 

0~0-?,t 

q~ TJ1t'Y,\~ 

Appellate Case: 89-4105 Document: 01019961643 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 4 
_., 

2 

with the United States Tax Court. Exhibit B. Mr. Brown did 

not file a petition with the tax court but instead wrote a 

letter to the Salt Lake office of the IRS claiming that the 

IRS did not have jurisdiction over him. Exhibit C. On May 4, 

1983, the IRS assessed the taxes against the defendant. Ts. 

at 20. On May 9, 1983, the IRS gave the defendant notice of 

the assessment and a demand for payment. Id. Defendant Brown 

never paid the assessment. Id. On May 17, 1984, the IRS 

filed notices of tax liens with the Sevier County Recorder on 

Hr. Brown's property. 

The IRS then located Mr. Brown's dental office where it 

believed that Mr. Brown had assets which could be seized for 

the nonpayment of taxes. On July 12, 1984 a revenue agent 

went to the magistrate and applied for a writ of entry. In 

support of the writ, the agent executed an affidavit which set 

forth the assessment, notice of assessment to the defendant, 

demand for payment, and fail~re to pay the assessed tax. The I 

affidavit also listed the address of Mr. Brown's dental office 

at 46 West 100 North, Richfield, Utah. The affidavit indicated that the writ was sought to enter the office and seize 

the defendant's dental equipment, furniture and office equipment. Exhibit f., Ts. 20-21. 

Based on the application and affidavit, the United States 

magistrate executed a writ of entry dated July 12, 1984. 

Pursuant to that writ on July 17, 1984, IRS personnel entered 

Mr. Brown's dental office and served Mr. Brown with the 

, 

Appellate Case: 89-4105 Document: 01019961643 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 5 
3 

executed writ of entry and IRS Levy. The IRS inventoried the 

office equipment and furniture and gave a copy of the 

inventory to Mr. Brown. The defendant removed certain 

business records and st least $1,000 in tools. The IRS then 

changed the locks on the doors in order to secure the seized 

property. Ts. 19-23, 28-33. 

Mr. Brown filed a motion to vacate the IRS writ of entry 

and a hearing on the motion was held on August 7, 1984. 

II. DISCUSSION 

Throughout a more than ten year battle with the IRS, Mr. 

Brown has consistently argued that the IRS, the magistrate and 

now this Court cannot assert jurisdiction over him. He contends further that he is "free and sovereign citizen." Defendant's objections to proposed findings of fact at 1. The 

•' 

defendant ignores the present statutory powers of the IRS and 

this Court and the judicial precedent determining the constitutionality of the income. tax laws here involved. Under . 

I 

the circumstances it is absolutely settled law that this Court 

has jurisdiction over the person and issues involved irt this 

proceeding. Under 26 U.S.C. § 7402 this Court can hear and 

adjudicate applications for writs of entry. Defendant cites 

absolutely no viable authority for the proposition that this 

Court cannot maintain jurisdiction over him. 

The defendant continues to argue that he has been denied 

due process. He fails to grasp what due process is. He had a 

day in court in which he presented his side of this case. Hie 

' 

Appellate Case: 89-4105 Document: 01019961643 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 6 
. _,· 

4 

view of the facts and law was ultimately Tejected. Nevertheless he still feels that unless this Court rules in his 

favor he has been denied due process. Due process means a 

full and fair opportunity to present one's side of the case. 

The defendant has had that and more. The IRS certainly has 

been long suffering with him; . more than thirteen years have • 

lapsed since he first failed to file a return. Accordingly, 

defendant's due process arguments are utterly without merit. 

Also without merit is his argument that the writ of entry 

violates due process. The magistrate has authority to issue 

writs of entry and warrants upon a showing of probable cause 

pursuant to fed. R. Crim. P. 41(a). ~ut an important 

distinction must be drawn between a criminal warrant and an 

IRS writ of entry. Under Carlson v. United States, 580 F.2d 

~ ~ I .i • •~~-

1365 (10th Cir. 1978), the standard for probable cause in an 

IRS writ of entry is not the same as for a cTiminal warrant. 

Thus, in an application for such a writ of entry, the IRS must 

.I 

establish by affidavit that: (1) it has a right to levy and 

seize assets of the taxpayer; this means proper assessment, 

notice of assessment to the taxpayer, demand for payment, end 

nonpayment, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §§ 6213, 6303 end 6331; and 

(2) there is probable cause to believe that there are assets 

which may be seized on the premises to be entered. 

The affidavit which the magistrate considered properly 

contained assessment, notice and demand, and nonpayment by the 

taxpayer. Moreover, the affidavit also presents a basis for 

Appellate Case: 89-4105 Document: 01019961643 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 7 
.._ ___ ___ \ 

5 

probable cause to believe there were seizable assets on the 

premises to be entered because the revenue officer identified 

that the address where the writ was to be served was the 

dental office of Mr. Brown. The revenue officer viewed the 

county assessor records which listed L.S. Brown as the owner 

of dental equipment, furniture_ and office equipment located at 

46 West 100 North, Richfield, Utah. Thus, a reasonable person 

would conclude that Mr. Brown's assets might be found at that 

locatitin. - Therefore, the writ of entry executed on July 12, 

1984 by th~ magistrate was lawfully entered and was based 

upon probably cause. _See exhibit r. 

l 

furthermore, due process does not require a prior hearing 

be~o~ e the magistrate issues the writ of entry. Carlson at 

1373-74. bnce ·the _ IRS effected the seizure the law allows a 

reasonable means .to secure the seized property. Padlocking 

the *ntrance has been specifically held to be reasonable. 

__ S_e_e_.,.___e __ .;...g~. , H e c k v • W a 1 t e_E_!. , 5 2 3 F • 2 d 2 3 , 2 5 ( 9 t h C i r • 

1975). 

Accordingly, defendant's motion to vacate the writ of 

entry is hereby DENIED. 

DATED this ~b 

Ccpies mailed 11/26/84:dp 

C. William Ryan, AJJSA 

L. Slyrl Brcwn 

day of November 1984. 

) 

• 

-~ 

ALDON J. 

United States District Judge 

Appellate Case: 89-4105 Document: 01019961643 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 8 
FILEO IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COL!RT, DISTRICT OF UTAH 

OCT 2 8 1985 

PAUL L. BADGER , ".\'"·1<" . 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

CENTRAL DIVISION 

IN THE MATTER OF 

L. SHYRL BROWN 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Case No. C-84-0651A 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

This case began when the United States obtained a writ of 

entry to seize property of Mr. Brown for collection of IRS taxes 

assessed and owin~. Mr. Brown moved to vacate the writ, and a 

full evidentiary hearing was held before Judge Anderson on August 

7, 1984. On November 26, 1984, Judge Anderson entered an order 

denying the motion to vacate. Mr. Brown did not appeal that 

decision7 however, he continued to file discovery requests and 

•notices of fraud.• Upon motion by the United States, Judge 

Anderson entered a protective order on November 30, 1984, which 

provided that: 

•the United States and the Internal Revenue Service 

need not respond to the discovery requests of L. Shyrl 

Brown made in connection with the motion to vacate writ 

of entry heretofore ruled upon by the Court, and L. 

Shyrl Brown's requests for discovery are stricken.• 

: DEFENDANT'S 

/1-4- ~s- J EXOBIT 

' ··- ·'i'",>'. ·: •.·· ._.,,.. .. 

Appellate Case: 89-4105 Document: 01019961643 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 9 
On August 30, 1985, Mr. Brown filed a •petition for 

investigation into perjury, fraudulent and false statements and 

violations of civil rights.• That petition was referred to the 

magistrate and is the subject of this report. 

Mr. Brown maintains that fraud has been perpetrated upon him 

because, technically, the IRS has not sent him a true copy of its 

assessment and because the letter of assessment sent him a true 

copy of its assessment and because the letter of assessment sent 

to him by Lynn Poll, Chief of IRS' Correspondence Section, bore 

no signature by the assessment officer (only a scroll stamp) and 

was not accompanied by sufficient documentation. According to 

Mr. Poll's affidavit, the actual assessment certificate is 

generated in a form that would not be meaningful to a taxpayer. 

Therefore, it is IRS procedure to arrange the information from 

the certificate in a letter that sets forth the name of the 

taxpayer, the assessment amount, penalty amounts, interest, the 

time period in question, and th~ date of assessment. Thus, the I 

letter provides all relevant information regaraing the assessment. 

Mr. Brown acknowledges that he received such a letter. See 

Exhibit zz following Petition. 

The propriety of the assessment was one of the issues at the 

August 7th evidentiary hearing. ~he IRS put on witnesses and 

entered exhibits to establish proper assessment, and Mr. Brown 

had the opportunity to cross-examine. The court subsequently 

found that •the IRS gave the aetendant notice of the assessment 

and demand for payment.• (Order of November 26, 1984). 

Appellate Case: 89-4105 Document: 01019961643 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 10 
·"--· 

It is unclear how Mr. Brown's current petition should be 

interpreted. It is clear, however, that it raises no new issue 

or new evidence of fraud. Because it asks the government to 

produce a document (a copy of the original assessment) and 

because it is like the •notices of fraud• already on file, the 

petition might be viewed as a discovery request. If so, it is 

stricken under the November 30, 1984 protective order. 

Mr. Brown's petition might also be viewed as a motion for 

relief from judgment on the basis of fraud, pursuant to Rule 

60(b)(3), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 The burden on a 

party moving for relief from judgment has been explained by 

Professor Moore: 

•The moving party must show fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct within the intendment of 60 

(b){3) and, normally, that he has a meritorious claim 

or defense, as the case may be. Fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct is not to be presumedi and 

they must ordinarily be proved by clear and convincinq 

evidence. Any findings of fact by the trial court 

are presumptively correct and should not be set aside 

on appeal unless clearly etroneous. 

7 Moore's Federal Practice, 60.24[5] ·(1985) {emphasis added). 

The absence of a copy of the original assessment certificate 

has not prejudiced Mr. Brown to the point of •fraud• where the 

information from that assessment was received by him in a clearer 

format from its official source. Nor is there other •clear and 

convincing• evidence of fraud or misconduct sufficient to rebut 

1 A motion for relief from judgment might be timely since this 

•petition• was filed within a year of the entry of judgment. 

Appellate Case: 89-4105 Document: 01019961643 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 11 
the presumption that Judge Anderson's finding of an adequate 

assessment is correct. Accordingly, a motion for relief from 

judgment on the basis of fraud or misconduct should be denied. 

However the petition is viewed, the issue of the assessment's 

adequacy has been fully litigated, and Mr. Brown is barred from 

relitigating it. If he continues to dredge up the same issues 

again and again after trial and judgment on the merits and after 

the time for appeal has elapsed, he risks being sanctioned under 

Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 11 obliges the 

court to impose an appropriate sanction whenever a pleading or 

other paper is signed for an improper motive, such as •to harass 

or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of 

litigation.• 

Conclusion 

The magistrate recommends that Mr. Brown's •petition for 

investigation• be denied. To the extent that it is a discovery 

request, it is stricken under th~ Court's previous protective 

order. To the extent that it seeks relief from judgment, it is 

denied. Mr. Brown has failed to present clear and convincing 

evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct 

sufficient to set aside the previous judgment. 

Copies of the foregoing report and recommendation are being 

mailed to the parties. They are hereby notified of their right 

Appellate Case: 89-4105 Document: 01019961643 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 12 
to file objections hereto 

DATED this -+-1- day 

within 10 days from the receipt hereof •. 

of October, 1985. 

I\ '\ ( 

Ca~ .. - United States Magistrate 

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 

I hereby certify that I have mailed a copy of the foregoing 

Report and Recommendation to L. Shyrl Brown, 490 North First 

West, Richfield, Utah 847011 and in inter-office mail to C. 

William Ryan, Assistant United States Attorney, Salt Lake City, 

Utah, this ~~~- day of October, 1985. 

Seer 

_i:;._ 

Appellate Case: 89-4105 Document: 01019961643 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 13 
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A. ~R ~_I-J ; ~ . aH isi.: ,iJ O ,. . u 

·_. :~ ·._ ,~tP, 

CL~Rr, 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

CENTRAL DIVISION 

* * * * • * * • * • • • * • * * * • * * * • * * • • * * • * * 

IN THE MATTER OF L. ) 

SHYRL BROWN RULING ON L. SHYRL BROWN'S 

) MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT AND OTHER 

) PENDING MOTIONS 

) Case No. 84-C-0651S 

* * • * * * * * • • • • • • • * * • • • • • • • • • • * * * • 

The court having heard oral argument and reviewed the 

record and the law, is now prepared to rule on Mr. Brown's 

Motion for Summary Judgment and other pending motions: 

RULING 

Mr. Brown requests that the court grant summary judgment 

vacating the Magistrate's order dated July 12, 1984, which 

order allowed the Internal Reyenue Service to enter Mr. 

Brown's dental office and seize his· personal property in 

satisfaction of delinquent taxes. However, the validity of 

the Magistrate's order has been determined by Judge Anderson 

pursuant 

appellate 

to a prior motion to -vacate. 

jurisdiction to overrule 

This court lacks 

Judge Anderson's 

conclusive and correct decisions in this matter. • 

This case has a long history of repeatedly dealing with 

issues previously decided by t~e court. After the Magistrate 

issued the writ of entry on July 12, 1984, Mr. Brown objecte~l!IIIIII~~~~

~ DEFENDANT

L. E~IBIT 

Appellate Case: 89-4105 Document: 01019961643 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 14 
to the seizure of his property and moved to vacate the 

Magistrate's order. He asserted misrepresentations by Mr. 

Pritchett, an IRS Revenue Officer, in the affidavit 

supporting the Magistrate's order, contested the legality of 

the tax assessment and the court's jurisdiction, and claimed 

that his right to "due process" had been violated. On August 

7, 1984, Judge Anderson heard the motion, denied it, and 

asked the Assistant United States Attorney to prepare the 

order. Mr. Brown filed an objection to the proposed order, 

asserting, inter alia, that the government failed to produce 

evidence of a Notice ot Assessment, that his property was 

taken without due process ot law, that Magistrate Gould 

lacked jurisdiction because he was not an "Article III 

judge", and that the government failed to prove assessment 

authority or that the enforcement action was properly 

initiated. 

On November 26, 1984, Judge Anderson issued a written 

order setting forth his findings of fact and conclusions of 

law relative to Mr. Brown's motion to vacate and subsequent 

objections. Judge Anderson found that Mr. Brown failed to 

file tax returns from 1971 through 1983, that in early 

• October 1982 the IRS determined his tax liability for the 

years 1971, 1972 and 1973 and notified him of the deficiency 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-4105 Document: 01019961643 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 15 
and of his right to petition the United states Tax Court 

within ninety days, that instead Mr. Brown wrote a letter to 

the Salt Lake office of the IRS denying jurisdiction, that on 

May 4, 1983, the IRS assessed the taxes, that on May 9, 1983, 

the IRS gave him notice of the assessment and a demand for 

payment, and that he never paid the assessment. Judge 

Anderson also concluded, after careful analysis of the issues 

raised, that the Magistrate and this court had jurisdiction 

over Mr. Brown in this matter, that due process had been 

satisfied by a full and fair opportunity to be heard, that 

the Magistrate had the authority to issue a writ of entry 

upon a showing of probable cause, and that the affidavit in 

support of the writ of entry properly contained assessment, 

notice and demand, nonpayment and a showing of probable 

cause. Accordingly, Judge Anderson determined that the 

Magistrate's writ of entry wa~_properly executed. 

Mr. Brown continued to file requests for admissions, 

interrogatories and "notices of fraud" contesting the 

Magistrate's order of entry and the government's authority to 

assess the tax. On November 27, 1984, the government moved 

tor an order to strike the discovery documents or, in the 

alternative, 

discovery. 

a protective ·order against · the ~ 

requested 

On November 30• 1984, a protective order was 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-4105 Document: 01019961643 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 16 
J• . 

entered by Judge Anderson stating that a full evidentiary 

hearing had been conducted on the motion to vacate the IRS's 

writ of entry and accordingly further discovery was 

"superfluous". Judge Anderson also recognized that "this 

court has upheld the validity of the writ as well as the 

propriety of the Internal Revenue Service's assessments of 

Mr. Brown's taxes". 

Mr. Brown persisted, filing a "Special Appearance, 

Denial of Jurisdiction, Denial of Liability, Evidence of 

Fraud by the Plaintiff, and Demand for Return of Property", 

and other papers of a similar nature, including a "Petition 

for Investigation into Perjury, Fraudulent and False 

statements and Violation of Civil Rights". The latter was 

referred to the Magistrate on September 9, 1985. On October 

28, 1985, the Magistrate issued a Report and Recommendation • . The Magistrate concluded that t -he issue of the "assessment's 

adequacy has been fully litigated" and properly observed 

that, "If he [Mr. Brown] continues to dredge up the same 

issues again and again after trial and judgment on the merits 

and after the time for appeal has elapsed, he risks being 

sanctioned under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 

However, Mr. Brown timely objected to the Report and 

Recommendation. Mr. Brown in his objection persists in 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-4105 Document: 01019961643 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 17 
.J . 

. 

raising the same issues, contending that no proper record of 

assessment was provided, that the IRS has not properly 

assessed a tax, that IRS officials made fraudulent statements 

in their affidavits supporting the assessment, and that the 

court should further investigate the fraud and allow further 

discovery of the Record of Assessment. 

These issues were all addressed by Judge Anderson in the 

initial hearing on Mr. Brown's motion to vacate, the 

subsequent ruling following the objections to denial of the 

motion, and the decision that further discovery would be 

"superfluous". The court having again reviewed the record 

finds no new evidence of fraud, misrepresentation or other 

misconduct which would justify setting aside the previous 

decisions. The court, accordingly, concurs with the Report 

and Recommendation of the Magistrate and hereby accepts it in 

I 

whole and incorporates it into this ruling. 

Mr. Brown continues to file papers raising the same 

arguments. On November 21, 1985, he filed a Petition for 

Rehearing or Reconsideration and Demand for Return of 

Property, stating eight reasons why he believed the IRS had 

not assessed a tax. Judge Anderson found that the tax was 

' properly assessed. The government objected to rehearing and 

Mr. Brown filed an "Objection to Plaintiff's Obj actions" 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-4105 Document: 01019961643 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 18 
.J • 

.. 

again contesting the validity of the tax assessment and 

asking the court to vacate the Magistrate's writ of entry. 

Judge Anderson ruled that the assessment was valid and that 

the Magistrate's order should not be vacated. 

On January 24, 1986, Mr. Brown filed a Petition to 

Investigate Violations of 18 u.s.c. 2235 and Demand for 

Return of Property which attacked the Magistrate's finding of 

probable cause. Judge Anderson ruled that the Magistrate had 

probable cause. 

On February 13, 1986, Mr. Brown filed a Motion for 

Summary Judgment, Motion for Judicial Notice, Motion for 

Protection from Crimes, Motion to Present Crimes to Grand 

Jury with Special Prosecutor, and Demand for Return of 

Property. 

vacate 

In substance, Mr. Brown again moves the court to 

the Magistrate's writ of entry, contesting 

jurisdiction, the record of assessment, and probable cause. 

And, Mr. Brown seeks the protection of the court against 

criminal fraud in the affidavits supporting the assessment. 

This court found, however, that Mr. Brown's allegations of 

fraud did not provide a basis for reconsideration of prior 

rulings. Judge Anderson held that. the Magistrate's writ of 

entry was proper, including jurisdiction, , the record of 

assessment and probable cause. 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-4105 Document: 01019961643 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 19 
J • . > 

on March s, 1986, Mr. Brown filed "Objections to 

Appearance of w. William Ryan, AUSA". Mr. Brown asserts that 

Mr. Ryan, counsel for the government, has no standing because 

he did not file a complaint establishing jurisdiction, that 

counsel is in default because he has not, and that Mr. Ryan 

exceeded his authority by misleading the magistrate to 

violate Mr. Brown's right to due process, to assume 

jurisdiction when none existed, and to find an assessment 

when there was none. Again, Judge Anderson reviewed the 

Magistrate's order, found that jurisdiction was proper, that 

Mr. Brown's due process rights were not violated, and that 

there was a proper tax assessment. 

Finally, on March 21, 1986, Mr. Brown filed a Subpoena 

Duces Tecum for Carol Fay, District Director of the IRS, to 

produce records verifying the tax assessment. The subpoena 

was followed by a petition t~ enforce it. This matter falls 

squarely within the purview of ·Judge Anderson's prior 

protective order dated November 30, 1984, in which Judge 

Anderson determined that the IRS need not respond to further 

discovery requests. 

Accordingly, Mr. Brown's motions are collectively 

denied. Any further filings relative to issues previously 

decided in this case, including, but not limited to, the 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-4105 Document: 01019961643 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 20 
) 

validity of the writ or the propriety of the IRS' s tax 

assessment of Mr. Brown's taxes, may be subject to Rule 11 

sanctions including an order to pay to the responding parties 

the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the 

filing and a reasonable attorney's fee. 

DATED this 2.<("'t day of ~, 1986. 

cc: attys, 4/28/86:dp 

C. William Ryan, AUSA 

L. Shyrl Brown 

8 

BY THE COURT: 

DAVID SAM 

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE 

-

Appellate Case: 89-4105 Document: 01019961643 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 21 
f' •. ~.. , •.• . ' - . .... . . . 

L . 

I f f I .j r· · ·· · .. ._ ., :. -.J !. , _. 

l.11 1" ;.,;.· .. '' . "., , - ., .. I •: . ' I . ·' -· .. : ··- - -~ ' 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT : 'FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

CENTRAL DIVISION 

IN THE MATTER OF 

L. SHYRL BROWN 

Case No. C-84-0651S 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

This case demonstrates a flagrant abuse of the judicial 

process. Mr. Brown continues to file papers raising long-settled 

issues of the I.R.S.'s authority to assess and collect income 

taxes from him. On April 24, 1986, Judge Sam ruled that: 

"Any further filings relative to issues previously 

decided in this case, including, but not limited 

to, the validity of the writ [of entry] or the 

propriety of the IRS's tax ~ssessment of Mr. Brown's 

taxes, may be subject to Rule 11 sanctions including 

an order to pay to the responding parties the amount 

of the reasonable expenses incurr~d because of the 

filing and a reasonable attorney's fee." 

Mr. Brown responded to this directive by filing papers of 

•special Appearance" on May 12, May 22, June 2, June 9, and June 

18, 1986. The magistrate has reviewed these papers and finds 

that they raise no new issues but are all res judicata. (For 

example, they challenge the court's jurisdiction and the I.R.S.'s 

; DEFENDANT'S 1.2:_ 

Appellate Case: 89-4105 Document: 01019961643 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 22 
.1 • 

authority to collect taxes, demand a copy of the record of 

assessment or return of the property seized, and demand a jury 

trial). 

This is a clear case for Rule 11 sanctions. Reasonable 

attorney's fees should be awarded, as set forth in the affidavit 

of William Ryan, Assistant United States Attorney, together with 

a $500 fine payable to the court. See, Snyder v. I.R.S., 596 

F.Supp. 240, 253 (N.D. Ind. 1984). 

Copies of the foregoing report and recommendation are being 

mailed to the parties. They are hereby notified of their right 

to file objections hereto 

DATED this~ day 

within 10 days from the receipt hereof. 

of July, 1986. 

Caln ~~ Gould "--. 

United States Magistrate 

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING . I hereby certify that I hav1

e mailed a copy of the foregoing 

Report and Recommendation to L. Shyrl Brown, 180 North First 

East, Richfield, Utah 84701; and in inter-office mail to C. 

William Ryan, AUSA, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, this \~ 

of July, 1986. 

-2-

day 

Appellate Case: 89-4105 Document: 01019961643 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 23 
.I • 

1 ,_ cg - P~ '86 

lJ •1 . f : : .! T E S 

AT.;" ·:.:·: 'i '.: f 

O1S rn1 ::T Or UT AH 

luc \ 

p~\JL L. BA~<;ER 

CLEP.i 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

CENTRAL DIVISION 

* * * * • • * • • * * * * * * • • * * * * • • • * * * * * • * 

) 

) 

IN THE MATTER OF 

) / L. SHYRL BROWN RULING AND ORDER 

) 

) 

) Case No. 84-C-0651S 

* * * * * * * * * * * • * * * * * * * * * * * • * * * * * * * 

The court, having referred the case to the magistrate 

and having reviewed the magistrate's Report and Recommendation together with objections filed by Mr. Brown, is now 

prepared to rule on the United states government's Motion for 

Costs, Attorney's Fees and Sanctions and Mr. Brown's motions 

filed subsequent to the court's prior ruling. 

RULING 

Mr. Brown persists in making the same arguments 

previously raised and ruled upon by the court. See the 

court's ruling dated April 25, 1986, referring to the hearing 

Judge Anderson conducted on August 7, 1984, his ruling dated 

November 26, 1984, and his protective order issued November 

30, 1984. The court concurs in the rulings and orders 

/ 

: DEFENDANT'S I E~IBl1 

Appellate Case: 89-4105 Document: 01019961643 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 24 
.) .,, > 

...:• . 

previously entered in this matter and accordingly will not 

disturb them. 

The court adopts the Report and Recommendation of the 

Magistrate and incorporates it by reference into this ruling. 

Mr. Brown's motions are denied and the government's motion is 

granted. 

It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that L. Shyrl 

Brown pay to the United states attorney's fees in the amount 

of $1,350.00 and pay to the court a fine of $500.00. 

Let judgment be entered accordingly. 

DATED this ,/£ day of¥-_ 1986. 

BY THE COURT: 

cc: attys, 8/1/86:dp 

C. William Ryan, AUSA 

L. Shyrl Brown 

LsLu 

DAVID SAM 

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE 

Appellate Case: 89-4105 Document: 01019961643 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 25 
• , J .. ,· f -..._. FILED - United Stat. Conn of Appeall· 

UNITED STATES COURT OP APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

Tenth Circuit ' 

JUL 071987 

IN TBB MA1'TER OF TAX INDEBTEDNESS 

OF L. SBYRL BROWN 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appel lee, 

v. 

L. SHYRL BROWN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ROBERT L. HOECICER 

Clerk 

No. 86-2244 

(D.C. No. C84-0651J) . (D. Utah) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT 

Before LOGAN and TACBA, Circuit Judges, and O'CONNOR, District 

Judge.* 

*The Honorable Earl!. O'Connor, Chief Judge, United States 

District Court for the District o~ Kansas, sitting by designation. 

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this 

three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument 

vould not be of material assistance -in the determination of this 

appeal. ~ Ped. R. App. P. 34(a>, 10th Cir. R. 34.1.S(c) and 

27.1.2. The cause is therefore ordered aubmitted without oral 

argument. 

, .. 

.· "':. .·. 

~ DEFENDANT'S I E~HIBIT 

Appellate Case: 89-4105 Document: 01019961643 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 26 
. ; • • 

, 

This is an appeal from a judgment of the United States 

District Court of the District of Utah which granted plaintiff'• 

aotion for Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions and attorney'• fees. 

On .appeal, defendant argues (1) the district court lacked 

jurisdiction to issue an order permitting his property to be 

aeized1 ' (2) the district court deprived him of a trial by jury, 

(3) the district court deprived · him of due process and the 

protections of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and United 

States Code1 (4) the district court deprived him of his right 

against unreasonable search and aeizure1 (5) 26 u.s.c. S 6331 does 

not apply to this act1oni (6) there vaa no proof of a proper tax 

assessment before the district court1 (7) there has been no 

judicial determination of tax liability, and (8) the district 

court improperly awarded sanctions against him. 

Because defendant's appeal is timely only as to the order 

granting sanctions and attorney's fees and costs, llJ:. Ped. R. 

App. P. •Ca)(l), ve need not consider defendant'• first seven 

arguments on appeal. After reviev~ng the record and briefs on 

appeal, ve conclude the district court appropriately ordered 

sanctions and attorney's fees and costs under Rule 11. 

Defendant'• requests that ve hear this ease en bane and that 

ve strike plaintiff'• brief are denied. 

Plaintiff request• that ve impose sanctions of $1,500 in lieu 

of attorney'• fees and coats on defendant for bringing a legally 

frivolous appeal. Defendant baa bad an~opportunity to respond, 

but baa failed to do ao. 

of 

Courts have the inherent power to impose a variety aanetiona on ••• litigant• ••• in order to 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-4105 Document: 01019961643 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 27 
• • 

., 

regulate their docket, promote judicial efficiency, and 

deter ·trivolous filings. Sil, L.SL., Roadway Express, Inc. Y, Piper, 447 o.s. 752, 164-61, 100 s. Ct. 2455, 

2463-64, 65 L. Ed. 2d ,es (1980>1 Link v, Wabash B, co,, 

370 U.S. 626, 632, 82 S. Ct. 1386, 1389, 8 L. Ed. 2d 734 

(1962)1 Whitney Y, Cook, 99 o.s. (9 Otto.) 607, 25 L.Ed. 

446 (1878). In addition, Fed. R. App. P. 38 and 28 

o.s.c. S 1912 provide that a court of appeals may award 

just damages and 1ingle or double costs if the court 

•determine[&] that an appeal is frivolous• or brought for purposes of delay. Thia court has imposed attorney's fees and double costs for the taking of 

frivolous appeals in other contexts. att, LS£., United 

states v, Rayco, Inc., 616 r.2d 462, 464 <10th cir. 

1980). 

Stafford v, commissioner, 805 F.2d 895, 896 (10th ~ir. 1986>1 

Stafford v. commissioner, 805 F.2d 893, 894-95 <10th cir. 1986>. 

In light of defendant's legally frivolous appeal, an award of 

,1,soo is justified. ~ Casper v, commissioner, 805 F.2d 902, 

906 <10th cir. 1986>1 Coleman v, commissioner, 791 F.2d 68, 72-73 

(7th Cir. 1986). 

The judgment of the united States District Court for the 

District of Otah is AFFIRMED. Additionally, a ,1,500 sanction is 

hereby imposed against defendant for the taking of a legally 

frivolous appeal. 

The mandat"e shall issue forthwith. 

b • 

ENTERED FOR TBB COURT 

PER CURIAM 

.• ": .- . 

3 

___ ,... __________ , ______ , _____ . ...:.,---.. ..:. _;• ~· 

Appellate Case: 89-4105 Document: 01019961643 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 28 
Before Honorable James K. _Logan and Honorable Deanell Reece Tacha, 

Circuit Judges, United States Court of Appeals, and Honorable 

Earl E. O'Connor, Chief Judge, United States District ,Court for 

the District of Kansas• 

IN THE MATTER OF TAX INDEBTEDNESS ) 

OF L. SBYRL BROWN ) 

'\ 

) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 86-2244 

) 

) 

L. SHYRL BROWN, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

The court, on its own motion, directs that the following be 

inserted in the mandate issued July 7, 1987. 

It is ordered that the district court judgment be modified 

(1) to include the $1,500 sanction· awarded to the United States, 

and (2) to direct and authorize tne counsel for the United States .I 

to take the necessary steps to collect t~e sanction. 

~ 

~:%-·~ .,;_. ~ 

IillBfRT L. TEhiR . Clerk 

•· . 

*The Honorable Earl E. O'Connor, Chief Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

11,;,)'. itl:l.,.. •li., c,;, 

l='VUTDTm -

Appellate Case: 89-4105 Document: 01019961643 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 29 
,. -.. 

TERM - SEPTEMBER 11, 1987. 

~efore Honorable William J. Holloway, Jr.,·chief Judge, Honorable 

Monroe G. McKay, Honor~ble Ja~es _K. Logan, Honorable Stephanie K. 

Seymour, Honorable John P. Moore, Honorable Stephen H. Anderson, 

Honorable_ Deanell Reece Tacha, and Honorable Bobby R. Baldock, 

Circuit Judges, United States Court of Appeals, and Honorable 

Earl E. O'Connor, Chief Judge, United States District Court for 

the District of lansas* 

IN THE MATTER OF TAX INDEBTEDNESS ) 

OF L. SBYRL BROWN ) 

) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 86-2244 

) 

) 

L. SHYRL BROWN, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

This matter is before the court on appellant's petition for 

rehearing with suggestion for rehearing en bane. 

The materials submitted b~ appellant have been reviewed by 

the members of the hearing panel, who conclude that the original 

disposition was correct. Accordingly, the petition is denied on 

the merits. 

The petition having been denied on the merits by the panel to 

whom the case was submitted and no member of the panel or judge in 

regular active service on the court having requested that the 

court be polled, the suggestion for rehearing en bane is denied. 

ROBERT L. HOECKER, Clerk 

~ 

-~,..~~~~ ' 

~ DEFENDANT'S *Honorable Earl E. O'Connor, Chief Judge, United States Di 

1

. EXHIBIT 

Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. :C 

..... '-# •• 

Appellate Case: 89-4105 Document: 01019961643 Date Filed: 01/24/1990 Page: 30