Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-35809/USCOURTS-ca9-12-35809-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DOUG LAIR; STEVE DOGIAKOS;

AMERICAN TRADITION

PARTNERSHIP; AMERICAN

TRADITION PARTNERSHIP PAC;

MONTANA RIGHT TO LIFE

ASSOCIATION PAC; SWEET GRASS

COUNCIL FOR COMMUNITY

INTEGRITY; LAKE COUNTY

REPUBLICAN CENTRAL COMMITTEE;

BEAVERHEAD COUNTY REPUBLICAN

CENTRAL COMMITTEE; JAKE OIL,

LLC; JL OIL, LLC; CHAMPION

PAINTING,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

STEVE BULLOCK, in his official

capacity as Attorney General of the

State of Montana; JAMES MURRAY,

“Jim”, in his official capacity as

Commissioner of Political Practices;

LEO GALLAGHER, in his official

capacity as Lewis and Clark County

Attorney,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 12-35809

D.C. No.

6:12-cv-00012-

CCL

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2 LAIR V. BULLOCK

DOUG LAIR; STEVE DOGIAKOS;

AMERICAN TRADITION

PARTNERSHIP; AMERICAN

TRADITION PARTNERSHIP PAC;

MONTANA RIGHT TO LIFE

ASSOCIATION PAC; SWEET GRASS

COUNCIL FOR COMMUNITY

INTEGRITY; LAKE COUNTY

REPUBLICAN CENTRAL COMMITTEE;

BEAVERHEAD COUNTY REPUBLICAN

CENTRAL COMMITTEE; JAKE OIL,

LLC; JL OIL, LLC; CHAMPION

PAINTING,

Plaintiffs,

and

RICK HILL, Warden; A LOT OF

FOLKS FOR RICK HILL; LORNA

KUNEY,

Intervenor-Plaintiffs–Appellants,

v.

STEVE BULLOCK, in his official

capacity as Attorney General of the

State of Montana; JAMES MURRAY,

“Jim”, in his official capacity as

Commissioner of Political Practices;

LEO GALLAGHER, in his official

capacity as Lewis and Clark County

Attorney,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 12-35889

D.C. No.

6:12-cv-00012-

CCL

OPINION

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LAIR V. BULLOCK 3

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Charles C. Lovell, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 5, 2015—Seattle Washington

Filed May 26, 2015

Before: Raymond C. Fisher, Carlos T. Bea,

and Mary H. Murguia, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Bea

SUMMARY*

Civil Rights

The panel reversed the district court’s judgment, entered

following a non-jury trial, and remanded in an action

challenging, under the First Amendment, Montana’s dollar

limits on contributions to political candidates. 

The panel held that the district court applied the wrong

legal standard prior to enjoining permanentlythe enforcement

of Montana’s restrictions on campaign contributions by

individuals, political action committees, and political parties. 

The panel held that the district court applied neither the new

formulation of what constitutes an important state interestset

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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4 LAIR V. BULLOCK

forth in Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S.

310 (2010), nor the correct formulation, set forth in Mont.

Right to Life Ass’n v. Eddleman, 343 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir.

2003), of whether the state’s contribution limits are “closely

drawn” to the state’s goal of preventing quid pro quo

corruption or its appearance. The panel remanded in order to

allow Montana’s political contribution limits to be tested

under the new and more restrictive standard of Citizens

United, and the correct “closely drawn” test set forth in

Eddleman.

COUNSEL

Matthew T. Cochenour (argued) and Michael G. Black,

Assistant Attorneys General, and Tim Fox, AttorneyGeneral,

Montana Department of Justice, Helena, Montana, for

Defendants-Appellants.

Matthew G. Monforton (argued), Monforton Law Offices,

PLLC, Bozeman, Montana, for Intervenor-Plaintiffs–

Appellants.

James Bopp, Jr. (argued) and Jeffrey Gallant, The Bopp Law

Firm, PC, Terre Haute, Indiana; Anita Y. Milanovich, The

Bopp Law Firm, PC, Bozeman, Montana, for PlaintiffsAppellees.

J. Gerald Hebert, Paul S. Ryan, Tara Malloy, and Megan

McAllen, Campaign Legal Center, Washington, D.C., for

Amici Curiae Campaign Legal Center, Common Cause,

Justice at Stake, and League of Women Voters.

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LAIR V. BULLOCK 5

Ronald A. Fein and John C. Bonifaz, Free Speech for People,

Amherst, Massachusetts, for Amici Curiae Free Speech for

People, The Honorable James C. Nelson, American

Independent Business Alliance, and American Sustainable

Business Counsel.

OPINION

BEA, Circuit Judge:

We are called on to determine whether Montana’s dollar

limits on contributions to political candidates are

constitutional under the federal Constitution’s First

Amendment. The claims against the limits are familiar. 

Limitations on contributions effectively abridge free speech

in two primary ways. First, the contribution itself is a general

expression of the donor’s support for the candidate and his

views. Limiting the amount a donor can contribute curtails

that expression. Second, it costs the candidate money to

produce political speech that will be heard. Without that

money, candidates will be silenced; their ideas will not be

considered by the voters at elections.

These claims are doubly familiar to us because we have

already considered some of Montana’s contribution limits

and found they passed constitutional muster.1 Why consider

them again? We must because, after Citizens United,

2 what

constitutes a sufficiently important state interest to justify

limits on contributions has changed. Now, the prevention of

1 Mont. Right to Life Ass’n v. Eddleman, 343 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2003).

 

2 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).

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6 LAIR V. BULLOCK

quid pro quo corruption, or its appearance, is the only

sufficiently important state interest to justify limits on

campaign contributions. Before Citizens United, it was

enough to show the state’s interest was simply to prevent the

influence contributors of large sums have on politicians, or

the appearance of such influence. No longer so.

After a non-jury trial, the district court held Montana’s

contribution limits were unconstitutional, and permanently

enjoined their enforcement.3 But the district court applied

neither Citizens United’s new formulation of what constitutes

an important state interest nor the correct formulation of

whether the state’s contribution limits are “closely drawn”4

to

the state’s goal of preventing quid pro quo corruption or its

appearance. To allow Montana’s political contribution limits

to be tested under the new and more restrictive standard of

Citizens United, and the correct “closely drawn” test, we

reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

I.

A.

Since 1994, Montana has limited how much individuals,

political action committees, and political-party-affiliated

committees are allowed to contribute to candidates for state

3 We granted a stay of that injunction, pending determination of this

appeal. Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 2012).

4 A “closely drawn” test is one that ensures the state’s contribution limits

are not lower than needed to accomplish the state’s goal of preventing

quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.

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LAIR V. BULLOCK 7

office. See Mont. Code Ann. § 13-37-216; Lair v. Bullock,

697 F.3d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Lair I”). By statute,

individuals and political action committees (“PACs”) can

contribute up to $500 total to two candidates who filed jointly

and are running together for the offices of governor and

lieutenant governor, $250 to candidates running for other

statewide offices, and $130 to candidates running for any

other state public office, including candidates for the state

senate and the state house of representatives. Mont. Code

Ann. § 13-37-216(1)(a) (“Individual/PAC Limits”). These

amounts are adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price

Index as a marker. Mont. Code Ann. § 13-37-216(4)(a). The

current limits are $650, $320, and $170, respectively. Mont.

Admin. R. § 44.10.338(1).

Political parties and their affiliated committees can

contribute more than can individuals. Montana treats all

committees that are affiliated with a political party as one

entity.

5 Mont. Code Ann. § 13-37-216(3). A political party

or its party-affiliated committees can contribute, in the

aggregate, up to $18,000 to two candidates running together

for the offices of governor and lieutenant governor, $6,500 to

candidates running for other statewide offices, $2,600 to

candidates for public service commissioner, $1,050 to

candidates for state senate, and $650 to candidates running

for any other state public office, including the state house of

representatives. Mont. Code Ann. § 13-37-216(3) (“Party

Limits”). These amounts are also adjusted for inflation using

5 The statute defines political parties as “any political organization that

was represented on the official ballot at the most recent gubernatorial

election.” Mont. Code Ann. § 13-37-216(3). Donations that come from

the political party itself and from political committees affiliated with that

party are subject to one aggregate limit. Id.

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8 LAIR V. BULLOCK

the Consumer Price Index, and the current limits are $23,350,

$8,450, $3,350, $1,350, and $850 respectively. Mont.

Admin. R. § 44.10.338(2).

Appellees are individuals, PACs, and party-affiliated

committees (together, “Lair”) that challenge these restrictions

as unconstitutional burdens on their freedom of speech under

the federal Constitution’s First Amendment. Intervenors are

Rick Hill, a 2012 candidate for governor, Hill’s campaign

treasurer, and a committee associated with the Hill campaign

(together, “Hill Campaign”). The Hill Campaign supports

Lair’s challenge. Appellants are the Attorney General of the

State of Montana, Montana’s Commissioner of Political

Practices, and a county attorney, each sued in their official

capacity (together, “Montana”).

B.

The district court held a non-jury trial in September 2012

and shortly after issued findings of fact and conclusions of

law. The district court concluded Montana’s Individual/PAC

Limits and Party Limits were unconstitutional under the

federal Constitution’s First Amendment and permanently

enjoined their enforcement. The district court’s decision

turned on our prior case addressing the constitutionality of

Montana’s contribution limits and a Supreme Court case that

followed. Montana has appealed that decision. Because our

decision today relies in large part on the chronology of those

prior cases, as well as subsequent cases, we discuss them in

chronological order.

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LAIR V. BULLOCK 9

1. Montana Right to Life Association v. Eddleman,

343 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2003).

The story begins with our opinion in Montana Right to

Life Ass’n v. Eddleman, 343 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2003), upon

whose continued validity this appeal turns. There, the district

court conducted a non-jury trial on the constitutionality of the

Individual/PAC Limits and found those limits were

constitutional under Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), and

its progeny. See Montana Right to Life Assoc. v. Eddleman,

96-165-BLG-JDS, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23161, at *3 (D.

Mont. Sept. 19, 2000). We affirmed. We first set out the

Supreme Court’s framework for addressing campaign

contribution limits per Buckley, the Court’s foundational

opinion on what governmental limitations of campaign

finance violate the free speech rights guaranteed by the First

Amendment. Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1090–92. In Buckley,

the Supreme Court struck down limitations on how much

candidates could spend on their campaigns, but upheld

limitations on how much donors could give to candidates’

campaigns. Id. at 1090. Central to the Supreme Court’s

decision validating contribution limits was its finding of the

minimal effect those contribution limits had on individuals’

First Amendment free speech rights: “A limitation upon the

amount that any one person or group may contribute to a

candidate or political committee entails only a marginal

restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free

communication.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Buckley,

424 U.S. at 20). Per the Supreme Court, a contribution

“serves as a general expression of support for the candidate

and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis

for the support.” Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21). For

that reason, a contribution limitation “involves little direct

restraint on [the contributor’s] political communication, for

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10 LAIR V. BULLOCK

it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a

contribution but does not in any way infringe the

contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues.” Id.

(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21). The Supreme Court

therefore did not apply the “strict scrutiny” doctrine to

contribution limits. Id. at 1091.6Instead, the Court explained

that contribution limits will be upheld “if the State

demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs a

means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of

associational freedoms.” Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at

25).

We noted in Eddleman that the Supreme Court reaffirmed

Buckley in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377

(2000). Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1091. We synthesized those

two cases to create a test for challenges to contribution limits:

[S]tate campaign contribution limits will be

upheld if (1) there is adequate evidence that

the limitation furthers a sufficiently important

state interest, and (2) if the limits are “closely

drawn”—i.e., if they (a) focus narrowly on the

state’s interest, (b) leave the contributor free

to affiliate with a candidate, and (c) allow the

candidate to amass sufficient resources to

wage an effective campaign.

6

“Strict scrutiny” is the most demanding test that the First Amendment

requires to test governmental regulation ofspeech for its constitutionality. 

It requires the governmental regulation serve “a compelling government

interest and [be] narrowly drawn to serve that interest.” Brown v. Entm’t

Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011).

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LAIR V. BULLOCK 11

Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1092. In conducting this “closely

drawn” tailoring analysis, courts must be “mindful that the

dollar amounts employed to prevent corruption should be

upheld unless they are ‘so radical in effect as to render

political association ineffective, drive the sound of a

candidate’s voice beyond the level of notice, and render

contributions pointless.’” Id. at 1094 (quoting Shrink

Missouri, 528 U.S. at 397). “[W]e look at all dollars likely to

be forthcoming in a campaign, rather than the isolated

contribution, and we also consider factors such as [1] whether

the candidate can look elsewhere for money, [2] the

percentage of contributions that are affected, [3] the total cost

of the campaign, and [4] how much money each candidate

would lose.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

In Eddleman, we identified Montana’s asserted

“important state interest” as “preventing corruption or the

appearance of corruption.” Id. at 1092. We explained that a

“state’s interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of

corruption is not confined to instances of bribery of public

officials, but extends ‘to the broader threat from politicians

too compliant with the wishes of large contributors.’” Id.

(quoting Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 389). We affirmed the

district court’s finding that Montana carried its burden to

show that latter interest: the threat of large contributors

affecting over-compliant politicians. Id. at 1092–93; see also

Eddleman, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23161, at *6–8, *11–12

(finding Montana had shown an important state interest in

combating “influence”). Neither we nor the district court

relied on a finding that Montana showed quid pro quo

corruption or its appearance. See Eddleman, 343 F.3d at

1092–93; Eddleman, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23161, at *6–8,

*11–12. We also held the Individual/PAC Limits were

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12 LAIR V. BULLOCK

“closely drawn” under this newly minted standard. Id. at

1093–96.

2. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006).

The Supreme Court decided Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S.

230 (2006), after our opinion in Eddleman. That case

addressed the constitutionality of Vermont’s campaign

contribution limits. Id. at 236. Like Montana, Vermont

limited contributions by individuals, PACs, and political

parties to candidates for state office. Id. at 238–39. The

Supreme Court found the contribution limits violated First

Amendment free speech rights and were unconstitutional. Id.

at 262–63. But no single opinion garnered a majority of the

justices. Justice Breyer wrote the plurality opinion, which

Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined in relevant part. 

Id. at 246–53. The plurality outlined a new two-part, multifactor “closely drawn” test for restrictions on contributions. 

Under that test, the reviewing court first should identify if

there are any “danger signs” that the restrictions on

contributions prevent candidates fromamassing the resources

necessary to be heard or put challengers at a disadvantage visa-vis incumbents. Id. at 249–52. The plurality found four

“danger signs” in Vermont’s contribution limits: “(1) The

limits are set per election cycle, rather than divided between

primary and general elections; (2) the limits apply to

contributions from political parties; (3) the limits are the

lowest in the Nation; and (4) the limits are below those we

have previously upheld.” Id. at 268 (Thomas, J., concurring)

(listing the plurality’s “danger signs”); see also id. at 249–53

(plurality op.); Lair I, 697 F.3d at 1208–10. The plurality

held, if such danger signs exist, then the court must determine

whether the limits are “closely drawn.” Randall, 548 U.S. at

249, 253.

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LAIR V. BULLOCK 13

The plurality looked to “five sets of considerations” to

determine whether the statute was closely drawn: (1) whether

the “contribution limits will significantly restrict the amount

of funding available for challengers to run competitive

campaigns”; (2) whether “political parties [must] abide by

exactly the same low contribution limits that apply to other

contributors”; (3) whether “volunteer services” are considered

contributions that would count toward the limit; (4) whether

the “contribution limits are . . . adjusted for inflation”; and

(5) “anyspecial justification that might warrant a contribution

limit so low or so restrictive.” Id. at 253–62; Lair I, 697 F.3d

at 1210. The plurality found each factor weighed against the

contribution limits’ constitutionality and held the limits

violated First Amendment free speech rights. Randall,

548 U.S. at 262.

Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred in the

decision to strike down Vermont’s contribution limits. Id. at

265 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). But Justice

Thomas expresslydisagreed with the plurality’s “rationale for

striking down that statute.” Id. Instead, he would overrule

Buckley and its progeny because “Buckley provides

insufficient protection to political speech.” Id. at 266. He

noted “[t]he illegitimacy of Buckley is . . . underscored by the

continuing inability of the Court (and the plurality here) to

apply Buckley in a coherent and principled fashion.” Id. 

Justice Kennedy concurred “only in the judgment” in a

separate opinion that expressed skepticism of Buckley and its

progeny’s viability. Id. at 264–65 (Kennedy, J., concurring

in the judgment).

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14 LAIR V. BULLOCK

3. Lair’s Challenge in the District Court: Lair v. Murry,

903 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (D. Mont. 2012).

Lair now challenges the Individual/PAC Limits, which

the Ninth Circuit upheld in Eddleman, and the Party Limits,

which were not at issue in Eddleman. After a non-jury trial,

the district court issued a brief order, without any analysis. 

It found the Individual/PAC Limits and Party Limits

unconstitutional and enjoined their enforcement. Seven days

later, the district court issued its findings of fact and

conclusions of law. Lair v. Murry, 903 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (D.

Mont. 2012). The district court concluded it was not bound

by the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Eddleman because the

Supreme Court’s “closely drawn” analysis in Randall

abrogated both Eddleman’s “closely drawn” analysis and

Eddleman’s ultimate holding that the Individual/PAC Limits

are constitutional. Id. at 1086–89. Unbound by Eddleman,

the district court then proceeded to analyze Montana’s

Individual/PAC Limits and Party Limits under the Randall

plurality’s standard. The court first “assum[ed] that the State

of Montana has a ‘sufficiently important interest’ in setting

contribution limits.” Id. at 1089 (quoting Randall, 548 U.S.

at 247). The court then applied the Randall plurality’s twopart, multi-factor “closely drawn” analysis to the facts

presented at the bench trial and found Montana’s limits were

not closely drawn. Id. at 1089–93. The district court

therefore permanently enjoined Montana from enforcing the

Individual/PAC and Party Limits. Id. at 1093–94.

4. Emergency Motion in the Ninth Circuit to Stay: Lair

v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 2012).

Montana filed in the Ninth Circuit an emergency motion

to stay the district court’s injunction. Lair I, 697 F.3d at

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LAIR V. BULLOCK 15

1203. As a part of its analysis, our motions panel was

required to determine whether Montana “made a strong

showing that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits” of its

appeal. Id. (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434

(2009)). The panel concluded Montana made that showing

because, contrary to what the district court had stated, the

Supreme Court’s decision in Randall did not abrogate the

Ninth Circuit’s opinion upholding the Individual/PAC Limits

in Eddleman. To that end, the panel applied the Supreme

Court’s test from Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188

(1977), to determine whether Randall had a binding majority

opinion. Id. at 1204–06. That test asks whether, in a

fractured Supreme Court decision, “one opinion can be

meaningfully regarded as narrower than another and can

represent a common denominator of the Court’s reasoning.”

Id. at 1205 (quoting United States v. Rodriguez–Preciado,

399 F.3d 1118, 1140 (9th Cir. 2005)). The panel held that

Justice Breyer’s plurality opinion could not represent a

“common denominator” with Justice Thomas’s concurring

opinion because Justices Thomas and Scalia would strike

down Buckley and its progeny in their entirety rather than

apply Buckley, as did Justice Breyer’s plurality. Id. As a

result, there was no majority, controlling opinion in Randall: 

“The only binding aspect of Randall . . . is its judgment,

striking down the Vermont contribution limit statute as

unconstitutional.” Id. at 1206. The motions panel therefore

held Montana was likely to succeed on the merits of its

appeal and, after addressing the other stay factors, stayed the

district court’s permanent injunction pending a decision by a

merits panel. Id. at 1215–16. The case then came before us.

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16 LAIR V. BULLOCK

II.

We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s

decision to issue a permanent injunction. Gathright v. City of

Portland, 439 F.3d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 2006). Under that

standard, we review legal conclusions de novo. Brown v.

California DOT, 321 F.3d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 2003). We

review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error, but

review the application of law to those facts de novo on free

speech issues. Id.; see also La Quinta Worldwide LLC v.

Q.R.T.M., S.A. de C.V., 762 F.3d 867, 879 (9th Cir. 2014) (“If

the district court identified and applied the correct legal rule

to the relief requested, we will reverse [a permanent

injunction] only if the court’s decision resulted from a factual

finding that was illogical, implausible, or without support in

inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.”

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The most important standard for this case comes from our

en banc decision in Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir.

2003) (en banc). Gammie explained that three-judge panels

are normally bound by the decisions of prior three-judge

panels. Id. at 892–93. But “where the reasoning or theory of

our prior circuit authority is clearly irreconcilable with the

reasoning or theory of intervening higher authority, a

three-judge panel should consider itself bound by the later

and controlling authority, and should reject the prior circuit

opinion as having been effectively overruled.” Id. at 893.

A.

The central question in this appeal is what parts of

Eddleman, if any, remain good law in this circuit. Lair

contends the district court was not bound to apply

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LAIR V. BULLOCK 17

Eddleman’s “closely drawn” analysis or to follow

Eddleman’s holding that the Individual/PAC Limits are

constitutional. Lair makes two arguments in support:

(1) Citizens United abrogated Eddleman’s “important state

interest” analysis because, after Citizens United, a state may

no longer justify limits on political contributions as a means

to prevent politicians too compliant with the interests of

contributors of large sums—only quid pro quo corruption or

its appearance can justify contribution limits; and

(2) Randall’s two-part, multi-factor “closely drawn” test,

which evaluates various “danger signs” and case-specific

factors, abrogated Eddleman’s “closely drawn” test, which

analyzes (a) whether the contribution limits narrowly combat

quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, (b) whether

contributors are able to associate with the candidate in ways

other than donating money, and (c) whether the candidate is

able to amass sufficient resources to wage an effective

campaign. We address each argument in turn.

1. Citizens United abrogated Eddleman’s “important

state interest” analysis.

Lair argues the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens

United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010),

and by extension McCutcheon v. Federal Election

Commision, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014), abrogated Eddleman’s

“important state interest” analysis; therefore, Eddleman is no

longer binding precedent on the point of what constitutes an

“important state interest” sufficient to limit political speech

through contribution limitations. The Supreme Court has

long held that preventing “corruption or the appearance of

corruption” is the only valid interest that supports limits on

campaign contributions. See, e.g., Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S.

at 388–89. But what constitutes “corruption” has been open

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18 LAIR V. BULLOCK

to debate. Buckley held that “corruption” includes quid pro

quo arrangements or the appearance thereof. Id. (explaining

Buckley). The Supreme Court in Shrink Missouri defined

“corruption” more broadly, explaining that “corruption” is

“not confined to bribery of public officials, but extend[s] to

the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the

wishes of large contributors.” Id. at 389. To that end, the

government can “constitutionally address the power of money

‘to influence governmental action’ in ways less ‘blatant and

specific’ than bribery.” Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28).

In Eddleman, the district court and the Ninth Circuit

relied on Shrink Missouri’s broader definition of corruption

to find Montana had shown an “important state interest.” In

that regard, the district court found Montana provided

sufficient evidence that “money results in improper influence

or the appearance thereof.” Eddleman, 2000 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 23161, at *7 (emphasis added). The district court

expressly relied on Shrink Missouri’s holding that the valid

corruption interest is “not confined to bribery of public

officials, but extend[s] to the broader threat from politicians

too compliant with the wishes of large contributions.” Id. at

*9 (quoting Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 389); see also id. at

*6–7, *11–12 (reiterating the district court was relying on an

“influence” standard). On appeal, we also relied on the same

broader definition of “corruption” in affirming the district

court. See Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1092–93.

The Supreme Court has since clarified what qualifies as

“corruption” under the “important state interest” analysis. In

Citizens United, the Court explained that “[w]hen Buckley

identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in

preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that

interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption.” Citizens

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LAIR V. BULLOCK 19

United, 558 U.S. at 359 (emphasis added). The Court

rejected the broader “influence” standard: “Reliance on a

‘generic favoritism or influence theory . . . is at odds with

standard First Amendment analyses because it is unbounded

and susceptible to no limiting principle.’” Id. (alteration in

original) (emphasis added) (quoting McConnell v. Fed.

Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 296 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,

concurring)). We have already recognized that Citizens

United “narrowed the scope of the anti-corruption rationale

to cover quid pro quo corruption only, as opposed to money

spent to obtain influence over or access to elected officials.” 

Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1119 (9th

Cir. 2011) (quoting Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce

v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684, 694 n.5 (9th Cir. 2010))

(internal quotation marks omitted). Because Eddleman relied

on a state’s interest in combating “influence,” whereas

Citizens United narrowed the analysis to include quid pro quo

corruption but to exclude the state’s interest in combating

“influence,” Citizens United abrogated Eddleman’s

“important state interest” analysis. See Gammie, 335 F.3d at

893. Eddleman’s holding that the Individual/PAC Limits are

constitutional is no longer binding on this panel or courts of

the Ninth Circuit because that holding relied on a state

interest analysis now made invalid by Citizens United. We

must now follow Citizens United’s narrower analysis:

“corruption” means only quid pro quo corruption, or its

appearance.

2. Randall did not abrogate Eddleman’s “closelydrawn”

analysis.

Lair also reprises the argument that the Supreme Court

abrogated Eddleman’s “closely drawn” analysis in Randall

when a plurality outlined a different “closely drawn” analysis,

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20 LAIR V. BULLOCK

and the district court’s reliance on the Randall plurality was

therefore not legal error. This argument is foreclosed by

Gammie because of our motions panel decision. The motions

panel in Lair I explicitly held that Randall did not contain a

majority opinion capable of abrogating Eddleman. Lair I,

697 F.3d at 1204 (“Randall is not binding authority because

there was no opinion of the Court.”); id. at 1206 (“The only

binding aspect of Randall . . . is its judgment, striking down

the Vermont contribution limit statute as unconstitutional.”);

id. (“Since Randall is otherwise only persuasive, in this

context it could not have altered the law as previously

dictated by such cases as Buckley and Shrink Missouri, the

law we expressly relied upon in Eddleman.”). Lair contended

at oral argument that a motions panel’s decision cannot bind

a merits panel, and as a result we are not bound by the

motions panel’s analysis in this case. Not so. We have held

that motions panels can issue published decisions. See

Haggard v. Curry, 631 F.3d 931, 933 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010);

Pearson v. Muntz, 606 F.3d 606, 608 n.2 (9th Cir. 2010); see

also General Order 6.3(g)(3)(ii); Circuit Rule 36-1. Under

Gammie, we are bound by a prior three-judge panel’s

published opinions, Gammie, 335 F.3d at 892–93, and a

motions panel’s published opinion binds future panels the

same as does a merits panel’s published opinion, see Circuit

Rule 36-1 (“A written, reasoned disposition of a case or

motion which is designated as an opinion [under the Ninth

Circuit’s criteria for publication] is an OPINION of the

Court. . . . All opinions are published . . . . As used in this

rule, the term PUBLICATION means to make a disposition

available to legal publishing companies to be reported and

cited.” (emphasis added)). In any event, the Lair I panel was

not the first one to hold that no opinion in Randall carried a

majority. Another panel arrived at that same conclusion in

2011. See Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1127 n.5. We can hold

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LAIR V. BULLOCK 21

Eddleman was abrogated only if “the reasoning or theory” of

Eddleman “is clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning or

theory of . . . later and controlling authority.” Gammie,

335 F.3d at 893 (emphasis added). With no majority opinion,

Randall cannot serve as the requisite “controlling authority”

capable of abrogating our precedent. See Thalheimer,

645 F.3d at 1127 n.5.

B.

Where does this leave us? We hold today the district

court was incorrect to find Randall’s “closelydrawn” analysis

abrogated Eddleman’s “closely drawn” analysis, because

there simply was no binding Randall decision on that point. 

But we also hold that Citizens United did abrogate Eddleman

because Eddleman relied on a now-invalid “important state

interest”—combating influence, not just preventing quid pro

quo corruption or its appearance. Because Eddleman relied

on a now-invalid state interest, its ultimate holding that the

Individual/PAC Limits are constitutional is abrogated. But

Citizens United left untouched Eddelman’s formulation of the

overall framework for determining whether contribution

limits are constitutional; it simply narrowed what constitutes

an “important state interest.” Eddleman’s framework is

otherwise still sound, and the test remains the same going

forward:

[S]tate campaign contribution limits will be

upheld if (1) there is adequate evidence that

the limitation furthers a sufficiently important

state interest, and (2) if the limits are “closely

drawn”—i.e., if they (a) focus narrowly on the

state’s interest, (b) leave the contributor free

to affiliate with a candidate, and (c) allow the

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22 LAIR V. BULLOCK

candidate to amass sufficient resources to

wage an effective campaign.

Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1092. As a result, the district court’s

decision to apply Randall’s “closely drawn” analysis to the

Individual/PAC Limits and the Party Limits was legal error. 

The district court therefore abused its discretion when it

entered a permanent injunction, and we remand for the

district court to apply the correct standard.7

We provide some instruction on remand. The district

court here assumed Montana had shown an “important state

interest” but did not identify what that interest was. But it is

difficult to address whether contribution limits further the

state’s asserted interest, and whether the limits are “closely

drawn” to that interest, unless we know exactly what that

interest is. See, e.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1445 (“[W]e

7 At oral argument, Lair asked us to review the record independently to

determine whether Montana’s contribution limits are valid. Though we

have recognized our review in First Amendment cases is more rigorous

than other cases, we still give some deference to the district court’s factual

findings. See Newton v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 930 F.2d 662, 670 (9th Cir.

1990) (“[W]e must simultaneously ensure the appropriate appellate

protection of First Amendment values and still defer to the findings of the

trier offact.”); see also Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc.

v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1082 (9th Cir. 2002). We

have no factual findings to review for either the “important state interest”

prong, because the district court assumed Montana had shown an

important state interest (without identifying what that interest was), or the

correct Eddleman “closely drawn” analysis, because the district court

applied the incorrect Randall “closely drawn” analysis. Further, the

parties developed a record with a different “important state interest”

standard in mind. Montana should have an opportunity to develop a

record aimed at the new “important state interest” standard as well as the

corresponding “closely drawn” analysis. We express no opinion on how

the parties should supplement the current record if they so choose to do.

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LAIR V. BULLOCK 23

must assess the fit between the stated governmental objective

and the means selected to achieve that objective.”); id. at

1456 (“In the First Amendment context, fit matters.”). On

remand, we instruct the district court either (1) to decide

whether Montana has carried its burden in showing the

contribution limits further a valid “important state interest”

or, if the district court again assumes the state has carried its

burden, (2) to identify expressly what interest the district

court assumes exists. Doing so will ensure the district court

and any reviewing courts will be able to evaluate whether the

contribution limits are “closely drawn.”8

8

Intervenor Rick Hill was the Republican nominee for governor for the

2012 election who received a $500,000 contribution from the Montana

Republican Party during the few days the district court’s injunction was

in effect. The Montana Commissioner of Political Practices opened an

investigation into Hill for his receipt and use of the $500,000 donation.

The Commissioner has stayed that investigation pending the outcome of

this appeal.

Hill intervened in this appeal after the Lair I panel vacated the district

court’s injunction. Hill argues that if we reverse the district court and

vacate the injunction against the enforcement of the Party Limits, as we

do today, we should leave in place the district court’s order enjoining

enforcement of those limits for the few days the injunction was in place. 

In effect, Hill asks this panel to enjoin Montana from prosecuting Hill for

receiving the $500,000 donation while the district court’s permanent

injunction was in place. This issue was not presented to the district court,

as Hill intervened after the Lair I decision. Moreover, it is not clear there

is a live dispute between Hill and Montana; indeed, a district court has

already found Hill’s attempt to enjoin Montana from prosecuting him to

be unripe because the threat of prosecution was too remote. See Order at

13–14, Hill v. Motl, 6:13-cv-41-RKS (D. Mont. Oct. 18, 2013), ECF No.

35. We therefore decline to grant the relief Hill requests.

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24 LAIR V. BULLOCK

III

The district court applied the wrong legal standard prior

to enjoining permanently the enforcement of Montana’s

restrictions on campaign contributions by individuals, PACs,

and political parties. We therefore reverse and remand for

proceedings consistent with this opinion.9

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

9 Because we reverse and remand, Lair’s renewed motion to lift our stay

of the district court’s injunction and Montana’s motion to strike portions

of Lair’s motion are denied as moot. We grant the Hill Campaign’s

motion for judicial notice.

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