Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00093/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00093-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Nelson C. Bowers, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Great Western Bank of South Dakota, 

David Fitzgibbons, Fitzgibbons Law Office, 

Paul Babeu, Pinal County Sheriff, et. al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-13-0093-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s Application for an Emergency Injunction 

and Restraining Order (Doc. 3), Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 8), and 

Defendants’ Cross Petition for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction 

(Doc. 13). For the reasons discussed below, both Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ applications 

for emergency relief are denied and Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment is denied.1

 This action arises out of competing claims to the ownership of vehicles subject to 

a state court debt judgment. On January 3, 2011, Plaintiff Nelson Bowers entered into a 

loan agreement with Glen Gabriel to enable Gabriel to purchase vehicles for his towing 

and car sales business. (Doc. 1 ¶ 8.) The parties agreed that in the event of a third-party 

 

1

 On January 15, 2013, the Court ordered Plaintiff to serve Defendants with his ex 

parte Application for an Emergency Injunction and Restraining Order. (Doc. 4.) The Court further ordered Defendants to respond to Plaintiff’s Application within seven days. (Id.) However, the Court’s Order was not provided to Defendants when served with 

Plaintiff’s Application on January 16, 2013. (Doc. 10 at 2.) Defendants were first made 

aware of the time limit for their response on January 30, 2013 when they received Plaintiff’s Motion for Default. (Id.) Defendants filed their Response to Plaintiff’s Application seven days later on February 7, 2013. 

Case 2:13-cv-00093-GMS Document 20 Filed 02/19/13 Page 1 of 5
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

judgment against Gabriel, he would surrender the vehicles and titles to Plaintiff. (Doc. 

14-7, Ex. J at 2.) However, neither party recorded this lien on the vehicles. 

 On June 19, 2012, Great Western Bank (the “Bank”) filed a state court action 

against Gabriel after he defaulted on a loan. (Doc. 14 ¶ 5.) The state court granted default 

judgment to the Bank and its counsel, David Fitzgibbons, initiated post-collection 

proceedings against Gabriel. (Id. ¶ 6.) On October 26, 2012, the state court issued a writ 

of general execution to seize property to satisfy the judgment. (Doc. 14-6, Ex. B.) The 

writ was served on Gabriel on November 14, 2012. (Doc. 14 ¶ 10.) At the time, the 

Arizona Department of Motor Vehicles’ registrar reflected that Gabriel owned title to the 

vehicles he had purchased pursuant to the loan agreement with Plaintiff. (Doc. 13 at 2.) 

After Plaintiff was informed of an attempt to seize the vehicles to satisfy the judgment, he 

repossessed them and changed the motor vehicle registrations from Gabriel’s name to his 

name on November 15, 2012. (Id.) On January 14, 2013, the state court issued a writ of 

garnishment and summons against Plaintiff because he claimed to own the vehicles. 

(Doc. 14-8, Ex. K.) Numerous attempts to serve Plaintiff were unsuccessful and the state 

court allowed service to occur by posting on Plaintiff’s property. (Doc. 14 ¶ 23; Doc. 14-

8, Ex. M.) 

 On January 15, 2013, Plaintiff filed this action alleging that the Pinal County 

Sheriff’s Office (the “Sheriff”), the Bank, and Fitzgibbons are violating the Fourth, Fifth, 

Seventh and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution by attempting to seize the 

disputed vehicles from his possession. (Doc. 1.) On the same day, he filed an ex parte 

motion requesting the Court to enjoin Defendants from seizing the vehicles “titled and 

owned” by him until true ownership is determined. (Doc. 3 at 2.) 

 Along with their Response to Plaintiff’s Motion, Defendants filed a cross petition 

to enjoin Plaintiff “from selling, conveying or otherwise transferring” the disputed 

vehicles and to request that they be transferred to a third party pending further orders of 

the Court. (Doc. 13 at 3.) 

/ / / 

Case 2:13-cv-00093-GMS Document 20 Filed 02/19/13 Page 2 of 5
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 A district court may grant a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order 

under two sets of circumstances. Guzman v. Shewry, 552 F.3d 941, 948 (9th Cir. 2009). 

First, a plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits, (2) 

the possibility of irreparable injury to plaintiff if preliminary relief is not granted, (3) a 

balance of hardships favoring the plaintiff, and (4) advancement of the public interest (in 

certain cases).” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Alternatively, a temporary restraining 

order or preliminary injunction is appropriate “if the plaintiff demonstrates either a 

combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury or 

that serious questions are raised and the balance of the hardships tips sharply in [its] 

favor.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). 

 Plaintiff does not demonstrate that there is a strong likelihood of success on the 

merits or that serious questions are raised by his Complaint. He alleges that the Bank and 

the Sheriff attempted to seize his vehicles pursuant to the state court writs in violation of 

his due process rights.2

 The gist of the Complaint is that the enforcement of the state 

court’s debt judgment through the writ of general execution against Gabriel and the writ 

of garnishment against Plaintiff are unconstitutional. Plaintiff is in fact challenging the 

state court’s writs because his constitutional claims are “inextricably intertwined” with 

those writs. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16 (“[T]he federal claim is inextricably 

intertwined with the state court judgment if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent 

that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.”); see also Worldwide Church of 

God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 892–93 (9th Cir. 1986). 

 The Court will not review the state court writs and their execution. “[R]eview of 

state court decisions may only be conducted in the United States Supreme Court. Lower 

federal courts may not review such decisions.” Partington v. Gedan, 961 F.2d 852, 864 

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 999 (1992) (citing Dist. of Columbia Ct. of App. v. 

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476, 482, 486 (1983)); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 

 

2

 Defendants admit that the Sheriff has not been able to seize the vehicles because 

Plaintiff concealed them. (Doc. 9 ¶ 14; Doc. 13 at 6.) 

Case 2:13-cv-00093-GMS Document 20 Filed 02/19/13 Page 3 of 5
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

413, 416 (1923)). The Court may not enjoin the state court writs even if Plaintiff’s 

Complaint alleges that the execution of those writs is unconstitutional. Feldman, 460 U.S. 

at 486; Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 893 n.4 (9th Cir. 

1986) (noting that there is no federal court jurisdiction to enjoin state court orders even if 

constitutional issues are raised in a § 1983 suit); Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 291 (9th 

Cir. 1995); see also Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding 

that federal district court may not enjoin state court orders regarding pension benefits). 

Plaintiff cannot state constitutional claims against the Bank and Fitzgibbons because they 

are private actors whose actions are not fairly attributable to the government. Morse v. N. 

Coast Opportunities, Inc., 118 F.3d 1338, 1340 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal citations 

omitted); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982). Therefore, there is no 

likelihood of success on the merits of Plaintiff’s claims. 

 Defendants also request injunctive relief to prevent Plaintiff from selling or 

transferring the disputed vehicles pending the execution of the state court orders. The 

Court will not do so. Because Plaintiff has not stated a claim for relief in federal court 

and complete diversity among the parties is not present, there is no subject matter 

jurisdiction for Defendants’ counterclaim against Plaintiff. Both Plaintiff and Defendants 

must pursue any relief in the state court action. Accordingly, 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application for an Emergency 

Injunction and Restraining Order (Doc. 3) is denied. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 

8) is denied. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

/ / / 

Case 2:13-cv-00093-GMS Document 20 Filed 02/19/13 Page 4 of 5
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Cross Petition for Temporary 

Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 13) is denied.

 Dated this 19th day of February, 2013. 

Case 2:13-cv-00093-GMS Document 20 Filed 02/19/13 Page 5 of 5