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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

THE OKLAHOMA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, an ) 

incorporated association; RUSS ISLAS and ) 

SUSAN STONE, as individuals and as ) 

members of the Oklahoma Education ) 

Association; THE OKLAHOMA PUBLIC ) 

EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, an incorporated ) 

association; SHERRI MOORE .and LINDA G. ) 

CUPP, as individuals and as members of ) 

the Oklahoma Public Employees Association,) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

THE ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE LAWS ENFORCEMENT 

COMMISSION; and WINSTON BOYDSTON, BILL 

PO~TER, ROBERT BERRY, JOAN BLANKENSHIP, 

HEBER FINCH, and RANDALL SPEARS, as 

members of the Alcoholic Beverage Laws 

Enforcement Commission; and RON WILLIS, 

as the Director of the Alcoholic Beverage 

Laws Enforcement Commission, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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FI LED 

Ut1iccd Stat~; Court of Appeals 

Tenth CirJ.tit 

NOV .. 7 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 87-2627 

and 87-2668 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CIV-86-1581-T) 

Richard B. Wilkinson (Karen L. Long, of the Oklahoma Education 

Association, of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; and Dennis w. Arrow, of 

Edmond, Oklahoma, with him on the briefs), of the Oklahoma 

Education Association, of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for the 

Plaintiffs-Appellants Oklahoma Education Association; and Russ 

Islas and Susan Stone, as individuals and as members of the 

Oklahoma Education Association. 

Frank E. Walta, of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on the briefs for the 

Plaintiffs-Appellants Oklahoma Public Employees Association; and 

Sherri Moore and Linda G. Cupp, as individuals and as members of 

the Oklahoma Public Employees Association. 

Appellate Case: 87-2627 Document: 01019988559 Date Filed: 11/07/1989 Page: 1 
William Kurt Morgan (Robert H. Henry, Attorney General of 

Oklahoma, and Michael Scott Fern, Assistant Attorney General, 

Deputy Chief, Civil Division, were on the brief), of the Alcoholic 

Beverage Laws Enforcement Commission, for the DefendantsAppellees. 

Before TACHA,* and MCWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and BRATTON, 

District Judge. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

* Honorable Howard C. Bratton, United States District Judge for 

the District of New Mexico, sitting by designation. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2627 Document: 01019988559 Date Filed: 11/07/1989 Page: 2 
Oklahoma Education Association, Oklahoma Public Employees 

Association, and various individually named plaintiffs ("state 

employees") appeal a district court order upholding both article 

"28, sect.ion 8 of the. Oklahoma Constitution and its statutory 

counterpart, title 37, section Sll(D) of the Oklahoma Statutes 

("the Oklahoma provisions"), against claims.that the Oklahoma 

provisions violate the first and fourteenth amendments of the 

United States Constitution, U.S. Const. amends. I, XIV. On 

appeal, the state employees argue that the district court erred in 

holding that the Oklahoma provisions do not violate either: (l} 

the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment; (2) the 

due process clause of the fourteenth amendment; or (3) the first 

amendment. The state employees further allege that the district 

court erred in its application of the twenty-first amendment, U.S. 

Const. amend. XXI, to their equal protection and due process 

claims. We affirm. 

The parties stipulated to the underlying facts giving rise to 

this action. The Oklahoma Education Association has approximately 

46,000 members, who are teachers, support employees and school 

administrators in the Oklahoma public school system. The Oklahoma 

Public Employees Association has approximately 11,000 members, who 

pursue many different professions and occupations as public 

employees. These associations, along with several named 

individuals, brought this action challenging Oklahoma's 

constitutional and statutory provisions prohibiting state 

employees from working in any phase of the alcoholic beverage 

business. Three of the individually named plaintiffs were unable 

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Appellate Case: 87-2627 Document: 01019988559 Date Filed: 11/07/1989 Page: 3 
to continue their part-time jobs in the alcoholic beverage 

business due to their inability to obtain employee liquor 

licenses • 

. On September 18, 1984, .the citizens of Oklahoma in a 

referendum vote repealed former Article 27 of the Oklahoma 

Constitution and replaced it with current Article 28. Section 8 

of Article 28 continues the former Article 27, section 8 language 

forbiding state employees from engaging in any phase of the 

alcoholic beverage business. 

Article 28, section 8 of the Oklahoma Constitution states in 

relevant part: 

The State of Oklahoma, or any political subdivision 

thereof, or any board, commission, agent, or employee 

thereof, is hereby prohibited from engaging in any phase 

of the alcoholic beverage business, including the 

manufacture, sale, transportation, or distribution 

thereof, at wholesale or retail, and the maintenance, 

ownership, or operation of warehouses or alcoholic 

beverage stores; except that if the voters of a county 

in which a state lodge is located approve retail sale of 

alcoholic beverages by the individual drink for onpremises consumption, and if the State Legislature 

enacts legislation approving such sales in any such 

lodges located in any such counties, then such sales are 

authorized. 

After the public referendum, the Oklahoma legislature enacted 

the statutory equivalent of Article 28, section 8 in title 37, 

section 511(0) of the Oklahoma Statutes. The practical 

significance of the Oklahoma provisions is that Oklahoma state 

employees can neither obtain liquor licenses nor work in positions 

in the alcoholic beverage business that require such licenses. 

I. 

The state employees contend that the district court erred in 

holding that the Oklahoma provisions do not violate the equal 

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Appellate Case: 87-2627 Document: 01019988559 Date Filed: 11/07/1989 Page: 4 
protection clause. This is a question of law that we review de 

novo. See In re Ruti-Sweetwater, Inc., 836 F.2d 1263, 1266 (10th 

Cir. 1988). 

Before we analyze the state employees' equal protection claim 

we first must determine the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny 

to apply to the Oklahoma provisions. It is well settled that 

economic and social legislation generally is presumed valid. We 

will sustain such legislation if the classifications drawn by the 

statute are rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 

See Cleburne Y.!. Cleburne Living Center 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 

When legislation categorizes persons using "suspect" 

classifications, such as race or national origin, we depart from 

the general rule and apply strict scrutiny, sustaining the law 

only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state 

interest. See id. We subject "quasi-suspect" classifications 

based on characteristics beyond an individual's control, such as 

gender, illegitimacy, and alienage, to intermediate review, and 

will uphold the law only if it is substantially related to an 

important or substantial state interest. See id. at 440-41; Plyer 

Y.!. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-24 (1982). The class here, public 

employees, clearly does not fall within a suspect or quasi-suspect 

category triggering a level of scrutiny more searching than a 

rational relationship test. 

We will apply strict scrutiny, however, if the state law 

impinges upon fundamental rights protected by the Constitution. 

See,~, Roe Y.!. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of a uniquely 

private nature); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right 

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to interstate travel); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) 

(right to associate for advancement of political beliefs); Harper 

.Y..!.. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to 

-· __ vote) •. The state employees_,.contend .that .we should apply strict 

scrutiny to the Oklahoma provisions because the ability to pursue 

additional employment in the alcoholic beverage business is a 

fundamental right. We disagree. 

The Supreme Court characterizes the ability to pursue a 

particular line of employment as a fundamental right only in the 

limited context of the privileges and immunities clause, U.S. 

Const. Art. IV, S 2, where a state government attempts to limit 

employment opportunities to state or municipal residents. See 

Supreme Court of N.H • .Y..!.. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 279-80 (1985) 

(limiting bar admission to state residents); United Bldg.! 

Constr. T.rades Council .Y..!.. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 220-22 

(1984) (requiring 40% of employees working on city construction 

projects to be city residents). The purpose of the privileges and 

immunities clause is to promote interstate harmony and the 

national economic union. See Piper, 470 U.S. at 279-80; United 

Bldg., 465 U.S. at 220-22. The ability of residents of one state 

to pursue their occupation in other states is fundamental to this 

purpose. 

The state employees argue that we should extend the Supreme 

Court's fundamental right analysis under the privileges and 

immunities clause to the equal protection clause. The Court, 

however, treats equal protection clause cases in which a party 

claims a fundamental right to pursue a particular line of 

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employment differently from cases in which ~he right is asserted. 

under the privileges and immunities clause. In the equal 

protection clause context, the Supreme Court has never recognized 

a fundamental right to pursue a particular line of employment. 

See United Bldg., 465 U.S. at 219 (no fundamental right to 

government employment under the equal protection clause); 

Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement Y..!. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 

(1976) (same); see also Edelstein Y..!. Wilentz, 812 F.2d 128, 132 

(3d Cir. 1987) (citing Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313) ("The Constitution 

does not create fundamental interests in particular types of 

employment."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 955 (1980). Rather, the 

Supreme Court applies a rational relationship test to state 

legislation restricting employment opportunities when the 

restrictions are not based on suspect or quasi-suspect 

classifications. See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312-15; Dandridge v. 

Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 and note 17 (1970) ("[rational 

relationship] standard[] has been consistently applied to state 

legislation restricting the availability of employment 

opportunities."). 

The Supreme Court's most recent definition of fundamental 

rights under the fourteenth amendment is in San Antonio School 

Independent District Y..!. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The 

Rodriguez plaintiffs contended that the Texas system for financing 

public schools violated the equal protection clause because per 

pupil expenditures for school districts varied according to each 

school district's property tax base. The Rodriguez Court rejected 

the argument that the category of fundamental rights under the 

equal protection clause should be expanded to include education: 

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It is not the province of_ this Court to create 

substantive constitutional rights in the name of 

guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. Thus, the 

key to discovering whether education is "fundamental" is 

not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal 

significance of education as opposed to subsistence or 

housing •.... Nor ... is it . to be found by weighing whether 

education is as important as the right to travel. 

Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether there is a 

right to education eipITcITly or implicitly guaranteed ~ the Constitution. 

Id. at 33-34 (emphasis added). 1 Our Constitution clearly does not 

explicitly or implicitly guarantee the right to pursue government 

employment free from restrictions on additional employment. We 

decline the state employees' invitation to expand the category of 

fundamental rights protected by the fourteenth amendment. 

We hold that the state employees do not have a fundamental 

right under the equal protection clause to pursue additional 

employment in the alcoholic beverage business. We therefore will 

uphold the Oklahoma provisions if the classifications created by 

the provisions are rationally related to legitimate state 

interests. See Vance .Y..!. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979). 

Under the rational relationship test the state employees have 

the heavy burden of proving that "the legislative facts on which 

the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be 

1 The state employees emphasize that by the Oklahoma Alcoholic 

Beverage Laws Enforcement Commission's own calculation, 

potentional income of $297,600,000 is foreclosed to them because 

they cannot pursue additional employment in the alcoholic beverage 

business. It is clear from the Supreme Court's discussion of 

fundamental rights under the equal protection clause in Rodriguez 

and under the fourteenth amendment due process clause in Board of 

Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-01 (1972), that 

constituITonally protected rights are determined by the nature of 

the interest asserted, not its weight. Contrary to the state 

employees' argument, we cannot create constitutional rights based 

on the amount of money at stake • 

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( 

conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker. 11 

State Club Ass'n, Inc. y City of New York, __ U.S. , 

New York 

, 

108 s.ct. 2225, 2236 (1988) (quoting Vance, 440 u.s. at 111). 

Oklahoma's purposes for prohibiting state employees from 

simultaneously working in the alcoholic beverage industry are 

threefold: (1) to prevent direct conflicts of interest with those 

state employees who have some authority over the administration 

and enforcement of the state's liquor laws; (2) to prevent the 

public perception that the state is involved with liquor 

trafficking; and (3) to prevent the state's encouragement of 

liquor consumption. 

The Oklahoma provisions are rationally related to the State's 

declared purposes. Among those state employees who are charged 

with administering and enforcing the Oklahoma liquor laws, 

potential conflicts of interest could arise if the state granted 

those employees licenses to distribute and sell liquor. The 

Oklahoma provisions are not irrational merely because the 

statutory scheme does not provide for individual hearings to 

examine the degree of the actual conflict of interest for each of 

those employees. See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 316; Gosney v. Sonora 

Indep. School Dist., 603 F.2d 522, 526 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing 

Murgia, 427 U.S. at 316-17). 

The legislature could rationally believe that if the state 

allowed its employees to work as waiters, waitresses, bartenders, 

i.e., in jobs that involve direct sales of liquor to the public, 

the public could perceive that state employees were trafficking in 

liquor and/or encouraging alcoholic beverage consumption. Patrons 

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who know that the person selling or serving them liquor also is a 

state employee could associate that person with the state's 

promotion of the liquor industry and the consumption of alcoholic 

beverages. The state employees did not convince the district 

court, nor do they convince us, that ·the factual assumption 

embedded in the Oklahoma provisions, namely that public perception 

may be influenced adversely if state employees are allowed to work 

in any phase of the alcoholic beverage business, could not 

reasonably be conceived to be true. 

The state employees emphasize the state's lack of empirical 

and statistical evidence. The state, however, is not compelled to 

verify its legislative assumptions with empirical evidence. See 

Vance, 440 U.S. at 110 n.28. "Common sense propositions" can be 

sufficient to uphold social and economic legislation analyzed 

under the rational relationship test. See id. at 111-12; Murgia, 

427 U.S. at 315. 

The state employees argue that several "loopholes" in the 

Oklahoma provisions render the scheme irrational. One alleged 

loophole is that the Oklahoma provisions do not require licenses 

for all jobs related to the alcoholic b~verage business. For 

example, security guards do not need liquor licenses to work in 

liquor stores. A second alleged loophole is the Oklahoma 

Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enforcement Commission's ("ABLE") 

unwritten policy stated in the parties' stipulation number 

sixteen: 

Public employees may participate as a stockholder, 

officer or director of a legitimate corporation 

maintaining a Mixed Beverage, Brewers, Distiller, 

Winemaker, Oklahoma winemaker, Rectifier, Bottle Club, 

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Caterer, Special Event, Airline/Railroad Beverage, Industrial Carrier, Private Carrier, Bonded Warehouse, 

Storage, Nonresident Seller and Sacramental Wine 

Supplier license, as long~ t~ey are not involved in 

the direct sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages 

• • • • 

(emphasis added). The state employees argue that these alleged 

loopholes are inconsistent with the stated purposes of the 

Oklahoma provisions because they allow state employees to work in 

select jobs related to the alcoholic beverage industry if the 

position does not require a license or falls within ABLE's 

nonenforcement policy. 

We first note that we will not invalidate a statute because 

the legislature has not fashioned the classification in question 

with "mathematical nicety." Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485 (1970) 

(quoting Lindsley Y.:. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 

(1911)). The Constitution does not prohibit the legislature from 

focusing on only part of a problem: "the reform may take one step 

at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which 

seems most a.cute to the legislative mind." Williamson v. Lee 

Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). We find, moreover, that these 

alleged loopholes rationally could be construed as consistent with 

the second and third public perception-oriented purposes 

underlying the Oklahoma provisions. Security guards and corporate 

officers are not involved directly in selling and serving liquor 

to patrons. The Oklahoma voters and the legislature could assume 

that the public would be less likely to associate those state 

employees with the alcoholic beverage business because the 

employees' influence on public perception would be insignificant. 

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Another alleged loophole is the Oklahoma provisions' 

exception allowing state lodge employees who work in counties that 

have approved retail liquor sales by the individualized drink to 

obtain liquor licenses. See Okla. Const. art. 28, § 8; Okla. 

Stat. Ann. tit. 37, § Sll(D) (Supp. 1989). The state employees 

argue that this exemption is inconsistent with the state's public 

perception-oriented goals and therefore renders the Oklahoma 

provisions irrational. We disagree. Stipulation of fact number 

27 of the parties states that this exemption only involves 26 

state lodge employees, making its effect on public perception de 

minimis. Furthermore, the licensing exemption is necessary for 

those 26 state lodge employees to perform their state job. Unlike 

the plaintiffs, the state lodge employees are not seeking liquor 

licenses to obtain other jobs in addition and unrelated to their 

state employment. Having sanctioned the sale of alcoholic 

beverages at state-owned lodges, the state can provide a limited 

exception that makes it legal for state lodge employees to serve 

those drinks. 

Finally, the state employees point out that the Oklahoma 

legislature has excluded sales of 3.2 percent beer from its 

licensing requirements. The state has discretion to define the 

categories of beverages that it will regulate pursuant to its 

powers under the twenty-first amendment. 2 Oklahoma need not 

2 The twenty-first amendment provides: "The transportation or 

importation into any state, territory, or possession of the United 

States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in 

violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." U.S. Const. 

amend. XXI, § 2. 

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attack every facet of a perceived evil. It can focus its 

resources on forms of alcohol more potent than 3.2 percent beer. 

We hold that the Oklahoma provisions do not violate the equal 

protection clause. Oklahoma's decision to deny liquor licenses to 

all state employees except those who work in certain state lodges 

is rationally related to achieving Oklahoma's legitimate state 

interests. 3 

IL 

The state employees contend that the Oklahoma provisions 

violate substantive and procedural due process. This is a 

question of law that we review de novo. See In re RutiSweetwater, Inc., 836 F.2d at 1266. 

Our review of legislation for substantive due process 

violations is well defined. 

When local economic or social regulation is 

challenged as violating substantive due process, courts 

consistently defer to legislative determinations as to 

the desirability of particular statutory schemes. 

Unless a state law trammels fundamental personal rights, 

we are to presume that state legislatures bave acted 

within their constitutional power and are to require 

only that the law "bears a reasonable relation to the 

state's legitimate purpose •••• " 

Murphy .Y..:.. Matheson, 742 F.2d 564, 575 (10th Cir. 1984) (citations 

omitted) (quoting Exxon Corp • .Y..:.. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 

125 (1978)). Our holding in Part I of this opinion that the state 

employees do not have a fundamental right to pursue additional 

3 The twenty-first amendment plays no role in our analysis of 

the validity of the Oklahoma restrictions on secondary employment 

opportunities for state employees. Therefore we do not address 

the state employees' argument that the district court erred in its 

application of the twenty-first amendment to their equal 

protection and due process claims. 

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employment in the alcoholic beverage business applies equally to 

the state employees' substantive due process claim. Because the 

Oklahoma provisions do not affect fundamental personal rights, we 

apply a deferential rational relationship test. 

For the reasons discussed in Part I of this opinion, we find 

that the Oklahoma provisions are rationally related to legitimate 

state interests. We therefore hold that the Oklahoma provisions 

do not violate the state employees' substantive due process 

rights. 

We also reject the state employees' claim that the Oklahoma 

provisions deprive them of procedural due process. The state 

employees argue that they have a procedural right to 

individualized hearings so that each individual state employee can 

present evidence showing that he or she does not have a conflict 

of interest warranting denial of a liquor license. The state 

employees' argument misconstrues the nature of procedural due 

process rights. The Oklahoma legislature has rejected an 

individualized hearing approach t~ liquor licensing and has 

instead adopted a liquor licensing scheme that flatly prohibits 

any state employee from obtaining a liquor license unless the 

employee works in a state lodge authorized to serve alcoholic 

beverages. "When the legislature passes a law which affects a 

general class of persons, those persons have all received 

procedural due process -- the legislative process." 2 R. Rotunda, 

J. Novak & J. Young, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance 

and Procedure§ 17.8 at 251 (1986) [hereinafter Rotunda]; see Bi-

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Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 

(1915). 

The state employees' claim that individualized hearings are 

necessary to redress the "arbitrariness" of the Oklahoma 

provisions is nothing more than a veiled challenge to the 

substance of the Oklahoma provisions. The purpose of procedural 

due process is to provide a hearing to ensure that the statute's 

commands are fairly and not erroneously applied to an individual. 

See Mackey .Y..:.. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979): Addington v. Texas, 

441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979). But "there is no requirement of a 

procedure to determine the basis for a[] [state] action which 

affects an individual where there are no factual issues in 

dispute." Rotunda, S 17.8 at 250; see Codd .Y..:.. Velger, 429 U.S. 

624, 627-29 (1977) (per curiam). It is undisputed that the state 

employees are in fact state employees and therefore are expressly 

prohibited by statute from obtaining liquor licenses in Oklahoma. 

A prior individualized hearing is not necessary for the ABLE to 

fairly and correctly apply this express prohibition of the 

Oklahoma provisions and deny a state employee's application for a 

liquor license. 

III. 

The state employees argue that the Oklahoma provisions 

violate their first amendment right to association by restricting 

their right to work in the alcoholic beverage business. We 

disagree. The right to association protects personal affiliations 

such as family relationships that are characterized by "relative 

smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and 

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maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical 

aspects of the relationship." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 

468 U.S. 609, 619-20 (1984). 

Conversely,. an.association lacking these _qualities 

such as a large business enterprise -- seems remote from 

the concerns giving rise to this constitutional 

protection. Accordingly, the Constitution undoubtedly 

imposes constraints on the State's• power to control .the 

selection of one's spouse that would not apply to 

regulations affecting the choice of o'iie"s fellow 

employees. 

Id. at 620 (emphasis added). We hold that the right to 

association simply is not at stake in this case. 

For the above reasons, the decision of the district court is 

AFFIRMED. 

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