Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_01-cv-06443/USCOURTS-caed-1_01-cv-06443-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MANUEL QUEVEDO, MARTIN

HERNANDEZ, FRANSISCO V. PAZ,

ALVARO LOPEZ, JUAN CORNEJO, JOSE

LUIS GUERRA, MARTHA REYES,

ALFONSO CARDENAS, SOCORRO

ALVAREZ, and KAREN YORK, for

themselves and all other persons

similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DOLE FOOD CO., INC., DOLE

FARMING, INC., BUD ANTLE, INC.,

DOLE CITRUS, and DOLE FRESH

FRUIT CO.,

Defendants.

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1:01-cv-6443 OWW SMS

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER APPROVING CLASS

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case was filed as a class action and is being settled

on a class basis. The parties move for approval of the

Settlement Agreement, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(A). 

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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case is a class action. The complaint was filed on

November 15, 2001. (Doc. 1, Compl.). The named Plaintiffs are

former employees of Defendants (“Dole”). Eight of the class

representatives worked at Dole’s Rancho Loma, Cawelo, Famosa, and

Ducor grape ranches (“Grape Ranches”) and two worked at Dole’s

Central Valley Citrus packingshed (“Packingshed”). Dole closed

the Grape Ranches on February 12, 2001, terminating 305

employees. Some employees who worked at the Grape Ranches in

January or February 2000 were not called back to work in January

or February 2001 as a result of the settlement. The Packingshed

was closed on September 27, 2000, and 70 employees were

terminated. 

Plaintiffs allege that Dole did not comply with the Worker

Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2101, et

seq. (“the WARN Act”), which requires employers to give employees

60 days notice before a plant closing or mass layoff. Id. at §

2102(a). The civil remedy is one day’s pay for each day the

notice is late. Id. at § 2104(a)(1). All Defendants are

employers as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(1). Dole admits it

terminated employees without notice in violation of the WARN Act.

On July 26, 2004, Plaintiffs and Defendants jointly moved

(pursuant to the settlement they had reached) to certify two

classes. (Doc. 20, Motion & Notice of Motion; Doc. 21, Pls.’

Mem. in Support of Parties’ Joint Motion to Certify Class,

hereinafter “Joint Mem.,” Ex. 1, Settlement Agreement)). The

parties moved at the same time for preliminary approval of the

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1 The Grape Ranches subclass (a) and the Packingshed

subclass (b) are formally defined in the Settlement Agreement as:

(a) All employees of Dole who worked at Dole’s Rancho Loma,

Cawello, Famoso, and Ducor operations and who (1)

experienced a termination, layoff, or any other

“employment loss” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §

2102(a)(6) as a result of Dole’s decision to cease

using employees in its farming operations at these

locations on or before February, 2001; and (2) did not

receive written notice pursuant to the WARN Act, 29

U.S.C. § 2101 et seq., of his/her termination, layoff,

or other employment loss at least 60 days before the

date that the termination, layoff, or other employment

loss took place. Not included in this subclass are

those employees who worked at the above locations and

who experienced an employment loss in or about

September, 2000 as a result of the closure of Dole’s

Central Valley Citrus packing shed in Terra Bella,

California.

(b) All employees of Dole who worked at Dole’s Central

Valley Citrus packing shed in Terra Bella, California

and who (1) experienced a termination, layoff, or any

other “employment loss” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C.

§ 2102(a)(6) as a result of the decision to cease

operations at this location on or about September 27,

2000; and (2) did not receive written notice pursuant

to the WARN Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq. of his/her

termination, layoff, or other employment loss at least

60 days before the date that the termination, layoff or

other employment loss took place.

(Doc. 21, Joint Mem., Ex. 1, Settlement Agreement at Notice of

Settlement p. 2; see also Doc. 28, Stipulation re Revised Notice

of Newspaper Publication, Ex. A. Notice of Settlement.).

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settlement, for approval of notice to class members, and to set

date for a fairness hearing. (Id.) On September 20, 2004, the

parties’ motions were granted, and two sub-classes were

certified: (1) workers who were discharged from work at the Grape

Ranches in early 2001 and (2) workers who were discharged from

the Packingshed in September 2000.1 (Doc. 27, Order). In

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addition, the parties’ requests for preliminary approval of the

Settlement Agreement for the limited purpose of mailing notice to

class members and for approval of the process of notifying class

members were also granted.

On January 24, 2005, pursuant to the September 20, 2004,

Order, a hearing on fairness of settlement was held. (See Doc.

33, Minutes). However, Plaintiffs filed their original

memorandum and other papers in support of their Settlement

Agreement on January 20 and 21, 2004, just days before the

hearing. (See Docs. 29-32). At the time of the January hearing,

Plaintiffs’ counsel did not yet know the identities of all class

members who had filed valid claims or what dollar amount each

class member would receive. Because the distribution of the

settlement proceeds was not available for the Court’s timely

review, the fairness hearing was continued to March 28, 2005. 

(Doc. 35, Order, filed Feb. 5, 2005). 

Plaintiffs filed a supplemental memorandum in support of the

Settlement Agreement on March 14, 2005, that includes information

regarding: the identities of class members whose claims were

approved; the identities of class members whose claims were

rejected; distribution of settlement proceeds to approved class

members; and the one objection that has been filed against the

Settlement Agreement. (Doc. 36, Pls.’ Supp. Mem. 2). Defendants

filed no memorandum in support of or opposition to the

settlement. Plaintiffs note in their memorandum that:

Dole joined in the motion for class certification only for

the purpose of settlement. It reserved the right to oppose

class certification if, for some reason, the settlement is

not approved. The description of the law in this brief with

respect to class certification comes only from plaintiffs.

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2 The WARN Act contains an exemption for “temporary”

employees. 29 U.S.C. § 2103. If employees hired for harvesting

understand that their work was temporary when they were hired,

then they fall within this exemption. See 20 C.F.R. §

639.5(c)(3). However, if employees do not expect their work to

be temporary, and the employer treats them as returning seasonal

employees, then they do not fall within the exemption. See

Marques v. Telles Ranch, 867 F. Supp. 1438 (N.D. Cal. 1994). The

parties do not dispute that the seasonal employees here do not

fall within the exemption. (See Doc. 36, Pls.’ Supp. Mem. 5).

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(Id. at 7, n. 2).

A fairness hearing was held on March 28, 2005. Cynthia L.

Rice of the California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation appeared

in person on behalf of Plaintiffs. Paul Strauss appeared

telephonically on behalf of Plaintiffs. William D. Claster

appeared telephonically on behalf of the Dole Defendants. No

objectors appeared.

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The Parties’ Disagreement as to Remedy under the WARN

Act.

The facts of the case are uncontested, but the parties

disagree as to the remedy afforded by WARN. Dole does not

dispute that it terminated employees without giving the 60 days

notice required by the WARN Act. Dole disputes the way in which

the remedy is calculated. 

Dole employed permanent seasonal employees who worked

intermittently, but had an expectation of returning to work each

season.2 However, because the nature of the employees’ work is

seasonal, employees often worked at different periods throughout

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the year. Some were not working at the time of the shutdown and

did not reasonably expect to be employed during the 60 days

following the shutdown. Such employees would not have suffered

an “employment loss” as a result. Marques v. Telles Ranch, 867

F.3d 1331, 1335 (9th Cir. 1997). Some of the employees might

have been employed for only a few days during the 60-day notice

period, and others would have been employed for the full 60 days.

Plaintiffs argue that Dole is liable to all employees for a

full day’s wages times 60, regardless of whether they would have

been employed at all, whether they would have been employed for

less than the 60-day period, or whether they would have been

employed for the entire 60-day period. Dole argues that the

employees are only entitled to what they would have actually

earned in the 60 days after the closing of the Grape Ranches and

Packingshed. (See Doc. 36, Pls.’ Supp. Mem. 6).

The Circuits are split as to which remedy calculation method

applies. The Third Circuit holds that an employer who failed to

give notice in violation of the WARN Act owes each employee one

day’s wages times 60 calendar days, regardless of whether the

worker would have actually worked fewer than 60 calendar days

during that period. United Steelworkers of Amer. v. North Star

Steel Co., 5 F.3d 39 (3d Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit (along

with the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits) favor Dole’s

position, and hold that an employer in a WARN Act case only owes

its employees for the days that the employee actually would have

worked. Burns v. Stone Forest Indus., Inc., 147 F.3d 1182, 1184

(9th Cir. 1998), cited with approval in Local Joint Exec. Bd. Of

Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d

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3 Plaintiffs assert that Burns, the Ninth Circuit case, is

factually distinguishable, although do not explain why the rule

established in that case regarding calculation of damages would

not apply here. (Doc. 36, Pls.’ Supp. Mem. 6). The employees in

Burns were workers in a timber plant. The Ninth Circuit dealt

with the issue of calculation of damages under the WARN Act as a

matter of first impression, and held that damages are calculated

by work days, not calendar days. Burns, 147 F.3d at 1183 (“We

join most of the other circuits that have ruled on the issue in

construing the statute to mean work days.”). The Court did not

indicate there are any exceptions to this rule. 

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1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001); Carpenters Dist. Council of New

Orleans v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 1283-5 (5th

Cir. 1994); Saxion v. Titan-C-Mfg., Inc., 86 F.3d 553, 560-1 (6th

Cir. 1996); Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 61 F.3d 757, 771-2 (10th Cir.

1995); Breedlove v. Earthgrains Baking Co., Inc., 140 F.3d 797,

801 (8th Cir. 1998). 

A district court is bound to follow the law of its circuit,

even if there are inter-circuit conflicts. Hasbrouck v. Texaco,

Inc., 663 F.2d 930, 932-3 (9th Cir. 1981). Under the Ninth

Circuit view, Plaintiffs’ counsel has estimated that Plaintiffs

and the class would receive approximately $467,000.00.3 Under

the alternate theory, Plaintiffs’ counsel has estimated that the

class would recover up to $1,364,000.00. (Doc. 36, Pls.’ Supp.

Mem. 6).

B. Notice to the Class & Claims Process.

1. Notice to the Class.

On or before October 8, 2004, Gilardi & Co. (the Claims

Administrator upon whom the parties agreed) mailed notice packets

to 545 potential class members, and also published notice by

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newspaper and radio. (Doc. 32, 01/19/05 Rice Decl. ¶ 3; Doc. 31,

Salazar Decl. ¶¶ 5-8, Ex. B, Notice Packet). Gilardi & Co. made

a toll-free telephone number available to claimants to answer

questions about the Settlement Agreement and the claims process. 

(Doc. 31, Salazar Decl. ¶ 9). The individuals were identified by

Plaintiffs’ counsel based on payroll records provided by Dole. 

(See Doc. 36, Pls.’ Supp. Mem. 11; Doc. 32, 01/19/05 Rice Decl. ¶

4). Workers at the Grape Ranches who were last employed by Dole

in January or February 2001 and 2000, and workers at the

Packingshed who were last employed from June 29, 2000, to

September 29, 2000. (Doc. 36, Pls.’ Supp. Mem. 9; Doc. 32,

03/11/05 Rice Decl. ¶¶ 5-6). 

The packets were to be returned 90 days after October 8,

2005, on January 6, 2004. (01/19/05 Rice Decl. ¶ 3). The notice

packets stated the deadline for submission of claims of January

6, 2004. (Doc. 31, Salazar Decl., Ex. B, Notice of Class Action

3). The notice packets also stated the Hearing on Fairness of

Settlement would be held on January 24, 2005, before Judge Oliver

Wanger of the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of California at the courthouse in Fresno. (Id. at 4).

In addition to mailing notices to potential class members,

Gilardi & Co. published a court-approved summary notice in

Spanish-language newspapers on November 5, 7, 12, and 19, 2004. 

(Id. at ¶ 7). Gilardi & Co. also aired announcements on two

Spanish radio stations from November 4, 2004, to January 6, 2005,

and November 9, 2004, to January 6, 2005. (Id. at ¶ 8). The

toll-free telephone line was answered in both Spanish and English

from 9 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday. (Id. at ¶ 9).

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4 Of these, 77 requests were from individuals who never

filed claim forms. (Doc. 42, 03/14/05 Heard Decl. ¶ 6). 

Plaintiffs do not make clear how the requests of these

individuals were made, by writing, telephone, or some other

method.

5 Plaintiffs use this date because they assert they

submitted their papers in support of the first fairness hearing

on January 18, 2005. The date of filing on the official docket,

however, is January 21, 2005. 

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After mailing and publication, Gilardi & Co. sent additional

notices to individuals who requested them. (Doc. 31, 01/20/05

Salazar Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. C). When approximately of the notices

were returned, Gilardi & Co. sought alternative addresses by

conducting electronic searches through a locator service and

obtained correct notices for fifty-one individuals to whom the

packets were subsequently re-sent. (Id. at ¶ 13).

2. Claims Process.

Counsel received a total of 571 claims.4 Of these, 534 were

postmarked before January 6, 2005. Four claims were postmarked

after January 6, 2005, but before January 18, 2005.5 Plaintiffs

received 33 additional claims after January 18, 2005. (Doc. 36,

Pls.’ Supp. Mem. 8, 14). Plaintiffs’ counsel recommends

including the late claims that are from persons properly included

in the class. A total of 5 of the 37 late claims are from

individuals Plaintiffs’ counsel has determined are eligible for

class participation. (Doc. 38, 03/14/05 Rice Decl. ¶¶ 12, 13). 

These individuals were included in the proposed distribution. 

(See Doc. 41, Soule Decl., Ex. 1).

Plaintiffs’ counsel reviewed and evaluated each claim to

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6 Gilardi & Co. sent 274 denial notices to claimants on Feb

16, 2005. Of the 274 denial notices, 63 were actually valid

claim members to whom a denial had been sent by mistake. (Doc.

38, 03/14/05 Rice Decl. ¶ 7). Of the 274 individuals who were

notified of denial, approximately 96 contacted Gilardi & Co. or

Plaintiffs’ counsel and asserted they were in the class. (Doc.

36, Pls.’ Supp. Mem. 13). Of the 96 individuals, 47 were

properly within the class, and were subsequently included. (Id.

at 15). Forty-nine (49) were found not to be ineligible, and

they were subsequently informed again that their claim was

denied. (Id.). Ultimately, all 63 individuals who had been

improperly denied were included in the proposed settlement

distribution.

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determine whether the claimants were class members and entitled

to a portion of the settlement. Claimants who were employed at

the Grape Ranches were determined to be class members eligible to

receive damage awards based on a record of employment in January

or February of 2001 and 2000. (Doc. 41, 03/14/05 Soule Decl. ¶

4). Claimants who were employed at the Packingshed were

determined to be class members eligible to receive damage awards

based on a record of employment from June 29, 2000, through

September 29, 2000. (Id.). 

Plaintiffs’ counsel accepted 361 of the 571 claims.6

Plaintiffs’ counsel asserts that “each individual was denied

because they did could not [sic] demonstrate that they had worked

during the periods of time used to determine whether or not a

worker was affected.” (Doc. 36, Pls.’ Supp. Mem. 15). Claimants

could prove they received wages by either appearing on Dole’s

payroll records or by showing a dated pay stub. Plaintiffs

included in the class claimants who could prove they received

wages in January or February 2000 (from the Grape Ranches), but

were not called back to work at the Grape Ranches in January or

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February 2001 as a result of the shutdown. (See Doc. 41, Soule

Decl. 2). Plaintiffs assert these claimants were included in the

class because they could have expected to be called back to work

in January or February 2001 as a result of the shutdown. 

Plaintiffs state that many claims were denied because the workers

would not have been called back in January or February 2001, but

instead would have been called back in March 2001 or later, and

therefore did not fall within the notice period. See Marquez,

867 F. Supp. at 1445. 

Plaintiffs’ counsel mailed official notices to workers at

the Grape Ranches in January or February 2000, but not to workers

who worked at the Packingshed in June - September 1999. 

Plaintiffs’ counsel explained at the fairness hearing that the

June - September 1999 workers were included in the class because

they had all already been called back to work by June - September

2000. For the 2000 Grape Ranches workers this was not the case.

2. Objections & Opt-Outs.

Plaintiffs state in the introduction to their brief that one

of their purposes is to “advise the court of the objection that

was submitted.” (Doc. 36, Pls.’ Mem. 2). No formal objections

were filed with Plaintiffs’ counsel or with Gilardi & Co. (Id.

at 15). No objections were filed with the Court and no objectors

appeared at either the January 24, 2005, or the March 28, 2005,

fairness hearings. Ninety-six individuals whose claims were

denied advised Plaintiffs’ counsel or Gilardi & Co. that they

were not satisfied with the outcome. The claims of each of these

persons was reviewed twice. Some of these individuals were

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7 Some of the claims & exclusion forms for this group of

claimants were received after the deadline January 6, 2005. 

Plaintiffs’ counsel recommends including the claims from

individuals who are class eligible. (Doc. 36, Pls.’ Supp. Mem.

16).

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included in the distribution. 

However, one individual, Gloria Cassaneda, submitted an optout form. Plaintiffs’ counsel stated at the March, 28, 2005,

fairness hearing that Gilardi & Co. attempted to contact this

individual but had not been successful. This individual does not

appear on Dole’s payroll records and does not appear to be a

member of the class. (Doc. 36, Pls.’ Supp. Mem. 16). A total of

forty individuals filed both a claim form and an exclusion form.7

(See id.; Doc. 42, 03/14/05 Heard Decl. ¶ 8). At the direction

of Plaintiffs’ counsel, Gilardi & Co. contacted each of these

individuals, and received letters from 37 claimants indicating

they want to participate in the settlement and did not want to

opt out. (See id.). Gilardi & Co. has not heard back from the

remaining three individuals, Antonio Moreno, Javier Ramirez

Almanza, and Aurora Gallegos. Based on Plaintiffs’ counsels’

review of the payroll records, these three individuals and Gloria

Cassaneda do not appear to be class members.

D. The Parties’ Settlement Agreement.

1. Settlement Agreement Provisions.

The Settlement Agreement provides that “Dole will pay

$1,017,500.00 to plaintiffs and class members,” and “[t]hat

amount will be divided up pro rata among class members who file

claims” based on a specific calculation agreed upon by the

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parties. Based on Plaintiffs’ counsel’s review of claims, 361 of

the 571 claims are class members and entitled to a portion of the

settlement. The Settlement Agreement also provides for Dole’s

payment of Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and all expenses related

to the administration of the proposed settlement and processing

of claims. (See Doc. 36, Pls.’ Supp. Mem. 8; Doc. 21, Joint

Mem., Ex. 1, Settlement Agreement).

First, the Settlement Agreement provides that “Dole will pay

$1,017,500.00 to plaintiffs and class members.” (Doc. 21, Joint

Mem., Ex. 1, Settlement Agreement § 5). “Plaintiffs’ counsel

will propose allocation of payments to class members pro rata,

based on a reasonable approximation of what they would have

received if this case was tried and plaintiffs prevailed.” (Id.

at § 6). The Settlement Agreement does not contain a description

of the particular pro rata distribution calculation to be used. 

However, the 03/14/05 Soule Declaration (Doc. 41 at ¶ 5) states: 

The damage amount computed for eligible claimant was based

on their average daily earnings for all days worked in the

60 days prior to their last date worked, as determined from

the Dole payroll data. This average daily rate was

multiplied by 60 to determine each employee’s 60-days pay

amount. 

Thus, each class members’ share is based on their average daily

wage multiplied by sixty, regardless of the number of days they

worked in the 60 days preceding the shutdown.

Second, the Settlement Agreement provides that $25,000.00 of

the $1,017,500.00 will be set aside as a reserve that is to

provide funds for the payment of late claims and to cure errors:

In calculating the amount of money that should be paid to

claimants, plaintiffs will direct the claims administrator

to keep a reserve of $25,000.00. This money will be used to

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pay late claims and cure errors made in the calculation or

distribution of settlement payments. The claims

administrator will be directed by plaintiffs’ counsel

(making reasonable judgments and exercising reasonable

discretion) to make payments to claimants from this reserve

to provide payment for class members who filed late claims

or to cure errors with respect to the calculation or

distribution of settlement payments. No part of these funds

will be paid to plaintiffs’ counsel.

(Doc. 21, Joint Mem., Ex. 1, Settlement Agreement § 30). The

reserve leaves $992,500 available for payment to claimants who

qualify as class members.

“Late claim” is not defined in the Settlement Agreement. At

the fairness hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel explained that it was

the intent of the parties that errors and pay other late claims

that may arise. The Settlement Agreement provides that unclaimed

or undistributed funds will be distributed to the Monterey County

Housing Alliance. (Doc. 21, Joint Mem., Ex. 1, Settlement

Agreement § 34).

Third, the agreement provides that Dole will pay the costs

of administering the claims:

Dole will pay the fees of the claims administrator and any

other costs of settlement administration provided for in

this agreement, including but not limited to the costs of

reproducing and mailing notice to the class, translating

written communications with class members, preparing

settlement checks and distributing those checks, and the

cost of any other appropriate mailings or communications to

class members or claimants. Dole will not be responsible

for any additional fees or expenses of plaintiffs’ counsel,

other than what is expressly authorized by this agreement.

(Id. at § 38).

Fourth, the Settlement Agreement provides that Dole will pay

attorneys’ fees, which are to be funded separately and apart from

the $1,017,500 settlement amount for the farm workers:

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Dole will pay $94,442.00 to plaintiffs’ attorneys for work

performed through December 18, 2002 and will pay an

additional $24,850.00 to plaintiffs’ attorneys for costs and

expenses they incurred through that date. Dole will also

pay up to but no more than $50,000.00 to plaintiffs’

attorney’s for work, costs, and expenses incurred after

December 18, 2002.

(Id. at § 39).

2. Distribution of the Settlement Fund.

As discussed above in brief, the damages for each claimant

who qualifies as a class member is the individual’s average daily

wage multiplied by 60. This is a variation of the “calendar

days” distribution employed by the Third Circuit in calculating

damages in WARN Act cases. See United Steelworkers, 5 F.3d at

43-4. The average daily wage for each individual was calculated

by determining the average daily earnings for all days worked in

the 60 days prior to that individual’s last date worked. The

figures were obtained from payroll data provided by Dole. (See

Doc. 41, Soule Decl. ¶ 5). 

Based on this calculation, the total amount due all

claimants who qualify as class members is $1,133,037. (Doc. 36,

Pls.’ Supp. Mem. 9). However, pursuant to the Settlement

Agreement, there is only $992,500.00 available to pay class

claims (when the $25,000 reserve is subtracted). Plaintiffs

decided not to include interest in this calculation because “the

base amount of wages due already exceeded the amount available to

pay out claims.” (Id. at 9, n. 4). Plaintiffs also decided to

reduce each claims amount proportionally in order to arrive at a

total payout of $992,500.00. (Id. at 9-10). The approximate

range of awards as a result of this calculation is a low of about

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$2,000.00 to a high of about $4,500.00. (Id. at 10; see also

Doc. 41, Soule Decl., Ex. A, “Quevedo v. Dole Proposed

Distribution”). 

3. Attorneys’ Fees.

The Settlement Agreement provides that Dole will pay

Plaintiffs’ counsel a maximum of $169,292.00, in fees, costs, and

expenses for work done on this case. (Doc. 39, 03/14/05 Strauss

Decl. ¶ 4; Doc. 31, Joint Mem., Settlement Agreement § 39). This

includes the $94,442.00 for plaintiffs’ attorneys’ work prior to

December 18, 2004; $24,850.00 for plaintiffs’ attorneys’ costs

and expenses prior to December 18, 2004; and the maximum

allowable amount of $50,000.00 for plaintiffs’ attorneys’ work,

costs, and expenses incurred after December 18, 2004. (See id.)

The Settlement Agreement provides that the payments of

attorneys’ fees “are contingent upon plaintiffs’ counsel

providing to Dole and to the Court appropriate documentation to

support fees, costs and expenses.” (Id.) Section 39 of the

Settlement Agreement does not explain how the $94,442.00 figure

for work done before December 18, 2004, was calculated. However,

Plaintiffs’ counsel have submitted declarations explaining the

work done, as required by the Court’s February 3, 2005, Order. 

(See Doc. 39, 03/14/05 Strauss Decl.; Doc. 38, 03/14/05 Rice

Decl.; Doc. 35, Order).

Plaintiffs are represented by Paul Strauss (of Miner,

Barnhill & Galland) and Cynthia Rice (of the California Rural

Legal Assistance Foundation (“CRLA Foundation”)). Paul Strauss

submitted a declaration describing the work completed by his law

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8 The CRLA Foundation is a non-profit legal services

organization that does not charge their clients for services. 

(Doc. 38, 03/14/05 Rice Decl. ¶ 20). Plaintiffs’ counsel stated

during the March 28, 2005, fairness hearing that the CLRA

Foundation does not receive federal funds. The CLRA Foundation

may collect attorneys’ fees in contingency fe cases such as

these.

17

firm through February 15, 2005, and attached time records for

hours worked by his law firm, and Mr. Strauss’ curriculum vitae. 

(Doc. 39, 03/14/05 Strauss Decl. ¶ 10; Doc. 40, Appendix). 

Cynthia Rice submitted a declaration describing the work

completed by the CLRA Foundation, and attached time records for

hours worked by the CLRA Foundation through March 11, 2005, and

Ms. Rice’s curriculum vitae.8 (Doc. 39, 03/14/05 Rice Decl. ¶

20).

Mr. Strauss asserts that Plaintiffs’ counsel have spent

substantially more than $169,292, the maximum amount provided for

attorneys’ fees by the Settlement Agreement, on this case. (Doc.

39, 03/14/05 Strauss Decl. ¶ 5). Mr. Strauss asserts that the

fees, costs, and expenses of Miner, Barnhill & Galland alone

amount to almost $200,000.00. (Id.). Ms. Rice asserts that the

total fees and costs sought by the CLRA Foundation is $70,096.65. 

(Doc. 38, 03/14/05 Rice Decl. ¶ 23). This means that the total

of Plaintiffs’ counsels’ fees, costs, and expenses amounts to

approximately $270,000.

Plaintiffs’ counsel, however, are not seeking to be

reimbursed for more than the maximum amount allowed by the

Settlement Agreement. (Doc. 39, 03/14/05 Strauss Decl. ¶¶ 6a,

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9 On page 2 of Mr. Strauss’ Declaration, there are two

consecutive paragraphs labeled “6.” The first of these

paragraphs will be referred to as “6a” and the second of these to

“6b.”

10 The paralegals under this entry are not identified, other

than Ephraim Camacho, who did work for and was paid by both Miner

Barnhill & Galland and the CLRA Foundation. (See Doc. 39,

03/14/05 Strauss Decl. ¶ 30).

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6b; Doc. 38, 03/14/05 Rice Decl. ¶ 23).9 Plaintiffs’ counsel

instead seek to show why an award of the maximum amount allowed

(i.e., $169,292), is justified. Defendants do not objected to

payment of this amount. In addition, payment of the $169,292.00

would not reduce the award to Plaintiffs, which is separate and

apart from the attorneys’ fees.

The fees incurred by Miner Barnhill & Galland working in

this case through February 15, 2005, are as follows:

Attorneys:

Paul Strauss 317.20 x $380.00 = $120,536.00

Steve Schneck 79.30 x 355.00 = 28,151.50

Marni Willenson 1.60 x 250.00 = 400.00

Rebecca Onie 18.90 x 190.00 = 3,591.00

Geoffrey Rapp 4.00 x 190.00 = 760.00

Carolyn Shapiro 0.80 x 190.00 = 152.00

Paralegals:

Paralegals10 51.70 x 105.00 = 5,428.50

Michelle CubanoGuzman 21.80 x 130.00 = 2,725.00

Law Student:

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11 Mr. Strauss’ Declaration states that the total is

$162,165.00. (Id. at ¶ 10). In fact, the total is $162,156.00.

12 Mr. Soule has 20 years of experience working with

payroll, personnel, and computer records to turn them into a

functional computer database and produce reports, charts, and

tables describing the data. (Doc. 39, 03/14/05 Strauss Decl. ¶

32). Mr. Soule used Dole’s payroll records to provide

alternative damages calculations, identify class members,

calculation individual claimants’ damages, and report on the

validity of individual claims. (Id. at ¶ 34).

13 The role of Mark S. Rudy was not made clear by the

parties.

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Aurthr Luk 2.40 x 130.00 = 312.00

TOTAL FEES = $162,156.0011

Costs & Expenses: 36,907.49 

 TOTAL FEES, COSTS & EXPENSES = $198,063.49

(See Doc. 39, 03/14/05 Strauss Decl. ¶ 10).

The total costs and expenses incurred by the law firm, based

on records of bills, invoices, and payment of litigation

expenses, totals $36,907.49. These expenses include computer and

data expert/consultant Whitman Soule, for work through March 10,

2005;12 fee for mediator Mark S. Rudy;13 travel/transportation;

hotels and meals during travel; Westlaw; Federal Express; Court

filing fees; long-distance and conference call exchanges; and inhouse copying. Mr. Strauss did not submit receipts and records

for these expenses, but can provide them to the Court if

necessary. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-3).

The total fees, costs and expenses incurred by the CLRA

Foundation through March 11, 2005, are as follows:

Attorneys:

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Cynthia Rice 202.75 x $325.00 = $65,893.75

Community Worker/Legal Assistant/Interpreter:

Ephraim Camancho 31.50 x 105.00 = 3,307.50

Travel, copying, mailing expenses: 895.40

TOTAL FEES, COSTS & EXPENSES = $70,096.65

(Doc. 38, 03/14/05 Rice Decl. ¶ 22, Exs. C, E, F).

The attorneys and paralegals at Miner Barnhill & Galland are

all highly-qualified with experience in employment

discrimination. (Doc. 39, 03/14/05 Strauss Decl. ¶¶ 18-31); see

also In re Arthur L. Lewis, 212 F.3d 980 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Miner,

Barnhill & Galland is a small law firm specializing in

employment-discrimination litigation. Many persons affiliated

with the firm have national reputations for quality work on

plaintiffs’ behalf.”). 

Ms. Rice has been a licensed attorney in California for 25

years and has specialized in labor and civil rights law both in

private practice and as an employee for various non-profit legal

service providers such as the CLRA Foundation. (Doc. 38,

03/04/05 Rice Decl. ¶ 19). CLRA Foundation is a non-profit legal

services organization that does not charge clients for services. 

Ms. Rice and CLRA’s legal assistant/interpreter Mr. Camacho

therefore do not have a standard hourly rate. (Id. at ¶ 20). 

Ms. Rice based her hourly rates on her knowledge of billing

practices on a review of U.S. District Court cases which address

the issue of reasonably hourly rate in northern California. She

did not cite any cases, however. Ms. Rice based Mr. Camacho’s

hourly rates on her knowledge of billing practices of paralegals. 

(Id. at ¶ 21).

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IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) provides that “the court must approve

any settlement...of the claims, issues, or defenses of a

certified class.” The role of the District Court is to determine

whether the notice and claims procedure was fair, and whether the

Settlement Agreement as a whole is fair, adequate, and

reasonable. Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of City

and County of San Francisco, 688 F.2d 615, 624-5 (9th Cir. 1982). 

First, the notice and claims procedure must be fair and

reasonable: 

the class must be notified of a proposed settlement in a

manner that does not systematically leave any group without

notice; the notice must indicate that a dissident can object

to the settlement and to the definition of the class; each

objection must be made a part of the record; those members

raising substantial objections must be afforded an

opportunity to be heard with the assistance of privately

retained counsel if so desired, and a reasoned response by

the court on the record; and objections without substance

and which are frivolous require only a statement on the

record of the reasons for so considering the objection. 

Id. 

Second, the settlement must be fair, adequate, and

reasonable. Factors to consider in the second part of the

analysis include: 

risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further

litigation; the risk of maintaining class action status

throughout the trial; the amount offered in settlement; the

extent of discovery completed, and the stage of the

proceedings; experience and views of counsel; presence of a

government participant; and reaction of the class members to

the proposed settlement. 

Id. at 625; see also Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 953 (9th

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Cir. 2003); Linney v. Cellular Alaska Partnership, 151 F.3d 1234,

1242 (9th Cir. 1998). 

“However, where the court is confronted with a request for

settlement-only class certification, the court must look to the

factors designed to protect absentees.” Molski, 318 F.3d at 953

(internal quotations omitted). “In addition, settlements that

take place prior to formal class certification require a higher

standard of fairness.” Id.

B. Whether the Notice Procedure was Fair and Reasonable.

The law requires that the class be notified of a proposed

settlement in a manner that does not systematically leave any

group without notice. Officers for Justice, 688 F.2d at 625. It

does not appear that plaintiffs’ notice procedures systematically

left out any group. Plaintiffs, through Gilardi & Co., mailed

545 notice packets to potential class members. Gilardi & Co.

received 571 claims, at least 361 of which were deemed valid. A

total of 361 are on the proposed distribution list.

The address list was compiled based on Dole’s payroll

records; Grape Ranches workers in January or February 2000 and

2001 and Packingshed workers from June 29 to September 30, 2000,

were included. At the time of the Settlement Agreement, the

plaintiffs believed that the only Grape Ranches workers affected

by the shutdown were those who were on the job in January and

February 2001. However, plaintiffs discovered after the claims

process began that some of the January or February 2000 workers

had not been called back to work in January or February 2001 as a

result of the shutdown. Plaintiffs’ counsel stated during the

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fairness hearing that the January or February 2000 workers were

then included in the class if they could reasonably have expected

to be called back to work in January or February 2001. 

Plaintiffs’ counsel also stated that notice packets were

subsequently sent to the January or February 2000 workers as

well.

Notice packets were not sent to a group of “June to

September 1999” Packingshed workers because all of the June to

September 1999 workers had already been called back on the job

once the shutdown occurred. There were no 1999 Packingshed

workers who were not called back to work in 2000 as a result of

the shutdown.

It is clear that Plaintiffs’ counsel made considerable

efforts in providing notice to potential class members and

organizing the claims procedure. They hired an expert, Mr.

Soule, to assist them in interpreting the payroll records

provided by Dole so that they could both identify class members

and determine their average daily wages. Plaintiffs’ counsel

worked closely with the claims administrator, Gilardi & Co., to

mail 545 individual notice packets to potential class members. 

They reviewed claims forms to determine whether the claimants

were properly included in the class. They included the January

or February 2000 workers in the class when they discovered this

group of individuals were not called back to work in 2001 when

they reasonably could have expected to be. They included in the

class, workers with pay stubs from the relevant time periods,

even when the individuals did not appear on Dole’s payroll

records. They worked with Gilardi & Co. to review forms of

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correspondence other than claims forms that were received from

potential class members. They set up and maintained a toll-free

telephone number, with English-speaking and Spanish-speaking

representatives, to field calls from potential class members. 

They arranged for Gilardi & Co. to post notice of the class

settlement in Spanish-language newspapers and on Spanish radio. 

The individual notice packets were not the only means of notice

employed by Plaintiffs. They also posted notice in newspapers,

arranged for announcements on the radio.

The notice and claims procedures did not systematically

leave out any class members. Finally, the other factors to be

considered when evaluating the fairness of notice procedures have

been met. The Notice of Settlement contained in the notice

packet informed the claimants that they had a right to object and

that they had a right to a privately-retained attorney. (Doc.

31, Salazar Decl., Ex. B, 3).

The notice and claims procedures were fair.

C. Whether the Terms of the Settlement Are Fair, Adequate,

and Reasonable.

First, Plaintiffs argue that the $1,017,500.00 figure is

fair because it is a compromise between the figures Plaintiffs

and class members would likely be awarded depending on which

legal theory regarding damages calculation prevailed. If the

“work days” calculation, which is that used in the Ninth Circuit,

is used, Plaintiffs and class members would be awarded a total of

about $467,000. Plaintiffs do not explain the formula they used

to arrive at this figure, although neither Dole nor the class

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members object to the calculation. The figure in the Settlement

Agreement is almost twice what Plaintiffs and class members would

likely receive if the case went to trial and if the trial court

used the “work days” calculation. 

Plaintiffs also argue that prompt settlement avoids the

delays inherent in litigation and appeal. Plaintiffs argue that

“by settling without proceeding to trial, or engaging in pretrial motions, money that might otherwise have been expended to

defend the litigation is being paid to the class.” (Id. at 16).

In addition, Plaintiffs argue that the amount of attorneys’

fees that are available to Plaintiffs’ counsel under the

Settlement Agreement is less than 15% of the total settlement

amount. This amount is separate from the $1,017,500 which is to

be divided among the class members. 

Plaintiffs also describe their extensive experience with

employment discrimination cases, and in particular in

representing minimum-wage farm workers. (Docs. 38 & 39). 

Plaintiffs’ arguments are persuasive insofar as they address

three of the factors in the reasonableness test: (1) the risk,

expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation;

(2) the amount offered in settlement; and (3) the experience and

views of counsel. These factors generally weigh in favor of

fairness and adequacy. 

First, inherent in all litigation is a certain level of risk

and uncertainty. There is a possibility that Plaintiffs would

recover nothing, although there is little evidence in the record

to allow for an accurate determination of the level of that risk. 

In addition, even if Plaintiffs were to prevail, there is a

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substantial risk that their legal theory for recovery would fail

since the “calendar days” formula is not law in the Ninth Circuit

and this court is bound to follow Ninth Circuit law. If the

“work days” formula were used, plaintiffs would collect

substantially less. Additionally, if the case were to proceed to

trial, the expense of litigation would reduce the class members’

recovery, not to mention considerably delaying such recovery as

well. The first factor, risk and expense of litigation,

therefore weighs in favor of a finding of fairness.

Second, the amount allocated to each class member was

initially based on the calendar days formula, but each amount was

proportionally reduced when it was discovered that the total

amount due exceeded the total amount available. The total amount

due (based on the calendar formula) was $1,133,037, but the total

amount available was $992,500 (i.e., $1,017,500 less the $25,000

reserve). Each reward was proportionately reduced.

The Settlement Agreement provides that unallocated funds

(including the $25,000 reserve meant for late claims and to cure

errors) be distributed to a nonprofit organization. This

arrangement is not fair, considering that “late claims” were not

defined in the Settlement Agreement and no potential “errors”

were identified. Taking into account the overall fairness of the

Settlement Agreement, it is more appropriate for the unclaimed

and undistributed funds, including the $25,000 reserve amount, to

be proportionally distributed to the farm workers. This solution

is particularly fitting considering that the amount each claimant

was due based on the average-daily-wage-times-sixty calculation

was proportionally reduced because the settlement amount was

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approximately $116,000 less than the total based on the

calculation. 

It is ORDERED that this provision of the Settlement

Agreement be stricken and any remaining reserve funds, unclaimed

funds, or otherwise undistributed funds shall be proportionally

divided among the class members.

Third, the attorneys’ fees amount is also fair. The total

amount to be awarded to plaintiffs’ attorneys is capped, and does

not reduce the award to plaintiffs and class members at all. The

$380 hourly rate that Plaintiffs’ counsel Mr. Strauss charges is

higher than average hourly rates considered reasonable for senior

partners practicing law in the Eastern District of California. 

However, considering Mr. Strauss’ experience with employment

cases and similar class action litigation, the $380 hourly rate

is reasonable. The same reasoning applies to the hourly rates

for the junior partners, associates, and paralegals at Mr.

Strauss’ law firm. The $325 hourly rate Ms. Rice charged for her

work is also reasonable, considering her 20 years of experience

with similar cases. The average hourly rate in the Eastern

District of California for senior partners (with whose experience

Ms. Rice may be equated and where the CLRA Foundation is located)

is approximately $220 to $260. However, the rates for Ms. Rice

are not grossly unreasonable and the Defendants do not object to

such rates. Plaintiffs have also documented in detail the hours

worked by Miner, Barnhill & Galland and the CLRA Foundation, as

well as other costs and expenses incurred (including Westlaw,

travel, photocopying). Most importantly, Plaintiffs’ counsel are

not requesting that they be awarded the total amount of fees and

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14 The only remaining factor, presence of a government

participant, is not at issue because there is no government

participant.

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expenses spent on this case, which is about $270,000. Instead,

they have presented detailed records and arguments to show that

an award of the maximum amount allowed for by the Settlement

Agreement (i.e., $169,292) is reasonable. Defendants do not

object to this amount. The higher hourly rates are offset by the

fact that there will not be a full recovery of fees for all time

worked.

Plaintiff offers no argument as to the remaining factors:

(1) risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial;

(2) reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement; and

(3) the stage of the proceedings.14

First, the risk exists that Dole would object to class

certification if this case proceeded to trial because Dole only

agreed to class certification for purposes of settlement and

reserved its right to object to class certification.

Second, the Plaintiffs’ submissions do not state the

reactions of the class members to the proposed settlement,

although it is reasonably inferrable that the reactions of those

ultimately included in the class are positive since each will be

receiving several thousand dollars as a result of the settlement. 

The most significant missing voice, however, is that of those

class members who may have been left out of the class due to

Plaintiffs’ inadvertence or lack of systematic criteria.

Third, this is a settlement-only certification, so the

standard against which fairness is judged is higher. Molski, 318

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F.3d at 953. The factors designed to protect absentees are

significant. Id. As discussed at length above, the record shows

that Plaintiffs made significant efforts and spent many hours to

ensure that as few class members as possible were not included in

the settlement. The membership of the classes is a finite

universe of individuals not exceeding 400, and 361 are included

in the current proposal. 

The remaining three factors therefore also weigh in favor of

a finding of fairness. Based on a review of the notice

procedures and the substance of the Settlement Agreement, the

terms of the settlement, particularly the amount, which is on the

high end of the defendants’ exposure, are fair, adequate, and

reasonable. 

V. CONCLUSION

For all the reasons set forth above, the Class Settlement

Agreement is APPROVED in the terms proposed with one

exception;

Any unclaimed or otherwise undistributed funds, including

but not limited to the $25,000 reserve fund, shall be

proportionally divided to all class members.

SO ORDERED. 

DATED: April 18, 2005. 

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/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER 

______________________________

 Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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