Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02229/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02229-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 47:0605 Communications Act of 1934

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

J & J Sports Productions, Inc., 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Jose Rubio Vargas, individually and d/b/a

Tacos El Grullo, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 11-2229-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff J & J Sports Productions, Inc.’s Motion to Strike

Defendant’s Affirmative Defenses (Doc. 14). The Court now rules on the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court briefly recounts the facts as stated in Plaintiff’s Complaint. Plaintiff was

granted the exclusive nationwide commercial distribution rights to “‘Firepower’: Manny

Pacquiao v. Miguel Cotto, WBO Welterweight Championship Fight Program,” telecast

nationwide on Saturday, November 14, 2009 (hereinafter the “Program”). Doc. 1 at ¶ 9.

These rights included all under-card bouts and fight commentary, in addition to the main

event, encompassed in the television broadcast of the Program. Id. Pursuant to contract,

Plaintiff entered into sublicensing agreements with various commercial establishments to

permit the public exhibition of the Program. Id. at ¶ 10. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Jose

Case 2:11-cv-02229-JAT Document 18 Filed 07/17/12 Page 1 of 5
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Rubio Vargas, individually and doing business as “Tacos El Grullo,” unlawfully intercepted

and exhibited the Program at his establishment in Mesa, Arizona. Id. at ¶ 12. Plaintiff then

filed the Complaint in this Court on November 10, 2011, alleging violations of the Federal

Communications Act of 1934 (“FCA”), 47 U.S.C. § 605 et seq., and the Cable & Television

Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (“Cable Act of 1992”), 47 U.S.C. § 553

et seq., as well as conversion under Arizona law. Id. at ¶¶ 14, 19 & 23. 

Defendant, appearing pro se, filed an Answer on January 24, 2012 (Doc. 12), in which

he stated the following under the heading “Affirmative Defenses:”

Defendant hereby places Plaintiffs [sic] on notice that they [sic] may raise the

following affirmative defenses which, through subsequent discovery, may be

supported by the facts: failure to satisfy conditions precedent; failure to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted; laches; waiver; estoppel; statute of

limitations; set-off; breach of contract; failure to mitigate damages; unclean

hands; scenes a faire doctrine; fair use; First Amendment of the U.S.

Constitution; any other matter constituting an avoidance and all other

affirmative defenses required to be listed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8(c)(1).

Doc. 12 at 3. Plaintiff now moves to strike all of Defendant’s alleged affirmative defenses.

Defendant did not file a response to the motion. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

 Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a “court may strike from

a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous

matter.” Motions under Rule 12(f) “are generally not granted unless it is clear that the matter

sought to be stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation.”

Rosales v. Citibank, Federal Savings Bank, 133 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1180 (N.D. Cal. 2001).

Thus, these motions are “looked on with disfavor because of the tendency for such motions

to be asserted for dilatory purposes.” State of Cal. ex rel. State Lands Comm’n v. United

States, 512 F. Supp. 36, 38 (N.D. Cal. 1981). “Accordingly, a Rule 12(f) movant not only

must demonstrate the allegedly offending material is redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or

scandalous, or constitutes an insufficient defense, but must also show how such material will

cause prejudice.” XY Skin Care & Cosmetics, LLC v. Hugo Boss USA, No. CV-08-1467-

PHX-ROS, 2009 WL 2382998, at *2 (D. Ariz. Aug. 4, 2009). 

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Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s affirmative defenses are insufficient because they

fail to meet the pleading standard set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544

(2007). However, the Court is hesitant to apply the Twombly standard to test the sufficiency

of Defendant’s pleading of his affirmative defenses. In refusing to apply the Twombly

standard to a party’s pleading of its affirmative defenses, another court in this district stated

the following:

The pleading of affirmative defenses is governed by Rule 8(c). That rule

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Furthermore, “[t]he decision to strike a pleading is within the discretion of the trial

court.” Id. When considering a motion to strike, however, a court must view the challenged

pleadings “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and resolve any doubt as to

the relevance of the challenged allegations in favor of the non-moving party.” Dealertrack,

Inc. v. Huber, 460 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1184 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Neilson v. Union Bank

of Cal., N.A., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1152 (C.D. Cal. 2003)). Finally, though pro se litigants

must still adhere to the rules of procedure, Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995),

courts hold pro se pleading “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.” J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Khachatrian, No. CV-10-1567-GMS-PHX, 2011 WL

720049, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 23, 2011) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)).

III. ANALYSIS

Here, Plaintiff has failed to show that the affirmative defenses in Defendant’s Answer

will cause prejudice. Rather, Plaintiff merely alleges that “Plaintiff has already been

compelled to expend time and resources litigating irrelevant issues [and] that requiring such

further litigation would further prejudice Plaintiff.” Doc. 14 at 10. Plaintiff, however, fails

to identify which “irrelevant issues” it has already litigated or to explain the “time and

resources” it has expended on such litigation. Thus, in light of the general disfavor with

which motions to strike are viewed, the Court does not find Plaintiff’s conclusory statements

sufficient to demonstrate that Plaintiff is at all prejudiced by Defendant’s affirmative

defenses.

Moreover, Plaintiff’s arguments that Defendant’s affirmative defenses are insufficient,

immaterial, impertinent, or fail to give fair notice suffer from similar deficiencies.1

 That is,

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requires only that a party “affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative

defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1) (emphasis added). It does not contain the

language from Rule 8(a) requiring a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis

added). Nor does it include the “short and plain terms” language found in Rule

8(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1)(A).

Ameristar Fence Prods., Inc. v. Phoenix Fence Co., No. CV-10-299-PHX-DGC, 2010 WL

203907, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 15, 2010). Thus, like the Ameristar Fence court, this Court “will

leave any extension of Twombly to the Supreme Court or this Circuit.” Id.

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the conclusory nature of Plaintiff’s arguments fail to demonstrate that Defendant’s

affirmative defenses could have “no possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation.”

See Rosales, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 1180. Though the Court acknowledges that some of

Defendant’s affirmative defenses may not be typical defenses to Plaintiff’s claims, the Court

does not find that striking any of these affirmative defenses is appropriate at this time.

Rather, any further inquiries the Plaintiff wishes to make into the specific nature of any of

these affirmative defenses can be handled through routine discovery practices with minimal

effort or expense. The Court therefore will deny Plaintiff’s motion to strike Defendant’s

affirmative defenses. 

Finally, Defendant includes the following language under the “Affirmative Defenses”

section of his Answer: “any other matter constituting an avoidance and all other affirmative

defenses required to be listed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c)(1).” Doc. 12

at 3. Plaintiff argues that Defendant has improperly attempted to reserve a right to

supplement his Answer. Indeed, such a reservation to add future defenses is improper.

However, the Court does not find it necessary to strike this language from the Answer.

Rather, the Court will remind the parties that any supplements or amendments to pleadings

must comply with Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendant’s Affirmative

Defenses (Doc. 14).

DATED this 17th day of July, 2012.

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