Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02197/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02197-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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1

 Hamblen also asserts an identical state-law claim under the Arizonans with

Disabilities Act (“AzDA”), A.R.S. §§ 41-1492 et seq. Although the Court only discusses the

ADA claim in the body of this order, the Court’s discussion is equally applicable to the

AzDA claim. Compliance with Title III and its implementing regulations equals compliance

with the AzDA. See A.R.S. § 41-1492.06(B).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gary Hamblen, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Gharibco Enterprises, LLC, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 07-2197-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Plaintiff Gary Hamblen claims that Defendant Gharibco Enterprises, LLC

(“Gharibco”) discriminated against him on the basis of disability in violation of Title III of

the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq.1

 Gharibco has

filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the Court will grant Gharibco’s motion.

I. Background

The relevant allegations in the complaint are as follows: Hamblen is a disabled

individual who requires a wheelchair for mobility. Gharibco operates, owns, or leases a

shopping center (i.e., a place of public accommodation). At this shopping center, Hamblen

Case 2:07-cv-02197-JAT Document 15 Filed 06/04/08 Page 1 of 4
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2

 The complaint contains a number of specific examples of the “most obvious

barriers” that Hamblen allegedly encountered. [Doc. # 1 ¶ 19.]

3

 Hamblen bases his entire response to Gharibco’s motion to dismiss on the wrong

legal standard. Hamblen argues that “[a] court may not dismiss a claim under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(6) ‘unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claims which would entitle him to relief.’” [Pl.’s Response (Doc. # 12) at 2

(quoting Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994).] As the Twombly Court stated,

this “phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading

standard.” 127 S. Ct. at 1969. Rather than stating “the minimum standard of adequate

pleading to govern a complaint’s survival,” this phrase “describe[s] the breadth of

opportunity to prove what an adequate complaint claims.” Id.

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encountered a number of architectural barriers that do not comply with the ADA

Accessibility Guidelines (“ADAAG”).2

Gharibco contends that these allegations, taken as true, are factually insufficient to

meet the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).

II. Legal Standard

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure embrace a notice-pleading standard. All that

is required to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), in order to “‘give the

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). In pleading the grounds of the claim, the plaintiff need not provide

“detailed factual allegations,” id.; however, the plaintiff must plead enough facts “to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 1965. Factual allegations that are

consistent with lawful conduct are insufficient to state a claim. Id. at 1966. Such allegations

are neutral and do not suggest “plausible liability” on the claim. See id. at 1966 n.5

(recognizing a line “between the factually neutral and the factually suggestive,” which “must

be crossed to enter the realm of plausible liability”).3

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4

 A facility is “readily accessible” only if it complies with the ADAAG. 28 C.F.R.

§ 36.406(a) (2007). Thus, if Gharibco’s property is subject to the “readily accessible”

standard, then Hamblen has shown plausible liability on his Title III claim by alleging that

the property contains non-ADAAG-compliant architectural barriers.

5

 In his response to Gharibco’s motion, Hamblen states that the Complaint alleges

“that alterations have occurred at the property.” [Doc. # 12 at 7 n.1.] But this allegation is

simply untrue. Paragraph 24 of the complaint merely states: “If this property was constructed

or altered since 1992, Defendant is required to adhere strictly to the [ADA Accessibility

Guidelines].” [Doc. # 1 ¶ 24 (emphasis added).] This is an accurate statement of the law,

not a factual allegation that Gharibco’s property has been altered.

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III. Discussion

The presence of non-ADAAG-compliant architectural barriers in a place of public

accommodation violates Title III only if (1) removal of the barriers is “readily achievable,”

42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) (2005), or (2) the public accommodation is required to make

its facility “readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.”4

 Id. § 12183(a).

A plaintiff makes the latter showing by proving that the public accommodation’s facility was

“designed and constructed for first occupancy after January 26, 1993,” 28 C.F.R. § 36.401,

or has undergone alterations since January 26, 1992. Id. § 36.402.

Although Hamblen alleges that he encountered non-ADAAG-compliant architectural

barriers in Gharibco’s shopping center, he does not allege that removal of the barriers is

readily achievable, that the shopping center was built after January 26, 1993, or that the

shopping center has been altered since January 26, 1992.5

 As a result, Hamblen’s right to

relief under Title III is a matter of speculation. On the face of the complaint, the alleged

architectural barriers on Gharibco’s property are just as likely to comply with the law as they

are to violate it—that is, the allegations in the complaint are factually neutral. Hamblen

therefore has failed to plead enough facts to nudge his Title III claim “across the line from

conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974.

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Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 11) is GRANTED.

DATED this 4th day of June, 2008.

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