Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_11-cv-05496/USCOURTS-cand-5_11-cv-05496-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

THINK COMPUTER CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROBERT VENCHIARUTTI, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 5:11-cv-05496-HRL 

ORDER DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO 

SHOW CAUSE WHY THIS CASE 

SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED AND 

JUDGMENT ENTERED FOR 

DEFENDANTS

Defendants have filed what the court will deem to be an administrative motion to dismiss 

this suit and enter judgment in their favor. In support, they point out that all of plaintiff’s claims 

were dismissed with leave to amend, but plaintiff did not file an amended complaint or seek an 

extension of time. The deadline for a filing has passed.

Accordingly, no later than June 24, 2015, plaintiff shall file a response to this order, 

showing cause why this case should not be dismissed and judgment entered for defendants.1

 

1 Aaron Greenspan, the plaintiff’s president and Chief Executive Officer, sent a letter to the 

court advising that the corporation’s lawyer, Michael Aschenbrener, had unilaterally stopped 

representing plaintiff and closed his practice. Mr. Greenspan urged the court to allow him, 

although he is not an attorney, to represent the plaintiff going forward. Specifically, he wanted to 

file a post-judgment motion to recover attorney fees from defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 

The purported basis for a fees award would be that this lawsuit was a catalyst for the State of 

California to make several amendments to the Money Transmission Act, the very statute that 

plaintiff’s suit challenged. Under this theory, plaintiff would be the “prevailing party” not because 

Case 5:11-cv-05496-HRL Document 68 Filed 06/10/15 Page 1 of 3
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 10, 2015

________________________

HOWARD R. LLOYD

United States Magistrate Judge

 

it won the suit, but because the lawsuit reportedly brought about the desired result.

Neither the status of plaintiff’s legal representation nor the question of recovery of fees is 

formally before the court at this time, but the court’s thinking is as follows:

(1) If Mr. Greenspan’s representations are correct, it is an appalling breach of professional 

responsibilities for plaintiff’s attorney to abandon a client without bothering to seek the 

court’s permission to withdraw. Nevertheless, the court does not have the authority to 

permit a corporation to represent itself pro se. Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, 

506 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1993) (“It has been the law for the better part of two centuries . . 

. that a corporation may appear in the federal courts only through licensed counsel”); In 

Re Highley, 459 F.2d 554, 555 (9th Cir. 1972) (“A corporation can appear in a court 

proceeding only through an attorney at law”).

(2) As the court understands the current state of the law, a motion for fees based on the 

catalyst theory would likely be unsuccessful. The United States Supreme Court in 

Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human 

Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 121 S. Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001) ruled that, for 

purposes of an attorney fee award, a plaintiff is not a prevailing party where it achieves 

a desired result because the lawsuit brings about a voluntary change in the defendant’s 

conduct. See also Bennett v. Yoshina, 259 F.3d 1097, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 2001) (“There 

can be no doubt that the Court’s analysis in Buckhannon applies to statutes other than 

the two at issue in that case. Specifically, the provision at issue in this case, the Civil 

Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, was cited by the Court 

as a ‘nearly identical [fee-shifting] provision[ ]’ to the two at issue in Buckhannon, 532 

U.S. at –––– n. 4, 121 S.Ct. at 1839 n. 4, and the Court noted that it has interpreted 

Congress’s various fee-shifting provisions consistently.”).

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

5:11-cv-05496-HRL Notice has been electronically mailed to:

Michael Brooks Carroll carroll_law@sbcglobal.net

Michael James Aschenbrener mja@aschenbrenerlaw.com, legal@thinkcomputer.com

Peter Keller Southworth Peter.southworth@doj.ca.gov

Ryan Marcroft Ryan.Marcroft@doj.ca.gov, janice.titgen@doj.ca.gov, 

marc.leforestier@doj.ca.gov

5:11-cv-05496-HRL Courtesy copy of this document sent by U.S. Mail to:

Aaron Greenspan

Think Computer Corporation

1132 Boranda Avenue

Mountain View, CA 94040

Case 5:11-cv-05496-HRL Document 68 Filed 06/10/15 Page 3 of 3