Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02105/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02105-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

SCOTTIA L. HICKS PLAINTIFF

VS. CIVIL NO. 05-2105

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Scottia Hicks (“plaintiff”), brings this action pursuant to § 405(g) of the Social Security Act

(“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of

the Social Security Administration denying her claim for Disabled Adult Children’s benefits

(“DAC”), under Sections 216(i) and 223 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3). 

Background:

The applications for DIB and SSI now before this court were protectively filed on July 31,

2001, alleging an onset date of February 15, 2001, due to pain in the knees; problems with her feet

(callouses, bunions, knots); chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”) with difficulty

breathing, chronic pneumonia, bronchitis, asthma and/or emphysema; pain in the back; numbness

in the hands; a learning disability; and, depression. (Tr. 18, 195-197). An administrative hearing

was held on October 2, 2002. (Tr. 304-356). On February 20, 2003, the Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”), issued an unfavorable decision. (Tr. 205-216). The Appeals Council reviewed the case

and remanded it to the ALJ on August 3, 2004. (Tr. 357-397).

A supplemental administrative hearing was then held on August 3, 2004. (Tr. 555-561). At

this time, plaintiff was forty-one years old and possessed a ninth grade education. (Tr. 18). The

record reveals that she had past relevant work (“PRW”), as a housekeeper and a waitress. (Tr. 18).

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On September 13, 2004, the ALJ found that, although severe, plaintiff’s impairments did not

meet or equal the criteria of any of the impairments listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No.

4. (Tr. 28). After discrediting plaintiff’s subjective allegations, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff

maintained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”), to perform light work, limited by her ability

to only occasionally kneel, crouch, and crawl; occasionally be exposed to dust, fumes, pollutants,

and temperature extremes; and, inability to climb ropes, ladders, and scaffolds. Further, he

determined that plaintiff’s mental impairments limited her to simple one and two-step tasks requiring

only incidental contact with the general public. As such, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff could

return to her PRW as a housekeeper in a rehabilitation center. (Tr. 28). 

On October 1, 2004, the Appeals Council declined to review this decision. (Tr. 7-9).

Subsequently, plaintiff filed this action. (Doc. # 1). This case is before the undersigned by consent

of the parties. The plaintiff and Commissioner have filed appeal briefs. (Doc. # 8, 9). Plaintiff has

also filed a motion to supplement the record with additional medical evidence and to have her case

remanded to the Commissioner for consideration of this evidence. (Doc. # 6). This case is now

ready for decision.

Applicable Law:

This Court’s role is to determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by

substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir.

2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but it is enough that a reasonable mind

would find it adequate to support the Commissioner’s decision. The ALJ’s decision must be

affirmed if the record contains substantial evidence to support it. Edwards v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d

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964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the

Commissioner’s decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists

in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because the Court would have

decided the case differently. Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). In other words,

if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and

one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed.

Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).

It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of

proving her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one year

and that prevents her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274

F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); see 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines

“physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that her

disability, not simply her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months.

The Commissioner’s regulations require her to apply a five-step sequential evaluation process

to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful

activity since filing her claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or mental

impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet or equal an

impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past

relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy

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given her age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1520(a)- (f)(2003). Only if the final

stage is reached does the fact finder consider the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in

light of his or her residual functional capacity. See McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1141-42

(8th Cir. 1982); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).

Discussion:

Reviewing courts have the authority to order the Commissioner to consider additional

evidence but “only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is

good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding.” 42

U.S.C. § 405(g); Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210 (8th Cir. 1993); Chandler v. Secretary of Health and

Human Servs., 722 F.2d 369, 371 (8th Cir. 1983). “To be material, new evidence must be noncumulative, relevant, and probative ofthe claimant's condition for the time period for which benefits

were denied, and there must be a reasonable likelihood that it would have changed the

Commissioner’s determination.” Woolf, 3 F.3d at 1215.

The evidence plaintiff now provides was not available to plaintiff on September 13, 2004,

when the ALJ issued his decision, thus it is new evidence. Accordingly, based on the facts, we find

sufficient cause to excuse plaintiff’s failure to submit the records at the administrative level.

Next, we consider the issue of materiality. To be “material,” the evidence must be relevant

to claimant's condition for the time period for which benefits were denied. See Williams v. Sullivan,

905 F.2d 214, 216 (8th Cir.1990). Thus, to qualify as “material,” the additional evidence must not

merely detail after-acquired conditions or post-decision deterioration of a pre-existing condition.

See Jones v. Callahan, 122 F.3d 1148, 1154 (8th Cir.1997) (holding immaterial evidence detailing

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a single incident occurring after decision and noting proper remedy for post-ALJ deterioration is a

new application). 

The additional evidence submitted by plaintiff consists of a psychological evaluation

conducted on August 16, 2005, by Dr. Steve Shry. (Doc. # 6, Ex. A). Dr. Shry administered the

following psychological tests: Weshler Adult Intelligence Scale III, Wide Range Achievement Test

III, MMPI-2, Beck Depression Inventory, and Beck Anxiety Inventory. Test results indicate that

plaintiff has a verbal I. Q. of sixty-one, a performance I. Q. of fifty-six, and a full scale I. Q. of fiftyfive. These scores place her within the moderate mentally retarded range of intellectual functioning.

(Doc. # 6, Ex. A).

The Unites States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that mental retardation

is not normally a condition that improves with age, thus, in the absence of any evidence of a change

in a claimant’s intellectual functioning, a person’s IQ is presumed to remain stable over time. See,

e.g., Muncy v. Apfel, 247 F.3d 728, 734 (8th Cir. 2001); Branham v. Heckler, 775 F.2d 1271, 1274

(4th Cir. 1985) (absent contrary evidence, an IQ test taken after the insured period correctly reflects

claimant’s IQ during the insured period); Guzman v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 273, 275 (7th Cir. 1986)

(claimant had low IQ during onset of disability in 1979 rather than just when first IQ tested in 1982);

Luckey v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 890 F.2d 666, 668-69 (4th Cir. 1989) (ALJ may

assume claimant’s IQ remained relatively constant in absence of evidence showing a change in

claimant’s intelligence functioning). See also Sird v. Chater, 105 F.3d 401, 402 n. 4 (8th Cir. 1997).

We note that the evidence contained in the administrative record reveals that plaintiff completed the

eighth grade, and was enrolled in special education classes. (Tr. 312, 315, 365). She reported

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difficulties with writing, spelling, and arithmetic. Further, plaintiff indicated an inability to keep a

checkbook and make change. (Tr. 94). This being the case, we believe that the supplemental

evidence plaintiff seeks to have admitted constitutes material evidence. Accordingly, we find that

remand is appropriate, as this evidence appears to indicate that plaintiff’s mental condition imposes

limitations that were more severe, during the time period in question, than the evidence before the

ALJ indicated. See Geigle v. Sullivan, 961 F.2d 1395, 1396-1397 (8th Cir. 1992). At the very least,

this new and material evidence, when considered by the undersigned, causes the court to believe

there is a reasonable likelihood it would have changed the Commissioner’s decision. Woolf, 3 F.3d

at 1215. Therefore, on remand, the ALJ is directed to properly consider this evidence. 

On remand, the ALJ is reminded that mental retardation is a “significant nonexertional

impairment that must be considered by a vocational expert.” Lucy v. Chater, 113 F.3d 905, 908 (8th

Cir.1997); Foreman v. Callahan, 122 F.3d 24, 26 (8th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, should the ALJ find

this evidence to be credible, expert testimony will be required. 

Conclusion:

Accordingly, we conclude that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence,

and therefore, the denial of benefits to the plaintiff, should be reversed and this matter should be

remanded to the Commissioner for further consideration pursuant to sentence six of 42 U.S.C. §

405(g). 

ENTERED this10th day of August 2006.

/s/ Bobby E. Shepherd

HONORABLE BOBBY E. SHEPHERD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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