Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01748/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01748-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:501 Copyright Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PRIORITY RECORDS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ANTHONY MARINARO,

Defendant.

___________________________________/

No. C-05-1748 JSW (EMC)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RE PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR

DEFAULT JUDGMENT

(Docket No. 15)

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 10, 2005, Plaintiffs Priority Records LLC, Sony BMG Music Entertainment,

Virgin Records America, Inc., Elektra Entertainment Group, Inc., Capitol Records, Inc., Warner

Bros. Records, Inc., and UMB Recordings, Inc. (“Plaintiffs”) moved for default judgment against

Defendant, Anthony Marinaro. The Clerk of the Court entered default on July 8, 2005. Plaintiffs’

Complaint pleads injunctive relief for copyright infringement and alleges statutory damages and

costs totaling $6,403.00.

Having considered Plaintiffs’ brief and supporting documents, the Court hereby issues the

following report and recommends that Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment be granted.

II. DISCUSSION

On April 26, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendant for copyright infringement,

citing generally to provisions under the Copyright Act. See Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 1 (April 26, 2005). In its

Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that they are all copyright owners or licensees of exclusive rights under

United States copyright with respect to certain copyrighted sound recordings (“Copyrighted

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Recordings”). Id. at ¶ 13. Among the exclusive rights granted to each Plaintiff under the Copyright

Act are those associated with the reproduction and distribution of Copyrighted Recordings to the

public. Id. at ¶ 15. Plaintiffs claim that Defendant violated these rights by willfully using and

continuing to use an online media distribution system to download, distribute, and/or make available

for distribution Copyrighted Recordings. See id. at ¶¶ 15, 16. Specifically, they allege that

Defendant infringed their rights over eight copyrighted sound recordings identified in Exhibit A as

well as some listed in Exhibit B, which are owned or exclusively licensed to one or more of

Plaintiffs or their affiliate’s record labels. Id. at ¶ 13, Ex. A, and Ex. B. In the prayer for relief,

Plaintiffs seek a total of $6,000.00 in minimum statutory damages under Section 504 of the

Copyright Act; an injunction pursuant to Section 502 of the Copyright Act; and costs in the amount

of $403.00 under Section 505 of the Copyright Act. See Pl.’s Applic. for Entry of Default Judgment

at ¶ 4 (October 10, 2005). Plaintiffs ask for an injunction as they believe there is “no adequate

remedy at law” and, unless enjoined, Defendant would continue to cause “great and irreparable

injury” that could not be fully compensated. See Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 18.

Plaintiffs’ Proof of Service states that, on April 27, 2005, Defendant was served with a

Summons and Complaint by personal delivery at his residence located at 1040 7th Street, Apt. B,

Novato, California. See Summons (Docket No. 4). Having not received a timely response from

Defendant, Plaintiffs subsequently filed for a request to enter default and notified Defendant via U.S.

Mail on July 6, 2005. See Certificate of Service (Docket No. 9). The Clerk of the Court entered

default two days later. Plaintiffs further notified Defendant of application for entry of default

judgment via U.S. Mail on October 10, 2005. See Certificate of Service (Docket No. 18). 

A. Adequacy of Service of Process

As a preliminary matter, the Court must first “assess the adequacy of the service of process

on the party against whom default is requested.” Board of Trustees of the N. Cal. Sheet Metal

Workers v. Peters, No. C-00-0395 VRW, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19065, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 2,

2001). Rule 4(e) authorizes service upon an individual within a judicial district: “Unless otherwise

provided by federal law, service upon an individual from whom a waiver has not been obtained and

filed, other than an infant or an incompetent person, may be effected in any judicial district of the

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United States: (1) pursuant to the law of the state in which the district court is located...” Fed. R.

Civ. Proc. 4(e)(1). As such, where a waiver has not been obtained and Defendant is neither an infant

nor incompetent person, the California Code of Civil Procedure governs the proper method of

delivery. Section 415.10 of the California Code of Civil Procedure declares that a “summons may

be served by personal delivery of a copy of the Summons and of the Complaint to the person to be

served. Service of summons in this manner is deemed complete at the time of such delivery.” Cal.

Code Civ. Proc. § 415.10. 

On April 27, 2005, Defendant was served with the Summons and Complaint by personal

delivery at his residence which is in Novato, California. See Summons (Docket No. 4). Plaintiffs

have not alleged in their Complaint that they obtained a waiver from Defendant. In addition,

Plaintiffs’ counsel has declared that Defendant is not an infant, incompetent person, nor in military

service. See Sheila M. Salomon Decl. in Support of Application for Default Judgment ¶¶ 4, 5

(October, 10, 2005). Hence, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 and California Code of Civil

Procedure Section 415.10, service of process via personal delivery to Defendant was properly

effected.

B. Entry for Default Judgment/ Personal and Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Defendant has not filed an Answer nor otherwise appeared in the action. Salomon Decl. in

Support of Applic. for Entry of Default Judgment, at ¶ 4. Given Defendant’s absence and the

allegation by Plaintiffs that Defendant is not an infant, incompetent person, nor in the military

service, the entry of default judgment by the Court was proper. Furthermore, since all allegations

are taken as true on motions for default judgment, Plaintiffs’ claims regarding Defendant’s residence

in the District and his acts of infringement that violate the Copyright Act provide the Court with

personal jurisdiction as well as subject matter jurisdiction. See Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 3.

C. Default Judgment and the Eitel Factors

After entry of default judgment, a court may grant a default judgment on the merits of the

case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. “The district court’s decision whether to enter a default judgment is a

discretionary one.” Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). Factors which inform

the exercise of discretion as to the entry of a default judgment include: (1) the possibility of

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prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of the

complaint; (4) the sum of the money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning

material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong public policy

underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. Eitel v. McCool,

782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). Since, as noted above, default has already been entered in

this case, the Court must take as true all factual allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint except for those

related to the amount of damages. See Televideo Sys., Inc. v. Hidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th

Cir. 1987).

1. The Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiffs

The first Eitel factor “considers whether the plaintiff will suffer prejudice if default judgment

is not entered.” Pepsico, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002). This

Court has found such prejudice when the denial of the default judgment would have left the Plaintiff

“without other recourse for recovery.” See Webb v. Indigenous Global Dev. Corp., 2005 WL

1200203, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2005). In the case at bar, Plaintiffs would suffer prejudice if a

default is not entered since, without an injunction, Plaintiffs would not be able to enjoin Defendant

from continuing to reproduce and distribute copyrighted sound recordings. Nor would Plaintiffs be

able to obtain monetary relief to which they are entitled under the Copyright Act. Effectively,

Plaintiffs would not have any other recourse for recovery.

2.&3. The Merits of Plaintiffs’ Substantive Claim and Sufficiency of the Complaint

The second and third Eitel factors “require that a plaintiff state a claim on which the

[plaintiff] may recover.” Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc. v. Castworld Products, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494,

500 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (internal citations omitted).

Plaintiffs allege direct copyright infringement and generally cite to provisions under the

Copyright Act. Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 1. Section 501(b) of the Copyright Act deems that “the legal or

beneficial owner of an exclusive right under copyright is entitled, subject to requirements of section

411, to institute an action for infringement of that particular right committed while he was an owner

of it.” 17 U.S.C. § 501(b). The 9th Circuit has further required that, in order to establish a prima

facie case of direct infringement, Plaintiffs must satisfy two requirements: (1) they must show

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 The owner of the copyright has the exclusive rights: “(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work

in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to

distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of

ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and

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ownership of the allegedly infringed material and (2) they must demonstrate that the alleged

infringers violate at least one exclusive right granted to copyright holders under 17 U.S.C. § 106. 

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001).

a. Ownership

“With respect to ownership, the copyright registration certificate constitutes prima facie

evidence in favor of the plaintiff, creating a presumption of ownership.” Elektra Entertainment

Group, Inc. v. Bryant, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26700, at *9 (finding ownership when Plaintiffs

provided a list of their copyrighted sound recordings which were each the subject of a valid

certificate of copyright registration (C.D. Cal. 2004, February 13, 2004)). Similarly, in the present

case, Plaintiffs have not provided the Court with the actual registration certificate. However, in

Exhibit A, they have provided a list of eight copyrighted sound recordings which are all subject to

valid certificates of copyright registration. Salomon Decl., Ex. A. Furthermore, in the Complaint,

Plaintiffs have asserted that each of the copyrighted sounds recordings listed in Exhibit A are subject

to a valid Certificate of Copyright Registration. Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 13. As such, the Court presumes

Plaintiffs’ owned the allegedly infringed materials.

However, it is unclear how many of the hundreds of sound recordings listed in Exhibit B are

owned by Plaintiffs. In the Complaint, they allege that they own only “certain of the sound

recordings listed on Exhibit B.” Id. Since Plaintiffs did not specifically identify which sound

recordings they own, this ambiguity weighs against Plaintiffs’ substantive claim regarding the extent

of Defendant’s alleged copyright infringement. However, it does not affect the fact that Plaintiffs

have clearly identified ownership over at least eight sound recordings that were copyrighted and that

Defendant allegedly infringed.

b. Violations of 17 U.S.C. § 106

Section 106 of the Copyright Act lays out six exclusive rights that belong to copyright

owners.1

 In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant willfully used and continues to use an

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choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the

copyrighted work publicly; (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,

pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion

picture of other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and (6) in the case of sound

recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.” 17

U.S.C. § 106.

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online media distribution system to download, distribute, and/or make available for distribution

Copyrighted Recordings. These alleged acts are in direct violation of the rights of reproduction

under Subsection 106(1) and distribution under Subsection 106(3). Given these allegations and the

aforementioned ownership of at least eight copyrighted sound recordings, Plaintiffs have adequately

stated a claim for copyright infringement.

4. Sum of Money at Stake

Pursuant to the fourth Eitel factor, “the court must consider the amount of money at stake in

relation to the seriousness of Defendant’s conduct.” Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc., 219 F.R.D. at 500

(internal citations omitted) (noting that defendant’s willful infringement of plaintiff’s trademarks

justified the imposition of a substantial $2 million award). If the sum at stake is completely

disproportionate or inappropriate considering Defendant’s actions, default judgment is disfavored. 

See Board of Trustees of the Cal. Metal Trades v. Pitchometer Propeller, 984 F.Supp. 978, 978

(N.D. Cal. 1997) (in granting default judgment, noting that “[t]he amount of money at stake is

reasonable, properly documented and contractually justified”). As discussed further under “Part E:

Damages,” infra, Plaintiffs seek a total of $6,403.00 in total damages: $750 in minimum statutory

damages for each infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) and $403.00 in costs pursuant to 17

U.S.C. § 505. The overall damage request is tailored specifically to the copyright infringement by

Defendant. Plaintiffs are seeking the minimum statutory damages. In addition, Plaintiffs have

suffered great harm due to Defendant’s alleged piracy. As such, the Court finds the amount of

money at stake is reasonable.

5. Possibility of a Dispute Concerning Material Facts

If the plaintiff has filed a well-pleaded complaint, alleging facts sufficient to support his

claim, and the clerk has entered default, the court presumes there is no dispute over facts. Elektra

Entertainment, Inc. v. Bryant, 2004 LEXIS 26700, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2004) (citing Televideo

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Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987)). In the instant case, Plaintiffs have

adequately stated a claim for copyright infringement, alleging facts sufficient to support the claim,

and the Clerk has entered default. In all likelihood, the act of downloading copyright songs can be

documented by objective evidence. Since Defendant has not made any attempt to challenge

Plaintiffs, then the analysis of this factor supports a default judgment.

6. Whether the Default was Due to Excusable Neglect

Usually, a court will ask whether the failure to answer is due to excusable neglect. See Eitel,

782 F.2d at 1472 (noting the fact that the parties were engaged in settlement negotiations excused

defendant from failing to answer). In Webb v. Indigenous Global Dev. Corp., this Court found it

unlikely that a Defendant’s failure to answer and consequently default was a result of excusable

neglect when Defendant had been properly served with a summons and complaint, with a request to

enter default judgment, and an application for default judgment. Webb, 2005 WL 1200203, at *4. 

Similarly, in the instant case, Defendant was properly served the Summons and Complaint on April

27, 2005, was provided notice of entry of default on July 6, 2005, and the application for default

judgment on October 10, 2005. See Summons (Docket No. 4), Certificate of Service (Docket No.

9), Certificate of Service (Docket No. 18). Given these circumstances, it is unlikely that

Defendant’s failure to answer and consequently default was a result of excusable neglect.

7. The Strong Public Policy Underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Favoring

Decisions on the Merits

Generally, default judgments are disfavored because “cases should be decided upon their

merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. However, because a discretionary

standard is applied, “default judgments are more often granted than denied.” Pepsico v. TriunfoMex, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 431, 432 (C.D. Cal. 1999). In this case, Plaintiffs have provided notice to

Defendant concerning the various stages leading up to this application for entry of default judgment

and they have pled relevant facts supporting their copyright infringement claim. As such, the policy

encouraging decisions of cases on their merits does not weigh against granting default judgment.

Based on all the Eitel factors discussed above, the Court recommends that Plaintiffs’ motion

for default judgment be granted.

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D. Remedies

1. Statutory Damages

Although the factual contentions of the Complaint must be taken as true, those statements

regarding damages are an exception, and a hearing in order to determine damages is authorized by

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b). While the courts are not obligated to hold such hearings, it

may not simply rely on bare assertions of damages; it must ensure the propriety of the damages

sought. Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency v. Ace Shipping Corp., 109 F.3d 109, 111 (2d Cir.

1997). The plaintiff must prove up damages.

The Copyright Act provides that “the copyright owner may elect, at any time before

judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory

damages for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work...in the sum of

not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just.” 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). A

plaintiff can recover statutory damages regardless of adequate evidence of the actual damages

suffered or the profits reaped by Defendant. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. v. Krypton Broad,

of Birmingham, Inc., 259 F.3d 1186, 1194 (9th Cir. 1997).

Under the Copyright Act, if the Court finds that Defendant committed the infringement

willfully, as Plaintiffs allege in this case, it has the discretion to increase the award to a sum of not

more than $150,000. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). The Court has great discretion to determine the amount

of damages to be awarded within statutory limits. Elektra Entertainment Group, 2004 LEXIS

26700, at *19, 20 (citing Nimmer § 14.04[B][3] at 14-55 (Rel. No. 574/02)).

Although Plaintiffs here have alleged willfulness in their Complaint, they seek only the

minimum award of statutory damages of $750 for each infringed work. Pl’s Applic. for Entry of

Default Judgment at ¶ 4. Although not expressly mentioned, Plaintiffs appear to be asking for

damages for infringement of the eight sound recordings listed in Exhibit A of the Complaint. They

do not appear to seek damages for any copyrighted sound recordings in Exhibit B. Plaintiffs request

a total award of $6,000, an amount which is ascertainable from the Application for Entry of Default

Judgment. These damages are reasonable and appropriate given the finding that at least eight

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recordings were illegally downloaded and the need to deter Defendant and others from violating

Plaintiffs’ rights in the future. As such, the Court recommends that Plaintiffs’ award be granted.

2. Permanent Injunctive Relief

The Copyright Act authorizes a court to grant injunctions “on such terms as it may deem

reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.” 17 U.S.C. 502(a). The four elements

for granting a permanent injunction include: (1) irreparable harm; (2) success on the merits; (3) a

balancing of competing claims of injury to the parties; and (4) consideration of the public interest. 

Sony Music Entm’t, Inc. v. Global Arts Prod. 45 F.Supp. 2d 1345, 1347 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (citing

Warren Pub., Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 115 F.3d 1509, 1516 (11th Cir.), cert. den., 522 U.S. 963

118 S. Ct. 397, 139 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1997)). Injunctive relief is a traditional remedy for copyright

infringement and is especially favored where there is a history of continuing infringement and a

substantial threat of continued infringement. Id.

Plaintiffs seek an injunction to enjoin Defendant from reproducing, distributing, or making

available for distribution to the public any present and future Copyrighted Recordings owned by

Plaintiffs and/or their affiliate record labels. Plaintiffs further request that Defendant destroy all

copies of Plaintiffs’ Copyrighted Recordings that he has downloaded or transferred onto any

computer hard drive, server, physical medium, or device without Plaintiffs’ authorization. Pl.’s 

Compl. ¶ 18.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant’s conduct is causing irreparable injury that cannot fully be

compensated or measured in money, and that they will continue to suffer such an injury unless the

Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to infringe Plaintiffs’ copyrights. Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 18. 

Copyright infringement is presumed to give rise to irreparable injury. Elektra Entm’t Group, 2004

LEXIS 26700, at *17 (citing A&M Records v. Napster, 114 F.Supp. 2d 896, 925 (N.D. Cal. 2000)). 

Hence, when seeking a permanent injunction in copyright cases, irreparable harm is presumed on a

showing of success on the merits. Id. at *17-18 (citing Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107,

1109; Sony Music Entm’t, 45 F.Supp. 2d at 1347). In addition, given the default on the merits,

Plaintiffs have established success on the merits. Id. (citing Caribbean Produce Exchange v. Caribe

Hydro-Trailer, Inc., 65 F.R.D. 46, 48 (D.P.R. 1974)).

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 The injunction requested by Plaintiffs does not specify that the distribution, reproduction, or

download be unlawful. To be enjoined, they must be.

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An analysis of the third and fourth elements also weighs in Plaintiffs’ favor of granting an

injunction. Plaintiffs claim that damages could not adequately compensate them for the harm caused

by Defendant’s widespread infringements. Pl’s Applic. for Entry of Default Judgment at 7: 3-5. 

There is no question that any piracy committed by Defendant results in monetary injury to Plaintiffs. 

In fact, the extent of this injury is difficult, if not impossible, to measure especially given the means

of infringement -- an online distribution system with millions of potential users who can further

unlawfully distribute sound recordings. Such an infringement leaves Plaintiffs “vulnerable to

massive, repeated, near-instantaneous, and worldwide infringement.” Elektra Entm’t Group, 2004

LEXIS 26700, at *19, 20. In addition, the public interest factor also favors an injunction. Record

piracy is reportedly a multi-billion dollar-a-year “industry” worldwide which can keep companies

from reaping financial rewards and cause record labels to increase wholesale prices of compact discs

and prevent companies from taking a risk on records in the future. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 45 F.

Supp. 2d at 1348. Conversely, there is no obvious injury to a protectible interest suffered by

Defendant if Defendant is ordered not to unlawfully reproduce, distribute, or make available for

distribution to the public the Plaintiffs’ Copyrighted Recordings and to destroy those which were

illegally downloaded.2

Given the aforementioned reasons and the fact that there is no evidence that Defendant will

not continue to infringe Plaintiffs’ recordings, a permanent injunction is warranted.

3. Costs

The Copyright Act gives the Court the discretion to allow recovery of full costs. 17 U.S.C. §

505. Plaintiffs seek reimbursement of costs in the amount of $403.00 without any documentation to

show why they are entitled to these costs. See Salomon Decl. ¶ 6. In this District, a prevailing party

may recover the Clerk’s filing fee “if paid by the claimant” and fees for service of process “to the

extent reasonable required and actually incurred.” Civ. L.R. 54-3(a)(1). Hence, it is reasonable for

the Court to infer that $250.00 was spent for these purposes and this amount should be awarded. 

(Docket No. 1 (indicating receipt of filing fee upon filing complaint)). If Plaintiffs would like to

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recover the remaining $153.00, then they must provide documentation detailing how the costs were

incurred.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court recommends that Plaintiffs’ motion for default

judgment and request for permanent injunction against Defendant be granted. Plaintiffs should be

awarded $6,000 in statutory damages for copyright infringement and $250.00 in costs. Defendant

should be permanently enjoined from unlawfully reproducing, distributing, or making available for

distribution any present and future Copyrighted Recordings owned by Plaintiffs and/or their affiliate

record labels. Defendant should be further ordered to destroy all copies of Plaintiffs’ Copyrighted

Recordings that he has unlawfully downloaded and transferred onto any computer hard drive, server,

physical medium, or device.

Dated: March 21, 2006

_________________________ EDWARD M. CHEN

United States Magistrate Judge

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