Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00808/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00808-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

)

RAFAEL LOPEZ, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

DERRAL ADAMS, et. al., )

) 

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

1:07-cv-00808 LJO DLB (PC) 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF

ACTION AS AGAINST DEFENDANTS

ADAMS AND TUCKER FOR FAILURE

TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH

RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED 

I. Findings and Recommendations Following Screening of Complaint

A. Screening Standard

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil rights

complaint filed June 1, 2007. 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

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U.S. District Court

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claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 

“Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a complaint only

if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with

the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether

the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of

the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.’” Jackson v. Carey,

353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also

Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need suffice only to put the

opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir.

2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” 

Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights

complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v.

Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents,

673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

B. Summary of Plaintiff’s Complaint

The events at issue allegedly occurred at the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation - Corcoran State Prison (“Corcoran”), where plaintiff was housed at the time. 

Plaintiff names Warden Derral G. Adams, Lieutenant J.T. Tucker, Davis, Masiel and Flowerdew as

defendants. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that in September 2005, defendant Davis ordered plaintiff

to move to another cell with a cellmate. Plaintiff alleges that when he refused, defendant Flowerdew

handcuffed plaintiff and removed him from his cell, while defendants Davis and Masiel removed all

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plaintiff’s property from his cell. Plaintiff alleges that he was then forced to sleep naked, for thirteen

days, without a mattress or linen. Plaintiff alleges that the temperature in his cell would fall into the

thirties. Plaintiff also alleges that he was not permitted to write and receive mail from his family

and friends. Plaintiff alleges that defendants “tortured” him in violation of the Eighth Amendment

for refusing to have a cellmate. Plaintiff alleges that as a result of defendants’ actions, plaintiff

suffers from various ailments, including a “mental problem”, and problems with his hip, knee, lower

back, and head. 

C. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Claim

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to

be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of

any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . .

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or

other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal

Constitution and laws.” Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997)

(internal quotations omitted). “To the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the

deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal Constitution,

Section 1983 offers no redress.” Id. 

Section 1983 plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of

the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v. 

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A

person deprives another of a constitutional right, where that person ‘does an affirmative act,

participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which [that person] is legally

required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.’” Hydrick v. Hunter, No. 03-

56712, 2007 WL 2445998, *5 (9th Cir. Aug. 30, 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740,

743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “[T]he ‘requisite causal connection can be established not only by some kind

of direct, personal participation in the deprivation, but also be setting in motion a series of acts by

others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the

constitutional injury.’” Id. (quoting Johnson at 743-44). 

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To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain . . . .” Rhodes v. Chapman,

452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials

must provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Id.;

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246

(9th Cir. 1982). Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from unsafe conditions of confinement,

prison officials may be held liable only if they acted with “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk

of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the

alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official

must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 837. Thus, a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane

conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Id. at 837-45. Prison officials

may avoid liability by presenting evidence that they lacked knowledge of the risk, or by presenting

evidence of a reasonable, albeit unsuccessful, response to the risk. Id. at 844-45. Mere negligence

on the part of the prison official is not sufficient to establish liability, but rather, the official’s

conduct must have been wanton. Id. at 835; Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128. 

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Clause depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8

(1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . . . contextual and responsive

to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. at 8 (quotations and citations omitted). “[E]xtreme

deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment] conditions-of-confinement claim.” 

Id. at 9 (citation omitted). With respect to this type of claim, “[b]ecause routine discomfort is part of

the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society, only those deprivations

denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of

an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 

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Plaintiff’s complaint appears to state cognizable claims for relief under the Eighth

Amendment against defendants Masiel, Flowerdew, and Davis. However, because plaintiff has

failed to link defendants Adams and Tucker with some affirmative act or omission, plaintiff’s

complaint is insufficient to state a claim under section 1983, as against them. 

Further, under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. When the named defendant holds a

supervisorial position, the causal link between the defendant and the claimed constitutional violation

must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v.

Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for

relief under section 1983 for supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege some facts indicating that the

defendant either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of

the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so

deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of

the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations

omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts indicating that defendants Adams or Tucker personally

participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to

act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a

repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” 

Hansen v. Black at 646. Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state facts sufficient to support a claim under

section 1983 for violation of plaintiff’s rights under the Eighth Amendment or for violation of any

other constitutional right, as against defendants Adams and Tucker. 

D. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s complaint states cognizable claims against defendants Davis, Masiel, and

Flowerdew. However, plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any cognizable claims as against

defendants Adams and Tucker under section 1983 for violation of plaintiff’s rights under the Eighth

Amendment, or for violation of any other constitutional right. 

///

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Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed as against

defendants Adams and Tucker for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, without

leave to amend.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, plaintiff may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 13, 2008 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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