Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-02100/USCOURTS-ca10-93-02100-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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RICKY G. 

v. 

ROBERT J. 

PUBLISH c Fl:U~D t;nJ~J ~bit4fl C:o~rt t~t ~\ppoalo '!'~nth CJrcH!t 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JU~ 0 1 1994 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

STALLINGS, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

TANSY, Warden, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

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ROEERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 93-2100 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CIV 90-9 SC} 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Juan A. Gonzalez, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for 

Appellant. 

Petitioner'-

Tom Udall, Attorney General of New Mexico, Patricia Gandert, 

Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, New Mexico, for RespondentAppellee. 

Before BRORBY and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and KANE,** District 

Judge. 

**Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., Senior District Judge, United 

States District Court for the District of Colorado, sitting by 

designation. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 93-2100 Document: 01019289201 Date Filed: 06/01/1994 Page: 1 
Petitioner, who was convicted on five counts of passing 

forged checks in violation of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-16-lO(B), seeks 

habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on the grounds that the 

trial court's examination of petitioner at trial deprived him of a 

fair trial and that insufficient evidence was adduced at trial to 

support petitioner's convictions. Petitioner raised both of these 

issues on direct appeal to the New Mexico Court of Appeals, which 

affirmed his convictions. State v. Stallings, 725 P.2d 1228, 

1228, 1231 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 725 P.2d 832 (N.M. 

1986) (table). Petitioner then presented the same issues to the 

district court, which denied petitioner habeas relief and 

dismissed his petition with prejudice. After a careful review of 

the state court record, we conclude that the evidence was not 

sufficient to support a finding of all the essential elements of 

the forgery charges and, therefore, we reverse.

1 

The evidence clearly established that petitioner passed five 

forged checks made payable to him. Petitioner argued, however, 

that he did not know the checks were forged at the time he cashed 

them. Petitioner contended that the person who wrote the checks 

represented himself to be the named owner of the account and 

petitioner had seen the person's identification, which confirmed 

his representation. Petitioner maintained that he received the 

checks in payment for goods he sold and services he provided to 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 93-2100 Document: 01019289201 Date Filed: 06/01/1994 Page: 2 
the maker of the checks and that he negotiated the checks quite 

openly at a grocery store where he was well known. 

The critical issue in this case, then, is whether the 

evidence established that petitioner knew the checks were forged 

when he cashed them. On that issue, the record is devoid of any 

evidence. Because petitioner's knowledge was an essential element 

of the State's case, see N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-16-lO(B) (defining 

forgery as "knowingly issuing or transferring a forged writing 

with intent to injure or defraud"), we must conclude that the 

forgery convictions violated petitioner's due process rights. 

Having reached this conclusion, we need not consider whether the 

trial court's examination of petitioner also denied him a fair 

trial. 

Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain petitioner's 

conviction is a question of law that we review de novo. Kelly v. 

Roberts, 998 F.2d 802, 807 (lOth Cir. 1993); Tapia v. Tansy, 926 

F.2d 1554, 1562 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 115 (1991). 

In conducting our review, we must view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 u.s. 

307, 319 (1979). "[W]e may not weigh conflicting evidence or 

consider the credibility of witnesses. Instead, we must 'accept 

the jury's resolution of the evidence as long as it is within the 

bounds of reason.'" Kelly, 998 F.2d at 808 (quoting Grubbs v. 

Hannigan, 982 F.2d 1483, 1487 (lOth Cir. 1993)). 

In its case-in-chief, the State adduced evidence that 

petitioner cashed each of the third-party checks, which were drawn 

on an Oklahoma bank account in the name of Randy Thacker, at a 

3 

Appellate Case: 93-2100 Document: 01019289201 Date Filed: 06/01/1994 Page: 3 
grocery store in Farmington, New Mexico, during late June and 

early July of 1984. The owner of the account testified that he 

discovered his checkbook was missing from his Farmington apartment 

in July 1984, that he did not write any of the five checks at 

issue, and that he had never met petitioner. The evidence 

established that petitioner was well known at the grocery store, 

that he presented proper identification when cashing the checks at 

issue, and that he had cashed third-party checks there in the 

past. Finally, the State adduced evidence that all of the checks 

petitioner negotiated were returned to the store unpaid and marked 

"forgery." When Jack Morrison, the store owner, told petitioner 

that one of the checks was returned unpaid, petitioner replied 

that he did not have any money to make good on the check. 

At the conclusion of the State's case, petitioner moved for a 

judgment of acquittal, arguing that the State had produced no 

evidence to show that he either knew the checks were forged or 

intended to injure or defraud the grocery store when he cashed 

them. The State argued that petitioner's knowledge and intent 

were established by his statement to Morrison that he did not have 

the money to make good on the returned check. The trial court 

denied petitioner's motion without comment. In so ruling, the 

trial court erred. 

We must bear in mind that petitioner was not charged with 

forging the checks himself and there was no evidence to suggest 

that he had. In addition, these were third-party checks, ~, 

the checks were not drawn on an account that petitioner 

represented to be his own. Under these circumstances, the jury 

4 

Appellate Case: 93-2100 Document: 01019289201 Date Filed: 06/01/1994 Page: 4 
could not logically infer from petitioner's statement, that he did 

not have the money to make good on the check, tha~ petitioner knew 

at the time he negotiated any of the checks that they were forged. 

Petitioner was in the same position as someone who innocently 

negotiates a third-party check that turns out not to be backed by 

sufficient funds; the person negotiating the check may or may not 

have sufficient funds of his own to make good on the check. Thus, 

the State presented no evidence in its case-in-chief on one of the 

essential elements of the crime: that petitioner knew the checks 

were forged when he passed them. 2 

After the trial court denied petitioner's motion for judgment 

of acquittal, petitioner took the stand and testified in his 

defense. Petitioner thereby waived any claim he had based on the 

insufficiency of the State's evidence at the conclusion of its 

case-in-chief. See United States v. Hack, 782 F.2d 862, 868 (lOth 

Cir.), cert. denied, 476 u.s. 1184 (1986); United States v. 

Foster, 783 F.2d 1082, 1085 and n.l (D.C. Cir. 1986) (in 

bane) (citing other circuit cases in accord). Our review of 

petitioner's sufficiency claim, therefore, must take into account 

not only the evidence adduced during the State's case-in-chief, 

but also the evidence adduced by the defendant in his case and the 

rebuttal evidence. 

2 Petitioner argues that the State failed to prove two 

essential elements: (1) his knowledge that the checks were forged 

and (2) his intent to injure or defraud the grocery store by 

passing the checks. Because the lack of evidence on the element 

of knowledge is enough to invalidate petitioner's convictions, we 

need not consider whether there was a similar lack of evidence as 

to petitioner's intent to injure or defraud. 

5 

Appellate Case: 93-2100 Document: 01019289201 Date Filed: 06/01/1994 Page: 5 
We turn, then, to the evidence presented after the State 

rested. Petitioner admitted at the outset of his testimony that 

he had a prior felony conviction for attempted burglary and 

motorcycle theft. Petitioner then explained how he came to be in 

possession of the forged checks. In May 1984, petitioner became 

acquainted with a person who said his name was Randy Thacker, and 

with whom petitioner shared an interest in cars. Over the course 

of the summer, the two became friends and petitioner sold Thacker 

a number of personal items, including stereo and martial arts 

equipment, for which Thacker paid with the checks at issue. 

Thacker also gave petitioner a check for the expenses petitioner 

incurred when he drove Thacker to Iowa. Petitioner said he had no 

reason to believe the person with whom he was dealing was not 

Randy Thacker, because he had seen Thacker's identification. 

Petitioner did admit that, to assist him in cashing the checks at 

the grocery store, he asked Thacker to make notations in the memo 

sections of some of the checks indicating that petitioner received 

the checks in the course of his employment. Petitioner explained 

that he frequently received checks in connection with his 

employment and cashed them at the grocery store because he did not 

have a checking account at a bank. Petitioner presented no other 

witnesses in his defense. 

On rebuttal, Morrison testified that sometime after the bank 

returned the checks unpaid, he told petitioner he did not get paid 

on one of them. Petitioner replied that he did not know why the 

check would have been returned, and, as far as he knew, the check 

was good. Petitioner told Morrison that he had only $400.00 in 

6 

Appellate Case: 93-2100 Document: 01019289201 Date Filed: 06/01/1994 Page: 6 
his savings 

not enough. 

checks. 

account to pay on the check, which Morrison said was 

Petitioner did not pay Morrison any money on the 

At the close of all the evidence, petitioner moved again for 

a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence did not 

establish that he knew any of the checks were forged at the time 

he cashed them or that he acted with intent to injure or defraud 

the grocery store. The trial court denied petitioner's motion and 

sent the case to the jury, which convicted petitioner on all five 

counts of forgery. 

"To be sufficient, the evidence supporting [a] conviction 

must be substantial; that is, it must do more than raise a mere 

suspicion of guilt." Beachum v. Tansy, 903 F.2d 1321, 1332 (lOth 

Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 904 (1990). Knowledge can be proven 

by circumstantial evidence. See State v. Hermosillo, 540 P.2d 

1313, 1314 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975). "The proven circumstances from 

which an accused's state of mind or intent can be inferred are his 

acts, conduct and words." State v. Gattis, 730 P.2d 497, 503 

(N.M. Ct. App. 1986). 

In upholding petitioner's convictions on direct appeal, the 

New Mexico Court of Appeals concluded that the following 

circumstantial evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that 

petitioner knew the checks were forged: (1) he failed to pay the 

store after being told that one of the checks was returned unpaid; 

(2) he had a prior felony conviction; and (3) he admitted that he 

asked the maker of the checks to put false notations on the checks 

indicating he received them in the course of his employment so the 

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checks would be easier to cash. Stallings, 725 P.2d at 1231. The 

district court relied on two additional factors in concluding the 

evidence was sufficient on habeas review: petitioner failed to 

question why the checks were drawn on an out-of-state checking 

account; and petitioner failed to ascertain anything about the 

purported Randy Thacker's ability to pay on the checks. On 

appeal, the State relies on the same evidence in arguing that the 

evidence was sufficient to convict. 

We note at the outset that all the evidence relied on by the 

State and the previous reviewing courts, with the exception of 

petitioner's failure to make good on the checks after being told 

one of them was returned unpaid, was adduced during the 

defendant's case; practically none of the allegedly pertinent 

evidence of knowledge came in during the State's case-in-chief. 

We have previously determined that no inference of petitioner's 

knowledge could be drawn from the evidence about petitioner's 

conversation with Morrison that was adduced in the State's 

case-in-chief. The additional evidence about that conversation 

that was adduced on rebuttal does not provide any additional 

support for an inference that petitioner knew the checks were 

forged. 

Morrison did not testify that he told petitioner any of the 

checks were forged; rather, he simply said that he did not get 

paid on one of them. Petitioner's response to Morrison was 

entirely compatible with his asserted ignorance of the forgery: 

petitioner said he did not know why the check had been returned 

and, as far as he knew, the check was good. In accordance with 

8 

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our previous discussion, petitioner's statement that he had only 

$400.00 in savings, which Morrison indicated was not sufficient to 

cover his loss, does not support an inference that petitioner knew 

at the time he cashed the checks that any of them were forged. 

The most damaging evidence against petitioner was his 

admission that he told the maker of the checks to put false 

notations on them indicating that petitioner received the checks 

in the course of his employment, rather than for personal goods 

and services. Although the notations represent a 

misrepresentation upon the face of the checks and, therefore, cast 

doubt on petitioner's general truthfulness and moral character, 

they do not support a logical inference that petitioner knew the 

checks were forged. The purpose of the notations was to 

facilitate cashing the third-party checks. The notations served 

the same purpose regardless of whether the checks were good or 

were forged. Therefore, petitioner's actions in having the false 

notations placed on the checks do not increase the likelihood that 

petitioner knew the checks were forged. See Doe v. State, 540 

P.2d 827, 834 (N.M. Ct. App.) (holding that defendant's furtive 

conduct, which was as compatible with defendant's belief that he 

was smoking tobacco in violation of school rules as it was with 

his belief that he was smoking marijuana, was not sufficient to 

support an inference that defendant knew the substance he was 

smoking was marijuana), cert. denied, 540 P.2d 

1975) (table). 

248 (N.M. 

We turn, then, to petitioner's failure to question why the 

checks he received were drawn on an out-of-state bank, which the 

9 

Appellate Case: 93-2100 Document: 01019289201 Date Filed: 06/01/1994 Page: 9 
jury could have concluded was unusual. We note at the outset that 

the true owner of the account testified that he lived in 

Farmington, New Mexico, yet maintained a checking account in 

Oklahoma. In our mobile society, maintenance of an out-of-state 

bank account is not particularly unusual. Moreover, while the 

nature of the out-of-state checks may have given petitioner reason 

to question the creditworthiness of the purported Randy Thacker, 

that fact does not give rise to an inference that petitioner knew 

the checks were forged, especially in light of petitioner's 

uncontradicted testimony that he saw the identification of the 

person who represented himself to petitioner as Randy Thacker. 

Under the circumstances, we do not see how petitioner's failure to 

question why the checks were drawn on an out-of-state bank is 

evidence of petitioner's guilt. 

Nor is petitioner's failure to ascertain information about 

the purported Randy Thacker's ability to pay on the checks 

evidence of petitioner's guilt. Petitioner was charged with 

passing checks he knew were forged, not with passing checks he 

knew were not backed by sufficient funds. See N.M. Stat. Ann. 

§ 30-36-4 (making it unlawful to issue a check knowing there are 

not sufficient funds or credit on deposit to pay the check in 

full). The purported Randy Thacker's ability to pay on the checks 

is not relevant to petitioner's knowledge that the checks were 

forged. 

Finally, we consider the inferences that can be drawn from 

petitioner's past criminal record. Petitioner's prior conviction 

for attempted burglary and motorcycle theft does not support an 

10 

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or often. Nonetheless, when we have concluded "that upon the 

record evidence adduced at the trial no ratiopal trier of fact 

could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt," id. at 

324, we have not hesitated to grant the petitioner habeas relief, 

see Kelly, 998 F.2d at 803; Sanders/Miller v. Logan, 710 F.2d 645, 

647, 656 (lOth Cir. 1983), and we do not hesitate to do so here. 

In closing, we note that implicit in the State's brief on 

appeal appears to be the argument that the jury could have 

inferred petitioner's guilty knowledge from its disbelief of his 

testimony. Although this circuit has not addressed this issue 

directly, several circuits have held that the jury's disbelief of 

a defendant's testimony can, in some limited instances, give rise 

to a positive inference of guilt. These circuits do not agree, 

however, on the circumstances that will support such an inference. 

The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, for instance, hold that if a 

defendant's testimony is sufficiently intrinsically incredible or 

implausible, then the jury can draw an inference of guilt from its 

disbelief of that testimony. See. e.g., United States v. Eley, 

723 F.2d 1522, 1525 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that defendant's 

"incredible explanation" of his possession of stolen goods was "so 

implausible that it [gave] rise to positive evidence in favor of 

the government"); United States v. Restrepo-Granda, 575 F.2d 524, 

528 (5th Cir.) (noting that defendant's "inherently improbable 

story does not provide accused with a plausible explanation for 

his possession of the cocaine consistent with his innocence"), 

cert. denied, 439 U.S. 935 (1978). 

12 

Appellate Case: 93-2100 Document: 01019289201 Date Filed: 06/01/1994 Page: 11 
The Second and Ninth Circuits, on the other hand, do not 

consider the quality of the defendant's testimony; rather, they 

require other corroborating evidence of guilt. These circuits 

would never allow a finding of guilt to be predicated on the 

jury's disbelief of the defendant's testimony, but they would 

allow the jury's disbelief of the defendant's testimony to bolster 

other, affirmative evidence of guilt. See. e.g., United States v. 

Eisen, 974 F.2d 246, 259 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[T]he jury is free to 

draw negative inferences from an untruthful witness's testimony as 

long as there is affirmative testimony to supplement or 

corroborate those negative inferences."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 

1619, and cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1840, and cert. denied, 113 S. 

Ct. 1841 (1993); United States v. Martinez, 514 F.2d 334, 341 (9th 

Cir. 1975) ("Disbelief of a defendant's own testimony may provide 

at least a partial basis for a jury's conclusion that the opposite 

of the testimony is the truth. But such belief can provide 

only partial support: there must also be 'other objective 

evidence on the record which buttresses the fact finder's drawing 

of the opposite inference.'") (quoting United States v. Chase, 503 

F.2d 571, 573 n.4 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948 

(1975)). 

Finally, the D.C. Circuit distinguishes between inferences to 

be drawn from a defendant's demeanor and those to be drawn from a 

defendant's facially inconsistent or implausible testimony. See 

United States v. Zeigler, 994 F.2d 845, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The 

court has refused to uphold a conviction when the only way to do 

so is to assume that, based on the defendant's demeanor, the jury 

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disbelieved the defendant's otherwise plausible testimony and, 

instead, believed the opposite of that to which she testified. 

Id. at 849-50. But see United States v. Zafiro, 945 F.2d 881, 888 

(7th Cir. 1991) (permitting jury to infer defendant's knowledge of 

presence of drugs from her demeanor while testifying and from 

expert testimony that "drug dealers do not discuss or deliver 

large quantities of drugs in the presence of bystanders"), aff'd 

on other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 933 (1993). 

We need not decide which, if any, of these approaches we 

should adopt, because an inference of guilt is not permissible 

under any theory here. Petitioner's testimony was neither 

implausible, incredible, nor inherently inconsistent. Nor did the 

evidence adduced at trial otherwise corroborate an inference of 

guilty knowledge. The jury's disbelief of petitioner's testimony 

could not fill the gap left by the State's total lack of relevant 

evidence as to petitioner's guilty knowledge. 

When "the evidence must be buttressed by surmise and 

conjecture, rather than logical inference in order to support a 

conviction, ... such conviction [cannot be allowed] to stand." 

State v. Romero, 352 P.2d 781, 782 (N.M. 1960). Because we 

conclude, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the State, that the evidence adduced at trial was not 

sufficient to support a finding of all the essential elements of 

forgery beyond a reasonable doubt, petitioner's convictions for 

forgery must fall. See Kelly, 998 F.2d at 809. 

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Therefore, the judgment of the district court is REVERSED and 

the action is REMANDED with directions to grant the writ of habeas 

corpus. 

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