Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_22-cv-00971/USCOURTS-azd-2_22-cv-00971-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael B Wallace,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-22-00971-PHX-DWL

ORDER 

Plaintiff Michael B. Wallace (“Plaintiff”) challenges the denial of his application 

for benefits under the Social Security Act (“the Act”) by the Commissioner of the Social 

Security Administration (“Commissioner”). The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s opening 

brief (Doc. 13), the Commissioner’s answering brief (Doc. 17), and Plaintiff’s reply (Doc. 

18), as well as the Administrative Record (Doc. 10, “AR”), and now affirms the 

Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision.

I. Procedural History

On February 20, 2020, Plaintiff filed an application for disability and disability 

insurance benefits, eventually alleging a disability onset date of January 1, 2020. (AR at 

20-21.) The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied Plaintiff’s application at the 

initial and reconsideration levels of administrative review and Plaintiff requested a hearing 

before an ALJ. (Id. at 20.) On May 10, 2021, following a telephonic hearing, the ALJ 

issued an unfavorable decision. (Id. at 20-31.) The Appeals Council later denied review. 

(Id. at 1-7.)

Case 2:22-cv-00971-DWL Document 19 Filed 09/30/23 Page 1 of 22
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

II. Sequential Evaluation Process And Judicial Review

To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Act, the ALJ 

follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). The claimant bears the burden of 

proof at the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Tackett 

v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines whether 

the claimant has engaged in substantial, gainful work activity. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.920(a)(4)(i). At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a “severe” 

medically determinable physical or mental impairment. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). At step 

three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments 

meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. 

Part 404. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is disabled. Id. If not, the ALJ 

assesses the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and proceeds to step four, 

where the ALJ determines whether the claimant is still capable of performing past relevant 

work. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, where 

the ALJ determines whether the claimant can perform any other work in the national 

economy based on the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. Id.

§ 416.920(a)(4)(v). If not, the claimant is disabled. Id.

An ALJ’s factual findings “shall be conclusive if supported by substantial 

evidence.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2019) (citations omitted) (internal 

quotations omitted). The Court may set aside the Commissioner’s disability determination 

only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 

495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a 

reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion considering the record 

as a whole. Id. Generally, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be 

upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). In 

determining whether to reverse an ALJ’s decision, the district court reviews only those 

issues raised by the party challenging the decision. Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 

Case 2:22-cv-00971-DWL Document 19 Filed 09/30/23 Page 2 of 22
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(9th Cir. 2001).

III. The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial, gainful work activity 

since the amended alleged onset date and that Plaintiff had the following severe

impairments: “cervical spine degenerative disc disease with stenosis status post cervical 

fusion and lumbar degenerative disc disease with stenosis.” (AR at 23.)1 Next, the ALJ 

concluded that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or medically equal a listing. (Id. at 

24.) Next, the ALJ calculated Plaintiff’s RFC as follows:

[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a range of light 

work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b). Specifically, the claimant can lift 

and carry up to 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; he can 

stand and/or walk for 6 hours out of an 8-hour workday with normal breaks; 

he can sit for 6 hours out of an 8-hour workday with normal breaks; he can 

never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; he can occasionally climb ramps or 

stairs, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl; he can frequently balance; he can 

occasionally reach overhead bilaterally; he can occasionally operate foot 

controls bilaterally; he can occasionally be exposed to excessive vibration; 

he can occasionally be exposed to dangerous, moving machinery and 

unprotected heights; and he is allowed to stand and stretch one minute every 

hour when sitting.

(Id.)

As part of this RFC determination, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s symptom 

testimony, concluding that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could 

reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements 

concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely 

consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons 

explained in this decision.” (Id. at 25.) The ALJ also evaluated opinion evidence from 

various medical sources, concluding as follows: (1) Dr. S. Gupta, M.D., state agency 

medical consultant (most “persuasive”); (2) Dr. M. Keer, D.O., state agency medical 

1 The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff presented evidence of “gastroesophageal reflux 

disease, hypertension, and mild bilateral hand arthritis” but found that these impairments 

were not severe. (Id. at 23.)

Case 2:22-cv-00971-DWL Document 19 Filed 09/30/23 Page 3 of 22
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

consultant (most “persuasive”); (3) Dr. Nima Salari, M.D., examining doctor (generally 

“unpersuasive”); and (4) Daniel J. Schneider, physical therapist (“unpersuasive”). (Id. at 

27-29.) Additionally, the ALJ considered third-party reports from Plaintiff’s wife and 

friend but concluded that those reports did “not support the inclusion of greater limitations 

in the [RFC].” (Id. at 29.)

Based on the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ concluded that 

Plaintiff was capable of performing his past relevant work as a telephone salesman and 

sales representative or estimator. (Id. at 30-31.) Thus, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff 

was not disabled. (Id. at 31.)

IV. Discussion

Plaintiff raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the ALJ erred in analyzing Dr. 

Salari’s opinions; (2) whether the ALJ improperly discredited Plaintiff’s symptom 

testimony; and (3) whether the ALJ improperly rejected lay witness testimony. (Doc. 13 

at 1-2.) As a remedy, Plaintiff seeks a remand for “payment of benefits” or a de novo

hearing. (Id. at 2.)

A. Dr. Salari

1. Standard Of Review

In January 2017, the SSA amended the regulations concerning the evaluation of 

medical opinion evidence. See Revisions to Rules Regarding Evaluation of Medical 

Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844 (Jan. 18, 2017). The new regulations apply to applications 

filed on or after March 27, 2017, and are therefore applicable here. The new regulations 

provide in relevant part as follows:

We will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including 

controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical 

finding(s), including those from your medical sources. . . . The most 

important factors we consider when we evaluate the persuasiveness of 

medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings are supportability 

. . . and consistency . . . .

20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a). Regarding the “supportability” factor, the new regulations 

Case 2:22-cv-00971-DWL Document 19 Filed 09/30/23 Page 4 of 22
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

explain that the “more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations 

presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s), . . . the more 

persuasive the medical opinions . . . will be.” Id. § 404.1520c(c)(1). Regarding the 

“consistency” factor, the “more consistent a medical opinion(s) . . . is with the evidence 

from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the 

medical opinion(s) . . . will be.” Id. § 404.1520c(c)(2).2

Recently, the Ninth Circuit confirmed that the “recent changes to the Social Security 

Administration’s regulations displace our longstanding case law requiring an ALJ to 

provide ‘specific and legitimate’ reasons for rejecting an examining doctor’s opinion.” 

Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 787 (9th Cir. 2022). Thus, “the former hierarchy of 

medical opinions—in which we assign presumptive weight based on the extent of the 

doctor’s relationship with the claimant—no longer applies. Now, an ALJ’s decision, 

including the decision to discredit any medical opinion, must simply be supported by 

substantial evidence.” Id. With that said, “[e]ven under the new regulations, an ALJ cannot 

reject an examining or treating doctor’s opinion as unsupported or inconsistent without 

providing an explanation supported by substantial evidence. The agency must articulate 

how persuasive it finds all of the medical opinions from each doctor or other source and 

explain how it considered the supportability and consistency factors in reaching these 

findings.” Id. at 792 (cleaned up). Although “an ALJ can still consider the length and 

purpose of the treatment relationship, the frequency of examinations, the kinds and extent 

of examinations that the medical source has performed or ordered from specialists, and 

whether the medical source has examined the claimant or merely reviewed the claimant’s 

records. . . . [T]he ALJ no longer needs to make specific findings regarding these 

relationship factors . . . .” Id. (citation omitted).

...

2 Other factors that may be considered by the ALJ in addition to supportability and 

consistency include the provider’s relationship with the claimant, the length of the 

treatment relationship, the frequency of examinations, the purpose and extent of the 

treatment relationship, and the specialization of the provider. Id. § 416.920c(c).

Case 2:22-cv-00971-DWL Document 19 Filed 09/30/23 Page 5 of 22
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2. Dr. Salari’s Opinions

Plaintiff’s treating doctor, Dr. Salari, completed a “Residual Functional Capacity 

Questionnaire—Lumbar Spine” on March 17, 2021. (AR at 524-26.) In that form, Dr. 

Salari opined that Plaintiff could only work four hours per day, could only work 20 hours 

per week, and would likely be absent from work more than four days each month. (Id. at 

525-26.) Dr. Salari also opined that Plaintiff could only sit for one hour at a time; could 

only sit for four hours in an eight-hour workday; could only stand for 30 minutes at a time; 

could only stand for two hours in an eight-hour workday; could only walk for 30 minutes 

at a time; and could only walk for two hours in an eight-hour workday. (Id. at 525.) 

Additionally, Dr. Salari opined that Plaintiff’s physical restrictions would cause various 

non-exertional limitations, including “moderately severe” limitations in Plaintiff’s ability 

to pay attention to and/or concentrate on tasks; to maintain interpersonal relationships with 

supervisors, co-workers, or the public; to respond to customary work pressures or stress; 

and to provide consistent work effort. (Id. at 526.) 

Additionally, Dr. Salari completed four listing questionnaires. First, on March 17, 

2021, Dr. Salari completed a form entitled “Listing 1.04 Questionnaire.” (Id. at 523.) 

There, Dr. Salari checked boxes indicating that Plaintiff had two impairments (first, “a 

disorder of the spine . . . resulting in compromise of a nerve root . . . or the spinal cord”; 

and second, “nerve root compression characterized by [among other things] motor loss 

(atrophy with associated muscle weakness or muscle weakness) accompanied by sensory 

or reflex loss”), confirmed that “I have reviewed the Commissioner’s Listing of 

Impairments, Section 1.00 through 1.04,” and opined that Listing 1.04 was met or equaled 

as early as January 2020. (Id.) Second, on March 31, 2021, Dr. Salari completed another 

version of Listing Questionnaire 1.04. (Id. at 550.) There, Dr. Salari stated that Plaintiff’s 

functional restrictions were first present on May 1, 2019. (Id. at 550.) Third, on April 21, 

2021, Dr. Salari completed a form entitled “Listing Questionnaire 1.15.” (Id. at 551-52.) 

There, Dr. Salari opined that although Plaintiff had “a disorder of the skeletal spine 

resulting in compromise of a nerve root(s),” that condition did not satisfy all of the 

Case 2:22-cv-00971-DWL Document 19 Filed 09/30/23 Page 6 of 22
- 7 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

necessary requirements under Listing 1.15. (Id.) Fourth, also on April 21, 2021, Dr. Salari 

completed a form entitled “Listing Questionnaire 1.16.” (Id. at 553-54.) There, Dr. Salari 

opined that although Plaintiff had “lumbar spinal stenosis resulting in compromise of the 

cauda equina,” that condition did not satisfy all of the necessary requirements under Listing 

1.16. (Id.) 

3. The ALJ’s Evaluation Of Dr. Salari’s Opinions

The ALJ deemed Dr. Salari’s opinions “unpersuasive,” albeit with one caveat. (Id.

at 28.) The ALJ’s full rationale was as follows:

The medical opinions of Dr. Salari are unpersuasive because the assessments 

are not supported by relevant objective medical evidence, inconsistent with 

evidence from other medical and nonmedical sources, and contradicted by 

other factors. In forms dated March 17, 2021, Dr. Salari opined that the 

claimant met section 1.04A. In another form dated March 17, 2021, Dr. 

Salari also opined the claimant could only work four hours a day, 20 hours a

week including standing and walking a total of two hours each in an eight 

hour workday. The doctor also determined the claimant would likely be 

absent from work more than four times a month as a result of his impairments 

or treatment. In a form dated March 31, 2021, Dr. Salari opined the claimant 

met listing 1.04A prior to January 1, 2020. 

First, a supportable explanation was not provided because there were 

insufficient references to medically acceptable objective clinical or 

diagnostic findings and seem to be based on the claimant’s subjective 

complaints. Second, a supportable explanation was not provided because the 

medical source merely checked boxes on a form and the lines on the form 

allowing for an explanation were inadequately completed. The March 17, 

2021 form is internally inconsistent indicating the claimant can only work 

four hours per day, but can sit 4 hours per day, stand 2 hours per day, and 

walk 2 hours per day. Third, the objective medical evidence, including the 

claimant’s use of only standard treatment, does not support the extreme

assessments. For instance, regarding listing 1.04, there was no consistent

evidence of motor loss of atrophy. There was also no need for an assistive 

device. The undersigned also notes this listing is obsolete and listings 1.15 

and 1.16 are now applicable. Fourth, evidence from other medical or 

nonmedical sources are inconsistent with the assessments. Fifth, the medical 

opinion is inconsistent with the claimant’s admitted activities of daily living, 

which have already been described above in this decision. Performance of 

this wide range of ordinary tasks is inconsistent with severe limitations and 

casts doubts on this opinion. Accordingly, these opinions are unpersuasive.

Case 2:22-cv-00971-DWL Document 19 Filed 09/30/23 Page 7 of 22
- 8 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Later, in a form dated April 21, 2021, Dr. Salari indicated that the claimant 

did not meet listing 1.15 or listing 1.16. The undersigned finds this specific 

opinion is persuasive based on factors of supportability and consistency. 

This opinion is consistent with the claimant’s clinical and diagnostic findings 

as detailed above. Hence, the undersigned find this opinion is persuasive.

(Id., cleaned up.)

4. The Parties’ Arguments

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “improperly rejected critical aspects of Dr. Salari’s 

opinion in the absence of legally adequate reasons for doing so.” (Doc. 13 at 16.)3 

According to Plaintiff, “Dr. Salari’s opinions were not inconsistent with the medical 

treatment notes from other medical evidence he reviewed, including [Plaintiff’s] diagnostic 

imaging.” (Id. at 11.) More specifically, Plaintiff argues that (1) although the ALJ viewed 

Dr. Salari’s opinion that Plaintiff had “‘decreased sensation’ in upper extremity” as 

inconsistent with Dr. McCunniff’s treatment notes indicating “that [Plaintiff] had ‘normal 

sensation in the upper extremity,’” this finding of inconsistency was based on a 

mischaracterization of Dr. McCunniff’s notes; (2) Dr. Salari’s opined limitations are

consistent with the evidence in the record concerning Plaintiff’s daily activities, which 

demonstrates that Plaintiff cannot play guitar, sit comfortably on a three-hour flight, or 

drive; and (3) Dr. Salari’s opinions are consistent with Plaintiff’s conservative course of 

treatment because Dr. Salari later recommended surgery. (Id. at 12-15, cleaned up.) 

Regarding supportability, Plaintiff argues that “contrary to the ALJ’s assertion, Dr. Salari 

did support his conclusions with a full examination of [Plaintiff], including objective 

findings, and did not base his conclusions solely on [Plaintiff’s] subjective complaints.” 

(Id. at 12.) Plaintiff argues that “Dr. Salari offered a detailed explanation as to how 

[Plaintiff’s] imaging results corresponded to his symptoms and [Plaintiff’s] functional 

3 One of Plaintiff’s specific arguments is that the ALJ improperly accused Dr. Salari 

of being biased by stating that “Wallace was evaluated by Dr. Salari ‘at request of 

attorney.’” (Id. at 10.) In response, the Commissioner contends that the ALJ “made no 

findings that the opinion was therefore ‘biased’” and that Plaintiff’s argument is “wholly 

speculative.” (Doc. 17 at 14.) The Court agrees with the Commissioner that the ALJ did 

not cite bias as a reason to discredit Dr. Salari’s opinions.

Case 2:22-cv-00971-DWL Document 19 Filed 09/30/23 Page 8 of 22
- 9 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

limitations. Dr. Salari did not simply ‘check boxes on a form’ as the ALJ asserts.” (Id.)

The Commissioner disagrees and defends the sufficiency of the ALJ’s rationale. 

(Doc. 17 at 10-14.) The Commissioner contends there is substantial evidence to support 

the ALJ’s evaluation of supportability because “[Dr. Salari’s] opinions lacked references 

to objective medical evidence and instead appeared significantly based on Plaintiff’s 

subjective symptom complaints, which the ALJ discounted for good reasons.” (Id. at 11, 

citations omitted.) The Commissioner also argues that it was permissible for the ALJ to 

discount Dr. Salari’s opinions because Dr. Salari “‘merely checked boxes on a form’ and 

‘inadequately completed’ the lines on the form that allowed for more explanation.” (Id., 

citation omitted) As for the consistency factor, the Commissioner contends that substantial 

evidence supports the ALJ’s findings that (1) “Dr. Salari made unsupported ‘extreme 

assessments’ that were inconsistent with the record as a whole”; (2) “Dr. Salari’s form 

opinion was ‘internally inconsistent’”; (3) Dr. Salari’s “opinion was inconsistent with other 

medical source opinion evidence, including the prior administrative findings of Drs. Gupta 

and Keer”; and (4) “Dr. Salari’s opinion was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s daily activities.”

(Id. at 12-14, citations omitted.) In response to Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ 

mischaracterized Dr. McCunniff’s treatment notes, the Commissioner argues that Dr. 

McCunniff made a typographical error by referring to the lower extremity rather than the 

upper extremity because other treatment notes from Dr. McCunniff’s clinic cite normal 

sensation in Plaintiff’s upper extremities. (Id. at 13, citations omitted.) 

In reply, Plaintiff essentially restates the arguments that appear in his opening brief. 

(Doc. 18 at 2-4.)

5. Analysis

The ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Salari’s opinions was free of harmful error. As noted, 

“[t]he agency must articulate how persuasive it finds all of the medical opinions from each 

doctor or other source and explain how it considered the supportability and consistency 

factors in reaching these findings.” Woods, 32 F.4th at 792 (cleaned up). Here, the ALJ

expressly considered both of the required factors. (AR at 28 [concluding, inter alia, that 

Case 2:22-cv-00971-DWL Document 19 Filed 09/30/23 Page 9 of 22
- 10 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“[t]he medical opinions of Dr. Salari are unpersuasive because the assessments are not 

supported by relevant objective medical evidence [and] inconsistent with evidence from 

other medical and nonmedical sources,” because “a supportable explanation was not 

provided,” and because “evidence from other medical or nonmedical sources [is] 

inconsistent with the assessments”].)

Additionally, the ALJ’s conclusions as to each factor were supported by substantial 

evidence. Beginning with the consistency factor, one of the ALJ’s proffered reasons for 

discounting Dr. Salari’s opinions was that “the objective medical evidence . . . does not 

support the extreme assessments. For instance, regarding listing 1.04, there was no 

consistent evidence of motor loss o[r] atrophy.” (AR at 28.) Substantial evidence supports 

this conclusion. As noted, in the Listing 1.04 Questionnaire, Dr. Salari indicated that 

Plaintiff had “nerve root compression characterized by [among other things] motor loss 

(atrophy with associated muscle weakness or muscle weakness) accompanied by sensory 

or reflex loss.” (AR at 523.) However, multiple other providers indicated in treatment 

records that Plaintiff did not have motor loss/atrophy accompanied by sensory or reflex 

loss. (See, e.g., id. at 336-37 [March 4, 2020 note from PT Jagodzinski, indicating normal 

gait]; id. at 344 [January 13, 2020 note from NP Rach, indicating that Plaintiff “denies leg 

weakness, numbness or tingling” and that Plaintiff had “normal gait and station]; id. at 353 

[March 5, 2020 note from NP Rach, again indicating “Normal gait”]; id. at 403 [February 

26, 2020 note from FNP-C Oarde: “NO obvious wasting atrophy of the limbs, 

STRENGTH: 5/5 . . . , SENSATION: intact throughout”]; id. at 410 [March 5, 2020 

note from FNP-C Mello, indicating “Normal gait,” 4/5 strength, and intact sensation]; id.

at 483 [November 23, 2020 note from Dr. Baker: “neuro strength 4/5, gait stable”]; id. at 

505 [March 9, 2021 note from Dr. McCunniff: “There is 5/5 motor strength in all muscle 

groups of the lower extremities”]; id. at 508-09 [February 23, 2021 “Nerve Conduction & 

Electromyographic Report,” concluding that “[t]he motor conduction test was normal in 

all 4 of the tested nerves”].) It was rational for the ALJ to conclude that these objective 

medical records were inconsistent with Dr. Salari’s opinions. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 954 

Case 2:22-cv-00971-DWL Document 19 Filed 09/30/23 Page 10 of 22
- 11 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(“Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which 

supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.”) (citation omitted). 

Cf. Rolus v. Colvin, 2016 WL 5316821, *3 (W.D. Okla. 2016) (noting that “absent evidence 

of muscle atrophy/sensory loss, [a claimant] cannot meet Listing 1.04(A)” and affirming 

the ALJ’s determination that Listing 1.04(A) was not satisfied because the ALJ cited 

examination records in which providers indicated that the claimant had “no evidence of 

muscular atrophy” and “no sensory loss in [his] lumbosacral spine”). 

Another of the ALJ’s proffered reasons for discounting Dr. Salari’s opinions 

pursuant to the consistency factor was that they conflicted with the less-restrictive opinions 

of the other medical sources whom the ALJ deemed persuasive. (AR at 28 [“Fourth, 

evidence from other medical or nonmedical sources are inconsistent with the 

assessments.”].) This, too, is a permissible basis for discounting a medical source’s 

opinions. See generally 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2) (“The more consistent a medical 

opinion(s) . . . is with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in 

the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) . . . will be.”). Cf. Michele I. v. 

Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 2022 WL 4533962, *5-6 (D. Or. 2022) (“The ALJ did not err 

in his consideration of PA Laughlin-Hall’s opinion. The ALJ considered the two most 

important factors in evaluating PA Laughlin-Hall’s medical opinion—supportability and 

consistency—and the record supports the ALJ’s conclusions. The ALJ . . . not[ed] PA 

Laughlin-Hall’s opinion ‘markedly conflict[s] with opinions of the reviewing physicians 

for the State agency who examined the claimant’s medical records’ . . . . The ALJ’s 

consideration of PA Laughlin-Hall’s medical opinion is supported by substantial 

evidence.”); Rafael G. v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 3019935, *6 (S.D. Cal. 2022) 

(“[I]inconsistency with two similar agency consultant opinions further supports the ALJ’s 

inconsistency finding.”). The ALJ’s finding of inconsistency was also supported by 

substantial evidence—for example, Dr. Salari’s opinion that Plaintiff could only stand and 

walk for two hours in an eight-hour workday (AR at 525) conflicted with the “more 

persuasive” opinions of the state agency consultants, who opined that Plaintiff could stand 

Case 2:22-cv-00971-DWL Document 19 Filed 09/30/23 Page 11 of 22
- 12 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and walk for six hours in an eight-hour workday (id. at 27, citing id. at 89, 104). 

Given these conclusions, it is unnecessary to resolve Plaintiff’s challenges to the 

ALJ’s other reasons for discounting Dr. Salari’s opinions pursuant to the consistency 

factor. Any error (including any error regarding the ALJ’s summary of Dr. McCunniff’s 

notes) was harmless in light of the sufficiency of the ALJ’s other reasons. See, e.g., Reed 

v. Saul, 834 F. App’x 326, 329 (9th Cir. 2020) (“To the extent the ALJ erred in discounting 

the opinions of Dr. Cochran because her opinions were based in part on Reed’s self-reports 

of his symptoms, that error is harmless because the ALJ offered multiple other specific and 

legitimate reasons for discounting Dr. Cochran’s opinions.”); Baker v. Berryhill, 720 F. 

App’x 352, 355 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Two of the reasons the ALJ provided for discounting 

examining psychologist Dr. Wheeler’s opinion were not legally valid . . . [but] the ALJ 

provided other specific and legitimate reasons for discounting Dr. Wheeler’s opinion. . . . 

As a result, any error was harmless.”); Presley-Carrillo v. Berryhill, 692 F. App’x 941, 

944-45 (9th Cir. 2017) (“The ALJ also criticized Dr. Van Eerd’s opinion in part because 

Dr. Van Eerd did not define the terms ‘mild,’ ‘moderate,’ or ‘severe’ in his assessment. 

This criticism was improper . . . [but] this error was harmless because the ALJ gave a reason 

supported by the record for not giving much weight to Dr. Van Eerd’s opinion—

specifically, that it conflicted with more recent treatment notes from Dr. Mateus.”).

Turning to the supportability factor, one of the ALJ’s proffered reasons for 

discounting Dr. Salari’s opinions was that “a supportable explanation was not provided 

because there were insufficient references to medically acceptable objective clinical or 

diagnostic findings and seem to be based on the claimant’s subjective complaints.” (AR 

at 28.) This conclusion, albeit expressed with less than ideal clarity, was supported by 

substantial evidence. As discussed above, one of Dr. Salari’s opinions was that Plaintiff 

had motor loss/atrophy accompanied by sensory or reflex loss. In addition to being 

inconsistent with the objective treatment records from other medical providers (and thus 

discountable pursuant to the consistency factor), this opinion was also inconsistent with 

Dr. Salari’s own records—in the RFC questionnaire, Dr. Salari did not indicate that 

Case 2:22-cv-00971-DWL Document 19 Filed 09/30/23 Page 12 of 22
- 13 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff had an abnormal gait. (Id. at 524.) Similarly, Dr. Salari’s notes from a motor 

examination of Plaintiff indicate that Plaintiff had 5/5 strength in all lower extremities, 

with the caveat that “[p]atient subjectively complained of increased pain throughout the 

motor exam.” (Id. at 519, emphasis added.) It was rational under these circumstances for 

the ALJ to conclude that Dr. Salari’s opinions could be discounted pursuant to the 

supportability factor. 

Another of the ALJ’s proffered reasons for discounting Dr. Salari’s opinions was 

that they were internally inconsistent. (Id. at 28 [concluding that “a supportable 

explanation was not provided because,” inter alia, “[t]he March 17, 2021 form is internally 

inconsistent” and Dr. Salari offered conflicting opinions in the “form[s] dated April 21, 

2021 [which] indicated that the claimant did not meet listing 1.15 or listing 1.16”].) This 

is another permissible basis for discounting a medical source’s opinions pursuant to the 

supportability factor. See, e.g., Katherine M. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2022 WL 36891, *4 

(W.D. Wash. 2022) (“Plaintiff has not shown that the ALJ erred by finding Dr. Sciarrone’s 

opinion unpersuasive by considering the internal inconsistencies in the doctor’s opinion.”). 

See generally Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 603 (9th Cir. 1999)

(“Internal inconsistencies within Dr. Reaves’s and Dr. Grosscup’s reports . . . also 

constitute relevant evidence . . . [from which the ALJ could] discount the opinions of Dr. 

Reaves and Dr. Grosscup . . . .”). The ALJ’s finding of internal inconsistency was 

supported by substantial evidence. Although Dr. Salari opined in the Listing 1.04 

Questionnaire that Plaintiff had motor loss/atrophy accompanied by sensory or reflex loss 

(AR at 523), Dr. Salari opined in Listing Questionnaire 1.15 that Plaintiff did not have any 

“[m]uscle weakness” or “[s]ign(s) of nerve root irritation, tension, or compression, 

consistent with compromise of the affected nerve root” (id. at 551) and opined in Listing 

Questionnaire 1.16 that Plaintiff did not have any “[m]uscle weakness” or “[s]ensory nerve 

deficit . . . on electrodiagnostic testing” (id. at 553). It was rational for the ALJ to conclude 

that these opinions were inconsistent. Separately, although Dr. Salari opined in the RFC 

questionnaire that Plaintiff could only work four hours a day, Dr. Solari also concluded a 

Case 2:22-cv-00971-DWL Document 19 Filed 09/30/23 Page 13 of 22
- 14 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

few lines later that during an eight-hour day, Plaintiff could sit for four hours, stand for two 

hours, and walk for two hours. (Id. at 525.) It was also rational for the ALJ to conclude 

that these findings were internally inconsistent.

Given these conclusions, it is unnecessary to resolve Plaintiff’s challenges to the 

ALJ’s other reasons for discounting Dr. Salari’s opinions pursuant to the supportabilty 

factor. Reed, 834 F. App’x at 329; Baker, 720 F. App’x at 355; Presley-Carrillo, 692 F. 

App’x at 944-45.

B. Symptom Testimony

1. Standard Of Review

An ALJ must evaluate whether the claimant has presented objective medical 

evidence of an impairment that “could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other 

symptoms alleged.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation 

omitted). If so, “an ALJ may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on 

a lack of medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain.” Burch v. 

Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Instead, the ALJ may 

“reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of [the] symptoms” only by “offering

specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 

487, 488-89 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).

2. The ALJ’s Evaluation Of Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony

The ALJ held that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could 

reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements 

concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely 

consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons 

explained in this decision.” (AR at 25.) The ALJ then identified what the Court perceives 

to be three reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. (Id. at 25-27.)

The first reason was inconsistency with the objective medical evidence. After 

noting that “musculoskeletal examinations . . . generally showed normal, full strength of 

the bilateral upper extremities and bilateral lower extremities and no distress despite 

Case 2:22-cv-00971-DWL Document 19 Filed 09/30/23 Page 14 of 22
- 15 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

complaints,” noting that Plaintiff’s “straight-leg-raising-test was negative on March 5, 

2020,” and discussing various pieces of “diagnostic evidence,” the ALJ concluded that 

those records were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s claimed “inability to work due to chronic 

pain, numbness and tingling in bilateral lower extremities and inability to engage in 

prolonged sitting and/or standing status post several motor vehicle accidents.” (Id. at 25-

27.)

The second reason was Plaintiff’s pursuit of “only conservative and/or standard 

treatment,” which the ALJ deemed “not comparable to” the “degree of the claimant’s 

subjective complaints.” (Id. at 26-27.) In support, the ALJ cited treatment notes stating 

that Plaintiff pursued “treatment with a pain management specialist, physical therapy, and 

injections” and reported symptom relief of up to 80% after such treatments. (Id. at 26.)

The third reason was inconsistency with Plaintiff’s activities of daily living 

(“ADLs”). The ALJ found that Plaintiff “described daily activities that are not limited to 

the extent one would expect, given the complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations.” 

(Id. at 27.) For example, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff “uses a salt-water pool and kicks with 

his legs to relieve pain” and “tries to go every day, five to six days a week and is in there 

an hour and a half and then is in sauna [for a] half hour.” (Id., citation omitted.) The ALJ 

also noted that Plaintiff drives, “has to stretch two hours before he gets up,” “‘frequently 

practices’ playing guitar,” and “just flew to Seattle and sat on [an] airplane for three hours” 

after walking to the gate without a wheelchair. (Id., citations omitted.)

3. The Parties’ Arguments

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide “specific, clear, and convincing 

findings” to discredit his symptom testimony. (Doc. 13 at 16-19.) Plaintiff argues that the 

ALJ’s reasoning is flawed because (1) “[i]t was improper for the ALJ to single out ‘a few 

periods of temporary well-being from a sustained period of impairment’” when the record 

supports that he cannot “sustain activity for a full work day and work week”; (2) “Dr. 

Salari[] opined that [Plaintiff’s] reports of symptoms were entirely consistent with the 

physical examination results and with the results Dr. Salari reviewed from the [X]-Rays 

Case 2:22-cv-00971-DWL Document 19 Filed 09/30/23 Page 15 of 22
- 16 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and MRIs of [Plaintiff’s] lumbar and cervical spine” and, in contrast, “[t]he ALJ has not 

identified any specific aspect of the medical evidence which is actually inconsistent with 

any specific aspect of [Plaintiff’s] testimony”; and (3) his pursuit of conservative treatment 

methods should not be viewed as discrediting because “Dr. Salari opined that [he] had 

exhausted his conservative options for treatment and that surgery was the likely next step.”

(Id. at 17-19, cleaned up.)

In response, the Commissioner contends that “the ALJ [properly] discounted 

Plaintiff’s subjective symptom complaints because of inconsistencies with (1) objective 

medical and other evidence, (2) improvements through conservative treatment, and (3) 

activities of daily living.” (Doc. 17 at 6.) More specifically, the Commissioner first argues 

that Plaintiff’s testimony was inconsistent with the objective medical evidence because 

although Plaintiff testified that he could not “engage in prolonged sitting and/or standing,” 

medical evidence demonstrated that (1) “Plaintiff could sit, stand, walk, and balance 

frequently; he could also reach, stoop, and crouch occasionally”; (2) despite one recent 

positive straight leg raising (“SLR”) test in 2021, Plaintiff had a negative balance test, 

several negative SLRs in 2020, “normal gait,” and “demonstrated ‘5/5 motor strength in 

all muscle groups of the lower extremities’ and intact sensation”; and (3) Plaintiff did not 

have “muscle wasting or atrophy.” (Id. at 6-7, cleaned up.) Regarding treatment, the 

Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s analysis did not “single[] out periods of temporary 

well-being from a sustained period of impairment,” but rather considered Plaintiff’s 

limitations and improvements over time and concluded that Plaintiff’s improvements over 

time with “conservative and/or standard treatment” demonstrated “that the degree of the 

claimant’s subjective complaints is not comparable to the extent of treatment sought by the 

claimant.” (Id. at 7-9, citations omitted.) Regarding ADLs, the Commissioner argues that 

“[t]he ALJ found that Plaintiff’s reported activities were inconsistent with the severity of 

his subjective symptom complaints.” (Id. at 9-10, citation omitted.)

In reply, Plaintiff essentially reiterates the arguments from the opening brief, 

specifically that (1) “[Plaintiff’s] testimony is consistent with the opinion and objective 

Case 2:22-cv-00971-DWL Document 19 Filed 09/30/23 Page 16 of 22
- 17 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

evidence included in the report from his examining doctor, Dr. Salari”; (2) Plaintiff’s 

conservative treatments “have not provided significant, ongoing relief of his pain, and 

[Plaintiff’s] doctors have noted that surgery is likely next”; and (3) Plaintiff’s testimony is 

consistent with Plaintiff’s ADLs. (Doc. 18 at 4-6.)

4. Analysis

The Court finds no harmful error in the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s symptom 

testimony.

First, it was permissible for the ALJ to discount Plaintiff’s symptom testimony on 

the ground that it was inconsistent with the objective medical evidence in the record. 

Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(“Contradiction with the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the claimant’s 

subjective testimony.”) (citation omitted). Although this may not serve as an ALJ’s sole 

reason for discounting a claimant’s symptom testimony, it is a permissible consideration 

when (as here) it is coupled with other grounds for an adverse credibility finding. Smartt 

v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 498 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Claimants like Smartt sometimes 

mischaracterize [Ninth Circuit law] as completely forbidding an ALJ from using 

inconsistent objective medical evidence in the record to discount subjective symptom 

testimony. That is a misreading of [Ninth Circuit law]. When objective medical evidence 

in the record is inconsistent with the claimant’s subjective testimony, the ALJ may indeed 

weigh it as undercutting such testimony. We have upheld ALJ decisions that do just that 

in many cases.”) (citations omitted); Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 

2001) (“While subjective pain testimony cannot be rejected on the sole ground that it is not 

fully corroborated by objective medical evidence, the medical evidence is still a relevant 

factor in determining the severity of the claimant’s pain and its disabling effects.”).

The ALJ’s finding of inconsistency with the objective medical evidence is supported 

by substantial evidence. As the Commissioner notes, the ALJ specifically identified 

medical examinations that “generally showed normal, full strength of the bilateral upper 

extremities and bilateral lower extremities and no distress despite complaints.” (AR at 25, 

Case 2:22-cv-00971-DWL Document 19 Filed 09/30/23 Page 17 of 22
- 18 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

citing 344-45, 350, 385, 475-98, 500.) It was rational for the ALJ to conclude that such 

examination results were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s hearing testimony that he “can hardly 

do anything,” experiences extreme pain from squatting (“probably the most painful thing 

to do is squat down to the floor”), and cannot even pour a glass of wine without his hands 

shaking. (Id. at 50, 63.) Although Plaintiff attempts to explain how the cited records could 

be construed as consistent with his symptom testimony, it was rational for the ALJ to 

conclude otherwise. Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014) (“When 

evidence reasonably supports either confirming or reversing the ALJ’s decision, we may 

not substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ.”) (citation omitted).

Another of the ALJ’s proffered reasons for the adverse credibility finding was 

inconsistency between Plaintiff’s symptom testimony and Plaintiff’s ADLs. This, too, is 

a permissible basis for an adverse credibility finding under Ninth Circuit law. Molina v. 

Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he ALJ may consider inconsistencies 

. . . between the testimony and the claimant’s conduct . . . and whether the claimant engages 

in daily activities inconsistent with the alleged symptoms. . . . Even where those activities 

suggest some difficulty functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant’s 

testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment.”) 

(cleaned up); Fry v. Berryhill, 749 F. App’x 659, 660 (9th Cir. 2019) (“The ALJ proffered 

specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discounting Fry’s testimony concerning the 

severity of her symptoms, including inconsistencies between her daily activities and 

alleged limitations . . . .”).

The ALJ’s finding of inconsistency between Plaintiff’s testimony and ADLs was 

supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff asserted in his function reports that his “range 

of motion is very limited [and] causes pain when moving [his] neck” and that he “cannot 

sit for long periods or stand for long periods.” (AR at 233-34.) However, Plaintiff 

elsewhere acknowledged that he can drive for between 30 minutes to “[an hour] or so,”

stretches daily for two hours, helps with household chores, swims for physical therapy fiveto-six days a week, and plays guitar. (Id. at 50 [stretches]; id. at 52 [household activities]; 

Case 2:22-cv-00971-DWL Document 19 Filed 09/30/23 Page 18 of 22
- 19 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

id. at 53 [guitar]; id. at 57-58 [swimming]; id. at 235 [driving]; id. at 470 [guitar].) 

Although Plaintiff emphasizes, when describing these activities, that his ability to perform 

them is limited—he only played three songs on the guitar three months ago and while 

swimming, he uses a pool noodle (id. at 53, 58)—it was still rational for the ALJ to 

conclude that Plaintiff’s ability to perform those activities in even a limited fashion was 

inconsistent with Plaintiff’s more extreme description of his limitations. The Ninth Circuit 

has recognized that “[i]nconsistencies between a claimant’s testimony and the claimant’s 

reported activities provide a valid reason for an adverse credibility determination.” Burrell 

v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2014). This makes sense—a factfinder is 

entitled to discount the credibility of a witness who has been shown to have testified in a 

false or exaggerated manner even if the impeaching material does not, on its own, foreclose 

the claim for relief. See also Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001)

(recognizing that a “tendency to exaggerate” is a “specific and convincing reason[]” for 

discrediting a claimant’s testimony); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(“To determine whether the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms 

is credible, the ALJ may consider . . . ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such 

as . . . prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other testimony by the 

claimant that appears less than candid . . . .”). See generally 9th Cir. Model Jury Ins. 1.14 

(“[I]f you decide that a witness has deliberately testified untruthfully about something 

important, you may choose not to believe anything that witness said.”). Perhaps a different 

factfinder might have declined to find inconsistency under these circumstances, but 

“[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which 

supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 

954 (citation omitted).

Given these conclusions, it is unnecessary to decide whether the ALJ’s third 

proffered reason for discounting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony—inconsistency with 

Plaintiff’s conservative course of treatment—was also supported by substantial evidence. 

Any error as to that issue was harmless because the ALJ identified multiple other clear and 

Case 2:22-cv-00971-DWL Document 19 Filed 09/30/23 Page 19 of 22
- 20 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

convincing reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for discrediting Plaintiff’s 

testimony. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (“[S]everal of our cases have held that an ALJ’s error 

was harmless where the ALJ provided one or more invalid reasons for disbelieving a 

claimant’s testimony, but also provided valid reasons that were supported by the record.”) 

(citations omitted); Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1162-63 (“Because we conclude that two of the 

ALJ’s reasons supporting his adverse credibility finding are invalid, we must determine 

whether the ALJ’s reliance on such reasons was harmless error. . . . [T]he relevant inquiry 

in this context is not whether the ALJ would have made a different decision absent any 

error, it is whether the ALJ’s decision remains legally valid, despite such error. . . . Here, 

the ALJ’s decision finding Carmickle less than fully credible is valid, despite the errors 

identified above.”) (citation omitted).

C. Lay Witness Testimony

1. The Parties’ Arguments

Plaintiff notes that his wife, Shari Short, and his friend, Richard Smokovich, each 

completed “questionnaire[s] describing [his] limitations.” (Doc. 13 at 19-20.) Plaintiff 

further notes that the ALJ seemed to cross-reference the ALJ’s rationale for discrediting 

Plaintiff’s symptom testimony when explaining why the ALJ was not fully crediting those 

third-party statements. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that because “the ALJ’s rationale for 

discrediting [Plaintiff’s] own testimony was legally inadequate,” that rationale was 

“equally inadequate as applied to the statements of these witnesses.” (Id. at 20-21.) 

According to Plaintiff, the ALJ failed “to base the rejection of the lay witness statements 

on the record and to give specific and legitimate reasons germane to each witness,” 

meaning “[t]here is no reliable evidence to support the ALJ’s contrary conclusion” that the 

lay witnesses’ statements are inconsistent with the record. (Id. at 21.)

In response, the Commissioner argues that “ALJs are not required to articulate how 

they consider evidence from non-medical sources” under the new regulations. (Doc. 17 at 

14.) Alternatively, the Commissioner argues that affirmance is required because “[e]ven 

if the ALJ had not provided any discussion of the nonmedical source statements, the alleged 

Case 2:22-cv-00971-DWL Document 19 Filed 09/30/23 Page 20 of 22
- 21 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

error would have been harmless because the nonmedical source statements are substantially 

the same as Plaintiff’s subjective symptom complaints, which the ALJ provided good 

reasons for discounting.” (Id. at 15, cleaned up.)

In reply, Plaintiff essentially reiterates the arguments from his opening brief. (Doc. 

18 at 6-7.)

2. Analysis

Plaintiff is not entitled to reversal based on his arguments regarding the lay witness 

statements. As an initial matter, the Court notes that the Ninth Circuit has not definitively 

resolved whether ALJs must continue, following the issuance of the new SSA regulations 

in 2017, to provide reasons for rejecting lay-witness statements. Lower courts have 

reached conflicting decisions on that issue. Compare Stricker v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 2022 WL 3588215, *6 (D. Ariz. 2022) (“Pursuant to Ninth Circuit caselaw 

from 1993, ‘[i]f the ALJ wishes to discount the testimony of the lay witnesses, he must 

give reasons that are germane to each witness’. . . . Defendant argues that caselaw no 

longer applies because the regulations have changed . . . [but] [t]his regulatory change does 

not provide that an ALJ need not articulate any reason for discounting evidence from lay 

witnesses, it only states that the ALJ’s consideration need not follow the requirements for 

evaluating medical opinions. This regulatory change is not inconsistent with the Ninth 

Circuit’s germane-reasons standard.”) (citations omitted) with Wendy J. C. v. Saul, 2020 

WL 6161402, *12 n.9 (D. Or. 2020) (“The new regulations provide the ALJ is ‘not required 

to articulate how [they] considered evidence from nonmedical sources . . . .’ As such, the 

ALJ is no longer required to provide reasons germane to lay witnesses to reject their 

testimony.”) (citations omitted).

Nevertheless, even assuming the reasoning requirement remains intact, the Ninth 

Circuit has recognized that the failure to provide such reasoning is harmless where (1) the 

ALJ provided legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the claimant’s symptom testimony 

and (2) the lay witness did not describe any limitations beyond those identified by the 

claimant. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1122 (“Here, the ALJ failed to explain her reasons for 

Case 2:22-cv-00971-DWL Document 19 Filed 09/30/23 Page 21 of 22
- 22 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

rejecting the lay witnesses’ testimony. That testimony, however, did not describe any 

limitations beyond those Molina herself described, which the ALJ discussed at length and 

rejected based on well-supported, clear and convincing reasons. . . . Because the ALJ had 

validly rejected all the limitations described by the lay witnesses in discussing Molina’s 

testimony, we are confident that the ALJ’s failure to give specific witness-by-witness 

reasons for rejecting the lay testimony did not alter the ultimate nondisability 

determination. Accordingly, the ALJ’s error was harmless.”). 

Here, the ALJ satisfied both conditions required for discrediting lay witnesses—the 

ALJ’s rationale for discrediting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony was legally valid, for the 

reasons stated in Part IV.B above, and the third-party statements did not identify any 

limitations beyond those Plaintiff identified via his own testimony. (AR at 50-70

[Plaintiff’s testimony]; id. at 283-89 [wife’s report]; id. at 290-96 [friend’s report].) 

Indeed, Plaintiff does not suggest that his wife’s and friend’s statements described any 

limitations beyond those he identified—his argument is that because the ALJ’s rationale 

for discrediting him was legally insufficient, that rationale was also legally insufficient as 

applied to the lay witnesses. For the reasons stated above, that argument is unavailing.

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the ALJ is affirmed. The Clerk shall enter 

judgment accordingly and terminate this action.

Dated this 30th day of September, 2023.

Case 2:22-cv-00971-DWL Document 19 Filed 09/30/23 Page 22 of 22