Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00850/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00850-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1 Eastern District L.R. 78-230(k) provides the procedural

rule for filing a motion for reconsideration of “any motion . . .

granted or denied in whole or in part.”

2 Plaintiffs inappropriately filed this motion pursuant

to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However,

Rule 60(b) provides the procedural rule for filing a motion for

relief from final judgment, and is therefore, not applicable. 

See Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 869 F.2d 461, 466-67

(9th Cir. 1989). The court’s Order granted in part and denied in

part defendants’ motion for summary judgment. As such, Rule

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

MARK J. HANSEN, et al.,

NO. CIV. S-02-0850 FCD GGH

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ARTHUR SCHUBERT, et al.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on plaintiffs’ motion for

reconsideration of this court’s September 28, 2006 Memorandum and

Order (“Order”) pursuant to Eastern District Local Rule 78-

230(k)1 and Rule 54(b)2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

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54(b) provides the appropriate procedural rule for this motion as

the court’s order adjudicated “fewer than all the claims . . . of

fewer than all the parties.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 54(b). 

Nonetheless, despite the procedural defect, the court will

interpret plaintiffs’ motion as a motion for reconsideration

under Rule 54(b).

3 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

4 The facts of this case are set forth in the court’s

Memorandum and Order, filed September 28, 2006. (Docket # 102).

2

or, in the alternative, certification of an immediate

interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b). Plaintiffs also

seek leave to file a third amended complaint. Because the court

has previously entered a scheduling order providing that “[n]o

further amendments to pleadings without leave of court, good

cause having been shown,” (Docket No. 7, filed Aug. 5, 2002),

plaintiffs are also implicitly seeking a modification of the

Pretrial Scheduling Order pursuant to Rule 16 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants oppose these motions. For

the reasons set forth below,3 plaintiffs’ motions are DENIED.4 

A. Reconsideration

The court’s Order granted in part and denied in part

defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs argue that

this court should reconsider its Order as it relates to two

issues for which defendants’ motion for summary judgment was

granted. First, plaintiffs argue that the court did not conduct

the proper proportionality analysis regarding the manner of the

execution of the warrant. Second, plaintiffs argue that the

court erred in finding that defendant Schubert’s affidavit

established probable cause for the search at issue in this case. 

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5 While the standards applicable to motions for

reconsideration of final judgments or orders under Rules

59(e)(final judgments) and 60(b)(final judgments and orders)

technically do not delimit the court’s inherent discretion to

reconsider interlocutory orders, the court nonetheless finds them

to be helpful guides to the exercise its discretion.

3

An order that resolves fewer than all of the claims among

all of the parties “is subject to revision at any time before the

entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and

liabilities of all the parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); 18B

Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice &

Procedure § 4478 (2d Ed. 2005) (while authorized, reconsideration

of interlocutory orders disfavored). Where reconsideration of a

non-final order is sought, the court has “inherent jurisdiction

to modify, alter or revoke it.” United States v. Martin, 226

F.3d 1042, 1048-49. (9th Cir. 2000), cert denied, 121 S. Ct. 1671

(2001). To succeed in a motion to reconsider, a party must set

forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the

court to reverse its prior decision. See, e.g., Kern-Tulare

Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F. Supp. 656, 665 (E.D.

Cal.1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 828

F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988).

Generally, and absent highly unusual circumstances,

reconsideration is appropriate only where (1) the party presents

the court with newly discovered evidence, (2) the court committed

clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, (3)

there is an intervening change in controlling law.5 See Sch.

Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Oregon v. ACANDS, Inc., 5 F.3d

1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993).

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6 Plaintiffs assert that the court improperly held that

they did not have a claim for the alleged unlawful seizure of

ashes. (Pls.’ Mot. at 4 n.1). Plaintiffs rely on the court’s

decision in Rutherford v. Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444, 1448 (9th Cir.

1986), asserting that this claim must proceed to trial even if

plaintiffs cannot identify the specific officers involved. In

Rutherford, the plaintiff testified that the defendant police

officers were among the five or six officers who were surrounding

him while he was beaten and that he saw each of their faces while

he was beaten. Id. However, the plaintiff could not

specifically state whether the defendants punched or kicked him. 

Id. The Ninth Circuit found that a jury could reasonably infer

that the named officers were participants in the plaintiff’s

beating and that summary judgment was inappropriate. Id. 

In this case, plaintiff Kelly Bartaldo testified at her

deposition that she saw that ashes from the urn were being put in

a plastic bag by a man with hair who was taller than she was and

who wore a vest. (Dep. of Kelly Bartaldo at 132:4-133:9). She

4

Turning to plaintiffs’ first issue, plaintiffs argue that

“the court did not address the issue of the reasonableness of the

manner of execution of the warrant directly, as it was required

to do.” (Pls.’ Mot. for Recons. (“Pls.’ Mot.”), filed Oct. 27,

2006, at 4). The court addressed this issue. (See Order at 18-

24). Plaintiffs argue that the order “did not consider the level

of intrusiveness of the search.” (Pls.’ Mot. at 5). The court

also addressed this issue. (See Order at 24-26). 

Plaintiffs assert, with great vehemence and a degree of

disdain, that they disagree with the court’s findings. This is

not grounds for the grant of reconsideration. Plaintiffs

advanced arguments in their motion for reconsideration identical

to the arguments they advanced in their opposition to defendants’

motion for summary judgment. The court found these arguments

unpersuasive then and unpersuasive now. In sum, plaintiffs

simply offer no new evidence or legal support for their

contention that the court committed clear error.6

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did not identify who was in the room or whether any of the named

defendants were present. As such, this case is readily

distinguishable from the facts of Rutherford. Further, Kelly

Bartaldo did not testify nor was there any evidence that any

defendant actually seized the ashes. 

7 In a footnote, plaintiffs also assert that they “are

entitled to have a jury decide whether defendant Schubert should

be held responsible for constitutional violations at the Hansen

and Lancaster homes” because he misled officers through “his

false and baseless comments.” (Pls.’ Mot. at 4 n.2). 

Plaintiff’s rely on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Baldwin v.

Placer County, 418 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2005). In Baldwin, plaintiffs presented evidence, in the form of thirteen

declarations from other individuals whose trash was searched,

that the defendant officer’s affidavit supporting probable cause

contained lies. In this case, plaintiffs did not present

evidence sufficient to create a triable issue of fact that

Schubert made false and baseless comments in his affidavit or to

the officers executing the warrant. As such, Baldwin is

inapplicable.

5

Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration regarding their

contention that the court did not adequately address the manner

of the execution of the warrant is DENIED.

Turning to plaintiffs’ second issue, plaintiffs argue that

the court erred in finding that defendant Schubert’s affidavit

established probable cause to issue a search warrant.7

 (Pls.’

Mot. at 6). Specifically, plaintiffs assert that (1) the

affidavit does not establish the reliability of the informant;

(2) the affidavit does not contain adequate underlying

circumstances on which the CI based his beliefs; and (3)

additional information did not corroborate the allegations of the

CI. Plaintiffs’ counsel concludes that the court’s analysis of

certain issues was “wrong-headed on every possible level.” 

(Pls.’ Mot. at 12). While the court is appreciative of counsel’s

personal assessment, as with the first issue, plaintiffs’ counsel

utterly fails to support the motion for reconsideration with new

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6

evidence or argument. Rather, counsel merely complains that the

court did not get it right. Such petulance has no place in a

serious discussion of the 4th Amendment, nor is it a substitute

for an understanding of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration regarding their

contention that the court erred in finding that defendant

Schubert’s affidavit established probable cause is DENIED. 

B. Interlocutory Appeal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)

In the alternative, plaintiffs request that the court

certify these two issues for immediate interlocutory appeal. The

general rule is that an appellate court should not review a

district court ruling until after entry of a final judgment. 

Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 474 (1978); In re

Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1982),

aff’d sub nom. Arizona v. Ash Grove Cement Co., 459 U.S. 1190

(1983); see 28 U.S.C. § 1291. There is however, an exception to

this general rule: 

When a district judge, in making in a civil action an

order not otherwise appealable under this section,

shall be of the opinion that such order involves a

controlling question of law as to which there is

substantial ground for difference of opinion and that

an immediate appeal from the order may materially

advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he

shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of

Appeals . . . may thereupon . . . permit an appeal . .

. if application is made to it within ten days . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). An interlocutory appeal should be granted

“only in exceptional situations in which allowing [such an

appeal] would avoid protracted and expensive litigation.” In re

Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d at 1026 (citing U.S. Rubber Co.

v. Wright, 359 F.2d 784, 785 (9th Cir. 1966)). The party seeking

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7

certification of an interlocutory appeal has the burden to show

the presence of those exceptional circumstances. Coopers &

Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 474-75.

Section 1292 identifies three factors that must be present

in order for the court to certify an appeal. First, the issue to

be certified must involve a controlling issue of law. An issue

is “controlling” if “resolution of the issue on appeal could

materially affect the outcome of litigation in the district

court.” In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d at 1026 (citing

U.S. Rubber Co. v. Wright, 359 F.2d at 785). Second, there must

be substantial ground for difference of opinion on that issue. A

party’s strong disagreement with the court’s ruling is not

sufficient for there to be a “substantial ground for difference”;

the proponent of an appeal must make some greater showing. See

First Am. Corp. v. Al-Nahyan, 948 F. Supp. 1107, 1116 (D.D.C.

1996) (“Mere disagreement, even if vehement, with a court’s

ruling on a motion to dismiss does not establish a ‘substantial

ground for difference of opinion’ sufficient to satisfy the

statutory requirements for an interlocutory appeal.”). Third, an

interlocutory appeal must be likely to materially speed the

termination of the litigation. This factor is linked to whether

an issue of law is “controlling” in that the court should

consider the effect of a reversal by the court of appeals on the

management of the case. See In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673

F.2d at 1026.

As apparently is their wont, plaintiffs again fail to

address the substantive requirements for granting their request,

except for conclusory assertions. (Pls.’ Mot. at 2). However,

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8

assuming that the first factor is met, plaintiffs have not shown

that there is a “substantial ground for difference of opinion.” 

Rather, the only ground that plaintiffs’ counsel implicitly rely

upon is his own opinions of the court’s findings. This is hardly

sufficient to certify an issue for interlocutory appeal.

Further, certification of any issues in this case would not

serve the goal of § 1292(b) to avoid protracted and expensive

litigation. The complaint in this case was filed on April 19,

2002. (Docket # 1). Over the next four years, both plaintiffs

and defendants filed various motions, including motions to stay

this action due to pending criminal investigations. Discovery in

this case was conducted and closed on June 27, 2006. On

September 28, 2006, the court entered its Order, granting in part

and denying in part defendants’ motion for summary judgment. A

jury trial is currently set in this matter for March 27, 2007. 

This litigation has been protracted for over four years. Now,

after dispositive motions have been filed and ruled upon by the

court, and the issues are ready for trial in March, defendants

seek certification for interlocutory appeal of two issues. This

is not the exceptional case which Congress contemplated in

enacting § 1292(b). 

Plaintiffs’ motion for certification for interlocutory

appeal is DENIED. 

C. Leave to Amend

Finally, plaintiffs seek leave to file a third amended

complaint. Plaintiffs seek to add a new claim based upon their

allegation that the search warrant at issue in this case was so

overbroad that it violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

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8 To rely solely on Rule 15 after a pretrial scheduling

order has been entered would “render scheduling orders

meaningless and effectively would read Rule 16(b) and its good

cause requirement out of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 

Sosa v. Airprint Systems, Inc., 133 F.3d 1417, 1419 (11th Cir.

1998); see also Mammoth Recreations, 975 F.2d at 610 (adopting

Rule 15's standards for amending the complaint would “undermine

the court’s ability to control its docket, disrupt the agreedupon course of the litigation, and reward the indolent and the

cavalier”); Eckert Cold Storage, 943 F. Supp. at 1232 n.3.

9

Once the court has entered a pretrial scheduling order

pursuant to Rule 16, the standards of Rule 16 rather than Rule 15

govern amendment of the pleadings. See Johnson v. Mammoth

Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th Cir. 1992); Eckert

Cold Storage, Inc. v. Behl, 943 F. Supp. 1230, 1232-33 (E.D. Cal.

1996).8 A scheduling order is not “a frivolous piece of paper,

idly entered, which can be cavalierly disregarded by counsel

without peril.” Gestetner Corp. v. Case Equip. Co., 108 F.R.D.

138, 141 (D. Me. 1985). Orders entered before the final pretrial

conference may be modified only “upon a showing of good cause.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b). The good cause requirement of Rule 16

primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the

amendment. 

When evaluating whether a party was diligently, the Ninth

Circuit has determined that “the focus of the inquiry is upon the

moving party’s reasons for modification. If that party was not

diligent, the inquiry should end.” Id. at 610. When the

proposed modification is an amendment to the pleadings, the

moving party may establish good cause by showing “(1) that [he or

she] was diligent in assisting the court in creating a workable

Rule 16 order; (2) that [his or her] noncompliance with a rule 16

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deadline occurred or will occur, notwithstanding [his or her]

diligent efforts to comply, because of the development of matters

which could not have been reasonably foreseen or anticipated at

the time of the Rule 16 scheduling conference; and (3) that [he

or she] was diligent in seeking amendment of the Rule 16 order,

once it became apparent that [he or she] could not comply with

the order.” Jackson v. Laureate, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 605, 608 (E.D.

Cal. 1999)(citations omitted). 

Only after the moving party has demonstrated diligence under

Rule 16 does the court apply the standard under Rule 15 to

determine whether the amendment was proper. See Mammoth

Recreations, 975 F.2d at 608; Eckert Cold Storage, 943 F. Supp.

at 1232 n.3.

As an initial matter, plaintiffs once again fail to discuss

the substantive requirements of the applicable federal rule, in

this case Rule 16, in their motion for leave to amend. However,

plaintiff’s counsel states that, “[i]n reading the Court’s

Memorandum and Order, dated September 28, 2006, co-counsel and I

were alerted to the fact that the Second Amended Complaint does

not expressly state a claim that the search warrant is

constitutionally overbroad.” (Decl. of Michael S. Sorgen in

Supp. of Mot. to File Third Am. Compl., filed Oct. 27, 2006, ¶

2). Plaintiffs’ counsel did not acknowledge his own glaring

omission until the court pointed it out in its Order. Now, after

the dispositive motion deadline has long passed, plaintiffs’

counsel’s belated effort hardly demonstrates the requisite

diligence required by Rule 16. See Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co.,

232 F.3d 1271, 1294-95 (9th Cir. 2000) (denying the plaintiffs’

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motion to modify the pretrial scheduling order to allow amendment

to the complaint where the motion was filed at the time of the

plaintiffs’ reply to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment

and where plaintiffs had knowledge of facts giving rise to the

claim at least one year prior to the filing of the motion). 

Further, even if plaintiffs’ counsel could demonstrate good

cause to amend the Pretrial Scheduling Order pursuant to Rule 16,

plaintiffs cannot satisfy even the liberal requirements of Rule

15. Pursuant to Rule 15(a), “leave [to amend] is to be freely

given when justice so requires.” “[L]eave to amend should be

granted unless amendment would cause prejudice to the opposing

party, is sought in bad faith, is futile, or creates undue

delay.” Martinez v. Newport Beach, 125 F.3d 777, 785 (9th Cir.

1997). In this case, granting plaintiffs leave to file an

amended complaint would cause undue delay and prejudice. 

Discovery has been completed. Dispositive motions have been

ruled upon. The jury trial is set for March 27, 2007. The facts

underlying the proposed additional claim have been known to

plaintiffs since the inception of the litigation in April 2002. 

Plaintiffs had four years to file this motion to amend their

complaint and failed to do so. Now, a few months before trial,

plaintiffs seek to add a new claim. In light of such

unexplained, dilatory conduct of plaintiffs’ counsel, justice

does not require such an amendment. See Acri v. Int’l Ass’n of

Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 781 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1986)

(denying leave to amend under Rule 15, stating that “late

amendments to assert new theories are not reviewed favorably when 

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the facts and the theory have been known to the party seeking

amendment since the inception of the cause of action”). 

Plaintiffs’ motion to amend the pretrial scheduling order

and for leave to file a third amended complaint is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 20, 2006

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