Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01926/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01926-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

GENGHIS KHAN ALI 

STEVENSON, 

 Petitioner,

v. 

JEFFEREY BEARD, 

 Respondent. 

Case No.: 15-cv-1926-DMS-MDD 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF 

UNITED STATES 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE: 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States 

District Judge Dana M. Sabraw pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and 

Local Civil Rule 72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of California. 

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS the 

Petition be DISMISSED. 

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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

A. Federal Proceedings 

 Genghis Khan Ali Stevenson (“Petitioner”) is a state prisoner 

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 4).1 On August 

26, 2015, Petitioner constructively filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 against Jefferey Beard 

(“Respondent”). (ECF No. 1). Petitioner claims that: (1) the procedure 

used by the California Department of Corrections to calculate his timeserved credits was misapplied, effectively extending his sentence and 

thereby violating his Due Process and Equal Protection rights; (2) his 

trial counsel failed to bargain for fifty percent time-served credits; and 

(3) the Court should grant him an evidentiary hearing. (Id. at 5-7).

On December 21, 2015, Respondent filed an Answer, 

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support thereof, and state 

court lodgments. (ECF Nos. 11, 11-1, 12). On January 21, 2016, 

Petitioner filed a Traverse. (ECF No. 13). 

II. BACKGROUND FACTS 

 In 2001, Petitioner was convicted of robbery with use of a firearm 

in violation of California Penal Code § 211. (ECF No. 1 at 19; Lodg. 1). 

Petitioner was sentenced to fourteen years with an expected release 

date in July 2014. (ECF No. 13 at 1 ¶ 1). Petitioner was eligible for a 

fifteen percent time-served credit on his robbery sentence. (ECF No. 1 

at 19). 

 

1 Pagination refers to the CM/ECF document not the native 

document. 

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 On February 28, 2006, Petitioner pled no contest to a charge of 

custodial possession of a weapon in violation of California Penal Code § 

4502(a). (Id. at 31). Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to six years 

as a second striker under California’s three strikes law, California 

Penal Code §§ 1170.12(a)-(d), 667(b)-(i). (Id. at 19, 22, 26, 31). This sixyear term was to run consecutively with Petitioner’s fourteen-year 

robbery sentence. (Id. at 32). In May 2006, Petitioner filed petitions for 

writ of habeas corpus in state and federal court challenging the 

possession conviction by asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. 

(ECF No. 13 at 5 ¶ 6). Both the state and federal petitions were denied. 

(Id.). 

 Petitioner states that every time he gains or loses time-served 

credits in prison, he receives a “Legal Status Summary Sheet” which 

advises him of the time-served credits accrued towards his sentence. 

(Id. at 5-6 ¶ 7). Petitioner attaches the June 2, 2014, Legal Status 

Summary showing the “credit rate” for the possession conviction as “2nd 

Striker 20%/33.3%” and refers to the “Tate decision.”2 (ECF No. 1 at 

32). 

In December 2012, Petitioner states that he passed the General 

Education Exam and therefore believed he was eligible for “Milestone 

Completion Credits” entitling him to six weeks of credit. (ECF No. 13 

at 6 ¶ 8). Petitioner was advised that although he may not be eligible to 

apply those six weeks to his prior robbery sentence, he may be able to 

apply them towards his possession sentence. (Id.). 

 

2 In re Tate, 135 Cal. App. 4th 756 (2006). 

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 In January 2013, Petitioner was informed of the time-served 

credits he was eligible to receive. (Id. ¶ 9). Petitioner states that the 

case records manager was confused because there were conflicting 

documents in his record that stated differing time-served credit 

percentages for his possession sentence. (Id.). Petitioner asserts that 

some documents listed fifty percent and others twenty percent. (Id.). 

On January 9, 2013, Petitioner filed an inmate appeal seeking 

clarification of his time-served credit percentage and also to exhaust his 

administrative remedies so that he could seek judicial review of his 

time-served credit calculation. (Id.; Lodg. 3 at 27). 

 On January 17, 2013, Petitioner’s First Level Appeal was partially 

granted for the purposes of exhausting administrative remedies. (Lodg. 

3 at 32). The First Level Response found that Petitioner was only 

entitled to twenty percent time-served credit for his possession sentence 

and that Petitioner’s calculated release date was May 17, 2019. (Id. at 

30). 

 Petitioner appealed, and on March 7, 2013, his Second Level 

Response was partially granted because a “Computation 

Review/Haygood Hearing” was held. 3 (Id. at 33-34). Petitioner was 

again advised that he was only eligible for twenty percent time-served 

credit on his possession sentence, and that his calculated release date 

was May 17, 2019. (Id.). Petitioner states he sought a calculation of his 

Earliest Possible Release Date (“EPRD”) in March 2013, and that he 

was notified during the Computation Review/Haygood Hearing on 

 

3 Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1985). 

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March 7, 2013, that he was only eligible for twenty percent time-served 

credit for his possession sentence. (ECF No. 1 at 6-7). 

 Petitioner appealed, and on July 15, 2013, his Third Level Appeal 

was denied. (Lodg. 3 at 29). The Third Level Response affirmed both 

the calculation of Petitioner’s EPRD of May 17, 2019, and Petitioner’s 

twenty percent time-served credit eligibility for his possession sentence. 

(Id.). Petitioner thus exhausted his administrative remedies. (Id. at 

31). 

 On October 18, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus in Imperial County Superior Court. (Lodg. 3 at 17). Petitioner 

argued that based upon In re Tate, he was eligible for day-to-day (fifty 

percent) time-served credit for his possession sentence. (Id. at 18). The 

court found that Petitioner’s twenty percent time-served credit 

eligibility was accurate because Petitioner was sentenced under the 

three strikes law for his possession offense. (Id. at 19). The court 

distinguished In re Tate on the grounds that, unlike Petitioner, Tate 

had entered into a plea agreement not governed by the three-strikes 

law. (Id.). On November 7, 2013, the superior court denied the petition. 

(Id. at 18). 

 On January 22, 2014, Petitioner filed a second habeas petition 

with the California Court of Appeal. (Lodg. 1). Petitioner again argued 

he was entitled to day-to-day time-served credit under In re Tate. (Id.). 

On February 11, 2014, the Court of Appeal denied the petition on the 

merits. (Lodg. 3 at 16). The Court of Appeal found that Petitioner was 

sentenced under the three strikes law and was only eligible for twenty 

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percent time-served credit. (Id.). The court distinguished Tate because, 

unlike Petitioner, Tate had bargained for the day-to-day time-served 

credit under the negotiated plea. (Id.). 

 On June 10, 2014, Petitioner filed a third petition with the 

California Supreme Court. (Lodg. 2). Petitioner raised the same 

arguments regarding the calculation of his time-served credits as his 

prior state habeas petitions. (Lodg. 3 at 10-11). On August 13, 2014, 

the California Supreme Court denied the petition without comment or 

citation. (Id. at 7). 

 In his Traverse, Petitioner claims that between January 2013 and 

August 2015, the prison where he is incarcerated had intermittent 

lockdowns of various lengths. (ECF No. 13 at 6-7 ¶ 10). Petitioner 

alleges “[there] [were] over five major lockdowns that lasted over two 

months, over ten minor lockdowns that last[ed] two weeks and 

countless 24-hour lockdowns.” (Id.). Petitioner asserts that during 

these lockdowns he did not have “Priority Legal User” status, which 

denied him priority access to the law library, legal materials and legal 

mailing. (Id. at 14). Petitioner states that non-Priority Legal Users 

were put into a lottery system for access during lockdowns, but often 

only Priority Legal Users were granted access, leading to the gaps in 

Petitioner’s state filings. (Id. at 14-15). 

III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 

A. Petitioner’s Arguments 

In his Petition, Petitioner argues that the state courts misapplied 

the law to his time-served credits. (ECF No. 1 at 5-7). In his Traverse, 

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Petitioner further argues that the Petition is timely under the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). (ECF No. 13 at 2). Petitioner argues that he 

always believed that he was entitled to day-to-day time-served credits 

for his possession sentence based upon Legal Status Summaries and 

court documents he received. (Id. at 13). Petitioner asserts that he is 

entitled to statutory tolling because he did not discover the factual 

predicate underlying this Petition until March 2013, although he filed 

an inmate appeal concerning the calculation of his time-served credits 

in January 2013. (Id.). Petitioner further claims that he was unable to 

file his first state habeas petition in superior court prior to October 2013 

because he was transferred to another prison in August 2013 for a civil 

trial and was not transferred back to his place of usual incarceration 

until September 2013.4 (Id. at 14). 

 Petitioner also argues that the statute of limitations did not run 

against him in the gaps between filing his state petitions because the 

intervals between a lower court petition being denied and the filing of a 

new petition in a higher court are considered within the statutory scope 

of the word “pending,” and thus tolled AEDPA’s statute of limitations. 

(Id. at 15). 

 Petitioner additionally argues that he is entitled to equitable 

tolling because the intermittent prison lockdowns constituted 

 

4 Case No. 3:11-cv-103-LAB-EVG. In that action, Petitioner was 

the plaintiff and pursued that action pro se through trial, disposition 

and post-trial motions. (Id.). 

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circumstances that were beyond his control and which denied him 

access to prison legal materials. (Id. at 16). Petitioner contends he 

diligently pursued his legal rights despite these lockdowns. (Id.). 

 On the merits, Petitioner argues that the state courts violated his 

Due Process and Equal Protection rights when they made unreasonable 

determinations of fact regarding the determination of his time-served 

credits. (Id.). 

B. Respondent’s Arguments 

Respondent argues that Petitioner’s claims are barred by 

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations, even if he is entitled to the 

later start date of March 7, 2013, and considering that he is entitled to 

some period of statutory tolling while his state petitions were pending. 

(ECF No. 11-1 at 4, 6) Respondent bases this argument on the grounds 

that: (1) seven months of untolled time elapsed between Petitioner’s 

discovery of the factual predicate of his claim on March 7, 2013, and the 

filing of his first state petition in superior court on October 18, 2013; (2) 

four months of untolled time elapsed between the denial of Petitioner’s 

state petition by the California Court of Appeal on February 11, 2014, 

and the filing of his next state petition with the California Supreme 

Court on June 10, 2014; and (3) a year of untolled time elapsed between 

the denial of his last state petition by the California Supreme Court on 

August 13, 2014, and the filing of this Petition on August 26, 2015. (Id. 

at 4-6). 

 On the merits, Respondent argues that Petitioner’s claims fail 

because the time-served credit calculations performed by prison officials 

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were correct and did not violate any federal right. (Id. at 6-10). 

Respondent contends that the state courts’ correct interpretation of 

state law precludes federal relief. (Id.). 

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

 Title 28, U.S.C. § 2254(a) provides the scope of review for federal 

habeas corpus claims: 

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a 

district court shall entertain an application for a writ of 

habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to 

the judgment of a State court only on the grounds that he is 

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties 

of the United States. 

As amended by AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides: 

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court 

shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was 

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless 

the adjudication of the claim – 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

 Petitioner presented all of his claims in his federal habeas Petition 

to the state trial, appellate and supreme courts on collateral review. 

(Lodg. 3). The California Court of Appeal denied Petitioner’s claims on 

the merits. (Id. at 16). 

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IV. DISCUSSION 

A. Statute of Limitations 

 AEDPA sets a one-year statute of limitations for all 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 habeas corpus petitions initiated by state prisoners after April 24, 

1996. Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2004). Under § 

2244(d)(1)(D), “[t]he limitation period shall run from . . . . the date on 

which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have 

been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” Id. 

Respondent accepts March 7, 2013, as the date Petitioner 

discovered the factual predicate of his claim. (ECF No. 11-1 at 5; Lodg. 

1). AEDPA’s statute of limitations therefore began to run on that date. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1)(D). Petitioner did not file this Petition until 

August 26, 2015, more than two years after his claim arose. (ECF No. 

1). Absent tolling, this Petition is untimely. 

 1. Statutory Tolling 

 Under AEDPA, the one-year statute of limitations begins to run 

on the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). “To 

accommodate any collateral state court habeas proceeding, however, the 

statute provides that the time during which a properly filed application 

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any 

period of limitation.” Maes v. Chavez, 792 F.3d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir. 

2015) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

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Petitioner discovered the factual predicate of his claim on March 

7, 2013, triggering AEDPA’s statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(D). Petitioner did not file a state habeas petition until 

October 18, 2013. (Lodg. 1). Although Petitioner suggests he is entitled 

to statutory tolling during the time he was pursuing administrative 

remedies, AEDPA’s statute of limitations is not tolled during the time a 

petitioner pursues administrative remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) 

(providing statutory tolling only during the time period in which “a 

properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral 

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending”). 

Petitioner asks the court to note that he was transferred to 

another prison for a federal civil trial, leading to the delay in filing his 

first state habeas petition.5 (ECF No. 13 at 14). However, that transfer 

does not give Petitioner any statutory tolling for that time period 

because only a properly filed petition in state court tolls AEDPA’s 

statute of limitations, not a federal civil suit. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Therefore, seven months of untolled time elapsed between Petitioner’s 

discovery of the factual predicate of his claim and the filing of his state 

petition in superior court. 

 Although Petitioner argues that he is entitled to gap tolling 

during the intervals between the filing of his state petitions, this 

argument fails. The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed that the reasonable 

benchmark for such gaps in filing is between thirty and sixty days. 

Stewart v. Cate, 757 F.3d 929, 935-36 (9th Cir. 2014). The Ninth 

 

5 Case No. 3:11-cv-103-LAB-WVG. 

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Circuit has consistently held that gaps between filings longer than sixty 

days are not entitled to statutory tolling because there is no properly 

pending petition in state court under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See 

Stewart, 757 F.3d at 935-36 (finding no gap tolling for one hundred day 

delay); Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 956 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. 

denied, 133 S.Ct. 1465 (2013) (eighty-two days); Velasquez v. Kirkland, 

639 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 554 

(2011) (eighty-one days); Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (one hundred and one days). The California Court of Appeal 

denied Petitioner’s state petition on February 11, 2014, and he did not 

file his next state petition in the California Supreme Court until June 

10, 2014. (Lodgs. 2, 3). Over four months of untolled time elapsed 

because there was no properly pending petition in state court under 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). When the untolled four-month gap is added to the 

pre-filing seven-month gap, Petitioner had one month to timely file a 

federal petition upon the conclusion of state judicial review. 

Except for the four months which elapsed between Petitioner’s 

filings in the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme 

Court, AEDPA’s statute of limitations was tolled for the period of time 

Petitioner sought state judicial review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). On 

August 13, 2014, state judicial review ended. (Lodg. 3). Petitioner then 

had one month to timely file a federal petition, or until September 12, 

2014, because eleven months of untolled time had previously elapsed 

prior to the conclusion of state judicial review. Petitioner did not file 

this Petition until August 26, 2015, more than eleven months after 

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AEDPA’s statute of limitations had expired. Petitioner did not have a 

pending state habeas petition during the interval between August 13, 

2014, and August 26, 2015, and therefore an additional twelve months 

of untolled time elapsed prior to his filing this Petition. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(2). 

 Twenty-three months of cumulative untolled time elapsed 

between Petitioner’s discovery of the factual predicate of his claim on 

March 7, 2013, and the filing of this Petition on August 26, 2015. 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. 

 2. Equitable Tolling 

 Although Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling, the 

Petition can survive if he is entitled to equitable tolling. Holland v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). 

 “The threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling under 

AEDPA is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Mendoza v. 

Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 2006). AEDPA’s statutory period 

can be equitably tolled only when extraordinary circumstances are 

shown. Holland, 560 U.S. at 645. “A petitioner is entitled to equitable 

tolling only if he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights 

diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his 

way and prevented timely filing.” Id. at 649 (citing Pace v. 

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)) (internal quotations omitted). A 

habeas corpus petition can “be timely, even after the one-year time 

period has expired . . . [if] equitable tolling applies.” Jorss v. Gomez, 

311 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 2002). The burden rests with the 

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petitioner to demonstrate he is entitled to equitable tolling. Pace, 544 

U.S. at 418. 

In his Traverse, Petitioner alleges that between January 2013 and 

August 2015, he was denied access to legal materials because of 

intermittent lockdowns of various lengths and also because of his 

transfer to another prison for his pro se civil trial. (ECF No. 13 at 6, 14-

15). Petitioner claims he was often denied access to legal materials 

during these lockdowns because he was not a Priority Legal User and 

had to go through a lottery system which often denied him access. (Id. 

at 14-15.). Petitioner gives no indication of how long such denials 

lasted. 

 a. Diligence 

“The diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is 

reasonable diligence not maximum feasible diligence.” Holland, 560 

U.S. at 653 (citing Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 326 (1996) and 

Starns v. Andrews, 524 F.3d 612, 618 (5th Cir. 2010)) (internal 

quotations omitted). To preserve his claim, Petitioner must show that 

he “diligently” pursued his legal interests in the year that elapsed 

between the California Supreme Court’s final judgment and the filing of 

this Petition. Id. at 649. 

Petitioner does not state what he did to pursue his legal rights 

during the untolled periods. Petitioner offers nothing to show his 

diligence in those intervals, except the threadbare allegation that he 

“diligently pursued his claim.” (Id. at 6). Although Petitioner filed an 

Application with the Ninth Circuit in March 2015, that filing came 

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nearly seven months after the denial of his petition by the California 

Supreme Court and over five months after AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations had expired. (Lodg. 3). Because Petitioner makes no 

showing that he did anything to diligently pursue his legal interests in 

those intervals, Petitioner fails to satisfy Holland’s diligence prong. 

 b. Extraordinary Circumstances 

“To apply the doctrine in extraordinary circumstances necessarily 

suggests the doctrine’s rarity, and the requirement that extraordinary 

circumstances stood in [Petitioner’s] way suggests that an external force 

must cause the untimeliness, rather than . . . mere[] oversight, 

miscalculation or negligence on the petitioner’s part, all of which would 

preclude the application of equitable tolling.” Waldron-Ramsey v. 

Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 

897 (2009). 

 Complete denial of access to legal materials is considered an 

“extraordinary circumstance.” See Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 925 

(9th Cir. 2002) (finding eighty-two day denial of legal materials during 

temporary transfers in addition to uncertainty of the finality of state 

proceedings during the AEDPA period met extraordinary circumstance 

requirement). A habeas petitioner should “receive an evidentiary 

hearing when he makes a good faith allegation that would, if true, 

entitle him to equitable tolling.” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th 

Cir. 2006) (quoting Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 919 (9th Cir. 

2003)) (internal quotations omitted). 

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Petitioner claims he was subject to intermittent lockdowns of 

various lengths which caused him to have to utilize a lottery system to 

access legal materials, which often resulted in a denial of access and 

therefore, constitutes extraordinary circumstances beyond Petitioner’s 

control. (ECF No. 13 at 6-7, 14-15). Petitioner alleges that these 

intermittent lockdowns occurred between January 2013 and August 

2015. (Id. at 6). 

 Petitioner also cannot satisfy Holland’s extraordinary 

circumstance prong. Between January 2013 and August 2015, 

Petitioner successfully exhausted his administrative remedies, filed a 

state habeas petition and pursued that action to its end in August 2014, 

pursued a pro se civil suit he had filed in 2011 through trial in 2013 and 

beyond6 and filed an Application with the Ninth Circuit in March 2015, 

demonstrating he had ample access to legal materials despite the 

claimed intermittent lockdowns. (Lodg. 3; ECF No. 13 at 14). 

If Petitioner was concerned about preserving his legal rights in 

federal court, he could have filed a defective pleading in federal court 

and then sought a stay and abeyance pending exhaustion of the state 

judicial proceedings to preserve his legal rights. See Irwin v. Dep’t. of 

Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990) (observing that courts “have 

allowed equitable relief in situations where the claimant has actively 

pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the 

 

6 The docket for Case No. 3:11-cv-103-LAB-WVG shows that 

Petitioner was able to successfully file documents in this action between 

March 2013 and April 2014. (Id. at ECF Nos. 69, 124). 

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statutory period”); see also Pace, 544 U.S. at 416 (stating “a petitioner 

trying in good faith to exhaust state remedies may litigate in state court 

for years only to find out at the end that he was never properly filed, 

and thus that his federal habeas petition is time barred . . . [but] [a] 

prisoner . . . might avoid this predicament . . . by filing a protective 

petition in federal court and asking the federal court to stay and abey 

the federal habeas proceedings until state remedies are exhausted”) 

(internal quotations and citations omitted). Petitioner did not do so. 

If Petitioner was able to successfully file legal documents 

repeatedly in both state and federal court for multiple actions in the 

same time period despite the claimed intermittent lockdowns, he was 

able to timely file a habeas petition in federal court even if it would 

have been defective at the time of filing. Petitioner also makes no 

showing that any of the claimed lockdowns and denials of access 

occurred between August 13 and September 12, 2014, the one month 

period remaining after the conclusion of state judicial review in which 

he could have timely filed a federal petition. 

 Because Petitioner has not shown he diligently pursued his legal 

interests or that some extraordinary circumstance occurred in the 

untolled periods that prevented timely filing, he has not met his burden 

and is not entitled to equitable tolling under Holland. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that this Petition is barred by 

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations because Petitioner has not 

demonstrated that he is entitled to statutory or equitable tolling. 

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Because the Court finds that this Petition is barred by AEDPA’s 

statute of limitations, the Court does not reach the merits of this 

Petition. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus be DISMISSED with prejudice and without 

leave to amend. 

V. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED 

that the District Court issue an Order: (1) Approving and Adopting this 

Report and Recommendation; and (2) DISMISSING the Petition with 

prejudice and without leave to amend. 

 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this 

Report must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later 

than April 15, 2016. The document should be captioned “Objections to 

Report and Recommendation.” IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any 

reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and served on all 

parties no later than April 22, 2016. 

The parties are advised that the failure to file objections within 

the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on 

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 

(9th Cir. 1998). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 30, 2016 

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