Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-01421/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-01421-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BOBBY SHAWN JANOE,

Plaintiff,

v.

SILVIA GARCIA, Warden; STUART

J. RYAN, Acting Warden,

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 04cv1421 W(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE:

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS AND GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT [DOC. NO. 30] AND

ORDER RULING ON DEFENDANTS’

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS [DOC.

NO. 41]

Plaintiff Bobby Shawn Janoe, a state prisoner proceeding pro

se and in forma pauperis, filed a civil rights complaint on July

15, 2004 [doc. no. 1], pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Janoe asserts

that his right of access to the courts and his right to due process

were violated because he was given inadequate access to the law

library at Calipatria State Prison. (Compl. 3.) At Defendants'

request, the Court extended the deadline to answer the Complaint to

May 16, 2005, and an Answer [doc. no. 13] was filed on that date. 

(See Order Granting App. for Extension; Order Granting App. for

Second Extension.) 

Case 3:04-cv-01421-W-RBB Document 47 Filed 10/12/06 Page 1 of 39
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On June 30, 2006, Defendants filed Motions to Dismiss and for

Summary Judgment [doc. no. 30] and a Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in Support of Motions [doc. no. 31]. The Motions were

accompanied by Declarations from Dexter Bell [doc. no. 33], Sylvia

Garcia [doc. no. 39], K. Raske [doc. no. 40], and Michael German

[doc. no. 32]. Defendants also filed a Request for Judicial Notice

[doc. no. 34] of the complete file and records in the action and

all exhibits submitted in support of Defendants' Motions. 

The Court found Defendants' Motions suitable for decision

without oral argument pursuant to civil local rule 7.1(d)(1) [doc.

no. 36]. Plaintiff was given notice, pursuant to Rand v. Rowland,

154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1988), and Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d

409 (9th Cir. 1988), of his opportunity to submit evidence in

opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. no.

37]. Janoe submitted an Opposition to Defendants' Motions to

Dismiss and for Summary Judgment [doc. no. 43], with a Memorandum

of Points and Authorities [doc. no. 46] and a Declaration with

exhibits [doc. no. 45] in support of the Opposition, which were all

filed nunc pro tunc to the date received, July 21, 2006. Plaintiff

also filed a Request for Judicial Notice [doc. no. 44]. Defendants

filed their Reply on July 24, 2006 [doc. no. 38] and later filed

Objections to Plaintiff's Evidence [doc. no. 41].

Defendants argue that Janoe's claims should be dismissed

pursuant to the unenumerated portions of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b) because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies before filing suit. (Defs.' Mem. 3.) 

Defendants also assert that they are entitled to summary judgment

because (1) Janoe has not suffered an actual injury; (2) Defendants

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are absolutely immune from any damages claim; (3) Defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity; and (4) injunctive relief is not

appropriate. (Defs.' Mem. 8, 10, 13.)

For the reasons set forth below, the district court should

GRANT Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Alternatively, the district

court should GRANT Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

On January 12, 1994, Plaintiff was convicted of first degree 

murder and received a sentence of life without the possibility of

parole. (German Decl. Ex. A.) Janoe is currently incarcerated in

Calipatria State Prison. (Compl. 1.) Plaintiff appealed his

conviction directly to the California Court of Appeal, which

affirmed on April 29, 1996. People v. Janoe, No. G015980, docket,

http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist

=43&doc_id=10538&doc_no=G015980. On May 6, 1996, Janoe filed a

petition for rehearing, which the court of appeal denied. Id. He

then filed a petition for review by the California Supreme Court on

June 10, 1996. Id. The court denied his petition on August 19,

1996. Id. Plaintiff filed additional petitions for review with

the California Supreme Court on July 13, 1998, and April 29, 2002,

both of which were summarily denied. Janoe v. Imperial Valley

Superior Court, No. S071800, docket, http://appellatecases.

courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=0&doc_id=71652&doc_no

=S071800; Janoe v. Orange County Superior Court, No. S106333,

docket, http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.

cfm?dist=0&doc_id=205322&doc_no=S106333.

Janoe also filed state habeas corpus petitions. Plaintiff

filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

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Supreme Court on March 27, 1998, another petition in the same court

on May 18, 1998, and a third petition on July 11, 2002, all of

which were denied. In re Janoe, No. S070370, docket, http://

appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=0&doc_

id=70226&doc_no=S070370; In re Janoe, No. S069015, docket, http://

appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=0&doc_

id=68867&doc_no=S069015; In re Janoe, No. S108292, docket,

http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist

=0&doc_id=217326&doc_no=S108292. 

Janoe filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in

the Southern District of California on March 20, 1996, challenging

his 1994 murder conviction; the petition was denied for failure to

exhaust state court remedies. Janoe v. Prunty, No. 96cv505-K(AJB)

(S.D. Cal. filed Mar. 20, 1996) (pet.); Janoe v. Prunty, No.

96cv505-K(AJB), slip op. at 3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 1997). Plaintiff

subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

Central District of California, which was denied. See Janoe v.

Small, No. 98cv1140-GLT(JWJ) (C.D. Cal. filed Dec. 22, 1998)

(pet.); Janoe v. Small, No. 98cv1140-GLT(JWJ), slip op. at 1 (C.D.

Cal. Jan. 25, 2001). The district court denied Janoe's request for

a Certificate of Appealability on March 19, 2001. Janoe v. Small,

No. 98cv1140-GLT(JWJ), doc. no. 54 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2001). The

Ninth Circuit also denied a request for a Certificate of

Appealability, and Janoe's petition for rehearing was denied on

November 2, 2001. (Pl.'s Mem. Ex. 6, at 2); Janoe v. Small, No.

01-55546, docket (9th Cir. Nov. 2, 2001).

Plaintiff's deadline to file a petition for writ of certiorari

to the U.S. Supreme Court was January 31, 2002, ninety days after

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the Ninth Circuit denied rehearing. See Sup. Ct. R. 13. According

to Janoe, he was unable to complete his petition for certiorari by

the Supreme Court's deadline because he was not allowed enough time

in the prison's law library. (Compl. 3.) Plaintiff submitted

requests for an extension of time to file his writ petition; one

application was rejected for failure to attach the order denying

rehearing and another as untimely, arriving well after the petition

was due. (Pl.'s Mem. Ex. 10.) Prison attendance records show that

Janoe was at the law library five times in November 2001; then, he

did not go again until February 2002. (Raske Decl. Ex. A.) 

Plaintiff requested library time on January 29 and 31, 2002, but he

did not attend the library on those dates. (Id. Exs. A, B at 1,

3.) 

Janoe contends that he submitted several inmate appeals to

prison administrators to complain about his lack of access to the

law library. According to Plaintiff, he filed inmate grievance

forms (commonly known as "602" forms) on January 16 and 25, 2002,

requesting additional library time to complete his petition to the

Supreme Court. (Compl. 3; Pl.'s Mem. Ex. 8, at 1.) Specifically,

Janoe's 602 form dated January 16, 2002, states, "My court

deadline, to submit my writ of certiorari to the United States

Supreme Court is the end of January 02. I need to be ducated as

much as possible for the law library." (Pl.'s Mem. Ex. 8, at 2.) 

The 602 form dated January 25, 2002, contains a similar request. 

(Id. at 3.) Neither 602 form appears on the computer printout of

the Inmate/Parolee Appeals Tracking System for the relevant time

period. (See Bell Decl. Ex. F.) 

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Janoe also claims he filed a 602 form for library time on

April 8, 2002, which went unanswered. (Pl.'s Mem. 6.) Although

Plaintiff's evidence includes a copy of a 602 bearing that date,

the form Plaintiff produced is not stamped or otherwise marked as

received by prison staff. (Pl.'s Mem. Ex. 8, at 4.) The appeals

regarding legal issues on the prison printout are after Janoe's

deadline for submitting a petition to the Supreme Court had passed. 

(See Bell Decl. Ex. F.)

The evidence presented by Defendants shows that the first

appeal on a legal issue was filed by Plaintiff on September 10,

2002, after submitting it to staff on August 18, 2002. (Id.; Bell

Decl. Ex. A at 1.) This grievance, however, related to obtaining

Janoe's records from "r&r" (Receiving and Release) but does not

mention library time. (Bell Decl. Ex. A at 1.) The parties

produced sixteen stamped and verified 602s asserting legal issues

which Janoe submitted to prison staff between August 2002 and May

2006, all well after his petition for certiorari was denied by the

Supreme Court. (See Bell Decl. Ex. A-E; Pl.'s Mem. Exs. 11, 13-

22.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO THE FAILURE TO EXHAUST

A. Motion to Dismiss Unexhausted Claims Pursuant to the 

Unenumerated Portions of Rule 12(b)

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act

("PLRA") states: "No action shall be brought with respect to

prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other

Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a) (West 2003). The

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exhaustion requirement applies regardless of the relief sought. 

Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). 

"'[A]n action is "brought" for purposes of § 1997e(a) when the

complaint is tendered to the district clerk' . . . ." Vaden v.

Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Ford v.

Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 400 (7th Cir. 2004)). Therefore, prisoners

must "exhaust administrative remedies before submitting any papers

to the federal courts." Id. at 1048 (emphasis added).

Section 1997e(a)'s exhaustion requirement creates an

affirmative defense. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th

Cir. 2003). "[D]efendants have the burden of raising and proving

the absence of exhaustion." Id. (footnote omitted). Defendants in

§ 1983 actions properly raise the affirmative defense of failure to

exhaust administrative remedies through an unenumerated motion to

dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). Id. 

Unlike Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a

claim for which relief may be granted, "[i]n deciding a motion to

dismiss for failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies, the court may

look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact." Id.

at 1119-20 (citing Ritza v. Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's

Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988)). "A court ruling on a

motion to dismiss also may take judicial notice of 'matters of

public record.'" Hazleton v. Alameida, 358 F. Supp. 2d 926, 928

(C.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668,

688 (9th Cir. 2001)). But "if the district court looks beyond the

pleadings to a factual record in deciding the motion to dismiss for

failure to exhaust[,] . . . the court must assure that [the

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plaintiff] has fair notice of his opportunity to develop a record." 

Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 n.14. 

"[When] the district court concludes that the prisoner has not

exhausted nonjudicial remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal of

the claim without prejudice." Id. at 1120 (citing Ritza v. Int'l

Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 837 F.2d at 368 & n.3). A

factual finding that Janoe failed to exhaust is reviewed under the

clearly erroneous standard. Id. 

B. The Administrative Grievance Process

"The California Department of Corrections [CDC] provides a

four-step grievance process for prisoners who seek review of an

administrative decision or perceived mistreatment: an informal

level, a first formal level, a second formal level, and the

Director's level." Vaden, 449 F.3d at 1048-49 (citing Brown v.

Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 929-30 (9th Cir. 2005)). The administrative

appeal system can be found in title 15, sections 3084.1, 3084.5,

and 3084.6 of the California Code of Regulations. See Brown v.

Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 929-30 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.1(a), 3084.5(a)-(b), (e)(1)-(2), 3084.6(c)). 

To comply with the CDC's administrative grievance procedure,

an inmate must file his grievance at the informal level "within 15

working days of the event or decision being appealed . . . ." Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(c) (2006); see also Brown, 422 F.3d at

929. 

C. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants

Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights

case, the Court must construe the pleadings liberally and give the

plaintiff the benefit of any doubts. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles

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Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule of

liberal construction is "particularly important in civil rights

cases." Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). 

III. PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO EXHAUST

A. Judicial Notice

Defendants request judicial notice of the complete file and

records in this action, Exhibits A through E to the Declaration of

Dexter Bell, and Exhibits A through D to the Declaration of G.

Michael German. (Defs.' Req. Jud. Notice 1.) Plaintiff also

requests that the Court take judicial notice of the complete file

and records in this action and of Janoe's Declaration and all

attached exhibits. (Pl.'s Req. Jud. Notice 1.) 

A court may take judicial notice of any fact that is "not

subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally

known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2)

capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid.

201(b). "A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a

party and supplied with the necessary information." Fed. R. Evid.

201(d).

Judicial notice may be taken of records of state agencies and

other undisputed matters of public record. Disabled Rights Action

Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 866 n.1 (9th Cir.

2004) (citing Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d at 689). But it

is an abuse of discretion to take judicial notice of agency records

when the facts contained in them are subject to reasonable dispute. 

Brown, 422 F.3d at 931 n.7 (quoting City of Sausalito v. O'Neill,

386 F.3d 1186, 1224 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004)); Lee v. City of Los

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Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001). Also, a court should

only take judicial notice of facts contained in agency records that

bear "sufficient indicia of reliability . . . ." United States v.

Perez-Corona, 295 F.3d 996, 1001 n.4 (9th Cir. 2002). Even if

facts or records are not subject to judicial notice, they may still

be germane to Defendants' unenumerated motion to dismiss for

failure to exhaust or their motion for summary judgment.

Exhibits A through E to Bell's Declaration consist of 602

forms completed by Janoe on August 18, 2002, January 5, 2004,

February 22, 2004, April 26, 2004, and May 5, 2004, and the

administrative responses to each. (Bell Decl. Exs. A-E.) These

forms are signed and dated by Plaintiff, and they have log number

stamps and stamps indicating they were received by prison

administrators. (See id.) The forms are part of the CDC inmate

records, and they bear clear markings and signatures indicating

their authenticity. Accordingly, the Court will take judicial

notice of the five inmate appeal forms and their contents.

Exhibit A to German's Declaration is a copy of the Abstract of

Judgment showing Janoe’s 1994 murder conviction. (German Decl. Ex.

A.) Exhibits B and C to German’s Declaration are copies of Supreme

Court decisions in Woodford v. Ngo, __ U.S. __, 126 S.Ct. 2378

(2006), and Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. __, 126 S.Ct. 2572 (2006). 

(German Decl. Exs. B, C.) Exhibit D is a copy of Silvia Garcia's

Declaration in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

filed in a separate case, Jones v. Garcia, No. 03cv2441-J(WMC)

(S.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2006). (German Decl. Ex. D.)

The decisions and orders issued by another tribunal in a

related case are appropriate subjects of judicial notice. Biggs v.

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Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 916 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the

Court will take judicial notice of Janoe's state court conviction. 

(German Decl. Ex. A.) The recent decisions of the Supreme Court

are not appropriate subjects of judicial notice. Rule 201 of the

Federal Rules of Evidence "governs only judicial notice of

adjudicative facts." Fed. R. Evid. 201(a) (emphasis added). 

Whether the contents of the declaration filed by Garcia in an

unrelated action are subject to judicial notice here depends upon

the facts the Defendants seek to establish. 

The twenty-five exhibits to Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points

and Authorities, which span nearly 400 pages, are not all

appropriate for judicial notice. For the purposes of the Motion to

Dismiss, the relevant Plaintiff exhibits are Exhibits 8, 10, 11 and

13-22. Exhibit 8 is a declaration signed by Janoe listing inmate

grievances he asserts were submitted between January 2002 and July

2003 that allegedly went unanswered by prison administrators, along

with copies of those grievance forms. (Pl.'s Mem. Ex. 8.) This

evidence, however, does not bear any indicia of reliability that

would make judicial notice appropriate; the forms are not stamped

with log numbers or other marks showing they were filed. (See id.) 

The Court is unable to determine whether the 602s attached to

Exhibit 8 are copies of the inmate appeals Janoe previously

submitted or are recently re-created specimen 602s. The Defendants

dispute that these 602s were submitted. (Bell Decl. Ex. B at 1.) 

The Court cannot judicially notice that the five inmate appeals

attached to Exhibit 8 were filed on or near the dates each was

signed. The fact is subject to reasonable dispute because there

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are no sources for the assertions in the documents, "whose accuracy

cannot be reasonably questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 

Exhibits 11 and 13-22 do not suffer from these defects. 

Consequently, like Exhibits A through E attached to the Declaration

of Dexter Bell, the Court will take judicial notice of the inmate

appeal forms identified as Exhibits 11 and 13-22 to Plaintiff's

Declaration. 

Exhibit 10 is a copy of a letter, dated April 2, 2002, from

Plaintiff to the Clerk of the United States Supreme Court regarding

his application for an extension of time and the clerk's refusal to

file Janoe's petition for certiorari because it was untimely. 

(Pl.'s Mem. Ex. 10.) This letter similarly bears no indicia of

reliability. Because the facts included in this exhibit are

subject to reasonable dispute, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request

for judicial notice of the contents of Exhibit 10.

B. Defendants' Objections to Plaintiff's Evidence

With the exception of Exhibit 1, Defendants object to all the

exhibits submitted by the Plaintiff and attached to his

declaration. (Defs.' Object. 1-2.) Many of the exhibits are not

relevant to this Court's determination of Defendants' Motions. For

that reason, the Court will only address the Plaintiff's exhibits

which are discussed in connection with the Motion to Dismiss or

Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants' objections to the

remaining exhibits are denied as moot.

1. Exhibits Considered on the Motion to Dismiss

In deciding whether the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss should

be granted, this Court considered Plaintiff's Exhibits 8, 10, 11,

and 13-22. Exhibit 8 is Janoe's Declaration which attaches five

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602 forms requesting more library time and dated January 16,

January 25, and April 8, 2002, and January 2, and July 29, 2003. 

(Pl.'s Mem. Ex. 8.) Exhibit 10 is a copy of a letter, dated April

2, 2002, from Janoe to the Office of the Clerk of the United States

Supreme Court. (Pl.'s Mem. Ex. 10.) Exhibits 11 and 13-22 are

602s submitted by Janoe after January 5, 2004. (Pl.'s Mem. Exs.

11, 13-22.)

Defendants object that Exhibits 8 and 10 are "incomplete,

irrelevant, self-serving, hearsay and unauthenticated." (Defs.'

Object. 1-2.) They also object to Exhibits 11 and 13-22 as

irrelevant. (Id. at 2.) These objections are overruled.

There is a difference between the consideration of evidence at

trial, in connection with a motion for summary judgment, or in

connection with an unenumerated motion to dismiss. See Fraser v.

Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing motion for

summary judgment and trial). "At the summary judgment stage, we do

not focus on the admissibility of the evidence's form. We instead

focus on the admissibility of its contents." Id. (citing Block v.

City of Los Angeles, 253 F.3d 410, 418-19 (9th Cir. 2001)). The

contents of these exhibits contain facts to which Janoe could

testify at trial. The Defendants' unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion

to dismiss will require the Court to decide issues of fact. Like a

summary judgment motion, the opposing party will not be required to

produce evidence that would be admissible at trial to avoid a

dismissal under Rule 12(b) for failure to exhaust. 

2. Plaintiff's Memorandum

Defendants also object to "any averments of fact contained in

Plaintiff's July 11, 2006 Memorandum of Points and Authorities" on

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a number of grounds. (Defs.' Object. 2.) A court ruling on

summary judgment should not consider the "mere allegation and

speculation" of the parties. Nelson v. Pima Cmty. College, 83 F.3d

1075, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 1996). But when the nonmoving party is

proceeding pro se, the Court has a duty to consider the nonmovant's

contentions set forth in motions and pleadings only if signed under

penalty of perjury. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 922-23 (9th

Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Consequently, the Court will not

consider the facts and contentions contained in Plaintiff's

unverified Opposition.

C. The Merits of the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust 

Administrative Remedies

Defendants move to dismiss Janoe's Complaint pursuant to the

unenumerated portions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) on

the ground that Plaintiff has not properly exhausted his

administrative remedies. (Defs.' Mem. 3.) Defendants allege that

all 602 forms submitted by Janoe appealing "any denial of library

time that hampered Janoe’s ability to prepare the denied certiorari

petition" were untimely because they were submitted long after the

fifteen-day limit provided by the CDC's administrative regulations. 

(Id. at 6.) See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(c). 

"Exhaustion of administrative remedies serves two main

purposes." Woodford v. Ngo, __ U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2385

(2006) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992)). It

first "protects 'administrative agency authority'" by giving an

agency "'an opportunity to correct its own mistakes . . . before it

is haled into federal court'" and by discouraging "'disregard of

[the agency's] procedures.'" Id. (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503

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U.S. at 145). "Second, exhaustion promotes efficiency. . . . [and]

'may produce a useful record for subsequent judicial

consideration.'" Id. (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. at

145). These two purposes are best served when civil rights

plaintiffs are forced to properly exhaust administrative remedies

and comply with the deadlines set by the administrative agency. 

Id., __ U.S. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 2385-86. Therefore, § 1997e(a)'s

exhaustion requirement has not been satisfied if the plaintiff

filed an administrative grievance that was rejected as untimely. 

Id., __ U.S. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 2387.

Before the Ninth Circuit's decision in Wyatt, some courts

treated motions to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies like motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and assigned the burden of proof to the plaintiff. 

See Doe v. Schachter, 804 F. Supp. 53, 57 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (citing

Thornhill Publ'g Co. v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730,

733 (9th Cir. 1979)). Now, because the failure to exhaust is an

affirmative defense, it is the defendant's burden to raise and

prove the absence of exhaustion. Brown, 422 F.3d at 936. In

ruling on Defendants' Motion, the Court may "look beyond the

pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact." Wyatt, 315 F.3d at

1119-20. “[T]he court has a broad discretion as to the method to

be used in resolving the factual dispute.” Ritza v. Int'l

Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir.

1988). 

If the defendant has pled and proved a failure to exhaust, the

burden shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence that he did

exhaust administrative remedies. Ming Ching Jin v. Hense, No.

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1 Plaintiff submitted a 602 form on August 18, 2002, which

appears on the Inmate/Parolee Appeals Tracking System printout as

"legal," however, that appeal concerns access to Janoe's legal

paperwork rather than access to the law library. (Bell Decl. Ex. A

at 1, Ex. F at 2.) 

16 04cv1421 W(RBB)

03cv5282-RECSMSP, 2005 WL 3080969, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2005). 

The defendant bears the burden of proof, in part, because "'it is

considerably easier for a prison administrator to show a failure to

exhaust than it is for a prisoner to demonstrate exhaustion.'" 

Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119 (quoting Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295

(3d Cir. 2002)). 

According to prison records submitted by Defendants, Plaintiff

did not file a 602 form complaining that he was given inadequate

access to the law library to complete his certiorari petition until

January 5, 2004, nearly two years after his petition was due.1

(Bell Decl. Ex. B at 1.) Janoe, on the other hand, claims that he

submitted grievances on January 16, January 25, and April 8, 2002. 

(Pl.'s Mem. 4, 6.) He asserts that on April 1, 2002, his petition

for certiorari was returned with a letter stating that "the Court

no longer had jurisdiction to review the Writ of Certiorari,

because it was not filed timely." (Pl.'s Mem. 5.) 

The 602s preceding the denial of Janoe's certiorari petition

and requesting more library time do not appear to be within fifteen

days of "the event or decision being appealed." See Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(c). The April 8, 2002, appeal, if filed,

would have been within fifteen days of Janoe learning that his

petition was denied. The 602, however, follows the denial and is

unrelated to the preparation of Janoe's petition. These three

appeal forms have no indication that they were ever submitted to

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prison authorities, and there is no objective way to confirm they

were completed on the dates alleged. 

Janoe submitted to the Court copies of completed 602 forms

dated January 16, January 25, and April 8, 2002; however, there is

no confirmation that any of these forms was filed with the prison

administration or completed on the date shown. (See Pl.'s Mem. Ex.

8, at 2-4.) They bear no log-number stamps from the prison

administration nor has the area designated "Staff Response" been

completed. (See id.) The forms do not appear on the prison

appeals tracking system printout, even though it is the regular

business practice of the prison to keep records of all filed

appeals. (Bell Decl. 1-2; see Bell Decl. Ex. F.) Plaintiff's

other 602s, Exhibits 11 and 13-22, contain identifying stamps or

markings. (Pl.'s Mem. Exs. 11, 13-22.) The absence of any entry

for the January and April 2002 grievances is evidence that they

were not submitted to the first or second level of formal review. 

See Fed. R. Evid. 803(7). 

Other than Janoe's declaration, Plaintiff has produced no

evidence to verify that he timely submitted a 602 form within the

applicable fifteen-day period. Without more, the Court cannot find

that Janoe filed a timely grievance with the prison administration. 

See Lara v. Santa Clara County Jail, No. C-04-4745-CRB (PR), 2006

WL 1141930, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2006) (dismissing for failure

to exhaust where jail administrative grievance records showed no

grievances were filed and plaintiff submitted no evidence showing

exhaustion); Mubarak v. Cal. Dep't of Corrs., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1057,

1059 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (finding failure to exhaust where the

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plaintiff did not submit evidence that his claim had been

considered by the CDC at any level of administrative review). 

Even if the Court were to accept Janoe's representation that a

602 form for informal review was properly submitted, he did not

proceed beyond informal review and pursue the three-step formal

review process. See Woodford v. Ngo, __ U.S. at __, 126 S.Ct. at

2385. Plaintiff has failed to show exhaustion. CDC administrative

procedures are not properly exhausted until an inmate has pursued a

grievance through all available levels of review. Brown, 422 F.3d

at 935; Butler v. Adams, 397 F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 2005);

Hazleton v. Alameida, 358 F. Supp. 2d 926, 929 (C.D. Cal. 2005).

Janoe has failed to rebut Defendants' evidence that no

administrative grievance was submitted at the informal level within

the CDC's deadline, and no grievance was submitted at any formal

level of review. Because Plaintiff has failed to properly exhaust

the available administrative remedies, his Complaint should be

dismissed. Existing Ninth Circuit case law directs the district

court to dismiss the Complaint without prejudice. Vaden v.

Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Wyatt, 315

F.3d at 1120; Fernandez v. Arpaio, No. CV 05-2367-PHX-SMM (LOA),

2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62773 (D. Ariz. Aug. 31, 2006) (dismissing

without prejudice where plaintiff failed to rebut defendants'

evidence of failure to exhaust). But Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d

1047, and Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, are pre-Ngo. Since the

Supreme Court decision, it may no longer be appropriate to dismiss

this Complaint with leave to amend, if it is too late to exhaust. 

Janoe is in that situation. The factual basis for Plaintiff’s

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claim and the steps he took to exhaust the claim are before the

Court. 

Since Booth v, Churner, 532 U.S. 741, exceptions to the

exhaustion requirement are limited. The Supreme Court explained: 

“Thus, we think that Congress has mandated exhaustion clearly

enough, regardless of the relief offered through administrative

procedures.” Booth, 532 U.S. at 741 (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan,

503 U.S. at 144 (“Where Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion

is required[.]”). The congressional mandate precludes Janoe from

arguing he need not exhaust because exhaustion would be futile or

that the agency has no power to award the relief requested. Id. at

741 n.6. Booth and Ngo effectively eliminated most exceptions to

exhaustion. Even the assertion that exhaustion is not required for

constitutional claims does not apply. See Matthews v. Eldridge,

424 U.S. 319, 329 n.10 (1976) (“If Eldridge had exhausted the full

set of available administrative review procedures, failure to have

raised his constitutional claim would not bar him from asserting it

later in a district court.”)

Janoe no longer has time to exhaust his administrative

remedies. There are no applicable exceptions to the exhaustion

requirements. For all these reasons, Plaintiff’s Complaint should

be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

The Court has concluded that Janoe failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies, and his Complaint should be dismissed. 

This, by itself, would resolve this case. Nevertheless, because a

review of Plaintiff's claims demonstrates that they are without

merit, the Court will address Defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment.

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IV. LEGAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO

DEFENDANTS' SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION

A. Rule 56 Motions for Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) authorizes granting

summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Like the standard for

a directed verdict, judgment must be entered for the moving party

"if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable

conclusion as to the verdict." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (citing Brady v. S. Ry. Co., 320 U.S. 476,

479-80 (1943)). However, "[i]f reasonable minds could differ,"

judgment should not be entered in favor of the moving party. Id.

at 250-51 (citing Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 62 (1949)).

The parties bear the same substantive burden of proof that

would apply at a trial on the merits, including plaintiff's burden

to establish any element essential to his case. Cleveland v.

Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 805-06 (1999); Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at

252; see also Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

"When the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial,

summary judgment is warranted if the nonmovant fails to 'make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to [its] case.'" Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590

(1993) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).

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The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying the

pleadings or other evidence which it "believes demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at

323; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970);

Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1182-83 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish,

beyond the pleadings, that there is a genuine issue for trial. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. To successfully rebut a defendant's

properly supported motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff "must

point to some facts in the record that demonstrate a genuine issue

of material fact and, with all reasonable inferences made in the

plaintiff[']s[] favor, could convince a reasonable jury to find for

the plaintiff[]." Reese v. Jefferson School Dist. No. 14J, 208

F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex,

477 U.S. at 323; Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249). Material issues

are those that "might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248; see also SEC v.

Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1982). More than

a "metaphysical doubt" is required to establish a genuine issue of

material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 

If the facts a plaintiff submits in opposition to a summary

judgment motion cannot "connect any particular defendant to the

incidents giving rise to liability, that defendant is entitled to

summary judgment and may not be required to go to trial." Paine v.

City of Lompoc, 265 F.3d 975, 984 (9th Cir. 2001). In deciding

whether any genuine issue of material fact remains for trial,

courts must "view[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the

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nonmoving party . . . ." Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 876 (9th

Cir. 2001); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs.,

Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456 (1992) (stating that the nonmoving party's

evidence is to be believed and all reasonable inferences drawn in

the nonmoving party's favor).

This Court must restrict its inquiry to facts supported by the

record. It does "not give credence to empty rhetoric, . . . but

credit[s] only those assertions that are supported by materials of

evidentiary quality." LeBlanc v. Salem (In re Mailman Steam Carpet

Cleaning Corp.), 196 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). 

"[M]ere allegation and speculation do not create a factual dispute

for purposes of summary judgment." Nelson v. Pima Cmty. College,

83 F.3d at 1081-82. However, when the nonmoving party is

proceeding pro se, the Court has a duty to consider "all of [the

nonmovant's] contentions offered in motions and pleadings, where

such contentions are based on personal knowledge and set forth

facts that would be admissible in evidence, and where [the

nonmovant] attested under penalty of perjury that the contents of

the motions or pleadings are true and correct." Jones v. Blanas,

393 F.3d at 922-23 (citations omitted).

V. DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that (1)

Janoe has not suffered an actual injury; (2) Defendants are

absolutely immune from any damages claim; (3) Defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity; and (4) injunctive relief is not

appropriate in this case. (Defs.' Mem. 8, 10, 13.)

//

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A. Defendants' Objections to Exhibits Considered on the Motion

for Summary Judgment

In connection with the Defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment, the Court considered Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 2, 5, 8, 10,

24 and 25 ("summary judgment exhibits"). Exhibits 1 and 2 are

sections of the operations manual governing the law library and

revised in January 2002 by Warden Garcia and July 2004 by Associate

Warden Ryan. (Pl.'s Mem. Exs. 1, 2.) Exhibits 8 and 10 are the

602s and letter to the Clerk of the Supreme Court identified above,

and Exhibits 5, 24, and 25 are admissions and interrogatory

responses by Defendants Garcia and Ryan. (Id. Exs. 5, 8, 10, 24,

25.) 

Defendants do not object to Exhibit 1. The relevance

objection to Exhibit 2 is sustained. Nevertheless, even if the

contents of the exhibit were considered, this would not alter this

Court's decision on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 

Defendants' objections to the remaining exhibits are overruled. 

Much of the content of the summary judgment exhibits are facts that

could be testified to at trial by Janoe. See Fraser v. Goodale,

342 F.3d at 1036-37; Hughes v. United States, 953 F.2d 531, 543

(9th Cir. 1992) (considering affidavit despite hearsay and best

evidence objections where the underlying facts could have been

testified to at trial).

B. Actual Injury

In order to survive a motion for summary judgment, the

plaintiff must set forth specific facts establishing standing to

bring the case. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357-58 (1996)

(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). 

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The doctrine of standing "prevents courts of law from undertaking

tasks assigned to the political branches." Id. at 349 (citations

omitted). "It is the role of the courts to provide relief to

claimants . . . who have suffered, or will immediately suffer,

actual harm; it is not the role of courts, but that of the

political branches, to shape the institutions of government . . .

." Id. To have standing to assert a claim for denial of access to

the courts, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered an actual

injury. Id. at 351; Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794, 798 (9th Cir.

1994). 

"[A]n inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by

establishing that his prison's law library or legal assistance

program is subpar in some theoretical sense." Lewis, 518 U.S. at

351. Actual injury exists where the inmate can "demonstrate that

the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program

hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim." Id. 

Defendants argue that to show actual injury, Janoe must

establish "that his inadequate access to the prison's law library

resulted in the denial of his writ petition." (Defs.' Mem. 9.) 

This overstates Plaintiff's burden. See Simkins v. Bruce, 406 F.3d

1239, 1244 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that "a plaintiff need not

show that a claim with which a defendant interfered would have

prevailed, but only that it was not frivolous"); Walters v. Edgar,

163 F.3d 430, 434 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that denial of access to

the courts claim requires that the denial had some effect on the

relief sought by the plaintiff). 

In Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 413-15 (2002), cited

by Defendants, the Court discussed forward- and backward-looking

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access to courts claims. In both, "the right [of access to courts]

is ancillary to the underlying claim, without which a plaintiff

cannot have suffered injury by being shut out of court." Id. at

415. 

Janoe's claim is backward looking. He complains that the

limited library time resulted in the Supreme Court's refusal to

entertain his petition for certiorari. (Compl. 3-4.) Plaintiff

must establish that his underlying claim was "nonfrivolous" or

"arguable." Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. at 415. "[T]he

predicate claim [must] be described well enough to apply the

'nonfrivolous' test and to show the 'arguable' nature of the

underlying claim is more than hope." Id. at 416 (footnote

omitted). A prisoner's right to access the courts does not include

the right to present frivolous claims. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. at

353 & n.3.

The Seventh Circuit has recently outlined what is required of

a backwards-looking access to courts claim. Marshall v. Knight,

445 F.3d 965, 968-99 (7th Cir. 2006).

[T]he mere denial of access to a prison law library or to

the other legal materials is not itself a violation of a

prisoner's rights; his right is to access the courts, and

only if the defendants' conduct prejudices a potentially

meritorious challenge to the prisoner's conviction,

sentence, or conditions of confinement has this right

been infringed.

Id. at 968 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 

Janoe has not shown that his petition for certiorari was not

frivolous or that it raised an arguable claim. Plaintiff's

challenge to his 1994 first degree murder conviction had been

rejected by the state courts, and federal habeas corpus relief had

been denied by the district court and the Ninth Circuit. At the

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summary judgment stage, more than a conclusory allegation is

required to show an actual injury.

This claim suffers from another defect. Janoe asserts that he

suffered actual injury caused by Defendants' actions when his

petition for a writ of certiorari was rejected by the Supreme

Court. (Pl.'s Mem. 12.) Plaintiff was notified by the Supreme

Court on April 1, 2002, that the Court no longer had jurisdiction

to review his petition because it was untimely. (Id. at 5-6.) 

According to Janoe, he "was not capable of bringing the [petition]

in a timely manner, because of denial of access to the law library

and/or the books and materials therein." (Id. at 12.) 

Plaintiff did not complete his petition until March 13, 2002,

although it was due on January 31, 2002. (Id. at 5.) On March 13,

Janoe submitted the petition with an application for an extension

of time to file it, since it was already overdue. (Id. at 5, Ex.

10.) His request was denied, and the petition was returned to him. 

(Id. at 5.) Plaintiff again tried to submit the petition with a

request for extension of time, but it was rejected as untimely. 

(Id. at 5, Ex. 10.) 

Janoe made no attempt to get an extension of time to file his

petition prior to the filing deadline, which is required by Supreme

Court rules. S. Ct. R. 30.2. If he had done so, Plaintiff may

have been able to submit his petition to the Supreme Court for

review. Janoe cannot show that the prison library policy prevented

him from applying for an extension and actually denied him access

to the courts. Cf. Vandelft, 31 F.3d at 798 (finding no actual

injury where inmate did not request an extension of time to file

his reply).

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Although Plaintiff claims that he sought, but was denied,

library access on January 12, January 25, January 29, and January

31, 2002, this does not change the result. (See Janoe Decl. Ex. 8;

Raske Decl. Exs. A, B.) In some instances, missing court deadlines

or failing to make timely filings because of the denial of

reasonable access to the prison law library can give rise to an

access-to-courts claim. Ortloff v. United States, 335 F.3d 652,

656 (7th Cir. 2003). This is only true, however, if the underlying

claim is nonfrivolous and arguable. Christopher v. Harbury, 536

U.S. at 415; Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d at 968 (requiring the

predicate claim to be "potentially meritorious"). Here, Janoe has

presented no evidence that he suffered an actual injury. Likewise,

he has presented no evidence that his limited library time

prevented him from seeking an extension of time within which to

file his petition for certiorari. The Defendants' Motion for

Summary Judgment should be granted.

C. Absolute Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment grants the states immunity from private

civil suits. U.S. Const. amend. XI; Henry v. County of Shasta, 132

F.3d 512, 517 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended, 137 F.3d 1372 (9th Cir.

1998). This immunity applies to civil rights claims brought under

§ 1983, so an inmate cannot recover damages from the state under §

1983 unless the state waives its immunity. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). A federal court only has

jurisdiction over a suit against a state when the relief sought is

"prospective injunctive relief in order to end a continuing

violation of federal law." Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019,

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1025 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,

517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996) (internal quotations omitted). 

Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to state officials

sued in their official capacities. "[A] suit against a state

official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the

official but rather is a suit against the official’s office." 

Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471

(1985)). "As such, it is no different from a suit against the

State itself." Id. (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-

66 (1985); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658,

690 n.55 (1978)).

Plaintiff sued both Silvia Garcia, Warden of Calipatria State

Prison, and Stuart J. Ryan, Acting Warden, in their official

capacities. (Compl. 2.) Janoe makes no claims against Defendants

in their personal capacities. (See id.) Plaintiff's claims

against Defendants in their official capacities constitute claims

against the State of California, which are absolutely immune from

liability for damages. Thus, Janoe is barred from seeking monetary

damages from these Defendants, and they are entitled to summary

judgment on his $100,000 claim for relief. (See id. at 9.) 

D. Qualified Immunity

"[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions,

generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as

their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A

constitutional right is "clearly established" if it is

"sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand

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that what he is doing violates that right." Hope v. Pelzer, 536

U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,

640 (1987)). This standard ensures that government officials are

on notice of the legality of their conduct before they are

subjected to suit. Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206

(2001)). Qualified immunity is immunity from suit for monetary

damages, but it is not immunity from suit for declaratory or

injunctive relief. Hydrick v. Hunter, 449 F.3d 978, 992 (9th Cir.

2006). It protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341

(1986).

"The threshold inquiry a court must undertake in a qualified

immunity analysis is whether plaintiff's allegations, if true,

establish a constitutional violation." Hope, 536 U.S. at 736; see

also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If the allegations

make out a constitutional violation, the next step is to determine

whether the right alleged to have been violated is "clearly

established." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. In ruling on a motion for

summary judgment based on qualified immunity, the court must decide

the "'purely legal' issue of 'whether facts alleged by the

plaintiff support a claim of violation of clearly established

law.'" Lytle v. Wondrash, 182 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1999)

(quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 n.9 (1985)). 

1. Violation of a Constitutional Right

As discussed above, Janoe cannot establish that he was

deprived of the ability to file a nonfrivolous petition for

certiorari. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. at 353 n.3; Marshall v.

Knight, 445 F.3d at 968. This shortcoming requires that summary

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judgment be entered for the Defendants, and the qualified immunity

inquiry need proceed no further.

There is, however, language in some decisions that suggests

that a missed deadline, by itself, may constitute an actual injury. 

See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 348 (stating that inability to meet a

filing deadline or present a claim can be actual injury); Ortloff

v. United States, 335 F.3d at 652 (indicating that missed court

deadlines and failure to make timely filings can constitute

prejudice); Phillips v. Hust, 338 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1161 (D. Or.

2004) (finding an actual injury where plaintiff missed the deadline

to file his petition for certiorari, which was subsequently denied

as untimely), judgment entered in 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19811 (D.

Or. Sept. 29, 2004). 

In Phillips, the plaintiff was denied permission to use the

library's binding machine to bind his one-hundred-plus page

certiorari petition; binding or stapling is required by Rule 33.2

of the Rules of the Supreme Court. Sup. Ct. R. 33.2. At the

summary judgment stage, the district court failed to consider

whether Phillips's petition was "nonfrivolous" or raised an

"arguable" claim. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. at 415. 

For the purpose of resolving whether the Defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity, this Court will assume that Janoe can show an

actual injury resulting from his missed deadline. 

2. Whether the Right Was Clearly Established

Even if Plaintiff's claim that he missed the deadline to file

his petition for certiorari because he was not given adequate

library time alleges a constitutional violation, the qualified

immunity analysis requires this Court to determine whether the

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right was clearly established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. at 201. 

"Whether the right is clearly established in a particular case is

judged as of the date of the incident alleged, and is a pure

question of law." Phillips v. Hust, 338 F. Supp. 2d at 1162

(citing Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir.

1993)).

Defendants correctly observe that Janoe has a substantial

burden in opposing their claim of qualified immunity. (Defs.' Mem.

11.)

[I]f a defendant moving for summary judgement has

produced enough evidence to require the plaintiff to go

beyond his or her pleadings, the plaintiff must counter

by producing evidence of his or her own. If in that

circumstance the plaintiff fails to produce evidence, the

district court is not required (or even allowed) to

assume that the challenged factual allegations in the

plaintiff's complaint are true. Similarly, if in that

circumstance the plaintiff produces evidence that is not

enough, by itself, to create a genuine issue of material

fact, the district court is not required (or even

allowed) to assume the truth of challenged allegations in

the complaint in order to supplement that evidence.

Butler v. San Diego Dist. Attorney's Office, 370 F.3d 956, 963 (9th

Cir. 2004).

Defendants cite Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998),

and incorrectly argue that to defeat qualified immunity, Janoe must

provide clear and convincing evidence of Defendants' improper

motive. (Defs.' Mem. 11.) This is not the law. Contrary to

defense counsel's assertion, the Supreme Court did not affirm the

court of appeal's application of a clear and convincing standard;

the Court rejected it, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case. 

Id. at 601. The Supreme Court explained: "Neither the text of §

1983 or any other federal statute, nor the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, provide any support for imposing the clear and

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convincing burden of proof on plaintiffs either at the summary

judgment stage or in the trial itself." Id. at 594.

Janoe alleges his right of access to the courts was violated

by the warden and acting warden of Calipatria prison when they

instituted policies that reduced the operating schedule of the

library and limited inmate library access to one two-hour session

per week. (Compl. 3-7; Pl.'s Mem. 15.) Inmates have a fundamental

right to access the courts, and this right places an affirmative

obligation on prison officials to assure prisoners meaningful

access. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828. The obligation may be fulfilled

"by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate

assistance from persons trained in the law." Id. (footnote

omitted). No particular methodology is required, but prisoners

must be given the capability to file nonfrivolous legal claims. 

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356. 

Several courts have refused to find constitutional violations

where inmates' access to law libraries was restricted. E.g.,

Rhinehart v. Gomez, No. 93cv3747, 1995 WL 364339, at *7 (N.D. Cal.

June 8, 1995) (finding no denial of access to courts where prisoner

could only access law library for two hours every two weeks); Magee

v. Waters, 810 F.2d 451, 452 (4th Cir. 1987) (finding one hour per

week in law library of city jail did not violate inmate’s

constitutional rights). Restrictions identical to those at issue

here, allowing two hours of library access per week for inmates

without court deadlines and four hours per week for those with

verified deadlines, were held to be "reasonable as a matter of law"

by another district court. Zatko v. Rowland, 835 F. Supp. 1174,

1177 (N.D. Cal. 1993). But cf. United States v. Janis, 820 F.

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Supp. 512, 515 (S.D. Cal. 1992) (ordering that inmate representing

himself in criminal trial be given library access ten hours per

week if requested). 

The essence of Janoe's Complaint is that his petition for

certiorari was denied as untimely because he was not given enough

library time to prepare his petition and a motion for an extension

of time. (Compl. 3-7.) General allegations, however, do not

defeat qualified immunity. "[I]n resolving a motion for summary

judgment based on qualified immunity, a court must carefully

examine the specific allegations against each individual defendant

. . . ." Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1287 (9th Cir. 2000);

see Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639; Figueroa v. Gates, 207 F. Supp. 2d

1085, 1091 (C.D. Cal. 2002).

Janoe alleges that on January 24, 2001, Warden Garcia directed

that four law libraries be consolidated into two, and as a result,

law library access was "too restrictive." (Compl. 3.) According

to the Plaintiff, the consolidation created problems and made

access more difficult. (Id. at 4.) The policy he complains of

authorizes inmates with court deadlines within thirty days to

"receive a minimum of four (4) hours per week in two (2) hour

increments." (Pl.'s Mem. Ex. 1, at 7.) Janoe notes that in

interrogatory answers, Defendant Garcia stated that two hours of

access to the law library each week was adequate access. (Pl.'s

Mem. 13; Pl.'s Mem. Ex. 24, at 8.)

The Complaint contains even fewer references to Defendant

Ryan. On March 22, 2004, he is alleged to have issued a memorandum

changing the law library schedule. (Compl. 7.) Plaintiff's

exhibits include a revision to the law library policies which was

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issued by Defendant Ryan on September 28, 2004. (Pl.'s Mem. Ex.

2.) Janoe observes that Ryan answered Plaintiff's interrogatory

number twenty-three by stating that two hours of library time a

week was adequate access. (Pl.'s Mem. Ex. 25, at 8.)

"[T]he right alleged to have been violated must not be so

broadly defined as to 'convert the rule of qualified that our cases

plainly establish into a rule of virtually unqualified liability

simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights.'" 

Cunningham, 229 F.3d at 1288 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483

U.S. at 639). "On the other hand, . . . the right can not be so

narrowly construed so as to 'define away all potential claims.'" 

Id. (citing Kelley v. Borg, 60 F.3d 664, 667 (9th Cir. 1995)).

Here, Janoe argues that Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, and

Lewis v. Casey, 510 U.S. 343, establish that prisoners have a

constitutional right of access to the courts. This is true. 

"While Bounds guarantees the right of access to the courts under

the Fourteenth Amendment, prisoners have no inherent or independent

right of access to a law library or to legal assistance." Wilson

v. Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Lewis,

510 U.S. at 349-51). Supreme Court law does not dictate a minimum

number of hours or any other requirement for satisfying the right

of access to law libraries or legal assistance. Vandelft v. Moses,

31 F.3d at 796; Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 931 (6th Cir.

1985) (stating that Supreme Court, in Bounds, did not prescribe a

specific amount of library time); Oswald v. Graves, 819 F. Supp.

680, 685 (E.D. Mich. 1993).

A right to a specified number of hours in the library has not

been recognized by the Supreme Court. It is not clearly

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established. Consequently, Defendant Garcia is entitled to

qualified immunity. A reasonable officer in her position could

have believed that authorizing an inmate with a court deadline

(like Janoe) to have a minimum of four hours per week during the

thirty days preceding a deadline was a reasonable limitation. 

Ordinarily, the same rationale would extend to Defendant Ryan, but

because this Court has concluded that his alleged actions in 2004

follow Janoe's claimed date of injury, 2002, there is no claim

against Ryan.

E. Injunctive Relief

In the request for relief in his Complaint, Janoe asks the

Court to issue an injunction for prospective relief, requiring

Defendants to institute policies (1) making law libraries open at

least five days per week for each facility yard, (2) allowing an

inmate to access the law library five days per week, for two hours

each day, and (3) permitting inmates to use typewriters in the law

library. (Compl. 9.) These requests, if granted, would require

state prison administrators to enact sweeping changes to prison

policies. 

Injunctive relief is an equitable remedy that is appropriate

where the plaintiff can show he will suffer a "likelihood of

substantial and immediate irreparable injury" if an injunction is

not granted. Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1049

(9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,

461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983)); see also Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422

U.S. 922, 932 (1975). Defendants assert that Plaintiff is not

entitled to an injunction because he "cannot prove any ongoing

violation of his constitutional rights . . . ." (Defs.' Mem. 13.) 

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The traditional criteria for granting an injunction are "'(1)

a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the possibility

of irreparable injury to the plaintiffs if injunctive relief is not

granted; (3) a balance of hardships favoring the plaintiffs; and

(4) advancement of the public interest.'" Mayweathers v. Newland,

258 F.3d 930, 938 (9th Cir. 2001)(quoting Textile Unltd., Inc. v.

A.BMH & Co., 240 F.3d 781, 786 (9th Cir. 2001). At the other end

of the continuum for granting injunctive relief, the Court examines

whether "serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships

tips sharply in favor of the moving party." Stuhlbarg Intern.

Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 840 (9th Cir. 2001)

(citing Dr. Seuss Enters. V. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d

1394, 1397 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997)). Under either measure, this

Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief.

 The Court does not have jurisdiction to issue wide-reaching

injunctions to remedy inadequacies in prison administration that

extend beyond any actual injury suffered by a plaintiff. Lewis,

518 U.S. at 357. "The remedy must of course be limited to the

inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has

established." Id. (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 88,

89 (1995)). 

Janoe is the sole Plaintiff in this case. (Compl. 1.) 

Defendants assert that he lacks standing to seek injunctive relief. 

(Defs.' Mem. 13-14.) The Ninth Circuit has defined standing as

requiring an "injury in fact (a concrete harm suffered by the

plaintiff that is actual or imminent), causation, and

redressability." Doe v. National Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 199 F.3d

146, 152 (9th Cir. 1999)(citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504

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U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). These factors are elements of the

Plaintiff's case; he carries the burden of producing evidence to

establish standing. Janoe's showing falls short.

In Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. at 351, the Court noted that

Bounds did not create "an abstract, freestanding right to a law

library or legal assistance . . . ." Instead, the inmate must show

an actual injury, which "derives ultimately from the doctrine of

standing, a constitutional principle that prevents courts of law

from undertaking tasks assigned to the political branches." Id. at

349. For the reasons discussed above, Janoe has not demonstrated

that he suffered an "actual injury." Without an actual injury, he

cannot seek injunctive relief. 

Nor has Janoe demonstrated that he may suffer an imminent

injury. In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101-02, the

Court explained that "[t]he plaintiff must show that he 'has

sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct

injury' as a result of the challenged official conduct and the

injury or threat of injury must be both 'real and immediate,' not

'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'" 

The Court has already concluded that Janoe failed to establish

that he suffered an actual injury that is redressable by the Court,

and he has not shown an imminent injury. Furthermore, as the sole

plaintiff, he has no standing to seek prospective injunctive relief

on behalf of other inmates. As the Defendants correctly observe,

Janoe's available remedies are limited by the Prison Litigation

Reform Act. (Defs.' Mem. 16.) Section 3626(a)(1) of the Act

states: "Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to

prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct

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the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or

plaintiffs." 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a) West 2000). This statutory

restriction limits available relief.

Even if standing were not an obstacle, Janoe has another

hurdle to overcome. The Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive

relief unless he can show that he will suffer substantial and

immediate irreparable injury for which there is an inadequate

remedy at law. Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 92 F.3d

1486, 1495 (9th Cir. 1996). "Under any formulation of the test

[for injunctive relief], plaintiff must demonstrate that there

exists a significant threat of irreparable injury." Oakland

Tribune, Inc. V. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th

Cir. 1985). Janoe has made no showing of irreparable harm. 

For all these reasons, Plaintiff cannot obtain the injunctive

relief he seeks. 

VI. CONCLUSION

Because Janoe failed to exhaust administrative remedies,

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss should be GRANTED, and this action

should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE in its entirety. In the

alternative, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be

GRANTED. Defendants' evidentiary objections are SUSTAINED in part

and OVERRULED in part.

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before November 13, 2006. The document should be captioned

"Objections to Report and Recommendation." Any reply to the

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K:\COMMON\BROOKS\CASES\1983\PRISONER\JANOE1421\R&R01.wpd39 04cv1421 W(RBB)

objections shall be served and filed on or before November 27,

2006. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

district court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

1991). 

Dated: October 12, 2006 Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Whelan

All Parties of Record 

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