Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-04739/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-04739-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CRAIGSLIST, INC., 

Plaintiff,

 v.

CHRISTOPHER MEYER, JOHN DOE d/b/a

CLBOTPRO.COM AND

CRAIGSLISTBOTPRO.COM; AND DOES 3

THROUGH 25, INCLUSIVE

Defendants. /

No. C 09-4739 SI

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO SERVE DEFENDANT BY

ALTERNATE MEANS

Plaintiff’s motion to serve defendant Christopher Meyer by alternate means is currently

scheduled for hearing on July 30, 2010. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds that this

matter is appropriate for resolution without oral argument and hereby VACATES the hearing. For the

reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the motion.

BACKGROUND

On November 5, 2009, plaintiff craigslist, Inc. filed a complaint against defendants John Doe

d/b/a Clbotpro.com and craigslistbotpro.com, and Does 2 through 25, inclusive, alleging violations of

federal copyright and trademark law, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, California Penal Code § 502,

California trademark law, as well as contract claims and fraud. 

On October 21, 2009, plaintiff moved for and was granted leave to conduct expedited third-party

discovery on the online service providers, payment processors, and privacy registrants for defendant’s

websites. According to plaintiff, as a result of that discovery, plaintiff learned defendant Meyer was the

Case 3:09-cv-04739-SI Document 29 Filed 07/26/10 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Registrant Contact, Administrative Contact, Technical Contact, and Billing Contact for the domain

names clbotpro.com and craigslistbotpro.com. FAC ¶ 12. On February 26, 2010, plaintiff filed the first

amended complaint and named Christopher Meyer as a defendant. 

Plaintiff craigslist, Inc. is a California-based company incorporated in Delaware that operates

the website, www.craigslist.org (“craigslist”), which provides localized online classified ad placements

and related online services. The FAC alleges that defendant Meyer operates Clbotpro.com and

craigslistbotpro.com, both of which purportedly sell programs that allow the automated postings of ads

on craigslist, including by circumventing craigslist security measures and other violations of craiglist’s

Terms of Use (“TOU”). Id. ¶ 83. Plaintiff alleges that auto-posting software allows the placement of

large numbers of redundant, miscategorized, and/or mislocated ads on craigslist that disrupt the use of

craigslist services and places a heavier burden on plaintiff’s computer systems. Id. ¶¶ 77-81.

Plaintiff’s counsel Jeremy Buxbaum states in his declaration that “craigslist made more than ten

unsuccessful attempts to serve defendant Meyer.” Buxbaum Decl. ¶ 8. These service attempts were

based on information gleaned from plaintiff’s investigation, including the third-party discovery. Id. ¶

9. Based on its investigation, plaintiff believes that Meyer is likely residing in Thailand, but plaintiff

does not know Meyer’s physical address. Id. ¶¶ 11, 12. Plaintiff also believes Meyer is associated with

and regularly uses certain email addresses including but not limited to mediagulch@excite.com,

chris@interobang.com, clbotpro@gmail.com, support@craigslistbotpro.com, and sales@clbotpro.com.

DISCUSSION

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3), plaintiff has moved to serve defendant

Christopher Meyer through alternate means, including by email and other electronic means. Rule 4(f)(3)

permits the service of an individual at a place not within any judicial district of the United States by

“means not prohibited by international agreement, as the court orders.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3). Rule

4(f) does not “create a hierarchy of preferred methods of service of process” and, “court-directed service

under Rule 4(f)(3) is as favored as service available under Rule 4(f)(1) or 4(f)(2).” Rio Properties, Inc.,

v. Rio International Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1014, 1015 (9th Cir. 2002) (footnote omitted) (emphasis

omitted). Under Rule 4(f)(3), a method of service must comport with constitutional notions of due

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For the Northern District of California

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 Plaintiff notes that even if Meyer is residing in one of the signatory nations, the result would

be the same because Article 1 of the Hague Service Convention states that the Convention does not

apply when the address of the person to be served is unknown. 

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process and must not violate any international agreement. Rio Properties, Inc., 284 F.3d at 1015, 1016.

A method of service comports with due process if it is “reasonably calculated, under all the

circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity

to present their objections.” Id. at 1016, 1017 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust, 339

U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). 

Plaintiff contends that service through email comports with due process because it is reasonably

calculated to inform defendant of the impending action, and under the circumstances here, it is the only

means of providing notice to defendant. In Rio Properties, the Ninth Circuit found that email was “the

method most likely to reach” a defendant who operated a website from Costa Rica with no discoverable

street address in either the United States or Costa Rica, and who only provided an email address as a

contact. 284 F.3d at 1017-118. As in Rio Properties, plaintiff argues defendant Meyer has a business

that is conducted entirely through the internet and that is structured such that Meyer can only be

contacted through email. Furthermore, through its investigation, plaintiff states that it has been unable

to determine a physical address for defendant Meyer in either the United States or Thailand and is thus

unable to serve Meyer by any other means.

Plaintiff also contends there is no authority that states or implies that email service is prohibited

by international agreement, or otherwise, in Thailand. Thailand is not a signatory of the Hague Service

Convention, thus it does not apply1

, nor are there any other agreements that would prohibit service via

email. See Rio Properties, 284 F.3d at 1016 (finding the Hague Service convention did not apply in

Costa Rica because the country was not a signatory of the convention). In addition to Rio Properties,

plaintiff cites two cases from this district for the proposition that service by email is not generally

prohibited by international agreement. See e.g., Bank Julius Baer & Co. Ltd v. Wikileaks, No. C

08-00824 JSW, 2008 WL 413737, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2008) (finding plaintiff has successfully

demonstrated that service through email was not prohibited by an international agreement);

Williams-Sonoma Inc. v. Friendfinder Inc., No. C 06-06572 JSW, WL 2007 1140639, at *2 (N.D. Cal.

Case 3:09-cv-04739-SI Document 29 Filed 07/26/10 Page 3 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Plaintiff’s motion is framed as seeking order authorizing service by alternate means, including

by email and other electronic means. However, plaintiff’s motion only addresses service by email.

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April 17, 2007) (concluding that there was no showing that service by email was prohibited by an

international agreement). 

The Court agrees and finds that service of defendant Meyer through email is appropriate and that

it comports with due process. Plaintiff has demonstrated that despite third-party discovery and other

investigation resulting in more than ten failed service attempts, plaintiff has been unable to obtain a

physical address for Meyer. Additionally, plaintiff has shown that because defendant has chosen to

conduct business through the internet and list only email addresses as contact information, service

through email will give defendant sufficient notice and the opportunity to respond. The Court also finds

that issuing an order allowing service via email would not be prohibited by international agreement.2

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS plaintiffs’

motion to serve defendant Christopher Meyer by email. (Docket No. 26).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 26, 2010. SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:09-cv-04739-SI Document 29 Filed 07/26/10 Page 4 of 4