Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02240/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02240-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Phillip Rose, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Sierra Vista, City of, et.al., 

Defendants.

No. CV 14-02240-TUC-JAS (CRP)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 This case arises from the dissolution of a marriage between Plaintiff Phillip Rose, 

and Starr L. Rose, now Star L. Seesler, a Defendant herein. (Doc. 19, p. 1; Doc. 1, p. 4) 

On May 2, 2011, Plaintiff and Seesler filed Decree of Dissolution of Marriage 

(“Decree”). (Doc. 1, p. 4; Doc. 19, p. 1) Cochise County Superior Court Judge Charles A. 

Irwin, presiding over the dissolution, signed the decree on the same date. (Decree, p. 1; 

Doc. 35, Exhibit A) The Decree contains information regarding the division of property 

between the couple, including items in contention within this case. (Doc. 35, Exhibit A, 

p. 2–3) Plaintiff maintains that he has been denied his property which was awarded in the 

Decree; namely a 1966 Plymouth Valiant, real property located at 554 Milam, Clifton 

Hill, Missouri, and personal property including jewelry and money. (Doc. 1, p. 4; Doc. 

32. p. 3; Doc. 35, p. 4) 

 Following the enactment of the Decree, Plaintiff failed to reclaim his property. As 

a result, on August 31, 2011, Judge Charles A. Irwin issued an Order regarding Plaintiff’s 

unclaimed property. (“Order”) The Order stated that Plaintiff’s “failure to take possession 

of his personal property has not been explained or justified by [Plaintiff] and his 

continued refusal to do so is causing undue expense” to Defendant Seesler. (Doc. 35, 

Exchibit C, p. 1) Therefore, Plaintiff was given until October 24, 2011 to “take 

Case 4:14-cv-02240-JAS-CRP Document 44 Filed 08/24/15 Page 1 of 17
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

possession of his personal property and vehicle (1966 Plymouth Valiant).” (Id. at p. 2) As 

of that date, Sessler was granted the “express authority to sell or dispose of [Plaintiff’s] 

property in the manner she deem[ed] most appropriate.” (Id.) 

 On September 30, 2011, Plaintiff sent an email to Laura Cardinal, the attorney for 

Starr Seesler in the divorce proceedings, and also a Defendant herein, maintaining that he 

had not received a full property list. (Doc. 1, p. 4) Defendant Cardinal explained to 

Plaintiff in her response that Plaintiff’s personal property was available for reclamation at 

Cashway Mini Warehouse in Sierra Vista, and provided the code to the facility. (Doc. 1, 

p. 5; Doc. 35, p. 2) Defendant Seesler opted to keep the personal property in the Cashway 

storage facility, and paid the monthly fee. (Doc. 26, p. 3) Plaintiff additionally stated that 

Defendant Cardinal informed him that his 1966 Plymouth Valiant was located on 

Defendant Seesler’s property, and that a police escort would need to assist him in its 

retrieval. (Doc. 1, p. 5) Defendant Cardinal noted that Plaintiff refused a package 

containing a full property list. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that he refused this package to assure 

that this acceptance would not be used as evidence against him. (Id.) 

 In another email on October 10, 2011 Plaintiff questioned both Defendant 

Cardinal and the Sierra Vista Police Department (“SVPD”) as to why his property had 

not been returned to him, and again alleged that he had not received a full list of his 

property. (Doc. 1, p. 5) Plaintiff additionally expressed disapproval that his property had 

been moved to a storage facility without his express consent. (Id.) Defendant Cardinal 

replied to this email on October 11, 2011 again instructing Plaintiff how he might retrieve 

his personal property. (Doc. 35, p. 2) 

 On November 8, 2011 Plaintiff alerted Defendant Cardinal that he intended to bill 

Defendant Cardinal for his expenses relating to the repossession of his real property in 

Missouri. (Doc. 1, p. 5; Doc. 35, p. 3) Defendant Cardinal replied to this email offering to 

“assist” Plaintiff in the retrieval of his property. (Doc. 1, p. 6; Doc. 35, p. 3) Defendant 

Cardinal additionally informed Plaintiff that he would need a Quit-Claim Deed to take 

possession of his real property in Missouri. (Doc. 1, p. 6; Doc. 35, p. 3) 

Case 4:14-cv-02240-JAS-CRP Document 44 Filed 08/24/15 Page 2 of 17
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Defendant Seesler executed a Quit-Claim Deed June 9, 2011, and this deed was 

recorded on November 9, 2011. (Doc. 35, Exhibit B) On November 15, 2011 Defendant 

Cardinal sent an email to Plaintiff explaining that the Missouri County Recorder stated 

that a Quit-Claim Deed was all that was required for Plaintiff to take possession of his 

real property. (Doc.35, p. 3) Plaintiff reports that when he sent the paperwork to the 

county recorder in Missouri, they were rejected because the documents were not original. 

(Doc. 1, p. 7; Doc. 35, p. 3) 

 Plaintiff filed his Complaint on July 23, 2014 raising a total of Nine Counts. (Doc. 

1, p. 11–15) Plaintiff raises three federal claims against all named Defendants including 

violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 18 U.S.C. § 242, and 18 U.S.C. § 241. (Doc. 1, p. 8) 

Additionally, Plaintiff argues that the Sierra Vista Police Department, and Officers Daryl 

L. Copp and Lori Burdick violated 42 U.S.C. § 14141. (Doc. 1, p. 8) Also, Plaintiff raises 

Counts of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Negligence, Negligent Infliction of 

Emotional Distress, and Intrusion upon Seclusion against all named Defendants. (Doc. 1, 

p. 11–14) Finally, Plaintiff raises a claim of Negligent Hiring, Retention, or Supervision 

against the City of Sierra Vista. (Doc. 1, p. 15) Defendants have each filed a Motion to 

Dismiss (Docs. 19, 26 and 35) 

 On August 4, 2015 this matter was heard for oral arguments on Defendants’ 

motions to dismiss. At the hearing, Plaintiff conceded that Counts Two, Three and Four, 

should be dismissed because these federal criminal statutes do not provide for a private 

right of action. (Trans., p. 28) Plaintiff agreed that no Notice of Claim was served 

pursuant to Arizona law and that, as a result, the state court claims against the City of 

Sierra Vista and Defendants Copp and Burdick should be dismissed. (Trans., p. 29) The 

Plaintiff also stated that he had no further allegations or additions to his Complaint and 

that leave to amend would be unnecessary. (Trans., pp. 28, 30) Parties advised the Court 

that through the diligent work of counsel all property in dispute has been returned to 

Plaintiff. (Trans., p. 27) This is a procedural due process case.

LEGAL STANDARD 

 A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be 

Case 4:14-cv-02240-JAS-CRP Document 44 Filed 08/24/15 Page 3 of 17
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

granted under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed.R.Civ.P. 

12(b)(6). “The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal 

sufficiency of the complaint.” N. Star Int'l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th 

Cir.1983). Generally, a plaintiff's burden at the pleading stage is relatively light. Rule 

8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[a] pleading which sets forth a 

claim for relief . . . shall contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). 

 In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court analyzes the 

complaint and takes “all allegations of material fact as true and construe[s] them in the 

light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Parks Sch. of Bus. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 

1480, 1484 (9th Cir.1995). Dismissal may be based on a lack of a cognizable legal theory 

or on the absence of facts that would support a valid theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1990). A plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case in 

order to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Swierkiewicz v. Sorema 

N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514–15 (2002); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir.2011) 

(reaffirming the holding of Swierkiewicz in light of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 

(2009)). A complaint must however “contain either direct or inferential allegations 

respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal 

theory.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562 (2007) (citing Car Carriers, Inc. 

v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir.1984)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels 

and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 

do.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint 

suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Rather, the claim must be “‘plausible on its face,”’ 

meaning that the plaintiff must plead sufficient factual allegations to “allow[ ] the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 

 The Ninth Circuit has interpreted Iqbal and Twombly to hold that (1) to be entitled 

to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint may not simply recite the elements 

Case 4:14-cv-02240-JAS-CRP Document 44 Filed 08/24/15 Page 4 of 17
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair 

notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively; and (2) the factual 

allegations that are taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that 

it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery 

and continued litigation. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216. While a plaintiff need not plead facts 

constituting all elements of a case in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, 

courts nevertheless look to the elements to analyze a motion to dismiss, so as to decide, in 

light of judicial experience and common sense, whether the challenged complaint 

contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is 

plausible on its face. Sheppard v. David Evans & Assocs., 694 F.3d 1045, 1050 n.2 (9th

Cir. 2012); Jianjun Xie v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., No. C 12–02950 CRB, 2013 WL 

812425, at *4 n.3 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 5, 2013) (quoting Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 

1188, 1192 (10th Cir.2012)). Confronted with a motion to dismiss, the court is not 

focused on what evidence is presented. Rather, the court is tasked with reviewing only 

that which is contained within the four-corners of Plaintiff’s Complaint, and must accept 

the allegations as true. 

JUDICIALLY NOTICED FACTS: STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS 

To determine what occurred in state court, the court takes judicial notice of the 

submitted records from divorce case, Starr L. Rose, nka Starr L. Seesler v. Phillip D. 

Rose, Cochise County Superior Court Case No. DO201000582. See Fed.R.Evid. 201(b). 

A district court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without 

the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” 

Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted).

DISCUSSION 

The 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims 

1. Defendants Cardinal and Seesler 

Plaintiff included his ex-wife, Defendant Seesler, and her divorce attorney, 

Defendant Cardinal, in this section 1983 action, but the complaint alleged no facts to 

Case 4:14-cv-02240-JAS-CRP Document 44 Filed 08/24/15 Page 5 of 17
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

support the claim that the private defendants were acting under color of state law. On the 

contrary, the allegations of the complaint make it clear that Defendant Seesler and 

Defendant Cardinal acted in a manner consistent with an attorney-client relationship in a 

divorce proceeding. Nothing in the Complaint contains a whisper of a suggestion that 

these defendants have acted with the State in any sense whatever, nor is any “state 

action” by these defendants alleged. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in pertinent part, that: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 

custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 

citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 

redress. 

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant was acting under 

color of state law at the time the acts complained of were committed, that the acts 

complained of resulted in the deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the 

Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the plaintiff was damaged as a result. 

Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163–64 (2005); Azer v. Connell, 306 F.3d 

930, 935 (9th Cir.2002). 

 Private persons may act under color of state law if they “willfully participate in 

joint action with state officials to deprive others of constitutional rights.” United 

Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540 (9th Cir.1989). 

Accordingly, to support his claim for violations under Section 1983 against Defendants, 

Plaintiff must present evidence that Defendants conspired, or acted in concert, with state 

officials, namely, the Sierra Vista Police, to deprive him of a federal right. Kimes v. 

Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir.1996). Private parties are viewed as state actors under 

Section 1983 in only rare circumstances. When determining whether a private party acted 

under color of law, the courts must “start with the presumption that private conduct does 

not constitute governmental action.” Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Medical Center, 192 

F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir.1999). The plaintiff bears the burden of overcoming this 

Case 4:14-cv-02240-JAS-CRP Document 44 Filed 08/24/15 Page 6 of 17
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

presumption. E.F.W. v. St. Stephen's Indian High School, 264 F.3d 1297, 1305 (10th 

Cir.2001)(“[I]t is the plaintiff's burden to plead, and ultimately establish, the existence of 

a ‘real nexus' between the defendant's conduct and the defendant's ‘badge’ of state 

authority in order to demonstrate action was taken ‘under color of state law.’ ”) (citation 

omitted). 

 Historically, courts have applied four different tests when determining whether the 

conduct of a private party qualifies as state action: (1) public function; (2) joint action; 

(3) governmental compulsion or coercion; and (4) governmental nexus. Sutton, 192 F.3d 

at 836. However, the primary question under each test is whether the necessary “close 

nexus” between the state, the private entity, and the challenged conduct exists. Id. 

 Defendant Cardinal is a private attorney. It is well-settled that a lawyer engaged in 

private practice does not act under color of state law. For example, in Polk County v. 

Dodson, the United States Supreme Court held that although attorneys are “officers of the 

court,” a lawyer representing a client is not a state actor within the meaning of § 1983. 

454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (noting that an attorney's duty to advance the undivided interest 

of his or her client is essentially a private function for which state office and authority are 

not required). Similarly, in Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court, the Ninth 

Circuit dismissed a plaintiff's civil rights claim against an attorney, finding the lawyer 

was engaged in private practice and not a state actor. 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 

2003). The court further held conclusory allegations that an attorney acted under color of 

state law are insufficient to show a private party is a state actor. Id. (citing Price v. State 

of Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702,708 (9th Cir. 1991). Here, Plaintiff's conclusory allegation that 

Defendant Cardinal conspired with the city Defendants is insufficient to show she acted 

under color of state law for purposes of asserting a civil rights violation claim. 

 With regard to Defendant Seesler, the Plaintiff fails to rebut the presumption that 

private conduct does not constitute governmental action. “To prove a conspiracy between 

the state and private parties under [§] 1983, the [plaintiff] must show an agreement or 

meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights.” Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d at 

1540-41 (internal quotation marks and quoted sources omitted). Conclusory allegations 

Case 4:14-cv-02240-JAS-CRP Document 44 Filed 08/24/15 Page 7 of 17
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

will not suffice to state a claim of conspiracy. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 

268 (9th Cir.1982). Here, Plaintiff presents no facts that indicate Defendant Seesler 

conspired, or acted in concert, with state officials in depriving him of his property. 

Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that Defendant Seesler was involved in a conspiracy 

with the City of Sierra Vista and Defendants Copp and Burdick are not sufficient to state 

a claim of conspiracy. Furthermore, there are no allegations of a close nexus, or 

symbiotic relationship, between Defendant Seesler and the City of Sierra Vista that 

results in governmental action. Again, private parties are viewed as state actors under 

Section 1983 in only rare circumstances. Those rare circumstances are not present here. 

 Because Defendants Cardinal and Seesler were not acting under the color of state 

law for purposes of a claim, and any amendment of this claim would be futile, it is 

recommended that Plaintiff's due process claim under § 1983 against Defendants 

Cardinal and Defendant Seesler be dismissed. 

2. Defendants City of Sierra Vista, Copp and Burdick 

 Plaintiff claims that the City of Sierra Vista, and Officers Copp and Burdick 

(hereinafter the “City Defendants”), acted to deny him access to his property without due 

process of law. To support this allegation, Plaintiff alleges that the City Defendants 

accepted a property list from the SVPD and that the City Defendants conspired to deprive 

Plaintiff of his property, maintained possession of it, transferred it without Plaintiff’s 

consent, and willingly obstructed him from retrieving it. (Doc. 1, pp. 8, 9) The City 

Defendants maintain that these are conclusory allegations insufficient to state a claim 

against the City Defendants. (Doc. 33, p. 5) 

 The Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals against the deprivation of liberty 

or property by the government without due process. A section 1983 claim based upon 

procedural due process thus has three elements: (1) a liberty or property interest protected 

by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the government; (3) lack of 

process. Portman v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993). 

 In essence, Plaintiff is saying he has a Constitutional right to the police recovering 

and returning his property to him. However, a private citizen does not have a 

Case 4:14-cv-02240-JAS-CRP Document 44 Filed 08/24/15 Page 8 of 17
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Constitutional right to the police taking a certain action, with the exception of those 

situations where police must avoid deliberate indifference to someone the police have put 

in their care or control or in a vulnerable position. See, e.g., Deshaney v. Winnebago 

County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189. 195–196 (1989) (the Due Process 

Clause generally “confers no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid 

may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government 

itself may not deprive the individual ... the State cannot be held liable under the Clause 

for injuries that could have been averted had it chosen to provide them”); see also, Estate 

of Amos ex rel. Amos v. City of Page, Arizona, 257 F.3d 1086, 1090 (9th Cir.2001) (a 

state actor violates another's due process rights under § 1983 if the state actor puts a 

person in a situation more dangerous than in which he was found). Nothing in the 

complaint or in the record suggests that the City Defendants had any legal obligation to 

take a certain action with respect to Plaintiff’s property. 

 Moreover, assuming arguendo, the City Defendants could have done something to 

ensure Plaintiff’s access to his property, none of the actions as described by the Plaintiff 

result in deprivation without due process. This case stems from divorce proceedings 

wherein Plaintiff was afforded the due process he was entitled to and awarded his 

property by decree of the Cochise County Superior Court. In fact, Judge Charles Irwin’s 

order dated August 31, 2011, which this Court took judicial notice of, establishes 

Plaintiff’s “failure to take possession of his personal property has not been explained or 

justified by [him] and his continued refusal to do so is casing undo expense to [Defendant 

Seesler].” (Doc. 35, Exh. C) Plaintiff’s admitted refusal to accept a property list likely 

contributed more to the delay in the return of his property than any action taken by the 

City Defendants. As the City Defendants correctly point out, Plaintiff’s allegations that 

the City Defendants “willfully obstructed the retrieval of his property through failure to 

provide the appropriate documentation and resources to make a full account of his 

property” does not amount to a procedural due process claim for deprivation of property. 

 In sum, the Court finds no merit to the § 1983 claims against any of the City 

Defendants. In view of the finding that no constitutional violations occurred, any implied 

Case 4:14-cv-02240-JAS-CRP Document 44 Filed 08/24/15 Page 9 of 17
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Monell claims against the City fail as well. Monell v. City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 

694 (1978). 

Counts Two, Three and Four 

 In Counts Two, Three and Four, Plaintiff alleges violations of 18 U.S.C. § 242, 

Deprivation of Civil Liberties, 42 U.S.C. § 14141, Police Misconduct, and 18 U.S.C. § 

241, Conspiracy Against Rights. Both 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 are federal criminal statutes 

and 42 U.S.C. § 14141 is brought under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement 

Act. Although Plaintiff stated that these claims were not going to be contested, the Court 

will briefly address why dismissal is appropriate. 

 The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act provides the Attorney 

General of the United States with the authority to initiate a civil action for injunctive or 

declaratory relief against law enforcement agencies that have engaged “in a pattern or 

practice ... that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected 

by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” 42 U.S.C. § 14141(a). The statute does 

not provide a private right of action. See 42 U.S.C. § 14141(b). Consequently, Plaintiff's 

claims under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act must be dismissed for 

failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

 Plaintiff also brings claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242. These are 

federal criminal statutes relating, respectively, to conspiracy against civil rights and 

deprivation of rights under the color of law. Criminal statutes do not provide a private 

cause of action or a basis for a civil lawsuit such as Plaintiff attempts to bring with the 

filing of the complaint now before the Court. See, e.g., Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 

F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir.2006) (affirming the dismissal of a plaintiff's claims under 18 

U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 because they “are criminal statutes that do not give rise to civil 

liability”); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir.1980) (finding 18 U.S.C. §§ 

241 and 242 provide no private right of action and cannot form a basis for civil suit); 

Pawelek v. Paramount Studios Corp., 571 F.Supp. 1082, 1083 (N.D.Ill.1983) (no private 

cause of action inherent in federal criminal statutes defining civil rights violations). 

Because there is no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 241 or 18 U.S.C. § 242, 

Case 4:14-cv-02240-JAS-CRP Document 44 Filed 08/24/15 Page 10 of 17
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim upon which relief may be granted. 

The State Claims 

1. Defendants City of Sierra Vista, Copp & Burdick 

 At oral argument, Plaintiff conceded that he did not serve the City Defendants 

with a notice of claim as is required by Arizona law pursuant to A.R.S. § 821.01. (Trans., 

p. 39) In Arizona, individuals with claims “against a public entity or a public employee 

shall file claims with the person or persons authorized to accept service for the public 

entity or public employee as set forth in the Arizona rules of civil procedure within one 

hundred eighty days after the cause of action accrues.” A.R.S. § 12–821.01(A). Because 

Plaintiff admitted to having failed to comply with the notice of claim statute, and because 

all parties agree the state law claims against City Defendants should be dismissed, the 

Court recommends that Counts Five, Six, Seven, Eight and Nine be dismissed as to the 

City Defendants. 

2. Defendants Seesler & Cardinal 

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

 In Count Five, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants are liable for intentional infliction 

of emotional distress pursuant to Arizona law. Defendants argue that the Complaint fails 

to state a claim for IIED because it does not allege that Plaintiff suffered severe 

emotional distress—an essential element of the claim. (Doc. 26, p. 9, Doc. 35, p. 12) 

 A claim for IIED has three elements: extreme and outrageous conduct by the 

defendant, defendant's intent to cause emotional distress or reckless disregard of the near 

certainty that such distress will result from the conduct, and resulting severe emotional 

distress. See Wallace v. Casa Grande Union High School Dist., 184 Ariz. 419, 428, 909 

P.2d 486, 495 (App.1995); Ford v. Revlon, 153 Ariz. 38, 43, 734 P.2d 580, 585 (1987). 

The Court may not assume that the plaintiff can prove facts different from those alleged 

in the complaint. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of 

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983); Jack Russell Terrier Network of N. Cal. v. Am. 

Kennel Club, Inc., 407 F.3d 1027, 1035 (9th Cir.2005). Similarly, legal conclusions 

couched as factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness and 

Case 4:14-cv-02240-JAS-CRP Document 44 Filed 08/24/15 Page 11 of 17
- 12 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

“conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a 

motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. F.D.I.C., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1998); see also Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662 at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported 

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”) (citation omitted). 

 Here, the complaint does not contain even a conclusory allegation that Plaintiff 

suffered severe emotional distress from the alleged outrageous conduct. Because Plaintiff 

has failed to allege an essential element of the IIED claim, the Court will recommend that 

Defendants' motion to dismiss that claim be granted. See Wallace, 184 Ariz. at 428, 909 

P.2d at 495; Ford, 153 Ariz. at 43, 734 P.2d at 585. 

Negligence 

 In Count Six, Plaintiff alleges a claim of Negligence against all Defendants. 

Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants owed him a duty to facilitate the return of his 

personal property pursuant to court order. (Doc. 1, p. 12) Defendants maintain that no 

such duty was owed to Plaintiff and that if such legal obligation was imposed by the 

divorce decree, the obligation was satisfied by their good-faith efforts in assisting 

Plaintiff in retrieving his property. (Doc. 19, p. 9-10, Doc. 26, p. 9) 

 “To establish a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must prove four elements: ‘(1) a 

duty requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of care; (2) a breach by the 

defendant of that standard; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and 

the resulting injury; and (4) actual damages.’ ” Narramore v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.,

2010 WL 2732815, at *8 (D.Ariz. July 7, 2010) (quoting Gipson v. Kasey, 214 Ariz. 141, 

143, 150 P.3d 228, 230 (Ariz.2007) (citing Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 504, 667 

P.2d 200, 204 (Ariz.1983))). “Generally, the element of duty is one for the court to 

decide, whereas the others are factual issues usually decided by the jury.” Id.

 “In order to determine whether a duty of care existed, the court decides ‘whether 

the relationship of the parties was such that the defendant was under an obligation to use 

some care to avoid or prevent injury to the plaintiff.’ ” Id. (quoting Markowitz v. Arizona 

Parks Bd., 146 Ariz. 352, 356, 706 P.2d 364, 368 (Ariz.1985)). “No duty exists unless the 

relationship imposes a legal obligation for the benefit of one party on the other.” Id.

Case 4:14-cv-02240-JAS-CRP Document 44 Filed 08/24/15 Page 12 of 17
- 13 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(citing Ontiveros, 136 Ariz. at 508, 667 P.2d at 208). 

 In the instant case, Plaintiff fails to meaningfully allege that Defendants owed him 

a duty to ensure the prompt return of his property. Defendant Seesler was an adverse 

party in divorce proceedings and that relationship did not impose a legal obligation upon 

her to avoid injury to Plaintiff. Insofar as the divorce decree instructed Defendant Seesler 

to relinquish property to Plaintiff, she complied with that order by making said property 

readily available to Plaintiff despite his troubles in retrieving it from the storage unit and 

his issues with the transfer of the Missouri property. Thus, assuming, arguendo, that there 

was a legal duty, there was no breach of that duty. Similarly, Defendant Cardinal was 

opposing counsel for Plaintiff’s ex-wife and it is well settled in Arizona that an attorney 

does not owe a duty to an adverse party. See Linder v. Brown & Herrick, 189 Ariz. 398, 

406, 943 P.2d 758, 766 (Ct. App. 1997); Lewis v. Swenson, 126 Ariz. 561, 564, 617 P.2d 

69, 72 (1980); Bird v. Rothman, 128 Ariz. 599, 602, 627 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Ct. App. 

1981). Because the Complaint fails to adequately plead a duty, breach, causation and 

damages for purposes of a negligence claim against Defendants, the claim must fail. 

Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 

 Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for Negligent Infliction of 

Emotional Distress because he failed to allege any manifested physical injury. (Doc. 19, 

p.10, Doc. 26, p. 9, Doc. 35, pp. 13-14) Plaintiff asserts that he experienced anxiety, 

mental anguish and exacerbated symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of 

his being unable to retrieve his private property. (Doc. 1, p. 13) 

 A plaintiff may recover damages for mental anguish or emotional distress 

precipitated by fright, shock or other mental disturbance resulting from conduct by the 

defendant that placed the plaintiff in fear for his own safety or security. Quinn v. Turner,

155 Ariz. 225, 227–28, 745 P.2d 972, 974–75 (App.1987); Restatement (Second) of Torts 

§ 313 cmt. d (1965) (hereafter “Restatement”). A plaintiff may not recover on a claim for 

negligent infliction of emotional distress, however, unless the mental anguish resulting 

from the defendant's conduct is accompanied by, manifests as, or develops into bodily 

harm. Keck v. Jackson, 122 Ariz. 114, 115–16, 593 P.2d 668, 669–70 (1979); Monaco v. 

Case 4:14-cv-02240-JAS-CRP Document 44 Filed 08/24/15 Page 13 of 17
- 14 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

HealthPartners of S. Ariz., 196 Ariz. 299, 302, ¶ 7, 995 P.2d 735, 738 (App.1999); Gau 

v. Smitty's Super Valu, Inc., 183 Ariz. 107, 109, 901 P.2d 455, 457 (App.1995); DeStories 

v. City of Phoenix, 154 Ariz. 604, 608, 744 P.2d 705, 709 (App.1987). Transitory 

physical phenomena, such as crying, nightmares, insomnia, and headaches, that are 

themselves inconsequential and do not result in substantial bodily harm, cannot support a 

claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Monaco, 196 Ariz. at 302, ¶ 8, 995 

P.2d at 738; Gau, 183 Ariz. at 109, 901 P.2d at 457; Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 156 

Ariz. 375, 378–79, 752 P.2d 28, 31–32 (App.1987); see also Restatement § 436A cmt. c. 

However, a claim may be sustained where such symptoms persist so as to result in a 

long-term physical illness or mental disturbance. Monaco, 196 Ariz. at 302–03, ¶ 8, 995 

P.2d at 738–39; Restatement § 436A cmt. c. 

 Plaintiff claims that he suffered anxiety, mental anguish and exacerbated 

symptoms of his post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of his inability to retrieve his 

property. But anxiety, mental anguish and exacerbated symptoms of a pre-existing mental 

disorder to not constitute the type of manifested bodily harm required under Arizona law. 

Plaintiff’s theory requires that he show he suffered physical manifestations of his mental 

distress that were not transitory, temporary, or inconsequential. See Monaco, 196 Ariz. at 

303, ¶ 12, 995 P.2d at 739; Gau, 183 Ariz. at 109, 901 P.2d at 457; Restatement § 436A 

cmt. c. The record before the Court does not contain an allegation of any physical 

manifestation of mental distress sufficient to present an issue of fact as to that claim. As 

such, Plaintiff’s claim for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress should be dismissed. 

Intrusion Upon Seclusion 

 Plaintiff’s eighth claim for relief is that Defendants invaded his right to privacy 

and intruded upon his seclusion by damaging his property, participating in an 

intimidation campaign against him, and contacting authorities in Calistoga, California. 

(Doc. 1, p. 15) Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations are insufficient to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Doc. 19, p. 11, Doc. 26, p. 9, Doc. 35, p. 

14) 

 Arizona courts have long recognized the four-part classification of the tort of 

Case 4:14-cv-02240-JAS-CRP Document 44 Filed 08/24/15 Page 14 of 17
- 15 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

invasion of privacy laid out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652A, et seq.

(Restatement); Rutledge v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 148 Ariz. 555, 556 n. 2, 715 P.2d 

1243, 1244 n. 2 (App.1986), overruled on other grounds, Godbehere v. Phoenix 

Newspapers, Inc., 162 Ariz. 335, 783 P.2d 781 (1989). The Restatement sets forth the tort 

of intrusion upon seclusion thus: 

One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude 

or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to 

liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be 

highly offensive to a reasonable person. 

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B. 

 To prevail on an intrusion claim, a plaintiff must first show that the defendant “has 

intruded into a private place, or has otherwise invaded a private seclusion that the 

plaintiff has thrown about his person or affairs.” Rest. § 652B, cmt. c; Shulman v. Group 

W. Productions, Inc., 18 Cal.4th 200, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 864, 955 P.2d 469 (Cal.1998) 

(to recover for intrusion, plaintiff must show that “defendant penetrated some zone of 

physical or sensory privacy surrounding, or obtained unwanted access to data about, the 

plaintiff.”) The Restatement states: 

The invasion may be by physical intrusion into a place in which the 

plaintiff has secluded himself, as when the defendant forces his way into 

the plaintiff's room in a hotel or insists over the plaintiff's objection in 

entering his home. It may also be by the use of the defendant's senses, with 

or without mechanical aids, to oversee or overhear the plaintiff's private 

affairs, as by looking into his upstairs window with binoculars or tapping 

his telephone wires. It may be by some other form of investigation or 

examination into his private concerns, as by opening his private and 

personal mail, searching his safe or wallet, examining his private bank 

account, or compelling him by a forged court order to permit an inspection 

of his personal documents. 

Hart v. Seven Resorts Inc., 190 Ariz. 272, 278, 947 P.2d 846, 852 (Ct. App. 1997) 

(quoting Rest. § 652B, cmt. b) (emphasis added). Regardless of the method of intrusion 

used, a plaintiff can recover “only if he had an objectively reasonable expectation of 

seclusion or solitude in the place, conversation, or data source.” Shulman, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 

at 864, 955 P.2d 469; Kemp v.Block, 607 F.Supp. 1262, 1264 (D.Nev.1985) (emphasis 

Case 4:14-cv-02240-JAS-CRP Document 44 Filed 08/24/15 Page 15 of 17
- 16 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

added); People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 111 Nev. 

615, 895 P.2d 1269, 1279 (Nev.1995). 

 Plaintiff fails to explain how Defendants intruded upon his private affairs or into 

his private space, either physically or otherwise. In his Complaint, Plaintiff makes no 

allegations specifically pertaining to Defendants Seesler and Cardinal and instead focuses 

his complaints against the City Defendants. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were 

involved in a “malicious intimidation campaign” and that the City Defendants contacted 

police in Calistoga, California in order to further intimidate Plaintiff. (Doc. 1, p. 15) 

These episodes do not materially resemble the kinds of invasions or intrusions into 

private affairs against which the law seeks to guard. Knocking on a door or speaking with 

neighbors to attempt to contact a person is a common event and hardly a hallmark of 

intrusive behavior. Nor does Plaintiff claim that he had an objectively reasonable 

expectation of seclusion or solitude in regards to his personal property, which he 

offhandedly claims was damaged. As such, Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim 

upon which relief may be granted and his claim for intrusion upon seclusion should be 

dismissed. 

Negligent Hiring, Retention or Supervision

 Because this claim is alleged against only the City Defendants, and because 

Plaintiff conceded that the state law claims against the City of Sierra Vista, Defendant 

Copp and Defendant Burdick should be dismissed for failure to comply with Arizona’s 

notice of claim statute, the Court recommends that Count Nine of the Complaint be 

dismissed. 

CONCLUSION

 Because Plaintiff has failed to state claim upon which relief can be granted, and 

because the Court’s analysis under Rule 12(b)(6) concludes that the facts, as alleged in 

the Complaint, would not entitle the Plaintiff to a legal remedy in this matter, the Court 

will recommend that the Complaint be DISMISSED in its entirety. 

Case 4:14-cv-02240-JAS-CRP Document 44 Filed 08/24/15 Page 16 of 17
- 17 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

RECOMMENDATION

(1) Defendants’ City of Sierra Vista, Copp and Burdick motion to dismiss (Doc. 19) be 

GRANTED as to all counts, without leave to amend. 

(2) Defendant Starr Lynn Seesler’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 26) be GRANTED as to all 

counts, without leave to amend. 

(3) Defendant Laura Cardinal’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 35) be GRANTED as to all 

counts, without leave to amend. 

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure and LRCiv 7.2(e), Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for the District 

of Arizona, any party may serve and file written objections within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS

after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond 

to another party’s objections within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy. 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). No replies to objections shall be filed unless leave is granted from 

the District Court to do so. If objections are filed, the parties should use the following 

case number: CV 14-02240-TUC-JAS. 

 Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the 

Magistrate Judge may be deemed a waiver of the party’s right to de novo review of the 

issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

 

 Dated this 21st day of August, 2015. 

Case 4:14-cv-02240-JAS-CRP Document 44 Filed 08/24/15 Page 17 of 17