Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-03290/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-03290-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANYALE PARRISH,

 Plaintiff,

v.

INDYMAC BANK, INC., a division 

of ONEWEST BANK, INC., a 

Washington corporation; and all 

persons unknown, claiming any 

legal or equitable right, 

title, estate, lien, or 

interest in the property 

described in the complaint 

adverse to Plaintiff‟s title, 

or any cloud on Plaintiff‟s 

title thereto; and DOES 1-20, 

inclusive,

 Defendants.

______________________________/

Case No. 2:09-CV-03290-JAM-GGH

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT‟S 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant OneWest

Bank, Inc.‟s (“Defendant‟s”) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #8)

Plaintiff Danyale Parrish‟s (“Plaintiff‟s”) First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”) (Doc.1), for failure to state a claim pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 12(b)(6), or in the 

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alternative, for a more definite statement pursuant to FRCP 

12(e). Plaintiff partially opposes the motion. 1 (Doc. #9).

Plaintiff does not oppose the dismissal of five claims: 

fraud/concealment, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, unfair 

business practices and negligent infliction of emotional 

distress. (Plaintiff‟s Opposition, pg. 3, FN. 1). Accordingly, 

these claims are dismissed, with prejudice. For the reasons 

explained below, the remainder of Defendant‟s Motion to Dismiss 

is also granted, with prejudice.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In September 2006, Plaintiff obtained a mortgage loan to 

refinance her residential property located at 883 Meadowridge 

Drive, Fairfield, CA 94534 (“subject property”). Indymac was the 

loan originator and lender on the subject property. The terms of 

the loan were memorialized in the promissory Note which was 

secured by a Deed of Trust on the subject property. The Deed of 

Trust was recorded on September 21, 2006.

Plaintiff alleges she discovered significant loan 

irregularities and statutory violations related to the loan. 

Plaintiff alleges that she did not receive required disclosures, 

that the defendants placed her into a loan without regard for 

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g).

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other products better suited for her, and defendants did not 

verify her income. Plaintiff defaulted on the loan. Defendant 

OneWest has instituted foreclosure proceedings on the subject 

property. 

In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that Indymac is a division of 

OneWest Bank, Inc. As a result, all allegations in the FAC 

combine the defendants. However, Defendant OneWest argues that

it is a separate entity, and that it was not in existence at the 

time Plaintiff‟s loan was originated. Therefore, Defendant 

argues that it is not responsible for Indymac‟s alleged misdeeds 

during loan origination. In Plaintiff‟s opposition brief she 

states that she does not oppose Defendant‟s motion to dismiss to 

the extent it argues it was not in existence at the time of the 

loan‟s origination, related to the causes of action for fraud, 

negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, unfair business practices 

and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 

II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

A party may move to dismiss an action for failure to state 

a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In considering a motion to 

dismiss, the court must accept the allegations in the complaint 

as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

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plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1975), 

overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 

(1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). Assertions that 

are mere “legal conclusions,” however, are not entitled to the 

assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 

(2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007)). 

To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff needs to plead 

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Dismissal is appropriate 

where the plaintiff fails to state a claim supportable by a 

cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep‟t, 

901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

Upon granting a motion to dismiss, a court has discretion 

to allow leave to amend the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 15(a). “Dismissal with prejudice and without 

leave to amend is not appropriate unless it is clear . . . that 

the complaint could not be saved by amendment.” Eminence 

Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F. 3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 

2003).

Generally, the Court may not consider material beyond the 

pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state 

a claim. There are two exceptions to this rule: when material is 

attached to the complaint or relied on by the complaint, or when 

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the court takes judicial notice of matters of public record, 

provided the facts are not subject to reasonable dispute.

Sherman v. Stryker Corporation, 2009 WL 2241664 at *2 (C.D. Cal. 

Mar. 30, 2009) (internal citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff 

attached to the FAC documents relating to the issuance of a

temporary restraining order in state court, which enjoined the 

defendants from engaging in the foreclosure of the subject 

property. The Court will take judicial notice of these 

documents. 

Defendant requests judicial notice of the documents in 

connection with Indymac‟s receivership and OneWest‟s creation. 

Plaintiffs do not dispute the authenticity of these documents, 

all of which are matters of public record. Accordingly, the 

Court takes judicial notice as requested.

B. Cancellation of Deed

Plaintiff brings a claim for “cancellation of deed,” 

alleging that “there is in existence a certain written 

instrument that purports to be a Deed of Trust with Defendant as 

the designated beneficiary... the above recited actions and 

omissions of Defendants and each of them in acquiring the 

invalid Deed of Trust were willful and or/or reckless and were 

intended or done without regard to injury to Plaintiff, who is 

indeed damaged.” (FAC, pg. 6) Plaintiff alleges the deed should

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be cancelled as a result of alleged violations of the Truth in 

Lending Act (“TILA”), the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 

(“RESPA”), the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”) and the 

Gramm, Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), as well as for other acts such 

as not placing Plaintiff in an “appropriate financial product.”

However, as discussed above, Plaintiff also stated in her 

opposition brief that she does not oppose Defendant‟s motion to 

dismiss to the extent it argues it was not in existence at the 

time of the loan‟s origination. For that reason, Plaintiff did 

not oppose dismissal of several of the claims, including those 

for negligence, fraud and unfair business practices. 

The Court in Mertan v. American Home Servicing, Inc., 2009 

WL 3296698 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2009) dealt with conflicting 

allegations very similar to the conflicting allegations raised 

by Plaintiff in this case. In that case the Court noted, 

“Plaintiffs aver that as a result of the wrongful and/or illegal 

acts of Defendants there was a Deed of Trust recorded on the 

subject property . . . Plaintiffs thus ask that the Court cancel 

the Deed of Trust. As written, Plaintiffs‟ request to cancel the 

deed of trust is too vague and ambiguous. Specifically, it 

appears that Plaintiffs contend that wrongful conduct caused the 

Deed of Trust to be recorded in the first instance and that this 

request to cancel speaks to those initial wrongful acts. 

However, as admitted by Plaintiffs in various portions of their 

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opposition briefing, Defendant AHMSI did not participate in the 

loan origination. As such it is not plausible that the deed of 

trust was recorded „as a result‟ of any allegedly wrongful 

conduct by AHMSI.” Id. at *8.

Likewise, here Plaintiff has conceded in her opposition 

brief that OneWest was not involved (or even in existence) at

the origination of her loan, yet she seeks to hold OneWest 

responsible, and have the deed of trust canceled, because of 

alleged violations of TILA, RESPA, and other statutes at the 

origination of the loan. 

Additionally, the Court in Mertan noted that, “the 

requested relief here sounds in equity. . . Plaintiffs have 

inadequately plead tender as a seemingly necessary prerequisite 

to cancellation of the instrument.” Id. As Defendant argues, 

Plaintiff has failed to plead an ability to tender the amount 

owed. 

Defendant further argues that Plaintiff‟s claim for 

cancellation of the deed of trust amounts to a claim for 

rescission of her loan. Indeed, in the general allegations of 

the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that the FAC serves as a notice of 

rescission. However, Defendant argues that a claim for 

rescission should be dismissed because Plaintiff does not allege 

her ability to tender the full amount of the loan.

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To the extent that the allegations in Plaintiff‟s Complaint 

amount to a claim for rescission under TILA, the claim fails 

because Plaintiff has not alleged tender. Rescission under TILA 

“should be conditioned on repayment of the amounts advanced by 

the lender.” Keen v. Am. Home Mortgage Serv., Inc., 2009 WL 

3380454 at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2009) (quoting Yamamoto v. 

Bank of N.Y., 329 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2003)). The Ninth 

Circuit has further explained that prior to ordering rescission 

based on a lender‟s alleged TILA violations, a court may require 

borrowers to prove ability to repay loan proceeds, and “there is 

no reason why a court that may alter the sequence of procedures 

after deciding that rescission is warranted, may not do so 

before deciding that rescission is warranted. . . the court does 

not lack discretion to do before trial what it could do after.” 

Garza v. Am. Home Mortgage, 2009 WL 188604 at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 

27, 2009) (quoting Yamamoto, 329 F.3d at 1173). 

The court in Keen noted that a number of California

district courts have required plaintiffs to plead facts 

demonstrating ability to tender the loan principal in order to 

withstand a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and proceed with a claim 

for rescission under TILA. Id. at *4-5 (citing Garza, 2009 WL 

188604; Serrano v. Sec. Nat‟l Mortgage Co., 2009 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 71725 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2009); Pesayco v. World Sav.

Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73299 (C.D. Cal. July 29, 2009).

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Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff pleads a claim for 

rescission under TILA, her claim fails because the FAC contains 

no allegations that Plaintiff is able to tender the full amount 

of the loan. Additionally, Plaintiff‟s allegations that 

Defendant violated RESPA and other statutes are conclusory and 

vague, and fail to state claims against Defendant. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff fails to state a viable claim for relief against One 

West, and her claim for “Cancellation of Deed” is dismissed.

Amendment of her claim would be futile, as Plaintiff has 

conceded that Defendant was not involved in the origination of 

her loan. Thus the Court grants dismissal with prejudice.

C. Quiet Title

Plaintiff brings a claim for quiet title. However, as 

Defendant argues, plaintiff has not paid the debt owed, and 

therefore cannot quiet title. “[A] mortgagor cannot quiet his 

title against the mortgagee without paying the debt secured.” 

Shimpones v. Stickney, 219 Cal. 637, 649 (1934). Here, the FAC 

does not allege that Plaintiff has tendered, or is able to

tender, the debt secured by the subject property. As such, 

Plaintiff cannot allege a claim for quiet title. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff‟s claim for quiet title is dismissed, with prejudice. 

D. Constructive Trust and Order of Conveyance

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Plaintiff brings a cause of action for “Constructive Trust 

and Order of Conveyance.” A constructive trust may be imposed if 

three conditions are met: (1) existence of a res; (2) the 

plaintiff‟s right to that res; and (3) the defendant‟s gain of 

the res by fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence or other 

wrongful act. United States v. Pegg, 782 F.2d 1498, 1500 (9th 

Cir. 1986). 

Here, a constructive trust is not an appropriate remedy. 

Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege that Defendant used

fraud or other wrongful acts to obtain the Deed of Trust to the 

subject property. Plaintiff alleges that “defendants set about a 

course of concealment” and that through “defendant‟s fraudulent 

conduct and improper omissions, defendants hold a Deed of Trust 

on title to the subject property.” FAC ¶¶ 23, 26. These 

conclusory allegations are not sufficient to support a plausible 

claim. Moreover, Plaintiff‟s allegations of fraud lack 

credibility given that Plaintiff did not oppose dismissal of her 

fraud claim against Defendant. Accordingly, Plaintiff‟s claim 

for a constructive trust or order of conveyance is dismissed, 

with prejudice. 

E. Wrongful Foreclosure

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant‟s foreclosure proceedings 

are based on a wrongfully obtained deed by virtue of Defendant‟s 

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noncompliance with applicable California Code statutes, TILA and 

RESPA. Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot allege wrongful 

foreclosure without tendering full payment.

“Under California law, in an action to set aside a 

trustee‟s sale, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he has made a 

valid and viable tender [offer] of payment of the indebtedness.” 

Pantoja v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 

1184 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2009) (internal citations omitted).

Here, aside from the conclusory allegation that Defendant failed 

to comply with California Code statues, TILA and RESPA, 

Plaintiff alleges no facts to support her ability to tender the 

full amount of the loan. Accordingly, Plaintiff‟s claim for a 

wrongful foreclosure is dismissed, with prejudice. 

F. Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary and Permanent 

Injunction

Plaintiff pleads a claim for a temporary restraining order 

and a permanent injunction. It is black letter law in California 

that injunctive relief is a remedy, not a cause of action. 

Marlin v. AIMCO Venezia, LLC, 154 Cal. App. 4th 154, 162 (2007). 

“A request for injunctive relief is not a cause of action. 

Therefore, we cannot let this „cause of action‟ stand.” 

Shamisian v. Atl. Richfield Co., 107 Cal. App. 4th 967, 984-85 

(2003). 

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Moreover, “it is appropriate to deny an injunction where 

there is no showing of reasonable probability of success, even 

though the foreclosure will create irreparable harm, because 

there is no justification in delaying that harm where, although 

irreparable, it is also inevitable.” Jessen v. Keystone Savings 

& Loan Ass‟n., 142 Cal. App. 3d 454, 459 (1983). Here, in 

addition to improperly alleging injunctive relief as a cause of 

action, Plaintiff has not paid the debt secured on her loan, nor 

has she shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff‟s claim for a temporary restraining order 

and preliminary and permanent injunction is dismissed, with 

prejudice. 

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant‟s Motion to 

Dismiss is GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE. Defendant‟s Motion for a More 

Definite Statement is dismissed as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 13, 2010

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