Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01408/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01408-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DORE DEVINE, ) 

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

FRESNO COUNTY CPS, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

)

) 

No. CV-F-05-1408 REC LJO

ORDER (1) GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S

COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO

STATE A CLAIM, (2) GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR MORE

DEFINITE STATEMENT, AND

(3) DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO

FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT

WITHIN 30 DAYS. 

(Doc. 4)

On January 30, 2006, the Court heard Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for Failure to State a Claim and

Motion for More Definite Statement (the “Motions”). Upon due

consideration of the written and oral arguments of the parties

and the record herein, the Court GRANTS the Motions as set forth

below.

I. Facts

The facts as they appear in the Complaint are as follows. 

Plaintiff Dore Devine (“Plaintiff”) had an infant daughter, Lura

Devine (“Lura”). At some point, Plaintiff lost custody of Lura. 

Case 1:05-cv-01408-AWI-LJO Document 14 Filed 02/02/06 Page 1 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

It appears that “Fresno County CPS” refers to the County of 1

Fresno’s Department of Children and Family Services. See Welcome

to Children and Family Services, http://www.fresnohumanservices.

org/ChildrenandFamilyServices/default.htm (last visited February 1,

2006).

2

Defendants County of Fresno (the “County”), Gary Zomalt, and

Cathi Huerta placed Lura in protective custody in a foster home. 

Mr. Zomalt is the director of “Fresno County CPS” and is 1

employed by the County. Ms. Huerta is also a County employee. 

On April 25, 2004, while in protective custody, Lura died. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ acts or omissions caused

Lura’s death. Mr. Zomalt had a responsibility to adequately

train the social workers involved in Lura’s death. The County of

Fresno, Mr. Zomalt, and Ms. Huerta ratified and condoned the

activities of the social workers that resulted in Lura’s death.

II. Procedural History

On April 25, 2005, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the

Superior Court of California, County of Fresno. Dore Devine v.

Fresno Co. CPS, et al., County of Fresno Superior Court Case No.

05 CE CG 01232 AMS. The Complaint features a claim on an

intentional tort theory and a claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983

(“Section 1983”) for violations of Plaintiff’s civil rights,

specifically the “right to life and liberty, freedom from cruel

and unusual punishment, and due process.” On November 8, 2005,

Defendants County, Fresno County CPS, Mr. Zomalt, and Ms. Huerta

(collectively “Defendants”) removed the case to this Court. On

Case 1:05-cv-01408-AWI-LJO Document 14 Filed 02/02/06 Page 2 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

The other defendants named in the Complaint do not appear to 2

have joined in these Motions. The other defendants are Glynda

Maroney, Renee Ballin, Tony Madden, Lorraine Ramirez, Candis Ryson,

and Peggy Thompson.

3

November 10, 2005, Defendants filed these Motions. On January 2

23, 2006, Plaintiff filed her opposition brief. On January 25,

2006, Defendants filed their reply.

III. Motion to Dismiss

A. Legal Standard

Dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is proper

if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2

L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957). In testing the sufficiency of a complaint

against a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, a court must “accept all

material allegations in the complaint as true and construe them

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” N. Star Int’l v.

Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 580 (9th Cir. 1983). 

The Court need not, however, “accept legal conclusions cast in

the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot

reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult

Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994). 

A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law if there is

a lack of a cognizable legal theory or if there are insufficient

facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v.

Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). The

Case 1:05-cv-01408-AWI-LJO Document 14 Filed 02/02/06 Page 3 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

Court must determine whether or not it appears to a certainty

under existing law that no relief can be granted under any set of

facts that might be proved in support of a plaintiff’s claims. 

De La Crux v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 48 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.

denied, 441 U.S. 965, 99 S. Ct. 2416, 60 L. Ed. 2d 1072 (1979). 

Where the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be

granted, leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so

requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Allen v. Beverly Hills, 911

F.2d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 1990).

B. Fresno County CPS

Plaintiff has named as a defendant in the Complaint “Fresno

County CPS,” which she identifies as “a department of the County

of Fresno,” in addition to naming the County of Fresno, itself. 

Compl. at 4. Defendants claim that Fresno County CPS, as a

department of a municipality, is not a person subject to

liability under Section 1983.

In the Section 1983 context, the Supreme Court has equated

the actions of a municipal department with the actions of the

municipality itself. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 472, 105 S.

Ct. 873, 83 L. Ed. 2d 878 (1985) (citing Monell v. N.Y. Dep’t of

Soc. Servs. (Monell), 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55., 98 S. Ct. 2018,

56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978)). Consequently, such claims are subject

to dismissal for failure to state a claim. See, e.g., Vance v.

County of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996)

(dismissing Department of Corrections of Santa Clara County);

Fields v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 789 F. Supp. 20, 22 (D.D.C. 1992)

Case 1:05-cv-01408-AWI-LJO Document 14 Filed 02/02/06 Page 4 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

(District of Columbia Department of Corrections); Stump v. Gates,

777 F. Supp. 808, 815 (D. Colo. 1991) (city police department and

county coroner’s office). Plaintiff’s claims against Fresno

County CPS are in effect claims against the County of Fresno. 

Since, no claims against Fresno County CPS are cognizable, the

Court concludes that leave to amend these claims would be futile. 

Accordingly, all claims against Fresno County CPS are DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

C. Monell Requirement of a Policy or Custom

Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to state a

claim against the County because she does not allege that she

suffered injuries pursuant to a governmental policy or custom. 

In Monell, the Supreme Court held that, in the absence of an

official policy, a municipality could be liable under Section

1983 where discriminatory practices are “so permanent and well

settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of

law.” 436 U.S. at 691. 

Construing the language of the Complaint in the manner most

favorable to Plaintiff, it alleges that the County inadequately

trained social workers and “ratified and/or condoned” acts of

social workers that infringed Plaintiff’s civil rights. Compl.

at 8. The Complaint also alleges that the County placed Lura

Devine in a foster home, causing her death. Id. It also alleges

that the County failed to protect Lura. In her opposition brief,

Plaintiff claims that various “city policies” and “customs and

practices” caused Plaintiff’s injuries. Opp’n at 2. Nowhere

Case 1:05-cv-01408-AWI-LJO Document 14 Filed 02/02/06 Page 5 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

does the Complaint allege that an official policy or permanent

and well settled practice injured Plaintiff or Lura. 

Plaintiff also claims that her allegation that County

inadequately trained its social workers suffices to establish a

policy or practice that satisfies Monell. Opp’n at 3. Failure

to train only serves as a basis for Section 1983 liability where

it reflects a “‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’” choice by a

municipality that amounts to its policy. Doe v. Lebbos, 348 F.3d

820, 831 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489

U.S. 378, 389), 109 S. Ct. 1197, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1989))

(county not liable for failure to train county social workers

absent showing of deliberate indifference). Plaintiff failed to

allege in the Complaint that the County has made a deliberate or

conscious choice not to adequately train social workers that

amounts to County policy. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Second Cause

of Action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to the County. 

Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel are reminded that they are

subject to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule

11(b)(3) provides that by presenting a signed pleading to the

court the pleader represents that the factual contentions therein

“have evidentiary support” or “are likely to have evidentiary

support” after reasonable discovery. Failure to comply with Rule

11 may result in sanctions, which may include dismissal of this

action and the imposition of monetary sanctions.

Case 1:05-cv-01408-AWI-LJO Document 14 Filed 02/02/06 Page 6 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

D. Fourteenth Amendment

To succeed on a Fourteenth Amendment claim based on

companionship and society of a relative, the plaintiff must show

that the government acted with “deliberate indifference” to

plaintiff’s rights of familial relationship and society. Byrd v.

Guess, 137 F.3d 1126, 1134 (9th Cir. 1998). The deliberate

indifference standard governs such claims because the Due Process

Clause does not entitle a plaintiff to recover based on merely

negligent conduct of a state official. Collins v. City of Harker

Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 127 n. 10, 12 S. Ct. 1061, 117 L. Ed. 2d

261 (1992); see also City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389 n. 7, 392

(deliberate indifference requires a showing greater than gross

negligence). Deliberate indifference standard allows relief for

“conduct that involves a ‘conscious disregard’ of public safety.” 

Fargo v. San Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638, 642 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Plaintiff does not allege facts that show Defendants acted

with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s relationship with

Lura. She does not allege facts from which the Court can infer

that Defendants were aware of and disregarded any risk to Lura’s

safety. Rather, the Complaint merely states conclusively that

Defendants “ratified and/or condoned the activities of various

social workers which resulted in the death of Lura Devine” and

“violated plaintiff’s civil rights by failing to protect Lura

Devine.” Compl. at 8. Plaintiff does not in the opposition

suggest any alternative theory of recovery under the Fourteenth

Amendment. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims in

Case 1:05-cv-01408-AWI-LJO Document 14 Filed 02/02/06 Page 7 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

the Second Cause of Action are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

E. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ claim for violation of

her right to “freedom from cruel and unusual punishment” fails

because the Eighth Amendment’s protections against cruel and

unusual punishment apply only to convicted prisoners, not to

citizens in general. The Supreme Court has held that “Eighth

Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has

complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally

associated with criminal prosecutions.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430

U.S. 651, 671 n. 40, 97 S. Ct. 1401, 51 L. Ed. 2d 711 (1977); see

also Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987)

(“The eighth amendment applies to ‘convicted prisoners.’”); Jones

v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986) (pretrial

detainee’s treatment was not properly evaluated under the Eighth

Amendment because he had not been convicted). The Court held

that though “evolving standards of decency” determine whether

punishments are “cruel and unusual,” the limitation of the Eighth

Amendment’s scope to criminal punishments is inflexible. 

Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 668 n. 36.

Plaintiff does not allege that she has been prosecuted and

convicted for any crime. Nor does her opposition brief detail

any theory of recovery for “cruel and unusual punishment” other

than the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, the claims for cruel and

unusual punishment in the Second Cause of Action are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Case 1:05-cv-01408-AWI-LJO Document 14 Filed 02/02/06 Page 8 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

F. Liability of Supervisors

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims

against Defendants Mr. Zomalt and Ms. Huerta (collectively the

“Supervisors”) fail because she has not alleged their “direct or

personal participation” in causing her injuries. Mot. at 4:15-

16. Though supervisors may not be vicariously liable for their

subordinates’ actions, they can be individually liable if they

are personally involved with the constitutional violation or if a

sufficient causal connection exists between their wrongful

conduct and the constitutional violation. Hansen v. Black, 885

F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Supervisory liability is imposed against a

supervisory official in his individual

capacity for his “own culpable action or

inaction in the training, supervision, or

control of his subordinates”; for his

“‘acquiesce[nce] in the constitutional

deprivations of which [the] complaint is

made’”; or for conduct that showed a

“‘reckless or callous indifference to the

rights of others.’”

Larez v. Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal

citations omitted). A supervisor may be liable for setting in

motion acts that cause others to inflict constitutional injury. 

Id. at 645 (citing Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th

Cir. 1978)). Normal notice pleading requirements are heightened

when a Section 1983 defendant faces personal liability for

supervisory conduct. Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194

(9th Cir. 1998). In such a case, “[a] plaintiff must allege

facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was

Case 1:05-cv-01408-AWI-LJO Document 14 Filed 02/02/06 Page 9 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

10

personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Id.

Larez concerned the liability of the chief of police based

on actions by law enforcement officials under his command. 946

F.2d at 645. The Ninth Circuit held that the chief could be

personally liable based on plaintiff’s allegations that

established that the chief “condoned, ratified, and encouraged”

the unconstitutional actions of his subordinates. Id. at 646. 

Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that the chief failed to

discipline officers involved or establish procedures to prevent

similar violations in the future. Id. Additionally, the chief

ratified the ineffectual procedures by signing a letter rejecting

plaintiff’s complaints. Id.

Here, the Complaint alleges merely that Zomalt “was

responsible for adequately training social workers” and that

Supervisors “ratified and/or condoned” actions of social workers

that violated Plaintiff’s rights. Compl. at 8. The Court

acknowledges that a common-sense application of pleading

standards must account for Plaintiff’s excusable lack of detail

concerning supervisors’ interactions with employees. See McGrath

v. Scott, 250 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1227 (D. Ariz. 2003). 

Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s bald assertions that the Defendants

Zomalt and Huerta “ratified and/or condoned” unconstitutional

conduct are insufficient to establish their personal Section 1983

liability. See, e.g., Davis v. County of Nassau, 355 F. Supp. 2d

668, 676-77 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing claim against supervisors

in their individual capacity for failure to offer “specific

Case 1:05-cv-01408-AWI-LJO Document 14 Filed 02/02/06 Page 10 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

11

facts” that indicated personal involvement); Rodriguez-Vazquez

v. Cintron-Rodriguez, 160 F. Supp. 2d 204, 211-12 (D.P.R. 2001)

(dismissing claim of supervisor liability based on failure to

allege facts that “affirmatively connect the supervisor’s conduct

to the subordinate’s violative act or omission”). Plaintiff does

not point to any act or omission of Supervisors that has a causal

connection to any constitutional violation. Therefore, the

Second Cause of Action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to

Defendants Mr. Zomalt and Ms. Huerta.

IV. Motion for a More Definite Statement

A. Legal Standard

Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows

for a motion for a more definite statement if a pleading “is so

vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to

frame a responsive pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Motions

for a more definite statement are disfavored, but are within the

Court’s discretion and may sometimes be appropriate. Osborne v.

County of Riverside, 385 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1052 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 

“[P]roper pleading under Rule 8 requires a pleading to contain

allegations of each element of the claim. If it does not, and if

the deficiency is not so material that the pleading should be

dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), a more definite statement is

appropriate.” 2 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 12.36[1] (Matthew

Bender 3d ed.). A defendant is not entitled to use a Rule 12(e)

simply to determine the legal theory upon which plaintiff plans

to proceed. See, e.g., Bryson v. Bank of N.Y., 584 F. Supp.

Case 1:05-cv-01408-AWI-LJO Document 14 Filed 02/02/06 Page 11 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

12

1306, 1319 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Sopkin v. Mo. Nat’l Life Ins. Co.,

222 F. Supp. 984, 985 (W.D. Mo. 1963) (“The failure to

characterize a claim as in contract or tort is not such vagueness

or ambiguity that the defendant cannot frame a responsive

pleading in an ordinary case such as this.”). “However, ‘even

though a complaint is not defective for failure to designate the

statute or other provision of law violated, the judge may in his

discretion . . . require such detail as may be appropriate in the

particular case.” Thompson v. City of Shasta Lake, 314 F. Supp.

2d 1017, 1022 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (quoting McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d

1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996)).

B. Discussion

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action

“is so vague and unintelligible that defendants are unable to

frame a responsive pleading without guessing as to the claim

being made.” Mot. at 5:23-24. Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action

is titled “Intentional Tort” and reads, in its entirety, as

follows:

Defendants, and each of them, recklessly and

willfully, deprived plaintiff of her parental

rights and took plaintiff’s baby daughter

away from her. They placed her daughter in

protective custody. The “protection” they

were supposed to provide was so inadequate

that the plaintiff’s baby daughter was

murdered while the baby was a ward of the

court.

Compl. at 6. It is unclear what tortious actions Plaintiff

alleges Defendants undertook. The allegation that Defendants

“deprived plaintiff of her parental rights” is merely a legal

Case 1:05-cv-01408-AWI-LJO Document 14 Filed 02/02/06 Page 12 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

13

conclusion and does not point to any conduct. The allegation

that Defendants “took” Lura and “placed [her] in protective

custody” does not indicate what role any Defendant had in those

actions. Plaintiff alleges that they inadequately protected Lura

and that she died as a result. It is not clear what intentional

conduct any Defendant engaged in that constituted this inadequate

protection. Did Defendants physically grab Lura away from

Plaintiff? Did they sign a piece of paper that effectuated the

assignment? Did they drive her to the foster home? Did they

engage in a direct physical act that injured Lura? Plaintiff’s

First Cause of Action conceivably alleges that any of the

Defendants engaged in any of these and limitless other imaginable

acts. 

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action is so

vague and ambiguous that Defendants cannot reasonably be required

to frame a responsive pleading. The wording of the First Cause

of Action requires Defendants to guess what tortious conduct it

encompasses and which Defendants engaged in that conduct. This

vagueness prejudices Defendants because they risk that their

interpretation of the claim “differs from the judge’s, that

plaintiffs will surprise them with something new at trial which

they reasonably did not understand to be in the case at all, and

that res judicata effects of settlement or judgment will be

different from what they reasonably expected.” McHenry, 84 F.3d

1172 at 1180. Therefore, Defendants’ motion for a more definite

statement is GRANTED. Plaintiff is directed to allege facts that

Case 1:05-cv-01408-AWI-LJO Document 14 Filed 02/02/06 Page 13 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

14

more particularly establish the nature of the intentionally

tortious act or acts. Plaintiff shall also indicate which

Defendant or Defendants engaged in each alleged act. 

ACCORDINGLY:

1. All claims against Fresno County CPS are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

2. Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action for constitutional

violations under Section 1983 is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.

3. Defendant’s motion for a more definite statement is GRANTED

with respect to the First Cause of Action for Intentional

Tort.

4. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within 30 days of

the issuance of this order. Failure to comply will result

in dismissal of the action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 1, 2006 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

810ha4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-01408-AWI-LJO Document 14 Filed 02/02/06 Page 14 of 14