Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00540/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00540-16/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES H. FISHER,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-0540 MCE EFB P

vs.

N. DIZON, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff is a prisoner without counsel suing for alleged civil rights violations. See 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Currently before the court is defendants’ February 2, 2007, motion for summary

judgment. Plaintiff has filed an opposition.

Plaintiff’s March 31, 2005, verified complaint alleges that defendants violated his Eighth

Amendment rights based on the following allegations: (1) on March 4, 2004, at around 12:30

a.m., Dizon and other guards awoke plaintiff and flung pocket knives in the area of plaintiff’s

bed; (2) on March 4, 2004, at around 4:30 a.m., defendants Dizon and Powers returned to

plaintiff’s bunk, awoke him and flung pocket knives in the area of plaintiff’s bed; (3) at around

12:35 a.m., on March 5, 2004, Dizon approached plaintiff’s bunk, shone a light in plaintiff’s

eyes, held a knife over plaintiff’s head, shook the bunk and poked plaintiff twice in the buttocks;

(4) at around 4:30 a.m. on March 5, 2004, plaintiff complained about Dizon to defendant

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Powers, who refused to take action to protect plaintiff from Dizon; and, (5) nine days later, on

March 14, 2004, defendant Dizon assaulted and battered plaintiff with the assistance of

Anunciacion, Barrientos, Mendoza, Rosales and Swan, causing plaintiff to suffer bruises and

cuts.

Defendants contend that plaintiff cannot produce evidence to create a genuine issue for

trial as to whether they used excessive force. For the reasons explained below, the court finds

that with respect to the first two claims, there is no genuine issue for trial. With respect to the

other three claims, plaintiff has established a genuine issue of material fact as to the claims

against Dizon and Powers.

I. Plaintiff’s Rule 56(f) Request

Plaintiff seeks additional time for discovery. Pl.’s Opp’n, at 3. Although he states that

he does not make this request pursuant to Rule 56(f), that rule governs a request to postpone

summary judgment to permit a party to conduct additional discovery. Plaintiff asserts that

defendants’ counsel did not produce documents that plaintiff duly requested. He asserts that

these records will show that other prisoners and civilians have filed complaints against

defendants alleging acts of violence, retaliation and the falsification of records. Id., at 4. 

Plaintiff states that defendant Powers was demoted shortly after plaintiff filed a grievance about

the conduct he alleges in his complaint. Id., at 4-5. He also asserts that the documents he seeks

will establish that defendants operate under a “Code of Silence.” Id., at 5.

As to the contention that other persons have filed complaints alleging retaliation, further

discovery by plaintiff to gather evidence to oppose this motion is unnecessary. The court finds

that the retaliation claim survives summary judgment.

As to the first two claims, plaintiff fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 56 (f). A

court may deny a motion for summary judgment or postpone ruling on the motion to permit

further discovery when an opposing party shows by affidavit that it cannot present facts essential

to justify the party’s opposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). As the party opposing summary

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 A “relief officer” covers for a regular officer when the latter is not at work. Rosales

Decl., ¶ 3.

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judgment, plaintiff’s burden to prevail on this motion is high: 

Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party

cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party’s

opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a

continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or

discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). This standard requires the party seeking a continuance to “identify by

affidavit the specific facts that further discovery would reveal, and explain why those facts

would preclude summary judgment.” Tatum v. City and County of San Fransisco, 441 F.3d

1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff’s request to continue summary judgment in order to permit

further discovery is not based on an affidavit. Furthermore, his reasons are too general. That

other people have complained about defendants is not a specific fact without which plaintiff

could not oppose defendants’ motion. Rather, at best, it is character evidence with limited

admissibility at trial. Plaintiff has not show by affidavit what specific discovery he proposes and

how that discovery would lead to evidence which would satisfy his burden in opposing summary

judgment. Thus, plaintiff’s Rule 56(f) request must be denied.

II. Facts

At all times relevant to this action, plaintiff was a prisoner confined at the California

Medical Facility (“CMF”), and housed in Dorm 1 in Unit H-3 with 11 other prisoners. Defs.’

Mot. for Summ. J., Exs. filed in Supp. Thereof (“Defs.’ Ex.”), Ex. A, Incident Report of

3/14/2004; Dizon Decl., ¶ 26. All defendants were employed at CMF. Defendants Dizon and

Anunciacion were first watch relief1

 officers in plaintiff’s housing unit. Dizon Decl., ¶ 1-2;

Anunciacion Decl., ¶ 1-2. Defendant Rosales was the regular first watch officer on plaintiff’s

housing unit. Rosales Decl., ¶ 2. Defendant Mendoza was a housing officer on Housing Wing

L-3. Mendoza Decl., ¶ 2. Swan was the first watch officer for the administrative segregation

unit. ¶ 2. Barrientos was a floor officer on plaintiff’s housing unit. Barrientos Decl., ¶ 2-3.

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Defendants’ motion necessitates some explanation of the process for counting prisoners. 

Relevant here is the “positive count,” i.e., counting “the actual number of inmates that each

respective staff member has counted and reported to Central Control.” Defs.’ Ex. B, CDCR

Departmental Operations Manual (“DOM”) 520204.3. Prisoners must be counted at least four

times each day at times established in the DOM. DOM 52020.4. Thus, positive counts are to be

conducted between 12:30 a.m. and 1:00 a.m.; 4:30 a.m. and 5:30 a.m.; 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m.;

and 9:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. DOM 52020.4.1. During what is known as a “standing count,”

which is done between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m., “inmates housed in cells shall stand upright at

their cell door and shall remain standing until counted by the officer conducting the count.” 

DOM 52020.4.2. Prisoners “housed in dormitories equipped with double tier bunks, shall

remain seated on their assigned bunk until the count is completed by the officer.” DOM

52020.4.3. No document specifies when a count is “completed.” However, defendants assert

that prisoners must remain on their bunks until guards finish counting and the last officer has left

the dormitory. Kaplan Decl., ¶ 10; Dizon Decl., ¶ 14. Guards counting prisoners must “ensure

that the individual inmate is awake, breathing and responsive.” Defs.’ Ex. C, California Medical

Facility Operational Procedure (“OP”) 4, at 4. A prisoner will not be counted if staff is “unable

to confirm the inmate being counted is alive and breathing.” OP 4, at 4.

Defendants submit evidence in the form of Dizon’s declaration explaining the security

precautions taken during a positive count made on first watch. To count prisoners in a

dormitory, guards must enter the dormitory. One guard remains in the main hall outside the

housing wing. Dizon Decl., ¶ 9. The door leading into the housing wing remains locked, and

the “key” officer holds the keys for all the wings, dormitories and cells where prisoners are to be

counted. Id. To count the prisoners in a dormitory, the guard stationed in the hallway unlocks

the door to the dormitory, two to four guards enter, and the wing officer locks the door after

them. Id., ¶ 10. One guard, the “wing officer,” counts the prisoners while the other officers,

“cover officers,” protect him. Id. Since it was dark in the dormitory, Dizon used a flashlight to

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verify that each prisoner was present and alive, and while it was not his practice to shine the light

in a prisoner’s eyes, it could have happened on occasion. Id., ¶ 25. Dizon asserts that during

counts he does not touch a sleeping prisoner with his hand or any object because startling a

sleeping prisoner can lead to a dangerous incident. Dizon Decl., ¶ 24.

Compounding prison officials’ concerns for security during a count was a habit of

prisoners, at the time of these events in dispute here, of hanging “curtains” on clotheslines

around their bunks. Dizon Decl., ¶¶ 15, 16; Rosales Decl., ¶ 13; Swan Decl., ¶ 11. This practice

required the wing officer to move whatever was hanging on the line. Dizon Decl., ¶ 15. Thus,

Sergeant Powers authorized guards to cut down curtains and clotheslines that hindered the ability

to count prisoners. Id., at 17; Rosales Decl., ¶ 14; Swan Decl., ¶ 11. Dizon asserts that he

carried what is known as a “cut down tool,” which he used for cutting curtains and clotheslines

to facilitate the count. Id., at 18. A “cut down tool” has the shape of “a curved version of the

number six,” and specifically is designed to cut a noose in order to prevent a suicide. Id. The

lower part of the tool is an oval-shaped handle of about 3/4 of an inch thick. Id. The top part is

curved, about 3/4 of an inch thick with “a razor-like device angled upward toward the center

inside curve of the top of the ‘six.’” Id. This upper, sharp portion is used for cutting. Id. Dizon

denies ever having used anything other than a cut down tool to cut an prisoner’s clothesline. 

Dizon Decl., at ¶ 22. At deposition, plaintiff explained that the instrument was like a box

cutting tool. Defs.’ Ex. G, Dep. of Plaintiff (“Pl.’s Dep.”), at 14.

For the most part, defendant Dizon avoids the use of specific dates in his declaration. He

states that about a week before the March 14, 2004, incident, when Dizon cut plaintiff’s

clothesline on which a sheet was hanging, plaintiff began pulling on the sheet. Dizon Decl., ¶

23. Dizon tugged back, but ultimately let go in order to avoid a violent incident. Id. That day,

plaintiff complained to Sgt. Powers about the what had happened. Id. Dizon denies knowing

who plaintiff was before this incident. Id. 

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On March 4, 2004, during “first watch,” guards conducted two positive counts. Kaplan

Decl., ¶¶ 5-6. They completed the first count by approximately 1:00 a.m., and the second by

approximately 5:00 a.m. Id. In the verified complaint, plaintiff alleges that at around 12:30

a.m., he was awakened by unspecified staff “and Dizon wielding and flinging knives in my bed

area, and snatching on the bunk as they cut away my towel line.” Compl., at 4. At deposition he

retracted this allegation stating that Dizon did not thrust the knife. Pl.’s Dep., at 14. Rather,

Dizon “used the cutting knife on string. He cut away a string. He cut away a towel, my towel

string.” Id. Plaintiff admitted that at this time he did not see the cutting tool. Id., at 17. He just

felt the bunk move when the string was cut away. Id. At 4:30 a.m., the same guards returned

with the sergeant, defendant Powers. Id. As they approached plaintiff’s bunk, Dizon pointed at

plaintiff and said, “That’s him.” Compl., at 5. Powers then took a knife out of his pocket and

cut a clothesline from plaintiff’s bunkmate’s bed with such force as to shake the entire bunk bed. 

Id. Defendant Dizon does not specify a date, but does not dispute that at least once during

the first week of March 2004, he was working the first positive count of the first watch. Dizon

Decl., ¶ 23. He used a “cut down” tool to cut a clothesline on plaintiff’s bunk. Dizon Decl., 

¶ 23; Swan Decl., ¶¶ 14-15. Plaintiff had hung a sheet on the line, and the sheet obstructed the

view of plaintiff’s bunk. Dizon Decl., ¶ 23; Swan Decl., ¶¶ 14-15. While Dizon was cutting the

sheet, plaintiff began to pull on it. Dixon Decl., ¶ 23; Swan Decl., ¶¶ 14-15. This continued so

that they essentially were in a tug-of-war. Eventually, Dizon let plaintiff have the sheet so as to

avoid having the situation escalate. Dixon Decl., ¶ 23; Swan Decl., ¶¶ 14-15. The court

construes these facts as pertaining to the first incident on March 4 because this was the only time

it appears that Dizon cut a clothesline attached to plaintiff’s bunk. 

The verified complaint also alleges that on March 5, 2004, at around 12:35 a.m., Dizon

and other, unidentified guards returned. Compl., at 5. Plaintiff was awake. Id. His towel was

folded and on the floor. Id. He had nothing hanging up, but “Dizon walked up to my head area

and shined his high-intensity flash light directly into my eyes.” Id. Plaintiff blocked the light

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with one hand. Dizon shook the bunk with the hand in which he was holding a knife. Id. Dizon

then went to the other side of the bunk, shook the bunk with both hands, poked plaintiff in the

buttocks and walked away. Id. Plaintiff asserts that the second poke “penetrated the crack and

cheeks” of his buttocks. Compl., at 6. At deposition, plaintiff testified that Dizon touched him

with some object, which could have been a baton or a flashlight. Pl.’s Dep., at 35.

Again, on March 14, 2004, during the first positive count on the first watch, Dizon cut

down a clothesline that was on plaintiff’s bed and told plaintiff that clotheslines were not

permitted. Dizon Decl., ¶ 28. Dizon asserts that thereafter, he stood near the restroom door,

which was about seven to ten feet from the door leading out of the dormitory. Id. The other

guards walked past him into the hallway. Id., ¶ 29. Dizon ensured that all staff walked out the

door, and then he began to walk toward the door, looking behind him as he went. Id. Plaintiff

took hold of his cane and walked toward Dizon. Id., ¶ 30; Compl., at 9. Rosales, the key person

during that count, saw plaintiff leave his bunk. Rosales Decl., ¶¶ 6, 7. Dizon twice ordered

plaintiff to stop. Dizon Decl., ¶ 30; Mendoza Decl., ¶¶ 7-8. Dizon thought that plaintiff was

upset because Dizon had cut his clothesline. Dizon Decl., ¶ 31. When plaintiff was about two

feet away from him, Dizon grabbed plaintiff. Dizon Decl., ¶ 33; Mendoza Decl., ¶ 8. Mendoza

heard a scuffle in the dormitory and ran inside, where he recovered a cut down tool one of the

other guards pushed across the floor away from the scuffle. Mendoza Decl., ¶¶ 7-8; Rosales

Decl., ¶ 9. Mendoza suggested removing plaintiff from the dorm. Mendoza Decl., ¶ 9; Dizon

Decl., ¶ 34. The other prisoners in the dormitory began to awaken and become agitated. Dizon

Decl., ¶ 35; Mendoza Decl., ¶ 9. As Dizon held plaintiff, who was the larger of the two, from

behind, plaintiff spun him around with such force that Dizon’s feet left the ground. Dizon Decl.,

¶¶ 34, 36; Rosales Decl., ¶ 10. Dizon became caught in the utility belt of another guard, Rosales,

and broke Rosales’s radio holder. Dizon Decl., ¶ 36; Rosales Decl., ¶ 10. Dixon and Mendoza

maneuvered plaintiff out of the dormitory, and both plaintiff and Dizon fell to the ground. Dizon

Decl., ¶ 37; Mendoza Decl., ¶¶10, 12; Rosales Decl., ¶ 11. Another guard, Swan, was

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performing a security check in a different unit when he saw the officers struggling with a

prisoner in plaintiff’s unit. Swan Decl., ¶¶ 6-7. Swan ran into the main hallway, blew his

whistle and commanded Anunciacion to sound his alarm. Id. Mendoza saw a pen in plaintiff’s

right hand, and ordered plaintiff to release it. Mendoza Decl., ¶ 12. Plaintiff did not obey the

order, and Mendoza pried the pen from his hand. Id. Other staff placed plaintiff into mechanical

restraints. Dizon Decl., ¶ 39; Defs.’ Ex. A, Incident Report of 3/14/2004. Anunciacion denies

touching plaintiff on March 14, 2004. Anunciacion Decl., ¶7.

In contrast to defendants’ version of events, the verified complaint alleges that Dizon and

others kicked his bunk during the count, and that after the guards, Dizon being the last, had left

the dormitory, plaintiff took his cane and started walking towards the bathroom. Compl., at 9. 

He alleges that when he was about 3-5 feet from the bathroom, Dizon ran back into the

dormitory, stood by the bathroom door and commanded plaintiff to stop. Id. Plaintiff stopped, 

Dizon then told the guard at the door to “hit his button,” presumably the alarm, and grabbed

plaintiff’s left arm. Id. Another guard grabbed plaintiff’s right hand, and Dizon said they should

take plaintiff down in the hallway. Id. They carried plaintiff out the door, Dizon hit plaintiff in

the face, knocking off his glasses, and then grabbed plaintiff around the neck. Id. Plaintiff

obeyed a different officer’s order to “just relax and go down.” Id., at 10. “Dizon then re-applied

his choke hold on me as someone was kicking me in the back and legs.” Id. Ultimately, Dizon

released plaintiff on the command of a sergeant who is not a defendant in this action. Id.

The parties agree, however, that after plaintiff was restrained, guards took him to the

medical clinic. Rosales Decl., ¶ 15; Anunciacion Decl., ¶ 10. At this point, Rosales and

Anunciacion collected plaintiff’s property, which was substantial. Rosales Decl., ¶ 15;

Anunciacion Decl., ¶ 10. These officers did not confiscate any of plaintiff’s property, but items

such as empty body oil containers would have been considered garbage and been thrown away. 

Rosales Decl., ¶ 16. Rosales, Barrientos, Anunciacion and Swan all categorically deny touching

plaintiff on March 14, 2004. Rosales Decl., ¶ 18; Barrientos Decl., ¶ 25; Anunciacion Decl., ¶ 7;

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Swan Decl., ¶¶ 5-7, 9.

Plaintiff submits evidence in the form of a declaration by a fellow prisoner, Roderick

Green, that prisoners did move around once guards had finished counting but before they left the

dormitory. Mr. Green asserts that from about May 1, 2004, until October 14, 2004, he was

housed in the same unit as plaintiff. Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. B, Green Decl., ¶ 1. When guards began to

count prisoners at about12:30 a.m., he would walk to his bunk, and once he had been counted he

would go to another part of the dormitory or to the bathroom while the count continued. Green

Decl., ¶ 2. Guards never scolded Green or ordered Green back to his bunk, even when he

followed them to the door as they left. Id., ¶¶ 4-5.

II. Standards on Summary Judgment

Summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) avoids unnecessary trials in cases

with no disputed material facts. See Northwest Motorcycle Ass’n v. United States Dep’t of

Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). At issue is “whether the evidence presents a

sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one

party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52

(1986). Rule 56 serves to screen the latter cases from those which actually require resolution of

genuine disputes over facts material to the outcome of the case; e.g., issues that can only be

determined through presentation of testimony and evidence at trial such as credibility

determinations of conflicting testimony over dispositive facts.

In three recent cases, the Supreme Court, by clarifying what the

non-moving party must do to withstand a motion for summary

judgment, has increased the utility of summary judgment. First, the

Court has made clear that if the non-moving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial as to an element essential to its case, and

that party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine

dispute of fact with respect to the existence of that element, then

summary judgment is appropriate. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317 (1986). Second, to withstand a motion for summary

judgment, the non-moving party must show that there are “genuine

factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact

because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (emphasis

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 On August 5, 2005, the court informed plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a

motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154

F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999), and Klingele v.

Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988). 

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added). Finally, if the factual context makes the non-moving

party's claim implausible, that party must come forward with more

persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary to show

that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). No longer can it be

argued that any disagreement about a material issue of fact

precludes the use of summary judgment.

California Arch. Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988) (parallel citations omitted) (emphasis added). In short, there is no

"genuine issue as to material fact," if the non-moving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial." Grimes v. City and Country of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236,

239 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).

Thus, to overcome summary judgement an opposing party must show a dispute that is

both genuine, and involving a fact that makes a difference in the outcome. Two steps are

necessary. First, according to the substantive law, the court must determine what facts are

material. Second, in light of the appropriate standard of proof, the court must determine whether

material factual disputes require resolution at trial. Id., at 248. 

When the opposing party has the burden of proof on a dispositive issue at trial, the

moving party need not produce evidence which negates the opponent’s claim. See e.g., Lujan v.

National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990). The moving party need only point to matters

which demonstrate the absence of a genuine material factual issue. See Celotex v. Cattret, 477

U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). 

If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to establish

genuine material factual issues. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586.2

 The opposing

party must demonstrate that the disputed facts are material, i.e., facts that might affect the

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 A verified complaint may be used as an affidavit in opposition to the motion. 

Schroeder v McDonald, 55 F. 3d 454, 460 (9th Cir. 1995); McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196,

197-98 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).

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outcome of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc.

v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that disputes are

genuine, i.e., the parties’ differing versions of the truth require resolution at trial, see T.W. Elec.,

809 F.2d at 631. There can be no genuine issue as to any material fact where there is a complete

failure of proof as to an essential element of the nonmoving party's case because all other facts are

thereby rendered immaterial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The opposing party may not rest upon the

pleadings’ mere allegations or denials, but must present evidence of specific disputed facts. See

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.3

 Conclusory statements cannot defeat a properly supported summary

judgment motion. See Scott v. Rosenberg, 702 F.2d 1263, 1271-72 (9th Cir. 1983). 

The court does not determine witness credibility. It believes the opposing party’s

evidence, and draws inferences most favorably for the opposing party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at

249, 255. Inferences, however, are not drawn out of “thin air,” and the proponent must adduce

evidence of a factual predicate from which to draw inferences. American Int’l Group, Inc. v.

American Int’l Bank, 926 F.2d 829, 836 (9th Cir.1991) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing Celotex,

477 U.S. at 322).

If reasonable minds could differ on material facts at issue, summary judgment is

inappropriate. See Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1995). On the other

hand,“[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation

omitted). In that case, the court must grant summary judgment.

With these standards in mind, it is important to note that plaintiff bears the burden of

proof at trial over the issue raised on this motion, i.e., whether the defendant acted with deliberate

indifference to the plaintiff’s safety. Equally critical is that “deliberate indifference” is an

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essential element of plaintiff’s cause of action. Therefore, to withstand defendant’s motion,

plaintiff may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. He must demonstrate a

genuine issue for trial, Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 1989), and he 

must do so with evidence upon which a fair-minded jury "could return a verdict for [him] on the

evidence presented." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 252.

III. Analysis

"As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only

disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly

preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Here, plaintiff’s action

arises under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and the Eighth Amendment. To prevail he must prove that

the defendant deprived him of his Eighth Amendment rights while acting under color of state law. 

To prove that defendants used force that violated the Eighth Amendment, he must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that they used force maliciously and sadistically solely for the

purpose of causing plaintiff physical harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). As

discussed below, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute for trial over this material

issue for his first two claims, but has demonstrated such a dispute with respect to his other claims.

As noted above, plaintiff alleges that at around on March 4, 2004 at 12:30 a.m., and

March 4, 2004, at 4:30 a.m., Dizon, Powers and other guards awoke plaintiff and flung pocket

knives in the area of plaintiff’s bed. He claims that on March 5, 2004, at 12:35 a.m., Dizon shone

a light in plaintiff’s eyes, held a knife over his head, shook the bunk and poked plaintiff twice in

the buttocks. He also claims that on March 5, 2004, at 4:30 a.m., he complained about Dizon to

defendant Powers, who refused to take action, and nine days later on March 14, 2004, defendant

Dizon assaulted and battered plaintiff with the assistance of Anunciacion, Barrientos, Mendoza,

Rosales and Swan, causing plaintiff to suffer bruises and cuts.

Harsh conditions of confinement, including the use of force, will not violate the Eighth

Amendment if the conditions are “part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses

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against society.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,

347 (1981). Not every “malevolent touch by a prison guard” violates the Eighth Amendment. 

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). Therefore, “de minimis uses of physical force” are

not unconstitutional unless it of a sort that is “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Whitley,

475 U.S. at 327. What violates the Eighth Amendment is “the unnecessary and wanton infliction

of pain,” i.e., infliction of suffering that is “totally without penological justification.” Rhodes,

452 U.S. at 346. Whether an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred depends upon the mental

state of the defendant together with objective indicia surrounding the condition or suffering

showing its relationship to the purpose of imprisonment. Id. The touchstone for any Eighth

Amendment analysis, however, is whether the condition can be said to run afoul of

“contemporary standards of decency. ” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. When force is used against a

prisoner, the question “whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and

suffering ultimately turns on whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or

restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Whitley,

475 at 320-21; see also Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. “When prison officials maliciously and

sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated,”

regardless of whether the resulting injury is significant. Hudson, at 9. In other words, “the use of

excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment when the

inmate does not suffer serious injury.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 4 (emphasis added). “Otherwise, the

Eighth Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman,

inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury.” Id. Therefore, the extent of injury suffered

is just “one factor that may suggest whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought

necessary in a given situation, or instead evinced such wantonness with respect to the unjustified

infliction of harm as is tantamount to a knowing willingness that it occur.” Id., at 7. When

determining whether the force used was excessive, the court must consider (1) the need to use

force, (2) the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, (3) the threat

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reasonably perceived by prison officials, (4) any effort made to temper the forceful response, and

(5) the extent of the injury suffered by the inmate. Id. at 7. With this background and these

standards in mind, the court turns to the facts of this case.

A. Incident of March 4, 2004, at 12:30 a.m.

Defendant Dizon contends that plaintiff cannot present evidence that he used force beyond

that necessary to accomplish a legitimate security measure, i.e., cutting down a clothesline. 

Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial over this incident. It is undisputed that

plaintiff had a clothesline across his bunk with a towel hanging from it. Such “curtains” made it

difficult to count prisoners because the counting guard had to ensure that a prisoner was present

and alive. Also, these “curtains” posed a security risk in that a prisoner behind a curtain could

commit some malfeasance unseen or render the officer and the inmate vulnerable to attack. In the

verified complaint, plaintiff alleges that Dizon flung a pocket knife at him. At deposition,

however, plaintiff conceded that Dizon did no such thing. Rather, Dizon cut the clothesline

hanging from plaintiff’s part of the bunk. Plaintiff’s concession that Dizon did not in any way

misuse a knife or other sharp object is fatal to this claim. He cannot prove an essential element of

his case, i.e., that Dizon used constitutionally excessive force. On the evidence before the court,

no jury could find in plaintiff’s favor on this claim. Dizon is entitled summary judgment on this

claim.

B. Incident of March 4, 2004, at 4:30 a.m.

Similarly, there is no genuine issue about whether Dizon and Powers used force

sadistically and maliciously for the purpose of causing harm. Plaintiff presents no evidence to

support this claim. It is undisputed that Dizon and Powers returned to plaintiff’s bunk at around

4:30 a.m. It also is undisputed that when they did, Powers cut the clothesline of plaintiff’s bunkmate just as he was required to do. In doing so, Powers shook the entire bed. While excessive

force directed at one prisoner can also establish a cause of action for harm that befalls other

prisoners, see Robins v. Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1441-42 (9th Cir.1995), plaintiff has not

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presented evidence to prevail on this claim. He alleges in the verified complaint that defendant

Dizon approached plaintiff’s bunk, pointed to him and said to defendant Powers, “That’s him.” 

However, plaintiff makes no connection between Dizon’s words apparently directed at plaintiff

on the one hand, and Powers’ cutting a different prisoner’s clothesline on the other. Furthermore,

while there is evidence that Powers shook the entire bunk when he cut the clothesline, there is no

evidence he did so only to cause harm. See Robins, 60 F.3d at 1440 (recognizing that intent to

harm is an essential element of any excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment). Given

that the “cut down tool” appears to be an awkward tool requiring some force to actually cut a

rope, it is not surprising that the bunk shook substantially when Powers used it. On this evidence,

no reasonable jury could find in plaintiff’s favor on this claim this constituted a use force

sadistically and maliciously for the purpose of causing harm. Accordingly, Dizon and Powers are

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim.

C. Incident of March 5, 2004

Again, plaintiff’s allegations with respect to the events of this date are inadequate to

survive summary judgment. Dizon does not in his motion directly address plaintiff’s detailed

allegations of what occurred on this date. However, plaintiff alleges that on March 5, 2004, at

around 12:35 a.m., Dizon and other, unidentified guards approached his bunk. Compl., at 5. 

Plaintiff was awake, and his towel was folded and on the floor. Id. Nothing obscured the view of

plaintiff’s bunk, but “Dizon walked up to my head area and shined his high-intensity flash light

directly into my eyes” and held a knife above plaintiff’s head. Id. Using the hand in which he

was holding a knife, Dizon shook the bunk. Id. Dizon then went to the other side of the bunk,

shook the bunk with both hands, poked plaintiff in the buttocks twice and walked away. Id.

Plaintiff asserts that the second poke “penetrated the crack and cheeks” of his buttocks. Id., at 6.

Dizon has submitted evidence that it was his practice to avoid shining his flashlight

directly into prisoners’ eyes, but he does not deny that he did so on this particular occasion. 

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 There can be no doubt that sexual abuse is wanton, and prisoners have a right to be free

from such abuse at the hands of guards. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir.

2000). However, plaintiff has not alleged facts which show that this incident amounted to such

abuse.

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There is evidence that in order to count a prisoner, the wing guard must be sure that the prisoner

is both present and alive. However, Dizon concedes that such confirmation may be made by

observing the prisoner move an arm or leg, or even by the rise and fall of the prisoner’s chest as

he breathes. He asserts that if a prisoner was covered in bedding, he would gently tap the bunk

with his flashlight.

Significantly here, not every “malevolent touch by a prison guard” constitutes

constitutionally excessive force. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. Thus, shaking plaintiff’s bunk and

shining light in his eyes do not in themselves constitute excessive force. However, for Eighth

Amendment purposes, “[w]antonness does not have a fixed meaning, but rather must be

determined in relation to the type of conduct on which the suit is based.” Robins, 60 F.2d at

1440. Neither does Dizon’s poking plaintiff in the buttocks meet that standard.4 Accordingly

Dizon’s motion must be granted as to this claim.

D. Powers’ Failure to Protect Plaintiff

Plaintiff alleges that Powers knew that Dizon was harassing plaintiff such that plaintiff

feared substantial physical harm. Powers has not moved for summary judgment and the court

does not address this claim.

E. Incident of March 14, 2004

Defendants Dizon, Rosales, Mendoza, Swan and Anunciacion contend that plaintiff

cannot demonstrate a genuine issue with respect to whether Dizon used force “maliciously and

sadistically” for the very purpose of causing harm on March 14. The court addresses this

question first with respect to Dizon and then with respect to the other defendants.

There is a genuine issue of material fact as to this claim. It is undisputed that plaintiff left

his bunk after he personally had been counted and while Dizon was leaving but still inside the

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dormitory. It also is undisputed that plaintiff walked in the direction of Dizon. Dizon has

submitted evidence that plaintiff walked to within two feet of him, seemed agitated and disobeyed

two orders to stop. His evidence also shows that while he and the cover guards were still inside

the dormitory, a scuffle ensued between plaintiff, Dizon and Mendoza. This account contrasts

sharply with plaintiff’s account in the verified complaint.

Plaintiff version of the event is that he took hold of his cane and started walking towards

the bathroom after the cover guards had exited the dormitory, but while Dizon was inside the

dormitory near the door. He alleges that when he was about 3-5 feet from the bathroom Dizon

ran back into the dormitory, stood by the bathroom door and commanded plaintiff to stop. 

Plaintiff obeyed, but Dizon then told another guard to “hit his button,” (presumably an alarm),

and grabbed plaintiff’s left arm. Another (unidentified) guard grabbed plaintiff’s right hand, and

Dizon said they should take plaintiff down in the hallway. They carried plaintiff into the hallway,

where Dizon hit plaintiff in the face twice, knocking off plaintiff’s glasses, and grabbed plaintiff

around the neck. Plaintiff obeyed a different officer’s order to “just relax and go down.” Compl.,

at 10. Plaintiff states that, “Dizon then re-applied his choke hold on me as someone was kicking

me in the back and legs.” Ultimately, Dizon released plaintiff on the command of a sergeant who

is not a defendant in this action. Id. 

Obviously, plaintiff and Dizon provide conflicting accounts and their factual disputes are

material. Within these divergent versions of the events are few basic agreed-upon facts. The

parties agree that plaintiff left his bunk after having been counted. But they disagree about what

he was doing, his demeanor and the level of the security breach. Dizon contends that plaintiff

approached him in an agitated manner. Plaintiff maintains that he was merely walking towards

the bathroom. The level of security concern over this is also unclear. Plaintiff presents evidence

that a different prisoner regularly strolled through the dormitory during the count suggests that

prisoner movement was not such a serious matter. Dizon’s evidence suggests that he did not

leave the dormitory until he and another guard removed plaintiff while attempting to subdue him. 

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Plaintiff’s version is that Dizon had just left the dormitory and suddenly reentered for the sole

purpose of attacking plaintiff. Finally, Dizon does not deny twice hitting plaintiff or twice putting

plaintiff in a choke-hold. Both the need for force and the actual amount of force used are in

dispute. Thus, there is a genuine issue for trial about whether Dizon used excessive force against

plaintiff on March 14, 2004.

The motion on behalf of Mendoza, Rosales, Swan and Anunciacion is a different matter. 

While Mendoza concedes that he participated in what he and Dizon characterize as an attempt to

restrain and subdue plaintiff, plaintiff nowhere identifies the guards who he asserts kicked him

and otherwise participated in Dizon’s attack. Therefore, there is no particular dispute for a jury to

resolve with respect to Mendoza. Rosales, Swan and Anunciacion submit evidence that they did

not touch plaintiff on March 14. Again, plaintiff presents no evidence any of them kicked, struck

or otherwise harmed plaintiff that date. Therefore, there is no genuine issue for trial and their

motion must be granted.

F. Qualified Immunity

Defendants allege that they are entitled to qualified immunity. With respect to plaintiff’s

claims of excessive force, Dizon is the only moving defendant who is not entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. There is no need to consider the defense of qualified immunity with respect to

the claims upon which the court has resolved the summary judgment motion on merits in favor of

defendants. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S.Ct. 2588, 2608 (2007). Thus, the court only considers

whether Dizon is entitled to qualified immunity on the two claims for which he would face trial. 

A motion for summary judgment based on the defense of qualified immunity is analyzed

under the ordinary framework established for such motions. Butler v. San Diego Dist. Attorney’s

Office, 370 F.3d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 2004). A defendant who makes a properly supported motion

for summary judgment based on the defense of qualified immunity shifts the burden such that

plaintiff must produce evidence in opposition. Butler, 370 F.3d at 964. Thus, in resolving

questions of qualified immunity on summary judgment, the court must decide whether, taking the

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undisputed facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, it can be said that the

officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If,

and only if, the court finds a violation of a constitutional right, “the next, sequential step is to ask

whether the right was clearly established . . . in light of the specific context of the case.” Id. 

Under the law and facts outlined above, if plaintiff’s version of the events of March 14, 2004, is

credited, Dizon is not entitled to qualified immunity on either claim.

It is not necessary to recount all the facts here. There is a genuine factual dispute about

the amount of force used and the justification therefor. Plaintiff alleges that Dizon attacked him

for no reason and beat him seriously. Dizon alleges that he felt threatened and decided to subdue

plaintiff by taking him down. If plaintiff proves his version of events, he will be entitled to relief. 

Thus, this claim survives the first part of the qualified immunity analysis.

With respect to the second prong, the court notes that the defense protects “all but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,

341 (1986). The dispositive inquiry is whether it would be clear to a reasonable guard that his

conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. It is not necessary

that the exact conduct be proscribed at the time of the acts alleged. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730,

739 (2002); Mendoza v. Block, 27 F.3d 1357 (9th Cir. 1994). Rather, the question is whether the

“contours of the right” have been defined at a sufficient level of specificity such that in light of

the pre-existing precedent, the unlawfulness of the conduct is apparent. Anderson v. Creighton,

483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). At the time of the events giving rise to this action, the law was clear

that force used sadistically and maliciously for the very purpose of causing harm violated the

Eighth Amendment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986).

Dispositive of the second prong of the analysis is that the factual dispute arises in large

part on plaintiff’s assertion that he did nothing to warrant the use of physical force in the first

place. As noted above, the Whitley standard was clearly established at the time of the events

giving rise to this action. Under the analysis used to apply that standard, it should go without

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saying that although a guard need not wait to be attacked before using force, see McCrary-El v.

Shaw, 992 F.2d 809, 812 (8th Cir. 1993), his unprovoked assault on a prisoner violates the Eighth

Amendment. See Pelfrey v. Chambers, 43 F.3d 1034 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1116

(1995) (allegations that guard approached inmate, who was opening his mail, with a knife and

restrained him and cut his hair with the knife stated claim for excessive use of force). On the

record presently before the court and assuming plaintiff’s testimony is believed, it cannot be said

that a reasonable guard in the situation Dizon confronted would have believed his conduct was

lawful. Dizon is not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, the court finds that there is no genuine issue for trial with

respect to plaintiff’s first and second claims, but there is with respect to his three other claims. 

Furthermore, defendant Dizon is not entitled to qualified immunity. Dizon and Powers are the

defendants against whom plaintiff has claims for a jury to resolve.

Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ February 2, 2007, motion for summary judgment be granted in part and

denied in part as follows:

a. Dizon’s motion for summary judgment be granted with respect to the claim that

he used excessive force against plaintiff at around 12:30 a.m. on March 4, 2004;

b. Dizon and Powers’s motion for summary judgment be granted with respect to

the claim that they used excessive force against plaintiff at around 4:30 a.m. on March 4, 2004

March 5, 2004;

c. Dizon motion for summary judgment be granted with respect to the claim that

he used excessive force against plaintiff March 5, 2004;

d. Dizon’s motion for summary judgment be denied with respect to the claims that

he used excessive force against plaintiff on March 14, 2004;

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e. Annunciacion, Barrientos, Mendoza, Rosales and Swan’s motion for summary

judgment on the claim that they used excessive force against plaintiff on March 14, 2004, be

granted; and, 

2. Plaintiff be given 30 days to file a pretrial statement, and Dizon and Powers be given

15 days from service thereof to file a pretrial statement.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: March 4, 2008.

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