Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02913/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-02913-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

Civil Case No. 12cv2913-BTM

Crim. Case No. 11cr5748-BTM

ORDER DENYING § 2255

MOTION AND DENYING

CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

v.

MARCO VAZQUEZ,

Defendant-Movant.

Marco Vazquez (“Defendant”), a federal inmate proceeding pro se, has filed a

motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. For

the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s § 2255 motion and a Certificate of

Appealability are DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 20, 2011, an information was filed, charging Defendant with

conspiring to distribute approximately 6.04 kilograms of methamphetamine. 

(Information, December 20, 2011, ECF No. 20.) On January 17, 2012, Defendant pled

guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. (Plea Agreement, January 17, 2012, ECF No. 32.) 

On November 6, 2012, the Court sentenced Defendant to a 46-month term of

imprisonment, followed by a three-year term of supervised release. (ECF No. 52.)

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II. DISCUSSION

On December 6, 2012, Defendant filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or

correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (ECF No. 56.) Under § 2255, a

prisoner may move to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence on the ground that

“the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United

States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the

sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject

to collateral attack.”

Defendant argues that his sentence should be reduced because he will

stipulate to deportation and because he has been denied community confinement

due to his alien status, which is a violation of equal protection.

In the Plea Agreement, Defendant waived his right to collaterally attack his

sentence except on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the

Plea Agreement states:

In exchange for the Government’s concessions in this plea agreement,

defendant waives, to the full extent of the law, any right to appeal or to

collaterally attack the conviction and sentence, except a postconviction collateral attack based on a claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel, unless the Court imposes a custodial sentence above the

high end of the guideline range recommended by the Government

pursuant to this agreement at the time of sentencing. If the custodial

sentence is greater than the high end of that range, defendant may

appeal, but the Government will be free to support on appeal the

sentence actually imposed.

(Plea Agreement at 11.) “A defendant’s waiver of his appellate rights is enforceable

if (1) the language of the waiver encompasses his right to appeal on the grounds

raised, and (2) the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made.” United States v.

Rahman, 642 F.3d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Jeronimo, 398

F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005)). The Ninth Circuit has also recognized that a

waiver barring collateral attack of a conviction or sentence is enforceable when

knowingly and voluntarily made. See United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014

(9th Cir. 1993). Here, the Court imposed a sentence of 46 months, which is less

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than the Government’s recommended guideline range of 87 to 108 months. 

Therefore, Defendant may only collaterally attack his sentence on the grounds of

ineffective assistance of counsel.

With regard to Defendant’s argument that he should receive a 2-point

downward departure because he will stipulate to deportation, he already stipulated

to deportation as part of the Plea Agreement. See Plea Agreement at 10. Because

he entered into the Plea Agreement as part of the fast-track program, he received a

-4 downward departure pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG”

or “Guidelines”) § 5K3.1. Stipulating to deportation was part of the fast-track

agreement. Thus, Defendant has already received the benefit that he now seeks.

Defendant also argues that he should receive a -2 downward departure

because he is ineligible for community confinement. He further argues that this is a

violation of equal protection. The Court already ruled on this issue at the time of

sentencing. As reflected in the minute order, the Court considered the fact that the

defendant is in this country illegally and cannot get any benefit of community

confinement, but declined to depart, finding no equal protection violation. (See

ECF No. 52.) The Ninth Circuit has previously held that illegal alienage is not a

suspect classification, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982), and therefore the

government need only demonstrate a rational basis for treating aliens and non-aliens

differently with regard to community confinement. McLean v. Crabtree, 173 F.3d

1176, 1186 (9th Cir. 1999). See also United States v. Rodriguez-Tovar, Case No.

11-cr-5558-BTM (S.D. Cal. January 7, 2013). 

In McLean, prisoners subject to Immigration and Naturalization Service

(“INS”) detainers were excluded from community-based treatment programs, and

therefore ineligible for sentence reduction on that basis. They argued that the

exclusion violated due process and equal protection, and the Ninth Circuit rejected

both arguments. First, the Ninth Circuit held that it was not a due process violation

because the statutory provision creating community confinement, 18 U.S.C.A. §

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3621(e)(2)(B), “does not create a liberty interest in sentence reduction.” 173 F.3d at

1185. Second, the Ninth Circuit held that it was not a violation of equal protection

because there was a rational basis for excluding prisoners with detainers, namely

that they were more likely to flee a halfway house because they might be deported

after release from custody. Id. at 1184, 1186. See also Santos v. United States, 940

F. Supp. 275, 281 (D. Haw. 1996) (“one’s status as a deportable alien, which may

result in ineligibility for less restrictive terms of confinement, nevertheless cannot

justify a downward departure”). Therefore, the Court holds that there is no due

process or equal protection violation.

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Because Defendant waived his right to collaterally attack his sentence and his

arguments also fail on the merits, his § 2255 motion is DENIED.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 and DENIES a Certificate of Appealability. The Clerk shall enter judgment

accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 29, 2013

BARRY TED MOSKOWITZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

Defendant also argues that his ineligibility violates the “Equal Rights Act” 1

because no person shall be discriminated based on nationality. Defendant is essentially

claiming that he istreated differently based on his status as an alien. Defendant’s equal

protection claim encompasses this claim. Accordingly, the result is the same, and this

claim also fails on the merits.

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