Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02203/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02203-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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10cv2203 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY ROSSER,

Petitioner,

v.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary,

Respondent.

 

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Civil No. 10-2203-MMA(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

I

INTRODUCTION

Larry Rosser (hereinafter “Petitioner”), a state prisoner

proceeding pro se, has filed a First Amended Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (hereinafter “Petition”), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. Respondent Matthew Cate (hereinafter “Respondent”) has filed

an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (hereinafter

“Answer”). Petitioner has filed a Traverse to Respondent’s Answer

(hereinafter “Traverse”).

Prison officials assessed a forfeiture of 181 days of good

time credit from Petitioner after a unit-wide cell search found an

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altered razor blade in property purportedly belonging to his cell

mate. At a Rules Violation Report hearing (hereinafter “RVR

hearing”), Petitioner challenged that finding with evidence from a

prison guard and from another inmate. Petitioner’s evidence tended

to show that property belonging to other inmates had been improperly

brought into and left within Petitioner’s cell during the cell

search process.

Petitioner argues that the RVR hearing violated his right to

due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United

States Constitution.

The Court has considered the Petition, Respondent’s Answer,

and Petitioner’s Traverse. Based upon the documents and evidence

presented in this case, and for the reasons set forth below, the

Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition be GRANTED.

 II

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On March 4, 1996, Petitioner was convicted of one count of

second degree murder, with an enhancement for use of a firearm, by

the Superior Court of Los Angeles. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1 at

1.) On September 27, 1996, Petitioner was sentenced to a state

prison term of 15 years to life imprisonment, plus four years for

the enhancement. Id. At the time of these events, Petitioner was

serving this sentence at Calipatria State Prison. (Petition at 13.)

A. CELL 151

On June 24, 2008, prison authorities conducted cell searches

within Administrative Segregation Unit One (hereinafter “ASU").

(Petition at 13.) Among the cells searched was ASU cell 151, which

was assigned to Petitioner and his cell mate, identified as inmate

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Odell Muhammed. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit B at 33.) Petitioner was

assigned to the upper bunk (ASU-151U) and inmate Muhammad was

assigned to the lower bunk (ASU-151L). During the search, Petitioner

and inmate Muhammad were placed in the exercise yard. (Petition at

13.)

According to a sworn declaration by Anthony Throop, another

inmate, he saw three guards in cell 151 when he was removed from his

own cell and taken to the exercise yard. (Respondent’s Lodgment No.

3, Exhibit C). When inmate Throop returned to his cell, he saw two

different guards in cell 151. Id. The two officers who signed the

cell search receipt for cell 151 were Officers M. Givens and P.

Castro. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3, Exhibit G.) There appear to be

two names crossed out on the receipt before the names “M. Givens”

and “P. Castro”. Id. Petitioner alleges that the presence of the

three unknown guards in the cell before Officers Givens and Castro

was a violation of search protocol. (Petition at 14.)

B. PROPERTY FROM CELL 151

Officer Castro’s report indicates that he or she removed

inmate Muhammad’s property from the lower bunk and placed it in a

crate. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3, Exhibit B at 28.) Officer

Castro’s report does not list or itemize the property removed. See

id. Officer Castro’s report states that the contents of the crate

were then X-rayed by CRT Officer A. Adams and CRT Sergeant B. Smith

at the Rapiscan scanning station. Id. There is no report or

testimony from Officers Adams or Smith as to this search. Officer

Castro’s report states that, upon a positive scan, Sergeant Smith

removed a black colored book from the crate, labeled it, and gave it

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10cv2203 4

to Squad Officer L. Hernandez to search. Id. On June 24, 2008,

Officer Castro’s report was reviewed by Lieutenant R.G. Hopper. Id.

According to an Incident Report by Officer Hernandez, when he

received the book, it was labeled as originating from ASU-151L

(assigned to Petitioner’s cell mate, inmate Muhammad). (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 3, Exhibit B at 33.) Officer Hernandez searched the

book, titled “The Plain Language Law Dictionary,” and discovered an

altered razor blade hidden within it. Id. Petitioner claims that

neither the book nor the weapon was in the cell before he and his

cell mate were removed for the cell search. (Petition at 14.) The

Incident Report is dated June 20, 2008. (Respondent’s Lodgment No.

3, Exhibit B at 33.) The Incident Report was reviewed by Officer M.

Morales who dated his review as June 20, 2008. Id. The date of the

Incident Report is inconsistent with the fact that the cell searches

took place on June 24, 2008. 

There is therefore a dispute as to the origin of the book

containing the altered razor blade.

C. CRATE FOUND IN CELL 151

Upon Petitioner and inmate Muhammad’s return to cell 151,

they discovered in their cell a crate of unknown origin. (Petition

at 13.) Petitioner further claims that he and his cell mate

discovered that “personal property items belonging to other inmates

had been placed in their cell.” Id. According to Petitioner, he

placed the personal property into the crate and discarded “all the

non-valuable items.” Id. Inmate Throop’s sworn declaration lends

credence to Petitioner’s version of events: “[a]t that time, they

[Petitioner and inmate Muhammad] told me... there was a plastic

crate with someone else’s books, papers, and other materials left

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Italic emphasis added, underline emphasis original.

10cv2203 5

behind in their cell.” (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3, Exhibit C at

2.) Throop further attests that he “observed as dozens of guards...

milled about” and that “staff appeared to be lost and unsure of what

to do or where to go...” Id. Throop notes that “[t]he entire hallway

was in disarry [sic] with trash, discarded clothing, linen, and

stacks of magazines, books, newspapers and other paperwork everywhere (in, and out of plastic crates.”)1/

 Id.

Petitioner subsequently informed Officer Rucker of the crate

that had been left in cell 151. (Petition at 13.) Officer Rucker

informed Officer Woodward who then removed the crate from cell 151.

Id. Officer Woodward alleges that the crate “contained misselaneous

(sic) trash, and discarded paper from cell searches.” (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 3, at Exhibit G.) On September 25, 2008 Officer L.

Romero questioned Officer Woodward and inmate Muhammad. Officer

Woodward recalled retrieving the crate from cell 151. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 3, Exhibit F.) Officer Woodward refused to answer

questions about what the hallways looked like during the searches,

responding that the question was “not relevant.” Id.

In contrast, Officer Rucker “clearly” remembered that the

crate contained legal briefs and miscellaneous paperwork. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3, Exhibit D.) Rucker also reported that he

“seemed to recall 1 or 2 books, and 1 or 2 magazines. Some items

appeared to be legal briefs.” Id. He remembered that most of the

property was labeled with Hispanic names and that he thought the

items should still be with those inmates. Id. Officer Rucker further

recalled that some of the items were post-marked or dated in May

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2008. Id. Officer Rucker’s recollection was dated October 9, 2008.

Id. However, this account is at odds with Officer Rucker’s statements when he was interviewed by Officer Romero on September 15,

2008. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3, Exhibit F.) In that interview,

Officer Rucker was asked, “Do you recall whether said milk crate

contained personal property belonging to other inmates?” and he

replied “Trash.” Id. At the RVR hearing on August 5, 2008, the

presiding Senior Hearing Officer (SHO), Lieutenant Prado, asked

Officer Rucker similar questions: 

Q3.) Do you recall whether said milk crate contained personal

property belonging to other inmates?

A3.) I think so.

Q4.) Despite the lapse of time, is it possible that you might

be able to identify what some of those property items were?

A4.) Not really.

(Respondent’s Lodgment 3, Exhibit I.) Petitioner alleges that the

SHO omitted or changed parts of Officer Rucker’s testimony when

documenting the record of the RVR hearing. (Petition at 16.) How

Officer Rucker could have remembered the details of items within the

crate in October 2008 but not in August 2008 is unexplained.

Therefore, while there is a dispute as to the nature of items

left within Petitioner’s cell by prison officials, there is no

dispute that items were in fact left in Petitioner’s cell.

On June 27, 2008, an RVR was then issued to Petitioner and

his cell mate. (Petition at 14; see also Respondent’s Lodgment No.

2, Exhibit H.) The RVR charged Petitioner and his cell mate with a

violation of California Code of Regulations § 3006(a); specifically,

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2/ The RVR contains unexplained discrepancies as to the cell numbers.

Specifically, the RVR reports that Officer Hernandez was alerted to

“the possibility of contraband inside a book from cell 154 assigned

to Inmates ROSSER (K26537, ASU-151U) and MUHAMMAD (T98221, ASU154L).” The RVR also states that the book was “labeled as coming

from cell ASU-151L” and contained the razor blade. The RVR was

signed by Officer Hernandez on June 24, 2008 and reviewed by Lt.

Hopper on July 8, 2008.

3/ Petitioner names the reviewing officer as Lieutenant Hopper. ( See,

e.g. Petition at 24.) The SHO appears to have been Lieutenant Prado

and not Lieutenant Hopper. See Petition at 15; (see also

Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3, Exhibit I.) Decisions by the

administrative appeals bodies and state courts appear to confuse

this issue. Petitioner states that Lt. Hopper reviewed the

documentation before the hearing and claims that Lt. Hopper believed

he would be the hearing officer. Petitioner does not claim that Lt.

Hopper actually served as the hearing officer.

10cv2203 7

possession of a deadly weapon.2/ (Petition at 14.) The weapon in

question was the altered razor blade found within “The Plain

Language Law Dictionary”. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3, Exhibit B at

33.)

 III

 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FIRST LEVEL REVIEW

On August 5, 2008, Petitioner appeared before the Senior

Hearing Officer (hereinafter “SHO”) to challenge the RVR. (Petition

at 15.) The SHO was Lieutenant Prado; Petitioner states that he

filed a staff complaint against this officer “[a]bout a month prior

to the hearing”.3/ Id. Petitioner alleges that, during the hearing,

Lieutenant Prado mentioned “that one of his partners had been sliced

on the arm with a razor by a prisoner during Prado’s rookie year...

[and] that he suffers flashbacks, relives the horrifying event, and

experience [sic] withdrawals whenever looking at a razor.” Id.

Petitioner further alleges that Lieutenant Prado’s written

report of the hearing shortened and altered inmate Throop’s

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10cv2203 8

statements. Id. at 16. Specifically, Petitioner claims that Throop’s

statements were reduced to two sentences. Id. Next, Petitioner

claims that Officer Rucker’s recollection that the crate left in

cell 151 contained legal paperwork belonging to other prisoners was

changed so that the record only reflected his recollection of the

presence of the crate and not the contents. Id.

Petitioner challenged the RVR, asserting that the book in

which the razor was concealed had not been in the cell prior to the

searches. Id. at 17. He argues that the three unidentified guards

were responsible for placing the book in cell 151. Id. Petitioner

believes that the book was placed there either by mistake or

deliberately. Id. Petitioner believes that prison officials may have

planted the book and razor in cell 151 in retaliation for Petitioner’s June 4, 2008 notice to them that he was planning a civil

action against them. Id.

The written report of the RVR hearing states that the SHO

found Petitioner guilty of the violation. Furthermore, the report

indicates that three pieces of evidence were relied upon: 1)

Hernandez’s written report, 2) testimony by witnesses at the

hearing, and 3) information from the incident package.

B. SECOND LEVEL APPEAL

On October 7, 2008, Petitioner appealed the SHO’s findings.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3, Exhibit A at 1.) Petitioner claimed

that his investigative process was improperly interfered with by the

SHO. Id. He alleged that the SHO mischaracterized reports, was

biased, and improperly abridged testimony. Id. First, Petitioner

claimed that the SHO stated that a weapon was found in Petitioner’s

property despite no testimony or documentation referring to his

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4/ It is unclear if Petitioner made this claim against Lt. Hopper or

Lt. Prado at this level. In his appeal, Petitioner appears to

believe the SHO was Lt. Hopper; however, the hearing record

indicates that Lt. Prado was the SHO. In his subsequent request for

review, Petitioner states that this claim was in fact against Lt.

Prado.

10cv2203 9

property. Id. Second, he claimed that the SHO was biased because the

SHO suffered from post traumatic stress disorder (hereinafter

“PTSD”) stemming from a past razor attack on his partner.4/ Id. at

3. 

Third, Petitioner alleged that the summary of the hearing

prepared by the SHO was improperly shortened and did not reflect the

extent of testimony given by inmate Throop and Officer Rucker. Id.

Petitioner noted that Throop testified that the ASU was crowded,

that the guards appeared disorganized, and that unidentified guards

were seen in cell 151 after Petitioner and inmate Muhammad had left

the cell and before the cell search. Id.; (see also Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 3, Exhibit C.) However, the SHO’s hearing report states

only that Throop testified that guards were confused and that Throop

believed the staff were liable to make mistakes. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 3, Exhibit I.) As to Officer Rucker, Petitioner noted

that Officer Rucker clearly recalled the contents of the crate as

personal property of other inmates and even remembered the postmark

dates on some of the documents. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3,

Exhibit A at 3.) In contrast, the SHO’s hearing report indicates

that Officer Rucker only thought he could remember the presence of

other inmates’ property and that he could not identify what property

was in the crate. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3, Exhibit I.)

As a part of this claim, Petitioner further alleged that

testimony given by Officer Woodward at the hearing was coached by

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10cv2203 10

the SHO. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3, Exhibit A at 3-4.) Specifically, Petitioner states that Officer Woodward could not recall what

items were in the crate until the SHO asked him if the crate

contained trash collected from cell to cell. Id. At that point,

Officer Woodward agreed with the SHO. Id.; (see also Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 3, Exhibit I.)

Therefore, there were serious discrepancies between the SHO’s

hearing report and the testimony alleged by Petitioner to have been

given at the hearing.

Petitioner’s Second Level Appeal was addressed by a written

memorandum on April 8, 2009. [Petition, Exhibit 1(a)(1) at 5-6.] The

memorandum notes that the SHO was Lt. Prado and not Lt. Hopper, thus

apparently disposing of Petitioner’s claims of bias. See id. As

previously noted, Petitioner claimed only that Lt. Hopper believed

that he would be the hearing officer and did not claim that Lt.

Hopper actually served as such. The memorandum does not appear to

directly address the other issues alleged by Petitioner; specifically, mischaracterization of reports and the discrepancies between

the hearing record and the testimony. See id. Notably, the memorandum states that the “weapon was secreted inside of a book, which was

labeled as coming from cell 151U.” Id. This is factually incorrect;

Hernandez’s report clearly states that the book was labeled “ASU151L”. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3, Exhibit B at 33.)

The memorandum concludes with a denial of the appeal on the

bases of the three pieces of evidence cited by the SHO. Id.

C. DIRECTOR’S LEVEL DECISION

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5/

 The Second Level Review response memorandum is dated six months

after the appeal was filed. It is unclear if such appeal responses

typically take this length of time, if there were other procedural

delays, or if the delay reflects deliberate tardiness.

10cv2203 11

On April 20, 2009, Petitioner requested a Director’s Level

Review, arguing that the Second Level Review was partisan or

arbitrary and repeating his earlier claims. (Petition, Exhibit

1(a)(2).) Petitioner stated that the Second Level Review had

misunderstood his claims regarding Lt. Hopper and that Lt. Prado was

in fact the officer suffering from PTSD (and therefore, was

allegedly biased). Id. Petitioner also noted that the Second Level

Review had addressed only one of his several grounds for appeal. Id.

Finally, Petitioner alleged that the Second Level Review was tardy

and that “[t]hey sat on it all this time.”5/ Id.

The Director’s Level Appeal decision, dated July 27, 2009,

found that Petitioner did not present sufficient evidence or facts.

[Petition, Exhibit 1(a)(3).] The decision states that there was no

support for a claim of falsified documents. Id. The decision also

notes that a Second Level Review occurred but it does not indicate

what deference, if any, was given to the Second Level Review

memorandum. Id.

D. SUPERIOR COURT

On September 22, 2009, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus in the Superior Court of the State of California.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2.) Many of Petitioner’s arguments were

substantially similar to those raised in the Second Level Review.

[See id.; see also Petition, Exhibit 1(a).] Among other things,

Petitioner alleged that the “SHO strategically left out [parts of

inmate] Throop’s declaration. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2, at 10.)

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10cv2203 12

The state court stated that the First Level Review “hearing

officer had evidence that during a cell search, a book was located

in petitioner [sic] cell. When x-rayed, it was revealed that a razor

blade was concealed in the book.” In re Larry Rosser, No. EHC 01253

at 1 (Cal. Sup. Ct. of Imperial County, 2009). That court acknowledged that the “court’s review of the sufficiency of the evidence

offered at an administrative hearing is limited to the question of

whether the decision of the hearing officer is supported by ‘some’

evidence.” Id., citing In re Zepeda 141 Cal. App. 4th 1493 (2006).

The state court found that the SHO’s decision “was supported by

ponderable evidence” and consequently, on December 7, 2009, denied

the Petition. In re Larry Rosser, No. EHC 01253 at 2.

E. CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL

On February 15, 2010, Petitioner appealed the state court

decision. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3.) He raised many of the same

issues previously presented to the Superior Court (but not addressed

in that court’s decision). Id. Notably, he again claimed that the

SHO had not “properly prepared and preserved” the record of the

hearing, apparently referring to his allegation that the SHO had

omitted certain testimony from the record. Id.

The appellate court stated as fact that the weapon was found

within cell 151, apparently relying upon the SHO’s hearing report.

See In re Larry Rosser, D056785 at 1 (Cal. Ct. of Appeal, 4th Dist.,

Div. 1, 2010). The Court of Appeal looked to the five procedural due

process requirements set forth by the Supreme Court for claims

arising from prison disciplinary hearings: written notice of the

charges, at least 24 hours between notice and the hearing to prepare

a defense, a written statement by the fact finders of the evidence

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they rely on, the right of the prisoner to call witnesses when doing

so is not unduly hazardous to safety, and, if the prisoner is

illiterate or the issues are legally complex, legal assistance. See

id at 2; see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). The

Court of Appeal found that Petitioner’s due process rights were not

violated. In re Larry Rosser, D056785 at 2; (Respondent’s Lodgment

No. 4.)

The Court of Appeal also partially addressed Petitioner’s

contention of insufficient evidence to support a guilty finding. Id.

It held that constructive possession existed because Petitioner had

“access to and joint control over the bunk where the weapon was

secreted” and that constructive possession was sufficient to find

Petitioner guilty. Id. It applied the standard cited in Zepeda,

noting that a reviewing court is limited to considering whether any

evidence in the record could support the conclusions reached by the

disciplinary hearing. Id. In this case, the Court of Appeal

determined the standard had been met and consequently denied

Petitioner’s appeal.

F. EXHAUSTION OF STATE REMEDIES

On June 30, 2010, Petitioner filed an appeal to the California Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court denied the appeal

without comment. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5.) Therefore, its

denial of his appeal exhausted Petitioner’s state remedies. See id.

On December 3, 2010, Petitioner filed the First Amended

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus now pending before this Court.

 

 IV

 PETITIONER’S CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

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Petitioner raises four claims for relief. First, he argues

that his due process right to an impartial hearing was violated

because the SHO was biased. Second, he claims that his due process

rights were violated when he was denied a written statement of the

facts relied on by the SHO to find Petitioner guilty. Third, he

contends that his due process rights to have documentary evidence

prepared and presented in defense of the charge and to review

witness statements at least 24 hours in advance were violated.

Fourth, Petitioner argues that he was denied adequate corrective

process by the state appellate court after the state court applied

the Zepeda standard. The Petitioner further argues that even if that

standard applied, the record does not support the guilty finding.

A. THE SHO WAS NOT IMPARTIAL

Petitioner’s first ground for relief is that Lt. Prado, the

hearing officer at the First Level Review, was biased and that his

participation therefore denied Petitioner an impartial hearing.

(Petition at 15.) Specifically, Petitioner states that he had filed

a complaint against Lt. Prado a month before the hearing. Id.

Petitioner also recounts that Lt. Prado explained during the hearing

that one of the officer’s partners “had been sliced on the arm with

a razor by a prisoner” and that Lt. Prado suffers flashbacks. Id.

On this basis, Petitioner argues that Lt. Prado was biased

and therefore should not have served as the SHO. Id. Petitioner

concludes that this violated his constitutional right to be heard by

an impartial disciplinary authority. Id. at 18; see also, Clutchette

v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 820 (9th Cir. 1978) (overturned on other

grounds).

B. PETITIONER WAS NOT PRESENTED WITH A STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

 USED BY THE SHO TO FIND HIM GUILTY

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Petitioner’s second ground for relief is that he was not

presented with a statement of the facts used by the SHO in determining his guilt. (Petition at 19.) He argues that the written report

provided to him does not comport to the actual testimony and

documentary evidence presented at the hearing. Id. at 20. Specifically, Petitioner alleges that his conviction was not supported by

the findings and that the findings were not supported by the

evidence. Id. at 23. He further argues that some of the evidence

used at the hearing was facially incorrect and that he was consequently hampered in his administrative and state court appeals

processes. Id. at 21-23. Petitioner also contends that he did not

have constructive possession of the weapon because he did not have

knowledge, dominion, or control of the weapon. Id. at 23.

Petitioner concludes that this violated his due process right

to a written statement of the evidence relied upon to find him

guilty, as enunciated in Wolff. Id. at 20-21.

C. PETITIONER WAS NOT GIVEN 24 HOURS BEFORE THE HEARING TO

 REVIEW DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AND WITNESS STATEMENTS

Petitioner’s third ground for relief is that the investigating employee failed to correctly prepare a record of witness

statements and evidence at least 24 hours in advance of the hearing.

Id. at 24. As a result, Petitioner argues that the SHO

mischaracterized the testimony of inmate Throop and Officer Rucker

at the hearing. Id. at 25.

Petitioner concludes that this violated his due process right

to advance written notice of the claimed violation and evidence

against him, as set forth in Wolff. Id.

D. STATE COURTS APPLIED THE INCORRECT EVIDENTIARY STANDARD;

 EVEN IF THAT STANDARD WAS CORRECT, IT WAS NOT MET

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Petitioner’s fourth ground for relief is that the state and

state appellate courts should not have applied Zepeda’s “any

evidence supports the finding” standard. Id. at 26. He argues that

the correct standard should have been “preponderance of the evidence

supports the finding.” Id. Petitioner further contends that even the

Zepeda standard was not met in his case. Id. at 27-28.

Petitioner concludes that the application of this standard

and the subsequent failure of the state appellate court to order

corrective action violated his due process rights. Id. at 26. 

 V

 STANDARD OF REVIEW

In order for federal subject matter jurisdiction over a

petition for writ of habeas corpus to lie, the petition must allege

that the petitioner is in custody in violation of the Constitution

or laws or treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a).

In habeas corpus cases, federal courts are bound by the

state’s interpretation of its own law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.

62, 68 (1991) (federal courts may not reexamine state court

determinations on questions of state law); Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d

882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990) (federal courts “have no authority to

review a state’s application of its own laws.”) However, “errors of

state law do not concern [a federal court] unless they rise to the

level of a constitutional violation”). Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877

F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989), (emphasis added.)

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(hereinafter “AEDPA”) applies to habeas corpus petitions filed after

April 24, 1996. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1997).

The Petition in this case was filed on December 3, 2010 and is

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therefore governed by AEDPA. To obtain federal habeas relief,

Petitioner must satisfy either U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1) or (2). See

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000).

The Supreme Court interprets § 2254(d)(1)and (2) as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a

question of law or if the state court

decides a case differently than this Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of

the prisoner’s case.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.

A state court’s decision may be found to be “contrary to”

clearly established Supreme Court precedent: (1) “if the state court

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the

Court’s] cases” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts

that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court

and nevertheless arrives at a result different from the [the

court’s] precedent.” Id. at 405-406; Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.

63, 72-75 (2003). A state court decision involves an “unreasonable

application” of clearly established federal law, “if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court’s cases

but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state

prisoner’s case,” or, “if the state court either unreasonably

extends a legal principle from our precedent to a new context where

it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle

to a new context where it should apply.” Williams, 539 U.S. at 407;

Andrade, 538 U.S. at 76. 

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Under § 2254(d)(2), a petitioner may obtain relief by showing

that the conclusion of the state court was “an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.” Therefore, the court must presume that the

state court’s factual findings are accurate unless a petitioner

rebuts the “presumption of correctness by clear and convincing

evidence.” U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231,

240 (2005).

“Even in the context of federal habeas, deference does not

imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review. Deference does

not by definition preclude relief.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.

322, 340 (2003). Factual findings may be infected with substantive

legal error where the fact-finding process itself is defective. The

state court fact-finding process is undermined where the state court

has before it, yet apparently ignores, evidence that supports a

petitioner’s claim. Id. at 346, Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1001

(9th Cir. 2004).

When there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest

court, the Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate court

decision. Ylst v. Nunnmeaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). If the

dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its

reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review

of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir.

2000) (overruled in part by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 74-77).

 VI

 PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO RELIEF

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In this case, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s Appeal without comment. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5.)

Therefore, this Court “looks through” to the decision of the

California Court of Appeal, contained in Respondent’s Lodgment No.

4. See Ylst v. Nunnmeaker, 501 U.S. at 801-06.

A. NO EVIDENCE OF BIAS ON THE PART OF THE HEARING OFFICER

Petitioner’s first claim for relief is based on alleged bias

of Lt. Prado, the SHO at the RVR hearing. Rule 2 of the Rules

Governing Habeas Corpus Cases requires that a petitioner “state the

facts supporting each ground” for relief. Rule 2(c)(2), foll. 28

U.S.C. § 2254 (hereinafter “Rule 2".) Under Rule 2, “mere conclusory

allegations without the support of facts” are insufficient. Farrow

v. U.S., 580 F.2d 1339, 1361-1362 (9th Cir. 1972); Schlette v.

Allen, 284 F.2d 827, 834 (9th Cir. 1960); Henderson v. Cate, 2009 WL

3126858 at *7 (S.D. Cal. 2009).

Petitioner alleges that Lt. Prado was biased because he had

witnessed a razor blade attack upon his partner and suffered from

PTSD as a result. The California Court of Appeal did not address

this claim; therefore, this Court “looks through” to the decision of

the decision of the Superior Court of California. That court

determined that “[a]s to the [PTSD bias] claim ... nothing in the

record indicates that petitioner was not given a fair hearing, and

no due process violation is shown.” In re Larry Rosser, D056785 at

2 (Cal. Ct. of Appeal, 4th Dist., Div. 1, 2010). 

Upon a careful and thorough review of the various petitions

and appeals filed by Petitioner, this Court found only one supporting statement for the PTSD bias claim: Petitioner’s own allegation

that Lt. Prado stated that he had witnessed a razor attack by an

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inmate upon his partner and suffered flashbacks as a result. The

record presented to this Court does not contain any corroborative

evidence of this statement.

Petitioner’s contention that Lt. Prado was biased is an

unsupported conclusory allegation. Petitioner fails to state a prima

facie case for relief that “overcome[s] a presumption of honesty and

integrity” on the part of Lt. Prado. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 46-47; see

also Stivers, 71 F.3d at 741.

Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s first

ground for relief be DENIED.

B. PETITIONER RECEIVED A WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

 USED BY THE HEARING OFFICER TO FIND PETITIONER GUILTY

Petitioner’s second claim for relief is that no written

statement of the facts used by the SHO to find Petitioner guilty was

provided to him. His argument involves the alleged misapplication of

California law. Specifically, Petitioner notes that, under California law, “prisoners are expected to be found not guilty of disciplinary charges unless such is substantiated by the preponderance of

the evidence submitted at the hearing”. [Petition at 19, citing Cal.

Pen. Code § 2932(c)(3) and 15 Cal. Code of Reg. § 3320(1).] He

further notes the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation definitions of constructive and actual possession and argues

that the preponderance of the evidence did not point to a finding of

constructive possession because “the record is devoid of evidence

that [he] had knowledge, dominion, or control over the razor.” 

The Court will not comment on the materiality of the

purported misapplication of state law. The Court notes that

Petitioner’s claim in this regard appears to rest solely on the

allegedly improper application of state law by state authorities.

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Federal courts “have no authority to review a state’s application of

its own laws.” Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885. The sole exception to this

limitation exists when errors of state law “rise to the level of a

constitutional violation.” See Oxborrow, 877 F.2d at 1400. Here,

Petitioner argues that he suffered a constitutional violation of his

due process right to receive a written statement of the evidence

relied upon by the factfinder. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564.

The Court of Appeal appears have relied on a close textual

reading of Wolff, which requires that “there must be a ‘written

statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on ... ’” See

Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564, quoting Morissey v. Brewer, 92 U.S. 471, 489

(1972). Since the hearing officer summarized the evidentiary record

in his findings and decision, the Court of Appeal accepted that the

decision constituted a statement of the evidence relied upon. If

this is true, it is elementary that providing Petitioner with a

written copy of that decision meets the letter the dictates of

Wolff.

Petitioner contends that, if there is no such evidence in the

record in support of the SHO’s decision, the findings could not have

been based on the evidence. Therefore, the decision of the SHO was

based on findings which did not reflect the facts and evidence

presented at the hearing. This argument is complicated by the

disputed aspects of the evidence.

The Court finds that Petitioner was provided with a written

copy of the SHO’s decision which included a summary of the evidence

relied upon. Therefore, the relevant requirement set forth in Wolff

was satisfied.

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Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s second

ground for relief be DENIED.

C. PETITIONER WAS GIVEN 24 HOURS TO REVIEW CHARGES AND AN

 OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE

Petitioner’s third ground for relief is that he was denied

the right “to have documentary evidence prepared and presented, in

defense of the charge” and the “right to review witnesses statements

at least 24 hours in advance of the hearing.” (Petition at 24.) He

alleges that these rights stem from the Fourteenth Amendment, as

stated in Wolff. Id.

Petitioner appears to conflate two of the due process

protections set forth in Wolff: the 24 hour notice requirement and

the right to present evidence. He combines elements from these two

distinct rules to claim that Wolff requires giving inmates 24 hours

in which to review witness statements and evidence.

First, Wolff requires that prisoners facing revocation of

good time credits be given “... advance notice of the claimed

violation ...” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563. The Supreme Court noted that

“[p]art of the function of notice is to give the charged party a

chance to marshal the facts in his defense and to clarify what the

charges are ...” Id. at 564. To ensure that the advance notice gives

the prisoner that chance, the Supreme Court noted that “[a]t least

a period of time after the notice, no less than 24 hours, should be

allowed to the inmate to prepare ...” Id.

Second, Wolff requires that the “inmate facing disciplinary

proceedings ... be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary

evidence in his defense ...” subject to institutional safety and

correctional goal concerns. Id. at 566.

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In this case, Petitioner was afforded both of these rights.

On July 8, 2008, he was informed of the charges and, on July 22,

2008, he received a copy of the Incident Report. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 3, Exhibit A.) Both of these events occurred more than

24 hours before the August 5, 2008 hearing, thus satisfying the

notice requirement. Therefore, Petitioner had notice of the charges

against him more than 24 hours before the hearing.

Petitioner’s “... right to have documentary evidence prepared

and presented ...” was not violated since he had the opportunity to

prepare and present evidence and witness statements at the hearing

and in fact did so. By exercising his right to call witnesses and

present evidence, Petitioner clearly demonstrated that he was not

denied that right.

The Court finds that since the Petitioner was provided with

notice of the charges against him more than 24 hours before the

hearing and because the Petitioner in fact presented evidence and

witnesses at the hearing, the relevant requirements set forth in

Wolff were satisfied.

Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s third

ground for relief be DENIED.

D. THE STATE COURTS APPLIED THE CORRECT EVIDENTIARY 

 STANDARD;HOWEVER, THE STANDARD WAS NOT MET

Petitioner’s fourth ground for relief is that the state court

erred in applying the Zepeda standard and that even if the standard

were correct, the evidence presented to the court did not meet that

standard. (Petition at 9, 26-28.)

Petitioner’s first contention, that the Zepeda standard was

inappropriate for his case, rests on two arguments. First, he argues

that he did not invoke this standard. Id. at 27. He appears to be

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under the misapprehension that he has control over which standards

are to be applied to his case. Standards are used to engender

uniformity in the outcomes of cases that are factually and legally

similar. Petitioners are not free to pick and choose which standards

are applied to their case. Instead, it is the role of a court to

determine what standards were previously established in similar

cases and to apply them to the case before it. Therefore, Petitioner’s argument in this regard lacks merit.

Second, Petitioner argues that the standard is limited to

cases testing the sufficiency of the evidence. Id. 26. In Zepeda,

the California Court of Appeal reiterated the standard set forth by

the Supreme Court in Superintendent v. Hill. See Zepeda at 1498;

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455, 456-457 (1985). Under

Hill, a prison disciplinary action will not be disturbed by a

reviewing court as long as “some evidence” supports the original

finding. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. The Ninth Circuit has held that

Hill’s “some evidence” standard is clearly established federal law

for AEDPA purposes and applicable to prison disciplinary hearings.

Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1127-28

(9th Cir. 2006). It is apparent that the standard used in Zepeda,

which mirrors that in Hill, is applicable as to the sufficiency of

the evidence claim raised by Petitioner.

Therefore, the Court finds that the state courts did not err

in determining that the Zepeda standard was most applicable since it

comports with the controlling federal standard.

Petitioner’s next contention is that the state courts did not

fully address his claims as to the veracity of the evidence.

Specifically, he alleges that both the administrative and state

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court appeal decisions relied upon the SHO’s account of the

evidence. This account was provided to the Petitioner in accordance

with Wolff’s requirement that inmates against whom disciplinary

action has been taken receive a written statement of the evidence

relied upon by the factfinder to find them guilty. See Wolff, 418

U.S. at 564. To comply with the spirit of the rule in Wolff, the

assumption is implicit that the evidence relied upon is truthful,

accurate, and reliable. The Court also notes that, under Hill, there

“must be some indicia of reliability of the information that forms

the basis for prison disciplinary actions.” Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d

703, 705 (9th Cir. 1987); Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831 F.2d 183, 186

(9th Cir. 1987); Luna v. Pico, 356 F.3d 481, 488 (2nd Cir. 2004)(holding that “‘reliable evidence,’ and not just ‘any evidence,’ is

required.”); Lenea v. Lane, 882 F.2d 1171, 1175-76 (7th Cir. 1989),

Aquiar v. Tafoya, 95 Fed. Appx. 931, 935 (10th Cir. 2004); Zepeda v.

Uribe, 710 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1031 (S.D. Cal. 2010). Petitioner

argues that despite the unreliable nature of the evidentiary

summary, the administrative and state court decisions relied upon

it.

Looking to Hill, the Court notes that the determinations by

the state courts should remain undisturbed as long as some evidence

exists to support their findings. However, from the evidentiary

record, the Court cannot find reliable evidence to support the

findings of the Court of Appeal.

The Court looks to the decision of the California Court of

Appeal, because it is the last reasoned opinion. The Court of Appeal

wrote that “[t]he evidence supported the conclusion that petitioner

possessed the weapon because it was found in his cell.” (ResponCase 3:10-cv-02203-MMA-WVG Document 11 Filed 07/13/11 Page 25 of 33
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dent’s Lodgment No. 4, at 2.) The court then explained that the law

“supports imputing possession to petitioner under these facts” due

to the doctrine of constructive possession. Id. It also noted that

it was bound by the “any evidence” standard set forth by Hill. Id.

Since the Court of Appeal found that there was some evidence in the

record, it affirmed the decision of the Superior Court. Id. at 2-3.

Likewise, the Superior Court relied upon the SHO’s record of

the evidence produced at the hearing. See In re Larry Rosser, No.

EHC 01253 at 1 (Cal. Sup. Ct. of Imperial County, 2009). The

Superior Court applied the Hill and Zepeda standard, and found that

the SHO’s decision was supported by “some” evidence. Id. at 2.

The decisions at the Director’s Level and Second Level both

relied upon the SHO’s record of the evidence as truthful, accurate,

and reliable. The Director’s Level Decision stated that Petitioner’s

“allegations that ... staff falsified documents ... were unsupported.” The decision apparently relied upon the findings made by

the Second Level Appeal, even going so far as to repeat the Second

Level Appeal’s factual error that the book in which the weapon was

secreted came from cell 151U. [Petition, Exhibit 1(a)(3).]

The Second Level Appeal decision addressed the Petitioner’s

claim of falsified or inaccurate evidence briefly and indirectly,

stating that “[t]he circumstances of the RVR states [sic] the inmate

manufactured weapon was secreted inside of a book, which was labeled

as coming from cell 151U.” Id. at Exhibit 1(a)(1). This is factually

incorrect. Throughout the incident report submitted by both

Petitioner and Respondent, the weapon is reported to have come from

cell 151L, not 151U. The Second Level Appeal dismissed Petitioner’s

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allegation of insufficient evidence as “unfounded as the SHO refers

to three references utilized to support his finding.” Id.

Since all subsequent hearings have relied upon the SHO’s

record of the evidence, this Court now turns to the three pieces of

evidence relied upon by the SHO. (See Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3,

Exhibit I.) The evidence consists of Officer Hernandez’s report,

testimony by witnesses, and the Incident Report.

Officer Hernandez’s report states that he searched through

the book to find the weapon. His report also states that the book

was labeled as coming from ASU-151L. The report does not claim any

knowledge of the chain of custody of the book prior to Officer

Hernandez’s inspection at the x-ray scanning area. Moreover, the

reliability of this report is suspect since it appears to have been

signed, dated, and reviewed on June 20, 2008 (four days before the

cell searches occurred). Even if the reporting date is a typographical error, the fact that the reviewer not only failed to spot and

even repeated the inaccurate date, raises serious questions as to

the truthfulness, accuracy, and reliability of this document.

The witness testimony at the hearing that the SHO relied upon

came from Inmate Throop and Officer Rucker. Inmate Throop’s

testimony is summarized as “Throop testified that ‘there was much

confusion, many people working in a small space. Throop’s opinion

was that the Staff was confused and liable to make mistakes.’”

However, it appears that Inmate Throop’s testimony was likely much

more substantial. In his Declaration (signed at a date after the

hearing), Throop discusses seeing three unknown officers inside cell

151 at some point before seeing the two officers who signed the cell

search receipt for the same cell. Throop also discusses seeing

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6/

The record does not explain who or what A-5 was.

10cv2203 28

stacks of magazines, books, and newspapers strewn about the ASU,

both in and out of milk crates. Since Throop’s later written

declaration is significantly more substantial than what the SHO

recorded as his oral testimony, the SHO’s summary of Throop’s

testimony is also suspect. However, the SHO’s decision does not

appear to rely on this evidence.

The SHO’s report also summarizes Officer Rucker’s testimony

as being unable to recall what was inside the milk crate Petitioner

and his cell mate discovered upon their return to cell 151. However,

this is in direct conflict with what Officer Rucker wrote in a later

declaration. On October 9, 2008, Officer Rucker answered questions

nearly identical to those posed at the RVR hearing in significantly

more detail. Specifically, he clearly recalled that the milk crate

contained legal and miscellaneous paperwork and “seem[ed] to recall”

books and magazines. In his written responses, Officer Rucker

remembered that the items had Hispanic names on them, that they were

addressed to A-5, and even recalled that the paperwork was postmarked or dated in May.6/ How Officer Rucker was able to recall these

facts in October 2008 but not during the oral hearing in August 2008

is unclear. What is clear is that the summary of witness testimony

prepared by the SHO is unreliable in light of the later recollections of both the inmate and officer who gave the testimony.

The third piece of evidence relied upon by the SHO was the

lengthy Incident Report. The Court directs its attention to those

portions involving Petitioner and his cell mate. On page 28 of the

Incident Report, Officer Castro reported that he or she “placed the

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7/

 Working backwards, the chain of custody is as follows. Officer

Hernandez found a weapon in a book labeled 151L. Evidence for this

event comes from a report dated and reviewed four days before the

searches. The book was removed and labeled from cell 151L’s crate by

Sgt. Smith. No evidence or testimony from Sgt. Smith is included in

the record. Cell 151L’s crate was filled with property from that

cell by Officer Castro. Evidence for this is provided by Officer

Castro’s report; also included is Officer Castro’s hearsay claim

that “I was later informed that a razor blade was discovered inside

the book”.

10cv2203 29

lower bunk property ... into a crate” but does not specify what

property that was. Officer Castro reports that at some later point,

Sgt. Smith removed a book from the property, labeled it at that

time, and gave it to Officer Hernandez to search. How Officer Castro

knew of Sgt. Smith’s actions is unclear. According to page 17 of the

incident report, Sgt. Smith did not process evidence. Officer

Castro’s account also indicates that individual items of property

were not labeled until they were removed from the milk crate at the

x-ray station. The incident report does not include the statements

of officers responsible for scanning the crates, removing suspect

property from the crates, and correctly labeling that property.

Therefore, the chain of custody relies on hearsay.7/ Officer

Hernandez’s report as to the physical search of the book, discussed

supra, is included in this incident report. 

What can be gleaned from this incident report is that

property present in Petitioner’s shared cell was collected and

placed in a milk crate and that the crate was scanned. A weapon was

found in a book but the chain of custody of that book is unclear.

The officer who removed the book from the crate and labeled it

offered no written account. The officer who placed inmate Muhammed’s

property in the crate did not report that a book was among that

property.

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Therefore, the Court concludes that the evidence cited by the

SHO to find Petitioner guilty is largely unreliable. Specifically,

the report by Officer Hernandez was dated and reviewed four days

before the searches, the summary of witness testimony contradicts

later declarations by those same witnesses, and the incident report

fails to report the chain of custody of the book containing the

weapon. The evidentiary record prepared by the SHO and relied on by

subsequent hearings appears to exclude certain evidence that weighs

in Petitioner’s favor. Specifically, the SHO omitted evidence

supporting Petitioner’s apparent contention that the book containing

the weapon was left in his cell, along with property belonging to

other inmates, before Officer Castro took inmate Muhammed’s property

to be scanned.

The only reliable evidence, which could be considered “some

evidence” under Hill, is as follows: First, the cells in the ASU

were searched on June 24, 2008. Second, in the course of this

search, some property, which may or may not have been commingled

with the belongings of other inmates, was removed from inmate

Muhammed’s bunk and placed in a crate. Third, this crate was taken

to an x-ray machine and scanned. Fourth, Officer Castro heard that

the scan had been positive.

The SHO relied upon unreliable reports and witness testimony

in finding Petitioner guilty of possessing the weapon in question.

Subsequent administrative and state court proceedings relied upon

the SHO’s characterization of the evidence. Consequently, while this

Court is bound by the strictures of Hill because the decisions of

the SHO and subsequent hearings did not rely on any reliable

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evidence, this Court concludes that Hill’s “some evidence” standard

was not met.

This Court finds that a serious chain of custody question

exists in this case. It is unclear if and when property belonging to

other inmates entered Petitioner’s cell and whether that property

was commingled with his cell mate’s possessions. Furthermore,

testimony may have been mischaracterized, reports may have been

misdated and inadequately reviewed, and even the RVR charging the

Petitioner references a different cell number.

The Court remains faithful to the Supreme Court’s admonition

in Hill that it should not reweigh the evidence or judge the

credibility of witnesses. However, the only evidence used to

determine where the weapon was found is unreliable. Furthermore, the

veracity of the SHO’s summary of evidence presented at the hearing

is questionable. The Court finds that the findings of the Court of

Appeal, the Superior Court, and the various administrative hearings

all relied upon this faulty summary of evidence. The record

presented to the Court rebuts the presumption of correctness given

to the Court of Appeal’s factual findings. See U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1);

see also Dretke, 545 U.S. at 240.

For the reasons set forth above, the Court of Appeal’s

decision involved an unreasonable application of U.S. Supreme Court

law and was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented.

Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s fourth

ground for relief be GRANTED.

Consequently, this Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition be

GRANTED.

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 VII

 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

After a review of the record in this matter, the undersigned

Magistrate Judge recommends that the Petition be GRANTED.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 12, 2011, any party

to this action may file written objections with the Court and serve

a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the court and served on all parties no later than

September 2, 2011. The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

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DATED: July 13, 2011

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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