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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS UBi FILED 

ted STtates Court of App ., ... ·~ enth Circuit ..... .... 

TENTH CIRCUIT APR 3 0 1996 

PATR!CKFISH~n Clerr~ 4Jh CAROL PARKER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT 

NO. 1-003 OF OKMULGEE COUNTY, 

OKLAHOMA, also known as Morris 

Public School, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

No. 95-7081 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CV -94-466) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Richard B. Wilkinson, Oklahoma Education Association, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 

Plaintiff-Appellant. 

K. Clark Phipps and David A. Russell of Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Boudreaux, Holeman, 

Phipps & Brittingham, and J. Douglas Mann and Jerry A. Richardson of Rosenstein, Fist & 

Ringold, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before KELLY and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, • Senior District Judge . 

• Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior District Judge, United States District 

(continued ... ) 

Appellate Case: 95-7081 Document: 01019275834 Date Filed: 04/30/1996 Page: 1 
• 

BROWN, Senior District Judge. 

Plaintiff Carol Parker appeals from a district court order granting summary judgment 

in favor of the defendant school district on her cause of action for violation of due process 

rights in public employment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 We review this determination de 

novo, applying the same standard used by the district court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56( c). 

Wolfv. Prudential Ins. Co., 50 F.3d 793, 796 (lOth Cir. 1995). Under that standard, we may 

affirm summary judgment for the school district only if the materials of record "show that 

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the [District] is entitled to judgment 

as a matter oflaw." lit (internal quotation omitted). For the reasons that follow, we reverse 

and remand the cause for further proceedings. 

Ms. Parker claims the school district deprived her of a property right without due 

process wht:n it declined to renew her contract for the 1994-95 school year in violation of the 

statutory scheme governing the employment of public school teachers in Oklahoma, known 

as the "Teacher Due Process Act of 1990" or TDPA. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 70, §§ 6-101.20 

*( ... continued) 

Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

2 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. 

~Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted 

without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 95-7081 Document: 01019275834 Date Filed: 04/30/1996 Page: 2 
to 6-101.30; see also Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 70, § 6-101 to 6-101.15 (related provisions of 

school code). The school district admits it is "self evident and undisputed" that the TDPA 

creates employment interests invoking constitutional protection, Appellee's Answer Br. at 

7; see. e.~:., Shorty. Kiamichi Area Vocational-Technical Sch. Dist. No.7, 761 P.2d 472, 

475-76 (Okla. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1066 (1989); Wood v. Independent Sch. Dist. 

No. 141, 661 P.2d 892, 894 (Okla. 1983), but argues that by accepting a contract crafted to 

elide pertinent TDP A provisions, Ms. Parker voluntarily waived her rights in this regard. 

Ms. Parker was originally hired by the school district as an English teacher with an 

extra-duty coaching assignment for the 1990-91 school year under a contract clearly falling 

within the compass of the TDPA. Accordingly, as a "probationary teacher," she could not 

thereafter be dismissed or nonreemployed except for cause. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 70, 

§ 6-101.22B. Moreover, even if a renewal contract were not formally executed for the 

ensuing year, absent timely notice of nonrenewal her teaching contract would automatically 

be extended."and such employment and continuing contract [would] be binding on [her] and 

on the school district." Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 70, § 6-10 1E. These principles applied only to 

her teaching position, however, as "extra duty assignments are too far removed 

from ... primary teaching responsibilities . . . to be protected under the [TDP A]." Maupin 

v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 26, 632 P.2d 396, 399 (Okla. 1981). 

The nonrenewal deadline for the 1991-92 year passed without any action by the 

school district. Hence, Ms. Parker began the year in August under a continuing contract 

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Appellate Case: 95-7081 Document: 01019275834 Date Filed: 04/30/1996 Page: 3 
pursuant to § 6-101E. At some point, however, she evidently was told she had to sign a 

(new) written contract before she could be paid in accord with Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 70, 

§ 5-125C (prohibiting payment of teacher "who does not have a written contract required by 

law"). ~Appendix to Appellant's Br. in Chief (App.) doc. 6, at 8. Actually, the school 

district had no basis for imposing such a condition on payment of Ms. Parker's salary, as the 

continuing contract provided by§ 6-101E is an express exception to the requirement of a 

written contract,~§ 6-101A. More importantly for our purposes, the new contract made 

Ms. Parker's teaching position, with its attendant rights under the TDP A, contingent upon her 

perceived success as a coach. She signed the contract, and executed similar ones for 1992-93 

and 1993-94. Ultimately, the school district invoked the coaching clause to nonrenew her 

contract for 1994-95, in a manner otherwise contrary to TDP A provisions governing the 

procedural and substantive rights of fourth-year (i.e., "career" or tenured) teachers. 

Ms. Parker then filed this action, claiming the school district's contractual efforts to 

circumvent the TDPA were ineffective for two reasons. First, to the extent the contracts for 

1992 through 1994 purported to negate the employment rights mandated by the state 

legislature (and implemented by the first contract), they were invalid as against public policy. 

Second, even if otherwise permissible, her contractual waiver of TDP A protections was not 

voluntary under the circumstances. The district court held that the challenged contractual 

terms were valid, deemed Ms. Parker's assent thereto voluntary as a matter of law, and 

granted summary judgment on the ground that the protected interests created by the TDP A 

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Appellate Case: 95-7081 Document: 01019275834 Date Filed: 04/30/1996 Page: 4 
• had been waived. Because we hold that the contract terms waiving the TDP A were invalid, 

we reverse summary judgment without deciding whether the purported waiver was voluntary. 

The rule in Oklahoma regarding the validity of contractual provisions waiving 

statutory rights is most fully expressed in Isenhower y. Isenhower, 666 P.2d 238 (Okla. Ct. 

App. 1983): 

While we agree that a right may be waived whether conferred by law or 

contract, when a statute contains provisions that are founded upon public 

policy, such provisions cannot be waived by a private party if such waiver 

thwarts the legislative policy which the statute was designed to effectuate. 

Courts must give effect to legislative acts and may not amend, repeal or 

circumvent them. · 

hL. at 241 (footnotes omitted);~ Rupp v. City of Tulsa, 214 P.2d 913, 916-17 (Okla. 

1950)(party may waive rule oflaw or statute "where it is exclusively a matter of private right, 

and no considerations of public policy ... are involved"); see also Dycus v. Belco Indus .. 

~, 569 P.2d 553, 556 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977)("contracts or portions thereof in derogation 

of our statut~s will not be enforced by courts of this state"); Tulsa Ener~. Inc. v. Oklahoma 

Oil & Gas Mana~ment. Inc. (In re Tulsa Bner~. Inc.), 181 B.R. 544, 548 (Bankr. N.D. 

Okla. 1995)(same). In contrast, the cases relied on by the district court for its very expansive 

view of permissible waiver involved contract terms that did not violate statutory provisions 

and, thus, would have required the clearest of judicially-articulated policy justifications for 

interference with the parties' private agreements. ~Shepard y. Farmers Ins. Co., 678 P.2d 

250,251-52 (Okla. 1983); Johnston v. J.R. Watkins Co., 157 P.2d 755, 757-58 (Okla. 1945). 

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The rule acknowledged in Isenhower. which is widely accepted, see ~nerally 28 Am. 

Jur. 2d Estoppel & Waiver§ 161 (1966), has been held by several state courts specifically 

to preclude purported contractual waivers of teachers' statutory tenure/due process rights. 

See. e.~., Kelso Educ. Ass'n v. Kelso Sch. Dist. No. 453,740 P.2d 889, 893 (Wash. Ct. App. 

1987); Bruton v. Ames Coromunicy Sch. Dist., 291 N.W.2d 351, 356 (Iowa 1980); Faust v. 

Ladysmith-Hawkins Sch. Sys., 277 N.W.2d 303, 306-307 (Wis. 1979); see also Ex Parte 

Wri~ht, 443 So. 2d 40, 42 (Ala. 1983)(holding "an attempted waiver of the protection 

afforded by teacher tenure laws is ineffectual on public policy grounds"); d Dugan v. 

Stockton State Colle~, 586 A.2d 322, 325 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 199l){rejecting waiver 

because statute "makes tenure a mandatory term and condition of employment, one which 

supersedes and cannot be overridden by contract provisions"). The only pertinent authority 

cited by the school district, Feinerman v. Board ofCoo.p. E<luc. Servs., 399 N.E.2d 899 (N.Y. 

1979), reached a contrary conclusion on waiver without considering the stated rule operative 

in Oklahoma and the cases cited above. Indeed, Feinerman expressly acknowledged the very 

sort of "strong policy considerations" underlying New York's tenure statute, .id... at 902, that 

would support an opposite determination under the principle we must follow here. 

The Oklahoma courts have expressly recognized the public function served by the 

statutory tenure/due process scheme, which "promotes good order and the welfare of the 

State and school system by preventing the removal of capable and experienced teachers for 

reasons arising solely from political or personal whim." Babb y, Independent Sch. Dist. No. 

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Appellate Case: 95-7081 Document: 01019275834 Date Filed: 04/30/1996 Page: 6 
1=5,, 829 P.2d 973, 975 n.14 (Okla. 1992)(citing Lovelace y. IniUam, 518 P.2d 1102, 1104 

(Okla. 1973)). Ms. Parker's post-1990 contracts, which permit her summary removal as 

teacher ifher supplementary position as coach--accorded no TDP A protection--ceased to suit 

the school district, directly conflict with the stated purpose of the statutory scheme.3 

Accordingly, adhering to Oklahoma law prohibiting the waiver of public-interest statutory 

rights, we hold that the purported waiver ofTDPA protections executed by the parties was 

invalid. See ~nerally .i.d.. at 977-78 ("The courts cannot sanction school boards' actions, 

whether taken in good or bad faith, which manipulate job assignments in a manner 

that ... circumvents the purpose and spirit of the tenure law."). 

Although the preceding rationale for our holding is complete in itself, certain 

arguments of the school district warrant some direct response. First, the school district insists 

that the waiver principle guiding our analysis "proves too much" because "no person could 

3 · Indeed, the school district's effort to rationalize this exclusion of TDP A rights 

by subordinating Ms. Parker's teaching function to the imperatives of high school sports is 

just as repugnant to the law as the exclusion itself As noted, Oklahoma deems the 

connection between "primary teaching responsibilities" and "extra duty assignments" too 

remote to extend TDPA protections afforded the former to the latter. Maupin, 632 P.2d at 

399. If a dog cannot wag its disjointed tail, such a tail surely cannot wag the dog. ~ 

id... (teaching and coaching must be kept separate for TDP A purposes because, just as a 

school "should [not] suffer from [a teacher's] possible shortcomings in the extracurricular 

areas ... [,] a fme academician [should not] suffer because he/she is poorly suited to certain 

extracurricular assignments"). See ~nerally Swa~er y. Board ofEduc., 688 P.2d 270, 276 

(Kan. Ct. App. 1984)(school authority cannot make coaching duties part of a teacher's 

primary employment contract by combining teaching and coaching duties in a single 

instrument). 

7 

Appellate Case: 95-7081 Document: 01019275834 Date Filed: 04/30/1996 Page: 7 
ever lawfully waive any statutory right in any contract," and cites as a counter-example~ 

v. Perry, 551 P.2d 256, 258 (Okla. 1976)(ex-spouses may voluntarily agree to deviate from 

statutory provision regarding usual termination of support alimony). Appellee's Answer Br. 

at 8. The obvious flaw in this argument is the school district's failure to acknowledge the 

critical public-policy element in the waiver principle applied here. The point to be drawn 

from~ is that the statutory guideline for termination of support alimony is not a directive 

rendered mandatory by the public interest. That particular judgment is no more relevant to 

this case than the contrasting one in Isenhower that the statutory provisions relating to 

alimony in lieu of property division do constitute such a directive. 666 P .2d at 241. It should 

be plain from the discussion above that our application of Oklahoma's waiver principle turns 

on the established public-interest character of the particular statutory scheme under 

consideration. 

The school district notes that in Miller v. Independent School District No. 56, 609 

P.2d756, 759 (Okla. 1980), the Oklahoma Supreme Court permitted a school board to 

deviate from statutory provisions to enlar~ a teacher's procedural rights, and argues that this 

holding implies the converse authority to deviate from the TDP A to a teacher's detriment as 

well. Again, the flaw in the school district's reasoning is readily discernible. The fact that 

public policy demands recognition of(at least) certain minimal procedural guarantees does 

not entail--indeed, it appears to belie--the conclusion that any further safeguards afforded the 

protected group would be contrary to the public interest. Significantly, the Oklahoma 

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• 

Supreme Court characterized the statutory notice provisions augmented by the school board 

in Miller as "minimum standards." Id.. at 759; Gamer v. Johnson, 609 P.2d 760, 762 (Okla. 

1980). Further, in Raines v. Independent School District No.6, 796 P.2d 303, 304 (Okla. 

1990), where a school district attempted to waive certain statutory provisions which, like the 

TDP A rights in this case, were considered mandatory limitations on its authority, the 

Oklahoma Supreme Court had no difficulty in holding the waiver invalid. 

Finally, the school district contends that statutory recognition of certain exceptions 

to TDPA coverage, specified in Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 70, § 6-101.23 (exempting temporary, 

substitute, and adult education positions), indicates the legislature's intent to leave the 

extension or restriction ofTDPA rights in particular cases to the discretion oflocal school 

boards. This ambiguous contention is either inapposite or incorrect. If the school district 

means that the legislature intended to afford local school boards the discretion to utilize, 

when applicable, any of the specific exceptions provided in the statute, its point appears 

correct but is irrelevant, as the hybrid teacher/coach contract fashioned here is not authorized 

by § 6-101.23. If the school district means that the careful delineation of particularized 

exemptions from TDP A coverage implies a legislative intent to permit local school boards 

the discretion to craft additional, ad hoc exceptions not specified in§ 6-101.23, its point is 

patently erroneous. This is a paradigmatic case for application of the "time-honored canon 

of construction known by the Latin phrase of expressio unius est exclusio alterius," or "the 

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Appellate Case: 95-7081 Document: 01019275834 Date Filed: 04/30/1996 Page: 9 
expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." Greenber~ y. Wolfber~, 890 P.2d 895, 

906 & n.54 (Okla. 1994). 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma 

is REVERSED, and the cause is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

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