Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01361/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01361-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 06cv1361

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM J. BAUMER, Civil No. 06cv1361 JM (CAB)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING FIRST AMENDED

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS AND REQUEST FOR

EVIDENTIARY HEARING 

[Doc. Nos. 31, 33.]

v.

JAMES TILTON, Warden,

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

WILLIAM J. BAUMER, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his San Diego Superior Court conviction in

case number SF 141219 for possession and manufacture of a weapon by a prisoner and two charges of

battery by a prisoner arising from his assaults on a correctional officer. He contends his federal

constitutional rights were violated as follows: (1) the state trial court violated his right to due process

under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments when it ordered him to wear restraints during his trial; and

(2) the trial court violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying his request, pursuant

to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), to represent himself at trial. Petitioner also requests this

Court hold an evidentiary hearing on his Faretta claim. 

The Court has considered the Petition, Respondent’s Answer, Petitioner’s Traverse, Petitioner’s

Request for an Evidentiary Hearing, and all the supporting documents submitted by the parties. Based

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upon the documents and evidence presented in this case, and for the reasons set forth below, this Court

recommends both the Petition and the Request for an Evidentiary Hearing be DENIED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be correct;

Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convicting evidence. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical

fact, including inferences properly drawn from such facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of

correctness). The facts as found by the state appellate court are as follows:

Counts 1 and 2, Battery by Prisoner (Jury Guilty Verdicts)

Baumer was housed in the prison’s administrative segregation unit where heightened

security procedures are utilized. The cell doors have locked “tray slot” openings that are

used to serve food and to attach and remove an inmate’s handcuffs. To remove an inmate

from his cell, the correctional officer unlocks the tray slot; the inmate places his hands

behind his back and out the tray slot; the officer handcuffs the inmate; the inmate pulls his

cuffed hands back into the cell; and then the cell door is opened by an officer in a control

booth. The same type of procedure is used to remove the inmate’s handcuffs when he is

placed back in his cell. Officers wear padded protective vests.

On June 8, 1999, Officer David Rivas escorted Baumer from the library cage back

to his cell. Baumer entered his cell and placed his hands through the tray slot for removal

of the handcuffs. After Officer Rivas removed the handcuff from one hand, Baumer pulled

his hands back through the tray slot. Officer Rivas tried to hold onto the key and the

handcuffs and was pinned against the cell door as Baumer pulled away. Officer Rivas

released the handcuffs and Baumer refused to return them. Officer Rivas suffered an

abrasion to his finger from the altercation.

Officer Rivas reported the incident to his supervisor, Sergeant Richard Holmes.

Sergeant Holmes was unsuccessful in convincing Baumer to return the handcuffs. About 20

to 30 minutes later, Baumer returned the handcuffs to Lieutenant William Humphrey.

On June 11, 1999, when Officer Rivas was escorting Baumer to the shower, Baumer

threatened to assault him even with handcuffs on. When Officer Rivas placed Baumer in the

shower stall and closed the grill gate, Baumer spat on Officer Rivas’s face. Baumer’s spit

hit Officer Rivas under his chin, on his right cheek, and on his protective vest.

Count 5, Possession Of Weapon, February 1999 (Jury Deadlock)

On February 6, 1999, Officer Rivas found an inmate-manufactured weapon in

Baumer’s cell inside an opening in the middle of his mattress. The weapon was made of

plastic that had been molded into a sharp point and was seven and one-half inches long and

one inch wide.

Witnesses for the defense testified that mattresses were not always searched when

inmates or mattresses were moved between cells.

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Counts 3 and 4, Possession and Manufacture of Weapon, April 1999 (Guilty Pleas)

Baumter stipulated that the testimony at the preliminary hearing formed the factual

basis for his guilty pleas. According to that evidence, on April 3, 1999, Officer Kenneth

Walls observed Baumer in his cell heating a black object and molding it into a sharp, pointed

form. On April 4, 1999, Officer Michael Krysinski, assisted by Sergeant William Schembri,

found an inmate-manufactured weapon in a hand lotion bottle in Baumer’s cell.

(Lodgment No. 6 at 1-4.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 22, 2000, in an amended complaint that was subsequently deemed an information,

Petitioner was charged with two counts of battery by a state prisoner in violation of California Penal

Code § 4501.5, two counts of possession of a deadly weapon by a prisoner in state prison in violation of

California Penal Code § 4502(a), and one count of manufacture of a deadly weapon by a state prisoner in

violation of California Penal Code § 4502(b). (Clerk’s Transcript, Vol. 4 at 974-75.) The amended

complaint also alleged two prior convictions under California’s “Three Strikes” Law, California Penal

Code § 667(b)-(i), and three prior prison term convictions under California Penal Code § 667.5(b). (Id.

at 975-77.)

On March 17, 2000, the trial court granted Petitioner’s request for advisory counsel and

appointed attorney William Burgener to assist Petitioner, who was representing himself. (CT, Vol. 8 at

1702.) On May 9, 2000, the trial court ordered Petitioner to wear restraints during the trial. (Id. at

1727.) The trial court also granted Petitioner’s request to terminate his pro per status and appointed

attorney William Burgener to represent him. (Id. at 1728.) 

On August 14, 2000, the trial court denied Petitioner’s motion to sever counts three and four. 

(Id. at 1744.) Subsequently, on August 28, 2000, Petitioner changed his plea and plead guilty to counts

three and four, possession of a deadly weapon by a state prisoner and manufacture of a deadly weapon

by a state prisoner. (Id. at 1759.)

A bifurcated jury trial on the remaining counts commenced on August 31, 2000. (Id. at 1764.) 

On September 19, 2000, a San Diego County Superior Court jury found Petitioner guilty of two counts

of battery by a state prisoner and was unable to reach a verdict on the remaining count of possession of a

deadly weapon by a state prisoner. (Id. at 1805-06, 1810-12.) A mistrial was declared as to the

remaining count of possession of a deadly weapon by a state prisoner and it was dismissed without

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1

 After the in camera review, Petitioner filed a second appeal, which was denied on June 13,

2005, when the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in its entirety. (Lodgment No. 9.) 

Petitioner did not pursue any further action on this issue. 

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prejudice on motion by the prosecution. (Id. at 1815, 1821.) On September 21, 2000, the jury returned

true findings on all prior conviction allegations. (Id. at 1854-55.)

On October 13, 2000, the trial court granted Petitioner’s request to represent himself again and

relieved attorney Burgener as attorney of record and as advisory counsel to Petitioner. (Id. at 1833.)

The trial court held a sentencing hearing on January 3, 2001. (Id. at 1852-54.) At the hearing,

the trial court denied Petitioner’s motion to withdraw his plea of guilty as to counts three and four, (id. at

1853), and sentenced Petitioner to state prison for a term of seventy-eight years to life, (id. at 1854-55). 

Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial court erred in: (1) requiring him

to wear restraints during trial; (2) denying his motion to reinstate his self-representation status; (3)

denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to counts three and four; and (4) denying his motion for

discovery of officer personnel records. (Lodgment No. 3.) On October 21, 2003, the California Court

of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the judgment as to the first three claims

and reversed the judgment as to the fourth claim for the limited purpose of having the trial court conduct

an in camera review of the records.1 (Lodgment No. 6 at 1-2.)

On December 2, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court,

raising the same arguments concerning the requirement that he wear restraints, the denial of his motion

to reinstate self-representation, and the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. (Lodgment No.

7.) The California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition on January 14, 2004. (Lodgment No.

8.)

On November 8, 2007, Petitioner filed his First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in

this Court. [Doc. No. 31.] On November 16, 2007, Respondent filed its notice of intent to rely on its

previous Answer. [Doc. No. 32.] Petitioner filed a Request for an Evidentiary Hearing on December 10,

2007, [Doc. No. 33], and his Traverse on December 11, 2007, [Doc. No. 35].

IV. DISCUSSION

Petitioner contends his federal constitutional rights were violated as follows: (1) the trial court

violated his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments when it ordered him to wear

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restraints during his trial; and (2) the trial court violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by

denying his request, pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 806, to represent himself at trial. 

Petitioner also requests this Court hold an evidentiary hearing on his Faretta claim. 

Respondent argues the Petition should be denied because both claims were reasonably rejected

by the California Court of Appeal within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

A. Standard of Review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review for federal

habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added).

The current Petition is governed by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) reads:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim –

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (emphasis added).

To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner must satisfy either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). See

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The Supreme Court interprets § 2254(d)(1) as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the

state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court’s

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73-74 (2003).

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Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks through” to

the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). If the

dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must

conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223

F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76); accord Himes

v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court need not cite Supreme Court

precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as

neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent],”

id., the state court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id.

B. Claim One

Petitioner claims the trial court violated his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments when it ordered him to wear restraints during his trial. He argues there was no manifest

need for him to wear physical restraints and that wearing restraints would “impinge on the presumption

of innocence.” (Petition, Attachment A at 2.) Respondent argues Petitioner’s due process rights were

not violated and thus his claim was reasonably rejected by the California Court of Appeal within the

meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

In a reasoned analysis, the California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s claim as follows:

[Background]

Prior to trial Baumer was granted self-representation status and advisory counsel was

appointed to assist him. Trial was set to commence on May 8, 2000. On [May 8, 2000],

Baumer filed a motion to be free of physical restraints at trial. At a hearing on [May 9,

2000], the prosecution, the California Department of Corrections, and the sheriff’s

department opposed the motion because of Baumer’s current and past violent conduct. They

pointed to the fact that Baumer was in prison for the violent crime of robbery and had

another past conviction for robbery; he was currently charged with assaultive conduct against

a correctional officer and possession of weapons in prison; and he was found with weapons

in county jail. Further, he had committed other acts of violence while in prison, including

a battery on staff and an inmate in 1998, and was housed in administrative segregaion

because he was a high security risk. Additionally, in 1995 during a trial where he was

ultimately found not guilty of murder, he had several outbursts and was ordered restrained;

he threatened his attorney; and he engaged in an altercation with an inmate in the holding

tank that required the inmate to be hospitalized. According to the Department of

Corrections, Baumer had refused to relinquish his handcuffs on two occasions after court

appearances and had told correctional staff that if he was convicted in the instant case, “it’s

on.”

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Baumer denied he made any threats to the correctional officers or withheld handcuffs

in relation to court appearances. [The state appellate court noted Baumer acknowledged he

did refuse to turn over handcuffs when he believed correctional officers were infringing on

his rights in prison.] Baumer argued he should not be restrained because the behavior

problems attributed to him were in the past; he had not been involved in any altercations in

prison for the entire past year; and during a recent federal trial, as well as the current

proceedings, he had demonstrated his ability and intention to act properly in the courtroom.

He explained that in February he had conducted a week-long jury trial in federal court

involving his civil rights claims against law enforcement officers, and during that trial had

acted professionally and without restraints. [However, the appellate court noted that in a July

federal trial, Baumer was restrained.] He also pointed out that his problems during the

murder trial had occurred six years earlier. Noting that he was representing himself, Baumer

argued it was important that he be able to present himself to the jury as a normal human

being, not a violent prisoner.

Recognizing that it had to balance court security with the right to a fair trial, the trial

court ruled that Baumer could wear civilian rather than prison clothing, but had to wear

physical restraints. The trial court acknowledge that Baumer had never acted up in the

courtroom in the instant case, but found the need for security was nevertheless shown by his

behavior during the 1995 murder trial. The court observed that the federal civil trial where

he was the plaintiff was very different from the instant criminal matter which placed him at

risk for a lengthy additional prison term. To prevent the jury from noticing that Baumer was

restrained with leg chains, the court ordered that skirts be placed around both the prosecution

and defense tables; that both the prosecutor and the defendant remain at the tables during

trial; and that the bailiff handle such matters as showing exhibits to the witnesses. 

(Lodgment No. 6 at 4-6.)

[Analysis]

A defendant cannot be required to wear physical restraints during trial unless there

is a manifest need for such restraints. (People v. Mar (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1201, 1216.)

Manifest need may arise from a showing of violence, threat of violence, or other

nonconforming conduct. (Id. at 1217.) It is not proper for a court to adopt a general policy

of imposing restraints upon prison inmates charged with new offenses, and the fact that a

defendant is a prison inmate charged with a violent crime does not, without more, justify the

use of physical restraints. (Id. at p. 1218.) Rather, the court must make the decision whether

to use physical restraints on a case-by-case basis. (Ibid.)

 Although no formal hearing is required, the trial court must make its determination

based on facts, not rumor and innuendo. (People v. Mar, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1218.) We

review a court’s determination that restraints are necessary under the abuse of discretion

standard. (Id. at p. 1217.)

Baumer argues there was no showing of a manifest need to restrain him. He also

asserts that the trial court’s decision was motivated, at least in part, by a routine policy

requiring prison inmates to be restrained. We disagree. Although the prosecutor informed

the court about procedures typically used to restrain prison inmates at trial, there is no

suggestion that the trial court decided to restrain Baumer because of a blanket restraint policy

without regard to his particular situation. To the contrary, the record shows that the court

engaged in a careful evaluation based on information provided by both law enforcement and

the defense.

There is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court’s discretionary

decision that there was a manifest need for restraints. In addition to the violence associated

with his prior robbery convictions, Baumer engaged in assaultive behavior and possessed

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 The trial court nevertheless instructed the jury that increased court security carries no

connotation of guilt of any kind and that any increased security measures should have no bearing on the

determination of guilt or innocence. (26 RT at 4372-73.) 

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weapons while he was in prison and jail. Thus, he continued to show a tendency towards

violence or the threat of violence even while incarcerated. Further, the trial court was

provided with specific information that he had to be restrained in a previous criminal case

due to disruptive conduct and that he may have threatened correctional officers in

conjunction with the instant case. The prior criminal trial where Baumer was disruptive is

analogous to the instant criminal trial because, unlike a civil trial, it carried the consequence

of loss of liberty. Thus, the court could reasonably give greater weight to his conduct during

the criminal trial than during the civil trial. It was not unreasonable for the trial court to

conclude that even though Baumer’s behavior had so far been appropriate in the current

courtroom, there was a substantial possibility that he might act in a violent or nonconforming

manner if matters did not unfold to his liking, and thus restraints were necessary. 

(Lodgment No. 6 at 8-10.)

A “defendant has the right to be free from shackles and handcuffs in the presence of the jury,

unless shackling is justified by an essential state interest.” Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th

Cir. 2002); see also Rhoden v. Rowland, 172 F.3d 633, 636 (9th Cir. 1999); Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S.

560, 568-69 (1986); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). In order for a defendant who was shackled

during trial to prevail on a claim that his due process rights were violated, “a court must find that the

defendant was indeed physically restrained in the presence of the jury, that the shackling was seen by the

jury, and that the physical restraint was not justified by state interests.” Ghent, 279 F.3d at 1132. 

Here, there is no evidence in the record, other than speculation by Petitioner, that the jury ever

saw the leg chains on Petitioner. The trial court ordered skirts to be placed around both the prosecution

and defense tables in order to prevent the jury from noticing Petitioner was restrained. (8 RT at 1151.) 

The trial court also ordered both the prosecutor and the defendant to remain at the tables during trial and

that the bailiff handle such matters as showing exhibits to the witnesses. (Id.) Furthermore, to address

Petitioner’s concerns that the jury could hear the chains rattling, the trial court ordered the chains to be

taped. (12 RT at 1932.) As a result, Petitioner’s claim fails because there is no evidence the jury ever

saw his leg chains.2 However, assuming arguendo the jury did observe the leg chains, Petitioner’s claim

still fails because the trial court’s decision was justified by state interests specific to his case. 

In Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 629 (2005), the United States Supreme Court held that “the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of physical restraints visible to the jury absent a trial

court determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are justified by a state interest specific to a

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particular trial.” In reaching this conclusion, the Court recognized the need to restrain dangerous

defendants to prevent courtroom attacks as well as the need to give trial courts broad discretion to make

individualized security determinations. Id. at 633. However, in light of the prejudicial effect of visible

restraints, “due process does not permit the use of visible restraints if the trial court has not taken

account of the circumstances of the particular case.” Id. at 632. 

The Court granted relief to the defendant in Deck because the evidence in the record

demonstrated that: (1) the jurors were aware of the defendant’s restraints; (2) the trial court did not make

any formal or informal findings justifying the restraints such as a risk of escape or a threat to courtroom

security, or explaining why the chosen restraints were necessary; and (3) the shackling of the defendant

was “inherently prejudicial,” so that it could not be upheld without adequate justification. Id. at 633-

635.

In the instant case, Petitioner wore leg chains throughout the trial, except during his testimony

when he requested that he wear a stun belt. (Lodgment No. 6 at 8.) The trial court based its decision to

shackle Petitioner on security concerns derived from his criminal background and current charges, his

history of disorderly incidents in the courtroom, his history of possessing weapons while in custody, his

classification by prison officials as a high security risk, and the representations from all the parties,

including the allegations that Petitioner made specific threats Petitioner in relation to the case at trial. 

(See generally 8 RT at 1085, 1089, 1091-93, 1095-97, 1102.) Furthermore, the trial court offered

Petitioner an alternative to shackling, in the form of a stun belt that would be concealed under his jacket,

which Petitioner rejected. (Id. at 1150-51, 1157-58.) 

As these facts demonstrate, the trial court examined the circumstances regarding the necessity of

Petitioner’s restraints. In conducting a case specific inquiry, the trial court balanced the competing

interests and determined that Petitioner presented a threat to court security sufficient to justify shackling. 

(8 RT at 1151.) Accordingly, because the trial court exercised its discretion reasonably in light of the

circumstances of the particular case, the state appellate court’s ruling on the claim was neither contrary 

///

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to nor involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and was not based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. Therefore, this Court recommends Petitioner’s claim be 

DENIED. 

C. Claim Two

Petitioner’s second claim contends that the trial court violated his Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights by denying his request, pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 806, to

represent himself at trial. Petitioner claims he did not make the motion for purposes of delaying the trial,

but because he sincerely believed his appointed counsel was ineffective. (Petition at 14-15.) 

Respondent argues Petitioner’s rights were not violated and thus his claim was reasonably rejected by

the California Court of Appeal within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

In a reasoned opinion, the California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s claim as follows:

[Background]

After the trial court’s ruling requiring restraints, Baumer concluded that he could not

effectively represent himself in chains and accordingly requested that counsel be appointed

to represent him. The court denied the motion, reminding Baumer he had previously been

admonished that if he did not want to represent himself he could not wait until the eve of trial

to request counsel. [The appellate court inserted a footnote observing that lengthy hearings

had been held in April in response to Petitioner’s claims he was not being provided adequate

resources or time to prepare for trial and that during these hearings the trial court told

Petitioner if he wanted counsel to represent him he needed to make the request by April 24,

2000, to give counsel time to prepare for trial.] in response, Baumer argued that at that time

he was not told he would be “chained like an animal” in front of the jury. Ignoring the trial

court’s denial of his motion for appointed counsel, Baumer refused to respond to the trial

court’s queries concerning his additional in limine motions, but instead reiterated that he

wanted counsel because he could not represent himself in chains.

Thereafter, the court advised Baumer that if an attorney was appointed to represent

him, any subsequent request for self-representation would be viewed as manipulative and

would be denied. Explaining its reasoning, the court referred to another instance of

manipulative conduct. On that occasion Baumer had requested to switch from selfrepresentation to appointed counsel when he had not obtained a favorable ruling. The court

regarded Baumer’s conduct as manipulative and designed to delay the proceedings and

pressure the court. Because it appeared Baumer would not voluntarily represent himself and

cooperate in the proceedings, the court appointed counsel to represent him. Thereafter, the

trial date was reset several times, from [July 5, 2000], to [August 2, 2000], to [August 21,

2000]. 

Baumer made repeated unsuccessful [People v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118 (1970)]

motions in July, August, and September. During pretrial hearings on [August 21, 22, and 23

2000], Baumer made several [Faretta, 422 U.S. at 806] motions to represent himself, stating

he would not seek a continuance of the trial date. The trial court denied the selfrepresentation motions. In the court’s view, Baumer was using the requests to manipulate

the court and delay the proceedings. The court pointed to his obstructive conduct during the

[May 9, 2000] hearing when he was dissatisfied with the ruling requiring restraints and had

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refused to cooperate with the proceedings. The court opined that even though he was not

currently asking for a continuance, based on past behavior the court was satisfied that if he

was allowed to represent himself he would again try to delay the proceedings and pressure

the court to give him favorable rulings.

(Lodgment No. 6 at 6-8.)

[Analysis]

[Appellate court’s discussion of case authority omitted] 

Baumer asserts that the trial court erred in denying his request for self-representation

because he made the request before the start of trial; he expressly told the court he did not

want a continuance; and the record shows he was keenly involved with preparation of his

case and thus self-representation would not have delayed the case. Even if his request is

deemed timely and thus subject to the trial court’s discretion, he asserts it was an abuse of

discretion to deny it because his request was sincere and would not have delayed the trial.

He points out the only reason he initially requested counsel was because he was being forced

to wear restraints. He claims that once he obtained counsel he found counsel’s performance

to be deficient and concluded he could better represent himself. 

We need not decide whether the Faretta request before us on appeal should be

evaluated under the timely or untimely standard. Even though Baumer did not request a

continuance when he asked to again represent himself, the record supports the trial court’s

conclusion that Baumer had acted in a manner which obstructed the orderly administration

of justice and that if his self-representation status was reinstated such behavior would likely

recur. When he was upset about the order that he wear restraints, Baumer defied the court’s

ruling that he could not revoke his self-representation status by simply refusing to cooperate

with the proceedings. He essentially forced the court to appoint counsel, which caused a

delay in the commencement of trial. At that time the court expressly advised Baumer that

if counsel was appointed he would not be able to reinstate his self-representation status

because the request would be viewed as manipulative. After counsel was appointed, Baumer

made repeated Marsden motions to relieve his counsel, and then, ignoring the court’s earlier

advisement, asked to represent himself.

Although Baumer had the right to make arguments and motions as he deemed

appropriate, he was required to abide by the court’s rulings once they were made. [See

People v. Welch, 20 Cal.4th 701, 734 (1999).] Baumer’s conduct of refusing to cooperate

with the proceedings in response to the unfavorable restraints ruling, demanding appointed

counsel instead of self-representation, and then forcing the court’s hand in this regard again

asking for self-representation status, supports a finding that he was engaging in obstructionist

tactics. By the time of Baumer’s Farettamotions, he had already been warned that if he gave

up his self-representation status any subsequent request to reinstate it would be viewed as

manipulative. The trial court had been interacting with Baumer for several months and was

aware of his propensity to engage in manipulative conduct to achieve desired results. It was

well within the reasonable exercise of the court’s discretion to conclude that if Baumer was

again allowed to represent himself he would likely repeat this conduct in the event of future

unfavorable rulings causing further delay and obstruction of trial. No error is shown by the

trial court’s denial of Baumer’s Faretta motion.

(Lodgment No. 6 at 11-12.)

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A defendant has the right to represent himself pro se or to be represented by an attorney. 

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807. In order to successfully invoke the right to self-representation, the defendant’s

waiver of counsel must be “timely, not for the purposes of delay, unequivocal, and knowing and

intelligent.” United States v. Erskine, 355 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2004) Even a timely request may be

denied if it has been made with an intent to cause delay. United States v. Kaczynski, 239 F.3d 1108,

1117-18 (9th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 810, 811 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that

a demand of self-representation is timely if made prior to jury selection or before jury is empaneled,

unless made for purpose of delay). 

 In order to determine whether a timely request was made for purpose of delay, a court must

examine the events preceding the request to determine if they are consistent with a good faith assertion

of the Faretta right and whether the defendant could reasonably be expected to have made the motion at

an earlier time. Fritz v. Spalding, 682 F.2d 782, 784-85 (9th Cir. 1982). “Delay per se is not a sufficient

ground for denying a defendant’s constitutional right of self-representation.” Id. at 784. A defendant

may not be deprived of the right to proceed pro se “absent an affirmative showing of purpose to secure

delay.” Id.

 Here, Petitioner claims he made the request because he was dissatisfied with his court-appointed

attorney and that it was not intended for purposes of delay. (Petition at 15.) He further notes that he

specifically did not ask for a continuance when he made the request. (Id.) The trial court denied the

request because it found that all the events preceding the request demonstrated that Petitioner’s true

purpose was to delay. (10 RT at 1641.) The record amply supports the trial court’s conclusion that

Petitioner offered his motion as a delaying tactic. 

After interacting with Petitioner for several months, the trial court found that Petitioner’s tactics

and techniques have repeatedly shown that his intent is to delay the trial. (Id.) The trial court noted that

although Petitioner claimed he was not requesting a continuance at the moment, all of his prior actions

made it clear that the moment Petitioner felt something was not going his way, he would create a delay

tactic such as refusing to do any work. (Id. at 1641-42.) Indeed, when the trial court had previously

denied Petitioner’s request to have counsel appointed, on the grounds that it was made on the eve of trial

in violation of a previous court order, Petitioner exhibited obstructive behavior and refused to proceed

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3

 In his Request for an Evidentiary Hearing, Petitioner also attempts to raise an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim. (Request at 4-6.) However, the Honorable Jeffrey T. Miller previously

denied Petitioner’s request to amend his petition to add this claim, agreeing with this Court’s finding that

such a claim would be procedurally barred as well as unmeritorious. [Doc. No. 25 at 10.] 

13 06cv1361

unless counsel was appointed, essentially forcing the trial court to appoint him counsel. (See 8 RT at

1157-81.) Furthermore, the trial court noted the same security measures regarding shackling, which was

the reason why Petitioner claimed could not represent himself earlier, were still in effect. (10 RT at

1641.)

In sum, the trial judge did not violate Petitioner right to self-representation because he reasonably

concluded that Petitioner’s request for self-representation was done with the purpose to secure delay. 

Accordingly, the state appellate court’s ruling on the claim was neither contrary to nor involved an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and was not based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. Therefore, this Court recommends Petitioner’s claim be DENIED. 

D. Request for Evidentiary Hearing

Finally, Petitioner filed a request for an evidentiary hearing.3 Petitioner indicated in the motion

that he wishes to present excerpts from the reporter’s transcript of a hearing the trial court held regarding

his motion to substitute counsel, in order to show that his request to represent himself was not for

purposes of delay, but because he sincerely believed his trial counsel was providing him ineffective

assistance of counsel. [Doc. No. 33 at 3-4.] 

For the reasons discussed above, the claim upon which the request for an evidentiary hearing is

based is without merit. Therefore, the Court recommends Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing

be DENIED. See Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1233 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that an evidentiary

hearing is not required on issues which can be resolved on the basis of the state court record).

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V. CONCLUSION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge Jeffrey T.

Miller under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of California. For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED

that the Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2)

directing that Judgment be entered DENYING the Petition and DENYING the Request for an

Evidentiary Hearing.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than March 14, 2008, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than 10 days after being served with the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998);

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 11, 2008

CATHY ANN BENCIVENGO

United States Magistrate Judge

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