Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00760/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00760-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ELIZABETH ZEMOLA, et al., 

Plaintiffs,

v. 

CARRINGTON TEA COMPANY, LLC, 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 17cv760-MMA (KSC) 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS IN 

SUBSTANTIAL PART; 

[Doc. No. 8] 

DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

TO STAY 

[Doc. No. 9] 

 Plaintiffs Elizabeth Zemola and Matthew Beaumont bring this putative class action 

against Defendant Carrington Tea Company, LLC, based on the allegedly misleading 

marketing and labeling of Defendant’s coconut oil products as “healthy.” See Doc. No. 

1. Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure 9(b), 12(b)(6), and 12(b)(1). See Doc. No. 8. In the alternative, Defendant 

moves to stay these proceedings on the grounds that the United States Food and Drug 

Administration (“FDA”) has announced that it is reconsidering the criteria and terms for 

an updated definition of “healthy.” See Doc. No. 9. Plaintiffs oppose both motions. See 

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Doc. Nos. 11, 12. Defendant filed reply briefs in support of the motions. See Doc. Nos. 

13, 14. The Court found the motions suitable for determination on the papers and 

without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. See Doc. No. 15. For the 

reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 

claims in substantial part and DENIES Defendant’s motion to stay these proceedings. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Elizabeth Zemola is an individual residing in the Escondido, California. 

Plaintiff Matthew Beaumont is an individual residing in San Pedro, California. 

Defendant Carrington Tea Company, LLC is a New Jersey limited liability company with 

its principal place of business at 7 Reuten Drive, Building A, Closter, New Jersey, 07624. 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant misleadingly and unlawfully markets its coconut oil 

products as inherently healthy. According to Plaintiffs, they relied upon Defendant’s 

misleading marketing and labeling to purchase the products, and suffered damages as a 

result. 

Plaintiffs assert that because of its high saturated fat content, the consumption of 

coconut oil increases the risk of cardiovascular heart disease and other morbidity. See 

Doc. No. 1, Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 33-43. Plaintiffs rely on scientific claims that 

saturated fat consumption increases the risk of cardiovascular heart disease and other 

morbidity; that high total low density proteins (LDL) are associated with increased risk of 

morbidity, including coronary heart disease (CHD) and stroke; and that saturated fat 

consumption causes increased total and LDL blood cholesterol levels, which increase the 

risk of CHD and stroke. Id. ¶¶ 10-32. Plaintiffs cite to studies conducted by the United 

States Departments of Agriculture and Health and Human Services, and other journals for 

support. 

As relevant here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant has manufactured, distributed, 

marketed, and sold coconut oil products since 2012. Id. ¶ 44. Plaintiffs provide 

numerous examples of the products sold by Defendant, complete with product 

descriptions and images of the product containers. Id. ¶¶ 49-55. Plaintiffs then highlight 

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the nutritional composition of these products, noting that, “[e]ach [one] tablespoon . . . 

serving of [Carrington’s] coconut oil . . . contains 130 calories, all of which come from 

fat . . . .” Id. ¶ 53. 

Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant markets its coconut oil products with 

misleading health and wellness claims. Id. ¶¶ 57-64. Plaintiffs claim that consumers are 

generally willing to pay more for foods they perceive as being healthy or healthier than 

other alternatives. Id. ¶ 54. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant is aware of this customer 

behavior, and has employed a strategic marketing campaign intended to convince 

consumers that its products are healthy, despite that they are almost entirely composed of 

unhealthy saturated fat. Id. ¶ 55. Plaintiffs contend that Defendant markets its products 

as healthy, and its labeling claims are designed to conceal or distract consumers from 

noticing its high fat content. Id. ¶ 56. For example, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant’s 

extra virgin coconut oil is actually unhealthy due to its high saturated fat content. Id. ¶ 

60. Plaintiffs raise similar claims regarding Defendant’s coconut cooking oil and the 

statements taken from Defendant’s website, where the products may be purchased. Id. ¶¶ 

64-77. Plaintiffs assert that totality of the labeling conveys a concrete message to a 

reasonable consumer that Defendant’s coconut oil is healthy and a healthier alternative to 

other cooking oils. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant intended consumers to rely on this 

message, which is false and misleading. Id. ¶¶ 64, 72. 

Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs bring causes of action against Defendant for 

violations of California’s consumer protection laws, including the Consumer Legal 

Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750 et seq. (“CLRA”), Unfair Competition Law, Cal. 

Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq. (“UCL”), and False Advertising Law, id. §§ 17500 et 

seq. (“FAL”). Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant breached express and implied 

warranties under California law. 

On September 27, 2016, the United States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) 

announced that it had initiated a public process to redefine the “healthy” nutrient content 

claim for food labeling as “part of an overall plan to provide consumers with information 

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and tools to enable them to easily and quickly make food choices consistent with public 

health recommendations and to encourage the development of healthier foods by the 

industry.” FDA Constituent Update, available at

https://www.fda.gov/Food/NewsEvents/ConstituentUpdates/ucm520703.htm (last visited 

10/17/2017). 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

 Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of documents extrinsic to 

Plaintiff’s complaint. Specifically, Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice 

of three articles published in academic journals regarding the health benefits of coconut 

oil. See Doc. No. 8-2, Def. RJN, Exs. 1-3. Plaintiffs oppose Defendant’s request. See 

Doc. No. 11-1. 

A court may take judicial notice of documents attached to or incorporated by 

reference into a complaint, as well as matters in the public record, without converting a 

motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 

688-89 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa 

Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2002). In addition, the Court may take judicial 

notice of facts that are either “generally known within the trial court’s territorial 

jurisdiction” or “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy 

cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 

 Defendant “does not request the Court to take judicial notice of the truth of the 

contents of these studies, only that such studies exist and contain conclusions that 

contradict Plaintiffs’ allegations.” Id. at 3.1

 Nonetheless, judicial notice is only 

appropriate if, among other things, “the document’s authenticity is not in question and 

there are no disputed issues as to the document’s relevance.” Coto Settlement v. 

Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010). Regardless, the Court need not 

                                               

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determine if judicial notice is appropriate in this case. The Court did not rely on the 

proffered documents in ruling on the instant motions. As such, the Court denies 

Defendant’s request for judicial notice as moot. 

MOTION TO DISMISS

 Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims based on lack of standing, failure to 

plead fraud with the requisite particularity, and general implausibility under the standards 

set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

1. Legal Standard 

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro 

v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A pleading must contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(2). However, plaintiffs must also plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

570 (2007). The plausibility standard thus demands more than a formulaic recitation of 

the elements of a cause of action, or naked assertions devoid of further factual 

enhancement. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Instead, the complaint “must 

contain allegations of underlying facts sufficient to give fair notice and to enable the 

opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 

2011). 

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must assume the truth 

of all factual allegations and must construe them in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The court need not take legal conclusions as true merely because they are cast in the form 

of factual allegations. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Similarly, “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to 

defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). 

In determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, courts generally may not 

look beyond the complaint for additional facts. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 

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908 (9th Cir. 2003). “A court may, however, consider certain materials—documents 

attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or 

matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for 

summary judgment.” Id.; see also Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 

2001). “However, [courts] are not required to accept as true conclusory allegations 

which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint.” Steckman v. Hart 

Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295–96 (9th Cir. 1998). Where dismissal is appropriate, a 

court should grant leave to amend unless the plaintiff could not possibly cure the defects 

in the pleading. Knappenberger v. City of Phoenix, 566 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2009). 

While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations to avoid dismissal 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), if a plaintiff’s claims are “‘grounded in 

fraud,’. . . Rule 9(b) applies to the whole of the complaint.” Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. 

USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1108 (9th Cir. 2003); In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer 

Data Sec. Breach Litig., 903 F. Supp. 2d 942, 967 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (“Rule 9(b)’s 

heightened pleading standards apply equally to claims for violation of the UCL, FAL, or 

CLRA that are grounded in fraud.”). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), 

“[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances 

constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). A sufficiently particular allegation 

of fraud must include the “who, what, when, where and how” of the circumstances giving 

rise to the claim. Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 627 (9th Cir. 1997). The purpose of 

this heightened pleading requirement is to ensure that defendants accused of fraudulent 

conduct have adequate notice of the allegations so that they might defend against them. 

Von Grabe v. Sprint PCS, 312 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1305 (S.D. Cal. 2003). 

2. Analysis 

a) Standing 

As an initial matter, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs lack standing to assert claims 

related to products they did not purchase, as they cannot establish any injury with respect 

to those products. Plaintiffs’ claims relate to Defendant’s Extra Virgin Coconut Oil and 

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the Coconut Cooking Oil products, however Plaintiffs purchased only the Extra Virgin 

Coconut Oil. 

In California, “[t]he majority of the courts that have carefully analyzed the 

question hold that a plaintiff may have standing to assert claims for unnamed class 

members based on products he or she did not purchase so long as the products and 

alleged misrepresentations are substantially similar.” Cortina v. Goya Foods, Inc., No. 

14-CV-169-L NLS, 2015 WL 1411336, at *18 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2015) (quoting Miller 

v. Ghirardelli Chocolate Co., 912 F. Supp. 2d 861, 869 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (noting where 

composition of the product is less important, “cases turn on whether the alleged 

misrepresentations are sufficiently similar across product lines”)). Here, Plaintiffs have 

standing because the composition of the products and the alleged misrepresentations are 

sufficiently similar.2

 The products’ primary ingredient is coconut oil. The nutrition facts 

are nearly identical. And the alleged misrepresentations on each product include some 

variation on the “healthy” theme. 

In addition, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs lack standing to sue for injunctive 

relief because they fail to allege that they would purchase the coconut oil products in the 

future. Resolving a split among district courts applying California’s consumer 

protections laws, the Ninth Circuit recently addressed this issue in Davidson v. KimberlyClark Corp., holding as follows: 

[A] previously deceived consumer may have standing to seek an injunction 

against false advertising or labeling, even though the consumer now knows or 

suspects that the advertising was false at the time of the original purchase, 

                                               

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 Defendant also asserts that Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue any claims based on representations made 

on Defendant’s website regarding the products at issue, because Plaintiffs fail to allege reliance upon 

those representations. The Court agrees that to the extent Plaintiffs’ claims arise from representations 

made on Defendant’s website, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged actual reliance for the purpose of 

standing. See Branca v. Nordstrom, Inc., No. 14cv2062-MMA (JMA), 2015 WL 1841231, at *4 (S.D. 

Cal. March 20, 2015) (finding that plaintiff lacked standing to pursue consumer protections claims based 

on website representations upon which plaintiff did not actually rely). However, as discussed supra,

Plaintiffs’ purchase of the coconut oil product, and the similarity of the two products at issue, provides 

them with standing to bring their claims. 

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because the consumer may suffer an “actual and imminent, not conjectural or 

hypothetical” threat of future harm. Summers, 555 U.S. at 493. Knowledge 

that the advertisement or label was false in the past does not equate to 

knowledge that it will remain false in the future. In some cases, the threat of 

future harm may be the consumer’s plausible allegations that she will be 

unable to rely on the product’s advertising or labeling in the future, and so 

will not purchase the product although she would like to. 

Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., No. 15-16173, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 20670, at *24-

25 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 2017). 

 In Davidson, the Ninth Circuit relied on the plaintiff’s particular allegation “that 

she desires to purchase Kimberly-Clark’s flushable wipes,” “based on her belief that ‘it 

would be easier and more sanitary to flush the wipes than to dispose of them in the 

garbage.’” Davidson, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 20670, at *28. Thus, the plaintiff 

specifically alleged a present desire to purchase the product at issue. In this case, 

Plaintiffs allege that “[a]t the time of purchase, plaintiffs were unaware that consuming 

coconut oil, such as Carrington’s, adversely affects blood cholesterol levels and increases 

risk of CHD, stroke, and other morbidity.” Compl. ¶ 117. In support of their request for 

injunctive relief, Plaintiffs claim that they “are likely to continue to be damaged by 

Carrington’s deceptive trade practices, because Carrington continues to disseminate 

misleading information.” Id. ¶ 146. However, Plaintiffs do not allege that they desire to

purchase the coconut oil products in the future, and claim that “[b]y consuming 

Carrington Farms Extra Virgin Coconut Oil, plaintiffs and other members of the class 

experienced detrimental effects to their blood cholesterol levels and suffered impaired 

arterial endothelial function.” Id. ¶ 116. As such, the Court finds that even under the 

newly clarified standards set forth in Davidson, Plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to 

confer standing to seek prospective injunctive relief. 

/// 

/// 

/// 

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b) Sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ Claims 

Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff consumer protections claims as 

insufficiently pleaded under Rules 12(b)(6) and (9)(b).3

 Defendant argues that Plaintiffs 

fail to plausibly allege that a reasonable consumer is likely to be deceived by 

representations made on Defendant’s coconut oil products. Defendant points out that the 

label contains accurate nutrition facts, which clearly indicate that the products are made 

up of 100% fat. Defendant further contends that Plaintiffs fail to adequately plead that 

their reliance on the alleged misrepresentations caused them to purchase the coconut oil 

product, and Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding technical violations of applicable FDA 

regulations cannot support Plaintiffs’ claims. Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs fail to 

plausibly allege that the representations on the coconut oil products are in fact false. For 

all these reasons, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ consumer protection claims are subject 

to dismissal. 

 Plaintiffs’ consumer protections claims are sufficiently pleaded under Rules 

12(b)(6) and 9(b). In order to state a claim under the relevant consumer protection laws, 

a plaintiff must plead that “members of the public are likely to be deceived” by a 

defendant’s representations. See Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th 

Cir. 2008). Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that “the totality of the labeling” on Defendant’s 

coconut oil products “conveys the concrete message to a reasonable consumer” that the 

products are “healthy, and a more healthful alternative to canola, soybean, vegetable, 

olive oil, and butter. Carrington intended consumers to rely upon this message, which is 

false and misleading for the reasons stated herein.” Compl. ¶ 72. Plaintiffs extensively 

allege that Defendant’s representations are misleading and/or false, point to specific 

representations, state why they believe the representations are misleading and false, and 

                                               

3

 California’s UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, 

deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code. § 17200. The FAL prohibits any 

“unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising,” id. § 17500, and the CLRA prohibits “unfair 

methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1770. 

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claim they relied upon those representations when choosing to purchase the product. See, 

e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 55, 56, 58-62, 66-70, 111, 112. Defendant may disagree with Plaintiffs’ 

allegations as a factual matter, but at this juncture, the Court must accept those 

allegations as true. 

Likewise, Plaintiffs sufficiently plead that Defendant has engaged in unfair and 

unlawful business practices. “The UCL prohibits unfair competition, which it broadly 

defines as including ‘any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and 

unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.’ Each prong of the UCL is a separate 

and distinct theory of liability.” Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (citing Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200). “Whether a practice is deceptive, 

fraudulent, or unfair is generally a question of fact” and unsuited for dismissal at the 

pleading stage. Williams, 552 F.3d at 939 (citing Linear Technology Corp. v. Applied 

Materials, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 221, 237 (2007)). Plaintiffs’ allegations, as discussed 

above, satisfy the “unfair” prong, while the allegations concerning Defendant’s purported 

mislabeling and technical violations of FDA regulations are sufficient to satisfy the 

“unlawful” prong of the UCL. 

 Plaintiffs have also brought plausible warranty claims against Defendant based on 

the representations made by Defendant on its coconut oil products. “In order to plead a 

cause of action for breach of express warranty, one must allege the exact terms of the 

warranty, plaintiff’s reasonable reliance thereon, and a breach of that warranty which 

proximately causes plaintiff injury.” Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp., 185 Cal. 

App. 3d 135, 142 (1986); see also Cal. Comm. Code § 2313(1)(a). The implied warranty 

of merchantability is violated if a product does not “[c]onform to the promises or 

affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any.” Cal. Com. Code § 2314(2); 

see Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 3d 104, 118 (1975) (citing Cal. Com. Code § 2314(2)(c), 

(f)). As noted above, Plaintiffs plausibly allege reliance and causation with respect to 

Defendant’s representations regarding the healthfulness of the coconut oil products. 

Plaintiffs also more specifically allege that Defendant “made affirmations of fact or 

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promises, or description of goods, that, inter alia, the product is “healthy,” and “breached 

its express warranties by selling a product that is not healthy, not healthier than butter or 

other oils, and that negatively affects cholesterol levels, increasing risk of CHD, stroke, 

and other morbidity.” Compl. ¶¶ 170-71. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant 

“breached [the] implied warranty in that Carrington Farms Coconut Oil Products are not 

healthy, not healthier than butter or other oils, and negatively affect cholesterol levels, 

increasing risk of CHD and stroke, as set forth in detail herein.” Id. ¶ 177. These 

allegations are sufficient to state plausible warranty claims under California law. 

Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs fail to allege any injury, and “Plaintiffs 

have not alleged—and cannot formulate—an appropriate or plausible method of 

calculating damages under their causes of action, their claims should be dismissed.” Doc. 

No. 8-1 at 20. However, federal pleading standards do not require Plaintiffs to set forth a 

specific methodology for calculating damages. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(3) (“A pleading 

that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a demand for the relief sought, which may 

include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.”). Furthermore, “[u]nder 

California law, the economic injury of paying a premium for a falsely advertised product 

is sufficient harm to maintain a cause of action.” Davidson, supra, 2017 U.S. App. 

LEXIS 20670, at *16-17. Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he Carrington Farms Coconut Oil 

Products cost more than similar products without misleading labeling, and would have 

cost less absent the false and misleading statements;” “Plaintiffs paid more for the 

Carrington Farms Extra Virgin Coconut Oil, and would only have been willing to pay 

less, or unwilling to purchase it at all, absent the false and misleading labeling statements 

complained of herein; “Carrington Farms Extra Virgin Coconut Oil was worth less than 

what plaintiffs paid for it;” and “Plaintiffs lost money as a result of Carrington’s 

deceptive claims and practices in that they did not receive what they paid for when 

purchasing Carrington Farms Extra Virgin Coconut Oil.” See Compl. ¶¶ 120-22, 124. 

Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded that they suffered an 

injury and resulting damages based on the purchase of Defendant’s product. 

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3. Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss 

in substantial part. However, the Court finds that Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently allege 

standing to seek prospective injunctive relief. Plaintiffs may file an amended complaint 

that cures this deficiency on or before November 9, 2017. See Eminence Capital LLC v. 

Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that “leave shall be freely 

given when justice so requires.”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15). 

MOTION TO STAY

As an alternative to dismissal, Defendant moves to stay this action under the 

primary jurisdiction doctrine pending the FDA’s reconsideration of the definition of the 

term “healthy” in the labeling of food products. 

1. Legal Standard 

Under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, district courts may stay proceedings 

“pending the resolution of an issue within the special competence of an administrative 

agency.” Clark v. Time Warner Cable, 523 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2008). This 

doctrine applies if four factors are met: “(1) [a] need to resolve an issue that (2) has been 

placed by Congress within the jurisdiction of an administrative body having regulatory 

authority (3) pursuant to a statute that subjects an industry or activity to a comprehensive 

regulatory authority that (4) requires expertise or uniformity in administration.” Id. at 

1115. The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that this doctrine applies “in a limited set of 

circumstances” and is to be used sparingly. Id. at 1114. “Primary jurisdiction is not a 

doctrine that implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. Rather, it is a 

prudential doctrine under which courts may, under appropriate circumstances, determine 

that the initial decisionmaking responsibility should be performed by the relevant agency 

rather than the courts.” Syntek Semiconductor Co. v. Microchip Tech. Inc., 307 F.3d 775, 

780 (9th Cir. 2002). 

2. Analysis 

Defendant argues that the FDA’s reconsideration of the definition of the term 

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“healthy” in the labeling of food products “will provide guidance, if not clear disposition, 

of the issues raised by Plaintiffs’ Complaint.” Doc. No. 9 at 1. Defendant relies for 

support upon two recent Ninth Circuit rulings, Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 783 

F.3d (9th Cir. 2015), and Kane v. Chobani, LLC, 645 F. App’x 593 (9th Cir. 2016).4

 In 

both of these deceptive labeling cases, the circuit court remanded with instructions to the 

district court to stay the proceedings based on the primary jurisdiction doctrine, pending 

the outcome of further FDA studies and regulations. Plaintiffs argue that unlike Astiana 

and Kane, the FDA proceedings regarding reconsideration of how to define the term 

“healthy” are insufficient to grant a stay of these proceedings. The Court agrees, and 

finds the Astiana and Kane cases distinguishable from the case at bar. 

The plaintiffs in Astiana brought a putative nationwide class action against a 

cosmetic products manufacturer alleging that the manufacturer’s use of the word 

“natural” on its products was false and misleading because its products contained 

synthetic and artificial ingredients. After invoking the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the 

district court dismissed the action. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit determined that while the 

district court erred in dismissing the action, it properly invoked primary jurisdiction and 

should have stayed the proceedings. Astiana, supra, 783 F.3d 753. In concluding that a 

stay was appropriate upon remand, the circuit court reasoned that “determining what 

chemical compounds may be advertised as natural on cosmetic product labels” was a 

“particularly complicated issue that Congress has committed to the FDA.” Id. at 761 

(internal quotations omitted).

In Kane, supra, buyers of fruit-flavored Greek yogurt brought a putative class 

action against the manufacturer, alleging that labels and advertising violated California’s 

consumer remedies laws. After analyzing the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, the district 

court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, 

                                               

4

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3, unpublished 

dispositions are not precedential, but may be cited to if issued after January 1, 2007. 

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and remanded with instructions for the district court to stay the action pending 

delineation by the FDA of the scope and permissible usage of the terms “natural” and 

“evaporated cane juice” in connection with food products based on “technical and policy 

questions that should be addressed in the first instance by the agency with regulatory 

authority over the relevant industry rather than by the judicial branch.” Kane, 645 F. 

App’x at 594 (citing Astiana, 783 F.3d at 760 (quoting Clark, 523 F.3d at 1114)). 

 Here, unlike in the Astiana case, the FDA is not considering an issue of first 

impression. The FDA has current and enforceable regulations governing the use of the 

term “healthy” and related terms. The terms may continue to be used by food 

manufacturers provided they meet other nutritional guidelines. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. 

101.65(d)(2) (setting forth the requisite nutrient requirements in particular foods in order 

to label a food “healthy” or some related term). While the FDA is considering whether to 

redefine the term “healthy” as a nutrient content claim, food manufacturers will continue 

to use the term “healthy” on foods that meet the current regulatory definition. 

Furthermore, the FDA has published guidance on the use of the term “healthy” in food 

labeling, and announced that it would continue to enforce existing regulations. See “Use 

of the Term “Healthy” in the Labeling of Human Food Products: Guidance for Industry,” 

available at https://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocuments 

RegulatoryInformation/ucm521690.htm (last visited 10/17/2017). In the interim, it is not 

beyond the competency of this Court to adjudicate Plaintiffs’ mislabeling claims as to the 

products at issue. 

Additionally, the Court notes that it “must also consider whether invoking primary 

jurisdiction would needlessly delay the resolution of claims. The primary jurisdiction 

doctrine is rooted in part in judicial efficiency.” Reid v. Johnson & Johnson, 780 F.3d 

952, 967–68 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 686 F.3d 832, 838 

(D.C. Cir. 2012). Under NinthCircuit precedent, “efficiency” is the “deciding factor” in 

whether to invoke primary jurisdiction. Rhoades v. Avon Prods., Inc., 504 F.3d 1151, 

1165 (9th Cir. 2007). The relevant FDA proceedings are nascent and unlikely to be 

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finalized within a reasonable time. See, e.g., Krommenhock v. Post Foods, LLC, No. 16-

cv-04958-WHO, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84359, at *62-63 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2017) 

(declining to invoke primary jurisdiction in a “high sugar cereal” deceptive labeling case 

on the grounds that “the FDA has very recently opened the discussion over whether and 

how to revise a specific nutrient claim guideline for ‘healthy’ claims,” and noting that 

“[t]here is no evidence that final action (or any further clarification as to the scope of the 

FDA’s review of the regulation at issue) is imminent.”). The FDA has not published an 

expected study completion date, nor has it committed to making any changes to the 

respective regulation. 

Finally, Defendant notes in its contemporaneously filed motion to dismiss that 

“Plaintiffs’ same counsel herein has effectively declared war on coconut oil, asserting 

nearly identical allegations and claims against coconut oil manufacturers in at least seven 

other cases.” Doc. No. 8-1 at 1, n.1 (citing, inter alia, Jones v. Nutiva, Inc., Case No. 

3:16-cv-00711 (N.D. Cal.); Boswell v. Costco Wholesale Corp., Case No. 8:16-cv-00278 

(C.D. Cal.); Hunter v. Nature’s Way Products, LLC, Case No. 3:16-cv-00532 (S.D. Cal.); 

Boulton v. Carrington Tea Company, LLC, Case No. 2:16-cv-01740 (C.D. Cal.); Tracton 

v. Viva Labs, Inc., Case No. 3:16-cv-02772-BTM (S.D. Cal.). These cases are being 

actively litigated in federal court, and have not been stayed pending the FDA’s 

reconsideration of the term “healthy.” The Court finds that the instant case should 

likewise proceed. 

3. Conclusion

 Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to stay these 

proceedings pending the FDA’s reconsideration of the definition of the term “healthy” in 

the labeling of food products. 

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CONCLUSION

 In sum, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss in substantial part. 

Plaintiffs may file an amended complaint that cures the deficiency with respect to the 

prayer for prospective injunctive relief on or before November 9, 2017. Additionally, 

the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to stay these proceedings. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE: October 27, 2017 ________________________________________ 

 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 

 United States District Judge 

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