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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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P U B L I S H 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

VAN BERING ROBINSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FILED 

United Srates Court of Appeab 

·ren~b C!~~"'iJi: 

JAN 1 9 19~1) 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. No. 86-1148 

JOHN MARUFFI, JOSEPH POLISAR, 

CLARENCE KRAEMER and ELOY WHITEY 

HANSEN, Chief of Police, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. No. 84-1216) 

Wayne C. Wolf, Civerolo, Hansen & Wolf, P.A., Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, (Anthony J. D. Contri, Civerolo, Hansen & Wolfe, P.A., 

Albuquerque, New Mexico was also on the brief) for DefendantsAppellants 

David L. Plotsky, Toulouse, Toulouse & Garcia, P.A., Albuquerque, 

New Mexico, (James R. Toulouse, Toulouse, Toulouse & Garcia, 

P.A., Albuquerque, New Mexico was also on the brief) for 

Plaintiff-Appellees 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, McWILLIAMS and LOGAN, Circuit Judges 

HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge 

Appellate Case: 86-1148 Document: 01019297287 Date Filed: 01/19/1990 Page: 1 
This appeal arises out of a civil rights action brought under 

42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986 by Van Bering Robinson against 

three Albuquerque police officers, John Maruffi, Joseph Polisar 

~nd Klarence Kraemer, the Chief of Police, Eloy "Whitney'' Hanson, 

and the City of Albuquerque for deprivation of his constitutional 

rights. Robinson alleged that the individual defendants caused 

the bringing of criminal charges against certain prosecution witnesses, which would then be dismissed for their false testimony 

before the grand jury and at the trial implicating Robinson in the 

murder of an Albuquerque police officer, Phil Chacon. Robinson 

alleged that the defendants knowingly permitted the false testimony to be used for the sole purpose of having him prosecuted, 

convicted and punished for Chacon's murder. 

The defendants answered, denying that they participated in 

the conduct alleged by Robinson. The defendants also raised 

various affirmative defenses, including the statute of limitations. After a twelve day trial, the jury returned a verdict for 

Robinson in the amount of $75,000 against all individual 

defendants, finding that they deprived Robinson of his 

Constitutional rights. The jury found that the City did not 

deprive Robinson of his Constitutional rights. 

The individual defendants appealed, raising these issues: 

(1) Robinson's claims were barred by the statute of limitations; 

(2) Robinson was collaterally estopped from pursuing this civil 

rights action; 1 (3) Robinson failed to prove the necessary causal 

1 

Defendants assert this defense for the first time in their 

appellate briefs. Because they did not raise this affirmative 

defense before the trial court, defendants waived their right to 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

2 

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link between the individual defendants' alleged conduct and his 

alleged injuries; (4) it was prejudical error for the trial court 

not to instruct the jury ·On entrapment; (5) several jury 

instructions were erroneous, and taken as a whole, highly 

prejudicial; (6) the court erred by allowing Robinson's counsel to 

call witnesses for direct examination and not allowing defendants' 

counsel immediate cross-examination; and (7) the court's award of 

attorneys' fees to plaintiff Robinson was in error. We affirm. 

I. 

BACKGROUND 

There was evidence tending to show these facts, considering 

the record in the light most favorable to the jury verdict as we 

must, Rock v. McCoy, 763 F.2d 394, 396 (lOth Cir. 1985): 

During the early evening hours on September 10, 1980, a 

Kinney's shoe store in Albuquerque was robbed by a masked black 

male carrying a pistol. The robbery was witnessed by some 

children who ran into the Albuquerque Woman's Center across the 

street and told some people of the robbery, including Officer 

Chacon. Officer Chacon left the Center and rode his motorcycle 

across the street where he was told by a Kenny's shoe store 

employee the direction in which the robber headed. Officer Chacon 

pursued the robber's vehicle in that direction. Shortly 

thereafter two shots were heard and Officer Chacon was found lying 

(Footnote continued): 

have us review this issue on appeal under the general rule. See 

Horowitz v. Bd. of Med. Examiners of State of Colo., 822 F.2d 

1508, 1512 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, u.s. , 108 S.Ct. 453 

(1987); Schamm v. Oakes, 35~2d 143, 15o-(10th Cir. 1965); Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 8(c). 

3 

Appellate Case: 86-1148 Document: 01019297287 Date Filed: 01/19/1990 Page: 3 
underneath his motorcycle, struck by both shots. He died from the 

wounds. 

On September 12, 1980, Robinson and his friend, Reginald 

Walker, were arrested for the murder of Officer Chacon on a 

Crimestopper's tip. The grand jury returned a no-bill and refused 

to indict Robinson for Chacon's murder, the armed robbery and 

conspiracy charges of the shoe store. Nearly six months later, 

Robinson was again subject to a grand jury investigation. This 

time, with confession testimony of Walker, Robinson was indicted 

for the armed robbery of the Kinney's shoe store and the murder of 

Officer Chacon. 

As part of the background to that indictment of Robinson, 

Maruffi had been assigned in early January 1981 to investigate the 

Chacon murder. Within a few days, Maruffi prepared and sent a 

memorandum to Chief Hansen, outlining the proposed investigation 

and requesting the assistance of defendants Kraemer and Polisar. 

This memorandum stated that a daily surveillance would take place 

at Walker's residence which "should successfully result in the 

apprehension of Walker for an in-progress felony crime. The 

probability of Walker's willingness to cooperate in the [Chacon] 

homicide investigation would increase considerably if the inprogress arrest was for a violent crime (robbery) rather than a 

property crime (burglary)." Addendum to Appellee's Brief, No. 

252. 2 

2 

Maruffi believed at the time he wrote the memorandum that 

The memorandum also stated that: 

ARREST AND INTERVIEW 

At the time of his [Walker's] arrest for the in-

(Footnote continued on next page) 

4 

Appellate Case: 86-1148 Document: 01019297287 Date Filed: 01/19/1990 Page: 4 
both Robinson and Walker were involved in the armed robbery and 

murder of Officer Chacon. 

Shortly after the memorandum was written, surveillance began 

at Walker's and Robinson's shared residence. On January 15, 1981, 

Robinson met Gene Green, a convicted felon who had been spending 

time in jail until he became employed by Maruffi as an informant. 

Green moved next door to Robinson and began to spend time with 

him. During their acquaintanceship, both Robinson and Green 

(Footnote continued}: 

progress crime, Walker would be thoroughly 

interviewed after being advised of his 

Constitutional rights and having waved [sic] his 

right to counsel. The interview would take place 

prior to any formal arrest (booking charges). The 

justification for the interview would stem from 

Walker's willingness to cooperate as he has so 

often demonstrated in the past. During previous 

investigations conducted by writer [Maruffi], 

Reginald Walker was frequently willing to cooperate 

after being taken into custody for property crime 

violations. Writer successfully used Walker as an 

informant on more than one occasion and found him 

easy to talk with during interviews conducted 

subsequent to his arrests. 

Written Statement 

Writer would evaluate Walker's potential as a 

State's witness after establishing his involvement 

in the homicide. A written statement would be 

obtained detailing the facts surrounding the 

homicide. The statement would contain any and all 

admissions and accusations made at this time. In 

addition, all new information that Walker provides 

would be investigated and the findings would be 

forwarded to the District Attorney's Office to be 

used as new evidence for prosecution. 

DESIRED RESULTS 

Through information supplied by Walker and 

through his subsequent testimony a prosecutable 

case would be obtained against the offender 

involved in the killing of Officer Phil Chacon. 

Id. (emphasis in original). 

5 

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committed various property crimes and an attempted armed robbery 

of a Jack-in-the-Box restaurant located across the street from the 

scene of Chacon's murder. Robinson was arrested on these charges 

by defendants Maruffi and Polisar. 3 

On January 17 Walker's landlady, Sue Goett, was robbed 

outside Robinson's and Walker's apartment. Both Robinson and 

Walker were under surveillance during the time Ms. Goett was 

robbed. Neither the six police officers conducting the 

surveillance, nor any other individual, saw Robinson or Walker 

commit the robbery. Ms. Goett gave a statement to Maruffi in 

which she stated that less than a minute after she had been 

robbed, Walker came running up to her and gave chase in the 

direction that the robber fled. Ms. Goett did not identify Walker 

as the assailant. However, Maruffi had obtained a statement from 

Green two days earlier in which Green stated Walker bragged about 

committing the robbery. With Green's statement, Maruffi prepared 

an affidavit and obtained an arrest warrant for Walker. On 

February 20 Walker was arrested for the Goett robbery. Later that 

month Walker was indicted for the Goett robbery. 

In early March 1981, facing the possibility of going to jail 

for the Goett robbery, Walker gave statements to Maruffi and 

Polisar incriminating Robinson and himself in the Kinney shoe 

store robbery and Officer Chacon's murder. He also stated that 

the car of Barry Foster, Robinson's foster brother, was used in 

the armed robbery and murder. Walker described how Foster 

3 

Robinson was convicted of these crimes in state court. See 

State v. Robinson, 662 P.2d 1341 (N.M. 1983), cert. denied, 464 

u.s. 851 (1983). 

6 

Appellate Case: 86-1148 Document: 01019297287 Date Filed: 01/19/1990 Page: 6 
threatened him by telling him that anyone who talked about the 

case would be killed. In exchange for Walker's testimony against 

Robinson for the armed robbery and murder, Walker would plead 

guilty to charges pending against him and receive five years' 

unsupervised probation. Walker was also provided with some money 

and relocated in Tucson. 

Shortly after Walker gave his statement that Foster had 

intimidated him, Foster's car was impounded by the defendants 

although it did not match the description of the get-away car 

given by the witnesses at the scene. On March 12, 1981, Foster 

was indicted for intimidating a witness due to Walker's testimony 

to the grand jury. On March 15 Foster was called to pick up his 

car by the Albuquerque Police Department. Not knowing of the 

indictment, Foster attempted to retrieve his car and was arrested. 

Foster was searched and a small vial of cocaine was allegedly 

found in his pocket. 4 Because Foster had been on probation, a 

preliminary parole revocation hearing was held on April 2 0 At 

this hearing, Foster denied that he was in possession of cocaine 

at the time he went to claim his car. The hearing officer 

recommended that Foster be continued on parole supervision until 

his charge was adjudicated. If Foster's parole was revoked, he 

could have been sentenced to jail for a period up to twenty years. 

Sometime between April 3 and April 5, 1981, Foster called an 

4 

At Robinson's first trial, Foster testified that the cocaine 

was his. During Robinson's second trial, Foster testifed that the 

cocaine vial had been planted on him. 

7 

Appellate Case: 86-1148 Document: 01019297287 Date Filed: 01/19/1990 Page: 7 
investigator for the District Attorney's office. 5 Foster told 

Investigator Pierengelli during this conversation that his car was 

not involved in the Chacon murder and he would do or say anything 

to avoid going to the penitentiary. On April 6, Foster gave a 

statement to Maruffi and Polisar which implicated Robinson in 

Officer Chacon's murder. On April 7 Foster was released on his 

own recognizance; although his cash bond had previously been set 

at $250,000. Following Foster's indication of his willingness to 

give a statement implicating Robinson, charges were dropped and 

his parole continued. 

At Robinson's first criminal trial in May and June, 1981, 

Walker broke his agreement with Maruffi and testified that his 

grand jury testimony about his and Robinson's involvement in the 

Kinney's shoe store armed robbery and Officer Chacon's murder was 

false and that Maruffi forced him to memorize his story. 6 

Walker's initial plea agreement was withdrawn, the charges 

implicating Walker in the Goett and Kinney robberies were 

dismissed, and Walker pled guilty to perjury for which he served 

an eighteen month sentence. 

At the conclusion of this first criminal trial of Robinson 

which occurred in May and June 1981, Robinson nevertheless was 

found guilty of Officer Chacon's murder and the Kenny's shoe store 

5 

This conversation between Foster and Investigator Pierengelli 

was taped, but for reasons not explained in the record, the tape 

was not made available to Robinson's counsel until just prior to 

Robinson's second murder trial. 

6 

Although it is not clear whether Walker testifed at 

Robinson's 1981 criminal trial that his grand jury testimony 

regarding his alleged intimidation by Foster was fabricated, 

Walker did testify to that effect in the civil trial below. 

8 

Appellate Case: 86-1148 Document: 01019297287 Date Filed: 01/19/1990 Page: 8 
armed robbery, as well as the additional 

committed during the surveillance period. He 

property crimes he 

was sentenced to 

life imprisonment for the murder and armed robbery convictions and 

an additional eight years for the remaining counts. The eight 

year sentence was to run consecutively to the life sentence. 

Robinson appealed these convictions to the New Mexico Supreme 

Court. The Court reversed the murder, armed robbery and 

conspiracy convictions due to the prosecutor's improper 

examination and impeachment of an eyewitness. State v. Robinson, 

662 P.2d 1341 (N.M. 1983), cert. denied, 464 u.s. 851 (1983). 

Robinson's second criminal trial was held in October 1983. This 

time, the false case, including Walker's perjured testimony, was 

presented again against Robinson, but with Robinson's counsel's 

ability to expose evidence of perjured testimony being used 

against Robinson by the State, Robinson was acquitted of the 

murder and armed robbery charges. This civil rights suit, 

commenced August 17, 1984, followed his acquittal. 

II. 

A. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 

Defendants argue that all of Robinson's causes of action are 

barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The parties do 

not dispute the applicability of New Mexico's three-year 

limitations period for this civil rights action, see Wilson v. 

Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985) (§ 1983 actions best 

characterized as personal injury actions and subject to New Mexico 

three-year limitation); aff'g Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640 (lOth 

Cir. 1984); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-l-8 (1978). Defendants say that 

as to the conspiracy claim, each overt act occurred outside the 

9 

Appellate Case: 86-1148 Document: 01019297287 Date Filed: 01/19/1990 Page: 9 
three-year limitations period and that all the other claims for 

false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution 

occurred more than three years before this civil rights suit was 

commenced in August 1984. Thus the claims are all time-barred. 

In rejecting the limitations arguments, the trial court held 

that the defendants' "wrongful acts [were] a single continuing 

violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights tied together by a 

plan to "get" Van Robinson at all costs." I. R., Memorandum 

Opinion & Order, ("Order") dated 1-13-86, p. 3. In instructing 

the jury, the trial court stated that the alleged conspiracy was 

for deprivation of Robinson's liberty interest without due process 

of law under the fourteenth amendment, and the right to a fair 

trial under the sixth amendment. I. R., Jury Instruction No. 3, 7 

7 

Jury Instruction No. 3 reads in part: 

The plaintiff seeks damages from the defendants, 

Maruffi, Polisar and Kraemer on a claim that they 

deprived him of liberty without due process of law by 

procuring perjured testimony against him, concealing and 

fabricating critical evidence, by arresting, imprisoning 

or prosecuting him without probable cause, or by 

conspiring to do any of these acts The plaintiff 

claims that these actions deprived him of his right to a 

fair trial. 

Jury Instruction No. 7 reads 1n part: 

In order to recover damages under the federal Civil 

Rights Act, plaintiff must prove to you by the greater 

weight of the evidence any or all of the following acts: 

l. He was deprived of his right to be free from 

false arrest and to be free from false imprisonmment; or 

2. He was deprived of his right to be free from a 

malicious prosecution; or 

3. He was deprived of hi~ right to liberty without 

due process of law; or 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

10 

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Jury Instruction No. 7; supra, note 7, Jury Instruction No. 15 

("Plaintiff alleges the defendants conspired among themselves to 

deprive him of his constitutional rights") Id.; Instruction No. 16 

("That the purpose of the conspiracy was either to obtain a false 

conviction of plaintiff based on perjured testimony, or to cover 

up the fact that perjured testimony was used against plaintiff in 

the trial in order to prevent his release from prison"). Id. 

We are persuaded that the limitations defense lacks merit. 

This case is similar to Vanegas v. Wagner, 704 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 

1983). There Vanegas alleged a conspiracy by police officers to 

cause his malicious prosecution on groundless charges by tampering 

with witnesses and knowingly presenting false evidence and perjury 

to the jury. The Ninth Circuit held that under its controlling 

precedent, Cline v. Brusett, 661 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1981), the 

civil rights claim asserting the elements of common law 

malicious prosecution did not accrue until the reversal of 

Vanegas' conviction by the California Supreme Court's holding of 

insufficient evidence, leading to Vanegas' release. 704 F.2d at 

1145-1146, citing 52 Am. Jur. 2nd Malicious Prosecution § 6 (1970) 

and Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 672 (1977). 

Here also there was an allegation of conspiracy, which is a 

viable claim under § 1983. Anthony v. Baker, 767 F.2d 657, 662 

(lOth Cir. 1985); Taylor v. Gilmantin, 686 F.2d 1346, 1355 (lOth 

Cir. 1982); Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256, 1261 (5th Cir. 1978). 

(Footnote continued): 

4. He was deprived of his right to a fair trial; 

or 

5. He was deprived of these rights by a 

conspiracy. 

ll 

Appellate Case: 86-1148 Document: 01019297287 Date Filed: 01/19/1990 Page: 11 
The conspiracy was essentially to cause malicious prosecution as 

in Vanegas. It began more than three years before the 

commencement of this civil rights suit, but it continued on 

through the second criminal trial of Robinson in October 1983, 

when the false case was presented again on retrial. Not until the 

end of this second criminal trial, with Robinson's acquittal, did 

his malicious prosecution conspiracy claim accrue, 8 as in Vanegas 

and Cline. See also Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 348-350 (3rd 

Cir. 1989); McCune v. City of Grand Rapids, 842 F.2d 903, 907 (6th 

Cir. 1988). The earlier reversal of his prior murder, armed 

robbery and conspiracy convictions for trial error by the 

prosecution and remand for retrial, State v. Robinson, 662 P.2d at 

1346, did not cause the malicious prosecution claim to accrue 

because Robinson remained subject to those serious charges and 

went on trial for his life again in October 1983 when the 

malicious prosecution conspiracy again resulted in presentation of 

the false case against him. 

There were other claims asserted of false arrest and false 

imprisonment. We are mindful that discrete claims of such wrongs, 

despite their being averred as a continuing wrong, have been held 

barred where outside the time bar. Compare McCune v. City of 

Grand Rapids, 842 F.2d 903, 906 (6th Cir. 1988) with Corbitt v. 

Andersen, 778 F.2d 1471, 1474 (lOth Cir. 1985). We are persuaded, 

however, that all such claims here were essentially part of the 

8 

It is now generally accepted that the accrual of federal 

causes of action is controlled by federal rather than state law. 

Ebrahimi v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 852 F.2d 516, 520 (lOth Cir. 

1988); see also Newcomb v. Ingle, 827 F.2d 675, 678 (lOth Cir. 

l987)(accrual of §1983 action is matter of federal law). 

12 

Appellate Case: 86-1148 Document: 01019297287 Date Filed: 01/19/1990 Page: 12 
malicious prosecution conspiracy. 

limitation defense the trial 

In his order rejecting the 

judge disregarded the defendants' 

characterization of the case as discrete claims and acts including 

false arrests and fabrications. The judge instead accepted the 

plaintiff's characterization that this was one conspiracy to 

"frame" Robinson and was a single continuing violation of 

"plaintiff's constitutional rights tied together by a plan to 

'get' Van Robinson at all costs," Order, pp.2-3, which continued 

until his acquittal in October 1983. We agree and are also 

convinced the essence of the claim was conspiracy for malicious 

prosecution which accrued within the limitations period. 

We hold that the civil rights case of Robinson based on 

conspiracy for malicious prosecution was not time barred when it 

was commenced on August 17, 1984 -- well within the three-year 

limitation period following the October 1983 second trial where 

the false case against Robinson was again presented and Robinson 

was finally acquitted. 

B. CAUSATION 

Defendants argue, as they did before the trial court, that 

they cannot be liable for Robinson's constitutional deprivations 

because the causal connection between their misconduct and 

Robinson's injuries was broken by subsequent, independent and 

intervening acts of the prosecutor, grand jury, state trial court 

and the New Mexico Supreme Court. Brief of Appellants at 21. 

Specifically defendants contend that they were not responsible for 

the prosecution of Robinson, the use of fabricated evidence, nor 

Appellate Case: 86-1148 Document: 01019297287 Date Filed: 01/19/1990 Page: 13 
the admission of the manufactured evidence by the trial judge. We 

disagree. 

We believe there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find 

that the defendants purposefully concealed and misrepresented 

material facts to the district attorney which may have influenced 

his decision to prosecute Robinson. This is clear in light of the 

testimony the defendants manufactured for Reginald Walker and 

Barry Foster, the state's key witnesses. See Anthony v. Baker, 

767 F.2d 657, 662 (lOth Cir. 1985)(state officials are liable for 

federal constitutional deprivations when they "conspire to procure 

groundless state indictments and charges based upon fabricated 

evidence or false, distorted, perjurious testimony presented to 

official bodies in order to maliciously bring about a citizen's 

trial or conviction"); Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 993 

(7th Cir. 1988)(jury found that police officers' concealment and 

misrepresentation of material facts to the prosecutor was a likely 

factor in the prosector's choice to charge the plaintiff with 

murder). 

Defendants' argument that their misconduct is shielded by the 

acts of the prosecutor, the grand jury, and the trial and 

appellate courts is disingenuous. Their actions did not make an 

intervening break from the conduct of the defendants. In fact, 

their actions were dependent in that they relied upon the 

falsified statements and testimony produced by the defendants in 

making their respective decisions. "[A] prosecutor's decision to 

charge, a grand jury's decision to indict, a prosecutor's decision 

not to drop charges but to proceed to trial -- none of these 

decisions will shield a police officer who deliberately supplied 

14 

Appellate Case: 86-1148 Document: 01019297287 Date Filed: 01/19/1990 Page: 14 
misleading information that 

police officers have been 

influenced the decision If 

instrumental in the plaintiff's 

continued confinement or prosecution, they cannot escape liability 

by pointing to the decisions of prosecutors or grand jurors or 

magistrates to confine or prosecute him. They cannot hide behind 

the officials whom they have defrauded." Jones, 856 F.2d at 994 

(emphasis added); see also Smiddy v. Varney, 803 F.2d 1469, 1471 

(9thCir. 1986). 

C. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 

The defendants argue that numerous errors were committed by 

the trial court with respect to the instructions given to the 

jury. The specific errors preserved for appeal include: (l) 

failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on the legal 

definition of entrapment; (2) error in instructing the jury as to 

Robinson's claims involving probable cause; (3) error in 

instructing the jury on false arrest for lack of 

error in instructing the jury on Robinson's 

defendants delayed his release from prison for lack 

evidence; (4) 

theory that the 

of evidence; 

and (5) error in Instruction No. 7 which was misleading in that it 

defined both the constitutional right to be free from malicious 

prosecution and the right to a fair trial. We find these 

arguments are without merit. 

The Entrapment Instruction 

Defendants first argue that the trial 

refusal to instruct the jury on the 

entrapment. They assert that their 

15 

court erred by its 

legal definition of 

proposed entrapment 

Appellate Case: 86-1148 Document: 01019297287 Date Filed: 01/19/1990 Page: 15 
instruction would have allowed the jury to determine what police 

conduct was legal and appropriate in their handling of the Chacon 

murder investigation. Finally, the defendants claim that the 

absence of the proposed entrapment instruction was severely 

prejudicial and affected a substantial right to present one of 

their defenses. We find both arguments to be untenable. 

The issue whether Robinson was entrapped by police informant 

Green or the defendants to commit property crimes and an attempted 

armed robbery in early 1981 is simply irrelevant in this civil 

rights lawsuit. Here, the critical determination was whether the 

defendants' conduct as a whole, in their pursuit of Robinson for 

the Chacon murder, was unconstitutional. It was not the manner ~r 

scope in which Green involved himself with Robinson that was 

relevant to Robinson's case; rather, it was the underlying purpose 

behind the defendants' use of Green as an informant which was 

relevant. Any factual determination by the jury that Robinson was 

not entrapped to commit the above crimes by Green or the 

defendants would not have established probable cause or a good 

faith defense for defendants in unconstitutionally pursuing 

Robinson for Officer Chacon's murder. The district court properly 

refused to charge the jury on the legal definition of entrapment. 

Defendants also argue that their proposed entrapment 

instruction supported their defense that the surveillance of, and 

the undercover operation concerning Robinson, was mandated by 

their witnessing Robinson's criminal activity. Reply Brief of 

Appellants, p. 20. However, defendants' argument misses the mark. 

Such a theory would not excuse the defendants for their 

unconstitutional conduct. A party is not allowed an instruction 

16 

Appellate Case: 86-1148 Document: 01019297287 Date Filed: 01/19/1990 Page: 16 
if their defense theory is not factually or legally supported. 

See Higgins v. Martin Marietta Corp., 752 F.2d 492, 496 (lOth Cir. 

1985}; Gander v. Mr. Steak of Sun Ray, Inc., 774 F.2d 920, 924 

(8th Cir. 1985); cf. Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812, 824-825 (lst 

Cir. 1985). 

Insufficient Evidence 

The defendants 

any instruction for 

arrested for Officer 

release from prison. 

argue that there was no evidence to support 

Robinson's claims that he was initially 

Chacon's murder and that they delayed his 

In support of the false arrest theory, 

evidence which showed Maruffi and Pulisar 

Robinson presented 

targetted him and 

conspired with others to build a case against him for the Chacon 

murder. Evidence was also presented which showed that the arrest 

of Robinson for the property crimes committed while under police 

surveillance was part of the defendants' overall scheme to frame 

and arrest Robinson for Officer Chacon's murder. Finally, 

Robinson presented evidence that the government's two key 

witnesses, Foster and Walker, were set-up by the defendants with 

false criminal charges which were subsequently dismissed for their 

false testimony against Robinson. Although defendants presented 

conflicting evidence, Robinson was entitled to an instruction on 

his theory of the case. See, General Motors Corporation v. 

Walden, 406 F.2d 606, 609 (lOth Cir. 1969)("A party is entitled to 

an instruction on his theory of the case only if that theory is 

supported by competent evidence"). 

Appellate Case: 86-1148 Document: 01019297287 Date Filed: 01/19/1990 Page: 17 
We are also convinced that there was competent evidence to 

support Robinsons's claim of denial of liberty in that the 

defendants were responsible for his continued imprisonment for the 

Chacon murder conviction. The defendants say there were other 

convictions with consecutive sentences so that Robinson would 

nevertheless have been imprisoned. The argument is unpersuasive. 

These factors were there, but beyond doubt imprisonment for murder 

and armed robbery -- with its effect on conditions of treatment 

and the stress of such grave false convictions -- were legitimate 

factors to consider in awarding damages for the wrongs inflicted 

by the defendants through their conspiracy for malicious 

prosecution. 

Lack of Probable Cause 

Next, defendants argue it was error for the trial court to 

instruct the jury on Robinson's theories involving lack of 

probable cause. The gist of defendants' argument again is that 

probable cause had already been determined under state court 

proceedings, thus making a new determination inappropriate. We 

hold that Robinson presented sufficient evidence upon which the 

jury could find that the defendants' conduct defiled the 

investigation, the grand jury proceedings and trial, and was so 

outrageous as to deny Robinson his constitutional right to a 

proper probable cause determination. Defendants' argument was 

specifically rejected by this court in Anthony v. Baker, 767 F.2d 

657, 663 (lOth Cir. 1985); see also, Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 

F.2d at 993-994. The district court did not err by instructing 

the jury that Robinson could recover for violation of his civil 

18 

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rights for false arrest or false imprisonment without probable 

cause. See, Rex v. Teeples, 753 F.2d 840, 842-43 (lOth Cir. 1985). 

We are convinced that the charge did not allow duplicative 

recoveries here because these were all matters leading up to the 

trials at which the false testimony was presented -- all part of 

the conspiracy to "get" Robinson, as the trial judge said, all 

steps in the malicious prosecution. The modest $75,000 verdict 

suggests no duplicative recovery. 

Finally, defendants argue that Instruction No. 7 was 

duplicative and misleading by allowing Robinson to recover either 

for malicious prosecution or for denial of a fair trial. We do 

not read these theories as duplicative or confusing. The theories 

could both be argued on this record and no unreasonable verdict 

resulted. 

IV. 

DENIAL OF CROSS-EXAMINATION 

Defendants contend that there were three witnesses called by 

Robinson for direct examination who were "never allowed to be 

cross-examined or their cross-examination was significantly 

delayed." Brief of Appellants at 44. We find no error or abuse 

of discretion on these matters. 

First, defendants argue they "never had the opportunity to 

cross-examine [Penny Walker]," who had been temporarily dismissed 

during her direct examination. Id. However, defendants made no 

objection to her temporary excusal, Vol. II, p. 200, and later 

during the trial agreed to her being permanently excused. Vol. 

VII, p. 1141. 

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Second, defendants say their cross-examination of Foster and 

Maruffi was significantly delayed. 9 While Foster was testifying 

on direct, defendants' counsel requested a bench conference to 

discuss the admissibility of tape recorded testimony. The court 

then recessed and trial resumed the following morning. Robinson's 

counsel requested that Foster's examination be interrupted so that 

Maruffi could be called to testify. Defendants' counsel did not 

object. After Maruffi's examination, defendants' counsel objected 

to the sequence of examination. Vol. v., p. 670. Counsel for the 

defendants then requested that the trial proceed in ordinary 

sequence, but also agreed that Foster could be recalled for 

additional direct examination in lieu of the completion of 

Maruffi's examination. Vol. V., p. 670. Counsel for the 

defendants then cross-examined Foster upon completion of 

Robinson's direct. Vol. VI., p. 869. Maruffi was then recalled 

for completion of Robinson's direct and immediately passed to 

defendants for their cross-examination. Vol. VI., p.987. 

Defendants' argument that they specifically asked to crossexamine Foster at the time Robinson's counsel requested to call 

Maruffi, and were refused the opportunity, is frivolous. 

Defendants' counsel, at the time Maruffi was requested to testify, 

stated no objection and said that all he wanted was to be able to 

ask Foster some questions. Vol. V., 590. This statment is a far 

9 

Although Maruffi is a defendant, the complaint is made that 

the defense was impaired in that when Maruffi was called during 

plaintiff's case, the defense was not allowed to cross-examine 

Maruffi. immediately after his direct examination and the court 

allowed the plaintiff instead to continue with Foster's 

examination. The argument is not convincing because the defense 

was later able to develop Maruffi's testimony as it desired. 

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cry from that presented in the defendants' brief here. 10 Because 

defendants failed to timely object to the sequence of witnesses, 

had an opportunity to cross-examine all the witnesses, and failed 

to show that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting 

the calling of the witnesses, the defendants' claim of error is 

rejected. See, Fed. R. Evid. 6ll(a); United States v. DeLuna, 763 

F.2d 897, 911-912 (8th Cir. 1985). 

v. 

ATTORNEYS' FEES 

Defendants argue that because the judgment should be 

reversed, we should also reverse the award of attorneys' fees to 

plaintiff. Since we do not agree that the judgment should be 

reversed, the request to reverse the fee award is denied. The 

plaintiff-appellee requests an award of attorneys' fees for the 

appeal, which we agree should be allowed. This fee claim is 

remanded to the district court for further proceedings to 

determine a proper award of fees for the appeal. See Ramos v. 

Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 556 (lOth Cir. 1983); Schwartz and Kirklin, 

Section 1983 Litigation; Claims, Defenses, and Fees, § 17.7; 42 

u.s.c. § 1988. 

10 

In a similiar vein, defendants argue that they were denied a 

substantial right because they were unable to cross-examine all 

the witnesses. Brief of Appellants, p. 47. However, they cite 

nothing in the record to support such a claim. In fact, our 

review of the record indicates that defendants were never deprived 

of the opportunity to cross-examine any witness. 

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VI. 

CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, the judgment and the award of attorneys' fees 

below are AFFIRMED; the case is REMANDED on the plaintiff's claim 

for his appellate attorneys' fees for further proceedings and the 

award of such fees. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

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