Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02312/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02312-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 15:2301 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

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1 In their motion to dismiss, defendants state that Albin Marine ceased all business

operations approximately 10 years ago and has no assets. Defendants also note that “[t]o the best

of Defendants’ knowledge, Defendant Albin Manufacturing, Inc. does not exist and likely has

been confused in this case for Defendant AMC.” Defendants’ Memo of Ps&As at 1. 

10cv2312

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALFREDO SAAVEDRA,

Plaintiff,

v.

ALBIN MANUFACTUING CORP., et

al.,

Defendants.

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Civil No. 10cv2312 L(POR)

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT [doc. #11] and

TRANSFERRING VENUE

Defendants Albin Manufacturing Corp. (AMC), Albin Marine, Inc.1

 and Fred W.A. Peters

move to dismiss the first amended complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2),

12(b)3) and 12(b)(6). Plaintiff opposes the motion. The Court finds this matter suitable for

determination on the papers submitted without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule

7.1(d)(1). 

I. Background

As set forth in the FAC, plaintiff alleges that he contracted with the Albin defendants to

purchase a new 2006 Albin 40 North See Cutter yacht with various upgrades; however, 

defendants actually provided a different and defective yacht to him. Plaintiff purchased the yacht

Case 3:10-cv-02312-L-POR Document 23 Filed 08/19/11 Page 1 of 8
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from a dealer located in Connecticut and signed the purchase order on July 17, 2006; the U.S.

Coast Guard registered the yacht to plaintiff on October 4, 2006; and defendants tendered the

yacht on July 24, 2007. Upon inspection of the yacht in St. Petersburg, Florida, plaintiff rejected

the boat as nonconforming.

Plaintiff filed this action on November 9, 2010. The FAC includes claims for: breach of

implied warranties under the Magnuson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301, et seq.; California

Consumer Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code §§ 1770, et seq.; breach of the SongBeverly Warranty Act, California Civil Code § 1792, et seq.; violation of the Florida Deceptive

and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Florida Stats. §§ 501.202, et seq.; breach of written contract;

rescission of contract; fraud; and common law breach of warranty.

II. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

As noted above, the Albin defendants and Fred W.A. Peters move to dismiss the FAC for

lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). Plaintiff bears the

burden of establishing that jurisdiction is proper. Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Technologies, Inc.,

2011 WL 3437047, *2 (9th Cir., Aug. 8, 2011.) If the defendant's motion is based on written

materials rather than an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing

of jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to dismiss. Id. (citing Brayton Purcell LLP v.

Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 2010). “The plaintiff cannot ‘simply rest

on the bare allegations of its complaint,’ but uncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be

taken as true.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004)

(quoting Amba Mktg. Sys., Inc. v. Jobar Int'l, Inc., 551 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir. 1977)). The court

“may not assume the truth of allegations in a pleading which are contradicted by affidavit,” Data

Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1977), but must resolve

“factual disputes in the plaintiff's favor.” Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th

Cir.2006).

The district court applies the law of the state in which the court sits when no federal

statute authorizes personal jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v.

Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998). California's long-arm statute, CAL. CIV. PROC.

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CODE § 410.10, is coextensive with federal due process requirements; therefore, the

jurisdictional analyses under state law and federal due process are the same. Schwarzenegger,

374 F.3d at 800–01. 

For a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant consistent with

due process, that defendant must have “certain minimum contacts” with the relevant forum

“such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice.’” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting

Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). Under a due process analysis, a defendant may be

subject to either general or specific personal jurisdiction. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia,

S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, 104 S.Ct. 1868 (1984).

A. General Jurisdiction

“For general jurisdiction to exist over a nonresident defendant . . . the defendant must

engage in continuous and systematic general business contacts, that approximate physical

presence in the forum state.” Schwartzenegger, 374 F.3d at 801 (internal quotations omitted).

“This is an exacting standard, as it should be, because a finding of general jurisdiction permits a

defendant to be haled into court in the forum state to answer for any of its activities anywhere in

the world.” Id.

While acknowledging that the Albin defendants have no physical contacts with California

and are located in Connecticut, plaintiff contends that the Court has general jurisdiction over

them because they have advertised their yachts on the internet, and have two authorized dealers

for their yachts in California.

As the Ninth Circuit recently noted:

To permit the exercise of general jurisdiction based on the accessibility in the

forum of a non-resident interactive website would expose most large media entities

to nationwide general jurisdiction. That result would be inconsistent with the

constitutional requirement that “the continuous corporate operations within a state”

be “so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against [the nonresident

defendant] on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those

activities.” International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318. See generally 4 RAYMOND T.

NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 19:7, at 19–12 n. 1 (4th ed.

2011) (collecting cases).

Mavrix Photo., 2011 WL 3437047, *2.

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2 Plaintiff does not address whether defendant Peters is subject to the Court’s

specific jurisdiction and therefore has not met his burden to establish personal jurisdiction in

California.

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Given their extremely minor contacts with California that plaintiff relies upon, the

exercise of general jurisdiction over the Albin defendants is unjustified. 

Also appearing to recognize that general jurisdiction over defendant Peters, a Connecticut

citizen, is untenable, plaintiff concedes this point by failing to mention him in his opposition. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to assert sufficient facts to prove that any

defendant is subject to general jurisdiction before this Court.

B. Specific Jurisdiction

A court exercises specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant where the claim arises

out of or has a substantial connection to the defendant's contact with the forum. Glencore Grain

Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth

Circuit analyzes specific jurisdiction according to a three-prong test: (1) The non-resident

defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum

or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege

of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws;

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant's forum-related

activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice,

i.e., it must be reasonable. Menken v. Emm, 503 F.3d 1050, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007).

The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs of this specific jurisdiction

test. Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990). Where plaintiff fails to satisfy either

of these prongs, personal jurisdiction is not established in the forum state.2 Schwarzenegger, 374

F.3d at 802. “If the plaintiff succeeds in satisfying both of the first two prongs, the burden then

shifts to the defendant to ‘present a compelling case’ that the exercise of jurisdiction would not

be reasonable.” Id.

1. Purposeful Availment

The first prong concerning purposeful availment is assessed by using the three-part

effects test set found in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); see also, Dole Food Co., Inc. v.

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Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing Calder and the three-part effects test).

This effects test states that the defendant must have allegedly: “(1) committed an intentional act,

(2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be

suffered in the forum state.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 803. All three parts of the test must be

satisfied. Id.

In arguing that defendants aimed their activities at California, plaintiff contends that the

Albin defendants “advertised its yachts on the internet with the intent to reach potential

customers across the United States and world wide” and as result “established a presence in

California” . . . “with the intent to obtain customers in California.” (Opp. at 7-8.) When personal

jurisdiction is premised on a defendant's internet activity, courts must examine “the level of

interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site.”

Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted). “[T]he

likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to

the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet.” Id. at 419

(quotation omitted). Passive web presence alone is not enough to confer personal jurisdiction.

Id. at 418. Rather, “something more” must show that the defendant purposefully directed activity

in a substantial way to the forum state. Id.

Here, defendants’ website is not interactive and as plaintiff acknowledges, the website

targets the general population and is not expressly aimed at California. (Opp. at 7.) Thus, the

Court finds that plaintiff has failed to establish that defendants expressly aimed their activities at

the forum state.

Second, plaintiff has failed to establish that defendants caused harm that they knew was

likely to be suffered in California. Indeed, plaintiff does not even argue that defendants knew

their actions were likely to cause harm to plaintiff in the forum. Plaintiff has not put forth any

evidence to suggest that defendants were aware that plaintiff had a connection to California or

that defendants caused harm that they knew was likely to be suffered by plaintiff in the forum

state.

The three parts of the Calder effects test have not been met here. Accordingly, the Court

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3 Plaintiff argues that venue should be determined under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) rather

than § 1406 because Albin is subject to personal jurisdiction in this Court. The Court has

concluded otherwise. Section 1404(a) is applicable.

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finds that defendants have not purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting

activities within the forum state.

2. Arising Out Of or Resulting From Defendant's Forum–Related

Contacts

The Ninth Circuit has adopted a “but for” test to determine whether a plaintiff's claim

arises out of a defendant's forum-related contacts. See Mattel, Inc. v. Greiner & Hausser GmbH,

354 F.3d 857, 864 (9th Cir. 2003). This second prong is met if plaintiff demonstrates that “but

for” defendant's contacts with California, plaintiff's claim would not have arisen. Id.

Plaintiff has not sufficiently shown that this “but for” requirement is met here.

Specifically, the Court finds that defendants’ limited forum-related contacts, i.e., a noninteractive internet website and the presence of two licensed Albin dealers in California, is not

directly related to the injuries plaintiff alleges he suffered as a result of his purchase of a nonconforming yacht from defendants. Indeed, plaintiff did not purchase the yacht from one of the

two licensed Albin dealers in California. Thus, the Court finds that plaintiff's claim does not

arise out of or result from defendants’ alleged forum-related contacts.

3. Conclusion

Because plaintiff has not sufficiently demonstrated that the Albin defendants have

purposefully availed themselves of the privileges of conducting activities in California and

plaintiff's claims do not arise out of defendants’ forum related activities, the Court finds that

plaintiff has failed to show that specific jurisdiction is present in this Case.

Further, because the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish that this Court has

either general or specific jurisdiction over any defendant in this action and defendants’ motion to

dismiss may be granted or alternatively, transferred to a proper venue

III. Improper Venue

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)3

, if the court determines that venue is improper, as is the case

here, the court must either dismiss the action or, if it is in the interests of justice, transfer the case

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to a district or division in which it could have been brought. Whether to dismiss for improper

venue, or alternatively to transfer venue to a proper court, is a matter within the sound discretion

of the district court. See King v. Russell, 963 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1992).

Under the general venue statute, a civil action in which jurisdiction is not founded on

diversity of citizenship may be brought only in (1) a judicial district where any defendant

resides, if all defendants reside in the same state, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part

of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of the property

that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may

be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. 28 U.S.C. §

1391(b). For purposes of venue, a corporation is deemed to reside in any district in which it is

subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action was commenced. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). As

noted above, in this action the defendant corporations are not subject to personal jurisdiction in

California. 

The Court notes that no party resides in California at this time; plaintiff resides in Cancun

Mexico; the Albin defendants reside in Connecticut; the yacht was manufactured in Texas and

delivered to plaintiff in Florida.

Defendants argue that venue is appropriate in Connecticut where defendants reside or in

Florida: “The resolution of this matter can be most efficiently resolved in Florida or

Connecticut.” (Defendants’ Memo of Ps&As at 15). Plaintiff argues, under 28 U.S.C. § 1406,

that Florida is a more convenient forum and would also have personal jurisdiction over the Albin

defendants.

Because it appears the parties agree that Florida is an appropriate venue for this action,

the Court finds in the interest of justice that transfer of this action to Florida is warranted rather

than dismissal.

IV. Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Because the Court finds that it does not have personal jurisdiction over the defendants,

the Court declines to decide whether any or all of plaintiff’s causes of action are barred by the

applicable statutes of limitation. 

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V. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED denying defendants’ motion to dismiss for

lack of personal jurisdiction. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED transferring this action to the

United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, St. Petersburg, Florida. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: August 19, 2011

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

HON. LOUISA S. PORTER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

Case 3:10-cv-02312-L-POR Document 23 Filed 08/19/11 Page 8 of 8