Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01812/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01812-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

DEBORAH SCHULTE,

NO. CIV. S-05-1812 FCD JFM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CITY OF SACRAMENTO, SAMUEL L.

JACKSON, THOMAS FRIERY, LYDIA

ABREU, WILLIAM P. CARNAZZO,

AND BRETT M. WITTER,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

 

This matter comes before the court on defendants City of

Sacramento (“City”), Samuel L. Jackson (“Jackson”), Thomas Friery

(“Friery”), Lydia Abreu (“Abreu”), William P. Carnazzo

(“Carnazzo”), and Brett M. Witter’s (“Witter”) motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s first amended complaint (“complaint”) pursuant to

///

///

Case 2:05-cv-01812-WBS-JFM Document 30 Filed 02/09/06 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

All further references to a “Rule” are to the Federal 1

Rules of Civil Procedure.

Because oral argument will not be of material 2

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

The facts of this case are taken from plaintiff’s 3

allegations in the complaint.

2

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1

Plaintiff seeks leave to amend her first amended complaint

pursuant to Rule 15(a). For the reasons set forth below,2

defendants’ motions is GRANTED, and plaintiff’s motion is

GRANTED. 

BACKGROUND3

Plaintiff Deborah Schulte (“Schulte”) is a licensed attorney

in California. (Pl.’s 1 Am. Compl. (“FAC”), filed Oct. 20, st

2005, ¶ 11). Schulte began employment with the City on August 9,

1999, where her primary duties were to develop expertise in

municipal finance matters. (Id. ¶ 10). In October 2001,

plaintiff left her employment with the City to work with the

State Treasurer’s office, but returned to work for the City in

June 2002. (Id.) Plaintiff worked in the Special Projects

Section, where only the most experienced attorneys who could

handle the most complex matters were assigned. (Id. ¶ 33). 

Throughout the majority of her tenure with the City, plaintiff

was consistently promoted and received excellent performance

evaluations. (Id. ¶ 27).

During the course of her employment, plaintiff spoke out

against the City complying with an agreement it had executed with

Lennar Communities, Inc., and/or its wholly owned subsidiaries

Case 2:05-cv-01812-WBS-JFM Document 30 Filed 02/09/06 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

(collectively, “Lennar”). (Id. ¶ 11). Plaintiff objected to the

enforcement of the Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) between

the City and Lennar on the grounds that the MOU required the City

to pay Lennar over six million dollars in excess of money Lennar

was lawfully entitled to recover. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 14, 16). This

overpayment would violate state statutory and constitutional

laws, as well as federal tax and securities laws. (Id. ¶ 11). 

Therefore, as part of her ethical and legal obligations as an

attorney, plaintiff had a duty to counsel actions that appeared

to be legal and just. (Id. ¶ 23). Plaintiff also had a

professional duty to urge reconsideration of actions that may be

or are illegal to the organization or refer such matter up her

chain of command. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of her speaking out

against compliance with the MOU, City Attorney Jackson and her

immediate supervisor, Witter, enacted a campaign of retaliation

against plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 29). Defendants redirected inquiries

and assignments that would normally have gone to plaintiff. 

(Id.) Defendants began soliciting negative information about

plaintiff’s performance in other areas of her work. (Id.) 

Finally, in July 2004, plaintiff was transferred out of the

Special Projects Section to the Litigation Section, where less

experienced attorneys handle more common cases. (Id. ¶ 33). It

was known that the City Attorney considered such a transfer as a

demotion because attorneys so transferred would not receive the

same consideration for salary adjustments and promotions. (Id. ¶

34). As such, plaintiff considered this transfer a demotion. 

(Id.) The transfer was done in such a manner as to communicate

Case 2:05-cv-01812-WBS-JFM Document 30 Filed 02/09/06 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

to City staff and other individuals that they could no longer

have confidence in plaintiff’s advice, causing significant injury

to plaintiff’s professional reputation. (Id. ¶ 35). Therefore,

plaintiff alleges that she was constructively terminated. (Id. ¶

38). 

Plaintiff brings claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42

U.S.C. § 1985 for violations of her First Amendment rights. 

Plaintiff also claims violations of California Labor Code §

1102.5, wrongful termination in violation of public policy,

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of

Civil Code § 52.1. On November 9, 2005, defendants filed a

motion to dismiss, seeking dismissal of plaintiff’s § 1985 claim,

intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, and claim for

violation of § 52.1. On December 27, 2005, plaintiff filed a

motion to amend her complaint. 

STANDARDS

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff

need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id. 

Given that the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader, the court may not dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would

Case 2:05-cv-01812-WBS-JFM Document 30 Filed 02/09/06 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Defendants also assert that plaintiff’s claim is barred 4

for failure to comply with the California Tort Claims Act. 

Because, as discussed infra, the court finds that plaintiff has

not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress, the court does not reach the

merits of this argument.

5

entitle him or her to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45

(1957); NL Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th

 Cir. 1986).

Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to assume that plaintiff

“can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendant[]

ha[s] violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been

alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal.

State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). Moreover,

the court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in

the form of factual allegations.” United States ex rel. Chunie

v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986).

In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the court may consider

only the complaint, any exhibits thereto, and matters which may

be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. 

See Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hospital, 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th

Cir. 1988); Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. Consumers Union of United

States, Inc., 12 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 1998).

ANALYSIS

A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s state tort claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress should be dismissed

because plaintiff’s complaint does not allege facts sufficient to

state a claim. To succeed on a claim of intentional infliction 4

of emotional distress, plaintiff must demonstrate: 

Case 2:05-cv-01812-WBS-JFM Document 30 Filed 02/09/06 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the

intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the

probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the

plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress;

and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional

distress by the defendants’ outrageous conduct. 

Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868, 903 (1991). 

“Outrageous conduct” requires that the conduct must be so extreme

“as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized

community.” Id. 

California courts have held that the question of whether the

conduct alleged in the complaint is sufficiently “extreme and

outrageous” is generally a factual issue for the jury. See Angie

M. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 4th 1217, 1226 (1995). 

However, California courts have also held that “[a] simple

pleading of personnel management activity is insufficient to

support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress,

even if improper motivation is alleged.” Janken v. GM Hughes

Electronics, 46 Cal. App. 4th 55, 80 (1996). Personnel

management actions include 

actions such as hiring and firing, job or project

assignments, office or work station assignments,

promotion or demotion, performance evaluations, the

provision of support, the assignment or nonassignment

of supervisory functions, deciding who will and who

will not attend meetings, [and] deciding who will be

laid off.

 

Id. at 64-65. “Managing personnel is not outrageous conduct

beyond the bounds of human decency, but rather conduct essential

to the welfare and prosperity of society.” Id. at 80.

Defendants contend that the allegedly tortious behavior

asserted by plaintiff in her complaint all fall within the ambit

of personnel management actions, and therefore, preclude a claim

Case 2:05-cv-01812-WBS-JFM Document 30 Filed 02/09/06 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff

alleges that, as a result of her recommendations concerning the

MOU, defendants enacted “a campaign of retaliation.” (FAC ¶ 29). 

This campaign included a significant decrease in assignments and

involvement with public financing and developers. (Id.) 

Plaintiff was also excluded from meetings. (Id.) Plaintiff’s

supervisors began soliciting negative information about her

performance. (Id.) Finally, plaintiff was transferred out of

the Special Projects Section and demoted to the Litigation

Section, by which she was constructively terminated. (Id. ¶¶ 33,

34, 39). 

California courts have construed all of the actions alleged

by plaintiff as personnel management actions. See Janken, 46

Cal. App. 4th at 64-65 (finding that personnel management actions

include “job or project assignments, . . . promotion or

demotion, performance evaluations, . . . [and] deciding who will

and who will not attend meetings); see also, Heglgeson v. Am.

Int’l Group, Inc., 44 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1095 (S.D. Cal. 1999)

(“Performance reviews, counseling sessions, lay-off decisions,

and work assignments are all decisions that businesses make

everyday. . . . Even if these decisions were improperly motivated

they fall far short of the necessary standard of outrageous

conduct beyond all bounds of decency.”). Therefore, plaintiff

cannot sustain a claim of intentional infliction of emotional

distress based upon these facts alone.

Plaintiff fails to address the cases cited by defendants,

but instead relies on the older case of Wallis v. Superior

Case 2:05-cv-01812-WBS-JFM Document 30 Filed 02/09/06 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Wallis was overruled on other grounds by Foley v. 5

Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654 (1988).

Plaintiff also relies on Monge v. Superior Court, 176 6

Cal. App. 3d 503 (1986). In Monge, the court faced the issue of

whether a complaint stated sufficient facts for punitive damages

in an employment discrimination case. The case did not address

the pleading requirements of an intentional infliction of

emotional distress claim. In light of existing state law that is

directly on point, the court does not view the analogy made by

plaintiff as persuasive. 

8

Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 1120 (1984). Wallis is factually 5 6

distinguishable from plaintiff’s case. In Wallis, the employer

breached its obligation to pay an agreed upon stipend for the

plaintiff’s agreement not to compete. Id. at 1112. The

plaintiff brought a claim for intentional infliction of emotional

distress, alleging that the employer intentionally abused its

position of financial control over the plaintiff by breaching the

contract. Id. at 1120. In overruling the trial court’s

demurrer, the court of appeals emphasized that the plaintiff’s

complaint alleged that the employer knew of the plaintiff’s

extremely vulnerable position because of his age, lack of other

work skills and financial responsibilities, and intended to cause

him emotional distress. Id. Plaintiff’s complaint fails to

allege such vulnerability and defendants’ knowledge of such

vulnerability as in Wallis.

Because the factual allegations supporting plaintiff’s tort

claim describe only personnel management actions by defendants,

plaintiff does not plead sufficient facts to state a claim. 

Thus, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim of

intentional infliction of emotional distress is GRANTED.

///// 

Case 2:05-cv-01812-WBS-JFM Document 30 Filed 02/09/06 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

B. California Civil Code § 52.1

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claims for violations of

California Civil Code § 52.1 should be dismissed because

plaintiff does not allege facts that rise to the level of

“threats, intimidation or coercion” within the meaning of the

statute. Section 52.1 provides that “any individual whose

exercise or enjoyment of [constitutional] rights . . . has been

interfered with or attempted to be interfered with” by “threats,

intimidation, or coercion” may bring a civil action on her own

behalf. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1. The section does not provide a

definition for the terms “threat,” “intimidation,” or “coercion,”

but does state that “speech alone is not sufficient to support an

action.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges that defendants “interfered and attempted

to interfere” with her First Amendment rights as well as her

right to disclose illegal conduct “by threats, intimidation, and

coercion.” Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendants

decreased assignments, excluded her from meetings, solicited

negative reviews of her and demoted her. Plaintiff also alleges

that defendants’ actions negatively affected her professional

reputation with colleagues and clients. These acts do not rise

to the level of “threats, intimidation, or coercion” contemplated

by § 52.1 and do not support her conclusory allegations. 

While no California court has interpreted the terms

“threats, coercion, or intimidation,” “the context of this

section makes it clear that the statute is meant to protect

against violence or the threat of violence.” Rabkin v. Dean, 856

F. Supp. 543, 552 (N.D. Cal. 1994); see also Cole v. Doe 1 thru 2

Case 2:05-cv-01812-WBS-JFM Document 30 Filed 02/09/06 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

California state or federal courts have not reached the 7

issue of whether allegations of economic coercion are sufficient

to state a claim under § 52.1 in any published opinions. 

However, the Massachusetts Supreme Court has interpreted the

Massachusetts Civil Rights Act of 1979, upon which § 52.1 was

modeled, to include economic coercion in certain circumstances. 

See Buster v. George W. Moore, Inc., 783 N.E.2d 399, 410 (Mass.

2003) (dismissing claim for failure to allege sufficient facts).

 

[T]he rule of deference to another state’s

interpretation of a statute that provided a model for a

California state establishes only a presumption of

legislative intent. Even when the presumption properly

operates, it does not compel the adoption of the

judicial construction of the other jurisdiction’s

statute.

(continued...)

10

Officers of the Emeryville Police Dept., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1084,

1103-04 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (finding sufficient facts alleged where

police used law enforcement authority to effectuate a stop,

detention, and search without probable cause). Plaintiff argues

that California courts have found facts sufficient to state a

claim under § 52.1 where the acts by defendants did not include

violence or a threat of violence. Plaintiff cites to Venegas v.

County of Los Angeles, in which the court found sufficient

allegations of misconduct under § 52.1 where police officers

handcuffed, detained, and arrested plaintiff without probable

cause. 32 Cal. 4th 820, 827 (2004). While the plaintiff did not

allege a claim of excessive force against the officers in

Venegas, the plaintiff did allege use of physical force, the

threat of arrest, and actual arrest. Id. Plaintiff’s

allegations fall far short of this type of conduct. Plaintiffs’

allegations (and any reasonable inferences drawn therefrom) do

not provide a factual basis for her claims that defendants

interfered or attempted to interfere with her rights through

threats, intimidation, or coercion. Plaintiff does not allege 7

Case 2:05-cv-01812-WBS-JFM Document 30 Filed 02/09/06 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(...continued) 7

Jones v. Kmart Corp., 17 Cal. 4th 329, 337 (1998) (internal

quotations omitted). In the absence of any California state or

federal authority and any evidence of legislative intent to

include such conduct in the purview of § 52.1, the court does not

broaden the scope of the statute to include such claims. 

11

that defendants made any threats, express or implied, subjected

her to any physical confrontations, or used any actual force. 

Therefore, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s § 52.1 claim

is GRANTED. 

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 Claim 

Plaintiff does not oppose defendants’ motion to dismiss her

claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Therefore, defendants’

motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

D. Leave to Amend

Plaintiff seeks leave to amend her complaint to allege a

conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to Rule 15(a),

“leave [to amend] is to be freely given when justice so

requires.” “[L]eave to amend should be granted unless amendment

would cause prejudice to the opposing party, is sought in bad

faith, is futile, or creates undue delay.” Martinez v. Newport

Beach, 125 F.3d 777, 785 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Defendants argue that it would be futile to allege a

conspiracy claim under § 1983 because the intra-corporate

conspiracy doctrine precludes such a claim in this case. The

intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine bars individual government

employees of a single entity from forming a conspiracy with one

another. Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 910

(9th Cir. 1993). Federal circuits have split on whether the

doctrine applies to civil rights claims, and the Ninth Circuit

Case 2:05-cv-01812-WBS-JFM Document 30 Filed 02/09/06 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

has declined to address the issue. Id. There is, however, some

legal authority holding that the intra-corporate conspiracy

doctrine is inapplicable to civil rights claims. Id. Thus, the

doctrine does not automatically bar plaintiff’s § 1983 conspiracy

claim. Further, circuits that have adopted the intra-corporate

conspiracy doctrine have also recognized that there are

exceptions to the doctrine. Dickerson v. Alachua County Comm’n,

200 F.3d 761, 769-70 (11th Cir. 2000). Because plaintiff may

plead facts that fit into one of these exceptions, amendment of

plaintiff’s complaint to add a conspiracy claim is not futile.

Defendants also argue that plaintiff’s claims center around

her allegations that the MOU was illegal, and that plaintiff is

precluded from making this “bald assertion.” Defendants contend

that, because of this, plaintiff’s conspiracy claims are futile

and plaintiff’s First Amendment violations should be dismissed. 

As an initial matter, defendants did not raise this argument in

their motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint. Therefore, the

court does not consider this argument as it applies to

plaintiff’s claims of First Amendment violations. Further,

plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to substantiate her claims

that the MOU was illegal. Defendants’ argument that the

agreement’s legality cannot be challenged because it was

authorized and adopted pursuant to the City’s plenary and

exclusive power does not preclude plaintiff’s allegations that

the content of the agreement was illegal under state and federal

laws. Therefore, amendment of plaintiff’s complaint is not

futile.

/////

Case 2:05-cv-01812-WBS-JFM Document 30 Filed 02/09/06 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

Finally, defendants argue that plaintiff does not allege

sufficient facts to state a claim for a § 1983 conspiracy in her

proposed complaint. This argument is more appropriately brought

on a motion to dismiss, not as an opposition to a motion to

amend. Given that plaintiff has alleged at least some facts

giving rise to a conspiracy claim in her proposed complaint, the

court cannot find that the addition of such a claim would be

futile. Therefore, plaintiff’s motion to amend her complaint is

GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion is GRANTED. 

Plaintiff’s motion to amend her first amended complaint is

GRANTED to add only the claim for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Plaintiff is granted fifteen (15) days from the date of

this order to file a second amended complaint in accordance with

this order. Defendants are granted thirty (30) days from the

date of service of plaintiff’s second amended complaint to file a

response thereto.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 9, 2006 

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:05-cv-01812-WBS-JFM Document 30 Filed 02/09/06 Page 13 of 13