Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_20-cv-00220/USCOURTS-cand-5_20-cv-00220-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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28 United States District Court Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KEVIN MCCULLOM,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

AHERN, et al., 

 Defendants. 

Case No. 20-00220 BLF (PR) 

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY 

PLAINTIFF’S IN FORMA 

PAUPERIS APPLICATION 

SHOULD NOT BE DENIED 

PURSUANT TO § 1915(G) 

Plaintiff, a California state prisoner, filed the instant pro se civil rights action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various officers and employees of the Santa Rita Jail, 

Alameda County Sheriff’s Department, and San Mateo County. Dkt. No. 5 at 2-5. 

Plaintiff moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Dkt. No. 4. 

For the reasons discussed below, the Court has reason to believe that Plaintiff’s 

motion for leave to proceed IFP should be denied under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) because he 

has three or more prior lawsuits that were dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim 

or as frivolous or malicious. Plaintiff shall be granted an opportunity to show cause why 

he should be granted leave to proceed IFP. 

/// 

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Case 5:20-cv-00220-BLF Document 7 Filed 04/29/20 Page 1 of 5
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28 United States District Court Northern District of California

DISCUSSION 

I. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 

A. Standard of Review 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) was enacted, and became 

effective, on April 26, 1996. It provides that a prisoner may not bring a civil action or 

appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (i.e., may not 

proceed in forma pauperis) “if the prisoner has, on three or more prior occasions, while 

incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United 

States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of 

serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

For purposes of a dismissal that may be counted under § 1915(g), Andrews I gave 

this guidance: The phrase “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” parallels 

the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and apparently means the same 

thing. Andrews I, 398 F.3d at 1121. A case “is frivolous if it is ‘of little weight or 

importance: having no basis in law or fact.’” Id. (citation omitted). “A case is malicious if 

it was filed with the ‘intention or desire to harm another.’” Id. (citation omitted). “Not all 

unsuccessful cases qualify as a strike under § 1915(g). Rather, § 1915(g) should be used to 

deny a prisoner’s IFP status only when, after careful evaluation of the order dismissing an 

action, and other relevant information, the district court determines that the action was 

dismissed because it was frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim.” Id. at 1121. 

Duplicative or repetitious litigation of virtually identical causes of action is subject 

to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 as malicious. Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 

(5th Cir. 1988). An in forma pauperis complaint that merely repeats pending or previously 

litigated claims may be considered abusive and dismissed under § 1915. Cato v. United 

States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995). A dismissal under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 

U.S. 477 (1994), may constitute a strike under § 1915(g) for failure to state a claim when 

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28 United States District Court Northern District of California

Heck’s bar to relief is obvious from the face of the complaint, and the entirety of the 

complaint is dismissed for a qualifying reason under § 1915(g). Washington v. Los 

Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., 833 F.3d 1048, 1055 (9th Cir. 2016). 

The Court finds that each of the following cases counts as a strike under § 1915(g): 

(1) McCullom v. Alameda County Sheriff’s Dept., No. 16-cv-3299 TEH (N.D. Cal. 2016) 

(dismissed as frivolous and malicious); (2) McCullom v. Cambra, No. 01-cv-01405-DMS 

(S.D. Cal. 2003)(dismissed for failure to state a claim); (3) McCullom v. Parker, No. 16-

cv-1054 TEH (N.D. Cal. 2016) (dismissed as duplicative and therefore may be considered 

a dismissal as malicious); and (4) McCullom v. Ahern, No. 16-cv-00044 HRL (N.D. Cal. 

2016) (dismissed entirely as barred by Heck). Based on these cases, Plaintiff has at least 

three cases that count as strikes under § 1915(g). Unless he was under imminent danger of 

serious physical injury at the time he filed this action, the IFP motion must be denied. 

B. Plaintiff’s Claims 

Plaintiff labels his complaint as a “class action” and lists several other inmates as 

plaintiffs. Dkt. No. 5 at 1-3. To the extent that Plaintiff is seeking class certification, it is 

DENIED. Pro se prisoner plaintiffs are not adequate class representatives able to fairly 

represent and adequately protect the interests of the class, see Oxendine v. Williams, 509 

F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975); see also Russell v. United States, 308 F.2d 78, 79 (9th 

Cir. 1962), so class certification may be denied on that basis, see Griffin v. Smith, 493 F. 

Supp. 129, 131 (W.D.N.Y. 1980) (denying class certification on basis that pro se prisoner 

cannot adequately represent class). Accordingly, the other named plaintiffs are 

DISMISSED from this action without prejudice to file separate, individual lawsuits. 

It appears from the complaint, that Plaintiff is challenging underlying criminal 

proceedings out of Alameda County, as he seeks the following relief: “that there be an 

evidentiary hearing of the evidence within my previous criminal court cases conviction on 

October 4, 2017, [where] I was falsely arrested [and] extorted to plea[d] guilty to 

29800(A)(1). I want that conviction expunged off my record if judicial corruption is 

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28 United States District Court Northern District of California

proven.” Dkt. No. 5 at 6. Plaintiff also seeks disciplinary action against the superior court 

judges involved in that conviction, id. at 7, that the attorneys involved be disbarred or 

suspended, id. at 8, and damages for pain and suffering and emotional distress, id. at 8-9. 

He also wants this Court to “remand back to the Oakland Superior Court my writ of habeas 

corpus petition vacating the March 18, 2019, illegal ruling that the exclusionary rule does 

not apply in my preliminary hearing and further granting... motion to suppress the 

evidence in superior court.” Id. at 10. There are no allegations indicating that Plaintiff 

was in “imminent danger” at the time he filed this action on January 10, 2020. Dkt. No. 1. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to the exception under § 1915(g). 

The Ninth Circuit in Andrews I, 398 F.3d at 1120, implicitly allowed the district 

court to raise the § 1915(g) problem sua sponte but required the district court to notify the 

plaintiff of the earlier dismissals it considers to support a § 1915(g) dismissal and allow the 

plaintiff an opportunity to be heard on the matter before dismissing the action. See id. at 

1120. The prisoner must be given notice of the potential disqualification under § 1915(g) 

and plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuasion that § 1915(g) does not bar pauper 

status for him. Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff shall be granted an opportunity to show cause 

why his IFP application should not be denied under § 1915(g) by showing why any of the 

prior dismissals discussed above should not count as a strike. Id. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, the Court orders Plaintiff to file a response no later 

than twenty-eight (28) days from the filing of this order, showing cause why his IFP 

application should not be denied pursuant to § 1915(g). 

If Plaintiff fails to file a response in the time provided, his IFP application shall be 

denied and the full filing fee will be immediately due. If the fee is not paid in due time, 

this case will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to pay the filing fee without further 

notice to Plaintiff. 

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28 United States District Court Northern District of California

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: __April 29, 2020_______ ________________________ 

BETH LABSON FREEMAN 

United States District Judge 

Order to Show Cause Re IFP 

PRO-SE\BLF\CR.20\00220McCullim_osc.1915g 

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