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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 28, 2016*

Decided March 30, 2016

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 15‐2897

FELIX J. BRUETTE, JR.

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

SALLY JEWELL,

Secretary of the Interior,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the  

United States District Court  

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 14‐C‐876

William C. Griesbach,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Felix Bruette appeals from a dismissal of his suit for lack of jurisdiction. In his

complaint Bruette sought an order requiring that the Department of the Interior follow

an 1893 law involving the Stockbridge and Munsee Indians. At a hearing Bruette

clarified his principal demand: He wants the Department to recognize that descendants

(including him) of Stephen Gardner, a signor of an 1856 Treaty between the Stockbridge

                                                 

* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP.

P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 15‐2897    Page 2

and Munsee Indians and the United States, belong to the tribe recognized in the Treaty.

The district court dismissed the suit based on several incurable defects. Because Bruette

has not developed an argument to disturb the district court’s decision, we dismiss his

appeal.

Bruette’s complaint alleges that as a great‐great‐grandson of Gardner, he is

entitled to his share of benefits that Congress promised to Gardner in the 1893 statute.

See An Act for the relief of the Stockbridge and Munsee tribe of Indians, in the State of

Wisconsin, ch. 219, 27 Stat. 744 (1893). The Department is disregarding that Act, the

complaint continues, and is thereby breaching its fiduciary duties by not establishing an

official list of tribe beneficiaries. At a hearing Bruette expanded these allegations. He

explained that he represents descendants of those who signed the 1856 Treaty, see

Treaty with the Stockbridge and Munsee, 11 Stat. 663, 1856 WL 11369, but whom

Congress excluded from its benefits under a law enacted 15 years later. See An Act for

the Relief of the Stockbridge and Munsee Tribe of Indians, in the State of Wisconsin, ch.

38, 16 Stat. 404 (1871). Congress, Bruette continued, recognized that it had wrongly

excluded many who signed the 1856 Treaty from receiving tribal benefits required by

the Treaty. It therefore passed in 1893 an act to remedy that situation. See An Act for the

relief of the Stockbridge and Munsee tribe of Indians, in the State of Wisconsin, ch. 219,

27 Stat. 744 (1893). But, Bruette concluded, the Department never completed the

required tribal membership “roll” that would have treated Gardner’s descendants as

members of the tribe contemplated by the 1856 Treaty.  

The Secretary moved to dismiss the suit, identifying numerous obstacles to it.

She argued that to the extent that Bruette was seeking tribal recognition, he first must

exhaust the remedies provided by the Department, see 25 C.F.R. § 83, which he had not

done. The Secretary observed that Bruette had sent a letter intending to seek tribal

recognition to the Office of Federal Acknowledgement in 2003, but he did not further

pursue the process. In addition, the Secretary contended that Bruette’s suit was blocked

by sovereign immunity, the statute of limitations, and the political‐question doctrine.

The district court dismissed Bruette’s suit. The judge noted that neither party

pointed to a statute creating a federal cause of action that engaged the court’s

jurisdiction. On his own the judge considered two provisions, the General Allotment

Act of 1887 (providing jurisdiction for claims seeking an allotment of land), see 25 U.S.C.

§ 345; 28 U.S.C. § 1353, and the Indian Tucker Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 1505. But he

concluded that neither statute provided subject‐matter jurisdiction because Bruette had

not sued for an allotment of land and the 1893 Act does not give Bruette any substantive

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No. 15‐2897    Page 3

rights. Even if the court had jurisdiction, the catch‐all six‐year statute of limitations for

federal claims would bar Bruette’s suit. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). And to the extent Bruette

was seeking tribal recognition, the judge determined that he had no authority to grant

such relief because it is a political question and Bruette has not completed the

Department’s internal process.

In his two‐page brief on appeal, Bruette ignores the district court’s reasoning. He

merely repeats his contention that the Department has violated the 1893 Act and “is in

breach of its fiduciary duties by failing to establish a roll of actual members under the

provisions Congress ordered.” His brief develops no argument to disturb the district

court’s reasons for dismissal or the Department’s defense of the dismissal. For example,

Bruette does not contest the Department’s statement that back in 2003 he began an

administrative effort, which he quickly aborted, to seek tribal recognition from the

government. That is the subject of this suit, and if Bruette waited more than a decade

after learning of the basis of his claim to file suit, it may be untimely. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2401(a). But we need not address the substance of the district court’s reasons for

dismissal because Bruette’s brief does not comply with Rule 28(a) of the Federal Rules

of Appellate Procedure. See Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545–46 (7th Cir. 2001).

Although Bruette is pro se, even pro se litigants must adhere to the rule that requires an

appellant to give us a reason to consider whether the district court erred in dismissing

the complaint. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); Pearle Vision, Inc. v.

Romm, 541 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2008). Without a developed appellate argument for the

government to oppose or us to review, see Ball v. City of Indianapolis, 760 F.3d 636, 645

(7th Cir. 2014), Bruette’s appeal must be DISMISSED.

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