Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-01035/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-01035-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1125 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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28 1 04cv1035

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ART ATTACKS INK, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

MGA ENTERTAINMENT, INC., et al.

Defendants.

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Civil No: 04 CV 1035-B(BLM)

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’

MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT AS A

MATTER OF LAW

Defendants MGA Entertainment, Inc. and Issac Larian renew their motions for

judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) on the following issues: (1) trade

dress infringement; (2) copyright infringement; and (3) contributory copyright infringement

as to Issac Larian. 

I. BACKGROUND

In May 2004, Art Attacks Ink LLC (“Art Attacks”) filed a complaint against

Defendants MGA Entertainment, Inc. (“MGA”) and Issac Larian (“Larian”) alleging

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 The defamation claim was withdrawn prior to trial.

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multiple causes of action including trademark, trade dress and copyright infringement.

(Complaint; Docket No. 1.) Art Attacks alleged that MGA’s use of the trademark BRATZ

and the dolls and other associated products identified as BRATZ infringed Art Attacks’

copyrighted airbrush artwork, Art Attacks’ trade dress associated with its airbrushed

cartoon characters and Art Attacks’ marks BRAT, BRATS and SPOILED BRATS.

Art Attacks initially moved for a preliminary injunction; this was denied in

September 2004. (Order September 7, 2004; Docket No. 64.) In October 2006, the Court

heard Defendants’ motions for summary judgment on Art Attacks’ copyright, trademark

and trade dress infringement claims and on Art Attacks’ defamation claims. The Court

granted-in-part summary judgment as to no infringement of the marks BRAT and BRATS,

finding that finds that Art Attacks had no protection for these two marks. The Court denied

summary judgment as to the mark SPOILED BRAT and also denied the motions with

respect to trade dress infringement, copyright infringement and defamation because

material issues of fact remained on each of these claims. (Order Oct. 31, 2006; docket no.

295.) The case then proceeded to trial.1

 

A jury trial was held beginning on April 23, 2007, on the remaining copyright,

trademark and trade dress infringement claims, including direct infringement claims against

MGA and contributory copyright infringement against Larian. The case was submitted to

the jury on May 7, 2007. The jury reached a partial verdict, finding no infringement of the

mark SPOILED BRATS; the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the trade dress and

copyright infringement claims. Defendants now move for judgment as a matter of law

contending that there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find for Plaintiff on

either the trade dress or copyright infringement claims.

II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

“A jury's inability to reach a verdict does not necessarily preclude a judgment as a

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matter of law.” Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt, 240 F.3d 1185, 1197

(9th Cir. 2000); Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). However, in considering the motion, the Court may

not substitute its view of the evidence for the jury's, may not make credibility

determinations, and may not weigh the evidence. Johnson v. Paradise Valley Unified

School District, 251 F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 2001). “The test is whether the evidence,

construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, permits only one reasonable

conclusion . . . .” White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 2002). “If

reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence, however, a verdict should

not be directed.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986). 

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Copyright Infringement

To prevail on a claim of copyright infringement a plaintiff must show that 1) it owns

a valid copyright in the work in question and 2) that the defendant copied protected

elements of that work. Cavalier v. Random House, 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002). A

plaintiff may establish copying by either presenting direct evidence of copying or by

showing that the defendant had access to the work and that the works at issue are

substantially similar. Id. Here, MGA moves for judgment as a matter of law only on the

element of access, contending that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial on this

element.

Direct evidence is not always necessary to show access. Access may be established

by showing that the defendant has a reasonable possibility to view the plaintiff’s work. 

Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 482 (9th Cir. 2000). The evidence must

rise beyond mere speculation or a bare possibility, but it may be proved circumstantially

such as by showing a chain of events linking plaintiff’s work and defendant’s alleged

access and/or showing that plaintiff’s work was widely disseminated. Id.

At trial, Art Attacks presented no direct evidence of access by MGA or Carter

Bryant (“Bryant”), the alleged creator of MGAs BRATZ doll designs. Instead, Art Attacks

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offered several lines of circumstantial evidence regarding the possibility of access by MGA

and its associates. The evidence showed that Art Attacks exhibited images of the spoiled

brats characters on T-shirts in its booths at numerous fairs in Southern California (such as

the Del Mar Fair and the Los Angeles County Fair) starting approximately in 1996. Art

Attacks also had a website that began approximately in the same time frame.

Although the evidence showed that millions of people attended the fairs at which

Art Attacks exhibited the spoiled brat images, the key question is not whether anyone

would have had the possibility to view the works, but rather, whether there was a

reasonable possibility that the Defendants would have viewed the works. As to this

question, only two pieces of evidence related to the fair exhibitions were presented. The

first was the geographic proximity of MGA and Carter Bryant’s work and residence (for a

limited amount of time) near and around Los Angeles to the fairs in Southern California at

which Art Attacks exhibited its work. This alone is insufficient. See Jason v. Fonda, 526

F. Supp. 774, 776 (D.C. Cal. 1981) (opinion affirmed and incorporated by Jason v. Fonda,

698 F.2d 966, 967 (9th Cir. 1982) (presence of 200-700 copies of plaintiff’s book in

Southern California bookstores in proximity to defendants working at United Artists and

NBC created only a bare possibility, not a reasonable possibility of access).

The second piece of evidence was MGA’s answer to one of Art Attacks’

interrogatories, which indicated that one MGA employee, Aileen Storer, identified as a

“relevant, current employee who had decision-making authority with respect to the creative

design and development of the first generation ‘Bratz’ dolls and MGA’s first ‘Bratz’

mark,” visited the Los Angeles County fair in Pomona “on one or more occasions.” (Pl.’s

Ex. 3050.) The date was not definitively established; the interrogatory answer, given in

2005, stated that she attended sometime in the last ten years, which would place the time

between 1995 and 2005. Art Attacks began exhibiting at this particular fair in 1998. ( Trial

Tr. Apr. 24, 2007, Test. J. Mauck 72:13-17.) The Bratz dolls were first marketed in 2001. 

Thus, the only relevant years here are 1998-2001, a span of three of the possible ten years

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Ms. Storer may have attended the fair. Even with this possibility, it still must be

conjectured that Ms. Storer viewed or had the reasonable possibility to view the Art

Attacks’ booth and saw within that booth the images of the spoiled brats. The evidence

indicated that these images were not featured or highlighted in any way in the booth, but

instead were exhibited mixed among a plethora of other images (Trial Tr. Apr. 30, 2007,

Test. J. Mauck 240-247; Ex. 5012, 5014, 5060.) 

The connection of Ms. Storer to Art Attacks’ works does not rise above a bare

possibility of access. Although Plaintiff compares the instant circumstances to Three Boys

Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 2000), key differences are apparent. Three

Boys was predicated on wide dissemination plus subconscious copying. Id. at 482. Not

only were plaintiff’s songs in that case widely played on radio and television where

defendant grew up, but defendant also admitted to being a fan and collector of plaintiff’s

music. Here, the connection between Defendants and the works in question is even more

attenuated. Unlike the repeated exposure of the defendant in Three Boys to plaintiff’s

music, here there is only the possibility that one MGA employee was at the same fair as Art

Attacks in the relevant period. Moreover, the potential exposure of Ms. Storer to the

spoiled brat images, surrounded in Art Attacks’ booth by many others images, was

minimal. 

As to the dissemination of the work on Art Attacks’ website, the evidence was

insufficient to establish either wide dissemination or an inference that MGA or Bryant had

a reasonable possibility of visiting the site. There was no evidence of “hits” to the website,

nor evidence that MGA or its associates ever viewed the website. There were no

searchable “metatags” related to the spoiled brats that would likely lead a user to the site. 

No evidence was presented that MGA or Bryant ever used the web in general in connection

with the design of their BRATZ products. In its totality, there was no evidence to suggest

MGA and/or its associates had a reasonable possibility of viewing or even stumbling across

Art Attacks’ website. See e.g., Hoch v. MasterCard Intern. Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 1217,

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1221 (D. Minn. 2003) (failure to track “hits” to website in relevant months coupled with no

evidence that anyone actually viewed the site was insufficient to establish wide

dissemination based on website); Nicholls v. Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures, Inc., 367

F. Supp.2d 514, 521 -522 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (insufficient evidence of access where plaintiff

could not establish when the images were posted to the website, nor that defendant viewed

the site before the accused work was created).

Finally, Art Attacks’ argument that the question of access relies on the jury’s

determination of Bryant’s credibility is not persuasive. Art Attacks argues that the jury was

not required to believe Bryant’s testimony regarding when and how he conceived of the

BRATZ doll designs and that Bryant’s credibility was challenged when it was revealed that

Bryant’s contract with Mattel, overlapping the relevant time period, may have provided a

motive for him to “create” this story. (Trial Tr. May 2, 2007, Test. Bryant 101:24-102-1,

110:24-114:5, 117:2-12, 120:20-121:14, 121:15-19; Ex. 3071, 3073.) Even if arguendo the

jury discarded all of Bryant’s testimony on the BRATZ creation, the absence of this

evidence does not “create” evidence in Art Attacks’ favor to substantiate a reasonable

possibility of access by Bryant or MGA to Art Attacks’ works; it only creates an absence of

explanation as to how Bryant and/or MGA created the BRATZ. 

In sum, Plaintiff’s evidence requires too much conjecture and speculation to

generate a reasonable possibility of access. Because the Court therefore finds that there

was no evidence on which a reasonable jury could find the required element of access,

MGA’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on the claim of copyright infringement is

GRANTED.

B. Contributory Infringement

Based on the determination as a matter of law that there is no copyright infringement

by MGA, there can be no contributory infringement by Larian. Thus, simply on this

ground, the motion is GRANTED. 

Moreover, even without the finding on copyright infringement, as a matter of law,

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 The Ninth Circuit has recently (a few weeks after the instant trial ended) refined its standard for

contributory infringement based on the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc.

v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 932 (2005). "[A]n actor may be contributorily liable for intentionally

encouraging direct infringement if the actor knowingly takes steps that are substantially certain to result in such

direct infringement." Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., - - F.3d - - , 2007 WL 1428632, *17 (9th Cir. May

16, 2007) (emphasis added). To the extent that Perfect 10 removes the “should have known” aspect of

contributory infringement provided in the Court’s jury instructions, it is unclear that this new standard would

apply retroactively to the instant case. Regardless, since the Court finds that the evidence fails to support even

the lower “should have known” standard, Perfect 10 would not change the Court’s ruling here.

7 04cv1035

the Court finds that no reasonable jury could find contributory infringement by Larian

based on the evidence presented at trial. The Court instructed the jury that contributory

infringement could be proven by a showing that Larian knew or should have known of

MGA’s infringing activity along with a showing that he induced, caused or materially

contributed to the infringing activity. (Court’s Jury Instruction No. 41; Docket No. 441.)

There was no evidence of actual knowledge by Larian that MGA’s works infringed

Art Attack’s copyright. The only evidence argued by Art Attacks’ to evidence Larian’s

knowledge is its supposition that Larian should have known of the infringement. Art

Attacks speculates that Bryant’s testimony regarding his association with Mattel during his

negotiations with MGA creates credibility issues as to how and when Bryant may have

conceived of the BRATZ doll design. Art Attacks thus argues that Larian should have been

tasked with doing a fuller investigation before using Bryant’s designs. However, even

given this supposition, Art Attacks failed to establish that Larian should have known of Art

Attacks’ copyright or that Bryant’s designs may have infringed such rights. Furthermore,

negligence is not the standard here; contributory infringement involves a showing of

knowledge and intent.2

 The Court therefore finds that no reasonable jury could have found

Larian liable for contributory infringement and on this ground as well, MGA’s motion for

judgment as a matter of law is GRANTED.

C. Trade Dress Infringement

“[T]rade dress may be protected if it is nonfunctional and has acquired secondary

meaning and if its imitation creates a likelihood of consumer confusion.” Fuddruckers, Inc.

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3

 Absence of a survey evidence or consumer testimony does not automatically create a failure of

evidence on secondary meaning. See Clamp Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Enco Mfg. Co., Inc., 870 F.2d 512, 517 (9th Cir.

1989) (evidence of use and advertising of trade dress but lack of evidence of views of actual purchasers still

sufficient to establish secondary meaning).

4

Although purchaser Suzanne Beltran testified that she repeatedly bought shirts with the images on

them for her daughters, she did not testify as to any association she had formed between a recognition of the

images and the company. (4/24/07 Beltran Test. 84:20 - 93:23.)

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v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 1987). MGA argues that there was

insubstantial evidence for a jury to find secondary meaning or likelihood of confusion

based on the evidence presented at trial.

1. Secondary Meaning

“A product's trade dress attains secondary meaning when the purchasing public

associates the dress with a single producer or source rather than just the product itself.” 

First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1383 (9th Cir. 1987). A number of

factors can be indicative of secondary meaning and these were provided to the jury in

Court’s Jury Instruction No. 53: (1) purchaser perception; (2) advertisement; (3)

demonstrated utility; (4) extent of use; (5) exclusivity; and (6) actual confusion. The first

two factors constitute the focus here.

Very little evidence of purchaser perception was presented to the jury. Art Attacks

had no survey evidence of purchasers which could have provided persuasive evidence of

consumer’s recognition of the trade dress. See Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888

F.2d 609, 615 (9th Cir. 1989) (“An expert survey of purchasers can provide the most

persuasive evidence of secondary meaning.”).3

 While Art Attacks points to the testimony

on the distinctive style of its images, only one purchaser testified on this issue; the

remainder of the testimony came from Art Attacks’ expert Dru Blair, an artist, Sheila Boyd,

a fair vendor, and Wendy Hodent, a friend to Joanne Mauck and co-exhibitor at the Del

Mar Fair. None of these witnesses constitute the purchasing public. Only one purchaser,

Tammie Gallagher, testified to the association she made between the image on Art Attacks’

business card and the Art Attacks company.4

 

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The circumstances here thus mirror that of Japan Telecom, Inc. v. Japan Telecom

America Inc., 287 F.3d 866, 874 (9th Cir. 2002), where sparse evidence of purchaser

recognition came from longtime customers and associates. As the Court noted in Japan

Telecom, “every small business with a descriptive name can point to at least a few former

customers who remember its name . . . . None of that means that the relevant buying public

makes the same associations.” Id. For such evidence to be persuasive there must be a

showing that the mental image formed by such witnesses was not just due to personal

relationships with the business owner but “because of some stimulus that was just as likely

to affect members of the buying public as it was likely to affect them.” See id. While Art

Attacks argues that its witnesses testified to the distinctive look of the spoiled brats images,

it offered no evidence why the public would have associated the images to Art Attacks (or

at least identified the images as originating from a single source, even if the identity of the

source was unknown).

With regard to advertisement, whether it is enough to create secondary meaning

depends on its “amount, nature and geographic scope.” Japan Telecomm, 287 F.3d at 875.

The evidence indicated that Art Attacks spent only approximately $2000 a year for

business cards and order forms primarily given to purchasers of its T-shirts. Art Attacks’

primary source of publicity came from its display at its fair booths of the T-shirt images

that it airbrushed, as well as on the purchased T-shirts that were either worn by the

purchasers or exhibited through the clear plastic bag in which they were purchased. The

fairs at which Art Attacks exhibited attracted millions of people over the years involved but

how many people even saw the booth of the cartoon images is total speculation. 

Additionally, Art Attacks advertised its images on its website but the site did not feature the

images; they could only be found by “scrolling down” through an eclectic collection of

information. The evidence does not support a focused program of advertising the spoiled

brat business, but only a diffuse, local listing of the company which included some images

along with a non-specific inventory of other artistic offerings.

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5

 Ms. Mauck testified that business cards and order forms were distributed with purchases and that

brochures were available at the fair booths. (Trial Tr. Apr. 30, 2007, Test. J. Mauck 28:12-30:7, Apr. 26, 2007,

31:1-32:1.) However, only approximately 2,000 T-shirts painted with spoiled brats were sold per year starting

from 1993 (Trial Tr. Apr. 26, 2007, Test. J. Mauck 64:3-9) and no estimate of the number of brochures

distributed was presented.

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Advertising, even it were substantial, which it is not, is not enough. “The

advertising and promotional activities must involve ‘image advertising,’ that is, the ads

must feature in some way the trade dress itself” such that potential customers associate the

trade dress with its source. First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1383

(9th Cir. 1987). Here, there is only de minimus evidence of image advertising: the images

were present at Art Attacks’ booth and some of the spoiled brat images were displayed on

Art Attacks’ website. However, neither of these displays were focused on the spoiled brat

images. Both the booths at the fair and the website displayed many images, most of which

were unrelated to the spoiled brats images. (Trial Tr. April 24, 2007, Test. S. Stone 21:3-

17, 31:7-12; Ex. 374 (website); Ex. 5012, 5014. 5060 (fair booth photos); Trial Tr. April

30, 2007, Test. J. Mauck 240:15 - 248:5.) See e.g., First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc.,

809 F.2d 1378, 1383 (9th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff’s advertising did not focus on the claimed

trade dress, the color and shape of product, and thus did not encourage consumers to

associate the trade dress with their source in a manner sufficient to establish secondary

meaning); Walker & Zanger, Inc. v. Paragon Industries, Inc., - - F. Supp 2d - - , 2007 WL

1302980, *10 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2007) (noting that “the advertising must direct the

consumer to those features claimed as trade dress; merely ‘featuring’ the relevant aspect of

the product does not suffice”). As for the business cards and brochures containing one or

more of the spoiled brat images and the company name that were distributed to purchasers

and/or available at the fair booths, the numbers distributed were either unestablished or

minimal.5

 See e.g., Continental Laboratory Products, Inc. v. Medax Intern., Inc., 114 F.

Supp. 2d 992, 1001 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (distribution of flyers and booklets to a minimal

and/or unidentified number of recipients insufficient to establish secondary meaning). 

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6

 Joann Mauck testified that Art Attacks was a traveling vendor for Wal-Mart starting in 1997 and

continuing through 2000. (Trial Tr. Apr. 26, 2007, Test. J Mauck 10:23-17-1.) 

11 04cv1035

There also was little or no evidence that any of Art Attacks’ advertising was effective. 

Many of the witnesses MGA presented and even some of those for Art Attacks were

unaware of the spoiled brat images and had never heard of Art Attacks. In total, there was

insufficient evidence of “image advertising” presented at trial to establish secondary

meaning. 

Therefore, lacking sufficient evidence of purchaser perception or advertising to

substantiate secondary meaning, no reasonable jury could find that this element was

satisfied on the trade dress infringement claim; the Court therefore GRANTS MGA’s

motion on this ground.

2. Likelihood of Confusion

A multi-factor test is applied to assess likelihood of confusion: 1) strength of the

mark; 2) proximity of the goods; 3) similarity of the marks; 4) evidence of actual

confusion; 5) marketing channels used; 6) type of goods and the degree of care likely to be

exercised by the purchaser; 7) defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and 8) likelihood of

expansion of the product lines. First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378,

1384 (9th Cir. 1987); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 349-50 (9th Cir. 1979).

These factors were given to the jury in the Court’s Jury Instruction No. 54; only three of the

factors figured at all in the evidence, and these only minimally. 

On the issue of marketing channels, there was minimal overlap. The evidence

showed that Art Attacks’ primary market is county fairs, whereas BRATZ products are sold

at retail stores. The only possible overlap was the appearance of an Art Attacks booth

inside Wal-Mart where customers could bring T-shirts to be painted by Art Attacks. 

However, Art Attacks had stopped selling at Wal-Mart after 2000, before the BRATZ

products became available in 2001.6

As to type of goods and degree of care, some differences were apparent. Art

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7

 Ms. Mauck’s testimony as to what customers said to her about confusion was admitted not for the

truth of the matter but as to effect on Ms. Mauck, that she was accused of copying. (Trial Tr. Apr. 26, 2007,

Test. J. Mauck 72:11-19.)

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Attacks’ products are T-shirts and other clothing individually air-brushed for the customer,

often based on customer requests as to the details of the images painted. Art Attacks does

not sell dolls. BRATZ products include T-shirts as well as dolls; these products are

purchased “as is” off the shelf. Regarding degree of care, MGA argues that Art Attacks’

customers took care in planning their visits to the Art Attacks’ booth and in selecting their

images for T-shirts indicating a higher degree of care. However, as to the purchasing

generally of T-shirts and dolls, there was little evidence. On this factor, a reasonable juror

using common sense might conclude that these products which are relatively inexpensive

non-luxury items might be purchased with a lesser degree of care than other items (such as

a high priced car or computer).

On actual confusion, MGA contends that simply the absence of any survey evidence

to show actual consumer confusion is definitive. While absence of survey evidence can

indicate that a likelihood of confusion is not present, see Essence Communications, Inc. v.

Singh Industries, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 261, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), other evidence of actual

confusion may be persuasive, see e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Azrak-Hamway Intern., Inc., 724

F.2d 357, 361 (2nd Cir. 1983) (noting that “direct evidence of actual confusion by

customers, retailers, salesmen, or the like” and/or survey evidence are usual ways of

demonstrating a likelihood of confusion); see also Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin

Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1404 n.14 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting at least three types of

proof for a likelihood of confusion: survey evidence; evidence of actual confusion; and

similarities of the marks and their use in the marketplace). Here, three witnesses (in

addition to JoAnn Mauck)7

 testified to actual confusion as to the source of the products. 

MGA argues that these witnesses all had biases; one witness was a friend of Ms. Mauck

and the other two were long-time customers. While such connections may impact the

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 MGA’s reliance on Continental Laboratory Products, Inc. v. Medax Intern., Inc., 114 F. Supp.2d

992,1006 (S.D. Cal 2000) is unhelpful here. That case primarily deals with testimony of employees’ confusion

as failing to be persuasive evidence of a consumer’s confusion. Here, the testimony was from at least three

consumers (not employees).

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credibility of such witnesses, credibility is not for the Court to judge, that was left to the

jury.8

 

MGA also argues that this evidence was de minimus. The amount of actual

confusion that need be shown may be influenced by the similarity between the products. 

Where such similarity is strikingly absent or where it is clear consumers would have been

skeptical that the products came from the same source, de minimus evidence of confusion

may fail to support a likelihood of confusion. See King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v.

Chrysler Corp., 185 F.3d 1084, 1093 (10th Cir. 1999) (“The de minimis evidence of actual

confusion is especially undermined in this case by the sheer lack of similarity between the

marks.”); Int’l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, v. Winship Green Nursing

Center, 103 F.3d 196, 205 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting that “no person of ordinary prudence and

normal intelligence . . . would have been confused as to the source” and thus, the evidence

was not representative of actual confusion). Here however, the jury made no finding on the

actual similarity of the products. The issue of similarity was hotly disputed by the parties’

experts. While MGA argues that its expert SB Masters should be given more weight

because her testimony went more to the overall impression of the products in the

marketplace, again that is for a jury to decide, not the Court.

In sum, although the evidence was very slim, the Court cannot say that a reasonable

jury could have only found there to be no likelihood of confusion. However, since as

explained above, sufficient evidence of secondary meaning was lacking, MGA’s motion for

judgement as a matter of law on the trade dress claim is GRANTED.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons herein, the Court GRANTS MGA’s motion for judgment as a matter

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of law on the claim of copyright infringement. The Court also GRANTS MGA’s motion

for judgment as a matter of law on contributory copyright infringement as to Larian and on

trade dress infringement.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 2, 2007

Hon. Rudi M. Brewster

United States Senior District Court Judge

cc: Hon. Barbara L. Major

 United States Magistrate Judge

 All Counsel of Record

Case 3:04-cv-01035-JAH-BLM Document 491 Filed 07/02/07 Page 14 of 14