Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00696/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00696-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Brendan Liam O'Rourke,

Petitioner,

v.

Joe Lizzaraga, et al.,

Respondents.

Case No.: 15-cv-00696-BAS-JLB

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION DENYING 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS

I. 

INTRODUCTION

On March 27, 2015, Brendan Liam O’Rourke (“Petitioner”), a California state

prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 challenging the constitutionality of his state court convictions. (ECF No. 1.) On

June 15, 2015, J. Lizzaraga (“Respondent”) filed the Answer and Memorandum of Points 

and Authorities in Support of the Answer as well as lodgments of the state court record. 

(ECF Nos. 12 and 13.) The deadline to file a traverse was July 20, 2015. To date, no 

traverse has been filed in this case.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge

Cynthia Bashant pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United 

States District Court for the Southern District of California. Having reviewed the record, 

and for the reasons discussed below, the Court recommends the Petition be DENIED.

II.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner was charged and convicted on multiple counts of premeditated attempted 

murder and assault with a firearm when he opened fire at Kelly Elementary School during 

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the recess hour. (ECF No. 13-22 at 3.) Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty by reason of 

insanity and his trial was separated into two phases: a guilt phase and a sanity phase. (Id.

at 2-4.) At the conclusion of the guilt phase, the jury found Petitioner guilty of numerous 

counts of premeditated attempted murder and assault with a firearm, with true findings on 

personal firearm use and great bodily injury enhancements. (Id. at 3.) After the sanity 

phase of the trial, the jury rejected Petitioner’s not guilty by reason of insanity defense, 

“finding him sane at the time of the offenses.” (Id. at 9). The trial court sentenced him to 

a determinate term of 90 years and an indeterminate term of 99 years to life. (Id.)

Petitioner filed a direct appeal to the California Court of Appeal. On appeal, 

Petitioner argued that the jury could not have reasonably rejected the evidence showing 

that he was insane when he opened fire at the school. (ECF No. 13-19 at 38-39; id. at 42.) 

Petitioner argued that he was insane because he was incapable of distinguishing moral right 

from wrong at the time of the shootings and that he had met his burden to show he was not 

guilty by reason of insanity on this basis.

1

 (ECF No. 13-21 at 6.) The California Court of 

Appeal affirmed the jury’s sanity phase verdict in an unpublished written opinion. (ECF 

No. 13-22 at 14-15.) The Court of Appeal found that the evidence at trial gave rise to 

conflicting inferences on the issue of sanity and thus, the jury was entitled to weigh these 

inferences and resolve the conflict. (Id. at 13 (citing People v Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 804 

(1964)).) Petitioner filed a petition for review on this issue with the Supreme Court of 

California. (ECF No. 13-23.) On February 11, 2014, the Supreme Court of California 

denied review without comment.

2

 (ECF No. 13-24.)

On May 27, 2015, Petitioner filed the present petition for a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the constitutionality of hisstate court convictions. 

(ECF No. 1.) Petitioner seeks relief for his convictions on the grounds that the jury could 

 

1 Petitioner acknowledged on direct appeal that he knew the quality and nature of his actions and that he 

knew his actions were legally wrong. Petitioner only argued that he did not know his acts were morally

wrong. (ECF No. 1 at 6.)

2 Petitioner did not file any state habeas corpus petitions.

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not have reasonably rejected his claim of not guilty by reason of insanity. (Id. at 6, 12, 18.) 

Although labeled as three separate grounds, all three of Petitioner’s claims amount to a 

single claim: a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. 

Petitioner argues that the evidence during the sanity phase of his trial showed that he was 

unable to tell moral right from wrong at the time of the shooting and that said evidence was 

of such weight and character that it could not have reasonably been rejected by a jury. (Id.) 

The petition is timely3and properly exhausted.

4

 (ECF No. 1; ECF No. 12 at 2.)

On June 15, 2015, Respondent filed the Answer and Memorandum of Points and 

Authorities in Support of the Answer as well as lodgments of the state court record. (ECF 

Nos. 12-13.) Respondent contends that the California Court of Appeal’s rejection of 

Petitioner’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence was not contrary to, or an 

objectively unreasonable application of, any clearly established Federal law as determined 

by the United States Supreme Court. (ECF No. 12-1 at 27-31.)

III.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts that follow are taken substantially from the California Court of Appeal 

opinion, an unpublished written decision affirming the judgment against Petitioner. (ECF 

No. 13-22.) A presumption of correctness attaches to state court determinations of factual 

issues on federal habeas review. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

On October 8, 2010, [Petitioner] went to an elementary 

school during the lunch recess when there were many children 

on the playground. He had a gun in one hand and a gas can in 

his other hand. As he walked across the playground, [Petitioner]

said “This is just a drill. These are not real bullets.” He then 

started shooting at the children. As the children ran away from 

him, he chased them and continued shooting at them. When a

 

3

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court).

4

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant 

has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State).

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noon duty employee confronted him, he pointed the gun at her 

and she heard it click. When the gun did not fire, [Petitioner] put 

down the gas can and tried to reload the gun. School employees 

continued to direct children to run to safety into classrooms. 

When a campus monitor approached [Petitioner] and asked, 

“What the hell are you doing?” [Petitioner] responded, “This is 

a drill, and these are blanks.”

Several construction workers at the school intervened in 

the incident. [Petitioner] was still trying to reload his weapon, 

and the workers were trying to corner him and yelling at him to 

stop and put the gun down. [Petitioner] aimed the gun at the 

workers and moved towards them. A worker heard the gun click. 

Another worker was moving crying children inside the jobsite to 

get them away from [Petitioner]. [Petitioner] started running

away across a field; he continued trying to load his gun as he was 

being chased by the construction workers. [Petitioner] exited the 

playground by climbing over a fence, and went towards his 

vehicle. Meanwhile, a construction worker ran to his truck, 

drove by [Petitioner’s] vehicle, and told [Petitioner] to stop and 

put the gun down. When [Petitioner] pointed his gun at the 

construction worker, the worker ran into [Petitioner] with his 

truck. The workers kicked and hit [Petitioner], grabbed the gun, 

and held [Petitioner] until the police arrived.

[Petitioner] had ammunition and a gun speed loader in his 

jacket pockets. There was a propane tank on the sidewalk by

[Petitioner’s] vehicle. [Petitioner’s] gas can, along with long 

matches, were found on the school grounds. An FBI bomb 

technician testified that a gas can, matches, and a propane tank 

are common materials used to create a large “fireball” explosion; 

i.e., by spreading the gas on the ground, lighting the gas, putting 

the propane tank in the middle of the gas, and then shooting the 

propane tank.

During the incident, witnesses observed that [Petitioner]

looked “crazed,” “distant, far-off” and “disconnected.” He was 

yelling “something about Christians,” and “Fuck Barack 

Obama”; “Kill Obama”; “Kill all the little fags”; and “Fuck 

A.I.G.” Two children suffered nonfatal gunshot wounds from 

the attack. The jury convicted [Petitioner] of numerous counts 

of premeditated attempted murder and assault with a firearm, 

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with true findings on personal firearm use and great bodily injury

enhancements.

Four psychiatrists (Drs. Jaga Glassman, Richard 

Rappaport, David Naimark, and Park Dietz) testified at the sanity 

phase of the trial. These experts summarized [Petitioner’s]

history of mental illness and his expressed motivations for the 

attack, and opined on the issue of his sanity at the time of the 

offense. All the doctors agreed that at the time of the offense 

[Petitioner] suffered from a serious mental illness involving

delusional beliefs. There was also no dispute that he understood 

the nature and quality of his acts, and that he understood his acts 

were legally wrong. However, the experts were not unanimous 

on whether [Petitioner] understood his acts were morally wrong. 

Dr. Dietz (retained by the prosecution) opined [Petitioner]

understood the immorality of his conduct, whereas the other 

three doctors opined he did not. Evidence presented at the sanity 

phase showed that [Petitioner] had long-standing delusions that 

members of a conspiracy were persecuting him, including by 

torturing him, holding him captive in a basement, threatening his 

life, preventing him from dating younger women, making false 

claims that he had committed rape, and telling women that he 

was homosexual. In the months prior to the offense, [Petitioner]

sent e-mails to his half-brother (Larry) and made lengthy journal 

entries that set forth his beliefs and perceptions. In these 

writings, as well as in his statements after the offense, he stated 

that the members of the conspiracy (who were part of “AIG 

insurance” and the “Illinois Underground Political 

Weathermen”) did not trust him because he knew about their 

illicit activities; they thought he might “narc” on them; the only 

way he could escape their persecution was to join them and 

commit a horrible terrorist act so that he would be discredited;

and he had decided that he had no choice but to commit a terrorist 

attack in order to stop the persecution and to save and improve 

his life.

(ECF No. 13-22 at 2-5.)

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review for 

federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district 

court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in 

[sic] behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 

State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation 

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

Additionally, Petitioner’s habeas claims are subject to the provisions of the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 

U.S. 320, 326 (1997) (Federal courts reviewing any petition filed in federal court after the 

April 24, 1996 enactment of “AEDPA,” will apply its provisions). Under AEDPA, the 

standard of review for Petitioner’s habeas claims, is as follows:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person 

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the 

claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Clearly established Federal law,” as understood in the context of § 2254(d)(1),

consists of holdings of Supreme Court decisions. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 365

(2000) (stating that the phrase “clearly established Federal law,” as determined by the 

United States Supreme Court, refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the 

Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision”). In order 

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to grant habeas corpus relief, a federal habeas court must rule out whether it is possible that 

“fair-minded jurists” could disagree that the decision is inconsistent with clearly 

established federal law. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). To satisfy 

§ 2254(d)(2), a petitioner must demonstrate that the factual findings upon which the state 

court’s adjudication of his claims rest, assuming it rests upon a determination of the facts, 

are objectively unreasonable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

Where, as here, there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court on appeal, 

the federal habeas court “looks through” to the underlying appellate decision to determine 

whether AEDPA’s standard for habeas relief is met. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 

801-06 (1991); see also Harrington, 562 U.S. at 99-100 (holding that an unexplained denial 

of a claim by the California Supreme Court is an adjudication on the merits of the claim 

and is entitled to deference unless “there is reason to think some other explanation for the 

state court’s decision is likely”). Therefore, the appellate decision before this Court is the 

California Court of Appeal’s November 25, 2013, written decision affirming the jury’s 

sanity phase verdict. (ECF No. 13-22.)

V. 

DISCUSSION

As set forth above, Petitioner seeks habeas relief for his state court convictions on 

the ground that the jury could not have reasonably rejected his defense of not guilty by 

reason of insanity. Petitioner’s argument focuses primarily on the trial testimony of Drs. 

Glassman, Naimark, Rappaport, and Dietz. Petitioner argues that the jury should have 

disregarded the testimony given by the prosecution’s expert, Dr. Dietz, that Petitioner

understood the morality of his actions at the time of the offenses. (ECF No. 1.) 

Specifically, Petitioner argues that Dr. Dietz lacked credibility, was biased, and did not 

properly differentiate and explain the elements necessary for a finding of not guilty by 

reason of insanity. (Id. at 12-13.) Due to these issues, Petitioner contends that the 

testimony of the three other experts that he was insane at the time of the offenses could not 

have been reasonably rejected by the jury. (Id. at 6, 12, 18.)

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As an initial matter, it does not appear that Petitioner’s claim relating to his insanity 

defense is a cognizable federal habeas claim. A district court will entertain a habeas 

petition on “behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on 

the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 

United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Petitioner has not identified any case law holding 

that a claim raising the adequacy of proof of an insanity defense is a cognizable habeas 

claim. In fact, the district courts which have addressed the issue consistently hold that such 

a claim is not a cognizable habeas claim. See, e.g., Maria v. Grounds, No. 13cv1183, 2015 

WL 4608086, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2015) (“a claim regarding the adequacy of the 

proof of an insanity defense ‘is really a challenge based on state law’ procedures that does 

not raise a federal constitutional question”); Moncada v. Smalls, No. 09cv5745, 2012 WL 

3150596, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2012) (“numerous courts have held that, where the 

defendant bears of the burden of proving insanity as a defense, constitutional challenges 

arising from a bifurcated trial regarding the defendant’s sanity are not cognizable on federal 

habeas review”). Nevertheless, even if Petitioner’s sanity phase evidence claim is 

cognizable on federal habeas review, it fails.

A. The California Court of Appeal’s Denial of Petitioner’s Claim was not 

Contrary to, nor did it Involve an Unreasonable Application of, Clearly 

Established Federal Law

Petitioner does not dispute that all the elements required to convict him were met 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, Petitioner argues that it was a constitutional error for 

the jury to reject his defense of not guilty by reason of insanity and convict him of the 

crimes charged. (ECF No. 1.) Petitioner raised this argument on appeal, and the California 

Court of Appeal affirmed the jury’s sanity phase verdict, concluding that the jury could 

have reasonably rejected the evidence of insanity. (ECF No. 13-22 at 11-14.) 

A state-court decision is “contrary to” the Supreme Court’s clearly established 

precedents if it “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme 

Court’s] cases” or if it “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a 

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decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a different result.” Early v. 

Parker, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). As to Petitioner’s plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, 

the Supreme Court of the United States has not said that a state is constitutionally required 

to recognize an insanity defense. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 449 (1992). Cf. 

Hawkins v. Horal, 572 F. App’x 480, 480-81 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[Petitioner] has not 

identified any case where the Supreme Court addressed challenges to the sufficiency of the 

evidence regarding sanity when a defendant bears the burden of proving insanity as an 

affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, he has not shown that 

there is a state or federal right to have the State prove sanity where it is not an element of 

the crime.”).

To the extent that Petitioner’s claim could be construed as a due process claim, the 

United States Supreme Court in Jackson stated that an essential safeguard of the Fourteenth 

Amendment’s due process clause is that “no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a 

criminal conviction except upon sufficient proof, defined as evidence necessary to 

convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the 

offense.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979) (emphasis added). Federal habeas 

courts must analyze Jackson claims “with explicit reference to the substantive elements of 

the criminal offense as defined by state law.” Boyer v. Belleque, 659 F.3d 957, 964 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The Jackson standard permits relief only when “no rational 

trier of fact” could have found the elements necessary for guilt satisfied beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. Further, where, as here, AEDPA applies, a 

federal habeas court must apply the standards of Jackson with an additional layer of 

deference and can only grant habeas relief if the state appellate court’s application of the

Jackson standard was “objectively unreasonable.” Boyer, 659 F.3d at 965.

Here, California state law applies. Under California law, sanity is not an element of 

the crimes for which Petitioner was convicted. Rather, a claim of insanity operates as an 

affirmative defense to a criminal charge and is “separate and independent from the 

elements of any underlying crime.” People v. Hernandez, 22 Cal. 4th 512, 522 (2000). 

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Thus, the present case is distinguished from Jackson because Petitioner’s sanity was not 

an element required for the offenses for which he was convicted.

Therefore, because the United States Supreme Court has not yet recognized a

constitutional right to present a not guilty by reason of insanity defense and California law 

states that such a defense operates separately from the elements of any underlying crime, 

the California Court of Appeal’s determination that sufficient evidence existed to support 

the jury’s sanity phase verdict was not contrary to, nor did it involve an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law.

B. The Court of Appeal’s Rejection of Petitioner’s Challenge to Jury’s 

Sanity Phase Verdict did not Involve an Unreasonable Determination of 

the Facts in Light of the Evidence Presented

Petitioner argues that no rational trier of fact could have concluded he was sane at

the time of the attack in light of the evidence presented. (ECF No. 1.) Petitioner points to 

the fact that, of the four psychiatrists who testified during the sanity phase of his trial, three 

psychiatrists’ opinions showed that Petitioner was legally insane at the time of the attack. 

(ECF No. 13-8 at 1337; ECF No. 13-9 at 1546-47, 1459.) The only psychiatrist that 

provided an opinion to the contrary was Dr. Park Dietz. (ECF No. 13-11 at 1815.) With 

respect to Dr. Dietz’s opinion, Petitioner argues that it was null and should have been 

rejected for the following two reasons: (1) Dr. Dietz was purportedly biased;

5

and (2) Dr. 

Dietz’s opinion was supported by faulty reasoning as he failed to properly differentiate 

between moral wrong and legal wrong.6 (ECF No. 1.) Petitioner contends that these 

aspects of Dr. Dietz’s opinion made the opinions of Drs. Glassman, Naimark, and 

Rappaport “virtually uncontradicted.” (Id. at 6, 12, 18, 23.) Therefore, Petitioner contends 

 

5 Petitioner described Dr. Dietz’s opinions as being “result-oriented – crafted to fit the desire of the 

prosecutors who hired him.” (ECF No. 1 at 26.) 

6 During trial, Dr. Dietz stated that Petitioner’s belief that if armed police had been at the school, they 

would have shot him reflected “[Petitioner’s] knowing and understanding that he was using lethal force 

that is viewed as morally wrong.” Petitioner argued that Dr. Dietz’s opinion was flawed and was not 

based on “sound reasoning.” (Id. at 26-27 (emphasis added).)

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that because these experts’ opinions could not have reasonably been rejected, the California 

Court of Appeal erred in affirming the jury’s sanity phase verdict. (Id.)

“Under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court is relieved of AEDPA deference when a state 

court’s adjudication of a claim ‘resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’” 

Hibbler v. Benedetti, 693 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2012). To satisfy this provision, the 

petitioner must demonstrate that the factual findings upon which the state court’s 

adjudication rests, assuming it rests on a factual determination, are objectively 

unreasonable. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 4 (2011). When 

analyzing insufficiency of the evidence claims, federal habeas courts must “respect the 

province of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, 

and draw reasonable inferences from proven facts by assuming that the jury resolved all 

conflicts in a manner that supports the verdict.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. 

Under California law, Petitioner’s affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of 

insanity required that the jury find Petitioner “suffered from a mental defect.” People v. 

Coddington, 23 Cal. 4th 529, 608 (2000), overruled on other grounds by Price v. Superior 

Court, 25 Cal. 4th 1046 (2001). Additionally, the jury then had to find that said mental 

defect rendered Petitioner “incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality 

of his act or incapable of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the offenses.” Id. 

In the context of legal insanity, “‘wrong’ . . . is not limited to legal wrong, but properly 

encompasses moral wrong as well. Thus, the defendant who is incapable of distinguishing 

what is morally right from what is morally wrong is insane, even though he may understand 

the act is unlawful.” Id. 

Also under California law, the finder of fact – in this case, the jury – is the “sole 

arbiter of a Defendant’s sanity at the time of the charged crime.” Pop v. Yarborough, 354 

F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1138 (C.D. Cal. 2005). The jury’s finding “cannot be disturbed on appeal 

if there is any substantial and credible evidence in the record to support such a finding.” 

People v. Dean, 158 Cal. App. 2d 572, 577 (1958). Similar to the Jackson sufficiency of 

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the evidence standard discussed above, a state appellate court cannot overturn the trial 

court’s conclusion of sanity unless it finds – as a matter of law – that the evidence of 

insanity could “not reasonably be rejected.” Skinner, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 1059.

1. Expert Testimony at Trial

During the sanity phase of Petitioner’s trial, four experts testified as to Petitioner’s 

sanity at the time of the offenses. (ECF No. 13-8 at 1296-1402 (Dr. Jaga Glassman); ECF 

No. 13-9 at 1519-1598 (Dr. David Naimark); id. at 1411-1518 (Dr. Richard Rappaport); 

ECF No. 13-11 at 1738- 1872 (Dr. Park Dietz).) All four experts agreed that Petitioner 

suffered from a serious mental defect involving delusional beliefs when he committed the 

offenses. (ECF No. 13-8 at 1312 (Dr. Glassman); ECF No. 13-9 at 1545 (Dr. Naimark); 

id. at 1444 (Dr. Rappaport); ECF No. 13-11 at 1773 (Dr. Dietz).)7 All four experts also 

agreed that Petitioner understood the nature and quality of his acts at the time of the 

offenses. (ECF No. 13-8 at 1360-61 (Dr. Glassman); ECF No. 13-9 at 1544 (Dr. Naimark); 

id. at 1460 (Dr. Rappaport); ECF No. 13-11 at 1779 (Dr. Dietz).) However, only three out 

of the four experts opined that Petitioner was incapable of distinguishing moral right from 

wrong and was therefore legally insane. (ECF No. 13-22 at 4.) The fourth expert, Dr. 

Dietz, opined that Petitioner understood the immorality of his actions at the time of the 

shooting, thus rendering him legally sane at the time of the attack. (ECF No. 13-11 at 

1815.) 

a. Dr. Glassman’s Opinion

During the trial, Dr. Glassman opined that Petitioner met the standard required to be 

found not guilty by reason of insanity. (ECF No. 13-8 at 1337.) He explained that 

Petitioner was in “tremendous conflict morally.” (Id. at 1356.) Dr. Glassman went on to 

opine that “on the one hand [Petitioner knew it was] wrong to do something harmful to 

children; on the other hand, it’s right to stop the torture. And so he was very conflicted 

 

7 Drs. Jaga Glassman and David Naimark were appointed by the court. Dr. Richard Rappaport was 

retained by Petitioner. Dr. Park Dietz was retained by the prosecution. 

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about that and, by the very definition, incapable of distinguishing [moral] right from wrong 

because of that.” Id. Dr. Glassman concluded that the circumstances surrounding the 

attack support a finding that Petitioner was insane at the time of the attack. (Id. at 1355.)

b. Dr. Naimark’s Opinion

Dr. Naimark opined at trial that Petitioner did not know moral right from wrong at 

the time of the attack. (ECF No. 13-9 at 1546.) Dr. Naimark explained that “because of 

what [Petitioner] felt that he was going through and because of what he felt that he was 

being subjected to, that he may very well not have been able to distinguish that what he 

was doing was wrong at that time from something that would be right at that time.” (Id. at 

1571.) He testified that Petitioner “may have been confused around the moral issue.” (Id. 

at 1577.) Dr. Naimark testified that under California law, Petitioner was legally insane at 

the time he committed the attack on the school. (Id. at 1546-47.) 

c. Dr. Rappaport’s Opinion

As part of his testimony at trial, Dr. Rappaport opined that Petitioner met the 

standard required to be found not guilty by reason of insanity. (Id. at 1518.) Dr. Rappaport 

explained that because Petitioner had delusions of being physically tortured, Petitioner 

believed he had no alternative but to follow the instructions of his torturers. (Id. at 1443-

44.) Dr. Rappaport further explained that “in one context you could say [Petitioner knew 

his actions were] immoral or terrible but in another context, his feeling [was] that it was 

the right thing to do.” (Id.) Thus, Dr. Rappaport concluded that Petitioner was legally 

insane because Petitioner believed anyone in those circumstances would have “done the 

same thing to stop the torture.” (Id. at 1459.)

d. Dr. Park Dietz’s Opinion

At trial, Dr. Dietz opined that Petitioner understood the immorality of his acts. (ECF 

No. 13-11 at 1815.) Dr. Dietz pointed to events prior to the shooting to support his opinion 

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that Petitioner knew his acts were immoral.8 (ECF No. 13-11 at 1787-88.) Dr. Dietz also 

referred to instances before and after the attack, where Petitioner described his own actions 

as “horrible.” (Id. at 1789-90.) Dr. Dietz explained that “the word ‘horrible’ carries with 

it the sense of moral condemnation . . . It’s certainly a negative, undesired, undesirable 

activity that would be described as a horrible act.” (Id. at 1789.) Additionally, Dr. Dietz 

referenced other instances prior to and after the attack when Petitioner referred to the school 

shooting as a “terrorist attack” and an “act of terror” to demonstrate Petitioner’s moral 

condemnation of his actions. (Id. at 1792, 1794-95, 1799-1800.) 

In further support of his opinion that Petitioner understood the immorality of his 

acts, Dr. Dietz pointed to the fact that during the attack, Petitioner made a statement to a 

female witness that it was just a “drill” and the gun was loaded with “blanks.” (Id. at 1798.) 

With regard to this statement, Dr. Dietz opined that:

[It was a] statement that in and of itself if there were no other 

evidence that told us about moral wrongfulness, that one alone 

tells us that in the midst of the crime he knows that there’s a

difference between a criminal act of shooting people and a drill 

that’s just an exercise. And he’s using a cover story, a pretext, 

to lull this woman into a false sense of security by pretending it’s 

just a drill and he’s shooting blanks. So that statement alone 

during the crime, I think, has great significance.

(Id.) Based on the materials he reviewed, Dr. Dietz opined with “reasonable medical 

certainty” that, at the time of the crimes, Petitioner “knew that his actions were terroristic, 

unlawful, subjected him to arrest, subjected him to being convicted of a felony, and were 

legally and morally wrong.” (Id. at 1815.) 

/ / /

 

8 By observing essays on morality written by Petitioner while enrolled at the University of Phoenix, Dr. 

Dietz determined that the fact that Petitioner had been delusional for years did not “knock out the 

morality center of his mind as it were, that his moral reasoning in general remained intact despite his 

delusional beliefs.” (ECF No. 13-11 at 1787.) Dr. Dietz also relied on the fact that Petitioner repeatedly 

made statements to a co-worker saying that anyone who hurts children is “a coward and ought to be 

killed.” (Id. at 1788.)

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2. Dr. Dietz’s Alleged Bias 

Turning to Petitioner’s arguments for federal habeas relief, Petitioner contends that 

Dr. Dietz was biased because his opinions were “result-oriented” for the prosecution which

had retained him as an expert witness in this case. (ECF No. 1 at 26.) Petitioner argues

that this bias tainted Dr. Dietz’s testimony and greatly reduced its value; thus making it 

unreasonable for the jury to have accepted his testimony over those of the other three 

experts. (ECF No. 1 at 24.)

“[Q]uestions of witness credibility fall squarely and exclusively within the jury’s 

purview.” United States v. Delgado, 357 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 2004). This Court must 

presume that the jury resolved any conflicts regarding witness credibility or bias and must 

defer to that resolution on habeas review. Id. at 1068 (“the credibility of witnesses is a 

question for the jury, unreviewable on appeal”); Wiley v. Hartley, No. 12cv144, 2012 WL 

2886682, at *10 (E.D. Cal. July 13, 2012) (“A federal habeas court ‘may not reweigh the 

evidence or redetermine the credibility of witnesses.’”). If the evidence is unclear or would 

support conflicting inferences, “the federal court ‘must presume – even if it does not 

affirmatively appear in the record – that the trier of fact resolved any such conflict in favor 

of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 338 

(9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326).

There is no basis for habeas corpus relief here. The only purported bias presented 

by Petitioner is the unremarkable fact that Dr. Dietz was retained by the prosecution and 

that his testimony supported the prosecution’s case against Petitioner. (See ECF No. 1 at 

26.) At best, Petitioner is speculating that Dr. Dietz was biased and that, but for that 

purported bias, Dr. Dietz would have provided testimony that supported Petitioner’s 

insanity defense. Speculation is not an adequate basis for a habeas court to usurp the role 

of the jury as the triers of fact. In this case, a reasonable jury could have concluded that 

Dr. Dietz’s presented unbiased testimony. See also Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 

2065 (2012) (when analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s findings 

on habeas review, “the only question under Jackson is whether that finding was so 

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unsupportable as to fall below the threshold of bare rationality”); Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320 

(holding that, in reviewing sufficiency of the evidence, “the relevant question is whether, 

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier 

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt”). 

Therefore, there is no basis for habeas corpus relief arising from Dr. Dietz’s purported 

bias. 

3. Dr. Dietz’s Alleged Failure to Differentiate Between Legal Wrong and

Moral Wrong

Petitioner challenges Dr. Dietz’s opinion that Petitioner understood the immorality 

of his actions at the time of the attack. Petitioner essentially argues that this opinion 

testimony was unreliable and that this unreliable testimony was the only evidence from 

which the jury was able to reject Petitioner’s insanity defense. According to Petitioner, the 

remainder of the sanity phase evidence showed that Petitioner was legally insane at the 

time of the attack – specifically, that he did not understand the immorality of his conduct 

at the time of the attack.

The California Court of Appeal issued the last reasoned decision on this question, 

finding:

The record supports the jury’s finding that [Petitioner]

understood the immorality of his conduct at the time of the 

offense. Although the evidence showed he thought he had to

commit the acts to stop the persecution he believed he was 

suffering, the jury was not compelled to find that he did not 

understand that it was immoral to shoot at innocent people at an 

elementary school, including children, notwithstanding his 

desperation to free himself from the perceived persecution.

When writing and talking about the offense before and after its 

commission, he repeatedly described it as a horrible terrorist 

attack and stated he was doing it to save himself and improve his 

life. Because [Petitioner] stated that the attack was horrible and 

that his motive for committing the attack was to protect himself, 

the jury could reasonably infer that he understood the immorality 

of his decision to jeopardize the lives of innocent people in order 

to save himself.

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This is not a case where a defendant attacked his perceived 

persecutors; rather, [Petitioner] attacked people at an elementary 

school with no indication that he thought they had anything to do 

with his suffering. Nor is this a case where the defendant’s 

thought processes were essentially focused on committing a 

crime to serve some greater public good that could provide 

subjective moral justification for the misconduct. Given

[Petitioner’s] repeated acknowledgement that his conduct was 

horrible and terroristic and that he was acting to save himself, the 

jury could reasonably conclude that he knew his conduct was 

morally wrong because he was acting to protect himself without

regard to the severe trauma inflicted upon innocent people, 

including children.[] Moreover, even if the jury thought that 

[Petitioner]sincerely believed he was acting to expose corruption 

and to save his life, the jury could also find that his recognition 

of the horrific nature of his conduct reflected his understanding 

that under generally accepted moral standards, the exposure of

corruption and even the saving of one’s own life would never 

justify opening fire on innocent children at an elementary school.

To support his challenge to the jury’s rejection of his 

insanity claim, [Petitioner] asserts Dr. Dietz’s opinion that he 

knew his act was morally wrong was not based on sound 

reasoning. He delineates various aspects of Dr. Dietz’s 

testimony that he finds deficient for a variety of reasons. We are 

not persuaded. As set forth above, Dr. Dietz’s opinions were 

well reasoned and supported by the evidence. Further, the record 

does not support [Petitioner’s] contention that Dr. Dietz’s 

testimony failed to differentiate between the moral component 

and the legal component of the right/wrong awareness standard.

Dr. Dietz frequently focused his opinions on whether [Petitioner]

understood the immorality of his conduct, and he did not simply 

address in unitary fashion the question of [Petitioner’s]

awareness of the wrongfulness of his conduct.

(ECF No. 13-22 at 11-13 (footnote omitted).)

The Court concludes that the California Court of Appeal’s decision was not an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. First, as the 

Court of Appeal explained, Dr. Dietz’s opinion both was supported by the evidence

showing Petitioner understood the immorality of his conduct at the time of the attack and 

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differentiated between the moral and legal components of the right/wrong awareness 

standard. (Id.; see ECF No. 13-22 at 13; ECF 13-11 at 1772, 1787-90, 1798.) Second,

because the evidence reasonably showed Petitioner understood the immorality of his 

conduct at the time of the attack, Dr. Dietz’s testimony also was not the only evidence from 

which the jury could have rejected Petitioner’s insanity defense. Thus, a rational trier of 

fact may have rejected Petitioner’s insanity defense without having to rely on Dietz’s 

expert opinion. 

Moreover, the burden was upon Petitioner at the sanity phase of his trial to prove by 

a preponderance of the evidence that he was insane at the time of the offense. Hernandez,

22 Cal. 4th at 515. Here, the jury’s sanity verdict reflected the jury’s determination that 

Petitioner failed to meet his burden. The jury was not required to accept the opinions given 

by Drs. Glassman, Rappaport, and Naimark. And the other evidence, even excluding Dr. 

Dietz’s expert opinion that Petitioner understood the immorality of his actions at the time 

of the attack, was enough for the jury to reasonably reject Petitioner’s insanity defense. 

Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational jury 

could have rejected Petitioner’s contention that he did not understand the immorality of his 

conduct at the time of the attack. See Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 2065; Cf. People v. Skinner, 

185 Cal. App. 3d 1050, 1059 (1986) (the jury’s finding of sanity at the time of the offenses 

must stand unless, “as a matter of law, the evidence of insanity [cannot] reasonably be 

rejected”). 

Therefore, the California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Petitioner’s challenge to the 

sufficiency of the sanity phase evidence was not based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge 

Cynthia Bashant under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Civil Local Rule 72.1(d)(4) of the United 

States District Court for the Southern District of California. For the reasons outlined above, 

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IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an order: (1) approving and 

adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment be entered 

DENYING Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than March 28, 2016 any party to this action may file 

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be 

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the 

Court and served on all parties no later than April 11, 2016. The parties are advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th 

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 7, 2016

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