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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Au ':' -; p "'001 U ..L V lv.J' 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ELBERT BLANGO, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

RICHARD R. THORNBURGH; J. MICHAEL 

QUINLAN; GARY L. HENMAN; 

MAYOR, WASHINGTON, D.C., 

Respondents-Appellees. 

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B.OBERT L. HOE·8===:-

Clerk 

No. 91-3047 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 90-3516-R) 

Application submitted by Elbert Blango, pro se. 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

Petitioner Elbert Blango was convicted of criminal violation 

of the District of Columbia Code and was sentenced by the District 

of Columbia Superior Court to the custody of the United States 

Attorney General. Pursuant to a memorandum of understanding 

Appellate Case: 91-3047 Document: 01019715793 Date Filed: 08/16/1991 Page: 1 
between the federal Bureau of Prisons and the District of Columbia 

Department of Corrections, petitioner was transferred to the 

United States Penitentiary, Leavenworth, Kansas (USPL), to serve 

his sentence. He petitioned the United States District Court for 

the District of Kansas for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 

28 u.s.c. § 2241. It was his position that his transfer violated 

the "compact clause" of the United States Constitution, art. I, 

§ 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, 

• enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State 

. . . II ) The district court denied his petition for habeas 

corpus, Blango v. Thornburgh, No. 90-3516-R (D. Kan. Jan. 25, 

1991), Dist. Ct. R. doc. 13 (order denying petition for habeas 

corpus, referred to in this opinion as the Jan. 25, 1991, Order). 1 

1 Petitioner submitted a notice of appeal, which the district 

court treated as an application for certificate of probable cause. 

Blango v. Thornburgh, No. 90-3516-R (D. Kan. Feb. 7, 1991), Dist. 

Ct. R. tab 16 (order declining to issue a certificate of probable 

cause). The certificate of probable cause is a procedural 

prerequisite for appeal of an order denying a petition for habeas 

corpus brought "where the detention complained of arises out of 

process issued by a state court." 28 u.s.c. § 2253. Whether 

prisoners sentenced by the District of Columbia Superior Court 

after passage of the District of Columbia Court Reform and 

Judicial Procedure Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 473, should be treated as 

prisoners under sentence of state court is still an open question. 

See Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 367-68 & n.4 (1974). 

However, because the resolution of petitioner's appeal does not 

hinge on the resolution of this important question, we express no 

view on the matter. In either case, the district court's refusal 

to issue a certificate of probable cause was not error. If the 

District of Columbia is treated as a state for the purposes of 

this statute, treating the notice of appeal as an application for 

certificate of probable cause was clearly correct, as was its 

denial. If the District of Columbia is not treated as a state 

under the statute, the district court was still within its sound 

discretion when it treated the notice of appeal as an application 

for certificate of probable cause. See 28 u.s.c. § 2253; Rule 

l(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings in the United 

States District Court ("In applications for habeas corpus in cases 

(continued on next page) 

2 

Appellate Case: 91-3047 Document: 01019715793 Date Filed: 08/16/1991 Page: 2 
Petitioner appeals pursuant to 28 u.s.c. 2253. 2 We affirm. 

Petitioner's habeas corpus claim to the district court was 

constructed through several interrelated arguments concerning the 

constitutionality of various statutes as applied to his transfer 

into federal custody. Summarizing his arguments, first, he noted 

he was transferred pursuant to a memorandum of understanding 

between the director of the federal Bureau of Prisons, under the 

authority of 18 u.s.c. § 5003 (statutory authority for director of 

Bureau of Prisons to contract with states to house state prisoners 

in federal prison facilities), 3 and the director of the District 

of Columbia Department of Corrections, under the authority of 

D.C. Code Ann. § 24-425 (ordinance authorizing the Attorney 

General to place of fenders sentenced by the District of Columbia 

courts in the most suitable District of Columbia or federal prison 

(continued from previous page) 

not [involving custody pursuant to a judgment of a state court], 

these rules may be applied at the discretion of the United States 

district court.") 

2 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. Petitioner's motion to proceed 

in forma pauperis is hereby granted. 

3 18 U.S.C. § 5003(a)(l) provides: 

The Director of the Bureau of Prisons when proper 

and adequate facilities and personnel are available may 

contract with proper officials of a State or territory, 

for the custody, care, subsistence, education, 

treatment, and training of persons convicted of criminal 

offenses in the courts of such State or territory. 

3 

Appellate Case: 91-3047 Document: 01019715793 Date Filed: 08/16/1991 Page: 3 
facility). 4 Under petitioner's analysis, the provisions of these 

two statutes produce a conflict so severe it violates the compact 

clause of the Constitution "when applied to the states." Building 

on this theme, petitioner claimed that because his transfer under 

section 5003 was allegedly unconstitutional, it violated 18 u.s.c. 

§ 4001(a)("No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by 

the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress."), and 

thus his incarceration at USPL constituted false imprisonment. 

And, as the final claim in his petition for release from prison, 

he argued that the District of Columbia lost jurisdiction over him 

when it transferred him and that such "unconditional, voluntary" 

loss of jurisdiction constituted an implied pardon or commutation 

of his sentence. Under this combination of claims, summarized as 

an 

4 

alleged unconstitutional basis for his transfer to the federal 

District of Columbia Code Annotated § 24-425 provides: 

All prisoners convicted in the District of Columbia 

for any offense, including violations of municipal 

regulations and ordinances and acts of Congress in the 

nature of municipal regulations and ordinances, shall be 

committed, for their terms of imprisonment, and to such 

types of institutions as the court may direct, to the 

custody of the Attorney General of the United States or 

his authorized representative, who shall designate the 

places of confinements where the sentences of all such 

persons shall be served. The Attorney General may 

designate any available, suitable, and appropriate 

institutions, whether maintained by the District of 

Columbia government, the federal government, or 

otherwise, or whether within or without the District of 

Columbia. The Attorney General is also authorized to 

order the transfer of any such person from one 

institution to another if, in his judgment, it shall be 

for the well-being of the prisoner or relieve 

overcrowding or unhealthful conditions in the 

institution where such prisoner is confined, or for 

other reasons. 

4 

Appellate Case: 91-3047 Document: 01019715793 Date Filed: 08/16/1991 Page: 4 
penitentiary coupled with an alleged implied pardon upon transfer, 

petitioner applied for his immediate release from the federal 

penitentiary. 

The district court held that petitioner was transferred 

pursuant to 18 u.s.c. § 5003 and that the compact clause did not 

address agreements between the states and the federal government. 

Jan. 25, 1991, Order at 4. 5 The court further held that Congress 

was within its power when it authorized such state-federal 

contracts under section 5003. The court found that the 

"Memorandum and Understanding" between the director of the federal 

Bureau of Prisons and the director of the District of Columbia 

Department of Corrections satisfied the requirements of section 

5003. Id. at 3-4. The court concluded that because there was 

lawful authority for the District of Columbia to contract for 

federal prison custody of petitioner, there was no basis for a 

claim of false imprisonment under 18 u.s.c. § 4001. Id. at 4. 

The court rejected petitioner's claim that the District of 

Columbia lost jurisdiction upon its transfer of petitioner to the 

federal penitentiary, noting that the case upon which petitioner 

relied was one involving extradition, not a transfer under 

5 As a preliminary matter, the district court held that 

petitioner could proceed with this habeas corpus action without 

first exhausting internal prison administrative remedies. The 

court held that because petitioner's habeas corpus application was 

based on a challenge to the underlying constitutional validity of 

his incarceration rather than control and management of the prison 

"[r]elief through the federal prison administrative grievance 

procedure would be so unlikely that to require such exhaustion 

would serve only as an obstructive formality." Jan. 25, 1991, 

Order at 3. 

5 

Appellate Case: 91-3047 Document: 01019715793 Date Filed: 08/16/1991 Page: 5 
inter-governmental agreement. Id. at 5; see also Miller v. 

Thornburgh, 755 F. Supp. 980 (D. Kan. 1991)(same holding under 

same facts and same claims). 

In his appeal to this court, petitioner makes three claims. 

First, he claims the district court failed to address issues 

relevant to his habeas corpus petition "in the context raised by 

petitioner." Second, he claims the district court failed to 

address his argument that his transfer was unconstitutional. And 

third, he claims the district court manifested an attitude of 

partiality in favor of the government, depriving him of a fair 

hearing. Petitioner's first two issues are closely related, and 

we consider them together. 

The cornerstone of ·petitioner's argument is his allegation 

that 18 u.s.c. § 5003 contravenes the congressional intent 

expressed 6 in the legislative history of 4 u.s.c. § 112. Section 

112 authorizes interstate cooperation in the enforcement of the 

states' respective criminal statutes. Petitioner quotes the 

following portion of the legislative history of section 112: 

6 4 u.s.c. § 112 provides: 

(a) The consent of Congress is hereby given to any 

two or more States to enter into agreements or compacts 

for cooperative effort and mutual assistance in the 

prevention of crime and in the enforcement of their 

respective criminal laws and policies, and to establish 

such agencies, joint or otherwise, as they may deem 

desirable for making effective such agreements and 

compacts. 

(b) For the purpose of this section, the term 

"States" means the several States and Alaska, Hawaii, 

the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, 

Guam and the District of Columbia. 

6 

Appellate Case: 91-3047 Document: 01019715793 Date Filed: 08/16/1991 Page: 6 
"The rapidity with which persons may move from one State 

to another, those charged with crime and those who are 

necessary witnesses in criminal proceedings, and the 

fact that there are no barriers between the States 

obstructing this movement, makes it necessary that one 

of two things be done, either that the criminal 

jurisdiction of the Federal Government shall be greatly 

extended or that the States by mutual agreement shall 

aid each other in the detection and punishment of 

offenders against their respective criminal laws." 

S Rep No. 1007, 73rd Congress, 2d Sess, 1 (1934); HR Rep 

No. 1137, 73rd Congress, 2nd Sess, 1-2 (1934). 

Dist. Ct. R. doc. 12 at 11 (traverse)(emphasis and punctuation as 

supplied by petitioner). Petitioner submits that section 5003 

contradicts this expressed intent by significantly extending the 

criminal jurisdiction of the federal government. In addition, 

petitioner argues that section 112 alone does not provide 

authority for his transfer because while it approves cooperation 

between the states, it does not contemplate federal-state 

transfers. 

Just as section 112 authorizes interstate prisoner transfer, 

18 u.s.c. § 5003 authorizes federal-state prisoner transfer. The 

legislative history of section 5003 was considered by the Supreme 

Court in Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 483-86 (1981), in which the 

Court concluded: 

of any evidence of congressional 

[federal Bureau of Prisons'] 

[that section 5003 authorizes 

In the absence 

objection the 

interpretation 

federal-state prisoner transfer] must be given great 

weight. 

The plain language, the legislative history, and 

the long-standing administrative interpretation of 

§ 5003(a) clearly demonstrate that the provision is a 

broad charter authorizing the transfer of state 

prisoners to federal custody. 

7 

Appellate Case: 91-3047 Document: 01019715793 Date Filed: 08/16/1991 Page: 7 
Id. at 486-87; see also United States ex rel. Gereau v. Henderson, 

526 F.2d 889, 894 (5th Cir. 1976)("§ 5003 is not beyond the 

delegated powers of the federal government"). However, petitioner 

argues that contrary to Howe, there was "evidence of congressional 

objection" in the legislative history of 7 18 u.s.c. § 112. 

Because section 112 is the statutory authority required by the 

Constitution's compact clause for interstate transfer of 

prisoners, petitioner asserts that if section 5003 violates the 

intent of Congress in fashioning section 112, it also violates the 

compact clause, rendering unconstitutional his transfer by the 

District of Columbia. 

However, petitioner's argument must fail, for while the 

compact clause prohibits agreements between the states, it does 

not prohibit agreements between the federal government and the 

states. See, ~' Gereau, 526 F.2d at 894 (approving mutually 

beneficial cooperative action between federal government and 

state). In addition, housing state offenders is not, as 

petitioner characterizes it, an expansion of federal criminal 

jurisdiction. Criminal jurisdiction over a state's inhabitants 

remains with the respective states and territories under whose 

jurisdiction the prisoners were originally sentenced. Section 

7 Although petitioner cites Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433 

(1981), in support of his theory, Cuyler deals with interstate 

transfer of prisoners in the context of the Interstate Agreement 

on Detainers and the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act and is not 

applicable to petitioner's circumstance. Petitioner was not 

extradited nor was he transferred after a detainer was filed; his 

was a mid-sentence transfer for completion of his incarceration in 

a federal penitentiary. 

8 

Appellate Case: 91-3047 Document: 01019715793 Date Filed: 08/16/1991 Page: 8 
5003 is limited to the grant of permission for the federal 

government and the states to enter into federal-state agreements 

for the efficient housing of of fenders after their conviction 

under the jurisdiction of state criminal law. 

Petitioner attempts to distinguish between the propriety of 

the federal government's acceptance of his transfer from the 

District of Columbia and the propriety of the District of 

Columbia's transfer of him to a federal prison. It is clear that 

section 5003 empowers the federal Bureau of Prisons to accept 

petitioner. It is equally clear that the Howe Court's 

interpretation of section 5003 as a broad grant of approval for 

federal-state prisoner transfer does not run afoul of the 

Congressional intent to ·avoid expansion of federal criminal 

jurisdiction, as expressed in the legislative history of 

4 u.s.c. § 112(a). As to the propriety of his transfer by the 

District of Columbia out of the District's correctional system to 

USPL, D.C. Code § 24-425 explicitly permits the Attorney General 

of the United States, in whose custody violators of the District 

of Columbia Code are placed, to house these prisoners in federal 

institutions or in institutions maintained by the District of 

C lumb . t h" d" t• 8 o ia, a is iscre ion. Thus, both considered as a transfer 

from the District of Columbia and as a transfer to USPL, 

petitioner's transfer was statutorily and constitutionally valid. 

8 Contrary to petitioner's assertion, United States v. District 

of Columbia, 703 F.Supp. 982 (D.D.C. 1988), aff'd as modified by 

897 F.2d 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1990)(District of Columbia Department of 

Corrections may not refuse to accept prisoners who have been 

sentenced by the District of Columbia Superior Court so long as 

prison population limits are not exceeded), is not contrary to 

this conclusion. 

9 

Appellate Case: 91-3047 Document: 01019715793 Date Filed: 08/16/1991 Page: 9 
Petitioner claims the District of Columbia waived 

jurisdiction over petitioner when it surrendered him to another 

sovereign in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment, citing Piper v. Estelle, 485 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1973). 

However, Piper does not support this proposition. In Piper, the 

Fifth Circuit held that a sovereign effectively waived 

jurisdiction only when its action was "so affirmatively wrong or 

its inaction so grossly negligent that it would be unequivocally 

inconsistent with 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice'" 

for that sovereign to retain jurisdiction. Id. at 246 (citation 

omitted). There is no merit in petitioner's argument that his 

transfer satisfies Piper's criteria. 

Finally, petitioner claims the district court was partial to 

the government during its review of the case. We find 

petitioner's suggestion of district court partiality to be 

completely without foundation. 

First, he cites several examples of purported partiality 

related to the broader issue of the district court's determination 

of the proper respondent to this action. 9 As One of the 

respondents of his habeas corpus petition, petitioner named the 

warden of the USPL. In addition, he named the Attorney General of 

the United States and the director of the federal Bureau of 

Prisons. Petitioner claimed that because the federal Bureau of 

9 Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the 

"state respondents" to respond to the district court's show cause 

order, these respondents presented no opposition to his claims and 

therefore his allegations as to those respondents must be deemed 

admitted. He buttresses this argument by claiming that the 

"federal respondent" had no standing to address his claims against 

the state respondents. 

10 

Appellate Case: 91-3047 Document: 01019715793 Date Filed: 08/16/1991 Page: 10 
Prisons drafted section 5003 and steered it through Congress, see 

Howe, 452 U.S. at 485, and because its director and the director's 

supervisor, the Attorney General of the United States, are jointly 

responsible for the administration of its provisions, id., they 

were proper respondents to this action. And finally, he named the 

mayor of Washington, D.C., claiming that because he viewed his 

transfer as an implied pardon and because the mayor of the 

District of Columbia is the official empowered to grant pardons of 

criminal sentences from the District of Columbia Superior Court, 

the mayor was a proper respondent. 

The district court found: "[T]he proper respondent for 

petitioner's habeas action is Gary Henman, warden at USPL, because 

he is petitioner's present custodian. The court finds it 

appropriate to dismiss from this action all named respondents 

other than respondent Henman." Jan. 25, 1991, Order at 3 

(citations omitted). The district court was correct; petitioner's 

arguments were without merit. See 28 u.s.c. § 2242 (provides in 

pertinent part that "application for a writ of habeas corpus shall 

allege the name of the person who has custody over 

[the petitioner] and by virtue of what claim or authority 

. II ) , 

o Guerra v. Meese, 786 F.2d 414, 416 (D.C. Cir. 

1986)(attorney general not an appropriate respondent in habeas 

petition); cf. Ashley v. State of Washington, 394 F.2d 125, 126 

(9th Cir. 1968)(the state under the authority of which the 

petitioner is in custody is not an appropriate respondent in 

11 

Appellate Case: 91-3047 Document: 01019715793 Date Filed: 08/16/1991 Page: 11 
habeas petition). 10 Because the United States Attorney General, 

the director of the federal Bureau of Prisons, and the mayor of 

Washington, D.C., were properly dismissed from the action, their 

lack of response to the district court's show cause order was of 

no consequence. 

Second, petitioner claims the district court showed 

partiality because every motion of the government was granted, 

"over 90%" of petitioner's motions were allegedly ignored, and all 

of petitioner's motions which were considered were denied. These 

arguments are unavailing. It is not favoritism for the district 

court to rule in favor of one party if that party's position is 

correct as a matter of law. And, after review of the record, it 

is clear that, while some of the court's rulings necessarily 

resolved claims not explicitly and separately addressed by the 

court, none of petitioner's motions were ignored. For example, 

the court's conclusion that the warden of USPL was the only proper 

respondent and that all other named respondents should be 

dismissed rendered moot petitioner's request that all claims as to 

those other respondents be deemed admitted because they did not 

10 The rationale for naming as respondent the person actually 

holding the petitioner in custody is undisputed. See, ~, 

Reimnitz v. State's Attorney, 761 F.2d 405, 408 (7th Cir. 

1985)(custodian is proper respondent "since habeas corpus 

challenges the lawfulness of the petitioner's custody, . . • [the 

proper respondent] shall be the person who has that custody"); 

Dunbar v. Cranor, 202 F.2d 949, 950 (9th Cir. 1953)("The person 

having the physical custody of the prisoner, who is capable of 

bringing him into court, is the only person who may properly be 

named respondent in a petition for habeas corpus."); United 

States ex rel. Goodman v. Roberts, 152 F.2d 841, 842 (2d Cir.)("A 

writ of habeas corpus must be directed to some person who has the 

power to produce before the court the body of the party 

detained."), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 873 (1946). 

12 

Appellate Case: 91-3047 Document: 01019715793 Date Filed: 08/16/1991 Page: 12 
file answers to the habeas corpus petition. The court responded 

to the substance of each claim put forth by petitioner. 

As a third example of the court's purported favoritism, 

petitioner notes that he submitted a motion to the district court 

for "injunctive relief to preserve the status quo of his 

confinement conditions pending a final determination of his rights 

in the matter." In response, the district court found "that a 

temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is not 

appropriate at this time." Dist. Ct. R. doc 7 (order to show 

cause). Petitioner complains that this adverse "sua sponte" 

ruling denying petitioner's initial motion for injunctive relief 

violated 28 u.s.c. § 1292(a)(1)[sic]. 11 

To determine whether denial of petitioner's motion for 

injunctive relief was an indication of partiality, we have 

reviewed that denial as if petitioner had appealed the substance 

of the denial. This court reviews a district court order denying 

preliminary injunction for legal error or abuse of discretion. 

See Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass'n v. Shoshone River 

Power, Inc., 805 F.2d 351, 354-55 (10th Cir. 1986), appeal after 

remand, 874 F.2d 1346, 1354 (10th Cir. 1989). The moving party 

bears the burden of proving: 

(1) the moving party will suffer irreparable injury 

unless the injunction issues; (2) the threatened injury 

to the moving party outweighs whatever damage the 

proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; (3) 

the injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the 

public interest; and (4) there is a substantial 

11 Inasmuch as 28 u.s.c. § 1292(a)(1) provides for appellate 

review of interlocutory decisions, it is clearly not the statutory 

basis for a claim of erroneous denial of injunctive relief. 

13 

Appellate Case: 91-3047 Document: 01019715793 Date Filed: 08/16/1991 Page: 13 
likelihood that the moving party will eventually prevail 

on the merits. 

Id. at 355. After review of the record on appeal, we conclude the 

district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 

petitioner's request for injunctive relief. Petitioner's 

arguments to the district court in support of his request were 

merely conclusory reiterations of the requirements for an 

injunction couched in the form of declarative statements. Dist. 

Ct. R. doc. 4. The district court did not show partiality to the 

government by correctly, if summarily, denying petitioner's motion 

for injunctive relief. 

Fourth, petitioner claims that because the copy of the 

memorandum of understanding between the federal Bureau of Prisons 

and the District of Columbia Board of Corrections submitted by the 

government as an attachment to its answer and return was not 

authenticated pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 44(a)(l)(proper 

authentication of official records to be used as evidence at 

trial), it should have been deemed stricken from the record, and 

the district court's failure to do so was evidence of partiality. 

We are guided by Rule 7(d) of the Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, which provides: 

"The court may require the authentication of any material under 

subdivision (b) and (c) [examples of materials the court may 

request to expand the record under consideration with the petition 

for the writ]." (emphasis added). We deem the contract in question 

to be part of an expansion of the trial court record, albeit 

proffered by the respondent rather than directed by the court. As 

14 

Appellate Case: 91-3047 Document: 01019715793 Date Filed: 08/16/1991 Page: 14 
such, authentication of the exhibit would be discretionary under 

Rule 7(d), and we deem that analysis to extend to petitioner's 

situation here. See Advisory Committee Note to Rule 7(d)("Under 

subdivision (d) the judge can require authentication if he 

believes it desirable to do so." (emphasis added)). In addition, 

28 u.s.c. § 2248 provides: "The allegations of a return to the 

writ of habeas corpus or of an answer to an order to show cause in 

a habeas corpus proceeding, if not traversed, shall be accepted as 

true except to the extent that the judge finds from the evidence 

that they are not true." While petitioner's traverse raised the 

issue of whether the document had been authenticated under the 

Federal Rules of Evidence, it did not challenge the truth of the 

government's allegation that the document attached to its answer 

was an accurate copy of the memorandum of understanding between 

the Department of Corrections for the District of Columbia and the 

federal Bureau of Prisons which satisfied the requirements of 

section 5003. 

Thus, petitioner has not come forward, either in his traverse 

to the government's return in the district court or in his brief 

on appeal, with any indication that the document attached to the 

answer and return was not a reliable copy of the memorandum of 

understanding between the federal Bureau of Prisons and the 

District of Columbia Department of Corrections or that there was 

any other impediment to the district court's conclusion that the 

memorandum of understanding was sufficient to satisfy section 

5003. The district court's conclusion was not an abuse of its 

discretion. The memorandum of understanding properly may be 

15 

Appellate Case: 91-3047 Document: 01019715793 Date Filed: 08/16/1991 Page: 15 
deemed a "contract" for purposes of section 5003, and the copy 

attached to the government's return was sufficiently reliable to 

form the basis of the district court's determination. 

Finally, petitioner claims that the court ruled on 

petitioner's traverse to the return in excess of the five days 

allowed by 28 U.S. C. § 2243 ,r 4. A closer look at the statute 

upon which petitioner relies reveals that his claim is without 

foundation. 

28 u.s.c. § 2243 requires a hearing on a show cause 

order issued pursuant to a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus within five days after the return is filed unless 

additional time is allowed for good cause, and it then 

requires that the court "summarily hear and determine 

the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice 

require." 

Johnson v. Rogers, 917 F.2d 1283, 1284 (10th Cir. 1990). However, 

when determining whether delay beyond the five-day period is 

permissible, "each situation must be considered on its own facts." 

Id. at 1285. 

In the present case, the government's answer and return was 

filed January 10, 1991, Dist. Ct. R. doc. 11; petitioner's 

traverse was filed January 22, 1991, id. doc. 12; and the district 

court's order denying the petition was filed January 25, 1991. 

Id. doc. 13. This computes to a fifteen-day delay before the 

court's order was filed, three days after the filing of 

petitioner's traverse. Under the circumstances of this case, we 

hold that this brief delay did not constitute an abridgment of 

16 

Appellate Case: 91-3047 Document: 01019715793 Date Filed: 08/16/1991 Page: 16 
( 

petitioner's right to speedy resolution of his habeas corpus 

petition. 

In conclusion, the district court's denial of petitioner's 

application for writ of habeas corpus is AFFIRMED. 

17 

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