Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01712/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01712-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

Civ. Case No. 13cv1712 BTM

Crim. Case No. 05cr00928 BTM

ORDER DENYING § 2255 MOTION

AND GRANTING CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALIBILITY

v.

LAWRENCE PUZON-BATAN,

Defendant-Movant.

Defendant Lawrence Puzon-Batan has filed a § 2255 motion to vacate,

set aside, or correct sentence. For the reasons discussed below, Defendant’s

motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

In a First Superseding Information filed on February 22, 2006, the United

States charged Defendant with a single count of knowingly brandishing a

firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (a bank robbery), in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii).

On February 22, 2006, Defendant entered a plea of guilty to the charge. 

At sentencing, the Court found that Defendant had discharged the firearm

during the bank robbery and therefore sentenced Defendant to a120-month

1 05CR00928 BTM

Case 3:13-cv-01712-BTM Document 2 Filed 03/24/14 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

term of imprisonment, the mandatory minimum term prescribed by 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii).

Judgment was entered on August 7, 2006. The Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals affirmed this Court’s judgment on March 25, 2008.

II. DISCUSSION 

Defendant moves to vacate his sentence based on the recent case,

United States v. Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013). As discussed below, the

Court denies Defendant’s motion because Alleyne does not apply retroactively

to Defendant’s conviction, which became final long before Alleyne was decided.

In Alleyne, the Supreme Court overruled Harris v. United States, 536 U.S.

545 (2002), and held that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum

sentence is an element of the offense and must be submitted to the jury and

found beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne specifically concerned a finding by

the district court judge during sentencing that Alleyne had “brandished” a

firearm, which carries a 7-year mandatory minimum sentence (18 U.S.C. §

924(c)(1)(A)(ii)), as opposed to a 5-year mandatory minimum for using or

carrying a firearm. The Supreme Court held that because the finding of

brandishing increased the prescribed range of sentences to which Alleyne was

exposed, the fact was an element which had to be found by the jury beyond a

reasonable doubt.

Alleyne clearly adopted a new rule, and if Defendant’s case had still been

pending on direct review at the time the decision was issued, the rule would

have applied to Defendant’s case. The Superseding Information did not charge

Defendant with discharge of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), and during

sentencing, Defendant disputed the allegation that he had discharged the

firearm during and in relation to the bank robbery.

2 05CR00928 BTM

Case 3:13-cv-01712-BTM Document 2 Filed 03/24/14 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

However, at the time of sentencing, the controlling law was Harris, which

held that Apprendi does not apply to facts that increase the mandatory

minimum sentence but not the maximum sentence, and United States v. Dare,

425 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2005) (following Harris as binding precedent despite the

Booker and Blakely decisions). Under Harris and Dare, the Court properly

made findings of fact – i.e, that Defendant discharged a firearm – that

increased Defendant’s mandatory minimum sentence. 

Defendant argues that Alleyne applies retroactively to his case. There are

two categories of cases that apply retroactively- (1) new substantive rules,

including “decisions that narrow the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting

its terms” and “constitutional determinations that place particular conduct or

persons covered by the statute beyond the State’s power to punish”; and (2)

new “watershed rules of criminal procedure” which “implicate[ ] the fundamental

fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.” Schriro v. Summerlin, 542

U.S. 348, 351-52 (2004) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989)).

In Schriro, the Supreme Court held that its decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.

584 (2002), which applied Apprendi to Arizona’s law governing the imposition

of the death penalty, does not apply retroactively because Ring announces a

procedural rule and does not qualify as a “watershed rule of criminal

procedure.” The reasoning in Schriro applies equally to Alleyne, which, like

Ring, is an extension of Apprendi. In re Payne, 733 F.3d 1027, 1030 (10th Cir.

2013); United States v. Redd, 735 F.3d 88, 91-92 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Alleyne did

not announce a new rule of law made retroactive on collateral review.”)

Alleyne does not apply retroactively to Defendant’s case. Therefore, the

Court denies Defendant’s § 2255 motion.

3 05CR00928 BTM

Case 3:13-cv-01712-BTM Document 2 Filed 03/24/14 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Defendant’s § 2255 motion is DENIED. 

The Court grants a certificate of appealability. The Clerk shall enter judgment

accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 24, 2014

BARRY TED MOSKOWITZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

 

 

4 05CR00928 BTM

Case 3:13-cv-01712-BTM Document 2 Filed 03/24/14 Page 4 of 4