Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00162/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00162-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), “a determination of a factual issue made by a State

court shall be presumed to be correct.” 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Rupert Ray Dixon, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CV-09-00162-TUC-JMR (JCG)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner, Rupert Ray Dixon, who is presently confined in the East Unit of the

Arizona State Prison Complex in Florence, Arizona, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this

matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Guerin for Report and Recommendation. Before the

Court are the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) (Doc. No. 1), Respondents’

Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. No. 12) and Petitioner’s

Reply. (Doc. No. 13.) The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court deny the

Petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

According to the Arizona Court of Appeals, the facts of Petitioner’s case are as

follows:1

Case 4:09-cv-00162-JMR Document 18 Filed 09/23/09 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

Following a jury trial held in his absence, petitioner Rupert Ray Dixon

was convicted of offering to sell a narcotic drug. Dixon admitted he had two

prior felony convictions, and the trial court sentenced him to a partially

mitigated, twelve-year prison term. . . . The underlying conviction arose from

an incident involving Dixon’s agreement to sell crack cocaine to an undercover

police officer in exchange for $40 plus a $5 fee for procuring the drug. The

evidence at trial . . . [established that the undercover officer] paid Dixon the

full amount after telling Dixon he did not want Dixon to “rip him off” by

failing to return with the drugs. Dixon took the money and never returned;

another officer located Dixon eight days later in the same area, and the

undercover officer then identified him. Dixon was a “trapper,” an addict who

acts as the “middleman” in a narcotics sale. Typically, a trapper will go to the

drug source with the purchaser’s money in hand, obtain the drugs, and return

to the buyer’s vehicle having already “chipped off” a portion of the drugs for

his or her personal use. 

(Answer, Ex. A, pgs. 1-2.) 

Petitioner appealed his conviction, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to

support the conviction because the evidence did not establish that Petitioner intended to sell

narcotics to the undercover officer. (Answer, Ex. B.) On November 30, 2005, the Arizona

Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction. (Answer, Ex. B.) Petitioner petitioned

for review of the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision; the Arizona Supreme Court denied

review on September 26, 2006. (Answer, Ex. C.)

On January 10, 2007, Petitioner filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief pursuant

to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. (“Rule 32 Petition”). (Answer, Ex. D.) In his Rule 32 Petition,

Petitioner presented the following claims: (1) Petitioner received ineffective assistance of

counsel when trial counsel failed to present expert testimony that trappers commonly rip

people off under the guise of scoring drugs; (2) Petitioner received ineffective assistance of

counsel when trial counsel failed to request that the jury be correctly and adequately

instructed on the specific intent necessary to prove an offer to sell narcotics; and (3)

Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel when appellate counsel failed to argue

that the jury was not properly instructed about the specific intent necessary to prove an offer

to sell narcotics and did not receive an instruction on the lesser-included offense of theft.

(Id.) The trial court denied Petitioner’s Rule 32 Petition on April 4, 2007. Petitioner filed

a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals, raising the same claims that were

presented in his Rule 32 Petition. (Answer, Ex. A.) The Arizona Court of Appeals denied

Case 4:09-cv-00162-JMR Document 18 Filed 09/23/09 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

the petition for review on September 18, 2007. (Id.) Petitioner sought review by the Arizona

Supreme Court; the Arizona Supreme Court denied review on May 12, 2008. (Answer, Ex.

F.)

On March 20, 2009, Petitioner filed the pending Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

In his Petition, Petitioner presents three grounds for relief:

Ground 1: Petitioner’s due process rights were violated because there was

insufficient evidence to support the intent element of his conviction;

Ground 2: Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel:

(a) failed to present expert testimony that trappers commonly rip people off under the guise

of scoring drugs; and (b) failed to request a jury instruction on the specific intent required to

prove an offer to sell narcotics; and

Ground 3: Petitioner received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel when

appellate counsel failed to argue that the jury was not properly instructed about the specific

intent necessary to prove an offer to sell narcotics and failed to argue that the jury should

have received instruction on the lesser-included offense of theft. (Doc. No. 1.)

DISCUSSION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the Petition be denied. Although properly

exhausted, the three grounds presented in the Petition are without merit. 

A. Exhaustion

Ordinarily, before a federal court will consider the merits of a habeas petition, the

petitioner must exhaust the remedies available to him in state court. 28 U.S.C.

§2254(b)(1)(A); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). First enunciated in Ex parte

Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886), the exhaustion requirement is designed "not to create a

procedural hurdle on the path to federal habeas court, but to channel claims into an

appropriate forum, where meritorious claims may be vindicated and unfounded litigation

obviated before resort to federal court." Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).

The requirement is grounded in principles of comity, and reflects a desire to protect state

courts' role in the enforcement of federal law. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989)

Case 4:09-cv-00162-JMR Document 18 Filed 09/23/09 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

(citation omitted). The requirement is also based on a pragmatic consideration that fully

exhausted claims will usually be accompanied by a complete factual record once they reach

federal court. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519 (1982). 

A petitioner must exhaust his claims by fairly presenting them to the state's highest

court, either through a direct appeal or collateral proceedings, before a federal court will

consider the merits of habeas corpus claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Rose, 455

U.S. at 519. A petitioner must have also presented his claim in a procedural context in which

its merits will be considered. See Castille, 489 U.S. at 351. A habeas petitioner's claims may

be precluded from federal review on exhaustion grounds in either of two ways. First, a claim

may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised in state court but

found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. See Coleman v. Thompson,

501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). Second, the claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal

court if the petitioner failed to present the claim in a necessary state court and "the court to

which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion

requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred." Id. at 735 n.1. If a petitioner

has procedurally defaulted a claim in state court, a federal court will not review the claim

unless the petitioner shows "cause and prejudice" for the failure to present the constitutional

issue to the state court, or makes a colorable showing of actual innocence. See Gray v.

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162 (1996); Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 337 (1992); Murray

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986).

Respondents concede that Petitioner has properly exhausted Ground 2 and 3 of his

Petition. Respondents contend, however, that Petitioner has not properly exhausted Ground

1 of his Petition because Petitioner did not present Ground 1 as a federal claim in his petition

for review by the Arizona Supreme Court. Petitioner, however, was not required to present

Ground 1 to the Arizona Supreme Court in order to exhaust the claim. In cases not carrying

a life sentence or the death penalty, "claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for

purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them." See

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). Respondents acknowledge that

Case 4:09-cv-00162-JMR Document 18 Filed 09/23/09 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

Petitioner presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals a proper federal-law basis for Ground

1. (Doc. 12, p. 5.) Therefore, Petitioner also properly exhausted Ground 1 of the Petition.

B. Merits

i. Legal Standard

On habeas review, a state court's findings of fact are entitled to a presumption of

correctness when fairly supported by the record. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 426

(1985). The presumption of correctness also applies to a state appellate court's findings of

fact. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546 (1981). The question presented in a state prisoner's

petition for a writ of habeas corpus is “whether the state proceedings satisfied due process.”

Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1991). 

 Federal courts may entertain a state prisoner’s petition for habeas relief only on the

grounds that the prisoner’s confinement violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

United States. Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994). General improprieties occurring in state

proceedings are cognizable only if they resulted in fundamental unfairness and consequently

violated the petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Estelle v. McGuire,

502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine

state court determinations on state law questions.”); Bonin, 77 F.3d at 1158. The Supreme

Court has held in the habeas context that "this Court will not review a question of federal law

decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is

independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment." Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). 

The provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)

govern this case and pose special burdens. Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir.

2004) (en banc). Under AEDPA, when reviewing a state criminal conviction, a federal court

may grant a writ of habeas corpus only if a state court proceeding "(1) resulted in a decision

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision

Case 4:09-cv-00162-JMR Document 18 Filed 09/23/09 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Under § 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established Supreme

Court precedent "if the state court applies a rule that contradictsthe governing law set forth"

in Supreme Court cases or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from" a Supreme Court decision but "nevertheless arrives at a result

differentfrom" that precedent. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A state court

decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law if "the state court

identifies the correct governing legal principle" from a Supreme Court decision "but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. In

considering whether a state court has unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent, "a

federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable."

Id. at 411; Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). In conducting habeas review, we

"presum[e] that state courts know and follow the law." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19,

24 (2002).

When applying the AEDPA and reviewing whether a state court decision is contrary

to federal law, this court must look to the state's last reasoned decision as the basis for its

judgment. See Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 & n. 6 (9th Cir. 2002).

ii. Petitioner’s challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, Ground 1, is without

merit.

In Ground 1, Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated because

there was insufficient evidence to support the intent element of his conviction. Specifically,

Petitioner argues that he only intended to steal the undercover officer’s money, not sell him

any drugs.

Petitioner presented Ground 1 in his direct appeal and the Court of Appeals’ decision

is the last reasoned decision on the issue. The Court of Appeals’ decision conformed with

Case 4:09-cv-00162-JMR Document 18 Filed 09/23/09 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

the applicable federal law. The Court of Appeals stated that “we will not disturb a verdict

unless rational jurors could not have found the defendant guilty of the charged offense

beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Answer, Ex. B, pg. 2.) Under federal law, “the relevant

question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979) (emphasis in original);

see also United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 852 (9th Cir. 1976) (“[t]he proper test [for

sufficiency of the evidence] is whether the jurors could rationally conclude from the evidence

presented that guilt was established beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 

The Court of Appeals reasonably applied the governing federal law and its decision

was reasonable in light of the evidence presented. A.R.S. § 13-3408(A)(7), the statute under

which Petitioner was convicted, provides: “A person shall not knowingly: . . . offer to sell

or transfer a narcotic drug.” For a person to be found guilty of offering to sell an illegal drug,

the “person must be aware or believe that he has made an offer to sell ... not that he has told

a lie or made a joke.” See State v. Alvarado, 178 Ariz. 539, 542, 875 P.2d 198, 201 (App.

1984). A defendant could not be found guilty of offering to sell an illegal drug if his only

intention was to take money from the potential purchaser and disappear. Id. 

The Court of Appeals found that sufficient evidence was presented from which the

jury could conclude that Petitioner intended to sell drugs to the undercover officer. The

appellate court detailed the evidence it relied upon in reaching this conclusion. The evidence

included the following. The undercover police officer testified about his extensive

experience in conducting investigations of illegal drug sales and about behavior related to

drug sales. (Answer, Ex. B.) He testified that Petitioner approached his car in an area known

for drug sales and offered to take the officer to a drug house, where Petitioner would

purchase drugs for the officer for a $5 fee. Petitioner rode with the officer to the purchase

location, then instructed the officer to drive around the block while he went inside to

purchase the drugs. Evidence established that Petitioner entered a known drug sale house

while the officer was waiting. Although Petitioner never delivered the drugs to the officer,

Case 4:09-cv-00162-JMR Document 18 Filed 09/23/09 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

evidence also established that on another occasion Petitioner had engaged in similar

“trapper” behavior with a different undercover officer, at which time Petitioner had delivered

drugs. (Id.) The Court of Appeals found that it was reasonable for the jury to conclude,

based on the evidence presented, that at the time Petitioner offered to purchase drugs for the

undercover officer he was aware that he had offered to sell a narcotic drug, and did not

believe he was telling a lie. This conclusion was a reasonable application of federal law in

light of the facts presented. Therefore, Ground 1 is without merit.

iii. Grounds 2 and 3 - ineffective assistance of counsel. 

In Grounds 2 and 3, Petitioner argues that his trial and/or appellate counsel were

ineffective. The governing federal law standard for claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel is set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984), which recognizes

a right to “effective assistance of counsel” arising under the Sixth Amendment. The

Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel has two components. A defendant

must first demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., that counsel made errors

so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed a defendant by the

Sixth Amendment. 466 U.S. at 687. It requires the defendant to show that counsel's conduct

“fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 466 U.S. at 687-688. Second, a

defendant must show that the mistakes made were "prejudicial to the defense," that is, the

mistakes created a "reasonable probability that, but for [the] unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different." 466 U.S. at 694. Counsel's performance is

strongly presumed to fall within the ambit of reasonable conduct unless Movant can show

otherwise. Id. at 689-90. 

In denying Petitioner’s petition for review, the Court of Appeals reasonably applied

the appropriate federal law. See Answer, Ex. A, pg. 3 (citing to Strickland). Thus, this

Court’s consideration of the merits of Grounds 2 and 3 is limited to whether the Court of

Appeal’s decision amounted to an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See § 2254(d)(1).

Case 4:09-cv-00162-JMR Document 18 Filed 09/23/09 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

iv. Ground 2 is without merit.

In Ground 2, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when

trial counsel: (a) failed to present expert testimony that trappers commonly rip people off

under the guise of scoring drugs; and (b) failed to request a jury instruction on the specific

intent required to prove an offer to sell narcotics.

a. Failure to present expert testimony.

The Court of Appeals’ decision with respect to Ground 2(a) was a reasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. Although Petitioner’s counsel

did not call an expert witness to testify that trappers often promise to deliver drugs when they

actually intend to simply steal the purchase money from the buyer and never return, the jury

heard other evidence to that effect. Three different police officers testified that they were

experienced in working with narcotics cases and that a trapper’s offer to sell is not always

sincere. (Answer, Ex. A, pg. 5.) In addition, defense counsel argued in her closing argument

that Petitioner had not made a valid offer to sell drugs to the officer but rather had lied about

it as part of a theft. (Id.) Defense counsel’s decision not to present duplicative testimony

was a sound tactical decision; Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that but for defense

counsel’s failure to call an expert witness the outcome of his trial would have been different.

b. Failure to request a jury instruction on the specific intent required to prove

an offer to sell narcotics.

The Court of Appeals’ decision with respect to Ground 2(b) was a reasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. The Court of Appeals held that

the jury was properly instructed, concluding that a defendant violates A.R.S. § 13-3408(A)(7)

if he knowingly offers to sell a narcotic drug. (Answer, Ex. A, pg. 3.) The jury received an

instruction on the “knowing” mens rea of the offense. Relying on State v. Strong, 178 Ariz.

507, 508, 875 P.2d 166, 167 (App. 1993), the Court of Appeals held that because A.R.S. §

13-3408(A)(7) requires proof that a defendant knowingly offered to sell a drug, there is no

reason to read into the statute the additional requirement of proof of intent to sell. (Answer,

Case 4:09-cv-00162-JMR Document 18 Filed 09/23/09 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

Ex. A, p. 4.) This Court is bound by the state court’s interpretation of the elements of an

offense under state law. See Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2000.) 

Because, under state law, Petitioner was not entitled to a separate instruction regarding

intent to sell, counsel’s failure to take futile action - requesting such an instruction - can not

be deficient performance. See Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996). 

v. Ground 3 is without merit.

In Ground 3, Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel when appellate counsel (a) failed to argue that the jury was not properly instructed

about the specific intent necessary to prove an offer to sell narcotics and (b) failed to argue

that the jury should have received instruction on the lesser-included offense of theft. 

a. Failure to argue that the jury was not properly instructed regarding specific

intent. 

The Court of Appeals’ decision with respect to Ground 3(a) was a reasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. For the reasons stated in Section

B(vi)(b), Petitioner was not entitled to an instruction regarding his intent to sell for the charge

of violating A.R.S. § 13-3408(A)(7). An appellate attorney is not ineffective for failing to

raise a meritless argument. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). 

b. Failure to argue that the jury should have received a lesser-included offense

instruction.

The Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s claim that his appellate counsel should

have challenged the trial court’s failure to give a lesser-included offense instruction on theft.

According to the Court of Appeals, theft is not a lesser-included offense of an offer to sell

drugs, and therefore it would have been error to provide a jury instruction on that offense.

The Court of Appeals’ decision with respect to Ground 3(b) was a reasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented.

As a threshold matter, this Court must accept a state court's interpretation of state law,

and alleged errors in the application of state law are not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.

Case 4:09-cv-00162-JMR Document 18 Filed 09/23/09 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 The Court of Appeals noted that Petitioner was originally also charged with fraudulent

scheme and artifice, and that theft may have been a lesser-included offense of that charge. 

However, a judgment of acquittal was entered on the fraudulent scheme and artifice charge. 

(Answer, Ex. A, pg. 7.)

- 11 -

See Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, to the extent Petitioner asks

this Court to review the legal sufficiency of the trial court’s conclusion that theft was not a

lesser-included offense of an offer to sell drugs, this claim is not cognizable. 

Furthermore, the trial court’s conclusion that Petitioner’s counsel was effective with

respect to Ground 3(b) was a reasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the state court. Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 23.3 requires the trial judge

to provide the jury with verdict forms “for all offenses necessarily included in the offense

charged, an attempt to commit the offense charged or an offense necessarily included therein,

if such attempt is an offense.” If requested to do so and the evidence supports it, the trial

judge must also instruct the jurors on all offenses “necessarily included” in the offense

charged. See State v. Wall, 126 P.3d 148, 150 (Ariz. 2006). “To constitute a lesser-included

offense, the offense must be composed solely of some but not all of the elements of the

greater crime so that it is impossible to have committed the crime charged without having

committed the lesser one.” State v. Cheramie, 189 P.3d 374, 375 (Ariz. 2008). As stated

above, Petitioner was charged with violating A.R.S. § 13-3408(A)(7), which prohibits

knowingly offering to sell a narcotic drug. A defendant is guilty of theft if, without lawful

authority, the person knowingly controls property of another with the intent to deprive the

other person of such property. See A.R.S. § 13-1802(A)(1). Theft is not a lesser-included

offense of knowingly offering to sell a narcotic drug because it is possible to knowingly sell

a narcotic drug without intending to unlawfully deprive another person of property. There

was no legal basis for the lesser-included offense instruction in Petitioner’s case.2

Accordingly, appellate counsel was not deficient in failing to argue that this instruction

should have been given. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 751. 

Case 4:09-cv-00162-JMR Document 18 Filed 09/23/09 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

C. Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

Petitioner requested an evidentiary hearing in his Reply. (Doc. No. 13.) Petitioner

is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a claim only if he alleges “facts that, if proven, would

entitle him to relief.” Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 890 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Tapia

v. Roe, 189 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir.1999)). In the present case, Petitioner challenges the

legal conclusions of the state court without alleging any facts which, if proven, would entitle

him to relief. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court enter

an order DENYING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

ten days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. If objections are

not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are filed, the parties should use

the following case number: CV-09-162-TUC-JMR.

The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of the Report and Recommendation to Petitioner

and counsel for Respondents.

DATED this 23rd day of September, 2009.

Case 4:09-cv-00162-JMR Document 18 Filed 09/23/09 Page 12 of 12