Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_04-cv-01075/USCOURTS-almd-3_04-cv-01075-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 29:621 Job Discrimination (Age)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

BETTY T. HARRIS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 3:04-CV-1075-WKW

) (WO)

TUSKEGEE-MACON COUNTY )

HEAD START, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This cause is before the court on the defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. # 12), filed on December 9, 2005, and the defendant’s Motion to Strike (Doc. # 19),

filed on January 5, 2006. For reasons to be discussed, the Court finds that the Motion for

Summary Judgment is due to be GRANTED, and the Motion to Strike is due to be DENIED.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts contained in the parties’ evidentiary submissions, viewed in a light most

favorable to the non-movant, show the following: 

Plaintiff Betty Harris (“Harris”) began working with Tuskegee-Macon County Head

Start (“Head Start”) in 1965. She was employed there for 39 years, until she was terminated

in January 2004. Harris worked in several different capacities during her employment with

Head Start; at the time she was terminated, she was employed as a lead teacher. While Harris

received some positive evaluations of her job performance, she also received negative

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feedback from her supervisors and was the subject of several disciplinary actions. On one

occasion, in October 2002, she was temporarily re-assigned from her position as a teacher

to work in the Head Start central office, due to tension at the center where she was teaching.

Harris asserts that, in 2002 and 2003, she was frequently moved from job site to job site. She

believes that she was treated disrespectfully by her colleagues and supervisors during this

time. Harris received written reprimands on November 7, 2001, and September 11, 2002,

for being away from her workplace without permission. On May 14, 2003, another Head

Start teacher filed a complaint against Harris for failing to accompany her students on a field

trip. On December 11, 2003, another Head Start employee filed a complaint against Harris

for being absent from her workplace without prior approval and without making

arrangements for another staff member to cover her class. 

Harris was terminated, effective January 30, 2004, for numerous violations of the

Head Start personnel policies. Harris filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on

March 11, 2004; she received a right-to-sue letter on August 6, 2004 and filed her Complaint

with this Court on November 5, 2004. 

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Because this case arises under 29 U.S.C. § 623 et seq., the Court exercises subject

matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Additionally, the Court

finds that the record includes adequate allegations supporting personal jurisdiction and

venue.

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III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Rule 56 (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is

appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party asking for summary judgment “always bears

the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323. The movant can meet this burden

by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which

it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-23.

Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) “requires the nonmoving party

to go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material

facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). On

the other hand, the court must believe the evidence of the non-movant and must draw all

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justifiable inferences from the evidence in the non-moving party's favor. Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). After the nonmoving party has responded

to the motion for summary judgment, the court must grant summary judgment if there is no

genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c).

IV. DISCUSSION

Harris has alleged one count of age discrimination under 29 U.S.C. § 623 et seq., the

Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). The ADEA provides that it is illegal for

an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate

against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623 (a)(1). 

“An employee bringing a claim under the ADEA must prove intentional

discrimination by the employer through one of two methods: presenting direct evidence of

discriminatory intent, or presenting circumstantial evidence of discrimination.” Ashe v.

Aronov Homes, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1258 (M.D. Ala. 2004). The Eleventh Circuit

has held that, in order to be considered direct evidence, a statement must prove the existence

of discrimination “without inference or presumption.” Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376

F.3d 1079, 1086 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). 

Harris claims that Kate LaFayette (“LaFayette”), director of Tuskegee-Macon County

Head Start, told her that she might need “psychological counseling,” and that this constitutes

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direct evidence of discrimination. Doc. # 16 at 9. However, it is not clear from the Harris’s

evidence whether this statement included any reference to her age. When Harris first

described the statement in her Complaint, she stated that she was “subjected to discriminatory

remarks . . . including the comment that [she] might need ‘psychological counseling,’ due

to her age.” Doc. # 1 at ¶ 8. By affidavit in her response to the defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment, Harris again quoted LaFayette as saying that “she might need some

‘psychological counseling,’ due to her age.” Doc. # 16 at 4. However, a few pages later in

this same document, Harris presents the quote this way: “That the Plaintiff Harris might need

‘psychological counseling due to her age.’” Doc. # 16 at 9. Further, in Harris’ original

charge of discrimination that she filed with the EEOC, she quoted LaFayette as saying that

she might need “psychological counseling,” without putting any other words in quotation

marks. Doc. # 16, Ex. 3. Because Harris only alleges that LaFayette used the words “due

to her age” at the point in her response where she is arguing that this statement constitutes

direct evidence, and in view of the fact that Harris’ own allegations in other evidentiary

filings – indeed, even in the same document – are inconsistent, the Court finds that the

statement in question, merged in its various forms into one most favorable to Harris, would

not constitute direct evidence of age discrimination.

Because Harris presents circumstantial, rather than direct, evidence of discrimination,

this case is governed by the analysis found in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

792 (1973). Under this test, the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie

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case of unlawful employment discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 802;

Young v. Gen. Food Corp., 840 F.2d 825, 828 (11th Cir. 1988). To establish a prima facie

case, Harris must show that (1) she is a member of the protected age group; (2) she was

subjected to adverse employment action; (3) she was qualified for the job; and (4) she was

replaced by a younger individual. See Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th

Cir. 2000). Head Start does not dispute that Harris has met the first three factors necessary

to establish a prima facie case. Harris was 58 years old at the time she was terminated, and

was qualified to perform her job. Head Start does dispute, however, that Harris was replaced

by someone outside the protected age group. Harris claims that she was replaced by Myrtle

Anyamore, who was 40 years old at the time. Doc. # 16 at 5. Head Start claims that the

plaintiff was replaced by Algerine Harris, who was 62 years old at the time. Doc. # 13 at 5.

At this stage, the Court must believe the plaintiff’s version of any disputed facts; therefore,

the Court finds that Harris has presented evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case

of age discrimination. 

After the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the

employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment

action. Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024. The employer’s burden is “exceedingly light,” requiring

only that the employer offer evidence that could lead a rational fact-finder to believe the

decision was not discriminatory. Turnes v. AmSouth Bank, N.A, 36 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th

Cir. 1994). At this stage, the employer has only the burden of production, not of persuasion.

Case 3:04-cv-01075-WKW-DRB Document 27 Filed 03/08/06 Page 6 of 14
 Head Start identified other reasons for Harris’ termination (ie., rudeness, failure to report the whereabouts 1

of a student) which are not sufficiently explained in the evidence before the Court. Because Harris has failed to show

that Head Start’s primary reasons, as discussed further in this opinion, are pretextual, the Court finds no need to

consider these additional reasons supplied by the defendant. See Lewis v. Chattahoochee Valley Community College,

136 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1239 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (“The general rule in analyzing discrimination claims based on

circumstantial evidence is that when a defendant has articulated several different reasons for an employment action, a

plaintiff must demonstrate that each of the proffered reasons is unworthy of credence in order to establish pretext.”)

(emphasis added).

7

See, e.g., Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-55, 258 (1981);

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. It is not necessary that the court believe the evidence;

the court’s analysis “can involve no credibility assessment.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,

509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993). If the employer is able to satisfy this burden, “‘the McDonnell

Douglas framework – with its presumptions and burdens’ – disappear[s] and the sole

remaining issue [is] ‘discrimination vel non.’” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc.,

530 U.S. 133, 142-43 (2000) (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 113, and U.S. Postal

Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 (1983)). 

Head Start contends that Harris was fired because she was either absent from her work

site or failed to report to work without prior approval on at least four occasions. Doc. # 13

at 7. Head Start has presented evidence to document that Harris received reprimands for 1

being away from work without prior approval on November 7, 2001 (Doc. # 13, Ex. C) and

September 11, 2002 (Doc. # 13, Ex. H). Other evidence includes two complaints filed

against Harris by other Head Start employees. One complaint was filed on May 14, 2003 by

Algerine Harris, alleging that the plaintiff did not report for a student field trip. Doc. # 13,

Ex. L. Another was filed on December 11, 2003, by Mary Frank, alleging that Harris was

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absent from work without receiving prior approval, resulting in a student-to-teacher ratio that

was out of compliance with Head Start standards. Doc. # 13, Ex. O. Policy number 903:2

of the Tuskegee-Macon County Head Start Program classifies “leaving the work site without

permission during working hours” and “failure to report to work without giving proper notice

to supervisor” as Class B offenses. The policy states that “[c]ommission of two (2) Class B

Offenses may result in termination.” Doc. # 13, Ex. N. Accordingly, the court finds that the

defendant has met its relatively light burden of providing legitimate reasons for Harris’

termination. 

The burden now shifts back to Harris to demonstrate that the defendant’s reasons are

merely pretexts. “[T]o avoid summary judgment [the plaintiff] must introduce significantly

probative evidence showing that the asserted reason is merely a pretext for discrimination.”

Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 990 F.2d 1217, 1228 (11th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). “A

reason is not pretext for discrimination ‘unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and

that discrimination was the real reason.’” Johnson v. Atlanta Independent School System, 137

Fed. Appx. 311, 315 (11th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509

U.S. at 515 (emphasis in original)). The plaintiff may meet this burden by pointing out

“weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the

employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action.” Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d

695, 725 (11th Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court has held that a “plaintiff’s prima facie case,

combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false,

Case 3:04-cv-01075-WKW-DRB Document 27 Filed 03/08/06 Page 8 of 14
 This is one of three affidavits of her own testimony that Harris filed as evidence in response to the motion 2

for summary judgment. See Doc. # 16, Exs. 1, 23 & 32.

9

may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.” Reeves,

530 U.S. at 148.

Harris attempts to show that Head Start’s reasons for her termination are pretextual

by asserting that the reprimands she received were inaccurate or unfair. In her affidavits,

Harris characterizes the reprimands as: blame “for others mistakes and misconduct” (Doc.

# 16, Ex. 1); lies (“I was lied on”) (Doc. # 16, Ex. 1); false accusations (Doc. # 16, Ex. 32,

¶ 18); a “false write up by the new comer” (Doc. # 16, Ex. 23); “a figment of [a co-worker’s]

faulty imagination” (Doc. # 16, Ex. 23); based on “favoritism” (Doc. # 16, Exs. 1 & 23);

“wrong conclusions . . . based on [a supervisor’s] friendship with the persons involved”

(Doc. # 16, Ex. 23); “trumped up” (Doc. # 16, Ex. 32, ¶ 6); part of a “plot to set me up for

termination” (Doc. # 16, Ex. 32, ¶ 10); frivolous (“All sorts of frivolous claims and write-ups

began to be launched against me”) (Doc. # 16, Ex. 32, ¶ 11); and set-ups (“I was set up”)

(Doc. # 16, Ex. 32, ¶ 15). Tellingly, Harris candidly admitted in her January 29, 2004

affidavit that “ . . . I felt that my age became a factor along with other issues” (Doc. # 16, 2

Ex. 1) (emphasis added). The Court finds that the “other issues” far outweigh Harris’

inferences of pretext, which are conclusory and weak at best. 

For instance, Harris claims that she did in fact have prior approval to be away from

her work site in September 2002 for classes at Auburn University. Not only does she claim

to have had permission from her supervisors to attend class during work hours, she says she

Case 3:04-cv-01075-WKW-DRB Document 27 Filed 03/08/06 Page 9 of 14
 Harris submitted as evidence her class schedules from three semesters at Auburn – Spring 2002, Summer 3

2002 and Spring 2003. Doc. # 16, Ex. 20. The absence in question, on September 11, 2002, would have occurred

during the Fall 2002 semester, a semester Harris does not claim to have been in school. Harris has not produced

evidence to demonstrate that she was attending class on September 11, 2002, nor has she produced evidence to

demonstrate that her supervisors were informed that she would be attending class on that date.

10

had also provided her supervisors with a copy of her class schedule so they would know

where she was at all times. Doc. # 16 at 5-6. Harris has presented evidence in the form of

a memo from her supervisor dated October 1, 2002, that discusses her work assignment at

that time. Doc. # 16, Ex. 10. The memo states that Harris “will continue to enjoy liberal

release time to attend classes at Auburn University.” Id. While this evidence does indicate

that Harris’ supervisors were aware of and had approved her absence from work to attend

classes, the memo does not show that Harris was in fact attending classes on the days in

question, or that her supervisors had received prior notice that she would be away from work

on those days. Harris has not presented any evidence to show that this reason offered by 3

Head Start is pretextual. 

Harris also contends that she did not miss a field trip on May 14, 2003, as alleged by

Algerine Harris. In an affidavit that appears to be Harris’ response to an explanation offered

by the defendant after Harris filed an EEOC charge, Harris states that she “never missed a

field trip.” Doc. # 16, Ex. 23. Harris does not, however, offer evidence to show that her

employer knew or had reason to believe she did not miss the field trip, nor does it appear that

Harris ever appealed or otherwise disputed the written report at the time. Whether or not

Harris actually missed the field trip, her burden is to demonstrate that this reason for her

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termination is a pretext. In order to do this, she must show not that the complaint filed

against her was erroneous, but rather that Head Start did not believe the complaint. See

Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991) (“The inquiry of the

ADEA is limited to whether [the defendant] believed that [the plaintiff] was guilty . . . , and

if so, whether this belief was the reason behind [the plaintiff]’s discharge.”) (emphasis in

original). Harris has not presented evidence to demonstrate that Head Start did not believe

the complaint made against her regarding her absence from a student field trip. Therefore,

Harris has failed to show that this proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination. 

Finally, Harris argues that she had previously given notice to her supervisor that she

would be absent from work on December 9, 2003. She offers as evidence a memo to Mary

Frank (“Frank”), Associate Education Manager, which stated that she would be out on

December 9, 2003 for a doctor’s appointment. Doc. # 16, Ex. 12. Franks’ complaint against

Harris (Doc. # 13, Ex. O) states that she had received Harris’ memo, but that she had not had

an “opportunity to approve or disapprove Mrs. Harris’ request for leave.” Further, the memo

states that Harris’ assistant had requested the same day off prior to Harris’ request. Doc. #

16, Ex. O. Harris’ position at the time was Lead Teacher; the job description for Lead

Teacher states that one responsibility of this position is to “[c]oordinate daily operations and

supervise center personnel; maintain child/staff ratio by providing qualified substitutes . . .

.” Doc. # 16, Ex. P. The Lead Teacher is to ensure that “[c]lassrooms are adequately staffed

in the event of staff absences.” Id. In her complaint against Harris, Frank states that, due to

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Harris’ absence, the student-to-teacher ratio was out of proportion, and Harris had not made

arrangements for sufficient staff coverage that day. Doc. # 16, Ex. O. While Harris has

provided evidence that she gave prior notice that she would be absent from her work site on

December 9, 2003, she had not provided evidence that she arranged for her classroom to be

adequately staffed in her absence. Given that such arrangements were part of her job duties

at the time, a reasonable employer could find such an occurrence to be cause for disciplinary

action. “[P]rovided that the proffered reason is one that might motivate a reasonable

employer, an employee cannot succeed on summary judgment by simply quarreling with the

wisdom of that reason.” Lewis, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1242 (citing Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030).

Harris, therefore, has not demonstrated that this proffered reason is a pretext for

discrimination. 

Harris may disagree with Head Start’s reasons for terminating her, but she has not

produced sufficient evidence to prove that those reasons would not motivate a reasonable

employer to terminate an employee. Harris has not shown that her supervisors did not

believe that she had been absent from work without permission or otherwise failed to

perform her duties on at least four occasions. Harris asks this Court to substitute its

judgment for that of her employer. “Federal courts ‘do not sit as a super-personnel

department . . . . [O]ur inquiry is limited to whether the employer gave an honest

explanation of its behavior.’” Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030 (quoting Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck

& Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991)). This Court finds no evidence of

Case 3:04-cv-01075-WKW-DRB Document 27 Filed 03/08/06 Page 12 of 14
 Harris has also alleged that Head Start engaged in a pattern and practice of age discrimination; however, 4

the Court finds that Harris has not produced sufficient evidence to establish this claim. “In a pattern and practice

case, plaintiffs must establish by a preponderance of the evidence not only that the employer discriminated against

certain individuals, but that ‘discrimination was the [employer’s] standard operating procedure – the regular rather

than the unusual practice.’ To meet this burden, plaintiffs must ‘prove more than the mere occurrence of isolated or

accidental or sporadic discriminatory acts.’” Hipp v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1227-28 (11th Cir.

2001) (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977)). In support of this claim, Harris

has submitted a list of employees which includes their birthdays, along with the Head Start staff assignments from

2004 to 2006. This evidence utterly fails to demonstrate that Head Start discriminated against any individuals or that

discrimination was the standard operating procedure. 

13

“discrimination vel non.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143. Because Harris has not demonstrated that

the stated reasons for her termination are pretextual, she has not provided sufficient evidence

to demonstrate that a disputed issue of material fact exists as to whether her termination was

impermissibly based on age. The defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is therefore 4

due to be granted.

The defendant filed a Motion to Strike Certain Exhibits (Doc. # 19) submitted by the

plaintiff. The Court finds no need to consider the evidence included in these exhibits, and

therefore finds that the motion is due to be denied as moot.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, it is hereby ORDERED that 

1. The defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 12) is GRANTED.

2. The defendant’s Motion to Strike (Doc. # 19) is DENIED as MOOT.

3. The defendant’s Motion to Extend Discovery Deadline (Doc. # 26) is DENIED

as MOOT. 

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4. The pretrial conference set for March 10, 2006 is CANCELED. 

5. The clerk is DIRECTED to remove this case from the April 10, 2006 trial

docket. 

A final judgment will be entered in accordance with this order. 

DONE this the 8 day of March, 2006. th

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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