Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-01310/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-01310-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FADI SABA,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNISYS CORPORATION,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-01310-WHO 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 145

Plaintiff Fadi Saba moves to alter or amend my prior Order granting summary judgment in 

favor of defendant Unisys Corporation (“Unisys”).1 Because he has not presented any reason that 

supports a finding of clear error of law or manifest injustice as required by Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 59(e), and because none of the evidence that he presents can be considered “newly 

discovered,” his motion is DENIED. 

BACKGROUND

This Order incorporates the facts described in the previous Order granting Unisys’s motion 

for summary judgment. See Order (Dkt. No. 137). Saba filed suit against Unisys, his former 

employer, after he was terminated in 2013. He brought two causes of action for wrongful 

termination in violation of a fundamental public policy and other related causes of action. 

In moving for summary judgment, Unisys cited several reasons for its termination of Saba, 

including that: (i) Saba was unable to work with one of two primary clients that his group worked 

with, the City of Minneapolis, because he never obtained security clearance; (ii) the group’s other 

main customer, TASC, reduced its contractual requirements so that it required approximately two, 

 

1 Although Saba styles his motion as a motion for reconsideration, because judgment has been 

entered in this case I address it as a motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 59(e). Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) (allowing a court to reconsider prior to final 

entry of judgment). 

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rather than five, full-time employees to service it; and (iii) the corporation faced financial 

hardships, resulting in a reduction in force of 54 employees, including Saba. Id. at 1, 19. Saba 

was identified as the junior of two employees in his group that worked with TASC. Id. at 9. I 

granted Unisys’s motion for summary judgment and denied Saba’s cross-motion for partial 

summary judgment. I found that Unisys met its burden of establishing legitimate reasons for 

terminating Saba, and that Saba was unable to establish a triable issue that Unisys’s justifications 

were a pretext for unlawful termination.

Saba filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that my prior decision rested on clear 

errors or manifest injustice, and that newly discovered evidence compels a different result. Dkt. 

No. 145. Saba was represented until after the hearing on the summary judgment motion. After 

the hearing, he discharged his attorney and now proceeds pro se. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), a motion to reconsider may be granted when 

(i) the court is presented with newly discovered evidence; (ii) the court committed clear error or its 

initial holding was manifestly unjust; or (iii) if there is an intervening change in the controlling 

law. Sch. Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Rule 59(e) is intended to “afford relief only in extraordinary circumstances, and not to 

routinely give litigants a second bite at the apple.” Van Derheydt v. Cty. of Placer, 32 Fed. App’x 

221, 223 (9th Cir. 2002) (granting a motion for reconsideration after the district court ruled that a 

claim was untimely, but statute of limitations had yet to start running). Rule 59(e) is “an 

extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial 

resources.” Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). 

Accordingly, Rule 59(e) may not be used to raise evidence or an argument for the first time “when 

they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Id. 

DISCUSSION

Saba relies on two of Rule 59(e)’s bases to alter or amend a judgment: “newly discovered 

evidence,” and clear error or manifest injustice. Dkt. No. 145 at 2. He does not assert any 

intervening changes in the controlling law. 

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Saba makes four primary arguments: (i) that he completed the City’s background check; 

(ii) that he was better qualified for his position than Helen Baker, the other member of his team 

that worked with TASC; (iii) that the court’s discussion of Unisys’s financial position and number 

of clients was incorrect and that there was not a widespread layoff at the time of his termination; 

and (iv) that Unisys in fact received his May 9, 2013 email. Saba appears to present these 

arguments as newly discovered evidence, as well as errors of fact or law that were material to the 

Court’s original holding and, once corrected, should change the outcome of the case.

All of these arguments rely on evidence that Saba could have presented at summary 

judgment, and Saba does not indicate that he did not discover the evidence until after the summary 

judgment Order issued. In addition, Saba does not present any legal basis that supports a finding 

of error, let alone clear error that would support a motion under Rule 59(e). 

I. NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE

A. Evidence that Saba Completed the Government Background Check

First, Saba argues that he completed the background check for the City and that he 

obtained higher level clearance from other entities. Dkt. No. 145 at 2. These arguments and 

supporting facts were presented at summary judgment, and I addressed the issue at length in the 

summary judgment Order. I decided that the factual issues of whether Saba completed the 

background check were not relevant because Saba’s application was never approved. As a result 

of not obtaining the necessary clearance, Saba could not work for the City, which was one of his 

team’s two primary customers. See Order at 19 (“The pertinent facts are undisputed: Saba did not 

obtain clearance, Unisys did not prevent Saba from obtaining the clearance, and Saba 

consequently was unable to work for the City.”). I found that this provided a justification for his 

termination. 

Therefore, Saba’s evidence that he completed of the background check is not “newly 

discovered evidence.” 

B. Evidence that Saba was Better Qualified for his Position than Baker and Could have 

Performed Other Jobs

Saba also raises the fact that he was better qualified for his position than Baker, the other 

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employee working for TASC in his group at Unisys. Dkt. No. 145 at 3. This was also raised at 

summary judgment. Saba does not present any evidence to demonstrate that he was the better 

equipped employee for his group that is not already in the record, or that was not reasonably 

available earlier in the litigation. For example, Saba makes new assertions that Baker did not 

actually work on City or TASC projects. However, he does not provide any evidentiary support 

these claims, and does not explain why he could not have raised them earlier in the litigation. 

Therefore, Saba’s evidence about his and Baker’s qualifications is not “newly discovered 

evidence.” 

C. Unisys’s Financial Position, Number of Clients, and Layoffs were Misrepresented

Saba devotes much of his motion to factual allegations about Unisys’s financial position, 

number of clients, and layoffs that he asserts were misrepresented in the Court’s prior Order. Id.

at 3-5. He asserts that the company employed 20,000 people and “ha[d] more than two main 

clients.” Id. at 3. Saba states that he should have been transferred to a different team if his 

inability to work with the City presented an issue, and argues that Unisys’s termination of 

approximately 54 employees could not be described as a layoff or a true reduction in workforce. 

Id.

All of this evidence was presented or could have been presented at summary judgment. 

For example, Saba’s argument that he should have been transferred to a new team or assigned new 

clients was specifically addressed both in the briefing and at the hearing. I found that these

arguments did not establish that Unisys’s reasons for terminating Saba were pretextual. See Order 

at 22 (“As reflected in plaintiff’s counsel’s argument at the hearing, Saba’s evidence demonstrates, at 

best, that Unisys could have terminated someone else or that they could have retained Saba to do a 

different job. This argument ignores the fact that in making such reductions in force, companies are 

often faced with difficult choices that are not actionable. It does not demonstrate that Unisys’s reasons 

for terminating Saba were false or pretextual.”). Furthermore, evidence of future layoffs does not 

impact whether Unisys implemented a valid reduction in workforce.2 For these reasons, Saba’s 

 

2

Similarly, Saba presents supposedly new evidence that Unisys was involved in charges of 

corruption and fraud. Dkt. No. 145 at 5. This evidence is not relevant to the determination of 

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arguments about Unisys’s financial condition and layoff decisions are not “newly discovered 

evidence.” 

D. Unisys received Saba’s May 9, 2013 Email

Lastly, Saba argues that Unisys received his May 9, 2013 email. Dkt. No. 145 at 5. Again, 

this exact question was discussed in the prior Order. Although I expressed doubt as to whether 

Unisys received the email, I assumed that it did. See Order at 22 (“assuming that Greene received 

this email, Saba does not present any other facts or evidence that would support a finding that 

Unisys terminated Saba because of this email, instead of the other valid reasons that Unisys 

presented”). Saba does not raise any other facts or evidence that were not made or available 

earlier in the litigation. For example, his assertion that there are “loopholes” to “Journaling” 

emails is an argument that was reasonably available to him before summary judgment. 

For the above reasons, Saba did not present any “newly discovered evidence” that would 

disturb the prior summary judgment Order. 3 

II. CLEAR ERROR OF LAW OR MANIFEST INJUSTICE

In presenting the arguments and facts discussed above as “newly presented evidence,” 

Saba also contends that the court committed clear error or that manifest injustice will arise if the 

judgment is not altered or amended. “While courts have generally not defined what constitutes 

clear error under Rule 59(e), case law indicates that clear error should conform to a very exacting 

standard.” SEC v. Pattison, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61922, 2011 WL 2293195 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 

2011) (quotations omitted). An error “must be one on which the final judgment was predicated” 

and “must be one that would alter the outcome of the case.” Id. 

Most of Saba’s arguments amount to disagreements with the Court’s Order and do not 

 

whether Unisys’s reasons for discharging Saba were pretextual. He also attacks factual 

determinations that were relevant to his motion for partial summary judgment, which was denied 

as moot. See Dkt. No. 145 at 6. 

3

Saba’s reliance on Alvarez v. QPI Multipress, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48588, *13, 2007 WL 

1988724 (N.D.N.Y July 5, 2007) is misplaced. In that case “Plaintiff’s counsel inadvertently 

omitted [page 4 of an affidavit] when he submitted Plaintiff’s opposition papers,” and “the Court 

would not have granted...[the] motion for summary judgment” if it had reviewed this new 

document. Rather than retry an issue, the Court examined evidence that was not previously 

available. 

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provide a legal basis for altering or amending the judgment under Rule 59(e). As described above, 

Saba’s theories regarding the facts do not establish that the prior Order is premised on clear error, 

or that a manifest injustice will result absent reconsideration. For example, he objects to my 

determination in the summary judgment Order that Saba “does not argue that the reasons above 

[for his termination] are false.” Dkt. No. 145 at 4. This refers to my finding that Saba did not 

dispute the underlying facts that Unisys laid off 54 other employees, that Saba could not work for 

the City, and that TASC changed its contract with Unisys and needed less employees to service it. 

However, I understood that Saba’s position was that Unisys’s reasons were pretext but focused 

that the underlying facts were not in dispute. In his motion for reconsideration, Saba again does 

not argue that these facts are purely false, but instead that they are pretextual. I have already 

rejected that argument and will not address it again here. 

Because Saba was unable to articulate specific explanations of how I committed clear error 

in the summary judgment Order, or that manifest injustice will result if I do not amend the Order, 

Saba has not established that the Order should be altered or amended pursuant to Rule 59(e). 

CONCLUSION

Saba fails to provide any basis under Rule 59(e) to reconsider my prior Order granting 

summary judgment. Saba’s motion raises evidence and arguments that were raised or could have 

been raised at summary judgment. Additionally, none of the issues raised by Saba can be 

interpreted as clear error or would lead to manifest injustice if they were not corrected. Instead, it 

appears that Saba hopes to re-litigate issues of law already addressed by the Court in violation of 

Rule 59(e). For these reasons, Saba’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 14, 2015

______________________________________

WILLIAM H. ORRICK

United States District Judge

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