Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_15-cv-00126/USCOURTS-azd-4_15-cv-00126-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

James Adam Medina, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-126-TUC-DCB (BPV)

 

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner James Adam Medina, has filed a pro se Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 1). Respondents have filed an Answer to Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 18) and Petitioner has filed a Reply (Doc. 28). 

 Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to the 

undersigned Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation. For the following 

reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court dismiss the Petition as 

untimely filed. 

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 A. STATE PROCEEDINGS

 On December 16, 2010, Petitioner pled guilty in state court to two counts of sexual 

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conduct with a minor. (Doc. 18 at 2 & Exhs. A, B). On February 7, 2011, the date set for 

sentencing, Petitioner asked to withdraw from the plea agreement. (Doc. 18, at 2, Exh. 

C). The court continued the matter until February 28, 2011 and granted the parties leave 

to file “‘briefs and/or information deemed necessary regarding sentencing issues and/or 

the defendant’s motion to withdraw.’” (Doc. 18, at 2 (quoting Exh. C)). Petitioner’s 

counsel, David McDaniel, did not file anything in support of Petitioner’s motion to 

withdraw from the plea agreement and Petitioner ultimately changed counsel. (Doc. 18 

at 2 & Exh. D). Petitioner’s new counsel, Verne Hill, filed a motion to continue 

sentencing, which the trial court denied. (Id.). On February 28, 2011, the trial court 

sentenced Petitioner to consecutive, 10-year terms of imprisonment. (Doc. 18, Exh. E). 

 On March 9, 2011, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief (“PCR”) 

pursuant to Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 18, Exh. F). The 

time for filing the petition was extended several times, and the PCR Petition was 

ultimately filed by appointed counsel on November 21, 2011. (Doc. 18 at 2 & Exhs. G, 

H, I). Petitioner asserted a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on his 

counsel’s failure to provide him with critical disclosure, failure to investigate regarding 

that disclosure, and failure to file anything before sentencing to support Petitioner’s 

request that he be allowed to withdraw from the plea agreement. (Doc. 18 at 2 & Exh. I). 

The trial court, after holding an evidentiary hearing where Petitioner and his trial counsel 

testified, denied Petitioner’s PCR Petition on April 12, 2012.1

 (Doc. 18 at 3 & Exhs. M, 

N). Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Review in the Arizona Court of appeals on July 

16, 2012. (Doc. 18 at 3 & Exh. O). On November 27, 2012, after accepting additional 

materials filed by Petitioner, the Arizona Court of Appeals accepted review but denied 

relief. (Doc. 18 at 3 & Exh. P, Q, R, S). Petitioner received multiple extensions of time 

to file a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court, with the final extension 

expiring on February 24, 2014. (Doc. 18 at 3 & Exh. T). Petitioner failed to file his 

 

1

 Although the court’s ruling is dated April 11, 2012, it was not filed until April 12, 2012. (See Doc. 18, Exh. N). 

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petition for review by February 24, 2014 and, on March 13, 2014, the Arizona Supreme 

Court dismissed the matter. (Doc. 18, Exh. T). The mandate issued on April 28, 2014. 

(Doc. 18, Exh. U). 

 Meanwhile, after the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s First PCR Petition on April 

12, 2012, but before filing a petition for review in the appellate court, Petitioner filed a 

Second PCR Petition on April 17, 2012. (Doc. 18, Exh. V). The Second PCR 

proceeding was stayed while Petitioner’s initial PCR Petition was before the appellate 

court. (Doc. 18, Exhs. Y, Z, AA). After the stay was lifted, Petitioner, through appointed 

counsel, filed his Second PCR Petition on May 22, 2013. (Doc. 18, Exhs. W, BB, CC). 

Petitioner asserted a claim of ineffective assistance of “appellate counsel” in failing to 

argue that the trial court had improperly considered his lack of acceptance of 

responsibility and lack of remorse in imposing consecutive sentences. (Doc. 18, Exh. 

CC). On August 29, 2013, the trial court found no merit to the claim raised in 

Petitioner’s Second PCR Petition. (Doc. 18, Exh. FF). Respondents assert, and 

Petitioner does not dispute, that “[t]here is no record of a petition for review to the court 

of appeals from this denial[]” of Petitioner’s Second PCR Petition. (Doc. 18 at 4). 

B. FEDERAL PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

 On March 30, 20152

, Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas Petition, raising the 

following grounds for relief: (1) ineffective assistance of trial and sentencing counsel 

(“Ground One”); (2) deprivation of Petitioner’s federal due process rights because the 

trial court denied sentencing counsel Hill’s motion to continue sentencing (“Ground 

Two”); (3) trial counsel McDaniel was ineffective because he failed to provide Petitioner 

with “critical disclosure” (“Ground Three”); (4) Petitioner is “actually innocent” 

 

2

 On March 30, 2015, Petitioner signed and placed the instant Petition for federal 

habeas relief “in the prison mailing system.” (Doc. 1 at 11). A federal habeas petition is deemed filed when handed by the inmate to a prison official for mailing. See Houston v. 

Lack, 487 U.S. at 270–71 (1988); Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 770 n. 1 (9th Cir. 

2010) (“[w]hen a prisoner gives prison authorities a habeas petition or other pleading to mail to court, the court deems the petition constructively ‘filed’ on the date it is signed.”). The Court deems the Petition commencing this action as filed on March 30, 

2015. 

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(“Ground Four”); and (5) prosecutorial misconduct in violation of Petitioner’s rights to 

due process and equal protection. (“Ground Five”). (See Doc. 1). 

II. DISCUSSION

Because Petitioner filed his petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) 

(“AEDPA”). Respondents contend that Petitioner’s March 30, 2015 federal habeas 

Petition is untimely filed under the AEDPA. Alternatively, Respondents contend that 

some of Petitioner’s claims are non-cognizable on federal habeas review, other claims are 

procedurally defaulted, and the cognizable claims that are not defaulted are without merit. 

Petitioner counters that his Petition is timely filed and he is entitled to relief on the merits 

of his claims. 

A. COMMENCEMENT OF THE AEDPA LIMITATIONS PERIOD

 The AEDPA “imposes a one-year statute of limitations on habeas corpus petitions 

filed by state prisoners in federal court.” Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th 

Cir. 2001)(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)) Pursuant to section 2244: 

The limitations period shall run from the latest of— 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by 

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is 

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized 

by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on 

collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented 

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). Additionally, as discussed infra, the statute of limitations 

may be subject to statutory or equitable tolling or other equitable exceptions. 

 Respondents contend that Petitioner’s case became final on direct review on 

February 24, 2014, which was the date that Petitioner’s petition for review was due in the 

Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 18 at 6). According to Respondents, under 28 U.S.C. 

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2244(d)(1)(A), Petitioner had until February 24, 2015 to file a petition for federal habeas 

relief. Because Petitioner did not file his federal habeas Petition until March 30, 2015, 

Respondents assert that the Petition is untimely under the AEDPA. Respondents 

alternatively argue that even if Petitioner’s case became final on direct review on the later 

date of March 13, 2014, when the Arizona Supreme Court issued its order dismissing 

Petitioner’s case for failure to file his petition for review by the February 24, 2014 

deadline, then he had one year from that date to seek federal habeas relief, thus, still 

rendering his March 30, 2015 Petition untimely filed. 

 Petitioner argues that his Petition is timely filed because the mandate on his direct 

review proceeding did not issue until April 28, 2014 leaving him until April 29, 2015 to 

file a federal habeas petition, which renders the March 30, 2015 Petition timely. (Doc. 28 

at 4; see also Doc. 1 at 11).3

 

 To determine the timeliness of the Petition, the Court must first determine the date 

that Petitioner’s February 28, 2011 judgment of conviction and sentencing “became final 

by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 

review[.]” 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(A). Generally, “direct review” encompasses a 

defendant’s direct appeal following the judgment of conviction and sentencing. 

However, Arizona criminal defendants like Petitioner, who stand convicted pursuant to a 

guilty plea, waive their “right to a conventional direct appeal under Arizona law, but 

[they] retain the right to seek review in an ‘of-right proceeding’ under Arizona Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 32.” Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007). The 

Ninth Circuit has held that Arizona’s “Rule 32 of-right proceeding for plea-convicted 

 

3

 In his Petition, Petitioner states that the mandate issued on April 28, 2014. (Doc. 1 at 11). According to Petitioner, because the memorandum decision attached to the 

mandate did not pertain to his case, he filed a motion for clarification which was denied 

on May 6, 2014. (Id.). “To stay within time frame and meet the one-year period of limitation for this court, Medina has submitted this Writ of Habeas Corpus” on March 30, 

2015. (Id). In his Reply, Petitioner states that the mandate issued on April 28, 2014 and then also states that it issued on April 4, 2014, but argues that the one-year statute of limitations expired on April 29, 2015. (Doc. 28 at 4). If Petitioner’s position is correct, then his federal habeas Petition would be timely whether the mandate issued on April 4 or April 28, 2014. 

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defendants is a form of ‘direct review’ within the meaning of §2244(d)(1)(A).” Id. at 

716‒17. In applying §2244(d)(1)(A), the Ninth Circuit has also held that when an 

Arizona defendant does not file a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court on 

direct review, his “direct appeal was final. . . [on] the date that he allowed his time for 

seeking review in the [Arizona] Supreme Court to expire.” Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 

F.3d 1069, 1073‒74 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that conclusion of proceeding on direct 

review under § 2244(d)(1)(A) occurred on the date that petitioner’s ability to seek review 

in the Arizona Supreme Court elapsed and not when the mandate issued). Furthermore, 

the United States Supreme Court has held that “for a state prisoner who does not seek 

review in a State’s highest court, the judgment becomes ‘final’ [under §2244(d)(1)(A)] 

on the date that the time for seeking such review expires.” Gonzalez v. Thaler, __ U.S. 

__, 132 S.Ct. 641, 646 (2012). 

 Here, there is no dispute that Petitioner’s Rule 32 of-right proceeding, which is 

considered a form of direct review under Summers, was timely initiated on March 9, 

2011. (See Doc. 18 at 6 & Exh. F). The trial court denied relief on April 12, 2012, and 

the appellate court granted review on Petitioner’s Petition for Review but denied relief on 

November 27, 2012. (Doc. 18, Exhs. N, S). Although Petitioner received several 

extensions for filing a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court, that court denied 

Petitioner’s request for an extension beyond the February 24, 2014 deadline previously 

set. (See Doc. 18 at 6 & Exh. T). Because Petitioner did not file a petition for review in 

the Arizona Supreme Court by the February 24, 2014 deadline, the judgment became 

final on that date. See Gonzalez, 132 S.Ct. at 656 (“[W]ith respect to a state prisoner who 

does not seek review in a State’s highest court, the judgment becomes ‘final’ under 

2244(d)(1)(A) when the time for seeking such review expires. . .”); Hemmerle, 495 F.3d 

at 1073 (direct review concludes on the date of expiration of time for seeking review in 

the Arizona Supreme Court); Summers, 481 F.3d at 717 (same).4

 Consequently, under 

 

4

 The Arizona District Court has held that in some situations issuance of the 

mandate may be a factor when determining whether a petition for post-collateral relief 

tolls the AEDPA statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(2). See Celaya v. 

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§2244(d)(1)(A), Petitioner had until February 24, 2015 to file a federal habeas petition. 

See Patterson, 251 F.3d at 1247 (applying the “anniversary method” of Rule 6(a) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to calculate the expiration date of AEDPA’s one-year 

statute of limitations). Petitioner’s March 30, 2015 Petition is untimely filed absent 

tolling. 

 Respondents are also correct that even if the March 13, 2014 date of the Arizona 

Supreme Court’s order dismissing Petitioner’s action for failure to timely file a petition 

for review is used in the statute of limitations calculation, thus giving Petitioner until 

March 13, 2015 to file his federal habeas petition, Petitioner’s March 30, 2015 Petition is 

still time barred absent tolling. However, use of the March 13, 2014 date for 

commencement of the limitations period is contrary to the holding in Gonzalez that the 

clock under §2244(d)(1)(A) starts running when the time for seeking review in the state 

supreme court expires, which in this case occurred on February 24, 2014. See Gonzalez,

132 S.Ct. at 656. 

B. THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD IS NOT SUBJECT TO STATUTORY TOLLING 

 The next question is whether tolling applies so as to render the instant Petition 

timely filed. Under the statutory tolling provision of §2244(d)(2), “[t]he time during 

which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review 

with respect to the pertinent judgement or claim is pending shall not be counted toward 

any period of limitation[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). As to statutory tolling under 

 Stewart, 691 F.Supp.2d 1046, 1054‒55 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d 497 Fed. Appx. 744, 2012 WL 5505736, *1 (9th Cir. 2012). The question whether the AEDPA limitations period is tolled under §2244(d)(2) because a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief . . . is pending. . .”is a separate and distinct inquiry from the question of when the statute of limitations commences to run in the first instance under 

28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(A). See Gonzalez, 132 S.Ct. at 654 n.10 (noting distinction); Hemmerle, 495 F.3d at 1074 (same). As to the latter, the Supreme Court has been clear that in a case such as this, where the petitioner failed to seek review in the state supreme court, “the judgment becomes ‘final’ under 2244(d)(1)(A) when the time for seeking such review expires. . . .” Gonzalez, 132 S.Ct. at 656. See also Hemmerle, 495 F.3d at 1074 

(direct review proceeding was final on the date of expiration for seeking review in the Arizona Supreme Court, and not the date the mandate issued). On the instant facts, this 

Court is bound by Gonzalez and Hemmerle. Accordingly, Petitioner’s direct review proceeding became final for purposes of §2244(d)(1)(A) on February 24, 2014, when the 

time expired for him to file a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme Court.			See	id.	

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§2244(d)(2), the fact that Petitioner filed a second petition for post-conviction relief, 

which was not an of-right PCR petition, does not alter the conclusion that Petitioner’s 

Petition is untimely filed. Petitioner’s Second PCR proceeding commenced on April 17, 

2012 when he filed his notice and concluded on August 29, 2013 when the trial court 

denied relief. See Isley v. Arizona Dep’t. of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(for purposes of §2244(d)(2), in Arizona, a PCR petition is deemed pending upon proper 

filing of the notice). (See also Doc. 18, Exhs. V, FF). Respondents concede that 

Petitioner had 35 days from the date of the trial court’s ruling to seek appellate court 

review. (See Doc. 18 at 6‒7 (citing Ariz.R.CrimP. 32.9(c); Ariz.R.Crim.P. 1.3(a); State 

v. Savage, 117 Ariz. 535, 356, 573 P.2d 1388, 1389 (1978)). Petitioner did not seek 

appellate court review. Because, during this same time period, Petitioner was still 

pursuing his Rule 32 of-right proceeding (i.e., direct review), the AEDPA statute of 

limitations had not yet begun to run. Furthermore, because Petitioner’s Second PCR 

proceeding was no longer pending on February 24, 2014, when the AEDPA statute of 

limitations commenced upon conclusion of direct review, Petitioner does not qualify for 

statutory tolling under §2244(d)(2). The same conclusion also results if the calculation is 

based on the March 13, 2014 date of the Arizona Supreme Court’s order dismissing 

Petitioner’s action. 

C. THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD IS NOT SUBJECT TO EQUITABLE TOLLING

 To qualify for equitable tolling, Petitioner must establish that he has been pursuing 

his rights diligently, and some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. Holland v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). A petitioner’s pro se status, on its own, is not enough 

to warrant equitable tolling. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 311 

(2005); Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2006). In addition, a petitioner’s 

miscalculation of when the limitations period expired does not constitute an 

“extraordinary circumstance” warranting equitable tolling. See Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 

F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). Petitioner makes no equitable tolling claim here and he 

has not proffered any extraordinary circumstance that would justify equitable tolling. Nor 

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has he shown that an external impediment hindered the diligent pursuit of his rights. On 

the instant record, equitable tolling is unavailable. 

D. THE ACTUAL INNOCENCE EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY

 One other consideration remains as to whether Petitioner’s untimely filing should 

be excused. The United States Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the 

AEDPA statute of limitations for a claim of actual innocence. McQuiggin v. Perkins, __ 

U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 1924 (2013). The Perkins Court adopted the actual innocence gateway 

previously recognized in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314‒15 (1995), for excusing the 

bar to federal habeas corpus review of procedurally defaulted claims. Id. at 1928. The 

rule announced in Perkins does not provide for an extension of the time statutorily 

prescribed by the AEDPA, but instead is an equitable exception to excuse untimeliness. 

Id. at 1935. Petitioner has not specifically argued that the actual innocence exception 

under Perkins should apply to excuse his untimely Petition. However, he has raised an 

actual innocence claim at Ground IV of his Petition. (Doc. 1 at 9). He also argues in his 

Reply that his “actual innocence claim is tied directly to the exclusion of potentially 

exculpatory evidence by trial counsel and encouraged by the prosecutor.” (Doc. 28 at 7; 

see also id. at 12 (“The exclusion of the evidence by defense counsel, aided by the 

prosecution, resulted in a fundamental miscarriage of justice denying [P]etitioner a fair 

trial and right to present a complete defense in favor of his actual innocence.”)). The 

Court addresses Petitioner’s allegations of actual innocence in the context of the 

timeliness analysis. 

 There is some debate as to whether a petitioner who pleads guilty can later make 

an actual innocence claim. See Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1140 n. 9 (9th Cir. 

2007) (assuming without deciding that actual innocence claim is available to pleading 

defendant). Assuming for purposes of the instant analysis that Petitioner’s guilty plea 

does not preclude him from pursuing an actual innocence argument, his argument 

nonetheless fails to qualify for the exception under Perkins. 

 Petitioner was indicted on six counts of child molestation and sexual contact with 

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a minor. (Doc. 18, Exh. K at 1). On December 16, 2010, Petitioner entered a guilty plea 

to two counts of sexual conduct with a minor in the second degree. (Doc. 18 Exh. K 

(internal Exh. 1 at 11‒13)). In establishing the factual basis for his guilty plea, Petitioner 

admitted: having oral sex with the victim by having her “suck my penis”; on another 

occasion, he and the same victim had sexual intercourse; and that both of the incidents 

occurred when the victim was fourteen years of age. (Id.). At Ground IV of his federal 

Petition, Petitioner claims that he is actually innocent, that he has been “claiming his 

innocence from the very beginning”, and that he “‘never’ intended to take a plea.” (Doc. 

1 at 9; see also Doc. 18, Exh. GG at 19 (Petitioner testifying: “I never intended in taking 

a plea because of my innocence.”5

)). To support his claim, Petitioner cites, among other 

things, his testimony at the evidentiary hearing during his Rule 32 of-right proceeding 

that he “definitely wouldn’t have taken a plea...” if he had been aware of police report 

that he claims his defense counsel did not show him and of which he was unaware until 

Rule 32 counsel showed it to him.6

 (Doc. 1 at 9 (citing Doc. 18, Exh. GG at 19)). 

 It is undisputed that the information Petitioner claims he did not know about 

involved the victim’s statements to police that she had had sex with three other men (two 

teachers and a hall monitor) around the same time as her alleged encounters with 

Petitioner. (See Doc. 18, Exh. I at 4; Doc. 18 Exh. GG at 18; see also Doc. 18, Exh. I at 5 

(the victim reported that the three men “traded favors with [her] in exchange for sex.”)). 

 

5

 Reasons Petitioner gave as to why he accepted the plea offer included that: trial counsel advised that doctors and specialists would testify that the victim was suicidal 

because of Petitioner; that trial counsel advised if Petitioner testified, “they could bring my other case—my prior into it and they could call the—my prior victim in”; and 

Petitioner “felt that [the plea]. . . was my last chance, the only thing I had to do, where I wouldn’t spend the rest of my life in prison, I had no evidence to go into court with at 

that time.” (Doc. 18, Exh. GG, at 18‒19;	see	also	Doc.	18,	Exh.	 I	ሺinternal	exh.	E	at	 20‒21ሻ	 ሺat	 sentencing	Petitioner	 stated	 that	he	did	not	 touch	 the	 victim	 or	do	 the	

things	the	victim	said	he	did	and	he	only	took	the	plea	because	he	did	not	want	 to	

spend	the	rest	of	his	life	in	prisonሻ.	

6

 The issue during the Rule 32-of right proceeding involved Petitioner’s claim that 

his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him about the disclosure prior to 

entry of the guilty plea and for failing to investigate regarding the disclosure. (See Doc. 

18, Exh. I). 

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Upon investigation during the Rule 32 of-right proceeding, two of the three men7 would 

have testified that they did not have any inappropriate contact with the victim and that 

neither the police nor Petitioner’s trial counsel contacted them. (Doc. 18, Exh. I at 4). 

According to Petitioner, police reports also reflected that the “police conducted no 

serious or substantial follow-up” with regard to the victim’s allegation against the three 

other men, and Petitioner argued during the Rule 32 of-right proceeding that the lack of 

follow-up indicated that “even police do not seem to believe the alleged victim in this 

case.” (Id. at 4‒5). Further, it appears that the evidence against Petitioner was not 

forensic, but was testimonial and primarily, if not entirely, based upon the credibility of 

the victim. (See Doc. 18, Exh. GG at 62 (Petitioner’s trial counsel testifying to this 

effect)). 

 The Supreme Court has not yet recognized actual innocence as grounds for habeas 

relief absent an independent constitutional violation in the underlying state criminal 

proceedings. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400–401 (1993); see House v. Bell, 547 

U.S. 518, 555 (2006) (declining to resolve the open question of whether freestanding 

actual innocence claims are possible); see also Perkins, 133 S.Ct. at 1931 (the Supreme 

Court has left open the question whether a freestanding actual innocence claim 

constitutes grounds for habeas relief in a non-capital case). In Herrera, the Court 

explained that its body of “habeas jurisprudence makes clear that a claim of ‘actual 

innocence’ is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a 

habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claims considered 

on the merits.” 506 U.S. at 404; see Schlup, 513 U.S. at 313–15 (distinguishing 

procedural claims of innocence from substantive claims of innocence, and holding that a 

claim of actual innocence may be raised to avoid a procedural bar to consideration of the 

merits of a petitioner’s constitutional claims). 

 The Ninth Circuit has noted that a majority of the Justices in Herrera would have 

supported a claim of free-standing innocence. Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1165 

 

7

 The third man, a hall monitor, could not be located. (Doc. 18, Exh. I at 4). 

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(9th Cir. 2000). The court has emphasized, however, that the standard for establishing a 

freestanding claim of actual innocence is “‘extraordinarily high’ and . . . the showing [for 

a successful claim] would have to be ‘truly persuasive.’” Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 

463, 476 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417). 

“Evidence that merely undercuts trial testimony or casts doubt on the petitioner’s 

guilt, but does not affirmatively prove innocence, is insufficient to merit relief on a 

freestanding claim of actual innocence.” Jones v. Taylor, 763 F.3d 1242, 1251 (9th Cir. 

2014). At a minimum, the petitioner must “go beyond demonstrating doubt about his 

guilt, and must affirmatively prove that he is probably innocent.” Id. (citing Herrera, 506 

U.S. at 442–44 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). That is, he must demonstrate that “in light of 

new evidence, ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found [the] 

petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” House, 547 U.S. at 537 (quoting Schlup, 

513 U.S. at 327); see Perkins, 133 S. Ct. at 1928. “To be credible, such a claim requires 

[the] petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable 

evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness 

accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. 

at 324. The new evidence must be reliable, and the reviewing court “may consider how 

the timing of the submission and the likely credibility of the affiants bear on the probable 

reliability of that evidence.” Id. at 332. See also Perkins, 133 S.Ct. at 1935‒36. 

Given these high standards, even if Petitioner’s free-standing actual innocence 

claim were cognizable, it is plainly without merit. First, Petitioner’s reliance on his own 

statements in the state court record declaring his innocence and speculating about the 

victim’s motive for her accusations against him does not constitute new evidence and 

does not satisfy the showing necessary for actual innocence. See e.g. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 

324 (petitioner must present new evidence‒whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, 

trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence‒that was not presented at 

trial). 

 Moreover, as to the victim’s report about her sexual conduct with three other men, 

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it is questionable that report, the subsequent investigator affidavits and the other related 

police report constitute “new evidence” for purposes of Schlup. Even assuming they do, 

that evidence indicates nothing as to Petitioner’s actual innocence. That evidence does 

not necessarily support a rational finding that the victim’s accusations against him were 

lies. That two of the other men, who were both teachers, who the victim said she also 

had sexual contact with denied such behavior may indicate more about their credibility 

than the minor victim’s. Further, Petitioner’s speculation about why the police 

apparently did not investigate these men have little bearing as to Petitioner’s actual 

innocence. Instead, the evidence is of questionable impeachment value at best. On the 

instant record, Petitioner has not come close to demonstrating “‘that, in light of the new 

evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt.’” Perkins, 133 S. Ct. at 1928 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329). See 

e.g., Carriger, 132 F.3d at 477 (rejecting freestanding actual innocence claim despite 

chief prosecution witness essentially recanting, because, among other things, the 

petitioner had “presented no evidence, for example, demonstrating he was elsewhere at 

the time of the murder, nor [was] there any new and reliable physical evidence, such as 

DNA, that would preclude any possibility of [the petitioner’s] guilt.”). 

 Further, if Petitioner’s actual innocence claim were construed as a gateway claim 

for his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct, he would 

still fail to satisfy Perkins. To pass through the Schlup gateway, a “petitioner must show 

that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light 

of the new evidence.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316. In Perkins, the Supreme Court 

“stress[ed] once again that the Schlup standard is demanding. The gateway should open 

only when a petition presents ‘evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have 

confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was 

free of nonharmless constitutional error.’” Perkins, 133 S.Ct. at 1936 (quoting Schlup,

513 U.S. at 316). As discussed above, the evidence Petitioner relies upon is merely 

collateral to his case and has little, if any, bearing on his actual innocence. See e.g., 

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Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 565–66 (1998) (noting that newly discovered 

impeachment evidence, which is “a step removed from evidence pertaining to the crime 

itself[,]” “provides no basis for finding” actual innocence). At bottom, the evidence cited 

by Petitioner to support his actual innocence claim “is insufficient to meet the actual 

innocence bar; instead, adequate evidence is ‘documentary, biological (DNA), or other 

powerful evidence: perhaps some non-relative who placed him out of the city, with credit 

card slips, photographs, and phone logs to back up the claim.’ Hayes v. Battaglia, 403 

F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir.2005). Only such ‘powerful’ evidence can establish that it is more 

likely than not that no jury would have convicted a habeas petitioner.” McDowell v. 

Lemke, 737 F.3d 476, 483-84 (7th Cir. 2013); Cf. Carriger, 132 F.3d at 477. 

Consequently, there is no basis to excuse Petitioner’s untimeliness based upon the actual 

innocence gateway. Therefore, Petitioner’s federal habeas Petition is untimely filed. 

III. CONCLUSION

 Petitioner’s federal habeas Petition was due on February 24, 2015. Because 

Petitioner did not file his Petition until March 30, 2015, his Petition is untimely filed 

under the AEDPA and should be dismissed. Alternatively, if the Court were to determine 

that direct review for purposes of §2244(d)(1)(A) concluded on March 13, 2014, when 

the Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s request for an additional extension to file 

a petition for review, the instant Petition, nonetheless, remains untimely filed and should 

be dismissed.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

 For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District 

Court, after its independent review, dismiss Petitioner’s Petition under 28 U.S.C. §2254 

for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) as untimely filed. 

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure and LRCiv 7.2(e), Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for the District 

of Arizona, any party may serve and file written objections within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS

after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond 

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to another party’s objections within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy. 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). No replies to objections shall be filed unless leave is granted from 

the District Court to do so. If objections are filed, the parties should use the following 

case number: CV 15-126-TUC-DCB. 

 Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the 

Magistrate Judge may be deemed a waiver of the party’s right to review. 

 Dated this 7th day of July, 2016. 

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