Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-02773/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-02773-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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Michael J. Astrue became Commissioner of the Social Security Administration on 1

February 1, 2007.

 This disposition is not designated for publication in the official reports. 2

The challenged decision was rendered by Administrative Law Judge Brenton L. Rogozen 3

(“the ALJ”) on April 28, 2006. The ALJ’s decision became final on March 21, 2007, when the

Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration denied Plaintiff’s request for

Case No. 07-2773 JF

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX2)

**E-Filed 9/25/08**

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

CHARLOTTE ANNE STINSON,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

1

Commissioner of Social Security,

 Defendant.

Case Number 07-2773 JF

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 2

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR REMAND;

AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Charlotte Ann Stinson (“Stinson”) filed this action pro se on May 25, 2007,

appealing a decision by Defendant Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) that

denied her disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. On June 8, 2007, the 3

Case 5:07-cv-02773-JF Document 15 Filed 09/25/08 Page 1 of 10
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28 administrative review of the decision.

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Case No. 07-2773 JF

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX2)

Court granted Stinson’s application to proceed in forma pauperis against the Commissioner.

Since filing her complaint, Stinson has obtained counsel, and the parties have filed cross-motions

for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny both motions and

will remand the case to the ALJ for further proceedings consistent with this Order.

The following facts are taken from the ALJ’s decision on April 28, 2008 and the

accompanying Administrative Record (“AR”). At the time of the hearing before the ALJ,

Stinson was fifty-one years old. AR at 22, 238. After graduating from high school, Stinson

attended Andrew Hill Adult School for a short period but did not complete a course of study. Id.

at 168. Her past work experience included employment as a stock clerk and as a housekeeper. 

Id. at 25. Stinson alleges that she became disabled in December 2003 as a result of persistent leg

and back problems, dyslexia, other learning disabilities, and the inability to read and write. Id. at

21–22. On December 28, 2004, Stinson filed concurrent applications for disability insurance

benefits and supplemental security income. Id. at 19. Her application was denied initially and

upon her motion for reconsideration. Id. Stinson, testified at the hearing. Id. Vocational expert

Scott Simon also testified. Id.

The ALJ found that Stinson “[had] not been under a disability within the meaning of the

Social Security Act at any time through the date of [the] decision.” Id. at 20. The ALJ explained

that the Social Security Administration has established a five-step sequential evaluation process

for determining whether an individual is disabled under 20 CFR §§ 404.1520(a) and 416.920(a). 

AR at 20. At step one, the ALJ concluded that Stinson had “not engaged in substantial gainful

activity from 2005 through the present.” Id. at 20–21. The ALJ noted that Stinson did engage in

substantial gainful activity in 2004, even though she claims onset of disability in December 2003. 

At step two, the ALJ found that Stinson’s degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, mixed

receptive-expressive language disorder, and history of learning disorder constituted severe

impairments under 20 CFR §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c). Id. At step three, however, the ALJ

concluded that Stinson did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or

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Case No. 07-2773 JF

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX2)

medically equaled one of the impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” Id. at

20, 22.

In determining Stinson’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ found that Stinson was

“able to lift and carry twenty-five pounds frequently and fifty pounds occasionally; and . . . [was]

able to sit, stand and/or walk for about six hours of an eight hour workday.” Id. at 24. 

Additionally, the ALJ determined that Stinson could “perform simple, repetitive tasks.” Id. The

ALJ found that Stinson’s residual functional capacity enabled her to “work as a housekeeper and

as a stocker.” Id. at 25. Based on these determinations, the ALJ concluded that Stinson was not

disabled as defined by the Social Security Act at any time through the date of his decision. Id.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Standard for Reviewing the Commissioner’s Decision

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court has the authority to review the Commissioner’s

decision denying Stinson benefits. The Court must affirm the ALJ’s decision if it determines that

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings and that the ALJ applied the correct legal

standards. Moncada v. Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1995); Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d

1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1992). In this context, the term “substantial evidence” means “more than a

mere scintilla but less than a preponderance—[it] is such reasonable evidence that a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion.” Moncada, 60 F.3d at 523; see also

Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. When determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the

ALJ’s decision, the Court examines the administrative record as a whole, considering adverse as

well as supporting evidence. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257; Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501

(9th Cir. 1989). Where evidence exists to support more than one rational interpretation, the

Court must defer to the ALJ’s decision. Moncada, 60 F.3d at 523; Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1258.

B. Standard for Determining Disability

A person is “disabled” for purposes of receiving social security benefits if he or she is

unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity caused by a physical or mental impairment

that is expected to result in death or that has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period

of at least twelve months. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257; Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452

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SGA is work that involves significant physical or mental activities performed for pay or 4

profit. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572 (elements of SGA). 

A claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) is what he or she can still do despite 5

existing exertional and nonexertional limitations. Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 n. 5

(9th Cir. 1989).

 There are two ways in which the Commissioner may meet the burden of showing that 6

there is other work in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform:

(1) by the testimony of a vocational expert or (2) by reference to the Medical-Vocational

Guidelines. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9thCir. 1999).

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Case No. 07-2773 JF

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX2)

(9th Cir. 1984). 

 Social security disability cases are evaluated using a five-step, sequential evaluation

process. AR at 20. In the first step, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant

currently is engaged in substantial gainful activity (“SGA”) ; if so, the claimant is not disabled, 4

and the claim is denied. Id. If the claimant is not engaged in SGA, the second step requires the

Commissioner to determine whether the claimant has a “severe” impairment or combination of

impairments that significantly limit the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities; if not,

the claimant is not disabled, and the claim is denied. Id. If the claimant has a “severe”

impairment or combination of impairments, the third step requires the Commissioner to

determine whether the “impairment or combination of impairments meets or medically equals the

criteria of an impairment listed in 20 CFR Part 404, subpart P, Appendix 1.” Id. In the fourth

step, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant has sufficient “residual functional

capacity” to perform his or her past work; if so, the claimant is not disabled and the claim is

5

denied. Id. at 21. The claimant has the burden of proving that he or she is unable to perform past

relevant work. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. If the claimant meets this burden, she has established

a prima facie case of disability. Finally, in the fifth step of the sequential analysis, the burden

shifts to the Commissioner to establish that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful

work. Id.; 20 CFR §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n. 5 (9th Cir. 6

1995), as amended April 9, 1996; Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257.

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Case No. 07-2773 JF

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX2)

III. DISCUSSION

Stinson asks that the Court reverse the Commissioner’s final decision and remand this

case to the Social Security Administration for immediate payment of benefits. Alternatively,

Stinson asks that her case be remanded to the ALJ for further additional administrative

proceedings to determine whether she is disabled. The specific issues raised in this case are

whether the ALJ properly: (1) assessed Stinson’s credibility; (2) assessed Stinson’s exertional

and mental RFC; and (3) developed the administrative record.

A. Whether the ALJ Properly Assessed Plaintiff’s Credibility

Stinson argues that the ALJ improperly discounted her credibility without articulating

clear and convincing reasons for doing so. She asserts that the ALJ failed to determine “whether

[her] symptoms were reasonably related to the medical impairments shown by the evidence.” 

Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 4–5. Stinson further claims that the ALJ’s finding of discrepancies

was not sufficiently specific.

The ALJ’s assessment of a claimant’s credibility must be “properly supported by the

record” and “sufficiently specific” to assure the reviewing court that the ALJ “rejected the

testimony on permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s testimony

regarding pain.” Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345–46 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Elam v.

Railroad Retirement Bd., 921 F.2d 1210, 1213–14 (11th Cir. 1991)(quotations omitted)). This

Court must give deference to the ALJ’s assessment of Stinson’s credibility if it is properly

supported by the record and applicable legal standards. Rollins v. Massanaril, 261 F.3d 853, 857

(9th Cir. 2001) (citing Reddick v. Chafer, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998)).

Here, the ALJ assessed Stinson’s claims pursuant to Social Security Ruling 96-7p and

Regulations 20 CFR §§ 404.1529 and 416.929. AR at 24. Specifically, the ALJ found:

discrepancies between [Stinson’s] assertions and the degree of medical treatment

(including medications) sought and obtained, the diagnostic tests and findings

made on examination, the reports of the treating and examining physicians, the

level of restrictions on the claimant in the physician opinions of record, and the

level of follow-up treatment, including diagnostic testing, ordered by the treating

physicians. 

Id. The ALJ additionally found that the degree to which Stinson sought medical care was minimal

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Case No. 07-2773 JF

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX2)

as compared to “the levels of pain and disability alleged by claimant.” Id. Finally, the ALJ noted

that Stinson had engaged in “substantial gainful activity from 1997 through 2004, despite an

alleged onset date of 2003.” Id. 

The record as a whole demonstrates that the ALJ did not dismiss Stinson’s testimony

arbitrarily but rather rejected the testimony on permissible grounds. In Johnson v. Shalala, the

Ninth Circuit held that discrepancies between medical evidence and a plaintiff’s testimony may be

considered in a credibility assessment. 60 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995). In the instant case,

for example, multiple physicians opined that Stinson did not have severe physical impairments

and that she could perform her past work. AR at 22–23. An ALJ may reject a plaintiff’s claims

“based on clear and convincing reasons supported by specific facts in the record that demonstrate

an objective basis for his finding.” Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 873–74 (9th Cir. 2003). In

this case, the ALidentified the testimony and evidence that suggested the testimony was not

credible by comparing Stinson’s reported degree of pain with the amount of care sought. AR at

24; see Connett, 340 F.3d at 873–74. Affording the ALJ’s credibility determination the deference

to which it is entitled, the Court finds no error.

B. Whether the ALJ properly assessed Plaintiff’s exertional and mental RFC

Stinson contends that the ALJ improperly assessed her RFC and therefore incorrectly

found that she was not disabled. The claimant bears the initial burden of establishing disability by

showing that a physical or mental impairment prevents her from engaging in any of her previous

occupations. Sanchez v. Sec’y of HHS, 812 F.2d 509, 511 (9th Cir. 1989); Allen v. Sec’y of HHS,

726 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1984). In assessing a claimant’s medical reports, the ALJ must

assess all evidence, including the claimant’s medical reports, to determine what capacity the

claimant has for work despite her impairments. 20 CFR 404.1545(a). The ALJ may resolve

disputes in contradicted medical evidence. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir.

1989); Vincent ex rel. Vincent v. Keckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9thCir. 1984).

Here, the ALJ considered all of the medical evidence in the record before determining that

Stinson had the exertional and mental RFC to do medium, unskilled work. AR at 24–25. Stinson

argues that the ALJ’s determination of her exertional RFC was not supported by substantial

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Case No. 07-2773 JF

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX2)

evidence. Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 6. Dr. Lara Salamancha examined Stinson and opined that

Stinson could perform light work. However, Stinson asserts that reliance on this opinion was

improper because Dr. Salamancha conducted her exam and wrote her opinion without seeing the

results of x-rays that were available four days later. Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 6. ; AR at 172–75. 

Even discounting Dr. Salamancha’s opinion, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s assessment

of Stinson’s exertional RFC. The findings of multiple doctors indicate that Stinson does not have

a severe physical impairment preventing her from performing her past work. 

Stinson also contends that the ALJ’s assessment of her mental RFC was not supported by

substantial evidence. Specifically, Stinson asserts that the ALJ “did not account for limits

assessed by several doctors in being able to deal with the general public” in finding that Stinson

could perform her past work. Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 7. However, Stinson bears the burden of

establishing that she can no longer perform her past work at step four of the five-step analysis. 

Lewis v. Barnhart, 281 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2003); Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 681

(9th Cir. 1993). Although multiple doctors noted that Stinson had difficulty interacting with the

public, none stated that this precluded her from performing her past work. AR at 22–23. A

vocational expert, Dr. Joan Yoos, opined that despite Stinson’s disabilities, “she has adapted to

her challenges, working for many years as a stock person.” Id. at 22. 

C. Whether the ALJ properly developed the record

Finally, Stinson argues that the ALJ did not properly develop the record to the degree

required for a claimant without representation. Stinson contends that important medical evidence

and records were not available to physicians, which resulted in a less than fully developed record.

She also claims that the ALJ improperly proceeded to step two of the analysis without resolving a

conflict at step one as to whether Stinson performed work after the alleged onset of disability. 

Stinson asserts that medical evidence submitted after the hearing could have affected the outcome

of the ALJ’s decision regarding Plaintiff’s mental RFC. 

In a social security case, the ALJ has a “‘duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to

assure that the claimant’s interests are considered.’” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1288 (9th

Cir. 1996) (quoting Brown v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983)). In cases “where the

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Case No. 07-2773 JF

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX2)

claimant is not represented, it is incumbent upon the ALJ to scrupulously and conscientiously

probe into, inquire of, and explore for all the relevant facts.” Cox v. Califano, 587 F.2d 988, 991

(9th Cir. 1978) (quotation marks and citations omitted). The ALJ may discharge this duty in

several ways, including: subpoenaing the claimant’s physicians, submitting questions to the

claimant’s physicians, continuing the hearing, or keeping the record open after the hearing to

allow supplementation of the record. Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1998).

Stinson’s waiver of her right to representation did not discharge the ALJ from his

heightened duty to develop the record of a claimant proceeding without representation. When

explaining to Stinson what would occur throughout the course of the hearing, the ALJ stated: 

First I’m going to swear you in. Then I’m going to explain what the issue is. 

Then I’m going to ask you some questions, and then after that you’re going to tell

me whatever you want, and keep in mind that if I don’t ask you questions about a

subject or some facts that you think is important – are important, it doesn’t mean

that I don’t think they’re important; it’s just I’ve never met you before. I’ve

looked at this file once on March 12th, haven’t seen it since. Well, March 12th

wasn’t that long ago, but I’ve only seen the file once. I may not realize everything

that’s in – I’m sure I don’t realize everything that’s important to you; you just

have to tell me.

AR 235–36. Throughout the remainder of the hearing, the ALJ did inquire into Stinson’s work

history and physical and mental impairments. However, the ALJ began inquiry into Stinson’s

impairments not by asking specific questions, but by directing Stinson to “tell [him] about” her

leg problems, back problems, and dyslexia. See AR at 244, 246. 

The ALJ’s failure to ask specific questions impermissibly shifted the burden of developing

the record to Stinson. Stinson has a high school education and claims mental disabilities. The

ALJ admittedly was almost completely unfamiliar with her file. It is unreasonable to expect a

claimant to be able to present all relevant facts in narrative form under these circumstances. This

is particularly true given the fact that it appears that at least some of the medical records were

incomplete. For example, the ALJ relied upon the report of Dr. Salamancha, an orthopedist who

examined Stinson and provided a written report four days prior to the date on which x-rays that

revealed abnormalities in Stinson’s lumbar spine became available. Knowledge of these 

abnormalities may have affected Dr. Salamancha’s opinion. Consequently, the ALJ relied on an

incomplete record in making his determination. 

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Case No. 07-2773 JF

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX2)

 In light of the ALJ’s failure to develop the record and reliance on an incomplete

physician’s report, the Court will grant Stinson’s alternative request to remand the case for further

administrative proceedings to determine whether additional facts may be discovered that might

materially affect the ALJ’s decision.

IV. ORDER

 Good cause therefor appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Stinson’s motion for

summary judgment is DENIED; the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment is DENIED;

and the matter is REMANDED to the ALJ for future proceedings consistent with this opinion.

DATED: September 24, 2008

 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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Case No. 07-2773 JF

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(JFEX2)

This Order has been served upon the following persons:

James Hunt Miller jim_miller0@yahoo.com

Donna Mae Montano donna.m.montano@ssa.gov 

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