Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-05374/USCOURTS-caDC-12-05374-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 17, 2014 Decided August 12, 2014 

No. 12-5374 

ELLA WARD, 

APPELLANT

v. 

ROBERT MCDONALD, SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS, 

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:10-cv-01414) 

Karen A. Khan argued the cause for the appellant. 

Alexander D. Shoaibi, Assistant United States Attorney, 

argued the cause for the appellee. Ronald C. Machen Jr., 

United States Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant 

United States Attorney, were on brief. 

Before: HENDERSON and MILLETT, Circuit Judges, and 

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON. 

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge MILLETT. 

USCA Case #12-5374 Document #1507156 Filed: 08/12/2014 Page 1 of 28
2 

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Ella Ward 

was an attorney advisor at the Board of Veterans Appeals 

(BVA), a part of the United States Department of Veterans 

Affairs (VA). After developing a medical condition that 

required lengthy daily treatments and prevented her from 

sitting at a desk for long periods, she sought an accommodation 

allowing her to work full-time from home. Ward supported 

her request with two physicians’ letters containing terse 

descriptions of her condition. When her supervisors asked for 

additional information to use in determining a reasonable 

accommodation, Ward resigned. She then sued Eric Shinseki 

(since replaced by Robert McDonald), in his capacity as 

Secretary of the VA, claiming the BVA had violated her rights 

under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et 

seq., by failing to accommodate her disability. Ward also 

claims she was constructively discharged because the failure to 

accommodate her disability left her with no choice but to 

resign. The district court granted summary judgment to the 

VA Secretary on both claims. We affirm. 

I. Background 

A. The Rehabilitation Act 

 “The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 governs employee claims 

of handicap discrimination against the Federal Government. Its 

basic tenet is that the Government must take reasonable 

affirmative steps to accommodate the handicapped, except 

where undue hardship would result.” Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 

1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The Act provides that “[n]o 

otherwise qualified individual with a disability” shall be 

discriminated against by a federal agency “solely by reason of 

her or his disability.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 

USCA Case #12-5374 Document #1507156 Filed: 08/12/2014 Page 2 of 28
3 

The Act expressly incorporates the standards applied 

under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Id.

§ 794(d); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(b). The ADA in turn 

bars discrimination against a “qualified individual on the basis 

of disability,” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), and defines “qualified 

individual” as “an individual who, with or without reasonable 

accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the 

employment position that such individual holds or desires,” id.

§ 12111(8); see Mogenhan v. Napolitano, 613 F.3d 1162, 1165 

(D.C. Cir. 2010); Woodruff v. Peters, 482 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C. 

Cir. 2007). “[T]hat is, an individual with handicaps is 

‘qualified’ if she can perform the essential functions of her 

position with reasonable accommodation. If she can perform 

these functions without reasonable accommodation, so much 

the better—she is, of course, still qualified.” Carr v. Reno, 23 

F.3d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1994). A “reasonable 

accommodation” may include “job restructuring, part-time or 

modified work schedules . . . and other similar 

accommodations for individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12111(9)(B); accord 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii). 

B. Factual Background1

When a veteran’s claim for benefits is denied by a local or 

regional office of the VA, the veteran may appeal to the BVA. 

The judges who decide such appeals are assisted by attorney 

advisors who read the case files, review the evidence and 

prepare draft opinions. Beginning in 2001, Ward served as 

one such attorney advisor. Hers was the quintessential desk 

job—reading, writing, typing—with the only physical duty 

 1

 Because we are reviewing the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment to the VA Secretary, we view the evidence in the 

light most favorable to Ward. Mogenhan, 613 F.3d at 1165; 

Langon v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 959 F.2d 1053, 1058 

(D.C. Cir. 1992). 

USCA Case #12-5374 Document #1507156 Filed: 08/12/2014 Page 3 of 28
4 

being that she had to carry sometimes unwieldy case files from 

the judges’ offices to her desk. She typically worked eight- to 

ten-hour days and, like her colleagues, was expected to 

produce three “credits” per week—each credit corresponding 

to the preparation of roughly one case.

In 2005, Ward began to suffer from chronic severe 

lymphedema of the lower right extremity, which causes her 

right foot and leg to swell with retained fluid. The condition 

substantially limits Ward’s ability to go up and down stairs, 

carry moderately heavy case files and travel to and from work. 

It is exacerbated by long periods of sitting at a desk. To 

manage the condition, Ward must frequently drain excess 

fluid, elevate her leg, bandage it and/or place it in a 

compression machine. The treatments take one to three hours 

at a time and some require her to disrobe. 

In mid-2006, Ward converted to part-time status for a few 

months so that she could receive treatments at the hospital. 

She returned to full-time status in September 2006. She also 

took some leave time pursuant to the Family Medical Leave 

Act (FMLA). Ward testified that she struggled at times to 

meet the three-credit per week expectation, see Joint Appendix 

(JA) 97–98, but it is undisputed that her final performance 

review, dated April 5, 2007, rated her “[f]ully [s]uccessful or 

better,” JA 447. 

 

Ward’s condition began to deteriorate and in early 2007 

she first requested an accommodation. After speaking in 

March 20072

 with her then-supervisor Constance Tobias, in 

April Ward presented her interim supervisor Mark Greenstreet 

with a letter from Dr. David Rose, a cardiothoracic and 

vascular surgeon. The letter was brief. It stated that Ward 

 2

 Unless otherwise indicated, all events occurred in 2007. 

USCA Case #12-5374 Document #1507156 Filed: 08/12/2014 Page 4 of 28
5 

“has been receiving physical therapy treatments for a chronic 

medical condition of the right lower extremity that requires 

routine daily care at home” and that “she is unable to apply the 

treatment routinely at work, which exacerbates the condition.” 

JA 205. Rose’s letter concluded that Ward “will benefit from 

a schedule that allows her to work from home. The maximum 

number of daily work hours will be determined as the condition 

stabilizes.” JA 205. 

On May 3, Ward met with Greenstreet, Jonathan Kramer 

and another supervisor to discuss her request. They asked for 

more details on Ward’s condition, which request Ward asked 

that they put in writing. Greenstreet did so. In a letter 

bearing the same date, he explained that he understood Ward to 

be “requesting an arrangement to work at home” but that 

“additional medical information is needed to process your 

request. Specifically, your physician needs to provide more 

details concerning the diagnosis and prognosis.” JA 243. 

The letter set forth the information the BVA needed so that it 

could evaluate Ward’s “ability to perform the duties of [her] 

position” and determine “what specific accommodations 

would be required.” JA 243. 

In late May, Ward submitted another letter, this time from 

Dr. Alice Fuisz, an internist. The letter contained the 

information set forth above regarding Ward’s condition and 

prescribed treatment. It explained that Ward “needs medical 

accommodations to work at home” because sitting for long 

periods exacerbates her condition and therefore Ward “should 

sit for only short intervals of time as tolerated, and be able to 

apply treatment routines whenever needed during the 

work-day.” JA 195. Fuisz’s letter noted that the treatment 

routines “can take from 1 to 3 hours at a time” and that Ward’s 

“disability also affects travel to and from work, but she should 

USCA Case #12-5374 Document #1507156 Filed: 08/12/2014 Page 5 of 28
6 

be able to commute to work once a week as required [to 

retrieve new case files].” JA 195.

On May 25, Ward met with Steven Cohn, who had since 

replaced Greenstreet as Ward’s supervisor. Cohn told Ward 

to consider working part-time because he was concerned that 

she could not maintain a full-time schedule given the length of 

her daily treatments. On May 31, Cohn and Ward met again, 

with Kramer also present this time. The parties’ accounts of 

that meeting differ. Cohn and Kramer attested that they were 

concerned Ward could not maintain a full-time schedule given 

her condition and the length of daily treatments and therefore 

asked for more information from her physician specifying that 

she was able to work full-time. Ward attested that Cohn and 

Kramer flatly denied her full-time work-from-home request 

during the meeting, instead offering her a part-time 

work-from-home accommodation. Ward asked that the 

BVA’s decision on her accommodation request be put in 

writing.

As requested, on June 5, Cohn sent a memo to Ward which 

“serve[d] to follow-up on the May 31, 2007 meeting.” JA 

246. The memo stated that “the [BVA] will strive to provide 

you with a reasonable accommodation” but that, as discussed 

in the meeting, “it is not evident to the [BVA], based on the 

medical documentation you have provided, that the [BVA] can 

reasonably accommodate your request for a flexiplace 

[work-from-home] arrangement.” JA 246. The memo 

outlined two questions left unanswered by Ward’s physicians’ 

letters. First, the memo asked whether Ward would be able to 

carry case files to and from work once a week. Second, it 

noted that Ward’s job requires sitting at a desk for prolonged 

periods—a requirement which would be no different in a 

work-from-home arrangement—and expressed concern 

whether, factoring in time for treatment, Ward would be able to 

USCA Case #12-5374 Document #1507156 Filed: 08/12/2014 Page 6 of 28
7 

log sufficient hours to meet a full-time schedule. JA 246–47. 

Accordingly, the memo asked that Ward obtain a letter from 

her physician addressing these two questions so that the BVA 

could “process [Ward’s] request for a flexiplace arrangement.” 

JA 247. The memo did not state any decision—one way or 

the other—on Ward’s accommodation request. 

 Ward did not respond. Instead, on June 11, she submitted 

a letter of resignation. On June 22, she asked that her 

resignation not take effect—and that she remain on 

leave-without-pay status under the FMLA—until the Office of 

Personnel Management adjudicated her pending claim for 

disability retirement benefits. Then, on July 30, Ward sent a 

letter to the BVA’s human resources personnel asking that the 

BVA “immediately terminate the deferred status of my 

resignation and process my involuntary 

resignation/constructive discharge immediately. . . . Because 

of BVA’s illegal and discriminatory actions in denying a 

reasonable accommodation for my chronic disability by 

allowing me to work at home as many other attorneys with 

disabilities do at the BVA, I was forced out of my job and had 

no recourse but to resign.” JA 258. 

 In response, a BVA personnel officer sent Ward a letter 

dated August 8. The letter disputed Ward’s assertions that her 

accommodation request had been denied and that she had been 

forced to resign. It changed the BVA’s tune on the need for 

more information, however, stating: “[A]lthough you never 

submitted any additional medical information as requested, the 

[BVA] has nevertheless reconsidered your reasonable 

accommodation request and is willing to consider allowing you 

to try work-from-home on a full-time basis.” JA 261. The 

letter asked that Ward respond within five days of August 8, 

but Ward attested that she did not receive it until more than five 

days later. She never responded. 

USCA Case #12-5374 Document #1507156 Filed: 08/12/2014 Page 7 of 28
8 

C. District Court Proceedings 

Ward obtained a notice of right to sue from the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and timely 

filed suit in district court. Her complaint alleged two 

violations of the Act: (1) the BVA failed to accommodate her 

disability; and (2) in so doing, the BVA constructively 

discharged her by deliberately creating intolerable working 

conditions, thus leaving her no choice but to resign. After 

discovery, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. 

The district court granted summary judgment to the VA 

Secretary on both claims. Ward v. Shinseki, No. 10-cv-1414, 

2012 WL 5839711 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2012), reprinted in JA 

862–81. It reached three conclusions with respect to Ward’s 

failure to accommodate claim: (1) the BVA acted in good 

faith by engaging in an interactive process to determine a 

reasonable accommodation but Ward walked away from that 

process, see JA 873–76; (2) the BVA’s August 8 letter offered 

Ward the very accommodation she sought, see JA 876–79; and 

(3) Ward had not demonstrated that she could perform the 

essential functions of her job with an accommodation, see JA 

879–80. Having rejected Ward’s failure to accommodate 

claim, the district court held that her constructive discharge 

claim failed a fortiori. JA 880–81. 

Ward timely appealed. We review the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment de novo. Mogenhan, 613 F.3d at 

1165. “Summary judgment is appropriate only if ‘there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Id. (quoting FED.R.

CIV. P. 56(c)(2)). “A dispute about a material fact is not 

‘genuine’ unless ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury 

USCA Case #12-5374 Document #1507156 Filed: 08/12/2014 Page 8 of 28
9 

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ ” Id. (quoting 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). 

II. Failure to Accommodate Claim 

 To prevail on her claim that the BVA failed to 

accommodate her disability, Ward must produce sufficient 

evidence that (1) she was a qualified individual with a 

disability, (2) the BVA had notice of her disability and (3) the 

BVA denied her request for a reasonable accommodation. 

Stewart v. St. Elizabeths Hosp., 589 F.3d 1305, 1307–08 (D.C. 

Cir. 2010). Ward bears the burden of proving these elements 

by a preponderance of the evidence. Barth, 2 F.3d at 1186. 

The second element is undisputed: The BVA had notice of 

Ward’s condition. The district court concluded that Ward had 

not satisfied the first element because she failed to demonstrate 

that she could perform the essential functions of her job with an 

accommodation. See JA 879–80. We express no opinion on 

that conclusion, however, because we agree with the district 

court that Ward failed to satisfy the third element: No 

reasonable jury could find that Ward’s accommodation request 

was denied in light of the BVA’s continuing good-faith 

dialogue with Ward to determine an appropriate 

accommodation, which dialogue was cut short by Ward’s 

sudden resignation. See JA 873–76. 

 Few disabilities are amenable to one-size-fits-all 

accommodations. To meet its obligations under the Act, then, 

an employer needs information about the nature of the 

individual’s disability and the desired 

accommodation—information typically possessed only by the 

individual or her physician. An individual seeking 

accommodation need not provide medical evidence of her 

condition in every case: “[A]n employee confined to a 

wheelchair would hardly need a doctor’s report to show that 

USCA Case #12-5374 Document #1507156 Filed: 08/12/2014 Page 9 of 28
10 

she needed help in getting to her workstation if this were 

accessible only by climbing a steep staircase.” Langon, 959 

F.2d at 1058. But “[w]hen the need for an accommodation is 

not obvious, an employer, before providing a reasonable 

accommodation, may require that the individual with a 

disability provide documentation of the need for 

accommodation.” Stewart, 589 F.3d at 1309 (quoting 29 

C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9). EEOC regulations therefore 

provide: 

To determine the appropriate reasonable 

accommodation it may be necessary for the [agency] 

to initiate an informal, interactive process with the 

individual with a disability in need of the 

accommodation. This process should identify the 

precise limitations resulting from the disability and 

potential reasonable accommodations that could 

overcome those limitations. 

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3); see also Mogenhan, 613 F.3d at 

1167 & n.4. 

The process contemplated is “a flexible give-and-take” 

between employer and employee “so that together they can 

determine what accommodation would enable the employee to 

continue working.” EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 

789, 805 (7th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted); see also

Mogenhan, 613 F.3d at 1167–68 & n.4; Stewart, 589 F.3d at 

1308–09. “[N]either party should be able to cause a 

breakdown in the process for the purpose of either avoiding or 

inflicting liability.” Sears, 417 F.3d at 805 (quotation marks 

omitted). Thus, 

courts should look for signs of failure to participate in 

good faith or failure by one of the parties to make 

USCA Case #12-5374 Document #1507156 Filed: 08/12/2014 Page 10 of 28
11 

reasonable efforts to help the other party determine 

what specific accommodations are necessary. A party 

that obstructs or delays the interactive process is not 

acting in good faith. A party that fails to 

communicate, by way of initiation or response, may 

also be acting in bad faith. In essence, courts should 

attempt to isolate the cause of the breakdown and then 

assign responsibility. 

Id. (quotation marks omitted); accord Taylor v. Phoenixville 

Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 312 (3d Cir. 1999). For instance, 

“when the parties are missing information that can only be 

provided by one of the parties, the party withholding the 

information may be found to have obstructed the process.” 

Jackson v. City of Chi., 414 F.3d 806, 813 (7th Cir. 2005) 

(quotation marks omitted); accord Stewart, 589 F.3d at 1308–

09. In sum, to establish that her request was “denied,” Ward 

must show either that the BVA in fact ended the interactive 

process or that it participated in the process in bad faith. 

 Here, the interactive process broke down before the BVA 

decided on Ward’s request and no reasonable juror could have 

found that the BVA, rather than Ward, was responsible for the 

breakdown. Ward first asked for an accommodation in 

March. In April, Ward presented her supervisor with a brief 

letter from her physician saying little more than that she was 

receiving treatment for a chronic medical condition that 

requires daily treatment and would “benefit from a schedule 

that allows her to work from home.” JA 205. The letter cast 

doubt on Ward’s capacity to continue working full-time, 

however, by stating that “[t]he maximum number of daily work 

hours will be determined as the condition stabilizes.” JA 205. 

Accordingly, on May 3, Ward’s supervisors met with her in 

person and requested more information about her condition. 

They repeated the request in writing the same day, setting forth 

USCA Case #12-5374 Document #1507156 Filed: 08/12/2014 Page 11 of 28
12 

the information needed by the BVA to evaluate Ward’s “ability 

to perform the duties of [her] position.” JA 243. Ward 

produced a letter from another physician in response but it too 

left doubt about her ability to work full-time by noting that she 

could not sit for long periods and that her treatments take one 

to three hours at a time. On May 25 and 31—i.e., within days 

of receiving the physician’s letter—Ward’s supervisors twice 

met with her to discuss her request.3 On June 5, the BVA set 

forth in writing precisely the information it needed to 

“reasonably accommodate [Ward’s] request for a 

[work-from-home] arrangement.” JA 246. Ward did not 

respond but instead resigned six days later. As the district 

court concluded, the interactive process broke down when 

Ward “walked away.” JA 874.4

 3

 Ward’s deposition testimony that her request was denied at 

the May 31 meeting differs from the testimony of the other 

participants in the meeting. Although we view the evidence in the 

light most favorable to Ward, the letter Ward received on June 5 (and 

had asked for at the meeting) made clear that, whatever was said at 

the meeting, her accommodation request was still under 

consideration.

4 As noted, the district court also concluded that no 

reasonable juror could find Ward’s request had been denied because 

the BVA “offered her the exact accommodation she sought” in its 

August 8 letter. JA 877. Because we conclude the interactive 

process had broken down when Ward resigned two months earlier, 

we need not address whether the BVA’s August 8 letter—which said 

the BVA was “willing to consider allowing [Ward] to try 

work-from-home on a full-time basis,” JA 261—in fact offered her 

the accommodation she sought or whether the letter is further 

evidence of the BVA’s willingness to continue the dialogue. We 

note, however, that the August 8 letter came after Ward had made 

plain her intent to sue. See JA 258. The BVA’s offer in the face of 

litigation cannot be viewed as evidence of pretext. 

USCA Case #12-5374 Document #1507156 Filed: 08/12/2014 Page 12 of 28
13 

 We addressed similar circumstances in Stewart, in which 

the plaintiff was a housekeeper at a mental facility whose 

interactions with the patients caused her own mental health to 

deteriorate. 589 F.3d at 1306–07. When the plaintiff 

requested a transfer, a supervisor promptly met with her and 

told her that he would help her as soon as she completed 

paperwork documenting her disability. Id. at 1307. She left 

work that afternoon and never returned. Id. She sued, 

claiming her employer had denied her a reasonable 

accommodation but the district court granted the employer’s 

motion for judgment as a matter of law. Id. We affirmed 

because “[n]othing in the evidence presented suggest[ed] that 

[the supervisor] acted in anything but an entirely appropriate 

manner” when he met with the plaintiff and requested medical 

documentation. Id. at 1308–09. In so holding, we cited two 

cases from our sister circuits that closely resemble Ward’s 

case. See id. at 1309 (citing Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of 

Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1136 (7th Cir. 1996) and Templeton v. 

Neodata Servs., Inc., 162 F.3d 617, 619 (10th Cir. 1998)). 

 In Beck, the plaintiff was a secretary who suffered from 

arthritis, depression and anxiety. 75 F.3d at 1132. Upon 

returning from medical leave, she asked for an unspecified 

accommodation for her depression. The employer sought 

further information from her physician but none was provided. 

Id. at 1133. The plaintiff took another period of medical leave 

and again sought an accommodation upon her return. This 

request was somewhat more specific—it sought an adjustable 

keyboard for her arthritis and a reduced workload to ease the 

transition back to work. The request was also accompanied 

by a letter from her physician. Id. Still uncertain what 

accommodations were necessary, the employer again sought 

more detailed information and got none. Id. The employer 

also took steps to accommodate the plaintiff based on the 

information it had but was unable to accommodate the plaintiff 

USCA Case #12-5374 Document #1507156 Filed: 08/12/2014 Page 13 of 28
14 

to her satisfaction. Id. at 1136–37. She sued and the Seventh 

Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

to the employer because “[a]t no point did the [employer] fail 

to respond in some manner to [the plaintiff’s] requests for 

accommodation, and there is nothing in the record from which 

we can discern any attempt by the [employer] to sweep the 

problem under the rug.” Id. at 1136. The court observed that 

“the information required to determine the necessary 

accommodations was of the type that only [the plaintiff] could 

provide” and “where . . . the employer makes multiple attempts 

to acquire the needed information, it is the employee who 

appears not to have made reasonable efforts.” Id. at 1137. 

In Templeton, the plaintiff suffered serious head and neck 

injuries in an automobile accident. 162 F.3d at 618. Her 

physician sent her employer a letter explaining her condition 

and expressing uncertainty as to the plaintiff’s ability to return 

to work. The employer requested further information from 

the physician but the plaintiff refused to authorize the 

information’s release. Id. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the 

district court’s grant of summary judgment to the employer, 

explaining that “[a]n employer cannot be expected to propose 

reasonable accommodation absent critical information on the 

employee’s medical condition and the limitations it imposes.” 

Id. at 619. Also in accord is Jackson, in which the Seventh 

Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

to the employer because the employer sent the plaintiff several 

letters asking for more detailed medical information and got 

only conclusory responses. 414 F.3d at 813–14. By contrast, 

cases in which our sister circuits have found genuine issues of 

fact regarding the responsibility for the breakdown of the 

interactive process typically include evidence that the 

employer was in some way unresponsive to the plaintiff’s 

requests for accommodation. See, e.g., Sears, 417 F.3d at 

807–08 (plaintiff “made several requests for accommodations 

USCA Case #12-5374 Document #1507156 Filed: 08/12/2014 Page 14 of 28
15 

which [the employer] simply denied” and employer, “unlike 

the defendants in [Beck and Jackson,] . . . did not actively 

engage in the interactive process by suggesting possible 

accommodations or requesting information that would help it 

do so”); Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc, 188 F.3d 944, 952–

53 (8th Cir. 1999) (employer did not discuss possible 

accommodations with employee); Taylor, 184 F.3d at 315–16 

(notwithstanding fact that plaintiff’s son “requested 

accommodations [for plaintiff], informed [the employer] about 

[plaintiff’s] condition, and provided [the employer] with the 

means to obtain more information if needed,” employer 

“offered no accommodations or assistance in finding them, 

made [plaintiff’s] job more difficult, and simply sat back and 

continued to document her failures”). 

Here, the BVA’s participation bore all the hallmarks of 

good faith. Ward’s supervisors promptly responded to her 

request for an accommodation, met with her on several 

occasions to discuss the request and sought more information 

from her physician to help them determine an appropriate 

accommodation. Like the plaintiffs in Stewart, Beck, 

Templeton and Jackson, Ward did not provide the requested 

information. Instead, she resigned. No reasonable juror 

could have found that the BVA denied Ward’s request for an 

accommodation, then, because Ward abandoned the interactive 

process before the BVA had the information it needed to 

determine the appropriate accommodation.5

 The district court 

 5

 Ward notes that the BVA has a “flexiplace” or “telework” 

policy whereby BVA employees whose job duties and performance 

records meet certain criteria may work from home with the approval 

of their supervisor. See JA 804, 807–08; see also JA 654–57. The 

existence of such a policy and any history of the employer allowing 

similarly situated employees to work from home are undoubtedly 

relevant to whether a work-from-home arrangement is a reasonable 

accommodation. See Woodruff, 482 F.3d at 528. But in those 

USCA Case #12-5374 Document #1507156 Filed: 08/12/2014 Page 15 of 28
16 

correctly awarded summary judgment to the VA Secretary 

because Ward “fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient to 

establish the existence of an element essential to [her] case.” 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).6 Ward is 

 

instances where the BVA granted other employees’ 

work-from-home requests due to disabilities, adequate medical 

documentation had been provided. See JA 518–22, 662–67, 815. 

Our dissenting colleague appears to view the full-time telework 

arrangement as the rule, not the exception, and concludes that the 

BVA must immediately grant the request of any fully successful 

employee who seeks to work from home. See Dissenting Op. 2–3. 

The reverse is true. See JA 807 (“Position suitability and 

availability of staff and resources are considerations for management 

when determining employee participation [in a telework 

arrangement]. . . . VA employees selected for telework arrangement . 

. . should have a history of being reliable, responsible, and able to 

work independently. . . . The supervisor is responsible for 

determining how many days per week are appropriate for a telework 

arrangement. Each arrangement to telework is to be considered 

individually.” (emphasis added)). Although it might have been 

reasonable for the BVA to permit Ward to work from home, it does 

not follow that the BVA exhibited bad faith by not immediately 

granting Ward that accommodation without further inquiry. Cf. 

Mogenhan, 613 F.3d at 1168 (noting “there are certainly 

circumstances in which a long-delayed accommodation could be 

considered unreasonable” (quotation marks omitted)). There was 

no long delay here. No more than three months passed from Ward’s 

first request to her resignation and much of that time was spent 

waiting for Ward to provide more information about her condition. 

Had the process been allowed to play out, the BVA may well have 

settled on a full-time work-from-home accommodation; it may 

instead have thought of other reasonable accommodations. Ward 

cannot cut the process short and then blame her employer for not 

immediately granting her specific request. 

6

 Our dissenting colleague deems the information sought by the 

BVA in the June 5th letter “irrelevant.” Dissenting Op. 3. We 

USCA Case #12-5374 Document #1507156 Filed: 08/12/2014 Page 16 of 28
17 

the author of her misfortune—she and the BVA parted ways 

not because the BVA discriminated or retaliated against her 

based on her disability but because she acted precipitately. 

III. Constructive Discharge Claim 

 Ward contends that she was constructively discharged 

because the BVA’s “continued refusal[,] obstruction and delay 

in accommodating [her] limitations made working conditions 

so intolerable that any reasonable person with her disability 

would feel compelled to resign.” Br. of Appellant at 50, Ward 

v. Shinseki, No. 12-5374 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 13, 2013). A claim 

of constructive discharge based on disability discrimination 

“must be predicated on a showing of either intentional 

discrimination, or retaliation.” Mayers v. Laborers’ Health & 

Safety Fund of N. Am., 478 F.3d 364, 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 

(quotation marks omitted); see also Johnson v. Shalala, 991 

F.2d 126, 131–32 (4th Cir. 1993) (elements of constructive 

discharge not met by failure to accommodate absent “evidence 

that the employer intentionally sought to drive [employee] 

from her position”); cf. Mungin v. Katten Muchin & Zavis, 116 

F.3d 1549, 1558 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (under Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964, “a finding of constructive discharge 

depends on whether the employer deliberately made working 

conditions intolerable and drove the employee out” (quotation 

marks omitted)). We have already concluded that the BVA 

did not deny Ward’s accommodation request but rather 

 

disagree. Whether it was an “essential feature[] of Ward’s job,” id.

at 4, to sit for prolonged periods or to carry heavy case files, Ward’s 

ability to perform these tasks was unquestionably relevant in 

determining a reasonable accommodation. By asking these 

questions, the BVA sought—as EEOC regulations instruct—to 

know the “precise limitations resulting from the disability” so that it 

could determine “potential reasonable accommodations that could 

overcome those limitations.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). 

USCA Case #12-5374 Document #1507156 Filed: 08/12/2014 Page 17 of 28
18 

responded promptly and in good faith. Ward’s inability to 

make out a claim of failure to accommodate “necessarily 

means that her constructive discharge claim fails.” Cole v. 

Powell, 605 F. Supp. 2d 20, 26 (D.D.C. 2009). 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment to the VA Secretary. 

 So ordered.

USCA Case #12-5374 Document #1507156 Filed: 08/12/2014 Page 18 of 28
MILLETT, Circuit Judge, dissenting: “Everything should 

be made as simple as possible, but not simpler.”1 And therein 

lies the critical flaw in the majority opinion’s analysis. The

opinion paints a logically alluring picture: Ella Ward sought 

an accommodation, but rather than give the Secretary of 

Veterans Affairs the information needed to provide it, she 

walked away. How could anyone blame the Secretary for 

that? 

The problem is that the essential predicate for the

majority opinion’s conclusion—that the June 5th letter to 

Ward from her supervisors sought only information “needed

to ‘reasonably accommodate’” her, Maj. Op. 12 (emphasis 

added)—long ago evaporated. The Secretary admits that he

did not need the demanded information to accommodate 

Ward; the letter sought nothing that was tied to the actual 

demands of her job; and the information demanded was 

irrelevant to ensuring that her requested flexiplace

accommodation was practicable. The factual record, in other 

words, pulls the legal rug out from under the majority’s feet. 

Ward cannot be saddled with legal responsibility for failing to 

respond to questions her supervisors had no business asking. 

That is especially so because her increasing inability to 

properly treat her lymphedema in the office was literally 

endangering her life, making the delay caused by her 

supervisors’ unjustified factual detours acutely harmful.

2

There are three essential points on which the majority and 

I part company:

 

1

See The Ultimate Quotable Einstein 475 (Alice Calaprice ed. 

2011).

2 While the ultimate determination of the facts should be for the 

jury, this dissent views all of the disputed material facts in the light 

most favorable to Ward, as the law requires. See, e.g., Mogenhan v. 

Napolitano, 613 F.3d 1162, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 

USCA Case #12-5374 Document #1507156 Filed: 08/12/2014 Page 19 of 28
2

1. THE FLEXIPLACE WORK OPTION NEVER BEFORE 

REQUIRED A SHOWING OF MEDICAL CONDITION

The majority opinion starts on the wrong track. It 

assumes that some showing of medical necessity and physical 

compatibility is a precondition for an employee in the 

Department of Veterans Affairs to work from home. Not so. 

As the majority opinion acknowledges, the Department’s 

flexiplace program is available to employees “whose job 

duties and performance records meet certain criteria.” Maj.

Op. at 15 n.5; see also J.A. 807. Ward came forward with 

evidence that her employment position and her “fully 

successful” rating qualified her to work at home under the 

program. J.A. 447. The majority opinion’s assumed 

predicate showing of “adequate medical documentation” 

(Maj. Op. at 16 n.5) appears nowhere in the program criteria; 

it never even mentions physical condition. 

Nor does the Secretary of Veterans Affairs contend that 

otherwise-qualified employees have had to make a threshold 

showing of medical need to enjoy the work-at-home option.

At least not for any employee other than Ward, whom the 

Secretary apparently chose to put on a different track with 

different demands because of her disability. J.A. 769. 

Perhaps the Secretary would say that he was concerned with 

how Ward would juggle her medical treatments and full-time 

work. But given that (i) Ward met the preexisting criteria for 

participation in the flexiplace program; (ii) Ward had already 

been working successfully full time in the office with her 

acute disability for the preceding two months, (iii) Ward had 

assured her supervisors that “I’m confident I would produce 

my three cases * * * if I could sit there in my [medically 

required state of undress] and prop my leg up and do what I 

need to do,” J.A. 565, and (iv) the presence of Ward’s 

disability is the only discernible reason for the supervisors’ 

USCA Case #12-5374 Document #1507156 Filed: 08/12/2014 Page 20 of 28
3

distrust of Ward’s judgment, a jury could just as likely find 

that, by demanding that Ward make an exceptional showing 

not required of other flexiplace applicants, Ward’s supervisors 

got the accommodation process wrong from the get-go.

The majority opinion responds that normal flexiplace

procedures did not entitle Ward to an “immediate[]” grant of 

her requested accommodation. Maj. Op. at 16 n.5. No one 

said they did. The relevant question is whether a jury could 

find the accommodation process was needlessly prolonged. 

And, as the majority elsewhere acknowledges, it was after 

Ward had already spent “three months” (id. at 17 n.5) meeting 

her supervisors’ evidentiary inquiries that the June 5th letter 

demanded that Ward chase down admittedly unneeded 

information. 

2. THE INFORMATION DEMANDED WAS IRRELEVANT

While the majority opinion places dispositive reliance on 

Ward’s supervisors’ need in the June 5th letter for more 

information, it is telling that the opinion never—not even 

once—says what extra information that letter sought. And 

that inquiry is what makes all the difference, because the 

Secretary has since confessed that not one bit of the 

information he sought was “needed to ‘reasonably 

accommodate’” Ward (Maj. Op. at 12), or has any relevance 

to any of the essential functions of Ward’s job. Not one. 

The letter demanded that Ward have her physician 

document: “how many hours, in total, that you are able to 

work sitting at your desk reviewing case files and drafting 

decisions during the approved work day, i.e., during a 

continuous period from 8.5 to 10 hours”; and “whether you 

are capable of transporting case files and a laptop computer 

back and forth to work at least once a week, which may 

weigh, collectively, up to about 45 pounds, and whether you 

USCA Case #12-5374 Document #1507156 Filed: 08/12/2014 Page 21 of 28
4

can lift individual cases that may weigh over 25 pounds each, 

at home.” J.A. 247. The letter thus purported to identify 

three essential features of Ward’s job: (i) sitting, rather than 

standing or alternating positions, for long periods of time, (ii) 

completing work during a block of time lasting no more than 

ten hours per day, and (iii) carrying heavy case files in stacks 

of up to 25 pounds at a time. None of that holds true.

First, it was simply false to assert that Ward’s job as a 

lawyer requires that she “sit[] at [he]r desk * * * during a 

continuous period from 8.5 to 10 hours.” J.A. 247. In his 

deposition, Ward’s supervisor and the author of the June 5th 

letter, Steven Cohn, admitted that “[i]t wasn’t a question of, 

can you sit for a period of time; can you stand for a period of 

time,” since the need is just for employees to “be[] at home 

and doing the work[;] People at home—I mean, people can 

proofread and walk around.” J.A. 726–727. 

That makes sense. Ward is a lawyer whose job was to 

review cases and prepare draft decisions. She could do that 

sitting down; she could do that standing up; she could 

alternate positions; she could even do that walking around 

with a dictation machine. J.A. 754.3 No one disputes that; 

Cohn admits it. So that portion of the supervisors’ letter 

sought information that was decidedly not “needed” (Maj. Op. 

at 12) to accommodate Ward.

Second, the Secretary undisputedly does not demand that 

employees in the flexiplace program complete their work 

within a pre-set, ten-hour window in a given work day. The 

 

3

 Indeed, adjustable and standing desks have become 

commonplace. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Taking a Stand for Office 

Ergonomics, NEW YORK TIMES, Dec. 1, 2012, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/02/business/stand-up-desksgaining-favor-in-the-workplace.html.

USCA Case #12-5374 Document #1507156 Filed: 08/12/2014 Page 22 of 28
5

Department of Veterans Affairs Handbook specifically 

identifies a “modified work schedule” as a possible 

accommodation for a disabled employee. J.A. 268. In 

keeping with that policy, the Secretary has previously allowed 

a lawyer working from home in the flexiplace program to pick 

up case files “other than during [her] official duty day,” 

including “during the workweek or evening, or on the 

weekend[.]” J.A. 815. And Jonathan Kramer, another of 

Ward’s supervisors, admitted in his deposition that a modified 

work schedule “would suffice as a possible reasonable 

accommodation for an employee with a disability,” but that he 

“did not think about” that possibility, J.A. 499–500, 

notwithstanding Ward’s request for such flexibility. Thus, the 

supervisors’ insistence that Ward document her ability to 

complete her work within a rigid ten-hour block of time was a 

makeweight.

Third, while the letter insisted that Ward document her 

physical ability to carry heavy case files, Cohn again gave 

away the game, admitting the irrelevancy of that demand. 

Cohn’s letter itself acknowledged that “the Board can assign a 

cart for you to use, or you can always ask me or [an]other 

management official on the team for assistance in transporting 

any heavy case files.” J.A. 246. That accords with the 

Board’s treatment of another of Ward’s colleagues in the 

flexiplace program, who was allowed to have her “husband or 

another individual assist [her] in transporting [work] materials 

to [her] Alternate Work Station[.]” J.A. 815. What is more, 

Kramer admitted in his deposition that, at home, Ward could 

have moved the necessary documents piece by piece, rather 

than all at once in heavy stacks. See J.A. 493. Weight-lifting, 

in short, is confessedly not an essential element of Ward’s 

lawyer position or required for a reasonable accommodation

to work. So when the majority opinion says the supervisors’ 

demand for proof that Ward “can lift individual cases that 

USCA Case #12-5374 Document #1507156 Filed: 08/12/2014 Page 23 of 28
6

may weigh over 25 pounds each, at home” was seeking 

“precisely the information it needed to ‘reasonably 

accommodate’” her, Maj. Op. at 12, that is just not correct.

The majority opinion points to the requirements for the 

flexiplace program. Maj. Op. 16 n.5. They prove my point: 

prolonged sitting and heavy lifting make no appearance. The 

policy instead lists “[p]osition suitability,” which is 

undisputed for Ward’s job; and a jury could reasonably find 

Ward “reliable, responsible, and able to work independently”

given her work record, as a long-term and “fully successful” 

employee, and her persevering service even with her disabling 

condition. See id. The majority opinion’s reference to 

“adequate medical documentation” submitted by others (id.) 

is even harder to understand, because, again, not one of those 

employees was asked about sitting endurance or dead-lifting 

case files. 

The majority opinion reasons that, even though irrelevant 

to Ward’s job performance, the information sought in the June 

5th letter was “unquestionably relevant in determining a 

reasonable accommodation.” Maj. Op. at 17 n.6. But not 

even the Secretary argues that any such showing of physical 

conditioning is needed to work at home rather than in the 

office. Nor was any such showing demanded of any other 

employee—disabled or not. 

If more were needed, the supervisors’ abrupt reversal of 

course on August 8th provides it. Without having received 

one bit of the information that the majority opinion deems so 

essential to granting Ward an accommodation, the Secretary 

offered Ward the opportunity to “try work-from-home on a 

full-time basis.” J.A. 261. The Secretary confirmed at oral 

argument that, in the August 8th letter, the supervisors 

decided to “try what she’s asking for.” Oral Arg. Tr. at 18:7–

USCA Case #12-5374 Document #1507156 Filed: 08/12/2014 Page 24 of 28
7

18:8. But the supervisors knew no more in August than they

knew in June. If no more information was needed to “try 

what she’s asking for” in August, it could not have been 

“unquestionably relevant” just two months earlier. 

Presumably, the pointlessness of the June 5th inquiry is why 

the Board of Veteran Appeals’ Assistant General Counsel 

advised those supervisors in August that they “should have 

just offered, at that point, offered the arrangement she 

requested.” J.A. 769.

To that, the majority opinion simply asserts that “the 

[Department’s] offer in the face of litigation cannot be viewed

as evidence of pretext.” Maj. Op. 13 n.4. But this is 

summary judgment, so the question should not be how 

appellate judges view the evidence, but whether a reasonable 

jury could view things differently based on not only the 

August 8th reversal of course, but also the Department’s 

admissions that the information was unneeded and its failure 

to demand a similar showing from any other employee 

admitted into the flexiplace program. 

Finally, counsel for the Secretary protested at argument 

that Ward “wasn’t entitled to get the position,” but that the 

Secretary offered it anyway because “they liked her, they 

thought she was a good employee.” Oral. Arg. Tr. at 19:2–

19:7. Counsel cannot mean what he said. Surely the 

Secretary would not expend taxpayer money giving Ward a 

make-work sinecure. Nor, given her “fully successful” rating 

and proven ability to perform her job for two months even 

under the physically onerous conditions of in-office work, 

J.A. 447, does the record foreclose a reasonable jury from 

finding that she was a qualified individual with a disability. 

Instead, counsel could only have meant the Secretary felt 

legally entitled to delay her accommodation until she ran a 

gauntlet of intrusive and entirely unnecessary questioning.

USCA Case #12-5374 Document #1507156 Filed: 08/12/2014 Page 25 of 28
8

3. WARD’S SUPERVISORS OBSTRUCTED THE 

ACCOMMODATION PROCESS

Because the Secretary’s concessions expose the June 5th 

letter’s informational demands as a contrivance, the majority 

opinion’s discussion (Maj. Op. at 13-15) of case law 

permitting employers to seek “critical” information that is 

genuinely “needed” to formulate a reasonable accommodation

is quite beside the point. Far from requesting needful 

information, the Board demanded that Ward have her 

physician certify to a litany of irrelevancies. And her 

supervisors did so not in the heat of the moment during a 

meeting, but after fully considering their position for five days 

after the May 31st meeting. A reasonable jury thus could find 

that this case involves supervisors throwing up obstacles to an 

accommodation that were not applied to other employees and 

that have no bearing on the reasonableness of the 

accommodation sought. That employers may not do. See, 

e.g., Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685, 695–

696 (7th Cir. 1998) (refusing to grant summary judgment to 

an employer because it may not have participated in good 

faith in finding accommodation); Cravens v. Blue Cross & 

Blue Shield of Kansas City, 214 F.3d 1011, 1021 (8th Cir. 

2000) (same).

The majority opinion emphasizes that the employer never 

failed to respond “in some manner” to Ward. Maj. Op. at 14 

(quoting Beck v. University of Wisconsin Board of Regents, 

75 F.3d 1130, 1136 (7th Cir. 1996)). True. But the 

accommodation process is not a verbal game of tag in which 

the last person to say something wins. The point of the 

interactive process is to exchange the information needed to 

determine whether a reasonable accommodation of a qualified 

individual can be made. 

USCA Case #12-5374 Document #1507156 Filed: 08/12/2014 Page 26 of 28
9

In this case, as the majority opinion suggests (Maj. Op. at 

12 n.3), the facts taken in the light most favorable to Ward 

show that her supervisors cut off the accommodation process 

at a meeting on May 31st when they laughed at her, 

humiliated her, and denied her request to work at home full 

time unless and until Ward met their demands for unneeded 

information. J.A. 580–581. On that record, a jury could find 

that the employer’s demands amounted to stonewalling, and 

thus that it is the employer that broke down the process. Id. at 

580 (Ward: “I’m trying to get here to do my job. You know 

I’m suffering, and * * * you’re dragging your feet on it.”). 

And while the majority opinion concludes that the June 5th 

letter saves the day, Maj. Op. 12 n.3, that rationale simply 

cannot survive a review of the letter’s content and the 

Secretary’s admissions. 

The costs of such delaying inquiries, moreover, can be 

dire for some individuals with disabilities, as this case 

illustrates. Ward’s lymphedema can be life threatening, and 

working full time at the office while her supervisors debated 

giving her the already-established flexiplace option was 

taking a severe physical toll on Ward. J.A. 195, 600. 

Insisting, as her supervisors did in that June 5th letter, that she 

go back to the well for information no one needed before 

giving her the accommodation was anything but the harmless 

delay that the majority opinion posits (Maj. Op. at 16 n.5).4

* * * * *

 

4 The district court granted summary judgment on Ward’s 

constructive discharge claim for the same flawed reasons it turned 

away her accommodation claim, Ward v. Shinseki, No. 10-cv-1414

(RLW), 2012 WL 5839711 at *10 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2012), so I 

would remand to the district court to reconsider that claim in the 

first instance. 

USCA Case #12-5374 Document #1507156 Filed: 08/12/2014 Page 27 of 28
10

What actually happened in this case—who is right and 

who is wrong—is for a jury, not an appellate court, to decide. 

All that matters at this juncture is that, once the actual content 

of the June 5th letter and the Secretary’s admissions are 

factored in, a reasonable jury could disagree with the majority

opinion that Ward’s supervisors were just seeking 

“information [they] needed to determine the appropriate 

accommodation” (Maj. Op. at 15), and could instead find that 

it was Ward’s supervisors that obstructed the accommodation 

process. 

For five years, Ward proved herself a hard-working, fully 

successful attorney for the Department of Veterans Affairs. 

All she asked for was the same flexiplace program afforded 

other employees in her position, whether or not they were 

disabled. Her supervisors’ withholding of that readily 

available accommodation until she chased down admittedly 

unneeded information is precisely the type of conduct the 

Rehabilitation Act was meant to stop—or so a jury could find. 

I respectfully dissent.

USCA Case #12-5374 Document #1507156 Filed: 08/12/2014 Page 28 of 28