Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01288/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01288-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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28 1/ The factual background is largely adapted from Defendant’s motion.

Much of the facts are not disputed. Where facts are disputed, the

undersigned will state so.

1 09CV1288 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL DOKTOREZTK,

Plaintiff,

v.

S. MORALES, ET AL.,

Defendants.

_______________________________

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Civil No. 09-CV-1288-JM(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

[DOC. NO. 28]

 

Pending before the Court is Defendant S. Morales’s Motion for

Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 28.) Defendant claims qualified

immunity from suit and argues that he did not violate Plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment rights because he did not display deliberate

indifference for Plaintiff’s safety. The undersigned RECOMMENDS

that Defendant’s motion be DENIED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1/

In August 2007, Plaintiff was a state prisoner incarcerated

at R. J. Donovan State Prison (“RJD”) in San Diego, California. On

August 27, 2007, plaintiff was escorted from his housing unit to the

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28 2/ All page numbers refer to the Court Clerk’s numbering of the

document when filed, not the document’s native pagination.

2 09CV1288 

Triage Treatment Area (“TTA”) for a medical appointment. (Doc. No.

28-4 at 16.)2/ The TTA building is a facility where licensed

physicians provide medical care to inmates, and contains offices,

treatment rooms, restrooms, and a holding cell. (Id. at 33-34.)

Plaintiff was placed in the TTA holding cell while he waited

to be examined. (Id. at 17.) Plaintiff shared the holding cell

with several other inmates from the Sensitive Needs Yard (“SNY”).

(Id. at 18.) Plaintiff was an SNY inmate. (Id. at 15.) Inmates

are assigned to the SNY if they have serious safety concerns. (Id.

at 34.) Such inmates include those convicted of sex crimes against

children, those who have dropped out of gangs, and other inmates

with special security needs. (Id.) SNY inmates are housed separately from the vast majority of the prison’s inmates, who do not

have the same serious security needs and can be housed in “general

population.” Various general population inmates were also waiting

for treatment and were seated on a bench, which was approximately

ten feet from the holding cell. (Id. at 18-19, 33.)

Defendant Morales was a correctional officer assigned to the

TTA and was supervising inmates as they waited to be treated by the

physician. (Id. at 32.) In 2007, Defendant had been a Correctional

Officer for approximately 21 years. (Id.)

The TTA holding cell was approximately seven by five feet,

with benches inside, but no restroom. (Id. at 33.) The SNY inmates

had been waiting in the cell for approximately 90 minutes, and

several of them requested permission to use the restroom. (Id. at

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33.) Defendant Morales granted their requests and allowed them to

use the restroom one at a time. (Id.)

In order for the SNY inmates to use the restroom, they had to

be let out of the holding cell and walk past the general population

inmates who were seated on benches. (Id. at 20-21, 33.) Defendant

escorted the SNY inmates individually and stood near the entrance to

the restroom while they were inside. (Id. at 33.) Defendant avers

that approximately five SNY inmates used the restroom without

incident before Plaintiff did so. (Id.) However, Plaintiff

believes he was the third SNY inmate to use the restroom. (Id. at

20.) Plaintiff requested to be let out of the holding cell to use

the restroom, but did not state he had any reservations about being

let out of the cell. (Id. at 21, 33.) Moreover, Plaintiff did not

request that the inmates from other units be cleared from the path

until he was secured. (Id.) Nor did Plaintiff state that he had

any safety concerns, either due to his classification as an SNY

inmate, or because of an enemy situation or prior conflict with any

of the general population inmates. (Id. at 33.)

As Plaintiff passed the general population inmates, they used

derogatory language toward him. (Id. at 22.) However, Defendant

avers he did not hear the general population inmates make the

derogatory comments. (Id. at 33.) Defendant stood near the door to

the restroom while Plaintiff was inside. (Id. at 23.)

Almost immediately after Plaintiff walked out of the

restroom, an inmate (later identified as Morales) stood up, yelled

profanities at Plaintiff, and began hitting him with a wooden

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crutch. (Id. at 23-24, 33-34.) Another inmate (later identified as

Buenrosto) hit plaintiff with his fists in the head and torso area.

(Id. at 24, 34.)

Defendant was a few feet away from where the assault

transpired, and he immediately responded by activating his personal

alarm device and repeatedly ordering the inmates to stop, which they

ignored. (Id. at 24-25, 34.)

Defendant then unholstered his pepper spray and sprayed a two

to three-second burst into the facial areas of inmates Morales and

Buenrosto. (Id. at 25-26, 34.) Simultaneously, another correctional officer sprayed inmate Morales in the face with a two-second

burst of pepper spray. (Id. at 34.) As soon as the inmates were

sprayed, they stopped and got down prone on the floor. (Id.)

Defendant maintained custody of the involved inmates until responding staff arrived and escorted them out of the area. (Id.)

As Plaintiff recounted in his deposition, the entire incident

lasted approximately 10 to 20 seconds. (Id. at 25.) Plaintiff had

never met, or even seen, either of his attackers before the day of

the attack. (Id. at 26.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) mandates the grant of

summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” The standard for granting a motion

for summary judgment is essentially the same as for the granting of

a directed verdict. Judgment must be entered “if, under the

governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the

verdict.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51

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(1986). However, “[i]f reasonable minds could differ,” judgment

should not be entered in favor of the moving party. Id.; see also

Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 470 (9th Cir. 2007)

(“If a rational trier of fact might resolve the issue in favor of

the nonmoving party, summary judgment must be denied.”) (alteration

omitted).

The parties bear the same substantive burden of proof as

would apply at a trial on the merits, including plaintiff’s burden

to establish any element essential to his case. Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 252; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Lack of

a genuine issue of material fact on a single element of a claim for

relief is sufficient to warrant summary judgment on that claim.

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.

The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying the

elements of the claim in the pleadings, or other evidence, and

“‘showing’ -- that is, pointing out to the district court -- that

there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s

case.” Id. at 325; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “A material

issue of fact is one that affects the outcome of the litigation and

requires a trial to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the

truth.” S.E.C. v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir.

1982).

The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish,

beyond the pleadings, that there is a genuine dispute for trial.

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. To successfully rebut a properly

supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party “must

point to some facts in the record that demonstrate a genuine issue

of material fact and, with all reasonable inferences made in the

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6 09CV1288 

plaintiff[]’s favor, could convince a reasonable jury to find for

the plaintiff[].” Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d

736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Rule 56; Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at

323; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249).

“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of

which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable

jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the

facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 327, 380 (2007).

III. DISCUSSION

A. A Genuine Dispute Exists Whether Defendant Acted With

Deliberate Indifference Toward Plaintiff’s Safety

The key issue is whether Defendant acted with deliberate

indifference toward Plaintiff’s safety when he walked Plaintiff past

a bench that seated two general population prisoners. Defendant

argues he did not so act because Plaintiff did not alert him of any

safety concerns, did not express discomfort with walking past the

general population inmates, Defendant was not aware of any specific

threats against Plaintiff, and Defendant had walked several other

inmates past the same bench without incident shortly before

Plaintiff was assaulted. Plaintiff counters that the mere fact that

he was an SNY inmate put Defendant on notice that he was at high

risk of being assaulted, and that Defendant was deliberately

indifferent to this high risk and, as a result, Plaintiff’s safety.

1. Legal Background

“‘Prison officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners

from violence at the hands of other prisoners.’” Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (quoting Cortes-Quinones v.

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7 09CV1288 

Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir. 1988)). The failure

of prison officials to protect inmates from attacks by other inmates

may rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation when:

(1) the deprivation alleged is “objectively, sufficiently serious”

and (2) the prison officials had a “sufficiently culpable state of

mind,” acting with deliberate indifference. Id. at 834 (internal

quotations omitted). In the seminal Farmer case, the United States

Supreme Court for the first time defined the precise contours the

mental state required for deliberate indifference purposes.

Farmer was a male transsexual who “wore women’s

clothing . . . , underwent estrogen therapy, received silicone

breast implants,” and generally projected feminine characteristics.

Id. at 829. Farmer was initially housed in administrative segregation but was reassigned to the federal prison’s general population

without any objection from him. Id. at 830. Within two weeks,

Farmer’s cell-mate beat and raped him, and he was returned to

administrative segregation. Id.

Farmer sued various prison officials, alleging that the

officials (1) placed him in the violent prison and (2) assigned him

to general population “despite knowledge that the penitentiary had

a violent environment and a history of inmate assaults, and despite

the knowledge that [Farmer], as a transsexual who ‘projects feminine

characteristics,’ would be particularly vulnerable to sexual attack

by . . . inmates.” Id. at 831. Farmer claimed this amounted to 

deliberate indifference for his safety and a failure to protect him

in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Id.

The district Court denied Farmer’s motion for additional

discovery and granted the prison officials’ summary judgment motion

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8 09CV1288 

because Farmer had not notified the officials of his safety

concerns. Id. at 831-32. The district court granted summary

judgment because it found that “[t]he failure of prison officials to

prevent inmate assaults violates the Eighth Amendment . . . only if

prison officials were ‘reckless in a criminal sense,’ meaning that

they had ‘actual knowledge’ of a potential danger.” Id. at 831.

Because Farmer “never expressed any concern for his safety to any”

official, they “had no knowledge of any potential danger to [Farmer

and] were not deliberately indifferent to his safety.” Id. at 832

(internal quotations and citation omitted). The United States

Supreme Court granted certiorari after the Seventh Circuit Court of

Appeals summarily affirmed the district court’s order without

opinion. Id. The Court took the case because appellate courts had

adopted inconsistent tests for “deliberate indifference.” Id.

The Court began by reaffirming that an Eighth Amendment

violation can lie for an official’s failure to protect inmates from

violence. “Prison conditions may be restrictive and even harsh, but

gratuitously allowing the beating or rape of one prisoner by another

serves no legitimate penological objective any more than it squares

with evolving standards of decency. Being violently assaulted in

prison is simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay

for their offenses against society.” Id. at 833-34 (internal

quotations and citations omitted).

The Court then turned to whether a prison official must have

actual knowledge of danger to an inmate (i.e., the subjective test)

or whether it is sufficient that he failed to “act in the face of an

unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious

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9 09CV1288 

that it should be know” (i.e., the objective test). Id. at 836-37.

In adopting the more stringent subjective test, the Court held:

[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the

Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions

of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official

must both be aware of facts from which the inference could

be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,

and he must also draw the inference.

Id. at 837. The Court thus held that the prison official must have

actual knowledge of the safety risk. Importantly, “an official’s

failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have

perceived but did not . . . cannot under [Supreme Court precedent]

be condemned as the infliction of punishment.” Id. at 838 (emphasis

added). Farmer thus mandated that Courts inquire into what each

official’s state of mind actually was, rather than dictate what his

state of mind should have been. In other words, what did this

official actually know?

As relevant to Plaintiff’s case, the Court also discussed the

role that “obviousness” of a risk plays in the above analysis.

Although the Court held that the objective obviousness of a risk

(i.e., the official knew or should have known of the risk) was not

the proper measure of the deliberate indifference mental state,

obviousness was nonetheless relevant evidence for whether a specific

official subjectively knew of the risk. As the Court explained:

Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge

of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject

to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence and a factfinder

may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was

obvious. . . . For example, if an Eighth Amendment

plaintiff presents evidence showing that a substantial risk of inmate attacks was longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison

officials in the past, and the circumstances suggest

that the defendant-official being sued had been

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exposed to information concerning the risk and thus

“must have known” about it, then such evidence could

be sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find that

the defendant-official had actual knowledge of the

risk.

Id. at 842-43 (emphasis added; some quotations omitted). Also as

relevant to the instant case, the Court further explained that

prison officials cannot claim ignorance that a particular inmate

would be attacked when that official has knowledge of the risk in

general:

Nor may a prison official escape liability for

deliberate indifference by showing that, while he was

aware of an obvious, substantial risk to inmate safety,

he did not know that the complainant was especially

likely to be assaulted by the specific prisoner who

eventually committed the assault. The question under

the Eighth Amendment is whether prison officials, acting

with deliberate indifference, exposed a prisoner to a

sufficiently substantial “risk of serious damage to his

future health,” and it does not matter whether the risk

comes from a single source or multiple sources, any more

than it matters whether a prisoner faces an excessive

risk of attack for reasons personal to him or because

all prisoners in his situation face such a risk. If,

for example, prison officials were aware that inmate

“rape was so common and uncontrolled that some potential

victims dared not sleep [but] instead . . . would leave

their beds and spend the night clinging to the bars

nearest the guards’ station,” it would obviously be

irrelevant to liability that the officials could not

guess beforehand precisely who would attack whom.

Id. at 843 (citations omitted). However, a trier of fact does not

have to conclusively accept that the obviousness of a risk automatically means the prison official is liable. The official may show

that he was justifiably unaware of the obvious risk:

Because, however, prison officials who lacked knowledge

of a risk cannot be said to have inflicted punishment,

it remains open to the officials to prove that they were

unaware even of an obvious risk to inmate health or

safety. That a trier of fact may infer knowledge from

the obvious, in other words, does not mean that it must

do so. Prison officials charged with deliberate indifference might show, for example, that they did not know

of the underlying facts indicating a sufficiently

substantial danger and that they were therefore unaware

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of a danger, or that they knew the underlying facts but

believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk to which the

facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexistent.

Id.

Applying the above principles, the Supreme Court reversed the

grant of summary judgment because the district court may have relied

too heavily on Farmer’s failure to warn anyone of the risks he faced

in general population. Id. at 848. The Court reasoned:

That [Farmer] “never expressed any concern for his safety

to any of [the officials],” was the only evidence the

District Court cited for its conclusion that there was no

genuine dispute about respondents’ assertion that they “had

no knowledge of any potential danger to [Farmer.]” But

with respect to each of [Farmer’s] claims, for damages and

for injunctive relief, the failure to give advance notice

is not dispositive. [Farmer] may establish [the officials’] awareness by reliance on any relevant evidence.

Id. (citations omitted; citing to portion of the opinion regarding

evidence of obviousness of a risk).

2. A Genuine Dispute of Material Fact Exists

Defendant argues that he is not liable because, inter alia,

Plaintiff failed to express any fear or concern about walking in

front of the general population inmates who sat on the bench next to

the SNY holding cell. However, as Farmer teaches, an inmate’s

failure to warn a prison official does not exculpate the official if

he ignored known dangers and placed the inmate at risk. The proper

inquiry is whether Defendant subjectively knew of the risk that a

general population inmate might attack an SNY inmate despite not

being told of that danger.

Defendant does present some evidence that, based on his

subjective belief, he did not believe the aforementioned danger

existed. His most compelling fact is that five other SNY inmates

walked the same path to the restroom that Plaintiff walked without

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3/ Defendant objects to the late filing of this declaration. However,

given that Plaintiff is representing himself and is currently in

custody, the undersigned recommends that Taylor’s declaration be

accepted despite its slightly untimely filing. See Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed pro se is ‘to be

liberally construed’ . . . .”) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)) (internal citations omitted);

Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 878 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Pro se habeas

petitioners may not be held to the same technical standards as

litigants represented by counsel.”); Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952,

957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (explaining that courts “tolerate

informalities from civil pro se litigants.”).

12 09CV1288 

being attacked. Thus, because the two general population inmates

had not attacked those inmates, he did not believe they would attack

Plaintiff either. Plaintiff only rejoins that two, not five,

inmates preceded him, but he does not dispute that other SNY inmates

walked in front of the same two general population inmates, who

attacked him, without incident.

For his part, Plaintiff presents some evidence, in the form

of a declaration from fellow SNY inmate Michael Douglas Taylor, who

avers that it is common knowledge among inmates and guards alike

that general population inmates attack SNY inmates when they have

the opportunity. (Doc. No. 38 at ¶¶ 5(h), 5(o).)3/ Indeed, Taylor

explains the “convict-code [sic],” which is a “standing-order [sic]

to assault any SNY-Inmate [sic] ‘on-site,’ [sic] and that any

general-population [sic] inmate who ‘has the opportunity to assault

a[n] SNY-Inmate [sic]’ and ‘doesn’t take the opportunity,’ is then

to be assaulted.” (Id. at ¶ 5(o).) Because of the dangers SNY

inmates faced, Taylor explains, all guards were “abundantly aware”

of the problem and the prison system had implemented special

procedures to protect SNY inmates as they were escorted between

different locations on prison grounds. (Id. at ¶ 5(r) (explaining

that general population inmates were to either be cleared from the

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area or compelled to sit on the ground until SNY inmates were

secured).)

At first blush, Defendant’s argument seems reasonable. After

all, he had never met Plaintiff before and had no specific information about Plaintiff’s safety concerns or the seated general

population inmates’ violence history. Plaintiff also did not

express any concerns about his safety or about walking in front of

the general population inmates. However, as explained above, the

Supreme Court has expressly rejected Defendant’s contention that

Plaintiff should have alerted him of the danger. Moreover,

Defendant never squarely addresses Plaintiff’s most compelling

argument, that the mere fact that he was an SNY inmate alerted

Defendant of the risks attendant with walking him in close proximity

to general population inmates. That argument, coupled with Taylor’s

declaration explaining the “convict code,” present a genuine dispute

of material fact. As explained below, the undersigned cannot

conclude that Plaintiff has not presented any facts such that

Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Plaintiff’s argument is that the risks to his safety were

obvious because everyone at the prison knew that general population

inmates attack SNY inmates on sight. Thus, based on the obviousness

of this risk, he did not have to tell Defendant of the risk because

Defendant, along with everyone else, was well aware of it. Had

Plaintiff been just another general population inmate, Defendant’s

purported lack of knowledge of the danger would have been much more

reasonable and convincing. Indeed, in that situation and without

more information, Defendant would have had no way of knowing that

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4/

 Defendant does not dispute that this informal standing rule exists.

14 09CV1288 

two general population inmates would have attacked another general

population inmate.

While the undersigned recognizes that Plaintiff made no

effort to inform Defendant of his safety concerns, his SNY status by

itself spoke volumes. SNY inmates are segregated from general

population inmates because significant safety concerns require their

segregation. This is not an insignificant point that should be as

easily overlooked as Defendant does. The SNY population consists of

gang drop-outs, child molesters, other sex offenders, and other

inmates who are all at serious risk of death if housed in general

population. Plaintiff alleges that this is no secret to any inmate

or corrections officer at any California prison, RJD included. It

is also no secret that there exists an informal standing rule that

a general population inmate who encounters an SNY inmate must attack

that inmate on sight.4/ This is simply part of the prison culture,

which the prison continuously strives to decipher, analyze, and

learn. While it is inexplicable why the two inmates waited to

attack Plaintiff, the fact remains that they did in fact attack

Plaintiff in accordance with the standing rule. Plaintiff had never

met or even seen his attackers, yet they attacked him without any

provocation whatsoever or any knowledge about him except that he was

an SNY inmate. The attackers’ actions are certainly consistent with

the existence of such a standing rule and bolsters why Plaintiff was

SNY inmates must be kept separate from general population inmates in

the first place. Plaintiff’s pro se pleadings, read liberally,

demonstrate that a genuine dispute of fact exists whether Defendant

acted with deliberate indifference because he subjectively knew of

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the risks of walking an SNY inmate in front of two general population inmates. As Farmer teaches, whether Defendant had knowledge of

the risk is a question of fact “subject to demonstration in the

usual ways,” which includes evidence of the obviousness of the risk.

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. The “standing rule” is precisely that kind

of evidence.

The foregoing notwithstanding, a rational trier of fact

could, of course, give full weight to Defendant’s argument that he

did not subjectively believe Plaintiff was in danger because several

SNY inmates preceded Plaintiff without incident and because he did

not believe Plaintiff would be attacked in Defendant’s presence.

After all, Defendant was a uniformed correctional officer. However,

this evidence is not so compelling, and the “standing rule” evidence

is not so unbelievable or contradictory, that a trier of fact could

only come to the conclusion that Defendant subjectively believed

Plaintiff was safe.

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned cannot conclude that

Defendant has presented evidence so compelling that reasonable minds

could not differ whether he possessed the requisite mental state and

displayed deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff’s safety.

Because a rational trier of fact could reasonably resolve this issue

in favor of Plaintiff, Defendant is not entitled to summary

judgment. See Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 470 (9th

Cir. 2007) (“If a rational trier of fact might resolve the issue in

favor of the nonmoving party, summary judgment must be denied.”)

(alteration omitted).

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16 09CV1288 

B. Defendant is Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity

Defendant claims he is entitled to summary judgment because

he is immune from suit. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned concludes that he is not entitled to qualified immunity.

In considering a claim for qualified immunity, the Court

engages in a two-part inquiry: whether the facts shown “make out a

violation of a constitutional right,” and “whether the right at

issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged

misconduct.” Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815-16 (2009). 

The undersigned first concludes that the facts in this case

make out a violation of a constitutional right. It has long been

established that prison officials have a duty to keep inmates safe,

in particular to protect them from each other, and the failure to do

so is a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832-

33. As the United States Supreme Court wrote in 1994, “the lower

courts have uniformly held, and as we have assumed, [that] ‘prison

officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at

the hands of other prisoners.’” Id. at 833 (citing cases; citation

omitted). If Defendant disregarded the known risk that Plaintiff

would be attacked, walked him in front of the unsecured general

population inmates, exposed him to the known risk of attack, and

Plaintiff was in fact attacked, Defendant unjustifiably failed to

safeguard Plaintiff from attack, and an Eighth Amendment violation

is made out.

The undersigned turns to whether the constitutional right

that would be violated was clearly established. This is “a two-part

inquiry: (1) Was the law governing the state official’s conduct

clearly established? (2) Under that law could a reasonable state

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5/ Defendant argues that the line between “some” risk and a

“substantial” risk is unclear. However, if there exists a standing

order that general population inmates are to assault SNY inmates on

sight, lest they themselves be attacked, any reasonable officer

would believe that the risk here did not straddle the fine line

between “some” and “substantial,” but rather, the risk was far on

the side of “substantial.” Otherwise, SNY inmates would not need to

be kept in completely segregated housing in the first place. The

instant case is distinguishable from Estate of Ford, 301 F.3d 1043

(9th Cir. 2002), which involved assigning two mentally ill inmates

in the same cell, where one ended up killing the other. Ford

involved two inmates who could have been assigned to the same cell,

but where the judgment to place the two particular inmates in the

same cell was misguided and unfortunate. However, the instant case

involves inmates in classifications that should not have been in

contact with each other to begin with.

17 09CV1288 

official have believed his conduct was lawful?” Browning v. Vernon,

44 F.3d 818, 822 (9th Cir. 1995). As previously explained, the

United States Supreme Court, the final arbiter of all constitutional

law questions, has long held that failure to safeguard an inmate’s

safety is a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 858 (“The opinion’s clear message is that prison officials must

fulfill their affirmative duty under the Constitution to prevent

inmate assault . . . or otherwise face a serious risk of being held

liable for damages . . . .”) (Blackmun, J., concurring). The right

was clearly established.

Next, “assuming the facts in the injured party’s favor,”

Estate of Ford, 301 F.3d 1043, 1045 (9th Cir. 2002), had Defendant

known of the danger of walking an SNY inmate in close proximity to

two unsecured general population inmates, no doubt exists that a

reasonable officer would have known that Plaintiff was entitled to

his safety and to be free from attack at the hands of other

prisoners. Defendant’s assertion to the contrary notwithstanding,

it could not have been more clear to Defendant, or any reasonable

officer, that failing to protect Plaintiff from attack in this

situation was unlawful.5/

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18 09CV1288 

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED. 

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than February 11, 2011, any party

to this action may file written objections with the Court and serve

a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

March 11, 2011. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: January 28, 2011

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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