Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-04029/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-04029-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART SCHOOL DISTRICT DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND

AMENDED COMPLAINT—No. C-06-04029 RMW

SPT

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

E-FILED on 8/27/07

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

TRACY WATSON, RENEE STALKER, O.S.,

S.W., R.W.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, COUNTY OF

SANTA CLARA DEPARTMENT OF

FAMILY AND CHILDREN SERVICES,

COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA

DEPARTMENT OF COUNTY COUNSEL,

COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA DISTRICT

ATTORNEYS OFFICE, SANTA CLARA

VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER,

EVERGREEN SCHOOL DISTRICT, CITY

OF SAN JOSE, SAN JOSE POLICE

DEPARTMENT, NORMA SPARKS,

YAZMINA LETONA, SHARON BURGAN,

JEWELS RAMIREZ, VU TRAN, ANN

MILLER RAVEL, RIMA SINGH, AARON

WEST, GEORGE KENNEDY, CLIFTON

BLACK, ROSE REAL, ROBERT PRUITT,

CHERYL HARMS, CLAUDIA BLODGETT,

GARY KISHIMOTO, JOELLA MOLLOY,

JOHN HAMILTON, ANITA NOBLE, JANET

KAHLE, MARY RITTER, DAVID KEARNS,

RAJUL KAZI, ROB DAVIS, WILLIAM

HOYT, CRAIG BLANK,

Defendants.

No. C-06-04029 RMW

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART SCHOOL DISTRICT

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

[Re Docket No. 58]

Defendants Evergreen School District, Clifton Black, Rose Real, Robert Pruitt, Cheryl

Harms, Claudia Blodgett, and Gary Kishimoto (the "School District defendants") move to dismiss

plaintiffs' second amended complaint ("SAC") for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs filed opposition

to the School District defendants' motion. The court has read the moving and responding papers and

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART SCHOOL DISTRICT DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND

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considered the arguments of counsel. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants in part and

denies in part the School District defendants' motion as follows: (1) defendants' motion to dismiss as

to plaintiffs' fifteenth claim for a violation of public policy is granted with prejudice; (2) defendants'

motion to dismiss as to plaintiffs' sixteenth claim for violation of the Americans with Disability Act

and the Rehabilitation Act and seventeenth claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is

granted without prejudice; (3) defendants' motion to dismiss as to the twenty-second claim is denied;

and (4) plaintiffs have twenty calendar days from the date of this order to amend their complaint. 

I. BACKGROUND

The court previously dismissed plaintiffs' complaint against the School District defendants

because, based on the allegations, the claims against defendants were barred by the absolute

immunity conferred by Cal. Penal Code § 11172 to mandatory reporters. See Order of January 3,

2007 Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss ("Jan. 3, 2007 Order") at 13:20-14:6. The court

granted leave to amend as follows:

Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend to adequately plead facts showing that (1)

defendants are not mandatory reporters within the meaning of The Child Abuse and

Neglect Reporting Act, Cal. Penal Code § 11164 et seq. and (2) specific statements or

conduct by defendants fall outside the purview of the immunity provided by §

11172(a), including as interpreted by the Ferraro court. Absent such pleadings,

plaintiffs' complaint will be dismissed with prejudice as to the School District

defendants.

Id. at 14:2-7. 

Plaintiff O.S. is a nine year old female child. According to the second amended complaint

("SAC"), she suffers from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Turrets Syndrome, Sensory

Integration Disorder, Processing Deficit, and has deficits in communications skills, cognitive skills,

and chronology, and memory impairments. SAC ¶ 34. O.S. was a special needs child in the care of

the Evergreen School District during the 2004 and 2005 school years. Id. ¶ 42. Plaintiff S.W. is a

four year old male child who suffers from severe autism. Id. ¶ 33. Plaintiff R.W. is a two year old

male child. Id. ¶ 32. Plaintiff Renee Stalker ("Stalker") is the mother of O.S., S.W., and R.W.. Id.

¶ 30. Plaintiff Tracy Watson ("Watson") is the father of O.S., S.W., and R.W., and is Stalker's

spouse. Id. ¶ 31. 

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1

 The complaint does not allege any further facts regarding the roles of these defendants as

employees of the Evergreen School District.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART SCHOOL DISTRICT DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND

AMENDED COMPLAINT—No. C-06-04029 RMW

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Defendant Clifton Black ("Black") is the superintendent of the Evergreen School District

located in Santa Clara County. Id. ¶ 12. Defendants Rose Real ("Real"), Robert Pruitt ("Pruitt"),

Claudia Blodgett ("Blodgett"), Gary Kishimoto ("Kishimoto"), and Cheryl Harms ("Harms") are

employed by the Evergreen School District.1 Id. ¶¶ 13-16, 29. Defendant Evergreen School District

is a division of Santa Clara County. Id. ¶ 38. 

Plaintiffs allege that during the 2004 and 2005 school years, staff from the Evergreen School

District systematically abused O.S. who was in their care for special education services. On May

26, 2005 Real filed an allegedly false claim that O.S. had been sexually abused with the Santa Clara

County Department of Family and Child Services ("DFCS"). On June 7, 2005 DFCS contacted

Watson and notified her that DFCS was investigating allegations that O.S. had been sexually abused. 

On June 24, 2005 DFCS cross-reported the sexual abuse report to the San Jose Police Department. 

On June 29, 2005 San Jose police officers removed S.W. and R.W. from Watson's and Stalker's

home, and the following day O.S. was taken into protective custody. Plaintiffs claim that

interrogations conducted by the police at that time did not turn up any complaints of abuse or

evidence for any charges.

Additional background facts are set forth in this court's January 3, 2007 Order. The court

addresses the allegations against the School District defendants in the analysis below. 

II. ANALYSIS

Four claims are directed against the School District defendants in the SAC: (1) fifteenth

claim for violation of California public policy, id. ¶¶ 223-29; (2) sixteenth claim for violation of the

Americans with Disability Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and section 504 of the Rehabilitation

Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, id. ¶¶ 230-39; (3) seventeenth claim for intentional infliction of emotional

distress, id. ¶¶ 240-53; and (4) twenty-second claim for "Civil Conspiracy–Oppressive

Governmental Conduct Deprivation of Substantive Due Process Rights" in violation of 42 U.S.C. §

1983, id. ¶¶ 294-305. 

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART SCHOOL DISTRICT DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND

AMENDED COMPLAINT—No. C-06-04029 RMW

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A. Violation of California Public Policy

In their fifteenth claim, plaintiffs allege that defendants violated California public policy

because defendant Real planned, created, and ultimately fabricated a claim that O.S. had been

sexually abused. The School District defendants first assert that plaintiffs have failed to address the

court's order that plaintiffs adequately plead facts showing that defendants are not mandatory

reporters within the meaning of The Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act, Cal. Penal Code §

11164 et seq. For purposes of The Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act, mandatory reporters

include: (1) a teacher, (2) an instructional aide, (3) a teacher's aide or teacher's assistant employed by

any public or private school, (4) a classified employee of any public school, (5) an administrative

officer or supervisor of child welfare and attendance, or a certificated pupil personnel employee of

any public or private school, and (6) any employee of a county office of education or the California

Department of Education, whose duties bring the employee into contact with children on a regular

basis. Cal. Penal Code § 11165.7. In the January 3, 2007 Order, the court determined that, based on

the first amended complaint, the School District defendants are all mandatory reporters within §

11164. Plaintiffs have not made any amendment to their allegations of the specific role or roles of

each School District defendant within the school district. As the court previously held, as alleged,

each School District defendant appears to fall within the category of "mandatory reporter" as defined

in § 11165.7. See Jan. 3, 2007 Order at 9:1-2.

Plaintiffs allege that Real's report is not covered by § 11172 because she reported suspected

sexual abuse of O.S. "for the sole purpose of retaliating against O.S.'s parents for engaging in proactive conduct to ensure O.S.'s educational rights." Id. ¶ 224. Moreover, defendants Black and the

"supervisory personnel within the Evergreen School District" allegedly had knowledge of and

ratified Real's conduct. Id. ¶ 227. In their previous complaint, plaintiffs had framed these same

factual allegations as a false report of sexual abuse under Cal. Penal Code § 11164. In the January

3, 2007 Order the court held that this claim is barred by the immunity provided under Cal. Penal

Code § 11172. Plaintiffs have now removed all references to Cal. Penal Code §§ 11164 and 11172

in their complaint, but have kept the same basic factual allegations. 

Defendants move to dismiss this claim on the grounds that it is barred by the absolute

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART SCHOOL DISTRICT DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND

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immunity provided in § 11172. Specifically, defendants contend that even if plaintiffs have

removed the references to §§ 11164 and 11172, the allegations essentially still assert that the School

District defendants' report of sexual abuse and subsequent ratification of the report of sexual abuse

fall within the protections of § 11172. Plaintiffs argue that because they have alleged that the report

of abuse by defendant Real was completely fabricated and made solely in retaliation against O.S.'s

parents for asserting their parental rights as to O.S.'s education plan, the report and purported

ratification are not protected by § 11172 immunity. The court disagrees. As noted in this court's

January 3, 2007 Order, California courts have concluded that immunity for mandatory reporters

applies even where the report is negligent or intentionally false because "it is inconsistent to expose

professionals to civil liability for failing to report and then expose them to liability where their

reports prove false." See Stecks v. Young, 38 Cal. App. 4th 365, 373 (1995). Whether immunity

applies to a mandatory reporter is not dependent upon whether plaintiffs could prove that defendants

made the report negligently or with knowledge of its falsity. Id. Here, plaintiffs have alleged facts

that suggest that all of the School District defendants fall within the definition of a mandatory

reporter for purposes of The Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act. Plaintiffs have failed, despite

the court's direction in granting the School District defendants' motion to dismiss the amended

complaint, to plead facts showing that defendants are not mandatory reporters. Thus, plaintiffs'

fifteenth claim is barred by § 11172.

Plaintiffs argue in opposition that the School District defendants, other than Real, are not

mandatory reporters because only Real made the actual report and the other defendants merely came

in after the fact and repeated the report while knowing it was false. This argument is not persuasive. 

In particular, plaintiffs have again failed to set forth the particular communications or conduct of the

School District defendants that purportedly fall outside § 11172. Thus, the allegations are

insufficient to show that any purported communications or conduct by the School District

defendants fall outside § 11172. See Storch v. Silverman, 186 Cal. App. 3d 671, 681 (1986) (noting

that "[l]imitation of immunity to the person making the telephone call to the agency or signing the

report would defeat that purpose" and sustaining demurrers where plaintiff's record "discloses no

basis to conclude that plaintiffs could have alleged facts to state a cause of action which would not

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 Plaintiffs argue that the report of abuse was not a collaborative event and therefore, the

defendants who purportedly did not participate in the initial report are not immunized. However,

plaintiffs offer no facts supporting their conclusory allegation. This is insufficient to meet plaintiffs'

burden to allege facts showing that § 11172 does not apply. To the extent plaintiffs argue that

Storch or other cases cited by defendants do not represent good case law, see Pls.' Opp'n at 10:18-

20; 14:10-16:7, plaintiffs have not cited any cases overruling or distinguishing Storch or other such

cases.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART SCHOOL DISTRICT DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND

AMENDED COMPLAINT—No. C-06-04029 RMW

SPT 6

be barred by the immunity statute").2 As this court previously noted, post-report communications by

mandatory reporters are considered authorized reports within § 11172. See Ferraro v. Chadwick,

221 Cal. App. 3d 86, 95 (1990) (noting that communications to child protective and law enforcement

agencies after the report of child abuse receive absolute immunity as "authorized" reports under §

11172(a)). Moreover, restatements or republications of the initial protected report are immunized. 

See James W. v. Super. Ct., 17 Cal. App. 4th 246, 255-56 (1993) (holding that "[i]t would be

anomalous to construe the Act as absolutely immunizing the 'required' initial report and yet construe

later republications of the same statements as exposing the reporter to civil liability").

Plaintiffs again argue that their facts are analogous to that in James W. and, because the facts

of Ferraro, Storch, and Stecks are distinguishable, the holdings of those cases should not apply. As

this court held in its January 3, 2007 Order, the facts alleged in the present action are clearly

distinguishable from those in James W. Moreover, although the specific facts in Ferraro, Storch,

and Stecks may differ from those in the present action, the holdings of those cases set forth the

applicable immunity standards to be applied here. 

B. Violation of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

Defendants argue that plaintiffs' claims under the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

must be dismissed either on the basis that plaintiffs have failed to exhaust administrative remedies or

that such claims are barred by § 11172. Under the ADA, "no qualified individual with a disability

shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the

services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such

entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Whether exhaustion is required for this section of the ADA is governed

by the same regulations as for the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794:

The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section 794a of Title 29 shall be the

remedies, procedures, and rights this subchapter provides to any person alleging

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART SCHOOL DISTRICT DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND

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discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of section 12132 of this title.

42 U.S.C. § 12133. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act "prohibits discrimination against the

disabled by recipients of federal funding, including private organizations." Barnes v. Gorman, 536

U.S. 181, 184-85 (2002); 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(3). 

Here, plaintiffs' ADA and § 504 claims are both predicated upon plaintiffs' allegation that

O.S. and S.W. are both individuals with disabilities who have been deprived of their rights under the

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). The IDEA is a "comprehensive educational

scheme, conferring on disabled students a substantive right to public education and providing

financial assistance to enable states to meet their educational needs." Hoeft v. Tucson Unified

School Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir. 1992). The federal government conditions funds upon

state compliance with IDEA's substantive and procedural requirements and requires states to "have

in effect 'a policy that assures all children with disabilities the right to a free appropriate public

education.'" Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1)). Parents and school officials work together to

determine the appropriate education plan for the child, ultimately formulating an individualized

education program ("IEP") tailored to the child's unique needs. Id. 

The IDEA requires states to provide procedural safeguards to allow parents to seek review of

decisions affecting their child, including a due process hearing and the right to sue in state or federal

court:

[T]he IDEA requires that states guarantee parents the right to seek review of any

decisions concerning their child's education which they consider inappropriate. This

right includes an opportunity to bring complaints about "any matter relating to the

identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a

free appropriate public education to such child." § 1415(b)(1)(E). The preliminary

forum for parent complaints is an "impartial due process hearing" conducted by the

local school district or by the state. § 1415(b)(2). If the hearing is conducted by the

local school district, the parents may appeal the decision to the state educational

agency. § 1415(c). Parents dissatisfied by the state's decision may appeal by filing a

civil action in federal or state court. § 1415(e)(2). 

Id. In general, the decision of the state agency after hearing is final unless the decision is appealed

by one of the parties. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(1). The IDEA provides a right to bring civil action in

state or federal court by "[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision" made by the local

school district or by the state educational agency. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). In California, the

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 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has expressly distinguished its interpretations of the IDEA's

exhaustion requirements from the interpretations by the Third Circuit. See Robb, 308 F.3d at 1049. 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART SCHOOL DISTRICT DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND

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enactment of legislation in compliance with IDEA is set forth in Cal. Educ. Code § 56000 et seq.

and the procedural safeguards are set forth in Cal. Educ. Code § 56500 et seq. Section 56505(5)

provides that the agency's decision may be appealed to state or federal court within 90 days of

receipt of the hearing decision. 

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Here, citing a Seventh Circuit case and a Third Circuit case, plaintiffs argue that exhaustion

is not required. However, plaintiffs cite no Ninth Circuit law to support this proposition. Rather,

under Ninth Circuit law, "[t]he IDEA requires a plaintiff to exhaust his or her administrative

remedies before commencing suit if that person 'is seeking relief that is also available under' the

IDEA." Robb v. Bethel School Dist., 308 F.3d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 2002).3

 As the Ninth Circuit has

recognized, "[e]xhaustion of the administrative process allows for the exercise of discretion and

educational expertise by state and local agencies, affords full exploration of technical educational

issues, furthers development of a complete factual record, and promotes judicial efficiency by giving

these agencies the first opportunity to correct shortcomings in their educational programs for

disabled children." Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1303. Here, plaintiffs sought a due process hearing with

respect to the education plan decisions for O.S.. The complaint was initially dismissed on February

7, 2006 and dismissed upon reconsideration on February 21, 2006. Defs.' Request for Judicial

Notice Supp. Mot. Dismiss ("Defs.' RJN"), Exs. I, J. Defendants argue that because plaintiffs did

not file the present action until June 29, 2006, any appeal of the agency decisions is untimely and,

therefore, barred. In addition, plaintiffs never sought an administrative hearing for S.W.. 

Defendants submit, to the extent plaintiffs asserts claims pursuant to § 504 outside of their

administrative claim, such claims are barred for failure to first exhaust administrative remedies. 

Plaintiffs do not dispute that they have not exhausted the administrative requirements. Instead,

plaintiffs argue that even if there is an exhaustion requirement, the IDEA does not provide adequate

remedy to them. 

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART SCHOOL DISTRICT DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND

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2. Exceptions to Exhaustion Requirement

The Ninth Circuit has recognized that there are exceptions to the exhaustion requirements,

including complaints that: "(1) it would be futile to use the due process procedures; (2) an agency

has adopted a policy or pursued a practice of general applicability that is contrary to the law; (3) it is

improbable that adequate relief can be obtained by pursuing administrative remedies (e.g., the

hearing officer lacks the authority to grant the relief sought)." Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 296, 99th

Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1985)). According to plaintiffs' complaint, defendants violated the ADA and §

504 because between 2003 through at least October 2005 defendants "intentionally interfered with 

the ability of O.S.'s parents . . . to engage in authorized conduct to ensure the School District

complied with the Individual Educational Plan to which O.S. was lawfully entitled and required due

to her disability." SAC ¶ 234. Defendants Pruitt, Real, Harms, and Blodgett "personally or directed

others to question the validity of O.S.'s disability and special needs without any reasonable basis"

thereby resulting in the "failure to provide the educational resources, supportive environment or

other actions needed for O.S. to participate in her educational process." Id. 

Plaintiffs further allege that defendants harassed O.S. by berating her for involuntary conduct

caused by her disability and tried to influence her to state that her father had sexually abused her. 

Id. The defendants also purportedly provided "false information and testimony" to the court for the

purpose of concealing their alleged harassment and discrimination, retaliated against O.S. and her

parents by fabricating a report of sexual abuse, and retaliated against O.S.'s parents by terminating

special education services for her brother S.W.. Id. ¶¶ 236-37. 

In Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1305, one of the plaintiffs' contentions was that the school district's

policy involving student eligibility for an extended year program for special needs students and the

methodology used by the district to determine which disabled students received extended year

programming violated the IDEA. The Ninth Circuit concluded that "[e]ligibility criteria and

methodology are classic examples of the kind of technical questions of educational policy best

resolved with the benefit of agency expertise and a fully developed administrative record." Id.

Because the issue involved a fact-specific inquiry into the operation of the school district's policy in

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 In Robb, the plaintiffs asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 predicated on a violation of

the IDEA. 308 F.3d at 1048. 

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an individual child's case rather than a purely legal issue, the court declined to agree that the

exhaustion requirement should be waived. Id. at 1306. Likewise, the court concluded that a 

challenge to the educational content of a program as violative of the IDEA is a "technical question

of educational policy and methodology," that "must await preliminary administrative review before

being addressed by the federal courts." Id. Here, plaintiffs' allegations, although not entirely clear,

appear to challenge conduct by the school district in determining the proper IEP for O.S. and her

particular disability and special needs. Such conduct included interfering with O.S.'s parents'

opinion of the proper educational needs for O.S.. As in Hoeft, such alleged conduct involves

decisions of eligibility and the methodology a school district uses to address an individual's

educational needs under its policies, to which the exhaustion requirement applies. 

Plaintiffs also submit that the third exception applies because plaintiffs' action seeks damages

for past emotional abuse and violation of rights and, therefore, it is improbable that adequate relief

can be obtained by pursuing administrative remedies. In Robb, the Ninth Circuit addressed this

exact issue—that is, whether a plaintiff who seeks only monetary damages is required to exhaust

administrative remedies before instituting a claim predicated on violation of the IDEA.4

 There, the

plaintiffs' daughter had been diagnosed with cerebral palsy. Id. at 1048. The school district's

teachers had purportedly removed the child from the classroom for "peer tutoring" without

supervision by a certified teacher. Id. The plaintiffs sought money to compensate them for "lost

educational opportunities" and "emotional distress, humiliation, embarrassment, and psychological

injury." Id. at 1050. They argued that because they sought only monetary damages—which is not a

remedy under the IDEA—that the exhaustion requirement is excused. The Ninth Circuit disagreed. 

Specifically, rejecting the holding of the Third Circuit and adopting a holding consistent with the

First, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, the court held that "a plaintiff cannot avoid the

IDEA's exhaustion requirement merely by limiting a prayer for relief to monetary damages." Id. at

1049. 

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The Robb court reasoned that the focus of the inquiry is not on the relief sought, but on the

source and nature of the alleged injuries. Thus, "[t]he dispositive question generally is whether the

plaintiff has alleged injuries that could be redressed to any degree by the IDEA's administrative

procedures and remedies." Id. at 1050. Because the alleged injuries were essentially the loss of selfesteem and decline in progress of the child, the court determined that the IDEA's remedies, which

included requiring a school district to provide developmental, corrective, and other supportive and

therapeutic services, were sufficient to address the alleged injuries. Id. In particular, 34 C.F.R. §

300.24(b)(9)(v) provides that services include psychological counseling for the parents as well as the

child. Id. The court finds that the reasoning in Robb is equally applicable here. As noted above,

plaintiffs' alleged injuries are essentially that O.S. was denied the requisite educational programs

that her parents felt were appropriate for her disability and that the School District defendants

questioned the validity of her disability resulting in a failure to provide the proper educational

resources. These are the types of injuries that the IDEA can remedy through the required

developmental, corrective, supportive, and therapeutic services. Further, that there might be some

residual harm that may not be fully remedied by the services Congress specified in the IDEA is not

sufficient basis for waiving the exhaustion requirement. Id. 

Plaintiffs distinguish Robb by arguing that the Robb court dealt with "damages to be

measured by the cost of remedial educational services." However, the Robb court's decision is not

as narrow as plaintiffs contend. The Robb court specifically held that the dispositive question is

whether the IDEA could redress to any degree the alleged injuries. Id. at 1050. Neither are the facts

in Robb distinguishable in the manner plaintiffs suggest. As discussed above, the facts in Robb are

that types of services provided for under the IDEA can remedy to some extent the alleged injuries

caused by the denial of classroom participation to the plaintiffs' daughter and the removal of her to

peer tutoring without supervision of a certified teacher. 

Finally, plaintiffs attempt to rely upon Witte v. Clark County School Dist., 197 F.3d 1271

(9th Cir. 1999), for the proposition that "a plaintiff seeking monetary relief for alleged past physical

and emotional abuse by school staff was not required to exhaust administrative remedies under the

IDEA." Pls.' Opp'n at 19:23-25. As made clear in Robb, such reliance upon Witte, takes the holding

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of Witte out of context. Robb, 308 F.3d at 1051-52. In Witte, the court held that exhaustion was not

required because the plaintiff sought only monetary damages and because all educational issues

already had been resolved to the parties' mutual satisfaction through the IEP process prior to filing

suit. 197 F.3d at 1275-76; Robb, 308 F.3d at 1051-52. In other words, because the plaintiff had

already utilized administrative procedures to secure remedies available under the IDEA, it was

permitted to proceed with its civil action for retrospective damages associated with residual harm

not remedied by the IDEA. Blanchard v. Morton School District, upon which plaintiffs also rely,

similarly held that exhaustion was not required for an emotional distress claim after all educational

issues had been administratively resolved. 420 F.3d 918, 921-22 (9th Cir. 2005).

Under Witte, there may be an exception to exhaustion where the injuries alleged are past

physical injuries. In Witte, these injuries included teachers force feeding a ten year old boy with

Tourette's syndrome oatmeal even though he was allergic to it, strangling him to the extent that he

had to be taken to the emergency room, tackling and holding him to the ground repeatedly, forcing

him to run on a treadmill at high speeds with weights strapped to his ankles, depriving him of meals,

spraying him in the face with water, and leaving him on the patio without food or water. 197 F.3d at

1273. The court reasoned that because the source and nature of these injuries were not educational,

but rather because plaintiff made noise in the classroom, could not run fast enough, could not stay on

task, could not cut his food, and made involuntary movements all due to his disabilities, the

exhaustion requirement did not apply. Here, the only allegation that might be considered a noneducational injury is that "Real and Harms specifically engaged in harassing and demeaning conduct

towards O.S.. This included amongst others of verbally abusing O.S. in front of other pupils for her

involuntary conduct caused by her disability." SAC ¶ 234. However, unlike the facts in Witte, there

is no allegation of physical injury, or at least of injury that cannot be remedied by the services

available under the IDEA. Moreover, as noted above, plaintiffs' allegations appear to be premised

on the ultimate failure of the school district to provide O.S. (and S.W.) with an appropriate IEP. 

Thus, the court dismisses plaintiffs' ADA and § 504 claims for failure to exhaust to the extent the

claims are premised on violations of the IDEA. This dismissal is without prejudice to allegations of

discrimination that are not premised on violations of the IDEA. 

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C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendants argue that plaintiffs' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress should

be dismissed for failure to exhaust or as barred by § 11172. In support of this claim, plaintiffs allege

the same conduct by defendants as alleged in support of their ADA and § 504 claim. In addition,

plaintiffs allege that defendants undertook to engage O.S. in certain unauthorized testing and

assessment for the purpose of concealing defendants' purported harassment and discrimination and

which led ultimately to the filing of the dependency petition before the juvenile court and the

removal of O.S., S.W., and R.W. from their parents. SAC ¶¶ 245-53. To the extent plaintiffs'

allegations rely upon the same allegations as asserted for their ADA and § 504 claims, their claim is

barred by the failure to exhaust under the IDEA as discussed in supra § B. To the extent plaintiffs'

allegations assert defendants' conduct leading up to the reporting of abuse by mandatory reporters,

plaintiffs' claim is barred by § 11172 as discussed in supra § A and this court's January 3, 2007

Order. 

D. Section 1983 Claim

Plaintiffs' twenty-second claim for "Civil Conspiracy—Oppressive Governmental Conduct

Deprivation of Substantive Due Process Rights" are directed at all defendants. Plaintiffs allege that

each defendant played a role and acted in concert to deprive plaintiffs of their familial relations

through a false accusation of sexual abuse unsupported by physical evidence. SAC ¶¶ 294-305. In

their twenty-second claim, plaintiffs make no specific allegations directed at conduct by the School

District defendants; thus, the only conduct alleged against the School District defendants are those

incorporated from the prior claims. To the extent plaintiffs' allegations rely upon the same

allegations as asserted for their ADA and § 504 claims, their claim is barred by the failure to exhaust

under the IDEA as discussed in supra § B.

Plaintiffs argue that Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980), and Good v. Dauphin

County Social Servs. for Children and Youth, 891 F.2d 1087 (3d Cir. 1989), support the proposition

that § 11172 cannot bar their § 1983 claim. The court agrees that a state statute cannot immunize an

entity or an individual from violations of federal law. In Martinez, the Supreme Court stated, "even

if one characterizes the immunity defense as a statutory deprivation, it would remain true that the

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State's interest in fashioning its own rules of tort law is paramount to any discernible federal interest,

except perhaps an interest in protecting the individual citizen from state action that is wholly

arbitrary or irrational." 44 U.S. at 282. In Good, the Third Circuit explained, "[t]he supremacy

clause of the Constitution prevents a state from immunizing entities or individuals alleged to have

violated federal law." 891 F.2d at 1091. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has held "state law cannot

provide immunity from suit for federal civil rights violations." Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126,

1143-44 (9th Cir. 2000). Defendants argue that the Ninth Circuit's unpublished decision, Wallis v.

Spencer, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 18536 (1996), indicates that a defendant in that case was dismissed

from the asserted § 1983 claim because he was a mandatory reporter. As defendants concede, this

court cannot rely upon the unpublished opinion as precedent. Under the published Wallis case, it

appears that § 11172 cannot bar plaintiffs' § 1983 claim. 

However, while the court does not dismiss plaintiffs' § 1983 claim on the basis of § 11172

immunity, the court's order does not reach whether plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient to support a

§ 1983 claim as defendants did not seek dismissal of plaintiffs' claim on such grounds. As noted

above, plaintiffs' allegations in support of their twenty-second claim are vague and do not assert any

specific conduct against defendants. 

 E. Leave to Amend

Plaintiffs request leave to amend should the court find their pleadings insufficient. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(a)'s edict that "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires" is "to be applied with

extreme liberality." Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations

omitted)). However, "a district court need not grant leave to amend where the amendment: (1)

prejudices the opposing party; (2) is sought in bad faith; (3) produces an undue delay in litigation; or

(4) is futile." AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist West, Inc., 2006 WL 709199, *3 (9th Cir. 2006)

(citations omitted) (certified for publication); see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 

Defendants seek dismissal with prejudice. As the court noted in its January 3, 2007 Order,

dismissal with prejudice is appropriate if plaintiffs' claims are barred by § 11172(a). In the January

3, 2007 Order, the court granted leave to amend and ordered that plaintiffs adequately plead (1) facts

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showing that defendants are not mandatory reporters within the meaning of The Child Abuse and

Neglect Reporting Act as suggested by the amended complaint or (2) specific statements or conduct

by defendants that fall outside the purview of the immunity provided by § 11172(a) as interpreted by

the Ferraro court. Specifically, the court provided that absent such pleadings, plaintiffs' complaint

would be dismissed with prejudice as to the School District defendants. Because plaintiffs have

pleaded facts suggesting that § 11172 does apply to the School District defendants and failed to

plead facts showing that it does not apply, their claims based upon the report of abuse are dismissed

with prejudice. 

In addition, to the extent plaintiffs' claims are barred by the failure to exhaust administrative

remedies under the IDEA, those claims are dismissed with prejudice. However, because plaintiffs

could still base their ADA, § 504, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims on alleged

conduct outside of the IDEA or the report of abuse, their sixteenth and seventeenth claims are

dismissed without prejudice. 

III. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the court grants in part and denies in part the School District

defendants' motion as follows:

1. Defendants' motion to dismiss as to plaintiffs' fifteenth claim for a violation of public

policy is granted with prejudice;

2. Defendants' motion to dismiss as to plaintiffs' sixteenth claim for violation of the

Americans with Disability Act and the Rehabilitation Act and seventeenth claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress is granted without prejudice;

3. Defendants' motion to dismiss the twenty-second claim is denied; and 

4. Plaintiffs have twenty calendar days from the date of this order to amend their

complaint. 

DATED: 8/27/07

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

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Notice of this document has been electronically sent to:

Counsel for Plaintiffs:

Peter J. Johnson jjlaw2@earthlink.net 

Counsel for Defendants:

Jacquelyn Kimmet Wilson jkw@swr-law.com 

Clifford S. Greenberg cao.main@ci.sj.ca.us 

Melissa R. Kiniyalocts melissa.kiniyalocts@cco.co.scl.ca.us 

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel that have not

registered for e-filing under the court's CM/ECF program.

Dated: 8/27/07 SPT

Chambers of Judge Whyte

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