Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_14-cv-01181/USCOURTS-alnd-5_14-cv-01181-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1132 E.R.I.S.A.-Employee Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

SUSAN SAUNDERS,

 Plaintiff,

v.

LIBERTY LIFE ASSURANCE 

COMPANY OF BOSTON, et al.,

 Defendants.

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 Case Number: 5:14-cv-01181-JHE 

 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Susan Saunders (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action against Defendants Liberty Life

Assurance Company of Boston (“Liberty”) and J.C. Penney Corporation, Inc. (“J.C. Penney”),

asserting violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). (Doc.

1). J.C. Penney moves to dismiss on the ground that, in the disability plan at issue (“the Plan”),

J.C. Penney is merely the Plan Sponsor and not the Plan Administrator and, therefore, it is not a

proper defendant. (Docs. 11 and 11-1). Plaintiff responds that she has alleged J.C. Penney is the

Plan Administrator so the Court cannot dismiss J.C. Penney without giving ten-days notice it is

converting the motion to an MSJ. (Doc. 14). J.C. Penney replies the Court may rely on an

undisputed document that is central to the complaint and therefore it is entitled to dismissal

based on the summary description of the Plan attached to its motion. (Doc. 15). The motion is

fully briefed and ripe for review. For the reasons stated more fully below, J.C. Penney’s motion

to dismiss, (doc. 11), is due to be GRANTED.

I. Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain “a short and plain

FILED

 2014 Nov-05 PM 02:46

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “[T]he pleading standard

Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.

Ct. 1955 (2007)). Mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action” are insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at

557, 127 S. Ct. 1955).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. 1949 (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted). A complaint states a facially plausible claim for relief “when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). The complaint must establish “more than a

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555,

127 S. Ct. at 1965 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.”). Ultimately, this inquiry is a “context-specific task that requires the

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679,

129 S. Ct. at 1950.

II. Analysis

In its motion to dismiss, J.C. Penney asserts that, in the Eleventh Circuit, the proper party

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defendants concerning ERISA benefits are parties “that control administration of the plan.” (Doc.

11 at 3) (quoting Garren v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 114 F.3d 186, 187 (11th Cir.

1997)). Pointing to the summary description of the Plan attached to its motion to dismiss, J.C.

Penney asserts it is not an administrator and is therefore not a proper party. (Id. at 4) (citing doc.

11-1 at 17, 18, & 20).

Plaintiff’s response states only that, on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court may

not consider evidence outside the allegations of the pleadings and exhibits attached thereto, (doc.

14 at 2) (citing Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000)), and,

therefore, to consider the copy of the Plan attached to J.C. Penney’s motion to dismiss, the Court

must give ten-days notice it is converting the motion to a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. 

(Id.) (citing Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1555 (11th Cir. 1987)).

In its reply, J.C. Penney cites cases explaining courts may consider a document attached

to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss without converting it to a motion for summary judgment “if

the attached document is (1) central to the plaintiff’s claim and (2) undisputed,” (that is, “the

authenticity of the document is not challenged”), Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir.

2005) (citing Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1134 (11th Cir. 2002)). (Doc. 15 at 2). The court

in Day also noted, “if the document’s contents are alleged in a complaint and no party questions

those contents, [a court] may consider such a document provided it meets the centrality

requirement imposed in Horsley.” 400 F.3d at 1276; accord Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799,

802 n.2 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[A] document central to the complaint that the defense appends to its

motion to dismiss is also properly considered, provided that its contents are not in dispute.”).

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges Plaintiff is “a participant in [] the J.C. Penney Corporation, 

Inc. Long Term Disability Plan,” which is administered by Liberty and falls “within the meaning 

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of Sec. 3(2)(a) of ERISA,” (doc. 1 at ¶ 4), and the complaint ultimately alleges Liberty violated 

obligations under ERISA, (id. at ¶ 29). Based on those allegations, whether the Plan falls under 

ERISA and is administered by defendants (and, as a result, the Plan itself) are central to the 

complaint. Plaintiff, although given the opportunity to respond to J.C. Penney’s motion to 

dismiss and attached summary description of the Plan, did not dispute the authenticity of the 

attached copy but instead argued the Court could not address it on a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 

14). Therefore, the summary description of the Plan attached to J.C. Penney’s motion to dismiss 

meets the requirements of Horsley, Day, and Harris, and may be considered on a motion to 

dismiss without converting the motion to one for summary judgment.

The question then becomes whether the attached document answers whether J.C. Penney

is a proper party. “Proof of who is the plan administrator may come from the plan document, but 

can also come from the factual circumstances surrounding the administration of the plan, even if 

these factual circumstances contradict the designation in the plan document.” Hamilton v. AllenBradley Co., 244 F.3d 819, 824 (11th Cir. 2001). 

The summary description of the Plan, attached to J.C. Penney’s motion, clearly states J.C. 

Penney is the “Plan Sponsor” and the Benefits Administration Committee is the “Plan 

Administrator.” (Doc. 11-1 at 20-21). The Benefits Administration Committee is defined in the 

Plan as “[a] committee appointed by J.C. Penney Corporation, Inc. to act as the Plan 

Administrator for the benefit plans and programs.” (Id. at 32). It is “the named fiduciary for the 

Disability Insurance option and has the authority to control, administer and manage the operation 

of the Disability Insurance option.” (Id. at 21). Under ERISA, the committee is a separate entity 

from J.C. Penney, separately subject to suit. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(d)(1) (“An employee 

benefit plan may sue or be sued under this subchapter as an entity.”); Rosen v. TRW, Inc., 979 

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F.2d 191, 192-93 & 194 n.2 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding a company properly dismissed where the 

plan designated an unincorporated committee as administrator under ERISA and the complaint 

did not allege the committee and company were alter egos); Boyer v. J. A. Majors Co. Emp. 

Profit Sharing Plan, 481 F. Supp. 454, 458 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (“[T]he Committee was an entity 

separate from the Company.”); Barrett v. Thorofare Markets, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 880, 884 (W.D. 

Pa. 1978) (“This court has no jurisdiction over the [non-party] Committee, which is an entity 

independent of either the union or [employer], and can sue or be sued in its own right.”) (citing 

29 U.S.C. §§ 1102, 1132(d)(1)). Under the Plan, the committee, as Plan Administrator, controls

and administers the operation of the Plan and, therefore, is the proper party defendant. See

Garren, 114 F.3d at 187 (“The proper party defendant in an action concerning ERISA benefits is 

the party that controls administration of the plan.”).

As for the circumstances surrounding administration of the Plan, the complaint 

conclusorily alleges J.C. Penney “is the ‘Plan Sponsor and Administrator’ of the Plan,” (doc. 1 at 

¶ 5), but the subsequent factual allegations state only that J.C. Penney “sponsored the disability 

insurance plan which was and is administered by Liberty for the J.C. Penney’s employee and 

plan participants,” (doc. 1 at ¶ 6). Even under “Count One,” the complaint only alleges Liberty’s 

refusal to pay, not J.C. Penney’s. (Id. at ¶ 29). As there are no allegations of factual 

circumstances surrounding the administration of the Plan indicating J.C. Penney is the actual 

administrator contrary to what is designated in the Plan, the court must rely on the Plan itself.

As the summary description of the Plan shows (and the complaint does not contradict), 

the Benefits Administration Committee is the Plan Administrator and named fiduciary for the 

Disability Insurance option, (doc. 11-1 at 21), and, therefore, subject to suit under ERISA; J.C. 

Penney, on the other hand, is Plan Sponsor and not subject to suit under ERISA. Based on the 

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facts alleged in the complaint and other documents properly considered on a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion to dismiss, J.C. Penney is an improper party to this action and the claims against it are 

due to be dismissed without prejudice. See Rosen, 979 F.2d at 194 (affirming dismissal of the 

company on the original complaint but finding the district court erred in denying a motion to 

amend the complaint asserting facts indicating the company was the de facto administrator).

III. Recommendation

Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS J.C. Penney’s motion to dismiss, (doc. 

11), be GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s claims against J.C. Penney be DISMISSED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE.

IV. Notice of Right to Object 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., any party may 

file specific written objections to this report and recommendation within fourteen (14) days from 

the date it is filed in the office of the Clerk. Failure to file written objections to the proposed 

findings and recommendations contained in this report and recommendation within fourteen (14) 

days from the date it is filed shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking the factual findings on 

appeal. Written objections shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings and 

recommendation to which objection is made and the specific basis for objection. A copy of the 

objections must be served upon all other parties to the action. 

DONE this 5th day of November 2014.

_______________________________

JOHN H. ENGLAND, III

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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