Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_00-cv-02554/USCOURTS-casd-3_00-cv-02554-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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00CV2554

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SOMBOON TIMME PHAYMANY,

Petitioner,

v.

DON TAYLOR,

Respondent.

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Civil No. 00-CV-2554-L(NLS)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION;

OVERRULING OBJECTIONS;

DENYING AMENDED PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS;

DIRECTING ENTRY OF

JUDGMENT

On December 20, 2000, petitioner Somboon Timme Phaymany (“petitioner”), a state

prisoner proceeding pro se, filed this action seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. The Court previously adopted the magistrate judge’s Report and

Recommendation (“Report”) and denied respondent’s motion to dismiss and granted petitioner

leave to file an amended pleading that would set forth only properly exhausted claims, i.e.,

petitioner’s claims one and two, and to add a sufficiency of the evidence claim that has been

exhausted. See Order filed September 19, 2001 [doc. #12].

On October 23, 2001, petitioner filed his amended petition for writ of habeas corpus [doc.

#13] alleging three claims. Respondents filed their Answer on January 9, 2002 [doc. #19]. On

May 31, 2002, petitioner filed his Traverse. The magistrate judge then entered a second Report

recommending that petitioner’s amended petition be denied. Although the parties were

permitted to file objections to the R&R, neither party submitted any objection to the R&R, nor

Case 3:00-cv-02554-L-NLS Document 69 Filed 01/09/07 Page 1 of 8
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1 The Court granted a certificate of appealability with respect to petitioner’s

confrontation clause claim only.

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requested an extension of time in which to do so. The Court adopted the findings of the second

Report on November 4, 2002 [doc. #35], and thereafter, judgment was entered [doc. #36]. 

Petitioner’s appealed and the Court denied in part and granted in part petitioner’s request for a

Certificate of Appealability on February 27, 2003 [doc. #42] with respect to petitioner’s three

claims.1

 

On April 30, 2003, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted

petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel [doc. #45] and attorney Benjamin P. Lechman

was appointed [doc. #44]. The Ninth Circuit also found that the seventh claim in petitioner’s

original Petition had been exhausted. The seventh claim alleges that petitioner’s conviction for

attempted premeditated murder on a vicarious liability theory of premeditation violated, inter

alia, federal due process. Accordingly, the seventh claim was remanded to the district court for

the limited purpose of considering the seventh claim on the merits.

Petitioner filed a supplemental memorandum, and respondent filed a supplemental

answer. The magistrate judge then filed a Report recommending that habeas relief as to claim

seven alleged in the original Petition be denied. Petitioner filed an objection to the Report.

Standard of Review

The duty of the district court in connection with a magistrate judge’s Report and

Recommendation in habeas cases such as this is set forth in Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). When objection is made, the Court must make a de

novo determination as to those parts objected to. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676,

100 S. Ct. 2406, 2412-13 (1980). When no objections are filed, the Court may assume the

correctness of the magistrate judge’s findings of fact and decide the motion on the applicable

law. Campbell v. United States Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974); see also Pizarro

v. Bartlett, 776 F. Supp. 815, 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Nelson v. Smith, 618 F.Supp. 1186, 1189

(S.D.N.Y. 1985). Under such circumstances, the Ninth Circuit has held that “a failure to file

objections only relieves the trial court of its burden to give de novo review to factual findings;

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conclusions of law must still be reviewed de novo.” Barilla v. Ervin, 886 F.2d 1514, 1518 (9th

Cir. 1989) (citing Britt v. Simi Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 708 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir. 1983)).

Petitioner’s Seventh Claim

Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated when the trial court refused

his proposed jury instruction that provided petitioner “must personally premeditate a killing in

order to be found guilty of willful, deliberate and premeditated murder.” (Petition at 14). In

other words, petitioner argues that personal willful, deliberate and premeditated intent is an

element of the crime of attempted premeditated murder. Petitioner further argues that even if

vicarious liability for premeditated murder is permissible, the jury did not find that anyone

involved with the murders acted with premeditation and accordingly, premeditation cannot be

imputed to him. Lastly, petitioner asserts that federal due process precludes conviction unless it

is proven that he personally achieved the mental state of attempted premeditated murder. Id. at

17.

Respondent argues, however, that personal deliberation and premeditation are not

elements of the crime and therefore, the prosecution was not required to prove petitioner

personally premeditated the attempted murders. Further, respondent contends that no federal

law provides that due process requires personal deliberation for attempted premeditated murder. 

At issue here is California Penal Code section 664(a) which provides:

If the crime attempted is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, the

person guilty of the attempt shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison

for one-half the term of imprisonment prescribed upon a conviction of the offense

attempted. However, if the crime attempted is willful, deliberate, and

premeditated murder, as defined in Section 189, the person guilty of that attempt

shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of

parole. If the crime attempted is any other one in which the maximum sentence is

life imprisonment or death, the person guilty of the attempt shall be punished by

imprisonment in the state prison for five, seven, or nine years. The additional term

provided in this section for attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder

shall not be imposed unless the fact that the attempted murder was wilful,

deliberate, and premeditated is charged in the accusatory pleading and admitted

or found to be true by the trier of fact.

Cal. Penal Code section 664(a)(emphasis added). 

Petitioner was convicted of ten counts of attempted, willful and premeditated murder and 

was sentenced to two life terms with the possibility of parole plus two years.

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Petitioner’s Objections to the Report

As noted above, petitioner has filed objections to the Report of the magistrate judge in

which he essentially re-argues the points made in his supplemental memorandum. Petitioner

contends that personal willful, deliberate and premeditated intent is a required mental state and

an element of the crime of attempted murder. Petitioner contends that although section 664(a)

can be read to impute liability upon a co-conspirator or aider and abettor who did not

premeditate the attempted murder, “it could just as easily be read to require personal

premeditation.” (Objections at 2). Notwithstanding petitioner’s belief to the contrary, People v.

Lee, 31 Cal. 4th 613 (2003), forecloses this argument. The California Supreme Court concluded

that “section 664(a), properly must be interpreted to require only that the murder attempted was

willful, deliberate, and premeditated, but not to require that an attempted murderer personally

acted willfully and with deliberation and premeditation, even if he or she is guilty as an aider

and abettor.” Lee 31 Ca. 4th at 616 (emphasis added). The Lee Court continued the analysis:

To begin with, as a substantive matter section 664(a) requires only that the murder

attempted was willful, deliberate, and premeditated for an attempted murderer to

be punished with life imprisonment. . . . Put otherwise, section 664(a) states that if

the murder attempted was willful, deliberate, and premeditated, any “person guilty

of that attempt” – not confined to persons who acted willfully and with

deliberation and premeditation – “shall be punished by imprisonment . . . for life. .

. . Referring three times broadly and generally to “the person guilty” of attempted

murder, section 664(a) not once distinguishes between an attempted murderer who

is guilty as a direct perpetrator and an attempted murderer who is guilty as an aider

and abettor, and not once requires of an attempted murderer personal willfulness,

deliberation, and premeditation. Had the Legislature intended to draw a

distinction between direct perpetrators and aiders and abettors, it certainly could

have done so expressly. 

Lee, 31 Cal. 4th at 621-22. 

In attempting to distinguish the facts, petitioner contends that in Lee there was a finding

by the jury that someone, a charged or uncharged co-conspirator, premeditated the attempted

murder, because attempted murder requires the specific intent to kill, and that is not the case

here. Although attempted murder requires the specific intent to kill and the commission of a

direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing, “to be guilty of a crime as

an aider and abetter, a person must “aid[] the [direct] perpetrator by acts or encourage[] him [or

her] by words or gestures.” Lee at 623(emphasis in original) (quoting People v. Villa, 156 Cal.

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2 See Report at 17-18 for discussion of the evidence in the record that demonstrates

that the attempted murders were willful, deliberate and premeditated. 

5 00CV2554

App. 2d 128, 134 (1957). Petitioner’s argument that “to be convicted of the specific intent crime

of attempted murder, the prosecution would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr.

Phaymany had a specific intent beyond that of the principal. In other words, for a specific intent

crime, it must be proved that the defendant had the purpose to effectuate every element of the

completed offense” is not supportable. (Objection at 4)(emphasis in original). As the Lee court

further discussed: “to be guilty of attempted murder as an aider and abettor, a person must give

aid or encouragement with knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s intent to kill and with the

purpose of facilitating the direct perpetrator’s accomplishment of the intended killing . . . .” Lee

at 624. As the Lee court noted, personal willfulness, deliberation and personal premeditation is

not an element of the crime of attempted murder; rather, the murder attempted must be willful,

deliberate, and premediated. Notwithstanding petitioner’s argument, Lee is controlling and must

be applied here.

Moreover, as the Court in Spivey v. Rocha, 194 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 1999) pointed out:

We further explained in People v. Croy [citation omitted] that the “aider and

abettor need not have intended to encourage or facilitate the particular offense

ultimately committed by the perpetrator. His knowledge that an act which is

criminal was intended, and his action taken with the intent that the act be

encouraged or facilitated, are sufficient to impose liability on him for any

reasonably foreseeable offense committed as a consequence by the perpetrator. It

is the intent to encourage and bring about conduct that is criminal, not the

specific intent that is the element of the target offense, which Beeman holds

must be found by the jury.

Spivey, 194 F.3d at 976 (emphasis added).

Petitioner also objects to the Report’s conclusion that there was a jury finding that the

attempted murders were committed with premeditation. As petitioner notes, “[c]learly, there

was no jury finding that Mr. Phaymany personally premeditated the [attempted] murders.” As

discussed above, there is no requirement that petitioner personally premeditate the attempted

murders under Lee. Nevertheless, the magistrate judge found that the record supported the jury’s

finding that the attempted murders were willful, deliberate and premeditated based on the

evidence contained within the record.2

 Having reviewed the evidence presented, the Court

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concurs with the magistrate judge in finding support in the record for finding the attempted

murders were willful, deliberate and premeditated.

Finally, petitioner objects to the Report’s conclusion that his conviction satisfied due

process under the federal constitution. Petitioner contends that the state court’s refusal to give

his proposed jury instruction requiring the prosecutor to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

petitioner personally premeditated the attempted murders reflects federal constitutional error. 

The basis of this argument is that the given jury instructions allowed petitioner to be found guilty

of attempted murder based on another’s intent. Moreover, because there was no specific jury

finding as to any other person’s intent, due process was violated. But as the Report notes, “in

order for Petitioner to succeed on his claim that his federal due process rights were violated, he

must demonstrate that California law, which permits vicarious liability with regard to the

premeditation requirement of attempted premeditated murder, violates federal due process.” 

(Report at 19). 

The Report relies upon Spivey v. Rocha, where the Ninth Circuit considered a similar

argument to that made by petitioner. 194 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 1999). Spivey argued that due

process was violated because he was able to be convicted of second degree murder absent

California’s statutory requirement of malice aforethought, based upon no greater criminal intent

on his part than to commit a misdemeanor brandishing. Id. at 977. As the Court noted: “The

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ‘protects the accused against conviction

except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with

which he is charged,’” Id. Spivey contended that the California jury instruction “relieved the

prosecution of its burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Spivey had the requisite

mental state to satisfy the elements of the crime of second degree murder, in particular the

element of malice aforethought.” Id. As the Spivey court noted: “In order to challenge a jury

instruction on habeas, the [petitioner] must prove that ‘the ailing instruction by itself so infected

the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.’” Id., at 976 (quoting Estelle v.

McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475 (1991).

The Spivey court concluded that with respect to aider and abettor liability, that “[i]t is the

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intent to encourage and bring about conduct that is criminal, not the specific intent that is the

element of the target offense, which [state law] holds must be found by the jury.” Id. (quoting

People v. Beardslee, 53 Cal 3d 68, 90 (1991). The Spivey court found that the jury instruction at

issue was consistent with California law, and the instruction was not violative of federal due

process. 

Here, because the requested instruction petitioner sought was not required under state

law, and the failure to give the instruction did not “so infect[] the entire trial [with fundamental

unfairness] that the resulting conviction violates due process,” federal due process has not be

violated. See Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)(quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414

U.S. 141, 147 (1973)). 

Conclusion

The Court has independently reviewed the Report, all relevant papers submitted by both

parties, and petitioner’s objections to the Report and finds that the Report presents a thorough,

well-reasoned analysis of the issues presented. Moreover, in neither his supplemental brief nor

his objections to the Report does petitioner provide legal citation that would cause the Report to

be rejected. Petitioner has failed to distinguish the California Supreme Court’s decision in

People v. Lee and has not demonstrated that federal due process is violated by California’s rule

of law. 

The reasoning and findings contained in the Report and Recommendation are hereby

ADOPTED in their entirety and petitioner’s objections are OVERRULED. Accordingly, IT IS

ORDERED denying petitioner’s seventh claim for relief found in the original petition for writ

of habeas corpus. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to enter

judgment in accordance with this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 9, 2007

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

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COPY TO: 

HON. NITA L. STORMES

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

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