Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01900/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01900-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DIANE BEALL, FKA TEMPLIN

Plaintiff,

v.

QUALITY LOAN SERVICE CORP.;

ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B.; DOES 1-10,

Defendants.

 

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Case No.: 10-CV-1900 (AJB) (WVG)

ORDER GRANTING ONEWEST BANK,

F.S.B.’S MOTION TO DISMISS,

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE

RESPONSE, AND DENYING AS MOOT

QUALITY LOAN’S EX PARTE MOTION

FOR ORDER EXCUSING QUALITY

FROM FURTHER PARTICIPATION

[Doc. Nos. 42, 46, and 37, respectively]

Before the Court is Defendant OneWest Bank, F.S.B.’s (“OneWest”) Motion to Dismiss

pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) [Doc. No. 42] and Plaintiff’s Motion for

Extension of Time to File Response [Doc. No. 46]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants

OneWest’s Motion to Dismiss and denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time. 

A. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME

On June 29, 2011, Plaintiff’s attorney, Garry Harre, filed an Emergency Motion for Extension of

Time to File Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and for Continuance of Hearing Because of Medical

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Condition of Attorney Garry Harre. [Doc. No. 46.] According to Plaintiff’s motion, Mr. Harre has been

suffering from a serious medical condition and asks that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss “not be granted

until Plaintiff is given time to file an Opposition and be heard on the merits of the case with an

Opposition considered by the Court or given an opportunity to retain new counsel and that Plaintiff be

granted leave to Amend the Complaint.” [Id. at 2.] Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a response in

opposition to OneWest’s Motion to Dismiss on her own behalf. Plaintiff is an attorney licensed by the

state of California who was initially proceeding pro se and thereafter substituted Mr. Harre as counsel. 

Plaintiff informed the Court’s law clerk that, although she had filed an opposition, she would still like a

continuance in order to acquire a new attorney. 

Having considered Plaintiff’s request along with the procedural history in this case, the Court is

disinclined to prolong this case further in order for Plaintiff to acquire a new attorney. Plaintiff’s

attorney drafted her Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) and Plaintiff, an attorney herself, filed an

opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. The Court has all of the documentation necessary in order to

consider the sufficiency of the SAC. Plaintiff, an attorney licensed by the state of California, filed this

action pro se initially and thereafter substituted Mr. Harre as counsel. Judge Gonzalez pointed out the

deficiencies in Plaintiff’s previous complaint and offered Plaintiff the opportunity to remedy those

deficiencies through amendment. However, as discussed more fully below, the SAC suffers from the

same deficiencies. Judge Gonzalez’s order expressly stated that should Plaintiff’s SAC fail to remedy

these deficiencies, her claims would be dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff has twice now had the

opportunity to cure the defects in her complaint in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and has been

unable to do so. At this point, granting Plaintiff a continuance would simply serve to prejudice the

Defendants by prolonging this matter when it does not appear that Plaintiff can successfully remedy her

complaint. 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time to File a

Response (Doc. No. 46). 

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1

On February 20, 2011, in response to the FAC, Defendant Quality filed a declaration of

nonmonetary status under CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924l as the trustee under the Deed of Trust. [Doc. No. 17]

On March 07, 2011, Plaintiff filed their objection to the declaration. [Doc. No. 27.] However, this

objection was filed after the statutorily imposed deadline of fifteen days and Quality filed an ex parte

motion for an order excusing it from further participation. [Doc. No. 37.] Inasmuch as this order

dismisses the entirety of the case, OneWest’s ex parte motion is DENIED AS MOOT. 

3 10cv1900

B. DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Unless otherwise specified, the following facts are drawn from the Plaintiff’s SAC. [Doc. No.

39.]

In July of 2003, Plaintiff entered a mortgage loan transaction with IndyMac Bank, F.S.B.

(“IndyMac”), to purchase a single-family residence in Lake Elsinore, California. The loan was secured

by a Deed of Trust on the property. On June 8, 2008, IndyMac went into Receivership with the Federal

Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”). On March 19, 2009, the FDIC, as receiver for IndyMac

transferred the servicing rights of Plaintiff’s loan to OneWest. Plaintiff alleges that OneWest only

received the servicing rights on her loan and not the underlying debt obligation. 

Defendant Quality Loan Service Corp. (Quality) recorded a Notice of Default on May 25, 2010.

On July 7, 2010, a Substitution of Trustee was recorded, substituting Quality for First American Title

Insurance Company as Trustee under the Deed of Trust. [Doc. No. 42-2.] On August 27, 2010, Quality

filed a Notice of Trustee’s Sale and scheduled a foreclosure sale for September 17, 2010. [Doc. No. 42-

2.] 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit pro se on September 13, 2010 against Defendant OneWest, the

purported current beneficiary of the loan, and Defendant Quality, the purported current trustee. The

original Complaint alleged twenty causes of actions, and included a motion for a temporary restraining

order and preliminary injunction, requesting the Court to enjoin the scheduled foreclosure sale, which

the Court denied.1

 [Doc. No. 4]

On January 10, 2011, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”), alleging ten causes of

actions. [Doc. No. 15.] One West moved to dismiss the FAC. [Doc. No. 16.] The Court granted the

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2

 While the cover page of the SAC lists a sixth cause of action as Wrongful Conveyance,

Plaintiff’s substantive discussion never addresses this claim. Therefore the Court will not consider the

sixth cause of action listed on the cover page as it was not substantively pled within the body of the

SAC.

3

 Throughout Plaintiff’s SAC, Plaintiff appears to allege wrongdoing by other additional parties,

though she has neither named those parties as Defendants nor served them with any documents related

to this Action. The Court will not consider allegations against non-parties except insofar as the

allegations are relevant to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants.

4 10cv1900

motion to dismiss with prejudice in regards to some claims and without prejudice in regards to the

others. [Doc. No. 36.] The Court granted Plaintiff twenty days to amend her complaint in order to

remedy the deficiencies identified in the order. The order further stated that should Plaintiff’s SAC fail

to remedy these deficiencies, her claims would be dismissed with prejudice.

On April 09, 2011, Plaintiff filed her SAC alleging five causes of action2 that were dismissed

without prejudice in the Court’s previous order: (1) Quiet Title, (2) Violation of the Real Estate

Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”) § 2605, (3) Fraud, (4) Violation of the Truth in Lending Act

(“TILA”) 15 U.S.C. § 1641, and (5) Violation of California Civil Code §17200, against OneWest,

Quality, and unnamed Doe Defendants 1-10.3

 [Doc. No. 39.] OneWest moved to dismiss the SAC. 

[Doc. No. 42.] 

LEGAL STANDARD

i. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(6); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2001). The court must accept all factual

allegations pleaded in the complaint as true, and must construe them and draw all reasonable inferences

from them in favor of the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th

Cir.1996). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations,

rather, it must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

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misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ––– U.S. ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Twombly,

550 U.S. at 556).

However, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires

more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not

do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)) (alteration in

original). A court need not accept “legal conclusions” as true. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. In spite of the

deference the court is bound to pay to the plaintiff's allegations, it is not proper for the court to assume

that “the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged or that defendants have violated the ...

laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State

Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely

consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of

entitlement to relief.’” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

ii. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)

Fraud claims must satisfy the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b). A claim of fraud must

have the following elements: “(a) a misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or

nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d)

justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” In re Estate of Young, 160 Cal. App. 4th 62, 79

(2008) (quoting Lazar v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 4th 631, 638 (1996) (internal quotation marks

omitted)). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires that each of these elements be pleaded with

particularity. The Ninth Circuit has “interpreted Rule 9(b) to mean that the pleader must state the time,

place and specific content of the false representations as well as the identities of the parties to the

misrepresentation.” Alan Neuman Prods., Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388, 1392-93 (9th Cir. 1988).

Averments of fraud must be accompanied by the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the

misconduct charged. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation

omitted). Additionally, “the plaintiff must plead facts explaining why the statement was false when it

was made.” Smith v. Allstate Ins. Co., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1152 (S.D. Cal. 2001) (citation omitted);

see In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1549 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (superseded by statute

on other grounds).

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4

 In her response to OneWest’s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff argues that she need not allege

tender in this instance because she is also alleging a violation of California Civil Code § 2923.5(a)(2). 

Inasmuch as Plaintiff’s section 2923.5 claim was dismissed with prejudice in the Court’s previous order

dismissing the FAC, the Court need not address the merit of Plaintiff’s contention.

6 10cv1900

PLAINTIFF’S CAUSES OF ACTIONS

i. Quiet Title 

The purpose of a quiet title action is to determine “all conflicting claims to the property in

controversy and to decree to each such interest or estate therein as he may be entitled to.” Newman v.

Cornelius, 83 Cal. Rptr. 435, 437 (Ct. App. 1970); Cal. Civ. P. Code § 760.020(a). California law

requires “a plaintiff seeking to quiet title in the face of a foreclosure [to] allege tender or an offer of

tender of the amount borrowed.” Mangindin v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 637 F. Supp. 2d 700, 712 (N.D. Cal.

2009) (citing Arnolds Mgmt. Corp. v. Eischen, 158 Cal. App. 3d 575, 578 (1984)); Manown v. CalWestern Reconveyance Corp., 2009 WL 2406335, at *6 (S.D. Ca. Aug. 4, 2009). 

In the Court’s previous order dismissing Plaintiff’s FAC, the Court noted that Plaintiff failed to

allege she is able or willing to tender the underlying debt, but gave Plaintiff leave to amend her

Complaint to cure this defect. [Doc. No. 36.] However, Plaintiff’s SAC also fails to allege she is able

or willing to tender the underlying debt.4

 Seeing as this was Plaintiff’s third failed attempt to properly

plead a claim to quiet title, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s first cause of action for Quiet Title with

prejudice. 

ii. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2605 et seq. 

Plaintiff’s SAC alleges a violation of RESPA and implies a another violation. First, Plaintiff

alleges that OneWest failed to properly respond to a Qualified Written Request (“QWR”), in violation of

§ 2605(e). Second, though not directly stated, she alleges that “Defendants”received money and or

things of value for referrals of settlement service business related to her loan and “conspired to

overcharge for various ‘services’ and ‘fees.’” [SAC ¶¶ 65-71.]

Plaintiff’s first RESPA claim alleges that she sent a QWR on January 4, 2010 to Defendant

“OneWest c/o IndyMac Mortgage Services.” She claims she only received an “acknowledgment letter”

in response but not any other responses to her QWR. [Id. ¶¶ 62-64.] Plaintiff also claims that on May

13, 2010 she mailed a Notice of Rescission, Demand for Validation, and CA Civil Code Demand to

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OneWest. [Id. ¶ 65] On May 25, 2010, OneWest responded by declining her request to rescind the

loan. [Id.¶ 69.] Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants engaged in a pattern or practice of non-compliance”

with 12 U.S.C. § 2605, by failing to provide her with requested information, make corrections to her

account, or explain why OneWest thought the account was correct. . .. [Id. ¶¶ 66, 71.]

Plaintiff’s RESPA claim in her FAC was dismissed for failure to attach copies of her QWR thus 

not showing statements identifying the reasons why a borrower believes her account is in error. 12

U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B). It was also dismissed for failure to state facts showing how OneWest’s alleged

failure to respond to her QWR caused her to incur actual damages. Plaintiff’s current SAC fails to

amend these defects cited by Judge Gonzalez. 

Plaintiff’s SAC claims to have attached a true and correct copy of said QWR letter as Exhibit F.

[SAC, FN 18.] However, Exhibit F is actually a response letter from OneWest stating they are not

required to furnish beneficiary statements unless the request was made before the recording of a notice

of default or within two months after the recording of the notice of default and describes the enclosed

Executed Note that was signed by the parties. [Exhibit F.] Plaintiff has not provided copies of the

QWR to the Court, nor has she described the contents of the alleged QWR. A QWR should include

statements identifying the reasons why the borrower believes her account is in error. 12 U.S.C. §

2605(e)(1)(B). The SAC does not describe any such statements in her QWR; it merely notes the

purported titles of the documents. 

Additionally, Plaintiff has again failed to state facts showing how OneWest’s failure to respond

to her QWR caused her to incur damages. See 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(1)(A) (“Whoever fails to comply

with this section shall be liable to the borrower . . . [for] any actual damages to the borrower as a result

of the failure.”) (emphasis added); Rosenfeld v, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d 952, 967

(“[A]lleging a breach of RESPA duties alone does not state a claim under RESPA. Plaintiff must, at a

minimum, also allege that the breach resulted in actual damages.”); Lawther v. Onewest Bank, 2010 WL

4936797, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2010) (“It is the plaintiff’s pleading obligation to ‘point to some

colorable relationship between his injury and the actions or omissions that allegedly violated RESPA.’”)

(quoting Allen v. United Fin. Mortg. Corp., 2010 WL 1135787, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2010));

Caravantes v. Cal. Reconveyance Co., 2010 WL 4055560, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2010) (“To recover

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actual damages under 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(1)(A), . . . a plaintiff must state allegations demonstrating

pecuniary loss.”). The SAC contains the same statement as the FAC, that “as a direct and proximate

result of Defendants’ failure to comply with RESPA, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer

damages and costs of suit.” [SAC ¶ 72, FAC ¶ 102.] This statement was found to be insufficient when

the Court dismissed her FAC and it remains insufficient in her SAC. 

For these reasons, the Court dismisses this claim with prejudice insomuch as this is the third time

Plaintiff has now raised and failed to sufficiently plead this claim. 

In Plaintiff’s second RESPA claim, Plaintiff alleges that unspecified Defendants “received

money and/or things of value for referrals of settlement service business related to the Subject Loan, in

addition to charging Plaintiff for services that were never rendered.” [SAC ¶ 71]. Such a claim arises

under 12 U.S.C. § 2607. Like the FAC, the SAC does not contain any specific facts related to this

claim. Previously, Judge Gonzalez noted that Plaintiff failed to specify “which Defendant charged what

fees or referred service business in exchange for something of value.” [Doc. No. 46.] Plaintiff has not

remedied this defect in the SAC. Without this information, the Court finds that Plaintiff does not

provide either Defendant enough “notice of the particular misconduct.. . so that they can defend against

the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.” Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317

F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Once again, Plaintiff’s

bare legal conclusions with no factual support are insufficient to state a claim under § 2607. Gumbs v.

Litton Loan Servicing, 2010 WL 1992199, at *7-8 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2010). Thus, the Court dismisses

this claim with prejudice. 

iii. Fraud

Under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, allegations of fraud or mistake must be

stated “with particularity.” Within the Ninth Circuit, this rule “has been interpreted to mean the pleader

must state the time, place, and specific content of the false representations, as well as the identities of

the parties to the misrepresentation.” Misc. Serv. Workers, Drivers & Helpers v. Philco-Ford Corp.,

661 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9t Cir. 1981) (citations omitted); see also Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317

F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that “averments of fraud must be accompanied by the who,

what, when, where, and how of the misconduct charged”). Furthermore, “[w]here multiple defendants

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are asked to respond to allegations of fraud, the complaint must inform each defendant of his alleged

participation in the fraud.” Ricon v. Ricontrust Co., 2009 WL 2407396, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009).

“In the context of a fraud suit involving multiple defendants, a plaintiff must, at a minimum, ‘identif[y]

the role of [each] defendant[] in the alleged fraudulent scheme.’” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756,

765 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 541 (9th Cir.

1989)). 

Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants made several representations . . . regarding material facts

concerning a corporate assignment and beneficial ownership of her note . . ..” [SAC ¶ 73.] She claims

that Defendant’s defrauded her by representing they had a beneficial interest in the Note and the Deed of

Trust and related ability to accept loan payments and to foreclose on her home. Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants knew or should have known they had no such interests and were making false representations. [SAC ¶¶ 73-78.] Plaintiff claims that these representations induced her to make monthly

payments in connection with the Subject Loan. [Id. ¶ 79.] 

Plaintiff does not satisfy Rule 9(b)’s specificity requirement nor the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Rule 9. She fails to specify which Defendant - OneWest or Quality - made what representations

or to which Defendant she submitted payment. The SAC fails to provide adequate notice to either

Defendants regarding their alleged misconduct such that they can defend themselves against her

charges. Additionally, in arguing OneWest is not the beneficiary of her Deed of Trust, Plaintiff

points to

the FDIC’s response to her request under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) for information

related to her loan. [SAC ¶¶ 46, 47.] In its response, the FDIC indicated that the servicing of the loan

described in Plaintiff’s FOIA request was transferred to OneWest Bank, FSB. [SAC ¶ 47.] Assuming

Plaintiff made some payments toward her loan after January 21, 2010, it is difficult to see

how payments to the servicer of her loan constitute damages; collecting monthly payments is one of

the primary functions of a loan servicer. “‘[F]raud without damage is not actionable’ because it fails to

state a cause of action. Furia v. Helm, 111 Cal. App. 4th 945, 956 (2003) (quoting Billings v. Farm

Development Co., 74 Cal. App. 254, 259 (1925)). Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s fraud

claim with prejudice.

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iv. Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200

Plaintiff’s UCL claims are predicated upon her allegations of fraud and violations of federal

lending laws. [SAC ¶¶ 93-95.] Where those claims are deficient, Plaintiff’s UCL claims also fail. See

Singh v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2009 WL 2365881, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (dismissing a UCL claim

predicated on other failed claims). As discussed above (regarding RESPA) and below (regarding

TILA), Plaintiff fails to state a claim under federal lending laws. Therefore, she also fails to state a

derivative UCL claim. 

Plaintiff’s UCL claim predicated upon her fraud claim must also fail. To state a claim under the

UCL, Plaintiff must allege actual damages. See In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298, 314 (2009)

(“[A] private person has standing to sue [under the UCL] only if he or she ‘has suffered injury in fact

and has lost money or property as a result of such unfair competition.’”) (quoting CAL. BUS. & PROF.

CODE § 17204)). As discussed above regarding servicing rights, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege

damages resulting from any alleged fraud. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s UCL claim is dismissed with

prejudice.

v. Violation of Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1641

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g)(1) by failing to provide a Notice of

New Creditor within thirty days after the FDIC purportedly transferred ownership to OneWest as

required by TILA. [SAC ¶¶ 108-109.] Plaintiff does not assert how OneWest’s failure to provide a

Notice of New Creditor caused her to incur actual damages. 

While Plaintiff alleges OneWest violated TILA, she does not allege any actual damage she

incurred as a result of the violation. A creditor that fails to comply with any requirement imposed under

§ 1641(g)(1) only faces liability for “any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of the

failure.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1) (discussing civil liability) (emphasis added). Moreover, “in the

case of an individual action,” damages are limited to “twice the amount of any finance charge in

connection with the transaction” and, in cases involving real property, “not less than $400 or greater

than $4,000.” Id. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i), (iv). Plaintiff has not alleged any actual damages or finance

charges related to OneWest’s failure to provide the notice of assignment required under § 1641(g)(1).

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K:\COMMON\BATTAGLI\DJ CASES\Odd Numbers - Sarah's Cases\Beall\ACTUAL - MTD Order.wpd 11 10cv1900

This is the third time Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead a violation of TILA claim, therefore

this Court dismisses this claim with prejudice. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, it is ORDERED that Defendant OneWest’s Motion to Dismiss,

[Doc. No. 42,] be, and it hereby is, GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims be, and

they hereby are, DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, as any further amendment is futile at this point. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 15, 2011

Hon. Anthony J. Battaglia

U.S. District Judge

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