Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_13-cv-00222/USCOURTS-alnd-2_13-cv-00222-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 15:2(a) Fair Labor Standards Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

GRADY L. BAKER,

Plaintiff,

v.

SUPREME BEVERAGE 

COMPANY, INC.,

Defendant.

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Civil Action Number

2:13-cv-00222-AKK

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Grady Baker, an African-American, pursues this lawsuit against his former 

employer, Supreme Beverage Company, Inc. (“SBC”). Doc. 1. Grady alleges that 

during his employment, SBC denied him overtime pay, subjected him to a racially 

hostile work environment, and subsequently discharged him in retaliation for his 

complaints about overtime and/or because of his race. Id. Accordingly, Baker 

pursues claims for alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 

U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Before the court is SBC’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment, doc. 36, which, for the reasons stated below, is due to be 

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FILED

 2014 Dec-15 PM 03:11

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:13-cv-00222-AKK Document 58 Filed 12/15/14 Page 1 of 26
granted.

1 At this juncture, however, the court notes that Baker’s strongest claims is

the hostile work environment claim. According to Baker, he was subjected 

repeatedly to racially offensive language by one of his co-workers and a 

supervisor. Doc. 38-1 at 81, 89, 91-92. Unfortunately for Baker, because he never 

complained about the alleged conduct, despite receiving SBC’s anti-harassment 

policy, doc. 38-1 at 90, 91, 157, 167; doc. 38-3 at 12, there is no relief available to 

him against SBC for the alleged conduct, see Coates v. Sundor Brands, Inc., 164 

F.3d 1361, 1366 (11th Cir. 1999).While Baker may think this is a harsh result, as 

the Eleventh Circuit has noted regarding workplace harassment:

We are not unmindful of the enormous difficulties involved in lodging 

complaints about discrimination in the workplace, including 

complaints of . . . harassment. We also recognize the great 

psychological burden it places on one who is already the victim of 

harassment to require that person to complicate further his or her life 

with the ramifications, both legal and otherwise, of making a 

complaint. Federal law has now attempted to correct the problem of 

workplace discrimination, but it cannot be done without the 

cooperation of the victims, notwithstanding that it may be difficult for 

them to make such efforts. When an employer has taken steps, such as 

promulgating a considered [anti-]harassment policy, to prevent . . . 

harassment in the workplace, an employee must provide adequate 

notice that the employer’s directives have been breached so that the 

employer has the opportunity to correct the problem.

1 Also before the court is SBC’s motion to strike portions of Baker’s affidavit that are allegedly inconsistent with his 

deposition testimony. Doc. 56. Except for paragraphs 24 through 26 and 28 of the affidavit, doc. 51-1 at 5-6, which 

Baker concedes are due to be stricken, and are STRICKEN, the court DENIES the motion because the remaining 

paragraphs in contention ultimately have no impact on the court’s summary judgment decision. 

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Id. Therefore, despite evidence of clear severe and pervasive racial harassment in 

this case, as explained more fully below, the hostile work environment claim also 

fails due to Baker’s failure to utilize SBC’s complaint procedure. 

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary

judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” To support 

a summary judgment motion, the parties must cite to “particular parts of materials 

in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, 

affidavits or declarations, stipulations, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other 

materials.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). Moreover, “Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of 

summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a 

party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden 

of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving 

party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material 

fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who is required to 

“go beyond the pleadings” to establish that there is a “genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 

324 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A dispute about a material fact 

is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for 

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the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

The court must construe the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it 

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 

398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (all justifiable 

inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party’s favor). However, “mere 

conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a 

summary judgment motion.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 

2005) (per curiam) (citing Bald Mountain Park, Ltd. v. Oliver, 863 F.2d 1560, 

1563 (11th Cir. 1989)). Furthermore, “[a] mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting 

the opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing 

that the jury could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 

1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This action arises from Baker’s employment as a delivery truck driver for 

SBC. Below are the relevant facts for summary judgment purposes with all 

reasonable doubts resolved in favor of Baker, organized as they relate to (a) the

alleged unpaid wages and retaliatory discharge and (b) the alleged discrimination 

and harassment. 

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A. Baker’s employment and discharge

From May 6, 2010 until June 18, 2012, Baker worked as a delivery truck 

driver for SBC, a wholesale beverage distributor that sells and delivers primarily 

beer and energy drinks to restaurants and retail outlets in Alabama. Doc. 38-30 at 

1; doc. 38-31 at 2. Baker describes that, on a regular workday, his position required 

that he arrive at SBC’s warehouse at 5:30 a.m., obtain an invoice that details the 

items on his truck (shrink-wrapped pallets of beverages), count the items (which 

SBC’s warehouse personnel would load onto the truck the preceding workday), 

confirm that the items in the truck match those on the invoice, and deliver the 

items on the truck to the appropriate “customer stops.” Doc. 38-1 at 16. Once he 

completed his stops for the day, Baker would return to the warehouse and “check 

in” to account for payment or returned product. Id. at 24. If a driver could not 

complete his stops,2 SBC’s policy required that he “let management know,” get a 

forklift driver to unload the truck, wait until “someone in management comes over 

and checks [to make] sure all the beer is there, and then the driver . . . takes the 

pink ticket copy [of the invoice] upstairs in the warehouse to the check up lady.” 

Doc. 51-1 at 6. The “check up lady” would then call management in the warehouse 

“to be sure the pallet of product is actually there,” “the pallet is then re-keyed to 

produce another invoice with changed route and date,” and the undelivered order 

2 Typical reasons for returning a stop include situations where a customer refused the order or canceled part of the 

order, or where the driver did not deliver items at a previously designated delivery time. Doc. 38-1 at 24; doc. 38-26 

at 8. 

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typically gets “[rolled] over to the next day.” Id. Baker performed these duties 

generally until June 18, 2012, when SBC discharged Baker for purportedly failing 

to complete his deliveries on the prior workday, June 15, 2012. Doc. 38-1 at 2.

Baker, on the other hand, claims that retaliatory animus motivated his discharge—

specifically that his supervisors “were out to get [him]” because he demanded 

overtime wages on June 15, 2012 and on multiple previous occasions. Doc. 38-1 at 

117; doc. 51-1 at 3. 

Turning to the events of June 15, 2012, when Baker arrived at work at 5:30 

a.m., he realized that he had “two customer stops more than usual” and believed 

that he would not have time to deliver the last two stops unless he worked for 

twelve to thirteen hours. Doc. 38-1 at 64; doc. 51-1 at 4. According to Baker, he 

“was not feeling well” that day, and his supervisors knew that he was undergoing 

treatment for diverticulitis. Doc. 38-1 at 64; doc. 51-1 at 7. Throughout the day, 

Baker purportedly notified warehouse managers Josh Lankford and Buster Tate3

that he could not complete the last two stops because he was not feeling well, and 

he told Lankford that completing the last two stops would take until “6:00 or 7:00 

[p.m.], [when] he got there at 5:30 [a.m.].” Doc. 38-1 at 64-66. Purportedly, 

Lankford told Baker that “he didn’t have nobody [else]” to complete the stops, and 

3 Tate claims that he never spoke with Baker that day, doc. 38-26 at 10, and Lankford denies that Baker stated he 

was not feeling well, doc. 38-18 at 11. While Lankford maintains that Baker “never gave a reason why” he would be 

returning the stops, id., Alan Creel, another warehouse manager, testified that Lankford told him on June 18, 2012 

that Baker did not complete his stops because he “had something to do,” doc. 38-16 at 18. 

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Tate told Baker, “Do what you can do.”4 Id. at 65, 66. At 5:30 p.m., after “working 

twelve hours . . . [when he] was not feeling well,” Baker decided to return the 

undelivered pallets remaining on his truck because he believed completing the 

deliveries would require an additional three hours of work. Doc. 51-1 at 5. In doing 

so, Baker claims he followed the proper procedure for returning the stops. Id. at 6. 

Specifically, a forklift driver unloaded the undelivered pallets and “set [the pallets] 

on the floor for them [to] take a picture of [the pallets],” another warehouse worker 

“signed that [the ] beer [was] back in [the] warehouse,” and Baker “[went] up and 

[checked] up” with the “check up lady,”5 Id. Additionally, earlier that day, because 

company “protocol” required that he inform the salesman for the undelivered 

product, Baker claims he notified the appropriate salesman, Charles Rose, that he 

could not complete the stops. Doc. 38-1 at 65. According to Baker, he “could not 

check up and go home until the check up lady and [his] paperwork matched,” and 

he “made sure” to follow this procedure because, otherwise, “he would have to pay 

for [the undelivered items].” Doc. 51-1 at 6-7.

The next workday, June 18, 2012, warehouse supervisor Alan Creel notified 

Baker that his employment was terminated as a result of the events that took place 

4 Lankford claims he told Baker that failing to complete his deliveries would be “unacceptable.” Doc. 38-18 at 11. 5 The “check up lady” at this point apparently contacted Alan Creel, who was seemingly the only warehouse 

manager present in the warehouse at that time, and informed him that Baker did not complete the last stops. Doc. 38-

16 at 17. While Creel claims he was not aware that Baker would be returning any stops, id., Lankford testified that 

he informed Creel earlier that day that Baker “wasn’t going to be making the stops,” doc. 38-18 at 11. 

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on June 15, 2012.6 Id. at 2. Because Baker maintains that he followed the proper 

procedure for returning the undelivered pallets, he describes another set of events, 

which he believes truly motivated the decision to terminate his employment. 

Specifically, Baker claims that he “got on [his supervisors’] nerves” in “asking so 

much” and complaining about unpaid overtime wages. Doc. 38-1 at 117. Baker 

purportedly complained about overtime “for two years” on “more than ten” 

occasions, and he recounts three specific incidences when he complained about 

overtime to three different supervisors, including Lankford and Creel. Id. at 110, 

112, 118. One of these incidences took place on Baker’s last workday: when Baker 

realized that morning that he would not be able to complete his without working an 

additional two to three hours, he told Lankford, “Y’all don’t want to pay me no 

overtime . . . I’m not going to be able to do them other stops.” Doc. 38-1 at 111. 

On the same day, Baker’s coworker, Alan Lowe, purportedly overheard Lankford 

speaking with Marshall Nichols (SBC’s Director of Operations) about discharging

Baker, prompting Lowe to opine that “they were out to get [Baker].” Doc. 51-1 at 

1-2. Lowe also told Baker that in May 2012, he overheard Lankford telling Creel 

that Baker “was getting to be a nuisance about talking about overtime in front of 

other employees.” Id. at 2.

6 Creel claims Baker stated on June 18, 2012 that he returned the stops because “he was trying to get to a graduation 

for a family member.” Doc. 38-16 at 21. 

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B. Discrimination and harassment 

To support his claims of discrimination and harassment, Baker relies in part 

on his coworker Lowe, who purportedly overheard Creel, Lankford, and 

warehouse worker Mike DeArman “discussing how Buster Tate, AfricanAmerican warehouse manager, would allow [Lowe] to help [Baker] make 

deliveries . . . and [how] them ‘n*****s’ must be [in] cahoots.” Doc. 51-1 at 4. 

Baker also maintains that he heard “the word ‘n*****’ used at [work] all the time.” 

Id. 

III. ANALYSIS

The court has considered Baker’s claims and the parties’ respective 

contentions and agrees with SBC that it is entitled to summary judgment on all of 

Baker’s claims. The court addresses the FLSA unpaid overtime and retaliation 

claims first, and the Section 1981 disparate treatment and hostile work 

environment claims second. 

1. FLSA unpaid overtime and retaliation claims 

SBC raises two arguments with respect to Baker’s FLSA claims: (a) that the

FLSA’s overtime requirement does not apply to Baker pursuant to the motor 

carrier exemption; and (b) that Baker cannot establish a prima facie case of 

retaliation. The court agrees with both arguments and addresses each in turn. 

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a. Unpaid overtime and the motor carrier exemption 

While the FLSA requires employers to pay employees at an overtime rate if 

they work more than forty hours during the workweek, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1), it 

also provides a number of exemptions to the overtime provision, see 29 U.S.C. §

213(b)(1)-(30). Relevant here is the motor carrier exemption, which exempts from 

the overtime pay requirement “any employee with respect to whom the Secretary 

of Transportation has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of 

service pursuant to the provisions of section 31502 of Title 49 [the Motor Carrier 

Act (“MCA”)].” 29 U.S.C. §213(b)(1). Section 31502 of the MCA authorizes the 

Secretary of Transportation to “prescribe requirements for . . . qualifications and 

maximum hours of service of employees of” a motor carrier or a private motor 

carrier. 49 U.S.C. § 31502(b)(1)-(2). This provision applies to “transportation . . .

described in” 49 U.S.C. § 13501. 49 U.S.C. § 31502(a)(1). In turn, Section 13501 

confers jurisdiction on the Secretary of Transportation over transportation by a 

motor carrier “on a public highway,” to the extent passengers, property, or both are 

transported by motor carrier “between a place in . . . a State and a place in another 

State” or “a State and another place in the same State through another State.” 49 

U.S.C. § 13501(1)(A)-(B). 

In this Circuit, to establish that the motor carrier exemption applies, the 

employer must first show that it is (1) a common carrier by motor vehicle, (2)

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engaged in interstate commerce, and (3) whose activities directly affect the safety 

of operations of such motor vehicles. Walters v. Am. Coach Lines of Miami, Inc., 

575 F.3d 1221, 1226 (11th Cir. 2009). Next, because the applicability of the 

exemption also depends on the “class of work involved in the employee’s job,” id.

at 1227, “the employee’s business-related activities must directly affect . . . the 

safety of operation of motor vehicles in the transportation on the public highways 

of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce within the meaning of 

the [MCA],” id. at 1226.

Baker concedes that SBC is a “motor carrier,” doc. 51 at 13, “that the DOT 

is authorized to regulate the safety of [SBC’s] . . . operation,” and seemingly 

concedes that SBC’s activities directly affect the safety of operations of motor

vehicles.

7 See id. at 24. Therefore, the only points of contention are: whether SBC

engages in interstate commerce, and whether the class of work involved in Baker’s 

job directly affects the safety of operation of motor vehicles. See id. at 12, 24.

(i) Engaging in interstate commerce

The parties agree that SBC receives its canned and bottled product and kegs

from various in-state and out-of-state suppliers on shrink-wrapped pallets. Doc. 38-

30 at 2-4. The evidence is undisputed that SBC receives products from more than 

7 Baker failed to offer any response on this issue and instead asserts only that “the parties dispute whether . . . [SBC] 

was engaged in interstate commerce,” and “the second prong necessary for [the] MCA exemption was also not met.” 

Doc. 51 at 15, 24. Accordingly, the court concludes that Baker has waived this issue. McCain v. Imery’s Carbonates 

LLC, No. 1:11-CV-25-VEH, 2013 WL 535541, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 7, 2013) (plaintiff waived an issue in failing to 

respond to defendant’s arguments at summary judgment phase).

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200 suppliers, which it orders based on a “forecasting system that includes past 

[seasonal] sales data,” and at least 75% of its sales are of products it receives from 

out-of-state suppliers. Id. at 2, 4. Once it receives the pallets from a supplier, SBC

unpacks and sorts some pallets for further distribution to restaurants and retail 

outlets in Alabama, and maintains some shrink-wrapped pallets in their original 

form for delivery directly to the customer. Id. at 2-3. The pallets stay in SBC’s 

warehouse as inventory for an indeterminate amount of time (but typically no more 

than 30 days) until a customer places an order requesting the particular product, at 

which point SBC’s drivers deliver them to various restaurants and retail 

outlets. Doc. 38-19 at 19. Upon delivering the products, the drivers collect the 

empty pallets and return them to the warehouse, and, according to SBC, in some 

situations where the empty pallets are “identifiable as from a specific supplier”—

for example, where the pallets are marked with a particular supplier’s logo—SBC

will ship the pallets back to the supplier “once it has collected a sufficient number 

of pallets.”8 Doc. 38-30 at 3. The driver also collects empty kegs from customers

and returns them to the warehouse, and once SBC collects enough empty kegs to 

be refilled by a specific supplier, SBC sends the empty kegs to that supplier, and 

the supplier ships the refilled kegs back to SBC. Id. The majority of the pallets and 

kegs that SBC collects are sent to out-of-state suppliers. Id.

8 Baker disputes that the pallets are sent back to suppliers and contends that SBC and its customers “retain the 

pallets for their own use.” Doc. 51 at 2. 

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SBC, while conceding that it ships products to customers only within the 

state of Alabama, claims that its business operations are a part of a “practical 

continuity of movement” across state lines because it distributes out-of-state 

products within Alabama, or, alternatively, that SBC meets the interstate 

commerce requirement because it collects and exports empty pallets and kegs outof-state. Doc. 37 at 20-25. SBC is correct that “transportation within a single state 

may remain ‘interstate’ in character when it forms a part of a ‘practical continuity 

of movement’ across state lines from the point of origin to the point of 

destination.” Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 568 (1943). 

Critically, the characterization of such transportation depends upon the “essential 

character” of the shipment, Texas N.O.R.R. v. Sabine Tram Co., 227 U.S. 111, 122 

(1913), and the crucial factor in determining the essential character of a shipment 

is “the shipper’s fixed and persisting intent at the time of shipment” based on a 

totality of the facts and circumstances of each case, Cent. Freight Lines v. I.C.C., 

899 F.2d 413, 419 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Texas v. United States, 866 F.2d 1546, 

1556 (5th Cir.1989)). See also 29 C.F.R. § 782.7(b)(2) (intrastate transportation 

can satisfy the interstate commerce requirement of the MCA if the shipper has a 

“fixed and persisting transportation intent beyond the terminal storage point at the 

time of shipment”).

9

 However, in the case at hand, the court does not need to 

9 In determining whether a shipper has the relevant “fixed and persistent intent,” courts have applied a three-prong 

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reach a conclusion regarding the “fixed and persistent intent” issue SBC’s regular 

practice of shipping kegs to its out-of-state suppliers meets the interstate 

requirement.

10As courts have held, the “regular pick up of empty containers 

destined for out-of-state bottling facilities . . . place[s] employees in interstate 

commerce and exempt[s] them from the overtime provisions of the FLSA under 

the motor carrier exemption.” Thomas v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 968 

F.2d 1022, 1025 (10th Cir. 1992). See also Baez v. Wells Fargo Armored Serv. 

Corp., 938 F.2d 180, 181 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing Opelika Royal Crown Bottling 

Co. v. Goldberg, 299 F.2d 37, 40 (5th Cir. 1962) (return of empty bottles to 

test. See Foxworthy v. Hiland Dairy Co., 997 F.2d 670, 672 (10th Cir. 1993); California Trucking Ass’n v. I.C.C., 

893 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1989); Baird v. Wagoner Trans. Co., 425 F.2d 407 (6th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 

829, 91 S.Ct. 58, 27 L.Ed.2d 59 (1970); Ashby v. Nat’l Freight, Inc., No. 807-CV-898-T-30MSS, 2008 WL 

3981422, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2008). See also Determination of Jurisdiction over Transportation of Petroleum 

and Petroleum Products by Motor Carriers Within a Single State, 71 M.C.C. 17, 29 (1957). Under this test, the 

major factors that could preclude single-state transportation from being considered interstate in nature are (1) that 

there is no specific order destined for a specific destination at the time of shipment (in this case, the shipment from 

the supplier to SBC); (2) that the terminal storage (here, SBC’s warehouse) is a distribution point or local marketing 

facility; and (3) that transportation from hub to spoke is arranged only after sale or allocation from storage. Cent. 

Freight Lines v. I.C.C., 899 F.2d 413, 421 (5th Cir. 1990). 

10 The court notes, however, in a case with facts nearly identical to those at hand with respect to SBC’s distribution 

scheme, the Fourth Circuit held that a wholesale beer distributor’s operations met the “practical continuity of 

movement” standard. See Talton v. I.H. Caffey Distrib. Co., 124 F. App’x 760, 765 (4th Cir. 2005) (distributor 

receives 50% of the products it sells from out-of-state suppliers, orders from suppliers based on predictions 

regarding customer needs, and stores the products in its warehouse until customers place an order). Baker attempts 

to distinguish Talton by offering a misplaced comparison: that SBC “does not have an exclusive relationship with its 

retail customers” like the distributor in Talton because SBC’s customers “do not have contracts with [SBC] and they 

are free to buy beer and other products from other wholesalers.” Doc. 51 at 19. See also doc. 38-19 at 27. However, 

Baker overlooks that the beer distributor in Talton also did not have contracts with its customers, and in fact state 

law “prohibited . . . [wholesale beer distributors] from requiring a retailer to purchase their beer pursuant to a 

contractual purchase agreement.” Talton, 124 Fed. App’x at 761. Significantly, the appropriate comparison between 

the cases lies in the fact that SBC undeniably has “exclusive territorial assignments” and distributor agreements 

which dictate that customers within a particular territory must purchase a particular brand of product from the 

distributor with the exclusive right to sell that particular brand in the territory. Doc. 38-30 at 1-2. Similarly, the 

distributor in Talton was “the exclusive distributor for certain beer products . . . for several North Carolina 

counties.” Talton, 124 Fed. App’x at 761. Furthermore, even accepting that SBC’s customers can purchase some of 

their products (i.e., brands for which SBC does not enjoy an exclusive distribution right) from other distributers, this 

does not negate a conclusion that the products that SBC does sell to customers are in “practical continuity of 

movement” across state lines. 

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supplier creates a “sufficient channel of interstate commerce” where the return of 

bottles is “an integral part of the [employer’s]” business)). While the parties 

seemingly disagree regarding whether SBC returns empty pallets to out-of-state 

suppliers as a regular or integral aspect of its operations, the record is undisputed 

with respect to the regularity with which SBC ships kegs to out-of-state suppliers. 

Specifically, Baker admits that he collected “three or four” empty kegs a week and 

offers no evidence to dispute testimony from SBC’s Chief Financial Officer, James 

Hall, that SBC “accumulates [the kegs] into truckload quantities and send[s] them 

back to the supplier,” that keg sales constitute a “significant” percentage of SBC’s 

sales, and that over 75% of SBC’s total sales are of products from its out-of-state 

suppliers. Doc. 38-19 at 25. Significantly, Baker testified that he has no knowledge 

of where SBC sends the kegs that its drivers collect, doc. 38-1 at 23, and the record 

is undisputed that SBC ships “the majority of the [empty] kegs” to out-of-state 

suppliers. Doc. 38-30 at 3. Accordingly, the court concludes that SBC meets the 

interstate commerce requirement of the motor carrier exemption in light of its 

regular export of empty kegs to out-of-state suppliers. 

(ii) Class of work involved in Baker’s job

Next, Baker contends that SBC does not satisfy the second prong of the 

motor carrier exemption because SBC “did not require its drivers to complete 

Department of Transportation (“DOT”) logs recording the time they spent 

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driving.” Doc. 51 at 24. However, Baker provides no support for the proposition 

that an employer’s failure to log its drivers’ time necessarily means that those 

drivers’ business-related activities do not directly affect “the safety of operation of 

motor vehicles.” Baker merely cites to a case where the Tenth Circuit found that 

the truck drivers’ duties in that case “affected the safety of operations” because the 

employer “complied with DOT regulations concerning preemployment physicals, 

log books, . . . driving tests and drug testing,” which subjected the drivers “to the 

power of the Secretary of Transportation.” Thomas, 968 F.2d at 1026. Baker’s 

reading of the Thomas case overlooks that the court did not indicate that the 

employer’s compliance specifically with regulations concerning log books was 

alone determinative or central to the court’s decision. See id. In any event, the

court notes that the record in this case is undisputed with respect to SBC’s 

compliance with various DOT regulations relating to its drivers, including 

requiring drivers to submit to pre-hire physical examinations, and pre-hire and 

random alcohol and drug testing, doc. 38-31 at 2, much like the employer in 

Thomas. See Thomas, 968 F.2d at 1026. Ultimately, because courts have 

consistently held that the duties of a delivery driver “directly affect highway safety

whenever he drives a motor vehicle in interstate or foreign commerce,” Alvarado 

v. I.G.W.T. Delivery Sys., Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1277 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (citing 

Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U.S. 649, 669 (1947)), the court rejects 

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Baker’s argument that he did not “engage in activities of a character affecting [the] 

safety” of operation of motor vehicles in interstate commerce, doc. 51 at 22. See 

also 29 C.F.R. § 782.3(b) (“The work of an employee who is a full-duty or partialduty ‘driver,’ . . . directly affects ‘safety of operation’ . . . whenever he drives a 

motor vehicle in interstate or foreign commerce within the meaning of that act.”)

For these reasons, because SBC is a motor carrier engaged in interstate 

commerce whose activities directly affect the safety of operations of such motor

vehicles, and because Baker’s business-related activities as a delivery driver 

directly affect the safety of operation of motor vehicles, the court concludes that 

the motor carrier exemption applies in this case. Accordingly, the court will grant 

summary judgment with respect to Baker’s claim for unpaid wages under the 

FLSA. See Walters, 575 F.3d at 1226.

b. FLSA retaliation 

SBC next contends that Baker’s retaliation claim fails because Baker cannot 

establish a prima facie case of retaliation, or, alternatively, because SBC

articulated a legitimate, non-pretextual reason for the discharge. Doc. 37 at 25. 

Indeed, while the FLSA protects persons against retaliation for asserting their 

rights under the statute, see 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), Baker carries the burden of 

establishing a prima facie case by showing that (1) he engaged in activity protected 

under the FLSA, (2) he subsequently suffered adverse action by the employer, and 

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(3) a causal connection existed between the employee’s activity and the adverse 

action. Wolf v. Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.3d 1337, 1342-1343 (11th Cir. 2000).

Unfortunately for Baker, he cannot establish a prima facie case because he 

did not engage in a protected activity. In reaching this decision, the court accepts 

as true Baker’s contentions that he repeatedly complained about the failure to pay 

him overtime, including on the last day that he worked for SBC. Doc. 38-1 at 110, 

111, 112, 118. However, in order for Baker’s complaints to qualify as a “protected 

activity,” Baker must establish that he “reasonably believed” SBC was engaging in 

conduct that is unlawful under the FLSA. See Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp.,

139 F.3d 1385, 1388 (11th Cir.1998). Significantly, this “reasonable belief”

element has an objective and a subjective component. See Little v. United 

Technologies, Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 960 (11th Cir.1997). Stated 

differently, Baker “must not only show that he subjectively . . . believed that his 

employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices, but also that his belief 

was objectively reasonable,” and the “objective reasonableness” of Baker’s belief 

is “measured against existing substantive law.” Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc.,

176 F.3d 1346, 1351 (11th Cir.1999). In applying this “objective reasonableness” 

test, the Eleventh Circuit has held that, where courts have concluded with 

unanimity that an employer’s conduct is lawful, a plaintiff’s belief that his 

employer engaged in an unlawful employment practice was not “objectively 

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reasonable,” and the plaintiff’s complaints therefore did not qualify as “protected 

activity.” See Harper, 139 F.3d at 1388. See also Burnette v. Northside Hosp., 342 

F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1135 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (citing Harper, 139 F.3d at 1388) (finding 

plaintiff’s belief that employer violated FLSA objectively unreasonable in light of 

Eleventh Circuit case law and the law of other circuits establishing that employer’s 

conduct was lawful). Based on these principles, and because the law of this Circuit 

and other circuits provides that SBC was not required to pay overtime wages to 

Baker under the motor carrier exemption, the court concludes that Baker cannot 

establish that he engaged in a protected activity. Accordingly, SBC’s motion on 

Baker’s FLSA retaliation claim is due to be granted.

11

2. Section 1981 disparate treatment and hostile work environment claims

Baker’s Section 1981 claims rest on two contentions: (1) as to the hostile 

work environment claim, that he “heard the word ‘n*****’ at [work] all the time;” 

11 The motion is also due to be granted because SBC articulated a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for the 

discharge—Baker’s admitted failure to complete his assigned deliveries—which Baker failed to rebut. See Wolf v. 

Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.3d 1337, 1342-1343 (11th Cir. 2000). Baker attempts to establish that SBC’s articulated 

reason was pretextual by pointing to the conversation that Lowe overheard between Lankford and Marshall 

Nichols—who were purportedly talking about firing Baker on his last workday—which prompted Lowe to opine 

that “they were out to get” Baker, presumably because he had complained about overtime. Doc. 51 at 29; doc. 51-1 

at 3. Even accepting that Lowe overheard this conversation, the fact that Lankford and Nichols discussed 

discharging Baker on the day that Baker returned the two stops is not the sort of evidence that suggests “weaknesses,

implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions” in SBC’s proffered reason suggesting that the 

reason is pretextual. See Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997). Rather, this evidence 

is wholly consistent with the contention that SBC discharged Baker for returning the stops since Baker does not 

identify any aspects of the conversation that suggest any other reason for his discharge. See doc. 51-1 at 3-4. 

Furthermore, to the extent Baker contends the fact that he had “two customer stops more than usual” on his truck 

that day establishes pretext because Lankford was “setting him up” for termination, see doc. 51 at 29, Baker points 

to no record evidence establishing that he was the only driver assigned two extra stops that day, or that other drivers 

were assigned extra stops but not discharged for failing to complete them, or any other scenario tending to show that 

the two extra stops were a “set up.” Ultimately, the court has carefully reviewed the evidence before it and finds no 

evidence of pretext. 

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and (2) as to the discrimination claim, that SBC discharged him because of his race

and that “the articulated reason for [his] termination is [pretextual] because [SBC] 

has falsely claimed that [Creel] was the decision maker who terminated Baker’s 

employment.” See doc. 51 at 30. Even accepting these facts as true for summary 

judgment purposes, aside from offering various unsubstantiated legal conclusions,

Baker does not elaborate on these issues, or cite to any legal authority to explain 

their relevance or significance. For example, with respect to the hostile work 

environment claim, Baker does not even address the last and key element of his 

prima facie case: that a basis exists to hold SBC liable for the alleged conduct. See 

Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1245 (11th Cir. 1999). To be sure, 

because there is no burden on this court “to distill every potential argument that 

could be made based upon the materials before it on summary judgment . . . [and]

the onus is upon the parties to formulate arguments, grounds alleged in the 

complaint but not relied upon in summary judgment are deemed abandoned.” 

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. 

denied, 516 U.S. 817 (1995). See also Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 

1322 (11th Cir.2001) (finding claim abandoned where plaintiff alleged the claim in 

complaint but did not address it in response to motion for summary judgment); 

Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 

1301, 1325 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding claim effectively abandoned before the 

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district court where party did not present any argument on that claim in its 

response to motion for summary judgment); Crayton v. Valued Servs. of Alabama, 

LLC, 737 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1330 (M.D. Ala. 2010) (“Plaintiff’s failure to address 

Defendant’s many arguments with respect to perceived infirmities with her . . . 

claims amounts to an abandonment of such claims.”). On this basis alone, SBC’s 

motion with respect to Baker’s Section 1981 claims is due to be granted.

Nonetheless, in the interest of thoroughly addressing Baker’s claims, the court has 

carefully reviewed the record before it and concludes that summary judgment is 

also appropriate for the reasons below.

a. Race discrimination 

Baker’s race discrimination claim—which, according to Baker’s response, is 

based solely on his discharge, see doc. 51 at 27-28,12—fails because he cannot 

establish the requisite discriminatory animus. See Clark v. Huntsville City Bd. Of 

Educ., 717 F.2d 525, 529 (11th Cir. 1983) (to prove discrimination, a plaintiff 

“must convince the court that [defendant] operated . . . with a racially 

discriminatory motive, purpose, or animus”). By Baker’s own contentions, SBC

discharged him for reasons unrelated to his race, i.e., because he “got on [his 

12 While Baker does not state so explicitly in his response, the court concludes that his race discrimination is based 

solely on his discharge because the only argument he makes in his response is that he can establish a prima facie

case of discrimination because he heard the “N” word at work “all the time” and because “the articulated reason for 

Baker’s termination is pretextual.” Doc. 51 at 27. The court reads this as Baker’s attempt to establish a 

discriminatory discharge claim by (1) showing that SBC had the requisite discriminatory animus in light of 

Lankford’s use of “N” word, and (2) rebutting SBC’s articulated reason for his discharge. Because Baker does not 

offer any response to SBC’s arguments with respect to pay discrimination and disparate work assignments, Baker 

has waived those issues. See McCain, 2013 WL 535541, at *5.

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supervisor’s] nerves” in “asking so much” and complaining about unpaid overtime. 

See doc. 38-1 at 117. Therefore, the race discrimination claim fails. Alternatively, 

if Baker is perhaps suggesting the fact that one of his supervisors (Lankford) used 

the “N” word and “liked to tell racial jokes,” doc. 38-1 at 81, 85, alone establishes 

discriminatory animus, summary judgment is nonetheless appropriate because 

Baker failed to show that his supervisor’s alleged conduct motivated his discharge. 

The closest Baker comes as far as this court can discern is his contention that SBC

falsely claimed Creel was the one who discharged Baker. Doc. 51 at 30. 

Presumably, Baker is contending that Lankford actually made the decision to 

discharge him or played a role in his discharge. Even if Baker is correct, 

Lankford’s involvement does not relieve Baker from his burden of rebutting SBC’s 

articulated reasons for his discharge, i.e., Baker’s failure to complete his assigned 

deliveries. See Clark, 717 F.2d at 529 (“Only when [defendant’s] articulated 

reason is pretext for accomplishing a racially discriminatory purpose will the 

plaintiff recover.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, 

while Baker believes that he had valid reasons for not completing his deliveries

(illness, long hours, etc.) and that he followed the proper procedure for returning 

the stops, the fact remains that he did not complete the deliveries and he has not 

shown that SBC discriminatorily enforced its policy. See Nix v. WLCY 

Radio/Rahall Commc’ns, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[Plaintiff] may 

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have shown that he was fired for violating a rule that he did not violate. But Title 

VII does not take away an employer’s right to interpret its rules as it chooses, and 

to make determinations as it sees fit under those rules.”). More importantly, this 

court is not a super personnel board and is precluded from second-guessing an

employer’s business decisions. Alexander v. Fulton Cnty., 207 F.3d 1303, 1341 

(11th Cir. 2000) (“[I]t is not the court’s role to second-guess the wisdom of an 

employer’s decisions.”). Accordingly, because an employer may discharge an 

employee “for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or 

for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason,” Nix,

738 F.2d at 1187, and in the absence of any arguments from Baker to support his 

race discrimination claim, summary judgment is due to be granted.

b. Racial harassment 

Baker claims he was subjected to repeated uses of the “N” word. Doc. 51-1 

at 4. Specifically, Baker purportedly heard Lankford use the “N” word “all the 

time” when telling racially inappropriate jokes “talking about blacks and 

n******.” Doc. 38-1 at 81. When asked the number of times he heard Lankford 

use the “N” word, Baker estimated five times. Id. Baker also heard Marshall

Nichols use the “N” word once, and frequently heard Lankford and Nichols “talk 

the way they talk,” i.e., telling racially inappropriate jokes. Id. at 89. Finally, Baker 

recounts that he heard Mike DeArman, a co-worker, use the “N” word on one or

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two occasions, that once or twice a week, DeArman would “use racial slurs” about 

“the n*****, the African,” and that DeArman oftentimes, in Baker’s opinion,

stopped just short of “saying the ‘N’ word.” Id. at 91-92. The alleged language is 

offensive and simply has no place in civilized society, let alone the workplace. As 

one court aptly put it, “far more than a ‘mere offensive utterance,’ the word 

‘[n*****]’ is a pure anathema to African–Americans,” and perhaps “no single act 

can more quickly alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive 

working environment than the use of an unambiguously racial epithet such as 

‘[n*****]’ by a supervisor in the presence of his subordinates.” Spriggs v. 

Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 185 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Given 

the prevalence of this alleged conduct, the court disagrees with SBC that this 

evidence—use of the “N” word at least eight times and repeated racially 

inappropriate jokes about “blacks” and “Africans”—describes “mere offensive 

utterances” and that Baker cannot establish the severe and pervasive requirement 

necessary for a hostile work environment claim. See doc. 37 at 36-37.

Nonetheless, despite the evidence of clear severe and pervasive abuse, to 

prevail, Baker must still establish that a basis exists to hold SBC liable for the 

actions of Lankford, Nichols and DeArman. Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1245. 

Unfortunately, Baker cannot do so in this case because, while an employer can 

generally be liable for harassment by a supervisor with immediate authority over 

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an employee (in this case, Lankford), the employer is not liable where (1) it 

exercises reasonable care to prevent harassing behavior, such as, by promulgating 

an anti-harassment policy that it distributes to its employees; and (2) the employee 

fails to take advantage of preventative or corrective opportunities that the employer 

offers. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Walton v. 

Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1286 (11th Cir. 2003).

13 And 

indeed, SBC undeniably promulgated an anti-harassment policy which articulated 

that employees should complain to SBC’s human resources manager or Chief 

Financial Officer, doc. 38-1 at 157, Baker acknowledged receiving that policy in 

the employee handbook, doc. 38-3 at 12, and Baker admittedly failed to complain 

to the persons designated in the handbook, see doc. 38-1 at 90, 91, 167. In failing 

to do so, Baker acted unreasonably because “once an employer has promulgated an 

effective anti-harassment policy and disseminated that policy and associated 

procedures to its employees, then ‘it is incumbent upon the employees to utilize the 

procedural mechanisms established by the company specifically to address 

problems and grievances.’” Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 

1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Farley v. American Cast Iron Pipe, 115 F.3d 

13 While this rule, the Faragher defense, does not apply where “the supervisor’s harassment culminates in a tangible 

employment action, such as discharge,” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808 (1998), Baker’s 

discharge in this case does not preclude application of the Faragher defense because he has not shown that he was 

terminated based on his race rather than his failure to complete his deliveries. See Walton v. Johnson & Johnson 

Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1281-82 (11th Cir. 2003) (Faragher defense applied in a sex harassment case where 

“there [was] no evidence that [employer], or any of the employees acting on its behalf, considered [plaintiff’s] 

gender when the company terminated her”). 

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1548, 1554 (11th Cir.1997)). Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate with 

respect to Baker’s hostile work environment claim. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, SBC’s motion for summary judgment is due to 

be granted. The court will enter a separate order consistent with this opinion. 

DONE the 15th day of December, 2014.

 

_________________________________

ABDUL K. KALLON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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