Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03311/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03311-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

United Sc11tes Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

AUG 2 7 1990 

ROBERT COTTON, ) 

) 

Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

STEVEN J. DAVIES and THE ATTORNEY ) 

GENERAL OF THE STATE OF KANSAS, ) 

) 

Respondents-Appellees. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-3311 

(D.C. No. 88-3173-S) 

(D. Kansas) 

Before LOGAN, SEYMOUR, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

The court grants the motion of appellant Robert Cotton for 

leave to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees and 

application for a certificate of probable cause. After examining 

the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the 

determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th 

Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without 

oral argument. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-3311 Document: 010110041586 Date Filed: 08/27/1990 Page: 1 
In 1977, apparently against the advice of counsel, Cotton 

pleaded guilty to murdering his brother-in-law. He was sentenced 

to fifteen years to life imprisonment. Before the killing, Cotton 

had served in the Marine Corps for fifteen years, including two 

combat tours in Vietnam. Cotton now argues that Post Traumatic 

Stress Disorder (PTSD), resulting from his combat experience, was 

an instigating factor in his crime. He also argues that PTSD 

prevented him from making a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent 

guilty plea in accordance with the standards set out in Dusky v. 

United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). 

Cotton makes thr ee arguments in his brief: 1) that his 

initial guilty plea to second degree murder was involuntary and 

not intelligent because of the coercive effects of PTSD; 2) that 

his conviction should be overturned because the recognition of 

PTSD as a psychological disorder constitutes new evidence which 

would have been a defense to the murder charge; and 3) that his 

description of the murder was inconsistent with his guilty plea 

and the court should have inquired further into his actual guilt 

before accepting his plea. 

The district court found that the record of Cotton's 

sentencing hearing indicated he understood and intelligently 

waived his right to trial when he pleaded guilty. The record 

indicates that Cotton responded appropriately to questions asked 

of him and that he was fully informed of the elements of the 

crime, the potential sentence for the crime and the consequences 

of pleading guilty. After an independent review of the record we 

agree with the district court's conclusion that Cotton was 

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Appellate Case: 89-3311 Document: 010110041586 Date Filed: 08/27/1990 Page: 2 
competent and able to understand and assist his counsel at the 

hearing. Thus, regardless of whether he was suffering from PTSD 

at the time of the hearing, and we assume for the purposes of this 

appeal that he was, he is not entitled to collaterally challenge 

the validity of his plea. 

Cotton also argues that the diagnosis of his PTSD is newly 

discovered evidence, which would have been a defense to the charge 

of murder. He argues by implication that he would not have 

pleaded guilty had the defense been available to him at the time 

of trial. It is undisputed that PTSD was not recognized as a 

psychological disorder until 1980. Cotton therefore argues that 

we should set aside his guilty plea. 

While PTSD might not have been recognized at the time of 

Cotton's conviction, other defenses regarding mental state and 

intent were certainly available. Cotton's choice not to challenge 

his murder charge on grounds of his mental state now precludes him 

from doing so, unless he had no notion whatsoever that such a 

defense might be open to him. See Scarborough v. United States, 

683 F.2d 1323, 1324-25 (11th Cir. 1982). Cotton had been treated 

for psychological disorders in the past. His choice not to 

introduce evidence of diminished capacity, insanity, or some other 

psychological impairment in defense of the murder charge bars him 

from now introducing new evidence on the issue. Id. at 1325. 

Finally, we find no error in the state trial court's 

acceptance of Cotton's guilty plea. Cotton argues that his 

description of the killing should have inspired further inquiry by 

the trial court into Cotton's actual guilt, before the court 

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Appellate Case: 89-3311 Document: 010110041586 Date Filed: 08/27/1990 Page: 3 
accepted his guilty plea. In his statement to the court, Cotton 

did indicate that he was struck on the head and that the gun went 

off, which might raise the issue of whether his actions were 

intentional. However, the court had clearly instructed Cotton on 

the elements of the crime, including that the killing be willful, 

malicious and deliberate. Transcript of Plea, April 15, 1977, at 

3. Cotton recognized the significance of the element of intent, 

as is demonstrated by his statement, 

I guess I want to say first of all, I didn't 

believe it had happened. I didn't have the courage to 

go forth before and to tell the police all that was 

happening. The thing says willfully and malicious and 

et cetera, and et cetera. 

I was struck in the head. I fought over the gun. 

It went off. I jumped out of the car and ran; I come 

back. I didn't want to even admit being there. I 

didn't have the courage to stand up like a man at that 

time and just led to other things. 

Id. at 15 (emphasis added). We cannot conclude that the trial 

judge erred in accepting Cotton's guilty plea. The prosecution 

made a proffer of evidence indicating circumstantial evidence of 

premeditation tending to negate Cotton's claim of innocence. 

Knowledge of the existence of such evidence could well motivate a 

defendant to plead guilty, even if he had doubts about his actual 

guilt. Cotton was aware of the elements of the crime, and despite 

his protestations of innocence, admitted to a willful, malicious 

killing. This is an alternative open to a criminal defendant. 

See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-39 (1970). The 

court did not err in accepting his plea and we will not set it 

aside. 

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Appellate Case: 89-3311 Document: 010110041586 Date Filed: 08/27/1990 Page: 4 
., ' . 

AFFIRMED. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

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Entered for the Court 

James K. Logan 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 89-3311 Document: 010110041586 Date Filed: 08/27/1990 Page: 5