Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00950/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00950-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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09CV950 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL A. LARRY,

Plaintiff,

v.

JAMES TILTON, et al.,

Defendants.

 

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Civil No. 09-CV-0950-JLS(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

[DOC. No. 19]

Plaintiff Michael A. Larry sues various prison officials

under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for alleged civil rights violations

that arose from a “modified program” imposed on African-American

inmates at Calipatria State Prison in 2007 after several AfricanAmerican inmates attacked correctional officers. Pending before the

Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgement. (Doc. No. 19.)

Having considered all moving papers, evidence presented, and the

relevant law, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion be

GRANTED in its entirety.

/ / /

/ / /

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09CV950 2

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

On September 2, 2008, Plaintiff filed suit pursuant to 42

U.S.C. Section 1983 in Imperial County Superior Court. Following

the Superior Court’s granting of a demurrer, Plaintiff filed an

Amended Complaint (“Complaint”). On May 4, 2009, Defendants removed

the action to this Court.

The Complaint names the following four Defendants: James

Tilton, T. Ochoa, W.J. Price, and R. Johnson. It claims violations

of the (1) First Amendment, based on denial of access to courts; (2)

Fourteenth Amendment, based on race-based disparate treatment; and

(3) Eighth Amendment, based on denial of outdoor exercise.

On October 19, 2009, the Court issued a scheduling order that

ordered that all discovery be completed on or before May 17, 2010.

(Doc. No. 14 at ¶ 3.) On July 19, 2010, Plaintiff filed a motion

for an extension of time to conduct discovery. (Doc. No. 21.) On

July 21, 2010, the undersigned denied Plaintiff’s motion without

prejudice on the basis that Plaintiff had not shown good cause to

extend the discovery cut-off. (Doc. No. 23.) The undersigned

instructed Plaintiff to “set forth a specific and sufficiently

detailed motion explaining all the documents sought and reasons that

justify Plaintiff’s request for more discovery.” (Id.) Plaintiff

did not re-file a formal motion for additional discovery.

On June 18, 2010, Defendants filed a motion for summary

judgment. (Doc. No. 19.) Plaintiff filed an opposition, which did

not address Defendants’ arguments but again requested more time to

conduct discovery. (Doc. No. 27.) Defendants filed an opposition

to Plaintiff’s request for more discovery. (Doc. No. 29.)

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28 1/ All page references to documents contained in the Court's docket are

to the Court Clerk's renumbered pages, not the document's native,

pre-filing pagination.

09CV950 3

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

The factual allegations below appear in Plaintiff’s Complaint. However, none of Plaintiff’s subsequent filings contain any

evidentiary support for these claims and allegations.

Plaintiff is an African-American inmate incarcerated at

Calipatria State Prison. (Doc. No. 1-2 at 73 (Amended Complaint).)1/

On May 30, 2007, a violent incident occurred between AfricanAmerican inmates and prison staff. (Id. at 74.) Prison staff

allegedly provoked the incident and initiated the physical altercation by pepper spraying inmates for no legitimate reason. (Id.)

Plaintiff was not involved in the incident. (Id.) Nor is there any

indication that Plaintiff witnessed this incident.

Prison officials responded to the violence by locking down

the entire “B” Facility, in which Plaintiff resided and which

included inmates of all races. (Id.) During the lockdown, all

inmates were confined to their cells and were not permitted outdoor

exercise or allowed to participate in other activities. (Id.)

On or about June 6, 2007, Plaintiff discovered that AfricanAmerican inmates continued to be locked down while inmates of other

races resumed their normal activities. (Id.)

On June 7, 2007, Plaintiff filed a grievance that sought

reasons why all African-American inmates continued to be locked

down. (Id.) On June 21, 2007, Plaintiff was informed that the

Secretary of Corrections had ordered the lockdown. (Id. at 75.)

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09CV950 4

On June 20, 2007, Hispanic, Caucasian, and other inmates were

released from the lockdown. (Id.) However, African-American

inmates remained on lockdown. (Id.)

On July 11, 2007, the lockdown for certain African-American

inmates, including Plaintiff, was lifted but not immediately

implemented. (Id.)

On July 12, 2007, another African-American inmate assaulted

a prison staff member. (Id.) Plaintiff did not witness the assault

but alleges that prison staff “manufactured” this incident to extend

the lockdown of African-American inmates. (Id.)

After the July 12, 2007, incident, Plaintiff was not released

from lockdown. (Id.) All of the inmates that participated in the

above-noted incidents were removed from the prison’s general

population and placed in ad seg. (Id.)

In total, Defendants allegedly locked down all Facility B

African-American inmates from May 30, 2007, to an unspecified date

in July 2007. (Id. at 76.) Plaintiff alleges this lockdown was

race-based, not based on continuing safety concerns, and was

punitive and retaliatory as a result. (Id. at 76-77.) The lockdown

deprived Plaintiff of religious services, exercise, and law library

access. (Id.)

Plaintiff states that the policy of segregating inmates based

on race may be constitutionally permissible on a short-term

emergency basis, but Defendants exceeded the time that may be

reasonably considered a short-term emergency. (Id. at 75-76.)

On August 21, 2007, Plaintiff had a legal deadline to file a

petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Id. at 77.) Plaintiff sought

law library access to copy the writ and mail it to the court. (Id.)

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09CV950 5

His request for law library access was denied, and his writ was

denied as a result. (Id.) It is unclear from the Complaint how

this event relates to the lockdown, which the Complaint suggests

ended in July 2007.

C. Defendants’ Statement of Facts

1. Violence At Calipatria State Prison in Mid-2007

Defendants’ motion provides a detailed explanation of the

events surrounding the lockdowns and supports each statement of fact

with several sworn declarations. Plaintiff’s bare allegations to

the contrary notwithstanding, Defendants’ factual statements are

otherwise uncontested.

Calipatria State Prison is a maximum security prison that

houses some of the most violent and unpredictable inmates in

California, many of whom are serving life sentences. (Doc. No. 19-7

at ¶ 3 (Ochoa Declaration); Doc. No. 19-5 at ¶ 3 (Price Declaration).) In 2007, Defendant Ochoa was the Chief Deputy Warden and

Acting Warden at Calipatria. (Doc. No. 19-7 at ¶ 2) Defendants

Johnson and Price were Facility Captains. (Doc. No. 19-4 at ¶ 2

(Johnson Declaration); Doc. No. 19-5 at ¶ 2.) In 2007, Defendant

Tilton was the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections

and Rehabilitation. (Doc. No. 19–6 at ¶ 2 (Tilton Declaration).)

At Calipatria, inmate attacks against correctional officers have

occurred on a frequent basis before and during the relevant times in

the Complaint. (Doc. No. 19-5 at ¶ 3.)

On May 30, 2007, five African-American inmates attacked and

“attempted to murder” two correctional officers in the prison’s

Facility B. (Doc. No. 19-7 at ¶ 6 & p. 7 (Ex. A to Ochoa Declaration).) Both officers sustained injury, with one sustaining a scalp

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2/ Facility B was never placed on a total lockdown at any point and was

subject only to modified programs that allowed inmates some

privileges. However, for the sake of readability, the undersigned

will use “lockdown” and “modified program” interchangeably to refer

to “modified program.”

09CV950 6

laceration that required nine staples. (Doc. No. 19-7 at ¶ 6.) The

attackers were all housed in Facility B. (Id.) At that time,

prison officials did not know exactly which inmates were involved in

the planning and staging of the attack, whether more officers were

targeted, or whether more attacks were planned. (Id. ¶ 8.) As a

result, the prison immediately instituted a “modified program” on

all inmates of all races who were housed in Facility B. (Id. ¶ 7 &

p. 7.) Defendants explain that a modified program is an emergency

measure that is instituted during emergency situations in order to

maintain prison security and safety. (Doc. No. 19-5 at ¶ 6.) The

program restricts inmates’ movements and privileges, and allows

prison officials to monitor and control inmates to prevent further

attacks and safety threats. (Id.; Doc. No. 19-7 at ¶ 5.) Defendants further explain that modified programs differ from lockdowns

in that lockdowns impose a total restriction on inmate movements and

privileges.2/ (Doc. No. 19-5 at ¶ 5.) A modified program, on the

other hand, imposes fewer restrictions, and the various restrictions

can be reviewed, updated, and customized. (Id.)

Immediately after the aforementioned attack, prison officials

immediately began to investigate the attempted murder. (Doc. No.

19-7 at ¶ 9 & p. 7.) The investigation sought to uncover the cause

of the attack, assess the threat of future attacks, and determine

whether any further immediate threats to the safety of officers,

staff, and inmates existed. (Id.) Officials interviewed several

inmates in Facility B and learned that African-American inmates

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09CV950 7

harbored a heightened state of dissension and ill will towards

officers for perceived disrespect. (Id. ¶ 24; Doc. No. 19-4 at ¶ 9;

Doc. No. 19-5 at ¶ 9.) However, the investigation revealed that

inmates of other races did not share those sentiments. (Doc. No.

19-7 at ¶ 24.) Further, Defendants aver that five “shanks,” or

homemade metal stabbing weapons, were found during cell searches,

though they do not identify the races of the inmates to whom the

weapons belonged. (Id.; Doc. No. 19-4 at ¶ 9; Doc. No. 19-5 at

¶ 9.)

On June 6, 2007, just seven days after the initial modified

program, it was updated in light of the initial findings of the

investigation. (Doc. No. 19-7 at ¶ 10.) All African-American

inmates in Facility B remained on the modified program, but inmates

of other races were returned to their original programs. (Id. at 7

(modified program update).)

Despite the imposition of the modified program, violence and

threats against officers continued. On June 9, 2007, an AfricanAmerican inmate attacked and choked an officer in Facility B. (Id.

at ¶ 24; Doc. No. 19-4 at ¶ 13.) On June 10, 2007, officials

learned that African-American inmates planned to continue their

negative attitude towards officers because of perceived disrespect.

(Doc. No. 19-4 at ¶ 14.) On June 21, 2007, another inmate reported

that an African-American inmate attempted to incite other AfricanAmerican inmates to attack staff on the recreational yard. (Id. at

¶ 15.) On July 2, 2007, another inmate anonymously reported that

the Crips gang, whose members are African-American, planned to pay

other inmates to stab a correctional sergeant and lieutenant. (Id.

at ¶ 16.)

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09CV950 8

From June 9, 2007, to July 11, 2007, the modified program

remained in effect against African-American inmates because the

prison’s investigation revealed that there was an ongoing threat of

violence against officials. (Doc. No. 19-7 at ¶ 11 & pp. 8-11 (four

modified program updates).)

Starting on July 11, 2007, the modified program was reconsidered and the restrictions on African-American inmates were slowly

eased. (Id. ¶ 11 & p. 12.) For example, on July 11, 2007,

recreational yard time was restored for African-American inmates who

were critical workers or assigned to “A1/A,” which Defendants do

not define. (Id.)

On July 12, 2007, a third act of violence against an officer

occurred, when a Facility B African-American inmate assaulted

another officer. (Id. ¶ 12; Doc. No. 19-4 at ¶ 17.))

On July 13, 2007, the modified program was reinstated against

Facility B African-American inmates as a result of the previous

day’s attack. (Doc. No. 19-7 at ¶ 13 & p. 13.) Facility B AfricanAmerican inmates’ recreational yard privileges were again suspended.

(Id.)

On July 25, 2007, and thereafter, the modified program was

twice updated to ease restrictions and restore certain privileges.

(Id. at ¶ 14 & pp. 14-15 (two program updates).)

For example, on August 8, 2007, an “Unlock List” was created

to include inmates who were excused from the modified program. (Id.

¶¶ 14-15 & p. 15.) Inmates on the Unlock List were those who the

Facility Captains deemed did not pose an immediate safety threat.

(Id. ¶ 15.) From August 8, 2007, until August 30, 2007, AfricanAmerican inmates were individually screened and added to the Unlock

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09CV950 9

List. (Id.) Inmates who were gang-affiliated, had disciplinary

history in prison, or were deemed a threat to security were excluded

from the Unlock List. (Id. ¶¶ 15-16.) Plaintiff was not placed on

the Unlock List for unknown reasons. (Id. ¶ 16.)

On August 22, 2007, another violent incident occurred when a

Caucasian inmate killed another Caucasian in Facility A. (Id. ¶ 17

& p. 16.) As a result, all inmates of all races in the entire

prison were immediately placed on a modified program. (Id.)

Recreational yard time was suspended for every inmate in the entire

prison. (Id.)

On August 23, 2007, the prison-wide modified program ended

for Facility B inmates, who returned to their prior programs

(modified or otherwise) while Facility A remained on modified

program. (Id. ¶ 18 & p. 17.)

On August 30, 2007, the modified program for Facility B

African-American inmates ended and all privileges were restored for

all inmates. (Id. ¶ 19 & p. 18.)

Based on the above timeline, Plaintiff did not receive

recreational yard time for 3 months: from May 30, 2007, to August

30, 2007.

2. The Decision Process That Led To The Modified Program

Of the four Defendants, only Ochoa had the responsibility to

order modified programs. (Id. ¶ 23.) His authority to do so

derives from his position as Calipatria’s Chief Deputy Warden and

Acting Warden. (Id.) The decision to continue the modified program

until August 30, 2007, was solely Ochoa’s and was based on several

violent incidents and factors that showed there existed a continuing, immediate threat of harm to officers and inmates. (Id. ¶ 24.)

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09CV950 10

As Captains, Defendants Johnson and Price reviewed information and made recommendations regarding the modified program. (Doc.

No. 19-4 at ¶ 8; Doc. No. 19-5 at ¶ 9.) However, neither Johnson

nor Price had the authority to order, update, modify, or end the

modified program. (Doc. No. 19-4 at ¶ 6; Doc. No. 19-5 at ¶ 8.)

Neither Captain had the authority to deviate from Acting Warden

Ochoa’s decisions and orders. (Doc. No. 19-4 at ¶ 7; Doc. No. 19-5

at ¶ 10.)

As Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation, Defendant Tilton did not directly manage or

supervise the daily operation of Calipatria State Prison. (Doc. No.

19-6 at ¶ 4.) That responsibility was delegated to Defendant Ochoa,

the prison’s Acting Warden. (Id.) There were two additional levels

of supervisors between Ochoa and Tilton. (Id.) Tilton did not

order, direct, manage, or supervise any lockdowns or modified

programs, race-based or otherwise, at Calipatria. (Id. ¶¶ 5-8.)

Race was a factor considered in the decision to continue the

modified program for African-American inmates. (Doc. No. 19-7 at

¶ 25.) However, as Defendants explain, race relations in prison are

much different than in the civilized society in which most Americans

live. (Id.) In prison, inmates organize themselves by race and may

apply pressure to members of their own race to commit crimes and

other rules violations. (Id.) Moreover, inmates of different races

rarely act together to commit violent acts against prison staff.

(Id.) For example, an African-American inmate who is not himself

affiliated with any gang may be forced by African-American gang

members to assault an officer, or face the threat of assault himself

if he refuses. (Id.) Thus, Defendants explain, even if an attack

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09CV950 11

is planned by Crip gang members, staff cannot be certain that it

will be carried out only by active gang members. (Id.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) mandates the grant of

summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” The standard for granting a motion

for summary judgment is essentially the same as for the granting of

a directed verdict. Judgment must be entered “if, under the

governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the

verdict.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51

(1986). However, “[i]f reasonable minds could differ,” judgment

should not be entered in favor of the moving party. Id.; see also

Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 470 (9th Cir. 2007)

(“If a rational trier of fact might resolve the issue in favor of

the nonmoving party, summary judgment must be denied.”) (alteration

omitted).

The parties bear the same substantive burden of proof as

would apply at a trial on the merits, including plaintiff’s burden

to establish any element essential to his case. Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 252; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Lack of

a genuine issue of material fact on a single element of a claim for

relief is sufficient to warrant summary judgment on that claim.

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.

The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying the

elements of the claim in the pleadings, or other evidence, and

“‘showing’ -- that is, pointing out to the district court -- that

there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s

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09CV950 12

case.” Id. at 325; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “A material

issue of fact is one that affects the outcome of the litigation and

requires a trial to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the

truth.” S.E.C. v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir.

1982).

The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish,

beyond the pleadings, that there is a genuine dispute for trial.

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. To successfully rebut a properly

supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party “must

point to some facts in the record that demonstrate a genuine issue

of material fact and, with all reasonable inferences made in the

plaintiff[]’s favor, could convince a reasonable jury to find for

the plaintiff[].” Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d

736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Rule 56; Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at

323; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249).

“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of

which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable

jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the

facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 327, 380 (2007).

III. Discussion

Before analyzing Plaintiff’s claims, the Court first notes

that the analysis below may not be necessary since Plaintiff’s

opposition does not address any of Defendants’ legal arguments or

presents any evidence despite having received notice pursuant to

Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1988), and Klingele v.

Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988), specifically telling him

how to oppose the summary judgment motion. (Doc. No. 20.) As a

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09CV950 13

result, Defendants’ motion is effectively unopposed. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e)(3). Nonetheless, the Court undertakes the analysis

below and concludes that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment

on the merits.

A. Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Additional Discovery is DENIED

Although Plaintiff opposes summary judgment almost

exclusively on the basis of former Rule 56(f), the Court partially

construes his opposition as a second motion for additional discovery

under Rule 56(d). Pursuant to the authority granted the undersigned

by 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(A) and Local Civil Rule 72.1(b),

Plaintiff’s renewed motion for additional discovery is DENIED.

1. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) (formerly Rule 56(f))

allows the Court to defer ruling on a summary judgment motion and

allow a party additional time to “obtain affidavits or declarations

or to take discovery” if the non-moving party, here Plaintiff,

“shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, [he]

cannot present facts essential to justify [his] opposition.” In

seeking such relief, “a party opposing summary judgment ‘must make

clear what information is sought and how it would preclude summary

judgment.’” Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 1998)

(quoting Garrett v. City and County of San Francisco, 818 F.2d 1515,

1518 (9th Cir. 1987)).

Where a party has failed to diligently pursue discovery, it

is proper to deny a request under Rule 56(d). Emplrs. Teamsters

Local Nos. 175 & 505 Pension Trust Fund v. Clorox Co., 353 F.3d

1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 2004); Cal. Union Ins. Co. v. Am. Diversified

Sav. Bank, 914 F.2d 1271, 1278 (9th Cir. 1990). However, if the

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09CV950 14

movant shows that he diligently pursued discovery but simply needs

additional time to complete discovery, denying his request is an

abuse of discretion. See Noyes v. Kelly Servs., 488 F.3d 1163, 1174

(9th Cir. 2007) (holding that a district court improperly denied

request for additional discovery where the plaintiff had pursued

discovery but was delayed by the opposing side); Garrett, 818 F.2d

at 1518-19 (holding that a district court improperly denied motion

where the plaintiff diligently pursued discovery but was unable to

obtain complete responses prior to due date of response to the

opposing party's summary judgment motion).

Finally, denial of a discovery request is also proper when

“the movant fails to show how the information sought would preclude

summary judgment.” Cal. Union Ins. Co., 914 F.2d at 1278; see also

Panatronic USA v. AT&T Corp., 287 F.3d 840, 846 (9th Cir. 2002).

2. Background

On October 19, 2009, the Court issued a scheduling order that

designated May 17, 2010, as the fact discovery cut-off. (Doc. No.

14 at ¶ 6.) Two months after that deadline passed, Plaintiff sought

to extend it for the first time on July 19, 2010. (Doc. No. 21.)

However, because Plaintiff admitted that he had conducted no

discovery and provided no explanation for not doing so, (id. at

2:21-26), the undersigned denied the motion without prejudice and

instructed him to explain the reasons for his request and identify

the additional discovery he sought, (see Doc. No. 23). Rather than

file a renewed motion for additional discovery, Plaintiff used his

opposition to Defendants’ summary judgment motion to again request

additional discovery. (See Doc. No. 27.)

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For their part, Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s request on

grounds that (1) Plaintiff has not conducted “any type of discovery

prior to the expiration of the discovery cut-off date”, (Doc. No. 29

at 2:23-3:6); (2) the request requires modification of the Court’s

scheduling order, and the requisite “good cause” does not exist,

(id. at 3:7-21); and (3) Plaintiff does not explain the delay in

seeking discovery of documents and events which occurred in 2007,

(id. at ll. 22-27).

3. Plaintiff Has Not Been Diligent and Has Made No Showing

That Discovery Will Preclude Summary Judgment

The Court denies Plaintiff’s second motion for additional

discovery because the four arguments the Court can decipher from his

moving papers fail to make even a minimal showing that he has been

diligent or that the discovery he seeks will preclude summary

judgment.

First, Plaintiff requests discovery “in light of the fact

that information upon which facts are stated in support of Defendants[’] Motion for Summary Judgment is [sic] in exclusive possession of [D]efendants and can not [sic] be opposed by plaintiff in

absence of discovery.” (Doc. No. 27 at 2:13-15.)

Second, in response to the Court’s request that Plaintiff

identify what discovery he seeks, he states that he seeks information regarding Defendant Ochoa’s declaration statement that the

modified program was ordered because of an immediate and ongoing

harm to prison staff and inmates. (Id. at ll. 16-20.)

Third, Plaintiff cites to a “group grievance” complaint that

fellow inmate Curtis Miller filed with prison officials on July 14,

2007, and seeks reports and other documents related to events Miller

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allegedly witnessed. (Id. at 3:2-22; 4:8-17.) On two occasions,

Curtis witnessed an “altercation” between prison guards and AfricanAmerican inmates. (Id. at 3:2-10.) Also, before one of the

lockdowns, he apparently witnessed guards handcuff an AfricanAmerican inmate and lead him out of Plaintiff’s sight. (Id. at

3:10-22.) Shortly thereafter, the prison alarm sounded, and the

African-American inmates learned that they would be placed on a

modified program the next morning. Though he did not witness

anything beyond the handcuffed prisoner being led away, Curtis

concludes that the alarm and subsequent lockdown were somehow

related to the handcuffed prisoner and questions the possibility

that a handcuffed prisoner could attack an officer.

Finally, Plaintiff explains that he needs to obtain any

reports on an anonymous report to officials, that African-American

inmates were planning to stab a correctional sergeant. (Id. at

3:23-24.) 

Considering that the above explanation for the need for

discovery was Plaintiff’s second opportunity to provide some basis

to grant his request, the undersigned finds his renewed request

wholly inadequate for the two reasons below.

First, Plaintiff has not explained how the discovery he seeks

will in any way preclude summary judgment or even minimally support

his claims and allegations.

In any event, even if the discovery Plaintiff seeks is

somehow relevant, his request nonetheless fails because he has not

diligently pursued discovery. As Defendants point out, he was well

aware that he had the ability to take discovery, failed to do so,

and failed to explain why. Indeed, Plaintiff was quite eager to

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begin the discovery process, as he twice requested that the Court

issue a scheduling order with discovery deadlines. (See Doc. Nos.

4, 7.) The first request came on June 18, 2009, a little over one

month after the case was removed to this Court and before Defendants

answered the complaint. (Doc. No. 4.) The second request came on

August 17, 2009. (Doc. No. 7.) The Court issued a scheduling order

shortly thereafter on October 19, 2009. (Doc. No. 14 at ¶ 6.)

However, despite his eagerness, Plaintiff conducted no discovery in

this case and provides no explanation for his failure to do so. He

did not request any documents. He did not depose inmate Miller. He

did not depose any of the accused Defendants. He did not serve

written discovery. He did nothing.

The Court also notes that all of the information or documents

Plaintiff identified existed during the time period that discovery

was open. Indeed, all of it even pre-dated Plaintiff’s filing of

the lawsuit. Plaintiff has not stated that he learned about the

information or documents for the first time after the discovery cutoff. Nor does he identify any information or documents that were

created after the discovery cut-off. The fact that the information

he seeks was in Defendant’s exclusive control changes nothing since

Plaintiff could easily have wrested this information from Defendants’ control had he diligently pursued discovery.

The Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff diligently pursued

discovery, nor can it conclude that Defendants delayed him in any

way despite his diligence. Cf. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 930

(9th Cir. 2004) (finding abuse of discretion where inmate had

diligently pursued discovery by, inter alia, serving multiple

interrogatories and requests for documents, but was delayed due to

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3/ On this claim, and every claim hereafter, Defendant Tilton is

entitled to summary judgment on the additional basis that there is

no evidence or allegation that he was in any way personally involved

in any of the events in this case. The uncontested evidence

establishes that he was not personally involved in any way.

09CV950 18

disagreements with the defendants). Plaintiff’s request for

additional discovery is DENIED.

B. Defendants Are Entitled To Summary Judgment On Plaintiff’s

First Amendment Claim3/

Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated his First Amendment

right to access to courts when “Mrs. Raske,” the law librarian

denied him access to the prison law library, causing him to miss an

August 21, 2007, court deadline. (Doc. No. 1-2 at 77.) The

undersigned recommends that summary judgment be granted in Defendants’ favor because (1) the modified programs did not preclude

Plaintiff’s access to the law library; (2) Plaintiff improperly sued

Defendants because if he was denied access, it was Mrs. Raske, not

Defendants, who denied him access to the law library; and (3)

Plaintiff fails to provide evidence that he suffered actual injury.

To succeed on the merits on the access to courts claim,

Plaintiff must show: (1) he was unreasonably denied access to the

courts and (2) he suffered an actual injury as a result. See Lewis

v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996); Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794,

797 (9th Cir. 1994). A prisoner establishes actual injury by

showing he was actually denied access to the courts. Vandelft, 31

F.3d at 797 (citing Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir.

1989)). An “actual injury” is “actual prejudice with respect to

contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet

a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348.

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Insofar as such a claim is based on law library access, there is no

absolute right to the use of a prison law library. Id. at 350.

Defendants’ evidence establishes that Facility B AfricanAmerican inmates had access to the law library even during the

modified program. From May 30, 2003, to June 26, 2007, AfricanAmerican inmates with court deadlines were allowed library access.

(Doc. No. 19-7 at 7-9 (Ochoa Declaration, Ex. A).) From June 27,

2007, to August 22, 2007, there were no restrictions on law library

access for any inmates, including African-American inmates. (Id. at

10-15.) Beginning on August 23, 2007, and for six days thereafter,

law library access was limited only to inmates of any race who had

approved court deadlines. (Id. at 16.) After August 29, 2007,

there were no restrictions on law library access for any inmate.

(Id. at 17-18.) The modified programs never outright denied AfricanAmericans access to the law library. Indeed, Plaintiff alleges that

his “legal deadline” was on August 21, 2007, which was within the

June 27, 2007, to August 22, 2007, time period during which there

were no restrictions on library access. Thus, insofar as Plaintiff

argues that Defendants, through the modified program, denied him

access to the courts, the uncontested evidence establishes that

Plaintiff cannot prevail on this basis.

Moreover, Plaintiff’s own Complaint establishes that he sued

the wrong defendants on this claim. Plaintiff fails to even allege

that Defendants were in any way involved in Mrs. Raske’s alleged

denial of Plaintiff’s access to the law library. The only persons

Plaintiff mentions in connection with this claim are Mrs. Raske,

Sergeant Catlett, and “building staff or the escorting officer,”

none of whom have been sued in this case. (Doc. No. 1-2 at 77:12-

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17.) Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on this

claim on the additional basis that they were not personally involved

and were not correctly sued on this claim.

Finally, Plaintiff fails to present any evidence to support

his claim that his petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied as

a result of missing a court deadline. Beyond his bare assertion

that this happened, he presents no evidence, for example, of which

court was involved, any case number that would help the Court

independently verify his claim, or any documentation of the petition

denial. This despite Plaintiff’s allegation that he had a “court

order” evidencing the deadline. (Doc. No. 1-2 at 77:11-13.)

Further, the Court’s independent research has not revealed any order

that denied Plaintiff’s petition in 2007 or since. Consequently,

because Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that he missed a

court deadline, he cannot establish that he suffered an actual

injury even if he had correctly sued Defendants.

C. Defendants Are Entitled To Summary Judgment On Plaintiff’s

Fourteenth Amendment Claim

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim because Defendants have

presented evidence that the modified program imposed on AfricanAmericans was narrowly tailored to further a compelling government

interest.

Racial discrimination in prisons and jails is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, except for “‘the necessities

of prison security and discipline.’” Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319,

321 (1972) (per curiam) (quoting Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333,

334 (1968) (per curiam)). A strict-scrutiny standard applies to

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racial classifications in prisons, requiring that the government

prove that such classification is narrowly tailored to further a 

compelling governmental interest. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S.

499, 505-07 (2005). Under this standard, “the government has the

burden of proving that racial classifications “are narrowly tailored

measures that further compelling governmental interests.” Adarand

Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). In other

words, Defendants must “show that reasonable men and women could not

differ regarding the necessity of a racial classification in

response to prison disturbances and that the racial classification

was the least restrictive alternative (i.e., that any race-based

policies are narrowly tailored to legitimate prison goals).”

Richardson v. Runnels, 594 F.3d 666, 671 (9th Cir. 2010).

No dispute exists that the state has a compelling interest in

prison security, nor can there be such a dispute. See Greene v.

Solano County Jail, 513 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Cutter

v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005)). Indeed, “deference is

due to institutional officials’ expertise in this area.” Cutter,

544 U.S. at 725 n.13. The only issue that remains is whether the

modified programs instituted here were narrowly tailored to further

that interest. Accord Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 998

(9th Cir. 2005). The undersigned concludes that they were.

Defendants’ evidence establishes that a dire emergency

situation existed in Calipatria’s Facility B in the Summer of 2007.

In brazen manner, five African-American inmates simultaneously

attacked two correctional officers in an attempt to kill them. Not

only was the attack violent, it demonstrated that multiple inmates

had worked in concert to plan and carry out the attack. As was the

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practice, Warden Ochoa immediately locked down Facility B in its

entirety, including all inmates of all races. The initial facilitywide lockdown was aimed at establishing total control over the

inmates to prevent future attacks while the prison investigated the

incident. The initial lockdown was not race-based and does not

violate the Fourteenth Amendment.

Once officials investigated the incident, they learned that

the attack was the result of general discontent and ill will towards

officers and was coordinated and pre-planned. Officials also

learned that the general discontent was isolated to one race, the

African-Americans. Indeed, no other race was involved in the

original attack and none attacked any guards after they returned to

their regular programs. Knowing that this sentiment was isolated to

one race, officials allowed other races to return to their normal

programs while they kept African-Americans in a controlled environment for everyone’s safety while tensions eased and officials

further investigated.

Restriction of the entire African-American population in

Facility B was necessary The original attack had already established that African-Americans were working together to plan and

execute attacks on staff. Further, the investigation revealed that

the original attack was not isolated to just the five attackers, as

the sentiment of heightened ill will towards officer was shared

among uninvolved Facility B African-Americans. Indeed, just nine

days after the original attack, another Facility B African-American

attacked and choked a correctional officer even while the modified

program was in place. It bears repeating that correctional officers

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09CV950 23

were not attacked by inmates of any other race and it appeared that

the heightened threat to officers was limited to African-Americans.

Moreover, because of the manner in which prisoners segregate

and classify themselves by race, even non-gang-affiliated inmates

are pressured to attack staff, lest they themselves face the gang’s

wrath. Officials reasonably believed that restricting all AfricanAmericans in Facility B was necessary until each inmate could be

individually screened. Otherwise, officials exposed correctional

officers to more attacks if they released all uninvolved AfricanAmericans. Thus, by this point, officials knew that there had been

a coordinated attack against an officer, a heightened state of ill

will existed among Facility B African-Americans, a third officer was

attacked and choked just nine days after the first incident, and the

identity of the next attacker was uncertain.

The evidence further establishes that, after a short period

of time, an Unlock List was established to identify those inmates

who were individually determined not to pose an immediate threat to

staff. The Unlock List demonstrates a careful attempt to ease

restrictions on some African-Americans while maintaining institutional security. The Unlock List belies Plaintiff’s contention that

African-Americans were categorically locked down without thought or

justification. To the contrary, officials attempted to strike a

delicate balance between easing restrictions during a time when

multiple officers had been attacked on multiple occasions by

multiple African-Americans.

In his opposition, Plaintiff cites Richardson v. Runnels, 594

F.3d 666 (9th Cir. 2010), which, upon examination, is distinguishCase 3:09-cv-00950-JLS-WVG Document 30 Filed 03/03/11 Page 23 of 30
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able from Plaintiff’s case. There, officials instituted several

race-based lockdowns after several inmate-on-staff and inmate-oninmate attacks. In the first attack, all African-American inmates

in one facility where locked down after a lone African-American

inmate attacked a correctional officer. Richardson, 594 F.3d at

669. Upon investigation, officials learned that the attack was a

premeditated and planned assault, id., but there is no indication

that any other inmates besides the attacker were involved in the

planning and assault.

One month after the first assault, officials received

information that members of the Black Guerilla Family (“BGF”) gang

intended to attack officers. Id. As a result, 100 BGF-affiliated

inmates were placed in ad seg. The subsequent investigation

revealed that the information had been fabricated by a correctional

officer, and all inmates resumed their normal programming. Id.

Two weeks later, two African-American inmates attacked one

correctional officer. Id. As a result, all African-American

inmates were locked down. Id. However, after a nearly two-month

investigation, officials learned that this attack was an isolated

event and gradually returned the inmates to normal programming. Id.

Then, on April 8, 2003, one African-American inmate attacked

two officers, resulting in a race-wide lockdown in one facility,

despite the seemingly immediate determination that this attack was

a result of a two-man conspiracy and not a broader conspiracy. Id.

Officials later determined that members of the Crips gang were

responsible for the attack, and other African-American groups were

not responsible. Id. As a result, the other groups returned to

normal programming while the Crips remained on lockdown. Id.

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The Ninth Circuit held that officials had failed to show

“that reasonable men and women could not differ regarding the

necessity of a racial classification in response to prison disturbances and that the racial classification was the least restrictive

alternative” because they had “made no evidentiary showing at all

concerning the basis for regarding all African-Americans as a

security risk when one or a few African-American inmates are

responsible for an assault.” Id. at 672-73 (emphasis added).

What sets Plaintiff’s case apart from Richardson is that the

investigation here revealed that the assaults were not isolated

events merely orchestrated and carried out by lone inmates or

inmates acting in pairs. Rather, the investigation revealed that

(1) the broader sentiment among African-Americans in Facility B was

that they had been disrespected by correctional officers, (2) many

Facility B African-Americans harbored a heightened state of

discontent and ill-will towards officers as a result, and (3) a

conspiracy of unknown size existed among inmates to attack officers.

Unlike in Richardson, where officials quickly discovered that the

attacks were isolated incidents or conspiracies between only two

inmates, the conspiracy here was larger than the five inmates who

attacked the two officers in the first assault, but its breadth was

unknown. The Court recognizes that the April 8, 2003, Crips-related

attack against the two officers in Richardson seems factually

similar. However, the key distinguishing fact is the absence of

information in Richardson that the Crips planned to carry out more

assaults against officers. Here, the investigation revealed that

more attacks were planned, and more attacks were indeed carried out.

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Moreover, the continued imposition of the modified program on

African-Americans was not arbitrary, but based on both the investigation and the nature of the attacks. Indeed, all of the incidents

that led to African-Americans only being locked down involved other

African-American inmates and no other race. Moreover, the investigation revealed that inmates of other races in fact did not share

the same heightened discontent and ill will towards correctional

officers.

Although it could have been true that not every locked-down

inmate shared the sentiment of ill will towards officers, officials

had no way of knowing which inmates were safe to release without

individually screening every inmate, which officials did. Faced

with (1) the knowledge that the ill will was not isolated only to

the attackers, (2) the larger threat of continued attacks against

Facility B officers, and (3) the uncertainty of which inmate would

carry out the next attack, the race-based modified program in

Facility B was narrowly tailored to address the immediate threat

officials faced. Thus, unlike in Richardson, Defendants here have

made an evidentiary showing that all Facility B African-Americans

posed an immediate security risk until they could be individually

screened. The threat to the correctional officers was much larger

than just “one or a few African-American inmates” who were responsible for the assaults in Richardson. Unlike in Richardson, here,

there is no lack of evidentiary basis that a link existed between

the attackers and the Facility B African-American population at

large. It is unimaginable how officials could have more narrowly

tailored their response in the face of the threats and uncertainties

they faced in 2007. Reasonable men and women in Defendants’ shoes

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at that time would not have disagreed that the modified program was

a necessary and narrowly-tailored response.

D. Defendants Are Entitled To Summary Judgment On Plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment Claim

Plaintiff claims a violation of the Eighth Amendment on the

basis that he was denied outdoor exercise while he was on the

modified program. Because the modified program was a response to a

genuine emergency, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on

this claim as well.

Although prison administrators generally have broad discretion in determining whether to declare emergencies and impose

lockdowns to control institutional disturbances, the conditions

imposed during the lockdown may constitute cruel and unusual

punishment under the Eighth Amendment. See Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d

1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994) (denial of outdoor exercise may give rise

to Eighth Amendment claim for deprivation of humane conditions of

confinement); Hayward v. Procunier, 629 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir.

1980) (same).

Although exercise is “one of the basic human necessities

protected by the Eighth Amendment,” Pierce v. County of Orange, 526

F.3d 1190, 1211 (9th Cir. 2008), “a temporary denial of outdoor

exercise with no medical effects is not a substantial deprivation,”

Norwood v. Vance, 591 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2010). “When a

‘lockdown was in response to a genuine emergency,’ and ‘restrictions

were eased as the prison administration determined that the

emergency permitted,’ [courts] may not lightly second-guess

officials’ expert judgments about when exercise and other programs

could safely be restored. ‘These decisions are delicate ones, and

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those charged with them must be given reasonable leeway.’” Norwood,

591 F.3d at 1069-70 (quoting Hayward v. Procunier, 629 F.2d 599, 603

(9th Cir. 1980)).

Several distinguished judges in this District have found an

absence of Eighth Amendment liability for exercise time denials,

that spanned many months, when security concerns justified the

deprivation. See, e.g., Jones v. Garcia, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1095,

1102-03 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (Jones, J.) (finding no Eighth Amendment

violation where prisoner was denied outdoor exercise for ten months

because of ongoing violence); Hayes v. Garcia, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1198,

1201, 1207-08 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (Gonzalez, C.J.) (same for nine-month

denial of outdoor exercise); Hurd v. Garcia, 454 F. Supp. 2d 1032,

1042-45 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (Benitez, J.) (same for five-month denial).

As explored in detail above, Defendants’ undisputed evidence

establishes that a genuine, ongoing emergency existed at Calipatria

during the relevant times of this lawsuit.

Moreover, the undisputed evidence amply shows that the

modified program was not punitively applied. Rather, it was a

reactive measure used only in response to violent incidents.

Defendants did not wantonly place inmates on modified programs for

no apparent reason. Violence against correctional officers

triggered the modified programs and continued violence and threats

against officers triggered continuation of the program.

Finally, there is no evidence that Plaintiff suffered any

harm. Although he alleges that he suffered various injuries,

Plaintiff has not provided any evidence to support his allegations.

Based on the foregoing, there exists no evidence that the

modified programs at issue here violated the Eighth Amendment, and

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ample evidence to the contrary exists. As a result, Defendants are

entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

E. Defendants Are Entitled To Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Plaintiff presents no argument to the contrary. Because Defendants

are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s constitutional

claims, the undersigned concludes that Defendants are also entitled

to qualified immunity.

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity

“insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” Liston v. County of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 975

(9th Cir. 1997) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982)). The Court engages in a two-part inquiry: (1) whether the

facts shown “make out a violation of a constitutional right,” and

(2) “whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the

time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555

U.S. 223, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815-16 (2009). The Court may consider

these steps in any order it wishes. Id. at 818.

“[T]here is no necessity for further inquiries concerning

qualified immunity” if the Court determines that no constitutional

violation has been made out. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201

(2001), overruled on other grounds by Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818.

The Court begins by determining whether the facts establish

a constitutional violation. As explained in detail above, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s three

constitutional claims. As a result, the facts cannot establish a 

constitutional violation, and the Court’s inquiry ends there. See

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Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that

Defendants’ summary judgment motion be GRANTED in full.

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section

636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than March 18, 2011, any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” The parties

are advised that failure to file objections within the specified

time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.

1991).

DATED: March 3, 2011

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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