Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-03159/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-03159-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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28 This matter is deemed to be suitable for decision without oral *

argument. E.D. Cal. R. 230(g).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN D. GEBHARD AND ELENA GEBHARD, )

)

Plaintiffs, ) 2:09-CV-03159-GEB-JFM

)

v. ) ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’

) MOTION TO REMAND*

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.; CRESTLINE )

FINANCIAL AND MARKETING SERVICE )

CORPORATION, INC.; EDITHA GANTAN )

SANTOS, AN INDIVIDUAL; AND DOES 1 )

THROUGH 100, )

)

Defendants. )

)

 

On January 7, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a motion in which they

seek to remand this case to the San Joaquin County Superior Court in

California from which it was removed. (Docket No. 9.) Plaintiffs

also request an award of the attorney’s fees and costs incurred in

connection with preparing and filing their remand motion. Defendant

Bank of America, N.A. (“BofA”) opposes Plaintiffs’ motion, arguing

federal question jurisdiction supports the removal of this case to

federal court. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs’ motion to

remand is GRANTED.

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28 BofA’s notice of removal cites to six paragraphs of 1

Plaintiffs’ complaint for support: ¶¶ 10, 53, 62, 68, 75 and 83.

2

I. BACKGROUND

On October 14, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the San

Joaquin County Superior Court, alleging fourteen claims under state

law. Specifically, Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges claims for breach of

fiduciary duty, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing, deceit, promissory estoppel, fraud by intentional

misrepresentation, fraud by concealment, restitution for unjust

enrichment, slander of title, civil conspiracy, declaratory relief,

rescission/cancellation of void instrument, preliminary and permanent

injunctive relief and violations of California Business and

Professions Code § 17200 et seq. and California’s Rosenthal Act. 

Plaintiffs’ claims relate to a mortgage loan transaction

involving property located at 10617 Tank House Drive in Stockton,

California. (Compl. ¶ 2.) On or about December 23, 2005, Plaintiffs

entered into a mortgage loan agreement with Aegis Wholesale Lending,

who later transferred the loan to Countrywide Home Loans. (Id.) BofA

is allegedly the “corporate successor” to Countrywide Home Loans. 

(Id. ¶ 3.)

On October 13, 2009, BofA filed a notice of removal,

removing this action to federal court on the basis of federal question

jurisdiction. (Notice of Removal ¶ 5.) BofA’s notice of removal

states that removal is proper since Plaintiffs’ claims “arise under”

two federal statutes: the Truth in Lending Act and the Real Estate

Settlement Procedures Act. (Id.) After removal, on November 20, 1

2009, BofA filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint. 

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3

Plaintiffs did not oppose BofA’s dismissal motion; however, on January

7, 2010, they filed their now pending remand motion.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Removal

A defendant may remove to federal court “any civil action

brought in a State court of which the district courts . . . have

original jurisdiction . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Removal,

therefore, is only proper when a case originally filed in state court

presents a federal question or is between citizens of different states

and involves an amount in controversy that exceeds $75,000. See 28

U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a). “The removal statute is strictly construed

against removal jurisdiction [and] [t]he defendant bears the burden of

establishing that removal is proper.” Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque

v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations

omitted). “Where doubt regarding the right to removal exists, a case

should be remanded to state court.” Matheson v. Progressive Specialty

Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003).

B. Federal Question Jurisdiction 

BofA argues federal question jurisdiction supports its

removal of this action. “The presence or absence of federal question

jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which

provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question

is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded

complaint.” California v. United States, 215 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th

Cir. 2000) (quoting Audette v. Int’l Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s

Union, 195 F.3d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 1999)). “Under that rule, [a

court] must look to what necessarily appears in the plaintiff’s

statement of his or her own claim . . . , unaided by anything alleged

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in anticipation of avoidance of defenses which is thought the

defendant may interpose.” Id. at 1014-15 (quoting Oklahoma Tax Comm’n

v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838, 841 (1999)). “In addition, the plaintiff is

the ‘master’ of her case, and if she can maintain her claims on both

state and federal grounds, she may ignore the federal question, assert

only state claims, and defeat removal.” Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d

1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996).

It is undisputed that the face of Plaintiffs’ complaint does

not allege a claim under federal law. However, “[u]nder the artful

pleading doctrine, a plaintiff may not defeat removal by omitting to

plead necessary federal questions in a complaint. The artful pleading

doctrine allows courts to delve beyond the face of the state court

complaint and find federal question jurisdiction by recharacterizing a

plaintiff’s state-law claim as a federal claim.” Lippit v. Raymond

James Fin. Servs., Inc., 340 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 2003). The

artful pleading doctrine applies to “(1) complete preemption cases,

and (2) substantial federal question cases. Subsumed within this

second category are those cases where the claim is necessarily federal

in character or where the right to relief depends on the resolution of

a substantial, disputed federal question.” Id. (citations omitted).

A state law cause of action “arises under” federal law and

confers federal question jurisdiction when it “necessarily raise[s] a

stated federal issue, [that is] actually disputed and substantial . .

. .” Grable & Sons Metal Prods. Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S.

308, 314 (2005). “[F]ederal law [must do] . . . more than just shape

a court’s interpretation of state law; the federal law must be at

issue” in the plaintiff’s claim. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs v.

County of Plumas, 559 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in

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original). Further, “[w]hen a claim can be supported by alternative

and independent theories-one of which is a state law theory and one of

which is a federal law theory-federal question jurisdiction does not

attach because federal law is not a necessary element of the claim.” 

Rains v. Criterion Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 346 (9th Cir. 1996).

A state law claim may also “arise under” federal law “where

federal law completely preempts state law.” ARCO Envtl. Remediation,

L.L.C v. Dept. of Health and Envtl. Quality, 213 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th

Cir. 2000). “In such circumstances, federal law displaces plaintiff’s

state-law claim, no matter how carefully pleaded. This is because the

claim purportedly based on a preempted state law is considered, from

its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal

law.” Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp., 410 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005)

(quotations and citations omitted). However, “[p]reempted state law

claims may be removed to federal court only in the rare instances

where Congress has chosen to regulate the entire field . . . .” Id.

“The [complete preemption] doctrine applies in select cases where the

preemptive force of federal law is so ‘extraordinary’ that it converts

state common law claims into claims arising under federal law for

purposes of jurisdiction.” Holman v. Laulo-Rowe Agency, 994 F.2d 666,

668 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). The “dispositive question” is

whether a federal law provides “the exclusive cause of action” for the

state claim alleged. Beneficial Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 9,

(2003). If the answer is yes, “the cause of action necessarily arises

under federal law and the case is removable.” Id. However, “[b]y

drafting a purely state law complaint, the plaintiff will ordinarily

remain in state court.” Holman, 994 at 668. 

//

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Plaintiffs’ deceit claim is alleged under California Civil 2

Code sections 1709 and 1710, which provide that “[o]ne who willfully

deceives another with intent to induce him to alter his position to his

injury or risk, is liable for any damage which he thereby suffers.”

Cal. Civ. Code § 1709. Section 1710 defines “deceit” for the purposes

(continued...)

6

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs argue this action should be remanded to state

court since Plaintiffs’ state law claims do not involve the

determination of a substantial, disputed question of federal law, nor

is federal law necessary to sustain any of their claims. BofA

responds, arguing federal question jurisdiction exists since

Plaintiffs’ deceit and breach of the implied covenant of good faith

and fair dealing claims are completely preempted by the National

Banking Act and regulations promulgated thereunder, and Plaintiffs’

claim for violation of California Business and Professions Code

section 17200 necessarily requires a determination that a federal law

was violated. 

A. Preemption of Plaintiffs’ Deceit and Breach of the Implied Covenant

of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Claims

1. Plaintiffs’ Deceit Claim

BofA argues Plaintiffs’ deceit claim premised upon

Defendants’ failure to disclose a yield spread premium is “completely

preempted” by the National Banking Act (“NBA”) and regulations

promulgated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”).

Specifically, BofA contends OCC regulation 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a)(9)

preempts Plaintiffs’ deceit claim.

BofA, however, narrowly characterizes the scope of

Plaintiffs’ claim. Plaintiffs’ deceit claim is not premised solely on

BofA’s failure to “disclose a yield spread premium.” Rather, 2

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28 (...continued) 2

of section 1709. Cal. Civ. Code § 1710.

7

Plaintiffs allege more broadly that “Defendants made

misrepresentations . . . including but not limited to statements that

Defendants would act in Plaintiffs’ best interest to obtain a loan

which would be to Plaintiffs’ benefit and to obtain a loan with the

best possible terms for Plaintiffs. In fact, Defendants did not

obtain a loan which was to Plaintiffs’ benefit and in fact induced

Plaintiffs to accept a loan on worse terms and with a higher interest

rate than they could have otherwise obtained so that Defendants could

receive a ‘yield spread premium’ kickback.” (Compl. ¶ 60.) 

Plaintiffs also allege “Defendants misrepresented the amount that

Defendants were charging Plaintiffs for their services” and

“Defendants stated to Plaintiffs that the cost of the loan brokerage

service they provided to Plaintiffs would be minimal.” (Id. ¶¶ 61,

63.) Plaintiffs further allege “Defendants suppressed the fact that

the yield spread premium was a kickback payment and that ultimately

Plaintiffs would end up paying for the improper kickback through

higher interest rates, other loan fees and generally less favorable

loan terms.” (Id. ¶ 62.) Plaintiffs allege, as a result of these

allegedly “misleading acts and statements,” Defendants “in fact did

mislead Plaintiffs and proximately damaged Plaintiffs by causing them

to pay more for products (the loan) and services (mortgage brokerage)

than the amount originally purported to be the price of these products

and services.” (Id. ¶ 68.)

Only Plaintiffs’ allegation that “Defendants suppressed the

fact that the yield spread premium was a kickback payment” arguably is

premised upon any failure to disclose a “yield spread premium.” (Id.

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¶ 62.) Even if a deceit claim premised upon a failure to disclose a

yield spread premium would be preempted by the NBA, Plaintiffs’ deceit

claim here can be maintained on alternative and independent state law

grounds. See Rains, 80 F.3d at 346 (stating that “[w]hen a claim can

be supported by alternative and independent theories . . . federal

question jurisdiction does not attach because federal law is not a

necessary element of the claim”). Therefore, Plaintiffs’ deceit claim

does not “arise under” federal law and does not provide a basis for

removal.

2. Plaintiffs’ Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and

Fair Dealing Claim

BofA also argues Plaintiffs’ breach of the implied covenant

of good faith and fair dealing claim is preempted by the NBA and OCC

regulations since 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a)(4) and (9) preempt “any state

law claim related to alleged non-disclosures.” Further, BofA argues

that Plaintiffs’ allegation that “defendants placed [P]laintiffs in a

usurious transaction is also completely preempted” since the “NBA

provides the exclusive remedy for a claim of usury.”

Plaintiffs allege that “at all times there existed an

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing represented by the

terms of the loan, Note, and Deed of Trust which imposed upon

Defendants a duty of good faith and fair dealing . . . to safeguard,

protect, or otherwise care for the assets and rights of Plaintiffs.” 

(Compl. ¶ 51.) Further, Plaintiffs allege:

Defendants willfully breached their implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing with

Plaintiffs when Defendants: 

(a) Failed to provide all the proper

disclosures; 

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28 It is undisputed that BofA is a national banking association 3

and is subject to the NBA and OCC regulations promulgated thereunder.

9

(b) Failed to provide documentation of the

loan or respond to Plaintiffs’

inquiries[;] 

(c) Failed to provide accurate lending

disclosures on the loan; 

(d) Attempted and did place Plaintiffs

into usurious transactions that any

reasonable mortgage broker or mortgage

lender would know would ruin Plaintiffs

financially, or attempted to profit from

servicing these loans when it was obvious

that they were entirely illegitimate[;

and] 

(e) Attempt[ed] to collect payments on the

loan without documenting their position

regarding the Deed of Trust[.]

(Id. ¶ 53.) In addition, Plaintiffs allege that “reporting payment

arrearages to credit agencies and refusing to respond to Plaintiffs’

inquiries and refusing to produce documentation of the loan

constitutes a breach of the covenant.” (Id. ¶ 54.) 

Plaintiffs’ breach of the implied covenant of good faith and

fair dealing claim, therefore, is broader than BofA’s

characterization. This claim does not rest solely on allegations of

non-disclosure or usury, and therefore, independent and alternative

state law theories support Plaintiffs’ claim. See Rains, 80 F.3d at

346.

Further, BofA has not demonstrated that Plaintiffs’ claim is

preempted by the NBA or OCC regulations promulgated thereunder. While

the NBA “shields national bank[s] from unduly burdensome and

duplicative state regulation,” federally chartered banks remain

“subject to state laws of general application in their daily business

to the extent such laws do not conflict with the letter or the general

purpose of the NBA.” Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 11 3

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(2007). Therefore, “[s]tates are permitted to regulate the activities

of national banks where doing so does not prevent or significantly

interfere with the national bank’s . . . exercise of its powers.” Id.

at 12. “Thus, [under the NBA,] states retain some power to regulate

national banks in areas such as contracts, debt collection,

acquisition and transfer of property, and taxation, zoning, criminal

and tort law.” Bank of America v. City and County of San Francisco,

309 F.3d 551, 559 (9th Cir. 2002).

OCC regulations prescribe the preemptive reach of the NBA. 

See 12 C.F.R. § 34.4 (identifying preempted state laws). In pertinent

part, 12 C.F.R. § 34.4 provides:

(a) Except where made applicable by Federal

law, state laws that obstruct, impair, or

condition a national bank’s ability to fully

exercise its Federally authorized real estate

lending powers do not apply to national

banks. Specifically, a national bank may

make real estate loans . . . without regard

to state law limitations concerning: . . .

(4) The terms of credit, including

schedule for repayment of principal

interest, amortization of loans,

balance, payments due, minimum payments,

or term to maturity of the loan,

including the circumstances under which

a loan may be called due and payable

upon passage of time or a specified

event external to the loan; . . .

(9) Disclosure and advertising,

including laws requiring specific

statements, information, or other

content to be included in credit

application forms, credit solicitations,

billing statements, credit contracts, or

other credit-related documents;

(10) Processing, origination, servicing,

sale or purchase of, or investment or

participation in, mortgages.

(b) State laws on the following subjects are

not inconsistent with the real estate lending

powers of national banks and apply to

national banks to the extent that they only

incidentally affect the exercise of national

banks’ real estate lending powers:

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(1) Contracts;

(2) Torts; . . .

(5) Rights to collect debts; . . .

(9) Any other law the effect of which

the OCC determines to be incidental to

the real estate lending operations of

national banks or otherwise consistent

with the powers and purposes set out in

§ 34.3(a).

12 C.F.R. § 34.4. “Federal regulations have no less pre-emptive

effect than federal statutes.” Bank of America, 309 F.3d at 560

(quoting Fidelity Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S.

141, 153 (1982)). Further, “the usual presumption against federal

preemption of state law is inapplicable to federal banking

regulation.” Rose v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 513 F.3d 1032, 1037 (9th

Cir. 2008) (quoting Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Boutris, 418 F.3d 949,

956 (9th Cir. 2005)). 

BofA argues that Plaintiffs’ claim is “completely preempted”

by 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a)(4) and (9) which provide that national banks

may make real estate loans without regard to state law limitations

regarding the “terms of credit” and “disclosure and advertising.” 

However, a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and

fair dealing is not a “state law limitation concerning” “[t]he terms

of credit” or the “disclosure and advertising” of real estate loans. 

Rather, it is common law claim of “general applicability” that does

not directly target banks or lending activity. Cf. Jefferson v. Chase

Home Finance, No. C 06-6510 TEH, 2008 WL 1883484, at *10 (N.D. Cal.

Apr. 29, 2008) (finding that California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act,

the False Advertising Act and the Unfair Competition Act are “laws of

general application, which merely require all businesses (including

banks) to refrain from misrepresentations and abide by contracts and

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representations to customers” and therefore “do not fall into the

enumerated categories of § 34.4(a)”) (quotations omitted)). 

Therefore, 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a) is inapplicable and the preemption

principles articulated in 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(b) control instead. See

Fultz v. World Sav. and Loan Ass’n, No. C08-0343RSL, at *2 (W.D. Wash.

Aug. 18, 2008) (concluding that the state laws under which plaintiffs

brought their claims were not “directly aimed at national banks or

lenders” and therefore did not fall within 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a) and the

pertinent inquiry required looking to 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(b)). Under 12

C.F.R. § 34.4(b), state contract and tort laws are only preempted to

the extent that they more than “incidentally affect the exercise of

[a] national bank’s real estate lending powers.” 

BofA’s preemption argument is conclusory. BofA merely

states that Plaintiffs’ claim is “completely preempte[d]” and cites 12

C.F.R. § 34.4(a)(4) and (9). BofA, however, does not address

preemption under § 34.4(b), nor has it shown that Plaintiffs’ claim

for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does

more than “incidentally affect” BofA’s “real estate lending powers.” 

Given that state contract and tort laws are generally “not

inconsistent with the real estate lending powers of national banks and

apply to national banks,” BofA has not demonstrated that Plaintiffs’

claim is preempted.

BofA also argues Plaintiffs’ allegation that the defendants

“attempted and did place Plaintiffs into usurious transactions” is

preempted by sections 85 and 86 of the NBA. While the NBA preempts

any state law claim of usury alleged against a national bank, BofA has

not demonstrated that Plaintiffs are alleging a usury claim. 

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that defendants breached their

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implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing with Plaintiffs when

they “[a]ttempted and did place Plaintiff into usurious transactions

that any reasonable mortgage broker . . . would know would ruin

Plaintiffs financially . . . .” (Compl. ¶ 53.) Plaintiffs,

therefore, are not seeking to recover because BofA applied an interest

rate that exceed any statutory maximum. Rather, Plaintiffs’

allegation is that Defendants breached an implied covenant by placing

them into a financially ruinous transaction. Cf. Cross-Country Bank

v. Klussman, No. C-01-4190-SC, 2004 WL 966289, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr.

30, 2004) (rejecting preemption argument where defendant improperly

characterized plaintiff’s allegations as a usury claim). Accordingly,

BofA has not demonstrated that Plaintiffs are alleging a usury claim

that is preempted by the NBA.

Since BofA has not shown that Plaintiffs’ breach of the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim is preempted by

the NBA or OCC regulations, this claim does not provide a basis for

removal.

B. Plaintiffs’ UCL Claim for “Unlawful” Business Acts or Practices

BofA also argues Plaintiffs’ claim alleging “unlawful”

conduct under California Business and Professions Code Section 17200

et seq. (“UCL") gives rise to federal question jurisdiction since it

requires a determination of whether there has been a violation of the

federal Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”).

“To bring a UCL claim, a plaintiff must show either an (1)

unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice, or (2)

unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising. Because section

17200 is written in the disjunctive, it establishes three varieties of

unfair competition - acts or practices which are unlawful, or unfair

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or fraudulent. A practice is prohibited as unfair or deceptive even

if not unlawful or vice versa.” Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin. Servs.

Inc., 340 F.3d 1033, 1043 (9th Cir. 2003) (quotations and citations

omitted). 

Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that defendants’

conduct “constitute[s] unlawful business acts and/or practices,” and

“threatens an incipient violation of various consumer protection

statutes, or which violate the policy or spirit of such laws,

including but not limited to, California Business and Professions Code

[section] 10130, California Civil Code [sections] 1709, 1710, 1711,

1920 and 1921 and Section 1639 of Title 15 of the United States Codes,

together with Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. 226.1.” (Compl. ¶ 75.)

BofA argues that neither California Business and Professions

Code section 10130 nor California Civil Code section 1770 are

applicable to Plaintiffs’ claim against it, and that California Civil

Code sections 1920 and 1921 are preempted by the federal Alternative

Mortgage Transactions Parity Act. BofA concludes that “other than

[the] completely preempted ‘deceit’ claim . . . the only viable

remaining alleged violation of law supporting liability under

[S]ection 17200 . . . is the averred violation of TILA and Regulation

Z.” 

However, as discussed above, Plaintiffs’ deceit claim

alleged under California Civil Code sections 1709 and 1710, is not

preempted by federal law. Therefore, BofA has not shown that

Plaintiffs’ reference to federal law in their UCL claim “does more

than just shape [the] court’s interpretation of state law . . . .” 

Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 559 F.3d at 1045. Plaintiffs’

“allegation that [BofA] has violated the TILA . . . is but one of

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[many] predicate violations . . . on which [Plaintiffs’] base[]

[their] Section 17200 cause of action. . . . The TILA violation

predicate, therefore, is not, and cannot be characterized as, an

essential part of the cause of action.” California v. H & R Block,

Inc., No. C 06-2058 SC, 2006 WL 2669045, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18,

2006). Accordingly, “[t]here is no ‘basic’ or ‘pivotal’ federal

question that impinges on [Plaintiffs’] right to relief.” Lippitt,

340 F.3d at 1046. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ UCL claim does not require a

determination of federal law and is not a basis for federal question

jurisdiction. 

BofA, therefore, has not demonstrated the existence of

federal question jurisdiction supporting removal of this action to

federal court. This action is accordingly remanded to the San Joaquin

County Superior Court in California from which it was removed.

C. Plaintiffs’ Request for Attorney’s Fees and Costs

Plaintiffs also argue they are entitled to attorney’s fees

and costs incurred in their remand motion. BofA responds, arguing

since Plaintiffs “have made no showing that removal was objectively

unreasonable” they are not entitled to recover fees and costs.

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) provides that “[a]n order remanding the

case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses,

including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” “[T]he

standard for awarding fees should turn on the reasonableness of the

removal. Absent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney’s

fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an

objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. Conversely, where

an objectively reasonable basis exists, fees should be denied.” 

Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005) (citations

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omitted). Although BofA’s arguments were ultimately found to lack

merit, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that BofA’s contentions were

objectively unreasonable. See Gardner v. UICI, 508 F.3d 559, 562 (9th

Cir. 2007) (stating that “whether removal is improper is not

dispositive in determining whether fees should be awarded”). 

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees and costs is

denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion is granted and

this case is remanded to the San Joaquin County Superior Court in

California from which it was removed. However, Plaintiffs’ request

for attorney’s fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) is denied.

Dated: February 10, 2010

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

 

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