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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3222

___________

Mary Rollins, Individually and as *

Administratrix of the Estate of *

Norman Rollins, *

* Appeal from the United States

Appellant, * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

v. *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Greg Smith, Individually and in his *

official capacity; City of Little Rock, *

Arkansas, *

*

Appellees.

___________

Submitted: July 7, 2004

Filed: July 22, 2004 

___________

Before BYE, McMILLIAN, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Mary Rollins (Mary), individually and as administratrix of Norman Rollins’s

(Norman’s) estate, brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Greg Smith, a Little

Rock Police Department (LRPD) officer, claiming Fourth Amendment violations and

battery. Mary’s claims arose from the shooting death of her son Norman during an

altercation that occurred when Officer Smith--who was called twice at Mary’s

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Summary judgment was granted as to the other defendant (the City of Little

Rock) and most of the state-law claims, and the remaining state-law claims (other

than the shooting-related battery) were not submitted to the jury. Except for an

assault-and-battery claim related to Officer Smith’s use of a baton before the

shooting, these rulings are not at issue on appeal. 

2

The Honorable Garnett Thomas Eisele, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Arkansas. 

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direction--attempted to convince Norman to leave Mary’s beauty salon.1 Mary now

appeals the district court’s2

 adverse entry of final judgment upon the jury’s verdict.

For reversal, she challenges certain pretrial evidentiary rulings, the district court’s

withholding of one claim from the jury, and the jury’s verdict on the Fourth

Amendment claim. 

To the extent we can determine the propriety of the district court’s pretrial

evidentiary rulings without a transcript of the related telephone conference, see

Schmid v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 827 F.2d 384, 386 (8th Cir.

1987) (per curiam) (appellant must bring before reviewing court all parts of

proceedings below necessary to determine validity of claimed error), cert. denied, 484

U.S. 1071 (1988), we find no abuse of discretion in the exclusion of evidence of

preseizure conduct, including an LRPD general order on handling mentally ill

persons, and a Deadly Force Review Board report completed after the incident, see

Lampkins v. Thompson, 337 F.3d 1009, 1012 (8th Cir. 2003) (standard of review).

In this circuit, preseizure conduct is not relevant in determining whether there was a

Fourth Amendment violation. See Duffy v. Wolle, 123 F.3d 1026, 1039 (8th Cir.

1997) (defining relevant evidence; review of district court’s determination as to

relevancy is extremely deferential), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1137 (1998); Schulz v.

Long, 44 F.3d 643, 648-49 (8th Cir. 1995) (this court scrutinizes only seizure itself,

and not events leading to seizure; no error in excluding evidence that officers should

have responded in different manner). 

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We also reject Mary’s contention that the district court should have admitted

the testimony of her expert, Dr. Terry Cox. Dr. Cox’s testimony primarily focused

on what Officer Smith should have done before confronting Norman a second time,

and his proposed testimony as to Smith’s use of force conflicted with Eighth Circuit

precedent. See Estes v. Moore, 993 F.2d 161, 163-64 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)

(expert testimony is only admissible if it assists trier of fact to understand evidence

or determine fact in issue; statement of legal conclusion by purported expert was

properly excluded). Further, he admittedly did not teach classes on the use of force,

nor had he taken any recent courses on the subject, cf. Jenkins v. Ark. Power & Light

Co., 140 F.3d 1161, 1162, 1165-66 (8th Cir. 1998) (expert properly excluded in

diving-accident case partly because he was not expert in placement of buoys, had

never investigated diving accident, and was not accident reconstructionist); and we

decline to consider Mary’s newly raised argument about using Dr. Cox as a lay

witness, see Brozo v. Oracle Corp., 324 F.3d 661, 668 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 124 S.

Ct. 578 (2003).

As to the sufficiency of evidence supporting the jury verdict on the Fourth

Amendment claim, Mary did not renew her motion for judgment as a matter of law

(JAML) after the jury rendered its verdict, and thus the verdict is subject to only

plain-error review. See Broadus v. O.K. Indus., Inc., 238 F.3d 990, 991 (8th Cir.

2001) (per curiam). The evidence Mary cites does not help her. Specifically, John

Lovelace’s testimony, as well as the report of Dr. Nordy (Mary’s expert), supported

Officer Smith’s version of the shooting, and the jury heard evidence that Mary’s and

Olivia Noland’s trial testimony as to what happened at the time of the shooting

differed from their previous deposition testimony and recorded statements. See

Herndon v. Armontrout, 986 F.2d 1237, 1240 (8th Cir. 1993) (it is jury’s province

and duty to resolve conflicts in testimony). We find no plain error. See Seiner v.

Drenon, 304 F.3d 810, 812 (8th Cir. 2002) (shooting is objectively reasonable when

officer has probable cause to believe suspect poses significant risk of death or serious

physical harm to officer or others; mistaken understanding of facts that is reasonable

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under circumstances can render seizure based on that understanding reasonable under

Fourth Amendment).

Finally, Mary contends the district court should not have granted JAML on the

assault-and-battery claim associated with a baton strike Officer Smith inflicted before

the shooting. This argument also fails. See Schulz, 44 F.3d at 647 (de novo standard

of review; JAML is appropriate only where nonmoving part has presented insufficient

evidence to support jury verdict in her favor; court must view evidence in light most

favorable to nonmoving party and not assess credibility). The witnesses agreed that

Mary did not want Norman in the shop, that Norman refused to go with Smith and

assumed an aggressive stance, and that he made threatening comments; and Smith

testified that Norman was retreating further into the shop, where customers, including

children, were present, and Norman had just struck him twice. Thus, Smith’s striking

Norman with a baton to immobilize him temporarily was not assault and battery. Cf.

Orr v. Walker, 310 S.W.2d 808, 809, 811 (Ark. 1958) (assault-and-battery jury

instruction in context of police officer’s conduct during misdemeanor arrest:

considering whether force was necessary to prevent escape or make arrest). 

Accordingly, we affirm. 

______________________________

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