Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02345/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02345-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY HIGBEE,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-08-2345 MCE DAD 

vs.

R. CAMBELL, Warden,

Respondent. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges the decision of the California Board

of Parole Hearings (hereinafter “Board”) to deny him parole for four years at his parole

consideration hearing held on April 20, 2006. Upon careful consideration of the record and the

applicable law, the undersigned will recommend that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus

relief be denied.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 9, 1987, in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, petitioner entered

a plea of guilty to second degree murder and was later sentenced to fifteen years to life, plus oneyear and a five-year enhancements to be served consecutively. Answer, Ex. A. This sentence

was to be served consecutively to a six-year sentence imposed on petitioner in another case. Id. 

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On April 20, 2006, following a hearing, the Board found that petitioner was

unsuitable for release on parole, and denied parole for four years. Pet., Ex. 3 at 87. Petitioner

challenged the Board’s decision in a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the Los Angeles

County Superior Court. Answer, Ex. B at 5. That petition was denied in a reasoned decision on

April 13, 2007. Id., Ex. C. Petitioner subsequently filed habeas petitions in the California Court

of Appeal and the California Supreme Court, both of which were summarily denied on January

17, 2008 and September 10, 2008, respectively. Id., Ex. D; Pet. at 8.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Board described the facts of petitioner’s offense of commitment at the April

20, 2006 parole suitability hearing as follows:

The inmate [met] the victim at a liquor store and they agreed to go

out together to drink alcohol. Sometime during the night, during

which they had consumed a considerable amount of alcohol, the

defendant hit the victim with his belt...[killed her, and] cut off

pubic hairs as well cutting off portions of the [breast]. When

[petitioner] sobered, the impact of what he had done hit him, he

told his family that he had done something terrible. The family

notified the police in Glendale, however, they could not verify [his]

story and no charges were filed at that time. Approximately eight

days after the killing, one of the members of the [petitioner’s]

family found the victim’s body and notified the Norwalk Sheriff’s

Station. The next day, the family brought [petitioner] to the

Sheriff’s Station where he was arrested.

Pet., Ex. 3 at 30-31.

ANALYSIS

I. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860,

861 (9th Cir. 1993); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v.

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991);

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000); Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085. Habeas

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corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de novo. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377

(1972). 

This action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d

1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003). Section 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting

habeas corpus relief:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall

not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

See also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362

(2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001). If the state court’s decision

does not meet the criteria set forth in § 2254(d), a reviewing court must conduct a de novo review

of a habeas petitioner’s claims. Delgadillo v. Woodford, 527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008). See

also Frantz v. Hazey, 513 F.3d 1002, 1013 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“[I]t is now clear both that

we may not grant habeas relief simply because of § 2254(d)(1) error and that, if there is such

error, we must decide the habeas petition by considering de novo the constitutional issues

raised.”).

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). If the last reasoned

state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a previous state court

decision, this court may consider both decisions to ascertain the reasoning of the last decision. 

Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 

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II. Petitioner’s Claims

Petitioner claims that the Board violated his due process and first amendment

rights by finding that he was unsuitable for parole based on his past substance abuse and his lack

of participation in AA or NA. (Pet. at 3; Traverse at 4-6.) Petitioner also seeks an order from

this court directing that his prison records be modified to reflect that his sentence is 15 years to

life in prison plus sentencing enhancements, rather than 27 years to life in prison. (Pet. at 5.)

A. Due Process in the California Parole Context

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state action that

deprives a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. One alleging a due

process violation must first demonstrate that he was deprived of a liberty or property interest

protected by the Due Process Clause and then show that the procedures attendant upon the

deprivation were not constitutionally sufficient. Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454,

459-60 (1989); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 891, 900 (9th Cir. 2002) (McQuillion I).

A protected liberty interest may arise from either the Due Process Clause of the

United States Constitution or state laws. Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987). The

United States Constitution does not, of its own force, create a protected liberty interest in a parole

date, even one that has been set. Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 17-21 (1981). However, “a

state’s statutory scheme, if it uses mandatory language, ‘creates a presumption that parole release

will be granted’ when or unless certain designated findings are made, and thereby gives rise to a 

constitutional liberty interest.” McQuillion I, 306 F.3d at 901 (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of

Neb. Penal, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979)). 

California’s parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on

parole, even for prisoners who have not already been granted a parole date. Sass v. Cal. Bd. of

Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006); Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914 (9th

Cir. 2003); McQuillion I, 306 F.3d at 903; see also In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181, 1204,

1210, 1221 (2008). Accordingly, this court must examine whether California provided the

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constitutionally required procedural safeguards when depriving petitioner of a protected liberty

interest and, if not, whether the state courts’ conclusion that it did was contrary to or an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

In this regard, it is clearly established federal law that a parole board’s decision

deprives a prisoner of due process with respect to his constitutionally protected liberty interest in

a parole release date if the Board’s decision is not supported by “some evidence in the record.” 

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985); Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir.

2007); Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128; Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915. “The ‘some evidence’ standard is

minimally stringent,” and a decision will be upheld under that standard if there is any evidence in

the record that could support the conclusion reached by the factfinder. Powell v. Gomez, 33 F.3d

39, 40 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1987)). See also

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1105 (9th Cir. 1986). However, “the evidence

underlying the board’s decision must have some indicia of reliability.” Jancsek v. Or. Bd. of

Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). See also Perveler v. Estelle, 974 F.2d 1132, 1134

(9th Cir. 1992). Determining whether the “some evidence” standard is satisfied does not require

examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or the

weighing of evidence. Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1105. The question is whether there is any reliable

evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached. Id. 

When assessing whether a state parole board’s suitability decision was supported

by “some evidence,” the analysis “is framed by the statutes and regulations governing parole

suitability determinations in the relevant state.” Irons, 505 F.3d at 851. Therefore, this court

must: 

look to California law to determine the findings that are necessary

to deem a prisoner unsuitable for parole, and then must review the

record in order to determine whether the state court decision

holding that these findings were supported by “some evidence” in

[petitioner’s] case constituted an unreasonable application of the

“some evidence” principle articulated in Hill.

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(Id.)

Under California law, prisoners serving indeterminate prison sentences “may

serve up to life in prison, but they become eligible for parole consideration after serving

minimum terms of confinement.” In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1078 (2005). The Board

normally sets a parole release date one year prior to the inmate’s minimum eligible parole release

date, and does so “in a manner that will provide uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and

magnitude in respect to their threat to the public.” In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th at 1202 (citing

California Penal Code § 3041(a)). A release date must be set “unless [the Board] determines that

the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or

past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more 

lengthy period of incarceration . . . and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed . . . .” Cal.

Penal Code § 3041(b). 

In order to carry out the mandate of § 3041, the Board must determine “whether

the inmate poses ‘an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison,’ and thus

whether he or she is suitable for parole.” In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th at 1202 (citing California

Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2281(a)). In doing so, the Board must consider all relevant, reliable

information available regarding

the circumstances of the prisoner’s social history; past and present

mental state; past criminal history, including involvement in other

criminal misconduct which is reliably documented; the base and

other commitment offenses, including behavior before, during and

after the crime; past and present attitude toward the crime; any

conditions of treatment or control, including the use of special

conditions under which the prisoner may safely be released to the

community; and any other information which bears on the

prisoner’s suitability for release.

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2281(b). 

The regulation identifies circumstances that tend to show suitability or

unsuitability for release. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2281(c) & (d). The following circumstances

have been identified as tending to show that a prisoner is suitable for release: (1) the prisoner has

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no juvenile record of assaulting others or committing crimes with a potential of personal harm to

victims; (2) the prisoner has experienced reasonably stable relationships with others; (3) the

prisoner has performed acts that tend to indicate the presence of remorse or has given indications

that he understands the nature and magnitude of his offense; (4) the prisoner committed his crime

as the result of significant stress in his life; (5) the prisoner’s criminal behavior resulted from

having been victimized by battered women syndrome; (6) the prisoner lacks a significant history

of violent crime; (7) the prisoner’s present age reduces the probability of recidivism; (8) the

prisoner has made realistic plans for release or has developed marketable skills that can be put to

use upon release; and (9) institutional activities indicate an enhanced ability to function within

the law upon release. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2281(d).

The following circumstances have been identified as tending to indicate

unsuitability for release: (1) the prisoner committed the offense in an especially heinous,

atrocious, or cruel manner; (2) the prisoner had a previous record of violence; (3) the prisoner has

an unstable social history; (4) the prisoner’s crime was a sadistic sexual offense; (5) the prisoner

had a lengthy history of severe mental problems related to the offense; and (6) the prisoner has

engaged in serious misconduct in prison. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2281(c). Factors to consider

in deciding whether the prisoner’s offense was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or

cruel manner include: (A) multiple victims were attacked, injured, or killed in the same or

separate incidents; (B) the offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner, such

as an execution-style murder; (C) the victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the

offense; (D) the offense was carried out in a manner that demonstrated an exceptionally callous

disregard for human suffering; and (E) the motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in

relation to the offense. Id. § 2281(c)(1)(A) - (E). 

The overriding concern in determining parole suitability under California law is

public safety. Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1086. This “core determination of ‘public safety’. . .

involves an assessment of an inmates current dangerousness.” Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th at 1205

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26 That holding has been acknowledged as representing the law of the circuit. Irons, 505 1

F.3d at 853; Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. 

8

(emphasis in original). See also Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2281(a) (“Regardless of the length of

time served, a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of

the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from

prison.”) Accordingly, California law provides that,

when a court reviews a decision of the Board or the Governor, the

relevant inquiry is whether some evidence supports the decision of

the Board or the Governor that the inmate constitutes a current

threat to public safety, and not merely whether some evidence

confirms the existence of certain factual findings.

Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th at 1212 (citing In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 658 (2002);

Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071; and In re Lee, 143 Cal. App. 4th 1400, 1408 (2006)). 

In recent years the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, given the

liberty interest that California prisoners have in their release on parole, a continued reliance upon

an unchanging factor to support a finding of unsuitability for parole may, over time, constitute a

violation of due process. The court has addressed the issue in three significant cases, each of

which will be discussed below. 

First, in Biggs, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that a continued

reliance on an unchanging factor to deny parole, such as the circumstances of the offense, could

at some point result in a due process violation. While the court in Biggs rejected several of the 1

reasons given by the Board for finding the petitioner in that case unsuitable for parole, it upheld

three: (1) petitioner’s commitment offense involved the murder of a witness; (2) the murder was

carried out in a manner exhibiting a callous disregard for the life and suffering of another; and (3)

petitioner could benefit from therapy. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 913. However, the court in Biggs

cautioned that continued reliance solely upon the gravity of the offense of conviction and 

petitioner’s conduct prior to committing that offense in denying parole could, at some point,

violate due process. In this regard, the court observed:

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As in the present instance, the parole board’s sole supportable

reliance on the gravity of the offense and conduct prior to

imprisonment to justify denial of parole can be initially justified as

fulfilling the requirements set forth by state law. Over time,

however, should Biggs continue to demonstrate exemplary

behavior and evidence of rehabilitation, denying him a parole date

simply because of the nature of Biggs’ offense and prior conduct

would raise serious questions involving his liberty interest in

parole.

Id. at 916. The court in Biggs also stated that “[a] continued reliance in the future on an

unchanging factor, the circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs

contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result in a due

process violation.” Biggs. 334 F.3d at 917. 

In Sass, the Board found the petitioner unsuitable for parole at his third suitability

hearing based on the gravity of his offenses of conviction in combination with his prior offenses. 

461 F.3d at 1126. Citing the decision in Biggs, the petitioner in Sass contended that reliance on

these unchanging factors to deny him parole violated due process. The court disagreed,

concluding that these factors amounted to “some evidence” to support the Board’s determination. 

Id. at 1129. The court provided the following explanation for its holding:

While upholding an unsuitability determination based on these

same factors, we previously acknowledged that “continued reliance

in the future on an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the

offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs contrary to the

rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result

in a due process violation.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at 917 (emphasis

added). Under AEDPA it is not our function to speculate about

how future parole hearings could proceed. Cf. id. The evidence of

Sass’ prior offenses and the gravity of his convicted offenses

constitute some evidence to support the Board’s decision. 

Consequently, the state court decisions upholding the denials were

neither contrary to, nor did they involve an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Id.

In Irons, the Ninth Circuit sought to harmonize the holdings in Biggs and Sass,

stating as follows:

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 The California Supreme Court has also acknowledged that the aggravated nature of the 2

commitment offense, over time, may fail to provide some evidence that the inmate remains a

current threat to public safety. In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th at 1218-20 & n. 20. Additionally, a

recent panel of the Ninth Circuit in Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536, 546-47 (9th Cir. 2008),

determined that under the “unusual circumstances” of that case the unchanging factor of the

gravity of the petitioner’s commitment offense did not constitute “some evidence” supporting the

governor’s decision to reverse a parole grant on the basis that the petitioner would pose a

continuing danger to society. However, on May 16, 2008, the Court of Appeals decided to rehear

that case en banc. Hayward v. Marshall, 527 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2008). Therefore, the panel

decision in Hayward is no longer citable precedent.

10

Because the murder Sass committed was less callous and cruel than

the one committed by Irons, and because Sass was likewise denied

parole in spite of exemplary conduct in prison and evidence of

rehabilitation, our decision in Sass precludes us from accepting

Irons’ due process argument or otherwise affirming the district

court’s grant of relief.

We note that in all the cases in which we have held that a parole

board’s decision to deem a prisoner unsuitable for parole solely on

the basis of his commitment offense comports with due process,

the decision was made before the inmate had served the minimum

number of years required by his sentence. Specifically, in Biggs,

Sass, and here, the petitioners had not served the minimum number

of years to which they had been sentenced at the time of the

challenged parole denial by the Board. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 912;

Sass, 461 F.3d at 1125. All we held in those cases and all we hold

today, therefore, is that, given the particular circumstances of the

offenses in these cases, due process was not violated when these

prisoners were deemed unsuitable for parole prior to the expiration

of their minimum terms.

Furthermore, we note that in Sass and in the case before us there

was substantial evidence in the record demonstrating rehabilitation.

In both cases, the California Board of Prison Terms appeared to

give little or no weight to this evidence in reaching its conclusion

that Sass and Irons presently constituted a danger to society and

thus were unsuitable for parole. We hope that the Board will come

to recognize that in some cases, indefinite detention based solely

on an inmate’s commitment offense, regardless of the extent of his

rehabilitation, will at some point violate due process, given the

liberty interest in parole that flows from the relevant California

statutes. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 917. 

Irons, 505 F.3d at 853-54. 

2

The Board found that petitioner was unsuitable for parole on April 20, 2006. 

(Pet., Ex. 3 at 82-87.) The Board gave the following reasons for its decision. The offense was

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carried out in a cruel and callous manner, as petitioner had anal sex with the victim and cut off

some of her pubic hairs and portions of her breasts after he strangled her with a belt, and the

victim was particularly vulnerable, as she was mentally challenged and drunk. Id. at 82-83. 

Petitioner had previously been convicted of sexual assault, and was on probation when he

committed the murder. Id. at 83. Petitioner had stopped attending substance abuse classes. Id. 

Petitioner had a significant prison disciplinary record including four 128s and two serious 115s

during his incarceration. Id. at 84. His psychiatric report stated that he had a moderate risk of

violence, as he lacked prosocial attachment and had a history of inappropriate sexual activity. Id. 

Petitioner also lacked realistic parole plans if he were to be released. Id. The Board commended

petitioner for remaining discipline free for the last five years, for his positive chronos, and for his

participation in self-help programs. Id. at 85.

The Los Angeles County Superior Court denied petitioner habeas relief, finding

that the record contained “some evidence” to support the Board’s finding of unsuitability. That

court wrote:

Contrary to petitioner’s assertions, the Board properly relied on

petitioner’s failure to attend NA, AA, or any other substance abuse

program since 2003 as a factor denying parole. A prisoner’s

participation in therapy or self-help while incarcerated is evidence

that indicates an enhanced ability to function within the law upon

release, a factor that favors suitability. . .In addition, the Board

may rely on an inmate’s lack of participation in a substance abuse

program under the general provision that requires the parole

authority to “consider [a]ll relevant, reliable information” in the

suitability determination . . . . Here, the record shows that

petitioner was addicted to narcotics/alcohol and committed the

present crime while under the influence. Accordingly, the Board’s

reliance on petitioner’s failure to participate in substance abuse

programs since 2003 is supported by some evidence.

Furthermore, the circumstances of petitioner’s second-degree

murder offense “exceed the minimum elements necessary to

sustain a conviction” of second degree murder . . .

Although the Board commended petitioner for the positive aspects

of his behavior, they found that his positive behavior did not

outweigh the factors of unsuitability. The Board’s decision is

supported by some evidence.

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 Petitioner also contends that the Board failed to comply with state laws and regulations 3

when it found him unsuitable for release on parole at the April 20, 2006 hearing. Petitioner’s

arguments that the state court has erred in applying state law are not cognizable in this federal

habeas corpus proceeding. See Rivera v. Illinois, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1446, 1454 (2009)

(“[A] mere error of state law . . . is not a denial of due process”) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456

U.S. 107, 121, n. 21 (1982) and Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 72-73 (1991)). A habeas

court may not grant the writ on the basis of errors of state law where, as here, the combined effect

of those errors does not violate the Federal Constitution. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984); Parle v. Runnels, 387 F.3d 1030, 1045 (9th Cir.

2004).

12

Answer, Ex. D at 12.

After taking into consideration the Ninth Circuit decisions in Biggs, Sass, and

Irons, and for the reasons set forth below, this court concludes that petitioner is not entitled to

federal habeas relief with respect to his due process challenge to the Board’s April 20, 2006

decision denying him parole. The court acknowledges that petitioner has remained discipline 3

free for the last five years of his imprisonment, has positive chronos, and has participated in selfhelp programs. However, the Board’s decision that petitioner was unsuitable for parole and that

his release would unreasonably endanger public safety was supported by “some evidence” that

bore indicia of reliability. Specifically, the Board relied on the circumstances of petitioner’s

conviction offense, his prior criminal history, his lack of participation in any substance abuse

program since 2003, his prison disciplinary record, his psychiatric evaluation finding that he

posed a moderate risk of violence, and his lack of realistic plans for release on parole. All of

these factors cited by the Board are supported by the record before this court and, according to

the cases discussed above, constitute “some evidence” supporting the Board’s decision that

petitioner was not yet suitable for release on parole at the time of his hearing in 2006. Sass, 469

F.3d at 1129; Irons, 505 F.3d at 665. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on his claim

that the Board’s failure to find him suitable for parole at his April 20, 2006 parole suitability

hearing violated his right to due process.

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B. Petitioner’s Other Claims

Petitioner also claims that the Board violated his first amendment rights by denying

him release on parole based on his history of substance abuse. (Pet. at 3) In this regard, petitioner

relies on the decision in Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2002). In that case the Ninth

Circuit held that under the ADA, a parole board may not categorically exclude a class of disabled

people from consideration for parole because of their disabilities, in that case the disability of drug

addiction. 295 F.3d at 898. The court also held, however, that the ADA does not categorically

bar a parole board from making an individualized assessment of the future dangerousness of an

inmate by taking into account the inmate’s history of addiction. 295 F.3d at 898, n. 4; see also

Turner v. Hickman, 342 F. Supp. 2d 887, 897 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (requiring inmates, as a condition

for being granted parole, to participate in a drug treatment program based on the concept of a

higher power to which participants had to submit was prohibited by the Establishment Clause of

the First Amendment). Petitioner’s argument in this regard is unpersuasive.

Petitioner murdered and mutilated a woman while under the influence of alcohol. 

The Board did not categorically deny petitioner parole because of his past addiction. Neither did

the Board require petitioner to attend a religious program in order to qualify for release on parole. 

Instead, the Board merely and properly considered petitioner’s failure to attend AA, NA or any

other secular substance abuse program since 2003 as a factor in assessing his future

dangerousness if released on parole in 2006. 

Petitioner also contends that he is serving a sentence of 15 years to life in prison

with consecutive sentencing enhancements terms of 6 years, and asks the court to issue an order

stating that “he has served his term for the [e]nhancements and . . . . started his 15 to life

sentence” in 1992. (Pet. at 5.) It appears from the documents submitted to the court that

petitioner was sentenced to fifteen years to life, with a term of six years on the sentencing

enhancement allegations found to be trues, on his second degree murder conviction. In addition,

petitioner was sentenced to a six-year prison term for another crime, with that term to be served

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consecutive to his sentence on the second degree murder conviction. (See Answer, Ex. A.)

Petitioner has not presented convincing or coherent reasons in support of the issuance of the order

he seeks from this court with respect to the sentence as reflected in his prison records. 

Accordingly, his request for this relief should be also denied.

III. Request for Evidentiary Hearing

In his traverse, petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(2), an evidentiary hearing is appropriate under the following circumstances:

(e)(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a

claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an

evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that-

(A) the claim relies on-

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases

on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously

discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by

clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no

reasonable fact finder would have found the applicant guilty of the

underlying offense[.]

Under this statutory scheme, a district court presented with a request for an

evidentiary hearing must first determine whether a factual basis exists in the record to support a

petitioner’s claims for habeas relief and, if not, whether an evidentiary hearing “might be

appropriate.” Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Earp v. Ornoski,

431 F.3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 2005); Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 669-70 (9th Cir.

2005). A petitioner requesting an evidentiary hearing must also demonstrate that he has presented

a “colorable claim for relief.” Earp, 431 F.3d at 1167 (citing Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 670,

Stankewitz v. Woodford, 365 F.3d 706, 708 (9th Cir. 2004) and Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d

966, 973 (9th Cir. 2001)). To show that a claim is “colorable,” a petitioner is “required to allege

specific facts which, if true, would entitle him to relief.” Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 934 (9th

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Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

The court concludes that no additional factual supplementation is necessary in this

case and that an evidentiary hearing is not appropriate with respect to the due process claim raised

in the instant petition. The facts alleged in support of these claims, even if established at a

hearing, would not entitle petitioner to federal habeas relief. Therefore, petitioner’s request for an

evidentiary hearing should be denied.

CONCLUSION

For all the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that

petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twentyone days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: April 16, 2010.

DAD:rh

higbee2345.hc

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