Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00911/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00911-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTOPHER CASTILLO,

 Plaintiff,

 v. 

SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO, and DOES 1

to 100, inclusive,

 Defendants.

1:05-CV-00911 OWW SMS

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISQUALIFY

PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL (DOC.

26) AND SETTING FURTHER

SCHEDULING CONFERENCE. 

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the court for decision is Defendant Sears, Roebuck &

Co.’s motion to disqualify Plaintiff’s counsel, Parnell Kirby,

from further participation in this state law race discrimination

in employment case, removed by Defendant from the Superior Court

for the County of Tulare. (See Doc. 1.) Defendant asserts that,

in her previous employment as an associate with the law firm of

Jackson Lewis LLP, Ms. Kirby was listed as the attorney of record

for Sears in eighteen employment-related matter, some as recently

as 2001. Sears argues that this “direct and substantial

representation of Defendant while at another law firm mandates

her disqualification under California rules of Professional

conduct, specifically rule 3-310(E), and the applicable case and

statutory authority.” (Doc. 26 at 1.) Plaintiff objects,

Case 1:05-cv-00911-OWW -SMS Document 44 Filed 10/12/06 Page 1 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

essentially arguing that Sears is (1) engaging in gamesmanship to

“leverage settlement and apply undue pressure on Plaintiff while

pre-trial and trial deadlines approach” and (2) that Sears’ delay

decision to proceed with the settlement conference after raising

the objection effectively waived the objection. (See Doc. 31,

Opp’n, filed Sept. 18, 2006.) 

After oral argument, the parties were permitted to submit

supplemental declarations. Ms. Kirby was given leave to file a

declaration providing additional information about the eighteen

cases on which she was listed as counsel of record for Sears. 

Defendant was permitted an opportunity to file a responsive

declaration. Upon further review of the record, Ms. Kirby

declined to file a supplemental declaration, instead directing

the district court’s attention to a paragraph in her original

opposition brief that explained which of the eighteen cases she

believed were workers’ compensation cases, rather than employment

discrimination cases. (Doc. 41.) Defendant filed a supplemental

declaration from Sears’ in house counsel, providing some

additional detail as to the nature of some of the eighteen cases

and providing other related information. (Doc. 42.) Plaintiff

objects to the court considering Defendant’s supplemental

declaration. (Doc. 43.)

II. BACKGROUND/ PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In June 2004, Plaintiff’s counsel, Parnell Kirby, left her

former employment with Jackson Lewis LLP, where she represented

management in employment matters. (Kirby Decl. at ¶2.) Ms.

Kirby opened up her own law practice, focusing on the

Case 1:05-cv-00911-OWW -SMS Document 44 Filed 10/12/06 Page 2 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

representation of employees in employment discrimination cases. 

Her new practice did not include representation of matters

involving workers’ compensation. (Id. at ¶3.) 

In April 13, 2005, Ms. Kirby wrote a six page letter to

Sears on behalf of Plaintiff, Christopher Castillo, raising

various race discrimination allegations. (Id. at ¶4.)

On June 10, 2005, having received no response to the letter,

Plaintiff filed a civil action in Tulare County Superior Court

against Sears alleging (1) race discrimination in violation of

the Fair Employment and Housing act, (2) wrongful termination,

(3) race discrimination in violation of California’s Business &

Professions Code §§ 1700 et seq.; (4) failure to provide

personnel file; (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress;

and (6) negligent infliction of emotional distress. Ms. Kirby’s 

state bar number appeared on the title page of the complaint. 

On June 29, Defendant’s in house counsel, Malory Burns

responded to Ms. Kirby’s letter, stating that Sears had conducted

an investigation and found Plaintiff’s claims to be without

merit. (Kirby Decl. at ¶6 & Ex. A). 

On July 14, 2005, Defendant removed the case on the basis of

diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. 1.) 

On October 17, 2005, Defendant's counsel, Todd Boyer,

contacted Ms. Kirby and requested that Plaintiff make a

settlement demand. (Kirby Decl. at ¶8.) Both counsel discussed

initial disclosures and deposition scheduling. (Id.) On

November 2, 2005, the parties filed a Joint Scheduling Conference

Report. (Doc. 4.)

On April 27, 2006, Plaintiff served a document request and

Case 1:05-cv-00911-OWW -SMS Document 44 Filed 10/12/06 Page 3 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

interrogatories on Defendant. (Kirby Decl. at ¶10.) Plaintiff

noticed the depositions of several witnesses on April 28, 2006,

setting deposition dates for May 25, 2006 and June 2, 2006. (Id.

at ¶11). 

On June 2, 2006, Mr. Boyer discovered that Ms. Kirby had

been counsel of record for Sears in two prior United States

District Court cases, Hamilton v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.,

97-cv-4893 (ABC) and Todd v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 97-cv-4375

(TJH), while Ms. Kirby was an attorney for the law firm of

Jackson Lewis LLP. (Boyer Decl. at ¶3.) At the time of those

cases, Ms. Kirby was practicing under the name Parnell G. Fox

(California Bar No. 186519). (Id.) According to Ms. Burns, Sears

retained Jackson Lewis for its employment related litigation. 

(Burns Decl. at ¶5.) For the relevant time period, April 1997

through March 2005, Jackson Lewis was not retained by Sears to

handle workers compensation cases. These were handled by Sears’

workers’ compensation carrier. (Burns Suppl. Decl. at ¶4.) 

However, Jackson Lewis did handle cases brought under California

Labor Code Section 132(a), which prohibits discrimination (i.e.,

retaliation) against employees who are injured during the course

of employment or who testify before the workers compensation

appeals board. (Id. at ¶5.) 

On June 6, 2005, Defendant's counsel, Mr. Boyer, sent Ms.

Kirby a letter explaining that Defendant had discovered that she

had worked on employment cases for Sears and requesting that she

voluntarily withdraw from representation due to the conflict of

interest. (Boyer Decl. at ¶4 & Exh. A.) On June 9, 2006, Ms.

Kirby responded that she vaguely recalled working on the Sears

Case 1:05-cv-00911-OWW -SMS Document 44 Filed 10/12/06 Page 4 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

cases named, but only as a first year attorney and denied any

real involvement besides "boilerplate" pleadings and discovery.

(Boyer Decl. at ¶ 5 & Exh. B.) Ms. Burns, however, recalls

working directly with Ms. Kirby on several employment related

cases and recalls discussions pertaining to settlement and

defense strategies. (Burns Decl. ¶ 4.)

On June 12, 2006, Mr. Boyer informed Ms. Kirby that Sears

would not waive the conflict. The letter pointed out that

Jackson Lewis named Ms. Kirby as one of the attorneys who would

work on Sears matters in a 2002 proposal. (Boyer Decl. at ¶6 &

Exh. C.) Defense counsel also noted that he would stipulate to

extending all deadlines to allow substitute counsel sufficient

time to become familiar with the case. (Id. at ¶7.) 

Meanwhile, in mid and late June 2006, Defendant refused to

respond to Plaintiff’s discovery on the ground that a potential

conflict existed. However, Defendant continued its discovery

efforts by serving deposition subpoenas on Plaintiff’s healthcare

providers. (Kirby Decl. at ¶14 & Ex. G & H; ¶15 & Ex. I.) 

In late June 2006, Plaintiff’s counsel apparently agreed to

voluntarily withdraw pending the Court’s approval of a

stipulation which would have continued the case management dates,

including the trial date, for a period of 90 days. (Id. at ¶ 8.) 

However, the request to continue the case management dates was

denied because Plaintiff had not been sufficiently notified. 

(Doc. 14.) Plaintiff’s counsel was directed to file appropriate

declarations and proofs of service. (Doc. 15.) The parties

resubmitted revised stipulations to continue the case management

dates on July 7, 2006. (Docs. 16 and 17). On July 21, 2006, the

Case 1:05-cv-00911-OWW -SMS Document 44 Filed 10/12/06 Page 5 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

district court approved the stipulation to extend time for taking

depositions. (Doc. 19.) However, on July 31, 2006, the district

court issued a minute order stating: “The Court will not approve

the stipulated application to postpone pretrial and trial dates.

If new counsel should appear for the plaintiff, that counsel may

then submit a request for a continuance.” (Doc. 20.) 

Meanwhile, on July 6, 2006 Defendant made a settlement

offer. (Kirby Decl. at ¶16.) On July 27, 2006, Plaintiff

responded with a counter-offer. (Id. at ¶18.) Defendant

countered again, offering a settlement range that was not

accepted by Plaintiff. (Id.) 

On or about July 31, 2006, Ms. Kirby again informed Mr.

Boyer that she would voluntarily withdraw from the case due to

the conflict of interest. (Boyer Decl at ¶9.) Nevertheless on

August 2, 2006, Plaintiff's counsel requested that the parties go

forward with a Mandatory Settlement Conference set for August 9,

2006. (Id. at ¶ 10 & Exh. D.) Another round of offers was made

in on August 2, to no avail, but, according to Kirby, both sides

agreed that further settlement negotiations would be prudent. 

(Kirby Decl. at ¶21 & Ex. K.) 

However, on August 3, 2006 Mr. Boyer again notified Ms.

Kirby that Sears demanded that she withdraw from the case. (Id.

at ¶ 11 & Exh. E.) Mr. Boyer also objected to proceeding with

the mandatory settlement conference, in part because he thought

“attendance at the Mandatory Settlement Conference appears to be

an exercise in futility given Plaintiff’s high demand to settle

this matter.” (Id. at ¶22 & x. L.) 

Mr. Boyer informed the court of Sears’ objections, and

Case 1:05-cv-00911-OWW -SMS Document 44 Filed 10/12/06 Page 6 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

Magistrate Judge Snyder set a conference call with the parties on

August 4, 2006. (Boyer Decl. at ¶ 12.) During the conference

call, Plaintiff's counsel stated that she refused to voluntarily

withdraw her representation of Plaintiff. (Id. ¶13.) According

to Defense counsel, Ms. Kirby stated in that call that she only

worked on “a few Sears cases nearly ten years ago.” (Id. at

¶13.) Mr. Boyer indicated that he would file a motion to recuse

Ms. Kirby from the case. (Kirby Decl at ¶23.) The mandatory

settlement conference was vacated. (Doc. 22.) 

On August 9, 2006, Defendant deposed Plaintiff, with Ms.

Kirby Present. (Kirby Decl. at ¶24.) 

On August 10, 2006, Mr. Boyer provided Ms. Kirby with a list

of the following eighteen cases in which she was listed as the

attorney of record for Sears: 

1. Edgar Fields v. Sears – closing date: 12/02/98

2. David Smith v. Sears– closing date: 04/10/98

3. Kenneth Hamilton v. Sears – closing date: 02/17/99

4. Denise Sturgis v. Sears – closing date: 09/08/98

5. Pablo Gay v. Sears – closing date: 11/24/98

6. Bryan Hill v. Sears – closing date: 09/21/99

7. Gloria Yrineo v. Sears – closing date: 10/25/99

8. Charlotte Utley v. Sears – closing date: 07/15/99

9. Godfrey Young v. Sears – closing date: 12/21/00

10. Michelle Lacroix v. Sears – closing date: 10/01/01

11. Guy Gomez v. Sears – closing date: 04/10/98

12. Christopher Todd v. Sears – closing date: 07/27/00

13. Angela Anderson v. Sears – closing date: 04/05/01

14. Tracy Bommarito v. Sears – closing date: 04/09/01

Case 1:05-cv-00911-OWW -SMS Document 44 Filed 10/12/06 Page 7 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

15. Ceprina Gutierrez v. Sears – closing date:04/03/01

16. Evelyn Reuben v. Sears – closing date: 07/24/00

17. Antonio Marquez v. Sears – closing date: 01/26/01

18. Ariana Martinez v. Sears

(Burns Decl. ¶8.)

In addition, Ms. Burns recalls direct and personal contact

between herself and Ms. Kirby in Ms. Kirby's representation and

defense of Sears during the time period of 2000 to 2001. (Id. at

¶9.) Attached to Sears’ recusal motion are billing records from

Jackson Lewis for the Sears cases handled by Ms. Kirby. (Boyer

Decl. at ¶17 & Exh. H.) After revealing the list of eighteen

cases to Ms. Kirby, Mr. Boyer again demanded that Plaintiff

voluntarily withdraw her representation of Plaintiff. (Id. at

¶16 & Exh. G.) 

Plaintiff’s counsel recalls that some of the eighteen listed

cases (Yrineo, Anderson, Bommarito, Gutierrez, Reuben, and

Marquez) “may have been workers’ compensation matters and thus

would not be substantially related to the instant FEHA-based

civil action.” (Kirby Decl. at ¶28.) But, Ms. Burns states in

her supplemental declaration that the Marquez case was a sexual

orientation discrimination claim, while the others were

“employment discrimination” cases brought under California Labor

Code Section 132(a). 

//

//

//

//

//

Case 1:05-cv-00911-OWW -SMS Document 44 Filed 10/12/06 Page 8 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

III. DISCUSSION

A. Evidentiary Objections.

Plaintiff raises various objections to evidence submitted by

Defendant. First, Plaintiff objects to portions of Ms. Burns’

initial declaration. (Doc. 33.) Specifically, Plaintiff objects

to Paragraph 6, which states:

Once Ms. Kirby’s previous representation of Sears

Roebuck and Co. became known, given the fact that she

handled and was involved in discussions pertaining to

settlement and defense strategies involving employment

litigation, Sears refused to waive the conflict of

interest.

(Doc. 28 at ¶6.) Plaintiff asserts that this paragraph contains

legal conclusions. To the extent that any of this language could

be read as suggesting whether there existed a conflict of

interest mandating involuntary withdrawal, the objection is

sustained. Otherwise, this paragraph is admissible for its

factual value, as it expresses Sears’ unwillingness to consent to

Ms. Kirby’s representation of Plaintiff in this case. 

Next, Plaintiff objects to paragraphs 8 and 9 of the first

Burns declaration. Paragraph 8 states “I requested from Jackson

Lewis a list of cases on which Ms. Kirby was listed as the

attorney of record for Sears, Roebuck and Co. during her

employment with that law firm. I was provided the following list

of case names and closing dates on which Ms. Kirby worked:

[listing the 18 cases].” (Doc. 28 at ¶8.) Paragraph 9 states:

“I recall having direct and personal contact with Ms. Kirby in

her representation and defense of Sears during the period from

2000 until 2001.” (Id. at ¶9.) Plaintiff objects to these

paragraphs as “conclusory; lacks probative value; insufficient

Case 1:05-cv-00911-OWW -SMS Document 44 Filed 10/12/06 Page 9 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

factual statement.” (See Doc. 33.) Plaintiff specifically

objects to the list of 18 cases provided in paragraph 8,

asserting that no background documentation is provided. But, Ms.

Burns makes the declaration based upon her personal knowledge. 

The appropriate mechanism for challenging the factual basis for

her assertions is to file a counter declaration, which Ms. Kirby

has declined to do. Similarly, there is nothing objectionable

about the content of paragraph 9. Neither of these passages are

conclusory in nature. They are based on Ms. Burns’ personal

knowledge and are relevant to the inquiry. These objections are

overruled. 

Finally, Plaintiff objects to Defendant’s filing of the

supplemental declaration of Ms. Burns. Plaintiff insists that

the court only gave Defendant leave to file a declaration in

opposition to Plaintiff’s own supplemental declaration. Because

Ms. Kirby declined to file such a supplement, Plaintiff asserts

that Defendant’s supplement should not be considered. But,

Plaintiff is interpreting the grant of leave to supplement far

too narrowly. At oral argument and in his papers, Plaintiff

challenged the accuracy of Ms. Burns’ initial declaration,

objecting that it did not adequately demonstrate a “substantial

relationship” between Ms. Kirby’s prior work and the current

case. Ms. Kirby specifically argued that some of the cases

listed were workers compensation cases. Both parties were given

leave to supplement the record in order to resolve this factual

dispute. Although the district court did refer to Defendant’s

filing as an “opposition” when granting leave, this was merely a

label of convenience. The district court has an obligation to

Case 1:05-cv-00911-OWW -SMS Document 44 Filed 10/12/06 Page 10 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

reach a reasoned conclusion in response to Defendant’s motion. 

To the extent that Defendant’s supplemental declaration may aid

this endeavor, it will be considered. 

Plaintiff also specifically objects to paragraph 5 of Burns’

supplemental declaration, arguing that it contains “insufficient

and conclusory statements.” In particular, Plaintiff argues:

Defendant claims the listed cases were not workers’

compensation cases. However, Defendant does not

provide the case numbers, venues, asserted claims or

any specific, probative information to determine wether

these cases were, in fact, venued before the Workers’

Compensation Appeals Board. Since Defendant is in a

superior position to provide this case information and

chose not to, the Court should presume Defendant is

withholding specific, probative information which is

against Defendant’s interest, and on that basis, find

against Defendant. 

(Doc. 43 at 1-2.) Plaintiff is essentially asserting that Ms.

Burns is not being truthful as to the factual assertions made in

her supplemental declaration. Ms. Burns is a member of the bar

of Illinois and has signed her declaration under penalty of

perjury. She is under an obligation to tell the truth and there

is nothing in the record to suggest she has not done so. There

are various legitimate reasons why Defendant would not have

appended further documentation from these cases to the Burns

declaration. The lack of supporting documentation may go to the

weight of the supplemental Burns declaration, but not to its

admissibility.

Finally, Plaintiff objects to the “format” of the

declaration in that “Ms. Burns fails to properly declare that she

is submitting her declaration under the laws of the United States

of America. Therefore her declaration should be disregarded.” 

Unsworn declarations under penalty of perjury are authorized by

Case 1:05-cv-00911-OWW -SMS Document 44 Filed 10/12/06 Page 11 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

28 U.S.C. § 1746 and are to be in the following form: “If

executed within the United States, its territories, possessions,

or commonwealths: ‘I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under

penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on (date). (Signature)’.” The oath was sufficient. 

See Fultz v. B.A. Mullican Lumber & Mfg. Co., 197 F. Supp. 2d

523, 524 (W.D. Va. 2002). 

B. Disqualification Motion. 

Disqualification based upon conflict of interest is governed

by California Rules of Court Rule 3-310(E), which provides: 

A member shall not, without the informed written

consent of the client or former client, accept

employment adverse to the client or former client

where, by reason of the representation of the client or

former client, the member has obtained confidential

information material to the employment.

A court has the power to disqualify counsel under this rule and

to demand that counsel withdraw. See In re Complex Asbestos

Litig., 232 Cal. App. 3d 572, 600 (1991).

In cases where an attorney who previously represented a

client attempts to represent interests adverse to that client in

a subsequent case –- a so-called “subsequent representation” case

-- California courts have held that disqualification is mandatory

if a “substantial relationship” exists between the former and

current representation. See Flatt v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 4th

275, 283-84 (1994). “The purpose of the rule is to protect the

confidential relationship which exists between attorney and

client, a relationship which continues after the formal

relationship ends. The fiduciary nature of that relationship

Case 1:05-cv-00911-OWW -SMS Document 44 Filed 10/12/06 Page 12 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

requires the application of strict standards.” Pound v. Demera,

135 Cal. App. 4th 70, 78 (2005)(citations omitted). 

In analyzing whether a substantial relationship exists, a

Court should take a “pragmatic approach that asks whether

confidential information material to the current dispute would

normally have been imparted to the attorney by virtue of the

nature of the former representation.” Huston v.

Imperial Credit Commercial Mortg. Inv. Corp., 179 F. Supp. 2d

1157, 1173 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (quoting H.F. Ahmanson & Co. v.

Salomon Brothers, Inc., 229 Cal. App. 3d, 1445,

1454(1991))(internal quotations omitted). Whether the attorney

actually received confidential information from the initial

client is irrelevant; the critical inquiry is whether a

substantial relationship exists between the prior and current

representation. Id. The Ninth Circuit held in Trone v. Smith,

621 F.2d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 1980): 

...it matters not whether confidences were in fact

imparted to the lawyer by the client. The substantial

relationship between the two representations is itself

sufficient to disqualify.... The test does not require

the former client to show that actual confidences were

disclosed.... It is the possibility of the breach of

confidence, not the fact of the breach, that triggers

disqualification. 

(emphasis added)(applying California law). Where there is a

substantial relationship between the prior and current

representation, it is “conclusively presume[d]” that the attorney

possesses confidential information and disqualification is

mandatory. Henriksen v. Great Am. Savings & Loan, 11 Cal.

App.4th 109, 114 (1992). 

In practice, when applying the substantial relationship

Case 1:05-cv-00911-OWW -SMS Document 44 Filed 10/12/06 Page 13 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

test, courts focus on the following factors: (1) the similarities

between the two factual situations; (2) the legal questions

posed; and (3) the nature and extent of the attorney’s

involvement with the cases. Id. Courts also consider: (a) the

time spent by the attorney on the earlier cases; (b) the type of

work performed; and (c) the attorney’s possible exposure to

formulation of policy or strategy. Huston, 179 F. Supp. at 1167.

Defendant argues that it is enough that Plaintiff’s counsel

is “representing a party in an action adverse to Sears in the

same type of case in which she previously represented Sears,

i.e., employment discrimination cases.” In support of this

proposition, Defendant cites Brand v. 20th Century Insurance Co.,

124 Cal. App. 4th 594, 607 (2004). The Brand court relied

heavily on the analytical approach to prior representation cases

set forth in Jessen v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Co., 111 Cal.

App. 4th 698 (2003). Jessen held that “the question whether an

attorney should be disqualified in a successive representation

case turns on two variables: (1) the relationship between the

legal problem involved in the former representation and the legal

problem involved in the current representation, and (2) the

relationship between the attorney and the former client with

respect to the legal problem involved in the former

representation.” Id. at 709. The second factor was given

particular weight:

If the relationship between the attorney and the former

client is shown to have been direct-that is, where the

lawyer was personally involved in providing legal

advice and services to the former client-then it must

be presumed that confidential information has passed to

the attorney and there cannot be any delving into the

specifics of the communications between the attorney

Case 1:05-cv-00911-OWW -SMS Document 44 Filed 10/12/06 Page 14 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

and the former client in an effort to show that the

attorney did or did not receive confidential

information during the course of that relationship. As

a result, disqualification will depend upon the

strength of the similarities between the legal problem

involved in the former representation and the legal

problem involved in the current representation. This is

so because a direct attorney-client relationship is

inherently one during which confidential information

would normally have been imparted to the attorney by

virtue of the nature of that sort of] former

representation, and therefore it will be conclusively

presumed that the attorney acquired confidential

information relevant to the current representation if

it is congruent with the former representation. 

Id. (emphasis added).

The Jessen court further held that 

[W]hen ruling upon a disqualification motion in a

successive representation case, the trial court must

first identify where the attorney's former

representation placed the attorney with respect to the

prior client. If the court determines that the

placement was direct and personal, this facet...is

settled as a matter of law in favor of disqualification

and the only remaining question is whether there is a

connection between the two successive representations,

a study that may not include an inquiry into the actual

state of the lawyer's knowledge acquired during the

lawyer's representation of the former client....

However, if the court determines the former attorney

was not placed in a direct, personal relationship with

the former client, the court must assess whether the

attorney was positioned during the first representation

so as to make it likely the attorney acquired

confidential information relevant to the current

representation, given the similarities or lack of

similarities between the two.

Id. at 710-11. 

The Brand court also relied upon a subsequent case, Farris

v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 119 Cal. App. 4th 671, 676-77

(2004). In Farris, the court applied the principles articulated

in Jessen to disqualify an attorney and his law firm from

representing an insured in a bad faith/breach of insurance

contract action against the insurer where the lawyer had

Case 1:05-cv-00911-OWW -SMS Document 44 Filed 10/12/06 Page 15 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

previously represented the insurer in coverage matters. During

his prior representation of the insurer, the attorney

participated in confidential communications with senior staff

from the insurer and gave coverage and claims handling advice to

the insurer, including settlement, litigation and claims

strategies. Id. at 677. The Farris court emphasized that “the

inquiry under Jessen focuses upon the general features of the

matters involved and inferences as to the likelihood that

confidences were imparted by the former client that could be used

to adverse effect in the subsequent representation,” concluding

that the evidence of the attorney’s “pervasive participation, and

indeed his personal role in shaping, [the insurer’s] practices

and procedures” constituted a substantial relationship warranting

mandatory disqualification. Id. at 688 (emphasis added). 

Here, it appears to be undisputed that Ms. Kirby was listed

as counsel of record for Sears on a number of cases. In

addition, Sears’ in-house counsel states that she worked directly

with Ms. Kirby. This is the kind of “direct and personal”

representation referenced in Jessen. 111 Cal. App. 4th at 709-

11. As a result, “the only remaining question is whether there

is a connection between the two successive representations, a

study that may not include an inquiry into the actual state of

the lawyer's knowledge acquired during the lawyer's

representation of the former client....” Id. at 710-11. Here,

the record indicates that Ms. Kirby worked on eighteen cases as

counsel of record for Sears. A handful of these cases appear to

have been “employment discrimination” claims brought under

California Labor Code 132a, which necessarily involve claims of

Case 1:05-cv-00911-OWW -SMS Document 44 Filed 10/12/06 Page 16 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

From a practical perspective, it strains credulity to 1

assert that Ms. Kirby, who was a junior attorney in a large firm

handling individual employee cases, gained information about

Sears at the policy-making level that would be of any

consequence. However, this is not the relevant legal inquiry

under Jessen, and Farris, and Burns.

17

discrimination against workers injured on the job or workers who

testify in workers compensation hearings. Even assuming that

these several cases bear absolutely no relation to the race

discrimination claims brought here, it appears to be undisputed

that at least two of the cases (Todd and Hamilton) involved

claims of race discrimination. Ms. Kirby admits as much. In one

declaration submitted to the district court, Ms. Kirby stated

that “I could not recall the work I performed on [the Todd and

Hamilton Federal Court cases] but did recall that the cases

involved employment discrimination...and thus may have been

sufficiently similar to the instant action.” (Kirby Decl.

Submitted in Support of Stipulated Ex Parte Application to

Postpone Pre-Trial Dates, filed July 7, 2006 at ¶3.) Moreover,

Ms. Burns, in her supplemental declaration, asserts that the

Marquez case was a sexual orientation discrimination claim, the

legal basis for which would be sufficiently similar to the

instant action. 

As was the case in Jessen and Farris, “general features of

the matters involved” in at least these three cases were similar

enough to those at issue in the present case to rase an

“inference[] as to the likelihood that confidences were imparted

by the former client that could be used to adverse effect in the

subsequent representation.” Farris, 119 Cal. App. 4th at 681.1

Case 1:05-cv-00911-OWW -SMS Document 44 Filed 10/12/06 Page 17 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s participation in

settlement discussions and continued pursuit of discovery waived

the protection afforded its confidences under Rule 310-E. 

Specifically, Plaintiff suggests that because the underlying

purpose of the Rule is to protect a former client’s confidences

from being disclosed by the former attorney, any such potential

disclosure would already have occurred. Plaintiff, however,

provides no legal authority to support a waiver theory under the

circumstances. In fact, as Defendant points out, the Rule’s

requirement of “written consent” suggests that it would be

inappropriate for a court to imply waiver from conduct. 

Plaintiff also suggests that Defendant is using the conflict

of interest issue as a tool to put pressure on Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff points out that the conflict issue was first raised

just a few weeks after Defendant received three deposition

notices and one month before the discovery cut off date. 

Plaintiff also suggests that Sears was deliberately using the

conflict issue to disrupt the progress of the case. 

On the one hand, Defendant proceeded with settlement

negotiations while the conflict issue was outstanding. When it

was unable to settle the case for what it believed was an

appropriate among, it renewed its disqualification motion with

the implied hope of leaving the Plaintiff without an attorney or

otherwise hindering Plaintiff’s pursuit of this case. On the

other hand, on several occasions, Defendant agreed to continue

all of the case management deadlines in the case, including

discovery deadlines, to allow sufficient time for Ms. Kirby to

withdraw and for Plaintiff to obtain new counsel. Overall,

Case 1:05-cv-00911-OWW -SMS Document 44 Filed 10/12/06 Page 18 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

Defendant’s behavior does not suggest gamesmanship. Rather, as

Ms. Kirby explained during oral argument, the parties had several

“balls in the air” at once. They were compelled by the

litigation schedule to proceed with certain steps while the

conflict issue remained pending.

Finally, Plaintiff suggests that Defendant was not diligent

in discovering the purported conflict. Specifically, Plaintiff

notes that Defendant had Ms. Kirby’s bar number for over one year

propr to raising the conflict issue in June of 2006. Plaintiff

suggests that Defendant knew or should have known of her

employment at Jackson Lewis. However, Plaintiff’s last name

changed after she represented Sears. Defendant notes that, after

Mr. Boyer discovered the first two cases in which Ms. Kirby

participated as counsel for Sears, Ms. Kirby did not disclose

that she had participated in additional cases as counsel for

Sears. Instead, Mr. Boyer had to contact Jackson Lewis to

retrieve copies of her billing records to discover the additional

sixteen cases. Defendant also notes that, had Ms. Kirby not

notified it of her intent to voluntarily withdraw on two

occasions, Sears would have filed this motion to recuse earlier. 

In the final analysis, Ms. Kirby worked on eighteen cases

for Sears, one as recently as five years ago. It is undisputed

that at least several of these cases rased claims similar in

nature to those raised here. It is also undisputed that during

her tenure as a junior associate with Jackson Lweis, Ms. Kirby

discussed strategy and settlement with one of Sears’ in house

attorneys who supervised outside counsel in these cases. This

fits the letter of conflict prohibited by the California Rules of

Case 1:05-cv-00911-OWW -SMS Document 44 Filed 10/12/06 Page 19 of 20
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

Professional Responsibility. Absent a waiver, this mandates her

disqualification. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion to

disqualify is GRANTED. A further scheduling conference is set

for November 17, 2006, at 8:45 a.m. in Courtroom 3. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 11, 2006 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

b2e55c UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00911-OWW -SMS Document 44 Filed 10/12/06 Page 20 of 20