Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05256/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05256-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 7, 2001 Decided November 16, 2001

No. 00-5256

Paul Forman,

Appellant

v.

Lawrence M. Small, Secretary, Smithsonian Institution,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 96cv02735)

Stephen Z. Chertkof argued the cause for appellant. With

him on the briefs was Douglas B. Huron.

Diane M. Sullivan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Kenneth L.

Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S.

Attorney, and Christine Nicholson, Assistant General Counsel, Smithsonian Institution.

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Before: Henderson, Randolph and Rogers, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Rogers.

Rogers, Circuit Judge: Paul Forman appeals the grant of

summary judgment to the Smithsonian Institution on his

claims of age discrimination and retaliation under the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C.

s 633a (1994 & Supp. V 1999). He contends that he established a prima facie case on each of his claims and rebutted

the Smithsonian's stated explanations for its actions. We

affirm the judgment on his claims of discrimination with

regard to his 1991 and 1995 promotions, but we reverse as to

his claim of retaliation with regard to his 1995 promotion.

I.

Paul Forman is a curator for Modern Physics at the

National Museum of American History of the Smithsonian

Institution. He was hired in 1972 as an associate curator,

Grade 12, and received a promotion in 1975 to curator, Grade

13. He was passed over for a non-competitive promotion to

Grade 14 in 1988 and 1991-92. In 1995, a decision concerning

his promotion was postponed for one year. He was promoted

to Grade 14 in 1996 when he was 59 years old. The relevant

background to these decisions is as follows.

In May 1988, Dr. Forman requested and was granted a

two-year temporary duty assignment to New York City with

the primary task of preparing a draft of a book on the history

of atomic clocks.1 His normal day-to-day duties as curator,

relating to exhibitions and collections, were minimized. For

the rating year September 1, 1988, to August 31, 1989, Dr.

Forman received a performance appraisal of "fully successful"

from his supervisor. In the same performance evaluation,

however, his supervisor advised Dr. Forman that he expected

a "concentrated and sustained effort ... during th[e] next

__________

1 An "atomic clock" is a clock in which the "periodic process is a

molecular or atomic event associated with a particular spectral

line." A New Dictionary of Physics 94 (H. J. Gray & Alan Isaacs

eds., 1975).

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year on the book project, now that it is underway." At the

time, Dr. Forman had only drafted about one-half of a

chapter, albeit a lengthy one.

In January 1990, Dr. Forman proposed that the one chapter he had drafted for his book on atomic clocks about

Charles Townes and the maser 2 become the basis of a

different, shorter book, narrower in scope than the one he

had originally committed to write about atomic clocks. His

supervisor approved the shorter book. His interim performance appraisal (evaluating only his performance from September 1, 1989 to May 1990 for the evaluation period of

September 1, 1989 to August 31, 1990), however, was "unacceptable" as to the "single critical element" of his assignment,

namely to draft a "book-length manuscript." An accompanying letter from his supervisor, dated May 22, 1990, described

Dr. Forman's lack of substantial progress on the promised

book manuscript, focusing on a substantial period of "under

productivity" in his central assignment, which was the principal area of his research during the last decade. In his final

performance evaluation for the rating period of September 1,

1989 to August 31, 1990, Dr. Forman received a rating of

"fully successful"; his supervisor noted that Dr. Forman had

begun in the latter part of the performance year to produce

"commendable draft chapters of the Townes and the Maser

manuscript at a steady pace." Dr. Forman returned to work

at the Smithsonian Institution in October 1990. In the next

rating year, from September 1, 1990 to August 31, 1991, he

again received a "fully successful" rating.

Robert McCormick Adams was the Secretary when Dr.

Forman was considered for promotion in 1991. During this

__________

2 A "maser" pre-dates the laser, but works under the same

principle as a laser, with the generated beam occurring in the

microwave region of the spectrum, which lies between infrared

radiation and radio waves, rather than, like a laser, in the visible,

ultraviolet, or infrared regions of the spectrum. See A New Dictionary of Physics, supra, at 335, 350. A laser is also known as an

"optical maser." Id. at 308. Masers and atomic clocks are interrelated because the oscillations produced by a maser can provide the

frequency standard for an atomic clock. Id. at 94.

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period, there were six principal features of the promotion

process for all curators at the National Museum of American

History. The Professional Accomplishment Evaluation Committee, which is a peer evaluation committee of curators

appointed by the Director of the Museum, considers curators

at Grade 13 for possible non-competitive promotion every

three years. The peer review committee's recommendation is

advisory to the Director of the Museum. The Director also

considered other factors such as annual summary performance appraisals as well as the opinions of the curator's

supervisors.3 The Director made an advisory recommendation to the Secretary. The Secretary also customarily received advisory recommendations from his Assistant Secretaries before making his final decision. Thus, the Secretary

had the final authority to make decisions regarding promotions.

In April 1991, the peer review committee recommended

Dr. Forman for promotion to Grade 14. The Director of the

Museum advised Dr. Forman in June 1991 that in light of

the fact that none of his supervisors thought he was working

at a Grade 14 level, and the primacy of a book in his

performance plan since 1978, Dr. Forman would not be

recommended for promotion. The Director nonetheless forwarded Dr. Forman's promotion package to the Assistant

Secretary for Research. The two Assistant Secretaries, Robert Hoffman and Tom Freudenheim, reviewed Dr. Forman's

promotion package. Hoffman recommended to the Secretary

that Dr. Forman be promoted; Freudenheim recommended

against promotion. In March 1992, after reviewing Dr. Forman's promotion package and discussing the matter with

both Assistant Secretaries, Secretary Adams decided not to

promote him, expressing concern that notwithstanding Dr.

Forman's international reputation as an historian, he had

failed to produce a book-length manuscript on atomic clocks

__________

3 Possible annual performance appraisal ratings were outstanding, highly successful, fully successful, improvement needed, and

unacceptable. The evaluations considered several performance elements including research, collections, exhibits, and public and Museum service.

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"or any other work of comparable scope." Secretary Adams

decided that consideration of a promotion should be postponed until Dr. Forman completed "a major scholarly work

such as the manuscript on atomic clocks, or his proposed

biography of Charles Townes, or some other work of his

choosing."

During the Secretary's discussion of Dr. Forman's promotion with the Assistant Secretaries, comments were made

regarding Dr. Forman's age, generally to the effect that he

might be "beyond his years of scholarly productivity"; Secretary Adams denied making these statements. Dr. Forman

filed an administrative complaint of age discrimination on

May 26, 1992, and upon being denied relief, he filed an

administrative appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which was still pending when he was considered for promotion in 1995.

When Dr. Forman was next considered for a promotion in

1995, I. Michael Heyman was the Secretary and Spencer

Crew was the Director of the National Museum of American

History. Secretary Heyman instituted various changes in the

structure and promotion process of the Museum. Secretary

Heyman abolished the positions of Assistant Secretary and

created in their place the position of Provost. During Dr.

Forman's 1995 promotion decision, Robert Hoffman served as

Acting Provost. Secretary Heyman also instituted a different

decision-making system for promotions, delegating responsibility for promotions of scholarly staff to the Directors but

with oversight responsibility in the Provost. Generally, the

Provost could consider promotions only of persons recommended for promotion by the Director of the Museum. Dr.

Crew, in turn, reorganized the Museum to shift its strategic

priorities from an "academic mode" toward a "customer service" mode that would be more responsive to the public. The

curatorial units were reduced from twenty to five to ensure

that curators would be better aware of the interrelationship

between their field of expertise and others' and share their

knowledge and research with the larger public.

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In April 1995, the peer evaluation committee recommended,

for a third time, to the Museum Director that Dr. Forman be

promoted to Grade 14. Dr. Crew, however, advised Dr.

Forman that he was going to postpone his final decision until

he could review the results of Dr. Forman's performance plan

for 1995-96. While acknowledging the importance of scholarship, Dr. Crew stated that "other factors also weigh quite

heavily," most notably the relationship of one's work to the

"strategic priorities of the museum" and "the priorities of

[one's] supervisor." Dr. Forman had expressed strong opposition to the new strategic priorities, and Dr. Crew explained

that he wanted to determine whether Dr. Forman's performance was consistent with the new priorities of the Museum

and Forman's supervisors. Dr. Crew did not forward the

promotion package to the Acting Provost.

Dr. Forman submitted a complaint to Acting Provost Hoffman, claiming that Hoffman had the authority to promote him

unilaterally to Grade 14. In a letter dated October 6, 1995,

Secretary Heyman stated that he had requested that Hoffman advise him as to how to act on Dr. Forman's complaint;

the Secretary was responding to a letter expressing concern

about Dr. Forman's "long overdue promotion" and the importance to the Smithsonian of indicating that it "prize[s] scholarship, originality, and independence" as demonstrated by Dr.

Forman. Hoffman turned the complaint and accompanying

materials over to Assistant Acting Provost Freudenheim for a

recommendation; Freudenheim responded with a memorandum, dated October 27, 1995, which Hoffman interpreted as

implicitly recommending Dr. Forman's promotion. In the

absence of a recommendation from the Museum Director,

however, Hoffman decided to ask Dr. Crew to reconsider his

decision not to recommend Dr. Forman's promotion; Dr.

Crew did not respond. Although Hoffman again favored Dr.

Forman's promotion in light of his research accomplishments,

he never "tested the system to determine" if he had "direct

authority to overrule the museum director's recommendation," and he did not forward Dr. Forman's complaint to the

Secretary, notwithstanding the Secretary's statement in October 1995 that "[Hoffman] expects to talk with all parties and

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then offer me guidance on how to proceed" regarding Dr.

Forman's 1995 promotion. Hoffman explained that he did

not forward the complaint because Dr. Forman had already

filed an EEO complaint, in which a decision would be made

concerning the legitimacy of his claim.

After exhausting his administrative remedies, see 29 C.F.R.

s 1614.201(c), Dr. Forman filed a lawsuit against the Smithsonian under the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. s 633a, for age discrimination and retaliation. The district court, observing that "[i]t

may very well be that [Dr. Forman] ha[d] not been treated

fairly by the Smithsonian," granted summary judgment to the

Smithsonian on Dr. Forman's age discrimination and retaliation claims. The district court found that Dr. Forman had

failed to show that age was a factor in the Smithsonian's

refusal to promote him in 1991-92. In so concluding, the

district court found that the Smithsonian had articulated a

legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its decision not to

promote him in 1991-92, namely his failure to produce a book

or major publishable work as outlined in his performance

plans, and that Dr. Forman had failed to show that this

explanation was pretext for age discrimination. The district

court made similar findings as to the 1995 promotion, referencing Dr. Crew's memorandum explaining why he was postponing Dr. Forman's promotion. The court found that Dr.

Forman failed to show that Dr. Crew's stated explanation for

postponing promotion, namely that Dr. Forman was not

meeting the expectations of his supervisors or aligning with

the priorities of the Museum, was a pretext for retaliation,

and presumably age discrimination. The court also found no

evidence of discriminatory retaliation by Dr. Crew or Acting

Provost Hoffman when he failed to forward Dr. Forman's

complaint to the Secretary. In Part II we address Dr.

Forman's promotion claims. In Part III we address his

retaliation claims.

II.

On appeal, Dr. Forman contends that he presented a prima

facie case of age discrimination because he was over forty

years old when his promotions were denied, he was extraordinarily accomplished in his field, the peer committee recomUSCA Case #00-5256 Document #638924 Filed: 11/16/2001 Page 7 of 24
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mended him in relation to both promotions, he presented

statistical evidence that reflected preferential treatment of

younger curators, and, as to his 1991 promotion, age-laden

comments strongly suggested age bias. He also contends

that he established a prima facie case of retaliation as to his

1995 promotion because he engaged in protected activity by

filing an EEO complaint regarding the denial of his 1991

promotion, his supervisors knew of his EEO activity, and both

Assistant Provost Freudenheim's memorandum and Acting

Provost Hoffman's statement that he did not bring Dr. Forman's promotion to the Secretary for decision because Forman had filed an EEO challenge, constituted direct causal

evidence between his protected activity and the denial of his

promotion. Dr. Forman further contends that he presented

sufficient evidence to discredit the Smithsonian's reasons for

rejecting both of his promotions.

Our review of the grant of summary judgment is de novo.

See Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Accordingly, the court must view the record in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, according that party the

benefit of all reasonable inferences. See Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); see also Reeves v.

Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).

Consistent with the courts' reluctance to become involved in

the micromanagement of everyday employment decisions, see

Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 451-52 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing

Mungin v. Katten, Muchin & Zavis, 116 F.3d 1549, 1556-57

(D.C. Cir. 1997)); Fishbach v. D.C. Dep't of Corr., 86 F.3d

1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996), the question before the court is

limited to whether Dr. Forman produced sufficient evidence

of age discrimination, not whether he was treated fairly or

otherwise entitled to promotion. The Smithsonian does not

dispute that Dr. Forman is highly praised by outside scholars

for both his exhibits and scholarly writing and that he was

generally qualified for promotion.

Section 633a of the ADEA provides that "All personnel

actions affecting employees ... in the Smithsonian Institution

... who are at least 40 years of age ... shall be made free

from any discrimination based on age." 29 U.S.C. s 633a(a)

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(Supp. V 1999). This circuit applies to ADEA cases the

scheme for allocating evidentiary burdens that has evolved in

Title VII discrimination cases. See Krodel v. Young, 748

F.2d 701, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Thus, as summarized in

Cuddy v. Carmen, 762 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the plaintiff

must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id.

at 122. Upon so doing, the burden of production shifts to the

employer to offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for

its action. Id. Upon the employer's meeting of this burden

of production, the plaintiff, however, carries the overall burden of persuasion, which may be met either indirectly by

showing the employer's reason is pretextual or directly by

showing that it was more likely than not that the employer

was motivated by discrimination. Id. at 123; see Reeves, 530

U.S. at 143, 146-47.

The ultimate question is whether age was a determining

factor in the disputed employment decision. See Cuddy, 762

F.2d at 123. In failure to promote cases, a prima facie case is

made by showing: (1) the plaintiff is at least forty years of

age; (2) the plaintiff was qualified for the position in question;

(3) the plaintiff was not promoted; and (4) the plaintiff was

disadvantaged in favor of a younger person. See Cuddy v.

Carmen, 694 F.2d 853, 856-57 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

A.

Regarding the denial of his 1991 promotion, Dr. Forman

presented evidence that he was a member of the protected

class, he was generally qualified for promotion to Grade 14,

and yet he was not promoted. He also presented evidence

that he alone of all curators had been twice denied promotions in the face of two recommendations by the peer

committee. To support the fourth element of his prima facie

case, Dr. Forman presented expert statistical evidence to

show that younger employees were favored for promotion.

Specifically, Dr. Forman presented evidence that persons

under forty-five years of age had a higher rate of promotion

to Grade 14 than those over forty-five, and that there was an

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inverse correlation between a curator's age and the annual

ratings given for research. These differences were statistically significant using either a one-tailed or two-tailed test of

significance. See Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F.2d 84, 90-97 (D.C.

Cir. 1987). This circuit recognizes statistical data as relevant

in individual discrimination claims. See Minority Employees

at NASA v. Beggs, 723 F.2d 958, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see

also Bell v. EPA, 232 F.3d 546, 553 (7th Cir. 2000); Adams v.

Ameritech Servs., Inc., 231 F.3d 414, 423-24, 427 (7th Cir.

2000). Although the Smithsonian showed that several older

curators were promoted, this is not dispositive, see O'Connor

v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996), and

Dr. Forman maintains that the Smithsonian never disputed

the overall statistical trend. The Smithsonian maintains that

the statistics are deficient because they rely on an overly

broad data pool, but the Smithsonian does not dispute that

the statistics were based on information that it supplied in

response to Dr. Forman's discovery requests.

In any event, Dr. Forman introduced other evidence that

age was a primary consideration in the denial of his promotion in 1991 to meet his prima facie burden, which is not

onerous. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450

U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Dr. Forman presented evidence that

when Secretary Adams was reviewing Dr. Forman's 1991

promotion papers with the two Assistant Secretaries, a series

of comments were made that implicitly referred to Dr. Forman's age. According to Assistant Secretary Hoffman, comments were made that Dr. Forman may be "over the hill" or

in the "twilight of his career," and may have "written his last

significant article." As pointed out in Hunt v. City of Markham, 219 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2000), when decision makers, or

those who have input into the decision, express such discriminatory feelings around the relevant time in regard to the

adverse employment action complained of, "then it may be

possible to infer that the decision makers were influenced by

those feelings in making their decisions." Id. at 653. Moreover, the employer's correlation of old age with declining

productivity represents the very essence of age discrimination. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610

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(1993); cf. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251

(1989).

With this evidence, Dr. Forman has presented a prima

facie case that shifts the burden of coming forward with

evidence to the Smithsonian to show that its action was not

based on Dr. Forman's age. The Smithsonian has met this

burden of production, presenting evidence that Dr. Forman

was not promoted because of his failure to produce a booklength manuscript on atomic clocks "or any other work of

comparable scope." Because Dr. Forman has no direct evidence of age discrimination, the dispositive question is whether he showed that the Smithsonian's explanation for its

decision not to promote him in 1991 was a pretext for

discrimination. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S.

502, 511 (1993). Dr. Forman disputes that he was obligated

to produce a book during his New York City sabbatical, and

maintains that he, in fact, produced the quantitative word

target set for his sabbatical and was productively focusing on

Townes (but could not complete the biography because

Townes was refusing access to his papers). Dr. Forman

questions why completion of yet another major scholarly

work was made a condition of his promotion, observing that

this supposedly critical requirement vanished in later years

and that completion of a book was not generally a requirement for promotion. This is insufficient evidence to show

pretext.

It is undisputed that Dr. Forman's performance plans for

the relevant period called for him to produce a book or

comparable body of work. Dr. Forman did not produce

evidence to show fulfillment of this requirement. The fact

that completion of a book dropped from later promotion

decisions is insufficient to show pretext because the later

promotion decisions occurred under different decision makers

using different procedures, having different priorities, and

considering different performance evaluations. Further, the

fact that Dr. Forman may have met word targets is not the

equivalent of producing a final book-length manuscript; the

latter, not merely the former, was specified in his performance plans, and Dr. Forman admitted that he finished

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neither his atomic clock book nor his Townes manuscript.

Nor does Dr. Forman's inability to finish his Townes manuscript because of factors beyond his control rebut the fact

that he did not produce a critical element of his performance

plan for several years. Hence, notwithstanding the agebased comments at the discussion of his promotion, the

Smithsonian produced evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason

for denying him a noncompetitive promotion in 1991.

Dr. Forman's reliance on Aka v. Washington Hospital

Center, 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998), is appropriate to the

extent it sets forth the proper legal analysis, but Aka highlights precisely what is missing here. In Aka, the plaintiff

offered evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that

he was "markedly more qualified" than the person selected

for the position at issue. Id. at 1299. Dr. Forman's task is

more difficult to the extent he is competing against himself.

That the promotion of others did not depend on completion of

a book is irrelevant to Dr. Forman's particular promotion

decision. Unless he could show that he had fulfilled the

central purpose of his sabbatical and performance plans, he

cannot show that Secretary Adams' reason for denying his

promotion was pretextual. As the district court explained to

Dr. Forman:

What is relevant is that they thought your work product

or your output was inadequate, given the fact that you

had no other significant responsibilities during that period of time, and that you were expected, during that twoyear period of time, to produce publishable-quality written material. * * * You may disagree with their evaluation of what you were doing that period of time, but

that's not age discrimination.

B.

Dr. Forman's 1995 promotion age-discrimination claim is

supported by neither the statistical evidence nor the agebased remarks by decision makers that he presented in

connection with the denial of his 1991 promotion. The statistical evidence, which examined only 1990 to 1993 and 1987 to

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1992, does not address the relevant period, and there is no

evidence to support the inference that the statistical trends

during these periods extended to 1995. As to Dr. Forman's

age, Dr. Crew, the Director who made the decision to postpone his decision on Dr. Forman's promotion until his performance during the upcoming year could be evaluated, stated

that he was unaware of Dr. Forman's age when he decided to

postpone Forman's promotion. Although Dr. Forman maintains this denial is evidence of age discrimination, this is

speculation, which is not the same as evidence showing that

age was a substantial factor in Dr. Crew's decision. See

McGill v. Munoz, 203 F.3d 843, 846 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Rather, the evidence showed that Dr.

Crew focused on whether Dr. Forman would adapt to the

Museum's new direction and his supervisor's expectations.

Other evidence corroborates Dr. Crew's explanation. Dr.

Forman had protested the Museum's new direction, thereby

indicating that the Museum did have a new focus. Further,

Dr. Forman's immediate supervisor had raised some of the

same concerns expressed by Dr. Crew, urging Dr. Forman to

collaborate more with others and do some new exhibition

work and thus "expand the audiences with whom he is

communicating." The evidence that Dr. Forman produced to

suggest that Assistant Acting Provost Freudenheim questioned whether the Museum had such a new direction was

later retracted by Freudenheim as being based on only

information provided by Dr. Forman, and in any event, at

most, suggests that Dr. Crew's stated explanation might be

false, not that Dr. Crew's decision was age-based.

For these reasons, we hold that Dr. Forman failed to

present a prima facie case of age discrimination in the 1995

denial of his promotion.

III.

We conclude, however, that Dr. Forman produced sufficient

evidence to establish a prima facie case of retaliation when

Acting Provost Hoffman failed to forward Dr. Forman's

complaint materials in response to Secretary Heyman's reUSCA Case #00-5256 Document #638924 Filed: 11/16/2001 Page 13 of 24
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quest for advice on Dr. Forman's 1995 promotion. In contrast, Dr. Forman did not present a prima facie case of

retaliation as a result of Dr. Crew's failure to promote him.

We first address a threshold jurisdictional issue, however,

before turning to the merits.

A.

For purposes of the ADEA, the Smithsonian is included in

the section addressing age discrimination in federal agency

employment. See 29 U.S.C. s 633a(a) (Supp. V 1999). Although the court has considered whether the Smithsonian is a

federal agency under certain statutes, see Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enters. v. Smithsonian Inst., 566 F.2d 289,

296 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Dong v. Smithsonian Inst., 125 F.3d

877, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1997), it has yet to address whether the

Smithsonian is entitled to sovereign immunity.

Several elements of the Smithsonian's congressional design

would appear to suggest that it does have sovereign immunity. First, it operates under a federal charter, 20 U.S.C. s 41,

and its Board of Regents is composed of or selected by

federal officials, id. ss 42-43. Second, it is authorized to

receive appropriations from Congress. See id. ss 53a, 54;

General Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Library and

Memorials, 91st Cong. 323 (1970), cited in Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enters., 566 F.2d at 296 n.4. Third, "[a]ll

moneys recovered by or accruing to, the institution shall be

paid into the Treasury of the United States, to the credit of

the Smithsonian bequest, and separately accounted for," 20

U.S.C. s 53, and disbursements for payments of debt are

submitted to the Treasury, id. s 57. Ultimately, as the

Supreme Court observed in Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731

(1947), whether "a suit is one against the sovereign" turns on

whether "[t]he 'essential nature and effect of the proceeding'

may be such as to make plain that the judgment sought would

expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere

with the public administration." Id. at 738 (quoting Ex parte

State of New York, 256 U.S. 490, 500, 502 (1921)). Thus,

notwithstanding that the Smithsonian is authorized to receive

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gifts from private sources, see 20 U.S.C. s 55, the Smithsonian's structure and federal funding would suggest that Congress's interest in safeguarding the public fisc from money

judgments is no less significant with respect to the Smithsonian than any federal agency. Cf. Story v. Snyder, 184 F.2d

454, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1950). Nonetheless, we do not decide the

issue. Rather, in order to ensure a consistent reading of the

scope of s 633a, we assume that the Smithsonian has sovereign immunity.

Consequently, before addressing the merits of Dr. Forman's retaliation claims, we must first determine whether Dr.

Forman, as an employee of the Smithsonian, may bring a

retaliation claim under s 633a of the ADEA. Although the

Smithsonian, which is represented by the United States Attorney, does not question whether s 633a prohibits retaliation, the court must because "officers of the United States

possess no power through their actions to waive an immunity

of the United States or to confer jurisdiction on a court in the

absence of some express provision of Congress." Dep't of the

Navy v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 56 F.3d 273, 275 (D.C.

Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. N.Y. Rayon Importing

Co., 329 U.S. 654, 660 (1947)); see also First Va. Bank v.

Randolph, 110 F.3d 75, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

"In analyzing whether Congress has waived the immunity

of the United States, we must construe waivers strictly in

favor of the sovereign and not enlarge the waiver beyond

what the language requires." Library of Congress v. Shaw,

478 U.S. 310, 318 (1986) (citations omitted) (internal quotation

marks omitted); accord United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.,

503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992). Thus, waiver cannot be implied; it

must be unequivocally expressed. United States v. Mitchell,

445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980); Dorsey v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 41

F.3d 1551, 1554-55 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Accordingly, we turn to

the text of s 633a.

Congress expanded the scope of the ADEA in 1974 to

include state and local governments and federal employers.

See Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 74 (1974) (codified as

amended at 29 U.S.C. ss 630(b), 633a). Unlike state and

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local governments, which were merely added to the definition

of "employer" in the ADEA, Congress created an entirely

new section of the ADEA in which it waived federal sovereign

immunity. This section, codified as s 633a, provides that

"[a]ll personnel actions affecting [federal agency] employees

... shall be made free from any discrimination based on age."

29 U.S.C. s 633a(a). Thus, "Congress deliberately prescribed

a distinct statutory scheme applicable only to the federal

sector." Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 167 n.15 (1981).

Unlike s 623(d), the ADEA provision governing private,

state, and local employers, however, s 633a does not by its

terms expressly prohibit retaliation. Section 623(d) explicitly

includes retaliation within the specified prohibited forms of

discrimination under the ADEA, providing that "[i]t shall be

unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of his

employees ... because such individual ... has made a

charge, ... or participated in any manner in an investigation,

proceeding, or litigation under [the ADEA]." 29 U.S.C.

s 623(d) (1994). Moreover, the prohibition of retaliation contained in s 623(d) does not apply to federal employees not

only because the ADEA defines "employer" as used in

s 623(d) to exclude the federal government, see 29 U.S.C.

s 630(b), but also because s 633a(f) specifically provides that

s 633a should not be subject to the provisions of s 623.

These statutory differences between the federal and private

sectors are not dispositive, however, as some courts have

concluded in holding that s 633a does not allow a claim for

retaliation, see Tomasello v. Rubin, 920 F. Supp. 4, 5-6

(D.D.C. 1996), aff'd on other grounds, 167 F.3d 612 (D.C. Cir.

1999); Koslow v. Hundt, 919 F. Supp. 18, 19-21, 21 (D.D.C.

1995), for it is the language that Congress used in s 633a(a)

alone that determines the scope of that provision. Unlike

s 623, which is narrowly drawn and sets forth specific prohibited forms of age discrimination in private employment, Congress used sweeping language when it subsequently extended

the ADEA to cover federal agency employees. Congress

required no less than that "[a]ll personnel actions affecting

employees ... who are at least 40 years of age ... shall be

made free from any discrimination based on age." 29 U.S.C.

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s 633a(a) (emphasis added). In enacting s 633a(a), Congress

used unqualified language that encompasses a claim of retaliation because "analytically a reprisal for an age discrimination charge is an action in which age bias is a substantial

factor." See Siegel v. Kreps, 654 F.2d 773, 782 n.43 (D.C. Cir.

1981) (Robinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)

(citations omitted). Congress's failure to mention "retaliation" explicitly does not undermine its intended breadth of

the provision. Cf. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 121 S. Ct. 1879,

1897, (2001); Teva Pharm., USA, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug

Admin., 182 F.3d 1003, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1999). It is difficult to

imagine how a workplace could be "free from any discrimination based on age" if, in response to an age discrimination

claim, a federal employer could fire or take other action that

was adverse to an employee. To treat Congress's mandate as

other than comprehensive would produce absurd results,

which courts are to avoid. See Griffin v Oceanic Contractors,

Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982). Nothing in the plain language

of s 633a suggests that Congress intended the federal workplace to be less free of age discrimination than the private

workplace. To the contrary, Congress's actions show that it

intended its mandate to reach more broadly in the federal

sector than in the private sector. In amending the ADEA in

1978, Congress eliminated the upper age limit for federal

employees in order to effectively end mandatory retirement

in the federal sector in most instances, whereas it merely

increased the coverage from 65 to 70 for private employers,

limiting the protection from mandatory retirement in the

private sector. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-950, at 2, 7-8, 10-11

(1978) (Conference Report); 124 Cong. Rec. 8,218 (1978) (Sen.

Javits, ranking minority member of the Human Resources

Committee). Moreover, the intent of Congress as expressed

in the legislative history of s 633a(a) was to "remove discriminatory barriers against employment of older workers in government jobs at the Federal and local government levels as

[the ADEA] has and continues to do in private employment."

S. Rep. No. 93-690, at 56 (1974); see also 120 Cong. Rec.

8,768 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Bentsen, principal proponent of

ADEA extension to federal employees).

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This focus on the sweeping language used by Congress is

the same reasoning that the court relied upon in holding that

s 2000e-16, in which Congress waived sovereign immunity

for claims under Title VII, includes a claim for retaliation.

See Ethnic Employees of the Library of Congress v. Boorstin,

751 F.2d 1405, 1415 & n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing Porter v.

Adams, 639 F.2d 273, 277-78 (5th Cir. 1981)). In Porter, the

Fifth Circuit explained that s 2000e-16 differs from

ss 2000e-3 and 2000e-4, which are narrowly drawn and

prohibit only specific forms of discrimination, because

s 2000e-16 is drafted broadly to prohibit "any discrimination

based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42

U.S.C. s 2000e-16; see Porter, 639 F.2d at 277-78. The

court reasoned that "the reasonable conclusion, therefore, is

that by drafting [s 2000e-16] to prohibit 'any discrimination,'

Congress intended to bar the federal government from engaging in all those forms of discrimination identified in

[ss 2000e-3 and 2000e-4], and others as well." Porter, 639

F.2d at 278; see also White v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 652 F.2d

913, 917 (9th Cir. 1981). Sections 633a and 2000e-16 use

identical language in creating a cause of action for federal

employees under the ADEA and Title VII, respectively, and

thus should be interpreted consistently. Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that s 633a, as finally enacted, is

"patterned directly after [s 2000e-16] of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, which extend Title VII protections to federal employees." Lehman, 453 U.S. at 167 n.15. Notably, the statutory

pattern here favors an unqualified interpretation of Congressional intent, unlike the statutory pattern that confronted the

Court in Lehman. See id. at 161.

The fact that, unlike s 2000e-16 of Title VII, s 633a of the

ADEA contains an exclusivity provision does not defeat our

analysis. The exclusivity provision provides that federal personnel actions under s 633a "shall not be subject to, or

affected by, any provision of this chapter," with one exception

not relevant here, see 29 U.S.C. s 633a(f), and makes s 633a

"self-contained and unaffected by other sections." Lehman,

453 U.S. at 168. Courts relying on s 633a(f) in concluding

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lo, 920 F. Supp. at 6; Koslow, 919 F. Supp. at 19-20, point to

the Supreme Court's language in Lehman that s 633a(f)

means that "federal personnel actions covered by [s 633a] are

not subject to any other section of the ADEA," Lehman, 453

U.S. at 168, and reason that "Congress has made clear that in

interpreting section 633a, the Court may not borrow provisions from elsewhere in the ADEA." Koslow, 919 F. Supp. at

19-20; Tomasello, 920 F. Supp. at 6. The reasoning fails for

two reasons.

First, nothing in the legislative history of s 633a(f), which

was added to s 633a in 1978, see Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat.

191 (1978), suggests that it was intended to limit the broad

coverage of s 633a that was originally intended. As noted,

the 1978 amendments imposed more stringent requirements

upon the federal sector than the private sector.

Second, our analysis is consistent both with s 633a(f) and

Lehman's interpretation of it because we do not borrow

provisions from elsewhere in the ADEA; rather, we rely on

Congress's use of sweeping language in s 633a(a) itself to

make unlawful "any discrimination" based on age, as age is

defined in the ADEA. In Lehman, the Supreme Court

considered whether a federal employee bringing suit pursuant

to s 633a had a right to a jury trial. Id. at 157. The Court

did not hold, as Koslow implies, that s 633a(f) precludes

courts from interpreting s 633a(a) as prohibiting the same

conduct prohibited in the private sector in other provisions of

the ADEA; rather, Lehman began its analysis with the plain

language of s 633a, asking first whether it contained an

express provision of a jury trial. Working against the background principle that "[w]hen Congress has waived the sovereign immunity of the United States, it has almost always

conditioned that waiver upon a plaintiff's relinquishing any

claim to a jury trial," id. at 161, the Court found no Congressional intent to provide federal employees a jury trial because

there was no express provision for a jury trial in s 633a,

whereas Congress had expressly provided for one for private

employees. Id. at 163. In further support of its conclusion,

the Court pointed to s 633a(f), noting that, in light of Congress's emphasis that s 633a was self-contained, Congress

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would not have overlooked the need to provide federal employees a jury trial if it had so intended. Id. at 168.

In the end, then, s 633a(f) presents somewhat of a red

herring. We do not incorporate the provisions of s 623(d)

into s 633a in concluding that s 633a supports a retaliation

claim against the federal government. Compare Ayon v.

Sampson, 547 F.2d 446, 449-50 (9th Cir. 1976). To the

contrary, we are relying on the plain language of s 633a(a) in

holding that a work place cannot be free from any age

discrimination if an employer can take an adverse employment action against its employees because the employee has

brought an age discrimination claim against the employer.

This is age discrimination, which s 633a(a) by its own terms

alone prohibits.

For these reasons, we hold that s 633a waives sovereign

immunity as to claims of retaliation. We proceed, therefore,

to address the merits of Dr. Forman's claims.

B.

The McDonnell Douglas framework is applicable to claims

of retaliation. See Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322,

330 (D.C. Cir. 1991); cf. McKenna v. Weinberger, 729 F.2d

783, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In order to establish a prima facie

case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged

in protected activity, (2) he was qualified for the promotion,

(3) the employer took an adverse personnel action, and (4) a

causal connection existed between the protected activity and

the adverse action. See Paquin v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage

Ass'n, 119 F.3d 23, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Mitchell v. Baldrige,

759 F.2d 80, 86 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1985); McKenna, 729 F.2d at

790. The initial burden is not great, as the plaintiff need only

establish facts adequate to permit an inference of retaliatory

motive. See McKenna, 729 F.2d at 790.

The district court was unpersuaded that Dr. Forman had

made a prima facie case of retaliation. The court construed

Hoffman's statement that he did not bring Dr. Forman's

complaint to the Secretary "since Dr. Forman had already

filed an EEO complaint, in the course of which a decision

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would be reached concerning the legitimacy of his claim" to

be, "Let's leave it to the courts." Recognizing that Hoffman

had previously supported Dr. Forman's promotion, the court

rejected Dr. Forman's argument that Hoffman's statement

was per se reprisal and that as a result of Hoffman's inaction,

Dr. Forman was deprived of consideration and procedures

from which he otherwise would have benefitted. The district

court erred by not viewing the evidence most favorably to

Forman in granting summary judgment. Dr. Forman met

his burden by presenting direct evidence of retaliatory motive. Despite Secretary Heyman's request for advice about

how to proceed on Dr. Forman's 1995 promotion, Acting

Provost Hoffman never forwarded Dr. Forman's complaint

materials to the Secretary because, according to Hoffman

himself, Dr. Forman had filed an EEO complaint about his

1991 promotion. Hoffman's explanation for not doing so was

that the EEO proceeding would determine whether Dr. Forman was entitled to his promotion. While these and other

evidentiary issues will remain open on remand, for purposes

of summary judgment, Dr. Forman is entitled to the benefit

of all reasonable inferences from the evidence before the

district court.

It is true that Hoffman supported Dr. Forman's promotion.

And it may be true that his failure to forward the complaint

to the Secretary was in good faith. But motive, in the sense

of malice is not required for liability under the ADEA.

Malicious or reckless motive is only pertinent to the issue of

liquidated or double damages, which Congress intended to be

punitive in nature and are not relevant here. See 29 U.S.C.

s 626(b); id. s 216(b); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125 (1985); Smith v. Office of Personnel

Mgmt., 778 F.2d 258, 261 (5th Cir. 1985); see also 42 U.S. C.

l981a(b)(1). "[A]n employer may offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for taking an adverse action against an

employee who has engaged in protected activity.... However, the employer may not proffer a good faith reason for

taking retaliatory action." EEOC v. Bd. of Governors of

State Colls. & Univs., 957 F.2d 424, 427-28 (7th Cir. 1992);

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lines, 469 U.S. at 126 & n.19. Unlawful motive, not malicious

motive, is all that Dr. Forman had to show.

Consequently, even if Hoffman acted in good faith in failing

to forward Dr. Forman's complaint to the Secretary, he

nonetheless would violate the ADEA if his reason for doing so

was retaliatory, i.e., in response to Dr. Forman's 1991 EEO

complaint. Dr. Forman offered evidence, sufficient to defeat

summary judgment, of such a retaliatory and hence unlawful

motive through Hoffman's own explanation of his inaction.

Hoffman's statement is direct evidence that his failure to take

Dr. Forman's complaint to the Secretary was substantially

motivated by Dr. Forman's prior EEO complaint and hence

was retaliatory. Moreover, giving Dr. Forman the benefit of

all reasonable inferences, it is unclear whether Hoffman could

reasonably have thought that the pending EEO proceeding

involving Dr. Forman's 1991 promotion, which turned on his

failure to produce a book or book-length manuscript, would

resolve Dr. Forman's complaint about the denial of his 1995

promotion, which turned on other factors, such as concern

whether he would adapt to the Museum's new focus. Although Hoffman may have thought that administrative resolution of the 1991 promotion in Dr. Forman's favor would

have resolved the question of promotion in 1995, an adverse

resolution would have left unresolved Dr. Forman's claim of

discrimination in 1995. Without a connection between the

two, Hoffman's conduct could reasonably be interpreted as

involving more than "leaving it to the courts."

Dr. Forman also provided evidence of the remaining elements of a prima facie case of retaliation. First, Dr. Forman's filing of an administrative complaint regarding the

denial of his 1991 promotion, as well as his appeal to the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, were protected

activities. See 29 U.S.C. s 623; Holbrook v. Reno, 196 F.3d

255, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Second, he was generally qualified

for the promotion, and the Smithsonian does not dispute this.

Third, Hoffman's failure to take Dr. Forman's complaint to

the Secretary constituted an adverse employment action,

viewing the record most favorably to Dr. Forman. The

record before the district court showed that Secretary HeyUSCA Case #00-5256 Document #638924 Filed: 11/16/2001 Page 22 of 24
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man had delegated promotion responsibility to the Directors,

but Dr. Forman introduced evidence that the Secretary had

made an exception in Dr. Forman's case, expressly stating

that Hoffman was to advise him on Dr. Forman's promotion.

Also, the Secretary retained the authority to unilaterally

promote curators. Notwithstanding the Secretary's request,

Hoffman, although aware of the Secretary's statement that he

was awaiting Hoffman's recommendation, never advised the

Secretary how to proceed on Dr. Forman's promotion. Hoffman's reason for not acting was that Dr. Forman had filed an

EEO complaint. As a result of Hoffman's inaction, a reasonable fact finder could find that Dr. Forman was denied the

opportunity for promotion that the Secretary had afforded

him. The Smithsonian did not contend that Dr. Forman

would not have been promoted had Hoffman taken Dr. Forman's complaint to the Secretary for action. Thus, Dr.

Forman's evidence that Hoffman's inaction was an adverse

employment action is sufficient to defeat summary judgment

for failure to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. See

Cones v. Shalala, 199 F.3d 512, 521 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also

Ruggles v. Cal. Polytechnic State Univ., 797 F.2d 782, 785-86

(9th Cir. 1986). Further, the Smithsonian's characterization

of its action as a postponement rather than a denial is to no

avail; for purposes of summary judgment, Hoffman's inaction

was the equivalent of non-promotion. See Price Waterhouse,

490 U.S. at 233 n.1.

Dr. Forman's claim that Dr. Crew retaliated against him as

a result of his EEO complaint fails, however, because Dr.

Forman does not allege sufficient facts to show causation.

Although Dr. Crew knew of the EEO complaint, his decision

not to promote Dr. Forman in 1995 occurred three years after

Dr. Forman filed his EEO complaint, which challenged his

non-promotion in 1991 under a different Smithsonian administration, and after changes had been made in the Museum's

curatorial staff. Because of the time lapse, Dr. Forman

cannot rely solely on the timing of Dr. Crew's decision not to

promote him to show causation. See Holbrook v. Reno, 196

F.3d 255, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Mitchell v. Baldridge, 759

F.2d 80, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Assistant Acting Provost FreuUSCA Case #00-5256 Document #638924 Filed: 11/16/2001 Page 23 of 24
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denheim's evaluation of Dr. Crew's denial of promotion also

cannot support a causal connection between Dr. Crew's failure to promote Dr. Forman and Dr. Forman's protected

activity. After discussing the 1995 promotion decision with

Dr. Forman, Freudenheim indicated that he thought that "it

looks like [Dr. Forman] is being handled prejudicially (either

because he previously sued, or because he's not part of some

vague team concept), and I suspect that [the Smithsonian]

will not win this one if it goes into formal legal processes."

As noted, Freudenheim later qualified this statement, explaining that it was based solely on information Dr. Forman had

provided and that he did not have "all of the pertinent

information at [his] disposal at the time [he] expressed [his]

view." Although Dr. Forman is entitled on summary judgment to have Freudenheim's initial letter credited, see Reeves,

530 U.S. at 150, it is insufficient to establish causation because it is not based on personal knowledge, but rather is

mere speculation. See McGill, 203 F.3d at 846; see also Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e).

Accordingly, because Dr. Forman has established a prima

facie case of retaliation, and the Smithsonian has failed to

meet its burden of production to set forth a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for Hoffman's failure to act on Dr. Forman's complaint, we reverse the grant of summary judgment

on Forman's 1995 retaliation claim; we otherwise affirm. Dr.

Forman's only other contention, that the district court abused

its discretion in denying him further discovery is unpersuasive in view of the wide scope of discretion accorded to the

district court. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253

F.3d 34, 100-01 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam), cert. denied on

other grounds, 70 U.S.L.W. 3107 (U.S. Oct. 9, 2001); Carey

Canada, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 940 F.2d 1548, 1559 (D.C.

Cir. 1991).

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