Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01989/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01989-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 18:1964 Racketeering (RICO) Act

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 This order does not address the Motion to Dismiss 

from Defendants Tilton, Hickman, Woodford, Dovey,

Kernan and Hoshino (“CDCR Defendants”).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAM BESS, 

Plaintiff, 

 v. 

 

MATTHEW CATE et al. 

 

 Defendants. 

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CV 07-1989 LEW-JFM 

ORDER DENYING OIG

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

Currently before this Court is Matthew Cate and

Davis Shaw’s (hereafter “OIG Defendants”) Motion to

Dismiss1. The Court took this matter under submission

on February 28, 2008. Having considered all papers

submitted pertaining to the above Motions, THE COURT

NOW FINDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS: 

Case 2:07-cv-01989-JAM -JFM Document 29 Filed 03/14/08 Page 1 of 8
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A. Legal Standard

1. Standard for Motion to Dismiss 

In a FRCP 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, “all

allegations of material fact in the complaint are taken

as true and construed in the light most favorable to

the Plaintiff.” McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d

1259, 1261 (9th Cir. 2004). A dismissal is only

appropriate “if it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the

claim which would entitle him to relief.” Stoner v.

Santa Clara County Office of Educ., 502 F.3d 1116, 1120

(9th Cir. 2007). However, “a formulaic recitation of

the elements of a cause of action will not do...

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007).

B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff, a corrections officer, brought three

claims against the OIG Defendants. Defendant Cate is

the Inspector General of California and Defendant Shaw

is the Chief Assistant to the Inspector General. In

his Complaint, originally filed September 21, 2007,

Plaintiff brings two claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1983 for

violations of Plaintiff’s right to Free Speech and Due

Process. Plaintiff’s third claim alleges a violation

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of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act

(RICO), brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964. 

1. Free Speech Retaliation Claim

Plaintiff specifically alleges that the OIG

Defendants violated his right to Free Speech because

they failed to initiate an investigation after

Plaintiff submitted multiple complaints to the OIG. 

The actions of the Inspector General are governed

under Cal. Penal Code § 6125-6133. Under Cal. Penal

Code § 6126(a)(1), the Inspector General may, but is

not required to, initiate an investigation into

departmental policies and procedures. Although Cal.

Penal Code § 6129(b)(1) mandates an “inquiry” into a

complaint of retaliation, a formal investigation is

only required if the IG determines that “a legally

cognizable cause of action is presented.” Thus,

Defendants are not required by law to conduct a formal

investigation upon Plaintiff’s complaints.

However, under Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,

597 (1972), even if a citizen does not have a legal

right to a benefit, the government may not deny the

benefit because the citizen exercised his free speech

rights. And, based on United Steelworkers of Am. v.

United Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1545-47 (9th

Cir. 1989), the Court may reasonably use circumstantial

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evidence to infer a conspiracy. 

Here, accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true,

the Court can reasonably infer that Defendants may have

abused their discretionary power to retaliate against

Plaintiff. At the pleading stage, this is sufficient

for Plaintiff’s retaliation claim to survive dismissal.

Thus, the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation

claim is DENIED. 

2. Deprivation of Property Rights Claim

Plaintiff claims that the OIG Defendants deprived

him of his property interest in his job because he was

constructively discharged based on what he claims was

an unjustified transfer. 

Permanent state employees hold a property interest

in their job which is protected by Due Process. 

Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 548 (9th Cir. 2006). 

This interest contains the right to continued

employment free from disciplinary measures without

cause. Skelly v. State Personnel Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194,

207-08 (1975). One type of disciplinary measure is a

constructive discharge. A constructive discharge

occurs when, under the totality of the circumstances,

“a reasonable person in [the employee’s] position would

have felt he was forced to quit because of intolerable

and discriminatory working conditions.” Sanchez v.

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City of Santa Ana, 915 F.2d 424, 431 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, a

reasonable person in Plaintiff’s position could argue

that he was faced with an intolerable and

discriminatory work environment. Therefore, there are

sufficient facts pledged to state a claim on a

constructive discharge theory. The Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s claim for deprivation of property rights is

DENIED.

3. Deprivation of Liberty Rights Claim

Plaintiff claims that his liberty interests have

also been violated based on the OIG Defendants’ failure

to investigate his claims. He also claims that this

same right has been violated because his free speech

has been unjustifiably hindered. Finally, Plaintiff

alleges that the OIG Defendants violated California’s

anti-retaliation laws. 

State laws do not create a protected liberty

interest unless the law itself places substantive

limits on official discretion. See White v. Lambert,

370 F.3d 1002, 1013 (9th Cir. 2004); Meachum v. Fano,

427 U.S. 215, 228-229 (1976). 

Here, Plaintiff argues that under Cal. Gov’t Code §

8547.3(a), state law places substantive limits on

Defendants’ discretion. This argument is persuasive. 

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The statute is quite clear that any interference with

the rights provided by the Whistleblower Protection Act

is barred. Plaintiff has alleged various acts of

retaliation, which allow the Court to reasonably infer

that Defendants interfered with Plaintiff’s right to

report governmental corruption free from retaliation. 

At the pleading stage, this is sufficient to avoid

dismissal. The Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

4. RICO Violation Claim

In order to plead a violation under RICO, Plaintiff

must allege four elements: (1) existence of an

enterprise affecting or engaged in interstate commerce,

(2) defendant employed by or associated with the

enterprise, (3) defendant participated in the

enterprise’s affairs, and (4) a pattern of racketeering

activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).

Here, if Plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true,

the elements of a RICO claim are met. Under 18 U.S.C.

§1961(4) enterprise is broadly defined to include any

“legal entity” or any group of individuals “associatedin-fact”. Plaintiff’s complaint clearly alleges that

Defendants are a legal entity, and are factually

associated to the CDCR Defendants. As to the

Interstate Commerce requirement, the Court in United

States v. Juvenile Male, 118 F.3d 1344, 1349-50 (9th

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2

 See, e.g., United States v. Pascucci, 943 F.2d 

1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1991) (defendant threatened to

deliver embarrassing audio tapes to his victim's

employer, a corporation engaged in interstate

commerce); United States v. Phillips, 577 F.2d 495,

501 (9th Cir. 1978) (defendant's extortion

threatened the depletion of resources from a

business engaged in interstate commerce').

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Cir. 1997) stated that the requirement is satisfied by

proof of a probable or potential impact. Because the

required connection to is so slight,2 the fact that the

alleged enterprise may have some imaginable de minimus

impact on interstate commerce is sufficient. 

Plaintiff needs only allege that Defendants played

“some part in directing the enterprise’s affairs.” 

Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 179 (1993). If

the enterprise is OIG, then Defendants, as high level

directors of the organization, certainly took part in

OIG’s affairs. And, if the enterprise is the

association-in-fact between CDCR Defendants and OIG

Defendants, then by definition the OIG Defendants would

certainly play “some part” in directing its affairs. 

Lastly, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to

plead a pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C.

§1861 defines racketeering activity to include a wide

variety of acts. Here, CDCR Defendants allegedly

conducted several predicate acts which may constitute

racketeering activity. By allowing these acts to occur

despite being the sole party with the ability to

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intervene, Defendants have indirectly participated in

these acts. 

The Court also finds a sufficient causal nexus

between the alleged RICO violations and Plaintiff’s

injury. Plaintiff’s injuries would not have arisen but

for the predicate acts described, and the injuries were

foreseeable consequences of the acts. Therefore,

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s RICO claim

should be DENIED at this time. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW

Senior, U.S. District Judge

DATED: March 13, 2008

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