Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-02298/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-02298-29/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER DENYING MANUFACTURERS' MOTIONS TO STRIKE RAMBUS' COUNTERCLAIMS; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART SAMSUNG AND HYNIX'S MOTIONS TO STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Nos. C-05-02298 RMW; C-05-00334 RMW; C-05-02298 RMW; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF

E-FILED on 11/15/07

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR INC., HYNIX

SEMICONDUCTOR AMERICA INC.,

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR U.K. LTD., and

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR

DEUTSCHLAND GmbH,

Plaintiffs,

v.

RAMBUS INC.,

Defendant.

No. CV-00-20905 RMW

ORDER DENYING MANUFACTURERS'

MOTIONS TO STRIKE RAMBUS'

COUNTERCLAIMS; GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART SAMSUNG AND

HYNIX'S MOTIONS TO STRIKE

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

RAMBUS INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA,

INC., SAMSUNG SEMICONDUCTOR, INC.,

SAMSUNG AUSTIN SEMICONDUCTOR,

L.P.,

Defendants.

No. C-05-02298 RMW

[Re Docket No. 180]

Case 5:05-cv-02298-RMW Document 542 Filed 11/15/07 Page 1 of 21
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For the Northern District of California

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1

 For the purposes of this order, "Manufacturers" comprise "Hynix," "Samsung," "Nanya," and

"Micron." In turn, "Hynix" means Hynix Semiconductor Inc., Hynix Semiconductor America Inc.,

and Hynix Semiconductor Manufacturing America Inc.; "Samsung" means Samsung Electronics

Co., Ltd., Samsung Electronics America, Inc., Samsung Semiconductor, Inc., and Samsung Austin

Semiconductor, L.P.; "Nanya" means Nanya Technology Corporation and Nanya Technology

Corporation U.S.A.; and "Micron" means Micron Technology, Inc., and Micron Semiconductor

Products, Inc.

ORDER DENYING MANUFACTURERS' MOTIONS TO STRIKE RAMBUS' COUNTERCLAIMS; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART SAMSUNG AND HYNIX'S MOTIONS TO STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Nos. C-05-02298 RMW; C-05-00334 RMW; C-05-02298 RMW; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 2

RAMBUS INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR INC., HYNIX

SEMICONDUCTOR AMERICA INC.,

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR

MANUFACTURING AMERICA INC., 

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA,

INC., SAMSUNG SEMICONDUCTOR, INC.,

SAMSUNG AUSTIN SEMICONDUCTOR,

L.P., 

NANYA TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION,

NANYA TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION

U.S.A.,

Defendants.

No. C-05-00334 RMW

[Re Docket Nos. 290, 296, 298, 375]

RAMBUS INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC., and

MICRON SEMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTS,

INC.

Defendants.

 No. C-06-00244 RMW

[Re Docket No. 116]

Defendants Manufacturers1

 separately move to strike patent infringement counterclaims

alleged by Rambus in its replies to the Manufacturers' counterclaims. Rambus opposes the motions. 

The court has read the moving and responding papers and considered the arguments of counsel. For

the reasons set forth below, the court DENIES Samsung, Micron, and Nanya's motions to strike

Case 5:05-cv-02298-RMW Document 542 Filed 11/15/07 Page 2 of 21
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ORDER DENYING MANUFACTURERS' MOTIONS TO STRIKE RAMBUS' COUNTERCLAIMS; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART SAMSUNG AND HYNIX'S MOTIONS TO STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Nos. C-05-02298 RMW; C-05-00334 RMW; C-05-02298 RMW; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 3

Rambus' counterclaims in reply and Rambus' supplemental infringement contentions. The court

GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Samsung's and Hynix's motions to strike as follows:

1. Hynix's motion to strike Rambus' affirmative defense of unclean hands is

GRANTED.

2. Samsung and Hynix's motions to strike Rambus' affirmative defense of no loss is

GRANTED.

3. Hynix's motion to strike Rambus' affirmative defense of prior action pending is

GRANTED.

4. Hynix's motion to strike Rambus' affirmative defense of no standing under Section

17200 is GRANTED.

5. In all other respects, the motions to strike affirmative defenses are DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 24, 2007, the court entered a joint case management order ("CMO") consolidating

proceedings in the above cases. At the time of the order, the Manufacturers had filed answers

asserting a number of counterclaims in response to Rambus' complaints for patent infringement. 

The case management order severed the allegations in the various pleadings into two phases: the

"January 22 Trial" and the "05-06 Patent Trials." As presently scheduled, the January 22 Trial will

try a number of the Manufacturers' counterclaims regarding Rambus' conduct. Second, the 05-06

Patent Trials will try Rambus' patent infringement claims against the various Manufacturers. See

CMO ¶ 1. These patent infringement claims generally accuse a variety of SDRAM technologies,

specifically "DDR2 (Double Data Rate 2), GDDR2 (Graphics Double Data Rate 2), and/or GDDR3

(Graphics Double Data Rate 3) memory components; DDR2 memory modules; and/or DDR2,

GDDR2, and/or GDDR3 memory controllers." The order did not stay discovery in the 05-06 Patent

Trials, CMO ¶ 1(e); instead, Appendix C set a timeline for claim construction, and Appendix D(1)

listed the Manufacturers' claims and defenses that would be tried in the 05-06 Patent Trials.

To help sort the issues, the order required that:

Ten (10) court days after Rambus files its replies to the current counterclaims,

Rambus and the Manufacturers shall file with the court, as to each defense asserted

therein, a statement identifying the phase of the proceedings in which that defense

shall be tried.

See CMO ¶ 1(d). Furthermore, the order set guidelines for amending pleadings as follows:

No further amendments to the pleadings or this order shall be allowed in any of the

Rambus NDCal Cases, except where a pleading or amendment to an existing

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ORDER DENYING MANUFACTURERS' MOTIONS TO STRIKE RAMBUS' COUNTERCLAIMS; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART SAMSUNG AND HYNIX'S MOTIONS TO STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Nos. C-05-02298 RMW; C-05-00334 RMW; C-05-02298 RMW; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 4

pleading may be filed as of right or unless a party obtains permission to modify this

order upon a showing of good cause. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b). To the extent new

claims or defenses are asserted in a pleading permitted by this section, the parties

shall promptly file with the court, as to each such claim or defense, a statement

identifying the phase of the proceedings in which such claim or defense shall be tried.

See CMO ¶ 7.

On July 9, 2007, Rambus filed the replies to the Manufacturers' counterclaims contemplated

by paragraph 1(d) of the CMO. These replies asserted a number of affirmative defenses to the

Manufacturers' counterclaims, some of which are scheduled to be tried on January 22. Rambus'

replies also added counterclaims, expanding the list of allegedly infringing products and allegedly

infringed patents to include claims against DDR3 and GDDR4 SDRAM, as well as to add claims

against Nanya's SDRAM and DDR SDRAM. Samsung, Micron and Nanya now separately move to

strike Rambus' counterclaims of patent infringement. Hynix and Samsung separately move to strike

various affirmative defenses from Rambus' replies.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Strike

Rule 12(f) permits a court to strike "any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial,

impertinent, or scandalous matter." Nevertheless, "because striking a portion of a pleading is a

drastic remedy and because it often is sought by the movant simply as a dilatory or harassing tactic,

numerous judicial decisions make it clear that motions under Rule 12(f) are viewed with disfavor by

the federal courts and are infrequently granted." Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure:

Civil 3d § 1380. This court's case law amply demonstrates this disfavor, repeatedly admonishing

litigants that motions to strike are "generally not granted unless it is clear that the matter to be

stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation." LeDuc v. Kentucky

Cent. Life Ins. Co., 814 F. Supp. 820, 830 (N.D. Cal. 1992); see also Rosales v. Citibank, Federal

Sav. Bank, 133 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1180 (N.D. Cal. 2001).

Rambus argues that because the Manufacturers have failed to show that the counterclaims

have "no possible bearing" on the litigation, the motions to strike should be denied. Rambus

overlooks the word "generally" in its argument. The decisions of this court in complex patent cases

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ORDER DENYING MANUFACTURERS' MOTIONS TO STRIKE RAMBUS' COUNTERCLAIMS; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART SAMSUNG AND HYNIX'S MOTIONS TO STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Nos. C-05-02298 RMW; C-05-00334 RMW; C-05-02298 RMW; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 5

demonstrate a more nuanced application of the motion to strike and an appreciation for its role in

enforcing the policies of "fair notice" encoded in Rule 8 and Rule 9. Rambus cites Raychem Corp.

v. PSI Telecommunications, Inc., 1995 WL 108193 (N.D. Cal. 1995) to demonstrate the disfavor

courts hold for motions to strike. The defendant in Raychem asserted a number of affirmative

defenses to patent infringement, including inequitable conduct, patent misuse, laches, and unclean

hands. Id. at *2-*5. The court granted the plaintiff's motion to strike three of the four defenses

because the defendant failed to plead any facts supporting them, thus failing to provide the plaintiff

with proper notice. Contrary to the tone of Rambus' citation from the discussion of the legal

standard, Raychem demonstrates how the motion to strike should be granted to enforce the

requirement that pleadings provide fair notice to the opposing party.

This court's jurisprudence has reinforced this point. In Advanced Cardiovascular Systems,

Inc. v. Scimed Systems, Inc., 1996 WL 467277 (N.D. Cal. 1996), the court struck both invalidity and

patent misuse defenses. Noting that "the key to determining the sufficiency of pleading an

affirmative defense is whether it gives plaintiff fair notice of the defense," the court struck a "general

reference to a series of statutory provisions" because they did not provide the plaintiff with fair

notice of the defendant's invalidity contentions. Id. at *3 (quoting Wyshak v. City National Bank,

607 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979)). The court also struck estoppel and laches defenses because the

defendant did not allege any facts to meet their respective legal standards. Similarly, the court in

Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Dataram Corp., 1997 WL 50272, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 1997), struck an

implied license defense because "the legal conclusion that Sun customers have a license to use

Dataram SIMMs is inadequate to provide 'fair notice' of the defense." The court required the

defendant to "assert some factual allegations that demonstrate the existence of a license." Id.

Tellingly, this court's most recent published synthesis of this law makes no mention of the

"disfavor" or "no possible bearing" language found in orders on motions to strike in other contexts. 

See Qarbon.com Inc. v. eHelp Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1048-49 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Instead,

Judge Ware granted the plaintiff's motion to strike because the defendant failed to provide fair notice

of the defense and "the grounds upon which it rests." Id. at 1049. The court emphasized that Rule 8

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2

 For the purposes of this section (II-B), "Manufacturers" refers only to Samsung, Nanya, and

Micron. Hynix has not filed a motion to strike Rambus' Counterclaims in Reply.

ORDER DENYING MANUFACTURERS' MOTIONS TO STRIKE RAMBUS' COUNTERCLAIMS; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART SAMSUNG AND HYNIX'S MOTIONS TO STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Nos. C-05-02298 RMW; C-05-00334 RMW; C-05-02298 RMW; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 6

covers both complaints and answers, and that both must satisfy the "fair notice" touchstone of

modern civil procedure. Id.; see also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007)

(reciting "fair notice" standard and adding that "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to

relief above the speculative level"). Since then, this court, and others, have continued to enforce the

requirement that pleadings assert sufficient factual allegations to provide fair notice by striking and

dismissing pleadings when they do not meet that standard. See PB Farradyne, Inc. v. Peterson,

2006 WL 132182, *3-*4 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. Theglobe.com, Inc.,

233 F.R.D. 615, 618-19 (D. Kan. 2006). In short, a motion to strike is an appropriate tool for

ensuring that parties receive fair notice, and should be granted where a pleading fails to recite

factual allegations that deliver such notice. See Heller Financial, Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., Inc.,

883 F.2d 1286, 1294-95 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that a motion to strike will "expedite, not delay"

when used against "bare bones conclusory allegations"). Some have suggested that a showing of

"prejudice" is required before a motion to strike should be granted. See Sample v. Gotham Football

Club, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 160, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). To the extent that "prejudice" to the movant is

required for a motion to strike, being forced to litigate without fair notice of the claims and defenses

arrayed against you constitutes "prejudice."

B. Counterclaims in Reply

The Manufacturers2

 contend that Rambus violated the CMO when it filed its Counterclaims

in Reply. As a preliminary matter, Rambus did not violate the CMO merely by filing its replies. 

Paragraph 1(d) of the CMO clearly allowed Rambus to file replies to the Manufacturers'

counterclaims. The Manufacturers argue, however, that Paragraph 7 of the CMO prohibits Rambus

from filing counterclaims with its replies. Paragraph 7 prohibits the parties from amending their

pleadings except upon a showing of good cause or where the pleading or amendment is allowed "as

of right." If Rambus' counterclaims may properly be filed in a reply, then they are taken "as of

right" and do not violate Paragraph 7. If Rambus' counterclaims may not be pled in a reply, then the

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3

 Paragraph 7 also permitted pleadings or amendments if a party obtained permission upon a

showing of good cause. No one disputes that Rambus did not ask the court for permission prior to

filing its counterclaims and attempting to expand the scope of this case.

4

 The parties do not raise the issue, but whether counterclaims in reply are permitted in a

patent case may actually be a question of Federal Circuit law. In the event that it is, the court

believes the Federal Circuit would agree with the Ninth Circuit and Wright & Miller that only

compulsory counterclaims are permitted in a reply.

ORDER DENYING MANUFACTURERS' MOTIONS TO STRIKE RAMBUS' COUNTERCLAIMS; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART SAMSUNG AND HYNIX'S MOTIONS TO STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Nos. C-05-02298 RMW; C-05-00334 RMW; C-05-02298 RMW; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 7

Manufacturers correctly point out that Rambus has violated Paragraph 7. Accordingly, the propriety

of Rambus' Counterclaims in Reply depends on whether Rambus' claims may properly be asserted in

reply to a counterclaim.3

Rambus argues that its replies may contain any counterclaims it desires, whether they are

permissive or compulsory. The Ninth Circuit permits only compulsory counterclaims in reply;

permissive counterclaims in reply are not. Davis & Cox v. Summa Corp., 751 F.2d 1507, 1525 (9th

Cir.1985) (in part superseded by statute); see also Electroglas, Inc. v. Dynatex Corp., 473 F.Supp.

1167, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 1188

(arguing that courts should not allow permissive counterclaims in reply, but that parties should seek

leave to amend their complaint instead). In Davis & Cox, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district

court's order dismissing the plaintiff's counterclaims in reply because the counterclaims in reply did

not arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the counterclaim. Id. Rambus supports its

arguments with cases from other jurisdictions, see, e.g., Power Tools & Supply, Inc. v. Cooper

Power Tools, Inc., 2007 WL 1218701, at *2-*3 (E.D. Mich. 2007), but this court is bound by the

Ninth Circuit's holding in Davis & Cox.

4

 Accordingly, Rambus' Counterclaims in Reply are only

proper if they are compulsory.

A counterclaim is "compulsory" if it "arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the

subject matter of the opposing party's claim." Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a). Whether a counterclaim for

patent infringement is compulsory in response to a declaratory judgment action for patent noninfringement is an issue unique to patent law, and therefore requires this court to follow Federal

Circuit law in deciding whether Rambus' Counterclaims in Reply are compulsory. See Vivid Techs.,

Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 802 (Fed. Cir. 1999). At this point, it is well-settled

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ORDER DENYING MANUFACTURERS' MOTIONS TO STRIKE RAMBUS' COUNTERCLAIMS; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART SAMSUNG AND HYNIX'S MOTIONS TO STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Nos. C-05-02298 RMW; C-05-00334 RMW; C-05-02298 RMW; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 8

Federal Circuit law that a claim for a declaratory judgment that a product does not infringe makes a

counterclaim that the product infringes the patent compulsory. Id.; see also Polymer Indus.

Products Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 347 F.3d 935, 939 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("PIPCO").

Beyond that proposition, the law ceases to be well-settled. Both Vivid Technologies and

PIPCO involved the narrow factual circumstances of explicit declaratory judgment actions

specifying the allegedly non-infringing technology or product. See Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 800

(requesting declaration that plaintiff did not infringe "[any] patent owned by American Science &

Engineering, Inc. covering x-ray backscatter technology"); PIPCO, 347 F.3d at 935 (discussing "a

counterclaim for declaratory judgment that the Skim-2 bladders did not infringe the 331 patent"). 

The holdings of these cases do not answer whether a declaratory judgment action for noninfringement that does not list a specific product or process makes a counterclaim for patent

infringement compulsory.

Two district courts have issued decisions grappling with this issue. In Kim v. Sara Lee

Bakery Group, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 929 (N.D. Ill. 2006), the court dismissed claims for patent

infringement in a second action because the claims were deemed, under Rule 13(a), compulsory

counterclaims that should have been brought in a prior action. The first action began when Dr. Kim

alleged that two specific Sara Lee products infringed Dr. Kim's patent. Id. at 930. Sara Lee filed a

counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that it "has not infringed, and does not infringe, U.S.

Patent No. RE 36,355." Id. Dr. Kim later amended the complaint to allege additional infringing

products, and Sara Lee again "maintained its global request for a declaratory judgment that Sara Lee

did not and does not infringe upon the '355 Patent." Id. at 932-33. While aware of additional

potentially infringing Sara Lee products, Dr. Kim did not bring additional infringement allegations

until Dr. Kim tried to admit the products into evidence, but was barred. Id. at 933-34. Dr. Kim

therefore brought a second action alleging that the additional Sara Lee products infringed the patent,

but the district court dismissed the claims as barred. Id. at 936-37. The court explained that "Sara

Lee broadly counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment of noninfringement regarding the '355

Patent." Id. at 936. Because Dr. Kim "did not in turn assert or claim in response that any other Sara

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ORDER DENYING MANUFACTURERS' MOTIONS TO STRIKE RAMBUS' COUNTERCLAIMS; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART SAMSUNG AND HYNIX'S MOTIONS TO STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Nos. C-05-02298 RMW; C-05-00334 RMW; C-05-02298 RMW; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 9

Lee brands or products infringed of [sic] the '355 Patent," the claims were dismissed as barred under

Rule 13(a).

The district court in The Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 500 F. Supp. 2d 1364 (N.D. Ga.

2007) took a different approach and held that Rule 13(a) did not bar claims that a defendant's

technology infringed a patent where the defendant had previously litigated a declaratory judgment

counterclaim that it "does not infringe any valid claim." Id. at 1375. In the first action, Coca-Cola

sued Pepsi alleging that two Pepsi technologies infringed a Coca-Cola patent. Pepsi counterclaimed

that it "does not infringe any valid claim of the '493 Patent." Id. In the second action, Coca-Cola

sued Pepsi alleging that a third Pepsi technology infringed the '493 Patent. Pepsi argued that CocaCola was barred because the non-product-specific noninfringement claim required Coca-Cola to

"allege all known, but previously unasserted, claims of infringement." Id. at 1374. The court

disagreed with Pepsi because "if the party seeking a declaration of non-infringement does not

affirmatively state which products it is requesting the court to declare as non-infringing, then it does

not follow that a counterclaim concerning any number of previously unmentioned products raises

the same issues of law and fact and requires the same evidence as those products which are already

at issues in the litigation." Id. at 1376 (emphasis in original). The district court also noted that

having Rule 13(a) turn on "whether a party possessed an indefinite level of 'awareness' of other

potentially infringing products used by the opposing party – as opposed to a more definite rule that

turns on whether the parties placed a specific product at issue in the prior litigation vis-a-vis their

allegations or conduct during the litigation" would lead to a series of unfortunate results, including

"fishing expeditions," Rule 11 violations, and vastly broader lawsuits. Accordingly, the court

concluded that "the relevant inquiry is whether a specific product was 'tried by express or implied

consent of the parties.'" Id. at 1377 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b)).

This court agrees that a general declaratory claim that a party does not infringe a patent does

not necessarily give rise to a compulsory counterclaim for patent infringement. Where a party

alleges that it generally does not infringe, a counterclaim that a specific technology infringes is only

compulsory if the parties expressly or impliedly consented to try the question of whether the specific

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ORDER DENYING MANUFACTURERS' MOTIONS TO STRIKE RAMBUS' COUNTERCLAIMS; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART SAMSUNG AND HYNIX'S MOTIONS TO STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Nos. C-05-02298 RMW; C-05-00334 RMW; C-05-02298 RMW; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 10

technology does not infringe. This rule accords with the principles the Federal Circuit adopted in

Vivid Technologies for determining whether a claim "arises out of the transaction or occurrence that

is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim." 200 F.3d at 801. There, the Federal Circuit

identified four tests for considering whether a counterclaim is so related to a claim that fairness and

efficiency render it compulsory: (1) whether the legal and factual issues are largely the same; (2)

whether res judicata would bar bringing the counterclaim after the current suit; (3) whether

substantially the same evidence supports or refutes both the claim and counterclaim; or (4) whether

there is a logical relation between the claim and counterclaim. Id. at 802. Any one of the tests can,

but does not necessarily, render a claim compulsory. Id. Requiring the parties to put a technology

into issue before finding that an infringement counterclaim is compulsory ensures that these tests are

satisfied. Once a specific technology is identified, the legal and factual issues between the

declaratory judgment noninfringement claim and the infringement counterclaim are identical and

rely on the same evidence.

This rule also comports with Rule 1's command to encourage the just, speedy, and

inexpensive determination of every action. It prevents patent holders from feeling compelled to

expand the scope of litigation whenever faced with a general noninfringement counterclaim. It also

ensures that the parties have notice of the scope of the litigation by requiring technologies to be

expressly brought into issue by the pleadings, which in turn discourages a "shifting sands" approach

to complex patent litigation. Cf. Integrated Circuit Systems, Inc. v. Realtek Semiconductor Co., Ltd.,

308 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Having established that the CMO only authorized Rambus

to file compulsory counterclaims in its replies and the applicable law for determining when an

infringement counterclaim is compulsory, the court's attention turns to the Manufacturers'

contentions at the hearing.

At the hearing on October 26, 2007, Rambus argued that it brought its counterclaims in reply

because it believed the Manufacturers' counterclaims sought relief on all memory technologies, not

just the ones originally put at issue by Rambus. Oct. 26, 2007 Hearing Tr. at 7:13-15. This is not

clearly reflected in the Manufacturers' pleadings, which request general declarations of

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ORDER DENYING MANUFACTURERS' MOTIONS TO STRIKE RAMBUS' COUNTERCLAIMS; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART SAMSUNG AND HYNIX'S MOTIONS TO STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Nos. C-05-02298 RMW; C-05-00334 RMW; C-05-02298 RMW; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 11

noninfringement and unenforceability. However, when directly asked about the scope of their

desired relief in this case, Micron, Nanya, and Samsung all admitted that they sought an injunction

against Rambus enforcing its patents against all of their memory products. Micron stated that, "On

the question of remedy and whether or not we're seeking a remedy broad enough to say that Rambus

has monopolized this market and attempted to monopolize it and does the relief extend to DDR3, the

answer to that question is, yes, we are seeking that relief." Id. at 23:13-18. When asked whether

Nanya's desired injunction would extend to DDR3, Nanya responded, "It [sic] theory it could, you

honor, and that would be a question of proof in the discretion of the court. The evidence

establishing the overall scheme in violation of section 2 could include ongoing conduct and ongoing

impact." Id. at 28:12-17. When the court posed the same question to Samsung, Samsung replied

that "we agree with what the Manufacturers have stated previously, that we are seeking an injunction

here. And to the extent that would include the standards that have been incorporated into the DDR3

standards, then we would be similarly situated." Id. at 30:1-6.

In light of this clarification of the scope of relief sought by the Manufacturers, the court finds

that Rambus' counterclaims in reply are compulsory. The counterclaims in reply share a logical

relation with the Manufacturers' counterclaims. The Manufacturers have expanded the scope of

products at issue in this case and impliedly agreed to try the question of whether or not additional

generations of SDRAM technology infringe Rambus' patents. The Manufacturers' counterclaims

and Rambus' counterclaims in reply share factual issues and the Manufacturers' counterclaims raise

preclusion concerns for Rambus' infringement counterclaims in reply. Accordingly, the

counterclaims in reply were compulsory under Vivid Technologies and brought "as of right." 

Rambus did not violate the case management order or the Patent Local Rules in asserting its

additional infringement claims. The motions to strike the counterclaims in reply are denied.

C. Affirmative Defenses

Samsung and Hynix separately move to strike various affirmative defenses from Rambus'

replies filed on July 9, 2007. Hynix also moves to strike affirmative defenses that Rambus asserted

in a third round of pleading. On July 30, 2007, Hynix asserted additional counterclaims against

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ORDER DENYING MANUFACTURERS' MOTIONS TO STRIKE RAMBUS' COUNTERCLAIMS; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART SAMSUNG AND HYNIX'S MOTIONS TO STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Nos. C-05-02298 RMW; C-05-00334 RMW; C-05-02298 RMW; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 12

Rambus in its reply to Rambus' July 9 reply. This led Rambus to file a response to Hynix's reply on

August 20, 2007, which asserted yet further affirmative defenses. The motions to strike attack

Rambus' affirmative defenses on a number of grounds, each of which is taken up below.

1. Lack of Fair Notice

Samsung moves to strike Rambus' First, Second, Fourth through Eighth, Eleventh, Thirteenth

and Fourteenth Affirmative Defenses for failing to provide sufficient factual allegations to put

Samsung on notice of the substance of the defenses. The pleadings are reproduced below:

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Failure to State Cause of Action)

1. The Counterclaims, in whole or in part, fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a

cause of action against Rambus.

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Unclean Hands)

2. Rambus is informed and believes and thereon alleges that the Counterclaims are

barred, in whole or in part, by reason of the unclean hands of Samsung including but

not limited to, spoliation of evidence.

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Waiver)

4. Rambus is informed and believes and thereon alleges that by virtue of the

knowledge, statements, and conduct of Samsung, as well as its respective agents,

employees, or representatives, Samsung has waived any right to bring this action.

FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Estoppel)

5. Rambus is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Samsung, by virtue of its

respective acts, omissions, conduct, statements, and/or representations, is estopped, in

whole or in part, from bringing this action and asserting the relief requested in the

Counterclaims

SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(No Loss)

6. Rambus is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Samsung has sustained

no loss or damages as a result of the conduct of Rambus.

SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

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first time in its August 20 reply. In fact, Rambus alleged the defense in its July 9 reply as well,

where it was pled as the Eighth Affirmative Defense.

ORDER DENYING MANUFACTURERS' MOTIONS TO STRIKE RAMBUS' COUNTERCLAIMS; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART SAMSUNG AND HYNIX'S MOTIONS TO STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Nos. C-05-02298 RMW; C-05-00334 RMW; C-05-02298 RMW; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 13

(Failure to Mitigate)

7. Rambus is informed and believes and thereon alleges that the Counterclaims are

barred, in whole or in part, because Samsung failed to mitigate its damages, if any.

EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Conduct of Third Parties)

8. Rambus is informed and believes and thereon alleges that the Counterclaims are

barred, in whole or in part, because the damages, if any, were caused by third parties

for whom Rambus bears no responsibility.

ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Ratification)

11. The purported causes of action of Samsung are barred, in whole or in part, as

Samsung has ratified and approved the purported actions of which it now complains.

THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Laches)

13. Samsung, by its acts and conduct, and/or the acts and conduct of its predecessors,

agents, or assigns, is barred, in whole or in part, from asserting claims against

Rambus by the doctrine of laches.

FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Consent)

14. Samsung’s acts, conduct and/or statements, and/or the acts, conduct and

statements of its predecessors, agents or assigns constituted consent to the alleged

acts and/or conduct of Rambus set forth in the Counterclaims.

Likewise, Hynix moves to strike Rambus' Second (unclean hands), Fourth (waiver), Fifth

(estoppel), Seventh (failure to mitigate), Ninth (Hynix's conduct), Eleventh (ratification), and

Thirteenth (laches) Affirmative Defenses from Rambus' July 9 reply because they do not provide

sufficient notice. Hynix also moves to strike the same defenses, as well as Rambus' Seventh

Affirmative Defense (conduct of third parties),5 from Rambus' August 20 reply. The pleadings in the

replies filed against Hynix are identical to those alleged against Samsung down to the numbering,

except the word "Hynix" has replaced the word "Samsung." The only affirmative defense Hynix

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ORDER DENYING MANUFACTURERS' MOTIONS TO STRIKE RAMBUS' COUNTERCLAIMS; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART SAMSUNG AND HYNIX'S MOTIONS TO STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Nos. C-05-02298 RMW; C-05-00334 RMW; C-05-02298 RMW; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 14

challenges on notice grounds that Samsung does not is "Hynix's Conduct," reproduced below.

NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Hynix’s Conduct)

9. Rambus is informed and believes and thereon alleges that the Counterclaims are

barred, in whole or in part, because the damages, if any, were caused by Hynix’s

conduct, for which Rambus bears no responsibility.

In opposing Samsung's motion to strike, Rambus does not appear to contest that these

pleadings fail to provide notice on their face. Instead, Rambus argues that Samsung was provided

fair notice of the substance of the defenses by Rambus' July 31, 2007 Joint Case Management

Conference Statement, where Rambus filed a "further definition" of each of its defenses. In its

opposition to Hynix's motion to strike, Rambus first suggests that "no recitation of details is

required," but wisely backs away from this statement to suggest that Hynix is also fully informed of

the basis for Rambus' defenses by its Joint Case Management Conference Statement ("JCMCS").

On their face, many of Rambus' affirmative defenses appear inadequately alleged. As this

court explained in Qarbon.com, an affirmative defense may not simply reference a doctrine. 315 F.

Supp. 2d at 1049. At a minimum, a pleading must set out the elements of the affirmative defense

and some factual allegations that meet those elements. Id. Rambus neither lays out the elements of

many of the above defenses, nor alleges any facts that meet them. On the basis of the pleadings

alone, most should be stricken.

Rambus argues that "there is no need to amend affirmative defenses where the purposes of

'notice pleading' have been met," and suggests that its disclosures in the JCMCS satisfy its

obligation to provide fair notice of its defenses. In light of these disclosures, Rambus argues that

Hynix's motion to strike is "a counterproductive resort to mere formalities." Rambus' failure to

comply with "mere formalities" troubled the court with respect to its infringement contentions, and

its failure to comply with "mere formalities" concerns the court here. Nevertheless, the court agrees

that no good will come from striking and amending pleadings with less than three months until trial

unless a party lacks fair notice.

Failure to state a cause of action. Rambus has properly pled the defense of failure to state a

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 This defense may have been dropped per stipulation.

ORDER DENYING MANUFACTURERS' MOTIONS TO STRIKE RAMBUS' COUNTERCLAIMS; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART SAMSUNG AND HYNIX'S MOTIONS TO STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Nos. C-05-02298 RMW; C-05-00334 RMW; C-05-02298 RMW; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 15

cause of action, whether or not it is technically an affirmative defense. See, e.g., Hernandez v.

Balakian, 2007 WL 1649911 at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2007). Accordingly, Samsung's motion to strike this

defense is denied.

Unclean hands. Rambus alleges that the basis for its unclean hands defense is "including but

not limited to, spoliation of evidence." The reply alleges no facts relating to what evidence may

have been spoliated, or when. Unlike Rambus' other affirmative defenses, the unclean hands

defense is omitted from the Joint Case Management Conference Statement.

Rambus argues that Samsung nevertheless has notice of the substance of the defense because

an August 24, 2007 motion to compel stated that "the defense of unclean hands result[s] from

Samsung's complete and total spoliation of e-mail[.]" Rambus also suggests that this disclosure

"fully informed" Samsung of the basis for Rambus' unclean hands defense. Having limited its

defense to Samsung's alleged spoliation of e-mail, the court agrees that, three weeks after it filed its

meritorious motion to strike, Samsung received notice of the basis for the unclean hands defense. 

Because Samsung now has fair notice and little efficiency would result from forcing Rambus to

amend its reply, Samsung's motion to strike this defense is denied.

With respect to Hynix, Rambus argues that "Hynix is fully informed as to Rambus's factual

basis for each affirmative defense. . . . Attachment 5 to the July 31, 2007 JCMCS contains a 'further

definition' of each affirmative defense that goes beyond the required factual specificity." As

discussed, the Joint Case Management Conference Statement omitted Rambus' second affirmative

defense. See Dougherty Decl., Ex. A at 1-2. At this point, Hynix still has no more notice about the

substance of Rambus' unclean hands defense than that it is "including but not limited to, spoliation

of evidence." This is not sufficient to provide fair notice to Hynix. Accordingly, the court grants

Hynix's motion to strike Rambus' second affirmative defense from Rambus' replies.6

Waiver. Rambus relies on its disclosure of its waiver defense in the JCMCS to provide fair

notice to Samsung and Hynix. In light of this further disclosure outlining the scope of Rambus'

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ORDER DENYING MANUFACTURERS' MOTIONS TO STRIKE RAMBUS' COUNTERCLAIMS; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART SAMSUNG AND HYNIX'S MOTIONS TO STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Nos. C-05-02298 RMW; C-05-00334 RMW; C-05-02298 RMW; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 16

defense, the court sees no benefit in striking Rambus' pleading now that Hynix and Samsung have

notice. Accordingly, the court denies their motions to strike Rambus' fourth affirmative defense.

Estoppel. Rambus' JCMCS disclosure apprises Hynix and Samsung that the gist of Rambus'

estoppel defense is that the Manufacturers were aware of Rambus' patents and chose to use Rambus'

technology without paying royalties. Having now specified the "respective acts, omissions, conduct,

statements, and/or representations" that form the basis of its defense, Rambus has belatedly given

fair notice to Hynix and Samsung of the scope of the defense. Seeing no benefit in striking the

pleading, the court denies the motions to strike Rambus' fifth affirmative defense.

No loss. Samsung and Hynix move to strike this affirmative defense. Rambus concedes that

it should be stricken. Accordingly, the court grants the motions to strike Rambus's sixth affirmative

defense of no loss.

Failure to mitigate. Rambus' reply failed to provide anything more than the conclusory

allegation that Hynix and Samsung "failed to mitigate [their] damages." This sort of bare bones

pleading fails to provide fair notice. Rambus' JCMCS further provides that its defense is based on

"the Manufacturers did not adopt an alternative, non-infringing technology." Having specified how

Samsung and Hynix allegedly failed to mitigate, Samsung and Hynix now have fair notice. 

Therefore, seeing no benefit in striking the pleading, the court denies the motions to strike Rambus'

seventh affirmative defense.

Conduct of third parties. Samsung and Hynix move to strike Rambus' defense of conduct of

third parties. Rambus supplements its original pleading ("because the damages, if any, were caused

by third parties for whom Rambus bears no responsibility") by alleging in its JCMCS that "other

members or participants at JEDEC with knowledge of the existence and scope of Rambus's patents

and patent applications were responsible." Hynix argues that this allegation does not provide

enough notice because Rambus does not identify who was responsible. The court agrees that even

this allegations remains skimpy, but believes that "other members or participants at JEDEC" is a

narrow enough class to give Samsung and Hynix fair notice of the substance of Rambus' defense. 

Accordingly, the court denies the motions to strike Rambus' eighth affirmative defense.

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ORDER DENYING MANUFACTURERS' MOTIONS TO STRIKE RAMBUS' COUNTERCLAIMS; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART SAMSUNG AND HYNIX'S MOTIONS TO STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Nos. C-05-02298 RMW; C-05-00334 RMW; C-05-02298 RMW; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 17

Hynix's conduct. Only Hynix moves to strike Rambus' affirmative defense stemming from

the opposing party's conduct. Rambus' JCMCS alleges that each Manufacturer knew about its

patents, knew they infringed, and made the business decision to continue infringing, as opposed to

developing other technology. Having provided some factual grounding for its otherwise conclusory

allegation, Rambus has now given notice to Hynix of the basis of its defense. Accordingly, the court

denies Hynix's motion to strike Rambus' ninth affirmative defense.

Ratification. Both Samsung and Hynix move to Rambus' ratification defense. Rambus'

JCMCS similarly explains that its defense stems from the Manufacturers' knowledge of the patents,

their alleged infringement, and adoption of the technology. Rambus also explains that its ratification

defense is based on the 2001 amendment to the Rambus/Samsung license. This further specification

adequately apprises Samsung and Hynix of the scope of Rambus' defense; therefore, the court sees

no benefit in striking the allegation and denies their motions to strike Rambus' eleventh affirmative

defense.

Laches. Both Samsung and Hynix move to strike Rambus' conclusory laches defense. 

Rambus has since explained in its JCMCS that its laches defense arises because Samsung and Hynix

allegedly knew about Rambus' patents, but delayed in taking any action while at JEDEC or during

licensing negotiations. As Samsung and Hynix have now received fair notice of the basis for

Rambus' defense, the court sees no benefit in striking Rambus' conclusory allegation in each reply. 

Accordingly, the court denies the motions to strike Rambus' thirteenth affirmative defenses of

laches.

Consent. Only Samsung moves to strike Rambus' defense of consent. Rambus' reply does

not specify any factual basis for what Samsung did to consent; however, its JCMCS alleges that

Samsung's consent stems from its decision to adopt Rambus technologies and enter into the 2001

license agreement with Rambus. Now that Samsung knows the factual basis for Rambus' defense,

there is no benefit in striking the allegation from Rambus' reply. Accordingly, the court denies the

motion to strike Rambus' fourteenth affirmative defense of consent.

This denial of Samsung's and Hynix's motions to strike should not be construed as passing

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ORDER DENYING MANUFACTURERS' MOTIONS TO STRIKE RAMBUS' COUNTERCLAIMS; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART SAMSUNG AND HYNIX'S MOTIONS TO STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Nos. C-05-02298 RMW; C-05-00334 RMW; C-05-02298 RMW; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 18

judgment on the viability of those defenses. Further, Rambus will not be permitted to expand the

scope of those asserted defenses beyond the factual notice provided in the JCMCS, absent leave of

court upon good cause shown.

2. Unrecognized Defenses

Samsung moves to strike Rambus' third (issue preclusion) and seventeenth (other action

pending) affirmative defenses because they are "unrecognized defenses." However, preclusion is an

affirmative defense and must be pled as such. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) ("res judicata"); Rivet v.

Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 476 (1998). With respect to "prior action pending,"

Samsung does not supply any legal authority for the position that "prior action pending" is "not [an]

affirmative defense[] at all." On the other hand, Rambus provides no legal authority for the

proposition that it is. The two cases Rambus cites involve defendants who plead "prior action

pending" as an affirmative defense, but in neither decision does the court determine whether it is

properly asserted as an affirmative defense. As such, they do not support Rambus' argument that

"Federal courts treat prior action pending as an affirmative defense." The court's own research

uncovered scant mention of the doctrine, and that what authority there is, is equivocal. Compare

Daugherty v. Popick 89 F.R.D. 642, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), with In re D.H. Overmyer Telecasting

Co., Inc., 23 B.R. 823, 931 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ohio 1982). Nevertheless, California case law suggests

that prior action pending is an affirmative defense that must be pled. See Brown v. Campbell, 110

Cal. 644, 649 (1896) ("If the defense of a pending suit, or the estoppel of a former judgment, is not

pleaded when such defense is available to the defendant, he cannot, after an adverse judgment, avail

himself of this defense, which he neglected to plead when he had an opportunity to do so, any more

than he could avail himself of any other defense which he had omitted to plead."). Accordingly,

Samsung's motion to strike Rambus' two "unrecognized" defenses is denied.

Hynix similarly challenges these defenses, arguing that neither is proper on the merits. As

discussed, issue preclusion is properly asserted as an affirmative defense. With respect to "prior

action pending," Rambus concedes the defense should be stricken. Accordingly, the court denies

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ORDER DENYING MANUFACTURERS' MOTIONS TO STRIKE RAMBUS' COUNTERCLAIMS; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART SAMSUNG AND HYNIX'S MOTIONS TO STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Nos. C-05-02298 RMW; C-05-00334 RMW; C-05-02298 RMW; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 19

Hynix's motion to strike Rambus' issue preclusion defense and grants Hynix's motion to strike

Rambus' "prior action pending" defense.

3. Improper Defenses

Hynix expends many pages arguing that various affirmative defenses pled by Rambus are not

valid defenses to a monopolization claim or a fraud claim. Rambus correctly points out that all of

the defenses are potentially viable against at least one of Hynix's claims, for example, section 17200

unfair competition or fraud. Notice pleading, however, does not require a defendant to identify

which affirmative defenses pertain to which of the plaintiff's claims. See, e.g., FTC v. Rawlins &

Rivera, Inc., 2007 WL 1730091, at *4 (M.D. Fla. 2007). Instead, it only requires a short, plain

statement of the claimed defense and the factual allegations that support it. Accordingly, the court

denies Hynix's motion to strike Rambus' waiver, estoppel, Hynix's conduct, ratification, and laches

claims.

4. Collateral Estoppel

Finally, Hynix argues that Rambus' twelfth (statute of limitations), fifteenth (no standing),

sixteenth (Noerr-Pennington), and nineteenth (California litigation privilege) affirmative defenses

should be stricken because the court has allegedly already decided these issues.

As a preliminary matter, Rambus concedes that its fifteenth affirmative defense of no

standing under California Business and Professions Code Section 17200 is an inappropriate

affirmative defense. Accordingly, it has dropped the allegations and the court grants Hynix's motion

to strike the defense from Rambus' reply.

Rambus opposes the motion to strike the remaining three defenses. The court agrees. No

prior court order has held that a statute of limitations defense fails as to all of Hynix's claims. Cf.

Rawlins & Rivera, 2007 WL 1730091, at *4. Accordingly, it would be improper to strike the

defense as to all of Hynix's claims. Nor does the court understand why Rambus' Noerr-Pennington

and litigation privilege defenses must be stricken based on the court's prior ruling regarding those

matters in Rambus' favor. Seeing no benefit to ordering those defenses stricken, the court denies

Hynix's motions to strike the Noerr-Pennington and litigation privilege defenses.

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ORDER DENYING MANUFACTURERS' MOTIONS TO STRIKE RAMBUS' COUNTERCLAIMS; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART SAMSUNG AND HYNIX'S MOTIONS TO STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Nos. C-05-02298 RMW; C-05-00334 RMW; C-05-02298 RMW; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 20

5. Alternative Relief

In the alternative, Samsung requested that Rambus be ordered to file a more definite

statement under Rule 12(e). Hynix requested additional discovery regarding Rambus' affirmative

defenses. Given the late hour in this phase of the litigation, the court sees no benefit in requiring a

more definite statement where Samsung is already on notice, nor any benefit in reopening discovery

with barely two months to trial. Accordingly, both requests are denied.

III. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES Samsung, Micron, and Nanya's motions to

strike Rambus' counterclaims in reply and Rambus' supplemental infringement contentions. The

court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Samsung's and Hynix's motions to strike as

follows:

1. Hynix's motion to strike Rambus' affirmative defense of unclean hands is

GRANTED.

2. Samsung and Hynix's motions to strike Rambus' affirmative defense of no loss is

GRANTED.

3. Hynix's motion to strike Rambus' affirmative defense of prior action pending is

GRANTED.

4. Hynix's motion to strike Rambus' affirmative defense of no standing under Section

17200 is GRANTED.

5. In all other respects, the motions to strike affirmative defenses are DENIED. .

DATED: 11/15/07

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

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ORDER DENYING MANUFACTURERS' MOTIONS TO STRIKE RAMBUS' COUNTERCLAIMS; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART SAMSUNG AND HYNIX'S MOTIONS TO STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Nos. C-05-02298 RMW; C-05-00334 RMW; C-05-02298 RMW; C-06-00244 RMW

TSF 21

Notice of this document has been electronically sent to:

Counsel for Plaintiff(s):

Craig N. Tolliver ctolliver@mckoolsmith.com 

Pierre J. Hubert phubert@mckoolsmith.com 

Brian K. Erickson berickson@dbllp.com

David C. Vondle dvondle@akingump.com 

Gregory P. Stone gregory.stone@mto.com 

Carolyn Hoecker Luedtke luedtkech@mto.com 

Peter A. Detre detrepa@mto.com 

Burton Alexander Gross burton.gross@mto.com

Steven McCall Perry steven.perry@mto.com

Jeannine Y. Sano sanoj@howrey.com 

Counsel for Defendant(s):

Matthew D. Powers matthew.powers@weil.com 

David J. Healey david.healey@weil.com 

Edward R. Reines Edward.Reines@weil.com

John D Beynon john.beynon@weil.com

Jared Bobrow jared.bobrow@weil.com

Leeron Kalay leeron.kalay@weil.com

Theodore G. Brown, III tgbrown@townsend.com

Daniel J. Furniss djfurniss@townsend.com

Jordan Trent Jones jtjones@townsend.com

Kenneth L. Nissly kennissly@thelenreid.com 

Geoffrey H. Yost gyost@thelenreid.com 

Susan Gregory van Keulen svankeulen@thelenreid.com

Patrick Lynch plynch@omm.com 

Jason Sheffield Angell jangell@orrick.com

Vickie L. Feeman vfeeman@orrick.com

Mark Shean mshean@orrick.com 

Kai Tseng hlee@orrick.com

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel that have not

registered for e-filing under the court's CM/ECF program.

Dated: 11/15/07 TSF

Chambers of Judge Whyte

Case 5:05-cv-02298-RMW Document 542 Filed 11/15/07 Page 21 of 21