Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_04-cv-01192/USCOURTS-azd-3_04-cv-01192-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Christine Baker, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Capital One Bank; Equifax Information

Services, LLC, 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 04-1192-PHX-NVW

ORDER

The court has considered Defendant Capital One Bank’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (doc. # 122) and Defendant Equifax Information Services, L.L.C.’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (doc. # 125).

Plaintiff Christine Baker brought this action against various defendants alleging

violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. The two

remaining defendants in the case, Equifax Information Services, L.L.C. (“Equifax”) and

Capital One Bank (“Capital One”), now move for summary judgment. 

I. Overview of Baker’s Claims

Since the 1990s, Capital One has issued Baker four credit cards. Capital One reports

information about Baker, as its customer, to credit reporting agencies such as Equifax. The

agencies then report that information to parties seeking to use it for certain permissible

purposes. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b.

Case 3:04-cv-01192-NVW Document 153 Filed 08/30/06 Page 1 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Retailers National Bank, a previous defendant in this litigation, appears recently to

have begun reporting its customers’ credit limits in addition to their “high credit” amounts.

(Doc. # 137 at 9:6-7; id. at Ex. M-1 at 11 (Target NB entry of credit report).) 

- 2 -

Although Baker raises several claims against Capital One, a central complaint for

Baker is that Capital One does not report its cardholders’ credit limits. Baker has argued that

a credit card company’s failure to report its cardholders’ credit limits leads to a reduction in

the cardholders’ FICO credit scores. As a result, users of credit information employing FICO

credit scores in their decisionmaking — such as insurance companies determining what rate

to charge, e.g., Reynolds v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Group, 435 F.3d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 2006)

— make decisions unfavorable or less favorable to such cardholders. Baker’s evidence

suggests that, up to this point at least, she is correct. 

One of the “most important factors” used in determining a consumer’s FICO credit

score is the “proportion of balances to credit limits” in their revolving accounts. (Doc. # 137

Ex. M-1 at 3 (Equifax “myFICO” score report and explanation).) As argued by Baker and

strongly suggested by the evidence, if a credit card company has not reported its cardholder’s

credit limit, FICO score generators substitute the cardholder’s “high credit” amount in place

of the credit limit when calculating this important factor. (See id. at Ex. M-1 at 3:5.) The

“high credit” amount, which is the largest amount the cardholder has utilized in any one

cycle from the creditor, is generally lower than the cardholder’s credit limit (except, of

course, for cardholders that at some time have exceeded their permitted credit limit). The

resultingly higher proportion of balance to credit limit resulting where the “high credit”

amount is used negatively affects the cardholder’s overall FICO credit score. Despite this

arbitrarily harmful result, it appears that Capital One continues to report its cardholders’

“high credit” amounts but not their credit limits.1

Aside from this complaint, Baker brings other claims against Capital One and claims

against Equifax, virtually all of which arise under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.

§§ 1681 to 1681u. Her claims predominantly are for allegedly negligent misreporting,

including the misreporting of information related to Baker’s 1996 bankruptcy, as well as for

Case 3:04-cv-01192-NVW Document 153 Filed 08/30/06 Page 2 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

allegedly negligent failures to follow statutorily prescribed procedures. The provision

governing civil liability for negligent violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act is located at

15 U.S.C. § 1681o. Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1332 (9th Cir.

1995). That section provides in relevant part:

§ 1681o. Civil liability for negligent noncompliance

(a) In general

 Any person who is negligent in failing to comply with any

requirement imposed under this subchapter [15 U.S.C. §§ 1681

to 1681u] with respect to any consumer is liable to that

consumer in an amount equal to the sum of— 

(1) any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a

result of the failure; and

(2) in the case of any successful action to enforce any

liability under this section, the costs of the action

together with reasonable attorney’s fees as determined by

the court.

Although Baker has also argued throughout this litigation that these and the other defendants

willfully violated the law in order to ruin her credit score and the credit scores of millions of

other Americans, she has provided no evidence to support a finding of willful violation

against either Capital One or Equifax. See Reynolds, 435 F.3d at 1097-99 (defining

“willfully” as it appears in the Fair Credit Reporting Act and discussing evidence that may

be used to show willfulness or lack thereof). As regards Baker’s claims for negligent

violations, the court addresses Capital One’s motion first and then the motion by Equifax.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall

be entered if the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file show that there is no genuine dispute regarding the material facts of the case and the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (2004);

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986) (citations omitted). The Court

must evaluate a party’s motion for summary judgment construing the alleged facts with all

reasonable inferences favoring the nonmoving party. Baldwin v. Trailer Inns, Inc., 266 F.3d

1104, 1117 (9th Cir. 2001).

Case 3:04-cv-01192-NVW Document 153 Filed 08/30/06 Page 3 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the Court

of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which

it believes demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (citations omitted). Where the moving party has met its

initial burden with a properly supported motion, the party opposing the motion “may not rest

upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (citations

omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate against a party who “fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which

that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322; accord

Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 1994). Although the initial

burden is on the movant to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, this burden

may be discharged by indicating to the Court that there is an absence of evidence to support

the nonmoving party’s claims. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315

(9th Cir. 1995).

III. Capital One’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Baker’s Second Amended Complaint (doc. # 48) (“Complaint”) alleges that she filed

notices of dispute with credit reporting agencies about information Capital One had

inaccurately reported to those agencies. (See Compl. at ¶ 81.) According to Baker, when

these notices were forwarded to Capital One, Capital One negligently failed to fulfill its

obligations under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b). That section provides:

(b) Duties of furnishers of information upon notice of

dispute

(1) In general

 After receiving notice pursuant to section 1681i(a)(2) of this

title of a dispute with regard to the completeness or accuracy of

any information provided by a person to a consumer reporting

agency, the person shall— 

(A) conduct an investigation with respect to the disputed

information;

Case 3:04-cv-01192-NVW Document 153 Filed 08/30/06 Page 4 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

(B) review all relevant information provided by the

consumer reporting agency pursuant to section

1681i(a)(2) of this title;

(C) report the results of the investigation to the consumer

reporting agency; 

(D) if the investigation finds that the information is

incomplete or inaccurate, report those results to all other

consumer reporting agencies to which the person

furnished the information and that compile and maintain

files on consumers on a nationwide basis; and

(E) if an item of information disputed by a consumer is

found to be inaccurate or incomplete or cannot be

verified after any reinvestigation under paragraph (1), for

purposes of reporting to a consumer reporting agency

only, as appropriate, based on the results of the

reinvestigation promptly— 

(i) modify that item of information;

(ii) delete that item of information; or 

(iii) permanently block the reporting of that item

of information.

Baker argues that Capital One violated this section in responding to notices of dispute about

four categories of reported information. (Compl. at ¶ 81 (a)-(l).) First, Baker disputed

Capital One’s failure to report her credit limit. Second, in May and June of 2002, Baker

disputed the date of Baker’s bankruptcy as reported by Capital One. Third, in September of

2002, Baker disputed the current balance reported by Capital One; Capital One then

corrected the current balance but did not correspondingly update her “high credit” amount,

forcing her to submit a further dispute in October of 2002. Fourth, in response to Baker’s

dispute, Capital One changed the “high credit” amount to $0 for two of her accounts. The

court addresses Baker’s claims related to each of these disputes in turn.

A. Credit Limits 

Baker argues that in response to her notice of dispute, Capital One violated 15 U.S.C.

§ 1681s-2(b) by reporting only her “high credit” amount and not her credit limit. According

to Baker, Capital One’s failure to subsequently include her credit limit in its reports rendered

those reports “incomplete” under § 1681s-2(b)(1)(D). The court, however, has already

determined that 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) does not by its terms require creditors to report

consumers’ credit limits. (Doc. # 103 at 4-5 (order of 1/24/2006).) Granted, a creditors’

choice not to report its customer’s credit limits may negatively effect those customers’ credit

Case 3:04-cv-01192-NVW Document 153 Filed 08/30/06 Page 5 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

scores, if calculated using FICO methodology. But third party use of a possibly imperfect

methodology in synthesizing consumer information for commercial use does not give rise

to a legal duty, previously unrecognized, requiring creditors to cater their reporting to such

third party’s methodology. Baker has provided no authority for the proposition that creditors

bear responsibility for assuring that FICO score generators render “accurate” results when

inputted with otherwise accurate reported information. Rather, the legal duty of creditors to

report information in response to disputes is governed by 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b), which

includes no specific requirement that credit limits be reported by creditors who do not

ordinarily do so. While other statutes, regulations or caselaw may or may not require the

reporting of certain specific items of information such as credit limits, Baker has waived her

rights under such authority by failing to present it here. See Arai v. Am. Bryce Ranches, Inc.,

316 F.3d 1066, 1070 n.4 (9th Cir. 2003). Capital One’s motion for summary judgment on

this claim is therefore granted. 

B. Date of Bankruptcy Reported in May and June of 2002

Baker next alleges that after receiving notification of her dispute, Capital One

continued to misreport the date of her bankruptcy. Baker alleges that despite two such

notifications, Capital One reported to the credit reporting agency Experian that one of her

accounts (the “52910 account”) had been discharged in bankruptcy in April of 2001, when

in fact the account had been discharged in 1996.

To establish a prima facie case of a Fair Credit Reporting Act violation, Baker must

present evidence showing that the defendant reported inaccurate information. See Guimond,

45 F.3d at 1333 (setting forth requirements for prima facie case under analogous § 1681e(b)).

The defendant can thereafter avoid liability by showing that the inaccurate report was

generated despite the defendant’s following reasonable procedures or performing a

reasonable investigation. See id. 

Capital One’s motion for summary judgment challenges this claim on three grounds.

Capital One argues (1) that the evidence Baker submits does not suggest Capital One

reported inaccurate information, because Baker is misinterpreting that evidence, (2) that

Case 3:04-cv-01192-NVW Document 153 Filed 08/30/06 Page 6 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

Capital One satisfied its duty to perform a reasonable investigation following both the May

and June disputes, and (3) that the statute of limitations bars any action based on the May

dispute.

1. Baker’s Evidence of Capital One’s Inaccurate Reporting

Baker introduces as evidence of Capital One’s inaccurate reporting a “correction

summary” issued by Experian to Baker following Capital One’s confirmation of the disputed

information with Experian. (Doc. # 131 Ex. 3 at Ex. A at EXP0175.) To understand the

related arguments, it is necessary to describe in some detail the appearance of this summary.

For each of Baker’s accounts, the summary has eight columns of information. The headings

for six of the eight columns suggest that more than one type of information is contained in

the column. For example, the second column’s heading is “Date opened/ Reported since.”

The date the account was opened readily could be different from the date the creditor began

reporting about the account to Experian, and indeed, for Baker’s 52910 account, the entry

in this column reads “7-1994/ 6-1996,” i.e., the account was opened in July of 1994 and

Capital One began reporting on this account to Experian in June of 1996. As another

example, the fourth column’s heading reads “Type/ Term/ Monthly payment,” and the entry

in that column is “Revolving/ NA/ $0.” 

The parties’ dispute centers around the third column, which has the heading “Date of

status/ Last reported.” The “status” that the “Date of status” apparently corresponds to is also

noted: “Status: Included in bankruptcy/ Account charged off.” For Baker’s Capital One

accounts, the entry in the column with the heading “Date of status/ Last reported” is “4-2001/

4-2001.” Baker argues that Experian is reporting the account as having been “included in

bankruptcy” in April of 2001 (and also last reported in April of 2001), suggesting that Capital

One is erroneously reporting the date of her 1996 bankruptcy to Experian. Her

understanding, moreover, is buttressed by the entry in this column for another of Baker’s

accounts, also with “status” of “included in bankruptcy” but with the entry “7-1996/ 12-

2000.” (Doc. # 131 Ex. 3 at Ex. A at EXP0176.) This other creditor, then, appears to have

last reported in December of 2000 that Baker’s bankruptcy was in July of 1996. For Baker,

Case 3:04-cv-01192-NVW Document 153 Filed 08/30/06 Page 7 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

this indicates that Capital One performed a perfunctory investigation upon receiving notice

of her dispute, did not correct the error, and continued to report an erroneous date to

Experian.

Capital One provides evidence purporting to unloose Baker from her confusion. The

affidavit testimony of Kimberly Hughes, a Specialist in Consumer Affairs Special Services

for Experian, is that “[t]he dates appearing in the ‘status’ column of Experian’s credit reports

reflect the date of the status or the date the creditor last reported information about the

account.” (Doc. # 131 Ex. 3 at Aff. at ¶ 5.) This testimony, of course, tells us nothing that

the column heading, “Date of status/ Last reported,” did not already. Hughes also testifies

that Experian “collects bankruptcy discharge information through public records and does

not rely on furnishers of information to provide information about the date of a consumer’s

bankruptcy filing.” (Id. at Ex. 3 at Aff. at ¶ 2.) But this testimony is also unhelpful, given

that the information Experian independently gathers is listed in a separate section of its

reports. (Id. at Ex. 3 at Aff. at ¶ 3.) That Experian collects and reports information on

bankruptcy in another section does not clarify whether, for accounts with status of “included

in bankruptcy,” the “Date of status” field completed by the creditor should correspond with

the date of the bankruptcy. See Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151,

1156-57 (11th Cir. 1991) (describing the “accuracy defense” under analogous § 1681e(b)).

In light of Baker’s evidence, Capital One has failed to show as a matter of law that it

accurately reported Baker’s information. 

2. Reasonable Investigation

Where a plaintiff has shown evidence tending to show inaccurate reporting, the

defendant may “escape liability” by showing that the “inaccurate report was generated

despite . . . following reasonable procedures.” Guimond, 45 F.3d at 1333 (discussing

procedures under § 1681e(b) for allegedly unreasonable investigations by reporting

agencies). The reasonableness of the defendant’s investigation is typically a jury question.

Id. 

Case 3:04-cv-01192-NVW Document 153 Filed 08/30/06 Page 8 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

Here, Capital One provides evidence that it conducted a reasonable investigation of

Baker’s disputes and verified everything mentioned in the notifications. (Doc. # 131 Ex. 1

at Aff. at ¶¶ 7, 10.) Baker provides neither argument nor evidence to the contrary, except to

surmise that Capital One’s investigation must have been unreasonable because it continued

to report as it had. Although Capital One would have the burden of proof on this issue at

trial, summary judgment in such circumstances is appropriate. See U.S. for Use & Benefit

of Hawaiian Rock Products Corp. v. A.E. Lopez Enters., 74 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 1996)

(affirming summary judgment for plaintiff where no dispute of fact existed on any of the four

elements of the plaintiff’s claims); Flying Diamond Corp. v. Pennaluna & Co., 586 F.2d 707,

713 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1978) (affirming summary judgment on negligence claim where the “case

was in effect a trial on a stipulated record. There is nothing to weigh, there is no credibility

involved” (citations and internal quotations omitted)); Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish

Co., 409 F.2d 635, 643 (9th Cir. 1969) (“One against whom a motion for summary judgment

is filed is therefore under a duty to show that he can produce evidence at the trial, and is not

entitled to a denial of that motion upon the unsubstantiated hope that he can produce such

evidence at trial.” (citations omitted)). The court nevertheless addresses Capital One’s

statute of limitations argument in the interest of thoroughness. 

3. Statute of Limitations for the May Dispute

An action to enforce any liability created under the Fair Credit Reporting Act is to be

brought no later than “2 years after the date of discovery by the plaintiff of the violation that

is the basis for such liability.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681p(1). Baker filed this action on June 9, 2004.

(Doc. # 1.) Baker was informed of the results of Capital One’s investigation by mail sent on

or about May 31, 2002. (Doc. # 131 Ex. 4 at ¶ 9.) Baker, however, asserts that she retreives

her mail only “about once a month” and submits evidence that she did not receive the

relevant mail until June 18, 2002. (Doc. # 137 at 9:20-22; doc. # 138 at ¶22.) Summary

judgment on this ground therefore is denied.

Case 3:04-cv-01192-NVW Document 153 Filed 08/30/06 Page 9 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

C. “High Balance” Reported in September and October of 2002

Finally, Baker’s Complaint alleges that in September of 2002, she disputed the

balance on another of her Capital One accounts (the “5187 account”). She did so, she argues,

not because her balance was incorrect, but because the “high credit” amount listed was

incorrect and there was no option to dispute the “high credit” amount. (Doc. # 137 at 5:18-

22.) In response, Capital One updated the balance only, without altering the “high credit”

amount. (Doc. # 122 at 10: 10-16.) 

In October, however, Baker disputed the “high credit” amount on the account, despite

her assertion that she was previously unable to do so. (Id. at 10:17-25; doc. # 131 at ¶ 23;

doc. # 139 at ¶ 23.) Baker does not contest Capital One’s assertion that her “high credit”

amount then was corrected.

In light of Baker’s concession that Capital One corrected all erroneous information

brought to its attention, summary judgment is appropriate. Section 1681s-2(b)(1)(A)

obligates creditors that receive notice of a dispute to conduct an investigation “with respect

to the disputed information.” In both the September and October investigations, Capital One

conducted an investigation of the information disputed and corrected it.

D. “High Credit” Amount Changed to $0

Baker’s Complaint alleges that in response to her disputes, on January 24, 2003,

Capital One changed the “high credit” amount for two of her accounts to $0. The evidence

Baker presents in support of this claim is at best incomprehensible and in any event does not

show that Capital One changed her “high credit” amount to zero. (Doc. # 137 Ex. N-1.)

Baker has therefore failed to fulfill her duty as the non-movant on summary judgment to

present evidence showing that Capital One reported inaccurate information. 

In conclusion, summary judgment is appropriate on all of Baker’s claims. Capital

One’s objections to Baker’s evidence are therefore moot.

 

Case 3:04-cv-01192-NVW Document 153 Filed 08/30/06 Page 10 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Equifax’s submission about the requisite showing for a prima facie case under

Guimond misstates that authority. (See doc. # 125 at 5:19-26.) 

- 11 -

III. Equifax’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Equifax moves for summary judgment on each of Baker’s nine claims, located at ¶¶

113-121 of Baker’s Complaint. The court addresses Equifax’s motion with respect to each

claim.

A. Reasonable Procedures Under 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b)

Paragraph 113 of Baker’s Complaint alleges that Equifax failed to follow reasonable

procedures to assure the accuracy of the information about Baker that it reported. Section

1681e(b) of Title 15, U.S.C., provides:

(b) Accuracy of report

Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer

report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum

possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual

about whom the report relates.

“In order to make out a prima facie violation under § 1681e(b), a consumer must present

evidence tending to show that a credit reporting agency prepared a report containing

inaccurate information.” Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th

Cir. 1995) (citing Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1156 (11th Cir.

1991)).2

 Thereafter, “an agency can escape liability if it establishes that an inaccurate report

was generated depite the agency’s following reasonable procedures.” Id. 

Baker does not refute Equifax’s argument that none of the documents she relies upon

is a “consumer report” as required under § 1681e(b). (See Doc. # 125 at 5:27-6:13); Thomas

v. Gulf Coast Credit Servs., Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1233 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (holding that

“the volumes of credit information Defedants relayed to Plaintiff do not constitute ‘consumer

reports’ under the FCRA.” (citations omitted)). As a more general matter, Baker cites no

evidence of any individual instance of inaccurate reporting by Equifax so as to make out a

prima facie case. Where the moving party has met its initial burden with a properly

supported motion for summary judgment, the party opposing the motion “must set forth

Case 3:04-cv-01192-NVW Document 153 Filed 08/30/06 Page 11 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (citations omitted). Instead of disputing or even

acknowledging Equifax’s arguments about Baker’s evidence in support of her prima facie

case, Baker merely reiterates, without citing evidence, that Equifax’s reporting was

inaccurate and that its procedures were unsatisfactory. (Doc. # 145 at 3-4.) Baker’s

previous, wholesale incorporation of her one-hundred-one paragraph statement of facts into

her brief (id. at 3:11-13), cannot suffice to carry her burden as the non-moving party on

summary judgment. The court will not undertake the role of advocate to review the entirety

of Baker’s evidence in search of what could be helpful in defending those elements of her

claim challenged by Equifax. See Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029-31

(9th Cir. 2001).

B. Incomplete Disclosures Under 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1) and A.R.S. § 44-

1522

In Paragraph 114 of her Complaint, Baker alleges that Equifax failed to provide

complete consumer disclosures in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1) and A.R.S. § 44-

1522. The court addresses Baker’s claims under these two statutes in turn.

1. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1)

With exceptions, 15 U.S.C. § 1681(g)(a) provides that “[e]very consumer reporting

agency shall, upon request . . . clearly and accurately disclose to the consumer . . . [a]ll

information in the consumer’s file at the time of request.” “The term ‘file,’ when used in

connection with information on any consumer, means all of the information on that consumer

recorded and retained by a consumer reporting agency regardless of how the information is

stored.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(g). 

Baker fails to raise a triable issue as to whether Equifax fully disclosed all information

on file in response to Baker’s requests. Equifax, for its part, presents evidence that it

provided Baker all the information in her file each time she requested it. (Doc. # 133 Ex. A

at ¶¶ 13, 26.) Baker’s evidence that for some accounts Equifax retains up to 22 fields of data

(doc. # 146 Ex. P-18 at EIS0092) does not contradict Equifax’s evidence that it retained no

Case 3:04-cv-01192-NVW Document 153 Filed 08/30/06 Page 12 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

undisclosed data about her accounts. Moreover, Baker’s apparent attempt to compare the

quantity of information reported about her in different Equifax publications, such as a trimerged report comparing Equifax, Experian, and Trans Union credit reports (id. at P-17),

does not show that the sole “consumer disclosure” form Baker relies upon was in any way

incomplete. (Id. at Ex. P-9.) The motion for summary judgment on Baker’s claim under 15

U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1) is therefore granted.

2. A.R.S. § 44-1522

Section 44-1522(A), A.R.S., provides:

The act, use or employment by any person of any deception,

deceptive act or practice, fraud, false pretense, false promise,

misrepresentation, or concealment, suppression or omission of

any material fact with intent that others rely upon such

concealment, suppression or omission, in connection with the

sale or advertisement of any merchandise whether or not any

person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby, is

declared to be an unlawful practice.

Baker presents no evidence that Equifax deceived her in any transaction in which she

purchased merchandise or that Equifax acted with intent to conceal information. The motion

for summary judgment on Baker’s claim under A.R.S. § 44-1522 is therefore granted. 

C. Improper Sale of Data to Resellers that Provide Incomplete Disclosures

and Overcharge for Resale of the Data

In Paragraph 115 of her Complaint, Baker alleges that Equifax sold credit data to

resellers of that data engaging in illegal practices. Baker’s brief provides no authority for

Equifax’s liability on such facts. The motion for summary judgment on this claim is

therefore granted.

D. Summary of All Rights Under 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(c)(2)

Baker alleges in Paragraph 116 of her Complaint that Equifax failed to provide her

a summary of all rights in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(c)(2). However, in her brief, Baker

concedes that Equifax sent a summary of rights with each disclosure. (Doc. # 145 at 5:27-

28.) Baker again alleges that Equifax is vicariously liable under the Fair Credit Reporting

Act for noncompliance by resellers of the data with whom Equifax does business but

Case 3:04-cv-01192-NVW Document 153 Filed 08/30/06 Page 13 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 -

provides no authority for that proposition. (Id. at 6:2-4.) The motion for summary judgment

on this claim is therefore granted.

E. Provision of Trained Personnel Under 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(c)

In Paragraph 117 of her Complaint, Baker alleges that Equifax failed to provide

trained personnel in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(c). That section provides:

(c) Trained personnel

Any consumer reporting agency shall provide trained personnel

to explain to the consumer any information furnished to him

pursuant to section 1681g of this title.

In her brief, Baker submits evidence that Equifax makes available trained personnel for 60

days after the consumer obtains an Equifax credit report. (Doc. # 146 Ex. R-8.) Baker’s

argument, then, must be that 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(c) requires Equifax to make available trained

personnel for a longer period of time. Given that the statute expressly ties the obligation to

make personnel available to the furnishing of information under section 1681g, the court will

not read section 1681h(c) to require availability in perpetuity, at least where Baker has

provided no authority on the issue. The court therefore grants the motion for summary

judgment on this claim.

F. Consideration of Baker’s Information Under 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(4)

Paragraph 118 of the Complaint alleges that, when provided notice of erroneous

information in Baker’s credit report, Equifax failed to consider Baker’s submitted

information in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(4). That provision states:

(4) Consideration of consumer information.–In conducting

any reinvestigation . . . with respect to disputed information in

the file of any consumer, the consumer reporting agency shall

review and consider all relevant information submitted by the

consumer in the period described in paragraph (1)(A) with

respect to such disputed information.

Equifax submits evidence that for each dispute remitted by Baker, it conducted a full

reinvestigation and reviewed all information submitted. (Doc. # 133 Ex. A at ¶¶ 12, 21-22.)

Where the moving party has met its initial burden with a properly supported motion for

summary judgment, the party opposing the motion “must set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (citations omitted). In response

Case 3:04-cv-01192-NVW Document 153 Filed 08/30/06 Page 14 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 -

to Equifax’s motion, Baker makes no comprehensible argument for liability under this

section. (Doc. # 145 at 6-9.) Baker’s general allegations of erroneous reporting contain no

isolated, specific facts upon which to premise liability under § 1681i(a)(4). Specifically,

Baker’s brief neither details nor cites information provided to Equifax that was allegedly

ignored. The motion is therefore granted.

G. Notice by Fax or Email Under 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(6)

In Paragraph 119 of Baker’s Complaint, she alleges that Equifax failed to provide

written notices by fax or email instead of by mail, as she requested. Baker alleges that

Equifax is liable under 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(6), which provides:

(6) Notice of results of reinvestigations.---

(A) In general.—A consumer reporting agency shall

provide written notice to a consumer of the results of a

reinvestigation under this subsection not later than 5

business days after the completion of the reinvestigation,

by mail or, if authorized by the consumer for that

purpose, by other means available to the agency.

Baker argues that her mailbox is miles from her home and that Equifax utilizes mail delivery

in order to subject Baker to identity theft. However, § 1681i(a)(6) merely authorizes, and

does not require, consumer reporting agencies to deliver notices “by other means” than mail.

Baker presents no authority suggesting Equifax was required to utilize email or fax at

Baker’s request. The motion for summary judgment on this claim is therefore granted.

H. Descriptions of Reinvestigation Procedures Under 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(7)

Paragraph 120 of Baker’s Complaint alleges that Equifax failed to provide

descriptions of its reinvestigation procedures in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(7), which

provides:

(7) Description of reinvestigation procedure.—A consumer

reporting agency shall provide to a consumer a description

referred to in paragraph (6)(B)(iii) by not later than 15 days after

receiving a request from the consumer for that description.

The “description” that must be provided by the consumer reporting agency is “a description

of the procedure used to determine the accuracy and completeness of the information . . .

including the business name and address of any furnisher of information contacted in

Case 3:04-cv-01192-NVW Document 153 Filed 08/30/06 Page 15 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 16 -

connection with such information and the telephone number of such furnisher, if reasonably

available.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(6)(B)(iii).

Baker provides no evidence that Equifax failed to provide an adequate description of

its procedures upon Baker’s request. In her brief, Baker cites generally to her Exhibit P,

which is a thick stack of papers containing 20 separate documents. The only specific citation

with regard to this claim is to Exhibit P-12. (Doc. # 145 at 9.) It is impossible to determine

what information in Exhibit P-12 is referred to or whether the document even supports

Baker’s assertion. No evidence is cited indicating which, if any, of these documents were

received in response to a request for a description by Baker under § 1681i(a)(7), or even

whether Baker ever made such a request. The motion for summary judgment is therefore

granted. 

I. Misrepresentation of CreditWatch Program Under A.R.S. § 44-1522

Paragraph 121 of Baker’s Complaint alleges that Equifax misrepresented its

CreditWatch program in violation of A.R.S. § 44-1522. Baker argues that having purchased

“CreditWatch consumer disclosures,” they were never delivered. (Doc. # 145 at 10:1-2.)

Equifax provides evidence that it did not sell the CreditWatch program to Baker and that

CreditWatch is sold by a separate entity named Equifax Consumer Services, Inc. (Doc. #

133 Ex. A at ¶ 27.) 

Baker in effect argues that the court should hold Equifax liable for the actions of

Equifax Consumer Services, Inc. No authority is provided in support of that course of action.

The motion for summary judgment is therefore granted. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Capital One’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(doc. # 122) is granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Equifax’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc.

# 125) is granted.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:04-cv-01192-NVW Document 153 Filed 08/30/06 Page 16 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 17 -

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk enter judgment in favor Defendant

Capital One Bank and Defendant Equifax Information Services, L.L.C., and that Plaintiff

Christine Baker take nothing on her complaint. The clerk shall terminate this action.

DATED this 29th day of August 2006.

Case 3:04-cv-01192-NVW Document 153 Filed 08/30/06 Page 17 of 17