Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01850/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01850-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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.. , . 

SYLVIA DRIGGINS, 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

) 

) 

FILED 

United Stat.es Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

MAR 1 61989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 87-1850 

) ( D. C. No. 87-537-B) 

CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA, ) (W.D. Okla.) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON and TACHA, Circuit Judges, and ROGERS, District 

Judge.** 

**The Honorable Richard D. Rogers, United States District Judge 

for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

*This order and 

be cited, or 

for purposes of 

res judicata, 

judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 87-1850 Document: 010110024630 Date Filed: 03/16/1989 Page: 1 
' . 

The plaintiff-appellant appeals the district court's order of 

May 11, 1987, granting the defendant-appellee's motion to dismiss 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The plaintiff instituted 

the underlying action pursuant to 42 u.s.c. § 1983 claiming that 

the defendant City of Oklahoma City (City), with whom she was 

employed from November of 1979 through April 30, 1986, terminated 

her employment without affording her due process. The plaintiff 

sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief in the form of 

reinstatement, and general damages in the amount of $50,000, plus 

back pay. 

The City moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on the 

grounds that the plaintiff did not allege or have a protected 

property interest in her continued employment with the City, and 

that even if she did have such an interest, her complaint 

demonstrated that she received all the process required by law 

prior to her termination. The district court granted the City's 

motion without stating its reasons therefor. 

We review dismissals for failure to state a claim de novo, 

because the sufficiency of a complaint is a question of law. See 

Morgan v. City of Rawlins, 792 F.2d 975, 978 (10th Cir. 1986). 

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create a powerful presumption 

against dismissals for failure to state a claim, and a court 

should only dismiss a complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) if 

it determines, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff cannot prove 

any set of facts that would entitle him or her to relief. Id. 

In order to state a claim for relief under § 1983, the 

plaintiff had to allege that she had either a property interest in 

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.... 

her continued employment with the City or a liberty interest, and 

that the City, while acting under color of state law, deprived her 

of that interest without due process. 

Although the plaintiff did not specifically allege that she 

had a property interest in her "permanent, 

employment with the City, she did allege that she 

non-probationary" 

was terminated 

without due process in violation of Cleveland Board of Education 

v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), which sets forth the process 

due an employee who has a property interest in his or her 

employment, prior to termination. Under the notice pleading 

standards, such an allegation was sufficient to give the City 

notice of the nature of the interest claimed by the plaintiff, and 

the City's motion to dismiss reflects that it, in fact, received 

such notice. 

In moving to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint, the City 

merely stated, without further discussion, that the plaintiff did 

not have a property interest in her continued employment. The 

plaintiff contended, in her brief in opposition to dismissal, that 

she had a property interest in her continued employment with the 

City because she could only be terminated for cause, and any 

termination decision would be reviewable. Such facts, if proven, 

would support a conclusion that the plaintiff had a property 

interest in her employment with the City that was protected by the 

due process clause. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 

U.S. 532 (1985}; Poolaw v. City of Anadarko, Okla., 660 F.2d 459 

(10th Cir. 1981). 

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Appellate Case: 87-1850 Document: 010110024630 Date Filed: 03/16/1989 Page: 3 
On appeal, the City argues for the first time that the City 

Charter of Oklahoma City governs the plaintiff's employment 

rights, and that it provides that the plaintiff can be dismissed 

for any reason. Therefore, the City contends, the plaintiff has 

no property interest in her employment. Specifically, the City 

asserts that the Charter states that the city manager has the 

power to "[a]ppoint all officers and employees of the City of 

Oklahoma City except the elective officers and the officers whose 

election is vested in the Council by [the] Charter," and to 

"[d]ismiss any officer or employee appointed by him whenever, in 

his judgment, the interests of the City service so require." 

We recently held, in Graham v. City of Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, 859 F.2d 142, 146 (10th Cir. 1988), that a police 

officer employed by the City of Oklahoma City, whom the city 

manager could dismiss "solely for the good of the service," did 

not have a "legitimate expectation of entitlement to continued 

employment absent cause for discharge" and, therefore, did not 

have a property interest in his employment. Although Graham may 

be controlling in the present action, we hesitate to so rule on 

the sparse record before us. 

Neither the City Charter itself, nor the City's arguments 

based thereon, was presented to the district court. Therefore, 

the record does not reflect whether the excerpt from the Charter 

attached to the City's brief on appeal contains all provisions 

pertinent to the nature of the plaintiff's interest in her 

continued employment, whether the excerpt comes from the Charter 

in effect at the times pertinent to the present action, or whether 

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. . it is the same as that relied upon by this court in Graham. 

Furthermore, the record reflects neither whether the plaintiff was 

in the class of officers and employees whom the city manager could 

dismiss, nor whether the plaintiff was dismissed under authority 

of the city manager. 

Based on the record before us, we cannot say as a matter of 

law that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would 

establish a property interest in her continued employment. By so 

stating, we make no judgment as to whether the plaintiff could 

withstand a motion for summary judgment based on the argument 

advanced by the City on appeal, if the motion were properly 

supported by the necessary facts. 

Turning to the issue of the process due the plaintiff, we 

conclude that, assuming she had a property interest in her 

continued employment, the plaintiff alleged enough facts to 

preclude dismissal of her claim. The plaintiff alleged that on 

the afternoon of April 30, 1987, her supervisor, Ms. Benson, 

called her into her office to discuss a written performance 

evaluation of the plaintiff. After soliciting the plaintiff's 

comments on the evaluation, Ms. Benson informed the plaintiff that 

she was terminating her, and asked the plaintiff whether she had 

anything to say regarding the matter. Ms. Benson later told the 

plaintiff to gather her belongings and leave, as her termination 

was effective immediately. 

The United States Supreme Court has held that "[a]n essential 

element of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or 

property 'be preceded by a notice and opportunity for hearing 

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Appellate Case: 87-1850 Document: 010110024630 Date Filed: 03/16/1989 Page: 5 
appropriate to the nature of the case.'" Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 

542 (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 

306, 313 (1950)). The notice must be "reasonably calculated, 

under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 

pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present 

their objections." Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. Furthermore, a 

party must be given the opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful 

time and in a meaningful manner." Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 

545, 552 (1965). 

The facts alleged by the plaintiff raise a legitimate 

question as to whether she received either adequate notice or 

opportunity for an adequate hearing prior to her termination. 

Therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's 

complaint for failure to state a claim for relief. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma is REVERSED and the cause is REMANDED 

for further proceedings not inconsistent with this order. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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