Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00345/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00345-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS PRATT, 

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA STATE BOARD OF

PHARMACY, et al.,

Defendants. 

CIV-S-05-0345 DFL KJM 

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

AND ORDER

Defendants Virginia Herold and Patricia Harris (the

“government defendants”) move to dismiss plaintiff Thomas Pratt’s

claims against them on two grounds: (1) plaintiff’s claims are

non-justiciable; and (2) the complaint fails to state a claim. 

I.

Pratt is an African-American male who has taken and failed

the California State Board of Pharmacy license exam on three

occasions -- June 2002, January 2003, and June 2003. (FAC ¶¶ 1,

4.) The exams taken by Pratt contained two parts: a multiplechoice portion allegedly based on a “Detailed Content Outline”

derived from a “Job Analysis Study” (“Part 1") and a short-answer

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essay portion that, Pratt alleges, was not based on any reliable

methodology or content outline (“Part 2"). (Id. ¶¶ 4, 6.) Part

2 was not graded unless the examinee received a score of 75 or

more on Part 1. (Id. ¶ 4.) Pratt passed Part 1 of each test,

but failed Part 2. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 6.) 

Pratt alleges that the lack of an outline for preparing

questions and the subjective nature of the grading for Part 2

resulted in an exam that was intentionally discriminatory against

African-Americans. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 9.) However, Pratt concedes that

the exam has subsequently been modified and that the current exam

does not have a discriminatory purpose or impact. (Id. ¶ 9.) 

Pratt alleges that use of Part 2 of the exam resulted in

violations of due process and equal protection and seeks as

remedies: (1) a declaration that his constitutional rights were

violated in the administration of the test; (2) an order from the

court deeming all persons who passed Part 1 of the June 2002,

January 2003, and June 2003 licensing exams as having passed the

exam and requiring the State to admit them as pharmacists; and

(3) a declaration that the administrative code provision setting

the required passing score for the exam was adopted without

adequate review and led to an unconstitutional licensing exam. 

(Id. ¶¶ 13, 17, 20.) The government defendants move to dismiss.

II.

Defendants argue that Pratt’s claims are non-justiciable

because the court would be required to usurp the State’s power to

determine who is entitled to licensure as a pharmacist in order

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to resolve the case. (Mot. at 5, 11.) However, if the court

found that Part 2 was intentionally discriminatory and did not

further the State’s legitimate licensing function, it would have

the authority to grant the requested relief to plaintiff based

upon his successful completion of Part 1. Whether plaintiff can

make such a showing is an entirely different matter that may be

tested by a motion for summary judgment.

The court does agree that certain aspects of plaintiffs’

requested relief should be dismissed. Pratt’s request that all

those who passed Part 1 be deemed to have passed the exam is not

relief to which Pratt is entitled. This is not a class action

and the proposed relief would extend to individuals who have not

suffered discrimination. Pratt’s claim on behalf of persons not

before the court is DISMISSED. 

Defendants also move to dismiss on the ground that Pratt has

not alleged facts that would give rise to a procedural or

substantive due process claim or a claim of an equal protection

violation. (Mot. at 14-22.) This aspect of the motion is denied

in part and granted in part. 

First, defendants assert that plaintiff cannot show a

legitimate claim of entitlement to a pharmacist’s license because

he has not passed the state exam. (Mot. at 16.) However, as

indicated above, if Pratt can demonstrate that because of the

lack of reliable methodology and the existence of an intent to

discriminate, Part 2 served no legitimate purpose in deciding an

examinee’s qualifications to be a pharmacist, Pratt gained a

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legitimate claim of entitlement to a license upon passing Part 1

of the exam. Therefore, the motion to dismiss the procedural due

process claim is DENIED. 

Defendants also assert that Pratt cannot state a claim for

deprivation of procedural due process based on the 1989 enactment

of the regulation setting the passing score for the exam. (Mot.

at 16 n. 3; Comp. ¶ 20.) In 1989, at the time the regulation was

adopted, and the alleged procedural violations occurred, Pratt

did not have a legitimate claim of entitlement to a pharmacist’s

license. Therefore, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to the

procedural due process claim allegedly arising from the 1989

regulation. 

Defendants argue that Pratt cannot state a substantive due

process claim because: (1) he cannot establish a legitimate claim

of entitlement; and (2) even if he could, the deprivation of that

interest did not “shock the conscience” or interfere “with rights

implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” (Mot. at 17.) The

first argument has been addressed previously and fails. 

As to the second argument, substantive due process forbids

the government from depriving a person of life, liberty, or

property in such a way that "shocks the conscience" or

"interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered

liberty." Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867, 871 (9th

Cir. 1998). A substantive due process claim can be stated

through allegations that the action was “arbitrary and irrational

and had no relationship to a legitimate government objective.” 

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City of Los Angeles v. McLaughlin, 865 F.2d 1084, 1088 (9th Cir.

1989). As discussed above, Pratt has alleged that Part 2 of the

exam served no legitimate governmental purpose, was not related

to determining his qualifications to be a pharmacist, and

intended to discriminate on the basis of race or national origin. 

These allegations adequately state a claim for deprivation of

substantive due process. Therefore, the motion to dismiss is

DENIED as to Pratt’s substantive due process claim. 

Defendants argue that Pratt has not stated a viable equal

protection claim because he has not pleaded that there was actual

discrimination in the grading of the test or that the government

defendants were aware of or intended any discrimination. (Mot.

at 19.) 

Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is

required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 

Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.

252, 265, 97 S.Ct. 555 (1977). To state an equal protection

claim, Pratt must allege that the government defendants acted

with an intent or purpose to discriminate against him based on

his membership in a protected class.

Pratt has alleged that he is a member of a protected class

as an African-American. (FAC ¶ 1.) Pratt also alleges that the

government defendants knew that Part 2 was discriminatory and

“intended such discrimination.” (Id. ¶ 9.) Finally, Pratt

alleges that because Part 2 uses subjective grading, “this allows

the graders to discriminate” based on membership in a protected

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class. (Id. ¶ 8.) Defendants contend that these allegations are

insufficient because Pratt fails to specifically allege that the

graders intentionally discriminated against him. (Mot. at 20-

21.) In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the complaint must be

construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Parks

Sch. Of Business, Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir.

1995). Given that Pratt has alleged that the test permitted

graders to discriminate, that he failed the test, and that a

disproportionate number of minorities failed the exam, his

complaint can be construed as alleging that he was actually and

intentionally discriminated against on the basis of his race. 

The government defendants’ motion to dismiss the equal protection

claim is DENIED. 

III.

For the reasons set forth above, the motion to dismiss is

granted in part and denied in part.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 6/24/2005

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

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