Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-00556/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-00556-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLARENCE A. GIPBSIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

SCOTT KERNAN, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:12-cv-0556 GEB CKD P (TEMP)

ORDER AND

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with an action filed 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court are several of plaintiff’s motions, 

including his motion for summary judgment, motion for default judgment, motion for sanctions, 

motion for a pretrial conference, and motion for appointment of an investigator. The court will 

address each of plaintiff’s motions in turn.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is proceeding on a second amended complaint. Therein, he alleges that the 

defendants failed to transfer him to a mental health facility in a timely fashion pursuant to a 

Lassen County Superior Court order. According to the allegations of plaintiff’s complaint and the 

exhibits attached thereto, a judge of the Lassen County Superior Court determined that plaintiff 

was not mentally competent to stand trial and ordered him committed to Atascadero State 

Hospital in 2007. Instead of transferring plaintiff to Atascadero State Hospital, however, 

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defendants allegedly kept plaintiff in administrative segregation at High Desert State Prison and 

then transferred him to Corcoran State Prison. Plaintiff alleges that more than two years passed 

before prison officials complied with the Lassen County Superior Court order and transferred him 

to the Salinas Valley Psychiatric Program in 2009. (Sec. Am. Compl. at 1-9 & Attachs.)

At screening, then-Magistrate Judge Dale A. Drozd determined that plaintiff’s second 

amended complaint stated a cognizable claim for relief against defendants Kernan, Ehle, Felker, 

Wong, Peddacour, Gamez. Perez, Grannis, Zamora, Jackson, Wagner, Schmollinger, Grimes, 

McCann, and Safi for their involvement in the delay of his mental health treatment in violation of 

the Fourteenth Amendment. (ECF No. 65)

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff has filed a motion for summary judgment on the merits of his Fourteenth 

Amendment claim. (ECF No. 122) In opposition to the motion, defense counsel requests that the 

court deny plaintiff’s motion without prejudice to give counsel time to complete discovery and 

retain an expert psychiatrist to evaluate the mental health care plaintiff received from 2007 to 

2009. (ECF No. 126)

On December 14, 2015, this court issued a discovery and scheduling order in this case. 

(ECF No. 130) Pursuant to that order, the parties needed to complete discovery on or before 

April 8, 2016. (Id.) Discovery is now closed, so presumably defense counsel has completed 

discovery and retained any necessary experts. Although there are some defects in form in 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, the court will nevertheless order defendants to file a 

new opposition to plaintiff’s motion. See Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010)

(“We have, therefore, held consistently that courts should construe liberally motion papers and 

pleadings filed by pro se inmates and should avoid applying summary judgment rules strictly.”). 

Under the court’s discovery and scheduling order, the parties must file any pretrial motions on or 

before July 1, 2016. The court will order defendants to file their opposition to plaintiff’s motion 

(or a cross-motion for summary judgment) by that date. Once the parties have submitted all of 

the necessary briefing, the court will issue findings and recommendations on plaintiff’s motion 

for summary judgment. 

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PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Plaintiff has moved for default judgment against defendants Gamez, Grannis, and Grimes

because they have failed to respond to plaintiff’s complaint. (ECF No. 124) First, with respect to 

defendant Gamez, this defendant is not in default because he has never been served with 

plaintiff’s complaint, and therefore he is not required to respond to the complaint. See Veeck v. 

Commodity Enters., 487 F.2d 423, 425-26 (9th Cir. 1973). Although the court has twice ordered 

the United States Marshal to effect service of plaintiff’s complaint on this defendant, the Marshal 

has been unable to do so based on the information plaintiff has provided the court on form USM285. (ECF Nos. 78 & 118) Under these circumstances, the court finds that plaintiff cannot show 

good cause for failure to effect service on defendant Gamez. The court has provided plaintiff 

with more than sufficient time to discover and provide to the court the correct address for this

defendant, but plaintiff has been unable to do so to date. Accordingly, the court will deny 

plaintiff’s motion for default judgment with respect to defendant Gamez and will recommend 

dismissal of this defendant pursuant to Rule 4(m).

With respect to defendant Grannis, on December 14, 2015, defendant Grannis filed an 

answer to plaintiff’s complaint. (ECF No. 129) According to his waiver of service of summons, 

he needed to respond to plaintiff’s complaint within sixty (60) days of July 15, 2015. (ECF No. 

131) Defendant Grannis filed his answer three months past that date. However, the court 

declines to enter default judgment against this defendant. Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure requires the court clerk to enter default against a party who “has failed to plead or 

otherwise defend [.]” Thereafter, the court may enter a default judgment against such a party if 

the court concludes that certain factors favor entry of default judgment. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 

F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). Those factors are:

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of 

plaintiff's substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, 

(4) the sum of money at stake in the action, (5) the possibility of a 

dispute concerning material facts, (6) whether the default was due 

to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.

Id.

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In this case, defendant Grannis filed his answer late, but he has not failed to plead or

otherwise defend. Moreover, even if the court construed defendant Grannis’s late filing of his 

answer as a failure to defend, the Eitel factors do not favor entry of default judgment against him. 

Plaintiff has shown no prejudice from the late answer, and since defendant Grannis filed his 

answer the defendant has indicated his intent to defend this action. “Cases should be decided 

upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. There is no 

compelling reason not to allow the parties to litigate plaintiff’s claim against defendant Grannis 

on the merits. Accordingly, the court will deny plaintiff’s motion for default judgment against

defendant Grannis. 

Finally, with respect to defendant Grimes, it appears that the United States Marshal 

successfully effected service on defendant Grimes. (ECF No. 110) Defendant Grimes has not yet 

appeared in this action, however. Under these circumstances, the court will ask defense counsel 

to clarify whether he represents defendant Grimes in this action. If defense counsel only 

represents the other named defendants, the court will request counsel’s assistance and direct 

counsel to make an informal inquiry as to whom, if anyone, represents defendant Grimes in this 

action and report back to this court. At this time, the court will not rule on plaintiff’s motion for 

default judgment against this defendant.

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

Plaintiff has filed a motion for sanctions for defendants’ purported failure to respond to 

his subpoena duces tecum. (ECF No. 137) Defendants have filed an opposition to the motion 

and contend that there were several defects in plaintiff’s subpoena addressed to defendants and 

nonparties. (ECF No. 140) In addition, before their responses were due, plaintiff served 

defendants with a request for production of documents, which counsel believed replaced the 

defective subpoena plaintiff had served earlier. (Id.) Defendants maintain that their nonresponse 

to plaintiff’s subpoena was not in bad faith or with an improper motive. (Id.) 

As an initial matter, under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

Parties may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged matter 

that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to 

the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at 

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stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative 

access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the 

importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the 

burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely 

benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be 

admissible in evidence to be discoverable.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b). 

In this case, the court has reviewed plaintiff’s subpoena and it is, as defense counsel 

contends, confusing and defective. (ECF No. 140 (Carrasco Decl. Ex. 1.)) For example, plaintiff 

commanded defendants and nonparties to appear at this federal courthouse and at California State 

Prison, Sacramento. (Id.) He did not specify a certain time for them to appear. (Id.) Nor did 

plaintiff specify what records or documents he sought from them. (Id.) Plaintiff also did not 

serve the subpoena on any nonparties through the United States Marshal. Finally, on February 4, 

2016, plaintiff served all defendants (and this court) with a request for production documents, 

which defense counsel interpreted as replacing plaintiff’s defective subpoena. (Id. (Carrasco 

Decl. Ex. 2.)) On March 14, 2016, when defendants filed their opposition to plaintiff’s motion 

for sanctions, their response to plaintiff’s request for production of documents was not yet due, 

but defense counsel declared that defendants intended to serve plaintiff with a timely response. 

(Id. (Carrasco Decl. at ¶ 7)) 

At most, it appears that defense counsel simply misunderstood plaintiff’s discovery 

requests. Although defense counsel could have served plaintiff with objections to the subpoena 

or sought to modify or quash the subpoena instead of disregarding it, under the circumstances of 

this case, the court finds that sanctions against defendants are not warranted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

37(b)(2) (allowing the court to issue sanctions “where a party fails to obey an order to provide or 

permit discovery”). Finally, the court notes that at this point, plaintiff does not appear to take any 

issue with defendants’ response to his request for production of documents. Accordingly, the 

court will deny plaintiff’s motion for sanctions. 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A PRETRIAL CONFERENCE

Plaintiff has filed a motion for a pretrial conference. (ECF No. 139) Following 

adjudication of the parties’ dispositive motions, this court will issue a further scheduling order 

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that includes dates for the parties’ pretrial statements, pretrial conference, and jury trial as 

appropriate. Neither party needs to file a motion for this purpose. Accordingly, the court will 

deny plaintiff’s motion for a pretrial conference as unnecessary. 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF AN INVESTIGATOR

Plaintiff has filed a motion for appointment of an investigator to help him investigate his 

claims. (ECF No. 142) Although the court granted plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, 

“‘the expenditure of public funds [on behalf of an indigent litigant] is proper only when 

authorized by Congress.’” Tedder v. Odel, 890 F.2d 210, 211 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting United 

States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 321 (1976). The expenditure of public funds for an 

investigator is not authorized by the in forma pauperis statute or any other statute. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915. Accordingly, the court will deny plaintiff’s motion for appointment of an investigator.

OTHER MATTERS

Plaintiff has filed a number of his discovery requests with the court. (ECF Nos. 136 & 

138) As an initial matter, plaintiff should file neither his discovery requests nor defendants’ 

responses to his discovery requests, unless plaintiff is dissatisfied with defendants’ responses to 

his discovery requests, and he seeks relief from the court pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. In any case, as noted above, discovery is now closed. The court will place plaintiff’s 

discovery requests in the case file and disregard them. Plaintiff is cautioned that further filing of 

discovery requests or responses, except when required by this court, may result in an order of 

sanctions, including but not limited to a recommendation that this action be dismissed. 

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment (ECF No. 124) is denied with respect to 

defendants Gamez and Grannis. With respect to defendant Grimes, within twenty-one days of the 

date of this order, defense counsel shall clarify whether he represents this defendant in this action. 

If defense counsel only represents the other named defendants, the court directs counsel to make 

an informal inquiry as to whom, if anyone, represents defendant Grimes in this action and report 

back to this court.

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2. Defendants shall file an opposition to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (or a 

cross-motion for summary judgment) on or before July 1, 2016.

3. Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions (ECF No. 137) is denied. 

4. Plaintiff’s motion for a pretrial conference (ECF No. 139) is denied as unnecessary.

5. Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of an investigator (ECF No. 142) is denied.

6. Plaintiff’s discovery requests (ECF Nos. 136 & 138) are disregarded.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendant Gamez be dismissed from this action.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) and 41(b).

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: May 31, 2016

ec

gipb0556.mots

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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