Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00411/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00411-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IMMANUEL C. PRICE,

CDCR #G-51247,

Plaintiff,

vs.

TINA SCOTT, et al.

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:16-cv-00411-DMS-NLS

ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL 

ACTION FOR FAILING TO STATE 

A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

AND 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)

IMMANUEL C. PRICE (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner currently incarcerated at California 

State Prison, Los Angeles County, in Lancaster, California, is proceeding pro se in this 

civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave 

to proceed in forma pauperis, but dismissed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) for 

failing to state a claim with leave to amend. (ECF Nos. 16.) Plaintiff has since filed a 

Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (ECF No. 19), but because it still fails to state a 

claim, the Court now dismisses the entire action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) 

and § 1915A(b)(1) without further leave to amend.

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Background

Plaintiff continues to contend, as he did in both his original and FAC, that City of 

La Mesa Police Department Sergeant K. Lynch, Detective Tina Scott, and an unidentified 

“John Doe” San Diego County Jail property officer violated his Fourth Amendment rights 

after his arrest due to a “domestic dispute with his spouse” on February 28, 2014.1(ECF 

No. 19 at 3.) He seeks $200,000 in general and punitive damages, in addition to $100,000 

for his “pain and suffering.” (Id. at 8.)

Discussion

A. Legal Standards for Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

Because Plaintiff remains a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his SAC requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). “The purpose of 

§ 1915A is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the

expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014)

(quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 

1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard applied in 

the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”).

 

1 Plaintiff’s FAC also alleged a “due process” violation against the unknown John Doe San 

Diego County Jail Property Officer based on the deprivation of his property. See FAC (ECF 

No. 12) at 3. While the Court also dismissed those claims with leave to amend, Plaintiff’s 

SAC alleges only a Fourth Amendment violation. (ECF No. 19 at 3-4). Therefore, 

Plaintiff’s due process claims are considered waived. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. 

Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading 

supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended 

pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

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The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires the Court to review complaints filed by 

all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained 

in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of 

criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary 

program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 

1915A(b). Under these screening statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, 

or any portions of them, which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek 

damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining whether a 

complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the 

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere 

possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se,

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir.

2010), but it “may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.”

Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 954 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations 

omitted).

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B. Allegations in Second Amended Complaint

Plaintiff’s SAC repeats the same essential facts as did his FAC: he contends that he 

was arrested at his home on February 28, 2014, after an “alleged domestic dispute with 

[his] spouse, Sherra Johnson,” and was thereafter booked into San Diego County Jail,

where “a set of keys to Plaintiff’s car and then residence,” were seized and held by a “John 

Doe” property officer. (SAC at 3.) Plaintiff claims Detective Scott and Lynch, as part of 

their investigation, “obtained a letter” asking the San Diego Jail property office to “turn 

over Plaintiff’s keys,” which were then used, with Johnson’s permission, to access the 

residence Plaintiff admits he “shared” with his spouse. (SAC at 3-4.) Plaintiff claims this 

violated his right to be free of “unreasonable search and seizure” because it happened “[a]ll 

without [his] consent.” (Id. at 4.)

Plaintiff’s SAC, like his FAC, still fails to state a Fourth Amendment claim upon 

which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b). This is 

because he continues to allege his keys were on his person at the time of his arrest, and 

seized when he was booked at the San Diego County Jail. “At the stationhouse, it is entirely 

proper for police to remove and list or inventory property found on the person or in the 

possession of an arrested person who is to be jailed.” Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 

646 (1983). Searches during the booking process are “incidental administrative step[s]” 

that do not violate either the Fourth Amendment’s preclusion against warrantless searches 

and seizures, id. at 643-48, or the California Constitution. People v. Hovey, 44 Cal.3d 543, 

570-71 (1988); see also Vetter v. Ayers, No. CV 06-1728-R (RC), 2009 WL 3672829, at 

*8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2009) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation based on booking 

search at Long Beach Police Station and seizure of address book found in defendant’s 

pants). 

To the extent Plaintiff also continues to challenge the validity of a warrantless entry

of his home after he was arrested, he fares no better, for he admits Defendants delivered 

his keys to Johnson, whom he admits used them to “gain access” into their “shared 

residence.” See ECF No. 19 at 4. The Supreme Court’s cases “firmly establish that police 

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officers may search [or enter] jointly occupied premises if one of the occupants consents.” 

Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1129 (2014). For example, a person with 

common authority over property can consent to a search of that property, or in this case to 

enter into such property, without the permission of the other persons with whom she shares 

that authority. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990); see also Roston v. Long, 

No. 15-CV-00729-YGR (PR), 2016 WL 1191686, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2016). 

Plaintiff’s spouse’s use of his keys to permit Defendants to “gain access” to their “shared 

residence,” (SAC at 4), is a valid entry even if, as is the case here, he later objects but was 

“absent due to a lawful detention or arrest.” Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1134; see also United 

States v. Moore, 770 F.3d 809, 813 (9th Cir. 2014) (Fourth Amendment permitted police 

to use battering ram to gain access to the home defendant shared with his fiancée, where 

fiancée was locked out and expressly consented to warrantless search).

Based on this authority, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Second Complaint still fails to 

state a plausible Fourth Amendment claim. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 

F.3d at 1004.

Conclusion and Order

The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint and this civil action in 

its entirety for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1), denies leave to further amend as futile, see 

Hartmann v. CDCR, 707 F.3d 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A district court may deny leave 

to amend when amendment would be futile.”), certifies that an IFP appeal of this Order 

would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), and directs the Clerk 

of Court to enter judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 28, 2017

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