Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-03081/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-03081-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK C. BOON,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 12-CV-03081-H

(WMC)

ORDER GRANTING

MOTION TO DISMISS WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND

vs.

PROFESSIONAL COLLECTION

CONSULTANTS,

Defendant.

On July 5, 2013, Defendant Professional Collection Consultants (“Defendant”

or “PCC”) filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. No. 13.) On July 21, 2013, Plaintiff Mark

C. Boon (“Plaintiff” or “Boon”) filed his opposition. (Doc. No. 14.) On July 26, 2013,

Defendant filed its reply in support of the motion. (Doc. No. 15.) On July 30, 2013,

the Court vacated the hearing and submitted the matter on the papers pursuant to Local

Civil Rule 7.1(d)(1). (Doc. No. 16.) For the following reasons, the Court grants the

motion to dismiss the complaint.

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Background

On February 6, 2012, Defendant PCC filed a lawsuit in California state court

against Plaintiff (the “state action”) to collect a debt. (Doc. No. 11 (“FAC”) ¶ 8.) In

that case, PCC alleged Plaintiff defaulted on an account with Chase Bank USA, NA

(“Chase”), and that Chase had subsequently assigned the claim to PCC. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 10,

11.) Plaintiff asserts the statute of limitations had run on Plaintiff’s debt by the time

PCC filed suit. (Id. ¶¶ 13-18.) On October 18, 2012, PCC voluntarily dismissed the

case against Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 19.)

On June 18, 2013, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint in this Court against

Defendant, alleging causes of action under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices

Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq., and California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt

Collection Practices Act (“Rosenthal Act” or “RFDCPA”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1788, et

seq. Plaintiff alleges PCC brought the state action after the statute of limitations on

Plaintiff’s debt had run, and that the lawsuit therefore constituted improper debt

collection in violation of the FDCPA and RFDCPA. Defendant does not concede the

statute of limitations issue, and moves to dismiss the lawsuit. 

Discussion

I. Legal Standard on a 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Navarro v. Block,

250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A complaint generally must satisfy only the

minimal notice pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) to

evade dismissal under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th

Cir. 2003). Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading stating a claim for relief contain “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 

Fed R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the

‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and

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a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint does not “suffice if it

tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting id. at 557). “Factual allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555 (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp.

235–36 (3d ed. 2004)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.’” Hartmann v. Cal. Dept. of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir.

2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate

only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support

a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097,

1104 (9th Cir. 2008). 

II. FDCPA and RFDCPA

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s conduct violated sections 1692e, 1692e(2)(A),

1692e(10), and 1692f, and 1692(f)(1) of the FDCPA, and section 1788.17 of the

RFDCPA. (FAC ¶ 27.) Congress enacted the FDCPA, in part, “to eliminate abusive

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debt collection practices by debt collectors.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692. Section 1692e of the

FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using false, deceptive or misleading

representations in connection with the collection of a debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. In

particular, §§ 1692e(2)(A) and -e(10) prohibit the “false representation of . . . the

character, amount, or legal status or any debt” and the “use of any false representation

Plaintiff states that Defendants’ conduct constitutes numerous and multiple 1

violations of the FDCPA that “include, but are not limited to” violations of §§ 1692e,

1692e(2)(A), 1692e(10), 1692f, and 1692(f)(1) of the FDCPA. (FAC ¶ 27.) Because

the “including, but not limited to” language fails to put Defendant on notice of the

other claims being asserted against it, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to

allege FDCPA violations based on certain statutory provisions not specifically listed

in the first amended complaint. See, e.g., Fortaleza v. PNC Financial Services Group,

Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1019-20 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Winter v. Chevy Chase Bank,

Case No. 09-3187, 2009 WL 3517619, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2009).

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or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information

concerning a consumer.” Id. §§ 1692e(2)(A), (10). Section 1692f prohibits the use of

“unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect of any debt,” and in

particular “[t]he collection of any amount” that is not “expressly authorized by the

agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” Id. § 1692f(1).

California’s version of the FDCPA, called the Rosenthal Act or RFDCPA,

“mimics or incorporates by reference the FDCPA’s requirements . . . and makes

available the FDCPA’s remedies” as independent violations. Riggs v. Prober &

Raphael, 681 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.17). 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated section 1788.17 because it violated the

identified provisions of the FDCPA. (FAC ¶ 30.)

Plaintiff’s sole allegation in the complaint is that Defendant engaged in unfair

debt collections practices by suing Plaintiff to collect a debt allegedly after the statute

of limitations had run. Plaintiff’s basis for the allegation is a choice of law provision

Plaintiff alleges was present in Plaintiff’s contract with Chase. The provision statesthe

following: 

Law That Applies. The laws of the United States of America and the State of

Delaware apply to this Agreement and to your use of your Card, your Checks,

and your Account. 

(FAC ¶ 13.) Plaintiff claims that the provision establishes that the Delaware statute of

limitations of three years for breach of a credit card agreement, see 10 Del. Code. §

8106, applied to Plaintiff’s contract with Chase, and that Defendant’s lawsuit on the

contract occurred after the three-year period had run. Defendant points out that the

contract language includes “the laws of the United States of America.”

Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim under the FDCPA or

RFDCPA. Plaintiff’s bare allegations do not conclusively establish that Delaware’s

three-year statute of limitations applied to Defendant’s state action. Defendant

contends that the four-year federal statute of limitations applies to Plaintiff’s contract

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with Chase, bringing Defendant’s debt collection action within the applicable

limitations period. See Western Filter Corp. v. Argan, Inc., 540 F.3d 947, 952 (9th Cir.

2008) (noting contractual stipulationsto shorten limitations periods are disfavored and

“should be construed with strictness against the party invoking them”). Alternatively,

Defendant argues that, even if Delaware’s statute of limitations applied to Defendant’s

state court action, Delaware’s tolling provision prevented the limitations period from

running. See Saudi Basic Indus. v. Mobil Yanbu Pet., 866 A.2d 1, 18 (Del. 2005), cert.

den., 546 U.S. 936 (2005) (“[T]he purpose and effect of Section 8117 is to toll the

statute of limitations as to defendants who, at the time the cause of action accrues, are

outside the state and are not otherwise subject to service of process in the state. In

those circumstances, the statute of limitations is tolled until the defendant becomes

amenable to service of process.”); CACV of Colorado, LLC v. Stevens, 248 Or. App.

624, 629-39 (2012) (surveying Delaware law and tolling Delaware statute of

limitations for credit card debt collection action). If either the federal statute of

limitations applied or the Delaware limitations period were tolled, then Defendant’s

debt collection action was not outside the limitations period. Plaintiff makes no other

allegations of wrongdoing and Plaintiff provides no authority to counter Defendant’s

assertions. Absent other allegations, Plaintiff’s conclusory assertions that Defendant

violated the debt collection statutes fail to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678. 

Moreover, the Court concludes that California’s litigation privilege bars

Plaintiff’s RFDCPA claims. The California litigation privilege applies to any

publication or broadcast made in any judicial proceeding. Cal. Civ. Code § 47(b). The

privilege is absolute in nature and is “applicable to any communication, whether or not

it amounts to a publication, and all torts except malicious prosecution.” See Silberg

v. Anderson, 50 Cal.3d 205, 215 (1990) (citations omitted). The litigation privilege

applies to “any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2)

by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the

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litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action.” Silberg,

50 Cal.3d at 212. Plaintiff’s only allegation is that Defendant PCC filed a lawsuit

against Plaintiff allegedly outside of the applicable statute of limitations. Defendant’s

conduct falls within the litigation privilege. Taylor v. Quall, 458 F. Supp. 2d 1065,

1067-69 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (dismissing RFDCPA claim based on time-barred debt suit

because oflitigation privilege);see also Nickoloff v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 511

F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (holding litigation privilege applies to

RFDCPA claims); Lopez Reyes v. Kenosian & Miele, LLP, 525 F. Supp. 2d 1158,

1161-1165 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (same);Cassady v. Union Adjustment Co., No. C07-5405,

2008 WL 4773976, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2008) (same). Moreover, Plaintiff

makes no allegations that Defendant engaged in conduct otherwise violative of the

RFDCPA such that application of the litigation privilege would run afoul of the

purpose of the RFDCPA. See Oei v. N. Star Capital Acquisitions, 486 F. Supp. 2d

1089, 1092, 1100 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (finding RFDCPA prevailed over litigation

privilege because application in that case would have “effectively immunized conduct

that the Act prohibits” such as “repeated, continuous and harassing telephone calls”). 

This is not an instance where Defendant engaged in otherwise prohibited debt

collection practices under the guise of litigation. Based on Plaintiff’s limited

allegations, Defendant’s conduct isshielded by the litigation privilege in thisinstance. 

See Lopez Reyes, 525 F. Supp. 2d at 1161-1165 (applying litigation privilege to

RFDCPA claim where “the only allegedly wrongful debt collection practices in the .

. . case occurred entirely in the context of the filing of a state court complaint to recover

a debt”).

The Court concludes Plaintiff fails to state a claim under either the FDCPA or

RFDCPA. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint.

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Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss the

complaint with leave to amend. The Court grants Plaintiff 30 days from the date of this

Order to file an amended complaint and cure the noted deficiencies, if he is so able. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 1, 2013

________________________________

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

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