Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01670/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01670-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Chris Langer,

Plaintiff,

v.

Nancy L. Nenow and Does 1-10,

Defendants.

Case No.: 18-cv-01670-GPC-BGS

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS AND 

DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT AS MOOT.

[ECF No. 16, 18.]

Before the Court are two motions. First, Defendants1 have filed a motion to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s first cause of action arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 

42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., as moot and to dismiss Plaintiff’s second cause of action 

arising under California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51–53, for lack of 

supplemental jurisdiction. (ECF No. 18.) Second, Plaintiff has filed motion for summary 

judgment on both causes of action. (ECF No. 16.)

 

1 W.K.S. Frosty Corporation (“WKS”), as Defendant Nancy L. Nenow’s lessee, attests that it is 

responsible to maintain the Restaurant and its property, and to indemnify Defendant Nenow in litigation. 

(ECF No. 18-4, Feinour Decl. at ¶ 3.) Thus, the Court refers to Defendant Nenow and WKS collectively 

as “Defendants.”

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion in full, and 

thus DISMISSES Plaintiff’s motion as moot.

I. Background

Plaintiff Chris Langer (“Plaintiff”) is a paraplegic who cannot walk and who uses a 

wheelchair for mobility. (ECF No. 16-4, Langer Decl. at ¶ 2.) He has a specially 

equipped van with a ramp that deploys from the passenger side to accommodate his 

wheelchair. (Id. at ¶ 3.) 

On April 10, 2018, Plaintiff went to a Wendy’s located at 1111 Camino del Rio 

South, San Diego, California (the “Restaurant”) to eat and use the restroom. (Id. at ¶ 5.) 

The Restaurant is located less than ten minutes from Plaintiff’s home and is a convenient

place for him to eat. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Upon arriving, Plaintiff observed approximately thirty 

parking spaces in the Restaurant’s parking lot, with only one parking stall marked and 

reserved for persons with disabilities. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Because a car was already parked in 

that spot, and it was too difficult for Plaintiff to park without using a space specifically 

reserved for persons with disabilities, Plaintiff left without parking, eating, or using the 

restroom. (Id. at ¶¶ 7–10.) 

On July 19, 2018, an investigator for Plaintiff, Zion Sapien, investigated the 

Restaurant. (ECF No. 16-7, Sapien Decl. ¶ 3.) Mr. Sapien counted approximately 29 

total parking spaces available for use by the Restaurant’s customers. (Id. at ¶ 5.) Mr. 

Sapien noted that only one space was marked as reserved for persons with disabilities. 

(Id.; ECF No. 16-8, Photos from Sapien Investigation.) Based on his own observations, 

and Mr. Sapien’s investigation, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant Nancy L. 

Nenow, the owner of the property located at 1111 Camino del Rio South in San Diego, 

CA, and Does 1–10. (ECF No. 1.)

On December 17, 2018, Defendants hired an ADA-expert, Mr. Paul Deppe, “to 

advise WKS with regard to the design of a new, second accessible parking stall.” (ECF 

No. 18-4, Feinour Decl. at ¶ 4.) Defendants did so “in response to allegations within the 

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Plaintiff’s complaint.” (Id. at ¶ 4.) Defendants hired a construction company to build the 

stall according to Mr. Deppe’s specifications. (Id. at ¶ 5.) Upon completion, Mr. Deppe 

inspected the parking lot and issued Defendants a Certified Access Specialist (“CASp”) 

“certificate noting that all exterior elements [of the Restaurant and parking lot] were in

compliance with state and federal access laws.” (Id. at ¶¶ 6–7; ECF No. 18-6, CASp 

Certificate.)

In May 2019, Plaintiff’s expert, Mr. Paul Bishop, also inspected the parking lot. 

(ECF No. 18-4, Feinour Decl. at ¶ 8.) Mr. Bishop issued a report of his inspection finding 

that the lot was largely in compliance. (Id. at ¶ 9–10.) Mr. Bishop found two deficiencies 

– an access aisle that was a few inches too narrow and a tow away sign that was missing 

information. (Id. at ¶¶ 11–13.) Defendants then remedied these errors by directing an 

employee to add the missing information to the sign on July 3, 2019 and hiring a 

construction professional to restripe the access aisle on November 8, 2019. (Id. at ¶¶ 14–

17.) On November 11, 2019, Mr. Deppe returned to the Restaurant for a second 

inspection, “found all exterior features to be compliant with state and federal access 

regulations, and issued a CASp certificate so stating, dated Nov. 13, 2019.” (Id. at ¶¶ 18–

19; ECF No. 18-8, CASp Certificate.)

Defendants have since “instructed the Restaurant’s General Manager to inspect the

condition of the accessible features of the Restaurant on a regular basis, and to report 

and/or repair any feature that requires maintenance.” (Id. at ¶ 20.) Defendants further aver 

that “prompt action” will be taken “to ensure continued compliance with state and federal 

accessibility regulations.” (Id.)

II. Legal Standards

A. Summary Judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56

“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or 

the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought. The court 

shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 

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any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a). A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the 

court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings and 

discovery responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the nonmoving party will have the 

burden of proof at trial, the movant can prevail by pointing out that there is an absence of 

evidence to support the moving party’s case. See id. If the moving party meets its initial 

burden, the nonmoving party must set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 

56, “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the court does not make 

credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence. Rather, it draws all reasonable 

inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. 

v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630–31 (9th Cir. 1987). The evidence 

presented by the parties must be capable of being presented at trial in a form that would 

be admissible in evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Conclusory, speculative 

testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact 

and defeat summary judgment. See Thornhill Publ'g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 

F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979).

B. Mootness2

 

2 Notably, Defendant moves the Court for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) and frames its argument as a 

question of standing. However, Defendant “conflates the concepts of standing and mootness.” Ngoc Lam 

Che v. San Jose/Evergreen Cmty. Coll. Dist. Found., No. 17-CV-00381-BLF, 2017 WL 2954647, at *3 

(N.D. Cal. July 11, 2017). “Standing and mootness are distinct issues that underlie whether the Court 

has jurisdiction under Article III to adjudicate a case and are separate from the merits of the claims 

asserted.” CRS Recovery, Inc. v. Laxton, No. C-06-7093 CW, 2013 WL 140084, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 

10, 2013). “Mootness can be characterized as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite 

personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue 

throughout its existence (mootness).” Oregon Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1116 (9th Cir. 

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Federal courts are creatures of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. 

of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Every federal court has a continuing obligation to 

assure its jurisdiction. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999); E. 

Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 932 F.3d 742, 763 (9th Cir. 2018). “Mootness is a 

jurisdictional issue.” Foster v. Carson, 347 F.3d 742, 745 (9th Cir. 2003). “If there is no 

longer a possibility that an appellant can obtain relief for his claim, that claim is moot and 

must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.” Id.

“The voluntary cessation of challenged conduct does not ordinarily render a case 

moot because a dismissal for mootness would permit a resumption of the challenged 

conduct as soon as the case is dismissed.” Rosebrock v. Mathis, 745 F.3d 963, 971 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (quoting Knox v. Serv. Employees Int’l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 

(2012)). But voluntary cessation can yield mootness if a “stringent” standard is met: “A 

case might become moot if subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly 

wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. 

v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000). The party asserting 

mootness bears a “heavy burden” in meeting this standard. Id.

To determine whether a danger of future violations warrants an injunction in an 

ADA lawsuit, courts consider “the bona fides of the expressed intent to comply, the 

effectiveness of the discontinuance and, in some cases, the character of the past 

violations.” Watanabe v. Home Depot USA, Inc., No. CV-02-5088-RGK, 2003 WL 

24272650, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2003) (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 

U.S. 629, 633 (1953)). Courts are more likely to find a matter moot on the basis of a 

voluntary cessation where the defendant remedies a “structural modification.” Zaldivar v. 

 

2003) (quotations and citation omitted). Thus, because Defendant challenges the current condition of the 

Property, rather than its condition when the complaint was filed, the challenge is properly characterized 

as one based on mootness.

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City of San Diego, No. 15-CV-67-GPC, 2016 WL 5118534, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 

2016). Such modifications are limited to physical alterations to the property at issue. See, 

e.g., Lopez v. AND Grp. Corp., No. CV 18-4855-PSG, 2019 WL 6434493, at *3 (C.D. 

Cal. July 30, 2019) (the re-grading and re-painting a parking lot); Sharp v. Rosa 

Mexicano, D.C., LLC, 496 F. Supp. 2d 93, 98 (D.D.C. 2007) (the installation of a 

wheelchair accessible sink); Grove v. De La Cruz, 407 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1130 (C.D. Cal. 

2005) (the installation of grab bars).

C. Supplemental Jurisdiction

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), a court can decline to assert supplemental jurisdiction 

over a pendant claim if one of the following four categories applies: (1) the claim raises a 

novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the 

claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court 

has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional 

circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. Underlying 

the § 1367(c) inquiry are consideration of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to 

litigants, and comity. “[I]f these are not present a federal court should hesitate to exercise 

jurisdiction over state law claims[.]” United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 

(1966).

A “district court can decline jurisdiction under any one of [the] four provisions” of 

§ 1367(c). San Pedro Hotel Co. v. City of L.A., 159 F.3d 470, 478 (9th Cir. 1998). When 

a district court declines supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim pursuant to one 

of the first three provisions of the statute, the court need not state its reasons for 

dismissal. Id. Thus, while the elimination of all federal claims gives the court “a powerful 

reason to choose not to continue to exercise jurisdiction,” the court’s decision to retain, 

dismiss, or remand the remaining supplemental claims is discretionary. Carnegie–Mellon 

Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351–57 (1988). 

III. Analysis

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A. Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action Arising Under the ADA is Moot.

The Court begins its analysis with Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Defendants

contend that the case is moot because it has cured the deficiencies outlined in Plaintiff’s 

complaint and asserts that such deficiencies are not reasonably likely to recur. (ECF No. 

18-1 at 9–14; ECF No. 25 at 2–5.) Plaintiff only cursorily objects to the efficacy of 

Defendants’ remedial actions, and instead argues that the Court should retain jurisdiction 

over its motion for summary judgment even if the parking lot is ADA-complaint because

there is no guarantee Defendants will continue to comply. (ECF No. 23 at 6–13.) For the 

foregoing reasons, the Court agrees that Defendants have remedied Plaintiff’s allegations 

and that the first cause of action is now moot.

Reviewing the evidence, the Court finds there is no genuine dispute that 

Defendants’ conduct has fully addressed Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint. While 

Plaintiff briefly asserts – without any citations or reference to legal authority – that the 

proof submitted by Defendants is inadequate in the absence of a CASp report, Plaintiff is 

mistaken. (See ECF No. 23 at 7.) Here, Defendants’ proof is sufficient. Defendants have

submitted a signed affidavit attesting to its efforts to construct a second, van-accessible, 

ADA-complaint parking stall and to address the related “exterior elements” of the 

Restaurant. (See ECF No. 18-4, Feinour Decl.) Defendants have also submitted Mr. 

Bishop’s expert report, which notes the post-construction painting and signage 

deficiencies, as well as Mr. Deppe’s declaration, which shows that Defendants corrected 

those deficiencies. (ECF Nos. 18-5 at 9; ECF No. 18-7 at ¶¶ 5–6.) In addition, the two 

CASp certificates,3 (ECF Nos. 18-6, 18-8), as well as the various photos of the 

Restaurant parking lot contained in Mr. Bishop’s expert report, (ECF Nos. 18-5 at 5–8), 

 

3 Oddly, both certificates bear the same inspection certificate number and inspection date. Compare

(ECF No. 18-6) with (ECF No. 18-8). Nonetheless, though Defendants have filed duplicate certificates, 

the Court does not discount Defendants’ argument as the most recent of the two certificates has been 

submitted, and Mr. Feinour avers to obtaining two certificates. (ECF No. 18-4, Feinour Decl. at ¶ 7.) 

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show that Defendants’ renovated lot complies with the ADA. Based on this evidence, the 

Court finds that Defendants’ efforts have cured the alleged violations.

The Court, moreover, finds that the “allegedly wrongful behavior could not 

reasonably be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189. Two cases are 

particularly instructive here as they consider similarly situated Defendants who also 

allegedly violated the ADA’s regulations on parking stripes. 

First, in Dalton, a Minnesota plaintiff visited defendant’s gas station, found no 

reserved accessible parking spots or van parking spaces, and filed an ADA complaint. 

Dalton v. JJSC Properties, LLC, No. 19-CV-522-SRN, 2019 WL 3802893, at *1 (D. 

Minn. Aug. 13, 2019). After receiving plaintiff’s complaint, defendant hired an ADA 

expert to examine the parking area and then implemented the expert’s recommendations. 

Id. at *2. Those changes addressed Plaintiff’s allegations, as was evident from 

defendant’s expert report, affidavits, and photographs. Id. at *4–5. Consequently, upon 

defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Court found the alleged ADA violations were moot, 

citing defendant’s “lack of prior complaints,” “expeditious actions to remedy the alleged 

violations,” and “assurances . . . that the offending conduct is not reasonably likely to 

recur.” Id. at *5. The Dalton Court specifically considered and rejected plaintiff’s 

argument “that because paint is impermanent and subject to fading, [d]efendant ha[d] not 

sufficiently shown how it [would] maintain the remedied conditions.” Id.

Second, in Lopez, a California plaintiff visited a liquor store where he observed 

that “the paint and striping” on the parking lot’s reserved spaces “were badly faded and 

barely visible.” Lopez v. AND Grp. Corp., No. CV-18-4855-PSG, 2019 WL 6434493, at 

*1 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2019). In response to Plaintiff’s complaint regarding the paint 

stripping, defendant hired a Certified Access Specialist (“CASp”) to inspect the liquor 

store, hired a contractor to fix any identified deficiencies, hired a second contractor when 

the first proved inept, and re-hired the CASp to re-inspect the property once renovated. 

Id. “[L]ooking at Plaintiff’s complaint, [the CASp’s] declaration, and his two CASp 

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reports together,” the court determined that the defendant’s remedial conduct had cured 

the plaintiff’s allegations. Id. at *3. Consequently, upon defendant’s motion to dismiss, 

the Court found the alleged ADA violations were moot, citing defendant’s lack of prior 

ADA violations, efforts to make the parking lot ADA-complaint, “expressed intent to 

comply with ADA requirements,” and “implementation of an annual inspection policy.” 

Id. at *4. Here too, the Lopez Court specifically considered and rejected plaintiff’s 

argument that “Defendant may fail to maintain the accessible parking spaces by letting 

the paint to fade away or painting them over once the case ends.” Id. at *3.

The Court finds that the same factors animating the decisions in Dalton and Lopez

show that Defendants’ violations here are not reasonably likely to recur. First, as with 

Lopez and Dalton, there is no allegation that defendants’ have ignored their own, existing 

ADA-compliant policy, or repeatedly violated the ADA. Cf. Lozano v. C.A. Martinez 

Family Ltd. P'ship, 129 F. Supp. 3d 967, 971 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (rejecting defendant’s 

motion to dismiss where they had constructed compliant parking space after settling a 

prior ADA lawsuit and were now again in violation). Second, Defendants have instructed 

the Restaurant’s management to regularly inspect the Restaurant for, and promptly fix, 

ADA violations, and aver that they will take prompt action going forward to ensure 

continued compliance. (ECF No. 18-4, Feinour Decl. at ¶ 19.) Third, though unsuccessful 

at first, Defendants tried to resolve Plaintiff’s complaint “expeditious[ly]” by building a 

new parking space within approximately six months of the complaint’s filing date. 

Dalton, 2019 WL 3802893, at *1 (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 2019). 

In light of these facts, the Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that 

“because the parking lot striping will fade and will need to be repainted every few years, 

it is very easy for the defendants to return to their previous ways.” (ECF No. 23 at 11–

12.) Plaintiff’s cited cases are factually distinguishable from Defendants’ violations in 

that Defendants’ violations have not been remedied by actions that could be undone 

almost immediately, including, by hiring a worker that could be easily fired, see Feldman 

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v. Pro Football, Inc., 419 F. App’x 381, 388 (4th Cir. 2011) (where defendant’s cure 

involved hiring someone to provide captioning), or by adopting new policies that could 

be “rescind[ed]” at any time. See Moeller v. Taco Bell Corp., 816 F. Supp. 2d 831, 860 

(N.D. Cal. 2011). Rather, Defendants’ actions here – e.g., building a new parking space, 

painting lines and an access aisle, and putting up signs – are more akin to “structural 

modifications” unlikely to be easily reversed. See Zaldivar, 2016 WL 5118534, at *10.

In addition, that the Moeller court treated “parking striping” as “subject to frequent 

change” is not dispositive here. Moeller, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 862. The court’s finding in 

Moeller was based on three facts not in evidence here: (1) express testimony from 

defendant’s former employee that certain practices at that defendant, including paint 

striping, were subject to frequent change, (2) an upcoming renovation scheduled for that 

specific restaurant that might entail re-painting the stripes, and (3) an interrogatory 

response from defendant that it would be too burdensome to describe all alterations to the 

restaurant as they were so frequent. Id. Here, there is no testimony as to a similar policy 

at Defendants’ Restaurant or evidence of an upcoming renovation. And, Defendants’

interrogatory response to the number of past alterations to the Restaurant is merely that 

“Defendant is unaware of any alterations.” (ECF No. 16-11 at 1–2.)

Thus, considering the parties’ arguments and the applicable law, the Court finds 

that Plaintiff’s ADA allegations are now moot, and that the Court no longer has 

jurisdiction to hear the first cause of action in Plaintiff’s complaint.

B. The Court Declines Supplemental Jurisdiction on the Unruh Claim.

The Court must also decide whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the 

second cause of action now that the first has been found moot. Defendants contend that 

the Court should dismiss the Unruh claim because the ADA claim is moot, while Plaintiff 

maintains that jurisdiction over the Unruh claim is appropriate regardless of the state of 

the ADA claim given the procedural posture of the case. (See ECF No. 18-1 at 15–16; 

ECF No. 23 at 12–27; ECF No. 25 at 6–8.)

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Here, the Court declines to extend jurisdiction. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), 

the Court “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction” and may now 

decline to hear the first cause of action. Also, as the Court has found that Defendants

remedied the alleged wrongful conduct such that it is not reasonably likely to recur, 

Plaintiff’s insistence that the Court now retain jurisdiction and enforce the state law 

claim’s damages remedy suggests that the state law claim “substantially predominate[d]

over the” now-moot ADA claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2). Declining to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction, moreover, is consistent with how courts of this district have 

addressed comparable situations arising in Plaintiff’s most recent ADA suits. See, e.g.,

Langer v. 6830 La Jolla Blvd., LLC, No. 3:19-CV-1790-GPC, 2020 WL 353601, at *4 

(S.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2020) (declining supplemental jurisdiction of Unruh claim); Langer v. 

Deddeh, No. 19-CV-1879-CAB, 2019 WL 4918084, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2019) 

(same); Langer v. Petras, No. 19-CV-1408-CAB, 2019 WL 3459107, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 

July 31, 2019) (same); Langer v. Badger Co., LLC, No. 18CV934-LAB, 2019 WL 

2269951, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 24, 2019) (same); Langer v. Manuele, No. 18-CV-00104-

BEN, 2018 WL 3019946, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 18, 2018) (same).

Consequently, the Court DECLINES jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s second cause of 

action and REMANDS Plaintiff’s case to state court. 

C. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is Moot.

In the absence of jurisdiction to hear either cause of action in Plaintiff’s complaint, 

the Court cannot adjudicate Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Consequently, the 

Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s motion so that it may be re-filed as to Plaintiff’s second 

cause of action, if desired, in state court on remand.

IV. Conclusion

In light of the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion (1) to

dismiss Plaintiff’s first cause of action as moot and (2) to decline to extend jurisdiction 

over Plaintiff’s second cause of action. (ECF No. 18.) The Court also DISMISSES

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Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as moot as it no longer has jurisdiction to hear 

the motion. (ECF No. 16.) The Court REMANDS this matter to state court for further 

consideration of Plaintiff’s second cause of action. Lastly, the Court VACATES the 

hearing currently set for February 14, 2020 as to these motions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 10, 2020

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