Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01014/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01014-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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• 

FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE 'TENTH CIRCUIT 

llflited Stttei tourc of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

JUN 12 1991 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

THOMAS EDWARD GIRARDIN, ) 

) 

Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

ERNEST PYLE, Acting Superintendent,) 

Colorado Department of Corrections,) 

) 

Respondent-Appellee. ) 

No. 91-1014 

(D. C. No. 90-C-1123) 

(D. Colo.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMEB'l'* 

Before ANDERSOH, TACBA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a): 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

Mr. Girardin, a state prisoner, appeals the denial of federal 

habeas corpus relief. 

* be 

for 

res 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-1014 Document: 010110119386 Date Filed: 06/12/1991 Page: 1 
t 

Mr. Girardin was convicted in a Colorado court of first 

degree murder, first degree burglary, second degree assault, and 

two counts of violent crime. He is presently serving a forty year 

sentence in a Colorado correctional facility. The district court 

concluded that Mr. Girardin may not have exhausted his state 

remedies; however, the court noted the exhaustion rule is not 

"jurisdictional" and present consideration would serve the best 

interests of all concerned. On appeal to this court, Mr. Girardin 

raises two issues. 

Mr. Girardin first asserts his 

confrontation was violated by the trial 

certain questioning of the victim on 

Sixth Amendment right to 

court's prohibition of 

cross-examination. The 

victim was Mr. Girardin's wife. One theory of 

that Mrs. Girardin was attacked by someone 

the defense 

other than 

was 

Mr. 

Girardin, but accused Mr. Girardin to gain an advantage in a 

pending child custody and property settlement proceeding. On 

cross-examination, defense counsel posed questions to Mrs. 

Girardin relating to her relationship, if any, with a member of 

the opposite sex. The trial court sustained a relevancy objection 

by the prosecution. The objection was sustained because Mr. 

Girardin could offer no proof in support of his theory that Mrs. 

Girardin was so involved. In fact, Mr. Girardin's counsel, when 

asked by the trial court if he had any evidence to support his 

line of questioning stated: "If I can't ask the question, I have 

no idea whether she was seeing somebody .... " 

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The district court found this evidentiary ruling was not 

constitutionally defective pointing out that counsel may not 

ethically base cross-examination upon mere speculation. Moreover, 

on review of the record the district court concluded that Mr. 

Girardin was not deprived of the opportunity to fully crossexamine the victim as to her memory, perception, or possible bias. 

Nevertheless, on appeal, Mr. Girardin argues that on the 

facts of this case, the trial court's ruling rendered his trial 

fundamentally unfair. Mr. Girardin contends Olden v. Kentucky. 

488 U.S. 227 (1988), is squarely on point with this case. We do 

not agree. Olden involved a refusal to allow cross-examination 

concerning the victim's relationship with a third party that may 

have established the victim's motive to lie. In Olden, clear 

proof of a relationship between that third party and the victim 

was offered. In the case before us, we have no such proof. If 

the foundation for proposed cross-examination is purely 

speculative, and a sufficient offer of proof is not made, a trial 

court acts properly in prohibiting such questioning. 

Mr. Girardin's second contention is that his due process 

rights were violated by the trial court's failure to sustain 

defense counsel's objections during the prosecutor's closing 

remarks. The district court examined this contention in detail. 

Basically, the court noted the prosecutor may have made 

misstatements in his closing, and the trial court overruled 

defense counsel's objections to these statements. However, the 

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court also acknowledged the trial court instructed the jury to 

rely upon their own recollection of the evidence presented. The 

district court, citing United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11 

(1985), noted that determinations regarding prosecutorial 

statements must be viewed "in context." The court then concluded 

the isolated, trivial, and brief statements complained of could 

not have affected the jury's ability to judge the evidence herein 

and the trial was not rendered unconstitutionally unfair. 

In reviewing a prosecutor's argument, the question is whether 

it "'so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the 

resulting conviction a denial of due process.'" Darden v. 

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986), quoting Donnelly v. 

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974)). We have examined the closing 

remarks and agree with the district court that no constitutional 

error exists. We quote the two instances of which Mr. Girardin 

complains. First: 

[MS. DUNBAR:] 

remembers this 

rearranged her 

you that she 

anniversary and 

And Robbyn Martin tells you that she 

because it ~ the date she 

furniture. Does that make any sense to 

would remember the first wedding 

the date she arranged her furniture? 

MR. BEEKS: Your Honor, once again, 

she rearranged the furniture recently back 

was at that time, not that that was 

arranged her furniture. 

she testified 

to the way it 

the date she 

THE COURT: Again, ladies and gentlemen, it is up 

to your collective memory to recall the testimony in 

this case. 

Second: 

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[MS. DUNBAR:] Now, the defense makes a large case 

for these scratches that are supposedly on the 

defendant's face. Well, the testimony has been that 

Lisa said she tried to scratch him, she thought she 

scratched him, she might have scratched him. She said 

she wasn't concentrating on exactly what she was doing 

in the middle of this attack, and she said she's sure 

she didn't break the skin. 

MR. BEEKS: That's not true, Your Honor. She did 

not say that. I am not going to let that go. 

THE COURT: Counsel, 

interrupt and unless you 

interrupt again. 

I have 

have 

told you not to 

an objection, do not 

MR. BEEKS: Well, I object 

misstatement, Your Honor. 

to the flagrant 

THE COURT: Overruled. Ladies and gentlemen, again 

you must rely upon your own remembrance and the 

collective memories of each of you of what the evidence 

shows. No one here is attempting to mislead you. The 

attorneys to the best of their abilities are recounting 

to you the evidence and their interpretations of it and 

the inferences they are asking you to draw. Both of 

them have done it, and both of them are entitled to do 

it, but you, in the final analysis, must rely upon your 

memories as to what has or has not been proven in this 

case, and what are or not the facts of this case. 

(Emphasis added.) 

We have reviewed the closing arguments in their entirety, and 

we have viewed the portions complained of in context. The minor 

misstatements by the prosecutor when judged in this light clearly 

did not render Mr. Girardin's trial fundamentally unfair. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

Circuit Judge 

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