Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01297/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01297-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United S!ates ~rt ~f Appeals f enth Cir~1t 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

KEARY J. KIMBLE, ) 

) 

Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

WL KAUTZKY and ATTORNEY GENERAL ) 

FOR THE STATE OF COLORADO, ) 

) 

Respondents-Appellees. ) 

) 

) 

KEARY J. KIMBLE, ) 

) 

Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

WL KAUTZKY and DUANE L. ) 

WOODARD, Attorney General, ) 

) 

Respondents-Appellees. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

APR 19 199 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-1297 

(D. Colorado) 

(D.C. No. 88-B-1468) 

No. 89-1298 

(D. Colorado) 

(D.C. No. 89-B-0138) 

Before MCKAY, ANDERSON and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-1297 Document: 01019971509 Date Filed: 04/19/1990 Page: 1 
Keary J. Kimble, appearing prose, appeals the denial of two 

separate petitions for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

u.s.c. § 2254. We affirm in part and vacate in part. 

I. 

The first petition, filed on September 14, 1988 (No. 89-1297 

in this court), alleges that Mr. Kimble's speedy trial rights 

under the United States Constitution were violated when the state 

of Colorado failed to bring him to trial in 1982 within the ninety 

day period prescribed by Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 16-14-1012-108 

(1978), the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (the 

"UMDDA"). The state trial court found that Mr. Kimble did make a 

written request on February 26, 1982, that he be brought to trial 

within the ninety days prescribed by the state statute. The court 

then ruled that Mr. Kimble waived his demand when he appeared in 

court, with counsel, on March 8, 1982, and allowed his jury trial 

to be set for July 6 or 7, 1982, without objection. R. Vol. I, 

Tab 7, Ex. A at 30-31. The court held that a further waiver 

occurred when Mr. Kimble allowed his case to go to trial in July 

without objection. The court of appeals affirmed. People v. 

Kimble, 692 P.2d 1142 (Colo. App. 1984), cert. dismissed, 701 P.2d 

17 (Colo. 1985). 

We affirm the district court's denial of this petition 

substantially for the reasons stated in the opinion of the 

district court, and the recommendation of the United States 

Magistrate. This state statute conferred no federal 

constitutional rights per se; and, more importantly, the state 

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Appellate Case: 89-1297 Document: 01019971509 Date Filed: 04/19/1990 Page: 2 
courts, construing the state's own statute, have ruled that the 

statute was not violated in this case. We will not second guess 

that finding. Federal habeas corpus review of state convictions 

is limited to correcting errors of federal constitutional 

dimension. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507 (1984). It is not 

available to review allegedly erroneous applications of state law. 

See Tucker v. Makowski, 883 F.2d 877, 881 (10th Cir. 1989); 

Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866 F.2d 1185, 1200 (10th Cir.), adhered 

to on reh'g en bane, 888 F.2d 1286 (10th Cir. 1989). 

Despite Mr. Kimble's allegations that he was prejudiced 

simply by being forced to go to trial, that the lapse of four or 

five months was presumptively prejudicial, and that his trial 

under these circumstances constituted an actual miscarriage of 

justice which should shock the conscience of the court, nothing in 

this record supports a claim that Mr. Kimble's Sixth Amendment 

rights to a speedy trial were violated. No allegations are made 

which would satisfy the requirements of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 

514 (1972). See United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 963 (10th 

Cir. 1987); United States v. Martinez, 776 F.2d 1481, 1483 (10th 

Cir. 1985). 

Mr. Kimble also contends that the district court was without 

jurisdiction to rule on the magistrate's recommendation because 

Judge Babcock served on the state appellate court panel which 

reviewed Mr. Kimble's state court appeal. Mr. Kimble argues that 

the bias and prejudice provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 144 apply, so 

Judge Babcock was prohibited from proceeding. 

accept the state's position that Judge 

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We disagree. 

Babcock cannot 

We 

be 

Appellate Case: 89-1297 Document: 01019971509 Date Filed: 04/19/1990 Page: 3 
considered biased or prejudiced simply because of information he 

received in a judicial capacity, United States v. Bond, 847 F.2d 

1233, 1241 (7th Cir. 1988), or because he had previously 

participated in a ruling adverse to petitioner, United States v. 

Br ay, 546 F.2d 851, 857 (10th Cir. 1976); see also United States 

v. Gigax, 605 F.2d 507, 511 (10th Cir. 1979). Furthermore, the 

federal constitutional questions posed by the petition in this 

case are substantially different from the questions addressed by 

the Colorado Court of Appeals. 

II. 

On January 25, 1989, Mr. Kimble filed a second habeas corpus 

action (No. 89-1298 in this court) which challenged the constitutionality of Colorado's sentencing laws. He acknowledged in the 

petition that he had not exhausted state remedies on that issue. 

On June 30, 1989, the United States Magistrate recommended that 

the petition be dismissed because of a failure to exhaust state 

remedies. On August 1, 1989, Mr. Kimble requested that the 

district court dismiss his petition without prejudice to refile it 

after he had exhausted his state remedies. The district court 

granted his motion that same day. R. Vol. I, Tab 5. On August 

21, 1989, however, the district court entered a combined order on 

both of Mr. Kimble's petitions, denying relief and dismissing both 

petitions with prejudice. The only question on appeal in this 

case is whether the court erred in dismissing the second petition 

with prejudice in the order of August 21, 1989. The state argues 

that the order of August 21, 1989, was a conscious modification by 

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the district court of its August 1, 1989, order dismissing the 

petition without prejudice. The rationale for such a modification, and for dismissal with prejudice, is asserted by the state 

to be that the second petition could not be refiled in the future 

in any event without violating the abuse of the writ doctrine. 

See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 444 n.6 (1986); Rose v. 

Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520-21 (1982); Sanders v. United States, 373 

U.S. 1, 17-19 (1963). While that reasoning may be correct (we do 

not pass on the point), we are unwilling to read it into the bare 

dismissal language contained in the district court's order of 

August 21, 1989. The petition was already dismissed, pursuant to 

the court's August 1, 1989, order and was technically no longer 

before the district court. Under the circumstances, the question 

of improper successive writs will have to be addressed at some 

future time, if Mr. Kimble chooses to attempt to pursue the 

subject of the unconstitutionality of Colorado's sentencing law in 

a later section 2254 proceeding. 

Based on the foregoing, that portion of the district court's 

August 21, 1989, order dismissing the petition in No. 89-B-0138, 

relating to the appeal in No. 89-1298 in this court, is vacated 

insofar as it dismisses that action with prejudice. 

III. 

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the district court in 

No. 89-1297 is AFFIRMED, and the judgment of the district court in 

No. 89-1298 is VACATED insofar as it dismisses with prejudice the 

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Appellate Case: 89-1297 Document: 01019971509 Date Filed: 04/19/1990 Page: 5 
petition filed in No. 89-B-0138 in the district court. The prior 

dismissal of that petition without prejudice stands. The mandate 

shall issue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

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