Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-03055/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-03055-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO HJ

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Donna D’Angelo, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social

Security, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 06-03055-PHX-EHC

ORDER

This is a proceeding to review a final decision of the Defendant Social Security

Commissioner (“Commissioner”) denying disability benefits to Plaintiff Donna D’Angelo.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment (Dkts. 12, 17), which are fully briefed.

For the reasons discussed herein, Plaintiff’s motion is granted and Defendant’s cross-motion

is denied.

I. Background

Plaintiff filed concurrent applications for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) and

Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act

on November 13, 2000, alleging that she became disabled on August 22, 2000, due to a

sprained ankle, pain in her right shoulder, an injured rotator cuff, and because she heard

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The record also contains evidence of a previous application for benefits made on

March 13, 1997, although the best copy available of this application is entirely illegible. (Tr.

216-218). Plaintiff alleged disability caused by pain in her arms and hands. (Tr. 246). This

application was denied. (Tr. 484-489).

2

The Court has thoroughly reviewed the lengthy administrative record and provides

only a brief summary of the facts herein.

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voices. (Tr. 200, 219-221, 490-492).1 Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially and after

reconsideration. (Tr. 193-197, 200-203, 493-497, 499-502). Plaintiff’s claim was then

denied by an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) in a decision dated May 3, 2002 (“ALJ’s

first decision”). (Tr. 511-521). In an Order dated October 15, 2002, the Appeals Council

vacated the ALJ’s first decision and remanded the case for further administrative

proceedings. (Tr. 526-529). Following a supplemental hearing on March 3, 2004, the ALJ

issued a revised decision denying benefits dated April 9, 2004 (“ALJ’s second decision”).

(Tr. 59-121, 18-27). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s

second decision. (Tr. 8-10). Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the ALJ’s second

decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

A. Medical Evidence Before the ALJ2

A Concentra Medical Centers transcription dated October 20, 2000, completed by

Donald J. Gibertini, D.O., reports that Plaintiff twisted her ankle while working as an usher

at the Coliseum, causing a severe sprain. (Tr. 396). The report found no remarkable history

and noted that Plaintiff was not taking any medication. (Tr. 396). The treatment plan

indicated that Plaintiff would be placed in a sprain walker, given crutches, and placed on

Naproxen and Vicodin. (Tr. 396). Plaintiff was also placed on light duty restriction, keeping

the foot elevated, and sitting 100% of the time. An injury recheck report dated November

10, 2000, limited Plaintiff to sitting 100% of the time and using a cane while walking. (Tr.

398).

On December 18, 2000, Arizona DDS referred Plaintiff to David R. Young, Ed.D for

a mental status examination because Plaintiff’s disability application stated that she was

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hearing voices and believed people were staring at her. (Tr. 399). Dr. Young diagnosed a

delusional disorder and major depression, recurrent and severe with psychotic features. (Tr.

400-401). Dr. Young opined that Plaintiff would benefit from medication, noting that

Plaintiff was not currently on any medication. (Tr. 401). Dr. Young also noted that Plaintiff

would have difficulty in the work setting as she has constant experiences of hearing voices

which interfere with concentration and ability to adjust. (Tr. 401). Dr. Young completed a

medical source statement (mental) of Plaintiff’s ability to do work-related activities, placing

Plaintiff in a “Fair: Seriously Limited but not Precluded” capacity in every category. (Tr.

402-403).

On December 20, 2000, Arizona DDS referred Plaintiff to Dr. Neil Edward McPhee,

M.D. for a physical examination related to her alleged shoulder pain and sprained ankle. (Tr.

404). Dr. McPhee diagnosed rotator cuff disease of both shoulders, severe ankle sprain on

the right, and depression. (Tr. 405). Dr. McPhee opined that Plaintiff would be able to sit

for two hours continuously for six of eight hours total, stand and walk short distances without

aids occasionally, lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, crouch and partially

stoop, but would have difficulty reaching overhead because of her limited range of motion

and painful shoulders. (Tr. 405). Dr. McPhee completed a medical source statement

(physical) of Plaintiff’s ability to do work-related activities, placing restrictions on Plaintiff

to lifting 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently, standing and/or walking for 2 hours

in an 8-hour workday, sitting 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. (Tr. 407). Dr. McPhee noted

that Plaintiff does not use an assistive device and that breaks and lunches would provide

sufficient relief for Plaintiff’s need to alternate standing and sitting. (Tr. 408). Dr. McPhee

also limited Plaintiff’s reaching and handling. (Tr. 408).

On April 20, 2001, Arizona DDS referred Plaintiff to Dr. Daniel K. Watkins, Ph.D.

for a psychological examination. (Tr. 436). Dr. Watkins diagnosed depressive disorder,

NOS and psychotic disorder, NOS, noting that Plaintiff retained the cognitive capacity to

understand, remember, and carry out short and simple instructions, to remember locations

and procedures, to make decisions, to travel independently, to set goals, to ask questions and

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The questionnaire defines “marked” as “serious limitations, ability to function is

severely limited.” (Tr. 608).

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request assistance, and to maintain generally socially appropriate behavior. (Tr. 438). Dr.

Watkins further noted that Plaintiff had never had appropriate treatment and believed that the

prognosis for significant improvement with appropriate treatment appeared good. (Tr. 438).

Dr. Watkins opined that Plaintiff’s ability to respond appropriately to stressors, to maintain

emotional stability, and to sustain reliability were moderately impaired. (Tr. 438).

On January 26, 2002, Dr. Akhtar Hamidi, M.D. performed a psychiatric evaluation

of Plaintiff and diagnosed generalized anxiety disorder, major depression that was recurrent

and moderate without psychotic features, chronic pain, and a Global Assessment of

Functioning (GAF) score of 50. (Tr. 457-459). Plaintiff continued treatment with Dr.

Hamidi. (Tr. 566-577). On March 7, 2002, Dr. Hamidi assigned a GAF score of 70. (Tr.

574). On July 12, 2002, Dr. Hamidi assigned a GAF score of 50. (Tr. 569). On July 26,

2002, Dr. Hamidi assigned a GAF score of 75. (Tr. 569). On August 23, 2002, Dr. Hamidi

assigned a GAF score of 90. (Tr. 567). On May 19, 2003, Dr. Hamidi reported Plaintiff as

markedly limited3

 in her ability to respond to work pressures in a usual work setting,

although he found only moderate to no impairment in all other categories. (Tr. 608-609).

Plaintiff received treatment from Henry Tomlinson, D.O. in 2003. Dr. Tomlinson

diagnosed, inter alia, fibromaylagia, headaches, chronic back pain, a right rotator cuff tear,

and lumbar nerve abnormalities. (Tr. 584-598). On May 29, 2003, Dr. Tomlinson opined

that Plaintiff could sit for one hour at a time, stand for one hour at a time, and walk for one

hour at a time. (Tr. 583). Dr. Tomlinson opined that Plaintiff could sit for two hours during

an eight hour day, stand for one hour during an eight hour day, and walk for one hour in an

eight hour day. (Tr. 583). Dr. Tomlinson opined that Plaintiff could occasionally lift up to

five pounds, occasionally carry up to five pounds, could use her right hand for simple

grasping but not her left hand, could not use either hand for pushing/pulling of controls, and

could use her right hand for fine manipulation but not her left. (Tr. 584). Dr. Tomlinson

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opined that Plaintiff could reach occasionally and classified her pain as moderately severe.

(Tr. 585).

B. Plaintiff’s Testimony

The ALJ’s final hearing occurred on March 3, 2004. Plaintiff testified that in July

2003, she had rotator cuff surgery performed by Dr. Erickson and had been undergoing

physical therapy ever since. (Tr. 62-66, 623). Plaintiff testified to her daily activities which

included walking around the block, riding her bicycle up and down the street a couple of

times, fixing breakfast, washing and stacking dishes, dusting, and reading about one book

every other week. (Tr. 66-68). Plaintiff lived with her daughter and would babysit her six

year old granddaughter and newborn grandson once every other week for two to three hours

at a time when her daughter and son-in-law went out to dinner. (Tr. 69). Plaintiff testified

that she was able to shower, clean her bedroom, and do crafts such as painting. (Tr. 71).

Plaintiff testified that she was able to go to the grocery store with her daughter and take her

dog to the groomer. (Tr. 72). Plaintiff testified that she hears whispers but that she takes

medication for the whispers and no longer experiences side-effects. (Tr. 71). Plaintiff

testified that her pain levels on an average day range between five and eight on a scale of one

to ten. (Tr. 72). Plaintiff testified that she naps every day around 2:00 or 2:30 for 30 to 45

minutes. (Tr. 73). Plaintiff testified that she could sit for half an hour or longer, stand for

45 minutes at a time, walk for 30 minutes at a time, could lift a gallon of milk, and had

increasing trouble with grasping items. (Tr. 73). Plaintiff testified that she still had

fibromyalgia, which was first diagnosed by Dr. Tomlinson. (Tr. 75).

C. Medical Expert Testimony

The medical expert testified that he did not have any medical records after the middle

of 2003, and could only speak to Plaintiff’s condition up through May of 2003. (Tr. 78).

Based on his review of the evidence, the medical expert believed that the best diagnosis of

Plaintiff’s mental condition was a depressive disorder. (Tr. 78). The medical expert could

not tell with any specificity whether Plaintiff had any mental limitations until about January

2002, when she was evaluated by Dr. Hamidi. (Tr. 79-80). The medical expert testified that

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Dr. Hamidi’s GAF assessment in January 2002, of 50, would be indicative of someone on

the border between moderate and severe symptoms. (Tr. 86). The medical expert testified

that Dr. Hamidi’s later notes indicating GAF assessment of 75 in July of 2002, would be

indicative of a person with symptoms but who could function generally across the board.

(Tr. 88). The medical expert testified that with a GAF of 75, the symptoms would come and

go, but a person at that level would probably get to work almost every day, although the

symptoms of depression might make them less efficient at work. (Tr. 88). The medical

expert testified that Dr. Hamidi’s GAF assessment of 90 on August 23, 2002, indicated

normal functioning near total remission. (Tr. 88). The medical expert testified that he did

not know what was causing Plaintiff more mood disturbances that were reflected in later

GAF assessments of 70 to 90 between January of 2003 and May of 2003. (Tr. 89). The

medical expert testified that Dr. Hamidi’s opinion of Plaintiff having marked limitation in

dealing with work pressures was based on extrapolation because, at the time, Plaintiff was

not in any real life work situations. (Tr. 91-93). The medical expert testified that there was

no objective evidence to support Dr. Hamidi’s opinion; the only evidence was that Plaintiff

was anxious. (Tr. 91-93). The medical expert testified that he did not believe Plaintiff’s

conditions met or equaled any listed disabilities. (Tr. 98).

D. Vocational Expert Testimony

The vocational expert testified that Plaintiff’s past relevant work was as a cashier and

has no transferable skills. (Tr. 110). The vocational expert testified that a person with

marked limitation in responding to work pressure, as indicated by Dr. Hamidi, could not

sustain work. (Tr. 114-115). The vocational expert testified further that if the same

limitations were mild to moderate, rather than marked, it would be somewhat of an arbitrary

opinion because it’s possible that such a person could sustain work and also possible that

such a person could not sustain work under such limitations. (Tr. 115). The vocational

expert testified that a person with the serious restrictions noted by Dr. Young could not do

any type of work. (Tr. 118). The vocational expert testified that a person with a GAF of 50

would not be able to sustain employment. (Tr. 118). 

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E. The ALJ’s Findings

The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s allegations regarding her limitations were not totally

credible, but that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to carry out light physical

activity with restrictions on overhead reaching, she was capable of understanding, carrying

out and remembering simple job instructions, she was capable of using judgment in making

work-related decisions, she was capable of responding appropriately to supervision, coworkers and work situations, and she was capable of dealing with changes in a routine work

setting. (Tr. 26). The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a café cashier did not

require the performance of work-related activities precluded by her residual functional

capacity and that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments do not prevent the claimant

from performing her past relevant work. (Tr. 26). Thus, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff

was not under a disability at any time through the date of the decision. (Tr. 26).

II. Standard of Review

The Court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision under a substantial evidence

standard; the decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or

based on legal error. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social

Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive....”).

“Substantial evidence” means “more than a scintilla,” but “less than a preponderance.”

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted). In

determining whether the Commissioner’s finding are supported by substantial evidence, the

Court considers the evidence as a whole, giving a full review to all the facts. Smolen, 80

F.3d at 1279.

III. Discussion

The Social Security Act defines a disability as the “inability to engage in any

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less

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than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The ALJ engages in the following five-step

evaluation:

In step one, the ALJ determines whether a claimant is currently engaged in substantial

gainful activity. If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step

two and evaluates whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or

combination of impairments. If not, the claimant is not disabled. If so, the ALJ

proceeds to step three and considers whether the impairment or combination of

impairments meets or equals a listed impairment under 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P,

App. 1. If so, the claimant is automatically presumed disabled. If not, the ALJ

proceeds to step four and assesses whether the claimant is capable of performing her

past relevant work. If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to

step five and examines whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity

("RFC") to perform any other substantial gainful activity in the national economy.

If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.

Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2005); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Here, the ALJ found

that Plaintiff satisfied steps one and two. Plaintiff “has not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since [August 22, 2000,]” and has “severe” impairments within the meaning of the

Act and Regulations. (Tr. 26). In step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was capable

of performing her past relevant work, and on that basis, found that Plaintiff was not disabled.

(Tr. 26).

A. The ALJ’s Rejection of Dr. Tomlinson’s Opinion

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ wrongfully rejected the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating

physician, Dr. Tomlinson. Dr. Tomlinson diagnosed fibromyalgia, headaches, chronic back

pain, a right rotator cuff tear, and lumbar nerve abnormalities. (Tr. 584-598). He also opined

that Plaintiff’s pain was moderately severe (Tr. 585) and that she could occasionally lift up

to five pounds but could never lift anything above five pounds. (Tr. 583). The ALJ rejected

this assessment, noting that Plaintiff had testified that she could lift a gallon of milk, which

weighs about eight pounds. (Tr.24). The ALJ also found that the physical functional

limitations outlined by Dr. Tomlinson were conclusory and unsupported by clinical findings.

(Tr. 24). 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly disregarded the opinion of Dr. Tomlinson,

Plaintiff’s treating physician. “By rule, the Social Security Administration favors the opinion

of a treating physician over non-treating physicians.” See Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631

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(9th Cir. 2007) (citing C.F.R. § 404.1527). The Administration has explained that an ALJ’s

finding that a treating source medical opinion is not well-supported by medically acceptable

evidence or is inconsistent with substantial evidence in the record means only that the

opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, not that the opinion should be rejected. See Orn,

495 F.3d at 632 (citing § 404.1527). Treating source medical opinions are still entitled to

deference and, in many cases, will be entitled to the greatest weight and should be adopted,

even if it does not meet the test for controlling weight.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 632; see also

Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983) (“If the ALJ wishes to disregard the

opinion of the treating physician, he or she must make findings setting forth specific,

legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the record.”). 

A review of the ALJ’s decision reveals little in the way of explanation for the

rejection of Dr. Tomlinson’s opinion. The ALJ notes Plaintiff’s ability to lift a gallon of

milk, which weighs eight pounds, as inconsistent with Dr. Tomlinson’s assessment that

Plaintiff could only lift five pounds. The ALJ also highlights absence of records regarding

Plaintiff’s 2003 rotator cuff surgery and Plaintiff’s own testimony that there had been

improvement in her arm after the surgery. (Tr. 24). The ALJ then concludes that Dr.

Tomlinson’s opinion was not supported by clinical findings because of these inconsistencies.

(Tr. 24). The record, however, contains numerous chart notes discussing Plaintiff’s back

pain and fibromyalgia, as well as diagnostic work finding nerve conduction abnormalities

and a rotator cuff tear. (Tr.582-594). The ALJ’s determination that Dr. Tomlinson’s opinion

was not supported by clinical findings was erroneous in light of the entire record, and the

highlighting of the inconsistency regarding the weight of a gallon of milk and the apparent

absence of certain medical records does not amount to substantial evidence for rejection of

Dr. Tomlinson’s opinion. As Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Tomlinson’s opinion was

entitled to great weight and should have been adopted. See Orn, 495 F.3d at 632.

B. The ALJ’s Rejection of Dr. Hamidi’s Opinion

Plaintiff further contends that the ALJ wrongfully rejected the opinion of Plaintiff’s

treating psychiatrist. The ALJ apparently rejected the opinion of Dr. Hamidi based upon the

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testimony of the medical expert who opined that the limitations noted by Dr. Hamidi could

not be reconciled with the mild signs/symptoms in his contemporaneous reports. (Tr.22).

Plaintiff contends that Dr. Hamidi’s opinion was corroborated by the findings of the

examining doctors, Dr. Young and Dr. Watkins, and therefore, that the ALJ was required to

give controlling weight to Dr. Hamidi’s opinion or provide clear and convincing reasons for

not doing so. See e.g., Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (“To reject

the uncontroverted opinion of a claimant’s physician, the ALJ must present clear and

convincing reasons for doing so.”). Dr. Young diagnosed a delusional disorder and major

depression, recurrent and severe with psychotic features (Tr. 400-401), and placed Plaintiff

in a “Fair: Seriously Limited but not Precluded” capacity in every category on the medical

source statement (mental) of Plaintiff’s ability to do work-related activities. (Tr. 402-403).

Defendant contends that the ALJ impliedly rejected Dr. Young’s opinion by giving weight

to the testimony of the medical expert. The medical expert testified consistently, however,

that Plaintiff’s best diagnoses based on his review of the evidence was depressive disorder.

(Tr. 78). Thus, it is not clear that the ALJ rejected the opinion of Dr. Young, who also noted

depression. Dr. Watkins also diagnosed depressive disorder and psychotic disorder after

examining Plaintiff (Tr. 438), and opined that she was moderately impaired in her ability to

sustain reliability. (Tr. 438). 

The Court does not find clear and convincing reasons in the ALJ’s opinion supporting

the rejection of Dr. Hamidi’s opinion. Where a treating doctor’s opinion is not contradicted

by another doctor, it may be rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons supported by

substantial evidence in the record. Orn, 495 F.3d at 632. Even if the treating doctor’s

opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the ALJ may not reject this opinion without

providing “specific and legitimate reasons” supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Orn, 495 F.3d 632. The ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Hamidi’s opinion was based largely upon the

testimony of the medical expert who opined that Dr. Hamidi’s entries on the checklist were

not well documented and may have been the result of extrapolation. (Tr. 23). As Plaintiff’s

treating psychiatrist, Dr. Hamidi’s opinion was controlling if uncontradicted. Orn, 495 F.3d

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at 632. Orn, 495 F.3d at 632. Even if Dr. Young’s and Dr. Watkins’ opinions were

contradictory, as Defendant contends, Dr. Hamidi’s opinion was still entitled to deference

and should have been adopted absent substantial evidence in the record. The Court does not

find the ALJ’s reliance on the medical expert testimony to constitute substantial evidence,

nor does the Court believe that Dr. Young and Dr. Watkins rendered findings that contradict

those of Dr. Hamidi. Both Dr. Young and Dr. Watkins noted depression, which is consistent

with Dr. Hamidi’s central diagnoses. Thus, the ALJ should have adopted the opinion of Dr.

Hamidi.

C. The Fairness of the Proceedings Before the ALJ

Plaintiff makes the additional claim that she was denied a fair and just process before

the ALJ, and again, on administrative appeal. Plaintiff contends that following the remand

by the Appeals Council to the ALJ for a second hearing, she submitted updated medical

records. On the date of the scheduled hearing, June 2, 2003, those medical records were not

found to be in the hearing file and the ALJ postponed the hearing and expressed displeasure

with Plaintiff for being late to the hearing. (Tr. 132). A second hearing was scheduled for

September 22, 2003, and the ALJ had failed to schedule a medical expert for that hearing and

postponed the hearing again. (Tr. 45). A third hearing was scheduled for December 1, 2003,

with both a medical expert and a vocational expert. (Tr. 39). Before the hearing was to

begin, the ALJ advised that the wrong medical expert had been scheduled and that she would

not proceed with the hearing. At the final hearing, on March 3, 2004, both a medical and

vocational expert testified. Plaintiff contends that the scheduling of experts was not

consistent in the first three schedules and that this points out inconsistency by the ALJ.

Plaintiff further contends that the rescheduling of hearings suggests that the ALJ may have

been “very displeased” with Plaintiff’s tardiness to the first hearing as well as with the

circumstance of having to deal with the case on remand. 

The Court must begin with the presumption that the ALJ is unbiased, and exercised

her decision-making authority with honesty and integrity. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d

1211, 1215 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195-196 (1982));

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Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). Plaintiff can only rebut these presumptions by

showing that the ALJ engaged in conduct that was so extreme it deprived the hearing of

fundamental fairness mandated by due process. See Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1215-16

(“‘Expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are within the

bounds of what imperfect men and women . . . sometimes display’ do not establish bias.”).

The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful

time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S. Ct. 893,

47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (U.S. 1976) (citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiff points to the ALJ’s dissatisfaction with Plaintiff’s tardiness, several

postponements in the hearing process and changes in the scheduled medical experts as

evidence of bias. These allegations are without merit. The fact that the ALJ postponed

hearings to correct errors, to obtain additional evidence, and to ensure the presence of a

competent medical expert demonstrate that the ALJ was attempting to provide Plaintiff every

opportunity to have a fair and unbiased hearing. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to rebut the

presumption of regularity afforded the ALJ.

D. The Fairness of the Delay During the Administrative Appeals Process

Plaintiff further contends that the Social Security Administration failed to afford due

process by taking two and a half years from the filing date on April 19, 2004, to the response

by the Appeals Council on November 20, 2006. Plaintiff contends that it required a Writ of

Mandamus before the Appeals Council issued their denial.

 In considering Plaintiff’s separate claim that the delay in the administrative appeals

process deprived her of due process, the Court must consider the reasonableness of the

administrative delay in light of the resources that Congress has supplied to the agency for the

exercise of its functions, as well as the impact of the delay on Plaintiff’s interests. See

Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 353-54 (7th Cir. 1978). The passage of time alone is

rarely enough to justify a court’s intervention in the administrative process, especially since

“administrative efficiency is not a subject particularly suited to judicial evaluation.” Wright,

587 F.2d at 353-54. While a two and one half year delay appears excessive, it is impossible

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for the Court, without more, to determine whether such a delay was reasonable in light of the

resources of the Social Security Administration. Because the Court finds that Plaintiff is

entitled to retroactive benefits, it is at the very least arguable that the delay in the

administrative appeals process harmed Plaintiff’s interests by prolonging her wait. As

discussed below, Plaintiff’s wait is over, and her case will be remanded for the sole purpose

of awarding benefits. 

IV. Conclusion

The ALJ should have adopted the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating doctors, Dr.

Tomlinson and Dr. Hamidi. Based on the opinions of these doctors and the testimony of the

vocational expert, Plaintiff is unable to perform her past relevant work as a cashier. Thus,

the ALJ erred in step four by not finding Plaintiff disabled based upon her inability to

perform her past relevant work. It is within the discretion of the Court to remand for

additional evidence as to whether Plaintiff could perform any work with her residual

functional capacity, or award benefits based on the evidence in the record. See Sprague v.

Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a cashier was

unskilled and her inability to perform such unskilled work combined with her lack of

transferable skills likely renders her unable to perform any type of work that exists in the

national economy. Indeed, the vocational expert testified that a person with marked

limitation as diagnosed by Dr. Hamidi, and serious restrictions as noted by Dr. Young could

not perform any work. (Tr. 114-115, 118). Thus, Plaintiff is disabled as defined by the

Social Security Act because she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by

reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted

or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §

423(d)(1)(A). In light of the extensive delay in Plaintiff’s application for benefits, the Court

invokes its discretion and remands this case for the payment of benefits beginning on August

22, 2000. Further delays at this point would be unduly burdensome on Plaintiff.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED:

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1. GRANTING Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 12).

2. DENYING Defendant’s Cross-motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt.

17).

3. REVERSING the decision of the Commissioner denying benefits.

4. REMANDING for payment of benefits for Plaintiff’s disability

beginning on August 22, 2000.

DATED this 27th day of December, 2007.

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