Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-01428/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-01428-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES

ADVOCATES, a Nevada Nonprofit

Corporation; and GEORGE S. LOUIE,

Plaintiffs,

v.

AMERCO, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 03-1428 CW

ORDER GRANTING IN

PART AND DENYING IN

PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR PARTIAL

SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

Defendants Amerco, Amerco Real Estate Company, U-Haul Co. of

California and U-Haul International, Inc. move pursuant to Rule 56

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for partial summary

adjudication on the ground that the scope of release under the

settlement agreement in Richard v. Bayshore Moving Center, 

No. C 96-3881 CW (N.D. Cal.), applies to permanent, architectural

barriers and that Plaintiffs Americans with Disabilities Advocates

Case 4:03-cv-01428-CW Document 52 Filed 10/04/05 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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and George S. Louie may not assert federal or State claims based on

architectural barriers to access. Plaintiffs oppose the motion. 

Having considered all of the papers filed by the parties, the Court

GRANTS Defendants' motion in part and DENIES it in part.

BACKGROUND

On April 4, 2003, Plaintiffs filed the first of the lawsuits

that make up this consolidated case alleging that Defendants owned,

operated and/or maintained several retail establishments that

violated applicable disability access requirements and standards. 

More specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants had violated

the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et

seq., California Civil Code §§ 54 et seq., California Civil Code

§§ 51 et seq., California Health and Safety Code §§ 19955 et seq.,

California Business and Professions Code § 17200, California Civil

Code § 3345, and the common law of negligence. On September 12,

2003, Defendant U-Haul International filed a motion to enforce a

settlement agreement entered into in a prior lawsuit filed against

it, Richard v. Bayshore Moving Center, No. C 96-3881 CW (N.D.

Cal.), and to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims on the basis that they

were barred by that settlement agreement. 

On March 18 2004, this Court granted U-Haul International's

motion to enforce the Richard settlement agreement and granted,

with leave to amend, U-Haul International's motion to dismiss. In

the March 18 Order, the Court concluded that the Richard settlement

agreement bars Plaintiffs from bringing claims under the ADA

addressing structural barriers to access. March 18 Order at 8. 

The Court instructed that if Plaintiffs wished to pursue this

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action, they must file an amended complaint alleging only claims

not released by the Richard settlement agreement. Id. However,

the Court agreed with Plaintiffs that the Richard settlement

agreement does not bar them from bringing claims based on U-Haul

International's alleged failure to keep paths of travel clear of

impermanent, non-structural blockages, such as displays or boxes. 

Id. Moreover, the Court agreed with Plaintiffs that the Richard

settlement agreement does not bar them from bringing claims, for

structural or non-structural blockages, based on State law because

the settlement agreement clearly states that the plaintiff class

does not release "any claims that may exist under State law, except

as set forth . . . regarding the Bayshore Moving Center." Id. at

5. 

On April 7, 2004, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended

Complaint (FAC), in which they refer to "architectural barriers" as

follows, 

Plaintiff LOUIE has encountered discriminatory conditions

(in the form of architectural barriers to equal access

and in the form of a policy, practice, or procedure of

placing obstructions - or permitting the placement of

obstructions - in the path of travel so that those paths

of travel are not kept clear for access by wheelchair

users) at various facilities that are under Defendants'

control (whether by reason of ownership, operation, or

through a leasing agreement) on various dates. 

FAC at ¶ 7.

Plaintiffs further refer to "architectural barriers" in their

allegations that "Defendants' conduct (in maintaining architectural

barriers and in failing to modify their policies, practices and

procedures so as stop the placement of obstructions in clear paths

of travel) was willful, intentional, reckless, and/or negligent

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1

 In their reply, Defendants request that Plaintiffs'

opposition to the motion for partial summary adjudication be

stricken as untimely. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-3(a), an

opposition to a motion must be served and filed no less than

twenty-one days before the hearing date. Plaintiffs served their

opposition only eighteen days before the hearing date, and

Defendants maintain that this delay denied them the opportunity

adequately to prepare their response. As evidenced by Defendants'

timely reply, the three-day delay did not result in prejudice to

them. Therefore, Plaintiffs' response is not stricken. 

4

(including negligent per se)." Id. at ¶ 10. 

In their final factual reference to "architectural barriers"

to access, Plaintiffs allege, "Defendants knew or should have known

that their conduct (in maintaining architectural barriers and in

failing to modify their policies, practices and procedures so as

stop the placement of obstructions in clear paths of travel) was

directed to one or more senior citizens or disabled persons." Id.

at ¶ 11. Plaintiffs include the above allegations of

"architectural barriers" to access in their first cause of action,

the ADA claim, as well as in their subsequent State law causes of

action. See id. at ¶¶ 13, 19, 24, 29, 33, 38, 45, 48. 

Defendants now request that the Court grant partial summary

adjudication on the ground that the scope of release in the Richard

settlement agreement precludes Plaintiffs from alleging structural

barriers to access and, therefore, Plaintiffs may not assert their

federal law or State law claims based on "architectural barriers"

to access.1 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

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clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that, in the FAC, Plaintiffs continue to base

their claims on permanent "architectural barriers" to access in

defiance of the Court's March 18 Order instructing Plaintiffs to

allege only claims not released by the Richard settlement

agreement. Defendants contend that the Court's directive prohibits

Plaintiffs from basing any federal or State law claims on

structural barriers. Plaintiffs contend that the Court's order

does not bar them from bringing claims on permanent architectural

barriers to access based on State law and that "the only claims in

the First Amended Complaint that are based on permanent,

architectural barriers are State law claims." Pl. Reply at 3

(emphasis in original). 

Plaintiffs are correct that the March 18 Order does not

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preclude them from bringing claims under State law based on

structural barriers to access. In its March 18 Order, the Court

clearly stated that "the Richard settlement agreement does not bar

[Plaintiffs] from bringing claims based on State law." Plaintiffs

are, therefore, free to assert State law claims based on structural

or non-structural barriers to access. 

Defendants rely upon a statement in the Court's order that

limits the scope of the Plaintiff's ADA claims to "impermanent,

non-structural blockages." However, Defendants ignore that this

limitation pertains solely to ADA claims and does not apply the

same limitation to State law causes of action. Thus, the Court's

order cannot be read to bar Plaintiffs from bringing State law

claims for "architectural barriers" to access. 

However, Plaintiffs incorrectly state that "the only claims in

the First Amended Complaint that are based on permanent,

architectural barriers are State law claims." In their first cause

of action for violation of the ADA, Plaintiffs "repeat and reallege

each and every allegation contained in paragraph 1 though 12

hereof, and incorporate the same herein by reference." FAC at 

¶ 13. Paragraphs 7, 10 and 11 of the FAC allege "architectural

barriers" to access. As such, Plaintiffs continue to base their

ADA claim on permanent architectural barriers. Although Plaintiffs

are free to allege paragraphs 7, 10 and 11 under their State law

causes of action, such claims are precluded under the ADA pursuant

to the Richard settlement agreement. 

Accordingly, the Court grants in part Defendants' motion for

partial summary adjudication and denies it in part. Plaintiffs may

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not bring a claim for "architectural barriers to access" under the

ADA cause of action. However, Defendants' motion for partial

summary adjudication that Plaintiffs are precluded from asserting

State law claims based on permanent barriers to access is denied. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion for partial

summary adjudication (Docket no. 43) is GRANTED in part and DENIED

in part. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 10/4/05

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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