Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01390/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01390-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAVIER CORTINAS,

Petitioner,

vs.

TOM L. CAREY, Warden,

Respondent.

No. 2:06-cv-01390-JKS-CMK

ORDER

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed this application for a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate

Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local General Order No. 262.

On January 22, 2007, the magistrate judge filed findings and recommendations based

upon a determination that the petition was untimely and that Petitioner had not made an arguable

case for equitable tolling. The Magistrate Judge’s recommendations were served on all parties,

which contained notice to all parties that any objections to the findings and recommendations

were to be filed within twenty days. Petitioner has filed objections to the findings and

recommendations.

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 72-304,

this Court has conducted a de novo review of this case. Having carefully reviewed the entire

file, with particular attention to those portions relevant or pertinent to the objections raised, the

Court finds the findings and recommendations to be supported by the record and by proper

analysis.

Petitioner argues that he was denied access to the prison law library legal materials

necessary for him to draft a habeas petition due to lock down conditions at the prison. This, he

argues, constituted “extraordinary circumstances beyond [his] control that made it impossible to

file a petition on time,” quoting Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Therefore, Petitioner contends he is entitled to equitable tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B).

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ORDER

Cortinas v. Carey, 2:06-01390-JKS-CMK 2

Petitioner relies heavily on the decision in Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146 (9th

Cir. 2000). See also Mendoza v. Cary, 449 F.3d 1065, 1070–71 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that

lack of Spanish-language legal materials and the assistance of a translator during the AEDPA

limitations period may trigger equitable tolling). In particular, Petitioner refers to the fact that

in remanding the matter to the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing the Ninth Circuit

stated “determinations of whether there was an ‘impediment’ under § 2244(d)(1)(B) and whether

there are grounds for equitable tolling are highly fact dependent.” 233 F.3d at 1148. The Court

agrees that Whalem/Hunt provides strong support for Petitioner’s argument that on the record as

it presently exists it is difficult to definitely state that the requirements of § 2244(d)(1)(B) have

not been met. Ordinarily, this Court, under circumstances such as are present in this case where

the question is a close one, might order an evidentiary hearing, but to do so here would not alter

the outcome. Even if the Court were to reach the merits, on the face of the petition and the

attached exhibits alone Petitioner would not prevail. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in

the United States District Court, Rule 4. The decision of the Board of Parole Hearings must be

upheld if it is supported by some evidence that he is currently a danger to the public. Sass v.

California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128–29 (9th Cir. 2006). The some evidence

standard is minimal. It does not require this Court to examine the entire record, independently

assess the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence. Id., at 1128.

Petitioner attacks the decision of the California Board of Parole Hearings finding him

unsuitable for parole and declining to set a parole date. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus in the California Superior Court, which granted him relief. On appeal the

California Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the California Superior Court, finding that

contrary to the determination of the lower court, “some evidence” supported the decision of the

Board. In re Cortinas, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 271 (Cal.App. 2004), review dism’d, 121 P.3d 1237 (Cal.

2005). Petitioner raises two issues before this Court: (1) he was denied due process by the Board

in that its determination was not supported by the evidence; and (2) the California Court of

Appeal erred in holding that the failure of the respondent to explicitly deny the allegation of his

habeas petition in the California Superior Court that the Board had adopted a “no parole policy,”

did not amount to an admission the allegation was true.

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ORDER

Cortinas v. Carey, 2:06-01390-JKS-CMK 3

Because Petitioner filed his petition after April 24, 1996, it is governed by the standard of

review set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). Consequently, this Court cannot grant relief unless the decision of the

California Court of Appeal was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” at the time

the state court renders its decision or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–406 (2000); see Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-73 (2003)

(explaining this standard). In applying this standard, this Court reviews the last reasoned

decision by the state court, Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004), which in

this case was that of the California Court of Appeal. In addition, the state court’s findings of fact

are presumed to be correct unless the petitioner rebuts this presumption by clear and convincing

evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). 

To the extent that Petitioner raises issues of the proper application of State law, they are

beyond the purview of this Court in a federal habeas proceeding. It is presumed that the state

court knew and correctly applied state law. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990)

overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); see also Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (a federal habeas court cannot reexamine a state court’s

interpretation and application of state law). Petitioner’s second ground, the effect of the

response to the petition, is clearly and unequivocally an issue of state procedural law. The effect

of state court pleadings in raising or controverting issues does not present an issue of federal

Constitutional magnitude. Accordingly, this Court is precluded from reaching the second

ground. Suffice it to say at this point that there is no controlling Supreme Court precedent that

requires a respondent to explicitly deny every allegation in a state habeas proceeding. 

Consequently, it cannot be said that the decision of the California Court of Appeal that the

general denial implicitly denied the specific allegation that the Board had adopted a “no parole

policy” was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law under

§ 2254(d). See Kane v. Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10 (2005) (per curiam). 

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ORDER

Cortinas v. Carey, 2:06-01390-JKS-CMK 4

Petitioner’s contention that he was denied due process because the “conclusions reached

and factors relied on by the Board were devoid of evidentiary basis,” Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d

910, 915 (9th Cir. 2003), lacks merit. The California Court of Appeal extensively reviewed the

evidence supporting the decision of the Board (16 Cal.App.3d at 283–290).

Given our analysis and conclusion, we proceed to the Board’s primary

contention that the court erred in finding that there was no evidence to support the

Board’s conclusion that defendant was unsuitable for parole. As outlined above,

we resolve this claim by determining whether there was some evidence before the

Board to support this conclusion.

In pronouncing its decision, the Board listed the following reasons for

finding defendant unsuitable: (1) the murder was carried out in an “especially ...

cruel manner,” demonstrating “exceptionally callous disregard for human

suffering” (see Regs., § 2402, subds. (c)(1) [especially cruel] & (c)(1)(D)

[exceptionally callous disregard] ); (2) defendant's motive was “trivial” in relation

to the offense (see § 2402, subd. (c)(1)(E) [“trivial” or “inexplicable” motive] );

(3) defendant had an unstable social history and criminal history involving

substance abuse (see § 2402, subd. (c)(3)); (4) he does not have “acceptable”

employment plans; and (5) he currently poses an “unpredictable degree of threat”

because (a) his therapeutic progress is “relatively recent,” (b) he requires

additional therapy “to face, and discuss, and understand the causative factors

which led to his life crime,” and (c) he needs to demonstrate an ability to maintain

his therapeutic gains over a more extended period of time.

The Board’s first finding focuses on the circumstances of the offense.

Defendant initially claims that in determining whether the circumstances of an

offense tend to show unsuitability and justify an extended prison term, the Board

must first make a proportionality analysis, comparing the commitment offense

against similar offenses, in order to ensure uniformity of punishment for similar

offenses.FN8 We disagree. We conclude that under section 3041, subdivisions (a)

and (b), the Board determines a defendant’s suitability first, without considering

the proportionality of his or her sentence in relation to other prisoners’ sentences.

Proportionality becomes a consideration only after the suitability determination is

made. Once the Board determines that a prisoner is suitable for parole, based on

“consideration of the public safety,” it “shall set a release date.” FN9 (§ 3041, subd.

(b).) At that point, when the Board has found an inmate suitable for parole and is

determining an appropriate release date, the Board must consider the

proportionality of the prisoner’s sentence: “The release date shall be set in a

manner that will provide uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and

magnitude in respect to their threat to the public, and that will comply with the

sentencing rules that the Judicial Council may issue and any sentencing

information relevant to the setting of parole release dates.” (§ 3041, subd. (a).)

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ORDER

Cortinas v. Carey, 2:06-01390-JKS-CMK 5

The statute separates the determination of suitability from the determination of a

release date, and makes it clear that only the determination of an appropriate

release date involves a proportionality analysis.

FN8. The issue is currently before the California Supreme Court in In re

Dannenberg (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 95, 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 458, review

granted January 15, 2003, S111029. [NOTE: a decision has been

published: In re Dannenberg, 104 P.3d 783 (Cal. 2005).]

FN9. Section 3041, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part, that the

Board “shall normally set a parole release date” at a prisoner's first parole

hearing. It further requires that “[t]he release date shall be set in a manner

that will provide uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and

magnitude in respect to their threat to the public, ...” Section 3041,

subdivision (b) states, in relevant part, that the Board “shall set a release

date unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense

or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense

or offenses, is such that consideration of the public safety requires a

more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual, and that a parole

date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting.”

Not surprisingly, we note that in Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at page

638, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174, the court upheld the Governor’s

determination of unsuitability due to the gravity of the defendant’s crime without

considering the length of sentence in comparison to the sentences for other similar

offenses.

Turning now to the Board’s finding of cruelty and callousness, we

reiterate our observation in Smith that since second degree murder requires

express or implied malice, all second degree murders by definition involve some

degree of cruelty and callousness. (Smith, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 366, 7

Cal.Rptr.3d 655.) Thus, because such a conviction does not automatically render

one unsuitable for parole, a determination that a second-degree murder was cruel

and/or callous must be supported by some evidence that it was perpetrated in an

especially cruel manner or with exceptionally callous disregard for suffering. (Id.

at pp. 366-367, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 655) In Smith, the Governor did not cite any facts

that reflected exceptionally callous disregard for the victim's suffering. There was

no evidence that the defendant acted with cold, calculated, dispassion; or that he

tormented, terrorized, or injured his victim before shooting her; or that he

gratuitously increased or unnecessarily prolonged her pain and suffering. Rather,

the defendant, a drug abuser plagued by jealousy, became enraged at his wife

because she refused to accompany him and told him she no longer wanted to see

him. He grabbed a gun and immediately shot her three times in the head. (Ibid.)

Although the evidence reflected a callous crime, it did not, in our view, support

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ORDER

Cortinas v. Carey, 2:06-01390-JKS-CMK 6

the Governor's finding that defendant acted with callous disregard for the victim's

suffering. (Ibid.)

Here, the record contains some evidence to support the Board’s finding.

After being summoned outside and challenged by his friend Herena, defendant

returned to his house to get a kitchen knife, came back out, and started stabbing

Herena. According to the deputy district attorney, he stabbed Herena six

times.FN10 Defendant admitted that he intended to “hurt” Herena. The Board could

reasonably conclude that such repeated stabbing caused Herena to suffer a

substantial, gratuitous amount of pain, and defendant’s expressed intent reflected

exceptionally callous disregard for Herena's suffering.

FN10. Defendant asserts that there is no evidentiary basis for the deputy

district attorney’s statements. We note, however, that defendant did not

dispute these statements or otherwise suggest that they were unfounded.

Under the circumstances, the Board could rely on the statements.

Concerning the Board’s finding that defendant’s motive was trivial, the

Board reasonably could have discounted defendant’s story that he stabbed Herena

because he honestly feared for his life. Indeed, if defendant had truly been afraid,

he could have decided to stay inside his house. In this regard, defendant offered

no explanation for coming outside when he saw Herena with his hands in his

pockets. Furthermore, even if defendant thought Herena had a weapon, there is no

evidence that he had one that night. Nevertheless, defendant repeatedly stabbed

him, sometimes in the back.

The Board also could have discounted defendant’s alleged intoxication.

Although defendant said he drank a pint of Southern Comfort around 4:00 p.m.

that afternoon, the encounter took place sometime after 11:00 or 11:30 p.m.,

seven hours later.

The only other possible motivation for the killing was that defendant was

angry at Herena for not following his advice, he had had some unspecified

problem at home that day, he was frustrated and in a bad mood, and he simply

“overreacted” to Herena’s challenge.

Given defendant’s explanations for the murder, the Board could have

considered defendant’s view that he overreacted to be an accurate understatement

and, more specifically, found that (1) his apparent reasons for repeatedly stabbing

Herena were insignificant in relation to their fatal result, (2) the link between

those reasons and the magnitude of his violence was inexplicable, and (3)

Herena’s death was not a reasonably foreseeable or predictable reaction to

Herena’s challenge.FN11 Under the circumstances, therefore, we disagree with

defendant’s view that his motivation was no more trivial than that behind any

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ORDER

Cortinas v. Carey, 2:06-01390-JKS-CMK 7

other second degree murder and conclude that the record supports the Board’s

finding of triviality.

FN11. The record contains no evidence that defendant was in a gang or

that Herena’s challenge to defendant was part of a struggle between rival

gangs, evidence that might reasonably raise the possibility of a violent, if

not fatal, reaction.

Next, we focus on the finding that defendant had an unstable social history

and a criminal history involving substance abuse. Section 2402, subdivision

(c)(3), of the Regulations lists “Unstable Social History” as a factor tending to

show unsuitability and explains that this means “[t]he prisoner has a history of

unstable or tumultuous relationships with others.”

In his evaluation, Dr. Glover reported that during defendant's adolescence,

he had a “tremendous amount” of conflict with his father, who was very strict and

wanted defendant to be a leader, not a follower. However, there is no evidence

that defendant had another relationship that could be called “unstable” or

“tumultuous.” Thus, although defendant had one such relationship, that one does

not reasonably constitute some evidence of “a history of unstable or tumultuous

relationships with others.” (Regs., § 2402, subd. (c)(3), italics added.)

Section 2402, subdivision (c)(2) of the Regulations makes a defendant’s

criminal history a factor showing unsuitability insofar as it reveals that “on

previous occasions [he or she] inflicted or attempted to inflict serious injury on a

victim, particularly if [he or she] demonstrated serious assaultive behavior at an

early age.” FN12 Thus, although the record supports the Board’s finding that

defendant had prior criminal record involving substance abuse-i.e., convictions as

a teenager for unlawful possession of alcohol and driving under the influence, and

use of marijuana and cocaine-this finding does not correlate with the enumerated

factors showing unsuitability.FN13

FN12. Conversely, section 2402, subdivision (d)(1) and (6) of the

Regulations make the lack of a juvenile or adult criminal history

involving assaultive or violent conduct or crimes a factor tending to

show suitability.

FN13. The People suggest that defendant's criminal record and history of

substance abuse support a finding that he had an unstable social history.

However, in the absence of evidence that prior nonviolent, nonassaultive

conduct and crimes involving substance abuse were accompanied by,

involved, or caused difficulty with other people or conflict in social

situations, we fail to see how substance abuse, standing alone, reflects an

unstable social history. However, we do not intend to suggest that

defendant's convictions and history of alcohol and drug abuse were

irrelevant in determining his suitability for parole. On the contrary, such

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ORDER

Cortinas v. Carey, 2:06-01390-JKS-CMK 8

evidence can be relevant in understanding the underlying causes of a

commitment offense, the reasons for therapy, and subsequent psychiatric

evaluations.

Next, we look to see if there is some support for the Board’s conclusion

that defendant does not have “acceptable employment plans.” This finding

implicitly relates to section 2402, subdivision (d)(8) of the Regulations, which

lists as a factor showing suitability “Understanding and Plans for Future,” and

provides, “The prisoner has made realistic plans for release or has developed

marketable skills that can be put to use upon release.” Comments by Board

members shed some light on the meaning of the Board’s finding. Commissioner

Pliler observed that defendant “has, you know, employable skills in several

different areas when he is released. And he has a high school diploma.... So

you've done basically what's been asked of you at prior hearings. So it would

appear that you would not have difficulty in maintaining some type of

employment when you're released.” However, Commissioner Lawin asked what

defendant was going to do for work. As noted, defendant responded generally that

finding work would not be a problem, even if he had to “flip burgers.”

Commissioner Lawin continued, “It’s nice that you’re that confident in your

abilities, but we need to see that you're out looking for something. You can’t rely

on your parents or your aunt or uncle or anyone else to find a job for you. Have

you sent out any letters or resumes or do you have any sort of listings of people

that might-” Defendant said he had only looked in newspapers. The member said

that “what we would like to see is that you're looking for work, that you're trying

to find someone who at least says yes, you're qualified. When you get out, come

see me and I'll interview you. Or, you know, yes, you're qualified. If we have a

spot open I’d be happy to talk to you about it. If you can get anything that shows

us that you're actively looking for someone to hire you it would be very helpful

because what we have to see is that you're going to be able to support yourself.

We can’t let you out with no financial support. You have skills. You’ve acquired

skills in here. Use those skills to try and find something. You know, even if you

just send out letters and you don't get any responses, keep a list of those places

you've sent the letter or resumes to and show us.” The member further suggested

that if defendant’s family intended to help him make contacts for work and

provide financial support and transportation, then they needed to put that

commitment in writing and submit it to the Board along with their general letters

of support.

Given these comments, we understand the Board’s finding to mean that in

addition to developing marketable skills, the Board wanted to see some evidence

that he knew how to prepare a resume and write letters to prospective employers

or had shown some initiative in seeking help to do so and then taken practical and

realistic steps toward soliciting potential employers about a job, potential

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Cortinas v. Carey, 2:06-01390-JKS-CMK 9

openings, or his qualifications.FN14 The Board also wanted some more specific and

explicit assurance from defendant’s family members that they were going to

assume responsibility for helping defendant find employment and provide the

necessary practical and financial support during his transition to a productive life

outside of prison.

FN14. Apparently, the Board did not accept defense counsel’s effort to

take “a little bit” of the blame for defendant’s failure to send resumes or

letters as an indication that defendant had shown some initiative in

looking for a job other than to look in the newspaper.

With this understanding of the Board’s finding in mind, we cannot say

there is no evidence to support it. Rather, there is some evidence that defendant

had not done anything more than look in the newspaper listings for job

opportunities. He had not sent out resumes or otherwise reached out to

prospective employers. (Compare with Smith, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 355, 7

Cal.Rptr.3d 655 [defendant presented written evidence of two job offers].)

Moreover, in their letters of support, defendant’s family members and friends

simply offered generally to help with employment and housing. FN15

FN15. Although defendant’s aunt and uncle offered him a job at their

ranch in Texas, they had not as yet acquired it.

We now review the Board’s conclusion that because defendant’s

therapeutic progress is “relatively recent,” he needs additional therapy “to face,

and discuss, and understand the causative factors which led to his life of crime,”

and therefore, until further progress is made and he demonstrates “an ability to

maintain gains over an extended period of time,” he “continues to be

unpredictable and a threat to others” if released at this time.

As noted, a 1989 evaluation noted that defendant had a prior history of

“polysubstance abuse” and concluded that because defendant was motivated to

explore and learn the “psychogenisis” of his crime, he would probably become

conversant with the “subconscious” forces that caused it. Thereafter, defendant

was written up for misconduct in 1990, 1991, and 1992. The 1994 psychiatric

evaluation noted that defendant had remained discipline free since 1992. It also

noted defendant’s history of alcohol and “polydrug” abuse and stated that he had

been active in AA and appeared to have profited from therapy when he was first

incarcerated. However, the report concluded that defendant needed more

education and understanding of his alcoholism, recovery and the AA process.

In 1997, he received a discipline write-up but thereafter remained

discipline free. In the May 2000 evaluation, Dr. Glover noted that defendant

believed his depression as a teenager and young adult was caused by his strict

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ORDER

Cortinas v. Carey, 2:06-01390-JKS-CMK 10

father. However, Dr. Glover disagreed, stating a few times that defendant's

history of depression was more likely the result of his use of marijuana and

cocaine, which can produce the sort of depressive and paranoid symptoms and

ideations that contributed to his offense. Nevertheless, Dr. Glover opined that

defendant “has gained a fair amount of insight into his development and

subsequent crime.”

Next, we observe that in explaining the murder to the Board, defendant

focused on what he considered to be the immediate causal circumstances: his

general fear of Herena’s friend, his drinking in general and earlier that day, his

frustration, his bad mood, and his belief that Herena might be armed and want to

kill him. As noted, defendant believed he overreacted to Herena’s challenge.

Other than admitting he had been in denial “that alcohol created all this to

happen,” defendant revealed no understanding of his drug abuse or awareness of

how it may also have affected his mental and emotional states and contributed to

his crime. He did not discuss how or why he started using drugs other than to

suggest that it was youthful experimentation; nor did he demonstrate an

awareness of a possible connection between his chronic use of drugs and his

experience of depression and paranoia, both of which, according to Dr. Glover,

manifested themselves on the day of the killing. On the contrary, defendant

showed no recognition that drug use might have magnified his fear of Herena

before and at the time of the incident and distorted his perception of danger.

Indeed, at the parole hearing, defendant did not discuss his depression or paranoia

and tended to minimize the extent of his drug use. FN16 The Board could have

reasonably found this particularly troubling in light of counsel’s closing

statements concerning what could happen if defendant started drinking or taking

drugs again. Despite Dr. Glover’s strong opinion about the connection between

defendant's drug use and the murder, defendant focused only on his problem with

alcohol. Moreover, he explained that “since my last hearing they really nailed me

on that and I really got interested in going to these programs and really paying

attention and understanding the whole meaning of all these steps.”

FN16. At the hearing, when asked about drug use, defendant said only

that as a teenager, he “experienced [ sic] marijuana and some cocaine.”

Later, the Board noted Dr. Glover’s evaluation, reporting that defendant

had admitted that he had used marijuana extensively, smoking numerous

times per week, and had snorted cocaine two times a month or whenever

it was available. Given Dr. Glover’s report, one Board member observed,

“I got the impression from your comments a while ago that you just did

this very sporadically, but according to what you told Dr. Glover, you

were a pretty regular user of drugs.” In response, defendant said, “Well,

of cocaine, like I said, I've tried it, I experimented. I wasn't an addict or

nothing. It [was] just teenage years that I just tried it. But marijuana, I

did use that, but that's the last thing on my mind. I doubt very seriously I

will ever even touch drugs again. I’m more here focusing on the alcohol

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ORDER

Cortinas v. Carey, 2:06-01390-JKS-CMK 11

right now. And drugs is not even an issue for me no more. That’s over

with.”

Last, we note that although Dr. Glover opined that defendant had a low

potential for violence in prison and that he expected it to remain low if and when

defendant was released, Hawkins opined that the degree of threat defendant

presented to the community remained “unpredictable.”

In our view, the evidence that defendant had been discipline free only

since his last hearing, his admission that only after his last parole hearing did he

“really” get interested in and pay attention to the AA step process, his failure to

articulate any awareness or understanding of his drug use as a contributing factor,

and Hawkins’s opinion concerning the unpredictable threat defendant would pose

if released together constitute some evidence reasonably supporting the Board’s

view that defendant’s full comprehension of the step process has been recent; he

needs additional therapy to recognize, understand, and learn how to better

articulate his awareness concerning all the underlying causes of his offense,

including his depression, paranoia, and chronic use of drugs as a teenager; and it

is appropriate for him to show that he has integrated his therapeutic understanding

for an additional period of time.

Defendant notes—and the trial court emphasized—that the record contains

abundant evidence that is not only inconsistent with this finding but strongly

indicative of his suitability for parole. For example, defendant argues that

Hawkins’s use of the word “unpredictable” to rate defendant’s level of

dangerousness is “meaningless”; the court below found that it is a “conclusory

term used by a correctional counselor when he or she does not know enough

about a prisoner to offer any insight or prediction.” On the other hand, defendant

and the court noted Dr. Glover’s professional opinion that defendant's potential

for violence was low.

In our view, however, this approach to Hawkins’s and Dr. Glover’s

evaluations is inconsistent with the standard and scope of review of the Board’s

decision. As noted, the factual basis for the Board’s decision “is subject to a

limited judicial review under the ‘some evidence’ standard of review.”

(Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 652, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174,

italics added.) Specifically, when reviewing a decision to deny parole, we merely

inquire “whether some evidence in the record before the Board supports the

decision to deny parole, based upon the factors specified by statute and

regulation.” (Id. at p. 658, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174.) Only a “modicum

of evidence” is required, and, in determining whether the record contains such

evidence, we may not independently resolve conflicts in the evidence, determine

the weight to be given the evidence, or decide the manner in which the specified

factors relevant to parole suitability are considered and balanced. Rather these are

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ORDER

Cortinas v. Carey, 2:06-01390-JKS-CMK 12

matters exclusively within the discretion of the Board or the Governor. Indeed,

“[i]t is irrelevant that a court might determine that evidence in the record tending

to establish suitability for parole far outweighs evidence demonstrating

unsuitability for parole.” (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 677, 128

Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174.)

Here, faced with reports by Hawkins and Dr. Glover, the Board apparently

accepted Hawkins’s view and agreed with it. Both defendant and the court,

however, substitute their own assessments of the weight that should have been

given these reports.

Defendant argues that the court properly deemed Hawkins’s view

meaningless in light of undisputed evidence submitted in support of his writ

petition to the effect that Hawkins did not know defendant well enough to make

an assessment of dangerousness.FN17 First, we observe that at his parole hearing,

defendant never challenged Hawkins’s evaluation or assessment of

dangerousness, even after the Board cited and relied on it. Second, defendant’s

opinion expressed in his declaration, whether undisputed or not, is insufficient by

itself to discredit Hawkins’s evaluation, which, the record reveals, was the result

of “a personal interview, and incidental contact with [defendant], consisting of

approximately 1.5 hours and a thorough review of his central file, consisting of

3.5 hours.” Last, in the absence of evidence that Hawkins was professionally

unqualified to evaluate defendant, we question whether it is appropriate in a

habeas proceeding for the court to make factual determinations concerning the

credibility evaluations made by Board members in the course of their duties or the

reasonableness of the Board's reliance on a particular evaluation.

FN17. In a declaration submitted with his petition, defendant asserted,

that Hawkins rated his dangerousness level “unpredictable based on the

fact that he does not know me on a better level to rate me.”

As our analysis and discussion reveal, we find some evidence to support

all of the Board’s findings of unsuitability except the findings concerning

defendant’s social and criminal history. Nevertheless, we do not find the Board’s

reliance on these factors to be so essential or significant to its decision that

without them, the Board would have found defendant suitable for parole. On the

contrary, a fair reading of the Board’s decision reveals that it placed primary

emphasis and weight on the circumstances of the offense, defendant’s lack of

more concrete employment plans, and his need to demonstrate greater

understanding of the causes of his offense over an additional period of time.

Under the circumstances, therefore, it is sufficiently clear to us that the Board

would have reached the same conclusion even without referring to defendant's

social and criminal history. Moreover, “those portions of the decision that are

supported by some evidence constitute a sufficient basis supporting the [Board's]

Case 2:06-cv-01390-JKS-CMK Document 23 Filed 12/17/07 Page 12 of 13
ORDER

Cortinas v. Carey, 2:06-01390-JKS-CMK 13

discretionary decision to deny parole.” (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 677,

128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59 P.3d 174.)

In sum, given the number of factors showing unsuitability and the

evidence supporting them, we conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion

by denying defendant parole at the 2000 hearing, because there was “ ‘some

evidence’ ” (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 652, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104, 59

P.3d 174) to support its conclusion that he would “pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to society if released from prison.” (Regs., § 2402, subd. (a).) Therefore,

we hold that the trial court erred in reversing the Board and ordering it to

schedule a parole release date.

The factors relied upon by the California Court of Appeal unquestionably constitute

“‘some evidence’ having ‘some indicia of reliability.’ ” McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895,

904 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying standard outlined by the Supreme Court in Superintendent v. Hill,

472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985)); see Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2007); Sass v.

California Board of Prison Terms, supra. In light of Hill, Irons, Sass, and McQuillion, this

Court cannot say that the decision of the California Court of Appeal, which applied the same

“some evidence” test applied in Hill, was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or

was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Nor can this Court find that the California

Court of Appeal unreasonably applied the correct legal principle to the facts of the Petitioner’s

case as required by Lockyer–Williams; i.e., the state court decision was more than incorrect or

erroneous, its application of clearly established law was objectively unreasonable. 

 Thus, the Board did not deny Petitioner due process and he is not entitled to relief on the

first ground.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The findings and recommendations filed January 7, 2007, are adopted in full; and

2. Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED; and

3. This case is closed.

Dated: December 17, 2007

s/ James K. Singleton, Jr.

JAMES K. SINGLETON, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 2:06-cv-01390-JKS-CMK Document 23 Filed 12/17/07 Page 13 of 13