Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_06-cv-05197/USCOURTS-arwd-5_06-cv-05197-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

THERESA CATHERINE W.

PRYOR-KENDRICK PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 06-5197 

JUDGE DAVID CLINGER;

JAMES A. ROE; Public Defender;

CHASITY CLARK; Prosecuting Attorney;

and JUDGE DAVID SCAGGS DEFENDANTS 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff, Theresa Pryor-Kendrick, filed this civil rights action on October 10, 2006.

(Doc. 1). She proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. The complaint is before the undersigned

for a determination of whether it should be served on the defendants. 

BACKGROUND

Pryor-Kendrick contends her constitutional rights were violated by the defendants when

she was wrongfully charged with a crime, was not brought to court within the proper time frame

after her arrest, was charged with additional charges without the preparation of a new or updated

warrant, was denied the right to see the alleged forged checks, was denied copies of requested

documents, and was given an illegal sentence. Further, plaintiff alleges that she had no checks

in her possession during the relevant time period, the signature on the checks does not match the

signature affidavit, her last name had been changed to Kendrick at the time the checks were

allegedly forged, and the checks were forged and stolen by another person. 

Pryor-Kendrick alleges she is currently being held in the McPherson Unit in New Port,

Arkansas. Pryor-Kendrick Hoyt seeks to have her charges dismissed and to be awarded punitive

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damages for lost wages. She also seeks punitive damages for her two children who she alleges

have suffered due to her false imprisonment. 

DISCUSSION

Pryor-Kendrick’s claims against all defendants are subject to dismissal. To state a claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the

Constitution and laws of the United States and must show that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a person acting under color of state law. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101

S.Ct. 1908, 1913, 68 L. Ed. 2d 420 (1981) (overruled on other grounds). Generally, a public

employee acts under color of state law while acting in his [or her] official capacity or while

exercising his [or her] responsibilities pursuant to state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 108

S.Ct. 2250, 2255-56, 101 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1988) (citations omitted). However, ‘[j]udges

performing judicial functions enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983 liability.” Robinson v.

Freeze, 15 F.3d 107, 108 (8th Cir. 1994). “A judge will not be deprived of immunity because

the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” Stump

v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978). 

Judicial immunityis overcome in two situations: (1) ifthe challenged act is non-judicial;

and (2) if the action, although judicial in nature, was taken in the complete absence of all

jurisdiction. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. It is clear that neither situation applies here.

In the past, claims for declaratory and injunctive relief “have been permitted under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against judges acting in their official capacity.” Nollet v. Justices of Trial Court

of Com. of Mass., 83 F. Supp. 2d 204, 210 (D. Mass. 2000), aff’d without op., 248 F.3d 1127 (1st

Cir. 2000)(citing Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 80 L. Ed. 2d 565 (1984)). 

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“However, in 1996 Congress passed the Federal Courts Improvement Act (“FCIA”), Pub. L. No.

104-317, Title III § 309(c), 110 Stat. 3847, 3853, which legislatively reversed Pulliam in several

important respects.” Nollet, 85 F. Supp. 2d at 210. As amended by the FCIA, §1983 now

precludes injunctive relief against a judicial officer “for an act or omission taken in such officer’s

judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was

unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Pryor-Kendrick does not allege that either of these prerequisites for injunctive relief are

met. See e.g., Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1999)(holding injunctive relief

against a quasi-judicial official is barred if the plaintiff fails to allege a violation of a declaratory

decree or the unavailability of declaratory relief); Fox v. Lee, 99 F. Supp. 2d 573, 575-576 (E.D.

Pa. 2000)(claim for injunctive relief dismissed where plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege that

either of the prerequisites to injunctive relief were met); Ackermann v. Doyle, 43 F. Supp. 2d

265, 273 (E.D. N.Y. 1999)(dismissing action against judicial officers because plaintiff failed to

allege that a declaratory decree was violated or the declaratory relief was unavailable). Thus, to

the extent Pryor-Kendrick seeks injunctive relief his claims are subject to dismissal.

To be entitled to equitable relief, “plaintiff must show that [s]he has an inadequate

remedy at law and a serious risk of irreparable harm.” Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court for Dist.

of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1392 (9th Cir. 1987)(citations omitted). Equitable relief is not

appropriate where an adequate remedy under state law exists. Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 542 & n. 22,

104 S. Ct. at 1981 & n. 22. See also Sterling v. Calvin , 874 F.2d 571, 572 (8th Cir. 1989). An

adequate remedy at law exists when the acts of the judicial officer can be reviewed on appeal or

by extraordinary writ. Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1392 (citation omitted). See also Nelson v. Com, 1997

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WL 793060, 2 (E.D. Pa. 1997)(appellate review of conviction provides plaintiff an adequate

remedy under state law). See also J&M Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Hampton, 347 Ark. 126, 60

S.W.3d 481 (2001)(discussing when a writ of prohibition is appropriate). As this is clearly the

case in this matter, Pryor-Kendrick’s claims against Judges David Clinger and David Skaggs are

barred. 

Pryor-Kendricks’ claims against Chasity Clark, a prosecuting attorney, are also barred.

Prosecuting attorneys are also immune from suit. The United States Supreme Court, in Imbler

v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431, 96 S. Ct. 984, 995, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128 (1976), established the

absolute immunity of a prosecutor from a civil suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “in

initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case.” Id., 424 U.S. at 427. This immunity

extends to all acts that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.”

Id., 424 U.S. at 430. See also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2615, 125

L. Ed. 2d 209 (1993)(Prosecutor acting as an advocate for the state in a criminal prosecution is

entitled to absolute immunity while a prosecutor acting in an investigatory or administrative

capacity is only entitled to qualified immunity). Based on the allegations of the complaint, it is

clear Clark is entitled to absolute immunity. See also Brodnicki v. City of Omaha, 75 F.3d 1261

(8th Cir. 1996)(County prosecutors were entitled to absolute immunity from suit).

To the extent Pryor-Kendrick’s complaint seeks injunctive relief, we find the claim not

cognizable. While the Supreme Court has not held that this immunity insulates prosecutors from

declaratory or injunctive relief, see Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 80 L. Ed.

2d 565 (1984), a plaintiff must show some substantial likelihood that the past conduct alleged

to be illegal will recur. Pryor-Kendrick can make no such showing here. Further, injunctive

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relief is not appropriate where an adequate remedy under state law exists. Id., 466 U.S. at 542

& n.22. See also Bonner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis, 526 F.2d 1331, 1336 (8th Cir. 1975). 

To the extent Pryor-Kendrick intends to bring a malicious prosecution claim, the claim

fails. It has been “uniformly held that malicious prosecution by itself is not punishable under §

1983 because it does not allege a constitutional injury.” Kurtz v. City of Shrewsbury, 245 F.3d

753, 758 (8th Cir. 2001). Similarly, a cause of action for defamation is not cognizable under §

1983. Loftin v. United States, 72 F.3d 133 (8th Cir. 1995); Miner v. Brackney, 719 F.2d 954, 955

(8th Cir. 1983).

In addition, Pryor-Kendrick’s allegations against James Roe must also be dismissed. In

Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L. Ed. 2d 509 (1981), the United

States Supreme Court held that a public defender does not act under color of state law for

purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a

defendant in a criminal proceeding. 

Finally, Pryor-Kendrick’s claims that she has been falsely arrested, improperly charged,

and falsely incarcerated are subject to dismissal. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct.

2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994), the Supreme Court held that a claim for damages for “allegedly

unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose

unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid” is not cognizable until “the

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared

invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a

federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. 486-87. 

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CONCLUSION

Itherefore recommend Pryor-Kendrick’s case be dismissed on the grounds the claims are

not cognizable under § 1983. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii)(IFP action, or any portion

thereof, may be dismissed on such grounds at any time). 

Pryor-Kendrick has ten days from receipt of this report and recommendation in

which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. Pryor-Kendrick

is reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by

the district court.

DATED this 9th day of November 2006.

/s/ Beverly Stites Jones

HON. BEVERLY STITES JONES

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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