Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-03009/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-03009-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jeanette Rose Eakerns,

Plaintiff, 

v.

Kingman Regional Medical Center,

Defendant. 

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No. CIV 06-3009-PHX-SMM

ORDER

On May 7, 2007, the Court held a telephonic discovery dispute conference to address

two issues. The first pertained to Plaintiff’s request for an e-mail communication between

attorneys involved in the representation of Defendant. The second pertained to Plaintiff’s

desire to interview ex parte a former employee of Defendant. The Court orally denied

Plaintiff’s request as to the ex parte interview. As to the e-mail communication, the Court

reviewed the cases cited by both parties and has reached the following conclusion.

At issue is an e-mail communication between two attorneys at the law firm

representing Defendant. Defendant contacted the law firm to discuss an employment matter

related to the events at issue in this case. Defendant attempted to reach Attorney A, who was

not available. Defendant then spoke with Attorney B, who also practiced employment law.

After the conversation, Attorney B sent an e-mail to Attorney A which recited the content

of a conversation between Attorney B and Defendant. Attorney B also followed up via letter

with Defendant to memorialize their conversation and Attorney B’s advice. Defendant has

Case 2:06-cv-03009-SMM Document 58 Filed 05/07/08 Page 1 of 3
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produced the letter to Plaintiff and another document related to Attorney B’s advice, but has

not produced the e-mail to Attorney A. 

Plaintiff contends that Defendant has waived attorney-client privilege by asserting an

advice-of-counsel defense in this matter. For purposes of this discovery dispute, Defendant

does not deny that an advice-of-counsel defense has been raised. However, Defendant

contends that the e-mail constitutes work product, a protection which has not been waived.

 Defendant further contends that Plaintiff has received the substantial equivalent of the e-mail

by virtue of the other documents which have been turned over. Plaintiff counters that the email is nonetheless discoverable because the contents are at issue and Plaintiff has a

compelling need for the e-mail.

The work product doctrine was first articulated by the Supreme Court in Hickman v.

Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), and has been substantially codified by Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 26(b)(3):

Ordinarily, a party may not discover documents and tangible things

that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another

party or its representative . . . . But, subject to Rule 26(b)(1), those materials

may be discovered if: . . . the party shows that it has substantial need for the

materials to prepare its case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their

substantial equivalent by other means.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A). A court ordering discovery of work product materials must

protect against “mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party’s

attorney or other representative concerning the litigation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(B). This

latter form of work product is referred to as “opinion work product,” and requires a showing

beyond the substantial need or undue hardship test required for non-opinion work product.

Holmgren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 573, 577 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus,

opinion work product may be discovered and admitted when mental impressions are at issue

in a case and the need for the material is compelling. Id.

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Plaintiff contends that she has a compelling need for the e-mail because witnesses who

have been deposed have not been able to remember the contents of the conversation, and

their testimony has relied on the other documents provided. Without the e-mail, Plaintiff will

not be able to test the credibility of Defendant’s witnesses. 

The Court finds that disclosure of the e-mail in question is not warranted because

Plaintiff has not shown the requisite level of need for either opinion or non-opinion work

product. Defendant has provided the “substantial equivalent” of the e-mail by turning over

the letter sent to Defendant by Attorney B. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A). Thus the

information—Attorney B’s advice to Defendant—is “available elsewhere.” Holmgren, 976

F.2d at 577. In addition, the testimony of witnesses deposed to date has been consistent with

the documents provided. In light of the existing disclosures, the Court will not require

Defendant to disclose an internal communication between attorneys that was never

communicated to the client (Defendant).

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s request for production of the e-mail

in question.

DATED this 7th day of May, 2008.

Case 2:06-cv-03009-SMM Document 58 Filed 05/07/08 Page 3 of 3