Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00582/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00582-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OTONIEL TYLER PENNINGS,

Plaintiff, 

v.

BARRERA, et al.,

Defendants. 

Case No.: 16cv582-JLS (MDD)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED 

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

RE: MOTION TO DISMISS

[ECF No. 12]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the United States 

District Judge Janis L. Sammartino pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and 

Local Civil Rule 72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of California.

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN 

PART.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Otoñiel Tyler Pennings (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner 

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 6). On March 7, 2016, 

Plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1). 

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Plaintiff’s complaint sets forth various claims against four named individuals 

working at the George Bailey Detention Facility (“GBDF”) alleging that they 

violated his civil rights by: (1) retaliating against him in violation of the First 

Amendment; (2) imposing cruel and unusual conditions of confinement in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment; (3) treating him inhumanely in violation 

of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause; (4) failing to 

provide Plaintiff his due process rights in violation of the Fourteenth 

Amendment; (5) using excessive force against him; (6) assaulting and 

battering him; (7) providing inadequate medical care; (8) providing negligent 

medical care; and (9) intentionally inflicting emotional distress upon him. 

(See id.). 

On October 12, 2016, Defendants Stapleton and Benjamin filed a 

motion to dismiss some of the claims against them. (ECF No. 12). 

Defendants contend that: (1) Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim 

against Defendant Benjamin should be dismissed because Defendant 

Benjamin did not “prevent[] Plaintiff from engaging in protected conduct[;]” 

(2) Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against both Defendants should be 

dismissed because Plaintiff did not allege that Defendants caused the 

unsanitary living conditions; (3) Plaintiff’s denial of religious 

accommodations claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff did not allege 

“facts indicating that the responding defendants denied him the kosher 

meals, or that they were necessary for him to practice” his religion;1 (4) 

Plaintiff’s destruction of property claim against Defendant Stapleton must be 

 

1 Defendants improperly construe Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Equal 

Protection Clause claim as a denial of religious accommodations claim under 

the First Amendment.

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dismissed because “Plaintiff does not allege the absence of an administrative 

remedy to challenge property destruction[;]” (5) Plaintiff’s intentional 

infliction of emotional distress claim against Defendant Stapleton should be 

dismissed because he does not allege extreme and outrageous conduct; and 

(6) the state law claims should be dismissed as untimely. (ECF No. 12-1 at 3-

7).

On October 13, 2016, this Court ordered Plaintiff to file a Response in 

Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on or before November 3, 2016, 

and Defendants to file a reply on or before November 10, 2016. (ECF No. 13). 

On November 2, 2016, Plaintiff requested a 90-day continuance to file his 

opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss in a duplicative action. 

(Pennings v. San Diego Sheriff’s Dep’t, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 

16cv2318-CAB-DHB, ECF No. 7). On January 10, 2017, District Judge 

Bencivengo closed Plaintiff’s duplicative action and denied Plaintiff’s motion 

for a continuance without prejudice to be re-filed in this case. (Id. at ECF No. 

11). Plaintiff did not re-file the motion as directed, but the Court 

nevertheless amended the briefing schedule and ordered Plaintiff to file a 

Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on or before 

February 8, 2017, and Defendants to file a reply on or before February 15, 

2017. (ECF No. 17). The Court granted Plaintiff one continuance and 

ordered him to file a Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss on or before March 16, 2017. (ECF Nos. 21, 22). On March 17, 2017, 

the date of his signature, Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to 

Defendants’ Motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 25). The Court will consider 

Plaintiff’s opposition even though it was not timely filed.

Plaintiff opposes the motion to dismiss on the grounds that: (1) 

Defendant Benjamin retaliated against Plaintiff by ordering he be moved “to 

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a dirty, feces-covered cell, in a module used as ‘punishment[;]’’’ (2) Defendant 

Stapleton intentionally inflicted emotional distress by calling Plaintiff 

derogatory names and assaulting him because of his religion; and (3) his 

state law claims are timely because he mailed his Complaint on February 26, 

2016.2 (Id. at 5-9).

Defendants reply that Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed 

because: (1) Plaintiff failed to timely file his opposition; (2) Plaintiff provided 

no proof that his Complaint was mailed on February 26, 2016; and (3) 

Plaintiff’s Complaint “consist[s] of mere conclusions in the form of allegations 

. . . . [that] fall woefully short of establishing a claim against Defendants for 

any constitutional violation.” (ECF No. 26 at 2-5).

II. BACKGROUND FACTS

The facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint and are not to be 

construed as findings of fact by the Court.

Plaintiff’s claims arise from a series of events that occurred while 

Plaintiff was held at GBDF as a subpoenaed witness for an evidentiary 

hearing in the criminal case of another state prisoner. (ECF No. 1 at 3). 

Plaintiff was placed in an administrative segregation unit (“Module 5A”) and 

immediately “noticed unconstitutional living conditions . . . and began the 

‘grievance process.’” (Id.). Plaintiff filed grievances alleging cruel and 

unusual living conditions, lack of access to the law library and law books, 

failure to provide three hours of recreation time, failure to provide a kosher 

diet or religious services and reading material and that Defendants were 

posting “excessive personal and private information” on cell doors. (Id. at 4).

 

2 Plaintiff’s opposition also includes several other claims that Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss do not challenge.

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Plaintiff’s Complaint describes his claim in nine counts as follows:

In count one, Plaintiff contends that Defendants Barrera, Stapleton and

Benjamin violated his First Amendment right to freedom of speech by 

retaliating against him for filing grievances. (Id. at 4-6). 

In count two, Plaintiff contends that Defendants Barrera, Sanchez, 

Stapleton and Benjamin imposed cruel and unusual conditions of 

confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Id. at 7-8). 

In count three, Plaintiff contends Defendants Barrerra and Sanchez 

violated his equal protection rights when they treated him differently than 

other inmates and made “racially insensitive slurs” targeted at his Jewish 

faith. (Id. at 8-9). 

In count four, Plaintiff contends that Defendants Benjamin, Barrera, 

Sanchez and Stapleton violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth 

Amendment. (Id. at 9; ECF No. 1-1 at 1).

In count five, Plaintiff contends that on November 17, 2014, Defendants 

Benjamin, Stapleton, Barrera and Sanchez used excessive force upon him. 

(ECF No. 1-1 at 1-3).

In count six, Plaintiff contends Defendants Barrera, Sanchez and

Stapleton assaulted and battered him during the excessive force incident 

explained in count six. (Id. at 5).

In count seven, Plaintiff contends that he received inadequate medical 

care from an unknown person treating Plaintiff’s injuries sustained during 

the assault, battery and excessive force incident. (Id. at 5-6).

In count eight, Plaintiff contends that some unknown person committed 

medical malpractice and was medically negligent when treating Plaintiff’s 

injuries. (Id. at 6).

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In count nine, Plaintiff contends Defendants Barrera, Sanchez, 

Stapleton and Benjamin intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon 

Plaintiff. (Id.).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro 

v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “Under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). The pleader must 

provide the Court with “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of 

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss [a 

court] must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, [a 

court is] not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual 

allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotations omitted). 

A pro se pleading is construed liberally on a defendant’s motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 

(9th Cir. 2002) (citing Ortez v. Washington Cnty. Oregon, 88 F.3d 804, 807 

(9th Cir. 1996)). The pro se pleader must still set out facts in his complaint 

that bring his claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A court “may not supply essential elements of the 

claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 

(9th Cir. 1982). A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the 

complaint and an opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies 

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cannot be cured by amendment. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 

(9th Cir. 1987).

IV. DISCUSSION

The Court will only address challenged claims brought against 

Defendants Benjamin and Stapleton. Those claims are: (1) count one, First 

Amendment retaliation against Defendant Benjamin; (2) count two, Eighth 

Amendment cruel and unusual punishment against both Defendants; (3) 

count three, Fourteenth Amendment violation of the Equal Protection Clause 

against Defendant Benjamin; (4) count four, Fourteenth Amendment 

violation of due process against Defendant Stapleton; (5) count nine, 

intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendant Stapleton; and 

(6) the timeliness of Plaintiff’s state law claims. (See ECF Nos. 1, 12-1).

A. First Amendment Retaliation Claim

In count one, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Benjamin retaliated 

against Plaintiff in violation of the First Amendment for filing grievances. 

(ECF No. 1 at 4). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Benjamin was in charge of 

the grievances filed in Plaintiff’s housing unit and was required to respond, 

process, investigate and resolve grievances, or forward them to someone who 

could address and resolve the grievances. (Id. at 4). 

After Plaintiff began filing grievances, Defendant Benjamin “came to 

Plaintiff’s cell screaming to stop filing grievances and if not, she would have 

him moved to module 5C” where mentally ill inmates are housed and 

explained that no grievance would fix the inadequate living conditions. (Id.

at 5). Plaintiff continued to file grievances and began helping other inmates 

file grievances. (Id.). In retaliation, Defendant Benjamin instructed others

to move Plaintiff to Module 5C. (Id.). Module 5C “had a constant smell of 

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feces coming out of the ventilation system and continued banging noises.” 

(Id.). 

Plaintiff filed a retaliation grievance against Defendant Benjamin for 

moving him to Module 5C, alleging he was moved “for the sole purpose of 

separating Plaintiff from other inmates he had been assisting with their 

grievances and to deter Plaintiff and other inmates from continuing to 

redress their grievances” and alleging that Defendant Benjamin refused to 

log inmate grievances. (Id.).

Defendants assert that count one must be dismissed because Plaintiff 

did not allege that Defendant Benjamin’s conduct was retaliatory, her alleged 

conduct did not prevent Plaintiff from filing grievances and there is no due 

process right for prisoners to file grievances.3 (ECF No. 12-1 at 3-4). 

The First Amendment protects against “deliberate retaliation” by prison 

officials against an inmate’s exercise of his right to petition for redress of 

grievances. Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir.

1989). Such conduct is actionable even if it would not otherwise rise to the 

level of a constitutional violation because retaliation by prison officials may 

chill an inmate’s exercise of legitimate First Amendment rights. Thomas v. 

Carpenter, 881 F.2d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1989). A prisoner suing prison officials 

for retaliation must allege that he was retaliated against for exercising his 

constitutional rights and that the retaliatory action did not advance 

legitimate penological goals. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 

 

3 Plaintiff also alleges Defendant Stapleton acted in retaliation, however 

Defendants did not respond to Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Stapleton 

destroyed Plaintiff’s property in retaliation for filing grievances. (See ECF

No. 12-1).

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1995); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994); Rizzo v. 

Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985).

In Rhodes v. Robinson, the Ninth Circuit set forth five basic elements of 

a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation: “(1) [a]n assertion that a state 

actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that 

prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s 

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably 

advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 

1269 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 n.11 

(9th Cir. 2005)).

1. Adverse Action Against an Inmate

The first element of the Rhodes pleading standard requires Plaintiff to 

make an assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against him. 

Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Benjamin 

threatened to move Plaintiff to Module 5C if he continued to file grievances 

and later ordered Plaintiff be moved as a specific consequence of his 

continued filing of grievances. (ECF No. 1 at 5). The cell Plaintiff was placed 

in was dirty and covered in feces. (ECF No. 25 at 5). Plaintiff also alleges 

that Defendant Benjamin retaliated by “refus[ing] to correctly process all . . . 

grievances.” (ECF No. 1 at 5); (see also ECF No. 25 at 6). 

The threat that Defendant Benjamin made and the later move to 

Module 5C, which Plaintiff characterized as a less desirable living situation, 

provide sufficient facts to allege the required adverse action. See Watison v. 

Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he mere threat of harm can 

be adverse action . . . .”); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(allowing a retaliation claim to proceed when a grievance decider made an 

implicit threat of retaliation regarding use of the grievance process); Puckett 

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v. Sweis, No. 2:15-cv-0602-AC P, 2016 WL 632795, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 

2016) (“[A]t the pleading stage, ‘allegations of harm [are] sufficient to ground 

a First Amendment retaliation claim without discussing whether that harm 

had a chilling effect.”); Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(retaliatory placement in administrative segregation for filing grievances is 

an adverse action); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(retaliatory prison transfer and double-cell status in retaliation constitutes 

adverse action). Defendant Benjamin’s alleged failure to properly process 

grievances also satisfies the first element of the Rhodes pleading standard. 

Harbridge v. Schwarzenegger, No. CV 07-4486-GW(SH), 2009 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 129379, at *36 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2009) (finding that the plaintiff 

satisfied element one of the Rhodes standard where he alleged that his 

prisoner grievances were not properly processed and his complaints were not 

adequately investigated). Accordingly, the first element of the Rhodes

pleading standard is met. See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568 (arbitrary confiscation 

and destruction of property and initiation of prison transfer are adverse 

actions).

2. Because of

The second element of the Rhodes pleading standard requires Plaintiff 

to make an assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an 

inmate because he exercised his First Amendment right. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 

567-68. Plaintiff alleges he was moved to Module 5C at the behest of 

Defendant Benjamin and that his grievances were not properly processed 

“because not only did Plaintiff continue to file grievances, but started 

assisting other inmates to file their grievances.” (ECF No. 1 at 5; see ECF 

No. 25 at 6). Plaintiff also contends Defendant Benjamin had him moved “for 

the sole purpose of separating Plaintiff from other inmates he had been 

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assisting with their grievances and to deter Plaintiff and other inmates from 

continuing to redress their grievances.” (ECF No. 1 at 5). Therefore, Plaintiff 

satisfies the second element of the Rhodes pleading standard.

3. Prisoner’s Protected Conduct

The third element of the Rhodes pleading standard requires Plaintiff to 

show he exercised protected conduct. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68. Plaintiff 

alleges that Defendant Benjamin’s actions “violated Plaintiff’s First 

Amendment Rights by preventing an avenue to seek actual relief for his 

grievances.” (ECF No. 1 at 6). This satisfies the third element of the Rhodes

pleading standard. See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567 (“of fundamental import to 

prisoners are their First Amendment ‘right[s] to file prison grievances’”).

4. Chilled First Amendment Rights

The fourth Rhodes pleading standard element requires Plaintiff to show 

that the harm chilled the exercise of his First Amendment right. Rhodes, 408 

F.3d 567-68. A plaintiff is not required to allege “a total chilling of his First 

Amendment rights to file grievances and to pursue civil rights litigation in 

order to perfect a retaliation claim. Speech can be chilled even when not 

completely silenced.” Id. at 568 (emphasis in original). The Court must ask 

“whether an official’s acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness 

from future First Amendment activities.” Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. 

Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal citations 

and quotations omitted).

Defendants contend that “the complaint does not allege facts that 

demonstrate Benjamin’s alleged conduct prevented Plaintiff from using the 

grievance process, thereby having a chilling effect on his First Amendment 

rights. To the contrary, Plaintiff admits he continued to file grievances and 

assisted other inmates in filing grievances as well.” (ECF No. 12-1 at 4). 

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Defendants are incorrect. The face of Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that 

his First Amendment rights were chilled. (ECF No. 1 at 5). Plaintiff 

specifically alleges that Defendants retaliated against him for the sole 

purpose of “deter[ring] Plaintiff and other inmates from continuing to redress 

their grievances.” (Id.). Plaintiff’s admission that he continued to file 

inmate grievances even after Defendants retaliated against him does not 

negate a chilling effect. See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568-69 (rejecting argument 

that inmate failed to state retaliation claim where, after alleged adverse 

action, plaintiff nonetheless had been able to file inmate grievances and a 

lawsuit); see also Martinez v. Muniz, No. 14-cv-03753-HSG (PR), 2016 WL 

3208398, at *13 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2016) (finding that a plaintiff’s continued 

filing of inmate appeals does not negate the existence of a chilling effect). 

Transferring an inmate to a less desirable living situation and improperly 

handling grievances would “chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness.” 

Mendocino Evtl. Ctr., 192 F.3d at 1300. Therefore, Plaintiff satisfies the 

fourth element of the Rhodes pleading standard despite the fact Plaintiff 

continued to file inmate appeals because the chilling effect need not be so 

great as to totally silence the inmate.

5. Action Did Not Reasonably Advance a Legitimate 

Correctional Goal

 The fifth and final element of the Rhodes pleading standard requires 

Plaintiff to make an assertion that Defendant Benjamin’s actions did not 

advance a legitimate correctional goal. Id. at 567-68. Plaintiff’s Complaint 

alleges that Defendant Benjamin told Plaintiff “no grievance will fix the 

problems with [the] inadequate living conditions.” (ECF No. 1 at 5). This 

suggests that Defendant Benjamin retaliated against Plaintiff because his 

grievance efforts would be futile, not to support legitimate penological 

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interests. The Court construes Plaintiff’s allegations to allege that Defendant 

Benjamin’s conduct was “arbitrary and capricious” rather than actions that 

advance legitimate goals of the correctional institution that were narrowly 

tailored to achieve such goals. See Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 532 (finding that the 

plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ actions were retaliatory and arbitrary 

and capricious, showing that they did not serve any legitimate correctional 

goal). Accordingly, Plaintiff satisfies the fifth element of the Rhodes pleading 

standard. 

6. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s Complaint satisfies the Rhodes pleading standard. The 

Court, therefore, RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss count 

one of Plaintiff’s Complaint (First Amendment Retaliation) as to Defendant 

Benjamin be DENIED. 

B. Eighth Amendment Unsanitary Living Conditions

On October 14, 2014, Plaintiff was transferred to GBDF and ultimately 

placed in Module 5C at Defendant Benjamin’s order.4 (ECF No. 1 at 7). 

Module 5C houses inmates with serious mental health issues “who are known 

 

4 Plaintiff also alleges that he was transferred to the San Diego Central Jail 

on October 13, 2014, where San Diego Sheriff’s Deputies warned him that his 

life would “be made as ‘miserable as possible’” and placed him in “an 

extremely dirty and unsanitary cell that had trash and feces spread all over 

the cell. (ECF No. 1 at 7). Plaintiff complained to the Sheriff’s Deputies for 

four hours before he was moved to a clean cell. (Id.). The Court notes that 

Plaintiff’s alleged unsanitary living conditions at the San Diego Central Jail 

are not at issue in this case. (See id.). Plaintiff’s Complaint does not name 

any Defendants employed at the San Diego Central Jail and does not allege 

that the named Defendants were responsible for the living conditions at the 

San Diego Central Jail. (See id. at 2-3). Accordingly, the Court will only 

analyze the alleged unsanitary living conditions at GBDF.

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to throw feces and continuously bang on their cell doors and toilets at all 

hours of the day.” (Id. at 5). Plaintiff alleges that Module 5C’s living 

conditions were unconstitutional because of the “constant smell of feces 

coming out of the ventilation system[,] . . . continued banging noises” and 

because the cell was covered in feces. (Id. at 5, 7; ECF No. 25 at 5). Plaintiff 

asserts that Defendants Benjamin and Stapleton were aware of the 

unsanitary living conditions and that Defendant Stapleton was blatantly 

indifferent to Plaintiff’s complaints of unsanitary living conditions. (ECF No. 

1 at 7). Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s facts do not show that either 

Defendant Stapleton or Defendant Benjamin caused “any of these alleged 

experiences or conditions.” (ECF No. 12-1 at 6). 

The Eighth Amendment provides that prison conditions must not 

amount to cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. “The 

Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it 

permit inhumane ones.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)

(internal quotations and citations omitted). Prison officials must provide 

inmates with the basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing, shelter, 

sanitation, medical care and personal safety. Id. at 832. A successful 

conditions of confinement claim must show that (1) the deprivation of the 

basic necessities of life is, objectively, sufficiently serious; and (2) the prison 

official acted with deliberate indifference. Id. at 834. Deliberate indifference 

exists where an “official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate 

health or safety; the official must both be aware of the facts from which the 

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists, and he must 

also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.

“Filthy conditions can infringe on an inmate’s basic human need for 

sanitary living conditions.” Carr v. Tousley, No. CV-06-0125SJLQ, 2009 WL 

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1514661, at *22 (D. Idaho, May 27, 2009); see Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 

F.3d 1310, 1314, as amended, 75 F.3d 448 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[A] lack of 

sanitation that is severe or prolonged can constitute an infliction of pain 

within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.”). Courts have recognized 

that proof of conditions similar to those alleged by Plaintiff may be sufficient 

to establish an Eighth Amendment claim. Cagle v. Gravlin, No. 9:09-CV0648, 2010 WL 2088267, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2010) (Lowe, M.J.) (finding 

the plaintiff’s allegations that he was subjected to feces on the wall and gate 

sufficient to plausibly suggest that he was subjected to unconstitutional 

conditions of confinement), Report and Recommendation Adopted, 2010 WL 

2087437 (N.D.N.Y. May 25, 2010) (Scrullin, S.D.J.); Hamilton v. Conway, No. 

03-CV-527S, 2008 WL 234216, at *8-9 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2008) (recognizing 

that allegations of excessive noise and inmates throwing feces in SHU may 

support an Eighth Amendment claim). Thus, at this stage in the 

proceedings, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

count two of Plaintiff’s Complaint against Defendants Benjamin and 

Stapleton (Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment) be DENIED. 

C. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause Violation

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants used “disrespectful language in 

reference to Plaintiff’s Jewish religion,” intentionally made it difficult for 

Plaintiff to contact his attorneys and family members by giving him access to 

the dayroom at midnight and by turning off the telephone in the dayroom on 

November 17, 2014. (ECF No. 1 at 8). Plaintiff also claims that Defendant 

Benjamin, as a supervisor, “allowed and encouraged rampant disrespect and 

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retribution” against Plaintiff due to him being a “Hispanic Jew.”5 (ECF No. 

25 at 7).

Defendants’ argument focuses on Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to 

religious accommodations. (ECF No. 12-1 at 5-6). Defendants’ argument is 

misplaced. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges violations of the Equal Protection 

Clause. (ECF No. 1 at 8). While Plaintiff does explain that he was denied 

religious accommodations, including a kosher diet, religious services and 

copies of a Torah and Tanakh, he does so to explain the type of grievances he 

filed that resulted in Defendants’ retaliation against him in count one of the 

Complaint and not as a separate cause of action. (ECF No. 1 at 4).

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires 

the State to treat all similarly situated people equally. See City of Cleburne 

v. City of Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). “Moreover, the 

Equal Protection Clause entitles each prisoner to ‘a reasonable opportunity of 

pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners 

who adhere to conventional religious precepts.’” Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 

878, 891 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972)). 

This does not mean that all prisoners must receive identical treatment and 

resources. See Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322 n.2; Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 880 (9th 

Cir. 1993); Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563, 568-69 (9th Cir. 1987). 

“To prevail on an Equal Protection claim brought under § 1983, 

Plaintiff[] must allege facts plausibly showing that the defendants acted with 

 

5 In his Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff for the first 

time asserts that Defendant Stapleton verbally abused him for his chosen 

religion. (ECF No. 25 at 8). The Court will not analyze whether Defendant 

Stapleton violated Plaintiff’s Equal Protection rights because he is not listed 

in the Complaint’s Equal Protection claim. (See ECF No. 1 at 8-9).

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an intent or purpose to discriminate against [him] based upon membership in 

a protected class.” Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 

1123 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

Discriminatory intent or purpose “implies that the decision maker . . . 

selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because 

of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” 

Pers. Adm’r of Mass. V. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). The Equal 

Protection Clause prohibits the government from engaging in discrimination 

that burdens a fundamental right, such as religious freedom. See City of 

Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. 

Plaintiff sufficiently alleges membership in a protected class because he 

is Jewish. (ECF No. 1 at 4, 8). Within the Equal Protection count on pages 

eight and nine of his Complaint, Plaintiff explains that Defendants made 

“racially insensitive slurs” and that Defendant Benjamin ordered others to 

move Plaintiff to Module 5C. (Id. at 9). Further, Plaintiff explains that 

Defendant Benjamin “allowed and encouraged rampart disrespect and 

retribution against Plaintiff as a practicing Jew.” (ECF No. 25 at 7). 

Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the Complaint also 

sufficiently alleges that Defendant Benjamin acted with the requisite 

discriminatory intent or purpose. See Vann v. Hernandez, No. 1:07-cv-01238-

LJO-SMS PC, 2008 WL 4500230, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2008) (Jewish 

plaintiff showed discriminatory intent or purpose where defendants “made 

remarks critical of plaintiff’s religion”); Bachman v. Melo, No. 1:05-CV01438OWWLJOP, 2006 WL 1455443, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 25, 2006) (Jewish 

homosexual plaintiff showed discriminatory intent or purpose where 

defendants called him a “Christ killing Jewish fag”); Epileptic Found. v. City 

& County of Maui, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1013 (D. Haw. 2003) (discriminatory 

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intent evident where park official used racial slur). Accordingly, at this stage 

in the proceedings, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss count three of Plaintiff’s Complaint against Defendant Benjamin 

(Equal Protection Clause violation) be DENIED.

D. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Violation

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Stapleton violated Plaintiff’s due 

process rights by confiscating his personal property, including legal 

documents, original grievances, stamped envelopes, personally made 

drawings, books, canteen items and Plaintiff’s address book. (ECF No. 1-1 at 

1). Defendants argue that there is no due process right to destruction of 

personal property where there is an alternate remedy available.6 (ECF No. 

12-1 at 6). 

Prisoners have a protected interest in their personal property under the 

Due Process Clause. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974); Hansen v. 

May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974). An authorized, intentional 

deprivation of property is actionable under the Due Process Clause. See 

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 n.13 (1984) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman 

Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-36 (1982)). Neither negligent nor unauthorized 

intentional deprivations of property give rise to a violation of the Due Process 

Clause if the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Hudson, 

468 U.S. at 533 n.14. “In other words, only an authorized intentional 

deprivation of property is actionable under the Due Process Clause. 

Authorized deprivations of property are permissible if carried out pursuant to 

a regulation that is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.” 

 

6 Defendants do not challenge Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Benjamin had 

Plaintiff transferred to Module 5C without due process. (See ECF No. 12-1). 

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Haraszewski v. Knipp, No. 2:13-cv-2494 DB P, 2016 WL 6766750, at *3 (E.D. 

Cal. Nov. 14, 2016).

Plaintiff vaguely alleges that Defendant Stapleton illegally “confiscated 

Plaintiff’s personal property” in retaliation for filing a Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus. (ECF No. 1-1 at 1). “Plaintiff’s allegations of wrongful, 

retaliatory confiscation of his personal property does not support a claim. 

Unauthorized, bad-faith behavior does not support a federal due process 

claim” if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy is available for the loss. Chick 

v. Lacey, No. 1:11-cv-01447-GBC (PC), 2012 WL 3912796, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 

Sept. 7, 2012) (citing Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533); Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533. The 

Ninth Circuit has held that “California Law provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy for any property deprivations.” Barnett v. Centoni, 31 

F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 810-895. “It is 

immaterial whether or not Plaintiff succeeds in redressing his loss through 

the available state remedies; it is the existence of these alternate remedies 

that bars him from pursuing a § 1983 procedural due process claim.” 

Hutchison v. Marshall, No. CV 09-04540-ABC (VBK), 2011 WL 862118, at *9 

(C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2011) (citing Willoughby v. Luster, 717 F. Supp. 1439, 1443 

(D. Nev. 1989)).

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff’s violation of due process against Defendant Stapleton be 

GRANTED and Plaintiff be given leave to amend. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Noll, 809 F.2d at 1448-49.

E. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

In count nine, Plaintiff contends Defendant Stapleton intentionally 

inflicted emotional distress upon Plaintiff by “taunting and 

psychologically/verbal[ly] abus[ing] Plaintiff [for three hours] prior to 

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physically assaulting him.”7 (ECF No. 1-1 at 6). Plaintiff alleges that he was 

given dayroom access at 12:30 a.m. and asked to make a phone call, but the 

phone had been turned off. (Id. at 2). From 1:00 a.m. to 4:00 a.m., Defendant 

Stapleton “verbally harassed Plaintiff by calling him disrespectful names (i.e. 

‘bitch,’ ‘kike,’ ‘punk,’ ‘sewer rat,’ etc.) and . . . attempted to ‘psych out’ the 

Plaintiff by flashing the overhead lights and opening/closing/clicking the front

and side doors.” (Id. at 3). Plaintiff claims that “[a]fter 3 hours of suffering 

this abuse, Plaintiff was mentally exhausted, distraught, and distressed.”8 

(Id.).

Defendants contend Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Stapleton’s 

conduct should be dismissed because there generally is no recovery for “mere 

profanity, obscenity, or abuse, without circumstances of aggravation, or for 

insults, indignities or threats which are considered to amount to nothing 

more than mere annoyances.” (ECF No. 12-1 at 5) (internal quotations and 

citations omitted).

A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires a 

plaintiff to prove “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with 

 

7 Intentional infliction of emotional distress is a state law claim. The court 

has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s civil rights causes of action pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental claims, including intentional infliction of 

emotional distress, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 

8 Plaintiff also contends that Defendant Stapleton is liable for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress for his alleged destruction of Plaintiff’s 

property and that Defendant Benjamin is liable for transferring Plaintiff to 

Module 5C. (ECF Nos. 1-1 at 6; 25 at 7-8). Defendants do not challenge 

these allegations. (See ECF No. 12-1 at 5). Accordingly, the Court will not 

determine whether these claims are sufficiently plead so as to survive a 

motion to dismiss.

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the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, 

emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional 

distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by 

the defendant's outrageous conduct.” Doe v. Gangland Prods., 730 F.3d 946, 

960 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 

209 (1982)). 

Plaintiff properly pled a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress against Defendant Stapleton. Plaintiff alleged that (1) Defendant 

Stapleton intentionally attempted to “psych out” Plaintiff by flashing lights, 

opening and closing doors and verbally abusing or taunting him for a period 

of three hours in the early morning; (2) Plaintiff suffered mental exhaustion 

and distress; and (3) Defendant Stapleton’s conduct was the actual cause of 

Plaintiff’s emotional distress. (ECF Nos. 1 at 3; 1-1 at 6). Thus, Plaintiff 

sufficiently stated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress 

against Defendant Stapleton to survive a motion to dismiss.

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim (count 

nine) against Defendant Stapleton for taunting and harassing Plaintiff for 

three hours be DENIED.

F. Timeliness 

Defendants allege that Plaintiff’s state claims must be dismissed as 

untimely pursuant to California Government Code §945.6(a)(1). (ECF No. 

12-1 at 7). Defendants claim that Plaintiff failed to timely file the instant 

action within six months after the August 27, 2015, rejection of Plaintiff’s 

state tort claims against Defendants Benjamin and Stapleton. (Id. at 7; ECF 

No. 12-2 at 3). Plaintiff contends that he mailed his Complaint on February 

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26, 2016, making his state claims timely under the mailbox rule. (ECF No. 

25 at 9).

Before a state law claim can be brought in state or federal court, the 

California Tort Claims Act requires that a claim against a public entity or its 

employees be presented to the California Victim Compensation and 

Government Claims Board no more than six months after the cause of action 

accrues. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 905, 945.4, 950.2; Hernandez v. McClanahan, 996 

F. Supp. 975, 977 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (failure to present timely California tort 

claims bars plaintiff from bringing them in federal suit). If the claim is 

rejected, the claimant has six months to file a lawsuit. Cal. Gov’t Code § 

945.6. Under the mailbox rule, pro se prisoner documents are considered 

filed as of the date the prisoner delivers the document to prison authorities. 

Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 275-76 (1988); Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 

1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the Houston mailbox rule applies to § 

1983 suits filed by pro se prisoners).

On August 27, 2015, the County of San Diego mailed Plaintiff a “Notice 

of Rejection of Claim.” (ECF No. 12-2 at 3). The Complaint was signed by 

Plaintiff, a pro se prisoner, and the envelope was dated and signed by “Davis” 

on February 26, 2016. (ECF No. 1-1 at 9, 11). Under the mailbox rule, 

Plaintiff’s Complaint was timely filed on February 26, 2016, which is five 

months and thirty days from the dated “Notice of Rejection of Claim.” (See 

ECF Nos. 1-1; 12-2). Thus, Plaintiff’s Complaint is timely and the Court 

RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s state causes 

of action as untimely be DENIED.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

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1) Defendants’ Motion be DENIED as to Plaintiff’s First 

Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Benjamin (count one);

2) Defendants’ Motion be DENIED as to Plaintiff’s Eighth 

Amendment claim against Defendants Benjamin and Stapleton (count two);

3) Defendants’ Motion be DENIED as to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth 

Amendment Equal Protection Claim against Defendant Benjamin (count 

three);

4) Defendants’ Motion be GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth 

Amendment Due Process claim against Defendant Stapleton and Plaintiff be 

given LEAVE TO AMEND (count four);

5) Defendants’ Motion be DENIED as to Plaintiff’s intentional 

infliction of emotional distress claim against Defendant Stapleton for 

taunting and harassing Plaintiff for three hours (count nine); and

6) Defendants’ Motion be DENIED as to Plaintiff’s state law claims.

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United 

States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written objections with the court and 

serve a copy on all parties by May 12, 2017. The document shall be 

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the 

objections shall be served and filed by May 19, 2017.

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the 

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 19, 2017

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