Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02808/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02808-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jose J. Rodriguez, )

)

 Petitioner, )

) 

v. ) CV 04-2808 PHX FJM (VAM)

)

Deputy Warden Tucker, et al., ) ORDER

)

 Respondents. )

Pending before the Court is petitioner's Motion for

Appointment of Counsel. (Doc. 13).

In a previous order, the Court noted that petitioner claims

he needs counsel at least in part, due to his allegation he is

mentally retarded and has an IQ of only 58. (See Doc. 13). The

Court, noting that "[i]f petitioner is mentally retarded it may be

necessary to appoint counsel if his habeas petition appears to

have merit," ordered respondents to file a response to the motion. 

(Doc. 16 at pp. 2-3).

After being granted extensions of time, respondents filed a

response on December 29, 2005, and this matter is ready for

disposition. (Doc. 23).

I. Law Generally

Indigent prisoners seeking habeas corpus relief are not

entitled to appointed counsel unless the circumstances indicate

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that counsel is necessary to prevent due process violations. 

Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 425, 428 (9th Cir. 1993); Chaney v.

Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S.

1023 (1987). The Court has discretion to appoint counsel when

"the interests of justice so require." 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(2)(B);

see also Bonin, 999 F.2d at 428-29 (explaining counsel should be

appointed in habeas cases only "when the case is so complex that

due process violations will occur absent the presence of

counsel"). Before appointment of counsel in a habeas proceeding

will be appropriate the Court "must evaluate the likelihood of

success on the merits as well as the ability of the petitioner to

articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the

legal issues involved." Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th

Cir. 1983); see also Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 750 (n. 8) 

(9th Cir. 1995).

II. Analysis of Petitioner's Request for Counsel

In his motion, petitioner contends the interests of justice

require that he be appointed counsel in this matter because he is

mentally retarded with an IQ of 58 "and i don't know what i am

doing don't know how to write to[o] good at all i don't know why

they have me here in prison ..." (Doc. 13).

In response, respondents oppose appointment of counsel. 

They concede that experts testifying on petitioner's behalf at

sentencing testified his IQ was 58, but argue that, although

"proof of mild mental retardation is sufficiently established ....

the expanded state record now before the Court conclusively

refutes the one viable claim raised in the habeas corpus petition:

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trial counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to inform the court and

opposing counsel of prisoner's mental retardation and I.Q. of 58." 

(Doc. 23 at p. 3). Respondents further contend weighing the

likelihood of success and petitioner's ability to articulate his

claims pro se remains the standard to evaluate whether appointment

of counsel is warranted and that petitioner has not established

either a likelihood of success or an inability to articulate his

claims pro se. (See id. at p. 4). As a result, they argue the

motion should be denied.

Weygandt and other cases make clear that the mere fact that

petitioner's IQ is 58, without more, is not sufficient to

establish entitlement to appointed counsel. Rather, petitioner

must demonstrate both an inability to articulate his claims pro se

and a likelihood of success on the merits of his claims. See

Weygandt, 718 F.2d at 954; see also Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789

F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986) and Agyeman v. Corrections

Corporation of America, 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004)

(Applying this standard in motions for appointment of counsel in

civil rights actions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)). As noted

in Wilborn, "[n]either of these factors is dispositive and both

must be viewed together before reaching a decision on request of

counsel ..." Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331.

Review of the facts in this case do not support appointing

counsel. Petitioner's low IQ alone, absent a showing of an

inability to articulate his claims pro se and a showing of a

likelihood of success on the merits, does not warrant appointment

of counsel. Review of his claims show that they are not complex

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and petitioner has communicated them with sufficient clarity. 

 Petitioner's primary claim alleges his counsel was

ineffective for not raising his mental competence as an issue

during his trial (and presumably on appeal). He also alleges that

counsel failed to inform him "on most of my Court proceedings." 

(Doc. 1 at p. 5). In addition, petitioner alleges that his

conviction was obtained due to a failure by the prosecution to

disclose evidence favorable to him. (Id.). Finally, Petitioner

also asserts he was denied a fair trial. (Doc. 1 at p. 6). 

A preliminary review of the record does not indicate a

likelihood of success on the merits of any of these claims. Other

than make assertions petitioner provides no convincing evidence. 

Moreover, petitioner did not properly exhaust any of his habeas

claims in state court. None of the claims were raised on direct

appeal. No copy of petitioner's pro se brief to the state trial

court in support of his petition for post-conviction relief was

included in the habeas record. (See Doc. 19 at Exhibit R),

Respondents state petitioner raised a claim in the Rule 32

alleging "his low intelligence interfered with his ability to

assist appellate counsel." (Doc. 19 at p. 4). However, that

issue is different than the claim raised in the habeas petition

and petitioner never sought review of the trial court's denial of

post-conviction relief in either the Arizona Court of Appeals or

Arizona Supreme Court. (See Doc. 1 at pp. 3 and 5; Doc. 19 at p.

4). 

If petitioner believes his mental competency (or lack

thereof) prevented him from properly raising and/or exhausting any

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of his habeas claims in state court, this may be grounds for

returning to state court, seeking appointment of counsel to

present these claims, and presenting these claims, including, most

particularly, any claims based on his lack of competency to stand

trial, in a new post-conviction relief petition. See

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(e) and (f); 32.4(a) (providing exceptions for

filing a second or successive petition for post-conviction

relief). In any event, petitioner must first exhaust his habeas

claims in state court. His failure to do so means he has no

chance of prevailing on such claims when raised for the first time

in a federal habeas corpus petition. For these reasons,

appointment of counsel in this matter is unwarranted and will not

serve the interests of justice.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that petitioner's Motion for

Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 13) is denied without prejudice.

 DATED this 25th day of January, 2006.

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