Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02809/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02809-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity Action

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BENJAMIN GUTIERREZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

ELI LILLY AND COMPANY and 

JAYD HANNA,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-02809-BTMAHG

ORDER

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, Eli Lilly & Company (“Lilly”), 

and former co-employee, Jayd Hanna (“Hanna”), in California Superior Court for 

claims related to his termination from Lilly. (ECF No. 1 (“Pl.’s Compl.”.) Plaintiff 

alleges numerous violations of employment discrimination laws and one count of 

defamation against Lilly. The only claim against Hanna is for defamation. (Id. at 

¶ 16-25.) Plaintiff argues that Hanna defamed him by maliciously making 

statements that he sexually harassed coworkers, (Id. at ¶¶ 12-13, 23), which led 

to his termination from Lilly, (ECF No. 14 (“Pl.’s Reply to Defs.’ Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. 

to Remand”), 3:3-10.) 

Lilly removed the case on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1

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(“Def.’s Notice of Removal”).) Hanna later consented to and joined in the 

removal. (ECF No. 11). Plaintiff and Hanna appear to be citizens of California 

and Lilly is a citizen of Indiana. (Def.’s Notice of Removal, at ¶¶ 7-11.) Though 

Hanna is not diverse from Plaintiff, Lilly argues that Hanna was fraudulently

joined and that her citizenship should be disregarded. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Plaintiff 

moved to remand this case to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

(ECF No. 6 (“Pl.’s Motion to Remand”).) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Pleading

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must include “a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8 does not require “‘detailed factual 

allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555). A pleading must go beyond 

“labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A complaint that “tenders 

‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” fails to satisfy Rule

8’s pleading standard. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557); see also 

Sollberger v. Wachovia Securities, LLC, 2010 WL 2674456, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 

30, 2010) (explaining that a complaint fails as “neither plain nor specific” under 

Rule 8(a) where “the facts do not support the inferences Plaintiff makes”).

Where the “complaint fails to link adequately a cause of action to its factual 

predicates,” the Court has a “supervisory obligation to sua sponte order 

repleading pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e).” Wagner v. First 

Horizon Pharm. Corp., 464 F.3d 1273, 1275 (11th Cir. 2006); see also CedilloVargas v. McAleenan, 2019 WL 3429187, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 29, 2019) 

(ordering Plaintiffs to replead under Rule 12(e) sua sponte because “the Court 

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does not believe that cognizable claims are immediately apparent from the face 

of the complaint”). 

B. Fraudulent Joinder

A fraudulently joined, or “sham,” defendant is one who is used as a “device 

to prevent an exercise of the [defendant’s] right of removal.” Wilson v. Republic 

Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 94 (1921) “[A] joinder is fraudulent when a 

plaintiff’s failure to state a cause of action against the resident defendant is 

obvious according to the applicable state law.” Allen v. Boeing, 784 F.3d 625, 

634 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th 

Cir. 2009)). The removing party bears the heavy burden of proving fraudulent 

joinder. Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1044. In determining whether a defendant is indeed 

fraudulently joined, the Court may “pierc[e] the pleadings” and look beyond the 

allegations in the complaint. Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 

1068 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Cavallini v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 44 

F.3d 256, 263 (5th Cir. 1995). The Court may dismiss fraudulently joined 

defendants from the action. See Grancare, LLC v. Thrower by and through Mills, 

889 F.3d 543, 549 (9th Cir. 2018).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff sued Hanna for defamation. To state a claim under California 

defamation law, the plaintiff must specifically identify the defamatory statement. 

Gilbert v. Sykes, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 752, 767 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (“The general rule 

is that the words constituting an alleged libel must be specifically identified, if not 

pleaded verbatim, in the complaint.”). Plaintiff describes a number of sexual 

harassment complaints that were discussed at his termination meeting. But he 

does not say which, if any, of those statements were made by Hanna. (See Pl.’s 

Compl, at ¶ 12.) Plaintiff has only speculated as to the existence of defamatory 

statements but has not identified their content. (See Pl.’s Reply to Defs.’ Opp. to 

Pl.’s Mot. to Remand, at 3:3-10 (“Hanna made slanderous statements about the 

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Plaintiff both within and outside of the employment environment, statements 

which caused Plaintiff to be wrongfully terminated. . . . The statements about him 

were false and called into question his moral character and harmed his 

reputation. . . .”))

Plaintiff has also failed to meet the Rule 8 standard in connecting Hanna to 

the complaints. Plaintiff asserts his good faith belief that Hanna defamed him, 

but the only fact Plaintiff pleads supporting this belief is that Hanna once made a 

comment about her own physical appearance at a work gathering. (Pl.’s Compl., 

at ¶ 14:16-21.) The Court fails to see the nexus between this incident and 

anonymous complaints made to human resources. 

Defendants assert a common interest privilege to any such statements 

made by Hanna. (Def.’s Notice of Removal, ¶¶ 18-22.) When an absolute

privilege exists, it completely disposes of the underlying claim and permits the 

Court to “rightly conclude that no cause of action had been stated against” the 

defendant, thus establishing fraudulent joinder. McCabe v. General Foods Corp., 

811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987). Under California law, “complaint[s] of 

sexual harassment by an employee, without malice, to an employer based upon 

credible evidence” are privileged. Cal. Civ. Code § 47(c). Though such 

statements are “absolutely privileged,” a “triable issue” may exist as to whether 

the statements were made with malice. Cruey v. Gannett Company, Inc., 76 

Cal.Rptr.2d 670, 678 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 

Under California law, the plaintiff “bears the burden of proving malice.” 

SDV/ACCI, Inc. v. A T & T Corp., 552 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lundquist 

v. Reusser, 7 Cal.4th 1193, 1211 (1994)). “ [M]alice is not inferred from the 

communication.” Cal. Civ. Code § 48. The plaintiff must provide “specific facts” 

in support of an allegation of malice. See Solarcity Corporation v. Doria, 2018 

WL 2229397, at *6 (S.D. Cal. May 16, 2018) (“General allegations of malice will 

not suffice, rather ‘actual facts of malice must be alleged or be apparent from the 

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communications themselves.’” (quoting Martin v. Kearney, 124 Cal.Rptr 281, 283

(Cal. Ct. App. 1975)). Plaintiff merely states that Defendants acted “with malice 

motivated by hatred or ill will” against him. (Pl.’s Compl., ¶ 23.) He again 

provides no factual support for an otherwise bare legal conclusion. Without facts 

supporting malice, the common interest privilege would completely extinguish 

Plaintiff’s claim against Hanna.

IV. CONCLUSION

While the Court must resolve all questions of fact in Plaintiff’s favor in 

deciding whether to remand, the Court cannot do this when Plaintiff presents no 

facts at all. Plaintiff’s defamation claim against Hanna presently fails to satisfy 

Rule 8(a). The Court cannot properly review the motion to remand and 

fraudulent joinder claim without identification of the defamatory statements and 

facts supporting Plaintiff’s belief that Hanna made these statements (1) at all, and 

(2) with malice. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS Plaintiff to amend his complaint 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) to resolve the factual deficiencies described 

above by September 13, 2019. The Court will resolve the pending motion based 

on the Amended Complaint. Further, Plaintiff and Defendant Hanna shall file 

separate statements specifying the states of their citizenship.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 29, 2019

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