Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-04984/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-04984-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT W. CAMPBELL, SR., 

Plaintiff,

 vs.

EDWARD S. ALAMEIDA, et al., 

Defendants. /

No. C 03-4984 PJH (PR)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This is a civil rights case filed pro se by a state prisoner. The remaining defendants,

A. Lamarque, J. Sareli, and D. Moon, move for summary judgment on the ground that there

are no material facts in dispute and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Plaintiff has filed an opposition. The motion is ready for decision.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s claims are based upon the defendants’ roles in denying him permission to

purchase and have in his cell “religious oils” called for by his religious beliefs. In the initial

review order the court dismissed claims against defendants Alameida, Grannis and Zavala

and ordered service on defendants Lamarque and Sareli. Plaintiff filed several requests for

leave to amend, without proposed amendments; the court denied the motions but granted

leave to file a complaint containing all of plaintiff’s claims. In the amendment he added

Chaplain Douglas Moon as a defendant; the court ordered service upon him. 

The prison has now reversed its policy and allowed plaintiff to purchase and possess

religious oils. 

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United States District Court

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DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show

that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may

affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury

to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those

portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Nissan

Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). When the moving

party has met this burden of production, the nonmoving party must go beyond the

pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial. If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to

show a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party wins. Id.

B. Analysis 

Defendants contend that there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial and that

on the undisputed facts they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the merits. 

They also contend that they are entitled to summary judgment on grounds of qualified

immunity. The court will consider in turn how these arguments apply to each of plaintiff’s

claims. 

 Plaintiff contends that refusal to allow him to have the religious oils he sought

violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion, his equal protection rights in

that Muslim inmates were allowed religious oils, and his rights under a federal statute, the 

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1. First Amendment Free Expression claim

a. Merits

i. Standard

In order to establish a free exercise violation, a prisoner must show a defendant

burdened the practice of his religion, by preventing him from engaging in conduct

mandated by his faith, without any justification reasonably related to legitimate penological

interests. See Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997). To reach the level of

a constitutional violation, "the interference with one's practice of religion 'must be more than

an inconvenience; the burden must be substantial and an interference with a tenet or belief

that is central to religious doctrine.'" Id. at 737 (quoting Graham v. C.I.R., 822 F.2d 844,

851 (9th Cir. 1987)). A prisoner may be inconvenienced in the practice of his or her faith so

long as the governmental conduct does not prohibit the prisoner from "participating in the

mandates of his religion." See id. (failure to give notice allowing time for cleansing ritual,

shackling, requiring sign-in for services and abusive language directed at faith failed to rise

to a constitutional level). 

A restriction on an inmate’s First Amendment religious rights is valid if it is

reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482

U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). There are several

factors which should be considered in determining whether a restriction is reasonably

related to legitimate penological interests: (1) The restriction must have a logical

connection to legitimate governmental interests; (2) "whether there are alternative means of

exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates"; (3) "the impact accommodation of

the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates and on the allocation

of prison resources generally"; and (4) the "absence of ready alternatives", or, in other

words, whether the rule at issue is an "exaggerated response to prison concerns." Turner,

482 U.S. at 89-90.

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1 The letter from Elder George Garner of Yahweh’s Assembly in Messiah, in Rocheport,

Missouri, says that “we have no studies on this anointing oil” and quotes a Bible verse

regarding use of oil in anointing the sick, which is not the same as plaintiff’s belief that he

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ii. Analysis

Plaintiff’s declaration contains allegations which, if proved, would establish that use

of religious oils is mandated by his personal religious beliefs. Pl.’s decl. at 2 ¶ 3 (“[prayer

oil] is an essential element/tool that enables and enhances a Believer[‘]s daily worship as

well as witness to Yahweh the Most High.”); 5 ¶ 11 (“prayer/anointing oil ... is an

element/tool intricately woven in ‘my faith’”). However, no violation of his First Amendment

rights can be made out if the restriction is reasonably related to legitimate penological

objectives, applying the O’Lone/Turner factors. 

It is generally the state's burden to establish a rational relationship between its

limiting regulation or policy and the legitimate penological objectives it asserts. Beard v.

Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2581-82 (2006). However, a dismissal of a claim challenging the

constitutionality of a prison policy, without requiring any evidence corroborating that a

rational connection exists between the prison policy and legitimate penological interests, is

appropriate if a common-sense connection exists between the regulation and the legitimate

governmental interest. Whitmire v. Arizona, 298 F.3d 1134, 1136 (9th Cir. 2002). “[E]ven

in the absence of institution-specific or general social science evidence, as long as it is

plausible that prison officials believed the policy would further a legitimate objective, the

governmental defendant should prevail on Turner’s first prong.” Frost v. Symington, 197

F.3d 348, 355 (9th Cir. 1999). 

In this case, petitioner concedes that he is a follower of no particular denomination,

but has taken what he believes to be the best of several versions of Christianity, along with

his own interpretation of the Bible, as his religion. Pl.’s decl. at ¶ ¶ 2-3, 19-20. In his efforts

to convince the defendants that his religion required personal use of religious oils, he cited

many bible verses as the sole proof of that requirement, rather than providing secondary

materials from an established church. See Am. Compl. ex. A-E.1

 In short, the religious oils

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28 should use it in daily prayer. 

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requirement is plaintiff’s own view of what his personal religion requires – which is all very

well, but accommodation of such individual views in a prison setting could be very

disruptive. Therefore, there is a common-sense connection between orderly administration

of the prison and not allowing claims for religious accommodation that are unique to one

prisoner or a very small group of prisoners. The restriction satisfies the first Turner test.

The second Turner factor, whether there are alternative means of exercising the

right that remain open, should not be defined too narrowly. Rather, the “‘relevant inquiry

under this factor is not whether the inmate has an alternative means of engaging in a

particular religious practice that he or she claims is being affected; rather, we are to

determine whether the inmate has been denied all means of religious expression.’” 

Henderson v. Terhune, 379 F.3d 709, 714 (quoting Ward v.Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir.

1993)). Obviously, in this case the denial of personal religious oil did not deny plaintiff all

means of religious expression.

The third Turner factor is the burden that accommodating plaintiff’s request would

have on the prison. Although it is clear that accommodating the request would not have a

significant impact in itself, allowing individual exceptions for personal religious beliefs held

by only one prisoner or only a very small group of prisoners could be very disruptive, given

that the authorities might be flooded with requests of all sorts. See Henderson, 379 F.3d

709. 714 (9th Cir. 2004) (recognizing burden on prison of exception for prisoner whose

religion banned cutting hair). 

The final factor is whether there are alternatives that would accommodate the right

at de minimis cost to the prison. For the reasons discussed with respect to the third factor

above, there are not. 

Applying the Turner factors, the court concludes that defendants are entitled to

summary judgment on plaintiff’s First Amendment Free Exercise claim. 

b. Qualified immunity

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Defendants also contend that they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s

damages claims because they are qualifiedly immune. The court will consider this as a

possible alternative ground for the grant of summary judgment on this issue.

i. Standard

The defense of qualified immunity protects "government officials . . . from liability for

civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The rule of qualified immunity “‘provides ample

protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law;’”

defendants can have a reasonable, but mistaken, belief about the facts or about what the

law requires in any given situation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (quoting

Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). "Therefore, regardless of whether the

constitutional violation occurred, the [official] should prevail if the right asserted by the

plaintiff was not 'clearly established' or the [official] could have reasonably believed that his

particular conduct was lawful." Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir.

1991). Qualified immunity is particularly amenable to summary judgment adjudication. 

Martin v. City of Oceanside, 360 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004).

A court considering a claim of qualified immunity must first determine whether the

plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right, then proceed to

determine if the right was “clearly established.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U. S. 603 (1999);

Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999). The threshold question must be: Taken in the

light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's

conduct violated a constitutional right? Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201

“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established,

there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Saucier, 533 U.S.

at 201. On the other hand, if a violation could be made out on the allegations, the next

sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established. Id. This inquiry must be

undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition. 

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Id. at 202. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly

established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id. If the law did not put the officer on notice that

his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is

appropriate. Id.

Even if the violated right is clearly established, qualified immunity shields an officer

from suit when he makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably

misapprehends the law governing the circumstances he confronted. Brosseau v. Haugen,

543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004); Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205-06. If “the officer’s mistake as to what

the law requires is reasonable . . . the officer is entitled to the immunity defense.” Id. at

205.

ii. Analysis

The court above concludes that plaintiff has not provided allegations which, if

proved, would show that his First Amendment free exercise rights were violated, the first

step of the Saucier analysis. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Defendants therefore are entitled

to qualified immunity on this claim.

Alternatively, the court will assume, for the sake of this decision only, that plaintiff’s

First Amendment rights were violated and consider the second Saucier step, whether the

right was sufficiently clearly established that it would be clear to a reasonable officer that

his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id. at 202. The court has not

found, and the parties have not pointed out, any authority that suggests that prison

authorities are required to accommodate religious beliefs held by only one prisoner or only

a handful of prisoners. On the contrary, cases have upheld refusal to accommodate

requests from prisoners who subscribe to religions which are widespread in society, though

perhaps not in a particular prison. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 & n.2 (1972) (not

every religious sect or group within a prison must have identical facilities or personnel);

Ward, 1 F.3d at 880 (no affirmative duty to provide prisoner with Orthodox rabbi); Johnson

v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 520 (9th Cir. 1991) (no free exercise violation where prisoner did

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not show prison's failure to provide him with Unitarian Universalist chaplain denied him

"reasonable opportunity" to exercise his faith); Reimers v. Oregon, 863 F.2d 630, 632 (9th

Cir. 1988) (no violation where prisoner denied United Pentecostal pastor). The defendants

therefore are entitled to qualified immunity on this alternative ground. 

2. Equal protection

Plaintiff contends that allowing Muslim prisoners to have prayer oils in their cells and

denying him the same privilege violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause.

a. Merits

The Equal Protection Clause requires that an inmate who is an adherent of a

minority religion be afforded a "reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to

the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts,"

Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (Buddhist prisoners must be given opportunity to

pursue faith comparable to that given Christian prisoners), as long as the inmate's religious

needs are balanced against the reasonable penological goals of the prison, O'Lone v.

Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987). 

Although prisoners are entitled to equal protection, it does not follow that a prison

must duplicate every religious benefit it provides so that all religions are treated exactly the

same. As the Supreme Court explained in Cruz:

We do not suggest . . . that every religious sect or group within a prison--

however few in number--must have identical facilities or personnel. A

special chapel or place of worship need not be provided for every faith

regardless of size; nor must a chaplain, priest, or minister be provided

without regard to the extent of the demand. But reasonable opportunities

must be afforded to all prisoners to exercise the religious freedom

guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments without fear of

penalty.

405 U.S. at 322 n.2. 

Application of the Cruz standard does not require "strict numerical analysis" or

"create a system of ratios or quotas." Thompson v. Commonwealth of Ky., 712 F.2d 1078,

1081 (6th Cir. 1983) (upholding grant of summary judgment on Muslim inmates' request for

access to chapel comparable to Christian inmates). It does require that the prison make a

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good faith accommodation in light of practical considerations. See Freeman, 125 F.3d at

737; Thompson, 712 F.2d at 1082 (court should scrutinize the prison officials' conduct to

determine whether they deliberately discriminated against the minority religion or abused

their discretion in distributing the prisons' limited resources). 

Defendants contend that there was no equal protection violation because plaintiff

and Muslim prisoners are not similarly situated and that plaintiff’s claim cannot survive the

four-factor Turner/O’Lone test. They are correct, for the reasons discussed in the section

above regarding the First Amendment claim. That is, under the Cruz test the defendants

need not provide plaintiff with the same accommodations that are given to Muslims, and

upon application of the Turner factors it is clear that treating plaintiff differently than a large

religious group is rationally related to the legitimate penological objective of simplifying

administration of the prison. 

b. Qualified immunity

As to the first prong of the Saucier test, the court has found above that plaintiff’s

allegations would not, even if proved, establish that defendants violated his equal

protection rights. Defendants therefore are entitled to qualified immunity from damages on

this claim. 

3. RLUIPA

a. Merits

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000cc-1, provides: "No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious

exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997

[which includes state prisons, state psychiatric hospitals, and local jails], even if the burden

results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that

imposition of the burden on that person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental

interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental

interest." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). The statute applies to any "program or activity that

receives Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b)(1). 

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RLUIPA defines "religious exercise" to include "any exercise of religion, whether or

not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." San Jose Christian College v.

Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)). 

RLUIPA does not define "substantial burden." Id. Construing the term in accord with its

plain meaning, the Ninth Circuit holds that "a 'substantial burden' on 'religious exercise'

must impose a significantly great restriction or onus upon such exercise." Id.; see id. at

1035-36 (City's denial of rezoning application by College which sought to build non-secular

school on property zoned for hospital use was not substantial burden on religious exercise;

College could use other sites within the city and other entities would be subject to same

restrictions). 

In properly applying RLUIPA, courts must take into account the burden

accommodations may impose upon nonbeneficiaries and must satisfy themselves that the

act is being applied neutrally among different faiths. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720

(2005). The accommodation must measured, so that it does not override significant

interests such as safety and maintaining order. Id. at 721. Although the Act adopted a

“compelling governmental interest” standard, the context must be considered; congress

expected the courts to apply the Act with due deference to prison authorities’ expertise, id.

at 723, and prison security is a compelling state interest, id. at 725 n.13. 

Defendants contend that their restriction on possession of prayer oil was not a

substantial burden on plaintiff’s religious exercise, because he was able to attend Christian

services and be anointed with oil there, and if he were to fall ill, the chaplain would come to

his cell to anoint him. Defs.’ P. & A. at 6 (citing decl. of def. Moon at ¶ 2). Plaintiff disputes

this in his declaration, saying that this alternative was never available to him in practice,

because “any chapel service, be it Protestant, Catholic or Islamic was virtually nonexisting;” prisoners questioned as to whether oil was offered to attendees at services

always answered “no;” that the chaplain almost never conducted the services, and that the

person who did conduct them said he had never been told about prayer oils or told to carry

them. Pl.’s decl. at ¶ 27. Two inmates who attended protestant services support this. 

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2 In view of the resolution of the grounds for summary judgment raised by defendants,

the court has not considered whether RLUIPA permits suit against defendants in their

individual capacity, compare Boles v. Neet, 402 F.Supp.2d 1237, 1240 (D. Colo. 2005)

(RLUIPA actions lie against governments, and do not appear to be permitted against

individuals in their individual capacities), with Guru Nanak Sikh Society of Yuba City v. Sutter, 326 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1136 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (“government” in RLUIPA includes officials, so

actions are permitted against them at least in their official capacities), and whether money

damages can be recovered for violation of RLUIPA, see Boles, 402 F.Supp.2d at 1241 (holding

damages not available). 

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Glen Davis decl. attached to amen. complaint at ¶ 7; Evans decl. attached to amen.

complaint at ¶ 6. Also, when plaintiff was in administrative segregation and unable to leave

his cell he asked defendant Moon to come to his cell and administer prayer oil, and

received no response. Pl.’s decl. at ¶ 31. 

In short, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was available

to plaintiff an alternative to having the prayer oil in his cell, and if plaintiff’s version is

correct, his rights under RLUIPA were violated. Defendants are not entitled to summary

judgment on the merits of this claim.2

 

b. Qualified immunity

The standard for consideration of qualified immunity claims is set out above. On the

first prong of the Saucier analysis, plaintiff has provided allegations which, if proved, would

show the violation of his RLUIPA rights. 

The second Saucier prong is whether in light of existing law it would have been clear

to reasonable officers in the position of defendants that their conduct was unlawful. 

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. RLUIPA is relatively new, having only been passed in 2000. The

events giving rise to plaintiff’s claims here occurred in 2002. The only Ninth Circuit 

RLUIPA decision filed in 2002 or before was Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062 (9th

Cir. 2002), which decided only that RLUIPA is constitutional. Id. at 1070. None of the other

ten decisions by courts of appeals which were filed by the end of 2002 were relevant; most

did not even deal with prisons. 

There also were twenty-four district court decisions by the end of 2002. Only one,

which held that RLUIPA was violated when Muslims were not allowed to have prayer oil in

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their cells for use in the five-times-a-day prayers required by their religion, is relevant. See

Charles v. Verhagen, 220 F.Supp.2d 937, 938 (W.D. Wis. 2002), aff’d 348 F.3d 601 (7th

Cir. 2003) (affirming district court’s conclusion that RLUIPA is not unconstitutional). That

case, however, involved Muslim prisoners, a group which was allowed to have prayer oil at

Salinas Valley State Prison at the time of the events giving rise to plaintiff’s claim. Id. As

discussed in the equal protection section above, defendants were not required to give

plaintiff the same accommodations afforded a large established religion, so they could not

be expected to gather from a case which was consistent with their treatment of Muslims

that they were required to extend the same accommodation to plaintiff. In short, at the time

of the events giving rise to plaintiff’s claims in 2002 relatively few court cases had been

decided, and none that would have made clear to reasonable persons in these defendants’

positions that what they were doing was a violation of plaintiff’s rights. Defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. 

4. Injunctive relief

Plaintiff has now been permitted to purchase and possess the religious oils he

seeks. In addition to the grounds set out above for granting summary judgment, his

requests for injunctive and declaratory relief are moot. See Native Village of Noatak v.

Blatchford, 38 F.3d 1505, 1509 (9th Cir. 1994) (declaratory judgment action may not be

used to secure judicial determination of moot questions). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc 54) is

GRANTED. The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 25, 2006. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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