Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01262/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01262-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

 DAVID SERENA, RYAN GOMEZ, 

 CHRIS ROCHA, MANUEL 

 ESCAMILLA, CARMEN ALVAREZ AND 

 ALEJANDRA HERNANDEZ,

NO. CIV. S-06-1262 FCD KJM

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

 STEPHEN L. MOCK, Presiding 

 Judge, Superior Court of Yolo 

 County, individually and in 

 his official capacity; THOMAS 

 WARRINER, Judge, Superior 

 Court of Yolo County, 

 individually and in his 

 official capacity; ROBIN 

 WEAVER, Yolo County Jury 

 Commissioner, individually 

 and in her official capacity, 

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter before the court is whether 1) the court may 

properly assert jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims against

defendants for allegedly violating their due process and equal 

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protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. §

1983 and their equal protection rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and

whether 2) plaintiffs have standing to raise these claims. This

matter was set for a status conference and both parties were

directed to brief these issues. 

Plaintiffs allege in their amended complaint (“FAC”) that

defendants have caused, and will cause, plaintiffs to suffer:

[I]rreparable injury in the form of lack of . . .

unequal notice of the opportunity to apply for [Yolo

County] grand jury service, exclusion from the grand

jury selection process, exclusion from service on the

grand jury and exclusion from service as foreperson as

a result of defendants’ actions unless injunctive

relief is granted. 

(Pls.’ FAC, filed June 30, 2006, at ¶¶ 57-58).

Defendants first contend that the court lacks jurisdiction

to hear plaintiffs’ claims against defendants, as defendants are

immune from liability as state officials under the Eleventh

Amendment (“11th Amendment”). Moreover, defendants argue that

plaintiffs have failed to establish standing to bring their

claims in this court because they did not apply for grand jury

service and did not show discriminatory intent on the part of

defendants. Defendants also argue that plaintiffs lack standing

to assert claims brought on behalf of Asians and “Non-whites” and

to assert their due process claim under § 1983.

The court ruled on the preliminary issues of 11th Amendment

immunity and standing at a hearing held on August 4, 2006. This

order memorializes the court’s rulings.

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I. Jurisdiction

Defendants argue that, as state officials, they are immune

from liability under the 11th Amendment. The 11th Amendment

provides:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be

construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,

commenced or prosecuted against one of the United

States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or

Subjects of any Foreign State.

It is a well-settled principle that “nonconsenting States may not

be sued by private individuals in federal court.” Board of

Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,

363 (2001). Moreover, the 11th Amendment bars suits against

state officials when “the state is the real, substantial party in

interest.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.

89, 100 (1984) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury of

Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945), overruled on other grounds by

Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 533 U.S. 613 (2002)). 

However, the Supreme Court has recognized a narrow exception

to 11th Amendment immunity, declaring that “a suit challenging

the constitutionality of a state official’s action is not one

against the State.” Pennhurst State Sch., 465 U.S. at 102

(citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 156 (1908)). The Ex parte

Young (“Young”) doctrine may be invoked only in certain

circumstances. The Ninth Circuit has reinforced that the purpose

of the Young doctrine is to protect the sovereign immunity

afforded to states under the 11th Amendment while preventing

state officials from violating federal law. Agua Caliente Band

of Cahuilla Indians v. Hardin, 223 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir.

2000)(citing Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261,

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269 (1997)). Specifically, a state official’s alleged

constitutional violation(s) must be ongoing and continuous, not

just a one-time violation or recurring past violations. Papasan

v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 277-278 (1985). Furthermore, the state

official must have “some connection with the enforcement of the

[unconstitutional] act[,]” such that suit against the official is

not equated with a suit against the state. Ex parte Young, 209

U.S. at 157. Similarly, the relief requested cannot “infringe

upon a state’s sovereignty to such a degree to render the suit

against the state itself . . . .” Hardin, 223 F.3d at 1048

(citing Idaho, 521 U.S. at 296). 

A. Ongoing and continuous violations

Defendants argue that here, plaintiffs “exclusive[ly] focus

on [defendants] past conduct,” not ongoing conduct, as the basis

for their causes of action against defendants. (Dfs.’ Memo. Re:

Sov. Imm. and Standing at 8:13-18). Accordingly, they contend

that the Young exception to 11th Amendment immunity is

inapplicable. The court disagrees. Plaintiffs allege that

defendants’ practices and actions “have led to the systematic

exclusion of persons of constitutionally cognizable groups.” 

(Pls.’ FAC at ¶ 37). Plaintiffs rely upon defendants’ alleged

past actions in recruiting candidates and selecting members of

the Yolo County Grand Jury to declare that Hispanic, Asian and

non-White persons have been consistently excluded from the

recruitment and selection processes. (Id.) However, they also

contend, in all three causes of action, that “plaintiffs will

suffer irreparable injury” from defendants’ alleged failure to

notify them of the opportunity to apply for grand jury service,

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and subsequently, from defendants’ systematic exclusion of

plaintiffs’ from the grand jury selection process. (Id. at ¶¶

52, 58, 62)(emphasis added). The court must give the plaintiff

the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the

“well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int’l

Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). 

Accordingly, the court reasonably infers from plaintiffs’ FAC

that defendants’ alleged discriminatory actions have persisted

beyond the 2005-2006 grand jury recruitment and selection

processes, thereby causing future “irreparable injury” to

plaintiffs.

Moreover, while the 11th Amendment bars suits against state

officials for retrospective relief, a suit seeking prospective

relief is permissible. Ulaleo v. Paty, 902 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th

Cir. 1990). The Ninth Circuit has specifically held that an

injunction is the relief available against state officials. Id.

Plaintiffs request: 

. . . a permanent injunction compelling defendants to

cease the systematic exclusion of non-White persons,

Asians and Hispanics from the Yolo County Grand Jury .

. . and compelling defendants to adopt written

procedures in accordance with the United States

Constitution to insure the full and equal participation

of non-White person, Asians and Hispanics in the . . .

selection process and [participation on the] Yolo

County Grand Jury, as grand jury members and

forepersons. 

(Pls.’ FAC at ¶ 62(2))(emphasis added). Accordingly, as

plaintiffs seek prospective relief to prevent defendants from

violating their constitutional rights in the future, they have

sufficiently pled “ongoing and continuous” violations for

purposes of the Young exception to 11th Amendment immunity. 

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 B. State official’s connection with unlawful act

Nevertheless, defendants argue that the Young doctrine does

not protect plaintiffs’ right to sue defendant Robin Weaver

(“Weaver”) because as Yolo County Grand Jury Commissioner, she is

not responsible for selecting potential grand jurors. While a

defendant must be connected to the alleged unlawful act to

properly be sued as a state official, defendants fail to address

the entirety of plaintiffs’ FAC. In addition to alleging that

defendants have systematically excluded Hispanics, Asians and

non-Whites from the Yolo County Grand Jury selection process,

that is, the application, interview, and final selection stages

of jurors and a foreperson, plaintiffs also contend that

defendants have excluded these populations from the recruiting

process. (Pls.’ FAC at ¶ 37). Accordingly, plaintiffs contend

that they have been denied “their right to receiv[e] equal notice

of the opportunity to apply for grand jury service.” (Pls.’ FAC

at ¶¶ 50, 57, 61). 

Defendant Weaver admits that she is “responsible . . . for

administering the recruitment of grand jurors for the 2006-2007

Yolo County Grand Jury.” (Weaver Decl., filed July 20, 2006, at

¶ 2). While “[a]ny process for recruiting grand jurors is under

the ultimate control of the [Yolo County Superior Court]

judges[,]” defendant Weaver details the steps she has taken in

the past to recruit racial minorities, including sending letters

to community groups. (Id. at ¶ 4). At this stage, the

allegations in plaintiffs’ FAC sufficiently assert that defendant

Weaver participated in one of the very processes that plaintiffs

challenge on constitutional grounds. As such, plaintiffs may

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1 Defendants argue that the Supreme Court’s decision in

Carter v. Jury Commission does not abrogate 11th Amendment

immunity for state officials who are alleged to have “engaged in

racial discrimination in grand jury selection.” (Dfs.’ Memo. Re:

Sov. Imm. and Standing at 16:6-10). However, as the Young

exception to 11th Amendment immunity is applicable in the case at

hand, the court need not address this argument.

2 Defendants note that plaintiffs allege defendant Weaver

violated California Penal Code § 903.1, requiring a jury

commissioner to, “pursuant to written rules or instructions

adopted by a majority of the judges of the superior court of the

county, . . . furnish the judges of the court annually a list of

persons qualified to serve as grand jurors . . . .” (Dfs.’ Memo.

Re: Sov. Imm. and Standing at 9:3-6). Subsequently, they argue

that the court may not assert jurisdiction over plaintiffs’

claims regarding an alleged violation of state law under the

Young doctrine. However, even if plaintiffs’ claims against

defendant Weaver arose from an alleged violation of state law,

under the Young doctrine, the court may still assert jurisdiction

over their claims to the extent plaintiffs allege defendant

Weaver’s actions violated federal law. 

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properly invoke the Young exception to 11th Amendment immunity as

to their claims against defendant Weaver, to the extent those

claims arise from the exclusion of Hispanics, Asians and nonWhites from the grand juror recruitment process. 

Therefore, the court may properly assert jurisdiction,

pursuant to the Young doctrine,1 over plaintiffs’ claims against

defendants for alleged ongoing and continuous constitutional

violations in recruiting and selecting Yolo County grand jurors

and grand jury forepersons.2 

II. Standing

A. Failure to apply

The Supreme Court has delineated a three-part test to

determine whether a party has established standing. Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992). First, the

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plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact, that is, “an

invasion of a legally protected interest” which is concrete and

particularized, and actual or imminent. Id. at 560 (citations

omitted). Second, the injury must be “fairly . . . trace[able]

to the challenged action of the defendant . . . .” Id. Finally,

there must exist a likelihood that the “injury will be redressed

by a favorable decision” for the plaintiff. Id. at 561.

Defendants first argue that, since plaintiffs have not

actually applied to become Yolo County grand jurors or

forepersons, they lack standing to bring their claims alleging

that they have been systematically excluded from the grand jury

selection process. To support their argument, defendants cite

the Supreme Court’s opinion in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Iris. In

Moose Lodge, the Supreme Court held that, since the plaintiff

failed to apply for membership with a club and therefore was not

injured by the club’s membership policy, he lacked standing to

litigate the constitutional validity of the membership policy. 

407 U.S. 163, 167-168, 171 (1972). However, defendants fail to

recognize the distinction between the facts of Moose Lodge and

the facts at hand here. Plaintiffs allege, not only that they

were racially discriminated by defendants in the selection

process for Yolo County grand jurors and foreperson, but that

they did not receive an “equal notice of the opportunity to apply

for grand jury service” in the first place. (Pls.’ FAC at ¶¶ 50,

56, 60). However, the Supreme Court in Moose Lodge did not

address whether the plaintiff was unconstitutionally denied an

opportunity to apply for membership with Moose Lodge. As such,

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3 Similarly, defendants citations to the Supreme Court’s

opinion in Allen v. Wright and the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in

Smelt v. County of Orange are inapplicable in this case. In

Allen, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing

“to litigate their claims based upon the stigmatizing injury

often caused by racial discrimination.” 468 U.S. 737, 755

(1984). Specifically, the court found that the plaintiffs were

not personally denied equal treatment, where the Government

granted tax exemptions to racially-discriminatory private

schools, to constitute a judicially cognizable injury. Id. at

752-756. In Smelt, the Ninth Circuit determined that the

plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge Congress’ definition of

marriage on the ground that it denied them benefits, in part

because the plaintiffs had not yet applied for any benefits. 447

F.3d 673, 683-684 (9th Cir. 2006). Neither case addresses

circumstances similar to the case at hand, where plaintiffs have

allegedly been denied notice of the opportunity to apply for

membership on the Yolo County Grand Jury in the first place. 

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defendants’ reliance upon Moose Lodge is unavailing.3 Plaintiffs

have pled a concrete, particularized and actual injury, caused by

defendants’ alleged unequal recruitment process for grand jury

membership, such that they have standing to sue for injuries

incurred from defendants’ alleged conduct. 

Moreover, plaintiffs’ failure to apply for membership on the

grand jury does not bar them from challenging racial

discrimination in the grand jury selection process as well. 

According to defendants, the process instituted for selecting the

2005-2006 and 2006-2007 Yolo County grand juries is comprised of

four steps. The Yolo County Superior Court (“Superior Court”)

recruits applicants, candidates submit membership applications, a

Superior Court judge interviews applicants, and grand jurors and

alternates are selected through a lottery process. It is

apparent to the court that, based upon defendants’ description of

the grand jury selection process, any exclusion of the Hispanic,

Asian and non-White populations from the first stage of the grand

jury selection process - recruitment - would lead directly to

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exclusion in the three remaining stages of the process. 

Nevertheless, defendants ask the court to assume that had

plaintiffs applied for grand jury membership, “they likely would

have either been selected as a grand juror or designated as an

alternative.” (Dfs.’ Memo. Re: Sov. Imm. and Standing at 11:3-

8). The court refuses to make such an assumption, which would

thereby deny plaintiffs the opportunity to challenge the alleged

discriminatory nature of the grand jury selection process. As

the selection process is directly linked to the recruitment

process, plaintiffs do not lack standing simply because they did

not receive an opportunity to apply for grand jury membership. 

B. Third party standing

Defendants contend that plaintiffs lack standing because

they are “asserting claims on behalf of racial groups to which

they do not belong.” (Dfs.’ Memo. Re: Sov. Imm. and Standing at

14:20-21). They further contend that a “plaintiff lacks standing

to assert claims on behalf of third parties.” (Id. at 14:24). 

As noted earlier, plaintiffs request a declaratory judgment and

permanent injunction regarding the systematic exclusion of three

populations, Hispanics, Asians, and non-White persons, from the

grand jury selection process. (Pls.’ FAC at ¶ 62). However, all

plaintiffs are of Hispanic descent. (Id. at ¶¶ 3-8).

Under the constitutional requirements of standing, a

plaintiff’s alleged injury must be “fairly traceable” to the

defendant’s alleged conduct. In the case at hand, plaintiffs’

injury, systematic exclusion from the grand jury recruitment and

selection process, including service as a juror or foreman, is

fairly traceable to defendants’ alleged exclusion of Hispanics

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from these processes. However, as plaintiffs are all Hispanics,

their injuries are not fairly traceable to the alleged exclusion

of Asian and non-Whites. 

While courts have permitted a party to bring actions on

behalf of third parties, plaintiffs here do not satisfy the

stringent requirements for such situations. The test for third

party standing requires that the plaintiff suffer an injury in

fact, that the plaintiff have a close relation to the third

party, and that the third party is hindered from protecting his

or her own interests. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410-11

(1991). In this case, plaintiffs do not have “a close relation”

with Asians and non-Whites for purposes of third party standing. 

In Powers, the court found that an excluded juror and criminal

defendant had a “close relationship” because first, they shared a

“common interest in eliminating racial discrimination from the

courtroom[,]” and second, the criminal defendant would be a

“motivated, effective advocate” for the excluded juror’s rights

because a victory in the case might result in the overturning of

his conviction. Id. at 414. While plaintiffs and persons of

Asian descent and non-Whites likely share the common interest of

prohibiting defendants from allegedly discriminating against them

in the grand jury recruitment and selection processes, it is

doubtful whether plaintiff would be a “motivated, effective

advocate” for Asians’ and non-Whites’ constitutional rights. 

Plaintiffs’ ability to win this suit is not necessarily dependent

upon their claims of alleged discrimination against Asians and

non-Whites. As such, they do not have the same incentive to 

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serve as an effective advocate on behalf of Asian and non-White

populations.

Furthermore, to the extent that plaintiffs argue they are

members of a “non-White” recognizable, distinctive group for

purposes of standing, their argument fails. The court has

explained that “persons challenging grand-jury selection

practices on th basis of statistical disparities must first

establish which ‘identifiable groups’ have been excluded.” 

Quadra v. Superior Court of City and County of San Francisco, 378

F. Supp. 605, 614 (citing Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475

(1954)). Plaintiffs argue that they are “entitled to present

evidence to show that . . . non-white ethnic minorities who have

been excluded” from grand jury participation here form a

“cognizable group.” (Pls.’ Reply, filed July 28, 2006, at 7:23-

26). However, the Ninth Circuit has held that “[a]ny group which

might casually be referred to as ‘non-whites’ would have no

internal cohesion, nor would it be viewed as an identifiable

class by the general population,” such that it might challenge a

grand jury selection process. United States v. Suttiswad, 696

F.2d 645, 649 (9th Cir. 1982); see also United States v. Luong,

255 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1127 (E.D. Cal. 2003)(J. Shubb). 

Therefore, plaintiffs do not have standing to bring their claims

as they arise from defendants’ alleged exclusion of “non-Whites”

from the grand jury recruitment and selection processes. 

Accordingly, plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims

regarding defendants’ alleged constitutional violations only to

the extent those violations arise out of the systematic exclusion 

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of Hispanics in the grand jury recruitment and selection

processes.

C. Due process claim

Additionally, defendants challenge plaintiffs’ standing to

assert their due process claim on the ground that, “the right of

members of the public . . . not to be excluded from a grand jury

due to racial discrimination is based on the right to equal

protection.” (Dfs.’ Memo. Re: Sov. Imm. and Standing at 15:13-

15). Defendants contend that only criminal defendants may assert

a due process right to a nondiscriminatory grand jury selection

process, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell v.

Louisiana. However, plaintiffs’ right to bring a due process

claim against defendants for their alleged conduct goes to the

merits of plaintiffs’ claims. The court will not address this

issue where the parties were directed only to address issues

relating to standing and 11th Amendment immunity. 

D. Discriminatory intent

Finally, defendants argue that plaintiffs lack standing

because plaintiffs “can not show any discriminatory intent in the

Yolo County jury selection process as a matter of law.” (Dfs.’

Memo. Re: Sov. Imm. and Standing at 11:11-12). Defendants rely

upon plaintiffs’ failure to establish a prima facie equal

protection case under the test set forth in Castaneda v. Partida. 

430 U.S. 482 (1977). However, whether plaintiffs have

established defendants’ discriminatory intent is an issue on the

merits. As such, the court will not consider this argument at

this time. 

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court may properly assert

jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims against defendants pursuant

to the Young exception to 11th Amendment immunity. However, with

respect to claims against defendant Weaver, the court may assert

jurisdiction over them only to the extent they relate to

defendant Weaver’s alleged discriminatory conduct with respect to

the grand jury recruitment process. Furthermore, plaintiffs have

standing to sue for defendants’ alleged constitutional violations

arising from the systematic exclusion of Hispanics from the

recruitment and selection processes of the Yolo County Grand

Jury. Plaintiffs do not, however, have standing to bring their

claims against defendants as they arise from the alleged

systematic exclusion of Asians and “non-Whites” from the same

processes. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 4, 2006

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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