Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00604/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00604-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES W. BRADY and PATRICIA

M. BRADY,

Plaintiff,

v.

GRENDENE USA, INC., a Delaware

Corporation, and GRENDENE S.A., a

Brazil corporation,

Defendants.

 

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Case No. 12-cv-00604-GPC-KSC

ORDER OVERRULING 

DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS

TO THE MAGISTRATE

JUDGE’S ORDERS DENYING

DEFENDANTS’ REQUEST TO

COMPEL COMPLIANCE WITH

PROTECTIVE ORDER FILED

APRIL 23, 2015

(ECF NO. 240)

INTRODUCTION

Currently before the Court are defendants Grendene USA, Inc. and Grendene

S.A.’s (together, “Defendants”) objections to Magistrate Judge Crawford’s April 23,

2015, orders denying Defendants’ Request to Compel Compliance with the Protective

Order, (ECF No. 161), and denying in part Defendants’ Alternative Request for Relief

that Plaintiffs’ Counsel be Compelled to Testify Regarding Confidentiality

Designations, (ECF No. 162). (ECF Nos. 222, 223.) After a careful consideration of 1

the parties’ submissions, the record in this matter, the applicable law, and for the

reasons that follow, the Court will OVERRULE Defendants’ Objections.

The page numbers listed reference the specific document, rather than the ECF, page number. 1

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint for trademark infringement on March 9,

2012, and their currently operative First Amended Complaint on March 16, 2012. 

(ECF Nos. 1, 4.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants make, promote, and sell beach

sandals and related goods under the name “Ipanema,” infringing on Plaintiffs’

“Ipanema” and “The Girl from Ipanema” trademarks, in an effort “to cause mistake or

deception as to the source of Defendants’ products, and/or to otherwise trade upon

Plaintiffs’ reputation and customer goodwill in their marks.” (ECF No. 4, at 3-4.) 

On September 27, 2012, Magistrate Judge Crawford issued, at the parties’ joint

request, an initial protective order governing discovery in this matter, (the “Protective

Order). (ECF No. 38.) The Protective Order providestwo designations, “Confidential”

and “Confidential–Attorneys’ Eyes Only (AEO),” and requires that “[d]esignations

under the Order shall be made with care and shall not be made absent a good faith

belief that the designated material satisfies the [applicable] criteria.” (Id. at 2.) The

Protective Order further requires that a party challenging such designations must meet

and confer with the producing party in a good faith effort to resolve the dispute. (Id.

at 10.) If no agreement is reached, the objecting party may bring a joint motion to the

Court specifying the particular material it believesisimproperly designated. (Id. at 10-

11.) Any disputes over a party’s confidentiality designations are required to be

presented to the Court in the following format: “(1) the specific pages in the dispute;

(2) the producing party’s statement in support of the designations; and (3) the

challenging party’s statement as to why the documents should not be designated

confidential.” (ECF No. 222, at 3.) 

In the present case, Plaintiffs made three substantial productions totaling over

35,000 pages of documents. (ECF No. 161, at 5.) On February 3, 2014, Plaintiffs

served their initial disclosures. (ECF No. 74-2, at 8.) On May 9, 2014, Plaintiffs

produced a disc containing 20,863 pages of documents, approximately 19,000 to

20,000 of which were marked “AEO.” (ECF No. 161, at 6.) On May 14, 2014,

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Plaintiffs produced a second disc, containing an additional 896 pages of documents,

875 of which were designated “Confidential” or “AEO.” (Id.) On or about May 20,

2014, Plaintiffs made available ten boxes, eight of which were marked “AEO” with a

single post-it note, for copying and inspection. (Id.) These boxes contained 16,152

pages of documents, 15,776 of which were marked “AEO.” (Id.) Thus, the vast

majority of documents produced were designated “Confidential” or “AEO.” (Id. at 1.)

On June 11, 2014, Defendants asserted that Plaintiffs’ confidentiality

designations were overbroad, and requested to compel Plaintiffs to re-review their

document productions and remove any improper designations. (ECF No. 74.)

Subsequently, in an order dated September 26, 2014, Judge Crawford denied

Defendants’ request for their failure to comply with the Protective Order’s procedure

for challenging confidentiality designations. (ECF No. 138, at 17-18.) Judge Crawford

further instructed the parties to comply with this procedure in all future requests. (Id.)

On October 9, 2014, Defendants served Plaintiffs’ law firm with a subpoena to

testify at a deposition scheduled for October 20, 2014, concerning Plaintiffs’

confidentiality designations. (ECF No. 161-1, Ex. B.) On October 17, 2014, Plaintiffs

submitted their opposition to the deposition and refused to produce a witnessto testify.

(Id., Ex. C.) On October 22, 2014, defense counsel sent an email to Plaintiffs’ counsel

listing by Bates number approximately 5,000 pages that the Defendants believed were

improperly designated. (ECF No. 163-3, Ex. 2.) On October 27, 2014, the parties met

and conferred telephonically about the dispute. (ECF No. 161, at 9.) On November 7,

2014, Plaintiffs’ counsel sent defense counsel a forty-four page list of documents for

which Plaintiffs were removing ormodifying the confidentiality designation. (ECF No.

163-5.) 

However, Defendants continued to dispute Plaintiffs’ initial designations,

claiming that Plaintiffs’ counsel failed to satisfy their obligation to review the

documentsin good faith, and instead made wholesale, “blanket” designations applying

to all documents. (ECF No. 161, at 18.) Defendants further claimed that Plaintiffs’

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counsel made statements disclaiming the obligation to make a good faith effort to

properly designate each document. (Id. at 17-18.) In response, Plaintiffs’ counsel

asserted they acted in good faith in designating documents as “Confidential” or “AEO,”

and had twice reviewed the 5,000 documents challenged by Defendants. (Id. at 25.)

Plaintiffs’ counsel further denied any disclaimer of their obligation to review and

designate each document in good faith. (Id. at 12-13.) 

As the dispute remained unresolved, on November 13, 2014, Defendants filed

a Joint Motion to Request to Compel Compliance with the Protective Order, (ECF No.

161), and, in the alternative, a Request for Relief that Plaintiffs’ Counsel be Compelled

to Testify Regarding Confidentiality Designations, (ECF No. 162). On April 23, 2015,

Judge Crawford ruled that Plaintiffs’ counsel had made their confidentiality

designations “with care” and in “good faith” in compliance with the Protective Order,

and denied Defendants’ Request to Compel Compliance. (ECF No. 222.) In so ruling,

Judge Crawford noted that Defendants failed both to comply with the Protective

Order’s designation challenge procedure, requiring a list of specifically disputed

documents, and to present sufficient evidence of Plaintiffs’ failure to designate

documents in compliance with the Protective Order. (Id. at 4, 6.) Absent such a

showing, Judge Crawford presumed Defendants’ challenges were resolved by

Plaintiffs’ subsequently produced forty-four page list of corrections, and further,

accepted representations in the Declaration of Plaintiffs’ Counsel that the

confidentiality designations were made with care and in good faith. (Id. at 3.)

Further, on April 23, 2015, Judge Crawford also denied Defendants’ alternative

request to compel testimony regarding Plaintiffs’ confidentiality designations, finding

such testimony was neither necessary nor appropriate. (ECF No. 223, at 1, 3.) In so

ruling, Judge Crawford again noted Defendants’ failure to comply with the procedure

for challenging confidentiality designationsset forth in the Protective Order, and stated

that “noticing a deposition of designating counsel is not an appropriate means of

addressing this issue.” (ECF No. 223, at 4.) As such, Defendants’ request to compel

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testimony and request for associated attorney’s fees were also denied. (Id.)

On May 6, 2015, Defendants filed objections to both ofJudge Crawford’s orders

denying Defendants’ requests to compel compliance with the Protective Order. (ECF

No. 240.) On May 29, 2015, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to Defendants’ objections.

(ECF No. 279.) On June 5, 2015, Defendants filed a reply in support of their

objections. (ECF No. 299.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A party may file objections to a non-dispositive pretrial order issued by a

magistrate judge within 14 days after being served with a copy of the order. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(a). “A non-dispositive order entered by a magistrate must be deferred to

unless it is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Grimes v. City and Cnty. of San

Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 241 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(A)). A ruling is clearly erroneous where the reviewing court is left with

“a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed,” a standard highly

deferential to the magistrate judge’s ruling. Concrete Pipe & Prod. v. Constr. Laborers

Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993). However, the district judge may decline to

consider evidence that was not presented to the magistrate judge. See Haines v. Ligett

Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 92-93 (3d Cir. 1992); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

v. CPT Med. Servs., P.C., 375 F. Supp. 2d 141, 158 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).

DISCUSSION

Defendants make the following objections to Judge Crawford’s April 23, 2015,

orders, denying both Defendants’ request to compel compliance with the Protective

Order, and alternative request to compel Plaintiffs’ counsel to testify regarding

Plaintiffs’ confidentiality designations, (ECF No. 240):

1. Judge Crawford ignored facts that clearly evidenced Plaintiffs’ failure to

designate documents as required by the Protective Order;

2. Judge Crawford ignored that Plaintiffs made “blanket protections” in

violation of the Protective Order;

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3. Judge Crawford ignored that proper initial designation isrequired by law;

4. Judge Crawford improperly concluded that compliancewith theProtective

Order’s procedure for designating documents cannot be compelled;

5. Judge Crawford improperly extended the presumption of attorney

truthfulness to the Declaration of Plaintiffs’ counsel, but not to the

Declaration of Defendants’ counsel;

6. Judge Crawford improperly attached an irrebuttable presumption of

accuracy to the Declaration of Plaintiffs’ counsel; and

7. Judge Crawford improperly concluded that certain remedies Defendants

sought were barred by law and rejected other remedies Defendants sought

without explanation.

 

1. Judge Crawford’s Finding that Plaintiffs’ made Their Initial Designations

in Compliance with the Protective Order was not “Clearly Erroneous”

Defendants argue that Judge Crawford erred in accepting the truthfulness of the

Declaration of Plaintiffs’ Counsel, stating that all documents were designated in

compliance with the Protective Order, despite evidence presented by Defendants that

Plaintiffs had imposed inaccurate, “blanket protections” on a large volume of

documents. (ECF No. 240, at 5-6.) 

In support of their requests, Defendants asserted that Plaintiffs designated the

majority of 35,000 documents “Confidential” or “AEO,” designating several boxes of

documents with a single post-it note, and further, produced a forty-four page list of

corrections after re-reviewing only 5,000 challenged pages. (Id. at 4-5.) Defendants

also submitted the following documents in support of their requests: (1) designated

portions of Mr. Brady’s deposition, concerning businessinformation related to “Made

in Brazil” and Mr. Brady’s involvement in making the designations; (2) Defendants’

subpoena of Plaintiffs’ counsel; (3) email exchanges regarding the parties’ “meet and

confer”; Plaintiffs’ list of de-designated documents; and (4) a letter from Plaintiffs’

counsel regarding the confidentiality oflarge portions of Mr. Brady’s deposition. (ECF

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Nos. 161, 162.) Lastly, in support of their present objection, Defendants submitted

additional evidence, including designated portions of the depositions of Patricia Maria

Duhart Martins Brady, James Brady, and Patricia Brady, and several documents that

Defendants allege were improperly designated. (ECF No. 240.)

Defendants argue that, had Judge Crawford properly weighed the evidence

presented, Plaintiffs would not have been found in compliance with the Protective

Order, having made “blanket protections” neither with care, nor in good faith. (ECF

No. 240, at 5-6.) Defendants further argue that in failing to adequately consider this

evidence, Judge Crawford improperly extended an irrebuttable presumption of attorney

truthfulness to the allegedly vague, conclusory, and hearsay Declaration of Plaintiffs’

counsel, but not to the allegedly highly detailed Declaration of Defendants’ counsel

made on personal knowledge. (Id. at 3.) Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ counsel failed

to provide any facts concerning how documents were designated or by whom. (Id.)

Defendants assert that, in contrast,Defendants’ counsel contradicted Plaintiffs’ counsel

in numerous respects, quoting admissions by Plaintiffs’ counsel of their disregard for

the initial designation requirements ofthe Protective Order, and presenting over 10,000

documents that did not meet the standards for designation. (Id.) Defendants also note

thatJudge Crawford incorrectly stated that Plaintiffs had reviewed all documentstwice,

when in fact, they had only reviewed 5,000 of the 35,000 documents twice, which

resulted in a forty-four page list of corrections. (Id. at 4.) Lastly, Defendants note that 2

Plaintiffs, in their reply, do not deny that their documents were designated as described

by Defendants, but rather, “fall back on their counsel’s conclusory assertion that the

designations nonetheless were made in good faith.” (ECF No. 299, at 3-4.)

In response,Plaintiffs assert they have already demonstrated that they designated

documents with care and in good faith. (See ECF No. 279, at 8.) Additionally, Plaintiffs

claim that the boxes, marked with a post-it note as “AEO,” were reviewed by counsel,

and further, that other disputed documents were either de-designated, or properly

The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ brief was unclear as to which documents were reviewed twice. 2

(See ECF No. 161, at 12, 21.)

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justified. (Id. at 8-9.) Plaintiffs assert that they previously briefed and argued their

reasons for designating the challenged documents, and further,that JudgeCrawford did

not view Defendants’ evidence as demonstrative of the Brady’s failure to conduct a

proper confidentiality review. (Id. at 8.) Therefore, Plaintiffs assert thatJudge Crawford

correctly credited counsel’s declaration and that her findings with respect to Plaintiffs’

confidentiality designations should be dispositive. (Id.)

After review, the Court finds that Judge Crawford’s finding that Plaintiffs’

counsel made designations with care, and in good faith, was not clearly erroneous. As

an initial matter, the Court declines to consider the additional evidence submitted in

support of Defendants’ present opposition because this evidence was not presented in

support of Defendants’ initial requests to Judge Crawford. See Haines, 975 F.2d at 92-

93. If Defendants’ had access to this evidence when submitting their initial requests,

as it appears they did, such evidence should have been submitted at that time. 

Second , the Court finds evidence that Plaintiffs’ counsel not only designated the

majority of 35,000 documents, but also produced a large list of corrections after

conducting a second review, insufficient to demonstrate “clear error.” The Court

acknowledges that several courts have found that a party’s de-designation of a large

percentage of documents indicates a failure to have initially designated documents in

good faith. See Humphreys v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. C-04-03808-SI-EDL,

2006 WL 3020902 at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2006) (finding “Defendants’ designations

were not [made] in good faith as more than 25% of the documents and all of the

computer data were de-designated at a meet and confer session); In re ULLICO Inc.

Litigation, 237 F.R.D. 314, 318 (D. of Col. 2006) (finding, after defendants’ redesignation of approximately 4,000 documents, that “such a sweeping correction

subsequent to [defendants’] initial production illustrates that [defendants’] noncompliance with the Protective Order occurred on a grand scale”).

Here, Defendants state, and Plaintiffs do not deny, that approximately 33,000 of

35,000, or approximately ninety-four percent of the documents, were designated

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“Confidential” or “AEO.” Further, after re-reviewing only5,000 challenged documents,

Plaintiffs produced a forty-four page list of corrections. Thus, it appears Plaintiffs not

only designated a high percentage of documents, but also improperly designated

several documents. However, while this evidence supportsthe inference that Plaintiffs’

counsel failed to make their initial designations in good faith, the Court finds this

evidence isinsufficient to establish a “definite and firmconviction that a mistake [was]

committed” by Judge Crawford in weighing this evidence against the Declaration of

Plaintiffs’ counsel. Concrete Pipe & Prod., 508 U.S. at 623. Accordingly, the Court

finds Judge Crawford’s review of this evidence was not clearly erroneous. 

Lastly, the Court findsthat evidence submitted by Defendant, including portions

ofJamesBrady’s deposition, email exchanges between the parties, Plaintiffs’ list of dedesignated documents, and Defendants’ subpoena of Plaintiffs’ counsel, is also

insufficient to demonstrate that Plaintiffs failed to comply with the Protective Order in

designating documents.Defendants primarilysubmit large, “AEO” designated, portions

of Mr. Brady’s deposition as exemplary of Plaintiffs’ use of “blanket protections” and

failure to designate documents with care, and in good faith. However, despite the large

number of pages designated, the information concerns businessinformation, related to

“Made in Brazil”, that is properly designated under the Protective Order, as well as

information validly protected as attorney work product, or under the attorney-client

privilege. See (ECF No. 38, at 7-8); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), 26(b)(3)(A). Therefore,

the Court finds Judge Crawford’s review of this evidence was not clearly erroneous.

In sum, for the reasons discussed, the Court finds that Judge Crawford’s

determination that Defendants’ evidence was insufficient to outweigh the Declaration

of Plaintiffs’ counsel was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, Defendants’ objections

to these findings are OVERRULED.

//

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2. Judge Crawford’s Refusal to Compel Plaintiffs’ Compliance with the Protective

Order was not “Clearly Erroneous”

Defendants argue Judge Crawford ignored that proper initial designation is

required by law and improperly concluded that compliance with the Protective Order’s

procedures for designating documents cannot be compelled. (ECF No. 240, at 1-2.)

Defendants have repeatedly been ordered, and have often failed, to comply with the

Protective Order’s procedure for challenging confidentiality designations. (See ECF No.

222, at 6.) This procedure requires the objecting party to make a written challenge to

specific designations, and to meet and confer with the designating party concerning the

dispute. (ECF No. 38, ¶ 11.) If an agreement cannot be reached, the party may then

make a motion challenging the disputed designations and must make specific challenges

to each individual document. (Id.)

However, Defendants argue that, although there is a “means to challenge the

result of the application of the document designation process, it provides no means to

challenge whether the process itself was actually followed.” (ECF No. 240, at 2.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to make their initial designations with care and

in good faith, and have disclaimed their obligation to do so. (ECF No. 161, at 7-8). As

such, Defendants assert that requiring Defendantsto make written, individual challenges

to a large volume of designated documents “unfairly and inappropriately shifts the

burden to the receiving party to make the initial good faith determination whether the

documents designated meet the requirements for designation.” (ECF No. 240, at 2.)

In response, Plaintiffs assert, and Judge Crawford has so found, that Plaintiffs

demonstrated good cause for their confidentiality designations in compliance with the

First Amendment and the common law. (ECF No. 279, at 8.) Plaintiffs further deny any

disclaimer of their obligations under the Protective Order. (ECF No. 161, at 12-13.)

Plaintiffs assert that Defendants’ interpretation “has no support whatsoever in the

stipulated Protective Order, and that Judge Crawford properly rejected it.” (ECF No.

279, at 10.) Therefore, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have a remedy in the challenge

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procedure provided in the Protective Order and were properly required to comply. (Id.)

After review, the Court notes that Judge Crawford’s orders improperly

characterize the partiesJoint Motion asseeking to dispute and change Plaintiffs’ chosen

designations. Consequently, the Court finds Judge Crawford placed an incorrect

emphasis on Defendants’ failure to complywith the challenge procedure provided in the

Protective Order. (See ECF No. 38, at ¶ 11.). While Defendants would be required to

follow the challenge procedure if they sought to change or dispute Plaintiffs’ chosen

designations, they are not required to follow it if, as is the case here, they only seek to

compel Plaintiffs’ compliance with the Protective Order in making their initial

designations. “The duty of good faith in the protective order is a duty to review the

documentsin good faith before designating themas[‘Confidential’] or‘Attorney’s Eyes

Only.’” Paradigm Alliance, Inc. v. Celeritas Techs., LLC, 248 F.R.D. 598, 605 (D. Kan.

2008). Thus, if Plaintiffs fail to meet their initial burden to designate documents with

care, and in good faith, by over-designating documents, it would be improper to shift

this burden to Defendants by requiring themto challenge to each specific document. See

Humphreys, 2006 WL 3020902, at *2. Accordingly, as similarly requested by

Defendants, several courts addressing this situation have compelled compliance with

the Protective Order by the designating party and imposed sanctions. See id.; Paradigm

Alliance, Inc., 248 FRD at 605; In re ULLICO Inc. Litigation, 237 F.R.D. at 318.

However, although Defendants’ properly challenged Plaintiffs’ counsel’s initial

designation procedure by submitting their request to compel compliance, Judge

Crawford validly found that Plaintiffs had in fact designated documents with care, and

in good faith. Therefore, as Plaintiffs were found to have satisfied their initial burden

in making their designations, there was no need to compel Plaintiffs’ compliance with

the Protective Order and Defendants were properly directed to follow the challenge

procedure. Accordingly, the Court finds no “clear error” in Judge Crawford’s refusal

to compel Plaintiffs’ compliance with the Protective Order in making their initial

designations, and Defendants’ objections to this finding are OVERRULED.

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3. Judge Crawford’s Refusal to Compel Plaintiffs’ Testimony Regarding

Confidentiality Designations was not “Clearly Erroneous”

Defendants alternatively requested that the lawyers who designated Plaintiffs’

documents be required to testify as to their compliance with the Protective Order’s

procedure and standard for making confidentiality designations. (ECF No. 240, at 7.)

Defendants argue that in denying this request, Judge Crawford improperly concluded

that their requested questions would intrude on attorney work product and information

protected by attorney client privilege or the Protective Order. (Id. at 9-10.)

After review, the Court finds Judge Crawford’s denial of Defendants’ requested

remedies was not clearly erroneous. Again, Judge Crawford properly ruled that

Plaintiffs had designated documents in compliance with the Protective Order. As such,

there was no need to permit further inquiry concerning Plaintiffs’ confidentiality

designations. Therefore, Defendants’ objections to Judge Crawford’s denial of their

alternative requests to compel testimony concerning Plaintiffs’ confidentiality

designations are OVERRULED.

CONCLUSION & ORDER

 

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ objections, (ECF No. 240), are OVERRULED; and

2. Judge Crawford’s Orders, (ECF Nos. 222, 223), are AFFIRMED.

DATED: August 21, 2015

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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