Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-21-35023/USCOURTS-ca9-21-35023-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAVIER MARTINEZ, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

 v. 

LOWELL CLARK, Warden, 

Northwest Detention Center; 

NATHALIE ASHER, Tacoma Field 

Office Director, United States 

Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement; ALEJANDRO N. 

MAYORKAS, Secretary, Department 

of Homeland Security; MERRICK B. 

GARLAND, Attorney General, 

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 21-35023 

D.C. No. 2:20-cv00780-TSZ 

OPINION

On Remand from the United States Supreme Court

Argued and Submitted September 24, 2024

San Francisco, California

Filed December 27, 2024

Before: Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Eric D. Miller, and Patrick 

J. Bumatay, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Bumatay;

Concurrence by Judge Bumatay

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2 MARTINEZ V. CLARK

SUMMARY*

Immigration Immigration/Habeas/Detention 

On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the 

panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Javier Martinez’s 

habeas petition challenging his immigration detention. The 

panel held that federal courts have jurisdiction to review the 

Board of Immigration Appeals’ determination that an alien 

is a “danger to the community,” but concluded that the BIA 

did not abuse its discretion or err in concluding that Martinez 

was such a danger.

Martinez was detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which 

provides for mandatory detention of aliens with certain 

criminal convictions. After Martinez filed a habeas petition, 

the district court ordered a bond hearing, reasoning that 

Martinez’s prolonged detention violated due process. An 

immigration judge denied bond, the BIA affirmed, and 

Martinez brought the instant habeas petition. The district 

court asserted jurisdiction, but denied habeas relief. 

This panel previously held that the district court lacked 

jurisdiction to review the “dangerousness” determination 

under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e), which bars review of a 

“discretionary judgment” regarding detention. The Supreme 

Court granted certiorari, vacated this court’s judgment, and 

remanded for consideration of its intervening decision in 

Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024), which clarified 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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MARTINEZ V. CLARK 3

that the application of a statutory standard to an established 

set of facts is a reviewable mixed question of law and fact.

The panel concluded that Wilkinson compels the 

conclusion that application of the “dangerousness” standard 

is a reviewable mixed question. The panel explained that 

“dangerousness” is not so different from the standard the 

Supreme Court found reviewable in Wilkinson or the 

standard this court later found reviewable in Zia v. Garland, 

112 F.4th 1194 (9th Cir. 2024), because the BIA’s caselaw 

sets out nine factors an IJ may consider before making the 

ultimate determination.

Next, the panel concluded that the applicable standard of 

review is the abuse-of-discretion standard, explaining that 

Wilkinson recognized that a “deferential standard of review” 

applies where a mixed question requires a court to immerse 

itself in facts. Here, the district court applied the de novo 

standard of review, but the court determined that that remand 

would be futile because the district court denied under a 

higher standard of review.

On the merits, the panel concluded that the BIA did not 

abuse its discretion, explaining that the BIA properly 

considered the relevant factors, and reasonably believed that 

Martinez’s equities did not outweigh the evidence of 

dangerousness.

The panel also rejected Martinez’s arguments that the 

BIA applied the wrong burden of proof and that the BIA’s 

failure to consider alternatives to detention violated due 

process or was legal error.

Concurring, Judge Bumatay wrote that this case should 

never have gotten to this point because federal courts 

actually lack authority to order bond hearings for aliens 

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4 MARTINEZ V. CLARK

mandatorily detained under § 1226(c). However, egged on 

by this court’s wayward precedent, the district court believed 

that due process required a bond hearing. That ruling also 

led to violation of Congress’s directive that “[n]o court may 

set aside any action or decision. . . regarding the detention or 

release of any alien or . . . denial of bond or parole.” 8 U.S.C 

§ 1226(e). Judge Bumatay wrote that, because this court’s 

precedent requires courts to defy Congress’s authority and 

assume an aggrandized role in immigration decisions, the 

court should change it. 

COUNSEL

Robert Pauw (argued), Gibbs Houston Pauw, Seattle, 

Washington; Matt Adams, Glenda M. Aldana Madrid, Leila 

Kang, and Aaron Korthuis, Northwest Immigrant Rights 

Project, Seattle, Washington; Lee Gelernt, American Civil 

Liberties Union Foundation Immigrants' Rights Project, 

New York, New York; Hannah Schoen and Cody Wofsy, 

American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Immigrants' 

Rights Project, San Francisco, California; for PetitionerAppellant. 

Dana M. Camilleri (argued), Trail Attorney; Patrick J. Glen; 

Anthony P. Nicastro, Assistant Director; Office of 

Immigration Litigation; Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General; Civil Division, United States 

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for RespondentsAppellees.

Michael K.T. Tan and Judy Rabinovitz, American Civil 

Liberties Union Foundation Immigrants' Rights Project, 

New York, New York; Michael Kaufman, American Civil 

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MARTINEZ V. CLARK 5

Liberties Union Foundation, Los Angeles, California; 

Ahilan Arulanantham, UCLA School of Law, Center for 

Immigration Law and Policy, Los Angeles, California; 

Jayashri Srikantiah, Stanford Law School, Immigrants' 

Rights Clinic, Stanford, California; Sean Commons and 

Alexandria Ruiz, Sidley Austin LLP, Los Angeles, 

California; Ava Guo, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, D.C.; 

for Amici Curiae ACLU Foundation, ACLU Foundation of 

Southern California, and UCLA School of Law Center for 

Immigration Law and Policy.

Genna E. Beier and Francisco Ugarte, San Francisco Public 

Defender's Office, San Francisco, California; Kelsey A. 

Morales and Raha Jorjani, Alameda County Public 

Defender's Office, Oakland, California; for Amici Curiae 

Alameda County Public Defender's Office, Asian Americans 

Advancing Justice— Asian Law Caucus, Immigrant Legal 

Defense, Pangea Legal Services, and the San Francisco 

Public Defender's Office.

Matt Adams and Aaron Korthuis, Northwest Immigrant 

Rights Project, Seattle, Washington; Trina A. Realmuto, 

National Immigration Litigation Alliance, Brookline, 

Massachusetts; for Amicus Curiae the Northwest Immigrant 

Rights Project and The National Immigration Litigation 

Alliance.

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6 MARTINEZ V. CLARK

OPINION

BUMATAY, Circuit Judge:

Earlier we concluded that the district court lacked 

jurisdiction to review a Board of Immigration Appeals 

(“BIA”) determination that an alien was a “danger to the 

community” for immigration detention purposes. We relied 

on 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e), which precludes judicial review of a

“discretionary judgment” regarding the detention of an alien. 

See Martinez v. Clark, 36 F.4th 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2022), 

cert. granted, judgment vacated, 144 S. Ct. 1339 (2024). 

The dangerousness determination was discretionary, we 

said, because it was “fact-intensive” and required “the 

equities to be weighed.” Id. at 1229 (simplified). No

immigration law defined “dangerousness,” and the BIA 

offered nine factors to consider in making the determination. 

Id. at 1228 & n.1 (citing In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 

40 (BIA 2006)). So BIA precedent appeared to only provide 

“malleable guidance” that did not demonstrate what was 

necessary to “cross[] the line into dangerousness.” Id. at 

1229–30. Thus, we held that federal courts lacked sufficient 

standards to review the agency’s judgment. Id.

After our decision, the Supreme Court decided

Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024). Wilkinson

clarified the boundaries of judicial review in the immigration 

context. It explained that “[t]he application of a statutory 

legal standard . . . to an established set of facts is a 

quintessential mixed question of law and fact” and is 

reviewable. Id. at 212. The Supreme Court then granted the 

petition for certiorari here, vacated our judgment, and 

remanded for further consideration of Wilkinson’s impact on 

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MARTINEZ V. CLARK 7

this case. See Martinez v. Clark, 144 S. Ct. 1339 (2024)

(mem.).

After Wilkinson, the determination whether an alien is 

“dangerous” for immigration-detention purposes is a mixed

question of law and fact and is reviewable as a “question of 

law.” See Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 

2011) (“Although § 1226(e) restricts jurisdiction in the 

federal courts . . . [,] it does not limit habeas jurisdiction over 

constitutional claims or questions of law.”); cf. GuerreroLasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221, 227 (2020) (holding, under 

an analogous provision governing judicial review in 

immigration cases, that “questions of law” include mixed 

questions of law and fact); Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 225 

(“Today’s decision announces nothing more remarkable 

than the fact that this Court meant what it said in GuerreroLasprilla.”).

Under Wilkinson, the district court’s review of the BIA’s 

“dangerousness” determination is for abuse of discretion, 

and our review of the district court’s denial of habeas relief 

is de novo. Because the district court initially denied

Martinez’s habeas petition under de novo review we 

conclude that it would have also properly denied the petition 

under the correct abuse-of-discretion standard. We also 

affirm the denial of Martinez’s two other habeas claims. 

I.

Javier Martinez, a native of Costa Rica and citizen of 

Nicaragua, entered the United States in 1987 as a conditional 

resident. Three years later, he became a lawful permanent 

resident. In 2000, he was convicted of conspiring to 

distribute cocaine under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846 and 

sentenced to 20 months in prison. The next year, after his 

release from prison, the Department of Homeland Security 

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8 MARTINEZ V. CLARK

(“DHS”) commenced removal proceedings against 

Martinez. An immigration judge later granted him 

withholding of removal.

Twelve years after his release from prison, in 2013, 

Martinez was once again arrested for trafficking cocaine 

under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. After his arrest, a federal 

magistrate judge released Martinez on his own recognizance. 

About five months later, Martinez pleaded guilty to the drug 

charge. He was released for three months before sentencing. 

At the sentencing hearing, the district court noted that it was 

“impressed” with Martinez’s ability to control himself and 

to “avoid the pitfalls” while he was “out on bond.” The 

district court observed that it would not have released 

Martinez (as the magistrate judge did), but that Martinez did 

well with the opportunity. Martinez remained drug-free and 

complied with all the conditions of his release. Based on his 

efforts at rehabilitation, the district court sentenced Martinez 

to 60 months in prison. The district court also allowed 

Martinez to self-report to prison, and he did so a month later. 

While in prison, Martinez earned his GED, took vocational 

classes, and attended Bible studies. He also participated in 

a drug-treatment program and received counseling for his 

drug addiction. 

In early 2018, DHS reopened Martinez’s removal 

proceedings based on his 2013 conviction. After his release 

in April 2018, Martinez was taken directly into DHS custody 

and held without bond. After about six months, Martinez 

received a bond hearing, but the presiding immigration judge 

determined that he did not have jurisdiction to release 

Martinez because he was subject to mandatory detention 

under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). 

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MARTINEZ V. CLARK 9 

In November 2018, Martinez filed a federal habeas 

petition seeking immediate release or, in the alternative, an 

individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge. 

The district court ordered that Martinez receive a bond 

hearing. Martinez v. Clark, 2019 WL 5962685, at *1 (W.D. 

Wash. Nov. 13, 2019). The district court reasoned that 

Martinez’s prolonged mandatory detention under § 1226(c) 

violated due process. Id. To comply with due process, the 

district court ordered “the government to show by clear and 

convincing evidence that [Martinez] presents a flight risk or 

a danger to the community at the time of the bond hearing.” 

Id. 

In November 2019, an immigration judge held a bond 

hearing for Martinez and denied him bond. The immigration 

judge ruled that the government had met its burden of 

showing by clear and convincing evidence that Martinez was 

a danger to the community and a flight risk. In making the 

dangerousness determination, the immigration judge 

evaluated Martinez’s mitigating evidence, such as his 

successful pre-incarceration release on bond, the district 

court’s statements during sentencing, his efforts at 

rehabilitation, his family ties, and his strong community 

support. Still, the immigration judge found Martinez’s two 

convictions for drug trafficking to be dispositive. The 

immigration judge also determined that conditional parole 

was not appropriate for Martinez. 

On appeal, the BIA ruled that Martinez was ineligible for 

release on bond based on the “totality of the evidence.” The 

BIA agreed with the immigration judge that the government 

sustained its burden to show that Martinez was a danger to 

the community by clear and convincing evidence. In doing 

so, the BIA emphasized that it had “long acknowledged the 

dangers associated with the sale and distribution of drugs” 

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10 MARTINEZ V. CLARK

and found that Martinez’s repeated drug-trafficking 

convictions provided “strong evidence” that he was 

dangerous. The BIA also acknowledged Martinez’s 

rehabilitation efforts, but it found that his good behavior for 

“the approximately 7 years he has been detained in either 

prison or DHS custody d[id] not indicate that he will not 

revert to his old habits of drug use and trafficking upon his 

release.” The BIA did not reach the immigration judge’s 

alternative conclusion that Martinez posed a flight risk.

Martinez then brought this federal habeas petition under 

28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking release from DHS detention. 

Martinez raised three claims: (1) clear and convincing 

evidence did not show he is a danger to the community; 

(2) the BIA applied an incorrect burden of proof at his 

hearing; and (3) the BIA failed to consider alternatives to 

detention, such as conditional parole. The district court 

asserted jurisdiction over all three claims and denied habeas 

relief. 

Martinez now appeals. We have jurisdiction over the 

appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and § 2253(a). We review 

the denial of a habeas petition de novo, Padilla-Ramirez v. 

Bible, 882 F.3d 826, 828 (9th Cir. 2017), any underlying 

legal questions de novo, and factual questions for clear error, 

Singh, 638 F.3d at 1202–03. 

II.

We first address Martinez’s claim that the BIA erred in 

concluding that clear and convincing evidence showed that 

he was a “danger to the community.” We have jurisdiction 

over the claim and conclude that the BIA didn’t abuse its 

discretion in considering Martinez a danger. 

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MARTINEZ V. CLARK 11

A.

We begin with jurisdiction. Martinez was mandatorily 

detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), so 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)

governs any review of his detention. That section provides: 

The Attorney General’s discretionary 

judgment regarding the application of 

[§ 1226] shall not be subject to review. No 

court may set aside any action or decision by 

the Attorney General under this section 

regarding the detention or release of any alien 

or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or 

parole. 

8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). Under § 1226(e), an alien may not 

“challeng[e] a ‘discretionary judgment’ by the Attorney 

General or a ‘decision’ that the Attorney General has made 

regarding his detention or release” in federal court. Jennings 

v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 295 (2018) (plurality opinion) 

(simplified).

The Ninth Circuit has clarified the federal courts’ 

jurisdiction over “constitutional claims or questions of law” 

regarding immigration detention under § 1226. Singh, 638 

F.3d at 1202. We ruled that § 1226(e) did not strip federal 

courts of “traditional habeas jurisdiction.” Id. (relying on 

Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003)). We explained that 

§ 1226(e) “restricts jurisdiction only with respect to the 

executive’s exercise of discretion” but that discretionary 

judgment does not include constitutional claims or questions 

of law. Id.

So we must decide whether the BIA’s determination that 

Martinez is a “danger to the community” is a “discretionary 

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12 MARTINEZ V. CLARK

judgment” or a “question of law.” For this question, we look 

to Wilkinson, which clarified the distinction between 

questions of law, mixed questions of law and fact, and 

questions of fact in the immigration context. 

Wilkinson examined the “exceptional and extremely 

unusual hardship” requirement for cancellation of removal

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2). 601 U.S. at 217. If an alien 

shows this “hardship” to a U.S.-citizen or permanentresident family member, then the alien may be eligible for 

discretionary cancellation of removal. Id. at 212–13. 

Wilkinson called the hardship determination the “first step” 

in the cancellation-of-removal determination, which allows 

the IJ to go to “step two” and decide whether to exercise 

discretion to cancel removal in a particular case. Id. at 213. 

Cancellation of removal also has both a jurisdictionstripping and jurisdiction-restoring provision. Section 

1252(a)(2)(B)(i) strips courts of jurisdiction to review 

certain judgments by the Attorney General, including 

“judgments regarding the granting of discretionary relief” of 

“cancellation of removal.” Id. at 218 (simplified). Then 

§ 1252(a)(2)(D) restores judicial review for “constitutional 

claims or questions of law” involved in cancellations of 

removal. Id. 

The Court ruled that the “hardship” determination fell 

within the jurisdiction-restoring provision. Under BIA 

precedent, the “hardship” standard requires a showing that a 

relative “would suffer hardship that is substantially different 

from or beyond that which would ordinarily be expected to 

result from their removal.” Id. at 215 (simplified). To 

evaluate that, an IJ must consider a “range of factors, 

including the age and health of the qualifying family 

member.” Id. (simplified). But ultimately, “[a]ll hardship 

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MARTINEZ V. CLARK 13

factors [are] considered in the aggregate” to make the 

determination. Id. (simplified). 

The hardship determination, the Court said, was not 

“discretionary,” id. at 218, because the application of the

statutory “hardship” standard to a “given set of facts presents

a mixed question of law and fact.” Id. at 221. To get there, 

the Court reasoned that the “hardship” standard resembled 

the “due diligence” standard for equitable tolling, which the 

Court already established was a “mixed question.” Id. at 222

(noting that the “due diligence” standard requires a court to 

“evaluate whether a noncitizen was adequately 

conscientious in his pursuit of a filing deadline”). Although 

both standards “require[d] close engagement with the facts,” 

they each represented a mixed question because a court had 

to “assess whether an IJ correctly applied the statutory 

standard to a given set of facts.” Id. at 221. And under the 

Court’s precedent, “[m]ixed questions of law and fact, even 

when they are primarily factual, fall within the statutory 

definition of ‘questions of law’ in § 1252(a)(2)(D).” Id. at 

225. So both the “due diligence” standard and the 

“hardship” standard are questions of law. And we’ve 

recently said that the “good faith marriage” determination 

under 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c) also constitutes a legal standard. 

Zia v. Garland, 112 F.4th 1194, 1201–02 (9th Cir. 2024). 

In contrast, “factual question[s] raised in an application 

for discretionary relief” remain unreviewable. Wilkinson, 

601 U.S. at 222. The jurisdiction-stripping provision still

precludes federal courts from reviewing “underlying factual 

determinations” in a claim for cancellation of removal, like

“credibility, the seriousness of a family member’s medical 

condition, or the level of financial support a noncitizen 

currently provides.” Id. at 225. Likewise, factfinding 

underlying a denial of immigration relief, such as whether 

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14 MARTINEZ V. CLARK

an alien intentionally lied on a state driver’s license form, is 

unreviewable. See Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 331

(2022). And the decision whether to revoke approval of a 

visa petition based on a sham-marriage determination is a 

“discretionary decision” that falls within the jurisdictionstripping provision of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Bouarfa v. 

Mayorkas, No. 23-583, slip op. at 1–2 (Dec. 10, 2024). 

With this background in mind, we turn to the 

“dangerousness” determination. To determine whether an 

alien is a danger to the community or a risk of flight, an IJ 

weighs nine factors under BIA precedent. Guerra, 24 I. & 

N. Dec. at 40. The nine factors an IJ “may” consider 

“include any or all of the following:”

(1) whether the alien has a fixed address in 

the United States; (2) the alien’s length of 

residence in the United States; (3) the alien’s 

family ties in the United States, and whether 

they may entitle the alien to reside 

permanently in the United States in the 

future; (4) the alien’s employment history; 

(5) the alien’s record of appearance in court; 

(6) the alien’s criminal record, including the 

extensiveness of criminal activity, the 

recency of such activity, and the seriousness 

of the offenses; (7) the alien’s history of 

immigration violations; (8) any attempts by 

the alien to flee prosecution or otherwise 

escape from authorities; and (9) the alien’s 

manner of entry to the United States. 

Id. And “[t]he Guerra factor most pertinent to assessing 

dangerousness” is “the alien’s criminal record, including the 

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MARTINEZ V. CLARK 15

extensiveness of criminal activity, the recency of such 

activity, and the seriousness of the offenses.” Singh, 638 

F.3d at 1206 (quoting Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 40). 

Wilkinson compels the conclusion that application of the 

“dangerousness” standard is a reviewable mixed question. 

Even though what constitutes “dangerousness” is malleable 

and involves agency discretion, Wilkinson instructs that this 

is still a legal standard so long as federal courts can “assess 

whether an IJ correctly applied the statutory standard to a 

given set of facts.” 601 U.S. at 221. Indeed,

“dangerousness” is not so different from the “exceptional 

and extremely unusual hardship” standard or the “good faith 

marriage” standard. All provide multiple factors for an IJ to 

consider before making the ultimate determination. For 

instance, the “hardship” determination includes eight factors 

“proper” for an IJ to “consider.” See In re MonrealAguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 63–64 (BIA 2001) 

(simplified) (listing factors such as age, family ties, length 

of residence in United States, health, political and economic 

conditions in country of removal, others means of adjusting 

status, involvement in community, and immigration history).

Likewise, the “good faith marriage” determination involves 

a review of the parties’ combined finances, length of 

cohabitation, birth certificates for any children, and “other 

evidence deemed pertinent to the director.” 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1216.5(e)(2); see also Zia, 112 F.4th at 1201. These 

multifactorial lists provide no guidance on what combination 

of factors constitutes “exceptional and extremely unusual 

hardship” or a “good faith marriage.” In fact, they grant an 

IJ broad discretion to weigh the listed factors and add any 

factors not mentioned or discount those that are less 

probative. The same goes for the “dangerousness”

determination. It is also a mixed question of fact and law. 

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16 MARTINEZ V. CLARK

The government suggests that the “dangerousness” 

determination is closer to the discretionary “step two” 

determination of the cancellation-of-removal process, which 

Wilkinson says is unreviewable. It is true that Martinez is 

detained under the mandatory detention provision of 

§ 1226(c), which requires detention for certain “criminal 

aliens.” As we have said, “noncitizens subject to mandatory 

detention under [§ 1226(c)] are not statutorily eligible for 

release on bond during the judicial phase of the proceedings, 

except under the narrow circumstances defined by 

§ 1226(c)(2).” Avilez v. Garland, 69 F.4th 525, 535 (9th Cir. 

2023). And so, as a statutory matter, the detention process

under § 1226(c) doesn’t compare exactly to the cancellationof-removal process, which requires the IJ to find the 

requisite “hardship” at step one and to exercise discretion at 

step two. Under § 1226(c), if an alien is convicted of a 

qualifying offense, then detention is automatic and 

nondiscretionary. 

But the district court here ordered the bond hearing under 

the Due Process Clause. Martinez, 2019 WL 5962685, at 

*1. The district court ruled that “due process requires the 

government to show by clear and convincing evidence that 

the detainee presents a flight risk or a danger to the 

community at the time of the bond hearing.” Id. That 

determination did not leave room for an added layer of 

agency discretion; if the BIA found that Martinez was not 

dangerous, it would have had to release him. See id.; see 

also Singh, 638 F.3d at 1202 (ordering release if the BIA did 

not find, by clear and convincing evidence, that alien was 

dangerous or a flight risk). So the “dangerousness” 

determination is unlike the fully discretionary second step 

under § 1229b(b)(1) and is reviewable. 

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MARTINEZ V. CLARK 17

B.

1.

Because we have jurisdiction here, we must next decide 

the standard of review for a “dangerousness” determination. 

The district court concluded that “the ultimate determination 

of whether th[e] facts amount to clear and convincing 

evidence of flight risk and dangerousness should be 

reviewed de novo.” Wilkinson, however, recognized that a 

mixed question that “requires a court to immerse itself in 

facts . . . suggests a more deferential standard of review.” 

601 U.S. at 222. Zia confirmed that “our review is 

deferential” for a “primarily factual question,” and it held 

that, “under a deferential standard,” the BIA did not err in 

concluding the alien failed to establish a good-faith 

marriage. 112 F.4th at 1202. 

The same principle applies here. When questions require 

a close review of agency-found facts, like the 

“dangerousness” determination, we review for an abuse of 

discretion. Cf. Konou v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (applying abuse of discretion standard to 

determination of whether an alien was convicted of a 

particularly serious crime) (simplified). That deference 

reflects Congress’s decision to cabin judicial review in 

removal proceedings. See Patel, 596 U.S. at 332 (“Congress 

has sharply circumscribed judicial review of the 

discretionary-relief process.”). And we tread especially 

carefully in this area where Congress sought to eliminate

judicial review.

2.

As explained, the district court erroneously reviewed 

Martinez’s habeas petition de novo instead of for abuse of 

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18 MARTINEZ V. CLARK

discretion. But because the district court denied habeas 

relief under a higher standard of review, remand to the 

district court to review the BIA’s “dangerousness” 

determination for abuse of discretion would be futile. We 

conclude that had the district court applied the proper 

standard of review, it would have correctly determined that 

the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding Martinez 

dangerous.

Under an abuse of discretion standard, “we cannot 

reweigh evidence . . . [but] can [only] determine whether the 

BIA applied the correct legal standard.” Konou, 750 F.3d at 

1127 (simplified). The BIA relied on the “totality of the 

evidence” to determine that Martinez’s repeated convictions 

for conspiracy to distribute cocaine, which occurred thirteen 

years apart, provided compelling evidence that he was a 

danger to the community. The BIA pointed to prior 

decisions in which it has highlighted the destructive effects 

of narcotics. For example, the BIA has concluded, 

Illicit narcotic drugs sold in the United States 

ruin or destroy the lives of many American 

citizens each year. Apart from the 

considerable number of people in this 

country who die of overdoses of narcotics or 

who become the victims of homicides related 

to the unlawful traffic of drugs, many others 

become disabled by addiction to heroin, 

cocaine, and other drugs.

In re Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 275 (BIA 2002). 

Distributing deadly drugs is a clear danger to the community. 

And the BIA reasonably believed that Martinez’s 

rehabilitative efforts and recent compliance with the law 

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MARTINEZ V. CLARK 19

didn’t outweigh this “strong evidence” of danger. Thus, the 

BIA properly considered the factors set forth in Guerra, and 

it did not abuse its discretion in finding, by clear and 

convincing evidence, that Martinez was a danger to the 

community. 

III.

We now turn to Martinez’s next claim—that the BIA 

erred by applying the wrong burden of proof. We have 

jurisdiction over this claim as it’s a “question[] of law.” 

Singh, 638 F.3d at 1202. Martinez contends that the BIA 

failed to apply the correct clear-and-convincing burden of 

proof and review all the evidence in the record. He also 

alleges that the BIA impermissibly shifted the burden of 

proof to him. We disagree.

Generally, in the absence of any red flags, we take the 

BIA at its word. For example, “[w]hen nothing in the record 

or the BIA’s decision indicates a failure to consider all the 

evidence,” we will rely on the BIA’s statement that it 

properly assessed the entire record. Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 

762, 771 (9th Cir. 2011). We do not require the BIA to 

“discuss each piece of evidence submitted.” Id. Similarly, 

we accept that the BIA “applied the correct legal standard” 

if the BIA “expressly cited and applied [the relevant 

caselaw] in rendering its decision.” See Mendez-Castro v. 

Mukasey, 552 F.3d 975, 980 (9th Cir. 2009). But when there 

is an indication that something is amiss, like if the BIA 

“misstat[es] the record” or “fail[s] to mention highly 

probative or potentially dispositive evidence,” we do not 

credit its use of a “catchall phrase” to the contrary. Cole, 

659 F.3d at 771−72. 

There are no such red flags here. At the outset of its 

decision, the BIA properly noted that the government bore 

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20 MARTINEZ V. CLARK

the burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that 

Martinez is a danger to the community. It then reviewed the 

record, including Martinez’s drug trafficking convictions, 

and concluded there was “strong evidence” of his 

dangerousness. It credited Martinez’s significant 

rehabilitation efforts, such as keeping a clean record while 

on pretrial release and in prison. But it concluded, under 

“the totality of the evidence,” that the serious nature of 

Martinez’s convictions and his history of reoffending, even 

after several years of sobriety, rendered him a danger to the 

community. Contrary to Martinez’s claim, the BIA 

explicitly noted the evidence of his release on his own 

recognizance and his self-report to prison during his 2013 

criminal proceedings. Thus, we conclude that the BIA 

applied the correct burden of proof here. 

IV.

Lastly, we consider Martinez’s third claim that the BIA 

had to consider alternatives to detention, such as conditional 

parole, before denying him bond. Martinez suggests that the 

BIA must import consideration of conditions of release from 

the criminal pretrial release context, such as GPS 

monitoring, drug testing, and counseling, to the immigration 

custody context. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c). In Martinez’s 

view, failing to do so violates due process or constitutes legal 

error—over which we have jurisdiction. See Singh, 638 F.3d 

at 1202. We reject Martinez’s argument. 

Due process does not require immigration courts to 

consider conditional release when determining whether to 

continue to detain an alien under § 1226(c) as a danger to the 

community. In Singh, we addressed the due process 

requirements for bond hearings for aliens subject to 

prolonged detention. 638 F.3d at 1203−10. We held that 

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MARTINEZ V. CLARK 21

due process requires immigration courts to make 

contemporaneous records of bond hearings, id. at 1200, and 

the government to prove dangerousness or risk of flight by 

clear and convincing evidence, id. at 1200, 1205. We then 

noted that these “greater procedural protections” are enough 

to safeguard an alien’s due process rights and “justify [the] 

denial of bond.” Id. at 1207.

Nowhere in Singh did we suggest that due process also 

mandates that immigration courts consider release 

conditions or conditional parole before deciding that an alien 

is a danger to the community. Singh offers the high-water 

mark of procedural protections required by due process, and 

we see no reason to extend those protections any further 

here. 

Relying on Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976 (9th 

Cir. 2017), Martinez argues that conditions of release must 

be considered to ensure that detention is reasonably related 

to the government’s interest in protecting the public. That 

case is inapplicable here. In Hernandez, the plaintiff aliens

complained that neither their financial circumstances nor 

alternative release conditions were considered before their 

bond decisions were made, even though they were 

determined not to be dangerous or flight risks. 872 F.3d at 

984−85, 990−91. While the government had a legitimate 

interest in protecting the public and ensuring appearances in 

immigration proceedings, we held that detaining an indigent 

alien without consideration of financial circumstances and 

alternative release conditions was “unlikely to result” in a 

bond determination “reasonably related to the government’s 

legitimate interests.” Id. at 991. The analysis is different 

here. Cf. id. at 994 (relying on absence of dangerousness or 

flight-risk determination in procedural due process analysis). 

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Martinez was found to be a danger to the community, so his 

detention is clearly “reasonably related” to the government’s 

interest in protecting the public. See id. at 991. 

V.

For these reasons, we affirm the denial of the petition. 

AFFIRMED. 

BUMATAY, Circuit Judge, concurring: 

While I now agree that our court has jurisdiction to 

review whether an alien is a “danger to the community” 

under binding Supreme Court precedent, we never should 

have gotten to this point. That’s because we had no authority 

to order a new bond hearing for a “criminal alien[]” subject 

to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). That 

provision provides that an alien who commits certain 

offenses “shall” be taken into custody. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1226(c)(1). Instead, egged on by some of our wayward 

precedent, the district court believed that due process 

requires that Javier Martinez receive a bond hearing (and be 

potentially released) simply because his removal proceeding 

had become “prolonged.” See Martinez v. Clark, 2019 WL 

5962685, at *1 (W.D. Wash. 2019). But this defies 

Congress’s clear command and assumes an outsized role for 

federal courts over immigration-detention decisions. Simply 

put, the Due Process Clause doesn’t grant federal courts the 

freedom to refashion statutory detention requirements in the 

immigration context. 

And the due process ruling here leads to a second 

problem—violation of Congress’s directive that “[n]o court 

may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney 

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MARTINEZ V. CLARK 23

General . . . regarding the detention or release of any alien or 

. . . denial of bond.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). But under the 

district court’s due process directive, federal courts are 

empowered to do just that—set aside the Executive’s 

detention decisions. For instance, if federal courts disagreed 

with the BIA’s assessment of Martinez’s dangerousness, 

then presumably the next step would have been to order his 

release. But we circumvent Congress’s will by claiming that 

authority. And our precedent supporting this expansive 

authority over detention decisions is wrong. Namely, Singh 

v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2011), held that 

“[a]lthough § 1226(e) restricts jurisdiction in the federal 

courts in some respects, it does not limit habeas jurisdiction 

over constitutional claims or questions of law.” But that is 

too broad. Nothing allows us to completely ignore 

§ 1226(e)’s direct command. 

These errors flow from a flawed conception of due 

process and our role in immigration proceedings. We ought 

to “defer to the political branches” on immigration decisions 

because they are “of a character more appropriate to either 

the Legislature or the Executive than to the Judiciary.” 

Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1215 (9th Cir. 

2022) (Bumatay, J., concurring) (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 

426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976)). That’s because “any policy toward 

aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with 

contemporaneous policies . . . of foreign relations, the war 

power, and the maintenance of a republican form of 

government.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003) 

(quoting Mathews, 426 U.S. at 81 n.17). We should have 

respected our limited role in this area. Yet we deepen the 

affront to the separation of powers by aggrandizing our 

authority.

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I.

Despite Congress’s decision to detain all criminal aliens 

during removal proceedings, the district court believed that 

due process requires bond hearings (and potential release) 

for an alien whose detention becomes “prolonged.” It 

reasoned, “despite the statutory language of 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1226(c), the Ninth Circuit offers ‘grave doubts that any 

statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without 

any process is constitutional.’” Martinez v. Clark, 2019 WL 

5962685, *1 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2019) (quoting 

Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 2018)). But 

that’s wrong.

Due process doesn’t require bond hearings for criminal 

aliens mandatorily detained under § 1226(c)—even for 

prolonged periods. “As a matter of text, structure, and 

history, Congress may authorize the government to detain 

removable aliens throughout their removal proceedings.” 

Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1214 (Bumatay, J., concurring). 

And “[n]othing in the Due Process Clause requires 

individualized bond determinations beyond what Congress 

has established.” Id. at 1214. That’s because, in the 

immigration context, “Congress regularly makes rules that 

would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” Demore, 538 

U.S. at 521 (simplified). So while mandatory detention may 

not be allowed for criminal purposes and most civil contexts, 

immigration stands apart from those areas. 

Because Congress possesses “considerable authority 

over immigration matters,” mandatory detention under 

§ 1226(c) has been upheld “as a constitutionally valid aspect 

of the deportation process.” Id. at 523 (simplified). Thus, 

when detention is for an “immigration purpose,” “Congress 

may grant the Executive the authority to detain aliens during 

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MARTINEZ V. CLARK 25

removal proceedings—with or without bond hearings.” 

Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1218 (Bumatay, J., concurring). 

“And so long as the government follows reasonable, 

individualized determinations to ensure that the alien is 

properly in removal proceedings, due process does not 

require more bond hearings even after a prolonged period.” 

Id. (emphasis added). 

Absent any allegation that the extended detention here is 

unrelated to an immigration purpose, the mere fact that 

detention is “prolonged” doesn’t alter the statutory 

framework. Indeed, in our circuit, the median processing 

time for an immigration case to reach a merits determination 

is 39 months. Does that mean that any immigration 

proceeding appealed in the Ninth Circuit would 

automatically invalidate mandatory detention under 

§ 1226(c)? Why should our delays in processing cases 

impact Congress’s design? 

And dicta from Rodriguez v. Marin isn’t a basis to rule 

otherwise. First, the Rodriguez order was written after the 

Supreme Court expressly rejected our view that immigration 

statutes must allow for individualized bond hearings after 

detentions become prolonged. 909 F.3d at 255. Second, 

Rodriguez’s musings were mainly justified by a criminal law

ruling. Id. at 256–57 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 

U.S. 739, 755 (1987)). But that’s irrelevant when it comes 

to immigration law. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 521. Third, 

Rodriguez cites Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 

(2001), for the proposition that “[c]ivil detention” violates 

due process outside of “certain special and narrow 

nonpunitive circumstances.” Rodriguez, 909 F.3d at 257 

(simplified). But Zadvydas only holds that immigration 

detention must “serve its purported immigration purpose,” 

Demore, 538 U.S. at 526, and there is no argument that the 

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detention of criminal aliens serves no immigration purpose. 

Finally, Rodriguez quotes at length Justice Breyer’s 

dissenting opinion in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 

(2018). Rodriguez, 909 F.3d at 257 (quoting Jennings, 583 

U.S. at 330) (Breyer, J., dissenting). But respectfully, a 

dissenting view is no reason to upset congressional will. 

In contrast, Rodriguez ignored the long history of 

deference to the political branches in administering the 

immigration system. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 538–40 

(O’Connor, J., concurring); Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 

1215–18 (Bumatay, J., concurring). Thus, no extra bond 

hearing was due here.

II.

Second, our erroneous precedent leads to a head-on clash 

with Congress’s immigration design. In Singh, we asserted 

jurisdiction over any “constitutional question” or “question 

of law” involving an individualized detention “decision” 

despite the clear prohibition of § 1226(e). Singh, 638 F.3d 

at 1202. Recall that § 1226(e) provides that “[t]he Attorney 

General’s discretionary judgment regarding the application 

of this section shall not be subject to review” and “[n]o court 

may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General 

under this section regarding the detention or release of any 

alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole.” 

The Court has been clear on the meaning of this 

provision: § 1226(e) precludes an alien from challenging “a 

‘discretionary judgment’ by the Attorney General or a 

‘decision’ that the Attorney General has made regarding his 

detention or release.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 516 (simplified). 

In other words, the jurisdiction-stripping provision prohibits 

federal courts from overturning the individualized

“decision” to detain a particular alien. But the Court also 

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MARTINEZ V. CLARK 27

affirmed review of limited constitutional questions—the 

provision doesn’t preclude “challenges [to] the statutory 

framework that permits [the alien’s] detention without bail.” 

Id. at 517 (reviewing a “constitutional challenge to the 

legislation authorizing . . . detention without bail”). So a 

challenge to the “statutory framework” of immigration 

detention “as a whole,” such as whether there is a statutory 

right to periodic bond hearings, remains reviewable. See 

Jennings, 583 U.S. at 295–96.

But Singh improperly expanded our authority beyond 

that. In that case, an alien challenged the result of his 

individualized bond hearing, arguing that the BIA violated 

his procedural due process right by using the wrong burden 

of proof. Singh, 638 F.3d at 1201. Singh agreed with the 

alien and ordered the alien’s “release” from detention unless 

the BIA afforded him a new bond hearing under the court’s 

newly fashioned due process standards. Id. at 1202. Singh

justified this broad authority based on “traditional habeas 

jurisdiction” and claimed that § 1226(e) “restricts 

jurisdiction only with respect to the executive’s exercise of 

discretion.” Id. It then broadly held that § 1226(e) doesn’t 

“limit habeas jurisdiction over constitutional claims or 

questions of law.” Id.; see also Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 

F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011) (asserting jurisdiction over 

an individual alien’s claims for constitutional and legal 

error). 

Singh didn’t properly respect Congress’s will here. 

Contrary to Singh’s claim, Demore didn’t restore 

“traditional habeas jurisdiction” under § 1226(e). Demore

only held challenges to the statutory scheme of detention 

under § 1226(c) were reviewable. This makes some textual 

sense because the statutory scheme isn’t within the 

Executive’s “discretionary judgment,” “action,” or 

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28 MARTINEZ V. CLARK

“decision.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 516. But § 1226(e) still 

precludes any challenges to “operational decisions” rather 

than the “legislation establishing the framework for those 

decisions.” Id. at 517 (simplified). Thus, Demore reinforced 

that Congress stripped our jurisdiction over individualized 

detention decisions. It didn’t open the door to the type of 

judicial review that Singh asserted. 

Even if Demore permits constitutional challenges to the 

statutory framework of detention, the Court has never 

endorsed judicial review over all constitutional or legal 

questions. After all, not all constitutional or legal challenges 

target the detention’s statutory framework. Many, including 

the ones raised by Martinez here, just appeal BIA decisions 

in an individual alien’s bond hearing, such as whether the 

BIA employed the proper burden of proof or correctly 

analyzed a legal standard. Not only did Singh assert 

jurisdiction over these “operational decisions,” it also 

claimed the extraordinary authority to “release” any alien 

detained contrary to our court’s wishes. 638 F.3d at 1202. 

Claiming the authority to release individual aliens directly 

contradicts § 1226(e)’s express prohibition on “sett[ing] 

aside” a “decision” of the Executive “regarding the detention 

. . . of any alien.” Yet Singh failed to grapple with this 

explicit statutory prohibition. Indeed, “[i]t cannot seriously 

be maintained . . . that ‘no court’ does not really mean ‘no 

court,’ or that a decision of the Attorney General may not be 

‘set aside’ in actions filed under the Immigration and 

Naturalization Act but may be set aside on habeas review.” 

Demore, 538 U.S. at 535 (O’Connor, J., concurring). We 

should have given those words their plain meaning and 

recognized that we lack authority to set aside an 

individualized decision to detain a particular alien—no 

matter whether it involves a question of law or not. 

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MARTINEZ V. CLARK 29

* * *

Because our precedent requires us to defy Congress’s 

authority and assume an aggrandized role in immigration 

decisions, we should change it. 

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