Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-04027/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-04027-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1444 Petition for Removal- Foreclosure

---

1 

Case No. 5:14-cv-04027-PSG

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION

MARIA OCHOA,

 Plaintiff,

 v. 

THE WOLF FIRM, et al.,

 Defendants. 

)

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

)

Case No. 5:14-cv-04027-PSG

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO 

DISMISS

(Re: Docket Nos. 30, 31)

Defendants Federal National Mortgage Association and Suntrust Mortgage, Inc. move to 

dismiss Plaintiff Maria Ochoa’s complaint. Although Ochoa filed her opposition more than three 

weeks late,1 the court nevertheless considers it in light of her pro se status. Because Ochoa has 

failed to allege the tender required to pursue her claims, Defendants’ motions are GRANTED 

without leave to amend. 

I.

In late 2006, Ochoa took out a mortgage with Suntrust on her Salinas home in the amount 

of $350,000.2 Several years later, Suntrust designated The Wolf Firm as trustee on the deed.3 By 

April 2013, Ochoa was in default on the loan. A notice of default was recorded, thereby initiating 

 

1 See Civ. L.R. 7-3. 

2 See Docket No. 24 at ¶ 14. 

3 See id. at ¶¶ 16-17. 

Case 5:14-cv-04027-PSG Document 37 Filed 05/20/15 Page 1 of 5
2 

Case No. 5:14-cv-04027-PSG

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

non-judicial foreclosure proceedings.4 Due to Ochoa’s failure to cure the default, a notice of 

trustee’s sale was recorded four months later.5 Before the sale, Suntrust assigned its interest in the 

loan to Fannie Mae, who took title to the property after the trustee’s sale.6

Ochoa then brought this suit against Defendants in Monterey Superior Court.7 After

removal to this court and two opportunities to amend her complaint,8 she is left with two causes of 

action: wrongful foreclosure in violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.5 and slander of title. 

II.

This court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441(b). The 

parties further consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. 

§636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). 

At this stage of the case, the court must accept all material allegations in the complaint as

true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.9 The court’s review is 

limited to the face of the complaint, materials incorporated into the complaint by reference, and 

matters of which the court may take judicial notice.10 However, the court need not accept as true 

allegations that are conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.11 

III.

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), “dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal 

theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.”12 If a plaintiff 

 

4 See id. at ¶¶ 21-23. 

5 See id. at ¶¶ 24-27. 

6 See id.

7 See Docket No. 1. 

8 See Docket Nos. 16, 18, 24. 

9 See Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008). 

10 See id.

11 See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 561 (“a wholly conclusory statement of [a] claim” will not survive a motion to 

dismiss).

12 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Case 5:14-cv-04027-PSG Document 37 Filed 05/20/15 Page 2 of 5
3 

Case No. 5:14-cv-04027-PSG

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

fails to proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” the complaint 

may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.13 A claim is 

facially plausible “when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”14 Against these standards, 

neither of Ochoa’s claims pass muster. 

A borrower in default on her payments, who nevertheless asks the court to stop or set aside 

foreclosure proceedings or who purports to assert claims based on defects or wrongful conduct 

associated with a foreclosure or foreclosure proceedings, must first personally “do equity” by 

tendering the undisputed amount due and owing.15 The tender rule applies to “any cause of action 

for irregularity in the sale procedure.”16 “When a debtor is in default of a home mortgage loan, and 

a foreclosure is either pending or has taken place, the debtor must allege a credible tender of the 

amount of the secured debt to maintain any cause of action for foreclosure.”17 Absent any alleged 

and actual tender, a complaint fails to state a cause of action.18

Here, Ochoa failed to allege any intended or actual tender of the amount owed.19 Nor does 

she do so in her opposition. Rather she first argues that she is not required to tender the entire 

debt—which flies in the face of the case law—and then shifts her position to one that challenges 

 

13 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 

14 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). 

15 Arnolds Mgmt. Corp. v. Eischen, 158 Cal. App. 3d 575, 577 (1984); see Meetz v. Mohr, 141 Cal. 

667, 673 (1904) (“[o]ne who seeks equity must do equity”). 

16 Abdallah v. United Savings Bank, 43 Cal. App. 4th 1101, 1109 (1996). 

17 Alicea v. GE Money Bank, Case No. 09-cv-00091, 2009 WL 2136969, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 

2009); Montoya v. Countrywide Bank, Case No. 09-cv-00641, 2009 WL 1813973, at *11-12 (N.D. 

Cal. Jun. 25, 2009) (“the ‘tender rule’ requires that as a precondition to challenging a foreclosure 

sale, or any cause of action implicitly integrated to the sale, the borrower must make a valid and 

viable tender of payment of the debt”). 

18 See Karlsen v. Am. Sav. & Loan Assn., 15 Cal. App. 3d 112, 117-18 (1971); see also U.S. Cold 

Storage v. Great W. Sav. & Loan Ass’n., 165 Cal. App. 3d 1214, 1225 (1985) (“It would be futile 

to set aside a foreclosure sale on the technical grounds that notice was improper, if the party 

making the challenge did not first make full tender and thereby establish his ability to purchase the 

property.”). 

19 See Docket No. 24. 

Case 5:14-cv-04027-PSG Document 37 Filed 05/20/15 Page 3 of 5
4 

Case No. 5:14-cv-04027-PSG

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

the validity of the underlying debt to avoid the requirement.20 But Ochoa’s complaint never 

challenges the underlying debt.21 In fact, she admits that she accepted a loan in order to finance 

her house.22 Nor can Ochoa avoid the tender rule because she purports to challenge the trustee’s 

power to conduct the sale.23 The documents submitted by Defendants show that the foreclosing 

trustee was substituted in as trustee of the deed of trust before conducting the sale.24

The tender rule applies to any claim implicitly integrated with the foreclosure sale.25 

Because both of Ochoa’s claims—for wrongful foreclosure and slander of title—closely relate to 

the underlying foreclosure sale, they are both barred by the tender rule. 

IV. 

Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED. Because Ochoa has previously amended 

her complaint and the court finds that amendment would be futile,26 leave to amend is DENIED. 

 

20 Cf. Lona v. Citibank, N.A., 202 Cal. App. 4th 89 (2011). 

21 See Docket No. 24. 

22 See id. at ¶ 14. 

23 Cf. Dimock v. Emerald Props., 81 Cal. App. 4th 868 (2000). 

24 Defendants submitted a request for judicial notice of a deed of trust, corporate assignments 

thereof, a notice of default, a notice of trustee’s sale and a trustee’s deed upon sale. See Docket 

No. 32. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) allows the court to take judicial notice of a “fact that is not subject to 

reasonable dispute because it is generally known” or “can be accurately and readily determined 

from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. The court also may take judicial 

notice of recorded documents. See Fimbres v. Chapel Mortgage Corp, Case No. 09-cv-00886, 

2009 WL 4163332, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2009); Maguca v. Auroroa Loan Servs., Case No. 09-

cv-01086, 2009 WL 3467750, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2009); Angulo v. Countrywide Home 

Loans, Inc., Case No. 09-cv-00877, 2009 WL 3427179, at *3 n.3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2009); Distor 

v. U.S. Bank NA, Case No. 09-cv-02086, 2009 WL 3429700, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2009); 

Hutson v. Am. Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., Case No 09-cv-01951, 2009 WL 3353312, at *3-4 

(N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2009). Because the documents at issue were all recorded by the County of 

Monterey, the request is GRANTED. 

25 See Arnolds Mgmt. Corp., 158 Cal. App. 3d at 579. 

26 See Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).

Case 5:14-cv-04027-PSG Document 37 Filed 05/20/15 Page 4 of 5
Case 5:14-cv-04027-PSG Document 37 Filed 05/20/15 Page 5 of 5