Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00267/USCOURTS-alsd-1_06-cv-00267-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:206 Collect Unpaid Wages

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1 The named plaintiffs are J. Daniel Godard, Jr., Tommy Wescovich, Mark V.

Collier, Sr., Lonnie Johnson, James D. McClure, William Block, Joseph F. Murphy, Sr., Winston

L. Steiner, and Chadwick A. Smith.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

J. DANIEL GODARD, JR., et al., )

 ) PUBLISH

Plaintiffs, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 06-0267-WS-C

 )

ALABAMA PILOT, INC., )

 )

Defendant. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 45)

and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 54). Both Motions have been fully briefed

and are ripe for disposition at this time.

I. Factual Background.

This collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C.

§§ 201 et seq. (“FLSA”), involves a singular question, to-wit: whether the nine similarly situated

plaintiffs in this case are properly considered exempt from overtime compensation under the

FLSA. More precisely, this lawsuit turns on the statutory provision that exempts “any employee

employed as a seaman” from the ambit of the FLSA’s overtime pay requirements. 29 U.S.C. §

213(b)(6).

The obvious starting point for the analysis is to determine what plaintiffs’ job duties

actually are and how they spend their working hours. On this point, the parties agree that the

material facts are largely undisputed. The nine plaintiffs in this case are launch operators,

currently or formerly employed by defendant, Alabama Pilot, Inc. (Barrett Aff., ¶ 3.)1

 These

launch operators navigate and pilot Alabama Pilot’s two small boats (called “launches” or “pilot

boats”) that ferry bar pilots to and from vessels entering or leaving the Port of Mobile, including

Case 1:06-cv-00267-WS-C Document 72 Filed 04/10/07 Page 1 of 25
2 This service is necessary to comport with a provision of Alabama law which

requires that “[a]ll steam or sail vessels crossing the outer bar of Mobile Bay, except those

exempt under this chapter, shall be conducted, controlled or navigated by a pilot licensed by or

under authority of the laws of the State of Alabama.” Ala. Code § 33-4-54.

3 The very first duty listed in a job description for launch operators is the following:

“Safely transport personnel to and from vessels.” (Burns Dep., at Exh. 8.)

4 That said, plaintiffs have received certain types of contractual premium pay, such

as overtime of double pay for hours worked in excess of 24 consecutive hours prior to May

2006, and, if they work more than 13 hours consecutively, double time for hours worked in

excess of 12 consecutive hours following May 2006. (McClure Dep., at 27-28; Barrett Dep., at

30; Godard Dep., at 96.) This contractual overtime is analytically distinct from the question of

whether plaintiffs are entitled to FLSA overtime at one and one-half times their regular rate for

all hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek. Except where specifically noted otherwise, all

references to overtime herein refer to FLSA overtime, rather than contractual overtime.

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the Theodore ship channel and the Port of Bayou LaBatre.2

 Thus, the launch operators are

responsible for captaining the boats that transport the bar pilots from a pilot station on Dauphin

Island to inbound vessels at the entrance of Mobile ship channel, and that likewise transport bar

pilots from outbound vessels at the mouth of the Mobile ship channel back to the pilot station. 

(Godard Dep., at 76; McClure Dep., at 100; Burns Dep., at Exh. 8.)3

Alabama Pilot’s launch operators work long hours set by a collective bargaining

agreement. Until May 2006, the launch operators worked 24 consecutive hours on duty (in the

form of two back-to-back 12-hour shifts), followed by 48 consecutive hours off duty. (Godard

Dep., at 55; Wittendorfer Dep., at 33.) The result was that plaintiffs would work 72 hours one

week, then 48 hours for each of the next two weeks, before the cycle would repeat itself. 

(Barrett Dep., at 30-31.) As of May 2006, however, the arrangement changed, such that

Alabama Pilot now schedules launch operators to work seven consecutive 12-hour “day” shifts,

followed by seven consecutive 12-hour “night” shifts, followed by seven consecutive days off. 

(McClure Dep., at 20; Johnson Dep., at 20.) Under this system, then, plaintiffs work 84 hours

per week for two straight weeks, then 0 hours for the third week. Both prior to and after the May

2006 scheduling change, Alabama Pilot has never paid plaintiffs overtime compensation under

the FLSA for hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek.4 In general, plaintiffs are paid a flat

“daily rate” for each 12-hour shift, which rate has increased annually from $124.96 in 2003 to

Case 1:06-cv-00267-WS-C Document 72 Filed 04/10/07 Page 2 of 25
5 To convert that straight-time daily rate into an hourly rate for purposes of any

overtime calculations that might be needed, one would simply divide the daily rate by 12 hours. 

Thus, the launch operators’ regular hourly rate has ranged from $10.41 in 2003 to $12.42 in

2006. (Wittendorfer Dep., at 31-33.)

6 There appears to be little debate among the parties as to the actual job duties of

the launch operators, although they disagree vehemently as to the legal implications of those

duties. Under the circumstances, the issues joined in these dueling Rule 56 motions might have

been more efficiently presented had the parties submitted stipulated facts, rather than forcing the

Court to undertake the laborious task of sifting through voluminous deposition transcripts in

order to understand plaintiffs’ duties.

7 In its present configuration, the pilot station consists of the radio room, a kitchen,

a bathroom, and an area for resting. (Johnson Dep., at 23.)

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approximately $149.00 in 2006. (Wittendorfer Dep., at 31-32.)5

The critical factual questions in this action relate to the job duties that launch operators

perform, and the proportion of their working hours that they devote to particular categories of

duties. Neither the plaintiff launch operators nor the defendant employer have maintained

minute-by-minute reports, comprehensive logs, or other detailed time records that specifically

track how the launch operators spend their time (Godard Dep., at 218; McClure Dep., at 56;

Wescovich Dep., at 49; Johnson Dep., at 39; Collier Dep., at 59-60); therefore, it is necessary to

piece together a summary of their activities from the record, which includes excerpts from each

of the nine named plaintiffs’ depositions.6

Launch operators report for duty at a land-based structure consisting of a boat dock and

pilot station on Dauphin Island. (Wittendorfer Dep., at 49; Godard Dep., at 80-81.) The pilot

station is a freestanding building containing a “radio room” from which launch operators

monitor radio and telephone communications relating to the scheduling and transport of bar

pilots. (Id.)

7

 There is broad consensus among the parties that transporting bar pilots by boat to

and from vessels requiring bar pilot services is the launch operators’ foremost job duty. In that

regard, plaintiff Dan Godard agreed that the launch operators’ primary function was “to put them

on the ship or get them off the ship.” (Godard Dep., at 76.) Similarly, plaintiff Doug McClure

testified that the launch operators’ “main job” is to drive the pilot boat and to “[s]ee that the

pilots are safely out there and safely back.” (McClure Dep., at 32, 41.) Other plaintiffs testified

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8 The 29.5% figure is drawn from Alabama Pilot logbooks which reflect the total

amount of time in each 24-hour period in which each launch’s engines are running. 

(Wittendorfer Dep., at 78.) In those logs, launch operators record the exact period of time in a

shift in which the engines are running, as measured by a counter onboard. (Id.) In general, the

period of time in which the engines run should closely approximate the total period of time in

which the boats are operated, although the time spent operating a vessel may be somewhat lower

than the recorded engine hours because the engines may need to be warmed up, or operated for

certain maintenance tasks. (Id. at 85-86; Cook Dep., at 2.) Records reveal significant variance

in the month-to-month daily averages during the March 2004 - August 2006 time period, with

launch operations ranging from a low-end figure of 4.86 hours per 24-hour shift in August 2005

to a high-end figure of 12.18 hours per 24-hour shift in October 2005. (Wittendorfer Dep., at

Exh. 3.) Notwithstanding these outliers, the daily average operation of the boats’ engines

hovered between 5.9 and 8.3 hours for 24 of the 30 months in which data is available.

9 All parties assume, without explanation, that the 7.09 hours reflects the total time

that each launch operator was at sea per 24 hours. But two launch operators are on duty at a

time; therefore, the 7.09 hours figure could only be accurate if both on-duty launch operators are

always aboard each pilot boat whenever it sails. The parties have identified no record evidence

that such is the case. Nonetheless, the Court will assume it to be true for purposes of this Order;

otherwise, the parties’ agreed figure of 7.09 hours would overstate the actual time at sea for each

launch operator in a given 24-hour period.

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similarly. (Steiner Dep., at 26; Wescovich Dep., at 27.)

While operating Alabama Pilot’s two launches (the Alabama and the Mobile Pilot) may

be plaintiffs’ primary duty, it is undisputed that they neither spend 100% of their working hours

captaining a pilot boat nor spend their entire shift on the boat. (Godard Dep., at 78; McClure

Dep., at 22-23.) Indeed, Alabama Pilot’s records reflect that, between March 2004 and August

2006, the pilot boats operated for 7.09 hours per 24-hour period, or 29.5% of the time. (Barrett

Dep., at 39-40.)8

 That fact, which neither side challenges, raises the question of what the launch

operators are doing for the nearly 17 hours of each 24-hour shift, or the nearly 8.5 hours of each

12-hour shift, in which they are not actually operating the launches.9

Pilot boats do not operate on a set, routine schedule, but may be called into service

anytime, day or night, and often on short notice, depending on the need for bar pilots. When the

launches are not operating, Alabama Pilot’s launch operators do not remain aboard those boats

waiting to spring into action; instead, they spend most of their time inside the pilot station,

approximately 30 feet from the docks. (Wittendorfer Dep., at 53; Barrett Dep., at 57.) There is

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10 This account is echoed by Kirk Barrett, an Alabama Pilot representative, who

testified that when the launch operators are not operating a pilot boat, “[t]he biggest job is to

maintain our radio watch,” such that a launch operator is always standing by via radio. (Barrett

Dep., at 40.)

11 Apparently, Alabama Pilot modified the working rules for launch operators in

June 2006, after the inception of this litigation, to prohibit launch operators from sleeping while

on duty. (Burns Dep., at Exh. 8.)

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no dispute that the plaintiffs spend a significant percentage of their on-duty hours on standby,

sitting in the radio room, monitoring the radio and telephone, and waiting for calls requesting

that a bar pilot be either picked up or delivered to another vessel. (McClure Dep., at 35, 42-43;

Wescovich Dep., at 32; Murphy Dep., at 30.) Although other estimates may exist, plaintiff

Tommy Wescovich testified that the launch operators spend “[o]ver half” of their working time

waiting to be called to pick up or drop off a bar pilot. (Wescovich Dep., at 32.)10 At any given

moment, two launch operators are on duty. (McClure Dep., at 40.) That way, if one launch

operator is moving cars or otherwise away from the pilot station, the other can remain at the

station to monitor radio traffic. (Id.) When the launch operators are not piloting a boat, one can

listen for the radio and telephone while the other one rests in crew quarters or performs odd jobs

around the pilot station and its environs. (Collier Dep., at 48.)11

Plaintiffs characterize the radio/telephone duties as dispatching, and suggest that they

spend an inordinate share of their time engaging in such dispatching functions. In that regard,

launch operators contend that they are on the telephone “almost constantly over a 24 hour

period” fielding calls from line handlers wanting to know when ships will arrive in port, from the

Coast Guard inquiring about particular ship runs, from pilots (both on-duty and off-duty)

inquiring about scheduling matters, and the like, all of which prompts plaintiffs to contend that

these were mere dispatching duties. (Godard Dep., at 175.) But Alabama Pilot also employs

two full-time dispatchers, who are not parties in this action. (Id. at 176.) Those dispatchers are

responsible for calling the launch operators to furnish them with a schedule of ships, and to

notify the launch operators of any changes to that schedule. (Wescovich Dep., at 44.)

When not operating the launch boats or monitoring radio and telephone traffic, the launch

operators fill their working hours with a dizzying array of odd jobs and general labor tasks. 

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12 For instance, the record reflects that Alabama Pilot assigns weekly cleaning duties

to launch operators for the pilot station, including such functions as cleaning base boards, door

trim, doors and window casings; dusting and cleaning window and door blinds; applying glass

cleaner to windows and door glass, both inside and out; cleaning kitchen, locker room, desk and

bath cabinets; cleaning all shelves and drawers of the refrigerator and freezer; cleaning the stove

top and oven; cleaning the shower stall; sweeping the porch, concrete slab and fuel pump areas;

sweeping and mopping all floors, shaking and sweeping all rugs, cleaning toilet and bath sink,

wiping all countertops, and washing and storing all dishes; and removing all garbage. 

(Wittendorfer Dep., at Exh. 6.)

13 The port engineer, Harry Bush, is not a party to this action. Bush, an employee of

Alabama Pilot, testified that his duties are to take care of the boats by making sure they are

clean, keeping the engines running, and performing maintenance work on them, as well as

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According to plaintiffs, launch operators’ duties are “many and varied,” and include such

functions as painting the house, watering the grass, fueling and moving cars, planting and

fertilizing trees and bushes, repairing fences and cabinetry, cleaning windows and toilets, and the

like, such that their duties are “[j]ust general labor and whatever had to be done.” (Godard Dep.,

at 76.) In the words of plaintiff McClure, the launch operators spend more time doing “general

handyman stuff” like driving cars, working around the yard, moving dirt and rocks, and cleaning

up storm debris than they do operating the pilot boats. (McClure Dep., at 30.) Launch operators

“did a multitude of stuff that we don’t ordinarily do when you are at sea.” (Steiner Dep., at 24.) 

For example, launch operators mop and sweep the pilot station, take out the trash, clean the

refrigerator, clean the stove, and cook meals and wash dishes for themselves. (Wescovich Dep.,

at 34-35.) They “do maintenance around the yard or on the boats.” (Collier Dep., at 41.) 

Overall, plaintiffs do “[p]retty much a little bit of everything” at the pilot station while waiting to

be called to captain the boats. (Smith Dep., at 32.)12 At least one plaintiff testified that launch

operators perform such projects as “[m]aintenance on the house, maintenance on the grounds ...

continuously on a daily basis.” (Godard Dep., at 139.)

On occasion launch operators perform landscaping tasks such as planting trees, spreading

grass seed, and watering grass. (Murphy Dep., at 34-37.) Several times launch operators painted

the old pilot station before Hurricane Ivan destroyed it in 2004. (Murphy Dep., at 35.) On one

occasion, the launch operators planted shrubs around the pilot station grounds. (Barrett Dep., at

53.) At other times, the launch operators have helped the port engineer13 dig ditches, repair

Case 1:06-cv-00267-WS-C Document 72 Filed 04/10/07 Page 6 of 25
performing maintenance responsibilities for company automobiles. (Bush Dep., at 14-16.) Bush

is not a crew member on the pilot boats but merely performs maintenance duties when the boats

are docked at the Dauphin Island facility.

14 Such building and grounds responsibilities were exacerbated in the wake of

Hurricanes Ivan and Katrina, which inflicted significant damage to the Dauphin Island area in

September 2004 and August 2005, respectively. By one estimate, plaintiffs devoted ongoing

attention to cleaning up the remnants of the pilot station, which had been smashed by Hurricane

Ivan, for a year and half after the storm. (Godard Dep., at 118-19.) Yet McClure testified that

plaintiffs spent only a week or two cleaning up after the hurricane. (McClure Dep., at 34;

Wescovich Dep., at 38.) In support of its Rule 56 Motion, Alabama Pilot urges the Court to

reject the Godard estimate because “[n]o reasonable jury could believe Godard.” (Defendant’s

Brief, at 22-23.) Of course, on summary judgment this Court is not permitted to make credibility

determinations of the kind advocated by defendant, but must instead consider the evidence in the

light most favorable to the nonmovant. Whatever the time frame may have been, it is undisputed

that plaintiffs spent work time moving storm debris and cleaning the grounds after Hurricanes

Ivan and Katrina, two cataclysmic events with potentially extraordinary short-term impacts on

plaintiffs’ job duties. (Collier Dep., at 53-54.) The question of whether plaintiffs spent a week

and a half or a year and a half performing hurricane cleanup duties is a fact question to be

resolved at trial.

15 On this point, however, plaintiffs’ testimony stands in contrast to that of Alabama

Pilot’s representative, who testified that, in the course of monitoring the radios and telephones,

the launch operators spent most of their working time watching television, as Alabama Pilot

“contracted out any major work that needed to be done. There just wasn’t that much to do down

there.” (Barrett Dep., at 53.) This inconsistency cannot be resolved on summary judgment, but

is instead taken in the light most favorable to the nonmovant on each Rule 56 motion.

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water lines, and perform other maintenance tasks around the grounds of the pilot station. (Block

Dep., at 41.)14 All of these responsibilities were a reflection of defendant’s admonition to launch

operators that “they didn’t want us sitting there resting and watching television when we were in

between runs, that we were to find something to do.” (Godard Dep., at 139.)15

Perhaps chief among these “odd jobs” is the category of work that plaintiffs describe as

“moving vehicles.” Because the pilot station is on Dauphin Island, bar pilots often require

ground transportation to or from Mobile, Bayou LaBatre or Theodore before being carried out to

sea or after being brought back to shore on the pilot boats. (McClure Dep., at 41-42; Steiner

Dep., at 27-28; Johnson Dep., at 27; Wescovich Dep., at 38-39.) The launch operators typically

provide that transportation by driving the pilots, or dropping off/picking up company vehicles for

the pilots, at those different locations as needed. (McClure Dep., at 100-01; Collier Dep., at 49-

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16 Alabama Pilot maintains records of every car trip made by a launch operator

because employees receive additional compensation for those trips. Based on those records, and

reasonable estimates of the time required for each car trip (90 minutes from Dauphin Island to

Mobile and back, 60 minutes to and from Theodore, and 45 minutes to and from Bayou

LaBatre), Alabama Pilot found that plaintiffs spent roughly 2.5 hours per week on driving

assignments, with such assignments never exceeding 20% of a launch operator’s working time

during the April 2003 to December 2005 period. (Barrett Aff., ¶¶ 4-8.) Plaintiff Godard, among

others, concurred with the reasonableness of those per-trip estimates. (Godard Dep., at 184.)

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50.) Thus, as plaintiff Steiner put it, launch operators routinely “hauled pilots from here to

yonder” on land. (Steiner Dep., at 24.) These “ground transportation duties” are reasonably

estimated to consume approximately 2.5 to 2.7 hours per week of each launch operator’s time, or

somewhere between 3% and 5.6% of each plaintiff’s weekly work hours (which could vary from

48 to 84 during the period of interest). (Barrett Aff., ¶¶ 4-7.)16

 Launch operators check the boats’ oil, fuel, and water every shift. (Godard Dep., at 126-

27; Wescovich Dep., at 28; Collier Dep., at 41.) They clean the pilot boats during every shift. 

(Collier Dep., at 42.) More generally, launch operators are assigned daily maintenance tasks for

the launches, such as inspecting the vessel for damage or malfunction, which is “something that

any seaman would do going on watch.” (Wittendorfer Dep., at 53-54.) Daily inspections of the

vessels should take approximately 10 to 15 minutes at the outset of each shift. (Id. at 54.) 

Launch operators are also required to wash the launch boats approximately three times per week,

which requires approximately an hour and a half on each occasion. (Id. at 55.) Launch operators

paint a boat once every six months. (Wescovich Dep., at 28, 30; Collier Dep., at 43-44.) They

complete logbook entries for the boats. (Wescovich Dep., at 27-28; Johnson Dep., at 22.) 

Alabama Pilot employs a separate port engineer specifically for the purpose of performing

maintenance work on the pilot boats; however, launch operators assist him with those

maintenance activities from time to time. (Wescovich Dep., at 29-30.)

II. Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment should be granted only if “there is no issue as to any material fact

and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The

party seeking summary judgment bears “the initial burden to show the district court, by reference

to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at

Case 1:06-cv-00267-WS-C Document 72 Filed 04/10/07 Page 8 of 25
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trial.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). Once the moving party

has satisfied its responsibility, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show the existence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Id. “If the nonmoving party fails to make 'a sufficient showing

on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,' the

moving party is entitled to summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317 (1986)) (footnote omitted). “In reviewing whether the nonmoving party has met its burden,

the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations of the

truth of the matter. Instead, the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable

inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 999

(11th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “Summary judgment is justified only

for those cases devoid of any need for factual determinations.” Offshore Aviation v. Transcon

Lines, Inc., 831 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).

The applicable Rule 56 standard is not affected by the filing of cross-motions for

summary judgment. See Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of America v. Gallagher, 267 F.3d

1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2001). Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has explained that “[c]ross-motions for

summary judgment will not, in themselves, warrant the court in granting summary judgment

unless one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not genuinely

disputed.” United States v. Oakley, 744 F.2d 1553, 1555 (11th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted); see

also Wermager v. Cormorant Tp. Bd., 716 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1983) (“the filing of cross

motions for summary judgment does not necessarily indicate that there is no dispute as to a

material fact, or have the effect of submitting the cause to a plenary determination on the

merits”). However, it is also true that cross-motions may be probative of the absence of a factual

dispute where they reflect general agreement by the parties as to the dispositive legal theories

and material facts. Oakley, 744 F.2d at 1555-56.

III. Analysis.

A. Contours of the FLSA “Seamen” Exemption.

The FLSA generally requires that an employer employing a non-exempt employee for a

workweek exceeding 40 hours must provide compensation for all hours in excess of 40 at a rate

of not less than one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 

Here, it is undisputed that plaintiffs work more (and often far more) than 40 hours for each

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17 The FLSA’s legislative history suggests that Congress excluded seamen from

overtime protection not because of any substantive policy judgment about the propriety of

paying seamen overtime, but instead for procedural reasons to avoid jurisdictional conflict with

other remedial provisions that already regulated the industry. See generally McLaughlin v.

Boston Harbor Cruise Lines, 419 F.3d 47, 54-57 (1st Cir. 2005) (Lopez, J., concurring); but see

Harkins v. Riverboat Services, Inc., 385 F.3d 1099, 1102 (7th Cir. 2004) (opining that FLSA’s

seaman exemption “recognizes that, at sea, with a normal life impossible, working more than 40

hours a week is an appropriate work norm, as distinct from the situation in most ordinary

employments”).

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workweek in which they are on duty, and that Alabama Pilot has never paid them overtime

compensation for hours worked in excess of 40. As such, defendant is in violation of the FLSA

unless plaintiffs are in some way exempt from these overtime provisions. This case turns on a

specific statutory exemption, which excludes from the ambit of the overtime requirement “any

employee employed as a seaman.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(6).17 If the launch operators are seamen,

then they are exempt from the FLSA; otherwise, they are covered by the FLSA and are owed a

sizeable award of unpaid overtime compensation. 

The FLSA does not define the term “seaman”; however, the Department of Labor

(“DOL”) has promulgated regulations explaining that an employee will be regarded as a seaman

for FLSA purposes “if he performs, as master or subject to the authority, direction, and control of

the master aboard a vessel, service which is rendered primarily as an aid in the operation of

such vessel as a means of transportation, provided he performs no substantial amount of work

of a different character.” 29 C.F.R. § 783.31 (emphasis added). The regulations further state

that an employee’s eligibility for the seaman exemption “depends upon the character of the work

he actually performs and not on what it is called or the place where it is performed.” 29 C.F.R. §

783.33; see also Bailey v. Pilots’ Ass’n for Bay and River Delaware, 406 F. Supp. 1302, 1307

(E.D. Pa. 1976) (“Whether one is a seaman depends upon the work actually performed, not the

job title.”). A concessionaire, dredging employee, or stevedore is not FLSA-exempt as a seaman

simply because he happens to perform such duties aboard a vessel, inasmuch as such services

generally are not rendered primarily as an aid to operation of the vessel as a means of

transportation. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 783.33 - .34. By contrast, a vessel’s crew members (e.g.,

sailors, engineers, radio operators, surgeons, cooks, etc.) are seamen if, as in the usual case, their

Case 1:06-cv-00267-WS-C Document 72 Filed 04/10/07 Page 10 of 25
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service is rendered primarily as an aid in the operation of the vessel as a means of transportation. 

See 29 C.F.R. § 783.32; Martin v. Bedell, 955 F.2d 1029, 1036 (5th Cir. 1992) (“A cook is

usually a seaman because he usually cooks for seamen.”). Again, then, the touchstone of the

seaman inquiry is whether “one’s services are rendered primarily as an aid in the operation of the

vessel as a means of transportation, as for example services performed substantially as an aid to

the vessel in navigation.” 29 C.F.R. § 783.33.

A seaman is not automatically reclassified as a nonseaman if he performs any duties that

do not primarily aid in the operation of his vessel as a means of transportation; rather, the test is

one of substantiality. See 29 C.F.R. § 783.32 (“an employee employed as a seaman does not lose

his status as such simply because, as an incident to such employment, he performs some work

not connected with operation of the vessel as a means of transportation ... if the amount of such

work is not substantial”). Indeed, “[w]hen a worker performs both seaman’s work and

nonseaman’s work, he is a seaman unless his nonseaman’s work is substantial in amount.” 

Martin, 955 F.2d at 1035-36. To guide employers, courts and practitioners as to the specific

parameters of this substantiality threshold, the DOL has long interpreted the FLSA’s seaman

exemption as being negated by substantial nonseaman’s work that “occupies more than 20

percent of the time worked by the employee during the workweek.” 29 C.F.R. § 783.37.

DOL interpretive bulletins and regulations have generally been afforded “great weight”

by reviewing courts in applying the FLSA’s seaman exemption. Martin, 955 F.2d at 1035; see

also Dole v. Petroleum Treaters, Inc., 876 F.2d 518, 521 (5th Cir. 1989) (“findings of the

Department of Labor are entitled to great weight by the courts” and the DOL’s consistent

interpretation of the seaman exemption over the life of the FLSA commands “great respect”). 

Thus, the determination of whether a particular worker is eligible for the seaman exemption

under the FLSA “calls for an examination of the nature of the work actually performed by the

employees and of the comparative amount of seamen versus nonseamen duties.” Petroleum

Treaters, 876 F.2d at 522. This is necessarily a fact-sensitive inquiry. As one court of appeals

explained in interpreting the seaman exemption, “[t]he line of demarcation between seamen and

non-seamen is not distinctly drawn, and probably cannot be. It depends a good deal upon the

facts in each case, especially upon the character of the work that is principally engaged in.”

Walling v. Bay State Dredging & Contracting Co., 149 F.2d 346, 351 (1st Cir. 1945); see also

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18 A recent First Circuit opinion underscores the fact-intensive nature of the

analysis. In McLaughlin v. Boston Harbor Cruise Lines, 419 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2005), the court

observed that in applying the “seaman” test under FLSA, the DOL regulations “make

distinctions that are factually intricate,” and that such intricacies are rendered “especially

complicated by the fact that many maritime-industry employees ... perform multiple tasks during

the course of the day.” Id. at 51. Such complications are prevalent in the case at bar.

19 As the Eleventh Circuit has pointed out, “[t]he employer carries the burden of

proving the exemption, and we narrowly construe the overtime provisions of Section 207 against

the employer.” Hogan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 361 F.3d 621, 625 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Avery v.

City of Talladega, Ala., 24 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 1994) (“We construe overtime exemptions

narrowly, against the employer.”); Birdwell v. City of Gadsden, Ala., 970 F.2d 802, 805 (11th Cir.

1992) (“The Act should be interpreted liberally in the employee’s favor,” and employer “must

prove applicability of an exemption by ‘clear and affirmative evidence’”) (citation omitted).

-12-

Walling v. W.D. Haden Co., 153 F.2d 196, 199 (5th Cir. 1946) (“The entire Act is pervaded by

the idea that what each employee actually does determines its application to him.”).18

Despite (or perhaps because of) the murkiness of the boundary separating seamen from

nonseamen, it is the employer’s burden to prove that its employees fall within the scope of this

FLSA exemption. See Martin, 955 F.2d at 1035.19

B. The 20-Percent Rule Applies.

Against this backdrop of case law and regulations construing the FLSA’s seaman

exemption, Alabama Pilot proffers two lines of argument regarding the governing legal standard.

First, Alabama Pilot urges this Court to look to the Jones Act and general maritime law to

define the term “seaman” and, in particular, points to authority within that body of jurisprudence

that a worker may qualify as a seaman even if he spends just 30% of his time performing

maritime duties. See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 371, 115 S.Ct. 2172, 132 L.Ed.2d

314 (1995) (identifying as an appropriate “rule of thumb” that one who spends less than 30% of

his time in the service of a vessel in navigation should not qualify as a seaman under the Jones

Act). But appellate courts have cautioned that “decisions interpreting the term ‘seaman’ in other

statutes do not necessarily control its meaning in the FLSA.” Harkins v. Riverboat Services,

Inc., 385 F.3d 1099, 1102 (7th Cir. 2004). In fact, courts have stressed that the definitions of

seaman are not interchangeable between the two regimes. See Martin, 955 F.2d at 1035

(contrasting broad definition of seaman under Jones Act with narrow definition under FLSA, and

Case 1:06-cv-00267-WS-C Document 72 Filed 04/10/07 Page 12 of 25
20 See also Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass’n v. Aubry, 918 F.2d 1409, 1412 (9th Cir.

1990) (opining that the term “seaman” is used in a much narrower sense in FLSA than it is under

general maritime law); Owens v. SeaRiver Maritime, Inc., 272 F.3d 698, 704 & n.7 (5th Cir.

2001) (determining, as a matter of law, that plaintiff was not a seaman for FLSA purposes, but

disavowing any suggestion that plaintiff was not a seaman for Jones Act purposes); Bay State,

149 F.2d at 349 (explaining that in context of FLSA seaman exemption, court is not concerned

with “the scope of the class of seamen at other times and in other contexts,” but is instead

focused on defining the term for this particular statute) (citation omitted); Sternberg Dredging

Co. v. Walling, 158 F.2d 678, 680 (8th Cir. 1947) (rejecting argument that the broad inclusive

meaning of the word “seamen” in other statutes passed for seamen’s benefit must also be

credited in FLSA exemption clause).

21 In so concluding, the undersigned recognizes the existence of an outlier case that

ascribes far greater importance to maritime law in interpreting the FLSA exemption. In Harkins

v. Riverboat Services, Inc., 385 F.3d 1099 (7th Cir. 2004), the Seventh Circuit found that once

plaintiffs have been deemed seamen for Jones Act purposes, “a presumption arises that they are

seamen under the FLSA as well.” Id. at 1103; see also Tate v. Showboat Marina Casino

-13-

explaining that Jones Act construction “is limited to that Act and its remedial goals”).20 Indeed,

in a 1989 opinion, the Fifth Circuit found that the district court had committed reversible error in

using the Jones Act definition to determine whether the workers at issue were exempt as seamen

under the FLSA, inasmuch as “[i]t is well established that the term under the two acts has

different, independent meanings.” Petroleum Treaters, 876 F.2d at 524. 

The remedial purposes of the Jones Act and the FLSA are vastly different. The former is

designed to cast the seaman net broadly to maximize the scope of coverage for injured

employees, while the latter is intended to circumscribe the seaman exemption narrowly to

minimize the number of employees who lose the benefit of statutory overtime protections. See

Petroleum Treaters, 876 F.2d at 522-23. Under the circumstances, “to expand the definition [of

‘seaman’] under the authority of a separate act clearly would frustrate congressional intent,

especially where the other act has a different purpose.” Id. The Court agrees, and finds that the

interpretive case law defining “seaman” for purposes of the Jones Act and general maritime law

is unilluminating, unhelpful, and potentially detrimental to determining the scope of the FLSA’s

seaman exemption. For that reason, the Court declines Alabama Pilot’s invitation to import

Jones Act authorities to supplant the regulations and caselaw arising under the FLSA with regard

to the breadth of the seaman exemption.21

Case 1:06-cv-00267-WS-C Document 72 Filed 04/10/07 Page 13 of 25
Partnership, 357 F. Supp.2d 1075, 1080-81 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (applying Harkins presumption). 

The Harkins opinion fails to enunciate any legal basis for such a counterintuitive conclusion, and

justifies this novel rule with an offhand reference to “making law a little simpler.” Harkins, 385

F.3d at 1103. The Harkins approach stands diametrically opposite that of the Fifth Circuit in

Petroleum Treaters, conflicts with the recognition by other appellate courts that the term

“seamen” has different meanings in the two statutes, makes no allowance for the drastically

different remedial purposes of the FLSA and the Jones Act, and fails to square the existence of

such a presumption with congressional intent. Therefore, this Court will not embrace the

Harkins presumption of seaman status, a minority approach that appears never to have been

embraced outside the Seventh Circuit, but will instead apply the Fifth Circuit approach, which in

this Court’s view much more accurately effectuates Congress’s intent and accounts for the vast

material divergence in the remedial purposes of the two statutes.

22 Alabama Pilot relies on the circular reasoning that the regulations violate the

intent of Congress, as construed by those very regulations. Indeed, defendant argues, “And how

do we know the intent of Congress when it comes to seaman? Because the Wage & Hour

Division has told us in its regulations.” (Opposition Brief (doc. 67), at 4.) Thus, Alabama Pilot

would have this Court condemn one section of the regulations by reference to an interpretation

of congressional intent found in another section of those same regulations. But if the same set of

regulations embodies two different interpretations of legislative intent, then how would this

Court then decide which of the two sections actually reflects the intent of Congress? Alabama

Pilot does not address that question.

-14-

Second, Alabama Pilot takes the position that the DOL’s 20% rule for determining

whether an employee performs a substantial amount of nonseaman work, set forth at 29 C.F.R. §

783.37, should be disregarded because it conflicts with Congress’s intent in crafting the FLSA.22

This contention is unpersuasive on several levels. It ignores binding precedent obliging this

Court to give deference to DOL regulations interpreting the FLSA. See, e.g., Falken v. Glynn

County, Georgia, 197 F.3d 1341, 1346 (11th Cir. 1999) (declaring that DOL regulations

implementing FLSA receive Chevron deference, under which courts must defer so long as the

regulation is based on a permissible construction of the statute); Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846

F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir. 1988) (observing that while courts are not bound by DOL’s

interpretation of FLSA, “the Department’s interpretation is entitled to considerable deference”). 

It would have the Court unilaterally jettison a reasonable, helpful agency interpretation that is

predicated on a sound construction of a decidedly murky statute. It completely fails to take into

account the fact that courts faced with the difficult task of applying the FLSA’s seaman

exemption routinely rely on the DOL’s 20% rule. See, e.g., Martin, 955 F.2d at 1036

Case 1:06-cv-00267-WS-C Document 72 Filed 04/10/07 Page 14 of 25
23 In an attempt to bolster its argument, Alabama Pilot points out that in August

2004 the DOL revised the interpretive regulations for the so-called “white collar” exemptions to

replace the 20% rule with a “primary duty” test. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.700; 69 Fed. Reg. 22127-

28 (April 23, 2004). (Contrary to plaintiffs’ counterargument, this revision was undertaken by

the DOL, and not by Congress itself.) But the DOL has left the 20% rule in place with respect to

the seaman exemption. That the DOL has recently retreated from the 20% rule in other contexts

in no way undermines the 20% rule in the seaman exemption, to which the DOL has held fast for

more than half a century. Nothing in the 2004 amendments to the white-collar exemption

regulations suggests that Congress did not intend for a 20% limitation to apply for purposes of

the seaman exemption. By leaving that rule intact even as it amended so many others, the

DOL’s position is clearly that such a 20% limitation does apply to the seaman exemption. The

Court therefore cannot endorse Alabama Pilot’s attempts to substitute the 20% rule with a

“primary duty” test in the context of the positions at issue here. The DOL has never applied a

“primary duty” rule to the seaman exemption, and its interpretation of that statutory exemption is

both reasonable and entitled to deference.

-15-

(remanding for district court to make limited fact findings as necessary for application of 20%

rule); Worthington v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc., 796 F.2d 337, 338 (9th Cir. 1986) (“If the district

court finds that more than 20 percent of the plaintiffs’ work was not rendered to aid the operation

of the vessel as a means of transportation, then plaintiffs were not ‘seamen’ and are entitled to

overtime compensation under the FLSA.”). And, perhaps most importantly, Alabama Pilot’s

argument glosses over the fact that the DOL announced its 20% rule in the context of the seaman

exemption back in 1948. Congress has had 59 years to correct any misreading of its intent by

the DOL’s implementing regulations. As defendant itself recognizes, Congress has taken full

advantage of that opportunity to revise the FLSA in other respects, but has left this aspect of the

seaman exemption untouched and undespoiled. See Petroleum Treaters, 876 F.2d at 522

(recognizing that in 1961 Congress revised the seaman exemption in certain respects, but did not

change DOL’s interpretive definition as to who qualifies as seamen). This omission is presumed

to be the product of an intentional choice by Congress. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580,

98 S.Ct. 866, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978) (“Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or

judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute

without change.”).23

In sum, the Court finds that the general maritime definition of “seaman” does not

delineate the scope of the FLSA seaman exemption. The Court further finds, based on the extant

Case 1:06-cv-00267-WS-C Document 72 Filed 04/10/07 Page 15 of 25
24 On this point, the Court rejects Alabama Pilot’s attempt to force this case into a

posture in which plaintiffs’ exemption status may change from week to week depending on the

particular assignments and ratios of seaman and nonseaman work performed in a given

workweek. See Defendant’s Brief (doc. 46), at 5-6 (“So even if a launch operator exceeds the

20% limitation in a particular work week, he looses [sic] the seaman exemption only for that

week.”). It would defy orderly administration of the FLSA for plaintiffs’ exempt status to

vacillate from one week to the next based on the idiosyncrasies of their particular assignments

for a given week, even as their basic assignment and position remain unchanged.

-16-

caselaw and the DOL’s reasonable construction of the FLSA, which construction is entitled to

great deference, that the definition of “seaman” set forth in the interpretive regulations at 29

C.F.R. §§ 783.31 - .37 is applicable here. Thus, an employee who spends more than 20% of his

time during the workweek performing service not rendered primarily as an aid in the operation of

a vessel as a means of transportation is not exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirements

pursuant to the seaman exemption. 29 C.F.R. §§ 783.31, 783.37.

Nonetheless, the 20% rule must not be applied in a strict, mechanical fashion, because

the amount of nonseaman’s work an employee performs can vary from week to week. In

particular, in a given week a “crew member may, without any change in basic assignment or

position, spend more than 20 percent of his time performing nonseaman’s work. This should not

mean that the crew member loses his seaman status for that week, and in such a case the crew

member should remain a seaman unless, as a general matter, a substantial portion of his time

was taken up by nonseaman’s work.” Owens v. SeaRiver Maritime, Inc., 272 F.3d 698, 703 n.5

(5th Cir. 2001). The Court agrees with the Owens court’s more heuristic application of the 20%

rule and will therefore not require a week-by-week breakdown of hours spent on particular tasks,

under which plaintiffs might sometimes qualify as seaman and other weeks not, all without any

modification to their basic assignment or position. Rather, the focus will be on “the general

nature of the work the employee most often performs in his particular position.” Id.24 Stated

differently, if plaintiffs’ basic assignment or position generally requires them to spend more than

20% of their time in the workweek performing nonseaman’s work, then they are not eligible for

the seaman exemption even if there are certain weeks in which the time they spend on

nonseaman’s work dips below the 20% threshold.

Case 1:06-cv-00267-WS-C Document 72 Filed 04/10/07 Page 16 of 25
-17-

C. The Record Does Not Definitively Show whether Plaintiffs Qualify as Seamen.

The summary judgment record reflects that, as a general rule, launch operators’ duties are

divided among three categories: operating the pilot boat, maintaining radio watch in the radio

room, and performing “odd jobs” such as moving cars, watering the grass, cleaning the pilot

station, and the like. To assess whether the 20% limitation on nonseaman work is satisfied, the

Court must classify each of these categories of duties as seaman work or nonseaman work.

1. Operating the Launch.

The parties are in agreement that the launch operators spend, on average, approximately

29% of their working hours operating the pilot boats while transporting bar pilots to and from

vessels entering and leaving the Mobile ship channel. There can be no reasonable debate that

such duties constitute performing, as master aboard a vessel, service which is rendered primarily

as an aid in the operation of such vessel a means of transportation. This aspect of plaintiffs’

duties is seaman work.

Operating the pilot boats may be the launch operators’ most important job duty; indeed,

multiple plaintiffs acknowledged during their depositions that this responsibility was their

primary function. But the applicable test for the seaman exemption is not whether plaintiffs’

primary duty is seaman work. To say that captaining the launch vessels is plaintiffs’ principal

job duty is not necessarily to conclude that they are seamen under the FLSA; rather, we must

investigate further to ascertain whether, notwithstanding these obviously seaman duties,

plaintiffs also perform a “substantial amount of work of a different character.” 29 C.F.R. §

783.31. If this question is answered affirmatively, then plaintiffs are not classified as seamen

within the narrow meaning ascribed to the term under the FLSA, and are not exempt from that

statute’s overtime provisions. For that reason, we now examine plaintiffs’ activities during the

70+ percent of their working hours that they do not spend actively captaining the pilot boats on

the water.

2. Maintaining Radio Watch.

The record is clear that plaintiffs spend a substantial percentage of their working hours on

dry land in the radio room of the pilot station monitoring radios and telephones. The nature of

the bar pilot business is such that bar pilots may be needed by an inbound or outbound vessel on

short notice. A schedule is disseminated in advance, but last-minute changes are not infrequent,

Case 1:06-cv-00267-WS-C Document 72 Filed 04/10/07 Page 17 of 25
25 The significance of this function is underscored by the following deposition

exchange:

“Q: For instance, what do the launch operators do? What are they supposed to

be doing when they are not operating a pilot boat?

“A: The biggest job is to maintain our radio watch.

“Q: And that’s pretty much ongoing throughout the whole shift?

“A: Any time they are not in the pilot boat, we have a man standing by on the

radio.”

(Barrett Dep., at 40.)

26 That said, the regulation narrowly cabins that fact pattern by indicating that

watchman services would not be deemed a seaman function if the vessel were laid up for a

considerable period, or if the watchman were furnished by an independent contractor, or if the

vessel were watched by a temporary crew hired merely to maintain the vessel while in port. 29

-18-

and it is necessary for the launch operators to be ready to transport the bar pilots by launch at all

times. Moreover, the launch operators generally do not know exactly when pilot boat services

will be needed until they are notified by the pilot, by a vessel or by a dispatcher. (McClure Dep.,

at 35.) Accordingly, plaintiffs spend a considerable portion of their working hours on standby,

waiting for the telephone or radio call that will immediately press them into service captaining

the pilot boats.25 It is therefore of no small import to assess whether this substantial job function

of the launch operators is properly classified as seaman work.

As the DOL interpretive regulations make clear, a worker does not have to be actively

navigating the vessel for his work to qualify as seaman work; to the contrary, a variety of

ancillary, support functions (e.g., engineers, radio operators, cooks, stewards) qualify as seaman

work, provided that the work is (a) performed “as master or subject to the authority, direction,

and control of the master aboard the vessel,” and (b) “rendered primarily as an aid in the

operation of such vessel as a means of transportation.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 783.31-.32. To clarify the

point, the regulations helpfully offer the example of a crew member serving as a watchman

aboard a vessel during a temporary stay in port or during a brief lay-up for minor repairs. 29

C.F.R. § 783.35. According to the regulations, that watchman function is a seaman duty, as is

the function of having licensed relief engineers maintain the ship in safe and operational

condition and exercise the authority of the master in his absence. Id.26

Case 1:06-cv-00267-WS-C Document 72 Filed 04/10/07 Page 18 of 25
C.F.R. § 783.35.

-19-

Based on the undisputed evidence in the record, it is the opinion of this Court that the

launch operators’ radio watch duties satisfy both criteria of the definition for seaman’s work

under the FLSA. In performing radio watch, the launch operators are acting in their capacity as

masters and sole crew members of the pilot boats. The pilot boats undertake multiple voyages a

day, but they may leave at any time of day or night, often on short notice and always being

captained by the launch operators. In awaiting instructions to launch their vessels, plaintiffs are

acting as master of their pilot boats. Likewise, these radio watch functions are plainly rendered

primarily as an aid in the operation of the pilot boats as a means of transportation. If no launch

operator were standing by and waiting to be pressed into service upon notification from a bar

pilot, incoming vessel, or dispatcher that pilot boat services were needed, then the pilot boats

would be utterly useless as a means of transportation. Stated differently, a pilot boat cannot

operate as a means of transportation without a crew and captain. The launch operators serve as

both crew and captain. The nature of the bar pilot business is that the launches must be prepared

to sail immediately to deliver bar pilots to inbound vessels or to pick bar pilots up from outbound

vessels. Unless that crew/captain is monitoring radio traffic at all times, standing by and

awaiting instructions to set sail from the Dauphin Island dock, as it does multiple times each day,

the pilot boat cannot serve as a means of transportation at all. In that respect, the Court finds that

plaintiffs’ radio watch duties are analogous to those of a crew member serving as a watchman

during a vessel’s temporary stay in port, which the regulations expressly deem to be exempt

seaman’s duties.

In reaching this conclusion, the undersigned considers and deems unpersuasive several

counterarguments by plaintiffs. As an initial matter, plaintiffs contend that a duty cannot qualify

as seaman work unless it is actually performed aboard a vessel, and that no tasks on land can

ever constitute seaman work. (Plaintiffs’ Brief (doc. 55), at 11-14.) But the regulations specify

that one’s eligibility for the seaman exemption “depends upon the character of the work he

actually performs and not on ... the place where it is performed.” 29 C.F.R. § 783.33 (emphasis

added); see also W.D. Haden, 153 F.2d at 199 (words of FLSA seaman exemption “warn us to

look to what the employees do, and not to rest on a mere matter of a name, or the place of their

Case 1:06-cv-00267-WS-C Document 72 Filed 04/10/07 Page 19 of 25
27 Of course, that principle is limited by the DOL’s recognition that the overtime

exemption is “not intended to apply to any employee who is not employed on a vessel.” 29

C.F.R. § 783.31. Once that threshold requirement of employment on a vessel is satisfied,

however, § 783.33 stands for the proposition that whether particular duties in furtherance of that

employment on a vessel are performed on a boat or on dry land is of no consequence.

28 Conceptually, the most serious defect with plaintiffs’ “aboard the vessel”

argument is that it ignores the symbiotic relationship between launch operators’ primary duty of

operating the pilot boats (which unquestionably occurred aboard a vessel) and their ancillary

responsibility of performing radio watch. The two functions are closely intertwined, and the sole

reason why Alabama Pilot engages plaintiffs to perform radio watch is to enable them to know

the exact moment when it is necessary to set sail in the pilot boat. The point is this: Plaintiffs

could not perform their crew duties “aboard a vessel” unless they also engaged in radio watch. 

The radio watch thus facilitates and enables plaintiffs to perform seaman duties aboard a vessel,

such that the function is seaman in character, irrespective of the specific physical location at

which the launch operators monitor radios. To hold otherwise would be to engage in a highly

arbitrary distinction, under which the radio-monitoring duty is exempt seaman’s work if

performed on a pilot boat moored at the dock, but is nonexempt nonseaman’s work if performed

in a building 30 feet away. Such a distinction would be both arbitrary and irrational, and finds

no direct support in the regulations or caselaw.

-20-

work”).27 Moreover, while case authority is limited on this point, extant authorities reflect that

even when a vessel is temporarily in drydock and its crew members are living ashore, those crew

members performing maintenance and repairs on the vessels are continuing primarily to perform

seaman’s work. Walling v. Keansburg Steamboat Co., 162 F.2d 405, 406-07 (3rd Cir. 1947); see

generally Harkins, 385 F.3d at 1104 (ship crew members who are scraping barnacles off docked

ship’s hull are engaged in maritime work); Tate v. Showboat Marina Casino Partnership, 357 F.

Supp.2d 1075, 1082-83 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (ship employees who acted as security guards on the

dock, or who stood onshore to monitor passengers’ safety as passengers boarded vessel,

performed functions directly related to a seaman’s primary maritime function, and were therefore

seaman’s duties). The Court therefore concludes that the launch operators’ radio watch duties

are not stripped of their seaman character because plaintiffs perform them in a building 30 feet

away from the dock, rather than aboard a vessel.28

Next, plaintiffs maintain that radio watch cannot be a seaman’s duty unless such services

are rendered primarily as an aid to navigation. (Plaintiffs’ Brief, at 14-15.) Plaintiffs read the

applicable regulations too narrowly. There is no requirement that services be rendered primarily

Case 1:06-cv-00267-WS-C Document 72 Filed 04/10/07 Page 20 of 25
-21-

as an aid to navigation of a vessel to constitute seaman work; rather, the “aid to navigation”

element is a subset of the types of functions that may qualify as seaman’s work. In particular,

“one is not employed as a seaman within the meaning of the Act unless one’s services are

rendered primarily as an aid in the operation of the vessel as a means of transportation, as for

example services performed substantially as an aid to the vessel in navigation.” 29 C.F.R. §

783.33 (emphasis added). Thus, the applicable test is not whether radio watch substantially aids

a vessel in navigation, as plaintiffs argue, but is instead whether such services are rendered

primarily as an aid in the operation of the vessel as a means of transportation. The Court

answers that question affirmatively, for the reasons stated above.

Finally, plaintiffs characterize their radio watch duties as mere dispatching, secretarial or

clerical functions because plaintiffs may field calls other than those advising them that a pilot

boat voyage is necessary at a particular time. The record is clear, however, that handling these

calls is simply incidental to the radio watch function. Alabama Pilot’s launch operators do not

man the phones for the purpose of providing hospitality and greetings to the general public,

taking down or conveying messages, or directing traffic; rather, they are sitting by the phone/

radio at the ready because they are waiting for calls instructing them to set sail in the pilot boats

immediately.

For all of these reasons, the Court finds that Alabama Pilot’s launch operators are

performing seaman work when they are engaged in radio watch, standing by to operate the

vessels aboard which they serve as both captain and crew.

3. Performing Odd Jobs.

The third and final category of work consists of what various plaintiffs aptly describe as

“odd jobs” or “general handyman stuff,” and is fairly summarized by plaintiffs’ counsel as

involving the tasks of “handymen, painters, gardeners, mechanics, chauffeurs, and all around

general laborers.” (Plaintiffs’ Brief, at 25.)

Alabama Pilot concedes that plaintiffs do perform these duties from time to time, and

further concedes that most of these tasks are not seaman work. The Court agrees. Launch

operators are clearly not rendering service primarily as an aid in the operation of their vessel as a

means of transportation when they are taxiing bar pilots around coastal Alabama by car, painting

a house, performing landscaping services, or engaged in similar tasks at the building and grounds

Case 1:06-cv-00267-WS-C Document 72 Filed 04/10/07 Page 21 of 25
29 Despite contending otherwise in its initial brief, defendant concedes, solely for

summary judgment purposes, that plaintiffs’ function of “moving cars” (that is, driving bar pilots

by car to various docks or dropping off cars for them at various docks) is not seaman’s work. 

This concession was prudent. Such taxi or chauffeuring services may be of substantial

convenience to the launch operators’ employers (the bar pilots), but they in no way can be

-22-

adjacent to the dock.

Nonetheless, defendant asserts that a few of these types of tasks do qualify as seaman’s

work, such as assisting with the general maintenance of the boats and painting and cleaning the

pilot station. As to the former, the types of low-grade vessel maintenance services at issue here

(e.g., checking the fluids on each shift, visually inspecting the vessel for damage, painting and

cleaning the vessel, keeping the logbooks, and assisting the port engineer with maintenance tasks

on the vessels from time to time) are, in this context, clearly services rendered primarily as an

aid in the operation of the vessel as a means of transportation. See 29 C.F.R. § 783.35 (relief

officers who, during short stays in port, maintain the ship in safe and operational condition and

exercise the authority of the master over the vessel, are employed as seamen); Harkins, 385 F.3d

at 1104 (interpreting § 783.31 to provide that a marine crew’s actions in ensuring the vessel’s

safe and efficient operation and maintenance while it is docked are maritime functions, such that

vessel’s crew are acting as seamen in performing such duties). Plaintiffs do not contend that

such responsibilities fall outside the realm of seaman’s work. 

As to the latter, by contrast, the janitorial, painting, and cleaning functions that plaintiffs

perform around the pilot station cannot reasonably be viewed as having any reasonable

connection to seamen’s work. Defendant’s suggestion that such duties should be viewed as

seaman’s work because the launch operators would have to perform such duties if they were

stationed on the boat misstates the relevant inquiry. As stated repeatedly herein, the test is

whether these services are rendered primarily as an aid in the operation of the vessel as a means

of transportation. Whether launch operators scrub the toilets, clean the windows, and polish the

stovetop in their crew quarters on land does not in any way benefit or impact the operation of the

pilot boats as a means of transportation. (The same may not be true if they were performing such

functions aboard a vessel at sea.) As such, these types of duties are simply too attenuated from

the operation of the pilot boats to qualify as seaman’s work under the FLSA test.29

Case 1:06-cv-00267-WS-C Document 72 Filed 04/10/07 Page 22 of 25
construed as being rendered primarily as an aid in the operation of the pilot boats as a means of

transportation. The bar pilots are mere passengers on the pilot boats, not crew members. 

Arrangements that plaintiffs may make to facilitate their passengers’ ground transportation

before or after their pilot boat voyages cannot reasonably be viewed as primarily aiding the

operation of the pilot boats as a means of transportation.

-23-

Thus, the summary judgment record reflects that the plaintiff launch operators do

perform certain nonseaman duties on an ongoing basis. The question for FLSA purposes is

whether those nonseaman duties, viewed in the aggregate, constitute a substantial amount of

work. More precisely, under the DOL regulations, the critical inquiry is whether launch

operators spend more than 20% of their working time engaged in nonseaman endeavors. 

Unfortunately, the record is inconclusive on this point. Defendant shows that plaintiffs spend

only approximately 5% of their work hours engaged in driving cars, and characterize the

evidence as being that their time spent on other nonseaman tasks was “minimal.” (Defendant’s

Reply Brief (doc. 66, at 3.) There is some evidence to support that position, as for example Kirk

Barrett’s testimony that launch operators spend most of their time watching television because

there is little work to do around the pilot station. But there is also evidence to the contrary. 

Plaintiff McClure testified that the launch operators “spend more time doing other stuff” akin to

general handyman work than they do acting as seamen. (McClure Dep., at 30.) Plaintiff Godard

testified that plaintiffs routinely engaged in “general labor and whatever had to be done” because

“[t]here was always something to do around there” when the pilot boats were not in use. 

(Godard Dep., at 76.) In an average week, how much time do plaintiffs spend performing

nonseaman’s work? The evidence is conflicting on this crucial factual point, which the Court

cannot resolve at this juncture without making credibility determinations and engaging in

inferences beyond those permissible on summary judgment. See generally Harkins, 385 F.3d at

1104 (concluding that a jury question was presented as to whether plaintiffs were performing

sufficient maritime work to qualify as seamen under FLSA).

IV. Conclusion.

The key legal question posed by the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment is

whether the plaintiff launch operators are subject to the seaman exemption to the overtime

provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. That determination hinges on whether plaintiffs

Case 1:06-cv-00267-WS-C Document 72 Filed 04/10/07 Page 23 of 25
30 Because it is not possible to determine at the Rule 56 stage whether Alabama

Pilot is or is not in violation of its legal duties under the FLSA, it would be premature to pass

judgment on whether any such violation is willful or whether plaintiffs would be entitled to

liquidated damages if they prevail. Those issues are therefore reserved for trial. That said, the

Court is not at all convinced that there are fact questions on that issue, given the unequivocal

testimony of defendant’s representative, David Wittendorfer, that prior to this lawsuit, Alabama

Pilot never conducted any investigation or study as to whether its compensation practices for

launch operators comported with the FLSA; instead, the company went no further than to

comply with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement in place between Alabama Pilot

and the launch operators’ union. (Wittendorfer Dep., at 62.) Based on this admission that

Alabama Pilot made no inquiries and conducted no analysis of the FLSA status of employees

whom they assigned to work as many as 84 hours per week as “general handymen,” among other

things, defendant may be hard-pressed to avoid a finding of a willful violation and liquidated

damages if in fact plaintiffs are not deemed eligible for the seaman exemption. See McLaughlin

v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133-35, 108 S.Ct. 1677, 100 L.Ed.2d 115 (1988) (FLSA

violation is willful if employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for whether its conduct

was violative of the FLSA); Spires v. Ben Hill County, 980 F.2d 683, 689 (11th Cir. 1993)

(employer who seeks to avoid FLSA liquidated damages bears burden of proving that violation

was both in good faith and predicated on such reasonable grounds that it would be unfair to

impose more than a compensatory verdict).

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spend more than 20% of their working time engaged in nonseaman duties. The record reveals a

genuine issue of material fact on that question; therefore, both defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (doc. 45) and plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 54) are denied.

30

As stated supra, the triable issue presented is whether plaintiffs’ basic assignment or

position generally requires them to spend more than 20% of their time in a workweek performing

nonseaman’s work. In making final preparations for trial on that issue, the parties should not

rely on outlier data or unusual, short-term circumstances in which plaintiffs’ duties may have

temporarily been modified. We are not interested in what duties the launch operators may have

been assigned for a week after the storm of the century, or on an isolated extraordinary occasion. 

As this Court and others apply the 20% rule, such temporary, short-term fluctuations are of no

consequence; rather, the relevant issue is whether, on average, plaintiffs’ general, week-to-week

assignments and job duties for Alabama Pilot required them to spend more than 20% of their

time performing nonseaman tasks during the period of concern. If defendants (who bear the

burden of proving that the exemption applies) are able to prove at trial by a preponderance of the

evidence that the answer to this question is no, then the FLSA seaman exemption will apply and

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31 As one final housekeeping matter, plaintiffs have filed a Motion to Strike Expert

Report and Testimony of Daniel F. MacKinnon (doc. 53). Given the very limited purposes

served by MacKinnon’s report (which is attached as Exhibit 19 to defendant’s evidentiary

submission (doc. 47)), the Court finds that plaintiffs’ objections are without merit. Contrary to

plaintiffs’ contention, defendant does not hold MacKinnon out as an expert on the FLSA; rather,

MacKinnon’s report merely states, based on his experience in the maritime industry, that the

industry would generally consider individuals performing launch operator duties to be seamen. 

Such testimony is not improper under Rule 702, Fed.R.Evid.; therefore, the Motion to Strike is

denied. That said, because “seaman” is a term of art for FLSA purposes, MacKinnon’s opinions

as to how those in the maritime industry might generally apply the term are largely unhelpful to

the issues on summary judgment.

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judgment will be entered against plaintiffs. Otherwise, plaintiffs will prevail and the court will

enter judgment in their favor on the overtime claims, taking up the willfulness and liquidated

damages issues at that time.31

DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of April, 2007.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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