Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00033/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00033-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Contract Dispute

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SE PROPERTY HOLDINGS, LLC, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 15-0033-WS-C

 )

TAMMY T. CENTER, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on defendants’ Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending 

Resolution of Mobile County Circuit Court Action (doc. 22). The Motion has been briefed and 

is now ripe.

I. Procedural History.

On January 23, 2015, plaintiff, SE Property Holdings, LLC (“SEPH”), brought this 

fraudulent transfer action against various defendants, including Tammy T. Center, in her 

individual capacity and as personal representative of the Estate of Charles H. Trammell; Belinda 

R. Trammell; Amy T. Brown; Trammell Family Orange Beach Properties, LLC; and Trammell 

Family Lake Martin Properties, LLC.1 The Complaint alleges that Charles and Belinda 

Trammell executed loan guaranties for many hundreds of thousands of dollars in loans made by 

SEPH’s predecessor (as well as all attorney’s fees incurred in collecting the debts) for a failed 

commercial development project. After SEPH (and/or its predecessor) brought claims against 

Mr. and Mrs. Trammell under the guaranty agreements, the Complaint alleges, Mr. and Mrs. 

Trammell conveyed their interest in certain assets (including a condominium unit at Perdido 

 1 For convenience’s sake, defendants will be collectively referred to herein as the 

“Trammells.” To distinguish defendants collectively from Charles and Belinda Trammell (the 

alleged debtors), the latter will be referred to as “Mr. and Mrs. Trammell.” Also, Charles 

Trammell is now deceased, such that the appropriate named defendant for Charles Trammell’s 

interests in this case is Tammy T. Center, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Charles H. 

Trammell. That defendant will be referred to herein as the “Estate.”

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Place, a house at Lake Martin and UPS stock) to the other defendants, who are their daughters 

and LLCs owned and/or controlled by those daughters. SEPH’s theory of relief is that these 

transfers of property constitute actual and constructive fraudulent transfers, in violation of 

Alabama Code §§ 8-9A-4(a), 8-9A-4(c) and 8-9A-5(a), and that defendants unlawfully conspired 

to plan and participate in such fraudulent transfers to frustrate SEPH’s ability to collect from Mr. 

and Mrs. Trammell under the guaranty agreements.

This case is not the only lawsuit involving SEPH, Mr. and Mrs. Trammell and the subject 

commercial development loans. Another action, styled Vision Bank v. Bama Bayou, LLC, et al., 

CV 2009-900085.00 (the “Bama Bayou Action”), has been pending in the Circuit Court of 

Mobile County, Alabama, since 2009. Joined in the Bama Bayou Action are claims between 

SEPH and approximately two dozen purported debtors / guarantors (including Mr. and Mrs.

Trammell) of those loans. Among the issues being litigated in the Bama Bayou Action are 

whether Mr. and Mrs. Trammell are indebted to SEPH, or whether SEPH’s enforcement efforts 

are precluded on grounds of unconscionability, lack of performance by SEPH, breach of duties 

of good faith and fairness in connection with foreclosure sales for the subject real property, lack 

of any deficiency that might trigger guaranty obligations, gross negligence, bad faith, and so on. 

The Bama Bayou Action remains ongoing in state court more than six years after its inception, 

although the Trammells represent that “SEPH and the investor/guarantors have pursued 

extensive discovery” and that it is “anticipate[d] that a hearing to resolve several dispositive 

issues will be scheduled for the very near future.” (Doc. 22-1, at 6.)

Further adding to the litigation morass, another lender, FNB Bank, filed a fraudulent 

transfer action against the exact same defendants named in this case relating to the same 

underlying indebtedness in an action styled FNB Bank v. Tammy T. Center, et al., No. 05-CV2015-900098.00 (the “FNB Bank Action”). The FNB Bank Action was filed in the Circuit Court 

of Baldwin County, Alabama, on January 26, 2015, just three days after SEPH commenced this 

federal litigation against the Trammells. The Complaint filed in the FNB Bank Action is 

virtually identical in many respects to that filed by SEPH here. (Compare doc. 1 with doc. 20, 

Exh. A.) FNB Bank seeks to invalidate the same transfers of property by Mr. and Mrs. 

Trammell to their daughters and certain LLCs, based on the same underlying indebtedness and 

using the same fraudulent transfer theories under Alabama law. Defendants’ motion to stay the 

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FNB Action pending final disposition of the Bama Bayou Action was denied by Circuit Judge 

Norton on July 29, 2015. (Doc. 27, Exh. B at 11.)

Defendants now ask the Court to stay these proceedings pending conclusion of the Bama 

Bayou Action pursuant to the abstention principles established in Colorado River Water 

Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). SEPH 

opposes the request for stay.

II. Analysis.

“The Colorado River doctrine of ‘exceptional circumstances’ authorizes a federal district 

court to dismiss or stay an action when there is an ongoing parallel action in state court.” 

Moorer v. Demopolis Waterworks and Sewer Bd., 374 F.3d 994, 997 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). “The principles of this doctrine rest on considerations of 

wise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and 

comprehensive disposition of litigation.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit has cautioned, however, that 

“Colorado River abstention is particularly rare” among abstention doctrines, under which

abstention is rarely approved to begin with. Jackson-Platts v. General Elec. Capital Corp., 727 

F.3d 1127, 1140 (11th Cir. 2013). This is so because “the pendency of an action in the state court 

is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in federal court,” and because “the federal 

courts have a virtually unflagging obligation to exercise their jurisdiction.” Id. (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted); see also Moorer, 374 F.3d at 997 (federal court may utilize 

Colorado River abstention principles to “defer to a parallel state proceeding under ‘limited’ and 

‘exceptional’ circumstances”) (citation omitted).

In determining whether to abstain from exercising federal jurisdiction under Colorado 

River, one must first examine the threshold requirement that there be “a parallel state action, 

which is one involving substantially the same parties and substantially the same issues.” 

Jackson-Platts, 727 F.3d at 1140 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Where there 

are parallel federal and state proceedings, abstention under the Colorado River doctrine is still 

only warranted in exceptional circumstances.” Id. at 1141. Among the factors to be weighed in 

determining whether the requisite “exceptional circumstances” exist are the following:

“(1) the order in which the courts assumed jurisdiction over property; (2) the 

relative inconvenience of the fora; (3) the order in which jurisdiction was obtained 

and the relative progress of the two actions; (4) the desire to avoid piecemeal 

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litigation; (5) whether federal law provides the rule of decision; and (6) whether 

the state court will adequately protect the rights of all parties.”

Moorer, 374 F.3d at 997 (citations omitted). “No single factor is dispositive, and we are required 

to weigh the factors with a heavy bias favoring the federal courts’ obligation to exercise the 

jurisdiction that Congress has given them.” Jackson-Platts, 727 F.3d at 1141. That said, “[o]ne 

factor alone can be the sole motivating reason for the abstention” in a particular case. Moorer, 

374 F.3d at 997. “Finally, we apply these factors flexibly and pragmatically, not mechanically.” 

Jackson-Platts, 727 F.3d at 1141.

As noted, the threshold inquiry for Colorado River abstention purposes is whether the 

Bama Bayou Action qualifies as a “parallel state action.” Defendants reason that the requirement 

of parallelism is satisfied because “the parties and issues are intertwined and substantially 

similar, to the extent that the existence of the alleged debtor-creditor relationship which is the 

backbone of SEPH’s fraudulent transfer claim in this case is contingent upon the outcome of the 

Mobile County Circuit Court proceeding.” (Doc. 22-1, at 13.) This point resonates. SEPH and 

Mr. and Mrs. Trammell are parties to both the federal and the state proceedings, and there is 

overlap between the two actions on a central issue. As this Court has previously recognized, “an 

essential element of proof in SEPH’s fraudulent transfer causes of action is that it has a ‘right to 

payment’ from the Estate and Belinda Trammell.” (Doc. 21, at 4.) That “right to payment” issue 

(i.e., whether the Estate and Mrs. Trammell are liable to SEPH for breach of the guaranty 

agreements) is being litigated between SEPH and Mr. and Mrs. Trammell in the Bama Bayou 

Action. Given this direct intersection of parties and issues, the undersigned is satisfied that these 

two actions involve substantially the same parties and substantially the same issues, such that the 

Bama Bayou Action constitutes a parallel state action.2

 2 In arguing otherwise, SEPH emphasizes that the two cases diverge as to various 

issues, parties, and requests for relief. (Doc. 27, at 7-8.) While SEPH’s characterization of the 

two cases is not wrong, its argument would insist on a degree of similarity that courts applying 

Colorado River abstention have not required. See generally Ambrosia Coal and Const. Co. v. 

Pages Morales, 368 F.3d 1320, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 2004) (rejecting as “formalistic” a litigant’s 

argument that “Colorado River abstention is permissible only when the relevant federal and state 

cases share identical parties, issues and requests for relief”); SE Property Holdings, LLC v. 

Parks, 2014 WL 3687226, *3 (S.D. Ala. July 24, 2014) (deeming federal fraudulent transfer 

action and state collection action to be parallel even though parties in federal case were just three 

of more than 50 parties in the state court proceedings, and even though relief sought was 

(Continued)

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Having found that the requirement of parallel actions is satisfied, the Court now turns to 

application of the six Colorado River factors. For this exercise, defendants rely heavily on two 

previous decisions from this District Court that, coincidentally, were decided exactly eight years 

apart, to-wit: SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Parks, 2014 WL 3687226 (S.D. Ala. July 24, 2014)

(DuBose, J.), and Stabler v. Transportation Ins. Co., 2006 WL 6915489 (S.D. Ala. July 24, 

2006) (Steele, J.). (See doc. 22-1, at 23-26; doc. 28, at 2-4, 13-14.) Boiled down to its essence, 

defendants’ position is that the Colorado River factors should be applied in this case exactly as 

they were in Parks and Stabler, and that doing so leads inexorably to the conclusion that 

Colorado River abstention is appropriate to avoid risking inconsistent results, wasting judicial 

resources, burdening the Trammells with a war on two fronts, and playing catch-up to state-court 

litigation that has already enjoyed a six-year head start.

The trouble with defendants’ proffered argument is that it overlooks the game-changing 

import of the FNB Bank Action in the Colorado River calculus. Defendants suggest that the 

options here are (i) to allow this action to proceed contemporaneously with the Bama Bayou

Action; or (ii) to stay this case, such that Bama Bayou Action will move forward alone. 

However, that is not the relevant comparison. The real choices here are (i) to allow this action to 

proceed contemporaneously with both the Bama Bayou Action and the FNB Bank Action; or (ii) 

to stay this action, such that Bama Bayou Action and the FNB Bank Action will move forward 

without SEPH being able to litigate its fraudulent transfer claims against the Trammells until 

some later date. As we will see, the distinction has profound consequences for the Colorado 

River analysis, including at least two factors that are pivotal here.

Perhaps defendants’ most compelling argument for Colorado River abstention is that

inefficiency and duplication would ensue if the “right to payment” issue were to be litigated in 

both this case and the Bama Bayou Action at the same time. However, this contention is 

attenuated by the existence and persistence of the FNB Bank Action. In addition to executing 

payment guaranties in favor of SEPH’s predecessor as to the Bama Bayou loans, the Trammells 

also executed guaranties in favor of FNB Bank’s predecessor as to a loan to Marine Park, LLC at 

 

different, where the “validity and enforceability of the Parks’ guarantee agreements will dictate 

the results” in both cases).

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or around the same time that they executed the Bama Bayou guaranties. Just as SEPH filed this 

action to set aside alleged fraudulent transfers by the Trammells to collect on the Bama Bayou 

loan guaranties, so did FNB Bank file the FNB Bank Action to set aside those same alleged 

fraudulent transfers to collect on the Marine Park loan guaranties. The Complaints in the two 

cases (which commenced a scant three days apart) are nearly verbatim, involving identical 

claims against identical defendants, with large chunks of verbiage seemingly cut and pasted from 

one pleading to the other. (Compare doc. 1 with doc. 20, Exh. A.) The state court in the FNB

Bank Action denied the Trammells’ motion to stay that action pending the conclusion of the 

Bama Bayou Action; thus, the FNB Bank Action is presently moving forward.

The pragmatic implications of these circumstances are that the Trammells are faced with 

litigating the “right to payment” issue in two different cases (the Bama Bayou Action and the 

FNB Bank Action) regardless of whether the undersigned abstains under Colorado River or not. 

Either way, the defendants in our case will be litigating their arguments against enforcement of 

their guaranty agreements (and the creditors will be litigating their arguments in favor of 

enforcement of those agreements) in two ongoing cases at the same time. What’s more, SEPH 

asserts (with no dissent from the Trammells) that discovery may be conducted jointly in both this 

case and the FNB Bank Action in the absence of a stay, and points out that FNB Bank, SEPH and 

the Trammells have all agreed to conduct joint discovery in that event. (Doc. 27, at 12 & n.5.)3 

 3 At most, defendants balk that joint discovery will be of scant benefit, because 

“depositions are only a small part of the resources required of the Defendants to prove the same 

affirmative defenses and counterclaims in two separate actions.” (Doc. 28, at 12.) Closer 

examination of this statement reveals its weaknesses. Certainly, it is true that much more goes 

into litigating a case than merely taking depositions. There is every reason to believe, however, 

that paper discovery could and would be coordinated between this action and the FNB Bank 

Action to minimize duplication of effort and redundancy. More importantly, the Trammells 

concede that they are advancing “the same affirmative defenses and counterclaims” in both 

cases. Thus, it appears highly likely that, in briefing those issues, the Trammells will be able to 

deploy substantially similar legal memoranda that are simply tweaked or adapted from one case 

to the other. The point is this: The Trammells have presented neither evidence nor persuasive 

argument that the incremental burden of litigating their identical “affirmative defenses and 

counterclaims” in both this case and the FNB Bank Action contemporaneously would be 

substantially greater than litigating those issues in the FNB Bank Action alone. That conclusion 

is reinforced when one factors in the Bama Bayou Action, and the likelihood that both discovery 

and legal memoranda prepared in that case may be adapted to fit the other two cases without 

subjecting defendants to the financial and temporal burdens of reinventing the wheel.

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In short, it does not appear (and defendants have not demonstrated) that the marginal burden to 

the Trammells of moving forward in this action will be sufficiently severe to warrant Colorado 

River abstention, particularly when considered in light of the work that the Trammells are 

already having to do in litigating these same issues in the FNB Bank Action.

Defendants’ other potentially persuasive argument for Colorado River abstention is that 

they would be prejudiced if this action were to proceed, while SEPH would not be prejudiced if 

this action were to be stayed pending the outcome of the Bama Bayou Action. Once again, 

however, the FNB Bank Action undermines the Trammells’ position. Any prejudice to 

defendants is mitigated by the fact they are litigating these fraudulent transfer issues (including 

the “right to payment” threshold question) in the FNB Bank Action already, and those litigation 

activities can be combined, coordinated or at least streamlined between these two cases. By 

contrast, the prejudice to SEPH of staying this action is potentially severe. Consider what would 

happen if (a) this case were stayed, (b) the Bama Bayou Action were resolved in a manner that 

vindicated SEPH’s right to payment, and (c) in the interim, the FNB Bank Action were resolved 

in favor of FNB Bank on the question of fraudulent transfers. What would stop FNB Bank from, 

in SEPH’s words, “swoop[ing] in to recover what is left before SEPH ever gets its day in court”? 

(Doc. 27, at 5.) After all, in that scenario, SEPH would still have to litigate its fraudulent 

transfer claims in their entirety in this case, with this action having been stayed before it ever left 

the starting blocks; meanwhile, FNB Bank would have already won its fraudulent transfer case 

against the Trammells, and would be poised to initiate collection activity without delay. 

Defendants provide no satisfactory assurances that SEPH’s interests could or would be 

adequately protected in that event.4

 4 At best, defendants argue that “FNB cannot collect before a judgment issues in 

the Bama Bayou case, so contrary to SEPH’s argument, SEPH’s ability to collect would not be 

prejudiced if the FNB fraudulent transfer action were to move forward.” (Doc. 28, at 4.) But 

this contention misses the point. If this case were stayed, both the Bama Bayou Action and the 

FNB Bank Action would continue moving forward. It is entirely possible that FNB Bank would 

have already received a favorable judgment in its fraudulent transfer action against the 

Trammells before judgment issues in the Bama Bayou Action. In that event, when the Bama 

Bayou judgment issues, FNB Bank would already have a fraudulent transfer judgment in the 

FNB Bank Action and would be ready to execute on the Trammells’ assets immediately. 

Meanwhile, SEPH would remain stuck at square one in this case because of the Colorado River 

abstention and would be unable to take any action vis a vis the transferred property to collect on 

(Continued)

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Applying these considerations (as well as all others) to the Colorado River factors, the 

Court concludes as follows: The “jurisdiction over property” factor is neutral because, as both 

sides recognize, neither court has asserted jurisdiction over the subject real property and stock 

certificates. The “relative inconvenience of the fora” factor weighs against abstention because 

this District Court and the Mobile County Circuit Court (where the Bama Bayou Action is 

pending) are equally convenient. The “piecemeal litigation” factor does not strongly favor 

abstention because (i) piecemeal litigation will be happening anyway thanks to the FNB Bank

Action, (ii) coordination of discovery and adaption of legal memoranda will minimize the 

deleterious effects of piecemeal litigation, and (iii) staying this action could actually exacerbate 

the piecemeal nature of the litigation by having relevant issues litigated at three different times in 

three different fora in three different cases.5 The “order in which jurisdiction was obtained and 

relative progress” factor favors abstention, but only weakly. All indications are that the Bama 

Bayou Action is large, cumbersome and perhaps even unwieldy, given the dozens of litigants and 

six years’ pendency on the state-court docket, as well as defendants’ failure to identify any 

tangible progress in that action towards a final resolution of the “right to payment” question. No 

light at the end of the tunnel appears visible in the Bama Bayou Action. Next, the “rule of 

 

the Bama Bayou judgment until such time as this case proceeded to judgment. The potential 

prejudice to SEPH in that scenario resulting from a grant of Colorado River abstention in this 

case would be substantial.

5 Also, on the subject of piecemeal litigation, it bears mentioning that regardless of 

whether the “right to payment” issue is first decided in this case or in the Bama Bayou Action, a 

compelling argument could be made that issue preclusion principles will render it unnecessary to 

have that same issue be litigated and decided separately in the other case. See, e.g., Ex parte 

Flexible Products Co., 915 So.2d 34, 45 (Ala. 2005) (under Alabama law, collateral estoppel, or 

issue preclusion, “is an equitable defense interposed against a party attempting to relitigate an 

issue that has been resolved in an earlier case involving the same parties,” and is available when 

the issue was identical, it was actually litigated, and its resolution was necessary to the prior 

judgment); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 746 F.3d 1008, 1036 (11th Cir. 2014) 

(“a federal court must give preclusive effect to a state court judgment to the same extent as 

would courts of the state in which the judgment was entered”) (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). Thus, defendants’ concerns about “an extraordinary risk of incompatible and 

deleterious results” (doc. 22-1, at 26) appear overblown, based on the likelihood that issue 

preclusion principles will prevent such an outcome.

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decision” factor does not favor abstention here.6 Finally, the “adequate protection of rights” 

factor cuts decisively against abstention. As discussed supra, the pendency of the FNB Bank

Action and the resulting prejudice to SEPH if this action is stayed means that the state courts 

may not adequately protect SEPH’s interests if Colorado River abstention is applied here.

In light of the foregoing discussion, and in recognition of the “limited” and “exceptional” 

nature of Colorado River abstention, as well as the heavy bias in favor of exercising jurisdiction, 

the Court is of the opinion that abstention is not warranted here. Under the circumstances as they 

now exist (including specifically the pendency of the ongoing FNB Bank Action), considerations 

of wise judicial administration favor allowing this case to move forward, with the parties to 

engage in joint discovery to the extent reasonably practicable. By contrast, abstaining in this 

case for an indefinite time until Bama Bayou is decided may not substantially reduce the risk of 

piecemeal litigation, but it will unacceptably increase the risk of unfair prejudice to SEPH from 

which the state courts likely cannot adequately protect it. Always in the Colorado River

abstention context, “the balance [is] heavily weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction.” 

Moorer, 374 F.3d at 997 (citation omitted). The Trammells have not met their burden of 

overcoming that heavy weight to establish that abstention is appropriate or desirable here.

One final point is warranted: The Court’s determination that Colorado River abstention 

would be unwise in these circumstances is dependent on the status of the FNB Bank Action as an 

ongoing, active matter in state court. Defendants have urged the Court to disregard the FNB 

Bank Action because they filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus (the “Mandamus Petition”) with 

the Alabama Supreme Court in that case on August 25, 2015, requesting entry of “an order 

staying the trial court proceedings pending resolution of the Bama Bayou action by the Circuit 

Court of Mobile County.” (Doc. 28, Exh. B, at 12.)7 Based on the Mandamus Petition, 

 6 To be sure, state law does provide the rule of decision for all of SEPH’s 

fraudulent transfer claims interposed herein. “But this factor favors abstention only where the 

applicable state law is particularly complex or best left for state courts to resolve.” JacksonPlatts, 727 F.3d at 1143. Defendants have identified – and the Court is aware of – no aspects of 

Alabama’s fraudulent transfer law that are particularly complex, or that might raise thorny and 

difficult state-law questions best deferred to the Mobile County Circuit Court in Bama Bayou.

7 The referenced Mandamus Petition actually marks the Trammells’ second Petition 

for Writ of Mandamus filed in the Alabama Supreme Court in the FNB Bank Action in the span 

of three weeks. On August 4, 2015, the Trammells sought a writ of mandamus in that case based 

(Continued)

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defendants maintain that it is “speculative” for SEPH to complain of prejudice if this action is 

stayed whilst the FNB Bank Action moves forward. (Doc. 28, at 2.) After all, defendants say, 

“[t]he Alabama Supreme Court consistently has found a stay appropriate where the issues 

overlap to the extent that the outcome of a pending litigation will determine how a later-filed 

litigation proceeds.” (Id.)

The undersigned is not so sanguine as to the Trammells’ odds of success on their 

Mandamus Petition. Alabama law is well settled that “[a] writ of mandamus is an extraordinary 

remedy ... that should be granted only if the trial court clearly abused its discretion by acting in 

an arbitrary or capricious manner,” and that requires a petitioner to prove, inter alia, “a clear 

legal right ... to the order sought.” Ex parte Edwards, 727 So.2d 792, 794 (Ala. 1998) (citations 

omitted). In both their briefs in this case and the Mandamus Petition itself, the Trammells argue 

only that binding Alabama authorities have “found a stay appropriate” in similar circumstances. 

To say that a stay is “appropriate” does not appear tantamount to saying that a stay is 

“mandatory” or “required,” that a petitioner has “a clear legal right” to a stay, that the trial court 

acted in an “arbitrary and capricious manner” by declining to enter a stay, or that the drastic and 

extraordinary remedy of mandamus is properly granted to override the trial court’s 

determination. Given applicable law emphasizing the stringent legal standard for mandamus 

juxtaposed against the discretionary standard for entry of a stay under Alabama law, it appears to 

this Court that if anyone is “speculating” as to the future of the FNB Bank Action, it is the 

Trammells in predicting that “the FNB fraudulent transfer case will not proceed immediately, but 

should be stayed by the Alabama Supreme Court.” (Doc. 28, at 12.) Under the circumstances, 

the Court declines to assume (as the Trammells would have it do) that the Mandamus Petition 

will be granted, that the FNB Bank Action will be stayed, and that SEPH’s concerns about 

 

on the trial court’s failure to transfer the FNB Bank Action to Mobile County or Montgomery 

County. (Doc. 28, Exh. A.) Although they cite it here, defendants’ mandamus petition on the 

issue of venue in the FNB Bank Action does not meaningfully play into the Colorado River

analysis. The determination as to the Alabama county in which the FNB Bank Action proceeds 

does not have any bearing, one way or the other, on the abstention calculus in this case. The 

Trammells have not shown otherwise. Nor are the nearly 600 pages of exhibits accompanying 

the mandamus petition concerning venue (all of which the Trammells have filed in this case) 

helpful here.

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prejudice and avoiding piecemeal litigation through coordinated discovery are merely

“speculative.”8 In other words, the undersigned will neither assume away the FNB Bank Action 

for purposes of the Colorado River analysis here, nor ignore the long shadow it casts in 

evaluating the equities of the situation, the path of wise judicial administration, and the propriety 

of abstention.

III. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, defendants’ Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending 

Resolution of Mobile County Circuit Action (doc. 22) is denied. This action is referred to 

Magistrate Judge Cassady for issuance of a Preliminary Scheduling Order and entry of a Rule 

16(b) Scheduling Order.

DONE and ORDERED this 25th day of September, 2015.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 8 That said, this Court does not presume to make an anticipatory ruling on behalf of 

the Alabama Supreme Court as to the ultimate fate of the Mandamus Petition. The point is a 

different one altogether, to-wit: At this time, the FNB Bank Action is a live, active, ongoing 

lawsuit whose effect on the Colorado River factors in this case is profound. The information 

presently before the Court suggests that the status of the FNB Bank Action as an active, ongoing 

matter is unlikely to change in the immediate future. Therefore, the Court’s ruling is being made 

on reliance on the present status of that case. Should circumstances change (i.e., if the Alabama 

Supreme Court grants the Mandamus Petition and forces the FNB Bank Action to be stayed 

pending the outcome of the Bama Bayou Action), the Trammells are free to renew their motion 

for Colorado River abstention in this case. The Court declines to speculate at this time as to how 

the Colorado River factors’ application might change if the FNB Bank Action were placed in 

suspended animation pending the Bama Bayou result; instead, the undersigned will invite 

briefing from the parties in that event to sort through the shifted procedural landscape.

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