Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01208/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01208-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 375
Nature of Suit: False Claims Act
Cause of Action: 31:3729 False Claims Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Marc A. Wichansky, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

David T. Zowine, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-13-01208-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 In a conference call on September 19, 2015, the parties disagreed on whether the 

attorney-client privilege and work product protection apply to communications that 

occurred between Plaintiff Marc Wichansky and his father-in-law, George Prussin, 

including communications that included Plaintiff’s current litigation counsel. The Court 

directed the parties to file memoranda on this issue. Plaintiff was also directed to deliver 

to the Court, for in camera review, all documents withheld by Plaintiff, Mr. Prussin, or 

Plaintiff’s counsel on the basis of this privilege claim. 

 The Court has reviewed the parties’ memoranda and the documents submitted in 

camera. The Court concludes that the emails in question are not protected by the 

attorney-client privilege but are protected as work product. 

I. Attorney-Client Privilege. 

 Plaintiff’s memorandum and the communications reviewed in camera make clear 

that Mr. Prussin is a friend of Plaintiff’s, as well as his father-in-law, and an individual 

from whom Plaintiff seeks counsel. The submissions also make clear that Mr. Prussin 

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did discuss litigation strategy with Plaintiff and his counsel. The Court cannot conclude, 

however, that this relationship brings Mr. Prussin within the attorney-client privilege. 

The following discussion from United States v. Evans, 113 F.3d 1457 (7th Cir. 1997), is 

particularly relevant: 

The attorney-client privilege shields only those communications by a 

client to an attorney that were intended to be confidential. Thus as a 

general matter, the attorney-client privilege will not shield from disclosure 

statements made by a client to his or her attorney in the presence of a third 

party who is not an agent of either the client or attorney. See 8 Wigmore, 

Evidence § 2311 (“One of the circumstances by which it is commonly 

apparent that the communication is not confidential is the presence of a 

third person who is not the agent of either client or attorney.”); In re Walsh, 

623 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir. 1980) (attorney required to testify about 

meetings with client at which third parties were present), certiorari denied, 

449 U.S. 994, 101 S. Ct. 531, 66 L. Ed. 2d 291. As Wigmore explains, the 

presence of such a third party defeats the privilege even though the client 

may harbor a desire for confidentiality because the privilege “goes no 

further than is necessary to secure the client’s subjective freedom of 

consultation. . . . The presence of a third person (other than the agent of 

either) is obviously unnecessary for communications to the attorney as 

such.” 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2311. 

Id. at 1462 (emphasis in original). 

 The court in Evans held that the presence of the defendant’s friend, Holden, in 

communications with attorneys, resulted in waiver of the attorney-client privilege even 

though Holden was there to provide support and advice, to help locate a suitable criminal 

defense attorney, and was himself a lawyer. The Seventh Circuit found that “the critical 

inquiry” was whether Holden “was acting in his capacity as a professional legal advisor – 

as opposed to his capacity as a long-time friend who happens to be a lawyer.” Id. at 

1463. The court found that “Holden was present merely as a friend and potential 

character witness. This is plainly insufficient to establish the necessity of Holden’s 

presence.” Id. at 1465. Because Holden was not necessary to the communications, the 

attorney-client privilege did not apply. 

 Other cases are in accord. See, e.g., Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 

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247-49 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding communications between a party and an accounting firm 

not privileged where the firm was retained to provide accounting services, not to assist in 

providing legal services); United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) 

(finding communications between a party’s lawyer and an investment banker not 

privileged where the lawyer’s purpose was “to gain information and to better advise his 

client”); State v. Super. Ct., In & For Cnty. of Pima, 586 P.2d 1313, 1315-16 (Ariz. Ct. 

App. 1978) (finding communications between a party and an insurance claims adjuster 

not privileged where the party lacked control over the claims adjuster, indicating the 

absence of an agency relationship). 

 Plaintiff relies on Benedict v. Amaducci, No. 92-cv-05239-KMW, 1995 WL 23555 

(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 1995), in which a plaintiff informally retained a close friend with 

financial expertise to act as a financial advisor and assist in preparing plaintiff for 

litigation. Id. at *1. The court found that the advisor became the functional equivalent of 

an independent contractor, and eventually entered into an oral agreement to receive 

compensation for his services. Id. The court held that the privilege protected only “those 

communications involving [the advisor] when he was acting as plaintiffs’ representative 

with respect to litigation, impending or pending.” Id. at *2. 

 Mr. Prussin is more like the friend in Evans than the friend in Benedict. The Court 

cannot conclude that Mr. Prussin acted as an independent contractor. Plaintiff has not 

identified any agreement that Mr. Prussin act in that capacity or be paid for his services. 

Mr. Prussin’s actions were much like those of Holden in the Evans case – a friend 

helping to arrange counsel, providing support, and participating in attorney-client 

communications. As in Evans, the Court concludes that Mr. Prussin was not necessary to 

Plaintiff’s communications with his counsel and does not fall within the privilege. 

 Plaintiff’s other cases are no more persuasive. Each involved a third person who 

was the functional equivalent of an agent or employee. See Neighborhood Dev. 

Collaborative v. Murphy, 233 F.R.D. 436, 440 (D. Md. 2005) (finding communications 

between a party and its financial consultant privileged where the consultant “essentially 

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functioned as the plaintiff’s employee with respect to the transaction at issue”); Carte 

Blanche (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. v. Diners Club Int’l, Inc., 130 F.R.D. 28, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 

1990) (finding communications between a party and its agent privileged based on “the 

existence of an agency relationship”); Harkobusic v. Gen. Am. Transp. Corp., 31 F.R.D. 

264, 266 (W.D. Penn. 1962) (finding communications between a party and his brother-inlaw privileged where “plaintiff’s brother-in-law was acting as plaintiff’s agent in 

communicating with various attorneys”). 

II. Work Product. 

 Work product consists of “documents and tangible things that are prepared in 

anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A). The protection thus applies to documents prepared “by” a party’s 

representative, including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent. 

Id. For reasons discussed above, the Court concludes that Mr. Prussin does not fall into 

any of these categories. The protection also applies, however, to documents prepared 

“for” a party or his representative. Id. The list of persons in Rule 26(b)(3)(A) – attorney, 

consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent – defines “representative,” and thus 

identifies the persons “by or for” whom work product may be prepared. Id. It does not 

limit the persons who can prepare work product “for” a party or its representative. 

 The Ninth Circuit has identified only two requirements for the work product 

protection to apply to documents: “(1) they must be ‘prepared in anticipation of litigation 

or for trial,’ and (2) they must be prepared ‘by or for [the] party [seeking the protection] 

or by or for that . . . party’s representative.’” In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 357 F.3d 900, 

907 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)) (citations omitted). The emails 

written by Mr. Prussin satisfy both requirements. The emails were written in anticipation 

of litigation and for Plaintiff. 

 The work product protection applies not only to emails written by Mr. Prussin to 

Plaintiff and his counsel, but also to emails written to Plaintiff alone, so long as they were 

written in anticipation of litigation. As the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 26(b)(3) 

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makes clear, a lawyer need not be party to a document for work product protection to 

apply: “Subdivision (b)(3) reflects the trend of the cases by requiring a special showing, 

not merely as to materials prepared by an attorney, but also as to materials prepared in 

anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial by or for a party or any representative 

acting on his behalf.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee note (1970) (emphasis 

added). Thus, “‘a lawyer need not be involved at all for the work product protection to 

take effect.’” Goff v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 240 F.R.D. 659, 660 (D. Nev. 2007) 

(quoting Roger Park et al., Hornbook on Evidence Law § 8.09 (West 2d ed. 2004)).1

 The Court concludes that emails written by Mr. Prussin satisfy the requirements 

for work product protection. They were written to a party in this litigation in anticipation 

of litigation. 

 The Court also concludes that emails written by Plaintiff and his counsel in 

anticipation of litigation constitute work product, and that they retain this protection even 

though they were shared with Mr. Prussin. As many courts have recognized, unlike the 

more sensitive attorney-client privilege, waiver of work product protection does not occur 

simply because a document is shared with a third person: 

A disclosure to a third party waives the attorney-client privilege unless the 

disclosure is necessary to further the goal of enabling the client to seek 

informed legal assistance. Because the work-product doctrine serves 

instead to protect an attorney’s work product from falling into the hands of 

an adversary, a disclosure to a third party does not necessarily waive the 

protection of the work-product doctrine. Most courts hold that to waive the 

protection of the work-product doctrine, the disclosure must enable an 

adversary to gain access to the information.

Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1428 (3d Cir. 1991) 

 

1

 Even though Rule 26(b)(3) refers only to “documents and tangible things,” work product protection also can apply to emails. See In re EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 

F.3d 1294, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“work-product immunity protects documents and tangible things, such as memorandums, letters, and e-mails”); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. 

Dep’t of Justice, 432 F.3d 366, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“the emails at issue in this case are 

attorney work product”); 8 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, 

Federal Practice & Procedure § 2024 (“protection under Rule 26(b)(3) should apply equally to electronically stored information”). 

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(emphasis added); see also 8 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. 

Marcus, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2024. Thus, as courts have recognized, “[o]ne 

may waive the attorney-client privilege without waiving the work product privilege.” 

Goff, 240 F.R.D. at 661 (citations omitted). 

 As other courts have explained, disclosure of work product to third persons 

“generally does not waive the work product immunity unless it has substantially 

increased the opportunities for potential adversaries to obtain the information.” Cal. 

Sportfishing Prot. All. v. Chico Scrap Metal, Inc., 299 F.R.D. 638, 645 (E.D. Cal. 2014) 

(citation and quotation marks omitted). “‘Disclosure to [a] person with interest[s] 

common to that of attorney or client is not inconsistent with intent to invoke work 

product doctrine’s protection and would not amount to waiver.’” Id. (quoting In re Doe, 

662 F.2d 1073, 1081 (4th Cir. 1981)); see also United States v. Stewart, 287 F. Supp. 2d 

461, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding no waiver of work product protection of an email 

between a party and her attorney after the party forwarded the email to her daughter). 

 Mr. Prussin is closely allied with Plaintiff in this litigation. His interests are 

aligned with Plaintiff’s. The Court cannot conclude that disclosure of work product to 

him substantially increased the opportunity for Defendants to obtain the information, or 

that it was otherwise inconsistent with the work product protection. The Court 

concludes, therefore, that the disclosure did not waive the protection. 

 Defendants do not make a showing of substantial need under Rule 26(b)(3)(A)(ii). 

Defendants do argue that the Court should deem the work product protection waived as a 

discovery sanction. Doc. 251 at 3. The Court is not persuaded. Although the Court 

previously concluded that Mr. Prussin could be deposed because he did not fall within the 

attorney-client privilege or the work product protection (Doc. 215), and the Court 

continues to view the deposition of Mr. Prussin as proper, the Court did not rule on the 

specific work product issues addressed here and cannot conclude that Plaintiff acted in 

bad faith by raising these arguments. 

IT IS ORDERED that emails written by Mr. Prussin, to Plaintiff or his counsel, 

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in anticipation of litigation, are entitled to work product protection. Emails written by 

Plaintiff or his counsel in anticipation of litigation are also entitled to work product 

protection, even if they were shared with Mr. Prussin. 

 Dated this 29th day of September, 2015. 

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