Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02120/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02120-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

George Russell Kayer, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-07-2120-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

DEATH PENALTY CASE 

 Before the Court is Kayer’s motion for reconsideration. (Doc. 84.) Kayer asks the 

Court to reconsider its order denying the claims raised in his supplemental Martinez brief. 

(Doc. 81.) For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied. 

DISCUSSION 

 “The Court will ordinarily deny a motion for reconsideration of an Order absent a 

showing of manifest error or a showing of new facts or legal authority that could not have 

been brought to its attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” LRCiv 7.2(g)(1). Kayer 

asserts that the Court applied an incorrect standard in evaluating his arguments under 

Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). 

 In Martinez, the Supreme Court held that “when a State requires a prisoner to raise 

an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in a collateral proceeding, a prisoner may 

establish cause for a default of an ineffective-assistance claim in two circumstances.” 

132 S. Ct. at 1318. As relevant here, one of those circumstances “is where appointed 

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counsel in the initial-review collateral proceeding, where the claim should have been 

raised, was ineffective under the standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

(1984).” Id. The Court added that “[t]o overcome the default, a prisoner must also 

demonstrate that the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a 

substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has 

some merit.” Id. 

 In addressing Kayer’s defaulted claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, 

this Court reviewed Ninth Circuit cases analyzing Martinez, including Clabourne v. 

Ryan, 745 F.3d 362, 377 (9th Cir. 2014), overruled on other grounds by McKinney v. 

Ryan, 813 F.3d 798, 818 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). (Doc. 81 at 4–5.) In Clabourne the 

Ninth Circuit held that to demonstrate cause under Martinez a petitioner must establish 

that post-conviction counsel was ineffective according to the standards of Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Accordingly, a petitioner must establish that counsel’s 

performance was deficient and that “there was a reasonable probability that, absent the 

deficient performance, the result of the post-conviction proceedings would have been 

different.” Clabourne, 745 F.3d at 377; see Pizzuto v. Ramirez, 783 F.3d 1171, 1178 (9th 

Cir. 2015). To establish “prejudice,” the petitioner must show that the “underlying 

ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to say that the 

prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit.” Id. Citing Clabourne, this 

Court found that Kayer’s default of the ineffective assistance claims was not excused 

because post-conviction counsel did not perform at a constitutionally ineffective level. 

(Doc. 81 at 15–17.) 

 In his motion for reconsideration, Kayer criticizes the Clabourne framework, 

which he contends is inconsistent with Martinez and the en banc opinion in Dickens v. 

Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302 (9th Cir. 2014). (Doc. 84 at 4–5.) Kayer argues that Dickens

“requires only a showing that the underlying trial-counsel ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim is substantial, and not a showing that the outcome of the post-conviction 

proceeding would have been different.” (Doc. 84 at 5.) 

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 The Ninth Circuit recently rejected this argument. In Runningeagle v. Ryan, No. 

07-99026, 2016 WL 3213095, at *10 n.13 (9th Cir. June 10, 2016), the court “decline[d] 

to revisit the Clabourne/Pizzuto standard.” 

 And even if nothing more than a “substantial” claim was required, it has not been 

shown here. The Court’s previous decision correctly identified the test for a “substantial” 

claim under Martinez. (Doc. 81 at 5 (“a claim is substantial if it meets the standard for 

issuing a certificate of appealability).) The Court then specifically found that none of 

Kayer’s defaulted ineffective assistance of counsel claims was “substantial” under this 

test. (Doc. 81 at 9, 12, 13, 15, 17-18.) 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED denying Kayer’s motion to alter or amend 

judgment. (Doc. 84.) 

 Dated this 2nd day of August, 2016. 

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