Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06508/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06508-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIO MARQUEZ, CV-F-03-6508 OWW WMW HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner, 

vs.

SCOTT P. RAWERS, Warden, 

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-302.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is serving a term of fifteen years to life plus a one-year deadly weapon enhancement,

imposed by the Contra Costa Superior Court following a conviction of second degree murder. He was

sentenced on November 18, 1980.

On October 22, 2002, the California Board of Prison Terms (“the Board”) found Petitioner

suitable for parole, with an effective date of February 19, 2003. On review, the Governor reversed the

Board’s decision on March 21, 2003.

LEGAL STANDARD

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I. Standard of Review

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484,

1499 (9th Cir. 1997), quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520

U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (holding

AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed after the

enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its provisions.

Petitioner is in custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to a state court

judgment. Even though Petitioner is not challenging the underlying state court conviction, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 remains the exclusive vehicle for his habeas petition because he meets the threshold requirement

of being in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9

th

Cir.2004);Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 376 F.Supp.2d 975 (E.D. Cal.2005); see 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(a) (This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”).

The instant petition is reviewed under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act which became effective on April 24, 1996. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70 (2003).

Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless the adjudication of the

claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71; see Williams, 529

U.S. at 413.

As a threshold matter, this Court must "first decide what constitutes 'clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71, quoting 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In ascertaining what is "clearly established Federal law," this Court must look to

the "holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant

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state-court decision." Id., quoting Williams, 592 U.S. at 412. "In other words, 'clearly established

Federal law' under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme

Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Id.

Finally, this Court must consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72, quoting 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law

or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable

facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413;see also Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72. “Under the ‘reasonable application

clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal

principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. 

“[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent

judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court

making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application of

clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

 Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to or

involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle, 94

F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the states, Ninth

Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a state court decision

is objectively unreasonable. See Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9

th Cir.2003); Duhaime v.

Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir.1999). 

AEDPA requires that we give considerable deference to state court decisions. The state court's

factual findings are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We are bound by a state's interpretation

of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 859 (2002),

rehearing denied, 537 U.S. 1149 (2003). 

//

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II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Petitioner contends that his federal constitutional rights were violated, and he was deprived of

liberty without due process of law, when Governor Gray Davis reversed the Board’s decision finding

Petitioner eligible for parole. Petitioner contends that the Governor’s decision was not supported by

credible evidence under the “some evidence” standard and failed to make individualized considerations

of the same factors on which the Board relied in making its decision. Because Petitioner is challenging

the actions of a state, the Court will proceed under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[no] State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. In certain cases, a state law

may create a liberty interest protected by the Constitution. In examining questions of procedural due

process, federal courts employ a two-step inquiry: 1) whether there exists a liberty or property interest

which has been interfered with by the State, Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,

571, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); and 2) whether the procedures attendant upon that

deprivation were constitutionally sufficient, Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74

L.Ed.2d 675 (1983),receded from and rejected on separate grounds, Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,

115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). See Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S.

454, 460, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989). 

Thus, the first question that must be answered is whether there exists a liberty interest protected

by the Due Process Clause. The United States Supreme Court has expressly denied entitlement to a

protected liberty interest in parole. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex,

442 U.S. 1, 7 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979) ("There is no constitutional or inherent right of a

convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence."). "Nevertheless,

early release statutes can create a 'liberty interest protected by due process guarantees.'" Bermudez v.

Duenas, 936 F.2d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir.1991) (per curiam), quoting Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12; Board

of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987). Moreover, "[a] state may create a constitutionally

protected liberty interest by establishing regulatory measures that impose substantive limitations on the

exercise of official discretion." Bermudez, 936 F.2d at 1067, citing Baumann v. Arizona Dep’t of

Corrections, 754 F.2d 841, 844 (9th Cir.1985). However, no protected entitlement to release exists unless

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a state scheme includes a formula which mandates release after the occurrence of specified events.

Baumann, 754 F.2d at 844 (stating that the unique "shall/unless" formula was decisive in Greenholtz).

If there exists mandatory language in a parole statute, then Petitioner has a protected liberty interest in

parole release. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-12. If, however, the state merely holds out the possibility of

parole, then such a hope is not protected by due process. Id.; Baumann, 754 F.2d at 844. Therefore, the

Court must look to the California parole statutes to determine whether the unique structure and language

of those statutes creates an entitlement to parole release or a presumption of expectation of parole

release.

The relevant California statutory language is contained in Cal. Penal Code § 3041, which states,

in relevant part:

(a) One year prior to the inmate's minimum eligible parole release date a panel of two or more

commissioners or deputy commissioners shall again meet with the inmate and shall normally

set a parole release date as provided in Section 3041.5. 

(b) The panel or the board, sitting en banc, shall set a release date unless it determines that the

gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past

convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more

lengthy period of incarceration for this individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be

fixed at this meeting . . . . 

Cal. Penal Code §§ 3041(a), 3041(b) (West 2000) (Emphasis added).

The language in Cal. Penal Code § 3041 provides for the possibility of parole. A release date

shall be set unless the BPT determines that the prisoner should not be released. The word “shall” is not

used in an absolute or mandatory sense. Sass, 376 F.Supp.2d at 982. It is qualified or modified in both

subsections. Thus, parole is not automatic; it is discretionary. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals, without the assistance of a definitive California Supreme Court interpretation, found the

language in § 3041 to be mandatory. See McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895 (9th Cir.2002). 

In 2005, in In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1087 (2005), the California Supreme Court

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provided a definitive interpretation of § 3041's structure and language. In Dannenberg, the California

Supreme Court held: 1) the language in § 3041 is not mandatory; 2) there is no right to parole in

California; 3) the Board of Prison Terms has extremely broad discretion and is not required to fix a

parole date; and 4) the statutory scheme of § 3041 indicates that § 3041(b) extinguishes any expectancy

an inmate may have in parole found in § 3041(a). Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th at 1084, 1087-88, 1097-98.

This Court is therefore faced with conflicting interpretations from the Ninth Circuit and the

California Supreme Court. Normally, the Court would defer to the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the

state statute; however, circuit opinions are only persuasive authority. Clark, 331 F.3d at 1069; Duhaime,

200 F.3d at 600-01. On the other hand, “[w]hen a state court has made its own definitive determination

as to the meaning of a state statute, federal courts give this finding great weight in determining the

natural effect of a statute, and if it is consistent with the statute’s reasonable interpretation, it will be

deemed conclusive.” Sass, 376 F.Supp.2d at 981-82 , citing Gurley v. Rhoden, 421 U.S. 200, 208, 95

S.Ct. 1605, 44 L.Ed.2d 110 (1975); see also Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 942 (1989) (Federal courts are bound by state court rulings on questions of state

law). As noted by this Court in Sass, the general principle of deference to state court interpretations is

compelled by the Supreme Court’s clearly established habeas corpus jurisprudence. See, e.g.,

Greenholtz, 422 U.S. at 12, citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345, 346 n.10, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48

L.Ed.2d 684 (1976) (demonstrating deference to, and the need for, holdings and interpretations of state

supreme courts when establishing interests protected by due process); Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377 n.8, 107

S.Ct. 2415, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987) (implying that a Montana Supreme Court decision would have been

instructive if there had been one on point). 

Therefore, this Court will defer to the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 3041 in

Dannenberg. The California Supreme Court answers the first question: the language of § 3041 is not

mandatory. Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th at 1087-88. The absolute sense of the word “shall” is eviscerated

by the modifications (“shall normally set”) and qualifications (“shall . . . unless it determines”)

contained in the subsection. Cal. Penal Code §§ 3041(a), 3041(b) (West 2000) (Emphasis added).

Furthermore, “the lack of mandatory language in § 3041, especially when considered in light of 1)

California’s long standing jurisprudence denying the existence of a parole right, 2) the statutory scheme

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of § 3041, and 3) the broad discretion given to the BPT under the “noncapital murderers” exception to

California’s determinant sentencing law, precludes a legitimate expectation of parole release and, thus,

does not give rise to an associated liberty interest under clearly established federal law.” Sass, 376

F.Supp.2d at 982-83, citing Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th at 1084, 1087-88, 1097-98. Therefore, as this Court

held in Sass, “the unique structure and language of § 3041 precludes the finding of a federal liberty

interest in parole.” Sass, 376 F.Supp.2d at 983. Consequently, the Governor’s decision was not contrary

to or an unreasonable of clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In addition, because

California’s parole statutes do not give rise to a protected liberty interest, this Court is without

jurisdiction to entertain Petitioner’s claims. 

III. Review in light of Supreme Court’s Analysis in Sandin v. Conner

Although Petitioner does not claim a violation of his constitutional rights as determined in

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), this Court is aware that

Sandin presents another analysis for assessing whether prisoners have a protected liberty interest.

In Sandin, the Supreme Court held that “States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests

which are protected by the Due Process Clause.” 515 U.S. at 483-84. To determine whether there is a

state-created liberty interest, the Court must inquire whether the state action “imposes [an] atypical and

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. As

noted by this Court in Sass, however, Sandin “is by no means clearly established in the context of parole

rights.” Sass, 376 F.Supp.2d at 980. In Sandin, the Supreme Court determined whether a prisoner’s

rights were violated in the context of his conditions of confinement, not the possibility of his release

from that confinement. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 480-81. In addition, Sandin did not overrule Greenholtz or

Allen. Id. at 483 n.5. Accordingly, Greenholtz and Allen remain controlling law in the context of

determining whether Petitioner has a liberty interest in parole. Indeed, the Supreme Court has cited

Greenholtz and Allen approvingly following Sandin as examples of cases where state statutes have

created liberty interests through the use of mandatory language. See I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 345-

46, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001).

In any case, Petitioner does not have a protected liberty interest even if Sandin were applied. As

correctly noted byRespondent, every California prisoner serving an indeterminate prison term is subject

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to the statutory maximum term unless the parole authority fixes a shorter term. See Dannenberg, 34

Cal.4th at 1097-98. Therefore, the denial of parole cannot possibly impose an “atypical or significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484.

Consequently, California’s parole statutes do not give rise to a protected liberty interest under the

Supreme Court’s test in Sandin. 

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this petition for writ of habeas

corpus be DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

These Findings and Recommendation are submitted to the assigned United States District Court

Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules

of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) days

after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on

all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus

three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. The court will then review the Magistrate

Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 25, 2006 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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