Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_15-cv-08093/USCOURTS-azd-3_15-cv-08093-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

United States of America, 

Plaintiff/Respondent. 

v. 

Christy V. Beltran, 

Defendant/Petitioner.

No. CV-15-8093-PCT-GMS (JZB)

(No. CR-13-8067-PCT-GMS) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 TO THE HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

JUDGE: 

I. Summary 

 While Defendant was serving a state prison sentence, she was transferred to 

federal authorities pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. She was held 

for approximately eight months prior to federal sentencing. The Court sentenced her to 24 

months imprisonment with credit for time served. The Federal Bureau of Prisons properly 

determined she was in state custody prior to sentencing and thus not entitled to time 

credit between execution of the writ and sentencing. Since the filing of her Motion, 

Defendant has also been released from custody. As detailed below, the Court 

recommends Defendant’s Motion to be released from prison be denied because it is moot. 

The Court also finds her claim fails on the merits. 

II. Procedural History

On April 1, 2013, Defendant was sentenced in the State of Arizona to a term of 

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imprisonment. (Doc. 1-1 at 10.)1 On July 3, 2013, she was transferred from the Arizona 

Department of Corrections to the United States Marshals Service (“USMS”) pursuant to a 

federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. (CR Doc. 8.) Defendant continued to be 

held by the USMS pending trial. (CR Doc. 9.) On February 24, 2014, Defendant was 

sentenced by this Court to 24 months imprisonment, “to run concurrently with the 

sentence imposed in Yavapai County Superior Court Case Number CR201380032, with 

credit for time served.” (CR Docs. 27, 28.) 

On April 30, 2015, Defendant filed the instant Motion challenging the Federal 

Bureau of Prison’s (“BOP”) calculation of time served in CR-13-8067-PCT-GMS. (Doc. 

1.) On July 28, 2015, the Government filed a Response asserting the Motion should be 

denied. (Doc. 4.) On September 11, 2015, Defendant filed a Reply. (Doc. 7.) 

III. Discussion

a. Mootness

A petitioner’s claim for habeas corpus relief is moot if the petitioner is no longer 

in custody and no longer presents a case or controversy under Article III, § 2 of the 

Constitution. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (stating the “case-or-controversy 

requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings . . . [and] [t]he 

parties must continue to have a ‘personal stake in the outcome’ of the lawsuit.”) (internal 

citations omitted); Kittel v. Thomas, 620 F.3d 949, 951–52 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding a 

habeas petition properly dismissed as moot where there was no legal issue remaining for 

the court to decide). 

 Here, Defendant requests that “this Court should order that Beltran should be 

released by the BOP.” (Doc. 1 at 5.) According to Defendant’s Reply submitted 

September 11, 2015, Defendant “has been released.” (Doc. 7.) Defendant is no longer in 

custody. Defendant’s request that she be released from BOP no longer presents a case or 

controversy under Article III, § 2 of the Constitution, and Defendant’s claim for habeas 

 

1

 Citations to “Doc.” are to the docket in CV-15-8093-PCT. Citations to “CR 

Doc.” are to the docket in the underlying criminal case, CR-13-8067-PCT. 

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corpus relief is moot.2 See Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding 

Defendant’s “petition would have to be dismissed for lack of a case or controversy 

because he has fully served the period of incarceration that he is attacking.”).3

b. Merits

The Government argues Defendant’s Motion should be denied because 

“Defendant previously waived her claim pursuant to her plea agreement, filed her Motion 

under the inapplicable Section, failed to exhaust her remedies within BOP, and contests 

by miscalculation the credit given by BOP.” (Doc. 4.) Here, the Court will only address 

the calculation of credit for time served because Defendant’s challenge fails on the 

merits. 

Defendant’s sentence began, not surprisingly, after she was sentenced. See 

Schleining v. Thomas, 642 F.3d 1242, 1248 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that a prisoner’s 

“federal sentence does not ‘commence’ until after he has been sentenced in federal 

court”). Defendant was entitled to credit for time served pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3585, 

which addresses the commencement of sentence and calculation of credit for prior 

custody: 

(a) Commencement of Sentence: A sentence to a term of imprisonment 

commences on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service of sentence at, 

the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served. 

(b) Credit for Prior Custody: A defendant shall be given credit toward the 

service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences— (1) as a result of the 

offense for which the sentence was imposed; or (2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested after the commission of the 

offense for which the sentence was imposed; that has not been credited 

against another sentence. 

(Emphasis added.) 

 

2

 Defendant also asserts, in her Reply, that the issue is not moot because the “issue 

must come up often” and “needs to be clarified.” (Doc. 7 at 5.) There is no need for 

clarification because law on this point has been undisputed for more than 20 years. 

3

 Defendant also requests that “her sentence be shortened” pursuant to Rules 33 and 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 1 at 5.) This request is similarly moot. 

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Here, BOP correctly determined the federal sentence in this case commenced on 

the date of sentencing, February 24, 2014. (Doc. 1-1 at 11.) BOP also concluded that 

“Title 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) precludes the application of credit for time spent in the service 

of another sentence.” (Id.) BOP further found that Defendant was entitled to 72 days of 

credit for time served “in state presentence custody after the commission of the federal 

offense. . . .” (Id.) BOP’s calculations are correct. 

Defendant was writ from state prison to federal authorities, and consequently was 

only “borrowed” from the state. The Ninth Circuit has held that a prisoner transferred per 

a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum “is considered to be ‘on loan’ to the federal 

authorities so that the sending state’s jurisdiction over the accused continues 

uninterruptedly. Failure to release a prisoner does not alter that ‘borrowed’ status, 

transforming a state prisoner into a federal prisoner.” Thomas v. Brewer, 923 F.2d 1361, 

1367 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). Because Defendant was not in federal custody 

prior to sentencing, she is not entitled to credit for time served from her transfer (July 3, 

2013) until sentencing (February 24, 2014). See United States v. Graham, 538 F.2d 261, 

265 (9th Cir. 1976) (“Unless time is served in federal custody, it does not count as credit 

for time served under a federal sentence.”); Lay v. Gill, 575 Fed. Appx. 816 (9th Cir. 

2014) (finding time “spent in federal custody pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad 

prosequendum” could not “be credited towards his federal sentence” because “he 

remained subject to the state’s jurisdiction during the time he spent in federal custody 

pursuant to the writ”); Schleining, 642 F.3d at 1245 n.2 (“18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) allows the 

BOP to grant a federal prisoner credit for time spent in state or federal custody before 

imposition of his federal sentence, but only if that term of pre-sentence imprisonment 

‘has not been credited against another sentence.’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) 

(emphasis in original)). 

From July 3, 2013, to February 24, 2014, while Defendant was being detained by 

the USMS, the state’s jurisdiction over the Defendant continued “uninterruptedly.” 

Defendant was being credited during that period for time served for her state sentence. 

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The BOP’s Designation and Sentence Computation Center correctly asserted “Title 18 

U.S.C. § 3585(b) precludes the application of credit for time spent in the service of 

another sentence.” (Doc. 1-1 at 11.) Thus, Defendant’s claim challenging the BOP’s 

calculation of time served in CR-13-8067-PCT-GMS fails on the merits. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s Application for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, or Alternatively a Motion to Clarify this Court’s 

Sentencing Order pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a) (Doc. 1) be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Defendant has not 

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) 

should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall have 

fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to 

file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the 

objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of 

the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of 

the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 3rd day of February, 2016. 

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

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