Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01820/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01820-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARCO PEREZ,

 Plaintiff,

 vs.

D. G. ADAMS, et al.,

 Defendants.

1:11-cv-01820-GSA-PC

 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR LEAVE TO AMEND, FOR LIMITED 

PURPOSE 

(Doc. 24.)

THIRTY DAY DEADLINE TO FILE FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT AS INSTRUCTED 

BY THIS ORDER

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

REQUEST TO MODIFY SCHEDULING 

ORDER

(Doc. 20.)

New Discovery Deadline: 11/30/15

New Dispositive Motions Deadline: 01/29/16

I. BACKGROUND

Marco Perez (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis 

with this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the Complaint 

commencing this action on November 1, 2011. (Doc. 1.) The parties to this action have 

consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Docs. 4, 26.)

The court screened the Complaint and issued an order on May 30, 2014, requiring 

Plaintiff to either file an amended complaint or notify the court of his willingness to proceed 

only on the claims found cognizable by the court. (Doc. 7.) On June 16, 2014, Plaintiff filed 

written notice that he did not wish to file an amended complaint, and wished to proceed only 

against defendants Schneider, Carter, Pimental, and Byrum for use of excessive force and 

deliberate indifference to medical needs. (Doc. 8.) This case now proceeds with Plaintiff’s 

Case 1:11-cv-01820-BAM Document 29 Filed 05/18/15 Page 1 of 9
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original Complaint, against defendants Sergeant Schneider, Sergeant Carter, Correctional 

Officer (C/O) Pimentel, and C/O Byrum (“Defendants”), for use of excessive force and 

deliberate indifference to medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

1

 

On September 30, 2014, Defendants filed an Answer to the Complaint. (Doc. 18.) This 

case is now in the discovery phase, pursuant to the court’s Scheduling Order of October 21, 

2014. (Doc. 20.)

On March 16, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend the Complaint. (Doc. 

24.) On April 16, 2015, Defendants filed a response and opposition to Plaintiff’s motion, and a 

motion to modify the court’s Scheduling Order. (Doc. 27.) Plaintiff has not filed a reply.

II. LEAVE TO AMEND – RULE 15(a)

A. Legal Standard

Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may amend the 

party=s pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Otherwise, a party may amend only by leave of the court or by written 

consent of the adverse party. Id. ARule 15(a) is very liberal and leave to amend >shall be freely 

given when justice so requires.=@ AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysis West, Inc., 445 F.3d 

1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)). However, courts Aneed not grant 

leave to amend where the amendment: (1) prejudices the opposing party; (2) is sought in bad 

faith; (3) produces an undue delay in the litigation; or (4) is futile.@ Id. The factor of A>[u]ndue 

delay by itself . . . is insufficient to justify denying a motion to amend.=@ Owens v. Kaiser 

Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712,13 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Bowles v. Reade, 

198 F.3d 752, 757-58 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

Defendants have filed and served a responsive pleading. Plaintiff asserts that on 

January 19, 2015, he asked for Defendants’ consent prior to amending the Complaint, and 

 

1 On June 18, 2014, the court issued an order dismissing all other claims and defendants from this action, 

based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim. (Doc. 9.) The court’s order dismissed Plaintiff’s claims based on cell 

conditions, unclothed body searches, and supervisory liability, and dismissed defendants Warden Adams, 

Administrative Officer Leon, Lieutenant Matthews, Lieutenant Hubach, Sergeant Taber, and Sergeant Latraille

from this action, based on Plaintiff’s failure to state any claims against them. (Id.)

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“[t]hey appeared to agree [for] the above mention (sic) reasons.” (Id. at 1:27-28.) Plaintiff’s 

assertion, without more, does not amount to written consent by Defendants. Therefore, 

Plaintiff requires leave of court to amend the Complaint.

B. Plaintiff’s Motion

Plaintiff seeks leave to amend the Complaint “to name the right defendants and correct 

all errors” in the Complaint. (Doc. 24 at 1:20-21.) Plaintiff asserts that in his original 

Complaint, he wrongly named defendants Schneider and Carter, and he seeks to replace them 

with the proper defendants.

Plaintiff has submitted a proposed First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 24 at 2-14.)

Proposed First Amended Complaint

The events at issue in the proposed First Amended Complaint allegedly occurred at 

Corcoran State Prison (“CSP”) in Corcoran, California, when Plaintiff was incarcerated there. 

Plaintiff names as defendants Correctional Officer (C/O) Byrum, C/O A. Pimental, Sergeant W. 

Taber, Sergeant D. Latraille, R. Hubach, LVN Johnson, LVN Lopez, LVN Moss, Sergeant R. 

Anderson, Adams, Pineda, and John Doe (RN).

2

 All of the Defendants were employed by the 

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation at CSP at the time of the events at 

issue. Plaintiff’s factual allegations follow.

Plaintiff alleges that beginning in February 2008, pursuant to a memo written by 

defendant Adams, staff at CSP began conducting unclothed body inspections of inmates 

outside on the yard instead of in a holding cell, prior to and after outdoor exercise. As a result, 

Plaintiff was forced to strip naked in a filthy yard filled with insects and bird feces, sometimes 

in the rain, in plain view of a yard full of inmates and staff, including female staff. This 

practice violates prison policy and administrative regulations. 

On March 15, 2008 at noon, staff refused to remove Plaintiff from the yard unless he 

submitted to a public unclothed body search. Plaintiff requested that the search be conducted 

 

2 Defendants Anderson, Adams, Pineda, and John Doe (RN) are not included in Plaintiff’s itemized list of 

parties in the proposed First Amended Complaint, (Doc. 24 at 3-4), but defendant Anderson is named in the 

caption on the front page of the proposed complaint, and Adams, Pineda, and John Doe (RN) are referred to as 

defendants in the body of the proposed complaint, (Doc. 24 at 1:13, 5:15, 7:10-11)

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inside a holding cell to afford some privacy and dignity, but Plaintiff’s request was disregarded 

and he was left outside in cold weather until 5:30 a.m. the next day, without lunch or dinner. 

While Plaintiff was outside, defendant Hubach ordered the removal of Plaintiff’s property from 

his cell, including clothing, blankets, sheets, and hygiene products.

At 5:30 a.m. on March 16, 2008, defendants Hubach, Latraille, and Taber forced 

Plaintiff to submit to an unclothed body search by applying pepper spray to Plaintiff’s body and 

face, including his eyes and genitals, until he stripped completely naked in very cold weather 

and in plain view of a yard full of inmates and staff, including females. Defendants Hubach 

and Leon authorized the use of force, which was video recorded by defendant Sergeant R. 

Anderson.

After being pepper sprayed, Plaintiff was not adequately decontaminated or offered pain 

medication by any of the named Defendants. While escorting Plaintiff to his unit, C/O Byrum 

and C/O Pimental used force on Plaintiff because he did not want to see medical staff. Plaintiff 

was slammed to the ground, where Byrum and Pimental banged Plaintiff’s head to the ground 

and defendant Taber yanked Plaintiff’s leg, causing great pain and bleeding. Nurses Johnson, 

Lopez and Moss refused to give Plaintiff medical care or medication, or clean out Plaintiff’s 

abrasions. Plaintiff continues to suffer pain in his chin.

Later, defendants Pineda and John Doe (RN) passed by Plaintiff’s cell and refused 

Plaintiff’s requests for medication to ease his burning skin, yelling to him to use water. 

Plaintiff was forced to spend the rest of the night in his cell naked, with only a mattress, 

shivering and in pain. Plaintiff was left without a blanket, sheet, clothing, or hygiene products, 

and could not sleep for three days. On the evening of March 18, 2008, Plaintiff’s property was 

returned to him, but his written requests for medical care were ignored.

Plaintiff brings claims for excessive force, adverse conditions of confinement, and 

inadequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff also brings claims for an 

improper body search under the Fourth Amendment, and claims based on supervisory liability. 

Plaintiff also brings state law claims for negligence and violation of the California Constitution,

///

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penal code, and regulations. Plaintiff requests monetary damages, injunctive and declaratory 

relief, attorney’s fees, and appointment of counsel.

C. Defendants’ Position

Defendants do not oppose Plaintiff’s motion to the extent he seeks to add defendants 

Latraille and Taber to replace defendants Carter and Schneider. Counsel for Defendants 

informed Plaintiff by letter dated February 10, 2015, that she was willing to agree to this 

substitution after discovering that Carter and Schneider were not involved in the March 16, 

2008 extraction, and that Latraille and Taber dispersed pepper spray during the incident at issue 

in this case. Thus, Defendants have consented to Plaintiff’s proposed amendment to add 

Latraille and Taber as defendants and dismiss defendants Carter and Schneider.

However, Defendants do not consent to, and they oppose, Plaintiff’s additional 

proposed amendments. Defendants argue that it is futile for Plaintiff to revive Fourth 

Amendment claims and claims against Lieutenant Hubach, which the court previously 

dismissed. Defendants also argue that it is futile to add nurses Johnson, Lopez, and Moss as 

defendants to this action for deliberate indifference to medical needs, because Plaintiff provides 

no explanation why they were not named or identified in the original complaint, such that any 

claims against them are time-barred. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s additional proposed

amendments are futile and untimely because Plaintiff was granted leave to amend after the 

court screened the complaint, but chose to proceed only on the claims the court found 

cognizable.

D. Discussion

Defendants have consented to the amendment of the complaint to replace defendants 

Schneider and Carter with defendants Taber and Latraille as persons involved in the March 16,

2008 incident at issue. Therefore, the court finds good cause to allow Plaintiff to amend the 

complaint to correctly identify these defendants.

The court finds that it would be futile to allow Plaintiff to reinstate his claims 

concerning the unclothed body search, supervisory liability, and cell conditions, or to reinstate 

defendants Adams and Leon. Plaintiff’s allegations in the proposed First Amended Complaint 

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concerning these claims and defendants are nearly identical to those which the court dismissed 

from the original Complaint for failure to state a claim. Moreover, Plaintiff consented to the 

dismissal of those claims and defendants on June 16, 2014. (Doc. 8.) Therefore, Plaintiff 

shall not be permitted to reinstate these claims and defendants.

Plaintiff also seeks to reinstate defendant Hubach, who was dismissed from the original 

Complaint based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim against him. Plaintiff’s allegations and 

claims against defendant Hubach in the proposed First Amended Complaint are nearly identical 

as those in the original Complaint, except that Plaintiff now alleges that Hubach participated in 

the March 16, 2008 incident at issue, excessively pepper-spraying Plaintiff and authorizing the 

use of force against him. The court finds that Plaintiff may be able to state a claim against 

defendant Hubach in the proposed complaint for his personal participation in the pepper-spray 

assault against Plaintiff, but not for acts of supervisory liability in authorizing the use of force. 

Therefore, Plaintiff shall be allowed to reinstate defendant Hubach, but only for his personal 

participation in the assault.

Under the allegations of the proposed First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff may be able 

to state medical claims against defendants Pineda, John Doe (RN), Nurse Johnson, Nurse 

Lopez, and Nurse Moss, for refusing to provide medical care to Plaintiff. Therefore, Plaintiff 

shall be permitted to add them as defendants for inadequate medical care.

3

 However, it would 

be futile to allow Plaintiff to add defendant Sergeant R. Anderson for merely video recording

the use of force incident. This allegation against Anderson, without more, is insufficient to 

state any cognizable claim against him under § 1983. Therefore, Plaintiff shall not be 

permitted to add Sergeant R. Anderson, or any claims against him, to the First Amended 

Complaint.

With respect to Plaintiff’s state law claims, Plaintiff is informed that violation of state 

tort law, state regulations, rules and policies of the CDCR, or other state law is not sufficient to 

 

3 Defendants argue that it is futile for Plaintiff to add new claims that appear to be time-barred. However, 

at this stage of the proceedings, the court shall not deny Plaintiff’s amendment based on the possibility of an 

affirmative defense.

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state a claim for relief under ' 1983. To state a claim under ' 1983, there must be a deprivation 

of federal constitutional or statutory rights. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). Although 

the court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, Plaintiff must first have 

a cognizable claim for relief under federal law. See 28 U.S.C. ' 1367. 

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff shall be granted leave to file a new First Amended 

Complaint to substitute defendants Latraille and Taber for defendants Carter and Schneider; to 

reinstate defendant Hubach, only for his personal participation in the pepper-spray assault 

against Plaintiff; and to add medical claims against defendants Pineda, John Doe (RN), Nurse 

Johnson, Nurse Lopez, and Nurse Moss. Thus, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint may only 

include allegations against defendants C/O Byrum, C/O Pimental, Latraille, Taber, Hubach, 

Pineda, John Doe (RN), Nurse Johnson, Nurse Lopez, and Nurse Moss. Plaintiff shall not be 

granted leave to reinstate his claims concerning the unclothed body search, supervisory 

liability, and cell conditions, to reinstate defendants Adams and Leon, or to add defendant 

Sergeant R. Anderson. 

III. MOTION TO MODIFY SCHEDULING ORDER

Defendants have requested modification of the court’s Scheduling Order to extend the 

deadlines for completion of discovery and filing of pretrial dispositive motions.

Modification of a scheduling order requires a showing of good cause, Fed. R. Civ. P. 

16(b), and good cause requires a showing of due diligence, Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, 

Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). To establish good cause, the party seeking the 

modification of a scheduling order must generally show that even with the exercise of due 

diligence, he or she cannot meet the requirement of the order. Id. The court may also consider 

the prejudice to the party opposing the modification. Id. If the party seeking to amend the 

scheduling order fails to show due diligence the inquiry should end and the court should not 

grant the motion to modify. Zivkovic v. Southern California Edison, Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087

(9th Cir. 2002). A party may obtain relief from the court=s deadline date for discovery by 

demonstrating good cause for allowing further discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). 

///

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Defendants request, if the court should grant any part of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to 

amend, that the court modify the current Scheduling Order of October 21, 2014, to extend the 

discovery and dispositive-motion deadlines. Defendants request additional time to allow 

defendants Latraille and Taber to be served and to appear before Defendants take Plaintiff’s 

deposition, and to allow Defendants to file a single motion for summary judgment.

Discussion

The court finds good cause to extend the deadlines in the court’s Scheduling Order. 

Defendants have shown that if new defendants are added to this action, Defendants will be 

unable to complete discovery and file a single dispositive motion within the current deadlines. 

Pursuant to this order, Plaintiff shall be granted leave to add new defendants to this action. 

Therefore, the deadline for completion of discovery shall be extended to November 30, 2015, 

and the deadline for filing pretrial dispositive motions shall be extended to January 29, 2016.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff is granted leave to file a new First Amended 

Complaint within thirty days, for the limited purpose discussed in this order. 

Plaintiff is reminded that an amended complaint supercedes the [prior] complaint, 

Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F 3d. 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be 

complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded pleading, Local Rule 220. 

Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the 

involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be 

clearly and boldly titled AFirst Amended Complaint,@ refer to the appropriate case number, and 

be an original signed under penalty of perjury. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend, filed on March 16, 2015, is GRANTED

for limited purpose: to substitute defendants Latraille and Taber for defendants 

Carter and Schneider; to reinstate defendant Hubach, only for his personal 

participation in the pepper-spray assault against Plaintiff; and to add medical 

///

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claims against defendants Pineda, John Doe (RN), Nurse Johnson, Nurse Lopez, 

and Nurse Moss;

2. Plaintiff is DENIED leave to amend the complaint to reinstate his claims 

concerning the unclothed body search, supervisory liability, and cell conditions, 

to reinstate defendants Adams and Leon, or to add defendant Sergeant R. 

Anderson; 

3. Plaintiff is DENIED leave to file the proposed First Amended Complaint lodged 

on March 16, 2015;

4. Within thirty days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a new 

First Amended Complaint as instructed by this order; 

5. The First Amended Complaint shall refer to case number 1:11-cv-01820-GSAPC and be an original signed under penalty of perjury;

6. Defendants’ request to modify the court’s October 21, 2014 Scheduling Order is 

GRANTED;

7. The deadline for the completion of discovery, including the filing of motions to 

compel, is extended from June 21, 2015 to November 30, 2015;

8. The deadline for the parties to file pretrial dispositive motions is extended from 

August 31, 2015 to January 29, 2016;

9. All other provisions of the court’s October 21, 2014 Scheduling Order remain 

the same; and

10. Plaintiff’s failure to comply with this order may result in the dismissal of this 

case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 16, 2015 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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