Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_03-cv-00091/USCOURTS-azd-4_03-cv-00091-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Shawn D. Catz, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Susan R. Chalker, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 03-91-TUC-FRZ

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Robert Catz' "Motion to Treat Defendants' Motion

to Dismiss as Motion for Summary Judgment Requiring Defendants to File Statement of

Factual Issues Not in Dispute Under L.Civ.R 56.1." See Doc. #72. For the reasons stated

below, Plaintiff's motion is denied.

This case has been litigated for over a decade. The litigation stems from a divorce action

between Robert S. Catz and Susan R. Chalker that was originally filed in Pima County

Superior Court in Tucson, Arizona in 1994. Pursuant to that divorce action, which was

initiated by Chalker, a default judgment was entered against Catz in 1995. The divorce

decree awarded Chalker various assets, including title to several securities accounts (which

were in Catz' name) maintained by TIAA-CREF, Waterhouse Securities, and Fidelity.

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Throughout the more than ten years of litigation, Robert Catz has both litigated pro se and

has litigated with retained counsel. Furthermore, Robert Catz has also included within the litigation

his two sons (Shawn and Jason Catz) who allegedly have a financial interest in the securities

accounts; throughout the litigation, to the extent Shawn and Jason have been included, the same

attorneys have represented Catz and his sons, or Catz (acting pro se) has both represented himself

and his two sons. For example, after this case was transferred from a federal district court in

Tennessee to the district of Arizona in 2003, Israel Weinstock (a disbarred attorney) attempted to

represent Catz and his sons and appear before this Court on behalf of Catz and his sons. However,

at the time that Israel Weinstock personally appeared before this Court in December of 2004 for a

status conference, the Court learned during that hearing that Israel Weinstock was a disbarred

attorney from New York; as such, the Court would not permit him to appear in this Court and

represent Catz and his sons before this Court. Thereafter, Robert Catz has appeared pro se in this

case on behalf of himself and his two sons.

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During the pendency of that divorce action and beyond (i.e., the next decade), Robert Catz1

has named as defendants, among others, Susan Chalker, her two divorce attorneys, the Clerk

of the Pima County Superior Court, various Pima County Superior Court judges, TIAACREF, Waterhouse Securities, and Fidelity. Catz has also asserted numerous claims,

including, that the Arizona divorce decree was obtained by fraud, that there were secret

agreements between Chalker's divorce attorneys and Pima County Superior Court judges to

defraud Catz, that the divorce decree must be declared invalid in violation of due process,

civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. §1983, professional malpractice, abuse of process,

intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, tortuous interference with business

relationships, and violations of the Electronic Communications Act (18 U.S.C. §2511). Catz

has also filed state and federal actions relating to these claims with the Arizona state trial

court, the Arizona Court of Appeals, the Arizona Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court,

Arizona federal district court, Ohio state trial court, Ohio federal district court, Tennessee

federal district court, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 

In light of the overlapping claims in these various jurisdictions which have required court

rulings, previous courts, including the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, have ruled that many

of Catz' claims are subject to preclusion. See Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279 (6th Cir. 1998),

as amended in 243 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2001). Thus, after this case was transferred from the

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The Court construes Defendants' submission of these documents in support of their motion

to dismiss, along with Defendants' response to Plaintiff's motion at bar, as a request to take judicial

notice of the documents in question relating to the underlying and related litigation in this case. The

Court notes, as Defendants argue in their response, that many of the pleadings actually submitted

are pleadings initiated by Catz.

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district of Tennessee to the district of Arizona, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing

that nearly all of Catz' claims must be dismissed due to preclusion. See id. In support of the

motion to dismiss, Defendants submitted a binder of exhibits (along with a detailed chart

identifying and summarizing the attached exhibits) filled with various pleadings, docket

reports, and rulings from the underlying and related litigation in this case to show that Catz'

claims are precluded. See Doc. #'s 69 (Motion to Dismiss) and 70 (Exhibits in Support of

Motion to Dismiss). In response, Catz filed the motion at bar arguing that Defendants

motion to dismiss must be viewed and treated as a summary judgment motion as Defendants

have submitted documents outside of the pleadings. See FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6)(stating that

a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is treated as a summary judgment motion

where matters outside the pleadings are submitted). The Court disagrees. 

As Defendants argue in their response, all of the documents submitted are simply Catz'

own pleadings filed in this or related litigation, docket reports related to this litigation, and

various rulings by the courts in this or related litigation. As such, all of these matters are

properly before the Court in relation to Defendants' motion to dismiss. Indeed, there is ample

Ninth Circuit authority showing that the documents submitted to the Court in support of

Defendants' motion to dismiss are subject to judicial notice, and therefore, this Court takes

judicial notice of those documents;2

 further, under these circumstances the motion to dismiss

is not converted into a summary judgment motion. See, e.g., Reyna Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa

USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2006)(affirming district court's dismissal of case

due to preclusion; holding that it is appropriate to take judicial notice of court filings and

other matters of public record such as pleadings, briefs, memoranda, motions, and transcripts

filed in the underlying and related litigation); Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d 854, 866 (9th Cir.

2002)(in relation to preclusion analysis, the court took judicial notice of related state court

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opinions and briefs); Manufactured Home Communities Inc. v. City of San Jose, 420 F.3d

1022, 1037 (9th Cir. 2002)(taking judicial notice of filings in state court action in order to

evaluate preclusion and any surviving claims in the case); Headwaters Inc. v. U.S. Forest

Service, 399 F.3d 1047, 1051 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005)(courts may take judicial notice of the docket

in related cases as materials from a proceeding in another tribunal are appropriate for judicial

notice); Emrich v. Touche Ross & Company, 846 F.2d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 1988)(a motion

to dismiss for failure to state a claim is not treated as a summary judgment motion where the

Court considers matters subject to judicial notice such as proceedings and determinations in

related litigation); Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385,

1388 (9th Cir. 1987)(facts subject to judicial notice may be considered in relation to a motion

to dismiss; further holding that on a motion to dismiss, the court need not accept as true

allegations that contradict facts which may be judicially noticed by the court). 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Catz' motion (Doc. #72) is denied; the

Court takes judicial notice of the matters submitted by Defendants in support of their motion

to dismiss, and Defendants' motion to dismiss will not be treated as a summary judgment

motion requiring a separate statement of undisputed facts.

DATED this 31st day of August, 2006.

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