Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_04-cv-01046/USCOURTS-azd-3_04-cv-01046-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kim Ordway 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dr. Charles Lucero, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-04-1046-PCT-MHM

ORDER

Currently before the Court is Plaintiff Kim Ordway's ("Plaintiff") Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment on Liability (Dkt.#39,40) and Defendants Dr. Charles Lucero, Doris

Goodale, Jeri Short, Patrick Carlin, Michael Cobb, Michael Ford and Tonya Ford's

(collectively "Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt.#41). After reviewing the

pleadings and record and conducting oral argument on January 22, 2007, the Court issues the

following Order. 

I. Evidentiary Objections

The Court has reviewed the evidentiary objections issued by Defendants to Plaintiff's

Statement of Facts in support of her Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The Court

overrules Defendants' objections to ¶¶'s 4,6,7,14, 15, 20,21,23, 24,25,26,27,28,29,32,34-

38,41, and 42. Defendants object to these statements upon grounds that the statements are

either not undisputed or are immaterial to matters raised in this litigation. The Court will

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overrule Defendants’ objections but notes that the statements presented are disputed or are

otherwise alleged to be immaterial. See S.E.C. v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th

Cir.1982) (stating that "a material issue of fact is one that affects the outcome of the litigation

and requires a trial to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth."). The Court will

sustain Defendants’ objection to ¶¶ 30-31, on the grounds that Plaintiff’s affidavit testimony

that other male employees had access to the same type of funds that Plaintiff was charged

with misusing is wholly inconsistent with Plaintiff’s deposition testimony. (DSOF ¶¶80-81).

See Block v. City of Los Angeles, 253 F.3d 410, 419 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that "[a]

party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact to survive summary judgment by

contradicting his earlier version of the facts."). 

II. Factual Background

On May 21, 2004, Plaintiff filed the instant suit against the above-mentioned

Defendants asserting claims of sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., (Title VII) and claims based upon

violations of Plaintiff's due process rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff's claims

are alleged against officials of the Kingman Unified School District; specifically: (1) Dr.

Charles Lucero ("Defendant Lucero"), president; (2) Doris Goodale ("Defendant Goodale"),

vice-president; (3) Jeri Short ("Defendant Short"), member of board; (4) Michael Cobb

("Defendant Cobb"), member; and (4) Michael Ford ("Defendant Ford"), superintendent.

Plaintiff's claims arise out of her employment with the Kingman Unified School District,

No.20 as the principal of Kingman High School - South Campus, from 1995 through June

of 2003. Plaintiff applied for the position with Defendant Ford, the superintendent of the

District. Plaintiff was employed pursuant to an employment contract for each school year

of her employment. The most recent contract was effective as of July 1, 2002, and expired

on June 20, 2003. Prior to the school year of 2002 through 2003, Plaintiff received positive

performance reviews by Defendant Ford. However, an issue arose in early 2003 regarding

the purchase and use of a mobile cart referred to as a "Gator" for her personal use.

According to Defendants, because Plaintiff did not like the cart, she arranged for the District

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to purchase the cart. Dr. Ford believed that Plaintiff's conduct with regard to the purchase

of the cart by the District was improper. Based upon this conduct, Dr. Ford requested that

Plaintiff resign from her position as principal. On February 11, 2003, Plaintiff submitted a

written letter of resignation to be effective as of June 30, 2003. The Governing Board of the

District accepted the letter of resignation. After Plaintiff's letter of resignation, Dr. Ford,

upon receipt of new information, requested the Mohave County Attorney's Office investigate

alleged misconduct by Plaintiff regarding the handling of a student booster account. The

Mohave County Attorney's Office issued its findings and prepared a written statement of

charges (the "Statement of Charges") against Plaintiff, which were presented to the

Governing Board. Dr. Ford, based upon these charges, recommended to the Board that

Plaintiff be dismissed. Plaintiff was informed in writing on May 14, 2003, that the

Governing Board would meet in executive committee the next day, May 15, 2003, to

consider whether to Adopt Dr. Ford's recommendation. Plaintiff was present at the meeting

on May 15, 2003. At the conclusion of the executive committee meeting, the Governing

Board held a public session at which time it voted to accept Dr. Ford's recommendation to

dismiss Plaintiff. The District provided Plaintiff with a written notice of dismissal effective

as of May 15, 2003. Shortly after Plaintiff's dismissal, Plaintiff's counsel issued

correspondence to the Board challenging the termination as a violation of Plaintiff's due

process rights. Through a series of correspondence, the District agreed to rescind the

dismissal of Plaintiff and pay Plaintiff her salary through the conclusion of her contract, or

June 30, 2003. The District also agreed to either withdraw the Statement of Charges that

formed the basis for Plaintiff's dismissal or afford Plaintiff the opportunity to contest the

charges. On November 12, 2003, the Governing Board withdrew the Statement of Charges

that formed the basis for Plaintiff's dismissal. Plaintiff was informed prior to the meeting, that

she might not be permitted to address the Governing Board before it made its decision. 

On May 27, 2004, a grand jury in Mohave County, Arizona returned an indictment

against Plaintiff on ten felony criminal counts, including nine counts of theft, regarding

Plaintiff's handling of school funds as to the student booster account. On October 20, 2004,

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Plaintiff entered a plea of guilty as to counts six and seven, which were counts of theft, class

six and three felonies respectively. On December 22, 2004, the Mohave County Superior

Court entered a judgment of conviction against Plaintiff. Plaintiff was placed on probation

and ordered to pay restitution of $7,500 to the District resulting from her handling of school

funds. 

III. Standard 

A motion for summary judgment may be granted only if the evidence shows "that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). To defeat the motion, the non-moving

party must show that there are genuine factual issues "that properly can be resolved only be

a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986). The party opposing

summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [the party’s]

pleadings, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."

Rule 56(e). See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87

106 S.Ct. 1348 (1986). The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). 

IV. Analysis 

A. Title VII

(1) Plaintiff Did Not Name the School District as a Defendant.

As noted above, Plaintiff's Complaint asserts claims of unlawful sexual discrimination

and retaliation in violation of Title VII against the individually named Defendants. As noted

by Defendants; however, a Title VII claim against these individual Defendants is misplaced.

Holly D. v. California Institute of Technology, 339 F.3d 1158, 1179 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting

that "Title VII does not provide a cause of action for damages against supervisors or fellow

employees”); see also Pink v. Modoc Indian Health Project, 157 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir.

1998). In response to Defendants' position on this point, Plaintiff states that "[w]hile it is true

that these claims against the individuals cannot proceed under Title VII, the Defendant

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District through its Board is not subject to dismissal." (Plaintiff's Response, Dkt.#51, p.2).

Thus, Plaintiff contends that her claims for sexual discrimination and retaliation asserted in

counts one and two against her employer, the Kingman Unified School District, cannot be

dismissed. However, the flaw with Plaintiff's position is that the District is not even named

in Plaintiff's complaint. Instead Plaintiff names only individuals employed with the District.

Plaintiff cites no authority suggesting that naming employees or members in a Title VII claim

is sufficient to also assert such claims against the employer District. Rather, Plaintiff cites

the Arizona Supreme Court's decision in Amphitheater Unified School Dist. No. 10 v. Harte,

128 Ariz. 233, 235, 624 P.2d 1281 (Ariz. 1981), which held that a school district can be

subject to an employment discrimination suit and the Ninth Circuit's decision in Savage v.

Glendale Union High School, Dist. No.205, Maricopa County, 343 F.3d 1036, 1051 (9th Cir.

2003), which addressed a question of sovereign immunity with regards to a school district

as opposed to the state. Neither of these cases provide any authority suggesting that a

plaintiff's failure to expressly bring suit against an employer or school district is forgiven

should the plaintiff name individual members of that district. In light of this finding, the

Court finds Plaintiff's failure to name the District significant and bars Plaintiff’s attempt to

assert Title VII claims against the District. However, the Court will not end its inquiry

regarding the merits of Plaintiff's Title VII claims on this basis alone and will evaluate the

propriety of an amendment to include the District at this late stage of the litigation. In re

Circuit Breaker Litigation, 175 F.R.D. 547, 551 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[l]eave to amend may be

denied if the proposed amendment is futile or would be the subject of dismissal.”). 

(2) Timeliness of Title VII Sex Discrimination and Retaliation Claims

As noted by Defendants, Plaintiff has filed two separate charges with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission regarding the alleged sexual discrimination and

retaliation while employed with the District. On May 19, 2003, Plaintiff filed her first

charge with the EEOC. (DSOF ¶ 61). The charge was dismissed by the EEOC on June 30,

2003. (DSOF ¶ 62). Plaintiff's Complaint was then filed on May 21, 2004 before this Court.

(Dkt.#1). These time considerations as to Plaintiff's first charge of sex discrimination

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demonstrate that the claim and allegations supporting Plaintiff's claim are time barred.

Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) provide that a claimant must file suit no later than 90

days after the EEOC's dismissal of the claimant's charge of discrimination. Here, the

Complaint was not filed until some 326 days after the EEOC dismissed Plaintiff's charge.

In addition, Plaintiff offers no argument to toll the 90-day requirement. As such, it is

apparent that Plaintiff's claim of sex discrimination and allegations supporting Plaintiff's

sexual discrimination claim with the EEOC are time barred. See Mitchell v. Los Angeles

Community College School District, 861 F.2d 198, 202 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding plaintiff’s

Title VII suit to be time barred where suit was brought more than 90 days after receiving the

right to sue letter). 

In light of the determination that Plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim based upon her

first EEOC charge is time barred, the Court must address the viability of Plaintiff’s Title VII

claims based upon the filing of her second EEOC charge on January 16, 2004. In reviewing

the timing of Plaintiff's second EEOC charge, Plaintiff received her right to sue letter on

February 27, 2004 and timely asserted her Complaint before this Court on May 21, 2004.

(DSOF ¶¶63,64). As such, on its face, Plaintiff's second EEOC charge is timely. However,

in reviewing the allegations of the second EEOC charge it is apparent that only part of the

allegations and claims can be considered timely. This determination is based upon the fact

that Plaintiff simply restated her allegations in support of her sexual discrimination claim

from her first EEOC charge with the second EEOC charge. (DSOF ¶¶61,63). Specifically,

in both of Plaintiff's first and second EEOC charges she asserted the following allegations

in support of her sex discrimination claim:

During the last 5 years I have been subjected to harassment and intimidation

by Michael Ford, Superintendent. On approximately February 11, 2003 I

submitted my letter of resignation under duress. It was accepted on March 11,

2003. On May 15, 2003 Michael Ford brought charges of unprofessional

conduct to the Board to have me dismissed. I was dismissed on May 15, 2003

and Michael Ford was given permission to submit information to the

Department of Education to have my certification pulled. 

(DSOF ¶¶ 61,63). 

 As noted by Defendants, it would defeat the purpose of the timeliness requirement for

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Title VII claims to allow previous untimely charges with the EEOC to simply be refiled and

timely filed in federal court to be recognized. See Lo v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,

787 F.2d 827, 828 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding plaintiff’s Title VII claim to be untimely where

the facts alleged in the second EEOC charge were the same as the first EEOC charge and

plaintiff previously failed to file action based upon right to sue letter from first EEOC

charge). As such, the Court finds that because Plaintiff has simply re-alleged the facts

supporting her first EEOC charge in support of her claim of sex discrimination that the claim

and supporting allegations are time barred. 

The Court does not find; however, Plaintiff’s allegations in her second timely EEOC

charge supporting her claim of retaliation to be time barred as those allegations were not

previously asserted and are sufficiently distinct from the allegations of sex discrimination

asserted in the first EEOC charge. Specifically, Plaintiff’s second EEOC charge asserts in

pertinent part:

Subsequent to my dismissal, I have been retaliated against. In May 2003, I

was not allowed to speak at the Board Meeting where the decision was made

to not renew my contract. I requested another meeting with the Board which

was finally granted on November 12, 2003. At the meeting, I was informed

that the Statement of Charges to school district had filed against me in May

2003 had been dropped. Again, I was not allowed to speak at this meeting.

As a result, I have lost seven school positions and countless other opportunities

in Kingman due to bad references given out by the Board. 

(DSOF ¶ 63).

In light of the fact that the allegations supporting Plaintiff’s retaliation claim asserted

in her second EEOC charge were not previously asserted and are sufficiently distinct from

the allegations of her first EEOC charge, the second EEOC charge and resulting retaliation

claim is timely. See Goodluck v. Kelly Tractor Co., 733 F. Supp. 1479 (S.D. Fla. 1990)

(holding certain Title VII claims based upon second timely EEOC charge which were

sufficiently distinct from previous untimely EEOC charge to be timely). 

(3) Merits of Title VII Retaliation Claim

To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff

must show that "(1) she engaged in activity protected under Title VII, (2) her employer

subjected her to adverse employment action, and (3) her employer's action is causally linked

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to the protected activity." Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir.1987). If the

plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a

legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse-employment action. Manatt v.. Bank of Am.,

339 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir.2003). If the defendant meets its burden, to avoid summary

judgment, the plaintiff then must show "specific and substantial evidence" of pretext. Schuler

v. Chronicle Broadcasting Co. 793 F.2d 1010, 1011 (9th Cir. 1986). Upon reviewing the

record, the Court finds that there is insufficient evidence before the Court to support a

retaliation claim under Title VII. Plaintiff argues that the retaliation by Defendants can be

found based upon the denial of her right to a hearing once her employment was terminated

by the District based upon the Statement of Charges regarding her conduct with respect to

the student booster account. However, even assuming these allegations support a prima facie

case that Plaintiff engaged in protected activity by opposing her termination and requesting

a hearing, it appears clear that there is a legitimate non-retaliatory basis for the District’s

action to take adverse employment action against Plaintiff. That is, her misappropriation of

the student funds producing the Statement of Charges and her termination. Notably, Plaintiff

was ultimately convicted for her conduct relating to the student funds which produced the

Statement of Charges. The fact that Plaintiff was convicted estops her from denying the

activity supporting the Statement of Charges. This fact clearly provides the District with a

valid non-retaliatory basis for taking the initial action of dismissing Plaintiff from her

employment without a hearing. In response to this valid non-retaliatory basis, Plaintiff fails

to set forth "specific and substantial evidence" that Plaintiff's misconduct with respect to the

student booster account was a pretext for taking such action. Plaintiff argues at length that

the denial of her right to a hearing to address the Statement of Charges exemplifies the

retaliatory motive of the District. However, the Court struggles to see how this argument

provides "specific and substantial" evidence that the District used the Statement of Charges

as a pretext. As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s proposed retaliation claim against the

District fails as a matter of law as Plaintiff’s misconduct with respect to school funds and

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Plaintiff’s termination on this basis provides a legitimate non-retaliatory basis for the actions

taken against Plaintiff, which Plaintiff cannot rebut. 

As such, because Plaintiff's proposed Title VII claims against the District are futile,

the Court finds that there is no reason at this late stage of the litigation to permit Plaintiff to

amend to assert such claims. 

B. Plaintiff’s § 1983 Claims Based Upon Sex Discrimination Against

Individual Defendants

As a result of Plaintiff’s failure to allege any claim against the Kingman School

District, Plaintiff alternatively asserts that her claims of sex discrimination survive in the

context of § 1983 claims against the individually named Defendants, even though Plaintiff

did not allege any such cause of action in her Complaint. (Plaintiff's Response, Dkt.#51,

pp.2-3). Plaintiff asserts that her "claims for sex discrimination (as an equal protection

guarantee founding Counts 1 and 2 of her complaint) survive against the individuals she has

named..." (Id. p.2). Plaintiff asserts that the liberal pleading rules and liberal standard

regarding amendment support this determination. Again, the Court finds Plaintiff’s request

to allow the assertion of new claims at this stage of this litigation barred, especially

considering the possible prejudice to Defendants to allow such new claims. However, again,

the Court will evaluate whether such an amendment in support a claim of sex discrimination

against the individually named Defendants would be futile. Circuit Breaker 175 F.R.D. at

551.

 Section 1983 recognizes a cause of action against "a person who, under color of any

statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State or Territory," deprives another

of any constitutionally protected rights. The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from

using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights

and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (1992).

As noted by Plaintiff, Title VII and claims based upon § 1983 are not mutually exclusive.

Roberts v. College of the Desert, 870 F.2d 1411, 1415 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Title VII does not

preempt an action under section 1983 for a violation of the fourteenth amendment.”). Section

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1983 incorporates the equal protection standards that have developed in fourteenth

amendment jurisprudence. See Chavez v. Tempe Union High School District, 565 F.2d 1087,

1095 (9th Cir. 1977). Plaintiff offers no specific argument in support of a sex discrimination

pursuant to § 1983 against the named Defendants in her pleadings, but presumably relies on

the same allegations supporting Plaintiff's Title VII claims of sex discrimination and

retaliation. Id. (stating that in order to prevail on § 1983 claim alleging sex discrimination

plaintiff must prove that the defendant purposefully discriminated against her because of her

sex). 

Based upon a review of the record, the Court finds that there is insufficient evidence

as a matter of law to support a prima facie case of sex discrimination. The record reveals that

on February 11, 2003, Plaintiff submitted her letter of resignation amongst allegations of

misconduct regarding the purchase of a mobile cart. After her resignation, the Mohave

County Attorney’s Office produced the Statement of Charges which detailed misconduct

with respect to the use of school funds as to student booster account. The District, based

upon the recommendation of Defendant Ford, approved Plaintiff’s termination, effectively

immediately. As addressed below, Plaintiff asserts that such dismissal without opportunity

for hearing was in direct violation of her due process rights as well. However, based upon

the record before the Court, Plaintiff fails to set forth any credible evidence suggesting sex

discrimination produced her termination. In fact, the closest Plaintiff gets to alleging any

type of discrimination in her papers is that "similarly situated persons with control of similar

funds had used [the funds] in much the same way as [Plaintiff] had used them." (Plaintiff’s

Response, Dkt.#51, p.11. ll 4-5). This assertion obviously falls far short of suggesting that

Plaintiff was discriminated against based upon her sex. Notably, Plaintiff's assertion does

not even differentiate between similarly situated males and females. In fact, the record

reveals no indication that the Defendants handled any type of similar situation involving the

misuse of public funds differently, whether it be male or female employees. (DSOF ¶¶78-

86). In light of the fact that there is no evidence of sex discrimination by the Defendants,

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Plaintiff proposed § 1983 claims based upon sex discrimination are without merit, thus

precluding Plaintiff's request to amend to assert such claims at this late stage.

(C) Section § 1983 Due Process Claims

Plaintiff also asserts several claims based upon a denial of her due process rights

under the umbrella of § 1983. (Counts III through VI). These claims are premised upon the

Defendants' conduct in denying Plaintiff a hearing with regard to her termination on May 15,

2003, based upon the Board's adoption of the Statement of Charges. Plaintiff asserts these

claims based upon violations of both her property and liberty interests. A plaintiff claiming

to have been discharged or suspended without notice or a hearing must first establish that she

has been deprived of a property or liberty interest that is protected by the due process clause

of the fourteenth amendment. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70, 92 S.Ct. 2701,

2705 (1972). Once a plaintiff has demonstrated a constitutionally protected property or

liberty interest, the court may inquire into the sufficiency of the process afforded. Royster

v. Bd. of Trustees of Anderson Co. School Dist. No. 5, 774 F.2d 618, 620 (4th Cir.), cert.

denied, 475 U.S. 1121 (1985).

(1) Property Interest Claims

Counts III and V of Plaintiff’s Complaint assert violations of her due process rights

based upon violations of her property interest in her employment with the District. In

response to these claims, Defendants argue that such claims fail as a matter of law due to the

fact that it is undisputed that upon rescinding the Statement of Charges against Plaintiff in

November of 2003, the Board also directed that Plaintiff receive full payment of her

remaining salary through the expiration of her employment contract or June 30, 2003.

(DSOF ¶¶ 51,58). Thus, according to Defendants, the fact that Plaintiff received full

compensation through the contracted expiration date of June 30, 2003 moots any due process

claim based upon a violation of Plaintiff’s property rights. The Court finds this argument

persuasive. 

A review of relevant persuasive authority demonstrates that in instances where a

person claiming a property interest in employment is paid in full the amount due and owing

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under the existing employment contract, the person’s property interest in that employment

is extinguished. Royster 774 F.2d at 621 (holding that "any constitutionally protected

property interest claimant had as a result of his employment contract has been satisfied by

payment of the full compensation due under the contract."); see also Fields v. Durham, 909

F.2d 94, 98 (4th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1068 (1991); Huang v. Bd. of Governors

of the Univ. of North Carolina, 902 F.2d 1134, 1141-42 (4th Cir.1990); Schneeweis v.

Jacobs, 771 F.Supp. 733,736-37 (E.D.Va. 1991) (holding that coach suspended during term

of contract but fully compensated was not deprived of property interest). In the instant case,

Plaintiff received full compensation due and owing to her through the expiration of her

contract, albeit, after her contract had expired. However, the fact that she was paid in full

eliminates any due process claim based upon a constitutionally property interest. 

In addition, to the property interest in her employment contract salary, Plaintiff also

appears to allege a property interest in the unpaid sick leave Plaintiff accrued through her

years of employment with the Kingman School District. However, the written policy of the

District is clear that in order to receive payment for such leave upon separation, the employee

must have ten years of continuous service with the District. (DSOF ¶54). Here, Plaintiff only

had eight years of continuous service, thus did not qualify for such payment. Thus, under

the circumstances, because Plaintiff received payment in full of her salary pursuant to the

2002 - 2003 contract she had signed, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s due process claims

asserting a violation of her property rights based upon employment fail as a matter of law.

 Plaintiff was paid the full benefit of her contract due and owing and did not possess any

further property interest in employment beyond the 2002-2003 term. 

(2) Liberty Interest Claims

Plaintiff asserts that her liberty interest with respect to her employment and ultimate

termination was implicated by the Defendants' conduct. Defendants on the other hand

dispute any such violation and argue that Plaintiff's liberty interest was not violated as a

matter of law.

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Due process demands that one be given "an opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful

time and in a meaningful manner.'" Vanelli v. Reynolds School District No. 7, 667 F.2d 773,

779-80 (9th Cir. 1982). With respect to the termination of a public employee, a liberty

interest is implicated only "if a charge impairs [one's] reputation for honesty or morality. The

procedural protections of due process apply if the accuracy of the charge is contested, there

is some public disclosure of the charge, and it is made in connection with the termination of

employment or the alteration of some right or status recognized by state law." Id. at 777-78.

In the instant case, there can be little doubt that the charge leading to Plaintiff's

termination with the District bears on Plaintiff's reputation for honesty or morality.

Specifically, the Statement of Charges asserted that Plaintiff had misappropriated school

funds while acting as principal. Moreover, because of the denial of any hearing, it appears

that Plaintiff was denied her opportunity to challenge the accuracy of the Statement of

Charges which was made in connection with Plaintiff's termination. However, that being

said, the fact that an employee is terminated without a hearing does not in and of itself

provide a sufficient basis for a denial of due process consistent with the employee's liberty

interest. Most notably for purposes of this case is that in addition to challenging the accuracy

of the charge producing the dismissal, a § 1983 plaintiff must also demonstrate that there is

some public disclosure by the defendants of the charge producing the dismissal.

Plaintiff contends that the Statement of Charges leading to her dismissal was publicly

disclosed. In support of this position, Plaintiff asserts that there "was public disclosure of the

substance of the Statement of Charges..." (Plaintiff's Motion, Dkt.#39, p.12). In addition,

Plaintiff states that "[t]he substance of the Statement of Charges were widely known and in

the media within a day or two of the Governing Board adopting them." (Id., p.4). As

authority for this statement, Plaintiff cites Plaintiff's declarations, the Statement of Charges

itself and the draft minutes from the Board hearing dismissing Plaintiff on May 15, 2003.

(PSOF ¶ 14; Plaintiff's Response, SOF ¶26, Exhibit 18). Defendants, on the other hand,

contend that the Statement of Charges was not publicly disclosed by Defendants. Defendants

contend that the Statement of Charges was read only in private executive session and never

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read in public. Moreover, according to Defendants, when the Board did reconvene into

public session, the Board voted only to accept the recommendation from Dr. Ford to dismiss

Plaintiff and did not go into the Statement of Charges. As support for this position,

Defendants cite the deposition testimony of Defendant Ford stating that the Statement of

Charges was not read during the public session of the Board Meeting. (DSOF ¶ 45). In

addition, Defendants rely on Defendant Ford's deposition testimony that the District Board

did not make any public statements regarding their decision to terminate Plaintiff's

employment. (DSOF ¶ 47). 

After reviewing the record on this issue, the Court finds that there is no credible

evidence suggesting that there was public disclosure of the Statement of Charges against

Plaintiff by the Defendants. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976) (holding that

where asserted reasons for decision to discharge policeman were communicated in private

and were not made public, it cannot form the basis for due process claim). This

determination is bolstered by the fact that in opposition to Defendants' reliance on Defendant

Ford's sworn deposition testimony, Plaintiff asserts only that "Dr. Ford did read the statement

of charges against her aloud in the public session of the meeting of the school board and that

discussion was held in public session." (Plaintiff’s Response to DSOF, Dkt.#52, ¶¶45,47).

Notably, Plaintiff cites no portion of the record to support this position. Rather, Plaintiff

asserts that the Statement of Charges was read in public session but only speculates that "the

District or Dr. Ford (or their agents) are most assuredly the entities who disclosed the

substance of the Statement of Charges." (Plaintiff’s Motion, p.4, n.2). However, such

conclusory and speculative statements not supported by the record are not sufficient to create

a factual issue as to whether the Statement of Charges was publicly disclosed by the

Defendants. See Thornhill Publishing Co. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979)

(stating conclusory testimony in moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact

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At oral argument, Plaintiff raised the possibility of the Statement of Charges

becoming public record when placed with Plaintiff's personnel file. However, again, Plaintiff

provides no evidence suggesting that the Statement of Charges was part of Plaintiff's file or

that it was subject to a public record request. As such, this case does not fall within the scope

of the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Cox v. Roskelley, 359 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2004) which

held that placement of stigmatizing information in the employee's personnel file in the face

of a state statute requiring release upon request was sufficient to constitute publication to

trigger the employee's liberty interest.

2

In addition, several of Ms. Ordway's sworn statements do not appear to be based upon

her personal knowledge. For instance, in ¶ 21 of her May 4, 2006, declaration she provides

that a reporter "reportedly" heard the reading of the Statement of Charges during the private

executive session. (PRSOF, Exhibit 18, ¶21). Clearly, this statement is not based upon

Plaintiff's own personal knowledge, but amounts only to her speculation. See Fed.R.Civ.P.

56(e).

3

Because of this determination, the Court will not entertain Defendants' other

argument of qualified immunity in opposition to Plaintiff's due process claims. 

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and defeat summary judgment).1

 Moreover, Plaintiff’s declarations and the draft minutes

from the May 15, 2003, hearing provide no indication of public disclosure of the Statement

of Charges by the Defendants. (PSOF ¶14; PRSOF ¶26). At best, Plaintiff's May 4, 2006,

declaration provides only speculation that Defendant Ford or the other Defendants publicly

disclosed the Statement of Charges to others such as prospective employers based upon

public awareness of Plaintiff's employment situation with the District. (PRSOF ¶26).

General public awareness does not demonstrate that any of the Defendants made affirmative

public disclosures.2

 See Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984) ("[t]o

impinge on a liberty interest, the stigmatizing information must be made public by the

offending governmental agency."). Therefore, because Plaintiff cannot demonstrate the

publication of the Statement of Charges by Defendants, Plaintiff's due process claims based

upon her liberty interest fail as a matter of law; Counts IV and VI.3

V. Summary

The Court finds that Plaintiff's claims against the individually named Defendants fail

as a matter of law. Plaintiff's Title VII claims against these named Defendants are not

recognized under the law. Moreover, any amendment to permit the Title VII claims to be

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asserted against the Kingman School District would be futile as Plaintiff's sex discrimination

claim is time barred and Plaintiff fails to offer "specific and substantial evidence" suggesting

pretext in support of Plaintiff's retaliation claim. In addition, the Court finds that any

amendment to assert Plaintiff's equal protection claims pursuant to § 1983 against the

Defendants based upon sex is also futile as there is simply no credible evidence of sex

discrimination. Finally, the Court finds that Plaintiff's due process claims grounded in §

1983 also fail as a matter of law as Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any recognizable

property interest or liberty interest in such claims. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED denying Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment On Liability. (Dkt.#39). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

(Dkt.#41). Plaintiff's claims are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Plaintiff's Motion to Strike. (Dkt.#43).

Exhibits 1 through 13 attached to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt.#39)

are to be stricken from the record. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter judgment accordingly. 

DATED this 21st day of March, 2007.

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