Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-04838/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-04838-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OSSIE GILES,

Plaintiff,

v.

D. REYES, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-04838-YGR (PR) 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF

LEAVE TO AMEND DELIBERATE 

INDIFFERENCE CLAIM AGAINST 

DEFENDANTS ESPINOZA AND 

TOOTELL; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF 

COUNSEL; AND DIRECTING CLERK 

TO PROVIDE PLAINTIFF WITH 

SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM FORM

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Ossie Giles, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at San Quentin State Prison 

(“SQSP”), filed the instant pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff, who

suffers from severe back pain, alleged that Defendants Doctors D. Reyes and J. Espinoza and 

Chief Medical Officer E. Tootell failed to give him treatment for his back pain. Dkt. 1 at 4-7. In 

April of 2014, Plaintiff alleged he could no longer walk, and he had to undergo emergency back 

surgery on May 20, 2014. Id. at 8-9. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. 

In an Order of Service dated March 28, 2016, the Court found that, liberally construed, the 

complaint stated cognizable claims of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against 

Defendants Reyes, Espinoza and Tootell. Dkt. 8. The Court ordered service of the complaint and 

directed the aforementioned Defendants to respond. 

On July 21, 2016, Defendants filed their answer to the complaint. Dkt. 18. 

On August 11, 2016,1Plaintiff filed a document entitled, “Motion for Amended 

Complaint,” which the Court construes as a motion for leave to amend the complaint as to the 

 

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 As a pro se prisoner, Plaintiff receives the benefit of the prisoner mailbox rule, which 

deems most documents filed when the prisoner gives them to prison officials to mail to the court. 

See Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Douglas v. Noelle, 567 

F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that the mailbox rule applies to the filing of a federal 

civil rights complaint). The Court will assume Plaintiff gave his “Motion for Amended 

Complaint” to prison officials for mailing on the date he signed it, i.e., August 11, 2016, and 

deems that document filed as of that date. 

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deliberate indifference claim against Defendants Espinoza and Tootell. Dkt. 21.

On August 30, 2016, Defendants Espinoza and Tootell filed their “Answer to the Amended 

Complaint.” Dkt. 22.

On September 27, 2016, the Court granted Defendants an extension of time to file their 

motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 24. The Court directed Defendants to file their motion for 

summary judgment no later than January 13, 2017. See id.

Also before the Court are Plaintiff’s other pending requests, including his requests for 

appointment of counsel (dkt. 19), and for a Court order to serve a subpoenas duces tecum on a 

non-party (dkt. 26).

For the reasons discussed below, the Court orders as follows: (1) Plaintiff’s motion for 

leave to amend his claim against Defendants Espinoza and Tootell is GRANTED; (2) his motion 

for appointment of counsel is DENIED; and (3) his request for a Court order to serve a subpoenas 

duces tecum on a non-party is DENIED as premature. 

DISCUSSION

I. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

A plaintiff may amend the complaint “once as a matter of course within [] 21 days after 

serving it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A). But, if the complaint requires a responsive pleading, a 

plaintiff may amend the complaint “21 days after service of a responsive pleading, or 21 days after 

service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B). 

In all other cases, a plaintiff must obtain the defendant’s consent or leave of Court to amend a 

complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Here, the record shows that Plaintiff filed his motion for 

leave to amend his deliberate indifference claim against Defendants Espinoza and Tootell within 

21 days after Defendants’ answer was filed. Even if it was filed past the 21-day period, it does not 

appear that Defendants would be prejudiced by allowing Plaintiff to amend his claim against 

Defendants Espinoza and Tootell. Thus, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend his claim 

against Defendants Espinoza and Tootell. See id. (“The court should freely give leave [to amend]

when justice so requires.”). The Court notes that the operative complaint is still the original 

complaint filed in this action. Dkt. 1. However, the Court now reviews Plaintiff’s motion for 

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leave to amend his claim against Defendants Espinoza and Tootell below. 

In his motion for leave to amend his claim against Defendants Espinoza and Tootell, 

Plaintiff alleges that these Defendants continue to fail to provide him with adequate treatment for 

his back pain. Dkt. 21 at 3. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that he was granted a consultation with a 

specialist named Dr. Wadhwa on October 29, 2015. Id. Plaintiff claims that Dr. Wadhwa had “a 

plan to possibly alleviate this daily pain and suffering [Plaintiff] endure[d].” Id. However, 

Defendants Espinoza and Tootell are “circumventing and delaying [Plaintiff’s] request to move 

forward with Dr. Wadhwa’s plan.” Id. The Court liberally construes these allegations as a claim 

that Defendants Espinoza and Tootell further participated in the alleged Eighth Amendment

violation; therefore, it finds that the proposed amended claim states a cognizable deliberate 

indifference claim against these Defendants. Because the proposed amended claim properly states 

a cognizable deliberate indifference claim against Defendants Espinoza and Tootell, Plaintiff’s 

motion for leave to amend his claim against these Defendants is GRANTED. Dkt. 21. 

II. MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Plaintiff has filed a motion for appointment of counsel to represent him in this action. Dkt. 

19. There is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case unless an indigent litigant may lose 

his physical liberty if he loses the litigation. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 

(1981); Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997) (no constitutional right to counsel 

in § 1983 action), withdrawn in part on other grounds on reh’g en banc, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 

1998) (en banc). The court may ask counsel to represent an indigent litigant under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915 only in “exceptional circumstances,” the determination of which requires an evaluation of 

both (1) the likelihood of success on the merits, and (2) the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his 

claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. See id. at 1525; Terrell v. 

Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th 

Cir. 1986). Both of these factors must be viewed together before reaching a decision on a request 

for counsel under section 1915. See id. 

The Court is unable to assess at this time whether exceptional circumstances exist which 

would warrant seeking volunteer counsel to accept a pro bono appointment. The proceedings are 

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at an early stage and it is premature for the Court to determine Plaintiff’s likelihood of success on 

the merits. Moreover, Plaintiff has been able to articulate his claims adequately pro se in light of 

the complexity of the issues involved. See Agyeman v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 

(9th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, the request for appointment of counsel is DENIED without 

prejudice. This does not mean, however, that the Court will not consider appointment of counsel 

at a later juncture in the proceedings; that is, after Defendants have filed their dispositive motion 

such that the Court will be in a better position to consider the procedural and substantive matters at 

issue. Therefore, Plaintiff may file a renewed motion for the appointment of counsel after 

Defendants’ dispositive motion has been filed. If the Court decides that appointment of counsel is 

warranted at that time, it will seek volunteer counsel to agree to represent Plaintiff pro bono.

III. REQUEST FOR A COURT ORDER TO SERVE A SUBPOENAS DUCES TECUM

Finally, Plaintiff moves for a Court order to serve a subpoenas duces tecum on a non-party. 

Dkt. 26. The Court cannot compel non-parties to provide Plaintiff with information. However, 

Plaintiff may compel a person who is not a party to this action to produce documents for 

inspection and copying pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(c), 45(a). In 

order to do so, Plaintiff must fill out the subpoena forms provided by the Clerk of the Court and 

must ensure that each person is served with the subpoena by a non-party. Plaintiff must tender to 

each person “the fees for one day’s attendance and the mileage allowed by law.” Fed R. Civ. P. 

45(b)(1). The current requisite fee for each person is forty dollars per day, see 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1821(b), and cannot be waived for a Plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis. See Dixon v. Ylst, 

990 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1993). These requirements do not apply to a request for production of 

documents from one party on any other party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a). Accordingly, at this 

time, Plaintiff’s request is DENIED as premature. Dkt. 26. The Court will consider ordering the 

United States Marshal to serve a subpoena duces tecum on a non-party if Plaintiff submits to the 

Court a completed subpoena form and the requisite fee. The form must describe the items to be 

produced with reasonable particularity and designate a reasonable time, place and manner for their 

production. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b). The Clerk is instructed to send Plaintiff a blank subpoena 

form along with Plaintiff’s copy of this Order.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s “Motion for Amended Complaint,” which has been construed as his 

motion for leave to amend his deliberate indifference claim against Defendants Espinoza and 

Tootell, is GRANTED. Dkt. 21. The Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s new allegations as a 

claim that Defendants Espinoza and Tootell further participated in the alleged Eighth Amendment 

violation; therefore, it finds that the proposed amended claim states a cognizable deliberate 

indifference claim against these Defendants. Defendants Espinoza and Tootell shall file a motion 

for summary judgment or other dispositive motion with respect to the aforementioned cognizable 

claim. The parties shall follow the same briefing schedule already in place pursuant to the filing 

of dispositive motions in this matter as stated in the Court’s September 27, 2016 Order.

2. Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED without prejudice. Dkt. 

19.

3. Plaintiff request for a Court order to serve a subpoenas duces tecum on a non-party

is DENIED as premature. Dkt. 26. The Clerk is instructed to send Plaintiff a blank subpoena 

form along with Plaintiff’s copy of this Order.

4. This Order terminates Docket. Nos. 19, 21 and 26.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: ______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Court Judge

October 20, 2016

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