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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

FILED . United States Court of Appca;J 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 0 2 1995 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

JEAN F. TRIGALET and MYRA J. TRIGALET, 

Personal Representatives of the 

Estate of CONSTANCE TRIGALET, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v. 

TERRY YOUNG; DICK CRAWFORD; ROGER 

RANDLE; DREW DIAMOND; ROBERT DICK; 

ROBERT H. GARDNER; T.G. JONES; 

ROBERT N. DICK, OLLIE HARRIS; 

VIC SEAL; ROBERT CHANCE; B.D. GARDNER; 

S.H. EMMONS; M. GOINS; E.E. COMPOS; 

D.L. CHRISTY; JOHN FLEAK; R. PLUNK; 

S. WILLIS; TULSA POLICE DEPARTMENT; 

CITY OF TULSA, 

Defendants, 

and 

M. WARRICK; H.G. STEGE; D. PIERCE, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 94-5006 

(D.C. No. 92-C-368-E) 

(N.D. Okla.) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. NO. 92-C-368-E) 

Submitted on the Briefs: 

David L. Pauling, City Attorney, and Michael C. Romig, Assistant 

City Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma, were on the brief for Defendants/ 

Appellants. 

Jack B. Sellers and Jessie Huff Durham, Jack B. Sellers Law 

Assoc., Inc., Sapulpa, Oklahoma, were on the brief for Plaintiffs/ 

Appellees. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, McKAY, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 94-5006 Document: 01019287644 Date Filed: 05/02/1995 Page: 1 
The personal representatives of Constance Trigalet 

(Trigalets) brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the 

City of Tulsa and three Tulsa police officers. The decedent was 

killed when a stolen van, pursued at high speeds by defendant 

officers, ran a red light and struck the vehicle in which she was 

a passenger.l The Trigalets alleged, inter alia, that defendants 

deprived the decedent of her Fourteenth Amendment right to 

substantive due process, and deprived her family of their right to 

intimate familial association. The district court granted summary 

judgment for the City of Tulsa, but denied it to defendant 

officers. The court held that the officers were not entitled to 

qualified immunity on the Trigalets' substantive due process claim 

upon concluding that, at the time of the incident, the law was 

clearly established that the officers' conduct could give rise to 

such a constitutional violation. The officers appeal pursuant to 

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). We reverse.2 

I. 

The decedent was killed on May 6, 1990, when a stolen van 

driven by a thirteen year-old boy struck her vehicle during a 

1 Two other passengers riding in the Trigalet vehicle were 

killed. Lawsuits brought on behalf of these decedents were 

consolidated below and qualified immunity was denied in all three 

cases. Defendant officers have chosen to appeal only in this 

case. 

2 The parties waived oral argument. After examining the briefs 

and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that 

oral argument would not materially assist the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The 

case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 94-5006 Document: 01019287644 Date Filed: 05/02/1995 Page: 2 
high-speed police chase. The pursuit, which took place on a 

Saturday night, began shortly before midnight when officers 

observed two vans traveling together which they suspected were 

stolen. The officers followed the vans while they confirmed that 

one of them was indeed stolen. When the officers activated their 

emergency lights, one of the vans pulled over but the other van 

sped up and fled, pursued by the police. 

During the initial pursuit through a residential area, the 

vehicles reached speeds of 60-65 mph and the van ran at least 

eight stop signs. The officer lost sight of the van, which was 

later observed to be running without headlights. As a second 

officer began pursuit, the chase headed toward three major Tulsa 

intersections. The vehicles reached speeds of up to 80 mph and 

proceeded at a speed in excess of 70 mph across two major 

thoroughfares. Although the van did not slow down at these 

intersections, the traffic lights at the first two happened to be 

green when the vehicles came through. The pursuit continued at 

speeds of 80 mph to the third intersection, where the van ran a 

red light and collided with the vehicle in which the decedent was 

riding. 

The Trigalets alleged that the three defendant officers 

involved in the chase: 1) used unnecessary force in the pursuit, 

thereby denying the decedent her Fourth Amendment right to be free 

from unreasonable seizure; 2) acted with deliberate indifference 

to the rights of innocent bystanders such as decedent, thereby 

3 

Appellate Case: 94-5006 Document: 01019287644 Date Filed: 05/02/1995 Page: 3 
denying her right to due process; and 3) acted with deliberate 

indifference to the rights of the families of these innocent 

bystanders, thereby denying decedent's parents, children, and 

siblings their right to intimate familial association with the 

deceased. 

The district court originally granted summary judgment 

against the Trigalets on all claims against all defendants. Upon 

the Trigalets' motion to reconsider, the court reassessed its 

judgment in light of Medina v. City of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493 (lOth 

Cir. 1992), and other authority. It reaffirmed its dismissal in 

favor of the City of Tulsa, but vacated its judgment in favor of 

the three defendant officers on the claim that their reckless 

conduct denied the decedent substantive due process. The court 

concluded that the officers were not entitled to qualified 

immunity because the law under which defendants actions could form 

the basis of a constitutional claim became clearly established on 

March 1, 1990, when this court rendered its decision in Archuleta 

v. McShan, 897 F.2d 495, 499 (lOth Cir. 1990). Although the 

district court did not specifically reaffirm on reconsideration 

its dismissal of the familial association claim, it impliedly did 

so by explicitly stating that its prior order of dismissal would 

stand except for the claim based on reckless conduct as it relates 

to a due process violation.3 

3 In their response brief on appeal, the Trigalets reassert 

their familial association claim. They did not cross-appeal on 

this issue, however, and we therefore have no jurisdiction to 

consider the district court's grant of summary judgment to 

(continued on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 94-5006 Document: 01019287644 Date Filed: 05/02/1995 Page: 4 
II. 

We turn to defendants' argument that they are entitled to 

qualified immunity with respect to the Trigalets' substantive due 

process claim. 

Once a defendant pleads qualified immunity, the 

plaintiff initially bears a heavy two-part burden. 

First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the 

defendant's actions violated a constitutional or 

statutory right. Second, the plaintiff must show that 

the constitutional or statutory rights the defendant 

allegedly violated were clearly established at the time 

of the conduct at issue .... 

If the plaintiff fails to carry either part of his 

two-part burden, the defendant is entitled to qualified 

immunity. 

Albright v. Rodriguez, No. 94-2108, 1995 WL 170712, at *3-4 (lOth 

Cir. April 7, 1995) (citations omitted). We held in Medina in 1992 

that an officer might be found liable for injury caused by a 

fleeing suspect if the officer "was aware of a known or obvious 

risk that was so great that it was highly probable that serious 

harm would follow and he or she proceeded in conscious and 

unreasonable disregard of the consequences." 960 F.2d at 1496. 

We need not determine whether the facts asserted by the Trigalets 

satisfy this standard, however, because we conclude that the 

standard was not clearly established in May 1990, and the 

Trigalets therefore failed to satisfy the second prong of the twopart test. 

(continued from previous page) 

defendants. In any event, the Trigalets' argument is foreclosed 

by our decision in Trujillo v. Board of Cty. Comm'rs, 768 F.2d 

1186 (lOth Cir. 1985). 

5 

Appellate Case: 94-5006 Document: 01019287644 Date Filed: 05/02/1995 Page: 5 
An official is protected from personal liability unless his 

allegedly unlawful official action was objectively legally 

unreasonable when assessed in light of legal rules that were 

clearly established when the action was taken. See Chapman v. 

Nichols, 989 F.2d 393, 397 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear 

that a reasonable official would understand that what he 

is doing violates that right. This is not to say that 

an official action is protected by qualified immunity 

unless the very action in question has previously been 

held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of 

pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent. 

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (citation omitted) 

(emhasis added) . 

We must therefore ascertain whether it was clearly 

established on May 6, 1990, that reckless conduct could give rise 

to a due process claim under section 1983 and that an officer 

could be liable for injury caused by a fleeing suspect to a member 

of a definable group, as opposed to the public at large. 

"Ordinarily, in order for the law to be clearly established, there 

must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the 

clearly established weight of authority from other courts must 

have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains. 11 Medina, 960 

F.2d at 1498. 

6 

Appellate Case: 94-5006 Document: 01019287644 Date Filed: 05/02/1995 Page: 6 
Turning first to the state of the law on reckless conduct, 

this circuit had clearly held by May 1990 that recklessness could 

form the basis for a due process violation. As we observed in 

Medina, 960 F.2d at 1498, we had so clarified our position in two 

cases decided prior to the events giving rise to this suit. See 

Archuleta, 897 F.2d at 499 (lOth Cir. Mar. 1, 1990); see also 

Harris v. Maynard, 843 F.2d 414, 416 (lOth Cir. 1988) ( 11 wanton or 

obdurate disregard of 11 or 11 deliberate indifference to 11 prisoner's 

Fourteenth Amendment rights violates § 1983). 

We must also ascertain, however, whether it was clearly 

established in May 1990 that a police officer could be liable 

under section 1983 for an injury caused by a third party. More 

specifically, as articulated in Medina, the relevant inquiry is 

whether, under the state of the law, it was clear that an officer 

11 could be liable under section 1983 for an injury caused not by 

the officer but by a suspect being chased by the officer. 11 960 

F.2d at 1498. 

In Medina we concluded it was not clearly established in 1986 

that an officer could be held liable under these circumstances, 

observing that the plaintiff had cited no Tenth Circuit or Supreme 

Court case on point. Id. We have found no opinion decided 

between 1986 and 1990 holding that an officer could be held liable 

under section 1983 to a third party injured as a result of police 

chasing a fleeing felon. Although we recognize that the very 

conduct need not have previously been held unlawful, the Trigalets 

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Appellate Case: 94-5006 Document: 01019287644 Date Filed: 05/02/1995 Page: 7 
have cited no case, nor have we found one, that is sufficiently 

analogous to the facts here to persuade us that the law became 

clearly established before Medina was decided in 1992. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the Trigalets have not satisfied 

their burden with respect to defendants' assertion of qualified 

immunity, and we reverse the district court's determination to the 

contrary. 

The judgment of the district court denying defendants' motion 

for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity is 

REVERSED. 

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