Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00925/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00925-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRENT ANTHONY MCCLANAHAN, 

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

____________________________________

Case No. 1:14-cv-00925-SKO

ORDER AFFIRMING ALJ’S DECISION

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Brent Anthony McClanahan (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision 

of the Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) denying his applications for 

Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits 

pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g); 1381-83. The 

matter is currently before the Court on the parties’ briefs, which were submitted, without oral 

argument, to the Honorable Sheila K. Oberto, United States Magistrate Judge.1

 

1

 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. Magistrate Judge. (Docs. 7; 8.)

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI on May 23, 2011, alleging disability beginning 

on May 13, 2008, caused by a back injury. (Administrative Record (“AR”) 182-92.)

A. Relevant Evidence2

The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s application initially and again on reconsideration; 

consequently, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (See 

AR 12.) A video hearing was held on February 12, 2013, before an ALJ. (AR 33-76.) Plaintiff

was represented by counsel at the hearing. (See AR 12; 33-76.)

1. Testimony of Vocational Expert at the Hearing

At the hearing, the ALJ solicited testimony from a Vocational Expert (“VE”) about 

Plaintiff’s past work and his ability to perform other work. (AR 67-75.) The VE testified 

Plaintiff’s past relevant work was characterized under the Dictionary of Occupational Titles 

(“DOT”) as a teacher’s aide, DOT 249.367-074, which is light, semiskilled3 work with a specific 

vocational preparation level (“SVP”) 4of 3; security, DOT 376.367-018, characterized as light but 

performed as medium or heavy, semiskilled work with an SVP of 4; guard, DOT 372.667-034, 

characterized as light, semiskilled work with an SVP of 3; electrician apprentice, DOT 824.261-

014, characterized as medium, skilled5 work with an SVP of 7; construction laborer, DOT 

862.684-014, characterized as heavy and performed as very heavy, semiskilled work with an SVP 

of 4; and, sales solicitor, DOT 299.357-014, characterized as sedentary, semiskilled work with an 

SVP of 3. (AR 67-69.) 

 

2

 As Plaintiff’s assertion of error is limited to the ALJ's consideration of the VE testimony, and because there is no 

challenge to the ALJ’s RFC finding, only evidence relevant to this single argument is set forth below.

3

 By regulation, semi-skilled work is defined as that “which needs some skills but does not require doing the more 

complex work duties . . . .” 20 C.F.R § 404.1568(b). 

4

 Specific Vocational Preparation, as defined in DOT, App. C, is the amount of lapsed time required by a typical 

worker to learn the techniques, acquire the information, and develop the facility needed for average performance in a 

specific job-worker situation. DOT, Appendix C – Components of the Definition Trailer, 1991 WL 688702 (1991). 

Jobs in the DOT are assigned SVP levels ranging from 1 (the lowest level – “short demonstration only”) to 9 (the 

highest level – over 10 years of preparation). Id. 

5

 By regulation, skilled work is defined as that “in which a person uses judgment to determine the machine and 

manual operations to be performed in order to obtain the proper form, quality, or quantity of material to be produced 

. . . . [and] may require dealing with people, facts, or figures or abstract ideas at a high level of complexity.” 

20 C.F.R. § 4047.1568(c). 

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The ALJ then posed a series of hypotheticals for the VE to consider. The ALJ asked the 

VE to consider a person of the same 

age, education, and past work, who is able to lift and carry 10 pounds – up to 10 

pounds, can sit for six hours in an eight-hour day, stand/walk for two hours in an 

eight-hour day, with the need for a cane for extended walking. The individual 

would need to . . . alternate s[itt]ing/standing ever[y] 30 minutes. Can occasionally 

climb ramps and stairs. Can never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds. Is limited to 

occasional balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl and cannot work around hazards, to 

include heights. 

(AR 69.) The VE testified that such a person could perform Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a 

sales solicitor, but could not perform any of Plaintiff’s other past relevant work. (AR 70.) 

Because it was unclear whether Plaintiff’s part-time, temporary work as a sales solicitor 

could be considered substantial, gainful employment, the ALJ asked the VE whether there were 

other jobs in the economy which such a person could perform. (AR 70-71.) The VE testified that 

such a person could perform representative occupations such as an order clerk, DOT 209.567-014, 

characterized as sedentary, unskilled work with an SVP of 2; clerk, DOT 249.587-014, 

characterized as sedentary, unskilled work with an SVP of 2; and assembler, DOT 734.687-018, 

characterized as sedentary, unskilled work with an SVP of 2. 

The ALJ asked the VE if his testimony was consistent with the DOT, and the VE stated 

that his testimony would be consistent with the DOT and that in his experience as a rehabilitation 

practitioner, “every 30 minutes with the alternating stand/sit [option] would be realistic for the 

jobs I gave you and the numbers.” (AR 72.) 

2. The ALJ’s Decision 

On March 21, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision, finding Plaintiff not disabled since May 13, 

2008. (AR 21-27.) The ALJ found Plaintiff had severe impairments including displaced disc with 

foraminal canal stenosis and foraminal encroachment lumbar spine; bilateral discectomy and 

foraminotomies two levels; bilateral foraminotomies two other levels, symptomatic lumbar 

stenosis, L2-3, with herniated disc, status post bilateral hemilaminectomy via left side approach 

with decompression of nerve roots, partial facetectomy, foraminotomy, and excision of herniated 

intervertebral disc; cauda equine syndrome; left radiculopathy, lumbar spine; post laminectomy 

syndrome; impotence and urinary and bowel sphincter dysfunction; and morbid obesity. (AR 14.) 

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The ALJ also found Plaintiff had non-severe impairments including hypertension, asthma, sleep 

disorder, and bipolar disorder. (AR 14.) 

The ALJ then determined that Plaintiff’s impairments, singly and in combination, did not 

meet or equal a listed impairment. (AR 15-16.) The ALJ found Plaintiff retained the residual 

functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform 

sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except lift and 

carry up to 10 pounds; sit 6 hours out of 8 hours; stand and walk 2 hours out of 8 

hours with can for extended walking; alternate sitting and standing every 30 

minutes; occasional ramps and stairs, never ladders, ropes or scaffolds, 

occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl; no exposure to hazards, including 

heights. 

(AR 16.) 

Given this RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant work. 

(AR 21-22.) The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was capable of performing other work, and listed 

representative occupations of order clerk, DOT 209.567-014, clerk, DOT 249.587-014, and 

assembler, DOT 734.687-018. The ALJ determined that the VE’s testimony was consistent with 

the DOT and noted that, because the DOT does not discuss a sit/stand option, the VE’s testimony 

had been based upon both the DOT and the VE’s years of experience as a vocational expert. 

(AR 22-23.) The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled, as defined in the Social Security 

Act, from May 13, 2008, the alleged onset date, through the date of the decision. (AR 23.) 

Plaintiff sought review by the Appeals Council on April 10, 2013. (AR 7-8.) The Appeals 

Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on April 22, 2014. (AR 1-6.) Therefore, the ALJ’s

decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.

C. Plaintiff’s Argument on Appeal

On June 14, 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint before this Court seeking review of the ALJ’s 

decision. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by accepting the VE’s testimony which 

conflicts with the DOT. (Doc. 10, pp. 5-7.) As such, Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred in concluding 

Plaintiff could return to his past relevant work at Step Four or could perform the alternative work 

identified at Step Five.

//

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III. SCOPE OF REVIEW

The ALJ’s decision denying benefits “will be disturbed only if that decision is not 

supported by substantial evidence or it is based upon legal error.” Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 

601 (9th Cir. 1999). In reviewing the Commissioner’s decision, the Court may not substitute its 

judgment for that of the Commissioner. Macri v. Chater, 93 F.3d 540, 543 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Instead, the Court must determine whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards 

and whether substantial evidence exists in the record to support the Commissioner’s findings. See 

Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007).

“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Ryan v. 

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). “Substantial evidence” means “such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 

305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The Court “must consider the entire record as a whole, weighing both 

the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion, and 

may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Lingenfelter v. 

Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

IV. APPLICABLE LAW

An individual is considered disabled for purposes of disability benefits if he is unable to 

engage in any substantial, gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 

mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted, or can be expected to 

last, for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 

1382c(a)(3) (A); see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 23 (2003). The impairment or 

impairments must result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities that are 

demonstrable by medically accepted clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and must be of 

such severity that the claimant is not only unable to do his previous work, but cannot, considering 

his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial, gainful work that 

exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)-(3), 1382c(a)(3)(B), (D).

//

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The regulations provide that the ALJ must undertake a specific five-step sequential 

analysis in the process of evaluating a disability. In Step 1, the ALJ must determine whether the 

claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 

416.920(b). If not, the ALJ must determine at Step 2 whether the claimant has a severe 

impairment or a combination of impairments significantly limiting her from performing basic 

work activities. Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If so, the ALJ moves to Step 3 and determines 

whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments that meet or equal 

the requirements of the Listing of Impairments (“Listing”), 20 § 404, Subpart P, App. 1, and is 

therefore presumptively disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If not, at Step 4 the ALJ must 

determine whether the claimant has sufficient RFC despite the impairment or various limitations 

to perform her past work. Id. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If not, at Step 5, the burden shifts to the 

Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers 

in the national economy. Id. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If a claimant is found to be disabled or 

not disabled at any step in the sequence, there is no need to consider subsequent steps. Tackett v. 

Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

V. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends the jobs identified by the VE do not contain a sit/stand option indicating 

a worker would be able to alternate positions every 30 minutes to stretch, despite that the ALJ 

determined Plaintiff required such an option. Because the DOT does not address the availability 

of a sit/stand option, Plaintiff asserts the VE’s testimony that Plaintiff could perform the 

requirements of certain occupations created an apparent conflict with the DOT. Plaintiff asserts 

the ALJ failed to inquire and the VE failed to provide an explanation as to whether or not the VE’s 

testimony was consistent with the DOT, as is required by Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 00-4p. 

(See Doc. 10, pp. 4-9.) The Commissioner responds that because the ALJ solicited, and the VE 

provided, “a reasonable explanation for his testimony” that Plaintiff could perform a significant 

number of alternative occupations, Plaintiff’s argument is without merit and the Court should 

affirm the ALJ’s decision. (See Doc. 13, pp. 2-4.) 

//

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At Step Four, the ALJ must determine whether a claimant's RFC allows him to return to 

his past relevant work. Lester v, Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995); 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). Plaintiff has the burden of establishing he cannot “return to his former type 

of work and not just to his former job.” Villa v. Heckler, 797 F.2d 794, 798 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Nonetheless, the ALJ is required to make sufficient findings of fact regarding the claimant's RFC, 

the physical and mental demands of the past relevant work, and whether the claimant can return to 

past relevant work “either as actually performed or as generally performed in the national

economy.” Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844-45 (9th Cir. 2001). 

In determining whether appropriate jobs exist for the claimant, the ALJ generally will refer 

to the DOT. Light v. Social Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 1997); SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 

1898704 (“In making disability determinations, we rely primarily on the DOT (including its 

companion publication, the SCO) for information about the requirements of work in the national 

economy.”). In addition to the DOT, the ALJ may rely on the testimony of vocational experts 

who testify about specific occupations that a claimant can perform in light of his RFC. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1560(b)(2); Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 2009). 

In making disability determinations, the ALJ may rely on VE testimony that contradicts 

the DOT, but only insofar as the record contains persuasive evidence to support the deviation. 

Light, 119 F.3d at 793; Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995); Massachi v. 

Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2007). Although evidence provided by a VE “generally 

should be consistent” with the DOT, “[n]either the DOT nor the VE . . . evidence automatically 

‘trumps’ when there is a conflict.” SSR 00-4p at *2.

6

 Thus, the ALJ must first determine whether 

 

6

 SSR 00-4p provides the following guidance regarding occupational evidence from a VE in relation to information 

included in the DOT:

Occupational evidence provided by a VE or VS [vocational specialist] generally should be 

consistent with the occupational information supplied by the DOT. When there is an apparent 

unresolved conflict between the VE or VS evidence and the DOT, the adjudicator must elicit a 

reasonable explanation for the conflict before relying on the VE or VS evidence to support a 

determination or decision about whether the claimant is disabled. At the hearings level, as part of 

the adjudicator's duty to fully develop the record, the adjudicator will inquire, on the record, as to 

whether or not there is such consistency. Neither the DOT nor the VE or VS evidence 

automatically “trumps” when there is a conflict. The adjudicator must resolve the conflict by 

determining if the explanation given by the VE or VS is reasonable and provides a basis for 

relying on the VE or VS testimony rather than on the DOT information.

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a conflict exists, and if it does, the ALJ must then determine whether the VE’s explanation for the 

conflict is reasonable and whether a basis exists for relying on the expert rather than the DOT. Id.

at *2-3. Only after determining whether the VE has deviated from the DOT, and whether any 

deviation is reasonable, can an ALJ properly rely on the VE’s testimony as substantial evidence to 

support a disability determination. Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1152-54. Evidence sufficient to support 

a deviation from the DOT may be either specific findings of fact regarding Plaintiff’s ability to 

perform particular jobs, see Johnson, 60 F.3d at 1435 n.7, inferences drawn from the context of 

the expert’s testimony, see Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1990), or the VE’s 

“own labor market surveys, experience, and research,” see Buckner-Larking v. Astrue, 450 Fed. 

Appx. 626, 628-29 (9th Cir. 2011). 

In Massachi, the Ninth Circuit held that an ALJ has an affirmative responsibility to ask the 

VE whether the VE’s testimony conflicts with the information in the DOT. 486 F.3d at 1153. 

Here, contrary to Plaintiff’s representation, during the hearing the ALJ explicitly inquired as to 

whether the VE’s testimony was consistent with the DOT:

Q Is your testimony consistent with the DOT? 

A Yes, Judge.

(AR 72.) The VE then elaborated that his testimony as to the availability of work with a sit/stand 

option sufficient to address the ALJ’s restrictions on Plaintiff’s RFC, was based upon his 

professional experience: 

A The stand and sit is I’ve been a rehabilitation practitioner for over 30 years 

and every 30 minutes with the alternating stand/sit would be realistic for the jobs I 

gave you and the numbers. 

(AR 72.) 

Under Massachi, the ALJ is further required to determine whether the VE’s explanation for 

any conflict with the DOT is reasonable and whether a basis exists for relying on the VE rather 

than the DOT. 486 F.3d at 1153. Here, contrary to Plaintiff’s representation, the ALJ explained 

in his decision that

//

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. . . Pursuant to SSR 00-4p, I have determined that the [VE]’s testimony is 

consistent with the information contained in the [DOT]. The [VE] testified that 

he based his decision on the [DOT] and his many years of experience as a [VE], 

noting that the DOT does not discuss a sit/stand option.

(AR 23.) The Court finds that the VE provided a reasonable explanation for any conflict with the 

DOT. Buckner-Larkin, 450 Fed. Appx. at 628-29 (holding that the VE’s testimony, “based on his 

own labor market surveys, experience, and research” sufficiently explained any conflict between 

the DOT and his testimony). The VE identified an apparent conflict between the DOT and his 

testimony – that the DOT does not discuss a sit/stand option – and explained why, based on his 

professional experience, in his opinion Plaintiff could still perform the requirements of the 

identified occupations. (See AR 23; 72.) 

Plaintiff contends that any deviation from the DOT by the VE must be based upon the 

VE’s own labor market surveys, experience, and research. (See Doc. 6-8.) “While this is true in 

an abstract sense, there is no requirement that the ALJ require the VE to establish this foundation 

for his or her expert testimony in the hearing before the ALJ.” Devore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

No. 1:14-cv-00663-SAB, 2015 WL 3756328, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 16, 2015). See also Bayliss, 

427 F.3d at 1218 n.4 (noting that Federal Rule of Evidence 702’s requirements regarding the 

admissibility of expert testimony do not apply to the admission of evidence in Social Security 

administrative proceedings). It is well-established in this Circuit that “[a] VE’s recognized 

expertise provides the necessary foundation for his or her testimony.” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 

F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the ALJ’s failure to elicit foundational testimony 

from the VE explaining the specific research and experience which led to the VE’s conclusions 

regarding the sit/stand option did not constitute error. Devore, 2015 WL 3756328, at *4. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in relying on the VE’s testimony that 

Plaintiff could perform the requirements of the identified occupations subject to a sit/stand option.

VI. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial 

evidence in the record as a whole and based on proper legal standards. Accordingly, the Court 

DENIES Plaintiff’s appeal from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social 

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Security. The Clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Carolyn 

W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security and against Plaintiff Brent Anthony 

McClanahan. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 27, 2015 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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