Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00784/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00784-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Arnoldo Zazueta-Miranda,

Movant/Defendant

-vsUnited States of America,

Respondent/Plaintiff.

CV-14-0784-PHX-NVW (JFM)

CR-09-1509-PHX-NVW

Report & Recommendation 

on Motion to Vacate, Set Aside 

or Correct Sentence

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Movant, following his conviction in the United States District Court for the 

District of Arizona, filed through counsel a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct 

Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on April 14, 2014 (Doc. 1). On September 5, 

2014 Respondent filed its Response (Doc. 8). Movant has not filed a Reply.

The Movant's Motion is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 10, Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases , Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In its un-traversed Response, Respondent summarizes the factual background as 

follows:

Through surveillance and federal wiretaps, Drug 

Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents determined that 

Defendant, also known as “Lolo” was a leader of a drug trafficking 

organization (DTO) which was supplying other DTOs with various 

controlled substances. The Zazueta-Miranda DTO obtained 

controlled substances including methamphetamine and cocaine from 

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Mexico, store[d] the drugs in stash houses in Phoenix, Arizona, and 

then distribute[d] the drugs to other DTOs in the United States. The 

Zazueta-Miranda DTO also employed money couriers to transport 

drug proceeds. In early May 2009, intercepted calls led agents to 

believe that a money transaction involving narcotics proceeds was 

going to occur. Agents conducted surveillance of a ZazuetaMiranda DTO stash house, observed co-defendant Rolina Jaramillo 

leave driving a DTO vehicle, and conducted a traffic stop. A search

of the vehicle revealed almost $378,000.00 in U.S. currency hidden 

in the vehicle. Once released by officers, Jaramillo called Defendant 

to advise him of the seizure. 

Through the investigation, agents determined that in 

approximately September of 2009, co-defendant Misael BeltranCital took over the leadership responsibilities of the DTO while 

Defendant was in Mexico. In November of 2009, through 

surveillance and wire interceptions, agents determined that 

Defendant had returned from Mexico and was arranging drug 

transactions with co-defendant Marcela Benitez-Salcido. Agents 

conducted surveillance during one drug deal between Defendant and 

Marcela, including following Defendant to Marcela’s stash house, 

where he was seen parking in the garage. Agents observed

Defendant leave, and later that afternoon, the vehicle believed to be 

used by Marcela’s drug customer, co-defendant Barrington 

Bowford, was seen leaving the stash house. Officers stopped 

Bowford, and seized 10.98 kilograms of cocaine from him. 

On many occasions, wiretap interceptions revealed 

Defendant relaying instructions to individuals involved in his DTO, 

such as co-defendant Jose Simental-Moreno, in addition to 

conversations in which Defendant organized or arranged narcotics

transactions. Through various traffic stops and search warrant

executions, agents seized a total of 73.31 kilograms of cocaine, 6.92 

kilograms of actual methamphetamine, 1 kilogram of heroin, and 

0.05 kilograms of crack cocaine, as well as U.S. currency, drug 

ledgers, and digital scales. Furthermore, a search of one of the stash 

houses from which Defendant had just emerged, resulted in the 

seizure of two handguns, both determined to be in Defendant’s 

possession, in addition to the kilograms of cocaine, 

methamphetamine, crack cocaine, drug ledgers, and cash mentioned 

above. 

(Response, Doc. 8 at 4-5.) See 28 U.S.C. § 2248 (“The allegations of a return to the writ 

of habeas corpus or of an answer to an order to show cause in a habeas corpus 

proceeding, if not traversed, shall be accepted as true except to the extent that the judge 

finds from the evidence that they are not true.”)

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

In an Indictment (CR Doc. 3) issued December 8, 2009, the Grand Jury for the 

District of Arizona indicted Movant and seven others in a six count indictment charing 

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various drug trafficking related offenses. (Documents filed in the underlying criminal 

case, CR-09-1509-PHX-NVW, are referenced herein as “CR Doc. ___.”) In particular, 

Movant was charged with:

1. Count 1, conspiracy to Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute 

Controlled Substances;

2. Count 2, Conspiracy to Import a Controlled Substance;

3. Count 3, Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering;

4. Count 4 and 6, Possession with Intent to Distribute Cocaine; 

Movant retained attorney Saji Vettiyil (CR Doc. 15, Notice of Appearance), but 

three months later substituted attorney Herman Alcantar Jr. (CR Doc. 72, Order 3/19/10; 

Exhibit A, Alcantar Affidavit at 1.) 

In a letter dated April 16, 2010, the Government tendered a plea offer to Movant. 

Any opportunity to improve upon the offer was conditioned upon Movant’s cooperation 

with the government. In particular, the Government sought information from Movant to 

support his contentions that Movant’s brother, Israel Zazueta-Miranda, and co-defendant 

Simental-Moreno, were the true leaders of the drug trafficking organization. However, 

Movant refused to provide any information against his brother. The plea offer was not 

accepted. (Exhibit A, Alcantar Affidavit at 2.) 

In a letter dated August 24, 2010, the Government extended the same offer to 

allow Movant to plead guilty to Count 1 with various sentencing stipulations including 

his role as a leader and possession of a firearm, with a sentencing range of 262 to 405 

months. (Exhibit A, Alcantar Affidavit at 3 and Exhibit A thereto.) Counsel reviewed 

the plea agreement and evidence with Movant, and advised Movant of the likely 

sentencing range. Movant refused to agree to the sentencing stipulations. (Exhibit A, 

Alcantar Affidavit at 4.) Counsel also advised Movant that his expected sentence at 

trial, even if convicted on all charges, was 180 to 240 months, less than the lowest 

possible under the plea agreement offered by the Government. (Id. at 5-6.) 

The court set a change of plea hearing for Movant on October 12, 2010, but 

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Movant advised the Court that he had learned additional information and would not be 

entering a plea. Movant was advised by the Government that the plea offer extended to 

him had expired. (CR Doc. 151, M.E. 10/12/10.)

On October 20, 2010, a Superseding Indictment (CR Doc. 157) was issued 

naming Movant and four of the other original indictees, plus two new indictees. Movant 

was charged with the original offenses, plus new charges for possession with intent to 

distribute (Count 7) and a weapons charge (Count 8). In total, Movant was charged 

with: 

1. Count 1, Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute Controlled 

Substances;

2. Count 2, Conspiracy to Import a Controlled Substance;

3. Count 3, Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering;

4. Count 4 and 6, Possession with Intent to Distribute Cocaine;

5. Count 7, Possession with Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance; and 

6. Count 8, Possession of a Firearm in Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking 

Offense.

On December 7, 2010, Movant and one other defendant, Mario Benitez, 

proceeded to trial. On the first day of trial, the Government dismissed Count 4 of the 

Superseding Indictment. (CR Doc. 202, M.E. 12/7/10.) After a six day jury trial, Movant 

was found guilty of the remaining charges against him. (CR Doc. 219, M.E. 12/16/10; 

CR Doc. 228, Special Jury Verdict.) 

On August 25, 2011, the Court sentenced Movant to a total of a 240-month term 

of imprisonment followed by 5 years on supervised release. (CR Doc. 293, M.E. 

8/25/11; CR Doc. 295, Judgment.) 

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Movant filed a direct appeal. (CR Doc. 296, Notice of Appeal.) Movant argued: 

(1) there was insufficient evidence to support the firearm charge; and (2) the sentence 

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was unreasonable. The Ninth Circuit rejected those arguments and affirmed. (CR Doc. 

342, Mem. Dec.) 

Movant filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the United States Supreme 

Court, which was denied on April 15, 2013. (Exhibit D). 

D. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Motion - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing through counsel the 

instant Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

on April 14, 2014 (Doc. 1). Movant’s Motion asserts the following two grounds for 

relief: “(1) his trial counsel erroneously informed him that his sentencing would be the

same if he pleaded guilty or went to trial and (2) his trial counsel failed to prepare and

effectively present testimony or evidence at the end of the government’s case to rebut the

mistaken identity of the leader of the drug organization.” (Order 5/21/14, Doc. 5 at 2.) 

Movant requests an evidentiary hearing to support his contentions.

Response – On September 5, 2014, Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”) 

(Doc. 8). Respondents argue that the claims are without merit.

Reply – In its Service Order, the Court provided: “Movant may file a reply within 

30 days from the date of service of the answer to the § 2255 Motion.” (Order 5/21/14, 

Doc. 5 at 2.) That time has long passed and Movant has not filed a reply.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. GROUND 1 – INEFFECTIVENESS RE SENTENCING ADVICE

In his Ground 1, Movant contends that upon receipt of the Government’s letter of 

August 24, 2010, counsel Alcantar failed to provide the letter to Movant or advise him of 

its contents, and informed Movant that his sentence would be the same if he plead guilty 

pursuant to a plea agreement as it would be if he lost at trial. Movant contends that 

counsel failed to inform him of the potential for a three level downward adjustment for 

acceptance of responsibility, or of the mandatory 60 month consecutive term on the 

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weapons charge. Movant contends that as a result of the rejection of the plea offer, the 

government filed its Superseding Indictment. (Motion, Doc. 1 at 6.) Thus, Movant 

concludes that as a result of counsel’s deficient advice, he proceeded to trial and risked 

exposure to a life sentence and lost the opportunity for a sentencing adjustment for 

acceptance of responsibility. (Id. at 8.) 

In response, the Government argues that the advice by counsel was correct, both 

as to: (1) the advice that Movant’s exposure at trial for a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 

846 being 120 months to life regardless whether he pled guilty or went to trial; and (2) 

the prediction that his sentencing range at trial was 180 to 240 months. Respondent

further argues that counsel advised Movant as to the potential for a reduction for 

acceptance of responsibility, the potential for the addition of the weapons charge, and 

reviewed the plea offer with him. Respondent argues that the actual sentence at trial was 

better than the best likely under the proffered plea agreement. (Response, Doc. 8 at 6-

10.)

Applicable Standard - Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are 

analyzed pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail 

on such a claim, a defendant must show: (1) deficient performance - counsel’s 

representation fell below the objective standard for reasonableness; and (2) prejudice -

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 

the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 687-88. Although the defendant must 

prove both elements, a court may reject his claim upon finding either that counsel's 

performance was reasonable or that the claimed error was not prejudicial. Id. at 697.

The court hearing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must consider the 

totality of the evidence with an eye toward the ultimate issue of whether counsel’s 

conduct so undermined the functioning of the adversarial process that the proceeding 

lacked fundamental fairness. Id. at 686; Card v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 1494 (11th Cir. 

1990)(observing that counsel cannot be labeled ineffective for failing to raise issues 

which have no merit); Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir.1985) (failing to 

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raise meritless argument on appeal does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel).

In the context of allegations that counsel was ineffective in advising on a plea 

offer, which is ultimately rejected, “a defendant must show that but for the ineffective 

advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been 

presented to the court (i.e., that the defendant would have accepted the plea and the 

prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances), that the 

court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under 

the offer's terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that 

in fact were imposed.” Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385 (2012)

The focus regarding prejudice in such circumstances remains on the effect of the 

asserted deficiency on the ultimate outcome.

To show prejudice from ineffective assistance of counsel where a 

plea offer has lapsed or been rejected because of counsel's deficient 

performance, defendants must demonstrate a reasonable probability 

they would have accepted the earlier plea offer had they been 

afforded effective assistance of counsel....To establish prejudice in 

this instance, it is necessary to show a reasonable probability that 

the end result of the criminal process would have been more 

favorable by reason of a plea to a lesser charge or a sentence of less 

prison time.

Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1409 (2012).

Deficient Performance – Movant points to four failures as deficient 

performance: (1) failure to communicate offer; (2) improper advice on consequences 

under plea or at trial; (3) failure to communicate potential for downward adjustment for 

acceptance of responsibility; and (4) failure to communicate mandatory sentence on 

weapons charge.

Communication of Offer – Movant alleges counsel failed to deliver the August 

24, 2010 offer or to communicate it to Plaintiff. Movant proffers nothing to support this 

contention other than his current counsel’s avowals as to the bare allegations of the 

Motion. 

Respondent provides the affidavit of attorney Alcantar avowing that he 

communicated the plea offer to Movant “on September 15, 2010, October 1, 2010, 

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October 8, 2010, and finally October 11, 2011 at Central Arizona Detention Center.” 

(Exhibit A, Alcantar Affid. at 2-3.)

On each occasion I spent at least 1 hour reviewing in Spanish the 

terms of the entire plea agreement. I am a fluent Spanish speaker 

and was able to converse directly with Mr. Zazueta-Miranda in his 

native Spanish language. I further did not perceive any issues with 

his comprehension of my language or the subject matter we

discussed. I read the entire plea agreement in Spanish to the 

defendant and discussed its contents with him.

(Id. at 3.) Trial counsel further details the specific contents of those discussions, and 

Movant’s reactions, including Movant’s objection to the provisos for stipulations to his 

leadership role and the firearm. (Id. at 3-4.) 

Movant makes no effort to counter those avowals. 

Movant does request an evidentiary hearing to support his claims. However, the 

Ninth Circuit has recognized that even when credibility is at issue, no evidentiary 

hearing is required if it can be " 'conclusively decided on the basis of documentary 

testimony and evidence in the record.' " Shah v. U.S., 878 F.2d, 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 

1989) (quoting United States v. Espinoza, 866 F.2d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir.1989)). The 

court may deny a hearing if the movant's allegations, viewed against the record, fail to 

state a claim for relief or "are so palpably incredible or patently frivolous as to warrant 

summary dismissal." United States v. Mejia-Mesa, 153 F.3d 925, 931 (9th Cir.1998). 

The circumstances of the case demonstrate that Movant was aware of the offer 

and its terms. Indeed, Movant’s own allegations indicate that the plea offer was 

communicated to him. Movant alleges that “[t]rial counsel informed Mr. ZazuetaMiranda and family, that it would be the same sentence outcome of 120 months to life in 

prison if he plead guilty pursuant to the plea agreement or lost at trial” (Motion, Doc. 1 

at 6.) 

Further, Movant appeared at the change of plea proceeding on October 12, 2010, 

heard the prosecutor advise the Court that the plea offer was expired, and voiced no 

surprise or objection. (Exhibit E, R.T. 10/12/10.) 

The undersigned finds nothing in the record to show that the written offer itself 

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was delivered to Movant. But, Movant “does not speak, read, or understand English.” 

(Motion, Doc. 1 at 8.). Thus, it is not surprising that counsel would not tender to Movant 

the actual letter, which was written in English. But Movant proffers nothing to show that 

delivery of the letter itself was necessary to communicate the offer, or to permit Movant 

to make an informed decision whether to accept or reject the offer.

To the extent that Movant contends portions of trial counsel’s explanation of the 

terms and their impact on him were in error, those matters are addressed hereinafter. It is 

clear, however, that the plea offer and its terms were communicated to Movant.

Advice on Comparative Sentencing – Movant argues that “[t]rial counsel 

informed Mr. Zazueta-Miranda and family, that it would be the same sentence outcome 

of 120 months to life in prison if he plead guilty pursuant to the plea agreement or lost at 

trial.” (Motion, Doc. 1 at 6.) 

Here, the 120 months to life recalled by Movant reflects trial counsel’s avowal 

that he advised Movant “the statutory minimum sentence on his most serious charge was 

10 years to life.” (Exhibit A, Alcantar Affid. at 3.) Trial counsel further avows that it 

was his habit to review those facts with defendants, and that he further advised Movant 

on the advisory nature of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. (Id.)

In that context, trial counsel did, effectively, communicate that Movant’s 

exposure under the plea or at trial was “120 months to life in prison.” Under the 

applicable law, that was a true proposition.

To the extent that Movant intends to assert that trial counsel asserted not that 120 

to life was his exposure, but the likely outcome, the record refutes such a claim. Trial 

counsel avows that he predicted to Movant that he faced “a sentence of between 180 and 

240 months” if he proceeded to trial. (Exhibit A, Alcantar Affid. at 5-6.) In contrast, 

counsel avows that he estimated Movant’s exposure under the plea agreement to be 262 

to 405 months. (Id. at 4.) Thus, according to counsel, the advice given was that the plea 

offer was not the same as trial, but that it was worse than proceeding to trial. And, in 

fact, the sentencing range proposed in the August 24, 2010 plea offer was a small subset 

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of the 120 months to life recalled by Movant. Thus, an assertion that Movant was left to 

believe that his likely sentence either under the plea and/or at trial was 120 months to 

life, would be palpably incredible. 

Acceptance of Responsibility Adjustment – Movant alleges that “[t]rial counsel 

did not inform Mr. Zazueta-Miranda of the government’s three-level adjustment for 

Acceptance of Responsibility had he taken the plea agreement.” (Motion, Doc. 1 at 6.) 

The undersigned does not understand Movant to assert that he was told of the 

adjustment but it was not adequately explained. Rather, Movant asserts he was not 

informed that such an adjustment was possible. 

Trial counsel avows: “I advised Mr. Zazueta-Miranda that although he would 

receive the three-level adjustment for Acceptance of Responsibility, he would receive a 

2-4 level enhancement as a leader/organizer and 2 levels for use of a firearm in 

furtherance of the drug conspiracy.” (Exhibit A, Alcantar Affid. at 3.) Counsel further 

avows:

I advised Mr. Zazueta-Miranda, as I do all defendants who reject a 

plea offer and proceed to trial, a court cannot punish a defendant for 

exercising his constitutional right to a jury trial. I advised Mr. 

Zazueta-Miranda that although by proceeding to trial he would lose 

the benefit of a recommended 3-level reduction for Acceptance of

Responsibility, this could possibly be offset by Mr. ZazuetaMiranda, through counsel, advising the Court well before trial, he 

was willing to plead guilty to all counts without a plea agreement. 

As stated earlier, this I did at the change of plea proceedings before

Magistrate Judge Burns and in my objections to the PSR.

(Id. at 6.) 

Counsel did raise the argument in his briefings on sentencing, but that was long 

after the plea had been rejected. Moreover, portions of that argument are not reflected 

on the trial court record. Movant argued: 

The only reason the defendant proceeded to trial was the defendant 

could not reach an agreement with the Government regarding his 

role in the DTO and use of a firearm. In fact, on October 6, 2010 

when this case was set for a change of plea before Magistrate Burns, 

the defendant was prepared, and placed on the record, he would 

admit to all charges without the benefit of a plea. The defendant was 

prepared to do so since the existing indictment did not contain the 

count alleging the use of a firearm.

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(CR Doc. Objection to PSR at 5.) The change of plea hearing was actually held on 

October 12, 2010. (CR Doc. 151, M.E. 10/12/10.) No hearing was held on October 6, 

2010, and the only docket entry on that date is a minute order resetting the change of 

plea to October 12. (CR Doc. 148, M.Order 10/6/10.) 

Further, trial counsel did not advise Magistrate Judge Burns on the record that 

Movant was willing to plead guilty to all counts on the record. Rather, he simply 

indicated that “I cannot proceed in terms of the factual basis for the current plea.” 

(Exhibit E, R.T. 10/120/10 at 3.) Still, at sentencing the prosecutor affirmed the 

allegation that Movant was at the time of the change of plea considering a plea to the 

charges.

At that date, based on the contemporaneous notes I took 

during that hearing, it's my recollection that the defendant advised 

that he was considering pleading straight up to all of the charges but 

that he could not enter the plea agreement but has not reviewed 

pleading to each count with the defendant yet.

(CR Doc. 325, R.T. 8/25/11 at 11.)

Moreover, a recommendation for a three level downward departure for acceptance 

of responsibility was essentially the only practical advantage under the plea offer. 

(Although the offer resulted in the dismissal of lesser charges, the likely and eventual 

outcome was that the sentencing on those charges was concurrent to the sentencing on 

Count One.) The record is uncontroverted that counsel Alcantar met with Movant 

repeatedly to review the plea offer, and that Movant had been previously presented with 

not only the August plea offer, but with the April plea offer on the same terms. (Exhibit 

A, Alcantar Affid. at 1-2.) It is all but inconceivable that counsel would have gone to 

such lengths to evaluate a plea offer with Movant without discussing its primary 

advantage.

Moreover, the plea offer explicitly stated: “As part of the plea, the government 

will recommend a three-level adjustment for Acceptance of Responsibility.” (Exhibit A, 

Attachment A, Letter 8/24/10 at 1.) The undersigned has found hereinabove that the 

terms of the plea were communicated to Movant. 

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Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that Movant’s allegation that he 

was not informed of the adjustment is palpably incredible. 

Mandatory Sentencing - Finally, Movant argues that counsel failed to inform him

of the mandatory 60 month consecutive term on the weapons charge. (Motion, Doc. 1 at 

6.) The undersigned does not understand Movant to assert that he was unaware of the 

potential for the weapons charge to be filed, but that he was unaware that the sentence 

was a mandatory 60 months sentence. 

Indeed, the Government’s offer of August 24, 2010 explicitly warned that if the 

offer were rejected, the government would not only allege additional drugs quantities, 

but “would also likely seek an 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) charge for the firearms seized on 

December 8, 2009.” (Exhibit A, Attachment A, Letter 8/24/10 at 1-2.) Moreover, the 

letter forewarned: “Please note that the government will not dismiss any firearms counts 

as a part of any later plea negotiations, which would likely expose your client to a 

mandatory, consecutive term of imprisonment in addition to any sentence on narcotics 

charges.” (Id. at 2.) As discussed hereinabove, the undersigned has concluded that the 

contents of this plea offer were communicated to Movant. Thus, Movant was on this 

basis alone made aware of the potential for not only the charge but a consecutive 

mandatory prison sentence. 

Moreover, counsel avows: “I further advised him of the federal offense of 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c); Possession of a Firearm in Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking Crime. 

We discussed the elements of the offense, the government's discovery substantiating his 

violation of this offense, and the potential penalties, including that those penalties would 

be consecutive to any sentence he received for the violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) [sic].” 

(Exhibit A, Alcantar Affid. at 3.) 

While counsel does not detail what he advised Movant was the applicable penalty 

for the violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the sentencing under that section is 

straightforward, beginning with a minimum of a mandatory five years, and proceeding 

upward to life. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (simple use or carrying of firearm, 5 

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years), 924(c)(1)(C)(ii) (second offense with machine gun, etc., life) and 924(c)(1)(D) 

(always consecutive). Even the most ham-handed review of the penalties under this 

offense would have communicated a minimum of a consecutive 60 month sentence. 

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds palpably incredible Movant’s 

allegation that he was not informed of the mandatory, consecutive, minimum sentence of 

60 months on the weapons charge. 

Summary – Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds palpably incredible 

Movant’s allegations that counsel performed deficiently in communicating with Movant 

concerning the plea offer and its benefits.

Prejudice – Even if the undersigned could find counsel’s performance deficient 

with regard to the plea offer, the undersigned finds no prejudice to Movant as a result.

Here, Movant fails to suggest how his condition was worsened by whatever 

defects he perceives in counsel’s advice. His sentence at trial was 240 months. The 

lowest possible guidelines sentence under the offer of August 24, 2010 was 262 months. 

Movant proffers no reason to believe that his sentence by pleading would have been less 

than 262 months. 

Movant argues that had he pled guilty he would have obtained a downward 

departure for acceptance of responsibility and would have not faced the mandatory 60 

month consecutive sentence on the weapons charge. (Motion, Doc. 1 at 8.) However, 

this argument presumes that the Court would have been inclined to extend the same 

leniency on the limited charges under the plea agreement as was ultimately extended at 

trial. Here, the government argued, in accordance with the Sentencing Guidelines for a 

life sentence. The Court, however, considered that next-to-most-extreme punishment 

inappropriate in this case as a matter of proportionality among co-defendants and with 

other offenses. Thus, the Court departed from the guidelines and imposed a reduced 

sentence of 240 months. (CR Doc. 325, R.T. 8/25/11 at 26-28.) The Court reasoned:

It is a very substantial and significant sentence, but it is short of this 

defendant's estimated life span, so that it gives him some hope of 

release, gives him some reason to try to deal with prison as best he 

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can, and maybe allow him to grow in such a way so that at the 

conclusion of that very lengthy sentence, his life will be different.

(Id. at 27-28.) Moreover, the Court made clear that this sentence was not founded upon 

some discrete calculations of offenses, but upon the Court’s perception of the appropriate 

penalty for Movant’s course of conduct. The Court stated:

For the record, the sentence imposed is 20 years, which under 

federal regimes is 240 months. And in order to achieve that net 

result, we are imposing the following sentences. If for any reason 

any subset of this sentence is set aside or vacated on further review 

or otherwise, then we would like an opportunity to resentence the 

defendant in order to achieve the ultimate goal of a 20-year 

sentence. In the alternative, any reviewing Court could do that on its 

own.

(Id. at 28.) But, the plea offer did not preclude the Court from considering all the 

relevant conduct in sentencing to the limited charge. Moreover, it explicitly required the 

Court to make findings on the only two issues which Movant opposed and on which he 

had a real chance at trial: the leadership role and the weapon.

Movant concludes that as a result of counsel’s deficient advice, he proceeded to 

trial and risked exposure to a life sentence. (Motion, Doc. 1 at 6.) The undersigned is 

unaware of any definition of prejudice which would extend to potential but unrealized 

risks at trial. Indeed, the focus of the prejudice inquiry is to compare what actually 

happened with what could have happened had counsel’s advice been better. Here, 

“better” is purportedly something resulting in a plea. “Actually” is not a life sentence, 

that could have happened but didn’t, but a sentence of 240 months. “An error by 

counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment 

of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.” Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 691. Moreover, even under the plea agreement, Petitioner risked a life sentence. 

10 years to life is the authorized sentence for violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) 

and (viii), as alleged in Count 1, to which Movant was to plea. Nothing in the plea offer 

prevented the Court from sentencing Movant to the maximum statutory penalty. The 

plea offer did “anticpate[]” a sentencing range of 262 to 405 months, but did not restrict 

the Court to that range.” (Exhibit A, Attachment A, Letter 8/24/10 at 1.) 

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Movant points to the addition of the weapons charge as a result of the rejection of 

the plea agreement. It is true that “the defendant who goes to trial instead of taking a 

more favorable plea may be prejudiced from either a conviction on more serious counts

or the imposition of a more severe sentence.” Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1386

(2012) (emphasis added). However, nothing in the plea offer explicitly precluded the 

government from subsequently bringing the weapons charge, even had a plea been

entered pursuant to the offer. At best, the offer intimated to such a preclusion by 

asserting that “the government will not dismiss any firearms counts as a part of any later

plea negotiations.” (Exhibit A, Attachment A, Letter 8/24/10 at 2 (emphasis added).) 

Thus, perhaps the government would have been open to negotiation on this point in the 

drafting of a plea agreement. 

All of this presupposes, however, that Movant would have (had he had all the 

advice he contends he did not receive) actually accepted the offer. It is not enough to 

show that the outcome at trial was worse. Rather, Movant must “demonstrate a 

reasonable probability [he] would have accepted the earlier plea offer had [he] been 

afforded effective assistance of counsel.” Frye, 132 S.Ct. at 1409. The Court must 

assess the circumstances surrounding the case to determine if the Movant’s allegation 

that he would have proceeded in the alternative direction is plausible. See e.g. United 

States v. Keller, 902 F.2d 1391, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1990)(petitioner failed to show 

prejudice because he entered plea as alternative to long trial, possible conviction on more 

serious charges and a longer sentence).

Here, the record establishes that it is more likely that Movant would not have 

accepted the plea offer in any event. Movant had previously rejected the same offer

when it was presented in April, 2010. His persistent position was that he was not a 

leader of the organization, and eventually attempted to shift that role to his brother and 

others, and that he did not effectively possess the weapons found in the stash houses. 

Albeit in this limited fashion, Movant consistently insisted on his innocence. Moreover, 

as discussed hereinabove, the offer provided Movant with minimal real benefit. The 

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foregone charges were likely to be, and ultimately were, the subject of concurrent 

sentences. The uncharged weapons offense did involve a consecutive and mandatory 

sentence. However, counsel had correctly advised Movant that his likely sentencing 

range at trial, even with the additional charge, was no worse than what was part of the 

plea offer, and still Movant did not accept the offer. 

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds no prejudice.

Summary – Movant has failed to allege plausible facts to show that counsel 

performed deficiently with regard to the plea offer, and similarly has failed to show 

prejudice from any such deficiencies. Accordingly, Ground 1 is without merit and 

should be denied. 

B. GROUND TWO – INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE RE LEADERSHIP ROLE

In his Ground Two, Movant argues that trial counsel was ineffective because of 

his failure to adequately show that Movant was not the leader of the drug organization. 

In particular, Movant argues that counsel requested photographs of Movant’s brother and 

told Movant’s wife she would be called to testify at trial that the voice in the 

government’s recordings were not Movant, but his brother. Counsel failed to present the 

photos or to call Movant’s wife to testify. (Motion, Doc. 1 at 6-7.) 

Respondent argues that counsel adequately pursued the line of defense by 

pursuing a voice analysis, and had a reasonable tactical basis to decline to call Movant’s 

wife because she would place Movant in the United States at the relevant times, and thus 

would be more harmful than helpful to the case. Further, the government had obtained 

its own voice analysis determining the voice on the calls to be Movant’s. Respondent 

further argues that counsel vigorously cross-examined the prosecution’s witnesses. 

(Response, Doc. 8 at 10-12.) 

Trial counsel avows that mistaken identity was the only viable complete defense 

at trial, and that Movant’s wife was a viable witness on this issue. However, counsel 

avows that “the danger in having her testify is she would have to admit the defendant 

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stayed in the United States through the fall of 2009...the time frame of the most 

damaging evidence assembled against the defendant.” (Exhibit A, Alcantar Affid. at 5.) 

Moreover, counsel avows that the Government had obtained a voice analysis using 

exemplars of phone calls between Movant and his wife, and the she would have had to 

confirm his identity on those calls. Counsel further avows that he decided to not call 

Movant’s wife after a co-defendant failed to identify Movant “as involved in the DTO 

and evidence linking [Movant] to the firearms, appeared weak.” (Id.) Further, counsel 

saw a tactical advantage to having “the Court and jury see at least [Movant’s] wife was 

present to support him.” (Id.) Counsel further avows that Movant agreed with the 

determination. (Id.)

Deficient Performance – Movant suggests two different bases for deficient 

performance: (1) the failure to pursue a mistaken identity defense at trial to challenge his 

leadership role; and (2) failure to call Movant’s wife at trial. 

Mistaken Identity Defense – Movant argues that counsel announced an intent to 

raise a defense of mistaken identity at trial as to the leader of the DTO, but failed to 

adequately prepare or present the defense at trial. 

A failure to investigate a meritorious defense may constitute ineffective assistance 

of counsel. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). However, a defendant may not 

leave a court to speculate what evidence the deficient investigation would have 

discovered. In order to prevail on an allegation that defense counsel conducted an 

insufficient investigation resulting in ineffective assistance, the defendant must show 

specifically what that investigation would have produced. For example, a defendant

ordinarily may not simply speculate about what a witness’ testimony might have been, 

but must adduce evidence to show what it would have been. Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 

F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir. 1997). “[E]vidence about the testimony of a putative witness 

must generally be presented in the form of actual testimony by the witness or on 

affidavit. A defendant cannot simply state that the testimony would have been favorable; 

self-serving speculation will not sustain an ineffective assistance claim.” U.S. v. Ashimi, 

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932 F.2d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 1991).

Here, Movant identifies only two pieces of evidence to support the claim, a 

photograph of his brother and the testimony of his wife. The latter is addressed 

hereinafter. 

Trial counsel makes the following avowals identifying the evidence to support a 

mistaken identity defense:

According to Mr. Zazueta-Miranda, Israel Zazueta-Miranda 

and co-defendant Roberto Simental-Moreno were the 

leader/organizers of the DTO; not the defendant. Israel and Roberto 

knew each other and each other's family in Mexico. Mr. ZazuetaMiranda worked with his brother's DTO occasionally in 2009 under

Simental-Moreno when the defendant was in Phoenix and his 

brother Israel, was in Mexico. According to Mr. Zazueta-Miranda, 

when he worked with the DTO, he never used or possessed any 

weapons nor did he know of anyone in the DTO using or possessing 

any weapons in connection with the DTO.

The defendant only worked with the DTO to help his brother 

and earn extra money. Mr. Zazueta-Miranda stated many of the 

intercepted phone calls; particularly calls in March and April 2009 

were made by his brother, not the defendant. According to the 

defendant's wife, Brissa, the defendant and his brother look and 

sound similar. Brissa also provided me with a photo of the 

defendant's brother, Israel as a possible trial exhibit.

The defendant had legitimate employment as a mason in 

Mexico and would travel into the United States to buy construction 

materials. Sometimes the defendant came into the United States 

with his wife, Brissa and their three children. Brissa provided me 

with receipts for construction material and travel documents into the 

United States.

(Exhibit A, Alcantar Affid. at 2.) 

Counsel avows that he reviewed all of the Government’s discovery and evidence, 

determined that the evidence confirmed Movant’s presence at the stash houses, travelled 

to San Luis Mexico and interviewed Movant’s family, including his brother, Israel 

Zazueta-Miranda, and took steps to retain a voice analysis expert to distance Movant 

from the intercepted calls. (Id. at 2-6.) This investigation revealed only two sets of 

usable evidence: the photograph of Israel, and the testimony of Movant’s wife. There is 

no suggestion that Movant’s brother would have appeared in the United States District 

Court to admit to being the leader of the DTO. And, the voice analysis was rendered 

superfluous once the Government obtained jailhouse recordings of Movant and his wife. 

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With regard to the photograph, Movant fails to suggest how this evidence would 

have been introduced. Movant did not testify, and for the reasons discussed hereinafter, 

counsel reasonably concluded that calling Movant’s wife was strategically the wrong 

thing to do. Moreover, even had Movant’s wife been called to provide the photograph of 

the brother, she would have ultimately had to identify Movant as the person in the 

videos. 

Further, the most damning evidence on the leadership role was not Movant’s 

presence, something he has regularly admitted, but the intercepted phone calls. A 

photograph would not have rebutted that information. 

Movant’s Wife – Movant complains that counsel decided to not call Movant’s 

wife as a witness. “[T]he skill and judgment one would expect of a reasonably competent 

attorney” is to decide when to not call a “witness [who] would have done ‘more harm 

than good’.” Denham v. Deeds, 954 F.2d 1501 (9th Cir. 1992). “Few decisions a lawyer 

makes draw so heavily on professional judgment as whether or not to proffer a witness at 

trial.” Lord v. Wood, 184 F.3d 1083, 1095 (9th Cir. 1999). “[S]trategic choices made 

after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually 

unchallengeable.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984). 

Here, the record reflects that counsel made a thorough investigation, and indeed 

waited through the course of trial, before concluding whether to call Movant’s wife. 

Movant makes no suggestion that counsel was uninformed before making that decision. 

Nor does Movant proffer anything to suggest that counsel’s concerns over the harmful 

effects of calling her were unfounded. 

At most Movant complains that counsel changed his mind on whether to call 

Movant’s wife. One would expect no less of competent counsel. Trials are not a Rube 

Goldberg machine, intricately planned out in advance, only to be set in motion and left to 

run their inevitable course. They are instead an improvisational dance, with a competent 

attorney adjusting his moves and counter moves as the trial takes shape. 

Movant fails to meet his burden of showing that counsel’s conduct was 

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unreasonable.

Prejudice – Even if counsel could be deemed deficient for having not called 

Movant’s wife to testify, Movant fails to show that he was prejudiced as a result. 

Respondent recounts the steps taken by Movant on cross examination to attempt 

to refute the assertion that Respondent was in a leadership role: “For example, trial

counsel vigorously cross-examined law enforcement witnesses regarding the possession

of the weapons found at a stash house and any counter-surveillance done by suspects; the 

initial misidentification of ‘Lolo’ aka Defendant as someone else; the lack of fingerprint 

evidence obtained by law enforcement agents; and the voice identification of Defendant 

by the co-case agent.” (Response, Doc. 8 at 11-12.) 

Given the other evidence against Movant, the undersigned finds no reasonable 

probability, that had Movant’s wife testified and presented a photo of Movant’s brother, 

the outcome would have been different. Movant’s wife proffered no competent 

testimony on Movant’s role, but would have offered only testimony either corroborative 

of the prosecution’s theory, or with regard to her attribution of the phone calls to 

Movant’s brother, rebutted by the voice analysis.

Summary – Movant has failed to allege plausible facts to show that counsel 

performed deficiently with regard to the leadership role evidence, and similarly has 

failed to show prejudice from any such deficiencies. Accordingly, Ground 2 is without 

merit and should be denied. 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the Adistrict court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising Aout of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. ' 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. ' 2253(c)(1). 

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Here, the Motion to Vacate is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 2255. The 

recommendations if accepted will result in Movant=s Motion to Vacate being resolved 

adversely to Movant. Accordingly, a decision on a certificate of Appealability is 

required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(ACOA”) is whether the applicant has Amade a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. ' 2253(c)(2). AWhere a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy ' 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). AWhen the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner=s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court=s judgment, that decision will be on the merits. Under the reasoning set 

forth herein, the claims are plainly without merit and jurists of reason would not find it 

debatable whether the Motion states a valid claim.

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Motion, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Movant's Motion to Vacate, 

Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, filed April 4, 2014 (Doc. 1) 

be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

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and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 10, Rules 

Governing Section 2255 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: February 4, 2015

14-0784r RR 15 01 27 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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