Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00396/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00396-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MATTHEW MONTAGUE, )

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Plaintiff, )

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vs. )

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COUNTY OF KERN, et al., )

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Defendant. )

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No. CV-F-06-396 OWW/TAG 

MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING

IN PART AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. 8) 

Before the court is the motion for summary judgment filed by

Defendants County of Kern, Kern County Sheriff’s Department,

Deputy Richard Garrett and Deputy James Rupe. Oral argument on

this motion was heard on September 21, 2007.

At the hearing on September 21, 2007, Plaintiff conceded

summary judgment for Defendants on the Eighth Cause of Action and 

for the Kern County Sheriff’s Department. The Court granted

summary judgment for the County of Kern on the Second Cause of

Action on the ground that Plaintiff had not submitted evidence

from which liability could be imposed on the County of Kern under

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42 U.S.C. § 1983 pursuant to Monell v. New York City Dept. of

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and its progeny. The Court

intends its oral ruling as articulated at the September 21, 2007

hearing to be its statement of decision in granting summary

judgment for Defendant County of Kern on all claims alleged

against it.

Following the hearing on the motion for summary judgment,

the parties entered into the following stipulation set forth in

the Pretrial Order:

1. The parties have stipulated that Deputy

J. Rube shall be DISMISSED from this action

with prejudice upon terms and conditions

agreed to by the parties that are known to

them.

This stipulation moots issues raised in the motion for summary

judgment concerning Defendant Rupe. The motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED with respect to Defendant Rupe on the ground

that he has subsequently been dismissed from this litigation.

The Pretrial Order also sets forth the following

stipulation:

2. The parties agree that the failure to

provide medical care claim under the Fourth,

Fifth or Eighth Amendments will not be

pursued, however, evidence of the Plaintiff’s

treatment at the sherif’s [sic] sub-station

both pre- and post-detention and/or arrest

shall be admitted for relevant purpose.

Pursuant to this stipulation, summary judgment for Defendant

Garrett is GRANTED with respect to these claims.

Plaintiff alleges that he was detained by Defendant Garrett

without reasonable suspicion, arrested by Defendant Garrett

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without probable cause, and was subjected to excessive force

during that arrest, all in violation of the Fourth Amendment to

the United States Constitution, and state law theories of relief

for negligence, battery, assault, and false arrest/false

imprisonment.

Defendant Garrett moves for summary judgment in his favor on

each of these claims and for summary judgment that he is entitled

to qualified immunity from liability under Section 1983.

I. Governing Standards.

Summary judgment is proper when it is shown that there

exists “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. A fact is “material” if it is relevant to an

element of a claim or a defense, the existence of which may

affect the outcome of the suit. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v.

Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th

Cir.1987). Materiality is determined by the substantive law

governing a claim or a defense. Id. The evidence and all

inferences drawn from it must be construed in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. 

The initial burden in a motion for summary judgment is on

the moving party. The moving party satisfies this initial burden

by identifying the parts of the materials on file it believes

demonstrate an “absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325

(1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to defeat

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summary judgment. T.W. Elec., 809 F.2d at 630. The nonmoving

party “may not rely on the mere allegations in the pleadings in

order to preclude summary judgment,” but must set forth by

affidavit or other appropriate evidence “specific facts showing

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. The nonmoving party

may not simply state that it will discredit the moving party’s

evidence at trial; it must produce at least some “significant

probative evidence tending to support the complaint.” Id. A

plaintiff’s verified complaint may be considered as an affidavit

in opposition to summary judgment if it is based on personal

knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence. 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.14 (9 Cir.2000). As th

explained in Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School District, 237

F.3d 1026, 1031 (9 Cir. 2001): th

[T]he district court may determine whether

there is a genuine issue of material fact, on

summary judgment, based on the papers

submitted on the motion and such other papers

as may be on file and specifically referred

to and facts therein set forth in the motion

papers. Though the court has discretion in

appropriate circumstances to consider other

materials, it need not do so. The district

court need not examine the entire file for

evidence establishing a genuine issue of

material fact, where the evidence is not set

forth in the opposing papers with adequate

references to that it could conveniently be

found.

The question to be resolved is not whether the “evidence

unmistakably favors one side or the other, but whether a fairminded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the

evidence presented.” United States ex rel. Anderson v. N.

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Telecom, Inc., 52 F.3d 810, 815 (9 Cir.1995). This requires th

more than the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in

support of the plaintiff’s position”; there must be “evidence on

which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. 

The more implausible the claim or defense asserted by the

nonmoving party, the more persuasive its evidence must be to

avoid summary judgment.” Id.

II. GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDE SUMMARY

JUDGMENT.

As set forth in the evidentiary record filed in connection

with the motion for summary judgment, material facts underlying

Plaintiff’s detention and arrest, including the use of force, are

highly disputed, including by an independent third party witness,

precluding summary judgment for Defendant Garrett. 

Based on these disputed facts, Defendant Garrett is not

entitled to summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity

from liability under Section 1983 on the issue of the

reasonableness of his conduct under the totality of the

circumstances. See Wilkins v. City of Oakland, 350 F.3d 949,

956 (9 Cir.2003), cert. denied sub nom. Scarrot v. Wilkins, 543 th

U.S. 811 (2004).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above and at the September 21, 2007 

hearing:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED with

respect to Defendants County of Kern, Kern County Sheriff’s

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Department, and Deputy James Rupe;

2. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED with

respect to Defendant Deputy Richard Garrett.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 28, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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