Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00476/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00476-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0402 Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

AIDA I., 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of 

Social Security,1

Defendant. 

Case No.: 3:19-cv-00476-AJB-RNB 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION REGARDING 

CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

(ECF Nos. 21, 22) 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Anthony G. 

Battaglia, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Civil Local 

Rule 72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

On March 12, 2019, plaintiff filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) 

seeking judicial review of a decision by the Commissioner of Social Security denying her 

applications for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits, and for 

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). The operative complaint is the First Amended 

Complaint filed by plaintiff on March 26, 2019. (See ECF No. 6.) 

1 Andrew Saul is hereby substituted as the defendant in this case per Fed. R. Civ. P. 

25(d). 

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Now pending before the Court and ready for decision are the parties’ cross-motions 

for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS that 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be GRANTED, that the Commissioner’s crossmotion for summary judgment be DENIED, and that Judgment be entered reversing the 

decision of the Commissioner and remanding this matter for further administrative 

proceedings. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 28, 2014, plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability and disability 

insurance benefits and for SSI, alleging disability commencing April 1, 2014. (Certified 

Administrative Record [“AR”]) 440-43, 444-52.) Her applications were denied initially 

and upon reconsideration. (AR 368-71, 375-79.) 

On January 5, 2016, plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge 

(“ALJ”). (AR 381-82.) The hearing was held on October 31, 2017. Plaintiff appeared 

with counsel, and testimony was taken from her and a vocational expert (“VE”). (See AR 

128-58.) The ALJ issued a decision on March 26, 2018, finding that plaintiff was not

disabled for purposes of her benefits applications. (AR 10-21.)

Thereafter, on April 25, 2018, plaintiff requested review of the decision by the 

Appeals Council. (AR 436-39.) The ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the 

Commissioner on January 22, 2019, when the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request 

for review. (AR 1-6.) This timely civil action followed. 

SUMMARY OF THE ALJ’S FINDINGS

In rendering his decision, the ALJ initially determined that plaintiff last met the 

insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on December 31, 2017. (AR 113.) 

// 

// 

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The ALJ proceeded to follow the Commissioner’s five-step sequential evaluation 

process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.2

At step one, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity since April 1, 2014, the alleged onset date. (AR 113.) 

At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff had the following severe impairments: 

asthma; degenerative disc disease, status-post lumbar fusion surgery; and degenerative 

joint disease of the right shoulder, hands, and knees. (AR 113.) As part of his step two 

determination, the ALJ further found that plaintiff had other medically determinable 

physical impairments that were nonsevere because they “caused only minimal effects and 

did not impair [plaintiff’s] ability to work. (See id.) In addition, the ALJ found that 

plaintiff had medically determinable mental impairments that, considered singly and in 

combination, were nonsevere because they did not “cause more than minimal limitation in 

[plaintiff’s] ability to perform basic mental work activities.” (See AR 113-15.) 

At step three, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination 

of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the impairments listed 

in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments. (AR 115-16.) 

Next, the ALJ determined that, through the date last insured, plaintiff had the 

residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1567(b), 

“except she can perform postural activities occasionally, with the exception 

of no climbing of ladders, ropes or scaffolds. She can occasionally reach 

overhead and otherwise frequently reach, handle, and finger. The claimant 

must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, lung irritants, and 

vibration and must avoid hazards.” (AR 116.) 

2 Unless otherwise indicated, all references herein to the Commissioner’s regulations 

are to the regulations in effect at the time of the ALJ’s decision. Hereafter the Court will 

only be citing the regulations applicable to disability insurance benefits applications 

because the parallel SSI regulations are virtually identical. 

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For purposes of his step four determination, the ALJ found that plaintiff had past 

relevant work between 2001 and 2003 as a loan officer. The ALJ adduced and accepted 

the VE’s testimony that a hypothetical person with plaintiff’s vocational profile and RFC 

would be able to perform the requirements of the loan officer job,3

 as the job is generally 

performed in the economy. Based on the VE’s testimony and the absence of any indication 

in the record that plaintiff performed the job at a different skill, exertional, or performance 

level than what was classified by the VE based on the DOT, the ALJ found that plaintiff 

was capable of performing her past relevant work as a loan officer, both as she performed 

it and as generally performed in the economy. (See AR 120-21.) 

Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff had not been under a disability, as 

defined in the Social Security Act, from April 1, 2014 through the date of his decision. 

(AR 121.) 

PLAINTIFF’S SOLE CLAIM OF ERROR 

Plaintiff’s sole claim of error is directed to the ALJ’s finding at step four of the 

sequential evaluation process that plaintiff remained capable of performing her past 

relevant work as a loan officer. 

The gravamen of plaintiff’s claim of error is that the ALJ’s vocational determination 

is not supported by substantial evidence because the loan officer job is a skilled job and the 

ALJ failed to properly account for plaintiff’s nonsevere mental impairments in his RFC 

assessment and his hypotheticals to the VE, when making his determination of whether 

plaintiff remained capable of performing that skilled job. 

// 

// 

// 

3 The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) classification code for the loan 

officer job is 186.267-018.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to 

determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and 

whether the proper legal standards were applied. DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 846 

(9th Cir. 1991). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but less than a 

preponderance. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Desrosiers v. Sec’y of 

Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 575-76 (9th Cir. 1988). Substantial evidence is 

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. The Court must review the record as a whole 

and consider adverse as well as supporting evidence. Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 529-

30 (9th Cir. 1986). Where evidence is susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, 

the Commissioner’s decision must be upheld. Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452 

(9th Cir. 1984). 

DISCUSSION

Step two of the Commissioner’s sequential evaluation process requires the ALJ to 

determine the medical severity of the claimant’s medically determinable impairments. See

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). The Social Security Regulations and Rulings, as well as 

case law applying them, discuss the step two severity determination in terms of what is 

“not severe.” Under the Commissioner’s regulations, an impairment is not severe “if it 

does not significantly limit [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work 

activities.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(a). Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 85-28 clarified 

that this means “an impairment is not severe if it has no more than a minimal effect on an 

individual’s physical or mental ability(ies) to do basic work activities.” See also Webb v. 

Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005). Basic work activities are “the abilities and 

aptitudes necessary to do most jobs,” including mental activities such as understanding, 

carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; use of judgment; responding 

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appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and usual work situations; and dealing with 

changes in a routine work setting. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(b); see also SSR 85-28. 

Under the Commissioner’s regulations, to determine whether a claimant has a severe 

mental impairment at step two, an ALJ must follow a “special technique.” See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520a(a). This entails the following steps: determining whether the claimant has any

medically determinable mental impairments; rating the degree of functional limitation

resulting from the mental impairment(s) in four broad functional areas; determining the

severity of the mental impairment(s); and then, if any of the mental impairments is severe,

proceeding to step three of the sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520a(b)-(d).

The four broad functional areas are: understand, remember, or apply information; 

interact with others; concentrate, persist, or maintain pace; and adapt or manage oneself. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(3). In rating the degree of limitation in these areas, the 

following five-point scale is utilized: None, mild, moderate, marked, and extreme. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(4). Under the Commissioner’s regulations, if the degrees of

limitation are rated as “none” or “mild,” the impairment generally is considered not severe,

“unless the evidence otherwise indicates that there is more than a minimal limitation in

your ability to do basic work activities.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(d)(1).

Here, the ALJ’s decision reflects that he followed the “special technique.” He found 

that plaintiff had medically determinable mental impairments of bipolar disorder, mood 

disorder, panic disorder, anxiety disorder, psychotic disorder, and a history of alcohol and 

polysubstance abuse. (See AR 113.) The ALJ then proceeded to rate the degree of 

functional limitation resulting from plaintiff’s mental impairments in each of the four broad 

functional areas as “mild.” (See AR 114-15.) 

Because they caused no more than “mild” limitations in any of the four broad 

functional areas, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s medically determinable mental impairments 

were nonsevere. (See AR 115.) 

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Plaintiff does not dispute that the ALJ’s nonseverity finding with respect to her 

mental impairments is supported by the substantial evidence of record. Nor is plaintiff 

disputing whether plaintiff’s nonsevere mental impairments had more than a minimal effect

on her ability to perform basic mental work activities. Rather, as set forth above, the 

gravamen of plaintiff’s sole claim of error is that the ALJ’s vocational determination is not 

supported by substantial evidence because the loan officer job that the ALJ found plaintiff 

remained capable of performing is a skilled job and the ALJ failed to properly account for 

plaintiff’s nonsevere mental impairments when making his determination of whether 

plaintiff remained capable of performing that skilled job. 

DOT 186.267-018 describes the attributes of the loan officer job as follows: 

“Interviews applicants, and examines, evaluates, and authorizes or 

recommends approval of customer applications for lines or extension of lines 

of credit, commercial loans, real estate loans, consumer credit loans, or credit 

card accounts: Interviews applicant and requests specified information for 

loan application. Analyzes applicant financial status, credit, and property 

evaluation to determine feasibility of granting loan or submits application to 

CREDIT ANALYST (financial) 160.267-022 for verification and 

recommendation. Corresponds with or interviews applicant or creditors to 

resolve questions regarding application information. Approves loan within 

specified limits or refers loan to loan committee for approval. Ensures loan 

agreements are complete and accurate according to policy. May confer with 

UNDERWRITER, MORTGAGE LOAN (financial) 186.267-026 to aid in 

resolving mortgage application problems. May supervise loan personnel. 

May analyze potential loan markets to develop prospects for loans. May 

solicit and negotiate conventional or government secured loans on 

commission basis and be known as Mortgage Loan Originator (financial). 

May specialize by type of lending activity and be known as Commercial 

Account Officer (financial); International Banking Officer (financial); 

Mortgage-Loan Officer (financial; insurance).” 

Further, DOT 186.267-018 describes loan officer as a sedentary job, requiring 

reasoning level 5 and SVP 7. Reasoning level 5 means the loan officer job requires the 

ability to “[a]pply principles of logical or scientific thinking to define problems, collect 

data, establish facts, and draw valid conclusions. Interpret an extensive variety of technical 

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instructions in mathematical or diagrammatic form. Deal with several abstract and 

concrete variables. See id. One of the functions of the loan officer job that the DOT 

characterizes as “significant” is “speaking-signaling.” See id. The DOT defines 

“speaking-signaling” as “[t]alking with and/or signaling people to convey or exchange 

information. Includes giving assignments and/or directions to helpers or assistants.” See 

DOT Appendix B. SVP 7 mean over two years of training and up to and including four 

years. See DOT Appendix C. The Commissioner considers jobs requiring an SVP between 

5 and 9 to be skilled jobs. See POMS DI 25015.017(C)(6). 

In the Court’s view, the Commissioner’s cross-motion is nonresponsive to the 

particular claim of error being raised by plaintiff. Nowhere in the cross-motion does the 

Commissioner address, let alone dispute, the skilled nature of the loan officer job. 

Moreover, the Commissioner repeatedly mischaracterizes what the ALJ’s nonseverity 

finding meant. It did not mean that plaintiff’s mental impairments “did not significantly 

impact her ability to work.” (See ECF No. 22-1 at 4, 5, 6.) Rather, under the authorities 

cited above, the ALJ’s nonseverity finding merely meant that plaintiff’s mental 

impairments did not cause more than minimal limitation in her ability to perform basic 

mental work activities. That’s precisely what the ALJ did find at step two of the sequential 

evaluation process. (See AR 113.) It does not follow that the ability to perform basic 

mental work activities equates to the ability to perform skilled work. 

Under the Commissioner’s regulations, an ALJ must consider the limiting effect of 

all impairments, including those that are nonsevere, in assessing a claimant’s RFC. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2). Thus, the mere fact that the ALJ’s nonseverity finding here was

supported by the substantial evidence of record is not dispositive of whether the ALJ

needed to account for the mild mental limitations underlying the nonseverity finding in his

RFC assessment and his hypotheticals to the VE. In Hutton v. Astrue, 491 F. App’x 850

(9th Cir. 2012), the ALJ determined at step two that the claimant’s PTSD caused mild

limitations in concentration, persistence or pace, but was nonsevere. Hutton, 491 F. App’x

at 850. The ALJ later explicitly excluded consideration of the claimant’s PTSD in making

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his determination of the claimant’s RFC because he found that the claimant lacked 

credibility. In holding that the ALJ had erred in failing to include the claimant’s PTSD in 

his RFC assessment and his hypotheticals to the VE, the Ninth Circuit reasoned: “[W]hile 

the ALJ was free to reject Hutton’s testimony as not credible, there was no reason for the 

ALJ to disregard his own finding that Hutton’s nonsevere PTSD caused some ‘mild’ 

limitations in the areas of concentration, persistence, or pace.” Hutton, 491 F. App’x at 

851. 

Numerous courts in this Circuit have followed Hutton and found reversible error 

where the ALJ failed to include mild mental limitations in the assessment of the claimant’s 

RFC. See, e.g., Carlson v. Berryhill, 2019 WL 1116241, at *17-*18 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 

2019); Barrera v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 4216693, at *4-*5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2018); Gates 

v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 2174401, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2017); Smith v. Colvin, 2015 WL

9023486, at *8-*9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2015); Kramer v. Astrue, 2013 WL 256790, at *2-

3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2013).

Here, the ALJ did purport to consider all of the evidence relating to plaintiff’s mental 

impairments in connection with his determination of plaintiff’s RFC. The ALJ asserted 

that his RFC assessment was “supported by the objective medical evidence and by the 

claimant’s reported activities of daily living, both of which contradict her allegations.” 

(See AR 118-20.) 

However, the objective medical evidence with respect to plaintiff’s mental 

impairments, to which the ALJ stated he was according “great weight,” merely 

substantiated the ALJ’s step two nonseverity finding. (See AR 119.) For example, in 

support of their nonseverity finding, the state agency psychological consultants had found 

that plaintiff had mild limitations in the first three of the four broad functional areas and no 

limitation in the fourth. (See AR 302-03, 317-18, 337-38, 359-60.)4

 Dr. Nicholson, the 

4 Under the Commissioner’s regulations then in effect for evaluating the severity of 

mental impairments, the four broad functional areas were: activities of daily living; social 

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psychiatric consultative examiner, had opined inter alia that plaintiff was mildly limited in 

the ability to relate and interact with coworkers and the public; in the ability to maintain 

concentration and attention, persistence and pace; in the ability to accept instructions from 

supervisors; in the ability to maintain regular attendance in the work place and perform 

work activities on a consistent basis; and in the ability to perform work activities without 

special or additional supervision. (See AR 1043.) The ALJ never stated that he was 

rejecting the foregoing specific functional limitations to which Dr. Nicholson had opined. 

And, the ALJ never explained why he failed to include those specific mild functional 

limitations in his RFC assessment or in his hypotheticals to the VE, when the ALJ was 

seeking to ascertain whether plaintiff remained capable of performing her past skilled work 

as a loan officer. 

Moreover, while Dr. Nicholson also had opined that plaintiff was able to do detailed 

and complex instructions, which is one of the characteristics of skilled work (see POMS 

DI 25015.017(C)(6)), Dr. Nicholson had not purported to render an opinion on whether 

plaintiff remained capable of performing her past skilled work as a loan officer, given the 

specific functional limitations to which he also had opined. Such an opinion was not within 

Dr. Nicholson’s purview, but rather was within the purview of the VE. In the Court’s view, 

the objective evidence of specific mild functional limitations here, which the ALJ never 

stated he was rejecting, is what distinguishes this case from cases in which courts have 

found Hutton to be inapplicable. See, e.g., Thompson v. Saul, 2019 WL 3302471, at *7 

(E.D. Cal. July 23, 2019); George A. v. Berryhill, 2019 WL 1875523, at *3-*5 (C.D. Cal. 

Apr. 24, 2019); Lindsay v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 3487167, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 18, 2018); 

Aranda v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 3399999, at *5-*6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2017). 

The Court also notes that, with respect to plaintiff’s activities of daily living, the ALJ 

merely concluded that plaintiff’s admitted activities of daily living “suggest an ability to 

functioning; concentration, persistence or pace; and episodes of decompensation. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520a(d)(1) (version effective June 13, 2011 to Jan. 16, 2017).

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perform a range of light work and directly contradict the claimant’s allegation that she can 

no longer maintain work activity.” (AR 119.) This conclusion begs the question whether 

plaintiff’s reported activities of daily living evidenced the ability to perform her past skilled 

work as a loan officer. 

Since the ALJ did not include any functional limitations relating to plaintiff’s mental 

impairments in any of his hypotheticals to the VE underlying his step four determination 

(see AR 151-52), the Court cannot determine how the VE would have testified had the 

specific mild functional limitations to which Dr. Nicholson had opined been included in 

the hypotheticals posed. The Court therefore finds that the ALJ’s finding at step four of 

the sequential evaluation process that plaintiff remained capable of performing her past 

relevant work as a loan officer is not supported by substantial evidence. 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 

The law is well established that the decision whether to remand for further 

proceedings or simply to award benefits is within the discretion of the Court. See, e.g., 

Salvador v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 13, 15 (9th Cir. 1990); McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 

603 (9th Cir. 1989); Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981). Remand for 

further proceedings is warranted where additional administrative proceedings could 

remedy defects in the decision. See, e.g., Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1497 (9th Cir. 

1984); Lewin, 654 F.2d at 635. Remand for the payment of benefits is appropriate where 

no useful purpose would be served by further administrative proceedings, Kornock v. 

Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1980); where the record has been fully developed, 

Hoffman v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1986); or where remand would 

unnecessarily delay the receipt of benefits to which the disabled plaintiff is entitled, Bilby 

v. Schweiker, 762 F.2d 716, 719 (9th Cir. 1985).

Here, plaintiff is not seeking a remand for the payment of benefits. Rather, plaintiff 

acknowledges that the proper remedy in the event of reversal is a remand for further 

administrative proceedings. (See ECF No. 21 at 11; ECF No. 23 at 4.) 

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The Court therefore RECOMMENDS that plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment be GRANTED, that the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment 

be DENIED, and that Judgment be entered reversing the decision of the Commissioner 

and remanding this matter for further administrative proceedings pursuant to sentence four 

of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

Any party having objections to the Court’s proposed findings and recommendations 

shall serve and file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a 

copy of this Report and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The objections 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” A party may respond 

to the other party’s objections within 14 days after being served with a copy of the 

objections. See id. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 28, 2020 

_____________________________ 

ROBERT N. BLOCK 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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