Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_97-cv-00152/USCOURTS-caed-2_97-cv-00152-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

LANCE IAN OSBAND,

NO. CIV. S-97-0152 WBS KJM

Petitioner, CAPITAL CASE

v.

ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR 

RECONSIDERATION

STEVEN W. ORNOSKI, acting

Warden of San Quentin State

Prison,

Respondent.

----oo0oo----

In pursuit of a federal habeas petition, petitioner

Lance Osband sought an evidentiary hearing, which was granted in

part and denied in part by Magistrate Judge Mueller. Petitioner

now moves for reconsideration of the magistrate judges’s denial

of an evidentiary hearing on Claims VI and VIII. Respondent

moves for reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s grant of an

evidentiary hearing on Claim I.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Because the specifics of petitioner’s crimes are

discussed in detail in the magistrate judge’s order of May 11,

2005, the court will only restate the facts relevant to the

instant motion for reconsideration. On December 11, 1987, a jury

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found petitioner guilty of multiple burglaries, the rape and

murder of a 66 year-old woman, and the assault and attempted

murder of a 51 year-old second grade teacher. (May 11, 2005

Order at 2, 4, 11-12.) During the penalty phase, the jury

returned a verdict of death. (Id. at 12.) Petitioner’s

subsequent appeal to the California Supreme Court and his

petition for certiorari were both denied. People v. Osband, 13

Cal. 4th 622 (1996); Osband v. California, 519 U.S. 1061 (1997).

Petitioner initiated the present action in federal

court on January 30, 1997. (May 11, 2005 Order at 12.) These

proceedings were, however, stayed pending the resolution of

petitioner’s state petition for writ of habeas corpus, which was

filed on July 22, 1997 in the California Supreme Court. (Id.) 

The court denied that petition on October 28, 1998, clearing the

way for petitioner to file a federal habeas claim, which he did

on March 12, 1999. (Id.)

Petitioner moved for an evidentiary hearing on October

1, 2003 and after several extensions, the magistrate judge heard

the motion on February 11, 2005. The resulting order, issued on

May 11, 2005, granted petitioner’s motion as to Claims I, V, IX,

and XX, with some limitations not relevant to the instant motion. 

(May 11, 2005 Order at 32.) The magistrate judge denied an

evidentiary hearing on Claims II-IV, VI-VIII, X-IXX, and XXIXXVIII. (Id.)

Again after several extensions, respondent filed with

this court a motion for reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s

holding regarding Claim I. (Resp’t Req. for Recons. by the Dist.

Ct.) Meanwhile, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of

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the order with respect to Claims VI and VIII and requested that

Magistrate Judge Mueller hear the motion. (Pet’r Mot. for

Recons. (filed under seal).) On September 9, 2005, respondent

moved to vacate reference of petitioner’s motion for

reconsideration to the magistrate judge. This court granted that

motion and set both parties’ reconsideration motions for hearing

before the undersigned.

II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) allows a district judge to

“reconsider any [non-dispositive] pretrial matter . . . where it

has been shown that the magistrate judge’s order is clearly

erroneous or contrary to law.” See also Gordon v. Vasquez, 859

F. Supp. 413, 415 (E.D. Cal. 1994). In addition, Local Rule

78-230(k) requires a party to present “new or different facts or

circumstances claimed to exist which did not exist or were not

shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the

motion.” In general, however, the relevant legal standard

directs that a motion for reconsideration be denied, “absent

highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is

presented with newly discovered evidence, . . . clear error [was

committed], or . . . there [has been] an intervening change in

the controlling law.” 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179

F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999). Here, respondent’s motion to

reconsider the grant of an evidentiary hearing on Claim I is

founded on a allegation of clear error. Petitioner bases his

motion to reconsider the Claim VI denial of an evidentiary

hearing on an alleged intervening change in the controlling law

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 Petitioner attempts to incorporate by reference his 1

replacement briefing on the underlying motion for evidentiary

hearing, which was filed on May 18, 2005. (Pet’r Mot. for

Recons. at 1 (filed under seal).) However, “[a] motion for

reconsideration is not a vehicle to reargue the motion . . . .”

United States v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1111,

1131 (E.D. Cal. 2001). The court will therefore only consider

the arguments set forth in petitioner’s motion for

reconsideration.

4

and arguments that the magistrate judge misconstrued the record. 

His motion on Claim VIII is based on claims that the magistrate

judge misapplied and incorrectly analyzed existing law.1

B. Claim I

In Claim I, petitioner alleges “that his counsel failed

to investigate and present evidence that two other individuals

were responsible for the murder.” (May 11, 2005 Order at 14-15.) 

In support of this claim, along with other evidence presented to

the state court with his state habeas petition, petitioner

submitted defense counsel’s reports and transcripts of interviews

with Joe Blackwell, Eric Gibson, and W.J. Thomas. Respondent

protests the magistrate judge’s decision to grant an evidentiary

hearing that will consider this and other evidence because, given

the procedural history of this case, this approach is allegedly

barred by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e). 

The AEDPA narrowly circumscribes the trial court’s

ability to grant an evidentiary hearing, barring such proceedings

“[i]f the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a

claim in State court . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2); see

also Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999) (“28

U.S.C. § 2254(e) now substantially restricts district court’s

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discretion to grant an evidentiary hearing.”). Still, petitioner

may receive an evidentiary hearing if he “was not at fault in

failing to develop [the] evidence in state court, or (if he was

at fault) if the conditions prescribed by § 2254(e)(2) [are]

met.” Holland v. Jackson, 124 S. Ct. 2736, 2738 (2004). In

short, petitioner must diligently pursue his state court habeas

petition, meaning he must “at a minimum, seek an evidentiary

hearing in state court in the manner prescribed by state law.” 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000).

California law, as identified by respondent and the

magistrate judge, directs that a habeas petition “should both (i)

state fully and with particularity the facts on which relief is

sought, as well as (ii) include copies of reasonably available

documentary evidence supporting the claim, including pertinent

portions of trial transcripts and affidavits or declarations.” 

(May 11, 2005 Order at 17 (citing People v. Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th

464, 474 (1995); Resp’t Req. for Recons. by the Dist. Ct. at 5

(same).) The documentary evidence requirement prevents further

consideration of petitions based solely on “[c]onclusory

allegations made without any explanation of the basis for the

allegations.” Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th at 474 (quoting People v.

Karis, 46 Cal. 3d 612, 656 (1988)).

The magistrate judge interpreted “documentary evidence”

to include only “sworn testimony”, similar to the examples of

documentary evidence identified in Duvall. (May 11, 2005 Order

at 17 (noting that “trial transcripts and affidavits or

declarations” are all sworn testimony).) She then concluded that

“[b]ecause these transcripts are not the sort of sworn testimony

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the California Supreme Court described in Duvall, it does not

appear that at the time of trial state law required they be

presented.” (Id.) Respondent argues that this interpretation

was clearly erroneous and resulted in a grant of an evidentiary

hearing despite petitioner’s failure to adhere to the procedures

mandated by California law. (Resp’t Req. for Recons. by the

Dist. Ct. at 5, 7.)

The court expresses no opinion on the correctness of

the magistrate judge’s interpretation of “documentary evidence”

and instead affirms the grant of an evidentiary hearing on Claim

I for different reasons. See In re Leavitt, 171 F.3d 1219, 1223

(9th Cir. 1999) (“[An] appellate court may affirm the lower court

on any ground fairly supported by the record.”); Bergen v. F/V

St. Patrick, 686 F. Supp. 786, 787 (D. Alaska 1988) (affirming a

magistrate judge’s decision on other grounds). Specifically, the

court does not read California law to require that every document

that a petitioner intends to introduce at an evidentiary hearing

be submitted along with the state habeas petition. The

California documentary evidence requirement appears to exist to

ensure that claims are well founded and not merely speculative. 

See Karis, 46 Cal. 3d at 656. As long as sufficient evidence,

though perhaps not every bit of evidence, is attached to the

state habeas petition to support the facts alleged by petitioner,

then the petitioner’s burden to show that the claims are not

merely conclusory has been met. 

Along with his state habeas petition before the

California Supreme Court, petitioner submitted a letter from a

self-proclaimed “secret witness” that suggested that someone

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 The California Supreme Court did seek an “informal 2

response” from petitioner’s custodian, a procedure that is used

“[t]o assist the court in determining the petition’s sufficiency

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other than petitioner committed the murder with which he was

charged. (May 11, 2005 Order at 16-17.) He also “submitted

three declarations stating that others admitted to committing the

Skuse murder.” (Id. at 15 (citing State Habeas Pet., Exs. 9

(Gibson Decl.) and 26 (Flynn and Breaux Decls.)).) These

documents support the factual allegations made in the state

habeas petition, namely petitioner’s claim that someone else

committed the murder and that his lawyer was aware of this theory

but failed to seriously pursue it. (Id.) The court therefore

finds that petitioner’s submission of documentary evidence was

sufficiently in compliance with the California procedural

requirements.

The court can only conclude that the California Supreme

Court found petitioner’s allegations to be insufficient to

establish even a prima facie case. Given that petitioner

presented a petition with specific factual allegations and

documentary evidence in support, the supreme court’s duty was to

“ask[] whether, assuming the petition’s factual allegations are

true, the petitioner would be entitled to relief.” Duvall, 9

Cal. 4th at 474-75 (citations omitted). If a prima facie case

had been demonstrated, the court would have issued a writ of

habeas corpus or an order to show cause, one of the procedural

steps preceding a grant of an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 475;

People v. Romero, 8 Cal. 4th 728, 738 (1994). Instead, however,

the supreme court summarily dismissed the petition. See http:// 2

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. . . .” Bd. of Prison Terms v. Superior Court, 130 Cal. App.

4th 1212, 1234 (2005). However, this procedure is actually

another part of the prima facie determination. Id. It does not

establish a factual dispute for the court to resolve–-this is

accomplished through the return and the traverse (discussed

infra). Romero, 8 Cal. 4th at 738-39.

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appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/dockets.cfm?dist=0&doc_id=

62912 (California Supreme Court docket in case no. S063051). 

This court doubts that the transcripts and records included in

the federal petition, largely reiterating the same facts included

in the declarations before both courts, would have convinced the

state court to rule otherwise.

Petitioner thus never came close to getting an

evidentiary hearing in state court. See Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th at

478 (explaining that the court can only order an evidentiary

hearing “after considering the return [(filed in response to an

order to show cause)] and the traverse, [and after] find[ing]

material facts in dispute”); Romero, 8 Cal. 4th at 738-39

(explaining that the return and the traverse are respectively

akin to the complaint and the answer in a civil proceeding and

are the means by which parties establish any factual disputes). 

Consequently, as the magistrate judge properly noted, “[b]ecause

the state court denied an evidentiary hearing, petitioner did not

have an opportunity to present [documents other than those

submitted with the state habeas petition.]” (May 11, 2005 Order

at 17); see also In re Serrano, 10 Cal. 4th 447, 465 (1995)

(stating, implicitly, that the evidentiary hearing provides

petitioner with an opportunity to present additional evidence in

support of his claims). This is significant because "[w]here . .

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 As petitioner notes, the Ninth Circuit adopted a similar 3

understanding in Horton v. Mayle, 408 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 2005),

shortly after the May 11, 2005 order issued. Id. at 582 n.6

(“Because [petitioner] never reached the stage of the proceedings

at which an evidentiary hearing should be requested, he has not

shown ‘a lack of diligence at the relevant stages of the

[California] state court proceedings’ and therefore is not

subject to AEDPA’s restrictions on evidentiary hearings.”).

9

. the state courts simply fail to conduct an evidentiary hearing,

the AEDPA does not preclude a federal evidentiary hearing on

otherwise exhausted habeas claims.” Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d

1002, 1013 (9th Cir. 1997). The parties have not yet debated 3

whether petitioner exhausted his habeas claims in state court. 

(Resp’t Req. for Recons. by the Dist. Ct. at 8 n.7.) The court

therefore holds that because petitioner filed a factually

specific ineffective assistance of counsel claim supported by

documentary evidence in state court and was nevertheless denied

an evidentiary hearing there, he cannot be faulted for failing to

develop the factual basis of his claim in state court. The

magistrate judge’s grant of an evidentiary hearing on Claim I was

thus permissible, and certainly not in clear error, despite the

limitations proscribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e). 

C. Claim VI

On Claim VI, Excessive Security and Shackling, the

magistrate judge denied petitioner’s motion for an evidentiary

hearing. (May 11, 2005 Order at 23, 32.) Petitioner presented

the declarations of Alternate Juror Broughton and Juror Sturtz in

support of the underlying motion, as well as the trial transcript

where the judge debated whether and how to restrain petitioner

during trial. (Id. at 23; Pet’r Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot.

for an Evidentiary Hearing Ex. O.) Sturtz claimed to have seen

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petitioner in shackles (handcuffs) outside the courtroom and

noted that, barring this exception, petitioner was usually seated

before the jury entered the courtroom and remained seated as they

filed out. (Pet’r Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. for an

Evidentiary Hearing Ex. O ¶ 2-3.) Broughton, who sat outside the

jury box, claimed to “remember that Mr. Osband wore shackles

during the trial.” The magistrate judge found that this evidence

was insufficient to “show[] that petitioner was, in fact,

shackled during trial . . . .” (May 11, 2005 Order at 24.)

“A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be

free of shackles and handcuffs in the presence of the jury” and

“[w]hen a defendant has been unconstitutionally shackled, the

court must determine whether the defendant was prejudiced." 

Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 591 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting

Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 572 (1986)); Parrish v. Small,

315 F.3d 1131, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Dyas v. Poole, 309

F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 2002)). However, the Ninth Circuit has

made clear that if “the jury never saw the defendant’s shackles

in the courtroom, . . . the shackles did not prejudice the

defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Williams, 384 F.3d at 592

(citing Castillo v. Stainer, 997 F.2d 669, 699 (9th Cir. 1993)

(unseen waist chain not prejudicial)); Parrish, 315 F.3d at 1134

(“[T]he issue of whether the shackling was prejudicial, . . .

turn[s] on whether the jury saw the shackles.”) In addition,

“[a] jury’s brief or inadvertent glimpse of a defendant in

physical restraints outside of the courtroom does not warrant

habeas relief unless the petitioner makes an affirmative showing

of prejudice.” Id. (citing Castillo v. Stainer, 983 F.2d 145,

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 Petitioner may not agree with the magistrate judge’s 4

reading of arguably ambiguous declarations and trial transcripts,

“[h]owever, in reviewing . . . for clear error, [a court] must

not reverse as long as the findings are plausible in light of the

record viewed in its entirety, even if [the court] would have

weighed the evidence differently had [it] been the trier of

fact.” United States v. Alexander, 106 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir.

1997). The magistrate’s findings, while not based on the only

possible interpretation of the evidence, were certainly based on

a plausible interpretation.

11

148 (9th Cir. 1992), amended by 997 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1993) (no

prejudice when members of the jury pool saw the defendant in

shackles in the court corridor)).

In this case, the magistrate judge found, after a

review of petitioner’s supporting documentation, that

petitioner’s declarants did not actually state that they saw the

petitioner shackled in the courtroom. (May 11, 2005 Order at

24.) In particular, she noted that the general statements of

alternate juror Broughton “lack[ed] specificity and conflict[ed]

with the trial transcript, which show[ed] petitioner was not

restrained by a security chain.” (Id.) Petitioner therefore 4

only had evidence of the juror’s one-time glimpse of him in

shackles outside the courtroom which, standing alone, is

insufficient to warrant habeas relief. Because that was not

inherently prejudicial, petitioner needed to present some

evidence of actual prejudice. See Williams, 384 F.3d at 593

(glimpse of a shackled defendant outside the courtroom not

inherently or presumptively prejudicial); see also United States

v. Waldon, 206 F.3d 597, 607 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Defendants are

required to show actual prejudice where the conditions under

which defendants were seen were routine security measures rather

than situations of unusual restraint such as shackling of

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 In addition, the state court previously held that the 5

record showed that petitioner was not mechanically restrained. 

People v. Osband, 13 Cal. 4th at 673-74. This determination is

subject to a presumption of correctness, which can be overcome

only by clear and convincing evidence that this finding was

erroneous. Belmontes, 414 F.3d at 1124 n.9. Petitioner’s nonspecific declarations do not meet this standard.

12

defendants during trial.” (internal citation omitted)). 

Petitioner did not produce any evidence suggesting prejudice.

Consequently, because the evidence submitted by

petitioner must support a colorable claim before an evidentiary

hearing is warranted, and because the declarations submitted did

not actually allege what petitioner must ultimately prove to

succeed on his habeas claim, petitioner was not entitled to an

evidentiary hearing on this matter. See Morales v. Woodford, 388 5

F.3d 1159, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that an evidentiary

hearing was not warranted when the evidence failed to raise a

colorable claim); see also Belmontes v. Brown, 414 F.3d 1094,

1124 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]o be entitled to a federal evidentiary

hearing [a habeas petitioner] must . . . allege facts which, if

proven, would entitle him to relief . . . .”). 

The non-committal declaration of one of Osband’s trial

attorneys, Richard Reese, Jr., stating that he is “not certain,”

but “it is [his] best recollection that . . . [petitioner was]

chained to the security chair for all proceedings” does little to

improve petitioner’s argument. (Pet’r Mot. for Recons. Attach.

1, Ex. OO (Reese Decl. ¶ 4.) First, like the other declarants,

Reese does not affirmatively state that petitioner was visibly

shackled in front of the jury. Second, this court cannot say

that the magistrate erred for failing to consider evidence that

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 Petitioner explains that he did not originally submit the 6

Reese declaration to the magistrate because, until Deck v.

Missouri, 125 S. Ct. 2007 (2005), he was unable to appreciate the

value of his trial counsel’s testimony. (See Pet’r Reply at 4.) 

However, as noted below, the Supreme Court did not consider Deck

in order to hold that “a trial attorney’s statement that his

client ‘was shackled in from of the jury’” is dispositive. (See

Pet’r Reply at 4.) Rather, the Supreme Court’s purpose in

accepting Deck’s petition was to establish that the rule

regarding shackling extends to the penalty phase of capital

cases. Deck, 125 S. Ct. at 2014. Deck did not work an

intervening change in the controlling law with respect to the

evidence sufficient to establish that a habeas petitioner was

indeed shackled during his trial. Consequently, because the

Reese declaration also fails to qualify as “newly discovered

evidence,” petitioner could have, and should have, presented it

to the magistrate judge. 

 The court interprets the Deck arguments made in 7

petitioner’s initial brief as “new law” arguments for

reconsideration. (Pet’r Mot. for Recons. at 3 (“The court should

reconsider its decision not to conduct an evidentiary hearing on

Claim 6 in light of Deck v. Missouri”).) However, to avoid the

problems of applying “new law” in habeas cases (discussed infra,

n.8), petitioner argues in his reply that Deck was not new law

and thus attempts to reform these arguments as being based on

“clear error.” (Pet’r Reply at ) This about face is confusing,

but regardless of whether petitioner uses Deck to expose clear

error in the magistrate judge’s denial of an evidentiary hearing

or to demonstrate a change in the law, his arguments are

unavailing for the reasons given above. 

13

was not before her. See Belmontes, 414 F.3d at 1125

(petitioner’s failure to present the facts that would entitle him

to relief does not warrant reconsideration). The court

reiterates that a motion for reconsideration is not an invitation

to re-litigate the underlying matter by presenting additional, as

opposed to “newly discovered,” evidence.6

Petitioner also argues that the magistrate judge’s

ruling on Claim VI should be reconsidered in light of the Supreme

Court’s superceding decision in Deck v. Missouri. In Deck, the 7

Supreme Court extended the prohibition on visible shackles at the

guilt phase of a trial to the penalty proceedings in a capital

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 The Supreme Court has held that “a new decision generally 8

is not applicable in cases on collateral review unless the

decision was dictated by precedent existing at the time the

petitioner’s conviction became final.” Butler v. McKellar, 494

U.S. 407, 409 (1990). Butler identified the appropriate

inquiries for determining if a rule was indeed “new” and whether

it applies to a given case. Id. at 409-17. Because the court

has found Deck inapposite in the instant case, it need not decide

whether plaintiff can secure habeas relief based on Deck.

14

case, absent a special need. 125 S. Ct. at 2014. However, this

decision, even if applicable to this case, has no bearing on the 8

magistrate judge’s decision to deny an evidentiary hearing on

Claim VI. The magistrate judge denied petitioner’s motion on

this claim because petitioner’s evidence did not support his

contention that he was, in fact, shackled at trial. (May 11,

2005 Order at 24.) As respondent points out, in Deck “there was

no dispute that the defendant was visibly shackled in front of

the jury.” (Resp’t Opp’n to Pet’r Mot. for Recons. at 7.) The

reasoning behind the magistrate judge’s order is therefore not at

odds with the holding of Deck.

D. Claim VIII

In Claim VIII, “[p]etitioner claim[ed] counsel was

ineffective for failing to present a coherent defense and for

failing to develop a mental defense, including a mental defense

based on drug use or taking account of the effect of drug use on

petitioner’s sub par mental functioning.” (May 11, 2005 Order at

25.) Based on Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir.

1995) and Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 2002), the

magistrate judge concluded that it is not unreasonable for an

attorney to rely on the unguided determinations of a mental

health expert when electing to forego a mental defense during the

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 This understanding of Jennings is not at odds with the 9

Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Daniels v. Woodford, --- F.3d.

---, 2005 WL 2861623 (9th Cir. Nov. 2, 2005). In Daniels,

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guilt phase of a trial. (May 11, 2005 Order at 26-27.) She

consequently denied an evidentiary hearing on Claim VIII because

petitioner’s allegations lacked legally cognizable grounds for

finding counsel’s choices unreasonable. (Id. at 27.) She also

determined that testimony from an expert on this matter was

unnecessary. (Id.)

Petitioner argues that the magistrate judge relied on

the wrong legal precedent and directs the court instead to

Jennings v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2002), which

allegedly “substantially overruled Hendricks.” (Pet’r Mot. for

Recons. at 12.) In Jennings, counsel’s failure to do anything

more than arrange for a two hour mental competency exam despite

overwhelming evidence of drug use and psychiatric troubles

constituted ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase,

based on failure to investigate. 290 F.3d at 1013-14. Far from

overruling Hendricks, the Jennings court distinguished it on its

facts, noting that in Hendricks “where nearly twenty hours of

mental health evaluation by defense experts revealed no basis for

a mental defense, defense counsel was justified in his decision

not to conduct further investigation into the matter.” Id. at

1014. Simply put, Jennings established that while counsel’s

reliance on a “lengthy examination specifically geared toward

finding any possible defenses” is reasonable, reliance on a

cursory exam conducted for the purpose of establishing mental

competency is not. Id. 9

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counsel relied on a cursory examination conducted by an

inexperienced psychologist, despite preliminary evidence of a

mental disorder. Id. at *18. Counsel’s failure to further

investigate defendant’s mental health under those circumstances

was unreasonable. Id. Although Daniels cited Jennings, it did

not overrule Hendricks or Silva. Moreover, it remains factually

distinguishable from the instant case, where counsel relied on

several experts who conducted more than a cursory analysis. 

Consequently, Daniels does not call into question the propriety

of the magistrate judge’s reliance on Hendricks and Silva.

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Therefore, as the magistrate judge noted, when health

experts are obtained to assess the viability of mental defenses,

an attorney may rely on the expert’s investigation and findings. 

Hendricks, 70 F.3d at 1037-38; Silva, 279 F.3d at 851; see also

Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 983 (9th Cir. 2004) (observing

that an attorney only has a duty to present a health expert with

sufficient information to investigate a mental defense during the

penalty phase of capital cases). Here, the court has before it a

case where three experts were obtained to evaluate petitioner and

possible mental defenses. (See, e.g., Resp’t Opp’n to Pet’r Mot.

for an Evidentiary Hearing Ex. 4 at 1 (Psychodiagnostic

Evaluation of Dr. Grant Hutchinson, filed under seal)(noting that

“Examination of Mr. Osbond was requested in order to determine

whether psychological factors may have played a part in the

crimes of which [he] is accused”).) The magistrate judge thus

did not commit clear error when she applied Hendricks/Silva over

Jennings. Moreover, because petitioner has not argued that

Hendricks/Silva, if applicable, was misapplied by the magistrate,

the court will not entertain this possibility. 

Regarding the rest of petitioner’s arguments to

reconsider the denial of an evidentiary hearing on Claim VIII,

the court fails to see a proper basis for granting petitioner’s

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motion. Petitioner’s brief loses sight of the proper scope of

such a motion and instead simply argues anew for expert testimony

and further evidentiary hearings on counsel’s alleged failure to

investigate mental health defenses in an effective and timely

manner. The arguments slip into detailed allegations of how

trial counsel’s conduct was unreasonable in light of the burdens

courts have place on defense lawyers to investigate background

circumstances and the standards of care generally recognized in

secondary sources. (Pet’r Mot. for Recons. at 15-30.) 

Petitioner then “respectfully submits” that this evidence would

be useful to the court and notes that some of the evidence it

seeks to present “is commonplace in ineffective-assistance

cases.” (Id. at 30, 32.)

Outside of the Jennings/Hendricks discussion,

petitioner does not argue that the magistrate judge’s decision to

deny an evidentiary hearing on Claim VIII was clearly erroneous

or contrary to controlling law. Petitioner argues that the

denial of an opportunity to present expert testimony violates his

“right to a full and fair hearing because ‘the basic ingredient

of due process [is] an opportunity to be allowed to substantiate

a claim before it is rejected.’” (Pet’r Reply at 17 (alteration

in original)(quoting Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399, 414

(1986).) This statement demonstrates just how far askew

petitioner’s arguments have gone-–the magistrate judge has not

yet rejected any of petitioner’s claims. 

The court notes that “an evidentiary hearing is not

required on issues that can be resolved by reference to . . . the

motion and the files and records of the case.” Totten v. Merkle,

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137 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). Here,

the magistrate judge determined that expert testimony and further

development of the facts specific to Claim VIII, in light of the

other evidentiary hearings already granted and record evidence,

was unnecessary. (May 11, 2005 Order at 27 & n.15.) This

decision was not clearly erroneous.

III. Conclusion

Respondent has failed to show that the magistrate

judge’s grant of an evidentiary hearing on Claim I was clearly

erroneous and contrary to law. Likewise, petitioner failed to

point to a controlling decision or factual data that the

magistrate judge overlooked or clearly misinterpreted. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that respondent’s motion for

reconsideration be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that petitioner’s motion for

reconsideration be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter be, and the same

hereby is, REMANDED to the magistrate judge to conduct the

evidentiary hearings granted in the May 11, 2005 order and all

subsequent proceedings previously assigned.

DATED: November 30, 2005

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