Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00657/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00657-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN V BANKS, 

Plaintiff(s),

 vs.

MICHAEL HENNESSEY, Sheriff, et

al,

Defendant(s). 

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No C 04-0657 VRW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR

DISMISSAL/SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

(Doc # 51)

While plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the San Francisco County Jail, he

filed the instant pro se civil rights action under 42 USC § 1983 alleging that

he is a “transgender/transsexual” inmate under constant fear of assault because

jail officials refuse to house him in the sexually vulnerable inmate housing unit

known as SXI. According to plaintiff, he expressed his safety concerns to two

deputies, but they explained that, under jail policy and practice, he would be

moved only if he is first assaulted. Plaintiff seeks an order compelling jail

officials to move him to the SXI unit, and damages from the San Francisco

Sheriff’s Department (“SFSD”) for violation of his due process right to personal

security as a result of SFSD’s unlawful policy and practice. 
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Per order filed on July 21, 2004, the court found that plaintiff's allegations,

liberally construed, stated a colorable claim for injunctive relief under § 1983 for

deliberate indifference to safety, which would be served on Sheriff Michael

Hennessey. The court also found that the allegations appeared to state a

colorable claim for local government/ municipal liability under § 1983 against

SFSD. Defendants now move for summary judgment on the ground that there

are no material facts in dispute and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. Defendants specifically argue that plaintiff failed to exhaust

administrative remedies before filing suit, as required by 42 USC § 199e(a), that

plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief was rendered moot by his conviction and

transfer to state prison, and that there is insufficient evidence to establish a

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff has filed an opposition and

defendants have filed a reply.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and

affidavits show that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed R Civ P 56(c). 

Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v

Liberty Lobby, Inc, 477 US 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is

genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for

the nonmoving party. Id.

The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of

identifying those portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp v

Cattrett, 477 US 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden
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of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable

trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. But on an issue for which

the opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial, as is the case here, the

moving party need only point out "that there is an absence of evidence to support

the nonmoving party's case." Id.

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must

go beyond the pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, "set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed R Civ P 56(e). 

If the nonmoving party fails to make this showing, "the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp., 477 US at 323.

B. Analysis

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because: (1)

plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit, as required

by 42 USC § 199e(a); (2) plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief was rendered moot

by his conviction and transfer to state prison; and (3) there is insufficient

evidence to establish a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment at trial.

1. Nonexhaustion

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 amended 42 USC §

1997e to provide that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison

conditions under [42 USC § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 USC § 1997e(a). Although once

within the discretion of the district court, exhaustion in prisoner cases covered by

§ 1997e(a) is now mandatory. Porter v Nussle, 534 US 516, 524 (2002). All

available remedies must now be exhausted; those remedies "need not meet

federal standards, nor must they be 'plain, speedy, and effective.'" Id (citation
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omitted). Even when the prisoner seeks relief not available in grievance

proceedings, notably money damages, exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit. Id;

Booth v Churner, 532 US 731, 741 (2001). Similarly, exhaustion is a

prerequisite to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general

circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or

some other wrong. Porter, 534 US at 532. 

Nonexhaustion under § 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense. Wyatt v

Terhune, 315 F3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir 2003). It should be treated as a matter of

abatement and brought in an “unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion rather than [in] a

motion for summary judgment.” Id (citations omitted). Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff failed to exhaust available

administrative remedies before filing suit accordingly will be construed as an

unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss.

In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies under § 1997e(a), the court may look beyond the pleadings and decide

disputed issues of fact. Id at 1119-20. If the court concludes that the prisoner has

not exhausted the appropriate administrative process, the proper remedy is

dismissal without prejudice. Id at 1120.

Here, defendants set forth evidence showing that in order to exhaust his

administrative remedies at the jail, plaintiff was required to file a prisoner action

request and a grievance and, if unsatisfied with the result, appeal the issue to the

custody division commander. They argue that plaintiff did not exhaust his

administrative remedies because the evidence shows that although plaintiff filed a

prisoner action request and a grievance, he did not appeal their denial to the

custody division commander. 

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Plaintiff’s contention that he was not required to appeal because the jail

did not act on his grievance is without merit because the evidence makes clear

that his grievance was reviewed and denied by jail staff on February 4, 2004. 

The evidence further shows that shortly after his grievance was denied, plaintiff

chose to file the instant action rather than appeal the denial of his grievance to the

custody division commander. Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to

exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit is granted. See McKinney v

Carey, 311 F3d 1198, 1199-1201 (9th Cir 2002) (prisoner action must be

dismissed unless the prisoner exhausted available administrative remedies before

he filed suit, even if the prisoner fully exhausts while the suit is pending).

2. Injunctive relief

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief was

rendered moot by his March 9, 2005 conviction and subsequent transfer to state

prison and should be dismissed. The court agrees. It is well-established that

where, as here, an inmate is released from prison or transferred to another prison

and there is no reasonable expectation nor demonstrated probability that he will

again be subjected to the prison conditions from which he seeks injunctive relief,

the claim for injunctive relief should be dismissed as moot. See Dilley v Gunn,

64 F3d 1365, 1368-69 (9th Cir 1995); Darring v Kincheloe, 783 F2d 874, 876-77

(9th Cir 1986).

3. Deliberate indifference to safety

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on

plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment personal safety claim because there is

insufficient evidence to establish at trial that jail officials were deliberately

indifferent to plaintiff’s safety, or that any violation was the direct result of an

official policy or practice of SFSD.
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A pretrial detainee establishes a violation of the right to personal security

protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by

demonstrating that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference. Redman v

County of San Diego, 942 F2d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir 1991) (en banc). A prison

official acts with deliberate indifference only if he knows of and disregards an

excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Farmer v Brennan, 511 US 825, 837

(1994). The official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could

be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the

inference. Id. Negligence is not sufficient to impose liability under § 1983. Id at

835; Frost v Agnos, 152 F3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir 1998). Rather, the official’s

conduct must have been “wanton,” which turns not upon its effect on the

prisoner, but rather, upon the constraints facing the official. Id (citing Wilson v

Seiter, 501 US 294, 302-03 (1991)). 

In order to prevail on his claim against SFSD, plaintiff must show a

violation of his due process right to personal security and that the violation was

the direct result of an official policy or practice. See City of Canton v Harris, 489

US 378, 385 (1989). The policy or practice must be a deliberate or conscious

choice by SFSD’s final policy-making official. See id.

Here, the undisputed evidence shows that on January 31, 2000, plaintiff

was arrested on charges of forcible rape and incarcerated in the San Francisco

County Jail pending trial. Between January 2000 and April 2005, plaintiff was

housed at various points in the jail’s general population, the medical unit and

administrative segregation. In January and February 2004, when the events

underlying this case occurred, plaintiff was housed in administrative segregation

at his own request and for his own protection. While in administrative

segregation, plaintiff had exposure to only one other inmate at a time.
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In late January 2004, plaintiff asked jail staff to transfer him from

administrative segregation to the SXI unit. Plaintiff’s written request did not

state that he had any fear for his safety in administrative segregation; rather, it

simply stated that he believed SXI housing was more appropriate for him than

either administrative segregation or general population housing. Jail staff refused

plaintiff’s request to be transferred to SXI because plaintiff is a registered sex

offender and convicted rapist who was in jail on new charges of forcible rape (of

which he was later convicted). Jail policy and practice prohibit inmates

convicted or accused of sex offenses from being housed in SXI, lest they prey on

sexually vulnerable inmates. 

Plaintiff’s claim that jail staff violated his due process right to personal

security as a result of SFSD’s policy and practice of not housing any inmates in

the SXI unit unless and until they are assaulted is without evidentiary support. 

First, there is no evidence in the record that in any way suggests that the decision

to leave plaintiff in administrative segregation, rather than transfer him to the SXI

unit, violated plaintiff’s due process right to personal security by ignoring a

substantial risk of serious harm to plaintiff. See Farmer, 511 US at 837; Frost,

152 F3d at 1128. The undisputed evidence shows that plaintiff was placed in

administrative segregation for his protection and there is no indication

whatsoever that anyone had any reason to suspect that he faced a substantial risk

of serious harm if he remained in administrative segregation. Plaintiff’s assertion

that he should have been transferred to the SXI unit because other sex offenders

like himself have previously been housed in the SXI unit is of no consequence to

his personal security claim. See also Hernandez v Johnston, 833 F2d 1316, 1318

(9th Cir 1987) (no constitutional right to particular housing classification). 

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Second, there is no evidence in the record to support plaintiff’s claim that

SFSD has an official policy and practice of refusing sexually vulnerable inmates

SXI housing unless and until they are assaulted. The undisputed evidence shows

that the policy is to house sexually vulnerable inmates in SXI whenever possible,

unless they pose a threat to the SXI population, as plaintiff apparently did. 

Plaintiff’s wholly conclusory allegation of an unlawful policy and practice is not

enough to defeat defendants’ motion for summary judgment. See Leer, 844 F2d

at 633 (conclusory allegations insufficient to defeat summary judgment). 

Plaintiff has set forth no facts showing a genuine issue for trial on his claim that

jail staff violated his due process right to personal security as a result of SFSD’s

policy and practice of not housing any inmates in the SXI unless and until they

are assaulted. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 

See Celotex Corp., 477 US at 323.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for dismissal/summary

judgment (doc # 51) is GRANTED.

The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of defendants, terminate all

pending motions as moot, and close the file.

SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge