Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01409/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01409-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

JEREMIAH ULYSSES CRAYTON, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 10-01409 PHX FJM (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

CHARLES L. RYAN, TERRY GODDARD, ) 

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE FREDERICK J. MARTONE:

On or about July 2, 2010, Petitioner filed a pro se

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 10) on October 21, 2010.

Petitioner has not filed a traverse to the answer to his

petition.

 I Procedural History

On July 16, 2007, pursuant to a written plea agreement,

Petitioner pled guilty to one count of child prostitution, two

counts of attempted child prostitution, and two counts of

attempted sexual conduct with a minor. See Answer, Exh. A.

Pursuant to the plea agreement, the state agreed to drop several

charges against Petitioner and agreed to drop an allegation of

prior convictions and the allegation that Petitioner was on

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probation at the time of the crimes. See id., Exh. A.

On August 21, 2007, Petitioner was sentenced to a term

of 17 years’ imprisonment pursuant to his conviction for child

prostitution, and concurrent terms of 3.5 years imprisonment

pursuant to each of his two convictions for attempted child

prostitution. Petitioner was further sentenced to a term of

lifetime probation for each of the two convictions for

attempted sexual conduct with a minor. Id., Exh. B.

Petitioner initiated an action for state

post-conviction relief. In his state Rule 32 action Petitioner

asserted his trial counsel coerced him into accepting the plea

bargain and that his guilty plea resulted from the ineffective

assistance of counsel as reflected by trial counsel’s motion to

withdraw as Petitioner’s counsel. See id., Exh. C & Exh. D.

On December 1, 2008, the state trial court denied

relief on the merits of Petitioner’s claims in his Rule 32

action. Id., Exh. E. The trial court found that Petitioner had

failed to demonstrate that his plea was coerced. The trial

court noted Petitioner’s own sworn affirmation during the plea

hearing that “his plea was no the result of any coercion,

promises, force, or threats.” Id., Exh. E. The state trial

court further concluded that Petitioner had failed to state a

colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id., Exh.

E. The trial court noted that, although Petitioner’s counsel

had initially filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, the motion

itself was subsequently withdrawn. Id., Exh. E. The trial

court determined that Petitioner had failed to present any

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specific act or omission that constituted ineffective assistance

of counsel. Id., Exh. E. The state trial court also determined

Petitioner had failed to establish that, but for counsel’s

alleged errors, the result of Petitioner’s criminal proceedings

would have been different. Id., Exh. E. 

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the

Arizona Court of Appeals, which denied review on February 25,

2010. Id., Exh. F. & Exh. G.

In his federal habeas petition Petitioner asserts he is

entitled to relief because his guilty plea was coerced in

violation of his right to due process and because his guilty

plea resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel.

II Analysis

Petitioner raised his claims in the state courts and

the state court denied relief on the merits of the claims.

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law, or the state court

decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 & Supp. 2010); Carey

v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 75, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006);

Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2009).

Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be correct and

can be reversed by a federal habeas court only when the federal

court is presented with clear and convincing evidence. See

Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240-41, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325

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(2005); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S. Ct.

1029, 1041 (2003); Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 567-68 (9th

Cir. 2010); Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir.

2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 247 (2008). The “presumption of

correctness is equally applicable when a state appellate court,

as opposed to a state trial court, makes the finding of fact.”

Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 593, 102 S. Ct. 1303, 1304-05

(1982). See also Vasquez v. Kirkland, 572 F.3d 1029, 1031 n.1

(9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1086 (2010).

A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it

applied a rule contradicting the governing law of Supreme Court

opinions, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but

reaches a different result. See Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133,

141, 125 S. Ct. 1432, 1438 (2005); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541

U.S. 652, 663, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2149 (2004); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1519 (2000). For

example, a state court’s decision is considered “contrary to

federal law” if the state court erroneously applied the wrong

standard of review or an incorrect test to a claim. See Knowles

v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 (2009); Wright v. Van

Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124-25, 128 S. Ct. 743, 746-47 (2008).

See also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 737 (9th Cir. 2008);

Bledsoe v. Bruce, 569 F.3d 1223, 1233 (10th Cir. 2009).

The state court’s determination of a habeas claim may

be set aside under the unreasonable application prong if, under

clearly established federal law, the state court was

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“unreasonable in refusing to extend [a] governing legal

principle to a context in which the principle should have

controlled.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166, 120 S. Ct.

2113, 2120 (2000). See also Murdoch v. Castro, 609 F.3d 983,

990-91 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 1035-38;

Cook, 538 F.3d at 1015. However, the state court’s decision is

an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law

only if it can be considered objectively unreasonable.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 409, 120 S. Ct. at 1521; Carey, 549 U.S.

at 74-75, 127 S. Ct. at 653. An unreasonable application of law

is different from an incorrect one. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.

685, 694, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 1850 (2002); Cooks v. Newland, 395

F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Furthermore, only United States Supreme Court holdings,

and not dicta or concurring opinions, at the time of the state

court’s decision are the source of “clearly established federal

law” for the purpose of the “unreasonable application” prong of

federal habeas review. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S. Ct. at

1523; Carey, 549 U.S. at 74, 127 S. Ct. at 653; Ponce v. Felker,

606 F.3d 596, 599 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 79 U.S.L.W. 3269

(Nov. 01, 2010); Plumlee v. Masto, 512 F.3d 1204, 1209-10 (9th

Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2885 (2009).

If the Supreme Court has not addressed a specific issue

in its holdings, the state court’s adjudication of the issue

cannot be an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. See Stenson, 504 F.3d at 881, citing Kane v.

Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10, 126 S. Ct. 407, 408 (2006).

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Stated another way, if the issue raised by the petitioner “is an

open question in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence,” the Court

may not issue a writ of habeas corpus on the basis that the

state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law

by rejecting the precise claim presented by the petitioner.

Cook, 538 F.3d at 1016; Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1123

(9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2961 (2008). The

United States Supreme Court “has held on numerous occasions that

it is not an unreasonable application of clearly established

Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific

legal rule that has not been squarely established by this

Court.” Knowles, 129 S. Ct. at 1419, citing Wright, 552 U.S. at

124-25, 128 S. Ct. at 746-47. See also Vasquez, 572 F.3d at

1038.

The holdings of the Circuit Courts of Appeal are

relevant to resolution of a petitioner’s habeas claims only to

the extent they are useful in deciding whether the law has been

clearly established or that the state court decision is an

“unreasonable application” of United States Supreme Court

precedent, and not with regard to what constitutes a violation

of constitutional rights. See Maxwell, 606 F.3d at 567; Bible

v. Ryan, 571 F.3d 860, 870 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.

Ct. 1745 (2010); Ortiz-Sandoval v. Clarke, 323 F.3d 1165, 1172

(9th Cir. 2003). Compare Smith v. Dinwiddie, 510 F.3d 1180,

1186 (10th Cir. 2007).

 Accordingly, a state court decision may be contrary to

a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ holding without being an

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unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court

precedent. See Kessee v. Mendoza Powers, 574 F.3d 675, 679 (9th

Cir. 2009). The Ninth Circuit has held that when a Supreme

Court decision does not “squarely address” the issue presented

by the habeas petitioner, or if the Supreme Court principle does

not “clearly extend” to the context of the situation presented

by the petitioner, “it cannot be said, under AEDPA, there is

‘clearly established’ Supreme Court precedent addressing the

issue.” Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 754 (9th Cir. 2009). 

The Court must review the last reasoned state court

opinion on the claims raised in the habeas action. See, e.g.,

Maxwell, 606 F.3d at 568; Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 1035. When there

is no “reasoned” state court decision explaining the state’s

denial of a claim presented in a federal habeas petition, the

District Court must perform an independent review of the record

to ascertain whether the state court’s decision summarily

denying the claim was objectively reasonable. See Medley v.

Runnels, 506 F.3d 857, 863 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,

128 S. Ct. 1878 (2008); Stenson, 504 F.3d at 890; Pham v.

Terhune, 400 F.3d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 2005). If the Court

determines that the state court’s decision was an objectively

unreasonable application of clearly established United States

Supreme Court precedent, the Court must review whether

Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated, i.e., the

state’s ultimate denial of relief, without the deference to the

state court’s decision that the Anti-Terrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) otherwise requires. See Panetti v.

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Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953-54, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2858-59

(2007); Frantz, 533 F.3d at 736-37; Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d

624, 641 (9th Cir. 2008). See also Jones v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 626,

640 (9th Cir. 2009); Delgadillo v. Woodford, 527 F.3d 919, 924-

25 (9th Cir. 2008).

1. Petitioner contends his guilty plea was coerced

Petitioner raised this issue in his state Rule 32

action. The state court concluded that Petitioner’s guilty plea

was not coerced.

A state court’s factual finding that a plea was

voluntary and knowing is entitled to a presumption of

correctness by a federal habeas court. See Lambert v. Blodgett,

393 F.3d 943, 982 (9th Cir. 2004); Cunningham v. Diesslin, 92

F.3d 1054, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996). Factual findings of a state

court are presumed to be correct and can be reversed by a

federal habeas court only when the federal court is presented

with clear and convincing evidence. See Miller-El v. Dretke,

545 U.S. 231, 240-41, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005); Anderson v.

Terhune, 467 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2006); Solis v. Garcia,

219 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 2000).

Petitioner’s contemporaneous statements regarding his

understanding of the plea agreement carry substantial weight in

determining if his entry of a guilty plea was knowing and

voluntary. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S.

Ct. 1621, 1629 (1977) (“Solemn declarations in open court carry

a strong presumption of verity. The subsequent presentation of

conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to

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summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the face of the

record are wholly incredible”); United States v. Mims, 928 F.2d

310, 313 (9th Cir. 1991) (reaching this holding in a section

2255 case); Restucci v. Spencer, 249 F. Supp. 2d 33, 45 (D.

Mass. 2003) (collecting cases so holding). Because Petitioner

stated at the time of his guilty plea that his guilty plea was

knowing and voluntary, the Court concludes that, as a matter of

fact, the plea was voluntary and made intelligently. See Chizen

v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1986).

The state court’s determination that Petitioner’s

guilty plea was not coerced was not clearly contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of federal law and, accordingly,

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this

claim.

2. Petitioner asserts his counsel was

unconstitutionally ineffective during his criminal plea and

sentencing proceedings

In his state Rule 32 action Petitioner argued his

counsel’s performance was unconstitutionally ineffective. The

state court concluded Petitioner was not entitled to relief

because he had not established that his counsel’s performance

was deficient or that he was prejudiced by any alleged error.

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the context

of cases wherein the defendant did not go to trial are governed

by the doctrine of Strickland v. Washington. See, e.g., Hill v.

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 106 S. Ct. 366, 369-70 (1985); Fields

v. Attorney General, 956 F.2d 1290, 1296-97 (4th Cir. 1992).

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The Strickland standard requires a defendant to “show that his

counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficient

performance prejudiced him.” Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d

1201, 1206 (9th Cir. 2001), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 690, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066 (1984). When a defendant

challenges a conviction resulting from a plea agreement the

“prejudice” prong of the Strickland test is modified; the

defendant must show there is a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel's alleged errors, he would not have pled guilty to

the charges against him, but instead would have insisted on

going to trial. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S. Ct. at 370.

Accord Fields, 956 F.2d at 1297; Craker v. McCotter, 805 F.2d

538, 542 (5th Cir. 1986).

To succeed on a claim that his counsel was

constitutionally ineffective regarding a guilty plea, a

petitioner must show that his counsel’s advice as to the

consequences of the plea was not within the range of competence

demanded of criminal attorneys. Hill, 474 U.S. at 58, 106 S.

Ct. at 370; Doganiere v. United States, 914 F.2d 165, 168 (9th

Cir. 1990). A lawyer’s advice to plead guilty in the face of

strong inculpatory evidence does not constitute ineffective

assistance of counsel. See United States v. Cassidy, 428 F.2d

383, 384 (9th Cir. 1970); Schone v. Purkett, 15 F.3d 785, 790

(8th Cir. 1994); Jones v. Dugger, 928 F.2d 1020, 1028 (11th Cir.

1991).

“[A] defendant has the right to make a

reasonably informed decision whether to

accept a plea offer.” In McMann v.

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Richardson, the seminal decision on

ineffectiveness of counsel in plea

situations, the Court described the question

as not whether “counsel’s advice [was] right

or wrong, but ... whether that advice was

within the range of competence demanded of

attorneys in criminal cases.” McMann, 397

U.S. at 771. Thus, for the petitioner to

establish a claim of ineffective assistance,

he “must demonstrate gross error on the part

of counsel....” Id. at 772. The Third Circuit

has interpreted this standard as requiring a

defendant to demonstrate that the advice he

received was so incorrect and so insufficient

that it undermined his ability to make an

intelligent decision about whether to accept

the plea offer.

Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 880 (9th Cir. 2002) (some

internal citations and quotations omitted).

Petitioner has not presented any evidence that his

counsel’s performance was deficient. Petitioner has not

established that, but for his counsel’s performance, he would

not have pled guilty but instead would have proceeded to trial.

The state court’s conclusion that Petitioner was not denied his

right to the effective assistance of counsel was not clearly

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of federal law and,

accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

III Conclusion

The state court’s determination that Petitioner’s

guilty plea was not coerced and that Petitioner was not denied

his right to the effective assistance of counsel was not clearly

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law as

expressed by the United States Supreme Court. Therefore,

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on these

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claims.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Crayton’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

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in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 1st day of December, 2010.

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