Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02192/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02192-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK JOHNSON,

Petitioner,

Case No. 15-cv-2192-BAS-BGS

ORDER: 

(1)OVERRULING 

PETITIONER’S 

OBJECTION [ECF No. 16];

(2)APPROVING AND 

ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION [ECF 

No. 15];

(3)DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS [ECF No. 1]; AND

(4)DENYING CERTIFICATE 

OF APPEALABILITY

v.

S. PEERY, Warden,

Respondent.

Petitioner Mark Johnson filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (the 

“Petition”) seeking relief from a California state court’s denials of his requests for 

resentencing under California’s Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (the “Reform 

Act”). (ECF No. 1.) Presently before the Court is a Report and Recommendation 

(R&R) from Magistrate Judge Bernard G. Skomal recommending denial of the 

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Petition. (ECF No. 15.) Petitioner filed an objection (“Objection”) to the R&R. 

(ECF No. 16.) For the reasons stated herein, the Court overrules the Objection, 

approves and adopts the R&R in its entirety, denies the Petition, and denies the

Petitioner a certificate of appealability. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

In 1997, Petitioner was convicted of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle 

pursuant to California Vehicle Code Section 10851(a). (ECF No. 13 at 2.) Because 

the Petitioner had two prior strikes for robbery, the 1997 conviction constituted a 

“third strike” and he was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life in 

prison under California’s Three Strikes law. (Id.)

On November 6, 2012, the California electorate approved the Reform Act, 

which “establish[ed] a procedure for an offender serving an indeterminate life 

sentence for a third strike conviction that is not defined as a serious and/or violent 

felony to file a petition for a recall of sentence.” Teal v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 4th 

595, 597 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Cal. Penal Code §1170.126(b)). The Reform 

Act, inter alia, established eligibility requirements for seeking resentencing for 

individuals sentenced prior to its passage. See Cal. Penal Code §1170.126(e). The 

Reform Act mandates that an eligible petitioner “shall be resentenced . . . unless the 

court, in its discretion, determines that resentencing the petitioner would pose an 

unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” Cal. Penal Code §1170.126(f). The 

Reform Act requires a court to exercise such discretion according to certain specified 

factors, including a petitioner’s criminal conviction history, disciplinary and 

rehabilitation records while in custody, and any other evidence relevant to whether a 

new sentence would result in an unreasonable risk of harm to public safety. Cal. 

Penal Code §1170.126(g). 

On November 22, 2012, Petitioner sought resentencing by the sentencing court 

pursuant to the Reform Act. (ECF No. 6-1 at 21–42.) The People acknowledged that 

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Petitioner was eligible for resentencing under the Reform Act and submitted to the 

court’s discretion the determination of whether the Petitioner posed an unreasonable 

risk of danger to public safety. (ECF No. 6-2 at 103.) On October 16, 2013, the court 

determined that Petitioner was eligible for resentencing and found, in its discretion, 

that resentencing Petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public 

safety. (ECF No. 6-3 at 7.) Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the 

decision on October 23, 2016.1 (ECF No. 6-2 at 181–89.) Prior to the hearing on 

that motion, Petitioner submitted a psychological evaluation finding that he posed a 

low risk of committing a future violent offense. (Id. at 191–203.) The court denied 

resentencing a second time. (ECF No. 6-4.) 

Petitioner appealed the initial denial and the denial of the motion for 

reconsideration to the California Court of Appeal. (ECF No. 6-2 at 205.) Upon a 

review of the record before the trial court, the Court of Appeal determined that the 

trial court had not abused its discretion and affirmed both decisions denying 

resentencing under the Reform Act. (ECF No. 6-8.) The California Supreme Court 

summarily denied Petitioner’s subsequent petition for review in that court, which 

asserted that the denial of resentencing violated due process and equal protection. 

(ECF Nos. 6-9 (petition for review); 6-10 (denial of review).) 

B. Procedural Background

On September 30, 2015, Petitioner filed his Petition in the Southern District of 

California. (ECF No. 1.) The Petition asserts two grounds in support of Petitioner’s 

claim for federal habeas relief. First, Petitioner claims that the trial court’s 

determination that Petitioner posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if

resentenced violated the Petitioner’s rights to due process under the U.S. 

Constitution. (Id. at 6.) Second, Petitioner claims that the trial court’s failure to 

 

1 The Court hereby modifies the R&R’s initial reference to the date of 

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration before the California trial court. (ECF No. 

15 at 5.) 

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resentence him as a second strike offender for an offense that does not now qualify 

as a third strike offense violated Petitioner’s right to equal protection under the U.S. 

Constitution. (Id. at 7.) Respondent filed an Answer (ECF No. 5) and Petitioner filed 

a Traverse (ECF No. 14). 

On November 29, 2016, the Magistrate Judge issued the R&R, recommending 

that then presiding Judge Roger Benitez deny the Petition on all grounds. (ECF No. 

15.) Objections to the R&R were due by December 23, 2016. (Id. at 13.) Petitioner 

mailed an Objection on December 22, 2016, which was filed on December 30, 2016 

on the docket. (ECF No. 16.) On December 12, 2017, nearly a year after submitting 

his Objection, Petitioner filed a notice of a request for a ruling on the pending R&R 

and Petition. (ECF No. 18.) Judge Benitez subsequently recused himself from the 

case on January 9, 2018, and the case was reassigned to this Court. (ECF No. 19.) 

This Court now turns to the R&R and Petitioner’s Objection. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court reviews de novo those portions of an R&R to which objections are 

made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or 

in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Id. “The 

statute makes it clear,” however, “that the district judge must review the magistrate 

judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not 

otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en 

banc) (emphasis in original); see also Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 

1226 (D. Ariz. 2003) (concluding that where no objections were filed, the district 

court had no obligation to review the magistrate judge’s report). “Neither the 

Constitution nor the statute requires a district judge to review, de novo, findings and 

recommendations that the parties themselves accept as correct.” Reyna-Tapia, 328 

F.3d at 1121. This legal rule is well-established in the Ninth Circuit and this district. 

See Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n.13 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Of course, de novo 

review of a[n] R & R is only required when an objection is made to the R & R.”); 

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Nelson v. Giurbino, 395 F. Supp. 2d 946, 949 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (Lorenz, J.) (adopting 

report in its entirety without review because neither party filed objections to the 

report despite the opportunity to do so); see also Nichols v. Logan, 355 F. Supp. 2d 

1155, 1157 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (Benitez, J.).

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Objection is Overruled and the Court Adopts the R&R

Petitioner’s Objection asserts that the Magistrate Judge2: (1) based the R&R 

on “errant records” and failed to thoroughly consider the record, (2) applied the 

wrong standard of review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

(“AEDPA”) for the issuance of habeas relief, and (3) erred in his analysis and 

disposition of Petitioner’s due process and equal protection claims. (ECF No. 16 at 

1.) Further, the Objection takes issue with the recommended denial of Petitioner’s 

request for an evidentiary hearing. (Id. at 1, 6.) The Court overrules the Objection 

in its entirety. 

1. The R&R’s Findings and Consideration of the Record

First, the Court turns to Petitioner’s Objection to the R&R as based on “errant 

records” and a failure to thoroughly consider the record. (ECF No. 16 at 1.) In 

discussing the proceedings concerning Petitioner’s first request for resentencing on 

the basis of the Reform Act, the R&R discussed certain information the People 

outlined to the trial court as bearing upon its discretionary decision to resentence the 

Petitioner pursuant to Section 1170.126(g). (ECF No. 15 at 4.) The information the 

People discussed included that: the Petitioner shot someone during a crime spree 

spanning August 7, 1991 through August 29, 1991; that burglaries were a part of that 

spree; and the Petitioner received rules violations reports while in custody, including 

 

2Although Petitioner’s Objection refers to “Respondent’s Recommendation,” 

(ECF No. 16), it is clear that Petitioner is referring to the Magistrate Judge and not 

Respondent Peery. 

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for possession of a deadly weapon in 2010. (Id. at 4–5.) In his Objection, Petitioner 

disputes the accuracy of the facts which the People submitted. Id. at 2.) Petitioner 

claims that if the Magistrate Judge had reviewed the record on which he relied to 

make the R&R, he would have noted the “discrepancies” and “errors” Petitioner 

identifies in his Objection. (Id. at 3.) The Court overrules Petitioner’s Objection. 

The specific factual information on which the R&R relied here is corroborated by the 

California Court of Appeal’s opinion, which directly quoted from the trial court. 

(ECF No. 6-8 at 5.) A habeas court must give deference to state court findings and 

presumes them to be correct. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1). This presumption of 

correctness can only be rebutted through clear and convincing evidence. Id.; Parke 

v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35–36 (1992). Petitioner has failed to meet this evidentiary 

burden. Accordingly, the Court adopts the R&R’s factual findings in their entirety.

2. The R&R’s Standard of Review

Petitioner objects that the Magistrate Judge “applied the wrong standard of 

review under AEDPA” in the R&R. (ECF No. 16 at 3.) Petitioner’s Objection 

appears to take issue with the R&R’s reference to a particular standard of review and 

subsequent determination that the Petition raises a state sentencing issue not 

cognizable in federal habeas proceedings. (ECF No. 16 at 3.) The Court overrules 

Petitioner’s Objection as to this issue.

The R&R referred to the standard of review applicable under AEDPA for the 

issuance of federal habeas relief. (ECF No. 15 at 7–8.) Specifically, the R&R

observes that a petition will not be granted unless a state proceeding (1) resulted in a 

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law, or (2) resulted in a disposition that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at that state 

court proceeding. (Id. at 7 (citing 28 U.S.C. §2254(d).) After citing this standard of 

review, the Magistrate Judge determined that “[s]entencing error claims generally do 

not raise a federal constitutional question and are not cognizable on federal habeas 

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review.” (Id. at 9.) 

The Court finds that Petitioner’s Objection regarding the applicable standard

is not without merit, but he fares no better under the directly applicable standard. 

Section 2254(a) limits a district court’s review of a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus to a “person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the 

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 

United States.” 28 U.S.C. §2254(a) (emphasis added). The Magistrate Judge’s 

conclusion that the Petition raises an issue of state sentencing law is appropriately 

addressed under this provision. Numerous authorities, including the United States 

Supreme Court, have concluded that “it is not the province of a federal habeas court 

to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 

502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991); see also Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir. 

1994). The R&R concluded that “[a]though Petitioner labels his claims as due 

process and equal protection violations, he is simply asserting that the court erred in 

its finding that resentencing Petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to 

the public.” (ECF No. 15 at 10.) As the Magistrate Judge observed, Petitioner’s true 

issue is with the weight the trial court afforded to Petitioner’s earlier conduct in its 

application of Section 1170.126(g) to the facts before it. (Id.) Indeed, even in his 

Objection, Petitioner continues to assert that the trial court’s decision not to 

resentence was in error because he has had a “180 degree behavioral transformation.” 

(ECF No. 16 at 6.) He continues to cite the same factual bases that were before the 

trial court, which the trial court weighed along with all other facts before it. A federal

court “cannot treat a mere error of state law, if one occurred, as a denial of due 

process, otherwise, every erroneous decision by a state court on state law would come 

here as a federal constitutional question.” Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d 1075, 1083 

n.6 (9th Cir. 2006). The Petition asks this Court to do exactly this, and the Court 

declines to do so. Moreover, as to the application of state law, the state court twice 

denied Petitioner’s requests for resentencing under applicable state law. The state 

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court’s interpretation and application of state law binds a federal habeas court. See 

Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005). Accordingly, the Court overrules 

Petitioner’s Objection on this issue and approves the R&R on this ground.

3. The R&R’s Disposition of Petitioner’s Claims 

Petitioner’s principal objection to the R&R is the Magistrate Judge’s analysis 

and disposition of his due process and equal protection claims. (ECF No. 16 at 3–6.) 

Although the Magistrate Judge concluded that the Petition presents an issue of state 

law not cognizable in a federal habeas petition, he also considered the merits of 

Petitioner’s due process and equal protection claims. (ECF No. 15 at 11–12.) The 

Court reviews the Magistrate Judge’s determinations on each claim, Petitioner’s 

Objection, and overrules Petitioner’s Objection. 

a. Due Process

Petitioner claims a denial of due process because the trial court found he posed 

an unreasonable risk to public safety despite the People not opposing resentencing 

and his psychological evaluation indicating he posed a low risk of violence. (Id. at 

11.) In his Objection to the R&R, Petitioner asserts that proceedings guided by 

Section 1170.126(g)’s factors do not guarantee due process and do not protect against 

arbitrariness, capriciousness, or fundamental unfairness where there are abuses of 

discretionary power. (ECF No. 16. at 4.) 

Under narrow circumstances, the misapplication of state sentencing law may 

rise to the level of a due process violation. See Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 50 

(1992) (federal constitutional question is whether the sentencing error was so 

arbitrary or capricious as to constitute an independent due process violation); see also 

Christian, 41 F.3d at 469 (“Absent a showing of fundamental unfairness, a state 

court’s misapplication of its own sentencing laws does not justify federal habeas 

relief.”). Although Petitioner makes a blanket assertion that resentencing 

proceedings pursuant to Section 1170.126(g) fail to guarantee due process, the 

Petitioner offers no basis in support of this general assertion, nor can he show that 

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his proceedings in particular were deficient in this manner. Consistent with the 

record, the Magistrate Judge determined that Petitioner was represented by counsel, 

the trial court received full briefing on the petition and expressly noted as much, the 

trial court considered the psychological evaluation Petitioner submitted in his second 

resentencing request, and the trial court expressly considered all factors identified in 

Section 1170.126(g). (ECF No. 15 at 11.) The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded 

that the Petitioner failed to establish a violation of due process because any error by 

the trial court was not so arbitrary or capricious to constitute such a violation and the 

record fails to show fundamental unfairness. (Id.) Accordingly, this Court approves 

the R&R’s recommended denial of this claim. 

b. Equal Protection

Petitioner claims a denial of equal protection on the ground that he is being 

treated differently in sentencing as a convicted third strike offender seeking 

resentencing than if he were convicted today of the same offense. (ECF No. 15 at 

12.) In his Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s recommended denial of the equal 

protection claim, Petitioner asserts that proceedings guided by Section 1170.126(g)’s 

factors do not guarantee equal protection for two reasons. (ECF No. 16. at 4.) First, 

he claims that because he meets every requirement for reduction of his sentence under 

the public safety exception, the trial court necessarily disregarded such evidence by 

denying him resentencing in violation of his right to equal protection. Second, 

Petitioner takes issue with Section 1170.126(g)’s requirements for the exercise of 

discretion to resentence, including its mandate that a trial court consider prior 

criminal history and prison disciplinary history. The Court is not persuaded by either. 

Petitioner’s first objection misconstrues the statutory scheme at issue. 

Although Petitioner is admittedly eligible for resentencing under the Reform Act 

(ECF No. 15 at 5), the Reform Act does not equate eligibility for resentencing with 

the right to ultimately receive a resentencing. Rather, the Reform Act expressly 

leaves the decision whether to resentence within the discretion of the trial court 

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pursuant to Section 1170.126(g) and its enumerated factors. Contrast Cal. Penal 

Code §1170.126(e) with Cal. Penal Code §1170.126(g). Petitioner’s assertion that 

the trial court disregarded evidence in support of a sentence reduction is belied by 

the record. On review of his appeal from the denials of his requests for resentencing, 

the California Court of Appeal found that the trial court had expressly considered the 

evidence in support of a sentence reduction. (ECF No. 15 at 6 (citing ECF No. 6-8 

at 11 (California Court of Appeal Opinion.) As discussed earlier, a federal habeas 

court must give deference to state court findings and presumes them to be correct

unless the petitioner can show otherwise through clear and convincing evidence. See 

28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1). In view of the California Court of Appeal’s express reliance 

on the trial court record, which has been submitted to this Court (ECF Nos. 6-1, 6-

2), Petitioner simply cannot meet this evidentiary burden. The Court thus finds this 

objection unavailing.

As to Petitioner’s second objection, neither the public safety exception in 

Section 1170.126(g), nor the specific factors it requires a court to consider in 

evaluating whether to resentence turns on a suspect class. The Magistrate Judge 

correctly concluded that the statute need only bear a rational relation to a legitimate 

governmental interest. (ECF No. 15 at 12.) The Magistrate Judge found it satisfied 

this requirement, and relied on a California authority which determined that “[t]he 

discretionary public safety exception to second strike sentencing that is present in 

§1170.126 . . . is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” People v. Yearwood, 

213 Cal. App. 4th 161, 167–68 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). Although Petitioner may 

disagree with the relevance of certain enumerated factors in the statute, his 

disagreement does not transform the statute and its application to him into a violation 

of equal protection. Accordingly, the Court overrules Petitioner’s Objection on this 

ground and approves the R&R’s recommended denial of this claim.

4. Request for an Evidentiary Hearing

The Magistrate Judge recommended a denial of Petitioner’s request for an 

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evidentiary hearing on the ground that he failed to identify any reason warranting an 

evidentiary hearing. (ECF No. 15 at 12 (citing 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(2).) The 

Magistrate Judge determined that the Petition could be resolved on the record. (Id.

at 13.) In his Objection, Petitioner asserts that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to 

objectively ascertain the facts before a “fair and unbiased” court. (ECF No. 16.) 

Section 2254(e)(2) establishes a general rule that a “court shall not hold an 

evidentiary hearing on” a claim concerning state court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. 

§2254(e)(2). The exception to this rule requires the Petitioner to satisfy two 

requirements. In relevant part, Petitioner is required to show that “the claim relies 

on (i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review 

by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or (ii) a factual predicate that 

could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 

28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(2)(A)(i)-(ii). Petitioner cannot satisfy this requirement because 

this case neither involves a new rule of constitutional law, nor does it involve a factual 

predicate that could not have been previously discovered. Rather, the facts 

underlying the Petition are the same facts relied upon by the trial court which denied 

Petitioner’s request for resentencing on two occasions, as well as those before the 

California Court of Appeal. Accordingly, the Court overrules Petitioner’s objection 

to the recommended denial of an evidentiary hearing and denies the request. 

B. Certificate of Appealability

Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules following 28 U.S.C. §2254, a district court

must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse 

to the applicant. A habeas petitioner may not appeal the denial of a habeas petition 

concerning detention arising from state court proceedings unless he obtains a 

certificate of appealability from a district or circuit court judge. 28 U.S.C. 

§2253(c)(1)(A); see also United States v. Asrar, 116 F.3d 1268, 1269−70 (9th Cir. 

1997). The district court may issue a certificate of appealability if the petitioner “has 

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. 

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§2253(c)(2). To meet this threshold showing, a petitioner must show that: (1) the 

issues are debatable among jurists of reason, (2) that a court could resolve the issues 

in a different manner, or (3) that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement 

to proceed further. Maciel v. Cate, 731 F.3d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 2013). The Court 

denies Petitioner a certificate of appealability because he has failed to make a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Although the Petition 

raises due process and equal protection claims, the Petition’s substance concerns a 

state sentencing issue. Even assuming that the Petition implicates the constitutional 

guarantees of due process and equal protection, this Court concludes that the Petition 

fails to raise a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, particularly 

in view of the multiple federal court decisions denying similar claims by prisoners 

seeking resentencing under the Reform Act. See, e.g., Tuggle v. Perez, No. 2:14-cv1680 KJM CKD P, 2016 WL 1377790, at *6 (E.D. Cal. April 7, 2016) (collecting 

cases and noting no federal court has found federal challenges to the Three Strikes 

Reform Act to be cognizable in federal habeas); Hill v. Warden, No. CV 14–0662–

CJC (RNB), 2014 WL 1093041, *1–2 (C.D. Cal. March 18, 2014); Green v. Hill,

No. 13–cv–01436–BAS–DHB, 2014 WL 6810682, *8 (S.D. Cal. Dec 1, 2014); 

Johnson v. Spearman, No. CV 13–3021 JVS (AJW), 2013 WL 3053043, at *2 (C.D. 

Cal. June 10, 2013).

IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that: 

1. The Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s Objection (ECF No. 16);

2. The Court APPROVES AND ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety (ECF 

No. 15);

3. The Court DENIES Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing (ECF 

Nos. 1, 16);

4. The Court DENIES the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 

1.); and

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5. The Court DENIES Petitioner a Certificate of Appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 11, 2018

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