Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00510/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00510-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 28:2671 Federal Tort Claims Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK CROZIER and KEVIN

GREENFIELD,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 09cv510-WQH-WMc

ORDER

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant United States

of America (“United States”). (Doc. # 13).

BACKGROUND

On January 20, 2009, Plaintiffs Mark Crozier and Kevin Greenfield filed a Complaint

for Damages for Slander and Libel (“Complaint”) against David Byrnes and Carl Newberry

in the Superior Court for the State of California, County of San Diego. (Doc. # 1 at 3). The

Complaint alleges that Byrnes and Newberry made false statements concerning Plaintiffs to

a representative of the Civilian Human Relations Department for Marine Corps Base Camp

Pendleton and several other persons unknown to Plaintiffs. (Doc. # 1 at 4).

On March 13, 2009, the United States, on behalf of Byrnes and Newberry, removed the

case to this Court pursuant to the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation

Case 3:09-cv-00510-WQH-WMC Document 14 Filed 07/28/09 Page 1 of 4
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Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d). (Doc. # 1). In the Notice of Removal, the United States asserts that

Byrnes and Newberry were acting within the scope of their employment as federal employees

with respect to the events giving rise to the allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint. The United

States concurrently filed a Notice of Substitution of United States of America as Defendant,

and a Certification of Scope of Employment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2879(d). (Docs. # 2, 3).

On April 6, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a response and objection to the notice of substitution

of United States of America as Defendant. (Doc. # 9).

On May 14, 2009, the Court issued an Order finding that Byrnes and Newberry were

acting within the scope of their employment and ordering that “the United States shall be

substituted as a Defendant in place of David Byrnes and Carl Newberry, and that the title of

the action be amended accordingly.” (Doc. # 12).

On June 12, 2009, the United States filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint on

the grounds that the United States is immune from slander and libel claims, and Plaintiffs

failed to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing suit. (Doc. # 13).

Plaintiffs have not responded to the Motion to Dismiss.

DISCUSSION

“The basic rule of federal sovereign immunity is that the United States cannot be sued

at all without the consent of Congress.” Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983).

Absent a Congressional waiver of sovereign immunity, a claim against the United States must

be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Gerritsen v. Consulado General de

Mexico, 989 F.2d 340, 343 (9th Cir. 1993); Gilbert v. Da Grossa, 756 F.2d 1455, 1458 (9th

Cir. 1985).

The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq., provides

a remedy for persons injured by the tortious activity of an employee of the United States,

where the employee was “acting within the scope of his ... employment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).

“[T]here are certain limitations to the right to bring suit against the United States under the

FTCA.... First, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) specifically excepts from the FTCA ‘[a]ny claim arising

out of ... libel, slander, ....’ Section 2680(h)’s exceptions are jurisdictional in nature.”

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Meridian Int’l Logistics, Inc. v. United States, 939 F.2d 740, 742-43 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing

Morrill v. United States, 821 F.2d 1426, 1426-27 (9th Cir. 1987)). “Second, 28 U.S.C. §

2675(a) establishes that a FTCA action ‘shall not be instituted’ against the United States unless

the claimant first presents his claim to the ‘appropriate Federal agency’ and the claim is denied.

The claim requirement of § 2675(a) is a jurisdictional limitation.” Id. at 743 (citing Blain v.

United States, 552 F.2d 289, 291 (9th Cir. 1977)).

The sole claims alleged in the Complaint are for slander and libel. (Doc. # 1 at 3-8).

Plaintiffs’ claims are explicitly covered by section 2680(h)’s exception from the FTCA, and

therefore the claims are barred. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h); Roundtree v. United States, 40 F.3d

1036, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994) (defamation); Waggy v. United States, 2009 WL 1764515, at

*3 (E.D. Wash., June 18, 2009) (“Plaintiff’s defamation and libel claims are explicitly covered

by section 2680(h)’s intentional-tort exception and therefore barred.”); Crump v. Social

Security Admin., 2008 WL 3850804, at *4 (E.D. Cal., Aug. 14, 2008) (“[P]laintiff’s claim

against the United States includes the torts of libel and slander, which are excluded torts under

§ 2680(h). Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss should be granted with regard to

plaintiff’s claim for libel and slander.”).

The Complaint does not allege that Plaintiffs filed an administrative claim with the

United States prior to filing suit. For this additional reason, the Complaint must be dismissed.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (“An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United

States unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency

and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or

registered mail [or languished for more than six months.]”); Jerves v. United States, 966 F.2d

517, 521 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Because Jerves failed to comply with the administrative claim

requirements of the FTCA, the district court correctly dismissed her suit for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction.”); Waggy, 2009 WL 1764515, at *3 (“Defendant argues that an alternative

basis for dismissal exists because Plaintiff has not alleged that he exhausted his administrative

remedies by presenting his claim to the appropriate federal agency before filing suit, a

necessary precursor to an FTCA action. After review, the Court agrees.”).

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CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 13) is GRANTED.

This action is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Clerk shall enter

judgment in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiffs.

DATED: July 28, 2009

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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