Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01893/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-01893-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY L. PATTON,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-04-1893 FCD EFB P

vs.

R.S. JOHNSON, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants filed an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion to

dismiss on July 24, 2006, alleging that plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to

filing suit. Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b). 

I. Standards Applicable to This Motion

Defendants’ motion to dismiss challenges whether plaintiff has met the requirement of

the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) that “[n]o action shall be brought” until available

administrative remedies are exhausted. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The Ninth Circuit has held that

the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108,

1117, n.9 (9th Cir. 2003). Moreover, “nonexhaustion under § 1997e(a) of the PLRA does not

impose a pleading requirement.” Id. at 1119. Rather, the Ninth Circuit held “that § 1997e(a)

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1

 Summary judgment procedures under Rule 56 test whether a dispute over a given fact

is genuine, and, if so, whether the dispute over that fact makes any difference to the outcome of

the case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. This is true whether a failure of proof is over an element to

the claim or an inability to overcome an affirmative defense once the defendant has presented

evidence establishing that defense. “There can be no genuine issue as to any material fact where

there is a complete failure of proof as to an essential element of the nonmoving party's case

because all other facts are thereby rendered immaterial.” Id. Thus, of particular relevance here,

if a claim is barred due to a failure to exhaust administrative remedies, all other facts are

rendered immaterial and the court must dismiss. The dismissal, however, follows the application

of the procedural mechanics of Rule 56 to determine whether the opposing party’s evidence is

adequate to establish a genuine factual dispute. Where those procedures result in the conclusion

that the plaintiff cannot prove his factual allegations refuting the evidence of failure to exhaust,

the dispute is not genuine and the complaint must be dismissed. The principle is hardly novel. It

applies whenever a material fact affects the outcome, whether it is on technical grounds such as

exhaustion, the unexcused delay beyond an expiration of a statute of limitations, a lack of

standing based on fact specific reasons, etc., or on the merits due to an inability to establish an

element of the underlying claim.

2

 A “matter in abatement” is “the suspension or defeat of an action for a reason unrelated

to the merits of the claim.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2005). It has its

roots in the common-law “plea in abatement,” abolished by Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(c). Rule 7 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “unceremoniously abolishes a great deal of ancient procedural

dogma that has little place in a streamlined litigation system,” Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 1181, including pleas in abatement. Black’s

Law Dictionary 4 (6th ed. 1990). The “plea in abatement” is an archaic common law “plea

which, without disputing merits of plaintiff’s claim, objects to place, mode or time of asserting it. 

It allows plaintiff to renew suit in another place or form, or at another time, and does not assume

to answer an action on its merits, or deny existence of a particular cause of action on which

2

creates a defense–defendants have the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion.” 

Id. Given the conclusion that exhaustion for purposes of the PLRA is neither a pleading

requirement nor a jurisdictional prerequisite, the quintessential grounds for motions under Rule

12(b), it would appear that the procedures under Rule 56 (not Rule 12) provide the appropriate

tool for addressing a prisoner’s failure to meet the requirement.1 It is, after all, the facts

establishing exhaustion, not allegation of its completion in the complaint, that are being

challenged. Indeed, the complaint need allege nothing about exhaustion. Instead, it is

defendants’ burden to present evidence proving the failure to exhaust. However, in light of

Wyatt, under which procedural rule the issue should be raised is not clear.

Wyatt instructs that “the failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies that are not jurisdictional

should be treated as a matter in abatement,2

 which is subject to an unenumerated Rule12(b)

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plaintiff relies.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1151 (6th ed. 1990). The Advisory Committee Notes

to Rule 7(c) state that all statutes using the word “plea” are “modified in form by this rule.” 

Thus, for example, the Revision Notes to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2105 (West 2006), which prohibits

reversal of a District Court’s ruling on non-jurisdictional “matters in abatement” in the Supreme

Court and Circuit Courts of Appeals states, “Rule7(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

abolished all pleas, and the rules adopted the motion as a substitute therefor. The words ‘matters

in abatement’ were, therefore substituted for the abolished ‘plea in abatement’ and ‘plea to the

jurisdiction.’” Modernly, a party makes a motion under Rule 12 or Rule 41, as appropriate,

instead of making a plea in abatement. See Black’s Law Dictionary 4, 1151-1152 (6th ed. 1990)

(“abatement of action,” and “plea in abatement).

3

motion rather than a motion for summary judgment.” Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. The Wyatt

opinion observes that summary judgment is ordinarily judgment “on the merits.” Id. However,

as noted, the standards under Rule 56 are used when a Rule 12 motion seeks to establish facts by

materials extrinsic to the complaint. Thus, Wyatt is clear that regardless of nomenclature, a

motion attacking failure to exhaust is not a challenge to the sufficiency of the complaint. It is a

motion in which defendant must raise and prove by evidence the absence of exhaustion. Id. In

this regard, the Ninth Circuit in Wyatt provides further guidance. It recognizes that when the

district court looks beyond the pleadings to a factual record in deciding the exhaustion motion, it

necessarily does so under “a procedure closely analogous to summary judgment.” Id., n.14.

Resort to the procedural safeguards of Rule 56 is for sound reason. Where the issue in

dispute is one of fact (did, or did not, plaintiff perform the acts required to exhaust available

remedies?) it is well established that regardless of whether a genuine factual dispute is over an

element of a cause of action (i.e., an issue going to the merits of the claim), or over an

affirmative defense such as a statute of limitations or exhaustion, the court may not weigh and

resolve credibility on paper. United States v. Two Tracts of Land in Cascade County, Mont., 5

F.3d 1360, 1362 (9th Cir. 1993) (determination that affidavit on summary judgment motion

lacked credibility was improper prior to live testimony at trial); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158,

1166 (9th Cir. 1988) (conflicting affidavits over cause for meeting a deadline warrant live

testimony). 

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3

 A similar approach is utilized over challenges to jurisdictional facts. A district court

may take evidence and make findings of fact necessary to rule on the subject matter jurisdiction

question prior to trial if the jurisdictional facts are not intertwined with the merits. Augustine v.

United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983). “[I]f the jurisdictional issue and substantive

claims are so intertwined that resolution of the jurisdictional question is dependent on factual

issues going to the merits, the district court should employ the standard applicable to a motion

for summary judgment and grant the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction only if the

material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a

matter of law. Otherwise, the intertwined jurisdictional facts must be resolved at trial by the trier

of fact.” Rosales 824 F.2d at 803 (citing Augustine, 704 F.2d at 1077).

4

 On October 5, 2004, the court expressly informed plaintiff of the requirements for

opposing a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v.

Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999), and

Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988). Pursuant to Wyatt, 315 F.3d at

1120, n.4, that order also expressly informed plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a failure

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For this reason, courts utilize the procedures of Rule 56 to determine if there is a genuine dispute

over an issue that is material to the outcome.3 Likewise, the court must recognize the command

in Rule 12(b) that where matters extrinsic to the complaint are submitted with a motion brought

under that Rule, the motion must be converted to a motion for summary judgment. The panel’s

opinion in Wyatt expressly accounts for this, recognizing that “if the district court looks beyond

the pleadings to a factual record in deciding the motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust--a

procedure closely analogous to summary judgment--then the court must assure that [the nonmoving party] has fair notice of his opportunity to develop a record.” Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120,

n.14.

Here, defendants’ motion necessarily requires the court to consider the affidavits and

exhibits presented for the purpose of proving the absence of exhaustion. Accordingly, the court

will follow the analogous procedures of Rule 56 to address this motion and its supporting

affidavit and exhibits. Those standards are well established.

II. Rule 56 Standards

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).4

 As explained by the Ninth Circuit, the utility of Rule 56 to

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26 to exhaust motion that is supported by affidavits or declarations and exhibits.

5

screen which cases actually require resolution of disputed facts over material issues (through

presentation of testimony and evidence at trial) has been clarified and enhanced.

In three recent cases, the Supreme Court, by clarifying what the

non-moving party must do to withstand a motion for summary

judgment, has increased the utility of summary judgment. First, the

Court has made clear that if the non-moving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial as to an element essential to its case, and

that party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine

dispute of fact with respect to the existence of that element, then

summary judgment is appropriate. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317 (1986). Second, to withstand a motion for summary

judgment, the non-moving party must show that there are “genuine

factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact

because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (emphasis

added). Finally, if the factual context makes the non-moving

party’s claim implausible, that party must come forward with more

persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary to show

that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). No longer can it be

argued that any disagreement about a material issue of fact

precludes the use of summary judgment.

California Arch. Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988) (parallel citations omitted) (emphasis added). In short, there is no

“genuine issue as to material fact,” if the non-moving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial.” Grimes v. City and Country of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236,

239 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).

III. Plaintiff’s Alleged Failure to Exhaust

A prisoner may bring no action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or any other federal law until he

has exhausted available administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This requirement is

mandatory. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). A prisoner seeking leave to proceed in

forma pauperis in an action challenging the conditions of his confinement brings an action for

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 The facts are taken from defendants’ July 24, 2006, motion to dismiss. 

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purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e when he submits his complaint to the court. Vaden v.

Summerhill, 449 F.2d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, a prisoner must exhaust available

administrative remedies before filing any papers in federal court and the prisoner is not entitled

to a stay of judicial proceedings in order to exhaust. Id. at 1051; McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d

1198 (9th Cir. 2002). Defendant has the burden of proving that plaintiff did not exhaust. Brown

v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936 (9th Cir. 2005); Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119.

California prisoners may appeal “any departmental decision, action, condition, or policy

which they can demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon their welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit.

15, § 3084.1(a). The regulations require the use of specific forms but contain no guidelines for

grievance content. Id., at §§ 3084.2, 3085. Prisoners ordinarily must present their allegations on

one informal and three formal levels of review, although the informal and the first formal levels

may be bypassed. Id., at § 3084.5. A division head reviews appeals on the first formal level, see

id., at § 3084.5(b)(3) (authorizing bypass of the first formal level when the division head cannot

resolve it), and the warden or a designee thereof reviews appeals on the second formal level. See

Id., at § 3084.5(e)(1). Generally, completion of the third level, the Director’s Level of Review,

exhausts the remedy. Id., at § 3084.1(a).

IV. Summary of Facts5

Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (CDCR) and is currently incarcerated at the California State Prison in Corcoran,

California. In his second amended complaint, filed February 2, 2006, plaintiff claims that

defendants, who are CDCR employees at High Desert State Prison, subjected him to ten days of

punitive housing status in which he was deprived of water, waste disposal, and ventilation for

four of those days. Second Amended Complaint (Compl.), p. 3(a), ¶ 2. Plaintiff alleges that on

or about June 16, 2004, defendant Epperson ignored plaintiff’s requests for assistance with

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serious health hazards from the living conditions. Id., at ¶¶ 3-6. Plaintiff contends that on or

about June 18, 2004, he informed Defendant Harwood of his medical condition but was told to

re-submit a medical request. Id., at ¶¶ 7-8. Plaintiff alleges that on June 28, 2004, he was issued

a false CDC-Rule Violation Report (RVR), which was approved by Defendant Van Leer, in

retaliation for his complaints about the living conditions. Id., at ¶ 11. Plaintiff contends that

Defendant Peddicord, as the hearing officer for the RVR, forced him to waive his right to reports

regarding the RVR, forced him to waive his right to have 24 hours to prepare for his RVR

hearing, and found him guilty of the RVR in retaliation for his complaints about the living

conditions. Id., at ¶¶ 11-12. Plaintiff further contends that Defendants Logan, Harwood, and

Masterson altered medical records to cover-up the purported civil rights violations. Complt., p.

3(d), at ¶ 15.

Defendants argue that plaintiff has not brought a CDC 602 appeal at the first or second

levels of review against any of the defendants for any of the alleged violations identified in his

Second Amended Complaint. Defs.’ Mot. to Dism., Ex. A, Babich Dec., at ¶¶ 4-5. Defendants

also argue that plaintiff has not brought a CDC 602 to the Director’s level for these allegations. 

Id., Ex. B, Emigh Dec., at ¶ 9. 

V. Analysis

The record shows that plaintiff filed a CDC grievance form 602 appeal on June 30, 2004,

containing the claims presented in the Second Amended Complaint. That appeal was denied at

the informal level on July 21, 2004. Plaintiff filed a second 602 appeal on July 20, 2004, in

which he complained that, at a hearing on a rules violation report, defendant Peddicord abused

his authority. That appeal was denied at the informal level on August 30, 2004. Plaintiff

abandoned his appeal after the informal level. He therefore did not exhaust his appeal prior to

filing suit. As the exhaustion requirement is mandatory, see Booth, 532 U.S. at 741, the proper

remedy is dismissal of plaintiff’s claim without prejudice. See Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s &

Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365 at 368, n. 3 (9th Cir. 1988)(per curiam). 

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ July 24, 2006, motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies be granted; and 

2. The Clerk be directed to close this case. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: August 17, 2007.

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