Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00204/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00204-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1 08cv0204 AJB(RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JACIE LEE GOUDLOCK, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

R. PEREZ, Correctional

Sergeant; R. AMILING,

Correctional Officer; R.

ESQUILIN, Correctional Officer

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 08cv0204 AJB(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING

IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S SECOND

AMENDED COMPLAINT [ECF NO. 70]

Plaintiff Jacie Lee Goudlock, a former state prisoner

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Complaint on

February 1, 2008, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [ECF No. 1]. He

filed an Amended Complaint on August 8, 2008 [ECF No. 7], and a

Second Amended Complaint on April 11, 2011 [ECF No. 63]. In his

Second Amended Complaint, Goudlock asserts that his Eighth

Amendment rights were violated when two correctional officers

failed to respond to Plaintiff’s calls for help after he fell from

Case 3:08-cv-00204-AJB-RBB Document 74 Filed 12/20/11 Page 1 of 35
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1

 Because the pleading is not consecutively paginated, the

Court will cite to the Second Amended Complaint using the page

numbers assigned by the electronic case filing system.

2 08cv0204 AJB(RBB)

the top bunk bed in his cell. (Second Am. Compl. 3, ECF No. 63.)1 

Goudlock further contends that a correctional sergeant violated

Plaintiff’s rights by ignoring his lower bunk medical accommodation

and disregarding his expressed concerns about sleeping in an upper

bunk bed. (Id. at 11.)

The individual Defendants have fluctuated over the nearly

four-year life of this action as Goudlock struggled to identify and

serve the Defendants. The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s original

Complaint sua sponte for failing to state a claim upon which relief

could be granted [ECF No. 6]. All but one of the Defendants named

in the Amended Complaint were dismissed for various reasons. When

Goudlock filed the Amended Complaint, he did not name two of the

original Defendants, Robert Hernandez and Silvia Garcia, and they

were subsequently dismissed [ECF No. 12]. Nurse Peterson

successfully moved to dismiss the cause of action Plaintiff had

alleged against her [ECF Nos. 23, 33-34]. Correctional Sergeant

Cruz was dismissed from the lawsuit because Goudlock did not serve

Cruz within 120 days of filing the Amended Complaint [ECF No. 48]. 

Therefore, the only remaining Defendant named in the Amended

Complaint was Correctional Officer Thompson.

Defendant Thompson filed a Motion to Dismiss the First Amended

Complaint on November 19, 2010 [ECF No. 52], which Goudlock did not

oppose. While Thompson’s Motion to Dismiss was pending, Plaintiff

filed a Motion to Amend Complaint — Adding New Defendants Sgt. R.

Perez, R. Amiling, R. Esquilin [ECF No. 53]. There, Goudlock

sought to substitute Correctional Sergeant R. Perez for

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Correctional Sergeant Cruz, in light of information Plaintiff had

discovered from the prison litigation coordinator. (Mot. Amend

Compl. 1-2, ECF No. 53.) Goudlock also sought to substitute

Correctional Officers R. Amiling and R. Esquilin for two of the

three unknown defendants initially sued as “3 Unknown C.O.’s on 1st

Watch, Building 3.” (Id. at 2.) Defendant Thompson, the remaining

named Defendant, did not oppose Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend.

Goudlock had sought to voluntarily dismiss Thompson in a

letter Plaintiff attempted to file with the Court, which was

rejected. (Notice Doc. Discrepancy 1, ECF No. 49; Report &

Recommendation 24, ECF No. 59.) The Court subsequently permitted

the letter to be filed; as a result, Thompson’s Motion to Dismiss

was denied as moot. (Id.; see Order Adopting Report &

Recommendation 1-2, ECF No. 62.) Goudlock’s Motion to Amend to add

three new Defendants, Amiling, Equilin, and Perez, was granted. 

(Id.) The Plaintiff was explicitly limited in the type of claims

he could allege against the new Defendants. (See Report &

Recommendation 24, ECF No. 59.)

Goudlock then filed a Second Amended Complaint against

Correctional Sergeant R. Perez, Correctional Officer R. Amiling,

and Correctional Officer R. Esquilin. (Second Am. Compl. 1, ECF

No. 63.) On July 22, 2011, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint was filed, along with a

Memorandum of Points and Authorities [ECF No. 70]. Plaintiff’s

Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Second] Amended

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 The Court will also cite to Plaintiff’s Opposition using

the case numbers assigned by the electronic filing system.

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Complaint was filed on July 28, 2011 [ECF No. 71].2 Amiling,

Esquilin, and Perez did not file a reply.

The Court finds that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is suitable

for resolution on the papers. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1). 

After reviewing the Second Amended Complaint, the Motion to Dismiss

and attachment, and Goudlock’s Opposition, the Motion to Dismiss

should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The allegations in the Second Amended Complaint arise from

events that occurred while Goudlock was incarcerated at Richard J.

Donovan State Prison (“Donovan”) in San Diego, California. (Second

Am. Compl. 1, ECF No. 63.)

In count one, the Plaintiff alleges that on June 15, 2007, at

approximately 4:00 a.m., a medical condition caused him to suddenly

fall asleep while he was on the top bunk in “building ‘3' facility

(1) cell 220 up.” (Id. at 3.) As a result, Goudlock fell off the

bunk, twisted his ankle, shaved skin off of his right thigh, and

cut his left foot in a way that caused it to bleed profusely and

require stitches. (Id.) The fall also caused further damage to

“an already damaged ciatic nerve.” (Id.) In support of his claim,

Plaintiff attaches copies of documents reflecting the incident as

well as his medical condition before and after the fall. (Id.)

Goudlock contends that at the time of the fall, he continually

screamed for medical assistance from Defendants Esquilin and

Amiling, the on-duty officers, but they refused to respond. (Id.) 

Plaintiff argues that after approximately thirty minutes had

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elapsed without any response, the pain had increased and was nearly

unbearable. (Id.) Goudlock asked his cellmate to yell for medical

assistance; his cellmate began screaming, “Man down.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff maintains that Defendants Amiling and Esquilin heard the

pleas for help, but chose to ignore them. (Id.) By failing to

act, the officers violated Goudlock’s Eighth Amendment rights to be

free from cruel and unusual punishment and to receive adequate

medical care. (Id.) The Plaintiff additionally asserts that

Defendants caused him to suffer extreme pain unnecessarily without

medical treatment. (Id.)

In count two, Goudlock alleges that on June 12, 2007, three

days before his fall, he spoke to Correctional Sergeant Perez about

the dangerous housing conditions Plaintiff was subject to. (Id. at

11.) Goudlock told Defendant Perez that the day before, on June

11, 2007, two officers in building three had “forced” Plaintiff

into a top bunk in a upper-tier cell. (Id.) According to

Goudlock, he showed Sergeant Perez the medical chrono requiring

that Plaintiff be assigned a ground-floor cell and a bottom bunk. 

(Id.) The Defendant then asked Plaintiff whether his medical

condition was documented in his file, and Goudlock confirmed that

it was. (Id.) Plaintiff explained that he also suffered from

severe sleep apnea and had already fallen from his bunk bed at

California Rehabilitation Center (“CRC”) in Norco, California,

where he was incarcerated before his transfer to Donovan. (Id.) 

Before the June 15, 2007 fall, the Plaintiff spoke to Sergeant

Perez two additional times and provided him with all of his

documentation. (Id.)

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Goudlock contends that despite this notice, Defendant Perez

chose not to take any action and instead permitted Plaintiff to

remain housed in a dangerous living condition. (See id.) 

Plaintiff maintains that Perez could have changed Goudlock’s

housing assignment. (See id.) Because Defendant failed to respond

to the warning, Plaintiff was forced to live in conditions

inadequate for his medical condition. (See id.) Further, Goudlock

contends that Perez did not report the malicious acts of the

correctional officers under his command. (Id.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

A. Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. See Davis v. Monroe

County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). “The old formula --

that the complaint must not be dismissed unless it is beyond doubt

without merit -- was discarded by the Bell Atlantic decision [Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007)].” Limestone

Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008).

A complaint must be dismissed if it does not contain “enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct.

1937, 1949 (2009). The court must accept as true all material

allegations in the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to

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be drawn from them, and must construe the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish,

382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Karam v. City of Burbank,

352 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003)); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v.

Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); N.L. Indus., Inc. v.

Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986).

 The court does not look at whether the plaintiff will

“ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer

evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,

236 (1974); see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8. A

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is generally proper only where there

“is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts

alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v. Block,

250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)).

The court need not accept conclusory allegations in the

complaint as true; rather, it must “examine whether [they] follow

from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff.” Holden

v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation

omitted); see Halkin v. VeriFone, Inc., 11 F.3d 865, 868 (9th Cir.

1993); see also Cholla Ready Mix, Inc., 382 F.3d at 973 (quoting

Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir.

1994)) (stating that on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “is not

required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual

allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from

the facts alleged.”). “Nor is the court required to accept as true

allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of

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fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

In addition, when resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, courts may not generally consider materials outside

of the pleadings. Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., 151 F.3d

1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); Jacobellis v. State Farm Fire &

Cas. Co., 120 F.3d 171, 172 (9th Cir. 1997); Allarcom Pay

Television Ltd. v. Gen. Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 385 (9th

Cir. 1995). “The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the

complaint.” Schneider, 151 F.3d at 1197 n.1. This precludes

consideration of “new” allegations that may be raised in a

plaintiff’s opposition to a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (citing Harrell v. United States, 13 F.3d 232,

236 (7th Cir. 1993)).

“When a plaintiff has attached various exhibits to the

complaint, those exhibits may be considered in determining whether

dismissal [i]s proper . . . .” Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc., 51 F.3d

at 1484 (citing Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1210 n.2 (9th Cir.

1980)). The court may also consider documents “‘whose contents are

alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions,

but which are not physically attached to the [plaintiff’s]

pleading.’” Sunrize Staging, Inc. v. Ovation Dev. Corp., 241 F.

App’x 363, 365 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Janas v. McCracken (In re

Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig.), 183 F.3d 970, 986 (9th Cir.

1999)) (alteration in original); see Stone v. Writer’s Guild of Am.

W., Inc., 101 F.3d 1312, 1313-14 (9th Cir. 1996).

These Rule 12 (b)(6) guidelines apply to Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss.

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B. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants

Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights

case, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford

the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los

Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule

of liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights

cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). 

In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights

complaint, courts may not “supply essential elements of claims that

were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of

Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations

are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see

also Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.

1984) (finding conclusory allegations unsupported by facts

insufficient to state a claim under § 1983). “The plaintiff must

allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which

defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff’s claim.” Jones,

733 F.2d at 649 (internal quotation omitted).

Nevertheless, the Court must give a pro se litigant leave to

amend his complaint “unless it determines that the pleading could

not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe

v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). Thus, before

a pro se civil rights complaint may be dismissed, the court must

provide the plaintiff with a statement of the complaint’s

deficiencies. Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623-24. But where

amendment of a pro se litigant’s complaint would be futile, denial

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of leave to amend is appropriate. See James v. Giles, 221 F.3d

1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000).

C. Stating a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts

sufficient to show (1) a person acting “under color of state law”

committed the conduct at issue, and (2) the conduct deprived the

plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983

(West 2010); Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746 (9th

Cir. 1986).

III. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants Amiling, Esquilin, and Perez argue that Goudlock

fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. (Mot. Dismiss 2, ECF No.

70.) The Defendants also assert that they are entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity as well as qualified immunity. (Id.)

Defendant Perez is only named in count two and generally moves

to dismiss the claim in its entirety, although he only

substantively addresses Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference to a

serious medical need claim. (See id. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 4-6.) 

Sergeant Perez does not argue that Goudlock’s conditions of

confinement claim for failure to prevent harm should be dismissed. 

(See id.; Report & Recommendation 20-21, ECF No. 59 (giving

Plaintiff leave to amend his deliberate indifference to a serious

medical need claim as well as his conditions of confinement

claim).) Thus, whether Goudlock adequately states a conditions of

confinement cause of action in count two is not before the Court in

ruling on the Motion to Dismiss.

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Also in count two, Plaintiff argues that “Sergeant Perez

failed to report malicious acts perpetrated by correctional

officers under his command.” (Second Am. Compl. 11, ECF No. 63.) 

To the extent Goudlock intends to allege a third claim against

Perez for failing to report staff misconduct, Plaintiff was not

given leave to include that claim in his Second Amended Complaint. 

(See Report & Recommendation 20-21, ECF No. 59; Order Adopting

Report & Recommendation 1-2, ECF No. 62.) Furthermore, Goudlock

does not appear to have exhausted this allegation in his inmate

grievance, as required. (See generally Second Am. Compl. 14-25,

ECF No. 63); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a) (West 2003).

Accordingly, the Court’s consideration of Sergeant Perez’s

Motion to Dismiss count two is limited to whether the Plaintiff

states a deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claim.

A. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

The Eighth Amendment requires that inmates have “ready access

to adequate medical care.” Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253

(9th Cir. 1982). Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs

violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and

unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). 

To state a claim, a prisoner’s allegations must satisfy two

requirements, one objective and the other subjective. Jett v.

Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); Lopez, 203 F.3d at

1132-33 (quoting Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir.

1995)). The plaintiff must first establish a “serious medical

need” by showing that “failure to treat a prisoner’s condition

could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and

wanton infliction of pain.’” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quoting

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McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled

on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th

Cir. 1997)). “Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s

response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Id. (citing

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060).

With regard to the objective requirement, “[e]xamples of

serious medical needs include ‘[t]he existence of an injury that a

reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of

comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that

significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the

existence of chronic and substantial pain.’” Lopez, 203 F.3d at

1131 (quoting McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60).

Under the subjective element, prison officials are

deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs when

the officials “‘deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical

treatment.’” Linderman v. Vail, 59 F. App’x 180, 182-83 (9th Cir.

2003) (quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir.

2002)). “[T]he official must be both aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Inadequate treatment due to medical

malpractice, negligence, or even gross negligence, does not rise to

the level of a constitutional violation. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501

U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06); Toguchi

v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). A defendant’s acts

or omissions will not amount to a constitutional violation unless

there is reckless disregard of a risk of serious harm to the

prisoner. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836. The official must have

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“know[n] that [the] inmate[] face[d] a substantial risk of serious

harm and disregard[ed] that risk by failing to take reasonable

measures to abate it.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847.

1. Count One: Defendants Amiling and Esquilin

Correctional Officers Amiling and Esquilin are only named in

count one; they contend that Goudlock has failed to state a

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim against

them. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 4-5, 7-8, ECF No. 70.)

a. Serious medical need

As to the objective requirement of the Eighth Amendment

inquiry, these two Defendants allege that Plaintiff’s injuries were

insufficient to establish a serious medical need. (Id. at 4.) The

officers challenge Goudlock’s claim that he was bleeding profusely. 

(Id.) Defendants argue that the Health Care Services Request Form

that Goudlock completed immediately after his fall shows that

Plaintiff stated that he injured his left knee and his toe. (Id.

(citing Second Am. Compl. 6, ECF No. 63).) Also, the portion of

the form completed by the treating nurse indicates that Goudlock

only had a toe laceration and a possible foot injury. (Id. at 5.) 

Defendants maintain that the nurse did not document any profuse

bleeding or need for stitches, which she would have noted had those

conditions existed. (Id.) Moreover, Plaintiff does not assert

that he suffered any further serious injury, either immediate or

ongoing, from the purported thirty-minute delay in treatment. (See

id.)

In response, Goudlock insists that his injuries were serious. 

(Opp’n 4, ECF No. 71.) He alleges that his accident occurred at

4:00 a.m., and he bled for four hours without any response from

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Defendants. (See id. at 2, 4.) Plaintiff states that his cell

door was finally opened at 8:00 a.m. for morning meal service; the

registered nurse completed the health care request at 9:00 a.m.,

and Goudlock was taken by ambulance to the Triage and Treatment

Area at roughly 1:00 p.m. (See id. (citing Second Am. Compl. 6,

ECF No. 63).) Although he bled immediately, Plaintiff argues that

over the course of four hours, the bleeding slowed. (See id. at

4.) Plaintiff submits, “I was still bleeding and in horrorable

[sic] pain and my foot was wrapped in a towel[.] [A]ll that nurse

did was write her finding based on what I had all ready [sic]

wrote.” (Id.) The triage nurse ultimately told Goudlock that

stitches were no longer an option because so much time had elapsed. 

(Id.) Plaintiff reemphasizes that he went without medical care

from 4:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m., and then from 9:00 a.m. to 1:30 p.m.,

which is approximately nine hours, not thirty minutes. (See id. at

4-5.)

In the Second Amended Complaint, Goudlock alleges that on June

15, 2007, at roughly 4:00 a.m., he fell from the top bunk bed in

his cell while sleeping, striking the floor. (Second Am. Compl. 3,

ECF No. 63.) He “cut [his] left foot to the point that the injury

needed stitches, and was bleeding profusely,” and he “twist[ed]

[his] ankle - shaving off skin on [his] right thigh, and causing

further damage to an already damaged [s]ciatic nerve.” (Id.) 

Goudlock argues that he suffered “great pain and agony.” (Id.) 

The injuries Plaintiff described in his grievance are consistent. 

There, he complained that he had severely injured his left foot and

right thigh, sliced open his toe, reinjured his lower back,

sprained his foot, and sustained several bruises. (Id. at 23.) 

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According to Goudlock, the examining physician called custody staff

in front of Plaintiff and told them that Goudlock could have died

from the fall. (Id. at 24.) The Plaintiff is six feet and three

inches tall, and on the date of the incident, he weighed

approximately 300 pounds. (Id. at 6.)

Based on these facts, Goudlock has sufficiently alleged a

serious medical need. See Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (explaining that

an inmate establishes a medical need when the failure to treat the

condition could result in unnecessary pain). Plaintiff’s failure

to describe the extent of his bleeding on the date of the incident

does not change the result. (See Second Am. Compl. 6, ECF No. 63.) 

That same day, the triage registered nurse indicated that Goudlock

had sustained a small toe laceration, avulsion injury, “foot

trauma,” and an “alteration in skin integrity.” (Id.) The nurse

also noted that Plaintiff was to obtain a medical evaluation,

x-ray, and tetanus shot. (Id.) Even the nurse’s description of

Plaintiff’s injuries is consistent with a serious medical need. 

His cut foot, twisted ankle, shaved skin, and reinjured sciatic

nerve are injuries that could significantly affect an individual’s

daily activities. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131.

b. Deliberate indifference

To satisfy the subjective element of a deliberate indifference

to medical needs cause of action, Goudlock must allege that

Defendants Amiling and Esquilin knew he faced a substantial risk of

serious harm and acted with deliberate indifference to that harm. 

See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836; Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104; Jett, 439

F.3d at 1096.

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The correctional officers maintain that the contentions in

Goudlock’s pleading establish that Defendants were merely

negligent, if anything, in their response to Plaintiff’s requests

for medical attention. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 7,

ECF No. 70.) Amiling and Esquilin urge that failing to summon

medical care for thirty minutes is insufficient to give rise to a

violation. (Id.) Plaintiff’s injuries were not visible to the

officers and were not serious enough to justify summoning the

emergency medical care that Goudlock insists he was entitled to. 

(See id. at 7-8.) Finally, Plaintiff has not asserted that the

purported thirty-minute delay exacerbated his injuries. (Id. at

8.) In response, Goudlock challenges the officers’ assertion that

they caused only a thirty-minute delay. (Opp’n 2, ECF No. 71.) 

“What did happen, and what is documented is, I sat in my cell

bleeding for 4 hours, till the door was opened for the morning meal

at 8:00 a.m., I did not receive medical help until [approximately]

1:00 p.m.” (Id.)

In count one, Goudlock pleads that after falling from the top

bunk in his cell, he screamed for assistance from Amiling and

Esquilin, but both officers refused to respond. (Second Am. Compl.

3, ECF No. 63.) After thirty minutes has passed, the pain became

unbearable and Goudlock asked his cellmate to yell for medical

assistance, which he did by screaming, “Man down.” (Id.) 

Defendants Amiling and Esquilin heard the pleas for help because

they were on duty. (Id.) Even so, Defendants chose to ignore

Plaintiff’s cries, which caused Goudlock to suffer unnecessarily. 

(Id.)

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Contrary to Defendants’ representation that Goudlock went only

thirty minutes without care, the Plaintiff has alleged that Amiling

and Esquilin ignored his pleas for medical assistance for at least

four hours. Goudlock asserts that he fell from the top bunk at

4:00 a.m., and he was not examined by a nurse until “0900,” or 9:00

a.m., and again at “1340,” or 1:40 p.m. (Second Am. Compl. 3, 6,

ECF No. 63; see also Opp’n 2, 4-5, ECF No. 71 (reiterating that

Plaintiff bled in his cell from 4:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m., when his

door was initially opened for meal service).) The documents

attached to the Second Amended Complaint support Plaintiff’s claim

that he suffered for at least four hours as Amiling and Esquilin

ignored his calls for help. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261 (noting

that courts must construe the pleadings of pro se plaintiffs

liberally).

The officers do not argue that they did not hear Goudlock’s

cries for help or that they responded to his pleas. Instead, they

insist that Plaintiff’s injuries were not serious and were not

visible enough to put Defendants on notice that Goudlock suffered

life-threatening harm. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 7-8,

ECF No. 70.) This argument misses the point. The inquiry is not

whether Defendants could have adequately diagnosed the severity of

Goudlock’s injuries had they responded to his pleas, but whether

the Defendants responded reasonably to a risk of harm to Plaintiff. 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. Amiling and Esquilin purportedly heard

but ignored Plaintiff’s calls for help. Id. at 843 n.8 (clarifying

that prison officials are liable if they decline to confirm

inferences of risk that they suspect existed); Swan v. United

States of America, 159 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1182 (N.D. Cal. 2001)

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(“[T]urning a blind eye to the relevant surrounding facts will not

shield a prison official from liability.”); cf. Trueman v. State,

No. CV 09-2179-PHX-RCB(DKD), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67847, at *4-5,

15-16 (D. Ariz. June 15, 2010) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim that

prison officials violated his rights when they witnessed plaintiff

slip and fall, saw no physical injuries, and failed to summon

medical care). The Plaintiff has alleged injuries that would be

visible to a correctional officer responding to the situation. 

(Second Am. Compl. 3, 6, ECF No. 63 (alleging profuse bleeding, a

toe laceration, a foot trauma, shaved skin, avulsion injury,

twisted ankle, and alteration in skin integrity.)

Goudlock has presented facts demonstrating that Defendants

Amiling and Esquilin deliberately denied or delayed his access to

medical care. See Linderman, 59 F. App’x at 182-83. The Plaintiff

described the injuries he sustained as a result of the fall and

alleged that Defendants heard the “frantic” and desperate pleas

that there was a “man down,” yet ignored them for four hours. 

(Second Am. Compl. 3, 6, ECF No. 63); see Thomas v. Hernandez, No.

C 01-4685 THE (pr), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11272, at *17 (N.D. Cal.

June 30, 2003) (stating that deliberate indifference requires an

actual perception of risk); Cf. Trueman, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

67847, at *15-16 (finding that plaintiff failed to state a

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim because he

did not allege facts showing that defendants should have known that

he even required medical aid). Further, Goudlock has asserted that

he required medical treatment and that the Defendants’ failure to

respond to his calls resulted in the unnecessary infliction of

pain. (Second Am. Compl. 3, ECF No. 63.)

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For all of these reasons, Defendants Amiling and Esquilin’s

Motion to Dismiss should be DENIED.

2. Count Two: Defendant Perez

Sergeant Perez contends that the Plaintiff has failed to state

a deliberate indifference to medical needs claim against him. 

(Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 4-6, ECF No. 70.) Goudlock

must assert the existence of a serious medical need and that Perez

was deliberately indifferent to that need. See Jett, 439 F.3d at

1096.

a. Serious medical need

The Defendant argues generally that the injuries Plaintiff

sustained from the fall were not serious enough to constitute a

serious medical need. (See Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A.

4-5, ECF No. 70.) Yet, the sergeant does not address the existence

of a medical need upon Goudlock’s arrival at Donovan, when Perez

purportedly allowed Plaintiff to be assigned to a top bunk bed,

disregarded his lower-bunk chrono, and ignored Goudlock’s concerns. 

(See generally id.)

Plaintiff states that when he arrived at Donovan, he suffered

from “severe sleep apnea” and had fallen from his bunk at CRC, the

prison where he was housed before Donovan. (Second Am. Compl. 11,

ECF No. 63.) On June 10, 2007, five days before Goudlock’s fall, a

correctional officer completed a form requesting medical services

for Plaintiff because he exhibited “bizarre” and “odd” behavior in

the form of a sleep disorder and would fall asleep suddenly. (Id.

at 5.) Goudlock contends that he told Perez several times about

his sleep apnea and his previous fall from a bed. (Id. at 11.)

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Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,

he has sufficiently alleged that his “severe sleep apnea”

constituted a serious medical need. See Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096;

Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 (noting that instances of serious medical

needs include the existence of a condition that a reasonable doctor

or patient would find important and worthy of comment, or a

condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily

activities).

b. Deliberate indifference 

Sergeant Perez argues that based on the information he was

provided, Goudlock’s bunk assignment was reasonable. (Mot. Dismiss

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 5-6, ECF No. 70.) The Defendant could not

have been aware of any risk to Plaintiff because Goudlock’s bottombunk chrono did not indicate that he had sleep apnea or that he was

at risk of falling from an upper bunk. (Id. at 6.) Perez argues

that most lower bunk chronos are issued because the inmate cannot

climb to the upper bunk, and Defendant therefore could not have

known that Goudlock’s medical condition posed a risk of falling. 

(Id.) Although Plaintiff contends that he told Sergeant Perez

about his sleep apnea, the documents attached to the Second Amended

Complaint illustrate that Goudlock was not actually diagnosed with

the condition until at least four months after the incident. (Id.) 

Further, Defendant insists that in Plaintiff’s inmate grievance,

Goudlock noted that he was placed in a top bunk because no lower

bunks were available. (Id.) These allegations, Perez insists, do

not indicate that he was deliberately indifferent to any excessive

risk of injury. (Id.)

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The Plaintiff argues in his Opposition that in light of his

prior fall from his bunk at CRC, doctors at CRC and at Donovan had

already diagnosed the sleep disorder. (Opp’n 6, ECF No. 71.) 

Goudlock cites to the Request for Psychiatric/Psychological

Services Form submitted by Correctional Officer Gonzalez five days

before Plaintiff’s incident, which indicates that Plaintiff had a

sleep disorder that caused him to fall asleep suddenly. (Id.) 

Goudlock argues that, as a sergeant, Perez had the authority to

call medical staff to verify this medical condition, and Defendant

was negligent on three different times prior to the incident. (See

id. at 5-6.) If Perez had reviewed Plaintiff’s medical file, the

Defendant would have been aware of Goudlock’s medical condition. 

(Id.) Although the actual diagnosis was not formally confirmed

until later, Plaintiff urges that his medical file contained

sufficient evidence of a sleep disorder to put Perez on notice that

keeping Goudlock in a top bunk bed posed a risk of harm. (See id.

at 6-7.) Defendant also allegedly lied to Plaintiff about

Defendant’s true name to conceal his identity. (Id.)

In count two, Plaintiff contends that he was transferred to

Donovan on June 11, 2011, and at that time, his medical file

included a ground-floor cell and bottom-bunk medical chrono issued

by CRC medical staff. (Second Am. Compl. 21, ECF No. 63.) That

same day, a Donovan physician, Dr. R. Walsh, evaluated Goudlock’s

medical accommodations and issued similar orders. (Id. at 4; see

also id. at 21.) In addition to the actual medical chrono,

Correctional Officer Gonzalez completed a staff referral form

requesting psychiatric and psychological services for Plaintiff’s

“bizarre behavior” in the form of a “sleeping disorder.” (Id. at

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5.) “[Goudlock] is sitting one minute, all of a sudden he [is]

sleeping. He was sitting on his bunk and fe[l]l forward. 

[B]ehavior odd. [S]hould be seen to see if he can be given psych

services.” (Id.) Although this form was completed on June 10,

2007, five days before Plaintiff’s June 15, 2007 accident, the

stamp on the document indicates that CRC Mental Health did not

receive the request until June 18, 2007. (Id.) Nevertheless,

Goudlock has sufficiently pleaded that the documents in his medical

file at the time of his transfer contained evidence of a severe

sleep disorder. (Id. at 5, 11.) The Plaintiff explicitly

described his medical condition to Defendant and the risk that

sleeping in a top bunk posed. (See id.)

The Defendant argues that he is not liable because he did not

know that Goudlock’s medical accommodation was due to sleep apnea. 

(Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 6, ECF No. 70.) This

argument is unavailing. Prison physicians are not required to

explain the bases for their orders. See Chess v. Sisto, No. 2:06-

cv-1639 LKK KJN P, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46494, at *25 (E.D. Cal.

May 12, 2010) (discussing that it is reasonable to believe that

prison staff will honor medical accommodation chronos). In any

event, the question is not whether Perez disobeyed the chrono, but

whether he knew of a serious medical need that he could have

addressed, yet chose to ignore.

Goudlock has alleged that three different times before the

fall, he told Perez that Plaintiff suffered from sleep apnea, had

fallen from his bunk at CRC, and this was documented in his medical

file. (See Second Am. Compl. 11, ECF No. 63.) Sergeant Perez was

purportedly responsible for locating appropriate housing and could

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have ensured that Plaintiff received a lower bunk. (See id.); see

Jones v. Martel, No. CIV S-09-1208 DAD P, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

17201, at *29-30 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2011) (finding that the

defendant was not deliberately indifferent because there was no

evidence of an actual accommodation chrono or that the sergeant

knew plaintiff should be housed in a lower-tier cell); Williams v.

Steck, No. CV 08-3161-DOC (OP), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106238, at

*14 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2009) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim with

leave to amend when plaintiff never specified what medical

condition, if any, he had that warranted the bottom bunk chrono);

see also Hickman v. Ciccati, No. 01CV2003-BTM(NLS), 2004 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 18315, at *14 n.3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2004) (clarifying that

prison officials can be liable for assigning a certain bunk to a

prisoner in spite of his medical conditions). Perez’s reliance on

the statement in Plaintiff’s grievance that a different

correctional officer told him that there was no bottom bunk open at

the time is insufficient to warrant dismissal. Goudlock has

contended that he was subsequently moved to a bottom bunk bed in a

ground-floor cell the same day as his accident. (Second Am. Compl.

15, 18, 24, ECF No. 63.)

Finally, the fact that Goudlock was not formally diagnosed

with sleep apnea until four months after the incident is

inconsequential. (See Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 6, ECF

No. 70.) There are allegations that Sergeant Perez was aware of a

sleep disorder and that keeping Plaintiff in an upper bunk posed a

risk of harm. Goudlock had a bottom-bunk chrono and had

communicated his sleep disorder to Defendant on three occasions. 

See O’Neal v. Voong, No. CIV S-07-2578 MCE GGH P, 2009 U.S. Dist.

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LEXIS 14824, at *9-10 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2009) (“If plaintiff told

defendants that he had a lower bunk chrono and they moved him to an

upper bunk, the court would find that he had stated a colorable

Eighth Amendment claim.”); Garrett v. Richhi, No. 1:03-CV-05892-

AWI-SMS-P, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36431, at *18-19 (E.D. Cal. June

5, 2006) (finding that defendant was not entitled to judgment as a

matter of law when defendant ignored plaintiff’s complaints about

his upper bunk assignment).

Sergeant Perez is alleged to have ignored inferences and risks

he was told about. His Motion to Dismiss should be DENIED.

B. Absolute Immunity

Amiling, Esquilin, and Perez insist that they are absolutely

immune from liability for damages in their official capacities. 

(Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 2, ECF No. 70.) The

Plaintiff does not address the Defendants’ argument. (See Opp’n

2-7, ECF No. 71.)

The Eleventh Amendment grants the states immunity from private

civil suits. U.S. Const. amend. XI; Savage v. Glendale Union High

Sch. Dist. No. 205, 343 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003). It also

provides immunity for state officials sued in their official

capacities. “[A] suit against a state official in his or her

official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is

a suit against the official’s office.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469

U.S. 464, 471 (1985)). “As such, it is no different from a suit

against the State itself.” Id. (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473

U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985); Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55). “The

proponent of a claim to absolute immunity bears the burden of

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establishing the justification for such immunity.” Antoine v.

Byers & Anderson, 508 U.S. 429, 432 (1993) (footnote omitted).

Goudlock sues Defendants Amiling, Esquilin, and Perez in their

individual and official capacities, and he seeks monetary damages. 

(Second Am. Compl. 2, 26, ECF No. 63.) A claim for damages is

properly alleged against the Defendants in their individual

capacities. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). But

claims against them in their official capacities are claims against

the State of California, which is absolutely immune from liability

for damages. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71. Accordingly, the

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss monetary claims against them in their

official capacities should be GRANTED. Goudlock may only seek

monetary damages from Amiling, Esquilin, and Perez in their

individual capacities.

C. Qualified immunity

Finally, Defendants allege that they are each protected by

qualified immunity from liability in their individual capacities. 

(Mot. Dismiss 2, ECF No. 70.) Amiling, Esquilin, and Perez argue

that because Goudlock has failed to state a deliberate indifference

to serious medical needs claim, the qualified immunity inquiry may

end there. (Id. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 9.) All Defendants

contend that their conduct was not clearly unlawful. (Id.) In

response, Goudlock maintains that qualified immunity only protects

members of the state government, such as mayors, governors, and

city councilmen, but the doctrine does not shield wardens or

correctional officers from liability. (Opp’n 2, ECF No. 71.) Even

if qualified immunity could protect Amiling, Esquilin, and Perez,

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Plaintiff argues, these Defendants are not entitled to immunity in

light of their negligence. (Id.)

“Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from

money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the

official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that

the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged

conduct.” Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080

(2011) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); see

also Hydrick v. Hunter, 449 F.3d 978, 992 (9th Cir. 2006). This

immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341

(1986).

When considering a claim for qualified immunity, courts engage

in a two-part inquiry: Do the facts show that the defendant

violated a constitutional right, and was the right clearly

established at the time of the defendant’s purported misconduct? 

Delia v. City of Rialto, 621 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2010)

(quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). A right

is clearly established if the contours of the right are so clear

that a reasonable official would understand his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted. Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d

1196, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) (internal

quotation marks omitted). This standard ensures that government

officials are on notice of the illegality of their conduct before

they are subjected to suit. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739

(2002) (citation omitted). “This is not to say that an official

action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in

question has previously been held unlawful . . . .” Id.

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“[L]ower courts have discretion to decide which of the two

prongs of qualified-immunity analysis to tackle first.” Al-Kidd,

__ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2080; Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236; see

also Delia, 621 F.3d at 1075 (citing Brooks v. Seattle, 599 F.3d

1018, 1022 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010); Bull v. City & County of San

Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2010)). “If the Officers’

actions do not amount to a constitutional violation, the violation

was not clearly established, or their actions reflected a

reasonable mistake about what the law requires, they are entitled

to qualified immunity.” Brooks, 599 F.3d at 1022 (citing

Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 471 (9th Cir. 2007));

see James v. Rowlands, 606 F.3d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232, 236).

Courts should generally attempt to resolve this threshold

immunity question at the earliest possible stage in the litigation

“before expending ‘scarce judicial resources’ to resolve difficult

and novel questions of constitutional or statutory interpretation

that will ‘have no effect on the outcome of the case.’” Al-Kidd,

__ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2080 (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at

236-37); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998)

(noting that the purpose of resolving immunity issues early is so

that officials are not subjected to unnecessary discovery); Hunter

v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991).

1. Count One: Defendants Amiling and Esquilin

According to Correctional Officers Amiling and Esquilin, it is

not clearly established that Goudlock had a right to emergency care

for his cut toe. (See Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 10, ECF

No. 70.) The officers argue that their purported thirty-minute

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delay in summoning medical care for Plaintiff was not clearly

unlawful and that Goudlock’s injuries did not appear to warrant

emergency response. (See id.)

a. Violation of a constitutional right

A prisoner has a constitutional right to “ready access to

adequate medical care.” Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1253. When

institutional officials are deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s

medical needs, the prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right to be free

from cruel and unusual punishment is violated. Estelle, 429 U.S.

at 103.

The Court has already found that Goudlock adequately alleged

that Defendants Amiling and Esquilin were deliberately indifferent

to a serious medical need when they ignored his calls for help and

delayed the medical response to Plaintiff’s injuries. Goudlock has

therefore asserted that Defendants violated a constitutional right.

b. Whether the right was clearly established

“Whether a right is clearly established turns on the

‘objective legal reasonableness of the action, addressed in light

of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was

taken.’” Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1241

(9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at ___, 129 S. Ct. at

822). “This is ‘a two-part inquiry: (1) Was the law governing the

state official’s conduct clearly established? (2) Under that law

could a reasonable state official have believed his conduct was

lawful?’” Estate of Ford, 301 F.3d at 1050 (quoting Jeffers, 267

F.3d at 910).

First, the law governing the Defendants’ conduct was clearly

established. “Whether the right is clearly established in a

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particular case is judged as of the date of the incident alleged,

and is a pure question of law.” Phillips v. Hust, 338 F. Supp. 2d

at 1162 (citing Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th

Cir. 1993)). “[T]he right alleged to have been violated must not

be so broadly defined as to ‘convert the rule of qualified immunity

that our cases plainly establish into a rule of virtually

unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of extremely

abstract rights.’” Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1288 (9th

Cir. 2000) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639

(1987)). “On the other hand, . . . the right can not be so

narrowly construed so as to ‘define away all potential claims.’” 

Id. (quoting Kelley v. Borg, 60 F.3d 664, 667 (9th Cir. 1995)).

An inmate’s right to adequate medical care has long been

established. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828-29; Estelle, 429 U.S. at

103-04; Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1253. A prison official’s deliberate

indifference to an inmate’s serious medical need constitutes the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain prohibited by the Eighth

Amendment. Helling, 509 U.S. at 32; Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104;

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. Deliberate indifference may be

manifested by the intentional denial, delay, or interference with

the prisoner’s medical care. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05;

Linderman, 59 F. App’x at 182-83. The law also imposes liability

on institutional staff members who turn a blind eye to surrounding

facts, fail to confirm inferences of risk they suspect to exist, or

do not respond reasonably to the risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843

n.8; Swan, 159 F. Supp. 2d at 1182. Consequently, the law

applicable to Goudlock’s deliberate indifference allegations was

clearly established on June 15, 2007, the date Officers Amiling and

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Esquilin allegedly ignored Plaintiff’s pleas for help and delayed

his access to medical care. (See Second Am. Compl. 3, ECF No. 63.)

Second, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to

Goudlock, a rational prison official would believe that his or her

conduct was unlawful. See Estate of Ford, 301 F.3d at 1045. “The

relevant, dispositive inquiry . . . is whether it would be clear to

a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation

he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. “If the law did not put

the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful,

. . . qualified immunity is appropriate.” Id. “The Eighth

Amendment requires that prison officials provide a system of ready

access to adequate medical care. Prison officials show deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs if prisoners are unable to

make their medical problems known to the medical staff.” Hoptowit,

682 F.2d at 1253.

Amiling and Esquilin contend that a thirty-minute delay in

summoning treatment for Plaintiff’s minor injuries was not clearly

unlawful. (See Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 10, ECF No.

70.) As discussed, Goudlock has alleged the Defendants ignored his

calls for at least four hours, not thirty minutes. Also,

Plaintiff’s ultimate medical diagnosis is not vital to the

qualified immunity inquiry. (See id.) The issue is whether a

reasonable official would have known it was unlawful to

deliberately ignore a prisoner’s calls for help without

investigating the matter whatsoever, causing a multiple-hour delay

in medical treatment. The Defendants’ knowledge of the risk may be

inferred from the fact that the risk was obvious. See Farmer, 511

U.S. at 842. Plaintiff alleges that the officers heard “frantic”

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pleas that a man was “down.” Goudlock urges that he bled in his

cell for four hours without any response from Amiling and Esquilin.

The officers were put on notice that their failure to respond

to, or at least investigate the reasons for, Plaintiff’s cries for

help was unlawful. See id. at 843 n.8 (failing to confirm

inferences of risk that a defendant suspects to exist constitutes

deliberate indifference); Swan, 159 F. Supp. 2d at 1182 (stating

that turning a blind eye to surrounding facts does not protect an

official from liability). Defendants Amiling and Esquilin are not

entitled to qualified immunity.

2. Count Two: Defendant Perez

 Sergeant Perez similarly submits that keeping Goudlock housed

in an upper-tier cell and an upper bunk for four days was not

clearly unlawful. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 9, ECF No.

70.) As discussed, Sergeant Perez’s Motion to Dismiss count two is

limited to Goudlock’s deliberate indifference to a serious medical

need claim. The Court will not consider whether Defendant Perez is

immune from liability for the conditions of confinement cause of

action asserted against him.

a. Violation of a constitutional right

The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to take

reasonable measures to protect prisoners from serious risks to

their health and safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The Court has

found that Goudlock adequately stated a claim against Perez for

allowing Plaintiff to remain housed in a top bunk, ignoring his

bottom bunk medical chrono, and disregarding Plaintiff’s statements

about his medical condition.

b. Whether the right was clearly established

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First, the Court must consider whether the law governing

Sergeant Perez’s conduct was clearly established. See Estate of

Ford, 301 F.3d at 1050. The facts in the Second Amended Complaint

are sufficient to allege that, at a minimum, Perez suspected that

keeping Goudlock assigned to an upper bunk could pose a risk of

harm to Plaintiff. The law is clear that a correctional sergeant’s

failure to confirm inferences of risk that prison officials suspect

exist is unconstitutional. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 n.8; Swan,

159 F. Supp. 2d at 1182.

Second, a reasonable correctional sergeant in Perez’s position

would know that it is unlawful to ignore an inmate’s lower bunk

chrono and disregard his express reluctance to sleep in an upper

bunk based on a severe sleep disorder and prior instances of

falling from prison bunk beds. See Estate of Ford, 301 F.3d at

1050.

The Defendant argues that it was not clearly unconstitutional

for Perez to assign Goudlock to a top bunk for four days when no

bottom bunks were available. (See Mot. Dismiss Attach. #1 Mem. P.

& A. 9-10, ECF No. 70.) Perez cites to Goudlock’s inmate

grievance. (Id. at 6, 9-10.) There, Plaintiff complains that one

of the two correctional officers who placed him in an upper-tier

cell and in a top bunk stated that there were no lower bunks

available. (Second Am. Compl. 22, ECF No. 63.) Goudlock disputes

this contention. He asserts there was appropriate housing

available on June 15, 2007, the date of the incident, because he

was moved to a bottom bunk in a ground-floor cell that same day. 

(Id. at 15, 18 (indicating that Donovan staff relocated Goudlock to

a bottom bunk on June 15, 2007, which satisfied his medical

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restrictions); see id. at 24 (clarifying that he was moved to a

compliant bed after his 4:00 a.m. fall); see also id. at 11

(asserting Perez could have “set the situation right,” but did

not).) At the pleading stage, Defendant Perez can not contend that

he ignored Plaintiff’s chrono and statements because Perez knew

there were no available lower bunks. Because the facts alleged are

that there was a lower bunk available on June 15, 2007, Perez’s

attempt to analogize this case to Hickman v. Ciccati, No.

01CV2003-BTM(NLS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18315 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 2,

2004), is inapposite. 

In Hickman, on a failure to prevent harm conditions of

confinement claim, the correctional officer was aware that

plaintiff had been issued a bottom bunk chrono because of his

tendency to experience seizures. Hickman, at *11. When the

officer discovered there were no lower bunks available, he

immediately notified his supervisor, a correctional sergeant. Id.,

at *11-12, 14. The sergeant then asked the plaintiff whether he

could temporarily spend the night on an upper bunk; twelve days

elapsed without plaintiff ever discussing the matter with the

sergeant again. Id. at *3-4. On the twelfth night, the plaintiff

fell from the top bunk due to a seizure. Id. at *4. The court

found that the officer reasonably responded by notifying his

supervisor of the situation, as the officer was not authorized to

make bed moves himself. Id. at *11. The sergeant also was found

to have responded reasonably because the plaintiff only approached

the sergeant once about sleeping on a lower bunk. Id. at *12. The

court concluded that while the upper-bunk placement created a risk,

because no lower bunks were available, and plaintiff did not

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continue to request a lower bunk, a reasonable officer could have

assumed that plaintiff would be safe in an upper bunk temporarily. 

See id. at *14.

Here, in contrast, Goudlock asserts that he gave Perez his

lower bunk chrono and directly communicated his concerns to

Defendant on three different occasions before the fall. (Second

Am. Compl. 11, ECF No. 63.) The Plaintiff even told Perez that

Goudlock had fallen from his upper bunk at a prior prison due to

his sleep disorder. (Id.) A rational sergeant in this situation

would know that to avoid liability, he could report his concerns to

another official or investigate the inmate’s statements by asking

more questions or reviewing his prisoner’s file.

Goudlock has pleaded that Sergeant Perez was aware of

Plaintiff’s medical condition and failed to address it in any

manner. Under the circumstances, Defendant Perez is not entitled

to qualified immunity.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Defendants Amiling and Esquilin’s Motion to Dismiss Goudlock’s

claim that the officers violated his Eighth Amendment rights by

acting with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs

should be DENIED. Defendant Perez’s Motion to Dismiss the

deliberate indifference to a serious medical need allegation

against him should also be DENIED.

The Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s monetary claims against the

Defendants in their official capacities should be GRANTED. The

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss based on qualified immunity should be

DENIED. When proceeding with his Second Amended Complaint,

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K:\COMMON\BROOKS\CASES\1983\PRISONER\GOUDLOCK204\R&R re MTD SAC.wpd 35 08cv0204 AJB(RBB)

Goudlock may only seek monetary damages from Amiling, Esquilin, and

Perez in their individual capacities.

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before January 11, 2012. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before January 31, 2012. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 20, 2011 

 Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc:

Judge Battaglia

All Parties of Record

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