Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01605/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01605-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW R. LOPEZ,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-03-1605 GEB DAD P

vs.

S. COOK, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the court is plaintiff’s third amended

complaint in which plaintiff presents twenty-one causes of action naming twenty-one defendants. 

Sixteen of those named defendants are correctional officers or other employees at High Desert

State Prison (H.D.S.P.). Plaintiff also names as defendants the Director of the California

Department of Corrections, three other employees with the Department, and a correctional

sergeant employed at California State Prison - Corcoran (CSP-Corcoran). Although the court has

advised plaintiff on numerous occasions regarding the requirements for stating a cognizable civil

rights claim, as well as the legal standards specifically applicable to plaintiff’s various claims 

(see Orders, filed December 30, 2003, June 2, 2004, and August 13, 2004), the third amended

complaint remains defective in several respects. In addition, plaintiff has failed to provide

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 In his first and second causes of action plaintiff has presented claims that he was

retaliated against in various ways due to his activities as a jailhouse lawyer and his pursuit of

litigation and grievances on his on behalf. The court has determined at this initial stage of the

proceedings that those causes of action appear to state a colorable claim. Accordingly, those

retaliation claims are not addressed further in these findings and recommendations.

2

 In the court’s December 30, 2003 order, the court noted that plaintiff’s January 2, 2000

rule violation report for delaying an officer during count time resulted in the loss of 90 days of

good-time credits. See Order, filed 12/40/03, at 3. Plaintiff was advised at that time that a

Fourteenth Amendment due process claim that necessarily implies the invalidity of the loss of

good-time credits following disciplinary proceedings, is barred under Edwards v. Balisok, 520

U.S. 641 (1997). 

2

sufficient allegations concerning two of the named defendants. Therefore, the court will

recommend that the following claims and defendants be dismissed. 

I. Retaliation Claims1

In plaintiff’s eighth cause of action, he claims that in violation of the First and

Fourteenth Amendments, defendant McKean retaliated against him “by falsely alleging that

plaintiff breached regulations.” (3rd Am. Compl. (Compl.), at 15.) Plaintiff alleges that

defendant McKean issued plaintiff a rule violation report for delaying a peace officer which

plaintiff contends was a false charge.2 (Id. ¶43, at 3.) Although plaintiff has stated a cognizable

retaliation claim based on the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide a

legal basis for a retaliation claim. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005)

(holding that retaliatory actions taken against a prisoner for exercising his right to file grievances

violates the First Amendment); Burton v. Jones, 321 F.3d 569, 573 (6th Cir. 2003) (Fourteenth

Amendment does not provide a legal theory under which a retaliation claim could be brought). 

Therefore, the court will recommend that the eighth cause of action be dismissed to the extent it

seeks to allege the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for a retaliation claim. 

In his ninth and tenth causes of action, plaintiff claims retaliation against him by

defendant Bartos in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff claims that

defendant Bartos issued a false rule violation report charging plaintiff with delaying a peace

officer by failing to exit the yard. (Compl. ¶77, at 8.) Plaintiff also claims that defendant Bartos

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made a disparaging statement to other inmates about plaintiff being a snitch. Again, although

plaintiff has stated cognizable retaliation claims based on the First Amendment, to the extent the

claim relies on the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis it should be dismissed. See Burton, 321

F.3d at 573. 

II. Equal Protection Claim

In his third cause of action, plaintiff claims violation of his right to equal

protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff claims that he has suffered

discrimination because of his activities as a jailhouse lawyer. (Compl. at 14.) However, plaintiff

has not alleged how each of the defendants have violated his right to equal protection. Moreover,

plaintiff has failed to allege the manner in which he has been treated differently than persons

similarly situated without a rational basis. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). 

Accordingly, This cause of action should be dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim.

III. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Claim

In his fourth cause of action, plaintiff claims that each of the defendants violated

his Eighth Amendment rights when they placed plaintiff in administrative segregation and the

SHU, knowing that by validating him as affiliated with a gang, he would be in the SHU for an

indefinite period of time. Plaintiff claims that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated in this

regard because he was subjected to “atypical and significant ad-seg and S.H.U. confines” and the

information used for this confinement “is apparently false[.]” (Compl. ¶ 114, at 14.) Plaintiff

alleges that on February 2, 2000, he was placed in administrative segregation pending

investigation into allegations of his gang affiliation. (Id. ¶ 49, at 3.) Plaintiff remained in

administrative segregation until February 15, 2001, when he was transferred to California State

Prison - Corcoran for indeterminate placement in the SHU. (Id. ¶¶ 84-85, at 10.) Plaintiff seeks

monetary damages, as well as, release from the SHU. (Id. ¶¶ 3 & 4-5, at 19-20.) 

Plaintiff has again failed to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim. He has

not alleged deprivations of life’s necessities or a deprivation of anything that would be

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cognizable under the Eighth Amendment. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)

(“Because routine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses

against society, only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.”) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Placement in administrative segregation, without more, does not constitute a violation of the

Eighth Amendment. See Toussaint v. Yockey, 722 F.2d 1490, 1494 n.6 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding

that more than the usual hardships associated with administrative segregation are required to state

an Eighth Amendment claim). Plaintiff’s contentions that false information was used to place

him in AdSeg and SHU are irrelevant to his Eighth Amendment claim. Therefore, the court will

recommend that this fourth cause of action be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

IV. Fourth Amendment Claim

In his seventh cause of action, plaintiff claims that defendants Hansen, Shaver,

and Holmes violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they searched his stored property,

including his legal materials, when he was not present. (Compl. ¶117, at 15.) The Supreme

Court has held that “prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy and that the Fourth

Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches does not apply in prison cells . . . .” Hudson

v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984). See also Taylor v. Knapp, 871 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir.

1989) (“Lawful incarceration necessarily entails limitations upon many of the rights enjoyed by

ordinary citizens. An inmate’s fourth amendment rights are among the rights subject to

curtailment. In particular, the fourth amendment does not protect an inmate from the seizure and

destruction of his property.”) (citations omitted); Nakao v. Rushen, 766 F.2d 410, 411-12 (9th

Cir. 1985) (concluding that searching an inmate’s cell when he was not present, and seizing and

reading his correspondence did not violate the Fourth Amendment). Therefore, plaintiff’s

seventh cause of action should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

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V. Failure to Protect Claims

In his eleventh cause of action, plaintiff claims that defendant Bartos violated his

Eighth Amendment rights by stating in the presence of other inmates that plaintiff was “ratting

on officers,” and that such conduct could result in the removal of the television during the NFL

season. (Compl. ¶ 77 at 8, and ¶ 121 at 15.) Plaintiff claims that the “rat” label increases a

prisoner’s chances of harm and being ostracized. However, an allegation of mere threats alone

fails to state a claim of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Gaut v.

Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987) (court upheld district court's dismissal of plaintiff's

claim that defendants threatened him with bodily harm to deter plaintiff from pursuing legal

redress for grievances). Likewise, neither verbal abuse nor the use of profanity violate the Eighth

Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830

F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987) (upholding summary judgment on claim that defendant used vulgar

language; profanity, verbal abuse and verbal harassment do not state a constitutional claim under

42 U.S.C. § 1983). Accordingly, the court will recommend that this claim be dismissed for

failure to state a claim.

In his thirteenth cause of action, plaintiff claims that defendant Statti violated his

Eighth Amendment rights when he had plaintiff placed in protective custody, “knowing that

protective custody inmates are chastised and are targeted for assualts [sic] or worse.” (Compl. ¶

123 at 16.) Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory and not supported by any allegations that

plaintiff was targeted or faced a substantial risk of injury as a result of his placement in protective

custody. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828-29 (1994). Therefore, this cause of action

should be dismissed.

VI. Due Process Claim

Plaintiff’s twenty-first cause of action is a due process claim based on the

Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff claims that a liberty interest has been created by various state

regulations. Those regulations concern: who may order an inmate placed in administrative

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segregation (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 3336), initial review of the administrative segregation

order (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 3337), use and placement of confidential information in an

inmate’s central file (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 3321), staff assistance for inmate at classification

hearing (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 3341), purpose of the initial hearing following issuance of an

administrative segregation order, opportunity for inmate to present his witnesses and evidence,

and documents which record the determination following the hearing (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 §

3338), mutual right of inmates and employees to be treated respectfully, impartially, and fairly

(Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 3004), extraordinary circumstances which aggravate the seriousness of

a rule violation (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 3329), reasons for placement of inmate in

administrative segregation (Cal. Code Reg. tit. 15 § 3335), release or retention in administrative

segregation (Cal. Code Reg. tit. 15 § 3339), placement in security housing unit (Cal. Code Reg.

tit. 15 § 3341.5(c)), inspection of cell, inmate property, and body (Cal. Code Reg. tit. 15 § 3287),

law enforcement responsibility of Department of Corrections employees (Cal. Code Reg. tit. 15 §

3291), and review of a formal appeal by a staff person who did not participate in the event or

decision being appealed (Cal. Code Reg. tit. 15 § 3084.5(e)). 

To the extent that this due process claim is based on regulations that pertain to a

prisoner’s placement and retention in the SHU, this twenty-first cause of action is duplicative of

plaintiff’s fifteenth cause of action. Plaintiff’s claim based on regulations pertaining to an inmate

being subject to an inspection is duplicative of his sixth cause of action. Plaintiff’s claim based

on a regulation pertaining to search of an inmate’s cell and property is duplicative of his seventh

cause of action. Lastly, plaintiff’s claim based on a regulation pertaining to an inmate’s appeal is

duplicative of plaintiff’s twelfth and fifteenth causes of action. Therefore, the twenty-first cause

of action should be dismissed as duplicative. 

VII. Dismissal of Certain Defendants

Plaintiff has named J. Woodford, the Director of the California Department of

Corrections, as a defendant. Plaintiff was required to specifically allege a causal link between

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supervisorial defendants such as Woodford and the claimed constitutional violation. See Fayle v.

Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.

1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). Plaintiff has failed to do so. Therefore, this defendant

should be dismissed. 

Plaintiff was advised in the court’s December 30, 2003 order that claims

concerning incidents that took place at CSP-Corcoran, needed to be filed with the Fresno

Division of the District Court for the Eastern District of California. (Order, filed 12-30-03, at 7.) 

However, in his third amended complaint filed with this court, plaintiff has named as a

defendant, correctional sergeant Drew who is employed at CSP-Corcoran. Plaintiff claims in his

twentieth cause of action that defendant Drew, as well as, seventeen other defendants conspired

to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights. (Compl. ¶ 134, at 18.) The only allegations

concerning defendant Drew is that he failed to process plaintiff’s grievances which were filed

while plaintiff was housed at CSP-Corcoran. There are no allegations that, if taken as true,

would demonstrate that there was an agreement between defendant Drew and the other

defendants to violate his constitutional rights. See Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d

1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989). Therefore, the court will recommend that defendant Drew be

dismissed from this action. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The third, fourth, seventh, eleventh, thirteenth, and twenty-first causes of

action in plaintiff’s third amended complaint, filed on October 6, 2004, be dismissed for failure

to state a claim or as duplicative;

2. Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim in his eighth, ninth, and tenth causes

of action be dismissed for failure to state a claim; and

2. Defendants Woodford and Drew be dismissed.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

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days after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: November 3, 2005.

DAD:4

lope1605.f&r

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