Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05932/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05932-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL PADDOCK,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEANNE WOODFORD, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:04-CV-05932-OWW-SMS-P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

TO DISMISS BE GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART, AND PLAINTIFF’S

DAMAGES CLAIMS BE DISMISSED FROM

THIS ACTION

(Doc. 31) 

I. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Michael Paddock (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000). This action is proceeding against defendants MendozaPowers and Woodford (“defendants”) on plaintiff’s claim that they violated his rights under RLUIPA

by substantially burdening his religious exercise. (Doc. 24.) Plaintiff is seeking both injunctive

relief and money damages, and appears to be suing defendants in both their official and personal

capacities. (Doc. 1, Comp.)

On June 13, 2005, pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendant

Mendoza-Powers filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff failed to exhaust, defendant

is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted under RLUIPA, and defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. 31.) Plaintiff filed

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 Plaintiff was provided with notice of the requirements for opposing an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion

on March 29, 2005. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 n.14 (9th Cir. 2003). (Doc. 27.)

2

 The California Department of Corrections has an administrative grievance system for prisoner complaints. 

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3084, et seq. “Any inmate or parolee under the department’s jurisdiction may appeal any

departmental decision, action, condition, or policy which they can reasonably demonstrate as having an adverse

effect upon their welfare.” Id. at 3084.1(a). Four levels of appeal are involved, including the informal level, first

formal level, second formal level, and third formal level, also known as the “Director’s Level.” Cal. Code Regs. tit

15, § 3084.5 (2005). 

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an opposition on July 1, 2005, and defendant filed a reply on July 14, 2005.1 (Docs. 33, 34.) On

August 17, 2005, defendant Woodford was granted leave to join in the motion to dismiss. (Doc. 37.)

B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Available Administrative Remedies

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, “[n]o action shall be brought with

respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies2 as are

available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The section 1997e(a) exhaustion requirement

applies to all prisoner suits relating to prison life. Porter v. Nussle, 435 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).

Prisoners must complete the prison’s administrative process, regardless of the relief sought by the

prisoner and regardless of the relief offered by the process, as long as the administrative process can

provide some sort of relief on the complaint stated. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001).

“All ‘available’ remedies must now be exhausted; those remedies need not meet federal standards,

nor must they be ‘plain, speedy, and effective.’” Porter, 534 U.S. at 524 (citing to Booth, 532 U.S.

at 739 n.5). Exhaustion must occur prior to filing suit. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-

1201 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Section 1997e(a) does not impose a pleading requirement, but rather, is an affirmative

defense under which defendants have the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion.

Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). The failure to exhaust nonjudicial

administrative remedies that are not jurisdictional is subject to an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion,

rather than a summary judgment motion. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119 (citing Ritza v. Int’l

Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 368 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curium)). In

deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the court may look

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 Although defendants cite to evidence that purports to have been submitted in support of their motion, no

evidence was submitted with the motion. Therefore, the court considers only the citations in the motion to plaintiff’s

complaint.

4

 Plaintiff’s 1998 appeal was assigned log number 98-0095. (Opp., Exhibit A, p. 5.) The 1998 Director’s

level decision identifies the appeal as log number 98-0098. (Id., p. 1.) This discrepancy appears to be the result of a

typographical error, as the appeal issue in the decision matches the issue set forth in the appeal itself, and the date on

the Director’s level decision matches the date set forth in the appeal form under “Director’s Action.” This error

would also explain why there was apparently some confusion as to whether plaintiff’s 1998 appeal was exhausted. 

(See e.g., Exhibit B, p. 2.) 

5 The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) was found to be unconstitutional by the United States

Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 

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beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119-20. If the court

concludes that the prisoner has failed to exhaust administrative remedies, the proper remedy is

dismissal without prejudice. Id. 

2. Discussion

In their motion, defendants argue that they are entitled to dismissal of this action because

plaintiff failed to exhaust his RLUIPA claim. Defendants contend that, as set forth in the complaint,

plaintiff filed an appeal but did not pursue it to the third and final level of review.

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 (Doc. 31,

Motion, 5:18-21; Doc. 1, Comp., § II.)

Plaintiff argues that his claim is exhausted because he did everything possible to ensure the

available administrative remedies were exhausted and no further avenues of relief are available.

(Doc. 33, Opp., p. 2-3.) Plaintiff contends that he filed an appeal on February 2, 1998, and pursued

it through the Director’s level of review.4 (Id., p. 2.) Plaintiff contends that after RLUIPA was

enacted in 2000, he filed a new appeal on October 28, 2003. (Id.) The second appeal was rejected

on the ground that it was duplicative of his earlier 1998 appeal. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that he

sought reconsideration and explained that RFRA was the foundation for his original appeal and

RLUIPA was the foundation for his second appeal.5 (Id.) Plaintiff contends that the appeals

coordinator rejected his request for reconsideration, stating that the prison regulations had not

changed since 1998, when plaintiff’s first appeal was submitted. (Id.)

In support of his opposition, plaintiff submits evidence that on June 19, 1998, a Director’s

level decision was issued denying his inmate appeal. (Id., Exhibit A, p.1-4.) The basis of plaintiff’s

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appeal was that the grooming standards impinged upon his religious freedom because long hair is

a part of his religious practice. (Id., p. 5-7) Plaintiff sought to be excluded from the grooming

standards. (Id.)

Plaintiff submits evidence that he submitted a second inmate appeal on October 28, 2003,

requesting that he be exempted from the grooming standards as they applied to hair length. (Id.,

Exhibit B, p. 6-8.) In the appeal, plaintiff set forth the history of the enactment of the grooming

standards, the holding that RFRA was unconstitutional, and the enactment of RLUIPA. (Id., p. 8)

The appeals office received the appeal on November 4, 2003, and the appeals coordinator screened

it out on the basis that plaintiff’s appeal was duplicative of his 1998 appeal. (Id., p. 9.) After

plaintiff sought reconsideration of the decision and requested that his second appeal be processed,

R. J. Wilson, the appeals coordinator, issued a memorandum dated December 4, 2003, informing

plaintiff that the issue had been discussed with Associate Warden Godfrey, who concurred with the

rejection of plaintiff’s appeal as duplicative. (Id., p. 2.) Wilson informed plaintiff that Title 15 had

not been reversed, changed, or modified, and that the Director’s rules and regulations had not been

changed since his appeal was submitted in 1998. (Id.)

On December 17, 2003, after the appeals office rejected his request for reconsideration of the

decision screening out his appeal as duplicative, plaintiff sought reconsideration from the Director’s

level of review, arguing that while the two appeals were similar, the legal landscape had changed

since 1998. (Id., p.5, 7-8.) Plaintiff acknowledged that the grooming standards had not changed but

requested that the appeal be processed in light of the changed legal landscape. (Id.) Plaintiff’s

attempt to pursue his appeal via submission to the Director’s level was rejected on January 16, 2004.

(Id., p. 3.) Plaintiff was notified that his appeal had been rejected, withdrawn, or cancelled, and that

he must contact the appeals coordinator and follow the instructions he had been given if he disagreed

with the decision. (Id.) On April 14, 2004, after requesting an interview to discuss the rejection of

his appeal on December 4, 2003, plaintiff was again informed by the appeals office that the

grooming standards had not been changed since he submitted his appeal in 1998, that his appeal was

considered duplicative, and that he may not appeal a duplicate issue. (Id., p. 1.)

///

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The position taken by defendants in their reply is untenable. Defendants first argue that

plaintiff cannot rely on his earlier 1998 grievance to satisfy exhaustion of his current RLUIPA claim.

(Doc. 34, Reply, 3:3:1-12.) Defendants contend that plaintiff’s 1998 RFRA grievance is not

applicable to his 2004 RLUIPA claim because the factual predicates have changed. (Id.) Defendants

contend that, in light of the intervening change in the law, plaintiff cannot rely a second time on an

old grievance involving an earlier law. (Id.) 

The court rejects defendants’ interpretation of what is required to exhaust a claim. The basis

of plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim is that the grooming standards, as they apply to hair length, violate his

right to exercise his religion. Although the enactment of RLUIPA in 2000 represents a change in

the law from 1998, when plaintiff’s first appeal was filed, the grooming standards plaintiff

challenges as a violation of his religious rights did not change. (See Opp., Exhibit B, p. 2.) That the

legal basis upon which plaintiff is premising his claim in this action was not in existence in 1998 is

irrelevant. Plaintiff’s 1998 appeal, which was exhausted through the Director’s level of review,

grieved the very facts that form the basis of claim in this pending action - that the grooming

standards burden the exercise of plaintiff’s religion.

Plaintiff in fact attempted to pursue a new appeal challenging the grooming standards in light

of the enactment of RLUIPA but was rebuffed. (See Opp. Exhibit B.) Plaintiff acknowledged that

the grooming regulations had not changed but argued that because the legal landscape had, his

second appeal should be considered. (Id., p. 5, 8.) Defendants’ argument that plaintiff’s earlier

grievance does not exhaust his RLUIPA claim runs directly afoul of the response given to plaintiff

by prison officials. Defendants apparently seek to have the court require the impossible of plaintiff

in the name of satisfaction of the exhaustion requirement. A change in the law was not grounds in

the eyes of prison officials to allow plaintiff to pursue a new appeal and they rejected the new appeal

as duplicative of the 1998 appeal. Yet defendants ask this court to find that the change in the law

is grounds for finding that plaintiff’s 1998 appeal did not exhaust his RLUIPA claim. The court

declines to do so.

Defendants next argue that substantial compliance with the administrative process or a good

faith attempt to utilize the process is insufficient. (Doc. 34, Reply, 3:13-5:8.) Defendants contend

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that after plaintiff’s second appeal was rejected, plaintiff ignored the requirement that he take the

appeal to the second level of review and instead submitted it to the third level of review (Director’s

level). (Id., 3:18-20.) Defendants contend that plaintiff was informed his appeal must be completed

through the second level of review and that plaintiff failed to comply with the instruction,

discontinuing his pursuit of the appeal. (Id., 3:21-24.) 

This argument misstates both the response from the Director’s level of review and the actual

sequence of events. After plaintiff’s second, new appeal was rejected by the appeals office, plaintiff

sought reconsideration of the rejection. After plaintiff’s reconsideration of the initial screening

decision was denied, plaintiff submitted the appeal to the Director’s level of review along with an

explanation as to why his appeal should be considered. Defendants’ contend, incorrectly, that

plaintiff ignored the requirement to take his appeal to the second and third levels of review following

rejection at the first level and then discontinued the pursuit of his appeal. 

Had plaintiff’s appeal received a formal first level decision that was unsatisfactory to

plaintiff, plaintiff would have been required to submit his appeal to the second level and then the

third level thereafter. In this instance, however, plaintiff’s appeal was screened out. Not only are

the governing regulations devoid of any requirement that a screened out appeal be pursued to the

next level of review, but the screening form itself informs the inmate that screening decisions may

not be appealed unless the inmate alleges that above reason is inaccurate. (Opp., Exhibit B, p. 9.)

If an inmate wishes to appeal the screening decision, he is to directed to return the appeal to the

appeals coordinator with the necessary information. (Id.) There is no instruction, either on the form

or in the regulations, directing the inmate file his appeal at the next higher level of review. Plaintiff

did what he should have done in the face of the screening decision rejecting his appeal - he

resubmitted the issue to the appeals coordinator. Only after this request for reconsideration was

denied did plaintiff take an additional step by attempting to secure relief from the Director’s level.

This step was not required of plaintiff, and supports his position that he tried everything to get his

second appeal exhausted.

Turning to the response given plaintiff by a staff member at the Director’s level of review,

pursuant to section 3084.5(c), the second formal level of appeal shall be completed prior to

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submission of the appeal to the third and final level of review (Director’s level). Cal. Code Regs.

tit 15, § 3084.5(c) (2005). The response given to plaintiff - that the Inmate Appeals Branch provides

the Director’s level review and the appeal form must be completed through the second level of

review - reflects the order in which an appeal must proceed through the formal levels of review. As

previously stated, plaintiff’s appeal had not been accepted into this formal process. The failure to

obtain a second level response was not the deficiency in plaintiff’s appeal and plaintiff was not

instructed to submit his appeal to the second level of review. Rather, plaintiff was informed that his

appeal had been rejected, withdrawn, or cancelled, and if plaintiff disagreed with that decision, he

must contact the appeals coordinator and comply with whatever instructions he was given. After

receiving that response, plaintiff went on to do just that. Plaintiff contacted the appeals office for

the second time following the initial screening decision and was informed that there were no

instructions to give plaintiff because his appeal was rejected as duplicative of his 1998 appeal.

Plaintiff was informed that he may not appeal the same issue twice.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ngo v. Woodford, 403 F.3d 620 (9th Cir. 2005) compels the

rejection of defendants’ argument that the rejection of plaintiff’s appeal as duplicative is insufficient

to constitute exhaustion. In Ngo, the plaintiff’s appeal had been screened out as untimely. Ngo, 403

F.3d at 624-25. The plaintiff challenged the appeals coordinator’s decision in a follow-up petition,

but the appeal was again rejected. Id. The district court, in granting the defendants’ motion to

dismiss for failure to exhaust, reasoned that because plaintiff had not obtained a Director’s level

decision, he had not exhausted and that the rejection of his appeal as untimely did not excuse his

failure to exhaust. Id. at 625.

The Ninth Circuit rejected the district court’s reasoning and result, finding that procedural

default is inapplicable. The Court held that the plaintiff “exhausted all administrative remedies

available to him as required by the PLRA when he completed all avenues of administrative review

available to him: His administrative appeal was deemed time-barred and no further level of appeal

remained in the state prison’s internal appeals process.” Id. at 631. The Court further held that the

“exhaustion requirement does not bar subsequent judicial consideration of an exhausted

administrative appeal that was denied on state procedural grounds.” Id. 

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 Claims for prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities are not barred by

the Eleventh Amendment. Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2002).

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In this instance, the appeals coordinator exercised his or her discretion to screen out

plaintiff’s appeal on the ground that it was duplicative and plaintiff was not allowed to appeal the

same issue twice. The appeals coordinator thereafter rejected plaintiff’s two attempts to seek

reconsideration of the decision, once in December of 2003 and once in April of 2004. In light of the

Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ngo, the appeals coordinator’s decision to screen out plaintiff’s appeal

as duplicative ends the exhaustion inquiry. Id. Exhaustion of plaintiff’s second appeal occurred

when the appeal was barred by the appeals coordinator on procedural grounds and “no further level

of appeal remained in the state prison’s internal appeals process.” Id. 

In summary, plaintiff’s 1998 appeal, which received a Director’s level decision, exhausted

plaintiff’s claim in this action, as it grieved the facts that give rise to the claim. Further, even if

plaintiff had not exhausted his 1998 appeal, his 2003 appeal was exhausted when it was screened

out by the appeals coordinator and no further avenues of relief remained available.

C. Motion to Dismiss Damages Claim Against Defendants in Their Official Capacities

In their motion to dismiss, defendants argue that plaintiff’s claim for damages against them

in their official capacities is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Motion, 5:23-6:8.) In his

opposition, plaintiff confuses defendants’ argument of sovereign immunity with one for qualified

immunity and his response is misplaced as a result. (Opp., p. 3-4.) 

The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought against an

unconsenting state. Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Co., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir.

1991) (citation omitted); see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1122 (1996);

Puerto Rico Aqueduct Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993); Austin v.

State Indus. Ins. Sys., 939 F.2d 676, 677 (9th Cir. 1991). “[A] suit against a state official in his or

her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office,”

and “[a]s such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Michigan Dept. of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Therefore, claims for damages against state officials in their official

capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.6 See Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131

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F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997); Eaglesmith v. Ward, 73 F.3d 857, 859 (9th Cir. 1996); Pena v.

Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, the court finds that defendants are entitled

to dismissal of the damages claim against them in their official capacities.

D. Motion to Dismiss RLUIPA Claim for Failure to State a Claim

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) provides:

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a

person residing in or confined to an institution. . . , even if the burden results from

a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition

of the burden on that person–

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. Defendants argue that plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim must be dismissed because

plaintiff has not been injured, and because the regulation furthers a compelling governmental interest

and is the least restrictive means to achieve that interest. (Motion, 6:9-10:23.) 

First, defendants’ argument that the grooming policy does not substantiallyburden plaintiff’s

religious practice must be rejected in light of Warsoldier v. Woodford, No. 04-55879, 2005 WL

1792117 (9th Cir. Jul. 29, 2005). In Warsoldier, which was issued after this motion was deemed

submitted, the Ninth Circuit held that because CDC’s grooming policy intentionally places

significant pressure on inmates to abandon their religious beliefs by cutting their hair, it imposes a

substantial burden on their religious practice. Id.

Second, with respect to whether there is a compelling governmental interest at stake and

whether the policy is the least restrictive means to achieve that interest, defendants’ arguments are

misplaced in the context of a motion to dismiss. Defendants bear the burden on these issues and

cannot meet their burden by mere unsupported argument, as an analysis of the issues requires the

consideration of evidence. See Warsoldier, 2005 WL 1792117. Accordingly, defendants’ motion

to dismiss plaintiff’s RLUIPA for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted must be

denied.

E. Motion to Dismiss Damages Claim on Qualified Immunity Ground

Finally, defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s damages

claims against them. (Motion, 10:24-13:8.) Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from

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civil damages unless their conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

In ruling upon the issue of qualified immunity, the initial inquiry is whether, taken in the light most

favorable to the party asserting the injury, the facts alleged show the defendants’ conduct violated

a right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If, and only if, a violation can be made out, the

next step is to ask whether the right was clearly established. Id. In resolving these issues, the court

must view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff and resolve all material factual

disputes in favor of plaintiff. Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2003). Qualified

immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley

v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). 

The court rejects defendants’ argument that the factual allegations do not show that their

conduct violated a right. At the pleading stage and in light of the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in

Warsolider, plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state a claim against defendants for violation of

RLUIPA. Warsoldier, 2005 WL 1792117.

Turning to the second prong, the court must determine whether the right was clearly

established. Id. The inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as

a broad general proposition . . . .” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2002). “[T]he right the

official is alleged to have violated must have been ‘clearly established’ in a more particularized, and

hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable

official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202

(citation omitted). 

RLUIPA was enacted in 2000 and to date, not many cases interpreting RLUIPA have been

issued. On July 29, 2005, the Ninth Circuit held for the first time that the CDC’s grooming policy

imposes a substantial burden on inmates’ religious exercise, in violation of RLUIPA. Warsoldier,

2005 WL 1792117. Prior to the issuance of the opinion in Warsoldier, the Ninth Circuit had not

issued any opinions finding that grooming policies regulating inmates’ hair length run afoul of

RLUIPA. Further, although the United States Supreme Court recently upheld RLUIPA against a

facial challenge to its constitutionality, Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. 2113 (2005), the Supreme

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Court has not issued any opinions which have clearly established the right at issue in any sense

relevant to the instant inquiry. 

Plaintiff’s argument that defendantsknewvia caselawthat RLUIPA forbids interference with

inmates’ religious practices misses the point of qualified immunity. (Opp., p.3-4.) Qualified

immunity does not focus on the broad question of whether or not defendants were aware of RLUIPA

and its prohibition against substantially burdening the religious practice of inmates unless the burden

furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means to further that interest.

Rather, the focus is whether or not the contours of plaintiff’s rights under RLUIPA were sufficient

clear that a reasonable official would know that enacting and enforcing the grooming policy

mandating minimum hair length would violate plaintiff’s rights under RLUIPA.

The court finds that plaintiff’s right under RLUIPA to be exempted from the grooming policy

based on his religious beliefs was not sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand

that what he was doing violated that right. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. Accordingly, the court

recommends that defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s damages claim based on qualified be

granted. 

F. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the court recommends that defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure

to exhaust and motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim be denied. However, the court

recommends that defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s damages claims against them in their

official capacities based on Eleventh Amendment immunity and damages claims against them based

on qualified immunity be granted. If these recommendations are adopted in full, only plaintiff’s

RLUIPA claim for injunctive relief will remain pending.

Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’ motion to dismiss, filed

June 13, 2005, be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss this action based on plaintiff’s failure to exhaust be

DENIED on the ground that plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim is exhausted;

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s damages claims against them in their

official capacities on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds be GRANTED;

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3. Defendants’ motion to dismiss this action based on plaintiff’s failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted under RLUIPA be DENIED; and

4. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s damages claims against them on qualified

immunity grounds be GRANTED.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 7, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-05932-OWW -SMS Document 43 Filed 09/08/05 Page 12 of 12