Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02843/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02843-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS JOHN CARLSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

B. DUFFY, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-02843 DB 

ORDER 

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil rights 

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the court are plaintiff’s two motions to appoint counsel 

due to his medical impairments and lack of legal education and experience (ECF Nos. 31; 35) and 

motion for injunctive relief (ECF No. 27). For the reasons set forth below, the court denies the 

motions to appoint counsel and the motion for injunctive relief. 

Plaintiff is proceeding on a fifth amended complaint.1 He alleges that defendants violated his 

due process rights by withdrawing money from his inmate trust account -- which is funded by 

plaintiff’s veteran’s disability benefits -- without his permission and in violation of federal law 

concerning the exemption of veteran’s benefits from creditor claims. (ECF No. 23.) According to 

 

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 Plaintiff subsequently filed a sixth (ECF No. 29) and a seventh (ECF No. 33) amended 

complaint; however, plaintiff only received leave of the court (ECF No. 22) to file the fifth 

amended complaint. Accordingly, the court proceeds on the fifth amended complaint. 

Case 2:14-cv-02843-KJM-DB Document 37 Filed 01/20/17 Page 1 of 4
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plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief, he seeks to stop defendants from withdrawing funds from 

plaintiff’s veteran’s benefits to pay for the costs associated with litigation he is involved in -- i.e., the 

costs for copies, envelopes, and postage for legal mail. (ECF No. 27.) 

The previous magistrate judge assigned to this case, Judge Kendall J. Newman, denied 

plaintiff’s initial motion for appointment of counsel. (ECF No. 25.)

I. Motions for Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff’s latest motions (ECF Nos. 31; 35) to appoint counsel are identical to the motion 

(ECF No. 24) filed on June 17, 2016. On June 29, 2016, Judge Newman denied the motion to appoint 

counsel, finding that plaintiff’s case did not present the requisite exceptional circumstances. (ECF 

No. 25.)

As plaintiff has been informed, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that district 

courts lack authority to require counsel to represent indigent prisoners in § 1983 cases. See

Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In certain exceptional 

circumstances, the court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(1). See Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. Housewright, 

900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990). A finding of “exceptional circumstances” requires an 

evaluation of both the likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to 

articulate his claims on his own in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. See

Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017. Circumstances common to most prisoners, such as lack of legal 

education and limited law library access, do not establish exceptional circumstances that would 

warrant a request for voluntary assistance of counsel.

Plaintiff’s circumstances have not changed since the court last denied his motion to appoint 

counsel. In fact, as noted above, plaintiff has now filed the identical motion three separate times. 

Plaintiff’s medical issues do not, in themselves, demonstrate exceptional circumstances warranting 

the appointment of counsel, nor, as noted above, does plaintiff’s lack of legal education establish 

exceptional circumstances. Plaintiff’s claims appear to be relatively straightforward. Plaintiff has not 

represented that his complaint was prepared by someone other than himself. Moreover, even if it was, 

plaintiff does not state that the individual who assisted him in drafting his complaint is now 

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unavailable to him.

For these reasons, the court finds that plaintiff’s motions for appointment of counsel do not 

present sufficiently exceptional circumstances warranting the appointment of counsel at this time. 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s motions for appointment of counsel will be denied.

II. Motion for Injunctive Relief

A temporary restraining order is an extraordinary measure of relief that a federal court 

may impose without notice to the adverse party only if, in an affidavit or verified complaint, the 

movant “clearly show[s] that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the 

movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). 

Local Rule 231(a) states that “[e]xcept in the most extraordinary of circumstances, no temporary 

restraining order shall be granted in the absence of actual notice to the affected party and/or 

counsel[.]” In the absence of such extraordinary circumstances, the court construes a motion for 

temporary restraining order as a motion for preliminary injunction. See, e.g., Aiello v. One West 

Bank, No. 2:10–cv–0227–GEB–EFB, 2010 WL 406092, at *1–2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2010).

A party requesting preliminary injunctive relief must show that “he is likely to succeed on 

the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the 

balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. 

Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The propriety of a request for injunctive relief 

hinges on a significant threat of irreparable injury that must be imminent in nature. Caribbean 

Marine Serv. Co. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988).

Alternatively, under the so-called sliding scale approach, as long as the plaintiff 

demonstrates the requisite likelihood of irreparable harm and can show that an injunction is in the 

public interest, a preliminary injunction may issue so long as serious questions going to the merits 

of the case are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in plaintiff’s favor. Alliance for 

the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131-36 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that the 

“serious questions” version of the sliding scale test for preliminary injunctions remains viable 

after Winter).

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The principal purpose of preliminary injunctive relief is to preserve the court’s power to 

render a meaningful decision after a trial on the merits. See 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. 

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2947 (3d ed. 2014). Implicit in this required showing is 

that the relief awarded is only temporary and there will be a full hearing on the merits of the 

claims raised in the injunction when the action is brought to trial. The Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals held that there must be a “sufficient nexus between the claims raised in a motion for 

injunctive relief and the claims set forth in the underlying complaint itself.” Pacific Radiation 

Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s Med. Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2015). That relationship is 

sufficient to support a preliminary injunction where the injunctive relief sought is “‘of the same 

character as that which may be granted finally.’” Id. (quoting De Beers Consol. Mines v. United 

States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945)). “Absent that relationship or nexus, the district court lacks 

authority to grant the relief requested.” Id. 

Plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief is incomplete and only contains a proposed order 

imposing the requested injunctive relief. (ECF No. 27.) As explained above, a request for a 

temporary restraining order is an extraordinary measure that will be imposed only if the movant 

“clearly show[s] that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant 

before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). Plaintiff’s 

barebones motion merely states the relief sought and is unsupported by any argument or evidence. 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief will be denied without prejudice.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motions for 

appointment of counsel (ECF Nos. 31; 35) are denied and plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief 

(ECF No. 27) is denied without prejudice. 

Dated: January 20, 2017

TIM-DLB:10

DB / ORDERS / ORDERS.PRISONER.CIVIL RIGHTS / carl2843.tro.mta

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