Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-02732/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-02732-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TREVOR MOSS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

TIBERON MINERALS LTD.,

Defendant.

 

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Case No. 07-2732 SC

ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO

ALTER JUDGMENT

PURSUANT TO FRCP

59(e) AND MOTION FOR

RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

DISMISSING FOR FORUM

NON CONVENIENS

PURSUANT TO FRCP

60(b)

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on the motions by

plaintiff Trevor Moss ("Plaintiff" or "Moss") to Alter Judgment

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and for Relief

from Judgment Dismissing for Forum Non Conveniens Pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (collectively "Motion"). 

See Docket No. 44. The defendant Tiberon Minerals Ltd.

("Defendant" or "Tiberon") filed an Opposition and Moss submitted

a Reply. See Docket Nos. 53, 59. For the following reasons, the

Court DENIES Moss's Motion.

II. BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are detailed in the Court's November

1, 2007, Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Forum

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For the Northern District of California

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1 Moss attempts to minimize the burden for demonstrating a

manifest error by stating a "party need only show 'a manifest error

of law or fact.'" Mot. at 5 (emphasis added). Thus, according to

Moss, he "need only" show that the Court completely disregarded

controlling law or credible evidence in the record. Although such

semantics are often the first tools to which a lawyer resorts, they

have no place in situations such as this. Any suggestion that a

party "need only" show a manifest error is nonsensical.

2

Non Conveniens ("November Order"). See Docket No. 40. The

parties' familiarity with the facts is therefore assumed.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

"A district court has considerable discretion when

considering a motion to amend a judgment under Rule 59(e)." 

Turner v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co., 338 F.3d 1058, 1063

(9th Cir. 2003). 

There are four grounds upon which a Rule

59(e) motion may be granted: 1) the

motion is necessary to correct manifest

errors of law or fact upon which the

judgment is based; 2) the moving party

presents newly discovered or previously

unavailable evidence; 3) the motion is

necessary to prevent manifest injustice;

4) there is an intervening change in

controlling law.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In the present case, Moss

asserts that the Court's Order is based on manifest errors of law

and fact. A manifest error is an "error that is plain and

indisputable, and that amounts to a complete disregard of the

controlling law or the credible evidence in the record." BLACK'S

LAW DICTIONARY 582 (8th ed. 2004).1

Rule 60(b) provides that "a court may relieve a party . . .

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from a final judgment . . . for . . . (1) mistake, inadvertence,

surprise, or excusable neglect . . . or (6) any other reason." 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).

B. Analysis

The Court will not repeat its reasons for granting dismissal

for forum non conveniens. The previous Order more than

sufficiently addressed most of the concerns Moss now raises. 

Nonetheless, several of Moss's claims deserve attention. 

To begin, Moss's allegation that the Court applied a choice

of forum standard when the parties had actually agreed to a choice

of law provision is simply false. The Court encourages Moss to

reread the November Order. In that Order, the Court specifically

held that the "Clause contained in the Agreement relates to choice

of law rather than forum . . . ." Order at 10. The Court also

held that it "nonetheless finds the forum-clause reasoning

instructive." Id. Finding certain reasoning instructive is a far

cry from applying that standard. Moreover, any suggestion that

the Court improperly applied a forum-selection standard rather

than a choice of law standard is refuted by the fact that the

first half of the section dealing with choice of law cites Ninth

Circuit precedent treating choice of law, rather than choice of

forum. See Order at 9. 

Moss asserts that the Court made several incorrect factual

statements in its Order. In particular, Moss states:

In its written opinion, this Court

incorrectly states that "Moss began

working for Tiberon on August 1, 2005, at

which point he and Tiberon signed a

consulting agreement ('the Agreement')"

Case 3:07-cv-02732-SC Document 60 Filed 03/11/08 Page 3 of 9
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For the Northern District of California

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and that "Moss alleges that after the

consulting relationship was terminated he

was entitled to certain bonuses pursuant

to the Agreement and that Tiberon refused

to pay these bonuses." Court's Order at

2:12-14, 18-21 . . . . Plaintiff Moss is

not suing for breach of consulting

agreement with defendant Tiberon. The

consulting agreement which was breached

is between plaintiff Moss and

Nuiphaovica, a Vietnamese mining company.

Plaintiff Moss . . . was hired by

Nuiphaovica to provide consulting

services . . . .

Mot. at 1 (emphasis in original).

Moss's contention that the Court incorrectly stated the facts

is remarkable in light of the facts alleged in Moss's own

Complaint. Moss takes the Court to task for suggesting that "he

and Tiberon signed a consulting agreement" and that "Tiberon

refused to pay these bonuses." Mot. at 1. Moss himself, however,

makes the following allegations in his Complaint:

-- "At the time he was approached by TIBERON to perform

consulting services in connection with a mining project in

Vietnam, plaintiff's consulting business was located in San Ramon,

California." Compl., Docket No. 1, ¶ 4 (capitalization in

original).

-- "Prior to accepting the consulting position offered by

TIBERON, Mr. Moss held positions with . . . ." Id. ¶ 6

(capitalization in original).

-- "Mr. Moss was solicited by TIBERON to provide consulting

engineering services in the spring and summer of 2005." Id. ¶ 7

(capitalization in original).

-- "In August of 2005, after lengthy negotiations, TIBERON

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appointed Mr. Moss to the position of vice president, operations,

although he continued to reside and provide his consulting

services from his California office." Id. (capitalization in

original).

-- "Mr. Moss was responsible for consulting services in the

development of TIBERON's . . . property . . . ." Id. ¶ 8

(capitalization in original).

-- "TIBERON failed and refused to make such bonus payment or

any part thereof . . . ." Id. ¶ 11 (capitalization in original).

-- "As an actual and proximate result of TIBERON's failure to

honor its agreement . . . ." Id. ¶ 15 (capitalization in

original).

-- "Plaintiff is presently owed his bonus by TIBERON as a

result of the Consulting Agreement and Guarantee." Id. ¶ 17

(capitalization in original).

-- "TIBERON's failure to pay the full amount due to plaintiff

upon his termination . . . ." Id. ¶ 18 (capitalization in

original).

At the risk of stating the obvious, the Court reminds Moss

that he filed a Complaint naming Tiberon as the sole defendant and

that this Complaint stated a cause of action for breach of written

contract. When Moss states in his Complaint that "TIBERON failed

and refused to make such bonus payment or any part thereof 'on the

date that the Agreement [was] terminated' as agreed," the Court

can only conclude that Moss's action is based on the underlying

consulting agreement and the guarantee. Compl. ¶ 11 (alteration

and capitalization in original). Moreover, Moss concedes that the

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relevant portion of the Agreement was in fact "drafted by

TIBERON." Id. ¶ 12.

In light of the excerpts from the Complaint, Moss's argument

that the Court's November Order was somehow factually deficient

appears to be nothing more than a transparently anemic attempt to

undermine, through any means necessary, an adverse ruling. 

Moss also attempts to argue that the "factual underpinnings"

of the Court's Order are "legally insufficient." Mot. at 3. 

Although unclear to the Court what exactly this means, Moss seems

to argue that the Court did not accord sufficient weight to Moss's

U.S. citizenship in granting the forum non conveniens dismissal. 

This contention, however, is contradicted by the second sentence

in the Court's November Order, which outlines the deference a

plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled. See November Order at 3. 

The Court was fully aware of Moss's U.S. citizenship and the

resulting deference to which Moss's choice of a home forum was

entitled. Nonetheless, after reviewing all of the public and

private factors and the existence of an adequate alternative

forum, see Lockman Found v. Evangelical Alliance Mission, 930 F.2d

764, 767 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating standard for forum non

conveniens dismissal), the Court was, and remains, convinced that

dismissal for forum non conveniens was appropriate.

The Court notes that in arguing that sufficient weight was

not given to Moss's U.S. citizenship, Moss cites, twice, to a

legal standard from Ito v. Tokio Marine and Fire Insurance Co.,

Ltd., 166 Fed. Appx. 932, 2006 WL 204412, *1 (9th Cir. 2002). See

Mot. at 8, 9. As Ito is an unpublished opinion, citation to it

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2

 The Court declines to impose any sanctions.

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for legal precedent is not only a violation of Civil Local Rule 3-

4(e), but is also a violation of Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3(c) and is

sanctionable. See Sorchini v. City of Covina, 250 F.3d 706, 709

(9th Cir. 2001) (per curium) (recognizing that violations of Rule

36-3 are sanctionable).2

Moss also argues that the Court improperly relied on the

number of witnesses in Ontario rather than their materiality. 

This argument is plainly refuted by the Court's November Order. 

In that Order, the Court, relying on Moss's own Complaint, found

that a necessary witness, Mr. Caron, lived in Ontario. November

Order at 5; see also Pl.'s Opp'n, Docket No. 27, at 1 (stating the

"only percipient witness located in Ontario is Mario Caron"). 

Although the Court also acknowledged that "Tiberon argues that at

least three other witnesses live in or around Toronto," November

Order at 5, the Court made no finding about whether these

witnesses were material and thus the Court did not factor these

witnesses into its final analysis of balancing the relevant public

and private factors.

Through tortured analysis, Moss demands that the Court rule

on the merits of a possible defense, the business judgment rule,

that Tiberon may assert, and thereby find that all of the

witnesses in Ontario are not material. In addition, Moss directs

the Court to do this under both California and Ontario law and yet

provides no helpful guidance. The Court declines such an

invitation. 

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Moss further states that "the question of whether the choice

of Ontario law provision in the consulting agreement should be

enforced was not adequately addressed, perhaps because this court

mistakenly believed that the consulting agreement was between

plaintiff and Tiberon rather than between plaintiff and

Nuiphaovica." Mot. at 19. As noted above, Moss has sued Tiberon,

not Nuiphaovica. Tiberon, according to Moss himself, "is, and at

all relevant times was, a Canadian corporation . . . with a

principal place of business in Toronto, Ontario." Compl. ¶ 3. 

Even assuming that the only agreement at issue is between Moss and

Nuiphaovica, which is an assumption that Moss has plainly

contradicted in his Complaint, that agreement also contains an

Ontario choice of law provision. For the reasons stated in the

Court's November Order, the Court finds not only that Ontario law

governs this action but also that Canada is the proper forum. 

Moss's remaining arguments in favor of relief from the judgment

are either meritless or squarely addressed by the Court's previous

Order Granting Dismissal for Forum Non Conveniens.

Moss has not demonstrated that the previous Order contained

manifest errors of law or fact and his Rule 59(e) Motion is

DENIED. Moss has also failed to persuade the Court that relief

pursuant to Rule 60(b) for mistake, inadvertence, surprise,

excusable neglect, or any other reason is warranted. Moss's Rule

60(b) Motion is therefore also DENIED.

/// 

///

///

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed herein, Moss's Motion to Alter

Judgment Pursuant to FRCP 59(e) and Motion for Relief from

Judgment Dismissing for Forum Non Conveniens Pursuant to FRCP

60(b) are DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 11, 2008 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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