Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02514/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02514-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANGEL ESCALANTE,

Petitioner,

v.

JEFFREY BEARD, Secretary, et al.,

Respondents.

Case No.: 3:15-cv-02514-JAH-NLS

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION FOR ORDER 

GRANTING RESPONDENT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION 

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

(Dkt. No. 9)

Before the Court is Respondent Jeffrey Beard, Secretary of the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (“Respondent”) Motion to Dismiss 

Petitioner Angel Escalante’s (“Escalante”) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus as 

Untimely Filed. (Dkt. No. 9.) Escalante did not file an opposition to Respondent’s 

motion, and the Court thereafter took the matter under submission. For the reasons set 

forth below, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss the 

Petition as untimely filed be GRANTED and the Petition be DISMISSED.

I. Background

The facts of the underlying offenses are not material to determining the motion to 

dismiss, and so they are not recounted here. A recounting of the facts is contained in the 

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California Court of Appeal’s opinion. (Lodg. 6.)

a. The Conviction

In 2001, a jury convicted Escalante of first degree murder, and found the crime 

was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal 

street gang. (Lodg. 6.) The jury also found a principal in the crime intentionally 

discharged a firearm causing death. (Id.; Lodg. 2 at 543.) The trial court sentenced 

Escalante to 50 years to life in state prison.

b. The Direct Appeal

Escalante filed a direct appeal to the California Court of Appeal. On April 9, 2003, 

the Court of Appeal issued an opinion affirming the judgment of the Superior Court. 

(Lodg. 6.) The Court of Appeal rejected Escalante’s claims that there was insufficient 

evidence to support the felony murder conviction, the criminal street gang allegation, and 

the firearm use enhancement, and rejected his claims that the trial court erred in denying 

his motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id.) Escalante did 

not file a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. (Lodg. 7.)

c. State Proceedings

i. Escalante Seeks to Obtain Trial Files From His Retained Counsel 

On February 16, 2012, Escalante constructively filed in the San Diego Superior 

Court an application for an order directing his counsel, Mr. Lawrence Harrison

(“Harrison”), to provide him with all files and records pertaining to his case. (Lodg. 8.) 

In support of his request, Escalante submitted a declaration stating that he and his parents 

hired Harrison to represent him to file a petition for review and collateral proceedings. 

He stated that from 2005 through 2010, Harrison moved around and was difficult to 

contact, and Escalante’s parents last spoke with him in 2010. He states Harrison took his 

family’s money, took the case files, and failed to provide him any legal representation. 

(Id.) Escalante also attached exhibits he obtained to show Harrison had a history of being 

disciplined and was deemed not eligible to practice law in 2010 and 2011. (Id.) On 

March 9, 2012, the court denied Escalante’s application on the ground it did not have 

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authority to order Harrison to release the files because the underlying criminal case was 

final. The court also stated Harrison never appeared as counsel in the case, and so the 

court never had jurisdiction over Harrison. (Lodg. 9.)

ii. Escalante Seeks Reductions in Restitution Fines

On or about April 23, 2012, Escalante constructively filed a writ of mandate in the 

Court of Appeal challenging the trial court’s imposition of restitution fines in his criminal 

trial. (Lodg. 11.) He requested the Court of Appeal reduce the amount of restitution 

fines. (Id.) The Court of Appeal denied the writ of mandate on May 2, 2012. (Lodg. 

12.)

On May 25, 2012, Escalante constructively filed in the California Supreme Court a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus to again challenge the imposition of restitution fines. 

(Lodg. 13.) He stated he did not file the petition sooner due to his appellate counsel 

failing to return his case files. (Lodg. 13.) The California Supreme Court summarily 

denied the petition on August 29, 2012, with citations to In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 

780 (1998) and In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756, 759 (1953). (Lodg. 14.) 

iii. Escalante Files State Habeas Petitions

1. State Habeas Petition for Relief from Default to File 

Petition for Review

On January 4, 2015, Escalante constructively filed a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus in the California Supreme Court seeking relief from default in timely filing his 

petition for review of the Court of Appeal’s 2003 decision challenging his conviction. 

(Lodg. 15.) He argued that two weeks after the Court of Appeal issued its decision, he 

and his parents retained Harrison, who had promised to file his petition but had not done 

so. He asked the court to provide relief from default because the delay was due to 

Harrison’s failure to advance his appeal despite his promises to do so over a period of 

years, and Escalante had reasonably relied on those promises that were not kept. (Id.) 

He included a proposed petition for review to be filed in the California Supreme Court, 

wherein he included claims of insufficient evidence to support the conviction, and that 

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the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial. (Id.) On April 1, 2015, the 

court summarily denied the petitions, citing to In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780 

(1998); In re Waltreus, 62 Cal. 2d 218, 225 (1965); and In re Lindley, 29 Cal. 2d 709, 

723 (1947). (Lodg. 16.)

2. State Habeas Petitions Challenging His Conviction Based on 

a Then-Recent California Supreme Court Ruling

While the petition for relief from default was pending, Escalante constructively 

filed a habeas petition in the San Diego Superior Court on January 27, 2015. (Lodg. 17.) 

He argued that based on the California Supreme Court’s recent ruling in People v. Chiu, 

59 Cal. 4th 155 (2014), the state court erred in instructing the jury that it could convict 

him under the “natural and probable consequences doctrine” and that this violated the 

U.S. Constitution. (Id.) Escalante asserted that an aider and abettor may not be 

convicted of first degree premeditated murder under the natural and probable 

consequence doctrine. (Id.)

On February 25, 2015, the Superior Court denied Escalante’s petition on the 

ground that People v. Chiu was inapplicable to his case because none of the instructions 

given in his case set forth, explained, or relied on the natural and probable consequences 

doctrine. (Lodg. 18.) The court explained that Escalante was convicted based on “direct 

aiding and abetting principles,” and further, that there was “no evidence the jury’s 

decision to convict him of first degree murder was based on a theory that murder is a 

natural and probable consequence of attempted robbery.” (Id.) Thus, even if Chiu had 

been the law at the time of his conviction, it would not have mandated reversal. (Id.)

On April 5, 2015, Escalante next constructively filed his habeas corpus petition in 

the Court of Appeal. (Lodg. 19.) He argued that the trial court erroneously instructed the 

jury it could find him guilty of first degree murder as an aider and abettor under the 

natural and probable consequences doctrine. He argued that under Chiu, an aider and 

abettor cannot be convicted of first degree premeditated murder under that doctrine. (Id.)

On April 13, 2015, the Court of Appeal denied the petition. The court reasoned 

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that the “only theory of first degree murder presented to the jury was that the shooting of 

[the victim] constituted felony murder in the commission or attempted commission of a 

robbery.” (Lodg. 20, citing Court of Appeal opinion on direct review.) The Chiu opinion 

is inapplicable because “[a]n aider and abettor’s liability for murder under the natural and 

probable consequences doctrine operates independently of the felony-murder rule.” (Id., 

citing Chiu, 59 Cal. 4th at 166.)

On June 2, 2015, Escalante next constructively filed a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus in the California Supreme Court. (Lodg. 21.) He again raised the claim that his 

conviction must be reversed based on Chiu. (Id.) On September 16, 2015, the California 

Supreme Court summarily denied the petition. (Lodg. 22.)

d. Escalante Files a Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On October 12, 2015, Escalante constructively filed the current federal Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Dkt. No. 1.) He asks this Court to deem his Petition “exempt” 

from AEDPA’s time constraints because he is not at fault for any perceived procedural

defaults in timely filing the Petition. (Id. at 1-2.) He asserts three grounds for relief: (1) 

the California Supreme Court erred in barring his application for relief from default to 

file a belated petition for review in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) there was 

insufficient evidence to support his conviction, and the trial court erred by denying his 

request for a new trial in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments; and (3) the 

state court erred in instructing the jury that it could convict him under the natural and 

probable consequences doctrine in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at 9-11.) 

He requests the Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the merits, and to 

issue a writ of habeas corpus. (Id. at 3.)

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the Petition on the ground that the petition is 

barred by the statute of limitations and should be dismissed with prejudice. (Dkt. No. 9.) 

Escalante did not file an opposition. The Court thereafter took the matter under 

submission on February 19, 2016.

/

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II. Discussion

a. Statute of Limitations

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a 

one year statute of limitations period to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); see Smith v. Mahoney, 611 F.3d 978, 993 (9th Cir. 2010) (“AEDPA

imposes a one year statute of limitations on habeas petitions from the date the state 

judgment became final, not including time for post-conviction review.”) The relevant 

section of the statute reads:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for writ of 

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 

The limitation period shall run from the latest of --

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created 

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such 

State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to 

cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or 

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under 

this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)-(d)(2).

b. Commencement of the Statutory Period

Respondent contends the one-year period of limitation runs from the date on which 

the judgment became final. He contends no alternate later start date applies. In particular, 

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he asserts that no claim exists that the State created an impediment to filing the federal 

Petition; that no new federal constitutional right is involved that would provide for a later 

start date; and that no later start date is created based on the date on which the factual 

predicate of the claims presented could have been discovered through exercising due 

diligence. (Dkt. No. 9-1 at 13-15.) Escalante did not file an opposition and thus does not 

dispute Respondent’s contentions.

The Court concludes that the latest start date is the date Escalante’s judgment became 

final upon expiration of the time for him to seek such review under subsection-A, and that 

no later start date applies. Escalante does not raise any claim or assertion that the State 

created an impediment to filing the Petition, nor does there appear to be in the record any 

suggestion of such an impediment. Thus, no later start date under subsection-B would 

apply.

To the extent Escalante may rely on the California Supreme Court’s decision in 

People v. Chiu to suggest it creates a newly recognized constitutional right by the Supreme 

Court and thus entitled him to a later start date under subsection-C, such a position would 

be unavailing. Chiu was a state supreme court decision that analyzed California state law, 

and the alternate start date under the AEDPA only applies to rights newly recognized by 

the United State Supreme Court that have been made retroactively applicable. See Dodd 

v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357 (2005).

Respondent also argues no later trigger date applies under subsection-D based on a

factual predicate from Escalante’s claim that the California Supreme Court should have 

permitted his belated petition for review due to his private counsel’s inactions. (Dkt. No. 

9-1 at 15.) Respondent contends Escalante’s claim that his private counsel failed to act is 

more appropriately analyzed under equitable tolling principles instead of statutory tolling 

because such a claim “must satisfy a far higher bar than that for equitable tolling.” (Id., 

quoting Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 2009). Having reviewed 

Escalante’s claim that he should not be faulted due to his private counsel’s inactions as to 

the belated petition for review, this Court agrees with Respondent that Escalante’s 

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argument regarding his private counsel’s inactions is not based a later start date, but rather 

is more appropriately analyzed under whether equitable tolling should apply. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes the date Escalante’s conviction became final is the 

appropriate trigger date for analyzing the one year period of limitation. The Court thus 

uses this date in its discussion below regarding whether statutory tolling applies to deem 

Escalante’s Petition timely.

c. Statutory Tolling

A petitioner’s statute of limitations is tolled while a “properly filed” state habeas 

corpus petition is “pending” in the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Generally, “the 

statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first state habeas petition is filed until the 

California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge[,]” Nino v. 

Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999), so long as the petitioner did not unreasonably 

delay in seeking collateral relief. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 225 (2002). Here, 

Escalante did not file a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, and so the 

appropriate start date is calculated from the date the Court of Appeal issued its opinion. 

Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 813 (9th Cir. 2002); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S.Ct. 641, 

646 (2012). The opinion was issued on April 9, 2003, and became final forty days later on 

May 19, 2003. Id. Escalante thus had one year from that date to timely file his federal 

Petition. Escalante filed his federal Petition on November 5, 2015, approximately 12 and 

a half years later. Thus, Escalante’s Petition is untimely unless tolling applies.

No statutory tolling occurs from the date the judgment became final to the date the 

first state petition is filed. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006 (“AEDPA’s statute of limitations is not 

tolled from the time a final decision is issued on direct state appeal and the time the first 

state collateral challenge is filed because there is no case ‘pending’ during that interval.”). 

Here, even if the date of Escalante’s earliest state filing of February 16, 2012 is used to 

calculate the amount of potential tolling, nearly nine years passed from the date the 

judgment became final to that filing. Moreover, the Court agrees with Respondent that it 

is unclear whether Escalante’s February 16, 2012 filing could even constitute an 

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application to seek post-conviction relief because that application only indicates Escalante 

sought the return of the case file, and Escalante did not file a state habeas petition until 

January 4, 2015. Moreover, Escalante’s subsequent petition filings do not toll the 

limitations period once it had already run. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (state petition for post-conviction relief that is filed after AEDPA’s one-year 

statute of limitations has expired does not reinitiate the limitations period). Accordingly, 

statutory tolling does not apply to deem Escalante’s Petition timely.

d. Equitable Tolling

AEDPA’s statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling. Holland v. Florida, 

560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). To be entitled to equitable tolling, the petitioner must establish 

two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some 

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Id. at 649, quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 

544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). The petitioner must show that “the extraordinary circumstances 

were the cause of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary circumstances made it 

impossible to file a petition on time.” Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 997 (internal marks and 

citations omitted).

Equitable tolling is “‘unavailable in most cases’ ... and is appropriate only ‘if 

extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a 

petition on time.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations 

omitted). “[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling . . . is very high, lest the 

exceptions swallow the rule.” Id. (citations omitted).

Respondent contends equitable tolling does not apply to save Escalante’s Petition 

from being deemed untimely. In support, Respondent argues that Escalante was not 

diligent in pursuing his rights from 2010 through 2012 because he did not file a petition 

for review, he did not hire another counsel, and he did not seek any other way to file a 

habeas petition. He also argues that Escalante was not diligent because the obligation to 

act diligently exists while an inmate is exhausting state court remedies. Respondent further 

argues that Escalante did not act diligently because he did not contact the State Bar about 

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his retained counsel until September 3, 2012. (Dkt. No. 9-1 at 18.) Respondent also argues 

that Escalante was arguably not diligent from 2003 through 2012, and failed to show that 

his prior private counsel’s lack of actions caused the approximate nine year delay before 

any state habeas corpus petition was filed. (Dkt. No. 9-1 at 18-19.)

Though ordinary attorney negligence will not justify equitable tolling, the Ninth 

Circuit “has acknowledged that where an attorney’s misconduct is sufficiently egregious, 

it may constitute an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ warranting equitable tolling of AEDPA’s 

statute of limitations.” Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 2003), citing Ford v. 

Hubbard, 330 F.3d 1086, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (“there are instances in which an attorney's 

failure to take necessary steps to protect his client’s interests is so egregious and atypical 

that the court may deem equitable tolling appropriate”). In Spitsyn, for example, the Ninth 

Circuit found that a retained attorney who failed to file a petition or return the trial record 

until two months after the limitations period had run, who had refused to respond to 

numerous requests from the petitioner and his mother regarding the petition, and who was 

disciplined for his actions by the bar, rose to the level of egregious behavior which justified 

equitable tolling. See also e.g., Gibbs v. Legrand, 767 F.3d 879 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding 

that equitable tolling was appropriate where counsel abandoned client by assuring that 

counsel would inform petitioner when the limitations period began to run but failed to do 

so and ignored petitioner’s diligent efforts to communicate with counsel).

Here, based on Escalante’s pleadings and the record, it appears Escalante is entitled 

to equitable tolling from 2003 through 2010 due to his private counsel’s egregious 

misconduct. Escalante contends that from the date Escalante’s conviction became final in 

the California Court of Appeal in 2003 until 2010, he relied on his privately retained 

attorney, Harrison, to file a petition for review, to investigate other potential claims and to

pursue filing a collateral action. (Dkt. No. 1 at 23-25, 28.) He contends that he signed a 

retainer agreement with Harrison, that he and his family paid him $6,000, and yet Harrison 

never provided any of the services that were promised. (Id. at 28.) He contends Harrison 

was difficult to contact because he would often not return phone calls and would frequently 

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move around, and that the last contact he had with Harrison was sometime in 2010. (Lodg. 

8.) Respondent does not dispute these assertions. (Dkt. No. 9-1at 17.)

Respondent alternatively argues that even if Harrison’s actions constituted 

extraordinary circumstances, Escalante “fails to show the nexus between Harrison’s 

inaction and the cause of his untimeliness.” (Dkt. No. 9-1 at 19.) He argues that Petitioner 

failed to demonstrate he needed Harrison to exhaust his claims, as Petitioner could have 

obtained the court of appeal decision from the court and filed a petition for review himself. 

(Id.) The Ninth Circuit, however, has already considered and rejected this argument. See 

Gibbs, 767 F.3d at 887 (concluding that although it was “technically possible” for the 

petitioner to contact the state supreme court to ask the status of his state petition, he had no 

obligation or reason to do so because he was represented by counsel and his lawyer had 

promised to notify him of any decision). Likewise here, Escalante also had no obligation 

or reason to file his petition for review between 2003 and 2010 because during that time 

he believed Harrison was representing his rights.

 Thus, the question boils down to whether Escalante exercised reasonable diligence 

in ultimately filing his petition after 2010 when he realized his retained counsel had 

essentially abandoned him. Respondent asserts Escalante was not diligent because he 

provides no explanation of what he did from 2010 through 2012. He contends that 

Escalante did not seek to contact the State Bar regarding Mr. Harrison until September 3, 

2012, and further he took a detour by filing reductions in restitutions instead of being 

diligent in exhausting his claims in state court or attempting to file a federal habeas petition 

himself. (Dkt. No. 9-1 at 18.)

However, the record indicates that Escalante wrote a letter to the State Bar on 

October 30, 2011 seeking Harrison’s contact information. (Lodg. 8, p.4.) Thus, some 

indication exists that he was attempting to be diligent in locating his counsel or determining 

the status of whether he should proceed on his own after he and his family last had contact 

with Harrison in 2010. 

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Nonetheless, even assuming arguendo that Escalante could establish he was 

diligently pursuing his rights from 2010 through 2012, the largely unexplained gap from 

2012 until January 4, 2015 when he filed his habeas petition with the state supreme court 

indicates he was not diligent during this period of delay. In Escalante’s declaration filed 

in support of his January 4, 2015 state habeas petition, Escalante stated the delay was due 

to being a pro se inmate, relying on his elderly parents, and not knowing how to research 

his claims or litigate them. (Dkt. No. 10-32 at 19.) An inmate’s pro se status and lack of 

legal training, however, is not an extraordinary circumstance to justify tolling. See 

Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (pro se petitioner’s lack of legal 

sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling). 

Indeed, Escalante’s stated reasons of ignorance of the law and his incarcerated status do 

not distinguish him from the majority of inmates pursuing habeas corpus relief. Bolanos 

v. Kirkland, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28042, 2008 WL 928252, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 

2008) (“If limited resources, lack of legal knowledge, and the difficulties of prison life 

were an excuse for not complying with the limitation period, the AEDPA’s limitation 

period would be meaningless since virtually all incarcerated prisoners have these same 

problems in common.”) As such, Escalante’s reasons do not suffice to satisfy the 

requirements of demonstrating he was diligent in pursuing his rights and that some 

extraordinary circumstances stood in the way. An evidentiary hearing is unnecessary 

because Escalante has not alleged facts which, if true, would justify equitable tolling. See 

Orthel v. Yates, 795 F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Further factual development may be 

required when a petitioner makes a good-faith allegation that tolling is warranted, 

depending on the sufficiency of the record that was before the district court.”); Roy v. 

Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006) (“A habeas petitioner . . . should receive an 

evidentiary hearing when he makes a good faith allegation that would, if true, entitle him 

to equitable tolling.”)

In sum, no indication of extraordinary circumstances exists to suggest they stood in 

Escalante’s way of filing his habeas petitions, and the Court concludes Escalante was not 

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diligent in ultimately pursuing his rights. Thus, there is not sufficient equitable tolling to 

deem Escalante’s petition timely. 

e. Equitable Exception Based On An Actual Innocence Claim

Respondent cites to an exhibit in Escalante’s petition where Escalante claims he is 

actually innocent. Respondent contends that to the extent Escalante asserts he is actually 

innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted such that an equitable exception 

should apply, Escalante failed to present sufficient evidence of this claim to warrant 

tolling. (Dkt. No. 9-1 at 19-23.) Respondent argues that a petitioner asserting actual 

innocence as a basis for seeking an exception to AEDPA’s limitations period must make 

a showing of evidence to warrant tolling, and Escalante has not done so.

The Ninth Circuit has held that the “actual innocence” gateway under Schlup v. 

Delo provides an exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 

929, 932 (9th Cir. 2011). Under this exception, even if a petitioner’s claim is otherwise 

time barred, if the petitioner provides “new reliable evidence” of his actual innocence 

then the Court must consider all the evidence and make a determination about what 

reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do. Id., 653 F.3d at 937-38. A petitioner is 

required “to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence—

whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical 

physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.” Id. at 938, quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. 

at 324. The petitioner must show that in light of the newly provided evidence it is more 

likely than not that no reasonable juror would find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Lee, 653 F.3d at 938. 

Here, Escalante attached to his federal Petition a letter he wrote to the State Bar of 

California regarding Harrison. (Dkt. No. 1 at 53-57.) In that letter, Escalante wrote to 

the State Bar that he is innocent, that he is trying to preserve his actual innocence, and 

that he was a “victim of circumstance.” (Id.) However, Escalante does not point to any 

new reliable evidence to consider in support of his claim of actual innocence, nor does 

the Court independently find such evidence contained in the Petition. Accordingly, to the 

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extent Escalante asserts he is actually innocent and thus an equitable exception should 

apply to permit his Petition, he has failed to make a sufficient showing to demonstrate he 

would be entitled to such an exception.

III. Conclusion

In sum, the Court concludes that neither statutory tolling nor sufficient equitable 

tolling applies to deem Escalante’s Petition timely, and Escalante has also not provided 

support for an equitable exception to hear the Petition based on an actual innocence 

claim. Escalante’s federal Petition is therefore untimely and must be dismissed. For all 

the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: (1) 

approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; (2) GRANTING

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss; and (3) DISMISSING the Petition with prejudice.

IT IS ORDERED:

No later than June 16, 2016, any party to this action may file written objections 

with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned 

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

Any reply to the objections must be filed with the Court and served on all parties 

no later than June 30, 2016. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within 

the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s 

order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 

F.2d 1153, 1156 (9thCir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 2, 2016

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