Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_21-cv-00818/USCOURTS-caed-1_21-cv-00818-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEVONTE B. HARRIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

D. ARDEN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:21-cv-00818-KES-CDB (PC) 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION

Doc. 36

Plaintiff Devonte B. Harris (“Harris” or “plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in 

this civil rights action. This matter proceeds on Harris’s Eighth Amendment excessive force 

claims against defendants Arden, Gamboa, Garcia, Pasillas and Perez, and First Amendment 

retaliation claims against defendants Arden, Gamboa, Garcia and Pasillas. 

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

The Court issued its Discovery and Scheduling Order on August 21, 2023. Doc. 28. On 

January 8, 2024, defendants filed a motion to stay these proceedings pending resolution of 

criminal proceedings in Kings County Superior Court. Doc. 32. The assigned magistrate judge 

issued an Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Stay Case and to Modify Discovery and 

Scheduling Order on January 10, 2024. Doc. 33. Defendants were directed to file a status report 

on February 15, 2024, and every sixty days thereafter, addressing the status of the criminal 

proceedings until resolution. Id. at 6. Further, the discovery deadlines were vacated and were to 

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be reset once the stay of this action was lifted following resolution of the Kings County Superior 

Court criminal proceedings. Id. 

On February 8, 2024, defendants filed a status report indicating Harris was granted mental 

health diversion in January 2024 and a hearing was to be held on February 20, 2024, to review 

Harris’s treatment plan. Doc. 34. 

On April 2, 2024, Harris filed a document titled “Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration 

and Lift of Stay of Proceedings.” Doc. 36.

In a second status report filed April 15, 2024, defendants advised the Court that Harris’s

mental health treatment plan had been approved in the state criminal proceeding and that a 

performance review was to be held on September 4, 2024. Doc. 37. Defendants further indicated 

that should Harris fail to comply with his treatment plan, criminal prosecution would resume. Id. 

at 2. Defendants asserted the stay of these proceedings should remain in effect and requested 

leave to file their next status report on September 15, 2024. Id. 

On April 19, 2024, the assigned magistrate judge issued an Order Regarding Defendants’ 

Status Report of April 15, 2024. Doc. 38. Defendants were directed to file their next status 

report no later than September 15, 2024. Id. at 2. Defendants were further directed to file a status 

report within five days in the event any additional hearing or proceeding was set in the criminal 

proceeding prior to the scheduled performance review. Id. 

On April 24, 2024, defendants filed their opposition to Harris’s motion for 

reconsideration. Doc. 39. On May 8, 2024, Harris filed his reply to the opposition. Doc. 40. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Summary of the Parties’ Positions

Harris seeks reconsideration of the magistrate judge’s order staying this action pending 

the resolution of criminal proceedings. Doc. 36. He contends the order involves “a clearly 

erroneous determination of facts and a failure to apply controlling [precedent].” Id. at 2. Harris

states he “waived his Fifth Amendment rights related to his parallel criminal proceedings when he 

filed his grievance [and] and participated in a videotaped excessive force interview.” Id. Harris 

also declares he will not assert his Fifth Amendment rights in this proceeding, stating were he to 

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commit “perjury, dismissal of his lawsuit with prejudice would be warranted.” Id. at 3. Harris

argues the implication of Fifth Amendment rights against incrimination “does not compel a stay” 

and further argues a “fair consideration of this factor overwhelmingly supports lifting the stay” of 

these proceedings. Id. at 4-5. He contends the magistrate judge “misapplied controlling 

precedent in concluding prejudice to Plaintiff will be minimal since both proceedings involve 

similar facts and witnesses, and it is unlikely memories will fade with passage of time.” Id. at 5.

Plaintiff states that “[i]f he completes his diversion program there will be no trial whatsoever” and 

argues “this factor overwhelmingly supports lifting the stay.” Id at 6. He maintains the 

magistrate judge erred by finding public interest favored a stay, id. at 6-7, contends that judicial 

efficiency does not favor a stay, id. at 8, and that issue preclusion does not favor a stay, id. at 8-9. 

Finally, Harris argues the magistrate judge’s finding that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) 

could bar his complaint “is untenable.” Id. at 9-12. 

Defendants oppose Harris’s motion for reconsideration. They argue the motion is 

untimely and that plaintiff fails to establish the magistrate judge’s order is clearly erroneous or 

contrary to law. Doc. 39. More specifically, defendants contend Harris’s Fifth Amendment 

rights were but one factor considered by the magistrate judge, id. at 3-4; that in the absence of a 

ruling in the state criminal proceeding it is premature to determine whether Heck applies here, id. 

at 4-5; that most courts in this jurisdiction stay civil proceedings pending resolution of related 

criminal proceedings, id. at 5-6; and finally, that Harris’s motion is untimely, id. at 6.

In his reply to defendants’ opposition, Harris contends that the magistrate judge “failed to 

exercise the principles of fundamental fairness” when he granted defendants’ motion in the 

absence of plaintiff having an opportunity to file an opposition to the motion. Doc. 40 at 2-3. He 

argues that the untimeliness of his motion for reconsideration is excused because “there was no 

District Judge assigned to this case for Plaintiff to seek redress,” id., and that this case is 

“factually distinct” from McCormick v. Rexroth because a trial is not scheduled to occur within 

weeks, id. at 4. Finally, he contends the stay of this action prejudices him and that lifting the stay 

will not prejudice defendants, id. at 3-10, and that judicial economy warrants lifting the stay, id. at 

10-11. 

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II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

District court review of magistrate judge orders on non-dispositive motions is limited. A 

district court judge may reconsider a magistrate judge's ruling on a non-dispositive motion only 

“where it has been shown that the magistrate's order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see also Fed. R. Civ. P 72(a); L.R. 303(f). “A magistrate judge's legal 

conclusions are reviewable de novo to determine whether they are ‘contrary to law’ and findings 

of fact are subject to the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard.” Meeks v. Nunez, No. 13cv973-

GPC(BGS), 2016 WL 2586681, *2 (S.D. Cal. May 4, 2016) (citing Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 268 

F.R.D. 344, 348 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2010)). “The ‘clearly erroneous’ standard applies to the 

magistrate judge's factual determinations and discretionary decisions . . . .” Computer Econ., Inc. 

v. Gartner Grp., Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 980, 983 (S.D. Cal. May 25, 1999) (citations omitted).

“Under this standard, ‘the district court can overturn the magistrate judge's ruling only if the 

district court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.’” Id. 

(quoting Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., Ltd., 126 F.3d 926, 943 (7th Cir. 1997)). 

“The ‘contrary to law’ standard allows independent, plenary review of purely legal 

determinations by the Magistrate Judge.” Jadwin v. County of Kern, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1110 

(E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2011) (citing FDIC v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 196 F.R.D. 375, 378 

(S.D. Cal. May 1, 2000)); see also Computer Econ, Inc.., 50 F. Supp. 2d at 983. A magistrate 

judge's order “is contrary to law when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or 

rules of procedure.” Jadwin, 767 F. Supp. 2d at 1110-11 (quoting DeFazio v. Wallis, 459 F. 

Supp. 2d 159, 163 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2006).

III. ANALYSIS

Initially, the Court notes a motion to stay is a non-dispositive motion because it does not 

dispose of any claims or defenses or otherwise deny ultimate relief. S.E.C. v. CMKM Diamonds, 

Inc., 729 F.3d 1248, 1260 (9th Cir. 2013); see also, e.g., Correa v. Braudrick, No. 1:19-cv00369-ADA-CDB (PC), 2022 WL 14122776, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2022) (“[M]otions to stay, 

and the like are non-dispositive motions that Magistrate Judges handle in the first instance.”). 

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A. Plaintiff’s Motion Is Untimely

Rule 72 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

When a pretrial matter not dispositive of a party's claim or defense is 

referred to a magistrate judge to hear and decide, the magistrate judge 

must promptly conduct the required proceedings and, when 

appropriate, issue a written order stating the decision. A party may 

serve and file objections to the order within 14 days after being 

served with a copy. A party may not assign as error a defect in the 

order not timely objected to. The district judge in the case must 

consider timely objections and modify or set aside any part of the 

order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.

Fed. R. Civ. P 72(a). Additionally, this Court’s Local Rule 303(b) states: “Rulings by Magistrate 

Judges pursuant to this Rule shall be final if no reconsideration thereof is sought from the Court 

within fourteen (14) days calculated from the date of service of the ruling on the parties, unless a 

different time is prescribed by the Magistrate Judge or the Judge.” 

Here, the assigned magistrate judge issued his ruling on January 10, 2024, whereas 

plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was signed and dated March 27, 2024. Harris’s motion is 

untimely by about two months. On this basis alone, the motion may be denied. Correa, 2022 

WL 14122776, at *2 (“Because [Correa’s] objections are untimely, this Court is not required to 

consider them.”). 

To the extent Harris argues in his reply that his untimely motion should be excused 

because during the relevant period there was no district judge assigned to this action, Doc. 40 at 

2, the argument is not well taken. As the Order of Temporary Reassignment to No District Court 

Judge (NODJ), issued December 4, 2023, stated, “[c]ontact information for the NODJ chambers 

and courtroom deputy” was available on the Court’s website. Doc. 30. Further, consulting the 

website reveals the Court adopted an Interim Emergency Plan for managing the Fresno caseload 

pending the appointment of a new district judge.

1 That plan provided for the handling of motions 

and case management matters by Chief Judge Kimberly J. Mueller; it did not suspend deadlines 

for the filing of any motion following District Judge Ana de Alba’s elevation to the Ninth Circuit 

Court of Appeals. Thus, the fact this action was assigned to the NODJ docket at the time did not 

leave Harris without redress.

1 See https://www.caed.uscourts.gov/caednew/assets/File/CAED%20Interim%20Plan%20Fresno%20Final.pdf.

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B. The Order Is Neither Clearly Erroneous Nor Contrary to Law

Setting aside the untimeliness of Harris’s motion, a review of the magistrate judge’s order 

reveals it is neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law. 

“[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to 

control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for 

counsel, and for litigants. How this can best be done calls for the exercise of judgment, which 

must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 

248, 254–55 (1936); see also Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(surveying non-exclusive factors courts weigh when issuing a docket management stay).

Here, the Court is not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

committed. Computer Econ., Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d at 983. A review of the record reveals the 

assigned magistrate judge exercised his judgment and considered the competing interests of the 

parties when granting the stay. In the order, the magistrate judge considered the substantial risk 

to Harris’s Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination given the parallel criminal 

proceedings involved allegations of battery on a peace officer and resisting an officer by means of 

force or threat. Doc. 33 at 3. The magistrate judge also considered the defendants’ ability to 

assess and assert available defenses, in particular any defense available pursuant to Heck v. 

Humphrey. Id. Last, the magistrate judge addressed the factors enumerated in Keating v. Office 

of Thrift Supervision, 45 F.3d 322, 324-25 (9th Cir. 1995). Id. at 3-4; see, e.g., Gonzalez v. City 

of Bakersfield, No. 1:23-cv-00208-ADA-CDB, 2023 WL 2760906, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2023) 

(considering same and finding stay appropriate); Lute v. Silva, No. 1:20-cv-01122-CDB, 2024

WL 402809, at *2-4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2024) (considering similar and finding stay appropriate); 

see also Peyton v. Burdick, 358 F. App’x 961, 962 (9th Cir. 2009) (vacating judgment and 

remanding for district court to stay § 1983 action where claims implicated potential rulings in 

pending state court criminal proceedings).

Harris’s assertions that he waived his Fifth Amendment self-incrimination rights during 

the prison’s administrative processes, and that he will waive those rights in this proceeding, do 

not make the magistrate judge’s consideration of the potential for self-incrimination clearly 

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erroneous or contrary to law. 

Next, in Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that

[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district 

court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff 

would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; 

if it would, the complaint must be dismissed . . . . But if the district 

court determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not

demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment 

against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the 

absence of some other bar to the suit.

512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). “Heck says that if a criminal conviction arising out of the same 

facts stands and is fundamentally inconsistent with the unlawful behavior for which section 1983 

damages are sought, the 1983 action must be dismissed.” Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 

695 (9th Cir. 2005) (cleaned up and citation omitted), distinguished on other grounds by Lemos v. 

County of Sonoma, 40 F.4th 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 2022); Ramirez v. City of Bakersfield, No. 1:19-

cv-01413-DAD-JLT, 2020 WL 5763828, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2020) (“This action should 

also be stayed in order to preserve defendants’ right to bring a motion to bar plaintiffs’ claims in 

this civil rights action under Heck.”).

Because defendants may have a defense pursuant to Heck, the magistrate judge properly 

considered its potential applicability. The finding is not “untenable,” as Harris alleges, because a 

determination as to whether the Heck bar applies in this action cannot be made until the criminal 

proceedings are concluded. In that sense, defendants’ ability to assert a potentially viable defense 

is protected by a stay of the proceedings, as is Harris’s right to proceed with his lawsuit—pending 

the outcome of the criminal proceedings—were a Heck bar inapplicable. While Harris argues that 

the stay of his federal action is unwarranted because the state court approved him for mental 

health diversion and his state criminal case is therefore not proceeding at present, Harris’s 

criminal case remains open in the Kings County Superior Court pending Harris’s successful 

completion of his mental health diversion treatment plan. While the ultimate resolution of 

Harris’s state criminal case has been delayed by Harris’s election to proceed to mental health 

diversion, that does not undermine the magistrate judge’s determination that a stay is warranted in 

Harris’s federal civil case pending the resolution of his state case.

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The Court is not persuaded by Harris’s arguments that he is prejudiced by the stay of these 

proceedings or that judicial economy warrants a lifting of the stay. At bottom, Harris’s motion 

“must show more than a disagreement with the Court’s decision,” nor does it set forth facts or law 

of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision. United States v. 

Westlands Water Dist., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1131 (E.D. Cal. 2001); Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. 

City of Bakersfield, 634 F. Supp. 656, 665 (E.D. Cal. 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on 

other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987).

It is “common practice” when pending civil and criminal actions stem from the same 

incident “to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is 

ended.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 394 (2007). “A trial court may, with propriety, find it is 

efficient for its own docket and the fairest course for the parties to enter a stay of an action before 

it, pending resolution of independent proceedings which bear upon the case.” Leyva v. Certified 

Grocers of Cal., Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863–64 (9th Cir. 1979). This is true even if the issues in 

such proceedings are not necessarily controlling with respect to the action before the court. Id.

In sum, the magistrate judge’s January 10, 2024, order staying this action pending 

resolution of criminal proceedings in the Kings County Superior Court is neither clearly 

erroneous nor contrary to law. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P 72(a). 

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Accordingly, for the reasons given above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s 

motion for reconsideration (Doc. 36) is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 26, 2024 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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