Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00957/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00957-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO JDN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Samuel Rudolph Rotondo, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Charles Ryan, et al.,

Defendants 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 10-0957-PHX-SMM (SPL)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION 

AND ORDER

Plaintiff Samuel Rudolph Rotondo filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 against multiple Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) officials (Doc. 1). 

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 58), to which

Plaintiff did not respond.

The Court will grant Defendants’ motion and terminate the action.

I. Background

Plaintiff’s claims concern his transfer to and confinement at the ADC Eyman

Complex-Browning Unit, a supermax prison facility in Florence, Arizona (Doc. 1 at 1). 

He named the following Defendants: (1) Director Charles Ryan; (2) Deputy Warden A.

Ramos; (3) Security Threat Group (STG) Coordinator George Smith; (4) STG

Investigator Lisa Celaya; and STG Committee Members (5) J. Kimble, (6) J. Freeland,

Case 2:10-cv-00957-SMM-SPL Document 62 Filed 02/09/12 Page 1 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 1Upon screening, the Court dismissed Dennis Kendall, Ron Carlson, and George

Herman as Defendants (Doc. 5).

 2

The Court dismissed those allegations in Count II concerning medical care, and it

dismissed Counts III (alleged equal protection violation) and IV (alleged mail censorship)

(Doc. 5).

- 2 -

and (7) R. Bock (id.).1

In Count I of his Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that all Defendants violated his due

process rights during the STG validation process when they failed to provide him with

notice of the charges against him and prevented him from using witness statements at his

hearing (id. at 3-3G). Plaintiff further alleged that he is subject to indefinite confinement

under conditions that constitute an atypical and significant hardship and he is denied any

meaningful review of his classification status (id.).

In Count II, Plaintiff alleged that Ryan and Ramos violated his Eighth Amendment

rights when they subjected him to conditions of confinement that constituted cruel and

unusual punishment, including the denial of outdoor recreation, constant illumination in

his cell, complete isolation, and limited food (id. at 4-4B).2

Defendants now move for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) Plaintiff

failed to exhaust administrative remedies for Count I as required under the Prison

Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997a(a); (2) Plaintiff’s STG validation

hearing comported with due process; (3) annual reviews of Plaintiff’s status comport with

due process; (4) debriefing does not violate the Eighth Amendment; (5) the conditions of

confinement at the Browning Unit are constitutional; and (6) Defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity (Doc. 58).

The Court issued the Notice required under Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962

(9th Cir. 1998), which informed Plaintiff of his obligation to respond and the

requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (Doc. 60). Plaintiff did not file a

response, and the time for doing so has expired. Therefore, in its summary judgment

analysis, the Court will construe Plaintiff’s verified Complaint as an affidavit in

Case 2:10-cv-00957-SMM-SPL Document 62 Filed 02/09/12 Page 2 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

opposition to the summary judgment motion. See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9th

Cir. 2004) (allegations in a pro se plaintiff’s verified pleadings must be considered as

evidence in opposition to summary judgment); Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460

(9th Cir. 1995) (verified complaint may be used as an affidavit opposing summary

judgment if it is based on personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in

evidence). 

II. Exhaustion

Defendants’ first argument for summary judgment is that Plaintiff did not properly

exhaust remedies for his claim in Count I (Doc. 58 at 7-10). Exhaustion is a matter in

abatement, which is properly raised in an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss

rather than a motion for summary judgment. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th

Cir. 2003). This is because summary judgment is on the merits, whereas dismissal for

nonexhaustion is not. Id. Thus, to the extent that Defendants argue nonexhaustion, the

motion will be construed as an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss.

A. Legal Standard

Under the PLRA, an inmate must exhaust available administrative remedies before

bringing a federal action. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117,

1119 (9th Cir. 2009). Exhaustion is required for all suits about prison or jail life, Porter v.

Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 (2002), regardless of the type of relief offered through the

administrative process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). An inmate must

complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable rules. See

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006). 

Exhaustion is an affirmative defense. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007). 

Therefore, the defendant bears the burden of raising and proving the absence of

exhaustion. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. Because exhaustion is a matter in abatement in an

unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion, a court may look beyond the pleadings to decide

disputed issues of fact. Id. at 1119-20. When doing so, a court has broad discretion as to

the method to be used in resolving the factual dispute. Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s &

Case 2:10-cv-00957-SMM-SPL Document 62 Filed 02/09/12 Page 3 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988) (quotation omitted). 

B. Arguments

Defendants explain that Plaintiff appealed his initial STG validation and he

exhausted administrative remedies as to the claims contained in his validation appeal;

however, Defendants assert that the claims raised in Plaintiff’s Complaint are different

from those raised in his validation appeal (Doc. 58 at 9). Defendants note that the claims

raised in Count I are that Plaintiff was unable to question witnesses at his hearing and that

he was not provided with proper notice before the hearing (id. at 9-10, citing Doc.1). 

They assert that these claims are entirely different than those raised in Plaintiff’s

validation appeal, in which he challenged the evidence used in the hearing, the Validation

Committee’s failure to specify the evidence relied upon for its decision, and the “some

evidence” standard used by the Committee (id. at 10; Doc. 59, Defs.’ Statement of Facts

(DSOF) ¶ 153). Defendants maintain that because Plaintiff failed to raise his pending

claims in his Validation Appeal, he did not put Defendants on notice of those claims and

did not properly exhaust remedies (Doc. 58 at 10).

 In his Complaint, Plaintiff indicates that he submitted a request for administrative

relief for his claims in Count I and appealed to the highest level (Doc. 1 at 3). He

specifically alleges that he exhausted remedies pursuant to ADC Department Order (DO)

806 and the ADC internal grievance system (id. at 3(G) ¶ 27). 

C. Analysis

As stated, Defendants must demonstrate that there were remedies available to

Plaintiff. See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119; see also Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936-37

(9th Cir. 2005). Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not exhaust remedies as to the claims

raised in this lawsuit; however, they fail to describe the review process that was available

to Plaintiff. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 200 (the procedural rules are defined by the prison

grievance process, not by the PLRA); Brown, 422 F.3d at 937. 

In their motion, Defendants refer to the Validation Appeal filed by Plaintiff; yet,

they provide no explanation of the Validation Appeal process. When reviewing

Case 2:10-cv-00957-SMM-SPL Document 62 Filed 02/09/12 Page 4 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

Defendants’ documents, the Court finds a copy of DO 806, which governs STGs and

which contains a section on appeals of the validation decision (Doc. 59, Ex. B, Attach. 1). 

The relevant portion states that to appeal an STG validation, an inmate must prepare an

appeal on an Inmate Letter form but “[i]nmates may appeal only those specific reasons

why they were validated” (id., DO 806.05 §§ 1.1.1, 1.1.1.1). Defendants also submit a

copy of Plaintiff’s Validation Appeal, which is set forth in an Inmate Letter and which

responds directly to each of the specific findings listed on the “Result of STG Validation

Hearing” form (Doc. 59, Ex. D, Attachs. 5, 7). This evidence shows that Plaintiff strictly

complied with the policy governing appeals and appealed the specific reasons and

evidence cited in support of his validation. Defendants fail to establish whether Plaintiff

could have included his pending due process claims in his Validation Appeal even if

those claims were not directly related to the specific reasons why he was validated. Nor

do they indicate whether Plaintiff could have raised his due process claims in the standard

grievance process apart from the Validation Appeal. Notably, Defendants do not respond

to Plaintiff’s assertion that he exhausted remedies pursuant to the ADC internal grievance

system (Doc. 1 at 3(G) ¶ 27). 

In short, Defendants fail to establish that there was an administrative review

process available to Plaintiff for the specific due process claims raised in this action and

that he failed to use that process. See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 (finding the defendants’

documents inadequate to show exhaustion because it was unclear whether the they

constituted a complete record of the plaintiff’s appeals or whether the plaintiff exhausted

his appeals). Defendants’ request to dismiss the claims in Count I for nonexhaustion will

therefore be denied.

III. Summary Judgment Legal Standard

A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23

(1986). Under summary judgment practice, the movant bears the initial responsibility of

Case 2:10-cv-00957-SMM-SPL Document 62 Filed 02/09/12 Page 5 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

presenting the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record, together

with affidavits, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

If the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact in

contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248, 250 (1986) ; see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th

Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its

favor, First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968);

however, it must “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue

for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587

(1986) (internal citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and

determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson,

477 U.S. at 249. In its analysis, the court must believe the nonmovant’s evidence, and

draw all inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 255.

IV. Count I-Due Process

A. Legal Standard

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from

“depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.

Const. amend. XIV, § 1. To determine whether a procedural due process violation has

occurred, a court engages in a two-step analysis. First, a court looks to whether the

person possesses a constitutionally-cognizable liberty interest with which the state has

interfered. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485-87 (1995). Second, if the state has

interfered with a liberty interest, a court looks to whether this interference was

accompanied by sufficient procedural and evidentiary safeguards. Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v.

Case 2:10-cv-00957-SMM-SPL Document 62 Filed 02/09/12 Page 6 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989).

It is well-settled that placement in maximum security segregation units implicates

a liberty interest requiring due process protections. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209,

224 (2005). An inmate may be deprived of his liberty interest as long as he is accorded

the proper procedural protections. For the initial decision to place an inmate in maximum

custody, due process is generally satisfied by notice of the factual basis for the placement

and an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 224-226; Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 476

(1983), overruled in part on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. 472. These procedural

mechanisms serve to avoid the risk of an erroneous deprivation; “[r]equiring officials to

provide a brief summary of the factual basis for the classification review and allowing the

inmate a rebuttal opportunity safeguards against the inmate’s being mistaken for another

or singled out for insufficient reason.” Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 226. 

After an inmate is placed in maximum security segregation, he is entitled to “some

sort” of periodic review of his status. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477 n. 9 (“administrative

segregation may not be used as a pretext for indefinite confinement of an inmate. Prison

officials must engage in some sort of periodic review of the confinement of such

inmates”). To determine whether the periodic review afforded Plaintiff conforms to due

process requirements, the Court must consider “[1] the private interest that will be

affected by the official action; [2] the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest

through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute

procedural safeguards; and [3] the Government’s interest, including the function involved

and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural

requirement would entail.” Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224-25 (citing Matthews v. Eldridge,

424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).

B. Facts/Arguments

1. Defendants’ Factual Assertions

a. STG Validation, Renunciation/Debriefing, and Step-Down Program 

In support of their summary judgment motion, Defendants submit a separate

Case 2:10-cv-00957-SMM-SPL Document 62 Filed 02/09/12 Page 7 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

Statement of Facts (DSOF), which is supported by the declarations of STG Supervisor

Jerry Dunn and Special Security Unit (SSU) Coordinators Carlos Reyna and George

Smith, with various attachments (Doc. 59, Exs. B-D).

Defendants’ factual assertions relevant to Count I are summarized as follows:

In 1991, the ADC established an STG policy in an effort to control prison gang

activity in Arizona’s prisons and minimize the threat posed by gangs (DSOF ¶¶ 4-5). The

STG policy provides for the identification and certification of prison gangs inmate STG

members (id. ¶ 7). 

Under this policy, an STG “Suspect” is an inmate believed to be involved in an

STG (id. ¶ 28). To be identified as an STG Suspect, there must be documentation of

certain specific criteria, such as self-proclamation, tattoos, photographs, association and

contacts (id. ¶ 29; Doc. 59, Ex. B, Attach. 1 (DO 806, Definitions)). 

Once an inmate is identified as a Suspect, the SSU staff initiates a “Suspect File,”

which contains confidential information on the Suspect including an STG Identifying

Questionnaire (DSOF ¶ 31). If there is sufficient evidence in an inmate’s Suspect File to

meet the validation criteria, the SSU staff prepares an STG Member Validation Packet

(id. ¶ 34). 

An STG Validation Committee, which is made up of three deputy wardens or

associate deputy wardens, then conducts an STG Validation Hearing (id. ¶ 39). The

Complex SSU Coordinator notifies the inmate of his Validation Hearing with the Hearing

Notification form—Hearing Notice—at least 10 days before the hearing so that the

inmate has time to prepare a defense (id. ¶ 41). The inmate signs and dates the Hearing

Notice to acknowledge that he received it (id.). The inmate chooses whether to appear at

the hearing or waive his right to appear and whether he will request witnesses; witnesses

are requested using the STG Witness Request/Response form (id.). The inmate’s choices

are denoted on the Hearing Notice by checking boxes or initialing next to each choice

(id.). If the inmate requests witnesses, the Complex SSU Coordinator provides the inmate

the witness forms and, no later than five business days before the hearing, picks up the

Case 2:10-cv-00957-SMM-SPL Document 62 Filed 02/09/12 Page 8 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

completed forms from the inmate (id.). 

If an inmate is validated, it means that the inmate is determined to be or to have

been a member of an STG (id. ¶ 35). Also, if an inmate’s participation level meets the

criteria of membership in an STG but the STG has not granted the inmate membership,

the inmate can still be validated as a member (id.). Validation is determined on a point

system, with varying point values assigned to specific criteria of evidence (id. ¶¶ 36-37). 

Validation requires a certain number of points in at least two of the criteria categories (id.

¶ 37).

Once an inmate has been validated as a STG member through the STG validation

process, the inmate may appeal the validation decision, choose to renounce his STG

membership through the debriefing process, or accept his validation and not renounce his

STG membership (id. ¶ 45). An inmate who refuses to renounce and debrief receives an

annual review by Classification staff (id. ¶ 49). The review consists of an inquiry as to

(a) whether the inmate is still associated with an STG or (b) whether the inmate has

disassociated himself from the STG, renounced his gang affiliation, and is sincerely

willing and able to debrief (id.). A validated inmate is considered an ongoing threat to

prison security and, therefore, is segregated and assigned to be housed at the maximumsecurity Browning Unit until the inmate is released from prison, renounces his STG

membership and satisfactorily debriefs, or successfully completes the ADC Step-Down

Program (SDP) (id. ¶ 51). 

Renunciation is when a validated STG member renounces his STG affiliation (id.

¶ 53). This is followed by the debriefing process, in which an STG Unit staff member

uses a STG Questionnaire to document the claim that an inmate is no longer a member of

an STG (id. ¶ 54). The objectives of the debriefing process are to (1) learn enough about

the validated STG member and the STG to determine whether the inmate has withdrawn

from the STG, (2) provide information regarding the STG’s structure and activity that

would adversely impact the STG and assist in management of the STG population, and

(3) provide sufficient information to determine if the inmate requires protection from

Case 2:10-cv-00957-SMM-SPL Document 62 Filed 02/09/12 Page 9 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

other STG members or suspects (id. ¶ 55). A validated STG member who renounces

membership and satisfactorily debriefs is housed in Protective Segregation (PS) and is

then reviewed for permanent PS status (id. ¶ 58). A validated STG member can request

to renounce and debrief at any time (id. ¶ 62). 

As an alternative to the debriefing process, a validated STG member may be able

to leave the Browning Unit through the SDP, which provides an inmate the opportunity to

demonstrate that he is not involved in STG activity (id. ¶ 65). To be eligible for the SDP,

an inmate must have completed a continuous 24-month period where he did not

participate in any documented gang activity, and he must make a written request to

participate in the program (id. ¶¶ 68, 85). There are different phases in the SDP that

provide inmates progressively more freedom in small increments, and the program must

be completed within 18 months of the date of entry into the program (id. ¶¶ 90, 92). 

b. Plaintiff’s Validation

Plaintiff was served with the Hearing Notice on March 12, 2008 (id. ¶ 130). This

Notice informed Plaintiff that he was suspected of being an STG member of the Aryan

Brotherhood, the basis for that suspicion and the charges against him, and that his

Validation Hearing was scheduled for March 27, 2008, at 9:00 a.m. (id. ¶ 131). On the

Hearing Notice form, Plaintiff checked the boxes indicating that he would appear at the

hearing and that he requested witnesses (id. ¶¶ 132-133). Also on March 12, 2008,

Plaintiff was given blank STG witness forms (id. ¶ 136). Plaintiff’s hearing was

rescheduled for May 23, 2008 (id. ¶¶ 137-138; Doc. 59, Ex. D, Attach. 3). 

Plaintiff submitted completed witness forms to Lieutenant Smith, who forwarded

the forms to the witnesses (id. ¶¶ 139-40). The witnesses returned the forms to Smith,

and Smith placed them in the Validation Packet (id. ¶ 141).

The validation hearing was held on May 23, 2008, with Plaintiff in attendance (id.

¶ 142). The STG Committee included Kimble, Bock, and Freeland (id. ¶ 143). Plaintiff

was able to review each piece of evidence used to support his validation and provide a

response or explanation to the Committee (id. ¶¶ 145-147). The Committee found

Case 2:10-cv-00957-SMM-SPL Document 62 Filed 02/09/12 Page 10 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

Defendants refer to Plaintiff’s transfer to “SMU II” (Special Management Unit II)

(Doc. 58 at 11), which was the former name of the Browning Unit (Doc. 59 at 2 n. 2).

- 11 -

evidence to support 23 points in four categories, which was sufficient to validate Plaintiff

as an STG member (id. ¶¶ 148-149). Plaintiff received written results of the Validation

Hearing at the hearing and he acknowledged receipt by signing his name (id. ¶ 150). 

Plaintiff chose to appeal the validation decision (id. ¶¶ 152). In his appeal,

Plaintiff claimed that the “some evidence” standard was unconstitutional when the result

of the hearing was indefinite detention; that there was no evidence that he had a history of

violence or misconduct; that his due process rights were violated when the Committee

relied on vague evidence; and that the Committee failed to support their decision with

specific documentation or citation to evidence in the record (id. ¶ 152). The STG

Appeals Committee upheld the validation (id. ¶ 158). 

To date, Plaintiff has not made a request to renounce or to debrief, nor has he made

a request to participate in the Step-Down Program (id. ¶ 159).

2. Defendants’ Legal Arguments

In their motion, Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiff possessed a liberty interest

in avoiding transfer to the Browning Unit and, therefore, was entitled to sufficient

procedural and evidentiary standards (Doc. 58 at 11).3

 They submit that due process

requires notice but that it does not require detailed written notice (id. at 12). According to

Defendants, Plaintiff admitted that he received written notice of the hearing, and they

state that this notice set out in great detail the evidence that would be used to validate him

as an STG member (id. at 11-12). 

In response to Plaintiff’s claim that he was denied an adversarial hearing and the

opportunity to present his views, Defendants submit that this type of situation does not

require an adversarial hearing and Plaintiff was provided the opportunity to respond to

and dispute each piece of evidence (id. at 12). Defendants note that Plaintiff did, in fact,

respond to the evidence used to validate him (id.). Defendants also assert that Plaintiff

listed questions to be asked of witnesses that he chose and those witnesses’ responses

Case 2:10-cv-00957-SMM-SPL Document 62 Filed 02/09/12 Page 11 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

were supplied to the Validation Committee for consideration (id.). Thus, Defendants

contend that Plaintiff was given the opportunity to present witnesses, which exceeds the

due process required at an administrative segregation hearing (id.). 

Defendants next argue that because the validation hearing is an administrative

process—not disciplinary—due process only requires a “some evidence” standard and,

here, there was significantly more than “some evidence” to support the finding that

Plaintiff is a STG member (id. at 12-13). Defendants identify the specific evidence that

the Validation Committee reviewed (id. at 13-14). They also point out that other courts in

this district have reviewed the same validation process and concluded that it comports

with due process (id. at 15, citing Hampton v. Ryan, 2008 WL 2959604, at *1 (9th Cir.

Aug. 4, 2008), and Baptisto v. Ryan, 2005 WL 2416356, at *5-6 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30,

2005)). 

Similarly, Defendants contend that the annual review of Plaintiff’s STG status

satisfies due process (Doc. 58 at 15-16). They state that Plaintiff is in the Browning Unit

solely because of his validation as a STG member; thus, the only way to remove himself

from the unit is to separate himself from the STG through debriefing or the SDP (id. at

15-16). Defendants reiterate that Plaintiff can request to debrief or to enter the SDP at

any time (id. at 16). Defendants state that as long as Plaintiff is an STG member, he is a

security risk (id.). Defendants maintain that annual reviews of Plaintiff’s status are

sufficient to determine whether Plaintiff remains a security risk (id.). Defendants assert

that it has already been ascertained that Plaintiff is an STG member and, since periodic

reviews are not to re-argue that determination, officials need not consider additional

evidence at the periodic review—they need only determine whether the basis for

Plaintiff’s placement still exists (id. at 17-18). And Defendants argue that other courts

have supported that annual reviews for inmates in supermax facilities are sufficient (id. at

18-19).

As to Plaintiff’s claim that he would be labeled a snitch if he debriefed,

Defendants contend that it is mere speculation, particularly given that Plaintiff has not

Case 2:10-cv-00957-SMM-SPL Document 62 Filed 02/09/12 Page 12 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

participated in the debriefing process (id. at 20-21). Defendants further contend that the

SDP provides Plaintiff a way out of the Browning Unit without the requirement that he

provide gang information to officials (id. at 21). Defendants assert that they have

nonetheless taken affirmative steps to ensure the safety of debriefed inmates by placing

them in protective segregation (PS), which is the method used to protect inmates who are

threatened by other inmates (id.). They argue that this is a reasonable response to any

possible risk associated with debriefing (id.). 

For the above reasons, Defendants request summary judgment on Count I.

3. Plaintiff’s Factual Assertions

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was denied written notice of the charges

against him and was therefore unable to prepare his defense (Doc. 1 at 3(A) ¶¶ 8-9). He

further alleges that although he completed witness forms, Smith and Celaya failed to

provide the witnesses’ answers to Plaintiff, and he claims that he was not allowed to

present the witnesses’ statements to the Validation Committee or call witnesses at the

hearing (id. at 3(B) ¶¶ 11-12, 14). Plaintiff also asserts that he was not allowed to present

his views against validation (id. at 3(C) ¶ 15). And he claims that the Committee did not

provide a written statement of the evidence relied upon and the reason for its decision (id.

at 3(B)-(C) ¶¶ 13, 15).

With respect to the annual reviews, Plaintiff avers that they are not meaningful

reviews and amount to nothing more than a “rubber stamp” of the initial validation (id. at

3(E)-(F) ¶¶ 19, 21). Plaintiff asserts that the debriefing process subjects a prisoner to the

risk of being classified as a snitch, which puts his life in danger (id. at 3(E) ¶ 20). 

Plaintiff also maintains that there is no other meaningful way to exit indefinite

confinement at the Browning Unit (id. at 3(F)-(G) ¶¶ 23, 26).

C. Analysis

1. Notice, Opportunity to Question Witnesses, Hearing

Although Plaintiff claims that he did not receive proper notice prior to his

validation hearing, the record includes a copy of the Hearing Notice, which is signed and

Case 2:10-cv-00957-SMM-SPL Document 62 Filed 02/09/12 Page 13 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 -

dated by Plaintiff as received on March 12, 2008 (Doc. 59, Ex. D, Attach. 2). The Notice

clearly states that Plaintiff is accused of being a member of an STG and identifies the

specific evidence that supports that accusation (Id.). The Notice describes nine incidents

in which staff discovered evidence supporting the STG charge against Plaintiff; the

descriptions include dates, names of other inmates involved, and the specific items of

evidence—including address books, a membership list, poems, letters and correspondence 

(id.). 

The Court finds that the record shows Plaintiff received the Hearing Notice and

this Notice more than adequately set forth a “brief summary of the factual basis” for

suspecting Plaintiff of STG membership. In addition, the Notice provided sufficient

information, including specific dates and named inmates who were connected to various

incidents, for Plaintiff to prepare a rebuttal to the charges. See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at

226. 

Defendants’ evidence includes two completed witness forms that were included in

the Validation Packet reviewed by the Validation Committee and a copy of the “result”

form outlining the results of the hearing (Doc. 59, Ex. D, Smith Decl. ¶¶ 20-21, Attachs.

4-5). The “results” form documents Plaintiff’s response to each item of evidence (id.). In

failing to respond to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff does not demonstrate how—in light of

this evidence—he was prevented from questioning witnesses or adequately responding to

the specific charges against him. 

The “results” form also explains the basis for the Committee’s findings, and it

specifies the evidence that the Committee relied upon (id.). The face of the form reflects

that Plaintiff received and signed it on May 23, 2008 (id.).

The Court notes that inmate gang validations are subject to the “some evidence”

standard, which sets a low bar; a single piece of evidence may be sufficient to meet the

“some evidence” requirement, if that evidence has “sufficient indicia of reliability.” 

Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287-88 (9th Cir. 2003). Courts are not required to

“examine the entire record, independently assess witness credibility, or reweigh the

Case 2:10-cv-00957-SMM-SPL Document 62 Filed 02/09/12 Page 14 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 -

evidence; rather, ‘the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that

could support the conclusion.’” Id. at 1287 (citing Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v.

Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985)). Here, the “results” form reflects that there was

sufficient evidence to support Plaintiff’s validation.

On the record before the Court, the Hearing Notice, the procedures for questioning

witnesses, the validation hearing, and the evidentiary standard applied all met due process

requirements.

2. Annual Reviews

According to Plaintiff, the annual review process constitutes a very limited review

and is little more than a cursory “rubber stamp” of the validation process (Doc. 1 at 3(E)

¶ 19). Defendants maintain that the annual reviews are sufficient for inmates housed in

supermax due to their STG status, as opposed to inmates housed in supermax for other

reasons, in which case more frequent reviews are required (Doc. 58 at 17-18). 

To the extent Defendants argue that annual reviews alone are sufficient to satisfy

due process, their argument fails. In Hernandez v. Schriro—a case involving an STG

inmate housed in the same facility as Plaintiff—the Ninth Circuit reversed the district

court’s finding that annual reviews did not violate due process and specifically stated that

annual reviews alone are insufficient. 357 F. App’x 747, 749 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1101 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated in part on other

grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. 472).

But Defendants’ evidence reflects that in addition to annual reviews, Plaintiff can

renounce and debrief at any time (Doc. 59, Ex. B, Dunn Decl. ¶ 66). On remand in

Hernandez, this Court found that annual reviews, combined with the option to debrief at

any time, satisfied due process. 2011 WL 2910710, at *8 (D. Ariz. July 20, 2011). The

Court observed that no prior case had held that debriefing as the sole method of leaving

administrative segregation violates due process. Id., at *9 (citations omitted). And the

plaintiff in Hernandez, just like Plaintiff in this case, had not requested to debrief (Doc.

59, Ex. D, Smith Decl. ¶ 39). See Hernandez, 2011 WL 2910710, at *9. Consequently,

Case 2:10-cv-00957-SMM-SPL Document 62 Filed 02/09/12 Page 15 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 16 -

there was no evidence of a risk of erroneous result in his annual review process. See id.;

Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. 

The Hernandez Court balanced the three Matthews factors and determined that the

plaintiff could not show that the process afforded him, i.e., the annual reviews with

debriefing available, was inadequate. 2011 WL 2910710, at *8-9. “Because debriefing is

available at any time, the periodic review of [the plaintiff’s] status satisfies the Matthews

test . . . .” Id., at *9. Plaintiff presents nothing that causes this Court to find differently in

the instant action.

3. Debriefing

Plaintiff contends that debriefing creates a serious risk to an inmate’s safety

because he is then identified as a snitch (Doc. 1 at 3(E) ¶ 20). The Eighth Amendment

requires prison officials to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners. 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). To establish an Eighth Amendment

violation, a prisoner must first satisfy an objective requirement—he must show that he

has been transferred into “conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at

834. Then, he must satisfy a subjective requirement—he must show that the defendant

was aware of the risk and disregarded it. Id. at 834, 837. Courts have recognized that

being labeled a snitch can place an inmate at a risk of harm. See Valandingham v.

Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 227

(“[t]estifying against, or otherwise informing on, gang activities can invite one’s own

death sentence”). But it is unclear whether this same risk is present when an inmate is

placed in PS as opposed to the general population. See Hernandez, 2011 WL 2910710, at

*5 (distinguishing the risk of harm faced by inmates who are labeled as snitches and

placed in general population with debriefed inmates who are labeled as snitches and

placed in PS).

Regardless, even assuming that the objective prong of the deliberate indifference

analysis is met when an inmate debriefs and is identified as a snitch, see Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 833, Plaintiff has not satisfied the subjective prong. Defendants’ undisputed evidence

Case 2:10-cv-00957-SMM-SPL Document 62 Filed 02/09/12 Page 16 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 17 -

shows that they did not disregard this risk to inmates’ safety. The evidence shows that a

debriefed STG member is not housed with other inmates but is placed in PS (Doc. 59, Ex.

B, Dunn Decl. ¶ 62). In failing to respond to Defendants’ evidence, Plaintiff presents

nothing to suggest that PS placement does not provide reasonable safety to debriefed

inmates following their transfer out of the Browning Unit. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844

(finding that a prison official who responds reasonably to a risk is not liable—even if the

harm ultimately is not averted). Further, because the record shows that Plaintiff has not

debriefed, he cannot show that he has faced or will face a substantial risk of serious harm

in PS. See Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987) (the “mere threat” of future

bodily harm to a prisoner may not provide a basis for a cognizable Eighth Amendment

claim). In short, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that debriefing is not an adequate

alternative to annual reviews. 

In light of the above, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

due process claim in Count I.

V. Count II-Conditions of Confinement

Plaintiff alleges that the following conditions of his confinement violate the Eighth

Amendment: (1) isolation; (2) cell illumination; (3) limited recreation; (4) denial of

adequate food; (5) restricted privileges; and (7) hygiene/sanitation (Doc. 1 at 3(C)-(D)

16). 

A. Legal Standard

“[T]he unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual

punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319

(1986). “Among ‘unnecessary and wanton’ inflictions of pain are those that are totally

without penological justification.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981)

(citation omitted). To demonstrate that a prison official has deprived an inmate of

humane conditions in violation of the Eighth Amendment, two requirements must be

met—one objective and one subjective. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132-33 (9th

Cir. 2000). First, “the prison official’s acts or omissions must deprive an inmate of the

Case 2:10-cv-00957-SMM-SPL Document 62 Filed 02/09/12 Page 17 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 18 -

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. (internal citation omitted). The

subjective prong requires the inmate to demonstrate that the deprivation was a product of

“deliberate indifference” by prison officials. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991). 

As mentioned above with regard to prison officials’ obligation under the Eighth

Amendment to protect prisoners from other prisoners, deliberate indifference occurs only

if a prison official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety;

the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exits, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511

U.S. at 837.

B. Isolation

The Ninth Circuit has found that “administrative segregation, even in a single cell

for twenty-three hours a day, is within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated

by a sentence.” Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing

Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1091-92). Even so, the Ninth Circuit has also recognized that the

harsh conditions such as those in the Browning Unit can cause psychological harm. See

Miller v. Stewart, 231 F.3d 1248, 1252 (9th Cir. 2000) (in a death row case, experts stated

that conditions present in [supermax placement] can cause psychological decompensation

to the point of incompetency). Other courts, however, have found that standing alone, the

isolation inherent in segregation does not violate the Eighth Amendment. In re Long

Term Admin. Segregation of Inmates Designated as Five Percenters, 174 F.3d 464, 472

(4th Cir. 1999) (“the isolation inherent in administrative segregation or maximum custody

is not itself constitutionally objectionable”); Jackson v. Meachum, 699 F.2d 578, 581-83

(1st Cir. 1983) (no Eighth Amendment violation by confining inmate in indefinite

segregation that was otherwise satisfactory except for virtually no communication or

association with other inmates, even when conditions caused depression). 

While it is clear that something more than isolation is required to violate the

Eighth Amendment, it is not exactly clear what the standard is. But the Court need not

reach that question because the evidence does not show that Plaintiff is incarcerated in

Case 2:10-cv-00957-SMM-SPL Document 62 Filed 02/09/12 Page 18 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 19 -

complete isolation. 

Plaintiff alleges that the only socialization available is brief telephone calls with

family and friends and limited visitation through protective glass (Doc. 1 at 3(C)

¶ 16(A)).

In contrast, Defendants’ evidence shows that some maximum-custody inmates can

communicate with other inmates in their cell group, though not face-to-face (Doc. 59,

DSOF ¶ 112). And, as Plaintiff acknowledges, there is visitation at the Browning Unit. 

Inmates are permitted a weekly two-hour block of non-contact visitation with up to four

visitors at a time (id. ¶ 113). STG-validated inmates are allowed one 15-minute telephone

call per week (id. ¶ 114). See Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996)

(prisoner telephone access is subject to reasonable security limitations) (citation omitted). 

In addition, inmates housed at the Browning Unit may possess soft cover books and

cassette players and head phones (DSOF ¶ 115). 

The undisputed evidence shows that Plaintiff has opportunities for limited social

contact and, therefore, is not isolated to a degree that would violate the Eighth

Amendment. Moreover, as discussed above, at any time Plaintiff may initiate the

debriefing process, which may allow him to transfer out of the Browning Unit and its

limits on social contact. Defendants will be granted summary judgment on the isolation

claim.

C. Cell Illumination

The Eighth Amendment requires that inmates be given appropriate lighting. 

Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1090. Constant illumination of a prison cell, standing alone, has been

upheld as constitutional under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Warren v. Kolender, 2009

WL 196114, at *15 (S.D. Cal., Jan. 22, 2009). But 24-hour lighting with excessively

bright bulbs has been held to violate the Eighth Amendment. See Keenan, 83 F.3d at

1090–91. Thus, the inquiry into whether constant security lighting in prison cells violates

the Eighth Amendment is necessarily fact-specific and often depends upon the brightness

of the light at issue. For example, 24-hour lighting with single 9-watt or 13-watt bulbs

Case 2:10-cv-00957-SMM-SPL Document 62 Filed 02/09/12 Page 19 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 20 -

has been found not to be objectively unconstitutional. Vasquez v. Frank, 290 F. App’x

927, 929 (7th Cir. Aug.15, 2008) (24-hour lighting with one 9-watt fluorescent bulb not

an “extreme deprivation”); McBride v. Frank, 2009 WL 2591618, at *5 (E.D. Wis.

Aug.21, 2009) (24-hour lighting with a 9-watt fluorescent bulb not unconstitutional);

Wills v. Terhune, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1230-31 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (24-hour illumination

by 13-watt bulb not objectively unconstitutional); compare with Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1090-

91 (24-hour lighting from “large fluorescent lights” unconstitutional where prisoner could

not tell if it was night or day).

Plaintiff alleges that the lights cannot be turned off day or night (Doc. 1 at 3(C)

¶ 16(B)). He claims that the 24-hour lighting serves no legitimate purpose other than to

torment prisoners (id.).

Defendants explain that each cell in the Browning Unit contains four light bulbs:

one 40-watt fluorescent lamp “up light”; two 40-watt fluorescent lamps “down light”; and

one 7-watt fluorescent night light (Doc. 59, DSOF ¶ 105). During the day, all four bulbs

remain on and, at night, only the 7-watt night light remains on (id.). Defendants submit

that the 7-watt security light enables staff to conduct health and welfare/security checks

during the night and ensures the safety of the officers (id. ¶ 106). 

 In light of Plaintiff’s failure to respond to Defendants’ evidence that there is a

single dimmed light at night and that this light is for security purposes, the Court finds the

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

D. Recreation

Exercise is a basic human necessity protected by the Eighth Amendment; thus, the

deprivation of outdoor exercise for inmates who are under long-term segregation violates

the Constitution. Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1089. But restricting an prisoner’s exercise

privileges may be reasonable if the prisoner represents a serious security risk. LeMaire v.

Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1458 (9th Cir. 1993). Five hours of exercise per week has been

found to be constitutionally sufficient. See Baptisto v. Ryan, 2006 WL 798879, at *33

(D. Ariz. March 28, 2006) (collecting decisions of the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth,

Case 2:10-cv-00957-SMM-SPL Document 62 Filed 02/09/12 Page 20 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 21 -

Ninth, and Tenth Circuits). 

Plaintiff asserts that STG inmates are never allowed outside and the “recreation

area” is simply a 10x20 walled, concrete box with 20-foot high walls and a steel grated,

mesh top (Doc. 1 at 3(C) ¶ 16(C)). He alleges that, except for one racquetball, no

exercise equipment is provided and his only contact with the sun is an occasional glimpse

through a skylight (id.).

Defendants proffer evidence that inmates housed in the Browning Unit receive six

hours of out-of-cell recreation per week and the six hours are on three different days and

two hours in duration (Doc. 59, DSOF ¶ 118). The recreation area has a cement floor and

walls and a steel mesh top that allows fresh air and sunlight into the area (id. ¶ 119). 

During recreation sessions, inmates may use a racquetball/handball, a hackie sack, a

kickball and/or a walkman (id.). 

In failing to respond, Plaintiff does not dispute that he receives six hours of

exercise per week, which is more than required. Further, the evidence shows that he gets

natural light and fresh air. On this record, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment

on Plaintiff’s exercise claim.

E. Food

“The Eighth Amendment requires only that prisoners receive food that is adequate

to maintain health; it need not be tasty or aesthetically pleasing.” LeMaire, 12 F.3d at

1456. “The fact that the food occasionally contains foreign objects or sometimes is served

cold, while unpleasant, does not amount to a constitutional deprivation.” Id. (internal

citations omitted). But if an inmate is served meals with insufficient calories for long

periods of time, he may be able to demonstrate a violation of his right against cruel and

unusual punishment. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that he is provided just one hot meal a day along with a cold sacklunch meal that serves as a combined breakfast and lunch (Doc. 1 at 3(D) ¶ 16(D)). He

states that this low-calorie diet is used as punishment against STG prisoners (id.).

Defendants confirm that inmates at the Browning Unit received a reduced-calorie

Case 2:10-cv-00957-SMM-SPL Document 62 Filed 02/09/12 Page 21 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 22 -

diet due to their sedentary lifestyle (Doc. 59, DSOF ¶ 121). According to Carlos Reyna,

an ADC Lieutenant and the SSU Coordinator, a nutritionist designed the diet to ensure

that these low-level activity inmates receive proper calories and nutrition (id., Ex. C,

Reyna Decl. ¶ 27). Reyna further explains that since 2010, STG-validated inmates

receive three-meals-per-day during the week and two-meals-per day on the weekends,

with one hot meal each day (id. ¶ 30).

Plaintiff presents no specific facts or evidence to dispute Defendants’ evidence that

the calories provided to him are determined by a nutritionist to meet his health needs, nor

does he present any evidence that he has been injured or is underweight as a result of the

diet he receives. Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate on Plaintiff’s diet claim.

F. Privileges

Plaintiff alleges that STG prisoners are denied participation in sentence-reducing

rehabilitation programs, vocational programs, and other classes and activities (Doc. 1 at

3(D) ¶ 16(E)). These allegations fail to implicate the Eighth Amendment. There is no

constitutional right to rehabilitation, and the lack of educational or vocational programs

does not rise to a constitutional violation. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1254-55 (9th

Cir. 1982), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. 472. Even so,

Plaintiff does not dispute that he is allowed to have limited drawing materials and he may

be eligible to participate in limited in-cell education programs (DSOF ¶¶ 117, 126).

G. Hygiene

A complete denial of personal hygiene items violates the Eighth Amendment. See

Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1089-91. And subjecting an inmate to lack of sanitation that is severe

or prolonged can rise also to a constitutional deprivation. Anderson, 45 F.3d at 1314; see

Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978). Therefore, prison officials must provide

inmates with adequate sanitation. See Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir.

2000). If a prison official’s refusal to provide adequate cleaning supplies prohibits

inmates from maintaining minimally sanitary cells and thereby threatens their health, it

amounts to a constitutional violation. See Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 784 (9th

Case 2:10-cv-00957-SMM-SPL Document 62 Filed 02/09/12 Page 22 of 23
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 23 -

Cir. 1985). 

Plaintiff states that he receives just three eight minute showers a week and he is

denied access to mops, brooms, and cleaning supplies (Doc. 1 at 3(D) ¶ 16(F)-(G)). 

Defendants submit that STG prisoners are issued cleaning supplies twice a week,

including a scrub brush, a sponge, and a spray bottle (Doc. 59, DSOF ¶ 102). The prison

staff is responsible for cleaning the pod common areas (id. ¶ 103). Defendants also

present evidence that STG prisoners may purchase hygiene items from the commissary

(id. ¶ 116). 

Plaintiff’s concession that he is allowed three showers a week along with evidence

that he may purchase hygiene items shows that he is not denied the right to personal

hygiene. Plaintiff does not dispute that he is provided with some cleaning supplies, and he

does not allege that he is completely unable to maintain sanitation in his cell. Defendants

will therefore be granted summary judgment on this claim.

Because summary judgment will be granted on the due process claim (Count I) and

the above conditions-of-confinement claims (Count II), the Court need not address

Defendants’ argument for qualified immunity (see Doc. 58 at 25-28). 

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate is withdrawn as to Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 58).

(2) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 58) is granted.

(3) The Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly and terminate the action.

DATED this 8th day of February, 2012.

Case 2:10-cv-00957-SMM-SPL Document 62 Filed 02/09/12 Page 23 of 23