Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01404/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01404-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARTHEL DENNIS BORING,

Plaintiff,

v.

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC,

Defendant.

No. 2:13-cv-01404-GEB-CMK

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

Defendant Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (“Nationstar”) seeks 

attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party in this lawsuit. Summary 

judgment was entered in Nationstar’s favor on certain issues, and 

it prevailed on the remaining claims at trial.1 (Notice of Mot. & 

Nationstar’s Mot. For Att’ys’ Fees (“Mot.”), ECF No. 125.) A jury 

returned a general verdict in Nationstar’s favor on Plaintiff’s

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 

claim, and the jury answered written questions on Plaintiff’s 

claims alleged under California Civil Code sections 2923.6 and 

2923.7 submitted to the jury under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 39(c)(1), which authorizes use of an advisory jury on 

claims that a trial judge is required to decide. (ECF Nos. 120-

1, 123.) The trial judge issued findings of fact and conclusions 

of law in favor of Nationstar on Plaintiff’s remaining claims 

 

1 Nationstar also mentions costs in its attorneys’ fees motion, but the 

cost issue is not addressed herein since the procedure concerning costs is 

prescribed in Local Rule 292. (See Mot. 9:23.) 

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alleged under California Civil Code sections 2923.6 and 2923.7. 

(ECF No. 123.) Plaintiff opposes Nationstar’s attorneys’ fees 

motion. (Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. (“Opp’n”), ECF No. 126.) 

I. DISCUSSION

A. Entitlement to Attorneys’ Fees

Nationstar argues its motion should be granted under 

California Civil Code section 1717, contending this statute 

“authorizes reasonable attorney fees ‘[i]n any action on a 

contract, where the contract specifically provides that 

attorney’s fees and costs, . . . incurred to enforce [a]

contract[] shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to 

the prevailing party.’” Barrientos v. 1801-1825 Morton LLC, 583 

F.3d 1197, 1216 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Cal. Civ. Code 

§ 1717(a)). Nationstar argues both the Deed of Trust and the Note 

signed by Plaintiff constitutes the contract underlying its 

entitlement to recover attorneys’ fees in this lawsuit. (Mot. 

7:4–6, 20–21.) 

Nationstar argues the following portion of the Deed of 

Trust supports its motion for an award of attorneys’ fees:

If (a) Borrower fails to perform the 

covenants and agreements contained in this 

Security Instrument, [or] (b) there is a 

legal proceeding that might significantly 

affect Lender’s interest in the Property 

and/or rights under this Security 

Instrument . . . Lender’s actions can 

include, but are not limited to: (a) paying 

any sums secured by a lien which has priority 

over this Security Instrument; (b) appearing 

in court; and (c) paying reasonable 

attorneys’ fees to protect its interest in 

the Property and/or rights under this 

Security Instrument . . . .

Any amounts disbursed by Lender under this 

Section 9 shall become additional debt of 

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Borrower secured by this Security Instrument. 

These amounts shall bear interest at the Note 

rate from the date of disbursement and shall 

be payable, with such interest, upon notice 

from Lender to Borrower requesting payment.

(Ex. A Deed of Trust § 9 at pp. 6–7, ECF No. 125-2.)

Nationstar also relies on the following language in the 

Note:

If the Note Holder has required me to pay 

immediately in full as described above, the 

Note Holder will have the right to be paid 

back by me for all of its costs and expenses 

in enforcing this Note to the extent not 

prohibited by applicable law. Those expenses 

include, for example, reasonable attorneys’ 

fees.

(Ex. B Note § 6(E) at p. 2, ECF No. 125-3.)

Plaintiff’s operative Third Amended Complaint (TAC) 

consists of the following five claims alleged under California 

law: three California Civil Code claims, a California Unfair 

Competition Law claim, and a claim that Nationstar breached the 

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (TAC, ECF No. 

68.) These claims concerned Nationstar’s interest in the property 

and bore on “the underlying validity of [Plaintiff’s mortgage]

obligation.” Siligo v. Castellucci, 21 Cal. App. 4th 873, 878 

(1994). Nationstar argues all “claims . . . challenge . . . its 

right to foreclose on the [subject] Property,” (Mot. 8:2–3), and 

therefore the claims are within the scope of the attorney-fee 

provisions in the Deed of Trust and Note. California authority 

construing section 1717 has stated it “is settled that an 

obligation to pay attorneys’ fees incurred in the enforcement of 

a contract includes attorneys’ fees incurred in defending against 

a challenge to the underlying validity of the obligation.” 

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Siligo, 21 Cal. App. 4th at 878 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Nationstar is the prevailing party, since it prevailed 

on all claims in the TAC. Therefore, Nationstar is entitled to 

recover reasonable attorneys’ fees under section 1717(a).

However, Plaintiff argues Nationstar was not a 

prevailing party before January 22, 2014, since during the 

referenced time period Plaintiff obtained “injunctive relief” 

against Nationstar under the California Homeowner Bill of Rights 

(HBOR). (See Opp’n 1:12–18.) Specifically, Plaintiff argues since

he “obtained injunctive relief and [Nationstar] did not cure the 

violations that formed the basis of the injunctive relief until 

January 22, 2014, [Nationstar] should not be entitled to collect 

its fees incurred from June 25, 2013, the date that Plaintiff 

obtained injunctive relief, and January 22, 2014, the date . . .

[on which Nationstar] cured its violations of the HBOR.” (Opp’n 

1:20–24.)

Nationstar replies that the referenced injunctive 

relief was a temporary restraining order, and “Nationstar 

incurred fees between June 25, 2013[,] and January 22, 2014[,]

defending all of Plaintiff’s claims, which were not limited to 

the HBOR.” (Nationstar’s Reply ISO of Mot. (“Reply”) 2:27–3:1, 

ECF No. 127.)

Plaintiff has not shown that Nationstar is precluded 

from recovering attorneys’ fees incurred during the referenced 

time period. 

B. Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees

Section 1717(a) prescribes attorneys’ fees are “fixed 

by the court.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1717(a). “[T]he trial court has

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broad authority to determine the amount of a reasonable fee.” 

PLCM Grp. v. Drexler, 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095 (2000), as modified

(June 2, 2000). “[T]he fee setting inquiry in California 

ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours 

reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.”

Id.

1. Reasonable Hours

Nationstar submits billing entries itemizing the time 

spent by its following attorneys: Edward Buell, Megan Kelly,

Laszlo Ladi, John Sullivan, Mary Kate Sullivan, and Mark Wraight; 

and by its following paralegals: Gina Filice, Rozie Firoozabadi, 

Jennifer Negrete, and Seana Tilton. (Ex. C, ECF No. 125-4.)

Plaintiff asserts the reimbursement hours Nationstar

seeks are unreasonable, arguing “the time expended on the Motion 

to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint and the Motion to Dismiss 

the Second Amended Complaint should be disallowed or, in the 

alternative, substantially reduced.” (Opp’n 2:18–21.) However, 

Plaintiff has not shown that the referenced hours were 

unreasonable. 

Plaintiff also argues that the forty hours incurred by 

Nationstar for preparation of its summary judgment motion are

“[un]reasonable given the matters at hand—a simple foreclosure 

dispute.” (Opp’n 2:23–24.) Plaintiff has not shown that these are

unreasonable. 

Further, Plaintiff asserts that the billings of 

Nationstar’s attorneys Wraight and Ladi for time attending the

trial are unreasonable, arguing: 

[O]n December 2, 2015, Mr. Wraight billed 8.5 

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hours for attending trial while Mr. Ladi 

billed only 8 hours for attending trial, 

despite the fact that both individuals were 

in trial for the same amount of time. 

Further, on December 3, 2015, Mr. Wraight was 

only in trial for 6 hours while Mr. Ladi 

billed for 7.2 hours, despite the fact that 

(1) both attorneys were in trial for the same 

amount of time and (2) trial on that date 

began at approximately 10 [AM] and ended at 

approximately 2:00 [PM], for a maximum time 

of 4 hours, not the 6 hours or 7.2 included 

in the bills.

(Opp’n 2:28–3:6.) Nationstar replies: “these time entries reflect 

more than just time spent in the courtroom[,] and they include 

time spent communicating with the client concerning the trial, 

time spent preparing for Court, and time spent preparing for the 

post-verdict hearing with the Court on December 3, 2015, among 

others.” (Reply 4:23–26.)

However, the referenced December 2–3, 2015, billing 

entries state “Attend trial” without further elaboration, and 

therefore do not reflect the communication and preparation work

Nationstar asserts is included in these entries. (Ex. C, Invoice 

No. 419639.) Moreover, Nationstar has submitted separate billing 

entries for time spent communicating with the client, preparing 

for trial, and preparing for post-trial motions, (id.); this

indicates that some of the “Attend trial” hours are duplicative 

of other entries. Nor has Nationstar explained in its December 2, 

2015, billing entry why attorney Wraight attended trial for a 

half hour longer than attorney Ladi. Further, on December 3, 

2015, trial started at 9:00 AM, (ECF No. 117), and ended at 

approximately 2:00 PM, totaling five hours. Therefore, the fees 

requested for attorneys Wraight and Ladi are reduced as follows: 

Wraight’s time to attend trial on December 2, 2015, is reduced to 

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eight hours; Wraight’s time to attend trial on December 3, 2015, 

is reduced to five hours; and Ladi’s time to attend trial on 

December 3, 2015, is reduced to five hours. 

2. Reasonable Hourly Rate 

“The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the 

community for similar work.” Drexler, 22 Cal. 4th at 1095. In 

general, “the relevant community is the forum in which the 

district court sits.” Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th 

Cir. 1997); accord Syers Props. III, Inc. v. Rankin, 226 Cal. 

App. 4th 691, 700 (2014), reh’g denied (May 27, 2014), review 

denied (Sept. 10, 2014) (“The determination of the ‘market rate’ 

is generally based on the rates prevalent in the community where 

the court is located.”). The burden is on the party seeking fees 

“to produce satisfactory evidence . . . that the requested rates 

are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar 

services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience 

and reputation.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984).

Nationstar seeks the following rates for its attorneys: 

$320 for Buell; $275 for Kelly; $285 for Ladi; $410 for John 

Sullivan; $350 for Mary Kate Sullivan; and $340 for Wraight. 

(Decl. of Laszlo Ladi ISO of Mot (“Ladi Decl.”) ¶ 25, ECF 

No. 125-1.) It also seeks a $150 rate for each of its four 

paralegals: Filice, Firoozabadi, Negrete, and Tilton. (Id.)

Ladi submits a declaration detailing the qualifications 

and rates of each attorney who provided services in this lawsuit. 

Plaintiff has not contested the rates Nationstar seeks. 

Nationstar argues that the hourly rates it seeks are 

consistent with the rates awarded in similar cases in this 

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district for legal services, citing Hopkins v. Wells Fargo Bank, 

N.A., No. 2:13-umbia cv-444-WBS-CKD, 2014 WL 2987753, at *4 (E.D. 

Cal. July 1, 2014), appeal dismissed (Sept. 3, 2014), where the 

court awarded hourly rates ranging from $240 to $496 for 

attorneys, and $180 for paralegals, and Becker v. Wells Fargo 

Bank, NA, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-2799-TLN-KJN, 2014 WL 7409447, at *8 

(E.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, No. 

2:10-cv-2799-TLN-KJN, 2015 WL 509662 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2015), 

where the court awarded hourly rates ranging from $265 to $330 

for attorneys. Nationstar has shown that the rates it seeks are 

reasonable. 

Accordingly, the actual lodestar in this case is 

$135,017.50, calculated as follows:

NAME TITLE HOURS HOURLY RATE FEE AMOUNT

Buell Associate .1 $320 $32.00

Kelly Associate .1 $275 $27.50

Ladi Associate 263 $285 $74,955.00

John 

Sullivan

Partner .3 $410 $123.002

Mary Kate 

Sullivan

Partner 16.3 $350 $5,705.00

Wraight Partner 136 $340 $46,240.00

Filice Paralegal 4.2 $150 $630.00

Firoozabadi Paralegal 1.5 $150 $225.00

 

2 Although Nationstar lists John Sullivan as billing $145, (Ladi Decl. 

¶ 25), he actually billed .3 hours multiplied by a $410 hourly rate, which is

$123 in attorney’s fees. 

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Negrete Paralegal 26.1 $150 $3,915.00

Tilton Paralegal 21.1 $150 $3,165.00

However, Nationstar has submitted the declaration of 

one of its attorneys in which its attorney declares that 

Nationstar’s law firm discounted “the amounts . . . billed to 

Nationstar by $29,958.94 . . . to $106,218.06.” (Ladi Decl. 

¶ 23.) Since the total amount of attorneys’ fees Nationstar seeks 

is less than the $135,017.50 lodestar calculated fee, it is 

evident that Nationstar’s attorneys’ fees request is reasonable.

Therefore, Nationstar is awarded $106,218.06 for the attorneys’ 

fees incurred in this lawsuit. 

Nationstar seeks to add to this fee award the 

attorney’s fees it incurred preparing its motion for attorneys’

fees. Attorneys’ “fees recoverable . . . include compensation for 

all hours reasonably spent . . . [and] necessary to establish and 

defend the fee claim.” Serrano v. Unruh, 32 Cal. 3d 621, 639 

(1982). Nationstar cites the declarations of Ladi in support of 

this portion of its motion where he avers the following 

reasonable fees are involved with the preparation of the motion 

and reply: 

NAME TITLE HOURS HOURLY RATE FEE AMOUNT

Ladi Associate 13.5 $285 $3,847.50

(Ladi Decl. ¶ 23; Supplemental Decl. of Laszlo Ladi ISO Mot. ¶ 3, 

ECF No. 127-1.) This portion of the request is reasonable and 

therefore granted.

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II. CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, Nationstar is awarded 

$110,065.56 in attorneys’ fees. In light of this ruling, and the 

previous decisions in this lawsuit, the following judgment shall 

enter: 

Judgment is entered in favor of Nationstar on 

Plaintiff’s claims alleged under California Civil Code section 

2924(a) and California Unfair Competition Law, since the order 

filed on August 17, 2015, summarily adjudicated these claims in 

favor of Nationstar. (ECF No. 88.) Judgment is entered in 

Nationstar’s favor on Plaintiff’s implied covenant of good faith 

and fair dealing claim in accordance with the jury’s general 

verdict filed on December 4, 2015. (ECF No. 123.) Judgment is 

entered in Nationstar’s favor on Plaintiff’s California Civil 

Code sections 2923.6 and 2923.7 claims in accordance with the 

findings of fact and conclusions of law in the order filed on 

December 21, 2015. (Id.) Lastly, the judgment includes 

Nationstar’s award of $110,065.56 in attorneys’ fees.

Dated: June 8, 2016

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