Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-04240/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-04240-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgment

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Valinda Jo Elliott,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

White Mountain Apache Tribal Court;

Honorable John Doe Tribal Judge; and

White Mountain Apache Tribe, 

Defendant. 

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No. CIV 05-4240-PCT-MHM

ORDER

Currently before the Court is Defendants White Mountain Apache Tribal Court;

Honorable John Doe Tribal Judge; and White Mountain Apache Tribe's ("Defendants")

Second Amended Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt.#6). After reviewing the pleadings and

conducting oral argument on December 4, 2006, the Court issues the following Order. 

I. Background 

On December 27, 2005, Plaintiff Valinda Jo Elliott ("Plaintiff") filed the instant

Complaint in this Court. (Dkt.#1). Plaintiff's Complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive

relief against Defendants. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the prosecution of a civil

action against Plaintiff in the White Mountain Apache Tribal Court and for a declaratory

judgment that the Tribal Court may not exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff. (Dkt.#1,

Complaint ("Compl.) ¶1). Plaintiff is named in the Tribal Court complaint for her alleged

role in contributing and/or causing a fire that caused substantial damage to the land within

Case 3:05-cv-04240-MHM Document 18 Filed 12/07/06 Page 1 of 13
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1

Defendants' basis for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)2), 12(b)(4) and 12(b)(5) is

moot as the Parties agree that the issue with service of process has been resolved. 

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the territory and boundary of the White Mountain Apache Tribe reservation in the months

of June and July 2002. (Id. ¶9). After being lost in the wilderness for approximately three

days, Plaintiff set a signal fire to flag down an overflying helicopter traveling to a nearby fire.

(Id.). The signal fire worked and the helicopter picked up Plaintiff and flew her to safety.

(Id.). However, the signal fire spread and continued to burn. The signal fire merged into the

nearby burning fire and formed the Rodeo-Chediski fire; one of the State of Arizona's largest

fires burning over 400,000 acres of land, including land within the White Mountain Apache

Tribal reservation. On June 11, 2003, the White Mountain Apache Tribe instituted a civil

action in White Mountain Apache Tribal Court against Plaintiff. The current tribal complaint

asserts claims against Plaintiff, a non-Indian and non-member of the White Mountain Apache

Tribe, seeking civil penalties including restitution for violations of the White Mountain

Apache Tribe government and game and fish codes as well as acts of negligence and

trespass. (Defendants' Second Amended Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit A). 

Plaintiff challenged the jurisdiction of the White Mountain Apache Tribal Court

during the course of litigation in that court. (Compl. ¶12). Specifically, Plaintiff filed a

motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction citing the Supreme Court's ruling in Montana v.

United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). Plaintiff's motion was denied at the Tribal trial court

level on December 18, 2003 and the White Mountain Apache Court of Appeals dismissed

Plaintiff's appeal on April 12, 2005, finding that it did not possess the requisite jurisdiction

to hear the appeal because a final order had not yet been issued in the case. (Defendants'

Second Amended Motion to Dismiss, Exhibits B and C). Plaintiff asserted the instant action

on December 27, 2005 and on March 20, 2006, Defendants filed their instant Second

Amended Motion to Dismiss citing Rules 12(b)(2), 12(b)(4), 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6) as basis

for dismissal. Plaintiff has opposed the Motion and it is fully briefed and ripe for the Court's

consideration.1

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II. Analysis

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint on several grounds invoking Rule

12(b)(6) including (1) Plaintiff did not properly exhaust the requisite tribal remedies prior

to bringing the instant action; and (2) the Tribal Court clearly has jurisdiction pursuant to the

Supreme Court's ruling in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).

A. Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies

Defendants contend that dismissal, or at the very least a stay, of Plaintiff's Complaint

is proper because Plaintiff has not exhausted tribal remedies prior to bringing suit in this

Court. This position is in direct contravention to the allegation of Plaintiff's Complaint

which states "Plaintiff has exhausted her Tribal remedies and Tribal jurisdiction clearly does

not lie under Montana v. U.S. Therefore, any further proceedings in Tribal Court are

contrary to law." (Compl. ¶15). Support for Defendants' position derives from the Supreme

Court's ruling in National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 854-57,

(1985) which held that "a district court should order a stay, or dismiss the action,

notwithstanding the fact it has subject matter jurisdiction over a civil action against a nonIndian, to permit a tribal court to determine in the first instance whether it has the power to

exercise subject matter jurisdiction in a civil dispute between Indians and non-Indians that

arises on an Indian reservation." Stock West Corp. v. Taylor, 964 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1992)(en

banc). The Supreme Court justified such action in district courts because "an orderly

administration of justice in federal court will be served by allowing a full record to be

developed in the Tribal Court before either the merits or any question concerning appropriate

relief is addressed." National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856. Moreover, Defendants point out that

according to the Supreme Court "exhaustion of tribal remedies requires that tribal appellate

courts be given the opportunity to review determinations of the lower tribal courts." Iowa

Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 17 (1987). Defendants further note that to date, only

the White Mountain Apache trial court has made a determination on the merits as to

jurisdiction over Plaintiff in the White Mountain Apache Tribal Court. (Defendants' Second

Amended Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit B). The White Mountain Apache Court of Appeals

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dismissed Plaintiff's interlocutory type appeal noting that the White Mountain Apache Rules

of Appellate Procedure only give the appellate court jurisdiction to hear "final decisions and

orders" from tribal court. (Defendants' Second Amended Motion to Dismiss, Exhibits C). 

As such, the appellate court did not reach the merits and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Defendants, therefore, argue that the exhaustion of tribal remedies has not been met.

Conversely, Plaintiff argues that a decision on the merits from the White Mountain Apache

Court of Appeals is not required under the holding of Iowa Mutual and that because the tribe

has taken the requisite "'first bite' at the apple" in determining jurisdiction that the tribal

remedies requirement has been met. (Plaintiff's Response, pp.3-4). 

The Court finds itself in agreement with Defendants on this issue. It is undisputed

that the White Mountain Apache Court of Appeals has not entertained the merits of Plaintiff's

appeal regarding her motion for lack of jurisdiction before the Tribal Court. As noted above,

the holding in Iowa Mutual is clear in that, at the very least, the Tribal appellate courts must

be given the opportunity to entertain the merits of the jurisdiction issue before bringing any

claim in federal court. Here, no such opportunity was presented as the White Mountain

Apache Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to review Plaintiff's appeal. In addition, there

does not appear to be any type of discretionary type of review that the White Mountain

Apache Court of Appeals could have exercised as the Appellate Rules of the White Mountain

Apache Tribe apparently do not consider hearing non-final orders, such as Plaintiff's appeal.

 As such, the appellate court lacked even the opportunity to hear Plaintiff's appeal. Until this

appeal is heard, or at least the Tribal appellate court has the opportunity to hear it, this Court

finds that the exhaustion requirement has not been met. 

While the Court finds that as a general matter, tribal remedies were not exhausted

prior to bringing suit in this Court, the inquiry does not stop here. Plaintiff offers several

bases justifying the exercise of jurisdiction in this Court even though exhaustion has not been

met. For instance, Plaintiff contends that exhaustion is not required where, as here, there is

no colorable or plausible claim of jurisdiction. In addition, Plaintiff asserts that the three

exceptions to the exhaustion requirement support jurisdiction in this Court. 

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2

In the instant case, there is no argument that tribal jurisdiction is appropriate based

upon statute or treaty, rather Defendants argue that tribal jurisdiction is appropriate based

upon inherent sovereignty of the tribe.

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(1) Appropriateness of Tribal Jurisdiction

As noted by the Ninth Circuit in Allstate Indem. Co. v. Stump, 191 F.3d 1071, 1073

(9th Cir. 1999) the Supreme Court has affirmed the exhaustion requirement prior to bringing

federal suit unless "it is plain" that the tribal court lacks jurisdiction over the dispute. (citing

Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997)). Thus, where the tribal court plainly

lacks jurisdiction, exhaustion serves no other purpose than delay and is, therefore,

unnecessary. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 356 (2001). In this case, Plaintiff asserts that

tribal jurisdiction is clearly lacking, thus excusing any failure to exhaust her tribal remedies

prior to bringing suit in this Court. Defendants, on the other hand, take exception to

Plaintiff's position and argue that this case falls firmly within the authorization of tribal

jurisdiction discussed in the seminal case on tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers of United

States v. Montana, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).

As recognized by the Ninth Circuit, "[a]nalyis of Indian tribal court jurisdiction begins

with United States v. Montana." Ford Motor Co. v. Todecheene, 394 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th

Cir. 2005). In Montana, the Supreme Court "held that an Indian tribe could not regulate

hunting and fishing by non-Indians on non-Indian owned fee land within the reservation."

Id. The Supreme Court further explained that there are two sources of tribal jurisdiction

against nonmembers; either positive by law, by way of statute or treaty, or through the

inherent sovereignty of the tribe. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.2

 The Supreme Court further

stated that "the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities

of nonmembers of the tribe." Id. at 565. However, this general principle, applicable to the

instant case as the Plaintiff is a non-member defendant in Tribal Court, is subject to two

exceptions. The first exception is that a tribe may regulate through taxation, licensing, or

other means, "the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe

or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases or other arrangements." Id.

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at 565. The second exception is that a tribe "may also retain inherent power to exercise civil

authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that

conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security,

or the health or welfare of the tribe." Id. at 566. The Ninth Circuit recently spoke to the

Montana exceptions and grant of jurisdiction over nonmembers in tribal courts in Smith v.

Salish Kootenai College ("SKC), 434 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. Jan. 10, 2006) (en banc). In SKC,

the Ninth Circuit noted that courts generally look to two specific facts when considering

tribal court jurisdiction over a nonmember. First, courts look to the party status of the

nonmember. Id. at 1131. In other words, whether the nonmember is a plaintiff or defendant

in tribal court. Second, courts have considered, perhaps to a lesser extent, whether the events

giving rise to the cause of action occurred within the reservation. Id.; (citing Montana, 450

U.S. at 1132, (stating "[t]o be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise

some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians... even on non-Indian fee lands.")). The

Ninth Circuit further explained that with respect to instances, such as here, where the

defendant in Tribal Court is a nonmember, that Ninth Circuit precedent suggests "that

whether tribal courts may exercise jurisdiction over a nonmember defendant may turn on

how the claims are related to tribal lands." Id. at 1132. The Ninth Circuit noted several

decisions in which tribal jurisdiction over a nonmember defendant based upon events

occurring on the reservation was appropriate. Id. (citing McDonald v. Means, 309 F.3d 530

(9th Cir. 2002) (cause of action arose out of accident on tribal land; tribal court had

jurisdiction); Allstate Indem. 191 F.3d 1971 (cause of action arose out of accident on tribal

roads, remanded for exhaustion of tribal determination of jurisdiction); and Stock W. Inc.,

v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1989) (contracts

with tribe for activities on reservation; tribal court's determination of jurisdiction entitled to

comity)). The Ninth Circuit further concluded that the Supreme Court has left open the

question of tribal-court jurisdiction over nonmember defendants in general. Id. (citing Hicks,

533 U.S. at 358 n.2). 

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3

The Supreme Court in White Mountain Apache Tribe noted that Fort Apache

Reservation occupies over 1.6 million acres including 720,000 acres of commercial forest.

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In light of the discussion above, this Court is presented with the question of whether

"it is plain" that the Tribal Court lacks jurisdiction over the Plaintiff, a nonmember defendant

in White Mountain Apache Tribal Court. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 459. Defendants argue at

length in their Motion that the jurisdiction is proper in Tribal Court based upon the tribe's

inherent sovereignty. Based upon the events at issue before the Tribal Court, Defendants cite

the second exception of Montana in support of tribal jurisdiction; specifically that [Plaintiff's]

activities on tribal land have clearly impacted the White Mountain Apache Tribe's political

integrity, economic security, health and welfare..." (Defendants' Motion, p.15). In support

of the application of the second exception to Montana, the Defendants cite the tribe's interest

and ownership of the reservation land that was damaged and is at issue before the Tribal

Court. Specifically, the fire damage and destruction to the White Mountain Apache land

took place entirely on the tribe's trust lands and not on land held in fee simple for

nonmembers. Moreover, Defendants cite the tribe's ownership and regulatory authority over

this land. Most notably, the timber that was destroyed. See White Mountain Apache Tribe

v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 138 (1980) (stating that "[u]nder federal law, timber on reservation

land is owned by the United States for the benefit of the Tribe...).3

 The Defendants further

note that protection of the tribal timber has been further solidified with the Indian

Reorganization Act of 1934 ("IRA"). Notably, the purpose of § 6 of the IRA, codified as 25

U.S.C. § 466, is "'to assure a proper and permanent management of the Indian Forest' under

modern sustained-yield methods so as to 'assure that the Indian forests will be permanently

productive and will yield continuous revenues to the tribes.'" United States v. Mitchell, 463

U.S. 206, 221 (1983). In fact, the White Mountain Apache Tribe's constitution provides the

tribe with authority "to manage all economic affairs and enterprises of the Tribe including

tribal lands, timber, sawmills,..." See WMAT Constitution, Article IV, § 1(i). Defendants

further contend that the inherent sovereignty is buttressed by the tribe's right to exclude

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nonmembers from its land. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144 (1982)

(stating that "[n]onmembers who lawfully enter tribal lands remain subject to the tribe's

power to exclude them," which includes the power to place conditions on entry, on continued

presence, or on reservation conduct.). Thus, in light of the tribe's interest and ownership in

the land at issue, Defendants contend that jurisdiction is proper as the tribe possesses inherent

sovereignty based upon the power to regulate, manage and protect its forest resources and

to enforce its laws.

Conversely, Plaintiff maintains that there is no doubt that jurisdiction does not lie

before the Tribal Court. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that neither exception of Montana

applies to this case. Most notably, with respect to the second exception of Montana, Plaintiff

argues that Defendants provide no authority suggesting that this exception is appropriate in

this case. Rather, Plaintiff contends that Defendants are attempting "to unilaterally expand

supreme court case law" (Plaintiff's Response, p.7) and to permit such jurisdiction would be

"a leap beyond reason." (Id. p.10). 

The Court does not agree with Plaintiff that it would be a "leap beyond reason" to

provide for Tribal Court jurisdiction over Plaintiff. Specifically, the Court finds that, at the

very least, there is a debatable question or colorable claim as to the application of the second

exception of the Montana to this case. The Ninth Circuit's thorough analysis of Montana and

Ninth Circuit authority in Ford Motor Co v. Todecheene, 394 F.3d 1170 (2005) is instructive

in this regard. In Ford Motor, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding in a

products liability case involving a car accident on tribal land that tribal defendant, Ford

Motor, "was not required to exhaust tribal remedies before challenging tribal court

jurisdiction in federal court, because jurisdiction was plainly lacking and exhaustion would

serve only to delay the proceedings." Id. at 1173. With respect to the second Montana

exception, the Ninth Circuit held that it provided no basis for tribal jurisdiction. Id. at 1181-

82. In making this determination; however, the Ninth Circuit addressed the dissent's point

that "tribal ownership of the land on which an accident occurs is a 'significant' factor that may

'may sometimes be dispositive.'" Id. at 1182 (emphasis original). The Ninth Circuit noted

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that "sometimes is not always. And this case is not one of those times when ownership

should be considered a dispositive factor in the Montana analysis." Id. More importantly,

for this case's purposes, the Ninth Circuit went on to explain that "[t]here is absolutely

nothing in the record to support the premise that the status of the land impacted potential

liability in this case. This case does not involve encroachment upon tribal land, damage to

tribal land, interference with the use of tribal land, or any other effect upon tribal land that

might prove dispositive." Id. Finally, in rejecting the dissent's reliance on McDonald, a case

in which the Ninth Circuit held tribal jurisdiction to be proper over a nonmember, the Ninth

Circuit noted that McDonald involved a ruling where the nonmember defendant's horse had

wandered onto the roads of the reservation, thereby impacting the interest of the tribe in

keeping its roadways free from obstruction. No such circumstances existed in Todecheene.

Id.

Unlike the situation presented in Todecheene, this case does involve, heavily, the

tribal land. The tribal land at issue, containing timber which the White Mountain Apache

Tribe clearly have an interest in, is at the heart of this litigation. Unlike Todecheene, this

case does involve "damage to tribal land" and the "interference with the use of the tribal

land." Id. Specifically, a significant portion of the White Mountain Apache Tribe's

reservation was burned and damaged by the Rodeo-Chediski fire which is alleged to be

attributable, at least in part, to Plaintiff's actionable conduct. Moreover, the White Mountain

Apache Tribe's useage of such acreage has undoubtedly been impacted. Todecheene,

provides distinguishing instructive authority that demonstrates that ownership of the land is

significantly relevant to this litigation. As such, the Court finds that, at the very least, there

is a debatable question or colorable claim as to whether jurisdiction lies in the Tribal Court.

The second exception of Montana provides tribes with the inherent power to exercise civil

authority over nonmembers where the conduct "threatens or has some direct effect on the

political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe." The conduct

at issue occurring on the reservation due to the alleged actions of the Plaintiff potentially

threatens the economic security of the tribe based upon the interference of the use of the

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tribe's land and timber and the overall welfare of the tribe as such resources are material to

the tribe's stability. As such, it is debatable that the tribe retains jurisdiction to enforce its

regulatory authority over the Plaintiff. Because Plaintiff did not exhaust her tribal remedies

before coming to this Court, the Court need not go any further in regards to a final

determination as to whether jurisdiction is proper before the Tribal Court. 

(2) Exceptions to Tribal Exhaustion 

In addition to challenging tribal jurisdiction on the basis that it is plainly lacking,

Plaintiff also argues that the three applicable exceptions to tribal exhaustion apply to this

case. In National Farmers, 471 U.S. 845, 857, n.21 (1985), the Supreme Court noted that

exhaustion would not be required where: (1) the assertion of tribal jurisdiction is motivated

by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith; (2) where the action is patently violative

of express jurisdictional prohibitions; or (3) where exhaustion would be futile because of the

lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the court's jurisdiction. 

With respect to the first exception, Plaintiff argues tribal jurisdiction is motivated by

a desire to harass or is in bad faith. Plaintiff relies on the situation involving Mr. Leonard

Gregg, a member of the White Mountain Apache Tribe and firefighter who intentionally set

fires that led to the Rodeo fire that eventually merged with the Chediski fire. Plaintiff takes

issue with the fact that even though Mr. Gregg is an enrolled member of the White Mountain

Apache Tribe and intentionally caused the Rodeo fire, he has not been charged civilly or

criminally in Tribal Court. Plaintiff uses Mr. Gregg's case to suggest that Plaintiff is being

disparately treated and prosecuted for relief that should, at least in part, be directed at Mr.

Gregg. 

The Court; however, does not find persuasive Plaintiff's reliance on Mr. Gregg's

situation. As noted by the Parties, Mr. Gregg was convicted in this District for crimes

resulting from his actions causing the Rodeo fire. CR 02-661-PHX-JAT (Dkt.#77). Notably,

Mr. Gregg in addition to his one hundred and twenty (120) month term of imprisonment with

the Bureau of Prisons has also been ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $27,882,502.

The Court struggles to see how the situation of Mr. Gregg demonstrates or suggests that

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tribal civil jurisdiction over Plaintiff for actions that resulted in damage to land owned by the

White Mountain Apache Tribe is motivated by a desire to harass or is in bad faith. At best,

Plaintiff's argument is based upon speculation.

As to the second exception, Plaintiff argues that the holding in Montana v. United

States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) and its progeny demonstrates the jurisdiction before the Tribal

Court is patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions. However, this argument has

been addressed above by the Court and in this Court's view, jurisdiction before the Tribal

Court is not "patently violative" of jurisdictional prohibitions. Rather, there is a debatable

question as to the propriety of jurisdiction over Plaintiff in Tribal Court based upon her

actions on the White Mountain Apache Tribe's reservation and resulting damage. Thus, the

Court does not find Plaintiff's argument as to the second exhaustion exception persuasive.

 Lastly, Plaintiff argues that exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of an

adequate opportunity to challenge the Tribal Court's jurisdiction. Again, Plaintiff takes issue

with the procedural history of her initial challenge before the trial level Tribal Court, which

rejected her jurisdictional challenge and the Tribal appellate court's dismissal of Plaintiff's

appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiff argues that it would be inequitable to require her to

go through the entire case at the trial level and then along with the other issues re-litigate

them to the Tribal Court of Appeals. The Court; however, does not find Plaintiff's argument

persuasive as it contrary to the Supreme Court's precedent established in Iowa Mutual, 480

U.S. at 17. As noted above, the Supreme Court was clear in stating in pertinent part:

[t]he federal policy of promoting tribal self-government encompasses the

development of the entire tribal court system, including appellate courts. At

a minimum, exhaustion of tribal remedies means that tribal appellate courts

must have the opportunity to review the determinations of the lower tribal

courts. 

Id.

In Iowa Mutual, the Supreme Court noted that while the tribal court had made an

initial determination as to jurisdiction, the insurer defendant in tribal court, had not yet

obtained appellate review as provided in the Blackfeet tribal code. Thus, the Supreme Court

stated "[u]ntil appellate review is complete, the Blackfeet Tribal Courts have not had a full

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opportunity to evaluate the claim and federal courts should not intervene." Id. The Court

finds this language to be clear and provides against Plaintiff's argument. Due to the Rules

of Appellate Procedure for the White Mountain Apache Code, it does not appear that the

White Mountain Apache Court of Appeals has even had the opportunity to entertain

Plaintiff's appeal as it only has jurisdiction over "final decisions and orders." See Rule 2A,

White Mountain Apache Rules of Appellate Procedure; (Defendants' Motion, Exhibit C).

Moreover, as noted above, there are compelling reasons for the federal courts to allow the

tribal court systems the first opportunity to address such issues, including the "orderly

administration of justice in federal court..." National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 855-57. In

addition, by allowing the tribal courts a full opportunity to determine jurisdiction it provides

the tribal courts with the ability "to rectify any errors it may have made." Id. at 856-57. As

such, while it is clear that Plaintiff takes exception with the trial Tribal Court's ruling with

respect to jurisdiction over Plaintiff; this determination needs to be taken to the Tribal

appellate court in accordance with the Tribal appellate rules so that the appellate court can

have an opportunity to address the jurisdictional issue. Until that time, Plaintiff's action in

this Court is premature. 

In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her tribal remedies prior to

bringing the instant suit. In addition, there is a debatable question or colorable claim as to

the propriety of jurisdiction over Plaintiff in Tribal Court exemplifying Plaintiff's obligation

to exhaust tribal remedies prior to bringing the instant suit. In addition, the Court does not

find any applicable exception justifying Plaintiff's failure to exhaust. 

B. Future Handling

The final determination this Court must make is whether to dismiss Plaintiff's suit

before this Court or to stay the present matter pending a determination from the Tribal Court.

See SAC, 434 F.3d at 1131, n.1 (stating "[o]rdinarily, so long as there is a 'colorable question'

whether a tribal court has subject matter jurisdiction, federal courts will stay or dismiss an

action in federal court 'to permit a tribal court to determine in the first instance whether it has

the power to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction in a civil dispute between Indians and nonCase 3:05-cv-04240-MHM Document 18 Filed 12/07/06 Page 12 of 13
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4

Notably, in SAC, the Ninth Circuit made clear that the district court did not issue its

decision that tribal court had jurisdiction until the plaintiff nonmember had exhausted his

appeals in tribal court. Id. at 1131, n.1. 

5

The Ninth Circuit subsequently held that the district should have stayed the action

based upon the alternative ground for dismissal of sovereign immunity. Id.

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Indians that arises on an Indian reservation.'") (citations omitted).4 For instance, in Stock

West, 964 F.2d at 920, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the

lawsuit filed by a nonmember corporation as a matter of comity where the tribal court had

not yet resolved the questions of tribal sovereignty.5

 Additionally, the Supreme Court has

held that whether the matter should be dismissed or stayed is a question reserved for the

district court's discretion. See Nat'l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 857. In this Court's view, and in

the interests of comity, dismissal of the Plaintiff's suit is appropriate. Plaintiff has identified

no prejudice resulting from such determination and can properly challenge jurisdiction once

the matter is ripe for federal district court consideration. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting Defendants' Second Amended Motion to

Dismiss. (Dkt.#6). Plaintiff's action is dismissed without prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk enter judgment accordingly. 

DATED this 6th day of December, 2006.

Case 3:05-cv-04240-MHM Document 18 Filed 12/07/06 Page 13 of 13