Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01084/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01084-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD GARCIA,

CDCR # T-77914,

Civil No. 12cv1084 IEG (KSC)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

(1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT 

OF COUNSEL PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1)

[ECF No. 18]; 

AND

(2) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR STAY AND

EXTENSION OF TIME IN 

WHICH TO FILE OPPOSITION 

[ECF No. 24] 

vs.

C.D.C.R., et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at California State Prison–Los Angeles

County (“CSP-LAC”), in Lancaster, California, is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with

this civil action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges his rights to adequate

medical care, due process, and to be free of cruel and unusual punishment were violated while

he was an inmate at Centinela State Prison in 2011. See Compl. [ECF No. 1] at 1-6.

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Case 3:12-cv-01084-H-KSC Document 25 Filed 04/26/13 Page 1 of 4
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I. Procedural Background

On November 30, 2012, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P.

12(b) and 12(b)(6) [ECF No. 13]. Because Defendants move to dismiss, in part, based on

Plaintiff’s alleged failure to exhaust available administrative remedies prior to suit pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), the Court provided Plaintiff with notice and an opportunity to develop the

record regarding exhaustion. See Dec. 20, 2012 Order [ECF No. 14] at 1-2 (citing Wyatt v.

Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 2003)). Plaintiff was directed to file and serve his

opposition, including evidentiary materials related to exhaustion, by January 14, 2013. 

Defendants were ordered to reply by January 22, 2013, and the Motion was set for hearing

without oral argument as submitted on January 28, 2013. Id.

On January 30, 2013, however, Plaintiff submitted a Motion to Appoint Counsel [ECF

No. 18], accompanied by a Motion to Stay Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and “expansion of

time.” [ECF No. 16]. The Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel and

granted him an extension of time to file his Opposition to Defendants’ Motion. [ECF No. 19]. 

However, rather than filing his Opposition, Plaintiff has filed virtually the identical request he

previously filed seeking appointment of counsel and “request for another stay in abeyance.”

[ECF No. 24].

A. Motion for Appointment of Counsel

“[T]here is no absolute right to counsel in civil proceedings.” Hedges v. Resolution Trust

Corp. (In re Hedges), 32 F.3d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Thus, federal courts

do not have the authority “to make coercive appointments of counsel.” Mallard v. United States

District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989); see also United States v. $292,888.04 in U.S.

Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1995).

Districts courts have discretion, however, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), to “request”

that an attorney represent indigent civil litigants upon a showing of “exceptional circumstances.”

 See Agyeman v. Corrections Corp. of America, 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004). “A finding

of the exceptional circumstances of the plaintiff seeking assistance requires at least an evaluation

of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the merits and an evaluation of the plaintiff’s

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ability to articulate his claims ‘in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Id.

(quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Terrell v.

Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991).

No doubt most pro se litigants “find it difficult to articulate [their] claims,” and would be

better served with the assistance of counsel. Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331. For this reason, in the

absence of counsel, federal courts employ procedures which are highly protective of a pro se

litigant’s rights. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (holding pro se complaint to

less stringent standard) (per curiam). In fact, where a plaintiff appears pro se in a civil rights

case, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the

doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule

of liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963

F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, so long as a pro se litigant, is able to “articulate his

claims” in light of the relative complexity of the matter, the “exceptional circumstances” which

might require the appointment of counsel do not exist. Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331; accord

Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009).

Plaintiff again requests counsel because he claims he does not “understand anything” and

without representation his “case is as good as lost before it even begins.” See Pl.’s Mot. [ECF

No. 24] at 1. As the Court stated in its previous Order, these circumstances are typical of almost

every pro se prisoner civil rights cases, and alone are insufficient to demonstrate the type of

“exceptional” circumstances which are necessary to justify the appointment of counsel under

Wilborn and its progeny. In fact, Plaintiff has shown that he has a good grasp of basic litigation

procedure, has effected service of his own Complaint and summons via the U.S. Marshal, and

has to date been able to articulate the facts underlying the basis of his suit adequately in light of

its relative legal complexity. Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103; Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017; Palmer, 560

F.3d at 970 (finding district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint counsel when

pro se prisoner “had done ‘quite a good job’ putting on his case and was able to “present

evidence effectively.”).

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For these reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel without

prejudice. [ECF No. 24.]

B. Motion to Stay and/or Extend Time

Plaintiff also asks the Court to stay the proceedings in this case, and to defer ruling on

Defendants’ Motion until it appoints him counsel for him. See Pl.’s Mot. to Stay [ECF No. 24]

at 2. The Court has previously granted Plaintiff an extension of time. [ECF No. 19]. The Court

will grant Plaintiff one more extension of time but no further requests will be considered absent

a showing of extraordinary circumstances. 

III. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby:

1) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel [ECF No. 24]; but

2) GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay and Extend Time [ECF No. 24]. 

Plaintiff shall have until Monday, May 20, 2013, to file and serve his Opposition to

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 13]. Defendants, for their part, shall likewise be

provided additional time, or until Tuesday, May 28, 2013, to file and serve their Reply. 

Following these submissions, unless otherwise Ordered, the Court shall thereafter enter

its written decision on the papers without requiring appearances of any kind or holding any oral

argument. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 7.1(d)(1). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 25, 2013 _________________________________________

HON. IRMA E. GONZALEZ

United States District Judge 

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