Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01715/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01715-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MICHAEL LAMAR PRESSLEY, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

M. PACHECO, 

Defendant. 

 Case No. 17cv1715-MMA (MDD) 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT 

PACHECO’S MOTION TO DISMISS 

[Doc. No. 20] 

Plaintiff Michael Lamar Pressley, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has 

filed a First Amended Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant 

Pacheco.1

 See Doc. No. 14. Defendant Pacheco moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims 

pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(m) and 12(b)(6). See Doc. No. 20. 

Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion, to which Defendant Pacheco 

                                               

1

 In his amended complaint, Plaintiff also added a new defendant, Sheriff William Gore, and re-alleged 

the previously dismissed claims against Defendant Martinez. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Gore 

do not survive screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1), and the claims 

against Defendant Martinez remain dismissed. 

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replied.2

 See Doc. Nos. 32, 34. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN 

PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant Pacheco’s motion to dismiss. 

BACKGROUND3

 This action arises out of events occurring on April 13, 2017 during Plaintiff’s 

temporary detention at the San Diego County Sheriff Department’s George Bailey 

Detention Facility.4

 Plaintiff claims Defendant Pacheco used excessive force against him 

after he requested a grievance in order to complain about his cell assignment. Plaintiff 

contends Pacheco “pepper sprayed [him]” through his tray slot “as [he] was getting 

cuffed up, with [his] hands behind [his] back.” FAC at 3. Plaintiff further alleges 

Pacheco “was informed that [he] was allergic” to “chemical spray,” and that he suffered a 

“grandma [sic] seizure,” which left him in a coma and “on life support” for seven days as 

a result of the incident. Id. at 3-4. 

 Plaintiff initially filed this action on August 23, 2017. See Doc. No. 1. He filed 

his first amended complaint on April 4, 2018. See Doc. No. 14. On February 23, 2019, 

the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why it should not dismiss the action based on 

Plaintiff’s failure to serve Defendant Pacheco with the summons and amended complaint. 

See Doc. No. 15. Plaintiff responded to the order, and on March 11, 2019, the Court 

granted Plaintiff an extension of time in which to serve Pacheco. See Doc. Nos. 16, 17. 

Specifically, the Court ordered Plaintiff to effectuate service of the summons and his 

                                               

2

 Plaintiff previously sought leave to file a second amended complaint for purposes of clarifying his 

claims and adding several defendants. See Doc. No. 25. The Court deferred ruling on Plaintiff’s request 

pending consideration of Defendant Pacheco’s motion to dismiss. See Doc. No. 30. 

3

 Because this matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true the 

allegations set forth in the complaint. See Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. Of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 

(1976). 

4

 Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint includes factual allegations regarding incidents occurring on 

additional dates in April 2017. Defendant Pacheco correctly observes that Plaintiff does not allege 

Pacheco’s involvement in any of these other incidents, a point which Plaintiff does not contest. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Pacheco are based solely on the events occurring on April 13, 

2017. 

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amended complaint within ninety days. See Doc. No. 17 at 2. Plaintiff served Defendant 

Pacheco with the summons and amended complaint on June 23, 2019. See Doc. No. 19. 

Thereafter, Pacheco filed the instant motion to dismiss. See Doc. No. 20. 

LEGAL STANDARD

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) 

A defendant may move to dismiss based on the plaintiff’s failure to timely serve 

the summons and complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5). Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 4(m) addresses the time limit for service and provides in pertinent part: 

If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the 

court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the 

action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made 

within a specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, 

the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). The rule “encourages efficient litigation by minimizing the time 

between commencement of an action and service of process.” Electric Specialty Co. v. 

Road and Ranch Supply, Inc., 967 F.2d 309, 311 (9th Cir. 1992) (addressing former Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 4(j)). “Substantial compliance” with Rule 4 is required in order to uphold 

service of process, even when a defendant has received actual notice. Jackson v. 

Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344, 1347 (9th Cir. 1982). As relevant here, substantial 

compliance has been found where service was completed very close to the deadline. See, 

e.g., Tyson v. City of Sunnyvale, 159 F.R.D. 528, 530 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (service 121 days 

after filing of the complaint constituted “substantial compliance” with Rule 4(m)). 

2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the 

sufficiency of the complaint. See Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A 

pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 

is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, plaintiffs must also plead 

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard 

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thus demands more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, or 

naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009). Instead, the complaint “must contain allegations of underlying facts 

sufficient to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” 

Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). 

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must assume the truth 

of all factual allegations and must construe them in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 

1996). The court need not take legal conclusions as true merely because they are cast in 

the form of factual allegations. See Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 

1987). Similarly, “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not 

sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 

1998). 

When the plaintiff is appearing pro se, the court must construe the pleadings 

liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. See Thompson v. Davis, 295 

F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2001); Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 

623 (9th Cir. 1988). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se complaint, however, the 

court is not permitted to “supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially 

pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

The court must give a pro se litigant leave to amend his complaint “unless it determines 

that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quotation omitted) (citing Noll v. 

Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1447 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

DISCUSSION

1. Failure to Timely Serve 

Defendant Pacheco moves to dismiss this action on the grounds that Plaintiff failed 

to effectuate timely service of the summons and complaint. On March 11, 2019, the 

Court ordered Plaintiff to serve Pacheco within ninety days. See Doc. No. 17. As 

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Pacheco notes, the record reflects that he was not served until June 23, 2019, 

approximately two-weeks beyond the ninety-day time limit. See Doc. No. 19. However, 

a review of the summons indicates that Plaintiff provided the U.S. Marshal Service with 

the necessary information on or before May 29, 2019, prior to the expiration of the 

ninety-day time limit. See id. 

The Court declines to dismiss this action based on a two-week delay in service 

when that delay was not clearly Plaintiff’s fault, particularly since courts “are generally 

more solicitous of the rights of pro se litigants, particularly when technical jurisdictional 

requirements are involved,” Borzeka v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 444, 447 n.2 (9th Cir. 1984), 

and “‘[s]trict time limits . . . ought not to be insisted upon’ where restraints resulting from 

a pro se . . . plaintiff’s incarceration prevent timely compliance with court deadlines.” 

Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Tarantino v. Eggers, 380 

F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1967). 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant Pacheco’s motion to dismiss based on 

Plaintiff’s failure to effectuate timely service of the summons and complaint. 

2. Failure to State a Claim 

a) Excessive Force 

Plaintiff brings Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Defendant 

Pacheco arising out of Pacheco’s alleged use of excessive force. 

i. Eighth Amendment 

Pacheco moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim based on Plaintiff’s 

allegation that he was a pretrial detainee at the time of the events in question. Plaintiff 

responds that he was both a pretrial detainee and a convicted felon (and therefore a 

prisoner) at the time of the incident. Plaintiff asserts that he was serving time for a 

convicted parole violation while simultaneously awaiting disposition of an additional 

charge. 

“When prison officials use excessive force against prisoners, they violate the 

inmates’ Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.” 

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Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2002). When officers use excessive force 

against pretrial detainees, they violate the detainees’ Fourteenth Amendment right to be 

free from unlawful force. See Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1440 & n.7 

(9th Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); 

see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. , 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2475 (2015) 

(distinguishing excessive force claims brought by pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth 

Amendment from those brought by convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment). 

The specific right at issue matters, because unlike the Eighth Amendment, the Fourteenth 

Amendment does not require a plaintiff to prove a defendant’s state of mind. Kingsley, 

135 S. Ct. at 2472-73. 

 Plaintiff alleges in his First Amended Complaint that he was a pretrial detainee in 

April 2017. Accordingly, he currently pleads himself out of a viable Eighth Amendment 

claim. However, Plaintiff has provided additional factual allegations in his response brief 

which indicate he may be able to amend his allegations to allege a plausible Eighth 

Amendment claim based on his status as a convicted felon at the relevant time. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant Pacheco’s motion to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim without prejudice and with leave to amend. 

ii. Fourteenth Amendment 

Although he does not move to dismiss the claim in its entirety, Defendant Pacheco 

raises several objections to the adequacy of Plaintiff’s allegations in support of his 

Fourteenth Amendment claim. Pacheco argues that to the extent Plaintiff’s claim relies 

on allegations of verbal abuse or unintentional acts, such as Pacheco dropping him, 

Plaintiff fails to state an actionable claim. 

Defendant Pacheco is correct that allegations of verbal abuse and harassment, 

absent any physical force, are not cognizable excessive force claims under section 1983. 

See, e.g., Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987) (“‘[V]erbal 

harassment or abuse . . . is not sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983.’”) (quoting Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1979). 

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However, Plaintiff clearly alleges that a physical attack and resulting injury accompanied 

the purported verbal abuse. In evaluating an excessive force claim, the appropriateness 

of the use of force must be determined by the facts and circumstances of each case. See 

Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 336 (9th Cir. 1988). And in the event Plaintiff 

amends his pleading to state a plausible Eighth Amendment claim, Defendant Pacheco’s 

alleged verbal abuse may be probative of whether force was applied maliciously or 

sadistically. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). 

Pacheco also argues that Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Pacheco dropping him 

are not actionable because Plaintiff fails to allege that any such act was intentional. 

Plaintiff responds by arguing that Pacheco dropped him with the intent to cause harm. 

However, “[i]n determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not 

look beyond the complaint to a plaintiff’s moving papers, such as a memorandum in 

opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss.” Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151 

F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). “The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the 

complaint.” Id. This precludes consideration of Plaintiff’s new allegations for purposes 

of ruling on the instant motion. Nevertheless, Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to 

file a second amended complaint in which he may include additional allegations 

regarding Pacheco’s intentional act of dropping him. 

b) Due Process 

Plaintiff alleges that as a result of Defendant Pacheco’s actions, he was unable to 

continue representing himself in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process 

rights. Pacheco argues that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), bars the claim. In 

the alternative, Pacheco contends that Plaintiff does not state a plausible claim based on 

his failure to allege actual injury as a result of the purported constitutional violation. 

Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, an individual may represent oneself 

during criminal proceedings. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975); see 

also Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 170 (2008) (“The Court’s foundational ‘selfrepresentation’ case, Faretta, held that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments include a 

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‘constitutional right to proceed without counsel when’ a criminal defendant ‘voluntarily 

and intelligently elects to do so.’”) (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807) (emphasis in 

original)). Allegations of interference with a pretrial detainee’s attempt to prepare his 

defense may give rise to a cognizable claim for relief under § 1983. See, e.g., Taylor v. 

List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1047-48 (9th Cir. 1989). However, a plaintiff must actual allege 

injury as a result of the deprivation and in this case, Plaintiff has failed to do so. See 

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). 

Moreover, in Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that if a favorable 

judgment on a claim in a civil rights action would necessarily imply the invalidity of the 

plaintiff’s conviction or sentence, the claim must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can 

demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has been invalidated. 512 U.S. at 486-87. 

Here, Plaintiff does not allege that his underlying conviction or sentence has been 

invalidated. And a finding that Plaintiff was convicted in violation of his right to selfrepresentation would necessarily imply the invalidity of that conviction. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s claim is subject to dismissal. See, e.g., Trudeau v. Warden, No. 13CV1691, 

2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148138, 2014 WL 5325339, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2014) 

(dismissing plaintiff’s claim based on violation of Sixth Amendment right to selfrepresentation in part because “once convicted, Plaintiff’s claim is subject to dismissal 

pursuant to Heck.”); Way v. 20 Unknown Emps., No. 12CV357, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

27168, 2013 WL 752257, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2013) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim 

based on violation of Sixth Amendment right to self-representation because he “cannot 

state a claim under section 1983 until his conviction or sentence has been invalidated.”); 

Jenkins v. Bartley, No. CIV S-05-358, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75846, at *15 (E.D. Cal. 

Aug. 28, 2008) (“If this court were to find that plaintiff was prevented from asserting his 

Faretta right to self-representation or to challenge some phase of the prosecution through 

a pretrial habeas petition, that finding would necessarily imply the invalidity of the 

underlying conviction.”). Plaintiff may amend this claim, but only if he can allege, in 

good faith, that his conviction or sentence has been invalidated. 

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c) Injunctive Relief 

Defendant Pacheco also moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for permanent 

injunctive relief. Pacheco argues that Plaintiff’s transfer to a different facility renders his 

claim moot. Pacheco is correct. Where a prisoner challenges conditions of confinement 

and seeks equitable relief, the prisoner’s transfer to another prison renders requests for 

declaratory and injunctive relief moot absent some evidence of an expectation of being 

transferred back. See Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 402-03 (1975) (holding transfer 

to another prison moots § 1983 claims for declaratory and injunctive relief brought 

against defendants employed by transferor prison); Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 

(9th Cir. 1991) (same as to § 1983 claim for injunctive relief). 

 Plaintiff’s claims arise out of events occurring at George Bailey Detention Facility 

involving Defendant Pacheco. Plaintiff has since been transferred to Richard J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility. Plaintiff does not allege that he reasonably expects to be 

transferred back to George Bailey Detention Facility. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant Pacheco’s motion to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief. 

CONCLUSION

 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART

Defendant Pacheco’s motion to dismiss. The Court grants Plaintiff leave to file a second 

amended complaint curing the deficiencies noted herein with respect to his claims against 

Defendant Pacheco, on or before February 14, 2020. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE: January 9, 2020 _______________________________________ 

 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 

 United States District Judge 

 

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