Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01159/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01159-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Barry Northcross Patterson, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 05-1159-PHX-RCB (SPL)

ORDER

Plaintiff Barry Northcross Patterson brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) Chaplains G. Broderick

and Wayne F. Mason (Doc. 106). Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 145), which Plaintiff opposes (Doc. 150). 

The Court will grant summary judgment to Defendants but deny their request for

attorney’s fees.

I. Background

Plaintiff initiated this action in April 2005 and filed a First Amended Complaint in

May 2005 (Docs. 1, 7). The case proceeded on three counts against seven ADC Defendants;

Plaintiff’s claims concerned the alleged denial of a religious diet and a retaliatory transfer

(Doc. 10). In January 2007, the Court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss and for

summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff (Docs.

Case 2:05-cv-01159-RCB Document 157 Filed 05/31/12 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

The Court granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction as to Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief because he has received three kosher

meals a day since late-2005; thus, his claim for injunctive relief was moot (Doc. 127 at 14-

17).

- 2 -

71-72). Plaintiff appealed, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and

vacated in part and remanded Plaintiff’s First Amendment religious-diet claim against

Broderick and Mason in light of the intervening decision in Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878,

885-88 (9th Cir. 2008) (Doc. 81). Plaintiff was permitted to file a Second Amended

Complaint to add a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

(RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. (Docs. 100, 106). Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim was

subsequently dismissed by the Court (Doc. 127).

The sole remaining claim in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is his allegation

that Defendants violated his First Amendment free-exercise rights when they denied him

kosher breakfasts and lunches even though he is a Messianic Jew eligible for a kosher diet

under ADC regulations (Doc. 106 at 3). Plaintiff averred that he received vegetarian

breakfasts and lunches and only his dinners were kosher (id. at 3-3A). He requested

compensatory and punitive damages (id. at 6).1

Defendants now move for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) they are not

liable because they merely responded to Plaintiff’s administrative complaints, (2) Plaintiff’s

desire to keep kosher is not sincerely held or rooted in religious belief, (3) there were

legitimate penological reasons for serving Plaintiff a diet with just one kosher meal a day;

and (4) they are entitled to qualified immunity (Doc. 145).

II. Summary Judgment Standard

A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Under

summary judgment practice, the movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis

for its motion and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, that it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S.

Case 2:05-cv-01159-RCB Document 157 Filed 05/31/12 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

at 323.

If the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant

to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact in contention is material,

i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that the

dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 250 (1986); see Triton

Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need

not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient that “the claimed

factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions

of the truth at trial.” First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89

(1968). 

At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and

determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477

U.S. at 249. In its analysis, the court must believe the nonmovant’s evidence, and draw all

inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 255.

III. Facts

With their summary judgment briefing, the parties each submit a separate Statement

of Facts and supporting exhibits, including declarations, grievance documents, Plaintiff’s

deposition, and copies of ADC policies (Doc. 146, Defs.’ Statement of Facts (DSOF); Doc.

151, Pl.’s SOF (PSOF)). Many of the parties’ factual assertions are not relevant for the

reasons set forth in the analysis. The relevant undisputed and disputed facts underlying

Plaintiff’s claim are as follows:

Plaintiff is a Messianic Jew, and in 2004, when he was housed at the Rynning Unit,

he requested a kosher diet (PSOF ¶ 1). Broderick informed Plaintiff that he was approved

for the “Kosher Diet Plan” as of March 10, 2004, and as soon as Plaintiff received his “diet

card” he would begin receiving the Kosher diet (DSOF ¶ 31; PSOF ¶ 31). But instead of a

full kosher diet, Plaintiff was provided with a vegetarian breakfast and lunch and a kosher

dinner (DSOF ¶ 2; PSOF ¶ 2). Plaintiff never requested a vegetarian diet, and at the time he

Case 2:05-cv-01159-RCB Document 157 Filed 05/31/12 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

requested a kosher diet and was approved for it, he was unaware that the “Kosher Diet Plan”

did not consist of three kosher meals a day (PSOF ¶¶ 2, 32). 

Defendants state that before 2005, ADC offered two kosher-diet plans, identified in

the Food Service System policy as the “Regular Kosher” diet plan and the “Orthodox

Kosher” diet plan; the “Orthodox Kosher” diet plan was only for inmates who were Orthodox

Jews (DSOF ¶ 60, Ex. E, Attach. 4, 912-T-OP §§ 912.10, 1.5.2-1.5.3). The Restricted Diet

Order form, used to formally request a special diet, does not provide for two kosher meal

plans; the only option is the “Kosher Diet Plan,” which Plaintiff requested (PSOF ¶ 60,

Ex. 5).

In late March 2004, Plaintiff submitted two inmate letters complaining that he was not

receiving a kosher diet (DSOF ¶ 32; PSOF ¶ 32). In his April 2, 2004 response, Broderick

advised Plaintiff that his approved Kosher Diet Plan consisted of one kosher meal and two

ovo-lacto vegetarian meals, unlike the Orthodox Kosher Diet that consisted of three kosher

meals (id.). On April 16, 2004, Plaintiff submitted another inmate letter to Broderick on this

issue; Senior Chaplain Sabbagh responded and informed Plaintiff that ADC Central Office

had established and approved different kosher diets for Orthodox and non-Orthodox Jewish

inmates (DSOF ¶ 33; PSOF ¶ 33). 

Plaintiff was subsequently transferred to the Florence-South Unit where Mason was

assigned (DSOF ¶ 37). In June 2004, Plaintiff informed Mason that he did not want the

vegetarian/kosher combination diet, and he requested the kosher diet plan (DSOF ¶ 45(b);

PSOF ¶ 45(b)). In July 2004, Plaintiff submitted a grievance seeking three kosher meals a

day (DSOF ¶ 45(e); PSOF ¶ 45(e)). 

On July 1, 2005, ADC switched from the two kosher meal plans to one meal plan for

all inmates receiving a kosher diet (DSOF ¶ 60). 

IV. Parties’ Arguments 

A. Defendants’ Motion

Defendants first argue that they cannot be liable for violating Plaintiff’s constitutional

rights because they merely responded to Plaintiff’s administrative complaints and inquiries,

Case 2:05-cv-01159-RCB Document 157 Filed 05/31/12 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

This name refers to the Stipulated Final Judgment from Ashelman v. Wawrzaszek,

CV 83-1072-PHX (MS), which required ADC to provide Orthodox Jewish inmates with

certified kosher meals.

- 5 -

and Mason once explained the kosher-diet history to Plaintiff (Doc. 145 at 3-4). According

to Defendants, Plaintiff did not qualify for the full kosher diet, which they refer to as the

Ashelman diet, because he was not an Orthodox Jew (id. at 4).2

 Defendants contend that

because they lacked authority to change ADC policy that limited full kosher diets to

Orthodox inmates, they are entitled to judgment (id.). 

Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s desire to keep kosher is not sincerely held or

rooted in religious belief as evidenced by conduct that is inconsistent with his claim to keep

kosher (id. at 4-5). They state that Plaintiff was a recent convert to Messianic Judaism who

showed a willingness to violate kosher rules and little familiarity with his professed faith (id.

at 5).

Defendants submit that if the Court finds that Plaintiff did have a sincere religious

belief to keep kosher and that their conduct implicated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights,

they are still entitled to summary judgment because ADC had legitimate penological reasons

to serve Plaintiff the combination diet (id. at 5-6). Defendants argue that ADC had a security

interest in streamlining their food service and an interest in preserving scarce financial

resources by providing food services within their budgetary constraints and without wasting

money with costly meals for inmates who do not partake of them (id. at 6-7). In support,

Defendants point to the increase in kosher diet requests and costs since ADC changed its

policy in 2005 to provide completely kosher diets to non-Orthodox inmates (id. at 7).

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff had alterative means of exercising his right to religious

practice, and they assert that Plaintiff could still eat fruits, vegetables, eggs, and dairy

products to supplement his combination meal plan (id. at 8).

Defendants contend that granting Plaintiff’s special diet request would have

effectively given him “carte blanche to make ADC provide [him] with a complete, koshercertified diet on request” (id.). They again point to the results of the 2005 diet change and

Case 2:05-cv-01159-RCB Document 157 Filed 05/31/12 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

The Court issued a Notice, required under Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th

Cir. 1998), that informed Plaintiff of the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56

and Local Rule of Civil Procedure 56.1 (Doc. 147).

- 6 -

argue that there was a significant impact on prison resources and staff as the cost for kosher

diets became prohibitive (id. at 8-9). 

Lastly, Defendants assert that even if their conduct was found to have implicated

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, they are entitled to qualified immunity (id. at 9). They state

that they were administering the ADC policy that provided for a combination kosher meal

plan, that this meal plan had been approved by a rabbinical authority, and that no reasonable

official in their position would have known that this policy and meal plan violated Plaintiff’s

First Amendment rights (id. at 11). Defendants seek summary judgment and an award of

attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (id.).

B. Plaintiff’s Response3

Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ motion (Doc. 150). He asserts that he requested a

kosher diet, and the ADC diet request form only listed one kosher meal plan; thus, there was

no indication that he would receive a vegetarian-kosher combination diet (id. at 1). Plaintiff

states that he “was not, is not, nor wants to be a vegetarian” (id.). Plaintiff asserts that

Defendants approved a kosher diet for him and then intentionally provided something

different without any regard for Plaintiff’s religious beliefs (id. at 2). 

Plaintiff notes the inconsistency between Defendants’ authority to approve a religious

diet for him and their claim now that they were not authorized to allow Plaintiff to receive

a religious diet meeting his needs (id. at 2). Plaintiff suggests that they simply do not want

“to accept the responsibility for the constant religious abuse directed against [him]” (id. at

5). Plaintiff also contends that Defendants’ argument that they could not provide Plaintiff

a full kosher diet for financial reasons is belied by the fact that they have provided full kosher

diets to all Orthodox and non-Orthodox Jewish inmates for the last eight years (id. at 1-2).

Plaintiff claims that he was denied the requested religious diet because Defendants had a

“single-minded purpose” to keep Plaintiff from eating kosher (id. at 4). 

Case 2:05-cv-01159-RCB Document 157 Filed 05/31/12 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

Plaintiff maintains that contrary to Defendants’ assertions, he has never conceded that

keeping kosher is not a central tenet of his faith, and he avers that his request for a kosher

diet is based on a sincere religious belief (id. at 4, 6). He states that he tries to follow God’s

word and accepts the kosher meals he is allowed and, when he is refused a kosher meal, he

eats what he knows is kosher and tries to sustain himself, or he simply stops eating altogether

(id. at 5). Plaintiff further states that just because he may eat kosher items from another

inmate’s tray or from the commissary, it does not mean that his desire to eat kosher is not

sincere (id. at 6). 

Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ current claim that he was denied a full kosher diet

because he was not an Orthodox Jew is a new claim and it is not the real reason for the denial

in 2004 (id.). He alleges that Defendants lied to him, refused the approved diet, tried to force

him to be a vegetarian, and have “continued to abuse him for 8 years with lies, retribution

& illegal religious tickets and punishments” (id.). 

C. Defendants’ Reply

Defendants note that Plaintiff acknowledges that the kosher/vegetarian diet he was

provided conformed to his conception of kosher, given his assertion that it is the nature of

the food rather than its preparation that is important (Doc. 155 at 4-5). Defendants assert that

a vegetarian diet, by definition, cannot contain meat products forbidden by kosher laws; thus,

the vegetarian/kosher diet served Plaintiff’s purposes and did not implicate his First

Amendment rights (id. at 5). 

Defendants argue that to the extent Plaintiff challenges the 2004 ADC policy that

allowed for two different kosher meal plans, they did not enact that policy; they were just

involved in its administration (id. at 4-5). Thus, Defendants reiterate that they cannot be

liable for a constitutional violation (id.). They also reiterate their arguments that Plaintiff’s

desire to keep kosher was not sincerely held, that there were legitimate penological reasons

to serve Plaintiff the combination diet, and that they are entitled to qualified immunity (id.

at 5-8).

. . .

Case 2:05-cv-01159-RCB Document 157 Filed 05/31/12 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

V. Governing Legal Standard

“Inmates retain the protections afforded by the First Amendment, ‘including its

directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.’” Shakur, 514 F.3d at 883-84

(quoting O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987)). To implicate the Free

Exercise Clause, a prisoner must show that the belief at issue is both “sincerely held” and

“rooted in religious belief.” Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994); see Shakur,

514 F.3d 884-85 (noting the Supreme Court’s disapproval of the centrality test and finding

that the sincerity test in Malik determines whether the Free Exercise clause applies).

Once that showing is made, an inmate must establish that prison officials substantially

burden the practice of his religion by preventing him from engaging in conduct which he

sincerely believes is consistent with his faith. Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85.

Finally, even if a prison regulation burdens an inmate’s free exercise of religion, the

regulation is valid if is reasonably related to legitimate penological interest. Turner v. Safley,

482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). “Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or

limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations

underlying our penal system.” Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884 (quoting O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 348).

To determine if a regulation is valid, courts must consider four factors: (1) whether there is

a rational connection between the regulation and the asserted government interest;

(2) whether there are alternative means of exercising the right; (3) whether accommodation

of the right will impact the prison or other inmates; and (4) whether there is an absence of

ready alternatives. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90. 

VI. Analysis

A. Liability

Before conducting an analysis under the First Amendment, the Court addresses

Defendants’ argument that they should be dismissed because they “merely responded” to

Plaintiff’s complaints and inquiries (Doc. 145 at 3-4). Defendants’ unsuccessfully raised this

same argument in their first summary judgment motion (Doc. 47 at 8). For the same reasons

as set forth in its prior Order, the Court will not dismiss Defendants on this basis (Doc. 71

Case 2:05-cv-01159-RCB Document 157 Filed 05/31/12 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

at 8).

B. Sincerely Held Belief

Defendants present the exact same argument they submitted in their first summary

judgment motion, and rely on the same pre-Malik case law, to assert that Plaintiff’s desire

to keep kosher was not sincerely held or rooted in religious belief (compare Doc. 47 at 10

with Doc. 145 at 4-5). See Malik, 16 F.3d at 333 (establishing the sincerity test to determine

whether Free Exercise Clause applies). Again, Defendants’ argument fails. Despite evidence

of religious conversions or occasional behavior contrary to purported religious views,

Plaintiff professes a belief in Messianic Judaism and the need to abide by kosher dietary laws

(see Doc. 150 at 4, 6; Doc. 151, PSOF ¶¶ 1, 8, 11-12, 70, 87-88). On Defendants’ motion,

all facts and the inferences therefrom must be construed in Plaintiff’s favor. Anderson, 477

U.S. at 255. For the Court to determine that Plaintiff’s beliefs are not sincere, it would have

to find that Plaintiff is not credible, which it cannot do on summary judgment. See id.

Defendants’ request for summary judgment on this ground will be denied.

C. Burden on Religious Practice 

As mentioned, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause are triggered when prison

officials substantially burden the practice of an inmate’s religion by preventing him from

engaging in conduct which he sincerely believes is consistent with his faith. Shakur, 514

F.3d at 884-85. With respect to accommodation of various religious affiliations, prison

authorities are not responsible for duplicating every religious benefit provided to other

religions so that all religions are treated exactly the same. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319,

322, n. 2 (1972) (“[w]e do not suggest . . . that every religious sect or group within a

prison—however few in number—must have identical facilities or personnel. A special

chapel or place of worship need not be provided for every faith regardless of size; nor must

a chaplain, priest, or minister be provided without regard to the extent of the demand”); see

also Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563, 568-69 (9th Cir. 1987) (prison administrators need not

provide each inmate with the spiritual counselor of his or her choice). Thus, the fact that

Plaintiff—a Messianic Jew—was denied the exact same kosher diet plan provided to

Case 2:05-cv-01159-RCB Document 157 Filed 05/31/12 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

Orthodox Jewish inmates, by itself, does not violate Plaintiff’s free-exercise rights. 

Instead, Plaintiff must show that the combination vegetarian/kosher meal plan that he

was provided burdened his practice of religion. Unlike the prisoner-plaintiff in Shakur,

Plaintiff does not allege that the vegetarian diet provided by the prison caused him

gastrointestinal problems or any other health problems that in turn substantially burdened his

religious activities. See 514 F.3d at 885 (given the plaintiff’s sincere belief in consuming

kosher meat and the gastrointestinal distress caused by the vegetarian diet, which interfered

with his religious activities, the prison’s refusal to provide a kosher meat diet implicated the

Free Exercise Clause). 

Nor does Plaintiff allege that the vegetarian/kosher combination diet did not adhere

to his religious beliefs. Plaintiff states that pursuant to his beliefs, all vegetables are kosher,

and he “gladly eats grains, fruits, vegetables, eggs, milk & dairy products without complaint”

because “its all kosher” (Doc. 151, PSOF ¶ 26; Doc. 150 at 7). See Ashelman v.

Wawrzaszek, 111 F.3d 674, 675 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1997) (fruits and vegetables and some cereals

are kosher). As Defendants point out, Plaintiff’s conception of kosher is based on the nature

of the food and not its preparation (Doc. 155 at 4-5). Indeed, as Plaintiff states in his

response, he believes that he can accept a regular food tray and eat only the kosher items or

exchange the non-kosher meat for other kosher items and still satisfy his beliefs (Doc. 150

at 4). He also states that his religious beliefs are not burdened by the denial of any specific

food, such as pie or turkey (Doc. 146, DSOF ¶ 20; Doc. 151, PSOF ¶ 20). 

In short, Plaintiff provides no specific facts or evidence, or even an allegation, that the

vegetarian/kosher diet interfered with or burdened his religious practice. Instead, Plaintiff

establishes that he is not a vegetarian and he did not like being forced to consume a

vegetarian diet to keep kosher (see Doc. 151, PSOF ¶ 26). Plaintiff’s allegations and

evidence also demonstrate that Defendants provided a misleading diet request form and were

not entirely forthright when they approved him for a kosher diet but did not inform him that

it was actually a combination vegetarian/kosher diet. But none of this implicates the First

Amendment where there is no showing that Plaintiff’s religious practice was burdened as a

Case 2:05-cv-01159-RCB Document 157 Filed 05/31/12 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

result. See Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85.

Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants wrongfully issued him tickets for “sharing”

food, that they abused him with “lies” and “retribution,” or that they otherwise retaliated

against him are beyond the scope of this action, which relates solely to whether the provision

of a vegetarian/kosher diet rather than a full kosher diet violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment

free-exercise rights (see Doc. 150 at 6). The Court finds that there is no genuine dispute of

material fact whether Plaintiff’s religious practice was burdened by the vegetarian/kosher

diet. Accordingly, the First Amendment is not implicated, and Defendants are entitled to

summary judgment. See Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85.

In light of this determination, the Court need not conduct an analysis under Turner to

determine whether the ADC’s 2004 two kosher meal plan served a legitimate penological

interest, nor is it necessary to address Defendants’ qualified immunity argument.

VII. 42 U.S.C. § 1988

Under § 1988, a district court may award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant

only if the plaintiff’s underlying claim is frivolous or without foundation. Maag v. Wessler,

993 F.2d 718, 719 (9th Cir. 1993). The Court does not find that Plaintiff’s claims were

frivolous or without foundation; therefore, it will deny Defendants’ request for attorney’s

fees.

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. 145). 

(2) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 145) is granted in part and

denied in part as follows:

(a) the motion is granted as to summary judgment in favor of Defendants on

the remaining First Amendment claim;

(b) the motion is denied as to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

(3) The Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly and terminate the action.

. . .

Case 2:05-cv-01159-RCB Document 157 Filed 05/31/12 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

(4) For the reasons set forth herein, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), an appeal

from the judgment in this action would not be taken in good faith.

DATED this 30th day of May, 2012.

Case 2:05-cv-01159-RCB Document 157 Filed 05/31/12 Page 12 of 12