Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03136/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03136-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 1 Respondent Darla Elliott's name is spelled "Eiolltt" on the Petition. (document # 1) However,

Respondent spells her name "Elliott" on pleadings filed on her behalf. The Court, therefore, uses the

spelling "Elliott." 

 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Anthony Baldonado, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Darla Elliot, et al., 

Respondents.

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No. CV-05-3136-PHX-SMM (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter arises on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by Person in

State Custody Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254. (document # 1) Respondents1

 filed an Answer to

the Petition asserting that it should be denied because all of Petitioner's claims are procedurally

defaulted and barred from federal habeas review. (document # 11) Petitioner filed a reply

requesting that the Court dismiss the Petition, without prejudice, so that Petitioner may exhaust

his claims in state court. (document # 12) 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

At 11:45 p.m. on January 19, 2003, Sergeant Kevin Harper observed Petitioner

speeding eastbound on Van Buren Street near Second Avenue in Phoenix, Arizona.

(Respondents' Exh. B at 2) Because Harper estimated that Petitioner was going 45 miles per

hour in a 25 mile-per-hour zone, driving erratically, and making "jack rabbit" starts, Harper

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 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 396 U.S. 868 (1969).

 3

 The Honorable Barry C. Schneider presided. 

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followed Petitioner. (Respondents' Exh. B at 2) Petitioner eventually turned into a driveway

at which time Harper approached Petitioner's vehicle and asked to see his driver's license. (Id.)

Petitioner produced an identification card instead of a driver's license. (Id.) Petitioner was also

unable to produce proof of insurance. (Respondents' Exh. B at 3) A records check revealed that

Petitioner's driver's license had been suspended. (Id.)

Harper called Officer Brett Campbell for assistance. Campbell conducted field

sobriety tests and noted that Petitioner had bloodshot eyes and smelled of alcohol. (Id.)

Petitioner admitted to drinking four beers. Petitioner failed the sobriety tests. (Id.) Petitioner

was arrested and taken to a "DUI" van. 

In the DUI van, Officer Vernon Ray Hancock administered two breath tests using

the Intoxilyzer 5000 EN. (Id.) Petitioner's blood alcohol content registered .135 on the first

test and .137 on the second test. (Id.) After being advised of his Miranda2

 rights, Petitioner

agreed to speak with Officer Hancock. Petitioner rated his impairment level as a "4 or 5" on a

scale of 0 to 10. (Id. at 3-4)

Based on the foregoing, on January 22, 2003, the State of Arizona charged Petitioner

with two counts of aggravated driving or actual physical control while under the influence of

intoxicating liquor or drugs. (Respondents' Exh. A, item 1) Following a jury trial, Petitioner

was found guilty as charged. (Respondents' Exh. B at 3) The trial court3

 determined that

Petitioner had two prior felony convictions and imposed mitigated, concurrent eight-year terms

of imprisonment. The trial court gave Petitioner credit for 264 days of pre-sentence

incarceration. (Respondents' Exh. B at 3) 

Petitioner appealed and on March 22, 2004, counsel filed a brief in accordance with

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) stating that counsel "has found no arguable question

of law that is not frivolous." (Respondents' Exh. C at 6) Petitioner did not file a supplemental

pro se brief. On June 17, 2004, the appellate court affirmed Petitioner's convictions and

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sentences. (Respondents' Exh. B) Petitioner did not seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court.

(Respondents' Exh. D)

In the meantime, on May 11, 2004, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief.

(Respondents' Exh. E) On October 4, 2004, post-conviction counsel filed a notice of

completion of post-conviction review informing the court that counsel could find no colorable

issue to raise. (Respondents' Exh. F) On October 29, 2004, Petitioner filed a pro se petition

for post-conviction relief raising three claims: (1) denial of constitutional right to effective

assistance of counsel; (2) violation of his right to a speedy trial; and (3) prejudice because a

juror saw Petitioner in handcuffs. (Respondents' Exhs. G, H) The trial court denied relief on

December 22, 2004. (Respondents' Exh. J) Petitioner did not file a petition for review in the

Arizona Court of Appeals 

Thereafter, in late July or early August of 2005, Petitioner filed a second notice of

post-conviction relief arguing that his sentence violated the rule announces in Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). (Respondents' Exhs. K, L) On August 4, 2005, the trial court

dismissed the petition finding that Blakely did not apply to mitigated sentences. (Respondents'

Exh. L) The court further found that the petition was untimely and did not fall within any

exception that would excuse the untimeliness. (Id.)(citing Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(g)). Petitioner

did not seek review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

On October 7, 2005, Petitioner filed the pending petition raising the following

claims: (1) his sentence violates the rule announced in Blakely v. Washington, 524 U.S. 296

(2004); (2) his right to a speedy trial was violated; (3) he was denied a fair trial because a juror

saw Petitioner in handcuffs; and (4) he was denied effective assistance of counsel because

counsel failed to investigate and failed to effectively examine witnesses at trial. (document #

1 at 5-8) Respondents contend that Petitioner's claims are procedurally defaulted and barred

from federal habeas review because Petitioner did not present any of his claims to the Arizona

Court of Appeals. Petitioner characterizes his claims as unexhausted and requests an order

dismissing his Petition without prejudice so that he may exhaust his claims in State court. 

/ / /

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ANALYSIS

I. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar

A. Relevant Law

A state prisoner must exhaust available state court remedies before seeking federal

habeas corpus review. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). Specifically, the federal court may not grant

a writ of habeas corpus unless "the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts

of the State, . . . there is an absence of available State corrective process, . . .or circumstances

exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant." 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(1). The exhaustion requirement is designed to give the State courts an initial

opportunity to consider and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights. Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). 

A state prisoner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement in one of two ways. First,

petitioner may actually exhaust his claims by presenting them to the state court in a

procedurally proper manner. To actually exhaust his claims, a petitioner must "fairly present"

his federal claim to the state courts. Fair presentation means that the petitioner presented the

state courts with the same factual and legal theories that he urges upon the federal court.

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (stating that a state prisoner must fairly present his

claim in each appropriate state court to alert that court to the claim's federal nature.)(citing

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995)). Petitioner must alert the state court to the fact that

he is presenting a claim under the United States Constitution. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66. 

It is not enough to make a general appeal to a constitutional guarantee such as due process.

Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 163 (1996). Under Arizona law, a state prisoner's claims

are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas corpus review once the Arizona Court of Appeals

has ruled on those claims. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The second manner in which a petitioner can exhaust state remedies is called

technical exhaustion. A petitioner demonstrates technical exhaustion by showing that either the

state court found a claim defaulted on procedural grounds, or, if petitioner never presented the

claim to the state courts, that no state remedies remain available to petitioner. Cassett v.

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Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 621 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied by, Schriro v. Cassett, ___U.S.___,

126 S.Ct. 1336 (2006)(stating that "the procedural default rule . . . applies . . . when a state court

has been presented with the federal claim, but declined to reach the issue for procedural reasons,

or if it is clear that the state court would hold the claim procedurally barred.")(citing Franklin

v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2002)(internal quotation marks and citations

omitted)). See also Ylst v.Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802–05 (1991) (noting that, in violation

of a California state procedural rule, state prisoner raised a Miranda claim for the first time on

direct appeal); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002).

 The state court's application of a procedural bar effectively exhausts the claim

because "no state remedies remain available" to the habeas petitioner. Kellotat v. Cupp, 719

F.2d 1027, 1029 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1982)).

 Similarly, "[b]ecause the exhaustion requirement refers only to remedies still available at the

time of the federal petition, if a petitioner failed to present his claims in state court and can no

longer raise them through any state procedure, state remedies are no longer available and are

exhausted." Rivas v. Schriro, No. CV-05-434-PHX-DGC (BPV), 2006 WL 987990, * 8

(D.Ariz., April 13, 2006)(citations omitted). "[The] procedural default [is] caused by a failure

to exhaust federal claims in state court." Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376 (9th Cir.

2002)(emphasis in original). The procedural default arises because, pursuant to a state court's

procedural rules, a return to state court to exhaust the claims would be futile. Teague v. Lane,

489 U.S. 288, 297–99 (1989); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1 (stating that a claim is

procedurally defaulted when "the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to

which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion

requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred."). 

For example, under Arizona law, state prisoners are precluded from filing petitions

for post-conviction relief if: (1) the ground has been waived "at trial, on appeal, or in any

previous collateral proceeding" or (2) the petition is filed more than thirty days after an order

or mandate affirming the judgment and sentence on direct appeal. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3),

32.4(a), 32.9. A claim that is procedurally defaulted by the "futility" of returning to state court

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to properly exhaust the claim is not subject to federal habeas review. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987

(holding that petitioner's unexhausted claims were not subject to federal habeas review because

he was time-barred under Rule 32.2(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure from

returning to state court to argue them); State v. Mata, 916 P.2d 1035, 1048–53, 185 Ariz. 319,

322-337 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1996) (holding that petitioner's unexhausted ineffective assistance

claims were procedurally barred under Rule 32.2(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

because he waived the right to present them at trial). 

When a petitioner defaults his federal claim in state court pursuant to an

"independent and adequate" state rule, federal habeas review on the merits is barred. Coleman,

501 U.S. at 722-23; Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81, 87 (1977); Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d

1005, 1010 (9th Cir.1994) ("In order to constitute adequate and independent grounds sufficient

to support a finding of procedural default, a state rule must be clear, consistently applied, and

well-established at the time of petitioner's purported default.")(citations omitted).

However, claims that are otherwise procedurally barred may warrant review on the

merits if petitioner demonstrates: (1) cause for the default and actual prejudice; or (2) that

failure to review the claims "will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman, 501

U.S. at 724. To establish cause for the default, a petitioner must establish that "some objective

factor external to the defense impeded [his efforts] to comply with the State’s procedural rule."

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). Prejudice is proved by demonstrating that the

alleged constitutional violation "worked to [a petitioner's] actual and substantial disadvantage,

infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions." United States v. Frady, 456

U.S. 152, 170 (1982). Cause and prejudice are conjunctive requirements; where a petitioner

fails to establish cause for his procedural default, the court need not consider whether petitioner

has shown actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violations. Smith v.

Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). 

The "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception applies only when a

constitutional violation probably has resulted in the conviction of one actually innocent of a

crime. Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 921 n. 27 (9th Cir. 2004). To establish a “fundamental

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miscarriage of justice” resulting in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a state

prisoner must establish that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found

him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of new evidence. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,

327 (1995); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2)(B); Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998)

("[T]he miscarriage of justice exception is concerned with actual as compared to legal

innocence. . . . Given the rarity of [reliable] evidence [of actual innocence], in virtually every

case, the allegation of actual innocence has been summarily rejected.") (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). 

B. Application of Law to Petitioner's Claims

As previously stated, Petitioner did not present any of his claims to the Arizona

Court of Appeals. The Court finds that Petitioner's claims are technically exhausted because

there are no state remedies available to Petitioner. Petitioner may not seek further review in

state court of his federal claims because the filing deadline has expired pursuant to Rule 32.4(a)

of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and Petitioner does not assert an applicable

exception to that deadline. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987 n. 5 (finding no state remedies available and

noting that petitioner did not raise any exceptions to Rule 32.2(a)). Under Rule 32.4(a), the

notice of post-conviction relief in a non-capital conviction must be filed "within ninety days

after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the order and

mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a).

A notice of post-conviction relief not timely filed may only raise claims pursuant

to Rule 32.1(d)-(h). Id. These exceptions are narrow:

(d) [t]he person is being held in custody after the sentence imposed has

expired; or

(e) [n]ewly discovered material facts probably exist and such facts

probably would have changed the verdict or sentence . . . ; or

(f) [t]he defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction relief

of-right or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was without fault

on the defendant's part; or

(g) [t]here has been a significant change in the law that if determined to

apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the defendant's

conviction or sentence; or

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(h) [t]he defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that

the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish that no

reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant guilty of the

underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h). If a claim does not fall into one of these categories and the notice

of Rule 32 relief is filed outside the time limits prescribed in Rule 32.4(a), the petition is

untimely and subject to summary dismissal. State v. Rosario, 987 P.2d 226, 228, 195 Ariz. 264,

266 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1999). As previously stated, Petitioner does not assert any of the foregoing

exceptions and the record does not contain any evidence supporting the application of the

foregoing exceptions in this case. Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987. 

In addition, Rule 32.2(b) provides that the notice of post-conviction relief for

successive or untimely post-conviction proceedings must indicate the applicable exception,

32.1(d), (e), (f), (g), or (h), and the basis for not raising the claim sooner. If meritorious reasons

are not set forth, the notice shall be dismissed. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b). Petitioner does not

set forth any of the foregoing exceptions. In view of Rules 32.4 and 32.2(b), Petitioner cannot

return to state court to present his claims. Accordingly, his claims are procedurally defaulted

and barred from federal habeas review.

C. Cause and Prejudice or Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

 The Court must next determine whether Petitioner has demonstrated cause and

prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice to excuse the procedural bar. Proof of cause

for procedural default ordinarily turns on a petitioner's showing of some objective factor

external to the defense that impeded compliance with state rules. Objective factors could be,

for example, "a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available,

. . . or that 'some interference by officials' . . . made compliance impracticable . . . . " Murray,

477 U.S. at 488 (citations omitted). A showing of constitutionally ineffective assistance of

counsel may also constitute cause. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. 

Petitioner merely claims that he was confused regarding the proper court in which

to raise his claims. Petitioner’s lack of knowledge of the law does not amount to cause for his

failure to properly present his claims to the Arizona courts. Hughes v. Idaho State Board of

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Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986)(finding that an illiterate pro se petitioner’s lack

of legal assistance did not amount to cause to excuse a procedural default). 

 Because Petitioner has failed to establish cause for the procedural default, the Court

need not consider the existence of prejudice from the alleged violation of federal law. Smith,

477 U.S. at 533. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of proof regarding cause

and prejudice.

Nor has Petitioner shown that his claims require federal review to prevent a

fundamental miscarriage of justice. The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception applies

only when a petitioner establishes "that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would

have convicted him in the light of the new evidence." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. Here, Petitioner

has not established that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found him

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of new evidence. Id. The fundamental miscarriage

of justice exception does not apply in this case and a miscarriage of justice would not result

from upholding the procedural bar.

III. Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Petition

As previously stated, Petitioner characterizes his claims as unexhausted, not

procedurally defaulted. Accordingly, he requests that the Court dismiss his petition without

prejudice so that he can present his claims to the State courts. 

Granting Petitioner's motion for voluntary dismissal would be futile. As an initial

matter, if the Court dismissed the Petition without prejudice, under the AEDPA, Petitioner

would be time-barred from returning to federal court on habeas review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244. The

AEDPA provides that a one-year period of limitations applies to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of a State court. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1). Although Petitioner's pending Petition was timely when filed on October 7, 2005,

the limitations period has since expired and a subsequent federal petition would be untimely.

Duncan, 533 U.S. at 181-82 (stating that the filing of a federal habeas petition does not toll the

AEDPA statute of limitations.)

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 In view of the interplay between the AEDPA statute of limitations and the

exhaustion requirement, the Supreme Court has held that when a petitioner files a mixed

petition, one containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims, the district court should

consider whether to stay the proceedings, hold in abeyance the exhausted claims, and dismiss

without prejudice the unexhausted claims so that petitioner can present them to the state courts.

Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 125 S.Ct. 1528, 1535 (2005); Cassett, 406 F.3d at 625. The

Court explained, however, that the "stay and abeyance" procedure should only be available in

limited circumstances. Rhines, 544 U.S. at ___, 125 S.Ct. at 1535. Thus, "stay and abeyance

is only appropriate when the district court determines that there was good cause for the

petitioner's failure to exhaust his claims first in state court." Id. 

Here, none of Petitioner's claims are actually exhausted, therefore, this is not an

appropriate situation to consider staying the Petition and permitting Petitioner to exhaust his

unexhausted claims. Because Petitioner did not actually exhaust any claims, there are no

claims for the Court to hold in abeyance. Moreover, even assuming that this were a mixed

petition, the stay and abeyance procedure is only appropriate if Petitioner can establish good

cause for failing to properly present his claims to the state court. Rhines, 544 U.S. at ___, 125

S.Ct. at 1535. Here, Petitioner merely asserts that he was confused regarding the proper court

in which to file his claims. Petitioner's confusion does not constitute good cause sufficient to

stay this matter. Dykens v. Allen, 379 F.Supp.2d 71, 74 (D.Mass. 2005)(declining to stay a

mixed petition where the record contained no evidence that petitioner had good cause for

failing to exhaust his claims in state court); Hubbert v. Renico, No. 04-CV-71018-DT, 2005WL

2173612, * 3-4 (E.D.Mich., September 7, 2005)(declining to stay a mixed petition on ground

that counsel's failure to raise claims on direct appeal did not constitute cause for petitioner's

failure to exhaust claims in state court). 

CONCLUSION

Petitioner's claims are technically exhausted and procedurally barred. Because

Petitioner has not demonstrated cause and prejudice, and because he has not shown that a

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miscarriage of justice would result from upholding the procedural bar, there are no grounds to

avoid the procedural bar. Therefore, federal habeas review on the merits is barred.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss (document

# 12) be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (document # 1) be DENIED.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court=s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P.

72, 6(a), 6(e). Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a response to the

objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

District Court without further review. United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th

Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate

Judge will be considered a waiver of a party=s right to appellate review of the findings of fact

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge=s recommendation. Fed.

R.Civ. P. 72.

DATED this 4th day of May, 2006.

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