Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00402/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00402-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federal)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICTOR MARTINEZ,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 11-cv-402 – IEG (JMA)

ORDER DENYING AND

vs. DISMISSING PETITION

ERIC HOLDER, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On February 25, 2011, Petitioner Victor Martinez filed the present Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging that he was being detained by

the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) without a bond hearing pending removal and

seeking release from custody because his detention has become indefinite. [Doc. No. 1.] On June

3, 2011, the Court ordered the Immigration Court of El Centro, California to provide Martinez

with a bond hearing pursuant to Casas-Castrillon v. D.H.S., 535 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2008), and

Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2008). [Doc. No. 17.] On June 16, 2011, an

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) conducted a bond hearing as ordered. On July 20, 2011, the IJ issued a

decision finding Martinez to be a danger to the community and denying his request for release. 

[Doc. No. 21-1.] In light of the bond hearing, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause Why the

Petition Should Not Be Denied as Moot. [Doc. No. 28.] Martinez filed a timely response on

November 14, 2011. [Doc. No. 31.] Having considered the respective arguments, and for the

reasons set forth below, the Court hereby DENIES and DISMISSES the Petition.

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BACKGROUND

Martinez is a native and citizen of Ecuador. He immigrated to the United States on July

19, 1970 as a lawful permanent resident. All of his close family is currently in the United States. 

Martinez has generally worked as a truck driver and as a cashier. He admits to having a mental

health problem, whereby he hears voices, and an alcohol problem. Originally, the voices told him

to take things, which led to numerous theft related convictions. The voices now sound like his

mother and daughter and urge him for help. According to Martinez, the medicines he was

prescribed do not appear to control the voices and, as a result, he stopped taking those medicines.

Martinez has a lengthy criminal history. He had been sentenced to state prison five or six

times, most recently in May 2009 for petty theft with priors. [Doc. No. 9-1, at 8-9; Doc. No. 21-1,

at 5.] Martinez claims his bad conduct is the result of his alcoholism and mental health disease. 

Martinez also has a very lengthy and convoluted immigration history. As relevant here, in

September of 2002, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) placed Martinez in

removal proceedings, charging him with removability for an aggravated felony and convictions of

crimes involving moral turpitude. On November 5, 2002, an IJ ordered Martinez removed to

Ecuador. The BIA summarily affirmed on July 30, 2003, and Martinez sought direct review by the

Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit ultimately remanded on December 20, 2007, finding that

Martinez’s 1996 burglary conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony. On May 23, 2008,

the BIA remanded the proceedings to the IJ. [See Doc. No. 9-1, at 13-14.]

While the above appeals were ongoing, Martinez filed a habeas petition challenging the

legality of his detention. See Martinez v. Gonzalez, 504 F. Supp. 887, 890 (C.D. Cal. 2007).

Pursuant to District Judge Hatter’s order, a bond hearing was conducted before an IJ, who ordered

Martinez released on a $10,000 bond in a written decision dated February 8, 2007. Id. at 891. 

Martinez posted the bond and was released on February 12, 2007. Id. On August 17, 2007, the

district court granted Martinez’s habeas petition, finding that Martinez’s continued detention was

not authorized by statute and that he therefore was entitled to release. Id. at 900.

On November 19, 2009, the DHS again took Martinez into custody and removal

proceedings were re-opened. [Doc. No. 9-1, at 8-11.] On November 16, 2010, the IJ ordered

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Martinez removed to Ecuador, finding that he was not entitled to any relief from removal or

voluntary departure. [Id. at 18-27.] The BIA upheld the IJ’s removal order on March 4, 2011. 

[Id. at 31-32.] On February 3, 2011, the BIA also upheld the IJ’s December 9, 2010 decision that

Martinez was not entitled to a Casas bond hearing. [Id. at 28-30.] Martinez sought Ninth Circuit

review of the BIA’s affirmance of the removal order, and those proceedings are still ongoing. See

Martinez v. Holder, No. 11-70751 (9th Cir. filed Mar. 15, 2011). An interim stay of removal was

initially automatically issued pursuant to the Ninth Circuit General Order 6.4(c)(1). However, on

August 9, 2011, in a brief order, the Ninth Circuit denied Martinez’s motion to stay removal

pending appeal, citing Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749 (2009), and Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640

F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). [Case No. 11-70751, Dkt. No. 12 (9th Cir.).]

Martinez filed the present Petition on February 25, 2011. [Doc. No. 1.] Respondent filed a

return to the Petition on April 8, 2011, and Martinez filed a traverse on April 28, 2011. [Doc. Nos.

9, 11.] On June 3, 2011, the Court ordered that Martinez receive a Casas bond hearing before an

IJ. [Doc. No. 17.] That hearing was conducted on June 16, 2011, and on July 20, 2011, the IJ

issued a written decision finding Martinez to be a danger to the community and denying his

request for release. [Doc. No. 21-1.] On October 7, 2011, in light of the bond hearing, the Court

issued an Order to Show Cause Why the Petition Should Not Be Denied as Moot. [Doc. No. 28.] 

Martinez filed a timely response on November 14, 2011. [Doc. No. 31.] The Court is issuing this

order without oral argument pursuant to the Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Statutory authority for Martinez’s current detention

Martinez challenges the legality of his detention and seeks release pending removal. The

initial question the Court has to resolve is pursuant to which statutory authority Martinez is being

presently detained. As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, “[t]he statutory scheme governing the

detention of [aliens such as Martinez] is not a model of clarity.” See Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at

1058. Martinez is either detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), which governs detention “during” and

“beyond” the removal period, or under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which permits detention “pending a

decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” “The distinction has real

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consequences for the alien, because detention under § 1231(a)(2), for example, is mandatory but

limited to a set period of time, whereas detention under § 1226(a) is discretionary and the

necessity of detention can be reviewed by an IJ and the BIA.” Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1059. 

An alien detained under § 1231(a), unlike an alien detained under § 1226(a), cannot obtain a bond

hearing before an IJ. See id. at 1059 n.4 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8)). But see Diouf v. Mukasey,

542 F.3d 1222, 1233-35 (9th Cir. 2008) (reserving this specific question for later determination).

Another wrinkle facing the Court is that detention authority is not static; rather, “the

Attorney General’s authority over an alien’s detention shifts as the alien moves through different

phases of administrative and judicial review.” Casas-Castrillon, 535 F.3d at 945. This makes the

task of determining where an alien falls within the statutory scheme particularly difficult for the

Court because, as the Ninth Circuit has explained, the Attorney General’s authority over the alien

presents “a moving target.” Id. at 945-46. Thus, the Attorney General’s authority over the alien at

the time the habeas petition is filed may differ from the authority at the time the Court issues its

order, which in turn may differ from the authority at the time the Court of Appeals hears oral

argument on appeal. Id. at 946. Martinez’s own case presents this problem.

It appears that when Martinez was first taken into custody as an alien who has committed

two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, [see Doc. No. 9-1, at 8-11], he was subject to

mandatory detention. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B) (“The Attorney General shall take into

custody any alien who . . . is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in

section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) . . . of this title.” (emphasis added)). The Attorney General may release

an alien detained under § 1226(c) only for narrow reasons not implicated here. See id. §

1226(c)(2).

After the BIA affirmed Martinez’s order of removal and the Ninth Circuit entered an

interim stay of removal, the Attorney General’s authority to detain Martinez changed. As the

Ninth Circuit explained in Prieto-Romero and Casas-Castrillon, once an alien’s order of removal

becomes administratively final and the court of appeals enters a stay of removal, the authority to

detain the alien shifts to § 1226(a), which allows the Attorney General to detain any alien

“pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” See Casas-

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Castrillon, 535 F.3d at 948; Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1059. An alien held under § 1226(a) is

entitled to a bond hearing before an IJ. See Casas-Castrillon, 535 F.3d at 951.

The problem, however, is that on August 9, 2011, while this habeas petition was pending,

the Ninth Circuit in a brief order denied Martinez’s motion for stay of removal. [See Case No. 11-

70751, Dkt. No. 12 (9th Cir.).] As a result, it appears that Martinez entered his “removal period” at

that time. See Casas-Castrillon, 535 F.3d at 947 (“If an alien has filed a petition for review with

this court and received a judicial stay of removal, the ‘removal period’ under § 1231(a) does not

begin until this court ‘denies the petition and withdraws the stay of removal.’” (quoting PrietoRomero, 534 F.3d at 1059)); Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1059 n.5 (“[I]f an alien files a timely

petition for review and requests a stay, the removal period does not begin until the court of appeals

(1) denies the motion for a stay or (2) grants the motion and finally denies the petition for

review.”). Accordingly, it appears that at that time the statutory authority for Martinez’s detention

has changed once more—this time to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a).1 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) (“During the

removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.” (emphases added)); see also id. §

1231(a)(1)(B) (“The removal period begins on the latest of the following: (i) The date the order of

removal becomes administratively final. (ii) If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a

court orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the date of the court's final order. . . . .”).

II. Detention authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)

Assuming Martinez’s removal period commenced on August 9, 2011, upon the Ninth

Circuit’s denial of his motion for stay of removal, it appears the Court must dismiss the Petition.

Detention “during” the removal period is governed by § 1231(a)(2) and is limited to ninety

days. Detention “beyond” the removal period is governed by § 1231(a)(6). In Zadvydas v. Davis,

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 It is possible, however, to read § 1231(a)(1)(B) as providing that once the Court of Appeals

grants a stay of removal, the removal period does not begin even if the stay is later denied. In other

words, if the alien seeks judicial review and the Ninth Circuit enters a stay of removal, the removal

period begins only as of “the date of the court’s final order,” regardless of whether the stay of removal

has been denied in the interim. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(ii) (“The removal period begins on the

latest of the following: . . . If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of

the removal of the alien, the date of the court's final order.”). If the removal period has not began yet,

then Martinez’s detention would continue to be governed by § 1226(a). See Casas-Castrillon, 535

F.3d at 948; Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1059. As such, in the abundance of caution, the Court will

analyze Martinez’s petition under both § 1231(a) and § 1226(a).

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533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether § 1231(a)(6) could

justify a prolonged or indefinite detention. The Supreme Court held that “[a] statute permitting

indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious constitutional problem.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S.

at 690. However, “interpreting the statute to avoid a serious constitutional threat,” the Supreme

Court concluded that “once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no

longer authorized by statute.” Id. at 699. Addressing the 90-day period contained in §

1231(a)(1)(A), the Supreme Court accepted as given that mandatory detention during that period

was presumptively reasonable. See id. at 683 (“After entry of a final removal order and during the

90-day removal period . . . aliens must be held in custody.”); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)

(“During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien. Under no circumstance

during the removal period shall the Attorney General release an alien who has been found

inadmissible under section 1182(a)(2) or 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable under section

1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title.”). The Ninth Circuit went further, holding that a habeas

petition filed during the 90-day removal period poses no due process issues and must be dismissed. 

See Khotesouvan v. Morones, 386 F.3d 1298, 1299-1301 (9th Cir. 2004).

In the present case, it is unclear whether the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Khotesouvan

governs Martinez’s habeas petition. On the one hand, while Martinez’s petition was pending

before the Court, Martinez arguably entered his removal period. Detention during that period is

mandatory and poses no due process issues. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2); Khotesouvan, 386 F.3d at

1299-1301. Accordingly, if Khotesouvan governs, the Court is required to dismiss Martinez’s

petition because the Government has not yet had the chance to remove him during the 90-day

period. See 386 F.3d at 1301 (“Because petitioners filed their habeas petitions during the 90–day

removal period, the district court correctly dismissed the petitions.”); see also Omidire v.

Gonzalez, No. CV 07-1471-PHX-SMM (ECV), 2008 WL 2351043, at *4 (D. Ariz. June 5, 2008)

(dismissing a habeas petition where the removal period commenced while the petition was

pending, even though the 90-day period already expired at the time the order was filed).

On the other hand, the mandatory 90-day period has already expired in this case without

the Government effecting Martinez’s removal. Section 1231(a)(2) authorizes detention for only

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90 days. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)(“Except as otherwise provided in this section, when an

alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States

within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as the ‘removal period’).” (emphasis added)). 

After 90 days, however, the Attorney General retains discretionary authority to detain certain

aliens. See id. § 1231(a)(6) (“An alien ordered removed who is . . . removable under section . . .

1227(a)(2) . . . of this title or who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the

community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal

period . . . .”). In this case, 90-day removal period would have ended on November 7, 2011. In

Zadvydas, the Supreme Court concluded that a six-month period was presumptively reasonable for

the government to effect removal. See 533 U.S. at 699-701. Here, the six-month period has not

expired yet. Therefore, because it is still possible for the Government to remove Martinez within

the presumptively reasonable period, the Court must dismiss his habeas petition. See id. at 700-01.

Accordingly, if Martinez’s removal period commenced on August 9, 2011 upon the Ninth

Circuit’s denial of his motion for stay of removal, and regardless of whether his detention is

currently governed by § 1231(a)(2) or § 1231(a)(6), Martinez is still being detained within the

presumptively reasonable six-month period, and therefore his petition must be DENIED. See

Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700-01; see also Khotesouvan, 386 F.3d at 1301.

III. Detention authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)

Even if Martinez’s removal period has not commenced on August 9, 2011, the Court must

still deny as moot and dismiss his habeas petition because the bond hearing provided him with all

the relief that he is currently entitled to.

If the removal period has not commenced yet, Martinez’s detention would continue to be

governed by § 1226(a). Section 1226(a) provides the authority for the Attorney General to

conduct a bond hearing and release an alien on bond or detain him if necessary to secure his

presence at removal. See Casas-Castrillon, 535 F.3d at 951. It does not, however, authorize

prolonged or indefinite detention without adequate procedural protections. See id. at 950-51. 

“Because the prolonged detention of an alien without an individualized determination of his

dangerousness or flight risk would be ‘constitutionally doubtful,’ [the Ninth Circuit] h[e]ld that §

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1226(a) must be construed as requiring the Attorney General to provide the alien with [a bond]

hearing.” Id. at 951. Accordingly, an alien is entitled to release on bond unless the government

establishes “by clear and convincing evidence that an alien is a flight risk or a danger to the

community.” Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011). Notably, “an opportunity to

contest the necessity of his detention before a neutral decisionmaker and an opportunity to appeal

that determination to the BIA” is the sole remedy available to a habeas petitioner in Martinez’s

situation. See Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1065-66; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); Casas-Castrillon,

535 F.3d at 949.

In this case, the Court first rejects Martinez’s argument that his removal has became

indefinite because there is no indication when the Government will be able to remove him. While

it is true that Martinez’s detention lacks a certain end date, this uncertainty alone does not render

his detention indefinite in the sense the Supreme Court found unconstitutionally problematic in

Zadvydas. See Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1063. Martinez cannot demonstrate that “there is no

significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at

701. In Prieto-Romero, the Ninth Circuit construed this language to require the alien to show that

he would be unremovable even if the government defeated his petition for review. 534 F.3d at

1063. Martinez provides no such evidence in this case. There is no evidence, for example, that

Ecuador would refuse to accept him, or that his removal would be barred by our own laws. See

Casas-Castrillon, 535 F.3d at 949; Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1063. Rather, Martinez

“foreseeably remains capable of being removed—even if it has not yet finally been determined

that he should be removed—and so the government retains an interest in ‘assuring his presence at

removal.’” See Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1065 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699).

Accordingly, § 1226(a) permits Martinez’s continuing detention while he pursues judicial

review of his administratively final order of removal. See id.

The Court next concludes that Martinez also had “an opportunity to contest the necessity of

his detention before a neutral decisionmaker and an opportunity to appeal that determination to the

BIA.” See id. at 1065-66. In Singh, the Ninth Circuit clarified that due process requires the

government to “prove by clear and convincing evidence that an alien is a flight risk or a danger to

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the community to justify denial of bond at a Casas hearing.” 638. F.3d at 1203. The Ninth Circuit

further held that due process requires a contemporaneous record of Casas hearings and that, in lieu

of providing a transcript, the immigration court may record Casas hearings and make the audio

recording available for appeal upon request. All of these requirements were complied with in this

case. When the IJ conducted the Casas hearing ordered by this Court, he explained to Martinez

that Martinez would be “‘entitled to release on bond unless the government establishes that he is a

flight risk or will be a danger to the community’” and “that the government must prove that he is a

danger or a flight risk by clear and convincing evidence.” [Doc. No. 21-1, at 2 (citations

omitted).] The IJ also made a contemporaneous record of the bond hearing. [Id.]

Because Martinez’s detention is not indefinite and because a Casas bond hearing provided

Martinez with the sole remedy to which he was entitled, the Court DENIES the Petition AS

MOOT.

IV. Constitutionality of the bond hearing

The Court also rejects any contention that Martinez’s bond hearing was constitutionally

defective.2

 Martinez contends the IJ erred in giving significant weight to his prior convictions and

in not giving sufficient weight to the evidence of his rehabilitation, such as his participation in

Alcoholics Anonymous and his employment at the prison for almost two years. The Court has

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to review a Casas bond hearing for constitutional claims and

legal error.3 Singh, 638 F.3d at 1200. The question for the Court is whether despite the fact that

Martinez’s detention is “permitted by statute because keeping him in custody could serve a

legitimate immigration purpose,” the Government has demonstrated that keeping him in custody

“actually serve[s]” that purpose. See Casas-Castrillon, 535 F.3d at 949. In doing so, the Court

looks at whether the IJ’s decision is supported by the factors set forth in Matter of Guerra, 24 I. &

2

 It is unclear whether Martinez is indeed challenging the constitutionality of his bond hearing,

or just one aspect of the IJ’s determination. Accordingly, the Court’s ruling on this argument should

not be construed as preventing Martinez from seeking further appropriate relief regarding the

constitutional or other legal issues raised by his Casas hearing. See Singh, 638 F.3d at 1200.

3

 It is unclear whether Martinez has sought BIA review of the IJ’s denial of release, and

whether he thus exhausted his administrative remedies. However, “[o]n habeas review under § 2241,

exhaustion is a prudential rather than jurisdictional requirement.” Singh, 638 F.3d at 1203 n.3. 

Accordingly, the Court can waive the requirement and reach the constitutional issues. Id.

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N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006).4 See Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1066. “The Guerra factor most

pertinent to assessing dangerousness directs immigration judges to consider ‘the alien’s criminal

record, including the extensiveness of criminal activity, the recency of such activity, and the

seriousness of the offenses.’” Singh, 638 F.3d at 1206 (quoting Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 40).

Here, the IJ properly concluded that Martinez’s extensive criminal record warranted a

finding of dangerousness. It is true that, as Martinez argues, the criminal history alone is not

always sufficient to justify denial of bond on the basis of dangerousness. See id. Rather, because

“[e]very criminal alien who receives a Casas hearing has, presumably, been convicted of at least

one crime giving rise to the removal order,” “the recency and severity of the offenses must be

considered.” Id. In this case, the IJ did consider the seriousness of Martinez’s crimes, their

frequency, and their recency. For example, the IJ emphasized that Martinez admitted to having

been sentenced to state prison five to six times, most recently in May 2009. [Doc. No. 21-1, at 5.] 

The IJ noted how each time that Martinez was released from prison, he would violate his parole or

commit another crime, and would be sent back to prison. [Id.] According to the IJ:

The respondent has not been convicted of any violent crime, per se. Even so, he is

a danger to the community. He has an unrelenting involvement in crime. He has

stolen and burglarized for years. Repeated imprisonment did not deter him. Five or

more stints in the prison system did not dissuade him from his criminal ways. Even

if it is true that he heard voices which played a role in his criminality, he still hears

the voices and prefers not to take medicine. Moreover, he said the medicine does

not help, though the voice no longer command [sic] the taking of items. Neither his

family ties, obligations nor support dissuade him from his inexorable march down a

criminal path. Neither did work nor fatherly responsibilities dissuade him. One

who embarks upon a criminal course, and veers not from it after facing repeated

imprisonment, is a danger to his community because he seems bent on crime, or at

4 Guerra discusses nine factors that,

Immigration Judges may look to . . . in determining whether an alien merits release

from bond, as well as the amount of bond that is appropriate. These factors may

include any or all of the following: (1) whether the alien has a fixed address in the

United States; (2) the alien’s length of residence in the United States; (3) the alien’s

family ties in the United States, and whether they may entitle the alien to reside

permanently in the United States in the future; (4) the alien’s employment history; (5)

the alien’s record of appearance in court; (6) the alien’s criminal record, including the

extensiveness of criminal activity, the recency of such activity, and the seriousness of

the offenses; (7) the alien’s history of immigration violations; (8) any attempts by the

alien to flee prosecution or otherwise escape from authorities; and (9) the alien’s

manner of entry to the United States.

24 I. & N. Dec. at 40.

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least unable to stop himself. He is undeterred by the threat of imprisonment or

consequences of imprisonment and apparently unrehabilitated by the leniency of

probation. Thus, I find the respondent is a danger and cannot be released.

[Id. at 6-7.] The above reasons support the IJ’s finding that the Government sustained its burden

of showing by clear and convincing evidence that Martinez should not be released on bond

because he presents a danger to the community. See Singh, 638 F.3d at 1203.

V. Martinez’s other contentions.

Martinez alleges that he is not subject to mandatory detention because he has not been

convicted of any aggravated felony or crime involving moral turpitude. [Doc. No. 31, at 4, 19.] 

This, however, appears to be a substantive challenge to his administratively final order of removal. 

“The REAL ID Act ‘expressly eliminated habeas review over all final orders of removal,’ and

provided that a petition for review in the court of appeals is the ‘sole and exclusive means for

judicial review of an order of removal.’” Singh, 638 F.3d at 1210 (quoting Singh v. Gonzalez, 499

F.3d 969, 977 (9th Cir. 2007), and 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5)). Although collateral relief continues to

be available for certain challenges post-REAL ID Act, the Court lacks jurisdiction over any

challenge that is “wholly intertwined” with the merits of the alien’s removal order. Id. at 1211

(“Singh makes the same argument in his habeas petition as he makes in his petition for

review—that he is not removable because his convictions do not qualify as aggravated felonies

under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). Because this portion of his habeas petition ‘does nothing more

than attack the IJ’s removal order,’ we lack jurisdiction to review it other than on a petition for

review.” (internal citations omitted)). Accordingly, because entertaining Martinez’s argument that

his convictions do not amount to an aggravated felony or crimes involving moral turpitude would

“contravene Congress’ express intention to limit review of removal orders to ‘one day in the court

of appeals,’” the Court lacks jurisdiction to address it. See id. at 1211-12 (citation omitted).

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES and DISMISSES Martinez’s habeas corpus

petition. The Clerk of Court shall close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: December 13, 2011 ________________________________

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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