Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03987/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03987-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition For Removal--Other Contract

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For the Northern District of California

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UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

U

For the Northern District of California

NITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STAN LACKEY, A.K.A. JOHN LONDON,

JOHN LONDON, LTD., DENNIS CRUZ,

CHRIS TOWNSEND,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CBS RADIO INC., PENN JILLETTE, DOES

3-10,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

No. C 06-03987 MHP

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Re: Defendant Penn Jillette’s Motion

for Summary Judgment

Plaintiffs Stan Lackey, aka “John London” (“London”), John London, Ltd., Dennis Cruz

(“Cruz”), and Chris Townsend (“Townsend”) bring this diversity action against defendants CBS

Radio, Inc. (“CBS”), CBS Radio Stations, Inc. and Penn Jillette. On August 24, 2007, the court

dismissed CBS Radio Stations, Inc. Docket Entry 98. The remaining defendants are CBS Radio,

Inc. and Penn Jillette. Now before the court is defendant Penn Jillette’s motion for summary

judgment against the plaintiffs who assert three causes of action: 1) interference with contract, 2)

interference with prospective economic advantage, and 3) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

 Having considered the parties’ arguments and for the reasons set forth below, the court enters the

following memorandum and order. In addition to defendant Penn Jillette’s motion, plaintiffs and

defendant CBS have filed cross-motions for summary judgment which are also before the court. A

separate memorandum and order is issued on that motion. 

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BACKGROUND

 The court references its accompanying order ruling on plaintiffs’ and defendant CBS’s

cross-motions for summary judgment. Many of the facts underlying this motion are described in

that order and are not repeated here. To summarize, plaintiff John London and defendant Penn

Jillette are talk-radio personalities who hosted back-to-back shows broadcast on a CBS-owned San

Francisco radio station KIFR-FM. London, whose show used a violent and confrontational format,

frequently attacked Jillette and on more than one occasion called for his death. See Inferno Tracks

CD, Track 3. Jillette’s management team was aware of London’s show and they received emails

from Jillette’s listeners reporting London’s attacks. See Barnhart Dec. Exh. O. On April 6, 2006,

London opened his show with the following “audience promotion”: “I’m offering . . . $5,000 for the

person who kills Penn Jillette. Now, I’ll add $2,000—that’s a total of $7,000—if there is some

suffering involved. If it’s a clean kill, five grand.” Cruz. Dec. ¶ 20, Exh. C. The next day, on April

7, CBS terminated all three plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have now brought this action against defendant

Penn Jillette, asserting that Jillette and his management team tortiously interfered with their

employment contracts and economic relations and caused them to suffer emotional distress. 

Plaintiffs’ theory of the case is that CBS’s decision to terminate the plaintiffs was driven by Jillette’s

demands that they be fired. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that there is

“no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. R. 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the

case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is

genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving

party. Id. The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of identifying those portions

of the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). On an issue for which the

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opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only point out “that

there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id.

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the

pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, “set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Mere allegations or denials do not defeat a moving

party’s allegations. Id.; Gasaway v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 957, 960 (9th Cir.

1994). The court may not make credibility determinations, and inferences to be drawn from the

facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Masson v. New

Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, 520 (1991); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

The moving party may “move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment

in the party’s favor upon all or any part thereof.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Supporting and opposing

affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in

evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated

therein.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

DISCUSSION

I. Interference With Contract

The tort of interference with contract requires the following elements: (1) a valid contact

between plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of the contract; (3) defendant’s

intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contract; (4) actual breach or

disruption; and (5) resulting damage. Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 19 Cal. 4th 26,

55 (1998). In the court’s companion order ruling on plaintiffs’ and defendant CBS’s cross-motions

for summary judgment, the court finds that there is no dispute that all three plaintiffs had valid

employment contracts with CBS. Second, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

plaintiffs, it is reasonable to infer that since Jillette’s management team was aware of the London

show and, thus, his contract with CBS prior to April 7, so too was Jillette himself. It is also

reasonable to infer that Jillette’s management team discussed with Jillette the attacks London made

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in January, February and March calling for his death. As to the fourth and fifth elements it is

undisputed that plaintiffs’ contracts were disrupted when they were terminated and as a result, they

suffered damage. 

Regarding the third element requiring intentional acts designed to induce a breach of

contract, defendant Jillette has testified that on the day plaintiffs were fired, Jillette was in contact

with CBS executive Rob Barnett because he was concerned for his safety and the safety of his

family and his on-air co-host. Jillette Dep. 106–107, 111–112. Jillette testified that he never wanted

the plaintiffs fired and never told Barnett or any other CBS executive to fire the plaintiffs. Id.

346–347. The defendant has met his initial burden to point out that there is an absence of evidence

to support the plaintiffs’ case. The plaintiffs, as the nonmoving parties who bear the burden of proof

at trial, must therefore go beyond the pleadings to set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial. Plaintiffs point to an April 7 email sent from Michael Goudeau, Jillette’s onair co-host, in response to one of Jillette’s listeners concerned about London’s solicitation. The

email states, “[w]e’ve sent it on to the boss at CBS and I [Goudeau] expect there will be something

done about it.” Barnhart Dec., Exh. K, JIL 031. The testimony of the local station manager Ken

Kohl indicates that Barnett first learned of the on-air solicitation from Jillette’s management team. 

Kohl testified that Barnett first heard about the incident from “Penn Jillette’s people.” Kohl Dep.

226, 228. Plaintiffs also point out that Jillette directed his managers Ken “Krasher” Lewis and Peter

“Spicoli” Golden to communicate with CBS and to “take care of this.” Jillette Dep. 121–122,

143–144, 147, 149. The record, however, does not contain any deposition testimony or declaration

from either Krasher or Spicoli, and therefore, does not reflect what they may have communicated to

CBS. The record is also unclear as to Krasher’s and Spicoli’s authority in dealing with matters

related to Jillette and his relationship with CBS. See id. 469–470. Plaintiffs bear the burden of

proof at trial, and therefore, it is plaintiffs’ burden to come forward with deposition testimony or

other evidence establishing the content of the communications between Krasher, Spicoli, and CBS

executives. In the absence of this kind of additional evidence, the current record shows that Jillette

and his management team communicated with CBS in order to convey their understandable concern

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for the safety of Jillette and his family. Plaintiffs have failed to oppose defendant’s motion for

summary judgment with “significant probative evidence” that the communications between Jillette,

Jillette’s management team, and CBS were designed to induce a breach of contract. Bias v.

Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1218 (9th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, defendant is entitled to summary

judgment as to this cause of action. 

II. Interference With Prospective Economic Advantage

The elements of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage are similar to

the elements of inducing breach of contract1, with the exception that unlike interference with

contract, liability is contingent upon an additional showing that defendant’s conduct was “wrongful

by some legal measure other than the fact of interference itself.” Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed

Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1154 (2003). In other words, there must be some “independently

wrongful conduct.” Id. “An act is not independently wrongful merely because defendant acted with

an improper motive.” Id. at 1159. Rather, “an act is independently wrongful if it is unlawful, that is,

if it is proscribed by some constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common law, or other determinable

legal standard.” Id. (through bribes and sexual favors, defendants engaged in unlawful behavior in

order to secure a contract and therefore, defendants’ acts, in addition to interfering with plaintiffs’

business expectancy, were wrongful in and of themselves). 

In this instance, plaintiffs’ prospective economic advantage claim involves the same alleged

conduct with the same economic relationship as plaintiffs’ claim for inducing breach of contract. 

Jillette’s alleged interference with plaintiffs’ employment at CBS is simply “interference” and

cannot be independently wrongful other than the fact of interference itself. Moreover, as the court

has already discussed, plaintiffs have not come forth with sufficient evidence to demonstrate that

defendant’s conduct was designed to interfere with plaintiffs’ contracts or otherwise disrupt their

economic relationship with CBS. Accordingly, defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this

cause of action. 

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III. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires extreme and outrageous

conduct that results in severe emotional distress. Extreme and outrageous conduct is defined as

conduct “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” 

Chirstiansen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868 (1991). The conduct alleged in this case involves

statements Jillette made to various people including his management team and CBS executives. 

These statements expressed Jillette’s concern for his personal safety. The court concludes that no

reasonable jury could find that these statements are extreme and outrageous. Indeed, they are a

natural reaction to plaintiff London’s extreme and outrageous murder solicitation. As for severe

emotional distress, London states that his termination was “very distressing and surprising and

shocking” and that he is concerned about his ability to secure future employment. London Dep.,

262:19-263:3. The court also concludes that based on this evidence, no reasonable jury could find

that plaintiffs have suffered severe emotional stress beyond the strain normally associated with

losing a job. Accordingly, defendant is entitled to summary judgment as to this cause of action. 

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s motion is GRANTED as to all three causes of action for 1) interference with

contract, 2) interference with prospective economic advantage, and 3) intentional infliction of

emotional distress. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 31, 2008

_______________________________

MARILYN HALL PATEL

United States District Court Judge

Northern District of California

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1. The elements are: (1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third party, with

the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the

relationship; (3) intentional acts on the part of the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship; (4)

actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by

the acts of the defendant. Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1153

(2003).

ENDNOTES

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