Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00757/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00757-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Jayson Monroe’s pro se Petition Under 28 

U.S.C. § 2241 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody (Doc. 1). In 

an Order (Doc. 5) filed on May 16, 2012, the District Court Judge reviewed the petition 

and directed Respondent to file an answer. Respondent filed an Answer to the Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 11-1, Doc. 14) on June 29, 2012. 

BACKGROUND 

 On or about September 29, 2010, Petitioner was incarcerated at the Federal 

Correctional Institution (FCI) in Phoenix, Arizona. (Doc. 2 at 2). Petitioner is serving a 

sentence of 60 months imprisonment for a conviction in the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri of Felon in Possession of a Firearm, Wire Fraud, and 

Money Laundering. (Doc. 11-2). 

 On October 28, 2011, Petitioner was charged with a violation of Code 296, Use 

Jayson Monroe, 

 

 Petitioner, 

vs. 

Dennis R. Smith, 

 Respondent. 

 

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No. CV 12-00757-PHX-SRB (SPL)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

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of the Mail for Abuses other than Criminal Activity. (Doc. 2 at 11, Doc. 11-4). On 

November 2, 2011, Petitioner appeared before the United Disciplinary Committee 

(UDC). After a hearing and upon review of the incident report, the UDC referred the 

charge to a Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) for a further hearing. (Doc. 11-5). On 

November 3, 2011, a hearing was held before Curtis Cole, an Alternate DHO. DHO Cole 

found that Petitioner committed the prohibited act. Petitioner was sanctioned 14 days 

good time credit, and 90 days of e-mail restrictions. (Doc. 2, Doc. 11-4). 

 Petitioner filed an administrative appeal, and on November 30, 2011, a Regional 

Director denied Petitioner’s appeal. (Doc. 2 at 16, Doc. 11-3). Petitioner filed an appeal 

of that decision with the Central Office in December of 2011, which was also denied. 

(Doc. 1 at 2, Doc. 11-3). Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition on April 10, 2012. 

(Doc. 1). He also filed a Brief and Affidavit in support of his petition. (Doc. 2). 

DISCUSSION

 Petitioner alleges that his prison disciplinary proceeding, which resulted in the loss 

of good time credits, violated his constitutional right to due process. Specifically, 

Petitioner alleges that the DHO who conducted his disciplining hearing on November 3, 

2011, was untrained and uncertified, and that such form of arbitrary decisionmaking 

violated his due process rights. Petitioner seeks restoration of the lost good time credits 

and expungement of the infraction from his record. 

A. Legal Standard 

 A federal prisoner may seek a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the manner of 

execution of his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 

F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000). For example, habeas corpus jurisdiction is available under 

28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a prisoner’s claims that he has been denied good time credits 

without due process of law. Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1989) 

(citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487–88 (1973)). Habeas corpus jurisdiction 

also exists when a petitioner seeks expungement of a disciplinary finding from his record 

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if expungement is likely to accelerate the prisoner’s eligibility for parole. Id. (citations 

omitted). 

 It is well-established that “[a] due process claim is cognizable only if there is a 

recognized liberty or property interest at stake.” Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 

462 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972)). 

Constitutionally protected liberty interests for prisoners require an “atypical, significant 

deprivation” or a deprivation that “will inevitably affect the duration of [their] sentence.” 

Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 486-87 (1995). Although the Constitution itself does 

not create a liberty interest in credit for good behavior, a statutory system authorizing 

good time credits creates such an interest in the shortened prison sentence that results 

from those credits. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 477-78 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 

557 (1974)). The minimum requirements of procedural due process must therefore be 

observed to protect this interest. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. 

 Procedural due process safeguards in prison disciplinary proceedings require that 

the prisoner receive: (1) written notice of the charges, no less than twenty-four hours 

prior to the hearing; (2) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on 

and reasons for the disciplinary action and (3) a limited right to call witnesses and present 

documentary evidence when it would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or 

correctional goals to allow the defendant to do so. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 

564-66 (1974). While not an express holding, the Wolff Court also implied that a fair 

hearing requires an impartial decisionmaker. Id. at 570-71. Moreover, the minimum 

requirements of procedural due process do not permit the revocation of good time credits 

unless the disciplinary officer’s findings are supported by “some evidence” in the record. 

Superintendent, Massachusetts Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985). 

B. Analysis 

 Petitioner argues that DHO Cole was untrained and uncertified at the time of his 

disciplinary hearing, which violated his due process rights. The Court need not reach the 

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issue as to whether Petitioner was entitled to a hearing before a certified DHO, because 

Petitioner’s contention is unsupported. Attached to its answer, Respondent has submitted 

a Declaration of Curtis Cole and a copy a Certificate of Completion. (Doc. 11-6, Doc. 11-

7). This evidence reflects that Curtis Cole received certification as a DHO on August 4, 

2011, approximately three months prior to Petitioner’s disciplinary hearing. (Id.). 

Petitioner has not filed a reply in the instant action. Absent any support for Petitioner’s 

claim beyond his own refuted statement, the Court will recommend that it be rejected. 

 Furthermore, Petitioner’s disciplinary hearing otherwise comported with due 

process standards. Petitioner was provided with written notice of the charged violation on 

October 28, 2011, several days prior to his hearing. (Doc. 11-5). Petitioner was advised 

of his right to have a staff representative appear on his behalf, to call witnesses, and to 

present documentary evidence at his hearing. Petitioner waived those rights. (Doc. 11-4). 

There are no facts in the record which indicate that DHO Cole was not an impartial 

decisionmaker. Petitioner was provided with a written statement as to reasons for the 

disciplinary action. (Doc. 11-4). Lastly, DHO Cole’s conclusions were supported by 

“some evidence” in the record. DHO Cole supported his findings that Petitioner 

committed the prohibited act and decision to impose sanctions by citing to an account of 

a staff member who monitored the institutional inmate emails, and reported specific 

instances in which Petitioner was writing unauthorized email messages to other inmates. 

DHO Cole further cited Petitioner’s admissions at the disciplinary hearing. Although 

Petitioner contended that he did not know that his actions were prohibited, he stated that 

he committed the violation charged. (Doc. 11-4). 

C. Conclusion 

 Upon consideration of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1), the Court 

finds that Petitioner has failed to establish a denial of due process. Therefore, the Court 

will recommend that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed. 

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RECOMMENDATION

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties shall have ten days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the 

Report and Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United 

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file 

objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a 

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order of 

judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72. 

 Dated this 24th day of September, 2012. 

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