Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01423/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01423-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARTIN ONTIVEORS,

Petitioner,

v.

AMY MILLER, Warden,

Respondent.

No. 2:14-cv-1423 JAM KJN P

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Introduction

Petitioner is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with an application for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 2012 conviction for

driving under the influence. Petitioner claims that he suffered ineffective assistance of counsel in 

violation of the Sixth Amendment, and claims that the prosecution committed misconduct in 

violation of petitioner’s due process rights. After careful review of the record, this court 

concludes that the petition should be denied.

II. Procedural History

On October 4, 2012, a jury found petitioner guilty of driving under the influence in 

violation of California Vehicle Code §§ 23152(a) and (b).

1

 (Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal (“CT”) 

 

1

 Section 23152(a) and (b) reads, in pertinent part:

(a) It is unlawful for a person who is under the influence of any alcoholic beverage to drive a 

Case 2:14-cv-01423-JAM-KJN Document 25 Filed 04/16/15 Page 1 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

at 159-53.) The jury also found petitioner suffered a prior felony conviction on August 3, 2007, 

for driving under the influence (CT at 161), and three prior convictions for driving under the 

influence (CT at 164). On October 26, 2012, petitioner was sentenced to seven years in state 

prison. (ECF No. 1 at 1.) 

Petitioner appealed the conviction to the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate 

District. “[D]ue to an anomaly in the rendition and recordation of the jury’s verdicts,” the Court 

of Appeal struck counts three and four from petitioner’s conviction, but otherwise affirmed the 

modified judgment. (LD 4 at 5.)

On July 2, 2013, prior to the conclusion of direct appeal, petitioner filed a petition for writ 

of habeas corpus in the Sierra County Superior Court. (LD 7.) On August 2, 2013, the petition 

was denied. (LD 8.) 

On November 4, 2013, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

California Supreme Court, adding new claims not raised on direct appeal. (LD 9.) Such petition 

was denied without comment on January 29, 2014. (LD No. 10.) 

The instant petition was filed on February 24, 2014. (ECF No. 1.) Respondent filed an 

answer (ECF No. 12); petitioner filed a reply (ECF No. 16).

III. Facts2

In its unpublished memorandum and opinion modifying and affirming petitioner’s 

judgment of conviction on appeal, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District 

provided the following background and factual summary:

////

 

vehicle.

(b) It is unlawful for a person who has 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her 

blood to drive a vehicle.

Id.

2

 The facts are taken from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate 

District in People v. Ontiveros, No. C072538 (Sept. 12, 2013), a copy of which was lodged by 

respondent as LD 4 on September 22, 2014.

Case 2:14-cv-01423-JAM-KJN Document 25 Filed 04/16/15 Page 2 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Prosecution Case-in-chief

On July 5, 2012, at 6:25 p.m., Sierra County Sheriff’s Deputy 

Matthew Boyd was driving a marked patrol car northbound on 

Highway 49 between Downieville and Sierra City. Deputy Boyd 

was driving behind a small red sport utility vehicle (SUV) driven 

by defendant. The SUV “crossed over the double yellow line by the 

entire length of the car and returned to his lane as if it was cutting a 

corner.” Deputy Boyd followed the SUV about a “mile, mile and a 

half” and then turned on his headlights (but not his emergency 

lights). Defendant activated his right turn signal and started trying 

to pull over. But then he deactivated the turn signal and continued

down the road. On three successive occasions, defendant activated 

his right turn signal and started to pull over but then made minor 

corrections within his lane and continued down the road.

Eventually, Deputy Boyd activated his emergency lights and 

defendant stopped at a large turnout. Deputy Boyd asked defendant 

for his driver’s license, and defendant said he did not have one. 

When defendant started to get out of the SUV, Deputy Boyd 

“immediately noticed a heavy odor of alcohol emitting from his 

breath and person.” Defendant was barefoot and took slow 

deliberate steps when he got out of the SUV.

Deputy Boyd asked defendant whether he had been drinking; 

defendant answered in the affirmative. Defendant said he had 

consumed approximately four beers at Bullards Bar Dam in Yuba 

County and one beer more recently in the SUV. Defendant’s eyes 

were red, watery, and bloodshot; and he continually smelled of 

alcohol.

Defendant explained that he did not have a driver’s license because 

he “had a DUI in the past” and had not paid off approximately 

$8,000 in fines.

Deputy Boyd conducted field sobriety tests to determine 

defendant’s level of intoxication and his ability, or inability, to 

drive. During the tests, Deputy Boyd asked defendant three or four 

times whether he would like to stop to get his shoes from the SUV; 

each time defendant declined.

Deputy Boyd performed a horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test, 

which requires the subject to move his eyes, not his head, as he 

follows the movement of the officer’s finger. At a point in the test, 

the subject’s eyes will begin to bounce back and forth. Deputy 

Boyd carried a card that correlates the point at which the eyes begin 

bouncing to the amount the subject had to drink. According to the 

card, defendant’s blood-alcohol content was 0.20 percent. Deputy 

Boyd did not bring the card to the trial.

Deputy Boyd also performed a “Romberg balance standing test” 

that required defendant to close his eyes, tilt his head back, and 

count to 30. During the test, defendant swayed back and forth two 

inches, which suggested he was under the influence of an alcoholic 

beverage.

Case 2:14-cv-01423-JAM-KJN Document 25 Filed 04/16/15 Page 3 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Deputy Boyd offered to do a preliminary alcohol screening (PAS) 

test, but defendant refused multiple times to do the test. The last 

time he refused to perform the test, defendant stated “he would be 

over the limit and the test would not be necessary.”

Based on his training and experience, as well as defendant’s general 

demeanor, the strong smell of alcohol, and all the field sobriety 

tests, Deputy Boyd believed that defendant was too intoxicated to 

continue driving.

Deputy Boyd handcuffed defendant and placed him in the back of 

the patrol car. Then Deputy Boyd spoke with defendant’s 

passenger, Michelle Killian, who agreed to take a PAS test. She 

tested as 0.02 percent blood alcohol, which is “way under the 

limit.” She was allowed to drive the SUV, and she followed the 

patrol car back to the sheriff’s office.

Deputy Boyd tried to test defendant’s breath using an intoxilyzer. A 

person performing this test must blow air into the machine for at 

least one-half second and must deliver 1.2 liters of air. If the person 

performs as required, the machine will process the test and then ask 

for a second breath test. If the person does not do as required, the 

machine asks that the test be repeated. The machine determines the 

percent of alcohol in a person’s blood by measuring grams of 

alcohol per 210 liters of breath. (People v. Williams (2002) 28 

Cal.4th 408, 411, fn. 1 (Williams).)

Defendant attempted to perform the breath test 12 to 14 times. On 

several attempts he failed to blow sufficient air into the machine. 

On some attempts he appeared deliberately to inhale small, 

insufficient amounts of air before exhaling into the machine. On 

other attempts he appeared to manipulate his tongue in order to 

limit the flow of air into the machine. The machine reported that 

one attempt was successful and the others were insufficient or in 

error.

The successful test, at 7:07 p.m., showed a blood-alcohol level of 

0.22 percent. Based on this reading, a criminalist opined that 

defendant was too impaired to safely operate a motor vehicle. 

Defendant’s blood-alcohol level at 6:00 p.m., prior to his arrest, 

would have been 0.23 percent. In order for someone of defendant’s 

size to have a blood-alcohol level of 0.22 percent, that person 

would have to have consumed approximately 15 shots of 86–proof 

alcohol or 15 bottles of beer.

Deputy Boyd wanted to get another breath sample, but defendant 

stated that he could not give another sample. Defendant also did not 

submit to a blood test. For reasons of employee safety, the clinic 

that does blood tests for Sierra County will not force a blood test 

upon a subject who does not consent to the test.

Defendant became quite upset when Deputy Boyd told him that, if 

he had multiple prior DUI’s, it “would be quite some time” before 

defendant was released. Defendant was upset because he wanted to 

go fishing.

Case 2:14-cv-01423-JAM-KJN Document 25 Filed 04/16/15 Page 4 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

When Deputy Boyd brought defendant to the jail, correctional 

officer Gary McFarland observed that defendant’s speech was a bit 

slurred, his eyes were a bit bloodshot and watery, and his breath 

smelled of alcohol. McFarland had been trained to recognize people 

who are under the influence of alcohol, and he has dealt with 

“hundreds and hundreds” of people who are under the influence.

Defense

Michelle Killian, the girlfriend of defendant, testified for the 

defense. About 2:00 to 2:30 p.m., she picked up defendant to go 

fishing. The two left Oroville and she drove them to Lake Francis. 

The trip took one hour and 20 minutes. They each drank four 

alcoholic beverages and stayed at Lake Francis for three to three 

and a half hours.

Killian testified that she and defendant left Lake Francis at “four” 

or 4:30 p.m. They were headed to Gold Lake. Killian was not 

familiar with the territory so she let defendant drive, even though 

she knew he did not have a license. They did not stop at Bullards 

Bar Dam.

Killian testified that there had been something wrong with the 

alignment mechanism of her SUV. Defendant said he could “make 

it so easier on” the SUV by “straighten[ing] out” the tight turns on 

the winding road. Killian did not recall the SUV going “all the way 

over the center line, the whole width of the car.” Instead, she 

remembered the two driver’s side tires going over the center line.

Killian testified that defendant has a back problem. She recalled 

that the officer had asked defendant when he last drank a beer. 

Defendant replied that he “was just about ready to crack one open.” 

Killian clarified that she does not let anyone drink and drive in her 

car.

Killian claimed her SUV smelled like beer because she had placed 

the empty cans from Lake Francis in the back of the SUV for 

recycling and she had collected additional cans.

Killian testified that defendant was arrested when he refused to take 

the PAS test at the side of the road. The officer gave Killian a 

breathalyzer test, and she was allowed to drive her SUV. Killian 

testified that she and defendant had consumed the same quantity of 

beer at Lake Francis.

People v. Ontiveros, 2013 WL 4855057, *1-3 (Cal. App. 3 Dist., Sept. 12, 2013). 

IV. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a 

state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or 

Case 2:14-cv-01423-JAM-KJN Document 25 Filed 04/16/15 Page 5 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

application of state law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 4 (2010); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 

U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000).

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting federal habeas 

corpus relief:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits 

in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -

 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

For purposes of applying § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” consists of 

holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the last reasoned state court decision. 

Thompson v. Runnels, 705 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 

38 (2011); Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 

U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). Circuit court precedent “may be persuasive in determining what law is 

clearly established and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at 

859 (quoting Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 2010)). However, circuit precedent 

may not be “used to refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court jurisprudence into a 

specific legal rule that th[e] [Supreme] Court has not announced.” Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S. 

Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013) (citing Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 (2012) (per curiam)). 

Nor may circuit precedent be used to “determine whether a particular rule of law is so widely 

accepted among the Federal Circuits that it would, if presented to th[e] [Supreme] Court, be 

accepted as correct. Marshall, 133 S. Ct. at 1451. Further, where courts of appeals have diverged 

in their treatment of an issue, it cannot be said that there is “clearly established Federal law” 

governing that issue. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006).

////

Case 2:14-cv-01423-JAM-KJN Document 25 Filed 04/16/15 Page 6 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it applies a rule 

contradicting a holding of the Supreme Court or reaches a result different from Supreme Court 

precedent on “materially indistinguishable” facts. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the 

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s 

decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. 3 Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); Taylor, 529 U.S. at 413; Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1002 

(9th Cir. 2004). In this regard, a federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because that 

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 

unreasonable.” Taylor, 529 U.S. at 412. See also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 

(2007); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent 

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”). 

“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. 

Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

Accordingly, “[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner 

must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so 

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter,131 S. Ct. at 786-87. 

If the state court’s decision does not meet the criteria set forth in § 2254(d), a reviewing 

court must conduct a de novo review of a habeas petitioner’s claims. Delgadillo v. Woodford, 

527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(en banc) (“[I]t is now clear both that we may not grant habeas relief simply because of

////

 

3

 Under § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision based on a factual determination is not to be 

overturned on factual grounds unless it is “objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state court proceeding.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Davis v. Woodford, 

384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

Case 2:14-cv-01423-JAM-KJN Document 25 Filed 04/16/15 Page 7 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

§ 2254(d)(1) error and that, if there is such error, we must decide the habeas petition by 

considering de novo the constitutional issues raised.”). 

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court 

judgment. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859; Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

If the last reasoned state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a 

previous state court decision, this court may consider both decisions to ascertain the reasoning of 

the last decision. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). “When a 

federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be 

presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication 

or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85. This 

presumption may be overcome by a showing “there is reason to think some other explanation for 

the state court’s decision is more likely.” Id. at 785 (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 

803 (1991)). Similarly, when a state court decision on a petitioner’s claims rejects some claims 

but does not expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must presume, subject to 

rebuttal, that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 

1088, 1091 (2013). 

Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to 

support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine 

whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). “Independent review of the record is not de novo 

review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether 

a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Where no 

reasoned decision is available, the habeas petitioner still has the burden of “showing there was no 

reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. 

A summary denial is presumed to be a denial on the merits of the petitioner’s claims. 

Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 957 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2012). While the federal court cannot analyze 

just what the state court did when it issued a summary denial, the federal court must review the 

state court record to determine whether there was any “reasonable basis for the state court to deny 

Case 2:14-cv-01423-JAM-KJN Document 25 Filed 04/16/15 Page 8 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

relief.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. This court “must determine what arguments or theories . . . 

could have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible 

fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the 

holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Id. at 786. The petitioner bears “the burden 

to demonstrate that ‘there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.’” Walker v. 

Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 939 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784). 

When it is clear, however, that a state court has not reached the merits of a petitioner’s 

claim, the deferential standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply and a federal 

habeas court must review the claim de novo. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 

F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003).

V. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner raises multiple claims of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, only one of 

which was decided in a reasoned decision by the state court. Thus, the undersigned will first set 

forth the legal standards governing these claims, and will then address each claim individually 

below.

The clearly established federal law for ineffective assistance of counsel claims is 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To succeed on a Strickland claim, a defendant

must show that (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient and that (2) the “deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687. Counsel is constitutionally deficient if his or 

her representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” such that it was outside 

“the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Id. at 687-88 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “Counsel’s errors must be ‘so serious as to deprive the defendant of a 

fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.’” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 787-88. (quoting Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 687). 

A reviewing court is required to make every effort “to eliminate the distorting effects of 

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the 

conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669; see Richter, 131 S. 

Case 2:14-cv-01423-JAM-KJN Document 25 Filed 04/16/15 Page 9 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

Ct. at 789. Reviewing courts must also “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls 

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. This 

presumption of reasonableness means that the court must “give the attorneys the benefit of the 

doubt,” and must also “affirmatively entertain the range of possible reasons [defense] counsel 

may have had for proceeding as they did.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1407 (2011) 

(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Id. “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” 

Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 792. A reviewing court “need not determine whether counsel’s 

performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of 

the alleged deficiencies . . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of 

lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.” Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 

955 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). 

 Under AEDPA, “[t]he pivotal question is whether the state court’s application of the 

Strickland standard was unreasonable.” Id. at 785. “[B]ecause the Strickland standard is a 

general standard, a state court has even more latitude to reasonably determine that a defendant has 

not satisfied that standard.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009).

1. Prior Conviction Allegations

Petitioner contends that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by 

defense counsel’s failure to seek bifurcation of petitioner’s prior conviction allegations, or to 

“simply admit” the prior convictions outside of the jury’s presence. (ECF No. 1 at 4, 30.) 

Petitioner argues that the prosecution reminded the jury about the prior convictions in the opening 

statement, but defense counsel failed to address them. (ECF No. 1 at 39.) Petitioner also 

contends that defense counsel should have moved to exclude petitioner’s admissions concerning 

these prior convictions. (ECF No. 1 at 39-41.) Petitioner argues that he was prejudiced by the 

court reading the charges involving prior convictions to the jury, as well as by the “copious 

Case 2:14-cv-01423-JAM-KJN Document 25 Filed 04/16/15 Page 10 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

evidence” the jury heard about the prior convictions. (ECF No. 1 at 44-45.) Petitioner contends 

there could be no reasonable or tactical reason to support defense counsel’s decision not to seek 

bifurcation of the prior convictions or, in the alternative, to stipulate to their truth. (ECF No. 1 at 

45.) 

Respondent counters that the state court’s rejection of these claims was neither contrary to 

nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Respondent argues that the 

state court properly applied Strickland, and reasonably found petitioner failed to establish a 

reasonable probability of prejudice because the evidence of petitioner’s guilt was overwhelming. 

In addition, respondent contends that petitioner demonstrated clear consciousness-of-guilt 

behavior, including the 12 to 14 attempts to adequately perform the intoxilyzer test, his 

apparently intentional failure to deliberately inhale sufficient air before exhaling into the machine, 

and the use of his tongue to restrict air flow into the machine. (ECF No. 12 at 18.) In addition,

respondent points out that the 0.22 blood-alcohol level was nearly three times the legal limit. 

Respondent argues that such overwhelming evidence supports the state court’s conclusion that 

petitioner failed to demonstrate that but for the admission of his prior convictions, the outcome 

would have been different. 

In reply, petitioner argues that the felony driving under the influence provisions of 

California Vehicle Code § 23175 are penalty provisions and do not prescribe elements of the 

underlying offense; thus the jury was not entitled to learn of petitioner’s prior driving under the 

influence convictions until after it had decided petitioner’s guilt in the instant offense. (ECF No. 

16 at 11, citing LD 9 at 22.) Petitioner contends that because he did not testify at trial, he would 

not be impeached by the convictions, and the failure of defense counsel to file a motion to 

bifurcate deprived petitioner of the trial court’s consideration of the extreme prejudice petitioner 

would suffer by the admission of the prior convictions which were identical to the charged 

offenses, fairly recent, and inflammatory given petitioner’s three year, eight month prison term on 

the prior felony driving under the influence conviction. (ECF No. 16 at 11, citing LD 9 at 23.) 

Petitioner contends that the California Legislature is concerned with the problem of prejudice 

when a jury learns of a prior conviction, as expressed in California Penal Code Section 1025. 

Case 2:14-cv-01423-JAM-KJN Document 25 Filed 04/16/15 Page 11 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

a. State Court Opinion

The last reasoned rejection of petitioner’s first claim is the decision of the California 

Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District on petitioner’s direct appeal. The state court 

addressed this claim as follows:

Defendant contends his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 

when he failed to request bifurcation of his three prior DUI 

convictions. He further contends trial counsel was ineffective for 

having failed to stipulate to the allegations’ truth so that the jury 

would not learn about the priors. Defendant also claims trial 

counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to seek exclusion 

of his statements about his prior convictions and the fact he had 

served a prior prison term for felony DUI. In a separate argument, 

defendant claims trial counsel’s ineffective assistance was 

prejudicial. This last claim is dispositive.

A. Background

Prior to trial, the prosecutor stated that he anticipated submitting 

some prior convictions in his case-in-chief. The prosecutor 

identified DUI priors from Sutter, Shasta, and Butte Counties. The 

prosecutor did not seek to admit a Fresno County prior conviction 

of armed robbery or a Sacramento County prior conviction of 

burglary during the case-in-chief.

Defense counsel did not seek to bifurcate the trial of the DUI priors. 

The trial court found the DUI priors were admissible. The jury 

received a redacted version of the information that did not include 

the prison term and strike allegations.

In his opening statement, the prosecutor told the jury that defendant 

was charged with felony DUI because he had “three prior 

convictions within 10 years,” and because he had “a prior felony 

[DUI] within 10 years.”

During trial, Deputy Boyd testified that defendant said he did not 

have a driver’s license because he had not paid off about $8,000 in 

fines from a DUI case. Deputy Boyd also recounted defendant’s 

statement that he “had a prior DUI” and had been through the 

process before. Deputy Boyd further recalled that defendant had 

become less cooperative when he was told he would not be released 

due to his “multiple DUI’s.”

In his opening summation, the prosecutor argued that the third 

prong of his case was “prior intoxication.” He discussed 

defendant’s three prior convictions, including the conviction of DUI 

with injury that resulted in a prison commitment of three years eight 

months.

In his summation, defense counsel argued, “don’t let your 

consideration of the prior convictions that have been mentioned 

here, don’t let that cloud affect your analysis of the facts of this 

Case 2:14-cv-01423-JAM-KJN Document 25 Filed 04/16/15 Page 12 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

case. They have to rest on their own laurels. [¶] So, you know, it is 

a bit prejudicial to hear about prior DUI’s, and assuming because he 

has priors, he must be guilty in this case. Don’t allow yourself to do 

that.”

The trial court instructed the jury that it could “[c]onsider the 

evidence presented on these [DUI prior] allegations only when 

deciding whether the defendant was previously convicted of the 

crimes alleged. Do not consider this evidence for any other 

purpose.” (CALCRIM No. 2125.)

B. Analysis

“‘“In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

defendant bears the burden of demonstrating, first, that counsel’s 

performance was deficient because it ‘fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness [¶] . . . under prevailing professional 

norms.’ [Citations.] Unless a defendant establishes the contrary, we 

shall presume that ‘counsel’s performance fell within the wide 

range of professional competence and that counsel’s actions and 

inactions can be explained as a matter of sound trial strategy.’

[Citation.] If the record ‘sheds no light on why counsel acted or 

failed to act in the manner challenged,’ an appellate claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel must be rejected ‘unless counsel 

was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless 

there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.’ [Citations.] If a 

defendant meets the burden of establishing that counsel’s 

performance was deficient, he or she also must show that counsel’s 

deficiencies resulted in prejudice, that is, a ‘reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.’”‘” (People v. Salcido

(2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 170 (Salcido).) “Finally, ‘there is no reason 

for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the 

inquiry in the same order [set forth above] or even to address both 

components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient 

showing on one. In particular, a court need not determine whether 

counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the 

prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged 

deficiencies.’” (People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 656.)

Defendant has not shown any reasonable probability that, but for 

admission into evidence of the prior convictions and prison term, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different. (Salcido, 

supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 170.) The evidence showed that defendant 

had been driving the SUV when it crossed over the double yellow 

line by the entire length of the car. Defendant’s eyes were red, 

watery, and bloodshot, and he emitted a heavy odor of alcohol from 

his breath and person. Defendant admitted to Deputy Boyd that he 

had been drinking, most recently a beer inside the SUV he had been 

driving.

Defendant’s conduct during the subsequent intoxilyzer test raised 

an inference of his consciousness of his guilt. Defendant attempted 

to perform the breath test 12 to 14 times. On several attempts he 

failed to blow sufficient air into the machine. On some attempts he 

Case 2:14-cv-01423-JAM-KJN Document 25 Filed 04/16/15 Page 13 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

appeared deliberately to inhale small, insufficient amounts of air 

before exhaling into the machine. On other attempts he appeared to 

manipulate his tongue in order to limit the flow of air into the 

machine.

The intoxilyzer also provided direct evidence of defendant’s guilt. 

The machine reported that one of defendant’s multiple efforts to 

take the test was successful. This test showed that defendant had a 

blood-alcohol level of 0.22 percent, which is almost three times the 

legal limit.

Defendant counters that “there was only one breath test, when two 

breath tests are required under title 17 of the California Code of 

Regulations.” In other words, we should ignore the one valid test 

because his subterfuge invalidated the others. The argument earns 

high marks for chutzpah. (E.g., Lewis v. County of Sacramento

(2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 107, 113.) As defendant concedes, the lack 

of a second test as required by the regulation does not make the 

existing test inadmissible. (Williams, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 417.) 

Defendant offers no reason to believe the one existing test was 

inaccurate.

Finally, there was evidence that, in order for a person of 

defendant’s size to have a blood-alcohol level of 0.22 percent, he 

would have to have consumed approximately 15 shots of 86-proof 

alcohol or 15 bottles of beer.

Thus, there was abundant evidence that defendant drove the SUV 

while under the influence of alcohol and with a blood-alcohol level 

over 0.08 percent. There is no reasonable probability that the result 

would have been any different had defendant’s admissions and 

prior convictions been excluded.

We need not join the parties’ debate whether defense witness 

Killian was credible with respect to the timing of the duo’s travels 

to Lake Francis and Gold Lake. Killian’s testimony about how 

much she and defendant consumed was problematic at best. Killian 

testified that they each drank four alcoholic beverages during the 

same time frame, even though their respective breath tests showed 

wildly divergent amounts of alcohol in their blood. Even if 

Killian’s testimony as to the timeline was credible, reasonable 

jurors could conclude her testimony about how much defendant 

drank that day was not. Defendant’s claim that he “presented a 

plausible defense based on his girlfriend’s testimony that he was 

not under the influence” has no merit.

In sum, defendant has not shown any reasonable probability of a 

more favorable outcome had his trial counsel sought to exclude his 

prior convictions and his statements acknowledging those 

convictions. (Salcido, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 170.) Any deficient 

performance by trial counsel could not have been prejudicial.

People v. Ontiveros, 2013 WL 4855057 at *3-5.

////

Case 2:14-cv-01423-JAM-KJN Document 25 Filed 04/16/15 Page 14 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

b. Discussion

The state court properly addressed petitioner’s claim under Strickland, as both Salcido and 

Cox, on which the state court relied, incorporate the standards required by Strickland. Salcido, 44 

Cal. 4th at 494; Cox, 53 Cal. 3d at 656. The state court reasonably concluded that petitioner 

failed to show any reasonable probability that absent admission of the prior convictions, the 

outcome of the proceedings would have differed. Deputy Boyd testified that petitioner’s vehicle 

went over the double yellow line four times. (RT at 16.) Boyd also testified that petitioner drove 

the SUV over “the double yellow line by the entire length of the car and returned to his lane as if 

it was cutting a corner.” (RT at 62.) After Boyd pulled over the car and asked petitioner for his 

license, Boyd “immediately noticed a heavy odor of alcohol emitting from [petitioner’s] breath 

and person.” (RT at 64.) When Boyd asked petitioner if he had been drinking, petitioner said “he 

had approximately four beers at Bullards Bar,” and “then one more recently in the vehicle.” (RT 

at 65.) Boyd observed that petitioner “had red, bloodshot eyes, they were also watery,” and 

petitioner emitted “the continual smell of alcoholic beverage.” (RT at 65.) Petitioner was 

swaying back and forth during the nystagmus eye test. (RT at 66.) Boyd had to explain the 

instructions for the eye test twice before the test could be performed. (RT at 67.) Deputy Boyd 

testified that his opinion that petitioner was intoxicated was not based on one test, but was based 

on all the field sobriety tests performed at the scene, and on the factors he testified to earlier. (RT 

89.) Correctional Officer Gary McFarland testified that he could tell petitioner was intoxicated; 

McFarland could “sense the emission of alcohol from [petitioner’s] breath.” (RT at 124.) 

McFarland noted petitioner’s eyes were a little bloodshot and watery,” and he had a “little bit of 

slurry speech.” (RT at 124.) Petitioner “was under the influence.” (RT at 130.) The intoxilyzer

administered at the police station at 7:07 p.m. registered one reading of a 0.22 blood alcohol 

level; all other attempts to obtain a reading were unsuccessful. (RT at 75-76.) Criminalist John 

Brogden testified that for a male of petitioner’s size (six foot tall, 220 pounds), petitioner would 

have to ingest 15 shots of 86 proof alcohol or 15 beers, and likely would have had a blood alcohol 

level of .23 at 6:00 p.m. (RT 110-11; 112.) In the face of such strong evidence that petitioner 

was driving with a blood alcohol level exceeding the .08 legal limit, he fails to demonstrate that 

Case 2:14-cv-01423-JAM-KJN Document 25 Filed 04/16/15 Page 15 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

there is a reasonable probability that the jury would not have convicted him absent admission of 

the evidence of his prior convictions for driving under the influence.4 

Moreover, the jury was admonished that the prior conviction evidence was only to be 

considered in deciding whether petitioner sustained the prior convictions. (CT at 153.) The jury 

was specifically directed: “Do not consider this evidence for any other purpose.” (CT at 153.) 

“The Court presumes that jurors, conscious of the gravity of their task, attend closely the 

particular language of the trial court’s instructions in a criminal case and strive to understand, 

make sense of, and follow the instructions given them.” Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 

n.8 (1985); Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755, 782 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We presume that jurors follow 

the instructions.”) 

Thus, petitioner is not entitled to relief on his first ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

2. Lay-Witness Testimony

Petitioner contends that defense counsel was ineffective based on his failure to challenge 

allegedly improper lay-witness testimony by Deputy Matthew Boyd. Petitioner argues that 

Boyd’s testimony concerning petitioner’s horizontal gaze nystagmus (“HGN”) test was 

inappropriate because the deputy was not qualified as a scientific expert. Respondent counters 

that California courts have permitted law enforcement officers to give opinion testimony based on 

nystagmus testing for almost two decades. (ECF No. 12 at 19.) Because such testing has long 

been accepted in the scientific community, defendants argue that defense counsel could have 

concluded that expert qualification was not required, and reasonable jurists would agree that 

meritless objections are not required by the Sixth Amendment.

////

 

4

 In addition, the Supreme Court has not decided whether a trial court’s failure to bifurcate trial 

on a defendant’s prior convictions for driving under the influence implicates due process. 

However, in Spencer v. State of Texas, 87 S. Ct. 648 (1967), the Supreme Court held that the Due 

Process Clause does not require bifurcation when the prosecutor seeks to admit evidence of a 

defendant’s prior convictions to prove a sentence enhancement under a recidivist statute. Id. at 

654-55. The Supreme Court noted: “Two-part jury trials are rare in our jurisprudence; they have 

never been compelled by this Court as a matter of constitutional law, or even as a matter of 

federal procedure.” Id. at 568. Here, petitioner faced felony driving under the influence charges 

because of his prior felony conviction for driving under the influence. (CT at 18.) 

Case 2:14-cv-01423-JAM-KJN Document 25 Filed 04/16/15 Page 16 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

The last state court decision on petitioner’s second ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

is the California Supreme Court’s summary denial of petitioner’s habeas petition containing the 

same claim. Although the California Supreme Court did not explain its reasoning, its summary 

denial is a decision on the merits of this claim. See Stancle, 692 F.3d at 957 & n.3 (a summary 

denial is presumed to be a denial on the merits of the petitioner’s claims). 

Although the federal court cannot analyze just what the state court did when it issued a 

summary denial, the federal court must review the state court record to determine whether there 

was any “reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. This 

court “must determine what arguments or theories . . . could have supported, the state court’s 

decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those 

arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] 

Court.” Id. at 786. The petitioner bears “the burden to demonstrate that ‘there was no reasonable 

basis for the state court to deny relief.’” Walker, 709 F.3d at 939 (quoting Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 

784). 

a. Applicable Legal Standards

As set forth above, petitioner must prove both prongs of Strickland: that counsel’s 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that, had defense counsel 

objected, the outcome of this proceeding would have been different (prejudice). 

b. Discussion

After reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, petitioner fails 

to demonstrate that petitioner sustained prejudice under Strickland. Even assuming the admission 

of the eye test results was error, but for the admission of such evidence, the outcome of the 

proceedings would not have differed because of the other strong evidence demonstrating that 

petitioner was driving with a blood alcohol level exceeding the .08 legal limit. Accordingly, 

petitioner fails to demonstrate that there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief, 

and petitioner’s second ineffective assistance of counsel claim should be denied.

////

////

Case 2:14-cv-01423-JAM-KJN Document 25 Filed 04/16/15 Page 17 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

3. Allegedly Exculpatory Discovery Evidence

Petitioner contends defense counsel was ineffective based on his failure to obtain a copy 

of the surveillance video allegedly showing Deputy Boyd “banging and beating” on the 

intoxilyzer machine. (ECF No. 1 at 21-22.) Petitioner argues that the video “would have 

‘clearly’ demonstrated how Deputy Boyd’s beating and banging on [the] machine rendered the 

‘aborted reading.’” (ECF No. 1 at 47.) Respondent counters that the record established that Boyd 

“tapped” on the breath machine twice (RT 129), but that defense counsel could reasonably have 

“feared that admitting the video evidence would have reinforced the consciousness of guilt 

evidence by providing visual confirmation of petitioner’s 12 to 14 attempts to provide a sufficient 

breath sample.” (ECF No. 12 at 21.) Respondent points out that defense counsel’s closing 

argument addressed and disputed this portion of the prosecution’s case. (RT 175-76.) 

Respondent also argues that petitioner failed to demonstrate that omitting such video evidence 

resulted in prejudice because the “evidence overwhelmingly established that petitioner was 

sufficiently intoxicated while driving his vehicle.” (ECF No. 12 at 21.) 

In his traverse, petitioner argues that “the erroneous use of the unfound[ed] allegations 

that the petitioner was attempting to circumvent the Breath Intoxilyzer Machine, when jurors had 

acquitted him of that allegation, defies federal due process.” (ECF No. 16 at 13.) Petitioner 

appears to argue that the jury’s verdict that petitioner was not refusing to blow into the Breath 

Intoxilyer Machine demonstrates that the machine was malfunctioning. (ECF No. 16 at 10.) 

The last reasoned decision on this claim of ineffective assistance of defense counsel is the 

California Supreme Court’s summary denial of petitioner’s habeas petition containing the same 

claim. As explained above, this summary denial is a decision on the merits of this claim, and 

requires this court to determine whether there was any reasonable basis for the state court to deny 

relief. As set forth above, petitioner must demonstrate both prongs of Strickland.

Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the July 5, 2012 video is exculpatory. While the video 

might show Deputy Boyd’s actions resulted in an “aborted reading,” it would also show the 

machine rendered the one result where petitioner had a .22 blood alcohol level at the police 

station. Although the jury found petitioner not guilty of refusing to take a chemical test (CT 165), 

Case 2:14-cv-01423-JAM-KJN Document 25 Filed 04/16/15 Page 18 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

such verdict does not address or confirm petitioner’s belief that Deputy Boyd’s actions somehow 

caused the machine to not operate correctly. Indeed, senior criminalist John Brogden testified 

that the machine was tested on July 3, 7, and 13, 2012, the machine was working correctly, and 

there was nothing wrong with the machine. (RT 120-21.) 

In any event, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict,

this ineffective assistance of counsel claim also fails on the prejudice prong of Strickland. 

Petitioner fails to demonstrate that had the video of Deputy Boyd administering the breath test at 

the police station been admitted at trial, the outcome of these proceedings would be different. 

Officer McFarland testified that he did see Boyd tap the machine twice “but he wasn’t . . . overly 

banging on it.” (RT at 129.) The jury was made aware that numerous attempts to obtain breath 

test results had failed, and criminalist John Brogden explained the meaning of the machine’s “test 

aborted” reading, and noted that it did not reflect the cause for the failed reading. (RT 115-16.) 

Brogden further opined that “[c]onsidering the totality of the information that the machine’s been 

working properly since this day, . . . [Boyd’s hitting the machine with his hand] would have no 

effect on this instrument.” (RT 116.) Thus, admitting the video would not have discounted the 

.22 blood alcohol level registered by the machine, or petitioner’s poor performance on the fieldsobriety tests, or the other objective signs of intoxication observed by Deputy Boyd and 

Correctional Officer McFarland (RT 62-68; 123-24). Moreover, the jury’s “not guilty” verdict to 

the charge of failure to take a chemical test, raises an inference that the jury did not believe that 

petitioner was attempting to alter the test results. But despite the “not guilty” verdict as to the 

chemical test, the jury still found petitioner guilty of driving under the influence. These verdicts 

support this court’s finding that admission of the video would not have changed the outcome of 

the proceedings in petitioner’s favor. 

Thus, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his third ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim. 

4. Cumulative Error

The petition does not specifically set forth a claim of cumulative error based on defense 

counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) However, the petition 

Case 2:14-cv-01423-JAM-KJN Document 25 Filed 04/16/15 Page 19 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

refers to Appendix A, in which petitioner states “[i]t is not one error standing alone that 

constitutes ineffective [assistance of counsel], it is a cumulative effect of errors that renders 

ineffective assistance of counsel. (ECF Nos. 1 at 46; 16 at 12.) 

The Ninth Circuit has concluded that under clearly established United States Supreme 

Court precedent the combined effect of multiple trial errors may give rise to a due process 

violation if it renders a trial fundamentally unfair, even where each error considered individually 

would not require reversal. Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Donnelly 

v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974), and Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 290 

(1973)). “The fundamental question in determining whether the combined effect of trial errors 

violated a defendant’s due process rights is whether the errors rendered the criminal defense ‘far 

less persuasive,’ Chambers, 410 U.S. at 294, and thereby had a ‘substantial and injurious effect or 

influence’ on the jury’s verdict.” Parle, 505 F.3d at 927 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 

U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). See also Hein v. Sullivan, 601 F.3d 897, 916 (9th Cir. 2010) (same).

This court has addressed each of petitioner’s alleged ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims and has concluded that no error of constitutional magnitude occurred. This court also 

concludes that the alleged errors, even when considered together, did not render petitioner’s 

defense “far less persuasive,” nor did they have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence on 

the jury’s verdict.” Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on his claim of cumulative 

error.

B. Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner claims that his due process rights were violated because the prosecution 

withheld the allegedly exculpatory video surveillance evidence discussed above. Petitioner 

claims that “from [the] time of arraignment,” the prosecutor was “put on notice” that petitioner 

wanted the video of Deputy Boyd striking the intoxilyzer, yet intentionally withheld the video, 

allegedly depriving petitioner of a meritorious defense. (ECF No. 1 at 46-47.) Petitioner 

contends that the “constant banging” on the intoxilyzer “caused an aborted test over & over.” 

(ECF No. 16 at 16.) Respondent argues that the video evidence was not “material,” and could not 

have had a favorable effect on the jury’s verdict because it is unlikely the jury would have 

Case 2:14-cv-01423-JAM-KJN Document 25 Filed 04/16/15 Page 20 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

attributed the .22 blood-alcohol reading to Boyd’s tapping of the intoxilyzer. But even if it had, 

respondent contends that the verdict would remain the same based on the evidence of petitioner’s 

erratic driving (RT 62), objective signs of intoxication (RT 62-68, 123-24), poor performance on 

field-sobriety tests (RT 65-67), and admission to drinking while behind the wheel (RT 65). (ECF 

No. 12 at 22.) 

The suppression of evidence favorable to the accused “violates due process where the 

evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of 

the prosecution.” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). There are three essential 

components of a Brady violation: “The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either 

because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed 

by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. 

Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). To establish prejudice under Brady, courts look to the 

materiality of the suppressed evidence. Id. at 282. “[E]vidence is ‘material’ within the meaning 

of Brady when there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result 

of the proceeding would have been different.” Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 469-70 (2009).

First, petitioner concedes he was aware of the video at the time of his arraignment. 

Evidence is not “suppressed” by the police or prosecution where the defendant is, or reasonably 

should have been, aware of that evidence. See United States v. Bracy, 67 F.3d 1421, 1428-1429 

(9th Cir. 1995) (finding that the government’s “disclosure provided all the information necessary 

for the defendants to discover the alleged Brady material on their own, so the government was not 

guilty of suppressing any evidence favorable to defendant”); United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 

761, 764 (9th Cir. 1991) (“When, as here, a defendant has enough information to be able to 

ascertain the supposed Brady material on his own, there is no suppression by the government.”); 

United States v. Dupuy, 760 F.2d 1492, 1501 n.5 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[S]uppression by the 

Government is a necessary element of a Brady claim, [so] if the means of obtaining the 

exculpatory evidence has been provided to the defense, the Brady claim fails.”) (internal citations 

omitted). Petitioner knew about the video evidence early in the proceedings, and defense counsel 

could have subpoenaed its production.

Case 2:14-cv-01423-JAM-KJN Document 25 Filed 04/16/15 Page 21 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22

Second, just as petitioner failed to demonstrate that he suffered Strickland prejudice by the 

omission of the video from evidence, petitioner fails to demonstrate that the video was material, 

as defined under Brady. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, 

petitioner’s guilt was supported by the direct evidence of the .22 blood alcohol level registered by 

the intoxilyzer, petitioner’s poor performance on the field-sobriety tests, including the eye test 

and the Romberg standing balance test (RT 10), petitioner’s erratic driving, as well as the other 

objective signs of intoxication observed by Deputy Boyd and Correctional Officer McFarland 

(RT 62-68; 123-24). Because there was such strong evidence demonstrating that petitioner was 

driving with a blood alcohol level exceeding the .08 legal limit, the omitted video is not material 

because its disclosure would not have presented a probability sufficient to undermine confidence 

in the outcome of the trial. See Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1053 (9th Cir. 2002)

(“Evidence is deemed prejudicial, or material, only if it undermines confidence in the outcome of 

the trial.”).

Thus, petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim of prosecutorial 

misconduct.

VI. Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner contends he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing because the California Supreme 

Court deprived him of his ability to fully develop his allegations by summarily denying his 

petition for writ of habeas corpus. (ECF No. 16 at 9.) Petitioner claims, in conclusory fashion, 

that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to “adequately” and “fully develop his allegations.” (ECF 

No. 16 at 13, 15.)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), an evidentiary hearing is appropriate under the 

following circumstances:

(e)(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a 

claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an 

evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that--

(A) the claim relies on--

(I) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on 

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously 

unavailable; or

Case 2:14-cv-01423-JAM-KJN Document 25 Filed 04/16/15 Page 22 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously 

discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish 

by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, 

no reasonable fact finder would have found the applicant guilty of 

the underlying offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).

Under this statutory scheme, a district court presented with a request for an evidentiary 

hearing must first determine whether a factual basis exists in the record to support a petitioner’s 

claims and, if not, whether an evidentiary hearing “might be appropriate.” Baja v. Ducharme, 

187 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 

2005); Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 669-70 (9th Cir. 2005). A federal court must take 

into account the AEDPA standards in deciding whether an evidentiary hearing is appropriate. 

Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474. A petitioner must also “allege[] facts that, if proved, would entitle him 

to relief.” Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000). 

The court concludes that no additional factual supplementation is necessary and that an 

evidentiary hearing is not appropriate with respect to the claims raised in the instant petition. In 

addition, for the reasons described above, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state 

courts’ decision on his claims is an unreasonable determination of the facts under § 2254(d)(2). 

See Schriro, 550 U.S. at 481. Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing is not necessary or appropriate 

in this case.

VII. Conclusion

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for a writ of 

habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” If petitioner files objections, 

he shall also address whether a certificate of appealability should issue and, if so, why and as to 

Case 2:14-cv-01423-JAM-KJN Document 25 Filed 04/16/15 Page 23 of 24
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24

which issues. A certificate of appealability may issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 “only if the 

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(3). Any response to the objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after 

service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: April 15, 2015

/onti1423.157

Case 2:14-cv-01423-JAM-KJN Document 25 Filed 04/16/15 Page 24 of 24