Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_11-cv-00609/USCOURTS-almd-3_11-cv-00609-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

JOHNATHAN RAY REVELLS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:11cv609-WHA

) [WO]

WARDEN DAVID WISE, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

Before the court is a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus relief filed on July

25, 2011, by Petitioner Johnathan Ray Revells (“Revells”), an inmate of the Alabama

Department of Corrections.1

 In this petition, Revells challenges his conviction for capital

murder imposed on him by the Circuit Court of Lee County, Alabama on March 7, 2007.

After reviewing the § 2254 petition, Respondents’ answers, and Petitioner’s responses, the

court concludes that no evidentiary hearing is required, and that the petition is due to be

denied in accordance with the provisions of Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases

in United States District Courts. 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 23, 2004, Revells was indicted for capital murder in violation of ALA.

1

 Although the present petition was stamped “filed” in this court on July 29, 2011, the petition was

signed by Petitioner on July 25, 2011. Pursuant to the prison “mailbox rule,” the court considers July 25,

2011, as the date of filing. (Doc. # 1 at 25). See also Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271-72 (1988);

Washington v. United States, 243 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“Absent evidence to the

contrary in the form of prison logs or other records, [this court] will assume that [the prisoner’s petition] was

delivered to prison authorities the day he signed it . . . .”

Case 3:11-cv-00609-WHA-CSC Document 29 Filed 09/24/14 Page 1 of 26
CODE § 13A-5-40(a)(2) (1975). In an unpublished opinion on direct appeal, the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals set forth the pertinent, undisputed facts surrounding the crime.

On August 25, 2004, Revells, who was under the influence of crack

cocaine, shot and killed his neighbor, Leroy Jones, as Jones sat on his front

porch. Revells went into Jones’s house and took Jones’s wallet, a knife, and

the keys to Jones’s Mercedes. Revells left the scene in the Mercedes.

Before anyone in law enforcement was aware of the events at Jones’s

house, a Lee County sheriff’s deputy saw the Mercedes traveling at a high rate

of speed and gave chase. She lost sight of the car but heard a crash. She came

upon the car, which had been wrecked, but no one was inside or near the car.

Sheriff’s deputies found blood and Jones’s wallet inside the car. Law

enforcement officials traced the Mercedes’s license plate and found the car

was registered to Jones. A deputy was dispatched to Jones’s home, and that

is when Jones’s body was discovered.

A day after Jones was killed, Revell[s] was seen coming out of the

woods at his grandmother’s home. By this time, officials had placed Revells’s

grandmother’s home under surveillance. On September 1, 2004, Donnie

Surrett and Eric McCane, investigators with the Lee County Sheriff’s

Department, saw Revells driving his grandmother’s pickup truck. They

followed the truck and a short, high-speed chase ensued. Revells suddenly

stopped, got out of the truck and ran into the woods. The investigators

stopped, and Surrett ran after him. Revells stopped and raised his hands, but

he refused Surrett’s demand that he lie down on the ground.

Revells and Surrett began struggling with each other. Both Revells and

Surrett received minor injuries in the struggle. Two other law enforcement

officials arrived and helped Surrett place handcuffs on Revells.

Revells was taken back to the street, where he was treated for his

injuries. He was arrested on outstanding warrants for drug offenses. Although

he was a suspect in Jones’s murder, he was not placed under arrest in

connection with the murder. The evidence is undisputed that, at the time of his

arrest, Revells was not advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona,

38 U.S. 436 (1966) because authorities did not intend to interrogate him at that

time.

2

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Revells was taken to the jail in Opelika. The next morning,

investigators questioned Revells. At that time, he confessed to killing Jones.

(Doc. # 11, Ex 4 at 2-3).2

When Revells was arrested, he made statements to Van Jackson (“Jackson”), an

investigator with the Lee County Sheriff’s Department. The trial court conducted a

suppression hearing on the admissibility of the statements Revells provided to Jackson.

During the suppression hearing held in the trial court, Revells challenged Jackson’s failure

to read him his Miranda3

 rights when he was initially arrested on the outstanding drug

warrants. The relevant portion of the suppression hearing transcript provides as follows:

Q. Was he placed under arrest concerning outstanding felony warrants for

possession of drugs?

A. Yes, sir, he was.

Q. When he was brought out of the woods, did you have any contact with

him?

A. I did.

Q. Prior to that, I guess, having any conversation with him, did you advise

him of his constitutional rights?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you have any intention to even interview him at that point?

A. No, sir.

2

 All references to the record use the document numbering system of the court’s electronic docketing

system.

3

 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 

3

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Q. Did he spontaneously make a statement to you?

A. He did.

Q. And what did he say?

A. When he – when they brought him out of the woods, he was in

handcuffs. He had some injuries, so we had asked for some medical

attention to see if we could get some treatment done to some of his

injuries, and while we were standing in the roadway, Mr. Revels was

standing there next to me, and, of course, I am familiar with Mr.

Revels, and he told me that – he said, well, I guess if you had put me in

jail before, all this stuff wouldn’t have happened, was the initiating

comment made to me by Mr. Revels.

Q. Did you reply back to him?

A. Sure. I told him, I said, well, you know, it could, but you just don’t

ever know.

Q. Did he make any comment back to you?

A. Yes. He at that point said that, well – he told me that it really probably

wouldn’t have mattered if he had been in jail or not because he

probably would have made bond. But he told me that the crack – he

said that that stuff really had a hold on him; that – that – he said that he

had tried to make an attempt to contact – that he called the person

Bobby, but he referring to Investigator Yates; Donnie Yates that works

in the investigative division as a Sergeant now. He said that he had

made a couple of attempt (sic) to contact him; that he could have been

some help to us because he knew all the people that was dealing drugs,

and that he had been dealing with them for so long. He also said that

after he couldn’t make contact with Bobby, that – that he just decided

that we were going to go ahead and arrest him, anyway, and at that

point he said that – he thought he was going to spend a long time in jail

because of all this stuff that had happened.

Q. During that whole series of events, what you have related just then, you

had never asked him a question? Correct?

A. No, I did not.

4

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Q. You did respond to what he was spontaneously saying to you?

A. Sure, I did.

Q. After he made that last statement, did you cease any further

conversation unless he volunteered something?

A. Sure. Right around the time that he made the final comment about

spending a long time in jail or being gone for a long time, the medical

personnel, they did put some bandages on him and do some treatment

on some of the scratches and injuries that he had, but he was placed in

the patrol car and transported to the Lee County jail.

(Doc. # 13, Ex. 1 at 58-61).4

Revells was booked into the Lee County Detention Center where he was allowed to

4

 Jackson also documented his encounter with Revells in a “Spontaneous Statement of Defendant” 

memorandum dated September 2, 2004.

On September 1, 2004, at approximately 10:00 PM/CST, Johnathan Ray Revells was

captured in a wooded section of Lee Road 296 Smiths, Lee County, Alabama after a brief 

car and foot pursuit. After being apprehended, Revells was standing on the roadway near

the patrol units and unmarked law enforcement vehicles when he initiated a spontaneous

conversation with Lt. Jackson. While standing there in handcuffs Revells stated, “I guess

you should have put me in jail, Mr. Jackson.” “Maybe all this stuff would not have

happened.” Jackson responded by saying, I guess you might be right but who knows. 

Revells said that he was so strung out on that stuff (crack) that it probably would not have

mattered if he had been arrested that day or not because he would have made bond and

probably done this anyway. Jackson told Revells that he thought that everyone deserves a

chance to change and that this had been the only reason that he did not arrest him

immediately for the drug violation. Revells stated that he knew he had asked for a chance

to help but the crack really had a hold on him. Revells said that he really could have helped

us arrest some of those crack dealers because they trusted him and he had been dealing with

them a long time. Revells further stated that he had tried to contact Bobby, once, (referring

to Investigator Surrett) by calling him on the phone and leaving a message. According to

Revells, after Bobby did not answer the phone that day or call him back, he did not worry

about it anymore because he knew we would arrest him later. Revells said, “this stuff

(crack) has ruined my life.” Then Revells stated, I guess, all that really doesn’t matter

anymore.” “Because I will be gone for a long time now.”

 The conversation ended.

(Doc. # 13, Ex. 2 at 7).

5

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sleep and given food. The next day, Jackson interviewed Revells at the Lee County

Detention Center. Prior to interviewing Revells, Jackson read him the Miranda warnings. 

Immediately after advising him of his rights, Revells inquired about an attorney.5

A. Well, right after I advised him of his rights, I read him his rights, he

said that he – he said, you know, I think I might want to wait for a

lawyer, and he followed up from – when he said that with, would that

take a long time. And I told him, no, that we could – we could try to

get him a court appointed attorney, and I don’t know how long it would

take, but we could do it as soon as possible.

Q. At that point, did you cease questioning him?

A. No. Well, you know, I was waiting for him to decide what he wanted

to do. And at that time –

Q. You just ceased talking to him?

A. Sure. Sure.

Q. And then what happened?

A. And then at that point he asked me – he said – let me make sure I get

this right because he said a couple of things at this point, but he did say

5

 Jackson also completed a “Memorandum of Interview” in which he described the conversation with

Revells.

Lt. Van Jackson advised Jonathan Ray Revells of his Miranda Rights in the Lee County

Sheriff’s Office Investigative interview room. After being advised of his rights, Revells

stated, “I think, I might want to wait for a lawyer.” He asked if that was all right? Lt.

Jackson, told him “sure!” Revells asked if that was going to take a long time. Lt. Jackson

stated that it would take sometime (sic) but it could be done as soon as possible. Revells

stated, “Well, I don’t if I want to wait for a lawyer.” Lt. Jackson told Revells that if he

wanted an attorney present, we could get him one appointed through the courts. Revells

stated, “I have the right to stop talking if I want to.” “And, I don’t have to answer if I don’t

want to.” Lt. Jackson replied by saying, “that’s right.” A few seconds pasted (sic) without

any conversation. Then, Revells waived his Miranda Rights by signing the rights form and

the interview started. He made no other mention of wanting an attorney or remaining silent.

(Doc. # 13, Ex. 2 at 24).

6

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that – he said, well, I am not sure if I want to wait for a lawyer, and I

told him that, you know, if he wanted a lawyer present that, you know,

we could get him a court appointed, and we could have one there to be

with him if he wanted that. And then he asked me, he said, well, so I

don’t have to answer a question if I did not want to? And I told him

sure. And he also said that I could stop talking whenever I want to? 

And I said sure. There was a brief pause, and then he said, well, just

give me that, and he took the form and signed the document, and we

started the interview.

Q. Okay.

(Id. at 73-74).

Revells then gave an oral statement that Jackson reduced to a written statement. (Id.

at 78). After Jackson wrote out Revells’ statement, Revells read the statement and signed

it. (Id. at 79).

That day I really don’t know what happened. I just did it. I know all those

people down there. I lived down there for fifteen years on that road. I haven’t

shot anybody before this. He was just sitting on the porch. I really anit (sic)

a bad person. I just shot him. That night I smoked crack and really did not

have anywhere to go. I was just out there. I broke into a house on the main

road near where Leroy lives. I don’t know whos (sic) house it was. I saw the

shot gun in hallway. I grabbed the shotgun and left walking. I walked up the

road to Leroy’s house with the gun. He was just sitting on the porch. I think

he was watching tv but I am not sure what he was doing. I did not say

anything to him. I was standing out to the side, in front of the house, near the

shed. I just shot one time at him because I only had one shell. I walked up to

the porch and walked in. He had his wallet, keys, and a knife on a wooden

shelf, where the screen stopped, in front of him. I grabbed all those things and

got in his car. The car was a Mecedes (sic). I threw the (sic) in the passenger

seat and took off. I really don’t know where I wrecked the car. I went straight

to my grandmothers house. I have been in those woods the whole time. I left

a couple of time (sic) and walked up to the tracks by the school. That day I

was wearing a pair of blue shorts and I don’t know what color T-shirt. The

shoes I was wearing last night is the same one I had on the day I shot Leroy. 

I have been thinking about this for a week and I don’t know why I done it. I

guess, I will be thinking about it for a long time right now. I don’t remember

7

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everything that happened that day. I don’t even remember where I wrecked

the car. This statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

(Doc. # 13, Ex. 2 at 18-22).

The trial court subsequently denied Revells’ motion to suppress. On March 2, 2007,

Revells entered a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement in which the State agreed to not

seek the death penalty against him. Pursuant to ALA. CODE § 13A-5-42 (1975), the State

presented its evidence to a jury which returned a guilty verdict on March 7, 2007.6

 On May

17, 2007, Revells was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole in

accordance with his plea agreement. 

Revells appealed his conviction and sentence to the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Revells’ arguments that his

statements to officers were admitted in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, supra, because (1)

he was interrogated without being offered the Miranda warnings, and (2) he made an

equivocal request for an attorney that the officers did not clarify after he was advised of his

Miranda rights. The court further determined that Revells had knowingly and intelligently

waived his rights, and that his statements were properly admitted into evidence. The Court

6

 At the time that Revells entered his guilty plea, ALA CODE § 13A-5-42 (1975), provided as follows.

A defendant who is indicted for a capital offense may plead guilty to it, but

the state must in any event prove the defendant’s guilt of the capital offense

beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury. The guilty plea may be considered in

determining whether the state has met that burden of proof. The guilty plea

shall have the effect of waiving all non-jurisdictional defects in the

proceeding resulting in the conviction except the sufficiency of the

evidence. A defendant convicted of a capital offense after pleading guilty

to it shall be sentenced according to the provisions of Section 13A-5-43(d).

8

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of Criminal Appeals then affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The Alabama Supreme

Court denied certiorari, and a certificate of judgment was entered on May 9, 2008. (Doc. #

11, Ex. 9).

Revells then filed a Rule 32 petition for post-conviction relief on June 12, 2008.7

(Doc. # 11, Ex. 11). After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief on the

following claims: 

(1) his counsel was ineffective for failing to secure a mental evaluation; 

(2) his counsel was ineffective for failing to inform Revells of the intent

element of capital murder and failed to argue lack of intent; 

(3) his counsel failed to investigate an intoxication defense; 

(4) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform the defendant of any

lesser included offenses and failed to argue lesser included offenses at trial;

(5) his guilty plea was not knowing or voluntary; and 

(6) that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge evidence or

cross-examine witnesses at trial. 

(Doc. # 1 at 21-22). 

In a motion to reconsider, Revells asserted that his ineffective assistance of counsel

claims should have been evaluated under the standard announced in United States v. Cronic,

7

 The Circuit Court of Lee County docketed Revells’ Rule 32 petition on June 18, 2008. (Doc. # 11,

Ex. 11 at 1). However, Revells signed his petition on June 12, 2008. (Doc. # 11, Ex. 11 at 21). Nevertheless,

the trial court, and this Court treat the date Petitioner signed the Rule 32 petition as the date it was filed. See

Ex parte Allen, 825 So. 2d 271, 272 (Ala. 2002) (“Alabama courts have held that a pro se incarcerated

petitioner/appellant is considered to have ‘filed’ a Rule 32 petition, a notice of appeal, or a petition for a writ

of certiorari when those documents are given to prison officials for mailing.) (citations omitted); see also

Holland v. State, 621 So. 2d 373, 374 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (following Houston, 487 U.S. at 270-72).

9

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466 U.S. 648 (1984) instead of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The trial

court denied Revells’ motion to reconsider, and Revells appealed. (Doc. # 11, Ex. 12 at 73). 

The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of relief. (Doc. # 11, Ex. 14). 

Specifically, the Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that the trial counsel had properly

evaluated and denied relief on Revells’ ineffective assistance of counsel claims under

Strickland. The Court found that Revells’ claims did not rise to the level of “very limited and

egregious failure of representation” necessary to invoke Cronic. (Doc. # 11, Ex. 14 at 7). 

The Court further found that “Revells waived any defect in the guilt phase other than

sufficiency of the evidence.” (Id. at 12). The Court considered Revells’ claims that his trial

counsel was ineffective but determined that Revells had failed to demonstrate prejudice. (Id.

at 12-15). Finally, the Court determined that Revells’ guilty plea was knowing and

voluntary, and that Revells was aware of the terms of his plea agreement. (Id. at 15-17). 

Revells sought rehearing of his claims, which the Court of Criminal Appeals overruled. 

(Doc. # 16, Ex. 16). On August 6, 2010, the Alabama Supreme Court denied Revells’

petition for writ of certiorari and a certificate of judgment issued on September 10, 2010. 

(Doc. # 11, Ex. 18) 

Revells then filed the instant section 2254 petition in which he raises the following

claims for habeas relief:

1. The lower court misapplied the law and reached unreasonable

conclusions of facts and affirmed the circuit court’s denial of [his]

motion to suppress [his] statement at the scene of the arrest, [and his]

confession at the Detention Center.

10

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2. The lower court misapplied the law, reached unreasonable conclusions

of facts and affirmed the circuit court’s denial of [his] Rule 32 petition

based on the inapplicability of United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648

(1984) to a trial where trial counsel entered into a stipulation during

plea negotiations with the State that he would not contest the evidence.

3. The lower court misapplied the law, reached unreasonable conclusions

of facts and affirmed the circuit court’s denial of [his] Rule 32 petition

based on the failure to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984) to a trial where:

A. Trial counsel failed to subject the

prosecution’s case to a meaningful adversarial

process;

B. Trial counsel failed to request lesser

included offense jury instructions;

C. Trial counsel failed to put on any evidence

in defense; [and]

D. Trial counsel failed to move for acquittal. 

4. The lower court misapplied the law, reached unreasonable conclusions

of facts when it held that [he] was fully informed of all aspects of his

guilty plea.

(Doc. # 1 at 17-20). 

Pursuant to the orders of this court, Respondents answered the petition, arguing that

Revells is not entitled to relief because his claims were properly adjudicated on the merits

by the state courts. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 638 (2003) (“A habeas petitioner whose

claim was adjudicated on the merits in state court is not entitled to relief in federal court

unless he meets the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).”); Williams v. Taylor,529 U.S. 362,

402 (2000). They further assert that Revells’ ineffective assistance of counsel claims are

meritless. (Doc. # 11).

II. DISCUSSION

11

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The instant petition for federal habeas relief is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as

amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act [“AEDPA”]. Congress,

through passage of AEDPA, “modified a federal habeas court’s role in reviewing state

prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials’ and to ensure that statecourt convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.

685, 693 (2002). 

A writ of habeas corpus shall be granted only if the prior adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

The Supreme Court has held that a state court decision is “contrary to” federal law “if

the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in our cases, or if it

decides a case differently than we have done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Cone, 535 U.S. at 694 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-06). Under the “unreasonable

application” standard, this court may grant a writ only if the state court identified the correct

governing federal legal principle but applied that principle to the facts of a petitioner’s case

in an objectively unreasonable way. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 411-13 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,

delivering the opinion of the Court with respect to Part II). “Objectively unreasonable”

means something more than an “erroneous” or “incorrect” application of clearly established

12

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law, and a reviewing federal court may not substitute its judgment for the state court’s even

if the federal court, in its own independent judgment, disagrees with the state court’s

decision. See id. at 411. See also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 76 (2003). The Court

of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held, “Clearly established federal law is not the law

of the lower federal courts, including this Court. Instead, in the habeas context, clearly

established federal law ‘refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme

Court’s] decisions as of the time of the relevant state court decision.’” Putman v. Head, 268

F.3d 1223, 1241 (11th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original, quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 412). 

The reviewing court “must determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have

supported[] the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded

jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a

prior decision of this Court.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, ___, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786

(2011). “In order to merit AEDPA deference the state court need not expressly identify

Supreme Court precedent, nor make a perfect statement of the applicable rule of law, nor

provide a detailed opinion covering each aspect of the petitioner’s argument.” Smith v. Sec’y,

Dep’t. of Corr., 572 F.3d 1327, 1333 (11th Cir. 2009). “All that is required under §

2254(d)(1) [for deference to the decision of the state court] is an adjudication on the merits,

not a full state court opinion.” Parker v. Sec’y, Dep’t. of Corr., 331 F.3d 764, 776 (11th Cir.

2003). Habeas relief is granted sparingly, reserved for “‘extreme malfunctions in the state

criminal justice systems’” and “not as a means of error correction.” Greene v. Fisher, ___

U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 38, 43 (2011) (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at

13

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786). “The usual ‘presumption that state courts know and follow the law’ is even stronger

in the AEDPA context because § 2254(d)’s ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating statecourt rulings . . . demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’” Allen

v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t. of Corr., 611 F.3d 740, 748 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Woodford v.

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (internal citation omitted)). As the Supreme Court has

reminded courts, “[i]t bears repeating that even a strong case for relief does not mean the

state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable. . . . [Section 2254(d)] preserves authority

to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that

the state court’s decision conflicts with this Court’s precedents. It goes no farther.” 

Harrington, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 786. 

Federal habeas courts are likewise directed to determine whether the state court based

its findings on “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A state court’s determinations of

fact shall be “presumed to be correct,” and the habeas petitioner “shall have the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1). Even when the state court addresses a question of law, this court is not

authorized “to evaluate [a petitioner’s] claim de novo rather than through the lens of §

2254(d).” Price, 538 U.S. at 639. The Supreme Court admonishes that such de novo

evaluation “exceeds the limits imposed on federal habeas review by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). .

. .” Id. at 636. Within this disciplined framework, the court addresses Revells’ claims. 

A. Miranda Claims - Suppression of Statements

14

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Revells argues that the trial court erred by failing to suppress his statement given at

the time of his arrest because he was not advised of his Miranda rights immediately.8

 He

also argues that because he made an equivocal request for an attorney that the officers did

not clarify when he was advised of his Miranda rights, the statement he gave at the Lee

County Detention Center should have been suppressed. Revells raised both of these claims

and supporting arguments on direct appeal. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

rejected Revells’ Miranda claims. 

Here the evidence shows that Revells’ statement to Jackson as the two

were standing at the roadside was made spontaneously. Revells initiated the

conversation with Jackson. Jackson did not ask Revells any questions, and his

replies to Revells’ statement were neutral and did not invite further comment

from Revells. Nonetheless, Revells continued to speak to Jackson. His

statements to Jackson at that time were voluntary and freely given, without any

type of compelling influences.

Because the statements Revells made to Jackson before he was advised

of his rights were unsolicited and spontaneous, they do not fall within the

scope of Miranda. Accordingly, the trial court properly allowed the statements

to be admitted into evidence.

(Doc. # 11, Ex. 4 at 6).

In addition, the Court held that Revells’ questions regarding an attorney after he was

8

 According to Revells, the mere fact that he was under arrest demonstrates that any conversation

with Jackson was the functional equivalent of a custodial interrogation. He is simply wrong. “Determining

whether an individual’s freedom of movement was curtailed, however, is simply the first step in the analysis,

not the last.” Howes v. Fields, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 1191 (2012). Revells does not argue, and

the facts do not suggest, that after his arrest he was subjected to any coercive tactics to induce him to confess. 

See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 299 (1980) (Not “all statements obtained by the police after a person

has been taken into custody are to be considered the product of interrogation.”); United States v. Young, 377

Fed. Appx. 965, 969 (11th Cir. 2010) (being in custody is not sufficient to establish statements were the result

the “functional equivalent of interrogation” rather than spontaneous statements.) 

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read his Miranda rights at the Lee County Detention Center did not require that his statement

be suppressed. (Id. at 6) After detailing the evidence, the Court found that Revells’ waiver

of his Miranda rights was knowing and voluntary. 

This case is distinguishable from McDevitt and Collins. The

conversation between Jackson and Revells after Revells was advised of his

rights does not indicate that Revells did not understand his rights or create an

ambiguity, as was the case in McDevitt. Indeed, Revells’s questions and

comments demonstrate that he knew he could have a lawyer present and that

he could stop answering questions whenever he wished. After taking a

moment to consider his rights, Revells chose to waive his rights and proceed

with the interrogation. Unlike the situation in Collins, where the interrogating

officer failed to respond when the suspect asked how long she would have to

wait until she could get a lawyer, the interrogating officer in this case, Jackson,

answered Revells’s question regarding how long it would take for him to get

a lawyer and then reiterated to Revells that the court would appoint a lawyer

for him. Revells’ response was that he was not sure he wanted to wait for a

lawyer.

Revells did not manifest confusion or misunderstanding. Jackson

answered his question about how long it would take to get a lawyer, then

Revells elected to proceed without a lawyer. The record demonstrates that

there was no misunderstanding or ambiguity for Jackson to clarify, thus, he

was not required to question Revells to ensure that he understood his rights.

Moreover, as Revells’s acknowledged in his brief, the State presented

testimony from Dr. Glen King, a psychologist who evaluated Revells and

determined that he was competent to waive his rights.

There was sufficient evidence presented during the suppression hearing

and at trial to support the trial court’s decision that Revells’s waived his rights

knowingly and intelligently. That decision is not palpably contrary to the great

weight of the evidence. Therefore, the trial court properly admitted evidence

of Revells’s confession to Jackson at the Lee County jail.

(Id. at 12-13).

Revells’ claims about his statements were decided adversely to him by the state court. 

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This court has undertaken a thorough review of the relevant transcripts, the opinion issued

by the state court and controlling federal law. After review, the court finds that the state

court did not decide Revells’ claims “differently than [the Supreme] Court has [in a case

based] on a set of materially indistinguishable facts” nor did the state courts apply a rule that

contradicts governing federal law. Williams, 362 U.S. at 412. Consequently, rejection of

these claims by the state court was not contrary to actual Supreme Court decisions or

violative of clearly established federal law. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458-

462 (1994) (A suspect who wishes to invoke his right to remain silent must do so

“unambiguously” and “unequivocal[ly]” . . . “[and i]f the suspect’s statement is not an

unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop

questioning him”). See also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) (applying same

standard to requests to remain silent). Moreover, under the circumstances of this case, the

court finds that the decision of the state court was objectively reasonable and likewise

constituted a reasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence before the court. 

Thus, Revells is not entitled to relief on his Miranda claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims - Strickland Standard

The clearly established federal law addressing issues of ineffective assistance of

counsel is set forth in Strickland v. Washington, supra. Under Strickland, a petitioner must

satisfy the requirements of a two-pronged test to prevail on his claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel. First, the petitioner must establish that the performance of his

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attorneys “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland 466 U.S. at 688. 

“The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under

prevailing professional norms.” Id; Hinton v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 134 S.Ct. 1081,

1088 (2014) (same). Once this threshold test is met, the petitioner must then show that the

deficient performance of his counsel prejudiced his defense. Id. at 687. To establish

prejudice, the petitioner is required to show that there is “a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Id. at 694. “[T]he two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas

based on ineffective assistance of counsel.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). 

Moreover, there is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable and

adequate and great deference is shown to choices dictated by reasonable trial strategy. 

Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 386 (11th Cir. 1994). 

Revells argues that his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance

during the trial after his guilty plea. Specifically, Revells contends his counsel was

ineffective for failing to (1) challenge the prosecution’s case; (2) request lesser included

offenses jury instructions; (3) offer any evidence in defense; and (4) moving for a judgment

of acquittal. (Doc. # 1 at 20). 

Revells raised these claims and supporting arguments in his Rule 32 petition. After

an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied his petition.9

 

9

 Revells’ claims in his Rule 32 petition, on appeal and in this court all vary slightly but the genesis

of these claims stem from his guilty plea and his agreement to not challenge the State’s evidence during the

trial mandated by ALA CODE § 13A-5-42 (1975). Because his claims change after each adverse decision, the

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Second, the defendant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to inform the defendant regarding the intent element of capital murder,

and by failing to argue lack of intent at trial. However, there was no evidence

that the defendant did not intend to kill the victim, nor was there evidence

presented that the defendant did not intend to take the victim’s possessions. 

Therefore, this claim is without merit. Moreover, it does not meet the (sic)

either prong of the Strickland v. Washington test for ineffective assistance of

counsel. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Counsel’s failure to argue intent was based on

the facts. The decision not to argue intent was not prejudicial to the defense.

Third, the defendant claims trial counsel failed to investigate or argue

any possible intoxication defense. An intoxication instruction is only

warranted when there is sufficient evidence in the record for a jury to entertain

reasonable doubt as to the element of intent. Coon v. State, 494 So.2d 184

(Ala. Crim. App. 1986). However, Dr. King testified that he did not believe

the defendant was “incapable of understanding his behaviors or the

wrongfulness of his acts” at the time of the offense. Pretrial Hearing p. 103. 

The defendant never made any mention at the time of his plea or at trial of

failing to understand his actions due to intoxication. The indictment in this

case was read to the defendant, including the Grand Jury’s charge that the

defendant “intentionally” caused the death of the victim. The defendant

clearly and unequivocally stated that he was guilty of the offense, and never

made any mention of any impairment of his ability to tell right from wrong. 

Therefore, counsel’s decision not to pursue an intoxication defense would not

meet the second prong of Strickland.

Fourth, the defendant claims that trial counsel was ineffective in failing

to inform the defendant regarding lesser included offenses and for failing to

request them at trial. Neither felony murder nor manslaughter would be

appropriate charges given the facts of this case. Counsel’s decision to urge the

defendant to take a plea deal rather than risking a death sentence does not meet

the first prong of the Strickland test. Counsel’s performance was not deficient. 

Moreover, the decision to take the plea deal and not try every facet of the case

was the defendant’s, and his attorneys were surprised at the decision.

* * * 

Sixth, the defendant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to contest evidence and cross-examine witnesses. However, there is no claim

that the evidence at trial was, in fact, insufficient. The purpose of the trial

court details both the trial court’s determination and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals decision.

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phase of a capital murder guilty plea is for the State to show that it has

sufficient evidence. The Court finds that the evidence presented was sufficient

to prove the defendant guilty of capital murder. Even if counsel had made

more extensive objections and had more strenuously cross-examined

witnesses, the State would still have been able to show sufficient evidence that

the defendant committed capital murder. The defendant’s own statement, the

admissibility of which was addressed at trial and on appeal, would likely have

been sufficient in and of itself. All alleged deficiencies in trial counsel’s

performance would not meet the second prong of a Strickland analysis.

(Doc. # 1 at 21-22; Doc. # 11, Ex. 12 at 51-52).

On appeal from the denial of the Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals determined that because Revells could not demonstrate prejudice as required by

Strickland, he was entitled to no relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

The United States Supreme Court established the “appropriate test for

prejudice” as requiring “the defendant [to] show that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068.

Here, if trial counsel had actively objected and challenged the State’s

evidence, he would have undermined and breached the terms of the plea

agreement, as long as the State presented the evidence according to the version

that the parties had agreed upon. “In light of the overwhelming evidence

presented against [Revells], counsel’s strategy was not unreasonable.” Lee v.

State, [Ms. CR-07-0054, October 9, 2009], ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Crim.

App. 2009).

Thus, because counsel’s inactivity was a result of the terms of the guilty

plea, it was not ineffectiveness. . . . 

Revells has failed to show prejudice as a result of his counsels’s (sic)

performance. The forensic psychologist could not testify concerning Revells’s

intoxication at the time of the offense. Nor was there any evidence that his

verbal I.Q. of 70 would have established an affirmative defense; in fact, the

expert’s evaluation was to the contrary. Moreover, Revells’s claims

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concerning his counsels (sic) lack of objections and cross-examination during

the guilt phase do not establish prejudice as this was required pursuant to the

plea agreement. Had the prosecutor attempted to introduce evidence that was

not known to the defense or incorrect to what was known to the defense, trial

counsel testified that he would have objected. Additionally, although Revells

contended that his counsel should not have informed the jury of the terms of

the plea agreement, this was necessary to explain counsel’s lack of active

participation. See Smith v. State, 838 S. 2d 413, 460 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002),

cert. denied, Smith v. Alabama, 537 U.S. 109, 123 S.Ct. 695, 154 L.Ed. 2d 635

(2002) (“However, in the present case, the terms of [the witness’s] plea

agreement was before the jury. Defense counsel was allowed to cross-examine

the witness extensively about the agreement and made the jury ‘fully aware of

the possible influences that the plea agreement could have had on [the

witness’s] testimony. The jury was free to reject [the witness’s] testimony. It

chose not to do so.” Wilson v. State, 690 So. 2d 449, 462 (Ala. Crim. App.

1995). See also Allen v. State, 611 So. 2d 1152 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).”).

The burden to establish ineffectiveness of counsel “is particularly

stringent when a defendant enters a guilty plea.” Key v. State, 891 So. 2d 353,

374 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002), affirmed Ex parte Key, 891 So. 2d 384 (Ala.

2004), cert. denied, Key v. Alabama, 543 U.S. 1005, 125 S.Ct. 608, 160 L.Ed.

2d 466 (2004). Revells has not met this burden.

(Doc. # 11, Ex. 14 at 13-15),

The state courts’ rulings were on the merits and are entitled to deference. Revells has

failed to show the Alabama state court decisions on his ineffective assistance claims were

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as

determined by the United States Supreme Court, and he is not entitled to habeas relief on

these claims. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

C. Cronic Standard of Review

Revells next argues that the state courts erroneously failed to apply the standard

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articulated in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984),10 to his claim that he was

effectively deprived of counsel when his attorney entered into a stipulation, as part of his plea

agreement, to not object to any evidence presented during the trial. (Doc. # 1 at 19). Revells 

raised this claim and supporting arguments in his motion to reconsider the denial of his

Rule 32 petition. The trial court summarily denied the motion. On appeal from the denial

of the Rule 32 petition, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals determined that Revells’

reliance on Cronic, supra, was misplaced.

Revells’s claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to provide

a meaningful adversarial proceeding by objecting and cross-examining

witnesses. However, Revells’s use of the Cronic standard is misplaced as his

counsel had not failed to function as his advocate. Florida v. Nixon, supra. He

was not constructively denied the assistance of counsel, because his counsel

pursued defenses, attempted to negotiate plea bargains for lesser offenses, and

was prepared to object or challenge evidence if the State had introduced

evidence other than what had been revealed through discovery. Trial counsel

did not fail to challenge the prosecution.

As trial counsel’s performance was not presumptively prejudicial, the

challenge to Revells’s counsel’s effectiveness is due to be evaluated pursuant

to Strickland v. Washington, supra. Because presumed prejudice under Cronic

is “reserved to very limited situations, . . . [Revells] must show actual

10 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) establishes three exceptions to Strickland’s prejudice

requirement. Under the first exception, prejudice may be presumed where counsel is either entirely absent

from, or was prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the trial. 466 U.S. at 659 n. 25

(explaining that an accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of trial “when counsel was either totally

absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding”) (emphasis added). 

Cronic’s second exception applies only where “counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to

meaningful adversarial testing.” 466 U.S. at 659 (emphasis added). This exception is reserved for situations

in which counsel has “entirely failed to function as the client's advocate” by failing to meaningfully oppose

the prosecution’s case. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 179, 189 (2004) (emphasis added). To dispense with

a showing of actual prejudice, counsel’s failure to test the prosecution’s case “must be complete.” Bell v.

Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 697 (2002) (emphasis added). The third Cronic exception applies when “counsel is

called upon to render assistance under circumstances where competent counsel very likely could not.” Cone,

535 U.S. at 696.

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prejudice.” Davie v. State, 381 S.C. 601, 613, 675 S.E. 2d 416, 422 (2009). 

See also Hays v. State, 518 So. 2d 749, 759 (Ala. Crim. App. 19850 (sic),

affirmed in part, reversed and remanded on other grounds, Ex parte Hayes, 518

[S]o. 2d 768 (Ala. 1986). (“We know of no other case wherein the

presumption-of-prejudice analysis has been applied to facts similar to those

herein. We are not predilective toward expanding the ‘presumption-ofprejudice’ test. It was incumbent upon the appellant to prove actual prejudice

as per the requirements of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct.

2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).”).

(Doc. # 11, Ex. 14 at 12-13).

The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the appropriate standard under which to

evaluate Revells’ claims was Strickland, and not Cronic. The state appellate court’s ruling

was on the merits and is entitled to deference. This court has undertaken a thorough review

of the relevant transcripts, the opinion issued by the state court and controlling federal law. 

After review, it is clear that the state court did not decide this claim “differently than [the

Supreme] Court has [in a case based] on a set of materially indistinguishable facts” nor did

the state courts apply a rule that contradicts governing federal law. Williams, 362 U.S. at

412. Consequently, rejection of this claim by the state court was not contrary to actual

Supreme Court decisions or violative of clearly established federal law. Moreover, under the

circumstances of this case, the decision of the state courts was objectively reasonable and

likewise constituted a reasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence before

the courts. Consequently, this Court cannot conclude that the state court’s decision was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as

determined by the United States Supreme Court, and Revells is not entitled to relief on this

claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

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D. Guilty Plea

Finally, Revells argues that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered

because he “was not made aware of the consequences with a full understanding that counsel

Azar was not going to provide assistance at trial.” (Doc. # 1 at 20). Revells raised the claim

that his guilty plea was not knowing or voluntary in his Rule 32 petition. The trial court

determined that this claim was meritless.

. . . the defendant argues that his plea was not knowing or voluntary. This

claim is simply without merit. The Court undertook a lengthy colloquy with

the defendant to make sure that he was apprised of his rights, that he was

giving them up voluntarily, and that he understood the charges against him. 

The defendant assured the Court multiple times that he understood his rights,

that he was voluntarily giving them up, and that he was guilty of capital

murder as charged in the indictment.

(Doc. # 1 at 22; Doc. # 11, Ex. 12 at 52). 

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court. 

Revells contends that the circuit court improperly accepted his guilty

plea, because it was unknowing and involuntary due to his verbal IQ of 70,

because he was not informed of the terms of the plea bargain, and because the

requisites of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, were not met.

The record contains the guilty plea colloquy in which Revells

acknowledged that he had read and understood his rights in entering his plea. 

The trial court ascertained by asking Revells that he had signed the Ireland11

form and had been informed of the nature of the charges, the penalties, his

rights, and the consequences of pleading guilty as contained in the form. Trial

counsel affirmed that he had read and explained these rights to Revells. The

trial court ascertained that Revells understood the terms of his plea bargain,

including that the charges other than capital murder would be nolle prossed. 

(Guilty plea R. 218). He also understood that he was withdrawing his not

11 Ireland v. State., 47 Ala. App. 65, 250 So. 2d 602 (1971).

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guilty by reason of mental disease plea. The trial court read the charges in the

indictment and ascertained that Revells understood them, as well as the

possible sentences. The trial court affirmed that the facts proved the

commission of the capital offense and that Revells understood the rights that

he was waiving. The trial court then ascertained that Revells’s plea had not

been induced through promises or threats. Revells then reserved one issue for

appeal and the circuit court adjudged him guilty.

***

The record establishes that the requisites of Boykin v. Alabama, supra,

and Rule 14.4, Ala. R. Crim. P. were met.

Moreover, there is no indication in the record that Revells’s verbal I.Q.

affected his understanding of his guilty plea. The experts determined that

Revells was competent to stand trial; therefore, he was found capable of

“understanding . . . court procedure; the capacity to disclose pertinent facts to

defense counsel; the quality of relating to defense counsel; an appraisal of

available defenses; the planning of legal strategy, including a possible guilty

plea.” M.D. v. State, 701 So. 2d 58, 64 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997).

As to Revells’s claim that his counsel did not inform him of the terms

of the plea agreement, Revells acknowledges, and the record reveals, that his

counsel informed the jury of these terms at the guilt phase and Revells made

no comment or objection. Although trial counsel stated that he could not recall

whether he told Revells that the agreement was to refrain from objecting to and

challenging the State’s evidence was part of the agreement, Revells was

clearly aware of these terms immediately prior to the guilt phase when counsel

so informed the jury.

(Doc. # 11, Ex. 14 at 15-17) (footnote in original)

Revells’ claim was decided adversely to him by the state courts. A thorough review

of the relevant transcripts, state court opinions and controlling federal law demonstrate that

these decisions were not contrary to clearly established federal law, were objectively

reasonable and also represented a reasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented. Revells is therefore entitled to no relief from this court on his claims

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challenging his guilty plea. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

III. CONCLUSION 

In light of the foregoing, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the petition for

habeas corpus relief filed by Johnathan Ray Revells be and is hereby DENIED and 

DISMISSED with prejudice.

A separate judgement will enter.

Done this 24th day of September, 2014.

/s/ W. Harold Albritton 

W. HAROLD ALBRITTON

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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