Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00921/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00921-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United Food and Commercial Workers

Local 99 et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

-andArizona Education Association, et al.,

Plaintiff-Intervenors

vs.

Jan Brewer, in her capacity as Governor of

the State of Arizona, et al, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-11-921-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before this Court are the following motions: (1) a Motion to Dismiss filed by

Defendant Maricopa County Sheriff Joseph Arpaio (Doc. 40); (2) a Motion to Dismiss filed

by Defendants the State of Arizona, Secretary of State Ken Bennett, Governor Janice K.

Brewer, Attorney General Thomas Horne, and Director of the Department of Labor Randall

Maruca, (“State Defendants”) (Doc. 50); and (3) a Motion to Dismiss Intervenor’s Complaint

filed by State Defendants, which Defendant Arpaio joins. (Doc. 71). For the reasons

discussed below, the motions are granted in part and denied in part.

/ / /

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BACKGROUND

In April 2011, the Arizona legislature passed Senate Bill 1363, 2011 Arizona Session

Laws, Chapter 153, which amended Sections 12-1809, 12-1810, 23-352, 23-1321, 23-1322,

23-1323 of the Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) and amended Title 23, Chapter 8, Article

2 of those statutes by adding sections 23-1325, 23-1326, 23-1327, 23-1328 and 23-1329.

Governor Janice K. Brewer signed the bill into law on April 18, 2011.

The law expands the definition of “harassment” under Arizona law to include

“unlawful picketing, trespassory assembly, unlawful mass assembly, concerted interference

with lawful exercise of business activity and engaging in a secondary boycott.” A.R.S. § 12-

1810®. The law expands the definition of “defamation” to include making a false statement

about an employer while “knowingly, recklessly, or negligently disregarding the falsity of

the statement.” A.R.S. § 23-1325(A)–(C). Further, the law makes labor unions liable for the

defamatory acts of their members. Id. § 23-1325(A)–(C).

The law also provides that employers may put their place of business on a “no trespass

public notice list” maintained by the Secretary of State through the county recorders. A.R.S.

§ 23-1326(A). Should an employer whose premises are on the list ask law enforcement to

remove “any labor organization or individual or groups of individuals acting on employees’

behalf that are engaged in unlawful picketing, trespassory assembly or mass picketing,” the

law enforcement officer can order the group to leave the property and “may not require the

employer to provide any further documentation to establish the employer’s property rights.”

Id. § 23-1326(F).

The law defines “trespassory assembly” by referencing Arizona’s criminal trespass

statutes. A.R.S. § 23-1321(5); A.R.S. § 13-1502–04 (2010). In addition, it defines “unlawful

picketing” as picketing where the purpose is “to coerce or induce an employer or selfemployed person to join or contribute to a labor organization.”A.R.S. § 23-1322. Finally, it

defines “unlawful assembly” as, among other things, an assembly conducted “other than in

a reasonable and peaceful manner.” A.R.S. § 23-1327.

In April of, 2011, the legislature passed Senate Bill 1365, the “Protect Arizona

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Employees’ Paychecks from Politics Act,” 2011 Arizona Session Laws, Chapter 251, which

Governor Janice K. Brewer signed into law on April 26, 2011. The law amended Title 23,

Chapter 2, Article 7 of the A.R.S. by adding section 23-361.02. This Court previously

described the provisions of this law and, on application of Plaintiff-Intervenors, enjoined

Defendant Horne from implementing it in its order of September 23, 2011. (Doc. 99).

Defendant Arpaio and the State Defendants have each filed motions to dismiss

Plaintiffs’ complaint. (Docs. 40, 50). State Defendants have also moved to dismiss PlaintiffIntervenors’ complaint, and Defendant Arpaio has joined their motion. (Doc. 71). Defendants

argue that Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear

the claim, that Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenors lack standing, and that the claims are not

ripe for adjudication. (Docs. 40, 50, 71). Further, the State Defendants argue that the

Eleventh Amendment affords them immunity from this suit. (Docs. 50, 71).

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

“The party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of proving all jurisdictional facts.”

Indus. Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing McNutt v.

Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)). In effect, the court presumes lack

of jurisdiction until the plaintiff proves otherwise. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.

of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction may

be raised at any time by the parties or the court. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).

The Constitution grants the federal courts the power to hear only “Cases” and

“Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III sec. 2. Therefore, to have standing under Article III,

plaintiffs must satisfy three elements. First, “the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in

fact” that is not “conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

560 (1992) (internal quotations omitted). Next, the injury must be “fairly traceable to the

challenged action of the defendant.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Finally, “it must be

likely . . . that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. (internal quotations

omitted).

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For a claim to be justiciable, a plaintiff must not only meet the case or controversy

requirements of Article III, but the claim must also be ripe for adjudication. Ripeness has

“both a constitutional and a prudential component.” Potman v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d

898, 902 (9th Cir. 1993). The “constitutional component of ripeness is synonymous with the

injury-in-fact prong of the standing inquiry.” California Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman,

328 F.3d 1088, 1094 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). In order to meet the prudential components of

ripeness, courts must evaluate “the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship

to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S.

136, 149 (1967), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).

States are generally immune from suits filed by individuals in federal court. U.S.

Const. amend. XI. State officials, however, can be sued in their official capacity for

injunctive relief to prevent them from implementing state laws that violate the Constitution.

See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, “relief that

serves directly to bring an end to a present violation of federal law is not barred by the

Eleventh Amendment even though accompanied by a substantial ancillary effect on the state

treasury.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986). Nevertheless, for a state officer to

be subject to suit in her official capacity, “such officer must have some connection with the

enforcement of the act.” Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157. This connection must be “fairly

direct.” Long v. Van de Kamp, 961, F.2d 151, 152 (1992). For example, a state attorney

general cannot be sued under Ex Parte Young when the statute complained of empowers

local law enforcement agencies, even if those agencies operate under the supervision of the

state attorney general. Id.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

Plaintiffs allege that SB 1363 violates the First Amendment and that SB 1365 is preempted by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. (Doc. 8). Plaintiff-Intervenors

allege that SB 1365 violates the First Amendment. (Doc. 77). Federal courts have subjectmatter jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of

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1

 Although it is true that in their Amended Complaint Plaintiffs improperly state that

jurisdiction is proper under 29 U.S.C. § 1332 (a section of the U.S. Code that does not exist),

they properly cite 28 U.S.C. § 1331 in their Response. (Docs. 8, 60). Plaintiff-Intervenors

properly cite to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (Doc. 52).

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the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.1

 The Court has jurisdiction to hear claims challenging

a state law on constitutional grounds. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681–82 (1946).

B. Standing and Ripeness

Defendants further allege that the Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenors lack standing,

and that the claims represent pre-enforcement challenges that are not justiciable because they

are not yet ripe. (Docs. 40, 50, 71).

1. Standing

To suffer an injury in fact, it is not adequate that a party merely speculate that he will

be the subject of an enforcement action to which he will have a constitutional defense.

Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The

Ninth Circuit has recognized that “neither the mere existence of a proscriptive statute nor a

generalized threat of prosecution satisfies the ‘case or controversy’ requirement.” Id. at 1139.

However, “[c]onstitutional challenges based on the First Amendment present unique standing

considerations.” Arizona Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Bayless, 320 F.3d 1002,

1006 (9th Cir. 2003). Because parties are likely to restrict their own speech or assembly

practices in reasonable fear that they may otherwise be found to have violated the law, “when

the threatened enforcement effort implicates First Amendment rights, the inquiry tilts

dramatically toward a finding of standing.” LSO, Ltd., v. Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146, 1155 (2000).

Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenors satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement necessary for

Article III standing. Both allege that the two laws restrict freedom of assembly and speech

in violation of the First Amendment, and both plausibly state that they will curtail their

protected speech and assembly activities in order to comply with the laws. (Docs. 60, 86).

The Court has already enjoined SB 1365 as a statute that, on its face, discriminates according

to viewpoint in violation of the First Amendment. (Doc. 99). Plaintiffs have standing to

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continue to challenge a law that facially discriminates against their speech activity. LSO, 205

F.3d at 1154–55. When parties seek to challenge laws that allegedly criminalize protected

behavior, as Plaintiffs do with respect to SB 1363, the Supreme Court has written that they

need not “risk prosecution to test their rights.” Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486

(1965). Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenors have adequately alleged that they suffer an injury

in fact caused by SB 1363 and SB 1365.

Defendants do not claim that the alleged injuries are not fairly traceable to the

challenged laws, or that the injuries would not be redressed were the laws struck down.

(Docs. 40, 50, 71). Thus, Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenors have demonstrated that their

claim is fairly traceable to the law, and that their injury would be redressed were their suit

successful.

2. Ripeness

Since Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenors satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for

standing, their claim meets the constitutional prong of the ripeness test. California Pro-Life

Council, 328 F.3d at 1094 n.2. To meet prudential standing requirements, Plaintiffs must

demonstrate the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of

withholding adjudication. Abbot Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 149. Plaintiffs mount a number

of purely legal claims, including claims that SB 1363 is impermissibly vague on its face and

impermissibly restricts First Amendment assembly rights. (Doc. 8). The attorney general has

already been enjoined from enforcing SB 1365 on purely legal grounds, namely that it

discriminates according to viewpoint. (Doc. 99). Likewise, the core issues of Plaintiffs’ and

Plaintiff-Intervenors’ complaints are purely legal in nature. Plaintiffs and PlaintiffIntervenors allege that the laws deprive them of their basic First Amendment rights.

Dismissing the case on ripeness grounds would cause them to continue to suffer this alleged

loss, which the Supreme Court has held “unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”

Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). Plaintiffs’ and Plaintiff-Intervenors’ claims are

ripe for review.

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C. Eleventh Amendment

The fact that a governor is responsible for implementing state law does not subject her

to liability in an Ex Parte Young suit unless the governor has some direct responsibility for

implementing the law being challenged. See National Audubon Society, Inc. v. Davis, 307

F.3d 835, 847 (9th Cir. 2002) (director of state fish and game department, not governor, is

the proper subject of Ex Parte Young suit challenging state law restricting use of certain

animal traps). The Governor of the State of Arizona is responsible for the operations of the

Department of Public Safety, which is responsible for enforcing the criminal provisions of

SB 1363. A.R.S. § 41-1711 (2011). However, such supervision does not constitute a “fairly

direct” relationship subjecting the governor to liability under Ex Parte Young. See, e.g.,

NAACP v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 714 F.2d 946, 953 (9th Cir. 1983) (school superintendent,

not governor, is proper subject of suit alleging racial discrimination in schools);

Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakama Indian Nation v. Locke, 176 F.3d 467, 469 (9th Cir.

1999) (governor not the proper subject of a suit alleging state was improperly running lottery

on tribal lands in violation of federal law). Governor Brewer has mere supervisory authority

over departments that implement SB 1363 and SB 1365, and is therefore not the proper

subject of an Ex Parte Young suit challenging them. 

Both laws specify that the Attorney General may levy fines and impose penalties for

their violation; his relation to the law’s enforcement is therefore “fairly direct.” A.R.S. § 23-

361.02(D); A.R.S. § 23-1324(C). Moreover, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that the

laws are unconstitutional, and Arizona’s Declaratory Judgments Act requires that they serve

the Attorney General. A.R.S. § 12-1841(C) (2003). “Arizona courts have uniformly held that

the Arizona Attorney General is an appropriate party to such cases.” Yes on Prop 200 v.

Napolitano, 215 Ariz. 458, 469, 160 P.3d 1216, 1227 (App. 2007). The Eleventh Amendment

does not prevent the Attorney General from being sued in his official capacity in a suit

seeking to prevent him from enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional state law. See Kentucky

v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985).

Secretary of State Bennett is required, under SB 1363, to maintain the “no trespass

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2

 Defendant Joe Arpaio made no argument that a claim against him was barred by the

Eleventh Amendment.

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public notice list” through the county recorders. A.R.S. § 23-1326(A). This lists forms the

foundation of enforcement actions against those engaged in unlawful picketing, trespassory

assembly, or mass picketing. Id. § 23-1326(F). As such, Secretary Bennet’s connection to

enforcing SB 1363 is “fairly direct.” Long v. Van de Kamp 961, F.2d 151, 152 (1992). The

statutes assign no direct enforcement role to the Department of Labor or to DOL Director

Randall Maruca. Plaintiffs allege that as the Director of DOL, Maruca is “in charge of

processing workers’ wage claims when they have wages deducted in violation of law.” (Doc.

60). Although Director Maruca may be responsible for resolving disputes that will arise if

the SB 1363 and SB 1365 go into effect, he is not responsible for direct enforcement of the

measures. His connection to the laws, therefore, is not “fairly direct” and he is dismissed as

a party to this case. Likewise, the State of Arizona, named by Plaintiffs, is not a proper party

to this suit, and is also dismissed as a party. See U.S. Const. amend XI.2

Periodically in their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs reference state law in addition to

federal law. For example, they claim that SB 1365 “is invalid under the federal and state

constitutional guarantees of the rights of speech, association, and petitioning,” and that

provisions of SB 1363 “violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution

and violate free speech and due process rights under the Arizona Constitution.” (Doc. 8, ¶¶

59, 90). The Supreme Court has held that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from

ruling on whether state statutes violate state constitutions, stating that “it is difficult to think

of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials

on how to conform their conduct to state law.” Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). None of Plaintiffs’ claims arise solely under state law, so

none of them need to be dismissed. However, only the federal component of Plaintiffs’

claims will be considered.

CONCLUSION

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Because Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenors allege that SB 1363 and SB 1365 are

unconstitutional, subject-matter jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In addition,

because they allege that they will refrain from engaging in protected speech and assembly

in order to comply with the unconstitutional law, they have standing and their claim is ripe

for adjudication. Because the Attorney General of the State of Arizona and the Secretary of

State of Arizona each have a fairly direct relationship to implementing the law, they are not

provided immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Governor Brewer, the State of Arizona,

and Randall Maruca, however are immune from this suit pursuant to the Eleventh

Amendment. Claims that the law is invalid under the Arizona constitution will not be

considered.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Sheriff Joseph Arpaio’s Motion

to Dismiss (Doc. 40) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 50)

is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss PlaintiffIntervenor’s Complaint (Doc. 71) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Parties State of Arizona, Governor Janice K. Brewer, and Director of the Department

of Labor Randall Maruca are hereby dismissed from this suit.

Parties Attorney General Thomas Horne, Secretary of State Ken Bennett, and

Maricopa County Sheriff Joseph Arpaio remain Defendants to this suit.

DATED this 11th day of October, 2011.

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