Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01165/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01165-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:12111 Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment

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17-CV-1165-CAB-AGS

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MARK GEORGE,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAN DIEGO CITY EMPLOYEES' 

RETIREMENT SYSTEM,

Defendants.

Case No.: 17-CV-1165-CAB-AGS

ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION 

TO PROCEED IN FORMA

PAUPERIS, DENYING REQUEST 

FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 

AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A 

CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF 

CAN BE GRANTED 

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis (“IFP”) [Doc. No. 2] and his request for appointment of counsel [Doc. No. 

3]. As discussed below, the application to proceed IFP is granted, the request to proceed 

IFP is denied, and the complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted. 

Motion to Proceed In Forum Pauperis 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a court may authorize the commencement of a suit 

without prepayment of fees if the plaintiff submits an affidavit, including a statement of all 

his or her assets, showing that he or she is unable to pay filing fees. Plaintiff has submitted 

an affidavit that sufficiently shows he lacks the financial resources to pay filing fees. See 

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S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2(d). Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to 

Proceed In Forma Pauperis.

Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

A complaint filed by any person proceeding in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§1915(a) is subject to mandatory and sua sponte review and dismissal by the court to the 

extent it is “frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 

or seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) ([T]he provisions of 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 

(9th Cir. 2000) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss 

an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”); see also Barren v. Harrington, 

152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (analogizing § 1915(e)(2) to Rule 12(b)(6) for 

purposes of determining if the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of an IFP complaint for 

failure to state a claim was subject to de novo review on appeal.)

Plaintiff’s complaint consists of a one sentence allegation that “Defendant San Diego 

Employees’ Retirement System violated the Americans With Disabilities Act [ADA] when 

it denied Plaintiff’s application for disability retirement from the City of San Diego Fire 

Rescue Department, knowing that Plaintiff properly qualified for disability retirement, 

having been found unable to perform the duties of his position by reason of becoming 

permanently incapacitated due to injuries suffered in the line of duty.” This statement is 

replete with legal conclusions but lacks factual allegations which, if accepted as true, state 

a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Moreover, to 

the extent Plaintiff alleges he is totally disabled or a former employee, he cannot sue under 

Title I of the ADA. See Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1112 

(9th Cir. 2000) (“[S]omeone who is totally disabled cannot sue under Title I’s unambiguous 

provisions. . . . Title I also unambiguously excludes former employees.”). To the extent

Plaintiff is contesting a finding that is not entitled to disability benefits because he is not 

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disabled, it is unclear how such a finding would constitute a denial of benefits “by reason 

of the plaintiff’s disability” as would be required to state a claim under Title II of the ADA. 

See Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Zimmerman v. Or. 

Dep’t of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1178 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that ADA claims concerning 

employment discrimination may not be asserted under Title II, which covers government 

entities). Finally, to the extent Plaintiff is suing Defendant in its capacity as administrator 

of Plaintiff’s former employer’s disability insurance policy, it is not a proper defendant in 

a lawsuit under Title III of the ADA. See Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1113-14. 

In light of the foregoing, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Motion to Appoint Counsel

Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel. In light of the Court’s decision to 

sua sponte dismiss the Complaint, Plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel is 

DENIED without prejudice.

Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, the Court:

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP. [Doc No. 2.] 

2. DENIES without prejudice Plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel. [Doc. 

No. 3.] 

3. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

4. GRANTS Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint on or before July 27, 

2017. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without 

reference to his original pleading. Defendants not named and any claims not realleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. 

CivLR 15.1; Valadez-Lopez v. Chertoff, 656 F.3d 851, 857 (9th Cir. 2011) (“an 

‘amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as 

non-existent.’”); Rasidescu v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 435 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 

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1099 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (“Claims in the original complaint which are not realleged 

in the amended complaint are no longer before the court and are deemed 

waived.”).

It is SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 12, 2017

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