Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00633/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00633-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C:\Documents and Settings\Roseanna\Local Settings\Temp\notes4DFDCF\11cv0633-grt-IFP-dny-csl1&serve.wpd 11cv0633 LAB (WMc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GILBERT SALDAÑA,

CDCR #V-23539,

Civil No. 11cv0633 LAB (WMc)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO PROCEED IN 

FORMA PAUPERIS, IMPOSING

NO INITIAL PARTIAL FILING FEE

AND GARNISHING BALANCE

FROM PRISONER’S TRUST

ACCOUNT PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

[ECF No. 2]; 

(2) DENYING MOTION FOR

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1)

[ECF No. 3]; 

AND

(3) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO

EFFECT SERVICE OF COMPLAINT

PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3) 

& 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)

vs.

T. BOREM, Receiving and Release

Sergeant; JOHN DOE I, Receiving and

Release Officer; R. MADDEN, Facility

Captain; JOHN DOE II, Assistant Warden;

J. TIM OCHOA, Deputy Warden; M.

HODGES WILKINS, Appeals Examiner; 

D. FOSTON, Chief Inmate Appeals Branch,

Defendants.

Gilbert Saldaña (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner currently incarcerated at California State Prison

in Calipatria, California, and proceeding in pro se, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims various Calipatria State Prison officials violated his First and

Case 3:11-cv-00633-LAB-WMC Document 4 Filed 05/04/11 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C:\Documents and Settings\Roseanna\Local Settings\Temp\notes4DFDCF\11cv0633-grt-IFP-dny-csl2&serve.wpd 11cv0633 LAB (WMc)

Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons

Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., by confiscating his “cultural/religious art, which

contained significant religious value.” Compl. at 4-7. Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief as well

as nominal, compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 9.

Plaintiff has not prepaid the $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead he

has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF

No. 2], as well as a Motion for Appointment of Counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1)

[ECF No. 3]. 

I.

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee

only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v.

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner granted leave to proceed IFP

remains obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether his action is

ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847

(9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a

prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account

statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113,

1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court must assess an initial

payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or

(b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater,

unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The

institution having custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of

the preceding month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and

Case 3:11-cv-00633-LAB-WMC Document 4 Filed 05/04/11 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C:\Documents and Settings\Roseanna\Local Settings\Temp\notes4DFDCF\11cv0633-grt-IFP-dny-csl3&serve.wpd 11cv0633 LAB (WMc)

forward those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(2).

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his trust account

statement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. Andrews, 398 F.3d at

1119. His trust account statement shows no deposits to his account and a current balance of

zero. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited

from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that

the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay [an] initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor,

281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing

dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds

available.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [ECF No. 2], and

assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350

balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court

pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II.

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Plaintiff requests appointment of counsel because “his imprisonment will greatly limit his

ability to litigate,” and the issues in his case are “complex” and will “require significant research

and investigation.” See Pl.’s Mot. [ECF No. 3] ¶¶ 1-2. Plaintiff claims he is unable to afford

counsel, that his case “will likely involve conflicting testimony,” and “counsel would be better

able to present the evidence and cross-examin[e] [the] witnesses.” Id. ¶¶ 1, 6. 

Nevertheless, “[t]here is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in a § 1983 action.”

Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d

1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981)); see also Hedges v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In re Hedges), 32 F.3d

1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]here is no absolute right to counsel in civil proceedings.”)

(citation omitted). Federal courts do not have the authority “to make coercive appointments of

/ / /

Case 3:11-cv-00633-LAB-WMC Document 4 Filed 05/04/11 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C:\Documents and Settings\Roseanna\Local Settings\Temp\notes4DFDCF\11cv0633-grt-IFP-dny-csl4&serve.wpd 11cv0633 LAB (WMc)

counsel.” Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989); see also United

States v. $292,888.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Districts courts do have discretion, however, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), to

“request” that an attorney represent indigent civil litigants upon a showing of “exceptional

circumstances.” See Agyeman v. Corrections Corp. of America, 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir.

2004); Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. “A finding of the exceptional circumstances of the plaintiff

seeking assistance requires at least an evaluation of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on

the merits and an evaluation of the plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims ‘in light of the

complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103 (quoting Wilborn v.

Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015,

1017 (9th Cir. 1991).

The Court agrees that any pro se litigant “would be better served with the assistance of

counsel.” Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525 (citing Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331). However, so long as a pro

se litigant, like Plaintiff in this case, is able to “articulate his claims against the relative

complexity of the matter,” the “exceptional circumstances” which might require the appointment

of counsel do not exist. Id. (finding no abuse of discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) when

district court denied appointment of counsel despite fact that pro se prisoner “may well have

fared better-particularly in the realms of discovery and the securing of expert testimony.”). 

Plaintiff’s Complaint demonstrates his ability to articulate essential facts supporting

claims under both the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as RLUIPA. Thus, the Court

finds Plaintiff does appear to have an adequate grasp of his case as well as the legal issues

involved. See Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017. 

In fact, as discussed below, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges facts sufficient to survive the

initial screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. Thus, because Plaintiff has

not satisfied the stringent standards required for an appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(1), Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel [ECF No. 3] must be DENIED at

this time. 

/ / /

Case 3:11-cv-00633-LAB-WMC Document 4 Filed 05/04/11 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C:\Documents and Settings\Roseanna\Local Settings\Temp\notes4DFDCF\11cv0633-grt-IFP-dny-csl5&serve.wpd 11cv0633 LAB (WMc)

III.

SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding

IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused

of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these

provisions of the PLRA, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof,

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-

27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir.

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Barren v. Harrington,

152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that § 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). In addition, courts “have an obligation where the petitioner

is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the

petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010)

(citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)). The court may not, however,

“supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of

the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory allegations

of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to

dismiss.” Id. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:11-cv-00633-LAB-WMC Document 4 Filed 05/04/11 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Plaintiff is cautioned that “the sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative of, 1

and not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12[] motion that [a defendant] may choose to bring.”

Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007). 

 Plaintiff must, of course, identify the parties currently described only as "John Doe I, Receiving 2

and Release Officer” and John Doe II, Assistant Warden" by their true names and substitute those

individual persons by amending his Complaint to identify each individual party before the United States

Marshal will be able to execute service upon them. See Aviles v. Village of Bedford Park, 160 F.R.D.

565, 567 (1995) (Doe defendants must be identified and served within 120 days of the commencement

of the action against them); FED.R.CIV.P. 15(c)(1)(C) & 4(m). Generally, Doe pleading is disfavored.

Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). And when the plaintiff proceeds IFP, it is in

most instances impossible for the United States Marshal to serve a summons and complaint upon a party

identified only as a Doe. See Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1994) (in order to properly

effect service under Rule 4 in an IFP case, the plaintiff is required to "furnish the information necessary

to identify the defendant."). However, the Court will not dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the Doe

Defendants at this time because where the identity of an alleged defendant is not known prior to filing

of an action, Ninth Circuit authority provides that the plaintiff be given an opportunity to pursue

appropriate discovery to identify the unknown Does, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover

their identities, or that the Complaint should be dismissed for other reasons. See Wakefield v. Thompson,

177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999).

C:\Documents and Settings\Roseanna\Local Settings\Temp\notes4DFDCF\11cv0633-grt-IFP-dny-csl6&serve.wpd 11cv0633 LAB (WMc)

As currently pleaded, the Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations sufficient to survive the sua

sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1

1126-27; Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (holding that when a prison regulation

impinges on an inmate’s sincerely held religious belief, it will be held valid under the Free

Exercise clause of the First Amendment only if “reasonably related to legitimate penological

purpose.”); Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that RLUIPA

extends an inmate’s free exercise of religion protection beyond the First Amendment).

Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff is entitled to U.S. Marshal service on his behalf. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all

duties in [IFP] cases.”); FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3) (“[T]he court may order that service be made by

a United States marshal or deputy marshal ... if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma

pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.”).2

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1)

[ECF No. 3] is DENIED without prejudice. 

Case 3:11-cv-00633-LAB-WMC Document 4 Filed 05/04/11 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C:\Documents and Settings\Roseanna\Local Settings\Temp\notes4DFDCF\11cv0633-grt-IFP-dny-csl7&serve.wpd 11cv0633 LAB (WMc)

2. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2] is

GRANTED.

3. The Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or

his designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this

case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty percent

(20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court each

time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Matthew Cate,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, P.O. Box 942883,

Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

5. The Clerk shall issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s Complaint [ECF No. 1] upon

Defendants and shall and forward it to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. Marshal Form 285 for

each Defendant. In addition, the Clerk shall provide Plaintiff with a certified copy of this Order

and a certified copy of his Complaint and summons so that he may serve Defendants. Upon

receipt of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff is directed to complete the Form 285s as completely and

accurately as possible, and to return them to the United States Marshal according to the

instructions provided by the Clerk in the letter accompanying his IFP package. Upon receipt,

the U.S. Marshal shall serve a copy of the Complaint and summons upon Defendants as directed

by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285s. All costs of service shall be advanced by the United States.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3).

6. Defendants are thereafter ORDERED to reply to Plaintiff’s Complaint within the

time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a). See 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may occasionally be permitted to “waive the right to

reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility

Case 3:11-cv-00633-LAB-WMC Document 4 Filed 05/04/11 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C:\Documents and Settings\Roseanna\Local Settings\Temp\notes4DFDCF\11cv0633-grt-IFP-dny-csl8&serve.wpd 11cv0633 LAB (WMc)

under section 1983,” once the Court has conducted its sua sponte screening pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and thus, has made a preliminary determination based on

the face on the pleading alone that Plaintiff has a “reasonable opportunity to prevail on the

merits,” the defendant is required to respond). 

7. Plaintiff shall serve upon the Defendants or, if appearance has been entered by

counsel, upon Defendants’ counsel, a copy of every further pleading or other document

submitted for consideration of the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be

filed with the Clerk of the Court a certificate stating the manner in which a true and correct copy

of any document was served on Defendants, or counsel for Defendants, and the date of service.

Any paper received by the Court which has not been filed with the Clerk or which fails to

include a Certificate of Service will be disregarded.

DATED: May 3, 2011

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

Case 3:11-cv-00633-LAB-WMC Document 4 Filed 05/04/11 Page 8 of 8