Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-55784/USCOURTS-ca9-12-55784-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ENCOMPASS INSURANCE COMPANY,

an Illinois Corporation; GLENS

FALLS INSURANCE COMPANY, an

Illinois Corporation,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

COAST NATIONAL INSURANCE

COMPANY, a corporation; MIDCENTURY INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 12-55784

D.C. No.

2:10-cv-06421-

GHK-PJW

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

George H. King, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 6, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed August 13, 2014

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2 ENCOMPASS INS. CO. V. COAST NAT’L INS. CO.

Before: Harry Pregerson, Michael R. Murphy*,

and N. Randy Smith,** Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Pregerson;

Dissent by Judge Murphy

SUMMARY***

California Insurance Law

The panel reversed the district court’s judgment in a

diversity insurance coverage action concerning coverage for

injuries sustained as part of an automobile accident.

The panel held that unloading an injured passenger from

a motor vehicle constituted “use” of that motor vehicle under

California law. Specifically, the panel held that as used in the

insurance policies at issue, the term “use” was defined by

California Insurance Code § 11580.06(g). The panel further

held that as defined by California Insurance Code

§ 11580.06(g), “use” of an automobile included unloading

* The Honorable Michael R. Murphy, Senior Circuit Judge for the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.

** Judge Berzon was originally a member of the panel, but recused

herself after oral argument. Judge N.R. Smith was drawn to replace her. 

He has read the briefs, reviewed the record, and listened to the audio

recording of oral argument.

 

*** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ENCOMPASS INS. CO. V. COAST NAT’L INS. CO. 3

that automobile, and therefore, the car in this case was “used”

when the injured passenger was removed.

Tenth Circuit Judge Murphydissented, and he would hold

that unloading the passenger did not constitute use of the

vehicle because the person unloading the passenger did not

avail herself of the vehicle simply by unloading it.

COUNSEL

Daniel P. Barer (argued), Girard Fisher, and Scott J. Vida,

Pollak, Vida &Fisher, Los Angeles, California, for PlaintiffsAppellants.

Limor Lehavi (argued) and Mariyetta A. Meyers-Lopez,

Archer Norris, APLC, Newport Beach, California, for

Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:

We must decide whether unloading an injured passenger

from a motor vehicle constitutes “use” of that motor vehicle,

under California law. We conclude that it does.

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of an automobile accident. Alexandra

Van Horn was a passenger in a car driven by a man named

Anthony Glen Watson. Watson lost control of his vehicle;

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4 ENCOMPASS INS. CO. V. COAST NAT’L INS. CO.

the car ran off the road and crashed into a light pole. A

second car, which was not involved in the crash, stopped at

the scene of the accident to render aid. A woman named Lisa

Torti was a passenger in the second car. Torti saw Van Horn

inside the wrecked car, and allegedly feared that Van Horn

might be in danger. (Torti later testified that Watson’s car

was smoking and leaking fluid, causing her to fear that the car

might catch fire or explode.) Torti grabbed Van Horn and

physically removed her from Watson’s car.

Van Horn suffered severe spinal injuries after the car

accident, and became a paraplegic. Van Horn sued Torti in

California state court, alleging that Torti caused Van Horn’s

injuries when she removed Van Horn from Watson’s car. See

Van Horn v. Watson, 197 P.3d 164, 166 (Cal. 2008).1

At the time of the accident, Torti was insured under a

“Package Policy” — including car insurance, homeowners

insurance, and personal excess liability insurance — issued

by Encompass Insurance Company.

2 Torti tendered her

defense against Van Horn’s lawsuit to Encompass. 

Encompass accepted the tender, and assumed responsibility

for Torti’s defense.

1 Our account of the car accident is drawn from the California Supreme

Court’s opinion in Van Horn.

 

2

 Torti’s Package Policy was actually jointly issued by Encompass and

Glens Falls Insurance Company, also a Plaintiffin this action. Encompass

later assumed all of Glens Falls’s rights and responsibilities under Torti’s

Package Policy. For convenience, we — like the parties and the district

court — refer only to Encompass.

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ENCOMPASS INS. CO. V. COAST NAT’L INS. CO. 5

Torti also sought to tender her defense to two additional

insurance companies — Mid-Century Insurance Company

and Coast National Insurance Company.

Mid-Century had issued a car insurance policy to Torti. 

The Mid-Century policy covered “damages for which an

insured person is legally liable because of bodily injury to any

person . . . arising out of the . . . use of a private passenger

car . . . .” Though Torti obtained the Mid-Century policy in

connection with her own car (which was not involved in the

accident), the policy also covered Torti’s “use” of “any other

private passenger car” — if such “use” was “with the

permission of the owner.” Thus, if Torti “used” Watson’s car

with Watson’s permission when she removed Van Horn from

Watson’s car, the Mid-Century policy covered Torti.

Coast National had issued a car insurance policy to

Watson, the driver of the car that crashed. The Coast

National policy covered liability for personal injuries “for

which any ‘insured’ becomes legally responsible because of

an accident.” The policy insured not only Watson, but also

“[a]ny person using ‘[Watson’s] covered auto’ with

[Watson’s] permission.” Thus, if Torti “used” Watson’s car

with Watson’s permission when she removed Van Horn from

Watson’s car, the Coast National policy also covered Torti.

Both Mid-Century and Coast National rejected Torti’s

tender, refusing to accept any responsibility for her legal

defense. Encompass continued to bear sole responsibility for

Torti’s defense, and ultimately settled Van Horn’s claims

against Torti for $4 million.

After settling Van Horn’s lawsuit against Torti,

Encompass brought this lawsuit against Mid-Century and

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6 ENCOMPASS INS. CO. V. COAST NAT’L INS. CO.

Coast National. In this lawsuit, Encompass seeks

contribution or subrogation for the expenses Encompass

incurred in its defense and indemnification of Torti. 

Encompass argues that Mid-Century and Coast National had

their own duty to defend and indemnify Torti: according to

Encompass, the Mid-Century and Coast National insurance

policies covered Torti when Torti removed Van Horn from

Watson’s car, because that act constituted permissive “use”

of Watson’s car. Mid-Century and Coast National deny that

their insurance policies covered Torti, arguing that Torti did

not engage in permissive “use” of Watson’s car.

The district court entered judgment in favor of MidCentury and Coast National.3 The district court reasoned that

Torti did not “use” Watson’s car when she removed Van

Horn from that car. The district court did not reach the issue

of permission.

This appeal followed.

JURISDICTION

The district court had jurisdiction over this diversity

action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have appellate

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“California’s substantive insurance law governs in this

diversity case.” West v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,

3 The parties dispute the precise nature of the district court’s ruling. We

need not resolve this dispute, because we would reverse the district court’s

judgment in any event.

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ENCOMPASS INS. CO. V. COAST NAT’L INS. CO. 7

868 F.2d 348, 350 (9th Cir. 1989). Whether an issue is a

question of law or a question of fact is a substantive question,

to which state law applies. See Wilcox v. Arpaio, 753 F.3d

872, 875 (9th Cir. 2014). Once we determine whether an

issue is a question of law or a question of fact, however, “the

proper standard of review is a question of federal procedure

and is governed by federal law.” West, 868 F.2d at 350.

“[I]nterpretation of an insurance policy is a question of

law . . . .” Ameron Int’l Corp. v. Ins. Co. of State of Penn.,

242 P.3d 1020, 1024 (Cal. 2010). We review questions of

law de novo. Matter of McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395, 1403 (9th

Cir. 1984) (en banc).

DISCUSSION

We must decide whether Torti “used” Watson’s car when

she removed Van Horn from that car. The parties do not

dispute that Torti “unloaded” Van Horn from Watson’s car. 

Thus, we must decide whether “unloading” an injured

passenger from an automobile constitutes “use” of that

automobile, within the meaning of Mid-Century’s and Coast

National’s insurance policies. We conclude that it does.

In this case, determining the meaning of the term “use” is

an exercise in statutory construction. The relevant language

in the Mid-Century and Coast National insurance policies is

required by the California Insurance Code: “With some

exceptions, Insurance Code section 11580.1, subdivision

(b)(4) requires every automobile liability insurer to provide

permissive user coverage to the same extent as that afforded

to the named insured.” Haynes v. Farmers Ins. Exch.,

89 P.3d 381, 391 (Cal. 2004); see Cal. Ins. Code

§ 11580.1(b)(4). Language required by the California

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8 ENCOMPASS INS. CO. V. COAST NAT’L INS. CO.

Insurance Code “must be construed to effect not the intent of

the parties, but the intent of the Legislature. Therefore, the

rules of statutory construction apply.” Galanty v. Paul

Revere Life Ins. Co., 1 P.3d 658, 662 (Cal. 2000). Thus, to

determine whether “unloading” a motor vehicle constitutes

“use” of that motor vehicle as defined in the insurance

policies at issue here, we must determine whether the

California Insurance Code defines “unloading” a motor

vehicle as “use” of that motor vehicle.

The text of the California Insurance Code makes clear

that “unloading” a motor vehicle constitutes “use” of that

motor vehicle. The California Insurance Code provides, in

relevant part: “The term ‘use’ when applied to a motor

vehicle shall only mean operating, maintaining, loading, or

unloading a motor vehicle.” Cal. Ins. Code § 11580.06(g)

(emphasis added). Section 11580.06(g) unambiguously

equates the “unloading” of a motor vehicle with the “use” of

a motor vehicle, and our inquiry should end there. See

Kavanaugh v. W. Sonoma Cnty. Union High Sch. Dist.,

62 P.3d 54, 59 (Cal. 2003) (“If the language of the statute is

not ambiguous, the plain meaning controls . . . .”).

As one would expect from the text of section

11580.06(g), California courts consistently define “use” of a

vehicle to include “unloading.” See Scottsdale Ins. Co. v.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 606, 613

(Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (“As a matter of law, [an injured person]

was using the insured truck if he was ‘operating, maintaining,

loading, or unloading’ it.”) (citing Cal. Ins. Code

§ 11580.06(g)); City of Los Angeles v. Allianz Ins. Co.,

22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 716, 719–20 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (“The City

contends it was a ‘user’ of the truck under the controlling

case law, which holds that ‘use’ of a vehicle includes its

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ENCOMPASS INS. CO. V. COAST NAT’L INS. CO. 9

loading and unloading. From this principle, which is

correct . . . .”) (internal citation omitted); Nat’l Am. Ins. Co.

v. Coburn, 257 Cal. Rptr. 591, 596 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)

(“[T]he ‘use’ of a vehicle includes its loading (and

unloading).”). We can find no case adopting the dissent’s

theory that, under section 11580.06(g), “the unloading of a

vehicle constitutes use of the vehicle onlywhen the unloading

is part of the user’s act of availing herself of the vehicle.” 

Dissenting Opinion at 14. On the contrary, California courts

have consistently said that “unloading” a vehicle — without

more — constitutes “use.”

Mid-Century and Coast National, for their part, argue that

“unloading” a motor vehicle only constitutes “use” of that

motor vehicle if the unloading is “integral to the function of

the vehicle as a means of transport,” so that the person doing

the unloading “gain[s] a benefit” from the vehicle. MidCentury and Coast National point to Travelers Insurance Co.

v. Northwestern Mutual Insurance Co., which held that

performing maintenance on a motor vehicle (without more)

was not necessarily “use” of the motor vehicle. 104 Cal.

Rptr. 283, 288 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972). This argument fails, for

two reasons.

First, Travelers can tell us nothing about the definition of

“use” under section 11580.06(g): Travelers was decided in

1972, and section 11580.06(g) was not enacted until 1984. 

See 1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 341, § 3. To the extent that Travelers

is inconsistent with section 11580.06(g), we are bound by

section 11580.06(g), and not by Travelers.

Second, and more fundamentally, there is no conflict

between Travelers and the idea that “unloading” a vehicle

constitutes “use” of that vehicle. Even if Travelers does limit

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10 ENCOMPASS INS. CO. V. COAST NAT’L INS. CO.

the circumstances under which “maintaining” a vehicle

constitutes “use” of that vehicle, Travelers imposes no such

limitations on “unloading.” On the contrary, Travelers itself

accepted the observation that “‘use’ has also been defined to

mean loading and unloading of a motor vehicle.” Travelers,

194 Cal. Rptr. at 286 (quoting Yandle v. Hardware Mut. Ins.

Co., 314 F.2d 425, 437 (9th Cir. 1963)). Indeed, even before

the enactment of section 11580.06(g), California courts

understood unloading a motor vehicle to constitute “use” of

that motor vehicle. See Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Transp. Indem.

Co., 492 P.2d 673, 678 (Cal. 1972) (in bank) (“the ‘use’ of a

vehicle includes its loading and unloading”).

Defendants’ attempt to distinguish Argonaut falls short. 

Even if the alleged tortfeasor in Argonaut did “gain[] a

benefit” from the use of the vehicle as a means of

transportation, that fact played no role in the California

Supreme Court’s decision. Nor was the court concerned with

whether a nexus existed between the unloading and the

individual’s operation of the vehicle. Dissenting Opinion at

17. Instead, Argonaut examined only whether the person

unloading the vehicle “was actually doing the unloading” —

whether he was “actively engaged in either loading or

unloading.” Argonaut, 492 P.2d at 678–79.

The dissent seeks to draw a distinction between

commercial vehicles (for example, the truck in Argonaut) and

other kinds of vehicles — suggesting that unloading the

former is “use,” but that unloading the latter may not be. See

Dissenting Opinion at 15. We are not convinced. The text of

section 11580.06(g) does not distinguish between commercial

and non-commercial vehicles: “[t]he term ‘use’ when applied

to a motor vehicle shall only mean operating, maintaining,

loading, or unloading a motor vehicle.” Cal. Ins. Code

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ENCOMPASS INS. CO. V. COAST NAT’L INS. CO. 11

§ 11580.06(g) (emphasis added). And the same section of the

California Insurance Code defines “motor vehicle” as “any

vehicle designed for use principally upon streets and

highways and subject to motor vehicle registration under the

law of this state.” Id. § 11580.06(a) (emphasis added).

Nor do the California courts seem to have adopted the

dissent’s distinction between commercial and noncommercial vehicles, in the context of unloading. In at least

two cases, California courts have held that unloading noncommercial vehicles constituted “use” of those vehicles. In

one case, a dog “unloading itself” from a “fourdoor sedan”

constituted “use” of that sedan. Hartford Accident & Indem.

Co. v. Civil Serv. Emps. Ins. Co., 108 Cal. Rptr. 737, 739, 742

(Cal. Ct. App. 1973). In another case, “the process of

unloading a child” from a two-door sedan likewise

constituted “use.” Nat’l Indem. Co. v. Farmers Home Mut.

Ins. Co., 157 Cal. Rptr. 98, 99–101 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).

In short, the plain text of section 11580.06(g) equates

“unloading” a vehicle with “use” of that vehicle. Today, after

the enactment of section 11580.06(g), California courts

consistently define “use” of a vehicle to include “unloading”

that vehicle. Even before the enactment of section

11580.06(g), California courts defined “use” of a vehicle to

include “unloading” that vehicle —suggesting that Travelers

can be reconciled with this definition, to whatever extent

Travelers remains controlling after the enactment of section

11580.06(g). And unlike the dissent, we see no basis for

confining this definition of “use” to commercial vehicles. 

Thus, we conclude that unloading a vehicle constitutes “use”

of that vehicle, under California law.

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12 ENCOMPASS INS. CO. V. COAST NAT’L INS. CO.

There is no merit to the suggestion that this definition of

“use” produces absurd results. Mid-Century and Coast

National warn that, if “unloading” a vehicle constitutes “use”

of that vehicle, “a person breaking a car window and stealing

a purse would be ‘using’ the car . . . .” As an initial matter,

it does not seem absurd to suggest that a burglar has “used”

the car he burgles: the burglar has certainly “availed

[him]self of” the car, or “exploit[ed]” the car. Use, MerriamWebster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/use

(last visited August 5, 2014). More to the point, the mere fact

that a burglar might be said to “use” the car he burgles does

not mean that the burglar would be covered by a California

car insurance policy. Even if the insurance policy did not

otherwise limit its “unloading” coverage to certain persons

(which it would be free to do under California law, see Cal.

Ins. Code § 11580.1(b)(4)(A)), that coverage need apply only

to people who unload the car with the permission of the

named insured, and within the scope of that permission. See

Cal. Ins. Code § 11580.1(b)(4).

To be sure, the idea that Torti “used” Watson’s car is

counterintuitive: unloading an injured passenger is not the

way most people “use” a car. But we are not asked to decide

what “use” of a car means to most people: we are asked to

decide what “use” of a car means in the insurance policies at

issue here. Insurance policies are free to define words in

idiosyncratic ways. See, e.g., Bennett v. State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co., 731 F.3d 584, 585 (6th Cir. 2013) (pedestrian

was an “occupant” of a vehicle, within the meaning of the

relevant insurance policy, when a traffic collision threw her

onto the vehicle’s hood). This remains true when the words

used in an insurance policy are defined by statute, rather than

by private parties. “[L]egislatures, too, are free to be

unorthodox.” Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 54 (2006).

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ENCOMPASS INS. CO. V. COAST NAT’L INS. CO. 13

As used in Mid-Century’s and Coast National’s insurance

policies, the term “use” is defined by California Insurance

Code § 11580.06(g). As defined by California Insurance

Code § 11580.06(g), “use” of an automobile includes

unloading that automobile. Thus, Torti “used” Watson’s car

when she unloaded Van Horn from that car.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that unloading an injured passenger from an

automobile constitutes “use” of that automobile, under

California law. Thus, we reverse the judgment of the district

court, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that

Torti was using Watson’s vehicle when she unloaded Van

Horn.

The insurance policies at issue do not define the term

“use.” Merriam-Webster defines “use,” in relevant part, as

“to put into action or service,” to “avail onself of,” “to carry

out a purpose or action by means of.” Use Definition,

Merriam-Webster.com, http://www.merriam-webster.com/

dictionary/use (last visited August 5, 2014). This definition

suggests that an individual does not use a motor vehicle

unless she employs it as a vehicle. See Waller v. Truck Ins.

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14 ENCOMPASS INS. CO. V. COAST NAT’L INS. CO.

Exch., Inc., 900 P.2d 619, 627 (Cal. 1995) (holding the

interpretation of an insurance contract is a question of law

which requires a court to “look first to the language of the

contract in order to ascertain its plain meaning”). In the

context of statutorily mandated permissive use coverage, the

California Insurance Code defines use to “only mean

operating, maintaining, loading, or unloading a motor

vehicle.” Cal. Ins. Code § 11580.06(g) (emphasis added). 

The majority believes the statute is clear on its face and

unambiguously states that any act of unloading a motor

vehicle is a use which must be covered. But the statutory

provision (which actually restricts the types of activities

considered to be uses of a vehicle) when read in concert with

the dictionary definition of use and California case law,

supports the conclusion that the unloading of a vehicle

constitutes use of the vehicle only when the unloading is part

of the user’s act of availing herself of the vehicle. Thus,

while loading or unloading a vehicle may constitute a use of

the vehicle, it must be a component of some broader

employment of the vehicle.

The requirement of some further association with the

vehicle beyond mere loading or unloading is supported by the

pre-§11580.06(g) case of Travelers Insurance Co. v.

Northwestern Mutual Insurance Co., 104 Cal. Rptr. 283 (Cal.

Ct. App. 1972). In the process of changing a customer’s tire

at the customer’s home, the owner of a service station caused

a fire that damaged the customer’s real and personal property. 

Id. at 284. The contention was made by Travelers that the

mechanic was “using” the customer’s vehicle, thereby

making him an additional insured under the customer’s

policy. Id. Similar to the arguments made by Encompass in

this matter, Travelers argued that changing the tire was

maintenance and “use” expressly includes maintenance. Id.

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ENCOMPASS INS. CO. V. COAST NAT’L INS. CO. 15

at 285. Although California law, at the time, expressly

required coverage for vehicle maintenance, id., the California

Court of Appeals held there was no coverage under the

customer’s policybecause the mechanic’s actions in changing

the tire did not constitute a use of the vehicle. Id. at 288. In

reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished California

cases in which there was no coverage because the

maintenance of the customer’s vehicle was disassociated

from the actual operation of the vehicle, from cases in which

service station employees were covered under a vehicle

owner’s policy because the employees drove the vehicle as an

incident of the maintenance work. Id. at 285–86. It also

referenced California decisions counseling against extending

coverage under “use” clauses in cases “involving claims by

an insurer of a negligent party that its insured is covered

under the extended coverage provisions of the policy of a

non-negligent person.” Id. at 288.

As the majority states, the Travelers court observed that

“‘use’ has been defined to mean loading and unloading of a

motor vehicle.” Id. at 286. But the majority fails to

acknowledge that the cases cited by the Travelers court

involved commercial vehicles. Id. Travelers specifically

noted that “[t]he reasoning in those cases points to the

function of the insured vehicle as a means of transporting

goods and arrives at the conclusion that loading and

unloading of a truck is integral to the mission of

transporting.” Id. Torti was not engaged in the transportation

of goods and her unloading of Van Horn was not integral to

such transportation. Thus, the brief reference to loading and

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16 ENCOMPASS INS. CO. V. COAST NAT’L INS. CO.

unloading in Travelers provides no support for the majority’s

conclusion.1

The cases on which the majority relies for the proposition

that California courts have “consistently” equated unloading

of a non-commercial vehicle, “without more” to be a “use” of

the vehicle have not so held. None, in fact, even addressed

the question of whether a non-commercial vehicle can be

unloaded by a individual who is not also employing it as a

vehicle. In Scottsdale Insurance Co. v. State Farm Mutual

Automobile Insurance Co., the California Court of Appeals

specifically refused to address the “unloading” argument,

concluding it was not raised below. 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 606,

614–15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (interpreting the term “operated

by” in a matter involving an individual who was injured when

the bucket of a cherry picker fell). In City of Los Angeles v.

Allianz Insurance Co., the California Court of Appeals

addressed whether the City of Los Angeles was the

“borrower” of a commercial truck, describing the issue as

“[t]he sole question in this case.” 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 716, 719

(Cal. Ct. App. 2004). National American Insurance Co. v.

Coburn, involved the use of a van by the person who was also

operating it. 257 Cal. Rptr. 591, 595 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)

(“All the alleged negligence arose from the . . . auto-related

conduct [of the operator of the vehicle], i.e., the use and

loading of the van for the camping trip. It cannot be seriously

argued that the parking, leaving open and braking of a vehicle

1 Contrary to the majority’s interpretation of the dissent, it does not draw

a distinction between commercial vehicles and other types of vehicles. 

Nor does it suggest the unloading of a non-commercial vehicle can never

constitute the use of that vehicle. The dissent merely notes that the dicta

describing unloading in Travelers relied on California cases in which the

unloading involved commercial vehicles that had also transported the

unloaded goods.

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ENCOMPASS INS. CO. V. COAST NAT’L INS. CO. 17

are anything other than aspects of the ‘use’ of the vehicle.”). 

The California Court of Appeals specifically stated that the

unloading issue was “of no particular significance in” the

case. Id. at 596 n.2.

Similarly, the majority’s statement that California courts

have twice “held that unloading non-commercial vehicles

constituted ‘use’ of those vehicles,” Majority Opinion at 11,

paints only half the picture. One case involved a passenger

who was bitten by a dog as both exited a vehicle driven by

the insured. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Civil Serv.

Emps. Ins. Co., 108 Cal. Rptr. 737, 739 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973). 

The California Court of Appeals held that the transportation

of the dog by the driver of the vehicle, was a use of the

vehicle. Id. at 741–42. Coverage was also found in a

situation where the insured, who was the driver of the vehicle,

unloaded a child from the vehicle. Nat’l Indem. Co. v.

Farmers Home Mut. Ins. Co., 157 Cal. Rptr. 98, 99–101 (Cal.

Ct. App. 1979). Thus, in both cases upon which the Majority

relies, it was concluded the unloading of the vehicle

constituted a use of that vehicle by the person operating it. 

The majority has not identified a single California case not

involving the commercial transportation of goods in which an

individual who was neither the driver of, nor a passenger in,

a vehicle was ruled to be using the vehicle by unloading it.

Although Travelers addressed the issue of maintenance as

a use, its reasoning is equally applicable to the unloading of

a vehicle and it supports the conclusion that an individual is

not “using” a vehicle for coverage purposes simply by

unloading it unless there is a nexus between the unloading

and the individual’s operation of the vehicle. When the

California legislature enacted §11580.06(g) limiting use to

“operating, maintaining, loading or unloading a motor

 Case: 12-55784, 08/13/2014, ID: 9203059, DktEntry: 31-1, Page 17 of 18
18 ENCOMPASS INS. CO. V. COAST NAT’L INS. CO.

vehicle” it was deemed “to have been aware of statutes

already in effect and of judicial decisions interpreting them

and to have enacted the statute in light of them.” Scottsdale

Ins. Co., 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 613. Thus, the most reasonable

interpretation of § 11580.06(g) is that mere unloading does

not constitute use.

The policy provisions at issue in this matter, given their

ordinary meaning and construed in the context of the

contracts as a whole and the applicable statute and case law,

are unambiguous and do not cover Torti’s removal of Van

Horn from Watson’s vehicle. Torti’s actions in unloading

Van Horn do not constitute a use of Watson’s vehicle because

Torti did not avail herself of the vehicle simply by unloading

it. Because Torti was not operating Watson’s vehicle, or

connected to the vehicle or the transportation of Van Horn in

any way, she was not using Watson’s vehicle in a manner

contemplated by the policies when she unloaded Van Horn. 

Thus, Torti was not an insured under Watson’s policy or her

own motor vehicle policy.

Because Torti was not using Watson’s vehicle,

Encompass cannot show a potential for coverage under the

Coast National and Mid-Century policies and the district

court should be affirmed.

 Case: 12-55784, 08/13/2014, ID: 9203059, DktEntry: 31-1, Page 18 of 18