Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-01164/USCOURTS-cand-5_19-cv-01164-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court 

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ROBERT INGERSOLL, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CITY OF DEL REY OAKS, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 19-cv-01164-NC 

ORDER GRANTING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS 

Re: Dkt. No. 39 

Defendants City of Del Rey Oaks and Dino Pick move to dismiss plaintiff Robert 

Ingersoll’s second amended complaint alleging that Defendants violated his civil rights 

when they fired him from his position as a police officer. See Dkt. No. 39. Because 

Ingersoll’s second amended complaint makes no meaningful changes to his prior 

complaint, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss without leave to amend. 

I. New Allegations in the Second Amended Complaint 

Because the parties are familiar with majority of Ingersoll’s allegations and prior 

orders have previously recounted the facts of this case in greater detail (see Dkt. Nos. 21, 

30), the Court focuses its discussion below to Ingersoll’s new factual allegations. 

In 2004, Ingersoll was invited by then-Chief of Police Ron Langford to apply for a 

position as a police officer with the Del Rey Oaks Police Department. See Dkt. No. 32 

(“SAC”) ¶ 11. Langford was aware that Ingersoll had been fired from his previous 

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employment as a police officer with the Seaside Police Department because of his federal 

misdemeanor conviction. Id. ¶¶ 10, 12. That conviction had been publicized by local 

media. Id. ¶ 14. 

Ingersoll was placed on administrative leave in 2017 pending an administrative 

investigation into allegations of work misconduct. See id. ¶ 21; see also Dkt. No. 39-3.1

 

During that investigation, Del Rey Oaks failed to interview relevant witnesses including 

Langford and a Seaside police commander, Chris Veloz. See SAC ¶¶ 23–24. Ingersoll 

was fired in March 2018. See id. ¶ 32. The decision to fire Ingersoll was demanded and 

orchestrated by then-councilman and mayor Edelen. See id. ¶ 31. 

II. Legal Standard 

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal 

sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). On a 

motion to dismiss, all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the 

light most favorable to the non-movant. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–

38 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court, however, need not accept as true “allegations that are 

merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re 

Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). Although a complaint need 

not allege detailed factual allegations, it must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 

true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when it “allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

 

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 Docket Number 39-3 is a “Notice of Intent to Terminate Employment” sent to Ingersoll 

by Pick. The Notice details the misconduct allegations against Ingersoll, which includes 

making false statements on his employment application, making false statements during 

the administrative investigation, and using racial epithets while on- and off-duty. See Dkt. 

No. 39-3. The Court previously took judicial notice of the document because Ingersoll’s 

complaint “necessarily relies” on the document. See Dkt. No. 30 at 2 n.1 (citing Lee v. 

City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001)). 

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III. Discussion 

In a § 1983 action, a municipality is liable where the alleged action implements a 

municipal policy or custom in violation of constitutional rights. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 

Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). “Under Monell, municipalities are 

subject to damages under § 1983 in three situations: when the plaintiff was injured 

pursuant to an expressly adopted official policy, a long-standing practice or custom, or the 

decision of a final policymaker.” Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 1066 (9th 

Cir. 2013) (quotations omitted). 

In the Court’s prior orders, the Court held that Pick was a final policymaker for 

Monell purposes (see Dkt. No. 21 at 5), but that Ingersoll failed to allege any underlying 

constitutional violation. Ingersoll’s amendments do not cure the deficiencies in his prior 

complaints. 

First, Ingersoll’s second amended complaint provides additional detail as to his 

misdemeanor conviction while working with the Seaside Police Department (see SAC 

¶ 14) and Langford’s knowledge of that conviction (see id. ¶¶ 10–12). The complaint also 

identifies another witness with knowledge regarding his conviction that Del Rey Oaks 

failed to interview during their investigation. See id. ¶ 23–24. None of these allegations, 

however, address the fact that Defendants did not fire him solely because of his prior 

misdemeanor conviction. Rather, Defendants fired Ingersoll because he also made false 

statements during the administrative investigation and he “regularly and consistently 

utter[ing] racial epithets to citizens and fellow officers and employees.” Dkt. No. 39-3. 

Nor do these allegations suggest that the administrative charges against him were 

vague. Contrary to his allegations, the Notice identified several specific incidents of 

misconduct and identified potential witnesses to those incidents. See id. at 5–6. 

Next, Ingersoll adds only one additional allegation related to his First Amendment 

claim. Ingersoll now identifies councilmember and Mayor Edelen as the individual who 

orchestrated his termination. See SAC ¶ 31. But Ingersoll again fails to allege any facts 

that plausibly suggests that Defendants thought he was engaging in political activity. 

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As the Court previously explained, although Ingersoll may not need to allege that he 

was actually engaged in protected political activity under Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 

578 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1418 (2016), he must still allege facts that plausibly suggest 

that Defendants had an improper motive for firing him under Twombley and Iqbal. See 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s] 

devoid of further factual enhancement.”) (quotation marks omitted and alterations in 

original). Ingersoll only offers conclusory allegations that “Langford and his . . . 

supporters were not supporting [Mayor Edelen’s] re-election” and that Edelen was 

attempting to “push out of the city government the city employees he viewed as politically 

disloyal, including but not limited to Langford.” SAC ¶ 31. The second amended 

complaint contains no facts to support those conclusions. Ingersoll does not allege, for 

example, any facts plausibly suggesting that Defendants believed that he was Langford’s 

supporter and that they fired him because of it. See, e.g., Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1416 

(the plaintiff was seen with a “sign in hand, talking to campaign workers”); see also 

Peterson v. Farrow, No. 15-cv-00801-JAM, 2016 WL 3653440, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 7, 

2016) (“[I]n order for [the plaintiff’s] claim against [the defendant] to survive, [the 

plaintiff] must still demonstrate the requisite causal connection between his perceived 

expressive association and the citations that were issued to him by [the defendant].”). Nor 

does Ingersoll allege any facts substantiating his allegation that Edelen was purging the 

Del Rey Oaks government of “politically disloyal” employees. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Ingersoll’s § 1983 

claims. Because Ingersoll has failed to allege sufficient facts after three attempts, further 

amendment would be futile. Thus, dismissal is without leave to amend. 

IV. Conclusion 

The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Ingersoll’s second amended 

complaint without leave to amend. Because no claims remain, the Court will enter 

judgment in favor of Defendants and against Ingersoll. 

 

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IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 22, 2019 _____________________________________ 

NATHANAEL M. COUSINS 

United States Magistrate Judge 

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