Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01667/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01667-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff/Respondent,

CASE NO. 11cv1667 BEN

 09cr1562 BEN

ORDER DENYING MOTION

TO VACATE, SET ASIDE OR

CORRECT A SENTENCE 

(28 U.S.C. § 2255)

vs.

HERMAN JAMES BROWN,

Defendant/Movant.

Now before the Court is Defendant/Movant Herman James Brown’s

(“Movant”) motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255. Because the motion is barred by the statue of limitations, the motion is

denied. 

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

On March 29, 2009, Movant drove across the California-Mexico border into

the United States at the Port of Entry in Calexico, California. The border inspectors

found methamphetamine hidden in his vehicle. As a result, a federal grand jury

indicted Movant for violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960, and 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1). On September 9, 2009, Movant pled guilty pursuant to a written plea

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agreement to the first count under 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960. 

On February 11, 2010, this Court imposed a sentence of 87 months in prison. 

Movant did not appeal. On June 6, 2011, Movant filed his §2255 motion. 

Respondent filed its opposition raising the statute of limitations bar. 

I. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

The Court finds that the motion is barred by the one-year statute of limitations

set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Although Movant describes in his motion the more

relaxed standard of the former Rule 9 of the Rules Governing §2255 Proceedings,

which applied prior to 1996, both Rule 9 and §2255 have since been amended. 

Section 2255 now incorporates a one-year period of limitations within which the

motion must be filed. Section 2255(f) of title 28 of the United States Code provides

in relevant part, 

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this

section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of–

(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final; 

(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the

movant was prevented from making a motion by such

governmental action;

(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to the cases on collateral review;

or

(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise

of due diligence. 

Here, the Court entered judgment on February 11, 2010. Because no appeal

was filed, the judgment became final on February 25, 2010. When the instant

motion was filed on June 6, 2011, more than one year had passed.

The Court further notes Petitioner has not alleged an impediment was created

by governmental action or that his attempts to file the §2255 motion were otherwise

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impeded. Likewise, Petitioner has not asserted a right that has been recently

recognized by the Supreme Court and is applied retroactively. And Petitioner does

not contend that the facts supporting his claim were not available to him at the time

of sentencing or that he could not have discovered those facts through due diligence. 

Therefore, there is no justification for applying a later starting date for the one-year

statute of limitations under Section 2255(f). Finally, Movant makes no case for

equitable tolling. Accordingly, the Court finds that the motion is time-barred. 

II. MOVANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COLLATERAL ATTACK 

In addition to the untimeliness of the motion, the Court finds Movant waived

his right to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence. Movant’s plea agreement

includes a waiver provision providing, in relevant part,

In exchange for the Government’s concessions in this plea

agreement, defendant waives, to the full extent of the law,

any right to appeal or to collaterally attack the conviction

and sentence, including any restitution order, unless the

Court imposes a custodial sentence greater than the high end of the Guideline range, or statutory mandatory

minimum term, if applicable, recommended by the

Government. . . 

(Opp., Ex. 4 at pg. 9.)

The Ninth Circuit regularly enforces knowing and voluntary waivers in

criminal cases where the waivers are part of negotiated guilty pleas. United States v.

Anglin, 215 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 2000). “The sole test of a waiver’s validity is

whether it was made knowingly and voluntarily.” Id. at 1068 (citing United States v.

Michlin, 34 F.3d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1994)). As part of the plea agreement, Petitioner

agreed to waive his right to collaterally attack his sentence. (Plea Ag. ¶ XI). The

Ninth Circuit has upheld the validity of waivers of the right to collateral attack a

sentence pursuant to § 2255. United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 979 (1993). Waivers in plea bargaining are “an

important component of this country’s criminal justice system.” United States v.

Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted) (in the context

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of a waiver of right to appeal). The Ninth Circuit has held that public policy

strongly supports plea agreements. Id. Plea bargaining saves the state time and

money, allowing it to promptly impose punishment without expending resources. 

Id. at 322 (citing Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 393 n.3 (1987)). 

Additionally, and “perhaps the most important benefit of plea bargaining, is the

finality that results.” Id. at 322. 

The right of collateral attack in a criminal case is purely statutory. Abarca,

985 F.2d at 1014. A waiver of the right to collateral attack will be upheld where it

was “knowing and voluntary.” Id. A knowing and voluntary waiver is enforceable

where the language of the waiver encompasses the grounds raised. See PattersonRomo v. United States, No. 10-cr-3319, No. 12-cv-1343, 2012 WL 2060872, at *1

(S.D. Cal. June 7, 2012); United States v. Rahman, 642 F.3d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir.

2011) (citation omitted) (discussing the right to appeal). 

The waiver of a statutory right to challenge a conviction or sentence is

knowing and voluntary if the plea agreement as a whole was knowing and voluntary. 

See United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing the

right to appeal) (overruled on other grounds); United States v. Portillo-Cano, 192

F.3d 1246, 1250 (9th Cir. 1999) (“waivers of appeal must stand or fall with the

agreement of which they are a part”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). A

waiver will be considered knowing and voluntary where the plea colloquy satisfies

Rule 11, and the record reveals no misrepresentation or gross mischaracterization by

counsel that tainted the plea. See United States v. Sepulveda-Iribe, 197 Fed. Appx.

592, 592 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1157 n.5) (discussing right to

appeal). 

The plea agreement’s language in this case clearly embraces a waiver of any

collateral attack, including a §2255 motion. See United States v. Schuman, 127 F.3d

815, 817 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). The record also reflects that Movant’s waiver

was knowing and voluntary, as evidenced by his initials on each page of the plea

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agreement and his signature at the end of the agreement, and the plea colloquy

before the U.S. Magistrate Judge. At sentencing, Movant again acknowledged his

waiver of his right to appeal and to otherwise collaterally attack his conviction and

sentence. After a careful review of the written plea agreement, the Rule 11 plea

colloquy, the sentencing hearing transcript, and the entire record in this matter, this

Court finds that the plea and the waiver were knowing and voluntary. Therefore, the

Court finds that, pursuant to the plea agreement, Movant waived his right to

challenge his conviction and sentence.

CONCLUSION

For the above stated reasons, the Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct the 

Sentence under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 is denied.

A court may issue a certificate of appealability where the petitioner has made

a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” and reasonable jurists

could debate whether the motion should have been resolved differently, or that the

issues presented deserve encouragement to proceed further. See Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335 (2003). This Court finds that Petitioner has not made

the necessary showing. A certificate of appealability is therefore DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 16, 2014

Hon. Roger T. Benitez

United States District Judge

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