Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02554/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02554-30/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY LYNN NORWOOD, )

 )

Plaintiff, ) 2:03-cv-2554-GEB-GGH-P

)

v. ) ORDER

)

STEVE J. VANCE; MIKE KNOWLES; )

THOMAS P. GOUGHNOUR; MICHAEL F. )

MARTEL; DAVID I. WILLEY; CHERYL )

PLILER; JAMES P. WALKER, )

)

Defendants. )

)

On December 13, 2007, Plaintiff moved for an award of

attorney’s fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (“§ 1988"). 

Defendants opposed the motion. Oral arguments were heard on the

motion February 11, 2008. 

BACKGROUND

In December of 2003, Plaintiff Gregory Lynn Norwood, a

California prisoner, filed a complaint alleging, inter alia, that

Defendants deprived him of his right to outdoor exercise in violation

of the Eight Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff

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represented himself pro per through the third day of trial. Carter

White, supervising attorney for the King Hall Civil Rights Clinic of

the University of California, Davis, and two law students, Erin Haney

and Nagmeh Shariatmadar, were then appointed as attorney for Plaintiff

and represented Plaintiff for the remainder of trial. On November 9,

2007, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff, awarding

$11.00 in nominal damages and $39,000.00 in punitive damages against

six defendants. 

ANALYSIS

I. Request to Stay the Motion

Defendants “request the Court to use its inherent powers and

stay Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees until resolution of the

Defendants’ appeal and final determination of Plaintiff’s status as

the prevailing party.” (Opp’n at 2:11-13.) However, the Supreme

Court has encouraged § 1988 fee awards to be decided before appeals. 

White v. N.H. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 454 (1982)

(“[D]istrict courts generally can avoid piecemeal appeals by promptly

hearing and deciding claims to attorney’s fees.”). Accordingly,

Defendants’ request to stay the motion is denied. 

II. Market Rate for Mr. White

Plaintiff moves for “an award of market rates for Mr.

White’s time of at least $300 per hour, the current market rate for

experience[d] counsel in the Sacramento area.” (Mot. at 7:9-10.) 

Defendants counter that Plaintiff’s “attorney’s fee rate is clearly

[limited] under the [Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)].” (Opp’n

at 2:15.) Plaintiff rejoins “[t]he Court should award Mr. White’s

fees at the market rate . . . rather than the lower rate suggested by

the PLRA as a sanction for the trial misconduct of defendants Martel

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and Pliler, [or in the alternative,] as an enhancement for excellent

results as two other district courts have done.” (Mot. at 7:18-20,

10:9-13 (citing Ginest v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 423 F. Supp. 2d 1237,

1241 (D. Wyo. 2006); Skinner v. Uphoff, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1287 (D.

Wyo. 2004).) Defendants counter Plaintiff cannot use the requested

trial sanctions as a basis for exceeding the PLRA hourly rate, relying

on Webb v. Ada County, 285 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The PLRA prescribes: in any action brought by a prisoner in

which attorney’s fees are authorized under § 1988 “[n]o award of

attorney’s fees . . . shall be based on an hourly rate greater than

150 percent of the hourly rate established under section 3006A of

Title 18 for payment of court-appointed counsel.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1997e(d)(3). Plaintiff and Defendants agree that this hourly rate

is $169.50. (Mot. at 11:3; Opp’n at 3:17.) In Webb, the Ninth

Circuit held that an attorney’s motions for fees as sanctions for

contempt and discovery abuses “were directly related to [the]

underlying § 1983 cause of action. . . . The purpose of the PLRA ‘was

apparently to curtail frivolous prisoners’ suits and to minimize the

costs — which are borne by tax-payers-associated with those suits.’ 

[Therefore,] PLRA rates [apply] to fees related to [the] motions for

contempt and discovery sanctions.” Id. at 837 (citing Madrid v.

Gomez, 190 F.3d 990, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999)). Plaintiff argues that

Webb is distinguishable because it “can be viewed as an attempt to

harmonize statutory and regulatory provisions, whereas in the present

case the [D]efendants’ bad faith conduct warrants a sanction under the

court’s inherent power apart from statutory provisions.” (Mot. at

9:23-26.) Plaintiff’s argument is unconvincing, however, because his

motion for sanctions is “directly related to [the] underlying § 1983

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For the same reason, an “enhancement fee” will not be awarded. 1

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cause of action.” Accordingly, Mr. White is awarded fees at an 1

hourly rate of $169.50.

Defendants argue “[t]he court should deny that portion of

attorney’s fees relating to preparation of the argument that the PLRA

does not apply [because Plaintiff] attempt[ed] to create an argument

where the law is clearly established . . . .” (Opp’n at 10:9-14.) 

The four pages in Plaintiff’s brief to which Defendants refer

comprises arguments regarding how reasonable fees are determined under

case law and Local Rules, Mr. White’s qualifications, the court’s

sanctioning authority, and the alleged sanctionable activities of

Defendants Martel and Pliler. (Mot. at 6:8-10:14.) This portion of

Plaintiff’s brief is not frivolous; Plaintiff cited authority for his

enhancement argument. Accordingly, the fee award will not be reduced

as Defendants argue. 

III. Law Student Time

Defendants argue because “a law student in court cannot

function independently, but must be under ‘the direct and immediate

supervision in the personal presence of the Supervising Attorney’” the

law students’ time in court is duplicative. (Opp’n at 11:17-21

(quoting L.R. 83-181(d)(2)(B)).) Defendants argue the students’ time

is also duplicative because

[t]he two law students appeared for trial over the

course of three days, November 6, 7, and 8, 2007. 

The sum total of the involvement of Ms. Haney

occurred during the morning of November 6, 2007,

when she examined a single witness, Defendant

Pliler. . . . Ms. Shariatmadar examined five

witnesses on November 6, 2007. . . . Thereafter,

both students merely observed the trial.

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Defendants also objected to time the students spent waiting 2

for a jury verdict. (Opp’n at 12:20-28.) On February 6, 2008,

Plaintiff filed a stipulation waiving “any claim to law student time

during jury deliberations. This will reduce Plaintiff’s claim for Ms.

Haney’s time by 11.6 hours, and Ms. Shariatmadar’s time by 12.05 hours.”

(Pl.’s Stipulation Regarding Attorney’s Fees ¶ 3.) 

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(Opp’n at 12:12-19.)2

“‘[L]aw students who serve as clerks,’ must be taken into

account” in calculating reasonable attorney fees. Missouri v.

Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 286 (1989) (quoting Ramos v. Laumm, 713 F.2d

546, 558 (10th Cir. 1983)). Since they are not yet members of the

bar, such law students must also be supervised by an attorney. This

required supervision does not necessarily make law student time

duplicative. Plaintiff has failed, however, to respond to Defendants’

argument that the law students were merely observing the trial after

they finished examining witnesses. Accordingly, Ms. Haney’s time

shall be reduced by 4.45 hours for time spent in trial the afternoon

of November 6, 2007 and the morning of November 7, 2007. Ms.

Shariatmadar’s time shall be reduced by 1.45 hours for time spent in

trial the morning of November 7, 2007.

IV. Law Student Rate 

Plaintiff argues “$120 per hour is a reasonable market rate

for compensation of law students.” (Mot. at 11:13-14.) Plaintiff

further argues the students “were uniquely qualified to participate in

this project [because both] had experience working with incarcerated

clients and had a working knowledge of prison operations, and

[California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation] rules and

regulations [and f]ew, if any other attorneys would be able to

essentially drop everything else for a one week period and complete a

jury trial . . . .” (Id. at 11:18-24.) Defendants rejoin “[b]ased on

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the simple issue in the case, the limited role of the law students,

the lack of trial experience, and the rulings of prior district courts

in similar cases, $60 per hour is a fair and reasonable rate for

compensation of law students in this matter.” (Opp’n at 14:8-11.)

Under § 1988(b), a court may award a “reasonable attorney’s

fee . . . .” “The most useful starting point for determining the

amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended

on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). Determinations of “a reasonable

hourly rate should be guided by the rate prevailing in the community

for similar work performed by [law students] of comparable skill,

experience and reputation.” Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d

1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1985). Local Rule 54-293 has incorporated the

Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Kerr v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d

67, 70 (9th Cir. 1997), to establish additional factors that must be

considered in setting a reasonable rate. These factors include, in

relevant part: 

(1) the time and labor required . . .; (2) the

novelty and difficulty of the questions presented;

(3) the skill requisite . . .; . . . (5) the

customary fee charged . . .; (6) any time

limitations imposed by the client or the

circumstances; . . . (8) the amount of money, or

the value of the rights involved, and the results

obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and

ability of the attorney(s); (10) the

“undesirability” of the action; . . . (12) awards

in similar actions . . . . 

L.R. 54-293.

Previous actions have awarded law students rates of $50 and

$60 per hour. In Valdez-Lopez v. Chertoff, a Northern District court

found that $50 per hour is a reasonable rate for law students. No. C05-04192, slip op. at 8 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 2007). Defendants also

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cite Mayweathers v. Terhune, in which the King Hall Civil Rights

Clinic’s request of $60 per hour for law student work was granted. 

No. C-96-1582, slip op. (E.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2004). However, that case

involved “work done until October 14, 2001” and it is reasonable to

assume law student work performed in 2007 should be compensated at a

higher rate. Id. at 2. While specialized skills were not necessarily

required in this action, other factors justify awarding a rate higher

than $60 per hour for law student work. 

Plaintiff submits a declaration from the Sacramento office

of the law firm Downey Brand, LLP in support of his position that the

market rate is $120, in which the declarant declares the law firm

bills its clients “at the rate of $120 per hour for both first and

second-year law students.” (Pl.’s Exs. 19:4-9 (Mills Decl.).) 

Plaintiff also relies on Hoirup v. Prof’l Eng’rs in Cal., 2006 WL

2791158, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2006), where the prevailing rate

for legal assistants was found to be $110 per hour. Even if the lower

rate that Defendants proffer is used, certain Kerr factors favor a

higher rate in this case. Counsel representing Plaintiff in this

action were not only faced with the undesirable task of representing a

prisoner, the attorney and law students entered the case at the

request of Plaintiff in the middle of a jury trial, and had little

time to prepare for the balance of the trial. See Oberfelder v. City

of Petaluma, 2002 WL 472308, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2002)

(discussing the undesirability of representing a prisoner who

challenges “the actions and judgment of a law enforcement official”). 

The time limitations imposed by the trial situation appeared to make

the circumstances attended to the representation of Plaintiff

extremely difficult. Further, the issues involved in the trial were

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difficult because Plaintiff was required to show that Defendants’

actions represented cruel and unusual punishment, a high burden to

meet. Nevertheless, Plaintiff not only prevailed on the merits but

also obtained a notably large punitive damage award. Considering the

relevant Kerr factors, $110 per hour is a reasonable rate for law

student work in this case.

V. Portion of Judgment Applied to Satisfy Attorney’s Fee Award 

Defendants argue 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (“§ 1997e”) prescribes

that Plaintiff is responsible for payment of twenty-five percent of

his attorney’s fees. (Opp’n at 14:23-27 (citing Johnson v. Daley, 339

F.3d 582, 585 (7th Cir. 2003)).) Plaintiff rejoins that § 1997e gives

“courts discretion to set the percentage at less than the maximum

amount” and that the “Court should require Plaintiff to pay only a

very small, if not a nominal . . . amount toward the attorney’s fees

in this case” because the “jury has awarded punitive damages.” (Reply

at 8:22-26, 10:11-13, 9:13-14.)

Section 1997e(d)(2) prescribes: “[w]henever a monetary

judgment is awarded in an action [such as this], a portion of the

judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the

amount of attorney’s fee awarded against the defendants.” “Although

the allocation is mandatory, the percentage to be allocated to

attorney’s fees is within the discretion of the court.” Livingston v.

Lee, 2007 WL 4440933, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2007). In this case

there are two types of damages awarded: nominal and punitive damages. 

“[T]he purpose of a punitive damage award is to punish the defendant”

and the “purpose of § 1997e(d)(2) . . . is to compel the prisoner to

bear some of the burden of the cost of litigation. Balancing these

countervailing policy considerations,” it is appropriate to allocate

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 This award is based on the following calculation: 3

Carter White 99.5 @ $169.50 per hour $16,865.25

Erin Haney 32.15 @ $110 per hour $3,536.50

Nagmeh Shariatmadar 30.55 @ $110 per hour $3,360.50

Case expenses $113.30

Total $23,875.55

Michael Martel was a defendant at trial, but Plaintiff 4

withdrew his request for jury questions regarding his conduct.

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“25 percent of the [nominal] damages awarded . . . .” Id. This offset is appropriate given that this action “involves a significant

violation of the Plaintiff’s rights[ and] the jury’s clear signal that

Defendants should be punished.” Morrison v. Davis, 88 F. Supp. 2d

799, 811 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (applying $1.00 of $15,000 judgment as offset). Accordingly, $2.75 or twenty-five percent of the $11.00 nominal

damages award shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorneys’

fees awarded against Defendants. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s counsel is awarded fees and costs

of $23,875.55 based on this Order and documentation submitted in

support of the Motion. The fee award is allocated as follows: 3

(a) $2.75 to be paid from the judgment award to Plaintiff, and (b)

$23,872.80 to be paid by Defendants Vance, Pliler, Goughnour, Willey,

Walker, and Knowles, jointly and severally.4

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 11, 2008

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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