Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08141/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08141-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

SKC 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Anthony L. Rodrigues, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 14-08141-PCT-DGC (ESW) 

ORDER 

Plaintiff Anthony L. Rodrigues, who is currently confined in the Red Rock 

Correctional Center (RRCC) in Eloy, Arizona, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disability Act (ADA) (Doc. 15). 

Pending before the Court are (1) “Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and 

Emergency Temporary Restraining Order” (Doc. 21), (2) “Defendants Ryan and Diaz’s 

Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint” (Doc. 29), and 

(3) “Defendants’ [Ryan, Diaz, Marquardt, and Rider’s] Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 

Second Amended Complaint” (Doc. 66). 

The Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction for lack of 

jurisdiction, deny as moot Defendants Ryan and Diaz’s Motion to Dismiss, and grant in 

part and deny in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 

 

Case 3:14-cv-08141-DGC Document 104 Filed 04/04/16 Page 1 of 14
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

I. Background 

This action arises from alleged constitutional and ADA violations that occurred 

while Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Arizona State Prison Complex (ASPC)-Kingman. 

(Doc. 15.) In his two-count Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff names as Defendants 

Charles L. Ryan, Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC); R. Scott 

Marquardt, President and CEO of Management Training Corporation; Tara R. Diaz, ADC 

Contract Beds Bureau Director; and Pamela Rider, Warden at ASPC-Kingman’s 

Hualapai Unit. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff seeks monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief, and 

punitive damages. (Id. at 11.) On screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court 

determined that Plaintiff stated Eighth Amendment and ADA claims in Count Two and 

directed Defendants to answer these claims. (Doc. 16.) The Court dismissed the claims 

in Count One and the remaining claims in Count Two. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff’s claims in Count Two are based on the following allegations. Plaintiff 

has a documented cardiac condition for which he is receiving treatment. On November 

26, 2013, Plaintiff was sanctioned for two unexcused absences from a life skills class. As 

a result, Plaintiff lost his preferred housing and was reassigned to a two-man bunk in the 

rear of the dorm, near where inmates smoked, despite ADC policies prohibiting indoor 

smoking. After his housing reassignment, Plaintiff was hospitalized at least twice due to 

the effects of second-hand smoke. Plaintiff sought a “reasonable accommodation” from 

Defendants. In particular, he made requests from at least January 2, 2014 to be 

reassigned to a new bunk away from the smoking, but he was not moved to a new bunk – 

apparently away from the smoking – until June 2014. (Doc. 15.) 

II. Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunctive Relief

 In his Motion for Injunctive Relief, Plaintiff alleges that following a July 2015 riot 

at ASPC-Kingman, he was transferred to RRCC, and, as a result, he lost access to legal 

reference materials and his trial preparation journal and case notes. (Doc. 22 at 3.) He 

further alleges that he has been subjected to the same ADA violations he encountered at 

ASPC-Kingman, including lack of access to smoke free housing and outdoor recreation, 

Case 3:14-cv-08141-DGC Document 104 Filed 04/04/16 Page 2 of 14
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

and, as a transferee, he is not given equal access to RRCC’s legal library as are nontransferred inmates. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that all of his efforts to resolve these issues 

with RRCC officials have failed to provide any relief, and this lack of response 

contributed to his hospitalization on August 11, 2015. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff requests that the Court “enjoin the Defendant(s), Defendants’ Agent, 

[and] Contract Representatives or Appointees to immediately provide the Plaintiff access 

to non-punitive smoke free housing and outdoor recreation and opportunities enjoyed by 

similarly situated individuals at Plaintiff’s current place of incarceration.” (Doc. 21 at 1-

2.) He additionally requests that Defendants and their agents be restrained from 

(1) transferring Plaintiff from his current place of incarceration without first seeking 

permission from the Court, (2) taking any retaliatory actions against Plaintiff or those 

who provide him material support in this action, and (3) interfering with Plaintiff’s access 

to the Court, right to discovery, and access to legal reference materials necessary to 

advance his claims. (Id. at 2.) 

 A. Legal Standard 

“A preliminary injunction is ‘an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should 

not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.’” 

Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 

520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam); see also Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 

555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted) (“[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary 

remedy never awarded as of right”). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must 

show that (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable 

harm without an injunction, (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor, and (4) an 

injunction is in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. “But if a plaintiff can only 

show that there are ‘serious questions going to the merits’—a lesser showing than 

likelihood of success on the merits—then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the 

‘balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor,’ and the other two Winter

factors are satisfied.” Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281, 1291 (9th 

Case 3:14-cv-08141-DGC Document 104 Filed 04/04/16 Page 3 of 14
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Cir. 2013) (quoting Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th 

Cir. 2011)). Under this serious questions variant of the Winter test, “[t]he elements . . . 

must be balanced, so that a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker 

showing of another.” Lopez, 680 F.3d at 1072. 

 Regardless of which standard applies, the movant “has the burden of proof on each 

element of the test.” See Envtl. Council of Sacramento v. Slater, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 

1027 (E.D. Cal. 2000). Further, there is a heightened burden where a plaintiff seeks a 

mandatory preliminary injunction, which should not be granted “unless the facts and law 

clearly favor the plaintiff.” Comm. of Cent. Am. Refugees v. INS, 795 F.2d 1434, 1441 

(9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). 

 The Prison Litigation Reform Act imposes additional requirements on prisoner 

litigants who seek preliminary injunctive relief against prison officials and requires that 

any injunctive relief be narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means necessary to correct 

the harm. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2); see Gilmore v. People of the State of Cal., 220 F.3d 

987, 999 (9th Cir. 2000). 

 A court may issue an injunction against a non-party only where the non-party acts 

in active concert or participation with an enjoined party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2) (a 

preliminary injunction only binds those who receive actual notice of it by personal 

service or are parties, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and 

persons in active concert); see Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1984) (“A 

federal court may issue an injunction if it has personal jurisdiction over the parties and 

subject matter jurisdiction over the claim; it may not attempt to determine the rights of 

persons not before the court.”); see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 

395 U.S. 100, 110 (1969). 

B. Discussion 

 Defendants Ryan and Diaz argue that Plaintiff’s Motion must be denied because 

(1) Plaintiff seeks relief outside the operative complaint, and (2) Plaintiff fails to establish 

Case 3:14-cv-08141-DGC Document 104 Filed 04/04/16 Page 4 of 14
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the necessary elements to justify injunctive relief. (Doc. 85.) For the reasons that follow, 

the Court finds the first argument dispositive and will deny the Motion. 

 According to Plaintiff’s allegations, RRCC is a private prison under contract with 

ADC to which Plaintiff was transferred in July 2015. (Doc. 22 at 1, 3.) Thus, the 

injunctive relief Plaintiff seeks at RRCC in the form of a bunk reassignment, restrictions 

on transfer, and access to legal materials is completely separate from the relief he seeks 

for Defendants’ alleged violations at ASPC-Kingman in the Second Amended Complaint. 

Plaintiff appears to rely on the asserted factual similarities of the alleged indoor smoking 

at both prisons as a basis for seeking injunctive relief at his current place of confinement. 

But absent any facts causally connecting the actions of Defendants in this action to the 

alleged violations at RRCC, mere similarity of potential future claims does not authorize 

the Court to order relief outside the scope of the current action. “A court’s equitable 

power lies only over the merits of the case or controversy before it. When a plaintiff 

seeks injunctive relief based on claims not pled in the complaint, the court does not have 

the authority to issue an injunction.” Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s Med. 

Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 2015); see also De Beers Consol. Mines v. United 

States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945) (preliminary injunctive relief is inappropriate for 

matters “lying wholly outside the issues in the suit.”). The Court will deny Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Injunctive Relief for lack of jurisdiction. 

III. Defendants Ryan and Diaz’s Motion to Dismiss 

 Defendants Ryan and Diaz filed their Motion to Dismiss on October 9, 2015 

(Doc. 29), before the Court issued a Scheduling Order in which it gave Defendants until 

December 21, 2015 to file any motions to dismiss. (Doc. 35 at 3.) On November 24, 

2015, Defendants Ryan and Diaz filed a Motion to Stay, requesting that the Court stay 

the pending Motion so they and Defendants Marquardt and Rider could file a single 

motion to dismiss. (Doc. 53.) The Court granted the Motion to Stay (Doc. 70), and all 

Defendants filed a single Motion to Dismiss on December 21, 2015 (Doc. 66). Because 

Case 3:14-cv-08141-DGC Document 104 Filed 04/04/16 Page 5 of 14
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

that Motion supersedes Ryan’s and Diaz’s prior Motion, the Court will deny Defendants 

Ryan and Diaz’s Motion to Dismiss as moot. 

. . . . 

IV. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

A. Motion to Dismiss Legal Standard 

 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged 

in the complaint. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Dismissal of the complaint, or any claim within it, may be based on either a “‘lack of a 

cognizable legal theory’ or ‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable 

legal theory.’” Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 

1990)). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. 

at 681. 

 In determining whether a complaint states a claim under this standard, the 

allegations in the complaint are taken as true and the pleadings are construed in the light 

most favorable to the nonmovant. Outdoor Media Group, Inc. v. City of Beaumont, 506 

F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2007). A court may not consider evidence outside the pleadings 

unless it converts the Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment 

and gives the nonmovant an opportunity to respond. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); United States 

v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003). A court may, however, consider documents 

Case 3:14-cv-08141-DGC Document 104 Filed 04/04/16 Page 6 of 14
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

attached to the complaint or incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of 

judicial notice, without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. Ritchie, 

342 F.3d at 908. 

 B. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claims 

 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting that (1) the 

conduct about which he complains was committed by a person acting under the color of 

state law and (2) the conduct deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right. 

Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989). In addition, a plaintiff must 

allege that he suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant 

and he must allege an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that 

defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). 

 To state an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim, plaintiffs must 

meet a two-part test. “First, the alleged constitutional deprivation must be, objectively, 

sufficiently serious” such that the “official’s act or omission must result in the denial of 

the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 

834 (1994) (internal quotations omitted). Second, the prison official must have a 

“sufficiently culpable state of mind,” i.e., he must act with “deliberate indifference to 

inmate health or safety.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Deliberate indifference is a 

higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary due care for the prisoner’s safety. Id.

at 835. In defining “deliberate indifference” in this context, the Supreme Court has 

imposed a subjective test: “the official must both be aware of facts from which the 

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also 

draw the inference.” Id. at 837 (emphasis added). 

 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims should be dismissed 

because he fails to allege sufficient facts to show he suffered a “specific injury as a result 

of the conduct of any particular defendant” and his allegations are insufficient to show 

that any Defendant acted with deliberate indifference. (Doc. 66 at 9-11.) The Court 

already screened the Second Amended Complaint and found that Plaintiff alleged 

Case 3:14-cv-08141-DGC Document 104 Filed 04/04/16 Page 7 of 14
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

sufficient facts to state Eighth Amendment claims against all Defendants. (Doc. 16.) 

The standard for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is identical to the standard applied on 

screening under § 1915A(b) (“fail[ure] to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted”) and does not call for a new evaluation. See Murray v. Corr. Corp. of Am., CV 

11-2210-PHX-RCB (JFM), 2012 WL 2798759 (D. Ariz. July 9, 2012) (Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion to dismiss almost never appropriate when the court has screened a prisoner 

complaint pursuant to § 1915A(b)). The Court also noted, however, that Plaintiff’s 

Counts were largely intertwined, and Plaintiff brought Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 

Amendment and ADA claims in both counts. (Id. at 3.) Due to the lack of clarity caused 

by the overlapping nature of Plaintiff’s claims, and in light of the Court’s dismissal of 

Count One and the related claims in Count Two, the Court will review the allegations in 

the Second Amended Complaint, specifically with respect to Plaintiff’s Eighth 

Amendment claims.1

 The relevant allegations are as follows: Plaintiff suffers from chronic vascular 

heart disease. (Doc. 15 ¶ 12.) On November 26, 2013, he was sanctioned and moved 

from a one-person cell to a two-man bunk in an area at the rear of the dorm known for 

illicit drug use, indoor smoking, and poor air circulation. (Id. ¶ 14.) These 

environmental conditions – made known to all Defendants on multiple occasions prior to 

and after November 2013 through inmate letters and grievances, verbal complaints by 

security staff, and internal audits and inspections – posed an immediate risk to Plaintiff’s 

health. (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff requested a bunk reassignment from security staff and 

medical personnel, but his requests were denied. (Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff was hospitalized 

twice after his move due to cardiac-related complications resulting from the alleged 

environmental conditions. (Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff filed a formal complaint, requesting what 

he styled to be a “reasonable accommodation” to be moved to a single-man cell to 

 

1

 Defendants appear to argue that because the Court dismissed Count One, they need only consider Plaintiff’s allegations in Count Two. (Doc. 66 at 3; Doc. 90 at 2.) 

The Court does not agree. Dismissal of Count One does not negate all the factual allegations in that section of the Complaint. Moreover, Plaintiff incorporates these allegations by reference in Count Two. (Doc. 15 ¶ 28.) 

Case 3:14-cv-08141-DGC Document 104 Filed 04/04/16 Page 8 of 14
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

eliminate his exposure to airborne contaminants, including second-hand smoke. (Id. ¶ 

31.) On April 2, 2014, Rider denied Plaintiff’s request on the grounds that he did not 

have an ADC-recognized disability that required accommodations. (Id.) Plaintiff filed 

an inmate grievance appeal, alleging that Rider had, without consultation with Plaintiff’s 

cardiologist and contrary to Plaintiff’s treatment plan, ignored the risk to his health that 

had resulted in two stress-related hospitalizations. (Doc. 15 ¶ 32.) On April 18, 2014, 

Diaz affirmed Rider’s denial on appeal and noted, among other things, that Plaintiff had 

not sufficiently documented his claims and that ASPC-Kingman staff regularly discipline 

inmates caught smoking in unauthorized areas. (Id.) Plaintiff appealed Diaz’s decision 

to Director Ryan, alleging that Diaz’s conclusions were “wholly self[-]appreciating” and 

“deliberately indifferent” to Plaintiff’s need to limit his exposure to second-hand smoke. 

(Id. ¶ 33.) Ryan affirmed Diaz’s decision and informed Plaintiff that he could choose to 

inform prison staff of smoking violations but he would not be moved without a 

demonstrated “medical necessity.” (Id.) 

 1. Rider, Diaz, Ryan 

 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against Rider, Diaz, 

and Ryan fail because Plaintiff does not link any viable injuries to the conduct of these 

Defendants. (Doc. 66 at 10.) They argue that the only substantive injuries Plaintiff 

alleges are that, after he was moved to a two-man bunk in November 2013, he was 

hospitalized twice for cardiac complications due to second-hand smoke. (Id.) They 

further maintain that because Plaintiff does not allege more precisely when these 

hospitalizations occurred, and his allegations show that he did not submit any bunk 

reassignment requests to Defendants until March 2014, he cannot plausibly link his 

injuries to Defendants’ denials of those requests. (Id.) These arguments miss the mark. 

Even if Defendants were unaware of Plaintiff’s injuries at the time of his hospitalizations, 

this is not determinative of whether their actions, once they were made aware, caused him 

harm. Plaintiff’s allegations that his bunk assignment presented an “immediate risk” to 

his health and his cardiac issues became aggravated to the point of hospitalization due to 

Case 3:14-cv-08141-DGC Document 104 Filed 04/04/16 Page 9 of 14
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the second-hand smoke and poor ventilation around his bunk suggest that Plaintiff 

experienced ongoing harm until he was moved away from the complained-of conditions. 

Construed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court can plausibly infer that Plaintiff 

suffered sufficient harm as a result of Defendants’ denials of his bunk reassignment 

requests to support his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims. 

 Defendants further argue that Plaintiff alleges only that Rider, Diaz, and Ryan 

denied his administrative grievances, and mere denial of grievances is not a sufficient 

basis to state a constitutional claim. This argument lacks merit. Whether a defendant’s 

denial of administrative grievances is sufficient to state a claim of constitutional 

deprivation depends on several facts. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 

1999); accord Proctor v. Applegate, 661 F.Supp.2d 743, 765 (W.D. Mich. 2009); Stocker 

v. Warden, No. 1:07-CV-00589, 2009 WL 981323, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2009); 

Mintun v. Blades, No. CV-06-139, 2008 WL 711636, at *7 (D. Idaho Mar. 14, 2008). 

These include whether, at the time of the grievance response, the violation was ongoing, 

see e.g., Flanory v. Bonn, 604 F.3d 249, 256 (6th Cir. 2010), or the unconstitutional 

conduct was completed, see Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300, and whether the defendant 

responding to the grievance had authority to take action to remedy the alleged violation, 

see Bonner v. Outlaw, 552 F.3d 673, 679 (8th Cir. 2009). In addition, under Ninth 

Circuit law, a defendant can be liable for the failure to act. See Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045; 

cf. King v. Zamiara, 680 F.3d 686, 706 (6th Cir. 2012) (under Sixth Circuit law, liability 

under § 1983 requires “active unconstitutional behavior; failure to act or passive behavior 

is insufficient.”). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Rider, Diaz, and Ryan were each made 

aware of ongoing environmental conditions that were allegedly causing him serious harm 

but they denied his grievances without proper investigation or consideration of his 

claims. Plaintiff has alleged sufficient personal involvement by these Defendants to state 

Eighth Amendment claims against them. 

 Finally, Defendants argue that Diaz and Ryan are entitled to qualified immunity 

because their alleged actions did not “‘violate clearly established statutory or 

Case 3:14-cv-08141-DGC Document 104 Filed 04/04/16 Page 10 of 14
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” (Doc. 66 at 15, 

quoting Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1069 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Harlow v. 

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).) They argue, in particular, that a reasonable 

prison official would not have understood that the denial of Plaintiff’s requests for a bunk 

change due to second-hand smoke violated clearly established rights under either the 

Eighth Amendment or the ADA. (Doc. 66 at 16.) These arguments are unavailing at this 

stage of the proceedings. Absent further factual development showing specifically what 

Defendants either knew about the alleged environmental hazards in Plaintiff’s dorm, or 

what they did to investigate Plaintiff’s claims, the Court cannot conclude that Diaz and 

Ryan’s alleged responses to Plaintiff’s grievances were objectively reasonable under the 

circumstances. 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against Rider, Diaz, and Ryan. 

 2. Marquardt 

 Defendants argue, and the Court agrees, that Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth 

Amendment claim against Marquardt. The only allegation Plaintiff makes against 

Marquardt specifically is that he, along with Ryan, contracted with a vendor to sell 

tobacco products at ASPC-Kingman. (Doc. 15 ¶ 18.) But the mere approval of the sale 

of these products at the prison, generally, is insufficient to show that Marquardt acted 

with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. As noted, Plaintiff’s 

allegations also show that prison policies prohibited the use of tobacco products in living 

quarters. (Id. ¶ 21.) Even though Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants knew that inmates 

regularly violated these regulations and smoked in the area of the dorm where Plaintiff 

was assigned, Plaintiff alleges no facts showing that Marquardt was aware that Plaintiff 

was injured or faced the threat of serious injury due to his bunk assignment. Absent any 

allegations showing that Marquardt was aware of and disregarded a substantial threat of 

serious harm to Plaintiff, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim 

against him. 

Case 3:14-cv-08141-DGC Document 104 Filed 04/04/16 Page 11 of 14
- 12 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

C. Plaintiff’s ADA Claims 

 Under Title II of the ADA, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by 

reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of 

the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination 

by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. A “public entity” is “any State or local 

government; [or] any department, agency, special purpose district, or other 

instrumentality of a State or States or local government.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131. 

Individuals, however, may only be sued under the ADA in their official, rather than, their 

individual capacities. Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff 

cannot sue state officials in their individual capacities to vindicate rights created by Title 

II of the ADA). To state an ADA claim, a plaintiff must allege facts to support that he 

“(1) is a handicapped person; (2) he is otherwise qualified; and that the public entity 

either (3) excluded his participation in or denied him the benefits of a service, program, 

or activity; or (4) otherwise subjected him to discrimination on the basis of his physical 

handicap.” Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 455 (9th Cir. 1996). The term “qualified 

individual with a disability” includes “an individual with a disability who, with or 

without . . . the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility 

requirements for the receipt of services or participation in programs or activities provided 

by a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). Claims under the ADA cannot be based on 

medical treatment decisions. Burger v. Bloomberg, 418 F.3d 882, 883 (8th Cir. 2005). 

 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s ADA claims against them in their individual 

capacities should be dismissed because the ADA does not create individual liability, and 

these claims should further be dismissed because Plaintiff does not allege that he was 

deprived of participation in a “service, program, or activity” as a result of an alleged 

disability. (Doc. 66 at 18.) Defendants are correct. First, to the extent Plaintiff can 

assert a viable ADA claim, he may sue only the public entity or public official – in this 

case Ryan – representing that entity, in his official capacity. 42 U.S.C. § 12131; Vinson, 

288 F.3d at 1156 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff’s ADA claims against Defendants in their 

Case 3:14-cv-08141-DGC Document 104 Filed 04/04/16 Page 12 of 14
- 13 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

individual capacities thereby fail as a matter of law. Second, Plaintiff’s allegations that 

he was denied reassignment to a single-man cell do not show that he was discriminated 

against because of his alleged disability. Nor do they show he was deprived of 

participation in any programs for which the ADA requires that reasonable 

accommodations be made. To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to assert that he was 

entitled to an accommodation because his heart condition interfered with his ability 

simply to be housed as an inmate at ASPC-Kingman, this is not a valid basis for an ADA 

claim. See Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996) (For purposes of ADA 

liability, “incarceration, which requires the provision of a place to sleep, is not a 

‘program’ or ‘activity.’ Sleeping in one’s cell is not a ‘program, or ‘activity.’”). The 

Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s ADA claims. 

IT IS ORDERED:

 (1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to “Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Emergency Temporary Restraining Order” 

(Doc. 21); “Defendants Ryan and Diaz’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 

Second Amended Complaint” (Doc. 29), and “Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 

Second Amended Complaint” (Doc. 66).. 

 (2) “Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Emergency Temporary 

Restraining Order” (Doc. 21) is denied for lack of jurisdiction. 

 (3) “Defendants Ryan and Diaz’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 

Second Amended Complaint” (Doc. 29) is denied as moot. 

 (4) “Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint” 

(Doc. 66) is granted in part and denied in part as set forth in this Order. 

 (5) Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims against 

Defendant Marquardt and his ADA claims against all Defendants are dismissed. 

 

Case 3:14-cv-08141-DGC Document 104 Filed 04/04/16 Page 13 of 14
- 14 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 (6) The remaining claims in this action are Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 

deliberate indifference claims against Defendants Rider, Diaz, and Ryan. 

 Dated this 4th day of April, 2016. 

Case 3:14-cv-08141-DGC Document 104 Filed 04/04/16 Page 14 of 14