Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02681/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02681-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Thomas William O’Connell,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security Administration, 

Defendant.

No. CV-12-02681-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is the appeal of Plaintiff Thomas William O’Connell, 

which challenges the Social Security Administration’s decision to deny benefits. (Doc. 

17.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court vacates the ALJ’s decision and remands 

for further proceedings. 

BACKGROUND

 O’Connell applied for disability insurance benefits and for supplemental security 

income on June 22, 2009. (R. at 18.) In both applications, O’Connell alleged a disability 

onset date of May 20, 2009. (Id.) O’Connell met the insured status requirements of the 

Social Security Act through September 30, 2013. (Id.) His claims were denied both 

initially and upon reconsideration. (Id. at 66–69, 1–6.) He then appealed to an 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Id. at 7–14.) The ALJ conducted a hearing on the 

matter on October 17, 2011. (Id. at 35–61.) 

 In evaluating whether O’Connell was disabled, the ALJ undertook the five-step 

Case 2:12-cv-02681-GMS Document 30 Filed 01/09/14 Page 1 of 10
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

sequential evaluation for determining disability.1 (Id. at 25–26.) At step one, the ALJ 

determined that O’Connell had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the 

alleged onset date. (Id. at 20.) At step two, the ALJ determined that O’Connell suffered 

from the severe impairments of cirrhosis of the liver due to autoimmune hepatitis, chronic 

obstructive pulmonary disease, and obstructive sleep apnea with fatigue. (Id. at 21.) At 

step three, the ALJ determined that none of these impairments, either alone or in 

combination, met or equaled any of the Social Security Administration’s listed 

impairments. (Id. at 24.) 

At that point, the ALJ made a determination of O’Connell’s residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”),2

 concluding that he could perform sedentary work with some 

limitations. (Id. at 24–27.) The ALJ thus determined at step four that O’Connell retained 

 1

 The five-step sequential evaluation of disability is set out in 20 C.F.R. '

404.1520 (governing disability insurance benefits) and 20 C.F.R. ' 416.920 (governing 

supplemental security income). Under the test: 

A claimant must be found disabled if she proves: (1) that she 

is not presently engaged in a substantial gainful activity[,] (2) 

that her disability is severe, and (3) that her impairment meets 

or equals one of the specific impairments described in the 

regulations. If the impairment does not meet or equal one of 

the specific impairments described in the regulations, the 

claimant can still establish a prima facie case of disability by 

proving at step four that in addition to the first two 

requirements, she is not able to perform any work that she has 

done in the past. Once the claimant establishes a prima facie 

case, the burden of proof shifts to the agency at step five to 

demonstrate that the claimant can perform a significant 

number of other jobs in the national economy. This step-five 

determination is made on the basis of four factors: the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, work experience 

and education. 

Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). 

2

 RFC is the most a claimant can do despite the limitations caused by his 

impairments. See S.S.R. 96-8p (July 2, 1996). 

Case 2:12-cv-02681-GMS Document 30 Filed 01/09/14 Page 2 of 10
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the RFC to perform his past relevant work as a Customer Service Representative in a call 

center. (Id. at 27.) The ALJ did not reach step five. Given this analysis, the ALJ 

concluded that O’Connell was not disabled. (Id. at 28.) 

The Appeals Council declined to review the decision. (Id. at 1–6.) 

Plaintiff filed the complaint underlying this action on December 18, 2012, seeking 

this Court’s review of the ALJ’s denial of benefits.3

 (Doc. 1.) The matter is now fully 

briefed before this Court. (Docs. 17, 23, 29.) 

DISCUSSION

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 A reviewing federal court will only address the issues raised by the claimant in the 

appeal from the ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 

2001). A federal court may set aside a denial of disability benefits only if that denial is 

either unsupported by substantial evidence or based on legal error. Thomas v. Barnhart, 

278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla but less 

than a preponderance.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence 

which, considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

 However, the ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in testimony, determining 

credibility, and resolving ambiguities. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th 

Cir. 1995). “When the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational 

interpretation, we must defer to the ALJ’s conclusion.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004). This is so because “[t]he [ALJ] and not the 

reviewing court must resolve conflicts in evidence, and if the evidence can support either 

outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney v. 

Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). 

 3

 Plaintiff was authorized to file this action by 42 U.S.C. ' 405(g) (“Any 

individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a 

hearing to which he was a party . . . may obtain a review of such decision by a civil 

action . . . .”). 

Case 2:12-cv-02681-GMS Document 30 Filed 01/09/14 Page 3 of 10
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

II. ANALYSIS

O’Connell argues that the ALJ erred by: (A) finding that O’Connell’s impairments 

do not meet or equal a listed impairment without substantial evidence in the record at step 

three; (B) failing to properly weigh medical source opinion evidence; and (C) failing to 

properly weigh subjective complaint reporting. The Court will address each argument in 

turn. 

A. Determination That Impairments Do Not Meet or Equal Listed 

Impairment 

 Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred by failing to sufficiently explain her 

finding at step three that O’Connell’s impairments do not meet or equal a listed 

impairment. (Doc. 17 at 10.) Plaintiff specifically challenges the ALJ’s statement that 

“[t]here are no pulmonary function test results indicating listing level impairment of 

respiratory functioning [or other medical evidence of such impairment in the record] . . . 

since the alleged onset date that meet the criteria under the Listings.” (R. at 24.) In 

response, Plaintiff notes that the record does contain one test result, dated April 6, 2009 

(R. at 479), that meets the required FEV levels for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 

under the Listings. However, this test result occurred before May 20, 2009, the date of 

the alleged onset of Plaintiff’s disability. Plaintiff does not dispute that the ALJ was thus 

correct in noting that the test results in the record since the alleged onset date do not meet 

the required FEV levels. (See, e.g., R. at 417, 610.) The ALJ therefore did not err in 

making this assertion. 

 Plaintiff does not argue that the ALJ’s explanation of her determination is 

otherwise incorrect or inadequate. Nor does Plaintiff establish that the April 6, 2009 test 

complied with the requirements to be used for adjudication under 3.02(A) which require 

that the FEV1 should represent the largest of at least three satisfactory forced expiratory 

maneuvers, two of which should be reproducible for both pre-bronchodilator tests. 20 

C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 3.02(A). There is no evidence submitted by Plaintiff 

that the April 6 test complied with that requirement. And, as the ALJ noted, although the 

Case 2:12-cv-02681-GMS Document 30 Filed 01/09/14 Page 4 of 10
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

one test noted severe obstructive lung disease Dr. Raza noted that the Plaintiff had 

“extremely good functional status” and that the Plaintiff did not need to use the 

prescribed inhalers. Thus, the Court finds the ALJ did not err in her step three 

determination. 

 B. Medical Source Opinion Evidence 

Next, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in failing to articulate sufficient reasons 

for giving undue weight to one of the state agency physicians and for rejecting the 

medical source opinion evidence from Plaintiff’s treating physicians. (Doc. 17 at 13–20.) 

 1. State Agency Physicians 

O’Connell argues that the ALJ erred in her consideration of one of the state 

agency physician’s opinion evidence. O’Connell asserts that the ALJ gave too much 

weight to Dr. Quinones’s opinion evidence because he did not treat O’Connell and 

because Dr. Quinones failed to sufficiently explain the findings in his opinion. (Doc. 17 

at 18–19.) However, the ALJ gave only some weight to Dr. Quinones’s findings, and did 

so only to the extent the findings were consistent with objective findings. (R. at 27.) As 

such, the ALJ did not err in giving some weight to Dr. Quinones’s opinion evidence. 

 2. Treating Physicians 

Next, O’Connell argues that the ALJ erred in failing to articulate sufficient reasons 

for rejecting the medical source opinion evidence from his treating physicians. The 

regulations impose a hierarchy for medical opinions offered by licensed physicians. The 

opinion of a treating physician is given more weight than non-treating and non-examining 

medical sources. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527; Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 

2007); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). When the treating doctor’s 

opinion is uncontradicted, the ALJ can reject those conclusions only for “‘clear and 

convincing’ reasons.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (quoting Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 

1396 (9th Cir. 1991)). Even when another doctor disagrees with the treating doctor’s 

opinion, the ALJ can reject the treating doctor’s conclusions only when he provides 

“‘specific and legitimate reasons’ supported by substantial evidence in the record for so 

Case 2:12-cv-02681-GMS Document 30 Filed 01/09/14 Page 5 of 10
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

doing.” Id. (quoting Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983)).

 The ALJ considered opinion evidence from three of Plaintiff’s treating physicians: 

Drs. Mohammed Raza, Mohammed Khan, and Savinda Satapathy. Dr. Raza, Plaintiff’s 

treating pulmonologist, found that Plaintiff’s shortness of breath does severely affect his 

ability to function. (R. at 661–63.) Dr. Raza found that O’Connell’s impairments limit his 

ability to perform work-related activities, but it is not clear from his statement that Dr. 

Raza found that O’Connell is not able to sustain activity necessary for employment. (Id.) 

The ALJ concludes that Dr. Raza “did not opine that the claimant’s limitations would 

preclude all work” and that “his opinion is not inconsistent with those determined in this 

decision.” (R. at 26–27.) It is true that Dr. Raza does not specifically state that O’Connell 

is precluded from all work. After having reviewed the exhibits pertaining to Dr. Raza, 

the Court cannot conclude that the ALJ erred when it characterized his treatment records 

as being consistent with some work limitations, but not limitations sufficient to qualify 

O’Connell for disability benefits. Next, Dr. Mohammed Khan, Plaintiff’s treating 

gastroenterologist, found that O’Connell cannot perform full-time work on a regular and 

consistent basis. (R. at 532.) The ALJ stated that the specific limitations noted by Dr. 

Khan “are not entirely inconsistent with the limitations assigned in [her] decision.” (Id. at 

27.) The ALJ does not explain how this can be the case when Dr. Khan concluded that 

O’Connell is unable to work a forty-hour workweek, and the ALJ reached the opposite 

conclusion. The ALJ did not specify what, if any, weight she gave to Dr. Khan’s opinion. 

 Dr. Satapathy, Plaintiff’s primary care provider, also stated that Plaintiff is unable 

to work full-time. (R. at 659.) The ALJ determined that Dr. Satapathy’s findings were not 

well-supported by the clinical records and inconsistent with those of Plaintiff’s treating 

specialists. (Id. at 27.) Beyond this general statement, the ALJ does not specify any 

portions of the record that she asserts conflicts with Dr. Satapathy’s findings. 

 Because the ALJ failed to sufficiently explain her rejection of and the potential 

inconsistencies between the treating physician’s opinion evidence, the ALJ committed 

legal error that is not harmless. The ALJ’s decision must therefore be vacated. 

Case 2:12-cv-02681-GMS Document 30 Filed 01/09/14 Page 6 of 10
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

C. Consideration of Subjective Complaints 

 Finally, O’Connell contends that the ALJ erred in failing to properly consider 

subjective complaints. First, O’Connell asserts that the ALJ erred in finding that his 

testimony was not fully credible as to the severity and extent of his limitations. (Doc. 17 

at 20–28.) The ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis in determining whether a 

claimant’s testimony is credible. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 

2007). The ALJ must first “determine whether the claimant has presented objective 

medical evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to 

produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Id. at 1036. If he has, and the ALJ has 

found no evidence of malingering, then the ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony 

“only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Id. If an ALJ finds 

that a claimant’s testimony relating to the intensity of his pain and other limitations is 

unreliable, the ALJ must make a credibility determination citing the reasons why the 

testimony is unpersuasive. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1991). The 

ALJ must specifically identify what testimony is credible and what testimony undermines 

the claimant’s complaints. See Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 

(9th Cir. 1999). These findings, properly supported by the record, must be sufficiently 

specific to allow a reviewing court to conclude the adjudicator rejected the claimant’s 

testimony on permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s testimony 

regarding pain. Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345–46 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). 

 Here, at the first step, the ALJ concluded that O’Connell’s medically determinable 

impairments could reasonably be expected to produce his alleged symptoms. (R. at 24.) 

However, at the second step, the ALJ found that O’Connell’s statements regarding the 

intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms were not credible to the extent 

that they conflicted with the ALJ’s RFC assessment. (Id. at 24–27.) The ALJ did not state 

that she found any evidence of malingering; thus, her reasons for rejecting O’Connell’s 

Case 2:12-cv-02681-GMS Document 30 Filed 01/09/14 Page 7 of 10
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

symptom testimony must be clear and convincing. Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036. The 

ALJ’s general statement that O’Connell’s symptom testimony conflicts with the RFC 

does not itself constitute “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for discounting her 

testimony. Indeed, the ALJ is required to consider O’Connell’s symptom testimony in 

making the RFC assessment. 20 CFR § 416.945(a)(3). “Dismissing a claimant's 

credibility because it is inconsistent with a conclusion that must itself address the 

claimant’s credibility is circular reasoning” that cannot be sustained by this Court. 

Leitheiser v. Astrue, No. CV 10–6243–SI, 2012 WL 967647 at *9 (D. Or. Mar. 16, 2012). 

 However, beyond this general statement, the ALJ did provide clear and convincing 

reasons for her finding that O’Connell’s symptom testimony was only somewhat 

credible. First, the ALJ cited to objective medical evidence in the record that does not 

support his testimony. (R. at 24–27.) This included numerous portions of O’Connell’s 

medical records noting symptom improvement and that symptoms were well-controlled 

by treatment. (Id.) For example, the ALJ noted that the records indicate Plaintiff’s liver 

disease has been stable since his June 2009 discharge from the hospital (Id. at 25–26) and 

that the records show improvement in his respiratory symptoms when Plaintiff utilized 

prescribed medications (Id. at 26). Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in finding 

O’Connell’s symptom testimony only somewhat credible. 

 Next, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in failing to consider the opinion 

evidence from his father. (Id. at 27.) In his third-party report, Plaintiff’s father did 

indicate that Plaintiff often has fatigue and that this fatigue limits his ability to do heavy 

cleaning and lifting (Id. at 192), to ride his bicycle as often or for as long as he once had 

(Id. at 193), and to walk distances (Id. at 195). However, this report is not inconsistent 

with the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff has significant limitations, but can perform a limited 

range of sedentary activity. For example, Plaintiff’s father did not indicate that Plaintiff is 

limited in his ability to sit, concentrate, or follow instructions. (Id. at 195.) The ALJ’s 

determination does not conflict with the third-party report and thus the ALJ did not err in 

failing to explicitly address that report. 

Case 2:12-cv-02681-GMS Document 30 Filed 01/09/14 Page 8 of 10
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Lastly, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred by giving an inadequate hypothetical to 

the vocational expert because her hypothetical did not include all limitations suggested by 

Plaintiff’s treating physicians. However, the ALJ need only consider medical limitations 

supported by the record. As discussed above, the ALJ did not provide sufficient 

justification for her rejection of the treating physicians’ opinion evidence. It is therefore 

not clear whether she erred by failing to include some of the limitations assessed by those 

treating physicians in her hypothetical to the vocational expert. 

III. REMEDY 

Having decided to vacate the ALJ's decision, the Court has the discretion to 

remand the case either for further proceedings or for an award of benefits. See Reddick v. 

Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 728 (9th Cir. 1998). The rule in this Circuit is that the Court should 

remand for an award of benefits where “(1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally 

sufficient reasons for rejecting [certain] evidence, (2) there are no outstanding issues that 

must be resolved before a determination of disability can be made, and (3) it is clear from 

the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled were such 

evidence credited.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (1996). 

 Here, the ALJ’s decision does fail to provide legally sufficient evidence for 

rejecting Khan’s opinion that Plaintiff could not work a forty-hour workweek. However, 

when that evidence is credited as true, it is not clear from the record that the ALJ would 

be required to find disability. Crediting Dr. Kahn’s opinion as true, Drs. Khan and 

Satapathy concluded that O’Connell is precluded from full-time work. (R. at 532–33, 

659–60.) However, as this Court has already discussed, the ALJ did not err in 

characterizing Dr. Raza’s report as one that demonstrates work limitations, but not a 

complete inability to work a forty-hour workweek. (R. at 661–63.) Because there is 

inconsistency among the treating physicians regarding the ability of the claimant to work 

a full employment schedule, it is still uncertain, in light of the separate opinions from the 

treating physicians, that the claimant is entitled to disability benefits. The weighing and 

evaluation of such opinions must be resolved by the ALJ and it is not clear that, in 

Case 2:12-cv-02681-GMS Document 30 Filed 01/09/14 Page 9 of 10
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

conducting such balancing, the ALJ would be required to award benefits, even when Dr. 

Khan’s opinion is credited as true. 

 Further, because it is not clear whether the ALJ properly rejected the treating 

physicians’ opinion evidence, it is not clear whether the ALJ erred in failing to include 

some of the limitations assessed by those physicians in her hypothetical to the vocational 

expert. Therefore, the Court will remand the case for further proceedings consistent with 

this order. 

CONCLUSION 

 The ALJ made a legal error in failing to provide sufficient explanation for her 

rejection of the treating physicians’ opinion testimony that Plaintiff could not work a 

forty-hour workweek. Because this error was not harmless, the ALJ’s decision must be 

vacated and the case must be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the ALJ’s decision is VACATED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is REMANDED for further 

proceedings. 

Dated this 9th day of January, 2014. 

Case 2:12-cv-02681-GMS Document 30 Filed 01/09/14 Page 10 of 10