Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_08-cv-00432/USCOURTS-almd-2_08-cv-00432-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNTIED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

HENRI N. BEAULIEU, SR. et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, ) 

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:08-cv-432-MEF

)

ALABAMA ONSITE WASTEWATER ) (WO)

BOARD, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

This action is presently before the Court on Defendants Alabama Department of

Public Health, Donald Williamson, and William Allinder’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #9)

and a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #14) filed by Defendants Alabama Onsite Wastewater

Board, Carolyn Gibson, and Melissa Hines. Both these motions seek dismissal on

grounds of failure to state a claim, abstention, and other grounds. Plaintiffs’ Complaint

(Doc. #1) filed on June 5, 2008, seeks declaratory and injunctive relief for alleged

violations of constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, resulting in deprivation of

a property interest. After careful review of the submissions made by the parties, the Court

finds that the motions to dismiss are due to be GRANTED. 

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The parties have not disputed that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over

this case which asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See U.S.C. § 1331. 

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Additionally, Defendants have not argued that the Court does not have personal

jurisdiction over each of them. There is no dispute over whether venue is appropriate.

III. RULE 12(B)(6) STANDARD

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Prior to the

Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), a

motion to dismiss could only be granted if a plaintiff could prove “no set of facts . . .

which would entitle him to relief.” See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see

also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d

964, 967 (11th Cir. 1986). In order to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544. While the factual allegations of a complaint need

not be detailed, a plaintiff must nevertheless “provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to

relief’ and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at

1965. The plaintiff’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above

a speculative level on the assumption that the allegations in the complaint are true.” Id. 

It is not sufficient that the pleadings merely “le[ave] open the possibility that the plaintiff

might later establish some set of undisclosed facts to support recovery.” Id. at 1968

(internal quotation and alteration omitted). In considering a defendant’s motion to

dismiss, a district court will accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and view

them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez,

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Due to the procedural posture of this case, the facts set forth herein are taken from the 1

allegations of the Complaint.

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480 F.3d 1043, 1057 (11th Cir. 2007). Accord, Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 640

(2004) (where a court is considering dismissal of a complaint at the pleading stage, it

must assume the allegations of the complaint are true).

IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

Plaintiffs Henri Beaulieu, Sr. (“Beaulieu Sr.”) and Henri Beaulieu, Jr. (“Beaulieu

Jr.”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) sued Alabama Onsite Water Board (“AOWB”), Carolyn

Gibson, AOWB Chairperson, Melissa Hines, AOWB Executive Director, Alabama

Department of Public Health (“ADPH”), Donald Williamson, ADPH State Health

Officer, and William Allinder, ADPH Environmental Director, (collectively

“Defendants”) for violations of their constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983

(“section 1983”). 

Beaulieu Sr. owns property in Chilton County, AL. He intends to build cottages

on his property to supplement his retirement income with rental income. Accordingly, he

would like to install onsite wastewater systems for the cottages himself. His son,

Beaulieu Jr., would like to help him with the installations free-of-charge.

AOWB establishes the licensing qualifications of individuals who install onsite

wastewater systems. See Ala. Code § 34-21A-1 (1975). AOWB also determines whether

an individual is appropriately licensed or exempted from its requirements. See Ala. Code

§ 34-21A-7(1). Thus, AOWB only permits appropriately licensed individuals to install

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Ala. Code § 34-21A-10 reads in its entirety: 2

“The licensing requirements of this chapter shall not apply to owners of property

acting as their own contractors for the purpose of installing, cleaning, servicing, or

maintaining an onsite wastewater system on their own property with a one-family

or two-family residence used for their own occupancy or use so long as the

owners of said property with an onsite wastewater system do not hire or

compensate anyone to supervise or perform any part of the installation, cleaning,

servicing, or maintenance of the onsite wastewater system or equipment located

on their property.” Id. (emphasis added).

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wastewater systems. An Alabama statutory provision exempts property owners from

AOWB’s licensing requirements when installing onsite wastewater systems on their

property “for their own occupancy or use”. Ala. Code § 34-21A-10 (hereinafter “section 2

34-21A-10"). AOWB told Beaulieu Sr. that section 34-21A-10 did not apply to him

because the exemption only applied when property owners installed wastewater systems

on their primary residence. Plaintiffs interpret section 34-21A-10's exemption from

AOWB licensing requirements as applying whenever property owners install wastewater

systems for any use on their own property. AOWB also informed Beaulieu Sr. that he

would be subject to arrest if he, as an unlicensed individual, installed the wastewater

systems himself on his property. 

ADPH is a state agency who issues an “Approval for Use”for onsite wastewater

systems installed by AOWB licensed individuals. Ala. Admin. Code r. 420-3-1-.95

(2007). ADPH told Beaulieu Sr. that it would not inspect his property and issue an

“Approval for Use” if he installed wastewater systems on his property himself because

AOWB did not deem him an appropriately licensed individual. As a result of AOWB and

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ADPH’s decisions, Beaulieu Sr. has not built onsite wastewater systems on his property.

V. DISCUSSION

A. Failure to State a Claim

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted and seek dismissal of this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs assert that they have stated claims for relief under section

1983 and seek a denial of Defendants’ motions. The Court addresses Plaintiffs’ claims as

alleged in the Complaint and finds that the claims fail to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted. 

1. Section 1983 Claims

Section 1983 provides a remedy when a person acting under color of state law

deprives a plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution, laws, or

treaties of the United States. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

386, 393-94 (1989) (stating that “section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights,

but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred”)

(internal quotes omitted). Pursuant to section 1983, Plaintiffs’ claims for relief allege that

Defendants’ interpretation of section 34-21A-10 violated their due process rights secured

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The Fifth Amendment commands the federal government that “No person shall be ... 3

deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...” U.S. Const. amend. V.

The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part: “nor shall any State deprive any 4

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. ” U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

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by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs 3 4

allege that Defendants have deprived them of their due process rights because section 34-

21A-10 created a “legitimate claim of entitlement and expectancy of benefit” that

Defendants subsequently denied them. (Doc. #16 pg. 7.) According to Plaintiffs’

interpretation of the provision, section 24-21A-10 gave Beaulieu Sr. a “right to use his

property for his own profit.” Id.

To state a claim for relief under section 1983, Plaintiffs must allege that

Defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived them of a right secured by the due

process clauses. See, e.g., Am. Mfgs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). 

In this case, there is no dispute that Defendants acted under color of state law. Thus, the

issue before this Court is whether Defendants’ refusal to allow Plaintiffs to install

wastewater systems on their property themselves, as unlicensed individuals, deprived

Plaintiffs of a federally protected due process right. The Court addresses this issue. 

a. Substantive Due Process

In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege a violation of the due process clauses in the

Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution (“due process clauses”). The

due process clauses prohibit any government action that deprives a person of property

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without due process of law. See U.S. Const. amends. V& XIV. The Court recognizes

that the due process clauses provide two types of constitutional protections: procedural

due process and substantive due process. “A violation of either ... may form the basis for

a suit under section 1983.” McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1555 (11th Cir. 1994). 

Plaintiffs do not clarify whether their claims are substantive or procedural due process

claims and often confuse the concepts. For example, Plaintiffs argue that section 34-21A10 is “not narrowly tailored, has no rational basis, and serves no state interest compelling

or otherwise,” which suggests Plaintiffs allege a violation of their substantive due process

rights. (Doc. #1 pg. 4.) Plaintiffs also cite United States Supreme Court procedural due

process cases in their briefs. See Doc. # 16, pg. 8 (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.

564 (1974); Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254

(1970)). Accordingly, this Court will first analyze Plaintiffs’ claims as substantive

procedural due process claims. It will then consider whether Plaintiffs’ Complaint states

a procedural due process claim.

In substantive due process cases, a court must first identify the right at issue and

then apply the appropriate level of scrutiny. If the statute does not implicate a

fundamental right or target a suspect class, then courts must apply rational basis scrutiny. 

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (“[I]f a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor

targets a suspect class, we will uphold the [law] so long as it bears a rational relation to

some legitimate end.”); see, e.g., Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2000)

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(applying rational basis scrutiny to a city ordinance prohibiting “camping” on public

property). A statute is constitutional under rational basis scrutiny so long as “there is any

reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the [statute].” 

FCC v. Beach Comm’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).

Here, Plaintiffs challenge the validity of section 34-21A-10 “as-applied” to them

because they seek to vindicate their own rights. Da Mortg., Inc. v. City of Miami Beach,

486 F.3d 1254, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007). Plaintiffs allege section 34-21A-10 deprives

Beaulieu Sr. of “the legitimate use of his property” because he cannot install wastewater

systems on his property himself. (Doc. #1, pg. 18). Because there is no fundamental

right to install a wastewater system on one’s property free from licensing requirements,

the Court applies rational basis scrutiny to challenge the constitutionality of section 34-

21A-10. Defendants argue that the State of Alabama maintains a human and environment

health interest in the regulation of properly installed wastewater systems. The Court

agrees that section 34-21A-10 bears a rational relation to promoting human and

environment health in the State of Alabama. Because section 34-21A-10 is constitutional

as applied to Plaintiffs, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ claims do not state a substantive

due process violation.

b. Procedural Due Process

 In procedural due process cases, a court must first ask whether the claim involves

an interest protected by the due process clauses. See Conn. Dep’t of Public Safety v. Doe,

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538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003); see also Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 57 (1999);

Coleman v. Director, OWCP, 345 F.3d 861 (11th Cir. 2003). In this Circuit, a section

1983 claim alleging a denial of procedural due process requires proof of three elements:

(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) state

action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process. Cryder v. Oxendine, 24 F.3d 175, 177

(11th Cir. 1994). Therefore, this Court must first determine whether Plaintiffs’ claims

involve an interest protected by the due process clauses.

The United States Supreme Court has developed an approach to procedural due

process cases that affords different levels of protection to government legislative actions

and government adjudicative actions. See Londoner v. City & County of Denver, 210

U.S. 373 (1908); Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441

(1915). An action is legislative when a governmental body enacts a law of general

applicability in its legislative capacity. Bi-Metallic, 239 U.S. at 446 (viewing a State

Board of Equalization order which required an “across-the-board” increase in assessed

value of taxable property and applied equally to all landowners in Denver as a legislative

act). A government action is adjudicative when a law is not generally applicable; for

example, when a city council makes determinations based on individualized grounds. 

Londoner, 210 U.S. at 380.

Under the Supreme Court’s due process approach, property owners are not

generally entitled to procedural due process if the government action is legislative

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In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981), the Eleventh Circuit 5

adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions issued prior to the close of business on

September 30, 1981. 

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because the legislative process provided the property owners with sufficient due process

protection. 75 Acres, LLC v. Miami-Dade County, Fla., 338 F.3d 1288, 1294 (11th Cir.

2003) (noting that “[w]hen the legislature passes a law which affects a general class of

persons, those persons have all received procedural due process-the legislative process”)

(quoting Ronald E. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law § 17.8 (3d

ed.1999)). In contrast, if government conduct is adjudicative in nature, property owners

may be entitled to procedural due process beyond that which already has been given. Id.

at 1294.

The Eleventh Circuit has acknowledged the distinction between legislative and

adjudicative action and has applied this principle in procedural due process cases. See,

e.g., 75 Acres, LLC, 338 F.3d at 1294; Peterman v. Coleman, 764 F.2d 1416, 1419 (11th

Cir. 1985); Couf v. DeBlaker, 652 F.2d 585, 590 (5th Cir. 1981); South Gwinnett Venture

v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc). In 75 Acres, LLC, a real estate 5

developer brought a section 1983 action against Miami-Dade county, alleging that a

county code provision requiring the county manager to impose a building moratorium on

certain parcels of real property violated the due process clause. Id. at 1290. The Circuit

held that the imposition of moratorium did not implicate due process protections because

it was a legislative act. Id. at 1291. The Circuit reasoned that the moratorium was

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 Plaintiffs cite Roth v. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), for the proposition that 6

they have a property interest in self-installing a wastewater system on their property. In Roth, the

United States Supreme Court considered whether a university deprived an untenured professor of

a property interest when it refused to renew his employment contract. Id. at 576. The Supreme

Court held that the untenured professor did not have a protected property interest because his

interest was not based upon “a legitimate claim of entitlement.” Id. at 577. Here, Plaintiffs argue

that Defendants’ refusal to exempt them from a license requirement was a deprivation of their

property because they expected the statutory exemption to apply to them. (Doc. #16, pg. 7.) The

Court disagrees. Plaintiffs’ expectation that section 34-21A-10 would apply to them is based

solely on their interpretation of the provision. As a result, Plaintiffs did not have a “legitimate

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legislative because it was generally applicable and prospective in nature. Id. at 1294. 

Importantly, the Circuit noted that the real estate developer did not seek a hearing at

which the Miami-Dade county manager would make a factual determination. Id. at 1297.

Here, Plaintiffs argue that they had a property right in installing a wastewater

system themselves because they interpret section 34-21A-10 as exempting Plaintiffs from

AOWB’s licensing requirements. Plaintiffs further contend that Defendants’ actions

prohibiting them from installing wastewater systems themselves denied them due process. 

Section 34-21A-10 is generally applicable and prospective in nature. In addition, the

Court notes that Plaintiffs did not seek a hearing at which AOWB would make a factual

determination whether Plaintiffs fit into section 34-21A-10's exemption provision. 

Plaintiffs instead sought injunctive and declaratory relief. Therefore, the Court classifies

AOWB’s application of section 34-21A-10 to Plaintiffs’ property as a legislative act and

finds that Plaintiffs are not entitled to additional due process. Consequently, Plaintiffs

cannot establish that their interest in installing wastewater systems constitutes a sufficient

property interest to give rise to a due process claim. 

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claim of entitlement” that they would be exempted from Defendants’ license requirements and

did not have a property interest subject to due process protections.

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B. Abstention

The foregoing analysis constitutes adequate grounds on which to grant the motions

to dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ claims. In addition to arguing failure to state a claim as a

ground for dismissal, Defendants argue that this action must be dismissed under the

Pullman abstention doctrine. The Court agrees. In Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163,

1174 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit described its approach to Pullman

abstention: 

Under the Pullman abstention doctrine, a federal court will defer to state

court resolution of underlying issues of state law. Two elements must be

met for Pullman abstention to apply: (1) the case must present an unsettled

question of state law, and (2) the question of state law must be dispositive

of the case or would materially alter the constitutional question presented.

The purpose of Pullman abstention is to avoid unnecessary friction in

federal-state functions, interference with important state functions, tentative

decisions on questions of state law, and premature constitutional

adjudication. Because abstention is discretionary, it is only appropriate

when the question of state law can be fairly interpreted to avoid

adjudication of the constitutional question. Id.

First, the Court must consider whether a case meets the two requirements of Pullman

abstention. Pittman v. Cole, 267 F.3d 1269, 1288 (11th Cir. 2001). Second, the Court

should “take into account the nature of the controversy and the importance of the right

allegedly impaired” in determining whether to abstain. Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1174 (finding

that abstention was less appropriate in context of voting rights). For example,

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“[a]bstention is to be invoked particularly sparingly in actions involving alleged

deprivations of First Amendment rights.” Pittman, 267 F.3d at 1287 (citing Cate v.

Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176, 1184 (11th Cir. 1983)). In sum, “[i]f the germane state law

questions are novel or unsettled, principles of federalism counsel in favor of allowing

state courts, instead of federal courts, to interpret and define state law before the federal

courts subject the state law to federal constitutional scrutiny.” Id. at 1287 (citing Allstate

Ins. Co. v. Serio, 261 F.3d 143, 149 (2d Cir. 2001)). That goal may be accomplished

through Pullman abstention. Id.

Here, the Court finds that Pullman abstention applies because this case presents an

unsettled question of state law and that question of state law is dispositive to the case. 

The Alabama law is unsettled because no Alabama court has interpreted section 34-21A10. Further, the text of section 34-21A-10 is unclear. Plaintiffs interpret section 34-21A10 as an exemption from AOWB licensing requirements for property owners installing

wastewater systems on their property for any use. In contrast, Defendants interpret

section 34-21A-10 as an exemption from AOWB requirements only when a property

owner is installing a wastewater system on their primary residence. The statute’s

meaning is dispositive to Plaintiffs’ claims because Plaintiffs’ claims would be resolved if

a court interpreted section 34-21A-10 as Plaintiffs interpret it. Therefore, this case meets

the two requirements of Pullman abstention. Further, the Court recognizes that the nature

of this case and the importance of the right allegedly impaired favor abstention. This case

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Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants are prohibiting them from installing wastewater 7

systems on their property. Instead, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are prohibiting them from

installing wastewater systems on their property themselves.

In the Complaint filed on June 5, 2008, Plaintiffs argue that this Court has supplemental 8

jurisdiction over their state law claims. (Doc. #1 pg. 5.) Notably, the Court could not identify

any state law claim in the Complaint. Out of an abundance of caution, however, this Court will

now address whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such claims to the extent they

actually exist.

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asks the Court to interpret a state statute and involves a right to install wastewater systems

free of state licensing requirements. Abstention in this case would allow the state court 7

to resolve state law issues that could moot the need for further proceedings in the federal

case. The Court has already found that Plaintiffs’ claims do not state a due process

violation and must be dismissed. On alternative grounds, this Court finds this action must

be dismissed under the Pullman abstention doctrine. 

C. Claims Pursuant to State Law 

In addition to Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs allege

claims pursuant to Alabama law. This Court has supplemental subject matter jurisdiction 8

over these claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The statutory provision addressing

supplemental jurisdiction provides that 

(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided

otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts

have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental

jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action

within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or

controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. 

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Thus, Section 1367(a) provides a basis for this Court to exercise

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jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to Alabama law because it has jurisdiction

over their claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, the requirement contained in §

1367(a) that this Court exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law

claims is subject to certain enumerated instances in which it is appropriate for a federal

court to decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over a case. Those

circumstances are set forth in Section 1367(c), which provides that

The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a

claim under subsection (a) if –

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, 

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over

which the district court has original jurisdiction, 

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction, or

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for

declining jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The Court finds that the federal claims over which this Court had

original jurisdiction have now been resolved against Plaintiffs. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3), the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’

claims pursuant to Alabama law. All of Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to Alabama law, to

the extent any have been stated, will accordingly be DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE. This dismissal should not work to Plaintiffs’ disadvantage should they

elect to bring suit in state court because the period of limitations for any of these claims is

tolled during the pendency of this action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).

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V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED and

Plaintiffs’ federal claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. All of Plaintiffs’ claims

pursuant to Alabama law are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. An appropriate

judgment will be entered.

DONE this the 13 day of March, 2009. th

 /s/ Mark E. Fuller 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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