Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_24-cv-00089/USCOURTS-ared-4_24-cv-00089-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Personal Injury

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

CENTRAL DIVISION 

BRETT DEVINE 

d/b/a DEVINE EXTERIOR PLAINTIFF 

v. Case No. 4:24-cv-00089 KGB 

JOHN PRESTON WILSON, SR. 

and LIGHTS BY SPARKY, INC. DEFENDANTS 

ORDER 

Before the Court are two pending motions to dismiss. First, there is separate defendant 

John Preston Wilson, Sr.’s answer to the complaint that prays that the complaint be dismissed with 

prejudice (Dkt. No. 3, at 5). This first motion to dismiss by Mr. Wilson is listed on the docket 

sheet for this case as Docket Number 5. Plaintiff Brett Devine responded in opposition to the 

motion (Dkt. No. 6). Also before the Court is defendant Lights by Sparky, Inc.’s (“Sparky”) 

motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint (Dkt. No. 8). Mr. Devine responded in opposition to 

Sparky’s motion (Dkt. No. 10). For the following reasons, the Court denies Mr. Wilson’s motion 

to dismiss and grants, in part, and denies, in part, Sparky’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. Nos. 5; 8). 

I. Background 

Mr. Devine filed this action on February 2, 2024, alleging five counts against Mr. Wilson 

and Sparky: “Violation of Cyberpiracy Protections for Individuals” under the Anti-Cybersquatting 

Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 8131 (Count I); “Violation of the Arkansas 

Deceptive Trade Practices Act” (“ADTPA”), Arkansas Code Annotated § 4-88-101 et seq. (Count 

II); “Outrage” (Count III); “Unjust Enrichment” (Count IV); and “Injunctive Relief” (Count V) 

(Dkt. No. 1, at 13–28). 

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To summarize the allegations, Mr. Devine states that he is a sole proprietor who provides 

landscaping services, including the installation and removal of Christmas lights during the holiday 

season (Id., ¶ 1). Mr. Devine operates under the name of “B. Devine Exterior” (“Devine Exterior”) 

and has been in this business in central Arkansas for over 13 years (Id., ¶ 4).1 Mr. Devine alleges 

that in 2018 Mr. Wilson formed a competing company, Sparky, an Arkansas corporation, that also 

installs Christmas lights during the holiday season (Id., ¶ 5). At times, Mr. Wilson uses Sparky as 

his alter ego (Id., ¶ 2). Mr. Devine also states that Mr. Wilson competed against him for several 

years prior to 2018 (Id., ¶ 5). 

Mr. Devine alleges that, over the course of several years, defendants have engaged in 

deceptive practices (Id., ¶ 6). Mr. Devine alleges that defendants told clients that: (1) Mr. Devine 

did not know what he was doing; (2) Devine Exterior was not a real business; (3) Devine Exterior 

would mess up their home; (4) the lighting work on the houses of Devine Exterior’s clients was 

“shotty”; and (5) Mr. Devine did not pay his taxes (Id.). Mr. Devine further alleges that his 

customers became aware of defendants’ false statements and that at least one of them confronted 

defendants about the false statements (Id.). The false statements eventually led to Mr. Devine 

issuing a cease-and-desist letter to Mr. Wilson and Sparky in 2019 (Id.). An attorney for Mr. 

Wilson and Sparky verbally responded to the letter indicating that the misconduct would stop (Id.). 

1

 The complaint refers variously to “Devine” and “Mr. Devine.” The Court understands 

references to “Devine” in the complaint to refer to the Devine Exterior business. The Court 

understands references to “Mr. Devine” in the complaint to refer to the plaintiff in his individual 

capacity. In Mr. Devine’s complaint, Mr. Devine refers variously to his business as “B. Devine 

Exterior” and “B. Devine Exteriors.” For purposes of consistency, the Court uses “B. Devine 

Exterior.” 

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Mr. Devine alleges that the misconduct did not stop (Id., ¶ 7). In 2021, Mr. Wilson posted 

on Facebook that his long-time competitor had retired and that customers should contact Sparky 

for that business (Id.). During that same year, Mr. Wilson allegedly continued falsely to tell 

customers that Devine Exterior was not a real business and that Devine Exterior was “uninsured” 

(Id.). Mr. Devine asserts that these allegedly false statements are inconsistent with the fact that 

Mr. Wilson once offered to sell his business to Mr. Devine (Id.). 

Mr. Devine also alleges that there were several instances where Mr. Devine’s customers 

had their Christmas lights cut while Sparky’s employees were in the area, although he notes that 

this was never tied to Sparky (Id.). 

In 2023, Mr. Devine explored ways to expand his business and his wife reached out to 

“Godaddy.com” to implement the Devine’s website plan and expanded business model (Id., ¶ 8). 

Over the course of a few weeks, Mr. Devine’s wife received responses from “Godaddy.com” 

informing her that the website domain names being attempted by Mr. Devine would violate the 

rights of others (Id.). The domain names attempted were in Mr. Devine’s personal name or 

variations thereof (Id.). Mr. Devine’s wife then reached out to “Godaddy.com” for an explanation 

(Id.). To her surprise, she received a response from Mr. Wilson, who was contacted by 

“Godaddy.com” regarding the inquiry (Id.). 

On January 5, 2024, Mr. Wilson emailed Mr. Devine’s wife and stated, “I received an email 

from godaddy.com about possible infringements” (Id., ¶ 10). Mr. Wilson further stated, “I have 

gone down this road before. I have several websites and names registered with the Secretary of 

State and have had them for several years now” (Id.). Mr. Wilson also said, “I would be interested 

in selling them if you are interested.” (Id.). Mr. Devine’s wife replied and asked for more 

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information to which Mr. Wilson wrote: “I’ve owned them for several years. I also own all these 

names with the Arkansas Secretary of State as fictious names. I’ll sell them as well. I have 

invested a lot of time and money over the years to maintain these. I will sell all for $10,000” (Id.). 

Mr. Wilson then listed the following domain names to be sold: devineexteriors.com; 

bdevineexterior.com; bdevinelights.com; bdevinelighting.com; brettdevinelights.com; and 

brettdevinelighting.com (Id.). 

Mr. Devine asserts that he never consented to Mr. Wilson or Sparky using his name for 

website domains (Id., ¶ 11). Further, the Arkansas Secretary of State website allegedly lists “B. 

Devine Exteriors” as a fictitious name for Sparky (Id.). 

Mr. Devine further alleges that defendants violated the ADTPA “by diverting business 

from Brett Devine through the use of the websites under Brett Devine’s name wherein customers 

would click the ‘Devine’ website domains only to be redirected to Sparky’s website” (Id., ¶ 19). 

Mr. Devine asserts that he sustained actual damages in each instance where a customer attempted 

to access Devine Exterior’s website but was instead diverted to Sparky’s website, resulting in Mr. 

Wilson and Sparky acquiring business at the expense of Mr. Devine (Id.). Mr. Devine alleges he 

suffered a financial loss due to the deceptive diversion of his customers to Sparky’s website and 

sustained mental anguish caused by the deception and loss of business (Id.). Mr. Devine contends 

that defendants’ long history of making false statements to Devine Exteriors’ customers in an 

attempt to divert business from Mr. Devine to defendants has resulted in harm to Mr. Devine’s 

reputation and to lost revenue (Id.). 

Mr. Devine avers that defendants’ allegedly deceitful conduct was intended to harm Mr. 

Devine and steal his good-will, reputation, and revenue (Id., ¶ 25). Defendants’ actions have 

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allegedly caused Mr. Devine emotional distress (Id.). Mr. Devine also alleges that defendants 

wrongfully received the value of Mr. Devine’s name and business goodwill, as well as revenue 

that was improperly diverted from Mr. Devine to Mr. Wilson and Sparky (Id., ¶ 27). 

II. Legal Standard 

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the claim or claims stated in the 

complaint. See Peck v. Hoff, 660 F.2d 371, 374 (8th Cir. 1981). “To survive a motion to dismiss, 

a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that 

is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Although a complaint “does 

not need detailed factual allegations” to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the “[f]actual 

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555. Stated differently, the allegations pleaded must show “more than a sheer possibility 

that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

A court considering a motion to dismiss must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the 

complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of the non-moving party. 

See Farm Credit Servs. of Am., FLCA v. Haun, 734 F.3d 800, 804 (8th Cir. 2013); Coons v. Mineta, 

410 F.3d 1036, 1039 (8th Cir. 2005); Abels v. Farmers Commodities Corp., 259 F.3d 910, 914 

(8th Cir. 2001). However, a court need not credit conclusory allegations or “naked assertion[s] 

devoid of further factual enhancement.” Retro Television Network, Inc. v. Luken Commc’ns, LLC, 

696 F.3d 766, 768 (8th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 

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III. Discussion 

A. Separate Defendant Wilson’s Motion 

Local Rule 7.2(e) of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Eastern and 

Western Districts of Arkansas requires that motions to dismiss be set forth in a separate pleading 

accompanied by a separate brief. Mr. Wilson failed to comply with Local Rule 7.2(e), instead 

moving to dismiss only in a paragraph in his answer. The Court denies Mr. Wilson’s motion on 

this basis. 

Further, the Court notes that, in his motion to dismiss, Mr. Wilson argues that he should be 

dismissed as a defendant in his individual capacity because he is protected by Sparky’s limited 

liability under Arkansas law (Dkt. Nos. 3, ¶ 19; 5). However, the Court understands the complaint 

to allege that Sparky’s corporate veil should be pierced as to Mr. Wilson on the basis that Sparky 

is an alter ego of Mr. Wilson (See Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 2). The Court considers Mr. Devine’s allegations 

of fraudulent conduct as sufficient to support a claim for corporate veil-piercing against Mr. 

Wilson at this stage of the litigation. See Wyatt v. Wyatt, 545 S.W.3d 796, 801 (Ark. Ct. App. 

2018) (“Our law . . . requires a finding that the corporate form has been abused to the injury of a 

third party.”); Fulmer v. Hurt, 515 S.W.3d 129, 134 (Ark. Ct. App. 2017) (“[I]n order to pierce a 

corporate veil, a plaintiff must have evidence of fraud, illegal conduct, or abuse of an entity for the 

specific purpose of injuring a third party.”). 

For these reasons, the Court denies Mr. Wilson’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 5). 

B. Separate Defendant Sparky’s Motion 

Mr. Devine’s complaint alleges four causes of action: (1) violation of the ACPA’s 

Individual Cyberpiracy Protections under 15 U.S.C. § 8131; (2) violation of ADTPA; (3) outrage; 

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and (4) unjust enrichment (Dkt. No. 1). Sparky moves to dismiss all of Mr. Devine’s claims (Dkt. 

No. 8). First, Sparky asserts that no domain name owned by defendant is that of a living person 

or one that is “substantially or confusingly similar” (Dkt. No. 9, at 2). Sparky contends that 

because one domain, “BrettDevine.com,” is not owned or registered by defendant, but instead by 

a Ph.D. economist, Mr. Devine’s complaint fails to state a cause of action under 15 U.S.C. § 8131 

(Id.). Second, Sparky argues that Mr. Devine fails to allege any facts to show that the defendant 

registered any of the domain names with the specific intent to profit from such name by selling the 

domain name for financial gain (Id.). Sparky asserts that the defendant paid for and maintained 

the domain names for many years (Id.). Sparky then states that plaintiff’s complaint “completely 

exonerates” it because it details that neither Sparky nor Mr. Wilson sought out the plaintiff to profit 

from the domain names (Id.). Rather, Sparky argues that it only contacted Mr. Devine after being 

informed that someone was trying to infringe upon this intellectual property by the server host 

(Id.). Sparky argues that, without a cause of action under 15 U.S.C. § 8131, this Court lacks subject 

matter jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims (Id.). The Court examines each of these 

arguments in turn. 

1. ACPA Claim 

Count I of the complaint asserts a claim under the ACPA, which enumerates certain 

“cyberpiracy protections for individuals” (Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 13–18). Specifically, this claim is 

brought under 15 U.S.C. § 8131, which provides in part: 

[a]ny person who registers a domain name that consists of the name of another 

living person, or a name substantially and confusingly similar thereto, without that 

person’s consent, with the specific intent to profit from such name by selling the 

domain name for financial gain to that person or any third party, shall be liable in a 

civil action by such person. 

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In any civil action brought under paragraph (1), a court may award injunctive relief, 

including the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the 

domain name to the plaintiff. The court may also, in its discretion, award costs and 

attorneys fees to the prevailing party. 

To prevail on this claim under § 8131, Mr. Devine must plead that Sparky: (1) registered a domain 

name consisting of Mr. Devine’s name; (2) that Mr. Devine did not consent to the registration; and 

(3) that Sparky had the specific intent to profit by selling the domain name for financial gain. Id. 

§ 8131 

In this case, Mr. Devine claims that defendants registered several domain names that 

incorporate Mr. Devine’s name without Mr. Devine’s consent (Id., ¶ 17). Mr. Devine further 

claims that defendants attempted to extort him by asking for $10,000 in exchange for the domain 

names (Id., ¶¶ 10, 17). In the light of these allegations, Mr. Devine has plausibly alleged that 

defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 8131. The complaint sufficiently alleges that: (1) defendants 

registered several names consisting of Mr. Devine’s name or one similar thereto; (2) Mr. Devine 

did not consent to defendants registering these names; and (3) defendants purportedly had the 

specific intent to profit by offering to sell the domain names to Mr. Devine for $10,000. Whether 

or not a single domain—“BrettDevine.com”—is owned by a Ph.D. economist rather than 

defendants is irrelevant to whether Mr. Devine’s complaint sufficiently states a cause of action 

under the statute as to the other domain names. Likewise, there is no requirement that defendants 

need have “sought out” Mr. Devine to have an intent to profit for purposes of § 8131. Indeed, 

merely using the domain names as leverage in negotiations is sufficient. See Tollefson v. Pladson, 

Case No. 3:11-cv-62, 2012 WL 3402107, at *3 (D.N.D. May 9, 2012), R. & R. adopted, Case No. 

3:11-cv-62, 2012 WL 3396389 (D.N.D. Aug. 14, 2012). 

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For these reasons, the Court finds that Count I of the complaint sufficiently states a claim 

under 15 U.S.C. § 8131. As such, this Court may properly exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 

the remaining state law claims. 

2. ADTPA Claim 

Count II of the complaint asserts a claim under ADTPA on the basis that defendants 

diverted business from Mr. Devine using the websites under Mr. Devine’s name wherein 

customers would click the “Devine” website domains only to be redirected to Sparky’s website 

(Dkt. No. 1). In addition, Mr. Devine claims that defendants has a long history of making false 

statements to Mr. Devine’s customers to divert business from Mr. Devine and direct it to 

defendants (Dkt. No. 1). 

To state a claim under ADTPA, a private plaintiff must plausibly allege: (1) a deceptive 

consumer-oriented act or practice which is misleading in a material respect; and (2) an injury 

resulting from such act. Parnell v. FanDuel, Inc., 591 S.W.3d 315, 318 (Ark. 2019). Arkansas 

Code Annotated § 4-88-107 states, in relevant part, that “disparaging the goods, services, or 

business of another by false or misleading representation of fact,” constitutes a deceptive and 

unconscionable trade practice. Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-107(a)(2). 

In this case, Mr. Devine has plausibly alleged that defendants engaged in a deceptive 

consumer-oriented practice which is misleading in a material respect and that an injury resulted 

from such practice. Mr. Devine alleges that defendants diverted business from Mr. Devine by 

using the websites under Mr. Devine’s name where customers would click the “Devine” website 

domain only to be redirected to Sparky’s website. Mr. Devine claims that, as a result, he sustained 

actual damages in each instance where a customer attempted to access Mr. Devine’s website but 

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was instead diverted to Sparky’s website. Mr. Devine alleges that this resulted in defendants 

acquiring business at Mr. Devine’s expense. 

For these reasons, the Court finds that Count II of the complaint sufficiently states a claim 

for a violation of the ADTPA. 

3. Tort Of Outrage 

Count III of the complaint alleges the tort of outrage on the basis that defendants’ deceitful 

conduct was intended to harm Mr. Devine and steal his goodwill, reputation, and revenue which 

caused Mr. Devine emotional distress. 

In an action for outrage, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege four elements: (1) the defendant 

intended to inflict emotional distress or knew or should have known that emotional distress was a 

likely result of his conduct; (2) the defendant’s conduct was “extreme and outrageous,” was 

“beyond all possible bounds of decency,” and was “utterly intolerable in a civilized community”; 

(3) the actions of the defendant caused the plaintiff’s distress; and (4) the emotional distress 

sustained by the plaintiff was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. 

Williams v. Mannis, 889 F.3d 926, 932 (8th Cir. 2018). Generally, Arkansas courts look to several 

factors to determine whether conduct is “extreme and outrageous.” Doe v. Wright, 82 F.3d 265, 

269 (8th Cir. 1996). Those factors include: the conduct at issue; the amount of time over which 

the conduct took place; the relation between the plaintiff and defendant; and the defendant’s 

knowledge that the plaintiff is particularly susceptible to emotional distress by some mental or 

physical peculiarity. Id. 

The Arkansas Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “the tort of outrage is not favored 

by this court and that clear cut proof is required to establish the elements in outrage cases.” Rorie 

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v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 151 F.3d 757, 762 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Shepherd v. Wash. Cnty., 

962 S.W.2d 779, 792 (Ark. 1998)). As such, Arkansas courts have taken a strict approach to 

determining the validity of an outrage claim, recognizing that the “tort of outrage should not and 

does not open the doors of the courts to every slight insult or indignity one must endure in life.” 

Tandy Corp. v. Bone, 678 S.W.2d 312, 315 (Ark. 1984). The type of conduct that meets the 

standard for outrage is determined case by case. Crockett v. Essex, 19 S.W.3d 585, 589 (Ark. 

2000). Merely describing conduct as outrageous does not make it so. Id. Even gross negligence 

cannot be characterized as “atrocious or exceeding all possible bounds of decency.” Wood v. 

National Computer Systems, Inc., 814 F.2d 544, 545 (8th Cir. 1987). 

In this case, Mr. Devine fails to plausibly plead a claim for outrage. Assuming arguendo 

that all of the allegations in Mr. Devine’s complaint are true, Mr. Devine fails to allege facts to 

demonstrate that defendants’ conduct was so “extreme and outrageous” as to be beyond all 

possible bounds of human decency. While Mr. Devine does allege that defendants made false 

representations about Mr. Devine’s business for many years, these facts do not rise to the level of 

outrageous behavior required by Arkansas case law. Mr. Devine argues that defendants’ conduct 

is regarded as atrocious and intolerable because a specific federal statute outlaws the specific 

conduct committed by defendants. However, this alone is insufficient to establish that the conduct 

was “outrageous” or “regarded as atrocious and intolerable” in a civilized society. See Shepherd 

v. Washington Cnty., 962 S.W.2d 779, 791 (Ark. 1998) (holding that a sheriff who knew the 

dangers posed by prisoner escorts but ignored them did not rise to “extreme and outrageous” 

conduct, even though this ignorance led to the prisoner disarming his transporting officer, escaping 

from custody, and killing an innocent bystander); Growth Props. I v. Cannon, 669 S.W.2d 447, 

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448 (Ark. 1984) (upholding an award of damages based on an outrage claim arising when an owner 

of a cemetery moved heavy equipment across the graves of plaintiffs’ relatives, causing exposure 

to their vaults that could have been avoided by an alternate route, determining that such conduct 

constituted “careless and callous” disregard); Rorie, 151 F.3d at 760 (holding that plaintiff could 

not establish an outrage claim in Arkansas based on her allegations of disparate treatment, sexual 

harassment, and termination due to her gender, emphasizing that the tort of outrage is not favored 

in Arkansas and that the alleged instances of discrimination and harassment do not support such a 

claim). Additionally, Mr. Devine has not pled facts alleging that these actions caused him 

emotional distress or that the emotional distress sustained by Mr. Devine was “so severe that no 

reasonable person could be expected to endure it.” Williams, 889 F.3d at 932. 

For these reasons, the Court dismisses Count III of Mr. Devine’s complaint as to separate 

defendants Sparky for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

 4. Unjust Enrichment 

Count IV of the complaint alleges a claim for unjust enrichment based on defendants 

receiving “the value of Mr. Devine’s name and business goodwill as well as revenue that was 

improperly diverted from Mr. Devine to Mr. Wilson and Sparky” (Dkt. No 1, at 27). 

Unjust enrichment is an equitable doctrine imposed when one party has been unjustly 

enriched at the expense of another such that restitution is warranted. Servewell Plumbing, LLC v. 

Summit Contractors, Inc., 210 S.W.3d 101, 112 (Ark. 2005). To state a cause of action for unjust 

enrichment in Arkansas, a plaintiff must plead four elements: (1) the plaintiff suffered a detriment; 

(2) the defendant received money from the plaintiff to which it was not entitled and which should 

be restored to the plaintiff; (3) there was some operative act, intent, or situation that made the 

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alleged enrichment of the defendant unjust and inequitable; and (4) the amount by which the 

defendant was unjustly enriched. Hall v. David H. Arrington Oil & Gas, Inc., Case No. 2:09-cv0091, 2010 WL 1253383, at *2 (E.D. Ark. 2010). 

In this case, Mr. Devine has plausibly alleged that defendants were unjustly enriched. The 

complaint is sufficient to establish: (1) Mr. Devine suffered a detriment due to defendants’ 

diverting business from Mr. Devine to Mr. Wilson and Sparky; (2) defendants were unjustly 

enriched by receiving the value of Mr. Devine’s name and business goodwill, as well as revenue; 

(3) the actions of defendants made this enrichment unjust and inequitable; and (4) the amount by 

which defendants were unjustly enriched. 

 For these reasons, the Court finds that Count IV of the complaint sufficiently states a 

claim for unjust enrichment. 

IV. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court: 

(1) denies Mr. Wilson’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 5); 

(2) grants Sparky’s motion to dismiss as to Count III as to separate defendant 

Sparky (Dkt. No. 8); and 

(3) denies Sparky’s motion to dismiss as to Counts I, II, and IV (Id.). 

It is so ordered this 18th day of December, 2024. 

_______________________ 

Kristine G. Baker 

Chief United States District Judge 

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