Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-00589/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-00589-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JOSEPH FLOWERS, 

 

 Petitioner, 

 

 v. 

F. FOULK, Warden, 

 

 Respondent. 

________________________________/ 

No. C 14-0589 CW 

ORDER GRANTING IN 

PART MOTION TO 

DISMISS 

(Docket No. 49) 

 A jury convicted Petitioner Joseph Flowers, a state prisoner, 

of robbing Wei Mei Chen, Wendy Zhang, and Lin "Lili" Juan--three 

masseuses working at a San Rafael massage parlor--and of 

kidnapping Zhang. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his state 

criminal conviction and asserting six claims of constitutional 

error, with subclaims. The matter comes before the Court on 

Respondent's motion to dismiss the petition and on several motions 

filed by Petitioner. 

BACKGROUND 

 The following background facts, including footnotes, are 

taken from the California Court of Appeal decision denying 

Petitioner's direct appeal. 

On December 24, 2008, two men robbed the New Day 

Health Spa in San Rafael and kidnapped one of the three 

female masseuses working there. By amended information 

filed July 30, 2009, prosecutors charged defendant and 

his alleged accomplice, Douglas Patterson, with 

kidnapping, kidnapping for robbery, second degree 

burglary, and three counts of robbery—one count per 

masseuse. 

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An eight-day jury trial began on April 29, 2010 and 

concluded on May 11, 2010. 

Interior and exterior surveillance cameras at the 

massage parlor captured part of the robbery and 

kidnapping. At trial, the prosecution played the 

surveillance tape during the testimony of massage parlor 

manager, Ms. Xiu He; one of the masseuses, Chen;1 and 

Patterson, who on the first day of trial entered a plea 

bargain to lesser charges and agreed to testify for the 

state. 

The interior surveillance tape showed defendant 

drawing a gun on the three masseuses and commanding them 

to get on the floor. The tape then showed defendant 

pointing his gun at Juan's head and grabbing her hair 

with his free hand. Patterson2 and Chen both testified 

defendant demanded money from Juan and led her into a 

back room, out of the camera's view, so she could get 

"her money" for him. This back room, explained Chen, 

contained lockers where the masseuses kept personal 

items, such as their money. From the back room, both 

Patterson and Chen could hear defendant demand money, 

and indeed, defendant emerged from the back room with, 

according to Patterson, about "two or three" purses, and 

according to Chen, "a bag with money inside." 

The tape next showed this scenario repeat, but with 

defendant dragging Chen into the back room by her hair 

at gunpoint. While in the back room, testified Chen, 

defendant forced her to open several lockers and 

defendant took money from a pink bag belonging to Zhang 

and about $900 in personal and work money from Chen's 

purse. 

When defendant returned with Chen, he began to 

repeat the process with the last masseuse, Zhang, 

grabbing her hair and pointing his gun at her head. 

According to Chen, Zhang pointed at her pink bag and 

tried to tell defendant he already had her money. 

Defendant then, with the gun still pointed at Zhang's 

head, dragged her outside. Patterson, by then waiting 

for defendant in a parked car, observed defendant emerge 

from the massage parlor and force Zhang at gunpoint into 

the car. The exterior surveillance camera captured 

this, as well. 

Patterson drove away, Zhang and defendant in the 

back seat, and defendant with his gun trained on Zhang. 

 1 The other masseuses did not testify at trial. 

2 It appears Patterson occasionally confused the names of the 

masseuses in his testimony. 

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During the drive, Patterson saw defendant rummaging 

through his takings from the massage parlor. Patterson 

testified he convinced defendant to let Zhang go. They 

left Zhang in a négligée at Point Richmond in the rain. 

A week after the robbery, Chen received an envelope 

in the mail with her checkbook and a letter demanding 

she provide an account pin number to someone who would 

call her. A police sergeant testified defendant's 

fingerprints were on the envelope and letter. At trial, 

Chen identified defendant as the perpetrator. She had 

also picked defendant's photo out of a lineup during the 

investigation. 

The massage parlor manager, He, testified $3,000 

was lost in the robbery. This sum included, according 

to He, money belonging to each of the three women (who 

had large sums of cash with them to pay for rent and 

food expenses associated with recently moving into 

state), and also $200 to $300 in business revenue. The 

parlor keeps two-thirds of business revenues and the 

masseuses split the other third at the end of each day. 

Just before trial, the court had granted a motion 

in limine prohibiting reference during trial "to 

[defendant's] prior record or prior felony conviction or 

prison incarceration" or "to his being on a parole hold 

or in custody." The court had further ordered counsel 

to admonish their witnesses about such pretrial rulings. 

Despite this, the prosecutor failed to admonish Lisa 

Holton, a corporal at the San Rafael Police Department 

assigned to investigate the robberies and kidnapping. 

Holton, while testifying midtrial, stated in passing 

defendant was a "parolee at large." Specifically, when 

asked why she did not use a particular photograph in the 

lineup she provided to Chen, Holton answered: "Because I 

knew that I was going to show Ms. Chen a line-up. I had 

spoken to her on the day that this information was 

released to the media. I tried to get her into the 

police department to show her the photo line-up that 

day. She told me she was going to be out of town and 

that she wasn't going to be able to meet with me until 

the following week. [¶] I felt that because of the 

weapon involved and the fact that we had released some 

of the surveillance video to the media already, there is 

a significant danger to the public, and I didn't want to 

hesitate in getting this information out to the public 

for a public safety reason that we have a parolee at 

large who is possibly still armed in public. I felt 

that there was an urgency in releasing that to the 

media." 

Following a bench conference, the trial court 

instructed the jury to "disregard the portion of the 

answer that referred to the term parolee. That's not 

for your consideration here. Don't be biased by it or 

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make any inferences from it. It's not part of this case 

and has no bearing on your consideration of the issues 

here. Disregard that in its entirety." 

Defendant moved for a mistrial. The trial court, 

however, found the prosecutor did not intend to elicit 

the testimony, believed the jury would abide by the 

instruction to ignore the testimony, noted Holton gave 

no details about defendant's prior conviction, and, 

finding no prejudice to defendant, denied the motion. 

On May 11, 2010, trial concluded and the jury found 

defendant guilty of the charged crimes. The trial court 

sentenced defendant to a life term and an additional, 

consecutive term of 29 years four months. Defendant 

filed a timely notice of appeal. 

People v. Flowers, 2012 WL 2168589, at *1-2 (Cal. Ct. App. June 

15, 2012). The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, 

id. at *5, and the Supreme Court of California denied Petitioner's 

petition for review, Resp.'s Ex. 2. 

 On October 25, 2012, Flowers filed a habeas petition in the 

Superior Court of California, County of Marin. Resp.'s Ex. 3. 

See also Resp.'s Exs. 4-5 (supplemental addenda filed). The court 

denied the petition on December 18, 2012. The Court of Appeal 

summarily denied Flowers' petition, Resp.'s Ex. 8, as did the 

Supreme Court of California, Resp.'s Ex. 12. Flowers filed a 

second petition for habeas relief with the Supreme Court of 

California on February 7, 2014. The Supreme Court denied this 

petition on April 9, 2014. Resp.'s Ex. 14. 

 Petitioner filed the operative petition for habeas relief in 

this Court in June 2014. The documents at Docket Numbers 25 and 

27 together constitute the operative petition.3

 Docket No. 32 at 

3. 

 3 Petitioner filed a Third Amended Petition on February 5, 

2016. Because the Court did not grant leave to file an amended 

petition, Petitioner's June 2014 petition remains the operative 

one. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). 

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LEGAL STANDARD 

A federal court may entertain a habeas petition from a state 

prisoner "only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of 

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, a district court may not grant habeas 

relief unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: 

"(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 

the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). 

 A state court decision is "contrary to" Supreme Court 

authority, that is, falls under the first clause of § 2254(d)(1), 

only if "the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that 

reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the 

state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court 

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Id. at 412-

13. A state court decision is an "unreasonable application of" 

Supreme Court authority, that is, it falls under the second clause 

of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly identifies the governing legal 

principle from the Supreme Court's decisions but "unreasonably 

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. 

at 413. The federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ 

"simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment 

that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established 

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federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 411. Rather, the 

application must be "objectively unreasonable" to support granting 

the writ. Id. at 409. Under AEDPA, the writ may be granted only 

"where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree 

that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's 

precedents." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). 

 If constitutional error is found, habeas relief is warranted 

only if the error had a "'substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" Penry v. Johnson, 

532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 

619, 637 (1993)). 

 When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state 

court to consider the petitioner's claims, the court looks to the 

last reasoned opinion of the highest court to analyze whether the 

state judgment was erroneous under the standard of § 2254(d). 

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). In the present 

case, the highest court to issue a reasoned decision on 

Petitioner's claims is the California Superior Court. 

DISCUSSION 

 Petitioner asserts six claims for relief, with subclaims, in 

his federal habeas petition; however, subsequent to the briefing 

on the motion to dismiss, Petitioner withdrew two claims.4

 The 

 4 Petitioner filed one of his withdrawals as a motion. 

(Docket No. 65). That motion, as modified by his subsequently 

filed correction (Docket No. 67) is GRANTED. Petitioner's claims 

for relief predicated on his trial counsel's alleged ineffective 

assistance for failing to investigate Chen Wei's background and 

appellate counsel's alleged ineffective assistance for failing to 

raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness on appeal--referred to as 

Claims 1(a) and part of 1(c)--are dismissed. 

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remaining claims are Ground 1, ineffective assistance of counsel: 

(b) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to dismiss 

the kidnapping count based on a discrepancy between the victim's 

name as listed on the information and the victim's own recitation 

of her name at trial; and (c) appellate counsel was ineffective 

for failing to raise on appeal the ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel. Ground 2, trial court errors violation of due process: 

(a) the trial court failed to grant a mistrial after a prosecution 

witness revealed that Petitioner was a parolee at large; (b) after 

a prosecution witness testified, in violation of a pretrial 

exclusionary order, that Petitioner was a pimp, the trial court 

failed to admonish the jury to disregard the testimony; and 

(c) the trial court failed to issue a ruling on the defense's 

pretrial Aranda5/Bruton6 motion. Ground 3, prosecutorial 

misconduct: (a) the prosecutor failed to disclose evidence 

relating to the credibility of Chen Wei; and (b) the prosecutor 

presented false evidence regarding the identity of the kidnap 

victim. Ground 4, denial of right to counsel: Petitioner was not 

allowed confidential visits with trial counsel at the county jail. 

Ground 5, actual innocence: (a) evidence of an alibi was not 

presented; and (b) insufficient evidence of the identity of the 

kidnap victim to support the conviction of kidnapping for robbery. 

Ground 6: cumulative error: the cumulative effect of errors 

alleged in grounds 1 through 5 violated due process. 

I. Petitioner's Pending Motions 

 5 People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518 (1965). 

6 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). 

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Petitioner has filed several motions. First, he filed 

"Motions of (a) Judges order for of Stipulations of grounds 2&3 

doc 25, p. 5-13." (Docket No. 37). In this motion Petitioner 

states that he submitted some of the pages of his petition in the 

wrong order, and asks that the Court read pages 5 through 6 and 10 

through 13 in support of his second claim of relief involving 

trial court errors violating his due process rights, and to read 

pages 7 through 9 in support of his third claim for relief 

involving prosecutorial misconduct. The motion is GRANTED and the 

Court will read the petition as described above. 

Petitioner also filed a motion for authorization to issue 

several subpoenas duces tecum. (Docket No. 44). A habeas corpus 

petitioner, unlike the usual litigant, is not entitled to 

discovery as a matter of course. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 

903–905 (1997). Habeas corpus petitioners may conduct discovery 

to the extent that "the judge in the exercise of his discretion 

and for good cause shown grants leave to do so, but not 

otherwise." Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

Good cause is shown where a petitioner demonstrates, through 

specific allegations, that there is reason to believe that he may 

be entitled to relief. Bracy, 520 U.S. at 908–909 (quoting Harris 

v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969)). In his motion, Petitioner 

claims that the subpoenas are necessary to prove his claim that he 

was denied effective assistance of counsel because he did not have 

confidential visits with his attorney while incarcerated in Marin 

County, which is claim 4 of his petition. Petitioner's motion is 

DENIED. As explained below, the Court grants Respondent's motion 

to dismiss claim 4 as procedurally defaulted. Because Petitioner 

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is not entitled to relief on this ground, he is not entitled to 

conduct discovery related to it. 

In addition, Petitioner filed two related motions: a motion 

for an order "of retracking and excluding of portions of Exhibit 

Z(7)" and a motion "for having Exhibit Z(7) stricken from record 

or of retracked filed under of seal." (Docket Nos. 45 and 52). 

The Court construes these as motions to seal. However, as the 

Court already stated when denying a previous identical request, 

Document Z(7) does not contain confidential material, a 

prerequisite to permitting any document to be filed under seal. 

Accordingly, Petitioner's motions are DENIED. 

Next, Petitioner filed a "Request for Correction of Records 

of Attorney General's Errors of Grounds 3(b)." (Docket No. 66). 

This filing is related to Respondent's motion to dismiss. 

However, pursuant to the District's Local Rules, once a motion is 

fully briefed, no additional filings are permitted without leave 

of the Court unless the filing party shows that the papers meet 

one of two specifically enumerated exceptions: parties may object 

to evidence presented for the first time in a reply brief and 

parties may file notice of any relevant judicial opinions filed 

after the reply brief. See Civil L. R. 7-3(d). Petitioner has 

not shown that he meets either exception, and after review of his 

filing the Court finds that he does not. As such, Petitioner's 

request is DENIED. 

Petitioner filed two subsequent motions for leave to file 

documents under seal. (Docket Nos. 59 and 63). In docket number 

59, Petitioner seeks to file under seal several letters addressed 

to his trial counsel and appellate counsel, to which he refers 

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collectively as exhibits V(3),7 citing attorney-client privilege. 

In docket number 63, also citing attorney-client privilege, 

Petitioner seeks to file under seal a declaration from his 

appellate counsel. Petitioner's motions to file these documents 

under seal are GRANTED. If Petitioner is able to pursue claims of 

ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel, these 

documents will have to be unsealed or stricken. 

Finally, Petitioner filed a "Request for Default of Motion to 

Dismiss" in which he argues that the Court should strike as 

untimely Respondent's reply brief in support of his motion to 

dismiss. (Docket No. 60). This Court's Order setting the 

briefing schedules in this case specified that Respondent shall 

file a reply "within fourteen days of receipt of an opposition." 

(Docket No. 32). Petitioner's opposition was received by the 

Court Clerk on April 24, but it was not docketed until April 27. 

(Docket No. 54). Respondent received the opposition the date it 

was docketed, April 27. Accordingly, the filing deadline for 

Respondent's reply was May 11. Respondent filed his reply that 

day. Thus, Respondent's reply is timely, and the Court DENIES 

Petitioner's Motion.8

// 

 7 Petitioner also filed a "request to attach of this document 

into record" under Exhibit V(3), Docket No. 68, which the Court 

grants.

8 Petitioner also requests evidentiary hearings on several 

issues. Because he does not identify any material factual 

disputes that would entitle him to relief if resolved in his 

favor, the Court denies his requests without prejudice. See 

Bracy, 520 U.S. at 904-05; Pham v. Terhune, 400 F.3d 740, 743 (9th 

Cir. 2005).

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II. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss 

Respondent moves to dismiss the petition because, he argues, 

certain claims within the petition are procedurally defaulted and 

unexhausted. The Court takes each argument in turn. 

A. Procedural Default 

Respondent argues that claims 2(b), 4 and 5(b) should be 

dismissed as procedurally defaulted. 

"A federal habeas court will not review a claim rejected by a 

state court if the decision of the state court rests on a state 

law ground that is independent of the federal question and 

adequate to support the judgment." Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 

307, 315 (2011) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). 

The state law ground may be "a procedural barrier to adjudication 

of the claim on the merits." Id. 

As a preliminary matter, this Court must determine whether 

the state court in fact disposed of the claims at issue based on a 

state rule. The state court decision must "clearly and expressly" 

explain that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar. Harris 

v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989). This "plain statement" rule 

applies to questions of "whether a state court has relied on an 

adequate and independent state ground." Id. at 265. As the 

Ninth Circuit has explained, "federal courts are to 'presume that 

there is no independent and adequate state ground for a state 

court decision when the decision fairly appears to rest primarily 

on federal law, or to be interwoven with federal law, and when the 

adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not 

clear from the face of the opinion.'" Nitschke v. Belleque, 680 

F.3d 1105, 1109 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 

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U.S. 722, 735 (1991)). Where the last reasoned opinion 

"explicitly imposes a procedural default," federal courts will 

"presume that a later decision rejecting the claim did not 

silently disregard that bar and consider the merits." Ylst, 501 

U.S. at 803.

From there, the procedural default analysis proceeds in two 

steps. First, the federal court must consider whether the state 

procedural rule the state court invoked to bar the claim is both 

"independent" and "adequate" to preclude federal review. See 

Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 580 (9th Cir. 2003). Once the 

state has adequately plead the existence of an independent and 

adequate state procedural ground as a defense, the burden to place 

that defense at issue shifts to the petitioner, who "may satisfy 

this burden by asserting specific factual allegations that 

demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, including 

citation to authority demonstrating inconsistent application of 

the rule." Id. at 586. A "petitioner's burden at this stage is 

'modest.'" Lee v. Jacquez, 788 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2015). 

The burden then shifts back to the state. "'The scope of the 

state's burden of proof thereafter will be measured by the 

specific claims of inadequacy put forth by the petitioner.'" 

Bennett, 322 F.3d at 584-85 (citation omitted). 

If the procedural rule invoked by the state court is both 

adequate and independent, then the next step of the evaluation 

requires the federal court to consider whether the petitioner has 

established either "cause" for the default and "actual prejudice" 

as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or whether 

failure to consider the claim will result in a fundamental 

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miscarriage of justice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 

(1991). If a petitioner cannot meet this burden, then federal 

habeas review of that claim is barred. Noltie v. Peterson, 9 F.3d 

802, 804-05 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Respondent argues that claim 2(b), failure to admonish the 

jury to ignore testimony that Petitioner was a pimp, and claim 4, 

denial of right to counsel based on non-confidential visits, are 

procedurally defaulted based on a rule from In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 

2d 756 (1953). This rule "prohibits California state courts from 

considering habeas claims that should have been raised on direct 

appeal but were omitted." Lee, 788 F.3d at 1126. The rule 

appears in the Superior Court's denial of Flowers' petition. 

Resp.'s Ex. 6, Super. Ct. Habeas Denial at 2. The court said, 

As Petitioner points out, the issues relating to Petitioner's 

ability to meet with counsel were addressed at length during 

pre-trial hearings. All of Petitioner's complaints, 

excluding his post-conviction complaints are issues are 

issues [sic] that could have been raised on appeal. As 

stated by the court in People v. Tulare County Superior Court 

(2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 324, 

"'under the power invested in the superior courts of 

this state to issue writs of habeas corpus they are not 

given the authority to invade the jurisdiction of an 

appellate court, and to oust said appellate court of its 

jurisdiction in a criminal action pending before it on 

appeal by discharging on habeas corpus the appellant in 

said action on any ground appearing upon the face of the 

record on appeal, and which is raised or could be raised 

on said appeal.' [citation]" 

Id. at 2. This Superior Court order specifically refers to 

Petitioner's claim of non-confidential meetings with his counsel 

and notes that the claim, which is now claim 4, was addressed on 

the trial court record. The court's order concludes that all of 

Petitioner's claims could have been raised on appeal, except any 

post-conviction claims. Claim 2(b)--failure to admonish the jury 

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to ignore the pimp reference--is necessarily included in this 

conclusion. The facts relating to this claim are in the trial 

record and could have been raised on appeal. It is not a postconviction claim. Thus, the state court "clearly and expressly" 

explained that its judgment rested on the rule enunciated in 

Dixon. 

Moving forward on claims 2(b) and 4,9 this Court performs the 

two-step procedural default analysis. For step one, Respondent 

plead the existence of the Dixon procedural bar, shifting the 

burden to Petitioner. See Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586. Petitioner, 

however, did not place the adequacy or independence of the Dixon 

bar at issue. Thus, the Court proceeds to the second step. 

 Petitioner argues that there was "cause" for violation of the 

Dixon rule and that "actual prejudice" resulted. Coleman, 501 

U.S. at 750. Constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel 

will satisfy the cause test. Walker v. Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 938 

(9th Cir. 2013). Where counsel is not constitutionally deficient, 

"the existence of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily 

 9 The Superior Court's order also briefly addresses the 

merits of Petitioner's claims. Super. Ct. Habeas Denial at 2. 

This alternative holding on the merits does not defeat dismissal. 

See Harris, 489 U.S. at 264 n.10 ("Moreover, a state court need 

not fear reaching the merits of a federal claim in an alternative 

holding. By its very definition, the adequate and independent 

state ground doctrine requires the federal court to honor a state 

holding that is a sufficient basis for the state court's judgment, 

even when the state court also relies on federal law." (emphasis 

in original)); Anselmo v. Sumner, 882 F.2d 431, 432-34 (9th Cir. 

1989) (explaining that Harris "nullified the law of this circuit 

that the merits of a federal constitutional claim may be reviewed 

if the state court denied a habeas corpus petition on alternate 

procedural and substantive grounds"). 

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turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor 

external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with 

the State's procedural rule." Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 

488 (1986). Such "objective impediments" may include "that the 

factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to 

counsel, . . . or that 'some interference by officials' . . . made 

compliance impracticable." Id. (internal citations omitted). 

Petitioner argues that his appellate counsel was 

constitutionally ineffective. However, appellate counsel does not 

have a constitutional duty to raise every non-frivolous issue 

requested by the defendant. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-54 

(1983). The weeding out of weaker issues is widely recognized as 

one of the hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy. Miller v. 

Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989). Therefore, 

Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim does not 

satisfy the cause requirement. 

Petitioner also argues that an external factor impeded his 

counsel's efforts. He claims that counsel "lacked the knowledge 

to fully foresee or formulate the basis of the evidence as a 

result of interference by way 'CDC' officials with opening 

tampering and thereof had mishandled of Petitioner documents of 

legal correspondences [sic]." Docket No. 54 at 7. However, any 

interference by prison officials that may have occurred could not 

have rendered compliance with Dixon impracticable. As explained 

above, the Superior Court stated that it addressed the issues 

relating to Petitioner's ability to meet with counsel during pretrial hearings. Super. Ct. Habeas Denial at 2; see also id. at 1 

(including denial of "meaningful or private meetings with his 

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trial counsel" in the list of issues raised before the Superior 

Court). Thus, because Petitioner raised the confidential meeting 

issue before trial, any subsequent interference by prison 

officials would not have made raising the claim on direct review 

"impracticable." Similarly, all facts regarding claim 2(b), 

failure to admonish the jury to ignore the reference to Petitioner 

as a pimp, were in the trial record. Therefore, no external 

factor constitutes cause for procedural default. 

To demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner must "shoulder the 

burden of showing, not merely that the errors . . . created a 

possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and 

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of 

constitutional dimensions." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 

170 (1982) (emphasis in original). Because there is no cause, 

this Court need not reach prejudice. 

Petitioner does not carry his burden to demonstrate that 

claims 2(b) and 4 should be heard under the miscarriage of justice 

exception to procedural bars. The exception applies where "new 

evidence shows 'it is more likely than not that no reasonable 

juror would have convicted [the petitioner].'" McQuiggin v. 

Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1933 (2013) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 

U.S. 298, 329 (1995)). Such new evidence may include "exculpatory 

scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical 

physical evidence" not presented at trial. Larsen v. Soto, 742 

F.3d 1083, 1095 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). 

This new evidence must "convincingly undermine the State's case." 

Id. at 1096. Because Petitioner has not satisfied this standard, 

he has not demonstrated miscarriage of justice.

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Because Petitioner does not demonstrate cause and prejudice 

or miscarriage of justice, claims 2(b) and 4 are procedurally 

barred. 

 Respondent argues that claim 5(b), insufficient evidence of 

the victim's identity to support a conviction of kidnapping for 

robbery, is procedurally defaulted as untimely. Respondent relies 

on the California Supreme Court's summary denial of Petitioner's 

2014 petition, which contained a single citation to In re Clark, 5 

Cal. 4th 750, 797-98 (1993). 

In California, a habeas petition is untimely when filed after 

"substantial delay" as "measured from the time the petitioner or 

counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information 

offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the 

claim." Walker, 562 U.S. at 312. The Supreme Court has explained 

that "California courts signal that a habeas petition is denied as 

untimely by citing the controlling decisions, i.e., Clark and 

Robbins."10 Id. at 310. "A summary denial citing Clark and 

Robbins means that the petition is rejected as untimely" under 

this rule. Id. at 313. California's Clark/Robbins untimeliness 

rule is an adequate and independent state ground for procedural 

bar purposes. Lee, 788 F.3d at 1129. 

However, Clark actually stands for two possible procedural 

bars: untimeliness and successiveness. The text at the California 

Supreme Court's pincite in its denial of Petitioner's petition 

enunciated California's general rule "that, absent justification 

for the failure to present all known claims in a single, timely 

 10 In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770 (1998). 

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petition for writ of habeas corpus, successive and/or untimely 

petitions will be summarily denied." Clark, 5 Cal. 4th at 797. 

Thus, it is not clear from the California Supreme Court's denial 

of Petitioner's 2014 habeas petition whether the court denied the 

petition based on untimeliness, which is adequate and independent, 

or only on successiveness, which Respondent did not address. See 

Bodnar v. Davis, 2014 WL 794575 at *19 (C.D. Cal.) (explaining 

that, where the Clark pincite at issue clearly indicated that it 

was referring to the successiveness bar, rather than the 

untimeliness bar, respondent's use of the Supreme Court's Walker 

decision, which only discussed untimeliness, was insufficient to 

meet its initial burden). 

Further, the United States Supreme Court has explained that 

when the California Supreme Court cites both Clark and Robbins, it 

is denying a habeas petition based on untimeliness. Walker, 562 

U.S. at 310. Here, again, the California Supreme Court cited only 

Clark and not Robbins. See Marquez v. Biter, 2014 WL 1715522 at 

*3 n.6 (C.D. Cal.) (reasoning that the California Supreme Court's 

invocation of Clark and not Robbins in a denial weighs in favor of 

concluding that the court invoked the successiveness bar, rather 

than the untimeliness bar). Finally, Petitioner's 2014 habeas 

petition was his second habeas petition to the California Supreme 

Court. His 2013 petition was not denied as untimely. Resp.'s Ex. 

12. Because the 2014 petition was his second habeas petition, it 

is plausible that the California Supreme Court was invoking a 

successiveness bar, rather than a timeliness bar, by citing Clark. 

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Respondent's argument relates to untimeliness alone. Thus, 

Respondent has failed to meet his burden.11

B. Exhaustion 

 Respondent also argues that claims 1(a) through (c), 3(b) and 

6 should be dismissed as unexhausted. Because this Court granted 

Petitioner's motion to withdraw above, claim 1(a) and part of 

claim 1(c) are no longer at issue. 

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally 

in federal habeas proceedings either the fact or length of their 

confinement are required first to exhaust state judicial remedies, 

either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by 

presenting the highest state court available with a fair 

opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim they 

seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). 

California habeas petitioners are "required to exhaust . . . 

habeas claims in a petition for review to the California Supreme 

Court." Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1999). 

"To satisfy this requirement, a petitioner must 'fairly present' 

the substance of his claim to the state court." Id. at 887 

(quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). The claim 

must include "reference to a specific federal constitutional 

 11 On November 27, 2015, Petitioner filed a document entitled 

"Order for Amendment to Default on Procedural Bars" to which he 

attached documents in support of his opposition to Respondent's 

procedural bar arguments. Petitioner referred to claims 1(b) and 

(c), 4 and 5(b). Of those, only claim 4 was procedurally 

defaulted. Petitioner attaches news articles, as well as prior 

California Supreme Court petition amendments dated January and 

December 2013. Because Petitioner failed to raise claim 4 on his 

direct appeal, which was resolved on August 22, 2012, Petitioner's 

filings are not persuasive. 

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guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts which entitle the 

petitioner to relief." Id. at 888 (quoting Gray v. Netherland, 

518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996)). "A claim is not 'fairly presented' 

if the state court 'must read beyond a petition or brief . . . in 

order to find material' that alerts it to the presence of a 

claim." Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(quoting Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004)). 

Petitioner fairly presented claims 1(b) and (c) and 3(b) to 

the California Supreme Court. That court received a document 

Petitioner filed entitled "Amendment of Writ of Habeas Corpus 

Petition" on March 28, 2014, Docket No. 54 at 28-38, before the 

court denied his petition summarily on April 9, 2014, Resp.'s Ex. 

14. This amended petition explicitly mentioned "ineffective 

assistance of the trial attorney in failure to submit a 995 motion 

to dismiss on insufficient evidence of 'Wendy Zhang' identity," 

(claim 1(b)) as well as Petitioner's appellate counsel's 

ineffectiveness for failure to raise this error on direct appeal 

(claim 1(c)). Docket No. 54 at 29-30. In addition to claim 1(b) 

and (c), claim 3(b) was also fairly raised in this document. In 

the context of discussing the evidence pertaining to Wendy Zhang's 

identity, Petitioner alleged that the prosecution "was knowingly 

using false testimony to obtain the guilty verdict." Id. at 32. 

Thus, Petitioner exhausted claims 1(b), 1(c) and 3(b). 

 Petitioner also exhausted claim 6, cumulative error, by 

presenting it to the California Supreme Court. Resp.'s Ex. 9 at 

39. The Ninth Circuit has held that even explicitly mentioning 

cumulative error may not be sufficient to exhaust the claim. 

Wooten, 540 F.3d at 1026. Specifically, such a claim was not 

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exhausted where "cumulative error was not labeled as an issue in 

the brief's table of contents and the petitioner did not argue 

cumulative error or cite any authority on cumulative error." Id. 

This petition is distinguishable. In Petitioner's petition, 

cumulative error received its own argument heading. Further, 

Petitioner cited supporting case law. Resp.'s Ex. 9 at 39. Thus, 

Petitioner did exhaust claim 6.

 Respondent's main argument as to why claim 6 is unexhausted 

is that Petitioner did not raise "this particular claim of 

cumulative error" because, before the California Supreme Court, 

Petitioner raised "the cumulative effect of a different set of 

claimed errors." Docket No. 49 at 9. Respondent cites no legal 

basis for this argument, and this Court could find nothing to 

support it. 

 Because the Court concludes that these claims were properly 

exhausted, the Court DENIES Petitioner's requests for abeyance to 

exhaust these claims (Docket Nos. 70 and 73).

 Respondent's motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part. Claims 

2(b) and 4 are dismissed as procedurally defaulted. 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court orders as follows: 

1. Petitioner's "Motions of (a) Judges order for of 

Stipulations of grounds 2&3 doc 25, p. 5-13" (Docket No. 

37) is GRANTED. 

2. Petitioner's motion to issue subpoenas (Docket No. 44) is 

DENIED. 

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3. Petitioner's motion for an order "of retracking and 

excluding of portions of Exhibit Z(7)" (Docket No. 45) is 

DENIED. 

4. Petitioner's motion "for having Exhibit Z(7) stricken from 

record or of retracked filed under of seal" (Docket No. 

52) is DENIED. 

5. Petitioner's motions for leave to file under seal (Docket 

Nos. 59 and 63) are GRANTED. 

6. Petitioner's "Request for Default of Motion to Dismiss" 

(Docket No. 60) is DENIED. 

7. Petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss" claim 1(a) and the 

related portion of claim 1(c) (Docket No. 65) is GRANTED. 

8. Petitioner's "Request for Correction of Records of 

Attorney General's Errors of Grounds 3(b)" (Docket No. 66) 

is DENIED. 

9. Petitioner's motions for order of abeyance (Docket Nos. 70 

and 73) are DENIED. 

10. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 49) is 

GRANTED in part. Claims 2(b) and 4 are dismissed as 

procedurally defaulted. In all other respects, the motion 

to dismiss is DENIED. The remaining claims are claims 

1(b), 1(c), 2(a), 2(c), 3(a), 3(b), 5(a), 5(b) and 6. 

11. No later than sixty days from the date of this Order, 

Respondent shall file with this Court and serve upon 

Petitioner an Answer conforming in all respects to Rule 5 

of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, showing cause 

why a writ of habeas corpus should not be issued. 

Respondent shall file with the Answer all portions of the 

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state record that have been transcribed previously and are 

relevant to a determination of the issues presented by the 

petition. In an abundance of caution, Respondent may 

answer Claims 2(b) and 4 on their merits. If Petitioner 

wishes to respond to the Answer, he shall do so by filing 

a Traverse with the Court and serving it on Respondent no 

later than thirty days from his receipt of the Answer. If 

he does not do so, the petition will be deemed submitted 

and ready for decision on the date the Traverse is due. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 9, 2016 CLAUDIA WILKEN 

United States District Judge

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