Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_07-cv-00609/USCOURTS-azd-4_07-cv-00609-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MICHAEL GOODMAN, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

CITY OF TUCSON, a Municipal

Corporation; ERNIE DURATE, Director

of Development Services, both

individually and in his official capacity;

WALTER TELLEZ, Tucson Zoning

Administrator, both individually and in his

official capacity; JOHN ROES 

1-20; and JANE ROES 1-20, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-07-609-TUC-CKJ

ORDER

Pending before this Court are Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion

to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim for Relief [Doc. # 16] and Plaintiff’s Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment as to Counts 1 and 2 of Complaint [Doc. #62]. Additionally, the

parties have submitted supplemental briefs regarding the Board of Adjustment’s decision as

to any vested rights issue. In its discretion, the Court finds this case suitable for decision

without oral argument. See LRCiv. 7.2(f). The Parties have adequately presented the facts

and legal arguments in their briefs and supporting documents, and the decisional process

would not be significantly aided by oral argument.

Case 4:07-cv-00609-CKJ Document 78 Filed 04/21/09 Page 1 of 17
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1

The factual background is derived from Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts

(USOF) [Doc. #66], except where otherwise noted. The USOF was submitted in opposition

to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. #62].

2

Goodman disputes the meaning of “unified site” arguing that it is not defined in the

Land Use Code or Development Code and the question of what work was authorized under

his approved building permits; however, the affidavit of the Deputy Director of the

Development Services Department/Zoning Administrator on which Defendant relies clearly

states that the permits authorized individual development of each parcel and that the work

could go on concurrently. See Defs.’ Statement of Facts in Support of Motion for Summary

Judgment (“Defs.’ SOF”) Exh. “1” [Doc. # 17].

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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff Michael Goodman (“Goodman”) is the owner of eight lots in Tucson,

Arizona, which he sought to develop. In 2003, Goodman obtained City approval for the

reconfiguration of the eight separate residential lots and obtained building permits for six of

the parcels. These approvals did not authorize development of the site as a unified site.2

The permits were valid for 180 days and could be extended by all means identified in the

Development Code. Goodman began site improvements which included grading and land

disturbance, as well as construction of two buildings.

On November 1, 2005, Goodman was cited by the City because his construction

violated the City’s Stormwater Management Regulations, Tucson Code § 26-20 et. seq.

More precisely, Goodman was cited for failure to have a Storm Water Pollution Prevention

Plan (SWPPP) and Notice of Intent (NOI) as required pursuant to Tucson Code § 26-40(7)(a)

and (b). A SWPPP is only required when the construction is for a unified project that is more

than one acre. Here, each individual lot was less than one acre. See 40

C.F.R.122.26(6)(14)(x). 

Enforcement of a SWPPP is performed by the Development Services Department as

part of the development review and approval process. Plaintiff was not required to have a

SWPPP for independent construction of each of the eight lots to be developed as single

independent lots. On January 3, 2006, Goodman pled “responsible” for the violation of not

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3

A plea of responsible equates to a guilty plea. See, e.g., 17C A.R.S. Traffic Violation

Cases Civ. Proc. Rules, Rule 24.

4

Goodman disputes that he was “inform[ed]” of “what plans had to be submitted and

approved for him to continue development of his site.” But Goodman fails to offer any

admissible evidence to dispute the court record. See Defs.’ Exh. “4” at 11 and Defs.’ Exh.

“1” ¶ 13).]

5

 Goodman disputed this statement; however, this Court finds that the Court

transcripts relied upon by Defendants speak for themselves.

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having a SWPPP, which was accepted and entered by the court.3 Goodman was informed

during hearings in City Court that he was required to submit a SWPPP, a comprehensive site

plan and grading plan showing how he was actually developing the property as a single site.4

The City Court held multiple compliance hearings while Goodman attempted to comply with

the court’s orders.5 Ultimately, on August 25, 2006, the City Court concluded that Goodman

had failed to abate the violation and referred the case for criminal prosecution to abate and

fined Goodman the maximum fine allowed by ordinance.

Goodman has never disputed nor appealed the plea of responsibility. Goodman did,

however, appeal the City Court direction to submit a comprehensive site plan to the Pima

County Superior Court. Pima County Superior Court Judge Bernini issued a decision stating

that the City Court’s direction was an “abuse of discretion” and exceeded the court’s

jurisdiction. The City filed a petition for special action for review of the Superior Court

order. The Arizona Court of Appeals granted the special action and issued a decision that

reversed the Superior Court decision and reinstated the City Court decision. Goodman filed

a Petition for Review with the Arizona Supreme Court which was denied on June 3, 2008.

Following the plea of responsibility for the SWPPP violation, the City Court directed

Goodman to submit a site plan showing the unified site development of the eight (8) lots.

Goodman submitted a site plan with all eight separate parcels plotted on a single map along

with a SWPPP; however, Goodman’s plan treated the eight individual lot as a single site for

purposes of grading and the SWPPP. See Complaint ¶ 30-31. The City approved

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6

Goodman objects to this contention, stating that the City never provided any notice

that his construction activities were inconsistent with his issued permits. PSOF 78-80. The

Court, however, cannot find the supporting evidence for this statement in the record before

it.

7

 Goodman objects stating that the new plans were an effort to mitigate the losses

associated with the two partially completed and deteriorating structures; however, the effect

of the new plans was to abate the SWPPP violation.

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development of eight (8) individual lots and issued permits based on that representation. The

single site development did not conform to the requirements of those permits. See id. On

January 19, 2006, the City’s Development Services Department (“DSD”) issued a stop work

order on further construction. The letter stated that the stop work order was based upon the

fact that the approved site plans were inconsistent with the development of the site, the site

was being graded as a single site without the required grading plan and the site plans

submitted provided for common infrastructure that had not been established by approved

easements.6 Goodman sought to appeal the stop work order, but was informed that the

decision that the plan was for a unified site was a zoning determination that was not

appealable to the Board of Appeals that had limited jurisdiction to hear matters concerning

the building code. On or about January 26, 2007, a SWPPP for the site was approved by

DSD. The approval abated the SWPPP violation, resolved the inconsistency between the

existing development and the remaining issues in the stop work order approved plans,

allowing completion of two structures. The City has allowed all development that is

consistent with that approved SWPPP.7

 Between the issuance of the stop work order and the

approval of the SWPPP, Goodman never submitted a site plan for the full site that resolved

the conflict between the originally approved plans and permits and the actual construction.

Goodman also did not have an approved grading plan and did not show that common

infrastructure was established through easements.

The Zoning Administrator determined that the plan submitted to comply with the City

Court orders was for a single site that did not conform to zoning. That decision was appealed

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8

Goodman asserts that he appealed the revocation of his existing permits as well;

however, that decision was never put before the Board of Adjustment.

9

Goodman v. City of Tucson, et al., Pima County Superior Court Case No.

C20064613, Under Advisement Ruling at 6 (Mar. 29, 2007).

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to the Board of Adjustment, which affirmed the Zoning Administrator.8 The Zoning

Administrator had informed the Board of Adjustment that he had not determined the validity

of the permits, the issue of vested rights, or that the Plaintiff could not use those permits in

the future. As such, the Board’s motion to affirm the Zoning Administrator did not include

those issues. 

Goodman appealed the Board of Adjustment decision to the Pima County Superior

Court, which affirmed the decision. Judge Miller of the Superior Court specifically found

that: “[f]rom the evidence presented to the Board it appears that the only actions undertaken

by Goodman on a separate, lot-by-lot basis were the separate applications for development

plans and building permits. All other actions by Goodman, from design to infrastructure,

were undertaken on an aggregate, unified basis.”9

 Judge Miller’s decision was appealed to

the Arizona State Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision stating that

the Board of Adjustment had abused its discretion by not considering Goodman’s vested

rights claim and the Zoning Administrator’s revocation of Goodman’s permits. The court

remanded, however, solely on the basis of the permit revocation.

On remand, the Board of Adjustment excised the portion of the Zoning

Administrator’s letter stating that Goodman’s permits were no longer in effect. Neither the

Zoning Administrator or the Board of Adjustment have ever addressed Plaintiff’s vested

rights claims, nor has any other state regulatory board or court.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986), “there

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is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [] the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law,” and a dispute is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

248. Thus, factual disputes that have no bearing on the outcome of a suit are irrelevant to the

consideration of a motion for summary judgment. Id. In order to withstand a motion for

summary judgment, the nonmoving party must show “specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial,” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). Moreover, a

“mere scintilla of evidence” does not preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson,

477 U.S. at 252. The United States Supreme Court also recognized that “[w]hen opposing

parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that

no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for

purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, — U.S. —, —, 127

S.Ct. 1769, 1776, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).

III. ANALYSIS

As an initial matter, this Court must consider whether it has jurisdiction to hear

Goodman’s claims. “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v.

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 1675, 128 L.Ed.2d

391 (1994). “The jurisdiction of federal courts is defined and limited by Article III of the

Constitution.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1949, 20 L.Ed. 947 (1968).

Additionally, jurisdiction may be conferred upon the federal courts by statute. Kokkonen,

511 U.S. at 377, 114 S.Ct. at 1675. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court recognizes

several doctrines which define the constitutional and prudential limitations on the federal

courts’ power to hear cases. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3324, 82

L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). Included among these are the concepts of standing, mootness, ripeness

and political questions. Id. Prior to invoking the power of the federal court, it must be

determined “whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute

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or of particular issues.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205, 45 L.Ed.2d

343 (1975).

A. Vested Rights Claims

“Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine designed to ‘prevent the courts, through

avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements

over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until

an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the

challenging parties.’” National Park Hospitality Assoc. v. Dept. of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803,

807-08, 123 S.Ct. 2026, 2030, 155 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2003). Further, “a claim that the

application of government regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until

the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision

regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue.” Williamson County

Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186, 105 S.Ct.

3108, 3116, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985).

The United States Supreme Court in Williamson County passed on plaintiff’s putative

Fifth Amendment takings and due process claims because the claims were premature. Id. at

185, 105 S.Ct. at 3116. In its examination of the ripeness doctrine, the Court delineated a

two-part test. See id. First, the property owner must demonstrate that the government has

reached a final decision regarding the “application of the regulations to the property at issue.”

Id. at 186, 105 S.Ct. at 3116. Second, the property owner must “seek compensation through

the procedures the State has provided for doing so.” Id. at 194, 105 S.Ct. at 3120. In

explaining the contours of the Fifth Amendment the Court stated:

The Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes

taking without just compensation. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &

Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S., at 297, n. 40, 101 S.Ct., at 2371, n. 40. Nor

does the Fifth Amendment require that just compensation be paid in advance

of, or contemporaneously with, the taking; all that is required is that a

“‘reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation’”

exist at the time of the taking. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419

U.S. 102, 124-125, 95 S.Ct. 335, 349, 42 L.Ed.2d 320 (1974) (quoting

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Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R.Co., 135 U.S. 641, 659, 10 S.Ct. 965,

971, 34 L.Ed. 295 (1890)).

Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194, 105 S.Ct. at 3120. Moreover, “a person deprived of

property through a random and unauthorized act by a state employee does not state a claim

under the Due Process Clause merely by alleging the deprivation of property.” Id. at 195,

105 S.Ct. 3121. “[T]he State’s action is not ‘complete’ in the sense of causing a

constitutional injury ‘unless or until the State fails to provide an adequate postdeprivation

remedy for the property loss.’” Id. (internal citations omitted).

The respondent in Williamson County owned “a tract of land it was developing as a

residential subdivision.” Id. at 175, 105 S.Ct. at 3110. The property owner brought suit

alleged that the application of various zoning laws and regulations of its property amounted

to a “taking.” Id. at 175, 105 S.Ct. at 3111. During the property owner’s ongoing

development of the subdivision, the county changed its zoning ordinances regarding the

calculations of allowable density and the number of allowable units per acre. Id. at 178, 105

S.Ct. at 3112. Although the property owner had submitted its original preliminary plat in

1973, which had been re-approved on several occasions, the owner’s revised preliminary plat

submitted in 1980 was disapproved. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 180-81, 105 S.Ct. at

3113-14. This rejection was based on several reasons including density and grade problems.

Id. The Court determined that the property owner had failed to avail itself to the

administrative remedies available, e.g., seeking a variance from the density and grade

requirements, and as such there was no final decision as to how the regulations would be

applied to the owner’s property. Id. at 197, 200, 105 S.Ct. at 3122, 3123. Therefore, the

property owner’s claims were not ripe for review. Id.

Subsequently, the Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed the ripeness test

delineated in Williamson County. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477

U.S. 340, 106 S.Ct. 2561, 91 L.Ed.2d 285 (1986); Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning

Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 117 S.Ct. 1659, 137 L.Ed.2d 980 (1997). The Court in MacDonald

declined jurisdiction where a property owner alleged a “taking” based on the planning

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commission’s denial of its subdivision plan. MacDonald, 477 at 342, 106 S.Ct. at 2563. The

county’s board of supervisors upheld the commission’s decision citing several reasons for

the denial. Id. The Court recognized that “local agencies charged with administering

regulations governing property development are singularly flexible institutions; what they

take with the one hand they may give back with the other.” Id. at 350, 106 S.Ct. at 2566.

Moreover, until an assessment of how the governmental entity will apply zoning ordinances

and subdivision regulations to a specific property is made, the constitutionality of those

regulations cannot be made. Id. at 350-51, 106 S.Ct. at 2566-67. 

The Court reiterated this logic in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520

U.S. 725, 117 S.Ct. 1659, 137 L.Ed.2d 980 (1997). The Court found the property owner’s

claims to be justiciable, however, because the rights in question were Transferrable

Development Rights, and there was no question regarding how the regulation applied to

those rights. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 739, 117 S.Ct. at 1667. Moreover, there was no

discretionary decision to be made by any agency official. Id. at 739-40, 117 S.Ct. at 1667-

68. Additionally, the agency introduced evidence from a real estate appraiser regarding the

value of those rights. Id. at 732, 117 S.Ct. at 1664. Thus, the claim was ripe for review.

Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has recognized a futility exception to the ripeness

doctrine. See Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1987). “Under this

exception, the requirement of the submission of a development plan is excused if such an

application would be an ‘idle and futile act.’” Id. at 1454 (citations omitted). The Kinzlis

owned property adjacent to the Santa Cruz city limits. Id. at 1451. Although the surrounding

area became urban in its development, the Kinzlis’ property remained rural. Id. The Kinzlis

had discussions with the city regarding potential development of a road on the property, but

this development never came to pass. Id. Subsequently, Santa Cruz adopted an ordinance

to limit the uses available to greenbelt properties, including the Kinzlis’. Kinzli, 818 F.2d

at 1452. The Kinzlis sought to sell the property to a developer contingent upon the receipt

of permits. Id. at 1451. Although the developer initially sought permits, it did not follow

through, and the Kinzlis did not seek any permits of their own accord. Id. at 1452. The

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10Regarding vested rights, Arizona recognizes the “general rule is that any substantial

change of position, expenditures, or incurrence of obligations under a building permit entitles

the permittee to complete the construction and use the premises for the purpose authorized

irrespective of subsequent zoning or changes in zoning.” Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Pima

County, 171 Ariz. 427, 831 P.2d 426 (Ct.App. 1992) (citations omitted).

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Kinzlis brought suit alleging that the city had abridged their constitutional and civil rights.

Id. The court held that because the Kinzlis had “failed to secure a ‘final decision’ from the

City regarding acceptable uses, and the futility exception [did] not excuse this failure since

no ‘meaningful application’ had been made[,]” any takings claim was not ripe. Id. at 1455.

This finding further resulted in the court finding that the Kinzlis’ due process and equal

protection claims were not ripe. Kinzli, 818 F.2d at 1455-56.

Here, Goodman relies on the futility exception outlined in Kinzli to justify the ripeness

of his claims. Goodman argues that because the code has changed since the issuance of his

original permits, any attempt to comply with the City’s requirements would be futile. This

argument misses the mark. Both parties agree that the Board of Adjustment has never

addressed Goodman’s vested rights claim.10 Further, any vested rights claim possessed by

Goodman contemplates a remedy irrespective of whether or not the City’s zoning ordinances

have changed. Unless and until the Board issues a final decision regarding Goodman’s

vested rights, there is no assessment of how the governmental entity will apply zoning

ordinances and subdivision regulations to Goodman’s property. Thus, the constitutionality

of those regulations cannot be made, and this Court is without jurisdiction to hear his claim.

Further, Goodman’s takings claims can only be construed in the nature of a vested rights

claim. As will be discussed infra, the alleged “taking” does not comport with the United

States Supreme Court’s Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence. As such, this Court finds

Goodman’s vested rights claims not ripe.

 . . .

 . . .

 . . .

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B. Fifth Amendment “Takings” Claim

The Fifth Amendment mandates that private property shall not “be taken for public

use, without just compensation.” U.S.CONST. amend. V. The United States Supreme Court

has recognized “that the ‘Fifth Amendment’s guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar Government

from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,

should be borne by the public as a whole.’” Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New

York, 438 U.S. 104, 123, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2659, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978) (quoting Armstrong

v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S.Ct. 1563, 1569, 4 L.Ed.2d 1554 (1960)). Further, the

Fifth Amendment is not designed “to limit the governmental interference with property rights

per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference

amounting to a taking.” Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537, 125 S.Ct. 2074,

2080, 161 L.Ed.2d 876 (2005) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

In Lingle, the Court reviewed the various takings theories recognized by its

jurisprudence. See id. First, is the actual, physical invasion or appropriation of private

property by the government. Id. at 537, 125 S.Ct. at 2081. Next, the Court addressed

“regulatory takings,” in which the “government regulation of private property . . . [is] so

onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster.” Id. The Court

recognized two types of regulatory takings that result in a per se taking under the Fifth

Amendment. Id. at 538, 125 S.Ct. at 2081. The first of these is where “government requires

an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of her property.” Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538,

125 S.Ct. at 2081. The Court’s benchmark case of this type of taking is Loretto v.

Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982).

In Loretto, a New York City landlord sued pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

for just compensation because a New York state law required landlords to allow cable

companies to install cable facilities on their property. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 421, 102 S.Ct. at

3169. The cable facilities consisted of cable wires running along the building rooftops, with

occasional wires running down the side of the building, as well as metal boxes that were

installed along the roof cables. Id. at 422, 102 S.Ct. at 3169. These cables formed a “cable

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highway” that networked buildings throughout the City. See id. The Court held that “a

permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking without regard to the

public interests that it may serve.” Id. at 426, 102 S.Ct. at 3171. Thus, despite the relative

small area occupied by the cable equipment, the permanent physical occupation warranted

just compensation. Id. at 441, 102 S.Ct. at 3179.

The second regulatory taking that results in a per se Fifth Amendment violation are

those government regulations that “completely deprive an owner of ‘all economically

beneficial us[e]’ of her property.” Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538, 125 S.Ct. at 2081 (citing Lucas

v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992))

(emphasis in original). In Lucas, the property owner bought two residential lots on which

he intended to build single-family homes. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006-07, 112 S.Ct. at 2889.

Prior to the owner beginning construction on the property, the South Carolina Legislature

enacted a statute “which had the direct effect of barring petitioner from erecting any

permanent habitable structures on his two parcels.” Id. at 1007, 112 S.Ct. at 2889. The

South Carolina statute was designed to preserve South Carolina’s beaches and prevent further

erosion thereof. Id. at 1008-09, 112 S.Ct. at 2889-90. The Court held that where a regulation

“deprives land of all economically beneficial use[,]” compensation is required unless “the

proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with.” Id. at 1028, 112 S.Ct. 2900.

Because the Court determined that the owner’s property had been rendered valueless, just

compensation was due. See id.

The third category of regulatory takings are “land-use exactions.” Lingle, 544 U.S.

at 546, 125 S.Ct. at 2086. In this circumstance, the government demanded an easement as

a precondition to receipt of a permit. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S.

825, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 114

S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994). The Court in Nollan held that such an exaction was

permissible so long as it would substantially advance the same governmental interest that

would otherwise be grounds for denial of the permit. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-47, 107 S.Ct.

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3141. Moreover, the Court recognized that such an exaction must be roughly proportional

to the impact of the proposed development. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391, 114 S.Ct. 2309.

All other regulatory takings are governed by Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct.

2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978). The Court in Penn Central recognized several factors in

assessing whether or not a regulation effects a “taking” requiring compensation. These

included “[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the

extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations[,]”

as well as “the character of the governmental action.” Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98

S.Ct. at 2659. With regard to this last factor, the Court noted a physical invasion of property

is more likely to result in a “taking” than “when interference arises from some public

program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”

Id.

In the instant case, Goodman obtained six (6) building permits for the eight (8) lots

that he owned. Based on these building permits, Goodman was entitled to develop six of his

lots individually. Because each lot was less than one acre in size, a SWPPP was not required,

nor was a NOI. When it appeared Goodman was developing his lot as one large unit, which

was greater than one acre in size, he was cited for a failure to have a SWPPP and NOI.

Goodman then pled “responsible” to this charge. Goodman now claims that this plea was

simply because he did not have a SWPPP or NOI, not because he was developing the six lots

as a single, unified site. Even if this is true, pleading responsible is an admission of guilt.

See 17 A.R.S. Traffic Violation Cases Civ. Proc. Rules, Rule 24 (plea of responsible equates

to a guilty plea). If Goodman had been developing the lots per his approved building

permits, he would not have been required to have a SWPPP or NOI, and there would have

been no reason for him to plead guilty. These events ultimately led to the issuance of the

stop work order, and the Zoning Administrator’s letter stating that all of Goodman’s existing

permits were revoked. Although Goodman eventually submitted a SWPPP and NOI for two

of the lots, thereby abating his noncompliance with the City’s requirements, he has failed to

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adduce any evidence demonstrating that he attempted to work with City officials to abate the

issues regarding the four other lots for which Goodman held permits.

Goodman does not and cannot contend that the City’s actions involved a physical

invasion or appropriation of his property. Cf. Loretto, 458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73

L.Ed.2d 868 (1982). Nor is this a circumstance of a land-exaction in exchange for issuance

of permits. Cf. Nollan, 483 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987); Dolan, 512

U.S. 374, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994). Goodman does contend that the City’s

actions deprived him of all economically beneficial use of his property; however, Goodman

is not entitled to the “most beneficial use of the property.” See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at

127, 98 S.Ct. at 2660. Moreover, Goodman could have sought to pursue development under

his original permits, but did not. There is nothing before this Court to suggest that the City’s

actions prevented Goodman from the reasonable use of his property. Furthermore, as the

United States Supreme Court recognized:

[T]he Takings Clause presupposes that the government has acted in pursuit of

a valid public purpose. The Clause expressly requires compensation where

government takes private property “for public use.” It does not bar

government from interfering with property rights, but rather requires

compensation “in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a

taking.”

Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543, 125 S.Ct. at 2084 (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran

Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d

250 (1987)) (emphasis in original). Whether or not a regulation is valid is a separate and

distinct inquiry properly brought under a due process theory. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543,

125 S.Ct. at 2084.

Although Goodman is correct that a “temporary” taking requires compensation

pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, the property deprivation must still constitute a taking

under Supreme Court precedent. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale

v. County of Los Angeles, California, 482 U.S. 304, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250 (1987).

Justice Stevens recognized two broad categories of temporary harms resulting from

regulatory takings, describing them as follows:

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11The Court notes that the explicit language of the Fifth Amendment preempts any

“takings” claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395,

109 S.Ct. 1865, 1871, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (analyzing claim brought pursuant to the

Fourth Amendment and Due Process Clauses under the explicit language of the Fourth

Amendment rather than the more generalized “substantive due process”).

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(1) those that result from a deliberate decision to appropriate certain property

for public use for a limited period of time; and (2) those that are a by-product

of governmental decisionmaking. The first subcategory includes, for example,

the condemnation of a laundry to be used by the military for the duration of

World War II, or the condemnation of the unexpired term of a lease, that type

of appropriation is correctly characterized as a “temporary taking.” The

second subcategory is fairly characterized as an inevitable cost of doing

business in a highly regulated society. . . . [I]n a challenge to a governmental

regulation – whether it be a zoning ordinance, a health regulation, or a traffic

law – [a property owner] is almost certain to suffer some temporary harm in

the process. At the least, he will usually incur significant litigation expenses

and frequently he will incur substantial revenue losses because the use of his

property has been temporarily curtailed while the dispute is being resolved.

Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 203-4, 105 S.Ct. at 3125-26 (Stevens, J., concurring)

(internal citations omitted). Furthermore, Goodman does not have “a constitutionallyprotectible property right to develop [his] property in contravention of Arizona’s . . . laws.”

Carr Huml Investors, LLC v. Arizona, 2007 WL 4403981 at 11 (D.Ariz.). Based upon the

evidence before this Court, Goodman cannot establish a Fifth Amendment “taking.”11 The

Court further notes, however, that because Goodman’s inverse condemnation action pursuant

to Arizona state law is still pending, that it remains possible he will prevail under this theory,

yet not obtain “just compensation.” See, Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186, 105 S.Ct. at

3116. As such, this Court will dismiss Goodman’s Fifth Amendment “takings” claim as

unripe, and dismiss his § 1983 “takings” claim for failure to state a claim.

C. Substantive and Procedural Due Process

Goodman alleges both substantive and procedural due process violations in the

revocation of his permits. As noted, supra, whether or not a regulation is valid is a separate

and distinct inquiry properly brought under a due process theory. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at

543, 125 S.Ct. at 2084. Moreover, whether the City has exercised its power in a manner that

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“fails to serve any legitimate governmental objective [and is] so arbitrary or irrational that

it runs afoul of the Due Process Clause” is a valid challenge to a deprivation of property.

Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542, 125 S.Ct. at 2083; See also, Kerley Industries, Inc. v. Pima Co., 785

F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1986) (considering whether government’s revocation of conditional use

permit violated due process protections). Despite the propriety of the legal theory, however,

it is still unresolved how the City will apply its regulations to Goodman’s property. As noted

previously, Goodman’s vested rights claim remains unripe, and any putative Fifth

Amendment takings claim is unripe. Until there is resolution as to these claims, this Court

cannot fully assess the adequacy of Goodman’s due process claims, because he has not yet

fully availed himself of the procedures afforded him by the government. Therefore, the

Court finds Goodman’s due process claims unripe for adjudication.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss for Failure

to State a Claim for Relief [Doc. # 16] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part;

2. Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint regarding a Fifth Amendment taking is

DISMISSED AS UNRIPE;

3. Count III of Plaintiff’s Complaint regarding his Vested Rights is DISMISSED

AS UNRIPE;

4. Count IV of Plaintiff’s Complaint regarding his Substantive and Procedural

Due Process rights is DISMISSED AS UNRIPE;

5. Count V of Plaintiff’s Complaint regarding a “taking” pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1983 is DISMISSED as preempted by Count I.

6. Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Counts I and II of

Complaint [Doc. #62] is DENIED;

7. All other motions pending before this Court are DENIED AS MOOT;

8. This case as to Count II is REMANDED to Pima County Superior Court

(Cause # C20074158);

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9. The Clerk of the Court shall mail a certified copy of this Order to the Clerk of

the Pima County Superior Court; and

10. The Clerk of the Court shall then close its file in this matter.

DATED this 21st day of April, 2009.

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