Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08053/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08053-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

RONNIE D. STILWELL and COURTNEY )

STILWELL, )

) 

 Plaintiffs, ) 

) 

vs. ) 

)

CITY OF WILLIAMS, et al., )

) No. 3:12-cv-8053-HRH

 Defendants. ) [Prescott Division]

__________________________________________) 

O R D E R

Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Related Costs

Defendants move for an award of attorneys’ fees and related costs.1 This motion is

opposed.2

 Oral argument has not been requested and is not deemed necessary.

1Docket No. 164. 

2Docket No. 169. Plaintiffs’ opposition does not comply with Local Rule 7.1(b)

because the font is too small and it does not comply with Local Rule 7.2(e)(1) because it is

over length. The court has nonetheless in its discretion considered plaintiffs’ opposition. 

 

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Case 3:12-cv-08053-HRH Document 173 Filed 04/25/14 Page 1 of 9
Background

Plaintiffs are Ronnie D. and Courtney Stilwell. Defendants are the City of Williams;

Joseph and Lyda Duffy; Raymond Glenn and Elsie Cornwell; Billy and Bessie Pruett; and

Kathy and Tracy Fuller. 

Mr. Stilwell was employed as the City’s Water Superintendent until he was

terminated on January 5, 2011. In their amended complaint,3 plaintiffs asserted the

following claims: 1) an ADEA retaliation claim against the City, Duffy, and Cornwell; 2)

an equal protection § 1983 claim against all defendants; 3) a First Amendment § 1983

retaliation claim against all defendants; 4) a 14th Amendment due process § 1983 claim

against all defendants; 5) a common law wrongful discharge claim against the City, Duffy,

and Cornwell; 6) a wrongful discharge claim under A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(d) against the City,

Duffy, and Cornwell; 7) a breach of contract claim against the City; 8) a breach of the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim against the City; 9) an intentional

interference with contract claim against Duffy and Cornwell; 10) an intentional infliction

of emotional distress claim against all defendants; 11) a negligent infliction of emotional

distress claim against all defendants; 12) a slander and/or libel claim against the City and

Duffy; 13) a slander and/or libel claim against the City, Duffy, and Cornwell based on

alleged statements made to Mr. Stilwell’s prospective employers; 14) a slander claim

3Docket No. 18. 

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Case 3:12-cv-08053-HRH Document 173 Filed 04/25/14 Page 2 of 9
against Fuller; 15) a libel claim against all defendants; and 16) a false light invasion of

privacy claim against all defendants. 

Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on their due process § 1983 claim, their

A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(d) wrongful discharge claim, their breach of the implied covenant of

good faith and fair dealing claim, and their intentional interference with contract claim

against Duffy. Defendants cross-moved for summary judgment on all of plaintiffs’ claims. 

During thependency ofthe cross-motions for summary judgment, plaintiffs withdrew their

second, twelfth, and thirteen claims for relief.4

On March 5, 2014, the court granted summary judgment to defendants5and the

judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ amended complaint was entered the same day.6 

Pursuant to Local Rule 54.2, defendants now move for an award of attorneys’ fees

and related costs.7 Defendants seek $147,263.25 in fees and $9,318.79 in costs.8 

4Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion[s] for Partial Summary Judgment [etc.]

at 36 & 56, Docket No. 152. 

5Docket No. 162. 

6Docket No. 163. 

7Defendants’motionwas timely filed but defense counsel’s statement of consultation

does not reflect a good faith effort to resolve the attorneys’ fees issue prior to the instant

motion being filed. The court has nonetheless in its discretion considered the instant

motion.

8Attached as Exhibit E to the instant motion is a document entitled “Defendants’

Statement of Costs and Notice of Taxation of Costs.” Although the costs outlined in this

(continued...)

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Discussion

There is no dispute that defendants are the prevailing parties in this matter. The

issue here is whether as the prevailing parties, defendants are entitled to an award of some

or all of their attorneys’ fees and related costs. 

Defendants first argue that they are entitled to attorneys’ fees for their defense of 

plaintiffs’ ADEA retaliation claim. “The ADEA does not expressly provide for the award

of attorney's fees. Instead, the ADEA incorporates the remedial provisions of the Fair

Labor Standards Act....” Richardson v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 750 F.2d 763, 765 (9th Cir.

1984). “The FLSA’s fee-shifting provision refers only to a prevailing plaintiff and says

nothing of a prevailing defendant.” Mach v. Will County Sheriff, 580 F.3d 495, 501 (7th Cir.

2009) (internal citation omitted). But, “the ADEA’s remedial scheme does not preclude

application of the common law rule that a prevailing defendant may obtain attorneys’ fees

if the plaintiff litigated in bad faith.” Id. “A finding of bad faith is warranted where an

attorney ‘knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous argument, or argues a meritorious

claim for the purpose of harassing an opponent.’” Primus Automotive Financial Services,

Inc. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d 644, 649 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Keegan, 78 F.3d 431, 436 (9th

8

(...continued)

document are the kind usually treated as taxable costs, defendants request that the court

treat these costs as “related costs”, rather than taxable costs. See Defendants’ Reply [etc.]

at 2, Docket No. 172. 

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Case 3:12-cv-08053-HRH Document 173 Filed 04/25/14 Page 4 of 9
Cir. 1996)). “A party also demonstrates bad faith by ‘delaying or disrupting the litigation

or hampering enforcement of a court order.’” Id. (quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678,

689 n.14 (1978)). “An award of attorneys’ fees for bad faith ‘is punitive and the penalty can

be imposed only in exceptional cases and for dominating reasons of justice.’” Dogherra v.

Safeway Stores, Inc., 679 F.2d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting United States v. Standard

Oil Co., 603 F.2d 100, 103 (9th Cir. 1979)).

Plaintiffs’ ADEA retaliation claim against the City was not frivolous or pursued to

harass defendants or delay this litigation. Although the court found that plaintiffs could

not establish causation as to this claim, plaintiffs’ argument that Mr. Stilwell’s termination

was the end result of a 15-month campaign of harassment by defendant Duffy was not

frivolous. And although plaintiffs’ ADEA retaliation claim against Duffy and Cornwell

failed as a matter of law, the fact that plaintiffs pursued this claim did not delay the

litigation and required little, if any, additional work for defense counsel. Because plaintiffs’

did not litigate their ADEA retaliation claim in bad faith, defendants are not entitled to

attorneys’ fees and related costs for their defense of this claim. 

Defendants next argue that they are entitled to attorneys’ fees for their defense of

plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims (claims 2, 3, and 4). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), “a prevailing

defendant” in a § 1983 case “may only recover fees in ‘exceptional circumstances’ where

the court finds that the plaintiff's claims are ‘frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.’” 

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Case 3:12-cv-08053-HRH Document 173 Filed 04/25/14 Page 5 of 9
Braunstein v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 683 F.3d 1177, 1187 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Harris v.

Maricopa Cnty. Superior Court, 631 F.3d 963, 971 (9th Cir. 2011)). 

Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ § 1983 equal protectionandfree speechclaimswere

frivolous because they were foreclosed by Ahlmeyer v. Nevada System of Higher

Education, 555 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2009). Defendants also argue that it is clearthat plaintiffs

realized that the § 1983 equal protection claim was frivolous since they withdrew it after

defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on this claim. As for plaintiffs’ § 1983

due process claim, defendants argue that this claim was frivolous because the evidence

clearly showed that Mr. Stilwell was an at-will employee who could be terminated without

cause.

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 equal protection and free speech claims were not frivolous. 

Plaintiffs made a plausible argument supported by legal authority that Ahlmeyer did not

apply. That the court found defendants’ argument more persuasive does not make these

claims frivolous nor does the fact that plaintiffs ultimately chose to withdraw their § 1983

equal protection claim. Plaintiffs’ withdrawal came early enough in the summary

judgment process to save both the court and defendants time. Plaintiff’s § 1983 due process

claim was also not frivolous. Plaintiffs had a plausible argument that Stilwell’s at-will

employment status had been modified by the City’s Employee Manual and the parties’

mutual understanding that he was entitled to the disciplinary procedures that applied to

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Case 3:12-cv-08053-HRH Document 173 Filed 04/25/14 Page 6 of 9
employees who could only be terminated for cause. Because plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims were

not frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, defendants are not entitled to attorneys’ fees

and related costs for their defense of these claims.9 

Defendants next argue that they are entitled to attorneys’ fees for their defense of

plaintiffs’ contract claims (claims 7 and 8).

10 The court, in its discretion, may award a

prevailing party reasonable attorneys’ fees “[i]n any contested action arising out of a

contract[.]” A.R.S. § 12–341.01(A). 

The court declines to award defendants attorneys’ fees for their defense of claims

7 and 8 “[b]ecause there is nothing in the record to suggest what portion of the fees is

related to” the claims arising out of contract “as distinguished from” plaintiffs’ other

claims. Circle K Corp. v. Rosenthal, 574 P.2d 856, 862 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977); see also, Marsh

v. Digital Equipment Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1411, 1412-13 (D. Ariz. 1988) (denying the

defendant’s application for fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A) because the parties had not

9Because defendants have not shown that they are entitled to attorneys’ fees

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), they are also not entitled to attorneys’ fees or sanctions

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

10Defendants contendthatplaintiffs’ claim9 forintentional interference with contract

is a claim “arising out of contract” but “[t]he duty not to interfere with the contract of

another arises out of law, not contract” and thus this claim is treated as a tort claim for

purposes of the instant motion. Bar J Bar Cattle Co. v. Pace, 763 P.2d 545, 550 (Ariz. Ct.

App. 1988). 

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Case 3:12-cv-08053-HRH Document 173 Filed 04/25/14 Page 7 of 9
“treated the discrimination and contract claims as discrete issues and had [not] kept

separate time records relating to each issue”). 

Defendants next argue that they are entitled to attorneys’ fees for their defense of 

plaintiffs’ state law tort claims (claims 5-6 and 9-16) pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-349(A). Section

12-349(A) provides, in pertinent part, that 

the court shall assess reasonable attorney fees, expenses and,

at the court’s discretion, double damages of not to exceed five

thousand dollars against an attorney or party, including this

state and political subdivisions of this state, if the attorney or

party does any of the following:

1. Brings or defends a claim without substantial justification.

2. Brings or defends a claim solely or primarily for delay or

harassment.

3. Unreasonably expands or delays the proceeding.

4. Engages in abuse of discovery.

“‘[W]ithout substantial justification’ means that the claim or defense is groundless and is

not made in good faith.” A.R.S. § 12-349(F). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that this state law statute, which the court of appeals

characterized as a “sanctions statute” does not apply to actions in federal court, even if the

court is sitting in diversity. In re Larry's Apartment, L.L.C., 249 F.3d 832, 837-840 (9th Cir.

2001). But even if A.R.S. § 12-349(A) applied here, the court would decline to award

defendants attorneys’ fees because plaintiffs’ state law tort claims, albeit weak, were not

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Case 3:12-cv-08053-HRH Document 173 Filed 04/25/14 Page 8 of 9
groundless or made in bad faith nor did they unreasonably expand the litigation. Plaintiffs

had plausible factual and legal arguments as to each of these claims, even though they did

not ultimately prevail on any of these claims. And, these claims did not unreasonably

expand the litigation, although they involved some discovery that was not directly related

to plaintiffs’ other claims. Thus, defendants are not entitled to attorneys’ fees and related

costs for their defense of plaintiffs’ state law tort claims. 

Conclusion

Defendants’ motion for an award of attorneys’ fees and related costs11 is denied. 

DATED at Anchorage, Alaska, this 25th day of April, 2014. 

/s/ H. Russel Holland 

United States District Judge

11Docket No. 164. 

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