Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02669/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02669-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1 The court issues the instant Amended Memorandum and

Order to make minor stylistic changes to the original Memorandum

and Order, filed April 19, 2006 (Docket #642).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

McKESSON INFORMATION

SOLUTIONS, INC.,

NO. CIV. S-02-2669 FCD KJM

Plaintiff,

v. AMENDED MEMORANDUM AND ORDER1

BRIDGE MEDICAL, INC.,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

At the April 11, 2006 hearing on the parties’ motions in

limine, the court took two of defendant Bridge Medical, Inc.’s

(“Bridge”) motions under submission: (1) Bridge’s motion in

limine #5 to exclude evidence and testimony regarding its advice

of counsel (Docket #588) and (2) Bridge’s motion in limine #6 to

strike ten witnesses on plaintiff McKesson Information Solutions,

Case 2:02-cv-02669-FCD-KJM Document 695 Filed 06/05/06 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 The court also took under submission Bridge’s motion in

limine #4 (Docket #587) to preclude McKesson from relying on the

doctrine of equivalents. However, as to this motion, the court

permitted supplemental briefing by McKesson (with a response by

Bridge) on the issue of whether McKesson’s expert, Dr. Bims,

could opine about the doctrine and if not, what evidence McKesson

expected to offer on the doctrine. To the extent Bridge brought

the motion to preclude McKesson from relying on the doctrine

based on the theory of prosecution history estoppel or McKesson’s

general failure to adequately disclose the theory in the course

of discovery, the court orally DENIED the motion on those

grounds. Thus, the only issue for resolution, pursuant to the

supplemental briefing, is whether McKesson should be otherwise

precluded from reliance on the doctrine because it has no

admissible evidence pertaining to it.

2

Inc.’s (“McKesson”) witness list (Docket #589).2 By this order,

the court issues its decision on those motions.

First, regarding Bridge’s motion in limine #5, Bridge has

asserted the attorney-client privilege over an opinion of counsel

it received regarding the ‘716 patent; Bridge does not intend to

rely on said opinion to defend against McKesson’s charge of

willful infringement. As such, by this motion, Bridge seeks to

preclude any evidence or testimony regarding its assertion of the

attorney-client privilege over its opinion of counsel. In

support, Bridge relies on Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge

Gmbh v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) wherein the

Federal Circuit held, overturning prior precedent, that: "the

assertion of attorney-client and/or work-product privilege and

the withholding of the advice of counsel shall no longer entail

an adverse inference as to the nature of the advice" that was

given. Id. at 1345. The court similarly held with respect to

the absence of an opinion of counsel that: "the failure to obtain

an exclupatory opinion of counsel shall no longer provide an

adverse inference or evidentiary presumption that such an opinion

Case 2:02-cv-02669-FCD-KJM Document 695 Filed 06/05/06 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

would have been unfavorable" had it been given. Id. at 1346.

The parties agree that pursuant to Knorr, McKesson cannot

argue to the jury that it should infer that the opinion received

by Bridge was unfavorable. However, the question before the

court is whether McKesson may nonetheless inform the jury that

Bridge asserted the attorney-client privilege over the opinion it

received regarding McKesson’s patent. The Federal Court in Knorr

expressly declined to decide whether the jury “can or should be

told whether or not counsel was consulted (albeit without any

inference as to the nature of the advice received) as part of the

totality of the circumstances relevant to the question of willful

infringement.” Id. at 1347. Rather, the court held that

“[t]oday we resolve only the question of whether adverse

inferences of unfavorable opinions can be drawn, and hold they

can not.” Id.

Subsequent cases applying Knorr have held in the context of

an absence of an opinion of counsel, that the jury may consider

that fact in its willful infringement analysis (without

inferences about the nature of any potential opinion). See e.g.

IMX, Inc. v. Lendingtree, LLC, 2006 WL 38918, *1 (D. Del. January

6, 2006) (holding that “fact that no opinion of counsel on the

issue of infringement was acquired by defendant may be considered

by the trier of fact in its willful infringement analysis");

Third Wave Technol. v. Strategene Corp., 405 F. Supp. 2d 991,

1016-17 (W.D. Wis. 2005) (holding that Knorr “did not say that it

was improper for a jury to infer from infringer’s failure to

consult counsel that the infringer had no prior knowledge of its

opponent’s patents or that it had not acted properly in other

Case 2:02-cv-02669-FCD-KJM Document 695 Filed 06/05/06 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

respects”).

These cases, however, are distinguishable on the facts

because, here, Bridge consulted counsel and received an opinion

but has chosen to assert the attorney-client privilege. The

court finds that this distinction requires a different result

than in Third Wave and IMX. Unlike those cases, any possible

inference that the jury could draw from knowing that Bridge

received an opinion of counsel, but refuses to reveal it under a

claim of privilege, would run directly afoul of the rationale of

Knorr. 383 F.3d at 1344 (“the inference that withheld opinions

are adverse to the client’s actions can distort the attorneyclient relationship, in derogation of the foundations of that

relationship”). The Federal Circuit explained in Knorr that

there should be no “special rule affecting attorney-client

relationships in patent cases” because

[t]here should be no risk of liability in

disclosures to and from counsel in patent

matters; such risk can intrude upon full

communication and ultimately the public

interest in encouraging open and confident

relationships between client and attorney.

Id. 

While the court acknowledges that McKesson may well be

prejudiced by the preclusion of evidence that Bridge obtained an

opinion of counsel while asserting the attorney-client privilege,

the court must also consider that Bridge would be prejudiced by

the admission of such evidence while asserting the privilege. 

Ultimately, the court must balance the parties’ respective

interests, considering the dictates of Knorr and its emphasis on

the sanctity of the privilege. “The attorney-client privilege

Case 2:02-cv-02669-FCD-KJM Document 695 Filed 06/05/06 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 McKesson conceded at oral argument that Putnam had not,

in any manner, been previously disclosed during the course of

discovery. As such, the court orally granted Bridge’s motion as

to him.

5

protects ‘interests and relationships which . . . are regarded as

of sufficient social importance to justify some sacrifice of

availability of evidence relevant to the administration of

justice.’” Id. (citation omitted.) Indeed, how can the court

honor the shield of the attorney-client privilege and then allow

McKesson to use it as a sword to prove its case?

Were the court to permit such evidence, even with a

cautionary instruction imposing Knorr’s limitations (of no

adverse inference), the jury would nevertheless be left to

speculate why Bridge would not reveal its counsel’s opinion. It

is inescapable that the jury would likely conclude that Bridge

received an unfavorable opinion, otherwise Bridge would reveal

it. This is precisely the negative inference Knorr prohibits. 

Accordingly, Bridge’s motion in limine #5 is GRANTED. 

McKesson is precluded, in all respects, from introducing evidence

or testimony pertaining to Bridge’s assertion of the attorneyclient privilege over the opinion of counsel it received

regarding the ‘716 patent.

Next, regarding Bridge’s motion in limine #6, with the

exception of witness George Putnam,3 the subject witnesses, while

not disclosed by McKesson in its Federal Rule of Civil Procedure,

Rule 26 disclosures, were otherwise made known to Bridge during

the discovery process. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1). Indeed, with

the exception of Putnam, all of the challenged witnesses were

identified in documents produced by both Bridge and McKesson

Case 2:02-cv-02669-FCD-KJM Document 695 Filed 06/05/06 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 The court also notes that Bridge listed eight

individuals as trial witnesses who it did not previously identify

in its Rule 26 disclosures.

6

during discovery. Specifically, witness John Hummel was

disclosed in document productions by Bridge; Bridge likewise

disclosed witnesses Michael Meyers, Teresa McCasky, Kris

Wanamaker, and Mark Gastright during discovery; witness Shirley

Hughes, Wanamaker and Gastright are former employees of Bridge;

and Hughes, Wanamaker, McCasky, Gastright and Billie Waldo were

each disclosed and discussed in depositions taken of other

witnesses. Because these witnesses were otherwise made known to

Bridge during the course of litigation, there is no prejudice to

Bridge in allowing the witnesses’ testimony at trial. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 37(c)(1). 

At the hearing, Bridge requested that if the court denies

the motion, it grant Bridge permission to depose these witnesses. 

The court finds no basis for such relief and accordingly denies

Bridge’s request.4 Discovery in this case, which was open for

nearly two years, has long closed (on February 28, 2005). The

court recently denied McKesson’s request to re-open discovery, a

motion which Bridge vigorously opposed, and it likewise finds no

basis to allow further discovery when requested by Bridge. (Mem.

& Order, filed March 13, 2006.) This case is on the eve of

trial, with the Phase I court trial to commence May 2, 2006; all

motions in limine, pertaining to both the court trial and the

Phase II jury trial, have been heard and will be resolved

shortly. The parties are fully engaged in trial preparation and

at this late juncture, there are no grounds to delay that

Case 2:02-cv-02669-FCD-KJM Document 695 Filed 06/05/06 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

preparation by re-opening discovery. 

As such, the court DENIES Bridge’s motion in limine #6 with

respect to all witnesses, except George Putnam. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 2, 2006.

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:02-cv-02669-FCD-KJM Document 695 Filed 06/05/06 Page 7 of 7