Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02780/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02780-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE DUARTE,

Plaintiff,

v.

DIMARIO FREELAND, et al.,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

No. C-05-2780 EMC

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION;

AND DENYING MOTION TO

RECONSIDER

(Docket No. 65)

Plaintiff Jose Duarte has sued various defendants, including the Oakland Unified School

District (“OUSD”), for violations of federal and state law. Mr. Duarte has amended his complaint

three times. Each complaint was challenged by a motion to dismiss filed by OUSD, Linda Halpern

(the “Principal Defendant”); Randolph Ward (the “Superintendent Defendant”); and David

Kakishiba, Gregory Hodge, Gary Yee, Noel Gallo, Alice Spearman, and Kerry Hammill (the “Board

Defendants”). Collectively, these defendants shall be referred to as the “School Defendants.” Judge

Jenkins granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss the third amended complaint. See

Docket No. 62 (order dated September 24, 2007). In the same order, Judge Jenkins noted that he

had “previously given Plaintiff leave to amend to attempt to address the deficiencies identified in

this Order. Because Plaintiff has not identified any additional facts that he could plead in support of

the dismissed claims, and because further leave to amend would be futile, the Court will not grant

further leave to amend at this time.” Id. at 17.

Subsequently, Mr. Duarte filed the currently pending motion to amend the judgment, relief

from judgment, or, in the alternative, for clarification. For the reasons discussed below, the Court

construes Mr. Duarte’s motion as a motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration and a

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motion to reconsider. Having considered the parties’ briefs and accompanying submissions as well

as the oral argument of counsel, the Court hereby GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the motion

for leave to file a motion for reconsideration and further DENIES the motion to reconsider with

respect to the breach-of-contract claim.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The allegations in the third amended complaint are summarized in Judge Jenkins’s order

granting in part and denying in part the School Defendants’ motion to dismiss:

On December 4, 2003, Plaintiff was working for the Oakland

Unified School District (“OUSD”) as a Spanish teacher at the School

for Social Justice. (TAC ¶ 37.) On this date, Plaintiff claims that

Defendants De Mario Freeland and Vuyo Mbuli, two students at the

school, attacked him when he tried to exclude them from his class. 

(Id. ¶¶ 37-38.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that they “rammed [him],

knocking him backward against the wall causing injury to his left

shoulder and arm.” (Id. ¶ 40.) After Plaintiff finished teaching class

that morning, he reported the attack to the school principal, Defendant

Linda Halpern, and informed her that he was going to press criminal

charges against the students. (Id. ¶ 42.) Plaintiff alleges that Principal

Halpern responded that she was not going to report the attack to the

police. (Id. ¶ 42.)

Later that day, Plaintiff went to the school’s main office to

make a written report of the incident. (Id. ¶ 43.) At this time, Plaintiff

saw another teacher, who Plaintiff identifies as “George,” talking to

Defendant Mbuli. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Mbuli saw

Plaintiff, became angry, and “taunted [Plaintiff] to a fight so [Plaintiff]

started to leave.” (Id.) However, before Plaintiff was able to leave the

office, Defendant Mbuli charged at him, grabbed Plaintiff by the

shoulder, and yelled, “Spanish bitch . . . I’m gonna get you . . . you

better watch your back!” (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that, at the time of the attack, the school did

not have any security guards on campus, and its classrooms did not

have any peepholes in the doors, telephones, or any other

communication devices in the classrooms. (Id. ¶ 44.) Additionally,

Plaintiff alleges that the various Defendants failed to warn him about

the Student Defendants’ behavioral disorders, failed to provide certain

security measures to prevent dangerous conditions on the school

campus, and failed to remove the Student Defendants from campus

after the attack. (Id. ¶ 55.) Plaintiff further alleges that, on the

morning of the attack, Defendants were aware that Defendant Mbuli

was intoxicated before he went to Plaintiff’s class, but failed to warn

Plaintiff about Defendant Mbuli’s condition and failed to remove him

from campus. (Id. ¶ 48.)

Plaintiff alleges that on December 5, 2003, his psychologist,

Dr. Suzanne Sloman, informed OUSD that Plaintiff was temporarily

disabled and could not teach. (Id. ¶ 58.) At that time, Plaintiff

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requested leave based on his disability. (Id. ¶ 59.) Also in December

2003, Plaintiff alleges that he wrote to Defendant Halpern about his

injuries. (Id. ¶ 64.) However, he claims that OUSD did not contact

him to propose an accommodation for his disability. (Id. ¶ 65.)

At about the same time, Plaintiff alleges that the Oakland

Educators Association advised him to seek restraining orders against

the Student Defendants. (Id. ¶ 67.) Soon thereafter, Plaintiff sought a

restraining order in Alameda Superior Court. (Id. ¶ 68.) Plaintiff

alleges that at the January 9, 2004 order to show cause hearing, OUSD

administrators “represented, supported, and ratified the Student

Defendants’ conduct at the hearing.” (Id. ¶ 69.) Plaintiff also alleges

that Defendants Halpern and Akuno Williams, a school administrator,

argued against issuance of the restraining order and “spoke in favor of

the attackers during work hours.” (Id. ¶¶ 70-71.) Plaintiff claims that

Defendants advocated on behalf of the student Defendants with the

consent of Defendants’ supervisors, Defendant Randolph Ward and

the School Board, and did not face any disciplinary action for their

statements. (Id. ¶ 71.) The court issued the restraining order against

both Student Defendants. (Id. ¶ 70.) Subsequently, Plaintiff alleges

that Akuno Williams, an administrator at the School for Social Justice,

made defamatory remarks about him in the East Bay Express

Newspaper in retaliation for Plaintiff’s protected activity. (Id. ¶ 74.) 

Plaintiff claims that in January 2004, Dr. Sloman informed OUSD that

he was permanently disabled from teaching. (Id. ¶ 75.) Thereafter,

Plaintiff filed a complaint with OUSD regarding the attack and his

resulting injuries. (Id. ¶ 81.) He also filed a complaint with his labor

union, the OEA, for disability discrimination and retaliation, so that

OEA would forward it to OUSD. (Id. ¶ 82.) According to Plaintiff,

the following month, February 2004, “the Board and Randolph Ward

met, voted to, and did in fact terminate Plaintiff as a result of his injury

claims, disability claims, complaints of workplace safety, testifying in

court to secure protection against crime, exposing the workplace

dangers in OUSD in open court, and complaining of disability

discrimination.” (Id. ¶ 104.)

On April 1 and 8, 2004, Plaintiff filed a complaint with OUSD

regarding the dangerous working conditions and his disabling injuries. 

(Id. ¶¶ 83-84.) In June 2004, Plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to

California Government Code § 910 for discrimination and retaliation

based on disability. (Id. ¶ 85.) Plaintiff claims that in July 2004,

OUSD wrongfully denied him dental benefits in retaliation for his

disability claims and complaints of discrimination. (Id. ¶ 86.) On July

15, 2004, Plaintiff received a continuing benefits/COBRA letter from

OUSD, which Plaintiff claims is the only notice he received indicating

that his employment had been terminated on June 30, 2004. (Id. ¶ 87.) 

Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated in retaliation for exercising his

right to seek redress from the government, right to speak out about

government injustice, filing claims for his injuries, speaking out about

his unsafe classroom, and protecting his students from the Student

Defendants. (Id. at ¶ 89.)

Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the attack, he suffered severe

emotional distress, permanent injury to his left shoulder, and is now

permanently disabled because of the trauma.

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Duarte v. Freeland, No. C05-02780 MJJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73750, at *3-8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24,

2007).

As noted above, Judge Jenkins granted in part and denied in part the School Defendants’

motion to dismiss the third amended complaint. Among the claims that were dismissed were: (1)

various tort claims (e.g., assault and battery, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional

distress, negligence); (2) failure to discharge a mandatory duty; (3) various violations of the

California Labor Code, but only with respect to the Board, Superintendent, and Principal Defendants

(i.e., as individuals); and (4) various breach-of-contract claims (e.g., breach of contract, breach of

implied-in-fact contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional

interference with contractual relations, inducing breach of contract). Mr. Duarte has now filed a

motion in which he seeks, in effect, reconsideration of Judge Jenkins’s rulings with respect to these

claims. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Request to Amend Complaint and Request for Clarification

As a preliminary matter, the Court addresses Mr. Duarte’s requests in his motion that (1) the

Court provide clarification as to why his claims for violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 were

deficient and (2) he be permitted to amend his complaint “to correct the mistaken omission of

defendant principal Halpern from Count VI Wrongful Termination.” 

The Court denies the first request. Judge Jenkins already provided in his order the reason

why the §§ 1985 and 1986 claims were being dismissed. See id. at 6 (noting that “Plaintiff’s mere

allegations of conspiracy without factual specificity are insufficient”).

The Court further denies the second request. Mr. Duarte did, in his third amended complaint,

assert a claim for wrongful termination against Ms. Halpern, see Compl. at 34 (stating that the claim

for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy was asserted “against School District, School

Board, Superintendent, and Principal defendants only”), but failed to include any allegations

supporting the claim that she was a part of the alleged termination. That was the basis of Judge

Jenkins’s ruling. See Docket No. 62, at 13 (order, dated September 24, 2007) (explaining that Mr.

Duarte had failed to state a claim for wrongful termination against Ms. Halpern because “there are

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 That “an individual-supervisor may be held personally liable for retaliation under the FEHA,”

Winarto v. Toshiba America Electronics Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 1276, 1288 (9th Cir. 2001), is of

no consequence because the dismissal was based on the insufficiency of the factual allegations. Mr.

Duarte also claims that an individual supervisor can be held liable for wrongful termination in violation

of public policy based on certain provisions of the California Labor Code. However, Judge Jenkins

dismissed the direct claims for violations of Labor Code §§ 98.6 and 6399.7 against all of the individual

defendants. See Part II.E, infra.

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no allegations in the claim that [she] was a part of the alleged termination”). Mr. Duarte claims that

his failure to include specific allegations about Ms. Halpern was a mere “error in drafting,” Pl.’s

Supp. Br. at 5, but Mr. Duarte was given multiple opportunities to amend by Judge Jenkins and

failed to correct this deficiency. To the extent Mr. Duarte now wants to add allegations that Ms.

Halpern was a part of the alleged termination, Judge Jenkins has already held that no further

amendments are permitted because Mr. Duarte was given multiple opportunities to amend. See id. at

as 17 (“Because Plaintiff has not identified any additional facts that he could plead in support of the

dismissed claims, and because further leave to amend would be futile, the Court will not grant

further leave to amend at this time.”). The Court sees no reason to depart from Judge Jenkins’s

ruling.1

B. Legal Standard

The main relief sought by Mr. Duarte with the currently pending motion is an amendment of

and relief from the judgment. Although Mr. Duarte styles his motion as one pursuant to Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e), there has been, as the School Defendants point out, no final

judgment in the instant case and what Mr. Duarte is really seeking is reconsideration of Judge

Jenkins’s interlocutory order. 

Under Civil Local Rule 7-9, “[n]o party may notice a motion for reconsideration without first

obtaining leave of Court to file the motion.” Civ. L.R. 7-9(a). Moreover,

[t]he moving party must specifically show: 

(1) That at the time of the motion for leave, a material difference

in fact or law exists from that which was presented to the Court

before entry of the interlocutory order for which

reconsideration is sought. The party also must show that in the

exercise of reasonable diligence the party applying for

reconsideration did not know such fact or law at the time of the

interlocutory order; or

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(2) The emergence of new material facts or a change of law

occurring after the time of such order; or

(3) A manifest failure by the Court to consider material facts or

dispositive legal arguments which were presented to the Court

before such interlocutory order.

Civ. L.R. 7-9(b). Finally, Civil Local Rule 7-9 instructs that “[n]o motion for leave to file a motion

for reconsideration may repeat any oral or written argument made by the applying party in support

of or in opposition to the interlocutory order which the party now seeks to have reconsidered. Any

party who violates this restriction shall be subject to appropriate sanctions.” Civ. L.R. 7-9(c).

In the instant case, Mr. Duarte did not ask leave of the Court to file a motion for

reconsideration, and therefore the Court could reject his motion outright. However, in the interest of

justice, the Court shall not hold Mr. Duarte to this procedural requirement. That being said, the

substantive standards laid out in Civil Local Rule 7-9(b) and (c) still apply.

C. Workers’ Compensation Exclusivity

In his order, Judge Jenkins dismissed multiple tort claims asserted by Mr. Duarte on the basis

that they were barred by the exclusive remedy provided for by the workers’ compensation laws. See

Docket No. 62, at 10-12; Cal. Lab. Code § 3601(a) (“Where the conditions of compensation set forth

in Section 3600 concur, the right to recover such compensation, pursuant to the provisions of this

division is, except as specifically provided in this section, the exclusive remedy for injury or death

of an employee against any other employee of the employer acting within the scope of his or her

employment . . . .”). 

In his motion, Mr. Duarte argues that workers’ compensation exclusivity should not have

been applied because exclusivity may only be applied where, inter alia, there is an employment

contract between the employee and employer, and Judge Jenkins concluded in his order (when

discussing the breach of contract and related claims) that Mr. Duarte had failed to allege that a

contract existed between him and the School Defendants. Mr. Duarte further argues that exclusivity

only applies where there is a causal connection between the injury suffered and the employment

(i.e., the injury must arise out of the employment) and Judge Jenkins “did not address how a violent

crime against a teacher arises out of the employment bargain.” Mot. at 4-5. Finally, Mr. Duarte

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argues that Judge Jenkins failed to explain why the School Defendants should not be held liable

under the in loco parentis doctrine.

All of the arguments that Mr. Duarte makes in his motion were made in his opposition to the

School Defendants’ motion to dismiss the second amended complaint. See Docket No. 36, at 5-9

(opposition, dated June 6, 2006) (arguing, inter alia, that the School Defendants have “not proven

that Plaintiff was their employee,” that there was a “causal connection between [the] violence and

the workplace,” and that there is liability based on the in loco parentis doctrine). Thus, Mr. Duarte

has failed to satisfy either Civil Local Rule 7-9(b)(1) or (2) and, further, has violated Civil Local

Rule 7-9(c), which specifically provides that “[n]o motion for leave to file a motion for

reconsideration may repeat any oral or written argument made by the applying party in support of or

in opposition to the interlocutory order which the party now seeks to have reconsidered.” Civ. L.R.

7-(c).

Moreover, Mr. Duarte has failed to show that there was a manifest failure by Judge Jenkins

to consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments which were presented to him before

issuance of his order. Civil Local Rule 7-9(b)(3). Regarding material facts, contrary to what Mr.

Duarte claims, he did allege in his third amended complaint that there was an employment

relationship between himself and the OUSD. See TAC ¶ 14 (“At the time of the incident, Mr.

Duarte was an employee of OUSD under a contract whereby Mr. Duarte was a probationary,

credentialed Spanish teacher, hired to teach high school Spanish at the School for Social Justice.”);

TAC ¶ 117 (“About November 2003, Mr. Duarte signed contract documents at OUSD. Those

contract documents provided for an annual salary of $46,000 per year, step increases, health

benefits, dental benefits, retirements, and disability benefits. Also, employment with OUSD entitled

Mr. Duarte to cancellation of his student loans over time for teaching in a shortage area.”). 

More fundamentally, contrary to what Mr. Duarte argues, the existence of a contractual

relationship is not necessary to exclusivity of workers’ compensation. What is required under

California Labor Code § 3600 is that at the time of the injury “the employee is performing service

growing out of and incidental to his or her employment and is acting within the course of his or her

employment.” Cal. Labor Code § 3600(a)(2). As Halliman v. Los Angeles Unified School District,

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163 Cal. App. 3d 46 (1984) demonstrates, workers’ compensation exclusivity applies to public

school teacher even though public employment in California is held by statute and not by contract. 

See Shoemaker v. Myers, 52 Cal. 3d 1, 23-24 (1990) (“[I]t is well settled in California that public

employment is not held by contract but by statute and that, insofar as the duration of such

employment is concerned, no employee has a vested contractual right to continue in employment

beyond the time or contrary to the terms and conditions fixed by law.”) (internal quotation marks

omitted); Summers v. City of Cathedral City, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1047, 1065 (1990) (same); see also

Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Under California law, the

terms of public employment are governed entirely by statute, not by contract, and hence as a matter

of law, there can be no express or implied-in-fact contract between plaintiff and [the County] which

restricts the manner or reasons for termination of his employment.”) (emphasis in original; internal

quotation marks omitted)

State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, 59 Cal. App.

3d 647 (1976), which suggests that employment for exclusivity purposes depends on an underlying

agreement between the parties is not dispositive. See id. at 652. There, the court relied on

California Labor Code § 3351 which defines “employee” as one “under any appointment or contract

of hire.” Cal. Lab. Code § 3351 (emphasis added). As the California Supreme Court held in

Arriaga v. County of Alameda, 9 Cal. 4th 1055 (1995), given § 3351’s explicit use of the disjunctive,

“a contract for hire is not ‘a prerequisite’ to the existence of an employment relationship.” Id. at

1061 (emphasis in original). The Court also pointed out that, under § 3357, “‘[a]ny person rendering

service for another, other than as an independent contractor, or unless expressly excluded . . . , is

presumed to be an employee.’” Id. (quoting California Labor Code § 3357).

Thus, contrary to what Mr. Duarte asserts, it was not inherently inconsistent for Judge

Jenkins to find both workers’ compensation exclusivity and a lack of basis for Mr. Duarte’s contract

claims. Exclusivity applies whether or not there is an employment contract where the employee is a

public employee. To the extent Judge Jenkins’s reasoning was implicitly based on the existence of a

contract, reconsideration is denied because that assumption whether right or wrong is immaterial to

the applicability of workers’ compensation exclusivity.

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As for dispositive legal arguments, as Judge Jenkins properly concluded, this case is

analogous to Halliman v. Los Angeles Unified School District, 163 Cal. App. 3d 46 (1984). Mr.

Duarte contends that Halliman is distinguishable because, in that case, there were no reports of prior

assaults on the plaintiff-teacher by the same student, see id. at 50, whereas, in his case, there were

prior incidents involving him and each student. There are two problems with this argument.

First, Mr. Duarte never presented this argument to Judge Jenkins as part of his opposition to

the motion to dismiss the second amended complaint. Mr. Duarte simply argued that “Halliman and

defendants’ opaque conception of human rights [is] offensive.” Docket No. 36, at 7 (opposition,

filed on June 6, 2006). Therefore, he has failed to meet the standard laid out by Civil Local Rule 7-

9(b)(3).

Second, even if the Court were to consider the merits of the argument, it has weaknesses. 

For example, while there were prior incidents involving Mr. Duarte and Mr. Freeland (at least, as

alleged in the third amended complaint), neither of the prior incidents involved an assault or even an

act of aggression by Mr. Freeland. Rather, the third amended complaint simply reflects that Mr.

Freeland acted disruptively. See TAC ¶ 37 (alleging that, the day before the incident at issue, Mr.

Freeland had been disruptive “with loud outbursts such as ‘puta’ . . . throughout the one-hour class

period”); TAC ¶ 38 (alleging that, the day of the incident at issue, Mr. Freeland “burst into [the]

classroom through a door from an adjacent classroom that had been blocked by heavy desks to

prevent intrusion” and that, after Mr. Duarte asked him to leave, he “refused and continued to

disrupt the class with loud outbursts”). Furthermore, there is no allegation that Mr. Duarte reported

either of these incidents involving Mr. Freeland prior to the day of the assault at issue. 

With respect to Mr. Mbuli, the third amended complaint does contain allegations that he

assaulted Mr. Duarte twice, with the second attack occurring after Mr. Duarte informed Ms. Halpern

of the first attack. See TAC ¶¶ 40-44. However, there is no allegation in the third amended

complaint that Ms. Halpern’s failure immediately to summon law enforcement and/or suspend Mr.

Mbuli after being told about the incident constituted purposeful ratification of the first attack. 

Indeed, in his motion, Mr. Duarte characterizes Ms. Halpern’s failure to act as indifference. See

Mot. at 8. See also Iverson v. Atlas Pacific Eng’g, 143 Cal. App. 3d 219, 228 n.7 (1983)

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(“‘precluding actions at law for those intentional torts committed without a specific intent to injure

would be consistent with the traditional policy of relying on workers’ compensation to cover

“accidents” on the job’”). Furthermore, even if Ms. Halpern’s failure to act could be considered

ratification, several courts have held that the ratification must be done with the intent to injure. 

Here, there is no allegation that Ms. Halpern’s failure to act was done for the purpose of injuring Mr.

Duarte. See Hart v. National Mortgage & Land Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 1430 (1987) (stating

that employer could be said to have ratified co-employee’s tortious conduct by having notice of the

conduct and failing to take action but adding that “it must be shown [that the employer] did this for

the purpose of causing [the plaintiff] emotional distress”; adding that, if the plaintiff “is able to

allege [the employer] acted with the intent to injure, he should be permitted to do so”); see also

Roberts v. Pup ‘N’ Taco Driveup, 160 Cal. App. 3d 278, 283 (1984) (noting that “[t]he modern view

respecting actionable intentional misconduct by the employer is that it must be alleged and proved

that the employer ‘acted deliberately with the specific intent to injure’ the employee”). 

The Court therefore denies Mr. Duarte’s motion to reconsider Judge Jenkins’s ruling on

workers’ compensation exclusivity.

D. Failure to Discharge Mandatory Duty

Mr. Duarte also moves the Court to “reinstate” his claim for failure to discharge a mandatory

duty, which Judge Jenkins dismissed on the basis of workers’ compensation exclusivity. In his

motion, Mr. Duarte argues that the claim should be resuscitated because “[i]t is well established that

causes of action arising under statute, particularly those enunciating a public policy are not subject

to workers’ compensation exclusivity. The California Supreme Court has stated explicitly, ‘[W]e

have refused to bar both statutory and tort claims where their motive element violates such a

policy.’” Mot. at 9 (quoting Vacanti v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 24 Cal. 4th 800, 823 (2001). 

Similar to above, this same exact argument was presented to Judge Jenkins in opposition to

the School Defendants’ motion to dismiss the second amended complaint, and therefore Mr. Duarte

has failed to satisfy either Civil Local Rule 7-9(b)(1) or (2). See Docket No. 36, at 7-8 (opposition,

dated June 6, 2006) (asserting that “[t]he exclusive remedy doctrine does not apply to causes of

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action created by statute” or where the motive behind the acts at issue violates a fundamental policy

of the state).

Likewise, Mr. Duarte has failed to meet the standard of Civil Local Rule 7-9(b)(3). The

legal argument presented by Mr. Duarte in his earlier opposition and restated in the pending motion

is not dispositive. First, many of the statutes cited by Mr. Duarte do not seem to impose any

mandatory duty on the School Defendants. See Haggis v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 4th 490, 501

(2000) (indicating that whether a statute contains a mandatory duty depends on whether the statute

contemplates a discretionary decision). They do not require the School Defendants to do anything at

all (e.g., Article I, § 1 of the California Constitution and California Education Code §§ 44808,

44030, 48910(a) and (b)). 

Second, with respect to the remaining statutes identified by Mr. Duarte in his motion (e.g.,

California Education Code §§ 32225, 48915, 49079(a)), Mr. Duarte has failed to show why workers’

compensation exclusivity should not apply. In Vacanti, the case which Mr. Duarte cites in support,

the California Supreme Court simply stated as follows:

In addition to the acts themselves, the motive element of a

cause of action may insulate that cause of action from the purview of

the exclusive remedy provisions. This exception to exclusivity,

however, is quite limited. “[A]ny inquiry into an employer’s

motivation is undertaken not to determine whether the employer

intentionally or knowingly injured the employee, but rather to

ascertain whether the employer’s conduct violated public policy and

therefore fell outside the compensation bargain.” In other words, the

motive element of a cause of action excepts that cause of action from

exclusivity only if it violates a fundamental public policy of this state.

Vacanti, 24 Cal. 4th at 823. In the instant case, Mr. Duarte has failed to articulate how any motive

element in his cause of action for failure to discharge a mandatory duty violates a fundamental

public policy. See, e.g., id. at 824-25 (concluding that “neither abuse of process nor fraud contains a

motive element that violates a fundamental public policy” because “[a]buse of process claims

merely require malice, which ‘may be inferred from the wilful abuse of the process’” and “fraud

requires only an ‘intent to induce’ another ‘to alter his position to his injury or risk’ and not an intent

that violates a public policy rooted in a constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision”; but

concluding that a Cartwright Act claim does require a motive that violates a fundamental public

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policy rooted in a statutory provision based on a case which stated that the Act “‘articulates in

greater detail a public policy against restraint of trade that has long been recognized by common

law’”).

E. California Unfair Labor Practices

In his order, Judge Jenkins dismissed Mr. Duarte’s claims for violations of the California

Labor Code, but only with respect to the claims asserted against the individual defendants, i.e., the

Board, Superintendent, and Principal Defendants. Judge Jenkins explained that “none of the Labor

Code provisions cited by [Mr. Duarte] create a private cause of action against the individual

defendants.” Docket No. 62, at 13 (order, dated September 24, 2007).

In his motion, Mr. Duarte contends that California Labor Code §§ 98.6, 230(b), and 6399.7

do provide for private causes of action against individuals -- noting, for example, that §§ 98.6 and

6399.7 provide that “‘[n]o person shall discharge . . . ‘” and that § 230(b) provides that “‘[a]n

employer may not discharge . . . .’” Mot. at 11 (emphasis added). But this same argument was

presented to Judge Jenkins in Mr. Duarte’s opposition to the motion to dismiss the second amended

complaint; consequently, Mr. Duarte has failed to meet the standards laid out in Civil Local Rule 7-

9(b)(1) and (2). 

Furthermore, Mr. Duarte has failed to meet the standard laid out in Civil Local Rule 7-

9(b)(3). Mr. Duarte has not set forth any dispositive legal argument that was presented to Judge

Jenkins that he failed to consider. While California Labor Code § 2699 et seq. provides that an

aggrieved employee may file a civil action for violations of §§ 98.6, 230(b), and 6399.7, Mr. Duarte

has not cited to any case law or other clear authority establishing that there is a private right of

action against individuals (as opposed to employers which could include persons) under the relevant

California Labor Code provisions.

F. Breach of Contract

Finally, in his order, Judge Jenkins dismissed Mr. Duarte’s claim for breach of contract,

stating that Mr. Duarte had failed to adequately plead “facts that establish that a contract existed

between the parties, [or] what conduct constituted the breach.” Docket No. 62, at 15 (order, dated

September 24, 1997). Judge Jenkins also dismissed related claims, i.e., claims for breach of

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 To the extent Mr. Duarte seeks to resuscitate the related claims, there appears to be problems

with at least some of them. For example, it is not clear how the individual defendants could have

interfered with the contract between Mr. Duarte and OUSD when the individual defendants were likely

agents of OUSD, see TAC ¶¶ 16-24 (alleging affiliation with OUSD), and a party cannot interfere with

its own contract. See Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia, 7 Cal. 4th 503, 513 (1994)

(“California recognizes a cause of action against noncontracting parties who interfere with the

performance of a contract.”) (emphasis in original). Similarly, it is not clear how the individual

defendants could have induced OUSD to breach the contract between Mr. Duarte and OUSD if they

were agents of OUSD. See Shoemaker v. Myers, 52 Cal. 3d 1, 24 (1990) (“It is axiomatic . . . that there

can be no action for inducement of breach of contract against the other party to the contract. It is also

well established that corporate agents and employees acting for and on behalf of a corporation cannot

be held liable for inducing a breach of the corporation’s contract.”).

3

 In the third amended complaint, the breach-of-contract claim is asserted against not only the

School District but also the Board and Superintendent Defendants. Although, in the complaint, Mr.

Duarte alleges that he had a contract with the Board and Superintendent Defendants as well as the

School District, see TAC ¶ 259, the contract to which Mr. Duarte refers in the third amended complaint

is the collective bargaining agreement between the School District and the Oakland Education

Association. See TAC, Ex. 10.

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implied-in-fact contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional

interference with contractual relations, and inducement of breach of contract. In his motion, Mr.

Duarte appears to seek reconsideration of only the claim for breach of contract and not any of the

related claims.2

 Furthermore, he appears to seek reconsideration of the breach-of-contract claim

with respect to the School District only.3

 Mr. Duarte contends that Judge Jenkins erred in dismissing

the breach-of-contract claim because such a ruling was inconsistent was his conclusion that workers’

compensation exclusivity applied. 

In contrast to the above, here, the Court finds that Mr. Duarte has satisfied the standard laid

out in Civil Local Rule 7-9(b)(3) -- i.e., that there was a manifest failure by Judge Jenkins to

consider material facts related to the breach-of-contract claim. As noted above, in his third amended

complaint, Mr. Duarte made the following allegations:

(1) “At the time of the incident, Mr. Duarte was an employee of OUSD under a contract

whereby Mr. Duarte was a probationary, credentialed Spanish teacher, hired to teach high

school Spanish at the School for Social Justice.” TAC ¶ 14.

(2) “About November 2003, Mr. Duarte signed contract documents at OUSD. Those contract

documents provided for an annual salary of $46,000 per year, step increases, health benefits,

dental benefits, retirements, and disability benefits. Also, employment with OUSD entitled

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Mr. Duarte to cancellation of his student loans over time for teaching in a shortage area.” 

TAC ¶ 117.

In addition, Mr. Duarte alleged: “About December 2003, Mr. Duarte and OUSD entered into an

agreement. The consideration was reasonable. Mr. Duarte performed all covenants required of him

by the contract.” TAC ¶ 247. Through the above allegations, Mr. Duarte did sufficiently allege that

there was a contract between him and OUSD. 

Furthermore, in the third amended complaint, Mr. Duarte did specify what conduct

constituted the breach: “The contract terms provided that Mr. Duarte could not be discharged

without good cause under the express terms of the collective bargaining agreement . . . . The contract

terms provided that the board would refrain from discriminating on the basis of handicap (Exh. 10

[collective bargaining agreement]). Moreover, the contract terms provide[d] for protection from

violent students and for safety devices (Exh. 10).” TAC ¶ 264.

Thus, based on the above allegations, the Court concludes that Mr. Duarte’s motion for leave

to file a motion for reconsideration should be granted and turns to the merits of the motion to

reconsider. 

The Court, upon reconsideration, affirms Judge Jenkins’s dismissal. Public employment is

governed not by contract, but by statute . See Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 23-24 (concluding that

plaintiff had failed to state a cause of action for breach of contract or breach of the implied covenant

of good faith and fair dealing because he was a civil service employee; noting that “[i]t is well

settled in California that public employment is not held by contract but by statute and that, insofar as

the duration of such employment is concerned, no employee has a vested contractual right to

continue in employment beyond the time or contrary to the terms and conditions fixed by law”)

(internal quotation marks omitted); accord Portman, 995 F.2d at 905; see also Summers v, 225 Cal.

App. 3d at 1065(stating that “[t]his rule applies at all levels of government”). Under Shoemaker,

Portman, and Summers, public employees such as teachers have no private claims for breach of

contract or other derivative state claims based on contract.

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 Even if Mr. Duarte could state a claim for breach of contract, such a claim would be

problematic for additional reasons. See, e.g., Pichon v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 212 Cal. App. 3d 488,

500 (1989) (“[W]here an employee sues for breach of contract, and the same conduct also caused a

compensable injury, that employee should simply be precluded from recovering any damages caused

by the compensable injury in a suit against his former employer.”); see also Mayer v. Multistate Legal

Studies, 52 Cal. App. 4th 1428, 1434 (1997) (“Pichon forecloses double recovery of economic damages

that were compensated by workers’ compensation benefits.”).

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The Court therefore grants Mr. Duarte’s motion to reconsider with respect to the breach-ofcontract claim, but affirms Judge Jenkins’s dismissal.4

 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Duarte’s motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration

is granted in part and denied in part. To the extent reconsideration is permitted, it is denied on the

merits.

This order disposes of Docket No. 65.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 21, 2008

_________________________ EDWARD M. CHEN

United States Magistrate Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE DUARTE,

Plaintiff,

v.

DIMARIO FREELAND, et al.,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

No. C-05-2780 EMC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the U.S. District Court, Northern

District of California. On the below date, I served a true and correct copy of the attached, by placing

said copy/copies in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the person(s) listed below, by depositing

said envelope in the U.S. Mail; or by placing said copy/copies into an inter-office delivery

receptacle located in the Office of the Clerk.

Jose Duarte

5319 Broadway Terrace #103

Oakland, CA 94618

ALL OTHER COUNSEL SERVED VIA

ELECTRONIC FILING ("E-FILING")

Dated: February 21, 2008 RICHARD W. WIEKING, CLERK

By: /s/ 

Leni Doyle

Deputy Clerk

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