Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-02054/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-02054-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY TEVIS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA SUPERIOR 

COURT, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:23-cv-02054 TLN CKD (PS)

ORDER & FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS DISMISSING FOR 

LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER 

JURISDICTION

Plaintiffs, who are proceeding without counsel in this action, request leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis (“IFP”).1 (ECF Nos. 2 & 3.) See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (authorizing the 

commencement of an action “without prepayment of fees or security” by a person who is unable 

to pay such fees).

The court finds that it lacks federal subject matter jurisdiction over the action. See United 

Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting the 

federal court’s independent duty to ensure it has subject matter jurisdiction in the case). 

Accordingly, the court recommends that the action be dismissed without prejudice, and that 

plaintiffs’ applications to proceed in forma pauperis in this court be denied as moot. 

1 Actions where a party proceeds without counsel are referred to a magistrate judge pursuant to 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 302(c)(21). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. Resolution of 

dispositive matters by a magistrate judge are to be filed as findings and recommendations. See

Local Rule 304.

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I. Legal Standards

Pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & fn. 7 

(9th Cir. 2010) (liberal construction appropriate even post–Iqbal). Prior to dismissal, the court is 

to tell the plaintiff of deficiencies in the complaint and provide an opportunity to cure––if it 

appears at all possible the defects can be corrected. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). However, if amendment would be futile, no leave to amend need be 

given. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996).

The court must dismiss a case if, at any time, it determines that it lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). A federal district court generally has jurisdiction over a 

civil action when: (1) a federal question is presented in an action “arising under the Constitution, 

laws, or treaties of the United States” or (2) there is complete diversity of citizenship and the 

amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a). Further, a plaintiff 

must have standing to assert a claim, which requires an injury in fact caused by defendant(s) that 

may be redressed in court. Harrison v. Kernan, 971 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 2020). 

Federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to consider claims that are “so insubstantial, 

implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit 

as not to involve a federal controversy.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 

83, 89 (1998); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 537 (1974) (court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 

over claims that are “essentially fictitious,” “obviously frivolous” or “obviously without merit”); 

see also Grancare, LLC v. Thrower by & through Mills, 889 F.3d 543, 549-50 (9th Cir. 2018) 

(noting that the “wholly insubstantial and frivolous” standard for dismissing claims operates 

under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of federal question jurisdiction). A claim is legally frivolous when it 

lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A 

court may dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory 

or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327; Rule 12(h)(3).

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II. Analysis 

Plaintiffs name multiple institutional and individual defendants in this action, which concerns 

the title to a manufactured home located in Rescue, California. Plaintiffs bring several claims 

under California law but assert federal jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming defendants 

violated their federal constitutional rights. ECF No. 1 at 2. Plaintiffs’ requested relief includes 

the voiding of a challenged grant deed, monetary damages, and an order that plaintiffs hold sole 

ownership and title to the disputed property. ECF No. 1 at 38. 

To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege facts showing each named defendant either 

exhibited some sort of “direct personal participation in the deprivation” or “set[ ] in motion a 

series of acts by others which the actor [knew] or reasonably should [have known] would cause 

others to inflict the constitutional injury.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743–744 (9th. Cir. 

1978). There must be an actual causal link between the actions of the named defendants and the 

alleged constitutional deprivation. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691–92, 

(1978).

The institutional defendants included by the plaintiffs in the complaint are the following state 

entities: the Superior Court of California; the Court of Appeal, Third Appellant [sic] District; the 

California Department of Housing and Community Development; and the California Department 

of Veterans’ Affairs. ECF No. 1 at 3-4. These defendants are immune from suit under the 

doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits which seek either damages 

or injunctive relief against a state, an “arm of the state,” its instrumentalities, or its agencies. 

Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1995), citing Durning v. Citibank, N.A., 950 

F.2d 1419, 1422–23 (9th Cir. 1991). The Eleventh Amendment serves as a jurisdictional bar to 

suits brought by private parties against a state or state agency unless the state or the agency 

consents to such suit. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 

(1978)( per curiam); Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344, 1349-50 (9th Cir. 1982). As the State 

of California has not consented to suit, the claims against these defendants cannot go forward. 

Plaintiffs also name two county entities as defendants: the County of El Dorado Building 

Department and the County of El Dorado Assessor. ECF No. 1 at 4. “Municipalities and other 

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local government units ... [are] among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.” Monell v. Dept.

of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. at 690. However, a municipal entity is liable under § 1983 only if 

plaintiff shows that his constitutional injury was caused by employees acting pursuant to the 

municipality’s policy or custom. See Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Association, 541 F.3d 

950, 964 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–94). “[A]n act performed pursuant to a 

‘custom’ that has not been formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker may fairly subject 

a municipality to liability on the theory that the relevant practice is so widespread as to have the 

force of law.” Board of County Comm'rs. of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). 

Plaintiffs have not alleged that any county employee acted pursuant to a policy or custom that 

violates their federal constitutional rights. Thus, the complaint does not state a federal claim as to 

these defendants. 

Plaintiffs also name California Attorney General Rob Bonta as a defendant. ECF No. 1 at 4. 

However, plaintiffs’ allegations do not show that Bonta committed any constitutional violation or 

caused plaintiffs harm. To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege facts showing each named 

defendant either exhibited some sort of “direct personal participation in the deprivation” or “set[ ]

in motion a series of acts by others which the actor [knew] or reasonably should [have known] 

would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-744 

(9th Cir. 1978). There must be an actual causal link between the actions of the named defendants 

and the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691–92 (1978). Thus, the 

complaint fails to state a claim against Bonta. 

As to individual defendants, plaintiffs name Deree Raymond, an El Dorado County Building 

Department employee. ECF No. 1 at 4. However, plaintiffs’ brief and conclusory allegations 

against Raymond are insufficient to state a federal claim under § 1983. See ECF No. 1 at 33 

(alleging Raymond “made false and fabricated evidence” and deprived plaintiffs of their rights 

under the Manufactured Housing Act). For the same reasons, plaintiffs fail to state a federal 

claim against state employee Leeanne Tedrow. See ECF No. 1, 33 (alleging Tedrow “committed 

fraud . . . and certified false documents . . . under the Manufactured Housing Act”). 

Plaintiffs also name as defendants two individuals (Waymire and Locatelli) who allegedly 

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purchased the disputed manufactured house in 2021 and lived in it. ECF No. 1 at 4. Plaintiffs do 

not allege a cognizable federal claim against these defendants, either, as the complaint does not 

demonstrate how the conduct of each defendant resulted in a deprivation of plaintiffs’ federal 

rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). 

The court does not have federal question jurisdiction over this action, because plaintiffs do 

not assert any federal claims against any defendant. In the absence of a basis for federal 

jurisdiction, plaintiffs’ claims cannot proceed in this venue. See McDaniel v. Hinch, No. 2:17-cv02448 KJM CKD (E.D. Cal.), Order dated July 11, 2018 (“[W]ith no stated claim triggering 

either diversity or federal question jurisdiction, the complaint is properly subject to dismissal for 

lack of jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P 8(a)(2); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009).”).

RECOMMENDATIONS

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiffs’ motions to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2 & 3) be DENIED AS 

MOOT; 

2. The action be DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; and

3. The Clerk of Court be directed to CLOSE this case.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to 

the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) days after

being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections with 

the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

Recommendations.” Plaintiffs are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time 

may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 

(9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).

ORDER

In light of these recommendations, IT IS ALSO HEREBY ORDERED that all pleading,

discovery, and motion practice in this action are stayed pending resolution of these findings and 

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recommendations. Other than objections to the findings and recommendations or non-frivolous 

motions for emergency relief, the court will not entertain or respond to any pleadings or motions 

until the findings and recommendations are resolved.

Dated: January 17, 2024

2/tevis2054.ifp-nojuris

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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