Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_09-cv-04410/USCOURTS-cand-5_09-cv-04410-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

**E-filed 02/26/2010** 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION 

NOREEN SALINAS, et al., 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

CITY OF SAN JOSE, et al., 

 Defendant. 

____________________________________/

No. C 09-04410 RS 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART MOTION TO 

DISMISS 

I. INTRODUCTION 

 Steven Salinas died after an encounter with San Jose police officers in which a Taser was 

used against him. In this action, plaintiffs seek to hold Taser International, Inc., among others, 

liable for Salinas’ death. Taser moves to dismiss the claims for relief sounding in express and 

implied warranty, arguing that it cannot be liable under such theories where Salinas was neither a 

purchaser nor a user of its products. Because a taser is designed for the very purpose of being used 

to affect persons such as Salinas, it is not dispositive that he did not operate the product. 

Nevertheless, under California precedent, the fact that Salinas cannot be said to have relied on 

Taser’s care and judgment in designing or selecting the product for use on him is fatal to his implied 

warranty claim. Under the same precedent, however, his express warranty claim may go forward, 

despite the reliance issue. Accordingly, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part. 

Case 5:09-cv-04410-EJD Document 23 Filed 02/26/10 Page 1 of 6
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II. BACKGROUND 

 This action originated in Santa Clara Superior Court. The complaint, pleaded on California 

Judicial Council forms, contains scant detail regarding the incident that allegedly led to the death of 

Salinas. There appears to be no dispute, however, that Salinas was tased by one or more San Jose 

police officers, and that he thereafter died. In addition to civil rights claims against the city and the 

police officers, plaintiffs have asserted claims against Taser for (1) strict products liability, (2) 

negligence, and (3) breach of express and implied warranty. This motion challenges only the 

warranty claims.1

 

III. DISCUSSION 

 A. The warranty claims

 California law once provided that privity of contract was necessary in an action for breach of 

either express or implied warranty and that no privity existed between the original seller and a 

subsequent purchaser unconnected to the original sale. Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co. 42 Cal.2d 682, 

695 (1954). As discussed below, over time exceptions to the privity requirement developed, and it 

appears to have been abandoned entirely in the context of express warranty claims. Thus, plaintiffs 

contend, under these facts and present-day California law, they should be permitted to proceed 

under warranty theories despite the fact that Salinas was not at purchaser of the taser at all, much 

less one in direct privity with the manufacturer. 

 California courts first recognized an exception to the privity requirement in numerous cases 

involving foodstuffs, and then more recently, drugs. See Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories 182 

Cal.App.2d 602, 606-607 (1960) (tracing emergence of exception in food cases, and extending it to 

a vaccine). Plaintiffs contend California also now recognizes an exception for any “dangerous 

instrumentality.” It is not clear, however, that California courts have wholly abandoned privity 

concepts where “dangerous” products are involved. Rather, they may have at most recognized that 

 

1

 The parties have agreed that the disposition of this motion will be binding on them in the related 

case, C 08-2625 RS. With this motion now decided, the Court will issue a separate order formally 

consolidating the two actions and setting out the procedures for subsequent filings in the matter. 

Case 5:09-cv-04410-EJD Document 23 Filed 02/26/10 Page 2 of 6
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privity should not be so narrowly construed as to bar claims by persons who effectively “stand in the 

shoes” of a purchaser. See e.g., Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Company, 54 Cal.2d 339, 346-348 (1960) 

(declining to accept proposition that “privity is not required where the item sold is inherently 

dangerous,” but holding an employee to be entitled to rely on warranties made to his employer who 

purchased the tool in question.). 

 Taser’s argument here goes beyond the ordinary concept of “privity” that has usually arisen 

in the cases either applying the rule or an exception. Taser’s point is not so much that Salinas lacks 

the requisite contractual privity as a non-purchaser, but rather it is lacking because he did not even 

use the taser in any conventional sense of the term. It is undisputed, however, that the very purpose 

of a taser is to deliver an electrical charge to someone other than the person operating it, and that is 

exactly how it was used on Salinas. It is also apparent that the express representations Taser 

allegedly makes regarding its product’s operation and safety, as well as any warranties implied by 

law, relate not only to the safety of the operator, but to the safety of persons receiving the electrical 

charge. Accordingly, it would be an oversimplification to conclude that no warranty claims are 

viable solely on the grounds that Salinas was not a “user” of the product in an ordinary sense. 

 The parties have not cited, nor has the Court located, any controlling authority involving 

tasers or similar devices. The nearest analogue appears to arise in the medical context. In Evraets v. 

Intermedics Intraocular, Inc. 29 Cal.App.4th 779 (1994), the allegedly defective product was an 

intraocular lens, surgically implanted into the plaintiff’s eye after removal of a cataract. Although 

the plaintiff had consented to the surgery, the product was applied to the plaintiff by the doctor; a 

scenario somewhat similar to the taser being applied to Salinas by a police office.2

 

2

 Admittedly the Evraets plaintiff could be characterized as thereafter “using” the implant in a way 

that Salinas could not be said to have subsequently “used” the taser. That does not, however, 

undermine the analogy entirely, as it appears the plaintiff’s injury in Evraets arose from the 

application of the product to his eye. 

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 The trial court in Evraets sustained a demurrer to claims based both on express and implied 

warranties.3

 The appellate court affirmed, as to the implied warranty claim, finding the lack of 

privity to be fatal. In so doing, the court observed: 

Evraets did not rely on [the defendants’] judgment that an intraocular device was 

appropriate for him. Rather, he relied upon his physician’s skill or judgment to select 

or furnish a suitable product. Thus, Evraets cannot sue the manufacturers, suppliers 

or distributors of the lens on an implied warranty of fitness theory. 

29 Cal.App.4th at 788. 

 Likewise here, Salinas cannot be said to have relied on Taser’s judgment that its products are 

safe and appropriate for use by police officers. At the very most, Salinas might be said to have 

“relied” on the skill and judgment of the San Jose Police Department in selecting and using 

appropriate law enforcement tools, in the sense that all members of the public are entitled to put 

such trust in the police. Although the police, in turn, very well may have relied on information and 

safety assurances provided by Taser, that leaves Salinas in no different position than the Evraets

plaintiff, whose doctor may likewise have relied on the representations of the manufacturer and 

distributor of the intraocular lens. Thus, even deeming Salinas to have “used” the taser in one sense, 

and even assuming he had the right to rely on the judgment of the police as much as a patient relies 

on a doctor’s judgment, the lack of privity between him and Taser bars his claim for breach of 

implied warranty under California law. 

 Plaintiffs’ claim based on express warranty, however, is a different matter. As the Evraets

court noted, California case law generally has abolished the requirement of privity for express 

warranty claims. Evraets, 29 Cal.App.4th at 789 n. 4 (citing Seely v. White Motor Co. 63 Cal.2d 9 

(1965) and Rodrigues v. Campbell Industries, 87 Cal.App.3d 494 (1978)). After concluding that the 

express warranty claim also was not preempted under federal law, the Evarets court held that the 

demurrer to that claim should have been overruled. Evraets, 29 Cal.App.4th at 858. 

 

3

 In addition to privity issues, Evraets had to consider whether federal regulation of medical devices 

preempted the state law claims. Those issues, not present here, do not affect the applicability of 

Evraets’ holdings regarding privity to this case. 

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 It is not entirely clear why, regardless of the existence or non-existence of any privity 

requirement, the issue raised by the Evraets court regarding the plaintiff’s lack of reliance on any 

representations of the product manufacturer or distributor would not equally apply to the express 

warranty claim. Indeed, it appears that the earliest California decisions suggesting that privity not 

be required for express warranty claims did so for the very reason that an end consumer should be 

entitled to rely on written representations that are communicated to him or her, regardless of where 

in the supply chain those representations originated. E.g. Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., supra, 42 

Cal.2d at 696 (“Another possible exception to the general rule is found in a few cases where the 

purchaser of a product relied on representations made by the manufacturer in labels or advertising 

material, and recovery from the manufacturer was allowed on the theory of express warranty 

without a showing of privity.”). 

 At this juncture, it is not necessary to determine whether proof of some form of reliance is 

still required to recover on an express warranty claim under California law, even if strict privity is 

no longer a prerequisite. Evraets stands as clear authority that at least at the pleading stage, 

California law permits a claim for breach of an express warranty to go forward under circumstances 

sufficiently similar to these as to warrant denial of this prong of the motion to dismiss. 

 Finally, it is not entirely clear what significance, if any, the existence or non-existence of 

warranty claims in this action is likely to have. As the Seeley court noted, strict products liability 

law was developed largely for the very purpose of providing a remedy to consumers injured by 

defective products, because otherwise, “‘[o]nly by some violent pounding and twisting,’ . . . could 

the warranty doctrine be made to serve this purpose.” 63 Cal.2d at 15 (citation omitted). Here, 

Taser has not moved to dismiss the strict liability or negligence claims, which would seem to 

provide a more natural basis for any recovery by plaintiffs in this action. It may be that this dispute 

at the pleading stage will have little bearing on the action other than with respect to a handful of jury 

instructions that will or will not be given. The Court reserves the right, of course, to determine what 

jury instructions are appropriate when that time comes. 

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 B. Amendment

 At the hearing, plaintiffs requested that if dismissal were granted, they be given leave to 

amend to allege with more specificity the various representations Taser apparently makes regarding 

its product. The proffered amendments, therefore, would appear to go only to the express warranty 

claim, which is not being dismissed. In any event, it is clear that the defect in the implied warranty 

claim as analyzed in this order is not subject to cure through amendment. Accordingly, no leave to 

amend will be granted. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 The motion to dismiss is denied with respect to the claim for breach of express warranty, and 

granted with respect to the claim for breach of implied warranty, without leave to amend. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

Dated: 02/26/2010 

RICHARD SEEBORG 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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