Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06490/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06490-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL NEVEAU,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF FRESNO, a municipality;

JERRY DYER, individually;

MICHAEL GUTHRIE, individually;

GREG GARNER, individually;

DARREL FIFIELD, individually;

MARTY WEST, individually;

ROGER ENMARK, individually; and

DOES 1 through 10,

Defendants.

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1:04-cv-06490 OWW LJO

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER RE DEFENDANTS’

(1) MOTION TO DISMISS

PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P.

12(b)(6);

(2) MOTION FOR A MORE

DEFINITE STATEMENT PURSUANT

TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e);

AND

(3) MOTION TO STRIKE

PORTIONS OF THE SECOND

AMENDED COMPLAINT PURSUANT

TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f).

I. INTRODUCTION

This is a civil rights action by a City of Fresno police

officer against the City of Fresno (“CITY”) and several

individual members of the City of Fresno Police Department. 

Michael Neveu (“Plaintiff”) brings a civil rights claim under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and under two California state “whistleblower”

statutes. Defendants CITY OF FRESNO, JERRY DYER, MICHAEL

GUTHRIE, GREG GARNER, DARREL FIFIELD, MARTY WEST, and ROGER

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1 The defendants named in the original Complaint were: City

of Fresno; Fresno Police Department; Jerry Dyer, Darrel Fifield;

Marty West; Dennis Montejano; John Fries; Roger Enmark; Greg

Garner; Fremen Hunter; Michael Guthrie; and Keith Foster.

2 Defendants filed their original Motion to Dismiss and

Memorandum in Support on March 25, 2005. (See Docs. 24, 25). 

Due to formatting problems, Defendants refiled their supporting

memorandum on May 12, 2005. (Doc. 33). All citations will be to

the corrected document (i.e., Doc. 33).

2

ENMARK (“Defendants”) move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended

Complaint. (Doc. 33, Def.’s Mem.). Plaintiff opposes the

motion. (Doc. 27, Pl.’s Opp.). 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed his original Complaint on November 11,

2004.1 (Doc. 1, Compl.). Plaintiff filed a First Amended

Complaint against the same defendants on December 17, 2004. 

(Doc. 19, First Am. Compl.). The defendants named in the First

Amended Complaint moved to dismiss on January 18, 2005. (Doc.

20, Def.’s First Mot.). Plaintiff stipulated to file a Second

Amended Complaint on January 28, 2005 (Doc. 22), and filed a

Second Amended Complaint on March 4, 2005. (Doc. 23, Second Am.

Compl.). The Second Amended Complaint is the operative complaint

and it is this complaint that the Defendants now seek to dismiss. 

(See Doc. 33, Def.’s Mem.).2

Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ Motion. (Doc. 27, Pl.’s Opp,

filed March 15, 2005). Defendants replied. (Doc. 28, Def.’s

Reply). Oral argument was heard on May 23, 2005. Michael A.

Morguess, Esq., appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. Joseph D.

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Rubin, Esq., appeared on behalf of Defendants. 

III. SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS

This civil rights action is brought by a Fresno City police

officer against the City of Fresno, the Fresno Police Chief, and

five individual Fresno City pPolice officers. Plaintiff brings

his § 1983 claim based on an alleged violation of his First

Amendment right to freedom of expression. Plaintiff claims he

was retaliated against for reporting to his superiors a number of

incidents of sexual harassment, racial discrimination, and

cheating on police department exams. The allegations in the

complaint are taken as true for the purpose of this motion to

dismiss.

Plaintiff is and was at all relevant times a Fresno City

police officer and has worked as a police officer for Fresno

since February 1995. (Doc. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 3, 11).

Defendant JERRY DYER is and was during all relevant times

the Chief of Police of the City of Fresno. Defendant

ROGER ENMARK was at all relevant times Captain and Deputy Chief

of the Fresno Police Department. Defendant DARREL FIFIELD was at

all relevant times Deputy Chief for the Fresno Police Department. 

Defendant MICHAEL GUTHRIE was at all relevant times a Lieutenant

for the Department. Defendants MARTY WEST and GREG GARNER were

at all relevant times Captains for the Department. (Id. at ¶¶ 4-

8).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against him for

having reported sexual misconduct and racial discrimination to

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28 3 Plaintiff has since been reinstated to duty.

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the Internal Affairs and Human Resources Departments of the

Fresno Police Department, and for having testified at an

investigatory hearing that cheating was occurring on Fresno

Police Department promotional exams. Plaintiff alleges two

adverse employment actions. The first is that from June 1997

through December 2002, Defendants failed to promote him despite

his high qualifications. The second is that, in March 2004,

Defendants placed Plaintiff on administrative leave and required

Plaintiff to undergo psychological examinations to determine his

fitness for duty. Despite the recommendations of three

psychologists that he was fit for duty, Defendants refused to

reinstate him to duty in July 2004.3

Plaintiff began working for the Fresno Police Department in

1995. (Doc. 1, Second Am. Compl. ¶ 11). Plaintiff alleges that

he “has never scored anything below ‘exceeds expectations’ on

[his] evaluations....” (Id. at ¶ 13). Plaintiff alleges that he

“has had only one incident of discipline in his personnel record

spanning his career.” (Id. at ¶ 14). 

Plaintiff asserts he was retaliated against for four

protected First Amendment activities. First, Plaintiff reported

to Police Department Internal Affairs Investigators alleged

sexual misconduct by a Richard Mata, who was a police department

official who was “suspended due to allegations of sexual

molestation” and was “investigated for sexual intimacy and

improper behavior towards a teenage girl.” (Id. at ¶ 16). On or

about July 16, 1996, Plaintiff was transferred from patrol to the

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post of “Explorer Post Advisor,” the position from which Richard

Mata had been suspended. Plaintiff alleges that unidentified

Internal Affairs investigators instructed him to report directly

to them any additional information relating to Richard Mata. In

July 1996, Plaintiff learned of “administrative improprieties

that appeared designed to foster opportunities for further sex

crimes” and reported these in writing to Internal Affairs. (Id.

at ¶¶ 21, 23). In or around August 1996, after he submitted the

report, Defendant WEST “ordered [Plaintiff] not to put any

information he obtained regarding the Mata allegations in

writing, and to only verbally report it to [Plaintiff’s immediate

supervisors].” (Id. at ¶ 27). According to Plaintiff, Internal

Affairs had instructed him not to report any information

regarding Mata to his immediate supervisors, even if they

instructed him to do so. Plaintiff “refused to follow WEST’S

order and reiterated that he was going to do exactly as Internal

Affairs and Chief Winchester ordered.” (Id. at ¶ 28).

Second, Plaintiff alleges that “[o]n or around December 23,

1996, [Plaintiff] documented and reported to [his immediate

supervisors] racial harassment of Southeast Asian Explorers by

Police Activity League volunteers....” (Id. at ¶ 29). One of

Plaintiff’s immediate supervisors (not a named defendant) advised

him that “Plaintiff should not have documented the racial

harassment because it caused staff at the Police Activity league

to become upset, including retired Deputy Chief Lee Piscola, and

that ‘pissing off a retired Chief is a bad career move.’” (Id.). 

Third, Plaintiff alleges that “[o]n or around December,

1996, [Plaintiff] submitted an extensive end of the year report

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documenting potentially embarrassing or troubling incidents

involving [his immediate supervisors], including the ‘banking’ of

overtime hours, which were unlawfully denied to [Plaintiff].” 

(Id. at ¶ 30). Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

WEST prevented the report from reaching Chief Winchester’s

office. (Id.). 

Fourth, Plaintiff alleges that in or about March 2002, he

testified at an administrative hearing that cheating occurred on

Department promotional exams. On or around March 2001, a new

promotional testing system for the promotion to the rank of

Sergeant was implemented by Chief DYER. (Id. at ¶¶ 32-34). 

According to Plaintiff, the system was created at the request of

Defendants GARNER AND ENMARK. However, after the new system was

implemented, some of the candidates complained that the system

was “tainted and therefore inaccurate.” (Id. at ¶ 34). The

complaints resulted in a hearing that took place before the Civil

Service Commission in February/March 2002. (Id.). Plaintiff he

informed attorneys handling the hearing “that some promotional

candidates were unlawfully given the answers prior to taking

the...promotional exam.” The day after Plaintiff reported this

information to the attorneys, Defendant GARNER “brought

[Plaintiff] into his office, confronted [Plaintiff] in a hostile

manner and stated words to the effect that ‘Yesterday I spent the

better part of the afternoon on the stand getting my [a**] chewed

off and I only kept wondering one thing--why your name had come

up as a witness.” (Id. at ¶ 36). Moreover, Plaintiff alleges

that “[i]n an attempt to discredit NEVEU’s testimony, Captain

GARNER advised attorneys handling the hearing that NEVEU was a

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‘crack pot,’ ‘screwball,’ and that he had ‘ethical problems.’” 

(Id. at ¶ 37). On or about March 12, 2002, Plaintiff, as well as

his wife, testified before the hearing “as to the improprieties

and outright cheating on in the testing process.” (Id. at ¶ 38).

Plaintiff alleges these activities are protected First

Amendment activities and that Defendants retaliated against him

for engaging in these activities. Plaintiff alleges two separate

adverse employment actions. First, he alleges that from

approximately June 1997 and December 2002, Defendants WEST,

FIFIELD, GUTHRIE, and GARNER failed to promote Plaintiff. (Id.

at ¶ 41). Plaintiff claims that someone informed him that “at

staff meetings, WEST, FIFIELD, GUTHRIE, and GARNER always

disapproved of any promotion or selection of NEVEU to...[a]

special unit, despite NEVEU’s record and commendations.” (Id.). 

Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that these Defendants denied the

promotions because of reporting the Mata allegations, the alleged

racial harassment, the “banking” of overtime hours, and

testifying before the Civil Service Commission. (Id.). Finally,

Plaintiff claims that on or about July 25, 2002, the sergeants

promotion list containing Plaintiff’s name was “killed” before

reaching Plaintiff’s name in retaliation for testifying before

the Civil Service Commission. This allegation is not related to

any particular defendant, although Plaintiff alleges in the next

paragraph that he “was further informed that Captain WEST ‘and

that group’ had done similar ‘black listing’ to other officers

who spoke up.” (Id. at ¶ 43).

Second, Plaintiff alleges that on March 1, 2004, Defendants

DYER and ENMARK, with the assistance of GUTHRIE, placed him on

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administrative leave pending a fitness for duty examination. 

(Id. at ¶ 45). Plaintiff alleges that DYER, ENMARK, and GUTHRIE

placed him on administrative leave “for engaging in the

aforementioned protected activities.” (Id. at ¶ 47). Plaintiff

was subsequently examined by three psychologists who declared him

fit for duty. (Id. at ¶ 49). Plaintiff alleges that “[o]n or

around July 6, 2004, Chief DYER and Deputy Chief ENMARK refused

to reinstate [him].” (Id. at ¶ 50).

On November 1, 2004, the same date that the original

Complaint in this action was filed, Plaintiff filed a government

tort claim pursuant to the California Tort Claims Act (Cal. Gov.

Code §§ 910 et seq.). Plaintiff received a response dated

December 13, 2004, which stated that any causes of action

accruing before November 1, 2003, were not presented within one

year after the incident. (Id. at ¶ 51). Plaintiff interpreted

this response as a rejection of his claim. (Id.).

IV. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to attack a

complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is

disfavored and rarely granted: “[a] complaint should not be

dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove

no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him

to relief.” Van Buskirk v. CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980

(9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). In deciding whether to

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grant a motion to dismiss, the court “accept[s] all factual

allegations of the complaint as true and draw[s] all reasonable

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” TwoRivers v. Lewis,

174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999). 

“The court need not, however, accept as true allegations

that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by

exhibit. Nor is the court required to accept as true allegations

that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or

unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors,

266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). For

example, matters of public record may be considered under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 201, including pleadings, orders and other papers filed

with the court or records of administrative bodies. See Lee v.

City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Conclusions of law, conclusory allegations, unreasonable

inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact need not be

accepted. See Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624

(9th Cir. 1981). 

“Where the facts and dates alleged in a complaint

demonstrate that the complaint is barred by the statute of

limitations, a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion

should be granted.” Ritchie v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 2d

1120, 1123 (N.D. Cal. 2002). There is no requirement, however,

that affirmative defenses, including statutes of limitation,

appear on the face of the complaint. Hyatt Chalet Motels, Inc.

v. Carpenters Local 1065, 430 F.2d 1119, 1120 (9th Cir. 1970).

“When a motion to dismiss is based on the running of the statute

of limitations, it can be granted only if the assertions of the

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complaint, read with the required liberality, would not permit

the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.” Jablon v.

Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (1980); see also TwoRivers,

174 F.3d at 991.

B. Motion for a More Definite Statement Pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(e).

A motion for a more definite statement pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(e) attacks the unintelligibility of the complaint, not

simply the mere lack of detail, and is only proper when a party

is unable to determine how to frame a response to the issues

raised by the complaint. A court will deny the motion where the

complaint is specific enough to apprise the defendant of the

substance of the claim being asserted. Bureerong v. Uvawas,

922 F. Supp. 1450, 1461 (C.D. Cal. 1996); see also Famolare, Inc.

v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 940, 949 (E.D. Cal.

1981) (finding a Rule 12(e) motion proper “only where the

complaint is so indefinite that the defendant cannot ascertain

the nature of the claim being asserted”). A motion for a more

definite statement is proper only where the complaint is “so

vague or ambiguous that the opposing party cannot respond, even

with a simple denial, in good faith or without prejudice to

himself.” Cellars v. Pacific Coast Packaging, Inc., 189 F.R.D.

575, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (internal quotations and citation

omitted); see also Sagan v. Apple Computer Inc., 874 F. Supp.

1072, 1077 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (citing Van Dyke Ford, Inc. v. Ford,

399 F. Supp. 277, 284 (E.D. Wis. 1975)) (“A Rule 12(e) motion is

more likely to be granted where the complaint is so general that

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ambiguity arises in determining the nature of the claim or the

parties against whom it is being made.”); Boxall v. Sequoia Union

High Sch. Dist., 464 F. Supp. 1104, 1114 (N.D. Cal. 1979)

(finding a motion for a more definite statement should not be

granted unless the defendant literally cannot frame a responsive

pleading). 

“Rule 12(e) is designed to strike an unintelligibility

rather than want of detail.... A motion for a more definite

statement should not be used to test an opponent’s case by

requiring him to allege certain facts or retreat from his

allegations.” Palm Springs Med. Clinic, Inc. v. Desert Hosp.,

628 F. Supp. 454, 464-65 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (quoting Juneau Square

Corp. v. First Wis. Nat’l Bank, 60 F.R.D. 46, 48 (E. D. Wis.

1973)). A Rule 12(e) motion “is likely to be denied where the

substance of the claim has been alleged, even though some of the

details are omitted.” Sagan, 874 F. Supp. at 1077 (citing

Boxall, 464 F. Supp. at 1113-14).

This liberal standard of pleading is consistent with Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2) which allows pleadings that contain a “short and

plain statement of the claim.” Both rules assume that the

parties will familiarize themselves with the claims and ultimate

facts through the discovery process. See Sagan, 874 F. Supp. at

1077 (“Motions for a more definite statement are viewed with

disfavor and are rarely granted because of the minimal pleading

requirements of the Federal Rules.”). If the detail sought by a

motion for a more definite statement is obtainable through

discovery, the motion should be denied. See McHenry v. Renne, 84

F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 1996) (granting 12(e) motion where

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complaint “does not provide defendants with a fair opportunity to

frame a responsive pleading”); see also Sagan, 874 F. Supp. at

1077 (“Parties are expected to use discovery, not the pleadings,

to learn the specifics of the claims being asserted.”); Beery v.

Hitachi Home Elec. (Amer.), Inc., 157 F.R.D. 477, 480 (C.D. Cal.

1993) (finding motion for a more definite statement should be

denied if the detail sought is obtainable through discovery); 

Federal Savings and Loan Ins. Corp. v. Musacchio, 695 F. Supp.

1053, 1060 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (finding that if plaintiff’s

complaint meets the notice requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, and

defendants are provided with a sufficient basis to respond, the

proper avenue for eliciting additional detail is through

discovery); Famolare, Inc. v. Edison Brothers Stores, Inc.,

525 F. Supp. 940, 949 (E.D. Cal. 1981) (“A motion for a more

definite statement should not be granted unless the defendant

cannot frame a responsive pleading.”); CMAX, Inc. v. Hall,

290 F.2d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 1961).

C. Motion to Strike Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) provides that “redundant, immaterial,

impertinent, or scandalous matters” may be “stricken from any

pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “[O]nly pleadings are subject

to motions to strike.” See Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co.,

697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). 

Motions to strike are disfavored and infrequently granted. 

See Pease & Curran Ref., Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F. Supp.

945, 947 (C.D. Cal. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by Stanton

Road Ass'n v. Lohrey Enters., 984 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993).

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4 Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State

or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall

be liable to the party injured in an action at law,

suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress,

except that in any action brought against a judicial

officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s

judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be

granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or

declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of

this section, any Act of Congress applicable

exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be

considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. 

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“[M]otions to strike should not be granted unless it is clear

that the matter to be stricken could have no possible bearing on

the subject matter of the litigation.” Colaprico v. Sun

Microsystems, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (N.D. Cal. 1991)

(citation omitted).

D. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 provides for liability against any person

acting under color of law who deprives another ‘of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’

of the United States.”4 S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana,

336 F.3d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

//

//

//

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5 “There is certainly no constitutional impediment to

municipal liability. ‘The Tenth Amendment’s reservation of

nondelegated powers to the States is not implicated by a

federal-court judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of

unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth Amendment.’”

Monell, 436 U.S. 691 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267,

291 (1977)). There is no “basis for concluding that the Eleventh

Amendment is a bar to municipal liability.” Id. (citing

Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976); Lincoln County

v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890)).

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1. Suits Against Local Governments: The Monell

Doctrine.

Local governments are “persons” subject to suit for

“constitutional tort[s]” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.5 Haugen v.

Brosseau, 339 F.3d 857, 874 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n. 55 (1978)). “[T]he

legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 compels the

conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities and other

local government units to be included among those persons to whom

§ 1983 applies.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Local governments can

be sued for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where

such suits arise out of unconstitutional actions that implement

or execute a “policy statement, ordinance, or decision officially 

adopted and promulgated by that body's officers....” Id. 690-1. 

If no official policy exists, “customs and usages” may fulfill

this element of a § 1983 claim against a local government. Id. 

A local government’s liability is limited, however. 

Although a local government can be held liable for its official

policies or customs, it will not be held liable for an employee’s

actions outside of the scope of these policies or customs. “A

municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a

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tortfeasor -- or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held

liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell,

436 U.S. at 691. “A local government may not be sued under

§ 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. 

Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom,

whether made by its law-makers or by those whose edicts or acts

may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the

injury that the government as an entity is responsible under

§ 1983.” Id. at 694.

To prevail on a § 1983 complaint against a local government

under Monell, a plaintiff must satisfy a three-part test: 

(1) The local government official(s) must have

intentionally violated the plaintiff’s constitutional

rights;

(2) The violation must be a part of policy or custom and

may not be an isolated incident; and

(3) A nexus must link the specific policy or custom to the

plaintiff’s injury.

See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-92.

2. Suits Against Governmental Officials

(a) Official-Capacity Suits

“[Section] 1983 claims against government officials in their

official capacities are really suits against the governmental

employer because the employer must pay any damages awarded.” 

Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1023 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing

Ky. v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985)); see also Doe v.

Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997)

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(finding that “a suit against a state official in his official

capacity is no different from a suit against the [official’s

office or the] State itself”) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). “As the Supreme Court

has stated, ‘official-capacity suits...generally represent only

another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an

officer is an agent.’” Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles,

167 F.3d 514, 524 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Graham, 473 U.S.

at 165). “‘As long as the government entity receives notice and

an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all

respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the

entity.’” Ruvalcaba, 167 F.3d at 524 n.3 (quoting Graham,

473 U.S. at 166.).

(b) Personal-Capacity Suits

“‘Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability

upon a government official for actions he takes under color of

state law.’” Dittman v. Cal., 191 F.3d 1020, 1027 (9th Cir.

1999) (quoting Graham, 473 U.S. at 165); see also Hafer v. Melo, 

502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (finding that “[p]ersonal capacity suits

seek to impose liability on state officials for acts taken under

color of state law”); Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 749 (9th

Cir. 1995). In setting forth the distinctions between personal

and official capacity suits, the Supreme Court said: 

Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal

liability upon a government official for actions he

takes under color of state law. See, e.g., Scheuer

v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-238 (1974).

Official-capacity suits, in contrast, “generally

represent only another way of pleading an action

against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”

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6 Immunity is not absolute, as the Ninth Circuit has

explained: 

This court has held that, when a public official acts

in reliance on a duly enacted statute or ordinance,

that official ordinarily is entitled to qualified

immunity. See Grossman v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d

1200, 1210 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that “an officer

who reasonably relies on the legislature’s 

determination that a statute is constitutional should

be shielded from personal liability”). The existence

of an authorizing statute is not dispositive,

however. Qualified immunity does not extend to a

public official who enforces a statute that is

“patently violative of fundamental constitutional

17

Monell[], 436 U.S. at 690, n. 55 []. As long as the

government entity receives notice and an opportunity

to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all

respects other than name, to be treated as a suit

against the entity. Brandon, 469 U.S., at 471-472.

It is not a suit against the official personally, for

the real party in interest is the entity. Thus,

while an award of damages against an official in his

personal capacity can be executed only against the

official’s personal assets, a plaintiff seeking to

recover on a damages judgment in an official-capacity

suit must look to the government entity itself.

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). 

“While the plaintiff in a personal-capacity suit need not

establish a connection to governmental ‘policy or custom,’

officials sued in their personal capacities, unlike those sued in

their official capacities, may assert personal immunity defenses

such as objectively reasonable reliance on existing law.” Pena

v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 473 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Graham,

473 U.S. at 166-167). Individuals are not immune under the

doctrine of qualified immunity if they violated “clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.”6 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457

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principles.” Id. at 1209.

Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1027.

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U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “A victory in such a suit is a ‘victory

against the individual defendant, rather than against the entity

that employs him.’” Cerrato v. San Francisco Community College

Dist., 26 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Graham, 473 U.S.

at 166-67).

E. State Law Claims Against Public Entities and the

California Tort Claims Act.

Plaintiff brings the following state law claims against

Defendants: violation of Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5 and violation

of Cal. Gov. Code § 52378, et seq. The California Tort Claims

Act governs tort claims against public entities and their

officials. See Cal. Gov. Code § 810 et seq. The California Tort

Claims Act (“CTCA”) requires plaintiffs to present a written

claim to the public entity allegedly responsible for their damage

before initiating suit on the cause of action. Cal. Gov. Code

§ 945.6. 

Under the California Tort Claims Act, no suit for “money or

damages” may be brought against a public entity until a written

claim has been presented to the public entity and the claim

either has been acted upon or is deemed to have been rejected. 

Hart v. Alameda County, 76 Cal. App. 4th 766, 778 (Cal. Ct. App.

1999). The CTCA requires a plaintiff to file a timely tort claim

with the public entity; if the claim is not timely, the public

entity may reject the claim.

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If a claimant fails to timely file a claim with the public

entity, and its claim is consequently rejected by the public

entity for that reason, courts are without jurisdiction to hear

the claimant’s cause of action. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. County

of Santa Clara, 187 Cal. App. 3d 480, 487 (1986); Moyer v. Hook,

10 Cal. App. 3d 491, 492-3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); Carr v. State of

Cal., 58 Cal. App. 3d 139, 144-6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Williams

v. Mariposa County Unified Sch. Dist., 82 Cal. App. 3d 843, 848-9

(Cal. Ct. App. 1978). For causes of action for death, personal

injury, or injury to personal property, a claimant must file a

claim within six months of the accrual of the cause of action. 

Cal. Gov. Code § 911.2. 

The CTCA also permits the filing of an application to file a

late claim for certain claims: “[w]hen a claim that is required

by Section 911.2 to be presented not later than six months after

the accrual of the cause of action is not presented within that

time, a written application may be made to the public entity for

leave to present that claim.” Cal. Gov. Code § 911.4. The

CTCA’s six-month limitations period applies to causes of action

for death, personal injury, or injury to personal property. Id.

at § 911.2. If a claimant fails to timely file a petition to

file a late claim, courts are without jurisdiction to hear the

cause of action. 

The overall policy of the claim requirements and time

limitations of the California Tort Claims Act are to: (1) “give

the governmental entity an opportunity to settle just claims

before suit is brought;” (2) “permit the entity to make an early

investigation of the facts on which a claim is based, thus

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enabling it to defend itself against unjust claims and to correct

the conditions or practices which gave rise to the claim;” and

(3) “avoid multiple suits arising out of the same transaction or

occurrence and thus further[] the goal of judicial economy.” 

Greyhound Lines, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 487 (quoting Gehman v.

Super. Ct., 96 Cal. App. 3d 257, 262, 265 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979),

disapproved on other grounds by Dept. of Transportation v. Super

Ct. (“Frost”), 26 Cal.3d 744, 759 n. 5 (1980)).

E. State Law Claims.

Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5 is a “whistleblower” statute that

establishes liability for employers who retaliate against their

employees for disclosing information to government or law

enforcement agencies. Specifically, § 1102.5(b) provides that: 

An employer may not retaliate against an employee for

disclosing information to a government or law

enforcement agency, where the employee has reasonable

cause to believe that the information discloses a

violation of state or federal statute, or a violation

or noncompliance with a state or federal rule or

regulation.

Cal. Gov. Code § 53298(a) establishes liability for any

local agency officer, manager, or supervisor who retaliates

against any employee for filing a complaint with the local agency

reporting “gross mismanagement, a significant waste of funds, an

abuse of authority, or a specific and substantial danger to

public health or safety.” Cal. Gov. Code §§ 53298(a), 53296(c);

see also LeVine v. Weis, 90 Cal. App. 4th 201, 212 (2001)

(discussing § 53298 in dicta).

//

//

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7 California Senate Bill 688 amended the one year statute of

limitations to two years, effective January 1, 2003.

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V. ANALYSIS

A. Whether Plaintiff’s § 1983 Claims Are Time-Barred.

A plaintiff is ordinarily not required to plead around

affirmative defenses. Hyatt Chalet Motels, 430 F.2d at 1120. 

The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense. A

complaint may nevertheless be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

if the facts and dates alleged demonstrate that the complaint is

time-barred. Ritchie, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1123; Jablon, 614 F.2d

at 682. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are

time-barred based on the allegations in the Second Amended

Complaint. (Doc. 33, Def.’s Mem. 2-6). 

In California, claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are

governed by California’s statute of limitations for personal

injury actions. Taylor v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 993 F.2d

710, 711-2 (9th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim

is therefore governed by California’s statute of limitations for

personal injuries under Cal. Civ. Proc. § 335.1. Currently, the

limitations period is two years; however, prior to January 1,

2003, the limitations period for personal injuries was one year.7

The applicable statute of limitations here is two years since the

Complaint was filed after January 1, 2003.

“Although state law prescribes the statute of limitations

applicable to section 1983 claims, federal law governs the time

of accrual.” Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1339 (9th

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8 Neither party addresses Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim in light

of the relation back doctrine of Rule 15. Defendants assume for

purposes of argument that November 1, 2004, is the operative

date, instead of March 3, 2005, which is the date the Second

Amended Complaint was filed. Before proceeding with the statute

of limitations analysis, the operative date of filing must be

determined through a Rule 15 analysis. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2) provides that “[a]n amendment of a

pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when

... the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose

out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or

attempted to be set forth in the original pleading.” Here,

Plaintiff’s original Complaint contained § 1983 claims. (Doc. 1,

Compl. ¶ 62). Those claims related to the same protected

22

Cir. 1986). “Under federal law, a cause of action generally

accrues when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the

injury which is the basis of his action.” Id. (internal

quotations omitted).

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are based on allegations of

retaliation for his exercise of expression under the First

Amendment. The adverse employment actions alleged include the

following: (1) from June 1997 to December 2002, Plaintiff was

passed over for promotions and special assignments (including an

incident in July 2002 when Defendants intentionally “killed” a

promotional list with Plaintiff’s name to avoid promoting

Plaintiff); and (2) on March 1, 2004, Plaintiff was placed on

Administrative Leave pending a fitness for duty examination. 

(See Doc. 27, Pl.’s Opp. 10). 

Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff’s March 1, 2004,

Administrative Leave is not time-barred. (See Doc. 33, Def.’s

Mem. 6; Doc. 28, Def.’s Reply 4). Plaintiff’s complaint was

filed on November 1, 2004.8 Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim based on

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activities alleged in the Second Amended Complaint; i.e.,

reporting (a) the Mata sexual misconduct allegations; (b) racial

harassment of Southeast Asian Explorers; (c) the “banking” of

overtime hours; and (d) testifying before the hearing regarding

cheating on the promotional examination. Plaintiff’s § 1983

claims in its Second Amended Complaint therefore arise out of the

same transactions alleged in its original complaint. The

relation back doctrine applies and the operative date for statute

of limitations purposes is November 1, 2004.

23

his placement on Administrative Leave was therefore filed within

the 2-year statutory period. Likewise, Defendants do not dispute

that alleged incidents of failure to promote Plaintiff that

occurred after November 1, 2002 are not time-barred. The only

issue is whether incidents of failure to promote that occurred

before November 1, 2002 are time-barred.

Plaintiff argues that incidents occurring before

November 1, 2002 are not time-barred because they are part of a

“continuing violation.” Plaintiff argues that the Ninth

Circuit’s “related acts” test applies, and cites two Ninth

Circuit cases in support (i.e., Green v. Los Angeles County

Superintendent of Schools, 883 F.2d 1472, 1480-81; Williams v.

Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918, 924 (9th Cir. 1982)). 

Defendants respond that the “related acts” test does not apply

here because that test was overruled by the United States Supreme

Court in Nat’l R. R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114

(2002). Defendants note that the Morgan Court held that where a

plaintiff alleges discrete retaliatory acts, the statute of

limitations runs separately from each act. Defendants argue that

Plaintiff’s allegations that he was passed over for promotions a

number of times from 1997 to December 2002 constitute discrete

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acts. Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot base his § 1983

claim on alleged incidents of failure to promote that occurred

before November 1, 2002 because the statute of limitations for

each of those alleged actions has run. 

Discrete employment actions are not subject to the

continuing violations doctrine. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114

(2002). The United States Supreme Court includes “failure to

promote” among discrete employment actions. Id. Each of

Plaintiff’s allegations of failure to promote is therefore a

separate actionable violation with a distinct accrual date. 

Although Morgan was an employment discrimination action brought

under Title VII, the Ninth Circuit applies the Supreme Court’s

holding in Morgan to actions brought under § 1983. RK Ventures,

Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002);

Carpinteria Valley Farms, Ltd. v. County of Santa Barbara,

44 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2003); Thompson v. City of Shasta Lake, 314

F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1027 (E.D. Cal. 2004).

Plaintiff argues that “[a] continuing violation may be

established by showing a series of related acts against a single

individual, one or more of which falls within the limitations

period.” (Doc. 27, Pl.’s Opp. 11). Plaintiff cites Green v. Los

Angeles County Superintendent of Schools, 883 F.2d 1472, 1480-81;

Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918, 924 (9th Cir.

1982) in support of its argument that the “related acts” doctrine

applies in determining whether alleged discriminatory acts

constitute continuing violations. However, as the Ninth Circuit

noted recently:

Morgan overruled previous Ninth Circuit authority holding

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that, if a discriminatory act was “related and similar to”

acts that took place outside the limitations period, all the

related acts--including the earlier acts--were actionable as

part of a continuing violation. [citation] Morgan held

that “discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if

time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in

timely filed charges.”

RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1061

(9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Morgan, 122 S.Ct. at 2072).

Insofar as Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are based on incidents

of failure to promote that occurred before November 1, 2002

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. This ruling has no

bearing on the evidentiary admissibility of such prior acts or

omissions, which must be separately determined.

B. Whether Plaintiff States Individual Capacity Claims

Against the Individual Defendants Under § 1983.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state individual

capacity claims under § 1983 against the Defendants GARNER, DYER,

ENMARK, FIFIELD, and GUTHRIE because Plaintiff fails to state a

claim for First Amendment retaliation. Defendants also argue

that Plaintiff fails to state individual capacity claims against

all individual Defendants because they are entitled to qualified

immunity. (Doc. 33, Def.’s Mem. 8-12). 

1. Whether Plaintiff States Claims for First

Amendment Retaliation.

The underlying constitutional violation on which Plaintiff

bases his § 1983 claim is First Amendment retaliation. To state

a claim for retaliation based on exercise of First Amendment

rights, a plaintiff must allege the following elements: (1) the

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plaintiff engaged in expressive conduct that addressed a matter

of public concern; (2) the government official took an adverse

action against the plaintiff; and (3) the expressive conduct was

a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse action taken

by the government official. Alpha Energy Savers, Inc. v. Hansen,

381 F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir. 2004).

Defendants GARNER, DYER, and ENMARK argue that Plaintiff’s

§ 1983 claim against them must be dismissed because Plaintiff

fails to allege the second element of a First Amendment

retaliation claim, i.e., that GARNER, DYER, and ENMARK took an

“adverse employment action” against Plaintiff. (Doc. 33, Def.’s

Mem. at 8-12). However, Plaintiff responds that he alleges that

all three of these defendants took an “adverse employment action”

against him. (See Doc. 27, Pl.’s Opp. 15 n. 7; 16, n. 8). In a

First Amendment retaliation case, an “adverse employment action”

is an act that is reasonably likely to deter employees from

engaging in constitutionally protected speech; it is not

necessary that the plaintiff demonstrate the loss of a valuable

governmental benefit or privilege. Coszalter v. City of Salem,

320 F.3d 968, 975 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that to determine

whether an act constitutes an adverse employment action, “the

inquiry is whether the exercise of the first amendment rights was

deterred by the government employer’s action”) (internal

quotations omitted). First, Plaintiff alleges that GARNER failed

to promote him as retaliation for his “whistleblowing.” (Doc. 1,

Compl. ¶ 41). Second, Plaintiff alleges that DYER and ENMARK

placed Plaintiff on Administrative Leave after his complaints. 

(Id. at ¶ 45). Third, Plaintiff alleges that DYER and ENMARK

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refused to reinstate Plaintiff despite that three psychologists

declared Plaintiff fit for duty. (Id. at ¶ 50). Each of these

allegations identifies individual adverse employment action by

each supervisor specifically directed against Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the “adverse employment

action” element of a First Amendment retaliation claim against

GARNER, DYER, and ENMARK.

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim

against Defendants FIFIELD and GUTHRIE because he did not allege

the third element for a First Amendment Retaliation claim; i.e.,

that FIFIELD and GUTHRIE’s failure to promote Plaintiff was

motivated by Plaintiff’s expression. (Doc. 33, Def.’s Mem. 12). 

However, Plaintiff notes that Paragraph 41 of the Complaint does

allege causation: “NEVEU was denied each and every promotion as

a result of WEST, FIFIELD, GUTHRIE, and GARNER’S actions, and in

retaliation for NEVEU reporting the Mata allegations, the alleged

racial harassment, and the end of the year report....” 

Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiff has not alleged all

three elements of a First Amendment claim are without merit and

find no support in the pleadings. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the individual Defendants on

the grounds that Plaintiff fails to allege First Amendment

retaliation claims against them is DENIED. 

2. Qualified Immunity.

Defendants next argue that GARNER, DYER, ENMARK, FIFIELD,

GUTHRIE, and WEST are entitled to qualified immunity. Public

officials sued in their individual capacity, as here, are immune

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from suit if “their conduct [did] not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Dittman, 191

F.3d at 1027. “To determine whether qualified immunity is

appropriate, a court must identify the specific right allegedly

violated and determine whether that right was so clearly

established as to alert a reasonable officer to its

constitutional parameters; if the law is clearly established, it

determines whether a reasonable officer could have believed

lawful the particular conduct at issue.” Knox v. Southwest

Airlines, 124 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal

quotations and citations omitted); see also Saucier, 533 U.S. at

201. Defendants’ arguments in support of qualified immunity

consist solely of conclusory statements that the individual

defendants in question are immune from suit. (Doc. 33, Def.’s

Mem., 10.4; 11.7; 11.25; 12:8). Defendants cite a few cases that

address general immunity principles, but cite no authority to

support that police officials are immune from suit when they

retaliate against a whistelblowing employee for reporting sexual

or racial discrimination to superiors, or for testifying that

other officers were cheating on promotional exams. See Mitchell

v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985); Brewster v. Bd. of Educ. of

the Lynwood Unifid Sch. Dist., 149 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1988);

Knox v. Southwest Airlines, 124 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Plaintiff alleges that his superiors denied him promotions

and placed him on administrative leave because he reported sexual

misconduct/harassment and racial discrimination and testified

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that cheating was occurring on police department promotional

exams. Plaintiff argues that these allegations are sufficient to

overcome qualified immunity at this stage in the litigation.

Plaintiffs’ allegations do not establish that the officers

here acted reasonably under the totality of the circumstances or

in reasonable reliance on a clearly established statute or

constitutional provision. Plaintiff complains that he was

retaliated against for having reported racial discrimination,

sexual misconduct, and overtime improprieties, and for having

testifying regarding cheating in the police department. 

Reporting such activities is expressive conduct regarding matters

of public concern and is conduct facially protected by the First

Amendment right to free speech. Defendants do not attempt to

identify any statute or constitutional provision under which

Defendants could have reasonably carried out such actions. 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims on

qualified immunity grounds is DENIED. 

C. Whether Plaintiff States a Claim Against the CITY Under

§ 1983.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim

against the CITY because he does not allege the existence of a

Monell policy or custom. (Doc. 33, Def.’s Mem. 13; see also Doc.

28, Def.’s Reply 5-6). Plaintiff responds, in conclusory

fashion, that he has alleged that Chief DYER has policy-making

authority. Plaintiff does not argue that he has alleged the

existence of a defined policy that operated to violate his civil

rights. Defendants argue that the alleged actions of Chief DYER

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do not constitute a “policy.” (Doc. 28, Def.’s Reply 6.18-27).

Local governments are “persons” subject to suit for

“constitutional tort[s]” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Haugen,

339 F.3d at 854. The CITY, as a local government, is therefore

subject to suit under § 1983. However, local governments can

only be sued where the claims arise out of unconstitutional

actions by their employees who implement or execute a “policy

statement, ordinance, or decision officially adopted and

promulgated by that body’s officers....” Monell, 436 U.S. at

690-1. In other words, a municipality cannot be held liable for

an employee’s actions outside the scope of implementation of the

policies or customs on a respondeat superior theory. Id. A

municipality can, however, be held liable for the acts of one of

its employees acting in an “official” capacity. “‘[O]fficialcapacity suits...generally represent only another way of pleading

an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” 

Ruvalcaba, 167 F.3d at 524 n. 3 (quoting Graham, 473, U.S. at

165). 

Here, Plaintiff attempts to plead an “official capacity”

suit against Defendant DYER. However, Plaintiff’s conclusory

allegations regarding the purported policy implemented and/or

created by Defendant DYER do not define or describe what that

policy is. (See Compl. ¶¶ 4, 54). Plaintiff’s “official

capacity” claim against the CITY is deficient.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim

against the CITY because he has not alleged that the Defendant

officers had policy-making authority. Plaintiff responds that he

has alleged that Chief DYER has policy-making authority. (Doc.

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27, Pl.’s Opp. 17). Plaintiff cites Paragraphs 4 and 54 of his

Complaint, which do contain allegations that Defendant DYER has

policy-making authority. (Id.). However, Defendants correctly

note that the alleged actions of Defendant DYER in a specific

case are not per se an official policy. (Doc. 28, Def.’s Reply

6). Just as Plaintiff fails to state a claim against the CITY

because he fails to identify the CITY’s policy by describing a

pattern or practice, Plaintiff also fails to state a claim

against Defendant DYER in his official capacity for failing to

define the same purported policy. Alleging that DYER had policymaking authority without defining the policy and its operation is

not sufficient.

Plaintiff’s argument that delegation of authority to

subordinates can subject a municipality to liability also fails.

Plaintiff argues that municipal liability can be established by

showing that “‘an official with final policymaking authority

either delegated that authority to, or ratified the decision of,

a subordinate.’” (Doc. 27, Pl.’s Opp. 18 (quoting Ulrich v. City

and County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 985 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

However, Plaintiff fails to identify any allegations in the

Complaint that identify what decision-making authority DYER

delegated to his subordinates. Defendant notes that Plaintiff

incorporates Paragraphs 1-52 into his cause of action and that

“[s]uch allegations include numerous actions taken by a variety

of other officers....” (Doc. 28, Def.’s Reply 6). To the extent

that Plaintiff attempts to allege official capacity claims

against the Defendant Officers other than DYER, Plaintiff’s

attempts fail. Plaintiff’s allegations of decision-making and

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policy-making authority are conclusory and insufficient. In

addition, no policy is identified or defined.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim

against the CITY is GRANTED with leave to amend. 

D. Whether Plaintiff Can Maintain a § 1983 Claim Based On

a Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Defendants argue in a footnote that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim

should be dismissed insofar as it is based on a violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 33, Def.’s Mem. 16, n. 3). 

Plaintiff does not address this argument in his opposition. 

(See Doc. 28, Def.’s Reply 5). Defendants argue that Plaintiff

appears to allege that Defendants violated his rights under the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by treating

him differently for having exercised his rights to free speech. 

(Doc. 33, Def.’s Mem. 16, n. 3). 

“To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of

the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a

plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or

purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon

membership in a protected class.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles,

250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001). The purpose of the equal

protection clause is to “secure every person within the State’s

jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,

whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its

improper execution through duly constituted agents.” Village of

Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam)

(quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441,

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445 (1923)). A successful equal protection claim may be brought

by a “class of one,” where the plaintiff alleges that he has been

intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated. 

Id. at 563.

Plaintiff identifies no allegations in his Complaint that he

was treated differently from others who were similarly situated. 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims

insofar as they are based on alleged violations of the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is GRANTED.

E. State Law Claims.

1. Whether Jurisdiction Exists over Plaintiff’s Claim

Under Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5.

Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5 establishes liability for employers

who retaliate against their employees for disclosing information

to government or law enforcement agencies. Defendants argue that

a federal court lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claim for

violation of Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5 because, pursuant to

Cal. Labor Code §§ 98.6 and 98.7, claims under Section 1102.5 are

solely within the province of the Labor Commissioner. (Doc. 33,

Def.’s Mem. 17; Doc. 28, Def.’s Reply 7). Plaintiff responds

that, pursuant to Cal. Labor Code § 96, Plaintiff “may” file a

claim with the Labor Commissioner, although he is not required to

do so.

Cal. Labor Code § 98.7 provides that “[a]ny person who

believes that he or she has been discharged or otherwise

discriminated against in violation of any law under the

jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner may file a complaint with

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the division within six months after the occurrence of the

violation.” Cal. Labor Code § 98.6(a) describes claims brought

pursuant to various sections of the labor code, including §

1102.5, as brought “under the jurisdiction of the labor

Commissioner.” Neither of the provisions Defendants cite

provides that exclusive jurisdiction over § 1102.5 claims lies

with the Labor Commissioner. Defendants argue that Plaintiff

cites no cases allowing a court to hear a claim under § 1102.5. 

Defendants also cite no cases holding that the Labor Commissioner

has exclusive jurisdiction over § 1102.5 claims and that a court

is not allowed to hear a § 1102.5 claim. 

The California Supreme Court has recently held that a

litigant seeking damages under § 1102.5 is required to exhaust

administrative remedies before the Labor Commissioner prior to

bringing suit. Campbell v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 35 Cal.

4th 311, 333-4 (2005) (“We conclude that absent a clear

indication of legislative intent, we should refrain from

inferring a statutory exemption from our settled rule requiring

exhaustion of administrative remedies.”) The exhaustion of

administrative remedies rule is “well established in California

jurisprudence.” Id. at 321. “‘[T]he rule is that where an

administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must be

sought from the administrative body and this remedy exhausted

before the courts will act.’” Id. (quoting Ablelleira v. Dist.

Ct. of Appeal, 17 Cal. 2d 280, 292 (1941)). “Exhaustion of

administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to

resort to the courts.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. City of Loma

Linda, 24 Cal. 4th 61, 70 (2000) (internal quotations omitted)). 

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9 Because there is no jurisdiction to hear this claim,

Defendants’ substantive arguments regarding the sufficiency of

Plaintiff’s Section 1105.2 claim will not be addressed.

35

Plaintiff does not allege that he exhausted available

administrative remedies, including bringing a complaint before

the Labor Commissioner, before bringing suit. 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim under Cal.

Labor Code § 1102.5 is GRANTED on the grounds that there is no

jurisdiction.9

2. Whether Plaintiff States a Claim Under Cal. Gov.

Code § 53298, et seq.

Cal. Gov. Code § 53298(a) establishes liability for any

local agency officer, manager, or supervisor who retaliates

against any employee for filing a complaint with the local agency

reporting “gross mismanagement, a significant waste of funds, an

abuse of authority, or a specific and substantial danger to

public health or safety.” Cal. Gov. Code §§ 53298(a), 53296(c);

see also LeVine, 90 Cal. App. 4th at 212 (discussing § 53298 in

dicta).

Plaintiff’s claim under § 53298 arises out of his

allegations that he was placed on Administrative Leave because of

(1) his written reports of sexual molestation by former-officer

Mata and of “administrative improprieties that appeared designed

to foster opportunities for further sex crimes;” and (2) his

“written reports of racial harassment of Southeast Asian

Explorers by Police Activity League volunteers.” (Doc. 23,

Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21, 29, 60). Although Plaintiff’s

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allegations are not entirely clear, it appears he filed at least

some of these reports with the Internal Affairs and Human

Resources Departments of the Fresno Police Department. (See

id.). Plaintiff alleges that his reports of alleged sexual

misconduct by Officer Mata and racial discrimination against

“Southeast Asian Explorers” constituted “an abuse of authority

and a substantial and specific danger to public health and

safety.” (Id. at ¶ 60).

(a) Whether Plaintiff States a Cal. Gov. Code

§ 53298 Claim against the CITY.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff is not entitled to bring a

§ 53298 claim against the CITY as is explicitly set forth in the

statute. (Doc. 33, Def.’s Mem. 18). Plaintiff does not dispute

Defendant’s argument in his opposition. (See Doc. 28, Def.’s

Reply 9).

Cal. Gov. Code § 53298.5(b) provides that no cause of action

for violation of that section shall be brought against the local

public entity:

In no way [] shall the provisions of this article establish

...any new cause of action against the local public entity

other than liabilities contained in existing law.

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claim Under Cal.

Gov. Code § 53298, et seq., against the CITY is GRANTED.

(b) Whether Plaintiff States a Cal. Gov. Code

§ 53298 Claim against the Individual

Defendants.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim under

§ 53298 against the individual officers because he has not

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10 “The 60-day time limit specified in [§ 53297(a)] shall be

extended by the amount of time actually utilized by the employee

in pursuing administrative remedies.” Id. at § 53297(b).

37

pleaded all required elements as set forth in Cal. Gov. Code

§§ 53296(c)-(d), 53297(a)-(d), and 53298(a). Plaintiff argues

that he has complied with the pleading requirements.

The elements for this whistleblower cause of action are not

clearly listed in any single section of the statute. Also, there

does not appear to be any case law interpreting this statute. 

According to the statute’s various provisions, it appears that

the elements of a claim under § 53298 include the following:

1) The employee filed a complaint with a local agency

regarding gross mismanagement, a significant waste of

funds, an abuse of authority, or a specific and

substantial danger to public health or safety. Cal.

Gov. Code §§ 53297(a), 53276(c)-(d).

2) The complaint was filed within 60 days of the date of

the act or event that is the subject of the complaint. 

Id. at § 53297(a).

3) The complaint was filed under penalty of perjury. Id.

at § 53297(d).

4) The complaint was filed in accordance with the locally

adopted administrative procedure, or in the alternative

there was no administrative procedure available. Id.

at § 53297(c). 

5) The employee made a good faith effort to exhaust all

available administrative remedies before filing the

complaint.10 Id. at § 53297(b).

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6) A local agency officer, manager, or supervisor took a

reprisal action against the employee for filing the

complaint. Id. at § 53298(a).

Plaintiff here has alleged three of the six elements listed

above: (1) the complaints he filed with Internal Affairs and/or

Human Resources related to abuse of authority and a substantial

and specific danger to public health or safety; (2) that these

complaints were filed in accordance with the CITY’s

administrative policies and procedures; and (3) that his

supervisors, who were local agency officers, took a reprisal

action (i.e., placing him on Administrative Leave) as the result

of his filing these complaints. Plaintiff has not alleged the

three remaining elements; i.e., (1) that he filed these

complaints within 60 days of the acts or events; (2) that the

complaints were filed under penalty of perjury; and (3) that he

attempted, in good faith, to exhaust the available administrative

remedies before filing his complaint, or in the alternative that

there were no available administrative remedies.

Assuming that the elements defined by the statute are

pleading requirements, Plaintiff has failed to allege all

elements necessary to state a claim. Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim under § 52378 is GRANTED with leave to

amend.

(c) Whether Plaintiff fails to allege causation

between Plaintiff’s whistleblowing activities

and the retaliatory act.

Defendants argue that because the whistleblowing activities

alleged took place in 1996 and 1997, and the alleged retaliatory

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act (i.e., the placement of Plaintiff on Administrative Leave)

took place over seven years later in March 2004, Plaintiff fails

to establish a causal connection. Plaintiff’s response is to

refer to several paragraphs of the Second Amended Complaint

(¶¶ 28-29, 37, 39-41, 43). Plaintiff states in his opposition

that “[w]hile the allegations are too extensive to set forth in

full here, a quick perusal of the Complaint as a whole

demonstrates the existence, if not presumption of a causal link.” 

(Doc. 27, Pl.’s Opp. 20). 

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that, from 1997 to 2002, he

was retaliated against by being passed over for promotions, and

that eventually the retaliation culminated in his being placed on

administrative leave in March 2004. While Plaintiff’s argument

about causation is tenuous, Defendants’ contention that Plaintiff

has failed to “establish” causation, ignores that this issue is

for the fact-finder and cannot be resolved at the pleading stage.

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s § 53298 claim on

the grounds of failure to allege causation is DENIED.

(d) Whether Plaintiff’s § 53298 Claim is TimeBarred for Failure to Timely File a Claim

under the California Tort Claims Act.

Under the California Tort Claims Act, no suit for “money or

damages” may be brought against a public entity until a written

claim has been presented to the public entity and the claim

either has been acted upon or is deemed to have been rejected. 

Hart v. Alameda County, 76 Cal. App. 4th 766, 778 (Cal. Ct. App.

1999). The CTCA requires a plaintiff to file a timely tort claim

with the public entity; if the claim is not timely, the public

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entity may reject the claim. If a claimant fails to timely file

a claim with the public entity, and its claim is consequently

rejected by the public entity for that reason, courts are without

jurisdiction to hear the claimant’s cause of action. Greyhound

Lines, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 487; Moyer, 10 Cal. App. 3d at 492-3;

Carr, 58 Cal. App. 3d at 144-6; Williams v. Mariposa County, 82

Cal. App. 3d at 848-9. For causes of action for death, personal

injury, or injury to personal property, a claimant must file a

claim within six months of the accrual of the cause of action. 

Cal. Gov. Code § 911.2. 

The parties dispute when Plaintiff’s cause of action under

§ 53298 accrued. Defendants argue that it accrued in March 2004,

when Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave. Plaintiff

suggests that it accrued on July 6, 2004, when Defendants DYER

and ENMARK refused to reinstate Plaintiff after allegedly having

received opinions from three psychiatrists that he was fit for

duty. Neither party offers any argument or authority as to when

a claim under § 53298 accrues. Plaintiff argued that the

earliest he reasonably could have been aware of his whistleblower

claim was July 2004, when Defendants refused to reinstate him to

duty after having been declared fit for duty by three

psychologists. Construing Plaintiff’s allegations in the most

favorable light, as is required on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,

Plaintiff’s whistleblower claim under § 53298 is not deficient

for failure to timely file a complaint under the California Tort

Claims Act.

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s § 53298 claim on

the grounds it is barred by the California Tort Claims Act is

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DENIED. 

F. Defendants’ Motion to Strike Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(f).

“[M]otions to strike should not be granted unless it is

clear that the matter to be stricken could have no possible

bearing on the subject matter of the litigation.” Colaprico, 758

F. Supp. at 1339 (citation omitted). 

1. Plaintiff’s Claim for Punitive Damages under

§ 1983.

First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim for punitive

damages under § 1983 against the individual defendants should be

dismissed because Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts to

support claims of malice against them. (Doc. 33, Def.’s Mem.

20). Under § 1983, punitive damages are proper either when a

defendant’s conduct was driven by evil motive or intent, or when

it involved a reckless or callous indifference to the

constitutional rights of others. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56

(1983); Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 639 (9th Cir.

1991). A public entity cannot be sued under § 1983 as a matter

of law for punitive damages. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,

Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). Insofar as Defendants seek to

strike Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim against the CITY, their

motion is GRANTED.

As to the punitive damages claims against the individual

defendants, Defendants’ conclusory argument that “Plaintiffs

[sic] allegations are insufficient to meet [the] standard as to

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all six individual Defendants” is not persuasive. It is not

clear from Plaintiff’s allegations whether the individual

defendants were motivated by evil intent or whether they acted

with recklessness or callous indifference to Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to

infer malice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Whether the officers

acted with malice is a question of fact not properly decided on a

motion to dismiss. Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s

claim for punitive damages against the individual defendants is

DENIED. 

2. Plaintiff’s Claim for Punitive Damages under Cal.

Gov. Code § 53298.

Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive

damages under Cal. Gov. Code § 53298 should be stricken for

failure to plead malice. In support, Defendants cite the

definition of malice at Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1) and two

California state cases regarding malice pleading requirements. 

Federal district courts sitting in diversity apply the

substantive law of the forum state, but apply procedural rules as

stated in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Erie R.R. Co. v.

Tompkins, 30 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see also Clark v. Allstate Ins.

Co., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1019 n.3 (S.D. Cal. 2000). The

California law Defendants cite is not controlling. While Cal.

Civ. Code § 3294(a) applies insofar as it allows for the recovery

of punitive damages on a successful tort claim (including

//

//

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11 Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a) allows for an award of punitive

damages against a tortfeasor whose acts are characterized by

oppression, fraud, or malice.

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 statutory torts),11 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern

pleading standards in federal district court. 

Specifically, Rule 9(b) governs pleading requirements for

malice: “Malice, intent, knowledge and other condition[s] of

mind of a person may be averred generally.” The court in Clark,

following other federal district courts in California, held that

“conclusory assertions that a defendant acted intentionally, with

‘malice’ or with ‘conscious disregard’” are “adequate to plead

the mental state required under Section 3294.” Clark, 106

F. Supp. 2d at 1019-20 (holding that because plaintiff’s

complaint alleges that defendant intentionally denied plaintiff’s

insurance claim and that it acted with an intent to injure

plaintiff, the Complaint complied with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, 9). 

Here Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against

Plaintiff for his “whistleblowing” activities. (See Doc. 23,

Second Am. Compl. ¶ 60). Allegations of retaliation are

sufficient to infer intent to injure. Defendants’ Motion to

Strike Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages under Cal. Gov.

Code § 53298 is DENIED.

3. Plaintiff’s Allegations Relating to Defendants’

Failure to Promote Plaintiff “Between June 1997

and December 2002.”

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations relating to

Defendants’ failure to promote Plaintiff “between approximately

June 1997 and December 2002” should be stricken because one of

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Plaintiff’s previously-filed complaints alleged different dates. 

Specifically, Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint alleged that

Defendants failed to promote him “between June 1997 and January

2002.” Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s “new” allegations

contradict the allegations in the First Amended Complaint, that

Plaintiff provided no explanation for the purported

contradiction, and that therefore the “new” allegations need not

be accepted as true and should be stricken. (Doc. 33, Def.’s

Mem. 21). Defendants cited no law or rule that does not allow a

plaintiff to expand the time period of alleged wrongdoing. The

expanded time period in the operative complaint does not

contradict the allegation in the earlier complaint. Defendants’

Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ allegations relating to Defendants’

failure to promote him between June 1997 and December 2002 is

DENIED.

4. Plaintiff’s Allegations Relating to Adverse

Employment Actions Taken Before November 1, 2002.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations relating to

adverse employment actions taken before November 1, 2002, should

be stricken as time-barred. Under notice pleading requirements,

a party is not required to plead evidentiary facts. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a). Allegations relating to adverse employment actions

may be evidence of improper motive, even if a § 1983 claim based

upon those actions would be time-barred. Carpinteria Valley

Farms, Ltd. v. County of Santa Barbara, 344 F.3d 822, 829 (9th

Cir. 2003). It is not proper to make evidentiary rulings at the

pleading stage. Striking allegations of adverse actions outside

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the statutory period for § 1983 violations is therefore not

appropriate. Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s

allegations relating to adverse actions prior to November 1, 2002

is DENIED.

5. Plaintiff’s Allegations Relating to his Written

Reports of the Alleged Sexual Misconduct of

Officer Mata.

Defendants’ papers do not make clear the precise allegations

regarding Officer Mata that they move to strike. Defendants

refer to Paragraphs 16-28 of the Second Amended Complaint in

their motion and their reply, and appear to move to strike all

allegations contained in these paragraphs. However, Defendants’

argument relates only to Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the

purported dispute between Internal Affairs and Plaintiff’s chain

of command as to whether Plaintiff should report issues relating

to Officer Mata in writing. (Doc. 28, Def.’s Reply 12). 

Defendants assume that Plaintiff’s § 1983 cause of action is

based upon this purported internal police dispute. Defendants

argue that the allegations regarding the disagreement over the

form of the reports does not, as a matter of law, relate to a

matter of public concern, and is therefore not protected speech

under the First Amendment. Plaintiff’s response does not relate

specifically to his allegations regarding the form of the

reports, but instead appears to relate to all of his allegations

regarding Mata. Plaintiff argues that reports of sexual

misconduct by a police officer address matters of public concern

and are therefore protected speech.

The parties’ treatment of this complex First Amendment issue

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is cursory and deficient. First, Defendants appear to raise an

argument on the merits, which is not appropriate on a Rule 12(f)

motion to strike. See Ritzer v. Gerovicap Pharmaceutical Corp.,

162 F.R.D. 642, 644 (D. Nev. 1995). Defendant appears to argue

that internal disputes over the form of reports are not, as a

matter of law, matters of public concern. This argument goes to

the merits of Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim and

is more appropriately dealt with on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss. 

Second, Defendants’ characterization of Plaintiff’s § 1983

claim is inaccurate, although Plaintiff does not dispute

Defendants’ characterization in his opposition. Defendants state

that Plaintiff’s § 1983 violation is “based on a dispute between

the Internal Affairs Division and his chain of command as to

whether he should report issues relating to Officer Mata in

writing.” (Doc. 33, Def.’s Mem. 24). Plaintiff’s § 1983 cause

of action, as stated in the Second Amended Complaint, contains no

specific allegations regarding the protected speech upon which

his § 1983 claim is based. (See Doc. 23, Second Am. Compl.

¶¶ 53-4). Allegations elsewhere in the complaint, however,

provide additional information. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges

that he was retaliated against for having reported to Internal

Affairs, in writing, information regarding purported sexual

misconduct by Officer Mata. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that

he was retaliated against for disobeying orders from his

immediate chain of command not to report the sexual misconduct to

Internal Affairs, in writing or otherwise, and that he was only

to report the alleged sexual misconduct to his immediate

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superiors. 

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding a purported “dispute”

within the Fresno Police Department over whether reports of

Officer Mata’s alleged sexual misconduct should be in writing are

irrelevant to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim and should therefore be

stricken is not appropriately decided on a motion to strike.

Public employees do not relinquish their right to free

speech by virtue of their employment. Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361

F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2004). However, public employees do

not enjoy absolute First Amendment rights. Id. To determine

whether a public employee’s speech is protected by the First

Amendment, courts in the Ninth Circuit apply a two-step test. 

Id. The first step is to determine whether the speech addresses

a matter of public concern. Id. If it does, the next step is to

engage in a balancing analysis established by the United States

Supreme Court in Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Township High

School Dist. 205, 291 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). The balancing test

requires a court to determine whether the public employee’s

interest in expressing him- or herself outweighs the government’s

interest “in promoting workplace efficiency and avoiding

workplace disruption.” Id.

Defendants argue that allegations regarding the dispute

between Internal Affairs and Plaintiff’s chain of command over

whether the reports regarding Officer Mata should be in writing

are not matters of public concern and are therefore irrelevant to

Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim and should be stricken. This

argument goes to the merits of Plaintiff’s First Amendment

retaliation claim and should not be dealt with on a motion to

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strike. The issue whether the expressive conduct upon which

Plaintiff bases his First Amendment retaliation claim is

protected speech was not fully briefed by the parties and should

not be decided in the context of this motion. 

The dispute over the reports concerning alleged violations

of law by police officers is part of the overall alleged scheme

of discrimination. Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s

allegations in Paragraphs 16 through 28 is DENIED. Defendants’

motion to strike the Mata allegations as irrelevant to the state

whistleblower claims is MOOT. 

VI. CONCLUSION

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6): 

(1) Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims insofar as they are

based on adverse employment actions occurring

before November 1, 2002 is GRANTED with prejudice;

(2) Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the individual

Defendants is DENIED;

(3) Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against the CITY is

GRANTED with leave to amend; Defendants’ Motion

for a More Definite Statement pursuant to Rule

12(e) as to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against the

CITY is MOOT;

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(4) Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim based on deprivation of

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment is GRANTED; 

(5) Plaintiff’s Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5 claim is

GRANTED; and

(6) Plaintiff’s Cal. Gov. Code § 53298 claim against

the CITY is GRANTED; Plaintiff’s Cal. Gov. Code §

53298 claim against the individual Defendants on

the grounds of failure to plead all elements is

GRANTED with leave to amend; Plaintiff’s § 53298

claim against individual defendants on all other

grounds is DENIED.

Defendants’ Motions to Strike pursuant to Rule 12(f)

Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages as to the CITY

is GRANTED. Defendants’ Motion to Strike all remaining

claims is DENIED.

SO ORDERED. 

DATED: July 15__, 2005. 

/s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

______________________________

 Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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