Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-00588/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-00588-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 422
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158
Cause of Action: 28:0158 Notice of Appeal re Bankruptcy Matter (BAP)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHEK,

Plaintiff,

v.

BURCHARD,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-00588-EMC 

ORDER DENYING APPELLANT’S 

MOTION TO STAY DISMISSAL 

PENDING APPEAL AND MOTION 

FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Docket Nos. 3, 9

I. INTRODUCTION

In January 2018, pro se Appellant John Shek filed a petition under Chapter 13 of the 

Bankruptcy Code to prevent the foreclosure of the property at 220 Santiago Street, San Francisco, 

CA 94116 (the “Property”). See In re John Shek, No. 18-30051-DM (Bankr. N.D. Cal. filed 

January 16, 2018), Docket (hereinafter “Bankr. Docket”) No. 1. Mr. Shek then filed a series of 

amended Chapter 13 plans, culminating in a Seventh Amended Plan on December 20, 2018. 

Bankr. Docket No. 124. On January 8, 2019, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed the case prior to 

confirmation of Mr. Shek’s Chapter 13 plan after he failed to make a court-ordered payment to the 

Chapter 13 Trustee. Bankr. Docket No. 132. Mr. Shek moved to stay the dismissal and to 

reinstate his proceedings. Bankr. Docket Nos. 133, 138. The Bankruptcy Court denied both 

motions on January 25, 2019, noting that Mr. Shek had still not made the required payment to the 

Trustee. Bankr. Docket No. 148; Transcript of January 25, 2019 Hearing at 7:2–5. Mr. Shek 

subsequently filed another motion to stay the dismissal, which was denied on January 30, 2019. 

Bankr. Docket No. 154. 

On February 1, 2019, Mr. Shek filed the instant appeal of the Bankruptcy Court’s orders 

denying his motions to stay and motion to reinstate proceedings. See Docket No. 1-1 (Notice of 

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Appeal) at 1. Shortly thereafter, he filed a motion to stay the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of his 

case pending appeal and a preliminary injunction motion. Docket Nos. 3 (“Stay Mot.”), 9 (“PI 

Mot.”).1 Both motions ask this Court to prevent the non-judicial foreclosure of the Property, 

currently scheduled to take place on March 18, 2019. See PI Mot. at 1. Mr. Shek separately filed 

a “Peremptory Challenge” to the Court, in which he states that he “has good reason to believe and 

does actually believe that he cannot have a fair and impartial hearings or trial before Judge Edward 

Chen.” Docket No. 4 at 1. 

For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds no merit to Mr. Shek’s “Peremptory 

Challenge,” and DENIES his motion to stay and preliminary injunction motion.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Disqualify

The Court construes Mr. Shek’s “Peremptory Challenge” as a motion to disqualify. 

According to Mr. Shek, the Court presided over “a prior employment case” in which Mr. Shek 

sought “to have his [employment] position reinstated.” Docket No. 4 at 1–2. It seems that Mr. 

Shek is referring to Shek v. VA Medical Center Department of Veteran et al, No. 05-cv-00405-

SBA (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 27, 2005), a case that was referred to the undersigned, then a magistrate 

judge, for settlement discussions. Mr. Shek states that during those discussions,

The VA offered 2 days of work; which is $621.xx dollars. 

Appellant /Debtor refused to accept the offer and want to proceed to 

trial. Then Judge seem very irritated and began to say .... I could

make this all disappear etc. Appellant forced to accept the

settlement for $621 dollar. Appellant was facing with such situation

but to accept the offer and without a chance for employment.

Docket No. 4 at 2. That is, he believes the Court pressured him into accepting a settlement offer 

against his will. On that basis, Mr. Shek “d[oes] not think that he will have a fair and impartial 

trial before Judge Edward Chen” in this case. Id. 

 

1 Mr. Shek filed an initial preliminary injunction motion on February 19, 2019. Docket No. 6. 

Two days later, he filed what appears to be an updated preliminary injunction motion, captioned as 

a “Notice of Motion to Amended [sic] Ex-Parte Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing on 

Preliminary Injunction.” Docket No. 9. The Court treats the second preliminary injunction 

motion as the operative one.

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Under federal law,2judicial disqualification is governed by two statutory provisions, 28 

U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455. Section 144 provides for recusal where a party “files a timely 

and sufficient affidavit” averring that the judge before whom the matter is pending “has a personal 

bias or prejudice” either against the party or in favor of an adverse party. 28 U.S.C. § 144. The 

affidavit “must state the facts and reasons” for such belief. Id. A judge finding the motion timely 

and the affidavits legally sufficient must proceed no further and another judge must be assigned to 

hear the matter. See id.; United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1980). Where the 

affidavit is not legally sufficient, however, the judge at whom the motion is directed may decide

the matter. See Sibla, 624 F.2d at 868. Similarly, Section 455 requires a judge to disqualify 

himself “in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 455(a), including where the judge “has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party,” id.

§ 455(b)(1). 

The substantive test for personal bias or prejudice is identical under Sections 144 and 455. 

See Sibla, 624 F.2d at 868. Under both statutes, recusal is appropriate where “a reasonable person 

with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be

questioned.” Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). The 

“reasonable person” standard does not contemplate “someone who is ‘hypersensitive or unduly 

suspicious,’ but rather is a ‘well-informed, thoughtful observer.’” United States v. Holland, 519 

F.3d 909, 913 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990)). Either 

actual bias or the appearance of bias will justify recusal. Id. The Ninth Circuit has instructed that 

in evaluating disqualification motions, a judge has “as strong a duty to sit when there is no 

legitimate reason to recuse as he does to recuse when the law and facts require.” Clemens v. U.S. 

Dist. Court for Central Dist. of Cal., 428 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). 

Here, Mr. Shek’s motion and affidavit are not legally sufficient to establish that a

reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the Court’s impartiality

 

2 The motion disqualify cites the California Supreme Court’s decision in Solberg v. Superior 

Court, 19 Cal. 3d 182 (1977), which discussed the disqualification of judges under California 

Civil Procedure Code § 170.6. However, California state law does not apply in this federal 

bankruptcy proceeding. 

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might reasonably be questioned. His affidavit only alleges that when he refused to accept a 

settlement offer in the prior case, “Judge seem[ed] very irritated and began to say .... I could make

this all disappear etc.” Docket No. 4 at 2. This does not appear to be an actual quote from a 

transcript, and Mr. Shek cites no evidence that the Court coerced him into accepting the 

settlement. Nor is there any indication that Mr. Shek has since sought to set aside the settlement 

agreement. His unsupported assertions are insufficient to justify recusal. See United States v. 

$292,888.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that “conclusory 

allegations” are “insufficient to support a claim of bias or prejudice such that recusal is required”); 

Bhambra v. Admin. Office of Fed. Courts of United States, No. 18-CV-05681-JSW (JD), 2019 WL 

935139, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2019) (denying motion to disqualify where movant’s 

“allegations of bias and dishonesty [we]re entirely unsupported by any facts” and there was “no 

evidence of any” impropriety on the part of the judge). In any event, Sections 144 and 455 are 

“limited by the ‘extrajudicial source’ factor which generally requires as the basis for recusal 

something other than rulings, opinions formed or statements made by the judge during the course 

of” a case. Holland, 519 F.3d at 913–14 (citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554–56 

(1994)). This means that a “judge’s conduct during the proceedings should not, except in the 

‘rarest of circumstances’ form the sole basis for recusal.” Id. (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555). 

There is no evidence such circumstances were present in Mr. Shek’s prior case.

Accordingly, Mr. Shek’s motion to disqualify is DENIED.

B. Stay and Preliminary Injunction

Mr. Shek brings his motion to stay under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8007(a). 

See Stay Mot. at 1. Under that rule, “[m]otions for stay pending appeal or for other relief pending 

appeal must ordinarily be presented to the bankruptcy court in the first instance, before the movant 

may seek relief from the [Bankruptcy Appellate Panel] or the district court.” In re Ho, 265 B.R. 

603, 604 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001) (citing Fed R. Bankr. P. 8007(a)). If the movant does not move 

for a stay in the bankruptcy court prior to doing so in the district court, he must “show that moving 

first in the bankruptcy court would be impracticable.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8007(b)(2). “A failure to 

seek emergency relief in the bankruptcy court is a critical defect.” In re Rivera, No. 5:15-CVCase 3:19-cv-00588-EMC Document 15 Filed 03/08/19 Page 4 of 8
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04402-EJD, 2015 WL 6847973, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2015). 

Here, Mr. Shek has not moved the Bankruptcy Court for a stay pending this appeal. Nor 

has he shown that doing so would be impracticable. That alone is grounds for denying his stay 

motion. See id. (“[D]istrict courts routinely dismiss motions for a stay pending appeal when stay 

relief is not first sought from the bankruptcy judge and the failure to do so is not adequately 

explained.”) (quoting In re BGI, Inc., 504 B.R. 754, 761 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)). 

Even if the Court were to consider the stay motion on its merits, it would be deficient. 

“Appellants seeking a discretionary stay under [Rule 8007] must meet the terms of a test virtually 

identical to that for a preliminary injunction.” Lynch v. California Pub. Utilities Comm’n, No. C04-0580 VRW, 2004 WL 793530, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2004) (citation omitted). “A plaintiff 

seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he [or she] is likely to succeed on the merits, 

that he [or she] is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the 

balance of equities tips in his [or her] favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” 

Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The party seeking the injunction 

bears the burden of proving these elements. Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1201 

(9th Cir. 2009). “A preliminary injunction is ‘an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that 

should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.’” 

Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). 

Mr. Shek has not made the requisite showing to justify a preliminary injunction or a stay.

1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

To establish a likelihood of success on the merits, the movant “must show, at a minimum, 

that she has a substantial case for relief on the merits.” Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 968 

(9th Cir. 2011). Here, Mr. Shek has appealed not the Bankruptcy Court’s order dismissing his 

Chapter 13 case on the merits, but rather its orders denying his motions to stay the dismissal and 

motion to reinstate proceedings. See Docket No. 1-1 at 1. To that end, Mr. Shek’s argument can 

be distilled into three points. First, he asserts that his attorney in the bankruptcy proceedings 

colluded with the Trustee’s staff to dismiss his Chapter 13 case. PI Mot. at 2; Docket No. 7 at 3. 

Second, the Bankruptcy Court colluded with the bank to dismiss his case and allow the bank to 

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foreclose on the Property. PI Mot. at 2; Docket No. 7 at 3. Third, the Bankruptcy Court, in 

dismissing the case, failed to take into account that he “ma[de] his January 2019 conduit payment 

in accord[ance] to the Seventh Amended Conduit payment plan.” PI Mot. at 3; Docket No. 7 at 5.

Mr. Shek’s first argument is not supported by any evidence that his attorney colluded with 

the Trustee. He states that his attorney did not file a Seventh Amended Plan with the Bankruptcy 

Court, but the record belies that claim. On December 19, 2018, the Bankruptcy Court ordered Mr. 

Shek to file an amended Chapter 13 plan and make a payment of $10,460 to the Trustee by 

January 3, 2019. Bankr. Docket No. 129. His attorney filed the amended plan the next day. 

Bankr. Docket No. 124. However, Mr. Shek did not make the required payment to the Trustee, 

leading to the dismissal of his case. Bankr. Docket No. 132. Thus, dismissal—and the 

Bankruptcy Court’s subsequent denial of his efforts to reinstate the case or stay the dismissal—

was not a result of his attorney’s actions. And there is no evidence of attorney collusion.

Mr. Shek likewise fails to provide a single piece of evidence in support of his second claim 

that the Bankruptcy Court colluded with the bank to foreclose on his house. 

Mr. Shek’s final argument is also unavailing. The Bankruptcy Court ordered him to make

a payment of $10,460 to the Trustee by January 3, 2019. Bankr. Docket No. 129. Mr. Shek 

represents that he sent a payment of $6,925 to the Trustee on January 4, 2019. Docket No. 7 at 5. 

This payment was neither timely nor in the correct amount. Therefore, the Bankruptcy Court 

properly dismissed the case in accordance with its December 19, 2018 order. See Bankr. Docket 

Nos. 129, 132. 

Mr. Shek has not established that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that the 

Bankruptcy Court erred in declining to stay dismissal and to reinstate his case. 

2. Irreparable Harm

On the second factor, Appellee concedes that irreparable harm weighs towards granting the 

preliminary injunction, as Mr. Shek would lose his house as a result of the pending foreclosure. 

See Docket No. 11 at 3. However, “this factor alone does not compel this Court to grant 

Plaintiff’s preliminary injunction.” Yee v. Select Portfolio, Inc., No. 18-CV-02704-LHK, 2018 

WL 4772341, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2018). The Court must still consider the other three factors.

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3. Balance of Equities

Mr. Shek’s contends that the “balance of equities between the parties support[s] an 

injunction,” because he has made “his January 2019 conduit payment in according to the Seventh 

Amended Conduit payment plan.” PI Mot. at 1, 3. However, as discussed above, this payment 

was neither timely nor in the correct amount. Equity does not weigh in Mr. Shek’s favor.

4. Public Interest

Mr. Shek insists that an “injunction is in the public interest, pursuant to AB 1950, SB 

1474,” without explaining what “AB 1950” and “SB 1474” refer to. PI Mot. at 1. “AB 1950” 

may be a reference to California Assembly Bill No. 1950, which concerns disclosure requirements 

for commercial websites that collect personally identifiable information about consumers. See 

A.B. 1950, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). “SB 1474” may be a reference to California 

Senate Bill 1474, which concerns the California Public Utilities Commission’s authority over 

passenger stage corporations. See S.B. 1474, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). Neither 

bears any apparent relation to this case or bankruptcy proceedings generally.

In sum, Mr. Shek has established irreparable harm, but has not made the requisite showing 

on any of the other three factors. He has therefore failed to meet his burden to show that a 

preliminary injunction is warranted. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. C 09-03444 

MHP, 2009 WL 3572118 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2009) (denying motion for preliminary injunction 

where “[Plaintiff] ... stands to lose his residence if the trustee’s sale is not enjoined,” but “[a]t the 

same time, there is a near-total absence of serious questions regarding whether [plaintiff] is 

entitled to the relief he seeks”)

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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Shek’s motion to stay the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of 

his Chapter 13 case and motion for preliminary injunction are DENIED.

This Order disposes of Docket Nos. 3 and 9.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 8, 2019

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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