Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03910/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03910-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3910

___________

Sierra Club, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

United States Army Corps of * Western District of Missouri.

Engineers; Federal Emergency *

Management Agency; et al., *

*

Defendants - Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: October 14, 2005

Filed: April 4, 2006

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, LAY and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

LOKEN, Chief Judge.

Responding to a request by Jefferson City, Missouri, the U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers (“the Corps”) proposes to construct a levee, known as L-142, to reduce the

risk of future flooding along the banks of the Missouri River as it flows through

Jefferson City. The project will include land previously acquired by Jefferson City

under the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121 et seq. Sierra Club filed this action alleging

that the Corps violated the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C.

§§ 4331 et seq., by not preparing an environmental impact statement, and that the

Appellate Case: 04-3910 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/04/2006 Entry ID: 2028738
-2-

Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) violated the Stafford Act by

permitting the levee to include land that is restricted to open space uses. 

On the government’s motion, the district court dismissed these claims for lack

of jurisdiction, concluding that judicial review under the Administrative Procedure

Act is barred by the lack of “final agency action,” see 5 U.S.C. § 704, and that Sierra

Club lacks standing because it has not shown sufficiently certain injury. Sierra Club

appeals. We agree that Sierra Club did not establish a final agency action with respect

to the Stafford Act claim, but we conclude that the Corps’ issuance of an

environmental assessment and a finding of no significant impact did constitute final

agency action under NEPA, and that Sierra Club has standing. Accordingly, we

reverse the district court’s dismissal of the NEPA claims. 

I.

Following extensive flooding in the Midwest in 1993, Congress amended the

Stafford Act to minimize the cost of future floods by authorizing FEMA to assist local

governments in acquiring property in flood-prone areas. To obtain assistance under

this hazard mitigation grant program (“HMGP”), an applicant must agree that:

(ii) no new structure will be erected on property acquired,

accepted or from which a structure was removed under the acquisition

or relocation program other than - 

 (I) a public facility that is open on all sides and functionally

related to a designated open space;

 (II) a rest room; or 

 (III) a structure that the [FEMA] Director approves in writing

before the commencement of the construction of the structure.

42 U.S.C. § 5170c(b)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). In 1994, Jefferson City applied for

and received HMGP funding to acquire residential and commercial properties in the

Appellate Case: 04-3910 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/04/2006 Entry ID: 2028738
-3-

Cedar City area seriously damaged by the 1993 floods. Deeds to those properties

contain covenants restricting their future use to uses consistent with the above-quoted

statute. See 44 C.F.R. § 206.434(e)(1).

By early 1998, FEMA had adopted a policy that large flood control structures

such as levees are not compatible with the non-structural emphasis of the HMGP

program and therefore FEMA “will not grant an exception [under 42 U.S.C.

§ 5170c(b)(2)(B)(ii)(III)] for such activities.” On March 29, 2000, FEMA and the

Corps signed a Memorandum of Agreement. The agencies agreed “that the

construction of flood damage reduction levees on HMGP lands is incompatible with

open space uses” but identified fourteen projects, including the proposed L-142 levee

in Jefferson City, in which local governments were pursuing the construction of levees

on lands previously acquired under the HMGP. The agencies agreed to conduct “an

expeditious joint review on a case-by-case basis to determine if any of the identified

levees may proceed” based on a determination “that there reasonably is no [other] land

. . . on which levee construction is technically feasible, economically justified, and

environmentally acceptable.” 

On April 26, 2001, the Corps issued an environmental assessment (“EA”) for

a proposed L-142 levee that would include 30.22 acres of deed-restricted land

acquired with HMGP funds, 1.47 acres under the levee footprint, and 28.75 acres

inside the levee. The Corps also issued a finding of no significant impact (“FONSI”)

in lieu of an environmental impact statement. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); 40 C.F.R.

§ 1501.4. Construction of the L-142 levee has not begun. 

Sierra Club filed this suit in December 2003 alleging that the Corps violated

NEPA and the APA by failing to adequately evaluate the environmental impacts of

the project and by issuing a FONSI rather than an environmental impact statement.

Sierra Club filed an amended complaint in February 2004 adding FEMA as a

defendant and alleging that its Memorandum of Agreement with the Corps and

Appellate Case: 04-3910 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/04/2006 Entry ID: 2028738
-4-

approval of a levee including 30.22 acres of deed-restricted land were arbitrary and

capricious agency actions within the meaning of the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

The government moved to dismiss all claims for lack of jurisdiction, raising

three inter-related issues. First, the government argued there is no final agency action

by the Corps because it has not entered into a Project Cooperation Agreement with

Jefferson City nor received necessary funding from Congress, and no final agency

action by FEMA because it has not entered into an Agreement of Clarification with

Jefferson City needed to modify the deed restrictions on HMGP-acquired properties.

Second, the government argued that the claims are not ripe because the project’s

future is uncertain and no construction work may begin until the Corps and FEMA

take these additional actions. Third, the government argued that Sierra Club lacks

standing because its alleged injury in fact is neither actual nor imminent. 

The district court dismissed the amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction,

concluding there has been no “final agency action” within the meaning of 5 U.S.C.

§ 704 and Sierra Club lacks standing because it has suffered no actual injury. The

court did not address ripeness. On appeal, Sierra Club argues FEMA’s approval of

the L-142 levee was a final agency action, the EA and FONSI issued by the Corps was

a final agency action, Sierra Club has standing to sue on behalf of its members, and

the dispute is ripe for judicial review. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal

of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See In re Sac & Fox Tribe of

the Miss. in Iowa/Meskwaki Casino Lit., 340 F.3d 749, 755 (8th Cir. 2003).

II. Final Agency Action

Neither the Stafford Act, NEPA, nor the statutes governing the Corps expressly

provide for judicial review of the agency actions at issue. Therefore, jurisdiction is

limited to judicial review under the APA, which provides for review of “final agency

action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. Two

Appellate Case: 04-3910 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/04/2006 Entry ID: 2028738
1

We have found no reported case interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 5170c, and the

Stafford Act does not expressly provide for private rights of action. This appeal raises

only threshold jurisdictional issues. Our discussion should not be read as expressing

a view as to any other issue of law or fact. 

-5-

conditions must be satisfied for an agency action to be final. “First, the action must

mark the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process -- it must not be of

a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. And second, the action must be one by

which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences

will flow.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997) (quotations and citations

omitted). A broad agency program is not a final agency action within the meaning of

5 U.S.C. § 704. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 890-94 (1990). Nor is an

agency report that “serves more like a tentative recommendation than a final and

binding determination.” Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 798 (1992). But

if the agency has issued “a definitive statement of its position, determining the rights

and obligations of the parties,” that action is final for purposes of judicial review

despite the “possibility of further proceedings in the agency” to resolve subsidiary

issues. Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773,779-80 (1983).

A. The Stafford Act Claim. For its claim against FEMA, Sierra Club first

alleged that the agency’s March 2000 Memorandum of Agreement with the Corps

permitting flood levees to be built on certain HMGP-acquired lands was an arbitrary

and capricious application of 42 U.S.C. § 5170c(b)(2)(B)(ii)(III).1

 We agree with the

government and the district court that the Memorandum of Agreement was not a final

agency action. It merely identified sites that might justify building levees on HMGPacquired properties and prescribed an interagency protocol for determining whether

a specific site such as the L-142 levee in Jefferson City warranted this exception to

FEMA’s normal policy. The Memorandum did not obligate either agency to permit

levee construction. It is an example of a tentative or interlocutory agency action

which determines no substantive rights or obligations within the meaning of Bennett

Appellate Case: 04-3910 Page: 5 Date Filed: 04/04/2006 Entry ID: 2028738
-6-

v. Spear. Therefore, it is not subject to immediate judicial review under the “final

agency action” provision of 5 U.S.C. § 704.

Sierra Club also alleged that FEMA’s “determination to allow construction of

the [L-142] levee on 30.22 acres of deed-restricted land” was an arbitrary and

capricious agency action. Surprisingly, although the Memorandum of Agreement

provided for an “expeditious joint review” to make such determinations “on a case-bycase basis,” the record on appeal does not reveal how or when this specific

determination was made. However, the record does include an April 12, 2000, letter

from FEMA’s Regional Director to his State of Missouri counterpart stating: (i)

FEMA agrees with the Corps that there is no practicable alternative to building the L142 levee on HMGP-acquired lands, (ii) Jefferson City has agreed to acquire 60.44

acres of flood-prone property as “an acceptable compensatory mitigation measure,”

and therefore (iii) FEMA “will provide an appropriate legal instrument to be signed

by FEMA, the State of Missouri and the City of Jefferson City that will modify the

open space restrictions and allow construction of the L-142 levee” impacting 30.22

acres of deed-restricted land. On appeal, Sierra Club argues that this determination

“mark[s] the end of FEMA’s decision-making” and is therefore a final agency action.

In support of its motion to dismiss, the government submitted an affidavit by

the Acting Director of FEMA’s Mitigation Division. The Acting Director first averred

that a recipient of HMGP funds such as Jefferson City must apply for approval

allowing a structure such as a levee to be built on HMGP-acquired lands, and FEMA’s

approval must be reflected in an “Agreement of Clarification.” A Model Agreement

of Clarification was attached to the affidavit. The Acting Director then averred that,

although Jefferson City applied for approval in March 2000 and the April 2000 letter

stated that FEMA “will provide an appropriate legal instrument,” no Agreement of

Clarification has been signed and no deeds have been amended. “Furthermore,” the

affidavit concluded, “given the amount of time that has lapsed . . . FEMA would

require the City to resubmit their request to allow the construction of the levee on

Appellate Case: 04-3910 Page: 6 Date Filed: 04/04/2006 Entry ID: 2028738
-7-

HMGP lands.” Acknowledging that finality is a pragmatic and flexible concept, the

government argues there is no final agency action under the Stafford Act until FEMA

takes these additional steps. 

Jurisdictional issues such as standing and ripeness are determined at the time

the lawsuit was filed in December 2003. See McClain v. Am. Econ. Ins. Co., 424

F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 2005). Therefore, we put aside as irrelevant the averment that

FEMA would start the approval process over because time has now passed without

construction of the L-142 levee. We are also inclined to disregard what may be the

final step in the Stafford Act process, the modification of individual deeds to HMGPacquired lands. The government has not established that deed modifications will be

required, though real property filings will doubtless be prudent, if not required. But

once FEMA has given the overall approval required by 42 U.S.C.

§ 5170c(b)(2)(B)(ii)(III), this step strikes us as ministerial, like the method of

repayment issue that did not render a deficiency determination non-final in Bell, 461

U.S. at 779. 

The difficult question in this case is whether the specific FEMA determination

described in the April 2000 letter was a final agency action before Jefferson City and

FEMA entered into an Agreement of Clarification. The April 2000 letter appears to

satisfy the first requirement of Bennett v. Spear; it reflects a final FEMA

determination to approve a specific levee proposal. But to be a final agency action,

this determination must be one that determines rights or obligations or from which

legal consequences will flow. Neither party analyzed this issue in detail, as the

Supreme Court’s precedents require, and the sparse record on appeal sheds inadequate

light on an agency process that is not carefully prescribed by statute or regulation.

One factor seems certain -- significant agency action remains before the L-142 levee

may be constructed, which strongly suggests the Stafford Act issue is not ripe because

“to withhold court consideration at present will not cause the parties significant

hardship.” Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998). Sierra Club

Appellate Case: 04-3910 Page: 7 Date Filed: 04/04/2006 Entry ID: 2028738
2

In discussing the lack of final agency action, the district court’s opinion stated

that the Corps did not violate NEPA by failing to issue an environmental impact

statement because its EA and FONSI were sufficient. The government on appeal

properly notes that its motion to dismiss did not address the merits of this issue and

therefore it should be remanded if we conclude the district court has jurisdiction.

-8-

as the party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden of proof. See Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Accordingly, we affirm the district

court’s resolution of this issue. 

B. The NEPA Claims. Sierra Club argues that the Corps’ issuance of an EA

and a FONSI was a “final agency action.” The government responds that an EA and

a FONSI are not a final agency action when, as here, “the federal agencies must take

several more actions before their decision is final and [the major federal action]

contemplated in the NEPA compliance documents could begin.” The district court did

not specifically address this issue.2

 

NEPA prescribes a set of “action-forcing” measures that require federal

agencies to take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of major federal

actions before they are taken. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332; Robertson v. Methow Valley

Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 348-49 (1989). NEPA’s obligations are procedural;

the statute does not mandate any particular result. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v.

Natural Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983). If an agency’s preliminary

environmental assessment of a project suggests that no significant environmental

impact is likely, the agency issues a FONSI. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.9, .13. If

significant environmental impact is likely, an environmental impact statement is

required. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). Sierra Club alleges that the Corps violated

NEPA because its EA overlooked the cumulative and secondary effects of the

proposed L-142 levee and because an environmental impact statement rather than a

FONSI is required. 

Appellate Case: 04-3910 Page: 8 Date Filed: 04/04/2006 Entry ID: 2028738
3

We conclude the government’s contention that there is no final agency action

until Congress appropriates the necessary funds is without merit. “[I]t is more

pragmatic to review Corps’ action at the end of the agency’s decision-making process

than after Congress has appropriated funds.” Oregon Natural Res. Council v. Harrell,

52 F.3d 1499, 1503 (9th Cir. 1995); accord Town of Rye v. Skinner, 907 F.2d 23, 24

(2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1024 (1991). 

-9-

The Supreme Court has strongly signaled that an agency’s decision to issue

either a FONSI or an environmental impact statement is a “final agency action”

permitting immediate judicial review under NEPA: 

NEPA . . . simply guarantees a particular procedure, not a particular

result. . . . Hence a person with standing who is injured by a failure to

comply with the NEPA procedure may complain of that failure at the

time the failure takes place, for the claim can never get riper.

Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 737 (citations omitted); cf. Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res.

Council, 490 U.S. 360, 370-74 (1989). More than one of our sister circuits have held

that the six-year statute of limitations for commencing a NEPA action under the APA

begins to run when the agency issues a FONSI. See Jersey Heights Neighborhood

Ass’n v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180, 188 (4th Cir. 1999); Southwest Williamson

County Cmty Ass’n v. Slater, 173 F.3d 1033, 1036 (6th Cir. 1999). 

To be sure, “plaintiffs in NEPA cases must point to ‘action’ at least arguably

triggering the agency’s obligation to prepare an impact statement.” Found. on Econ.

Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 85 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Here, the action is the proposal to

build a specific levee. The Corps’ decision to issue a FONSI was the culmination of

the agency’s NEPA decision-making. To deny judicial review of the agency’s NEPA

compliance because additional steps are required before the levee can be built would

undermine the purpose of judicial review under NEPA -- to “ensure that important

effects will not be overlooked or underestimated only to be discovered after resources

have been committed or the die otherwise cast.” Robertson, 490 U.S. at 349.3

 For

Appellate Case: 04-3910 Page: 9 Date Filed: 04/04/2006 Entry ID: 2028738
-10-

these reasons, we conclude that the Corps’ decision to issue a FONSI constituted a

“final agency action” under NEPA that is subject to immediate judicial review under

5 U.S.C. § 704. 

III. Standing and Ripeness under NEPA

We likewise reject the district court’s conclusion that Sierra Club lacks standing

because no injury is certain to occur until the Corps and FEMA take additional steps

to finalize the levee project. Injury under NEPA occurs when an agency fails to

comply with that statute, for example, by failing to issue a required environmental

impact statement. The injury-in-fact is increased risk of environmental harm

stemming from the agency’s allegedly uninformed decision-making. See Comm. to

Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 448-49 (10th Cir. 1996). The

government does not challenge Sierra Club’s standing to assert that injury on behalf

of its members. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7 (1992).

Finally, we have little difficulty concluding that this NEPA dispute was ripe for

judicial review when the lawsuit was filed in December 2003. See Ohio Forestry, 523

U.S. at 737. However, that does not mean the district court must ignore the current

posture of the dispute. An agency must continue to take a “hard look” at the

environmental effects of a planned action after preliminary approval and may need to

prepare a supplemental assessment or impact statement if environmentally significant

new circumstances or information develop, and if as in this case major federal action

is yet to occur. See Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 72

(2004); Marsh, 490 U.S. at 372-74. 

Substantial time has elapsed since FEMA approved the L-142 levee in April

2000 and the Corps issued a FONSI in April 2001. Both agencies have identified

additional steps that must be taken before the levee may be built, steps that may

require a new approval process before FEMA and may trigger supplemental

Appellate Case: 04-3910 Page: 10 Date Filed: 04/04/2006 Entry ID: 2028738
-11-

environmental analysis by the Corps, or by Jefferson City, see 33 U.S.C. § 701b13(d)(1)(B). A district court has broad discretion to stay proceedings when

appropriate to control its docket, Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 ( 1997),

including the discretion to stay judicial review under NEPA based upon ripeness

considerations that do not deprive the court of jurisdiction. See Malama Makua v.

Rumsfeld, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1165 (D. Haw. 2001). We leave these questions for

further development by the parties and the district court on remand.

The judgment of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded for

further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 

______________________________

Appellate Case: 04-3910 Page: 11 Date Filed: 04/04/2006 Entry ID: 2028738