Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01487/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01487-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:0101 Copyright Infringement (definitions)

---

1

17-cv-1487-WQH-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Live Face on Web, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

Archevos Corporation and Scott E. 

Layne,

Defendants.

Case No.: 17-cv-1487-WQH-NLS

ORDER

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(2) (ECF No 

12) filed by Defendant Archevos Corporation.

I. Background

On July 21, 2017, Plaintiff Live Face on Web, LLC (“LFOW”) initiated this action 

by filing the Complaint (ECF No. 1) against Defendants Archevos Corporation 

(“Archevos”) and Scott E. Layne. On July 31, 2017, LFOW filed the First Amended 

Complaint (the “FAC”) (ECF No. 4). The FAC is the operative complaint in this matter. 

Case 3:17-cv-01487-WQH-NLS Document 24 Filed 02/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 10
2

17-cv-1487-WQH-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On October 10, 2017, Archevos filed a Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(2) (ECF 

No. 12) as well as a Declaration of Scott Layne in Support of the Motion to Dismiss (the 

“First Layne Declaration”) (ECF No. 12-2). On October 16, 2017, LFOW filed an 

Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 14) along with the Declaration of Imran 

Vakil (ECF No. 14-1) and twelve Exhibits (ECF Nos. 14-2 and 14-3). On November 6, 

2017, Archevos filed a Reply in Support of the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 16) as well as 

a Declaration of Scott Layne in Support of the Reply (the “Second Layne Declaration”) 

(ECF No. 16-1). 

II. Facts and Allegations

LFOW is a Pennsylvania limited liability company. FAC at ¶ 5. 

LFOW is a software company specializing in borderless video technology. 

LFOW is the developer and owner of “live person” software, which is an 

original work of authorship independently created by LFOW (“LFOW 

Code”). The LFOW Code allows a company to display a video of a “walking” 

and “talking” personal host who introduces a website to an online visitor.

Id. at ¶¶ 9–10. 

Archevos is a Wyoming corporation. LFOW’S Exhibit 1, ECF No. 14-2, at 2. Scott 

Layne is the President of Archevos. First Layne Declaration, ECF No. 12-1, at ¶ 2. “Layne 

resides in Encinitas California.” Answer of Defendant Scott Layne, ECF No. 11, at ¶ 7. 

Earl Hopper1 holds stock in Archevos. Second Layne Declaration, ECF No. 16-1, at ¶ 6. 

Archevos leases an office in Arizona where it “meets clients and potential clients” and 

“conducts firm business such as board meetings. Id. at ¶ 5.

Archevos operates the website www.experdocs.com (the “Website”). FAC at ¶ 7; 

see also Second Layne Declaration at ¶ 8 (referring to “the Archevos website.”). 

Experdocs is a software product that stores files electronically. Second Layne Declaration

 

1 LFOW refers to “Earl Hooper,” who LFOW contends “is the second officer of Archevos (the VicePresident, COO and CFO).” (ECF No. 14 at 3). For the purposes of this motion, the Court assumes that 

the person LFOW refers to as “Earl Hooper” is the same person that Archevos refers to as “Earl Hopper,” 

and elects to refer to this person as “Earl Hopper.”

Case 3:17-cv-01487-WQH-NLS Document 24 Filed 02/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 10
3

17-cv-1487-WQH-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

at ¶ 3. The Website states that “experdocs servers are maintained . . . in Southern 

California.” Vakil Declaration, Exhibit 7, ECF No. 14-3 at 2. Archevos markets and sells 

Experdocs on the Website. Second Layne Declaration at ¶ 3. Archevos does not own 

Experdocs. Id. 

Defendants, or someone acting on their behalf, modified the Website “to include the 

following website source code and/or text . . . :

http://tweople.com/client/multi_new.js.php?id=124” (the “Source Code”). FAC at ¶ 22. 

The Source Code links the Website to a third party’s website, 

http://tweople.com/client/multi_new.js.php?id=124 (the “Tweople Website”). Id. at ¶ 23. 

The Tweople Website links to the file “http://tweople.com/client/playerbase‐ multi.js” (the 

“Tweople Playerbase”). Id. The Tweople Playerbase infringes on LFOW’s copyright in 

the LFOW Code. Id. “[W]hen a web browser retrieves a page from the [] Website, a copy 

of [the Tweople Playerbase] is distributed by Defendants to the website visitor” causing a 

“web spokesperson video [to] launch[] on [the] Website.” Id. at ¶¶ 24, 26. 

III. Standard of Review

“In opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, 

the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction is proper.” Boschetto v. 

Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008). Where, as here, the parties have submitted 

declarations and exhibits in support of their motion and opposition; see ECF Nos. 12-2, 14-

1, 14-2, 14-3, and 16-1; the Court considers both the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint 

and the declarations and exhibits submitted by the parties. Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand 

Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011). The Court accepts as true all 

uncontroverted allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint and “draw[s] reasonable inferences 

from the complaint in favor of the plaintiff.” Fiore v. Walden, 688 F.3d 558, 574–75 (9th 

Cir. 2012), rev’d on other grounds, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014). However, the Court does not 

accept as true allegations that are contradicted by factual material submitted by the parties. 

Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1223 (quoting Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 

1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1977)). 

Case 3:17-cv-01487-WQH-NLS Document 24 Filed 02/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 10
4

17-cv-1487-WQH-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IV. Discussion

Where, as here, no federal statute authorizes personal jurisdiction, the district 

court applies the law of the state in which the court sits. California’s longarm statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10, is coextensive with federal due 

process requirements, so the jurisdictional analyses under state law and 

federal due process are the same. 

Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1223.

Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement

established that a state may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant without violating due 

process if the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the State] such that the 

maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial 

justice.’” 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 

International Shoe’s conception of “fair play and substantial justice” presaged the 

development of two categories of personal jurisdiction. The first category is 

represented by International Shoe itself, a case in which the in-state activities of the 

corporate defendant . . . gave rise to the liabilities sued on. . . . Adjudicatory authority 

of this order, in which the suit arises out of or relates to the defendant’s contacts with 

the forum, is today called specific jurisdiction.

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014) (citations and quotations omitted). 

International Shoe distinguished between, on the one hand, exercises of 

specific jurisdiction, as just described, and on the other, situations where a 

foreign corporation’s continuous corporate operations within a state are so 

substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action 

arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities. As [the Supreme 

Court] ha[s] since explained, a court may assert general jurisdiction over 

foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims 

against them when their affiliations with the State are so continuous and 

systematic as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.

Id. (citations and quotations omitted). 

A. Specific Jurisdiction

1. Applicable Law

The Court of Appeals has established three requirements that must be met for a court 

to have specific jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. First, “The non-resident 

defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the 

Case 3:17-cv-01487-WQH-NLS Document 24 Filed 02/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 10
5

17-cv-1487-WQH-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of 

the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and 

protections of its laws.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 

(9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1987)). Purposeful

“availment and direction are, in fact, two distinct concepts. A purposeful availment 

analysis is most often used in suits sounding in contract. A purposeful direction analysis, 

on the other hand, is most often used in suits sounding in tort.” Id. (citations omitted). A 

defendant has “purposefully direct[ed] his activities” toward a state if the defendant has 

“(1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm 

that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Id. at 805 (quoting 

Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

The second requirement that must be met for a court to have specific jurisdiction 

over a non-resident defendant is that “the claim must be one which arises out of or relates 

to the defendant’s forum-related activities.” Id. at 802 (quoting Lake, 817 F.2d at 1421). 

The final requirement is that “the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and 

substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.” Id. (quoting Lake, 817 F.2d at 1421). 

2. Analysis

In order to determine whether a plaintiff has alleged that a defendant committed an 

intentional act, a court must examine the alleged actions of the Defendant that allegedly 

amount to copyright infringement. See Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1228. The FAC alleges that 

Archevos (or someone acting on its behalf) modified the Website to include the Source 

Code, which links to the Tweople Website, which links to the Tweople Playerbase, which

infringes on LFOW’S copyright in the LFOW Code. FAC at ¶¶ 22, 23. The FAC alleges

that Archevos committed an intentional act: modifying its website to include the Source 

Code. 

Consequently, for the Court to have specific jurisdiction over Archevos, Archevos’s 

act of modifying the Website to include the Source Code must have been expressly aimed 

at California and must have caused harm that Archevos knew was likely to be suffered in 

Case 3:17-cv-01487-WQH-NLS Document 24 Filed 02/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 10
6

17-cv-1487-WQH-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the California. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802 (quoting Lake, 817 F.2d at 1421). LFOW

contends that Archevos’s act of modifying its website to include the Source Code was 

expressly aimed at California because the Website “is an interactive one that allows users 

from any state to make purchases,” “highlights the California locations for the servers,” 

and “appeals to the technology-focused audience of California.” ECF No. 14 at 7 (citing 

Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1231). Archevos contends that “Mavrix makes clear that an interactive 

website, without more, cannot by itself be the basis for jurisdiction” and that “storing data 

on the California servers . . . cannot be the basis for specific jurisdiction, because storing 

that data is not ‘suit-related conduct.’” ECF No. 16 at 6–7 (citing Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 

1229). 

In this case, the Website makes a product available for sale to persons accessing the 

Website from any state, including California. Second Layne Declaration at ¶ 3. That fact

does not, by itself, demonstrate that the placement of allegedly infringing material on the 

Website was expressly aimed at California. See Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1231 (“Not all material 

placed on the Internet is, solely by virtue of its universal accessibility, expressly aimed at 

every state in which it is accessed.”). Accordingly, the interactive nature of the Website 

does not give the Court specific jurisdiction over Archevos. The statement on the Website 

that “experdocs servers are maintained . . . in Southern California” does not demonstrate 

that Archevos’s act of modifying the Website to include the Source Code was expressly 

aimed at California. Vakil Declaration, Exhibit 7, ECF No. 14-3 at 2. Finally, even if the 

Website does “appeal[] to [a] technology-focused audience,” it does not follow that 

Archevos’s act of modifying the Website to include the Source Code was expressly aimed 

at California. (ECF No. 14 at 7). Mavrix does not require a different result. See Mavrix, 

647 F.3d at 1230–32 (finding that the district court had specific jurisdiction over a website 

owner sued for copyright infringement in part because the website and infringing material 

focused on “the California-centered celebrity and entertainment industries,” not the 

technology industry). Consequently, the Court finds that LFOW has not met its burden of 

Case 3:17-cv-01487-WQH-NLS Document 24 Filed 02/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 10
7

17-cv-1487-WQH-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

establishing that the Court has specific jurisdiction over Archevos. See Schwarzenegger,

374 F.3d at 802 (quoting Lake, 817 F.2d at 1421). 

B. General Jurisdiction

1. Applicable Law

LFOW contends that a court has general jurisdiction over a defendant corporation

when the defendant “has ‘substantial’ or ‘continuous and systematic’ contacts with the 

forum state.” ECF No. 14 at 4 (citing Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 

1163, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006)). Archevos contends that “general jurisdiction only generally 

exists over a corporation at ‘the place of incorporation’ or the ‘principal place of business.’” 

ECF No. 16 at 3–4 (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014)). 

In Daimler, the United States Supreme Court held that, for a district court to exercise 

general jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant must have affiliations with the forum 

State that “are so continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the 

forum State.” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 

S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). “With respect to a corporation, the place of 

incorporation and principal place of business are ‘paradig[m] . . . bases for general 

jurisdiction.’” Id. at 760 (alteration and omission in original) (citing Brilmayer et al., A 

General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 Texas L.Rev. 721, 735 (1988)). A corporation’s 

“principal place of business” is 

the place where a corporation’s officers direct, control, and coordinate the

corporation’s activities. It is . . . the corporation’s “nerve center.” And in 

practice it should normally be the place where the corporation maintains its 

headquarters—provided that the headquarters is the actual center of direction, 

control, and coordination, i.e., the “nerve center,” and not simply an office 

where the corporation holds its board meetings (for example, attended by 

directors and officers who have traveled there for the occasion).

Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92–93 (2010). The Supreme Court explicitly rejected 

a test under which general jurisdiction would have been available “in every State in which 

a corporation engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business” as

“unacceptably grasping.” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760–61. The Supreme Court also clarified 

Case 3:17-cv-01487-WQH-NLS Document 24 Filed 02/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 10
8

17-cv-1487-WQH-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that it has not “h[e]ld that a corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction only in a 

forum where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business; it [has] simply typed 

those places paradigm all-purpose forums.” Id. at 760. 

2. Analysis

LFOW contends that the Court has general jurisdiction over Archevos

because Archevos is essentially a two-man operation—one of whom is 

working in California and one of whom is working in Arizona. The brain of 

the operation—the designer and president of the company—is in California. . 

. . The control is being exerted through its President, who works out of 

California.

(ECF No. 14 at 5). Archevos contends that the court does not have general jurisdiction 

over Archevos because “Archevos is a Wyoming Corporation, and Archevos’ principal 

place of business is in Arizona.” (ECF No. 16 at 4). Archevos contends that the following 

facts establish that its principal place of business is in Arizona: “Archevos has one office, 

which is in Arizona,” “[i]t meets clients and potential clients at that office,” “[i]t conducts 

firm business such as board meetings at that office,” “[n]o such board meetings and client 

meetings have ever taken place in California,” and “all day-by-day operations are run by 

Earl Hopper (an officer and shareholder of Archevos) who is in Arizona.” Id. 

Scott Layne is the President of Archevos. First Layne Declaration at ¶ 2. “Layne 

resides in Encinitas California.” Layne Answer at ¶ 7. LFOW contends that Layne is 

“[t]he brain of the operation” and the person who exerts control over Archevos. (ECF No. 

14 at 5). In support of that contention, LFOW cites the Declaration of Imran Vakil, 

LFOW’s counsel, which states, in relevant part, that (1) “Layne is listed as registrant for 

the . . . Website, as well as the administrative contact”; (2) “Layne explained Archevos is 

owned and run by him and Earl Ho[p]per”; (3) “Layne informed me he is based in 

California”; and (4) “Layne was the only individual from Archevos who had any 

interaction with me after the initiation of this lawsuit.” Vakil Declaration, ECF No. 14-1 

at ¶¶ 14, 16, 18. 

Case 3:17-cv-01487-WQH-NLS Document 24 Filed 02/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 10
9

17-cv-1487-WQH-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Earl Hopper holds stock in Archevos. Second Layne Declaration at ¶ 6. Layne 

declares that “[a]ll [of Archevos’s] day-by-day operations are run by Earl Hopper in 

Arizona.” Id. at ¶ 5. Archevos leases an office in Arizona where it “meets clients and 

potential clients” and “conducts firm business such as board meetings.” Id. 

The Court finds that, in light of this evidence, LFOW has not met its burden of 

establishing that the Court has general jurisdiction over Archevos. Boschetto v. Hansing, 

539 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008). The facts submitted by the parties do not establish 

that Layne “direct[s], control[s], and coordinate[s Archevos]’s activities” from California;

Hertz, 559 U.S. at 92–93; or that Archevos is “essentially at home in [California]”;

Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761. 

C. Jurisdictional Discovery

“A court may permit discovery to aid in determining whether it has in personam 

jurisdiction.” Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Techn. Assoc., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 

1977). Jurisdictional discovery “should be granted where pertinent facts bearing on the 

question of jurisdiction are controverted . . . or where a more satisfactory showing of the 

facts is necessary.” Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 430 

n.24 (9th Cir. 1977).

LFOW contends that the Court should permit jurisdictional discovery. (ECF No. 14 

at 10). Archevos contends that “[j]urisdictional discovery is not appropriate because here 

there are case dispositive facts that are not controverted,” including that Archevos’s

“principle [sic] place of business is in Arizona, not California.” (ECF No. 16 at 13). The 

Court finds that the facts submitted by the parties create a genuine dispute as to the location 

of Archevos’s principal place of business and whether Archevos is “essentially at home” 

in California. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919). The facts 

submitted by the parties do not establish that Layne “direct[s], control[s], and coordinate[s 

Archevos]’s activities” from California, or that Hopper “direct[s], control[s], and 

coordinate[s Archevos]’s activities” from Arizona. Hertz, 559 U.S. at 92–93. “A more 

satisfactory showing of the facts is necessary” before the Court can determine whether 

Case 3:17-cv-01487-WQH-NLS Document 24 Filed 02/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 10
10

17-cv-1487-WQH-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Archevos is essentially at home in California. Wells Fargo, 556 F.2d at 430 n.24. The 

court will allow the parties a period of 60 days to engage in limited jurisdictional discovery 

regarding whether Archevos is essentially at home in California.

2

V. Conclusion

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 12) will remain 

pending during the period of jurisdictional discovery. The parties shall file any 

supplemental responses within 90 days of this Order, and any replies shall be filed within 

14 days of any supplemental response. Any discovery disputes will be resolved by the 

Magistrate Judge.

Dated: February 23, 2018

 

2 The Court denies LFOW’s remaining requests for jurisdictional discovery because they do not relate 

to information that, under the Court’s analysis in Sections IV.A and IV.B, would “bear[] on the question 

of jurisdiction.” Wells Fargo, 556 F.2d at 430 n.24.

Case 3:17-cv-01487-WQH-NLS Document 24 Filed 02/23/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 10