Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-07071/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-07071-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 380
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Property Damage
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SWC INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

ELITE PROMO INC,

Defendant.

Case No. 16-cv-07071-DMR 

ORDER RE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 

REMAND

Re: Dkt. No. 17

Pending before this court is Plaintiff SWC, Inc. (“SWC”)’s motion to remand. [Docket 

No. 17]. The court held a hearing on February 9, 2017. For the following reasons, the court 

GRANTS SWC’s motion to remand, and DENIES Defendant Elite Promo, Inc.’s (“Elite Promo”) 

pending motion to dismiss [Docket No. 5] as moot. SWC’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs is 

denied. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

SWC is an exclusive licensee of the Pebble Beach trademark. SWC brings this action

against Elite Promo for its allegedly unauthorized use of the Pebble Beach trademark. 

A. Prior Federal Action (“SWC I”) 

On August 5, 2016, SWC filed an action in federal court against Elite Promo, alleging five 

California state law claims: 1) Unfair Competition under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.; 

2) False Advertising under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500 et seq.; 3) Intentional Interference 

with Contractual Relations; 4) Conversion; and 5) Trespass to Chattels. See SWC Inc. v. Elite 

Promo Inc., No. 16-cv-04445-DMR (“SWC I”). SWC pleaded federal subject matter jurisdiction 

on the basis of diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, alleging that SWC was a 

citizen of the State of Maryland, Elite Promo was a citizen of the State of California, and the 

amount in controversy exceeded the jurisdictional minimum of $75,000.00, exclusive of interests 

Case 4:16-cv-07071-DMR Document 25 Filed 02/10/17 Page 1 of 10
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

and costs. See SWC I Comp., § 6. 

Elite Promo thereafter filed a motion to dismiss SWC I. The court held oral argument on 

the motion to dismiss on October 13, 2016, took the matter under submission, and ordered the 

parties to submit supplemental briefing on issues related to the motion to dismiss. See SWC I

10/13/16 Minute Order [Docket No. 15]. The parties submitted the requested supplemental 

briefing on October 24, 2016 as ordered. See SWC I Docket Nos. 16, 17. 

On October 28, 2016, while this court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss was pending, SWC 

voluntarily dismissed SWC I pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i). See SWC 

I Notice of Voluntary Dismissal [Docket No. 18]. 

B. Instant Action (“SWC II”) 

On November 21, 2016, SWC filed another action against Elite Promo in San Mateo 

County Superior Court. See SWC Inc. v. Elite Promo Inc. (“SWC II”) State Court Complaint, Ex. 

A to Notice of Removal [Docket No. 1]. SWC II is virtually identical to SWC I; it alleges the same 

five California state law claims against Elite Promo for unauthorized use of the Pebble Beach 

trademark. Id. 

On December 10, 2016, Elite Promo removed SWC II solely on the basis of diversity 

jurisdiction. See SWC II Notice of Removal [Docket No. 1], ¶¶ 9-16. Elite Promo did not allege 

any other basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction in its Notice of Removal. . 

On December 15, 2016, Elite Promo filed a motion to dismiss SWC II, which was in all 

respects identical to the motion it had filed in SWC I. On December 29, 2016, SWC opposed Elite 

Promo’s motion to dismiss SWC II, arguing, among other things, that Elite Promo’s removal was 

improper for the reasons detailed in a forthcoming motion to remand. See SWC II Opp’n to Mot. 

to Dismiss at 1 [Docket No. 16]. 

On January 5, 2017, less than 30 days after removal, SWC filed its motion to remand SWC 

II to San Mateo Superior Court, arguing that Elite Promo’s removal was procedurally improper.

[Docket No. 17]. Elite Promo opposed. [Docket No. 19]. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . . [and] possess only that power 

Case 4:16-cv-07071-DMR Document 25 Filed 02/10/17 Page 2 of 10
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 

377 (1994). It is presumed that a matter “lies outside this limited jurisdiction . . . and the burden 

of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (citations omitted). 

Generally, a defendant may remove to federal court any state court action in which the federal 

court would have original jurisdiction, e.g., federal question or diversity jurisdiction. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1441. However, there is a “strong presumption against removal jurisdiction,” which

“means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper, and that 

the court resolves all ambiguity in favor of remand to state court.” Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 

582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Luther v. Countrywide Homes Loans Servicing, LP, 

533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[R]emoval statutes are strictly construed against 

removal.”); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Federal jurisdiction must be

rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.”). 

III. DISCUSSION

SWC argues that removal was improper because Elite Promo is a resident of the state in 

which SWC II is filed, and is therefore a forum defendant. According to SWC, Elite Promo is 

barred from removing SWC II due to the forum defendant rule embodied in 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1441(b)(2). Elite Promo counters that SWC waived its right to remand because it affirmatively 

invoked this court’s jurisdiction when it filed SWC I in federal court, and because it has engaged 

in litigation activity in SWC II.

A. The Forum Defendant Rule

The forum defendant rule provides that “[a] civil action otherwise removable solely on the 

basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any of the parties 

in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is 

brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). The forum defendant rule “confines removal on the basis of 

diversity jurisdiction to instances where no defendant is a citizen of the forum state.” Lively v. 

Wild Oat Mkts., Inc., 456 F.3d 933, 939 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Spencer v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. 

Dist. Of Cal., 393 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that “the presence of a local defendant at 

the time removal is sought bars removal”). 

Case 4:16-cv-07071-DMR Document 25 Filed 02/10/17 Page 3 of 10
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

As explained by the Ninth Circuit, the purpose of the forum defendant rule is tied to the 

purpose of diversity jurisdiction, which is to “protect out-of-state defendants from possible 

prejudices in state court.” Lively, 456 F.3d at 940. Where the defendant is a resident of the state 

in which the case is brought, “the need for such protection is absent.” Id. By preventing a local 

defendant from removing on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, the forum defendant rule “allows 

the plaintiff to regain some control over forum selection by requesting that the case be remanded 

to state court” on the ground that the defendant is a resident of the forum. Id.

Since the forum defendant rule is procedural rather than jurisdictional, a plaintiff must file 

a motion to remand on this basis within 30 days of removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“A motion 

to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be 

made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a).”). Failure to 

timely seek remand results in a waiver of the defect. See Lively, 456 F.3d at 942 (holding that the 

“forum defendant rule . . . is a procedural requirement, and thus a violation of this rule constitutes 

a waivable non-jurisdictional defect subject to the 30-day time limit imposed by § 1447[c]”). 

Applying these principles, the court finds that the forum defendant rule applies here. SWC 

filed SWC II in San Mateo County Superior Court. See SWC II State Court Complaint, Ex. A to 

Not. of Removal [Docket No. 1]. At the time of removal, Elite Promo was a citizen of California 

and a forum defendant. See SWC II Not. of Removal, ¶ 10 (“Defendant Elite Promo, Inc. . . . is, 

and at all relevant times has been, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State 

of California, with its principle place of business in the City of San Mateo, California.”); see also

28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, “a corporation shall be deemed 

to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the State 

or foreign state where it has its principal place of business . . .”). As a forum defendant, Elite 

could not remove solely on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Since the sole basis of Elite 

Promo’s removal was diversity jurisdiction, see SWC II Notice of Removal [Docket No. 1], ¶¶ 9-

16, and Plaintiff filed a timely motion to remand, see Docket No. 17, remand is appropriate unless 

the court finds that Plaintiff waived that right. 

//

Case 4:16-cv-07071-DMR Document 25 Filed 02/10/17 Page 4 of 10
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

B. Waiver of Right to Remand

A plaintiff may waive the right to remand by (1) failing to file a timely motion to remand 

on a non-jurisdictional defect, see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), or (2) engaging in affirmative conduct 

suggesting a waiver of the right to remand. Owens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 686 F. Supp. 827, 

830 (S.D. Cal. 1988). Since Plaintiff filed a timely motion to remand, only the second ground is at 

issue. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff waived its right to remand by litigating SWC I in federal 

court, and by filing an opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss in SWC II.

District courts in this circuit have held that in order to waive the right to remand, a plaintiff 

must engage in the type of post-removal conduct that constitutes “affirmative conduct or 

unequivocal assent of a sort which would render it offensive to fundamental principles of fairness 

to remand . . . .” Owens, 686 F. Supp. at 830 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see 

also Student A. By & Through Mother of Student A. v. Metcho, 710 F. Supp. 267, 269 (N.D. Cal. 

1989) (finding the plaintiff did not waive her right to remand by filing a jury demand, even though

the plaintiff did not file a timely remand motion) (citing Owens); Magill v. Wick Towing, Inc., No. 

C16-0348 JLR, 2016 WL 3476449, at *2 (W.D. Wash. June 21, 2016) (finding the plaintiff did 

not waive his right to remand by filing a joint status report and serving Initial Disclosures prior to 

filing his timely remand motion) (citing Owens). 

As one court in this district has observed, “[t]he exact quantity or quality of conduct on [a] 

[p]laintiff’s part which would evidence waiver of the [removal petition’s] defect or consent to 

removal is less than clear.” Alarcon v. Shim Inc., No. C 07-02894 SI, 2007 WL 2701930, at *2 

(N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, a district 

court “‘has broad discretion in deciding whether a plaintiff has waived a right to object to 

procedural irregularities in removal proceedings.’” Id. (quoting Lanier v. Am. Bd. of Endodontics, 

843 F.2d 901, 905 (6th Cir. 1988)). 

Generally, “[w]aiver of the right to remand has been found where [the] plaintiff has filed 

numerous pleadings and discovery requests after a case has been removed to federal court.” 

Barahona v. Orkin, No. CV 08-04634-RGK (SHX), 2008 WL 4724054, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 

2008). For example, in Meadows v. Bicrodyne Corp., 559 F. Supp. 57 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff’d, 785 

Case 4:16-cv-07071-DMR Document 25 Filed 02/10/17 Page 5 of 10
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1986), the plaintiffs sought to remand their action on the ground that 

defendants’ removal petition was untimely, but did not raise this defect until they filed a second 

remand motion. In the meantime, the plaintiffs appeared multiple times before the district court 

both defending against motions and bringing substantive motions of their own. Accordingly, the 

district court held that the plaintiffs waived their right to remand on the basis of a nonjurisdictional 

defect. Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion in the denial of the remand 

motion since plaintiffs “by appearing repeatedly before the court before raising the timeliness 

objection, had waived their right to raise that issue.” Meadows, 785 F.2d at 672; see also Bearden 

v. PNS Stores, Inc., 894 F. Supp. 1418, 1424 (D. Nev. 1995) (noting in dicta that the plaintiffs 

waived their right to remand by “filing numerous pleadings and discovery requests after the case 

was removed to this federal court”). 

Courts generally have not found waiver where a plaintiff undertakes minimal or expected 

case-management obligations once a case is removed. For example, courts have found that a 

plaintiff does not waive its right to remand by filing a jury demand prior to filing a timely remand 

motion. See, e.g., Owens, 686 F. Supp. at 830-31 (finding the plaintiffs did not waive their right to 

remand by filing a jury demand on the same day as their remand motion); Olds v. Wynn Las 

Vegas, LLC, No. 2:12-CV-357-RCJ-RJJ, 2012 WL 4792919, at *2 (D. Nev. Oct. 9, 2012) (same; 

collecting cases).

At least two courts have concluded that a plaintiff has not waived the right to remand by 

filing an amended complaint in response to a motion to dismiss. In Rapid Displays, Inc. v. Ford, 

Walker, Haggerty & Behar, LLP, No. 16 CV-1703-WQH-JLB, 2016 WL 6543207 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 

3, 2016), the defendant removed the case to federal court. The plaintiff then filed an amended 

complaint in response to the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The district court held that such 

behavior did not constitute a waiver of the right to remand, given that Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 15(a) permitted plaintiff to amend its complaint once as a matter of right within 21 days 

of service. Id. at *4; see also Newport v. Dell Inc., No. CIV 08-096-TUCCKJJCG, 2008 WL 

2705364, at *4 (D. Ariz. July 2, 2008) (rejecting the defendants’ contention that the plaintiff 

waived her right to remand because she filed an amended complaint). 

Case 4:16-cv-07071-DMR Document 25 Filed 02/10/17 Page 6 of 10
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

The Ninth Circuit has not addressed the precise factual scenario presented here, i.e., 

whether a plaintiff may waive his or her right to remand based on prior conduct in a near-identical

federal court action. Piper Jaffray & Co. v. Severini, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1020–21 (W.D. Wis. 

2006), dealt with facts that are close to the present case. In Piper Jaffray & Co., the plaintiff filed 

a motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, but voluntarily dismissed the 

case under Rule 41 three days later. Id. at 1018. That same day, the plaintiff filed a nearly 

identical complaint in state court seeking the same relief. Id. The defendants, who were forum 

defendants, thereafter removed the action on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. The plaintiff filed 

a timely remand motion. Id. In opposing the plaintiff’s remand motion, the defendant argued that 

the plaintiff waived its right to remand by filing its prior action in federal court, and was judicially 

estopped from objecting to the removal. Id. at 1019. The district court explained that because the 

“plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its prior action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41,” 

the dismissal left the “situation as if a suit had never been brought,” and thus the court could not 

consider any actions taken by the plaintiff during the pendency of that action. Id. at 1020-21. 

Accordingly, the district court found that the plaintiff did not waive its right to remand based on 

its conduct in the previously dismissed action, and held that defendants’ removal was procedurally 

improper under the forum defendant rule. Id. at 1022.

On the question of whether SWC waived its right to remand based on its conduct in SWC I, 

the court finds the reasoning in Piper Jaffray & Co. persuasive. It is well-established in the Ninth 

Circuit that the effect of a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41 is “to leave the parties as though no 

action had been brought.” United States v. Real Prop. Located at 475 Martin Lane, Beverly Hills, 

CA, 545 F.3d 1134, 1145 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The 

Ninth Circuit has “adhered slavishly to this interpretation of Rule 41(a).” City of S. Pasadena v. 

Mineta, 284 F.3d 1154, 1157–58 (9th Cir. 2002) (collecting cases). In City of S. Pasadena, the 

plaintiff sought leave to amend the complaint in a long-standing federal lawsuit. The court denied 

leave to amend, and the parties stipulated to dismissal. Two days later, the plaintiff filed a new 

federal action that raised many of the claims that it unsuccessfully had sought to add to the 

dismissed lawsuit. The state defendant promptly invoked sovereign immunity in the new lawsuit. 

Case 4:16-cv-07071-DMR Document 25 Filed 02/10/17 Page 7 of 10
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

The district court rejected the defense, holding that the new lawsuit was essentially a continuation 

of the original lawsuit, and the state defendant had waived sovereign immunity through its 

activities in the prior lawsuit. 284 F.3d at 1156. The Ninth Circuit held that the waiver of 

immunity in the original lawsuit did not carry over to the second lawsuit because the plaintiff 

voluntarily dismissed the first lawsuit pursuant to Rule 41(a). Such a dismissal “leaves the 

situation as if the action had never been filed.” Id. at 1157 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

Applying City of S. Pasadena here, the court concludes that it cannot examine SWC’s 

actions in SWC I, because the effect of SWC’s voluntary dismissal of SWC I essentially erased that 

case from consideration. To conclude otherwise would vitiate the effect of the Rule 41(a) 

voluntary dismissals. To the extent there is any ambiguity as to whether this court can consider

SWC’s prior conduct in SWC I in determining waiver of its right to remand in SWC II, the court 

resolves any such ambiguity in favor of remand, as it must in determining whether removal was 

proper, since federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042; see 

also Luther, 533 F.3d at 1034; Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. 

Turning to SWC’s post-removal conduct in SWC II, the court finds that SWC did not 

engage in the type of “affirmative conduct” that would offend principles of fairness if the action 

were remanded. SWC’s litigation conduct in SWC II consists of filing an opposition to a pending 

motion to dismiss, as it was required to do pursuant to Civ. L.R. 7-3. It did so one week before

filing a timely remand motion. Such minimal mandatory and defensive conduct does not amount 

to the type of affirmative conduct that courts typically have found to support waiver. See, e.g., 

Alarcon, 2007 WL 2701930, *3 (two week delay in filing motion for remand after filing motion 

for entry of default does not amount to waiver); Magill, 2016 WL 3476449, at *2 (positing, in 

dicta, that even if the plaintiff had filed its joint status report and served its initial disclosures after 

filing a remand motion, that plaintiff still would not have waived its right to remand under those 

circumstances). 

Elite Promo’s argument that SWC is engaging in forum shopping is not persuasive. 

Indeed, the forum defendant rule protects a plaintiff’s choice of forum and permits a plaintiff to 

Case 4:16-cv-07071-DMR Document 25 Filed 02/10/17 Page 8 of 10
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

seek remand where there is a local defendant. See Lively, 456 F.3d at 940. 

C. Newly Raised Basis for Removal Jurisdiction

In its opposition to SWC’s motion to remand, Elite Promo argues for the first time that 

federal subject matter jurisdiction is also proper on the basis of federal question jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Elite Promo’s argument is untimely. The Ninth Circuit has held 

that a notice of removal “cannot be amended to add a separate basis for removal jurisdiction after 

the thirty day period.” ARCO Envtl. Remediation, L.L.C. v. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Quality of 

Mont., 213 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation and internal quotation mark omitted); see 

also Rader v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can., 941 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2013) 

(explaining that a “notice of removal cannot be amended to add new bases for removal after the 

thirty day removal period has run, nor can a defendant present new grounds for removal for the 

first time in opposition to a motion for remand”) (citing ARCO Envtl. Remediation, L.L.C.). As 

Elite Promo’s argument is untimely, the court declines to address its merits.

D. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

SWC requests attorneys’ fees and costs in seeking remand. See Mot. to Remand at 4. 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) provides that “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the 

district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. An order remanding the 

case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred 

as a result of the removal.” District courts have wide discretion in deciding to award fees. Ervin 

v. Ballard Marine Constr., Inc., No. 16-CV-02931-WHO, 2016 WL 4239710, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 

Aug. 11, 2016) (quoting Moore v. Permanente Med. Grp, Inc., 981 F.2d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

“Absent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only where the 

removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. Conversely, when an 

objectively reasonable basis exists, fees should be denied.” Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 

U.S. 132, 141 (2005); see also Gardner v. UICI, 508 F.3d 559, 562 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he 

standard for awarding fees . . . turn[s] on the reasonableness of the removal.”) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). A court may award fees even if it does not find the removing 

party acted in bad faith. See Moore v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 981 F.2d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 

Case 4:16-cv-07071-DMR Document 25 Filed 02/10/17 Page 9 of 10
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

1992).

In determining whether a removing party lacked an “objectively reasonable basis” for 

removal, this court is mindful that “removal is not objectively unreasonable solely because the 

removing party’s arguments lack merit, or else attorney’s fees would always be awarded whenever 

remand is granted.” Lussier v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 518 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008). In 

Lussier, the Ninth Circuit explained that in determining whether removal was objectively 

unreasonable, a court should determine “whether the relevant case law clearly foreclosed the 

defendant’s basis of removal,” taking into account “clarity of the law at the time of removal.” Id. 

at 1066. “[I]f the law in the Ninth Circuit is not so clear as to make the removing party's endeavor 

entirely frivolous, a court will deny the request for attorney’s fees.” Busch v. Jakov Dulcich & 

Sons LLC, No. 15-CV-00384-LHK, 2015 WL 5915362, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2015), appeal 

dismissed (Dec. 23, 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

As the parties concede, the question of whether SWC waived its right to remand under the 

circumstances presented has not been addressed by any case in this circuit. The court cannot 

conclude that Elite Promo’s attempt to remove SWC II was objectively unreasonable, and 

therefore denies SWC’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs. 

IV. CONCLUSION

The court grants Plaintiff’s motion to remand. Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees and 

costs is denied. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied as moot. The Clerk is directed to close 

the case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 10, 2017

______________________________________

Donna M. Ryu

United States Magistrate Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORN

I

A

IT IS SO ORDERED

Judge Donna M. Ryu

Case 4:16-cv-07071-DMR Document 25 Filed 02/10/17 Page 10 of 10