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Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 8, 2000 Decided June 16, 2000

No. 99-5298

Barrick Goldstrike Mines Inc.,

Appellant

v.

Carol M. Browner, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(99cv00958)

Richard E. Schwartz argued the cause for appellant. With

him on the briefs was Thomas C. Means.

Todd S. Kim, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued

the cause for the federal appellees. With him on the brief

were Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, Mary F.

Edgar and Andrew C. Mergen, Attorneys.

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Before: Edwards, Chief Judge; Randolph and Garland,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Randolph, Circuit Judge: This is an appeal from the

judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint of

Barrick Goldstrike Mines Inc. The case arises under s 313

of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know

Act ("EPCRA"), 42 U.S.C. s 11023. EPCRA requires certain types of facilities that "manufactured," "processed" or

"otherwise used" listed "toxic chemicals" in amounts exceeding specified thresholds to report "releases" of these chemicals by July 1 of each year to the Environmental Protection

Agency. Id. s 11023(b)(1). EPA uses the information to

administer a "toxic release inventory" program pursuant to

EPCRA. The program makes the toxic release information

public. Although the toxic release inventory program originally applied only to manufacturing facilities, EPA extended it

by regulation to several other industry groups, including

metal mining. See 62 Fed. Reg. 23,834 (1997). Barrick

mines gold and other precious metals in Nevada. The company alleges that in applying the program to mining, EPA in

fact revised the program; that its revisions were substantive;

that they were not made through rulemaking, as they should

have been; and that the revisions were made instead through

statements in "rulemaking preambles" and in detailed directives issued in the form of "guidance" and a letter. Brief

of Appellant Barrick at 4. On EPA's motion the district

court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and

because it was not ripe. The court issued no written opinion.

EPCRA contains no judicial review provision. Barrick

therefore invoked the district court's general federal question

jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. s 1331) and sought, pursuant to the

Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. ss 701-706, and 28

U.S.C. s 2201), a declaratory judgment that the three EPA

actions were contrary to law. As to jurisdiction, the question

is whether Barrick has challenged "final agency action" within the meaning of the APA, see 5 U.S.C. s 704. As to

ripeness, we must determine whether Barrick, like the drug

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manufacturers in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S.

136 (1967), but unlike the cosmetics companies in Toilet

Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S.158, 164 (1967), must change

its conduct or risk costly sanctions, and whether the issues

presented in Barrick's complaint are suitable for review at

this time. See Clean Air Implementation Project v. EPA,

150 F.3d 1200, 1204-05 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

1. Barrick claimed that for certain mining operations,

including its own, EPA had revised the so-called de minimis

exception set forth in 40 C.F.R. s 372.38(a) without conducting a rulemaking. Barrick moves waste rock. The rock

contains trace concentrations of listed substances--toxic

chemicals--including copper, nickel, silver and other metalbearing minerals. Under EPA's de minimis regulation, if a

toxic chemical in a mixture amounts to less than 1% (or in the

case of a carcinogen, less than 0.1%) the substance is not

counted as having been released and does not count toward

the manufacturing, processing or "otherwise used" threshold.

Id. In EPA's "Metal Mining Facilities" guidance, posted on

EPA's website in January 1999,1 the agency stated that the

chemicals in waste rock are not eligible for this de minimis

exception because waste rock is not "manufactured, processed

or otherwise used." Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics, EPA, EPCRA Section 313 Industry Guidance: Metal

Mining Facilities 3-28 (Jan. 1999) [hereafter "1999 Guidance"].

Counsel for EPA admitted at oral argument that EPA's

position on the application of the de minimis exception to

waste rock is final. If Barrick does not conform to EPA's

view in fulfilling its reporting obligation it will be subject to

an enforcement action and fines. Even without counsel's

concession, the finality of EPA's position is clear enough.

__________

1 The guidance went through several iterations from 1997 to

1999, some of which were published in the Federal Register. See,

e.g., 62 Fed. Reg. 63,548 (1997). According to Barrick, the January

1999 version is "comprehensive and authoritative" and represents

the agency's principal set of reporting instructions for mining

companies. Brief of Appellant Barrick at 5.

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That the issuance of a guideline or guidance may constitute

final agency action has been settled in this circuit for many

years. See, e.g., Better Gov't Ass'n v. Department of State,

780 F.2d 86, 92-96 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v.

EPA, 801 F.2d 430, 435 & n.7, 436 (D.C. Cir. 1986). In Better

Government we rejected the proposition that if an agency

labels its action an "informal" guideline it may thereby escape

judicial review under the APA. 780 F.2d at 93. In CibaGeigy we held that a letter from an agency official stating the

agency's position and threatening enforcement action unless

the company complied constituted final agency action. 801

F.2d at 436-39, 438 n.9. In Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA,

208 F.3d 1015, 1020-23 (D.C. Cir. 2000), we held again that a

guidance document reflecting a settled agency position and

having legal consequences for those subject to regulation may

constitute "final agency action" for the purpose of judicial

review. For finality to be found in these cases two conditions

had to be satisfied: "First, the action must mark the 'consummation' of the agency's decisionmaking process, Chicago &

Southern Airlines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103,

113 (1948)--it must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. And second, the action must be one by which

'rights or obligations have been determined,' or from which

'legal consequences will flow,' Port of Boston Marine Terminal Assn. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71

(1970)." Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997). Here

there is no doubt that EPA will refuse to apply the de

minimis exception to Barrick's waste rock and that its refusal to do so has legal consequences--namely, that Barrick is

bound to keep track of its movement of waste rock and report

the movements as releases of toxic substances.2

As against this EPA contended at oral argument that the

1999 Guidance changed nothing; that EPA had already taken

the position Barrick complains about in the preamble to the

__________

2 EPA's 1999 metals mining guidance commanded: "you must

report ... the waste rock." 1999 Guidance, at 3-28. Other

portions of the 1999 Guidance, not challenged in this case, are

framed as recommendations.

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rule subjecting the mining industry to the toxic reporting

program; and that Barrick should have aimed its complaint

at the preamble, but had not done so. There are three reasons

for rejecting this line of reasoning.3 First, EPA never made

the argument in its brief in this court. See, e.g., Carducci v.

Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983). It did not even

cite the page or pages in the preamble that supposedly

support its position. Second, Barrick did indeed challenge

EPA positions expressed in the preambles (Complaint p 25;

Brief at 4) and did so in a timely fashion because no statute of

limitations applied. Third, we have recognized that final

agency action may result "from a series of agency pronouncements rather than a single edict." Ciba-Geigy, 801 F.2d at

435 n.7. Hence, a preamble plus a guidance plus an enforcement letter from EPA could crystallize an agency position

into final agency action within APA s 704's meaning. Fairly

read, this is what Barrick's complaint alleges.4

__________

3 EPA's brief contained a quite different argument--namely

that the 1999 Guidance was not final because it was not "binding"

and it was not binding because it merely explained "EPA's current

view of how the statutory and regulatory requirements of the [toxic

reporting] program apply to the metal mining industry and do not

impose any binding new requirements." Brief for Federal Apellees

at 16. It appears that EPA has abandoned this line of argument in

light of our intervening decision in Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA.

If it has not, if EPA still wishes us to consider the argument despite

the quite different position it took at oral argument, we reject it for

the reasons given in Appalachian Power, 208 F.3d at 1020-23.

There is not the slightest doubt that EPA directed regulated

entities to comply with the 1999 Guidance regarding their treatment

of waste rock, see supra note 1, and the other two interpretations

Barrick protests--conversion of one metal compound into another

within the same compound category, and impurities in dore, see

infra pp. 6-8.

4 In a case (unlike this one) in which our jurisdiction was

restricted to reviewing final "regulations," we held that a statement

in a preamble to a proposed rule could not be reviewed. See

Florida Power & Light Co. v. EPA, 145 F.3d 1414, 1418-20 (D.C.

Cir. 1998); see also Molycorp, Inc. v. EPA, 197 F.3d 543 (D.C. Cir.

1999).

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We also agree with Barrick that this aspect of its case is

ripe for judicial review. The questions presented are purely

legal.5 Nothing we can imagine happening would bring the

issues into greater focus or assist in determining them. And

there is certainly the prospect of hardship to Barrick. Its

only alternative to obtaining judicial review now is to violate

EPA's directives, refuse to report releases involving waste

rock, and then defend an enforcement proceeding on the

grounds it raises here. In that respect the case is indistinguishable from Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 801 F.2d at 438-39,

in which we held an analogous claim ripe for judicial review.

2. Barrick's second claim deals with whether it is "manufacturing" a "toxic chemical" when, in the course of extracting

gold from ore, trace amounts of naturally occurring metal

compounds change form, generally from metal sulfides to

metal oxides. In the 1999 metals mining guidance, EPA

announced that it would treat these changes as the manufacturing of toxic chemicals, a reportable event. See 1999 Guidance, at 3-11. Barrick objects that the 1999 Guidance is

inconsistent with s 313(c) of the statute and 40 C.F.R.

s 372.65(c), which do not permit the agency to treat as

"manufacturing" the conversion of one metal compound into

another within the same compound category. No further

detail is needed to understand why there is final agency

action here and why this claim is ripe. Here too, EPA

counsel conceded at oral argument that the position on this

subject expressed in the 1999 Guidance is the agency's final

position. The 1999 Guidance itself (at 3-11) says just that:

Metal mining facilities should be aware of chemical conversions that may take place during beneficiation. The

following types of conversions constitute manufacturing:

__________

5 Barrick claimed not only that EPA had issued a substantive

rule without engaging in rulemaking but also that it had misinterpreted its regulation (40 C.F.R. s 372.38(a)) and had acted arbitrarily by saying, with respect to the de minimis exception, that

waste rock is not manufactured, but saying elsewhere that all

"chemicals which exist in nature have been 'manufactured' at some

point," 62 Fed. Reg. at 23,857.

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. Conversion of one metal compound to another

within the same compound category. For example, a

lead mine may convert galena (lead sulfide in ore) to

lead oxide during beneficiation.

Thus, if Barrick refuses to abide by the 1999 Guidance, the

company will be subject to an enforcement action.

3. Barrick's third and last claim relates to the fact that its

mine produces metal bars--dore--that are gold and silver but

also contain tiny amounts of naturally occurring elements and

compounds from rock, compounds and elements that EPA

lists as "toxic chemicals." Under the statute, "the term

process means the preparation of a toxic chemical, after its

manufacture, for distribution in commerce." 42 U.S.C.

s 11023(b)(1)(C)(ii). Barrick thus believes that a "toxic

chemical" cannot be "processed" unless it has first been

"manufactured." From this it concludes that in producing its

dore it has not processed toxic chemicals and therefore has no

reporting obligation under the statute. EPA's opposite conclusion, Barrick contends, is embodied in its statement in the

preamble to the 1997 rule expanding coverage to the mining

industry, in the 1999 Guidance and in a letter, dated March

18, 1999, from the Chief of EPA's Toxic Release Inventory

Branch to another mining company. The preamble states

that the term "manufacture" is not limited to human activity.

"Manufacture" of a toxic chemical includes its "production"

and "EPA interprets 'production' to include creation." 62

Fed. Reg. at 23,857. Thus, according to the preamble "chemicals which exist in nature have been 'manufactured' at some

point." Id. The 1999 Guidance states the same conclusion

without giving the reasoning:

Non-Target Metals and Metal Compounds. When processing the target metals and metal compounds at your

facility, the ore you are beneficiating may also contain

other non-target EPCRA Section 313 metals and metal

compounds. If any portion of these non-target metals

and metal compounds remain in the metal concentrate

distributed into commerce, you must consider them toward the processing threshold of 25,000 pounds. If the

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EPCRA Section 313 chemicals are completely removed

from your product prior to distribution into commerce,

the chemicals are not considered processed and do not

have to be considered toward the processing threshold.

1999 Guidance, at 3-15. The March 18, 1999, "guidance"

letter from the branch chief also states the same conclusion.

In order to comply with EPA's interpretation, Barrick claims

that in 1999 it wound up reporting that it had " 'processed'

the naturally occurring metal impurities that it could not

completely remove from its dore." Reply Brief of Appellant

Barrick at 21.

Nothing in EPA's brief or in its oral argument indicates

that the EPA's position on this subject is tentative. The

March letter is firm and conclusive, as is the 1999 Guidance.

Both state what must be done to comply with EPA's toxic

release inventory program. Legal consequences flow from

the position expressed--Barrick must keep records and report to EPA unless it wishes to risk an enforcement action.

That the agency action is embodied in interpretative statements in a rulemaking preamble, in a guidance document, and

in a letter from a branch chief is not disqualifying. As we

have said, the final agency action in Ciba-Geigy, 801 F.2d at

436 n.8, consisted of a "series of steps taken by EPA"

culminating in a letter from an EPA official stating the

agency's position.6 We have no doubt that EPA, in responding by letter to industry inquiries, assists companies in bringing themselves into compliance. But it scarcely follows that a

company may not obtain judicial review of the agency's

interpretation of the statute or regulation. There is of course

the matter of timing. We have already decided that the first

two objections Barrick raised are ripe for review and we see

no basis for ruling any differently on this claim. It too

presents a pure question of law and withholding review has

sufficient adverse effects on Barrick's business.

__________

6 The final agency action in Her Majesty the Queen v. EPA, 912

F.2d 1525, 1530-32 (D.C. Cir. 1990), consisted of a letter from an

EPA official reiterating the agency's interpretation of a provision in

the Clean Air Act.

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For the reasons stated, the judgment of the district court is

reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

So ordered.

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