Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07212/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07212-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:501 Copyright Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CAPITOL RECORDS, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

RODRIGO BARRERA, 

Defendant.

___________________________________/

No. C-06-7212 JSW (EMC)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RE PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR

DEFAULT JUDGMENT

(Docket No. 12)

Plaintiffs Capitol Records, Inc., Sony BMG Music Entertainment, Arista Records LLC,

BMG music, and Fonovisa, Inc. filed suit against Defendant Rodrigo Barrera for copyright

infringement. After entry of default on January 17, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a motion for default

judgment. Having considered Plaintiffs’ motion, accompanying submissions, and all other evidence

of record, the Court hereby recommends that the motion be GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 21, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Mr. Barrera for copyright

infringement. In the complaint, Plaintiffs allege that they are all copyright owners or licensees of

exclusive rights under United States copyright law with respect to certain copyrighted sound

recordings. See Compl. ¶ 11. The copyrighted recordings at issue include the twelve specific

recordings listed in Exhibit A of the complaint as well as some unidentified recordings listed in

Exhibit B of the complaint. See id. & Exs. A-B. Among the exclusive rights granted to each

Plaintiff are the exclusive rights to reproduce these copyrighted recordings and to distribute them to

the public. See id. ¶ 12. According to Plaintiffs, Mr. Barrera violated these rights by using and

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continuing to use, without the permission or consent of Plaintiffs, an online media distribution

system to download the copyrighted recordings, to distribute them to the public, and/or to make

them available for distribution to others. See id. ¶ 13. Plaintiffs have submitted a declaration

providing details on how Plaintiffs uncovered the copyright violation by Mr. Barrera. More

specifically, in August 2005, an investigator for Plaintiffs detected an individual using the KaZaA

online media distribution system over a peer-to-peer file sharing network. See Kerr Decl. ¶ 3. The

individual had 731 music files on his computer and was distributing the files to others. See id.

Based on the IP address used by the individual, Plaintiffs determined that Mr. Barrera was the

copyright violator. See id. ¶¶ 3-7. In the prayer for relief, Plaintiffs ask for statutory damages for

each infringement of each copyrighted recording, attorney’s fees and costs, and an injunction. See

Compl. ¶¶ 16-17.

Plaintiffs served the summons and complaint on Mr. Barrera on December 6, 2006. See

Docket Nos. 5, 10; Kerr Decl., Ex. 2. After Mr. Barrera failed to respond to the complaint, Plaintiffs

sought entry of default. Default was entered by the Clerk of the Court on January 17, 2007. See

Docket No. 8. Subsequently, Plaintiffs filed this motion for default judgment. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Service of Process

To grant or deny a default judgment, a court must first “assess the adequacy of the service of

process on the party against whom default is requested.” Board of Trustees of the N. Cal. Sheet

Metal Workers v. Peters, No. C-00-0395 VRW, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19065, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan.

2, 2001). In this case, Plaintiffs served the summons and complaint on Mr. Barrera by personal

delivery. See Docket Nos. 5, 10; Kerr Decl., Ex. 2. Service by such means complied with Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(2). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2) (allowing for service on an individual

“by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally”). 

Consequently, the Court concludes that service of process on Mr. Barrera was proper.

B. Default Judgment and Eitel Factors

After entry of a default, a court may grant a default judgment on the merits of the case. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. A default judgment may not be entered, however, against an infant or

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incompetent person unless represented in the action by a general guardian or other such

representative who has appeared. See id. Furthermore, a default judgment may not be entered

against an individual in military service until after the court appoints an attorney to represent the

defendant. See 50 U.S.C. App. § 521. In the instant case, Plaintiffs have provided sufficient

evidence demonstrating that Mr. Barrera is not an infant, incompetent person, or a person in military

service. See Kerr Decl. ¶ 15 & Ex. 2. Accordingly, the Court may consider whether a default

judgment may be entered against Mr. Barrera.

“The district court’s decision whether to enter a default judgment is a discretionary one.” 

Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). Factors that a court may consider in

exercising that discretion include: 

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of

plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4)

the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute

concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to

excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. 

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). Upon entry of default, the factual

allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint will be taken as true, except for those relating to the amount

of damages. See TeleVideo Systems, Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987).

The Court concludes that the Eitel factors weigh in favor of granting Plaintiffs default

judgment. First, Plaintiffs would be prejudiced if default judgment were not granted because they

would be denied the right to judicial resolution of their claims and would likely be without other

recourse for recovery. See Pepsico, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal.

2002) (“If Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment is not granted, Plaintiffs will likely be without

other recourse for recovery.”). Furthermore, without entry of default judgment, there could be no

injunctive relief and Mr. Barrera’s infringements could continue. As discussed below, given the

copyrights at issue and alleged violations, Plaintiffs presumptively will suffer irreparable injury if

violations by Mr. Barrera are not enjoined.

Second, Plaintiffs have adequately stated a claim for copyright infringement. See Philip

Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 500 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (noting that the

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second and third Eitel factors “require that a plaintiff state a claim on which the [plaintiff] may

record”). To establish a prima facie case of direct infringement, a plaintiff must show (1) ownership

of the allegedly infringed material and (2) the defendant’s violation of at least one exclusive right

granted to the copyright holder under 17 U.S.C. § 106. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239

F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiffs have satisfied both elements. In their complaint, they

allege that they are the copyright owners or licensees of the copyrighted recordings See Compl. ¶

11; see also 17 U.S.C. § 201(a), (d)(2) (noting that “[c]opyright in a work protected under this title

vests initially in the author or authors of the work” and that “[a]ny of the exclusive rights comprised

in a copyright . . . may be transferred . . . and owned separately”). They also allege that, without the

permission or consent of Plaintiffs, Mr. Barrera used an online media distribution system to

download the recordings and distribute them to the public or make them available for distribution to

others. See Compl. ¶ 13; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (noting that the owner of the copyright has the

exclusive rights to, inter alia, reproduce the copyrighted work and distribute copies of the

copyrighted work).

Third, the sum of money at stake in the action is not completely disproportionate or

inappropriate. Plaintiffs seek to recover only the minimum amount of statutory damages under 17

U.S.C. § 504(c), plus costs.

Fourth, the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts is unlikely. Mr. Barrera has

failed to respond to the complaint and, because default has been entered, all well pled allegations in

the complaint, except for those relating to damages, are taken as true. 

Fifth, it is also unlikely that Mr. Barrera’s default is a result of excusable neglect. Notably,

Plaintiffs served not only the complaint on Mr. Barrera but also the Clerk’s entry of default, see

Docket No. 9, their motion for default judgment, see Docket No. 13, and their ex parte application to

continue the case management conference because of the motion for default judgment. See Docket

No. 15. In spite of this service, Mr. Barrera still has not responded to Plaintiffs’ complaint or

otherwise made an appearance in this Court. Moreover, prior to filing the complaint, counsel for

Plaintiffs sent a letter to Mr. Barrera, advising him that he had infringed Plaintiffs’ copyrights and

providing him with contact information for Plaintiffs’ representatives so that the matter could be

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 Where a plaintiff can establish willful infringement, a court may award as much as $150,000

in statutory damages. Where a defendant can establish innocent infringement, a court may reduce the

statutory damages award to$ 200. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). The allegations and evidence submitted

by Plaintiffs are sufficient to establish willful infringement.

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resolved before litigation commenced. See Kerr Decl. ¶ 8. Mr. Barrera failed to respond to that

letter. See id. ¶ 9. Similarly, before Plaintiffs even moved for entry of default, they sent a letter to

Mr. Barrera, informing him that he was in default and asking him to respond to the complaint or

contact Plaintiffs about a settlement. See id. ¶ 12. Again, it appears that no response was given.

Finally, while policy favors judgments on the merits, should a defendant fail to answer or

appear, a decision on the merits is “impractical, if not impossible.” Elektra Entm’t Group, Inc. v.

Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 393 (C.D. Cal. 2005). Accordingly, this factor, though it counsels

against a default judgment, does not preclude such a judgment.

Considering all of the Eitel factors above, the Court finds that, on balance, they weigh in

favor of granting Plaintiffs’ motion for entry of default judgment. Accordingly, the Court

recommends that Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment be granted.

C. Damages and Injunctive Relief

Having concluded that a default judgment is appropriate, the Court now turns to the issue of

damages and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs have the burden of proving up their damages. See Board of

Trustees of Pipe Trades Dist. Council No. 36 v. Drexal Power, Inc., No. C 04-0630 BZ, 2004 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 15657, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2004). 

1. Statutory Damages

Plaintiffs argue first that they should be awarded statutory damages pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §

504(c)(1). Under this statute, a “copyright owner may elect, at any time before judgment is

rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, any award of statutory damages for all

infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work . . . in the sum of not less than

$750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just.”1

 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). Plaintiffs seek the

minimum award of $750 for Mr. Barrera’s infringement of each of the twelve copyrighted

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 Plaintiffs apparently do not seek damages for any of the copyrighted recordings listed in

Exhibit B.

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recordings listed in Exhibit A, attached to Plaintiffs’ complaint.2

 The total statutory damages award

requested is therefore $9,000 (i.e., $750 x 12). The Court recommends that Plaintiffs be awarded

this sum. These damages are reasonable and appropriate given the finding that at least twelve of the

copyrighted recordings were illegally downloaded and distributed and the need to deter Mr. Barrera

and others from violating Plaintiffs’ rights in the future. See, e.g., Arista Records LLC v. Billops,

No. CIV S-06-0873 MCE EFB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10546, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2007)

(recommending that plaintiffs be awarded the minimum statutory damages award of $750 for each

act of infringement); Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. Malacara, No. 1:06-cv-00630-OWW-SMS,

2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13421, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2007) (same); Warner Bros. Records, Inc.

v. Brown, No. C-06-0406 RMW (N.D. Cal. July 7, 2006) (ordering that plaintiffs be awarded the

minimum statutory damages of $750 for each act of infringement); Interscope Records v. Bloom,

No. C-05-2586 SI (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2006) (same); Priority Records v. Marinaro, No. C-05-1748

JSW (EMC) (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2006) (same).

2. Costs

Plaintiffs further argue that they should be awarded certain costs as part of the default

judgment. Under 17 U.S.C. § 505, a court has discretion to award the recovery of full costs. Here,

Plaintiffs ask only for costs associated with bringing the litigation, more specifically, the cost of

filing fees ($350) and service of process fees ($70), for a total of $420. See Kerr Decl. ¶ 16. 

Because this is a reasonable request, the Court recommends that these costs be awarded.

3. Injunctive Relief

Finally, Plaintiffs ask for injunctive relief to enjoin Mr. Barrera’s wrongful conduct. 

Plaintiffs ask that the following injunction be issued: 

Defendant shall be and hereby is enjoined from directly or indirectly

infringing Plaintiff’s rights under federal or state law in the

Copyrighted Recordings and any sound recording, whether now in

existence or later created, that is owned or controlled by Plaintiffs (or

any parent, subsidiary, or affiliate record label of Plaintiffs)

(“Plaintiffs’ Recordings”), including without limitation by using the

Internet or any online media distribution system to reproduce (i.e.,

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download) any of Plaintiffs’ Recordings, to distribute (i.e., upload)

any of Plaintiffs’ Recordings, or to make any of Plaintiffs’ Recordings

available for distribution to the public, except pursuant to a lawful

license or with the express authority of Plaintiffs. Defendant also shall

destroy all copies of Plaintiffs’ Recordings that Defendant has

downloaded onto any computer hard drive or server without Plaintiffs’

authorization and shall destroy all copies of those downloaded

recordings transferred onto any physical medium or device in

Defendant’s possession, custody or control.

See Compl. at 4.

The Copyright Act authorizes a court to grant an injunction “on such terms as it may deem

reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 502(a). There are four

factors that must be considered in determining whether an injunction should be issued: (1)

irreparable harm; (2) success on the merits; (3) a balancing of competing claims of injury to the

parties; and (4) consideration of the public interest. See Sony Music Entm’t, Inc. v. Global Arts

Prod., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1347 (S.D. Fla. 1999). “Injunctive relief is a traditional remedy for

copyright infringement and is especially favored where there is a history of continuing infringement

and a substantial threat of continued infringement. In such cases, a district court ought not only to

issue a broad permanent injunction protecting present works, but can protect works not yet created.” 

Id.

Based on the four factors above, the Court recommends that an injunction be issued. First,

irreparable harm is presumed in copyright infringement cases based on a showing of success on the

merits. See Elektra Entm’t Group, Inc. v. Bryant, No. CV 03-6381GAF (JTLx), 2004 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 26700, at *17 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2004). Given the default on the merits, Plaintiffs have

established success on the merits and, accordingly, irreparable harm is presumed. See id. at *17-18;

see also Priority Records LLC v. Rodriguez, No. CV F 06-0484 AWI LJO, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

2231, at *16 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2007) (“[U]pon entry of default against a defendant, a plaintiff need

not show irreparable harm in that default satisfies the element of success on the merits.”).

Furthermore, there is sufficient evidence that Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury if Mr.

Barrera is not enjoined. Mr. Barrera’s infringement has consisted of using an online media

distribution to illegally download copyrighted recordings and then distribute them to the public or

make them available for distribution to others. This type of infringement subjects Plaintiffs to

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“massive, repeated, and worldwide infringement” of their copyrighted recordings. Twentieth

Century Fox Film Corp. v. Streeter, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1073 (D. Az. 2006). As explained by one

court: “When digital works are distributed via the internet, . . . every downloader who receives one

of the copyrighted works from Defendant is in turn capable of also transmitting perfect copies of the

works. Accordingly, the process is potentially exponential rather than linear, threatening virtually

unstoppable infringement of the copyright.” Id.

Second, the Court cannot discern any harm to Mr. Barrera that would outweigh the harm to

Plaintiffs if an injunction were issued. Indeed, there is no obvious injury if Mr. Barrera is only

enjoined from unlawfully reproducing, distributing, or making available for distribution copyrighted

recordings.

Finally, the public interest weighs in favor of an injunction. The public has an interest in

ensuring that a party’s intellectual property rights are protected. See Autoskill Inc. v. National Educ.

Support Sys., Inc. 994 F. 2d 1476, 1499 (10th Cir. 1993) (explaining that “this factor normally

weighs in favor of the issuance of an injunction because the public interest is the interest in

upholding copyright protections”). Moreover, record piracy reportedly impacts the industry

worldwide, and may prevent companies from taking a risk on records in the future “ as piracy may

keep record companies from reaping the financial awards ordinarily connected with risk-taking.” 

Sony Music Entm’t, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1348.

Accordingly, the Court recommends that an injunction be issued; the only question

remaining is whether the terms of the injunction proposed by Plaintiffs are appropriate. The Court

finds that most of the terms are reasonable. For example, even though the injunction broadly seeks

protection of not only existing copyrighted works but also future copyrighted works, courts have

held that “[t]he weight of authority supports the extension of injunctive relief to future works.” 

Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Serv., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1392 (6th Cir. 1999). An

injunction of this scope is especially appropriate in light of the particular nature of the infringement

by Mr. Barrera, as described above. Cf. Priority Records, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2231, at *20

(noting that, where “there has been a history of continuing infringement, and a significant threat of

future infringement remains, a court ‘is well within its equitable powers to enjoin infringement of

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 The Court acknowledges that other judges, both in and outside this District, have approved

injunctions using the exact language proposed by Plaintiffs.

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future registered works”). Similarly, even though the injunction broadly seeks protection of any of

Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works, and not just the copyrighted works identified in Plaintiffs’ complaint,

courts have also permitted such relief. See, e.g., Sony Music Entm’t, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1347-48. Cf.

Pacific & Southern Co., Inc. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1499 n.17 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting that

district court had the power to issue an injunction against infringement of works not yet created

“because the statute provides for injunctions to prevent infringement of ‘a copyright’ (emphasis

added), not necessarily the registered copyright that gave rise to the infringement action”).

The Court, however, finds that some of the proposed injunction’s terms are overbroad.3

First, Plaintiffs ask that the injunction bar Mr. Barrera from violating either federal or state law. 

However, in their complaint, Plaintiffs implicate only federal law. See Malacara, 2007 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 13421, at *20 (noting that “the sole subject of the complaint and this action is infringement

of rights created by the Copyright Act, not any other federal or state law”).

Second, the proposed injunction “would enjoin infringement not only of copyrighted sound

recordings, but also of any sound recording owned or controlled by Plaintiffs; thus, it would include

recordings that are not copyrighted. This exceeds the scope of infringement, which was limited to

copyrighted works.” Id.; see also Compl. ¶ 12 (alleging infringement of copyrighted recordings

only); 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (authorizing a court to issue an injunction “on such terms as it may deem

reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright”).

Finally, in the proposed injunction, Mr. Barrera would be enjoined from infringement not

only of recordings copyrighted by Plaintiffs, but also those recordings owned or controlled by any

parent, subsidiary, or affiliate record label of Plaintiffs. “Such a provision does not give reasonable

notice of what conduct would be included within the scope of the injunction because a reasonable

person would not know what entities or operations constitute parents, subsidiaries, or affiliate record

labels of infringement. This aspect of the injunction would also be unclear and would also exceed

the scope of the infringement.” Warner Bros., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13421, at *20. 

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For the above-mentioned reasons, this Court recommends that a permanent injunction be

issued which enjoins Mr. Barrera from violating federal law by unlawfully reproducing, distributing,

or making available for distribution any present and future copyrighted recordings owned by

Plaintiffs. The scope of the injunction may be expanded to include Plaintiffs parents, subsidiaries,

or affiliates but only if Plaintiffs identify those entities and supply evidence establishing their

relationship with Plaintiffs. If Plaintiffs decide to provide such evidence, they must do so within a

week of the issuance of this report and recommendation. The undersigned shall evaluate the

evidence and thereafter make a supplemental report and recommendation to the presiding district

judge.

III. RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends that Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment

be granted and that Plaintiffs be awarded $9,000 in statutory damages and $420 in costs. 

Additionally, injunctive relief as described above should be issued.

Dated: March 29, 2007

 EDWARD M. CHEN

United States Magistrate Judge

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