Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02791/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02791-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

PACIFIC MERCHANT SHIPPING

ASSOCIATION, a California Mutual

Benefit Corporation,

NO. CIV. S-06-2791 WBS KJM

Plaintiff,

v.

ORDER RE: MOTIONS TO INTERVENE

CATHERINE E. WITHERSPOON, in

her official capacity as 

Executive Officer of the 

California Air Resources Board, 

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Pacific Merchant Shipping Association

(“PMSA”) brought this suit to enjoin the adoption and enforcement

of 13 C.C.R. § 2299.1 and 17 C.C.R. § 93118, and to obtain a

declaration that those regulations are preempted by federal law

and/or unconstitutional. 

Plaintiff elected to bring this suit only against

defendant Witherspoon, in her capicity as Executive Officer of

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The NRDC and CCA filed a single motion jointly, and 1

will therefore be referred to jointly as NRDC/CCA.

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the California Air Resources Board (“CARB”), which has adopted

and has the responsibility of enforcing the assailed regulations. 

Plaintiff seeks no relief from the Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc. (“NRDC”), the Coalition for Clean Air, Inc.

(“CCA”) ; the South Coast Air Quality Management District 1

(“SCAQMD”); or the City of Long Beach (“Long Beach”). Indeed, it

would be difficult to construe the complaint as drafted to even

state a claim upon which relief could be granted as against any

of those parties. Nevertheless, each of those parties now seek

to also be sued in this action.

Plaintiff bases this suit on four claims: 1) preemption

by Title II of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521 et seq.; 2)

preemption by the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et

seq.; 3) preemption by the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, 46

U.S.C. §§ 3701 et seq.; and 4) violation of the Commerce Clause

of the United States Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3. 

(Compl.) 

A party may intervene as a matter of right if the party

seeking to intervene can demonstrate that “(1) it has a

‘significant protectable interest’ relating to the property or

transaction that is the subject of the action; (2) the

disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or

impede the applicant’s ability to protect its interest; (3) the

application is timely; and (4) the existing parties may not

adequately represent the applicant’s interest.” Donnelly v.

Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 409 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Cabazon Band

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of Mission Indians v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1050, 1061 (9th Cir.

1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 926 (1998)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). 

Alternatively, permissive intervention may be granted under Rule

24(b) when: (1) there is an independent ground for jurisdiction;

(2) the motion to intervene is timely; and (3) the movant’s claim

or defense and the main action have “a question of law and fact

in common.” Venegas v. Skaggs, 867 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir.

1989); Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). Ultimately, in determining whether

intervention is appropriate, courts are to be “guided primarily

by practical and equitable considerations.” Donnelly, 159 F.3d

409; United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 826 (9th Cir.

1986). 

All three proposed intervenors have highlighted for the

court specific ways in which their interests diverge from CARB’s. 

Cf. Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 820

(9th Cir. 2001) (remarking that courts should “take all wellpleaded nonconclusory allegations in the motion to intervene . .

. as true absent sham, frivolity or other objections”). See also

Forest Conservation Council v. United States Forest Serv., 66

F.3d 1489, 1490 (9th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, the court will

grant all three motions. See United States v. Washington, 86

F.3d 1499, 1503 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that courts should

“generally interpret the requirements broadly in favor of

intervention”). 

The court would have allowed movants to participate as

amicus curiae, but they each stated that was insufficient and

they preferred to be sued as defendants. The court will consider

their request to be joined as defendants as a waiver of any

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subsequent claim that they are improperly named as defendants in

this case. By becoming defendants, they submit themselves to the

jurisdiction of this court and become bound by all of its orders

and any final judgment that may be entered against them.

Allowing the movants to intervene does not, however,

expand the issues or scope this suit. Plaintiff’s concern that

allowing the proposed intervenors into the case will result in

burdensome discovery or delay the progress of the case can be

handled by objections to discovery requests which are unduly

burdensome or fall outside the scope of the issues in this case. 

To facilitate the parties’ efforts to keep the discovery and

pretrial procedures in tow, the court will implement the

following special abbreviated procedure for all discovery motions

in this case.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motions to intervene

filed by the NRDC/CCA, SCAQMD, and the City of Long Beach be, and

the same hereby are, GRANTED. Each of said parties is now joined

as a defendant in this action for all purposes. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, notwithstanding the local

rules, all discovery motions in this case shall be noticed for

hearing on five court days notice before the undersigned judge. 

The provisions of Local Rule 37-251 shall not apply. All such

motions shall be no more than five pages in length. Such motions

may be noticed for hearing at 8:30 a.m. on any court day except

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Mondays. All opposition to such motions shall be oral.

DATED: April 3, 2007

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