Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02458/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02458-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

TAJHIKEEM WOODS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

RODDRICK, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:14-cv-2458 MCE AC P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

I. Introduction 

Plaintiff is a state prisoner under the authority of the California Department of Corrections 

and Rehabilitation (CDCR) who proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil rights action 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging the conduct of correctional officials at High Desert State 

Prison (HDSP). Several matters are before the court: screening of plaintiff’s original and 

amended complaints pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and review of plaintiff’s requests for 

extraordinary relief. For the reasons that follow, this court recommends dismissal of this case 

without prejudice and denial of plaintiff’s requests for extraordinary relief as moot. 

II. Background 

By order filed December 29, 2014, this court found that plaintiff’s original complaint, 

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filed October 13, 2014,1 ECF No. 1, stated potentially cognizable claims against defendant 

Correctional Officer Roddrick for excessive force and retaliation, but failed to state cognizable 

claims against the other named defendants, Correctional Sergeant Arnold and Correctional 

Captain Hale. See ECF No. 11. Plaintiff was accorded the option of proceeding on his original 

complaint against defendant Roddrick or filing an amended complaint. 

Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (FAC) on January 19, 2015, naming 

defendants Roddrick, Arnold and Hale, as well as J. Ramsey, D. Davidge, T. Jackson, J. Sanchez, 

J. Mason, “et al.” ECF No. 15 at 1. In separate filings, plaintiff requested that this court direct 

prison officials to stop retaliating against him for utilizing the prison grievance system, allegedly 

by interfering with plaintiff’s access to food, legal materials, legal mail and the law library, and 

by threatening plaintiff with harm. See ECF Nos. 14, 16-7. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a notice of 

change of address, from HDSP to the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (CSATF) in 

Corcoran, indicating that he was transferred on February 26 and 27, 2015. See ECF Nos. 18-9. 

 On June 12, 2015, this court recommended dismissal of this action without prejudice 

because it appeared clear from both plaintiff’s original complaint and FAC that he had failed to 

exhaust his administrative remedies on his claims before commencing this action. See ECF No. 

20. The court also recommended that plaintiff’s requests for extraordinary relief be denied as 

moot, due to his transfer from HDSP to CSATF. Id. Plaintiff filed objections in which he 

requested, inter alia, that the court undertake substantive review of this case without requiring the 

exhaustion of administrative remedies which plaintiff asserted were unavailable due to the alleged 

misconduct of prison officials. See ECF No. 23. 

 Following the district judge’s adoption of the undersigned’s findings and 

recommendations, and the dismissal of this case without prejudice, see ECF Nos. 24, 25, plaintiff 

filed a motion for protective order and notice that he had again been moved, this time to the 

 

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 Unless otherwise noted, petitioner’s filing dates referenced herein are based on the prison 

mailbox rule, pursuant to which a document is deemed served or filed on the date a prisoner signs 

the document (or signs the proof of service, if later) and gives it to prison officials for mailing. 

See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988) (establishing prison mailbox rule); Campbell v. Henry, 

614 F.3d 1056, 1059 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying the mailbox rule to both state and federal filings 

by prisoners). 

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California Health Care Facility (CHCF) in Stockton, see ECF Nos. 27-6. Plaintiff informed the 

court that he had attempted suicide on July 30, 2015 (during the period between the undersigned’s 

findings and recommendations and the district judge’s order adopting those findings and 

recommendations), due to “verbal/mental abuse” by correctional staff and alleged physical abuse 

resulting in an untreated foot injury. See ECF No. 27. 

 In an abundance of caution, the undersigned recommended that this case be reopened to 

reconsider the merits of plaintiff’s FAC and to request that the Office of the California Attorney 

General (AG) investigate plaintiff’s allegations concerning his conditions of confinement; the 

district judge agreed. See ECF Nos. 28, 32. This court asked the AG to contact CHCF 

authorities and file a status report. See ECF No. 28. On October 2, 2015, Deputy Attorney 

General (DAG) Martha Ehlenbach specially appeared to file a status report, which included the 

declarations of plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. K. Yusufzie, M.D., and treating psychiatrist, Dr. 

J. Johnson, M.D. See ECF No. 29. These declarations and the AG’s status report indicate that 

plaintiff was then receiving regular mental and physical health evaluations and treatment, 

including an x-ray of his right foot to assess his allegedly untreated injury; that he was regularly 

receiving pain and psychotropic medications; and that plaintiff was not then exhibiting suicidal 

thoughts or behavior. Id. 

 Plaintiff filed objections to the DAG’s status report and supporting declarations, and to the 

undersigned’s most recent order and findings and recommendations. See ECF No. 30, 33. 

Plaintiff also filed a “motion for court order,” seeking an order of this court directing staff at 

CHCF to stop retaliating against him; to provide plaintiff with his legal property; to adequately 

treat plaintiff’s right foot; and to give plaintiff access to the law library and legal supplies. See 

ECF No. 31. 

Thereafter, plaintiff notified the court that he had again been transferred, this time to Kern 

Valley State Prison (KVSP). See ECF No. 34. On January 4, 2016, plaintiff filed another motion 

for protective order, wherein he alleged that KVSP staff were “maliciously using the petitioner’s 

mental health treatment as a tool to mentally tourture (sic) petitioner, for the very purpose of 

causing harm.” ECF No. 35. That motion seeks a court order directing KVSP correctional 

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officials to provide food when plaintiff is administered his psychotropic medication (Geodon), to 

alleviate side effects of stomach cramping and severe headaches. Id. 

The following week, plaintiff informed the court that he had been moved to Salinas Valley 

State Prison (SVSP). ECF No. 36. On June 23, 2016, plaintiff informed the court that he had 

been moved to California State Prison-Los Angeles County (CSP-LAC), with an anticipated 

transfer to Folsom State Prison or to the CSP-LAC Enhanced Outpatient Program Yard. ECF No. 

37. On July 29, 2016, plaintiff informed the court that he is again incarcerated at CHCF, and 

“admitted to the Department of State Hospital Stockton due to a suicide attempt.” ECF No. 38. 

Review of CDCR’s Inmate Locator website2 indicates that plaintiff, now age 26, currently 

remains incarcerated at CHCF. 

 To summarize, since commencing this action plaintiff has been transferred from HDSP to 

CSATF, to CHCF, to KVSP, to SVSP, to CSP-LAC, and back to CHCF, where plaintiff is 

presently incarcerated. Outstanding are three motions for intervention and/or preliminary 

injunctive relief at three of these locations, each including new allegations against newly-named 

correctional officials: (1) a “motion for protective order,” challenging matters at CSATF, which 

was addressed by the AG’s status report and supporting declarations, ECF No. 27; (2) a “motion 

for court order,” challenging matters at CHCF, ECF No. 31; and (3) a “motion for order of 

protection,” challenging matters at KVSP, ECF No. 35. 

 III. Screening and Administrative Exhaustion 

 A. Legal Standards 

This court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). This court “shall” dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised 

 

2

 See http://inmatelocator.cdcr.ca.gov/ (Inmate Locator website operated by the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation). This Court may take judicial notice of facts that 

are capable of accurate determination by sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201; see also City of Sausalito v. O'Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1224 n.2 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (“We may take judicial notice of a record of a state agency not subject to reasonable 

dispute.”). 

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claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(b). This court must construe pro se pleadings liberally, and must accord the 

plaintiff leave to amend unless it is clear that amendment could not cure the deficiencies in the 

complaint. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000). 

“The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) mandates that an inmate exhaust 

‘such administrative remedies as are available’ before bringing suit to challenge prison 

conditions.” Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1854-55 (June 6, 2016) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 

1997e(a)). “There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA[.]” Jones v. 

Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007) (citation omitted) (cited with approval in Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 

1856). The exhaustion requirement is based on the important policy concern that prison officials 

should have “an opportunity to resolve disputes concerning the exercise of their responsibilities 

before being haled into court.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 204. The “exhaustion requirement does not 

allow a prisoner to file a complaint addressing non-exhausted claims.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 

F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002) (per 

curiam) (“a prisoner does not comply with [the exhaustion] requirement by exhausting available 

remedies during the course of the litigation”). 

Regardless of the relief sought, a prisoner must pursue an appeal through all levels of a 

prison’s grievance process as long as some remedy remains available. “The obligation to exhaust 

‘available’ remedies persists as long as some remedy remains ‘available.’ Once that is no longer 

the case, then there are no ‘remedies . . . available,’ and the prisoner need not further pursue the 

grievance.” Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 935 (9th Cir. 2005) (original emphasis) (citing Booth 

v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)). “The only limit to § 1997e(a)’s mandate is the one baked 

into its text: An inmate need exhaust only such administrative remedies as are ‘available.’” 

Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1862. 

Thus, “an inmate is required to exhaust those, but only those, grievance procedures that 

are ‘capable of use’ to obtain ‘some relief for the action complained of.’” Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 

1859 (quoting Booth, 532 U.S. at 738). The Supreme Court has clarified that there are only 

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“three kinds of circumstances in which an administrative remedy, although officially on the 

books, is not capable of use to obtain relief.” Ross, at 1859. These circumstances are as follows: 

(1) the “administrative procedure . . . operates as a simple dead end – with officers unable or 

consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates;” (2) the “administrative scheme 

. . . [is] so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use . . . so that no ordinary 

prisoner can make sense of what it demands;” and (3) “prison administrators thwart inmates from 

taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” 

Id. at 1859-60 (citations omitted). Other than these circumstances demonstrating the 

unavailability of an administrative remedy, the mandatory language of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) 

“foreclose[es] judicial discretion,” which “means a court may not excuse a failure to exhaust, 

even to take [special] circumstances into account.” Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1856-57. 

Within the Ninth Circuit, dismissal of a prisoner civil rights action for failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies must generally be decided pursuant to a motion for summary judgment 

under Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(en banc). The only exception is “[i]n the rare event that a failure to exhaust is clear on the face 

of the complaint.” Id. at 1166 (authorizing defendant to move for dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b)(6)); see also Jones, 549 at 215 (exhaustion is not a pleading requirement but an 

affirmative defense that, if apparent on the face of the complaint, may support dismissal); Wyatt 

v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A prisoner’s concession to nonexhaustion is a 

valid ground for dismissal, so long as no exception to exhaustion applies.”), overruled on other 

grounds by Albino, supra, 747 F.3d at 1166; Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 

2006) (“Because Vaden did not exhaust his administrative remedies prior to sending his 

complaint to the district court, the district court must dismiss his suit without prejudice.”) (citing 

Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120). 

Even after Albino, when it is clear from the face of the complaint and any attached 

exhibits that a plaintiff did not exhaust his available administrative remedies before commencing 

an action, the action may be dismissed on screening for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(b)(1) (upon screening, “the court shall . . . dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the 

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complaint, if the complaint (1) . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted”); 42 

U.S.C. § 1997e (c)(2) (“In the event that a claim [] on its face . . . fails to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted, . . . the court may dismiss the underlying claim without first requiring the 

exhaustion of administrative remedies.”); see also Sorce v. Garikpaetiti, 2014 WL 2506213, at *3, 

2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76431, at *8 (S.D. Cal. May 30, 2014) (“based on Plaintiff’s concession 

of nonexhaustion, which is clear and unequivocal on the face of his Complaint, the Court finds 

Plaintiff’s case must be dismissed [on screening] for failing to state a claim upon which any relief 

may be granted”) (citations omitted); Young v. Unnamed, Secretary of CDCR, 2014 WL 

5176386, at*4, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146472, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2014) (on screening and 

“based on Plaintiff’s concession of nonexhaustion, which is clear and unequivocal on the face of 

his Complaint, the Court finds that even if Plaintiff had sufficiently alleged an Eighth 

Amendment claim against the Secretary, his Complaint would still be subject to dismissal . . . for 

failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”) (citations omitted); Lucas v. Director of 

Dept. of Corrections, 2015 WL 1014037, at*4, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27957, at *9 (E.D. Cal. 

Mar. 5, 2015) (on screening plaintiff’s FAC, in which plaintiff conceded that he had not 

exhausted his administrative remedies before he commenced the action, the court found that 

plaintiff’s “attempt to initiate federal litigation prior to his full administrative exhaustion requires 

dismissal of this civil action without prejudice to plaintiff’s bringing of his now exhausted claims 

in a new civil action”) (citations omitted); Eha v. California Institute for Men, 2015 WL 8664155, 

at *3, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27957, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2015) (“Plaintiff’s ‘concession to 

nonexhaustion’ in his Complaint and in his First Amended Complaint warrants dismissal at the 

pleading stage.”) (citations omitted); Morehead v. Kern Valley State Prison, 2016 WL 3136034, 

at *2, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72234, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 2, 2016) (dismissing FAC on 

screening on the ground that,“[w]hile the Court typically grants leave to amend in a pro se cases 

(sic), Plaintiff’s clearly conceded failure to exhaust cannot be cured by the allegation of additional 

facts.”). 

 B. Pleadings and Grievances 

Both plaintiff’s original complaint and FAC challenge defendant Roddrick’s alleged use 

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of excessive force on August 31, 2014, when he reportedly slammed plaintiff’s hand in his food 

tray slot in retaliation for plaintiff filing a grievance against Roddrick. Additional defendants are 

named based on their alleged failure to adequately respond to the incident. See ECF No. 1 at 4; 

ECF No. 15 at 3. Plaintiff concedes that he did not exhaust his administrative remedies on this 

matter before commencing this action, or before filing the FAC. 

In his original complaint, filed October 13, 2014, plaintiff averred that his administrative 

remedies were then “in the first level.” See ECF No. 1 at 2. The December 2014 order of this 

court, which found cognizable claims against defendant Roddrick, did not address this matter. 

See ECF No. 11. Plaintiff did not assert that the grievance process was unavailable to him, but 

implied that he was afraid to use the process.3 Exhibits to the complaint include plaintiff’s 

administrative grievance submitted August 17, 2014 (Log No. HDSP-C-14-02461), and the First 

Level Response to that grievance issued September 3, 2014. See ECF No. 1 at 9-17. Although 

this grievance includes allegations against defendant Roddrick,4 it is not relevant to the 

allegations and claims asserted against Roddrick in plaintiff’s original and amended complaints. 

Also attached to the original complaint is an October 7, 2014 letter to plaintiff from the 

 

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 Plaintiff explained, ECF No. 1 at 2: 

State Officials are retaliating against me, causing a substantial risk 

upon my well-being and safty (sic). The inmate grievance is in the 

first level and internal affairs is involved with the investigation but 

state officials are threatening inmates that are around me who 

witnessed the facts contained in this complaint. 

Plaintiff also “ask[ed] the courts to force the Prison to Grant a Safe remedy for exhaustion of 

administrative remedies[.]” Id. at 3. 

4

 In this grievance (Log No. HDSP-C-14-02461), plaintiff alleged that on August 17, 2014, he 

“became a victim of retaliation due to me not being able to attend worker yard and worker 

dayroom because I filed a 602 on C/O Mcnott (sic) [MacNaught] regarding me not being able to 

work.” Id. at 14. Plaintiff explained that “Watch, C/O [MacNaught], Irish and Roddrick, didn’t 

allow me to go to worker yard because I 602ed [MacNaught].” Id. at 16. Plaintiff expressed fear 

for his safety and life based on [MacNaught]’s alleged statement that “You’ll regret ever filing a 

602 against me. You must of (sic) forgot that I will be working in the tower.” Id. Plaintiff 

further alleged that these actions were “racist and oppressive” because not directed “to Mexicans 

or the Others.” Id. On August 20, 2014, three days after plaintiff submitted this grievance, the 

Inmate Appeals Office assigned it for First Level Review. ECF No. 1 at 11. The First Level 

Review decision was issued on September 3, 2014. Following an interview with plaintiff, staff 

construed plaintiff’s retaliation claim as limited to MacNaught, and found that CDCR policy had 

not been violated. Id. at 9-10. On September 30, 2014, plaintiff challenged the First Level 

Review decision, asserting in part that he was also challenging the conduct of Roddrick and Irish 

as well as MacNaught. Id. at 15, 17. 

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HDSP Warden, noting plaintiff’s correspondence with the Office of Internal Affairs about another 

grievance he had submitted (Log No. HDSP-C-14-02875), which alleged the use of excessive 

force. (Although not evident in this exhibit to the original complaint, a copy of the grievance is 

attached to the FAC and alleges excessive force by defendant Roddrick based on the August 31, 

2014 incident.) The Warden’s letter indicates that the grievance was then under First Level 

Review. ECF No. 1 at 23; see also id. at 26. The letter documented that, as a result of plaintiff’s 

allegations, “a videotaped Use of Force interview” of plaintiff was held on September 24, 2014, 

and preserved as CDCR 3014 Log No. FF-14-09-0256. Id. at 23. No further information 

concerning this grievance was provided with the original complaint. 

Thus, of the two grievances referenced in plaintiff’s original complaint, only Log No. 

HDSP-C-14-02875 is relevant to the allegations of the complaint, but was then only “in first level 

review.” ECF No. 1 at 2. 

In his FAC, filed January 19, 2015, plaintiff again challenged defendant Roddrick’s 

alleged retaliatory use of excessive force on August 31, 2014, and again stated that he had not 

exhausted his grievances, explaining only: “Prison officials are retaliating against me for filing 

grievances on this matter. The inmate grievance is in the second level at this current moment.” 

ECF No. 15 at 2. 

A copy of plaintiff’s pertinent grievance (Log No. HDSP-C-14-02875) is included in the 

exhibits to the FAC.5

 See ECF No. 15 at 36, 47. The grievance, submitted by plaintiff on 

September 29, 2014, alleges that on August 31, 2014, “C/O Roddrick used excessive force as a 

form of reprisal for filing 602 Log # HDSP-C-14-02461, by slaming (sic) my right hand in the 

tray slot. C/O Roddrick was working 2nd watch picking up breakfast trays, for top tier.” ECF 

No. 15 at 36. The grievance further alleges that Roddrick conceded that his challenged conduct 

was in reprisal against plaintiff for naming Roddrick in a grievance. Id. at 47. The grievance also 

names as defendants Hale, Arnold, Ramsey and Nason. Id. Plaintiff’s requested relief includes 

 

5

 Exhibits to the FAC demonstrate no further exhaustion past the First Level of plaintiff’s 

unrelated grievance alleging retaliation premised on the denial of his access to the worker yard 

and dayroom on August 17, 2014 (Log No. HDSP-C-14-02461). See ECF No. 15 at 17-28. 

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$750,000 damages from Roddrick; $90,000 jointly from Hale, Arnold and Ramsey “for doing 

nothing about the matter;” a discussion with the HDSP Warden; the firing of all responsible 

parties; and transfer of plaintiff to a therapeutic setting. Id. 

On October 6, 2014, a week after plaintiff submitted this grievance, the Inmate Appeals 

Office assigned it for First Level Review. ECF No. 15 at 40. The First Level Review decision, 

issued on October 20, 2014, notes that the investigation of this grievance included interviewing 

plaintiff, correctional officers Roddrick and Nason, Facility C Captain Hale and Sergeant Arnold, 

and an inmate witness identified by plaintiff. The decision concluded that CDCR policy had not 

been violated but nonetheless “partially granted” plaintiff’s grievance on the ground that “the 

Appeal Inquiry is complete, has been reviewed, and all issues were adequately addressed.” Id. at 

38. 

There is no indication in the exhibits to the FAC that this relevant grievance was further 

exhausted past First Level Review. Although additional grievances are included as exhibits to the 

FAC and plaintiff’s requests for extraordinary relief,6 none are relevant to plaintiff’s allegations 

 

6

 The following additional unrelated grievances are included as exhibits to the FAC: $ Log No. HDSP-C-14-03113: On October 14, 2014, plaintiff submitted this grievance 

alleging that C/O Joksch had refused to process plaintiff’s legal mail. See ECF No. 15 at 72-5; 

see also ECF No. 14 at 5-8. The exhibits to the FAC include nothing further regarding plaintiff’s 

pursuit of this grievance. $ Log No. HDSP-C-14-03273: On October 29, 2014, plaintiff submitted this grievance 

alleging that C/O Joksch had twice refused to process plaintiff’s legal mail (specifically, 

plaintiff’s in forma pauperis application). ECF No. 15 at 61-2. On November 12, 2014, two 

weeks after plaintiff submitted this grievance, the Inmate Appeals Office assigned it for First 

Level Review. ECF No. 15 at 69. The FAC includes copies of the First and Second Level 

decisions addressing this grievance. The First Level decision, issued November 26, 2014, 

“partially granted” the grievance to the extent that staff had investigated plaintiff’s allegations 

pursuant to two interviews with plaintiff, and interviews with Joksch and another correctional 

officer, both of whom reported that they had returned plaintiff’s in forma pauperis applications 

with specific instructions how to prepare his correspondence and envelopes for acceptance and 

processing in accordance with departmental policy. Id. A completed in forma pauperis 

application was ultimately mailed out on November 4, 2014. Id. at 62. This grievance was 

referred for Second Level Review on December 11, 2014. ECF No. 15 at 65; see also ECF No. 

14 at 4. The Second Level Review decision, issued January 2, 2015, also “partially granted” the 

grievance based on the fact of reviewing plaintiff’s concerns, and concluded that the investigation 

and conclusion reached in the First Level decision were appropriate. ECF No. 15 at 63-4. The 

exhibits do not include any evidence that this grievance was further exhausted. 

Plaintiff also attached additional grievances to his requests for extraordinary relief. See 

ECF Nos. 14, 27, 35. These include the following: 

$ Log No. HDSP-D-14-03725: On December 24, 2014, plaintiff was informed that this 

grievance was assigned for First Level Review. See ECF No. 14 at 10. No other exhibits in 

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and claims against defendant Roddrick asserted in plaintiff’s original and amended complaints.7 

 C. Analysis 

Review of plaintiff’s original and amended complaints, and exhibits attached thereto, 

demonstrate that plaintiff did not exhaust his claims through HDSP’s administrative grievance 

process before commencing this action. Rather, on September 29, 2014, plaintiff submitted to 

prison authorities his only grievance relevant to the allegations of this action (Log No. HDSP-C14-02875), then filed his complaint two weeks later on October 13, 2014. On October 20, 2014, 

one week after plaintiff filed his complain, his grievance was “partially granted” on First Level 

Review. 

Plaintiff has repeatedly attempted to persuade this court that administrative remedies have 

been unavailable to him due to the ongoing retaliation of prison officials in response to plaintiff’s 

efforts to utilize the grievance system. In his original complaint, despite noting that his 

administrative remedies were “in the first level,” plaintiff stated that he sought a “safe remedy for 

exhaustion.” ECF No. 1 at 2, 3. In his FAC, despite stating that his grievance was “in the second 

 plaintiff’s numerous filings identify the claims that plaintiff pursued in this grievance. 

$ Log No. HDSP-15-00099: On January 5, 2015, plaintiff submitted this grievance 

seeking damages from another inmate who allegedly beat up plaintiff at the behest of prison 

officials, from whom plaintiff also sought damages. Plaintiff requested that the other inmate be 

disciplined, that plaintiff’s own disciplinary ruling (see n.5, infra) be overturned, and that plaintiff 

be transferred to another institution. See ECF No. 27 at 7-10. The First Level Review decision, 

issued February 1, 2015 and based on interviews with plaintiff and six prison officials, concluded 

that no staff had violated CDCR policy. Id. at 11-2. The grievance was “partially granted” on the 

ground that a thorough inquiry of plaintiff’s claims had been conducted. Id. The Second Level 

Review decision, issued March 4, 2015, reached the same conclusion. Id. at 13-5. Plaintiff 

received notification on July 29, 2015 that this grievance had been received for Third Level 

Review, see id. at 6, but the Third Level Review decision is not included in any of plaintiff’s 

exhibits. 

$ Log No. KVSP-HC-15-036736: On November 29, 2015, plaintiff submitted this 

Health Care Appeal, which he designated an emergency, requesting that he be provided an 

“Ensure drink” when administered his antipsychotic medication, Geodone, to reduce the side 

effects of “cramping nauseating stomach ache and dizzy like head-rush.” See ECF No. 35 at 

11-3. The appeal was partially granted on First Level Review based on a decision to switch the 

administration of plaintiff’s medication to dinnertime. Id. at 9. In response, plaintiff withdrew 

his appeal. Id. at 12. 

7

 Exhibits to the FAC include documentation of a Rules Violation Report against plaintiff, 

including a disciplinary finding of guilt to the charge “fighting” with another inmate on 

November 4, 2014. Plaintiff refused to participate in the hearing and was assessed a 90-day 

credit loss and 10-day loss of exercise yard privilege beginning December 5, 2014. See ECF No. 

15 at 42-59; see also ECF No. 27 at 16-21, 23. 

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level at this current moment,” ECF No. 15 at 2, plaintiff sought preliminary injunctive relief to 

“allow the administrative remedies to be made available and exhausted,” and a permanent 

injunction “ordering prison staff to cease their physical violence and threats toward plaintiff 

Woods, to stop the unsafe and harsh condition of his confinement and to allow the petitioner to 

safely utilize the grievance system,” id. at 15. In his objections to the undersigned’s prior 

recommendation that this case be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, 

plaintiff asserted that administrative remedies were unavailable to him due to “the retaliation that 

came with the utilization of the appeal system.” ECF No. 23 at 2. 

The processing of plaintiff’s grievance at the First Level one week after plaintiff filed his 

complaint contradicts plaintiff’s assertion that administrative remedies were unavailable to him 

when he commenced this action. Plaintiff contends that he, like the plaintiff in Rhodes v. 

Robinson, 408 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 2004), was required to abandon the administrative grievance 

process and appeal directly to the district court due to the retaliatory conduct of prison officials. 

See e.g. ECF No. 23 at 4. Plaintiff’s reliance on Rhodes is misplaced. Although the fact is not 

explicitly stated in the cited decision, the Ninth Circuit subsequently noted, in Rhodes v. 

Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 2010) (Rhodes II), that Rhodes had “asserted properly 

exhausted claims in his original complaint.” In the same opinion, the Ninth Circuit again made 

clear that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to commencing suit, Rhodes II, 

621 F.3d at 1004-05: 

McKinney held that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement does not 

allow a prisoner to file a complaint addressing non-exhausted 

claims, even if the prisoner exhausts his administrative remedies 

while his case is pending. See 311 F.3d at 1199. Vaden held that a 

prisoner must exhaust his administrative remedies before he tenders 

his complaint to the district court. See 449 F.3d at 1050. Vaden 

also held that the claims which are exhausted after the complaint 

has been tendered to the district court, but before the district court 

grants him permission to proceed in forma pauperis and files his 

complaint, must be dismissed pursuant to § 1997e. See id. at 1050-

51. Together, these cases stand for the proposition that a prisoner 

must exhaust his administrative remedies for the claims contained 

within his complaint before that complaint is tendered to the district 

court. 

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Although a plaintiff can add new claims that are newly exhausted in an amended 

complaint, the claims asserted in the original complaint (and re-alleged in an amended complaint) 

must have been exhausted when the action was commenced.8 Here, plaintiff’s excessive force 

and retaliation claims against Roddrick (and other officials who allegedly failed to act in response 

to Roddrick’s challenged conduct), asserted in both plaintiff’s original and amended complaints, 

were not administratively exhausted when plaintiff filed his original complaint. 

This court has considered whether the circumstances plaintiff alleges come within any of 

the “three kinds of circumstances in which an administrative remedy, although officially on the 

books, is not capable of use to obtain relief.” Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1859. In light of plaintiff’s 

frequent use of the grievance process, and the decisions rendered in response to his six HDSP 

grievances, including the First Level decision on plaintiff’s pertinent grievance (Log No. HDSPC-14-02875), there appears to be no basis on which to conclude that HDSP’s grievance 

procedures were “opaque” or an effective “dead end,” the first two circumstances identified by 

the Supreme Court to support a finding of unavailability. Id. at 1859-60. 

Nor does plaintiff’s failure to exhaust this grievance prior to commencing this action 

appear to come within the third set of circumstances excusing exhaustion under Ross, viz., when 

“prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through 

machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Ross at 1860. Although plaintiff’s filings 

allege such conduct by prison officials in each of the facilities where he has been incarcerated, 

none of his allegations support an inference that plaintiff was thwarted by official misconduct 

from utilizing HDSP’s grievance process prior to filing his complaint. That plaintiff submitted 

his grievance prior to filing his complaint, so informed the court in his original complaint, then 

received a First Level decision shortly after he filed his complaint, demonstrate just the opposite. 

Moreover, the prison’s investigation into plaintiff’s grievance appears to have addressed at least 

 

8

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barred under McKinney so long as the plaintiff exhausted them prior to filing the amended 

complaint. See Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1005; see also Akhtar v. J. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1210 (9th 

Cir. 2012. Moreover, new claims based on actions that took place before the original complaint 

was filed are not barred under McKinney so long as the plaintiff exhausted them prior to filing the 

amended complaint. See Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1220 (9th Cir. 2014). 

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some of plaintiff’s safety concerns.9 These factors fail to support a reasonable inference that 

prison administrators thwarted plaintiff’s efforts to utilize HDSP’s grievance process prior to 

filing his complaint. Hence, there appears to be no basis on which to conclude that HDSP’s 

grievance procedures were unavailable under any of the circumstances recognized by the 

Supreme Court. Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1859-60. 

The prompt consideration of plaintiff’s relevant grievance on First Level Review, one 

week after plaintiff filed his initial complaint, demonstrates that administrative remedies were 

open and available to plaintiff when he filed his complaint. The possibility that plaintiff’s 

subsequent transfers may have impacted his ability to further exhaust this grievance is not 

material in assessing plaintiff’s options at the time he commenced this action. 

For these reasons, this court finds that plaintiff’s clear concession of nonexhaustion when 

he filed his original and amended complaints, underscored by his exhibits demonstrating the 

availability of administrative remedies when plaintiff commenced this action, require dismissal of 

this action without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 

Albino, 747 F.3d at 1169 (failure to exhaust warrants dismissal without prejudice for failure to 

state a claim). Moreover, under these circumstances, such dismissal is appropriate on screening. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (c)(2); accord Sorce v. Garikpaetiti, 2014 WL 

2506213, at *3, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76431, at *8 (S.D. Cal. May 30, 2014); Young v. 

Unnamed, Secretary of CDCR, 2014 WL 5176386, at*4, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146472, at *8 

(S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2014); Lucas v. Director of Dept. of Corrections, 2015 WL 1014037, at*4, 

2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27957, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2015); Eha v. California Institute for Men, 

2015 WL 8664155, at *3, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27957, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2015); 

//// 

 

9

 HDSP officials promptly undertook an apparently thorough investigation of plaintiff’s claims 

against defendant Roddrick for excessive force and retaliation, and plaintiff’s related claims 

against other HDSP officials, by conducting a videotaped interview of plaintiff premised on his 

allegations of excessive force, and by conducting additional interviews with four prison officials 

and another inmate. When plaintiff was interviewed by Captain Davidge and invited to provide 

“any additional information,” he reportedly stated only, “No, my appeal stands as it is written and 

I don’t have anything else to add.” ECF No. 15 at 37. 

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Morehead v. Kern Valley State Prison, 2016 WL 3136034, at *2, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72234, 

at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 2, 2016). 

 IV. Extraordinary Relief 

 The following motions for intervention and/or preliminary injunctive relief remain 

outstanding: (1) plaintiff’s “motion for protective order,” filed September 20, 2105, challenging 

matters at CSATF, which was addressed by the AG’s status report and supporting declarations, 

ECF No. 27; (2) plaintiff’s “motion for court order,” filed October 7, 2015, challenging matters at 

CHCF, ECF No. 31; and (3) plaintiff’s “motion for order of protection,” filed January 4, 2016, 

challenging matters at KVSP, ECF No. 35. 

 A. Legal Standards 

In cases brought by prisoners involving conditions of confinement, a preliminary 

injunction “must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the 

court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct the 

harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that 

he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the 

public interest.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The 

principal purpose of preliminary injunctive relief is to preserve the court’s power to render a 

meaningful decision on the merits of the case, see 11A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 

Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2947 (2d ed. 2010), that is, to preserve the status quo pending a 

determination on the merits, Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 577 F.3d 1015, 1023 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(citation omitted). An injunction against individuals not parties to an action is strongly 

disfavored. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969). 

 B. Analysis 

Plaintiff’s various requests for extraordinary relief are directed, respectively, to officials at 

CSATF, CHCF and KVSP, while plaintiff’s FAC states claims exclusively against officials at 

HDSP. Significantly, each of plaintiff’s transfers rendered moot his requests for institutionspecific relief at his prior place(s) of incarceration. Moreover, plaintiff’s motions do not conform 

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to the basic requirements noted above, as they seek orders directed to prison officials who are not 

parties to this action, concerning matters unrelated to plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff’s requests for 

access to his legal materials and the law library, better quality mental health care and medical 

treatment, and his efforts to stop the alleged retaliation of various prison officials, required 

administrative exhaustion at the facility in which the alleged conduct occurred. Plaintiff must 

exhaust institution-specific claims through that institution’s administrative grievance process 

before he can proceed in this court with a cognizable civil rights action in which he may then seek 

preliminary injunctive relief. In the absence of a sustainable underlying action, this court is 

without authority to grant extraordinary relief.10 

Accordingly, should the district judge adopt this court’s recommendation that the instant 

case be dismissed without prejudice, this court further recommends that each of plaintiff’s 

requests for extraordinary relief be denied as moot. 

V. Conclusion 

 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

 1. This action be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim on which relief 

may be granted due to plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies before commencing 

this action, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (c)(2); and 

 2. Plaintiff’s requests for extraordinary relief, ECF Nos. 27, 31, 35, be denied as moot. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections 

with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings 

 

10 Notwithstanding the limitations on this court’s ability to substantively review unexhausted 

claims and issue injunctive relief directed at non-parties, the undersigned did (as previously 

noted) direct the AG to inquire into the matters challenged by plaintiff when he was incarcerated 

at CHCF. ECF No. 28. The declarations obtained by the AG from plaintiff’s treating physician 

and psychiatrist indicated that plaintiff was then receiving regular and appropriate mental and 

physical health care. ECF No. 29. In the absence of a cognizable civil rights action, this court is 

without authority to direct the AG to continue to track plaintiff’s care. 

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and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified 

time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 

(9th Cir. 1991). 

DATE: July 28, 2016 

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