Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08067/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08067-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

William Westley Duncan,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-11-8067-PCT-JAT (JFM)

Report and Recommendation

Regarding 

Motion to Stay

Under consideration is Petitioner’s Amended Motion for a Stay and Abeyance, 

filed August 8, 2012 (Doc. 32). Petitioner seeks a stay of consideration of his Petition to 

permit him to exhaust state remedies on additional claims to be added by amendment. 

Respondents responded on September 12, 2012 (Doc. 38), and Petitioner replied on 

September 28, 2012 (Doc. 39). On October 11, 2012, Respondents filed a Surreply 

(Doc. 40). 

Because the matter appears to be outside the referral authority of the magistrate 

judge, see Reynaga v. Cammisa, 971 F.2d 414 (9th Cir. 1992) (magistrate judge had no 

authority to stay case pending exhaustion of state remedies), the undersigned makes the 

following report and recommendation.

Background –Petitioner challenges his conviction for first degree murder and 

sentence to life without possibility of parole, arising out of drug-related murder-for-hire 

in Bullhead City, Arizona. The prosecution sought the death penalty. Petitioner asserted 

defenses of an alibi, and misidentification, but was convicted after a 10 day trial. 

Petitioner proceeded through: (1) an unsuccessful initial direct appeal; (2) a successful 

first petition for post-conviction relief resulting in re-sentencing,; (3) a successful second 

direct appeal/petition for review resulting in a remand for appointment of an investigator 

and further hearings in the PCR proceeding; (4) an unsuccessful continued PCR hearings 

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on remand; and (5) an unsuccessful second petition for review.

Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on April 28, 2011 (Doc. 1). Petitioner’s Petition 

asserts 20 primary grounds for relief, including: Confrontation Clause violations, 

instructional error, prosecutorial misconduct, improper identification procedures, 

improper impeachment, insufficient evidence, improper exclusion of evidence, denial of 

an investigator, nine unique claims of ineffective assistance, improper assistance, and an 

additional claim of ineffective assistance.

Respondents argue in their Answer (Docs. 14, 15, 16, 16, 18, 19, and 20) that the 

claims are either procedurally defaulted, procedurally barred, without merit, or 

duplicative.

Petitioner’s Reply (Doc. 25), filed December 16, 2011, asserts that he is entitled 

to an evidentiary hearing and addresses the substance of the Answer.

Motion - On August 8, 2012, Petitioner filed an Amended Motion to Stay (Doc. 

32), seeking to stay consideration of the Petition to permit him to exhaust state remedies 

on additional claims to be added by amendment or on the basis of the instant motion. 

Petitioner argues the claims are not procedurally defaulted because the ineffectiveness of 

PCR counsel in failing to bring them establishes cause, and because of his actual 

innocence. He asserts newly discovered evidence, a significant change in the law, and 

actual innocence as bases for avoiding the statute of limitations.

The claims to be added are:

(1) Ineffective assistance of trial counsel as a result of: deficient cross 

examination, failure to call codefendant as a witness, failure to call various 

eyewitnesses, failure to request a tire and footprint expert, failure to impeach 

the eyewitness, failure to raise a claim of prosecutorial misconduct/failure to 

disclose, failure to move for a Rule 11 psychiatric exam of Petitioner, Failure 

to request an “aiding and abetting” jury instruction.

(2) Prosecutorial misconduct based on failure to disclose additional letters from 

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co-defendant to Petitioner.

(3) Actual Innocence based upon co-defendant’s confession to the murder.1

Petitioner argues that determining the likelihood of success on his claims requires an 

evidentiary hearing, and thus he requests a hearing be granted. In the alternative, 

Petitioner asks that if a procedural default can be avoided, that this Court address the 

merits of his claims without requiring exhaustion. Petitioner further requests additional 

time to expound upon his new claims.

Finally, Petitioner revealed that he had filed a Notice of Postconviction Relief in 

state court on July 17, 2012, seeking to raise these new issues.

Response - Respondents responded on September 12, 2012 (Doc. 38), arguing in 

a 101 page brief that: (1) even after Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), habeas 

relief is not available for ineffective assistance of PCR counsel; (2) Petitioners new 

ineffective assistance and prosecutorial misconduct claims are untimely under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d); (3) Petitioner’s actual innocence claim is without merit; and (4) Petitioner’s 

efforts to amend should be denied under Fed.R.Civ. Proc. 15(a)(2) because of the delay 

and futility of the amendments.

Reply - Petitioner replied on September 28, 2012 (Doc. 39). Petitioner argues 

inter alia: (1) that he should be granted counsel; (2) the prison received his materials 

from PCR counsel, and he was limited in his ability to possess them, and only had access 

to them for one hour before they were sent to the Arizona Justice Project; (3) that 

Respondent’s counsel had agreed to stipulate to the stay; (4) Petitioner’s PCR notice did 

not contain his legal arguments; (5) under Martinez he can establish cause to excuse his 

procedural defaults based upon the ineffectiveness of PCR counsel; (6) he has shown 

actual innocence to avoid any procedural default; (7) his claims are meritorious; (8) his 

claims are based on newly discovered facts; (9) the claims relate back in time to his 

 

1

In his Reply in support of his Amended Motion to Stay, Petitioner discusses a claim 

asserted in his recent PCR filings alleging that he was improperly sentenced based upon 

pecuniary gain. (Doc. 39 at 17.) Petitioner did not raise such a claim in his Amended 

Motion to Stay, nor does he suggest that it is a federal claim he is asserting and thus 

wishes to raise in this federal habeas proceeding. 

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original Petition; and (10) resolution of his claims requires an evidentiary hearing.

Surreply - On October 11, 2012, Respondents filed an expansive Surreply (Doc. 

40), addressing previously privileged and undisclosed information revealed by Petitioner 

in his Reply (Doc. 39), and arguing that the information further supports Respondents’

assertions that the proposed new claims are untimely and without merit.

Recent Proceedings – On February 8, 2013, Respondents supplemented the 

record (Docs. 45, 46) to provide briefs, orders, etc. from Petitioner’s recent state PCR 

petition. Following briefing by Petitioner and the state, on January 18, 2013, the state 

PCR court denied Petitioner’s petition, finding his claims of ineffective assistance 

precluded, and his claims of newly discovered evidence, actual innocence, and change in 

the law to be without merit. The time for motions for rehearing and petitions for review 

continue to run on that order.

Applicable Law – In the absence of a mixed petition asserting exhausted and 

unexhausted claims, the decision whether to stay proceedings to permit the exhaustion 

and presentation of new claims is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. 

In reviewing a stay of a habeas proceeding, the courts “balance the length of the stay 

against the strength of the justification given for it.” Yong v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d 1116, 1119 

(9th Cir. 2000).

In exercising that discretion, the district court must be mindful of “the clear 

appropriateness of a stay when valid claims would otherwise be forfeited.” Kelly v. 

Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2003).2 

Here the justification urged by Petitioner is his desire to have additional claims 

heard. Arguably, failing to grant a stay would result in the loss of those claims. They 

would be subject to defenses not only under the habeas statute of limitations, but also 

 

2

In Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005), the Supreme Court applied additional 

requirements for a stay of a mixed petition, including a showing of good cause for the 

failure to previously exhaust. In Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2007), the 

Ninth Circuit held that Rhines did not apply to the stay of fully exhausted petitions. In 

King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2009), the Ninth Circuit held that the “good 

cause” requirement in Rhines did not apply to a stay of a fully exhausted petition.

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under the limitations on second and successive petitions, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).

It is true that the guidance given by Kelly only applies to “valid claims,” and 

Respondents go to considerable lengths to argue that the new claims Petitioner seeks to 

add are without merit, either because they are barred by the statute of limitations, or on 

their merits. In addition, the PCR court’s latest ruling indicates that Petitioner’s 

ineffective assistance claims are procedurally defaulted.

Ordinarily, the undersigned would be inclined to simply proceed to dispose of the 

proposed new claims on the merits, deny the motion to stay, and complete review of the 

existing claims. However, in this instance, many of Petitioner existing claims would be 

impacted by the substance of Petitioner’s new claims. At a minimum, those claims 

which would impact this Court’s decision on an actual innocence reply to defenses of 

procedural default, procedural bar on independent and adequate state grounds, and the 

statute of limitations. 

At present, the undersigned presumes that the state proceedings will be pending 

for at least a month, and perhaps significantly longer. If Petitioner seeks further review 

by the state courts (a prerequisite to exhaustion of his state remedies on his new claims), 

then without a stay, this Court would find itself evaluating the procedural and substantive 

merits at the same time as the state courts. Further, to the extent that a procedural bar

might be an issue, it is at least conceivable that the state courts could reverse the PCR 

court’s dismissal of claims on state law grounds.

This presents a second problem to continued consideration of the Petition. In 

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court recognized the “longstanding 

public policy against federal court interference with state court proceedings.” Id. at 43. 

The notion of “comity” includes “a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of 

the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and 

a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and 

their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.”

Id. at 44. Although Younger dealt specifically with the limits on federal courts to enjoin 

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state court proceedings, and no such injunction is currently contemplated here, the 

simultaneous litigation of the same issues in this Court and the state court invites the 

same sort of unseemliness underlying, at least in part, the decision in Younger, e.g. if this 

Court were to grant Petitioner relief.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Amended Motion for 

a Stay and Abeyance, filed August 8, 2012 (Doc. 32) be GRANTED to the extent of the 

relief recommended herein.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that this proceeding be STAYED 

pending completion or expiration of Petitioner’s state court proceedings on his July 17, 

2012 Arizona post-conviction relief petition, and any petitions for review, etc. therefrom.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court enter an Order that:

(1) Petitioner and Respondents shall, within fourteen days of the conclusion of the 

state court proceedings, file with this Court a notice advising the Court of the 

status of the state court proceedings;

(2) Petitioner shall, on or before March 31, 2013, and before the expiration of 

each calendar quarter thereafter, until termination of the stay, file with this 

Court a notice advising the Court of the status of his state court proceedings. 

(3) Petitioner’s failure to timely file such notices will be grounds for dismissal of

this action without further notice.

EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties 

have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to 

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timely file objections to any findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will 

be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will 

constitute a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order 

or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. 

Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: February 8, 2013

11-8067o Order 13 02 08 re RR on MStay MAmend.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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