Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01137/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01137-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROY D. TAYLOR, ON BEHALF OF 

HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS 

SIMILARLY SITUATED, 

Plaintiff,

v.

FEDEX FREIGHT, INC., an Arkansas 

Corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, 

inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:13-CV-01137-LJO-BAM

ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS GRANTING 

CLASS CERTIFICATION.

(Doc. 17, 36)

I. INTRODUCTION

On May 15, 2015, the Magistrate Judge issued Findings and Recommendations (“F & Rs”) 

that (1) Plaintiff’s motion for class certification be granted; (2) the class should be defined as: all 

persons who worked for Defendant as line-haul drivers from January 28, 2012 through the date of 

trial, and all class members who have left their employment with Defendant from January 28, 2012, 

through the date of trial; (3) Roy D. Taylor be appointed as Class representative; and (4) the law firm 

of Westrup & Associates and the Labor Law Office, APC be appointed as Class Counsel. (Doc. 36).

On May 29, 2015, Defendants filed objections to the F & Rs. (Doc. 39). On June 12, 2015, Plaintiff

filed a response to Defendants’ objections. (Doc. 40). This matter is now ripe for decision.

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Case 1:13-cv-01137-DAD-BAM Document 48 Filed 07/27/15 Page 1 of 5
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II. DISCUSSION

In their objections, Defendants’ primary argument is that Plaintiff has failed to offer a valid 

trial plan for damages relating to rest breaks under Rule 23(b)(3), as required under Comcast Corp. 

v. Behrend, 133 S.Ct. 1426 (2012). (Doc. 39).

1 Defendants contend that the method for computing 

damages proposed by Plaintiff fails because “individual damage calculations . . . overwhelm 

questions common to the class,” id. at 3:9 (Internal quotations omitted), and that damages are

incapable of common determination, id. at 7:20-21. Specifically, Defendants argue that the 

electronic records upon which Plaintiff’s method for computing damages relies do not exist. Id. at 

3-5. Defendants acknowledge that there are handwritten records (“DOT logs”) containing the 

information needed for statistical analysis under Plaintiff’s method, but claim that the lack of 

electronic records is fatal to Plaintiff’s trial plan for damages because the proposed trial plan is 

based exclusively upon electronic records and not the DOT logs. Id. at 3-7. Further, Defendants

claim that Plaintiff did not offer any “examples or additional information supporting [Plaintiff’s] 

argument . . . that the records at issue are capable of sampling and/or expert review.” Id. at 4:3-4. In 

addition, Defendants object to the appointment of Plaintiff as Class representative. Defendants 

claim that Plaintiff did not accurately log information on his DOT logs and handheld time records. 

Id. at 7. Defendants contend that this demonstrates that “[Plaintiff’s] interests do not align with the 

interests of the putative class,” and “[t]hus, the method used to calculate [Plaintiff’s] damages will 

be different from the rest of the class.” Id. at 7:22-25. Defendants also object to the class definition 

because they allege it is unascertainable and it presents a risk of one-way intervention. Id. at 8-9.

In response to Defendants’ objections, Plaintiff maintains that there is ample evidence in the 

record to support the Magistrate Judge’s finding that Plaintiff’s trial plan for damages is adequate. 

(Doc. 40). Plaintiff points to the deposition testimony of FedEx Transportation Manager Jeffrey 

Scroggins and FedEx Field-Human Resources Manager Katyna Naylor, both of whom

acknowledge that rest breaks are recorded electronically on handheld devices. Id. at 6:4-19. In 

 

1

In Defendants’ Objections to the F & Rs, Defendants state in a subheading that Plaintiff has not shown sufficient 

commonality required under Rule 23(a). (Doc. 39 at 5). However, the body of the argument under that heading addresses 

Plaintiff’s failure to provide a method to “calculate damages on a class-wide basis,” mirroring their predominance 

argument under Rule 23(b)(3). Id. at 7:5 (original emphasis omitted). Defendants even state that “it is undisputed that 

there is commonality in the questions [Plaintiff] poses above.” Id. at 6:25. For these reasons, the Court finds that 

Defendants do not raise objections related to commonality under Rule 23(a).

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addition, Plaintiff states that he presented the Magistrate Judge with written policies “decrib[ing] 

FedEx’s procedures for drivers to acknowledge the taking of meal and rest periods on log grids and 

handheld devices.” Id. at 6:20-22. Plaintiff claims that Defendants failed to submit any evidence of 

their own to prove that the F & Rs are erroneous. Id. at 6. Plaintiff responds to Defendants 

objection to the Class representative, claiming that the argument Defendants raise is the same as the 

one rejected by the F & Rs. Id. at 8. In response to the class definition, Plaintiff suggests “providing 

notice following an order granting class certification, and a supplemental mailing of notice to new 

hires near the time of trial which would provide them with the opportunity to opt out.” Id. at 10.

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this Court has conducted a 

de novo review of the case. Having carefully reviewed the entire file, the Court concludes that the F 

& Rs regarding class certification are supported by the record and proper analysis and class 

certification is warranted.

This Court is not persuaded by Defendants’ objections to the adequacy of the trial plan for 

damages and adequacy of Plaintiff as Class representative. Defendants’ objections are virtually 

identical to the arguments considered and properly rejected by the Magistrate Judge’s wellreasoned Findings and Recommendations. This Court rejects Defendants’ objections for the same 

reasons stated in the F & Rs. The Court now turns to Defendants’ remaining objections to the class 

definition.

A. One-Way Intervention and Ascertainability of Class Definition

Defendants claim that “[t]he rolling class defined by the [F & Rs],” places Defendants at 

risk of one-way intervention. (Doc. 39 at 8:4) (internal quotations omitted). Defendants rely on 

Villa v. San Francisco Forty-Niners, Ltd., --- F.Supp 3d.----, 2015 WL 2250239 at *2 (N.D. Cal. 

May 13, 2015), for the proposition that the F & Rs’ class definition, “with no definite ending date 

other than the date of trial,” creates a problem that “not-yet bound absent plaintiffs may elect to stay 

in a class after favorable merits rulings but opt out after unfavorable ones.” (Doc. 39 at 8). In Villa, 

the plaintiff filed for summary judgement two days prior to filing for class certification. 2015 WL 

2250239 at *2. The defendants argued that summary judgment was procedurally improper prior to 

class certification under the one-way intervention rule. Id. The district court explained that one-way 

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intervention occurs when “the members of a class not yet certified can wait for the court's ruling on 

summary judgment and either opt in to a favorable ruling or avoid being bound by an unfavorable 

one.” Id. It stated that deciding the merits of plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment would be 

“the very ‘one-way intervention’ problem warned of,” in the court’s review of the rule. Id. It held 

that the one-way intervention rule applied and denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.2Id.

Defendants’ contention that by “leaving th[e] class open indefinitely – through the date of 

trial – the Court has created the same Due Process concerns that the Villa” court found 

unacceptable is incorrect. (Doc. 39 at 8:20-21). Plaintiff is not moving for summary judgment, or 

any other dispositive ruling prior to class certification. Rather, Plaintiff is only seeking to certify the 

class. Therefore, there is no risk that the Court will rule on the merits prior to certification. In 

addition, the class definition does not extend beyond the date of trial, which precludes the 

possibility of class members retaining the option to participate in or withdraw from the class after a 

merits ruling. Accordingly, the Court finds the class definition does not violate the one-way 

intervention rule.

Defendants also argue that the class as presently defined is unascertainable because the 

“class definition would include persons who [Defendants] ha[ve] not even hired yet.” (Doc. 39 at 

9:4-5). This argument is without merit. In the Ninth Circuit, it is common in class actions for class 

definitions to include future members. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1118 (9th Cir. 

2010) (“The inclusion of future class members in a class is not itself unusual or objectionable.”).

In addition, Defendants state that the definition “include[s] employees hired after the class 

notice goes out later this year,” and propose to close the definition as of the date the class notice is 

sent out. (Doc. 39 at 9). Defendants claim that “[a]nyone who is not given notice of this action 

could not be bound by any orders or judgments in this case.” Id. In response, Plaintiff proposes 

“providing notice following an order granting class certification, and a supplemental mailing of 

notice to new hires near the time of trial which would provide them with the opportunity to opt 

 

2 Defendants also rely on American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 549 (1974), for support. That case 

involved “an aspect of the relationship between a statute of limitations and the provisions of Fed.[ R] Civ.[ Pro.] 23 

regulating class actions in the federal courts.” Id. at 540. Defendants cite to a passage pertaining to the definition of the 

one-way intervention rule. The definition provided by American Pipe is adequately represented by the Villa decision. 

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out.” (Doc. 40 at 10:21-22). The Court agrees with Plaintiff’s proposal. Supplemental mailing prior 

to trial ensures that future members will receive adequate notice.

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Findings and Recommendations issued May 15, 2015 are ADOPTED IN FULL;

2. Plaintiff’s motion for Class Certification is GRANTED;

3. The following classes are certified:

a) All persons who worked for Defendant as line-haul drivers from January 28, 2012 

through the date of trial.

b) All Class Members who have left their employment with Defendant from January 

28, 2012, through the date of trial. (Labor Code §203: Waiting time penalties 

subclass).

4. Roy D. Taylor is appointed as Class representative;

5. The law firm of Westrup & Associates and the Labor Law Office, APC is appointed as 

Class Counsel.

As included in the F & Rs, the Magistrate Judge will set a scheduling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 24, 2015 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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