Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01162/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01162-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LG CORPORATION, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

HUANG XIAOWEN DBA TOPUUSHOP, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 16-CV-1162 JLS (NLS)

ORDER (1) GRANTING MOTION 

TO DISMISS; (2) SEVERING CASE; 

AND (3) TRANSFERING CASE TO 

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

(ECF No. 129)

Presently before the Court is Defendant N&K Trading, Inc.’s (“N&K”) Motion to 

Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. (“MTD,” ECF No. 129.) Also before the Court 

are Plaintiffs LG Electronics MobileComm U.S.A., Inc., LG Corporation, and LG 

Electronics, Inc.’s (collectively, “Plaintiffs” or “LG”) Response in Opposition to, 

(“Opp’n,” ECF No. 137), and Defendant’s Reply in Support of, (“Reply,” ECF No. 141), 

Defendant’s MTD. The Court vacated the hearing on the motion and took it under 

submission pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). (ECF No. 140.) After considering the 

parties’ arguments and the law, the Court GRANTS N&K’s MTD, SEVERS N&K from 

the instant case, and TRANSFERS its case to the United States District Court for the 

District of New Jersey.

/ / /

/ / /

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BACKGROUND

LG is the owner of various registered Federal Trademarks. (See Compl. ¶ 34, ECF 

No. 1.) The following LG marks are at issue in this case:

Mark

Relevant 

Goods/Services

Reg. No. Reg. Date Owner

Earphone for

Mobile Phone

3661175 07/28/2009 LG Corp.

HBS

Headphones; 

Wireless 

Headphones

4894207 02/02/2016

LG 

Electronics, 

Inc.

HBS-730

Headphones; 

Earphones; 

Wireless 

Headphones

4894209 02/02/2016

LG 

Electronics, 

Inc.

HBS-740

Headphones; 

Wireless 

Headphones

4894212 02/02/2016

LG 

Electronics, 

Inc.

HBS-750

Headphones; 

Wireless 

Headphones

4894211 02/02/2016

LG 

Electronics, 

Inc.

HBS-760

Headphones; 

Wireless 

Headphones

4894210 02/02/2016

LG 

Electronics, 

Inc.

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Mark

Relevant 

Goods/Services

Reg. No. Reg. Date Owner

HBS-800

Headphones; 

Wireless 

Headphones

4894206 02/02/2016

LG 

Electronics, 

Inc.

HBS-900

Headphones; 

Wireless 

Headphones

4894208 02/02/2016

LG 

Electronics, 

Inc.

Earphones; 

Headphones

4694125 03/03/2015

LG 

Electronics, 

Inc.

Headphones 4925092 03/29/2016

LG 

Electronics, 

Inc.

Headphones; 

Earphones

4820986 9/29/2015

LG 

Electronics, 

Inc.

TONE PRO

Head Sets; 

Earphones

4734180 5/12/2015

LG 

Electronics, 

Inc.

TONE INFINIM

Wireless Cellular 

Phone Headsets; 

Earphones

4780031 7/28/2015

LG 

Electronics, 

Inc.

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Mark

Relevant 

Goods/Services

Reg. No. Reg. Date Owner

NECKBEHIND

Headphones; 

Earphones; 

Headsets for 

Mobile Phones

4630809 11/4/2014

LG 

Electronics, 

Inc.

TONE&TALK

Software For 

Wireless 

Communication 

Between Mobile 

Phone And 

Earphones

4900181 2/16/2016

LG 

Electronics, 

Inc.

(Id. (collectively, the “LG Trademarks”).) 

LG filed suit against various Defendants on May 16, 2016. (ECF No. 1.) LG moved 

for default judgment against several Defendants on December 13, 2016, (ECF No. 111), 

which the Court granted on February 6, 2017, (ECF Nos. 125–28). Defendant N&K was 

not among those affected by the default judgment, and now seeks to dismiss the case 

against it due to lack of personal jurisdiction. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) challenges 

the Court’s personal jurisdiction over a party. The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing 

that jurisdiction is proper. Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008)

(citing Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990)). The Court may decide the 

motion without an evidentiary hearing, and thus “‘the plaintiff need only make a prima 

facie showing of the jurisdictional facts.’” Id. (quoting Caruth v. Int’l Psychoanalytical 

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Ass’n, 59 F.3d 126, 127–28 (9th Cir. 1995)). “Uncontroverted allegations in the plaintiff’s 

complaint must be taken as true,” id., and “‘[c]onflicts between the parties over statements 

contained in affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor,’” id. (quoting 

Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004)).

“Where, as here, there is no applicable federal statute governing personal

jurisdiction, the district court applies the law of the state in which the district court sits.” 

Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 800. “Because California’s long-arm jurisdictional statute is 

coextensive with federal due process requirements, the jurisdictional analyses under state 

law and federal due process are the same.” Id. at 800–01; Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs. 

v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2003) (California’s long-arm statute 

“allows courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants to the extent permitted by 

the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution”). Thus, “[f]or a court to exercise 

personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, that defendant must have at least 

‘minimum contacts’ with the relevant forum such that the exercise of jurisdiction ‘does not 

offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d 

at 801 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). “There are two 

forms of personal jurisdiction that a forum state may exercise over a nonresident 

defendant—general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.” Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1016.

ANALYSIS

N&K argues that the Court lacks both general and specific jurisdiction over it. (See 

generally MTD.) LG concedes the Court lacks general jurisdiction over N&K, (Opp’n 121

n.3), but argues that N&K waived its objection to personal jurisdiction and, even if it did 

not, the Court has specific jurisdiction over N&K, (see generally Opp’n). The Court 

considers each argument in turn.

/ / /

 

1 Pin citations to docketed material refer to the CM/ECF numbers electronically stamped at the top of each 

page. 

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I. Waiver of Personal Jurisdiction

A defense of lack of personal jurisdiction may be waived “as a result of the course 

of conduct pursued by a party during litigation.” Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc., 140 

F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998), as amended on denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc (June 

15, 1998).

LG argues that N&K waived the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction before it 

raised it as an affirmative defense in its Answer. (Opp’n 8.) Specifically, LG argues that 

N&K waived the defense when it: (1) sought additional time to respond to LG’s motion 

for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”); (2) appeared at the order to show cause hearing 

and consented to convert the TRO to a preliminary injunction (“PI”); and (3) stipulated to 

a PI and submitted a joint motion for its entry. (Id. at 8–9.)

The Court disagrees. As an initial matter, the Court is inclined to agree with the 

general proposition that consenting to a TRO or PI, without raising objection or reserving 

rights, weighs in favor—if it is not dispositive—of a finding that a defendant has waived 

its defense of a lack of personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Aeration Sols., Inc. v. Dickman, 85 

F. App’x 772, 775 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[F]ew actions [can] more clearly signal an acceptance 

of a court’s jurisdiction than signing a stipulated injunction order.”); Wright v. Interbank 

Capital, Inc., No. C 99-0091 MMC(ARB), 1999 WL 354516, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 

1999) (finding waiver where defendants, among other things, entered into stipulations 

regarding plaintiffs’ TRO request and filed an application to appear pro hac vice without 

first raising the defense). But that is not what happened in this case. Rather, as to the 

consented PI order (“Consent Order”), N&K “agreed to the order to avoid unnecessary 

motion practice at a time when it had not yet even been validly served.” (Reply 8 (citing 

Reply Declaration of Samuel Butt (“Butt Reply Decl.”) ¶¶ 2–4, ECF No. 143).) In addition, 

in the Consent Order, (ECF No. 45), N&K expressly stated that it reserved all of its 

defenses. (See, e.g., Butt Reply Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. 2 (“In consenting to this Order, N&K Trading 

shall not be deemed or construed to have made any admissions, including without 

limitation, and admission of liability or responsibility, of any kind.”); see also Consent 

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Order ¶ 4); see also Aeration Sols, 85 Fed. App’x at 775 (clarifying that signing a stipulated 

injunction order “without reservation” indicates a party’s willingness to submit itself to 

powers of the court). Additionally, while N&K certainly participated in this case through 

some discovery and procedural motion practice, (Opp’n 10 (listing activity)), this is N&K’s 

first contested motion, and discovery has not progressed past interrogatories and document 

requests (and has been stayed with LG’s consent in conjunction with this motion), (Reply 

7). And N&K repeatedly made clear to LG that it would contest personal jurisdiction. (Id.

at 6 (stating defense in its Answer, the parties’ Joint Case Management Order, and at a 

settlement conference, among others)). This limited activity coupled with N&K’s repeated 

statements of its intention to raise this defense in a motion do not amount to “deliberate, 

strategic behavior” or “sandbagging” under Peterson. See, e.g., Lions Gate Entm’t, Inc. v. 

Yagoozon Inc., No. CV1210653JFWFFMX, 2013 WL 12119724, at *4 n.2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 

31, 2013) (finding no waiver of personal jurisdiction where defendants raised defense in 

answer and Rule 26 Joint Report but litigated case on merits until moving for summary 

judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction); Freeney v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 

CV1502376MMMPJWX, 2015 WL 4366439, at *20 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2015) (finding 

same based on similar facts and collecting cases). Accordingly, the Court finds that N&K 

has not waived its defense of lack of personal jurisdiction.

II. Specific Jurisdiction

“In order for a court to have specific jurisdiction over a defendant, ‘the defendant’s 

suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum State.’” Williams 

v. Yamaha Motor Co., 851 F.3d 1015, 1022–23 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 

134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014)). “The relationship between the defendant and the forum state 

must arise out of contacts that the defendant [itself] creates with the forum State.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). “Additionally, the requisite ‘minimum contacts’ must 

be ‘with the forum State itself, not . . . with persons who reside there.’” Id. (quoting Walden, 

134 S. Ct. at 1122).

/ / /

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The Ninth Circuit has established a three-prong test for analyzing a claim of specific 

personal jurisdiction:

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or 

consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform 

some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of 

conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and 

protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates 

to the defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction 

must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.

Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802; see also Williams, 851 F.3d at 1023. The plaintiff bears 

the burden of establishing the first two prongs. See Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., 

Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1228 (9th Cir. 2011). If the plaintiff does so, the burden shifts to the 

defendant to argue that exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Id.

“In [trademark] infringement actions, the Ninth Circuit typically employs a 

purposeful direction analysis.” Lindora, LLC v. Isagenix Int’l, LLC, 198 F. Supp. 3d 1127, 

1138 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (citing Mavrix Photo, 647 F.3d at 1228). “This analysis, in turn, 

involves application of an ‘effects’ test that ‘focuses on the forum in which the defendant’s 

actions were felt, whether or not the actions themselves occurred within the forum.’” Id.

(quoting Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(en banc)). “The ‘effects’ test, which derives from the Supreme Court’s decision in Calder 

v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 [(1984),] . . . requires that the defendant allegedly must have (1) 

committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that 

the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” CollegeSource, Inc. v. 

AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1077 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The Court address each requirement in turn.

LG must first sufficiently allege that N&K committed an intentional act, which is 

“an external manifestation of the actor’s intent to perform an actual, physical act in the real 

world, not including any of its actual or intended results.” Washington Shoe Co. v. A–Z 

Sporting Goods Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Schwarzenegger, 374 

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F.3d at 806. LG alleges that N&K “is a counterfeiter who is knowingly and willfully 

manufacturing, importing, distributing, offering for sale, and/or selling wireless headsets 

bearing [a] counterfeit version of the LG Trademarks . . . as shown on the company’s virtual 

store front (‘hi-pc’) on ebay.com.” (Compl. ¶ 115; see also id. ¶¶ 116–17 (alleging that 

N&K “is directly engaging in the sale of counterfeit LG wireless headsets” and providing 

examples of products purchased from N&K).) This is sufficient to allege an intentional act 

under Calder’s effects test. See, e.g., Adobe, 2015 WL 5834135, at *3 (finding same based 

on similar allegations); see also Lindora, 198 F. Supp. 3d at 1139 (same and collecting 

authority).

The Court must next determine whether N&K expressly aimed its conduct at 

California. “The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that express aiming requires ‘something 

more’ than ‘a foreign act with foreseeable effects in the forum state.’” Lindora, 198 F. 

Supp. 3d at 1139 (quoting Washington Shoe, 704 F.3d at 675). “In assessing whether a 

defendant has done ‘something more,’ courts consider several factors, including ‘the

interactivity of the defendant’s website, the geographic scope of the defendant’s 

commercial ambitions, and whether the defendant ‘individually targeted’ a plaintiff known 

to be a forum resident.” Id. (quoting Mavrix Photo, 647 F.3d at 1229 (citation omitted)).

“Express aiming can be shown where a corporation ‘continuously and deliberately’

exploits the forum state’s market for its own commercial gain.” Id. (quoting Mavrix Photo, 

647 F.3d at 1229–30).

Here, the Court finds that N&K has not expressly aimed its activities at California.

Rather, N&K is simply a fulfillment company that facilitates shipments of products to 

states depending on where the purchaser resides. (See Declaration of Hang Feng (Nick) 

Wu (“Wu Decl.”) ¶ 3, ECF No. 129-2.) As N&K explains:

When a consumer orders a product on a website operated by the seller, who 

is typically located outside the United States, the seller processes the order 

and sends N&K an electronic communication directing N&K to ship the 

product to the purchaser. An N&K employee picks up the product, already in 

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the seller’s or manufacturer’s packaging, from its location in the warehouse, 

delivers it to an employee charged with putting products for shipment into the 

proper shipping packaging, such as a Federal Express box, and then the 

packaged product is delivered to an employee charged with putting shipping 

labels on the packaged products. Once the shipping label is affixed, the 

package is ready to be delivered to or picked up by the carrier, be it the U.S. 

Postal Service, Federal Express, or another carrier.

(Id.) Of course, N&K fulfills shipments to California. (Id. ¶¶ 21–22.) But these shipments 

are consistent only with N&K committing “foreign act[s] with foreseeable effects in the 

forum state.” Lindora, 198 F. Supp. 3d at 1139.

Nor has LG demonstrated that N&K does “something more” that would otherwise 

subject it to specific jurisdiction in California. For one, N&K does not operate any website, 

let alone an interactive one. To be sure, LG claims that N&K operates a website offering

for-sale products bearing the LG Trademarks. (See Declaration of Morgan Smith (“Smith 

Decl.”) ¶¶ 2–4 (listing N&K’s LinkedIn and Facebook pages that advertise 

www.tmart.com as N&K’s website).) But N&K counters that it does not own or maintain 

any website, let alone www.tmart.com. (Reply Declaration of Nick Wu (“Wu Reply 

Decl.”) ¶4, ECF No. 142.) Furthermore, N&K neither created nor has access to edit the 

LinkedIn and Facebook pages that purport to be owned and operated by N&K. (Id. ¶¶ 2–

3.) Because Ms. Smith’s personal knowledge of these sites is limited to what they purport 

to establish, and thus she does not claim to have personal knowledge of N&K’s actual 

ownership or control of these websites, her evidence of N&K’s alleged websites do not

overcome N&K’s specific denial of creation, ownership, and operation over those same 

sites. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 901.2

Furthermore, LG has provided no evidence that N&K “‘individually targeted’ a 

plaintiff known to be a forum resident.” Lindora, 198 F. Supp. 3d at 1139. Nor has it 

 

2 For this reason LG’s cited cases relying on the relative interactivity of a party’s website are inapposite. 

(See Opp’n 15 (collecting cases).)

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controverted N&K’s declaration that it “did not make any independent decision to ship the 

allegedly counterfeit headsets to any buyer in California” and “only shipped headsets to

individuals in California if (a) the buyer of the headset listed a shipping address in

California, and (b) the seller of the headset sent N&K a communication directing it to ship 

a headset to a California address.” (Wu Decl. ¶ 6.) Nor has LG argued that the geographic 

scope of N&K’s commercial ambitions counsels a finding of specific jurisdiction one way 

or another.

Instead, LG relies on two arguments. First, LG argues that “even shipments 

‘initiated’ by a customer can be purposefully directed at the customer’s forum of 

residence.” (Opp’n 15 (citing Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. TC Heartland, LLC, No. 

14-28-LPS, 2015 WL 4778828, at *5 (D. Del. Aug. 13, 2015), overruled on other grounds 

by TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, ––– S. Ct. –––, No. 16-341, 2017 

WL 2216934, at *5 (U.S. May 22, 2017), and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. 

Grokster, Ltd., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1086–87 (C.D. Cal. 2003)).) Neither case is 

persuasive to establish such a proposition as applied to N&K. Unlike the defendants in TC 

Heartland, which shipped approximately 2% of the accused products from their Indiana 

manufacturing facility to two of their customers’ distribution facilities in Delaware at their 

customers’ request, 2015 WL 4778828, at *4, N&K does not ship products to any of its 

own customers because it does not have any; as discussed, N&K simply fulfills shipments 

for customers of other companies. To be sure, the TC Heartland Court cited other Delaware 

district court cases for the proposition that shipments initiated by a customer (and not by 

the defendant) may demonstrate purposeful availment. Id. at *3–5. So, broadly speaking, 

these cases lend some force to LG’s argument. But LG has cited no authority in this Circuit 

aligned with the Delaware approach.3 Nor can the Court find any. To the contrary, courts 

 

3 Grokster is inapposite. In that case, personal jurisdiction was found where, among other things, the 

defendant made a program that offered peer-to-peer file sharing available through its website, had roughly 

two million California users, generated advertising on its site fueled by its user base, and entered into 

licensing agreements with every user authorizing and limiting use of the software. 243 F. Supp. 2d at 

1087, 1092.

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in this Circuit have declined to exercise personal jurisdiction in similar circumstances. See, 

e.g., Imageline, Inc. v. Hendricks, No. CV 09-1870 DSF AGRX, 2009 WL 10286181, at 

*4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2009) (“While the Defendants did commit intentional acts by selling 

products through eBay and shipping them to the purchasers, including California residents, 

the Defendants fail to satisfy elements 2 and 3 of the effects test. The Defendants’ sales to 

California residents were not specifically directed contacts, but instead occurred only 

because the purchasers of Defendants’ goods happened to reside in California. There was 

no ‘indivdual[ized] targeting’ of California.”). Indeed, “[t]he Ninth Circuit has held that a 

sale into the forum is not a substantial contact where it ‘involved the forum state only 

because that is where the purchaser happened to reside.’” Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Cardinal 

Camera & Video Ctr., Inc., No. 15-CV-02991-JST, 2015 WL 5834135, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 

Oct. 7, 2015) (quoting Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1019); see also id. (collecting district court 

cases extending this principle to cases involving multiple sales entering the forum simply 

because the purchasers happened to live there). N&K’s contacts with the forum state are 

even more attenuated than the sales in these cases, since N&K’s uncontroverted evidence 

demonstrates that it does not operate a website or otherwise market or sell any products to 

California consumers; it merely fulfills shipments to different states based on consumer 

purchases from other websites.

Second, LG argues that “N&K has further aimed its intentional acts at California by 

engaging PayPal, a California company, to process its payments.” (Opp’n 16 (collecting 

cases for the proposition that maintenance of a bank in the forum state can support a claim 

of personal jurisdiction).) The Court is inclined to agree with the proposition that a party’s 

“use of third-party California companies to process payments on its site lends further 

support to the claim that it has purposefully availed itself of the forum.” Craigslist, Inc. v. 

Kerbel, No. C-11-3309 EMC, 2012 WL 3166798, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2012). But N&K 

does not have a website, much less a website that uses California-based PayPal to directly 

 

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facilitate payments. Rather, N&K (1) collects the customers’ payments on behalf of other 

sellers through use of PayPal accounts on those sellers’ websites and (2) remits those 

payments to those sellers, less a fixed fee for N&K’s collection services. (Wu Decl. ¶ 7.)

And even if N&K’s use of PayPal accounts in this fashion weighs in favor of holding N&K 

accountable in California, it does not alone outweigh the contrary evidence demonstrating 

that N&K has not targeted California or its consumers. In sum, the Court finds that N&K’s 

fulfillment and shipment business is not expressly aimed at California.4 Because LG has 

failed to establish that N&K expressly aimed its conduct at California, the Court GRANTS

N&K’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction.5

III. Sever and Transfer

Now that the Court has concluded it lacks personal jurisdiction over N&K, LG 

argues that the Court should sever N&K from this case and transfer its case to the District 

of New Jersey. Thus the Court must determine whether to dismiss the action against N&K 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) or transfer this action to another court 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. See, e.g., Linthicum v. Shenkman, No. 13CV1099 WQH 

DHB, 2013 WL 4875024, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2013). 

“The transfer of civil actions among federal courts to cure jurisdictional defects is 

governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1631.” Cruz–Aguilera v. INS, 245 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir.

2001). Section 1631 provides: “Whenever a civil action is filed in a court . . . and that court 

finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, 

transfer such action . . . to any other such court in which the action . . . could have been 

brought at the time it was filed . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1631. A transfer under § 1631 is 

appropriate if “(1) the transferring court lacks jurisdiction; (2) the transferee court could 

have exercised jurisdiction at the time the action was filed; and (3) the transfer is in the 

 

4 For this reason the Court does not assess whether N&K knows the harm is likely to be suffered in the 

forum state.

5 For this reason the Court does not reach the remaining elements to determine whether the Court lacks 

specific jurisdiction over N&K. See, e.g., Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 807 n.1.

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interest of justice.” Cruz–Aguilera, 245 F.3d at 1074. “When determining whether transfer 

is in the interest of justice, courts have considered whether the failure to transfer would 

prejudice the litigant, whether the litigant filed the original action in good faith, and other 

equitable factors.” Id.

The Court concludes that a transfer to the District of New Jersey is appropriate. First, 

as discussed, supra Part II, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over N&K. Second, the 

District of New Jersey could have exercised jurisdiction over N&K at the time LG filed 

this action because N&K is a New Jersey corporation with its principal place of business 

in New Jersey. (See, e.g., N&K’s Answer to Compl. (“N&K Answer”) ¶ 27, ECF No. 88

(admitting that it is a New Jersey corporation with its principal place of business at 1980 

US Highway 1, Building 3, North Brunswick, NJ 08902).) Finally, a transfer of this case, 

rather than its dismissal, is in the interest of justice. This case has been pending for just 

over a year. During that time N&K has participated in the merits of the case, including 

consenting to a PI, conducting discovery on the merits, and participating in early settlement 

attempts. While the Court found that this activity, in conjunction with its reservation of 

defenses, did not constitute waiver of its defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, that same 

activity demonstrates its participation in this case and, more importantly, the efforts LG 

has thus far undertaken to develop its case against N&K. Dismissing the case at this stage 

would be unfairly prejudicial to LG and would not be in the interest of justice.

Furthermore, the Court can properly sever the claims against N&K pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, which provides that “the court may sever any claim 

against a party.” Courts have broad discretion to sever a claim pursuant to Rule 21. See, 

e.g., Lindora, 198 F. Supp. 3d at 1149; Pamplona ex rel. Pamplona v. Hernandez, No. 

08CV2205-IEGBLM, 2009 WL 578578, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2009). The same 

reasoning supporting the Court’s decision to transfer this case supports the Court’s decision 

to sever N&K from this action in order to effect the transfer. Moreover, the case is now 

entirely resolved with respect to the twenty-one other defendants, and all that remains is an 

assessment of LG’s attorneys’ fees as they relate to those defendants. Thus, neither N&K 

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nor any other defendant would suffer unfair prejudice as a result of this severance. 

Accordingly, the Court SEVERS N&K from this action and ORDERS this severed case

transferred to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendant N&K’s Motion to 

Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (ECF No. 129). Additionally, the Court SEVERS

N&K from the instant case and ORDERS this severed case transferred to the United States 

District Court for the District of New Jersey for further proceedings between LG and N&K.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 8, 2017

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