Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00076/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00076-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

AARON T. WARREN, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

SWAT, T.P.D., et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CIV 10-076-TUC-CKJ

ORDER

On February 5, 2010, Plaintiff Aaron T. Warren ("Warren") filed a pro se Complaint.

On March 30, 2010, Warren filed an Amended Complaint. Warren has also submitted a

Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis [Doc. # 6].

In Forma Pauperis

The Court may allow a plaintiff to proceed without prepayment of fees when it is

shown by affidavit that he "is unable to pay such fees[.]" 28 § 1915(a)(1). Warren’s

statement, made under penalty of perjury, establishes that Warren receives $536.00 per

month unemployment payments and $360.00 per month in food stamps. The Court finds

Warren is unable to pay the fees. The Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis will be granted.

Screening Order

This Court is required to dismiss a case if the Court determines that the allegation of

poverty is untrue, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(A), or if the Court determines that the action "(i)

is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii)

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seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B).

General Requirements 

A complaint is to contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief[.]" Rule 8(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. Especially where the pleader is pro

se, the pleading should be liberally construed in the interests of justice. Johnson v. Reagan,

524 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1975). Nonetheless, a complaint must set forth a set of facts that

serves to put defendants on notice as to the nature and basis of the claim(s). Furthermore,

all allegations of a claim are to be set forth in numbered paragraphs that should be limited

to a single set of circumstances. Rule 10(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. "Each claim . . . shall be stated

in a separate count . . . whenever a separation facilitates the clear presentation of the matters

set forth." Id. Failure to set forth claims in such a manner places the onus on the court to

decipher which, if any, facts support which claims, as well as to determine whether a

plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought. Haynes v. Anderson & Strudwick, Inc., 508 F.Supp.

1303 (D.C.Va. 1981). Enforcement of this rule is discretionary with the Court, but such

enforcement is appropriate where it is necessary to facilitate a clear presentation of the

claims. See, Benoit v. Ocwen Financial Corp., Inc., 960 F.Supp. 287 (S.D.Fla. 1997),

affirmed 162 F.3d 1177 (compliance with rule required where allegations were so confusing

and conclusory, claims were commingled, and impossible to determine nature of claims).

Moreover, “[t]he title of the complaint must name all the parties; the title of other

pleadings, after naming the first party on each side, may refer generally to other parties.”

Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(a). Warren’s Amended Complaint fails to include the names of all the

parties in the caption. 

The Court will dismiss the Amended Complaint to allow Warren to comply with

these requirements. If a court determines that dismissal is appropriate, a plaintiff must be

given at least one chance to amend a complaint when a more carefully drafted complaint

might state a claim.. Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991). Moreover, when

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The holding in Twombly explicitly abrogates the well established holding in Conley

v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), that “a complaint should

not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” 

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dismissing with leave to amend, a court is to provide reasons for the dismissal so a plaintiff

can make an intelligent decision whether to file an amended complaint. See Bonanno v.

Thomas, 309 F.2d 320 (9th Cir. 1962); Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Requirement that Action State a Claim on Which Relief Can be Granted

The United States Supreme Court has determined that, in order to survive a motion

to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its facts.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127

S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).1

 While a complaint need not plead “detailed

factual allegations,” the factual allegations it does include “must be enough to raise a right

to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 1964-65. Indeed, Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) requires

a showing that a plaintiff is entitled to relief “rather than a blanket assertion” of entitlement

to relief. Id. at 1965 n. 3. The complaint “must contain something more . . . than . . . a

statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right to action.”

Id. at 1965. Although a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), has not been

filed in this case, the Court screens the Complaint in light of Twombly and must determine

if Warren has “nudge[d] [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id. at

1974. The Court also considers that the Supreme Court has cited Twombly for the

traditional proposition that “[s]pecific facts are not necessary [for a pleading that satisfies

Rule 8(a)(2)]; the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim

is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardue, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. 2197,

2200, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). 

In discussing Twombly, the Ninth Circuit has stated:

“A claim has facial plausibility,” the Court explained, “when the plaintiff pleads

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42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a

method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,

393-94, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1870, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). To state a claim under § 1983, a

plaintiff must allege: (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the

United States and (2) the alleged deprivation was committed by a person action under color

of state law. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

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factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 129 S.Ct. at 1949. “The plausibility

standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent

with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and

plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127

S.Ct. 1955).

In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory “factual

content,” and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive

of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief. Id. 

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2009).

This Court must take as true all allegations of material fact and construe them in the

light most favorable to Warren. See Cervantes v. United States, 330 F.3d 1186, 1187 (9th

Cir. 2003). In general, a complaint is construed favorably to the pleader. See Scheuer v.

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), overruled on other

grounds, 457 U.S. 800. Nonetheless, the Court does not accept as true unreasonable

inferences or conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual allegations. Western

Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). Furthermore, the Court is not

to serve as an advocate of a pro se litigant, Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir.

1987), in attempting to decipher a complaint. 

Claims – 42 U.S.C. § 19832

The construes Warren’s Complaint as alleging a Fourth Amendment excessive force

violation, a Fourth Amendment unreasonable search violation, a Fourth Amendment

unreasonable seizure violation, a Fifth Amendment due process violation, an Eighth

Amendment cruel and unusual punishment violation, a Fourteenth Amendment due process

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Warren also alleges that Officer Wakefield subsequently removed the plastic ties and

placed handcuffs on Warren.

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violation, and a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection violation. Warren also appears

to be alleging the tort claim of defamation. The Court will discuss these claims.

Fourth Amendment – Excessive Force

The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” United States

Constitution, 4th Amend. To state a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, a plaintiff

must allege that a defendant’s use of force was unreasonable. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

386, 396 (1989). “The Fourth Amendment requires police officers making [a seizure] to use

only an amount of force that is objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances facing

them.” Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 477 (9th Cir. 2007). In determining

whether the use of force was reasonable, “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the

individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing government interests at

stake” are to be balanced. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104

L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), internal quotation marks omitted. Relevant factors in this inquiry

include “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat

to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or

attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id.

Warren asserts that he was restrained with plastic ties that were too tight.3

 The Ninth

Circuit has determined that “detaining a person in handcuffs during the execution of a

warrant to search for evidence is permissible, but only when justified by the totality of the

circumstances.” Meredith v. Erath, 342 F.3d 1057, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2003). Moreover,

Warren alleges that an officer threw him down on the floor and slammed his face on the

floor. While these facts may state a claim that the use of force was unreasonable, Warren

has failed to allege any individual who used force upon him. An allegation of an affirmative

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link is needed between the injury and the conduct of a defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.

362, 371-72, 377 (1976); see also Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 2002)

(officer cannot be held liable without a showing of individual participation, i.e., integral

participation, in unlawful conduct); Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979)

(section 1983 liability arises where there is personal involvement). The Court finds Warren

has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Fourth Amendment – Unreasonable Search

To state a claim for a Fourth Amendment unreasonable search violation, a plaintiff

must allege that a defendant conducted an unreasonable search. Samson v. California, 547

U.S. 843, 126 S.Ct. 2192, 2197, 165 L.Ed.2d 250 (2006); see also Branch v. Tunnell, 937

F.2d 1382, 1387 (9th Cir. 1991) (where an officer knowingly or recklessly submits false

information in an affidavit supporting an application for a warrant, the individual’s Fourth

Amendment rights are violated), overruled on other grounds. Under the Fourth

Amendment, courts examine the totality of circumstances to determine whether a search is

reasonable. Id. Furthermore, reasonableness is determined by weighing the intrusion on the

individual’s privacy right against the promotion of a legitimate governmental interest. Id.

Warren alleges that the officers had a bad warrant and no valid evidence to support

probable cause. Warren further alleges that the officers acted with malice and in reckless

disregard for whether the contents of the warrant were true. Although pro se pleadings are

liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), conclusory and vague

allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of

Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); Rhodes v. Robinson, 612 F.2d 766, 772 (3d Cir.

1979). Warren’s allegations as to the officers acting with malice and in reckless disregard

for the truth are merely conclusory. See also Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821

(9th Cir. 1989). Moreover, Warren has not alleged an affirmative link between the injury

and the conduct of a specific defendant. The Court finds Warren has failed to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. 

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Fourth Amendment – Unreasonable Seizure

Warren asserts that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by his unlawful

arrest. Warren alleges that Officers Robles and Wakefield integrally participated in his

arrest. Under the Fourth Amendment, to arrest a suspect on probable cause, the facts and

circumstances within the officer's knowledge must be sufficient to warrant a prudent person,

or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has

committed, is committing or is about to commit an offense. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443

U.S. 31, 37, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979). In considering alleged violations of the

Fourth Amendment, the court undertakes an objective assessment of an officer's actions in

light of the facts and circumstances then known to the officer. Scott v. United States, 436

U.S. 128, 137, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978).

Police may arrest a person without a warrant if the arrest is supported by probable

cause. See United States v. Hoyos, 892 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir.1989). Indeed, probable cause

to arrest is a complete defense to the liability of a police officer for an action under § 1983

arising out of an arrest. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637, 100 S.Ct. 1398,

63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980); United States v. Del Vizo, 918 F.2d 821, 825 (9th Cir.1990). An

officer has probable cause to arrest when the officer has knowledge of facts and

circumstances sufficient to cause a reasonable person to believe an offense has been

committed. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); Henry v.

United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959); Brinegar v. United

States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). In evaluating a custodial

arrest executed by state officials, federal courts must determine the reasonableness of the

arrest in reference to state law governing the arrest. United States v. Mota, 982 F.2d 1384,

1388 (9th Cir.1993); see also Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 771 (9th Cir.1990) (finding

that arrest without probable cause that the arrestee committed a crime constitutes a violation

of the Fourth Amendment).

In this case, Warren has alleged that probable cause did not support the search or

seizure of any personal property of the home. Although implied, Warren has not alleged

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Fifth Amendment due process claims and Fourteenth Amendment due process claims

are analyzed in the same way. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 702 n. 3, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47

L.Ed.2d 405 (1976).

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that probable cause did not exist for his arrest. Because the Amended Complaint does not

comply with procedural requirements, the Court will dismiss this claim with leave to amend.

Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

“The Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government from depriving persons of

due process[.]” Castillo v. McFadden, 370 F.3d 882, 889 n.5 (9th Cir. 2004). Because

Warren’s allegations are not against federal officials, the Court will discuss a Fourteenth

Amendment due process claim.4

 The United States Supreme Court has found that, to state

a claim for a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff

must allege that a defendant denied plaintiff a specific right protected by the federal

constitution without procedures required by the Constitution to ensure fairness (procedural

due process), or deliberately abused his power without any reasonable justification in aid

of any government interest or objective and only to oppress in a way that shocks the

conscience (substantive due process). Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84, 115 S.Ct.

2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Board of Regents

of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). To

allege a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must allege that there is a liberty or

property interest protected by the Constitution, there has been a deprivation of the interest

by the government, and a lack of process. Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898,

904 (9th Cir. 1993). Substantive due process rights are those not otherwise constitutionally

protected but which are deeply rooted in this country’s history and tradition and “implicit

in the concept of ordered liberty” such that “neither liberty or justice would exist if it were

sacrificed. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772

(1997). Negligence is not sufficient to state a claim for substantive due process. See e.g.,

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333 (1986); Maddox v. City of Los Angeles, 792 F.2d

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The Court has also discussed this claim as a Fourth Amendment excessive force

claim.

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1408, 1413 (9th Cir. 1986).

Warren appears to be alleging a substantive due process claim based on false

information providing the basis for the search warrant. However, where an officer

knowingly or recklessly submits false information in an affidavit supporting an application

for a warrant, the Fourth Amendment rights of the individual subject to the warrant are

violated. See Branch, 937 F.2d at 1387. Because a claim for a Fourth Amendment violation

is available to Warren, this due process claim is “otherwise constitutionally protected.” The

Court finds, therefore, that Warren has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.

Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment

The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is

confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. Helling v. McKinney, 509

U.S. 25, 31, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993); see also Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d

189, 193-94 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Whatever rights one may lose at the prison gates, . . . the full

protections of the eighth amendment most certainly remain in force. The whole point of the

amendment is to protect persons convicted of crimes.”). The Due Process Clauses of the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the punishment of persons prior to a judgment

of conviction; the Due Process Clauses govern conditions or restrictions of pretrial

detention. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979).

In this case, Warren does not allege any pre-conviction or post-conviction

confinement violation. Rather, Warren asserts a violation based on an officer throwing him

down on the floor and slamming his face on the floor.5

 The Court finds Warren has failed

to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

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Fourteenth Amendment – Equal Protection

“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . is essentially a

direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v.

Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985).

“‘To state a claim . . . for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause . . . a plaintiff must

show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff

based upon membership in a protected class.’” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668,

686 (9th Cir. 2001), quoting Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998).

The Equal Protection Clause also forbids unequal enforcement of valid laws where such

unequal enforcement is the product of improper motive. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,

6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886); see also United States v. Bourgeois, 964 F.2d 935 (9th

Cir. 1992); Church of Scientology of California v. C.I.R., 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Warren has not alleged that any defendant acted with an intent or purpose to

discriminate against his based upon membership in a protected class or even that he is a

member of a protected class. See generally Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193,1194 (9th

Cir. 1998). The Court finds Warren has failed to state a claim on which relief can be

granted.

Defamation

Warren asserts a claim of defamation in his Second Amended Complaint.

“Oversimplifying, libel is a written or visual defamation, while slander is an oral

defamation.” Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 152 Ariz. 1, 6 n. 4, 730 P.2d 178 n. 4

(App. 1985). “‘One who publishes a false and defamatory communication concerning a

private person . . . is subject to liability, if, but only if, he (a) knows that the statement is

false and it defames the other, (b) acts in reckless disregard of these matters, or (c) acts

negligently in failing to ascertain them.’” Dube v. Likins, 216 Ariz. 406, 167 P.3d 93 (App.

2007), citations omitted. 

In making his defamation claim, Warren does not assert who is alleged to have

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defamed him. It appears Warren is alleging that one or more officers made false statements

to the property manager, but this is not clearly alleged; similarly, the alleged false statements

are not set forth in the Second Amended Complaint. The Court finds Warren has failed to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

SWAT and TPD Defendants

Warren has included SWAT and TPD as defendants in this case. Supervisory

officials may be liable if they “implement a policy so deficient that the policy 'itself is a

repudiation of constitutional rights' and is 'the moving force of the constitutional violation.'”

Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct.

972 (1992) (quotations omitted); see also Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989)

(a supervisor may be liable under § 1983 if he "knew of the violations and failed to act to

prevent them."). "[L]ocal governments can be sued [under § 1983 only where] the action

that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance,

regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." Monell

v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611

(1978). Material facts must be presented that a policy expressly sanctioned, enacted, or

authorized by the municipality has led to an alleged injury. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,

475 U.S. 469, 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986); Ulrich v. City and County of San

Francisco, 308 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2002). Warren has not alleged any unconstitutional

policy statement, ordinance, regulation or decision officially adopted and promulgated by

either SWAT or TPD. See Ortez v. Washington County, State of Oregon, 88 F.3d 804 (9th

Cir. 1996) (pre-Twombly, the Ninth Circuit found that a claim of municipal liability was

sufficiently alleged even though the claim was based on nothing more than bare allegations),

citing Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988). The

Court finds Warren has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. 

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Second Amended Complaint

The Court finds that dismissal with leave to amend is appropriate. See Noll v.

Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987) (leave to amend is liberally granted unless

absolutely clear deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment). The Court has provided the

reasons for the dismissal so Warren can make an intelligent decision whether to file a

Second Amended Complaint. See Bonanno v. Thomas, 309 F.2d 320 (9th Cir. 1962);

Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1987). Furthermore, Warren is advised that all

causes of action alleged in the original or amended complaints which are not alleged in any

Second Amended Complaint will be waived. Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co.,

896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990) ("an amended pleading supersedes the original"); King

v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1987). Any Second Amended Complaint filed by Warren

must be retyped or rewritten in its entirety and may not incorporate any part of the original

complaint by reference. Any Second Amended Complaint submitted by Warren shall be

clearly designated as a Second Amended Complaint on the face of the document.

Warren should take notice that if he fails to timely comply with every provision of

this Order, this action will be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). See Ferdik v.

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir.) (district court may dismiss action for failure to comply

with any order of the Court), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 915 (1992).

Accordingly, IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. Warren’s Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis [Doc. # 6] is GRANTED.

2. Warren’s Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE,

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Warren shall have thirty (30) days from the date of filing this

Order to file a Second Amended Complaint.

3. Any Second Amended Complaint must be retyped or rewritten in its entirety

and may not incorporate any part of the prior complaints or subsequent pleadings by

reference. All causes of action alleged in the original or amended complaints which are not

alleged in any Second Amended Complaint will be waived. Any Second Amended

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Complaint submitted by Warren shall be clearly designated as a Second Amended

Complaint on the face of the document. Any Second Amended Complaint shall comply

with the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), 10(a), and 11(a).

4. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to enter a judgment of dismissal,

without prejudice, without further notice to Warren, if Warren fails to file a Second

Amended Complaint within thirty (30) days of the filing date of this Order. 

5. A clear, legible copy of every pleading or other document filed SHALL

ACCOMPANY each original pleading or other document filed with the Clerk for use by the

District Judge to whom the case is assigned. See L.R.Civ. 5.4. Failure to submit a copy

along with the original pleading or document will result in the pleading or document

being stricken without further notice to Warren.

6. At all times during the pendency of this action, Warren shall immediately

advise the Court of any change of address and its effective date. Such notice shall be

captioned "NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS". The notice shall contain only

information pertaining to the change of address and its effective date. The notice shall not

include any motions for any other relief. Warren shall serve a copy of the Notice of Change

of Address on all served opposing parties. Failure to file a NOTICE OF CHANGE OF

ADDRESS may result in the dismissal of the action for failure to prosecute pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). 

DATED this 13th day of May, 2010.

Case 4:10-cv-00076-CKJ Document 7 Filed 05/17/10 Page 13 of 13