Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-03084/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-03084-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity Action

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCHOULEE CONES, an individual on 

behalf of herself and all others similarly 

situated, and DEXTER PASIS, and 

individual on behalf of himself and all 

others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PAREXEL INTERNATIONAL 

CORPORATION and PAREXEL 

INTERNATIONAL, LLC,

Defendants.

Case No.: 16cv3084 L (BGS)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

QUASH PLAINTIFFS’ SUBPOENA 

TO IQVIA (FORMERLY 

QUINTILES) AND INVENTIV 

HEALTH CLINICAL

[ECF No. 77] 

Defendants Parexel International Corporation and Parexel International, LLC 

(“Defendants”) move to quash Plaintiffs Schoulee Cones and Dexter Pasis’ (“Plaintiffs”) 

subpoenas directed to IQVIA and inVentive Health Clinical. (ECF No. 77.) Plaintiffs

have filed an Opposition to the Motion, and Defendants have filed a Reply. (ECF Nos. 

81-82.) For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is GRANTED. 

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I. BACKGROUND

Defendants move to quash subpoenas issued to IQVIA and inVentive Health 

seeking employee records for two current Parexel employees. The employees were 

employed by IQVIA and inVentive prior to their employment with Parexel. The 

subpoenas essentially seek the entirety of each employee’s employment records from 

their respective former employers. Neither individual is a party to this case, but 

Defendants identified them, in Supplemental Initial Disclosures, as individuals who are 

“anticipated to have information regarding the various requirements, duties, and 

performance expectations of the CRA position.” (Decl. of James M. Treglio (Treglio 

Decl.), Ex. 11.) Defendants brief indicates the update was prompted by these individuals 

providing declarations. (Mot. at 2.)

The subpoenas were emailed to Defendants’ counsel on March 8, 2018 and were 

received by mail by Defendants’ counsel on March 13, 2018. (Decl. of Michael Kopp 

¶ 4.) The subpoenas demanded a response by March 19, 2018. (Id., Ex. A.) The 

subpoenas were not provided directly to either individual whose records were being 

sought. (Id. at ¶ 4.) 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Rule 45 allows a party to subpoena a non-party to produce documents. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(c)(“As permitted in Rule 45, a nonparty may be 

compelled to produce documents and tangible things or to permit an inspection”). It must 

meet the same relevancy requirements applicable to any discovery sought. The “scope of 

discovery through a subpoena is the same as that applicable to Rule 34 and the other 

discovery rules.” ATS Prods., Inc. v. Champion Fiberglass, Inc., 309 F.R.D. 527, 530 

(N.D. Cal. 2015) (“The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 45 state that ‘the scope of 

discovery through a subpoena is the same as that applicable to Rule 34 and the other 

discovery rules,’ which in turn is the same as under Rule 26(b).”); see also Moon v. SCP 

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Pool Corp., 232 F.R.D. 633, 636 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Advisory Committee Notes and 

finding scope of discovery under Rule 45 is the same as Rule 34). 

“On motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery 

otherwise allowed by these rules or by local rule if it determines that . . . the proposed 

discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 

Rule 26(b)(1) allows parties to “obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that 

is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case”

giving consideration to numerous factors including the burden of the discovery as 

compared to its benefit. “A court determining the propriety of a subpoena balances the 

relevancy of the discovery sought, the requesting party’s need, and the potential hardship 

to the party subject to the subpoena.” ATS Products, Inc., 309 F.R.D. at 531 (N.D. Cal. 

2015) (quoting Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D 674, 680 (N.D. Cal. 2006)). “The 

party moving to quash bears the ‘burden of persuasion’” under Rule 45(d)(3). Id.

(quoting Moon, 232 F.R.D. at 637). 

Under Rule 45, the court “must quash or modify a subpoena that . . . requires 

disclosure of privilege or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies; or 

subjects a person to undue burden.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iii)-(iv). To determine 

whether a subpoena presents an undue burden, courts ‘weigh the burden to the 

subpoenaed party against the value of the information to the serving party.’” Travelers 

Indem. Co. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 228 F.R.D. 111, 113 (D. Conn. 2005); Moon, 232 

F.R.D. at 637. A party cannot simply object “to a subpoena served on a non-party, but 

rather, must seek a protective order or make a motion to quash.” See Moon, 232 F.R.D. 

at 636; see also Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland Inc., 708 F.2d 492, 494 n.5 (9th Cir. 

1983). 

B. Analysis

Defendants raise numerous challenges to these subpoenas, including failure to 

properly serve, an unreasonably short response time, lack of relevancy, invasion of 

privacy, undue burden, overbroad and not proportional to the needs of the case, and 

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propounded for the improper purpose of harassing these individuals.1 Plaintiffs argue 

that Defendants do not have standing to challenge the subpoenas seeking employment 

records of Defendants’ employees and claim the records are relevant because the Court 

previously indicated during a discovery conference that Plaintiffs’ employment records 

were relevant.

2 Because there are numerous problems with these subpoenas, from service 

to Plaintiff’s relevancy argument, the Court only briefly addresses each issue.

As a threshold issue, the return time on the subpoenas, 4 business days and six total 

days, was unreasonable. Under Rule 45(3)(A)(1), “the court . . . must quash or modify a 

subpoena that fails to allow a reasonable time to comply.” Plaintiffs fail to address this 

issue at all, providing no explanation for the unreasonably short response time or any 

indication why they waited almost a month after receiving this disclosure to subpoena 

these records. Based on the record before the Court and the absence of any explanation 

from Plaintiffs, it appears any urgency in the return time was of Plaintiffs’ own making. 

On this ground alone, the subpoenas can be quashed. 

 

1 Defendants also argue the subpoenas should be quashed because Plaintiffs have refused 

to meet and confer on this issue despite repeated attempts by Defendants’ counsel to do 

so. As the Court explained in a prior order issued after this Motion had been filed, the 

Court will not quash the subpoenas on this basis given there may have been some 

confusion on this point. However, the Court expects counsel will meet and confer 

regarding any issue either party intends to raise with the Court before raising it with the 

Court as required by Chambers Rules.

2 Plaintiffs Opposition also includes a footnote that begins “[i]t should also be noted” that 

references document requests they believe Defendants have not properly responded to

that may relate to these witnesses. (Pls’ Opp’n at 9, n.3.) However, the only issue before 

this Court is whether to quash the two subpoenas. Document requests have not been 

raised with the Court. Even assuming it would be proper to rule on an issue raised for the 

first time via a footnote in an opposition, there is not sufficient information for the Court 

to address it. Putting aside the absence of analysis or law (other than reference to Rule 

37), Plaintiffs do not indicate when this issue became ripe, why they did not timely raise 

it with the Court pursuant to the undersigned’s Chambers Rules, or provide sufficient 

information for the Court to address it. 

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As to service, Plaintiffs’ assertion that the individuals were served is not 

persuasive. Plaintiffs do not argue they were not obligated to serve them, but rather 

claim that providing them to Defendants’ counsel constituted proper service. Plaintiffs 

rely on a statement in Defendants’ Supplemental Initial Disclosures indicating that 

“Parexel requests that individuals it employs be contacted through its counsel of record.” 

(Treglio Decl., Ex. 11.) Plaintiffs interpret this language to mean that Defendants’ 

counsel is both representing them and accepting service on their behalf.3 However, 

Plaintiffs cite no authority for the proposition that this request by Defendants’ counsel in 

a supplement to its initial disclosures that does not address legal representation or service 

constitutes these individuals choosing to retain Defendants’ counsel to represent them or 

consent to Defendants’ counsel accepting service on their behalf. Nor do Plaintiffs 

explain why they ignored Defendants’ counsel’s advisement that they were not properly 

served. Accordingly, mailing these subpoenas to Defendants’ counsel did not constitute 

service of either individual. In the same vein, Plaintiffs’ reliance on the lack of objection 

or a motion to quash from the individuals, as opposed to Defendants, to suggest they do 

not have the concerns raised is misplaced. It is not surprising that individuals whose 

employment records were sought did not move to quash themselves when they were not 

served. 

Additionally, as noted above, “the scope of discovery through a subpoena is the 

same as that applicable to Rule 34 and the other discovery rules.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 

advisory committee’s note. And, the Court has a duty to control discovery and ensure 

discovery does not exceed the scope dictated in Rule 26(b)(1). Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(b)(2)(C) (“On motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency or extent of 

 

3 Defendants’ counsel indicated in his Reply that he informed Plaintiffs’ counsel that 

service was not proper the day after receipt and that he could not accept service on behalf 

of these individuals along with other deficiencies, but received no response from 

Plaintiffs’ counsel. (Reply Declaration of Michael Kopp ¶¶ 2.) This Motion followed 

very shortly thereafter given the short return time on the subpoenas.

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discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or by local rule if it determines that . . . the 

proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).”) Defendants argue 

that these subpoenas were issued to harass these individuals into not being witnesses in 

this case. More specifically, that the records sought by the subpoenas are completely

irrelevant.

4

 Plaintiffs’ argue that because Plaintiffs’ employment records with another 

employer were relevant these potential witnesses’ employment records must be equally 

relevant.5 Plaintiffs emphasize the parties’ respective positions previously taken 

regarding Plaintiffs’ employment records.6 However, Plaintiffs fail to address how the 

employment records of these individuals are relevant to this case, or even draw a parallel 

 

4 Because the Court finds Plaintiffs have failed to make any showing that the records they 

are seeking are relevant, the Court does not address the issue of these individuals’ privacy 

rights in their employment records. The Court does, however, note that some courts have 

found that employment records require a specific showing as to relevance before they are 

deemed discoverable. See, e.g ., Paananen v. Cellco P’ship, 2009 WL 2057048 at *3 

(W.D. Wash. July 14, 2009). And, production of employment records may be denied or 

narrowly tailored to balance the needs of the case against an individual’s reasonable 

expectation of privacy. Prof’l Recovery Servs., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 2009 

WL 137326, *4 (D. N.J. Jan. 15, 2009).

5 The Court does not address at this time Plaintiffs’ argument that these records might be 

relevant to an industry standard defense. At the time this subpoena was issued, the 

parties were limited to discovery related to class certification and Plaintiffs have not 

explained in their briefing how this defense would be related to class certification. 

6 Plaintiffs also argue this Court must treat these witnesses’ employment records from a 

prior employer the same way it treated Plaintiffs’ employment records from a subsequent 

employer. Plaintiff’s suggestion that the Court ruled on their relevancy and reliance on a 

single statement by the Court is, at best, misinformed. (Pls’ Opp’n at 1; 1, n.1; 7-8.) The 

selective quotation ignores the following 11 pages of transcript in which the Court hears 

argument on the issue and brokers a compromise both counsel agreed to as to production 

of Plaintiffs’ employment records from a subsequent employer. (ECF 61 at 39-51.) 

Equally troubling is counsel’s incomplete quotation of the Court early in this 11-page 

discussion. (Pls’ Opp’n at 1, n.1.) Plaintiff quotes the following: “‘So if I – if I serve a 

subpoena on the two witnesses I deposed in Boston for their former employers, then 

that’s fair game?’ To which the Court replied, ‘you do whatever you need to do.’” (Id.) 

Plaintiffs’ counsel conveniently excises “I’m not making any rulings” from the middle of 

the quote. (ECF 61 at 40.)

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between Plaintiffs and these individuals. Plaintiffs essentially argue that because 

Plaintiffs’ employment records were relevant, employment records of anyone must be 

relevant. This does not make any sense. There are likely many differences, but the Court 

notes two that seem particularly critical. First, Plaintiffs are plaintiffs, not witnesses.

Plaintiffs have filed this case and made allegations in this case regarding their job duties 

at Parexel and their representations to subsequent employers, about what they did at 

Parexel might cast doubt on the veracity of those allegations and might undermine their 

adequacy to serve as a class representative. Second, Defendants sought Plaintiffs’ 

employment records from a subsequent employer. Plaintiffs are seeking employment 

records from these individuals’ prior employers. Even if witnesses and parties were 

equivalent, these individuals would not have made representations about their 

employment with Parexel to potentially be undermined by their employment records 

because they worked for them before they worked for Parexel. Given the absence of any 

other basis for relevancy from Plaintiffs,7the Court could only speculate how their 

employment records before they worked for Parexel would be in anyway relevant to this 

litigation. 

Finally, while the subpoenas list categories of documents, these subpoenas

essentially seek these individuals’ entire employment files. In this respect, the demands 

are overbroad. See Lewin v. Nackard, 2010 WL 4607402, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 4, 2010); 

Belling v. DDP Holdings, Inc., 2013 WL 12140986, at *3 (C.D Cal. May 30, 2013). If 

Plaintiffs attempt to cure the deficiencies noted above and obtain any employment 

 

7 Plaintiffs’ brief requests that if the Court finds these subpoenaed documents are not 

relevant, it prohibit Defendants from using Plaintiffs’ employment records. This is based 

on Plaintiffs’ inaccurate assertion that the Court issued a ruling on the relevancy of 

Plaintiff’s employment records and Plaintiffs’ argument, rejected above, that all 

employment records of anyone have the same relevancy to this case as Plaintiffs’

employment records with a subsequent employer. Given the Court’s conclusion that 

there are critical differences in the relevancy of Plaintiffs’ employment records with a 

subsequent employer and these nonparties’ records, the Court denies that request.

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records from these individuals’ prior employers at any point in this litigation, they should 

narrow the request, giving due consideration to the relevancy of the documents sought

rather than broadly treating all employment records the same. 

CONCLUSION

The Motion to Quash is GRANTED.

Dated: August 24, 2018

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