Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00746/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00746-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 730
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Report &amp; Disclosure
Cause of Action: 29:185 Labor/Mgt. Relations (Contracts)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALBERT SANCHEZ,

 Plaintiff,

 v. 

HENDRICK’S HALLOWELL

CHEVROLET and DOES 1 TO 20, 

 Defendants.

1:05-CV-00746 OWW SMS

ORDER RE: HENDRICK’S

HALLOWELL’S MOTION FOR

TERMINATING SANCTIONS (DOC.

25) 

I. INTRODUCTION

This is an employment discrimination suit lawsuit filed by

Albert Sanchez (“Plaintiff”) against his former employer

Hendrick’s Hallowell Chevrolet (“HHC”). Plaintiff claims that he

was terminated because of disabilities/injuries he sustained on

the job and in retaliation for his filing workers compensation

claims in connection with those injuries. HHC maintains that

Sanchez was terminated for violating anti-moonlighting provisions

contained within the Collective Bargaining Agreement that

governed Plaintiff’s employment with HHC. (Doc. 26, at 2.)

Before the court for decision is HHC’s motion for sanctions

based on Plaintiff’s purported failure to comply with his

discovery obligations. Specifically, HHC asserts that Plaintiff

has failed to comply with a prior court order that requires him

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to provide further disclosures regarding the damages sought in

this case. HHC requests that Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed

or, in the alternative, that Plaintiff be barred from offering

any evidence regarding damages. (Doc. 26.) Plaintiff objects to

the issuance of any sanctions on the ground that he has offered

to dismiss the case without prejudice, with each party to bear

their own attorney’s costs, but HHC refuses to agree to dismissal

under those terms. (Doc. 29.) Plaintiff’s attorney declined to

appear for the hearing on this motion for sanctions, opting to

submit on the papers. 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 21, 2005, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the

Superior Court for the County of Fresno, alleging tortious

termination in violation of public policy, termination and

retaliation in violation of California’s Fair Employment and

Housing Act, Breach of Contract, Breach of the Implied Covenant

of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, and Intentional Infliction of

Emotional Distress. (Doc. 1-1.) HHC filed its answer in

Superior Court on June 7, 2005, asserting various affirmative

defenses, including the defense that the complaint is preempted

by section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 

§ 185(a). (Doc. 1-1.) HHC removed the case to federal court on

the ground that it raises a federal question in that it arises

under section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act. Plaintiff

did not object to removal. Instead, both parties proceeded with

discovery. 

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On April 28, 2006, HHC filed a motion to compel further

disclosures “regarding the calculation of all categories of the

damages he seeks in this case...,” and requesting sanctions to

compensate HHC for the expenses, including attorney’s fees,

incurred in bringing the motion to compel. (Doc. 10 at 1.) 

Before a decision on the motion to compel issued, HHC filed a

motion for summary judgment and a hearing was set for June 19,

2006. (Doc. 14, filed May 19, 2006.) On April 30, 2006,

Magistrate Judge Dennis L. Beck granted HHC’s motion to compel,

but denied its request for sanctions. (Doc. 23.) Specifically,

Judge Beck reasoned:

Rule 26 does not define the specificity required in

initial damages disclosures. Thus, “guidance as to the

adequacy of the disclosures must be gleaned from Rule

26(a)’s purpose: to ‘accelerate the exchange of basic

information’ that is ‘needed in most cases to prepare

for trial or make an informed decision about

settlement.’” City and County of San Francisco v. TutoSaliba Corp., 218 F.R.D. 219, 221 (N.D. Cal. 2003).

Early disclosure also functions to assist the parties

in focusing and prioritizing their organization of

discovery. Id. Given these purposes, a plaintiff should

provide more than a lump sum statement of the damages

allegedly sustained. Id. The “computation” of damages

required by Rule 26(a)(1)(C) contemplates some

analysis. For example, in a claim for lost wages, there

should be some information relating to hours worked and

pay rate. Id. (citations omitted). 

The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s statement regarding

damages is insufficient. Defendant’s motion is

therefore GRANTED. Plaintiff shall supplement his

damages calculation within ten (10) days of the date of

service of this order. Defendant’s request for

sanctions is DENIED.

(Doc. 23 at 3.) 

Prior to the date for oral argument on HHC’s motion for

summary judgment, HHC filed the instant motion for terminating

sanctions based on its allegation that Plaintiff failed to comply

with Judge Beck’s order compelling further disclosures. The

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hearing on the motion for summary judgment was vacated and the

motion for sanctions was set for hearing before the district

court. (Minute order filed July 10, 2006.) 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Request for Dismissal. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2) provides that if a

party “fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery” a

court “may make such orders in regard to the failure as are

just,” including issuing:

(A) An order that the matters regarding which the order

was made or any other designated facts shall be taken

to be established for the purposes of the action in

accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the

order;

(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to

support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or

prohibiting that party from introducing designated

matters in evidence;

(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof,

or staying further proceedings until the order is

obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any

part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default

against the disobedient party;

(D) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in

addition thereto, an order treating as a contempt of

court the failure to obey any orders except an order to

submit to a physical or mental examination;

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 37(b)(2). “Where it is determined that counsel

or a party has acted willfully or in bad faith in failing to

comply with the rules of discovery or with court orders enforcing

the rules or in flagrant disregard of those rules or orders, it

is within the discretion of the trial court to dismiss the action

or to render judgment by default against the party responsible

for noncompliance.” G-K Properties v. Redevelopment Agency of

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the City of San Jose, 577 F.2d 645, 647 (9th Cir. 1978).

“Disobedient conduct not shown to be outside the control of the

litigant is all that is required to demonstrate willfulness, bad

faith, or fault.” Henry v. Gill Industries, Inc., 983 F.2d 943,

948 (9th Cir. 1993).

Here, as a sanction for failing to provide further the

ordered disclosures regarding damages, HHC requests “an order

forbidding Plaintiff from offering any evidence in this case

supporting his alleged damages and/or that Plaintiff’s case be

dismissed,” the ultimate sanction. (Doc. 26.) 

In opposition to the motion for sanctions, Plaintiff asserts

that, soon after receiving the order granting the motion to

compel, Plaintiff drafted a stipulation of dismissal and faxed

that draft to counsel for HHC. (Doc. 29, Chatoian Decl. at ¶¶5-

6.) That draft stipulation provides for dismissal with prejudice

and that each side will bear its own costs and attorney’s fees. 

(Doc. 29.) 

HHC rejoins that “[t]he mere fact that Plaintiff discussed

dismissal with Defendant did nothing to comply with the Court’s

discovery order at issue in this motion...Hedrick’s has never

consented to dismissal of the present action and is not obligated

to do so.” (Doc. 30.) In fact, HHC asserts that it previously

refused to agree to a dismissal whereby each party would bear

their own costs. HHC apparently made a counter-offer of

settlement to Plaintiff, to which Plaintiff has not responded. 

Instead of responding to the counter-offer, Plaintiff apparently

submitted to HHC the above-mentioned draft stipulation, which

again requires each party to bear its own costs, the very offer

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Under California and Federal law, a prevailing party is 1

entitled to recover costs of suit. 

6

HHC previously rejected.

HHC is entitled to refuse to consent to dismissal under the

circumstances. Without such consent, Plaintiff needed to move 1

for dismissal with reasonable conditions. An offer of dismissal

is insufficient to obviate Plaintiff of his discovery

obligations. As Plaintiff’s counsel declined to be present at

the hearing on this motion to demonstrate that Plaintiff’s

disobedient conduct was outside his control. See Henry, 983 F.2d

at 948. Absent such a demonstration, there is no alternative but

to conclude that Plaintiff willfully failed to comply with his

discovery obligations. See id. Accordingly, under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 37, dismissal is an appropriate sanction if no

lesser sanction would be sufficient. Here, given Plaintiff’s

apparent abandonment of his claims on the merits, a sanction less

than dismissal with costs being awarded to defendant would be

ineffective. Accordingly, Plaintiffs complaint is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE for violating a court order. Costs shall be awarded to

defendant as a matter of course. 

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B. Requests for Monetary Sanctions.

Defendant has also moved for monetary sanctions to

compensate HHC for reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses

incurred in making this motion under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 37(a)(4)(A), which provides:

If the motion is granted or if the disclosure or

requested discovery is provided after the motion was

filed, the court shall, after affording an opportunity

to be heard, require the party or deponent whose

conduct necessitated the motion or the party or

attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay

to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in

making the motion, including attorney's fees, unless

the court finds that the motion was filed without the

movant's first making a good faith effort to obtain the

disclosure or discovery without court action, or that

the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or

objection was substantially justified, or that other

circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.

Here, although Plaintiff’s failure to comply with his

discovery obligations does warrant dismissal and the award of

costs to defendant as a matter of course, the posture of this

case does not warrant further monetary sanctions. This motion

was filed after it became clear to all parties that Plaintiff

intended to abandon his claims, at a time when the only issue

that remained in dispute was whether Plaintiff should be required

to cover some or all of the costs and attorney’s fees incurred by

HHC. Awarding costs to defendant is an appropriate financial

sanction. No further sanctions are justified. 

Defendant has apparently filed a subsequent motion

requesting monetary sanctions to compensate HHC for Plaintiff’s

failure to appear at a recent settlement conference. This motion

is ordered off calendar. 

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s complaint is

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Defendant shall submit a bill of costs

in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the

Local Rules of the Eastern District of California. Defendant

shall submit a form of judgement within ten (10) days of service

of this order in accordance with this memorandum decision.

 The pending motion for sanctions (Doc. 35) is ORDERED OFF

CALENDAR. 

SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 10, 2006

_/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER_____

Oliver W. Wanger

United States District Judge

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