Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00647/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00647-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAYMOMD THOMAS GARCIA, Jr.,

Booking #1902300268,

Plaintiff,

vs.

RAYMOND MADDEN, 

Superintendent / CSP Warden,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-00647-WQH-BGS

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

[ECF No. 2]

2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) AND 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)

AND

3) DENYING MISCELLANEOUS 

MOTION AS MOOT 

[ECF No. 4]

Raymond Thomas Garcia, Jr., currently incarcerated at the San Bernardino County 

Sheriff Department’s Central Detention Center, and proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights 

Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Compl.”), together with a Motion to Proceed In 

Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) on April 5, 2019. See ECF Nos. 1, 2. 

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Garcia has since filed a miscellaneous motion entitled “Motion for the Right of 

Right(s) of Civil Procedure(s) / Civil Right(s) under Color of Law,” see ECF No. 4, a prison 

trust account statement in support of his IFP Motion, see ECF No. 5, and a “Memorandum 

[of] Point(s) and Authoritie(s).” See ECF No. 7.

Because Garcia has complied with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2), the Court grants 

him leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). 

But because his Complaint and subsequent filings suggest Garcia seeks relief which is not 

available under § 1983, the Court dismisses his Complaint without prejudice pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), denies his miscellaneous pending motion as moot, 

and grants him leave to amend.

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

To institute a civil action, Garcia must pay a filing fee of $400.1 See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1914(a). The action may proceed despite his failure to prepay the entire fee only if he is 

granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews, 493 F.3d at 

1051; Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, because he is a 

prisoner, even if he is granted leave to proceed IFP, Garcia remains obligated to pay the 

entire filing fee in “increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. 

Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and 

regardless of whether his action is dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. 

Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 6-

month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); 

 

1

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June 1, 2016)). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account 

statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits 

in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account 

for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner 

then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in 

any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the Court 

until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his IFP Motion, Garcia submitted a Trust Account Summary from the

San Bernardino County Sheriff Department’s Jail Information Management System 

attesting to his trust account activity since his arrest date on February 6, 2019. See ECF 

No. 5 at 1-2; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119.

This summary shows Garcia had a total of $413.82 deposited to his account, and a total of 

$413.67 withdrawn, leaving him with only a $.15 balance at the time of filing. See ECF 

No. 7 at 1. 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Garcia’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) and 

assesses no initial partial filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no 

event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action 

or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which 

to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 

(finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a 

prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available 

to him when payment is ordered.”). The remaining balance of the $350 total fee owed in 

this case must be collected by the agency having custody of Garcia and forwarded to the 

Clerk of the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

III. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Garcia is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his complaint requires a preCase 3:19-cv-00647-WQH-BGS Document 8 Filed 06/05/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 10
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answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes, 

the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which 

is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are 

immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the 

targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief 

[is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, 

the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility 

standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Garcia’s Complaint is practically illegible, rambling, disjointed, and comprised of 

case citations, dates, and references to prior prison commitments and habeas petitions. His 

Complaint, as well as the Memorandum of Points & Authorities he has submitted in support

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(ECF No. 7), are both peppered with legal jargon, but they contain very few 

comprehensible facts. As best the Court can decipher, however, Garcia seeks monetary 

damages for every day he has been “wrongfully held” based on his “arbitrary confinement” 

and intermittent terms of “false imprisonment” dating back to 2008. See Compl., ECF No. 

1 at 1, 4-5, 11-13. He names Raymond Madden, the Warden of Centinela State Prison “et

al.,” as the sole Defendant, id. at 1, but he is currently incarcerated at the San Bernardino 

County Sheriff Department’s Central Detention Center, and his Complaint seeks to hold 

the Director of the Bureau of Prison Terms, Kern Valley State Prison, the CDCR, and

“Sacramento” all liable for miscalculating his custody credits, lengthening his prior prison 

term, and delaying his release on parole in 2008. Id. at 5, 8, 11-13.

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 789 F.3d 1030, 

1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015).

D. Criminal Proceedings – Heck’s “Favorable Termination” Requirement

There are two methods for state prisoners to raise complaints related to their 

imprisonment in federal court. See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) 

(“Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to imprisonment....”) 

(citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)). In general, claims of constitutional 

violations related to the “circumstances” of a prisoner’s confinement must be brought in a 

civil rights action under Section 1983, see id., while constitutional challenges to the validity 

or duration of a prisoner’s confinement which seek either “immediate release from prison” 

or the “shortening of [a state prison] term” must be raised in a petition for federal habeas 

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, or through appropriate state relief. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 

544 U.S. 74, 78-79 (2005) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Nettles v. 

Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“The Court has long held that habeas 

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is the exclusive vehicle for claims brought by state prisoners that fall within the core of 

habeas, and such claims may not be brought in a § 1983 action.”) (citing Dotson, 544 U.S. 

at 81-82).

Thus, to the extent Garcia seeks damages based on claims that he has been 

unlawfully convicted, sentenced, and/or incarcerated, he may not pursue those claims in a 

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, without first showing his conviction (or 

convictions) has already been invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 

(1994).

In Heck, the Supreme Court held:

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional 

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions 

whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence 

invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or 

sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by 

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to 

make such determination, or called into question by a federal 

court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A 

claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or 

sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under 

§ 1983.

Id. at 486-87; Washington v. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1054-55 

(9th Cir. 2016).

“Suits challenging the validity of the prisoner’s continued incarceration lie within 

‘the heart of habeas corpus,’ whereas ‘a § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner 

who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the 

fact or length of his custody.’” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2003)

(emphasis added), quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 498-99 (holding that a writ of habeas corpus 

is “explicitly and historically designed” to provide a state prisoner with the “exclusive” 

means to “attack the validity of his confinement” in federal court).

Because it appears that Garcia seeks damages based on allegations that he has and 

continues to suffer an “arbitrary confinement” and “aggravated wrongful detention,” see

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Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1, 13, he may not proceed pursuant to § 1983, unless and until his 

conviction, sentence and/or parole revocation proceedings have already been invalidated. 

Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 855-56 (“Absent such a showing, ‘[e]ven 

a prisoner who has fully exhausted available state remedies has no cause of action under

§ 1983.’”), quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 489. This is because an award of damages in his 

favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his convictions and consequently affect the 

duration of his confinement. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487; see also Pattillo v. Lombardo, No. 

2:17-CV-01849-JAD-VCF, 2017 WL 3622778, at *4 (D. Nev. Aug. 23, 2017) (“When a 

prisoner challenges the legality or duration of his custody, raises a constitutional challenge 

which could entitle him to an earlier release ... or seeks damages for purported deficiencies 

in his state court criminal case, which effected a conviction or lengthier sentence, his sole 

federal remedy is the writ of habeas corpus.”).

Because Garcia does not claim to have already invalidated either his previous 

conviction or the parole revocation proceedings which may form the basis of his current 

term of detention by way of direct appeal, executive order, or through the issuance of either 

a state or federal court writ of habeas corpus, Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, his Complaint must 

be dismissed sua sponte and in its entirety for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 

relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b). See Phillipi 

v. Does, No. CIV. 11-2612 DMS RBB, 2011 WL 6400303, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2011)

(sua sponte dismissing civil rights action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A 

because “habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy whenever the claim for damages 

depends on a determination that ... the sentence currently being served is 

unconstitutionally long.”) (citing Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643-44 (1997); Heck, 

512 U.S. at 486–87; Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Wilhelm, 680 

F.3d at 1121.

E. Leave to Amend

In light of his pro se status, however, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an 

Amended Complaint in order to address the pleading deficiencies identified in this Order, 

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if he can. See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district court 

should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)] unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint 

could not be cured by amendment.’”) (quoting Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th 

Cir. 2012)).2

IV. Conclusion and Orders

For the reasons explained, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Garcia’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 2).

2. DIRECTS the Watch Commander of San Bernardino County Sheriff 

Department’s Central Detention Center, or his designee, to collect from Plaintiff’s inmate 

trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing monthly payments in an 

amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forwarding 

those payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS MUST BE CLEARLY 

IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

 

2 Because Garcia’s initial pleadings in this case are virtually impossible to understand, the 

Court cautions that any Amended Complaint he files must comply Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8, which requires that each pleading include a “short and plain statement of the 

claim,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and that “each allegation must be simple, concise, and 

direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). A district court may dismiss a complaint for failure to 

comply with Rule 8 where it fails to provide the defendant fair notice of the wrongs 

allegedly committed. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178–80 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(upholding Rule 8(a) dismissal of complaint that was “argumentative, prolix, replete with 

redundancy, and largely irrelevant”); Cafasso, United States ex rel. v. General Dynamics 

C4 Systems, Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1059 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing cases upholding Rule 8 

dismissals where pleadings were “verbose,” “confusing,” “distracting, ambiguous, and 

unintelligible,” “highly repetitious,” and comprised of “incomprehensible rambling,” and 

noting that “[o]ur district courts are busy enough without having to penetrate a tome 

approaching the magnitude of War and Peace to discern a plaintiff’s claims and 

allegations.”).

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3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Watch 

Commander, San Bernardino County Sheriff Department Central Detention Center, 630 E. 

Rialto Road, San Bernardino, California, 92408.

4. DISMISSES Garcia’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b), and DENIES his

Motion for the Right of Right(s) of Civil Right Procedure(s) (ECF No. 4) as moot.

5. GRANTS Garcia forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in 

which to file an Amended Complaint which cures the deficiencies of pleading noted. 

Garcia’s Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to his original 

pleading. Defendants not named and any claim not re-alleged in his Amended Complaint 

will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard 

Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading 

supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended 

pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

If Garcia fails to file an Amended Complaint within 45 days, the Court will enter a 

final Order dismissing this civil action based both on his failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b), and his failure 

to prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring amendment. See Lira v. Herrera, 

427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of the 

opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the complaint 

into dismissal of the entire action.”).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 5, 2019

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