Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_18-cv-00087/USCOURTS-azd-4_18-cv-00087-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Melvin Elem,

Petitioner,

v. 

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-18-0087-TUC-JGZ (BGM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Currently pending before the Court is Petitioner Melvin Elem’s Petition Pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Non-Death 

Penalty) (“Petition”) (Doc. 1). Respondents have filed a Limited Answer to Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 14), and Petitioner replied (Doc. 17). The

Petition (Doc. 1) is ripe for adjudication.

Pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure,1this matter 

was referred to Magistrate Judge Macdonald for Report and Recommendation. The 

Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court deny the Petition (Doc. 1).

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Initial Charge and Sentencing

The Arizona Court of Appeals stated the facts2as follows:

1 Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.

2 As these state court findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness and Petitioner 

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One afternoon in December 2012, C.S. was at home with her two sons 

when she heard a knock at her front door. As she opened the door, she saw 

Melvin’s brother, Larry. C.S. knew both Melvin and Larry from the 

neighborhood. Larry repeatedly demanded to speak with C.S.’s boyfriend 

A.A., who also lived there. Larry wanted to speak to A.A. about an 

accusation of arson involving Melvin. C.S. told Larry repeatedly that A.A. 

was at work and not home. C.S. asked Larry to leave numerous times but he 

refused and started yelling angrily. C.S. called the police.

After hanging up with the police, C.S. looked out at the street and saw 

Melvin sitting in his car. She went out to speak with Melvin to ask if he 

could convince Larry to leave. As she spoke with Melvin, she saw a gun 

next to him in the car, which made her “really, really scared.” Melvin got 

out of the car with gun in hand and followed her back toward the house.[2]

C.S. testified that Melvin was yelling at her from outside, shouting 

obscenities and “very mean, violent things” such as “Bitch, I’m going to kill 

you” and “I’m going to hurt you,” and threatening to kill her children as well. 

Calling 9-1-1 again, C.S. told the operator that “Melvin Elem” was outside 

her house and was threatening to “shoot [her] and kill [her].”[3]

Melvin threw a rock through C.S.’s front living room window, 

shattering it. C.S.’s four-year-old son was standing about eight feet away 

from the window at that point. She ran to get her on-year-old son out of his 

crib and placed both children in one bedroom. Then she went outside to see 

what Melvin and Larry were doing, fearing that they might try to shoot her 

through the window or invade her home. She saw Melvin standing in her 

yard with a rock in one hand and a gun in the other. When Melvin saw her, 

he started “coming after” her as though “[h]e was . . . getting ready to run 

towards [her], like lunge.” C.S. pulled her own gun out of her pocket and 

fired about three shots; one hitting Melvin and causing him to fall.[4] She 

went back inside, shut the screen door, and checked on her children.

By this point, Larry had parked his pickup truck at an angle in the 

street in front of the house. Standing on the ground between the open driver’s 

door and the cab of the truck, Larry fired one or two shots at the house.[5]

has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the findings are erroneous, the Court 

hereby adopts these factual findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 

473–74, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 1940, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 426, 

105 S.Ct. 844, 853, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); Cf. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 

1204, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). Petitioner asserts that testimony was perjured or inadmissible 

hearsay; however, he provides no evidence of the same. See, e.g., Petition (Doc. 1) at 16, 18. Such 

speculation does not rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence.

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Shortly thereafter, a neighbor across the street who had heard the 

commotion came outside and began recording video using his cell phone. 

The video showed Melvin in the street hobbling toward his car after having 

been shot, and he could be heard saying to Larry, “C’mon bro, I’m gonna get 

my gun.” It further showed Melvin climbing into the driver’s seat of his car, 

beginning to drive away slowly, and then pointing the gun at C.S.’s house 

and firing one shot.[6] The neighbor who was filming testified he saw the 

muzzle of Melvin’s gun flash in “a bright line of light extending from the 

[car] window towards [C.S.’s] house.” C.S. testified she heard a single 

gunshot a minute or two after she shot Melvin, but did not see who fired it. 

She also testified she saw Melvin and Larry drive away just after the shot 

was fired. She observed them through the open front door or the front 

window, which both faced the street. Melvin was apprehended minutes later, 

the sole occupant of the black car visible in the video.

[2] The state did not allege a criminal act from this interaction.

[3] The call was recorded and admitted at trial.

[4] In another recorded 9-1-1 call later admitted as an exhibit, C.S. can be 

heard telling the operator that just before the call, she “had to shoot at” a man 

who had been “throwing rocks at [her] window” and “threatening [her] and 

[her] son.”

[5] Larry was charged with multiple criminal acts and tried jointly with 

Melvin, but his convictions are not the subject of this appeal nor do they 

affect it.

[6] This shot can also be heard in the recording of a 9-1-1 call from another 

neighbor. The neighbor then says that “[t]he guy in the black, that was 

yelling, took off.” The cell phone video shows Melvin wearing black and 

yelling, and then driving away after he fires the shot.

Answer (Doc. 14), Ariz. Ct. of Appeals, Case No. 2 CA-CR 2014-0167, Mem. Decision 

11/30/2015 (Exh. “A”) (Doc. 15) at 4–6.

3

Following a jury trial, Defendant Melvin Elem was “convicted of drive-by shooting, 

discharging a firearm at a residential structure, endangerment, and disorderly conduct.” 

3 Page citations refer to the CM/ECF page number for ease of reference. Also, although 

Petitioner has attached the state court records to his Petition (Doc. 1) and the Court has reviewed 

the same, the Court references only exhibits included with the Government’s Answer (Doc. 13) 

for ease of reference.

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Id., Exh. “A” at 4. On May 5, 2014, Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent, presumptive 

terms of fifteen point seventy-five (15.75) years imprisonment for the drive-by shooting 

and discharging a firearm counts, and presumptive three point seventy-five (3.75) year 

terms of imprisonment for the disorderly conduct and endangerment convictions. See 

Answer (Doc. 14), Ariz. Superior Ct., Pima County, Case No. CR20124581-001, Minute 

Entry—Sentence of Imprisonment 5/5/2014 (Exh. “C”) (Doc. 15) at 54–56. The 3.75-year 

disorderly conduct and endangerment terms were ordered to run concurrently with one 

another, and consecutively to the 15.75-year sentences. Id., Exh. “C” at 55–56.

B. Direct Appeal

On May 11, 2014, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal from the judgment and 

sentence. See Answer (Doc. 14), Ariz. Superior Ct., Pima County, Case No. CR20124581-

001, Def.’s Not. of Appeal 5/11/2014 (Exh. “D”) (Doc. 15). On February 16, 2015, counsel 

for Petitioner filed an Opening Brief asserting seven (7) issues for review. See Answer 

(Doc. 14), Ariz. Ct. of Appeals, Case No. 2 CA-CR 2014-0167, Appellant’s Opening Br. 

2/16/2015 (Exh. “E”) (Doc. 15). Petitioner’s issues included whether 1) there was 

sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction and sentence on drive by shooting as alleged 

in Count Four; 2) there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction for discharging a 

weapon at a residential structure as alleged in Count Three; 3) there was sufficient 

foundation for the evidence presented to sustain a finding that appellant was previously 

convicted of three historical felonies; 4) the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s Rule 

20 motions; 5) the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion in limine allowing 

evidence that Appellant had been accused of arson; 6) the trial court erred by ordering the 

sentences on Counts One and Two to run consecutively to the sentences on Counts Three 

and Four; and 7) there was sufficient evidence to sustain Appellant’s conviction for 

endangerment, risk of imminent death of C.S., A.A.(1) and A.A.(2) as alleged in Count 

Two of the indictment. See id., Exh. “E” (Doc. 15). On November 30, 2015, the Arizona 

Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions, found that the imposition of a 

consecutive sentence for endangerment was fundamental error and modified it to be served 

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concurrently with his sentences for drive-by shooting and discharging a firearm at a 

residential structure, and otherwise affirmed the sentences as imposed. Answer (Doc. 14), 

Ariz. Ct. App., Case No. 2 CA-CR 2014-0167, Memorandum Decision 11/30/2015 (Exh. 

“A”) (Doc. 15).

The court of appeals first considered the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s postverdict motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 20, Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure, as to the disorderly conduct conviction, as well as the court’s denial of his preverdict Rule 20 motion as to the aggravated assault charge. Id., Exh. “A” at 7. The 

appellate court noted that “[a] jury verdict cannot be vacated for insufficient evidence 

unless it clearly appears that ‘upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient evidence to 

support the conclusion reached by the jury.’” Id., Exh. “A” at 7 (quoting State v. 

Arredondo, 155 Ariz. 314, 316, 746 P.2d 484, 486 (Ariz. 1987)). The appellate court 

further noted that it would not “disturb the trial court’s denial of a Rule 20 motion unless 

there is a ‘complete absence of ‘substantial evidence’ to support the conviction.’” Id., Exh. 

“A” at 7 (quoting State v. Sullivan, 187 Ariz. 599, 603, 931 P.2d 1109, 1113 (Ariz. Ct. 

App. 1996) (quoting Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20(a))). The appellate court reviewed C.S.’s 

testimony and Melvin’s actions and found that substantial evidence existed to support a 

jury finding of guilt as to the aggravated assault charge and the disorderly conduct charge. 

Id., Exh. “A” at 8–9. As such, the trial court did not err in denying Petitioner’s Rule 20 

motions. Answer (Doc. 14), Exh. “A” (Doc. 15) at 8–9. 

Next, the court of appeals considered the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain 

Petitioner’s conviction of drive-by shooting. Id., Exh. “A” at 9–10. The appellate court 

stated that the offense of drive-by shooting is “committed by intentionally discharging a 

weapon from a motor vehicle at a person.” Id., Exh. “A” at 9 (citing A.R.S. § 13-1209(A)). 

The appellate court acknowledged that “[a] person also commits drive-by shooting by 

intentionally discharging a weapon from a motor vehicle at an occupied structure . . . which 

is implicated by shooting at the house.” Id., Exh. “A” at 9 (citing A.R.S. § 13-1209(A)). 

The indictment, however, “alleged only that Melvin had committed drive-by shooting by 

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intentionally discharging a weapon from a motor vehicle at C.S. or either of her two 

children.” Id., Exh. “A” at 9. The appellate court considered Melvin’s own statements 

regarding getting his gun and threatening C.S., as well as video showing him aiming the 

gun while she was in proximity of the front door or window, to determine that sufficient 

evidence existed to support a finding of guilt as to drive-by shooting. Answer (Doc. 14), 

Exh. “A” (Doc. 15) at 9. The appellate court also found that “the state was only required 

to prove that Melvin intentionally had fired at one or more of the named victims, not 

necessarily all three.” Id., Exh. “A” at 9–10 (citing State v. Bowsher, 225 Ariz. 586, ¶ 7, 

242 P.3d 1055, 1056 (Ariz. 2010)). As such, the appellate court determined that “[t]he trial 

court did not err in finding Rivera distinguishable, because in that case the state failed to 

identify any evidence that the defendant shot at the one particular victim named in the 

indictment.” Id., Exh. “A” at 10 (citing State v. Rivera, 226 Ariz. 325, ¶¶ 4–5, 247 P.3d 

560, 562–63 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011)).

Third, the appellate court considered the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

Petitioner’s conviction for “knowingly discharging a firearm at a residential structure in 

violation of A.R.S. § 13-1211(A).” Id., Exh. “A” at 10. The appellate considered the 

testimony regarding Petitioner’s threats of harm to C.S. and concluded that those 

statements “constituted indirect, but substantial evidence to establish [Petitioner] 

purposefully fired his gun.” Id., Exh. “A” at 10 (citing A.R.S. §§ 13-105(10)(a), 13-

202(C)). The appellate court further noted that “the evidence that Melvin knew C.S. and 

A.A. lived in the house was sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude the house was a 

permanent structure adapted for human residence.” Answer (Doc. 14), Exh. “A” (Doc. 15) 

at 10 (citing A.R.S. § 13-1211(C)(2)). The appellate court reviewed the evidence including 

“the video show[ing] Melvin pointing the gun out the passenger window of the car toward 

C.S.’s house just before the muzzle flash[,] . . . [and] the neighbor who was filming[’s] 

testi[mony] [that] he saw ‘a bright line of light extending from the [car] window towards 

[C.S.’s] house.” Id., Exh. “A” at 10 (alterations 8 and 9 in original). The appellate court 

concluded that “[b]ased on this evidence, reasonable persons could conclude Melvin 

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knowingly had discharged a firearm at a residential structure.” Id., Exh. “A” at 10.

Fourth, the appellate court considered the sufficiency of the evidence underlying 

Petitioner’s conviction for endangerment with a substantial risk of imminent death. Id., 

Exh. “A” at 11–12. The appellate court noted that “[a] person ‘commits endangerment by 

recklessly endangering another person with a substantial risk of imminent death[.]” Id., at 

Exh. “A” at 11 (quoting A.R.S. § 13-1201(A)). The court assumed that “the state was 

required to prove Melvin had endangered all three victims listed in the indictment,” and 

found that “the state [had] presented more than a mere scintilla of evidence that he had 

done so.” Answer (Doc. 14), Exh. “A” (Doc. 15) at 11. Based on C.S.’s testimony and a 

bullet hole in the wall of the house above the front window, the court found that “[t]he jury 

reasonably could have found that the bullet hole came from the shot Melvin had fired, or 

from one of the bullets Larry had fired, and found Melvin guilty under the accomplice 

theory on which the jury was instructed.” Id., Exh. “A” at 11–12 (citing A.R.S. §§ 13-301, 

13-303(A)(3)). The appellate court further found that “a reasonable juror could have 

concluded the bullet that narrowly missed the front window placed the children in actual 

substantial risk of imminent death.” Id., Exh. “A” at 12 (citing State v. Carreon, 210 Ariz. 

54, ¶¶ 38, 42, 107 P.3d 900, 909, 910 (Ariz. 2005)). As such, the appellate court found 

that the trial court did not err. Id., Exh. “A” at 12.

Fifth, the appellate court considered whether the state had met its burden to prove 

Petitioner’s three (3) historical prior felony convictions. Id., Exh. “A” at 12. The appellate 

court observed that “[t]o prove a historical prior felony conviction, it is sufficient for the 

state to introduce a certified copy of the prior conviction and prove that the defendant is 

the person to whom the document refers.” Answer (Doc. 14), Exh. “A” (Doc. 15) at 12–

13 (citing State v. Lee, 114 Ariz. 101, 105, 559 P.2d 657, 661 (Ariz. 1976)). The appellate 

court observed that “[t]he state introduced certified copies of the judgments and sentences 

from each of Melvin’s prior convictions, as well as a certified copy of Melvin’s ‘pen pack,’ 

a packet of information assembled by the Arizona Department of Corrections detailing 

Melvin’s history of criminal convictions and incarceration, his personal information, his 

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fingerprints, and more.” Id., Exh. “A” at 13. The appellate court further observed that the 

pen pack documents and photographs, including his date of birth, corresponded with court 

records. Id., Exh. “A” at 13. As such, the appellate court held that “[t]he trial court did 

not err in finding this evidence sufficient to establish each of Melvin’s three historical prior 

felony convictions.” Id., Exh. “A” at 13 (citing Lee, 114 Ariz. at 105, 559 P.2d at 661).

Sixth, the appellate court considered the trial court’s grant of “the state’s motion in 

limine . . . allowing C.S. to testify that her boyfriend A.A. had previously accused Melvin 

of arson, and that Melvin and Larry went to C.S.’s house on the day of the crime to confront 

A.A. about it.” Id., Exh. “A” at 13. The appellate court found that “evidence of A.A.’s 

prior accusation that Melvin had committed arson was relevant to the issue of Melvin’s 

motive and intent.” Answer (Doc. 14), Exh. “A” (Doc. 15) at 14 (citing Ariz. R. Evid. 401; 

then citing State v. Jeffers, 135 Ariz. 404, 418, 661 P.2d 1105, 1119 (Ariz. 1983); then 

citing State v. Tuttle, 58 Ariz. 116, 120, 118 P.2d 88, 90 (Ariz. 1940)). As such, the 

appellate court determined that the trial court “did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 

evidence.” Id., Exh. “A” at 14. The appellate court also found that “[t]he trial court 

reasonably could have concluded that evidence A.A. had accused Melvin of committing 

arson, rather than sanitized testimony about a dispute or disagreement, was more accurate 

and would allow the jury to fairly determine whether Melvin’s actions giving rise to this 

appeal were motivated by a grudge.” Id., Exh. “A” at 14–15 (citing Ariz. R. Evid. 401(a)). 

Finally, the appellate court observed that “Melvin did not submit a written request for a 

limiting instruction with his other proposed instructions, nor did he object to its absence 

from the final instructions,” and as such he had “waived the issue as to all but fundamental 

error.” Id., Exh. “A” at 15 (citations omitted). “Because Melvin d[id] not argue the alleged 

error was fundamental he forfeit[ed] the analysis.” Id., Exh. “A” at 15 (citing State v. 

Moreno-Medrano, 218 Ariz. 349, ¶ 17, 185 P.3d 135, 140 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008)).

Lastly, the appellate court considered Petitioner’s argument that “the trial court 

violated A.R.S. § 13-116 by ordering him to serve the concurrent sentences for disorderly 

conduct and endangerment consecutively to his concurrent sentences for drive-by shooting 

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and discharging a firearm at a residential structure.” Answer (Doc. 14), Exh. “A” (Doc. 

15) at 15. The appellate court observed that because “Melvin failed to raise this argument 

at sentencing, . . . [its] review [is limited] to fundamental, prejudicial error.” The appellate 

court reviewed the test for determining “whether two convictions arise out of a single ‘act’ 

for purposes of [A.R.S.] § 13-116[.]” Id., Exh. “A” at 16 (citing State v. Gordon, 161 Ariz. 

308, 315, 778 P.2d 1204, 1211 (Ariz. 1989)). After application of the Gordon test, the 

appellate court found that “Melvin’s consecutive sentence for disorderly conduct d[id] not 

violate” the test; however, the endangerment count was a single act with the drive-by 

shooting and discharging a firearm at a residential structure counts, and the sentence for 

endangerment should not have been imposed consecutively. Id., Exh. “A” at 16–17. The 

court modified Petitioner’s sentence accordingly. Id., Exh. “A” at 17–18.

The appellate court sua sponte reviewed count two of the indictment, which lacked 

“a coordinating conjunction among the victims’ names [and which] arguably create[d] an 

ambiguity . . . constitut[ing] a duplicitous charge[.]” Id., Exh. “A” at 18 (citing State v. 

Petrak, 198 Ariz. 260, ¶ 23, 8 P.3d 1174, 1180–81 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000)). After review of 

the verdict form and interrogatories contained therein, as well as the jury’s responses to 

those interrogatories, the appellate court held that there was “no doubt that the jury was 

actually unanimous that Melvin was guilty of endangerment as to all three individuals listed 

in Count Two[,] [and] [a]ny arguable duplicity in the indictment was not prejudicial as to 

Melvin.” Answer (Doc. 14), Exh. “A” (Doc. 15) at 18–19 (citing Petrak, 198 Ariz. at ¶ 

17)).

On December 14, 2015, Petitioner petitioned the Arizona Supreme Court for review. 

See Answer (Doc. 14), Arizona Supreme Court, Case No. CR-15-0424-PR, Pet.’s Pet. for 

Review 12/14/2015 (Exh. “F”) (Doc. 15). On May 4, 2016, the Arizona Supreme Court 

denied review. See Answer (Doc. 14), Arizona Supreme Court, Case No. CR-15-0424-

PR, Memorandum 5/4/2016 (Exh. “G”) (Doc. 15). On May 25, 2016, the Arizona Court 

of Appeals issued its mandate. See State v. Melvin Elem, State of Ariz., Ct. of Appeals, 

Case No. 2 CA-CR 2014-0167, Docket.

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C. Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding

On December 29, 2015, Petitioner filed his Notice of Post-Conviction Relief

(“PCR”). See Answer (Doc. 14), Ariz. Superior Ct., Pima County, Case No. CR20124581-

001, Def.’s Not. of PCR (Exh. “H”) (Doc. 15). On February 3, 2016, the trial court 

appointed counsel to Petitioner for the Rule 32 proceeding. See Answer (Doc. 14), Ariz. 

Superior Ct., Pima County, Case No. CR20124581-001, Notice, In Chambers Re: Def.’s 

Notice of PCR (Exh. “I”) (Doc. 15). On November 28, 2016, Petitioner filed his Petition 

for Post-Conviction Relief (Rule 32). See Answer (Doc. 14), Ariz. Superior Ct., Pima

County, Case No. CR20124581-001, Pet.’s Pet. for PCR (Exh. “J”) (Doc. 15).

1. PCR Petition

Petitioner asserted a single claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for 

an alleged failure to argue that the trial court “committed reversible error in denying the 

defense the right to examine the gun fired by [C.S.] and having ballistic tests performed to 

determine the trajectory of the bullets during the incident.” Id., Exh. “J” at 109. Petitioner

noted that his co-defendant, Larry Elem, asserted on appeal that “the trial court violated 

Larry Elem’s due process and constitutional confrontation rights in denying the Motion to 

Compel and have [C.S’s] gun released to the defense for testing, thus violating the 

constitutional right to present a complete defense,” and the Court of Appeals reversed and 

remanded Larry Elem’s case due to the trial court’s prejudicial error. Id., Exh. “J” at 108. 

2. Rule 32 Court Order

On April 3, 2017, the Rule 32 court issued its Order dismissing the Petition for PCR. 

See Answer (Doc. 14), Ariz. Superior Ct., Pima County, Case No. CR20124581-001, 

Ruling, Criminal Ruling Re: Post-Conviction Relief 4/3/2017 (Exh. “O”) (Doc. 16). The 

Rule 32 court delineated the test for ineffective assistance of counsel, stating “[t]o establish 

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that counsel’s 

performance fell below prevailing professional norms and that the outcome of the case 

would have been different but for the deficient performance.” Id., Exh. “O” at 44 (citing 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674 (1984); then 

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citing State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 397, 694 P.2d 222, 227 (Ariz. 1985)). The Rule 32 

court observed that “Petitioner [was relying] on the contention that the issue would have 

been successful on appeal simply because it was successful for his brother”; however, 

Melvin and Larry advanced different arguments at trial. Id., Exh. “O” at 44. Larry argued 

a justification defense at trial, whereas Petitioner maintained that he did not fire his gun at 

all. Id., Exh. “O” at 44. The Rule 32 court further commented that “the direction of [C.S.’s] 

gun was not in dispute with regard to Petitioner because he was actually struck by [her] 

gunfire.” Id., Exh. “O” at 44. The Rule 32 court concluded that “since the direction of the 

gun when aimed at Petitioner was undisputed, any additional evidence to that fact would 

have been cumulative.” Answer (Doc. 14), Exh. “O” (Doc. 16) at 44–45. As such, the 

Rule 32 court found counsel’s performance did not fall below objectively reasonable 

standards, and further found that Petitioner “fail[ed] to prove that he was prejudiced by 

counsel’s performance[.]” Id., Exh. “O” at 45.

3. PCR Appeal

On April 25, 2017, Petitioner filed his Petition for Review Pursuant to the Denial of 

Rule 32, Post Conviction Relief with the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Answer (Doc. 

14), Ariz. Ct. App., Case No. 2 CA-CR 2017-0147-PR, Appellant’s Pet. for Review

Pursuant to the Denial of Rule 32, PCR (Exh. “P”) (Doc. 16). Petitioner asserted that the 

trial court erred in denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See id., Exh. “P.” 

Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in finding appellate counsel’s performance 

deficient when he “fail[ed] to recognize and raise the very issue that obtained relief for 

Melvin’s co-defendant[.]” Id., Exh. “P” at 53. Petitioner further asserted that he was 

prejudiced by appellate counsel’s alleged failure, because there was a reasonable 

probability that if the issue had been raised, the court of appeals would have reversed 

Melvin’s conviction and ordered a new trial. Id., Exh. “P” at 56–57. Petitioner relied on 

the Due Process and Confrontation clauses in arguing that the trial court’s error was not 

harmless. Id., Exh. “P” at 58–64.

On July 25, 2017, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review, but denied relief. 

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See Answer (Doc. 14), Ariz. Ct. App., Case No. 2 CA-CR 2017-0147-PR, Mem. Decision 

7/25/2017 (Exh. “Q”) (Doc. 16). The appellate court reviewed Petitioner’s initial PCR 

petition and the Rule 32 court’s decision. Id., Exh. “Q” at 109–10. The appellate court 

also described Melvin’s brother and co-defendant Larry’s appeal as follows:

Larry also appealed his convictions and sentences, arguing inter alia 

that the trial court had erred by denying his request that an expert be 

permitted to examine and test-fire the victim’s firearm. We concluded that 

Larry was entitled to examine the firearm pursuant to Rule 15.1, Ariz. R. 

Crim. P., and that the error was not harmless because it may have led to 

evidence about the direction in which the gun had been fired during the 

incident and thus bolstered Larry’s justification defense by showing the 

victim also had fired at him instead of only at Melvin. We therefore reversed 

his convictions and sentences and remanded the case for a new trial. State v. 

Elem, No. 2 CA-CR 2014-0437 (Ariz. App. May 12, 2016) (mem. decision).

Id., Exh. “Q” at 109–10. The appellate court noted that the test for ineffective assistance 

of counsel requires a defendant to show “both that counsel’s performance fell below 

objectively reasonable standards and that this deficiency prejudiced the defendant.” Id., 

Exh. “Q” at 110 (citing State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, ¶ 21, 146 P.3d 63, 68 (Ariz. 2006)). 

The appellate court “agree[d] with the trial court that Melvin’s claim warranted summary 

dismissal” and held that “Melvin ha[d] shown neither that counsel fell below prevailing 

professional norms by failing to raise this issue or that he was prejudiced thereby.” Id., 

Exh. “Q” at 110–11.

Petitioner did not seek review by the Arizona Supreme Court, and on November 1, 

2017, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its mandate. Answer (Doc. 14), Ariz. Ct. of 

Appeals, Case No. 2 CA-CR 2017-0147-PR, Mandate 11/11/2017 (Exh. “R”) (Doc. 16).

D. The Instant Habeas Proceeding

On February 16, 2018, Petitioner filed his Petition Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for 

a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Non-Death Penalty) (Doc. 1). 

Petitioner asserts eight (8) grounds for relief, each with multiple sub-parts. See Petition 

(Doc. 1). First, Petitioner alleges that the “Appeals Court errd [sic] by not modifying [his] 

consecutive sentence disorderly [sic] conduct along with [his] other three counts, which

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violated [his] constitutional rights” pursuant to the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 6; Reply (Doc. 

17) at 3. Petitioner urges that a) his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated and A.R.S. 

§ 13-116 was violated because his disorderly conduct sentence was ordered to run 

concurrently with his other convictions, thereby placing Petitioner in double jeopardy; b) 

Petitioner did not receive equal protection of the law during sentencing; c) the appellate 

court failed to protect Petitioner from double jeopardy; d) trial counsel was ineffective 

because he failed to object during sentencing and allowed the illegal sentence in violation 

of A.R.S. § 13-116 to occur, which is a violation of his constitutional rights; e) the appellate 

court’s reliance on State v. Gordon was in error, and Petitioner’s convictions all arose from 

“one single shot or one single act” which required his sentences to run concurrently; f) the 

appellate court used “a real unique role” by modifying Petitioner’s sentence on the 

endangerment count, but affirming his disorderly conduct sentence; and g) the appellate 

court abused its discretion in violation of Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights by failing 

to correct his sentences. Petition (Doc. 1) at 6–7.

Second, Petitioner asserts that the “Appeals Court erred by refusing to reaffirm or 

dismiss an [sic] duplicitous charge[,] there was no substantial evidence to support a [sic] 

endangerment risk of imminent death, which violated [his] constitutional rights.” Id. at 8. 

Petitioner further asserts that a) the appellate court erred by “failing to reaffirm a 

duplicitous charge that a jury didn’t make a guilty verdict on”; b) the appellate court erred 

because “the jury did not mark guilty in [sic] the form on the endangerment count which 

they kept it blank, thus charge should have been dismiss [sic]”; c) Petitioner’s “sentence 

for endangerment was insufficient to warrant a conviction, underlying there was no proof 

of any recklessly endangering another person with a substantial risk of imminent death or 

physical injury [because] no bullets entered the house and the alleged victims was [sic] 

inside their home behind closed doors[,]” and Petitioner was unaware of who was inside 

the home or where the alleged victims were located; d) the court of appeals erred “by 

refusing to grant relief on the endangerment conviction knowing the charge [was] 

duplicitous and there’s no substantial evidence to show probable cause beyond a reasonable 

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doubt”; e) the courts erred by “overlook[ing] the fact that Petitioner was denied a jury 

instruction”; f) “[d]etectives clearly testified that there was a bullet hole only observed up 

high on the header of the attic which his testimony does not prove an actual substantial risk 

of imminent death”; g) the appellate court erred when it took the “position claiming a 

bullet went through the front window which is (incorrect), there is no record or file 

containing [that evidence]”; h) speculative nature of the evidence relied on by the appellate 

court violated Petitioner’s due process and equal protection rights. Id. at 8; Reply (Doc. 

17) at 4.

Third, Petitioner claims that the “Appeals Court erred by not dismissing historical 

priors and refusing to correct an unlawful sentence which the findings of priors was 

insufficient, which violated his constitutional rights.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 9. Petitioner

argues that a) the appellate court erred by failing to overturn Petitioner’s historical priors, 

because they were “only for purposes of nondangerous repetitive offenses, and the alleged 

priors were 10 yrs old”; b) there was “no release date to CR #1779 nor was [Petitioner] 

under parole for CR #1772, and the record shows a false alleged prior dated on January 20, 

2001, which was used for purposes of sentencing”; c) the appellate court “knew that trial 

court failed to reflect dates concerning prior convictions and these priors was [sic] alleged 

after guilty verdicts[,] [and] on record a statement was said claiming that these alleged 

priors cannot be used for purposes of sentencing but only for aggravating factors”; d) he

“was still sentence[d] under an unlawful sentencing range in violations [sic] of the statutory 

limits § A.R.S. 13-704(A)” which placed him in Double Jeopardy; e) he was “entitled to 

be sentence[d] under 13-704 . . . [as a] first time dangerous offender which is a seperate 

[sic] sentencing range from 13-702 nondangerous repetitive offenses[,] [and] [the] sentence 

and priors placed [Petitioner] in harmful double punishment”; f) ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel because he failed to object to the historical nondangerous priors; g) he was 

prejudiced by being illegally sentenced pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-703; h) during the priors 

trial Detective Walker and Parole Officer Wayne testified regarding hearsay without 

knowing Petitioner or being familiar with him; i) Parole Officer Wayne lied about a 

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previous parole officer’s retirement and did not supervise Petitioner; j) no complete 

identification or prior fingerprint was done to prove up historical prior convictions; k) 

hearsay testimony was allowed and there was no substantial proof of the historical prior 

convictions; l) the appellate court showed prejudice against Petitioner and violated his 

Fourteenth Amendment rights by allowing the historical prior convictions to stand without 

substantial proof; and m) the court “relied on misleading information using a prior which 

counted as one under the same CR #2011772 to sentence [Petitioner] in violation of the 

Double Jeopardy Clause in the Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 9–10; Reply (Doc. 17) at 4–5.

Fourth, Petitioner alleges that the “Appeals Court erred by denying relief and failing 

to reaffirm alleged conviction for discharging a weapon at a residential structure, which 

violated [his] constitutional rights.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 11; Reply (Doc. 17) at 5. Petitioner 

urges that a) the appellate court erred by “failing to show substantial evidence that a shot 

was fired from [a] car at a residence”; b) his sentences on Counts Three and Four, 

discharging a weapon at a residential structure and drive-by shooting, were double 

punishment because he should not have been charged with both after a review of the 

evidence; c) the appellate court erred because it “fail[ed] to overturn the trial court lack of 

evidence[,]” thereby denying Petitioner of his procedural rights and equal protection of the 

laws; d) the appellate court’s “decision of evidence [was] opinional [sic] and an [sic] 

fundamental error basing evidence on pure speculations and false events which aren’t cited 

on record”; e) no witness testimony that Petitioner fired his gun or other physical evidence 

which denied Petitioner of his rights pursuant to the Due Process and Confrontation 

clauses; and f) Petitioner was denied the opportunity to present a complete defense. 

Petition (Doc. 1) at 11–12; see also Pet.’s Written Mot. and Pleadings (Doc. 23) at 2–3. 

Petitioner contends that because the video does not show him holding a gun or firing a gun;

no witness testified that they saw defendant fire a gun or saw a weapon; the gun found in 

his car did not have a clip in it and no clip was ever found; C.S. never testified that 

Petitioner shot at her residence, her, or her family; no ballistics, projectiles, unspent 

casings, clip, or test firing of a 22 gun; and no hand residue test, no fingerprints, forensics, 

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or scientific analysis were performed, there is not substantial evidence to support his 

conviction for discharging a weapon at a residential structure. Petition (Doc. 1) at 11–12; 

see also Pet.’s Written Mot. and Pleadings (Doc. 23) at 2–3.

Fifth, Petitioner asserts that “[t]he Appeals Court abused its discretion by denying 

relief and violating [his] constitutional rights causing harmful prejudice [by] refusing to 

overturn trial court error.” Id. at 13–14. Petitioner contends that he a) should not have 

been treated differently from his co-defendant; b) is entitled to relief and investigation by

a forensic weapon specialist; c) is entitled to impeachment of C.S.’s statements and 

testimony; d) was “denied the right to confront the evidence because [he] was denied 

motions to compel discovery, victim phone record, and test firing guns by a [sic] expert to 

determine directions”; e) was placed in “harmful prejudice” by the appellate court’s refusal 

to grant relief resulting in Petitioner not being given “a fair opportunity to prepare a 

complete defense, impeachment of prosecution witness, newly discovered exculpatory 

evidence, [and] a duplicitous indictment/investigation”; f) was denied his rights pursuant 

to the Due Process and Confrontation clauses and his “constitutional right to prepare a 

complete defense” was violated because there was no “investigation of a 22, and a bullet 

hole which the state claim [sic] came from a 22 of [his]”; g) was denied “equality, justic 

[sic] and equal rights” by the appellate court; and h) was denied his constitutional right to 

present a complete defense when the trial court denied his Rule 15.1 motion for discovery. 

Id. at 13–14; Reply (Doc. 17) at 6–7; Pet.’s Written Mot. and Pleadings (Doc. 23) at 1–2. 

Sixth, Petitioner alleges that “[t]he Appeals Court erred by denying [him] relief on 

the drive by shooting count, and there was not substantial evidence to support that 

conviction and the indictment is duplicitous[,] [w]hich violated [his] Constitutional 

Rights.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 15; Reply (Doc. 17) at 7–8. Petitioner asserts that a) the 

appellate court erred when it reviewed the record, saw the indictment was duplicitous but 

refused to remand; b) the appellate court erred when it failed to overturn Petitioner’s 

conviction based on State v. Rivera; c) his conviction for drive-by shooting was not 

supported by substantial evidence; d) the court of appeals erred because it knew that 

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“elements of the indictment specifically alleged that [Petitioner] committed the offenses 

by shooting at all three victims, which is incorrect[,] and the indictment wasn’t amened 

[sic] automatically to conform to evidence at trial”; e) the indictment was void and 

insufficient to support the offenses charged; f) the appellate court “decision was in violation 

of [Petitioner’s] constitutional rights in the Fourtheenth [sic] Amendments and under 

U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. XIV, . . . [and] equal protection of the laws”; g) the appellate 

court decision was based on speculation and false statements made on the record; h) the 

appellate court erred when it claimed the video showed Petitioner pointing the gun at the 

house and firing one shot which was incorrect; i) the appellate court erred in relying on 

perjured statements and avoided the fact that C.S.’s front door was closed and she could 

not see who fired the shot; j) the video showed a closed door and does not show an arm 

aiming a gun out of a car window; k) Petitioner’s statement that he was going to get his 

gun “does not prove sufficient evidence that a shot was fired at all; l) the appellate court’s 

“decision was bias [sic] and prejudice [sic] acts of a forejudgment being preconceived, 

failing to view facts in light most favorable to sustaining conviction”; and m) the appellate 

court acted in bad faith “performing injustic [sic] acts and compelling with each others [sic] 

decisions and using falsification alter fabricated evidence to have an effect on the decisions 

of the appeals court which violated [Petitioner’s ] const[itutional] rights in due process of 

law, rights of being accused in criminal prosecution, fourth amends [sic] and equal protect 

[sic] of the laws.” Id. at 15–16; Reply (Doc. 17) at 8; Pet.’s Written Mot. and Pleadings 

(Doc. 23) at 3–4.

Seventh, Petitioner argues that “[t]he Appeals Court abused its discretion by 

denying [him] relief in motion in limine and proforming [sic] prejudicial error which 

violated [Petitioner’s] constitutional rights.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 17; Reply (Doc. 17) at 8. 

Petitioner further asserts a) the appellate court erred when it failed to overturn his case 

based on the denial of a request not to admit evidence of bad acts which had nothing to do 

with his case; b) the trial court said it would give a limiting instruction, but no instruction 

was given; c) ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel did not raise the issue 

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of the limiting instruction; d) the appellate court erred in claiming that Petitioner’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim was withdrawn in reply; e) the appellate court 

“abused its discretion when claiming the arson accusation was relevant to [his] case[,] [and] 

[by] failing to relize [sic] admitting evidence of bad acts to a jury had a strong impact on 

the jury decision placing [Petitioner] in harmful prejudice by making [him] look guilty” in 

violation of his Due Process rights; and f) C.S.’s testimony regarding arson was hearsay, 

“and the trial court failed to have A.A. testify to that accusation.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 17–

18; Reply (Doc. 17) at 8.

Eighth, Petitioner alleges that “[t]he Appeals Court erred in denying [his] Rule 20 

motions for an acquittal and depriving [him] out of life liberty and freedom[,] [w]hich 

violated [his] constitutional rights.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 19; Reply (Doc. 17) at 8. Petitioner 

further contends that a) the appellate court erred when it refused to enter a judgment of 

acquittal on his post-trial motions, knowing that there was insufficient evidence to convict, 

the charges were false, and the indictment was void; b) the appellate court erred in 

“avoiding the issues refusing to respond to each conviction basing a decision on an assault 

that [Petitioner] wasn’t found guilty on[,] . . . was indicted wrongfully plus falsely because 

two alleged victims had no involvement in the alleged crime which was make believe and 

the evidence is influencing, fabricated and insufficient to support all charges” resulting in 

a denial of due process; c) the appellate court abused its discretion because there was a lack 

of substantial evidence to convict Petitioner; and d) the appellate court violated Petitioner’s 

rights pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution’s equal protection clause 

by “not reaffirming any alter charge or alter indictment.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 19; Reply 

(Doc. 17) at 8–9.

On August 17, 2018, Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 14), and on September 

5, 2018, Petitioner replied (Doc. 17). On May 2, 2019, Petitioner filed a Motion Written 

and Pleadings (Doc. 23). Concurrently with this Report and Recommendation, the Court 

has filed its Order construing Petitioner’s motion (Doc. 23) as a supplement to his Petition 

(Doc. 1). Petitioner asserts that his gun should have been tested, because the gun did not 

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have a clip and none was ever recovered. Pet.’s Mot. Written and Plead. (Doc. 23) at 1–2. 

Petitioner further contends that this failure to test his weapon violated his rights pursuant 

to the due process and confrontation clauses. Id. at 1–2. Petitioner reiterated his assertion

regarding the need for discovery in the state court and allegation that C.S. committed 

perjury which resulted in his conviction proceeding, consistent with his Ground Five and 

Six claims as set forth in his Petition (Doc. 1). Pet.’s Mot. Written and Plead. (Doc. 23) at 

2–3.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. In General

The federal courts shall “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in 

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground 

that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus by a person 

in state custody:

shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim – (1) 

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 

the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 

1398, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011). Correcting errors of state law is not the province of federal 

habeas corpus relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 

385 (1991). Ultimately, “[t]he statute’s design is to ‘further the principles of comity, 

finality, and federalism.’” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 945, 127 S.Ct. 2842, 

2854, 168 L.Ed.2d 662 (2007) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337, 123 S.Ct. 

1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003)). Furthermore, this standard is difficult to meet and highly 

deferential “for evaluating state-court rulings, [and] which demands that state-court 

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decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181, 131 S.Ct. at 1398 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 110 Stat. 

1214, mandates the standards for federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The 

“AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims 

have been adjudicated in state court.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 19, 134 S.Ct. 10, 16, 

187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013). Federal courts reviewing a petition for habeas corpus must 

“presume the correctness of state courts’ factual findings unless applicants rebut this 

presumption with ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 

473–74, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 1940, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). 

Moreover, on habeas review, the federal courts must consider whether the state court’s 

determination was unreasonable, not merely incorrect. Id., 550 U.S. at 473, 127 S.Ct. at 

1939; Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 987 (9th Cir. 2013). Such a determination is 

unreasonable where a state court properly identifies the governing legal principles 

delineated by the Supreme Court, but when the court applies the principles to the facts 

before it, arrives at a different result. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 

770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 

L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); see also Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 905 (9th Cir. 2004). “AEDPA 

requires ‘a state prisoner [to] show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented 

in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error . . . beyond any 

possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” Burt, 134 S.Ct. at 10 (quoting Harrington, 562 

U.S. at 103, 131 S.Ct. at 786–87) (alterations in original).

B. Exhaustion of State Remedies

Prior to application for a writ of habeas corpus, a person in state custody must 

exhaust all of the remedies available in the State courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). This 

“provides a simple and clear instruction to potential litigants: before you bring any claims 

to federal court, be sure that you first have taken each one to state court.” Rose v. Lundy, 

455 U.S. 509, 520, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1204, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). As such, the exhaustion 

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doctrine gives the State “the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its 

prisoners’ federal rights.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 

L.Ed. 2d 64 (2004) (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, “[t]he exhaustion doctrine is 

principally designed to protect the state courts’ role in the enforcement of federal law and 

prevent disruption of state judicial proceedings.” Rose, 455 U.S. at 518, 102 S.Ct. at 1203 

(internal citations omitted). This upholds the doctrine of comity which “teaches that one 

court should defer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of 

another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already cognizant of the litigation, have 

had an opportunity to pass upon the matter.” Id. (quoting Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 

204, 70 S.Ct. 587, 590, 94 L.Ed. 761 (1950)).

Section 2254(c) provides that claims “shall not be deemed . . . exhausted” so long 

as the applicant “has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure 

the question presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). “[O]nce the federal claim has been fairly 

presented to the state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied.” Picard v. Connor, 

404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971). The fair presentation 

requirement mandates that a state prisoner must alert the state court “to the presence of a 

federal claim” in his petition, simply labeling a claim “federal” or expecting the state court 

to read beyond the four corners of the petition is insufficient. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 

27, 33, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (rejecting petitioner’s assertion that 

his claim had been “fairly presented” because his brief in the state appeals court did not 

indicate that “he was complaining about a violation of federal law” and the justices having 

the opportunity to read a lower court decision addressing the federal claims was not fair 

presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that petitioner failed 

to exhaust federal due process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim in 

state court only on state grounds). Furthermore, in order to “fairly present” one’s claims, 

the prisoner must do so “in each appropriate state court.” Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29, 124 

S.Ct. at 1349. “Generally, a petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement if he properly 

pursues a claim (1) throughout the entire direct appellate process of the state, or (2) 

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throughout one entire judicial postconviction process available in the state.” Casey v. 

Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 916 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Liebman & Hertz, Federal Habeas 

Corpus Practice and Procedure, § 23.3b (9th ed. 1998)).

In Arizona, however, for non-capital cases “review need not be sought before the 

Arizona Supreme Court in order to exhaust state remedies.” Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 

1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F.Supp.2d 925 (D. Ariz. 

2007); Moreno v. Gonzalez, 192 Ariz. 131, 962 P.2d 205 (1998). Additionally, the 

Supreme Court has further interpreted § 2254(c) to recognize that once the state courts 

have ruled upon a claim, it is not necessary for an applicant to seek collateral relief for the 

same issues already decided upon direct review. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 350, 

109 S.Ct. 1056, 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 380 (1989).

C. Procedural Default

“A habeas petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the 

technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer ‘available’ to 

him.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2555, 115 L.Ed.2d 650 

(1991). Moreover, federal courts “will not review a question of federal law decided by a 

state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the 

federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Id., 501 U.S. at 728, 111 S.Ct. at 

2254. This is true whether the state law basis is substantive or procedural. Id. (citations 

omitted). Such claims are considered procedurally barred from review. See Wainwright 

v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained the difference between exhaustion 

and procedural default as follows:

The exhaustion doctrine applies when the state court has never been 

presented with an opportunity to consider a petitioner’s claims and that 

opportunity may still be available to the petitioner under state law. In 

contrast, the procedural default rule barring consideration of a federal claim 

applies only when a state court has been presented with the federal claim, but 

declined to reach the issue for procedural reasons, or if it is clear that the state 

court would hold the claim procedurally barred. Franklin v. Johnson, 290 

F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations 

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omitted). Thus, in some circumstances, a petitioner’s failure to exhaust a 

federal claim in state court may cause a procedural default. See Sandgathe 

v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 2002); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 

987 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A claim is procedurally defaulted ‘if the petitioner 

failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would 

be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement 

would now find the claims procedurally barred.’”) (quoting Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991)).

Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 621 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, a prisoner’s habeas 

petition may be precluded from federal review due to procedural default in two ways. First, 

where the petitioner presented his claims to the state court, which denied relief based on 

independent and adequate state grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 728, 111 S.Ct. at 2554. 

Federal courts are prohibited from review in such cases because they have “no power to 

review a state law determination that is sufficient to support the judgment, resolution of 

any independent federal ground for the decision could not affect the judgment and would 

therefore be advisory.” Id. Second, where a “petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies 

and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to 

meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.” Id. at 

735 n.1, 111 S.Ct. at 2557 n.1 (citations omitted). Thus, the federal court “must consider 

whether the claim could be pursued by any presently available state remedy.” Cassett, 406 

F.3d at 621 n.6 (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal 

courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and 

actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 

L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding barred 

federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice); see also Smith 

v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 534, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 2666, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986) (recognizing 

“that a federal habeas court must evaluate appellate defaults under the same standards that 

apply when a defendant fails to preserve a claim at trial.”). “[T]he existence of cause for a 

procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some 

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objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the 

State’s procedural rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645, 91 

L.Ed.2d 397 (1986); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 

1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, [as such] there is no basis on which to address the merits 

of his claims.”). In addition to cause, a habeas petitioner must show actual prejudice, 

meaning that he “must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, 

but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial 

with error of constitutional dimensions.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 494, 106 S.Ct. at 2648 

(emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted). Without a showing of both cause and 

prejudice, a habeas petitioner cannot overcome the procedural default and gain review by 

the federal courts. Id., 106 S.Ct. at 2649.

The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that “the cause and prejudice standard 

will be met in those cases where review of a state prisoner’s claim is necessary to correct 

‘a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S.Ct. 

2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 

1572–73, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982)). “The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is 

available ‘only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional claim with a colorable 

showing of factual innocence.’” Herrara v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404, 113 S.Ct. 853, 

862, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993) (emphasis in original) (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 

U.S. 436, 454, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 2627, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986)). Thus, “‘actual innocence’

is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner 

must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.” 

Herrara, 506 U.S. at 404, 113 S.Ct. at 862. Further, in order to demonstrate a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice, a habeas petitioner must “establish by clear and convincing evidence 

that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty 

of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B).

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In Arizona, a petitioner’s claim may be procedurally defaulted where he has waived 

his right to present his claim to the state court “at trial, on appeal or in any previous 

collateral proceeding.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) (2018). “If an asserted claim is of

sufficient constitutional magnitude, the state must show that the defendant ‘knowingly, 

voluntarily and intelligently’ waived the claim.” Id., 2002 cmt. Neither Rule 32.2. nor the 

Arizona Supreme Court has defined claims of “sufficient constitutional magnitude” 

requiring personal knowledge before waiver. See id.; see also Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 

446, 46 P.3d 1067 (2002). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that this 

assessment “often involves a fact-intensive inquiry” and the “Arizona state courts are better 

suited to make these determinations.” Cassett, 406 F.3d at 622.

III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

A. Timeliness

As a threshold matter, the Court must consider whether Petitioner’s petition is 

barred by the statute of limitation. See White v. Klizkie, 281 F.3d 920, 921–22 (9th Cir. 

2002). The AEDPA mandates that a one-year statute of limitations applies to applications 

for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in state custody. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Section 

2244(d)(1) provides that the limitations period shall run from the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by 

the State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States 

is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by 

the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral 

review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

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28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2005). “The time 

during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral 

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted 

toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Respondents do not dispute the timeliness of Elem’s petition. The Court has independently 

reviewed the records and finds that the Petition (Doc. 1) is timely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Ground One: Consecutive Sentence on Disorderly Conduct

Petitioner alleges that the “Appeals Court errd [sic] by not modifying [his] 

consecutive sentence disorderly [sic] conduct along with [his] other three counts, which 

violated [his] constitutional rights” pursuant to the Sixth Amendment. Petition (Doc. 1) at 

6; Reply (Doc. 17) at 3. 

As discussed in Section II.B., supra, prior to bringing a claim to federal court, a 

habeas petitioner must first present all claims to the state court. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 

509, 520, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1204, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). The fair presentation requirement 

mandates that a state prisoner must alert the state court “to the presence of a federal claim” 

in his petition. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 33, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 

(2004) (rejecting petitioner’s assertion that his claim had been “fairly presented” because 

his brief in the state appeals court did not indicate that “he was complaining about a 

violation of federal law” and the justices having the opportunity to read a lower court 

decision addressing the federal claims was not fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 

F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1009 (2000) (holding that petitioner failed 

to exhaust federal due process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim in 

state court only on state grounds). Merely labeling a claim “federal” or making a passing 

reference to the United States Constitution does not constitute “fair presentment.” See 

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S.Ct. at 1351; see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 

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364, 365–66 115 S.Ct. 887, 888, 130 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995) (“If state courts are to be given 

the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely 

be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States 

Constitution”). Moreover, Petitioner cannot expect the state court to read beyond the four 

corners of the petition to meet the fair presentation requirement. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 

U.S. 27, 33, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (rejecting petitioner’s assertion 

that his claim had been “fairly presented” because his brief in the state appeals court did 

not indicate that “he was complaining about a violation of federal law” and the justices 

having the opportunity to read a lower court decision addressing the federal claims was not 

fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that petitioner 

failed to exhaust federal due process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim 

in state court only on state grounds).

Here, Petitioner presented his claim regarding his consecutive sentence for 

disorderly conduct to the state courts as a violation of the Arizona state law without 

reference to the Constitution of the United States. See Answer (Doc. 14), Ariz. Ct. App., 

Case No. 2 CA-CR 2014-0167, Appellant’s Opening Br. (Exh. “E”) (Doc. 15) at 85–87. 

As such, the claim would now be precluded and meets the technical requirements for 

exhaustion. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) (2018); see also Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 

29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (in order to “fairly present” one’s claims, 

the prisoner must do so “in each appropriate state court”). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is 

procedurally defaulted. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 

2557 n. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (“petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the 

court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the 

exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred”). Additionally, 

when a Petitioner presents his claim to the state court, and is denied upon independent and 

adequate state grounds, this Court is prohibited from review. This is because the “state law 

determination [] is sufficient to support the judgment, [and] resolution of any independent 

federal ground for the decision could not affect the judgment and would therefore be 

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advisory.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 728, 111 S.Ct. at 2554. Accordingly, Petitioner is not 

entitled to habeas relief.

Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal 

courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and 

actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 

L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding barred 

federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). Petitioner has 

not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 

478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely 

that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and 

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) 

(emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 

80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally 

defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits 

of his claims.”). Neither has Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear and convincing evidence 

that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty 

of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to 

meet the cause and prejudice standard or demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S.Ct. at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). 

Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is denied.

1. Ground 1(a): A.R.S. § 13-116 and Double Jeopardy

Petitioner asserts that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated, as well as 

A.R.S. § 13-116, because his disorderly conduct sentence was ordered to run concurrently 

with his other convictions, thereby placing Petitioner in double jeopardy. Petition (Doc. 

1) at 6. As discussed in Section II.A., supra, this Court shall “entertain an application for 

a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 

court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of 

treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Federal habeas 

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corpus relief is not for the purpose of correcting errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 

502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). As such, to the extent that 

Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for a violation of A.R.S. § 13-116, it is not cognizable in 

federal habeas corpus.

Further, to the extent that Petitioner urges a violation of his Fifth Amendment 

double jeopardy rights, such a claim must also fail. As discussed in Section IV.A., supra, 

Petitioner failed to present a federal claim to the state courts, and his claim is procedurally 

defaulted. Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the 

federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause 

and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 

103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding 

barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). 

Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. 

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must 

show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked 

to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of 

constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also 

Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer 

any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on 

which to address the merits of his claims.”). Neither has Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear 

and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder 

would have found [him] guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As 

such, Petitioner has failed to meet the cause and prejudice standard or demonstrate a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S.Ct. at 2564 

(citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is denied.

2. Ground 1(b): Equal Protection

Petitioner asserts that he did not receive equal protection of the law during 

sentencing. Petition (Doc. 1) at 6. As discussed in Section IV.A., supra, Petitioner failed 

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to present this federal claim to the state courts, and it is now procedurally defaulted. Where 

a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are 

prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and actual 

prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 

L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding barred 

federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). Petitioner has 

not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 

478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely 

that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and 

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) 

(emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 

80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally 

defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits 

of his claims.”). Neither has Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear and convincing evidence 

that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty 

of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to 

meet the cause and prejudice standard or demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S.Ct. at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). 

Therefore, Petitioner’s claim must fail.

3. Ground 1(c): Double Jeopardy

Petitioner asserts that the appellate court failed to protect him from double jeopardy. 

Petition (Doc. 1) at 6. As discussed in Sections IV.A. and IV.A.1., supra, Petitioner failed 

to present this federal claim to the state courts, and it is now procedurally defaulted. Where 

a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are 

prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and actual 

prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 

L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding barred 

federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). Petitioner has 

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not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 

478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely 

that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and 

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) 

(emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 

80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally 

defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits 

of his claims.”). Neither has Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear and convincing evidence 

that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty 

of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to 

meet the cause and prejudice standard or demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S.Ct. at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). Thus, 

Petitioner’s claim is denied.

4. Ground 1(d): Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Regarding 

Sentencing

Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to object 

during sentencing and allowed the illegal sentence to occur in violation of A.R.S. § 13-

116. Petition (Doc. 1) at 6. Petitioner asserted a single ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim for an alleged failure by appellate counsel to argue that the trial court “committed 

reversible error in denying the defense the right to examine the gun fired by [C.S.] and 

having ballistic tests performed to determine the trajectory of the bullets during the 

incident” to the state courts. Answer (Doc. 14), Exh. “J” at 109.

“As a general matter, each ‘unrelated alleged instance [ ] of counsel’s 

ineffectiveness’ is a separate claim for purposes of exhaustion.” Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 

F.3d 976, 992 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1056 (9th 

Cir. 2005)) (alterations in original). This means “all operative facts to an ineffective 

assistance claim must be presented to the state courts in order for a petitioner to exhaust 

his remedies.” Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007). This is 

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“[b]ecause ineffective assistance claims are not fungible, but are instead highly factdependent, [requiring] some baseline explication of the facts relating to it[.]” Id. As such, 

“a petitioner who presented any ineffective assistance of counsel claim below can[not] later 

add unrelated instances of counsel’s ineffectiveness to that claim.” Id. (citations and 

internal quotations omitted); see also Date v. Schriro, 619 F.Supp.2d 736, 788 (D. Ariz. 

2008) (“Petitioner’s assertion of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on one 

set of facts, does not exhaust other claims of ineffective assistance based on different 

facts”).

Because Petitioner failed to present this federal claim to the state courts, it is now 

procedurally defaulted. Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally 

defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner 

can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 

S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state 

appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause 

and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) 

(Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but 

that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with 

error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); 

see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed 

to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no 

basis on which to address the merits of his claims.”). Neither has Petitioner “establish[ed] 

by clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable 

factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to meet the cause and prejudice standard or 

demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S.Ct. 

at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is denied.

. . .

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5. Ground 1(e): Single Act

Petitioner asserts that the appellate court’s reliance on State v. Gordon4 was in error, 

and all of his convictions arose from “one single shot or one single act” which required his 

sentences to run concurrently. Petition (Doc. 1) at 6–7. As discussed in Section II.A., 

supra, this Court shall “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a) (emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief is not for the purpose of 

correcting errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 

L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an alleged misapplication of state 

law, and as such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.

6. Ground 1(f): Appellate Court’s Unique Role

Petitioner asserts that the appellate court used “a real unique role” by modifying 

Petitioner’s sentence on the endangerment count but affirming his disorderly conduct 

sentence.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 7. As discussed in Section II.A., supra, this Court shall 

“entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) 

(emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief is not for the purpose of correcting errors 

of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 

(1991). Again, Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an alleged misapplication of state law, 

and as such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.

7. Ground 1(g): Sixth Amendment

Petitioner asserts that the appellate court abused its discretion in violation of his 

Sixth Amendment rights by failing to correct his sentences. Petition (Doc. 1) at 7. As 

discussed in Sections IV.A. and IV.A.1., supra, Petitioner failed to present this federal 

4

State v. Gordon, 161 Ariz. 308, 778 P.2d 1204 (Ariz. 1989) (describing the test for 

whether sentences should be consecutive or concurrent pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-116).

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claim to the state courts, and it is now procedurally defaulted. Where a habeas petitioner’s 

claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from subsequent 

review unless the petitioner can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. 

Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that 

failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless 

petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show 

either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 

2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created 

a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, 

infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) 

(internal quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . 

. [and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits of his claims.”). Neither 

has Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear and convincing evidence that but for the 

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the 

underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to meet the 

cause and prejudice standard or demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S.Ct. at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, 

Petitioner’s claim is denied.

B. Ground Two: Duplicitous Charge and Lack of Substantial Evidence

Petitioner alleges that the “Appeals Court erred by refusing to reaffirm or dismiss 

an [sic] duplicitous charge[,] here was no substantial evidence to support a [sic] 

endangerment risk of imminent death, which violated [his] constitutional rights.” Petition 

(Doc. 1) at 8. As discussed in Section II.B., supra, prior to bringing a claim to federal 

court, a habeas petitioner must first present all claims to the state court. Rose v. Lundy, 

455 U.S. 509, 520, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1204, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). The fair presentation 

requirement mandates that a state prisoner must alert the state court “to the presence of a 

federal claim” in his petition. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 33, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1351, 

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158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (rejecting petitioner’s assertion that his claim had been “fairly 

presented” because his brief in the state appeals court did not indicate that “he was 

complaining about a violation of federal law” and the justices having the opportunity to 

read a lower court decision addressing the federal claims was not fair presentation); Hiivala 

v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1009 (2000) (holding that 

petitioner failed to exhaust federal due process issue in state court because petitioner 

presented claim in state court only on state grounds). Merely labeling a claim “federal” or 

making a passing reference to the United States Constitution does not constitute “fair 

presentment.” See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S.Ct. at 1351; see also Duncan 

v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365–66 115 S.Ct. 887, 888, 130 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995) (“If state 

courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal 

rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under 

the United States Constitution”). Moreover, Petitioner cannot expect the state court to read 

beyond the four corners of the petition to meet the fair presentation requirement. Baldwin 

v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 33, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (rejecting 

petitioner’s assertion that his claim had been “fairly presented” because his brief in the 

state appeals court did not indicate that “he was complaining about a violation of federal 

law” and the justices having the opportunity to read a lower court decision addressing the 

federal claims was not fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(holding that petitioner failed to exhaust federal due process issue in state court because 

petitioner presented claim in state court only on state grounds).

Here, Petitioner presented his claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to the 

state courts as a violation of the Arizona state law without reference to the Constitution of 

the United States. See Answer (Doc. 14), Ariz. Ct. App., Case No. 2 CA-CR 2014-0167, 

Appellant’s Opening Br. (Exh. “E”) (Doc. 15) at 88–89. Further, he did not raise the issue 

of a duplicitous charge at all. Answer (Doc. 14), Ariz. Ct. App., Case No. 2 CA-CR-2014-

0167, Mem. Decision 11/30/2015 (Exh. “A”) (Doc. 15) at 18–19. As such, the claims

would now be precluded and meet the technical requirements for exhaustion. Ariz. R. 

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Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) (2018); see also Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 

1349, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (in order to “fairly present” one’s claims, the prisoner must 

do so “in each appropriate state court”). Therefore, Petitioner’s claims are procedurally 

defaulted. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2557 n. 1, 115 

L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (“petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the 

petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion 

requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred”).

Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal 

courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and 

actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 

L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding barred 

federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). Petitioner has 

not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 

478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely 

that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and 

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) 

(emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 

80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally 

defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits 

of his claims.”). Neither has Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear and convincing evidence 

that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty 

of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to 

meet the cause and prejudice standard or demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S.Ct. at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s claims are denied.

1. Ground 2(a): Duplicitous Charge

Petitioner asserts that the appellate court erred by “failing to reaffirm a duplicitous 

charge that a jury didn’t make a guilty verdict on.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 8. As discussed in 

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Section II.A., supra, this Court shall “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus 

in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground 

that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief is not for the purpose 

of correcting errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 

116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an alleged misapplication of 

state law, and as such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.

2. Ground 2(b): Jury Form

Petitioner asserts that the appellate court erred because “the jury did not mark guilty 

in [sic] the form on the endangerment count which they kept it blank, thus charge [sic] 

should have been dismiss [sic].” Petition (Doc. 1) at 8. As discussed in Section II.A., 

supra, this Court shall “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a) (emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief is not for the purpose of 

correcting errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 

L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an alleged misapplication of state 

law, and as such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.

3. Ground 2(c): Lack of evidence

Petitioner asserts that his “sentence for endangerment was insufficient to warrant a 

conviction, underlying there was no proof of any recklessly endangering another person 

with a substantial risk of imminent death or physical injury [because] no bullets entered 

the house and the alleged victims was [sic] inside their home behind closed doors[,]” and 

Petitioner was unaware of who was inside the home or where the alleged victims were 

located. Petition (Doc. 1) at 8. As discussed in Section II.A., supra, this Court shall 

“entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) 

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(emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief is not for the purpose of correcting errors 

of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 

(1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an alleged misapplication of state law, and as 

such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.

4. Ground 2(d): Appellate Court Denial of Relief

Petitioner asserts that the appellate court erred “by refusing to grant relief on the 

endangerment conviction knowing the charge [was] duplicitous and there’s no substantial 

evidence to show probable cause beyond a reasonable doubt[.]” Petition (Doc. 1) at 8. As 

discussed in Section II.A., supra, this Court shall “entertain an application for a writ of 

habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court 

only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties 

of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief 

is not for the purpose of correcting errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 

67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an 

alleged misapplication of state law, and as such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas 

corpus.

5. Ground 2(e): Denial of Jury Instruction

Petitioner asserts that the courts erred by “overlook[ing] the fact that Petitioner was 

denied a jury instruction because the court failed to do so[.]” Petition (Doc. 1) at 8. As 

discussed in Section II.A., supra, this Court shall “entertain an application for a writ of 

habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court 

only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties 

of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief 

is not for the purpose of correcting errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 

67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an 

alleged misapplication of state law, and as such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas 

corpus.

. . .

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6. Ground 2(f): Detectives’ Testimony

Petitioner asserts that “[d]etectives clearly testified that there was a bullet hole only 

observed up high on the header of the attic which his testimony does not prove an actual 

substantial risk of imminent death.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 8. As discussed in Section II.A., 

supra, this Court shall “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a) (emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief is not for the purpose of 

correcting errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 

L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an alleged misapplication of state 

law, and as such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.

7. Ground 2(g): Bullet Through Front Window

Petitioner asserts that the appellate court erred when it took the “position claiming 

a bullet went through the front window which is (incorrect), there is no record or file 

containing [that evidence.]”5 Petition (Doc. 1) at 8. As discussed in Section II.A., supra, 

this Court shall “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person 

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody 

in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(a) (emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief is not for the purpose of correcting 

errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 

385 (1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an alleged misapplication of state law, and 

as such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.

8. Ground 2(h): Due Process and Equal Protection

Petitioner asserts that the speculative nature of the evidence relied on by the 

appellate court violated his due process and equal protection rights. Petition (Doc. 1) at 8; 

Reply (Doc. 17) at 4. As discussed in Section IV.B., supra, Petitioner failed to present 

5 The Court has reviewed the Arizona Court of Appeals Opinion in this case and could not 

find any statement suggesting that a bullet went through the front window.

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these federal claims to the state courts, and they are now procedurally defaulted. Where a 

habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are 

prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and actual 

prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 

L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding barred 

federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). Petitioner has 

not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 

478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely 

that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and 

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) 

(emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 

80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally 

defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits 

of his claims.”). Neither has Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear and convincing evidence 

that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty 

of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to 

meet the cause and prejudice standard or demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S.Ct. at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). 

Therefore, Petitioner’s claims are denied.

C. Ground Three: Historical Priors

Petitioner alleges that the “Appeals Court erred by not dismissing historical priors 

and refusing to correct an unlawful sentence which the findings of priors was insufficient, 

which violated his constitutional rights.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 9. As discussed in Section 

II.B., supra, prior to bringing a claim to federal court, a habeas petitioner must first present 

all claims to the state court. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1204, 71 

L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). The fair presentation requirement mandates that a state prisoner must 

alert the state court “to the presence of a federal claim” in his petition. Baldwin v. Reese, 

541 U.S. 27, 33, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (rejecting petitioner’s 

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assertion that his claim had been “fairly presented” because his brief in the state appeals 

court did not indicate that “he was complaining about a violation of federal law” and the 

justices having the opportunity to read a lower court decision addressing the federal claims 

was not fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 

529 U.S. 1009 (2000) (holding that petitioner failed to exhaust federal due process issue in 

state court because petitioner presented claim in state court only on state grounds). Merely 

labeling a claim “federal” or making a passing reference to the United States Constitution 

does not constitute “fair presentment.” See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S.Ct. at 

1351; see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365–66 115 S.Ct. 887, 888, 130 L.Ed.2d 

865 (1995) (“If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of 

prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are 

asserting claims under the United States Constitution”). Moreover, Petitioner cannot 

expect the state court to read beyond the four corners of the petition to meet the fair 

presentation requirement. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 33, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 

L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (rejecting petitioner’s assertion that his claim had been “fairly 

presented” because his brief in the state appeals court did not indicate that “he was 

complaining about a violation of federal law” and the justices having the opportunity to 

read a lower court decision addressing the federal claims was not fair presentation); Hiivala 

v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that petitioner failed to exhaust federal 

due process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim in state court only on 

state grounds).

Here, Petitioner presented his claim regarding the sufficiency of proof of historical 

priors to the state courts as a violation of the Arizona state law without reference to the 

Constitution of the United States. See Answer (Doc. 14), Ariz. Ct. App., Case No. 2 CACR 2014-0167, Appellant’s Opening Br. (Exh. “E”) (Doc. 15) at 78–80. As such, the claim 

would now be precluded and meet the technical requirements for exhaustion. Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) (2018); see also Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 

1349, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (in order to “fairly present” one’s claims, the prisoner must 

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do so “in each appropriate state court”). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is procedurally 

defaulted. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2557 n. 1, 115 

L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (“petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the 

petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion 

requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred”).

Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal 

courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and 

actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 

L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding barred 

federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). Petitioner has 

not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 

478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely 

that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and 

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) 

(emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 

80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally 

defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits 

of his claims.”). Neither has Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear and convincing evidence 

that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty 

of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to 

meet the cause and prejudice standard or demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S.Ct. at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim is denied.

1. Ground 3(a): Overturning Historical Priors

Petitioner asserts that the appellate court erred by failing to overturn Petitioner’s 

historical priors, because they were “only for purposes of nondangerous repetitive offenses, 

and the alleged priors were 10 yrs old.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 9. As discussed in Section 

II.A., supra, this Court shall “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf 

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of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he 

is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief is not for the purpose of 

correcting errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 

L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an alleged misapplication of state 

law, and as such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.

2. Ground 3(b): Adequacy of Evidence

Petitioner asserts that there was “no release date to CR #1779 nor was [he] under 

parole for CR #1772, and the record shows a false alleged prior dated on January 20, 2001, 

which was used for purposes of sentencing[.]” Petition (Doc. 1) at 9. As discussed in 

Section II.A., supra, this Court shall “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus 

in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground 

that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief is not for the purpose 

of correcting errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 

116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an alleged misapplication of 

state law, and as such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.

3. Ground 3(c): Lack of evidence

Petitioner asserts the appellate court “knew that trial court failed to reflect dates 

concerning prior convictions and these priors was [sic] alleged after guilty verdicts[,] [and] 

on record a statement was said claiming that these alleged priors cannot be used for 

purposes of sentencing but only for aggravating factors[.]” Petition (Doc. 1) at 9. As 

discussed in Section II.A., supra, this Court shall “entertain an application for a writ of 

habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court 

only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties 

of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief 

is not for the purpose of correcting errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 

67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an 

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alleged misapplication of state law, and as such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas 

corpus.

4. Ground 3(d): Double Jeopardy

Petitioner asserts that he “was still sentence[d] under an unlawful sentencing range 

in violations [sic] of the statutory limits § A.R.S. § 13-704(A)” which placed him in Double 

Jeopardy. Petition (Doc. 1) at 9. As discussed in Section IV.C., supra, Petitioner failed to 

present this federal claim to the state courts, and it is now procedurally defaulted. Where 

a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are 

prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and actual 

prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 

L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding barred 

federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). Petitioner has 

not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 

478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely 

that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and 

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) 

(emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 

80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally 

defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits 

of his claims.”). Neither has Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear and convincing evidence 

that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty 

of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to 

meet the cause and prejudice standard or demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S.Ct. at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). Thus, 

Petitioner’s claim is denied.

5. Ground 3(e): Sentencing Range—Non-dangerous Repetitive 

Offender Versus First Time Dangerous Offender

Petitioner asserts that he was “entitled to be sentence[d] under 13-704 . . . [as a] first 

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time dangerous offender which is a seperate [sic] sentencing range from 13-702 

nondangerous repetitive offenses[,] [and] [the] sentence and priors placed [Petitioner] in 

harmful double punishment[.]” Petition (Doc. 1) at 9. As discussed in Section II.A., supra, 

this Court shall “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person 

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody 

in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(a) (emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief is not for the purpose of correcting 

errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 

385 (1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an alleged misapplication of state law, and 

as such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.

6. Ground 3(f): Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel Regarding 

Historical Priors

Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to the 

historical non-dangerous priors. Petition (Doc. 1) at 9. Petitioner asserted a single 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim to the state courts regarding an alleged failure by 

appellate counsel to argue that the trial court “committed reversible error in denying the 

defense the right to examine the gun fired by [C.S.] and having ballistic tests performed to 

determine the trajectory of the bullets during the incident” to the state courts. Answer 

(Doc. 14), Exh. “J” at 109.

“As a general matter, each ‘unrelated alleged instance [ ] of counsel’s 

ineffectiveness’ is a separate claim for purposes of exhaustion.” Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 

F.3d 976, 992 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1056 (9th 

Cir. 2005)) (alterations in original). This means “all operative facts to an ineffective 

assistance claim must be presented to the state courts in order for a petitioner to exhaust 

his remedies.” Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007). This is 

“[b]ecause ineffective assistance claims are not fungible, but are instead highly factdependent, [requiring] some baseline explication of the facts relating to it[.]” Id. As such, 

“a petitioner who presented any ineffective assistance of counsel claim below can[not] later 

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add unrelated instances of counsel’s ineffectiveness to that claim.” Id. (citations and 

internal quotations omitted); see also Date v. Schriro, 619 F.Supp.2d 736, 788 (D. Ariz. 

2008) (“Petitioner’s assertion of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on one 

set of facts, does not exhaust other claims of ineffective assistance based on different 

facts”).

Because Petitioner failed to present this federal claim to the state courts, it is now 

procedurally defaulted. Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally 

defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner 

can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 

S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state 

appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause 

and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) 

(Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but 

that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with 

error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); 

see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed 

to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no 

basis on which to address the merits of his claims.”). Neither has Petitioner “establish[ed] 

by clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable 

factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to meet the cause and prejudice standard or 

demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S.Ct. 

at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is denied.

7. Ground 3(g): Sentencing Pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-1703

Petitioner asserts that he was prejudiced by being illegally sentenced pursuant to 

A.R.S. § 13-703. Petition (Doc. 1) at 9. As discussed in Section II.A., supra, this Court 

shall “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody 

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pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) 

(emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief is not for the purpose of correcting errors 

of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 

(1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an alleged misapplication of state law, and as 

such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.

8. Ground 3(h): Detectives’ Testimony—Hearsay

Petitioner asserts that during the priors trial Detective Walker and Parole Officer 

Wayne testified regarding hearsay without knowing Petitioner or being familiar with him. 

Petition (Doc. 1) at 9. As discussed in Section II.A., supra, this Court shall “entertain an 

application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the 

Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis 

added). Federal habeas corpus relief is not for the purpose of correcting errors of state law. 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). 

Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an alleged misapplication of state law, and as such, it is 

not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.

9. Ground 3(i): Parole Officer Wayne’s Testimony

Petitioner asserts that during the priors trial Parole Officer Wayne lied about a 

previous parole officer’s retirement and did not supervise Petitioner. Petition (Doc. 1) at 

9–10. As discussed in Section II.A., supra, this Court shall “entertain an application for a 

writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 

court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of 

treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Federal habeas 

corpus relief is not for the purpose of correcting errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 

502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks 

relief for an alleged misapplication of state law, and as such, it is not cognizable in federal 

habeas corpus.

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10.Ground 3(j): Lack of Complete Identification

Petitioner asserts that the appellate court failed to review the record and address an 

alleged lack of complete identification of Petitioner that there were no prior fingerprints 

done to prove up his historical prior convictions. Petition (Doc. 1) at 10. As discussed in 

Section II.A., supra, this Court shall “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus 

in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground 

that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief is not for the purpose 

of correcting errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 

116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an alleged misapplication of 

state law, and as such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.

11.Ground 3(k): Hearsay and Lack of Substantial Proof

Petitioner asserts that during the priors trial hearsay testimony was allowed and 

there was no substantial proof for the historical prior convictions. Petition (Doc. 1) at 10. 

As discussed in Section II.A., supra, this Court shall “entertain an application for a writ of 

habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court 

only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties 

of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief 

is not for the purpose of correcting errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 

67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an 

alleged misapplication of state law, and as such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas 

corpus.

12.Ground 3(l): Fourteenth Amendment Violation

Petitioner alleges that the appellate court showed prejudice against Petitioner and 

violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by allowing the historical prior convictions to 

stand without substantial proof. Petition (Doc. 1) at 10. As discussed in Section IV.C., 

supra, Petitioner failed to present this federal claim to the state courts, and it is now 

procedurally defaulted. Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally 

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defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner 

can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 

S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state 

appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause 

and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) 

(Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but 

that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with 

error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); 

see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed 

to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no 

basis on which to address the merits of his claims.”). Neither has Petitioner “establish[ed] 

by clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable 

factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to meet the cause and prejudice standard or 

demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S.Ct. 

at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is denied.

13.Ground 3(m): Double Jeopardy—Misleading Information

Petitioner asserts that the court “relied on misleading information using a prior 

which counted as on under the same CR #2011772 to sentence [Petitioner] in violation of 

the Double Jeopardy Clause in the Fifth Amendment.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 10. As 

discussed in Section IV.C., supra, Petitioner failed to present this federal claim to the state 

courts, and it is now procedurally defaulted. Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been 

procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the 

petitioner can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 

298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in 

state appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated 

cause and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual 

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prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 

(1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of 

prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his 

entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal 

quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 

1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . 

[and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits of his claims.”). Neither has 

Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional 

error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the underlying offense.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to meet the cause and prejudice 

standard or demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 

748, 111 S.Ct. at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). Thus, Petitioner’s claim is 

denied.

D. Ground Four: Discharging a Weapon at a Residential Structure

Petitioner alleges that the “Appeals Court erred by denying relief and failing to 

reaffirm alleged conviction for discharging a weapon at a residential structure, which 

violated [his] constitutional rights.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 11; Reply (Doc. 17) at 5. 

As discussed in Section II.B., supra, prior to bringing a claim to federal court, a 

habeas petitioner must first present all claims to the state court. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 

509, 520, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1204, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). The fair presentation requirement 

mandates that a state prisoner must alert the state court “to the presence of a federal claim” 

in his petition. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 33, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 

(2004) (rejecting petitioner’s assertion that his claim had been “fairly presented” because 

his brief in the state appeals court did not indicate that “he was complaining about a 

violation of federal law” and the justices having the opportunity to read a lower court 

decision addressing the federal claims was not fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 

F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1009 (2000) (holding that petitioner failed 

to exhaust federal due process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim in 

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state court only on state grounds). Merely labeling a claim “federal” or making a passing 

reference to the United States Constitution does not constitute “fair presentment.” See

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S.Ct. at 1351; see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 

364, 365–66 115 S.Ct. 887, 888, 130 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995) (“If state courts are to be given 

the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely 

be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States 

Constitution”). Moreover, Petitioner cannot expect the state court to read beyond the four 

corners of the petition to meet the fair presentation requirement. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 

U.S. 27, 33, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (rejecting petitioner’s assertion 

that his claim had been “fairly presented” because his brief in the state appeals court did 

not indicate that “he was complaining about a violation of federal law” and the justices 

having the opportunity to read a lower court decision addressing the federal claims was not 

fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that petitioner 

failed to exhaust federal due process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim 

in state court only on state grounds).

Here, Petitioner presented his claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support his conviction for discharging a weapon at a residential structure to the state courts 

as a violation of the Arizona state law without reference to the Constitution of the United 

States. See Answer (Doc. 14), Ariz. Ct. App., Case No. 2 CA-CR 2014-0167, Appellant’s 

Opening Br. (Exh. “E”) (Doc. 15) at 85–87. As such, the claim would now be precluded

and meets the technical requirements for exhaustion. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) (2018); 

see also Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) 

(in order to “fairly present” one’s claims, the prisoner must do so “in each appropriate state 

court”). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted. Coleman v. Thompson, 

501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2557 n. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (“petitioner 

failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to 

present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims 

procedurally barred”). Additionally, when a Petitioner presents his claim to the state court, 

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and is denied upon independent and adequate state grounds, this Court is prohibited from 

review. This is because the “state law determination [] is sufficient to support the 

judgment, [and] resolution of any independent federal ground for the decision could not 

affect the judgment and would therefore be advisory.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 

722, 728, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). Accordingly, Petitioner is not 

entitled to habeas relief.

Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal 

courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and 

actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 

L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding barred 

federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). Petitioner has 

not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 

478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely 

that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and 

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) 

(emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 

80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally 

defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits 

of his claims.”). Neither has Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear and convincing evidence 

that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty 

of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to 

meet the cause and prejudice standard or demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S.Ct. at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). 

Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is denied.

1. Ground 4(a): Substantial Evidence Regarding Shot Fired from Car

Petitioner asserts that the appellate court erred by “failing to show substantial 

evidence that a shot was fired from [a] car at a residence[.]” Petition (Doc. 1) at 11. As 

discussed in Section II.A., supra, this Court shall “entertain an application for a writ of 

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habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court 

only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties 

of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief 

is not for the purpose of correcting errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 

67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an 

alleged misapplication of state law, and as such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas 

corpus.

2. Ground 4(b): Double Punishment

Petitioner asserts that his sentences on Counts Three and Four, discharging a 

weapon at a residential structure and drive-by shooting, were double punishment because 

he should not have been charged with both after a review of the evidence. Petition (Doc. 

1) at 11. As discussed in Section II.A., supra, this Court shall “entertain an application for 

a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 

court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of 

treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Federal habeas 

corpus relief is not for the purpose of correcting errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 

502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks 

relief for an alleged misapplication of state law, and as such, it is not cognizable in federal 

habeas corpus.

To the extent that Petitioner is alleging a Double Jeopardy violation, as discussed in 

Section IV.A., supra, Petitioner failed to present this federal claim to the state courts, and 

it is now procedurally defaulted. Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been 

procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the 

petitioner can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 

298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in 

state appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated 

cause and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual 

prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 

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(1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of 

prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his 

entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal 

quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 

1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . 

[and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits of his claims.”). Neither has 

Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional 

error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the underlying offense.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to meet the cause and prejudice 

standard or demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 

748, 111 S.Ct. at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim 

must fail.

3. Ground 4(c): Equal Protection

Petitioner asserts that the appellate court erred because it “fail[ed] to overturn the 

trial court lack of evidence[,]” thereby denying Petitioner of his procedural rights and equal 

protection of the laws. Petition (Doc. 1) at 11. As discussed in Section IV.D., supra, 

Petitioner failed to present this federal claim to the state courts, and it is now procedurally 

defaulted. Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the 

federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause 

and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 

103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding 

barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). 

Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. 

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must 

show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked 

to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of 

constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also 

Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer 

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any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on 

which to address the merits of his claims.”). Neither has Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear 

and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder 

would have found [him] guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As 

such, Petitioner has failed to meet the cause and prejudice standard or demonstrate a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S.Ct. at 2564 

(citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is denied.

4. Ground 4(d): Speculative Evidence

Petitioner asserts that the appellate court’s “decision of evidence [was] opinional 

[sic] and an [sic] fundamental error basing evidence on pure speculations and false events 

which aren’t cited on record.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 11. As discussed in Section II.A., supra, 

this Court shall “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person 

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody 

in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(a) (emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief is not for the purpose of correcting 

errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 

385 (1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an alleged misapplication of state law, and 

as such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.

5. Ground 4(e): Due Process and Confrontation

Petitioner asserts that there was no witness testimony that Petitioner fired his gun or 

other physical evidence, which denied Petitioner of his rights pursuant to the Due Process 

and Confrontation clauses. Petition (Doc. 1) at 11. As discussed in Section IV.D., supra,

Petitioner failed to present these federal claims to the state courts, and they are now 

procedurally defaulted. Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally 

defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner 

can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 

S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state 

appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause 

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and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) 

(Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but 

that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with 

error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); 

see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed 

to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no 

basis on which to address the merits of his claims.”). Neither has Petitioner “establish[ed] 

by clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable 

factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to meet the cause and prejudice standard or 

demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S.Ct. 

at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, Petitioner’s claims are denied.

6. Ground 4(f): Complete Defense

Petitioner contends that because his constitutional rights were violated, he was 

denied the opportunity to present a complete defense. Petition (Doc. 1) at 11–12. As 

discussed in Section IV.D., supra, Petitioner failed to present this federal claim to the state 

courts, and it is are now procedurally defaulted.6 Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have 

been procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review 

6

“Whether a claim is exhausted through a direct appellate procedure, a post-conviction 

procedure, or both, the claim should be raised at all appellate stages afforded under state law as of 

right by that procedure.” Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 916 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Liebman & 

Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure, § 23.3b (4th ed. 1998)). Thus, “where the 

claim has been presented for the first and only time in a procedural context in which its merits will 

not be considered unless ‘there are special and important reasons therefor’ ... [r]aising the claim in 

such a fashion does not, for the relevant purpose, constitute ‘fair presentation.’” Castille v. 

Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989). Petitioner raised this claim as part of the appeal of his 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Answer 

(Doc. 14), Ariz. Ct. App., Case No. 2 CA-CR 2017-0147-PR, Appellant’s Pet. for Review Pursuant 

to the Denial of Rule 32, PCR (Exh. “P”) (Doc. 16). The Court will construe Petitioner’s assertion

as an individualized claim regarding the denial of the opportunity to present a complete defense, 

but recognizes he only raised it to the Arizona Court of Appeals during review of his PCR petition.

This does not constitute fair presentation. Casey, 386 F.3d at 918.

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unless the petitioner can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 

U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise 

claims in state appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless petitioner 

demonstrated cause and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause 

or actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 

L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created a 

possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, 

infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) 

(internal quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . 

. [and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits of his claims.”). Neither 

has Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear and convincing evidence that but for the 

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the 

underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to meet the 

cause and prejudice standard or demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S.Ct. at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, 

Petitioner’s claim is denied.

E. Ground Five: Refusal to Overturn Trial Court Error

Petitioner alleges that the “Appeals Court abused its discretion by denying relief and 

violating [his] constitutional rights causing harmful prejudice [by] refusing to overturn trial 

court error.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 13; see also Reply (Doc. 17) at 6–7. As discussed in 

Section II.B., supra, prior to bringing a claim to federal court, a habeas petitioner must first 

present all claims to the state court. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 

1204, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). The fair presentation requirement mandates that a state 

prisoner must alert the state court “to the presence of a federal claim” in his petition. 

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 33, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (rejecting 

petitioner’s assertion that his claim had been “fairly presented” because his brief in the 

state appeals court did not indicate that “he was complaining about a violation of federal 

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law” and the justices having the opportunity to read a lower court decision addressing the 

federal claims was not fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999), 

cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1009 (2000) (holding that petitioner failed to exhaust federal due 

process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim in state court only on state 

grounds). Merely labeling a claim “federal” or making a passing reference to the United 

States Constitution does not constitute “fair presentment.” See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 

at 33, 124 S.Ct. at 1351; see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365–66 115 S.Ct. 887, 

888, 130 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995) (“If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct 

alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that 

the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution”). Moreover, 

Petitioner cannot expect the state court to read beyond the four corners of the petition to 

meet the fair presentation requirement. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 33, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 

1351, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (rejecting petitioner’s assertion that his claim had been “fairly 

presented” because his brief in the state appeals court did not indicate that “he was 

complaining about a violation of federal law” and the justices having the opportunity to 

read a lower court decision addressing the federal claims was not fair presentation); Hiivala 

v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that petitioner failed to exhaust federal 

due process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim in state court only on 

state grounds).

Here, Petitioner did not raise this vague claim of harmful prejudice to the state 

courts. See Answer (Doc. 14), Ariz. Ct. App., Case No. 2 CA-CR 2014-0167, Appellant’s 

Opening Br. (Exh. “E”) (Doc. 15) at 88–89; Answer (Doc. 14), Ariz. Ct. App., Case No. 2 

CA-CR 2017-0147-PR, Appellant’s Pet. for Review Pursuant to the Denial of Rule 32, 

PCR (Exh. “P”) (Doc. 16). As such, the claim would now be precluded and meet the 

technical requirements for exhaustion. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) (2018); see also 

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (in order 

to “fairly present” one’s claims, the prisoner must do so “in each appropriate state court”). 

Therefore, Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 

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722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2557 n. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (“petitioner failed to 

exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present 

his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims 

procedurally barred”).

Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal 

courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and 

actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 

L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding barred 

federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). Petitioner has 

not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 

478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely 

that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and 

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) 

(emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 

80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally 

defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits 

of his claims.”). Neither has Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear and convincing evidence 

that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty 

of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to 

meet the cause and prejudice standard or demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S.Ct. at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim is denied.

1. Ground 5(a): Treated Differently from Co-Defendant

Petitioner contends that his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were

violated when the state courts treated him differently from his co-defendant. Petition (Doc. 

1) at 13. As discussed in Section IV.E., supra, Petitioner failed to present these federal 

claims to the state courts, and they are now procedurally defaulted. Where a habeas 

petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from 

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subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding 

that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless 

petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show 

either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 

2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created 

a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, 

infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) 

(internal quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . 

. [and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits of his claims.”). Neither 

has Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear and convincing evidence that but for the 

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the 

underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to meet the 

cause and prejudice standard or demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S.Ct. at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, 

Petitioner’s claims are denied.

2. Ground 5(b): Forensic Weapon Specialist

Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to relief and investigation by a forensic weapon 

specialist. Petition (Doc. 1) at 13. As discussed in Section II.A., supra, this Court shall 

“entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) 

(emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief is not for the purpose of correcting errors 

of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 

(1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an alleged misapplication of state law, and as 

such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.

To the extent that Petitioner is alleging a Due Process violation, as discussed in 

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Section IV.E., supra, Petitioner failed to present this federal claim to the state courts, and 

it is now procedurally defaulted. Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been 

procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the 

petitioner can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 

298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in 

state appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated 

cause and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual 

prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 

(1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of 

prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his 

entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal 

quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 

1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . 

[and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits of his claims.”). Neither has 

Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional 

error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the underlying offense.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to meet the cause and prejudice 

standard or demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 

748, 111 S.Ct. at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim 

must fail.

3. Ground 5(c): Impeachment of C.S.

Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to impeachment of C.S.’s statement and 

testimony. Petition (Doc. 1) at 13. As discussed in Section II.A., supra, this Court shall 

“entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) 

(emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief is not for the purpose of correcting errors 

of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 

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(1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an alleged misapplication of state law, and as 

such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.

To the extent that Petitioner is alleging a Due Process violation, as discussed in 

Section IV.E., supra, Petitioner failed to present this federal claim to the state courts, and 

it is now procedurally defaulted. Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been 

procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the 

petitioner can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 

298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in 

state appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated 

cause and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual 

prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 

(1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of 

prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his 

entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal 

quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 

1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . 

[and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits of his claims.”). Neither has 

Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional 

error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the underlying offense.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to meet the cause and prejudice 

standard or demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 

748, 111 S.Ct. at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim 

must fail.

4. Ground 5(d): Confrontation of Evidence

Petitioner contends that was “denied the right to confront the evidence because [he] 

was denied motions to compel discovery, victim phone record, and test firing guns by a 

[sic] expert to determine directions.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 13. As discussed in Section 

IV.E., supra, Petitioner failed to present these federal claims to the state courts, and they 

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are now procedurally defaulted. Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been 

procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the 

petitioner can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 

298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in 

state appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated 

cause and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual 

prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 

(1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of 

prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his 

entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal 

quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 

1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . 

[and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits of his claims.”). Neither has 

Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional 

error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the underlying offense.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to meet the cause and prejudice 

standard or demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 

748, 111 S.Ct. at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, Petitioner’s claims

are denied.

5. Ground 5(e): Harmful Prejudice

Petitioner contends that he was placed in “harmful prejudice” by the appellate 

court’s refusal to grant relief resulting in Petitioner not being given “a fair opportunity to 

prepare a complete defense, impeachment of prosecution witness, newly discovered 

exculpatory evidence, [and] a duplicitous indictment/investigation[.]” Petition (Doc. 1) at 

13. As discussed in Section IV.E., supra, Petitioner failed to present these federal claims 

to the state courts, and they are now procedurally defaulted. Where a habeas petitioner’s 

claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from subsequent 

review unless the petitioner can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. 

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Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that 

failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless 

petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show 

either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 

2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created 

a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, 

infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) 

(internal quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . 

. [and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits of his claims.”). Neither 

has Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear and convincing evidence that but for the 

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the 

underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to meet the 

cause and prejudice standard or demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S.Ct. at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, 

Petitioner’s claims are denied.

6. Ground 5(f): Due Process and Confrontation Regarding Gun

Petitioner contends that he was denied his rights pursuant to the Due Process and 

Confrontation clauses and his “constitutional right to prepare a complete defense” was 

violated because there was no “investigation of a 22, and a bullet hole which the sate claim 

[sic] came from a 22 of [his.]” Petition (Doc. 1) at 14. As discussed in Sections IV.E. and 

IV.D.6. n. 7, supra, Petitioner failed to present these federal claims to the state courts, and 

they are now procedurally defaulted. Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been 

procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the 

petitioner can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 

298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in 

state appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated 

cause and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual 

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prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 

(1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of 

prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his 

entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal 

quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 

1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . 

[and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits of his claims.”). Neither has 

Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional 

error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the underlying offense.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to meet the cause and prejudice 

standard or demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 

748, 111 S.Ct. at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, Petitioner’s claims

are denied.

7. Ground 5(g): Equal Rights

Petitioner contends that he was denied “equality, justic [sic] and equal rights” by 

the appellate court. Petition (Doc. 1) at 14. As discussed in Section IV.E., supra, Petitioner 

failed to present these federal claims to the state courts, and they are now procedurally 

defaulted. Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the 

federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause 

and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 

103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding 

barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). 

Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. 

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must 

show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked

to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of 

constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also 

Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer 

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any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on 

which to address the merits of his claims.”). Neither has Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear 

and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder

would have found [him] guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As 

such, Petitioner has failed to meet the cause and prejudice standard or demonstrate a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S.Ct. at 2564 

(citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, Petitioner’s claims are denied.

8. Ground 5(h): Complete Defense—Rule 15.1 Discovery

Petitioner contends that he was denied his constitutional right to present a complete 

defense when the trial court denied his Rule 15.1 motion for discovery. Petition (Doc. 1) 

at 14. As discussed in Section IV.E., supra, Petitioner failed to present this as a federal 

claim to the state courts, and it is now procedurally defaulted. Where a habeas petitioner’s 

claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from subsequent 

review unless the petitioner can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. 

Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that

failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless 

petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show 

either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 

2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created 

a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, 

infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) 

(internal quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . 

. [and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits of his claims.”). Neither 

has Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear and convincing evidence that but for the 

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the 

underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to meet the 

cause and prejudice standard or demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See 

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Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S.Ct. at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, 

Petitioner’s claim is denied.

F. Ground Six: Drive-By Shooting Count

Petitioner alleges that the “Appeals Court erred by denying [him] relief on the drive 

by shooting count, and there was not substantial evidence to support that conviction and 

the indictment is duplicitous[,] [w]hich violated [his] Constitutional Rights.” Petition 

(Doc. 1) at 15; Reply (Doc. 17) at 7–8. 

As discussed in Section II.B., supra, prior to bringing a claim to federal court, a 

habeas petitioner must first present all claims to the state court. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 

509, 520, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1204, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). The fair presentation requirement 

mandates that a state prisoner must alert the state court “to the presence of a federal claim” 

in his petition. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 33, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 

(2004) (rejecting petitioner’s assertion that his claim had been “fairly presented” because 

his brief in the state appeals court did not indicate that “he was complaining about a 

violation of federal law” and the justices having the opportunity to read a lower court 

decision addressing the federal claims was not fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 

F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1009 (2000) (holding that petitioner failed 

to exhaust federal due process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim in 

state court only on state grounds). Merely labeling a claim “federal” or making a passing 

reference to the United States Constitution does not constitute “fair presentment.” See 

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S.Ct. at 1351; see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 

364, 365–66 115 S.Ct. 887, 888, 130 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995) (“If state courts are to be given 

the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely 

be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States 

Constitution”). Moreover, Petitioner cannot expect the state court to read beyond the four 

corners of the petition to meet the fair presentation requirement. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 

U.S. 27, 33, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (rejecting petitioner’s assertion 

that his claim had been “fairly presented” because his brief in the state appeals court did 

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not indicate that “he was complaining about a violation of federal law” and the justices 

having the opportunity to read a lower court decision addressing the federal claims was not 

fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that petitioner 

failed to exhaust federal due process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim 

in state court only on state grounds).

Here, Petitioner presented his claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support his conviction drive-by shooting to the state courts as a violation of the Arizona 

state law without reference to the Constitution of the United States. See Answer (Doc. 14), 

Ariz. Ct. App., Case No. 2 CA-CR 2014-0167, Appellant’s Opening Br. (Exh. “E”) (Doc. 

15) at 75–77. Moreover, he did not raise the issue of a duplicitous charge at all. Answer 

(Doc. 14), Ariz. Ct. App., Case No. 2 CA-CR-2014-0167, Mem. Decision 11/30/2015 

(Exh. “A”) (Doc. 15) at 18–19. As such, the claims would now be precluded and meet the

technical requirements for exhaustion. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) (2018); see also 

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (in order 

to “fairly present” one’s claims, the prisoner must do so “in each appropriate state court”). 

Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 

722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2557 n. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (“petitioner failed to 

exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present 

his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims 

procedurally barred”). Additionally, when a Petitioner presents his claim to the state court, 

and is denied upon independent and adequate state grounds, this Court is prohibited from 

review. This is because the “state law determination [] is sufficient to support the 

judgment, [and] resolution of any independent federal ground for the decision could not 

affect the judgment and would therefore be advisory.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 

722, 728, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). Accordingly, Petitioner is not 

entitled to habeas relief.

Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal 

courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and 

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actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 

L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding barred 

federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). Petitioner has 

not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 

478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely 

that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and 

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) 

(emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 

80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally 

defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits 

of his claims.”). Neither has Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear and convincing evidence 

that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty 

of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to 

meet the cause and prejudice standard or demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S.Ct. at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). 

Therefore, Petitioner’s claims are denied.

1. Ground 6(a): Duplicitous Charge in the Indictment

Petitioner asserts that the appellate court erred when it reviewed the record, saw the 

indictment was duplicitous but refused to remand. Petition (Doc. 1) at 15. As discussed 

in Section II.A., supra, this Court shall “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus 

in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground 

that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief is not for the purpose 

of correcting errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 

116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an alleged misapplication of 

state law, and as such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.

. . .

. . .

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2. Ground 6(b): State v. Rivera7

Petitioner asserts that the appellate court erred when it failed to overturn Petitioner’s 

conviction based on State v. Rivera. Petition (Doc. 1) at 15. As discussed in Section II.A.,

supra, this Court shall “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a) (emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief is not for the purpose of 

correcting errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 

L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an alleged misapplication of state 

law, and as such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.

3. Ground 6(c): Substantial Evidence Supporting the Conviction

Petitioner asserts that his conviction for drive-by shooting was not supported by 

substantial evidence. Petition (Doc. 1) at 15. As discussed in Section II.A., supra, this 

Court shall “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody 

in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(a) (emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief is not for the purpose of correcting 

errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 

385 (1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an alleged misapplication of state law, and 

as such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.

4. Ground 6(d): Amendment of the Indictment

Petitioner asserts that the appellate court erred because it knew that “elements of the 

indictment specifically alleged that [Petitioner] committed the offenses by shooting at all 

three victims, which is incorrect[,] and the indictment wasn’t amened [sic] automatically 

to conform to evidence at trial.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 15 (citing State v. Rivera). As 

discussed in Section II.A., supra, this Court shall “entertain an application for a writ of 

habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court 

7

State v. Rivera, 226 Ariz. 325, ¶¶ 4–5, 247 P.3d 560, 562–63 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011).

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only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties 

of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief 

is not for the purpose of correcting errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 

67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an 

alleged misapplication of state law, and as such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas 

corpus.

5. Ground 6(e): Void Indictment

Petitioner asserts that indictment was void and insufficient to support the offenses 

charged. Petition (Doc. 1) at 15. As discussed in Section II.A., supra, this Court shall 

“entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) 

(emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief is not for the purpose of correcting errors 

of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 

(1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an alleged misapplication of state law, and as 

such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.

6. Ground 6(f): Equal Protection

Petitioner contends that the appellate court “decision was in violation of 

[Petitioner’s] constitutional rights in the Fourtheenth [sic] Amendments and under 

U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. XIV, . . . [and] equal protection of the laws.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 

14. As discussed in Section IV.F., supra, Petitioner failed to present this federal claim to 

the state courts, and it is now procedurally defaulted. Where a habeas petitioner’s claims 

have been procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review 

unless the petitioner can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 

U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise 

claims in state appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless petitioner 

demonstrated cause and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause 

or actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 

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L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created a 

possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, 

infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) 

(internal quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . 

. [and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits of his claims.”). Neither 

has Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear and convincing evidence that but for the 

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the 

underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to meet the 

cause and prejudice standard or demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S.Ct. at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, 

Petitioner’s claim is denied.

7. Ground 6(g): Speculation and False Statements

Petitioner contends that the appellate court decision was based on speculation and 

false statements made on the record. Petition (Doc. 1) at 15–16. As discussed in Section 

II.A., supra, this Court shall “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he 

is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief is not for the purpose of 

correcting errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 

L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an alleged misapplication of state 

law, and as such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.

8. Ground 6(h): Factual Error Regarding Video

Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred when it claimed the video showed 

Petitioner pointing the gun at the house and firing one shot which was incorrect. Petition 

(Doc. 1) at 16. As discussed in Section II.A., supra, this Court shall “entertain an 

application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the 

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Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis 

added). Federal habeas corpus relief is not for the purpose of correcting errors of state law. 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). 

Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an alleged misapplication of state law, and as such, it is 

not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.

9. Ground 6(i): Perjured Testimony

Petitioner asserts that the appellate court erred in relying on perjured statements and 

avoided the fact that C.S.’s front door was closed and she could not see who fired the shot. 

Petition (Doc. 1) at 16; see also Pet.’s Mot. Written and Pleadings (Doc. 23). As discussed 

in Section II.A., supra, this Court shall “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus 

in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground 

that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief is not for the purpose 

of correcting errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 

116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an alleged misapplication of 

state law, and as such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.

10.Ground 6(j): Video—Closed Door and No Arm Out of Car Window

Petitioner contends that the video showed a closed door and does not show an arm 

aiming a gun out of a car window. Petition (Doc. 1) at 16. As discussed in Section II.A., 

supra, this Court shall “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a) (emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief is not for the purpose of 

correcting errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 

L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an alleged misapplication of state 

law, and as such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.

11.Ground 6(k): Petitioner’s Statement Regarding His Gun

Petitioner asserts that his statement that he was going to get his gun “does not prove 

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sufficient evidence that a shot was fired at all.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 16. As discussed in 

Section II.A., supra, this Court shall “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus 

in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground 

that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief is not for the purpose 

of correcting errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 

116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an alleged misapplication of 

state law, and as such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.

12.Ground 6(l): Appellate Court Bias

Petitioner argues that the appellate court’s “decision was bias [sic] and prejudice 

[sic] acts of a forejudgment being preconceived, failing to view facts in light most favorable 

to sustaining conviction.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 16. As discussed in Section II.A., supra, 

this Court shall “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person 

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody 

in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(a) (emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief is not for the purpose of correcting 

errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 

385 (1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an alleged misapplication of state law, and 

as such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.

13.Ground 6(m): Due Process, Fourth Amendment, and Equal 

Protection

Petitioner asserts that the appellate court acted in bad faith “performing injustic [sic] 

acts and compelling with each others [sic] decisions and using falsification alter fabricated 

evidence to have an effect on the decisions of the appeals court which violated 

[Petitioner’s] const[itutional] rights in due process of law, rights of being accused in 

criminal prosecution, fourth amends [sic] and equal protect [sic] of the laws.” Petition 

(Doc. 1) at 16; Reply (Doc. 17) at 8. As discussed in Sections IV.F., supra, Petitioner 

failed to present these federal claims to the state courts, and they are now procedurally 

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defaulted.8 Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the 

federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause 

and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 

103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding 

barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). 

Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. 

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must 

show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked 

to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of 

constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also 

Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer 

any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on 

which to address the merits of his claims.”). Neither has Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear 

and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder 

would have found [him] guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As 

such, Petitioner has failed to meet the cause and prejudice standard or demonstrate a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S.Ct. at 2564 

(citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, Petitioner’s claims are denied.

G. Ground Seven: Denial of Motion in Limine and Prejudicial Error

Petitioner contends that “[t]he Appeals Court abused its discretion by denying [him]

relief in motion in limine and proforming [sic] prejudicial error which violated 

[Petitioner’s] constitutional rights.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 7; see also Reply (Doc. 17) at 8. 

As discussed in Section II.B., supra, prior to bringing a claim to federal court, a habeas 

petitioner must first present all claims to the state court. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520, 

8 Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim is not cognizable in this habeas corpus proceeding. 

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3052, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) (“where the 

State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state 

prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in 

an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.”).

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102 S.Ct. 1198, 1204, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). The fair presentation requirement mandates 

that a state prisoner must alert the state court “to the presence of a federal claim” in his 

petition. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 33, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) 

(rejecting petitioner’s assertion that his claim had been “fairly presented” because his brief 

in the state appeals court did not indicate that “he was complaining about a violation of 

federal law” and the justices having the opportunity to read a lower court decision 

addressing the federal claims was not fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 

(9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1009 (2000) (holding that petitioner failed to exhaust 

federal due process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim in state court 

only on state grounds). Merely labeling a claim “federal” or making a passing reference 

to the United States Constitution does not constitute “fair presentment.” See Baldwin v. 

Reese, 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S.Ct. at 1351; see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365–66 

115 S.Ct. 887, 888, 130 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995) (“If state courts are to be given the opportunity 

to correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the 

fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution”). 

Moreover, Petitioner cannot expect the state court to read beyond the four corners of the 

petition to meet the fair presentation requirement. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 33, 124 

S.Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (rejecting petitioner’s assertion that his claim had 

been “fairly presented” because his brief in the state appeals court did not indicate that “he 

was complaining about a violation of federal law” and the justices having the opportunity 

to read a lower court decision addressing the federal claims was not fair presentation); 

Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that petitioner failed to exhaust 

federal due process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim in state court 

only on state grounds).

Here, Petitioner presented his claims regarding the denial of his motion in limine

and prejudicial error to the state courts as a violation of the Arizona state law and 

procedural rules without reference to the Constitution of the United States. See Answer 

(Doc. 14), Ariz. Ct. App., Case No. 2 CA-CR 2014-0167, Appellant’s Opening Br. (Exh. 

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“E”) (Doc. 15) at 82–85. As such, the claims would now be precluded and meet the 

technical requirements for exhaustion. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) (2018); see also 

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (in order 

to “fairly present” one’s claims, the prisoner must do so “in each appropriate state court”). 

Therefore, Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 

722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2557 n. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (“petitioner failed to 

exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present 

his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims 

procedurally barred”).

Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal 

courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and 

actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 

L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding barred 

federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). Petitioner has 

not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 

478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely 

that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and 

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) 

(emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 

80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally 

defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits 

of his claims.”). Neither has Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear and convincing evidence 

that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty 

of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to 

meet the cause and prejudice standard or demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S.Ct. at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s claims are denied.

. . .

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1. Ground 7(a): Admission of Prior Bad Acts

Petitioner contends that the appellate court erred when it failed to overturn his case 

based on the denial of a request not to admit evidence of bad acts which had nothing to do 

with his case. Petition (Doc. 1) at 17. As discussed in Section II.A., supra, this Court shall 

“entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) 

(emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief is not for the purpose of correcting errors 

of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 385

(1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an alleged misapplication of state law, and as 

such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.

2. Ground 7(b): Limiting Instruction

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred when it said it would give a limiting 

instruction, but no instruction was given. Petition (Doc. 1) at 17. As discussed in Section 

II.A., supra, this Court shall “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf 

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he 

is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief is not for the purpose of 

correcting errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 

L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an alleged misapplication of state 

law, and as such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.

3. Ground 7(c): Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel Regarding 

Limiting Instruction

Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective because he did not raise the issue 

of the limiting instruction. Petition (Doc. 1) at 17. Petitioner asserted a single ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim to the state courts regarding an alleged failure by appellate 

counsel to argue that the trial court “committed reversible error in denying the defense the 

right to examine the gun fired by [C.S.] and having ballistic tests performed to determine 

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the trajectory of the bullets during the incident” to the state courts. Answer (Doc. 14), Exh. 

“J” at 109.

“As a general matter, each ‘unrelated alleged instance [ ] of counsel’s 

ineffectiveness’ is a separate claim for purposes of exhaustion.” Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 

F.3d 976, 992 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1056 (9th 

Cir. 2005)) (alterations in original). This means “all operative facts to an ineffective 

assistance claim must be presented to the state courts in order for a petitioner to exhaust 

his remedies.” Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007). This is 

“[b]ecause ineffective assistance claims are not fungible, but are instead highly factdependent, [requiring] some baseline explication of the facts relating to it[.]” Id. As such, 

“a petitioner who presented any ineffective assistance of counsel claim below can[not] later 

add unrelated instances of counsel’s ineffectiveness to that claim.” Id. (citations and 

internal quotations omitted); see also Date v. Schriro, 619 F.Supp.2d 736, 788 (D. Ariz. 

2008) (“Petitioner’s assertion of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on one 

set of facts, does not exhaust other claims of ineffective assistance based on different 

facts”).

Because Petitioner failed to present this federal claim to the state courts, it is now 

procedurally defaulted. Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally 

defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner 

can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 

S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state 

appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause 

and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) 

(Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but 

that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with 

error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); 

see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed 

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to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no 

basis on which to address the merits of his claims.”). Neither has Petitioner “establish[ed] 

by clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable 

factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to meet the cause and prejudice standard or 

demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S.Ct. 

at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is denied.

4. Ground 7(d): Withdrawal of Ineffective Assistance Claim

Petitioner asserts that the appellate court erred in claiming that Petitioner’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim was withdrawn in reply. Petition (Doc. 1) at 17. 

When a Petitioner presents his claim to the state court and is denied upon independent and 

adequate state grounds, this Court is prohibited from review. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 

U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2553, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). This is because the “state 

law determination [] is sufficient to support the judgment, [and] resolution of any 

independent federal ground for the decision could not affect the judgment and would 

therefore be advisory.” Id. at 729, 111 S.Ct. at 2554. Moreover, “[t]his rule applies 

whether the state law ground is substantive or procedural.” Id.

Here, however, Petitioner failed to present this claim to the state courts, and it is

now procedurally defaulted.9 Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally 

defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner 

can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 

S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state 

appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause 

and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) 

(Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but 

9 Petitioner did not seek review of his PCR petition with the Arizona Supreme Court. 

Review of the appellate docket for his post-conviction case suggests that is where this issue arose.

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that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with 

error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); 

see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed 

to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no 

basis on which to address the merits of his claims.”). Neither has Petitioner “establish[ed] 

by clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable 

factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to meet the cause and prejudice standard or 

demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S.Ct. 

at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, Petitioner’s claims are denied.

5. Ground 7(e): Due Process

Petitioner contends that the appellate court “abused its discretion when claiming the 

arson accusation was relevant to [his] case[,] [and] [by] failing to relize [sic] admitting 

evidence of bad acts to a jury had a strong impact on the jury decision placing [Petitioner] 

in harmful prejudice by making [him] look guilty” in violation of his Due Process rights. 

Petition (Doc. 1) at 17. As discussed in Section IV.G., supra, Petitioner failed to present 

this federal claim to the state courts, and it is now procedurally defaulted. Where a habeas 

petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from 

subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding 

that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless 

petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show 

either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 

2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created 

a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, 

infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) 

(internal quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . 

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. [and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits of his claims.”). Neither 

has Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear and convincing evidence that but for the 

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the 

underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to meet the 

cause and prejudice standard or demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S.Ct. at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, 

Petitioner’s claim is denied.

6. Ground 7(f): Hearsay Testimony

Petitioner contends that C.S.’s testimony regarding arson was hearsay, “and the trial 

court failed to have A.A. testify to that accusation.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 18; Reply (Doc. 

17) at 8. As discussed in Section II.A., supra, this Court shall “entertain an application for 

a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 

court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of 

treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Federal habeas 

corpus relief is not for the purpose of correcting errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 

502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks 

relief for an alleged misapplication of state law, and as such, it is not cognizable in federal 

habeas corpus.

H. Ground Eight: Denial of Rule 20 Motions

Petitioner alleges that “[t]he Appeals Court erred in denying [his] Rule 20 motions 

for an acquittal and depriving [him] out of life liberty and freedom[,] [w]hich violated [his] 

constitutional rights.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 19; Reply (Doc. 17) at 8. 

As discussed in Section II.B., supra, prior to bringing a claim to federal court, a 

habeas petitioner must first present all claims to the state court. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 

509, 520, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1204, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). The fair presentation requirement 

mandates that a state prisoner must alert the state court “to the presence of a federal claim” 

in his petition. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 33, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 

(2004) (rejecting petitioner’s assertion that his claim had been “fairly presented” because 

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his brief in the state appeals court did not indicate that “he was complaining about a 

violation of federal law” and the justices having the opportunity to read a lower court 

decision addressing the federal claims was not fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 

F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1009 (2000) (holding that petitioner failed 

to exhaust federal due process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim in 

state court only on state grounds). Merely labeling a claim “federal” or making a passing 

reference to the United States Constitution does not constitute “fair presentment.” See

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S.Ct. at 1351; see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 

364, 365–66 115 S.Ct. 887, 888, 130 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995) (“If state courts are to be given 

the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely 

be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States 

Constitution”). Moreover, Petitioner cannot expect the state court to read beyond the four 

corners of the petition to meet the fair presentation requirement. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 

U.S. 27, 33, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (rejecting petitioner’s assertion 

that his claim had been “fairly presented” because his brief in the state appeals court did 

not indicate that “he was complaining about a violation of federal law” and the justices 

having the opportunity to read a lower court decision addressing the federal claims was not 

fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that petitioner 

failed to exhaust federal due process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim 

in state court only on state grounds).

Here, Petitioner presented his claim regarding the denial of his Rule 20 motions to 

the state courts as a violation of the Arizona state law without reference to the Constitution 

of the United States. See Answer (Doc. 14), Ariz. Ct. App., Case No. 2 CA-CR 2014-0167, 

Appellant’s Opening Br. (Exh. “E”) (Doc. 15) at 80–82. As such, the claim would now be 

precluded and meets the technical requirements for exhaustion. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.2(a)(3) (2018); see also Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 

L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (in order to “fairly present” one’s claims, the prisoner must do so “in 

each appropriate state court”). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted. 

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Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2557 n. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 

(1991) (“petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner 

would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would 

now find the claims procedurally barred”). Additionally, when a Petitioner presents his 

claim to the state court, and is denied upon independent and adequate state grounds, this 

Court is prohibited from review. This is because the “state law determination [] is sufficient 

to support the judgment, [and] resolution of any independent federal ground for the 

decision could not affect the judgment and would therefore be advisory.” Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 728, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief.

Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal 

courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and 

actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 

L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding barred 

federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). Petitioner has 

not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 

478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely 

that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and 

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) 

(emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 

80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally 

defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits 

of his claims.”). Neither has Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear and convincing evidence 

that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty 

of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to 

meet the cause and prejudice standard or demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S.Ct. at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). 

Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is denied.

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1. Ground 8(a): Sufficiency of the Evidence

Petitioner asserts that the appellate court erred when it refused to enter a judgment 

of acquittal on his post-trial motions, knowing that there was insufficient evidence to 

convict, the charges were false, and the indictment was void. Petition (Doc. 1) at 19. As 

discussed in Section II.A., supra, this Court shall “entertain an application for a writ of 

habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court 

only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties 

of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief 

is not for the purpose of correcting errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 

67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an 

alleged misapplication of state law, and as such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas 

corpus.

2. Ground 8(b): Due Process

Petitioner asserts that the appellate court erred in “avoiding the issues refusing to 

respond to each conviction basing a decision on an assault that [Petitioner] wasn’t found 

guilty on[,] . . . was indicted wrongfully plus falsely because two alleged victims had no 

involvement in the alleged crime which was make believe and the evidence is influencing,

fabricated and insufficient to support all charges” resulting in a denial of due process. 

Petition (Doc. 1) at 19. As discussed in Section IV.H., supra, Petitioner failed to present 

this federal claim to the state courts, and it is now procedurally defaulted. Where a habeas 

petitioner’s claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from 

subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding 

that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless 

petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show 

either cause or actual prejudice. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 

2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created 

a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, 

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infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) 

(internal quotations omitted); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . 

. [and as such,] there is no basis on which to address the merits of his claims.”). Neither 

has Petitioner “establish[ed] by clear and convincing evidence that but for the 

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the 

underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to meet the 

cause and prejudice standard or demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S.Ct. at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, 

Petitioner’s claim is denied.

3. Ground 8(c): Lack of Substantial Evidence

Petitioner asserts that the appellate court abused its discretion because there was a 

lack of substantial evidence to convict him. Petition (Doc. 1) at 19. As discussed in Section 

II.A., supra, this Court shall “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf 

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he 

is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Federal habeas corpus relief is not for the purpose of 

correcting errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 

L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Petitioner’s claim seeks relief for an alleged misapplication of state 

law, and as such, it is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.

4. Ground 8(d): Equal Protection

Petitioner asserts that the appellate court violated his rights pursuant to the 

Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution’s equal protection clause by “not reaffirming 

any alter charge or alter indictment.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 19. As discussed in Section 

IV.H., supra, Petitioner failed to present this federal claim to the state courts, and it is now 

procedurally defaulted. Where a habeas petitioner’s claims have been procedurally 

defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner 

can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 

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S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state 

appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause 

and prejudice). Petitioner has not met his burden to show either cause or actual prejudice. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) 

(Petitioner “must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but 

that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with 

error of constitutional dimensions”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); 

see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed 

to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims[,] . . . [and as such,] there is no 

basis on which to address the merits of his claims.”). Neither has Petitioner “establish[ed] 

by clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable 

factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(e)(2)(B). As such, Petitioner has failed to meet the cause and prejudice standard or 

demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 748, 111 S.Ct. 

at 2564 (citations and quotations omitted). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is denied.

V. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Petitioner’s habeas claims are either 

not cognizable in habeas or procedurally defaulted and recommends the Petition (Doc. 1) 

be denied.

VI. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons delineated above, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District 

Judge enter an order DENYING Petitioner’s Petition Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a 

Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Non-Death Penalty) (Doc. 1).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after being served 

with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to another party’s 

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objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(b)(2). No replies shall be filed unless leave is granted from the District Court. If 

objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV-18-0087-TUCJGZ.

Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the 

Magistrate Judge may result in waiver of the right of review.

Dated this 6th day of February, 2020.

Case 4:18-cv-00087-JGZ Document 26 Filed 02/07/20 Page 88 of 88