Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_17-cv-08133/USCOURTS-azd-3_17-cv-08133-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Brian S. Sharp, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-17-08133-PCT-DWL

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Brian S. Sharp (“Sharp”) has moved for reconsideration (Doc. 20) of the 

Court’s March 5, 2019 Order (Doc. 17) finding reversible error by the ALJ and remanding 

his case for further proceedings. Sharp asks the Court to remand for an award of benefits. 

For the following reasons, the Court denies the motion. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Legal Standard 

The Court has discretion to reconsider and vacate a prior order. Barber v. Hawaii, 

42 F.3d 1185, 1198 (9th Cir. 1994). However, motions for reconsideration are generally 

disfavored and should be denied “absent a showing of manifest error or a showing of new 

facts or legal authority that could not have been brought to [the Court’s] attention earlier 

with reasonable diligence.” LRCiv. 7.2(g). Indeed, reconsideration is an “extraordinary 

remedy” that is available only in “highly unusual circumstances.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. 

Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Accordingly, a 

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motion for reconsideration “may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the 

first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Id.

(emphasis in original). 

II. Analysis 

The motion for reconsideration contains citations to an array of Social Security 

cases in which courts remanded to the ALJ for an award of benefits (as opposed to 

remanding for further proceedings). (Doc. 20 at 3-6.) Sharp contends he was unable to 

submit these authorities “before the rationale expressed in the Order remanding for further 

administrative proceedings.” (Id. at 7.) 

This contention lacks merit. Sharp argued in his opening brief, and again in his 

reply, that the Court should remand for an award of benefits. (Doc. 13 at 19-22; Doc. 15 

at 4.) He also cited Rawa v. Colvin, 672 Fed. App’x 664 (9th Cir. 2016), as a case 

supporting his position. (Doc. 13 at 20.) The motion for reconsideration, which also 

discusses Rawa, simply constitutes an attempt to provide additional case law in support of 

this argument. This is improper under LRCiv. 7.2(g)(1), which provides that “[n]o motion 

for reconsideration of an Order may repeat any oral or written argument made by the 

movant in support of or in opposition to the motion that resulted in the Order.” 

The reconsideration request also fails on the merits. Sharp cites unpublished Ninth 

Circuit cases and several district court cases for the proposition that “[r]emand for further 

proceedings is not needed because there are no medical opinions in the record to support a 

finding of disability, so long as a claimant has established medically determinable 

impairments that may reasonably be expected to result in the reported symptoms.” (Doc. 

20 at 3-6.) But Sharp ignores clearly established Ninth Circuit case law providing that, 

“[w]hen the ALJ denies benefits and the court finds error, the court ordinarily must remand 

to the agency for further proceedings before directing an award of benefits.” Leon v. 

Berryhill, 880 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2017). Only in rare circumstances, then, should 

the court remand for an award of benefits. The appropriate rule, as indicated in the Court’s 

Order, is the credit-as-true rule. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has noted that courts are 

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required “to remand for further proceedings when, even though all conditions of the creditas-true rule are satisfied, an evaluation of the record as a whole creates serious doubt that 

a claimant is, in fact, disabled.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(citing Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2003)); see also Treichler v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Where . . . an ALJ makes a 

legal error, but the record is uncertain and ambiguous, the proper approach is to remand 

the case to the agency.”). 

Here, as the Court found when applying the credit-as-true rule, “administrative 

proceedings would arguably serve a useful purpose,” because “[o]ther than Sharp’s 

testimony, there is little evidence in the record indicating that Sharp’s atrial fibrillation is 

disabling.” (Doc. 17 at 10-11.) The Court also applied Garrison and found “the record as 

a whole ‘creates serious doubt that [Sharp] is, in fact disabled’” because “no medical 

opinions in the record suggest Sharp is incapable of working.” (Id. at 11, citing Garrison, 

759 F.3d at 1021.) Sharp does not seem to dispute the Court’s factual conclusions 

regarding the lack of any supporting evidence in the record. He simply cites nonbinding 

cases, with different facts, in which courts reached a different outcome. The Court is not 

required to follow such cases, particularly where the scope-of-remand decision is 

discretionary. Cf. Leon v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Even if [the 

court] reach[es] the third step and credit[s] the claimant’s testimony as true, it is within the 

court’s discretion either to make a direct award of benefits or to remand for further 

proceedings.”). 

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Sharp’s motion for reconsideration (Doc. 20) 

is DENIED. 

 Dated this 26th day of March, 2019. 

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