Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04401/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04401-25/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RITCHIE PHILLIPS, dba R&D COMPUTERS

Plaintiff,

v.

NETBLUE, INC., formerly known as

YFDIRECT, INC., et al., 

 Defendants. 

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No. C-05-4401 SC

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO

STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S

EXPERT JEFFREY

POSLUNS' REPORT AND

TESTIMONY

Before the Court is a Motion by Defendants Netblue, Inc. et

al. ("Defendants") to Strike Plaintiff's Expert Jeffrey Posluns'

Report and Testimony. For the following reasons, the Motion is

DENIED. 

I. BACKGROUND

Familiarity with the Courts' previous Orders which discuss

the background of the dispute between Defendants and Plaintiff

Ritchie Phillips ("Plaintiff") is assumed.

/

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Regarding the instant Motion before the Court, the following

facts are relevant. Plaintiff retained Jeffery Posluns

("Posluns") as an expert witness. Posluns provided an expert

report to Defendants on December 7, 2006 ("Posluns Expert Report"

or "Expert Report" or "Report"). See Riffer Decl., Ex. A. The

Expert Report is eighteen pages long, contains inter alia fourteen

expert opinions ("Opinions"), lettered A-N, and refers to twelve

lengthy documents which are attached to the Report. See id.

Defendants deposed Posluns for over seven hours on December 13,

2006. See Grabowski Decl., Ex. A. On December 29, 2006,

Defendants filed the instant Motion. See Docket No. 159. On

January 12, 2007, Plaintiff filed its Opposition, to which was

attached a supplemental expert report by Posluns ("Posluns'

Supplemental Expert Report" or "Supplemental Expert Report" or

"Supplemental Report"). See Docket Nos. 174, 176. 

 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Sitting in its capacity as gatekeeper, the Court must ensure 

that an expert's testimony “both rests on a reliable foundation

and is relevant to the task at hand.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597(1993). In doing so,

"[t]he trial court has broad discretion in admitting and excluding

expert testimony." Taylor v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 787 F.2d

1309, 1315 (9th Cir. 1986). Exercise of this discretion is guided

by the rule that "[t]o be admissible, expert testimony must (1)

address an issue beyond the common knowledge of the average

layman, (2) be presented by a witness having sufficient expertise,

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1

The opinions challenged on this ground are A, B, C, D, E, H,

I, J, K, L, and M. 

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and (3) assert a reasonable opinion given the state of the

pertinent art or scientific knowledge." U.S. v. Vallejo, 237 F.3d

1008, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants offer six arguments why some or all of Posluns'

Opinions should be stricken and Posluns should be prevented from

testifying. None have merit.

A. Posluns' Expert Report is Adequate

Defendants petition the Court to exclude eleven of Posluns'

Opinions on the ground that the Expert Report does not meet the

requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP")

26(a)(2).1 See Motion at 2-8. In particular, Defendants complain

that the Report does sufficiently explain Posluns' bases and

reasons for each of these Opinions. See id. This argument is

without merit. 

FRCP 26(a)(2) requires parties to disclose to other parties a

"written report prepared and signed by" any witness whom a party

intends will provide expert testimony. Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(a)(2)(B). Such a report must contain, in addition to "a

complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis

and reasons therefor," information going to the expert's

qualifications to testify regarding the intended subjects of his

or her testimony, information going to his or her credibility, and

information going to the foundation of his or her opinions. See

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id. FRCP 37(c)(1) empowers a court to impose sanctions on a

party which fails to comply with FRCP 26(a)(2), which may include

excluding evidence from trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1). 

"The purpose of expert disclosure rules is to facilitate a

fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the

fullest practical extent. Thus FRCP 26(a) and 37(c)(1) seek to

prevent the unfair tactical advantage that can be gained by

failing to unveil an expert in a timely fashion, and thereby

potentially deprive a [party] of the opportunity to depose the

proposed expert, challenge his credentials, solicit expert

opinions of his own, or conduct expert-related discovery." 

Poulis-Minott v. Smith, 388 F.3d 354, 358 (1st Cir. 2004)(internal

quotations omitted).

 Posluns' Expert Report meets the requirements of FRCP

26(a)(2), and creates no danger of putting Defendants at any

tactical disadvantage. Defendants do not complain that the report

was not disclosed in a timely fashion, that it contained

insufficient information regarding Posluns' qualifications, or

that it somehow deprived them of the opportunity to depose

Posluns. See Motion. Indeed, Defendants deposed Posluns for over

seven hours. See Grabowski Decl., Ex. A. Rather, they argue that

the bases and reasons which Posluns gives for these eleven

opinions was insufficient. See Motion at 3-8. Importantly, they

do not argue that Posluns failed to give any reasons or basis but

rather that he didn't give enough. See id. 

This argument fully misses the point of expert reports. As

the First Circuit opinion quoted above makes clear, expert reports

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2

The cases cited by Defendants which purportedly support a

contrary conclusion are completely inapposite, dealing with

situations in which a party completely failed to provide required

types of information. See U.S. ex rel. Mossey v. Pal-Tech, Inc.,. 231 F. Supp. 2d 94, 98 (D.D.C. 2002)(report failed to disclose:

amount expert was paid; what exhibits expert intends to use in

testimony; whether expert had published any articles); Ohime v.

Foresman, 186 F.R.D. 507, 508 (N.D. Ind. 1999) (report failed to

disclose whether expert had published any articles or testified in

other trials). 

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are meant to ensure that a party has sufficient information to

test a purported expert's qualifications and cross-examine and/or

depose the expert regarding his or her opinions. See PoulisMinott, 388 F.3d at 358. Posluns' Expert Report more than

sufficiently provides such information. The Report lists several

sources, or bases, for each opinion, which, in most cases, crossreference more detailed information, concepts and standards

contained in exhibits to the Expert Report or Requests for Comment

("RFCs") or other official sources. See Riffer Decl., Ex. A. 

Based on the information provided in Posluns' Expert Report,

Defendants were able to depose Posluns on his opinions and will be

able to cross-examine him at trial. Indeed, the problems which

Defendants allege are, in substance, subjects that would be

properly raised in cross-examination. Defendants' argument that

Posluns' Expert Report violates FRCP 26(a) is therefore without

merit.2

Having found that Posluns' Expert Report is sufficient under

FRCP 26(a), the Court sees no need to consider Posluns'

Supplemental Report for this purpose. However, the Court notes

that Defendants' argument that the Supplemental Report should be

disregarded by the Court because it was submitted after various

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deadlines and events had passed is without basis. See Reply at 1. 

As just found, Posluns' Expert Report was sufficient and therefore

no prejudice was caused to Defendants by the Supplemental Report's

timing. The Supplemental Report does not add anything new to

Posluns' Expert Report or fill-in any gaps in required

information, but rather verbalizes in advance the testimony which

Posluns intends to give at trial on the bases and reasons already

stated in his Expert Report. Plaintiff's decision to supplement

Posluns' Expert Report was not an admission that the Expert Report

was deficient, as Defendants argue. See id. Rather, it was a

good faith effort by Plaintiff to ensure that Defendants had

sufficient information to fairly interrogate Posluns at trial. If

Posluns' Expert Report had actually been deficient, and the

Supplemental Report resolved those deficiencies, the proper remedy

by this Court would have been to give Defendants additional time

to address the new information. It would not be, as Defendants

suggest, to ignore or strike the Supplemental Report, strike the

original Report, and exclude any testimony by Posluns at trial. 

See id. The purpose of FRCP 26(a) disclosures "is to facilitate

a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the

fullest practical extent," Poulis-Minott, 388 F.3d at 358, not to

facilitate "gotcha" strategies of litigation. 

B. Posluns is Qualified to Testify as an Expert

Defendants' only explicit challenge to Posluns'

qualifications as an expert relates to Posluns' Opinion F.

Defendants also vaguely suggest that Posluns is not qualified to

testify as an expert on the subjects described in the Expert

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Report, generally. See Motion at 8-10. The explicit challenge is

without merit, and the vague suggestion is absurd.

"In assessing whether an expert has the appropriate

qualifications, the court considers whether the expert offers some

special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education on

the subject matter." Gebhardt v. Mentor Corp., 15 Fed.Appx. 540,

542 (9th Cir. 2001). 

This case is about unsolicited commercial email, or spam. 

See Complaint. Posluns has worked for seven years in the field of

internet security, and is currently the chief information officer

of an internet security firm. See Riffer Decl., Ex. A. Posluns

has attained seven professional certifications related to internet

security. See id. Posluns has published three books on internet

security, including one titled Inside the Spam Cartel, and has

published over 10 articles or white papers on internet security,

including "Eliminating Spam: Postfix as a Mail Transfer Agent." 

See id. Defendants' vague suggestion that he is not qualified to

testify regarding spam is silly.

Defendants explicitly challenge Posluns' qualifications to

testify regarding whether certain email subject lines are

misleading, suggesting that such testimony is more properly the

province of an "expert in consumer confusion." Motion at 10. 

Misleading subject lines are a characteristic of spam, see

Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornographic and

Marketing ("CAN-SPAM") Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C. § 7704(2), thus an

expert in spam is qualified to testify on this subject. 

/

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C. Posluns' Opinions are Reliable

Defendants argue that all fourteen of Posluns' opinions are

unreliable. See Motion at 14-19. In support, Defendants cite

essentially the same short-comings which they alleged made

Posluns' Expert Report inadequate. See id. As the Court stated

above regarding Defendants' challenges to the adequacy of the

Expert Report, the reasons and bases which Posluns gives in his

Report are sufficient. See supra. The detailed, well-supported

bases that the opinion cites, along with Posluns' solid expertise

in the area, leave the court with no doubt about the reliability

of the expert testimony he will give. See U.S. v. Decoud, 456

F.3d 996, 1012 (9th Cir. 2006). As with Defendants' arguments in

support of their claim that the Expert Report violates FRCP 26(a),

their arguments regarding Posluns' alleged unreliability as an

expert witness are more properly made before a jury on crossexamination. 

D. Posluns' Opinions Do Not Simply Summarize Evidence

Defendants challenge Posluns' Opinions J through N on the

grounds that these opinions are simply summaries of evidence

already before the jury. See Motion at 19-20. This argument

fails.

"Expert testimony is admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 702 if it

addresses an issue beyond the common knowledge of the average

layperson.” U.S. v. Hanna, 293 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2002)

(quotation omitted). These opinions by Posluns satisfy this

standard. The opinions do not simply summarize evidence but point

out certain elements of that evidence and analyze their

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significance. See Riffer Decl., Ex. A. Posluns is qualified to

do this because of his expertise and experience in internet

security and spam, see id., whereas a layman would not be. If

Defendants believe Posluns reached the wrong conclusions regarding

the significance of this evidence, again, they are free to

challenge him during cross-examination. 

E. Posluns' Opinions Are Not Improperly Based on the

Opinions of Others

Defendants challenge Posluns' Opinions E, F, and G, on the

ground that these opinions are based, in part, on an examination

of a subset of emails at issue in the case which was generated by

a program which Posluns did not author. Motion at 21-22. 

Defendants claim this amounts to Posluns basing his expert opinion

on the expert opinion of another. Id. Courts in other circuits

have held that an expert may not base his or her opinion on the

expert opinion of another. See, e.g., Mike's Train House, Inc. v.

Lionel, L.L.C., 472 F.3d 398, 409 (6th Cir. 2006). And while this

rule seems proper to the Court, it has no application here. 

Defendants' complaint in this regard goes to Posluns' methodology,

which the Court has already found was proper. See supra.

Defendants strained attempt to transform it into a complaint about

something else is unavailing.

F. Language Used in Posluns' Opinion Is Not Unfairly

Prejudicial

Defendants challenge Posluns' Opinions G through N on the

ground that these Opinions use the word "spam," and thus would

have an unfairly prejudicial effect which would substantially

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outweigh their probative value. See Motion at 22-24. This

argument fails. 

Federal Rule of Evidence 403 states inter alia that

"[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice . . ." Fed. R. Evid. 403. Thus, a party challenging

offered evidence on Rule 403 grounds bears a two part burden: it

must first prove that the offered evidence has an unfairly

prejudicial "non-probative aspect," for example, an "aspect of the

evidence which makes conviction more likely because it provokes an

emotional response in the jury or otherwise tends to affect

adversely the jury's attitude toward the defendant wholly apart

from its judgment as to his guilt or innocence of the crime

charged"; and, assuming the party has made this initial showing,

it must prove that this unfairly prejudicial, non-probative aspect

of the evidence substantially outweighs the offered evidence's

probative aspect. U.S. v. Bailleaux, 685 F.2d 1105, 1111 (9th Cir.

1981). 

Plaintiff's accusation that Defendants are responsible for

the sending of emails which are commonly understood to be "spam"

is at the heart of Plaintiff's case against the Defendants. See

Complaint; see also 15 U.S.C. § 7701 et seq.; Cal. Bus. & Prof.

Code §17529 et seq. Plaintiff will try to prove this accusation,

and Defendants will try to refute it. Analogously, when a

defendant is charged with murder, the government tries to prove

that the defendant committed the murder, and the defendant tries

to refute that accusation. It does not, in the latter example,

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make the government's use of the word "murder" unfairly

prejudicial simply because the word has a negative connotation;

its negative connotation has the same source as the prohibition

against the behavior it describes. As the First Circuit put it,

"Rule 403 is not contravened by evidence that might show only that

the defendant is guilty of the crime charged." U.S. v. Monahan,

633 F.2d 984, 985 (1st Cir. 1980). The same holds true here in

regards to the Posluns' use of the word "spam" in the context of

Plaintiff's effort to prove that Defendants are responsible for

the sending, in violation of the CAN-SPAM Act and its California

equivalent, of email which is commonly understood to be spam. 

Even assuming that there was any danger that Posluns' use of

the word "spam" could have an unfairly prejudicial effect, such an

effect would not substantially outweigh its probative value. The

word "spam" is one of common usage, with a commonly understood

meaning. The CAN-SPAM Act, itself, uses the word. See 15 U.S.C.

§ 7703(c). Posluns' use of the word would assist the jury to make

sense of the complicated technical testimony which the court has

already ruled Posluns is qualified to give. See supra; see,

generally, Hangarter v. Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 373 F.3d

998, 1016 (9th Cir., 2004). It therefore would have a

significantly probative aspect which is not substantially 

/

/

/

/

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outweighed by the danger, if any, of it having an unfairly

prejudicial effect. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Motion to Strike

Plaintiff's Expert Jeffrey Posluns' Report and Testimony is

DENIED.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 13, 2007

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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