Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-02061/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-02061-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY R. TURNER,

Plaintiff,

v.

KATHLEEN ALLISON, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-02061-YGR (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

On March 19, 2018, Plaintiff, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at California State 

Prison – Corcoran (“CSP-Corcoran”), filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Dkt. 1. The operative complaint is the amended complaint, in which Plaintiff seeks damages for 

alleged civil rights violations stemming from his previous incarceration at Salinas Valley State 

Prison (“SVSP”). Dkt. 10. 

Plaintiff has filed requests for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Dkts. 9, 12. 

Plaintiff has also filed three other motions entitled as follows: “Motion for Magistrate Review on 

Consent for Judge’s Review for Jurisdiction” (dkt. 15), “Motion for (Freedom of Information Act) 

Request for Copy of Endorsed Filed Civil Complaint and Exhibit Evidence” (dkt. 22); and 

“Motion for Preliminary Injunction and/or Perminant [sic] Injunction” (dkt. 23).

On August 10, 2018, in its Order to Show Cause, the Court found Plaintiff had “on 3 or 

more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in 

a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” and further found Plaintiff was not “under 

imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Consequently, the Court 

ordered Plaintiff to show cause why the action should not be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915 (g). See Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005). 

On September 13, 2018, Plaintiff filed his response to the Order to Show Cause wherein he

seems to contest the Court’s finding that he is not “under imminent danger of serious physical 

injury” within the meaning of section 1915(g). Dkt. 19. 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

The plain language of the imminent danger clause in section 1915(g) indicates that 

“imminent danger” is to be assessed at the time of filing, not at the time of the alleged 

constitutional violations. See Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 312 (3d Cir. 2001) (en 

banc); Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189, 1192-93 (11th Cir. 1999); Ashley v. Dilworth, 147 F.3d 

715, 717 (8th Cir. 1998). “Imminent danger” may include an ongoing danger of serious physical 

injury. See Ashley, 147 F.3d at 717 (holding that plaintiff sufficiently alleged ongoing danger 

where he had repeatedly been housed near enemies, despite his protests, and where he filed his 

complaint very shortly after being attacked by an enemy); cf. Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 315 n.1 

(while declining to reach question of whether “imminent danger” encompasses an ongoing danger 

of serious physical injury, noting that the plaintiff’s allegations of past acts of physical harassment 

were not sufficiently specific or related to support an inference of an ongoing danger); Medberry, 

185 F.3d at 1193 (finding no ongoing danger where plaintiff had been placed in administrative 

segregation following physical assaults by fellow inmates and before he filed his complaint).

A district court should liberally construe the allegations in a complaint filed by a pro se

prisoner facing a section 1915(g) bar, construing all allegations in favor of the complainant and 

crediting those allegations of “imminent danger” that have gone unchallenged. See McAlphin v. 

Toney, 281 F.3d 709, 710-11 (8th Cir 2002) (liberally construing allegations in complaint for 

initial determination of whether prisoner is in “imminent danger of serious physical injury”); 

Gibbs v. Cross, 160 F.3d 962, 966 (3d Cir. 1998) (same). Plaintiff has the burden of proving that 

he was in imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed the instant action. 

Here, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s twenty-seven-page, single-spaced handwritten 

response is difficult to decipher as it is disorganized and filled with challenges to his conditions of

confinement during various time periods of his incarceration at different prisons (CSP-Corcoran, 

California Medical Facility, Deuel Vocational Institution (“DVI”), SVSP, Kern Valley State 

Prison) from 2010 through 2018, including his various periods of hospitalization at medical 

facilities at these prisons. See id. Importantly, Plaintiff does not contest that the dismissals cited 

in the Order to Show Cause fall within the definition of section 1915(g). As mentioned, he does 

appear to be arguing that he should be allowed to proceed IFP because he is in “imminent danger,” 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (providing for “imminent danger” exception), insofar as he alleges that he 

has suffered excessive force by prison officials at DVI in June of 2010 and also at CSP-Corcoran

in October of 2012. None of these alleged incidents of excessive force occurred at the prisons

where Plaintiff was incarcerated at the time he filed his complaint (California Men’s Colony) and

his amended complaint (California State Prison – Los Angeles County). From what the Court can 

decipher from his response, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not otherwise shown that he was in 

imminent danger of serious physical injury or subject to an “ongoing danger” at the time he filed 

either his complaint or amended complaint. See Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 312. Consequently, the 

Court finds that Plaintiff has not shown cause why this case should not be dismissed and IFP

should not be denied under Section 1915(g). 

In sum, Plaintiff was given the opportunity to be heard on the question of whether the 

instant action is subject to dismissal under section 1915(g), see Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1120-21, and 

his response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause fails to establish that section 1915(g) does not 

apply. 

Accordingly, this action is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to Plaintiff’s refiling his 

claims in a new case in which he pays the filing fee, and the amended complaint, filed May 11, 

2018 (dkt. 10), is hereby STRICKEN. Plaintiff’s requests to proceed IFP are DENIED. Dkt. 9, 

12.

The Clerk of the Court shall terminate all other pending motions as moot (dkts. 15, 22, 23)

and close the file.

This Order terminates Docket No. 9, 12, 15, 22, and 23.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

March 15, 2019

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