Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02117/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02117-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff,

v.

Valerano Jimenez-Marcial, 

Defendant/Movant.

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CV 14-2117-TUC-GMS (MHB)

CR 11-2012-TUC-GMS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE G. MURRAY SNOW, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Defendant/Movant Valerano Jimenez-Marcial, who is confined in the Giles W. Dalby

Correctional Facility in Post, Texas, filed a pro se Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate,

Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody. (CV 14-2117 (“CV”) Doc.

1; CR 11-2012 (“CR”) Doc. 57.) Plaintiff United States of America (the “Government”)

filed a Response (CV Doc. 5), but despite having the opportunity to do so, Movant has not

filed a reply.

BACKGROUND

In his Motion, Movant alleges four grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel as

follows: (1) Movant’s trial counsel was ineffective by failing to properly advise Movant of

his constitutional rights, which resulted in an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea; (2)

Movant’s counsel was ineffective by failing to object to an unsupported allegation in the

presentence worksheet in determining an aggravated felony; (3) Movant’s counsel did not

assure that there was an adequate factual basis for Movant’s guilty plea; and (4) Movant’s

counsel failed to file a timely notice of appeal.

Case 4:14-cv-02117-GMS Document 6 Filed 03/31/15 Page 1 of 8
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On July 15, 2011, Defendant pleaded guilty to an indictment charging him with Illegal

Reentry, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (the “2011 Felony”). (CR Doc. 13.) Under the

terms of the plea agreement, the parties entered into a detailed framework for determining

Defendant’s sentence. (Id. at 2-5.) In the plea agreement, Defendant expressly waived “any

right to appeal ... and any right to collaterally attack defendant’s conviction and sentence

under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255 ... .” (Id. at 6.) Pursuant to the plea

agreement, the Court sentenced Defendant to 21 months’ imprisonment, and a 2-year term

of supervised release. (CR Doc. 20.)

Two years later, on July 12, 2013, Defendant pleaded guilty to an additional Illegal

Reentry violation (the “2013 Felony”), and admitted to violating his supervised release. (CR

Doc. 44.) As with the 2011 Felony, Defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement,

which provided sentencing terms for both the new felony and the violation of supervised

release. In the 2013 Felony plea agreement, Defendant expressly waived “any right to file

an appeal ... and motions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2255 (habeas petitions).” The court

sentenced Defendant to 33 months’ incarceration for the 2013 Felony, with an eight-month

consecutive sentence for violating his supervised release in the 2011 Felony. (CR Doc. 44.)

On March 24, 2014, Defendant filed an untimely notice of appeal in the 2011 Felony.

Defendant failed to respond to the Ninth Circuit’s Order to Show Cause; therefore, the Ninth

Circuit dismissed Defendant’s appeal as untimely.

DISCUSSION

The Government claims in its Response that pursuant to the plea agreement and record

from the 2011 felony proceedings, Movant has waived Grounds Two, Three, and Four. As

to Ground One, the Government contends that Movant “entered into the plea agreement

knowingly and voluntarily,” and in any event argues that Ground One has no merit.

A. Waiver of Grounds Two, Three, and Four

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has found that there are “strict standards for

waiver of constitutional rights.” United States v. Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d 1093, 1102 (9th

Cir. 2005). It is impermissible to presume waiver from a silent record, and the Court must

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indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.

See United States v. Hamilton, 391 F.3d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004).

Plea agreements are contractual in nature, and their plain language will generally be

enforced if the agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. See United States v.

Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005). A defendant may waive the statutory right

to bring a § 2255 action challenging the length of his sentence. See United States v. Pruitt,

32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir.

1992). The only claims that cannot be waived are claims that the waiver itself was

involuntary or that ineffective assistance of counsel rendered the waiver involuntary. See

Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a plea agreement

that waives the right to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to § 2254 is unenforceable with

respect to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that challenges the voluntariness of the

waiver); Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433 (expressing doubt that a plea agreement could waive a claim

that counsel erroneously induced a defendant to plead guilty or accept a particular plea

bargain); Abarca, 985 F.2d at 1014 (expressly declining to hold that a waiver forecloses a

claim of ineffective assistance or involuntariness of the waiver); see also Jeronimo, 398 F.3d

at 1156 n.4 (declining to decide whether waiver of all statutory rights included claims

implicating the voluntariness of the waiver).

“Collateral attacks based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims that are

characterized as falling outside [the category of ineffective assistance of counsel claims

challenging the validity of the plea or the waiver] are waivable.” United States v.

Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001). See also Williams v. United States, 396

F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005) (joining the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth

Circuits in holding that “a valid sentence-appeal waiver, entered into voluntarily and

knowingly, pursuant to a plea agreement, precludes the defendant from attempting to attack,

in a collateral proceeding, the sentence through a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

during sentencing.”).

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As part of his plea agreement, Movant made the following waiver:

[t]he [D]efendant further waives: (1) any right to appeal the Court’s entry of

judgment against defendant . . .; and (3) any right to collaterally attack

defendant’s conviction and sentence under Title 28, United States Code,

Section 2255, or any other collateral attack. The defendant acknowledges that

this waiver shall result in the dismissal of any appeal or collateral attack the

defendant might file challenging his/her conviction or sentence in this case.

(CR Doc. 15 at 6.) During Defendant’s change of plea proceeding, the Court confirmed

Movant’s understanding of the plea agreement:

THE COURT: As I read your plea agreement, it provides that if you plead

guilty to this charge, you will face a range of sentences that range is from six

to 87 months and your plea agreement provides that as long as Judge

Jorgenson does not impose a sentence greater than 87 months, you agree to

waive or give up any right you have to appeal that sentence. Is that your

understanding of this plea agreement?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

(RT 7/15/11 7-8; CR Doc. 60.) Movant also indicated during the change of plea proceeding

that he had discussed the terms with his attorney, agreed to the terms and conditions, and

entered into the plea voluntarily. (Id. at 2-11.) Movant indicated, among other things, that

he understood: (1) the consequences of perjury (RT 7/15/11 3; CR Doc. 60); (2) his right to

a jury trial (id. at 4); (3) his right to maintain his not guilty plea (id.); (4) his right to an

attorney (id.); (5) the presumption of innocence (id.); (6) the Government’s obligation to

prove his criminal act beyond a reasonable doubt (id.); (7) his right to testify at trial (id. at

5); his right to cross-examine witnesses (id.); (8) his right not to testify, and that his silence

could not be held against him (id.); (9) his waiver of his appellate rights or his ability to

collaterally attack the judgment and sentence (id. at 7-8); (10) the statutory maximum

sentences and fines for his crime (id. at 6); (11) the imposition and nature of supervised

release (id.); (12) the mandatory special assessment (id.); (13) the collateral consequences

to his immigration status by pleading guilty (id.) and (14) the nature of sentencing (id. at

7-9).

Movant’s assertions in Grounds Two, Three, and Four of his § 2255 Motion pertain

to counsel’s alleged failure to: object to an unsupported allegation, assure that there was an

adequate factual basis, and file a timely notice of appeal. In each of these grounds for relief,

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Movant does not challenge the voluntariness of the waiver or his express waiver of the right

to bring a § 2255 motion. The Court accepted his plea as voluntarily made and Movant was

sentenced in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement. Consequently, the Court finds

that Movant waived Grounds Two, Three, and Four set forth in his § 2255 Motion. Thus,

the Court will recommend that Grounds Two through Four be denied.

B. Merits of Ground One

In Ground One, Movant alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to

properly advise him of his constitutional rights, which resulted in an unknowing and

involuntary guilty plea.

The two-prong test for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel was set forth by

the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on an

ineffective assistance claim, a convicted defendant must show (1) that counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. See id. at 687-88. There is a strong presumption that

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable assistance. See id. at 689-90.

To satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, “the defendant must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. “If it is easier to dispose of an

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will

often be so, that course should be followed.” Id. at 697.

The Court, having reviewed the parties’ submissions and the record in this matter,

finds that even if Movant could demonstrate that he received objectively inaccurate advice

as to his trial rights, which he fails to do, he cannot show that he was prejudiced. The record

is clear that Movant was advised of his trial rights, at a minimum, during the change of plea

proceeding:

THE COURT: So are you pleading guilty today voluntarily because, in truth

and in fact, you are guilty of this offense and for no other reason?

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THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Mr. Jimenez, I want to make sure you understand you don’t

have to plead guilty here today. You could maintain your non-guilty plea and

if you did, your lawyer would continue to represent you at the trial in your

case.

The trial in your case would occur before a randomly selected jury of 12

United States citizens.

Now, the jury in your case would not be able to reach a verdict unless every

single one of those jurors agreed. In other words, it would have to be a

unanimous verdict.

At your trial, you would be presumed not to have committed this offense and

the prosecutor would have to prove that you did commit this offense by proof

beyond a reasonable doubt.

The prosecutor would be forced to bring his witnesses and his evidence into

the courtroom to present them to the jury hearing your case in your presence.

Your lawyer could cross-examine these witnesses and challenge the

Government’s evidence.

You could also call witnesses, Mr. Jimenez, and you could use the subpoena

power of the Court to compel these witnesses to come into the courtroom and

testify. You could testify if you wanted to at your trial. You could get up on

the witness stand where our court reporter is sitting this morning and you could

explain to the jury hearing the evidence in your case what you believe to be the

true facts.

But if you didn’t want to testify, you wouldn’t have to testify. And no one

could force you to testify because you have an absolute right to remain silent.

In fact, if you elected not to testify, the fact that you had not testified could not

be considered by the jury hearing your case when they were evaluating where

you were guilty or not guilty of the offense that you are charged with.

Do you understand that you have all of these rights?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: So you understand that you don’t have to plead guilty here

today unless you want to? The only reason - - let me rephrase that.

You understand you don’t have to plead guilty here today. Instead, you could

go to trial if you want to and have all of these rights. You understand those,

don’t you?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Do you understand if you do plead guilty, you’re

going to lose all of these rights and there’s not going to be a trial in your case

and you’re going to have to answer all of my questions, so you’re going to lose

your right to remain silent?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

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THE COURT: Do you still want to plead guilty then?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

(RT 7/15/11; CR Doc. 60.)

Therefore, because there is no support, and ample contradictory evidence, for Ground

One as set forth in Movant’s Motion, the Court will recommend that Ground One be denied.

CONCLUSION

Having determined that Movant has waived or otherwise failed to satisfy the

Strickland standard with respect to the claims asserted in his Motion, the Court will

recommend that Movant’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence be denied and

dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Movant’s Motion Under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (CV Doc.

1; CR Doc. 57) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Petitioner has not made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

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to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 31st day of March, 2015.

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