Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-00161/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-00161-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Willie Gene Woodard,

Movant/Defendant

-vsUnited States of America,

Respondent/Plaintiff.

CV-19-0161-PHX-DLR (JFM)

CR-10-1721-PHX-DLR

Report & Recommendation 

on Motion to Vacate, Set Aside 

or Correct Sentence

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Movant, following his conviction in the United States District Court for the District 

of Arizona, filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255 on January 7, 2019 (Doc. 1), and a Motion for Release on Bail on April 30, 2019 

(Doc. 17). The Movant's Motion to Vacate and Motion for Release on Bail are now ripe 

for consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned makes the following proposed findings 

of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule 10, Rules Governing Section 2255 

Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 

72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

According to the prosecution’s case, between April 2006 and April 2012, Movant 

and his co-defendant Pihakis represented to victims that Pihakis was a trustee of a wealthy

trust (the “Greek Trust”) with the purpose of making large loans to fund business and land 

development projects. They purported to offer loans that required proof of assets which 

exceeded the assets of the various victims. To “assist” the victims in obtaining the loans, 

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they offered “leases” of “proof-of-funds” documents in exchange for substantial lease fees, 

which were to be refundable if the loans were not granted. Movant played upon purported 

religious connections with the victims. The trust, loans, and proof-of-funds documents

were all fictional, and the “lease” payments were largely spent by Movant and codefendant on personal expenses, or used to “refund” earlier victims. When the dust settled, 

30 victims had been swindled out of over $7 million, with $3.6 million going to codefendant, $1.9 million to Movant or his family members, and some $1.6 million returned 

to earlier victims as refunds of the “lease” fees.

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

An original Indictment (CRDoc. 10) of Movant and Pihakis was filed in November 

2010. In 2012, Movant and co-defendant were indicted in the Superseding Indictment 

(CRDoc. 89) on 1 count of conspiracy and 22 counts of wire fraud. Pihakis, who was in 

his 80’s, pled guilty but died in custody before sentencing. (See CRDocs. 148, 423, 425.) 

(Documents in the underlying criminal case, CR-10-1721-PHX-DLR, are referenced 

herein as “CRDoc. ___.”)

Movant proceed to trial, representing himself, resulting in a hung jury. (CRDoc. 

330.) 

On retrial, Movant again represented himself, with advisory counsel assisting. 

Movant largely admitted his conduct alleged by the prosecution, but asserted an intent to 

make any requested refunds (jointly with Pihakis and the Trust), efforts to secure proofof-funds instruments, and a belief that loans were actually being made by the trust. He 

asserted his conduct was innocent, and he had simply been duped by Pihakis.

Prior to both trials, Movant sought appointment of an accounting expert, and both 

requests were denied both as untimely and as unnecessary given Movant’s experience and 

the simplicity of analyses involved. 

Movant was convicted on the remaining 19 counts (one count of conspiracy to 

commit wire fraud and eighteen counts of wire fraud) and was ultimately sentenced to 

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concurrent 87 month sentences on each count.

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Movant filed a direct appeal through counsel, arguing error in the denial of funds 

for a forensic accountant, and prosecutorial misconduct from references to Movant’s 

religious beliefs during rebuttal closing argument. The Ninth Circuit rejected the claims 

on the merits and affirmed Movant’s convictions and sentences. United States v. Woodard, 

697 F. App'x 915, 916 (9th Cir. 2017). 

Movant sought certiorari review, which the U.S. Supreme Court denied on January 

8, 2018. Woodard v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 705 (2018). 

D. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Motion – Almost one year later, Movant commenced the current case by filing his 

Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on January 

7, 2019 (Doc. 1), and a Memorandum in Support and various exhibits (Doc. 7). Movant’s 

Motion asserts the following five grounds for relief:

In Ground One, Movant alleges that this appellant counsel provided 

ineffective assistance. In Ground Two, Movant alleges that he is 

actually innocent. In Ground Three, Movant alleges that the 

prosecution knowingly presented fabricated evidence. In Ground 

Four, Movant alleges that his prosecution was “obtained by [the] 

government’s impermissible use and exploitation of Movant’s 

religious beliefs and practices...” In Ground Five, Movant alleges 

that the government misrepresented material facts to the appellate 

court, causing that Court to improperly affirm his conviction.

(Service Order, Doc. 6 at 2.) 

Motion for Release – On April 30, 2019, Movant filed a Motion for Release on 

Bail (Doc. 17). 

Response - On June 7, 2019, the Government responded (Doc. 24) to both motions. 

Respondent argues Grounds 3 (fabricated evidence) and 4 (prosecutorial misconduct at 

trial) are procedurally defaulted, and Grounds 1 (ineffective assistance on appeal), 2 

(actual innocence), and 5 (prosecutorial misconduct on appeal) are without merit. 

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Respondent argues the Motion for Release on Bail should be denied based on a lack of 

authority for such release, and the failure to meet the standard for release on appeal.

Reply – On July 1, 2019, Movant filed his Reply (Doc. 29) on the Motion to Vacate 

and the Motion to Release. Movant argues the merits of Grounds 1 and 2.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

Movant’s Motion to Vacate present a series of Matryoshka doll claims, which 

largely nest one inside the other. Accordingly, the undersigned addresses them in logical, 

rather than numerical, order.

A. LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION

Movant repeatedly asks for a liberal construction of his pro se filings. “A document 

filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) 

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). 

The liberal construction rule requires the Court to read a filing as asserting legal 

theories suggested by the facts alleged, Cynthia Gray, Reaching Out or Overreaching: 

Judicial Ethics and Self-Represented Litigants, 27 J. Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L. Judiciary 97, 

124-125 (2007), while at the same time not assuming the role of an advocate, Hall v. 

Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991), and to not dispose of filing based on its 

“inartfulness” (e.g. failure to comply with conventions of style, grammar, or formatting), 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). 

Liberal construction does not, however, require the Court to construct factual 

allegations. At most, the liberal construction mandate requires the Court to not, as a matter 

of course, place reliance on the petitioner’s division of his factual allegations among 

various claims or grounds for relief, but instead to ““look[] to the entire petition” Zichko 

v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended (June 5, 2001). Thus, the Court 

is not required to supply facts or to independently develop them for the pro se litigant, but 

is not free to overlook assertions of facts merely because they are inartfully presented. 

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A liberal construction has been applied to Movant’s pro se filings consistent with 

these requirements. To the extent that some of Movant’s arguments fail because he has 

failed to marshal facts and evidence to support them, relying instead upon conclusory 

claims, a liberal construction provides no safe-haven. 

B. GROUND 2 - ACTUAL INNOCENCE 

In Ground 2, Movant argues that newly presented evidence shows he lacked the 

requisite intent to defraud, by demonstrating the falseness of evidence at trial about: (A) 

the origin and amount of funds deposited into Movant’s bank accounts; (B) the recipients 

of distributions from the accounts; and (C) Movant’s religious beliefs and practices and 

related interactions with clients as a modus operandi. In particular, Movant points to: (1) 

FBI reports purportedly showing his ignorance of Pihakis’ use of an alias and nonexistence of the Greek Trust, and his appropriate use of victim funds; (2) his bank records, 

Proof of Funds acquisition contracts, and his own comparisons of accountings; and (3) a 

2010 letter from Movant to Pihakis. (Motion, Doc. 1 at 5, Attachment; Memorandum, 

Doc. 7 at 42-52.)1

Respondent argues Movant fails to meet the Schlup standard for actual innocence 

to avoid a procedural default, that the evidence is not newly discovered and/or is not 

persuasive. (Response, Doc. 24 at 23-24.) 

Movant replies that his 100 exhibits constitute newly discovered evidence and show 

an absence of intent to defraud and his ignorance of Pihakis’ lies. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 3-5.)

1. Newly Discovered Evidence 

A motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is commensurate with a habeas petition, 

and claims solely based on new evidence are generally not cognizable on habeas. United 

 

1 This purported newly discovered evidence and actual innocence underlies Movant’s 

attempts to avoid procedural default on Grounds 3 and 4, a portion of the claim of 

ineffective assistance in Ground 1, and the claim of prosecutorial misconduct in Ground 

5.

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States v. Berry, 624 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010). “Claims of actual innocence based 

on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas 

relief absent an independent constitutional violation...This rule is grounded in the 

principle that federal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in 

violation of the Constitution-not to correct errors of fact.” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 

390, 400 (1993). Accordingly, the mere assertion of newly discovered evidence of 

innocence is not grounds for relief under § 2255. 

2. Substantive Actual Innocence

In Herrera, the Court assumed “for the sake of argument in deciding this case, that 

in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ made after trial 

would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional...[but] the threshold showing 

for such an assumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily high.” 506 U.S. at 417. 

The Ninth Circuit has similarly assumed but not decided that a similar claim would be 

viable in a non-capital context. Jones v. Taylor, 763 F.3d 1242, 1246 (9th Cir. 2014). 

To make out such a claim, the Ninth Circuit has held that “at a minimum, the 

petitioner must ‘go beyond demonstrating doubt about his guilt, and must affirmatively 

prove that he is probably innocent.’” Id. While not adopting a controlling standard, the 

Ninth Circuit has referred to the standard for avoiding procedural defaults under Schlup as 

the lowest possible threshold. Id. at 1247. 

As discussed hereinafter, Movant fails to meet the procedural actual innocence 

standard under Schlup and therefore cannot meet whatever standard might apply to a 

substantive claim of actual innocence.

3. Procedural Actual Innocence Not Shown

Movant’s assertion of procedural actual innocence must be based on a showing that 

"it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light 

of the new evidence" presented in his Motion. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). 

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A showing that a reasonable doubt exists in the light of the new evidence is not sufficient. 

Rather, the petitioner must show that no reasonable juror would have found the defendant 

guilty. Id. at 329. “To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his 

allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory 

scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that 

was not presented at trial. Because such evidence is obviously unavailable in the vast 

majority of cases, claims of actual innocence are rarely successful.” Id. at 324.

Respondent argues Movant’s evidence is not newly discovered, only newly 

presented. In Griffin v. Johnson, 350 F.3d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 11/20/03), the Ninth Circuit 

held "that habeas petitioners may pass Schlup’s test by offering 'newly presented' evidence 

of actual innocence," and that the actual innocence determination is not limited to newly 

discovered evidence. But see Reeves v. Fayette SCI, 897 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2018) 

(noting dispute among the circuits, and adopting a limited exception to the “newly 

discovered” requirement “when a petitioner asserts ineffective assistance of counsel based 

on counsel’s failure to discover or present to the fact-finder the very exculpatory evidence 

that demonstrates his actual innocence”). 

Respondent argues Movant fails to support his claim by explaining how the 

proffered evidence establishes his innocence. Indeed, Movant does little more than dump 

his exhibits on the courthouse doorstep and pronounce they negate elements of the 

prosecution’s case.2 

Movant points to FBI reports purportedly showing his ignorance of Pihakis’ use 

of an alias and non-existence of the Greek Trust, and his appropriate use of victim funds, 

citing his Exhibits A1 to A4. But Movant fails to point to any specific portions of these 

exhibits. These exhibits are FBI interview records of various affiliates of Movant and 

Pihakis. In general, they demonstrate Movant’s participation in the scheme. At most, they 

 

2

 For example, Movant fails to make specific references to particular items of evidence of 

the purchase of proof-of-funds instruments for identified victims, non-victim sources of 

funds, or to explain the vast sum of money Movant expended from such funds. 

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show that Movant and Pihakis had paid for some proof-of-funds documents, albeit at least 

some from a source, Griffen, they knew to have provided fraudulent records (see Pet. Exh. 

A-3, Pierce Interview at 3-4; Pet. Exh. A-2, Laxen Interview at 3.) But the occasional 

actual purchase of proof-of-funds documents does not negate the overwhelming evidence 

that Movant and Pihakis pocketed the vast majority of funds received from victims, all of 

which was supposed to be used to make such purchases. Moreover, Movant fails to 

connect any such purchases to the victims in this case. Nor do these exhibits establish 

that Movant was unaware of Pihakis’ false name and the non-existence of the Greek Trust. 

Even if Movant was unaware the Greek Trust did not exist, Movant was aware none of his

loans were granted.

Additionally, Petitioner fails to show why the documented statements are reliable

evidence of his innocence. Three of them are from people involved in the scheme. Exhibit 

A1 is an interview of George Alexander, an employee of Pihakis. Exhibit A2 is an 

interview of Anthony Laxen who was involved in the market for proof-of-funds 

documents which he explained could be used fraudulently. Exhibit A3 is an interview of 

James Pierce, an associate of Laxen and Pihakis who was involved in provision of the 

fraudulent proof-of-funds documents from Griffen. 

The only arguably credible statements were from Mohamed Jivraj, a victim of a 

fraudulent loan scheme involving Pierce and Pihakis, who was called as a defense witness. 

But Movant fails to explain how anything in this statement is newly presented evidence 

that would have precluded a reasonable juror from convicting.

Movant points to various bank records, proof-of-funds contracts, and Movant’s

accountings. Presumably this is references to his Exhibits B1, C1 through C4, F2, and 

F3. Again, even assuming their authenticity, these exhibits at best would tend to show that 

Movant did make payments for some proof-of-funds documents, and issued some refunds. 

But the former (as discussed above) does not show Movant’s actual innocence. The latter 

is simply confirmation of evidence introduced at trial, which showed the Ponzi-scheme 

nature of the operation, using funds from new victims to reimburse earlier victims 

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demanding refunds. 

Finally, Movant points to his resignation letters to Pihakis (June 28, 2010) and 

“All Trust Funding Clients” (July 5, 2010) (Pet. Exh. B2) as evidence that he continued to 

believe in Pihakis and the Greek Trust. Such self-serving statements do not meet the 

credibility requirements of Schlup. A reasonable juror could simply dismiss them as an 

attempt to further delay adverse action by victims or criminal or civil liability, rather than 

evidence of innocence. 

Movant also references and provides various portions of the trial transcripts, 

Exhibits D1 through D4. Such transcripts are neither newly discovered nor even newly 

presented. To the extent that Movant simply intends to rely upon them as additional 

support for his claim to actual innocence, he fails to so in anything other than a purely 

conclusory fashion. 

In sum, Movant fails to show credible evidence not presented at trial that is 

persuasive enough that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.

4. Conclusion

Newly discovered evidence is not a ground for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 225. Movant 

fails to establish either a substantive nor procedural claim of actual innocence. 

Accordingly, Ground 2 must be denied. 

C. GROUND 5 - PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

1. Parties’ Arguments

In Ground 5, Movant argues that on direct appeal the prosecution (repeating false 

testimony from trial) misrepresented: (A) the origin and amount of funds deposited into 

Movant’s bank accounts; (B) the recipients of distributions from the accounts; (C) 

Movant’s lack of other income sources; and (D) Movant’s religious beliefs and practices 

and related interactions with clients to “create a false modus operandi, to support its false 

theory of ‘intent’.” He asserts the falseness of the representations (and related evidence 

at trial) is shown by his newly discovered evidence raised in Ground 2, which he asserts 

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was exculpatory evidence in the prosecutions’ possession. (Motion, Doc. 1 at Attachment; 

Memorandum, Doc. 7 at 85-91.)

Respondent argues that evidence at trial supported the contentions made on appeal, 

and nothing Movant proffers establishes to the contrary. In particular: (a) testimony from 

Magarella supported the assertion that some 6% of the deposits in Movant’s accounts 

came from “co-conspirators” (and the balance from victims); (b) testimony from 

Magarella and other evidence at trial showed that none of Movant’s transactions reflected 

payment to a financial institution for a proof-of-funds document, and supported the 

represented distributions of funds; (c) testimony from Magarella supported the contention 

that Movant had no other source of income. (Response, Doc. 24 at 24-26.) Respondent 

does not, in connection with Ground 5, address the religious beliefs issue 5D, but does so 

in connection with the related claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (Id. at 

21-23.) 

Respondent further addresses the merits of this claim in the course of challenging 

the ineffectiveness claim in Ground 1 to reject the assertion of cause to avoid the 

procedural default of Grounds 3 and 4. (Response, Doc. 24 at 18-23.) Respondent argues 

with regard to issues 5A (deposits), 5B (distributions), and 5C (other sources) that the 

propriety of the calculations by the prosecution’s forensic accountant, Magarella, was 

addressed at trial by Movant on cross-examination of Magarella, cross-examination of FBI 

Agent Williams, and in Movant’s own testimony. With regard to the deposits, Respondent 

argues Movant now fails to identify any specifics misstatements, and simply offers his 

own summary accounting and points to no specific records demonstrating the falseness of 

Magarella’s testimony. With regard to the distributions, Respondent argues that Magarella 

testified to some $1 million in payments to Pierce for proof-of-funds documents, some 

from Movant, and that this was presented to the jury in testimony from Movant and FBI 

Agent Williams. Thus, Respondent argues, the evidence Movant now proffers was before 

the jury, and was rejected by it. (Response, Doc. 24 at 19-21.) 

Respondent argues with regard to issue 5D (religious beliefs) that the evidence of 

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Movant’s use of his religious beliefs was well-established by evidence at trial and his 

beliefs were part of Movant’s closing arguments. (Response, Doc. 24 at 21-23.) 

In his Reply, Movant makes only a conclusory argument that without the

“misrepresentation of material facts” on appeal, his conviction would not have been 

sustained. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 5.) 

2. Not a Cognizable Claim

The parties reference no case recognizing as a claim, or espousing a standard for,

prosecutorial misconduct on appeal. The undersigned has found none. See e.g. Bennett 

L. Gershamn, Table of Contents, Prosecutorial Misconduct (2nd ed.) (making no reference 

to misconduct beyond sentencing). 

The leading cases on prosecutorial misconduct are all concerned with fairness at 

trial. See e.g. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974) (“so infected the trial 

with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process”); Darden v. 

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly); United States v. Hermanek, 

289 F.3d 1076, 1102 (9th Cir. 2002) (“prosecutor's conduct materially affected the fairness 

of the trial”). 

This dearth of cases seems unaccidental. Trial is the crucible in which facts are 

tested, and juries are potentially swayed by extrajudicial publicity, perjury, failure to 

disclose exculpatory evidence, vouching, and other forms of prosecutorial misconduct. 

See Arthur & Hunter, The United States Attorneys and conduct of the case, 1 Federal Trial 

Handbook: Criminal § 13:1 (4th ed.). The same is not true on appeal. On appeal, the 

defendant has already been convicted. The relevant evidence (i.e. the evidence presented 

at trial) is generally open to inspection by both sides and the court. Thus, as argued by 

Respondent, on appeal the evidence is often not up for re-evaluation, but is examined by 

making all reasonable inferences in favor of sustaining the conviction. 

This is not to suggest that appeal is a free for all. Rather, prosecutors (like all 

attorneys) have various ethical duties to the courts, and remain subject to the supervisory 

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powers of the courts. Id. See also Brian L. Gershman, Other judicial sanctions,

Prosecutorial Misconduct § 14:10 (2d ed.). But that involves administrative issues between 

the courts and the attorneys, and does not justify a win-by-default by the other side the 

way such misconduct can at trial. Cf. United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th 

Cir. 1993) (direct appeal admonishing prosecution for failing to “own up” on appeal to 

misconduct at trial, reversing because misconduct at trial had “deprived the defendants of 

...a powerful defense,” but denying the government retrial based on misconduct on appeal 

as a matter of “supervisory power”).

On this basis alone, the undersigned concludes that Ground 5 is without merit. 

3. Misconduct Not Shown

Even assuming arguendo that prosecutorial misconduct on appeal could justify 

relief from a conviction, Movant fails to show such misconduct occurred. 

Even when evaluating this claim under the trial misconduct standard, “the 

appropriate standard of review for such a claim on writ of habeas corpus is ‘the narrow 

one of due process, and not the broad exercise of supervisory power.’” Darden, 477 U.S. 

at 181 (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 642). See United States v. Berry, 624 F.3d 1031, 

1038 (9th Cir. 2010) (2255 remedy commensurate with habeas). 

It is a prosecutor's duty to refrain from knowingly presenting perjured testimony 

and from knowingly failing to disclose that the testimony used to convict defendant was 

false. The defendant must establish, however, that the prosecution knew, or should have 

known, that the evidence was false. Where there are merely conflicting versions, it is 

within the province of the jury to resolve the disputed testimony, and the prosecution can 

present the disputed evidence. United States v. Geston, 299 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 

2002). Here, Movant offers, at best, exhibits and arguments which arguably conflict with 

that offered at trial, but do not establish it was false. More importantly, they do not 

establish that the representations made on appeal about the evidence before the jury were 

false, nor that the prosecution knew, or should have known, they were false. 

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Here, the disputed statements by the prosecution on appeal were in the context of 

arguing the specific claims raised on appeal, i.e. denial of a forensic accountant and 

misconduct re comments on religion. In this case, the sufficiency of the evidence of guilt 

was not an issue on appeal, except to the extent that it impacted the appellate court’s 

evaluation of the harmlessness of any error.3 In that context, what was at issue was not 

absolute truth, but merely what evidence that had been presented to the jury. Movant does 

not assert that the prosecution misrepresented the evidence that had been placed before the 

jury, only that such evidence was (purportedly) false.

4. Conclusion

Movant fails to show that prosecutorial misconduct on appeal is a cognizable claim, 

and even if cognizable, Movant fails to show that the prosecution made representations on 

appeal that it knew or should have known were false, or that had any injurious effect on 

the appeal. Accordingly, Ground 5 is without merit and should be denied. 

D. GROUND 1 - INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

1. Parties Arguments

In Ground 1, Movant argues appellate counsel was ineffective for: (A) failing to 

challenge the prosecutions’ misrepresentations at trial and on appeal regarding (1) false 

expert accountant testimony and (2) Movant’s use of victim funds; (B) failing to 

adequately challenge the elicitation of testimony about religion as evidence of modus 

operandi and intent; (C) failing to adequately communicate with Movant, provide Movant 

 

3 Respondents appear to argue that the prosecution was entitled to make representations 

by asserting facts inferred from viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

sustaining the verdict, citing United States v. McNeil, 320 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003). 

However, McNeil dealt with a challenge based on insufficiency of the evidence. 

Respondents cite, and the undersigned has found, no authority applying a similar standard 

of review on the claims being argued on direct appeal. On direct appeal, the Ninth Circuit 

applied an abuse of discretion standard to the denial of an expert, and considered whether 

there was “substantial evidence” of the fraudulent scheme to find no prejudice, and 

reviewing the unpreserved claim of misconduct on religion under a “plain error” standard 

and considering the prejudice in light of the “strength of the government’s case.” Woodard, 

697 Fed. Appx. 915. 

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a copy of the Government’s appellate brief, and inform Movant of counsel’s withdrawal. 

(Motion, Doc. 1 at 5 and Attachment; Memorandum, Doc. 7 at 34-39.) 

Respondent argues that appellate counsel made a reasonable selection of claims, 

particularly in light of the lack of merits of the other claims Movant urges, and adequately 

argued the religion claim. (Response, Doc. 24 at 17-23.) Although acknowledging the 

claim, Respondent does not address the assertions of inadequate communication, etc. 

beyond summarizing the claim as challenging the failure to bring certain claims on appeal. 

(Id. at 14.)

In his Reply, Movant reiterates the basics of his claims, adding that counsel’s lack 

of communication prevented him from assisting in identifying the errors in the 

prosecution’s accounting evidence. (Doc. 29 at 2-3.)

2. Failure to Argue Misconduct

“The law does not require counsel to raise every available nonfrivolous defense. 

Counsel also is not required to have a tactical reason—above and beyond a reasonable 

appraisal of a claim's dismal prospects for success—for recommending that a weak claim 

be dropped altogether.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 127 (2009) (citations 

omitted). Rather, appellate counsel performs deficiently if unpresented claims were

“clearly stronger than issues that counsel did present.” Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 

285, 288 (2000). 

Here, Movant fails to show that the claims of misconduct based on 

misrepresentations that he now urges were clearly stronger than the claims raised by 

counsel based on denial of an accountant and references to religion.

As discussed hereinabove with regard to Ground 5, Movant fails to show any 

cognizable claim for relief based on misrepresentations on appeal. Moreover, Movant 

fails to show that the representations were false. Similarly, as discussed hereinabove with 

regard to Ground 2 and 5, Movant fails to show that the evidence presented at trial was 

false, rather than (at best) conflicting. “The failure to raise a meritless legal argument does 

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not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 

572 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Thus, Movant fails to show that the challenges to misrepresentations at trial or on 

appeal had merit, and thus fails to show they were clearly stronger than the claims raised 

by appellate counsel.

3. Failure to Argue Evidence on Religion

Movant argues appellate counsel should have pursued a claim challenging “the 

prosecution’s perpetual elicitation of religious characterization testimony” to show modus 

operandi and intent, characterizing them as appeals to religious prejudice and passions. 

(Memorandum, Doc. 7 at 36-37.) Movant fails to show this claim was clearly stronger 

than the claims raised by appellate counsel.

While religious passion and prejudice are generally improper tools to obtain a 

conviction, evidence regarding religion is not forbidden. For example, Federal Rule of 

Evidence 610 generally prohibits evidence of “a witness's religious beliefs or opinions...to 

attack or support the witness's credibility.” But that the Advisory Committee Notes 

observe that an inquiry into a witness’s religious affiliations is not prohibited if it is “for 

the purpose of showing interest or bias because of them.” 

In particular, when religion is relevant to proof an element of the offense, it may 

(unless unfairly prejudicial) be admitted. See e.g. United States v. Reme, 738 F.2d 1156, 

1164 (11th Cir. 1984) (applying Fed.R.Evid. 403 in alien smuggling case, to find 

admissible the evidence of defendant’s participation with captain of boat in voodoo 

ceremony resulting in disappearance of two passengers accused by the captain of having 

black magic as evidence of being in control of the boat and not just a passenger). 

The fact that Movant concedes that the evidence of his religious demonstrations 

was introduced to establish modus operandi and intent indicates the legitimate purposes 

for its admission. And, Movant fails to show that the probative value was outweighed by 

the prejudicial effect. The kinds of evidence introduced did not obviously invite 

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condemnation of Movant for his beliefs, only his exploitation of them to defraud his 

victims. Movant fails to suggest how it would have been different if the commonality 

Movant had used to exploit his victims had been a different religion or even a civic or 

social relationship. 

Movant fails to show that an attack on the evidence of religion had merit, and fails 

to show it was clearly stronger than the claims raised by counsel.

4. Communication

Finally, Movant complains that counsel did not adequately communicate with him 

in three regards: (1) “failed to initiate contact with Appellant Woodard after several 

months of appointment” (Motion, Doc. 1 at 5); (2) “failed to ‘counsel’ with Appellant or 

otherwise discuss with him as to merit-worthy issues to possibly raise on appeal” (id.); and 

(3) “failed to provide Appellant a copy of the government’s brief prior to denial of appeal, 

and his withdrawal from the case” (id. at 5, Attachment) resulting in loss of ability to seek 

rehearing (Memorandum, Doc. 7 at 35). 

In the face of no argument to the contrary, the Court assumes arguendo that 

appellate counsel was deficient in communicating with Movant.

Movant fails, however, to show any prejudice from such deficiency. To prove 

prejudice, petitioner must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's 

errors he would have prevailed on appeal.

4

 Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th 

Cir. 1989). The only offer of prejudice is that as a result of the lack of communication 

 

4 Movant argues that prejudice need not be shown but is presumed, citing United States v. 

Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). (Memorandum, Doc. 7 at 37-38.) But Cronic’s presumption 

of prejudice has been applied in only very limited circumstances where assistance was not 

deficient, but was simply not provided because “counsel was either totally absent, or 

prevented from assisting the accused.” Id. at 659, n. 25. Compare Javor v. United States, 

724 F.2d 831, 834 (9th Cir. 1984) (presumption applied where counsel was sleeping 

through much of trial) with Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1377 (2015) (presumption 

not applied to counsel’s short absence from the courtroom during testimony relevant only 

to co-defendant). “Cronic applies in ‘circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the 

accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.’” Woods, 

135 S.Ct. at 1378 (quoting Cronic at 658). Here, the lack of prejudice discussed herein 

demonstrates the justification for the cost of litigating the prejudice issue in this case.

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counsel failed to bring the misconduct and evidentiary claims discussed above, and 

Movant was denied the ability to seek rehearing by asserting such claims. However, 

Movant fails to show a reasonable probability of a different result on appeal because those 

claims were without merit. See Williams v. Lockhart, 772 F.2d 475, 480 (8th Cir. 1985)

(denying claim of ineffective assistance from lack of communication with appellate 

counsel because no prejudice shown). 

5. Conclusion

Movant fails to show appellate counsel was ineffective. Accordingly, Ground 1 

must be denied.

E. GROUNDS 3 AND 4 - PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

In Ground 3, Movant argues the substance of the claims of prosecutorial 

misconduct at trial based on false evidence underlying Ground 5. In Ground 4, Movant 

argues the substance of the claim of prosecutorial misconduct at trial based on evidence of 

religion underlying Ground 5. Movant, anticipating a procedural default defense, argues 

that such default should be excused based on the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel in 

failing to raise the claims, and his actual innocence. (Motion, Doc. 1 at 5, Attachment; 

Memorandum, Doc. 7 at 52-82.) 

Respondent argues that these claims should have been raised on appeal, and Movant 

fails to show ineffective assistance or actual innocence. (Response, Doc. 24 at 16-24.)

Petitioner replies arguing ineffective assistance and actual innocence. (Reply, Doc. 

29.)

“Where a defendant has procedurally defaulted a claim by failing to raise it on direct 

review, the claim may be raised in habeas only if the defendant can first demonstrate either 

‘cause’ and actual ‘prejudice,’ or that he is ‘actually innocent’.” Bousley v. U.S., 523 U.S. 

614, 622 (1998) (citations omitted). Movant did not raise his claims in Grounds 3 and 4 

on direct appeal. Accordingly, he has procedurally defaulted on the claims.

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Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel can constitute the cause required to 

avoid a procedural default. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488-92 (1986); United States 

v. Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957, 965 (9th Cir. 2003). But, for the reasons discussed hereinabove 

in connection with Ground 1, Movant fails to establish ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel. 

And, for the reasons discussed above in connection with Ground 2, Movant fails to 

establish his actual innocence. 

Accordingly, Grounds 3 and 4 must be dismissed with prejudice.

F. SUMMARY RE MOTION

Grounds 1 (ineffective assistance), 2 (actual innocence), and 5 (prosecutorial 

misconduct on appeal) are without merit and must be denied. Grounds 3 (prosecutorial 

misconduct at trial) and 4 (religion evidence) are procedurally defaulted and must be 

dismissed with prejudice.

G. MOTION FOR RELEASE

Movant has moved (Doc. 17) for release pending the resolution of his Motion to 

Vacate. Respondent argues there is no authority for such a release, and that Movant fails 

to show special circumstances and high probability of success. (Response, Doc. 24 at 26-

27.) Movant does not reply beyond arguing that merits of the Motion to Vacate and urging 

a grant of the motion. (Reply, Doc. 29 at 6.)

It is unresolved in the Ninth Circuit whether district courts have authority to release 

a habeas petitioner pending resolution of their petition. See In re Roe, 257 F.3d 1077, 1080 

(9th Cir. 2001) (noting divergence among circuits and declining to resolve whether release 

may be granted pending a decision by the district court on a habeas petition). Cf. Marino 

v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499 (9th Cir.1987) (grant of release on bail after conditional grant of 

habeas relief). 

Even if it is assumed that such authority exists, it is limited to “an ‘extraordinary 

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case[ ] involving special circumstances or a high probability of success.’” Roe, 257 F.3d 

at 1080 (quoting Land v. Deeds, 878 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1989)).5

No High Probability of Success - Here, for the reasons discussed above in 

addressing the Motion to Vacate, Movant fails to show a high probability of success. 

No Special Circumstances - “Special circumstances” have been found to include 

such things as: (1) “a serious deterioration of health while incarcerated, and unusual delay 

in the appeal process,” Salerno v. United States, 878 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1987); and (2) 

situations where “the sentence was so short that if bail were denied and the habeas petition 

were eventually granted, the defendant would already have served the sentence,” Landano 

v. Rafferty, 970 F.2d 1230, 1239 (3rd Cir. 1992).

Movant has not shown such exceptional circumstances. Instead, he simply argues 

the merits of his claims and his purported innocence, and points to the portion of his 

sentence completed, good behavior, and recent release on supervision. 

Accordingly, the undersigned must recommend that Movant’s Motion for Release 

be denied. 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases, requires that 

in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it 

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in cases 

concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a proceeding 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Motion to Vacate is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and challenges 

 

5 The same standard is generally applied on appeal, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 23. See United States v. Mett, 41 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 1994) (bail on 

appeal, after conditional grant of petition). But see Aronson v. May, 85 S.Ct. 3, 5 (1964) 

(requiring showing of “substantial questions” rather than high probability of success, for 

release on appeal of habeas petition).

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Movant’s federal criminal judgment or sentence. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Movant’s Motion being resolved adversely to Movant. Accordingly, a decision 

on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on 

procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be in part on procedural grounds, and in part 

on the merits. Under the reasoning set forth herein, jurists of reason would not find it 

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling, and jurists of 

reason would not find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable 

or wrong. Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Motion to Vacate, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

(A) Grounds 3 (prosecutorial misconduct at trial) and 4 (religion evidence) of Movant's 

Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, filed 

January 7, 2019 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

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(B) The remainder of Movant's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, filed January 7, 2019 (Doc. 1) be DENIED.

(C) Movant’s Motion for Release on Bail, filed April 30, 2019 (Doc. 17) be DENIED.

(D) To the extent the foregoing findings and recommendations are adopted in the District 

Court’s order, a Certificate of Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall 

have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 10, Rules Governing 

Section 2255 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to 

file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any findings or 

recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to 

de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's right to appellate 

review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th 

Cir. 2007). 

In addition, the parties are cautioned Local Civil Rule 7.2(e)(3) provides that 

“[u]nless otherwise permitted by the Court, an objection to a Report and Recommendation 

issued by a Magistrate Judge shall not exceed ten (10) pages.” 

Dated: December 10, 2019

19-0161r RR 19 12 04 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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