Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00739/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00739-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Fair Credit Reporting Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

This putative class action was removed from the Fresno County Superior Court, and 

involves violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), specifically 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1681b(b)(2)(A). Currently before the Court is Defendant Frontier California, Inc.’s combined 

Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. Defendants Verizon Communications, Inc. and 

Verizon Corporate Resources Group, LLC (collectively “Verizon”) have joined Frontier’s 

motions. See Doc. No. 4. For the reasons that follow, the combined motions will be denied.

 LEGAL FRAMEWORK

1. Rule 12(b)(1)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows for a motion to dismiss based on lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(1). Rule 12(b)(1) motions may be either 

facial, where the inquiry is confined to the allegations in the complaint, or factual, where the court 

is permitted to look beyond the complaint to extrinsic evidence. Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 

358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004). A facial attack is one that asserts “that the allegations contained in the 

complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction . . . .” Lacano Invs., LLC v. 

Balash, 765 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2014). The complaint must show “affirmatively and 

DAVID MEZA, an Individual on behalf of 

himself and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff

v.

VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS, INC., et 

al.,

Defendants

CASE NO. 1:16-CV-0739 AWI MJS 

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

TO DISMISS

(Doc. No. 3)

Case 1:16-cv-00739-AWI-MJS Document 15 Filed 09/09/16 Page 1 of 7
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distinctly the existence of whatever is essential to federal jurisdiction, and if [it] does not do so, 

the court, on having the defect called to its attention or on discovering the same, must dismiss the 

case, unless the defect be corrected by amendment.” Smith v. McCullough, 270 U.S. 456, 459 

(1926); Tosco Corp. v. Communities For A Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2001); see 

also Snell v. Cleveland, Inc., 316 F.3d 822, 828 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). When a defendant challenges 

jurisdiction “facially,” all material allegations in the complaint are assumed true, and the question 

for the court is whether the lack of federal jurisdiction appears from the face of the pleading itself. 

See Lacano Invs., 765 F.3d at 1071. However, courts do not accept the truth of legal conclusions 

merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. Id. 

2. Rule 12(b)(6)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim may be dismissed because of the 

plaintiff’s “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A 

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or on the 

absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Conservation Force v. Salazar,

646 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2011). In reviewing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), all 

allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Faulkner v. ADT Sec. Servs., 706 F.3d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 2013). However, the 

Court is not required “to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted 

deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 

1145 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2012). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, “a complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Johnson v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 793 

F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015).. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Johnson, 793 F.3d at 1007. “Plausibility” means 

“more than a sheer possibility,” but less than a probability, and facts that are “merely consistent” 

with liability fall short of “plausibility.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Li v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 999 

(9th Cir. 2013). 

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3

 BACKGROUND

From the Complaint, in September 2015, Meza applied for a job with Verizon. On 

September 23, 2016, Verizon procured or caused to be procured a consumer report regarding 

Meza from A-Check Global. Meza alleges:

Verizon violated [§ 1681b(b)(2)] by procuring or causing to be procured consumer 

reports for employment purposes regarding [Meza] and other class members 

without first making a clear and conspicuous disclosure in writing to [Meza], in a 

document consisting solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be 

obtained for employment purposes and without first obtaining [Meza’s] written 

authorization for the procurement of a consumer report. In addition, while Verizon 

had [Meza] sign a “Post-Employment Background Check Authorization and 

Disclosure of Rights under the [FCRA]” on November 9, 2015, such document did 

not consist solely of the disclosure, but included additional provisions not 

authorized by the FCRA, including a provision that stated: “Further, I consent to 

and authorize Verizon to release a copy of any consumer report or investigator 

consumer report to an authorized Verizon customer if required by a customer 

contract.” 

Complaint ¶ 12.

Also, in preceding paragraphs, the Complaint quotes the entirety of § 1681b(b)(2)(A). In 

pertinent part, the quotation reads: “Except as provided in subparagraph (B), a person may not 

procure a consumer report, or cause a consumer report to be procured, for employment 

purposes with respect to any consumer, unless – (i) a clear and conspicuous disclosure has been 

made in writing to the consumer at any time before the report is procured or caused to be 

procured, in a document that consists solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may be 

obtained for employment purposes; and (ii) the consumer has authorized in writing (which 

authorization may be made on the document referred to in clause (i)) the procurement of the report 

by that person.” Complaint ¶ 10 (emphasis in original); see 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A). 

 DEFENDANT’S MOTION

Defendants’ Argument

Defendants argue that Meza has failed to plead a cognizable injury. The allegations do not 

demonstrate an injury in fact because the allegations do not show that Meza suffered either a 

particularized or concrete injury. Meza does not allege that any information was incorrectly 

reported or that he suffered any negative consequences whatsoever. The Complaint seeks only 

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statutory damages instead of actual damages, which indicates that Meza has not been injured. At 

best the allegations demonstrate a violation of a procedural right, which is not sufficient under 

Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540 (2016) to show a concrete injury. Further, the Complaint makes 

no allegations to show how Meza was particularly injured. There are general allegations that 

Meza and other class members were deprived of their rights, but nothing explains how Meza or 

anyone else was injured. Thus, Meza has failed to plead sufficient jurisdictional facts to create 

subject matter jurisdiction and failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim.

Plaintiff’s Opposition

Meza argues inter alia that the Complaint sufficiently alleges a concrete and personalized 

injury, and sufficiently states a claim for relief. Meza argues that he was to obtain a specific type 

of information and disclosure under § 1681b(b)(2). By obtaining consumer reports without first 

providing the proper disclosure required by § 1681b(b)(2), Meza argues that this caused him an 

informational injury. Also, because the disclosure did not comply with § 1681b(b)(2), the 

authorization signed by Meza was also improper. Using the improper authorization to obtain 

highly private information is a violation of privacy. 

Discussion

1. Standing

In order for a plaintiff to have standing, he must show inter alia an “injury in fact.” See

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016); Habeas Corpus Res. Ctr. v. United States 

D.O.J., 816 F.3d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 2016). An “injury in fact” must be “concrete and 

particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 

1548; Habeas Corpus, 816 F.3d at 1248. An injury is “particularized” when it “affect[s] the 

plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1548; Habeas Corpus, 816 F.3d 

at 1250 n.11. An injury is “concrete” if it “actually exists” and is real and not abstract. Spokeo, 

136 S.Ct. at 1548. When an intangible injury is involved, courts should consider both history, i.e. 

whether the intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded 

as providing a basis for lawsuit, and the judgment of Congress, i.e. whether Congress has 

identified an intangible harm or elevated de facto injuries that were previously regarded as 

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inadequate in law. See id. at 1549. However, a “bare procedural violation, divorced from any 

concrete harm, [will not] satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.” Id.

Here, the Complaint has sufficiently alleged a particularized injury. The Complaint alleges 

that Defendants procured a consumer report on Meza, but did so without providing Meza with a 

document that consisted only of the required clear and conspicuous disclosure. See Complaint ¶ 

12. That is, the Complaint alleges that Defendants did not follow the requirements of 

§ 1681b(b)(2)(A) as to Meza himself. Therefore, the Complaint shows that Meza was affected in 

a personal and individual way. See Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1548; Habeas Corpus, 816 F.3d at 1248. 

With respect to “concreteness,” the Eastern District of Virginia has recently analyzed 

§ 1681b(b)(2)(A) in the wake of Spokeo. In Thomas v. FTS USA, LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

85545 (E.D. Va. June 30, 2016), the district court found that § 1681b(b)(2)(A) created two rights: 

(1) a right to specific information in the form of a clear and conspicuous disclosure; and (2) a right 

to privacy in one’s consumer report that employers may invade only under stringently defined 

circumstances. Id. at *19. Thomas held that a violation of either of these rights was something 

more than a “bare procedural violation.” First, relying largely on Supreme Court precedent, 

Thomas found that a violation of § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) constituted a statutorily created 

“informational injury,” and such an “informational injury” was “concrete.” See id. at *26-*29 

(citing inter alia Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20-25 (1998) and Public Citizen 

v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989)).1 Next, relying on the common law’s

recognition that an unauthorized dissemination of personal information violates the right to 

privacy, and also noting Congress’s ability to create a statutory right to privacy in certain 

information, Thomas found that a violation of the § 1681b(b)(2)(A) procedures also violated that 

section’s privacy interest, and that such a violation was a “concrete” injury. See id. at *29-*33. 

Since the “informational injury” under § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) and the invasion of the of the privacy 

right of § 1681b(b)(2)(A) were concrete, Thomas found injuries in fact under Spokeo. See id. at 

*26-*33. The Court finds Thomas’s analysis persuasive and will follow that decision. Therefore, 

a violation of § 1681b(b)(2)(A) represents a “concrete injury” under Spokeo. 

 

1 Both Akins and Public Citizen were cited with approval in Spokeo. See Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1549-50.

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Here, the Complaint alleges that Meza did not receive a document that consisted only of 

the necessary disclosure. See Complaint ¶ 12. Instead, he received a document that contained 

additional information. See id. The allegation indicates an informational injury under 

§ 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i). See Thomas, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85545 at *28-*29 (“Therefore, where a 

consumer alleges, as Thomas has here, that he or she has received a disclosure that does not satisfy 

those requirements, the consumer has alleged a concrete informational injury.”). Further, the 

Complaint alleges that a consumer report was procured without first obtaining Meza’s written 

authorization. See Complaint at ¶ 12. Procuring a consumer report without first making the 

required disclosure and without first obtaining written authorization violates the mandated 

procedures of § 1681b(b)(2)(A). See Thomas, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85545 at *32-*33; Harris v. 

Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 114 F.Supp.3d 868, 869 (N.C. Cal. 2015); Daniel v. Swift Transp. 

Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191791, *6 (D. Ariz. Jan. 9, 2012); Smith v. Waverly Ptnrs., LLC, 

2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90135, *11 (W.D. N.C. Aug. 2, 2011). This shows an invasion of the 

privacy interest created by § 1681b(b)(2)(A). See Thomas, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85545 at *32-

*33 (holding that an allegation that an employer “invaded the statutory right to confidentiality of 

[the plaintiff’s] personal information by obtaining a consumer report without first providing the 

required disclosure or obtaining [the plaintiff’s] written consent” was sufficient to allege an 

invasion of the statutory right to privacy and thus, a concrete injury). Therefore, the Complaint 

adequately alleges two concrete injuries (an informational injury and a privacy invasion) through 

violations of § 1681b(b)(2)(A). See id. at *26-*33. 

Because the Complaint’s allegations adequately show a concrete and particularized injury 

to Meza, Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) motion will be denied. 

2. Failure To State A Claim

Defendants argue that the Complaint contains only conclusory allegations. The Court 

agrees that the relevant allegations closely track § 1681b(b)(2)(A). However, the nature of the 

statute and the nature of a violation of the statute do not lend themselves to a number of factual 

details. Meza alleges that he applied for a job with Defendants in September 2015, he was given a 

document that did not consist only of a clear and conspicuous disclosure, the additional 

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information in the disclosure is expressly identified, a consumer report was obtained without first 

receiving Meza’s written authorization, and Defendants procured a consumer report despite failing 

to follow the requirements of § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i). See Complaint ¶¶ 10, 11, 12. The relevant 

allegations collectively show that Defendants violated § 1681b(b)(2)(A) with respect to Meza. It 

is true, as Defendants argue in their reply, that the Complaint does not use phrases such as 

“informational injury” or “right to privacy.” However, such words need not be expressly stated in 

the Complaint. The nature of the violations of § 1681b(b)(2)(A) alleged in the Complaint 

necessarily entail an “informational injury” and an invasion of the “right to privacy.” Cf. Thomas, 

2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85545 at *26-*33. Defendants have not persuasively explained what 

further factual detail is necessary in order to plausibly allege a violation of § 1681b(b)(2)(A), nor 

have they argued that the allegations are anything other than improperly conclusory. Without 

more from Defendants, Meza has stated a plausible claim under § 1681b(b)(2)(A). 

Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion will be denied.

ORDER 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 3) is DENIED; and

2. Defendants shall file answer within twenty (20) days of service of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 8, 2016 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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