Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02306/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02306-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

YVETTE M. DESSERT, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 3:17-cv-2306-MMA (RNB) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION REGARDING 

CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

(ECF Nos. 13, 14) 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Michael M. Anello, 

United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 

72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

On November 14, 2017, plaintiff Yvette M. Dessert filed a Complaint pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of a decision by the Commissioner of Social 

Security denying her application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). (ECF No. 1.) 

Now pending before the Court and ready for decision are the parties’ cross-motions 

for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS that 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be GRANTED, that the Commissioner’s crossmotion for summary judgment be DENIED, and that Judgment be entered reversing the 

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decision of the Commissioner and remanding this matter for further administrative 

proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). . 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 26, 2014, plaintiff filed an application for SSI under Title XVI of the 

Social Security Act, alleging disability since January 16, 2014. (Certified Administrative 

Record [“AR”] 253-262.) After her applications were denied initially and upon 

reconsideration (AR 140-43, 145-50), plaintiff requested an administrative hearing before 

an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (AR 153-55.) An administrative hearing was held 

on December 9, 2015. Plaintiff appeared at the hearing with counsel, and testimony was 

taken from her, a lay witness (her stepfather), and a vocational expert (“VE”). (AR 49-74.) 

As reflected in his May 12, 2016 hearing decision, the ALJ found that plaintiff had 

not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from the date her 

application was filed. (AR 116-34.) In an Order issued August 15, 2016, the Appeals 

Council granted plaintiff’s request for review. It vacated the hearing decision and 

remanded the case to the ALJ with instructions inter alia to (a) evaluate a mental residual 

functional capacity assessment provided by plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Brolaski, 

dated June 7, 2016 (about three weeks after the ALJ decision was issued) and (b) further 

evaluate the March 18, 2016 consultative psychiatric disability opinion of Dr. Glassman, 

to which the ALJ had accorded “little weight.” (AR 135-39.) 

A second administrative hearing was held on April 17, 2017. Plaintiff appeared at 

the hearing with new counsel, and testimony was taken from her and a different VE. (AR 

29-48.) As reflected in his August 8, 2017 hearing decision, the ALJ again found that 

plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from the 

date her application was filed. (AR 9-28.) The ALJ’s decision became the final decision 

of the Commissioner on October 24, 2017, when the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s 

request for review. (AR 1-8.) This timely civil action followed. 

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SUMMARY OF THE ALJ’S FINDINGS

In rendering his decision, the ALJ followed the Commissioner’s five-step sequential 

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. At step one, the ALJ found that plaintiff had 

not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 26, 2014, her application date.1

 

(AR 14.). 

At step two, the ALJ found that that plaintiff had the following severe impairments: 

degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine; major depressive disorder; and generalized 

anxiety disorder. (AR 14.) 

At step three, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination 

of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the impairments listed 

in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments. (AR 32.) 

Next, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 

to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.967(b), except that she could only 

occasionally bend, stoop, crouch, climb, crawl, kneel, and balance. The ALJ also limited 

plaintiff to “SVP-1 or -2 type work in a non-public setting with only occasional interaction 

with co-workers and supervisors.” (AR 16.) 

For purposes of his step four determination, the ALJ adduced and accepted the VE’s 

testimony that a hypothetical person with plaintiff’s vocational profile would not be able 

to perform the requirements of plaintiff’s past relevant work as an office manager. 

Accordingly, the ALJ found that plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work as 

actually performed or as generally performed in the national economy. (AR 20.) 

The ALJ then proceeded to step five of the sequential evaluation process. Based on 

the VE’s testimony that a hypothetical person with plaintiff’s vocational profile could 

perform the requirements of occupations that existed in significant numbers in the national 

economy (i.e., conveyor belt bakery worker; assembler, small products; and garment 

                                               

1

 SSI is not payable prior to the month following the month in which the 

application is filed. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.335. 

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sorter), the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled. (AR 20-21.) 

PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM OF ERROR 

Plaintiff is claiming that, in determining her mental RFC, the ALJ failed to properly 

consider the opinions of Dr. Brolaski and Dr. Fajerman, two of her treating psychiatrists, 

and the opinion of Dr. Glassman, a consultative examining psychiatrist. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to 

determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and 

whether the proper legal standards were applied. DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 846 

(9th Cir. 1991). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but less than a 

preponderance. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Desrosiers v. Sec’y of 

Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 575-76 (9th Cir. 1988). Substantial evidence is 

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. This Court must review the record as a whole 

and consider adverse as well as supporting evidence. Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 529-

30 (9th Cir. 1986). Where evidence is susceptible of more than one rational interpretation, 

the Commissioner’s decision must be upheld. Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452 

(9th Cir. 1984). 

DISCUSSION 

 Medical opinions are among the evidence that the ALJ considers when assessing a 

claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(b). 

 The law is well established in this Circuit that a treating physician’s opinion is 

entitled to special weight because a treating physician is employed to cure and has a greater 

opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual. See McAllister v. Sullivan, 

888 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). “The treating physician’s opinion is not, however, 

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necessarily conclusive as to either a physical condition or the ultimate issue of disability.” 

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). The weight given a treating 

physician’s opinion depends on whether it is supported by sufficient medical data and is 

consistent with other evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 

416.927(d)(2). If the treating physician’s opinion is uncontroverted by another doctor, it 

may be rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 

821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995); Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.3d 1391, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991). Where, 

as here, a treating physician’s opinion is controverted, it may be rejected only if the ALJ 

makes findings setting forth specific and legitimate reasons that are based on the substantial 

evidence of record. See, e.g., Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (“A 

treating physician’s opinion on disability, even if controverted, can be rejected only with 

specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record.”); 

Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751; Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987). 

The opinion of an examining physician is entitled to greater weight than the opinion 

of a nonexamining physician. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830; Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 

1454 (9th Cir. 1984). The Commissioner must provide “clear and convincing” reasons for 

rejecting the uncontradicted opinion of an examining physician. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. 

Even if contradicted by another doctor, the opinion of an examining physician may only 

be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in 

the record. Id. at 830-31; Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Dr. George Brolaski 

 In its August 15, 2016 remand order, the Appeals Council specifically instructed the 

ALJ to evaluate Dr. Brolaski’s June 7, 2016 assessment of plaintiff’s mental residual 

functional capacity. In that assessment, Dr. Brolaski opined that plaintiff was “markedly 

limited” in almost all major mental functioning areas, except that she was only “moderately 

limited” in her ability to do the following: carry out very short and simple instructions; 

interact appropriately with the general public; ask simple questions or request assistance; 

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maintain socially appropriate behavior and adhere to basic standards of neatness and 

cleanliness; be aware of normal hazards and take appropriate precautions; and travel to 

unfamiliar places or use public transportation. (See AR 1572-75.) The ALJ stated in his 

decision on remand that he was giving “very little weight” to this opinion. (AR 18.) 

 One of the reasons proffered by the ALJ for according “very little weight” to Dr. 

Brolaski’s opinion was that it was inconsistent with the findings and opinions of Dr. 

Gregory Nicholson. (AR 19.) However, any such inconsistency merely was determinative 

of the standard to be applied to the ALJ’s proffered reasons for not crediting Dr. Brolaski’s 

opinion; it was not a legally sufficient reason in itself. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (in the 

event of conflict in the medical opinion evidence, an ALJ still must provide legally 

sufficient reasons to reject a treating or examining physician’s opinion); see also Widmark 

v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066-67 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (existence of a conflict among the 

medical opinions by itself cannot constitute substantial evidence for rejecting a treating 

physician’s opinion). 

Another reason proffered by the ALJ was that Dr. Brolaski’s opinion regarding 

plaintiff’s mental limitations was “inconsistent with the mental status examinations 

documented by the progress notes from the San Ysidro Health Center.” (See AR 18.) The 

ALJ did not specify in what respects Dr. Brolaski’s opinion supposedly was inconsistent 

with the progress notes. Instead, the ALJ merely cited two exhibits from the 

Administrative Record, one comprised of 66 pages of medical records (AR 1715-90) and 

the other comprised of 20 pages of medical records (AR 1848-67). It is not the Court’s 

function to comb the record to find specific conflicts when the ALJ makes this kind of 

general statement. See Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 494 (9th Cir. 2015). 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the supposed inconsistency with the progress notes also 

does not constitute a specific and legitimate reason for according “very little weight” to Dr. 

Brolaski’s opinion. 

Another reason proffered by the ALJ was that Dr. Brolaski’s opinion was 

“inconsistent with the very conservative nature of [plaintiff’s] mental health treatment 

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other than the two brief inpatient psychiatric hospitalizations.” (See AR 18.) The qualifier 

at the end of the statement renders it disingenuous. Plaintiff was hospitalized twice for 

psychiatric reasons. The ALJ is not permitted to “cherry-pick” only the part of the medical 

record that supports his decision. See Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1207 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (concluding that the ALJ’s specific reason for rejecting a treating physician was 

not supported by substantial evidence when the ALJ selectively relied on medical evidence 

of plaintiff improving while ignoring records indicating continued, severe impairment). 

Moreover, the Court is unable to reconcile the ALJ’s characterization of plaintiff’s mental 

health treatment as conservative with the evidence of record that, in addition to her two 

hospitalizations, she underwent therapy to address suicidal and homicidal ideation, and that 

she was prescribed a high dosage of a psychotropic drug “on special order.” (See AR 1787, 

1841, 1863, 1880.) The Court therefore finds that this proffered reason for according little 

weight to Dr. Brolaski’ opinion was not supported by substantial evidence. 

The other reason proffered by the ALJ for according “very little weight” to Dr. 

Brolaski’s opinion was that progress notes showed she was “doing well on her 

medications.” (See AR 18-19.) In support of this reason, the ALJ cited a single progress 

note from June 20, 2016 from another treating source at San Ysidro Health Center who 

was not one of plaintiff’s attending mental health physicians. (See AR 1840.) Even if this 

single notation qualifies as inconsistent with Dr. Brolanski’s June 7, 2016 opinion, it must 

be read in the context of plaintiff’s overall diagnostic picture at the time. See Ghanim v. 

Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 2014). According to progress notes dated four 

days later, on June 24, 2016, during the preceding twelve months, plaintiff had visited the 

Health Center fifteen times for mental health evaluation. On fourteen of those visits, she 

had presented with severe depression, and on the other with moderate depression. (AR 

1785-86.) On June 24, 2016, plaintiff again presented with severe depression, and 

specifically with “anxious/fearful thoughts, depressed mood, difficulty concentrating, 

difficulty falling asleep, diminished interest or pleasure, excessive worry, fatigue, feelings 

of guilt, loss of appetite, restlessness and thoughts of death or suicide.” Her risk factors 

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included relationship problems. It was noted that her depression was “aggravated by 

conflict or stress and social interactions.” Her Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) 

Score was assessed at 45. (See AR 1783-85.) A GAF score of 45 is indicative of “serious 

symptoms . . . [or] serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning,” such 

as inability to keep a job. See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical 

Manual of Mental Disorders, 32 (4th ed.). Thus, in the context of plaintiff’s overall 

diagnostic picture at the time, the single progress note cited by the ALJ does not constitute 

an adequate evidentiary basis for rejecting Dr. Brolanski’s opinion regarding plaintiff’s 

mental limitations. See Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1161-63 (treatments notes evidencing some 

improved mood and energy level insufficient basis for rejecting opinions of claimant’s 

treating sources about his impaired cognitive and social functioning where treatment notes 

consistently reflected that claimant continued to experience severe symptoms). 

Dr. Jaga Nath Glassman 

 In its August 15, 2016 remand order, the Appeals Council also specifically instructed 

the ALJ to further evaluate the March 18, 2016 consultative psychiatric disability opinion 

of Dr. Glassman, to which the ALJ had accorded “little weight.” On the assessment form 

accompanying her 2016 psychiatric evaluation, Dr. Glassman had opined that plaintiff was 

markedly limited in a number of work-related mental activities, including the ability to 

carry out simple instructions, to make judgments on simple work-related decisions, to 

interact appropriately with supervisors, to interact appropriate with co-workers, and to 

respond appropriately to usual work situations and to changes in a routine work setting. 

(AR 1519-21.) Dr. Glassman also had assigned plaintiff a GAF score of 40.2

 (AR 1526.) 

                                               

2

 A GAF score of 31-40 is indicative of “[s]ome impairment in reality testing or 

communication . . . or major impairment in several areas, such as work or school, family 

relations, judgment, thinking or mood (e.g., depressed man avoids friends, neglects 

family, and is unable to work ...).” See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic 

and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 32 (4th ed.).

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The ALJ stated in his decision on remand that he was giving “very little weight” to this 

opinion. (AR 18.) 

 Two of the reasons given by the ALJ were that Dr. Glassman’s 2016 opinion was 

“inconsistent with the opinion of attending psychiatrist Fajerman” and “inconsistent with 

the findings and opinion of Dr. Nicholson.” (AR 18.) The ALJ failed to specify in what 

respects Dr. Glassman’s opinion supposedly was inconsistent with the opinions of the other 

two physicians. In any event, as discussed above, whether Dr. Glassman’s opinion was 

controverted by the opinions of other physicians of record merely was determinative of the 

standard to be applied to the consideration of her opinion. It was not a legally sufficient 

reason in itself for not crediting it. 

 Another reason proffered by the ALJ for according “very little weight” to Dr. 

Glassman’s 2016 opinion was that it was it was “inconsistent with [plaintiff’s] course of 

treatment that has been very conservative other than the two brief inpatient psychiatric 

hospital admissions in March 2015 and February 2016.” (AR 18.) The Court’s finding 

above that that this proffered reason for according little weight to Dr. Brolaski’ opinion 

was not supported by substantial evidence applies with equal force to Dr. Glassman’s 2016 

opinion. 

The other reason proffered by the ALJ for discrediting Dr. Glassman’s 2016 opinion 

was that it was “completely inconsistent with her own mental status examination and those 

documented by her mental health treating sources. (AR 18.) However, the ALJ did not 

specify in what respects Dr. Glassman’s opinion supposedly was inconsistent with her own 

mental status examination or other mental status examinations by plaintiff’s mental health 

treating sources. Nor did the ALJ provide any citations to the Administration Record to 

support this conclusory assertion. As discussed above, it is not the Court’s function to 

comb the record to find specific conflicts when the ALJ makes this kind of general 

statement. Accordingly, the Court finds that this reason also does not constitute a specific 

and legitimate reason for according “very little weight” to Dr. Glassman’s 2016 opinion. 

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 In connection with the proceedings on remand, Dr. Glassman conducted a second 

evaluation of plaintiff and provided a second report dated May 31, 2017.3

 In that report, 

Dr. Glassman opined that plaintiff had marked impairment in her capacity to get along 

adequately with others and to behave in a socially-appropriate manner; moderate 

impairment in her capacity to understand and follow even simple instructions consistently; 

and marked impairment in her capacity to maintain concentration, persistence and pace, 

and to adapt to changes and stresses in a workplace setting. Dr. Glassman again assessed 

plaintiff’s GAF score as 40. (See AR 1878-82, 1884-86.) In his decision, the ALJ 

mischaracterized Dr. Glassman as having opined that plaintiff had marked limits in the 

ability to understand and follow even simple instructions. (See AR 19.) Further, the ALJ 

stated that he was giving “very light weight” to this opinion. (See id.) 

 Most of the reasons proffered by the ALJ for according “very little weight” to Dr. 

Glassman’s 2017 opinion were the same reasons proffered by the ALJ for according “very 

little weight” to Dr. Glassman’s 2016 opinion, which the Court already has found are 

legally insufficient. The Court will not bother to address those reasons again. Rather, the 

Court will confine its focus to the “additional” reasons proffered by the ALJ for according 

“very little weight” to Dr. Glassman’s 2017 opinion. 

One of the “additional” reasons proffered by the ALJ for according “very little 

weight” to Dr. Glassman’s 2017 opinion was that it was “at odds” with her prior mental 

status examination. (AR 19.) The ALJ failed to specify in what respects Dr. Glassman’s 

second examination supposedly was at odds with the first or explain how any differences 

between the two evaluations impacted the credibility of the second evaluation. For 

example, the Court fails to see how Dr. Glassman’s reduction in plaintiff’s level of 

impairment from marked to moderate relating to her capacity to understand and follow 

                                               

3

 According to the report, Dr. Glassman interviewed plaintiff on May 22, 2017. (AR 

1878.) The signature date on the accompanying assessment form is May 30 2017. (AR 

1886.)

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even simple instructions consistently after another year of psychiatric treatment constitutes 

a legitimate reason for discounting the entirety of the later opinion. 

Another “additional” reason proffered by the ALJ for according “very little weight” 

to Dr. Glassman’s 2017 opinion was that it was “inconsistent with [plaintiff’s] presentation 

at the hearing in which she displayed appropriate hygiene, attire, and was appropriate 

overall in appearance.” (AR 19.) However, there was no inconsistency. Dr. Glassman 

had noted in her 2017 examination report that plaintiff was “clean and neat and decentlygroomed” during her examination. (See AR 1881.) 

 Another “additional” reason proffered by the ALJ for according “very little weight” 

to Dr. Glassman’s 2017 opinion was that plaintiff was compliant with her treatment 

regimen and therapy appointments. (AR 19.) It is not readily apparent to the Court from 

its review of the Dr. Glassman’s 2017 report which part of her opinion plaintiff’s 

compliance with her treatment regimen would undermine. In fact, Dr. Glassman did not 

offer an explicit opinion about plaintiff’s ability to comply with or the efficacy of the 

treatment regimen. (See AR 1875-82.) To the extent the ALJ believed this evidence 

contradicted any of the marked and moderate impairments to which Dr. Glassman had 

opined, it was incumbent on the ALJ to provide an interpretation such that a reviewing 

court could analyze whether his decision was supported by substantial evidence. Reddick, 

157 F. 3d at 725 (“ALJ must do more than offer conclusions. He must set forth his own 

interpretations and explain why [he], rather than the doctors, are correct.”). The Court 

therefore finds that this proffered reason also was not a specific and legitimate reason on 

which the ALJ could properly rely to discount Dr. Glassman’s 2017 opinion. 

The other “additional” reason proffered by the ALJ for according “very little weight” 

to Dr. Glassman’s 2017 opinion was that plaintiff “was able to travel to Arkansas by car 

and return by plane.” (AR 19.) Again, to the extent the ALJ believed the evidence of this 

trip contradicted any of the marked and moderate impairments to which Dr. Glassman had 

opined, it was incumbent on the ALJ to provide an interpretation such that a reviewing 

court could analyze whether his decision was supported by substantial evidence. Based on 

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the ALJ’s failure to do so, the Court finds that this proffered reason also was not a specific 

and legitimate reason on which the ALJ could properly rely to discount Dr. Glassman’s 

2017 opinion. 

Dr. Leon Fajermen

Treating psychiatrist Leon Fajerman completed a Mental Residual Functional 

Capacity Assessment on March 14, 2017. (AR 1703-05.) Dr. Fajerman opined that 

plaintiff had marked limitations in three areas: her ability to ask simple questions or request 

assistance, her ability to get along with co-workers or peers, and her ability to maintain 

socially appropriate behavior and adhere to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness. 

(AR 1704.) However, Dr. Fajerman further opined that plaintiff had no limitations in any 

other mental functional category, including her understanding, memory, concentration, 

persistence, and adaptation abilities. (AR 1703-04.) 

The ALJ stated in his decision that he was crediting Dr. Fajerman’s opinion because 

he was plaintiff’s attending psychiatrist and his opinion about plaintiff’s mental limits were 

consistent with the progress notes from plaintiff’s mental status examinations. (See AR 

19.) Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred when he failed to pose the limitations about 

which Dr. Fajerman opined to the VE or incorporate them in his assessment of plaintiff’s 

functioning. (See AR 18-19.) 

An ALJ is required to consider all limitations imposed by a plaintiff’s impairments, 

even those that are not severe. See Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p (1996); See 

Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding 

the ALJ erred by not including a significant limitation in his assessment of plaintiff’s RFC). 

However, the Court concurs with the Commissioner that the ALJ did properly account for 

the limitations assessed by Dr. Fajerman by restricting plaintiff to unskilled work in a nonpublic setting with only occasional interaction with co-workers and supervisors and by 

posing a hypothetical to the VE that comported with that restriction. (See AR 16, 45.) 

 

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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 

In conclusion, the Court finds that, in determining plaintiff’s mental RFC, the ALJ 

did not follow the proper legal standard when he properly considered the opinions of Dr. 

Brolaski and Dr. Glassman. Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision must be reversed. 

 The law is well established that the decision whether to remand for further 

proceedings or simply to award benefits is within the discretion of the Court. See, e.g., 

Salvador v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 13, 15 (9th Cir. 1990); McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 

603 (9th Cir. 1989); Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981). Remand for 

further proceedings is warranted where additional administrative proceedings could 

remedy defects in the decision. See, e.g., Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1497 (9th Cir. 

1984); Lewin, 654 F.2d at 635. Remand for the payment of benefits is appropriate where 

no useful purpose would be served by further administrative proceedings, Kornock v. 

Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1980); where the record has been fully developed, 

Hoffman v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1986); or where remand would 

unnecessarily delay the receipt of benefits to which the disabled plaintiff is entitled, Bilby 

v. Schweiker, 762 F.2d 716, 719 (9th Cir. 1985).

The Court is mindful of Ninth Circuit authority for the proposition that, where an 

ALJ failed to properly consider either subjective symptom testimony or medical opinion 

evidence, it is sometimes appropriate to credit the evidence as true and remand the case for 

calculation and award of benefits. See, e.g., Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1019-21 

(9th Cir. 2014). However, in Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1167, a case decided after Garrison, 

another Ninth Circuit panel did not apply or even acknowledge the “credit as true” rule 

where substantial evidence did not support an ALJ’s rejection of treating medical opinions 

and his adverse credibility determination; instead, the panel simply remanded the case for 

further administrative proceedings. And, in Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.2d 1170, 1173 (9th 

Cir. 2015), the panel did not apply or even acknowledge the “credit as true” rule where the 

ALJ had failed to even mention a treating source’s opinion that the claimant was “pretty 

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much nonfunctional”; instead, the panel simply remanded the case to afford the ALJ the 

opportunity to comment on the doctor’s opinions. 

Here, although the Commissioner has argued that the proper remedy in the event of 

reversal would be a remand to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings 

(see ECF No. 14-1 at 24-25), plaintiff has only “respectfully request[ed] this Court 

seriously consider granting a reversal and ordering benefits be paid forthwith.” (See ECF 

No.13 at 24.) The Court deems plaintiff’s failure to adequately brief the issue of the 

appropriate remedy and failure to even reply to the Commissioner’s contention in this 

regard as a concession to the correctness of the Commissioner’s position. 

For the foregoing reasons, this Court RECOMMENDS that plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment be GRANTED, that the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary 

judgment be DENIED, and that Judgment be entered reversing the decision of the 

Commissioner and remanding this matter for further administrative proceedings pursuant 

to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

Any party having objections to the Court’s proposed findings and recommendations 

shall serve and file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a 

copy of this Report and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The objections 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” A party may respond 

to the other party’s objections within 14 days after being served with a copy of the 

objections. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). See id. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 10, 2018 

 _________________________________ 

 ROBERT N. BLOCK 

 United States Magistrate Judge

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