Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02004/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02004-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Because the court has determined that the pending petition is time-barred, respondents’

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procedural default and jurisdictional arguments will not be addressed herein.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WALLACE ERVIN,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-05-2004 DFL DAD P

vs.

JOHN MARSHALL, Warden, et al., 

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a 2004 decision by the California

Board of Prison Terms (BPT) finding him unsuitable for parole. Respondents have moved to

dismiss the petition on the grounds that: (1) the petition is time-barred under the applicable

statute of limitations; (2) the petition contains procedurally defaulted claims; and (3) the court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned will

recommend that the motion be granted based on petitioner’s failure to file a timely petition.1

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 Petitioner has submitted a form petition with the first page numbered as page 2. 2

 The parties refer to the last page of the transcript of the February 25, 2004 BPT hearing 3

which provides the “Final Date of Decision.” See Court document number 15, Ex. D at

electronic case file (ECF) page 81. Although the parties both agree that the date which appears at

that page is May 25, 2004, the court is unable to verify the representation because the date

appears too faint on the copy that was scanned into the court’s ECF system. However, since the

parties do not dispute this date, the court will accept it as the date the BPT decision became final. 

 This court has implemented the Case Management/Electronic Case Files (CM/ECF) 4

docketing and file system so that all documents are now stored and can be retrieved

electronically. Under this system, every page of a document is numbered in chronological order,

including cover pages, blank pages, tabbed pages, and proofs of service. When the undersigned

refers to a page number with an “ECF” designation, the court is using the page number assigned

by the CM/ECF system.

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I. Procedural History

1. In 1991, petitioner was convicted of second degree murder in the Sacramento

County Superior Court and was sentenced to a term of fifteen years to life imprisonment.

(Petition at 2. ) 2

2. On February 25, 2004, the BPT denied petitioner parole following a hearing at

the California Men’s Colony at San Luis Obispo, California. (Mot. to Dismiss (MTD), filed

2/8/06, Ex. D.) 

3. On May 25, 2004, the BPT decision became final. (MTD at ECF 5 ; MTD, 3 4

Ex. A at ECF 20 and Ex. C at ECF 49.)

4. On February 21, 2005, petitioner attempted to file a state habeas petition

challenging the parole denial with the Sacramento County Superior Court. However, the

Superior Court returned the petition to petitioner because he had not used the form approved by

the California Judicial Council. (Opp’n at 2 and Ex. A.)

5. On March 27, 2005, petitioner signed and delivered his habeas petition on the

approved form for mailing to the Sacramento County Superior Court. (MTD, Ex. A at ECF 66-

67.) 

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6. On May 2, 2005, the Sacramento County Superior Court denied the habeas

petition as untimely, stating as follows:

 An untimely state habeas corpus petition is an abuse of the writ

of habeas corpus, and if unjustified, is barred from habeas corpus

review (In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal. 4th 770, 811-812, 812 fn. 32;

In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal. 4th 750, 774-775). As petitioner has

failed to set forth any justification or exception to the Robbins/

Clark bar, his claims are all barred from review by this court on

habeas corpus.

 In addition, petitioner has failed to attach a copy of the entire

transcript of the February 25, 2004 parole hearing, having deleted

pages 15 through 22 of that transcript. Without the full transcript,

this court would not have been able to fully assess his claims, had

they not been barred from habeas corpus review, requiring denial

of this petition for that reason as well (In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.

4th 813, 827 fn. 5). 

(MTD, Ex. B at ECF 3.)

7. On an unknown date, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with

the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate Court. (Petition, at ECF 3.) That petition

was summarily denied on June 2, 2005. (MTD, Ex. C at ECF 4.)

8. On June 15, 2005, petitioner filed a petition for review with the California

Supreme Court. (MTD, Ex. C at ECF 2.) The petition was summarily denied on August 17,

2005. (MTD, Ex. E at ECF 2.)

9. On September 29, 2005, petitioner’s pending federal habeas petition was

signed and delivered to prison officials for mailing. The petition was filed on October 4, 2005. 

II. The Parties’ Arguments

Respondents argue that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)(D), the statute of

limitations on petitioner’s claim challenging his parole denial began to run on May 25, 2004

when the BPT decision became final and continued to run for 492 days until September 29, 2005

when the petitioner signed his federal habeas petition. (MTD at ECF 5.) Since this period of

time far exceeds the one-year statute of limitations, respondents argue that the petition is time

barred unless petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2). (Id. at ECF 7.) In

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 In an unauthorized reply to respondents’ reply, petitioner argues that he is entitled to 5

tolling of the statute of limitations and that there should be no penalty for any delay caused by the

necessity of his filing the habeas petition on the form required by the Superior Court.

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determining whether statutory tolling is appropriate, respondents assert that this court must look

to the ruling by the Sacramento County Superior Court denying petitioner’s state habeas petition

since that was the only reasoned decision issued by the state courts. (Id.) Relying on the recent

United States Supreme Court decisions in Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005) and Evans

v. Chavis, U.S. , 126 S. Ct. 846 (2006), respondents argue that the state court’s

determination that the state habeas petition was untimely compels the conclusion that the state

petition was not “properly filed,” and cannot serve to toll the statute of limitations. (MTD at

ECF 7.) Finally, respondents argue that petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling because he

has failed to allege any circumstances that would justify his delay in seeking to challenge the

BPT final decision. (Id. at ECF 8.)

Petitioner opposes the motion to dismiss, arguing that the correct filing date of his

habeas petition with the Sacramento County Superior Court is February 21, 2005, rather than the

date when that petition was resubmitted using the form petition approved by the state’s judicial

council. (Opp’n at 1.) Based on a filing date of February 21, 2005, petitioner contends that he 

complied with the requirements of the statute of limitations. (Id. at 2.)

In their reply, respondents argue that a letter dated March 16, 2005 from Judge

Michael G. Virga of the Sacramento County Superior Court accompanying the return of

petitioner’s first habeas petition filed with that court indicated that the petition had not been

submitted on the proper form and was therefore not “properly filed” for purposes of statutory

tolling. (Resp’ts’ Reply at 2.) In addition, respondents argue that in ultimately rejecting

petitioner’s subsequently filed petition the Superior Court determined that it was untimely under

state law and that such a determination is dispositive on the issue of tolling under § 2244(d)(2). 

(Id. at 3.)5

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 Apart from this statutory tolling provision, the one-year period is also subject to 6

equitable tolling if extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to

file a federal petition on time. Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2003).

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III. Analysis

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a one-year

statute of limitations applies to the filing of a non-capital habeas corpus petition in federal court. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). When a petitioner challenges the decision of an administrative

body, such as a parole board, the one-year period of limitation begins to run on the date on which

the factual predicate of the claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of

due diligence. Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004); Redd v. McGrath, 343

F.3d 1077, 1080-83 (9th Cir. 2003). In general, the one-year period will begin to run on the date

the administrative decision, such as the denial of parole, becomes final. Shelby, 391 F.3d at

1065-66; Redd, 343 F.3d at 1084 (AEDPA statute of limitations on challenge to a parole board

decision begins to run on the day following the denial). 

The one-year federal statute of limitations is tolled while a petitioner exhausts

state remedies. "The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be

counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). This 6

statutory tolling will apply if a state habeas petition has been properly filed. Artuz v. Bennett,

531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (holding that a properly filed state application complies with the applicable

laws and rules governing filings, including the form of the application and time limitations). A

state habeas petition is "pending" during a full-round of review in the state courts. This includes

the time between a lower court decision and filing a new petition in a higher court as long as

those intervals are "reasonable." Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 222-24 (2002). 

In reviewing habeas petitions originating from California, the Ninth Circuit

formerly employed a rule that where the California courts did not explicitly dismiss for lack of

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 In Pace v. DiGuglielmo the Supreme Court held that time limits for filing “go to the 7

very initiation of a petition and a court’s ability to consider that petition[.]” 544 U.S. 408, 417

(2005). 

 This is the earliest possible filing date for the federal petition pending before this court 8

under the mailbox rule announced in Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988). 

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timeliness, the petition was presumed timely and was "pending." In Evans v. Chavis, U.S.

 , 126 S. Ct. 846 (2006) the Supreme Court rejected this approach and now requires that the

lower courts determine whether a state habeas petition was filed within a reasonable period of

time. 126 S.Ct. at 852 ("That is to say, without using a merits determination as an 'absolute

bellwether' (as to timeliness), the federal court must decide whether the filing of the request for

state-court appellate review (in state collateral review proceedings) was made within what

California would consider a 'reasonable time.'”). However, “[w]hen a postconviction petition is

untimely under state law, that [is] the end of the matter for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” Bonner v.

Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Pace, [544 U.S. at 414] 125 S. Ct. at 1812).7

See also Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. at 226. 

Here, the one-year statute of limitations began to run on May 26, 2004, the day

after the decision of the BPT became final. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th

Cir. 2001) (applying Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for computation of the

statute of limitations period, so that the day of the event from which the designated period of

time begins to run shall not be included); Redd, 343 F.3d at 1084. Respondents are correct in

their assertion that absent tolling the one-year limitation period expired several months before

petitioner signed his federal habeas petition on September 29, 2005.8

As set forth above, petitioner filed three state habeas applications each of which

was denied. Both the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court issued

summary denials. These are “unexplained orders,” i.e., “an order whose text or accompanying

opinion does not disclose the reason for the judgment.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802

(1991). When confronted with a state court’s unexplained order, the federal court applies the

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 In In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 811-12 (1998) and In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 774-75 9

(1993) the California Supreme Court addressed the barring of review of habeas petitions filed

after substantial delay. 

 For what it may be worth, this conclusion also appears to be generally consistent with 10

those reached by federal courts called upon to independently determine whether petitions were

filed within what California would consider a “reasonable time.” See Evans v. Chavis, 

U.S. , 126 S. Ct. 846, 853-54 (2006) (holding that a six month delay in seeking review by

the state supreme court after denial of a writ by the state court of appeal was unreasonable);

Gaston v. Palmer, 447 F.3d 1165, 1167 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding delays of 10, 15 and 18 months

between denials and the filing of the subsequent petition to be unreasonable). Moreover, in light

of the untimeliness determination by the state courts, petitioner’s arguments concerning the filing

date for his initial state court petition miss the mark. 

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following presumption: “Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal

claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the

same ground.” Id. at 803. See also Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

In applying this look-through presumption, unexplained orders are given no effect. Id. at 804.

In this case, the Sacramento County Superior Court issued a reasoned order

rejecting petitioner’s claims. This court will therefore “look through” unexplained orders of the

California Supreme Court and the California Court of Appeal to the Superior Court order filed

May 2, 2005, in order to determine whether the state courts found the state petition to be

untimely as a matter of state law. In that order the state court specifically stated:

The petition, however, is untimely, having been signed, on

March 27, 2005, and submitted to prison authorities for filing with

the court more than one year after the February 25, 2004 denial of

parole.

An untimely state habeas corpus petition is an abuse of the

writ of habeas corpus, and if unjustified, is barred from habeas

corpus review (In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal. 4th 770, 811-12, 812

fn. 32; In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal. 4th 750, 774-75). As petitioner

has failed to set forth any justification or exception to the

Robbins/Clark bar, his claims are all barred from review by this

court on habeas corpus. 

(MTD, Ex. B (Superior Court Order) at ECF 3.) Thus, the state courts clearly found petitioner’s

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state petitions to be untimely. As noted above, it is now also clear that once the state courts

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find a postconviction petition untimely under state law, that petition has been determined to be

not properly filed and cannot serve as the basis for statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2). Pace,

544 U.S. at 414; Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. at 226; Bonner, 425 F.3d at 1148-49.

Finally, petitioner has claimed no entitlement to equitable tolling and thus has

failed to met his burden on that issue. See Miranda v Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir.

1998). Therefore, the court finds that petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling in that he has

failed to demonstrate that extraordinary circumstances beyond his control made it impossible for

him to file his federal petition in a timely manner. See Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Calderon v. United

States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc), overruled in part on other

grounds by Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 , 205-06 (2003); Redd, 343 F.3d at 1085. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondents’ February 8, 2006 motion to dismiss the petition as time-barred 

be granted; and

2. This action be dismissed.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fifteen

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within five days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: August 14, 2006.

DAD:4

ervi2004.mtd2

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