Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00611/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00611-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES SANFORD POBURSKY and )

WANDA POBURSKY, ) 

)

Plaintiffs, )

v. )

)

MADERA COUNTY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

1: 07 - CV - 0611 AWI DLB

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

(Document #58)

This action stems from an incident in which Plaintiff James Pobursky and Plaintiff

Wanda Pobursky (“Plaintiffs”) were arrested and their children taken into Child Protective

Services (“CPS”)’s custody. Plaintiffs allege violations of their constitutional rights and RICO. 

This court appears to have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Because the events at

issue occurred in this court’s judicial district and division, venue is appropriate.

BACKGROUND

On April 23, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a complaint. On July 12, 2007, the court dismissed

the complaint with leave to amend. 

On August 13, 2007, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. The first cause of action

alleges Defendants violated the Fourth Amendment by searching their “place and things” and

arresting them without a warrant. The second cause of action alleges Defendants violated

Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment to a familial

relationship with their children. The third cause of action alleges that Defendants violated the

Fourteenth Amendment by subjecting them to cruel and unusual punishment. Specifically, this

cause of action alleges that Defendants subjected Plaintiffs to cruel and unusual conditions of

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incarceration, failed to treat Plaintiffs’ medical needs, and subjected them to harassment and

demeaning statements. The fourth cause of action alleges that Deputy Tallmon violated the

Fourth Amendment and due process by stopping Plaintiffs’ van On August 5, 2006, searching it,

and having the family van towed. The fifth cause of action alleges Defendants violated the

Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment by maliciously prosecuting Plaintiffs. The sixth

cause of action appears to allege supervisory liability and/or municipal liability by Defendant

County of Madera and other entity defendants based on their failure to verify and insist that

persons applying for offices or employment with them had sworn or affirmed to THE mandated

oath of office and oath of allegiance. There appears to be an unlabeled seventh cause of action

for violations of RICO. There appears to be an unlabeled eighth cause of action for conspiracy

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985.

On September 19, 2007, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the first amended

complaint or for a more definite statement. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs should not be

allowed to add additional defendants because the court did not give Plaintiffs leave to add

additional defendants. Defendants contend that the redundant Defendants should be dismissed. 

Defendants contend that the complaint fails to state a claim against Defendant County of Madera. 

 Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against many of the individual

Defendants. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to plead a malicious prosecution

claim. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs other due process claims should be dismissed. 

Defendants contend that the conspiracy and RICO claims should be dismissed without leave to

amend. Defendants contend the equal protection claims should be dismissed without leave to

amend. 

Plaintiffs did not file a timely opposition to Defendants’ motion. On October 18, 2007,

the court took the motion under submission. Plaintiffs then asked for an extension of time in

which to file an opposition. On October 30, 2007, the court granted Plaintiffs until November

5, 2007 to file any opposition.

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On November 5, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the complaint.

On November 19, 2007, Defendants filed a reply to their motion in which Defendants

note that Plaintiffs did not file an opposition.

On November 28, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a reply to Defendants’ reply, which appears to be

an untimely opposition to the motion to dismiss.

LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the

claim that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department, 901 F.2d

696, 699 (9 Cir. 1990). A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal can be based on the failure to allege a th

cognizable legal theory or the failure to allege sufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. 

Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9 Cir. 1984). In considering a th

motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question,

Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in

the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolve all doubts in the pleader's

favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969). 

Essentially, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the plaintiff's compliance

with the liberal requirements of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 5A

Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356, at 294-96. 

Rule 8(a)(2) requires a complaint include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) requires sufficient

allegations to put defendants fairly on notice of the claims against them. McKeever v. Block,

932 F.2d 795, 798 (9 Cir.1991); Lynn v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Intern. Ass’n, 804 F.2d 1472, th

1482 (9 Cir. 1986). “The liberal notice pleading of Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified th

pleading system, which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim.” Swierkiewicz

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v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002); see also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct.

1955, 1976 (2007) (quoting Swierkiewicz). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies

only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A]

liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim

that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9 Cir. th

1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9 Cir. 1982)). th

ALLEGED FACTS

The amended complaint alleges that on July 7, 2006, at 6:31 p.m., Madera County Sheriff

Sargent Karl Hancock and Deputy Brian Dee Cunnings approached Plaintiff James Pobursky

(“Plaintiff James”) in the front yard of a house near a parked van. A short time later Deputy

Jacob Tallmon, Deputy J. Adkins, and Deputy Chris Swanson arrived. 

The amended complaint alleges that Sargent Hancock and Deputy Cunnings asked

Plaintiff James if Jami Pobursky (“Jami”) was there because they had a warrant for her arrest. 

That amended complaint alleges that Plaintiff James told the deputies that this was not Jami’s

house or residence, the family was tired of being harassed, and the Sheriff had been told many

times that Jami did not live there. The amended complaint alleges that Sargent Hancock then got

angry and stated that if they found Jami in the house, Plaintiff James would be arrested for aiding

and abetting.

The amended complaint alleges that Deputy Cunnings then saw Plaintiff James’s eight

year-old daughter, Shawni, who suffers from a disability, standing in the front seat of a parked

van. The amended complaint alleges that Deputy Cunnings approached the van and opened the

door, creating a hazzard for Shawni. The complaint alleges that upon seeing that his daughter

was about to fall, Plaintiff James reached over to stabilize her, without touching the deputy, who

was facing his daughter. The complaint alleges that Deputy Cunnings then turned around and

shoved Plaintiff James back, causing Plaintiff James to fall. The complaint alleges that Deputy

Cunnings then put handcuffs on Plaintiff James, handcuffing him so tightly that his right middle

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finger and hand became numb. The amended complaint alleges that Deputy Cunnings told

Plaintiff James that he was under arrest for assaulting an officer. The amended complaint alleges

that Plaintiff James told the officer that the officer knew he was only trying to stabilize his

disabled daughter from falling out of the van.

The amended complaint alleges that Plaintiff James was then placed in the back seat of

the Sheriff’s truck in 80-90 degree heat for five hours. The amended complaint alleges that

Plaintiff James’s clothing was caught in the truck’s door, and he began banging on the door to

free his leg. The amended complaint alleges that Deputy Tallmon approached the truck and

unprofessionally stated to Plaintiff James: “If you don’t stop banging on the car, I will kick your

fucking ass.” 

The amended complaint alleges that Deputy Cunnings and Sergeant Hancock, without

possessing a valid warrant, entered the van and searched it. This search included Plaintiff

James’ briefcase and Bible located in the van.

The amended complaint alleges that the deputies were chain smoking, dropped cigarette

butts in the flower bed, and blew smoke in Shawni’s face. 

The amended complaint alleges that Sergeant Hancock went into the duplex adjoining

Plaintiffs’ place through an unlocked screen door. The amended complaint alleges that Sergeant

Hancock searched Linda Bye’s purse, and found the keys to Plaintiffs’ place even though they

were in the bottom of the purse. The amended complaint alleges that Sergeant Hancock falsely

stated that the keys were lying out. The complaint alleges that Sergeant Hancock, Deputy

Cunnings, Jacob Tallmon, J. Adkins, and Chris Swanson went into Plaintiffs’ place without a

warrant with one or more guns drawn. 

The amended complaint alleges that the deputies told Plaintiff Wanda Pobursky

(“Plaintiff Wanda”) that if she did not identify herself, they would trash her house. The

amended complaint alleges that when Plaintiff Wanda remained silent, the deputies went and

dumped Plaintiff Wanda’s purse and other drawer contents out on the bed. The amended

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complaint alleges that Plaintiff Wanda was arrested for obstructing and delaying a police officer. 

The amended complaint alleges that Plaintiff Wanda was nursing her baby, and asked to be able

to take the baby with her. The amended complaint alleges that the baby was taken away from

Plaintiff Wanda.

The amended complaint alleges that County of Madera CPS was called to take custody of

the children. The amended complaint alleges that Linda, the owner of the duplex, told the

deputies that she would take the children, but she was refused. The oldest daughter, Christian,

was also present and was old enough to take the children. The amended complaint alleges that

while CPS was still there, Geri Pobursky, Plaintiff James’s sister-in-law, called and begged Lynn

Annete Hunt, a CPS social worker, to be able to take the children. This request was refused. 

The amended complaint alleges that at one time a deputy stated: “Those fucking kids

won’t even talk. They’ll break once we get them separated.” The amended complaint alleges

that Deputy Hancock jerked Elisah’s arm so hard that it felt like it was being pulled out of it’s

socket. The amended complaint alleges that Lynn Annete Hunt transported some of the children

without being seat belted. The amended complaint alleges that once taken away, the children’s

religious diet was not respected and they were shown R rated movies. 

The amended complaint alleges that Plaintiffs were told later that they were being

charged with child abandonment and neglect because they refused to identify themselves. The

amended complaint alleges that Plaintiff Wanda was not told what she was charged with at the

time. The amended complaint alleges Plaintiff James was only advised of a charge of assault on

an officer and not a charge of obstructing and delaying an officer. The amended complaint

alleges that Plaintiffs were never shown a warrant. The amended complaint alleges Plaintiffs

were never Mirandized. The complaint alleges that during transportation to the jail, Plaintiff

James was not seat belted and the deputy drove erratically and over the speed limit.

The amended complaint alleges that at the jail, Plaintiffs elected to exercise their Fifth

Amendment right to remain silent. Plaintiffs allege that the watch commander, Sergeant Davis,

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stated: “I don’t care about these people. I can make it pretty uncomfortable for them.” The

amended complaint alleges that Plaintiff James was not fed and kept in a bathroom/ dressing

room all night. The amended complaint alleges that Plaintiff Wanda was put in a cell without a

bench and was forced to sit on a cold filthy floor all night. The amended complaint alleges that

the next day, when Plaintiff Wanda asked for a breast pump because she was a nursing mother,

two County of Madera jail nurses talked down to her as though it was all her fault because she

would not identify herself and would not help her. The amended complaint alleges that

Sergeant Ackerman told Plaintiff Wanda to relieve herself in the sink.

The amended complaint alleges that on July 15, 2006, Deputy Cunnings stopped

Plaintiffs’ van without probable cause. The amended complaint alleges that Deputy Cunnings

stated he was “just looking for her,” opened the vans doors, and searched the van unlawfully. 

The amended complaint alleges that on August 5, 2006, Deputy Tallmon stopped Plaintiff

James on a country road. The amended complaint alleges the van was unlawfully impounded.

The amended complaint alleges that on July 9, 2006, Lieutenant J. Bernardi approved a

false and misleading Sheriff’s report. The amended complaint alleges that on February 5, 2007,

Deputy R. Norton denied Plaintiff James a copy of the Sheriff’s Incident Report of the July 7,

2006 incident. 

The amended complaint alleges that Ernest Joseph Licalsi, D.A., indicated that he wanted

the state court to proceed in order to stave off any potential lawsuit by Plaintiff James. The

amended complaint alleges that D.A. Licalsi refused to file any complaints by Plaintiffs

regarding criminal actions by law enforcement officers.

The amended complaint alleges that D.A. Regina Bardshaw continued the prosecution

despite the admonition of the judge that the officers testifying were disingenuous. The amended

complaint alleges the officers committed perjury.

//

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DISCUSSION

A. Constitutional Claims and Linkage 

Defendants contend that Defendant Sheriff John Anderson, Defendant Deputy Warren

Anderson, Defendant Deputy Brian Bangerter, Defendant Jennifer Blackburn, Defendant Cliff

Kemper, Defendant Shawn P.K. Huston, Defendant Ed Gill, Defendant M. Todd Spangler, and

Defendant Karen Mitchell are entitled to dismissal because these Defendants have not been

linked to the alleged constitutional violations. In the court’s order dismissing the original

complaint, the court already informed Plaintiffs of the need to link all named Defendants with

some affirmative act or omission. 

The Civil Rights Act allows suits against state actors for actions taken under state law

that violate the Constitution, and reads in part:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link

between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by

plaintiff. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode,

423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the

deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an

affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is

legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v.

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9 Cir. 1978). th

Defendant Deputy Warren Anderson, Defendant Deputy Brian Bangerter, Defendant

Jennifer Blackburn, Defendant Cliff Kemper, Defendant Shawn P.K. Huston, Defendant Ed Gill,

Defendant M. Todd Spangler, and Defendant Karen Mitchell are discussed in paragraphs 65, 66,

and 68. These paragraphs are under Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for malicious prosecution. 

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While the amended complaint alleges malicious prosecution, the amended complaint is

completely unclear as to what Defendant Sheriff John Anderson, Defendant Deputy Warren

Anderson, Defendant Deputy Brian Bangerter, Defendant Jennifer Blackburn, Defendant Cliff

Kemper, Defendant Shawn P.K. Huston, Defendant Ed Gill, Defendant M. Todd Spangler, and

Defendant Karen Mitchell specifically did that resulted in malicious prosecution. 

Paragraphs 77 and 90 list all of the named Defendants, including Defendant Deputy

Warren Anderson, Defendant Deputy Brian Bangerter, Defendant Jennifer Blackburn, Defendant

Cliff Kemper, Defendant Shawn P.K. Huston, Defendant Ed Gill, Defendant M. Todd Spangler,

and Defendant Karen Mitchell. While not completely clear, these paragraphs appear to be

alleging a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It appears, the amended complaint alleges

that the liability of Defendant Deputy Warren Anderson, Defendant Deputy Brian Bangerter,

Defendant Jennifer Blackburn, Defendant Cliff Kemper, Defendant Shawn P.K. Huston,

Defendant Ed Gill, Defendant M. Todd Spangler, and Defendant Karen Mitchell is premised on

their membership in a conspiracy.

A conspiracy claim brought under section 1983 requires proof of “‘an agreement or

meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights,’” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th

Cir. 2001) (quoting United Steel Workers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-

41 (9 Cir. 1989) (citation omitted)), and an actual deprivation of constitutional rights, Hart v. th

Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1071 (9 Cir. 2006) (quoting Woodrum v. Woodward County, Oklahoma, th

866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9 Cir. 1989)). “‘To be liable, each participant in the conspiracy need not th

know the exact details of the plan, but each participant must at least share the common objective

of the conspiracy.’” Franklin, 312 F.3d at 441 (quoting United Steel Workers, 865 F.2d at 1541).

The federal system is one of notice pleading, and the court may not apply a heightened

pleading standard to plaintiff’s allegations of conspiracy. Empress LLC v. City and County of

San Francisco, 419 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9 Cir. 2005); Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d th

1119, 1126 (2002). However, although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be

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[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007) (citations omitted). A plaintiff must set forth “the

grounds of his entitlement to relief[,]” which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action . . . .” Id. at 1964-65 (internal quotations

and citations omitted). As such, the complaint’s bare allegations that these defendants were part

of a conspiracy to violate Plaintiffs' constitutional rights is insufficient to allege a conspiracy

claim under section 1983. Thus, Defendant Deputy Warren Anderson, Defendant Deputy Brian

Bangerter, Defendant Jennifer Blackburn, Defendant Cliff Kemper, Defendant Shawn P.K.

Huston, Defendant Ed Gill, Defendant M. Todd Spangler, and Defendant Karen Mitchell will be

dismissed.

B. Second Cause of Action - Fourteenth Amendment Loss of Familial Rights

The second cause of action alleges that Plaintiffs’ Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

were violated when Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of their familial relationship with their

children. Defendants contend this claim is subject to dismissal because Plaintiffs have failed to

sate a claim for a loss of familial rights claims. 

A plaintiff may individually assert a Fourteenth Amendment claim based on the

deprivation of their liberty interest arising out of their familial relationship with their children. 

See Guess v. Byrd, 137 F.3d 1126, 1134 (9 Cir.1998). Parents have a constitutionally protected th

liberty interest in the care and custody of their children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753

(1982). The Ninth Circuit has generally characterized the right to familial association as a

liberty right under the Due Process Clause. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 685-86

(9 Cir. 2001); Kelson v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651, 655 (9 Cir.1985); Estate of Imrie v. th th

Golden Gate Bridge Highway and Transp. Dist., 282 F.Supp.2d 1145, 1150 n.4 (N.D.Cal. 2003).

Application of the “deliberate indifference” standard to Fourteenth Amendment familial

association claims was reaffirmed by the Ninth Circuit in Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d

668 (2001). In Lee the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial judge's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims,

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 Where law enforcement officers are forced to react to sudden situations with haste and 1

under pressure without the opportunity to fully consider their acts, the Fourteenth Amendment is

only implicated if the officers were motivated by a purpose to harm. County of Sacramento v.

Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 852-53(1998). Under this standard, if an officer’s instinct is to do his or her

job as a law enforcement officer and not to terrorize, cause harm, or kill, there is no substantive

due process violation even if prudence should have repressed the officer’s reaction. Lewis, 523

U.S. at 855. There must be reason to believe that an officer’s actions were tainted by an

improper or malicious motive. Id. However, if law enforcement is responding to a circumstance

in which there is time to fully consider potential consequences, such as in this action, then

conduct will shock the conscience if it is deliberately indifferent to the plaintiffs’ rights. Byrd v.

Guess, 137 F.3d 1126, 1133-34 (9 Cir. 1998) (superceded by statute on other grounds). th

11

finding that the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action by alleging "reckless, intentional and

deliberate acts and omissions of defendants," constituting an "unwarranted interference" with the

rights of family members. Id. at 685-86. Deliberate indifference requires an officer to know of 1

and disregard an excessive risk. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).

The amended complaint alleges that Defendants’ children were taken into CPS’s custody. 

 The amended complaint alleges that Defendants conspired to take Plaintiffs’ children away even

though there were two adults and an older sibling who could have watched the children. While

the amended complaint states in a conclusory fashion that Defendants’ conduct shocked the

conscience, all Plaintiffs have alleged is that Defendants choose to take the children into custody

instead of leaving them with the people Plaintiffs would have preferred them to have been left

with. The amended complaint does not allege the these other people were known to CPS or that

CPS had time to ensure they would be appropriate guardians. The amended complaint neither

alleges that Defendants were motivated to harm Plaintiffs’ relationship with their children nor

that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiffs’ relationship with their children. The

mere act of requiring the children to stay in CPS custody for a short period of time when

Plaintiffs had other people they would have preferred the children to stay with is insufficient to

raise to the level of deliberate indifference. Defendants were not deliberately indifferent by

failing to leave children, whose parents had been arrested, with the parents’ stated choice of a

temporary guardian. Thus, Plaintiffs’ amended complaint must be dismissed as to Plaintiffs’

second cause of action.

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C. Third Cause of Action - Conditions in Jail

The complaint identifies several Defendants related to Plaintiffs’ detention in the Madera

County Jail. Defendants contend that the amended complaint fails to state a constitutional

violation concerning the jail conditions. 

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment only protects

convicted prisoners. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

386, 395 n.10 (1989). It is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that protects

pre-trial detainees from the use of excessive force. Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d

1435, 1440 (9 Cir. 1991) (quoting Graham v. Connor at 395 n.10). Pretrial detainees have the th

right to be free from punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). While this right

is located in the Due Process Clause, courts borrow from Eighth Amendment principles in

determining the care to be afforded pretrial detainees. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107

F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir.1996); Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9 Cir. 1986); Collins v. th th

County of Kern, 390 F.Supp.2d 964, 973 (E.D.Cal. 2005). As such, pretrial detainees are

entitled to adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. 

Alvarez-Machain, 107 F.3d at 701

1. Failure to Treat Plaintiff Wanda’s Medical Condition

The amended complaint alleges that Plaintiff Wanda was a nursing mother. The

amended complaint alleges that two jail nurses, which have been named as doe defendants, and

Sergeant Ackerman denied her request for a breast pump. The amended complaint alleges that

Sergeant Ackerman told Plaintiff Wanda she could relieve herself in a sink. The amended

complaint alleges that Plaintiff Wanda was extremely uncomfortable and had engorged breasts. 

Claims of failure to provide care for serious medical needs, when brought by a detainee

who has been neither charged nor convicted of a crime, are analyzed under the substantive due

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 418-19

(9 Cir. 2003); Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1185-86 (9 Cir. 2002.) To state a th th

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claim for a constitutional violation regarding medical care, a plaintiff must allege that he or she

was (1) confined under conditions posing a risk of ‘objectively, sufficiently serious harm and (2)

that the officials had a sufficiently culpable state of mind in denying the proper medical care

support that he had a serious medical need and that a defendant acted with deliberate indifference

to that need. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976) (describing standard for

convicted inmates); Lolli, 351 F.3d at 418-19 (describing standard for pretrial detainees). 

Deliberate indifference may occur if “prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with

medical treatment.” Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9 Cir. 2002) (internal quotation th

marks omitted). 

In order to know of the risk, it is not enough that the person merely ‘be aware of

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious

harm exists, he must also draw that inference. But if a person is aware of a

substantial risk of serious harm, a person may be liable for neglecting a prisoner's

serious medical needs on the basis of either his action or his inaction. 

Lolli, 351 F.3d at 419 (alterations in original); Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1187. A delay in receiving

medical care, without more, is insufficient to state a claim against jailors for deliberate

indifference unless the plaintiff can show that the delay in treatment harmed her. Shapley v.

Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9 Cir.1985). th

The complaint’s allegations concerning the Doe Defendant Nurses and Sergeant

Ackerman are sufficient to state a claim. The amended complaint alleges that these Defendants

were told Plaintiff Wanda was a breast feeding mother and Plaintiff Wanda asked for a breast

pump. Because the amended complaint’s allegations are consistent with an allegation that Doe

Defendant Nurses and Sergeant Ackerman knew Plaintiff Wanda needed a breast pump and

knew that denying her a pump for a significant period of time caused her pain, the amended

complaint adequately states a Fourteenth Amendment claim concerning the denial of a breast

pump to Plaintiff Wanda. In making this finding, the court does not find that Plaintiff Wanda’s

Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. Rather, the court finds that it is not clear that no

relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations

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Plaintiff Wanda’s medical need was not serious and/or Defendants did not have sufficient

knowledge to be deliberately indifferent.

14

concerning the denial of medial care for Plaintiff Wanda. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512.2

2. Failure to Treat Plaintiff James’ Medical Condition

The amended complaint alleges that a Doe Defendant and Correctional Officer Lara

denied Plaintiff James of necessary medical care for his right hand and right middle finger. 

Defendants’ request to dismiss this claim will be granted. First, Officer Lara is not named as a

defendant in this action. Second, even taking the complaint’s allegations as true, the amended

complaint does not allege that the Doe Defendant and Officer Lara knew there was a serious risk

to Plaintiff James’ health by not treating Plaintiff James’s right hand and middle finger. In fact,

the amended complaint does not even allege that these officers knew Plaintiff James had been

injured. Plaintiff James’ allegations differ from those of Plaintiff Wanda because Plaintiff

Wanda alleges she asked for a breast pump whereas Plaintiff James makes no allegations that he

asked for medical aid. Thus, the amended complaint fails to state a Fourteenth Amendment

claim concerning the denial of medical treatment to Plaintiff James. 

3. Conditions of Confinement

The amended complaint alleges that Sergeant Davis kept Plaintiff James in a cold

dressing room/bathroom all night without a blanket, despite Plaintiff James’ requests. The

amended complaint alleges that Sergeant Davis placed Plaintiff Wanda in a special cell that had

no bench. The amended complaint alleges that Plaintiff Wanda was forced to sit on the floor all

night without any shoes, coat, or blanket. The amended complaint also alleges that Plaintiff

Wanda’s cell was constantly observed through a window.

Prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food,

clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348

(1981); Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9 Cir. 2000). “The circumstances, nature, and th

duration of a deprivation of necessities must be considered in determining whether a

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constitutional violation has occurred. Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9 Cir. 2005) th

(quoting Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731). “The more basic the need, the shorter the time it can be

withheld.” Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731.

The Eighth Amendment requires neither that prisons be comfortable nor that they provide

every amenity that one might find desirable. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9 Cir. th

1982), on appeal after remand, Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779 (9 Cir. 1985). Pre-trial

th

detainees are entitled to clean clothing, a mattress, and bedding on a regular basis. Thompson v.

City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1448 (9 Cir. 1989); Jones v. Neven, 2007 WL 3232522, *4 th

(D.Nev.,2007); Zin v. Chief Medical Officer, 1994 WL 224841, *5 (N.D.Cal.1994); Toussaint

v. Rushen, 553 F.Supp. 1365, 1379 (N.D.Cal.1983). However, being forced to sleep without a

mattress for only one night is insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment violation. Hernandez v.

Denton, 861 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9 Cir. 1988), judgment vacated on other grounds, 493 U.S. 801 th

(1989). Adequate food is also a basic Eighth Amendment requirement. Zin v. Chief Medical

Officer, 1994 WL 224841, *5 (N.D.Cal.1994); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 597 F.Supp. 1388, 1412

(N.D.Cal.1984). But, deprivation of a single meal does not constitute an injury serious enough to

support an Eighth Amendment claim. See, e.g., Hernandez, 861 F.2d at 1424 (holding that

allegation that inmate slept without a mattress for one night is insufficient to state an Eighth

Amendment violation). The denial of adequate clothing may, under certain circumstances, rise to

the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1421 (9 Cir. th

1994). The Ninth Circuit has found that requiring inmates to live under conditions that include

unsatisfactory plumbing, inadequate ventilation and vermin infestation violate the Constitution.

Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 784 (9 Cir.1985). However, claims that a facilities’ th

cleaning standards do not match the plaintiff’s standards are insufficient to support a finding that

he is living in squalor. Brotten v. State of Cal., 1994 WL 173916, *2 (N.D.Cal.1994).

Here, Plaintiffs have alleged, at most, the deprivation of adequate bedding for one night. 

Plaintiff James has also alleged the deprivation of one meal. The circumstances and duration of

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Plaintiffs’ confinement weighs against finding a constitutional violation even taking all of the

amended complaint’s allegations as true. Because of the short length of the Plaintiffs’ detention,

the conditions they were subjected to do not rise to the level of a Constitutional violation. 

Pursuant to Hernandez v. Denton, 861 F.2d 1421 (9 Cir. 1988), the failure to provide adequate th

bedding, clothes, and food for what appears to have been one night in jail, which lasted through

one meal, is insufficient to state a constitutional violation. See Hernandez, 861 F.2d at 1424 (9th

Cir. 1988), judgment vacated on other grounds, 493 U.S. 801 (1989). Thus, Plaintiffs’

condition of confinement claims are subject to dismissal.

4. Verbal Statements

The amended complaint also alleges that various jail personal spoke to Plaintiffs in a

demeaning manor. This claim fails because verbal harassment does not violate the Eighth

Amendment. See Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9 Cir. 2004); Keenan v. Hall, 83 th

F.3d 1083, 1092 (9 Cir. 1996). Thus, the complaint’s claims concerning verbal harassment at th

the jail must be dismissed.

D. Fifth Cause of Action – Malicious Prosecution

The amended complaint alleges that Defendants committed malicious prosecution in

violation of the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants move to dismiss this

claim because the amended complaint fails to adequately plead a malicious prosecution claim.

A malicious prosecution claim requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant

prosecuted him or her with malice and without probable cause, and that the defendant did so for

the purpose of denying the plaintiff equal protection or another specific constitutional right. 

Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1031 (9 Cir.1985) (en banc). In order to succeed on a th

malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must show (1) tortious conduct

under the elements of state law, and (2) intent to deprive the individual of a constitutional right.

Poppell v. City of San Diego, 149 F.3d 951, 961 (9 Cir.1998). “In California, the elements of th

malicious prosecution are (a) the initiation of criminal prosecution, (b) malicious motivation, and

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(c) lack of probable cause.” Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 562 (9 Cir.1987); see th

also Singleton v. Perry, 45 Cal.2d 489, 289 P.2d 794, 798 (Cal. 1955). 

The amended complaint alleges that the Defendants committed malicious prosecution by

filing a criminal complaint. The amended complaint alleges that D.A. Licalsi indicated the state

court case would proceed in order to stave off any potential law suit by Plaintiff James. The

amended complaint alleges that Deputy D.A. Bradshaw continued the prosecution despite an

admonition from the judge that the officers were disingenuous. The court agrees with

Defendants that these allegations, read in connection with the rest of the amended complaint, are

insufficient to allege a malicious prosecution claim under the Federal Constitution. The

amended complaint does not clearly allege that there was no probable cause to charge Plaintiffs. 

The amended complaint does not contain sufficient allegations to allege that Defendant initiated

a criminal prosecution with the intent to deprive Plaintiffs of a constitutional right. While the

complaint does imply one motive in continuing with the state criminal complaint was an attempt

to stop this federal lawsuit, this allegation in isolation is insufficient to show a malicious motive. 

 Thus, the amended complaint fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution, and this claim

must be dismissed.

E. Sixth Cause of Action - Failure to Verify

The sixth cause of action alleges that Defendant County of Madera and its entities failed,

refused, or neglected to verify and insist that persons applying for offices or employment with

them had sworn or affirmed the mandated oath of office and oath of allegiance as mandated in

the California Constitution and other California laws. The amended complaint alleges that

Defendant County of Madera and its entities had a duty to provide Plaintiffs with officers and

employees who had sworn or affirmed the oath of office and oath of allegiance. The amended

complaint states that this cause of action is brought pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the

Fifth and Fourteen Amendments. Plaintiffs have failed to adequately explain to this court how

Defendants’ failure to ensure officers and employees had sworn or affirmed an oath of office and

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 To the extent the sixth cause of action is merely attempting to establish one, among 3

many, policies and practices of Defendant County of Madera in order to establish municipal

liability over other causes of action, Plaintiffs may still be able to cite to the failure to ensure the

officers had sworn or affirmed the mandated oath of office and oath of allegiance. Plaintiffs’

allegations concerning the oath of office and oath of allegiance do not provide an independent

basis of liability. 

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oath of allegiance violates the Fifth and Fourteen Amendments. The court does not see how the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect Plaintiffs against having officers and employees who

have potentially violated a California state law. Accordingly, the sixth cause of action will be

dismissed on its face. 

3

F. Liability of Defendant Madera County

Defendants contend that the amended complaint does not state a claim against Defendant

Madera County. The court previously found that the original complaint did not state a claim

against Defendant Madera County because the complaint did not allege that other defendants

acted pursuant to a policy or custom of Defendant Madera County.

Local governments can be subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Monnell v. Dep't

of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). However, a local government unit may not be held

responsible for the acts of its employees under a respondeat superior theory of liability. Monell,

436 U.S. at 691; Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1534 (9 Cir. 1995). Rather, to state a th

claim for municipal liability, a plaintiff must allege that he or she suffered a constitutional

deprivation that was the product of a policy or custom of the local government unit. See City of

Canton, Ohio, v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). Thus, prevail on their claims against the

County of Madera, Plaintiffs must show that: (1) There was a violation of Plaintiffs’

constitutional rights, and (2) The County of Madera’s policy or custom caused the violation. See

Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-92. 

In this action, the amended complaint states at paragraph 80 that: “Regarding all Causes

of Action, Plaintiff’s [sic.] have suffered the claimed constitutional deprivation that was the

product of a custom, usage, policy, and practice of Defendant COUNTY OF MADERA, in which

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all identified Defendants, acted under the color of state law.” See Amended Complaint ¶ 80. 

Defendants contend that this conclusory statement is insufficient to state a claim for municipal

liability under Monell. “In this circuit, a claim of municipal liability under section 1983 is

sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss 'even if the claim is based on nothing more than a

bare allegation that the individual officers' conduct conformed to official policy, custom, or

practice.” Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 581 (9 Cir. 2007); Galbraith v. County of Santa th

Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9 Cir. 2002); Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d th

621, 624 (9 Cir. 1988); Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 747 (9 Cir. 1986). th th

Thus, Plaintiffs’ bare allegation that the actions of individual defendants conformed to official

policy suffices to withstand this motion to dismiss. 

Defendants also appear to argue that Plaintiffs’ conclusory statement in paragraph 80

alleging that all claimed constitutional deprivations at issue were the product of a custom, usage,

policy, and practice of Defendant Madera County conflicts with paragraph 76. Paragraph 76 is

under the heading “REGARDING ALL CAUSES OF ACTION”. Paragraph 76 reads:

These complained of acts or omissions did not involve the formulation of

any official policy, nor did they apply to the community at large. They were

simply personal in nature and not covered by any type of judicial, quasi-judicial,

good faith, or qualified immunity against this personal injury action. . . .

See Amended Complaint ¶ 76. While paragraph 76 is confusing and at first glance appears to

conflict with paragraph 80, paragraph 77 seems to clarify Plaintiffs’ position. Paragraph 77

alleges that Defendants “have met together and conspired to penetrate the above mentioned

action clearly related to their custom, usage, policy, and practice in dealing with the humans,

James Sanford, Pobursky and Wanda Pobursky . . . .” Reading these paragraphs together, along

with the rest of the amended complaint, the court finds that Plaintiffs have not conceded that the

individuals’ actions were not the result of Defendant Madera County’s custom or policy. 

Rather, Plaintiffs appear to be alleging that Defendant Madera County’s custom and policy

regarding Plaintiffs was directed only at Plaintiffs and not other people. Thus, the court finds

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that the amended complaint sufficiently alleges that Defendant Madera County’s custom and

policy regarding Plaintiffs caused the constitutional violations at issue in this action.

G. Liability of Defendant Sheriff John Anderson and Supervisors 

The amended complaint names Sheriff John Anderson and other defendants who appear

to be the supervisors’ of the deputies listed in the first cause of action. While not clear from the

amended complaint, it appears that Plaintiffs are alleging Defendant Sheriff John Anderson and

the supervisors are liable for the remaining causes of action because they supervised the other

Defendants. Defendants contend that the amended complaint fails to adequately allege

supervisor liability.

Despite Plaintiffs’ assertions to the contrary, there is no respondeat superior liability

under Section 1983. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9 Cir. 2002). To show a th

supervisor’s liability, the plaintiff must show: (1) The supervisor’s personal involvement in the

constitutional deprivation, or (2) A sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's

wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 915 (9 Cir. th

2001). Supervisors can be held liable if they play an affirmative part in the alleged deprivation

of constitutional rights by setting in motion a series of acts by others which the supervisor knew

or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury. Graves

v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 848 (9 Cir.2003) (citations omitted) (quoting Rise v. th

Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1563 (9 Cir.1995); Larez v. City of LA, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9

th th

Cir.1991)). “Supervisory liability is imposed against a supervisory official in his individual

capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his

subordinates, for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivations of which the complaint is

made, or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” 

Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1149 (9 Cir. 2005) (quoting Larez v. City of Los th

Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9 Cir.1991)). th

 The amended complaint does not allege specifically how any of the supervisor defendants

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were involved in the alleged constitutional violations. While the amended complaint states in a

conclusory fashion that the supervisors set in motion a serious of acts by their deputies that they

knew or should have known would cause the deputies to inflict constitutional injury, this

allegation is too vague to state a claim based on supervisor liability. The amended complaint

fails to state what Defendant Sheriff John Anderson or any other supervisor did to cause the

deputies to violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. It is unclear if the deputies were acting

pursuant to Defendant Sheriff John Anderson’s and/or the other supervisors’ policy, order,

directions, or/and other actions. There are insufficient allegations on how the supervisor

defendants caused the other defendants to commit constitutional violations. Thus, the complaint

fails to allege a civil rights violation by Defendant Sheriff John Anderson and the other

supervisors defendants. Defendant Sheriff John Anderson and the other supervisor defendants

are entitled to dismissal. 

H. Conspiracy - Section 1983

The amended complaint alleges that Defendants acted pursuant to a conspiracy. To

allege a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a complaint must “allege [some] facts to

support the existence of a conspiracy among the defendants.” Buckey v. County of Los Angeles,

968 F.2d 791, 794 (9 Cir. 1992); Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Department, 839 F.2d th

621, 626 (9 Cir. 1988). A plaintiff must allege that the defendants conspired or acted jointly in th

concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy. Sykes v. State of

California, 497 F.2d 197, 200 (9 Cir. 1974). th

As discussed above, the remaining Section 1983 claims in this action are found in the

first cause of action, alleging Fourth Amendment violations based on Deputy Cunnings, Sergeant

Hancock, Deputy Tallmon, Deputy Adkins, Deputy Swanson’s search of Plaintiffs’ house and

Plaintiffs’ arrest. This action will also continue based on Plaintiffs’ third cause of action to the

extent Plaintiff Wanda alleges that Deputy Ackerman and two Doe Nurses fails to treat her

medical concerns. Finally, this action will continue based on Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action,

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which alleges Deputy Tallmon and Deputy Adkins violated Plaintiff James’s Fourth Amendment

rights by stopping Plaintiffs’ van and searching it on August 5, 2006. All other causes of action

are being dismissed, along with the Defendants at issue in those causes of action. 

As to Plaintiff’s first cause of action, the court finds that the amended complaint

sufficiently alleges a conspiracy by Deputy Cunnings, Sergeant Hancock, Deputy Tallmon,

Deputy Adkins, Deputy Swanson and Defendant Madera County to violate Plaintiffs’ Fourth

Amendment rights. Plaintiffs have alleged facts that demonstrate these Defendants violated their

constitutional rights. The amended complaint alleges the existence of a conspiracy between

these Defendants. The amended complaint alleges that these Defendants took an act to further

their conspiracy by unlawfully searching Plaintiffs’ house and arresting Plaintiffs. Thus, a

conspiracy claim may proceed against these Defendants. 

All other conspiracy claims are subject to dismissal. The court finds that Plaintiffs’

blanket assertion that all Defendants were part of a greater conspiracy to deprive Plaintiffs of

their constitutional rights is an insufficient allegation. In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,

courts do not “assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of

factual allegations.” Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9 Cir. th

2003); Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9 Cir.1981). Rule 8's “liberal

th

pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). While accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient]

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127

S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007) (citations omitted). A plaintiff must set forth “the grounds of his

entitlement to relief[,]” which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action . . . .” Id. at 1964-65 (internal quotations and

citations omitted). As such, a bare allegation that all Defendants conspired to violate Plaintiffs'

constitutional rights will not suffice to give rise to a conspiracy claim under section 1983.

 Thus, Plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim alleging all named Defendants were part of a broader

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conspiracy must be dismissed.

I. Conspiracy - Section 1985

Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim that is based on title 42 U.S.C. §

1985. Section 1985 proscribes conspiracies to interfere with an individual’s civil rights. To

state a cause of action under Section 1985, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a conspiracy, (2) to deprive

any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, (3) an act by one of the

conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (4) a personal injury, property damage or

deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. Gillispie v. Civiletti, 629

F.2d 637, 641 (9 Cir. 1980); see also Giffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971). The th

plaintiff must also demonstrate a deprivation of a right motivated by “some racial, or perhaps

otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action.” RK

Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1056 (9 Cir. 2002); Sever v. Alaska Pulp

th

Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9 Cir. 1992). The “plaintiff must be a member of the class th

discriminated against.” RK Ventures, Inc., 307 F.3d at 1056.

The amended complaint alleges that Plaintiffs were discriminated against because of their

status as “radical, Montana Freeman type, constitutionalist(s).” Plaintiffs have not cited, and

this court has been unable, any authority finding radical constitutionalists to be a class given

special protection under the Constitution. Thus, any conspiracy claim under Section 1985 must

be dismissed.

J. Other Possible Constitutional Violations 

The amended complaint appears to state other potential constitutional violations. 

Defendants have moved to dismiss claims that appear to be based on various allegations in the

complaint. While these facts are not used to support one of the specific seven causes of action

discussed above, it is possible Plaintiffs are attempting to allege additional constitutional

violations. Thus, these allegations will be addressed.

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1. Approving Report

The complaint alleges that Lieutenant James Berardi approved a false and misleading

Sheriff’s report. The amended complaint fails to adequately link Lieutenant Berardi to any

constitutional violation. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some

affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo

v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9 Cir. 1980); Johnson v. th

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9 Cir. 1978). A person is adequately linked when he or she “does an th

affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he [or

she] is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson,

588 F.2d at 743. Here, the amended complaint does not allege that Lieutenant Berardi knew the

report was false when he approved it. In addition, the amended complaint does not state how

Lieutenant Berardi’s approving of the report caused a deprivation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional

rights. Plaintiffs have not cited to, and this court is unaware of, a free standing constitutional

right to have police reports be accurate. Thus, Lieutenant Bernardi is entitled to dismissal. 

2. Denial of Physical Injury Claim 

The amended complaint alleges that Judson Gross from the Risk Management Division

denied Plaintiff James’s physical injury claim to the county. Plaintiffs have not stated the

constitutional basis of this claim. Plaintiffs do not have a right protected by the Constitution to

have administrative claims they file against Madera County properly resolved. Thus, Judson

Gross is entitled to dismissal. 

3. Coerced Statements

The amended complaint alleges that some of the conditions Plaintiffs were subjected to

were a result of Defendants attempting to obtain unlawful statements from Plaintiffs. 

Defendants seek to dismiss any claims based on alleged coerced statements.

The Supreme Court in Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003), addressed the issue of

whether a civil rights plaintiff could proceed with a civil rights claim alleging a violation of the

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Fifth Amendment where the police had compelled statements from the plaintiff during

interrogation but those statements were never used by the police or prosecutors because the

plaintiff was never charged with a crime. The Supreme Court concluded that an officer could not

be subjected to civil liability for an alleged violation of the privilege against compelled

self-incrimination where the coerced statement was not used. Justice Thomas, joined by the

Chief Justice and two other Justices, reasoned that “mere coercion does not violate the text of the

Self-Incrimination Clause absent use of the compelled statements in a criminal case against the

witness.” Id. at 769 (Thomas, J.). While the privilege may be invoked in any proceeding, a

violation of the constitutional right “occurs only if one has been compelled to be a witness

against himself in a criminal case” or when a defendant is placed under oath and exposed to “the

cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt.” Id. at 767, 770 (Thomas, J.)(internal

quotes omitted). This same plurality also explained that although the Supreme Court has

“permitted the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination privilege to be asserted in noncriminal

cases, that does not alter our conclusion that a violation of the constitutional right against

self-incrimination occurs only if one has been compelled to be a witness against himself in a

criminal case.” Id. at 770 (Thomas, J.) (internal citations and quotations omitted). While

agreeing that the plaintiff was not entitled to pursue a damages claim for violation of his Fifth

Amendment rights, Justice Souter, joined by Justice Breyer, approached the issue before the

Supreme Court from a policy perspective and concluded that no civil rights claim was available

because the plaintiff could not “make the 'powerful showing, subject to a realistic assessment of

costs and risks, necessary to expand protection of the privilege against compelled

self-incrimination to the point of the civil liability he asks us to recognize here.” Id. at 778

(Souter, J., concurring in the judgment)

Here, at most, Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants attempted to coerce statements

from Plaintiffs. After Chavez, it is clear that the mere act of attempting to coerce a confession is

not a Fifth Amendment violation upon which a Section 1983 claim may be predicated. A

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plaintiff may not base a section 1983 claim on the mere fact that the police used coercive

questioning tactics when statements that allegedly violate the Self Incrimination Clause are not

used against him or her in a criminal proceeding. Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, Ill., 434 F.3d

1006, 1023-24 (7 Cir. 2006); McKinley v. City of Mansfield, 404 F.3d 418, 430 (6 Cir. 2005); th th

Renda v. King, 347 F.3d 550, 552 (3 Cir. 2003). Because the amended complaint alleges that rd

Plaintiffs did not make any statements, and as such, no statements have been used against them

in criminal proceedings, any claim based on alleged coercive statements must be dismissed.

4. Duplicative Substantive Due Process Claims

Defendants seek to dismiss substantive due process claims to the extent they seek relief

for alleged improper actions covered by another constitutional amendment. Substantive due

process cannot supply the basis for a civil rights claim if the challenged governmental conduct is

prohibited by another, more specific, constitutional right. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,

394-95 (1989). The Fourth Amendment adequately protects Plaintiffs from the allegations in the

first cause of action, which include allegations of an unlawful search of Plaintiff’s house and

Plaintiffs’ false arrest. The Fourth Amendment also adequately protections Plaintiffs from the

allegations in the fourth cause of action, which alleges Defendants violated the Fourth

Amendment by searching Plaintiffs’ van and impounding it on August 5, 2006. Thus, to the

extent the first caused of action and fourth cause of action are based on substantive due process,

these claims must be dismissed. These causes of action will proceed on the basis of the Fourth

Amendment.

K. RICO CAUSE OF ACTION

While not listed as a specific cause of action, the amended complaint’s language tracks

language used in RICO actions. Civil damages for RICO violations are provided by 18 U.S.C. §

1964(c). To state a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must allege “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3)

through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity (5) causing injury to plaintiffs’ ‘business or

property.’” Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 825 (9 Cir. 2001) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)). th

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The conclusory statements in the amended complaint fail to allege sufficient facts to meet these

elements.

To show an injury under RICO, the plaintiff must show a concrete financial loss and not

mere injury to a valuable intangible property interest. Oscar v. University Students Coop. Ass'n,

965 F.2d 783, 785 (9 Cir.1992). “Personal injuries are not compensable under RICO. Ove v. th

Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 825 (9 Cir. 2001). The amended complaint fails to allege concrete th

damages. The amended complaint concerns Plaintiffs’ damages arising from alleging Fourth

Amendment violations and alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement. While

compensation may be available based on the facts of the complaint in a civil rights action, such

personal injuries are not damages for which RICO is available. 

A RICO claim must also allege an enterprise. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) defines an

enterprise as “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any

union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” According to the

Supreme Court, “establishing the existence of an associated-in-fact enterprise requires proof (1)

of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and (2) that the various associates function as a

continuing unit.” Chang v. Chen, 80 F.3d 1293, 1297 (9 Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. th

Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981)). The enterprise element requires the organization, formal or

informal, to be an entity separate and apart from the pattern of racketeering activity in which it

engages. Chang, 80 F.3d at 1298. The complaint does not provide any details on a decision

making structure for controlling and directing the affairs of the RICO enterprise on an on-going

basis. The amended complaint’s conclusory allegations regarding the presence of an enterprise

are insufficient. The amended complaint’s RICO allegations do not go beyond those necessary

to commit the predicate acts of racketeering. Thus, no RICO claim is available. 

L. New Defendants

In the amended complaint, Plaintiffs have added several new defendants, including Reta

Norton, Melisssa Norton, A. Hernandez, Ed Gill, M. Todd Spangler, Karen Mitchell, John K.

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 Plaintiffs are forewarned that any future amendments may only be made with leave of 4

court.

 For reasons discussed above, the New Defendants are subject to dismissal for other 5

reasons.

28

Johnson, Dennis Orander, Elizabeth Eninman, Cindy Suarez, Michael Hansen, and Nick Cha

(“New Defendants”). Defendants contend that New Defendants must be dismissed because

Plaintiffs did not have leave of court to add any additional defendants. Defendants argue that

because Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ original complaint, no amendments

could be made without leave or court or consent of the adverse party.

While not cited by Defendants, it appears they base their argument on Rule 15(a) of the

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. Rule 15(a) provides that a “party may amend the party's

pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served. . . .

Otherwise a party may amend only by leave of court. . . .” Defendants’ position is that their

motion to dismiss the original complaint was a responsive pleading and, as such, Plaintiffs were

not free to amend the complaint under Rule 15(a). Defendants are incorrect. A motion to

dismiss for failure to state claim is not a “responsive pleading” that would terminate a plaintiff’s

right to amend the complaint. Saaf v. Lehman Brothers, 123 F.3d 1307, 1308 (9 Cir. 1997); th

Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9 Cir. 1995); Schreiber Distrib. v. Serv-Well Furniture th

Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9 Cir.1986); Breier v. Northern California Bowling Proprietors' th

Ass'n, 316 F.2d 787, 789 (9 Cir.1963). “Neither the filing nor granting of such a motion before th

answer terminates the right to amend . . . .” Doe, 58 F.3d at 497. Because Defendants did not

file a responsive pleading, but only a motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs did not need leave of court to

amend their complaint once as a matter of course. See Allwaste, Inc. v. Hecht, 65 F.3d 1523,

1530 (9 Cir. 1995); Doe, 58 F.3d at 497. Because Plaintiffs could still amend once as a matter th

of course, Plaintiffs’ addition of New Defendants in the amended complaint was proper. Thus,

4

New Defendants will not be dismissed at this time merely because they were added for the first

time into the amended complaint. 

5

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M. Duplicative Defendants

The amended complaint names the Madera County Sheriff’s Department, Madera County

District Attorney’s Office, Madera County Department of Corrections, Madera County Adult

Probation Department, Madera County Department of Social Services, Madera County Child

Protective Services, and County of Madera Risk Management Division. Defendants request

these entities be dismissed because they are sub-divisions of Defendant Madera County, and as

such, are redundant defendants. 

A claim for civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a “person” who

acted under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Local governmental units, such as counties or

municipalities, are considered “persons” within the meaning of Section 1983. Will v. Michigan

Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989); Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91 & n. 54 (1978);

County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1171 (1998). However,

municipal departments and sub-units, including police departments, are generally not considered

“persons” within the meaning of Section 1983. United States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236, 1239

(9 Cir. 2005) (Ferguson, J., concurring) (findings municipal police departments and bureaus are th

generally not considered “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Vance v. County of

Santa Clara, 928 F.Supp. 993, 995-96 (N.D.Cal.1996) (holding that “naming a municipal

department as a defendant is not an appropriate means of pleading a § 1983 action against a

municipality,” and dismissing the Santa Clara Department of Corrections from the action); 

Brockmeier v. Solano County Sheriff's Dept., 2006 WL 3760276, *4 (E.D.Cal. 2006) (finding

that sheriff’s department is a municipal department and not a proper defendant for purposes of

plaintiff's § 1983 claims). Finding that these entities appeared to be sub-divisions of Defendant

Madera County, the court dismissed the entity Defendants as follows:

It appears that these Defendants are sub-divisions and departments within

Defendant Madera County. As such, naming these sub-divisions and departments

is not necessary. They should not be listed as Defendants in any amended

complaint unless Plaintiffs have a good faith belief that these entities are not subdivisions and departments within Defendant Madera County. See Fed.R.Civ.Pro.

11.

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The amended complaint does not cure the defect previously noted by the court. Plaintiffs have

failed to include any allegations that Madera County Sheriff’s Department, Madera County

District Attorney’s Office, Madera County Department of Corrections, Madera County Adult

Probation Department, Madera County Department of Social Services, Madera County Child

Protective Services, and County of Madera Risk Management Division are not sub-divisions of

Defendant Madera County and redundant defendants. Accordingly, the court will dismiss these

Defendants without leave to amend, but Plaintiffs may continue to litigate their claims against the

sub-divisions as part of Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Madera County. 

N. Leave to Amend

The court recognizes that “leave to amend should be granted unless the district court

determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.”

Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9 Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); th

Chang v. Chen, 80 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9 Cir. (9 Cir. 1996). The court has already informed th th

Plaintiffs about the deficiencies noted in this order. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9 Cir. th

2000) (if court determines that complaint fails to state claim, leave to amend may be granted to

extent that complaint’s deficiencies can be cured); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F. 2d 1446, 1448 (9th

Cir. 1987). Neither the amended complaint nor Plaintiffs’ motion and briefs filed after the

pending motion to dismiss cure the deficiencies noted above. Plaintiffs have not asked to file an

amended complaint that corrects any deficiencies. The court finds that, at this time, Plaintiffs are

unable or unwilling to amend their action to properly allege the constitional claims and RICO

claims being dismissed by this order. Thus, these claims and Defendants will be dismissed

without leave to amend at this time. However, this ruling is without prejudice to Plaintiffs filing

a properly noticed motion to amend in which they include sufficient allegations to state a claim.

ORDER

Based on the above memorandum opinion, the court ORDERS that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part;

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2. This action will proceed on the following causes of action:

a. The first cause of action, alleging that Defendants County of

Madera, Deputy Brian Dee Cunnings, Sergeant Karl E. Hancock,

Deputy Tallmon, Deputy J. Adkins, and Deputy Swanson violated

Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights and conspired to violate

Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights;

b. The third cause of action to the extent Plaintiff Wanda alleges that

Defendant Sergeant Ackerman and two Doe Nurses caused a

serious risk to Plaintiff Wanda’s health by refusing to allow her to

use a breast pump;

c. The fourth cause of action alleging that Defendant Doc’s Towing

and Transport, Defendant Clifton Ginn, Defendant Madera County,

Defendant Deputy Jacob Tallmon, and Defendant Deputy J.

Adkins violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights by stopping

Plaintiffs’ van, searching Plaintiffs’ van, and impounding the van.

2. All other causes of action, claims, and defendants are DISMISSED from

this action;

3. Defendants shall file an answer to the remaining causes of action within

twenty days of this order’s date of service; and

4. The pending motion to amend the complaint is referred to the Magistrate

Judge.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 21, 2007 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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