Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01146/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01146-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 28:1343 Violation of Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHANTE C. PAPPION,

Plaintiff,

v.

R-RANCH PROPERTY OWNERS

ASSOCIATION, a California Non-Profit

Corporation; HAL GLOVER; MARK

GRENBEMER; JOHN CROSBY; RON 

BUCHER; MARK PERRY; MICHAEL 

HORNE; RICKWEVER; and Does 1 - 10,

Defendants.

No. 2:13-cv-01146-TLN-CMK

ORDER

This matter is before this Court pursuant to Chante Pappion’s (“Plaintiff”) Ex 

Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 16). Defendant R-Ranch Property 

Owners Association (“R-Ranch”), on behalf of itself and each of the Defendants opposes 

Plaintiff’s motion. (ECF No. 18.) The Court has carefully considered the arguments raised by 

both parties and for the reasons set forth below denies Plaintiff’s motion.

R-Ranch is a family oriented recreational property. Plaintiff alleges that she has a 

deed to 1/2500 share of the property and is entitled to use and enjoy the property and its 

amenities. (Compl., ECF No. 2 at ¶ 4.) On June 7, 2013, Plaintiff filed a complaint against 

Defendants alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Unruh Civil Rights Act, 

Case 2:13-cv-01146-TLN-CMK Document 22 Filed 11/15/13 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

and California Disabled Persons Act (collectively referred to as “Disability Claims”). (ECF No. 

2.) Plaintiff is currently residing in her Recreational Vehicle (“RV”) within the property. (ECF 

No. 16-1 at 2.) On November 8, 2013, Defendants denied Plaintiff electricity access for her RV 

while at the subject property. (ECF No. 16-1 at 2.) On November 13, 2013, Plaintiff filed an ex 

parte motion for temporary restraining order alleging that Defendants deprived her of electricity 

to retaliate against her for filing claims against them. She further alleges that she pays an annual 

assessment of $675 for continued use and enjoyment of the property, which entitles her to 30 days 

of complementary electricity use per year. Plaintiff asks this Court to enjoin Defendants from 

depriving her of electricity access. (ECF No. 16-1 at 3.) Defendants counter that Plaintiff was

denied electricity access because her membership was suspended for failure to pay fines assessed 

prior to the initiation of this suit. (ECF No. 18.) Additionally, Defendants contend that Plaintiff

cannot meet the standards required to obtain a temporary restraining order. (ECF No. 18.) 

The general standard for granting injunctive relief requires balancing a plaintiff’s 

likelihood of success on the merits against the relative hardships to the parties. Benda v. Grand 

Lodge Int’l Assoc. Machinest, 584 F.2d 308, 314–15 (9th Cir. 1978). This balancing is a 

continuum, wherein the required showing of irreparable harm varies inversely with the 

probability of success. Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers, 408 F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The Supreme Court clarified the proper standard for granting or denying a preliminary injunction 

stating that “[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to 

succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary 

relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” 

Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (listing factors for preliminary 

injunction); see also Lockheed Missile & Space Co., Inc. v. Hughes 6 Aircraft Co., 887 F. Supp. 

1320, 1323 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is identical 

to the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction.”). 

“A court issues a preliminary injunction in a lawsuit to preserve the status quo and 

prevent irreparable harm until the court has an opportunity to rule on the lawsuit’s merits.” 

Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Dataphase Sys., Inc., v. C L Sys., 

Case 2:13-cv-01146-TLN-CMK Document 22 Filed 11/15/13 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 & n. 5 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc)). Thus, a party moving for a preliminary 

injunction must necessarily establish a nexus between the character of the injury claimed in the 

party’s motion for injunctive relief and the conduct asserted in the complaint. Id.; see also Ashker 

v. Brown, No. C 09-5796 CW, 2013 WL 1701702, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2013); see also 

Tatum v. Puget, No. C 10-0418 LHK (PR), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71576, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 

1, 2011); Penn v. San Juan Hosp., Inc., 528 F.2d 1181, 1185 (10th Cir. 1975). 

In the instant case, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief concerning a matter that is of a 

different character than the claims raised in her complaint. Thus, if the Court were to grant 

Plaintiff’s motion it would in effect be providing relief beyond that which Plaintiff would be 

entitled to should she prevail in her lawsuit. This approach is disfavored. See Ashker, 2013 WL 

1701702, at *2–3; see also Tatum, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71576, at *3 (“[A] preliminary 

injunction may be granted only when the ‘intermediate relief [is] of the same character as that 

which may be granted finally.’ “) (quoting De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 

212, 220 (1945)). Thus, because Plaintiff’s request for interim relief as stated in her motion is 

unrelated to Plaintiff’s pending Disability Claims, it would be inappropriate for this Court to grant 

the relief sought. See Stewart v. United States I.N.S., 762 F.2d 193, 198–99 (2d Cir. 1985) 

(holding that new assertions cannot provide the basis for a preliminary injunction); Omega World 

Travel v. TWA, 111 F.3d 14, 16 (4th Cir. 1997) (“The purpose of interim equitable relief is to 

protect the movant, during the pendency of the action, from being harmed or further harmed in 

the manner in which the movant contends it was or will be harmed through the illegality alleged 

in the complaint.”); Devose, 42 F.3d at 471 (“a party moving for a preliminary injunction must 

necessarily establish a relationship between the injury claimed in the party’s motion and the 

conduct asserted in the complaint”); Kaimowitz v. Orlando, Fl., 122 F.3d 41, 43 (11th Cir. 1997) 

(“A district court should not issue an injunction when the injunction in question is not of the same 

character, and deals with a matter lying wholly outside the issues in the suit.”). As such, 

Plaintiff’s ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 16) is DENIED. 

Case 2:13-cv-01146-TLN-CMK Document 22 Filed 11/15/13 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 15, 2013

Case 2:13-cv-01146-TLN-CMK Document 22 Filed 11/15/13 Page 4 of 4