Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00530/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00530-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

REED A. BRADFORD, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 06-0530 PHX NVW (MEA)

)

DORA B. SCHRIRO and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, ) 

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_________________________________)

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE:

On February 21, 2006, Petitioner filed a pro se

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 2254. Respondents filed an answer to the petition (“Answer”)

on April 17, 2006. Docket No. 8. Respondents assert the action

for habeas relief must be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

I Procedural History

On August 23, 2002, Petitioner was sentenced in two

separate criminal cases to two concurrent 3-year terms of

probation pursuant to his conviction on a charge of theft of a

credit card obtained through fraudulent means, and solicitation

to commit forgery. See Answer, Exh. A.

Petitioner committed several felonies while on

probation. On October 2, 2003, pursuant to a plea agreement,

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Petitioner pled guilty to one count of burglary, two counts of

theft of a credit card, and one count of theft involving more

than $1,000, in a case docketed as CR 2003-033072. Id., Exh. A.

Petitioner also pled guilty at that time to two counts of

forgery, involving cashing a check on another individual’s

account and purchasing gift cards using another individual’s

credit card, in case CR 2003-038572. Id., Exh. A. Lastly,

Petitioner pled guilty to identity theft, i.e., possessing a

driver’s license with his picture and another individual’s

biographical information, in case CR 2003-033627. Id., Exh. A.

At the change of his plea hearing regarding the

aforementioned 2003 charges, Petitioner admitted he had

committed each of these offenses while he had one historical

felony conviction, and also admitted he had previously been

convicted of theft of a credit card in 2002. Id., Exh. B. The

plea agreement provided the trial court could impose either

concurrent or consecutive prison sentences in Petitioner’s 2003

cases, and also provided the sentence for each conviction would

be no less than 4.5 years and no more than 10 years for the most

serious offenses. Id., Exh. B.

At a hearing conducted November 17, 2003, the Arizona

trial court found Petitioner had violated the terms of the

probation imposed as a sentence for his 2002 convictions by

committing the 2003 crimes. Id., Exh. C. The trial court

revoked Petitioner’s probation and sentenced Petitioner to one

and two years of imprisonment on each of the 2002 charges, the

terms to be served concurrently to one another and consecutively

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to the sentences imposed for the 2003 convictions. Id., Exh. C.

At that time the trial court also imposed sentence for the seven

2003 convictions; the trial court imposed aggravated prison

terms on each of the seven convictions. Id., Exh. C. The trial

court imposed aggravated sentences citing “the number of

opportunities that [Petitioner had] been given on probation and

the number of offenses that have been committed and the

repetitive nature of them.” Id., Exh. C at 23. Petitioner

received, in total, a sentence of ten years imprisonment. Id.,

Exh. C at 26-27.

Petitioner did not take a direct appeal of his

convictions and sentences. On January 5, 2004, Petitioner filed

an action for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32,

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. A. Petitioner

was appointed counsel; on June 30, 2004, counsel represented to

the court that he could find no colorable claim to raise on

Petitioner’s behalf. Id., Exh. A. On August 23, 2004,

Petitioner filed a pro per petition for post-conviction relief

regarding his convictions in CR 2003-033072, CR 2003-038572, and

CR 2003-033627. Id., Exh. A. Petitioner asserted his sentences

violated his constitutional rights because the sentences were

aggravated based on facts found by a judge, rather than a jury

beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., Exh. A.

On February 8, 2005, the Arizona Superior Court denied

the petition for post-conviction relief. Id., Exh. D. On April

13, 2005, Petitioner’s appointed post-conviction counsel sought

review of this decision by the Arizona Court of Appeals. Id.,

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Exh. E. Petitioner argued to the Arizona Court of Appeals only

that his sentence violated the doctrine stated by the United

States Supreme Court in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124

S. Ct. 2531 (2002). Id., Exh. E. In response, the government

argued Petitioner’s rights pursuant to the Blakely doctrine were

not violated because Petitioner had admitted the facts upon

which the trial court had based its decision to impose

aggravated sentences. Id., Exh. F. The Arizona Court of

Appeals denied review in a decision filed December 29, 2005.

Id., Exh. G. 

Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition on

February 16, 2006. Petitioner asserts he is entitled to habeas

relief because he was sentenced in violation of the doctrine

stated in Blakely. Respondents contend Blakely may not be

applied to provide relief to Petitioner, whose conviction was

final prior to the decision in Blakely, and that Petitioner’s

Blakely claim may be denied on the merits.

D. Petitioner’s claims for relief

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law, or one involving an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or

unless the state court decision was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 &

Supp. 2005). 

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A state court’s decision is “contrary to” our

clearly established law if it applies a rule

that contradicts the governing law set forth

in our cases or if it confronts a set of

facts that are materially indistinguishable

from a decision of this Court and

nevertheless arrives at a result different

from our precedent. 

Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 14, 124 S. Ct. 7, 10 (2003)

(internal citations and quotations omitted). 

The United States Supreme Court announced a new

constitutional rule regarding criminal procedure in Blakely v.

Washington on June 24, 2004. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

has conclusively held the Supreme Court’s Blakely decision does

not apply retroactively to a state criminal conviction which was

final before June 24, 2004. See Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d

1025, 1038 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Because Petitioner pled guilty, pursuant to Arizona

law, he had no right to a direct appeal and his conviction

became “final” on the date judgment was entered and he was

sentenced by the state trial court, i.e., November 17, 2003.

See Montgomery v. Sheldon, 181 Ariz. 256, 258 (1995); Isley v.

Arizona Dep’t of Corr., 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004).

Cf. Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 390, 114 S. Ct. 948, 953

(1994) (noting “[a] state conviction and sentence become final

... when the availability of direct appeal to the state courts

has been exhausted and the time for filing a petition for a writ

of certiorari has elapsed or a timely filed petition has been

finally denied”); Hernandez-Almanza v. United States Dep’t of

Justice, INS, 547 F.2d 100, 103 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding, for

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purposes of immigration proceeding, that a criminal conviction

was final when the defendant entered a guilty plea and waived

direct appeal); Arizona v. Superior Court, 138 Ariz. 4, 6 (Ct.

App. 1983) (holding that conviction pursuant to a guilty plea is

final ten days after the entry of the guilty plea). 

Petitioner was sentenced and judgment entered on

November 17, 2003. His conviction became final, arguably, that

day or ten days later. Therefore, Petitioner’s conviction

became final prior to the date the United States Supreme Court

issued the Blakely decision in June of 2004, and that decision

does not provide a basis for federal habeas relief from

Petitioner’s sentence. The Arizona courts did not err in

concluding that Blakely did not provide a basis for relief from

the imposed sentences. 

Respondents also argue that Petitioner is not entitled

to relief on the merits of his claim. The Court agrees with

this contention. The federal courts have held, in the context

of section 2255 proceedings, that judicial findings regarding

the timing and number of a defendant’s convictions for purposes

of imposing sentence do not violate the Sixth Amendment. See,

e.g., United States v. Barrero, 425 F.3d 154, 157-58 (2d Cir.

2005); United States v. Carrillo Beltran, 424 F.3d 845, 848 (8th

Cir. 2005). Therefore, Petitioner’s sentence does not violate

the Blakely doctrine because a judge could properly assess the

timing and number of Plaintiff’s convictions for the purpose of

determining his sentences.

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III Conclusion

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law. Because Petitioner

pled guilty, pursuant to Arizona law, he had no right to a

direct appeal and his conviction became final on November 17,

2003. Because Petitioner’s conviction became final prior to the

date that the United States Supreme Court issued the Blakely

decision in June of 2004, that decision does not provide a basis

for federal habeas relief from Petitioner’s sentence. The

Arizona courts did not err in concluding that Blakely, which was

decided after Petitioner’s convictions became final, did not

provide a basis for relief from the imposed sentences.

Additionally, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on the merits

of his claim that his sentences violate the doctrine stated in

Blakely.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Bradford’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

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Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 23rd day of May, 2006.

 

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