Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-07103/USCOURTS-caDC-97-07103-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

---

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Filed November 18, 1997

No. 97-7103

BRUCE F. WOOTEN,

APPELLANT

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA METROPOLITAN 

POLICE DEPARTMENT, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(97cv00831)

Bruce F. Wooten, pro se, was on the motion to proceed in 

forma pauperis.

Before: WALD, SILBERMAN, and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

USCA Case #97-7103 Document #309683 Filed: 11/18/1997 Page 1 of 4
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: Bruce Wooten, a frequent filer, 

is a prisoner appearing pro se. A district court order barred 

him from filing another civil action unless he sought the 

district court's leave, and unless he certified "that any such 

complaint raises new matters never before decided on the 

merits by any federal court." Wooten tried to file a new 

complaint without complying with the order. The district 

court denied him leave. After Wooten filed a notice of appeal 

from the denial, the district court certified that his appeal was 

not taken in good faith. See FED. R. APP. P. 24(a). The Clerk 

of the court of appeals issued an order giving Wooten three 

choices: pay the $105 docketing fee; file a motion to proceed 

in forma pauperis, with a signed form consenting to collection of the fee from Wooten's prison trust account, pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Reform 

Litigation Act; or suffer dismissal of his appeal for lack of 

prosecution. Wooten chose option two, filed his motion with 

this court, sent in his consent form and requested the appointment of counsel.

This sequence of events, though hardly uncommon, raises 

several issues of first impression in our court concerning 

amended § 1915. The first issue deals with § 1915(a)(3)

"An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial 

court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith." 

Does this provision, a half-century old and unchanged by the 

Prison Reform Litigation Act of 1995, still apply to prisonerlitigants like Wooten? The Sixth Circuit holds that it does 

not, in light of § 1915(b)(1): "Notwithstanding subsection (a), 

if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma 

pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to pay the full 

amount of a filing fee." See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 

F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997); Floyd v. United States Postal 

Service, 105 F.3d 274 (6th Cir. 1997). Section 1915(b)(1), 

according to the Sixth Circuit, renders all of § 1915(a) inapplicable to prisoners appealing in forma pauperis. We join 

the Fifth Circuit, see Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197 (1997), 

and the Seventh, see Newlin v. Helman, 123 F.3d 429, 432 

(1997), in rejecting this conclusion. The notwithstanding 

clause of § 1915(b)(1) "addresses a particular element of 

subsection (a), concerning the collection of the filing fee, and 

USCA Case #97-7103 Document #309683 Filed: 11/18/1997 Page 2 of 4
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

provides that prisoners (unlike other plaintiffs) always must 

pay in full, although other parts of subsection (b) permit 

much of the payment to be deferred." Newlin, 123 F.3d at 

432. As to prisoners, then, the PLRA changes the meaning 

of in forma pauperis. Lack of financial resources no longer 

excuses them from paying the full filing fee for an appeal. 

The designation of in forma pauperis entitles prisoners to 

satisfy the $105 charge on an installment plan. The purpose 

of § 1915(b) is to deter frivolous litigation brought by prisoners in forma pauperis. See In re Smith, 114 F.3d 1247, 1249 

(D.C. Cir. 1997). The purpose of § 1915(a)(3) is not simply to 

deter, but to preclude prisoners (and nonprisoners) from 

taking appeals in forma pauperis when they attempt to do so 

in bad faith.

Since § 1915(a)(3) continues to apply, and since the district 

court certified that Wooten's appeal was not taken in good 

faith, Wooten must pay the full filing fee to save his appeal 

from dismissal, unless the certification is set aside. The 

"unless" qualification is necessary in light of FED. R. APP. P. 

24(a), paragraph 3 of which provides litigants in Wooten's 

position a means to challenge the district court's finding of 

lack of good faith. Under Rule 24(a), if a district court denies 

a litigant leave to appeal in forma pauperis, the litigant may 

file a motion in the court of appeals to proceed in that status 

within 30 days after service of notice of the district court's 

action.

This raises the next question: should our decision on a 

Rule 24(a) motion precede assessment and collection of the 

filing fee? Again, we agree with the Fifth and Seventh 

Circuits that it should. See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 200-01; 

Newlin, 123 F.3d at 433. Logic dictates as much. The terms 

of payment will depend upon how the Rule 24(a) motion is 

decided. Here Wooten noted his appeal on June 19, 1997; 

the order certifying his appeal as not in good faith was 

entered on June 30; and Wooten filed his Rule 24(a) motion 

on July 29. Whether Wooten would wish to pursue his 

appeal if we refused to allow him to proceed in forma 

pauperis, in other words if we sustained the district court's 

certification, remains to be seen. In the event we did so rule, 

USCA Case #97-7103 Document #309683 Filed: 11/18/1997 Page 3 of 4
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

the $105 would be due and payable immediately; Wooten's 

failure to pay would result in the dismissal of his appeal. On 

the other hand, if we disagreed with the district court and 

found the appeal in good faith, Wooten could proceed in 

forma pauperis by paying the initial assessment and having 

his prison account docked for the balance (§ 1915(b)).

We therefore proceed to Wooten's Rule 24(a) motion. "In 

the absence of some evident improper motive, the applicant's 

good faith is established by the presentation of any issue that 

is not plainly frivolous." Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 

(1978); see Sills v. Bureau of Prisons, 761 F.2d 792, 795 (D.C. 

Cir. 1985); but see Newlin, 123 F.3d at 433. Here, Wooten's 

repeated filing of the same complaint led to the district 

court's order barring him from filing any new complaints 

unless he satisfied conditions. Wooten never challenged the 

injunctive order on appeal nor has he moved to have it 

modified. He thus had a duty to comply with the order. See 

Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). Because 

Wooten disobeyed the injunction, the district court correctly 

determined that his appeal from the order refusing to allow 

his complaint to be filed was not taken in good faith.

Accordingly, Wooten may not proceed on appeal in forma 

pauperis. He therefore cannot defer payment of the filing 

fee pursuant to § 1915(b). If he is foolish enough to pay $105 

to have us say essentially what we have already said about his 

case, his appeal may proceed. But if he fails to pay this 

amount within 14 days of receipt of our opinion and order, his 

appeal shall be dismissed. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(e).

So ordered.

USCA Case #97-7103 Document #309683 Filed: 11/18/1997 Page 4 of 4