Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_03-cv-02201/USCOURTS-azd-3_03-cv-02201-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Donald Hugh Cook, et ux., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) CIV 03-2201 PCT VAM

)

Mayer Unified School District ) O R D E R

No. 43 Governing Board, et al., )

)

 Defendants. )

This case was removed from the Yavapai County Superior Court

on November 10, 2003. (Doc. 1). The parties consented to proceed

before a Magistrate Judge. (Docs. 3, 5, 14, 15). Defendants

filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 2) and plaintiffs filed a Motion

to Amend (Doc. 7). The Court denied the Motion to Dismiss and

granted the Motion to Amend. (Doc. 19). The parties are

proceeding on the Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 20). Now

pending before the Court is defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment. (Docs. 55, 56). The Motion for Summary Judgment was

opposed by plaintiffs on September 29, 2005. (Docs. 61, 62). 

Defendants' reply was filed on November 4, 2005. (Doc. 66). The

Motion was argued to the Court on December 6, 2005. 

A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant shows "there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), 

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F.R.Civ.P.; California Architectural Building Products, Inc. v.

Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987),

cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988). "Summary judgment will not

lie if the dispute about a material fact is 'genuine,' that is, if

the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of

demonstrating that there is no material fact precluding summary

judgment. Adickes v. S.H. Cress and Company, 398 U.S. 144, 157

(1970). 

Substantive law determines which facts are material. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248; Jesinger v. Nevada

Federal Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994). "Only

disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit

under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of

summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 

Summary judgment is appropriate against a party who "fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear

the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also Citadel Holding Corporation v.

Roven, 26 F.2d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Furthermore, the party opposing summary judgment "may not

rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the [party's]

pleadings, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial." Rule 56(e), F.R.Civ.P.;

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

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Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 585-88 (1986); Brinson v. Lind Rose Joint

Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995). There is no genuine

issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the

non-moving party. If the evidence is merely colorable or if not

significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. However, "the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be

drawn in his favor." Id. at 255.

B. SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

The Second Amended Complaint contains 14 causes of action. 

The 14th claim has been withdrawn by plaintiffs. Many of the

allegations and causes of action in the Second Amended Complaint

are the same or very similar as those in the First Amended

Complaint which were the subject of the Court's Order filed 

March 18, 2004. (Doc. 19). This lawsuit arises out of an

employment relationship that existed between plaintiff, Donald

Cook, as the principal of the elementary school of the Mayer

Unified School District No. 43 (MUSD), and James Nelson, the

district superintendent of schools, and other named defendants as

board members of the school board. Basically, plaintiffs allege

that defendants illegally retaliated against him after he filed a

report accusing defendant Nelson of sexually harassing a female

employee of the school system. Plaintiffs allege that defendant

Nelson retaliated in various ways, which include, engaging in

unfounded criticism of plaintiff's job performance, unwarranted

negative job reviews which resulted in low salary increases and

unfounded reports of misconduct. Plaintiffs also allege that all

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defendants joined in some form of retaliation. The retaliation

culminated in a failure to renew his contract beyond June 30,

2004. 

In the Second Amended Complaint, plaintiffs are pursuing 13 

specific claims against defendants Nelson, Mayer Unified School

District No. 43 Governing Board and board members Don Davenport,

Sandy Roberts, Kathryn Want, Lamont Hunsinger, Jesse Bais and

Carol Ernst. Because plaintiff, Donald Cook, alleges he was

acting on behalf of the community in his job and because he

alleges that James Nelson was acting on behalf of the community in

his actions, plaintiff's wife, Barbara Cook, is named as a

plaintiff and James Nelson's wife, Candice Nelson, is named as a

defendant. The specific claims are as follows:

1. Violation of Title VII (retaliation for filing a

complaint of sexual harassment on behalf of a co-worker).

2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (violation of the Equal Protection

Clause of the U.S. Constitution as applied to the retaliation

prohibitions of Title VII).

3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (due process property interest

violation).

4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (due process liberty interest

violation).

5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (violation of First Amendment).

6. Arizona Civil Rights Act, A.R.S. § 41-1464.

7. Intentional infliction of emotional distress.

8. Negligent infliction of emotional distress.

9. Intentional interference with employment relationship.

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 10. Breach of contract.

 11. Breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing.

 12. Wrongful discharge under A.R.S. § 23-1501.

 13. Slander per se.

Plaintiffs seek equitable relief under Title VII, damages for

lost wages, emotional distress, pain and suffering, medical

expenses, loss of reputation, punitive damages, interest on the

judgment and attorneys' fees and costs. (Doc. 20). 

C. DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

First, defendants argue that all claims arising from

"separation of employment fail as a matter of law." 

1. Plaintiff's allegation that the Board terminated his

employment in April, 2003 has already been ruled on by the Court. 

In ruling on the Motion to Dismiss, the Court found that by

operation of law the Board could not consider renewal of

plaintiff's contract until May, 2003. Therefore, any claim based

exclusively on the allegations set forth in Paragraph 34 are

barred as a matter of law. (Doc. 19 at pp. 11-12). Since the

Board could not consider renewal of the contract until May, 2003,

they did not "terminate" him in April, 2003. A.R.S. § 15-503(B). 

In addition, defendants are correct that the statute requires

specific action to renew a contract and this action occurred 

April 8, 2004. (Doc. 62 par. 86; Doc. 56 Ex. D at p. 6).

2. Plaintiff's cause of action for non-renewal under Title

VII and ACRA.

Plaintiffs conceded at the hearing on this Motion for Summary

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Judgment that plaintiffs may not pursue a claim regarding nonrenewal of the contract under Title VII and ACRA because

plaintiffs did not file the required administrative claim.

3. Defendants argue that plaintiff did not have a property

right in renewal of his contract.

The Court allowed plaintiffs to amend and allege "mutually

explicit understandings" of continued employment. (Doc. 19 at pp.

12-13). The Court said that plaintiffs would have to prove (1)

"mutually explicit understandings" to continued employment and (2)

his employment was not continued for improper reasons. Id.

Defendants now argue that it is clear there were no mutually

explicit understandings of continued employment. Defendants cite

to their statement of facts paragraphs 22-24. Plaintiffs argue

there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there were

"mutually explicit understandings" of continued employment. 

Plaintiffs cite to their statement of facts at paragraphs 88-90. 

In plaintiffs' statement of facts paragraphs 88-90, they cite to a

former superintendent of schools understanding of how the renewal

of contract process worked when he was there. This does not raise

a genuine issue of material fact as to "mutually explicit

understandings" between the Board and plaintiff Donald Cook. 

Plaintiffs also cite to Donald Cook's own affidavit which is

conclusory. It simply says "I knew there was a mutually explicit

understanding. . ." of continued employment. (Doc. 62, Ex. 33 at

par. 3). Plaintiffs also argue that because certain Board members

cited reasons for not renewing the contract, this shows there was

a "mutually explicit understanding" that the contract would be

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renewed absent a failure to perform properly. However, just

because some board members had a reason for voting to not renew

does not mean they needed a reason for their actions. 

The Court has read through the deposition excerpts of the

Board members who were cited in the statement of facts. The

statement of facts shows that some Board members had a reason for

not renewing plaintiff's contract. One Board member said it was

just "a business decision" and could not give an explicit reason. 

All Board members have not been heard from. The term "mutually

explicit understanding" has a very specific meaning. Mutual means

that all parties to the issue are involved in the understanding

(i.e. all Board members). Explicit means "fully revealed or

expressed without vagueness, implication or ambiguity; leaving no

question as to meaning or intent. . .fully developed or

formulated. . .unambiguous in expression. . ." Webster's Ninth

New Collegiate Dictionary. Whether we cite to a dictionary or use

our own common understanding, "explicit" means clear and

unambiguous. Understanding means to grasp the meaning of or

comprehend. Id. When the case law refers to "mutual explicit

understanding," it is clear to the Court that there cannot be any

ambiguity or lack of consensus on the part of any parties to the

understanding. It is clear to the Court from reading the

deposition excerpts that, while plaintiff may have believed that

his contract would be automatically renewed absent misconduct or

job performance problems, that has not been shown for the Board

members. Plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue of material

fact by citing to a former superintendent, plaintiff himself or

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the depositions of the Board members.

There is no genuine issue of material fact and defendants are

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff's third claim

alleging a property right to contract renewal.

4. Defendants argue they did not deprive plaintiff of a

constitutionally protected liberty interest.

Defendants move for summary judgment stating that any

defamatory statement must have been uttered in the actual course

of termination of employment. (Doc. 55 at p. 7). Plaintiffs cite

Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991) and Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.

693 (1975). In Paul v. Davis, a photograph of the plaintiff

bearing his name was included in a flyer regarding shoplifters. 

Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming this violated a

"liberty interest." The Court found otherwise citing Board of

Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). The Supreme Court found

that: 

While Roth recognized that governmental action defaming

an individual in the course of declining to rehire him

could entitle the person to notice and an opportunity to

be heard as to the defamation, its language is quite

inconsistent with any notion that a defamation

perpetrated by a government official but unconnected

with any refusal to rehire would be actionable under the

Fourteenth Amendment. . .

Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 709. In Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. at

233-34, the Court found that plaintiff's lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 did not support a constitutional tort (i.e. deprivation of

a liberty interest) based on derogatory statements made by a

former employer because the statements were not "incident to"

termination of employment. Defendants read these two cases to

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mean that the defamatory statements have to have occurred at the

moment that the party was fired or, in this case, the Board

declined to renew the contract. The Court does not read these

cases so narrowly. The Court finds there is a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether or not defamatory statements violating

plaintiff's "liberty interest" in a good reputation occurred in

the course of declining to renew his contract. Board of Regents

v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the fourth claim

is denied.

5. Defendants next argue they are entitled to summary

judgment on plaintiffs' contract-based claims arising from his

non-renewal.

The Court notes that this argument is directed solely at

claims of non-renewal. In Counts 9, 10 and 11, plaintiff alleges

that defendants intentionally interfered with his employment

relationship, breached his employment contract and breached an

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Doc. 20 at pp.

14-15). All of these claims are based on allegations that

defendants acted in retaliation for plaintiff's reporting a claim

of sexual harassment. 

All allegations contained in the Second Amended Complaint

refer to actions of the defendants which occurred during his

contract of employment. Plaintiff contends the failure to renew

his contract was an act of retaliation in violation of Title VII. 

Defendants cite Nelson v. Pima Community College, 83 F.3d

1075, 1083 (9th Cir. 1996) for the proposition that when plaintiff

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is employed through the end of the term of his or her contract,

the employer is entitled to summary judgment on contract claims.

The Court previously analyzed these claims on the Motion to

Dismiss. The additional arguments by defendants have not changed

the Court's mind. The Court does not read the case of Nelson v.

Pima Community College to bar the contract-based claims. Wells

Fargo Bank v. Arizona Laborers, 201 Ariz. 474, 38 P.3d 12 (2002)

makes it clear that a covenant of good faith and fair dealing is

implied in every contract and that ". . .a party may nevertheless

breach its duty of good faith without actually breaching an

express covenant of the contract." 201 Ariz. at 491. The

interference with contract claim also survives the Motion for

Summary Judgment. Chanay v. Chittenden, 115 Ariz. 32, 563 P.2d

287 (1977). For the reasons set forth in the Court's previous

Order (Doc. 19), the Motion for Summary Judgment is denied on the

breach of contract claim in the Second Amended Complaint.

In summary, defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on claims

9-11 is denied.

6. Defendants argue the Employment Protection Act claim

(12th claim) fails as a matter of law.

Defendants argue that the Arizona Civil Rights Act is the

exclusive remedy for plaintiff's claim set forth in paragraphs 60-

61 of the Second Amended Complaint. Defendants rely on A.R.S. 

§ 23-1501(3)(b); Cronin v. Sheldon, 195 Ariz. 531, 536, 991 P.2d

231, 236 (1999) and Taylor v. Graham County Chamber of Commerce,

201 Ariz. 184, 190, 33 P.3d 518, 524 (Ct. App. 2001). (Doc. 55 at

pp. 9-10). Plaintiffs counter with the argument that defendants'

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argument may bar paragraph 61 of the Second Amended Complaint but

not paragraph 60. 

The 12th claim for relief (Doc. 20 at p. 15) contains

paragraph 60 alleging a wrongful discharge under A.R.S. 

§ 23-1501(3)(b) and paragraph 61 alleging wrongful discharge under

A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(c)(ii). Defendants' argument is based only on

A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(b) and the cases of Cronin v. Sheldon and

Taylor v. Graham County Chamber of Commerce which only address

claims under A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(b). The arguments set forth by

defendants bar a claim based on A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(b) only. 

Therefore, defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as

to any claim under A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(b) but denied as to a claim

under A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(c)(ii).

7. Defendants argue plaintiffs' retaliation claims arising

from non-renewal fail as a matter of law.

Plaintiffs stated in oral argument that claims 1-12 allege

retaliation resulting in non-renewal of the contract. The Court

has already granted summary judgment for defendants as to nonrenewal claims arising under Title VII and ACRA (claims 1 and 6);

claim 3 (property right) and part of the 12th claim. Defendants'

argument that the claims regarding "retaliation" are barred as a

matter of law does not specify whether it is directed at

plaintiffs' Title VII claims exclusively or whether it is directed

at all retaliation claims. However, in defendants' reply (Doc. 66

at p. 4), defendants argue that the retaliation argument is

directed to contract-based claims as well.

All of the cases cited by defendants in support of this

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argument are based on Title VII, ADEA or ACRA. The cases are

based on the burden shifting scheme set forth in McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). More specifically,

defendants' cases set forth the principle that:

If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the

burden of production--but not persuasion--then shifts to

the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. 

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. If

the employer does so, the plaintiff must show that the

articulated reason is pretextual "either directly by

persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more

likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing

that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of

credence." Chuang v. University of California Davis,

225 F.3d 1115, 1123 (9th Cir. 2000). . .although a

plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence to show

pretext, such evidence must be both specific and

substantial. . .

Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th

Cir. 2002). Defendants correctly argue, plaintiff may not raise a

genuine issue of material fact by simply stating he thought his

performance was fine. Schuler v. Chronicle Broadcasting Co., 793

F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Because the Court has already granted summary judgment on

plaintiffs' Title VII and ACRA claims alleging retaliatory nonrenewal, defendants' argument is moot. All defendants' cases are

in the context of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework. 

The Court does not believe this analysis is applicable outside

Title VII, ADEA and ACRA. However, to the extent that defendants

are arguing that "specific and probative evidence" of pretext is

required in claims other than claims 1 and 6, the Court finds that

plaintiffs have met the burden. 

Plaintiffs' opposition argues that Donald Cook thought his

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performance was fine. Defendants are correct that this is

insufficient. However, defendants have overlooked the

explanations that individual defendants gave for their actions. 

Some of the individual defendants' explanations for their actions

are facially suspect. A finder of fact could certainly arrive at

the conclusion that the explanations are pretextual. For example,

defendant Donald Davenport stated in his deposition that he voted

not to renew plaintiff's contract:

Because of the condition of the schools and--of the

elementary school. . .Dr. Cook was not professionally up

to par at the Board meetings. He would get up and read

his--recite his little card reading. And he didn't want

to discuss too many different things. And just, in

general, things like that. . .Because every time you

asked Mr. Cook something he would stand up and read his

card or had to talk to his attorney; couldn't answer

questions. There was numerous different things in

different meetings--in some of the meetings that we had

and he just couldn't do anything on his own. I would

say he couldn't do anything on his own--got to where he

couldn't do anything on his own without talking to his

attorney first. And I didn't think that was

appropriate.

(Doc. 56 at Ex. H, pp. 122, 123 and 125).

These statements could lead a trier of fact to conclude that

because plaintiff was consulting his attorney in connection with

his claims/lawsuit, Mr. Davenport concluded he should not be

renewed. This could be an improper retaliatory purpose. 

Defendant Lamont Hunsinger could never give a reason for his

decision. He stated it was "a tough business decision, because I

felt it was the right decision to make, because of the kids" and

then had to admit he does not know Dr. Cook's performance and did

not observe his performance. Mr. Hunsinger was not capable of

giving a basis for his decision. While it may be that he did not

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have to give a basis for his decision, when questioned he

indicated it was a "tough business decision" but could never give

an explanation of the basis for the "tough business decision." 

Based on the limited information available in this Motion for

Summary Judgment, the Court must conclude that some of the 

explanations for the failure to renew appear improper. As a

result, the Court concludes there are genuine issues of material

fact that preclude summary judgment.

8. Defendants Davenport and Nelson (named in the 13th claimslander per se) argue they are immune from liability for their

report under A.R.S. § 13-3620.

Defendants Davenport and Nelson argue that they must report

certain conduct to appropriate law enforcement or Child Protective

Service authorities. They cite to A.R.S. § 13-3620. They argue

that had they not made such a report, they could be subject to

felony prosecution. A.R.S. § 13-3620(O). 

The 13th claim in the Second Amended Complaint alleges that

defendants Davenport and Nelson published certain oral statements

accusing Donald Cook of sexual abuse or child molestation. The

complaint alleges the statements made by the defendants were false

and defamatory in nature. The complaint alleges the statements

were published about plaintiff Donald Cook and were made out of

spite and malice and in the absence of good faith. The claim then

alleges that defendants Davenport, Nelson and MUSD are liable for

slander per se. (Doc. 20 at pp. 15, 16).

A.R.S. § 13-3620 states in pertinent part:

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A. Any person who reasonably believes that a minor is

or has been the victim of physical injury, abuse, child

abuse, a reportable offense or neglect that appears to

have been inflicted on the minor by other than

accidental means. . .shall immediately report or cause

reports to be made of this information to a peace

officer or to Child Protective Services in the

department of economic security, except if the report

concerns a person who does not have care, custody or

control of the minor, the report shall be made to a

peace officer only. 

 . . . 

D. Reports shall be made immediately by telephone or in

person and shall be followed by a written report within

72 hours. The reports shall contain:

1. The names and addresses of the minor and the minor's

parents or the person or persons having custody of the

minor, if known.

2. The minor's age and the nature and extent of the

minor's abuse, child abuse, physical injury or neglect,

including any evidence of previous abuse. . .

3. Any other information that the person believes might

be helpful in establishing the cause of the abuse, child

abuse, physical injury or neglect.

 . . .

F. Any person other than one required to report or

cause reports to be made under subsection A of this

section who reasonably believes that a minor is or has

been a victim of abuse. . .may report the information to

a peace officer or to Child Protective Services in the

department of economic security, except if the report

concerns a person who does not have care, custody or

control of the minor, the report shall be made to a

peace officer only.

 . . .

J. A person who furnishes a report, information or

records required or authorized under this section. . .is

immune from civil or criminal liability by reason of

that action unless the person acted with malice or

unless the person has been charged with or is suspected

of abusing or neglecting the child. . . [Emphasis

added].

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The exact oral statements which give rise to plaintiffs' 13th

claim for relief are described as ". . .oral statements, accusing

Cook of the crime of sexual abuse/child molestation. . ." (Doc.

20 at pp. 14-15). In their statements of fact, the parties have

referred to this as the "bug incident." Plaintiffs' statement of

facts regarding this incident is set forth in Document 62 at

paragraphs 51 through 77. Defendants' statement of facts

concerning the "bug incident" is set forth in Document 56 at

paragraphs 36 through 47.

The statute does not grant any immunity for reports outside

of law enforcement and Child Protective Services. In fact, the

statute states that in this circumstance the report ". . .shall be

made to a peace officer only." A.R.S. § 13-3620A. Therefore,

reports by either defendant Davenport or defendant Nelson other

than to law enforcement authorities are not immune under A.R.S. §

13-3620J. 

Plaintiffs argue that defendants' repeated phone calls to the

child's mother indicate malice, within the meaning of A.R.S. § 13-

3620J. The information set forth in plaintiffs' statement of

facts (Doc. 62 at pars. 66, 67, 68, 71, 76) raises a genuine issue

of material fact as to whether or not defendants Davenport and

Nelson acted with malice. Therefore, summary judgment must be

denied even as to the report to law enforcement.

Defendants also argue that the immunity set forth in A.R.S. 

§ 13-3620J precludes plaintiffs' cause of action for intentional

infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of

emotional distress and any other claim based on the "bug

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incident." Because the Court has found there is a genuine issue

of material fact regarding malice and that the statute does not

apply to all of the reports, the Motion for Summary Judgment based

on any claim of immunity under A.R.S. § 13-3620J is denied.

9. Defendants allege the defamation claim (13th claim--

slander per se) fails as a matter of law because truth is a

complete defense.

Defendants argue the only statements that were made were true

and the only statements were that Dr. Cook made contact with the

youngster's genitals. However, this is not established in the

record. In fact, plaintiffs' unrebutted statement of facts

indicates there were many more statements made to the child's

mother. In short, there are genuine issues of material fact as to

what each defendant said regarding the "bug incident" and whether

these statements were true. 

10. Next defendants argue that plaintiff's emotional

distress claims fail as a matter of law.

Defendants' arguments again are based on the immunity found

in the Arizona Revised Statutes. As set forth above, summary

judgment cannot be granted based on that statute. In addition,

defendants argue the only remarks that were made about the "bug

incident" were statements made "describing the incident." (Doc.

55 at p. 16, ln. 5). Defendants argue that under these

circumstances, defendants' report of the matter could not possibly

be "extreme and outrageous" conduct sufficient to support a claim

for intentional infliction. Defendants then cite an Iowa case. 

For the reasons set forth above, there are genuine issues of

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material fact which preclude summary judgment on this matter.

As to plaintiffs' claim for negligent infliction of emotional

distress, defendants make the same arguments as they did for the

intentional infliction claim and further note that Arizona does

not recognize a cause of action for negligent employment actions

citing Mack v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Corp., 179 Ariz. 627,

629, 880 P.2d 1173, 1175 (Ct.App. 1994). As this Court has

previously stated, the only claims alleged in the Second Amended

Complaint which could give rise to a claim of intentional

infliction of emotional distress is the "bug incident." All other

allegations are insufficient. As this Court previously noted with

respect to the negligent infliction claim, "nothing in Mack

supports the proposition that such a claim cannot be maintained

because it arises out of a setting in which petitioner is also

alleging Title VII and/or state wrongful terminations claim as

well. Smith v. American Express Travel Related Service Co. Inc.,

876 P.2d 1166 (Ariz.Ct. App.). . ." (Doc. 19 at p. 21). The

Court has already ruled on these matters and summary judgment is

not appropriate. There are genuine issues of material fact which

preclude summary judgment, as set forth above, and it is not clear

as a matter of law that defendants are entitled to summary

judgment.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED granting in part and denying in part,

as set forth above, defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 

(Doc. 55).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a joint final pretrial statement

shall be filed no later than February 28, 2006.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a final pretrial conference is set

for March 28, 2006 at 9:30 a.m.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any party who would like a

settlement conference shall notify the Court.

DATED this 21st day of December, 2005.

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