Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02312/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02312-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

Ernesto Azada Mangat, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security, 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 15cv2312 AJB RBB 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 

MOTION TO AUGMENT THE 

RECORD [ECF NOS. 16, 19]; 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION GRANTING 

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NOS. 

15, 18] AND DENYING 

DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF 

NO. 20] 

 

On October 15, 2015, Plaintiff Ernesto Azada Mangat commenced this action 

against Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin, the Commissioner of Social Security, for judicial 

review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of a final adverse decision for social security benefits. 

(Compl. 1,1

 ECF No. 1.) On January 19, 2016, Defendant filed an Answer and the 

Administrative Record [ECF Nos. 10, 11]. Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for 

                                               

1

 With the exception of the Administrative Record, all citations are to the page numbers assigned by the 

Court’s Electronic Case Filing System. 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 39
2 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Summary Judgment [ECF Nos. 15, 182

], Plaintiff’s Motion to Augment the Record [ECF 

Nos. 16, 193

], and Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Augment the Record [ECF No. 20]. The Court has taken the 

motions under submission without oral argument [ECF No. 29]. For the following 

reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Augment the Record is DENIED. The Court recommends 

that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED, Defendant's Cross-Motion 

for Summary Judgment be DENIED, and the case be REMANDED for an award of 

benefits. 

I. BACKGROUND 

On January 29, 2009, Plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability, 

disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income, alleging disability since 

December 10, 2008. (Admin. R. 139-45,4

 ECF No. 11.) On November 10, 2010, Mangat 

testified at the hearing before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Larry Parker. (Id. at 38-

39.) ALJ Parker denied the claim for benefits in a decision issued on November 17, 

2010. (Id. at 15-31.) Mangat requested that the Appeals Council reconsider the ALJ’s 

decision and submitted additional medical records in support of the request. (See id. at 9, 

226-29, 494-511.) On September 6, 2011, the Appeals Council upheld the ALJ’s 

decision. (Id. at 5-10.) On November 4, 2011, Plaintiff challenged the Commissioner’s 

decision in the district court. See Mangat v. Astrue, Civ. No. 11-cv-2579-GPC-BGS 

(S.D. Cal. filed Nov. 4, 2011). On April 4, 2013, the Court granted Mangat’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment, denied Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and remanded 

the case to evaluate additional medical evidence. (See Admin. R. 651-67, ECF No. 11). 

                                               

2

 Plaintiff first filed his Motion for Summary Judgment without a supporting memorandum of points and 

authorities [ECF No. 15]. Plaintiff later resubmitted the motion with the supporting brief [ECF No. 18]. 

3

 Plaintiff’s Motion to Augment the Record [ECF No. 15] did not include the memorandum of points 

and authorities. Plaintiff later resubmitted the motion with the supporting brief [ECF No. 19]. 

4

 The administrative record is filed on the Court’s docket as multiple attachments. The Court will cite to 

the administrative record using the page references contained on the original document rather than the 

page numbers designated by the Court’s CM/ECF system. 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 39
3 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 While his appeal was pending, Mangat filed subsequent applications for disability 

insurance benefits on June 21, 2010, and for supplemental security income on December 

14, 2010.5

 (Id. at 670.) He had a hearing before ALJ Peter Valentino on May 24, 2012.6 

(Id. at 677.) On July 24, 2012, ALJ Valentino issued a favorable decision, awarding 

disability benefits as of March 10, 2011.7 (Id.) The ALJ found that Mangat suffered 

from uncontrolled diabetes mellitus, chronic renal failure, polyarthritis, congestive heart 

failure, and coronary artery disease. (Id. at 679.) Judge Valentino also determined that 

Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to sit, stand, or walk for less than two hours 

in an eight-hour workday, and to lift less than ten pounds. (Id.) The ALJ accepted 

Mangat’s testimony about his condition: 

The claimant credibly testified that he is unable to work due to pain in 

his chest as well as swelling in his feet and elbows. He takes nitroglycerin at 

night for chest pain. He is also diabetic for which he takes insulin, has heart 

disease and high blood pressure. He has trouble sleeping because the pain in 

his chest wakes him up. Thus, he is tired during the waking hours and must 

lie down the entire day. The claimant further testified that fatigue and 

shortness of breath prevent him from working. 

(Id. at 680.) 

Judge Valentino gave controlling weight to the medical opinions of Plaintiff’s 

treating doctors, primary care provider Dr. Bautista-Sacamay and cardiologist Dr. Scharf. 

(Id.) The ALJ noted that on March 10, 2011, Dr. Sacamay reported that “claimant had 

uncontrolled diabetes, chronic renal failure, polyarthriticular gouty arthritis, coronary 

artery disease status post bypass surgery in 2009, and a history of congestive heart 

failure, hypertension and hyperlipidemia.” (Id.) Dr. Sacamay observed that Mangat 

“experienced fatigue, joint swelling and joint pain” and stated that “his prognosis was 

                                               

5

 These applications are not part of the administrative record before the Court. 

6

 The transcript of May 24, 2012 hearing is not part of the record before the Court. 

7

 After the hearing, but before the decision was issued, Plaintiff amended the alleged onset date of 

disability to March 10, 2011. (See Admin. R. 677, 809, ECF No. 11.) 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 39
4 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

guarded.” (Id.) The treating physician limited Plaintiff to less than two hours of sitting, 

standing, or walking during an eight-hour workday. (Id.) She also opined that Mangat 

would need to shift positions at will, take unscheduled breaks, and elevate his feet for two 

or three hours during the workday. (Id.) Dr. Sacamay stated that Plaintiff could not bend 

or twist; was unable to carry more than ten pounds; and could not use his hands to grasp, 

turn, or twist objects. (Id.) The ALJ found that Dr. Sacamay’s opinion was entitled to 

controlling weight: 

Pursuant to C.F.R. § 404.1527 and 416.927, the undersigned assigns 

considerable weight to this opinion, as it is well-supported by the medical 

evidence, including the claimant’s medical history and clinical and objective 

signs and findings as well as treatment notes, which provides a reasonable 

basis for claimant’s chronic symptoms and resulting limitations. Moreover, 

this opinion is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence of record. In 

addition, the physician is a treating source, who has seen the claimant on a 

regular basis and is best able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of the 

claimant’s impairment and resulting limitations. The undersigned gives this 

opinion controlling weight. 

(Id.) 

The ALJ also assigned great weight to the opinion of Dr. Scharf, Mangat’s treating 

cardiologist, who diagnosed Plaintiff with coronary artery disease and “felt that the 

claimant was incapable of even a low stress job and described the claimant’s condition as 

very severe.” (Id.) Judge Valentino explained that medical evidence in the record, such 

as Mangat’s assessment at Paradise Valley Hospital in April 2011, supported the treating 

doctors’ conclusions. (Id.) Mangat was admitted to the hospital for a coronary 

catheterization; the hospital record indicated “episodes of dizziness, coronary artery 

disease status post coronary artery bypass surgery and status post recent stenting of the 

right contrary artery graft; diabetes mellitus, dyslipidemia and chronic renal 

insufficiency.” (Id.) Following the procedure, his joints were “swollen more than usual 

with fever and pain.” He underwent another catheterization in May 2011. (Id. at 681.) 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 39
5 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The impartial medical expert believed that Mangat was capable of light exertional 

work, but Judge Valentino gave that opinion little weight, reasoning that it was not 

supported by the medical evidence in the record and “contrary to the opinions of the 

claimant’s treating physicians who because of their history with the claimant, are better 

able to assess the overall condition and functional capabilities.” (Id.) After reviewing all 

the evidence, on July 24, 2012 the ALJ issued a decision finding Mangat had been 

disabled since March 10, 2011. (Id. at 682.) 

While Mangat’s 2010 applications for benefits were pending, the denial of 

Plaintiff’s 2009 application was reversed by the court in Mangat v. Astrue, Case No. 

11cv2579-GPC (BGS), and the case was remanded to the Appeals Council in order to 

consider the additional medical records from Dr. Sacamay. (Admin. R. 651-67, ECF No. 

11). The Appeals Council noted that a favorable decision was issued by ALJ Valentino 

on Mangat’s subsequent 2010 applications, finding Plaintiff disabled as of March 10, 

2011. (Id. at 670.) On July 23, 2013, the Appeals Council affirmed that decision and 

remanded the case for further administrative proceedings for the period prior to March 

10, 2011. (Id.) 

On September 2, 2014, Mangat appeared with his attorney at a hearing before ALJ 

Valentino. (Id. at 515, 589.) Dr. Minh D. Vu, an impartial medical expert, appeared 

telephonically at the hearing. (Id. at 589.) The ALJ had a brief conversation with the 

expert before inviting Plaintiff into the hearing room: 

ALJ: And I decided that based upon the amended onset date, which is 

March 10, 2011, I was able to [award benefits as of] March 10, 2011. So 

now the Appeals Council says, “Okay. The issue is what is his disability 

from 2008 to March 10, 2011?” And I’m not going to tell you what the 

reports show, but I think if you look at these reports dated from 2008 to 

3/10/11, it’s going to be hard to find severe impairments. At any event, 

that’s going to be the issue. What is his disability from 2008 to March 10, 

’11? Now, I’m going to ask the attorneys why they amended onset date of 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 39
6 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

March 10, 2011, and now they changed their mind.[8

] They want to go back 

to 2008. So I’m just – I just want to narrow the issue and let you know that 

that’s the only period of time involved, March 10, 2008 to March 10, ’11. 

So if you would, please, you know, just comment on what the reports 

showed during that period of time, that would be very helpful. 

ME: Okay, thank you. 

ALJ: Okay, let’s call them in now. 

(Id. at 589-90.) Judge Valentino asked Plaintiff’s attorney to point to specific evidence in 

the record during the relevant time period. (Id. at 591-92.) Counsel referenced exhibit 

1F showing an abnormal EKG on December 9, 2008. (Id. at 592; see id. at 309.) The 

medical expert could not find the exhibit, and counsel noted that some of the medical 

records attached to the first application were missing: 

ATTY: Well, it’s in the other file. The administration has it; they just didn’t 

put it in here. 

ALJ: No, we have many reports during this period of time, counsel. Not 

only the EKG. There’s evidence that he’s been seen for other problems. 

ME: I don’t have any EKG at 1F, your honor. 

(Id. at 595.) Throughout the hearing it became apparent that relevant medical evidence 

was not in the file before the judge or the medical expert: 

ATTY: Well, your honor, I – I’m – I have to say the evidence in the record 

is not all the evidence in this record. 

                                               

8

 The transcript of the May 24, 2012 hearing is not in the record before this Court; however, in a letter to 

the ALJ dated June 26, 2012, Plaintiff’s counsel referred to the ALJ asking Mangat at the hearing if he 

would agree to amend the onset date to March 10, 2011, the date of Dr. Sacamay’s residual functional 

capacity report. (See Admin. R. at 809, ECF No. 11.) Plaintiff’s counsel wrote: 

I agreed only for the purpose of the subsequent application . . . . As the basis of the 

District Court action was the Commissioner’s failure to consider Dr. Sacamay’s March 

10, 2011 medical source statement and assess Mangat’s excess pain, Mr. Mangat has 

agreed to amend his onset date for all purposes to March 10, 2011 upon the agreement 

that a fully favorable determination would be issued as of that date. 

(Id.) 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 39
7 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ALJ: Well, I’m sorry. Then you have an obligation to present what’s not in 

the record, counsel. 

ATTY: We sent it to the administration and I can produce all of the 

submissions. However, the evidence that I’m relying upon is evidence that 

was in the exhibit file of that – the administration produced. So I know that 

the administration has it. That being said, the record – I will find the EKG 

for you. 

ALJ: I have 25 exhibits here. You mean that these reports from 1F to 25F 

doesn’t define the claimant’s impairments for a three-year period? 

ATTY: I don’t believe it does, and here’s why. 5F was [Samahan] Medical. 

That evidence showed the gouty arthritis, the swelling in his left elbow, 

peripheral neuropathy, swelling in his hands and feet, decreased sensation, 

and high uric acid levels. That – 

ME: 5F? 

ALJ: 5F, 6/12/09, 5F. 

ME: Mine is [INAUDIBLE] I don’t have gout inside. 

(Id. at 598-99.) The ALJ tried to question the medical expert regarding the record before 

him: 

Q And doctor, have you reviewed these reports from 1F to 25F? 

A I have, your honor. 

Q All right. Please – 

A I have 26F. 

Q 26F. Please tell me what those records show for the period of question 

here, which was December 10, 2008, to March 10, ’12. 

A I don’t have anything in the time frame that you told me. I have 

[INAUDIBLE] in December 2008 and May 2011. I don’t think anything – 

42, I did not receive. 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 39
8 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(Id. at 600.) Counsel argued that the file did not include the records from the June 21, 

2010 application: “[T]hose are medical records that should’ve been associated with this 

file as they pertain to his disability before March 1st, 2011.” (Id. at 603.) The expert 

opined that there was no evidence prior to March 2011 to show severe impairments that 

meet or equal the listings, and that Mangat had a full range of light exertional capacity 

prior to March 2011. (Id. at 605-06.) Counsel inquired whether the expert’s conclusion 

would change if there was other evidence available: 

Q If I were to present to you that on November 25th, 2009, that Mr. Mangat 

had a three-way bypass due to showings that his artery was 99 percent 

blocked, would that change your opinion? 

A I don’t see that. Could you point to me exactly what exhibit. 

Q If I were to present that to you. 

A I don’t work on “ifs.” Show me exhibits and I’ll – 

Q So as I – 

A -- have an answer for that. 

Q As I understand your testimony, you just don’t have enough evidence to 

offer any greater limitations. However, if there was missing evidence, 

would your opinion be different or could it possibly be different? 

A I think, you know, this exercise is about not here and is not for me to 

handle as an ME. 

(Id. at 606-07.) Plaintiff’s counsel eventually asked Judge Valentino for a supplemental 

hearing to present the additional evidence. (Id. at 607.) The ALJ allowed Mangat the 

opportunity to submit a post-hearing brief with missing medical records. (Id. at 608.) 

 On July 30, 2015, a supplemental hearing before ALJ Valentino was held. (Id. at 

535.) Prior to the hearing, Dr. Vu completed a three-page medical questionnaire. (Id. at 

515-16; 1310-12.) The expert did not personally examine Mangat or previously serve as 

a medical expert for him. (Id. at 1310.) The expert listed coronary artery disease, renal 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 39
9 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

insufficiency, arthralgia from gout and degenerative joint disease, diabetes mellitus, and 

hypertension as major medically determinable impairments during the relevant period. 

(Id.) Dr. Vu also stated that these impairments, either combined or separately, did not 

meet or equal any listing for cardiac, renal, or articular impairments. (Id. at 1311.) 

At the supplemental hearing, Plaintiff’s challenged Dr. Vu’s conclusion that 

Mangat had a good recovery after his November 2009 bypass surgery. (Id. at 543.) 

Q Okay. Now, in the coronary artery disease you indicate that he had a 

good recovery. Are you aware that he’s had two other stentings after the 

first three way bypass? 

A Number one, what is it – I never heard three way bypass, what did you 

mean by that? 

Q He had a three way bypass in – 

A Let me – 

Q -- November of 2009. 

A -- ask you what you mean by that because -- as you pointing about the 

three vessels are hooked together or – I don’t understand the term. 

Q Okay. I think he had three vessels bypassed, is that correct? 

CLMT: Yes. 

ATTY: That’s correct. 

ME: Not three way, okay. 

Q Did you – 

A And then tell me exactly when he had subsequent stenting – 

Q He – 

A -- point out the date. 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 39
10 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Q It was November – well the first was November – mid-November 2009. 

CLMT: Nine. 

Q The second was August of 2010. He was – he had – he was re-stented in 

a few spots, and I’m not sure. Then in March of 2011 he was re-stented 

again. 

A. Okay. Beginning by March 2011, point me the exhibit? 

Q Beginning in March of 2011? 

A Yeah. Talk about the stenting at that time. 

Q Okay. 

A. What actually is supporting that statement? 

Q Okay. Let me pull the exhibits all up. Okay. Well, now the – well, were 

you aware of his stenting in March of 2011? 

A I didn’t find it. Point to me the exhibit. I saw a study in here, but I don’t 

see the stenting. 

(Id. at 543-45.) Because of the expert’s answers, Plaintiff’s counsel became concerned 

that Dr. Vu did not have the exhibits for the relevant time period. (Id. at 546, 548-49.) In 

response, the medical expert challenged the attorney: 

A And this is the wrong citation, and I think you made it up. 

Q What? 

A There’s no – you made up that citation. There’s no stenting on this date. 

Q Well – 

A I don’t think it’s really normal practice to make things that doesn’t 

happen in the file. 

ATTY: You were stented, were you not? 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 39
11 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

CLMT: I did. 

ME: No. counselor – 

ATTY: He was stented. 

ME: -- I look at the date and I don’t see anything – 

ATTY: Okay. 

ME: -- that you talk about. 

Q So – 

A Then – because you miss the stent report. Or, you intentionally give the 

untrue statement. 

(Id. at 553.) The ALJ inquired if counsel could specifically refer the expert to the 

evidence of subsequent stenting, and Plaintiff’s attorney explained: 

ATTY: I did not see the actual surgical report. If I were to obtain it, I will 

send it to you. But I’ve ordered the records from all these facilities. We’ve 

gotten thousands of pages on this case, and I think we have to take a little bit 

of inference in there. But, in the event that Dr. Vu is unwilling to do that, 

then I will try to find – 

ALJ: Well, he – 

ATTY: -- that piece of paper. But I have Mr. Mangat here who has 

indicated that he was stented at that time. I have a report saying 99 percent 

occlusion. So, with that I think that – in this non-adversarial proceeding, I 

think that we need to review the evidence in the most favorable light to the 

claimant. 

(Id. at 554-55.) Eventually, the medical expert acknowledged that his conclusion would 

change if Plaintiff did in fact require the subsequent surgical procedures: 

Q So -- well my question is let’s presume that he did get the stenting in 

2000 – August, 2010, and then he did get it again in March – May of 2011. 

Beginning – and he had the original one in November, 2009. Let’s pretend 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

 39
12 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that those operations occurred as Mr. Mangat testifies. Would that change 

your response at all? 

A Oh, yes. 

(Id. at 563.) Nonetheless, the expert remained convinced that Mangat’s impairments did 

not meet or equal a listing and that Plaintiff was capable of the full range of light work. 

(Id. at 576-77.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the ALJ stated to the Plaintiff and his 

counsel: 

ALJ: All right. Thank you. Thank you, counsel. I have another case I have 

to commence a hearing on. And Ernesto, you’re getting benefits now, 

correct? 

CLMT: Yes, sir. 

ALJ: Don’t you worry about your benefits, I’m not going to interfere with 

them. 

CLMT: Okay. 

ALJ: We’re just talking about an earlier period. 

CLMT: Okay. 

ALJ: And your attorney’s doing a good job trying – 

CLMT: Okay. 

ALJ: -- to get you more money – 

CLMT: Thank you, your honor. 

ALJ: -- if she can. So, now counsel please be – I know you’re cooperative 

and you’re a very fine attorney. But if you’re going to come up with 

additional material, let’s keep it very clear for my medical expert to 

comment on, and my [sic] also. And the issue is whether or not you – 

there’s additional evidence of additional stenting. Right? 

ATTY: Okay. Well, he seemed to be concerned that the stenting did not 

occur. So, I thought what he wanted was the actual operative reports. 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of

 39
13 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ALJ: Yeah, well find those. 

(Id. at 584-85.) 

On August 17, 2015, Plaintiff’s counsel transmitted additional evidence to the 

ALJ. (See Pl.’s Mot. Augment Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 1-2, ECF No. 19.) The 

Administrative Record reflects that a five-page letter brief was received. (Admin. R. at 

839-43, ECF No. 11.) Plaintiff has also submitted evidence that the medical records 

accompanying the brief were received by Judge Valentino. (See Pl.’s Mot. Augment 

Attach. #1, at 1, ECF No. 16 (identifying the receipt of 8,557 kB of data).) Then, on 

August 25, 2015, ALJ Valentino issued an unfavorable decision. (Id. at 515-27.) 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Sections 405(g) and 421(d) of the Social Security Act allow unsuccessful 

applicants to seek judicial review of a final agency decision of the Commissioner. 42 

U.S.C.A. §§ 405(g), 421(d) (West 2011). The scope of judicial review is limited, 

however, and the denial of benefits "'will be disturbed only if it is not supported by 

substantial evidence or is based on legal error.'" Brawner v. Sec'y of Health & Human 

Servs., 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 529 

(9th Cir. 1986)). 

"Substantial evidence is 'more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; 

it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.'" Sandqathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Andrews 

v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)). The court must consider the entire 

record, including the evidence that supports and detracts from the Commissioner's 

conclusions. Desrosiers v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 

1988). If the evidence supports more than one rational interpretation, the court must 

uphold the ALJ's decision. Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). When 

the evidence is inconclusive, "'questions of credibility and resolution of conflicts in the 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of

 39
14 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

testimony are functions solely of the Secretary.'" Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 

642 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting Waters v. Gardner, 452 F.2d 855, 858 n.7 (9th Cir. 1971)). 

The ALJ has a duty in social security cases to fully and fairly develop the record in 

order to make an informed decision on a claimant's entitlement to disability benefits. 

DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 1991). Because disability hearings are 

not adversarial in nature, the ALJ must "inform himself about the facts relevant to his 

decision," even if the claimant is represented by counsel. Dixon v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 

506, 510 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 471 n.1 (1983) 

(Brennan, J., concurring). 

The district court may affirm, modify, or reverse the Commissioner's decision. Id. 

The court should affirm the decision unless "it is based upon legal error or is not 

supported by substantial evidence." Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (citing Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999)). A district court 

may remand a Social Security disability decision under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g). Hoa Hong Van v. Barnhart, 483 F.3d 600, 605 (9th Cir. 2007). That provision 

states, "The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the 

record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner 

of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." 42 U.S.C.A. 

§ 405(g). "A remand under sentence four is 'essentially a determination that the agency 

erred in some respect in reaching a decision to deny benefits[]' . . . ." Hoa Hong Van v. 

Barnhart, 483 F.3d at 605 (quoting Akopyan v. Barnhart, 296 F.3d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 

2002)). 

After a case is remanded and an additional hearing is held, the Commissioner may 

modify or affirm the original findings of fact or the decision. 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g). 

A remand to the Commissioner for further proceedings or to award benefits is within the 

court's discretion. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). "'If 

additional proceedings can remedy defects in the original administrative proceedings, a 

social security case should be remanded. Where, however, a rehearing would simply 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of

 39
15 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

delay receipt of benefits, reversal [and an award of benefits] is appropriate.'" Id. 

(alteration in original) (quoting Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981)). 

As a matter of administrative law, "the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to 

remand to an administrative agency for additional investigation or explanation." INS v. 

Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Legal Standard 

To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, an applicant must 

show two things: (1) He or she suffers from a medically determinable impairment that 

can be expected to last for a continuous period of twelve months or more, or would result 

in death; and (2) the impairment renders the applicant incapable of performing the work 

that he or she previously performed or any other substantially gainful employment that 

exists in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), (2)(A) (West 2011). 

An applicant must meet both requirements to be classified as "disabled." Id. 

The Commissioner makes this assessment by a five-step analysis outlined in 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520 (West 2012). See also Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th 

Cir. 1999) (describing five steps). First, the Commissioner determines whether a 

claimant is engaged in "substantial gainful activity." If so, the claimant is not disabled. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Second, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant 

has a "severe impairment or combination of impairments" that significantly limits the 

claimant's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. If not, the claimant is 

not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(c). Third, the medical evidence of the claimant's 

impairment is compared to a list of impairments that are presumed severe enough to 

preclude work; if the claimant's impairment meets or equals one of the listed 

impairments, benefits are awarded. Id. § 404.1520(d). Fourth, if the impairment meets 

or equals one of the listed impairments, the Commission determines whether the claimant 

can do his past relevant work. If the claimant can do his past work, benefits are denied. 

Id. § 404.1520(e). If the claimant cannot perform her past relevant work, the burden 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 15 of

 39
16 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

shifts to the Commissioner. In step five, the Commissioner must establish that the 

claimant can perform other work. Id. § 404.1520(f). If the Commissioner meets this 

burden and proves that the claimant is able to perform other work that exists in the 

national economy, benefits are denied. 

B. Plaintiff’s Motion to Augment the Record 

 Plaintiff filed a Motion to Augment the Record [ECF No. 19], arguing that the 

record before the Court is incomplete absent supplementation. (Pl.’s Mot. Augment 

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 2-3, ECF No. 19.) Mangat argues that after the July 30, 2015 

supplemental hearing before ALJ Valentino, counsel electronically transmitted a letter 

brief that referenced attached medical documentation to the ALJ. (Id. at 2.) The 

Administrative Record indicates that only a five-page letter brief was received. (Id.; see 

also Admin. R. 839-43, ECF No. 11.) In Exhibit 1, Mangat submits that medical records 

were attached to the letter and seeks to include them as evidence before this Court. (Pl.’s 

Mot. Augment Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 1-3, ECF No. 19; see id. Attach. #2 Ex. 1.) He 

argues that the record is incomplete without these medical reports, and that they are 

needed for the Court to review the record as a whole. (Pl.’s Mot. Augment Attach. #1 

Mem. P. & A. 3, ECF No. 19.) But the August 17, 2015 facsimile transmittal sheet from 

Mangat’s counsel shows that a total of five pages were sent to the ALJ. (Admin. R. 839, 

ECF No. 11.) Yet, the confirmation shows that the file received by the Social Security 

Administration on August 17, 2015, contained 8,557 kB of text data, suggesting that 

more than a five-page letter was sent to ALJ Valentino. (See Pl.’s Mot. Augment Attach. 

#2, at 1, ECF No. 16.) 

 The Commissioner opposes the request to supplement, arguing that the “exhibit 

submitted by Plaintiff was not considered by the ALJ or the Appeals Council, and 

therefore cannot be included as part of the record upon which this Court may issue a 

decision . . . .” (Def.’s Cross-Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 18, ECF No. 20.) 

Defendant also argues that the majority of the evidence is “not new, as it already exists in 

the record.” (Id.) The Commissioner claims that the only new evidence in the 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 16 of

 39
17 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

submission is the operative reports from Mangat’s bypass surgery in November of 2009. 

(Id. at 19.) Defendant contends that the ALJ considered the fact of the surgery in 

reaching his decision, and predicated his opinion on Plaintiff’s recovery following the 

heart surgery. (Id.) 

The purpose of this action is to evaluate the record before the Commissioner in 

reaching a decision. The Defendant is required to “file a certified copy of the transcript 

of the record including the evidence upon which the findings and decision complained of 

are based.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The first page of the Administrative Record is a 

“Certification” that states, “[T]he documents annexed hereto constitute a full and accurate 

transcript of the entire record of proceedings relating to this case.” (Admin. R. Caption 

Page, ECF No. 10.) The documents transmitted on August 17, 2015, were before the 

ALJ, but they are not all included in the Administrative Record. See Tackett, 180 F.3d at 

197-98 (stating that the court may set aside a “denial of disability insurance benefits 

when the ALJ’s findings . . . are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a 

whole[]”); see also Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993 (“We consider the 

record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from 

the Secretary’s conclusion.”). 

Most of the evidence submitted in his Motion to Augment is duplicative of 

documentation already in the record. See McCoy v. Astrue, No. C 11-00782 CRB, 2011 

WL 4595008, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2011) (denying plaintiff’s motion to augment 

because no legal authority supported the motion and because augmentation of the record 

would be duplicative and immaterial). The records submitted are Plaintiff’s operative 

reports from his November 2009 bypass surgery and subsequent stenting. The fact that 

Mangat underwent surgery in 2009 is not in dispute and was acknowledged by the ALJ: 

“The Sharp Chula Vista records from November 12, 2009, showed the urgent coronary 

bypass procedure.” (Admin. R. at 518, ECF No. 11.) The documents that are missing 

from the record go to whether a remand for further proceedings or an award of benefits is 

the proper remedy. 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 17 of

 39
18 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In any event, because the Court concludes below that the ALJ erred in making his 

determination, Plaintiff’s Motion to Augment the Record is denied as moot. 

C. Plaintiff’s Claims 

In the Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in 

rejecting Mangat’s testimony about the limitations his symptoms produce. (Pl.’s Mot. 

Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 7-14, ECF No. 18.) Plaintiff contends that the ALJ 

should have credited Mangat’s statements regarding his impairments to the extent they 

were supported by the medical evidence. (Id. at 7.) Mangat also argues that Judge 

Valentino failed to properly evaluate the medical evidence and opinions of treating 

physicians. (Id. at 15.) 

1. The ALJ’s Decision 

The ALJ concluded, on August 25, 2015, that Plaintiff had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity from December 10, 2008, his alleged onset date, through 

March 9, 2011. (Admin. R. 518, ECF No. 11.) During this time period, Mangat had the 

following severe impairments: coronary artery disease; arthralgia from gout and 

degenerative joint disease; diabetes mellitus; renal insufficiency; and hypertension. (Id.) 

Judge Valentino gave “great weight” to the determination of the medical expert, Dr. Vu, 

who acknowledged that Plaintiff suffered from severe impairments related to these 

conditions prior to March 10, 2011. (Id.) The decision discussed medical evidence from 

several providers who treated Mangat throughout the relevant period: 

Kaiser medical records prior to the relevant period March to October 

2008 reported treatment for acute conditions and evidence of gout flare-ups, 

hand and knee swelling, and elevated sugar levels (Ex. 1F). 

 

Progress notes from Operation Samahan in 2009 reported decreased 

sensation in the lower extremity with a diagnosis of neuropathy, swelling, 

and gouty arthritis intermittently (Ex. 15F/3, 6, 8, 14, 15, 22). 

The Sharp Chula Vista records from November 12, 2009, showed the 

urgent coronary bypass procedure (Ex. 25F/1-5.) 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 18 of

 39
19 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On November 30, 2009, the consultative examiner, Phong Dao, D.O., 

examined the claimant and found limited range of motion in the lumbar 

spine. An x-ray of the lumbar spine revealed spondylosis at L3-L5 and mild 

disc degeneration at L3-L4 (Ex. 7F/9-10). Dr. Dao reported an impression 

of diabetes mellitus insulin-dependent and a history of diabetic peripheral 

neuropathy but sensation to light touch in the extremities was intact (Ex. 

7F/7). He reported hypertension, controlled. He reported coronary artery 

disease with chest pain and dyspnea on exertion with ambulating about one 

block. He also had lumbar strain. Dr. Dao limited the claimant to sedentary 

work (Id.). 

Progress notes from Genaro Fernandez dated December 31, 2009, 

indicated the claimant was recovering slowly post CAD surgery in 

November 2009, taking his medications, and EKG continued to show some 

abnormality (Ex. 11F/3-4). 

Nephrology progress notes from Elena Maria Bautista Sacamay, 

M.D., dated April 2010 indicated that his ANA testing was positive (Ex. 

14F/2, 9). Lab reports showed increased protein with creatine ration and 

total protein elevated (Ex. 14F/7; 15F/28-29; and 18F/5). The claimant took 

Prednisone for this condition (Ex. 15F/2-3, 31). On March 24, 2010, the 

claimant had minimal swelling in his hands and was able to walk without a 

cane (Ex. 15F/18). 

Paradise Valley Hospital admitted the claimant on February 27, 2010, 

and discharged him on March 3, 2010, for polyarthralgia (Ex. 16F/2-3). 

ANA testing was positive (EX. 16F/7). An echocardiogram showed 

diastolic dysfunction and mild pulmonic insufficiency (Ex. 14F/11). A renal 

ultrasound showed nonobstructing multiple left renal stones (Ex. 16F/13). 

 

Progress notes from Samahan Medical from January to December 

2010 indicate swelling and joint pains, congestion issues, positive ANA, and 

elevated proteins (Ex. 24F/44, 63, 65). 

Progress notes from Dr. Fernandez in September 2010 showed 

occasional chest pains despite compliance with medication, edema in the 

lower extremities, and decreased sensation in the lower extremities (Ex. 

19F/2-3). 

Paradise Valley emergency room records in 2010 reported foot pain 

due to gout (Ex. 23F/121). He was admitted for polyarthralgias (Ex. 23F/80) 

and examination revealed erythema on multiple joints (Ex. 23F/83, 92). XCase 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 19 of

 39
20 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

rays of the joints showed osteoarthritic changes. In 2011, he had 

swelling/edema in the upper and lower extremities and his condition of gout, 

osteoarthritis, and renal insufficiency were addressed (Ex. 23F/4). 

On February 10, 2011, the claimant went to the emergency room with 

complaints of pain and edema involving his hands and feet but denied chest 

pain or shortness of breath (Ex. 25F/3). The discharge diagnosis is acute 

arthralgia/myalgia (Ex. 35F/6). He has multiple other visits prior to this date 

in 2011 for complaints related to high blood sugar and bilateral foot and 

hand swelling (Ex. 35F/13). Exams showed mild tenderness and edema of 

the feet bilaterally with no erythema, warmth, and normal range of motion 

(Ex. 35F/14). 

(Id. at 518-19.) Based on this, the ALJ reasoned that Mangat’s “severe physical 

impairments . . . cause more than minimal limitations in work-related functioning.” (Id. 

at 520.) At step three, Judge Valentino concluded that Plaintiff did not have an 

impairment that met or medically equaled the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 

Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id.) In determining Mangat’s residual functional capacity 

(RFC), the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform a range of light work as defined in 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). (Id. at 521.) At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could 

not perform his past relevant work. (Id. at 525.) At step five, the ALJ found that from 

December 10, 2008, through March 9, 2011, Plaintiff could perform jobs that existed in 

significant numbers in the national economy. (Id. at 525-26.) Judge Valentino concluded 

that Plaintiff was not under a disability from December 10, 2008, through March 9, 2011. 

(Id. at 527.) 

2. Mangat’s Credibility 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's credibility determination and rejection of Mangat’s 

testimony are flawed. (Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 7-14, ECF No. 18.) 

Mangat argues that because the ALJ did not make a finding of malingering, he had to 

articulate clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the pain and limitation testimony. 

(Id. at 9.) Plaintiff points out that one of the purposes of the remand to the ALJ was to 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 20 of

 39
21 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

consider Mangat’s testimony in light of an expanded record, yet at the September 2, 2014 

remand hearing, Judge Valentino asked Plaintiff only two questions. (Id.) 

“In order for the ALJ to find [the claimant's] testimony unreliable, the ALJ must 

make ‘a credibility determination with findings sufficiently specific to permit the court to 

conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit [the] claimant's testimony.’” Turner v. 

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 613 F.3d 1217, 1224 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Thomas v. 

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002)). To decide whether a plaintiff's testimony 

regarding subjective pain is credible, the adjudicator must engage in a two-step analysis. 

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007); see Batson v. Comm'r of 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004). “‘First, the ALJ must determine 

whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying 

impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms 

alleged.’” Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036 (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 

344 (9th Cir. 1991)). Second, if the claimant satisfies the first step and there is no 

evidence of malingering, the ALJ may “reject the claimant's testimony about the severity 

of the symptoms if she gives ‘specific, clear and convincing reasons’” for doing so. Id. 

(quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996)); see Brown-Hunter v. 

Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 493 (9th Cir. 2015) (reaffirming the “clear and convincing” 

requirement for credibility findings). “While an ALJ may find testimony not credible in 

part or in whole, he or she may not disregard it solely because it is not substantiated 

affirmatively by objective medical evidence.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 

880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006); see Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282 (same). 

In this case, the ALJ found that between December 10, 2008, and March 9, 2011, 

Plaintiff suffered from coronary artery disease; arthralgia from gout and degenerative 

joint disease; diabetes mellitus; renal insufficiency; and hypertension. (Admin. R. 518, 

ECF No. 11.) Based on the objective medical evidence, Judge Valentino determined that 

Mangat suffered from severe physical impairments which caused limitations in workrelated functioning. (Id. at 520.) The first prong of the inquiry is therefore satisfied. 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 21 of

 39
22 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Furthermore, there is no evidence of malingering. Consequently, the Court must assess 

whether the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for discrediting Plaintiff's 

testimony concerning his subjective pain that are supported by evidence in the record. 

The ALJ found Mangat’s allegations “concerning the intensity, persistence, and 

limiting effects of his symptoms [were] less than fully credible.” (Id. at 522.) The ALJ 

gave the following explanation for the adverse credibility determination: 

The undersigned finds that the claimant’s allegations concerning the 

intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms are less than fully 

credible. The claimant alleges that his impairments prevent him from 

working during the relevant period. However, the claimant failed to submit 

a Function Report – Adult form so the undersigned is unable to ascertain the 

claimant’s activities of daily living. The record shows that the claimant 

primarily received routine and conservative treatment for his impairments 

with prescribed medications during the relevant period, as discussed above. 

Based on the totality of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the record 

supports finding the claimant capable of light work. 

(Id.) 

The reasons stated by the ALJ to discount Mangat’s credibility are not clear and 

convincing, which “‘is the most demanding [standard] required in Social Security 

cases.’” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Moore v. 

Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also Burrell v. 

Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2014) (reaffirming that “specific, clear, and 

convincing reasons” are required for rejecting a claimant’s testimony). “The ALJ must 

state specifically which symptom testimony is not credible and what facts in the record 

lead to that conclusion.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d at 1284; see also Orn v. Astrue, 495 

F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2007) (the ALJ must provide specific, cogent reasons for the 

disbelief and state the reasons why the testimony is not persuasive). “A finding that a 

claimant's testimony is not credible ‘must be sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing 

court to conclude the adjudicator rejected the claimant's testimony on permissible 

grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant's testimony regarding pain.’” BrownHunter, 806 F.3d at 493 (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d at 345-46. 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 22 of

 39
23 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 The ALJ’s credibility determination does not meet the clear and convincing 

standard because Judge Valentino failed to specify which of Mangat’s statements were 

unpersuasive. At the remand hearing, the ALJ asked Plaintiff only two questions, none 

of which elicited testimony about his symptoms. (Admin. R. 594, ECF No. 11.) The 

ALJ’s decision does not discuss Plaintiff’s answers, and Mangat did not testify about his 

limitations at either the September 2, 2014 hearing or the July 30, 2015 supplemental 

hearing. The adverse credibility finding in 2015 is also inconsistent with ALJ 

Valentino’s 2012 decision which accepted Mangat’s statements about his condition. On 

July 24, 2012, Plaintiff testified at the hearing before Judge Valentino,9

 and the ALJ 

concluded that Mangat was credible when he explained “that he is unable to work due to 

pain in his chest as well as swelling in his feet and elbows,” about his pain in the chest 

due to heart disease, and his fatigue and shortness of breath. (Id. at 680.) 

 In his 2012 decision, Judge Valentino held that Mangat had severe impairments, 

but singly or in combination, he did not have “an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments.” 

(Id. at 679.) Nevertheless, the ALJ concluded, “Considering the claimant’s age, 

education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are no jobs that exist 

in the national economy that the claimant can perform.” (Id. at 681 (emphasis added).) 

 Unlike in 2012, ALJ Valentino now concluded that for the period from December 

10, 2008, through March 9, 2011, Mangat could perform light work and could lift and 

carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently. (Id. at 521.) Furthermore, 

he found that Plaintiff would have been able to perform the requirements of occupations 

such as a counter clerk or usher. (Id. at 526.) Judge Valentino held that “[Mangat’s] 

allegations concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms are 

less than fully credible.” (Id. at 522.) 

                                               

9

 The transcript of that hearing is not part of the record before the Court. 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 23 of

 39
24 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

To support a finding that the plaintiff was not credible, the ALJ must “point to 

specific facts in the record which demonstrate that [the claimant] is in less pain than she 

claims.” Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993). The ALJ must make 

specific findings “stat[ing] which pain testimony is not credible and what evidence 

suggests the complaints are not credible.” Id. The ALJ may consider the following when 

assessing the claimant's credibility: (1) his reputation for truthfulness; (2) inconsistences 

in the claimant’s testimony or between the testimony and conduct; (3) the claimant’s 

daily activities; (4) work record; and (5) testimony from physicians and third parties 

concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the claimant’s symptoms. Thomas v. 

Barnhart, 278 F.3d at 958-59 (citing Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th 

Cir. 1997)). 

The Commissioner appears to argue that ALJ’s credibility determination was 

proper to the extent Mangat’s November 2010 testimony before ALJ Parker was in 

conflict with the medical evidence. (See Def.’s Cross-Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. 

& A. 14, ECF No. 20.) Even assuming the basis for ALJ Valentino’s credibility finding 

was his review of Mangat’s 2010 testimony before another judge, Judge Valentino’s 

2015 decision failed to identify which statements were inconsistent and why. See 

Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 493-94 (rejecting the determination that the claimant was not 

credible where the ALJ did not specifically identify any inconsistencies but “simply 

stated her non-credibility conclusion and then summarized the medical evidence 

supporting her RFC determination”). 

 In Brown-Hunter, the claimant challenged the ALJ’s rejection of her symptom 

testimony. Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 491. The district court rejected the claimant’s 

arguments, identifying inconsistences in the medical record that it believed “could be 

reasonable inferences drawn from the ALJ’s summary of the evidence.” See id. On 

appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the ALJ had failed to identify the testimony she found 

not credible and did not link that testimony to the particular parts of the record supporting 

the determination that the claimant was not credible. Id. at 493. The Court explained 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 24 of

 39
25 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that “[a] reviewing court may not make independent findings based on the evidence 

before the ALJ to conclude that the ALJ's error was harmless.” Id. at 492. Thus, even if 

the district court could identify inconsistencies with the medical record, the court’s 

analysis could not supplant the ALJ’s obligation to assess the claimant’s credibility. See 

id. 

Defendant cites Mangat’s testimony before ALJ Parker regarding the pain in his 

chest and feet as examples of statements that may be the basis for ALJ Valentino’s 

adverse credibility finding. (Def.’s Cross-Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 14, 

ECF No. 20.) Defendant alleges these statements conflict with the medical evidence in 

the record. (Id.) But the ALJ may not rely solely on a contradiction with, or a lack of 

support from, the objective medical evidence as a basis to find a claimant not credible. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2) (2016); Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856, 857 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (alteration in original) (“‘[O]nce a claimant produces objective medical 

evidence of an underlying impairment, an [ALJ] may not reject a claimant's subjective 

complaints based solely on a lack of objective medical evidence to fully corroborate the 

alleged severity of pain.’” (quoting Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345)). 

Furthermore, Judge Valentino did not cite these statements as reasons for finding 

Mangat only partially credible. The Court "cannot affirm the decision of an agency on a 

ground that the agency did not invoke in making its decision." Pinto v. Massanari, 249 

F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court is “constrained to review the reasons the ALJ 

asserts.” Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492 (quoting Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 

874 (9th Cir. 2003)). The ALJ's credibility discussion did not specifically refer to 

Plaintiff's statements to ALJ Parker or identify the grounds Defendant asserts support the 

ALJ's adverse credibility finding. Because ALJ Valentino did not rely on these reasons 

in his decision, the Defendant's later justifications cannot serve as the basis for an adverse 

credibility determination. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 

2008). 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 25 of

 39
26 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The ALJ wrote that Mangat’s “allegation of inability to work since December 10, 

2008, due to disability is . . . somewhat disingenuous given the fact he reported ceasing 

work activity due to being ‘laid off.’” (Admin. R. 522, ECF No. 11.) Defendant cites 

Bruton v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2001), arguing that the ALJ properly 

found Mangat less than fully credible because he was laid off from his job. (Def.’s 

Cross-Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 16, ECF No. 20.) In Bruton, the Ninth 

Circuit upheld an ALJ's negative credibility finding, in part, because the claimant “stated 

at the administrative hearing and to at least one of his doctors that he left his job because 

he was laid off,” not because he was injured. Id. at 828. Bruton, however, is factually 

distinct. There, the claimant testified at the administrative hearing that he was laid off; 

however, his disability application alleged that he stopped working because of “lower 

back pain, pain in his left arm, left shoulder, left leg, and left foot.” Bruton, 268 F.3d at 

826, 828. Further, the ALJ in Bruton gave additional reasons to reject pain testimony, 

including that the claimant waited nine months to seek any medical treatment despite his 

complaints of severe pain. Id. at 828. 

There are no comparable inconsistencies in this case. The disability report cited by 

the ALJ indicates that Plaintiff’s ability to work was limited due to “diabetes, difficulty 

walking and back pain.” (Admin. R. 188, ECF No. 11.) Plaintiff alleges that he was let 

go because he failed his breathing test. (Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 

10, ECF No. 18.) The medical record before the ALJ included Kaiser Permanente 

records from October 29, 2008, indicating that Mangat had active tuberculosis six to 

eight years prior to that, has chronic scarring on his x-ray, and was unable to pass the 

respirator test at work. (Id. at 9-10; see Admin. R. 271, ECF No. 11.) The record does 

not support inferences that Mangat did not suffer from severe impairments and sought 

disability benefits because he had been laid off. The ALJ’s 2015 decision acknowledges 

that prior to the alleged disability date Plaintiff sought treatment for “acute conditions 

and . . . gout flare-ups, hand and knee swelling, and elevated sugar levels.” (Id. at 518.) 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 26 of

 39
27 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Additionally, three years earlier, in his July 24, 2012 decision, Judge Valentino found 

that Mangat’s testimony about his inability to work was credible. (Id. at 680.) 

The ALJ also stated that he was unable to ascertain Mangat’s activities of daily 

living because Plaintiff did not submit a report form. (Id. at 522.) The decision does not 

point out to any discrepancy in the record or explain how the absence of a report 

undermined Plaintiff’s credibility. Plaintiff argues that he testified to his daily activities 

at the first hearing before Judge Parker, and if the ALJ perceived any inconsistency, he 

should have inquired to resolve it. (Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 13, 

ECF No. 18.) Ambiguous evidence, or the ALJ's finding that the record is inadequate to 

allow for proper evaluation of the evidence, triggers the ALJ's duty to “conduct an 

appropriate inquiry.” See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1288; Armstrong v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 160 F.3d 587, 590 (9th Cir. 1998). If the ALJ were concerned about the 

Plaintiff’s ability to perform daily activities, he could have questioned Mangat at the 

hearing. 

The ALJ's stated rational does not provide an adequate basis for rejecting Plaintiff's 

subjective complaints. The ALJ's credibility determination was conclusory and failed to 

offer clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence to find that 

Plaintiff's allegations were not credible. Defendant’s examples attempt to extrapolate 

from the ALJ's recitation of the medical evidence; they are not grounds expressly stated 

by the ALJ as supporting an adverse credibility determination. This court may not draw 

inferences from the ALJ's summary of the medical evidence to find a basis for affirming 

the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination. Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492. Because 

Judge Valentino failed to give specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discounting 

Mangat’s alleged limitations, the ALJ’s credibility finding was not supported by 

substantial evidence. 

3. Treating Physician Evidence 

Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred in concluding that Mangat had the residual 

functional capacity to perform light work because the ALJ adopted the opinions of the 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 27 of

 39
28 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

nonexamining physician, Dr. Vu, over every examining physician in the record. (Pl.’s 

Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 15, ECF No. 18.) Mangat argues that the 

opinion of Dr. Sacamay, his treating physician, was entitled to more weight and was 

consistent with other medical evidence, including the opinions of Dr. Dao, the 

consultative examiner who saw Plaintiff in November of 2009. (Id. at 23.) Plaintiff 

argues that in granting disability on his subsequent application, Judge Valentino relied on 

Dr. Sacamay’s report indicating a diagnosis of uncontrolled diabetes, chronic renal 

failure, polyarticular gouty arthritis, coronary artery disease status post bypass surgery 

2009, history of congestive heart failure, and hypertension with fatigue, joint swelling 

and pain. (Id. at 16.) Mangat also points out that after reversing the first unfavorable 

determination, the district court remanded the case to evaluate the additional medical 

evidence from Dr. Sacamay, as well as Mangat’s testimony in light of this evidence. (Id. 

at 16-17.) 

A treating source's opinion about the nature and severity of a medical condition 

must be given controlling weight when it “is well-supported by medically acceptable 

clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other 

substantial evidence in [the] case record . . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (2016). If a 

treating physician's opinion “is not well-supported” or “is inconsistent with other 

substantial evidence in the record,” it should not be given controlling weight. Orn, 495 

F.3d at 631. When a treating source's opinion is not given controlling weight, its 

probative value must be determined by considering the following factors: (1) the length 

of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination; (2) the nature and depth 

of the treatment relationship; (3) the degree of support, particularly in the form of 

medical records and tests, for the treating source's opinion; (4) the opinion’s consistency 

with the record as a whole; (5) whether the treating source is a specialist in the area of 

treatment; (6) other factors relevant to the determination. Id. § 404.1527(c)(2)(i)-(ii), 

(c)(3)-(6). Substantial evidence that contradicts a treating physician's opinion may 

consist of either (1) an examining physician's opinion or (2) a non-examining physician's 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 28 of

 39
29 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

opinion combined with other evidence. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 

1995). 

On remand, pursuant to the district court’s order and the directions from the 

Appeals Council, the ALJ was to “reconsider the weight afforded to Dr. Sacamay’s 

opinion and reconsider the claimant’s subjective complaints in light of the additional 

evidence.” (Admin. R. 515, ECF No. 11.) In his decision dated August 25, 2015, the 

ALJ found Mangat capable of performing light work. (Id. at 525.) In reaching this 

conclusion, Judge Valentino discussed the medical opinions of Dr. Dao, the consultative 

examiner who saw Plaintiff in November of 2009, and Dr. Vu, the non-examining expert. 

(Id. at 522-23.) Judge Valentino gave “great weight to Dr. Vu’s very thorough and 

detailed medical expert opinion and testimony at the supplemental hearing.” (Id. at 523.) 

The ALJ gave lesser weight to Dr. Dao’s opinion limiting the claimant to sedentary work 

based on internal inconsistencies with an “unremarkable physical examination.” (Id. at 

524.) He afforded “greater weight to the non-examining State agency medical 

consultants’ opinions, at the initial and reconsideration levels, that the claimant could 

perform light work.” (Id.) With regard to Dr. Sacamay’s diagnosis and opinion, the ALJ 

wrote: 

The undersigned gives lesser weight to the treating source opinions 

from Dr. Sacamay (Ex. 23F, 24F, and 36F). On March 9, 2011, Dr. 

Sacamay wrote on a prescription pad a note stating that the claimant had 

multiple medical problems and he would be unable and ineffective for 

employment (Ex. 23F/2 and 36F/1). Dr. Sacamay did not include any 

supporting narrative statement detailing the claimant’s objective and clinical 

findings. The opinion does not state the treatment provided to the claimant, 

nor does it explain why treatment has failed to control the claimant’s 

symptoms. . . . . In contrast, Dr. Sacamay completed a Physical Residual 

Functional Capacity Questionnaire on March 10, 2011, which detailed the 

claimant’s impairments and resulting limitations (Ex. 36F). . . . . The 

undersigned does not find that this opinion relates back to December 10, 

2008, nor does Dr. Sacamay opine that it does (Ex. 36F). There is also no 

other medical opinion in the record to support Dr. Sacamay’s opinion of a 

less than sedentary RFC prior to March 10, 2011, let alone back to 

December 10, 2008. The earliest medical evidence from Dr. Sacamay in the 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 29 of

 39
30 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

record is October 18, 2010, and the progress note is mostly illegible with 

only a mention of complaints of back pain due to a kidney stone (Ex. 22F/3). 

This is not sufficient evidence to support Dr. Sacamay’s March 10, 2011, 

opinion to relate back to December 10, 2008 through March 9, 2011. 

(Id.) 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in concluding that Dr. Sacamay’s opinion 

cannot relate back to the alleged onset date. (Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & 

A. 17, ECF No. 18.) Mangat cites Social Security Ruling 83-20 to support the claim that 

his impairments predate the treating physician’s report date because they are not of 

traumatic origin. (Id.) 

 Social Security Ruling 83-20 (“SSR 83–20”) provides rules for determining the 

onset date of a disability. See generally SSR 83-20, 1983 WL 31249, at *1 (1983). “[I]t 

is essential that the onset date be correctly established and supported by the evidence 

. . . .” Id. The Ruling provides that for disabilities without a “traumatic origin,” the 

Commissioner should consider “the applicant's allegations, work history, if any, and the 

medical and other evidence concerning impairment severity[,]” and “[w]ith slowly 

progressive impairments, it is sometimes impossible to obtain medical evidence 

establishing the precise date an impairment became disabling.” Id. at *2. Specifically, 

when precise information is not available, “it may be possible, based on the medical 

evidence[,] to reasonably infer that the onset of a disabling impairment(s) occurred some 

time prior to the date of the first recorded medical examination, e.g., the date the claimant 

stopped working.” Id. at *3. 

 Defendant argues that Mangat cannot rely on Dr. Sacamay’s March 10, 2011 

report because “Plaintiff was adamant at the remand hearings that the ALJ should not 

consider any evidence after the relevant period.” (Def.’s Cross-Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 

Mem. P. & A. 8, ECF No. 20.) The Commissioner misstates the record. At the remand 

hearing, the ALJ addressed the procedural posture of the case, and acknowledged that 

Plaintiff received a favorable decision on the subsequent application with the onset date 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 30 of

 39
31 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of March 10, 2011. (Admin. R. 537, ECF No. 11.) The ALJ expressed a concern that by 

cross-examining the medical expert, Plaintiff’s counsel may jeopardize the favorable 

decision that Judge Valentino had entered for the later period: “So, it’s entirely your call. 

[Medical expert] will testify to the current period. I awarded him disability, an onset of 

3/10/11, so now we’re going back to December, 2008 through the present date here. (Id. 

at 538.) In response, Mangat’s counsel argued that the remand proceeding would not 

affect the subsequent decision issued in 2012: 

ATTY: So, the period of this remand hearing, which this is the remand 

hearing. The decision that you have made on the other case was for a 

subsequent application that this remand case had not been associated with. 

So, my question is — and if it’s going to be different for you I will present it 

to Mr. Mangat, but the period that I believe we were — are here about is 

from December 10th, 2008 to[,] I believe, March 1 or March 10th, 2011 

only. The subsequent period is not in this record, nor was it put before Dr. 

Vu — presented to him. And I also note that the 26F, the records go up to, I 

think 32F or something like that, and the part of issue that I think arose, and 

I know that I covered some of this in the reply that I had sent, but — like for 

example the coronary artery disease, [Dr. Vu] indicates that he had a 

recovery, you know, a good recovery from them, but he’s had two stentings 

since due to almost full oc[c]lusions. In August of 2010 and also in, I think, 

it was March of 2011. So — and that record is actually in an exhibit after 

26F, the 2010. So, I mean I would be happy to go forward to discuss the 

period prior to March, 2011, but I do not believe his current — the second 

application would be open because it had also been issued more than a year, 

it’s almost three years old at this point, the 2012. 

(Id. at 538-39.) Mangat points out that his counsel did not focus on the later report 

because “the ALJ threatened to take Mr. Mangat’s benefits after March 2011 away 

reopening the entire period despite the directive of the Appeals Council.” (Pl.’s Reply 5, 

ECF No. 27.) 

The ALJ erred in concluding that Dr. Sacamay’s March 10, 2011 report did not 

“relate” to the disability period ending March 9, 2011. Medical reports containing 

observations made after the period of disability are relevant to assess the disability. 

Lester, 81 F.3d at 832. The ALJ must consider impairments even if they were diagnosed 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 31 of

 39
32 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

after the alleged onset date. See Carmickle v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 

1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the ALJ erred by rejecting limitations because they 

were based on a “recent” diagnosis of a “non-severe” impairment). “It is obvious that 

medical reports are inevitably rendered retrospectively and should not be disregarded 

solely on that basis.” Smith v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Bilby 

v. Schweiker, 762 F.2d 716, 719 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

The ALJ also failed to give sufficiently specific reasons for rejecting the March 9, 

2011 note in which Dr. Sacamay stated that Mangat was unable to work due to his 

“multiple medical problems.” (Admin. R. 524, ECF No. 11.) The decision argued that 

opinions regarding inability to work are “issues for the Commissioner and are not 

considered medical opinions.” (Id.) “Although the ALJ is not bound by an expert 

medical opinion on the ultimate question of disability, [the ALJ] must provide ‘specific 

and legitimate’ reasons for rejecting the opinion of a treating physician.” Tommasetti, 

533 F.3d at 1041. Still, “[t]he Commissioner is required to give weight not only to the 

treating physician's clinical findings and interpretation of test results, but also to his 

subjective judgments. Lester, 81 F.3d at 832-33 (citing Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 

422 (9th Cir. 1988)). The Ninth Circuit explained in Embrey that “[t]he subjective 

judgments of treating physicians are important, and properly play a part in their medical 

evaluations. Accordingly, the ultimate conclusions of those physicians must be given 

substantial weight; they cannot be disregarded unless clear and convincing reasons for 

doing so exist and are set forth in proper detail.” Embrey, 849 F.2d at 422 (reversing and 

remanding because the ALJ failed to give sufficiently specific reasons for rejecting the 

conclusion of three treating physicians and one consulting physician that the claimant 

was disabled due to his medical condition). 

Judge Valentino rejected the March 9, 2011 note as unsupported by any “narrative 

statement detailing the claimant’s objective and clinical findings.” (Admin. R. 524, ECF 

No. 11.) He contrasted the note with the report Dr. Sacamay completed the following 

day, on March 10, 2011, which detailed Plaintiff’s impairments and resulting limitations. 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 32 of

 39
33 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Even though the physician’s report was made the next day, the ALJ refused to view these 

statements jointly, but instead distinguished the later report as “evidence that supported 

the prior favorable decision whereby the claimant requested an amended onset date of 

March 10, 2011.” (Id.) Dr. Sacamay’s March 9, 2011 note regarding disability was 

brief, but she had treated Mangat since March 2010, (see id. at 409-10), and her diagnosis 

should have been given more consideration. As discussed above, the March 10, 2011 

report should have been considered contemporaneously with the note to evaluate the 

existence of disability in the preceding period. See Smith, 849 F.2d at 1225 (citing Kemp 

v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 967, 969 (9th Cir. 1975)). 

Judge Valentino stated that “the earliest medical evidence from Dr. Sacamay in the 

record is October 18, 2010,” but discounted that evidence as “mostly illegible with only a 

mention of complaints of back pain due to a kidney stone.” (Admin. R. 524, ECF No. 

11.) Yet, the record shows that Dr. Sacamay treated Mangat in March 2010. (See id. at 

409-10.) Furthermore, Dr. Sacamay diagnosed Mangat with stage three chronic kidney 

disease on October 18, 2010. (Id. at 493.) Other medical evidence in the record supports 

the conclusion that Mangat suffered from chronic renal disease. On November 17, 2010, 

ALJ Parker wrote that Plaintiff had “chronic renal insufficiency secondary to his 

diabetes.” (See id. at 21.) Judge Valentino’s conclusory statement that “Dr. Sacamay’s 

opinion is inconsistent with the medical evidence discussed above” is contradicted by 

ALJ Parker’s 2010 decision. 

Diagnosis and treatment for multiple other conditions that predate Dr. Sacamay’s 

March 10, 2011 report were acknowledged by Judge Valentino. For example, records 

from Kaiser dating from March to October 2008 showed treatment for acute conditions, 

gout flare-ups, hand and knee swelling, and elevated sugar levels. (Id. at 518.) Operation 

Samahan records from 2009 indicated a diagnosis of neuropathy, swelling, and gouty 

arthritis. (Id.) Mangat’s urgent coronary bypass procedure at Sharp Chula Vista was on 

November 12, 2009. (Id.) Shortly after the bypass, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Dao, 

the agency examining consultant, who noted diabetes mellitus, hypertension, and 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 33 of

 39
34 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

coronary artery disease, and limited Mangat to sedentary work. (Id. at 519.) In 

December 2009, Mangat’s recovery was slow and his EKG showed some abnormality. 

(See id.) Two months later, in February 2010, Plaintiff was admitted to the Paradise 

Valley Hospital for polyarthralgia. He had a positive ANA test, his echocardiogram 

showed “diastolic dysfunction and mild pulmonic insufficiency,” and ultrasound showed 

multiple renal stones. (Id.) Throughout 2010 Mangat was treated at Samahan Medical 

for various conditions, including swelling and joint pains, congestion issues, positive 

ANA, and elevated proteins. He visited Paradise Valley emergency room multiple times 

in 2010 to treat swelling and pain in his hands and feet, as well as high blood sugar, and 

was diagnosed with acute arthralgia/myalgia. (Id.) 

Despite describing objective evidence of Plaintiff’s severe medical impairments, 

the ALJ gave little weight to the treating physician’s opinion regarding disability. (Id. at 

524.) The specific reasons given by the ALJ do not legitimately warrant giving little 

weight to Dr. Sacamay’s opinion. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d at 830) (“A treating physician's opinion on disability, 

even if controverted, can be rejected only with specific and legitimate reasons supported 

by substantial evidence in the record.”). Judge Valentino assigned great weight to the 

conclusions of the nonexamining physician, Dr. Vu, whose opinion appears to contradict 

that of Dr. Sacamay. (Id. at 523-24.) "The opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot 

by itself constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either 

an examining or a treating physician." Lester, 81 F.3d at 831 (citing Pitzer v. Sullivan, 

908 F.2d 502, 506 n.4 (9th Cir. 1990); Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1456 (9th Cir. 

1984)). "[T]he report of [a] non-treating, non-examining physician, combined with the 

ALJ's own observance of [the] claimant's demeanor at the hearing did not constitute 

substantial evidence" and does not support an ALJ's "decision to reject the examining 

physician's opinion that the claimant was disabled." Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 

Gallant, 753 F.2d at 1456) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 34 of

 39
35 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Moreover, an ALJ' s conclusory statement that a treating physician's opinion is 

unsupported by medical evidence is insufficient to overcome the deference afforded 

treating doctors' conclusions concerning their patients. See Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725 n.7 

(citing Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d at 422) (“To say that medical opinions are not 

supported by sufficient objecting findings or are contrary to the preponderant conclusions 

mandated by the objective findings does not achieve the level of specificity our prior 

cases have required, even when the objective factors are listed seriatim.”). Dr. Sacamay 

treated Plaintiff extensively and concluded that Mangat likely qualified for disability 

because he was unable to work due to his “multiple medical problems.” (Admin. R. 524, 

ECF No. 11.) Based on the length of the treatment relationship and her experience with 

Mangat, Dr. Sacamay was in the best position to opine on Plaintiff's multiple medical 

conditions. Lester, 81 F.3d at 833 ("The treating physician's continuing relationship with 

the claimant makes him especially qualified to evaluate reports from examining doctors, 

to integrate the medical information they provide, and to form an overall conclusion as to 

functional capacities and limitations, as well as to prescribe or approve the overall course 

of treatment."). The ALJ failed to articulate specific reasons supported by substantial 

evidence for rejecting Dr. Sacamay’s conclusions. 

D. Remand for Award of Benefits 

The court has discretion to remand a case either for additional evidence and 

findings or to award benefits. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d at 1292. Mangat argues that the 

ALJ’s decision should be reversed and the case remanded to the agency for an award of 

benefits. (Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 23-24, ECF No. 18.) In the 

alternative, Plaintiff argues that the Court should remand the case for further proceedings, 

including consideration of Mangat’s onset date prior to March 10, 2011; reaffirming 

disability prior to that date; and evaluating Mangat’s testimony “in light of the expanded 

record.” (Id. at 24.) 

The Commissioner disagrees that the Court should reverse the ALJ’s decision, but 

urges that if the agency is reversed, the proper remedy would be to remand for further 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 35 of

 39
36 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

administrative proceedings. (Def.’s Cross-Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 19-

20, ECF No. 20.) 

"Remand for further administrative proceedings is appropriate if enhancement of 

the record would be useful." Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(citing Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000)). If, however, the record 

has been fully developed and further proceedings would serve no useful purpose, the 

court should remand with directions to award benefits. Id. at 593 (citing Smolen, 80 F.3d 

at 1292). 

More specifically, the district court should credit evidence that was rejected 

during the administrative process and remand for an immediate award of 

benefits if (1) the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for 

rejecting the evidence; (2) there are no outstanding issues that must be 

resolved before a determination of disability can be made; and (3) it is clear 

from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled 

were such evidence credited. 

 

Id. (citing Harman, 211 F.3d at 1178). 

 In a more recent case, Trnavsky v. Colvin, 636 F. App’x 390, 391 (9th Cir. 2016), 

the court explained the Harman analysis. “If the first element [under Harman] is met, the 

district court may credit the rejected evidence as true as a matter of law (the ‘credit-astrue’ doctrine) and analyze the next two elements of the Harman test under that 

assumption.” Id. (citing Benecke, 379 F.3d at 594). 

In this case, the ALJ did not provide legally sufficient reasons for discrediting 

Mangat’s pain and limitation testimony. There is little support in the record for the ALJ’s 

adverse credibility finding, given that Mangat was asked only two questions at the 

remand hearing. Furthermore, the ALJ erred in giving lesser weight to the opinion of the 

treating physician Dr. Sacamay regarding Plaintiff’s disability. Much of the medical 

record predates Dr. Sacamay’s March 10, 2011 diagnosis, and the ALJ should have 

considered that opinion to assess Mangat’s disability during the relevant period. Lester, 

81 F.3d at 832. The decision instead relied on the conclusions of the nonexamining 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 36 of

 39
37 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

medical expert. Yet, the medical consultant did not disagree with Dr. Sacamay’s 

diagnosis, (see Admin. R. 1310, ECF No. 11), but merely reached different conclusions 

with regard to Mangat’s limitations. Because the ALJ failed to give legally sufficient 

reasons for rejecting the treating physician’s opinion and discounting Mangat’s pain and 

limitations testimony, the first step of the Harman analysis is satisfied. See Benecke v. 

Barnhart, 379 F.3d at 594. 

 At step two of the Harman analysis, the court exercises its discretion to determine 

whether “no outstanding issues remain after crediting [the treating physician’s] opinion 

as true, even though [a nonexamining physician] disagreed with the [treating physician’s] 

assessment.” Trnavsky, 636 F. App’x at 392. In Trnavsky, the court found that the 

nonexamining physician’s opinion was based on “conjecture” and did not “materially 

conflict” with the opinion of the treating physician. Id. “The credit-as-true rule permits a 

reviewing court to ‘credit as true’ an improperly rejected treating physician’s assessment 

over a non-examining non-treating physician’s contrary opinion on the same question.” 

The district court’s finding that the latter’s opinion was not enough to raise an 

“outstanding issue” was within its discretion. See id. 

 In Mangat’s case, Dr. Vu was a nonexamining, nontreating medical expert. (See 

Admin. R. 535-40, ECF No. 11.) The doctor reviewed the records and concluded that 

Mangat’s impairments, combined or separately, did not “meet or equal any impairment 

described in the Listing of Impairments.” (Id. at 524, 1311.) Crediting Dr. Sacamy’s 

statements as true, the opinions of a nonexamining and nontreating physician do not raise 

outstanding issues that would need to be resolved on remand. This is especially true 

considering that Dr. Vu acknowledged that his opinion would change if medical records 

existed which show that additional heart stent procedures took place. (See Admin. R. 

563, ECF No. 11.) 

If the improperly discredited medical evidence were credited as true, the ALJ 

would be required to find Mangat disabled on remand, meeting the third prong of the 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 37 of

 39
38 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Harman analysis. See Trnavsky, 636 F. App’x at 393. This conclusion is consistent with 

Ninth Circuit precedent. 

In Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit found 

that substantial evidence did not support the conclusion that the claimant's condition did 

not meet or equal a listed impairment because the ALJ did not provide specific reasons 

for disregarding the opinion of the treating physician. Rather than remanding for further 

proceedings, the Ninth Circuit accepted the treating physician's opinion and ordered the 

payment of benefits. Id. In Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1987), the 

Ninth Circuit awarded benefits because no legitimate reasons were given for disregarding 

the physician's opinion and the Secretary's decision was not supported by substantial 

evidence. Again, in Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990), the court 

awarded benefits when the ALJ did not provide legitimate reasons for disregarding the 

opinion of the treating physician and there was "no legitimate conflicting testimony." 

Accordingly, a remand for an award of benefits is proper, and within this Court’s 

discretion. See id. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment should be 

GRANTED, Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED, and the 

case be REMANDED for an award of benefits. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion 

to Augment the Record. 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District 

Court Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or 

before January 6, 2017. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and 

Recommendation.” Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed on or before 

January 20, 2017. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

// 

// 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 38 of

 39
39 

15cv2312 AJB RBB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 

951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: December 13, 2016 

cc: Judge Battaglia 

 Counsel of Record 

Case 3:15-cv-02312-AJB-RBB Document 30 Filed 12/13/16 PageID.<pageID> Page 39 of

 39