Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01698/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01698-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, )

)

Plaintiff/Respondent, )

) CR 05-00923 PHX NVW

v. ) CV 13-01698 PHX NVW MEA

) 

Rayford L. Terrell, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

 Defendant/Movant. )

_________________________________)

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE:

On August 16, 2013, Mr. Rayford Terrell (“Movant”),

filed a pro se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which was dismissed with leave to

amend. Movant filed an amended motion on December 16, 2013. See

Doc. 4. On June 3, 2014, Respondent filed an Opposition to

Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2255 (“Response”) (Doc. 6). Movant docketed a reply

(Doc. 7) to the response to his motion on June 24, 2014. 

I Procedural History

A grand jury indictment returned September 14, 2005,

charged Movant (and one co-defendant) with one count of being a

felon in possession of a firearm and also alleged forfeiture,

with regard to a crime allegedly committed June 9, 2005. See

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Criminal Doc. 3. A superseding indictment returned by a federal

grand jury on September 20, 2006, charged Movant with one count

of being a “Felon in Possession of a Firearm/Armed Career

Criminal, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and

924(e)”, and also alleged forfeiture. Criminal Doc. 57. On

November 28, 2007, at the conclusion of a two-day trial

conducted by the Honorable Frederick J. Martone, the jury found

Movant guilty as charged. 

Pursuant to this conviction, in an order docketed

December 10, 2008, the Court sentenced Movant to a term of 188

months imprisonment followed by a term of five years of

supervised release. See Criminal Doc. 236. The Court further

found Movant had forfeited “any interest that he has in the

FEG.380 caliber handgun serial number L046344 to the United

States of America.” Id. 

Movant took a timely direct appeal of his conviction

and sentence. In a decision entered February 2, 2010, the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Movant’s conviction and

sentence. The Ninth Circuit determined:

The district court enhanced Terrell’s

sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act

(“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-31, which raises

the mandatory minimum sentence for convicted

felons in possession of a firearm who have

“three previous convictions ... for a violent

felony.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Terrell

argues that the prior convictions relied upon

for the enhancement—sexual assault under

Arizona law, second-degree burglary under

Arizona law, and second-degree burglary under

Missouri law—do not qualify as “violent

felon[ies]” under the ACCA. We hold that all

of these prior offenses fit categorically

within the ACCA’s residual clause in that

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they “involve[ ] conduct that presents a

serious potential risk of physical injury to

another.” Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Thus, we

affirm the district court’s decision to

enhance Terrell’s sentence.

Criminal Doc. 268, Attach 2.

Petitioner sought a rehearing en banc, which relief was

denied on August 13, 2010, with four judges dissenting from the

denial of rehearing en banc. The dissent to the denial of a

rehearing en banc opined:

Judge M. SMITH, with whom Chief Judge

KOZINSKI and Judges PREGERSON and REINHARDT

join, dissenting from the denial of rehearing

en banc:

 Just one year ago, Chief Judge Kozinski

presciently observed that we had on our hands

“a train wreck in the making.” United States

v. Mayer, 560 F.3d 948, 951 (9th Cir. 2009)

(Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from the denial

of rehearing en banc). For years we had

become accustomed to applying uniformly the

Taylor categorical approach in our

immigration and criminal sentencing

jurisprudence. Mayer ended that practice. It

developed a unique categorical approach for

cases involving the Armed Career Criminal Act

(ACCA) and the Sentencing Guidelines career

offender provision. It also expanded those

provisions’ “residual clause” to cover nearly

any crime. Chief Judge Kozinski warned of the

growing number of casualties that would

result in our circuit following our decision

in Mayer. See id. at 954. Add Rayford Terrell

as the next name on that list, and expect it

to grow after the panel’s decision here. In

this case the panel holds that we can find a

categorical match—and apply a substantial

sentence enhancement— without reference to a

single state case or other objective measure

of whether the state offense falls within the

definition of the generic federal offense

that Congress intended to be the basis for

enhancement. Apparently, a panel’s gut

instinct is all that matters. It also holds

that a state offense that lacks one of the

generic crime’s key elements—key because it

makes the generic offense inherently

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violent—is “almost always” the same offense

as the corresponding generic crime. As a

result, we have officially abandoned the

categorical approach in “residual clause”

cases. Because I believe the panel’s approach

is contrary to the intent of Congress and

Supreme Court case law, I respectfully

dissent from the court’s denial of rehearing

en banc. 

Criminal Doc. 268, Attach 1. 

Movant sought a writ of certiorari, which petition was

denied by the United States Supreme Court on April 18, 2011.

In his pending section 2255 action, initiated August

16, 2013, Movant asks the Court to vacate his conviction,

asserting that the United States Supreme Court has made the

holding in Descamps v. United States retroactively applicable to

cases like Movant’s upon collateral review. See Doc. 4. 

Respondent contends the section 2255 motion should be

summarily denied because it is both time-barred and because

Movant’s conviction is “not subject to review under Descamps v.

United States, 133 S.Ct. 2276 (2013), the sole case/issue argued

by defendant.” Doc. 6.

Movant does not dispute that his conviction was “final”

on April 18, 2011, when the Supreme Court denied certiorari in

his direct appeal. Movant asserts that his action is timely

pursuant to section 2255(f)(3), which provides for a different

beginning of the running of the statute of limitations than when

a conviction becomes final upon the conclusion of direct review.

II Analysis

Respondent contends Movant’s section 2255 action, filed

August 16, 2013, was not filed within the one-year statute of

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limitations.

Section 2255 provides, inter alia:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to

a motion under this section. The limitation

period shall run from the latest of--

(1) the date on which the judgment of

conviction becomes final; 

(2) the date on which the impediment to

making a motion created by governmental

action in violation of the Constitution or

laws of the United States is removed, if the

movant was prevented from making a motion by

such governmental action; 

(3) the date on which the right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if

that right has been newly recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review...

Movant contends his action is timely because he asserts

a right initially recognized by the Supreme Court in Descamps v.

United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, which was decided on June 20,

2013, allowing him until June 20, 2014, to file a section 2255

motion seeking collateral review. 

In Descamps, reversing a decision of the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that the federal courts

may not apply the modified categorical approach to sentencing

under Armed Career Criminals Act (“ACCA”) when the crime of

conviction has a single, indivisible set of elements.

Until at least 2009, confusion existed

regarding the approach sentencing courts must

take in determining whether a prior

conviction fits the definition of “crime of

violence” set forth in § 4B1.2(a)(2). See

United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 405

(7th Cir. 2009). Prior to Woods, courts in

this circuit used different approaches,

sometimes called the categorical approach and

the modified categorical approach, in

determining whether a prior conviction

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constituted a “crime of violence” under §

4B1.2(a)(2). .... In 2013, the Supreme Court

adopted the divisible/indivisible distinction

as discussed in Woods. See Descamps v. United

States, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2276,

2281, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013). To date, the

Supreme Court has not made Descamps

retroactive on collateral review.

Groves v. United States, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 2766171, at *4

(7th Cir. June 19, 2014)

However, with regard to the applicability of section

2255(f)(3), the Supreme Court has clearly stated that “a new

rule is not made retroactive to cases on collateral review

unless the Supreme Court holds it to be retroactive.” Tyler v.

Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 663, 121 S. Ct. 2478, 2482 (2001). As noted

by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Groves, issued June

19, 2014, the Supreme Court has not declared the decision in

Descamps to be retroactively applicable on collateral review. 

Additionally, several federal District Courts have

concluded that: 

The Supreme Court did not state in Descamps

that the decision represented a new rule of

law. ... 

 While no circuit court has addressed the

issue, the district courts that have done so

consistently hold that Descamps does not

apply retroactively to cases on collateral

review.

United States v. Chapman, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2014 WL 1931814,

at *4 (S.D. Tex. May 14, 2014) (collecting unpublished cases by

the federal District Courts so holding).

In reply to the response to his section 2255 motion,

Movant contends his claim is cognizable on collateral review

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Generally speaking, when the Supreme Court

announces “a ‘new rule,’ that rule applies to all

criminal cases still pending on direct review.”

Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351, 124

S.Ct. 2519, [] (2004) []. Where a conviction is

“already final, however, the rule applies only in

limited circumstances.” Schriro, 542 U.S. at 351,

124 S.Ct. 2519. New procedural rules apply

retroactively to cases on collateral review only

if they fall within the “small set of watershed

rules of criminal procedure implicating the

fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal

proceeding.” Id. at 352, 124 S.Ct. 2519 []. This

is because such rules “regulate only the manner

of determining the defendant’s culpability.”

Schriro, 542 U.S. at 353, 124 S.Ct. 2519. “They

do not produce a class of persons convicted of

conduct the law does not make criminal, but

merely raise the possibility that someone

convicted with use of the invalidated procedure

might have been acquitted otherwise.” Id. at 352,

124 S.Ct. 2519.

 “New substantive rules,” in contrast, “generally

apply retroactively. This includes decisions that

narrow the scope of a criminal statute by

interpreting its terms, as well as constitutional

determinations that place particular conduct or

persons covered by the statute beyond the State's

power to punish.” Id. at 351-52[]. “A rule is

substantive rather than procedural if it alters

the range of conduct or the class of persons that

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because the error was a “fundamental defect which inherently

results in a miscarriage of justice.” Movant contends the rule

stated in Descamps is a “new substantive rule” which must be

applied to his conviction and sentence. Movant argues that,

because Descamps is applicable to his case his section 2255

motion was filed within the time specified in section 2255(f).

Movant asserts the Court has the discretion to apply Descamps

and order he be resentenced notwithstanding any procedural bar

to his motion for relief, citing United States v. Thomas, 627

F.3d 534 (4th Cir. 2010).1

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the law punishes.” Schriro, 542 U.S. at 353, 124

S.Ct. 2519. “Such rules apply retroactively

because they necessarily carry a significant risk

that a defendant stands convicted of an act that

the law does not make criminal or faces a

punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.”

Id. at 352, 124 S.Ct. 2519 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Thomas, 627 F.3d at 537.

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III Conclusion

The section 2255 action was not filed within one year

of the date Movant’s conviction became final upon direct review.

Movant is not entitled to a different beginning of the running

of the statute of limitations based on the Supreme Court’s

opinion in Descamps because that decision has not been made

retroactive to cases on collateral review.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Terrell’s motion

for relief from his conviction and sentence pursuant to section

2255 be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

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file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. 

Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil Procedure

for the United States District Court for the District of

Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to de novo appellate consideration of the issues. See United

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of

fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

DATED this 25th day of June, 2014.

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