Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01657/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01657-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CODY CROUCH, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

)

v. )

)

RALPH DIAZ, Warden, ) 

 )

Respondent. )

)

 )

1:12-cv—01657-SKO-HC

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION

TO STAY THE PETITION PURSUANT TO

RHINES v. WEBER (Doc. 2)

ORDER TO PETITIONER TO SHOW CAUSE

IN THIRTY (30) DAYS WHY THE

PETITION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED

FOR PETITIONER’S FAILURE TO

EXHAUST STATE COURT REMEDIES

(Doc. 1)

DEADLINE: THIRTY (30) DAYS 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1),

Petitioner has consented to the jurisdiction of the United States

Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings in the case,

including the entry of final judgment, by manifesting consent in

a signed writing filed by Petitioner on November 2, 2012 (doc.

5). Pending before the Court are the petition and Petitioner’s

motion for a stay of the proceedings, which were filed on October

10, 2012.

I. Screening the Petition 

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United

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States District Courts (Habeas Rules) requires the Court to make

a preliminary review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus.

The Court must summarily dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly

appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court....” 

Habeas Rule 4; O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir.

1990); see also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir.

1990). Habeas Rule 2(c) requires that a petition 1) specify all

grounds of relief available to the Petitioner; 2) state the facts

supporting each ground; and 3) state the relief requested. 

Notice pleading is not sufficient; the petition must state facts

that point to a real possibility of constitutional error. Rule

4, Advisory Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption; O’Bremski v. Maass,

915 F.2d at 420 (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75

n.7 (1977)). Allegations in a petition that are vague,

conclusory, or palpably incredible are subject to summary

dismissal. Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d at 491.

The Court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus

either on its own motion under Habeas Rule 4, pursuant to the

respondent's motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the

petition has been filed. Advisory Committee Notes to Habeas Rule

8, 1976 Adoption; see, Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042-43

(9th Cir. 2001). A petition for habeas corpus should not be

dismissed without leave to amend unless it appears that no

tenable claim for relief can be pleaded were such leave granted. 

Jarvis v. Nelson, 440 F.2d 13, 14 (9th Cir. 1971).

Petitioner alleges that he is an inmate of the California

Substance Abuse Treatment Facility at Corcoran, California

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(CSATF), serving a sentence imposed in Kern County Superior Court

case number MF008710A for failing to register as a sex offender

in violation of Cal. Pen. Code § 290. (Pet., doc. 1, 1.) 

Petitioner alleges the following claims in the petition: 1)

the sentencing court failed to give proper weight to mitigating

factors in sentencing Petitioner and thereby violated

Petitioner’s due process liberty interest in being sentenced

correctly and in having the sentencing rules applied in an evenhanded manner; 2) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

of counsel within the purview of Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668 (1984) by failing to make a Pitchess motion with respect

to the arresting officer; and 3) trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance in violation of the Strickland standard by

stipulating that Petitioner actually knew that he had to register

as a sex offender under Cal. Pen. Code § 290 in any location

where he resided – an element of the crime that the prosecution

otherwise needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at 2.)

II. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies 

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to challenge

collaterally a conviction by a petition for writ of habeas corpus

must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and

gives the state court the initial opportunity to correct the

state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,

518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1162-63 (9th Cir.

1988). 

/// 

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A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by

providing the highest state court with the necessary jurisdiction

a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before

presenting it to the federal court, and demonstrating that no

state remedy remains available. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270,

275-76 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir.

1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court

was given a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the

petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's

factual and legal basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365

(1995) (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 9-10

(1992), superceded by statute as stated in Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362 (2000) (factual basis). 

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the

state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

(9th Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Hiivala

v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999); Keating v. Hood,

133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). In Duncan, the United

States Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275...(1971),

we said that exhaustion of state remedies requires that

petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the

state courts in order to give the State the

"'opportunity to pass upon and correct’ alleged

violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some

internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are

to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be

alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting

claims under the United States Constitution. If a

habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary

ruling at a state court trial denied him the due

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,

he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state

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court.

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule

further in Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir.

2000), as amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th

Cir. 2001), stating: 

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly

presented" (and thus exhausted) his federal claims

in state court unless he specifically indicated to

that court that those claims were based on federal law.

See, Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir.

2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan,

this court has held that the petitioner must make the

federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing

federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is "self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding,

189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7... (1982)), or the underlying

claim would be decided under state law on the same

considerations that would control resolution of the claim

on federal grounds, see, e.g., Hiivala v. Wood, 195 

F.3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon,

88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); Crotts, 73 F.3d 

at 865.

...

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert

the state court to the fact that the relevant claim is a

federal one without regard to how similar the state and

federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how

obvious the violation of federal law is.

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir. 2000), as

amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th Cir.

2001). 

Where none of a petitioner’s claims has been presented to

the highest state court as required by the exhaustion doctrine,

the Court must dismiss the petition. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448

F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478,

481 (9th Cir. 2001). The authority of a court to hold a mixed

petition in abeyance pending exhaustion of the unexhausted claims

has not been extended to petitions that contain no exhausted

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claims. Raspberry, 448 F.3d at 1154.

Here, Petitioner admits that he failed to exhaust state

court remedies as to his ineffective assistance claims. Further,

although he alleges that state court remedies as to the

sentencing claim were “fully and fairly exhausted” (pet., doc. 1

at 2), he does not specifically describe the state proceedings

undertaken with respect to the sentencing claim. Petitioner

attaches to his petition a copy of the unpublished appellate

decision of the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth

Appellate District (CCA). (Id. at 31-68.) That decision shows

that the Court addressed two sentencing claims: 1) abuse of the

trial court’s discretion in failing to grant a motion to strike

prior convictions pursuant to Cal. Pen. Code § 1385, and 2)

imposition of a sentence in violation of the prohibition against

cruel or unusual punishment. (Id. at 55-68.) However,

Petitioner did not raise the precise sentencing issue he raises

before this Court, namely, whether the failure to weigh

mitigating factors properly violated Petitioner’s due process

liberty interest in being sentencing correctly and even-handedly.

Further, Petitioner did not attach the petition for review he

filed in the California Supreme Court. 

Accordingly, upon review of the instant petition for writ of

habeas corpus, it appears that Petitioner has not presented his

numerous claims to the California Supreme Court and received a

decision from that court. If Petitioner has not presented all of

his claims to the California Supreme Court, the Court cannot

proceed to the merits of those claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

It is possible, however, that Petitioner has otherwise presented

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his claims to the California Supreme Court and simply neglected

to inform this Court. 

III. Motion for a Stay 

Petitioner moves for a stay of the proceedings in this

action in order to permit him to complete exhaustion of state

court remedies. Petitioner seeks a stay pursuant to Rhines v.

Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). (Mot., doc. 2, 1-3.)

A district court has discretion to stay a petition which it

may validly consider on the merits. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. at

276; King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2009). A

petition may be stayed either under Rhines, or under Kelly v.

Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003). King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d

1133, 1138-41 (9th Cir. 2009).

Under Rhines, the Court has discretion to stay proceedings;

however, this discretion is circumscribed by the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Rhines, 544

U.S. at 276-77. In light of AEDPA’s objectives, “stay and

abeyance [is] available only in limited circumstances” and “is

only appropriate when the district court determines there was

good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims

first in state court.” Id. at 277-78. A stay of a mixed

petition pursuant to Rhines is required only if 1) the petitioner

has good cause for his failure to exhaust his claims in state

court; 2) the unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious; and

3) there is no indication that the petitioner intentionally

engaged in dilatory litigation tactics. Id. 

Here, Petitioner admits that two of the claims are

unexhausted but makes no offer to withdraw the unexhausted

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claims. The Court, therefore, interprets Petitioner’s motion as

characterized by Petitioner, namely, as a motion for a stay

pursuant to Rhines v. Weber. 

In view of the limited record before the Court at this stage

of the proceedings, the Court cannot conclude that Petitioner’s

claims concerning the allegedly ineffective assistance of counsel

and the unconstitutionality of Petitioner’s sentence are without

merit. Further, it does not appear that Petitioner has been

intentionally dilatory, although Petitioner does not explain his

delay in exhausting state court remedies. 

However, Petitioner has not made a showing of good cause. 

The mere fact that Petitioner is alleging ineffective assistance

of counsel does not entitle him to relief. This would run

counter to the directions in Rhines that stays be available only

in limited circumstances. Accordingly, the Court concludes that

because Petitioner has not demonstrated good cause, he is not

entitled to a stay under Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78

(2005). Therefore, Petitioner’s motion for a stay is DENIED.

IV. Order to Show Cause 

Petitioner must inform the Court if his claims have been

presented to the California Supreme Court, and if possible,

provide the Court with a copy of the petition for review filed in

the California Supreme Court, along with a copy of any ruling

made by the California Supreme Court. If Petitioner has

exhausted only some of his claims, the petition must be dismissed

as a mixed petition. Without knowing what claims have been

presented to the California Supreme Court, the Court is unable to

proceed to the merits of the petition.

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Accordingly, Petitioner is ORDERED to show cause why the

petition should not be dismissed for Petitioner’s failure to

exhaust state remedies as to all the claims in his petition. 

Petitioner is ORDERED to inform the Court what claims have been

presented to the California Supreme Court within thirty (30) days

of the date of service of this order. 

Petitioner is forewarned that failure to follow this order

will result in dismissal of the petition pursuant to Local Rule

110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 6, 2012 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

ie14hj UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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