Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01597/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01597-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVE TRUNK and PHILIP K.

PAULSON,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 06cv1597-LAB (WMc)

(Consol. w/06cv1728-LAB (WMc)

ORDER DISMISSING CLAIMS

FOR LACK OF STANDING; AND

ORDER DISMISSING CITY OF

SAN DIEGO; AND 

ORDER ENTERING JUDGMENT

AS TO DISMISSED CLAIMS

vs.

CITY OF SAN DIEGO, UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA, DONALD H. RUMSFELD,

Secretary of Defense and DOES 1

through 100, inclusive,

Defendants.

________________________________

MOUNT SOLEDAD MEMORIAL

ASSOCIATION, 

Real Parties in Interest.

On September 8, 2006, Plaintiffs Steve Trunk and Philip Paulson filed their First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, Plaintiffs

seek a declaration that transfer of a certain parcel of land on Mt. Soledad to the federal

government violates Plaintiffs’ rights under the U.S. and California constitutions, and that the

statute authorizing it be declared void ab initio. Plaintiffs also sought both a preliminary and

permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants from displaying the cross on government

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 Plaintiff Paulson is now deceased, and thus Trunk is the only remaining Plaintiff who

may have standing to prosecute the FAC.

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property. On September 22, 2006, this case was consolidated with Jewish War Veterans

of the United States of America, Inc., et al., v. Rumsfeld, Case no. 06cv1728, filed August

24, 2006 (now Jewish War Veterans of the United States of America, Inc., et al. v. Gates)

(“Jewish War Veterans”).

The FAC was subject to a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, filed October 10,

2006. Amicus Pacific Justice Institute filed a brief on October 13, 2006 in support of

Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Court issued an order on November 7, 2006, noting the

amicus brief had raised the issue of Article III standing, and directed the parties to address

this issue either in their briefing on the motion to dismiss, or in a subsequent motion. The

Court denied the motion to dismiss on November 29, 2006 by minute order following a

hearing.

On May 31, 2007, the consolidated cases were reassigned to Judge Larry Burns. On

June 4, the Court ordered Plaintiff Trunk to show cause why the certain claims in the FAC

filed in Trunk v. City of San Diego should not be dismissed as non-justiciable.1 In its order

to show cause (the “OSC”), the Court noted that it did not intend to revisit the earlier rulings

regarding standing, but that additional questions going to the issue of subject matter

jurisdiction presented themselves. In particular, it was not clear to the Court Trunk had

standing to pursue all the claims set forth in the FAC. The Court further directed the parties

to address certain questions it appeared had not been adequately briefed.

The Court thereafter held a status conference at which all parties were represented,

and at which the OSC was discussed. Thereafter, the Court issued a scheduling order for

briefing on the OSC and other matters, and the parties filed their briefing in response to the

OSC. Although the OSC was specifically directed to Trunk, the other parties and the amicus

were directed or permitted to submit briefing, and did so.

/ / /

/ / /

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I. Legal Standards

Standing is a jurisdictional requirement, and a party invoking federal jurisdiction —

i.e., Trunk — has the burden of establishing it. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Standing is a “threshold question in

every federal case.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). Federal courts are required

to examine jurisdictional issues including standing, even sua sponte if necessary. B.C. v.

Plumas Unified School Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1264 (9th Cir. 1999). The presence of a

political question is likewise a jurisdictional issue. If Trunk, the only remaining Plaintiff raising

claims in the FAC, lacks standing, or if claims in the FAC present a political question, they

must be dismissed as non-justiciable. No GWEN Alliance of Lane County, Inc. v. Aldridge,

855 F.2d 1380, 1382 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). If both questions are presented, the

Court should address the issue of standing first. Id.

Even though Trunk cites California law, he must show he has standing sufficient to

satisfy federal standards, regardless of whether he had standing under California law in

preceding actions. Lee v. American Nat’l Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 997, 999–1000, 1001–02

(9th Cir. 2001). Accord Wheeler v. Travelers Ins. Co., 22 F.3d 534, 537 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing

Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804, 105 S.Ct. 2965, 2970, 86 L.Ed.2d 628

(1985)) (holding that standing to bring an action in federal court is determined under federal,

not state law). To show he has Article III standing, Trunk must establish three things:

First [he] must have suffered an injury in fact — an invasion of a legally

protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or

imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal

connection between the injury and the conduct complained of . . . . Third,

it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be

redressed by a favorable decision.

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Each element must be

supported in the same way as any other matter on which the Plaintiff bears the burden of

proof. Id. at 561 (citations omitted). Here, Trunk must adequately allege injury such as

would give him standing. Id. (citation omitted).

/ / /

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Even though other parties briefed this issue, the burden is ultimately on Trunk to

demonstrate he has standing. The Court thus looks first to Trunk’s response to the OSC,

to see whether he has established this Court’s jurisdiction to consider his claims.

II. Discussion

H.R. 5683, enacted as Public Law 109-272, purports to take the property at issue

here to be used as a veterans’ memorial. As the FAC frames it, Trunk’s primary injury

consists of the imminent harm he will suffer if the property at issue is taken by the United

States with the large cross in place, in order that the property will be used as a veterans’

memorial. His claim, in other words, is that the taking of the property, by itself, violates the

Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Trunk has also asked for an injunction

prohibiting Defendants from displaying the cross on the site, which is essentially the same

relief sought in Jewish War Veterans. (FAC at 11:13–14.) The OSC was specifically

directed, however, at Trunk’s challenge to the federal government’s acquisition of the

property.

The Court’s ruling in this order is compelled by Paulson v. City of San Diego, 475 F.3d

1047, 1048 (9th Cir. 2007). There, the Ninth Circuit set forth several holdings binding on this

Court. First, the City of San Diego (the “City”) has been completely divested of any interest

in the property at issue here by unilateral action of the federal government without the City’s

involvement. Id. at 1048–49. Second, previous injunctive relief requiring the removal of the

cross from the property at issue was granted to enforce provisions of the California state

constitution, to which the federal government is not subject. Id. at 1048. Taken together,

these two holdings make clear any claim Trunk may have had based on violations of the

California state constitution is now moot and any future relief Trunk may obtain must be

based solely on federal law. No party has argued the taking at issue here removed the

property from the effects of federal law, including the U.S. Constitution’s Establishment

Clause. This Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to entertain questions of whether the taking

violated the California constitution, or to grant relief based on events that were the subject

of earlier litigation. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 1705, 40

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L.Ed.2d 164 (1974) (per curiam) (holding federal courts lack jurisdiction to decide moot

questions). These holdings also make clear the taking was the work of the federal

government and therefore not “fairly traceable” to any action by the City. See Lujan, 504

U.S. at 560.

The OSC took care to point out the fact that a large cross is located on particular

mountain is not an Establishment Clause violation, nor was government ownership or nonownership of land on Mt. Soledad, nor were mere efforts by officials or voters who wished

the cross to remain where it was. The Establishment Clause violation, if any, consists of

government endorsement of religion. How the U.S. government may use the property,

assuming the property is successfully acquired, is to be decided at a later stage.

The FAC says this action arises under the Establishment Clause of the U.S.

Constitution as well as certain provisions of the California state constitution. (FAC at

1:22–26.) To the extent Trunk seeks to invalidate the transfer, it is clear the state

constitutional provisions cannot give rise to a cause of action and, as pointed out by the

Ninth Circuit, such a claim is moot. Paulson v. City of San Diego, 475 F.3d at 1048. It is

likewise clear Trunk has no standing to bring any claim against the City arising out of the

transfer, because the transfer is not “fairly traceable” to any action by the City. Id. at

1048–49; see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. The OSC therefore also specifically directed

Trunk to focus on actions taken by the United States, rather than the City, and on the U.S.

Constitution rather than on the California state constitution. (OSC at 5:1–17.)

A. Theories of Standing

Trunk has alleged or alluded to three theories of standing, although he does not

clearly differentiate among claims to which each theory might apply. He alleges general

taxpayer standing, although the injury as he frames it is the transfer of the land, not the

illegal expenditure of tax money. He alleges standing as a result of being denied use of the

veterans memorial as it now exists. He has also suggested that the transfer itself gave him

standing, because it prevented the enforcement of an injunction requiring the removal of the

cross.

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1. Denial of Use

Trunk alleges he is a veteran and a resident of San Diego and would visit the

memorial if the cross were removed. While this may affect his standing to challenge how

the veterans memorial is operated, see Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp.2d 1202, 1212–13

(C.D.Cal. 2002) (holding that presence of cross prevented plaintiff from freely using the

public land), it has no bearing on whether he has standing to challenge the taking of the

property. The taking itself merely transfers ownership and does not by itself affect whether

Trunk will be able to use the memorial. Trunk concedes he has no interest in seeing the

memorial operated by the City rather than the federal government. (Trunk’s Response to

OSC, at 5:12–13.)

2. Taxpayer Standing

Trunk has also alleged status as a taxpayer, because he pays federal, state, and local

taxes. The Supreme Court has carved out a narrow exception to the general bar on

taxpayer standing. In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968),

the Supreme Court recognized taxpayer standing to bring Establishment Clause challenges

to expenditures under the Taxing and Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Art. I, § 8.

392 U.S. at 105–06. Trunk may have standing under this precedent because Public Law

109-272 provides for payment to the property owner. Pub. L. 109-272, § (2)(b), 120 Stat.

771 (2006). 

The power of eminent domain is an attribute of sovereignty, and is limited by the Just

Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. United States v. 0.95 Acres of Land, 994

F.2d 696, 698 (9th Cir. 1993). A taking of land is thus not an exercise of Congress’ taxing

and spending power, although to provide the owner with the required “just compensation,”

some spending must generally take place. The Supreme Court’s recent holding in Hein v.

Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2553, 2569 (2007) emphasizes the

narrowness of the Flast exception. The Supreme Court suggested in Hein that the Flast

exception is limited to Establishment Clause challenges that implicate Congress’ taxing and

spending power. 127 S.Ct. at 2569 (“We have similarly refused to extend Flast to permit

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taxpayer standing for Establishment Clause challenges that do not implicate Congress'

taxing and spending power.”) Cf. Flast, 392 U.S. at 105–06 (“[W]e hold that a taxpayer will

have standing consistent with Article III to invoke federal judicial power when he alleges that

congressional action under the taxing and spending clause is in derogation of those

constitutional provisions which operate to restrict the exercise of the taxing and spending

power.”) In so holding, the Court specifically reaffirmed the limitations it imposed in Valley

Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454

U.S. 464, 479–82, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982), where it refused to extend

taxpayer standing to actions taken pursuant to the Property Clause of Art. IV.

Hein presents particular interpretive problems for the Court, because it was decided

after the parties had briefed the issue and therefore they did not address it, and because it

was issued by a divided panel. The Court believes the natural reading of the language of

this opinion is that when a Congressional act implicates the taxing and spending power,

taxpayer standing is not precluded. 

Because Public Law 109-272 implicates Congress’ taxing and spending power, the

dicta in Hein appear to direct this Court to find taxpayer standing on this basis. This

assumes, of course, other elements of Article III standing are also established. Kurtz v.

Baker, 829 F.2d 1133, 1140 (D.C.Cir. 1987) (“[A] taxpayer's ability to meet the Flast test

does not bestow automatic standing. More is required.”) (citing Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at

480 n.17) (further citations omitted). The Supreme Court’s dicta are entitled to deference

by this Court. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.17 (9th Cir. 2000).

This is not to say standing can be found to bring an Establishment Clause challenge to any

acquisition of land alleged to be for religious purposes, because a taking does not

necessarily implicate the Taxing and Spending Clause, e.g., where an owner waives just

compensation either gratuitously or in exchange for non-monetary benefits. Cf. Buono v.

Kempthorne, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 2493512, *12–*13 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that an 

exchange of land violated an existing injunction designed to remedy Establishment Clause

violation). 

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While no amount of “just compensation” has yet been set and it is theoretically

possible compensation may be disclaimed or the property may be found to have no real

value, Public Law 109-272 contemplates and authorizes payment of compensation. An

additional difficulty is that Public Law 109-272 authorizes the expenditure of funds already

appropriated as part of the permanent judgment appropriation under 31 U.S.C. § 1034 and

is more in the nature of a settlement. The Court concludes, however, this falls within the

meaning of an appropriation as contemplated by Flast and Hein, because it authorizes the

expenditure of money. See Hein, 127 S.Ct. at 2559 (recognizing the Flast exception as

permitting challenges to Congressional action that authorizes the use of federal funds).

Exercise of the federal spending power is thus likely and imminent. The Court therefore

concludes Trunk may have standing as a taxpayer to challenge the taking, but only if other

requirements for Article III standing are met. 

3. Interference with Enforcement of Injunction

Previously, the City, was subject to an injunction requiring it to remove the cross from

the property at issue here. Paulson v. City of San Diego, 475 F.3d at 1048. The Ninth

Circuit has recognized the United States was not in violation of the California state

constitution and was not subject to the injunction, and its actions mooted the injunction. Id.

at 1048–49. In effect, Trunk is arguing his injury stems from the fact that he is no longer

being injured by violations of California law and thus, the particular remedy he sought is no

longer available.

Clearly, Trunk would prefer above all else that the California constitutional violations

were brought to an end by removal of the cross. However, his wishes, by themselves,

cannot give rise to standing. Trunk had an interest in having his injury under California’s

constitution end, but he had no protected interest in having that injury brought to an end in

the manner of his choosing. The injunction, issued pursuant to the California state

constitution, was designed to remedy violations of the state constitution. Paulson, 475 F.3d

at 1048. Now those violations have ended, he has no standing to complain about the

/ / /

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manner in which they ended. Any other holding would represent an end-run around the

Ninth Circuit’s finding of mootness.

In a more general sense, Trunk might be understood to be arguing the inconvenience

of litigating anew constitutes injury sufficient to support Article III standing. The OSC

observing that, while convenience and efficiency of litigation was a laudable goal, there was

no showing inconvenience of litigation, by itself, could constitute an injury giving rise to

Article III standing. (OSC at 5:26–6:3) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 1, Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). In

any event, Trunk has now abandoned this argument. (Trunk’s Response to OSC, at

14:1–3.)

This is a different situation from that presented in Buono, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL

2493512, slip op. at *10–*14 (concluding that federal government’s attempt to transfer land

on which cross was located to private parties was impermissible, where the federal

government was already under an injunction to remove the cross in order to comply with

U.S. Constitutional requirements). In that case, the attempted transfer of the land by the

United States was found to be an attempt to evade the injunction to which the United States

was already subject, and inadequate as a means of ending the Establishment Clause

violation; the transfer by itself was not held to be an independent Establishment Clause

violation. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit held the federal government was attempting to

evade requirements by which it was bound, whereas in this case the federal government is

clearly not bound by California state constitutional requirements, which are more stringent

than the U.S. Constitution’s requirements. See American Family Ass'n, Inc. v. City and

County of San Francisco, 277 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that California’s

“No Preference” clause is interpreted more expansively than the U.S. Constitution’s

Establishment Clause in cases where government approval of religion is at stake) (citation

omitted). Compare, e.g., Access Fund v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 499 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th

Cir. 2007) (citing with approval examples of federal protection of certain religious buildings

as landmarks), with Frohliger v. Richardson, 63 Cal.App. 209, 217 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1923)

/ / /

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(holding that California constitution forbade public maintenance of California missions in

spite of their undoubted historic significance).

B. Request for Encouragement to Abide by the Settlement Agreement

 Trunk agrees his request that the Court admonish the parties abide by a settlement

agreement reached in an earlier case (FAC at 11:15–16) is not a justiciable claim, (Trunk’s

Response to OSC, at 2:17–19), and the Court holds this claim to be non-justiciable.

C. Effect of California Law

Previously, Plaintiff Paulson was successful in obtaining an injunction on the basis of

California state law requiring the City to remove the cross from its property on Mt. Soledad.

Paulson v. City of San Diego, Civ. No. 89-0820GT, 2006 WL 3656149 (S.D.Cal. May 3,

2006). That injunction became unenforceable, however, when Public Law 109-272 was

enacted, purporting to transfer the Mt. Soledad property to the federal government. Paulson,

475 F.3d at 1048 (remanding with instructions to vacate the injunction as moot).

In the OSC, the Court admonished Trunk to focus on the U.S. Constitution rather than

state law. (OSC at 5:11–17.) In referring broadly to the United States' alleged efforts to

"save the cross," however, Trunk has conflated California and U.S. law. As discussed more

fully below, "saving the Cross" cannot mean shielding the cross from U.S. Constitutional

requirements, but can only refer to California state law. Trunk's argument is thus,

essentially, that the United States acted improperly by evading California law.

Public Law 109-272 was enacted, in part, as a reaction to the extensive litigation of

these matters. The statute frankly states, as one of its findings, the following: "76 percent

of the voters of San Diego supported donating the Mt. Soledad Memorial to the Federal

Government only to have a superior court judge of the State of California invalidate that

election," Preservation of Mt. Soledad Veterans Memorial, Pub. L. 109-272, § 1(6),120 Stat.

770, referring apparently to the superior court judgment later reversed in Paulson v.

Abdelnour, 145 Cal.App.4th 400 (Cal.App. 4 Dist. 2006). 

Trunk relies heavily on the federal government’s apparent intention to avoid the force

of California constitutional requirements as evidence of its nefarious motive. In enacting its

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own statutes, the United States is of course not limited by or subject to the California

constitution, Paulson, 475 F.3d at 1048, and therefore cannot be liable for either violating

or evading it. As the Ninth Circuit held, id.,Trunk therefore had no interest in the injunction

the United States was bound to respect. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (explaining that an

“injury in fact” sufficient to confer standing refers to “an invasion of a legally protected

interest”). The fact the United States wished the Mt. Soledad property to be subject solely

to federal law is therefore not in itself improper and did not result in any cognizable injury to

Trunk.

The Ninth Circuit held the taking put an end to any California constitutional violation

by the City. Paulson, 475 F.3d at 1048–49 (Plaintiffs’ appeal became moot with the City’s

divestment of its interest in the memorial) (citation omitted). Obviously, Trunk would have

preferred that the violation was remedied by removing or altering the cross; but, as a matter

of law, it appears any means by which the alleged violation was brought to an end would bar

injunctive relief. The Court specifically directed Trunk to explain why this was not the case,

citing Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 227 (1971) (declining to require city to continue

to operate swimming pools after Constitutional problem of operating pools in a racially

segregated manner was brought to an end by closing the pools) and Evans v. Abney, 396

U.S. 435, 447 (1970) (declining to intervene further after Constitutional violation was ended

by state’s decision to divest itself of park accepted on condition that it be operated in a

racially segregated manner). Trunk, however, declined to do so, and asserted the question

was dealt with by McCreary County, Ky. v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S.

844, 125 S.Ct. 2722 (2005), which he claimed was “directly on point,” without citing any

particular portion of that opinion. (Trunk’s Response to OSC at 5:22–27.) McCreary does

not, however, examine the issue of Article III standing or the effect of a transfer of ownership

on the justiciability of an Establishment Clause claim.

 The United States will be required to abide by the same U.S. Constitutional

requirements as was the City. Because violations of the California constitution have ended

/ / /

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and thus do not require redress, it does not appear invalidating the transfer would redress

any injury done to Trunk.

D. Taking of Land as an Establishment Clause Violation

Trunk has argued Public Law 109-272 should be declared void ab initio because it

was enacted in violation of the Establishment Clause. He argues that, because the United

States’ apparent objective in enacting this legislation was to “save the cross,” the mere

enactment of the law constitutes an Establishment Clause violation. (Trunk’s Response to

OSC at 5:2–7, 5:14–17, 6:15–18, 8:20–22.)

This argument suffers from two infirmities. First, even accepting Trunk’s allegations,

the taking was at most a step taken in preparation for the later action Trunk wishes to

challenge; it did not, by itself, injure Trunk. Allegedly illicit plans or motives are not

themselves cognizable injuries, particularly where it is not yet apparent what the government

will actually do. Second, Public Law 109-272 does not “save the cross,” at least not in the

way urged by Trunk.

1. Injury to Trunk

While it is understandable how a taking might fall afoul of the First Amendment’s Free

Exercise Clause, especially where the government targets a property owner for religious

reasons, it is unclear whether a taking, by itself, might ever violate the Establishment Clause.

More importantly, it is unclear how such a taking could cause an injury sufficient to give an

individual Article III standing to bring an Establishment Clause challenge to a taking. A

taking is merely an acquisition of land by the government, Black’s Law Dictionary 1493 (8th

Ed. 2004), and does not, in and of itself, include any religious or potentially religious

elements. Trunk cites Cottonwood Christian Center v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218

F. Supp.2d 1203 (C.D.Cal. 2002) as an example of such a case, but in fact the holding there

was based on the Free Exercise Clause. The Plaintiffs in Jewish War Veterans (“JWV

Plaintiffs”), likewise, cite several First Amendment cases where takings were challenged, but

all are based on the other First Amendment clauses and not the Establishment Clause.

(JWV Plaintiffs’ Response to OSC, at 5:11–6:6.)

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Furthermore, the Court is unaware of any case where a person with no ownership or

occupancy interest in property has been found to have standing to challenge a taking of that

property. See, e.g., Haldeman v. Freeman, 558 F. Supp. 514, 518 n.10 (D.D.C. 1983)

(“[T]he owner of the targeted property is the only person with standing to object to

condemnation proceedings.”) (citing Benitez v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 141 F.2d 943, 951 (1st

Cir. 1944), C.M. Patten & Co. v. United States, 61 F.2d 970, 972–73 (9th Cir.), vacated as

moot, 289 U.S. 705, 53 S.Ct. 687, 77 L.Ed. 1462 (1932)) (further citations omitted). Of the

cases cited by Trunk or the JWV Plaintiffs, none found standing where a party challenging

a taking did not hold an ownership interest in the property at issue.

Trunk concedes the Establishment Clause does not forbid the United States to take

property with existing religious symbols on it. (Trunk’s Response to OSC at 11:6–9.)

Rather, he contends because he believes the United States intends to use the property for

the unconstitutional purpose of endorsing religion, the taking itself is invalid. (Id. at

10:24–26, 11:12–17, 11:27–12:4 (“[T]he ‘purpose’ of the taking and its ‘effect’ under the 

Lemon test, was to save the cross and promote religion . . . .”) (italics added) (citing Lemon

v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105 (1971)).) In so arguing, Trunk suggests that the

transfer of land will necessarily entail permanent display of the cross.

Although Public Law 109-272 mentions the existing cross, it does not require the

continued display of the cross on Mt. Soledad, nor does it even require the federal

government to manage the property. Rather, it takes ownership of the property to be used

as a veterans memorial, describing the memorial in terms of the boundaries of the land only.

Pub. L. 109-272, § 2(d),120 Stat. 771. While the gist of the findings make clear Congress

considered the memorial as it existed to be historically significant and hoped it would remain

in its present condition, this is not specifically provided for or required in the statute. 

Public Law 109-272 merely provides for the acquisition of land, the compensation of

the land’s owners, and the maintenance of the property as a veterans memorial. These are

not religious actions, nor do they injure Trunk. Trunk himself has conceded it makes no

difference to him who maintains the property, and in fact he wants it to be operated as a

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veterans memorial. Trunk appears to be arguing that because the federal government was

planning to violate his rights by maintaining a cross on the property it was acquiring, he has

standing. This does not, however constitute the kind of “concrete and particularized”

required for standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.

2. Intent to “Save the Cross”

As discussed, the United States’ alleged intent to “save the Cross” was only with

regard to a controversy regarding the application of state law, which of course does not bind

the United States. In other words, by taking the property, the federal government was at

most removing the memorial from divisive and protracted litigation under state law. Trunk

has not argued the federal government was attempting to “save the Cross” from the

requirements of the Establishment Clause. And, in any event, the taking cannot do so.

This is borne out by Public Law 109-272, whose findings, as noted above, indicate

the United States believed the Superior Court unnecessarily blocked a democratic solution

to the controversy. Publ. L. 109-272, 120 Stat. 770, § 1(6). The statute makes clear the

federal government believed the state, acting through the Superior Court, was behaving in

a manner tending to undermine public confidence in courts and the democratic process, and

the federal government believed removal of the property from state control was in order.

The federal government’s position was later vindicated in Paulson v. Abdelnour, 145

Cal.App.4th at 428–29 (rejecting trial court’s determination that the ballot measure was a

“sham” and observing “any judicial attempt to discern or ascribe a hidden purpose behind

a vote of the electorate would create rather than dispel divisiveness”).

As a way of showing concrete injury, Trunk tries to conflate acquisition of the Mt.

Soledad property with unconstitutional operation of the property. (Trunk’s Response to OSC

at 8:8–10, 9:6–24, 10:24–28.) As noted, Public Law 109-272 does not specifically require

the operation of the property in question in any particular manner. It is far from a legal

certainty the United States cannot under any circumstances Constitutionally carry out the

provisions of Public Law 109-272, including permitting the operation of the property as a

veterans memorial by the Mt. Soledad Memorial Association. See Pub. L. 109-272, § 2(c),

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120 Stat. 771 (providing for the continued maintenance of the veterans memorial by the Mt.

Soledad Veterans Memorial Association). 

Even assuming the cross remains unaltered in its present location — which is not a

requirement of Public Law 109-272 — it is misleading to contend that “no federal case has

ever found the display of a Latin cross on public land to be constitutional.” (Trunk’s

Response to OSC at 8:10–11) (citing Mendelson v. City of St. Cloud, 719 F. Supp. 1065,

1069 (M.D.Fla. 1989)). It may have been true at the time Mendelson was issued, but the

Supreme Court’s holding in Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S.

753, 115 S.Ct. 2440 (1995) is to the contrary. See also Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543,

545–46 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that Establishment Clause claim was not yet moot because

land on which cross was displayed was still operated by the National Park Service and had

not yet been transferred to private owners); but see id. at 546 (noting that presence of a

religious symbol on land transferred into private hands might still violate the Establishment

Clause, but reserving the question). 

BothPinette and Buono suggest Public Law 109-272 does not inevitably translate into

in an Establishment Clause violation. In order to determine whether Trunk was unavoidably

injured by the taking, the Court would have to consider hypothetical alternative scenarios

under which the memorial might be operated. It is thus doubtful this injury is “actual or

imminent,” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Certainly it is not ripe. Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402,

426–27, 94 S.Ct. 2274, 2288 (1974) (where the Court would have to consider possible

arrangements for sending publicly-funded teachers into parochial schools, Establishment

Clause issue was not ripe).

The Court does not reach the issue of whether the taking would violate the Lemon

test if Trunk had standing to challenge it. Nevertheless, the Court notes the acquisition of

property is itself a secular purpose, and that a statute falls afoul of the first prong of Lemon

test only when it is “entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion,” Wallace v. Jaffree,

472 U.S. 38, 56, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985), or “there [is] no question that the

statute or activity [is] motivated wholly by religious considerations,” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465

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U.S. 668, 680, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984) . See also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487

U.S. 589, 602, 108 S.Ct. 2562, 101 L.Ed.2d 520 (1988) (explaining that a court “may

invalidate a statute only if it is motivated wholly by an impermissible purpose”). In particular

here, the acquisition of property for a veterans memorial is a secular purpose. Trunk himself

recognizes this when he argues he is now being denied use of the veterans memorial, and

if the cross is removed, he will visit the veterans memorial and pay tribute to the veterans it

memorializes. (FAC at 4:3–6.) 

Furthermore, the taking, by itself, would not fall afoul of Lemon’s “effects” or

“excessive entanglement” prong because, as noted, the taking has no effect on the

Establishment Clause’s application to the property at issue. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.

203, 232, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 2015 (1997) (explaining the second and third prongs of the Lemon

test — the “effects” and “excessive entanglement” prongs — were similarly assessed).

E. Effect of Invalidating Public Law 109-272

Separately, the City first attempted to donate the property to the federal government

by Proposition A, a municipal ballot measure; and the United States, by Public Law 108-447,

designated the site as a veterans memorial and expressed its intent to accept the donation.

This attempt was initially thwarted when the San Diego County Superior Court invalidated

the measure, as noted in Paulson v. Abdelnour, 145 Cal.App.4th at 411–12. Thereafter,

Public Law 109-272 was enacted. Later still, however, the California Court of Appeals

reversed the Superior Court. Id. at 439. Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, however,

Public Law 109-272 trumps the municipal measure.

Assuming this Court were to invalidate Public Law 109-272, the City’s attempted

donation of the property to the federal government would then be effective and the property

would be transferred to the United States pursuant to that measure. This alternative

arrangement would eliminate the expenditure of funds by the federal government, which

Trunk must rely on as the injury giving him standing. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 106 (holding

taxpayer standing arises from injury suffered when “ tax money is being extracted and spent

in violation of specific constitutional protections against such abuses of legislative power”).

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Invalidating the transfer would also deprive the City — to which Trunk also pays taxes — of

any claim to “just compensation,” creating a corresponding loss. The transfer, however,

would be accomplished, such that regardless of how this Court rules, in the end the property

will be transferred from the City to the United States. The only tangible difference would be

whether the United States pays the City for the property or not.

The question arises, then, whether Trunk has suffered any “distinct and palpable”

injury if one sovereign to whom Trunk pays taxes transfers funds to another sovereign to

whom he also pays taxes, because the alleged injury is offset by a corresponding benefit.

See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 480 n.17 (noting that effect of challenged property transfer

on plaintiffs’ tax burden would likely be inconsequential, and therefore plaintiffs could not

establish they would likely benefit in any tangible way from the court’s intervention). Trunk

has not attempted to show a tangible benefit related to his taxes if the transfer were

invalidated. Nor can the Court say with any certainty he would receive any tangible benefit

if the Court invalidated the transfer. The Court’s intervention would resolve nothing except

whether the United States obtains the property by taking it, or by donation.

Plaintiff makes clear the relief he actually wants is transfer of the land back to the City.

The Court cannot grant this relief. Regardless of how the Court rules on Trunk’s request to

invalidate Public Law 109-272, the United States will own the land at issue here. 

F. Application of Article III Standing Requirements

Looking at the three elements of standing required under Lujan, Trunk has not shown

he has suffered an “injury in fact,” consisting of “an invasion of a legally protected interest

which is . . . concrete and particularized and . . . actual or imminent, not conjectural or

hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Trunk has

therefore not shown any causal connection between action by the United States and any

such injury. 

Furthermore, even if this Court were to give Trunk everything he is asking for, the

property in question would still be transferred to the United States, pursuant to the municipal

/ / /

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ballot measure and Public Law 108-447. Thus, even if the transfer injured Trunk, the injury

would not be redressed by a favorable decision. See id. at 561.

For these reasons, Trunk lacks Article III standing to pursue his claims regarding

Public Law 109-272.

G. Political Question Doctrine

As discussed in the OSC, the Court is concerned the Political Question Doctrine might

deprive it of jurisdiction, and even if not, that Separation of Powers principles counsel

abstention. Because the Court holds Trunk has no standing to challenge the taking of the

Mt. Soledad property, the Court does not reach these issues. No GWEN Alliance, 855 F.2d

at 1382.

III. Conclusion and Order

Trunk has not met his burden of demonstrating he has standing to challenge the

taking of the Mt. Soledad property by Public Law 109-272. This claim is therefore

DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. His requests for a declaration that the taking violated his

California state constitutional and U.S. Constitutional rights, and for the Court to encourage

the parties to abide by the earlier settlement agreement are likewise DENIED for lack of

jurisdiction.

The City has made clear it does not wish to remain a party to this action. (City’s

Response to OSC at 2:14, 6:11–17.) Because it appears there is no just cause to delay

entry of judgment as to the claims dismissed by this Order, the Court hereby ENTERS

JUDGMENT as to these claims, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 54(b). This order disposes of any

interest the City of San Diego may have in this dispute. The City is therefore DISMISSED

as a party, and is excused from further filing and participation requirements.

In light of the previous consolidation of these cases, the dismissal of most of Trunk’s

claims, and the similarity of Trunk’s remaining claim to those of the other Plaintiffs, it appears

joint pleadings and filings by Plaintiffs would promote efficiency. Plaintiffs are ORDERED

to show cause why they should not file future pleadings (with the exception of their own

motions for summary judgment) jointly. They may do this by filing memoranda of points and

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authorities no more than three pages in length, no later than ten calendar days following the

issuance of this order. Any other parties may likewise submit a memorandum of points and

authorities within the same time limit, subject to the same page limitation, giving their

position. The parties are requested to focus primarily on legal authority for or against

requiring joint filings, rather than prudential concerns.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 6, 2007

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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