Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00715/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00715-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 490
Nature of Suit: Cable/ Satellite TV
Cause of Action: 47:553 Unauthorized Reception of Cable Service

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

J&J SPORTS PRODUCTIONS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

RUBEN CONTRERAS MACHUCA & 

SILVIA OCHOA GOMEZ,

Defendants.

No. 2:16-cv-715-TLN-KJN

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS

Presently before the court is plaintiff J&J Sports Productions, Inc.’s (“plaintiff”) motion 

for entry of default judgment against defendants Ruben Contreras Machuca and Silvia Ochoa 

Gomez, both individually and doing business as Centenial Ranch Sports Bar and Grill

(collectively “defendants”).1 (ECF No. 11.) After defendants failed to file an opposition to the 

motion in accordance with Local Rule 230(c), the October 6, 2016 hearing was vacated, and the 

motion was submitted on the record and written briefing pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). (ECF 

No. 13.) 

For the reasons stated below, the court recommends that plaintiff’s motion for default 

judgment be granted in part, that judgment be entered in plaintiff’s favor, and that plaintiff be 

 

1

This motion was referred to the undersigned pursuant to E.D. Cal. L.R. 302(c)(19). 

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awarded a total judgment of $9,000.00. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initiated this action on April 6, 2016, alleging claims under 47 U.S.C. § 605; 47 

U.S.C. § 553; and Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq., in addition to a state law tort claim 

for conversion. (See generally Complaint, ECF No. 1 [“Compl.”].) Defendants are the owners, 

operators, licensees, permittees, persons in charge, and/or persons with control of the commercial 

establishment doing business as Centenial Ranch Sports Bar and Grill (“Centenial Bar”), which is 

located at 10408 Franklin Boulevard, in Elk Grove, California. (Compl. ¶¶ 7-10.) Plaintiff was 

granted by contract “the exclusive nationwide commercial distribution (closed-circuit) rights to 

‘The Fight of the Century’ Floyd Mayweather, Jr. v. Manny Pacquiao Championship Fight 

Program , telecast nationwide on Saturday, May 2, 2015” (“Plaintiff’s Program”), which included 

the distribution rights to “all under-card bouts and fight commentary encompassed in the 

television broadcast of the event.” (Id. ¶ 18.) 

Plaintiff alleges that on May 2, 2015, defendants either specifically directed the 

employees of Centenial Bar “to unlawfully intercept and broadcast Plaintiff’s Program” at 

Centenial Bar, or that the actions of Centenial Bar employees are directly imputable to defendants

“by virtue of their acknowledged responsibility for the actions of [Centenial Bar].” (Compl. ¶

15.) Plaintiff further alleges that “the unlawful broadcast of Plaintiff’s Program, as supervised 

and/or authorized by Defendants . . . resulted in increased profits for [Centenial Bar].” (Id. ¶ 16.)

In its complaint, plaintiff requested statutory damages of $110,000 for defendants’ 

violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605, as well as recovery of all costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 

(Compl. at 10.) The complaint further sought statutory damages of $60,000 for defendants’

violation of 47 U.S.C. § 553, as well as recovery of all costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. (Id.) 

The complaint also sought compensatory, exemplary, and punitive damages; reasonable 

attorneys’ fees; and costs of suit for defendants’ tortious conversion of Plaintiff’s Program. (Id.) 

Finally, the complaint requested restitution, declaratory relief, injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees, 

and costs of suit for defendants’ violation of sections 17200 et seq. of the California Business and

Professions Code. (Id. at 11.)

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After defendants were properly served with process and failed to appear in the action, the 

Clerk of Court, upon plaintiff’s request, entered defendants’ default. (ECF Nos. 6-9.) The instant 

motion for entry of default judgment followed. (ECF No. 11.) 

LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, default may be entered against a party 

against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought who fails to plead or otherwise defend 

against the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). However, “[a] defendant’s default does not 

automatically entitle the plaintiff to a court-ordered judgment.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 

238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924-25 

(9th Cir. 1986)). Instead, the decision to grant or deny an application for default judgment lies 

within the district court’s sound discretion. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 

1980). In making this determination, the court considers the following factors: 

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of 

plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, 

(4) the sum of money at stake in the action[,] (5) the possibility of a 

dispute concerning material facts[,] (6) whether the default was due 

to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). 

As a general rule, once default is entered, well-pled factual allegations in the operative 

complaint are taken as true, except for those allegations relating to damages. TeleVideo Sys., Inc. 

v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (citing Geddes v. United Fin. 

Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)); accord Fair Housing of Marin v. Combs, 

285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002). In addition, although well-pled allegations in the complaint 

are admitted by a defendant’s failure to respond, “necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, 

and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. 

of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 

(9th Cir. 1978)); accord DIRECTV, Inc. v. Hoa Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating 

that a defendant does not admit facts that are not well-pled or conclusions of law); Abney v. 

Alameida, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1235 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (“[A] default judgment may not be 

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entered on a legally insufficient claim”). A party’s default does not establish the amount of 

damages. Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560. 

DISCUSSION

Appropriateness of the Entry of Default Judgment Under the Eitel Factors

1. Factor One: Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiff

The first Eitel factor considers whether the plaintiff would suffer prejudice if default 

judgment is not entered, and such potential prejudice to the plaintiff militates in favor of granting 

a default judgment. See PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Here, plaintiff would face 

prejudice if the court did not enter a default judgment, because plaintiff would be without another 

recourse against defendants. Accordingly, the first Eitel factor favors the entry of a default 

judgment. 

2. Factors Two and Three: The Merits of Plaintiff’s Substantive Claims 

and the Sufficiency of the Complaint

The court considers the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claims and the sufficiency of the 

complaint together because of the relatedness of the two inquiries. The court must consider 

whether the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state a claim on which plaintiff may 

recover. See Danning, 572 F.2d at 1388; PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1175. 

In its motion for default judgment, plaintiff only seeks relief on two of its claims – its 

claim for violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605 and its conversion claim. (ECF No. 11-1.) Accordingly, 

the court only addresses those claims and declines to consider whether plaintiff’s remaining 

claims are sufficiently pled and have merit. 

a. Liability under 47 U.S.C. § 605

In its motion for default judgment, plaintiff seeks statutory damages pursuant to its claim 

under 47 U.S.C. § 605. That statute prohibits the unauthorized interception, reception, 

publication, or divulgence of interstate radio communications. See 47 U.S.C. § 605(a). 

Specifically, it provides, in pertinent part, that:

No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any 

radio communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, 

substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted 

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communication to any person. No person not being entitled thereto 

shall receive or assist in receiving any interstate or foreign 

communication by radio and use such communication (or any 

information therein contained) for his own benefit or for the benefit 

of another not entitled thereto. No person having received any 

intercepted radio communication or having become acquainted with 

the contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such 

communication (or any part thereof) knowing that such 

communication was intercepted, shall divulge or publish the 

existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such 

communication (or any part thereof) or use such communication (or 

any information therein contained) for his own benefit or for the 

benefit of another not entitled thereto.

47 U.S.C. § 605(a). 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that satellite television signals are 

covered communications under 47 U.S.C. § 605(a). DIRECTV, Inc. v. Webb, 545 F.3d 837, 844 

(9th Cir. 2008). The scope of section 605(a) is less clear with respect to transmissions intercepted 

from a cable system, which are expressly covered under 47 U.S.C. § 553(a). Section 553(a) 

states, in relevant part: “No person shall intercept or receive or assist in intercepting or receiving 

any communications service offered over a cable system, unless specifically authorized to do so 

by a cable operator or as may otherwise be specifically authorized by law.” 47 U.S.C. § 

553(a)(1).

Here, plaintiff has not alleged whether defendants intercepted Plaintiff’s Program in the 

course of transmission over a cable system or by satellite television signal. A split of authority 

has developed as to whether the unlawful interception of a broadcast in the course of transmission 

over a cable system is covered by both sections 553(a) and 605(a) , or whether it is only covered

by section 553(a). Compare United States v. Norris, 88 F.3d 462, 466-69 (7th Cir. 1996) and

TKR Cable Co. v. Cable City Corp., 267 F.3d 196, 204-07 (3d Cir. 2001) (only covered by

section 553(a)) with Int’l Cablevision, Inc. v. Sykes, 75 F.3d 123, 132-33 (2d Cir. 1996) (covered 

by both sections 553(a) and 605(a)). 

At a minimum, plaintiff’s complaint and evidence support a conclusion that defendants 

intercepted, without authorization, a transmission of Plaintiff’s Program and broadcasted it to 

their patrons. Plaintiff has supplied proof of defendants’ violation through an affidavit of a 

private investigator who entered defendants’ establishment on May 2, 2015, and viewed 

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Plaintiff’s Program. (See Affidavit of Ilir Nushi [“Nushi Aff.”], ECF No. 11-3.) The 

investigator’s affidavit indicates that Plaintiff’s Program was displayed on two (2) flat screen

televisions he observed after entering Centenial Bar and provides details of the portions of 

Plaintiff’s Program that he viewed. (Id.) (noting the names, attire, and actions of fight 

participants, the number of televisions, and other distinguishing features of the establishment). 

Accordingly, plaintiff has established that defendants violated the gravamen of 47 U.S.C. § 605.

However, plaintiff essentially concedes in its motion for default judgment that the 

operative complaint and the record contain no allegations or evidence substantiating the nature of 

the transmission that was intercepted by defendants. (ECF No. 11-1 at 8.) Nevertheless, plaintiff 

argues that, although it was unable to allege the precise means of transmission in this case (i.e., 

transmission over a cable system or satellite broadcast), it should not be prejudiced for its 

inability to do so in light of defendants’ failure to respond to the complaint. (Id.) The court

agrees that, under the circumstances of this case, where plaintiff was deprived of the opportunity 

to conduct discovery regarding the exact type of transmission at issue because of defendants’

failure to appear in the action, plaintiff should not suffer the resulting prejudice. In any event, the 

split of authority discussed above has little practical impact in this case, because, as discussed 

below, the court recommends the award of statutory damages that are towards the lower end of 

the spectrum of statutory damages available under both section 553 and section 605. 

Consequently, the court finds that plaintiff’s claim under 47 U.S.C. § 605 is sufficiently 

pled and has merit. 

b. Conversion

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a claim for conversion in California has 

three elements: “ownership or right to possession of property, wrongful disposition of the 

property right and damages.” G.S. Rasmussen & Associates, Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Service, Inc., 

958 F.2d 896, 906 (9th Cir.1992). In this case, plaintiff purchased the licensing rights to 

Plaintiff’s Program, defendants aired Plaintiff’s Program without plaintiff’s permission, and 

plaintiff alleges that it suffered damages as a result of this airing, because it was deprived of the 

commercial license fee that would ordinarily be charged for permitting defendants to show 

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Plaintiff’s Program in their establishment. (Compl. ¶¶ 18-20, 32-35.) Therefore, plaintiff’s 

conversion claim is sufficiently pled and has merit. 

Accordingly, the second and third Eitel factors favor the entry of a default judgment. 

3. Factor Four: The Sum of Money at Stake in the Action

Under the fourth factor cited in Eitel, “the court must consider the amount of money at 

stake in relation to the seriousness of Defendant’s conduct.” PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 

1176-77; see also Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 500 (C.D. 

Cal. 2003). By its motion for default judgment, plaintiff seeks a judgment in the total amount of 

$113,000.00 against defendants, consisting of $110,000.00 for violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605 and 

$3,000.00 for the tort of conversion.

Given the substantial amount of money at stake, this factor could weigh against the entry 

of default judgment. See, e.g., Joe Hand Promotions v. Streshly, 655 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1136

(S.D. Cal. 2009) (proposed award amount of $100,875.00 was “manifestly excessive under 

existing law”); J & J Sports Productions. v. Cardoze, 2010 WL 2757106, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 

2010) (“a large sum of money at stake would disfavor default judgment,” such as damages 

totaling $114,200.00); see also Board of Trustees of the Sheet Metal Workers v. Vigil, 2007 WL 

3239281, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2007) (“[D]efault judgment is disfavored if there were a large 

sum of money involved.”). However, the court declines to recommend judgment in the large

amount requested. Consequently, when the judgment amount is appropriately reduced, as 

explained below, the fourth Eitel factor also weighs in favor of the entry of default judgment. 

4. Factor Five: The Possibility of a Dispute Concerning Material Facts

The court may assume the truth of well-pled facts in the complaint (except as to damages) 

following the clerk’s entry of default, and defendants have not appeared to dispute any such facts. 

Thus, there is no likelihood that any genuine issue of material fact exists. See, e.g., Elektra 

Entm’t Group Inc. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 393 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“Because all allegations in 

a well-pleaded complaint are taken as true after the court clerk enters default judgment, there is 

no likelihood that any genuine issue of material fact exists”); accord Philip Morris USA, Inc., 219 

F.R.D. at 500; PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Accordingly, the fifth Eitel factor favors 

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the entry of default judgment. 

5. Factor Six: Whether Default was Due to Excusable Neglect

In this case, there is no indication in the record that defendants’ default was due to 

excusable neglect. Defendants were not only served with the complaint, but also the request for 

entry of default and the motion for default judgment. (ECF Nos. 8, 11.) Indeed, despite having 

been provided with multiple opportunities to appear and defend their interests, defendants

apparently declined to do so. Accordingly, the sixth Eitel factor favors the entry of a default 

judgment. 

6. Factor Seven: The Strong Policy Underlying the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure Favoring Decisions on the Merits

“Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, 782 

F.2d at 1472. However, district courts have concluded with regularity that this policy, standing 

alone, is not dispositive, especially where a defendant fails to appear or defend itself in an action. 

PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177; see also Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. 

Supp. 2d 1039, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2010). Accordingly, although the court is cognizant of the policy 

in favor of decisions on the merits—and consistent with existing policy would prefer that this 

case be resolved on the merits—that policy does not, by itself, preclude the entry of default 

judgment.

In sum, upon careful consideration of all the Eitel factors, the court concludes that 

plaintiff is entitled to a default judgment against defendants. All that remains is a determination 

of the specific relief to which plaintiff is entitled. 

Terms of the Judgment to be Entered

After determining that a party is entitled to the entry of default judgment, the court must 

determine the terms of the judgment to be entered. As stated above, plaintiff requests judgment 

in the total amount of $113,000.00 against defendants, consisting of $110,000.00 for violation of 

47 U.S.C. § 605 and $3,000.00 for the tort of conversion. Although defendants failed to object to 

the amount requested, one of the factors the court is free to consider in exercising its discretion in 

granting default judgment is the sum of money to be awarded. See J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. 

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Jurado, 2011 WL 6153605, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2011). Considering plaintiff’s briefing and 

the record in this case, the court recommends that damages be awarded, but not in the amount 

requested.

1. Damages Under 47 U.S.C. § 605

For purposes of a 47 U.S.C. § 605 claim, a plaintiff may elect to seek either actual or 

statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(I & II). The statute generally provides for 

statutory damages for each violation of not less than $1,000 and not more than $10,000, as the 

court considers just. 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II). Plaintiff seeks the maximum award of 

$10,000. The statute also authorizes enhanced statutory damages of not more than $100,000 if 

the court finds the violation was “committed willfully and for purposes of direct or indirect 

commercial advantage or private financial gain.” 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(ii).2 Here, plaintiff 

seeks the maximum of $100,000 in enhanced statutory damages, for a total of $110,000 in 

statutory damages. In support of its request, plaintiff argues that the requested amount is justified 

primarily because of the need to deter broadcast piracy and the significant harm done to plaintiff’s 

business as a result of such activities. Although deterrence is certainly an important 

consideration, the court finds plaintiff’s requested damages to be grossly excessive and 

unsupported by the record here. 

In this case, plaintiff’s investigator stated that during the roughly 6-minute period he was 

present in Centenial Bar, he observed only 10-11 patrons inside the establishment, which had the 

capacity to hold “60+ people.” (Nushi Aff.) The investigator noted that Centenial Bar showed 

Plaintiff’s Program on two (2) flat screen televisions in the bar area. (Id.) He also reported that 

there was no cover charge for entry on the night in question. (Id.) Furthermore, there is no 

evidence before the court that defendants promoted the fight’s airing at the establishment, or that 

a special premium on food and drink was charged on the night of the fight. Indeed, with only 10-

 

2 By comparison, 47 U.S.C. § 553 provides that “the party aggrieved may recover an award of 

statutory damages for all violations involved in the action, in a sum of not less than $250 or more 

than $10,000 as the court considers just.” 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(A)(ii). Furthermore, “[i]n any 

case in which the court finds that the violation was committed willfully and for purposes of 

commercial advantage or private financial gain, the court in its discretion may increase the award 

of damages...by an amount of not more than $50,000.” 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(B). 

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11 patrons in the establishment, it appears unlikely that Centenial Bar was doing any greater level 

of business on the night that Plaintiff’s Program was shown than at any other time. In light of this 

record, which lacks evidence of defendants reaping any significant commercial benefit from their

piracy of Plaintiff’s Program, the court recommends that plaintiff be awarded $1,000 in statutory 

damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II). 

However, the court takes judicial notice of the fact that defendants have already violated

47 U.S.C. § 605 on at least two prior occasions – in two other actions that were previously filed in 

this court, defendants likewise defaulted on a claim pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 605. See J&J Sports 

Productions, Inc. v. Machuca et al., 2:13-cv-1076- JAM-KJN (E.D. Cal.); Joe Hand Promotions 

v. Machuca, 2:13-cv-1228-GEB-KJN (E.D. Cal.) Because defendants’ repeat violations are more 

indicative of willful conduct for purposes of commercial advantage or financial gain, and because 

such repeat violations suggest that increased deterrence is necessary, the court recommends that 

plaintiff be awarded an additional $5,000 in enhanced damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 

605(e)(3)(C)(ii), for a total of $6,000 in statutory damages, which the court finds appropriate 

under the circumstances here. See J & J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Jurado, 2011 WL 6153605, at 

*4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2011) (collecting awards in similar cases; awarding $1,000 in statutory 

damages and $3,000 in enhanced statutory damages in a default judgment where the defendant 

was not a repeat offender, but where the program at issue was broadcast to a larger number of

patrons); Joe Hand Promotions v. Machuca, 2:13-cv-1228-GEB-KJN (E.D. Cal.), ECF Nos. 24, 

26 (awarding enhanced damages of $3,000.00 based on one prior violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605). 

2. Damages for Conversion

Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment also seeks an award of $3,000.00 in compensatory

damages for the state law tort of conversion. Damages for conversion are measured by the value 

of the property at the time of the conversion. Cal. Civ. Code § 3336; see also Stan Lee Trading, 

Inc. v. Holtz, 649 F. Supp. 577, 581 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Spates v. Dameron Hosp. Ass’n, 114 Cal. 

App. 4th 208, 221 (2003). In the context of broadcast piracy, damages for conversion have often 

been calculated based upon the amount that the defendant would have been required to pay for a 

proper sublicensing agreement. See J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Jurado, 2011 WL 6153605, at *5

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(E.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2011); J & J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Ro, 2010 WL 668065, at *4 (N.D. 

Cal. Feb. 19, 2010). 

Here, the affidavit of plaintiff’s president, Joseph M. Gagliardi, indicates, by reference to 

Exhibit 2 to his affidavit, that defendants’ establishment, which has a maximum occupancy of 

about 60 people, would have been required to pay a sublicense fee of $3,000.00 to lawfully air 

Plaintiff’s Program. (ECF No. 11-4, ¶ 8, Ex. 2.) Accordingly, the court recommends an award of 

$3000.00 on plaintiff’s conversion claim. 

CONCLUSION

In sum, the court finds that plaintiff is entitled to $6,000.00 in statutory damages (based 

on its claim under 47 U.S.C. § 605) and $3,000.00 in compensatory damages (based on its claim 

of conversion), for a total of $9,000.00. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that within three (3) days after these findings 

and recommendations are filed, plaintiff shall serve a copy of the findings and recommendations 

on defendants by mail at their last known address(es), and shall forthwith file proof of such 

service on the court’s docket. 

IT IS ALSO HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment (ECF No. 11) be granted in part. 

2. Judgment be entered in plaintiff’s favor, and against defendants jointly and severally, in 

the amount of $9,000.00. 

3. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) 

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served on all parties and filed with the court within fourteen (14) days after service of the 

objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th 

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Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED. 

Dated: October 12, 2016

Case 2:16-cv-00715-TLN-KJN Document 15 Filed 10/13/16 Page 12 of 12