Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02335/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02335-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332pi Diversity-Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CRYSTAL HILSLEY and WILLIAM 

RILEY, on behalf of themselves and all 

others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

OCEAN SPRAY CRANBERRIES, INC., 

 Defendant.

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Case No. 3:17-CV-2335-GPC-MDD

CLASS ACTION

ORDER GRANTING 

PLAINTIFFS’ UNOPPOSED 

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 

APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION 

SETTLEMENT

[Dkt. No. 232.]

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Plaintiffs Crystal Hilsley and William Riley (“Plaintiffs”), individually and 

on behalf of the Class defined below, along with Defendant Ocean Spray 

Cranberries, Inc. (“Ocean Spray”), move this Court for preliminary approval of the 

proposed settlement in the above-captioned action. 

The case was originally filed by Plaintiff Crystal Hilsley against Ocean Spray 

Cranberries, Inc. (“Ocean Spray”) and Arnold Worldwide, LLC (“Arnold 

Worldwide”). (Dkt. No. 1-2, Compl.) The gravamen of Plaintiff Hilsley’s 

Complaint was that the Ocean Spray product labels claiming that certain Ocean 

Spray beverage products (the “Products”) contain “No Artificial Flavors” are false 

and misleading because the Products actually contain artificial ingredients, dl-malic 

acid and fumaric acid, that function as flavors. (Dkt. No. 1-2, Compl. ¶¶ 32, 54). 

Plaintiff alleged that she paid a premium for Ocean Spray Products believing that 

the Products contained “No Artificial Flavors.” (Id., Compl. ¶ 67). Hilsley sought 

both monetary damages and injunctive relief for the following claims: (1) violations 

of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code Sections 1750, et seq.; (2) 

violations of the False Advertising law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Sections 17500, et 

seq.; (3) violations of the unlawful and unfair prong of the Unfair Competition Law, 

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Sections 17200, et seq.; (4) Breach of Express Warranties; 

and (5) Breach of Implied Warranties. (Dkt. No. 1-2). Ocean Spray has denied any 

and all allegations, including because the named acids were used as acidulants and 

not artificial flavors in the Products. 

After hard-fought litigation with written discovery, depositions, contested 

motion practice, expert discovery, and extensive settlement negotiations, Plaintiffs1

and Ocean Spray reached a proposed Settlement. The Settlement Agreement 

establishes both monetary and non-monetary relief and requires Ocean Spray to pay 

$5,400,000 into a non-reversionary settlement fund. The Settlement will bring an 

end to what has been, and likely would continue to be, highly contentious and costly 

litigation centered upon unsettled legal questions. Therefore, the motion seeks the 

 

1 Plaintiff William Riley was added as a named Plaintiff on October 25, 2019. (Dkt. No. 228, FAC.)

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entry of an order providing for: (1) preliminary approval of the Settlement; (2) 

preliminary certification of a Settlement Class and appointment of the Plaintiffs as 

Class Representatives and Plaintiffs’ counsel as Class Counsel; (3) approval of the 

Settlement Administrator; (4) approval of the Notice program; (5) approval of the 

Claims process; and (6) the scheduling of a Final Approval Hearing to consider Final 

Approval of the Settlement.

A. Settlement Terms

1. Monetary Relief

The Settlement Agreement provides that Ocean Spray will pay $5,400,000.00 

into a settlement fund. (Dkt. No. 232-3, Marron Decl., Ex. 1, Agreement at § 7.4.)

This fund will be used, among other things, to pay authorized claims to the 

Settlement Class Members, to pay the costs of settlement administration and notice 

to the Class Members, to pay any necessary taxes and tax expenses, to pay Class 

Counsel’s fees and expenses, and to pay incentive awards to the named Plaintiffs. 

(Id., Agreement at § 7.6.) For Authorized Claimants, Ocean Spray will provide 

$1.00 in cash from the Settlement Fund per bottle of Products purchased (any size) 

during the Class Period, up to 20 bottles, limited to one claim per household. (Id., 

Agreement at § 7.2.1.) No additional proof of purchase will be required beyond a 

timely and properly submitted claim form, and no evidence of additional purchases 

will entitle a claimant to receive compensation in excess of $20.00 (unless 

distribution is increased pro rata). (Id., Agreement at § 7.2.1.) The settlement 

provides for a pro rata reduction if the claims exceed the amount in the settlement 

fund. (Id., Agreement at § 7.2.3) or a pro rata increase if the settlement fund is not 

exhausted. (Id., Agreement at § 7.2.3.)

2. Non-Monetary Relief

Ocean Spray also agrees to injunctive relief that within 12 months after the 

Final Approval Effective Date, Ocean Spray shall discontinue manufacturing, for 

retail sale in the United States, the Products that contain the artificial versions of 

malic acid and/or fumaric acid as an ingredient with labels that contain the claim “no 

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artificial flavors”, provided Ocean Spray shall be permitted to exhaust existing label 

stock purchased, printed, or ordered prior to the Final Approval Effective Date even 

if the associated Products are manufactured later than 12 months after the Final 

Approval Effective Date. (Id., Agreement at § 7.3.)

B. Certification of Settlement Class 

Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes four 

prerequisites for class certification: (1) numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality; 

and (4) adequacy of representation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Under Rule 23(b)(3), 

common questions must predominate over individual questions, Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(b)(3), and the class action device must be “superior to other available methods 

for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Id. Moreover, under Rule 

23(b)(2), a class action may be certified if the “party opposing the class has acted or 

refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive 

relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a 

whole”. Fed. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). 

Plaintiffs contend the settlement class meets the numerosity requirement. 

Numerosity is met if “the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 

impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). “As a general matter, courts have found 

that numerosity is satisfied when class size exceeds 40 members, but not satisfied 

when membership dips below 21.” Slaven v. BP Am., Inc., 190 F.R.D. 649, 654 

(C.D. Cal. 2000). Here, the proposed Class consists of thousands of consumers who 

purchased Ocean Spray Products; therefore, the numerosity factor is easily satisfied.

Next, Plaintiffs contend that the settlement class meets the commonality and 

predominance factors. Rule 23(a)(2) requires the existence of “questions of law or 

fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Commonality is established if 

plaintiffs and class members’ claims “depend upon a common contention,” “capable 

of class-wide resolution – which means that determination of its truth or falsity will 

resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” 

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). In this case, the class 

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members’ claims stem from the same legal claims and common nucleus of facts, that 

the “No Artificial Flavors” labels on Defendant’s Products are false and misleading. 

Therefore, commonality has been met. Predominance tests “whether proposed 

classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” Tyson 

Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045 (2016). “Rule 23(b)(3) requires 

a showing that questions common to the class predominate.” Amgen Inc. v. 

Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 459 (2013) (emphasis 

in original). Here, common questions of law and fact exist and predominate over 

individual questions of (1) whether Ocean Spray’s representations regarding its “No 

Artificial Flavors” claims were false and misleading or reasonably likely to deceive 

consumers; (2) whether Ocean Spray violated the CLRA, UCL, FAL and the MGL2; 

(3) whether Ocean Spray had defrauded Plaintiffs and the Class Members; and (4) 

whether the Class has been injured by the wrongs complained of, and if so, whether 

Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to damages, injunctive and/or other equitable

relief, including restitution, and if so, the nature and amount of such relief. In sum, 

the Court concludes that commonality and predominance have been satisfied. 

Plaintiffs further argue that the settlement class meets the typicality 

requirement. Typicality requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative 

parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). 

The named plaintiffs must be members of the class they seek to represent and they 

must “possess the same interest and suffer the same injury” as putative class 

members. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982) (internal 

quotations omitted). The representative claims are typical if they are “reasonably 

co-extensive with those of absent class members,” though they “need not be 

substantially identical.” Parsons v. Ryan, 764 F.3d 657, 685 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 

Hanlon v. Chrylser Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9 Cir. 1998)). Plaintiffs’ claims are 

typical of those of the Class in that their claims arise out of the purchase of Ocean 

 

2 Massachusetts General Law.

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Spray Products after relying on the allegedly misleading “No Artificial Flavors” 

representation and suffered the same injury as putative Class members. 

Finally, Plaintiffs claim that the class settlement meets the adequacy 

requirement. Representative parties must be able to “fairly and adequately protect 

the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). In analyzing whether Rule 

23(a)(4) has been met, the Court must ask two questions: “(1) do the named plaintiffs 

and their counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class members and (2) will 

the named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of 

the class?” Evon v. Law Offices of Sidney Mickell, 688 F.3d 1015, 1031 (9th Cir. 

2012) (citation omitted). Adequacy of representation is designed to deny 

certification in instances of “actual fraud, overreaching, or collusion.” In re 

Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 948 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis 

in original).

Plaintiffs have no interests antagonistic to those of the Class, (Dkt. No. 232-

5, Hilsley Decl. ¶ 11; Dkt. No. 232-6, Riley Decl. ¶ 7), and have prosecuted this 

action vigorously on behalf of the Class. (Dkt. No. 232-5, Hilsley Decl. ¶¶ 3-9; Dkt. 

No. 232-6, Riley Decl. ¶¶ 3-5.) Class Counsel, who has extensive experience in 

consumer class actions, has also vigorously represented the Class and has no 

conflicts of interest.

3

(Dkt. No. 232-2, Marron Decl. ¶¶ 18-36). Based on his 

experience, Class Counsel concluded that Settlement provides exceptional results 

for the class while sparing the class from the uncertainties of continued and 

protracted litigation. (Id. ¶ 14.) The Court concludes that adequacy has been met. 

Finally, for settlement purposes only, a class settlement is superior to other 

available methods for a fair resolution of the controversy because the class 

mechanism will reduce litigation costs and promote greater efficiency. In 

 

3 The Court notes that in the instant motion for preliminary approval, Plaintiffs have not set forth the experience and 

competence of co-counsel Law Office of David Elliot. (Dkt. No. 232.) In the Court’s order granting in part 

Plaintiff’s motion for class certification, the Court appointed Law Office of David Elliott as Class Counsel based on 

his submissions. (Dkt. No. 23-18, Elliot Decl.) Relying on those same submissions, the Court concludes that 

adequacy of counsel has been met. 

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conclusion, the Court finds that the proposed class may be certified under Rule 

23(b)(3). 

Under Rule 23(b)(2), Plaintiffs must demonstrate that “the party opposing the 

class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that 

final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting 

the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). The Settlement Agreement provides 

that “[w]ithin 12 months after the Final Approval Effective Dates, Ocean Spray shall 

discontinue manufacturing the Products that contain the artificial versions of malic 

acid and/or fumaric acid as an ingredient with labels that contain the claim ‘no 

artificial flavors’, provided Ocean Spray shall be permitted to exhaust existing label 

stock purchased, printed, or ordered prior to the Final Approval Effective Date even 

if the associated Products are manufactured later than 12 months after the Final 

Approval Effective Date.” (Dkt. No. 232-3, Marron Decl., Ex. 1, Settlement 

Agreement § 7.3.) The injunctive relief sought applies to the whole class and seeks 

to redress the class-wide injury of misleading labels. Therefore, the requirements of 

Rule 23(b)(2) have been met. 

Because the proposed Class satisfies the elements of Rule 23(a), Rule 

23(b)(3), and Rule 23(b)(2), the Court conditionally certifies the Class for settlement 

purposes only. 

Under Rule 23(g), “a court that certifies a class must appoint class counsel.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1). The Court must consider “(i) the work counsel has done in 

identifying or investigating potential claims in the action; (ii) counsel's experience 

in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types of claims asserted 

in the action; (iii) counsel's knowledge of the applicable law; and (iv) the resources 

that counsel will commit to representing the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A).

Plaintiffs ask the Court to appoint the Law Offices of Ronald A. Marron and 

the Law Office of David Elliot as Settlement Class Counsel. (Dkt. No. 232-3, 

Marron Decl., Ex. 1 at 80.) Mr. Marron has outlined his extensive experience in 

litigating consumer class actions. (See Dkt. No. 232-2, Marron Decl. ¶¶ 18-35; id.; 

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Ex. 2.) From this experience, it appears that Mr. Marron has knowledge of the 

applicable law in this area. In the Court’s prior order on class certification, the Law 

Office of David Elliot submitted a declaration to support his experience. (Dkt. No. 

23-18, Elliott Decl.) Based on the experience and work of both counsel, the Court 

concludes that he has satisfied the factors to support appointment of class counsel. 

The Court therefore appoints Law Offices of Ronald A. Marron and Law Office of 

David Elliott as Class Counsel in this action. 

Additionally, the Court finds appointing Plaintiffs Crystal Hilsley and 

William Riley, as class representatives is appropriate. (See Dkt. No. 232-5, Hilsley 

Decl.; Dkt. No. 232-6, Riley Decl.) Plaintiffs’ interests align with those of the 

proposed class members, and no conflicts of interest exist that would render them 

inappropriate class representatives. Furthermore, Plaintiffs attest to their 

involvement in this case throughout the litigation. (See id.)

C. Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement 

Next, the Court must determine whether to preliminarily approve the class 

action settlement. Rule 23(e) was amended in 2018 to create uniformity amongst 

the circuits and to focus the inquiry on whether a proposed class action is “fair 

reasonable, and adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), advisory committee notes (2018 

amendment). As amended, Rule 23(e) provides that a court may approve a proposed 

class action settlement “after a hearing and only on finding that it is fair, reasonable, 

and adequate after considering whether:

(A) the class representatives and class counsel have adequately 

represented the class;

(B) the proposal was negotiated at arm's length;

(C) the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking into account:

(i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal;

(ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing 

relief to the class, including the method of processing classmember claims;

(iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney's fees, including 

timing of payment; and

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(iv) any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3); 

and

(D) the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). The first and second factors are viewed as “procedural” in 

nature, and the third and fourth factors are viewed as “substantive” in nature. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2), advisory committee notes (2018 amendment).

1. Plaintiffs and Class Counsel Have Adequately Represented the 

Class

Rule 23(e)(2)(A) requires the Court to consider whether “the class 

representatives and class counsel have adequately represented the class.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(A). This analysis is “redundant of the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4) 

and Rule 23(g), respectively.” Final approval criteria-Rule 23(e)'s multifactor test, 4 

NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 13:48 (5th ed.); In re GSE Bonds Antitrust 

Litig., --F. Supp. 3d --, 2019 WL 5848960, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2019) (noting 

similarity of inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) and Rule 23(e)(2)(A)). 

Because the Court found that adequacy under Rule 23(a)(4) has been satisfied 

above, due to the similarity, the adequacy factor under Rule 23(e)(2)(A) is also met. 

2. The Settlement was Negotiated at Arm’s Length

Rule 23(e)(2)(B) requires the Court to consider whether “the proposal was 

negotiated at arm's length.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(B). Here, the settlement was 

negotiated at arm’s length after hard-fought litigation and discovery. The Parties did 

not begin settlement discussions until after the Court had entered Orders on Plaintiff 

Hilsley’s Motion to Exclude (Dkt. No. 105) and Motion for Partial Summary 

Judgment (Dkt. No. 101), and Defendant Ocean Spray’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (Dkt. No. 108) and Motion to Decertify the Class (Dkt. No. 109). (Dkt. 

No. 232-2, Marron Decl. ¶ 12.) Settlement discussions also did not begin until after 

the Parties had exchanged written discovery and documents, which speaks to the 

fundamental fairness of the process. See Nat'l Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. 

DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 528 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“A settlement following 

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sufficient discovery and genuine arms-length negotiation is presumed fair.”). 

Further, settlement discussions did not begin until the Court entered a Pretrial Order 

and encouraged the parties to discuss settlement. The time that it took to work out 

significant details and vigorous disagreements between the parties and the parties’ 

need for a settlement conference in front of Magistrate Judge Dembin demonstrate 

that this proposed resolution was the product of heavily disputed and arm’s length 

negotiation. (Dkt. No. 232-2, Marron Decl. ¶ 13.) The settlement negotiations were 

hard-fought, with both Parties and their counsel thoroughly familiar with the 

applicable facts, legal theories, and defenses on both sides. (Id.)

Here, class members who submit a timely claim will be entitled to actual

monetary relief that includes $1.00 in cash from the Settlement Fund per bottle of 

Products purchased (any size) during the Class Period, up to 20 bottles, limited to 

one claim per household. (Dkt. No. 232-3, Marron Decl., Ex. 1, Agreement at § 

7.2.1.) Additionally, Ocean Spray has agreed to valuable injunctive relief. (Id., 

Agreement at § 7.3.) Although Class Counsel intends to request a fee and out-ofpocket expense award of up to 33.33% of the Settlement Fund, (id., Agreement at § 

8.1), they claim the amount is not disproportionate to the amount of recovery 

received by the Class which will need to be decided at the final approval stage. The 

settlement agreement also does not contain a “clear sailing” provision “in which 

defendant[] agreed not to object to an award of attorneys' fees.” See In re Bluetooth 

Headset Prod. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir. 2011). The settlement is also 

not contingent upon an award of attorneys’ fees to class counsel and the amount of 

fees awarded is within the sole discretion of the Court. Finally, the settlement 

agreement does not contain a “kicker” arrangement whereby unpaid attorneys' fees 

revert to the defendant. Id. at 949; (see Dkt. No. 232-3, Marron Decl., Ex. 1, 

Agreement at § 8.1.) Instead, unpaid attorneys’ fees will be added to the class fund 

and will not revert back to Ocean Spray. Therefore, this Court concludes that the 

settlement is fundamentally fair and was negotiated at arm’s length by competent 

counsel who are experienced in class action litigation.

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3. The Relief Provided to the Class is Adequate

Rule 23(e)(2)(C) requires that the Court consider whether “the relief provided 

for the class is adequate, taking into account: (i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial 

and appeal; (ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to the 

class, including the method of processing class-member claims; (iii) the terms of any 

proposed award of attorney's fees, including timing of payment; and (iv) any 

agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(e)(2)(C). The amount offered in the proposed settlement agreement is generally 

considered to be the most important consideration of any class settlement. See Bayat 

v. Bank of the West, No. C-13-2376 EMC, 2015 WL 1744342, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 

15, 2015) (citing In re HP Inkjet Printer Litig., 716 F.3d 1173, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 

2013)).

Ocean Spray has agreed to settle this matter for a non-reversionary total of 

$5,400,000. (Dkt. No. 232-3, Marron Decl., Ex. 1, Agreement at § 7.4.) In lieu of 

taking this matter to trial with the possibility of obtaining no relief, this is an 

excellent result for the Class. Further, the $5,400,000 nationwide settlement amount 

is reasonable considering that damages would be limited to a fraction of total sales 

if Plaintiffs were to prevail at trial. Damages for the nationwide class would be 

based on the price premium method, which is based on the difference between the 

value of the Products with the “No Artificial Flavors” statement and the actual value 

received.

The amount of recovery per claimant is also adequate considering that 

Settlement Class Members can claim $1.00 in cash from the Settlement Fund per 

bottle of Products purchased (any size) during the Class Period, up to 20 bottles, 

limited to one claim per household. (Id., Agreement at § 7.2.1.) This recovery is 

significant considering that the Plaintiff calculated the average price of the Ocean 

Spray products at $3.25, (see Dkt. No. 192-5). The $1.00 recovery per purchase (up 

to twenty purchases per household) for each claimant is an excellent result 

considering it represents a large fraction of total damages alleged by Plaintiffs and 

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that Plaintiffs believed could have been recoverable at trial. Indeed, Hilsley’s expert, 

Dr. Belch, opined that the price premium attributable to the “No Artificial Flavors” 

claim is roughly 19%. (See Dkt. No. 192-5). Taking Hilsley’s presumed average 

retail price of $3.25 and price premium of 19%, the damages for each Product 

purchased could total 61 cents. ($3.25 x 19% price premium = 61 cents). Balancing 

all of the factors that go into protracted litigation and taking this into consideration, 

$1.00 per bottle represents a fair settlement amount. Moreover, the settlement 

agreement provides for injunctive relief. (Dkt. No. 232-3, Marron Decl., Ex. 1,

Agreement at § 7.3.) 

i. The Costs, Risks, and Delay of Trial and Appeal Support 

Preliminary Approval

The costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal further support preliminary 

approval. Proceeding in this litigation in the absence of settlement poses various 

risks such as failing to certify a nationwide class, having summary judgment granted 

against Plaintiffs, or losing at trial. Such considerations have been found to weigh 

heavily in favor of settlement. See Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 966 (risk, expense, 

complexity and duration of litigation supports settlement); Curtis-Bauer v. Morgan 

Stanley & Co., Inc., No. C 06-3903 TEH, 2008 WL 4667090, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 

22, 2008) (“Settlement avoids the complexity, delay, risk and expense of continuing 

with the litigation and will produce a prompt, certain, and substantial recovery for 

the Plaintiff class.”). 

ii. The Proposed Method of Distributing Relief to the Class Is 

Effective

“[T]he goal of any distribution method is to get as much of the available 

damages remedy to class members as possible and in as simple and expedient a 

manner as possible.” Final approval criteria—Rule 23(e)(2)(C)(ii): Distribution 

method, 4 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 13:53 (5th ed.). The claims process 

is straightforward and allows Settlement Class members to make a claim by 

submitting a valid and timely Claim Form to the Settlement Administrator without 

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complication. See In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales 

Practices, & Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 8:10ML 02151 JVS, 2013 WL 3224585, at *18 

(C.D. Cal. June 17, 2013) (“The requirement that class members download a claim 

form or request in writing a claim form, complete the form, and mail it back to the 

settlement administrator is not onerous.”). Significantly, if there is any remaining 

cash amount in the Settlement Fund after payment of Notice and Settlement 

Administrator expenses, a Fee and Expense Award, any necessary taxes, tax 

expenses, Incentive Awards, and the total amount of all Authorized Claims, the 

Settlement Administrator shall divide any remaining monetary amounts equally 

among the Authorized Claimants and shall pay each such Authorized Claimant his 

or her pro rata share of the remaining monetary amount. (Dkt. No. 232-3, Marron 

Decl., Ex. 1, Agreement at § 7.2.3.) This pro rata distribution ensures that Settlement 

Class Members will receive the maximum amount of the settlement fund and that no 

money will revert back to Defendant. See McGrath v. Wyndham Resort Dev. Corp.,

No. 15CV1631 JM (KSC), 2018 WL 637858, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2018) (finding 

a non-reversionary settlement fund to be “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”). 

Accordingly, the Court finds the proposed method of distribution of class funds to 

be effective.

iii. The Proposed Attorneys’ Fee Award 

The Settlement Agreement provides that Class Counsel may request an award 

of attorneys’ fees and out-of-pocket expenses of up to 33.33% of the Settlement 

Fund, subject to this Court’s approval. (Dkt. No. 232-3, Marron Decl., Ex. 1,

Agreement at § 8.1.) Although the “benchmark” for attorneys’ fees in the Ninth 

Circuit is typically 25% of the common fund, Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 942, Class 

Counsel argues that its fee request is within the range of what courts have approved 

in other class action cases. See, e.g., Singer v. Becton Dickinson & Co., No. 08–

CV–821–IEG, 2010 WL 2196104 (S.D. Cal. June 1, 2010) (awarding 33.33% of $1 

million settlement fund); Vasquez v. Coast Valley Roofing, Inc., 266 F.R.D. 482, 492 

(E.D. Cal. 2010) (awarding 33.33% of $300,000 settlement fund); Weeks v. Kellogg 

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Co., No. CV 09-08102 MMM RZX, 2013 WL 6531177, at *30 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 

2013) (awarding 30% of the $2.5 million settlement fund); Mollicone v. Universal 

Handicraft, No. 17-21468-CIV, 2018 WL 3913689, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2018) 

(awarding Class Counsel fees in the amount of 31.9% of the settlement fund); Rawa,

2018 WL 2389040, at *9 (awarding Class Counsel 28% of the settlement fund). 

“Selection of the benchmark or any other rate must be supported by findings that 

take into account all the circumstances of the case.” Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 

290 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002). Because the Court does not need to determine 

attorney’s fees at the preliminary approval stage, Class Counsel indicates it will fully 

address the reasonableness of their requested fee award in their forthcoming Motion 

for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Incentive Awards. 

iv. No Side Agreements Were Made in Connection with the 

Proposed Settlement

Rule 23(e)(3) requires that the Parties “must file a statement identifying any 

agreement made in connection with the [settlement] proposal.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(e)(3). No agreements were made in connection with the settlement aside from 

the Settlement Agreement itself. (Dkt. No. 232-2, Marron Decl. ¶ 17.)

4. The Proposed Settlement Treats Class Members Equitably 

Relative to Each Other

Rule 23(e)(2)(D) requires the Court to consider whether the Settlement 

Agreement “treats class members equitably relative to each other.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(e)(2)(D). “A distribution of relief that favors some class members at the expense 

of others may be a red flag that class counsel have sold out some of the class 

members at the expense of others, or for their own benefit.” Final approval criteria—

Rule 23(e)(2)(D): Intra-class equity, 4 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 13:56 

(5th ed.). Here, the settlement treats each class member equally as each class 

member can make a claim for $1.00 in cash from the Settlement Fund per bottle of 

Products purchased (any size) during the Class Period, up to 20 bottles, limited to 

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one claim per household. (Dkt. No. 232-3, Marron Decl., Ex. 1, Agreement at § 

7.2.1.) 

Accordingly, the Settlement (including all terms of the Settlement Agreement 

and exhibits thereto) is hereby PRELIMINARILY APPROVED. The Court 

further finds and orders as follows:

1. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1332(d)(2)(A), the Class Action Fairness Act, and venue is proper in this district. 

2. The Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs’ and 

Settlement Class Members’ claims against Ocean Spray comports with the Due 

Process Clause of the United States Constitution. 

3. The Court finds that, subject to the Final Approval hearing, the 

Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the best interests of the 

Settlement Class. The Court further finds that the settlement falls well within the 

range of reason and has no obvious deficiencies. 

4. Because the settlement meets the standards for preliminary approval, 

the Court preliminarily approves all terms of the settlement, including the Settlement 

Agreement and all of its exhibits. 

The Court certifies a Settlement Class of all citizens and residents of the 

United States who, on or after January 1, 2011 until the [date preliminary approval 

is granted] (the "Class Period"), purchased one of the following Products for 

personal or household use and not for resale, in their respective state of citizenship:

• Ocean Spray® Cran-AppleTM;

• Ocean Spray® Cran-GrapeTM;

• Ocean Spray® “100% Apple” Juice Drink;

• Ocean Spray® Cran-RaspberryTM;

• Ocean Spray® WaveTM Apple with White Cranberries;

• Ocean Spray® WaveTM Berry Medley;

• Ocean Spray® Cran-CherryTM;

• Ocean Spray® Cran-PineappleTM;

• Ocean Spray® Cran-PomegranateTM;

• Ocean Spray® diet Cran-PomegranateTM;

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• Ocean Spray® Diet Cran-CherryTM;

• Ocean Spray® 100% Juice Cranberry Cherry Flavor 

• Ocean Spray® Cran-StrawberryTM

• Ocean Spray® Diet Blueberry 

• Ocean Spray® Diet Cranberry With Lime 

• Ocean Spray® Cran-LemonadeTM

• Ocean Spray® Classic Tea White Cranberry Peach

• Ocean Spray® Cran-TeaTM White Cranberry Peach

• Ocean Spray® Classic Tea Cranberry 

• Ocean Spray® Cran-TeaTM Cranberry

• Ocean Spray® 100% Premium Juice Cranberry Apple

• Ocean Spray® 100% Cranberry Concord Grape 

• Ocean Spray® 100% Juice Cranberry Raspberry 

• Ocean Spray® 100% Juice Cranberry Pomegranate

• Ocean Spray® 100% Juice Tropical Citrus Fruit & Vegetable

• Ocean Spray® Light Tropical Citrus Fruit And Vegetable

• Ocean Spray® 100% Juice Cranberry Pomegranate Blueberry Fruit & 

Vegetable

• Ocean Spray® Pink Cranberry Passionfruit Juice Drink

• Ocean Spray® 100% Juice Cranberry Mango

• Ocean Spray® Pink Lite Cranberry Juice Drink

• Ocean Spray® Light Cran-MangoTM

• Ocean Spray® Pink Cranberry Juice Drink

• Ocean Spray® Pink Lite Cranberry Juice Drink 

• Ocean Spray® Pink Cranberry Juice Drink

• Ocean Spray® Ruby Pomegranate

• Ocean Spray® Diet Cran-TeaTM

• Ocean Spray® 100% Juice Cranberry Pineapple 

• Ocean Spray® Diet Cran-PineappleTM

• Ocean Spray® Mocktails Tropical Citrus 

• Ocean Spray® Cran-AmericaTM

• Ocean Spray® Pink Cranberry Juice Drink

• Ocean Spray® CranharvestTM Cranberry Apple Cider

• Ocean Spray® Diet Cran-RaspberryTM

• Ocean Spray® Diet Cran-AppleTM

• Ocean Spray® Diet Cranberry 

• Ocean Spray® Diet Cran-GrapeTM

• Ocean Spray® Cranberry CranenergyTM

• Ocean Spray® Diet Ruby Red 

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• Ocean Spray® New Light 50 Cranberry Grape 

• Ocean Spray® Sparkling Citrus Tangerine

• Ocean Spray® CranenergyTM Sparkling Diet Cranberry

• Ocean Spray® Ruby Cherry

• Ocean Spray® Cherry Juice Cocktail

• Ocean Spray® CranenergyTM Sparkling Cranberry 

• Ocean Spray® Sparkling Pink Cranberry Juice Drink

• Ocean Spray® Pom Blue Sparkling Beverage

• Ocean Spray® Sparkling Cranberry

• Ocean Spray® Diet Pom Blue Sparkling Beverage

• Ocean Spray® Sparkling Diet Cranberry

• Ocean Spray® Sparkling Cran-RaspberryTM

• Ocean Spray® Sparkling Cran-GrapeTM

• Ocean Spray® Diet Cran-LemonadeTM

• Ocean Spray® Cran-MangoTM

• Ocean Spray® Ruby Cranberry 

• Ocean Spray® 100% Citrus Tangerine Orange 

• Ocean Spray® 100% Citrus Mango Pineapple 

• Ocean Spray® Cran-TropicalTM Juice Drink

• Ocean Spray® Light Cranberry Apple

• Ocean Spray® Diet Cran-MangoTM

• Ocean Spray® Light Ruby Red 

• Ocean Spray® Blueberry Juice Cocktail

• Ocean Spray® Blueberry Pomegranate 

• Ocean Spray® Diet Blueberry Pomegranate 

• Ocean Spray® Pomegranate CranenergyTM

• Ocean Spray® Light Cran-PomegranateTM

• Ocean Spray® Wave TM Mango Pineapple 

• Ocean Spray® Raspberry CranenergyTM

• Ocean Spray® Diet Cran-BlackberryTM

• Ocean Spray® New Light 50 Cranberry Raspberry.

A. Excluded from the Settlement Class are (1) any judicial officer 

presiding over the action; (2) the Defendant, its subsidiaries, parent companies, 

successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendant or its parent has a 

controlling interest, and each of their current or former officers, directors, and 

employees; (3) legal representatives, successors, or assigns of any such excluded 

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person; and (4) any person who properly executes and files a timely request for 

exclusion.

5. The Court has reviewed the content of the Parties’ proposed Notice 

Plan, the long-form and short-form Notices, and the Claim Form and finds that they 

satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2), Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 23(e)(1), and the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the 

United States Constitution. Accordingly, the Court approves the Notices and the 

Claim Form. 

6. The Court further approves the methods for giving notice of the 

settlement to the members of the Settlement Class, as reflected in the Settlement 

Agreement and proposed in the Parties’ Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval. In 

addition to the Notices, the Court has also reviewed the notice procedures and finds 

that the members of the Settlement Class will, thereby, receive the best notice 

practicable under the circumstances. The Court also approves payment of the costs 

of notice as provided for in the Settlement Agreement. The Court finds that the 

notice procedures, carried out with reasonable diligence, will constitute the best 

notice practicable under the circumstances and will satisfy the requirements of 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(1), 

and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. 

7. The Court preliminarily finds that the following counsel fairly and 

adequately represent the interests of the Settlement Class and hereby appoints the 

Law Offices of Ronald A. Marron, APLC and the Law Office of David Elliot as 

Settlement Class Counsel (“Class Counsel”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 23(g). 

8. The Court further approves the appointment of Classaura LLC, or an 

equivalent class action administrator identified by the Parties to administer and 

oversee, among other things, the processing, handling, reviewing, and approving of 

claims made by Claimants; communicating with Claimants; and distributing 

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payments to Authorized Claimants whose Claim Forms have been accepted and 

validated.

9. The Court directs that pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

23(e)(2) a hearing will be held on July 31, 2020 at 1:30 p.m. in Courtroom 2D, to 

consider final approval of the settlement (the “Final Approval Hearing”) including, 

but not limited to, the following issues: (a) whether the Settlement Class should be 

finally certified for settlement purposes only; (b) the fairness, reasonableness, and 

adequacy of the settlement; (c) Class Counsel’s application for an award of 

attorneys’ fees and costs; and (d) approval of incentive awards to the Class 

Representatives. The Final Approval Hearing may be adjourned by the Court and 

the Court may address the matters set out above, including final approval of the 

settlement, without further notice to the Settlement Class other than notice that may 

be posted at the Court and on the Settlement Website.

10. Any member of the Settlement Class wishing to object (an “Objector”) 

to the proposed settlement and/or be heard at the Final Approval Hearing shall 

comply with the following procedures: 

a. To object, a member of the Settlement Class, individually or 

through counsel, must file a written objection with the Court, with a copy delivered 

to Class Counsel and Defendant’s Counsel at the addresses set forth below:

Ronald A. Marron

LAW OFFICES OF RONALD A. MARRON 

651 Arroyo Drive

San Diego, CA 92103 

Email: ron@consumersadvocates.com

Rick L. Shackelford

GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP

1840 Century Park East, Suite 1900 

Los Angeles, CA 90067

Email: ShackelfordR@gtlaw.com

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b. A written objection filed with the Court regarding or related to 

the settlement shall contain all of the following information: (a) a reference, in its 

first sentence, to the Litigation, Hilsley v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., Case No. 

3:17-CV-2335-GPC-MDD; (b) the Objector’s full, legal name, residential address, 

telephone number, and email address (and the Objector’s lawyer’s name, business 

address, telephone number, and email address if objecting through counsel); (c) a 

statement describing the Objector’s membership in the Settlement Class, including 

a verification under oath as to the date, name of the Products purchased, and the 

location and name of the retailer from whom the Objector purchased the Products, 

and all other information required by the Claim Form; (d) a written statement of all 

grounds for the objection, accompanied by any legal support for such objection; (e) 

copies of any papers, briefs, or other documents upon which the objection is based; 

(f) a list of all persons who will be called to testify in support of the objection; (g) a 

statement of whether the Objector intends to appear at the Final Approval Hearing 

(note: if the objector intends to appear at the Final Approval Hearing through 

counsel, the objection must also state the identity of all attorneys representing the 

objector who will appear at the Final Approval Hearing); (h) a list of the exhibits 

that the Objector may offer during the Final Approval Hearing, along with copies of 

such exhibits; and (i) the objector’s signature. In addition, Settlement Class 

Members, if applicable, must include with their Objection (a) the identity of all 

counsel who represent the objector, including former or current counsel who may be 

entitled to compensation for any reason related to the objection; (b) a detailed list of 

any other objections submitted by the Settlement Class Member, or his/her counsel, 

to any class actions submitted in any court, whether state or federal, in the United 

States in the previous five (5) years.

c. Any member of the Settlement Class who files and serves a 

timely written objection in accordance with this Order may also appear at the Final 

Approval Hearing, to the extent permitted by the Court, either in person or through 

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an attorney hired at the Settlement Class member’s expense, to object to the fairness, 

reasonableness, or adequacy of the proposed settlement. 

11. Members of the Settlement Class who elect not to participate in the 

settlement (i.e., “opt-out”) must submit a written Request for Exclusion that is 

postmarked no later than July 1, 2020. 

12. Any member of the Settlement Class who fails to timely submit a 

Request for Exclusion shall be bound by all subsequent proceedings, orders, and the 

Final Judgment (including the Settlement), even if he or she has a pending, or 

subsequently initiates, litigation, arbitration, or any other proceeding against Ocean 

Spray relating to the Released Claims.

13. In order to participate in the settlement and receive a cash payment from 

the Settlement Fund, members of the Settlement Class must properly complete a 

Claim Form (online or in paper format) and submit it to the Settlement 

Administrator. To be effective, any such Claim Form must be postmarked or 

submitted on the Internet at www.NoArtificialFlavorsLitigation.com no later than 

July 10, 2020 and must otherwise comply with the procedures and instructions set 

forth in the Claim Form.

14. The deadlines for key events are as follows:

EVENT DEADLINE

Publishing Notice March 16, 2020

Filing of papers in support of Final 

Approval and Class Counsel’s 

Application for Attorneys’ Fees and 

Expenses

June 18, 2020

Deadline for submitting Claim Forms July 10, 2020

Filing an Objection with the Court, or 

submitting a Request for Exclusion to 

the Settlement Administrator

July 1, 2020

Filing of response to Objections July 17, 2020

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Final Approval Hearing July 31, 2020 at 1:30 p.m. in 

Courtroom 2D

15. To the extent not otherwise defined herein, all defined terms in this 

Order shall have the meaning assigned to them in the Settlement Agreement. 

16. In the event the settlement does not become effective for any reason, 

the Parties shall be restored to their respective pre-settlement positions in the action, 

including with regard to any agreements concerning tolling and similar agreements, 

and the entire Settlement Agreement shall become null and void. Additionally, the 

entire amount of the Settlement Fund (to the extent it was deposited) shall be 

promptly returned to Ocean Spray, with any interest accrued thereon.

17. Nothing in this Preliminary Approval Order, the Settlement Agreement, 

or any documents or statements related thereto (1) is, or may be used as, an 

admission of, or evidence of, the validity of any Released Claim, or of any 

wrongdoing or liability of Ocean Spray, or of the propriety of Class Counsel to 

maintain the action as a class action; or (2) is, or may be used, as an admission of, 

or evidence of, any fault or omission of Ocean Spray in any civil, criminal, or 

administrative proceeding in any court, administrative agency, or other tribunal, 

except that Ocean Spray may file the Settlement Agreement or the Final Judgment 

in any action that may be brought against any Released Person in order to support a 

defense or counterclaim based on principles of res judicata, collateral estoppel, 

release, good faith settlement, judgment bar, reduction, or any other theory of claim 

preclusion or issue preclusion or similar defense or counterclaim.

18. All activity in the action with respect to Ocean Spray shall be stayed 

unless and until the Settlement Agreement is terminated pursuant to its terms and 

conditions.

19. Upon final approval of the Settlement, all Class Members who do not 

timely and validly exclude themselves from the Class shall be forever enjoined and 

barred from asserting any of the matters, claims, or causes of action released 

pursuant to the Settlement Agreement against any of the Released Parties, and any 

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such Class Member shall be deemed to have forever released any and all such 

matters, claims, and causes of action against any of the Released Parties as provided 

for in the Agreement. 

20. The Court shall retain continuing jurisdiction over the Parties and the 

implementation and enforcement of the terms of the Settlement Agreement, and to 

assure that all payments and other actions required of any of the Parties by the 

Settlement Agreement are properly made or taken. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 31, 2020

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