Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00996/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00996-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 730
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Report &amp; Disclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUDOLPH COLE,

Plaintiff,

v

TEAMSTERS LOCAL 70,

Defendant. /

No C-04-0996 VRW

ORDER

The court’s previous order in this case, Doc #28, granted

summary judgment to defendant on various grounds with respect to

several aspects of the six discrete grounds for relief in

plaintiff’s complaint. The court assumes familiarity with that

order and, in particular, the factual background recited therein. 

At the end of that order, the court set forth plaintiff’s remaining

viable arguments:

In sum, plaintiff may proceed on two

claims that defendant did not fairly represent

him: first, in connection with the computer

tracking information proceeding, and second in

connection with defendant’s failure to secure

for plaintiff copies of the private

investigator’s reports. Both may be amenable

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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to disposition on summary judgment, but at

present the court has neither sufficient facts

nor adequate briefing to address these two

aspects of plaintiff’s claim.

Doc #28 at 13:11-18. Defendant has filed a further motion for

summary judgment addressing these two issues, Doc #35, which has

been briefed and is now ripe for decision. Because the court

determines that this matter is suitable for decision without oral

argument, the hearing scheduled for May 5, 2005, is VACATED. See

Civ L R 7-1(b). For the reasons that follow, defendant’s motion is

GRANTED.

I

A

In reviewing a summary judgment motion, the court must

determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist, resolving

any doubt in favor of the party opposing the motion. “[S]ummary

judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is

‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v

Liberty Lobby, 477 US 242, 248 (1986). “Only disputes over facts

that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law

will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. And

the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact lies with the moving party. Celotex Corp v Catrett,

477 US 317, 322-23 (1986). When the moving party has the burden of

proof on an issue, the party’s showing must be sufficient for the

court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other

than for the moving party. Calderone v United States, 799 F2d 254,

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United States District Court

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258-59 (6th Cir 1986). Summary judgment is granted only if the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FRCP

56(c).

The nonmoving party may not simply rely on the pleadings,

however, but must produce significant probative evidence supporting

its claim that a genuine issue of material fact exists. TW Elec

Serv v Pacific Elec Contractors Ass’n, 809 F2d 626, 630 (9th Cir

1987). The evidence presented by the nonmoving party “is to be

believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his

favor.” Anderson, 477 US at 255. “[T]he judge’s function is not

himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter

but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id

at 249.

B

As the court explained in its prior order, this question

presented in this case is whether defendant (plaintiff’s union)

breached the duty of fair representation it owed plaintiff by

virtue of plaintiff’s membership in the union. The Ninth Circuit

has explained:

Whether in a particular case a union's

conduct is “negligent”, and therefore

non-actionable, or so egregious as to be

“arbitrary”, and hence sufficient to give rise

to a breach of duty claim, is a question that

is not always easily answered. A union acts

“arbitrarily” when it simply ignores a

meritorious grievance or handles it in a

perfunctory manner, see [Vaca v Sipes, 386 US

171, 191 (1967)], for example, by failing to

conduct a “minimal investigation” of a

grievance that is brought to its attention. 

See Tenorio v National Labor Relations Board, 680 F2d 598, 601 (9th Cir 1982). We have said

that a union’s conduct is “arbitrary” if it is

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“without rational basis,” see Gregg v

Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Union Local

150, 699 F2d 1015, 1016 (9th Cir 1983), or is

“egregious, unfair and unrelated to legitimate

union interests.” See Johnson v United States

Postal Service, 756 F2d 1461, 1465 (9th Cir

1985). In Robesky v Qantas Empire Airways Ltd, 573 F2d 1082, 1089-90 (9th Cir 1978), we held

that a union’s unintentional mistake is

“arbitrary” if it reflects a “reckless

disregard” for the rights of the individual

employee, but not if it represents only “simple

negligence violating the tort standard of due

care.” In Dutrisac v Caterpillar Tractor Co, 749 F2d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir 1983), we concluded

that unintentional union conduct may constitute

a breach of the duty of fair representation in

situations where “the individual interest at

stake is strong and the union’s failure to

perform a ministerial act completely

extinguishes the employee's right to pursue his

claim.” 

There are some significant general

principles that emerge from our previous

decisions. In all cases in which we found a

breach of the duty of fair representation based

on a union’s arbitrary conduct, it is clear

that the union failed to perform a procedural

or ministerial act, that the act in question

did not require the exercise of judgment and

that there was no rational and proper basis for

the union’s conduct. * * *.

We have never held that a union has acted

in an arbitrary manner where the challenged

conduct involved the union’s judgment as to how

best to handle a grievance. To the contrary,

we have held consistently that unions are not

liable for good faith, non-discriminatory

errors of judgment made in the processing of

grievances. We have said that a union’s

conduct may not be deemed arbitrary simply

because of an error in evaluating the merits of

a grievance, in interpreting particular

provisions of a collective bargaining

agreement, or in presenting the grievance at an

arbitration hearing. In short, we do not

attempt to second-guess a union’s judgment when

a good faith, non-discriminatory judgment has

in fact been made. It is for the union, not

the courts, to decide whether and in what

manner a particular grievance should be

pursued.

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Peterson v Kennedy, 771 F2d 1244, 1253-54 (9th Cir 1985) (some

citations omitted).

II

A

The first issue concerns defendant’s failure to prevent

the introduction at plaintiff’s termination grievance hearing of

evidence derived from a computer tracking device known as a “DIAD

board.” Marty Frates (“Frates”), who represented plaintiff during

his termination grievance proceedings, objected to the use of

information gathered through the DIAD board. See, e g, Frates Supp

Decl (Doc #37) ¶3. The admissibility of that evidence was the

subject of an appeal taken before the final hearing on September

11, 2003. See Frates Decl (Doc #23) ¶¶7-11. Objecting and

pursuing the appeal was, it appears, all that Frates could do in

the context of the union grievance process. Moreover, there is no

indication that Frates failed to pursue plaintiff’s appeal

diligently. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to establish the

existence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to

whether defendant’s representation of him was deficient at all (let

alone a breach of the duty of fair representation) with respect to

the DIAD board issue.

B

The second issue concerns Frates’ failure to secure

plaintiff access to reports prepared by a private investigator on

behalf of plaintiff’s employer, UPS. The documents in question are

rather ephemeral: In his deposition, when plaintiff was asked

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about these reports, he was generally nonresponsive:

Q: Let me have this marked as Exhibit D. 

Tell me when you are done. Just look over

them generally.

A: Okay.

Q: Are those the investigator reports you are

referring to?

A: No.

Q: They are not?

A: No.

Q: That was not what you were talking about

in the complaint?

A: No.

Q: What are you talking about? What do the

reports look like then?

A: He read something in the hearing that I

never heard before.

Q: He read something?

A: Yes, that was pertinent information that

we needed.

Q: It’s not contained in Exhibit D?

A: No.

Q: Then you need to tell us something about

what he read. Otherwise we can’t even

identify what you are talking about.

A: If I’m not mistaken, I believe some of it

was on the tape. I believe some of it was

on the tape he read [referring to the

audiotape of the September 11, 2003,

hearing].

* * *

Q: What did [the report] look like then?

A: I don’t know. It was something he was

reading. He was reading his reports.

* * *

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Q: It appeared he was reading from something.

A: Yes.

Q: So that’s what you referred to as the

investigator’s reports?

A: Yes.

Cole Depo (Doc #36 Ex A) at 39:1-41:8.

When later asked to review the hearing transcript to

identify a passage where the reports in question were being read,

plaintiff was able to identify only one brief instance. Id at 151-

56. Defense counsel asked him at the end of the deposition to

augment this response by letter, but plaintiff did not do so. Pau

Decl (Doc #36) ¶¶2-3. Plaintiff asserts in his opposition that he

“[r]ecently * * * secured the investigator[’]s reports from a

separate lawsuit filed against United Parcel Service.” Pl Opp (Doc

#38) at 6:1-2. Plaintiff has not, however, put these documents

before the court.

It is evident that defendant has made substantial but

unsuccessful efforts to secure the reports that plaintiff has put

in issue. Plaintiff claims to have these reports, but he has not

submitted them to the court. Under these circumstances, the court

can only conclude that the reports -- if they exist at all -- are

either not favorable to plaintiff or do not create a genuine issue

of material fact whether defendant breached its duty of fair

representation in failing to secure the reports in advance of the

September 11, 2003, hearing. Accordingly, summary judgment must be

GRANTED in defendant’s favor on this issue as well.

/

/

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III

In sum, defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc #35)

is GRANTED. The clerk is DIRECTED to close the file and TERMINATE

all pending motions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 /s/ 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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