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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 26, 1998 Decide June 5, 1998

No. 97-5145

Steve Kosanke, et al.,

Appellants

v.

United States Department of the Interior, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 96cv00369)

Francis E. Froelich argued the cause for appellants, with

whom Charles T. Carroll, Jr., was on the briefs.

Sean H. Donahue, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for federal appellees, with whom Lois J.

Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, and Edward J. Shawaker and Caroline M. Zander, Attorneys, were on the brief.

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Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Tatel, Circuit Judge and

Buckley, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.

Edwards, Chief Judge: Appellants are two individuals who

allegedly staked mining claims on federal lands and two other

individuals to whom they assigned an interest in these claims.

The Department of the Interior's ("DOI") Bureau of Land

Management ("BLM") declared Appellants' mining claims

void ab initio, on the grounds that the land in question had

been closed to mining entries pursuant to two separate DOI

actions segregating the land from the operation of mining

law, both of which had been duly noted on the appropriate

public land records. The Interior Board of Land Appeals

affirmed this decision. Appellants appealed to the United

States District Court for the District of Columbia, which

granted the DOI's motion for summary judgment. This

appeal followed.

We find that the parcels at issue were segregated from the

operation of mining laws on June 17, 1994 as indicated by a

notation entered on the appropriate public land records in

accordance with the notation rule set forth at 43 C.F.R.

s 2201.1-2(a), which governs the segregation of public lands

pending a proposed land exchange. This notation remained

in effect at the time Appellants attempted to enter their

mining claims in November 1994 and January 1995. Such

notation effectively bars mining claims--even if the underlying segregation was illegally or erroneously entered--until

the notation is corrected or superceded on the public land

records. Thus, we affirm the lower tribunals' decisions finding Appellants' mining claims null and void ab initio on the

basis of the June 1994 notation, without reaching Appellants'

claims that the underlying segregations were unlawful.

I. Background

A.Mining Law

The General Mining Law of 1872 provides that "[e]xcept as

otherwise provided, all valuable mineral deposits in lands

belonging to the United States ... shall be free and open to

exploration and purchase, and the lands on which they are

found to occupation and purchase, by citizens of the United

States ..." in accordance with specified procedures for filing

mining claims. 30 U.S.C. ss 22, 29 (1994); see also Pathfinder Mines Corp. v. Hodel, 811 F.2d 1288, 1291 (9th Cir. 1987).

However, any lands withdrawn from mineral entry are no

longer considered to be within the public domain and therefore are not subject to the statutory rights enumerated in the

General Mining Law. See Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574,

599-602 (1922); Pathfinder Mines, 811 F.2d at 1291.

The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976

("FLPMA"), as amended, 43 U.S.C. ss 1701-1784 (1994),

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specifies conditions under which the Secretary of the Interior

or an authorized delegate ("the Secretary") may withdraw or

segregate lands from the operation of some or all of the

public land laws, including mining laws. As relevant here,

the Secretary may segregate public lands to preserve the

status quo of a parcel of land pending a proposed land

exchange. See id. s 1716. The FLPMA, as amended by the

Federal Lands Exchange Facilitation Act of 1988, authorizes

the Secretary to exchange public lands for other lands where

the Secretary determines that such an exchange would serve

the public interest, see 43 U.S.C. s 1716(a), to "temporarily

segregate the Federal lands under consideration for exchange

from appropriation under the mining laws ... for a period of

not to exceed five years," id. s 1716(i)(1), and to promulgate

regulations governing his implementation of this authority,

see id. s 1716(f)(1). The regulations issued in accordance

with this mandate are codified in C.F.R. Title 43, Part 2200

(1997). See 58 Fed. Reg. 60,904 (1993) (promulgating

C.F.R. Title 43, Part 2200 regulations as final rules following

notice and comment procedure).

These regulations, in pertinent part, detail the procedures

governing the commencement and termination of the segregative effect of a proposed land exchange authorized by 43

U.S.C. s 1716:

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(a) If a proposal is made to exchange Federal lands, the

authorized officer may direct the appropriate State Office

of the Bureau of Land Management to segregate the

Federal lands by a notation in the public land records.

Subject to valid existing rights, the Federal lands shall

be segregated from appropriation under the public land

laws and mineral laws for a period not to exceed 5 years

from the date of the record notation.

43 C.F.R. s 2201.1-2(a) (emphasis added).

B.Procedural History

On February 26, 1992, the Secretary, acting under 43

C.F.R. ss 2310.1, 2310.2(a) (providing for segregation of

lands from mining laws pending congressional action withdrawing the lands for military purposes), signed Public Land

Order No. 6924, segregating approximately 135,000 acres of

land located in the southern portion of the Chocolate Mountain Aerial Gunnery Range in Imperial County, California,

from the operation of federal mining law for a period of five

years or until the segregation was lifted. See 57 Fed. Reg.

6,560 (1992). The purpose of this segregation was to preserve the status quo of the land pending congressional action

on a DOI request to permanently reserve the land for military use. Id. This segregation was duly noted in the appropriate public land records. See Kosanke, IBLA 95-438 (Dec.

7, 1995) ("IBLA Decision"), reprinted in Joint Appendix

("J.A.") 3.

On June 17, 1994, the California State Office of the BLM,

acting under 43 U.S.C. s 1716(i) (authorizing segregation of

lands pending a proposed land exchange), segregated a portion of the lands included in the February 1992 segregation in

order to maintain the status quo of the land pending a

possible exchange of lands with a private party by noting the

segregation of these lands on the appropriate public land

records pursuant to 43 C.F.R. s 2201.1-2(a). The June 1994

segregation included the north-half section of section 5 and

the north-half section of section 6 of the Township 13 South,

Range 19 East, San Bernandino Meridian, Imperial County,

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California. See Memorandum from BLM Area Manager to

BLM State Director for California (June 15, 1994), J.A. 143.

On October 31, 1994, Congress passed the California Military Lands Withdrawal and Overflights Act of 1994, Pub. L.

No. 103-433, s 803(b), 108 Stat. 4502 (1994), withdrawing the

lands segregated by the February 1992 order, except for the

parcels included in the June 1994 segregation. See Appellees'

Br. 6 (it is undisputed that the parcels at issue in this case

were not part of the lands withdrawn by the Act).

On November 1, 1994, Appellants Steve and Mary Lou

Kosanke entered onto the same two parcels of land included

in the June 1994 segregation and purportedly located 34 lode

mining claims and 16 placer mining claims. They filed notices of location pertaining to these claims with the California

State Office of the BLM on November 23, 1994 and January

27, 1995. See, Kosanke, CAMC 264550 et al. (Mar. 20, 1995)

("BLM Decision"), J.A. 63. When Appellants filed these

claims, notations pertaining to both the February 1992 and

the June 1994 segregations remained in the relevant public

land records; nothing in the records indicated that they had

been canceled, superceded, or otherwise nullified. See IBLA

Decision, J.A. 3.

Subsequently, on March 20, 1995, the California State

Office of the BLM issued a decision declaring these mining

claims null and void ab initio. See BLM Decision, J.A. 63-65.

The BLM found that the subject lands had been validly

removed from operation of mining law on February 26, 1992

and June 17, 1994 and that these segregations remained in

effect at the time Appellants attempted to locate and file their

mining claims. Therefore, the BLM concluded, Appellants'

claims were without legal effect. Id. at 63-64. In upholding

the validity of the June 1994 segregation, the BLM noted that

the parcels at issue were withdrawn for a proposed land

exchange and that the segregation of the parcels from the

operation of mining law pending the proposed exchange was

duly noted on the relevant land records pursuant to the

notation rule set forth in 43 C.F.R. s 2201.1-2. Id. at 64.

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Appellants appealed the BLM's decision to the Interior

Board of Land Appeals ("IBLA"), arguing that both the

February 1992 and June 1994 segregations were invalid and

thus that their respective notations in the land records were

without any legal effect. The IBLA rejected Appellants'

claims and affirmed the BLM's decision. See IBLA Decision,

J.A. 2-4. In its decision, the IBLA stated that it was

immaterial whether the underlying segregations were posted

illegally or in error. See id. at 3. Rather, the IBLA determined that, "the decisive issue before this Board is whether

BLM's records indicated that the lands were open to the

location of mining claims on the particular day when the

claims were located." Id. (citation omitted). Since the two

segregation notations appeared in the public land records and

these records did not include any notation nullifying the

segregations, the IBLA concluded that, pursuant to the notation rule, these notations worked to remove the subject lands

from mineral entry. Id. The IBLA held that, "[e]ven if a

withdrawal is effected or perpetuated in error, the notation

rule precludes a mining claimant from locating a claim until

the land office records are corrected." See id. (citations

omitted).

The Kosankes then transferred part of their interests in

the mining claims to the other two Appellants and together

they brought suit in the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia for review under the Administrative

Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. ss 701-706 (1994), seeking a

declaration that the February 1992 and June 1994 segregations were illegal and that the DOI's application of the

notation rule to their claims violated the APA. The District

Court granted summary judgment in favor of the DOI. See

Kosanke v. United States Dep't of the Interior, Civ. No.

96-369 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 1997). This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

This court reviews the disputed agency action de novo. See

Dr Pepper/Seven-Up Cos. v. FTC, 991 F.2d 859, 862 (D.C.

Cir. 1993) ("Where the decision under review is the legal

sufficiency of an agency's action in light of the record, ...

[w]e proceed as if the [agency's] decision had been appealed

to this court directly;" the district court's decision is not

entitled to any particular deference.) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). Judicial review of the BLM

and IBLA decisions is governed by the APA, which directs

the court to "hold unlawful and set aside" agency action that

is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise

not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. s 706(2)(A) (1994).

This court's review of agencies' interpretations of their own

rules is deferential; an agency's interpretation of its own

regulation is "controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." Auer v. Robbins, 117 S. Ct. 905,

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911 (1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted);

Consolidated Rail Corp. v. ICC, 43 F.3d 1528, 1532 (D.C. Cir.

1995).

B.Merits

Appellants challenge the validity of the February 1992 and

June 1994 segregations on various grounds. We affirm the

IBLA's conclusion that the notation recording the June 1994

segregation in the relevant BLM records served to remove

the subject lands from mineral entry, even if the underlying

withdrawal of the land was effected or perpetuated in error.

Therefore, we need not reach the question of whether the

withdrawal underlying the June 1994 notation was valid.

Furthermore, since we find that Appellants' mining claims

are null and void due to the June 1994 notation, we need not

address the validity or effect of the February 1992 segregation or the notation pertaining to it.

As explained above, the statutory scheme enacted by the

FLPMA, as amended, and its implementing regulations clearly specify actions which trigger the segregation and reopening of lands from the operation of mining laws. The regulations applicable to the June 1994 segregation pending a

proposed land exchange specify that segregation commences

with a notation in the land records, see 43 C.F.R.

s 2201.1-2(a), and terminates five years from the notation

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date, or when a decision not to proceed with the exchange is

published in the Federal Register, or when the land is

conveyed in accordance with an exchange agreement, see id.

s 2201.1-2(c). Thus, the June 1994 notation, implemented in

accordance with section 2201.1-2, operated to segregate the

lands in question from the operation of mining laws until June

1999 or until the notation was otherwise nullified.

The IBLA looked to administrative and judicial interpretations of similar notation rules to determine the effect of a

notation made pursuant to section 2201.1-2(a). Although the

IBLA's decision and the cases cited therein make reference to

the DOI's historic reliance on notation rules, it is clear that

the BLM decision which it affirmed in this case actually relied

on the BLM's compliance with the specific notation rule set

forth in 43 C.F.R. s 2201.1-2(a). See BLM Decision, J.A. 64

(citing s 2201.1-2(a)); see also Memorandum from BLM

Area Manager to BLM State Director for California (June 15,

1994), J.A. 143 (ordering segregation of subject lands pending

proposed land exchange pursuant to s 2201.1-2). This rule

was promulgated through an appropriate rulemaking procedure. See 56 Fed. Reg. 49,962, 49,972 (1991) (publication of

proposed rule providing for 60-day comment period); 58 Fed.

Reg. 60,904, 60,921 (1993) (publication of final rule). Thus,

we need not consider whether the DOI relied only on a

generalized notation rule promulgated through adjudication

rather than rulemaking and, if so, whether this would have

affected the efficacy of the June 1994 notation. Appellants

contentions on this point are misplaced.

Appellants argue further that, even if the notation would be

lawful if based on a valid segregation, a notation on land

records should not serve as an effective bar on mining entries

if the underlying segregation is invalid. Thus, Appellants ask

us to reach the question of whether the underlying February

1992 and June 1994 withdrawals were lawful and, if we find

them to be unlawful, to disregard the respective notations in

the land records and recognize Appellants' November 1994

and January 1995 claims as valid.

Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the withdrawal underlying the June 1994 notation was unlawful, we

decline to recognize Appellants' mining claims filed prior to

public correction of the June 1994 notation. The courts, as

well as the DOI, have consistently upheld notation rules

similar to that in 43 C.F.R. s 2201.1-2(a) as barring mining

entries until the notation is either corrected or superceded--

even if the underlying segregation was erroneous or otherwise unlawful--for the sake of fairness to the general public.

See, e.g., Wright v. Paine, 289 F.2d 766, 768 (D.C.Cir.1961);

Shiny Rock Mining Corp. v. United States, 825 F.2d 216, 219

(9th Cir. 1987) (the purpose of such notation rules is to

prevent confusion and conflict of claims) and cases cited

therein; B.J. Toohey, 88 I.B.L.A. 66, 78-82, 92 Interior Dec.

317, 324-26 (1985) (explaining equal protection basis for notation rules) and cases cited therein. Under this reasoning, the

proper course of action for claimants such as Appellants is to

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challenge the underlying segregation in order to have the

alleged error corrected. Once any error has been corrected,

the land will be reopened in accordance with applicable

regulations. Only then can the challenger enter his mining

claims. As this court held in Wright, interpreting notation

rules in this way is "consistent with the policy ... of providing equal opportunity to all persons interested in obtaining

[interests in the land]." 289 F.2d at 768.

Because we hold that the June 1994 notation effectively

segregated the lands at issue from the operation of the

mining laws at the time Appellants located and filed their

mining claims regardless of the validity of the underlying

withdrawal, we need not reach the question of whether the

withdrawal underlying the June 1994 notation was valid.

Furthermore, since we find that Appellants' mining claims

are null and void due to the June 1994 notation, we need not

address the validity or effect of the February 1992 segregation or the notation pertaining to it.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, the District Court's order

granting the DOI's motion for summary judgment is affirmed.

So ordered.

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