Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00059/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00059-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KIMBERLY ALEKSICK, individually

and on behalf of other members of the

general public similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 08cv59 WQH (WMc)

ORDER

vs.

7-ELEVEN, INC., a Texas Corporation;

MICHAEL TUCKER, an individual; and

DOES 1-50, inclusive,

Defendants.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the Motion to Remand (Doc. # 7) filed by Plaintiff

Kimberly Aleksick.

Background

On or about April 16, 2007, Plaintiff Kimberly Aleksick (“Plaintiff”) filed a class 

action Complaint against 7-Eleven, Inc. (“7-Eleven”) and its franchisee Michael Tucker

(collectively referred to as “Defendants”) in the Superior Court for the State of California,

County of Imperial. (Doc. # 1). The Complaint alleges a class of “approximately five

thousand (5000)” present and former employees, and that Plaintiff worked as a “Sales

Associate” of “Defendants” from 2005 until she was involuntarily terminated on February

20, 2007. Complaint, ¶ 11, 18. The Complaint contains factual allegations that

“Defendants” engaged in the following unlawful conduct: requiring “Plaintiff and other

Case 3:08-cv-00059-WQH-WMC Document 25 Filed 03/25/08 Page 1 of 7
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members in her class” to perform work during their mandated meal and rest periods; failing

to provide “Plaintiff and the other members in her class” with their mandated off-duty meal

and rest breaks; failing to provide “Plaintiff and other members in her class” with one hour

of pay for each meal and rest period during which they performed work; failing to

compensate “Plaintiff and other members of the class” for work performed in excess of

eight hours a day and/or forty hours a week; failing to provide “Plaintiffs and other

members of the class” with statutorily compliant itemized wage sheets; and requiring

“Plaintiffs and other members of the class” to purchase and clean working uniforms using

their own wages. Id. ¶¶ 20-34. The Complaint alleges that as a result of this conduct,

“Defendants” violated sections 226.7, 510, 512, 2082 of the California Labor Code and

have engaged in unlawful, unfair and/or fraudulent business practices in violation of

section 17200 of the California Business and Professions Code. The Complaint seeks an

order certifying the proposed class, compensatory damages and waiting time penalties for

the California Labor Code violations, compensatory damages, lost back pay, injunctive

relief, restitution pursuant to section 17200 of the California Business and Professions

Code, an award of interest, an award of attorney’s fees, and punitive and exemplary

damages to the extent permissible. Complaint, p. 10-11. 

On December 11, 2007, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) in the

Superior Court of California. The FAC alleges causes of action against Defendants for

violations of the California Labor Code and California Business and Professions Code that

are virtually identical to the allegations in the original Complaint. The FAC alleges

additional causes of action against 7-Eleven for negligence, negligence per se, negligent

interference with prospective economic advantage and for civil penalties pursuant to

section 2699 of the California Labor Code. In support of the cause of action for

negligence, the FAC alleges that 7-Eleven owed each class member a duty to ensure that

each member was fully and completely paid all wages earned, and breached this duty by

failing to comply with state requirements regarding the payment of minimum and overtime

wages, and wages for non-complaint meal and rest periods. FAC ¶¶ 23-27. In support of

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the cause of action for negligence per se, the FAC alleges that 7-Eleven has a statutory duty

to ensure that each class member was fully and completely paid all wages earned and

breached this duty by failing to comply with these statutory requirements. FAC ¶¶ 28-37. 

In support of the cause of action for negligent interference with prospective economic

advantage, the FAC alleges that an economic relationship existed between 7-Eleven

franchisees and their employees and that 7-Eleven interfered with this relationship by

requiring third-party franchisees to use 7-Eleven as a “Bookkeeper/ Payroll Provider” and

then using an “illegal ‘rounding’ technique” to deprive each member of the class of full

compensation for wages earned. FAC ¶¶ 38-44. The FAC seeks an order certifying the

proposed class, compensatory damages and waiting time penalties for the California Labor

Code Violations, compensatory damages, lost back pay, injunctive relief, restitution

pursuant to section 17200 of the California Business and Professions Code, an award of

interest, an award of attorney’s fees, and punitive and exemplary damages to the extent

permissible. Complaint, p. 10-11. 

On January 10, 2008, 7-Eleven removed this action to federal court. (Doc. # 1). 

On January 24, 2008, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand. (Doc. # 7). On February

15, 2008, 7-Eleven filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion to Remand. (Doc. # 13). 

On February 25, 2008, Plaintiff filed a Reply. (Doc. # 18). 

Analysis

Plaintiff moves to remand the case to state court on grounds that 7-Eleven’s notice 

of removal was untimely. Plaintiff contends that the California Labor Code violations

alleged in the original Complaint “clearly establish” a potential damages amount over

$5,000,000.00, and that the original Complaint alleges a class of approximately 5,000

former and present employees and diversity. Mot. to Remand, p. 12. Plaintiff contends that

the original Complaint, filed on April 16, 2007, gave 7-Eleven sufficient notice that the

action was removable under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”). Plaintiff

contends that the notice of removal, which was filed nearly nine months after the original

Complaint, was untimely because the notice of removal was not filed within “30 days of

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defendant’s receipt of an initial pleading setting forth a removable claim.” 28 U.S.C. §

1446(b). Plaintiff further contends that the Ninth Circuit does not apply the so-called

“revival doctrine,” which allows an amendment to a complaint to revive the period of

removal in a state court case if the amendment “changes the character of the litigation so as

to make it a substantially new suit.” See Braud v. Transport Serv. Co. of Ill., 445 F.3d 801,

806 (5th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff contends that even if the Ninth Circuit did recognize the

“revival doctrine,” the doctrine is inapplicable to this case because the FAC is not “entirely

new and completely different” from the original Complaint such that the FAC constitutes a

“substantially new suit.” Reply, p. 7. 

7-Eleven contends that its “potential liability” on all causes of action in the original

Complaint was conditioned on a finding that 7-Eleven was Plaintiff’s “employer along with

its franchisee Tucker.” Opposition, p. 12. 7-Eleven contends that it was not Plaintiff’s

employer because Tucker was an independent contractor of 7-Eleven, and that the

“practical effect of this fact-based determination would be to limit the scope of any

potential class action to Tucker’s two stores.” Id. 7-Eleven contends that the FAC changed

the nature of the case as against 7-Eleven because the FAC asserts three new negligence

claims against 7-Eleven only, which seek to impose direct liability against 7-Eleven and

may give rise to punitive damages. Id. at 13. 7-Eleven opposes the Motion to Remand on

grounds that the “well-settled ‘revival exception’” restores 7-Eleven’s right to remove this

action because the FAC “so changed the nature of this action as to constitute a new lawsuit

against 7-Eleven.” Opposition, p. 1, 10. 

When “considering a motion to remand, the district court accepts as true all relevant

allegations contained in the complaint and construes factual ambiguities in favor of the

plaintiff.” Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1163-64 (5th Cir. 1988); accord City of

Ann Arbor Emples. Ret. Sys. v. Gecht, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21928 (N.D. Cal. 2007). “In

measuring the amount in controversy, a court must assume that the allegations in the

complaint are true and assume that a jury will return a verdict for the plaintiff on all claims

made in the complaint.” Kenneth Rothschild Trust v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 199 F.

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Supp. 2d 992, 1001 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1441(a), a defendant may remove “any civil action

brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original

jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). There is a “strong presumption” against removal

jurisdiction, and courts construe removal statutes restrictively. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980

F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). Pursuant to section 1446(b), an action must be removed

within 30 days of a defendant’s receipt of an initial pleading setting forth a removable

claim. Otherwise, the defendant waives his right of removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b); see

Cantrell v. Great Republic Inc. Co., 873 F.2d 1249, 1256 (9th Cir. 1989). “If the case is

removable at the outset, it must be removed within the initial thirty-day period specified by

§ 1446(b); subsequent events do not make it ‘more removable’ or ‘again removable.’”

Samura v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 970, 972 (N.D. Cal. 1989). 

Once waived, the right to removal is “generally waived for all time (and for all defendants),

regardless of subsequent changes in the case.” Dunn v. Gaiam, 166 F. Supp. 2d 1273,

1278-79 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 

The so-called “revival exception” to the waiver of the right to removal is a “narrow,

judicially-created exception” which holds that a right to removal may be “revived” in cases

“where the plaintiff files an amended complaint that so changes the nature of [the] action as

to constitute substantially a new suit begun that day.” Dunn, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 1278-79;

quoting Wilson v. Intercollegiate (Big Ten) Conf. Athletic Assoc., 668 F.2d 962, 965 (5th

Cir. 1982). Circumstances which may trigger the “revival doctrine” include where a

“plaintiff, seeking to mislead the defendant about the true nature of his suit and thereby

dissuade him from removing it, included in his initial complaint filed in a state court an

inconsequential but removable federal count unlikely to induce removal and then, after the

time for removal had passed without action by the defendant, amended the complaint to add

the true and weighty federal grounds that he had been holding back.” Wilson, 668 F.2d at

965; see also Dunn, 166 F. Supp. at 1279. There“seem to be no reported cases in the Ninth

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waived statutory right of removal.” Dunn, 166 F. Supp. at 1279. 

The original Complaint alleged a class of 5,000 present and former employees,

California Labor Code violations that, if proven, would exceed $5,000,000.00, and

diversity. Accepting as true all relevant allegations in the original Complaint, the Court

finds that the original Complaint, which was filed on April 16, 2007, was removable under

CAFA. 7-Eleven concedes that the original Complaint was removable under CAFA and

relies solely on the argument that the “revival exception” applies because the FAC so

changed this action as to constitute a substantially new lawsuit against 7-Eleven.

The original Complaint was removable under CAFA, and the addition of negligence

claims asserting direct liability against 7- Eleven does not make the case “more removable”

or “again removable.” See Samura, 715 F. Supp. at 972. There is also no indication that in

filing the original Complaint, Plaintiff was seeking to mislead 7-Eleven about the true

nature of this action to dissuade 7-Eleven from removing it. Accepting as true the

allegations in the original Complaint and the FAC, the additions to the FAC do not change

the scope in 7-Eleven’s “potential liability, the alignment of the parties, or the general

gravamen of the complaint, so dramatically as to overlook” 7-Eleven’s waiver of the right

to remove the case. See Dunn, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 1280 (holding that the addition of ten

causes of action, including a claim under the federal RICO statute, to an initial complaint

asserting causes of action arising in contract did not revive the right of removal). The

Court finds that the FAC does not constitute a “substantially new suit.” See Dunn, 166 F.

Supp. 2d at 1278-79. Given the strict construction courts apply to the removal statutes and

the “strong presumption” against removal jurisdiction, the Court concludes that the notice

of removal, which was filed nearly nine months after the original Complaint was filed and

served, was untimely. The Court will grant the Motion to Remand. 

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Conclusion

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Remand (Doc. # 7) is GRANTED.

The Court REMANDS this action to state court. 

DATED: March 25, 2008

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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