Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06950/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-06950-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE T. BURKE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA,

ALLEN YOCHELSON, BARBARA

ANSCHER, GALAL GOUGH, ALLEN

MALMQUIST, DEBRA MURPHYLAWSON, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, and

BILL LOCKYER,

Defendant. /

No. C 06-06950 WHA

ORDER GRANTING 

MOTIONS TO DISMISS

INTRODUCTION

This action alleges an improper denial of admission to membership to the State Bar of

California. Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. For the reasons

stated below, the motions to dismiss are GRANTED.

STATEMENT

The complaint is not a model of clarity, but the essential facts are recited here as they

are alleged in the complaint. Plaintiff George Burke graduated from law school in May 2005

and passed the February 2006 California State Bar Exam. On January 5, 2005, Burke submitted

his moral character application to the Committee of Bar Examiners of the State Bar of

California. He disclosed his criminal history in the application, which included six prior

misdemeanor violations for driving under the influence of alcohol between 1979 and 1991,

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misdemeanor convictions for driving with a suspended license and attempting to evade police

officers, and a no-contest plea in connection with a vandalism charge (Compl. ¶¶ 3, 20, 21, 36).

After “delays in the processing of his application,” Burke sent a four-page letter to the

committee in December 2005. In the letter, he disclosed “supposedly mitigating factors,”

including his genetic predisposition to alcoholism, environmental challenges in his childhood,

and his “strong interest in moral philosophy and beliefs about God.” The moral character

department “reacted negatively” to his letter and further delayed the processing of Burke’s

application. In May 2006, Burke received a letter notifying him that his certification to practice

law would be delayed because of “multiple criminal convictions and related alcohol abuse”

(Compl. ¶¶ 38, 39, 40).

A week after receiving the letter, Burke sent another letter to the committee “amending”

his application for admission to “include a request for reasonable accommodation for the prior

record of alcoholic impairment under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and other civil rights

laws.” He received no response from the committee. He made a second request for reasonable

accommodation. The committee sent a letter back to Burke in June 2006 that “totally rejected

Mr. Burke’s second request for a reasonable modification” (Compl. ¶¶ 43–47).

The committee held an informal conference on July 7, 2006, at which Burke appeared. 

According to the complaint, the members of the Subcommittee on Moral Character expressed a

“hostile demeanor” to Burke. Burke verbally requested “re-integration into society to the

maximum extent possible under the law, as required by the ADA, saying that otherwise the

subcommittee would falsely render him disabled again.” The subcommittee requested that

Burke undergo a psychiatric evaluation. Burke refused to submit to one. Burke then filed

administrative complaints against the State Bar of California with various state and federal

agencies, including the United States Department of Justice, the California Department of Fair

Employment and Housing, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. All of those

agencies declined to take action (Compl. ¶¶ 48, 49, 54, 67–71, 79, 80, 82).

By letter dated October 2, 2006, the committee notified Burke that it would not

recommend his admission to the California Supreme Court. Its decision was based on factors

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including Burke’s numerous prior convictions, “lack of candor” on applications to several law

schools for failure to disclose those convictions on his applications, and a general “failure to

establish that [he was] of good moral character.” The letter also informed him that he could

appeal the committee’s decision to the State Bar Court within 60 days of service of the letter

(Compl. Exh. 1). Burke has not appealed the committee’s recommendation.

The complaint alleges violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983, Title II of the Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1990, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Age Discrimination in Employment

Act, the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the First

Amendment, California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, and Article I of the California

Constitution.

ANALYSIS

Defendants have moved to dismiss this action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. “[I]n reviewing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to

dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, [a court must] take the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as

true.” Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit has stated: “A

Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual. In a facial attack, the challenger

asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke

federal jurisdiction. By contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the

allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for

Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). Defendants here attack jurisdiction

facially by contending that the complaint itself demonstrates that this Court lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction over this action.

The complaint is based on Burke’s exclusion from admission to practice law in

California. Burke admits in his complaint, however, that while the committee declined to

recommend him for admission, he has not sought review of that recommendation by the

California Supreme Court (Compl. ¶ 98). This fact is fatal to his entire action.

Ninth Circuit authority on this issue is clear — an applicant who fails to appeal a

recommendation of the committee to the California Supreme Court has not been denied any

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cognizable rights, and therefore there is no case or controversy for a federal court to adjudicate. 

See Giannini v. Comm. of Bar Examiners of the State Bar of Cal., 847 F.2d 1434, 1435 (9th Cir.

1988); Margulis v. State Bar of Cal., 845 F.2d 215, 216–17 (9th Cir. 1988); Chaney v. State Bar

of Cal., 386 F.2d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 1967). The Ninth Circuit first addressed this issue in

Chaney. There, the plaintiff, an applicant for admission to the California bar, had failed the bar

examination twice. Because he was not certified for admission to the Supreme Court of

California, he sued the State Bar of California, members of its Board of Governors, and

members of its Committee of Bar Examiners for injunctive relief and damages. The Ninth

Circuit held that there was no basis for federal relief because the plaintiff had not appealed the

decision to the California Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit held:

Under California law, refusal of the Committee to certify an

applicant to the Supreme Court is not a terminative or fixative

step in his seeking of admission to the bar. Neither the State Bar

of California nor its Board of Governors nor its Committee of Bar

examiners has any power to grant or to deny admission to the bar. 

That power is vested in the California Supreme Court alone.

Chaney, 386 F.2d at 963, 966 (citing In re Lacey, 11 Cal.2d 699, 701 (1938)). Under California

law, the committee’s certification or refusal to certify “is legally simply a recommendation to

the [California Supreme Court].” The Ninth Circuit quoted the California Supreme Court’s

holding that the committee’s recommendation “is advisory only” because “the final

determination in all these matters rests with [the California Supreme Court] and its powers in

that regard are plenary and its judgment conclusive.” Lacey, 11 Cal. 2d at 701. 

The Chaney court recognized that California statutory law provided that “[a]ny person

refused certification to the Supreme Court for admission to practice may have the action

. . . reviewed by the Supreme Court, in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the court.” 

Chaney, 386 F.2d at 966 (quoting Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6066). Relevant to the instant action,

the Chaney court held: “[T]he situation here is not a matter of exhausting state remedies in

respect to an alleged federal right but of there being no basis for any alleged federal right to

exist as to the Committee’s actions until the California Supreme Court in the exercise of its

original power over admissions has allowed these actions to serve as a deprivation.” 

Accordingly, the committee’s actions alone “could not give rise to any right of federal

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remediability until it had been made the basis of a deprivation of admission.” Such a

deprivation “could not legally occur until the California Supreme Court had expressly or

impliedly approved the Committee’s refusal to certify and thus had allowed the Committee’s

actions to become the basis of a denial of admission.” Id. at 966. The Ninth Circuit has

subsequently relied on Chaney for this proposition several times. See Giannini, 847 F.2d at

1435 (“Until such review [by the California Supreme Court] is completed, an applicant has no

basis for any claim of deprivation under federal law because no deprivation has taken place.”);

Margulis, 845 F.2d at 216 (“Due to [the applicant’s] failure to petition for review, the state has

never officially acted on his application and, therefore, has never deprived him of federally

protected rights.”). 

This Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over all of Burke’s federal claims pursuant

to Chaney. Because Burke has not petitioned for review of the committee’s decision before the

California Supreme Court, there has not been any cognizable deprivation of federal rights. 

“This prerequisite to federal deprivation operates as a bar upon [Burke’s] suit in federal court.” 

Giannini, 847 F.2d at 1435. Burke’s opposition to the motions to dismiss ignores Chaney and

its progeny.

Burke does attempt to justify ignoring the appeal requirement. His position lacks merit. 

In his complaint, Burke contends that “the State Bar Court’s (limited power) moral character

appeal process will result in repressive, unfair delays and involuntary waiver of Mr. Burke’s

federal and state civil rights, remedies and procedures, and eliminate access to federal courts for

vindication thereof on account of the abstention doctrine, and state courts due to the restrictive

California State Bar Act procedures” (Compl. ¶ 98). This order holds that Burke’s bare

allegation that Supreme Court review would result in “repressive, unfair delays” is not enough

to excuse the strict-compliance rule the Ninth Circuit enforced in the above-cited cases. Burke

has not identified any specific prejudice he would suffer if he was required to give the

California Supreme Court an opportunity to rule on his application. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit

has held that “[n]ot even a claim of futility . . . could excuse” the failure to seek Supreme Court

review. Giannini, 845 F.2d at 1435. 

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At oral argument, Burke attempted to distinguish Chaney on other grounds. Burke

contends that: (1) Chaney is limited to Section 1983 claims and that it does not apply, for

example, to his ADA and First Amendment claims; (2) Chaney used a “loose” definition of

standing; (3) Chaney was superseded by the ADA; (4) Chaney was rendered obsolete by the

creation of the State Bar Court; and (5) Chaney, Giannini, and Margulis are distinguishable

because the plaintiffs in those decisions failed the bar exam. The Court has considered these

arguments and finds that they lack merit. Chaney and its progeny remain good law and apply to

all federal claims asserted by Burke. In Giannini, for example, the Ninth Circuit applied

Chaney to bar claims based on the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV, the due

process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the commerce clause. 

See Giannini, 847 F.2d at 1435. Additionally, Burke has supplied no authority that the

principles underlying Chaney were superseded by the ADA. Moreover, even though applicants

are required to first appeal to the State Bar Court, the decision by the State Bar Court, like a

decision by the committee, is merely a recommendation to the California Supreme Court. See

Cal. Rules of Court 9.13. The California Supreme Court is the only body vested with the

authority to grant or deny admission to the bar. This order follows the clear Ninth Circuit

authority in holding that Burke’s complaint “alleges no cognizable deprivation of federal

rights.” Margulis, 845 F.2d at 217.

Finally, Burke’s supplemental state claims must also be dismissed. These are his claims

under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act and Article I of the California

Constitution. Burke does not contend that this Court has diversity jurisdiction over this case. 

Accordingly, this Court could only have jurisdiction over this action if it arose out of the

Constitution and laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. 1331. For the reasons stated above,

however, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear any of Burke’s federal claims. Jurisdiction is

therefore lacking over the supplemental state claims because original federal-question

jurisdiction is absent. 28 U.S.C. 1367(a). Burke’s state-law claims must also be dismissed. 

Because this order holds that there is no jurisdiction to hear this action, it does not

address defendants’ alternative arguments that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this action,

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that Younger abstention bars this action, and that Burke’s complaint does not state a claim and

should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction are GRANTED. Generally “[a] pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or

her complaint unless it is ‘absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be

cured by amendment.’” Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). Here, however,

because Burke “failed to petition the California Supreme Court for review, there is no

conceivable way he could amend his complaint so as to state a federal claim.” Margulis, 845

F.2d at 216 n.3. The complaint must be dismissed without leave to amend.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 4, 2007. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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