Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06542/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06542-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY WILLIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOSEPH MULLINS, et al., 

Defendants.

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CIV-F-04-6542 AWI LJO

ORDER RE: INTERLOCUTORY

APPELLATE CERTIFICATION

Plaintiff Gary Willis has made a motion for interlocutory appellate certification pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Doc. 86. Defendant Diane Mora has filed an opposition (Doc. 87) while

the Defendants associated with the City of Bakersfield have joined in that opposition (Doc. 89). 

No oral argument was held, and the matter was taken under submission. Doc. 101.

I. History

Gary Willis (“Plaintiff”) was a registered occupant of room 221 at the E-Z 8 Motel on

March 27, 1996. Police received reports of heavy traffic from that room. A Kern County

Narcotics Enforcement Team consisting of four members (Bakersfield Police Officer Joseph

Mullins; Bakersfield Police Officer Silvius; Kern County Deputy Sheriff Hood; and California

State Parole Officer Diane Mora) investigated. Defendant Mullins told Defendant Mora that

Plaintiff was on parole subject to search condition; Defendant Mora arranged for the team of

officers to search the motel room. After announcing their presence and entering room 221, the

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officers found Plaintiff and Kathleen Moye with a knife, a syringe, and a briefcase. The officers

announced the commencement of a parole search. Plaintiff informed Defendant Mullins he was

no longer on parole. The officers halted the search while Defendant Mora sought telephone

confirmation of Plaintiff’s parole status. While the call was taking place, Defendant Silvius

talked with Kathleen Moye who admitted that there was a “speed pipe” in the briefcase and that

she had recently used methamphetamine. At this point, the officers searched the room. Based on

evidence collected from the search, Plaintiff was ultimately convicted of possession of

methamphetamine for sale (Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11378) and possession of narcotics

paraphernalia (Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11364). He ultimately served over six years in state

prison. 

Plaintiff made a motion to suppress evidence before the trial court which was denied. On

appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal found the entry constitutionally invalid and the good

faith exception to exclusion inapplicable, but nonetheless affirmed the denial of suppression

based on the finding that the officers had sufficient probable cause based on Kathleen Moye’s

statements. The Fifth District’s rationale was that the “freeze” in search was a reasonable

response to the uncertainty concerning Plaintiff’s parole status. People v. Willis, 71 Cal. App. 4th

530, 541 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). On appeal, the attorney general conceded the Fifth District’s

rationale for denying the motion to suppress was erroneous. People v. Willis, 28 Cal. 4th 22, 25

(Cal. 2002). The California Supreme Court overturned Plaintiff’s conviction on June 3, 2002,

finding that evidence from the search must be suppressed as the good faith exception did not

apply. People v. Willis, 28 Cal. 4th 22, 38 (Cal. 2002). Plaintiff was released on August 31,

2002. Plaintiff first filed this suit on May 3, 2004. 

Plaintiff sued a number of Defendants (in their official and individual capacities) under

nine causes of action. After motions to dismiss were granted in part and denied in part, the only

remaining Defendants were Mora, Mullins, Silvius, and the City of Bakersfield. The Defendants

fall into two groups, which are separately represented by counsel: those affiliated with the City of

Bakersfield and Defendant Mora who is affiliated with the State of California. Plaintiff filed a

motion for summary adjudication on May 20, 2005. Doc. 45. He sought to establish (1) the

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unconstitutionality of the search and arrest; (2) the inapplicability of the qualified immunity

affirmative defense; and (3) the unreasonableness of Defendants’ behavior. The motion was

solely based on the California courts’ determination that Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights

were violated; Plaintiff sought the application of issue preclusion. Defendants opposed the

summary adjudication motion. Docs. 52 and 55. The court requested additional briefing on the

issue of privity in issue preclusion analysis (Doc. 65) which the parties provided (Docs. 69, 70,

and 72). By order of December 21, 2005, Plaintiff’s motion for summary adjudication was

denied on the basis that there was no privity between Defendants in this case and the criminal

prosecution in People. v. Willis. Doc. 81.

Plaintiff has filed a motion for interlocutory appellate certification of the December 21,

2005 order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Doc. 86. Defendant Mora has filed an opposition,

but does not oppose the motion on the merits, arguing only that the motion is untimely. Doc. 87. 

The Bakersfield Defendants joined in Defendant Mora’s opposition. Doc. 89. No oral argument

was held in the matter; it was taken under submission. Doc. 101.

II. Legal Standards

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) provides that: 

When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise

appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a

controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference

of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance

the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order.

The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action

may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if

application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided,

however, that application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the

district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof

shall so order.

The court cannot be compelled to certify an order or an issue under section 1292(b) and the

court’s refusal to certify an order under this statute is not appealable. See Green v. Occidental

Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1976); Oppenheimer v. Los Angeles County

Flood Control Dist., 453 F.2d 895, 895 (9th Cir. 1972). The Ninth Circuit has listed the

requirements for certification as: (1) a controlling question of law; (2) substantial grounds for

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difference of opinion; and (3) immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination

of the litigation. In re Cement Antitrust Litigation, 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1982). Overall,

Congressional legislative history “indicates that [interlocutory appeal] was to be used only in

extraordinary cases where decision of an interlocutory appeal might avoid protracted and

expensive litigation. It was not intended merely to provide review of difficult rulings in hard

cases.” United States Rubber Co. v. Wright, 359 F.2d 784, 785 (9th Cir. 1966).

III. Discussion

The parties’ briefing focus on whether the request for certification is timely. As to the

merits of the motion, Plaintiff only asserts that “immediate appeal addressing that issue may

materially advance the ultimate determination of this action.” Doc. 86, Motion, at 3:6-7.

What constitutes a controlling question of law is not absolutely clear. The issue need not

be “dispositive of the lawsuit in order to be regarded as controlling” but it cannot be “collateral to

the basic issues of [the] case.” United States v. Woodbury, 263 F.2d 784, 787-88 (9th Cir. 1959). 

The Ninth Circuit has cited approvingly to the Third Circuit’s finding that “at the very least, a

controlling question of law must encompass ‘every order which, if erroneous, would be

reversible error on final appeal.’” In re Cement Antitrust Litigation, 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th

Cir. 1982), citing Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 755 (3rd Cir. 1974). In this case,

interlocutory appeal is sought on the issue of whether a state court’s final decision in a criminal

matter, finding that police officers undertook an unconstitutional search, estops those police

officers (and the municipality for whom they work) from arguing that they acted lawfully and/or

reasonably under the circumstances in a subsequent civil suit. The issue is a legal question and

not factual in nature. If the order’s conclusion is wrong, it would likely constitute reversible

error. As such, the issue is controlling as defined in Katz.

As the December 21, 2005 order indicated, this is an issue of state law and there is no

clear answer to privity in California jurisprudence. The Ninth Circuit has addressed this issue

many years ago, but the standard under which that panel reached its conclusion is unclear. See

Davis v. Eide, 439 F.2d 1077, 1078 (9th Cir. 1971). Other circuits have addressed this issue with

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reference to various states’ laws and have come to a general conclusion that privity does not exist

in these circumstances. A clear statement by the Ninth Circuit on this issue has the potential to

resolve this question for a number of cases in addition to the one at hand. 

A reversal by the Ninth Circuit would greatly speed the resolution of this case as it would

establish several key factual and legal findings. A large part of the case would be avoided as

issue preclusion might establish liability, leaving only damages in question. 

Plaintiff has not asked for a stay of the case in conjunction with his request for

interlocutory appeal. The court declines to independently issue such a stay when the Ninth

Circuit has not yet decided whether to entertain the interlocutory appeal. 

The parties have both raised the issue of whether the motion for interlocutory appeal is

timely. Plaintiff states that Section 1292(b) “requires that an application be made to the court of

appeals within 10 days of entry of the order from which appeal is sought” and further represents

that the December 21, 2005 order started the 10 day deadline. Doc. 86, Motion, at 3:12-16. 

Similarly, Defendant Mora implicitly accepts that Plaintiff had 10 days from the filing of the

December 21, 2005 order to appeal to the Ninth Circuit. See Doc. 87, Opposition. As far as this

court understands Section 1292(b), parties have ten days to appeal to the Ninth Circuit from the

time the district court certifies an order for appeal. Where the certification for interlocutory

appeal is included in the substantive order, the ten day limit does run from entry of that order. 

Where, as here, the substantive order does not include a certification for interlocutory appeal, the

ten day limit does not start to run on the date of that substantive order’s entry. The ten day limit

only starts to run when (and if) the district court enters a separate order certifying the substantive

order as appropriate for interlocutory appeal. Regardless, this is an issue that the Ninth Circuit

will determine, and not for the district court to decide. 

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IV. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED. The December 21, 2005 order is certified for

interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 24, 2006 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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