Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-04095/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-04095-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUSSELL FRANKLIN SCHROEDER,

Petitioner,

 v.

EDWARD ALAMEIDA, JR.,

in his capacity as head of the California

Department of Corrections, 

Respondent. /

No. C 03-04095 JSW

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Now before the Court is Russell Franklin Schroeder’s (“Schroeder”) petition for writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, concerning his conviction for four counts of

committing a lewd act on a minor. After considering the record, the parties’ papers and arguments,

and reviewing the legal authority, the Court hereby DENIES the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

BACKGROUND

On May 14, 1999, five counts of sexual misconduct were filed against Schroeder: three

counts of committing a lewd act on his granddaughter Jessica; one count of committing a lewd act

on his other granddaughter Alicia; and one count of exhibiting harmful material. (Clerk’s Transcript

(“CT”) at 94-98.)

At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence that Schroeder had previously molested his

daughters Marcia and Lisa, paid young girls to take off their clothes, offered to pay young girls for 

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oral sex, and had been seen naked by young girls. (Id. at 286-297, 361-69, 232-36, 333-341, 375-

384.) The court permitted this evidence of prior sexual offenses under California Evidence Code

section 1108 (“Section 1108”) to demonstrate a propensity to commit sexual offenses. (Reporter’s

Transcript (“RT”) at 463-65.) 

On May 22, 2000, the jury in the Santa Clara County Superior Court convicted Schroeder of

all five counts and later sentenced him to a term of 12 years. (CT at 889-891, 940.) The California

Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction. People v. Schroeder, H021715, 2002 WL 436944 (Cal.

App. 6 Dist. Mar. 20, 2002). The California Supreme Court denied review. People v. Schroeder,

S097513 (June 12, 2002).

On September 8, 2003, Schroeder filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court, but

requested that the petition be held in abeyance while he exhausted all state remedies. The state court

then vacated the harmful matter count. After exhausting state remedies, Schroeder filed an amended

petition for writ of habeas corpus before this Court on August 30, 2004.

Schroeder asserts that the admission of his prior uncharged sexual offenses under Section

1108 violates the prohibition of ex post facto laws because Section 1108 did not become effective

until after the offenses were purportedly committed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The

petition in this case was filed after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), so the provisions of that act apply. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320,

327 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499-1500 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Under AEDPA, a district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or

sentence with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state

court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

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the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the

state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable

facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the ‘unreasonable application’

clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing

legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413.

A “federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. When

making the “unreasonable application” inquiry, the federal habeas court should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409.

ANALYSIS

In general, evidence of past misconduct is not admissible to show propensity to commit the

charged crime. Cal. Evid. Code § 1101. However, in cases in which the defendant is accused of a

sexual offense, evidence of prior sexual offenses is admissible for the purpose of showing a

disposition to commit sexual offenses. Cal. Evid. Code § 1108. Evidence offered under Section

1108 is subject to balancing under California Evidence Code section 352, which provides for the

exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence when its probative value is outweighed by potentially

prejudicial effects. Cal. Evid. Code § 352. 

Despite Schroeder’s objections, the trial court admitted the evidence of his prior uncharged

sexual offenses under Section 1108. (RT at 463-65.) The jury was instructed that, if they found

Schroeder had committed the prior offenses, they could infer that he had a disposition to commit

sexual offenses and that he was likely to have committed the charged crime. (RT at 712-13.)

The legislature enacted Section 1108 in 1995, and the law became effective at the beginning

of 1996. Cal. Evid. Code § 1108; Cal. Gov’t Code § 9600. Schroeder’s offenses are purported to

have occurred in 1993, prior to Section 1108’s enactment. (CT at 94-98.) He therefore contends

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that Section 1108 is an ex post facto law that should not apply in his case because it post-dated the

commission of his offenses. He claims the retroactive application of Section 1108 during his 2000

trial, violates the prohibition of ex post facto laws. 

The Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution provides that “[n]o state shall . . . pass any Bill

of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .” U.S. Const.,

Art. I, § 10. The Supreme Court has identified four categories of ex post facto laws that cannot be

applied retroactively: 1) a law that makes an act criminal even though innocent when committed, 2)

a law that aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when committed, 3) a law that inflicts greater

punishment than when committed, and 4) a “law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives

less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in

order to convict the offender.” Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798).

The Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed these categories, including the fourth category. 

Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 525, 537 (2000). The fourth category is at issue in this case. The

fourth category encompasses laws that “lower the burden of proof” or “reduce the quantum of

evidence necessary to meet that burden.” Id. at 541. At the time the Carmell defendant committed

the charged sexual offense, a Texas statute required corroborating evidence to support the victim’s

testimony unless the victim was under age 14. Later, the statute was amended to remove the

corroboration requirement if the victim was under age 18. Id. at 517-18. The Court determined that

the amendment fit into the fourth category because it “authorize[d] a conviction on less evidence

than previously required.” Id. at 531.

The Court made clear, however, that not all evidentiary rules implicate the Ex Post Facto

Clause. “Ordinary rules of evidence . . . do not violate the Clause” because “by simply permitting

evidence to be admitted at trial, [the rules] do not at all subvert the presumption of innocence,

because they do not concern whether the admissible evidence is sufficient to overcome the

presumption.” Id. at 533 n.23. The Court differentiated sufficiency of the evidence rules, like the

one at issue in Carmell, with admissibility rules, such as the one at issue in this case. “The issue of

admissibility of evidence is simply different from the question whether the properly admitted

evidence is sufficient to convict the defendant.” Id. at 546. Additionally, the Court explained that

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another Supreme Court decision “specifically distinguished laws that ‘alter the degree . . . of the

proof’ required to convict from those laws that merely respect what kind of evidence may be

introduced at trial.” Id. at 550 (referring to Hopt v. Territory of Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884)). Section

1108 does not alter the amount of evidence necessary to convict; it merely allows the admission of

evidence that was previously excluded for purposes of showing propensity. Because Section 1108

addresses only what type of evidence can be admitted, it is an admissibility rule, distinguishable

from a sufficiency rule.

Schroeder’s reliance on Carmell is misplaced because of this important distinction between

sufficiency of the evidence rules and admissibility of evidence rules. Schroeder claims that his case

is “virtually identical to Carmell” because Section 1108 “changed the sufficiency of facts . . . for

meeting the burden of proof.” Petitioner’s Memorandum at 15. 

The amendment at issue in Carmell changed the amount of evidence necessary to meet the

burden of proof. Before the amendment, the victim’s testimony and corroboration were both

required, while after the amendment, testimony alone was sufficient. Carmell, 529 U.S. at 517-18. 

By removing the corroboration requirement, the prosecution could met its burden with less evidence. 

In contrast, Section 1108 does not change the amount of evidence necessary to meet the burden of

proof. The jury was specifically instructed that the evidence of Schroeder’s prior sexual offenses

was “not sufficient by itself to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the charged

crimes.” (RT at 1756.) So, “[w]hile [Section 1108] may have added to the evidence the jury could

consider as to defendant’s guilt, it did not lessen the prosecution’s burden to prove his guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.” People v. Fitch, 55 Cal. App. 4th 172, 182-83 (1997). Therefore, Section 1108

does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.

The California Supreme Court in Fitch rejected an ex post facto challenge to Section 1108. 

Id. at 186. During defendant’s trial for rape, the court admitted evidence under Section 1108 that he

had previously committed rape. Id. at 177. Defendant asserted that the application of Section 1108

violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because the charged offense took place in 1995, prior to the 1996

enactment of Section 1108. Id. at 185. The court explained that Calder’s fourth category

concerning a law that alters the legal rules of evidence “was not intended to prohibit the application

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of new evidentiary rules in trials for crimes committed before the changes.” Id. (citations omitted). 

Therefore, “a new rule of evidence which admits evidence not previously admissible or which

extends competency to a witness may validly operate in the trial of a prior offense.” Id. at 186

(citations omitted). Although Fitch pre-dates Carmell, the court’s reasoning in Fitch regarding

rules of admissibility is consistent with Carmell.

Other post-Carmell district court decisions have ruled that the retroactive application of

Section 1108, and section 1109 of the California Evidence Code, which allows the admission of

prior domestic violence actions in domestic violence cases to prove propensity, does not violate the

Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. Three decisions in this district involve

similarly situated petitioners who have made the same claim as Schroeder – that the admission of

prior misconduct under Section 1108 or 1109 violated ex post facto rights because the charged crime

occurred before the appropriate section went into effect. All three petitioners were denied relief on

this basis. 

In Perez v. Duncan, the defendant was convicted of several sexual assaults against children. 

Perez v. Duncan, 2005 WL 2290311, *1 (N.D. Cal. 2005). During trial, the court admitted evidence

under Section 1108 that the defendant had molested other children. Id. at *6. Because the charged

sexual offenses took place between 1991-1995, the defendant claimed that Section 1108, enacted in

1996, was an ex post facto law. Id. In rejecting this claim, the court explained that Section 1108

“did not lower the burden of proof for the prosecution or change the quantum of evidence necessary

to convict. . . . Section 1108 changed evidence admissibility rules, but that was permissible under

Carmell and did not run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause.” Id. at *7.

In Niebauer v. Blanks, the court admitted evidence of a prior domestic “scuffle” during

defendant’s trial for the murder of his wife. Niebauer v. Blanks, 2003 WL 22288155, *1, *7 (N.D.

Cal. 2003). The court of appeal found the evidence admissible under Section 1109. Id. at *7. 

Defendant argued that Section 1109 was not part of the California Evidence Code at the time of the

tried offense, and therefore the application of retroactive legislation violated the Ex Post Facto

Clause. Id. at *8. In rejecting the claim, the court explained that the “effect of section 1109 was

merely to permit the introduction of a type of evidence that was previously inadmissible” and that

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“changes to rules of evidence that ‘simply permit[ ] evidence to be admitted at trial’ do not pose an

ex post facto problem.” Id. (quoting Carmell, 529 U.S. at 533 n.23). 

In Chavarria v. Hamlet, during defendant’s trial for acts of domestic violence against his

current wife, the court admitted Section 1109 evidence of prior incidents of domestic violence

against his current and former wives. Chavarria v. Hamlet, 2003 WL 1563992, *3-4 (N.D. Cal.

2003). Defendant argued that the trial court erred in admitting this evidence because it violated his

rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at *9. In rejecting the claim, the court explained that the

statute “did not lower the burden of proof for the prosecution and did not change the quantum of

evidence necessary to convict.” Id. at *13. Rather, it “permitted the jury to consider additional

relevant evidence” and therefore “did not run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause.” Id.

Likewise, the retroactive application of Section 1108 in Schroeder’s trial did not violate the

Ex Post Facto Clause.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. The clerk

shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 31, 2006 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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