Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02808/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02808-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAVIER SANCHEZ, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 09-CV-2808 W (POR)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ UNOPPOSED

MOTION TO DISMISS

(Doc. No. 15.)

vs.

WORLD SAVINGS BANK, FSB, et

al.,

Defendants.

On May 25, 2010, Defendants Wachovia Mortgage, a Division of Wells Fargo

Bank, N.A., formerly known as Wachovia Mortgage, FSB, formerly known as World

Savings Bank, FSB and named herein as “World Savings Bank, FSB, and Wachovia

Mortgage, FSB,” moved to dismiss Plaintiffs Javier Sanchez and Martina Sanchez’s

(“Plaintiffs”) complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9, 12(b)(6), and

12(e). (Doc. No. 15.)

Case 3:09-cv-02808-W-POR Document 16 Filed 07/19/10 Page 1 of 4
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The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral

argument. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(d.1) And for the reasons stated below, the Court

GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 15.)

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs were the title holders of a house located at 29760 Miller Road, Valley

Center, CA 92082. (the "Property") Defendants are a collection of financial institutions

that were involved with the mortgage on the Property. 

On or about July 25, 2005, Plaintiffs purchased the Property for $575,000 by

signing a note in the amount of $575,000 secured by a first deed of trust. (Doc. No. 1

at ¶ 7.) At some point, Plaintiffs began having difficulty making payments on their

mortgage. On August 7, 2009, a “Notice of Default” was recorded on the Property. (Id.

at ¶ 23.) On January 28, 2009, the Property was sold at a Trustee’s Sale. (Id. at ¶ 24.)

On December 15, 2009, Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit, asserting seven claims

against the Defendants, including claims for intentional misrepresentation and

violations of various statutes that dictate lending practices. (Doc. No. 1.)

On March 29, 2009, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 10.) On

April 19, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), which mooted the

pending motion to dismiss. (Doc. Nos. 13, 14.) 

On May 25, 2010, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the FAC. (Doc. No. 15.)

Defendants motion was set to be heard July 19, 2010. As such, any opposition to

Defendants’ motion was due July 2, 2010. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(e.3) To date,

Plaintiffs have not filed an opposition, nor have they requested an extension of time in

which to do so.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss a complaint upon a finding that the

plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. FED. R. CIV. P.

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12(b)(6). A 12(b)(6) motion tests a complaint’s legal sufficiency. See Navarro v. Block,

250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, dismissal is proper only where the plaintiff’s

complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal

theory. See id. “[I]f as a matter of law ‘it is clear that no relief could be granted under

any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,’ a claim must be

dismissed . . . whether it is based on an outlandish legal theory or a close but ultimately

unavailing one.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989) (citations omitted).

Thus, a court should not dismiss a complaint “unless it appears beyond doubt that

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc.

v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). Finally, a court must accept the

complaint’s allegations as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff. See Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 338 (9th Cir. 1996).

III. DISCUSSION

The Court grants Defendants’ motions based upon Plaintiffs’ failure to file an

opposition as required by Civil Local Rule 7.1. The Ninth Circuit has held that

pursuant to a local rule a district court may properly grant a motion to dismiss for failure

to respond. See generally Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir.1995) (affirming

dismissal for failure to file timely opposition papers where plaintiff had notice of the

motion and ample time to respond); accord Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1183

(9th Cir. 2003)(affirming Ghazali’s applicability to Rule 12(b) motions).

Moreover, Civil Local Rule 7.1(f.3.c) expressly provides that “[i]f an opposing

party fails to file papers in the manner required by Local Rule 7.1(e)(2), that failure may

constitute a consent to the granting of that motion or other ruling by the court.” Here,

Plaintiffs has failed to oppose or to request an extension of time in which to do so.

Relying on Civil Local Rule 7.1(f.3.c), the Court interprets Plaintiffs’ failure to oppose

Defendants’ motion to dismiss as a consent to its merits.

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As mentioned above, Plaintiffs have already been afforded an opportunity to

amend their Complaint. Accordingly, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ motion

WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 19, 2010

Hon. Thomas J. Whelan

United States District Judge

Case 3:09-cv-02808-W-POR Document 16 Filed 07/19/10 Page 4 of 4