Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00973/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00973-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Brandon Meeks,

Plaintiff,

v.

A. Nunez, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 13cv973-GPC-BGS

ORDER 

1. OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S 

OBJECTION TO A PRIOR RULING, 

and

2. DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

TO APPOINT COUNSEL

On September 8, 2016, Plaintiff filed an objection to a prior order of this Court 

denying his request for counsel. (ECF No. 192.) On January 4, 2017, Plaintiff filed a

motion to appoint counsel. (ECF No. 215.) Based on the reasoning below, the Court 

OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objection and DENIES his Motion to Appoint Counsel.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 23, 2013, Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against Defendants 

for constitutional violations for an incident on April 25, 2011. (ECF No. 1.) On October 

15, 2013, Plaintiff filed a motion to appoint counsel. (ECF No. 17.) On November 5, 

2013, Magistrate Judge Skomal denied Plaintiff’s motion. (ECF No. 21.) 

On September 29, 2014, Plaintiff filed another motion to appoint counsel. (ECF 

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No. 56.) In that motion, Plaintiff sought appointment of counsel to assist in conducting 

discovery and claimed to have a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act 

(“ADA”) which makes it difficult for him to read, write and understand materials in the 

case. (Id.) Judge Curiel denied this request for counsel on October 6, 2014. (ECF No. 

62.) In that order, Judge Curiel noted that Plaintiff provided no evidence to support his 

disability or the nature of his disability. (Id. at 3:19-21.)

On November 30, 2015, Plaintiff filed a third motion to appoint counsel. (ECF 

No. 114). In that motion, Plaintiff again sought appointment of counsel to assist in 

conducting discovery and again claimed to have a disability under the ADA. (Id.) Judge 

Skomal denied Plaintiff’s motion for counsel on December 11, 2015. (ECF No. 116.) In 

that order, Judge Skomal noted that Plaintiff’s arguments were no different than his prior 

requests for appointment of counsel, all of which the Court denied, and that Plaintiff still 

provided no evidence to support his disability or the nature of his disability. (Id. at 3-4.)

On July 20, 2016, Plaintiff filed a fourth motion to appoint counsel. (ECF No. 

177.) In that motion, Plaintiff stated that he cannot afford to hire a lawyer (ECF No. 177 

at 1, ¶ 1), he cannot conduct an investigation and discovery (id. at 3, ¶ 2) and the case 

involves complex legal issues (id. at 2, ¶ 1). The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion on 

August 15, 2016. (ECF No. 182.) In its order denying Plaintiff’s motion, the Court 

noted that Plaintiff made the same arguments in his first request for appointment of 

counsel, which was denied on November 5, 2013. (See ECF No. 21.) 

On September 9, 2016, Plaintiff filed an objection to this Court’s order denying his 

motion to appoint counsel. (ECF No. 192.) In that motion, Plaintiff states that his 

previous filing was not a motion for appointment of counsel as the Court construed it, but 

rather a request for a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. (Id. at 2.) Based on his

alleged disability, Plaintiff requests an evidentiary hearing to determine his ability to 

litigate his case. (Id.) He also requests that the Court appoint him counsel “to assist 

Plaintiff before the Court.” (Id.)

On January 4, 2017, Plaintiff filed a motion for Appointment of Counsel. (ECF 

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No. 215.) In this motion, Plaintiff requests counsel pursuant to 28 USC § 1915(d). (Id. at 

1.) Plaintiff states that appointment of counsel is necessary because he is “unlearned in 

the law,” has a “limited grade education,” is “indigent and cannot afford to obtain 

counsel,” and “because of his incarceration, is unable to obtain crucial evidence under 

discovery that only an attorney can obtain through cooperation.” (Id. at 1.)

II. STANDARD

“There is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in a § 1983 action.”

Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Storseth v. Spellman,

654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981)); see also Hedges v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In

re Hedges), 32 F.3d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]here is no absolute right to

counsel in civil proceedings.”) (citation omitted). Federal courts do not have the

authority “to make coercive appointments of counsel.” Mallard v. United States District 

Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989); see also United States v. $292,888.04 in

U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1995).

Districts courts have discretion, however, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1),

to “request” that an attorney represent indigent civil litigants upon a showing of

“exceptional circumstances.” See Agyeman v. Corrections Corp. of America, 390

F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004); Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. “A finding of the

exceptional circumstances of the plaintiff seeking assistance requires at least an

evaluation of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the merits and an

evaluation of the plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims ‘in light of the complexity

of the legal issues involved.’” Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103 (quoting Wilborn v.

Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Terrell v. Brewer, 935

F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Objection to this Court’s Prior Order Denying His Request for 

Counsel

In this objection, Plaintiff states that the Court previously misconstrued his prior

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letter (ECF No. 56) as a motion to appoint counsel, when it was actually a “Request for 

Assitance from the Court.” (ECF No. 192 at 2.) The Court notes that this motion was 

filed nunc pro tunc on September 25, 2014 (ECF No. 56) and the Honorable Judge Curiel

denied this motion on October 6, 2014. (ECF No. 62.) Plaintiff provides no explanation 

for waiting two years to make his objection. 

Moreover, there is no procedure for Plaintiff to file objections to rulings of the 

District Judge, and Plaintiff provides no legal authority supporting his assertion. 

Additionally, Judge Curiel did not misunderstand Plaintiff’s request as he noted in his 

Order that Plaintiff claimed to have a disability under the ADA. (ECF No. 62 at 3.) 

However, as Judge Curiel stated, and this Court again reiterates, Plaintiff has not 

provided any evidence to support his disability or the nature of his disability. (ECF No. 

62 at 3.) As a result, Plaintiff’s objection is OVERRULED. 

B. Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel argues that Plaintiff is “unlearned 

in the law,” has a “limited grade education,” cannot afford counsel, and cannot “obtain 

crucial evidence under discovery” due to his incarceration. (ECF No. 215 at 1.) 

Plaintiff’s arguments in this motion are no different than his prior requests for 

appointment of counsel. He made these exact arguments in his first request for 

appointment of counsel, which this Court denied on November 5, 2013. (See ECF No. 

21.) 

Plaintiff contends that appointed counsel would assist him in the investigation and 

discovery involved in his case. (ECF No. 215 at 1.) However, factual disputes and 

anticipated examinations of witnesses at trial do not warrant the finding of exceptional 

circumstances supporting an appointment of counsel. See Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 

1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (en 

banc) (holding that the appellant “may well have fared better [with appointed counsel]—

particularly in the realms of discovery and the securing of expert testimony—but this is 

not the test”); see also Peterson v. Anderson, 2009 WL 4506542, at *3 (D. Mont. Dec. 2, 

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2009) (citing Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331) (“Although Plaintiff contends he is not in a 

position to litigate this matter, pro se litigants are rarely in a position to research and 

investigate facts easily. This alone does not deem a case complex.”). Indeed, “any pro se 

litigant certainly would be better served with the assistance of counsel.” Rand, 113 F.3d 

at 1525; see also Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331 (“[A] pro se litigant will seldom be in a 

position to investigate easily the facts necessary to support the case.”). But a plaintiff is 

only entitled to appointed counsel if he can show “that because of the complexity of the 

claims he [is] unable to articulate his positions.” Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525; see also

Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331 (“If all that was required to establish successfully the 

complexity of the relevant issues was a demonstration of the need for development of 

further facts, practically all cases would involve complex legal issues.”). Despite his 

assertions to the contrary, Plaintiff has not shown anything in the record that makes this 

case “exceptional” or the issues in it particularly complex.

Moreover, an examination of the docket indicates that Plaintiff has participated in 

the discovery process, the meet and confer process, and has filed over fourty motions or 

objections with the Court, including a response to a motion for terminating sanctions. 

(See e.g., ECF Nos. 17, 23, 31, 33, 36, 38, 50, 56, 58, 61, 63, 72, 74, 80, 83, 88, 90, 94, 

100, 105, 114, 118, 129, 135, 140, 141, 155, 157, 169, 173, 177, 180, 185, 188, 192, 195, 

198, 200, 212, 215.) 

The Court denied Plaintiff’s four previous requests for counsel (ECF Nos. 17, 56,

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114, 177), and Plaintiff’s current request does not provide any new facts justifying such 

an extraordinary remedy. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate an inability to represent 

himself beyond the ordinary burdens encountered by pro se parties, and the Court finds 

that the “exceptional circumstances” required for court-appointed counsel are absent.

 

1 Plaintiff asserts that this motion was not a motion to appoint counsel, but rather a request for 

reasonable accommodation under the ADA. Because Plaintiff requested a reasonable accommodation in 

the form of an attorney, and the Court provided legal analysis regarding Plaintiff’s right to counsel, the 

Court includes this filing as an example of the Court’s reasoning for previously denying Plaintiff’s 

claims regarding his need for counsel. 

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See, e.g., Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103; Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 12, 2017

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