Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01148/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01148-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 -

wo

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Khalafa M. Khalafala,

Plaintiff

-vsKatrinia Kane, et al.,

Defendants

CV-09-1148-PHX-ROS (JRI)

ORDER

Under consideration is Defendants' Motion to Vacate Scheduling Order and Stay

Discovery, filed July 23, 2010 (Doc. 76). Defendants argue that their Motion for Summary

Judgment, filed July 23, 2010 (Doc. 73) is likely to resolve this matter, that Plaintiff has

served significant discovery requests, and that an efficient resolution of the matter calls for

a hiatus in pretrial procedures until the dispositive motion is resolved. 

Plaintiff responds (Doc. 86) that: Defendants: are too late, have drug their feet on

disclosure and a joint discovery plan, shouldn’t be permitted to ignore the scheduling order

simply because they have filed a dispositive motion, haven’t established a likelihood of

success on their dispositive motion, haven’t shown that discovery is not needed to resolve

the dispositive motion, haven’t shown the discovery is burdensome. Plaintiff complains he

will be prejudiced by a halt of discovery because his motion for preliminary relief remains

pending.

Defendants reply (Doc. 84) that, inter alia, Plaintiff may seek protection under Rule

56(f) for purposes of obtaining discovery necessary to respond on the motion for summary

judgment, and his discovery has not, to date, addressed his motion for preliminary relief.

The Court is not swayed by Plaintiff’s procedural complaints. The motion to stay is

timely and properly brought. The motion for preliminary relief is now fully briefed. Thus

the sole question is whether the pendency of the motion for summary judgment justifies

Case 2:09-cv-01148-ROS Document 89 Filed 09/01/10 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

delay.

Rule 1 directs the Court to pursue a “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of

every action.” If it is assumed that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment will be

successful, then the proper balancing of these interests would call for a stay of any discovery

not necessary to a fair resolution of the motion. If a contrary assumption is made, the Court

should require the parties to press on. Unfortunately, the Court cannot assume, but must

prognosticate based upon the incomplete briefing on the motion.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment asserts a general defense of qualified

immunity. As to Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claims, Defendants rely upon a series

of cases addressed to the conditions which must be tolerated by pretrial detainees, and argue

that Plaintiff has been placed in administrative segregation upon his own request and based

upon his mental illness. (Defendants do not address Plaintiff’s unique status as a civil

detainee, as opposed to a criminal pretrial detainee. See e.g. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918,

932 (9th Cir. 2004).) Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s transfer to the Pinal County Adult

Detention Center was not in retaliation for any First Amendment protected action by

Plaintiff, but was part of a wholesale transfer of hundreds of detainees with Plaintiff’s

security risk level. They argue that Plaintiff’s threat to safety claim is unfounded because

of the limited risk he faces among detainees, and the absence of any evidence of a prior

assault or assault threat. They argue that his due process claim is unfounded because his

transfer was not for disciplinary reasons, but as part of the wholesale transfers mandated by

facility management concerns.

Although Plaintiff is not required to brief the motion for summary judgment in

responding to this motion to stay, Plaintiff proffers no reason to believe that summary

judgment will not be granted. Therefore, at this juncture, it appears that there is a significant

likelihood that Defendants will be successful in their motion, if not in total then at least as

to some claims. 

To the extent that the Court might harbor some doubts, a showing that specific

discovery was necessary to address the dispositive motion might tempt the Court to err on

Case 2:09-cv-01148-ROS Document 89 Filed 09/01/10 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

the side of pressing the matter forward. Plaintiff makes no suggestion that any outstanding

discovery requests are necessary to allow him to respond to the summary judgment motion.

And, as noted by, Defendants, Plaintiff still has available to him a motion under Rule 56(f).

Moreover, as noted by Defendants, a qualified immunity defense is intended to shield

a defendant not only from judgment but “in protecting public officials from the costs

associated with the defense of damages actions.” Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 590

(1998). 

As Plaintiff argues, qualified immunity is only an immunity from suit for damages,

it is not an immunity from suit for declaratory or injunctive relief. See L.A. Police Protective

League v. Gates, 995 F.2d 1469, 1472 (9th Cir. 1993). And, it is true that Plaintiff’s

complaint seeks injunctive relief in the form of a release from custody. However, in light of

the nature of Plaintiff’s claims, the Court finds it highly unlikely that an absolute release

from custody would ever be ordered in this proceeding. While the Court might fashion some

lesser injunctive relief (see Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c) (relief not limited by demand)), the potential

for such relief is limited, particularly based on Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim.

Further, although Defendants’ motion hails primarily on the basis of qualified

immunity, it directly attacks the core of Plaintiff’s allegations which are necessary to

maintain his claims for injunctive relief as well. Thus, the motion may well narrow the issues

to be resolved in disposing of Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief.

Finally, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s response to the motion for summary judgment

is due September 9, 2010, and a reply brief two weeks later. Thus, a reasonably prompt

resolution of the motion for summary judgment is to be expected.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Vacate Scheduling

Order and Stay Discovery, filed July 23, 2010 (Doc. 76) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court’s Scheduling Order, filed June 24, 2010

(Doc. 66) is VACATED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the service of all further discovery requests is

stayed, and the deadlines for responding to outstanding discovery requests vacated, to be

Case 2:09-cv-01148-ROS Document 89 Filed 09/01/10 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

reset upon further order of the Court. 

DATED: August 31, 2010 _____________________________________

JAY R. IRWIN 

S:\Drafts\OutBox\09-1148-076o Order 10 08 18 re MStay MVacateSchedOrd.wpd United States Magistrate Judge 

Case 2:09-cv-01148-ROS Document 89 Filed 09/01/10 Page 4 of 4