Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05919/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05919-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BLANCA MARTINEZ, ALEJANDRO

FUENTES, et al.,

 Plaintiffs,

 v. 

COUNTY OF MADERA, CORRECTIONAL

MANAGED CARE MEDICAL

CORPORATION, et al., 

 Defendants.

1:04-CV-05919 OWW SMS

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

UNOPPOSED MOTION TO DISMISS

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

Before the court for decision is Defendant County of

Madera’s motion to dismiss the first amended complaint. See Doc.

24, filed July 27, 2005. Defendant Correctional Managed Care

Medical Corporation (“CMCMC”) filed an answer to the first

amended complaint. See Doc. 25, filed Aug. 1, 2005. Plaintiffs

late-filed a statement of non-opposition to the motion to dismiss

Friday, September 30, 2005. Doc. 28. 

I. BACKGROUND

This case concerns the death of Moises Fuentes. For reasons

that are not explained in the record, Mr. Fuentes was in the

custody of the California state prison system prior to June 2003. 

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On or about June 22, 2003, Mr Fuentes was transferred to the

custody of the Madera County Department of Corrections (“MCDC”)

based upon an outstanding warrant issued for his failure to

appear in the Madera County Superior Court on criminal charges. 

Doc. 23, first amended complaint, at ¶1-2. 

Soon after his transfer into MCDC custody, Mr. Fuentes began

to complain that he was in “great pain, had trouble swallowing

and eating, and that he was coughing up blood.” Id. at ¶4. He

sought medical treatment and was diagnosed as having a throat

infection. Id. Mr. Fuentes’ medical condition worsened over the

next few months, but his requests for medical attention were

largely ignored. Id. at ¶5. He was taken to Madera Community

Hospital on September 25, 2003. Allegedly, this was the first

time Mr. Fuentes had seen a physician since entering MCDC

custody. Id. 

On September 10, 2003, while Mr. Fuentes awaited trial in

Madera County Superior Court, his public defender filed a motion

to dismiss the criminal charges. Id. at ¶3. The complaint

alleges that Mr. Fuentes continued to press his motion to dismiss

as “the only avenue he could pursue to get released so that he

could obtain vital health services.” The District Attorney’s

Office for the County of Madera filed a written opposition to the

dismissal on October 14, 2003. 

At some point in early to mid October, defendant CMCMC

informed the District Attorney’s office that Mr. Fuentes had been

diagnosed with throat cancer and was going through diagnostic

tests in preparation for “triple modality treatment.”

 

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On October 17, 2003, the District Attorney’s office had the

charges against Mr. Fuentes dismissed. Shortly thereafter, Mr.

Fuentes was turned over to the Immigration and Naturalization

Service and was deported to Guatemala. He died there, a few

weeks following his deportation. 

II. ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs, who are all relatives of Mr. Fuentes, name as

defendants the County, CMCMC, and various unnamed defendants. 

See Doc. 23, filed July 18, 2005. 

The Complaint first alleges, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

that defendants violated decedent’s Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights. With respect to the § 1983 claim Plaintiffs

allege:

(a) That the County had a duty to provide medical

assistance to persons incarcerated by the MCDC and that

the County had a “special custodial and patient-doctor

relationship with Moises Fuentes that triggers the

constitutional duty on the part of the County of Madera

to provide specific medical and protective services to

Mr. Fuentes.” 

(b) That the County acted with deliberate indifference

toward Mr. Fuentes. 

(c) That both the County and CMCMC knew Mr. Fuentes had a

dangerous medical condition but failed and refused to

adequately treat him. 

//

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(d) That the County deliberately released Mr. Fuentes from

custody for the sole purpose of avoiding their duty to

provide medical treatment to him. 

The second cause of action is a wrongful death claim under

state law. Plaintiffs allege that, as a result of Defendants’

conduct, plaintiffs have suffered “a tremendous loss, including

the loss of companionship, comfort, advise, affection, solace,

and society of their son. 

Plaintiffs seek “general” and “special” damages against both

defendants on both causes of action.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides that a motion to dismiss

may be made if the plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.” However, motions to dismiss under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) are disfavored and rarely granted. The

question before the court is not whether the plaintiff will

ultimately prevail; rather, it is whether the plaintiff could

prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle

him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73

(1984). “A complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears

beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support

of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Van Buskirk v.

CNN, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

In deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court

“accept[s] all factual allegations of the complaint as true and

draw[s] all reasonable inferences” in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th

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Cir. 1999); see also Rodriguez v. Panayiotou, 314 F.3d 979, 983

(9th Cir. 2002). A court is not “required to accept as true

allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 

IV. DISCUSSION

The County moves to dismiss on two independent grounds: (1)

that Plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege standing to sue

under either § 1983 or California law; and (2) Plaintiffs have

failed to state valid claims under either § 1983 or the

California Tort Claims Act. 

A. Standing

1. Standing to bring section 1983 claim.

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim is based upon alleged violations of

Mr. Fuentes’ Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The rights

protected by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments are personal

rights. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 160 (1990)(only

the person subject to the penalty has standing to assert an

Eighth Amendment objection under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Clause); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)(The rights

created by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are

“by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights

established are personal rights.”). The general rule is that

“only the person whose [personal] rights were violated can sue to

vindicate those rights.” Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. Police

Dept., 159 F.3d 365, 370 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Alderman v.

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1 Survival actions do not cover legal injuries which occur

simultaneous to or as a result of the death itself. See Smith,

818 F.2d at 1417 n.7 (citing Pease v. Beech Aircraft, 38 Cal.

App. 3d 450, 459-60 (1974)).

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United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)("Fourth Amendment rights

are personal rights which... may not be vicariously asserted."). 

In § 1983 actions, survivors of a deceased individual whose

rights were violated before death1 may assert these personal

claims on the decedent’s behalf, but only if the relevant state's

law authorizes such persons to bring a survival action in state

court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a); Smith v. City of Fontana, 818

F.2d 1411, 1416-17 (9th Cir. 1987). It the plaintiff’s burden to

establish that applicable state law permits a survival action. 

Moreland, 159 F.3d at 369.

California law does permit “survival actions,” which are

intended to compensate the decedent for personal injuries

suffered while he or she was alive. This compensation may pass

to the decedent’s estate. See Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 377.20. 

(California law also permits wrongful death actions, which are

meant to compensate the decedent’s heirs for damages they suffer

as a result of the death. § 377.60. Only survival actions, not

wrongful death claims, are compensable under § 1983.)

A survival action may be prosecuted by an executor or

administrator of the decedent’s estate. § 377.30. If no such

person has been appointed, the action may be pursued by the

person or persons who succeed, by will or intestacy, to the

particular interest of the estate. §§ 377.10, 377.11, 377.30,

377.31. A person who wishes to commence a survival action is

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required to file an affidavit setting forth particular

information about the decedent, the claims, and the prosecuting

person’s relationship to the decedent. § 377.32. 

Here, Blanca Martinez (the decedent’s mother) and Alejandro

Fuentes (the decedent’s father) claim to be administrators of

Moises Fuentes’ estate, but have failed to file the required

affidavit or to properly allege standing to bring a survival

action. Plaintiffs have not alleged standing to bring this suit

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The County’s motion to dismiss this

claim is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

2. Standing to bring a state-law wrongful death

action.

California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.60 sets forth those

persons who have standing to sue in a wrongful death action:

A cause of action for the death of a person caused by

the wrongful act or neglect of another may be asserted

by any of the following persons or by the decedent's

personal representative on their behalf:

(a) The decedent's surviving spouse, domestic

partner, children, and issue of deceased

children, or, if there is no surviving issue

of the decedent, the persons, including the

surviving spouse or domestic partner, who

would be entitled to the property of the

decedent by intestate succession.

(b) Whether or not qualified under subdivision

(a), if they were dependent on the decedent,

the putative spouse, children of the putative

spouse, stepchildren, or parents....

Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 377.60. If decedent has no surviving

spouse or domestic partner, and no other dependents, standing to

sue is governed by the law of intestate succession. The

California Probate Code provides that, absent a surviving spouse,

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property passes to children. Absent children, property passes to

the decedent’s parents equally. If a decedent has no surviving

spouse, but does have surviving children, the property will go to

the children. See Cal. Prob. Code § 6402. In such a case,

parents and siblings may not maintain a wrongful death action. 

See Mayo v. White, 178 Cal. App. 3d 1083, 1090-91 (1983). 

Here, two of the named plaintiffs are apparently Mr.

Fuentes’ children, Moises I. Fuentes, Jr. and Ana P. Fuentes. 

Accordingly, only these two individuals have standing to bring a

wrongful death claim. The County’s motion to dismiss the

wrongful death claim is GRANTED AS TO ALL PLAINTIFFS EXCEPT

MOISES I. FUENTES AND ANA P. FUENTES WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

B. Failure to State a Claim.

1. Failure to properly allege a Monell claim.

Local government entities, such as the County of Madera may

be sued for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief, but only

if the allegedly unconstitutional actions took place pursuant to

some “policy statement, ordinance, or decision officially adopted

and promulgated by that body's officers....” Monell v. Dep’t of

Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). Alternatively, if no

formal policy exists, plaintiffs may point to “customs and

usages” of the local government entity. Id. A local government

entity cannot be held liable simply because it employs someone

who has acted unlawfully. 

A local government may not be sued...for an injury

inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead,

it is when execution of a government’s policy or

custom, whether made by its law-makers or by those

whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent

official policy, inflicts the injury that the

government as an entity is responsible....

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Id. at 694.

The existence of a “policy or custom” can be shown through

proof of a “longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the

‘standard operating procedure’ of the local government entity.” 

Ulrich v. City and County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984-85

(9th Cir. 2002). Alternatively, Plaintiffs may show either (1)

that “the decision-making official was, as a matter of state law,

a final policymaking authority whose edicts or acts may fairly be

said to represent official policy in the area of decision,” or

(2) by showing that “an official with final policymaking

authority either delegated that authority to, or ratified the

decision of, a subordinate.” Id.

Here, Plaintiffs have failed to allege that the County’s

action of dismissing the claims against Mr. Fuentes was based on

any existing policy or custom of the County, rather than on the

merits of the criminal case. The County’s motion to dismiss the

section 1983 claims against it is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

2. Failure to comply with the California Tort Claims

Act. 

The California Tort Claims Act requires as a prerequisite to

any damages claim against a public entity that the claim be

presented to the entity as a demand for “money or damages.” See

City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 447, 454

(1974)(failure to comply with this requirement is fatal to a

claim). It is Plaintiffs’ burden to allege facts demonstrating

compliance with the claim presentation requirement. State v.

Superior Court (Bodde), 32 Cal. 4th, 1234, 1241 (2004).

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Plaintiffs have failed to allege compliance with the

presentation requirement. The County’s motion to dismiss the

wrongful death claim is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the County’s motion to

dismiss is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Any amended complaint

shall be filed within thirty (30) days following electronic

service of this decision. 

Dated: October 8, 2005

/s/ OLIVER W. WANGER

____________________________

OLIVER W. WANGER

United States District Judge

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