Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01513/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01513-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAVIER CRESPO,

Petitioner,

Criminal Case No. 14-cr-1903 DMS 

Civil Case No. 16-cv-1513 DMS

ORDER DENYING (1) 

PETITIONER’S MOTION TO 

VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR 

CORRECT SENTENCE UNDER 

28 U.S.C. § 2255 AND (2) 

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO 

STAY

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Javier Crespo’s Motion to Vacate, Set 

Aside, or Correct Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Petitioner moves to vacate his 

sentence pursuant to Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) and Welch v. 

United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016). Respondent United States of America 

opposes, and it moves to stay proceedings pending a decision by the Supreme Court 

in Beckles v. United States, No. 15-8544, 2016 WL 1029080 (June 27, 2016) (order 

granting certiorari). For the reasons set out below, the Court denies the motion and 

denies as moot Respondent’s motion to stay. 

I.

BACKGROUND

On September 30, 2014, Petitioner pleaded guilty to two counts of bank 

robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and the parties agreed that Petitioner 

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was a career offender pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.

The probation department prepared a Presentence Report (“PSR”) and 

determined that Petitioner was a career offender under § 4B1.1. According to the 

PSR, Petitioner’s instant offenses qualified as crimes of violence under § 4B1.2(a) 

and prior drug trafficking offenses qualified as controlled substance offenses under 

§ 4B1.2(b). This resulted in a total offense level of 29 and criminal history category 

VI. Accordingly, the PSR calculated a guideline range of 151 to 188 months. On

December 18, 2014, the Court varied from the advisory guideline range and 

sentenced Petitioner to 100 months, followed by three years of supervised release.

On June 16, 2016, Petitioner filed the present motion, challenging his sentence 

in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Johnson.

1 Petitioner argues Johnson 

renders the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2) unconstitutional, and further argues 

Johnson applies retroactively on collateral review pursuant to Welch. Thus, 

Petitioner contends he is entitled to relief because bank robbery no longer qualifies 

as a crime of violence because it could only qualify as a crime of violence under the 

residual clause, which is now unconstitutional under Johnson.

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

A prisoner in custody may move the federal court that imposed a sentence 

upon him to vacate, set aside, or correct that sentence on the ground that:

the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 

United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such 

1 Because the present motion is Petitioner’s second or successive § 2255 motion, 

Petitioner filed the motion protectively with this Court and then sought authorization 

from the Ninth Circuit to file a second or successive § 2255 motion. On January 25, 

2017, the Ninth Circuit issued an order, denying as unnecessary Petitioner’s 

application for authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 motion. 

Subsequently, on January 31, 2017, the Court issued an order, requesting 

supplemental briefing from the parties in light of recent developments in the case 

law.

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sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized 

by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack[.]

28. U.S.C. § 2255(a). If the court determines that relief is warranted under § 2255, 

it must “vacate and set the judgment aside” and “discharge the prisoner or resentence 

him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.” Id. at

§ 2255(b).

III.

DISCUSSION

In Johnson, the Supreme Court found unconstitutionally vague the residual

clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2551. 

The residual clause defined a “violent felony” as one that is “‘punishable by 

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year’ and ‘is burglary, arson, or extortion, 

involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious 

potential risk of physical injury to another.’” Id. at 2555–56 (quoting 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e)(2)(B)). In finding the residual clause unconstitutional, the Court first 

reasoned the clause left “grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by 

a crime” because “[i]t ties the judicial assessment of risk to a judicially imagined 

‘ordinary case’ of a crime, not to real-world facts or statutory elements.” Id. at 2557. 

The Court also reasoned the clause left “uncertainty about how much risk it takes 

for a crime to qualify as a violent felony” because it forced courts to determine 

potential risk “in light of the four enumerated crimes—burglary, arson, extortion, 

and crimes involving the use of explosives[, which] are ‘far from clear in respect to 

the degree of risk each poses.’” Id. at 2558 (quoting Begay v. United States, 553 

U.S. 137, 143 (2008)). Accordingly, the Court concluded “imposing an increased 

sentence under the residual clause of the [ACCA] violates the Constitution’s

guarantee of due process.” Id. at 2563. 

Petitioner argues bank robbery is no longer a “crime of violence” under 

§ 4B1.2(a) in light of Johnson. Prior to its amendment on August 1, 2016, § 4B1.2(a) 

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defined a “crime of violence” as:

any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for 

a term exceeding one year, that—

(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 

physical force against the person of another, or 

(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of 

explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious 

potential risk of physical injury to another.

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). The italicized language is referred to as the “residual clause.” 

See United States v. Crews, 621 F.3d 849, 852 (9th Cir. 2010).

In Johnson, however, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of 

the residual clause in the ACCA, not in § 4B1.2(a). Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2551. 

Moreover, the Court was clear in limiting the reach of its decision. Id. at 2554 

(“Holding the residual clause void for vagueness does not put other criminal laws 

that use terms such as ‘substantial risk’ in doubt”). Indeed, in its recent decision in 

Beckles v. United States, No. 15-8544, 2017 WL 855781 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2017), the 

Supreme Court expressly held “the advisory Sentencing Guidelines are not subject 

to a vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause and that § 4B1.2(a)’s residual 

clause is not void for vagueness.” Id. at *9. Therefore, Johnson does not apply to 

the Career Offender Guidelines, and bank robbery remains a crime of violence under 

§ 4B1.2(a). See United States v. Steppes, 651 F. App’x 697, 698 (9th Cir. 2016) 

(holding § 2113(a) “categorically” qualifies as a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)).

As a result, Petitioner is not entitled to relief.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct 

sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is denied, and Respondent’s motion to stay 

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proceedings is denied as moot.2 The Court declines to issue a certificate of 

appealability because Petitioner has not demonstrated that reasonable jurists could 

find debatable this Court’s denial of Petitioner’s motion. The Clerk is directed to 

close the associated civil case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 9, 2017

2 The Court also denies as moot Petitioner’s request in Notice Concerning Beckles

v. United States that the Court defer ruling on his section 2255 motion for 30 days. 

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