Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00062/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00062-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

AGA Shareholders, LLC, an Illinois

limited liability company,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

CSK Auto, Inc., an Arizona corporation,

Defendant.

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-07-62-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Defendant CSK Auto, Inc. (“CSK”) has filed a motion for reconsideration of the

Court’s summary judgment order. Dkt. #235; see Dkt. #232. CSK argues (1) that the

Court’s ruling on count one is contradicted by its findings regarding count two (id. at 2-4),

and (2) that the record reveals a material issue of disputed fact regarding CSK’s right to

terminate the Agreement (id. at 4-5). The Court denied the motion with respect to the first

issue. Dkt. #243. Plaintiff AGA Shareholders, LLC (“AGA”) has filed a response

addressing the second issue. Dkt. #263. For reasons stated below, the Court will deny

CSK’s motion in its entirety.

I. Motion for Reconsideration Standard.

Motions for reconsideration are disfavored and should be granted only in rare

circumstances. See Ross v. Arpaio, No. CV 05-4177-PHX-MHM (ECV), 2008 WL 1776502,

at *2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 15, 2008) (citing Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 909 F. Supp. 1342,

1351 (D. Ariz. 1995)). A motion for reconsideration may not be used to make new

Case 2:07-cv-00062-DGC Document 264 Filed 01/16/09 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

arguments or to ask the Court to rethink its analysis. See id. (citing United States v.

Rezzonico, 32 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1116 (D. Ariz. 1998)); see also N.W. Acceptance Corp. v.

Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925-26 (9th Cir. 1988). Courts in this district have

identified four circumstances where a motion for reconsideration will be granted: (1) the

moving party has discovered material differences in fact or law from those presented to the

Court at the time of its initial decision, and the party could not previously have known of the

factual or legal differences through the exercise of reasonable diligence, (2) material factual

events have occurred since the Court’s initial decision, (3) there has been a material change

in the law since the Court’s initial decision, or (4) the moving party makes a convincing

showing that the Court failed to consider material facts that were presented to the Court at

the time of its initial decision. See, e.g., Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mech. Contractors,

Inc., 215 F.R.D. 581, 586 (D. Ariz. 2003).

II. Analysis.

The Court granted summary judgment as to CSK’s liability on count one on the

ground that the Agreement constitutes a 5-year requirements contract and CSK does not

dispute that it ceased purchasing products from AGA during the term of the Agreement.

Dkt. #232 at 11. CSK contends that the Court should take into account an argument made

by Defendant Jenkins but not made by CSK in its summary judgment briefing. Dkt. #235

at 5. Jenkins argued that AGA’s tortious interference claim failed in part because any

damages would be speculative given that “AGA admits that CSK could terminate AGA if

AGA failed to match a competitor’s offer.” Dkt. #163 at 10 (citing Dkt. #164 ¶ 32; see Dkt.

#176 ¶ 32). CSK argues that the Court should have considered this portion of Jenkins’

argument in ruling on CSK’s motion for summary judgment because CSK’s motion “was

based on ‘the entire record in the case’ (Dkt. #210-2) and this specific issue was briefed for

the court.” Dkt. #235 at 5.

In its motion for summary judgment, AGA argued that CSK “ignored and breached

[the] express five-year term [A]greement between the parties.” Dkt. #210 at 2. AGA further

argued that the terms of the Agreement and “CSK’s liability under it are ripe for interlocutory

Case 2:07-cv-00062-DGC Document 264 Filed 01/16/09 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

judgment.” Id. AGA specifically sought “judgment as to CSK’s liability to AGA for the

remaining four plus years of the [A]greement.” Id. at 4.

In response, CSK contended that the Agreement “does not reflect an agreement

binding on CSK.” Dkt. #228 at 5; see Dkt. #212 at 8. Having lost on that issue, CSK now

argues that it terminated the Agreement for cause. Dkt. #235 at 4. CSK contends that the

Court should consider this new alternative argument because the record contains evidence

purportedly showing that AGA believed that the Agreement could be terminated if it failed

to match a competitor’s offer to CSK. Id. at 4-5. CSK asserts that “it was reasonable to

expect that all of the pending motions would be considered together.” Id. at 5.

As the party opposing summary judgment, CSK was required to “‘identify with

reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment.’” Keenan v. Allan,

91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). CSK did not do so; it made no

mention of the termination-for-cause argument in the three memoranda it filed as part of the

summary judgment briefing. Nor did CSK cite any evidence relevant to this argument. The

fact that Jenkins mentioned the argument and cited to one item of evidence in asserting that

damages were speculative does not satisfy CSK’s obligation, particularly when the Court

ruled in favor of Jenkins on other grounds and never considered that argument. See

Dkt. #232 at 17. The Court certainly was not required to consider an irrelevant argument

raised by Jenkins on the off-chance that it might support a position CSK did not take in its

extensive briefing. The Court is not counsel for CSK. It has no obligation to “‘scour the

record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact.’” Keenan, 91 F.3d at 1279. As this Circuit

has recognized, “‘judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.’” Independent

Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

In short, CSK has not made convincing showing that the Court failed to consider

material facts presented by CSK at the time of Court’s initial decision. See Motorola, 215

F.R.D. at 586. The Court will therefore deny the motion for reconsideration. See

Independent Towers of Wash., 350 F.3d at 929 (courts will consider “only issues which are

argued specifically and distinctly” in a party’s brief).

Case 2:07-cv-00062-DGC Document 264 Filed 01/16/09 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

IT IS ORDERED that CSK’s motion for reconsideration (Dkt. #235) is denied.

DATED this 16th day of January, 2009.

Case 2:07-cv-00062-DGC Document 264 Filed 01/16/09 Page 4 of 4