Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-02528/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-02528-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

GERALD W. BOTTERO,

Plaintiff,

v.

HOYA CORPORATION, VISION CARE 

DIVISION, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-02528-BLF 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 

MOTION TO STRIKE

[Re: ECF 89]

Plaintiff moves to strike the twenty-seven affirmative defenses raised by Defendant Hoya 

Corporation in its Amended Answer, contending that the defenses are not pled with the requisite 

specificity demanded by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662 (2009). Defendant opposes the motion to strike with regard to seventeen of 

these affirmative defenses, arguing that the heightened pleading requirements of Twombly and 

Iqbal should not apply to affirmative defenses, and that Plaintiff has been given fair notice of the 

defenses Defendant is asserting in this action. 

Having reviewed the briefing of the parties, the Court finds this this motion appropriate for 

determination without oral argument. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons stated below, the 

Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to strike, with leave to amend. 

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant’s Answer asserts twenty-seven affirmative defenses: (1) failure to state a cause 

of action, (2) failure to exhaust, (3) no consideration, (4) laches, estoppel, or unclean hands, (5) 

waiver, (6) no damages, (7) accord and satisfaction, (8) intervening or superseding acts, (9) no 

proximate cause, (10) unjust enrichment, (11) no control, (12) statute of frauds and the parol 

evidence rule, (13) uncertainty, (14) prejudgment interest, (15) no duty, (16) Defendant’s right to 

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attorneys’ fees, (17) conditions precedent, (18) unreasonable reliance, (19) excuse, (20) frustration 

of purpose, (21) interference with performance, (22) commercial impracticability, (23) 

unconscionability, (24) equitable reformation, (25) set-off and recoupment, (26) failure to state a 

claim for attorneys’ fees and costs, and (27) right to amend. See Am. Answer, ECF 85 at 4-8. 

Plaintiff moves to strike fourteen of these defenses for failure to plead any factual matter, 

seven of these defenses for failure to plead sufficient factual matter, and four of these defenses 

because they are not actually defenses and are, instead, attacks on the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s 

pleadings. See Mot. to Strike, ECF 89 at 5-8. 

Defendant does not oppose the motion to strike with regard to ten of the defenses: the first, 

third, fourth, sixth, ninth, thirteenth, fourteenth, sixteenth, twenty-sixth, and twenty-seventh 

defenses. As to the other seventeen defenses, Defendant makes two arguments: first that

affirmative defenses do not need to meet Twombly and Iqbal’s heightened pleading standards, and 

second that Plaintiff has been given fair notice of the defenses through Defendant’s “numerous 

submissions to the Court.” Opp., ECF 92 at 6-7. It then asks, if the Court grants the motion, for 

leave to amend with regard to the seventeen remaining affirmative defenses, a request that

Plaintiff does not oppose. See Reply, ECF 94 at 3. 

II. DISCUSSION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b) demands that a party state “in short and plain terms 

its defenses to each claim asserted against it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1). Rule 12(f) governs motions 

to strike, and permits a court to strike from a pleading “any insufficient defense or any redundant, 

immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Defenses can be stricken 

when they fail to give a plaintiff “fair notice” of the defense asserted. See, e.g., Wyshak v. City 

Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979). 

Courts in this district, including the undersigned, apply the heightened pleading standards 

of Twombly and Iqbal to affirmative defenses. See Camacho v. Jefferson Capital Systems, LLC, 

2014 WL 4954817, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2014); see also Perez v. Gordon & Wong Law Grp. 

P.C., 2012 WL 1029425, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012) (collecting cases within this district 

and finding that “the vast majority of federal district courts presented with [this] issue have 

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reached the same conclusion”). Though courts in other districts have reached other conclusions,

see, e.g., Hansen v. Rhode Island’s Only 24 Hour Truck & Auto Plaza, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 119 (D. 

Mass. 2012), this Court finds no persuasive reason to depart from its practice, and the practice of 

other courts within this district, to require that affirmative defenses meet the heightened pleading 

standards of Twombly and Iqbal. See Scott v. Fed. Bond & Collection Servs., Inc., 2011 WL 

176846, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2011) (“While a defense need not include extensive factual 

allegations in order to give fair notice, bare statements reciting mere legal conclusions may not be 

sufficient.”). 

Here, Defendant does not argue that any of the affirmative defenses pled in the Amended 

Answer meet the heightened pleading requirements of Twombly and Iqbal. Defendant argues

instead that it has given Plaintiff fair notice of its defenses by the facts and evidence submitted 

with other documents filed with the Court, including its opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment and its own cross-motion for summary judgment. See Opp. at 7-8. It cites in 

support of this fair notice argument Simmons v. Navajo County, Arizona, a Ninth Circuit case 

which states that the district court has “discretion to allow a defendant to plead an affirmative 

defense in a subsequent motion [after filing an Answer].” 609 F.3d 1011, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010). 

The context of Simmons, however, undercuts Defendant’s argument: in Simmons, the Ninth 

Circuit determined that the defendant did not waive an affirmative defense because the defense 

was pled in the answer and then further explicated through facts in later papers filed with the 

Court. Here, the Court is not determining waiver of a defense, but rather its sufficiency. 

The Court is persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant’s remaining seventeen 

defenses are insufficiently pled. The vast majority, including the second, fifth, seventh, eighth, 

tenth, eleventh, twelfth, fifteenth, twentieth, twenty-first, twenty-second, and twenty-fifth, merely 

state legal conclusions without pleading any supporting facts. Still others, including the ninth and 

nineteenth, state a list of reasons why Plaintiff’s recovery is barred, but provide no facts to support 

any of the listed reasons. Defendant has therefore failed to plead sufficient facts that would permit 

the Plaintiff to “ascertain the basis for these affirmative defenses.” G&G Closed Circuit Events, 

LLC v. Nguyen, 2010 WL 3749284, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2010). 

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III. ORDER

Defendant’s first, third, fourth, sixth, ninth, thirteenth, fourteenth, sixteenth, twenty-sixth, 

and twenty-seventh affirmative defenses are STRICKEN, with prejudice, because Defendant does 

not oppose Plaintiff’s motion to strike with regard to those ten defenses. See Opp. at 9 n.1.

Defendant has requested leave to amend with regard to its seventeen other defenses, and 

Plaintiff has indicated that he does not oppose this request. The Court therefore STRIKES the 

second, fifth, seventh, eighth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, fifteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, 

nineteenth, twentieth, twenty-first, twenty-second, twenty-third, twenty-fourth, and twenty-fifth 

affirmative defenses pled in Defendant’s Amended Answer, but grants Defendant leave to amend 

in order to plead these affirmative defenses in conformance with the heightened pleading 

requirements of Twombly and Iqbal. Defendant may not assert any additional defenses beyond 

these seventeen in its Second Amended Answer. 

Defendant’s Second Amended Answer shall be filed no later than April 24, 2015. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 10, 2015

______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

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