Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_08-cv-03076/USCOURTS-cand-5_08-cv-03076-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 20:1400 Civil Rights of Handicapped Child

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

K.P., a minor, by and through C.P., her 

Guardian Ad Litem,

Plaintiff,

v.

SALINAS UNION HIGH SCHOOL 

DISTRICT,

Defendant.

Case No. 5:08-cv-03076-HRL

ORDER RE PLAINTIFF'S PETITION

FOR REVIEW

Plaintiff K.P. filed this action alleging that the defendant Salinas Union High School 

District (District) failed to provide her with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) as required 

by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, et seq.1 An 

administrative law judge (ALJ) rendered a decision in the District’s favor. K.P. now seeks review 

of that decision, contending that the ALJ erred in several respects. The District maintains that the 

ALJ’s decision is correct and should be affirmed. Upon consideration of the parties’ moving and 

responding papers, the oral arguments presented, and the entire administrative record,

2

this court 

 

1 On December 10, 2015, Congress enacted the Every Student Succeeds Act (“ESSA”). See Pub. 

L. No. 114–95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015). The ESSA is a reauthorization of the Elementary and 

Secondary Education Act of 1965 and includes amendments to the IDEA that are not relevant to 

this case.

2 KP’s Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”), the operative administrative pleading, was not 

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denies the petition.

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

Under the IDEA, all children with disabilities are entitled to a FAPE. 20 U.S.C. §

1412(a)(1). A FAPE means special education and related services that:

(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and 

direction, and without charge;

(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency;

(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary 

school education in the State involved; and

(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program 

required under section 1414(d) of this title.

20 U.S.C. § 1401(9).

To achieve this purpose, the IDEA provides for a cooperative process between parents and 

schools, culminating in the creation of an individual education plan (IEP) for every disabled 

student. 20 U.S.C. § 1414; Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53, 126 S. Ct. 528, 

163 L.Ed.2d 387 (2005). The IEP “must include an assessment of the child’s current educational 

performance, must articulate measurable educational goals, and must specify the nature of the 

special services that the school will provide.” Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 53. Additionally, the IEP 

must be “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.” Bd. of Educ. 

of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 

690 (1982). Schools are required to provide “a ‘basic floor of opportunity’ to disabled students, 

not a ‘potential-maximizing education.’” J.L. v. Mercer Island Sch. Dist., 592 F.3d 938, 947 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 197 n. 21, 200). The IDEA also requires that the IEP 

allow the disabled student to receive an education in the “least restrictive environment.” This 

means that schools are required to ensure that, to the maximum extent appropriate, a student with 

disabilities is educated with nondisabled students, unless “the nature or severity of the disability of 

 

included in the copy of the administrative record submitted to the court. The District submitted a 

copy of the TAC with its opposition. (See Osher Decl., Ex. A). K.P. does not object to the 

submission of the TAC or this court’s consideration of it.

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a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services 

cannot be achieved satisfactorily.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.114 

(same).

Parents have the right to participate in both the development and continued implementation 

of their child’s IEP. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b). If parents disagree with a school district regarding “any 

matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the 

provision of a free appropriate public education to such child,” they are entitled to an impartial due 

process hearing before a state agency. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A), (f). If the parents disagree with 

the results of the administrative hearing before the state agency, an appeal may be brought in a 

district court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A).

BACKGROUND3

K.P., born in September 1990, was eligible for special education as a child with cognitive 

abilities in the low average to borderline range; deficits in expressive, receptive, and pragmatic 

language skills; attention deficits; difficulties in mathematic reasoning; and an auditory processing 

disorder. She also has a seizure disorder, circulatory problems, and poor short-term memory.

In June 2000, K.P.’s prior school district, Washington Union School District (WUSD), 

assessed K.P. and concluded that she was eligible for special education services due to a disorder 

in speech/language development. (AR 770-779). Parents declined WUSD’s offer of services at 

that time.

From kindergarten through eighth grade, K.P. attended a small, private Montessori school. 

The Montessori school did not provide special education services. Parents, however, had hired a 

private instructional aide, as well as a speech and language therapist, who were permitted to work 

with K.P. in the classroom.

Mother wanted K.P. to attend a learning disability high school and had not previously 

considered putting K.P. in a public school. However, the Montessori school only went to the 

eighth grade, and there were no learning disability high schools in their area. (AR 1559:6-16, 

 

3 All citations to the administrative record are designated “AR.”

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1661:5-7). Parents had WUSD assess K.P. again in 2003; and, in December 2003, WUSD 

concluded that K.P. was eligible for special education services in speech and language. (AR 123-

127, 130-132).

In June 2004, WUSD prepared an IEP, which provided that K.P. would enroll full time at 

WUSD’s San Benancio Middle School at the start of the 2004-2005 school year and would spend 

a little over half of her day (i.e., 185 minutes per day, 5 days per week) in special education class. 

(AR 832-41). However, Mother decided to keep K.P. in Montessori school for the first half of the 

school year and to do a transition to WUSD later in the year. (AR 1562:5-14).

K.P. enrolled into WUSD in March 2005 and did not attend full time. (AR 1670:16-20). 

Instead, she arrived at lunch time and was there for less than half the day, attending regular 

education classes in history, physical education, and art, primarily for socialization and to ease her 

transition from Montessori school to a larger public school. (AR 842-49; 1563:3-8, 12-15).

A. May 2005 IEP

On May 24, 2005, WUSD held an IEP meeting for K.P.’s transition to Salinas High School 

(SHS). (AR 858-69). Mother attended, along with Mary Rose,4 K.P.’s private speech and 

language therapist who had worked with K.P. for several years. Also in attendance were Karen 

Pfeiffer (an SHS special education resource teacher), Jean Bye (SHS speech/language specialist), 

and Mary Forbord (SHS general education teacher).

The May 2005 IEP offered to place K.P. in two special education classes for math and 

independent studies, for a total of 100 minutes per day (i.e., less than half the school day), five 

times per week. Additionally, K.P. would receive speech and language services, twice per week, 

for 30 minutes per session. For the rest of the school day, K.P. would be placed in general 

education courses, including English and a business technology class. Accommodations included 

extra time, simplified directions, and on-task reminders for test-taking. The May 2005 IEP also 

proposed goals for study skills, consumer math, and reading, as well as a plan to help K.P.’s 

transition to SHS. The IEP did not expressly say whether KP would have the services of an 

 

4 Mary Rose is also referred to in the record as Mary Krieg.

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instructional aide in her regular education courses.

As of the May 25, 2005 IEP meeting, K.P. had been assessed several times. Most of those 

assessments, however, were several years old. In February 2002, Parents privately retained 

Rochelle B. Wolk, Ph.D. to conduct a neuropsychological evaluation. (AR 785-802). And, as 

discussed, WUSD assessed K.P. in 2003. In April 2005, Parents obtained a private assessment re 

K.P.’s speech and language needs. (AR 851-857). There is no indication that Mother told the IEP 

team about that assessment or presented it at the May 24, 2005 IEP meeting. (AR 858-869). 

Mother testified that she gave the April 2005 assessment to WUSD, not the District, believing that 

the assessment would be transferred to the District when K.P. enrolled in SHS. (AR 1672:6-25). 

However, Nancy Jones-Powers, SHS Director of Special Education, testified that the April 2005 

assessment was not in K.P.’s files received from WUSD. (AR 2608:4-21). And, Jean Bye wrote a 

note in the IEP stating, “Since no speech/language information is available, [K.P.] will be given a 

full evaluation during the first full month of the school term.” (AR 861). It was agreed that goals 

and objectives would be developed within the first month of the school year after K.P. had some 

time to adjust to her new school and classes.

Mother approved the May 2005 IEP.

B. 2005-2006 School Year

K.P. enrolled at SHS in the Fall of 2005. She was placed in special education classes for 

consumer math and individual studies, as well as regular education classes for English and 

business technology.

The District did not hold an IEP meeting within the first month of K.P.’s attendance at 

SHS. Charles Haynes, K.P.’s case carrier and consumer math teacher, did not know about the 

agreement to hold an IEP meeting within the first month of school until he received a September 

16, 2005 letter from Mother requesting an IEP meeting to discuss K.P.’s goals, the progress of her 

current placement, and monthly meetings with her teachers. In that letter, Mother also requested 

that the District provide accommodations in K.P.’s regular education classes in the form of extra 

time, modified assignments, and an in-classroom aide. (AR 870; 1901:7-25). Haynes responded 

by letter on September 20, 2005, stating that he believed the May 2005 IEP was complete with 

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appropriate goals. Haynes further stated that he would speak with the speech therapist that week 

about whether K.P. needed a speech/language assessment to develop goals for her. (AR 871).

It was around this time that the District realized that it had not received K.P.’s file from 

WUSD. The District requested the file and eventually received it; however, District staff testified 

that the file contained only the May 2005 IEP and assessments that were several years old. (AR 

2606:18-2608:21). Thus, the District says that it did not have sufficient information to determine 

whether any changes to the May 2005 IEP were warranted. (AR 1903:3-14, 2251:21-2252:11).

On September 23, 2005, Haynes presented Father with a triennial assessment plan. (AR 

873). That plan not only proposed a speech/language assessment, but also recommended 

academic, social/emotional, cognitive, perceptual/motor, and health tests. The District said this 

plan was prepared because SHS did not have any assessment information for K.P. (AR 1902:22-

1903:14, 2610:23-2611:20). Father initially consented to the assessment plan; but Parents later 

rescinded their consent on September 28, 2005 and again requested an IEP meeting. (AR 875-77).

The District thereafter held meetings and sent correspondence throughout the Fall of 2005, 

requesting Parents’ consent to assess K.P. (AR 1956:18-1961:11, 880, 884, 889, 893, 912-17, 

922-23). However, Mother was again having K.P. evaluated by Dr. Wolk and did not want the 

District to conduct any assessments until after Dr. Wolk’s testing was done. (AR 1590:13-21). 

The District also asked for permission to communicate with K.P.’s private service providers, but 

Mother did not consent. (AR 913, 1683:8-24).

October 25, 2005 IEP

An IEP meeting was held on October 25, 2005. Mother requested an instructional aide, 

expressing concerns about K.P.’s low cognitive abilities (based on Dr. Wolk’s 2002 assessment), 

as well as her social skills deficits. (AR 27). Mother also relayed concerns about K.P.’s safety. 

(Id.). These safety concerns were based on a September 28, 2005 incident where the District 

could not locate K.P. on campus for over an hour. During that time, K.P. was with Gisele 

Curnow, an SHS speech and language therapist. Curnow (who did not know that Parents 

rescinded their consent for the District to conduct any assessments that very day) had taken K.P. 

from class for an assessment, but forgot to sign K.P. out of class. The District contacted Parents 

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while SHS staff looked for K.P., who eventually was found with Curnow. Mother’s safety 

concerns also stemmed from a separate incident in which K.P. was found leaning on an older male 

student in a classroom during lunch. District staff told her that behavior was inappropriate, and 

she was never again found in an inappropriate situation with any male student. (AR 1746:14-

1747:1, 1882:8-17, 1963:5-7).

At the October 25 meeting, the District staff reported that K.P. had significant problems 

with paying attention to classroom instruction, had difficulty with multiple step math and word 

problems, and was failing her business technology class. District staff also noted that K.P. was 

very shy, and did not mingle with other students. The District again proposed special education 

classes for 100 minutes per day, five times per week, and speech and language services, twice per 

week, for 30 minutes per session. (AR 21). Additionally, the IEP meeting minutes indicate that 

the IEP team discussed K.P.’s need for an instructional assistant, a one-on-one aide, the District’s 

proposed assessments, and potential academic, social and organizational goals. (AR 21-27). 

Mother refused to sign the IEP and testified that, with respect to assessments, she would not have 

signed any IEP until after Dr. Wolk completed her evaluation. (AR 24, 1696:11-16).

On November 2, 2005, Haynes sent Parents a proposed contract with K.P. to help her make 

up for missed work in the business technology class. (AR 901-10). He also provided the prior 

reading, consumer math, and study skills goals from the May 2005 IEP, as well as new proposed 

goals re written expression, classroom behavior, and social interaction. (Id.). Haynes suggested 

discussing these matters at a November 7 IEP meeting. (Id.). On November 4, Mother advised 

that she was not available for a meeting on November 7. (AR 918).

Dr. Wolk’s 2005 Assessment

As it turns out, November 7 was the first date of Dr. Wolk’s assessment.

Dr. Wolk evaluated K.P. over several days in November and completed her assessment on 

December 5. (AR 144-161). In testing administered by Dr. Wolk, K.P. obtained a full scale IQ of 

73, placing her in the 4th percentile. Dr. Wolk found that K.P.’s scores placed her in the 

borderline to low average range for cognitive functioning. She observed that K.P. had significant 

language delays with respect to her ability to follow verbal directions; an inability to maintain 

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focus and extract information; significant memory deficits (requiring that K.P. be given 

information multiple times before she would understand it); expressive and pragmatic language 

deficits; reading comprehension deficits; and executive functioning deficits that affected K.P.’s 

ability to perform more mature thinking and problem solving. In Dr. Wolk’s opinion, K.P. could 

not attend in a general education classroom due to her attention deficits. Dr. Wolk made a number 

of recommendations re K.P.’s education, including that K.P.’s math program should be limited to 

simple consumer math, with a focus on pragmatics such as managing a debit card; and that she be 

educated in a small classroom environment, with a focus on basic daily living and vocational 

skills. Additionally, Dr. Wolk felt that K.P. would be unable to meet grade appropriate 

expectations for written expression and that her skills were likely to fall far below the level 

required to pass the California High School Exit Exam (CAHSEE).

Meanwhile, the District filed for mediation to resolve the assessment issue, and the 

mediation was scheduled for December 5. (AR 919, 2612:7-16). Parents’ attorney wrote the 

District stating, “We advised our clients to sign the assessment plan,” and acknowledging that 

“[t]he District understandably wanted proper assessments in order to provide appropriate 

services.” (AR 943). On December 5, the same day Dr. Wolk completed her assessment, Mother 

signed a letter consenting to the District’s proposed academic and speech/language assessments 

(AR 942), which the District says was less than the comprehensive assessment for which consent 

was sought.

By the end of the fall semester, K.P. received passing grades in all of her classes, primarily 

B’s and C’s. (AR 1232). And, although she had been failing her business technology class (AR 

892), and continued to struggle in it, she ended up receiving a D. (AR 1232).

January 31, 2006 IEP

In January 2006, Curnow conducted the District’s speech and language assessment. (AR 

946-950). She found that K.P.’s overall language skills were scattered between average and 

significantly below average for her age. However, Curnow believed that K.P.’s attention and 

memory deficits may have negatively impacted K.P.’s test performance, such that the test scores

obtained did not accurately reflect K.P.’s true language skills and that K.P. could perform better 

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than the test results showed if she were attending to the matter at hand. (AR 947, 2224:3-8). 

Curnow observed that K.P. had a tendency to start doing an activity very quickly (sometimes 

starting before all the instructions were given) and to rush through the task without paying 

attention to the quality of her work. Although K.P. was easily distracted, Curnow found that when 

prompted, K.P. was easily redirected to her task.

An IEP meeting was held on January 31, 2006 to discuss the District’s assessments and Dr. 

Wolk’s December 5 assessment, and K.P.’s program was revised. (AR 974-988).

K.P. continued with special education classes for 100 minutes per day, five times per 

week, and speech and language services, twice per week, for 30 minutes per session. However, 

K.P. was given additional speech and language services (50 minutes of speech and language 

consultation per month), as well as new speech and language goals. She would be removed from 

the business technology class and placed in a culinary arts class. Additionally, the IEP states that 

she would be given additional instructional support as necessary. Mother consented to this IEP. 

(AR 975).

At the January 31 meeting, Mother requested that K.P. be placed in a social skills group, 

and the District agreed to explore what groups were available and appropriate for K.P. About two 

weeks later, the District proposed that half of K.P.’s speech and language services be provided 

through an SHS social skills group. (AR 990). Although she did not sign an IEP that identified 

the social skills group, Mother agreed with the District’s proposal; and, KP joined the group. (AR 

1725:1-1728:18, 2662:24-2663:2).

Additionally, on January 31, 2006, Mother consented to having the District conduct a 

comprehensive assessment of K.P. (AR 972). Reb Morga, a District school psychologist, 

conducted a psychoeducational assessment and found that K.P.’s cognitive abilities were in the 

low-average range and that K.P.’s full scale IQ was 81. (AR 1044, 2398:9-2398:18, 2400:18-22). 

Nevertheless, the District maintains that K.P.’s academic achievement scores show that she is able 

to perform at a higher academic level than her IQ scores alone would indicate. Here, the District 

points out that K.P.’s academic achievement scores were generally higher than 81, with several 

scores in the 90s. (AR 1046). Thus, the District believed that K.P. could learn and perform at a 

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higher level than suggested by K.P.’s IQ scores and could succeed in a regular education 

classroom with supports and accommodations.

Morga found that K.P. had strengths in letter-word identification, story recall, calculation, 

math fluency, spelling, writing fluency, and handwriting. (AR 1046). She had learning disability

in applied problems, difficulty understanding directions, and cognitive weakness in visualauditory memory and symbolic reasoning. (AR 1048, 1050). K.P. also had attention deficit 

hyperactivity disorder, as well as speech/language deficits revealed in prior assessments. Morga, 

however, did not find that K.P. had deficits in self-help and daily living skills. (AR 2408:25-

2409:20). She recommended that K.P. be given accommodations, such as preferential seating, 

multisensory learning experiences, and as much visuals (e.g., visual outlines, graphic organizers) 

as possible. (AR 1051).

An IEP meeting was held in April and May 2006 to discuss the assessments and to review 

K.P.’s progress on prior goals and objectives.

April 2006 IEP

As in the January 31, 2006 IEP, the April 19, 2006 IEP proposed that K.P. would continue 

to receive 100 minutes of special education per day, 5 days per week; two 30-minute 

speech/language sessions per week; and 50 minutes of speech/language consultation. (AR 996). 

But, whereas prior IEPs designated K.P.’s special education program as “Special Day Class” 

(SDC), the April 2006 IEP designates K.P.’s special education as “Resource Specialist Program”

(RSP). (Id.). According to the District, the SDC designation signified that a student was in 

special education class for more than half the school day. The RSP designation, on the other hand, 

referred to students who spent less than half the school day in special education class. (AR 

1912:15-24, 2619:1-14). Thus, says the District, it was the number of minutes that a student spent 

in special education class that determined a student’s categorization, not the other way around; 

and, an SDC student would not, simply by virtue of her categorization, be entitled to any more 

special education services than an RSP student. (AR 1912:18-1913:15, 2619:1-14).

As discussed above, K.P.’s May 2005 IEP prepared by WUSD categorized K.P. as an SDC 

student, even though the IEP placed her in special education classes for less than half the school 

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day. The District says that K.P.’s designation as SDC therefore was an error, and it corrected her 

classification in the April 2006 IEP to RSP. (AR 996, 1912:25-1913:10, 1914:13-19, 2621:11-

2622:7). K.P., however, remained in the same classes and continued to receive the same services 

as before. (AR 2620:18-2621:10).

In any event, the District says that by late spring 2006, the SDC and RSP designations 

were obsolete because both designations were replaced with “Specialized Academic Instruction” 

(SAI). This change, says the District, was due to a statewide change in the designation schools 

were to use for all special education students. (AR 2619:15-2620:20). Thus, the District says that 

when the April 2006 IEP meeting was continued to May, K.P.’s RSP designation was crossed out 

and changed to SAI. (AR 996, 2619:15-2620:13).

The April 2006 IEP maintained some of K.P.’s goals and objectives and revised and 

expanded others. Her math goal (previously limited to consumer math and basic computation) 

was changed to a goal for solving algebraic equations and graph linear equations. (AR 1000, 

1014). A new writing goal was set for development of an essay. (AR 1001). The IEP added a 

social interaction goal of displaying appropriate behavior in the classroom, hallways, before and 

after school and during lunch. (AR 1002). The IEP maintained her study skills and speech and 

language goals. (AR 999, 1004-05). The April IEP also included a new transition plan, meant to 

apply primarily to K.P.’s sophomore year, to help prepare her for life after high school. (AR 

1008). Thus, the transition plan provided for exploring career options, community involvement, 

and graduation requirements. (AR 2641:13-2643:2). Additionally, the IEP states that K.P. would 

be provided with assistance in her regular education classes. Mother also requested a change in 

K.P.’s case carrier, and Jennifer Fanoe would be K.P.’s case carrier for the 2006-2007 school year.

The IEP meeting was concluded on May 31, 2006. (AR 998). Mother says she did not 

approve the April 2006 IEP because she disagreed with the change in K.P.’s designation from 

SDC to SAI. (Opening Brief at 8).

Shortly after, the District received a letter from Mother, stating that she understood that 

K.P.’s health plan would be updated, an aide would be provided in all of her regular education 

classes, and that the IEP team would meet about six weeks into the new school year to review 

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K.P.’s progress and “to refine the goals and objectives, if necessary.” (AR 1056). Mother added 

that she was “not comfortable changing [K.P.]’s SDC designation but will be happy to revisit this 

issue during the upcoming school year.” (Id.). The District says that because Mother’s June 7 

letter did not raise any objections to the IEP’s goals and objectives, and because the letter stated 

that the parties would meet in the fall “to refine the goals and objectives, if necessary,” it 

understood Mother’s letter to mean that Mother agreed to the goals and objectives in the April 

2006 IEP, subject to a meeting in the fall to review them. And so, it proceeded to implement those 

goals and objectives. (AR 2625:9-2626:8).

At some point in 2006, K.P. was caught marking graffiti on District property. She was 

made to clean it and was never caught marking graffiti again. (AR 1705:9-22).

C. 2006-2007 School Year

During her sophomore year at SHS, K.P. continued with a special education individual 

studies class and was placed in a special education algebra class, which covered in two years the

material taught in one year in regular algebra class. She was placed in regular education English, 

health, history, science, and physical education. K.P. also continued to participate in the social 

skills group for 30 minutes per week; to receive 30 minutes of one-on-one speech/language 

therapy per week; and to receive 50 minutes of speech/language consultation services per month.

On September 12, 2006, the District sent notice of an IEP meeting to be held on September 

26. Because Parents’ attorney was unavailable on that date, Mother asked that the meeting be 

rescheduled to November 2 or 6. The IEP meeting was re-set for November 6, 2006. (AR 67-68, 

1089).

Meanwhile, K.P. was struggling in her regular education English class and was receiving a 

D. So, on September 26, District staff including Jones-Powers, Fanoe, Marlene Hlebo (one of

K.P.’s instructional aides) and John Miller (K.P.’s English teacher) met to discuss ways to help 

her. Staff agreed to provide K.P. with additional assistance and modifications, such as providing 

visual reminders to keep her on-task, frequent checking to ensure that she understood the 

information being presented, and breaking down information into smaller “chunks” to make it 

easier for K.P. to understand. (AR 1103-04).

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November 2006 IEP

At the November 6 IEP meeting, the District discussed the modifications that were made at 

the staff’s September 26 meeting and also presented a progress report re the goals and objectives 

from the April 19, 2006 IEP. A goal was added to have K.P. join an extracurricular school club to 

address social and transitional skills. The team also discussed having K.P. use a highlighter on 

tests, that K.P. would be given a second set of textbooks that she could use at home, and Mother’s 

request that a one-on-one aide accompany K.P. at all times to ensure K.P.’s safety. Mother did not 

sign the IEP because she did not agree with the change in K.P.’s designation from SDC to SAI. 

(AR 1092-1121, 1701:8-14). The District maintains that the change in K.P.’s designation to SAI 

was a change in name only and had no substantive impact on her program or services.

The District continued to implement the goals and objectives in the April 19, 2006 and 

November 6, 2006 IEPs. With Mother’s consent, K.P. joined the Future Farmers of America per 

the added goal of having K.P. participate in an extracurricular club.

In December 2006, at Mother’s request, Rita Rispoli, one of K.P.’s private educational 

therapists and consultants, observed K.P. in her math, English, history, and individual studies 

classes. According to Rispoli, K.P. was distracted in classes and required constant redirection; she 

had difficulty starting assignments; doodled instead of taking notes or working; tended to imitate 

rather than initiate behavior; and did not have much interaction with other students. (AR 1122-

26). K.P.’s teachers testified that Rispoli did not speak with them about K.P. or her work. 

Additionally, they believed that K.P. knew that she was being observed because Rispoli sat very 

close to K.P. and Rispoli’s presence caused K.P. and other students in the classroom to behave 

differently than they ordinarily would. (AR 1975:17-1976:10, 2483:21-2486:8, 2578:9-2581:7, 

2717:22-2718:16).

March 2007 IEP

IEP meetings were held on March 13 and 28, 2007. The IEP did not include any changes 

to KP’s placement; included 11 annual goals for writing, math, organization, transition, reading 

comprehension, problem solving and receptive/expressive/pragmatic language; and provided that 

KP would take a vocational skills assessment to help identify her strengths and interests. 

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(AR1172-1205, 2455:6-16, 2469:5-2470:18, 2673:5-18).

At the March 13 meeting, the IEP team reviewed K.P.’s first semester grades. She 

received an A in science, health, and individual studies; a B in history; and a C in algebra and 

English. By the time of the March 13 meeting, however, K.P., who was caught twice cutting 

classes and was not doing her classwork, had an F in algebra and a C- in English. Staff reported 

that K.P.’s social behaviors seemed age appropriate, but a bit on the immature side; she hung 

around with a group of kids at lunch; in individual studies class, K.P. sat with another girl and they 

sometimes worked on math together; and in general education classes, K.P. was quiet and did not 

seek interaction, but was responsive to her peers and teachers. (AR 1129). Curnow, K.P.’s 

speech/language therapist, reported that K.P. had improved in identifying parts of an essay, but 

still had difficulty extracting information from her reading and organizing that information in her 

essays. Curnow also noted that while K.P. still had attention problems and tended to rush through 

her assignments, her focus had improved. And, in Curnow’s opinion, K.P.’s performance on a 

task and quality of work was proportionally related to her willingness to do well, noting that when 

K.P. was interested in an activity, she would stay focused for a long time and participate in 

discussion extensively. (AR 1130-31).

The District revised K.P.’s goals based on the March 13 meeting, and the IEP meeting was 

re-convened on March 28 to review them. The written expression goal from the April 19, 2006 

IEP was broken down into smaller parts, designed to have K.P. outline a paragraph, write an 8-10 

sentence paragraph, and prepare an essay of 3 or more paragraphs. A pragmatic language goal 

was added whereby K.P. would keep a log of her actions and the social consequences of those 

actions. Proposed speech and language goals were designed to have K.P. read passages, extract 

essential details, and express her opinions and convey her ideas when answering questions. Math 

goals included solving addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division problems with 80% 

accuracy, as well as solving single variable algebraic equations with 80% accuracy. An 

organization/transition goal required K.P. to use an academic calendar for assignments and to 

maintain a notebook for each subject area. The meeting notes state that Mother and the District 

disagreed about K.P.’s abilities. (AR 1159). Mother did not sign this IEP.

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In March 2007, K.P. took the CAHSEE for the first time. Although she did not pass, K.P. 

did pass the written essay component of the exam, and obtained a score of 333 on the language 

arts section, 17 points short of the 350 points required to pass. She also obtained a score of 306 on 

the math portion, again with 350 points required to pass.

As noted, K.P. was caught twice cutting classes. She was made to attend two Saturday 

school sessions as a consequence, and she did not cut classes again. (AR 2482:11-24).

The District says that it over the course of the year, it provided K.P. with a number of 

modifications and accommodations. Fanoe, now K.P.’s case carrier, also regularly consulted with 

K.P.’s teachers and aides. K.P. was given preferential seating, extra time on tests, and shortened 

English assignments. (AR 2516:13-17, 2566:18-2567:5, 2683:23-24, 2685:14-15, 2696:1-

2697:15). Her regular education teachers used repetition and various types of multimodal 

instruction. (AR 2436:3-2438:5, 2683:21-2684:20, 2691:6-14, 2704:9-2705:4). Instructional 

aides worked with K.P. in her regular education classes and made sure she was on-task, redirected 

her as necessary, and checked that K.P. understood the material and her work. (AR 2684:24-

2685:6, 2685:11-22, 2696:1-11, 2697:16-2698:8, 2753:19-24).

Additionally, the District considered Dr. Wolk’s 2005 assessment and implemented a 

number of her recommendations. (See, e.g., AR 2503:5-2522:15). However, the District declined 

to implement recommendations to limit K.P.’s program to living skills and basic consumer math, 

because it believed those recommendations underestimated K.P.’s abilities and would have kept 

her from graduating with a regular diploma. (AR 1944:14-1945:5, 1952:10-22, 2447:7-10).

By the end of the year, K.P. received a C in algebra; a B in English, history, and health; 

and an A in science and individual studies. (AR 1232). According to the District, K.P. 

maintained a 3.0 grade point average and also met her social interaction and transition skills goals, 

one of her speech/language goals, two of her short-term study skills goals, as well as her written 

expression goal (with assistance). (AR 1195-96, 1198, 1232).

K.P. did not return to SHS for the 2007-2008 school year. Instead, in September 2007, 

Parents placed her at Riverview, a private residential school for learning disabled children in 

Massachusetts.

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K.P. initiated an administrative proceeding, claiming that the District failed to provide her 

with a FAPE. Following six full days of hearing, at which seventeen witnesses were called, the 

ALJ issued a detailed 51-page, single-spaced decision adverse to K.P.

This appeal followed.

K.P. seeks an order setting aside the ALJ’s decision; finding that the District did not 

provide a FAPE for the school years in question; requiring the District to reimburse her for the 

private placement at Riverview ($63,000 per year) plus associated travel and visitation costs;

awarding her attorney’s fees and costs as a prevailing party in the underlying administrative 

action; and awarding her attorney’s fees and costs in bringing and prosecuting this appeal.

For the reasons discussed below, K.P.’s petition is denied.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In actions brought before the district court pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415, the court’s 

inquiry is twofold: (1) Has the State complied with the procedures set forth in the IDEA? and (2) 

is the IEP developed through the IDEA’s procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to 

receive educational benefits? Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07. “If these requirements are met, the 

State has complied with the obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can require no more.” 

Id. at 207.

In such actions, the IDEA provides that the court “(i) shall receive the records of the 

administrative proceedings; (ii) shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party; and (iii) 

basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court 

determines is appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C). “Thus, judicial review in IDEA cases 

differs substantially from judicial review of other agency actions, in which courts generally are 

confined to the administrative record and are held to a highly deferential standard of review.” Ojai 

Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1471 (9th Cir.1993). At the same time, however, the 

preponderance of the evidence standard “‘is by no means an invitation to the courts to substitute 

their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they 

review.’” Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting 

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206).

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Additionally, courts must give “due weight” to the state administrative proceedings. Van 

Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2007). How much 

deference to give state educational agencies is a matter within the court’s discretion. Wartenburg, 

59 F.3d at 891. Particular deference should be accorded where the administrative findings are 

“thorough and careful,” Capistrano, 59 F.3d at 891, or are based on credibility determinations of 

live witnesses, Amanda J. ex rel. Annette J. v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 889 (9th Cir. 

2001). The party challenging a prior administrative ruling---here, K.P.---bears the burden of 

persuasion. See Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist. No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir.1994),

superceded by statute on other grounds, as recognized in Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 556 F.3d 

at 900.

DISCUSSION

K.P. challenges the ALJ’s procedural ruling that her claims pertaining to the May 2005 

IEP were time-barred. As for his substantive rulings, K.P. contends that the ALJ erred 

fundamentally by applying the incorrect legal standard. Application of the correct standard, K.P. 

argues, compels a ruling in her favor as to (1) the dispute over the change in her classification 

from SDC to SAI; (2) alleged problems in her program and placement; and (3) the development of 

an appropriate transition plan.

A. Statute of Limitations Issue: May 24, 2005 IEP

The IDEA imposes a two-year statute of limitations. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C) (“A parent 

or agency shall request an impartial due process hearing within 2 years of the date the parent or 

agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the complaint . 

...”); see also Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(l) (requiring a request for a due process hearing to be filed 

“within two years from the date the party initiating the request knew or had reason to know of the 

facts underlying the basis for the request.”). In his decision, the ALJ concluded that K.P. could 

not raise any challenge to the time period from the beginning of the 2005-2006 school year 

through October 25, 2005 because (a) the May 2005 IEP developed by WUSD was in effect 

during that time period; and (b) K.P.’s challenge to that IEP fell outside the two-year statute of 

limitations. (AR 1283-84).

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K.P. concedes that she cannot challenge any development or drafting errors in the May 

2005 IEP because they fall outside the limitations period. However, she argues that whether that 

IEP provided a FAPE in its implementation during August-October 2005 is within the limitations 

period and therefore should have been considered by the ALJ.

As presented to the ALJ, however, K.P.’s challenge to the May 2005 IEP was based on 

alleged deficiencies in that IEP as written. Specifically, she claimed that the May 2005 IEP was 

not based on relevant information about her deficits, failed to give due weight to available 

information from prior assessments, failed to properly address all of her deficits, failed to address 

safety concerns, and did not have an appropriate transition plan. (Osher Decl., Ex. A (TAC at 

4:19-22, 6:6-11).

The ALJ properly concluded that K.P.’s claims re the May 2005 IEP are time-barred. 

Mother signed her consent to the May 2005 IEP and initialed the plan to indicate that she received 

a copy of a document advising as to parents’ and child’s procedural due process rights and that 

these rights were explained to her. (AR 859). Mother therefore knew or should have known about 

any deficiencies in the IEP as of that date. See, e.g., Miller v. San Mateo-Foster City Unified Sch. 

Dist., 318 F. Supp.2d 851, 860-62 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (concluding that the parents’ claims were 

time-barred where the record showed that they properly were apprised of their due process rights, 

but failed to take timely action after they learned or had reason to suspect that the District 

incorrectly assessed that their son was not disabled).

As for the 2005-2006 school year, K.P. claimed that she was denied a FAPE because she 

was placed in an RSP program with regular education classes; her classrooms were too crowded 

for her learning needs; she was denied accommodations and modifications; and her teachers 

artificially inflated her grades. (Osher Decl., Ex. A (TAC at 6:12-16). The challenge to her RSP 

placement is an attack on the IEP as written; and, as discussed above, the ALJ properly concluded 

that issue was time-barred.

As for the remaining issues, at no time did the ALJ state that he was limiting his analysis to 

the period after October 25, 2005. And, in addressing K.P.’s claims the ALJ considered each of 

the school years at issue in their entirety, including events that occurred between August and

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October 2005. (See, e.g., AR 1284-86, 1314, 1318-27). Accordingly, this court finds no basis to 

conclude that the ALJ improperly refused to consider issues.

K.P. nonetheless argues that the District failed to develop goals and get a speech 

assessment done. As discussed above, the record demonstrates that throughout the Fall of 2005, 

the District made repeated requests for Parents’ consent to assess K.P., but Mother would not 

consent to any assessments until after Dr. Wolk completed hers. (AR 1319, 1956:18-1961:11, 

880, 884, 889, 893, 912-17, 922-23, 1590:13-21, 1683:8-24).

The court finds no error here.

B. Whether the ALJ Used the Correct Standard

K.P. argues that, in determining whether she was denied a FAPE, the ALJ applied the 

wrong legal standard because he referred to the “some” educational benefit standard, rather than 

the “meaningful” educational benefit standard. As discussed, she contends that application of the 

“some” benefit standard was a fundamental error that tainted the ALJ’s analysis as to (1) the 

dispute over the change in her classification from SDC to SAI; (2) alleged problems with her 

program and placement; and (3) the development of an appropriate transition plan.

In Rowley, the U.S. Supreme Court held that providing a FAPE does not require states to 

maximize the potential of each disabled student commensurate with the opportunity provided to 

nondisabled students. Rather, states are to provide disabled students with “a basic floor of 

opportunity” that is “sufficient to confer some educational benefit” upon the disabled child. 

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200. The Ninth Circuit has confirmed that “Rowley continues to set the free 

appropriate public education standard.” Mercer Island Sch. Dist., 592 F.3d at 941. Although there 

previously was some confusion in the Ninth Circuit as to whether the IDEA requires school 

districts to provide “some” educational benefit or “meaningful” educational benefit, the Ninth 

Circuit has clarified that the terms “some educational benefit,” and “meaningful educational 

benefit” refer to the same standard as discussed in Rowley. Id. at 951 n.10. The ALJ therefore did 

not err with respect to the applicable legal standard.

C. K.P.’s placement

As discussed, K.P. initially was classified as an SDC student, even though she had always 

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been in special education classes for less than half the school day. Her student designation 

subsequently was changed to RSP to reflect that; and in her April 2006 IEP, her designation was 

changed to SAI pursuant to a mandate from the state. The ALJ concluded that the District did not 

deny a FAPE by changing K.P.’s designation from SDC to SAI because that change had no impact 

on the educational services K.P. actually received (AR 1300, 1302, 1322).

K.P. says that the District’s use of the SDC designation led Parents to believe that she was 

an SDC student when the District was providing only RSP services. Here, she states that the 

reason Mother did not sign the April 2006 IEP was because she “didn’t agree with the change in 

designation from SDC to [SAI] as the District proposed,” believing it would lead to a “reduction 

in the level of special education services and she had consistently been asking for an increase in 

special education services and placement.” (Opening Brief at 8:17-18, 16:15-17). She further 

argues that the District improperly changed her designation to SAI without parental consent; and, 

she contends that pursuant to California Education Code § 56346(f), the District improperly failed

to file for an administrative hearing to resolve the issue.

The evidence of record demonstrates that even after K.P.’s designation was changed, she 

continued to receive exactly the same services as before---namely, 100 minutes of special 

education classes per day, two 30 minute speech/language sessions per week, and 50 minutes of 

speech/language consultation per month. (AR 996). Thus, K.P. has not managed to persuade that 

the District was required to file for an administrative hearing pursuant to California Education 

Code § 56346. That statute requires a school district to file for a due process hearing if it 

“determines that the proposed special education program component to which the parent does not 

consent is necessary to provide a free appropriate public education to the child . . ..” Cal. Educ. 

Code § 56346(f). As explained by the District, the change from SDC to SAI was a change the 

state required schools to make for all special education students; and, the change had absolutely no 

effect on the K.P.’s educational program and placement. (AR 2619:15-2620:20).

To the extent K.P. seems to suggest that she should have been placed in more special 

education classes or that her entire curriculum should have been in special education, the IDEA 

requires that the IEP allow the disabled student to receive an education in the “least restrictive 

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environment.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A). As discussed above, this means that school districts

must ensure that, to the maximum extent appropriate, a student with disabilities is educated with 

nondisabled students, unless “the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that 

education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved 

satisfactorily.” Id.; 34 C.F.R. § 300.114. For the reasons to be discussed, the ALJ did not err in 

concluding that K.P. received educational benefit at SHS.

D. Aide Support

In the administrative proceedings, K.P. contended that the District did not adequately train 

her instructional aides. Mother also expressed concern that one of K.P.’s aides did not have 

sufficient English-speaking skills. The ALJ found no credible evidence that the aide could not be 

understood. And, crediting the testimony of K.P.’s teachers, case carriers, and aides, the ALJ 

concluded that the evidence did not establish that the District failed to adequately train K.P.’s 

instructional aides or that the aides failed to provide her with necessary assistance. (AR 1312). 

K.P. does not directly challenge that conclusion here.

Instead, as this court understands it, K.P. now argues that she should have been permitted 

to challenge aide services that she received in her regular education classes, but which were not 

documented in the October 2005 or January 2006 IEPs. In his decision, the ALJ found that the 

District provided K.P. with aide services in her regular education classes, even though it did not 

list an instructional aide as a service on either the October 2005 IEP or January 2006 IEP. (AR 

1292, 1312). Such aide service apparently was expressly stated for the first time in the April 2006 

IEP. (AR 1312). The ALJ noted, however, that KP “did not allege in her Complaint that the 

District committed a procedural violation by failing to document in [KP’s] IEP the instructional 

aide support.” (AR 1292 n.6).

K.P. does not dispute that the undocumented aide issues were not raised in her complaint. 

The District correctly notes that the party requesting the due process hearing (here, K.P.) may not 

raise issues at the hearing that were not raised in the complaint, unless the other party otherwise 

agrees. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(B); Cal. Educ. Code § 56502(i). And, generally, matters must be 

administratively exhausted before judicial review is available. 20 U.S.C. § 1415; Doe v. Arizona 

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Dep’t of Ed., 111 F.3d 678, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1997). The ALJ properly barred this issue.

K.P. nonetheless argues that she should have been permitted to raise this issue because she 

did not realize until the due process hearing that the District had provided undocumented aide 

support. The District says that this is all too little, too late. It points out that an October 2006 

letter establishes that Mother was aware K.P. was receiving aide support. Further, the District 

argues that K.P. could have pursued subpoenas in connection with the due process hearing and 

also had the right to discovery pertaining to her student records. K.P. says that no amount of 

discovery would have revealed the undocumented provision of such services.

Even assuming the ALJ was not precluded from considering the issue, this court finds no 

basis to grant K.P.’s petition as to this issue. K.P. surmises that the District did not document the 

aide support to make it seem like she was more high functioning than she is and to obscure her 

actual performance at SHS. The upshot, says K.P., is that if the ALJ had applied the “meaningful 

benefit” standard, then he would have concluded that the District’s assertions as to her 

performance levels were inaccurate, unless they stated that K.P. could perform at that level with 

aide support. As discussed above, the ALJ did not err with respect to the applicable legal 

standard. In any event, the ALJ’s decision indicates that he was fully cognizant of the 

undocumented aide support and took that into account when determining whether K.P. received a 

FAPE. (See, e.g., 1300, 1312-14, 1319).

K.P.’s petition as to this issue is denied.

E. Educational Benefit at SHS

K.P. contends that, in concluding that she was making progress at SHS and received

educational benefit there, the ALJ improperly glossed over the shortcomings in her performance. 

The overarching problem, she says, is that the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard. For the 

reasons discussed above, that argument is rejected.

K.P. also argues that the ALJ put too much stock in her grades, which she claims were 

inflated to make it look like she was succeeding. K.P., however, has cited no evidence to support 

the allegation of grade inflation, which appears to be based solely on Mother’s belief that K.P. 

could not perform as well as her grades suggested. (AR 1706:15-21). K.P. contends that if the 

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ALJ was correct that she functioned in the low average range, then her grades should have been 

those of a low average student, i.e., C’s and D’s, not A’s and B’s. But, she has not cited any 

evidence suggesting that grades correlate directly to IQ. Moreover, a number of K.P.’s teachers 

testified about how they evaluated K.P.’s work and stated that they did not inflate her grades and 

that she earned the grades reflected in her transcript. (AR1942:4-19, 1949:3-8, 2570:11-16,

2686:1-2687:3, 2701:5-2703:11, 2758:6-22). The ALJ did not err in crediting that testimony. 

(AR 1313-14).

K.P. nevertheless contends that her grades are not an accurate reflection of her actual 

abilities because the District modified her regular education curriculum and provided her with 

instructional aides. She argues that the ALJ erred in assessing her progress at SHS because he 

failed to properly account for those modifications and that assistance. Her contention appears to 

be that the ALJ was somehow duped into believing that she could function in regular education 

“with little support” and “was sold on a charade of leaving off documentation the assistance the 

District was providing.” (Opening Brief at 22:13-14). However, it does not appear that the 

District has ever taken the position that K.P. could function “with little support.” Nor did the ALJ 

make such a finding. Additionally, there is no indication that the District attempted to hide from 

the ALJ the fact that K.P. received aide support. To the contrary, K.P.’s case carrier, teachers, and 

one of her aides testified about the aide support she received. (See, e.g., AR 2436:17-2438:23, 

2489:2-7, 2503:18-2504:4, 2696:1-11, 2697:16-2698:8, 2739:13-2741:22, 2753:19-2754:7). And, 

as discussed above, the ALJ took into account the modifications and aide support K.P. received, 

including aide support that was not documented on her IEP. (See, e.g., 1300, 1312-14, 1319).

K.P. maintains that she made no real progress on her goals and objectives, stating that in

the two years she was at SHS, she achieved only three or four of eleven or more annual goals and 

met her written expression goal “with assistance.” Nevertheless, in evaluating K.P.’s performance 

levels as of March 2007 (shortly before she left the District), the ALJ did not err in concluding 

that, while K.P. did not achieve all of her goals and objectives, she did make progress. (AR 1307). 

For example, although K.P. did not meet her study skills goal (because she was not always writing 

down her assignments and her school binders were disorganized), she was bringing the required 

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materials to class. (AR 1193; 2571:23-2572:13). Additionally, K.P. met her social interaction 

goal by demonstrating appropriate behavior on campus (AR 1195), and she met her transitional 

skills goal by joining the Future Farmers of America (AR 1196). She did not meet her math goal, 

but the ALJ found that it was not because K.P. was not capable but because she tended to rush 

through her work without checking for accuracy. (AR 1307). That conclusion is amply supported 

by Haynes’ testimony. Haynes testified that K.P. was capable of doing the work, but he had 

observed that K.P. tended to rush through her work and make careless errors. Additionally, 

Haynes testified that around this time, K.P. had not been coming to class or doing her classwork; 

but, once she did start doing those things, she did them well. (AR 1934:1-12, 1972:9-1973:15). 

While K.P. did not meet her speech/language goals, the ALJ correctly observed that Curnow 

reported that K.P.’s story retelling had improved and that K.P. did make progress on answering 

questions after reading a four-paragraph passage. (AR 1307, 1130-31, 1199).

Further, the ALJ noted that although K.P. did not meet her writing goal, she did make 

significant progress in being able to write a grammatically correct, three-paragraph essay with 

supporting ideas, with assistance from her instructional aide. (AR 1307). Indeed, for her regular 

English class, K.P. prepared an essay, comparing the novels All Quiet on the Western Front and 

The Diary of a Young Girl, on the subject of the characters’ need for human contact and love, for 

which she received an A-. (AR 586-88). The ALJ correctly noted that there was no indication 

that K.P. did not write that essay. (AR 1307). Indeed, instructional aide Hlebo averred that she 

did not write the essay for K.P. and helped by getting K.P. to draw pertinent information from the 

books and to discuss how to organize the information. (AR 1307, 2744:9-2745:5). And, as 

discussed above, K.P. took the CAHSEE for the first time in the spring of 2007, passed the written 

essay component of the exam, and obtained a score of 333 on the language arts portion of the test, 

just seventeen points short of the 350 needed to pass. (AR 1238, 2474:10-14, 2528:19-25).

The District correctly notes that K.P.’s teachers testified in detail about K.P.’s goals and 

objectives. Additionally, K.P.’s case carriers, teachers, and therapists testified as to the progress 

they personally observed:

Haynes testified that he saw a “dramatic change” in K.P.’s confidence and abilities from 

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the first time she entered his math class to the time she left the District, including the ability to 

solve simple algebra problems. (AR 1948:23-1949:2, 1949:9-23).

Fanoe testified that while K.P. continued to work on her organizational skills, she was 

progressing well toward that goal. Additionally, Fanoe observed that K.P. had made friends at 

SHS, including regular education students. (AR 2446:14-21, 2525:24-2526:11).

John Miller, K.P.’s regular education English teacher, testified that at the beginning of her 

sophomore year, K.P. “had about a C grade, which is about average” and that toward the end of 

the year she “was demonstrating written competence and reading comprehension competence that 

was in the above average range.” (AR 2700:12-20).

Stephen Goodbody, K.P.’s regular education history teacher, testified that K.P.’s work 

“was at the quality of the majority of the tenth graders, better than average of the tenth graders that 

I had in tenth grade.” Additionally, Goodbody noted that, over the course of the year, the quality 

of K.P.’s written work improved, the number of times she was late with her work decreased, and 

K.P. began working ahead in his class. (AR 2755:18-2756:7).

Speech/language therapist Gisele Curnow testified that K.P. learned from her mistakes and 

observed that “there was a lot of maturation and growth in her.” (AR 2247:11-2248:7, 2277:10-

11).

K.P. has not met her burden to show that she did not receive educational benefit at SHS.

F. Transition Plans

Beginning with the IEP that will be in effect when a special education student reaches 16 

years of age, an IEP must contain a transition plan with appropriate postsecondary goals based 

upon age-appropriate transition assessments related to training, education, employment, and where 

appropriate, living skills. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(a)(8)(A). 

K.P. contends that the District failed to prepare an appropriate transition plan that was specific to 

her needs and that would properly prepare her for life after high school.

The May 2005 IEP provided a transition plan. K.P. contends that the identified goals are 

too generic to be of any benefit to her and argues that she is entitled to challenge the adequacy of 

those goals because the essential components of the May 2005 transition plan were carried over to 

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the January 2006 IEP. However, insofar as K.P. seeks to challenge the contents of the May 2005 

IEP, as discussed above the ALJ properly determined that such challenges are time-barred.

In any event, as for the remaining transition plans, K.P. does not point to any testimony as 

to any alleged deficiencies in those plans or how any such deficiencies might have affected her 

ability to receive a FAPE. On the other hand, there was considerable testimony from District staff 

as to the preparation of the transition plans who explained how and why those plans were 

appropriate for K.P.

In December 2005, the District prepared a Vocational Guidance Report for K.P. based on 

an interview with K.P., her work/school history, assessment test results, and observations of K.P. 

(AR 162). The report noted K.P.’s stated interests, skills, and hobbies and stated that K.P. planned 

to go to a 2-year college and transfer and to work in retail sales after high school and while 

attending college. Potential employment interests included police officer, teacher, waitress, 

painter, and a public relations representative. Among other things, the report suggested that K.P. 

explore job opportunities through the Monterey County Youth Employment program, enroll in the 

SHS Transition Partnership Program during her senior year, participate in community service and 

volunteer projects, and become a client of the California Department of Rehabilitation for 

continued supportive services after high school. (Id.).

Jones-Powers testified that the purpose of the Vocational Guidance Report is to get an idea 

of the student’s strengths and interests to assist in future planning re courses to take or 

occupational programs to explore. (AR 2613:13-19). That document was used in developing 

K.P.’s transition plans. (AR 2613:20-2614:3).

Haynes’ testimony established that he took K.P.’s needs and interests into account, as well 

as his experience with her, when he prepared the April 2006 transition plan. (AR 1922:22-

1923:2). He read K.P.’s Vocational Guidance Report and had it in mind when he prepared K.P.’s 

transition plan. (AR 1987:7-20). He also spoke with K.P. while developing the plan. (AR 

1924:13-1925:6). And, K.P. attended the IEP meetings where the plan was developed and 

discussed. (AR 975, 996).

The March 2007 IEP transition plan focused on the end of K.P.’s sophomore year and the 

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majority of her junior year. Fanoe, who prepared that plan, spoke with K.P. while preparing it and 

incorporated K.P.’s stated interest in retail sales. (AR 2468:15-2469:1). Fanoe testified that the 

plan was designed to help K.P. take responsibility and ownership of graduation requirements, 

explore possible post-high school career options (including by being involved in the community 

through community service, a graduation requirement), and research various post-high school 

living skills, such as cooking, cleaning, paying bills, and managing a budget. (AR 2469:15-

2470:18).

K.P. has not cited any evidence or testimony to the contrary. Instead, she argues that she 

never actually met the goals set in the May 2005 IEP transition plan and that the District had to 

extend those goals into the 2006-2007 school year. But, even assuming that the transition plans 

were deficient, K.P. has failed to show that reimbursement for placement at Riverview would be 

an appropriate remedy for the alleged failure to prepare or implement an appropriate transition 

plan. To obtain reimbursement, K.P. must prove that the private placement was appropriate. 34 

C.F.R. § 300.148(c). As noted by the ALJ, the testimony of Maureen Brenner, Riverview’s Head 

of School, established that K.P. did not have an individualized transition plan at Riverview and 

that Riverview students do not enroll in the school’s vocational program until after their senior 

year. (AR 1316, 2306:19-20, 2338:12-19).

K.P.’s petition as to this issue is denied.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, K.P. petition for an order setting aside the ALJ’s decision is 

denied. The clerk shall enter judgment for the defendant and close the file.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 8, 2016

HOWARD R. LLOYD

United States Magistrate Judge

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5:08-cv-03076-HRL Notice has been electronically mailed to:

Bob N. Varma bvarma@varmaclancy.com, raiderbobv@yahoo.com

Daniel Andrew Osher dosher@lozanosmith.com

Geralyn Marie Clancy gclancy@clancylegal.com

Gregory Alan Wedner gwedner@lozanosmith.com, ploftis@lozanosmith.com, 

ssimmons@lozanosmith.com

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