Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_18-cv-00105/USCOURTS-azd-4_18-cv-00105-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Manuel Armando Reyna, Jr.,

Petitioner, 

v. 

Warden Bruno Stolc, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-18-0105-TUC-RM (LCK)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

 Petitioner Manuel Reyna, incarcerated at the Arizona State Prison in Eloy, Arizona, 

has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Before this 

Court are the Petition (Doc. 1), Respondents’ Answer (Doc. 11), and Petitioner’s Reply 

(Doc. 18). Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to 

Magistrate Judge Kimmins for Report and Recommendation. The Magistrate Judge 

recommends the District Court, after its independent review of the record, deny the 

Petition. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Petitioner was convicted in the Pima County Superior Court for possession of a 

narcotic drug for sale, possession of a dangerous drug for sale, possession of drug 

paraphernalia, possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony drug 

offense, and use of wire or electronic communication in a drug/narcotic related 

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transaction.1 (Doc. 12, Ex. B.) He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms, the longest of 

which was 19 years. (Id.) 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the facts in support of Petitioner’s 

convictions: 

 In September 2012, a Pima County Sheriff’s deputy stopped a van in 

which Reyna was a passenger in the front seat. Deputies searched the van 

and found heroin, a handgun, methamphetamine, and baggies near the front 

passenger seat. Reyna was arrested and during a search of his person, a 

deputy found a cell phone, approximately $60 cash, and a small bag of a 

crystalline substance believed to be methamphetamine. Deputies 

downloaded text messages and voice mail from the cell phone. A detective 

with experience in narcotics investigation and familiarity with “the 

vernacular that drug dealers and drug addicts use” testified that the messages 

concerned drug sales. 

(Doc. 12, Ex. A at 1.) 

 The court of appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Id., Ex. A.) 

He petitioned for review with the Arizona Supreme Court (id., Ex. G), but the court denied 

review (id., Ex. H). Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (PCR). (Id., Ex. 

L.) The court denied the Petition (id., Ex. O), and he appealed the decision (id., Ex. Q). 

The court of appeals granted review but denied relief. (Id., Ex. R). Petitioner appealed to 

the Arizona Supreme Court (id., Ex. T), which denied review (id., Ex. U). Petitioner filed 

a second Notice of PCR to raise ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims but failed 

to file a pro se petition by the September 16, 2017 deadline.2

 (Id., Exs. V, EE.) 

 

1

 The Petitioner also was convicted of possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited 

possessor, but he was not sentenced for this offense. (Doc. 12, Ex. A at 6.) 

2

 The superior court docket contains no entries after the September 2017 time 

extension for Petitioner to file a pro se petition. The Court reviewed PCR counsel’s August 

25, 2017 assessment of the claims Petitioner desired to raise in a second PCR petition – 

legality of the warrantless phone search and related trial IAC; trial court failed to evaluate 

probable cause for the search warrant of his phone after redacting illegally-obtained 

information and related trial IAC; and trial IAC for failing to challenge discrimination in 

the selection of the grand and petite jury pools. Appointed PCR counsel found no basis for 

relief under the governing state court rules. Further pursuit of these claims in state court 

would not alter this Court’s analysis of the claims included in the Habeas Petition. 

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DISCUSSION 

 Respondents argue that Claim 1 is not cognizable and Claim 3 is procedurally 

defaulted. They concede that Claim 2 is exhausted and the Court will evaluate it on the 

merits. The Court first assesses the procedural status of Claims 1 and 3 before addressing 

the merits of the claim(s). 

Claim 1 

Petitioner asserts three subclaims based on violations of the Fourth Amendment. He 

alleges (a) the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the van, (b) the initial 

warrantless search of his cell phone was unreasonable, and (c) the legally-obtained 

information in the warrant affidavit did not establish probable cause to search his cell 

phone. 

 Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claims are not subject to review by the Court. In 

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976), the Supreme Court held that “where the State 

has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a 

state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas relief on the ground that evidence obtained 

in an unconstitutional search and seizure was introduced at trial.” Arizona allows for the 

filing of pretrial suppression motions and the denial of a motion may be appealed. Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 16.1, 16.2; A.R.S. § 13-4031; State v. Peterson, 267 P.3d 1197, 1199, 228 Ariz. 

405, 407 (Ct. App. 2011). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that a defendant may fully 

litigate a suppression claim in the system provided by Arizona. See Moormann v. Schriro, 

426 F.3d 1044, 1053 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that petitioner filed a pre-trial motion to 

suppress, after an evidentiary hearing the court made factual findings and limited the 

admissible evidence, and that decision was reviewed on appeal). Pursuant to Stone, a 

prerequisite for consideration of Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claims is the denial of the 

chance to fully and fairly litigate the claims in state court. 

 Petitioner filed four motions to suppress prior to trial asserting: (1) illegally recorded 

statements, (2) an illegal vehicle stop, (3) illegal arrest and searches, and (4) illegal 

detentions. (Doc. 12, Ex. II.) After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court suppressed the 

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recorded statements, but denied the remaining three requests. (Id., Ex. JJ.) On appeal, 

Petitioner again challenged the stop of the vehicle (Claim 1(a)) and, for the first time, 

challenged the warrantless search of his cell phone (id., Ex. D); the court of appeals denied 

both claims on the merits (id., Ex. A). Because Petitioner fully litigated Claim 1(a) in state 

court, it is barred by Stone. See Moormann, 426 F.3d at 1053. 

Although Petitioner did not raise Claims 1(b) and (c) prior to trial, they were 

addressed in state court. He raised Claim 1(b) on appeal and received a ruling on the merits 

of the claim. (Doc. 12, Ex. A at 4.) In the PCR Petition, Petitioner alleged trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the warrant to search his phone. (Id., 

Ex. L.) In denying the claim, the PCR court addressed the validity of the warrant (Claim 

1(c)) (id., Ex. O), and the court of appeals reviewed that decision on the merits (id., Ex. 

R).3

 Therefore, Petitioner did litigate these claims in state court. Regardless, if a petitioner 

did not pursue suppression in state court, Stone still bars the claim if the state court provides 

for the filing of such motions. See Gordon v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 1990) 

(finding irrelevant whether petitioner litigated suppression in state court because California 

penal code allowed him to do so). Petitioner had the opportunity to fully litigate Claims 

1(b) and 1(c) prior to trial when he raised Claim 1(a), but he failed to do so. Because he 

had a full and fair opportunity to litigate all three subclaims, regardless of whether he 

attempted to do so or not, the claims are barred by Stone.

4

Claim 3 

 Petitioner alleges IAC based on counsel’s failure to investigate and present valid 

Fourth Amendment claims. (Doc. 1-2 at 38.) 

 3

 The appellate court found the underlying Fourth Amendment claim (Claim 1(c)) 

precluded pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3) but ruled on the 

legality of the search warrant in addressing the IAC claim. (Doc. 12, Ex. R at 3.) 

4 Stone does not bar the related Sixth Amendment claim that counsel was ineffective 

in relation to the Fourth Amendment issues (as alleged in Claim 3). See Kimmelman v. 

Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986). 

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Exhaustion and Procedural Default Standard 

 A writ of habeas corpus may not be granted unless it appears that a petitioner has 

exhausted all available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). To properly exhaust, a petitioner must “fairly 

present” the operative facts and the federal legal theory of his claims to the state’s highest 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 

(1999); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-

78 (1971). 

 In Arizona, there are two primary procedurally appropriate avenues for petitioners 

to exhaust federal constitutional claims: direct appeal and PCR proceedings. A habeas 

petitioner’s claims may be precluded from federal review in two ways. First, a claim may 

be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was raised in state court but found by that 

court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30. Second, a 

claim may be procedurally defaulted if the petitioner failed to present it in state court and 

“the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet 

the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.” Coleman, 501 

U.S. at 735 n.1; see also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that 

the district court must consider whether the claim could be pursued by any presently 

available state remedy), overruled on other grounds by Apelt v. Ryan, 878 F.3d 800, 827 

(9th Cir. 2017). If no remedies are currently available pursuant to Rule 32, the claim is 

“technically” exhausted but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1; see 

also Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161-62 (1996). 

 Because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not jurisdiction, 

federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims. 

Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). However, the Court will not review the merits of a 

procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates legitimate cause for the 

failure to properly exhaust the claim in state court and prejudice from the alleged 

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constitutional violation, or shows that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if 

the claim were not heard on the merits in federal court. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

Analysis 

Exhaustion and Procedural Default 

Petitioner alleged in the PCR Petition that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

review the search warrant for his cell phone because, had counsel done so, he would have 

realized the warrant was facially defective. (Doc. 12, Ex. D.) This claim is not directly 

raised in the Habeas Petition. But conceivably it is part of Claim 3, which includes an 

allegation that trial counsel failed to raise a Fourth Amendment claim later raised by PCR 

counsel. Because Petitioner included this allegation within a section that he labeled as the 

fourth subpart of Claim 3, the Court will refer to this portion of the claim as Claim 3(d) – 

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the validity of the search warrant. 

Respondents concede this claim was addressed on the merits by the Arizona Court of 

Appeals (Doc. 11 at 13); therefore, the Court will review it on the merits. 

Although Petitioner separated Claim 3 into multiple subparts, he asserts one 

overarching claim of error, that counsel’s performance in preparing for the pretrial 

suppression hearing was deficient. Therefore, the Court addresses the specific arguments 

made by Petitioner but does not separate Claim 3 into multiple parts. Additionally, although 

Petitioner alleges that trial, appellate, and PCR counsel were ineffective (Doc. 1-2 at 38), 

Claim 3 discusses only errors by trial counsel; he alleges solely that counsel’s performance 

in relation to the pretrial suppression hearing was deficient.5

 Therefore, the Court treats the 

 5

 To the extent Claim 3 could be read to refer to appellate counsel, the claim would 

be procedurally defaulted because Petitioner failed to bring any claims in state court of 

IAC regarding appellate counsel. If he were to bring the claim to state court now, it would 

be found waived and untimely under Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure because it does not fall within an exception to preclusion. Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2(b); 32.1(d)-(h); see State v. Swoopes, 166 P.3d 945, 953, 216 Ariz. 390, 398 

(Ct. App. 2007) (finding successive IAC claims waived and precluded because they could 

have been raised in a prior proceeding). Thus, any claim of IAC on appeal is technically 

exhausted but procedurally defaulted. 

If Claim 3 refers to PCR counsel, it is not cognizable in this Court because assertions 

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remainder of Claim 3 (apart from Claim 3(d)) as alleging that trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to conduct a sufficient investigation to raise and present all Petitioner’s Fourth 

Amendment challenges. 

Petitioner failed to fairly present the factual basis of the remainder of Claim 3 to the 

state courts; therefore, it is not properly exhausted. See Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1068 

(9th Cir. 2003) (finding IAC claims unexhausted because specific instances alleged in 

federal petition were not included in the IAC allegations raised in state court), overruled 

on other grounds by Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2007). If Petitioner were to 

return to state court now to litigate this claim, it would be found waived and untimely under 

Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure because it does 

not fall within an exception to preclusion. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b); 32.1(d)-(h). Therefore, 

this claim is technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted. 

 Cause and Prejudice 

 In his Reply, Petitioner states there is cause to excuse the state-court default of 

Claim 3 due to ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, on appeal, and in his PCR 

proceeding. (Doc. 18 at 5.) As an initial matter, IAC at trial claims cannot be raised at trial 

or on appeal because IAC must be raised in Arizona during a PCR proceeding. Martinez v. 

Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 6 (2012). Therefore, conduct by trial and appellate counsel cannot serve 

as cause for failure to properly exhaust IAC claims in state court. 

Claim 3, alleging IAC at trial, should have been raised, if at all, in Petitioner’s first 

PCR proceeding. There is no constitutional right to PCR counsel; thus, the Sixth 

Amendment is not implicated when counsel is ineffective in such a proceeding. However, 

because a PCR proceeding is the first time in Arizona that IAC at trial may be raised, if 

PCR counsel is ineffective pursuant to the standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668 (1984), in failing to raise a trial IAC claim, that may constitute cause to excuse a default 

of that claim. Martinez, 566 U.S. at 17. The Ninth Circuit has concluded that an allegation 

 

that counsel was ineffective as to a collateral proceeding are precluded from review under 

the governing statute. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i). 

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that PCR counsel was ineffective, as cause to excuse the default of an IAC claim, does not 

have to be exhausted. See Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302, 1322 (9th Cir. 2014). 

 To establish “cause” to overcome procedural default under Martinez, a petitioner 

must show: (1) the underlying ineffective assistance of [ ] counsel claim is “substantial”; 

(2) the petitioner was not represented or had ineffective counsel during the PCR 

proceeding; (3) the state PCR proceeding was the initial review proceeding for the IAC 

claim; and (4) state law required the petitioner to bring that claim in the initial review 

collateral proceeding. Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013). There is no dispute 

as to elements 3 or 4 in this case. To demonstrate that an underlying IAC claim is 

“substantial,” Petitioner must show that it has some merit. Martinez, 566 U.S. at 15 (noting 

a claim is insubstantial if it has no merit, is “wholly without factual support,” or counsel’s 

performance was not below constitutional standards). A substantial claim is one as to which 

“reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a 

different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to 

proceed further.” Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1245 (9th Cir. 2013). To evaluate 

substantiality, the Court necessarily considers the essence of Petitioner’s ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel claim. Accordingly, the Court examines the merits of Claim 3 

below. 

Standard for IAC claims 

 IAC claims are governed by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To 

prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must show that counsel’s representation fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Id. at 

687-88. 

 The inquiry under Strickland is highly deferential, and “every effort [must] be made 

to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s 

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” 

Id. at 689. Thus, to satisfy Strickland’s first prong, deficient performance, a defendant must 

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overcome “the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be 

considered sound trial strategy.” Id.

 Because an IAC claim must satisfy both prongs of Strickland, the reviewing court 

“need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the 

prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.” Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 697 (“if it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 

sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed”). A petitioner must affirmatively 

prove prejudice. Id. at 693. To demonstrate prejudice, he “must show that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient 

to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. 

Merits 

First, Petitioner alleges trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and 

prepare for the motion to suppress hearing because counsel did not make a motion to hire 

an investigator, did no independent investigation, did not interview potential witnesses for 

the probable cause hearing, did not advise Petitioner that he had the right to testify at the 

probable cause hearing, and failed to investigate all viable Fourth Amendment claims. 

(Doc. 1, Ex. 2 at 45.) The failure of counsel to conduct a reasonable pretrial investigation, 

including a failure to interview witnesses, may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 

See Bemore v. Chappell, 788 F.3d 1151, 1162-65 (9th Cir. 2015). 

Merely suggesting that interviewing witnesses could have provided helpful 

information for the defense, without actual evidence to show what counsel would have 

learned from such interviews, is not enough to demonstrate ineffective assistance of 

counsel. See Sechrest v. Baker, 816 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1042 (D. Nev. 2011), aff’d, 603 F. 

App’x 548 (9th Cir. 2015). Petitioner alleges that had trial counsel investigated and 

interviewed witnesses, the witnesses could have corroborated either the state’s or defense’s 

theory of the case and clarified other witness testimony. (Doc. 1, Ex. 2 at 46-47.) Petitioner 

did not identify exculpatory evidence counsel would have learned or confirmed from 

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interviewing the identified witnesses. Therefore, Petitioner fails to establish that further 

investigation would have created a reasonable probability of additional evidence being 

suppressed or that he would not have been convicted. 

Second, Petitioner argues that counsel failed to advise him of his right to testify at 

the probable cause hearing. However, he does not identify any testimony he could have 

provided that would have created a reasonable probability of a different outcome. 

Therefore, Petitioner has not established that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s alleged 

failure to inform him of his right to testify. 

Third, Petitioner alleges trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present all Fourth 

Amendment claims at one single probable cause hearing: (1) the officer did not have 

reasonable suspicion to stop the car, (2) the warrantless search of the cell phone was 

unreasonable, and (3) the redacted warrant affidavit did not contain enough information to 

establish probable cause to search his cell phone. To establish actual prejudice, Petitioner 

must show that challenges to the stop of the car, search of his cell phone, and the warrant 

would have been successful. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986). 

Petitioner’s trial counsel raised subpart (1) before trial and the court denied the claim 

on the merits; therefore, counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise that Fourth 

Amendment claim. (Doc. 12, Exs. II and JJ.) Although subpart (2) was not raised by trial 

counsel, the police ultimately obtained a warrant to search Petitioner’s cell phone; 

therefore, Petitioner was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to challenge the 

warrantless search. (Id., Ex. A.) Further, appellate counsel unsuccessfully challenged the 

warrantless search of the cell phone. (Id., Exs. A, D.) Because the appellate court found 

that Fourth Amendment challenge to be without merit, trial counsel was not ineffective for 

failing to raise subpart (2). Subpart (3) is discussed below in the Merits section, where the 

Court concludes Petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to raise the claim. 

Because Petitioner has not established a reasonable probability that these three Fourth 

Amendment claims would have been meritorious if raised in a comprehensive pretrial 

proceeding, he was not prejudiced. 

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In sum, Petitioner has not established that Claim 3 is substantial. Thus, PCR 

counsel’s failure to raise this claim cannot operate as cause to excuse the default of the 

claim, and the claim also fails on the merits. 

Merits 

Legal Standards for Relief Under the AEDPA 

 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) created a 

“highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings’ . . . demand[ing] that statecourt decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 

(2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n. 7 (1997)). Under the 

AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim “adjudicated on the 

merits” by the state court unless that adjudication: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The last relevant state court decision is the last reasoned state decision 

regarding a claim. Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991)); Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 664 

(9th Cir. 2005). 

 “The threshold test under AEDPA is whether [the petitioner] seeks to apply a rule 

of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became final.” 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Therefore, to assess a claim under subsection 

(d)(1), the Court must first identify the “clearly established Federal law,” if any, that 

governs the sufficiency of the claims on habeas review. “Clearly established” federal law 

consists of the holdings of the Supreme Court at the time the petitioner’s state court 

conviction became final. Williams, 529 U.S. at 365; see Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 

74 (2006). 

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 The Supreme Court has provided guidance in applying each prong of § 2254(d)(1). 

The Court has explained that a state court decision is “contrary to” the Supreme Court’s 

clearly established precedents if the decision applies a rule that contradicts the governing 

law set forth in those precedents, thereby reaching a conclusion opposite to that reached by 

the Supreme Court on a matter of law, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially 

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but reaches a different result. 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06; see Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam). Under 

the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant 

relief where a state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme] 

Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular . . . case” or 

“unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context 

where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend the principle to a new context 

where it should apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. For a federal court to find a state court’s 

application of Supreme Court precedent “unreasonable,” the petitioner must show that the 

state court’s decision was not merely incorrect or erroneous, but “objectively 

unreasonable.” Id. at 409; Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007); Visciotti, 537 

U.S. at 25. “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas 

relief so long as ‘“fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s 

decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. 

Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

 Under the standard set forth in § 2254(d)(2), habeas relief is available only if the 

state court decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Miller-El v. 

Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (Miller-El II). In considering a challenge under 

§ 2254(d)(2), state court factual determinations are presumed to be correct, and a petitioner 

bears the “burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473-74; Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 240. 

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Analysis 

 Claim 2 

 Petitioner asserts that his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair 

and impartial jury were violated when the trial court failed to remove a juror who spoke to 

a witness. The court of appeals found the following facts: 

¶ 10 At the beginning of the trial, the jury was admonished not to speak with any of the witnesses in the case. On the second day of trial, the prosecutor brought it to the court’s attention that a juror had spoken to one of the state’s 

witnesses, a detective. The detective testified that the juror, ultimately determined to be Juror 11, “asked if [the detective] knew how many 

witnesses we still had.” The detective replied that he did not know, and the juror responded, “[Y]ou don’t know or you are not allowed to tell me?” The detective said “both,” and said the juror “sounded like he had a timing issue.” 

¶ 11 Reyna asked the trial court if the juror might be designated an alternate, and the court agreed, noting that it would “probably” be done “by stipulation.” The court asked if anyone believed the communication had been 

prejudicial, and Reyna agreed that it had not. Later that day, the state declined to stipulate to the designation of Juror 11 as an alternate. The court stated 

that it did not believe there was cause to remove Juror 11 from the panel, and Reyna agreed. 

(Doc. 12, Ex. A at 4-5.) The appellate court denied the claim finding no error: 

[A] court has no discretion to designate which juror will be the alternate, by stipulation or otherwise. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 18.5(h); State v. Cota, 229 

Ariz. 136, ¶¶ 43–44, 272 P.3d 1027, 1038 (2012). A court cannot abuse 

discretion that it does not possess. To the extent Reyna argues Juror 11 should have been dismissed for cause, he not only failed to request this in the trial court; he explicitly disclaimed this argument. Accordingly, by acquiescing in the continued participation of the juror, he has limited our appellate review to fundamental, prejudicial error. See State v. Lucero, 223 Ariz. 129, ¶ 31, 220 P.3d 249, 258 (App. 2009). 

¶ 13 A juror should be excused pursuant to Rule 18.4(b), Ariz. R. Crim. P., 

only when “there is reasonable ground to believe that [he] cannot render a 

fair and impartial verdict.” And a defendant bears the burden of 

demonstrating such. State v. Blackman, 201 Ariz. 527, ¶ 13, 38 P.3d 1192, 

1198 (App. 2002). Here, although Juror 11 violated the court’s admonition 

not to speak to any of the witnesses, our supreme court has recognized that not every violation of the court’s admonitions requires dismissal of the juror involved. See State v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 13, 951 P.2d 869, 878 (1997), 

citing Cook, 170 Ariz. at 54, 821 P.2d at 745. The court stated that “some 

discussion by jurors of their pending cases may be inevitable,” and noted that “casual utterances regarding, for example, the length of the trial or similar matters” generally do not demonstrate a juror’s inability to be fair and impartial. Cook, 170 Ariz. at 54, 821 P.2d at 745. Reyna has not shown that Juror 11’s conduct was anything more than a “casual utterance[ ] regarding . . . the length of the trial,” id., nor that it demonstrated an inability to be impartial. We therefore conclude the trial court did not err, much less err 

fundamentally, in not dismissing Juror 11 for cause. 

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(Id. at 5-6.) 

 A criminal defendant is entitled to “a fair trial by a panel of impartial, ‘indifferent’ 

jurors,” and the verdict must be based on evidence developed at trial. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 

U.S. 717, 722 (1961) (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948)). For purposes of due 

process, a new trial is not required “every time a juror has been placed in a potentially 

compromising situation”; rather, “due process means a jury capable and willing to decide 

the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent 

prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen.” 

Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982). The determination of whether a particular juror 

was biased as to deny a defendant a fair trial is a question of fact. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 

1025, 1036 (1984). The state trial judge’s finding of impartiality is “presumptively correct 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254[(e)(1)].” Phillips, 455 U.S. at 218. 

 In the Petition, Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in finding juror 11 impartial 

because (1) the juror’s questions and behaviors indicated he had timing issues that may 

have impacted his ability to render a fair and impartial verdict, (2) violating the admonition 

showed that the juror would not follow the court’s instructions, including “keeping an open 

mind and not forming an opinion until the end of the case,” and (3) the juror was never 

questioned about his contact with the witness or if anything related to that contact would 

impact his ability to render a fair and impartial verdict. (Doc. 1, Ex. 2 at 37.) Although the 

state court did not hold an evidentiary hearing or question the juror, that does not make the 

fact-finding process unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) because the court “could 

have reasonably concluded that the evidence already adduced was sufficient to resolve the 

factual question.” See Hibbler v. Benedetti, 693 F.3d 1140, 1147 (9th Cir. 2012). Petitioner 

does not present any new evidence that was not already considered by the state court. The 

trial judge considered what the juror and the witness discussed and any behaviors the juror 

exhibited that indicated he may have had a timing restriction; from this information, he 

determined that being in a hurry was not a reason he would remove the juror from the 

panel. (Doc. 15-3 at 74.) Further, Petitioner’s counsel agreed there was no prejudice to 

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argue and he was simply asserting his observations for the record. (Id. at 148.) The trial 

judge considered all the facts before him. And, there was no evidence that the juror was 

unable to decide the case solely on the evidence before him or that he obtained any extrinsic 

information. Therefore, the determination that the juror was not prejudiced was not an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. Finally, because Petitioner failed to rebut the 

impartiality of the juror by clear and convincing evidence, the state court did not 

unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent in denying this claim. 

Claim 3(d) 

Petitioner alleges trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain and challenge the 

validity of the search warrant, because there was not probable cause for it when illegally 

obtained information was redacted from the supporting affidavit. The PCR court, who also 

heard the pretrial motions to suppress and the trial, found that the affidavit was not facially 

defective after removing illegally obtained information; therefore, trial counsel’s failure to 

raise this claim did not prejudice Petitioner. (Doc. 12, Ex. O at 3-5, Ex. II.) The court of 

appeals similarly found that Petitioner had failed to establish his trial counsel’s failure to 

review the affidavit caused him prejudice because the redacted search warrant affidavit 

established probable cause to search Petitioner’s cell phone. (Id., Ex. R.) Considering those 

rulings, there is not a reasonable probability that this claim would have been successful if 

counsel had raised it prior to trial. See Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 375 (holding that defendant 

fails to demonstrate prejudice arising from counsel’s failure to litigate a Fourth 

Amendment issue unless he establishes the claim is meritorious). Therefore, the state 

court’s denial of this claim was not objectively unreasonable. 

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Claim 1 is not cognizable in this proceeding and is barred from this Court’s 

consideration by Stone. Claims 2 and 3(d) are without merit. Claim 3 (with the exception 

of 3(d)) is procedurally defaulted and without merit. 

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court 

enter an order DISMISSING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

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 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file 

written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and 

Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party’s objections within fourteen 

days. No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the District 

Court. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are 

filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV-18-0105-TUC-RM. 

 Dated this 19th day of August, 2019. 

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