Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_23-cv-00300/USCOURTS-alnd-4_23-cv-00300-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Age)

---

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

MIDDLE DIVISION

JENNIFER WALLENSTEIN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. Case No. 4:23-cv-300-CLM 

STOPWATCH URGENT CARE 

CENTERS, INC., 

Defendant. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

Jennifer Wallenstein sues her former employer, Rock Oak Group 

Services, Inc.1, for age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination 

in Employment Act (“ADEA”), violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act 

(“FLSA”), and disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of the 

Rehabilitation Act. (Doc. 1). Rock Oak seeks dismissal of Wallenstein’s age 

and disability discrimination claims. (Doc. 9). For the reasons stated within, 

the court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Rock Oak’s motion to 

dismiss (doc. 9). 

STATEMENT OF THE ALLEGED FACTS 

Wallenstein, who is over the age of 40, began working for Rock Oak in 

January 2021 as a medical assistant. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 14–15). Wallenstein suffers 

from several disabilities, including a neurological disorder, ADHD, and 

diabetes that limit her ability to think, move, lift, bend, twist, push, pull, 

work, and stand. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 56). Rock Oak knew of Wallenstein’s disabling 

conditions because she didn’t conceal them and discussed them with Rock 

Oak many times. (Id. ¶ 18). 

1 Rock Oak is a management company that employs all staff at Stopwatch Urgent Care 

Clinics. According to Rock Oak, Stopwatch Urgent Care Centers is a brand name and has 

no employees, so Wallenstein incorrectly identified Stopwatch as the Defendant in her 

complaint. Wallenstein “has no reason to dispute this assertion.” (Doc. 15 at 1 n.1). For ease 

of reference, the court will refer to the Defendant as Rock Oak throughout this 

memorandum opinion and order. 

FILED

 2024 Jan-17 AM 11:49

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 4:23-cv-00300-CLM Document 29 Filed 01/17/24 Page 1 of 6
2

Office protocol was for two medical assistants to work each 12-hour

shift. (Id. ¶ 20). But the second medical assistant on Wallenstein’s shift quit 

about a month after Wallenstein started working for Rock Oak. (Id.). As a 

result, Wallenstein was forced to work by herself for months, while the two 

other medical assistants, who were both under 40 and not disabled, continued 

to work the other 12-hour shift together. (Id. ¶ 21). 

Wallenstein complained to clinal manager Olivia Brown about her 

overwhelming workflow as the only medical assistant on her shift and that 

she was being treated differently than the other younger and non-disabled 

assistants. (Id. ¶ 23). Brown, who would make condescending or sarcastic 

comments to Wallenstein, commented on how the other medical assistants 

could work their shifts solo. (Id. ¶ 24). Brown also questioned if Wallenstein 

was a good fit for the job and asked if Wallenstein had considered quitting. 

(Id. ¶ 25). 

Wallenstein asked Brown and the human resources managers about 

whether they could hire another medical assistant to assist Wallenstein on 

her shift. (Id. ¶ 26). Brown responded by commenting “all the others could do 

it, maybe the job isn’t for you.” (Id. ¶ 27). Wallenstein asked to speak to the 

COO, Mark Morgan, and though assistant manager, Bridget Byers emailed

Morgan, Wallenstein received no response. (Id. ¶ 28). 

Provider Tracy Hackett emailed Morgan to report how Wallenstein 

allegedly often forgot to write her triage notes. (Id. ¶ 29). Hackett knew about 

Wallenstein’s ADHD and diabetes and would often comment in a 

condescending manner about how Wallenstein “deserved a gold star” if she 

did not make any mistakes at work for the day. (Id. ¶ 30). 

In May 2021, Brown called Wallenstein to berate her and terminate her 

employment by telling her “it was no longer working out, and you are not cut 

out for [this work].” (Id. ¶ 31). Rock Oak then hired Youn Fong, a young 

woman in her twenties with no experience and who did not have any 

disabilities, to replace Wallenstein. (Id. ¶ 34). So after Wallenstein’s 

termination, all three medical assistants were in their early twenties and did 

not have disabilities. (Id. ¶ 35). 

Case 4:23-cv-00300-CLM Document 29 Filed 01/17/24 Page 2 of 6
3

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

In reviewing a Rule 12 motion, this court accepts the allegations in 

Wallenstein’s complaint as true and construes them in the light most 

favorable to Wallenstein. See Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc., 679 F.3d 1267, 

1275 (11th Cir. 2012). The ultimate question is whether Wallenstein’s 

allegations, when accepted as true, “plausibly give rise to an entitlement of 

relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). If the facts as pleaded 

could entitle Wallenstein to relief, then the court must deny Rock Oak’s 

motion to dismiss. If, however, the court accepts all of Wallenstein’s pleaded 

facts as true, and Wallenstein still would not be entitled to relief, then the 

court must grant the motion. 

DISCUSSION 

Rock Oak moves to dismiss Wallenstein’s age discrimination claim 

(Count One) and disability discrimination claim (Count Three). A complaint 

alleging employment discrimination needn’t include facts that establish a 

prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework 

to state a claim for relief. See Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 

1239, 1246 (11th Cir. 2015). Instead, the “complaint need only provide 

enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest intentional . . . 

discrimination.” Id. (quotations omitted). So “when the well-pleaded factual 

allegations of a complaint plausibly suggest that the plaintiff suffered an 

adverse employment action due to intentional . . . discrimination,” the 

complaint will survive a Rule 12 motion. See id. 

A. Age Discrimination (Count One) 

The ADEA prohibits employers from discriminating against employees 

who are at least 40 because of their age. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)(1), 631(a). To 

succeed at trial on her age discrimination claim, Wallenstein will need to 

prove that age was the “but-for” cause of an adverse employment decision. 

See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009). 

Rock Oak says that the court should dismiss Wallenstein’s age 

discrimination claim for two reasons. First, Wallenstein being required to 

work a shift alone, receiving criticism, and having a provider email Morgan 

Case 4:23-cv-00300-CLM Document 29 Filed 01/17/24 Page 3 of 6
4

that she often forgot to write triage notes aren’t adverse employment actions. 

Second, Wallenstein hasn’t plausibly alleged that Rock Oak terminated her 

because of her age. 

Wallenstein concedes that the only adverse employment action that she 

has alleged is her termination. The court agrees that none of the other 

actions that Wallenstein describes amount to an adverse employment action. 

See Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (2001) (To establish an 

adverse employment action in the discrimination context, a plaintiff “must 

show a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of 

employment.” (emphasis in original)), overruled on other grounds by 

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). So to the 

extent that Wallenstein’s complaint could be construed as bringing an age 

discrimination claim based on any act other than the termination of 

Wallenstein’s employment, the court will dismiss those claims. 

As for Rock Oak’s argument that Wallenstein hasn’t plausibly alleged 

that her firing was because of her age, Wallenstein has alleged that she was 

over 40 and replaced by someone in her early 20s. In fact, once Wallenstein 

was fired, all the medical assistants were in their 20s. Plus, during 

Wallenstein’s employment, Rock Oak treated the younger medical assistants 

better than Wallenstein by not requiring them to work shifts alone. Despite 

requiring Wallenstein to shoulder this heavier workload, the reason Rock 

Oak gave for firing Wallenstein was that she was “not cut out for [this work].” 

(Doc. 1 ¶ 31). Accepting these allegations as true and viewing the facts in a 

light most favorable to Wallenstein, the court finds that Wallenstein has 

plausibly alleged that Rock Oak preferred younger medical assistants and 

that the rationale for her firing was pretext for age discrimination. So the 

court will deny Rock Oak’s motion to dismiss Wallenstein’s age 

discrimination claim based on her firing. 

Case 4:23-cv-00300-CLM Document 29 Filed 01/17/24 Page 4 of 6
5

B. Disability Discrimination (Count Three) 

To state a disability discrimination claim, a plaintiff must allege that 

she was a “qualified individual” who suffered an adverse employment action 

because of her disability. See Equal Emp. Opportunity Commission v. STME, 

LLC, 938 F.3d 1305, 1314 (11th Cir. 2019); see also Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 

1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[U]nder the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must 

prove that he suffered an adverse employment action ‘solely by reason of’ his 

handicap.”).2

Rock Oak once again asserts that the only adverse employment action 

described in Wallenstein’s complaint is the termination of her employment 

and that Wallenstein hasn’t plausibly alleged that her disability was the 

“but-for” reason for her firing. As explained, the court agrees with Rock Oak 

that the only adverse employment action that Wallenstein has alleged is the 

termination of her employment. So to the extent that Wallenstein’s complaint 

could be read as bringing a disability discrimination claim based on any act 

other than Wallenstein’s firing, the court will dismiss those claims. 

As for Wallenstein’s claim that Rock Oak fired her because of her 

disability, Rock Oak doesn’t dispute that Wallenstein has adequately alleged 

that she is disabled and qualified for her position as a medical assistant. And 

though Rock Oak asserts that Wallenstein failed to plausibly allege that her

disability (rather than dissatisfaction with her job performance) is what led 

to Wallenstein’s firing, the court disagrees. Wallenstein asserts that Rock 

Oak replaced her with a non-disabled medical assistant. And throughout 

Wallenstein’s employment with Rock Oak, the other, non-disabled medical 

assistants were treated more favorably than Wallenstein because they 

weren’t required to work shifts alone. Despite not requiring the non-disabled 

medical assistants to work solo shifts, Brown repeatedly asked Wallenstein 

why she couldn’t work solo shifts like her non-disabled colleagues. Finally, 

though requiring Wallenstein to shoulder a heavier workload than her nondisabled colleagues, the reason Brown gave for Wallenstein’s firing was that 

she was “not cut out for [this work].” (Doc. 1 ¶ 31). 

2 The disability discrimination claim in STME was brought under the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), which has the same standard for liability as the Rehabilitation

Act. See Sutton v. Lader, 185 F.3d 1203, 1207 n.5 (11th Cir. 1999). 

Case 4:23-cv-00300-CLM Document 29 Filed 01/17/24 Page 5 of 6
6

A reasonable person could infer from these allegations that 

Wallenstein’s disability was the real reason for her firing.3 So the court will 

deny Rock Oak’s motion to dismiss Wallenstein’s disability discrimination 

claim based on the termination of her employment. 

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN 

PART Rock Oak’s partial motion to dismiss (doc. 9). Wallenstein’s age 

discrimination and disability discrimination claims are limited to her claims 

that Rock Oak fired her because of her age or disability. The court GRANTS 

Rock Oak’s motion for extension of time to answer the complaint. Rock Oak 

has until on or before January 31, 2024, to answer Wallenstein’s complaint. 

DONE and ORDERED on January 17, 2024

 _________________________________

 COREY L. MAZE

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

3 “Rule 8(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly permits the pleading of 

alternative and inconsistent claims.” United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1273 

(11th Cir. 2009). So Wallenstein’s allegations in Count One that Rock Oak fired her because 

of her age don’t preclude her allegations in Count Three that Rock Oak fired her because of 

her disability. 

Case 4:23-cv-00300-CLM Document 29 Filed 01/17/24 Page 6 of 6