Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01993/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01993-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:2201 Declaratory Judgment

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Gila River Indian Community, a federally 

recognized Indian tribe; Delvin John Terry, 

Celestino Rios, Brandon Rios, Damon Rios, 

and Cameron Rios, members of the Gila 

River Indian Community; the City of 

Glendale and Michael Socaciu and Gary 

Hirsch, residents of Glendale; Speaker of 

the House Kirk Adams, House Majority 

Leader John McComish, House Majority 

Whip Andy Tobin, and Senate Majority 

Leader Chuck Gray, in their official 

capacities as members of the Arizona 

Legislature; and the State of Arizona, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

United States of America; United States 

Department of the Interior; Kenneth L. 

Salazar, in his official capacity as Secretary 

of the Interior; Larry Echo Hawk, in his 

official capacity as Assistant Secretary for 

Indian Affairs; and Tohono O’odham 

Nation, a federally recognized Indian tribe, 

Defendants.

Nos. CV-10-1993-PHX-DGC

 CV-10-2017-PHX-DGC 

 CV-10-2138-PHX-DGC 

ORDER AND INJUNCTION

 

 This case concerns a July 23, 2010 decision by the United States Department of 

the Interior to accept in trust for the benefit of the Tohono O’odham Nation a 54-acre 

parcel of unincorporated land surrounded by the City of Glendale (the “Trust Decision”). 

On September 16, 2010, the City of Glendale, the Gila River Indian Community 

Case 2:10-cv-01993-DGC Document 162 Filed 05/03/11 Page 1 of 9
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(the “Community”), and certain individuals brought suit to overturn the Trust Decision 

and enjoin the United States from acquiring in trust the 54-acre parcel of land 

(“Parcel 2”). The State of Arizona and members of the Arizona Legislature intervened as 

Plaintiffs, and the Tohono O’odham Nation (the “Nation”) intervened as a Defendant. In 

an order dated March 3, 2011, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of 

Defendants, finding no legal basis for setting aside the Trust Decision. Doc. 133. The 

order has been appealed. Docs. 137-140. 

 Plaintiffs have filed a motion for an injunction and stay pending appeal pursuant to 

Rule 62(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Doc. 153. Plaintiffs seek an order 

prohibiting the United States Department of the Interior (“DOI”) from taking Parcel 2 

into trust until the appeal is decided. The motion is fully briefed. Docs. 157-159. Oral 

argument has not been requested. For reasons stated below, the motion will be granted in 

part with respect to the request for an injunction.1

I. Rule 62(c) Standard.

 While an appeal is pending from an order denying an injunction, the court may 

“grant an injunction on terms for bond or other terms that secure the opposing party’s 

rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c). This rule “codifies the inherent power of a court 

‘to preserve the status quo where in its sound discretion, the court deems the 

circumstances so justify[.]’” Christian Science Reading Room v. City & County of S.F., 

784 F.2d 1010, 1017 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). A party may obtain an injunction 

under Rule 62(c) by showing that it is likely to succeed on appeal, that it is likely to 

suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief, that the balance of hardships 

tips in its favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest. See Winter v. Natural Res. 

Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008). The test includes a sliding scale. If 

the movant shows that the balance of hardships will tip sharply in its favor, it need not 

 

1

 The factual background of the case is set forth in the summary judgment order, and will not be repeated in this order except as necessary to explain the Court’s ruling. 

Case 2:10-cv-01993-DGC Document 162 Filed 05/03/11 Page 2 of 9
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

make as strong a showing of the likelihood of success on appeal – the existence of serious 

questions will suffice. See Alliance for Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 622 F.3d 1045, 1049-53 

(9th Cir. 2010); see also Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1983) (standard 

for obtaining a preliminary injunction applies to motions for injunctions pending 

appeal).2

II. Success on Appeal and Serious Questions.

 In arguing that they are likely to succeed on appeal, Plaintiffs essentially reassert 

the positions taken in their summary judgment briefs. See Doc. 153 at 19. The Court 

thoroughly considered those positions, heard oral arguments, and issued a 24-page order 

on the merits. For the reasons set forth in that order (Doc. 133), the Court concludes that 

Defendants, not Plaintiffs, are likely to prevail on appeal. See Cachil Dehe Band of 

Wintun Indians v. California, No. CIV. S-04-2265 FCD KJM, 2009 WL 2971547, at *4 

(E.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2009) (noting that the mere disagreement with the court’s ruling does 

not amount to a likelihood of success on the merits). 

 This is not to say, however, that Plaintiffs have failed to raise serious questions. 

For purposes of injunctive relief, serious questions are “‘substantial, difficult and 

doubtful, as to make them a fair ground for litigation and thus for more deliberative 

investigation.’” Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1362 (9th Cir. 

1988) (citation omitted). This standard is satisfied with respect to the Court’s 

conclusions that the argument under § 6(c) of the Gila Bend Act has been waived 

(Doc. 133 at 8-11), that DOI reasonably interpreted § 6(d) of the Act (id. at 11-18), and 

that neither IGRA nor its implementing regulations required DOI to make an Indian land 

determination when it chose to take Parcel 2 into trust (id. at 18-21). While the Court 

believes its rulings on these issues to be correct, they raise substantial legal questions 

 

2

 The United States contends that the “serious questions” test is inconsistent with 

Winter’s requirement that the moving party show he is likely to succeed on the merits. 

Doc. 157 at 8 n.3. While this may be true, the decision in Alliance for the Wild Rockies is 

the law of this Circuit which the Court must follow. 

Case 2:10-cv-01993-DGC Document 162 Filed 05/03/11 Page 3 of 9
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

warranting more deliberative consideration on appeal.3

III. Irreparable Harm.

 The United States has taken the position that once Parcel 2 is held in trust, the 

Quiet Title Act will maintain the United States’ sovereign immunity and the Trust 

Decision may not be challenged. Doc. 153-2 at 6; see 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a); Metro. 

Water. Dist. of S. Cal. v. United States, 830 F.2d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1987) (the Quiet Title 

Act bars suits “to interfere with the Government’s discharge of its responsibilities to 

Indian tribes in respect to the lands it holds in trust for them”). Absent injunctive relief, 

Parcel 2 may be taken into trust as early as May 16, 2011 (Doc. 153-1), well before 

Plaintiffs’ appeal will be heard and decided. 

 Plaintiffs argue that the taking of Parcel 2 into trust and the resulting effect of the 

Quiet Title Act “presents a very real and significant risk of the irreparable harm of 

mooting any appeal.” Doc. 153 at 14. Plaintiffs cite cases concluding that the loss of the 

right to appeal constitutes irreparable harm. See Gonzalez v. Reno, No. 00-11424-D, 

2000 WL 381901, at *1 (11th Cir. Apr. 19, 2000); Population Inst. v. McPherson, 797 

F.2d 1062, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Other cases have “found that ‘the risk that an appeal 

may become moot does not, standing alone, constitute irreparable injury.’” In re 

Fleetwood Enters., Inc., No. CV 10-0114 AHM, 2010 WL 960358, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 

15, 2010) (quoting In re Convenience USA, Inc., 290 B.R. 558, 563 (Bank. M.D.N.C. 

2003) (compiling cases)). 

 The Court need not decide the issue because Plaintiffs have shown irreparable 

harm other than the loss of appellate review. If Parcel 2 is taken into trust, Glendale will 

forever lose its right to annex the land. Glendale and its residents clearly would suffer 

irreparable injury if deprived of this significant public policy interest “without first 

having a full and fair opportunity to be heard on [appeal].” Kansas v. United States, 249 

 

3

 Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion (Doc. 153 at 27), no serious question is raised from the claims under the Tenth Amendment and the Indian Commerce Clause. See

Doc. 133 at 21-23. 

Case 2:10-cv-01993-DGC Document 162 Filed 05/03/11 Page 4 of 9
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

F.3d 1213, 1227 (10th Cir. 2001). In addition, Glendale residents, including Plaintiffs 

Gary Hirsch and Michael Socaciu, likely will suffer irreparable quality-of-life injuries 

from gaming activities on Parcel 2. See Docs. 87 ¶¶ 68-69, 133 at 5; see also Fort 

Funston Dog Walkers v. Babbitt, 96 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (harm to 

one’s quality of life may be both “substantial and irreparable”). The threat of those 

claimed injuries is real, not speculative, given the Nation’s stated plan to move forward 

with its casino once Parcel 2 is held in trust. See Doc. 133 at 6. 

 As previously explained (Doc. 133 at 6), because a major casino in Glendale will 

reduce the Community’s revenue from its own casinos, the taking of Parcel 2 into trust 

will cause the Community and its members to suffer injury. Plaintiffs assert, and the 

Nation does not dispute, that while the loss of casino revenue is economic, the Nation’s 

sovereign immunity would prevent the Community from recovering damages. Doc. 153 

at 17-18 & n.3 (citing Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 104, 1045-47 (9th Cir. 

2006)). The Community therefore is likely to suffer irreparable harm if Parcel 2 is taken 

into trust. See Cal. Pharmacists Ass’n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 563 F.3d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 

2009) (plaintiffs suffer irreparable harm where they are unable to recover damages even 

though successful on the merits). 

 Plaintiffs contend that the alleged violation of the Tenth Amendment constitutes 

irreparable harm to the State of Arizona (Doc. 153 at 18), but for reasons explained in the 

summary judgment order (Doc. 133 at 21-23), that constitutional claim is “too tenuous” 

to support injunctive relief. Goldie’s Bookstore, Inc. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 739 F.2d 466, 

472 (9th Cir. 1984). 

 In summary, Plaintiffs have shown that, absent an injunction pending appeal, 

irreparable harm is likely to befall Glendale, the Community, and their residents and 

members.4

 

4

 Plaintiffs argue that irreparable harm may flow from the summary judgment order as “it judicially grants to DOI a power denied the agency by Congress,” that is, authorizing DOI to hold in trust land acquired in excess of the acreage limit set forth in 

Case 2:10-cv-01993-DGC Document 162 Filed 05/03/11 Page 5 of 9
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IV. Balance of Hardships.

 In determining whether an injunction pending appeal is appropriate, the Court 

“‘must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party 

of the granting or withholding of [an injunction].” Winter, 129 S. Ct. 376 (citation 

omitted). Defendants argue, correctly, that if the trust acquisition were to be enjoined 

pending appeal, their strong interests in having Parcel 2 held in trust could be unfairly 

prejudiced by Glendale’s annexing of Parcel 2 once House Bill 2534 becomes effective 

this summer. Docs. 157 at 14-14-18, 158 at 21-25. As explained more fully below, 

however, this prejudice can be avoided by an injunction prohibiting annexation pending 

appeal and a bond to cover potential damages suffered by the Nation from the delay 

occasioned by the appeal. Given the substantial irreparable harm Plaintiffs would suffer 

absent injunctive relief, including the fact that the Quiet Title Act likely will moot 

Plaintiffs’ appeal once Parcel 2 is taken into trust, the Court finds that the balance of 

hardships tips sharply in favor of Plaintiffs. 

V. Public Interest.

 “[T]he public interest is served in preserving the integrity of the right to appellate 

review[.]” In re SK Foods, L.P., No. 2:09-cv-02942-MCE, 2009 WL 5206639, at *4 

(E.D. Cal. Dec. 24, 2009). Indeed, the public has a strong interest “in the appeal right as 

one component of the constitutional right to due process in enforcement of the nation’s 

laws.” Maine v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, No. CIV. 00-122-B-C, 2001 WL 98373, at *4 

(D. Me. Feb. 5, 2001). Granting the requested injunctive relief in this case not only will 

serve the general public interest in the right to appellate review, it will also protect the 

appellate rights of specific public entities and officials: the City of Glendale, the 

Community, the State of Arizona, and members of the Arizona Legislature. 

 The Nation contends that if Parcel 2 were to be held in trust, and if the Quiet Title 

 § 6(c) of the Gila Bend Act. Doc. 153 at 16. This argument is wholly without merit. No 

power has been granted to DOI; the Court held only that the argument under § 6(c) has been waived for failure to raise it during the administrative process. Doc. 133 at 8-11. 

Case 2:10-cv-01993-DGC Document 162 Filed 05/03/11 Page 6 of 9
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Act barred further challenges to the Trust Decision, the public interest would be served 

“because Congress decided, in passing the Quiet Title Act, to retain the government’s 

sovereign immunity in these circumstances.” Doc. 158 at 26. While that may be true, the 

Nation has not shown, and it is not otherwise clear to the Court, that the policy behind the 

Quiet Title Act outweighs the public interest in the right to appeal, particularly where, 

as here, the appeal raises serious questions warranting more deliberative consideration. 

 By refusing to agree to a stay of annexation efforts, the United States argues, 

Plaintiffs seek to play one public interest (appellate review) against another 

(implementation of the Gila Bend Act), all to the detriment of the Nation and the United 

States. Doc. 157 at 16. The Court agrees, and therefore will enjoin annexation pending 

completion of the appeal. 

 In summary, the Court concludes that until Plaintiffs’ appeal is decided, the public 

interest is best served by maintaining the status quo – enjoining both the acquisition in 

trust and the annexation by Glendale of Parcel 2. 

VI. Securing Defendants’ Rights.

 Rule 62(c) provides that the district court may grant an injunction pending appeal 

“on terms for bond or other terms that secure the opposing party’s rights.” Any action 

“taken pursuant to Rule 62(c) ‘may not materially alter the status of the case on appeal.’” 

Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Sw. Marine Inc., 242 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Stated differently, Rule 62(c) grants the court “no broader power than it has always 

inherently possessed to preserve the status quo[.]” Id.

 The Court agrees with Defendants that an injunction prohibiting the acquisition of 

Parcel 2 into trust would materially alter the status quo if the delay caused by the 

injunction would then enable Glendale to annex Parcel 2 under House Bill 2534. 

Docs. 157 at 16-17, 158 at 30-31. In order to secure Defendants rights, therefore, the 

injunction pending appeal will enjoin both the trust acquisition and the annexation of 

Parcel 2. 

Case 2:10-cv-01993-DGC Document 162 Filed 05/03/11 Page 7 of 9
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Plaintiffs contend that because House Bill 2534 is the subject of a separate 

proceeding before this Court, and because a ruling on the statute’s validity is expected 

before it takes effect, there is no need to enjoin annexation of Parcel 2. Plaintiffs 

apparently believe that if House Bill 2534 is found to be valid, annexation of Parcel 2 

would cause no prejudice to Defendants. The Court does not agree. 

 The Court has found the Trust Decision to be lawful. Absent the voluntary stay 

agreed to by the United States (Doc. 153-1), DOI could immediately acquire Parcel 2 in 

trust for the benefit of the Nation. Plaintiffs ask the Court to enjoin DOI from doing so 

while the appeal is pending, but at the same time to allow Glendale to annex the land 

once House Bill 2534 is declared valid and takes effect. Because annexation would result 

in Parcel 2 being “within the corporate limits” of Glendale, annexation arguably would 

render the Trust Decision violative of the Gila Bend Act. See Doc. 133 at 12. In short, 

Plaintiffs seek to materially alter the status quo in their favor. The goal of an injunction 

pending appeal is not to alter the status quo, but to preserve it. The best way to preserve 

the present state of affairs is to enjoin both the acquisition into trust and the annexation of 

Parcel 2, thereby allowing the parties to litigate these issues without concern that the 

other side’s actions may render the litigation moot. 

 The Nation asks that any injunction be conditioned on the posting of a bond. 

Doc. 158 at 31. Plaintiffs assert that a bond requirement would hamper their ability to 

appeal (Doc. 159 at 21), but present no evidence in support of this assertion. The Court 

concludes that a bond is necessary to cover any damages the Nation may suffer as result 

of the injunction pending appeal. 

 The Nation identifies no specific bond amount, instead proposing that the amount 

be determined based on further submissions from the parties. Doc. 158 at 31. The Court 

declines to adopt that approach given the urgency of Plaintiffs’ motion. The Court finds 

a bond in the amount of $500,000 to be appropriate. 

 

Case 2:10-cv-01993-DGC Document 162 Filed 05/03/11 Page 8 of 9
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

VII. Plaintiffs’ Request for a Stay.

 Plaintiffs’ request for a stay of the summary judgment order (Doc. 133) will be 

denied. Plaintiffs have sought relief under Rule 62(c). Doc. 153 at 12. That rule 

provides for an injunction pending appeal, not a stay. An injunction and a stay serve 

different purposes. “The former is a means by which a court tells someone what to do or 

not to do.” Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1757 (2009). “By contrast, instead of 

directing the conduct of a particular action, a stay operates upon the judicial proceeding 

itself . . . by halting or postponing some portion of the proceeding, or by temporarily 

divesting an order of enforceability.” Id. at 1758. Stated differently, a stay “‘simply 

suspends judicial alteration of the status quo,’ while injunctive relive ‘grants judicial 

intervention that has been withheld[.]’” Id. (citation omitted). 

 The Court agrees with the United States (Doc. 157 at 7 n.2) that the summary 

judgment order did not alter the status quo or otherwise grant the United States authority 

to acquire Parcel 2 in trust. The request for a stay of that order will be denied. 

IT IS ORDERED:

 1. Plaintiffs’ motion for injunction and stay pending appeal (Doc. 153) is 

granted in part and denied in part. The motion is granted with respect to the request 

for an injunction, and denied as to the request for a stay. 

 2. During the pendency of Plaintiffs’ appeal from the summary judgment 

order, the United States is enjoined from taking Parcel 2 into trust and the City of 

Glendale is enjoined from annexing Parcel 2. 

 3. This order shall become effective upon Plaintiffs’ posting of security in the 

amount of $500,000.00. 

 Dated this 3rd day of May, 2011. 

 

Case 2:10-cv-01993-DGC Document 162 Filed 05/03/11 Page 9 of 9