Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02032/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02032-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 441
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Voting
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DON HIGGINSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

XAVIER BECERRA, in his 

official capacity as ATTORNEY 

GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA; 

and CITY OF POWAY,

Defendants.

Case No.: 17cv2032-WQH-JLB

ORDER

HAYES, Judge:

The matters before the Court are the motion for injunction pending appeal (ECF No. 

69) filed by Plaintiff Don Higginson and the motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 74) filed 

by the California League of United Latin American Citizens (California LULAC), 

Jacqueline Contreras, Xavier Flores, Judy Ki, and Hiram Soto (collectively, “Proposed 

Defendant-Interveners”).

I. BACKGROUND

On October 4, 2017, Plaintiff Don Higginson initiated this action by filing a Complaint 

against Defendants Attorney General Xavier Becerra (the “Attorney General”) and the City 

of Poway (the “City”). (ECF No. 1). Higginson alleged a cause of action pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 for a violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

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Higginson asserted that the California Voting Rights Act (“CVRA”) and the City’s Map 

133, allegedly enacted as a result of the CVRA, violate the equal protection clause. 

Higginson sought an order declaring the CVRA and Map 133 unconstitutional and 

enjoining their enforcement and use. 

On October 19, 2017, Higginson filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. (ECF 

No. 11). Higginson sought a preliminary injunction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 65(a) that temporarily enjoined “Defendant Attorney General Xavier Becerra 

and his agents from enforcing the California Voting Rights Act and Defendant City of 

Poway from using Map 133 for elections during the pendency of this action.” Id. at 2. The

City filed a response to the motion for a preliminary injunction stating that it takes a neutral 

position in this litigation and would not actively support or oppose the motion. (ECF No. 

16 at 2). The Attorney General opposed the motion for a preliminary injunction on the 

grounds that Higginson lacks standing and “has not established a likelihood of success on 

the merits on his Fourteenth Amendment claim” or “any of the remaining factors . . . 

necessary to show he is entitled to a preliminary injunction.” (ECF No. 22). 

On November 6, 2017, the Proposed Defendant-Interveners filed a motion to 

intervene and lodged an opposition to the motion for a preliminary injunction. (ECF Nos. 

18, 19). 

On November 22, 2017, the Attorney General filed a motion to dismiss the 

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The Attorney 

General asserted that Higginson lacks Article III standing to bring this action and that 

Higginson fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (ECF No. 33). Higginson 

filed a response in opposition and the City filed a response stating that it takes a neutral 

position with respect to the motion to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 48, 47). 

On February 23, 2018, the Court issued a ruling on the pending motion to dismiss, 

motion for a preliminary injunction, and motion to intervene. (ECF No. 68). The Court 

concluded that Higginson failed to allege sufficient facts to establish Article III standing to 

bring his equal protection claim against the Attorney General and the City and dismissed 

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the Complaint without prejudice. The Court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction 

and stated that it “cannot conclude that Higginson has demonstrated a likelihood of success 

on the merits in light of the determination that the Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts 

to establish subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 20. The Court denied without prejudice the 

motion to intervene by the Proposed Defendant-Interveners as moot in light of the dismissal 

of the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

On February 27, 2018, Higginson filed a motion for injunction pending appeal. (ECF 

No. 69). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c) and 8(a)(1), Higginson seeks 

“an order enjoining Defendant Attorney General Xavier Becerra and his agents from

enforcing the California Voting Rights Act and Defendant City of Poway from using Map 

133 for elections during the pendency of Plaintiff’s appeal.” (ECF No. 69 at 2). 

On March 13, 2018, the City filed a response stating that it “intends to take a neutral 

position in this lawsuit” and “will not support or oppose the Motion.” (ECF No. 71 at 2). 

The City requests a ruling as soon as possible and states that “[a]bsent an order of the Court 

directing otherwise, the City will implement district elections pursuant to its Ordinance No. 

809 (the ‘Ordinance’), codified in Chapter 2.04 of the City’s Municipal Code.” Id.

On March 13, 2018, the Attorney General filed a response in opposition to the 

motion for an injunction pending appeal. (ECF No. 72). 

On March 16, 2018, Higginson filed a reply in support of the motion for an 

injunction pending appeal. (ECF No. 73). 

On March 19, 2018, the Proposed Defendant-Interveners filed a motion for 

reconsideration of the Order denying their motion to intervene. (ECF No. 74). 

On March 20, 2018, Higginson filed a response in opposition to the motion for 

reconsideration. (ECF No. 75). 

On March 28, 2018, the Proposed Defendant-Interveners filed a reply. (ECF No. 

77). 

II. MOTION FOR AN INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL 

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Higginson requests that “the Court enjoin, for the pendency of [Higginson’s] appeal, 

[the Attorney General] and his agents from enforcing the California Voting Rights Act and 

[the City] from using Map 133 for future elections.” (ECF No. 69-1 at 2). Higginson

asserts that he intends to file a notice of appeal and a motion to expedite the appeal with 

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals once the Court rules on this motion. Higginson

contends that the Court should issue an injunction pending appeal despite the Court’s denial 

of preliminary injunctive relief because there is a plausible argument that serious questions 

on the merits exist and that irreparable injury may result if no injunction issues. Higginson 

contends that he has standing to bring this lawsuit and that the Court’s prior conclusion 

that he lacks standing was incorrect. Higginson contends that he has established a 

likelihood of success on the merits and that he is likely to suffer the irreparable harm of the 

infringement of his constitutional right to vote. Higginson contends that the balance of 

equities and public interest factors for injunctive relief also weigh in his favor. 

The Attorney General contends that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in 

this action and therefore cannot grant any relief. Further, the Attorney General contends 

that Higginson has failed to establish that he is entitled to an injunction even if the Court 

had jurisdiction to issue an injunction. The Attorney General asserts, “[Higginson] offers 

no reason this Court should reconsider its ruling and the Court should decline to do so.” 

(ECF No. 72 at 2). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c) states, “While an appeal is pending from an 

interlocutory order or final judgment that grants, dissolves, or denies an injunction, the 

court may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction on terms for bond or other terms

that secure the opposing party’s rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c). Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 8(a)(1) provides that “[a] party must ordinarily move first in the district court 

for . . . (C) an order . . . granting an injunction while an appeal is pending.” Fed. R. App. 

8(a)(1). 

The standard for granting an injunction pending appeal is generally the same as the 

standard for granting a preliminary injunction. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 

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(2009); Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987); Humane Soc’y of U.S. v. Gutierrez, 

523 F.3d 990, 991 (9th Cir. 2008). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must 

establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable 

harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and 

that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 

U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see also Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 

1052 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should 

not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” 

Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (quotation omitted); see also Sierra 

Forest Legacy v. Rey, 691 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1207 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (“Like any injunction, 

an injunction pending appeal is an extraordinary remedy that should be granted sparingly”). 

District courts have determined in some cases that an injunction pending appeal may be

appropriate even where the district court previously denied a request for a preliminary 

injunction. See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, No. 15-CV-03415-

EMC, 2016 WL 9184999, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2016) (“Thus, an injunction pending 

appeal may be appropriate, even if the Court believed its analysis in denying preliminary 

injunctive relief is correct. This is such a case.”); Protect Our Water v. Flowers, 377 F. 

Supp. 2d 882, 884 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (“An injunction is frequently issued where the trial 

court is charting a new and unexplored ground and the court determines that a novel 

interpretation of the law may succumb to appellate review.”). 

In this case, the Court determined that Higginson “fail[ed] to allege sufficient facts 

to establish Article III standing to bring his equal protection claim.” ECF No. 68 at 19; see

Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A suit brought by a plaintiff 

without Article III standing is not a ‘case or controversy,’ and an Article III federal court 

therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the suit.”). “The Court cannot conclude 

that Higginson has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits in light of the 

determination that the Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to establish subject matter 

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jurisdiction.” (ECF No. 68 at 20). Higginson has failed to satisfy his burden to demonstrate 

that the extraordinary remedy of an injunction pending appeal is warranted in this action. 

In his reply in support of the motion for injunction pending appeal, Higginson states, 

“Higginson does not intend to amend his complaint . . . . Thus, if the Court is not inclined 

to reconsider its decision . . . Higginson requests entry of final judgment so he may appeal.” 

(ECF No. 73 at 2 n.1). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a plaintiff who 

believes a complaint is adequately plead and chooses not to amend following dismissal 

may obtain an appealable final judgment by “filing in writing a notice of intent not to file 

an amended complaint.” Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 2004)

(citing WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 1997)). The 

request for entry of final judgment is granted. 

III. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF DENIAL OF MOTION TO 

INTERVENE

The Proposed Defendant Interveners move for reconsideration of the Order denying 

the Proposed Defendant-Interveners’ motion to intervene pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 60(b). The Proposed Defendant-Interveners contend that reconsideration is 

warranted on the basis of changed circumstances or new facts now before the Court based 

on Higginson’s motion for an injunction on appeal and his planned appeal. The Proposed 

Defendant-Interveners contend that by filing a notice of appeal and continuing to pursue 

an injunction that will harm their interests, “the question of intervention has been kept 

alive” and the Proposed Defendant-Interveners’ interests may be adversely affected by 

decisions made on the pending motion for injunction and by the appellate courts. (ECF 

No. 74-1 at 4). The Proposed Defendant-Interveners contend that upon reconsideration of 

the motion to intervene, the Court should grant intervention as of right. The Proposed 

Defendant-Interveners contend that amicus curiae statues “will be insufficient to protect 

their interests on appeal.” (ECF No. 77 at 1). 

Higginson contends that the motion for reconsideration should be denied because 

the Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29 provides the appropriate mechanism for 

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Proposed Defendant-Interveners to participate in this case on appeal through the filing of 

an amicus curiae brief. Further, Higginson asserts that he “will not oppose any motion by 

Proposed Defendant-Interveners to participate as amicus curiae.” (ECF No. 75 at 2). 

Higginson contends that the motion to intervene should be denied for the reasons 

articulated in his initial opposition to the motion to intervene “[i]n the event that the Court 

sua sponte reconsiders its order on the Attorney General’s motion to dismiss[.]” Id. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides that a

On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal 

representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 

reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 

discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been 

discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether 

previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by 

an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been 

satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has 

been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; 

or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). 

Rule 60(b)(5) may not be used to challenge the legal conclusions on which a 

prior judgment or order rests, but the Rule provides a means by which a party 

can ask a court to modify or vacate a judgment or order if “a significant change 

either in factual conditions or in law” renders continued enforcement 

“detrimental to the public interest.” 

Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 447 (2009) (citing Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 

U.S. 367, 384 (1992)). “The party seeking relief bears the burden of establishing that 

changed circumstances warrant relief . . . .” Id.

“A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time–and for reasons 

(1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of 

the proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). Under Rule 60(b), “[w]hat qualifies as a 

reasonable time depends on the facts of each case[,]” and “[t]he relevant facts may include 

the length and circumstances of the delay and the possibility of prejudice to the opposing 

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party.” In re Int’l Fibercom, Inc., 503 F.3d 933, 945 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). 

Local Rule 7.1(i)(2) provides that “[e]xcept as may be allowed under Rule . . . 60 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any motion or application for reconsideration must be 

filed within twenty-eight (28) days after the entry of the ruling, order or judgment sought 

to be reconsidered.” CivLR 7.1(i)(2). 

In this case, the Court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and 

dismissed the Complaint without prejudice. The Court also dismissed the motion to 

intervene as moot in light of this determination. See Leisnoi, Inc. v. United States, 313 

F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a district court properly denied a motion to 

intervene as moot where it dismissed an action for lack of jurisdiction because “[t]here 

remained no controversy in which [a party] could intervene.”). Higginson’s filing of a 

motion for an injunction pending appeal and his stated intent to file a notice of appeal do 

not constitute changed circumstances warranting reconsideration. The Court concludes 

that the Proposed Defendant-Interveners have not satisfied their burden of demonstrating 

that reconsideration is appropriate. 

IV. CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for an injunction pending appeal (ECF 

No. 69) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 74) is 

DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to the request of Plaintiff Don 

Higginson, the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice and the Clerk of Court is directed to 

enter final judgment in this matter. 

Dated: April 5, 2018

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