Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06172/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06172-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Uoited States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Cirroit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT JUL 12 1990 

JOHN LESLIE DEPEW, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v . 

J AMES SAFFELS, Warden; ATTORNEY 

GENERAL, State of Oklahoma, 

Respondents-Appel lees. 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

> Clerk 

} 

} 

} 

} No. 89-6172 

} (D.C. No. 88-2020-W} 

} (W.D. Okla.) 

} 

} 

} 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Be fo re ANDERSON, BARRETT, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a ); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submi tted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

Petitioner appeals from an order of the district court 

deny ing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 

28 u.s.c. § 2254. 

In 1979, in No. CRF-78-5193, petitioner was found guilty 

foll owing a jury trial of one count of robbery with firearms after 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

t he case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

3 6. 3 . 

Appellate Case: 89-6172 Document: 010110038279 Date Filed: 07/12/1990 Page: 1 
former conviction of a felony and was sentenced to thirty years 

imprisonment. Also in 1979, in No. CRF-78-5242, petitioner 

entered a plea of guilty to one count of robbery with firearms 

after former conviction of a felony and was sentenced to twenty 

years imprisonment to be served concurrently with the sentence in 

No. CRF-78-5193. 1 In this petition, petitioner challenges both 

convictions and the sentence imposed in No. CRF-78-5242. 

No. CRF-78-5193 

In 1985, in Nos. CRF-77-68 and CRF-78-2, the prior felonies 

upon which the enhancement of petitioner's sentence was 

predicated, the Oklahoma State District Court for Kingfisher 

County in a post-conviction proceeding held that petitioner had 

not received adequate assistance of counsel and was not adequately 

advised of his rights at the time he entered his guilty pleas. 

The court vacated petitioner's certification as an adult and 

dismissed the charges against him. 

In 1986, the state district court affirmed in part 

petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief in No. 

CRF-78-5193 holding that petitioner's sentence was invalid due to 

the dismissal of prior felonies. The court reduced his sentence 

1 In No. CRF-78-5242, petitioner was sentenced pursuant to 

Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 51B which provides that anyone who commits 

a third felony shall be imprisoned not less than twenty years. 

Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 7801, which provides a sentence of not 

less than ten years for anyone guilty of three separate felonies 

of robbery with firearms, is inapplicable. Petitioner's prior 

felonies were possession of stolen property and assault with a 

deadly weapon. See Chambers v. State, 764 P.2d 536, 538 (Okla. 

Crim. App. 1988); Eilis v. State, 749 P.2d 114, 116 (Okla. Crim. 

App. 1988). 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-6172 Document: 010110038279 Date Filed: 07/12/1990 Page: 2 
to five years, the minimum sentence for the offense. The sentence 

was then deemed served. 

In 

district 

ruling 

court 

on petitioner's federal habeas 

held that because petitioner 

petition, 

had served 

the 

the 

sentence imposed, he was not in custody for purposes of section 

2254. Therefore, the court was without jurisdiction to review 

that conviction. On appeal, petitioner argues that this ruling is 

in error. 

Habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy for state prisoners 

who are in custody and are attacking the validity of the fact or 

length of their confinement. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Freiser v. 

Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973). The district court correctly 

held that petitioner is not in custody for the purposes of section 

2254 because that sentence has been completely served and he has 

not shown that he can satisfy the in-custody requirements of 

section 2254. See generally, Freiser, 411 U.S. at 484, 487. 

No . CRF-78-5242 

In his federal habeas petition, petitioner alleged that the 

state court was without jurisdiction to try him as an adult 

because he was an uncertified juvenile, and he was denied due 

process and equal protection by the state court's application of 

Edwards v. State, 591 F.2d 313 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979). He also 

alleged that his guilty plea was invalid because it was induced by 

the invalid prior convictions and that the state court improperly 

relied on the infirm prior convictions to enhance his sentence. 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-6172 Document: 010110038279 Date Filed: 07/12/1990 Page: 3 
The district court held that the state's use of the Edwards 

procedure was constitutional. The district court also held that 

by entering a guilty plea, petitioner waived any collateral 

attacks upon his sentence challenging the prior convictions. He 

knew of the maximum sentence possible even though he did not know 

the unenhanced minimum sentence. See Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 801; 

Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 5l(b). The court held that petitioner 

failed to indicate how knowing the correct minimum sentence would 

have made any difference in his decision to enter a guilty plea 

and that the record showed his plea was voluntary and knowing. On 

appeal, petitioner argues that these rulings are in error. 

In 1979, petitioner, then a juvenile, was not certified as an 

adu l t because he had previously been certified in Nos. CRF-77-68 

and CRF-78-2. A juvenile who has been certified to stand trial as 

an adult and is convicted "shall be tried as an adult in all 

subsequent criminal prosecutions, and shall not be subject to the 

jurisdiction of the juvenile court in any further proceedings." 

Okla. Stat. tit. 10, § 1112(d). When the prior convictions were 

dismissed, the certification was also deemed invalid thereby 

invalidating the certification here. However, the Oklahoma Court 

of Criminal Appeals permitted petitioner to apply for an Edwards 

hearing to determine whether he would have been certified in 1979. 

The state court determined that he would have been certified. 

The state court properly applied the procedures announced in 

Edwards. This court has permitted the use of these procedures 

after a prior certification has been declared invalid in order to 

determine whether a person would have been certified had a hearing 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-6172 Document: 010110038279 Date Filed: 07/12/1990 Page: 4 
been held at the time. Cf. Crisp v. Mayabb, 668 F.2d 1127, 1131 

(10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 827 (1982). This 

procedure is constitutional and, therefore, the state court had 

jurisdiction to try petitioner as an adult. 

The summary of facts sheet establishes that petitioner's plea 

was voluntary and knowing as required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 

U.S. 238, 242 (1969). Moore v. Anderson, 474 F.2d 1118, 1120 

(10th Cir. 1973). Petitioner knew the direct consequences of his 

plea, including the maximum penalty to be imposed. Worthen v. 

Meachum, 842 F.2d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir. 1988). The fact that 

petitioner entered his plea out of fear that his sentence would be 

more severe if he went to trial does not render the plea 

involuntary. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). 

The fact that petitioner may not challenge his plea does not 

mean that his sentence cannot now be corrected in light of the 

fact that the convictions upon which the enhanced sentence was 

based have since been declared invalid. Although the maximum 

sentence petitioner could have received was the same regardless of 

whether the sentence was enhanced, the minimum sentence did vary 

from not less than twenty years under Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 51B 

to not less than five years under Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 801. The 

state court sentenced petitioner to the minimum enhanced sentence 

of twenty years. 

In Hicks v. Oklahoma, 477 U.S. 343 (1980), petitioner was 

sentenced by a jury to a mandatory forty years imprisonment under 

the habitual offender statute. The statute was later declared 

unconstitutional by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-6172 Document: 010110038279 Date Filed: 07/12/1990 Page: 5 
However, that court refused to resentence petitioner holding that 

he was not prejudiced, since his sentence was within the 

permissible range of punishment. The Court held that a criminal 

defendant in Oklahoma has "a substantial and legitimate 

expectation that he will be deprived of his liberty only to the 

extent determined by the jury in the exercise of its statutory 

discretion." Id. at 346. An appellate court may cure any such 

sentencing error by reconsidering the appropriateness of the 

sentence. Id. at 347. However, in Hicks, the appellate court 

"simply affirmed the sentence imposed by the jury under the 

invalid mandatory statute. In doing so, the State deprived the 

petitioner of his liberty without due process of law." Id.; see 

also Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S. Ct. 1441, 1447 (1990). 

The Fifth Circuit has held that in order to determine whether 

petitioner has established 

a valid Hicks claim, the state criminal defendant must 

show (1) either (A) that the sentencing decision was not 

made by the sentencing authority designated. under state 

law or (B) that the sentencing authority lacked 

knowledge and understanding of the range of sentencing 

discretion under state law and (2), in the case of 

either (A) or (B), that there was a "substantial" 

"possibility" that prejudice was thereby caused. 

Dupuy v. Butler, 837 F.2d 699, 703 (5th Cir. 1988). 

Here, petitioner was not sentenced under the correct statute. 

Therefore, the court imposed the minimum sentence possible under 

the incorrect statute. Because petitioner was sentenced to the 

minimum under that statute, there is a substantial possibility he 

would have been sentenced to less than twenty years had he been 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-6172 Document: 010110038279 Date Filed: 07/12/1990 Page: 6 
sentenced under the correct statute. Cf. Shaw v. Johnson, 786 

F.2d 993, 998 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 843 (1986). 

The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals did not exercise its 

d i scretion by correcting petitioner's sentence after the invalid 

prior felony convictions were dismissed or by remanding the case 

for resentencing by the trial court. See Carbray v. Champion, 

F.2d , No. 89-5152, slip op. at 7-10, (10th Cir. filed 

May 25, 1990). While we have the option to reduce petitioner's 

sentence to the minimum sentence of five years under section 801, 

it is preferable that the state court resentence petitioner. 

Therefore, the petition for habeas corpus is granted unless 

the state court resentences petitioner within a reasonable time to 

be fixed by the district court. If petitioner is not resentenced, 

we reduce his sentence to the five year minimum and order him 

released. The record shows petitioner has fully served this 

sentence. It does not show any other felony convictions which 

could be used for enhancement. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma is REVERSED in part, and the case is 

REMANDED to the district court with directions that the writ of 

habeas corpus be granted releasing petitioner from custody unless 

the state resentences petitioner, establishes that petitioner is 

in custody for other offenses, or shows that other felony 

convictions are available for enhancement purposes. 

v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 (1988). The district court's 

7 

See Lockhart 

judgment is 

Appellate Case: 89-6172 Document: 010110038279 Date Filed: 07/12/1990 Page: 7 
AFFIRMED as to No. CRF-78-5193 and as to the validity of 

petitioner's conviction in No. CRF-78-5242. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

8 

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