Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-04831/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-04831-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

COREY A. MITCHELL,

Petitioner,

v.

ANTHONY HEDGPETH,

Respondent.

Case No. 09-cv-04831-EMC 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

I. INTRODUCTION

Corey Mitchell filed this pro se action for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 to challenge his conviction in Alameda County Superior Court. Respondent has filed an 

answer to the petition and Mr. Mitchell has filed a traverse. For the reasons discussed below, the 

Court denies the petition.

II. BACKGROUND

A. The Crimes

Mr. Mitchell was convicted of several counts of carjacking and related crimes. The facts 

of only two of the five carjacking episodes are relevant to the legal claims presented in the petition 

for writ of habeas corpus. The California Court of Appeal described those two criminal episodes:

B. Janet Grossman (Counts 4-5)

On October 19, 2003, at about 4:30 p.m., Janet Grossman was on 

Hill Lane behind her home in Piedmont. Her home had a detached 

garage accessible from Hill Lane. Grossman was leaving her garage 

and entering the garden area of her home when defendant 

approached her. He pointed a gun at her and said, “„Lady, I need the 

keys to your car.‟” Grossman said that she did not have the keys 

with her. Defendant repeated that he needed the keys and that he 

would shoot her if she did not give them to her. She then 

volunteered to get the keys and promised not to call the police. 

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Defendant said he could not allow that and followed her into the 

house, pointing the gun at her. Her son, who was in the basement of 

the house, yelled out “„Mom‟” when she entered the house. 

Grossman screamed at him to stay put and not to come upstairs. 

The distance from the garden to the house was about 70 feet. Once 

inside the pantry area of her kitchen, Grossman retrieved her car 

keys and handed them to defendant. Defendant fled in Grossman‟s 

Ford Explorer.

On October 24, 2003, Grossman viewed a photographic line-up. 

She said that a photograph of Shultz looked like the perpetrator 

except for the mustache, his eye color and his ears. On October 30, 

2003, Grossman attended a physical lineup. She identified 

defendant as the perpetrator and also identified him at trial.

* * *

E. Katherine Rice and Sarah Foster (Counts 12-14, 16)

On October 27, 2003, Katherine Rice was returning to her Oakland 

home at approximately 5:15 p.m. She parked her Ford Expedition in 

the driveway. While she was still in the car, her partner, Sarah 

Foster, came over to the car and opened the passenger door. They 

talked while Foster leaned over the front seat and looked for 

something in the glove compartment. As they talked, Rice noticed 

two men walking toward the back of the car. Rice saw them 

continue walking toward the direction of 42nd Street. She continued 

to talk with Foster but then sensed someone at the driver‟s side 

window. Rice turned toward her window and saw defendant 

pointing a gun at her. Defendant told her to get out of the car. Rice 

got out of the car and was carrying her purse. As Rice got out of the 

car, Foster too backed away from it. Defendant demanded Rice‟s 

purse. Rice hesitated but gave it to him after he repeated his 

demand. Rice backed away and hid behind a neighbor‟s car. 

Defendant fled in the car. Foster called 911.

A high speed chase ensued. Defendant eventually crashed into a 

parked car at 33rd Street and Martin Luther King Jr. Way. He 

jumped out of the car and ran off. The police pursued defendant on 

foot and defendant was taken into custody within a few minutes.

The police later took Rice and Foster to make a field identification.

Both identified defendant as the perpetrator. They also identified 

defendant at trial.

People v. Mitchell, Nos. A113501, A118946, 2008 WL 2898663, at *2-3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 

Mr. Mitchell does not assert any claims relating to the facts of three other carjacking 

episodes so they need only be mentioned briefly. First, on the morning of October 17, 2003, Mr. 

Mitchell hit Vance Goulart and took his car at gunpoint. Id. at *1-2. Second, on the afternoon of 

October 24, 2003, Mr. Mitchell shot Santos Cruz in the chest and took his minivan. Id. at *2.

Third, on the afternoon of October 26, 2003, Mr. Mitchell took Marie Sylvestre‟s car at gunpoint. 

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Id. at 3.

B. Procedural History

Following a jury trial in Alameda County Superior Court in 2006, Mr. Mitchell was 

convicted of six counts of carjacking, two counts of second degree robbery, three counts of 

possession of a firearm by a felon, kidnapping in the commission of a carjacking, assault with a 

semiautomatic firearm, and reckless driving while fleeing from a peace officer. The jury also 

found true several sentence enhancement allegations. On March 20, 2006, the court sentenced Mr. 

Mitchell to state prison for a term of 62 years to life. 

Mr. Mitchell then filed a direct appeal and a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The 

California Court of Appeal dismissed one count of carjacking and otherwise affirmed the 

judgment. The California Court of Appeal denied Mr. Mitchell‟s petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. In 2008, the California Supreme Court denied Mr. Mitchell‟s petition for review. 

On October 9, 2009, Mr. Mitchell filed his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. The 

case was eventually stayed to allow Mr. Mitchell to exhaust state court remedies for an 

unexhausted claim. Mr. Mitchell next went to the state courts, and presented that claim to exhaust 

it. When he returned to federal court, respondent successfully moved to dismiss that nowexhausted claim as procedurally barred. The following claims remain for adjudication: (1) the 

evidence is insufficient to support the conviction of kidnapping in the commission of a carjacking

in Count 4; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the carjacking conviction in Count 13; and 

(3) the Marsden motions to substitute counsel were improperly denied. Respondent has filed an 

answer, and Mr. Mitchell has filed a traverse. 

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action for a writ of habeas corpus under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the petition 

concerns the conviction and sentence of a person convicted in Alameda County, California, which 

is within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 2241(d).

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in 

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custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The Antiterrorism And Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) amended § 2254 

to impose new restrictions on federal habeas review. A petition may not be granted with respect to 

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court‟s adjudication of 

the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the „contrary to‟ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court 

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if 

the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000).

“Under the „unreasonable application‟ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if 

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court‟s 

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner‟s case.” Id. at 413. 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its 

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law 

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. “A 

federal habeas court making the „unreasonable application‟ inquiry should ask whether the state 

court‟s application of clearly established federal law was „objectively unreasonable.‟” Id. at 409.

V. DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the Kidnapping Conviction

Mr. Mitchell contends that his conviction of kidnapping during the commission of a 

carjacking violates his due process rights because there was insufficient evidence to support the 

conviction. Specifically, he argues that the movement of Janet Grossman, the victim, was 

incidental to the carjacking and that the kidnapping occurred before (rather than during) the 

carjacking.

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1. The Crime of Kidnapping During The Commission of a Carjacking

California law provides for a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole 

for “[a]ny person who, during the commission of a carjacking and in order to facilitate the 

commission of the carjacking, kidnaps another person.” Cal. Penal Code § 209.5(a). A 

kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking occurs only “if the movement of the victim is 

beyond that merely incidental to the commission of the carjacking, the victim is moved a 

substantial distance from the vicinity of the carjacking, and the movement of the victim increases 

the risk of harm to the victim over and above that necessarily present in the crime of carjacking 

itself.” Id. at § 209.5(b).1

 

1 At trial, the jury was instructed with CALCRIM pattern jury instructions – the adequacy of 

which Mr. Mitchell does not contest – which set out the requirements for carjacking and 

kidnapping for carjacking. The kidnapping instruction provided: 

To prove that the defendant is guilty of [kidnapping during a 

carjacking], the People must prove: 

1. The defendant committed a carjacking;

2. During the carjacking, the defendant took, held, or detained 

another person by using force or by instilling reasonable fear;

3. The defendant moved the other person or made that person move 

a substantial distance from the vicinity of the carjacking;

4. The defendant moved or caused the other person to move with the 

intent to facilitate the carjacking;

5. The person moved was not one of the carjackers;

AND

6. The other person did not consent to the movement.

. . . 

As used here, „substantial distance‟ means more than a slight or 

trivial distance. The movement must have been more than merely 

brief and incidental to the commission of the carjacking. The 

movement must also have substantially increased the risk of 

physical or psychological harm to the person beyond that necessarily 

present in the carjacking. In deciding whether the movement was 

sufficient, consider all circumstances relating to the movement. 

“Fear,” as used in this instruction, means fear of injury to the person 

or injury to the person‟s family or property. It also means fear of 

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The asportation, or movement, requirement is similar for several types of aggravated 

kidnapping in California, such as kidnapping for rape or robbery or kidnapping during the 

commission of a carjacking. See People v. Bell, 179 Cal. App. 4th 428, 436 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); 

Cal. Penal Code §§ 209, 209.5. The jury must consider both whether the movement was more 

than merely incidental to the crime and whether there was an increased risk of harm to the victim, 

but these two “are not mutually exclusive, they are interrelated.” People v. Shadden, 93 Cal. App. 

4th 164, 168 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). As to whether the movement was more than merely incidental 

to the commission of the underlying crime in an aggravated kidnapping, such as kidnapping 

during the commission of a carjacking, “the jury considers the scope and nature of the movement, 

which includes the actual distance a victim is moved. There is, however, no minimum distance a 

defendant must move a victim to satisfy” this element. People v. Simmons, 233 Cal. App. 4th 

1458, 1471 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). “As to whether the 

movement increased a victim‟s risk of harm, the jury considers such factors as the decreased 

likelihood of detection, the danger inherent in a victim‟s foreseeable attempts to escape, and the 

attacker‟s enhanced opportunity to commit additional crimes.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). See, e.g., People v. Dominguez, 39 Cal. 4th 1141, 1151-52 (Cal. 2006) (asportation 

element of kidnapping-for-rape satisfied where the victim was moved about 25 feet from the 

shoulder of the road, down an embankment and partially into an orchard about 10-12 feet lower 

than the road‟s surface); People v. Rayford, 9 Cal. 4th 1, 23 (Cal. 1994) (asportation element 

satisfied where evidence showed rapist-defendant forcibly moved victim “105 feet at night from 

the parking lot of a closed store to the other side of a wall located at the edge of the lot” where she 

was outside the view of passers-by); Shadden, 93 Cal. App. 4th at 170 (asportation element of 

kidnapping-for-rape satisfied where victim was moved nine feet, from front counter of store to a 

small back room where she would be out of public view and which "made it less likely for others 

to discover the crime and decreased the odds of detection”).

 

immediate injury to another person present during the incident or to 

that person‟s property. 

CT 840-41 (CALCRIM 1204 (2006 version)); see Cal. Penal Code § 209.5. 

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2. California Court of Appeal Decision

The California Court of Appeal rejected Mr. Mitchell‟s challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support his conviction of kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking. The state 

appellate court noted that, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, a 

court must view the record in the light most favorable to the judgment and then must decide 

whether that record discloses substantial evidence, such that a reasonable trier of fact could find 

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Mitchell, at *6.

Here, the evidence showed that defendant forced Grossman at 

gunpoint to move from her garden to the inside of her home, a 

distance of approximately 70 feet. The asportation not only caused 

her to move from a place where she might have been seen by her 

neighbors, it increased the risk of harm to her and that of her son 

who, unbeknownst to defendant, was in the home. Moreover, the 

kidnapping was not merely incidental to the carjacking as Grossman 

had volunteered to get her keys. (See People v. Shadden (2001) 93 

Cal.App.4th 164, 168-169, 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 826 [movement that is 

neither part of nor necessary to the offense is not incidental to the 

crime].) The jury could, thus, reasonably infer that the movement 

was substantial and not incidental to the carjacking. (People v. 

Smith (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1586, 1593-1594, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 31 

[movement that changes victim‟s environment does not have to be 

great in distance to be substantial].)

Relying on People v. Moore (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 37, 88 

Cal.Rptr.2d 914, defendant argues that the kidnapping in the 

commission of a carjacking offense requires that the asportation 

occur or continue after the carjacking is complete. Moore does not 

so hold. Rather, the Moore court was concerned with the definition 

of substantial distance in the asportation requirement of section 

209.5. The court held that the trial court properly instructed the jury 

that a substantial distance from the vicinity of a carjacking is a 

distance that is more than slight, brief or trivial. (Moore, at p. 46, 88 

Cal.Rptr.2d 914.) The Moore court concluded that “„any point 

within the “vicinity” of the carjacking was a sufficient starting point 

for the calculation of whether the victim was moved a “substantial 

distance.”„” (Ibid.) Here, there is no question that Grossman was 

moved a substantial distance-70 feet-from the vicinity of the 

carjacking. Defendant‟s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 

to support his conviction of the offense therefore fails.

Mitchell, at *7.

3. Analysis of Due Process Claim

The Due Process Clause “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 

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charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A federal court reviewing collaterally a state 

court conviction does not determine whether it is satisfied that the evidence established guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather determines whether, “after viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Only if 

no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt may a court 

conclude that the evidence is insufficient. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. The “prosecution need 

not affirmatively „rule out every hypothesis except that of guilt,‟” and the reviewing federal court 

“„faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume – even if 

it does not affirmatively appear in the record – that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in 

favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.‟” Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296-

97 (1992) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326). 

The Ninth Circuit has explained that “„[c]ircumstantial evidence and inferences drawn 

from it may be sufficient to sustain a conviction.‟ Nevertheless, „mere suspicion or speculation 

cannot be the basis for creation of logical inferences.‟” Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). “Jackson leaves juries broad discretion in deciding what inferences 

to draw from the evidence presented at trial, requiring only that jurors „draw reasonable inferences 

from basic facts to ultimate facts.‟” Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2064 (2012) (per 

curiam) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). “[O]n habeas review, a federal court may not overturn 

a state court decision rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge” unless “the state court 

decision was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 2062 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The California Court of Appeal‟s rejection of Mr. Mitchell‟s challenge to the sufficiency of

the evidence was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, 

as set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court. The state appellate court identified the correct legal 

standard and reasonably applied it. 

The California Court of Appeal reasonably determined that the evidence was sufficient to 

support the jury‟s determination that the movement of Ms. Grossman was beyond that merely 

incidental to the commission of the carjacking and increased the risk of harm to her. Ms. 

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Grossman described her property as including a house, a path leading from the house to a detached 

garage, and a garden adjacent to the detached garage. One accessed the garage and garden from 

Hill Lane, a quiet thoroughfare. RT 299-301. Ms. Grossman testified that Mr. Mitchell forced her 

at gunpoint to move about 70 feet, and to move to inside her house from her garden, which was 

next to her garage or carport. RT 315 (the distance from the area she was in when confronted to 

the kitchen pantry where the keys were was about 70 feet); RT 316 (Ms. Grossman did not move 

or allow Mr. Mitchell in her house in the exercise of her own free will); RT 316 (Ms. Grossman 

thinks Mr. Mitchell kept the gun pointed at her as she walked in front of him to the house). Ms. 

Grossman‟s testimony would allow a reasonable jury to view that movement as increasing the risk 

of danger to her, as she was initially in a place where she (with her kidnapper) could be seen by 

neighbors and passers-by. See RT 309 (Ms. Grossman stalled for time, hoping that a neighbor 

would see them); RT 309 (“it‟s very typical on a warm afternoon for people to be gardening or 

doing other things in the backyard, and I was -- with the [garage] door wide open, I was hoping 

that somebody would come down Hill Lane, would see this man holding a gun at me, or would 

just notice that something wasn‟t right”). Once she was made to go in the house by Mr. Mitchell‟s 

threat of force, her opportunity to be detected and rescued by a neighbor or passerby decreased. 

Ms. Grossman‟s 13-year-old son was in the house, but Ms. Grossman‟s testimony indicates she 

thought of him as someone to be protected, rather than someone who would rescue her. See RT 

308 (her 13-year-old son was at home working on a computer in the recreation room in the 

basement); RT 314, 338 (she swung the pantry door open to slow any potential entry into the 

kitchen by her son); RT 314 (after her son called out “Mom” when she entered, she “screamed for

him to stay put and not to come upstairs”); RT 313 (“I didn‟t know if [defendant] was going to just 

leave, or if he was going to shoot me, or harm my child that was home”). Cf. People v. Simmons, 

233 Cal. App. 4th 1458, 1472 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (asportation element satisfied for kidnappingfor-robbery convictions where two victims were forced to walk back up the stairs outside the 

house and into the house to be robbed because the movement “decreased the likelihood the 

defendants would be detected and increased the victims‟ risk of harm” once in the house); People 

v. Robertson, 208 Cal. App. 4th 965, 984 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (movement of the victim from the 

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back of the garage by a door to the front of the garage next to a large tub of water, which led 

victim to fear being drowned if she resisted, “was not merely incidental and increased the victim‟s 

risk of physical and psychological harm above the risk inherent in the crime of rape”).

The jury also reasonably could have determined that the kidnapping was not merely 

incidental to the carjacking because Mr. Mitchell could have accomplished the carjacking without

the kidnapping. For example, Mr. Mitchell could have retrieved the keys himself while letting 

Ms. Grossman remain in the garden or he could have let her go to get the keys while he waited in 

the garden. See RT 313 (“I asked him if I could -- in fact, I think I begged him. I said, „Please, 

my keys are inside the house. I‟ll go back and get you the keys. I won‟t call the police. You can 

leave.‟ [¶] And he said, No, he couldn‟t do that.”); RT 314 (Ms. Grossman told him she did not 

want him in the house). The California Court of Appeal reasonably relied on Mr. Mitchell‟s 

decision to escort the victim back to her house at gunpoint as evidence that the kidnapping was not 

merely incidental to the carjacking. 

The forced movement of Ms. Grossman about 70 feet from the place where Mr. Mitchell 

first demanded the keys changed Ms. Grossman‟s environment from a relatively open area to a 

place significantly more secluded, decreasing the possibility of detection, escape or rescue. As the 

appellate court reasonably concluded, the jury could find that this compelled movement increased 

the risk of harm to Ms. Grossman, decreased the risk of detection, and provided enhanced 

opportunities for Mr. Mitchell to commit additional crimes. See People v. Martinez, 20 Cal. 4th 

225, 236-37 (Cal. 1999) (“kidnaps” “has been interpreted to require consideration of the „scope 

and nature‟ of the movement and the increased risk of harm to the victim;” nothing “limits the 

asportation element solely to actual distance”); Shadden, 93 Cal. App. 4th at 169-70 (moving 

victim nine feet was sufficient to satisfy the asportation element of kidnapping to commit rape, 

where victim was moved from the retail area of the store to a back room). 

There is no merit to Mr. Mitchell‟s argument that the kidnapping was not committed 

during the carjacking because it took place before the carjacking. “The intent that the kidnapping 

facilitate the carjacking must be present when the original asportation began.” People v. Ortiz, 

208 Cal. App. 4th 1354, 1365 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). Here, there was ample evidence that would 

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allow a jury to so find: Mr. Mitchell approached Ms. Grossman with a gun, asked for her car 

keys, and only demanded that Ms. Grossman move to her house after she told him that the keys to 

the car were in the house. She only walked to the house after Mr. Mitchell demanded that she get 

the keys to her car and followed behind her with a gun. From this evidence, a rational jury could 

have concluded that Mr. Mitchell kidnapped Ms. Grossman to obtain her keys with the intent to 

take her vehicle and accomplish the carjacking.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and drawing the 

reasonable inferences therefrom in the prosecution‟s favor, a rational trier of fact could have 

concluded that Mr. Mitchell‟s movement of Ms. Grossman was more than incidental to the 

carjacking and was done during the commission of the carjacking offense. The California Court 

of Appeal‟s rejection of the challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction 

of kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking was not an unreasonable application of 

Jackson. Mr. Mitchell is not entitled to the writ on this claim.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the Conviction For Carjacking Ms. Foster

Mr. Mitchell contends that his right to due process was violated because the evidence was 

insufficient to support his conviction of carjacking Sarah Foster. Specifically, he contends that 

Ms. Foster could not be the victim of the carjacking because she was not the driver, not a 

passenger, and not in possession of the vehicle when it was taken at gunpoint.

1. Background

Under California law, carjacking is “the felonious taking of a motor vehicle in the 

possession of another, from his or her person or immediate presence, or from the person or 

immediate presence of a passenger of the motor vehicle, against his or her will and with the intent 

to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person in possession of the motor vehicle of his 

or her possession, accomplished by means of force or fear.” Cal. Penal Code § 215(a).

2

 

2

The jury was instructed on the offense of carjacking, as follows:

To prove that the defendant is guilty of [carjacking], the People 

must prove that:

1. The defendant took a motor vehicle that was not his own;

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The California Court of Appeal rejected Mr. Mitchell‟s claim that the evidence was 

insufficient to support the conviction for carjacking Ms. Foster.

Contrary to defendant‟s contention, there was substantial evidence 

that Foster was a passenger in the Expedition. The evidence showed 

that as defendant approached to carjack the car, Foster was leaning 

over the front seat of the passenger‟s side of the car talking with 

Rice, who was in the driver‟s seat, and looking for something in the 

glove compartment. That she was not seated in the car is not 

dispositive. It is well settled that a carjacking does not require that 

the victim be inside or touching the vehicle at the time of the taking.

(People v. Coleman (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1373, 53 

Cal.Rptr.3d 505; see also People v. Coryell (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 

1299, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 477 (Coryell) [passenger who fled from a car 

after witnessing confrontation between driver and defendant at a 

phone booth was a victim of subsequent carjacking].) Here, the 

evidence that Foster was leaning into the car at the time of the 

carjacking supported the finding that she was a passenger within the 

meaning of the carjacking statute. Moreover, as a passenger, she 

had sufficient possession of the vehicle to be a victim of the 

carjacking. (Coryell, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 1304, 2 

Cal.Rptr.3d 477 [passenger in automobile has ostensible control 

over it to be in possession of the vehicle for purposes of carjacking 

statute].)

 

2. The vehicle was taken from the immediate presence of a person 

who possessed the vehicle or was its passenger;

3. The vehicle was taken against that person‟s will;

4. The defendant used force or fear to take the vehicle or to prevent 

that person from resisting; AND

5. When the defendant used force or fear to take the vehicle, he 

intended to deprive the other person of possession of the vehicle 

either temporarily or permanently.

. . . 

Two or more people may possess something at the same time.

“Fear,” as used here, means fear of injury to the person himself or 

herself or immediate injury to someone else present during the 

incident or to that person‟s property.

A vehicle is within a person‟s “immediate presence” if it is 

sufficiently within his or her control so that he or she could keep 

possession of it if not prevented by force or fear.

CT 837-38 (CALCRIM 1650 (2006 version)); see Cal. Penal Code § 215.

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Mitchell, at *8.

2. Analysis

As mentioned in Section A.3, above, a court reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support a conviction must decide whether, “after viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 319. This being a 

federal habeas action reviewing a state court conviction, relief is available only if the state court‟s

rejection of the sufficiency of the evidence challenge was “objectively unreasonable.” Coleman v. 

Johnson, 132 S. Ct. at 2062. The California Court of Appeal‟s decision was not objectively 

unreasonable. 

Unlike robbery, which requires a taking from the person or immediate presence of the

possessor, a carjacking can occur when the vehicle is taken from the person or immediate presence 

of either the possessor or any passenger. See People v. Hill, 23 Cal. 4th 853, 860 (Cal. 2000). A 

vehicle is within a person‟s immediate presence for purposes of § 215(a) “if it is so within his 

reach, inspection, observation or control, that he could, if not overcome by violence or prevented 

by fear, retain his possession of it.” People v. Johnson, 60 Cal. 4th 966, 989 (Cal. 2015) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). A passenger need not have a possessory interest to be a victim of a 

carjacking. Hill, 23 Cal. 4th at 860; e.g., id. at 860-61 (upholding two carjacking convictions; one

conviction for the carjacking of the mother who possessed the car and another conviction for the

carjacking of the infant in the car); People v. Hamilton, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1137, 1144 (Cal. Ct. 

App. 1995) (upholding two carjacking convictions where armed defendant approached husband 

and wife, who were standing outside their car from which they had just exited). California law 

also “does not require that the victim be inside or touching the vehicle at the time of the taking” 

for a carjacking to occur. People v. Coryell, 110 Cal. App. 4th 1299, 1303 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)

(passenger, who fled from the car after witnessing a vicious attack on the driver, was also a victim 

of carjacking); People v. Mora, 2007 WL 1982264, at *2-3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (unpublished 

decision) (upholding three carjacking convictions; two children had raced ahead of their father and 

were about to enter the car when defendant appeared with a gun, told them to “get back,” pointed 

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the gun at their father, took the car keys and fled in the car); People v. Aguirre, 2008 WL 

4983004, *11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (unpublished decision) (upholding carjacking conviction as to 

victim who was robbed outside a taxi and told to walk away before the taxi was taken). 

Mr. Mitchell identifies no California case holding that one‟s status as a passenger in a car 

for purposes of carjacking is contingent on that person having travelled, or planning to travel, any 

amount of distance in the vehicle. The California Court of Appeal relied on Ms. Foster‟s physical 

location (i.e., halfway in the vehicle) to determine that she was a passenger and implicitly 

determined that California law did not define a passenger based on the distance travelled or to be 

travelled for purpose of carjacking. A state court‟s interpretation of state law, including one 

announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas 

corpus. See Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005); Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629 

(1988). Thus, this court accepts that the law of California is that a person need not travel or intend 

to travel any distance before being a passenger within the meaning of the carjacking statute, 

California Penal Code § 215. 

The California Court of Appeal‟s rejection of the challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support this carjacking conviction was not an unreasonable application of Jackson v. 

Virginia. The evidence supported a finding that Ms. Foster was a passenger of the vehicle at the 

time Mr. Mitchell took it at gunpoint. She was physically partially in the car when Mr. Mitchell

pointed a gun at the driver and took the car. Ms. Foster testified she had “opened the passenger 

door, and was going through the glove compartment.” RT 604. With the door opened, she “was 

leaning in over the front seat” and talking with the driver, Ms. Rice. RT 605, 640; see also RT 

655 (Ms. Rice‟s testimony that Ms. Foster “went to the passenger‟s side -- the front passenger‟s 

side, opened the door, and we talked, and then looked for something in the glove box that she 

needed”). When Ms. Foster backed away from the car after Mr. Mitchell demanded the car from 

the driver, the passenger side door remained open as Mr. Mitchell backed out of the driveway and 

sped away in the car with the passenger door still open. RT 610-11, 647. 

In light of the evidence presented at trial, a rational trier of fact could have found that Ms. 

Foster was a passenger in the car, and that Mr. Mitchell had committed the crime of carjacking 

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against her. The California Court of Appeal‟s rejection of Mr. Mitchell‟s challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence on this count was not an unreasonable application of Jackson v. 

Virginia. 

A rational jury also could have found that Ms. Foster had a possessory interest in the car, 

although it is not necessary for a passenger to have a possessory interest to be a carjacking victim. 

The California Court of Appeal linked possessory interest with passenger status, but passenger 

status is not necessary to possessory interest. The language of the statute makes it a crime to take 

a vehicle from the possessor or a passenger, or both. See Hill, 23 Cal. 4th at 860. Regardless of 

her status as a passenger, the evidence amply supported a finding that she was a possessor of the 

car. Ms. Foster was not a mere bypasser who walked by a car that happened to be in the midst of 

being taken. Ms. Foster was the owner of the car. RT 619. The carjacking took place as Ms. 

Foster was looking through the glove compartment in search of a car registration and proof of 

insurance for an appointment she had the next day. RT 604 (“I . . . was going through the glove 

compartment, because I had an appointment on Coast Guard Island the following day, and I had to 

have proof of registration -- I mean registration and proof of insurance, and I wanted to make sure 

those documents were in fact in the glove compartment.”) Although Mr. Mitchell directed his 

attention at the driver and did not point the gun at Ms. Foster, the driver was Ms. Foster‟s 

girlfriend, and the gun was pointed at her girlfriend‟s face when Mr. Mitchell said “get out of the 

car.” RT 608-09, 636 (“he had a gun in my girlfriend‟s face”). And Ms. Foster had to back away 

from the car, or would have been hit by, or carried away in, it as Mr. Mitchell had to back out of 

the driveway before speeding away. With regard to the charge that Mr. Mitchell had committed a 

carjacking against Ms. Foster, a rational trier of fact could have concluded that the vehicle “was 

taken from the immediate presence of a person who possessed the vehicle” when the evidence 

showed that Ms. Foster was the owner of the vehicle, Ms. Foster had the door open and was 

leaning into the vehicle, and Ms. Foster had to back away from the car to avoid being taken away 

with it at Mr. Mitchell backed out of the driveway before driving away. The evidence was 

sufficient to support the conviction. Mr. Mitchell is not entitled to the writ on this claim.

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C. Claim of Wrongful Denial of Marsden Motions

Mr. Mitchell contends that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when the 

trial court denied his four Marsden3 motions against his appointed counsel, Barbara Thomas. Ms. 

Thomas was Mr. Mitchell‟s second appointed counsel, having been appointed after Frank Lang 

had been allowed to withdraw. Before withdrawing, Mr. Lang had represented Mr. Mitchell for 

about two years, during which Mr. Lang had worked on the case with his investigator. See Docket 

No. 33-2 at 32 (12/12/05 RT 29-30). 

1. Background

Attorney Frank Lang was appointed to represent Mr. Mitchell on December 4, 2003. More 

than eighteen months into that relationship, Mr. Mitchell filed a Marsden motion against Mr. 

Lang. The superior court denied that motion on August 10, 2005. (Mr. Mitchell does not 

challenge the denial of that Marsden motion.) Mr. Lang later moved to withdraw as counsel 

because Mr. Mitchell had lost “confidence in him and wanted him to be replaced, that he 

[Mitchell] was refusing to speak to [Lang], and that they disagreed over how the defense of the 

matter should be handled.” Mitchell, at *3. Eventually -- and to the dismay of Mr. Mitchell, who 

by then wanted to keep Mr. Lang as his counsel – Mr. Lang‟s motion to withdraw was granted on 

October 20, 2005, and attorney Barbara Thomas was appointed as Mr. Mitchell‟s new attorney.

Mr. Mitchell was unhappy with Ms. Thomas‟ appointment. Mr. Mitchell later explained

that he did not want Ms. Thomas to take the case because he thought he had a valid claim against 

attorney Lang that would allow him to get any eventual conviction overturned. See 11/22/05 RT 4 

(“I told her if she takes my case right now it‟s going to hurt my case just for the fact that . . . if I 

was convicted, I was for sure going to get it overturned because I have paperwork on Mr. Lang, 

but anyway, and so I told her at that time she was going to hurt my case if she took my case.”); see 

also id. at 12 (“When I asked her not to take the case . . . . I honestly don‟t want her as my 

lawyer.”) Although the court and counsel contemplated that the case file would be turned over to 

 

3

People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118 (1970), requires the California trial court to permit a criminal 

defendant requesting substitution of counsel to specify the reasons for his request and generally to 

hold a hearing.

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Ms. Thomas immediately upon her appointment on October 20, 2005, Ms. Thomas did not receive 

the case file until two weeks later. See Docket No. 33 at 10-11 (10/20/05 RT 18-19).

Defendant brought his first Marsden motion against Thomas on 

November 22, 2005. He argued that Thomas had not talked to him 

about the case and was not qualified to represent him. Thomas 

explained to the court that Lang did not provide her with the 

discovery in the case until November 3, 2005, that she was learning 

the case and reviewing approximately 2,000 pages of documents, 

and creating her motions in limine, witness list and jury instructions. 

She also remarked that she understood the prosecution intended to 

take six weeks to present its case so that she would have plenty of 

time as the case unfolded to meet with defendant. The trial court 

denied the motion, finding that the Marsden motion was premature. 

The court, however, ordered that Thomas meet with defendant 

immediately.

On December 12, 2005, defendant brought a second Marsden

motion contending that Thomas failed to meet with him, refused to 

communicate with him and had not filed motions critical to his 

defense. He acknowledged that Thomas had met with him in a 

visiting booth at the jail where they communicated by telephone. He

argued, however, that he needed a contact visit. He also argued that 

he wanted Thomas to file certain motions. Thomas explained to the 

court that she visited defendant on November 25, 2005, and that she 

was not able to schedule a contact visit for that date given the short 

notice. She said that Thomas refused to give her a list of things he 

wanted her to do. She told defendant that his motions were not 

viable on the facts. As she was explaining the various pros and cons 

of the things defendant wanted her to do, defendant became angry 

and left the visiting room. Thomas later spoke with Lang about the 

motions and learned that he had the same discussions with defendant 

during the two years he represented him, so she opined that “it‟s not 

so much what I say, it‟s just I‟m the bearer of bad news and I can‟t 

change the law.” She also stated that she offered to meet with 

defendant after the hearing but that he did not want to meet with her 

in the jail upstairs or to talk on the phone or to write. The court 

denied the motion, but admonished Thomas to make more efforts to 

talk with defendant.

Defendant made a third Marsden motion by letter on December 20, 

2005. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that defendant 

was not raising anything new since his last hearing.

On January 3, 2006, defendant brought his fourth Marsden motion. 

Defendant argued that Thomas had not visited him since the last 

Marsden hearing in December. Thomas explained that she offered to 

meet with defendant after the hearing on December 20, 2005, but 

that he refused. She told him that she could come out to the Santa 

Rita jail but that she could not arrange a contact visit. She wrote to 

him and asked him to provide her with a list of witnesses. She also 

attempted to arrange a contact visit to no avail since no one would 

answer the telephone at the jail. The court denied the motion, noting 

the difficulty in arranging contact visits in Santa Rita, and that 

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defendant still had time to consult with her because it would be over 

two weeks before the defense had to present its case.

Mitchell, at *4.

The California Court of Appeal rejected Mr. Mitchell‟s claim that the trial court had 

violated his state and federal rights by denying his several Marsden motions. 

A defendant has a right to substitute counsel upon a showing that his 

constitutional right to counsel would otherwise be substantially 

impaired. (Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 123, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 

P.2d 44.) A defendant is entitled to substitute counsel if the record 

clearly shows that his counsel is not providing competent 

representation or that the defendant and counsel are embroiled in 

such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is 

likely to result. (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1085, 74 

Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384.) “A trial court is not required to 

conclude that an irreconcilable conflict exists if the defendant has 

not made a sustained good faith effort to work out any 

disagreements with counsel and has not given counsel a fair 

opportunity to demonstrate trustworthiness.” (People v. Crandell

(1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 860, 251 Cal.Rptr. 227, 760 P.2d 423.) We 

review a trial court‟s denial of a Marsden motion for abuse of 

discretion. (People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 690-691, 25 

Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 863 P.2d 192 (Smith).)

Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion because it 

did not hold a hearing after receiving his letter of December 20, 

2005. As defendant acknowledges, in People v. Wharton (1991) 53 

Cal.3d 522, 580, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290, our Supreme 

Court held that where the defendant, in a detailed letter to the court, 

explains the reasons for his dissatisfaction with counsel in sufficient 

detail, the court is not required to conduct a hearing. Here, as in 

Wharton, defendant‟s letter apprised the court of his complaints 

about Thomas. In any event, defendant was given an additional 

opportunity to discuss his issues with counsel shortly thereafter 

during the hearing on his fourth Marsden motion on January 3, 

2006. No error appears.

Defendant also argues the record shows that Thomas never had a 

“private conversation” with him, and that they became embroiled in 

an irreconcilable conflict. The record, however, demonstrates that 

Thomas met with defendant several days after the first Marsden

hearing. While it was not a contact visit, Thomas discussed the case 

with defendant, and explained the pros and cons of the various 

motions he wished to make. Defendant, however, became angry and 

terminated the visit. As Thomas explained to the court during the 

second Marsden hearing, she asked Lang, defendant‟s former 

counsel, about the motions and “he ... indicated that he had all of 

these discussions with Mr. Mitchell earlier and that he had gone 

over everything that I had gone over, such as the standing issue and 

the 1538, such as the Pitchess information.... [H]e‟d gone over those 

items with Mr. Mitchell in detail during the two years that he 

represented him.” And, Thomas informed the court that she offered 

to meet with defendant at the jail after the second Marsden hearing, 

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but he indicated that he did not want to talk at the upstairs jail, 

insisting instead on a contact visit at the Santa Rita jail.

Hence, this is not a case where defendant did not have an 

opportunity to discuss his case with his attorney, but rather one 

where defendant could have made more use of the time his counsel 

had to talk with him about the case. By the time of trial in midDecember 2005, defendant‟s case had been pending for more than 

two years, and the case was proceeding on a “no-time-waiver.” 

Thomas, who was substituted as counsel on October 20, 2005, was 

under a time constraint to prepare the case for trial, and even with 

the limited time available made numerous attempts to communicate 

with defendant. Defendant, however, stifled Thomas‟s attempts to 

discuss the case further.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Marsden

motions. The record shows that Thomas was a competent and 

experienced attorney. As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 

recognized, “[w]e know of no case establishing a minimum number 

of meetings between counsel and client prior to trial necessary to 

prepare an attorney to provide effective assistance of counsel....” 

(United States ex rel. Kelba v. McGinnis (7th Cir.1986) 796 F.2d 

947, 954.) While it might have been optimal for Thomas to have met 

with defendant more frequently prior to trial, the trial court accepted 

Thomas‟s explanation; and we cannot conclude that defendant was 

entitled to a substitution of counsel on that basis.

The California Supreme Court has cautioned trial courts to substitute 

counsel only when necessary--that is, only when the record clearly 

shows that counsel is not providing competent representation or that 

the defendant and counsel are embroiled in such an irreconcilable 

conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result. (Smith, 

supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 696, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 863 P.2d 192.) Here, 

the trial court inquired into defendant‟s dissatisfaction with counsel 

at several hearings; the court was entitled to accept counsel‟s 

explanations for her actions. To the extent defendant complained 

about counsel‟s failure to meet with him before trial, the record 

shows that Thomas did meet with him and made several efforts to 

meet again prior to trial but that defendant declined to meet. It is 

well settled that “a defendant may not force the substitution of 

counsel by his own conduct that manufactures a conflict.” (Ibid.) On 

this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

defendant‟s Marsden motions.

Mitchell, at *5-6.

2. Analysis

The Sixth Amendment grants criminal defendants who can afford to retain counsel a 

qualified right to hire counsel of their choice. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 164 

(1988). A criminal defendant who cannot afford to retain counsel has no right to counsel of his 

own choosing. See id. Nor is he entitled to an attorney who likes and feels comfortable with him. 

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The Sixth Amendment guarantees effective assistance of counsel, not a “meaningful relationship”

between an accused and his counsel. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983). The essential 

aim is “to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a 

defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers.” Wheat, 486 U.S. at 

159. Nonetheless, to compel a criminal defendant to undergo a trial with the assistance of an 

attorney with whom he has become embroiled in irreconcilable conflict is to deprive the defendant 

of counsel. Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181, 1197 (9th Cir. 2005). “[N]ot every conflict or 

disagreement between the defendant and counsel implicates Sixth Amendment rights.” Schell v. 

Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1027 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

4

 The “ultimate constitutional question” on 

federal habeas review is whether the state trial court‟s denial of the Marsden motion “actually 

violated [the defendant‟s] constitutional rights in that the conflict between [the defendant] and his 

attorney had become so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication or other significant 

impediment that resulted in turn in an attorney-client relationship that fell short of that required by 

the Sixth Amendment.” Schell, 218 F.3d at 1026. 

Under circuit precedent, the superior court must make an inquiry when a criminal 

defendant moves to substitute counsel based on an irreconcilable conflict with counsel. See 

Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873. 886-87 (9th Cir. 2007). There is no U.S. Supreme Court 

precedent on the procedural steps that must be taken when a criminal defendant moves for 

substitution of appointed counsel based on an irreconcilable conflict with counsel, so it is doubtful 

that the mere failure to make an adequate inquiry into the claimed conflict could support habeas 

relief because the AEDPA requires this court to evaluate the state court‟s decision with reference 

only to “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

 

4

The term “conflict of interest” is a term of art that ordinarily “denotes representation of multiple 

conflicting interests, such as an attorney‟s representation of more than one defendant in the same 

criminal case, or representation of a defendant where the attorney is being prosecuted for related 

crimes.” See Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 886 (9th Cir. 2007). That sort of conflict could 

be the basis for a motion for substitution of counsel. There also is another kind of conflict, usually 

pertaining to the conduct of the defense or trial strategy, that is referred to as an “irreconcilable 

conflict” between attorney and client that gives rise to many motions to substitute counsel. See id.

It is this latter sort of perceived irreconcilable conflict that prompted Mr. Mitchell‟s Marsden

motions. 

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States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In any event, the superior court did conduct adequate inquiries 

into Mr. Mitchell‟s concerns about his appointed counsel. See Hudson v. Rushen, 686 F.2d 826, 

831 (9th Cir. 1982) (state court conducted adequate hearing when it invited defendant to make a 

statement and listened to defendant‟s reasons for wanting new counsel). The superior court made 

a thorough inquiry into each of Mr. Mitchell‟s several Marsden motions. See Docket No. 33-1 

(11/22/05 Marsden hearing transcript); Docket No. 33-2 (12/12/05 Marsden hearing transcript); 

Docket No. 33-3 (1/3/06 Marsden hearing transcript). 5 At each hearing, the superior court 

allowed Mr. Mitchell to voice all his concerns about counsel‟s alleged shortcomings and then 

allowed attorney Thomas to respond to those concerns, asking follow-up questions as needed to 

clarify information. A separate hearing was not held after Mr. Mitchell sent a letter seeking 

reconsideration a few days after the denial of the second Marsden motion, but the superior court 

gave an adequate reason on the record: no hearing was needed because the letter did not raise any 

new information that had developed since the denial of the most recent Marsden motion. See

Docket No. 32-2 at 16-17 (RT 147-49). Additionally, as the state appellate court noted, Mr. 

Mitchell was given an opportunity to raise his issues in the next Marsden hearing about ten days 

 

5

Some of the pages in the transcripts of the Marsden hearings were redacted. The Court requested 

Respondent to supplement the record with unredacted copies of the pages that had been redacted. 

Docket No. 35. Respondent then filed a response to that request demonstrating that Respondent 

did not have the unredacted pages and could not obtain them without a court order from the 

California Court of Appeal. 

Respondent demonstrated that, at the same time he filed his Appellant‟s Opening Brief in 

the California Court of Appeal asserting the claim that the Marsden motions had been wrongly 

denied, Mr. Mitchell‟s appellate counsel had filed a motion in the California Court of Appeal to 

keep those portions of the Marsden transcripts “sealed as they contain confidential information not 

relevant to the issues on appeal.” Docket No. 36-1 at 3. The California Court of Appeal found 

good cause to grant the motion to keep portions of the Marsden transcripts sealed, and ordered a 

redacted copy of the transcripts transmitted to Respondent. See Docket No. 36 at 2. Respondent 

explained to this Court that an unredacted copy of the redacted pages could not be obtained 

without an order from the California Court of Appeal. 

Respondent also pointed out that the California Court of Appeal did not rely on the 

redacted portions of the Marsden transcripts in ruling on the claim on direct appeal. This Court 

agrees with Respondent‟s contention that this Court should not consider the redacted portion of 

the Marsden transcripts because the California Court of Appeal did not rely on them. See Holland 

v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 651-53 (2004) (per curiam) (error to grant relief in disregard of state 

court‟s statement that certain evidence was not properly before it). Accordingly, this Court 

decides the claim without using the redacted portions of the Marsden transcripts. 

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later.

The California Court of Appeal reasonably rejected the claim that Mr. Mitchell‟s Sixth 

Amendment right was violated due to an irreconcilable breakdown in the relationship between 

attorney and client requiring substitution of counsel. 

Mr. Mitchell‟s primary frustration was that Ms. Thomas would not have a contact visit 

with him. Mr. Mitchell fails to show that the other alternative means of communication were 

inadequate for him to communicate with Ms. Thomas. Mr. Mitchell simply did not want to utilize 

another method, as is shown by his responses to the other offered methods. First, Ms. Thomas met 

with Mr. Mitchell in the visiting room three days after the first Marsden hearing, and they spoke 

through a partition that divided inmates from visitors. To alleviate Mr. Mitchell‟s worries that 

someone might be eavesdropping on their communications in the visiting room, Ms. Thomas told 

Mr. Mitchell that he could write his information on a piece of paper and hold it up to the partition 

for her to read. He did not agree to this method of communication. Second, after the court session 

on December 22, 2005, counsel offered to meet Mr. Mitchell in the jail upstairs from the 

courtroom, where they could have a meeting that was “essentially a contact meeting” and where 

they “would not be heard.” Docket No. 33-3 at 4 (RT 168). Mr. Mitchell did not agree and 

instead decided he would rather return to the Santa Rita Jail on the early bus. (Id.) Third, counsel 

sent to Mr. Mitchell paper and stamped envelopes so Mr. Mitchell could send her letters, but Mr. 

Mitchell rejected written communication, professing to be “semi-illiterate.” See Docket No. 33-2 

at 11 (12/12/05 RT 8). Yet Mr. Mitchell was a high school graduate, see CT 1107; cogently 

argued his Marsden requests; and had handwritten a four-page letter to the judge requesting that 

the judge reconsider an earlier Marsden decision. See Docket No. 17-1 at 45-48. Especially 

having Mr. Mitchell‟s handwritten letter in front of him, the judge rightly gave little weight to any 

suggestion by Mr. Mitchell that he could not communicate in writing. Fourth, when Mr. Mitchell 

refused to meet with Ms. Thomas at the jail upstairs from the courtroom on December 22, 2005, 

she “told him if [she] came out to Santa Rita [Jail], it would not be a contact visit,” to which he 

responded that she should not come to Santa Rita Jail. RT 168. Even though Ms. Thomas told 

Mr. Mitchell she would not travel to Santa Rita Jail to have a contact visit, she actually did try to 

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set one up. Ms. Thomas was unable to set up a contact visit at the Santa Rita Jail due to her 

inability to reach someone at the jail who would set up the visit in a timely manner. RT 169-170.

The California Court of Appeal pointed out that there is no specific number of meetings 

that must be held between an attorney and client before trial. As that court reasonably determined, 

more meetings might have been better, but Mr. Mitchell had an opportunity to discuss his case 

with Ms. Mitchell and could have made better use of the time that his counsel did have to talk with 

him. The record amply supports a determination that Mr. Mitchell‟s behavior and unrealistic 

demands for a contact visit were the real cause of any shortfall in the communications between 

him and Ms. Thomas. The Sixth Amendment is not violated when a defendant is represented by a 

lawyer free of actual conflicts of interest, but with whom the defendant refuses to cooperate 

because of dislike or distrust. Plumlee v. Masto, 512 F.3d 1204, 1211 (9th Cir. 2008); see Larson 

v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057, 1067 (9th Cir. 2008) (no relief under AEDPA for defendant who did 

not argue counsel had either an actual or apparent conflict of interest, and instead complained only 

about lack of communication with counsel and counsel‟s strategic decisions, including not making 

motions defendant requested, contacting witnesses without defendant‟s consent, and not providing 

defendant with a defense witness list for his approval): see generally Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d at 

1026 (suggesting that Sixth Amendment violation would not occur if the conflict between counsel 

and client was of the client‟s own making); Crandell v. Bunnell, 144 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 

1998) (pre-AEDPA case) (“had the magistrate judge found that the [criminal defendant] sabotaged 

the relationship or failed to make reasonable efforts to develop the relationship . . . then the ruling 

today might be different” from the order granting relief where counsel was plainly deficient), 

overruled on other grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2000). 

In the Marsden hearings, Mr. Mitchell faulted counsel for not talking to him about his 

case, but the record shows that Mr. Mitchell and Ms. Thomas did talk about the case and Ms. 

Thomas also had a lot of information about the case based on materials in the case file obtained 

from attorney Lang, who earlier had communicated with Mr. Mitchell about the case. Mr. 

Mitchell and Ms. Thomas communicated about potential defense motions, and Mr. Mitchell was 

dismayed by Ms. Thomas‟ view of the likely futility of certain motions he wanted her to make. 

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Ms. Thomas explained at the second Marsden hearing the various motions and strategies she had 

discussed with Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Mitchell wanted a suppression motion filed, but Ms. Thomas 

thought the motion would fail because the apartment had been searched with a valid consent from 

the resident or owner of the apartment. Mr. Mitchell wanted Pitchess motions filed to obtain 

personnel records of all law enforcement officers who had contact with a van in which his DNA 

was found to support his theory that the DNA evidence had been planted. Ms. Thomas explained 

that there were numerous law enforcement people involved and Mr. Mitchell could not identify 

any one of them who had reason to plant evidence against him; more importantly, regardless of the 

DNA evidence, Mr. Mitchell had been identified by “civilian” witnesses as the carjacker. Mr. 

Mitchell apparently wanted a DNA expert, and Ms. Thomas explained that Mr. Mitchell‟s desire 

for an expert to challenge the DNA evidence was inconsistent with Mr. Mitchell‟s insistence that 

the DNA had been “planted,” because an argument that DNA evidence has been “planted” 

generally concedes that the DNA is a defendant‟s DNA. Mr. Mitchell apparently wanted counsel 

to search for alibi and other witnesses, but apparently gave her incomplete identifying information 

such that finding the witnesses would be very difficult. Also, Ms. Thomas intimated that the 

expected information from the witnesses would not be helpful to Mr. Mitchell‟s defense, although 

the transcript is less than clear on her reasoning. Ms. Thomas also explained to the court that, 

after talking to Mr. Mitchell, she contacted Mr. Mitchell‟s prior attorney, Mr. Lang, who told her 

that he had gone over these same points with Mr. Mitchell, and Mr. Mitchell was dismayed with 

his analysis as well. Ms. Thomas told the superior court that she was the messenger with the bad 

news for the client. The superior court accepted counsel‟s explanations as reasonable ones. See

Docket No. 33-2 (12/12/05 Marsden hearing transcript). 

The record shows that Mr. Mitchell refused to cede to the lawyer‟s judgment on legal 

questions and matters of trial strategy, if he disagreed with it. A client‟s erroneous view of the law 

that counsel does not accept does not provide a sufficient reason to discharge counsel. The 

client‟s unwillingness to let the lawyer make tactical determinations is not a legitimate reason to 

compel appointment of new counsel. See Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d at 1026 & n.8. 

“Disagreements over strategical or tactical decisions do not rise to [the] level of a complete 

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breakdown in communication” that amounts to a Sixth Amendment violation. Stenson v. Lambert, 

504 F.3d at 886 (citing Schell, 218 F.3d at 1026).

Further, counsel was working under tight time constraints. Mr. Mitchell was under a notime-waiver and his trial had to start by December 15, 2005 for speedy trial purposes. Ms. 

Thomas was appointed less than two months before trial was set to start, and received a file with 

about 2,000 pages of material six weeks before trial was set to start. Ms. Thomas explained to the 

superior court that she had a lot of documents to review, had to make witness files, and had to 

prepare motions in limine and jury instructions. Her efforts to prepare for trial were being 

hindered by a client who refused to engage in any sort of communications other than a contact 

visit. Also, there were no plea negotiations to discuss with the client because the prosecutor 

“ha[d] not made an offer and steadfastly refuse[d] to make an offer” as of December 12, 2005. 

Docket No. 33-2 at 23 (12/12/05 RT 20).

Mr. Mitchell argued on appeal that the superior court exceeded the bounds of law and 

reason when it rejected his Marsden motions as “premature.” Mitchell misunderstood the judge‟s 

comment. In context, the comment meant that there was still time for the attorney to prepare the 

case and communicate with Mitchell. Contrary to Mitchell‟s intimation, the trial judge was not 

suggesting that a Marsden motion could not be made until after trial. That the trial judge did not 

reject the motion for the procedural reason that it was unripe is evident from the fact that the judge 

discussed the merits of Mr. Mitchell‟s complaints about counsel. When the trial court commented 

that the motion was “premature,” the essence of the message was there was still time to 

accomplish the things the criminal defendant was faulting counsel for not doing, rather than that 

the court would not entertain the motion because it was too early in the proceedings for a criminal 

defendant to ever make such a motion. See, e.g., 11/22/05 RT at 11, 15 (trial court states that, 

since Ms. Thomas first received the case file with 2,000 pages three weeks ago, “she had been 

working on that, and that‟s what she should be doing. I will agree with you that it would be nice if 

she would come out and see you, so you guys could have a sit down, and you can tell her -- from 

your standpoint you can give her information that she can follow up on, and I think that needs to 

be done right away. That sit down needs to take place so that she can get to work on that, and we 

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can revisit this if we need to down the line a little bit, but I just think that the motion is a little 

premature right now because of the timing.”); Docket No. 32-2 at 31 (12/22/05 hearing at which 

Mr. Mitchell complains he has not had a consultation with his attorney; judge responds that the 

next court day is “almost two weeks away, so this may be premature”); Docket No. 33-3 at 10

(1/3/06 Marsden hearing ends with judge noting that the prosecution‟s case is “about to start,” and 

the defense case will not start for at least two weeks, “so there‟s still time to consult on what you 

might say if you were to say something.”) 

In light of the evidence presented at the Marsden hearings, the trial court could reasonably 

think that Mr. Mitchell‟s claimed conflict with counsel was almost completely due to his stubborn 

insistence that she meet with him in person for a contact visit and Mr. Mitchell‟s disagreement 

with Ms. Thomas‟ strategic decisions about the futility of certain motions he wanted presented. 

Bearing in mind that the “purpose of providing assistance of counsel „is simply to ensure that 

criminal defendants receive a fair trial,‟” Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159, it was not unreasonable for the 

California Court of Appeal to determine that that purpose was fulfilled in this case and that no 

Sixth Amendment violation occurred. The California Court of Appeal‟s rejection of Mr. 

Mitchell‟s claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law as set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court. Mr. Mitchell is not entitled to the writ on this 

claim.

D. No Certificate of Appealability

A certificate of appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). This is not a case in 

which “reasonable jurists would find the district court‟s assessment of the constitutional claims 

debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Accordingly, a certificate of 

appealability is DENIED. 

///

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VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED on the merits. 

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 9, 2017

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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