Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-06-01750/USCOURTS-ca7-06-01750-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 06-1750

DAVID PAUL HAMMER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JOHN D. ASHCROFT, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. IP 01-558-C-T/G—John Daniel Tinder, Judge.

____________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 26, 2007—DECIDED JANUARY 15, 2008

____________

Before BAUER, ROVNER, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. David Hammer, a federal

prisoner on death row, sued various Bureau of Prisons

(“BOP”) officials alleging that they violated his First

Amendment and equal protection rights by implementing and enforcing a policy that prevents him from giving

face-to-face interviews with the media and from talking

with the media about other inmates. The current defendants—the former Attorney General of the United States,

John Ashcroft; a former BOP Director, Kathleen HawkSawyer; and former wardens of the federal prison in Terre

Haute, Indiana, Harley Lappin and Keith Olson—moved

for summary judgment, arguing that the challenged policy

is rationally related to legitimate penological interests.

Case: 06-1750 Document: 49 Filed: 01/15/2008 Pages: 16
2 No. 06-1750

1 Hammer’s death sentence has been vacated, see United States

v. Hammer, 404 F.Supp.2d 676 (M.D. Pa. 2005)—a decision

the government is challenging in the Third Circuit Court of

Appeals, see United States v. Hammer, No. 06-9001. Although

Hammer is no longer under a death sentence, Hammer’s counsel informed us during oral argument—and the appellees do

not dispute—that he is still housed on death row at the SCU

and is still subject to the challenged policy.

The district court granted the defendants’ motion, and

Hammer appeals. Because we conclude that Hammer

raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether the defendants’

proffered justification for the policy banning face-to-face

interviews is pretextual, we reverse and remand.

I. Background

In July 1999 the BOP opened the Special Confinement

Unit (“SCU”) at the federal prison in Terre Haute, Indiana,

to house male inmates sentenced to death by the federal

courts. The SCU also houses inmates who are not under a

death sentence, but who are considered to be on “administrative detention status.” Hammer—who was under a

federal death sentence for killing his cellmate—was

among the first inmates transferred to the SCU.1

Between August and December 1999, Hammer gave

three face-to-face interviews with members of the media

in the SCU’s non-contact visiting area. No security problems arose as a result of these interviews. But in late

December 2000, Lappin ordered Hammer not to provide

information to members of the media about other inmates.

When Hammer asked Lappin for clarification, he stated

that Hammer was “prohibited from disclosing to a media

representative any information about another inmate

through any manner of communication (oral, written,

etc.).” Just over a month later, the BOP disciplined

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No. 06-1750 3

Hammer for providing information about a fellow death

row inmate to a reporter. Lappin did not, however, generally prohibit Hammer from giving face-to-face interviews.

That situation changed a few months later. In March

2000, CBS aired a national broadcast of “60 Minutes”

featuring an interview with Timothy McVeigh. At that

time McVeigh was housed at the SCU awaiting execution for his role in the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P.

Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City. Following this

interview, U.S. Senator Byron Dorgan wrote to BOP

Director Hawk-Sawyer on March 14, 2000, criticizing

the BOP for allowing the McVeigh interview and demanding that the BOP prohibit similar interviews with

other death row inmates. The published account of this

criticism described Dorgan’s view of the value of such

interviews:

The American people have a right to expect that the

incarceration of a convicted killer will not only remove

him physically from society, but will also prevent

him from further intrusion in our lives through television interviews and from using those forums to advance his agenda of violence.

Soon thereafter Lappin (then the SCU warden) denied

every media request for a face-to-face interview with

Hammer. When Hammer filed an administrative grievance to protest these denials, Lappin informed him that

the procedures for granting interviews “have evolved” since

the SCU opened and that requests for in-person media

interviews are evaluated on “a case-by-case basis.”

The policy on face-to-face interviews evolved further

one month later. On April 12, 2001, Ashcroft and HawkSawyer gave a press conference during which they announced a change from the case-by-case policy to a blanket

policy preventing SCU inmates from having face-to-face

interviews with members of the media on any subject at

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4 No. 06-1750

any time. The policy allows SCU inmates to speak to the

media only by telephone during their ordinary 15-minute

daily allotment of telephone time. In announcing this

policy, Ashcroft explained that it is designed to prevent

murderers from, in his view, altering our culture by

glamorizing violence:

I am aware that several media outlets have requested

access to interview inmate McVeigh. As an American

who cares about our culture, I want to restrict a mass

murderer’s access to the public podium. On an issue

of particular importance to me as Attorney General of

the United States, I do not want anyone to be able to

purchase access to the podium of America with the

blood of 168 innocent victims.

***

I’m concerned about irresponsible glamorization of

a culture of violence, and that concern has shaped our

approach to these issues profoundly.

Hawk-Sawyer announced that the 15-minute telephone

limitation “will become the policy for the [SCU] in general.”

Three days after the press conference, Lappin signed

Institution Supplement 1480.05A (“the media policy”),

which states that “[t]o maintain safety, security and the

good order of the SCU, in-person interviews (including

video-recorded interviews) will not be permitted.” To

gain permission for a 15-minute telephone interview

under the new media policy, members of the press must

agree that they will not ask an SCU inmate any questions

about other federal or state prisoners. And members of

the press must agree not to publish any information that

an SCU inmate volunteers about other prisoners. All

parties agree that the media policy does not apply to

all SCU inmates—it applies only to those SCU inmates

who have been sentenced to the death penalty.

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No. 06-1750 5

Hammer sued the defendants under Bivens v. Six

Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging that the media policy’s

ban on in-person interviews and discussions about other

inmates violated his First Amendment and equal protection rights. The district court dismissed the complaint

under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1), but we reversed, finding that Hammer’s

allegations—specifically, that the defendants implemented the media policy to prevent death row inmates

from speaking publicly rather than to further security

concerns—stated a claim, see Hammer v. Ashcroft, et al.,

42 Fed. App’x 861, 863 (7th Cir. 2002).

After we remanded the case, Hammer moved three

times for the court to recruit counsel on his behalf. The

district court denied each motion. Hammer also filed three

requests for discovery, but instead of responding to those

requests, the defendants moved for summary judgment

a full month before the close of discovery. Only after

filing their summary judgment motion did the defendants

respond to Hammer’s discovery requests by objecting

to them all. Hammer filed a motion for a continuance

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), arguing that

he needed additional time to procure discovery from the

defendants. He also filed a brief opposing the motion

for summary judgment. The court entered an order

granting the continuance “to the extent that his filings

in this action . . . shall be deemed to have been timely

made,” but it denied Hammer any extension of time to

conduct further discovery.

In support of the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, Lappin submitted a declaration purporting to

justify the SCU’s media policy. He explained that broadcasting face-to-face interviews of inmates can create

“jailhouse celebrities,” giving them heightened status

among the inmates and leading to security breaches.

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6 No. 06-1750

He also explained that it was necessary to restrict inmates from discussing other inmates with the media to

prevent privacy breaches or “real or imagined slights,

insults or provocations” that could inflame tensions in the

SCU. In his response, Hammer argued that Lappin’s

articulated security rationale for the ban on face-to-face

interviews was “a guise” to cover up “the real reason”

behind the ban—anger over the McVeigh interview and

the resulting outrage over death row inmates speaking

to a national audience. The court granted the defendants’

motion for summary judgment, stating that the media

policy is reasonably related to legitimate penological

interests.

II. Analysis

On appeal Hammer argues that the SCU’s media

policy preventing death row inmates from giving face-toface interviews with the media violates his equal protection, First Amendment, and procedural due process

rights. Specifically, he argues that the media policy treats

death row inmates differently from all other federal

inmates based on an untested assumption that giving

death row inmates access to the media poses a categorically heightened security risk. Hammer also asserts that

he submitted evidence sufficient to show that the media

policy was passed for the impermissible reason of preventing death row inmates from speaking publicly, and not

to further security interests. He also argues that the

manner in which the BOP adopted the media policy

deprived him of due process. Finally, Hammer challenges the district court’s denial of his three motions for

counsel and his Rule 56(f) motion for a continuance.

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No. 06-1750 7

A. Constitutional Claims

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants on Hammer’s constitutional challenges to the media policy. See Steen v. Myers,

486 F.3d 1017, 1021 (7th Cir. 2007). Inmates retain

constitutional rights that are consistent with incarceration; those rights include access to the media. See Turner

v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987); Pell v. Procunier, 417

U.S. 817, 827-28 (1974). But recognizing the deference

owed to the administrative judgment of prison officials,

the Supreme Court has held that a prison regulation

infringing on an inmate’s constitutional rights is valid if

“it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. Accordingly, a prison regulation that restricts an inmate’s access to the media will

be upheld if there is a “valid, rational connection between

the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental

interest put forward to justify it.” Id. (quotation marks

omitted). Other relevant factors include whether the

regulation leaves open alternative means of exercising

the right; the impact accommodation would have on

other inmates, guards, and prison resources; and whether

there are obvious, easy alternatives to the restriction.

Id. at 89-90; see also Lindell v. Frank, 377 F.3d 655, 657

(7th Cir. 2004).

Hammer argues that we should apply strict scrutiny

to his equal protection claim, rather than the Turner

analysis, because he maintains that Turner applies only

to policies that affect all inmates within a prison equally

or that apply temporarily to individual inmates in response to a disciplinary infraction. Hammer argues

that strict scrutiny should apply here because the media

policy arbitrarily deprives death row inmates of First

Amendment freedoms that other federal prisoners

enjoy—namely, face-to-face media access. But the SuCase: 06-1750 Document: 49 Filed: 01/15/2008 Pages: 16
8 No. 06-1750

preme Court has held that the Turner analysis “applies

to all circumstances in which the needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights.” Washington v.

Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990); see also Russell v.

Richards, 384 F.3d 444, 447 (7th Cir. 2004). Post-Turner,

the Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny only to prison

regulations involving suspect classifications such as race.

See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005).

Federal inmates on death row are not a suspect class. Cf.

Pryor v. Brennan, 914 F.2d 921, 923 (7th Cir. 1990).

Accordingly, courts have declined to apply heightened

scrutiny in cases involving equal protection challenges

to prison regulations that implicate First Amendment

rights, see, e.g., Williams v. Lane, 851 F.2d 867, 881 (7th

Cir. 1988); Taylor v. Johnson, 257 F.3d 470, 474 (5th Cir.

2001); Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654-55 (4th

Cir. 2001), even where the regulations distinguish

among groups of inmates within a prison, see DeHart v.

Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 61 (3d Cir. 2000); Benjamin v.

Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571, 575 (2d Cir. 1990). Thus we

view Hammer’s equal protection and First Amendment

claims through the Turner lens.

Turning then to the first prong of the Turner analysis

and Hammer’s First Amendment claim, we ask whether

a valid, rational connection exists between the media

ban on face-to-face interviews and the cited security

interest. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. No such connection exists if the purpose of the policy is to suppress the

content of the restricted message. See id. at 90. And the

penological interest that the prison officials invoke in

court to justify the restriction must have actually motivated them at the time they enacted or enforced the

restriction; the invoked interests fail under Turner if

they are a pretext for an illegitimate, content-specific

motivation. See Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 276-77

(2d Cir. 2006) (holding that prison officials must show

Case: 06-1750 Document: 49 Filed: 01/15/2008 Pages: 16
No. 06-1750 9

that they “actually had, not just could have had, a legitimate reason for burdening protected activity” to survive

summary judgment); Abu-Jamal v. Price, 154 F.3d 128,

134 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that a prison rule is “not

content neutral as required by Turner” if it is enforced

at least in part due to public pressure rather than

security concerns); Quinn v. Nix, 983 F.2d 115, 118 (8th

Cir. 1993) (stating that “[p]rison officials are not entitled

to the deference described in Turner . . . if their actions

are not actually motivated by legitimate penological

interests at the time they act.”); Walker v. Sumner, 917

F.2d 382, 386-87 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that where a

prisoner alleges that a policy is enforced for a “dubious

purpose” officials must demonstrate that the asserted

penological interests “are the actual bases for their policies”); Baraldini v. Thornburgh, 884 F.2d 615, 620 (D.C.

Cir. 1989) (noting that “[a] reviewing court must always

be careful to make certain that prison administrators

are not pretextually using alleged concerns in order to

punish an inmate for his or her political or other views.”).

Here, Hammer submitted evidence suggesting that the

driving force behind the ban on face-to-face interviews

was not a security concern, but rather outrage over

McVeigh’s message and a desire to prevent other death

row inmates from expressing their views about themselves or their fates and thereby influencing “our culture.”

For example, without any concerns about security

breaches Lappin allowed Hammer face-to-face media

interviews until the McVeigh interview aired; after that

(and after a senator’s written protest to the BOP about

such broadcasts) Lappin denied all media requests for faceto-face interviews with Hammer. Most significantly, in

unveiling the blanket restriction on face-to-face interviews

with death row inmates, Ashcroft—with Hawk-Sawyer at

his side—explained that he wanted to deny such inmates

a platform from which they could spread their “irresponsiCase: 06-1750 Document: 49 Filed: 01/15/2008 Pages: 16
10 No. 06-1750

ble glamorization of a culture of violence.” This is evidence

from which a jury could conclude that when Aschroft’s

subordinate Lappin implemented the restriction at the

SCU just three days later, the defendants desired to

control a disfavored message rather than to secure the

SCU.

The defendants argue that this evidence amounts to

nothing more than “a coincidence of timing.” But the

evidence is more than just timing. Ashcroft explained

that his distaste for the content of interviews given by

death row inmates was the reason for the policy. That

is direct evidence of the actual motivation, and it creates

a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Lappin

was motivated by a desire to prohibit a disagreeable

viewpoint or to advance prison security.

The defendants also argue that we must defer to

Lappin’s judgment that the challenged policy is needed to

combat the problem of jailhouse celebrities. But in reviewing a grant of summary judgment we must be careful

to distinguish between matters of prison administration—on which we give substantial deference to prison

officials’ professional judgment—and matters of disputed

fact on issues like motivation—on which we draw inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Beard v.

Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578 (2006). If an inmate submits evidence showing that the penological interests

invoked by prison authorities are pretextual, the policy

is not neutral and fails under Turner. See Abu-Jamal,

154 F.3d at 134. Hammer submitted evidence from

which a reasonable jury could conclude that the media

policy was implemented and is now enforced not because of safety concerns, but rather in response to

public pressure to prevent death row inmates from

voicing their views publicly. Accordingly, summary judgment is inappropriate on Hammer’s First Amendment

challenge to the ban on face-to-face interviews based

Case: 06-1750 Document: 49 Filed: 01/15/2008 Pages: 16
No. 06-1750 11

on the first Turner factor. See Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at

276-77.

Summary judgment on the First Amendment claim

was also inappropriate as to two other Turner factors

because Hammer has cast doubt on whether the media

policy leaves open sufficient alternate routes of access to

the media and whether there are reasonable alternatives to the ban on face-to-face interviews. See Turner,

482 U.S. at 90. For example, Lappin’s justification for

the ban on face-to-face interviews is that the broadcast of

inmate interviews creates the risk of jailhouse celebrity.

The government has not explained why, then, the prison

needs to ban face-to-face interviews that are not recorded

or broadcast. Moreover, there is a question of material

fact whether the ban on discussing other inmates with the

media allows Hammer an alternate route for discussing his

criminal case. Hammer’s goal is to discuss his criminal case (which involves inmate witnesses) with members of the press to highlight his disagreement with the

prosecution. But he is subject to discipline if he engages

in those discussions. Thus there is a question of material

fact as to whether the policy leaves open any meaningful

way for Hammer to access the media to discuss his

case. Cf. Pell, 417 U.S. at 827-28.

Turning to Hammer’s equal protection claim, we note

that the district court gave this claim short shrift, stating

only that the media policy applies equally to all inmates

housed in the SCU. But this ignores Hammer’s evidence

that the media policy applies only to SCU inmates

under a death sentence, a fact that the defendants do

not dispute on appeal. And Hammer’s evidence of pretext also casts doubt on whether the defendants had a

valid interest in treating death row inmates differently

from all other federal inmates. The equal protection clause

prohibits the government from making distinctions

among groups of speakers based on the content of their

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12 No. 06-1750

speech. See, e.g., Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,

96 (1972). Here, Ashcroft said that his concern about the

“glamorization of violence” in American culture shaped

the BOP’s approach to the SCU-specific ban on death

row inmates giving face-to-face interviews. A reasonable

jury could thus conclude that death row inmates are

treated differently not because they are disproportionately likely to become jailhouse celebrities or inflame

tensions with other inmates, but because the policy

makers believed that death row inmates are disproportionately likely to promote a “glamorization of violence.”

Accordingly, the defendants are not entitled to summary

judgment on Hammer’s equal protection claim.

The district court did not address what Hammer now

argues is a claim that the defendants violated his due

process rights by adopting the media policy without

offering him notice or the opportunity to comment. But

the court did not address this claim because Hammer did

not make it; nothing in his complaint or opposition to

summary judgment would have put the defendants or

the court on notice that he objected to the process through

which the policy was adopted. Because Hammer’s purported due process claim is outside the scope of the

court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants,

we need not address it here.

We note that it can be an easy thing for an inmate to

allege that prison officials are lying about the rationale

behind a prison restriction; it is only because Hammer

has backed up his allegations with admissible evidence

from which a reasonable jury could infer that an illegitimate reason lies behind the interview ban that his

First Amendment and equal protection claims survive

summary judgment.

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No. 06-1750 13

B. Personal Involvement

The district court granted summary judgment for

Ashcroft and Hawk-Sawyer because, in its view, they

had no personal involvement in the events underlying

the allegations. A supervisory defendant is personally

involved in and liable for a constitutional violation if he

“create[s] a custom or policy fostering the violation or

allow[s] the custom or policy to continue after learning of

it.” Thomas v. Ashcroft, 470 F.3d 491, 496-97 (2d Cir.

2006). Ashcroft’s and Hawk-Sawyer’s participation in the

press conference in which they called for the BOP ban on

face-to-face interviews raises a triable issue of whether

they fostered the ban for the purpose of suppressing

expression. See Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 531 (7th

Cir. 1995). Thus summary judgment on the basis of their

non-involvement was unwarranted.

Before addressing Hammer’s procedural challenges to

the district court’s decision, we note two issues that the

district court may address on remand. Hammer has

sued the defendants in their individual and official capacities for damages, and for injunctive and declaratory relief. The defendants may be entitled to qualified immunity

from damages, but given the unresolved issues of fact,

we leave that determination to the district court in the

first instance. Hammer’s claim for injunctive relief

against the defendants in their individual capacities

is now moot because none of the defendants currently

hold the positions in which they were sued. But pursuant

to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2) and

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), the district court

should substitute the current officeholders for the officialcapacity claims and consider which of them are proper

defendants for injunctive relief under Ex Parte Young,

209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908) (requiring a “special relation”

between the public official sued and the challenged rule).

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14 No. 06-1750

C. Denial of Motions for Counsel and for a Continuance

Hammer also argues that the district court erroneously

denied his three motions to recruit counsel and his

Rule 56(f) motion for a continuance. We review the district court’s rulings on these motions for abuse of discretion. See Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1006 (7th

Cir. 2006); Davis v. G.N. Mort. Co., 396 F.3d 869, 885

(7th Cir. 2005). In resolving a motion for the recruitment

of counsel, the district court must consider both the

complexity of the case and the pro se plaintiff’s ability to

litigate it himself. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654-55

(7th Cir. 2007). The court must analyze the plaintiff’s

capabilities in light of the challenges specific to his case,

including “the tasks that normally attend litigation:

evidence gathering, preparing and responding to motions

and other court filings, and trial.” Id. at 655. In reviewing

a court’s decision to deny a motion for counsel, we

must ensure that the court meaningfully engaged in

the correct analysis, and did not render a decision arbitrarily. Id. at 658, 660.

Here, the district court’s three orders denying Hammer’s

requests for counsel do not demonstrate that the court

meaningfully considered the complexity of Hammer’s

claims. Its first order is silent regarding the difficulty of

his case. The second two orders state that Hammer “has

demonstrated familiarity with his claims and the ability

to present them, because the issues presented by his

claims are not complex, and because this does not

appear to be a case in which the presence of counsel

would make a difference in the outcome.” But this is

nothing more than a restatement of the applicable legal

standard, without any reasoning showing that the

court actually considered the standard in light of the

particulars of Hammer’s case. See id. at 660.

Case: 06-1750 Document: 49 Filed: 01/15/2008 Pages: 16
No. 06-1750 15

But we will reverse the district court’s decision to deny

counsel only on a showing of prejudice, see id. at 659,

which leads us to Hammer’s Rule 56(f) motion for a

continuance. Hammer asked for more time to conduct

discovery because the defendants moved for summary

judgment before the close of discovery and then objected

to all of his discovery requests. Because Hammer filed

his opposition to summary judgment before the court

ruled on his motion, it concluded that he did not need

further time for discovery. But the fact that Hammer

filed his response before waiting to see if the court

would grant the continuance shows only that he made

the best of what he had, not that he had a fair opportunity to avail himself of discovery. And nothing in the

court’s order denying the continuance suggests that it

considered the impact that the defendants’ premature

summary judgment motion had on Hammer’s ability to

obtain the discovery necessary to defend against the

motion.

The appellees now defend the district court’s denial of

the continuance on the ground that Hammer did not

specify what documents he needed time to procure. But

that is precisely the kind of failure that could have

been cured had the court granted his motion for counsel.

The appellees cannot have it both ways—they cannot

argue that Hammer has the ability to litigate his own

claims and then fault him when he fails to do so with the

sophistication of an attorney. We thus conclude that

the denial of counsel prejudiced Hammer, and, especially

in light of Hammer’s pro se status, that the court abused

its discretion in denying his Rule 56(f) motion for a

continuance.

For the reasons set forth above, the district court’s

decision is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.

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16 No. 06-1750

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—1-15-08

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