Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01852/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01852-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC C. CHATMAN,

CDCR #BD-5474,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CUSH ACURA; ADAM ROSSMAN, 

Manager; ALLEN SWEETOW, General 

Sales Manager; ACURA 

CORPORATION; TERRY ELMANI

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-01852-WQH-JLB

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[ECF No. 12]

AND 

2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

ERIC C. CHATMAN (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and incarcerated at California 

State Prison in Corcoran, California has filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. (ECF No. 1). 

Plaintiff did not prepay the $400 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), but 

instead, filed a certified copy of his inmate trust account statement which the Court liberally 

construes as a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF No. 12). He has since 

submitted six letters to the Court detailing the allegations raised in his Complaint. Those 

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letters have been accepted for filing in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, and despite Local 

Rule 83.9, which clearly prohibits such ex parte communications. (ECF Nos. 4-11, 13-18).

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, if the Plaintiff is a prisoner2at the 

time of filing, even if he is granted leave to proceed IFP, he remains obligated to pay the 

entire filing fee in “increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. 

Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and 

regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); 

Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 6-

month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); 

Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account 

statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits 

in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account 

 

1

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

2

 For purposes of the IFP statute, a “prisoner” is “any person incarcerated or detained in 

any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, 

violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions or parole, probation, pretrial 

release, or diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). 

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for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner 

then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in 

any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the Court 

until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has also submitted a copy of his CDCR Inmate 

Statement Report showing his available balance and trust account activity at CIM. See ECF 

No. 12; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. This 

statement shows that while Plaintiff had $50.33 deposited to his account over the 6-month 

period immediately preceding the filing of his Complaint, he had an available balance of 

zero at the time of filing. See ECF No. 12 at 2. Based on this accounting, the Court 

GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP, and will assess no initial partial filing fee

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no 

event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action 

or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which 

to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 

(finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a 

prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to 

him when payment is ordered.”). The Court will further direct the Secretary of the CDCR, 

or his designee, to instead collect the entire $350 balance of the filing fees required by 28 

U.S.C. § 1914 and forward them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment 

payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 

II. Sua Sponte Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

A. Standard of Review

If a prisoner’s complaint “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or 

employee of a governmental entity,” the Court “shall review” the pleading “as soon as 

practicable after docketing,” and “dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, 

if [it] . . . is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 

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28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b)(1); Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014). 

In this case, Plaintiff seeks to sue a car manufacturer, one of its dealerships, and a sales 

manager for events occurring during his employment there in 1996 through 1998. See ECF 

No. 1 at 1-5. Plaintiff does not seek redress from or name any governmental actors or 

entities as Defendants. Id. at 1-2. Therefore, § 1915A(a)’s screening provisions do not 

apply. See Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Section 1915A 

mandates early review ... for all complaints ‘in which a prisoner seeks relief from a 

governmental entity...”) (quoting § 1915A(a)).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, however, his Complaint is still subject to a sua 

sponte review, and mandatory dismissal, if it is “frivolous, malicious, fail[s] to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted, or seek[s] monetary relief from a defendant immune 

from such relief,” regardless of whether he seeks redress from a “governmental entity.” See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1763 (2015) (pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 

determines that—(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or (B) the action or appeal—(i) is 

frivolous or malicious; [or] (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”); 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only 

permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to 

state a claim.”). 

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain “a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.

R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals 

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 

suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

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relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls 

short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 

F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all 

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff.”). 

However, while the court has an obligation “where the petitioner is pro se, 

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the 

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply 

essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd of Regents of the Univ.

of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff alleges that while he was employed at Cush Acura, a car dealership, Adam 

Rossman, an Acura sales manager, and Allen Sweetow, the general sales manager, forced 

him to steal a car. See ECF No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff seeks millions of dollars in general and 

punitive damages from Cush Acura, the individually named Defendants, and the Acura 

Corporation. Id. at 5.

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 is a “vehicle by which plaintiffs can bring federal constitutional and 

statutory challenges to actions by state and local officials.” Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 

1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege 

two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United 

States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting 

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under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 789 F.3d 

1030, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015).

First, none of the named Defendants are alleged to have to be a “person[s] acting 

under color of state law.” See West, 487 U.S. at 48; Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. 

Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding that the party charged with a 

constitutional deprivation under § 1983 must be a person who may fairly be said to be a 

governmental actor). “A civil rights plaintiff suing a private individual under § 1983 must 

demonstrate that the private individual acted under color of state law; plaintiffs do not 

enjoy Fourteenth Amendment protections against ‘private conduct abridging individual 

rights.’” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 444 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Burton v. Wilmington 

Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961)). Section 1983 liability attaches only to 

individuals “who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity.” 

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 

Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 

The Constitution protects individual rights only from government action and not 

from private action; it is only when the government is responsible for the specific conduct 

alleged that individual constitutional rights are implicated. Single Moms, Inc. v. Mont. 

Power Co., 331 F.3d 743, 746-47 (9th Cir. 2003). Generally, private parties do not act 

under color of state law. See Price v. Hawai’i, 939 F.2d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Section “1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how 

discriminatory or wrong.” Sutton, 192 F.3d at 835 (citing Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. 

Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 

Ouzts v. Md. Nat’l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 551 (9th Cir. 1974) (a purely private actor may 

be liable for his misconduct in state court, but his conduct is not actionable under section 

1983, regardless of how egregious).

In order for private conduct to constitute governmental action, “something more” 

must be alleged. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982) (“Action by 

a private party pursuant to [§ 1983], without something more, [i]s not sufficient to justify 

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a characterization of that party as a ‘state actor.’”). Courts have used four different factors 

or tests to identify what constitutes “something more”: (1) public function, (2) joint action, 

(3) governmental compulsion or coercion, and (4) governmental nexus. See id.; Johnson v. 

Knowles, 113 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 1997); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 

F.3d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1995); Gorenc v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement and 

Power Dist., 869 F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 1989).

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to plausibly 

show that Cush Acura, Adam Rossman, Allen Sweetow, Acura Corporation, or Terry 

Elmani performed any public function traditionally reserved to the state, acted as willful 

participants in joint action with government agents, were compelled or coerced by, or had 

any connection whatsoever with, the state when they allegedly engaged in a plot to force 

Plaintiff to steal a car. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939. 

Second, Plaintiff has not alleged the violation of any “right secured by the 

Constitution or laws of the United States.” See West, 487 U.S. at 48 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 

1983). Plaintiff may not rely on § 1983 as an independent, substantive claim. See Cholla 

v. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2004). “[O]ne cannot go 

into court and claim a ‘violation of § 1983’ — for § 1983 by itself does not protect anyone 

against anything.” Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979). 

“Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights; rather it is the vehicle whereby 

plaintiffs can challenge actions by governmental officials.” Henderson v. City of Simi 

Valley, 305 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff’s § 1983 suit fails if he does not 

allege a plausible violation of his federal constitutional or statutory rights. Cholla, 382 F.3d 

at 978; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“[A] [§1983] plaintiff must plead that each Governmentofficial defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the 

Constitution.”).

Finally, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to bring state charges based on Defendants’

alleged acts of criminal wrongdoing, § 1983 offers him no recourse. See Campbell v. Burt, 

141 F.3d 927, 930 (9th Cir. 1998) (violations of state law alone do not support a claim of 

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liability under § 1983); Alexandre v. Phibbs, 116 F.3d 482 (9th Cir. 1997) (unpub.) (section 

1983 claims may not be predicated upon the violation of criminal statutes); see also 

Buckheit v. Dennis, 713 F. Supp. 2d 910, 919 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Doe v. Connecticut 

Dept. Of Child & Youth Services, 911 F.2d 868, 869 (2nd Cir. 1990) (“A violation of state 

law neither gives plaintiffs a § 1983 claim nor deprives defendants of the defense of 

qualified immunity to a proper § 1983 claim.”)); Ward v. City of Barstow, et al., 2017 WL 

4877389, at *16 (C.D. Cal. June 23, 2017) (finding alleged violation of the California Penal 

Code “cannot form the basis of a federal claim under § 1983” as a matter of law), report 

and recommendation adopted sub nom. Ward v. City of Barstow, 2017 WL 4877239 (C.D. 

Cal. Oct. 27, 2017).

Thus, for all these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 

1130.

III. Conclusion and Order

For all the reasons discussed, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 12).

2. DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from 

Plaintiff’s trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing monthly 

payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding 

month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the 

amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS 

SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO 

THIS ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Scott 

Kernan, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 

§ 1983 relief can granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and DENIES leave 

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to amend as futile. See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (leave to 

amend is not required if it is “absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could 

not be cured by amendment.”) (internal citations omitted).

5. CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would be frivolous, and 

therefore not taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See Coppedge v. 

United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 

1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal would not 

be frivolous); and 

6. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close the file.3

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 21, 2017

 

3 While the Court has previously accepted Plaintiff’s letters for filing despite his failure to 

comply with the Court’s Local Rules, he is hereby cautioned that S.D. Cal. Local Civil 

Rule 83.9 provides that “attorneys or parties to any action must refrain from writing letters 

to the judge,” and that “[p]ro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that 

govern other litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

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