Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-02258/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-02258-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 560
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Civil Detainee - Conditions of Confinement
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CORY HOCH,

Plaintiff,

v.

STEPHEN MAYBERG, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:10-cv-02258-AWI-DLB PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

RECOMMENDING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS BE GRANTED IN 

PART AND DENIED IN PART

(ECF No. 43)

FOURTEEN-DAY DEADLINE

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Cory Hoch, a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this 

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on December 6, 2010. This action is proceeding 

on Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed on May 1, 2010, against Defendants Tarkenton, 

Christian, and Sanzberro for violation of the Fourth Amendment. (ECF Nos. 31 & 39.) 

Pending before the Court is Defendants Takenton and Sanzberro’s (“Defendants”) motion 

to dismiss, filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on July 12, 2013.1 (ECF No. 

43.) Plaintiff filed an opposition on November 12, 2013, and Defendants replied on November 20, 

2013. (ECF Nos. 53 & 54.) The matter is deemed submitted pursuant to Local Rule 230(l).

///

///

 

1 Defendant Christian has not appeared yet in this action. (ECF No. 61.) 

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a 

claim, and dismissal is proper if there is a lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 

1240, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 

1762 (2012). In resolving a 12(b)(6) motion, a court’s review is generally limited to the operative 

pleading. Daniels-Hall v. National Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010); Sanders v. 

Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007); Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 1003-

04 (9th Cir. 2006); Schneider v. California Dept. of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 

1998). However, courts may properly consider matters subject to judicial notice and documents 

incorporated by reference in the pleading without converting the motion to dismiss to one for 

summary judgment. U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). 

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 

129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 

1955, 1964-65 (2007)) (quotation marks omitted); Conservation Force, 646 F.3d at 1242; Moss v. 

U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court must accept the well-pleaded 

factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, 

Daniels-Hall, 629 F.3d at 998; Sanders, 504 F.3d at 910; Huynh, 465 F.3d at 996-97; Morales v. 

City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000), and in this Circuit, prisoners proceeding 

pro se are still entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved 

in their favor, Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012); Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir. 2011); Hebbe 

v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Further, “[a] claim may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that it is barred by 

the applicable statute of limitations only when ‘the running of the statute is apparent on the face of 

the complaint.’” Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (quoting Huynh, 465 F.3d at 997), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 3055 (2011). “‘A complaint 

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cannot be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that 

would establish the timeliness of the claim.’” Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 969 (quoting Supermail 

Cargo, Inc. v. U.S., 68 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

III. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff is detained at Coalinga State Hospital (“CSH”) in Coalinga, California, where the 

events giving rise to this action occurred. Plaintiff names as Defendants: officers Tarkenton and 

Christian, and senior psychiatric technician John Sanzberro.

Plaintiff is a civil detainee, detained at Coalinga State Hospital in Coalinga, California. 

First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) 2. Plaintiff has a hospital room. FAC 2. On March 18, 2008, officers 

Tarkenton and Christian entered his hospital room and searched his living area and locker. FAC 2. 

Plaintiff did not consent to the search. FAC 2. There was no warrant. FAC 2. Plaintiff contends 

that he has an expectation of privacy in his hospital room. FAC 3. Senior psychiatric technician 

John Sanzberro gave the officers the opportunity to search when he declared that he believed 

Plaintiff had other contraband in his property. FAC 3. Plaintiff’s property was seized, which 

included his laptop and PlayStation Portable, a gaming device. FAC 11. Plaintiff contends a 

violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Fourteenth 

Amendment, and Article I, sections 7(a), 13, and 19 of the California Constitution. Plaintiff 

requests as relief: declaratory relief, the return of all his property, punitive damages, 

reimbursement for any property destroyed, costs of suit, and a mandate that the DMH cease taking 

all property without a criminal warrant or pending legal proceeding, that DMH implement all rules 

and regulations in accordance with state law and the Administrative Procedures Act, and all 

employees to cease enforcement of all policy or procedure not in conformance with the 

Administrative Procedures Act.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Limitations

1. Statute of Limitations and Tolling

Federal law determines when a claim accrues, and “[u]nder federal law, a claim accrues 

when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury that is the basis of the cause of action.” 

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Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); Maldonado v. Harris, 

370 F.3d 945, 955 (9th Cir. 2004); Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1999). Because 

section 1983 contains no specific statute of limitations, federal courts should apply the forum 

state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th 

Cir. 2004); Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 954; Fink, 192 F.3d at 914. California=s statute of limitations 

for personal injury actions was extended to two years effective January 1, 2003. Cal. Civ. Proc. 

Code ' 335.1; Jones, 393 F.3d at 927; Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 954-55. 

In actions where the federal court borrows the state statute of limitations, courts should 

also borrow all applicable provisions for tolling the limitations period found in state law. Jones, 

393 F.3d at 927. Under California law, prisoners who at the time the cause of action accrued were 

either imprisoned on a criminal charge or serving a sentence of less than life for a criminal 

conviction benefit from a two-year tolling provision for damages actions. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code '

352.1. 

In addition, California=s equitable tolling doctrine “applies when an injured person has 

several legal remedies and, reasonably and in good faith, pursues one.” McDonald v. Antelope 

Valley Community College Dist., 45 Cal.4th 88, 100 (Cal. 2008) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). The equitable tolling of statutes of limitations is a judicially created, nonstatutory 

doctrine designed to prevent unjust and technical forfeitures of the right to a trial on the merits 

when the purpose of the statute of limitations - timely notice to the defendant of the plaintiff=s 

claims - has been satisfied, McDonald, 45 Cal.4th at 99 (quotation marks and citations omitted), 

and pursuit of administrative remedies equitably tolls the statute of limitations so long as there was 

timely notice, lack of prejudice to the defendant, and reasonable, good faith conduct on the part of 

the plaintiff. Id. at 101-03. 

2. Findings

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim accrued on March 18, 2008, when his property was 

seized. (Pl’s Am. Compl.; ECF No. 30 at 5.) This action was filed two years and eight months 

later, on December 6, 2010, for the search of his room and confiscation of his locker. (Pl’s 

Original Compl.; ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff failed to file this action prior to the two year statute of 

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limitations period. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code ' 335.1; Jones, 393 F.3d at 927; Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 

954-55. Thus, the issue here is whether the statute of limitations was effectively tolled.

Defendants argue that because Plaintiff is not a prisoner, the PLRA exhaustion 

requirements and tolling provisions do not apply to him. Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1137, 

1139 (9th Cir. 2000). However, California courts have rejected the assertion that equitable tolling 

should be limited to cases in which a plaintiff was required to pursue a particular alternate remedy 

before initiating suit and instead espoused ‘the principle that regardless of whether the exhaustion 

of one remedy is a prerequisite to the pursuit of another, if the defendant is not prejudiced thereby, 

the running of the limitations period is tolled.’” McDonald, 45 Cal.4th at 101-102 (quoting Elkins 

v. Derby, 12 Cal.3d 410, 414, 115 (Cal. 1974).

Defendants further argue that Plaintiff fails to meet all three conditions under California 

law for the equitable tolling of the statute of limitations: (1) defendant must have had timely notice 

of the claim; (2) defendant must not be prejudiced by being required to defend the otherwise 

barred claim; and (3) plaintiff's conduct must have been reasonable and in good faith. Fink v. 

Shelder, 192 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir.1999) (quoting Bacon v. City of Los Angeles, 843 F.2d 372, 

374 (9th Cir.1988)). However, equitable tolling, which its fact-specific focus, is only rarely an 

inquiry appropriate at the pleading stage. Daviton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 

1131, 1140 (9th Cir. 2001), en banc, (citing Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1276 

(9th Cir. 2001)). A claim may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that it is barred by 

the applicable statute of limitations only when “the running of the statute is apparent on the face of 

the complaint.” Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 997 (9th Cir.2006). “[A] 

complaint cannot be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 

facts that would establish the timeliness of the claim.” Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. U.S., 68 F.3d 

1204, 1206 (9th Cir.1995). Here, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s amended complaint is 

accompanied by the evidence of his pursuit of administrative remedies and thus, it is not clear at 

this stage in the proceedings that Plaintiff is not entitled to equitable tolling. Accordingly, the 

Court recommends that Defendants’ motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds be denied.

///

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B. Failure to State a Claim

1. Prior Screening Order

On May 1, 2010, this Court issued an order indicating that it had screened Plaintiff’s 

complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and found that it stated a claim against Defendants 

Tarkenton, Christian, and Sanzberro for violation of the Fourth Amendment. (ECF Nos. 31 & 39.) 

While the order finding a cognizable claim did not include a full analysis,2the Court conducted 

the same examination as it does in all screening orders. In other words, the Court’s conclusion 

was based upon the same legal standards as this 12(b)(6) motion. Insofar as Defendants argue that 

Plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, he wholly fails to acknowledge 

the Court’s prior finding. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 

2012). 

A screening order may not be ignored or disregarded. Ingle v. Circuit City, 408 F.3d 592, 

594 (9th Cir. 2005). To the contrary, the existence of a screening order which utilized the same 

legal standard upon which a subsequent motion to dismiss relies necessarily implicates the law of 

the case doctrine. As a result, the moving party is expected to articulate the grounds for the 

12(b)(6) motion in light of a screening order finding the complaint stated a claim. Ingle, 408 F.3d 

at 594; Thomas v. Hickman, 2008 WL 2233566, *2-3 (E.D. Cal. 2008).

In this regard, this Court recently explained:

If the defendants in a case which has been screened believe there is a good faith 

basis for revisiting a prior determination made in a screening order, they must 

identify the basis for their motion, be it error, an intervening change in the law, or 

some other recognized exception to the law of the case doctrine. Ingle, 408 F.3d at 

594 (“A district court abuses its discretion in applying the law of the case doctrine 

only if (1) the first decision was clearly erroneous; (2) an intervening change in the 

law occurred; (3) the evidence on remand was substantially different; (4) other 

changed circumstances exist; or (5) a manifest injustice would otherwise result.”). 

The duty of good faith and candor requires as much, and frivolous motions which 

serve only to unnecessarily multiply the proceedings may subject the moving 

parties to sanctions. Pacific Harbor Capital, Inc. v. Carnival Air Lines, Inc., 210 

F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000). Parties are not entitled to a gratuitous second bite 

 

2 Generally, the Court provides a fully reasoned analysis only where it must explain why the complaint does not state 

at least one claim. In cases where the complaint states only cognizable claims against all named defendants, the Court 

will issue a shorter screening order notifying plaintiff that his complaint states a claim and that he must submit service 

documents. 

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at the apple at the expense of judicial resources and in disregard of court orders. 

Ingle, 408 F.3d at 594 (The law of the case “doctrine has developed to maintain 

consistency and avoid reconsideration of matters once decided during the course of 

a single continuing lawsuit.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); 

Thomas, 2008 WL 2233566, at *3 (for important policy reasons, the law of the case 

doctrine disallows parties from a second bite at the apple). 

Chavez v. Yates, No. 1:09-cv-01080-AWI-SKO (PC) (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2013) (ECF No. 

41).

2. Analysis

Here, rather than move forward with this action based upon the Court’s findings in the 

screening order, Defendants now move to dismiss the claim based on the argument that Plaintiff’s 

complaint does not demonstrate the required elements of a Fourth Amendment claim. 

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 

U.S. 520, 558, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979); Byrd v. Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, 629 F.3d 1135, 

1140 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 2964 (2011); Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 

332 (9th Cir. 1988). For the Fourth Amendment to apply, there must be a “reasonable expectation 

of privacy in the area invaded.” Espinosa v. City and County of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 533 

(9th Cir. 2010); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525, 104 S.Ct. 3194 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 

U.S. 520, 556-57, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979). 

While Plaintiff is not a convicted criminal, he is involuntarily serving a civil commitment 

term at a secure facility; he is not a free individual with a full panoply of rights. Civil detainees 

are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose 

conditions of confinement are designed to punish, Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322, 102 

S.Ct. 2452 (1982) (quotation marks omitted), but maintaining facility security and effectively 

managing the facility are unquestionably legitimate, non-punitive government interests, Jones v. 

Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted).

The contours of an involuntarily confined civil detainee’s right to privacy in his room in a 

secure treatment facility are unclear. Defendants cite to various unpublished cases, not binding on 

this Court, in support of their argument that civil detainees do not have a reasonable expectation of 

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privacy in their rooms.3 However, the Court is unpersuaded by this nonbinding authority and 

stands by its original screening order. At this stage, Defendants have not shown that the screening 

order was clearly erroneous so as to avoid application of the law of the case doctrine. Based on 

the allegations above, Plaintiff has set forth a plausible claim for relief under the applicable 

screening standards. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2012); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (prisoners proceeding pro 

se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any 

doubt resolved in their favor). Accordingly, the Court recommends denying Defendants’ motion 

to dismiss on the basis of Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim. 

V. OFFICIAL CAPACITY CLAIMS

Plaintiff’s amended complaint names Defendants in both their individual and official 

capacities. (ECF No. 31 at 4.) The Eleventh Amendment precludes Plaintiff’s suit against 

Defendants Tarkington and Sanzberro in their official capacity for monetary damages. States and 

state agencies are protected against suit in federal court by the Eleventh Amendment. Lovell v. 

Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276-77 (1986); 

Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). The Eleventh 

Amendment bars civil rights actions in the federal courts by a citizen against a state or its agencies 

unless the state has waived its immunity or Congress has overridden that immunity. Will v. 

Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 749 (9th 

Cir. 1995). “The State of California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with 

respect to claims brought under § 1983 in federal court, and the Supreme Court has held that ‘§ 

 

3 Courts have “concluded that no Fourth Amendment claim lies because civil detainees do not have a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in their rooms.” Griego v. Allenby, No. 1:11-cv-01676, 2012 WL 4670803 at *3, citing 

Rainwater v. Bell, No. 2:10–cv–1727 GGH P, 2012 WL 3276966, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2012) (civil detainee did 

not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his jail cell); Pyron v. Ludeman, Nos. 10-3759 (PJS/JJG), 10-4236 

(PJS/JJG), 2011 WL 3293523 at * 6 (D. Minn. June 6, 2011) (search of a civil detainee's personal items in his cell did 

not violate the Fourth Amendment), report and recommendation adopted in full, 2012 WL 1597305 (D. Minn. Jul. 29, 

2011); Banda v. Corzine, No. 07-4508 (WJM), 2007 WL 3243917, at * 7-8 (D.N.J. Nov. 1, 2007) (civil detainee 

unable to state Fourth Amendment claim as his expectation of privacy yielded to legitimate governmental interest in 

keeping facility free of controlled substances); Riley v. Doyle, No. 06-C-574-C, 2006 WL 294743, at *5 (W.D. Wis. 

Oct. 16, 2006) (civil detainee cannot state Fourth Amendment claim for repeated contraband searches of cell); 

compare Stearns v. Stoddard, No. C11-5422-BHS-JRC, 2012 WL 1596965, at * 3 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 11, 2012.) (open 

question whether civil detainee housed in a secure facility has any expectation of privacy in his cell), report and 

recommendation adopted in full, 2012 WL 1597305 (W.D. Wash. May 7, 2012.).

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1983 was not intended to abrogate a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity[.]’” Dittman v. State 

of California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 

1261 (2000). Accordingly, the Court recommends that Defendants’ motion to dismiss be granted 

in regards to the claims against Defendants in their official capacities. 

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION4

Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss, filed on July 12, 2013, be DENIED in part and GRANTED in part as follows:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the 

statute of limitations is DENIED;

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim is 

DENIED; and

3. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims against Defendants Tarkington and 

Sanzberro in their official capacity is GRANTED.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within

fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may 

file written objections with the Court. Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 5, 2014 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE DEAC_Signature-END:

3b142a

 

4 Defendants additionally argue that Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and other patients at Coalinga 

State Hospital. (ECF No. 43 at 10.) However, Defendants mistakenly refer to Plaintiff’s original complaint rather 

than the amended complaint. Any amended complaint supersedes the original complaint Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 

114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, this action is 

proceeding as an individual civil suit brought only by Plaintiff. 

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