Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01386/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01386-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALMA M., an individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

WILLIAM NULICK, an 

individual; TULARE COUNTY 

SHERIFF, a California 

governmental entity; COUNTY 

OF TULARE, a California 

governmental entity; and DOES 

1 to 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 1:15-cv-01386-JAM-SAB

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR STRIKE

Tulare County Sheriff’s Deputy and defendant William Nulick 

(“Nulick”) allegedly exploited his position as a police officer 

by sexually assaulting plaintiff Alma M. (“Alma”). At issue in 

this motion is whether Nulick’s employers, defendants County of 

Tulare (“Tulare”) and Tulare County Sheriff (“Sheriff”) 

(collectively “Defendants”) are vicariously liable for Nulick’s 

abuse and subsequent efforts to cover-up his wrongdoing. 

Defendants seek to dismiss and/or strike the ninth, tenth, 

eleventh and twelfth causes of action of Alma’s complaint 

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pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b) and 

12(f). For the reasons stated below, the Court grants in part 

and denies in part the motion.1

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Court takes the following facts as true for purposes of 

this motion. 

On October 4, 2013, Alma was driving on Highway 384 near 

Dinuba, California, when Tulare County Sheriff’s Deputy William 

Nulick pulled over her car. Compl. ¶ 12. After Alma failed to 

produce her license and registration, Nulick ordered Alma to step 

out of the car. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. Nulick proceeded to grope Alma’s 

breasts, vagina, and buttocks. Id. ¶ 16. Nulick then threatened 

to arrest Alma and stated that he wanted to have sex with her in 

exchange for not arresting her or issuing her a ticket. Id. ¶¶ 

17-18. Alma began to cry and said “No.” Id. ¶ 19. Nulick 

responded by telling her she had five minutes to decide whether 

to be arrested or to have sex with him. Id. ¶ 20. 

Frightened for her life and wellbeing, Alma followed Nulick 

to an orchard in a secluded area off of interstate 384. Id. ¶ 

21. Nulick told Alma that he wanted to have vaginal sex with 

her. Id. ¶ 22. Alma refused. Id. Nulick then pulled out his 

erect penis and pushed Alma’s head down to his penis, forcing 

Alma to perform oral sex on him until he ejaculated in her mouth. 

Id. ¶¶ 23-24. Alma spit out the semen and wiped her mouth with a 

 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for April 5, 2016.

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Kleenex. Id. ¶ 25. Nulick took the soiled Kleenex from Alma to 

conceal the evidence and told her she was free to go. Id. ¶ 26. 

Alma reported the incident the next day. Id. ¶ 27.

Alma’s complaint contains the following twelve causes of 

action: (1) assault; (2) battery; (3) sexual battery; (4) false 

imprisonment; (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress

(“IIED”); (6) violation of civil rights 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(“Section 1983”); (7) intentional violation of civil rights –

Monell; (8) violations of civil code § 52.1; (9) violations of 

the Unruh Act; (10) negligent hiring and supervision; 

(11) negligent training; and (12) negligent infliction of 

emotional distress (“NIED”). The first through ninth and the 

twelfth causes of action are brought against all defendants, 

while the tenth and eleventh causes of action are brought only 

against Sheriff and Tulare.

Defendants move to dismiss and/or strike the ninth cause of 

action for violation of the Unruh Act. Mot. at 4-6; the tenth 

and eleventh causes of action because there is no statutory basis 

for these claims or, alternatively, because they are duplicative. 

Id. at 6-7; and the twelfth cause of action for failure to state 

a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. at 7-8. Alma 

opposes the motion in its entirety (Doc. #24).

II. OPINION

A. Analysis

1. Unruh Act

Alma’s ninth cause of action for violations of the Unruh 

Act alleges that Defendants “denied full and equal 

accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges and/or 

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services to Plaintiff” because of Alma’s “sex, race, ancestry, 

and/or national origin.” Compl. ¶¶ 104-105. Defendants seek 

dismissal of this claim for two reasons. First, Defendants 

argue that they cannot be liable under the Unruh Act because 

that law applies only to “business establishments” and Sheriff 

and Tulare are not business establishments. Mot. at 4-5. 

Second, Defendants argue that Alma fails to allege “any conduct 

preventing her from accessing public accommodations,” which is 

also required by the Unruh Act. Id. at 5-6. Alma argues in 

opposition that Nulick was a “member of an establishment” that 

discriminated against her based on her sex in a way that denied 

her equal accommodations. Opp. at 7.

The Unruh Act entitles all individuals to “full and equal 

accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services 

in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” Cal. 

Civ. Code § 51(b) (emphasis added). Whether and when public 

entities are covered by the Unruh Act is well-litigated. 

Some courts have exempted public entities from Unruh Act 

liability. However, these cases do not stand for the categorical 

rule proposed by Defendants that “public entities are not 

considered business entities under the Act.” Mot. at 5. The 

cases cited by Defendants only deal with state prisons or 

legislative acts, not actions taken by counties or law 

enforcement agencies. See, e.g., Qualified Patients Ass'n v. 

City of Anaheim, 187 Cal.App.4th 734, 765 (2010) (“Because the 

terms of the Unruh Act expressly apply to business 

establishments, we see no room for its application to the city's 

legislative action here.”); Carter v. City of Los Angeles, 224 

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Cal.App.4th 808, 825 (2014) (“A state prison is not a business 

establishment for purposes of the act unless it engages in

behavior involving sufficient businesslike attributes.”); 

Taormina v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 946 F. Supp. 829, 834 (S.D. Cal. 

1996) (stating that “a prison does not qualify as a business 

entity under Cal. Civ. Code section 51”); Gaston v. Colio, 883 F. 

Supp. 508 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (“[P]laintiffs cite no authority, nor 

any reasonable argument, that a state prison qualifies as a 

‘business establishment’ for the purposes of the statute.”). 

Defendants have provided the Court with no cases that are 

directly on point to the case presently before the Court.

A more compelling analysis can be found in Gibson v. Cty. of 

Riverside, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1090 (C.D. Cal. 2002), in which

the District Court concluded that “persons and entities who are 

not themselves business establishments are subject to” the Unruh 

Act. The court pointed out that the text of the Unruh Act 

clearly states that discrimination is barred “in all business 

establishments,” not by all business establishments. Id. The 

court explained that “the provision only defines who is protected 

and where they shall be free from discrimination; it does not 

define--and limit--what persons are liable for such 

discrimination.” Id. (emphasis in original). Moreover, as 

pointed out by the Gibson court, “whoever denies . . . or makes 

any discrimination or distinction contrary to Section 

51 . . . is liable.” Id. (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a) 

(emphasis in original)). And Section 52(c) describes how to 

bring a civil action whenever “any person or group of persons is 

engaged in conduct of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of 

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the rights hereby secured.” Id. (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 52(c) 

(emphasis in original)). This statutory language supports the 

conclusion that “the term ‘business establishments’ must properly 

be interpreted in the broadest sense reasonably possible.” 

Harrison v. City of Rancho Mirage, 243 Cal.App.4th 162, 173 

(2015) (citing Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, 

17 Cal.4th 670, 689 (1998)).

Several courts have concluded that public entities may be 

held liable for Unruh Act violations even when they are not 

strictly considered to be business entities. For example, 

“public schools are business establishments within the meaning of 

the Unruh Act.” Nicole M. By & Through Jacqueline M. v. Martinez 

Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369, 1388 (N.D. Cal. 1997); 

Walsh v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1123 

(E.D. Cal. 2011) (“[S]everal federal courts have concluded that a 

plaintiff's allegation that a public school failed to adequately 

respond to his or her complaints of harassment gives rise to a 

cognizable claim under the Unruh Civil Rights Act. This Court 

follows the lead of those courts.”). At least one lower state 

court has similarly concluded that a county’s legislative action 

is also subject to the Unruh Act. Travis v. Cty. of Santa Cruz, 

2007 WL 294132, at *14 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2007) (“In the 

circumstances here, which involve claims of discrimination in 

housing, we believe the County's Ordinance is subject to the 

Unruh Act.”).

In light of the compelling textual analysis of the Gibson

court and the multiple cases finding that public entities may be 

liable for Unruh Act violations, this Court concludes that

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Defendants are not exempt from liability for violations of the 

Unruh Act based on Defendants’ argument that “Plaintiff does not 

allege conduct by any business establishment.” Mot. at 5.

The Court also disagrees with Defendants’ argument that 

Alma was required but failed to adequately plead that she was 

subject to intentional discrimination in public accommodations. 

Mot. at 5. Alma specifically pleaded that she was denied “full 

and equal accommodations.” Compl. ¶ 104 and the Unruh Act does 

not simply bar discriminatory actions that prevent access to 

places of public accommodations. The Act also establishes that 

all individuals are entitled to equal privileges and services. 

Cal. Civ. Code § 51. The allegations set forth in the complaint 

describe multiple instances in which Defendants failed to 

provide equal services to Alma because of her sex and/or 

ethnicity. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Unruh Act cause of 

action under this theory is denied as well. 

2. Negligent Hiring and Supervision; Negligent 

Training

Alma’s tenth cause of action for negligent hiring and 

supervision alleges that Defendants “failed to use reasonable 

care in hiring and supervising their employees . . . creat[ing] 

a dangerous environment for the general public, including 

Plaintiff.” Compl. ¶ 114. Alma’s eleventh cause of action for 

negligent training alleges that Defendants “neither had in place 

nor implemented an adequate system or procedure for 

investigating, training, and supervising employees . . . to 

prevent or remedy sexual abuse of its citizens.” Id. ¶ 128.

Defendants argue that the tenth and eleventh causes of 

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action should be dismissed because they are direct liability 

claims and “there is no statutory basis for declaring a public 

entity liable for negligence in its training, hiring, and 

supervision practices.” Mot. at 6-7. Alternatively, Defendants 

move to strike one or both of the causes of action because they 

are duplicative. Id. Alma opposes the motion and argues that 

Defendants had an established duty to protect Alma and “to not 

expose [her] to the danger of sexual abuse and threats [or] 

intimidation by its employees.” Opp. at 6. Alma contends that

the only issue is whether this duty was breached, which is a 

factual issue that cannot be decided at this stage of the

proceeding. Id.

California case law makes it clear that public entities are 

not directly liable for negligent hiring, supervision, or 

training. de Villers v. Cty. of San Diego, 156 Cal.App.4th 238, 

252 (2007) (“We find no relevant case law approving a claim for 

direct liability based on a public entity's allegedly negligent 

hiring and supervision practices.”); Shoval v. Sobzak, 2009 WL 

2780155, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2009) ("California courts have 

repeatedly held that there is no statutory basis for direct 

claims against a public entity for negligent hiring and 

supervision practices."). Yet, as this Court pointed out in 

Avila v. California, 2015 WL 6003289, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 

2015), “public entities can be held vicariously liable for the 

conduct of their employees when committed within the scope of 

their employment.” (emphasis added). California law 

specifically states that a “public entity is liable for injury 

proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the 

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public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or 

omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a 

cause of action against that employee or his personal 

representative.” Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2.

Alma clearly alleges that Defendants are vicariously liable 

pursuant to Section 815.2. Compl. ¶¶ 111, 123 (“Plaintiff also 

contends that Defendants are vicariously liable for the tortious 

sexual acts of Defendant Nulick flowing from his employment with 

Defendants.”). However, “in order to state a proper claim for 

negligent hiring or supervision” based on vicarious liability 

against a public entity, the plaintiff “must identify, if not 

join, the specific employee whose negligence is alleged and the 

specific negligent conduct underlying the claim.” Avila, 2015 WL 

6003289, at *6. Alma has not satisfied this pleading requirement 

and therefore the motion to dismiss the tenth and eleventh causes 

of action is granted. Because Alma might be able to cure this 

defect, the Court dismisses these two causes of action without 

prejudice and with leave to amend. Eminence Capital, LLC v. 

Aspeon Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Dismissal with 

prejudice and without leave to amend is not appropriate unless it 

is clear on de novo review that the complaint could not be saved 

by amendment.”).

3. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendants move to dismiss Alma’s twelfth cause of action 

for negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”), arguing 

that Alma has not adequately pleaded facts that would support 

either a bystander or non-bystander NIED claim. Mot. at 7-8. 

Alma opposes dismissal by arguing that an employer may be 

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vicariously liable for the torts of its employees and that Alma 

has therefore pled sufficient facts to state an NIED claim. 

Opp. at 7.

NIED is not an independent tort in California, but a subset 

of negligence. Burgess v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1072

(1992). As such, plaintiffs must adequately plead the 

“traditional elements of duty, breach of duty, causation, and 

damages.” Id.; Hall v. Apollo Grp., Inc., 2014 WL 4354420, at *6 

(N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2014) (“The elements of a claim of negligent 

infliction of emotional distress are: (1) the defendant engaged 

in negligent conduct; (2) the plaintiff suffered serious 

emotional distress; and (3) the defendants' negligent conduct was 

a cause of the serious emotional distress”). 

There are two possible theories of liability in an NIED 

cause of action: the bystander theory and the direct victim 

theory. Burgess, 2 Cal.4th at 1071. Alma does not seek relief 

under a bystander theory because she alleges that she was 

directly harmed, not harmed due to witnessing another’s injury. 

Instead, Alma seeks relief under the direct victim theory. In 

direct victim cases, a duty may be imposed by law, be assumed by 

the defendant, or exist by virtue of a special relationship. 

Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal.4th 965, 985 (1993); 

Burgess, 2 Cal.4th at 1073 (liability for NIED can be imposed for 

“a breach of duty owed the plaintiff that is assumed by the 

defendant or imposed on the defendant as a matter of law, or that 

arises out of a relationship between the two”). Additionally, 

“public policy considerations are relevant in determining whether 

a particular plaintiff may recover damages for emotional 

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distress.” Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.3d 868, 885 

(1991). 

[I]n considering the existence of ‘duty’ in a given 

case several factors require consideration including 

the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the 

degree of certainty that plaintiff suffered injury, 

the closeness of the connection between the 

defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral 

blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy 

of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to 

the defendant and consequences to the community of 

imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting 

liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and 

prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.” 

Id. at 885-86 (1991) (citations omitted). 

Here, Defendants seek dismissal of this cause of action 

solely for the reason that “Plaintiff does not allege any . . . 

factual circumstances” that may give rise to a direct liability 

NIED claim, including the “negligent breach of a duty arising out 

of a preexisting relationship.” Mot. at 7-8. However, Alma has 

clearly alleged that Defendants had a special relationship with 

Alma and that Nulick was responsible for maintaining this 

relationship. Compl. ¶ 136. Alma further alleges that a duty 

may have been assumed by Defendants. Id. ¶¶ 136-138. 

Additionally, the Christensen factors weigh in favor of 

concluding that a duty may be imposed in this case. The alleged 

emotional harm caused by Defendants’ actions was foreseeable and 

certain, the alleged actions are morally blameworthy, and the 

possibility of preventing future harm is compelling. For these 

reasons, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss the NIED 

cause of action.

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III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the tenth and eleventh causes of 

action with leave to amend and DENIES Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss the ninth and twelfth causes of action. If Alma desires 

to cure the defects identified in her tenth and/or eleventh 

causes of action, Alma’s amended complaint must be filed within 

twenty days from the date of this Order. Defendants’ responsive 

pleadings are due within twenty days thereafter. The Court 

advises that failure to cure the defects identified in this Order 

may be grounds for dismissal of those claims without further 

leave to amend. Dick v. Am. Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., 2013 

WL 5299180, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 2013).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 11, 2016

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