Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_17-cv-01084/USCOURTS-caed-2_17-cv-01084-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL TYRONE SHANNON,

Plaintiff,

v.

RALPH DIAZ, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:17-CV-1084-JAM-DMC-P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is Plaintiff’s second amended complaint (ECF No.

34). Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth 

Amendment by allowing female inmates to have a selection of seven different alarm clocks to 

choose from and purchase, but denying the same choice to male inmates. 

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT AND STANDARD

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require complaints contain a “...short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See McHenry v. 

Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)). Detailed factual 

allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s 

allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. 

Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their 

pleadings liberally construed and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 

338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be 

facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer 

that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation 

marks omitted); Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The 

sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with 

liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks 

omitted); Moss, 572F.3d at 969.

II. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff has named four Defendants: (1) Ralph Diaz, (2) Sgt. Swan, (3) C. 

Tileston, and (4) Robert W. Fox. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his right to equal 

protection under the Fourteenth Amendment because female inmates in the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation are offered the choice of purchasing any of seven 

different kinds of alarm clocks and male inmates are afforded no such choice. Plaintiff alleges 

Defendant Diaz instituted the policy and Defendants Swan, Titleston, and Fox implemented it. 

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III. ANALYSIS

Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated 

individuals are treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See

San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). Prisoners are protected from 

invidious discrimination based on race. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). 

Racial segregation is unconstitutional within prisons save for the necessities of prison security 

and discipline. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (per curiam). Prisoners are also 

protected from intentional discrimination on the basis of their religion. See Freeman v. Arpaio, 

125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997). Equal protection claims are not necessarily limited to racial 

and religious discrimination. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686-67 (9th Cir. 

2001) (applying minimal scrutiny to equal protection claim by a disabled plaintiff because the 

disabled do not constitute a suspect class) see also Tatum v. Pliler, 2007 WL 1720165 (E.D. Cal. 

2007) (applying minimal scrutiny to equal protection claim based on denial of in-cell meals 

where no allegation of race-based discrimination was made); Hightower v. Schwarzenegger, 2007 

WL 732555 (E.D. Cal. March 19, 2008).1 

In order to state a § 1983 claim based on a violation of the Equal Protection Clause 

of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that defendants acted with intentional 

discrimination against plaintiff, or against a class of inmates which included plaintiff, and that 

such conduct did not relate to a legitimate penological purpose. See Village of Willowbrook v. 

Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (holding that equal protection claims may be brought by a “class 

of one”); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren v. 

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Henderson, 940 

F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985).

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1 Error! Main Document Only.Strict scrutiny applies to equal protection claims 

alleging race-based or religious discrimination (i.e., where the plaintiff is member of a “protected 

class”); minimal scrutiny applies to all other equal protection claims. See Lee v. City of Los 

Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686-67 (9th Cir. 2001).

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Here, Plaintiff’s complaint again fails to state a claim sufficient to pass screening. 

Plaintiff’s allegations relate to female inmates being able to purchase several different kinds of 

alarm clocks and male inmates not being able to do the same. Plaintiff claims this policy was 

implemented by Defendant Diaz but there are no facts that allege the policy functions as an 

intentionally discriminatory policy against men or that it was implemented for the purpose of 

discriminating against men. In other words, there is no indication from the complaint this policy 

is gender-based for the purpose of discriminating against men. There are likely many differences 

between the correctional institutions housing female inmates and those housing male inmates, 

including the items available for purchase. This Court can find no support for the proposition that 

the Equal Protection Clause compels items for purchase to be the same for both male and female 

inmates. Further, this Court can find no basis in law for a constitutional right to an alarm clock. 

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint cannot pass screening and continual amendment would be 

futile. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Because it does not appear possible that the deficiencies identified herein can be 

cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of 

the entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff’s second amended 

complaint be dismissed without leave to amend.

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of 

objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: August 16, 2019

____________________________________

DENNIS M. COTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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