Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05226/USCOURTS-caDC-00-05226-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

---

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 4, 2001 Decided January 25, 2002

No. 00-5226

Ronald Lee Madley,

Appellant

v.

United States Parole Commission,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv00918)

A. J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, appointed by the

court, argued the cause and filed the briefs as amicus curiae

for appellant.

Ronald L. Madley, appearing pro se, was on the brief for

appellant.

USCA Case #00-5226 Document #653354 Filed: 01/25/2002 Page 1 of 8
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

David B. Goodhand, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause and filed the brief for appellee. With him on the brief

were Kenneth L. Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher

and Robert D. Okun, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: Ginsburg, Chief Judge, Edwards and Sentelle,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

Sentelle, Circuit Judge: Ronald Lee Madley was convicted and sentenced to prison by the Superior Court of the

District of Columbia, later released on parole, and then had

his parole revoked. After serving an additional year of his

sentence, Madley had a reparole hearing at which reparole

was denied. Madley then made a pro se petition for a writ of

habeas corpus to the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia, naming the United States Parole Commission as respondent and complaining of alleged abuse of

discretion and denial of procedural due process in the Commission's reparole decision. The district court filed the petition April 27, 2000 and on the same day filed a memorandum

order dismissing the petition without requiring a response, on

the grounds that Mr. Madley had no constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole and therefore had not been

deprived of a constitutional right. Memorandum and Dismissal Order, Madley v. U.S. Parole Commission, No.

CV00918 (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 2000). Madley made a timely

motion under Rule 60 which the district court denied. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 60. Order Denying Reconsideration, Madley v.

U.S. Parole Commission, No. CV00918 (D.D.C. May 31,

2000). Madley filed a timely notice of appeal. He made no

apparent effort to obtain a certificate of appealability ("COA"

hereafter), and the district court made no apparent effort to

grant or deny one. See generally 28 U.S.C. s 2253(c); Fed.

R. App. P. 22(b). To assist us with the issues presented, we

appointed amicus to make arguments on behalf of appellant

Madley. We now dismiss his appeal on the grounds that we

have no jurisdiction, for the reasons that follow.

In general, a district court disposition of a writ of habeas

corpus is subject to review in the applicable circuit court of

USCA Case #00-5226 Document #653354 Filed: 01/25/2002 Page 2 of 8
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

appeals, 28 U.S.C. s 2253(a), with two exceptions or limitations. First, and not in issue here, there is no appeal when

the district court decision relates to certain removal proceedings. 28 U.S.C. s 2253(b). Second, and in issue here, there

is no appeal when "the detention complained of arises out of

process issued by a State court," 28 U.S.C. s 2253(c)(1)(A),

unless a "circuit justice or judge issues a certificate," 28

U.S.C. s 2253(c)(1), that the "applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right," 28 U.S.C.

s 2253(c)(2), and that identifies the "specific issue or issues

[that] satisfy the showing required." 28 U.S.C. s 2253(c)(3).

(The same certificate threshold applies to appeals in 28

U.S.C. s 2255 proceedings, 28 U.S.C. s 2253(c)(1)(B), not at

issue here.)

We have previously addressed the present incarnation of

section 2253, United States v. Johnson, 254 F.3d 279, 287 &

n.11 (D.C. Cir. 2001), but not the specific question whether a

court of the District is a section 2253(c) "State court" for

purposes of that act. As the question affects our power to

consider this appeal, 28 U.S.C. s 2253(c)(1), we must consider

it before the merits of the appeal. See Steel Company v.

Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 93-95 (1998).

The answer is not as immediately obvious as might be

thought. The federal seat of government is constitutionally

different from the states, but Congress has created a trial

and appellate court system of general jurisdiction for the

District separate from the United States courts (of which we

are a part) and intended to serve the District in much the

same manner as the court systems of the various states and

other large municipal entities. See District of Columbia

Court Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, title I,

s 111, 84 Stat. 473, 475-521 (codified at D.C. Code s 11-101

et seq.) (creating current system); Palmore v. U.S., 411 U.S.

389, 392 n.2 (1973) ("invested ... with jurisdiction equivalent

to that exercised by state courts"). Beginning with the same

enactment, Congress has specified that the courts of the

District would be deemed state courts for certain purposes,

28 U.S.C. ss 1257 (certiorari), 1451 (removal), 2113 (other

Supreme Court review under chapter 133), or that laws

USCA Case #00-5226 Document #653354 Filed: 01/25/2002 Page 3 of 8
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

limited in effect to the District would be deemed not federal

laws for certain purposes, 28 U.S.C. s 1366 (chapter 85

district court jurisdiction), or that the District itself would be

deemed a state for certain purposes. 28 U.S.C. ss 1332

(diversity jurisdiction), 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction).

There is no such statutory provision relating to section

2253(c). See generally 28 U.S.C. ss 2241-2255.

We have nevertheless concluded from precedent that a

court of the District is a state court for purposes of section

2253(c). The present version of that section originated by

amendment in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, s 102, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217-

18 (amending 28 U.S.C. s 2253). Prior to that amendment,

the third paragraph of section 2253 had since its enactment in

1948 required a certificate, not of appealability but of probable cause ("CPC" hereafter) by the following language:

An appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals

from the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding where

the detention complained of arises out of process issued

by a State court, unless the justice or judge who rendered the order or a circuit justice or judge issues a

certificate of probable cause.

Act revising, codifying, and reenacting title 28 United States

Code, c. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 967 (June 25, 1948) (codified at 28

U.S.C. s 2253). The requirements for that section 2253 CPC

were not specified by statute, as are the requirements for the

current 2253(c) COA, but the language "the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court" came

forward unchanged. In the 1986 decision Garris v. Lindsay,

we had interpreted the 1948 language in light of the 1970

creation of the current court system of the District as requiring a prisoner convicted by Superior Court of the District to

obtain a CPC, and, denying him one, dismissed his appeal.

794 F.2d 722, 724 n.8, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Congress's 1996

amendment to section 2253 left that interpreted language

unchanged and made no effort to disapprove Garris. Cf.

Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978) (Congress presumed to adopt existing judicial interpretations of a statute

USCA Case #00-5226 Document #653354 Filed: 01/25/2002 Page 4 of 8
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

when it re-enacts without change). Accordingly, Garris remains persuasive, if not controlling, and we conclude that a

court of the District is a state court for the purpose of this

statute.

Our next question is to identify the detention of which

Madley complains and to determine whether or not that

detention "arises out of process issued by a" court of the

District. The first of those steps is easily surmounted. Madley's petition is clear that the detention of which he complains

is his continued detention following what he regards as a

seriously flawed reparole hearing. His petition raises no

complaint about his original conviction or his original loss of

parole status. This alone, however, does not answer the

question whether that detention "arises out of" state process

or, as Madley argues, out of a parole board decision. Although we and a prior appellant appear to have assumed on a

prior occasion that the closely analogous CPC requirement

under the prior version of section 2253 applied to the appeal

of a Virginia state prisoner complaining of loss of good-time

service credits, Crowell v. Walsh, 151 F.3d 1050 (D.C. Cir.

1998), we have not decided the precise question. Our sister

circuits are divided on the point. In Walker v. O'Brien, the

Seventh Circuit declared, without analysis, that when the

immediate cause of a prisoner's detention is "a prison disciplinary proceeding, the resulting detention does not arise out

of process issued by a state court." 216 F.3d at 637. Because the source of the petitioner's detention was the decision

of an administrative board, rather than the petitioner's conviction in state court, the petitioner did not need to obtain a

COA. See id. at 637-38. In Coady v. Vaughn, on the other

hand, the Third Circuit held that a prisoner's original conviction in state court, rather than the unfavorable decision of the

parole board, was the cause of his detention for purposes of

section 2253(c)(1)(A). See 251 F.3d 480, 486 (3d Cir. 2001).

Accordingly, the court ruled that a prisoner convicted in state

court must obtain a COA to appeal from denial of habeas,

even when the prisoner's petition challenges a parole board's

refusal to reduce the duration of his confinement. See id.;

accord Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 866-69 (10th Cir.

USCA Case #00-5226 Document #653354 Filed: 01/25/2002 Page 5 of 8
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

2000); Greene v. Tennessee Dep't of Corrs., 265 F.3d 369,

371-72 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Walker, 216 F.3d at 642-44

(Easterbrook, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en

banc).

We are persuaded that the better interpretation of the

statutory phrase "the detention complained of arises out of

process issued by a State court" is that the language requires

a COA when the prisoner's detention originated in state court

process, even if a later decision of a parole board to deny

parole or reparole is the more immediate cause of the prisoner's continuing detention, and of which more immediate cause

the prisoner complains. The continuing detention "arises out

of" the earlier process because the parole board would have

no occasion to consider parole at all, and the prisoner to

complain thereof, had the prisoner not been convicted in the

first instance and had the prisoner fully served his sentence

in the second. Accordingly, as we already have determined

above that the courts of the District are state courts for

purposes of this statute, a prisoner arrested or convicted

pursuant to process or judgment of the courts of the District

must obtain a COA by making "a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. s 2253(c)(2).

Our interpretation of this threshold for appellate review

does not deny such prisoners as Madley the remedy of a writ

of habeas corpus entirely; it has no effect on district court

jurisdiction, only our own. Under our interpretation, a prisoner convicted in a state court may obtain appellate review of

a decision denying habeas only when the prisoner offers "a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right," 28

U.S.C. s 2253(c)(1)(A), regardless of whether the prisoner

challenges his sentence or challenges a later administrative

decision not to reduce that sentence. We do not think the

Congress intended to limit federal review of a sentence

imposed by a state court while allowing an unfettered appeal

from a parole decision declining to decrease the time served

thereunder. See Walker, 216 F.3d at 644 (Easterbrook, J.,

dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). The relative

informality of the liberty-affecting administrative processes of

parole or of good-time-credit disciplinary proceedings, comUSCA Case #00-5226 Document #653354 Filed: 01/25/2002 Page 6 of 8
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

pared to judicial convictions and sentencing, is not cause for

plenary federal appellate scrutiny in addition to district court

scrutiny, as the Seventh Circuit believes, Walker, 216 F.3d at

637-38, because less process is due in those post-conviction

determinations. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480

(1972) (parole revocation). Therefore Madley, whose detention ultimately arises out of his conviction and sentencing--

process--by the Superior Court of the District, a state court

for this purpose, needs a COA to proceed with appellate

review of his complaint about denial of reparole.

The fact that Madley needs a COA and does not presently

have one does not dispose of the matter. Madley did not

request a COA from the district court and the district court

did not grant or deny one on its own. See Fed. R. App. P.

22(b)(1). Had the district court denied a COA, Madley might

have asked for a COA from one of our number, id., but had

he failed to do so, the notice of appeal itself would be deemed

an application to the judges of this court for such a certificate.

Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(2). We will not dismiss on the ground

that Madley has no power to request a COA from us because

the district court has not technically denied the COA. Nor,

in the circumstances of this case, will we assume that remand

to the district court for yet a third evaluation of the merits

would serve any purpose because the district court's view of

the strength of the application is clear from that court's

denial of the petition and of the subsequent Rule 60 motion

without ever soliciting a response from the named respondent

or any other person. Accordingly, we will treat the COA as

denied under Rule 22 by the district court and the notice of

appeal as a request to us under Rule 22 for the denied COA.

The question before us, then, is whether we should issue a

certificate--i.e., whether Madley has made a substantial

showing of deprivation of a constitutional right, as required

by section 2253(c)(2).

We conclude that he has not. Madley alleges, but does not

complain of, revocation of parole based on noncriminal behavior, followed after a year by a reparole hearing at which he

fully expected parole based on applicable guidelines. The

United States Parole Commission, which had not made the

USCA Case #00-5226 Document #653354 Filed: 01/25/2002 Page 7 of 8
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

original parole revocation decision but which was charged

with parole determinations for District prisoners when Madley again became eligible for parole review, however, denied

him parole on the basis of an attempted burglary charge of

which he claims innocence, that had been dismissed, and that

was not the basis for revocation of parole. The Parole

Commission apparently failed to follow the procedures prescribed in its own regulations for denial of parole based on

evidence of new criminal conduct. Madley alleges deprivation

of due process.

The difficulty for Madley is that there is "not, of course,

... a direct constitutional liberty interest in parole," BlairBey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1998), and nonmandatory parole regulations for the District do not create

one. Id. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr.

Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7-8, 11-12 (1979). The particular parole

regulations at issue here remain discretionary, insufficiently

mandatory to create a constitutional liberty interest that

otherwise would not exist. See 28 C.F.R s 2.21(d) ("merely

guidelines"). It may be, as this court has observed before in

dictum, that "exceptionally arbitrary governmental conduct

may in itself violate the due process clause," 151 F.3d at 1048

n.11, but the facts alleged here do not meet that standard.

Accordingly, we conclude that Madley has not made the

showing required, and we therefore must deny the certificate

of appealability and dismiss the appeal without reaching any

other issue.

Appeal dismissed.

USCA Case #00-5226 Document #653354 Filed: 01/25/2002 Page 8 of 8