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Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 3, 1994 Decided January 13, 1995

No. 93-5193

FREDERIC V. HETZEL AND MARY HETZEL,

APPELLEES

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLANT 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

91cv02986

Michael J. Ryan, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the

brief were Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, R. Craig Lawrence and John D. Bates,

Assistant United States Attorneys. David B. Orbuch, Assistant United States Attorney entered an

appearance.

Laurence Shore argued the cause for appellees. With him on the briefs was Nathan D. Povich.

Before: WALD, WILLIAMS, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion of the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

Concurring opinion by Circuit Judge WILLIAMS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: This appeal presents the issue whether the United States can be held

liable for negligence under the FederalTort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680

(1988), for an accident caused by a federal officer's high-speed chase of a criminal suspect in the

District of Columbia. Appellees Frederic V. and Mary Hetzel brought suit for personal injuries

sustained when a car being pursued bythe United States DrugEnforcement Agency("DEA") collided

with Mr. Hetzel. The district court entered a judgment for the Hetzels, finding that the DEA was

negligent in conducting the chase and in not breaking offthe chase before the collision occurred. The

United States contends that its liability under the FTCA is defined by a District of Columbia statute

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1The previous day, Hunter had arrived at Washington's National Airport in Virginia where a

dog trained to identify illegal drugs indicated that the cash Hunter was carrying contained traces

of cocaine. DEA officers confiscated the cash but released Hunter. The following morning, DEA

officers arrested Hunter's associate at Union Station for cocaine possession. The officers then

decided to lure Hunter to the Station. 

partially waiving the District government's immunity from suit for claims arising from the gross

negligence ofDistrict government employees operating emergency vehicles. Alternatively, the United

States contends that if a negligence standard does apply, the district court's findings are clearly

erroneous. We hold that the local statute on which the United States relies does not modify the

United States' waiver of immunity under the FTCA. See Indian Towing Co., Inc. v. United States,

350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955). Therefore, the district court properly determined that negligence is the

standard of care to which law enforcement officers operating in the District are held. See Biscoe v.

Arlington County, 738 F.2d 1352, 1364 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1159 (1985).

Because the district court's finding of negligence is not clearly erroneous, we affirm.

I.

The eventsresulting in the Hetzels' injuries began as part of a criminal investigation by federal

law enforcement officials that led to Union Station in the District of Columbia. On the morning of

February 7, 1990, DEA officerslured a target of the investigation, Donald Hunter, to Union Station,

where they intended to surround his car with government vehicles and arrest him.1 When Hunter

arrived, however, a taxi pulled in front of one DEA vehicle and provided Hunter with an avenue of

escape. When an Amtrak investigator, with his weapon drawn, approached Hunter's car, Hunter fled,

hitting the investigator's hand with the car, jumping the pedestrian island, and driving erratically and

at a high speed into traffic on E Street, N.W. DEA Officer Forshey activated the emergency lights

of his car and began a high-speed pursuit of Hunter. Forshey briefly lost sight of Hunter, but then

resumed his pursuit on E Street between 2nd and 3rd Streets, N.W. Hunter was traveling between

60 and 70 miles an hour with Forshey following closely behind. At 9:30 a.m., Hunter ran a red light

at the intersection of 3rd and E Streets, N.W., and collided with Mr. Hetzel, who was riding to work

on his motorcycle.

Mr. Hetzel sustained a number of injuries, including an injury to his leg that required

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2Section 1346(b) of the FTCA provides that federal district courts:

shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States,

for money damages, accruing on or after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of

property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or

omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his

office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private

person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place

where the act or omission occurred.

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). 

amputation below the knee. After pursuing administrative claims against the DEA, Mr. and Mrs.

Hetzel sued the United States under the FTCA. The district court found that the DEA's pursuit of

Hunter "was in utter and careless disregard for the lives and safety of the Plaintiff and members of

the public," and that the DEA's decision "to engage in a high-speed chase ... through busy

Washington streets during rush hour was negligent." Hetzel v. United States of America, 1993 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 7506, at *11, 14 (D.D.C. June 1, 1990). The district court awarded Mr. Hetzel

$629,055.25 and awarded Mrs. Hetzel $25,000 for loss of consortium. Id. at *14. The United States

appeals.

II.

Under the FTCA, the United States is liable for torts committed by its agents "to the same

extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to

judgment or for punitive damages." 28 U.S.C. § 2674. This liability is defined "in accordance with

the law ofthe place where the act or omission occurred." Id. § 1346(b).2 The United States contends

that the FTCA's reference to a "private individual" should be strictly construed to preclude reliance

on liability standards applicable to municipalities and other public entities even when a readily

available private analogue is absent. The United States nevertheless maintains that "for purposes of

determining the applicable law here, the most appropriate standard ... isthe standard of care used for

D.C. Metropolitan Police under local law." It locates this standard in D.C. Code § 1-1212, which

restricts the District of Columbia's right to interpose a defense of governmental immunity and

provides that the District of Columbia shall be liable only for gross negligence arising from the

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3D.C. Code § 1-1212 provides:

Hereafter the District of Columbia shall not assert the defense of governmental

immunity in any suit at law in which a claim is asserted against it for money only

on account of damage to or loss of property or on account of personal injury or

death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the

District occurring as the result of the operation by such employee, within the scope

of his office or employment, of a vehicle owned or controlled by the District: 

Provided, that in the case of a claim arising out of the operation of an emergency

vehicle on an emergency run the District shall be liable only for gross negligence. 

4The Hetzels' contention that a private analogue to the DEA's conduct is found in District of

Columbia and Maryland law authorizing "citizen's arrests" is unpersuasive. DEA officers are

authorized to engage in high-speed pursuits of suspected felons such as the pursuit that caused

appellees' injuries here, and the district court expressly found that DEA officers were acting within

the scope of their employment on the day of the collision with Mr. Hetzel. Hetzel, at *6. The law

cited by the Hetzels does not authorize private individuals to engage in high-speed pursuits, and

thus the analogy between the DEA's agent's conduct and that authorized by "citizen's arrest" laws

is inapt. 

5Although the United States argues against applying a municipal or state analogy in FTCA

cases where a private analogue is absent, it nevertheless maintains that the applicable standard of

care in the instant case is "the standard of care used for D.C. Metropolitan Police under local

operation of its emergency vehicles by its employees.3 Because DEA Officer Forshey operated his

official vehicle in an emergency pursuit, the United Statesmaintainsthat evidence of gross negligence

is a prerequisite to imposing liability pursuant to the FTCA and that the district court erred by

imposing liability based only on a finding of negligence. We review this question de novo. See, e.g.,

LTV Corp. v. Gulf States Steel, Inc. of Ala., 969 F.2d 1050 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 661

(1992).

No private individual has the authority to engage in a high-speed chase of a suspected felon

as occurred here, and thus there is no readily available private analogue upon which to premise

liability under the FTCA.4 Other courts confronting the issue of FTCA liability in the law

enforcement context have abandoned the private individual analogy and looked to the standards of

care applicable to government employers under state law. Stuart v. United States, 23 F.3d 1483,

1487 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 357 (1994); see also Doggett v. United States, 875 F.2d

684, 689 (9th Cir. 1989); Tomcsik v. United States, 720 F. Supp. 588, 591 (E.D. Mich. 1989), aff'd

without opinion, 917 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 948 (1991). We adopt this

approach.5

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law." We find no substantive difference between the position the United States urgesreliance

on the standard of care applicable to District of Columbia police officersand that which it

criticizesthe adoption of a municipal analogy by other courts. 

6

In Biscoe, the court held that § 1-1212 did not apply to Arlington County and an Arlington,

Virginia police officer in a suit brought by a bystander and his wife for injuries sustained as a

result of the officer's negligent high-speed pursuit of a suspected felon into the District of

Columbia. 738 F.2d at 1364. Construing § 1-1212 to be applicable only to conduct by District of

Columbia employees, the court noted that vehicles of all police departments operating within the

District of Columbia must comply with the regulatory standard of due care. Id.

7

In 1960, the District of Columbia Board of Commissioners requested that Congress enact a

statute partially waiving the District's governmental immunity because of concern with "the

problem of protecting against financial loss any District of Columbia employee who may be

subjected to a lawsuit for injury or damage allegedly arising out of the negligent operation of a

This court has previously considered the standard of care applicable to a non-District of

Columbia law enforcement official engaged in an authorized high-speed pursuit ofsuspect within the

District's boundaries. In Biscoe, 738 F.2d at 1363, the court held that "the proper standard of care

to be applied to the felony stop and pursuit ... [in] the District of Columbia is that of due care."6

District of Columbia municipal regulations require all drivers, including "the drivers of all vehicles

owned or operated by the United States, the District of Columbia, or any state, county, city, town,

district, or any other politicalsubdivision of anystate" to obeygenerallyapplicable traffic regulations.

See 18 D.C.M.R. § 2001.1 (1987). Although the regulations exempt "authorized emergency

vehicles" that are "in pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law" from certain of the

generally applicable traffic rulesincluding speed limits, parking rules, traffic lights, and stop signs,

see id. § 2002.2they expressly provide that the drivers of such vehicles in such circumstances

remain subject to the general "duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons." Id. §

2002.4. In Biscoe, the court noted that courtsin other jurisdictions have construed language similar

to that in the District'sregulation as permitting liability based on a finding of negligence. Biscoe, 738

F.2d at 1364 (citing cases).

In light of this regulation, D.C. Code § 1-1212's provision that "in the case of a claim arising

out of the operation of an emergency vehicle on an emergency run the District shall be liable only for

gross negligence" is best read as nothing more than a qualification to the general waiver of

governmental immunity expressed in the first part of § 1-1212.7Id.; see also Sisk v. Styer, 1990 U.S.

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motor vehicle while such employee is engaged in activities within the scope of his official

employment." S. REP. No. 1815, 86th Cong. 2d Sess. 1, 2 (1960). At the time, the District of

Columbia could not be sued for damages arising from the negligent operations of a police car or

fire truck. 106 CONG. REC. H15797 (daily ed. July 2, 1960) (statement of Rep. Davis). The

legislative proposal envisioned that D.C. employees would be immune from suit and only the

municipal corporation could be held liable. S. REP. No. 1815, at 2. 

8The Ninth Circuit has strictly limited the application of its divided opinion in Aguilar, 920

F.2d 1475. See Montes, 37 F.3d at 1351-52; Stuart, 23 F.3d at 1488. 

Dist. LEXIS 12360, at *10 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 1990). As a partial waiver of the District of Columbia's

governmental immunity, § 1-1212 cannot provide the basis to limit the liability of the United States

under the FTCA. In Indian Towing Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the United

Statesremained liable under the FTCA for theCoast Guard's negligent operation of a lighthouse even

though state law may have immunized municipalities from liability for the negligent maintenance of

the navigation lights. The Court stated that the FTCA was "not self-defeating by covertly embedding

the casuistries ofmunicipal liability for torts," 350 U.S. at 65, and observed that the Court should not

"as a self-constituted guardian of the Treasury import immunity back into a statute designed to limit

it." Id. at 69; see United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 164 (1963) ("it [is] improper to limit suits

by federal prisoners [under the FTCA] because of restrictive state rules of immunity"); Montes v.

United States of America, 37 F.3d 1347, 1351-52 (9th Cir. 1994) (state immunity from liability for

negligence in law enforcement pursuit inapplicable to United States in FTCA suit by victims of

automobile collisionwith a car fleeing fromthe United States Border Patrol); Stuart, 23 F.3d at 1488

(same); Wright v. United States, 719 F.2d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1983) (state law immunizing public

employees from liability for malicious prosecution inapplicable to federal employees under FTCA

because state immunity does not determine the scope of the United States' liability under FTCA).

Even if a state law concerning governmental immunity could be read to establish a standard of care

where no other statute or regulation sets the standard of care for functions peculiar to government

actors, cf. Aguilar v. United States, 920 F.2d 1475, 1479 (9th Cir. 1990) (state monetary cap on

damages applied to claim against federal officers under FTCA),8that case is not presented here.

Instead, the standard of care for emergency vehicles in the District of Columbia is clearly set forth

in D.C. M.R. § 2002.4, and D.C. Code § 1-1212 therefore has no application in this case. See Muniz,

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9Congress has left Indian Towing undisturbed notwithstanding its willingness, in other

contexts, to limit the United States' liability under the FTCA. See, e.g., PUB. L. 100-694, § 4

(1988) (1988 FTCA amendments adding language: "the United States shall be entitled to assert

any defense based upon judicial or legislative immunity which otherwise would have been

available to the employee of the United States whose act or omission gave rise to the claim ....")

(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2674). Further, the Supreme Court observed in Muniz that:

Congress has taken steps to protect the [United States] Government from liability

that would seriously handicap efficient government operations.... [T]he

Government is not without defenses. Most important, the Government is relieved

from liability on "[a]ny claim [where its] employee ... [is] exercising due care, in

the execution of a statute or regulation, ... or based upon the exercise or

performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty."

374 U.S. at 163 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (emphasis in Maniz omitted)); see, e.g., Morton v.

United States, 228 F.2d 431, 432 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 975 (1956) (United

States not liable for claims based on discretionary function or duty); 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (same,

as to intentional torts of its employees). 

374 U.S. at 164-65 (noting that a federal jailor's duty of care isindependently fixed by federalstatute

and cannot be affected by state immunity laws).

As a result, the standard of care to which the United States must be held in the instant case,

where it seeksto apply the standard of care of D.C. Metropolitan Police Officers, is that of due care,

or negligence, as set forth in District of Columbia regulations and explained by the court in Biscoe.

Although the United States will be liable for conduct for which the District of Columbia is immune,

this result follows directly from the interpretation of the FTCA adopted by the Supreme Court in

Indian Towing, an interpretation that Congress has let stand for more than thirty years.9

III.

Finally, the government's alternative argument, that the district court's finding that the DEA

was negligent is clearly erroneous, is without merit. This court must defer to the district court's

findings so long as they are supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous, and it will not

reverse even if this court as the trier of fact would have weighed the evidence differently. Cuddy v.

Carmen, 762 F.2d 119, 124 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1034 (1985); FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).

The district court found that the Hetzels had met their burden to prove negligence through

evidence that Officer Forshey pursued the suspect by means of a high-speed chase in a heavily

traveled area during the morning rush hour. The district court also found that the officer's failure to

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10The cases on which the United States relies to assert that the district court's finding is clearly

erroneous are factually distinguishable and principally involve gross negligence rather than

negligence. 

abandon the chase after he lost sight of the suspect showed negligence. The court further found that

the officer's conduct was contrary to the Guidelines ofthe D.C. Metropolitan Police Department and

the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

The court found, specifically, that the officer activated his emergency lights and began his

pursuit when the suspect jumped the pedestrian island in his car in front of the station after hitting

another officer's hand with his car. After losing sight of the suspect in the unit block of E Street,

Officer Forshey resumed pursuit of the suspect over the crest of a hill between 2nd and 3rd Streets.

The suspect ran red lights before reaching 3rd Street, and he was speeding, weaving and driving

recklessly from a moderately trafficked area into a heavily populated area. By the time the suspect

approached the intersection of 3rd Street, he was traveling between 60 to 70 miles an hour, with the

officer not more than two car lengths behind, and ran through a red light at 3rd Street. These findings

are not clearly erroneous and the district court's conclusion is owed deference. Cuddy v. Carmen,

762 F.2d at 124. The district court could properly find that evidence showed that the DEA's

high-speed pursuit of Hunter was negligent, and Officer Forshey's activation of his emergency

equipment reinforces the district court's conclusion that Forshey was not merely following Hunter,

but pursuing him in an effort to make an arrest.10

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment for the Hetzels.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge, concurring. I write separately only to note my disagreement with

the categorical dictum that "a partial waiver ... cannot provide the basis to limit the liability of the

United States under [the Federal Tort Claims Act]." Maj. Op. at 7.

In the present case a valid regulation set out a standard of care for a function peculiar to

government actorsemergency vehicular pursuit of a fleeing violator of the law. But one can easily

picture a case in which the only source of a duty of care for a government function is a statute, like

D.C. Code § 1-1212, waiving government immunity, but only for actions based on gross negligence.

The statute in that circumstance would have to be read as accomplishing the two purposes at once:

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setting the standard of care at gross negligence and waiving the immunity defense for suits brought

under that standard. In that case, United States liability under the FTCA would be set by reference

to that standard, the only standard supplied by state law.

The cases cited by the majority to support its dictum that partial waivers of state immunity

are irrelevant to determination of the standard of care under the FTCA, see Maj. Op. at 7-8 & n.8,

from Indian Towing to Wright, Montes and Stuart, stand only for the simple proposition that state

laws providing for complete immunity from suit do not affect U.S. liability under the FTCA. Unlike

laws waiving immunity for activity that fails to meet a specified standard of care, such rules of total

immunity cannot conceivably be read as establishing a standard of care.

Aguilar v. United States, 920 F.2d 1475, 1479 (9th Cir. 1990), see Maj. Op. at 8, strikes me

as a curious intermediate case. There a state statute waived immunity but, rather than setting a

special standard of care, capped the damages. The court found the cap applicable to the United

States's FTCA liability. Yet a cap seems likely to arise in large measure from a concern to protect

the public fisc, i.e., the same purpose as has commonly been asserted as driving complete immunity,

see 5 Fowler V. Harper et al., The Law of Torts § 29.3 (2d ed. 1985), and thus perhaps inconsistent

with the impulses behind the FTCA. The special standard, by contrast, seems to embody the state's

balance of the interest in the official's vigorous pursuit of his activity against the competing interests

that call for caution in that pursuit, i.e., a policy determination that the FTCA adopts by reference.

Surely if Aguilar is correct, any standard of care specified in a state's partial waiver should govern

FTCA liability.

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