Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-07269/USCOURTS-caDC-95-07269-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Decided June 11, 1996

Nos. 88-7237, 95-7267, & 95-7269

GILDA MARX, INCORPORATED; BODY DESIGN BY GILDA,

INC.; BODY DESIGN BY GILDA STUDIOS, INC.,

APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES

v.

WILDWOOD EXERCISE, INC., ET AL.,

APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 86cv01171)

-

On Motions to Consolidate and to Dismiss

Herbert Cohen, Wigman, Cohen, Leitner & Myers, for appellants.

Burton A. Schwalb, Schwalb, Donnenfeld, Bray & Silbert, for appellees.

Before WALD, WILLIAMS, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

PERCURIAM: The district court entered judgment for the defendants and ruled that they were

entitled to reimbursement of attorney's fees they expended in defending against some, but not all, of

plaintiffs' claims. The district court has not yet fixed the amount of the fee award. The plaintiffs

appealed from the adverse judgment and from the finding of liability for attorney's fees, while the

defendants cross-appealed from the limitation placed on the fee award. Both parties now move to

consolidate the appeal and the cross- appeal. Because the district court's attorney's fee order is not

final insofar as the amount of the award has not been determined, we decline to exercise pendent

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1Local Rule 215(b) provides: "After a decision has been made that there will be an appeal [on

the merits], the Court shall make a specific determination as to whether, in the interest of justice,

the fee issues, in whole or in part, should be considered or be held in abeyance pending the

outcome of the appeal." 

jurisdiction over the appeal and cross-appeal from that portion of the order.

I.

The parties to this ten-year-old dispute are Body Design by Gilda, Inc. ("Gilda Marx") and

Wildwood Exercise, Inc. ("Wildwood"), two organizationsformerlyoperating exercise studiosin the

Washington, D.C. area. Gilda Marx sued Wildwood for trademark infringement, unfair competition,

deceptive trade practices, violations of employment contracts, and violations of the Racketeer

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") provisions of the Organized Crime Control Act of

1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982). The district court entered judgment for Wildwood in 1988.

Gilda Marx, Inc. v. Wildwood Exercise, Inc., No. 86-1171 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 26, 1988) (mem.).

Gilda Marx filed Appeal No. 88-7237 from that judgment.

Shortlythereafter, Gilda Marx filed a motion to amend the judgment pursuant to FederalRule

of Civil Procedure 52(b), and Wildwood filed a motion for attorney's fees pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 59(e). This court held the appeal in abeyance pending the district court's

disposition ofthe post-judgment motions. Gilda Marx, Inc. v. Wildwood Exercise, Inc., No. 88-7237

(D.C. Cir. filed Dec. 20, 1988) (order). On September 29, 1995, the district court denied Gilda

Marx's Rule 52(b) motion and granted, in part, Wildwood's motion for attorney'sfees "asto attorney

time expended in defending against the RICO claims." Gilda Marx, Inc. v. Wildwood Exercise, Inc.,

No. 86-1171 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 29, 1995). As permitted by Local Rule 215(b)1, the court deferred

determining the amount of attorney's fees "pending the outcome of the appeal on the RICO claims."

Gilda Marx noted an appealfrom the September 29, 1995, order, No. 95-7267, and repeated

its request for review of the original 1988 judgment. In its statement of issues on appeal in No. 95-

7267, Gilda Marx also disclosed its intention to challenge the 1995 finding that it was liable for

attorney's fees. Wildwood filed a cross-appeal from the district court's limitation of the recovery of

attorney's fees to those expended on the RICO claims. Appeal No. 95-7269. Pending now before

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this court are two motions concerning these three appeals: Gilda Marx's motion to consolidate the

appeals and hold the consolidated appeal in abeyance until the district court determines the amount

of attorney's fees, and Wildwood's motion to dismiss Gilda Marx's 1988 appeal and consolidate the

1995 appealofGildaMarxwithWildwood's cross-appeal. Although both parties favor consolidation,

Wildwood opposes Gilda Marx's request to hold the consolidated appeal in abeyance.

II.

When certain post-judgment motions are pending in the district court, including motions to

amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 52(b), "the time for appeal[ofthe judgment] for all partiesruns

from the entry of the order disposing of the last such motion outstanding." FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4).

Therefore, Gilda Marx's notice of appeal filed on October 12, 1995, is a timely appeal from the

district court's 1988 judgment, as well as from the September 29, 1995, denial of the Rule 52(b)

motion. Moreover, Gilda Marx's 1995 appeal, No. 95-7267, subsumes the 1988 appeal, No. 88-

7237. Consequently, we grant Wildwood's motion in part by dismissing No. 88-7237.

Before deciding whether to consolidate the two remaining appeals, we first consider whether

we have jurisdiction over either of them. This court generally has statutory jurisdiction of appeals

from "final decisions" of the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994). The 1988 judgment and 1995

denial of Gilda Marx's Rule 52(b) motion constitute an appealable "final decision" on the merits, even

though Wildwood'sfee motion isstill outstanding in the district court. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson

& Co., 486 U.S. 196, 202-03 (1988). We thus have jurisdiction over No. 95-7267, at least insofar

as it challenges the 1988 judgment and the 1995 Rule 52(b) denial.

Jurisdiction over Wildwood's cross-appeal is less clear. Although the district court found

Gilda Marx liable for attorney's fees, the amount of the award has not been established. In keeping

with the principle that a finding of liability is not final until the court has specified the relief to be

awarded, Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737 (1976), every circuit to addressthe question

has held that an order finding liability for attorney's fees is not final until the amount has been

determined. Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century 21 Real Estate, Inc., 929 F.2d 827, 830 (1st

Cir. 1991); Echols v. Parker, 909 F.2d 795, 798 (5th Cir. 1990); Phelps v. Washburn Univ. of

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2

In Haralson v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 837 F.2d 1123, 1124-25 (D.C. Cir. 1988), the

court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) over the district court's interlocutory

order denying an injunction. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court's

separate order refusing to force the defendant conservator to return seized funds that the plaintiffs

wished to use to pay their attorneys. Although this section of the opinion was headed "Counsel

Fees," it did not address an attorney's fee award of the sort involved here. 

Topeka, 807 F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Becton Dickinson & Co. v. District 65,

United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Amer., 799 F.2d 57, 61 (3d Cir. 1986);

Morgan v. Union Metal Mfg., 757 F.2d 792, 795 (6th Cir. 1985); see also Crowley v. Shultz, 704

F.2d 1269, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1983). We would therefore dismiss No. 95-7269 for lack of jurisdiction

if it were the only appeal before us.

The question, then, is whether to assume jurisdiction over Wildwood's cross-appeal(No. 95-

7269) by consolidating it with Gilda Marx's 1995 appeal (No. 95-7267), over which, at least in part,

our jurisdiction is unquestionable. Our sister circuits are split on the question whether we even have

the power to do so. Three circuits have held or suggested that an otherwise unappealable fee liability

order can be appended to the appeal of a final judgment on the merits. Andrews v. Employees'

Retirement Plan of First Ala. Bancshares, Inc., 938 F.2d 1245, 1247-48 (11th Cir. 1991); Bittner

v. Sadoff & Rudoy Ind., 728 F.2d 820, 826-27 (7th Cir. 1984); Morgan, 757 F.2d at 795-96 (6th

Cir.) (dicta). On the other side, two circuits have flatly rejected that position, Southern Travel Club

v. Carnival Air Lines, Inc., 986 F.2d 125, 131 (5th Cir. 1993); Phelps, 807 F.2d at 155 (10th Cir.),

and another has at least expressed skepticism toward it. Becton Dickinson, 799 F.2d at 61-62 (3d

Cir.); but see Pennsylvania v. Flaherty, 983 F.2d 1267, 1276-77 (3d Cir. 1993). The question is

undecided in this circuit.2

A circuit court exercises pendent jurisdiction when, in the course of reviewing an order from

which an appeal is within its jurisdiction, it hears an appealfrom another order that, while part of the

same case or controversy, would not otherwise be within its statutory jurisdiction. Cf. United Mine

Workers of Amer. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 721-29 (1966). All of the above-cited authorities on both

sides of the question presented here predate Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1203

(1995), in which the Supreme Court took a relatively restrictive position on the circuit courts' power

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3The jurisdiction approved in Gibbs has since been largely codified. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994). 

to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction. Nonetheless, Swint left open the questions "whether or

when it may be proper for a court of appeals with jurisdiction over one ruling to review,

conjunctively, related rulings that are not themselves appealable." Id. at 1212. The Court has on a

number of occasions approved the exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction. E.g., Thornburgh v.

American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 755-57 (1986), overruled in

part on other grounds, Planned Parenthood of S.E. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992)

(plurality); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 172 (1974); Deckert v. Independence

Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 286-87 (1940). Moreover, while it is not clear from the opinion in Swint which,

if any, of these facts were dispositive, that case involved a number of factors militating against

pendent appellate jurisdiction that are not present here: the pendent appeal involved a separate cause

of action from the one giving rise to the appealable order, rather than an ancillary matter; the

appealable order was itself interlocutory, suggesting a greater threat to orderly procedure when the

appeals court broadly intervened before the district court had an opportunity to render a final

judgment on any of the claims in the case; and the court of appeals complicated the appeal by

bringing in "pendent parties," i.e., parties who were not involved in the appealable order but were

parties to the pendent order.

Review of the attorney's fees order is certainly within our Article III power. See Gibbs, 383

U.S. at 725; Chicago, Rock Isl. &Pac. R.R. Co. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574, 578 (1954) (holding circuit

court reviewing the dismissal of one suit had jurisdiction to review denial of a remand motion in a

separate suit arising from same set of events). Also, unlike the extra-statutory3exercise of pendent

original jurisdiction approved in Gibbs, pendent appellate jurisdiction in a case such as this does not

bring into our court any claim that could not otherwise be here; it merely affects the timing of an

appeal that one or more parties will ultimately be able to bring here as of right. While we do not

eagerly reach out to decide whatever issues the parties wish to present, cases like Gibbs and Cohen

v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), indicate that we should give the jurisdictional

statutes a "practical construction." Swint, 115 S. Ct. at 1203-04 (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v.

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4Some courts read Swint to permit pendent appellate jurisdiction only when the quoted

conditions obtain. See Woolfolk v. Smith, 81 F.3d 741, 743 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Sevier

v. City of Lawrence, Kan., 60 F.3d 695, 701 (10th Cir. 1995). But see Kaluczky v. City of White

Plains, 57 F.3d 202, 207 (2d Cir. 1995). While we agree that Swint counsels caution in the

exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction, we do not think that it meant to prescribe a definitive or

exhaustive list of conditions. 

Desktop Direct, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1992, 1995 (1994)). Our own recent jurisdictional decisions suggest

restraint tempered by a recognition ofthe need forsensible allocation ofjudicialresources. Compare

McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 52 F.3d 346, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.

704 (1996), with Shell Oil Co. v. Federal Energy Reg. Comm'n, 47 F.3d 1186, 1194-96 (D.C. Cir.

1995). We therefore decline to create a blanket rule absolutely barring pendent appellate jurisdiction

over non-final attorney's fee liability orders. But, as a general matter, we anticipate that cases in

which we review such orders will be rare exceptions.

This court exercises pendent appellate jurisdiction sparingly. See Consarc Corp. v. Iraqi

Ministry, 27 F.3d 695, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1994); 16 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and

Procedure § 3937 nn.5, 6.5 (1992 & Supp. 1995). As the Supreme Court pointed out in Swint, 115

S. Ct. at 1209-11, a more expansive approach would undermine the statutory scheme, which gives

rulemaking authority over general classes of interlocutory appeals to the Supreme Court and

case-by-case discretion over such appeals to the district courts in the first instance. 28 U.S.C. §

1292(b), (e) (1994). Deferring to the choices made by the district court in managing its docket, we

entertain pendent appeals only when substantial considerations of fairness or efficiency demand it.

Such considerations may be presented, for example, when the nonappealable order is "inextricably

intertwined" with the appealable order, or when review of the former is "necessary to ensure

meaningful review of the latter."4Swint, 115 S. Ct. at 1212; see also Brennan v. Township of

Northville, 78 F.3d 1152, 1157-58 (6th Cir. 1996); Dolihite v. Maughon, 74 F.3d 1027, 1034-35

n.3 (11th Cir. 1996); Blue v. Koren, 72 F.3d 1075, 1084 n.6 (2d Cir. 1995). The appeals may be so

closely related, or turn on such similar issues, that a single appeal should dispose of both

simultaneously. See Eisen, 417 U.S. at 172-73; Shell Oil, 47 F.3d at 1194-96; Consarc, 27 F.3d

at 700. In some cases, pendent review will likely terminate the entire case, sparing both this court

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and the district court from further proceedings and giving the parties a speedy resolution. See

Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 757; Deckert, 311 U.S. at 287. By choosing to entertain a pendent appeal,

we may sometimes be able to forestall a second appeal, thus streamlining the judicial process.

On the other hand, there are a number of circumstances that generally weigh against the

exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction. We do not consider pendent appeals that challenge orders

from which the time for appeal has already passed. Consarc, 27 F.3d at 700. Likewise, pendent

appellate jurisdiction may be declined if the appealing party has, intentionally or not, circumvented

the district court's authority to decide whether to endorse an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(b) or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). We also must be careful not to accept pendent

appeals prematurely, without the benefit of an adequate record or before the district court has an

opportunity to render a considered decision on the subject. See Swint, 115 S. Ct. at 1210 n.5; Gross

v. Winter, 876 F.2d 165, 168 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Not only judicial economy but the prohibition

on advisory opinions counsel against reaching an issue that might be mooted or altered by subsequent

district court proceedings. See Dellums v. Powell, 660 F.2d 802, 804 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Fort v.

Roadway Expr., Inc., 746 F.2d 744, 748 (11thCir. 1984). Finally, the Supreme Court has repeatedly

warned against "pendent" appeals that substantially predominate over the independently appealable

order; parties should not be encouraged to bring insignificant, but final, matters before this court as

mere vehicles for pendent review of numerous or complex orders that are not independently

appealable. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 663 (1977); see also Johnson v. Jones, 115 S.

Ct. 2151, 2159 (1995).

With these considerationsin mind, we decline to assume jurisdiction over the order imposing

liability on Gilda Marx for attorney'sfees. The attorney's fees issue is not so inextricably intertwined

with the judgment on the merits; nor must the former be reviewed in order to review the latter fully.

Early review of attorney's fees liability is not likely to terminate the case or obviate further

proceedings either here or in the district court. Indeed, because, as the district court's order suggests,

our ruling on the merits may cause the district court to revisit Gilda Marx'sliability for attorney'sfees,

any decision we reached as to attorney's fees would be somewhat speculative. Reviewing the

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5Obviously, from the appellate court's perspective, it would be desirable if the merits appeal

and the appeal from the final order on fees could be decided together. Indeed, this appears to be

the import of the 1993 amendments to the civil and appellate rules. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2), 58; 

FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4)(D); see also 15B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and

Procedure § 3915.6 n.19 (1992); id. at 36-37 (Supp. 1995). However, the needs of judicial

economy take into account not only the best use of our resources, but those of the district court

as well. In some cases, as here, the district court will reasonably conclude that it would be most

efficient to permit a merits appeal to go forward immediately. In other instances, the district court

may find it more appropriate to expedite fee proceedings or exercise its authority under Local

Rule 215 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to delay the merits appeal until a final fee order

can be entered. In any event, the wise division of labor between the two courts under the

circumstances of each case is committed by statute and rule to the district court in the first

instance, which is all the more reason for us to be cautious in exercising pendent jurisdiction. See

Swint, 115 S. Ct. at 1210. 

attorney's fees issues now would not save the district court any work, irrespective of how we

ultimately rule on the merits, because the district court has exercised its discretion under the local

rules to defer further proceedings until after the appeal is decided.5 We can only guess whether

exercising or declining pendent jurisdiction would make more efficient use of this court's resources.

Compare Bittner, 728 F.2d at 827, with Flaherty, 983 F.2d at 1277, and Becton Dickinson, 799 F.2d

at 61. Without a reason to believe that the interests of judicial economy and fairness to the parties

would be served, we have no occasion to take the "disfavored" step of exercising pendent jurisdiction.

Moore v. City of Wynnewood, 57 F.3d 924, 929 (10th Cir. 1995). Adherence to the general rule is

further warranted by the difficulty of assessing the propriety of the district court's liability ruling

without a determination of the amount of the award. Although the district court appears to have

allowed recovery of fees only for Wildwood's defense of the RICO claim, the court treated all the

non-RICO counts as predicate acts of the RICO claim. Mem. at 59. The scope of the fee award is

therefore not entirely clear and may explain the district court's decision to delay a decision on the

amount of attorney's fee liability until this court reviews the merits of the underlying judgment.

Accordingly, we sua sponte dismiss Wildwood's cross-appeal, No. 95-7269, and the portion

of Gilda Marx's appeal, No. 95-7267, that challenges Gilda Marx's liability for attorney's fees. We

also deny Gilda Marx's request to hold the remaining merits appeal, No. 95-7267, in abeyance.

Although the court has discretion to defer review of the merits of this case until the amount of

attorney'sfeesis established, nothing would be gained here by so delaying since the district court has

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deferred setting an amount until this court rules on the merits. Moreover, Gilda Marx's interest in

staying the remaining appeal appears to be based on the assumption that the appeal will include

review of the determination of liability for attorney's fees. Hence, our review of the 1988 judgment

for Wildwood and the denial of Gilda Marx's Rule 52(b) motion may proceed in No. 95-7267.

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