Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-08089/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-08089-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

 Petitioner named Dora B. Schriro as a respondent in this matter. Charles Ryan, the

current director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, is automatically substituted for Dora

Schriro pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d). 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robert Stanley Paige, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-07-8089-PCT-EHC (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter arises on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (docket #

1) Respondents1

 have filed an Answer (docket # 11) to which Petitioner has not replied and

the deadline has passed. 

As an initial matter, the Court will address Petitioner’s request that the Court

order the Arizona Superior Court or the State Attorney General to transfer their files to

Petitioner. (docket # 1 at 9) Such an order is unnecessary. Respondents have submitted the

relevant portions of the record in support of their Answer and have provided Petitioner with

a copy of their Answer and exhibits. (dockets # 11, # 14) Additionally, because Petitioner

was afforded an evidentiary hearing in his post-conviction proceeding in State court, this

matter is suitable for resolution on the pleadings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2); Schriro v.

Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007). 

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After careful review of the record, the Court concludes that trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance and that the state court’s resolution of Petitioner’s claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel rests on an unreasonable determination of the facts and is an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent to the facts of this case. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On June 6, 2002, Petitioner was indicted in the Superior Court of Arizona,

Yavapai County, on eight counts of dangerous crimes against children based on alleged

sexual activities with a minor. (docket # 1 at 11-12; Respondents’ Exh. A at 21-23)

Petitioner initially pled not guilty, rejected several plea offers, and proceeded to trial on

January 14, 2004 before Judge David L. Mackey. (docket # 1 at 12; Exh. J, Tr. 5/24/05 at

124-26) Petitioner’s defense at trial was guilty but insane. The trial ended in a mistrial on

February 12, 2004 when the jury was unable to reach a verdict. (docket # 1 at 16, Tr.

2/12/04 at 22-23) Thereafter, the parties negotiated a plea agreement. (docket # 1;

Respondents’ Exh. C, Tr. 7/16/04 at 54-56; docket # 14) Judge Mackey, and later Judge

Kiger, participated in the plea negotiations. (docket # 1 at 14) The plea agreement provided

that Petitioner would plead guilty to Counts I and VIII of the indictment, and that the State

would dismiss the remaining counts. (docket # 14) Specifically, Petitioner would plead

guilty to attempted sexual conduct with a minor (Count I), and to sexual abuse (Count VIII),

both class 3 felonies. (docket # 14) The written plea agreement provided that Count I

carried “a presumptive sentence of 10 years; a minimum sentence of 5 years; and a

maximum sentence of 15 years.” (docket # 14) (emphasis in original) The plea agreement

also provided that Count VIII carries “a presumptive sentence of 5 years; a minimum

sentence of 2.5 years; and a maximum sentence of 7.5 years.” (docket # 14 ) (emphasis in

original). 

In a section entitled “Special conditions regarding sentence, parole, or

commutation, if any,” the written plea agreement specified that, “[p]ursuant to A.R.S. § 13-

902(E), the Court may, in lieu of prison, order that the Defendant be supervised on probation

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 The Honorable David L. Mackey presided. 

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for any term from five years up to the rest of Defendant’s life.” (docket # 14) That same

section also stated that “DEFENDANT SHALL BE SENTENCED TO THE

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS WITH REFERENCE TO COUNT VIII OF

THE INDICTMENT FOR A TERM OF NOT LESS THAN 5 YEARS.” (docket # 14)

(emphasis in original). The “Special Conditions” section also enumerated 17 specific

conditions that the court would impose if Petitioner were placed on probation. (docket # 14) 

Finally, the written plea agreement specified that “it is the Court’s duty to impose sentence

upon the Defendant and that any sentence either stipulated to or recommended herein . .. is

not binding upon the Court. . . .” (docket # 14) 

On April 30, 2004, the trial court2

 conducted a change of plea hearing. At the

commencement of that hearing, the written plea agreement was not yet signed and

authorized by the State of Arizona through the Yavapai County Attorney because the county

attorney “would not sign an agreement that is not approved by the people whose lives were .

. . greatly impacted by this conduct . . . .” (Respondents’ Exh. A at 3) The court explained

“that’s the State’s prerogative to determine under which circumstances they’re (sic) going to

offer a plea agreement.” (Respondents’ Exh. A at 3) 

After noting that the State had not yet signed the plea agreement because it was

awaiting approval from the victim’s family, the trial court addressed the victim and her

mother in court, in Petitioner’s presence, and explained the plea agreement’s sentencing

range:

The plea agreement that I have in front of me indicates that [Petitioner]

would plead guilty to an attempted sexual conduct with a minor, a class

three felony, and a sexual abuse, a class three felony. The range of sentences

available to the Court, based upon this plea agreement, would be a minimum

of — a stipulated minimum of five years in the Arizona Department of 

Corrections . . . .

The maximum term that would be available to the Court for a sentence 

under this plea agreement would be 22 1⁄2 years in the Arizona Department

of Corrections. And there would be some possibilities of a prison term and

lifetime probation within those ranges. 

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And, as I read this plea agreement, it would allow the Court to impose a 7 1⁄2 

year prison term, up to a 7 1⁄2 year prison term, followed by lifetime probation.

That lifetime probation could begin with one year in the Yavapai County

Jail. 

(Respondents’ Exh. A, Tr. 4/30/04 at 3-4) 

Judge Mackey explained that he

wanted to give both sides an opportunity to ask [the court] any questions

they might have or see whether there’s any misunderstanding. Because right

now - and I’m not in a position to tell anybody that they have to agree to this

- - this is an agreement that would only take place if everyone is in agreement.

(Respondents’ Exh. A at 5) 

The victim’s mother stated that “with the plea that’s written up today – or the

plea, I’m sorry, that was offered yesterday would put a cap on [Petitioner’s prison term] and

tie [the court’s] hands to give him a maximum of seven and a half years . . . .” 

(Respondents’ Exh. A at 5) The victim’s mother also expressed concern that Petitioner

could be released from prison after a few years and, if not placed on probation, re-offend. 

(Respondents’ Exh. A at 6-7) The court responded that a 7 1⁄2 year sentence plus lifetime

probation was one possible sentence available under the agreement, and that the court also

had the option of sentencing Petitioner to over 22 years imprisonment:

This plea agreement would allow up to a 22 1⁄2 year prison term without

lifetime probation and still require [Petitioner] to submit his DNA into 

a databank with the U.S. Department of Safety; Would require him to 

register as a sex offender for the rest of his life. 

And while the probation would provide some monitoring by a probation 

officer, it would not prevent [Petitioner] from, if that was his predilection,

[finding] ways to have contact with young people. It would be a violation 

of his probation and it would probably be a new crime, depending upon 

what that contact was, for which he would face consequences. 

I’m just concerned that you’re seeing the lifetime probation as a greater

protection than those of us who are, unfortunately, involved in this system

recognize that it is. It’s an important feature and it may be one that, under

this plea agreement, I decide is appropriate after a prison term or after a 

prison term followed by some jail term as well. But this plea agreement,

also, given [Petitioner’s] age [52], gives this Court the authority to put him in 

custody today, if it’s entered into today, and ensure that he would not be 

out in the public again for 22 1⁄2 years less credit for time served.

(Respondents’ Exh. A at 7-8, 12) (emphasis added).

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3

 Remeron is a specific brand of Mirtazapine which is used to treat depression.

Mirtazapine is classified as an antidepressant. It works by increasing certain types of activity

in the brain to maintain mental balance. 

Paxil is a specific brand of Paroxetine which is used to treat depression, panic disorder

(sudden, unexpected attacks of extreme fear and worry about these attacks), and social anxiety

disorder (extreme fear of interacting with others or performing in front of others that interferes

with normal life). 

Lorazepam is used to relieve anxiety. 

(See, www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/)

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After a short recess, the victim and her mother consented to the plea agreement

and the prosecutor signed it. (Id. at 11) The trial court then engaged Petitioner in a plea

colloquy to determine whether he understood the agreement and if it contained all the terms

to which he had agreed. The court also inquired whether Petitioner had consumed any

drugs, alcohol, or medication before the hearing, and how such drugs affected him:

Q. Have you had any drugs, alcohol or medicine in the last twenty-four

hours?

A. Yes.

Q. And what is that?

A. Remeron, Lorazepam, and Paxil.3

Q. And how long have you been taking all three of those medications?

A. Oh, pretty much the year and a half since I’ve been out.

Q. Are those medications acting normally for you today?

A. Yes.

Q. You’re not experiencing any different reaction to those medications?

A. No.

Q. Do you understand what we’re talking about today?

A. Yes.

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(Respondents’ Exh. A at 16-17) The court also asked Petitioner about his understanding of

the plea agreement and whether it reflected all of the agreements related to his plea:

Q. Have you read this plea agreement?

A. Yes.

Q. Has your attorney had the opportunity to explain it all to you?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you understand it?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you agree with everything that’s in it ?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you have any agreements with the State that are not included in 

this plea agreement?

A. Not that I know of. 

* * *

Q. Now, you indicated that there wasn’t any other agreement that you

knew of. I want to make sure that you understand that once we go 

through this plea agreement, that is the document I’ll be relying upon 

that sets forth any agreement that you have with the State of Arizona 

about what’s going to happen to you. Any agreements that your attorney

might have told you about all have to be in here in writing.

Is this the complete agreement with respect to what’s going to happen 

to you?

A. I assume so. There was (sic) some intentions that weren’t —

 Mr. Griffen: Judge, can we stop for a second?

 The Court: Yes.

 Mr. Griffen: Judge, because of some of the things that have been 

 bandied about this morning, there was some concern something was 

 changed. We’re clear it’s the same agreement as yesterday.

 The Defendant: Right.

Q [the Court]: [Petitioner], I want you to understand, while there has been

a lot of discussion back and forth this morning and a lot of discussion back 

and forth before today, I want you to take a moment with your attorney,

glance through the pages — Mr. Griffen, let me hand this one to you; 

this is the one I’m working off of — look at each page and make sure you

see that there have been no other changes.

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A. Yes, it appears to be the same.

Q. That plea agreement sets forth all the agreements that you have about

what’s going to happen to you?

A. (Nodding.)

Q. Yes?

A. Yes.

(Respondents’ Exh. A at 12-14)(emphasis added)

The court emphasized that Petitioner had “an absolute right” to plead not guilty

and “proceed with the jury trial that’s set next week.” (Respondents’ Exh. A at 14)

Petitioner indicated that he understood that right and chose to forego his right to a jury trial

and the related rights. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 14-15) The court further explained

Petitioner’s sentencing exposure, and Petitioner stated that he understood he could face over

22 years in prison:

Q. [T]he plea agreement tells me you’re going to plead guilty to an

attempted sexual conduct with a minor, a class three felony, as well as

sexual abuse, a class three felony.

Do you understand that a class three felony, attempted sexual conduct

with a minor, carries a presumptive term in the Arizona Department of 

Corrections of ten years, a minimum term of five years, and a maximum

term of fifteen years?

A. Okay.

Q. Yes?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you understand that the sexual abuse, a class three felony, carries

a presumptive term in the Arizona Department of Corrections of five years,

minimum term of two and a half years, and a maximum of seven and a half

years?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, the plea agreement tells me you’ve agreed that probation is available

on the attempted sexual conduct with a minor. Is that in fact your agreement?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you understand that that agreement is not binding upon the Court 

but that I can determine whether to give a prison term or a lifetime probation

term on that count?

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A. Yes.

Q. And that if I were to give you a probationary term on that count, that

probationary term could be and likely would be for the rest of your life.

Do you understand that?

A. Yes, sir. 

* * *

Q. Now, with respect to the other count, there’s a stipulation that your 

sentence would not be any less than five years. Is that in fact your 

agreement?

A. Yes.

* * *

Q. Do you understand that you need to consider that the prison terms you

could receive on these offenses would be for as much as 22 1⁄2 years and

that you may have to serve all of that 22 1⁄2, less credit for the approximately 

 six months that you’ve served in the Yavapai County Jail? Do you understand 

 that?

A. Yes.

(Respondents’ Exh. A at 17-20)(emphasis added) 

The Court further questioned defense counsel, Bruce Griffen, regarding

Petitioner’s ability to understand the proceedings and enter the plea:

Q. Mr. Griffen, you’ve had an opportunity to meet with your client 

today and on prior occasions. Do you believe that medication is 

affecting his ability to understand what’s going on today?

A. No, it’s positive help to him and it’s the same as he’s represented. I

think he’s thinking clearly. I’ve had extensive negotiations with Rob 

over the last week and over the last day and today and there’s been no

indication of any problems with his thought process. It’s solid.

I’ve also consulted with his treating psychologist who has represented

to me that he has performed well over the last several weeks, despite

the various pressures that are ongoing, and that they see no change in 

his mental ability.

(Respondents’ Exh. A at 17) Before accepting Petitioner’s plea, the court again inquired

whether counsel had “any questions as to the voluntariness of the plea” (Respondents’ Exh.

A at 23) Petitioner’s counsel indicated that he had no questions regarding the voluntariness

of the plea. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 23) The court then asked if “either counsel [was]

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aware of anything the Court has left out.” (Respondents’ Exh. A at 23) Counsel responded

that he was not aware of “anything the Court [had] left out.” (Respondents’ Exh. A at 23)

The court specifically asked Petitioner “based upon the discussions we had in

court, do you have any other questions for [the court] with respect to what will happen to

you based upon this plea.” (Respondents’ Exh. A at 24) Petitioner replied, “No. I (sic) just

wait for the next legal happening.” (Respondents’ Exh. A at 24) The trial court then found

that Petitioner had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered a plea of guilty to the

offenses set forth in the plea agreement (Counts I and VIII of the Indictment) and accepted

his plea. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 24)

An aggravation/mitigation hearing took place before Judge Mackey on July 15,

2004. (Respondents’ Exh. B) At the beginning of the hearing, Petitioner and the State

agreed to amend the plea agreement to include a waiver of Petitioner’s right to a jury trial on

aggravating factors pursuant to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). (Respondents’

Exh. B, Tr. 7/15/04 at 2-3) Before accepting the amendment to the plea agreement, the

court again ensured that Petitioner understood the sentencing range. 

Q. The plea agreement that you’ve entered into provided for a range 

of prison from down as low as five years plus lifetime probation, to as

much as 22 1⁄2 years. You remember that?

A. Yes. 

(Respondents’ Exh. B at 3)

Following a two-day aggravation/mitigation hearing, on July 16, 2004, the trial

court sentenced Petitioner to an aggravated term of 15 years imprisonment on Count 1

(attempted sexual conduct with a minor), and a consecutive presumptive term of 5 years

imprisonment on Count VIII (sexual abuse). (Respondents’ Exh. B, Exh. C at 54-58; Exh. D

at 1-2) The remaining six counts of the indictment were dismissed on the State’s motion. 

(Respondents’ Exh. C at 59) 

On October 12, 2004, Petitioner, through counsel, timely filed a notice of postconviction relief. (Respondents’ Exh. F) On December 22, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition

for post-conviction relief, claiming his guilty plea was involuntary because: (1) the

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4

 Because the parties refer to “Count 1 and 2”, rather than the specific counts of the

Indictment to which Petitioner plead guilty (Count I - attempted sexual conduct, and Count VIII

- sexual abuse), the record is a bit confusing. The parties seem to refer to the attempted sexual

conduct charge as Count 1 and to the sexual abuse charge as Count 2, thus, the Court will use

this same manner of identification. 

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sentencing judge, the Honorable David Mackey, suggested during plea negotiations that he

would sentence Petitioner to between 2.5 and 7.5 years imprisonment on Count 1 and

suspend imposition of sentence on Count 24

 and place Petitioner on lifetime probation, and

Petitioner pled guilty in reliance on those assurances; and (2) Petitioner was “under the

influence of psychotropic medication [anti-anxiety drug Lorazepam at the time of his guilty

plea to an extent that made him unable to make a voluntary decision.” (Respondents’ Exh.

F) Petitioner further argued that defense counsel, Mr. Griffen, was ineffective in advising

him that Judge Mackey would impose between 2.5 and 7.5 years imprisonment on Count 1

and place Petitioner on lifetime probation on Count 2, and that such ineffective assistance

induced him to plead guilty. (Respondents’ Exh. F at 8) 

Because Judge Mackey was a potential witness, the case was transferred to Judge

Janis Sterling who conducted an evidentiary hearing. (Respondents’ Exh. H) Petitioner also

moved to disqualify the Yavapai County Deputy Attorney, Thomas Thurston, who

prosecuted the case because he, too, was a potential witness. (Respondents’ Exh. I) The

court denied Petitioner’s motion to disqualify Thurston. (Respondents’ Exh. H) 

At the post-conviction hearing, Petitioner presented Judge Mackey, who testified

that he did not recall advising the parties that he was inclined to impose any particular

sentence. (Respondents’ Exh. J, Tr. 5/24/05 at 17-20, 26-27, 46) Likewise, Terry Gray, a

paralegal with the Yavapai County Attorney’s office who attended the plea negotiations,

testified that she did not recall Judge Mackey making a promise to impose a particular

sentence. (Respondents’ Exh. K, Tr. 6/7/05 at 33, 36, 46) Judge Mackey did not have a

detailed recollection of the plea negotiations. He admitted that he often held off-the-record

conversations with counsel and that, if Petitioner was not present, there would be no court

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reporter. (Respondents’ Exh. J, Tr. 5/24/05 at 8, 14-19, 23-27, 32, 40, 45) He testified that

one settlement conference had occurred before a different judge, Judge Kiger. 

Judge Mackey testified that he informed the parties that he “would have a much

easier time” accepting a plea agreement that included the option of lifetime probation on the

sexual abuse count, if the plea agreement provided for a stipulated sentence on the attempted

sexual conduct count. (Respondents’ Exh. J, Tr. 5/24/05 at 7, 13-14, 25) Judge Mackey

also testified that he told the parties he would “consider” imposing a sentence of 5 to 7.5

years imprisonment followed by lifetime probation. (Respondents’ Exh. J at 23) Judge

Mackey testified that if he had been inclined to impose a particular sentence, he would have

said so on the record. He also specifically recalled discussing the available sentencing range

with the victim’s mother in court in Petitioner’s presence. (Respondents’ Exh. J at 41-43) 

Judge Mackey further testified that he was aware of Petitioner’s history of mental

illness and recalled inquiring whether his medications were affecting him differently than

usual the day of the change-of-plea hearing. (Respondents’ Exh. J at 28-31, 38-40) He

recalled that Petitioner had responded negatively. Judge Mackey testified that he observed

nothing during the change-of-plea hearing which suggested that Petitioner did not

understand the change-of-plea proceedings. (Respondents’ Exh. J at 27-29, 38-40)

Similarly, Petitioner’s trial counsel, Mr. Griffen, testified at the post-conviction hearing that

Petitioner did not appear impaired during the change-of-plea hearing. (Respondents’ Exh. J

at 38-40)

Griffen also testified about the plea negotiations. (Respondents’ Exh. J at 59-81,

91) He testified that he tried to negotiate a plea agreement with a sentencing range of 2.5 to

7.5 years imprisonment followed by lifetime probation. (Respondents’ Exh. J at 66-67) He

testified that Judge Mackey indicated several times, but not in Petitioner’s presence, that if

Petitioner entered the plea agreement, the appropriate sentence would be prison between 2.5

to 7.5 years, followed by lifetime probation. (Respondents’ Exh. J at 67-83) Griffen

testified that Judge Mackey gave him the impression that he would impose a sentence of 5 to

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7.5 years imprisonment followed by lifetime probation. (Respondents’ Exh. J at 71-80, 84) 

Griffen opined that Judge Mackey wanted the option of imposing probation. (Respondents’

Exh. J at 109-11) Griffen testified that he advised Petitioner to accept the plea offer

because, based on his 25 years of experience, a judge - including Judge Mackey - would not

“backtrack” on his representations regarding sentencing. (Respondents’ Exh. J at 80-81) 

Griffen testified that he “made sure [Petitioner] understood there was no guarantee (as to the

sentence the Judge would impose), and that [he didn’t] think [Petitioner] misunderstood

that.” (Respondents’ Exh. J at 81-82, 96, 99, 117-19) Griffen further testified that he “also

told [Petitioner], quite strongly, that in [his] opinion, . . . every indication was . . . that the

judge was championing, he was the leader, . . . trying to pursue a plea that gave probationary

discretion, and that [Griffen believed] that was [the judge’s] intention. . . .” (Respondents’

Exh. J at 81) Griffen testified that Petitioner would not have accepted the plea offer absent

his advice. (Respondents’ Exh. J at 54, 80) Griffen further opined that Petitioner was

competent to plead guilty the day of the change-of-plea hearing and that he was not

impaired. (Respondents’ Exh. J at 106-08) 

Petitioner also testified at the post-conviction hearing. He testified that Griffen

told him that Judge Mackey would impose five years imprisonment on Count 1 and suspend

sentence on Count 2 and sentence Petitioner to lifetime probation. (Respondents’ Exh. J at

125-27) He testified that Griffen told him that the written plea agreement would “say . . .

that you can get [prison time on count 2], but . . . what they are telling you when they put

probation eligible,” is that the judge will impose probation. (Respondents’ Exh. J at 127) 

Petitioner further testified that Griffen told him that Judge Mackey had indicated that he

would impose probation and that, based on Griffen’s 25 years in practice, judges do not “go

back” on their word. (Respondents’ Exh. J at 128, 130-31, 145) Petitioner also testified that

Griffen explained to him that the written plea agreement did include a specific sentence

because judges in Yavapai county would not “stipulate to an exact sentence.” (Id. at 127) 

However, Griffen also told Petitioner that Judge Mackey’s representation during plea

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negotiations that he would impose lifetime probation on count 2 was “as close as you’re

going to get to a guarantee around here.” (Respondents’ Exh. J at 128) Petitioner testified

that, when Judge Mackey asked during the change of plea hearing if the written plea

agreement was “the complete agreement,” he attempted to discuss the alleged promise

regarding sentencing, but Griffen dissuaded him from doing so. (Respondents’ Exh. J at

138-39; Exh. A at 12-14) Petitioner testified that Griffen said, “answer this right.” 

(Respondents’ Exh. Tr. 138-39) 

Petitioner further testified that he had practiced as a registered nurse for twentyfive years and is familiar with medications. (Respondents’ Exh. J at 120-21) He stated that

he ingested six times his usual dose of Lorazepam, which he took to control panic attacks,

before the change-of-plea hearing because he was extremely nervous. (Respondents’ Exh. J

at 122-23, 136-38) As a result, Petitioner testified that he was “unconscious” during the

change-of-plea hearing, and that counsel had to wake him up to sign the plea agreement. 

(Respondents’ Exh. J at 138-39) He also claimed that, because of the large dose of

Lorazepam, he did not remember the court discussing the sentencing range at the change-ofplea hearing. (Respondents’ Exh. J at 146)

Petitioner’s ex-wife testified that he appeared “passive” at the change-of-plea

hearing, appeared to not understand the proceeding, and did not remember the proceeding. 

(Respondents’ Exh. J at 161-64) Petitioner’s friend Dr. Julia Williams, an emergency room

physician, testified that the quantity of Lorazepam that Petitioner allegedly consumed would

have made him sleepy, confused, and vulnerable to suggestion. (Respondents’ Exh. K at 19-

20, 28-30) Williams also testified that “even a lay person,” like Judge Mackey, likely would

have noticed if Petitioner was excessively sedated. (Respondents’ Exh. K at 28-29) 

The victim’s mother, a registered nurse who had known Petitioner socially for

four years and had worked with him in the ambulatory surgery department at the Verde

Valley Medical Center, testified that she did not observe Petitioner fall asleep or appear

confused during the change-of-plea hearing. (Respondents’ Exh. K at 58-65)

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The trial court rejected Petitioner’s claims and concluded that under “the totality

of the circumstances and the facts as noted in [the court’s] findings, this Court concludes, as

a matter of law, that Defendant/Petitioner knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered

into a plea agreement with the State of Arizona.” (Respondents’ Exh. L at 6) 

On September 30, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona

Court of Appeals. (Respondents’ Exh. M) Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in

rejecting his claims that (1) Judge Mackey’s off-the-record representations to the parties

regarding sentence induced him to plead guilty; (2) counsel’s ineffectiveness and erroneous

advice regarding sentence rendered his pleas involuntary; and (3) Petitioner’s consumption

of a large dose of Lorazepam and resulting impairment rendered his plea involuntary. (Id.) 

The Court of Appeals summarily denied review on August 4, 2006. (Respondents’ Exh. O)

On August 29, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona

Supreme Court, arguing that his plea was involuntary due to Judge Mackey’s off-the-record

promises and trial counsel’s “incompetent statements and assurances that reinforced the false

promise.” (Respondents’ Exh. P) On November 11, 2006, the Arizona Supreme Court

denied review. (Respondents’ Exh. Q)

Thereafter, Petitioner filed a timely Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this

Court raising the following claims:

1. Petitioner’s guilty plea was involuntary because:

 a. He relied on Judge Mackey’s representations regarding sentencing;

 b. He was “over-medicated” with prescription drugs during the plea

 negotiations and during the change-of-plea hearing; and 

 c. He relied on trial counsel’s “avowals” in deciding to plead guilty.

2. Counsel was ineffective in advising Petitioner that the trial court would 

sentence Petitioner to five years’ imprisonment on Count 1, and suspend 

sentence on Count 2 and place Petitioner on lifetime probation. 

(docket # 1 at 10-41) After discussing the law regarding exhaustion and the applicable

standard of review, the Court will consider Petitioner’s claims that are properly before it.

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II. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar

A federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless the

petitioner has exhausted the state remedies available to him. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). When

seeking habeas relief, petitioner bears the burden of showing that he has properly exhausted

each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). The

exhaustion inquiry focuses on the availability of state remedies at the time the petition for

writ of habeas corpus is filed in federal court. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999). 

The prisoner “shall not be deemed to have exhausted . . . if he has the right under the law of

the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). 

In other words, proper exhaustion requires the prisoner to “give the state courts one full

opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the

State’s established appellate review process.” O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. 845. “One complete

round” includes filing a “petition[] for discretionary review when that review is part of the

ordinary appellate review procedure in the State.” Id. State prisoners may skip a procedure

occasionally employed by a state’s courts to provide relief only if a state law or rule

precludes use of the procedure, or the “State has identified the procedure as outside the

standard review process and has plainly said that it need not be sought for purposes of

exhaustion.” Id. at 848, 850. 

In this case, Respondents argue that because Petitioner did not present Ground

1(b) to the Arizona Supreme Court, that claim is unexhausted. (docket # 11 at 15-18) As

discussed below, Petitioner was not required to present his claim to the Arizona Supreme

Court to satisfy the exhaustion requirement of § 2254(b). 

To exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the

opportunity to rule upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the

state’s “highest” court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S.

346, 349 (1989); Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (stating that “[t]o provide the

State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must “fairly present” her claim in each

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appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting the court to the federal nature of the claim.”). 

Contrary to Respondents’ assertion, in Arizona, unless a prisoner has been sentenced to

death, the “highest court” requirement is satisfied if the petitioner has presented his federal

claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals either on direct appeal or in a petition for postconviction relief. Crowell v. Knowles , 483 F.Supp.2d 925 (D.Ariz. 2007) (discussing

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

Relying on Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 1999) and Baldwin v.

Reese, 541 U.S. 27 (2004), Respondents argue that to properly exhaust federal claims, a

petitioner is required to present those claims to the Arizona Supreme Court. (docket # 11 at

15-18) Swoopes does not support this assertion. Although less than a life sentence had been

imposed in Swoopes, the Ninth Circuit broadly stated that “Arizona state prisoners need not

appeal an Arizona Court of Appeals’ denial of post-conviction relief to the Arizona Supreme

Court in order to exhaust their state remedies for federal habeas corpus purposes, except in

capital cases or cases involving the imposition of a life sentence.” 196 F.3d at 1008. In

support of this conclusion, Swoopes included undated citations to A.R.S. §§ 120.21(A)(1),

12-120.24, and 13-4031, and citations to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31, State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582,

684 P.2d 154 (1984), State v. Sandon, 161 Ariz. 157, 777 P.2d 220 (1989), and Moreno v.

Gonzalez, 192 Ariz. 131, 962 P.2d 205 (1989). Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1009-10. As the court

noted in Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F.Supp.2d 925, 930 (D.Ariz. 2007), “none of those

authorities — either at the time of Swoopes or now — support the proposition that Arizona

Supreme Court review remains part of the standard review process necessary for exhaustion

in cases carrying life sentences. Id. (emphasis in original). Rather, to the extent those

authorities mentioned life imprisonment, it was in reference to outdated versions of A.R.S. §

12-201.21(A)(1) and 13-4031. In 1989, years before Swoopes was decided, A.R.S. § 12-

120.21(A)(1) and § 13-4031 were amended to omit the phrase, “or life imprisonment.” “The

effect of this change was to give the Arizona Court of Appeals jurisdiction over criminal

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convictions carrying life sentences and eliminate the [Arizona] Supreme Court’s exclusive

and mandatory jurisdiction.” Crowell, 483 F.Supp.2d at 928. 

The erroneous statement of the law included in dictum in Swoopes was repeated

in dictum in Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 1994) and several district cases. 

See, Crowell, 483 F.Supp.2d at 930 and n. 4 (compiling cases). These cases, however,

“present a tale of zombie precedent. A rule definitively extinguished by statutory

amendment in 1989 continues to prowl, repeatedly re-animated by mistaken citation and

dicta.” Id. at 931. 

Accordingly, in Crowell, the court found that “[s]ince 1989, the Arizona

Supreme Court has not had exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases carrying life

sentences, and petitioners who have received a life sentence have not had a right to State

Supreme Court review.” Id. The court went on to hold that:

In sum, the language of Swoopes on life sentences was dictum

unnecessary for the correct disposition of that case. The subsequent

repetition of that dictum as dictum in other cases does not change 

its character. Nor do any of the dicta undercut the clarity of the 

pronouncement by the Arizona Supreme Court, together with the 

1989 enactments of the Arizona Legislature, that discretionary review 

in non-capital cases is ‘unavailable’ for purposes of federal habeas 

exhaustion. 

Id. at 933. The Crowell court found that petitioner, who had received a life sentence, had

exhausted his federal claims by presenting them to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Id. The

court further noted that the Swoopes decision supported its conclusion. Id. The court

explained that, “[a]pplying O’Sullivan, Swoopes held that ‘Arizona has declared that its

complete round [of appellate review] does not include discretionary review before the

Arizona Supreme Court.’” 483 F.Supp.2d at 933 (quoting Swoopes, 940 F.3d 1308). The

Crowell court concluded that “there is no longer any basis for distinguishing among noncapital sentences under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) in light of the 1989 amendments to A.R.S. § 12-

120.21(A)(1) and 13-4031.” Crowell, 483 F.Supp.2d at 933. 

In accordance with Arizona law and the thorough discussion in Crowell, to

properly exhaust his federal claims, Petitioner was not required to present his claims to the

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Arizona Supreme Court. Rather, the “highest court” requirement is satisfied by fair

presentation to the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

The Supreme Court’s decision in Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) does

not require a different conclusion. Respondents argue that pursuant to Baldwin, non-capital

defendants must exhaust their claims in the Arizona Supreme Court. Respondents’

argument hinges on the following language in Baldwin, “[t]o provide the State with the

necessary ‘opportunity,’ [to rule on his claims] the prisoner must ‘fairly present’ his claim in

each appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary

review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.” Baldwin, 541 U.S. at

29 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Respondents latch onto a single phrase, “including

a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review,” to support their argument and

ignore the basis for this statement. In O’Sullivan, the Supreme Court explained that proper

exhaustion requires the prisoner to “give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any

constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate

review process.” O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. 845. “One complete round” includes filing a

“petition[] for discretionary review when that review is part of the ordinary appellate review

procedure in the State.” Id. (emphasis added). 

As previously stated, “Arizona has declared that its complete round [of appellate

review] does not include discretionary review before the Arizona Supreme Court.” Swoopes,

940 F.3d 1308. Thus, contrary to Respondents’ assertion, Baldwin does not require a noncapital prisoner, such as Petitioner, to present his claims to the Arizona Supreme Court. 

In summary, Petitioner properly exhausted all of his federal claims raised in the

pending Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by fairly presenting those claims to the Arizona

Court of Appeals. 

III. Standard of Review

In 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”) which “modified a federal habeas court’s role in reviewing state prisoner

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applications in order to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials’ and to ensure that state-court

convictions are given effect to the extent possible under the law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.

685, 693 (2002). 

Under the AEDPA, a federal court may not grant a habeas petition “with respect

to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court” unless the state court’s

decision was either (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or (2)

“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),(2); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70

(2006); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003); Mancebo v. Adams, 435 F.3d 977,

978 (9th Cir. 2006). To determine whether a state court ruling was “contrary to” or involved

an “unreasonable application” of federal law, courts look exclusively to the holdings of the

Supreme Court which existed at the time of the state court’s decision. Mitchell v. Esparza,

540 U.S. 12, 15-15 (2003); Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003). When no decision

of the Supreme Court “squarely addresses” an issue or provides a “categorical answer” to

the question before the state court, § 2254(d)(1) bars relief. Moses v. Payne, ___ F.3d ___,

2008 WL 4192031 (9th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that it

cannot reverse a state court decision merely because that decision conflicts with Ninth

Circuit precedent on a federal constitutional issue. Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 957 (9th

Cir. 2004); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Even if the state court neither explained its ruling nor cites United States

Supreme Court authority, the reviewing federal court must nevertheless examine Supreme

Court precedent to determine whether the state court reasonably applied federal law. Early

v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2003). The United States Supreme Court has expressly held that

citation to federal law is not required and that compliance with the habeas statute “does not

even require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the

state-court decision contradicts them.” Id. 

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A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a rule of law

“that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set

of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Mitchell v.

Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14 (2003) (citations omitted); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411

(2000).

A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the court

identifies the correct legal rule, but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of a particular

case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405; Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). An incorrect

application of federal law does not satisfy this standard. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S.

652, 665-66 (2004) (stating that “[r]elief is available under § 2254(d)(1) only if the state

court's decision is objectively unreasonable.”) “It is not enough that a federal habeas court,

in its independent review of the legal question,” is left with the “firm conviction” that the

state court ruling was “erroneous.” Id.; Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75. Rather, the petitioner must

establish that the state court decision is “objectively unreasonable.” Middleton v. McNeil,

541 U.S. 433 (2004); Andrade, 538 U.S. at 76. 

In conducting an analysis under the AEDPA, the habeas court considers the last

reasoned state court decision addressing the claim. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803

(1991). Additionally, the habeas court presumes that the state court’s factual determinations

are correct and petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and

convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (stating that “a determination of factual issues

made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden

of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”); Williams v.

Rhoades, 354 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Where a state court decision is deemed “contrary to” or an “unreasonable

application of” clearly established federal law, the reviewing court must next determine

whether it resulted in constitutional error. Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052 n. 6 (9th

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Cir. 2002). On habeas review, the court assesses the prejudicial impact of most

constitutional errors by determining whether they “had substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623

(1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)); see also Fry v.

Pliler, 551 U.S. 112 (2007) (Brecht standard applies whether or not the state court

recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness). The Brecht harmless error analysis

also applies to habeas review of a sentencing error. The test is whether such error had a

“substantial and injurious effect” on the sentence. Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141,

145-57 (1998) (holding that for habeas relief to be granted based on constitutional error in

capital penalty phase, error must have had substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s

verdict in the penalty phase.); Hernandez v. LaMarque, 2006 WL 2411441 (N.D.Cal., Aug.

18, 2006) (finding that even if the evidence of three of petitioner’s prior convictions was

insufficient, petitioner was not prejudiced by the court’s consideration of those convictions

because the trial court found four other prior convictions which would have supported

petitioner’s sentence.) However, some constitutional errors do not require that the petitioner

demonstrate prejudice. Musladin v. Lamarque, ___F.3d ___, 2009 WL 331457, * 2 (9th Cir.

2009) (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991); United States v. Cronic, 466

U.S. 648, 659 (1984)). Furthermore, where a habeas petition governed by AEDPA alleges

ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the

court applies Strickland’s prejudice standard and does not engage in a separate analysis

applying the Brecht standard. Id. (citing Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 n. 7 (2002)). 

The Court will review Petitioner’s claims under the applicable standard of review. 

IV. Deference Owed Factual Findings

As an initial matter, the Court will address Petitioner’s blanket assertion that

none of the state court’s factual findings are entitled to the presumption of correctness which

they are normally afforded under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). (docket # 1 at 42, 44) The

AEDPA’s presumption of correctness applies to the state court’s factual findings. Petitioner

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bears the burden of “rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing

evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner generally argues that the “circumstances

surrounding the [post-conviction] hearing and the voluntariness of the plea,” the “actions of

the state prosecutor and the trial court,” and the fact that the post-conviction hearing was

conducted in Yavapai County, render the trial court’s factual findings incorrect. (docket # 1

at 42-44) These conclusory allegations are not sufficient to overcome the AEDPA’s

presumption of correctness. Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding

conclusory allegations insufficient to satisfy clear and convincing error standard.) 

Additionally, Petitioner cannot rebut the presumption of correctness by arguing that the state

court evidentiary hearing was inadequate because an evidentiary hearing is not required for

AEDPA deference to the state court’s factual findings. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943,

969 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We decline to accept [the petitioner’s] proposal to inject an ‘evidentiary

hearing’ requirement as a prerequisite to AEDPA deference.”). 

Petitioner further argues that none of the State court’s factual findings are

entitled to a presumption of correctness because neither the Arizona Court of Appeals nor

the Arizona Supreme Court made “individual separate factual findings.” (docket # 1 at 42-

44) This argument does not rebut the AEDPA’s presumption of correctness because “[t]here

is no requirement that fact findings by a state trial court be reviewed on the merits by an

appellate court in order to be afforded the [AEDPA’s] presumption [of correctness].” 

Wallace v. Price, 265 F.Supp.2d 545, 567 (W.D.Pa. 2003). 

Petitioner further argues that the presumption of correctness does not apply to the

state court’s resolution of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (docket # 1 at 42,

44) Petitioner is correct that the ultimate question of whether counsel was ineffective is a

mixed question of law and fact to which the ADEPA presumption of correctness does not

apply. However, the presumption of correctness does apply to “state court findings of fact

made in the course of resolving claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Lambert, 393

F.3d at 977. Similarly, although the voluntariness of a guilty plea is a question of law not

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subject to deferential review, Marhsall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 431 (1983), findings of

historical fact underlying a court’s determination of voluntariness are entitled to deference.

Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Findings of historical facts underlying a

court’s conclusion of [a guilty plea’s] voluntariness are given deference in a habeas

proceeding.”)

Petitioner has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that none of the State

court’s findings of fact are entitled to the AEDPA’s presumption of correctness. However,

the Court’s finding regarding Petitioner’s global challenge to the state court’s factual

findings does not preclude the Court from finding that several of the state court’s specific

factual findings may not be entitled to deference. 

V. Analysis

A. Voluntariness of Plea

Petitioner claims his guilty plea was involuntary because: (a) he relied on Judge

Mackey’s promises to impose a particular sentence; (b) he was under the influence of a large

dose of Lorezapam during the change-of-plea hearing; and (c) he relied on counsel’s

avowals that Judge Mackey would impose a particular sentence. (docket # 1 at 7-8, 17, 20-

23, 30-32, 34-36)

The United States Supreme Court law governing the voluntariness of a guilty

plea is Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) and its progeny. The Supreme Court has

held that “the Constitution insists, among other things, that the defendant enter a guilty plea

that is ‘voluntary’ and that the defendant must make related waivers ‘knowing[ly],

intelligent[ly], [and] with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely

consequences.’” United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002) (quoting Brady, 397 U.S.

at 748). A guilty plea is valid if it is entered voluntarily and intelligently considering the

totality of the circumstances. Brady, 397 U.S. at 749; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,

242-44 (1969). The central question is “‘whether the plea represents a voluntary and

intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.’” Hill v.

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Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31

(1970)). Although it is fundamental that a guilty plea must be voluntary and intelligent,

Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-44, a plea is not involuntary “simply because it is induced by the

promise of a recommendation of a lenient sentence, and thus by the fear of a greater penalty

upon conviction after a trial.” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978). However,

a guilty plea may be involuntary where it is induced by threats, misrepresentations, or

promises “that are by their nature improper.” Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509 (1984). 

1. Judge Mackey’s Representations

Petitioner first argues that his plea was involuntary because Judge Mackey

participated in the plea negotiations and represented that he would impose a particular

sentence if Petitioner pled guilty. (docket # 1) 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 prohibits federal judges from

participating in plea negotiations because the “judge’s participation in plea negotiations is

inherently coercive.” United States v. Barrett, 982 F.2d 193, 194 (6th Cir. 1992);

Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(1). Rule 11 does not apply to state court judges and is not

constitutionally mandated. See Frank v. Blackburn , 646 F.2d 873, 882 (5th Cir. 1980); Toler

v. Wyrick, 563 F.2d 372, 374 (8th Cir. 1977); Waddy v. Heer, 383 F.2d 789, 794-95 (6th Cir.

1967). A federal court, however, may set aside a state court plea bargain if persuaded that

the trial judge’s participation denied the defendant the due process of law by causing him

not to understand the nature of the charges against him or the consequences of a guilty plea,

or if the judge’s participation coerced the defendant to enter into a plea involuntarily. See

Frank v. Blackburn, 646 F.2d 873, 882 (5th Cir. 1980).

Here, the state court’s conclusion that Petitioner’s guilty plea was not rendered

involuntary due to the trial judge’s statements is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, Supreme Court law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Judge Mackey engaged in offthe-record plea negotiations with counsel. Petitioner did not participate in the negotiations

with Judge Mackey. There is no evidence in the record that Judge Mackey threatened or

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coerced Petitioner into pleading guilty. The trial judge’s statements regarding sentencing

were not made in Petitioner’s presence, but were conveyed to Petitioner through counsel. 

There is no evidence that Judge Mackey used coercive language or made any threats. See

Longval v. Meachum, 651 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1102

(1982) (trial judges’ “plea-or-else” language was coercive and rendered plea involuntary);

Damiano v. Gaughan, 592 F. Supp. 1222 (D.Mass. 1984) (rejecting claim that guilty plea

was involuntary where trial judge told petitioner’s counsel that he would consider a reduced

sentence if petitioner cooperated with police). 

During plea negotiations, outside of Petitioner’s presence, Judge Mackey

expressed his view that the State should be willing to make an offer that included prison

time on count one and probation on count two. (docket # 1 at 17, Tr. at 5/24/05 at 67-83) 

Judge Mackey did not promise to impose that particular sentence, however, and repeatedly

reminded Petitioner during the change of plea hearing that he could receive a sentence of up

to 22.5 years. (Respondents’ Exh. A at Tr. 4/30/04 at 3-4, 7-8, 17-20) 

Before accepting Petitioner’s guilty plea, Judge Mackey engaged in a plea

colloquy during which Petitioner stated that he understood the sentencing range he would

face and the rights he would waive by pleading guilty. (Respondents’ Exh. A at 12-20)

Petitioner stated that the plea agreement contained all the terms he expected, and that he had

not received any additional promises that were not contained in the agreement. 

(Respondents’ Exh. A at 12-20) 

Judge Mackey’s alleged promise to impose a particular sentence did not render

Petitioner’s guilty plea involuntary. On post-conviction review, the trial court conducted an

evidentiary hearing where it observed several witnesses testify and was able to assess their

credibility. Based on the state court record and the testimony adduced at the evidentiary

hearing, the trial court found no support for Petitioner’s claim that Judge Mackey had

promised to impose a particular sentence. (Respondents’ Exh. L at 1-4) This finding is

supported by Judge Mackey’s testimony that he made no such promises (Respondents’ Exh.

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J at 17-20, 26-27, 46), Terry Gray’s testimony that she did not hear Judge Mackey make

such promises during plea negotiations (Respondents’ Exh. K at 36, 46), and Judge

Mackey’s statements during the change-of-plea hearing advising the victim and her mother

that Petitioner could be receive over 22 years imprisonment under the plea agreement. 

(Respondents’ Exh. A at 3-10, 17-20; Exh. B at 3) 

On habeas corpus review, this Court defers to the state court’s factual findings

which were based on an assessment of witness credibility. Aiken v. Blodgett, 921 F.2d 214,

217 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Section 2254(d) ‘gives federal habeas courts no license to redetermine

credibility of witnesses whose demeanor has been observed by the state trial court.’”)

(quoting Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983)). The Court concludes that the

State court’s determination that Judge Mackey did not promise to impose a particular

sentence is not an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the record before the

court on post-conviction review. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Because the trial court found that

Judge Mackey did not promise to impose a particular sentence, its conclusion that Petitioner

did not involuntarily plead guilty in reliance on such a promise is neither contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

2. Medicated State

Petitioner next argues that his plea was involuntary because of his “mental

condition based on the fact that he was over medicated with prescribed drugs during the plea

negotiations and during the change of plea hearing.” (docket # 1 at 7-8, 34) The state court

rejected this claim on post-conviction review. (Respondents’ Exh. L) 

The Court finds that the state court’s conclusion that Petitioner’s Lorazepam

consumption did not render his plea involuntary is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing during which several

witnesses testified regarding Petitioner’s demeanor during the change-of-plea hearing. Dr.

Williams, a friend of Petitioner, and the victim’s mother both testified that Petitioner did not

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appear confused or sleepy during the change-of-plea hearing. Likewise, Petitioner’s defense

counsel testified that Petitioner’s mental ability was not impaired during the change-of-plea

hearing. (Respondents’ Exh. J at 38-40) And, during the change-of-plea hearing itself,

Petitioner stated that the medications were “acting normally” for him. (Respondents’ Exh. J

at 16-17) Based on the foregoing testimony, the state court concluded that Petitioner was

not impaired during the change-of-plea hearing. (Respondents’ Exh. L) 

Although contrary evidence was also presented at the hearing by Petitioner’s exwife who testified that Petitioner appeared “passive” and did not remember the change-ofplea hearing (Respondents’ Exh. J at 161-64), and by Petitioner who testified that he was

“unconscious” during the change-of-plea hearing (Respondents’ Exh. J at 138-39), this

Court defers to the State court’s factual findings and cannot reassess the credibility

determinations made by the state court which observed the testimony. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1). 

The Court concludes that Petitioner has not shown that the state court’s decision

that “[a]t the time of the entry of the plea, [Petitioner] was not under the influence of

medications to the extent is his plea is not voluntary,” is contrary to federal law, rests on an

unreasonable application of federal law, or is based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this ground. 

3. Representations of Counsel

Petitioner further argues that his plea was involuntary because of his “absolute

reliance on his lawyer who provided erroneous advice.” (docket # 1 at 8, 31) Although the

habeas petition casts the arguments challenging the voluntariness of Petitioner’s guilty plea

and those challenging Griffen’s representation in connection with the plea as two separate

theories, Petitioner’s guilty plea limits the grounds upon which he can subsequently

challenge his detention. The Supreme Court has explained that “[w]here, as here, a

defendant is represented by counsel during the plea process and enters his plea upon the

advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice was

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within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.... [A] defendant

who pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel ‘may only attack the voluntary and intelligent

character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was

[ineffective].’ ” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985) (quoting Tollett, 411 U.S. at

267) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because Petitioner pled guilty upon the

advice of counsel, he is limited to challenging his plea by demonstrating that counsel’s

advice did not constitute effective representation. See also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S.

357, 363 (1978) (“Defendants advised by competent counsel and protected by other

procedural safeguards are presumptively capable of intelligent choice in response to

prosecutorial persuasion....”); Worthen v. Meachum, 842 F.2d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 1988),

overruled on other grounds by Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (stating that

“[w]hen an involuntariness claim rests on the faulty legal decisions or predictions of defense

counsel, the plea will be deemed constitutionally involuntary only when the attorney is held

to have been constitutionally ineffective.”). See also Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 866 (9th

Cir. 1986) (noting that to the extent that petitioner argued that his plea was involuntary due

to counsel’s erroneous advice, his claim was foreclosed by Hill unless he could establish

prejudice). Accordingly, the Court will consider Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

In Ground 2, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for advising him

that Judge Mackey intended to impose a sentence of five years, followed by lifetime

probation. (docket # 1 at 8, 11, 17-20, 28, 35, 41) He further argues that his reliance on

counsel’s erroneous advice renders his plea involuntary. As discussed below, Petitioner is

entitled to habeas corpus relief based on this claim. 

1. Controlling Law

The “clearly established” Supreme Court law governing claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To establish

ineffective assistance, petitioner must show both that his counsel’s performance was

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deficient and that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687. The two-part Strickland test “applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on

ineffectiveness of counsel.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-58 (1985) (stating that the

Strickland standard applies equally to a defendant who has been “represented by counsel

during the plea process and enters his plea upon the advice of counsel . . . .”).

To be deficient, counsel’s performance must fall “outside the wide range of

professionally competent assistance” demanded in criminal cases. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

690. When reviewing counsel’s performance, the court engages a strong presumption that

counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every

effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Review of counsel’s performance is

“extremely limited.” Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d on

other grounds, 525 U.S. 141 (1998). Acts or omissions that “might be considered sound

trial strategy” do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

689. 

To establish a Sixth Amendment violation, petitioner must also establish that he

suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

691-92; United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147 (2006) (stating that “a violation

of the Sixth Amendment right to effective representation is not ‘complete’ until the

defendant is prejudiced.”) To show prejudice, petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would

have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Hart, 174 F.3d at 1069; Ortiz v.

Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 934 (9th Cir. 1998). In the context of a guilty plea, a petitioner

“must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not

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have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 57-59. 

Petitioner bears the burden of proving prejudice, the mere possibility that he suffered

prejudice is insufficient to satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong. Cooper v. Calderon, 255

F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2001). The court may proceed directly to the prejudice prong. 

Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1155 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at

697). The court, however, may not assume prejudice solely from counsel’s allegedly

deficient performance. Jackson, 211 F.3d at 1155. 

On habeas review, the court must give “substantial weight” to the state court’s

analysis of a claim of ineffective assistance. Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 487 (9th Cir.

2000). The habeas court considers whether the state court applied Strickland unreasonably:

 For [a petitioner] to succeed [on an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim], . . . he must do more than show that he would have satisfied

Strickland’s test if his claim were being analyzed in the first instance,

because under § 2254(d)(1), it is not enough to convince a federal 

habeas court that, in its independent judgment, the state-court decision

applied Strickland incorrectly. Rather, he must show that the [state

court] applied Strickland to the facts of the case in an objectively 

unreasonable manner. 

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-99 (2002) (citation omitted). See also Woodford v.

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002) (“Under § 2254(d)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause,

a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the state-court decision applied Strickland incorrectly. Rather, it

is the habeas petitioner’s burden to show that the state court applied Strickland to the facts of

his case in an objectively unreasonable manner.”) (citations omitted). See also Price v.

Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003) (stating that the burden is on the habeas petitioner to

show the state court applied Supreme Court precedent in an unreasonable manner). 

2. Analysis of Petitioner’s claim 

On post-conviction review, the state court concluded that Petitioner “failed to

establish Defense counsel performed deficiently under prevailing professional norms.” 

(Respondents’ Exh. L) The state court’s conclusion was based on its factual findings and

legal conclusions that:

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1. Defense counsel promptly advised [Petitioner], and his family, of

the plea offer, and fully explained the terms of the plea, including the

statutory sentencing requirements and possibilities. (Respondents’ Exh. L) 

2. Defense counsel made it clear, and [Petitioner] understood, there 

were “no guarantees” as to sentencing.

3. Defense counsel advised Defendant sufficiently to permit Defendant to

make a reasonably informed decision whether to accept or reject the plea

offer.

4. Defense counsel complied with the American Bar Association Standards

for Criminal Justice.

5. Counsel did not “recklessly misinform” [Petitioner] of the contents or

effects of the plea.

6. At the time of the entry of the plea, the Court made specific inquiry of 

[Petitioner] whether had his attorney told him of other agreements as to

what was going to happen to him, and [Petitioner] advised the Court that

there were no other agreements.

7. Defense counsel’s honest, but inaccurate assessment of the Judge’s 

unexpressed sentencing intentions did not constitute ineffective assistance 

of counsel.

(Respondents’ Exh. L) The court finds that paragraph numbers 1, 2 and 6 are factual

findings and the remaining paragraphs are legal conclusions. 

The ultimate question of whether counsel was ineffective is a mixed question of

law and fact to which the ADEPA presumption of correctness does not apply. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1). “Consequently, federal court reviewing a state court conclusion on a mixed

issue involving questions both of fact and law must first separate the legal conclusions from

the factual determinations that underlie it. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 978 (9th Cir.

2004). The Court finds that paragraph numbers 1, 2 and 6 are factual findings and the

remaining paragraphs are legal conclusions. 

Thus, the state court’s legal conclusions that (1) “Defense counsel advised

Defendant sufficiently to permit Defendant to make a reasonably informed decision whether

to accept or reject the plea offer;” (2) “Defense counsel complied with the American Bar

Association Standards for Criminal Justice;” (3) Counsel did not “recklessly misinform”

[Petitioner] of the contents or effects of the plea;” (4) “Defense counsel’s honest, but

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inaccurate assessment of the Judge’s unexpressed sentencing intentions did not constitute

ineffective assistance of counsel;” (5) “Petitioner has failed to established Defense counsel

performed deficiently under prevailing professional norms,” and (6) “Petitioner knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily entered into the plea agreement with the State of Arizona, may

be overturned only if they are contrary to, or involve an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court precedent. 

As discussed below, the Court finds that the state court’s denial of Petitioner’s

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented. Federal courts may not grant habeas relief based

upon an error in a state court factual determination, unless the state decision “was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). “Or, to put it conversely, a federal court may not

second-guess a state court’s fact-finding process unless, after review of the state-court

record, it determines that the state court was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable.”

Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir.2004). A state court decision is based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts if “an appellate panel, applying the normal standards

of appellate review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding[s][are] supported by the

record.” See Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000. Once a state court’s fact-finding process survives an

“unreasonable determination” challenge, the state court’s findings of fact are presumed to be

correct. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). To overcome this presumption, a habeas petitioner

must show by clear and convincing evidence that the state court’s factual findings were in

error. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000 ( “State-court fact-finding may

be overturned based on new evidence presented for the first time in federal court only if such

new evidence amounts to clear and convincing proof that the state-court finding is in

error.”).

As discussed below, the state court’s factual findings (paragraphs 1, 2 and 6 of

the “Ineffective Assistance” discussion, Exh. L at 7) are based on a selective review of the

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record and the testimony presented during the post-conviction hearing, and ignore

significant evidence which supports Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance. “[A]n

appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not reasonably

conclude that the finding[s][are] supported by the record.” See Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000. 

Thus, those findings are not entitled to deference under 2254(d). 

a. Counsel’s Performance 

“In the context of a guilty plea, the ineffectiveness inquiry probes whether the

alleged ineffective assistance impinged on the defendant’s ability to enter an intelligent,

knowing and voluntary plea of guilty.” Lambert, 393 F.3d at 980. To prevail on such a

claim, the petitioner must show that counsel’s assistance was not within the range of

competence demanded of counsel in criminal cases and that the defendant suffered actual

prejudice as a result. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. A deficient performance is one in which counsel

made errors so serious that he was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth

Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

Because a guilty plea waives a criminal defendant’s Fifth Amendment

protections against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the right to

confront one’s accusers, . . . it must be a knowing, intelligent act “done with sufficient

awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d

861, 865 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (internal

citations omitted). “Because ‘an intelligent assessment of the relative advantages of

pleading guilty is frequently impossible without the assistance of an attorney,’. . . counsel

have a duty to supply criminal defendants with necessary and accurate information.” Iaea,

800 F.2d at 865. “A defendant who pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel may only

attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the plea by showing that the advice he

received from counsel was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in

criminal cases.” United States v. Signori, 844 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Tollet v.

Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). 

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Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel rests on his allegation that

counsel led him to believe that the court would “impose a sentence of [five] years on count

one and life time probation on count two.” (docket # 1 at 37) A guilty plea cannot be

“induced by . . . misrepresentation.” Brady, 397 U.S. at 755. Although a mere inaccurate

prediction of a defendant’s sentence, standing alone, would not constitute ineffective

assistance, see McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770 (1970); Doganiere v. United

States, 914 F.2d 165, 168 (9th Cir. 1990), “the gross mischaracterization of the likely

outcome [of the plea], combined with the erroneous advice on the possible effect of going to

trial, falls below the level of competence required of defense attorneys. See Iaea v. Sunn,

800 F.2d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 1986) and Chacon v.Wood, 36 F.3d 36 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir.

1994), overruled on other grounds by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). Likewise, “counsel’s

misrepresentations as to what [a defendant’s] sentence in fact would be” may render a

defendant’s plea involuntary. Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1986); Mayes v.

Pickett, 537 F.2d 1080, 1083-84 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that even an exemplary Rule 11

record in a federal plea proceeding was inadequate to determine the appellant’s claims of

involuntariness where he asserted that his attorney made promises regarding his sentence.) 

In this case, during the post-conviction hearing, Petitioner’s trial counsel testified

that he explained the plea agreement to Petitioner and emphasized that it did not guarantee a

particular sentence. (Respondents’ Exh. J at 81, 96, 99, 117-19) The state court found that

Petitioner’s “counsel made it clear . . . there were ‘no guarantees’ as to sentencing.” (docket

# 11-12 at 7, Respondents’ Exh. L) The state court, however, ignored Griffen’s other

statements regarding the sentence which Petitioner could expect if he pled guilty,

Petitioner’s lack of experience with the criminal justice system, and Petitioner’s extreme

reluctance to accept a plea which exposed him to a sentence greater than 7.5 years.

During the evidentiary hearing, Griffen testified that he could not point to any

specific statements that Judge Mackey made that would have led him to believe that Judge

Mackey was going to give Petitioner a sentence of five to seven and a half years, followed

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by lifetime probation. (Respondents’ Exh. J at 73) Rather, he testified that “the constant

theme [of the off-the-record negotiations] was, “why isn’t this a fair disposition. Why isn’t

a two count, some prison followed by probation [an] available deal where I can give him up

to the maximum term in the first count, year in the county jail on the second count, with

consecutive probation?” (Respondents’ Exh. J at 73-74) Griffen testified that Judge

Mackey gave him the impression that, if Petitioner accepted the plea, he would impose a

sentence of 5 to 7.5 years imprisonment followed by lifetime probation. (Respondents’ Exh.

J at 71-80, 84) The relevant plea offer provided that Petitioner would plead guilty to one

count of attempted sexual conduct with a minor, and to one count of sexual abuse. (docket #

14) Griffen testified that he advised Petitioner to accept the plea offer because, based on his

25 years of experience, a judge - including Judge Mackey - would not “backtrack” on his

representations regarding sentencing. (Respondents’ Exh. J at 80-81) 

Griffen testified that he thought that Judge Mackey had “agreed” to sentence

Petitioner to a mandatory prison term on the sexual abuse count, followed by lifetime

probation on the attempted sexual conduct count - which Griffen described as a sentence of

“mandatory prison, five to seven and a half, plus a consecutive probationary term on the

attempted count.” (Respondents’ Exh. J at 95) Griffen admitted that the written plea

agreement did not reflect that sentence, “[b]ecause there wasn’t an agreement with [the

County Attorney’s] office to that extent.” (Respondents’ Exh. J at 95) Counsel reiterated

that “there was no agreement between [the County Attorney’s] office and [defense

counsel’s] office that” Petitioner would be sentenced to a prison term of 5 to 7.5 years,

followed by lifetime probation. (Respondents’ Exh. J at 95-96) Griffen also admitted that

he was aware that Judge Mackey “insisted” on having “adequate discretion in any plea

agreement to do what he thought was appropriate.” (Respondents’ Exh. J at 96-97) 

Despite having only an “impression” that Judge Mackey would impose lifetime

probation on count 2, his knowledge that Judge Mackey insisted on having sentencing

discretion, and his knowledge that the County Attorney had not agreed to a sentence which

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included a prison term of 5 to 7.5 years followed by lifetime probation, Griffen conveyed to

Petitioner that Judge Mackey had given “every . . . indication” that he would sentence

Petitioner “somewhere between five and seven and a half [years imprisonment], followed by

lifetime [probation.]” (Respondents’ Exh. J at 80) 

Griffen also testified that he did not specifically advise Petitioner of the potential

consequences of his plea — the potential prison sentence he could face under the plea

agreement. See Iaea, 800 F.2d at 864-65 (finding counsel ineffective and plea involuntary

where counsel inaccurately predicted the sentence and misinformed petitioner about the

consequences of going to trial). Rather than specifically advising Petitioner “[that he could]

get prison on Count I with the range of five, ten, 15 [years imprisonment],” (Respondents’

Exh. J at 99), Griffen testified that it is “more likely” he would have simply told Petitioner

“there is no guarantee. It could go either way.” (Respondents’ Exh. J at 99) In view of the

foregoing, the state court’s finding that counsel “fully explained the terms of the plea

including the statutory sentencing requirements and possibilities” is an unreasonable

determination of the facts. (Respondents’ Exh. L) 

Further, although counsel told Petitioner that there was “no guarantee” as to the

specific sentence the judge would impose, he diluted that statement by also advising

Petitioner that Judge Mackey would not back track on his word — in other words, he told

Petitioner that there was a guarantee. Griffen testified that he told Petitioner “two things. . .

One, I made sure he understood there was no guarantee, and I don’t think he misunderstood

that, but I also told him, quite strongly, that in my opinion, that every indication was from

the judge that the judge was championing, he was the leader at this point trying to pursue a

plea that gave probationary discretion, and I believe that was his intention by reasons of his

negotiations, close door session.” (Respondents’ Exh. J at 81) (emphasis added). Griffen

further testified that he “told [Petitioner] that in [his] . . . 25 years of experience, [he] was

confident that based upon discussions that had occurred among the parties in chambers, that

Judge Mackey was absolutely inclined to afford [Petitioner] probation.”. . . “I conveyed that

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to [Petitioner] and conveyed to him that I believe that no judge would do that, and then

change course with out fair warning . . . .” (Respondents’ Exh. J at 81) 

The post-conviction court isolated counsel’s statement to Petitioner that there

was “no guarantee” about sentencing, but ignored counsel’s self-described “strong”

statements to Petitioner that Judge Mackey had given his word that he would impose

lifetime probation on count 2, and that in counsel’s 25 years of experience, a trial judge

would never go back on his word without warning. Thus, on the one hand, counsel said “no

guarantees,” but then he said, a judge would not go back on his word - which essentially

constitutes a guarantee. Defense counsel’s representations to Petitioner that “Judge Mackey

was absolutely inclined to afford [Petitioner] probation” combined with counsel’s statement

that, in his 25 years of experience, a judge would not go back on his word negated counsel’s

warning that there was “no guarantee” about sentencing. 

Petitioner was ultimately sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment on the attempted

sexual conduct with a minor count, and to a consecutive presumptive term of five years

imprisonment on the sexual abuse count. (Respondents’ Exh. C at 54-58) Counsel advised

Petitioner that Judge Mackey would sentence him to five year’s imprisonment on the

attempted sexual conduct count, and to lifetime probation on the sexual abuse count. In so

doing, counsel did more than inaccurately predict Petitioner’s ultimate sentence. But see

United States v. Martinez, 169 F.3d 1049, 1053 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that “an attorney’s

mere inaccurate prediction of a sentence does not demonstrate the deficiency component of

an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.”); United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1570

(10th Cir. 1993) (“A miscalculation or erroneous sentence estimation by defense counsel is

not a constitutionally deficient performance rising to the level of ineffective assistance of

counsel.”) Rather, counsel affirmatively misrepresented to Petitioner that Judge Mackey

had given his word that he would impose lifetime probation and that, even though that

promise was not reflected in the plea agreement and Judge Mackey wanted to retain

sentencing discretion, Judge Mackey would not go back on his word. See Chizen v. Hunter,

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809 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that counsel’s misrepresentation that the judge had

agreed to the specific sentence in the plea agreement constituted ineffective assistance and

rendered the plea involuntary and that defense counsel’s misrepresentation was sufficient to

surmount the imposing barrier imposed by petitioner’s statements during the plea hearing.). 

In addition to ignoring the foregoing circumstances, the post-conviction court

ignored a critical event that took place during the change-of-plea hearing. During the

change-of-plea hearing, when Judge Mackey was addressing Petitioner, he interjected about

certain “intentions” that he had been promised. (Tr. 4/30/04 at 13) Counsel, however,

interrupted Petitioner and told him that further discussion would result in the court rejecting

the plea. (Tr. 7/16/04 at 55-56; Tr. 5/24/05 at 130, 135, 136, 139) Thereafter, the trial court

inquired whether the “plea agreement sets forth all the agreements you have about what’s

going to happen to you?” (Tr. 4/30/04 at 14) Petitioner “nodd[ed]” which the court

interpreted as “yes,” and Petitioner confirmed “Yes.” (Tr. 4/30/04 at 14) 

On post-conviction review, the trial court ignored Petitioner’s interjection at the

change-of-plea hearing. (docket # 11-12) The post-conviction court concluded that “[a]t the

time of the entry of the plea, the Court made specific inquiry of [Petitioner] whether had his

attorney told him of any other agreements as to what was going to happen to him, and

[Petitioner] advised the Court there were no other agreements.” (Respondents’ Exh. L) The

state court, however, failed to discuss the portion of the plea hearing where Petitioner balked

at the mention of a 22 year sentence and mentioned that there were other “intentions.” 

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the state court’s decision is based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The record reflects that counsel’s

performance was deficient in the manner described above.

b. Prejudice

Having found counsel’s performance deficient, the Court will consider whether

Petitioner establishes that he was prejudiced thereby. To satisfy the prejudice prong in the

context of a guilty plea, Petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but

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for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to

trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. As set forth below, “[t]he record is replete with evidence that

[Petitioner] was very reluctant to plead guilty.” See Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d at 865

(remanding to district court to determine whether petitioner established prejudice where

record indicated that petitioner was reluctant to plead guilty). Additionally, the “special

circumstances” in this case indicate that Petitioner placed particular reliance on counsel’s

advice in deciding whether to plead guilty. Hill, 106 S.Ct. at 371. 

On June 6, 2002, Petitioner was indicted on eight counts of dangerous crimes

against children. He had no prior experience with the criminal justice system. (Tr. 7/16/04

at 44; Tr. 5/24/05 at 9. 38, 56, 120, 121, 152; Tr. 6/7/05 at 11, 12, 21) Petitioner had a

history of mental illness, and several days after the indictment was filed, he requested an

examination pursuant to Ariz.R.Crim.P. 11. (Id.) Before his arrest, Petitioner was treated

by several mental health professionals and after his arrest, he was treated at an in-patient

facility in Maricopa County. (Tr. 5/24/05 at 152-53; Tr. 6/7/05 at 11)

Petitioner initially pled not guilty. The State made numerous plea offers which

Petitioner rejected. For example, one pretrial plea offer proposed “prison with a range of 10

to 24, with three other counts eligible for probation . . . .” (Respondents’ Exh. J at 60)

Defense counsel testified that such a possible sentence was not “a realistic possibility for

Mr. Paige.” (Respondents’ Exh. J at 60) Counsel explained that if Petitioner proceeded to

trial, and prevailed on his defense of guilty but insane, he would “not [have] been subjected

to prison but to treatment through the mental health system [the state mental hospital].” 

(Respondents’ Exh. J at 60) Petitioner confirmed that he rejected the pre-trial plea offers

because he was mentally ill, and he and his family wanted to make sure that he could receive

mental health treatment. (Tr. 5/24/05 at 124-26, 155) Petitioner, who was 52 at the time of

his arrest and pre-trial proceedings, did not feel that life imprisonment was an option. (Tr.

4/30/04; Tr. 5/24/05 at 124-26, 155) Because the State did not offer a plea which provided

for a short prison term - approximately five years - and probation, Petitioner proceeded to

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trial before a jury. During post-conviction proceedings, defense counsel testified that

Petitioner “was not prepared to accept a significant prison term, period.” (Respondents’

Exh. J at 54, Tr. 5/24/05 at 54)

The jury trial began on January 14, 2004. Petitioner’s defense was guilty but

insane. (Respondents’ Exh. J, Tr. 5/24/05 at 9, 38, 53-56, 93-94, 123, 125, 155) After tendays of trial, the jury was unable to reach a verdict and the court declared a mistrial. (Tr.

2/14/04 at 22-23) After his trial ended in a mistrial, Petitioner “remained desirous of going

to trial.” (Respondents’ Exh. J at 56-57) Petitioner’s family was prepared to proceed to a

second trial and had the finances to cover the trial. (Respondents’ Exh. J at 69) A second

trial was scheduled for April 7, 2004, and plea negotiations resumed. (Respondents’ Exh. J

at 66) Petitioner again refused to consider any plea offers that included extensive prison

time. Petitioner felt that there was no benefit to serving the rest of his life in prison with

minimal mental health treatment. Thus, the only realistic plea offer to Petitioner was one

that would result in a short prison term followed by probation. (Tr. 5/24/05 at 69, 124-26,

155) Petitioner rejected all of the pre-trial and post-trial plea offers that exposed him to a

prison term that was much longer than five years. (Id.; Respondents’ Exh. J, Tr. 5/24/05 at

53-54, 120-26) During post-conviction proceedings, defense counsel testified that Petitioner

would not have taken a plea if he “knew that he was going to be exposed to perhaps more

than seven and a half years . . . .” (Respondents’ Exh. J, Tr. 5/24/05 at 54) 

Petitioner ultimately accepted a plea offer pursuant to which he believed he

would receive between 2.5 and 7.5 years imprisonment on the first count, followed by

lifetime probation on the second count. Petitioner accepted this plea in reliance on counsel’s

representation that Judge Mackey had promised that he would impose a 5 year sentence on

count one and probation on count two. (Tr. 5/24/05 at 76, 77, 80-82, 103, 127, 145, 151,

157). Counsel testified during post-conviction proceedings, that Petitioner “relied on [his]

expertise.” (Respondents’ Exh. J at 58) Defense counsel further testified that if “there had

been any other statement from [counsel] along the lines that [Petitioner] could face more

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than seven and a half years in prison,” Petitioner would not have taken the plea. 

(Respondents’ Exh. J at 72) Counsel testified that he told Petitioner that “in discussing this

with Judge Mackey, that every . . . indication was, he was going to wind up somewhere

between five and seven and a half, followed by lifetime [probation.]” (Respondents’ Exh. J

at 80) Counsel testified that “but for that representation, [Petitioner] wouldn’t have” taken

the plea.” (Respondents’ Exh. J at 80) 

During post-conviction proceedings, Petitioner testified consistently with defense

counsel that he relied on counsel’s advice and would not have accepted the plea absent his

advice. (Tr. 5/24/05 at 58, 80, 103) He testified that, if he had believed he would be

exposed to more than five years imprisonment, he “wouldn’t have gone for”

 the plea. I mean I hadn’t before. I wouldn’t now. I felt we were stronger going back to

trial the second time.” (Respondents’ Exh. J at 141-42) In assessing Petitioner’s claims,

the post-conviction court disregarded Petitioner’s subjective state of mind which is relevant

to determining the voluntariness of a guilty plea. Iaea, 800 F.2d at 866 (stating that to

determine the voluntariness of the plea, the court looks to the totality of the circumstances,

examining both the defendant’s “subjective state of mind” and the “constitutional

acceptability of the external forces inducing the guilty plea.”). 

In view of the Petitioner’ rejection of numerous plea offers both before and after

his trial, which ended in a mistrial, Petitioner’s consistent preference for proceeding to trial

rather than accepting a plea that exposed him to more than five years imprisonment, and his

numerous statements during the post-conviction proceedings that if he had believed the plea

agreement exposed him to a sentence of over five years, he would have rejected it, there is a

reasonable probability that but for counsel’s deficient performance, Petitioner would not

have pled guilty and would have proceeded to trial. 

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the state court’s application of

Strickland was objectively unreasonable. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21

(2003). Knowing that the trial judge wanted to retain sentencing discretion and would not

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stipulate to a particular sentence, defense counsel advised Petitioner that the trial judge had

“given his word” that he would impose a sentence of five years imprisonment followed by

lifetime probation. Counsel also told Petitioner that, although that agreement was not

reflected in the written plea agreement, the trial judge would not “backtrack” from his word,

which was “as good of a guarantee” as Petitioner would get in this case. Petitioner, who had

no prior experience with the judicial system, was entitled to credit defense counsel’s

representation that an agreement existed with Judge Mackey, and to rely on it. The record

reflects that Petitioner’s guilty plea was induced by such a representation. Contrary to

Respondents’ assertion, the plea colloquy does not cure any defects that may have occurred

due to counsel’s misrepresentations. During the plea colloquy, Petitioner tried to express to

the court that there were other “intentions” regarding sentencing that were not reflected in

the written plea agreement. However, Petitioner was prevented from voicing his views by

counsel and the plea proceeded. Petitioner again relied on counsel’s assurances that an

agreement had been reached regarding sentencing and that he should accept the plea. Due to

the circumstances surrounding Petitioner’s plea, Petitioner has overcome the “imposing

barrier” of his representations made during the plea hearing. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431

U.S. 63, 74 (1977).

In conclusion, the Court finds that the state court’s resolution of Petitioner’s

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts, which led to an unreasonable application of Strickland. Petitioner is entitled to habeas

corpus relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Because the court finds that

Petitioner is entitled to habeas relief based on his allegation of ineffective assistance of

counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court need only apply

Strickland’s prejudice standard and does not engage in a separate analysis applying the

Brecht standard. Musladin v. Lamarque, ___F.3d ___, 2009 WL 331457, * 2 (9th Cir. 2009)

(citing Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 n. 7 (2002)).

Accordingly,

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IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (docket # 1) be GRANTED and that the state court has the discretion to

determine the specific relief Petitioner is afforded. For example, the court may give

Petitioner the sentence for which he thought he had bargained, or permit him to withdraw his

guilty plea and proceed to trial. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court=s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1); Rules

72, 6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate

Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party=s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge=s recommendation. See, Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 24th day of February, 2009.

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