Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01085/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01085-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY WAYNE QUINN, CDCR 

#P-28271,

Plaintiff,

v.

D. SINGH, et al.,

Defendants. 

 

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Case No. 11-CV-1085-DMS (JMA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING DEFENDANTS’

MOTIONS TO DISMISS 

[Doc. Nos. 18, 37]

Plaintiff Gregory Wayne Quinn (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner previously

incarcerated at California State Prison, Los Angeles County, in Lancaster, California,

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights complaint against

Defendants D. Singh, F. Rodriguez, and B. Smith pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Compl. [Doc. No. 1]. On October 28, 2011, Defendants Rodriguez and Smith filed a

motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Doc. No. 18. On

November 21, 2011, Plaintiff filed both a “reply” to the motion to dismiss in which he

stated he intended to file a motion for leave to amend the complaint, as well as a motion

for leave to amend the complaint. Doc. Nos. 28, 29. On December 23, 2011, the Court

issued an order granting Plaintiff’s motion. Doc. No. 31. The order was sent via U.S.

mail to Plaintiff’s address at California State Prison, Lancaster. On December 16, 2011,

Plaintiff mailed a notice of change of address indicating he had been released from

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prison and had a new address in Compton, California. Doc. No. 33. The change of

address was entered onto the Court’s docket on December 29, 2011 (i.e., after the

Court issued the order granting Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the complaint). Id.

On April 9, 2012, Defendant Singh, who was served after Rodriguez and Smith and who

has separate counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(6). Doc. No. 37. On May 8, 2012, over four months after it was mailed, the

December 23, 2011 order granting Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint was returned

to the Court via return mail. Doc. No. 39. On May 9, 2012, the Court issued a

supplemental order granting Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend complaint, in which the

Court gave Plaintiff until June 8, 2012 to file an amended complaint. Doc. No. 40. This

order was sent to Plaintiff’s address in Compton. To date, Plaintiff has neither filed an

amended complaint nor an opposition to either of the motions to dismiss. 

For the following reasons, the Court recommends the motion to dismiss filed by

Defendants Rodriguez and Singh be GRANTED and the motion to dismiss filed by

Defendant Singh be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 

I. Background

On September 19, 2010, Plaintiff submitted a CDC-602 Inmate/Parolee Appeal

Form against Defendant Singh and two other correctional officers in relation to a

complaint by Plaintiff that he was not receiving delivery of his mail and that Singh

conducted herself in an unprofessional manner and was “overfamiliar” with inmates. 

Compl., Ex. C [Doc. No. 1-1 at 35, 41-42]. On September 20, 2010, Plaintiff submitted

another CDC-602 stating he had been confronted by inmates who accused him of filing

a 602 against Singh. Id. at 39. Plaintiff wrote that he felt Singh was trying to “set him

up” and that she had no right to tell other inmates about the confidential information he

had written in his previous 602 form. Id. He requested Singh be moved out of his

building and fired for trying to put his life in danger. Id.

Plaintiff alleges on September 21, 2010, he informed Defendant Rodriguez, a

correctional sergeant, that Singh had told other inmates he was a “snitch” and had

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revealed what he had written in his 602 about her. Compl. at 5. Plaintiff states he told

Rodriguez multiple inmates had threatened to harm him if he did not drop his complaint

against Singh. Id. Rodriguez allegedly told Plaintiff that he needed to tell the sergeant

on the following watch about the situation. Id. Plaintiff states on September 22, 2010,

he informed Defendant Smith, a correctional sergeant, about the circumstances. Id. at

7. Plaintiff contends Smith gave him the same reaction and treatment Rodriguez had

given him the day before, i.e., that “he could care less.” Id. 

Plaintiff and another inmate, Farkas, were involved in an altercation in the

shower area on September 23, 2010. Id. at 8 & Ex. A [Doc. No. 1-1 at 2]. Plaintiff

alleges Farkas attacked him and told him he knew Plaintiff had submitted a 602 about

Singh. Id. at 8 & Ex. C [Doc. No. 1-1 at 16]. Plaintiff was placed in Administrative

Segregation for fighting. Id. at Ex. A [Doc. No. 1-1 at 2-5].

Plaintiff alleges that each of the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right

to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by acting with deliberate indifference

toward his safety; that Singh retaliated against him for filing a 602 against her; that

Singh violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, and that Rodriguez and

Smith violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. Compl. at 3-8. He

requests an injunction preventing any further reprisals against him, $50,000 in

damages, and $200,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 10. 

II. Motions to Dismiss

A. Legal Standards

A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a “‘lack of a cognizable legal

theory’ or ‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’” 

Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare System, LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). “While a

complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual

allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of

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a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(citations omitted). A complaint does not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid

of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)). 

Every complaint must, at a minimum, plead “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Weber v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 521 F.3d 1061,

1065 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 544). “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Facts which are alleged in the complaint are

presumed true, and the court must construe them and draw all reasonable inferences

from them in favor of the plaintiff. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988

(9th Cir. 2001). Factual allegations asserted by pro se petitioners, “however inartfully

pleaded,” are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Thus, where a plaintiff appears

pro se in a civil rights case, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford

plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839

F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). Nevertheless, and in spite of the deference the court is

bound to pay to any factual allegations made, it is not proper for the court to assume

“the [plaintiff] can prove facts which [he or she] has not alleged.” Associated General

Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,

526 (1983). 

B. Eighth Amendment Claims

“[T]he treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he

is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (citation omitted). “Prison officials have a duty to take

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reasonable steps to protect inmates from physical abuse.” Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d

1237, 1250 (9th Cir. 1982). “It is not, however, every injury suffered by one prisoner at

the hands of another that translates into constitutional liability for prison officials

responsible for the victim’s safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. A prison official violates

the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met, one of which is objective

and the other of which is subjective. Id.

“Under the objective requirement, the prison official’s acts or omissions must

deprive an inmate of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Allen v. Sakai,

48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). A prisoner meets the objective

requirement by alleging the deprivation of what courts have defined as a basic human

need. Id. at 1088. The subjective requirement requires a prison official to have a

“sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. In prison conditions

cases, that state of mind is “deliberate indifference” to inmate health or safety. Id.

“Deliberate indifference” exists when a prison official “knows of and disregards an

excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he

must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.

1. Defendant Singh

Defendant Singh moves for dismissal of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim on

the grounds that Plaintiff does not allege he suffered any physical injuries as a result of

the alleged assault by inmate Farkas, and that her conduct was not the proximate cause

of the alleged assault as she was not responsible for determining what actions should

have been taken to provide the protection Plaintiff allegedly sought from her superiors,

Rodriguez and Smith. Def’s. Mem. [Doc. No. 37-1] at 4-6.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) states that “[n]o Federal civil action

may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for

mental or emotional injury while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” 

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). This provision “requires a prior showing of physical injury that

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need not be significant but must be more than de minimis.” Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d

623, 627 (9th Cir. 2002); Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 2003). The

Ninth Circuit has determined, however, the PLRA does not bar claims for

compensatory, nominal, or punitive damages. Oliver, 289 F.3d at 630. Therefore,

though a prisoner may not pursue a claim for mental or emotional injury without showing

more than a de minimis physical injury, he may still purse compensatory, nominal, or

punitive damages even without having suffered physical injury. Id.; see also Cockroft v.

Kirkland, 548 F. Supp. 2d 767, 776-77 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“The fact that Cockroft never

suffered any physical injury as a result of [the defendant’s] alleged acts may make his

Eighth Amendment claim of very little financial value but does not make the claim nonexistent.”). 

Here, while Plaintiff alleges he was “attacked physically, brutally” by Farkas and

had to “defend[] himself from great bodily injury” (see Compl. at 3-4, 8), he does not

allege he suffered any physical injury as a result of Farkas’s attack. Plaintiff seeks

$50,000 in damages, construed by the Court as a request for compensatory damages,

and $200,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 10. A request for punitive damages is

consistent with a claim for nominal damages even when the latter are not specifically

requested. See Oliver, 289 F.3d at 630. Therefore, while Plaintiff may be barred by the

PLRA from seeking damages for mental or emotional injury regarding his Eighth

Amendment claim, and has not alleged any physical injury for which he could be

compensated, he is not barred under Oliver from seeking nominal or punitive damages

in relation to this claim. See id. 

Singh further argues her conduct was not the proximate cause of the alleged

assault on Plaintiff because she had no control or influence over her superiors,

Rodriguez and Smith, as to how Plaintiff should be protected. Def.’s Mem. [Doc. No.

37-1] at 5-6. This argument fails. The Complaint adequately alleges Singh placed

Plaintiff in harm’s way by labeling him a “snitch” and exerting her influence over other

inmates to threaten and assault Plaintiff. See Compl. at 3-4. The Ninth Circuit has held

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an allegation that a prison official called a prisoner a “snitch” in the presence of other

inmates is sufficient to state a claim for violation of the right to be protected from

violence while in custody. Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir.

1989).

The Court accordingly recommends that Singh’s motion to dismiss be DENIED

as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim.

2. Defendants Rodriguez and Smith

Defendants Rodriguez and Smith move for dismissal of Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment claim on the grounds that Plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient to support

an allegation of deliberate indifference. Defs.’ Mem. [Doc. No. 18-1] at 6-7.

A prison official’s alleged act or omission must be accompanied by knowledge of

a significant risk of harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38. A prison official’s failure to

alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived, but did not, is insufficient for

Eighth Amendment liability. Id. Despite Plaintiff’s contention that Rodriguez and Smith

each acted with deliberate indifference toward his safety (see Compl. at 5-8), he has

failed to allege any facts to show these defendants had the requisite state of mind to

support an allegation of deliberate indifference. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265,

286 (1986) (stating that courts are not bound to “accept as true a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation”). Here, with respect to Defendant Rodriguez, Plaintiff

alleges Rodriguez told him to “talk to the sergeant on the following watch” when Plaintiff

reported his concerns about being attacked to him. Compl. at 5. This does not support

an allegation Rodriguez had the requisite culpable state of mind to inflict unnecessary

and wanton injury or pain. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. With respect to Defendant Smith,

Plaintiff alleges Smith “could care less” when Plaintiff brought his concerns to him, and

references Exhibit A to his Complaint, consisting of the Rules Violation Report relating

to the altercation between Plaintiff and Farkas, to show Smith indeed knew about the

risk to Plaintiff’s safety and failed to protect him. Compl. at 7. According to the Rules

Violation Report, however, Plaintiff told Smith he did not feel threatened at the time he

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made his report to Smith because he did not think the other inmates would “take it that

far.” Id. at Ex. A [Doc. No. 1-1 at 6].1

 This in no way supports an allegation Smith knew

of and disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s safety. 

Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to support an allegation of deliberate

indifference against Defendants Rodriguez and Smith. Accordingly, the Court

recommends the motion to dismiss by Rodriguez and Smith be GRANTED, with leave

to amend, as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim.

C. Retaliation Claim

Defendant Singh moves for dismissal of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against her on

the grounds that he has not alleged all elements of a retaliation claim. Def.’s Mem.

[Doc. No. 37] at 6-7. 

“Of fundamental import to prisoners are their First Amendment rights to file prison

grievances . . . .” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations and

internal quotations omitted). “Without [that] bedrock constitutional guarantee[], inmates

would be left with no viable mechanism to remedy prison injustices.” A plaintiff suing

prison officials for First Amendment retaliation must allege sufficient facts to show: (1)

that a state actor took some adverse action against him (2) because of (3) his protected

conduct, and that such action (4) chilled his exercise of his First Amendment rights, and

(5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Id. at 567-68;

Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Singh argues Plaintiff fails to adequately plead a retaliation claim because “[t]he

only alleged adverse action that Singh took was to disclose [the contents of Plaintiff’s

602 appeal] and call [P]laintiff a snitch,” which does not entitle Plaintiff to relief. Def.’s

Mem. at 6. Singh’s argument ignores, however, that calling Plaintiff a “snitch” in front of

other inmates impacted his right to be free from violence. See, e.g., Valandingham, 866

F.2d at 1138. “[T]he mere threat of harm can be an adverse action, regardless of

1

Documents that are a part of a complaint may be considered by the court on a motion

to dismiss to determine whether the plaintiff can prove any set of facts in support of his claim. 

Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 625 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991). 

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whether it is carried out because the threat itself can have a chilling effect.” Brodheim v.

Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original). 

Plaintiff alleges he suffered the threat of attack by other inmates as well as an

actual attack by an inmate due to Singh’s labeling of him as a “snitch”, and has

therefore adequately alleged Singh took adverse action against him in retaliation for his

filing of a 602 appeal against her. Accordingly, the Court recommends Singh’s motion

to dismiss be DENIED as to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.

D. Fourteenth Amendment Claims

1. Defendant Singh

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Singh violated his right to due process under the

Fourteenth Amendment. Compl. at 3. Singh argues the due process claim should be

dismissed as Plaintiff does not allege any facts in support of this claim other than those

alleged in relation to his Eighth Amendment claim. Defs.’ Mem. [Doc. No. 37] at 7. 

The Court concurs with Singh that Plaintiff’s due process claim is redundant of

his Eighth Amendment claim. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)

(providing that when there is an “explicit textual source” of constitutional protection

available, “that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due

process,’ must be the guide for analyzing” such claims); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475

U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment, which is specifically concerned with

the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain in penal institutions, serves as the primary

source of substantive protection to convicted prisoners”). The Court also agrees with

Singh that Plaintiff has failed to set forth allegations to support a due process claim

under the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court recommends Singh’s motion

to dismiss be GRANTED, with leave to amend, as to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment

claim.

2. Defendants Rodriguez and Smith

Plaintiff alleges Defendants Rodriguez and Smith violated his right to equal

protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Compl. at 8. Rodriguez and Smith argue

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the equal protection claim should be dismissed as the claim is redundant of Plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment claim and because Plaintiff makes only conclusory allegations

without any facts to support his claim. 

The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim is redundant of his

Eighth Amendment claim. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395; Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327. 

Additionally, “[t]he Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands

that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated

alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). When an

equal protection violation is alleged, the plaintiff must plead facts to show the defendant

“acted in a discriminatory manner and that the discrimination was intentional.” Federal

Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). 

Plaintiff’s Complaint is devoid of any facts to show he was discriminated against

in any manner or that he was treated differently from any other class of prisoners. 

Thus, Plaintiff has pled no facts from which the Court could find he has stated an equal

protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court

recommends the motion to dismiss by Rodriguez and Smith be GRANTED, with leave

to amend, as to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim.

E. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Defendants Rodriguez and Smith seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s damages claims to

the extent they are based on acts taken in their official capacities. The Eleventh

Amendment bars a prisoner’s section 1983 claims against state actors sued in their

official capacities. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). It

does not, however, bar damage actions against state officials for acts taken in their

personal or individual capacities. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991); Pena v.

Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472-73 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, Plaintiff has sued Rodriguez and

Smith in both their individual and official capacities. See Compl. at 2. The Court

recommends the motion to dismiss by Rodriguez and Singh be GRANTED with

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prejudice to the extent Plaintiff seeks damages against them in their official capacities. 

F. Mootness of Claim for Injunctive Relief

As part of his request for relief, Plaintiff requests an injunction preventing any

further reprisals against him. Compl. at 10. To establish eligibility for an injunction, an

inmate must demonstrate the continuance of the defendants’ knowing and

unreasonable disregard of an objectively intolerable risk of harm during the remainder of

the litigation and into the future. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 846. The court may consider

developments that postdate the pleadings and pretrial motions in determining an

inmate’s eligibility for an injunction. Id. Here, Plaintiff has been released from prison,

and thus there is no risk of future reprisals by Defendants against him. The Court

accordingly recommends Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief be DISMISSED AS MOOT.

IV. Conclusion and Recommendation

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, the undersigned magistrate

judge recommends:

1. The motion to dismiss brought by Defendants Rodriguez and Smith [Doc. No.

18] pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim as to Plaintiff’s Eighth

and Fourteenth Amendment claims be GRANTED with leave to amend;

2. The motion to dismiss brought by Defendants Rodriguez and Smith [Doc. No.

18] as to Plaintiff’s claim for damages against them in their official capacities be

GRANTED with prejudice;

3. The motion to dismiss brought by Defendant Singh [Doc. No. 37] pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

and retaliation claims be DENIED;

4. The motion to dismiss by Defendant Singh [Doc. No. 37] pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim as to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim

be GRANTED with leave to amend; and

5. Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief be DENIED AS MOOT. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Dana M.

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Sabraw, United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions

of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). IT IS ORDERED that not later than August 10, 2012, any

party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” IT IS

FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be served and filed not later

than August 24, 2012. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s

order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: July 27, 2012

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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