Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00198/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00198-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 28:1331as Fed. Question: Assault, Libel, Slander

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3:17-cv-00198-BEN-WVG

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TIFFANY DEHEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOHN DOE; TWITTER, INC.; 

UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-00198-BEN-WVG

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Plaintiff Tiffany Dehen has filed a complaint against John Doe, Twitter, Inc., and 

the University of San Diego, alleging malicious defamation and intentional infliction of 

emotional distress. (ECF No. 1.) Concurrently, she filed a motion to proceed in forma 

pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF No. 2.)

All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for a writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. 28 

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire 

fee only if he or she is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1),

[A]ny court of the United States may authorize the commencement, 

prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding . . . without 

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3:17-cv-00198-BEN-WVG

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prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit 

that includes a statement of all assets such [person] possesses that the person 

is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.

“An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges that the 

affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo v. 

Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). The IFP statute does not itself define 

what constitutes insufficient assets. The Ninth Circuit has recognized, “[o]ne need not be 

absolutely destitute to obtain benefits of the in forma pauperis statute.” Jefferson v. 

United States, 277 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir. 1960). Nonetheless, a plaintiff seeking IFP 

status must allege poverty “with some particularity, definiteness and certainty.” United 

States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir.1981) (internal quotation marks omitted).

On its face, Plaintiff’s IFP application is deficient. She admits that she is 

employed but fails to state her monthly income. Instead, she states that her taxable 

income will be negative after she pays her student loans over the next eight months and 

after expenses. The Court must determine whether a plaintiff is unable to pay the filing 

fee based on complete information, and Plaintiff has not met this burden. 

Accordingly, her motion to proceed IFP is DENIED. Within twenty-one (21) days 

of entry of this Order, Plaintiff may either pay the applicable filing fee or file a renewed 

motion to proceed IFP that sufficiently explains why she cannot afford to pay the court 

costs. The Clerk of Court shall send Plaintiff a blank Southern District of California in 

forma pauperis application.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 15, 2017

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