Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00446/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00446-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Carl G. Burkin, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of

Social Security, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-11-446-PHX-SMM

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to the

Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). (Doc. 23.) As the prevailing party, Plaintiff moves

for attorney’s fees in the amount of $5,121.06. The Commissioner does not contest the

reasonableness of the amount of fees submitted, but opposes the motion for attorney’s fees

contending that the government’s position was substantially justified. (Doc. 22.) 

Plaintiff filed this action for review of the final decision of the Commissioner for

Social Security pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(b). At Step 5, this Court found Plaintiff’s

mental limitations disabling, reversed the Commissioner’s final decision, and remanded this

case to the Commissioner for an award of benefits pursuant to sentence 4 of the Social

Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). In the underlying agency

proceeding, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) had determined that Plaintiff was not

disabled because even though he could not return to his past relevant work, there was work

in the national economy that he could perform despite his mental limitations. (Doc. 21 at

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2.) On the issue of whether Plaintiff’s mental limitations were disabling, there was

conflicting medical evidence between the examining psychiatrist and the non-examining

psychologists. The ALJ conceded that if she accepted the “marked” mental work limitations

assessed by the examining psychiatrist, it would preclude Plaintiff from performing sustained

work. (Doc. 21 at 10-11.) In addition to three other “marked” mental work limitations, the

examining psychiatrist specifically found that Plaintiff could not complete a normal workday

and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and could not

perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods. (Id.

at 10.) Regarding the conflict in the medical evidence, the Court found that the ALJ had not

met her burden of laying out “specific, legitimate reasons” for rejecting the examining

psychiatrist’s opinion by providing “a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and

conflicting clinical evidence, stating her interpretation thereof, and making findings. (Id. at

13.) Regarding Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony, the Court also found that the ALJ

erred in the manner by which she discounted his subjective symptom testimony. (Id. at 13-

15.)

The parties dispute whether the position taken by the ALJ and the Commissioner’s

defense of the ALJ position were substantially justified. 

 Legal Standard

Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA):

[A] court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees

and other expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action (other than

cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency

action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction

of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was

substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The phrase “fees and other expenses” includes reasonable

attorney’s fees. Shafer v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2008).

A prevailing party in an action against the United States is entitled to an award of

attorney’s fees and costs under the EAJA unless the government’s position was

“substantially justified.” Under the EAJA, substantial justification means that the

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government’s position must have a reasonable basis both in law and fact.” Pierce v.

Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988); Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 569 (9th Cir. 1995)

(“In this circuit, we apply a reasonableness standard in determining whether the

government’s position was substantially justified for purposes of the EAJA.”). The

government bears the burden of showing that its position was substantially justified. See

Gonzales v. Free Speech Coalition, 408 F.3d 613, 618 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Discussion–Substantial Justification

The assessment of whether the position of the government is substantially justified

includes, in addition to the position taken by the Commissioner in the civil action, the action

or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based. See 28 U.S.C. §

2412(d)(2)(D); Comm’r, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 159 (1990) (explaining that the

“position” relevant to the inquiry “may encompass both the agency’s prelitigation conduct

and the [agency’s] subsequent litigation positions”). 

As previously noted, the ALJ here conceded that if she accepted the “marked” mental

work limitations assessed by Examining Psychiatrist Dr. Robert Narvaiz, it would preclude

Plaintiff from performing sustained work. (Doc. 21 at 10-11.) Following circuit precedent,

the Court discussed the greater weight that is assigned to the opinion of an examining

physician over and above the opinion of a non-examining physician. See Andrews, 53 F.3d

at 1041. An ALJ may reject the opinion of an examining physician, if contradicted by a nonexamining physician, only by providing specific, legitimate reasons that are supported by

substantial evidence in the record. See Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d

920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002). In this case, the ALJ rejected Dr. Narvaiz’s mental limitations

assessment and credited the opinions of the non-examining physicians without providing

specific, legitimate reasons that were supported by substantial evidence in the record. (Doc.

21 at 11.) Regarding Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony, the Court also found that the

ALJ erred in the manner in which she discounted his subjective symptom testimony. (Id. at

13-15.)

The Commissioner maintains that his litigation position in this action--that the ALJ

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did not wholly reject Dr. Narvaiz’s opinion-- was reasonable, and at the agency level, that

the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Narvaiz’s opinion was reasonable. (Doc. 26 at 5-6.) Specifically,

at the agency level, although the ALJ rejected Dr. Narvaiz’s opinion as to the severity of

Plaintiff’s mental limitations, the ALJ sought to reconcile Plaintiff’s mental limitations as

assessed by Dr. Narvaiz by limiting Plaintiff to simple work with minimal social and public

contact. (Id. at 6.) This finding, the Commissioner argues, was a reasonable assessment of

Plaintiff’s ability to work. (Id.)

The Court does not agree. Circuit precedent specifically describes the requirement

of a sufficient explanation when the ALJ is crediting the opinions of the non-examining

physicians and rejecting the assessment of the examining psychiatrist regarding mental

limitations. The ALJ did not comply. Such a failure to comply constitutes legal error. See

Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1259–60 (9th Cir. 2001). The Commissioner

implicitly agrees arguing that any ALJ error was harmless because the record as a whole

supports the ALJ position. (Doc. 26 at 6.) At this juncture the Court is not re-litigating the

disability finding. The Commissioner was not substantially justified in defending the ALJ’s

failure to provide a sufficient explanation of why she chose to reject Dr. Narvaiz’s mental

limitations assessment of Plaintiff.

The Court’s inquiry is at an end. Because the Commissioner was not substantially

justified in defending the ALJ’s failure to provide a sufficient explanation, the Court need

not further evaluate whether the Commissioner was substantially justified in defending the

ALJ’s error in the manner by which she discounted Plaintiff’s subjective symptom

testimony. (Id. at 13-15.)

Reasonableness of Fees

Plaintiff’s counsel requests $5,121.06 in attorney’s fees for 28.3 hours of work

performed in 2011 and 2012. (Doc. 24 at 7; Doc. 25.) Specifically, Plaintiff’s counsel

requests fees for 25 hours of work in 2011 and 3.3 hours in 2012. EAJA provides for an

upward adjustment of the $125 rate contained in the statute, based on cost of living

increases. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A); Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1147-49 (9th

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Cir. 2001). Pursuant to the EAJA and Thangaraja v. Gonzalez, 428 F.3d 870, 876–77 (9th

Cir. 2005), the Court will award Plaintiff’s counsel a cost of living increase for billed hours.

Counsel will be compensated at the requested statutory rate of $180.59 per hour for work

performed in 2011 and $183.73 per hour for work performed in 2012. (Doc. 25-1 at 1.)

Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED GRANTING Plaintiff’s Application for Attorney’s

Fees and Costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act. (Doc. 23.) Plaintiff is awarded

attorney’s fees in the amount of $5,121.06. This payment shall be made payable to Plaintiff

and shall be paid by the Agency.

DATED this 21st day of November, 2012.

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