Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-01795/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-01795-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 460
Nature of Suit: Deportation
Cause of Action: 28:1346 Tort Claim

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Luis Martin Lopez; et ux.,

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

The United States of America; et al.

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CIV 14-1795-TUC-CKJ (LAB)

Report and Recommendation

Pending before the court is the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction

and, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, filed on

June 3, 2014. (Doc. 15) The plaintiff, Luis Martin Lopez, alleges he was illegally

removed to Mexico by the Department of Homeland Security. He brings an action claiming

various state law torts pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act. The government moves that

this court dismiss the complaint pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(1) because Lopez’s claims

are precluded by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), which restricts claims arising out of the government’s

decision to remove an alien. The government argues in the alternative that Lopez fails to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6).

The case has been referred to Magistrate Judge Bowman for report and

recommendation pursuant to the Local Rules of Practice. LRCiv 72.1. The court finds the

Case 4:14-cv-01795-CKJ-LAB Document 31 Filed 11/20/14 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

motion suitable for decision without oral argument. The complaint should be dismissed with

leave to amend.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Luis Martin Lopez, is a citizen of Mexico. (Doc. 1, ¶ 11) Lopez was

removed from the United States to Mexico on March 26, 2003 following an allegation of

domestic violence. Id. at ¶ 12

Shortly afterwards, Lopez reentered the United States using his border crossing card.

Id. at ¶ 13 The government argues this entry was illegal because the card became invalid

after Lopez’s removal. 

On June 12, 2009, Lopez married his current wife, a United States citizen, and began

the process of applying for permanent residency status. (Doc. 1, ¶ ¶ 14, 15) 

On January 9, 2012, Lopez and his attorney met with United States Citizenship and

Immigration Services (USCIS) official Charles Portillo. Id. at ¶ 16 It was evident to Lopez

that Portillo did not like him and was not favorably disposed to grant him a waiver to adjust

his status to legal permanent resident. Id. at ¶ 16, 17, 18, 19 

On February 29, 2012, USCIS notified Lopez that his request was denied. Id. at ¶

20 The deadline for filing an appeal was April 2, 2012. Id. at ¶ 22; see (Doc. 15, p. 6)

(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1))

Nevertheless, on March 27, 2012, government agents arrested Lopez and removed

him to Mexico. Id. at ¶ 21 Lopez asserts that because his “appeal was still pending, no

person had any legal authority to arrest, to detain and/or to deport Mr. Lopez.” Id. at ¶ 34

Twenty-six days later, Lopez was permitted to reenter the country. Id., at ¶ 44; (Doc.

15, p. 15) (“Mr. Lopez was paroled into the United States, which allowed him to re-apply

for adjustment of status while physically present.”) He has since obtained legal permanent

residency status. Id., at ¶ 47

Lopez and his wife filed a complaint in this court alleging subject matter jurisdiction

pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act. (Doc. 1) Based on Lopez’s arrest, detention, and

Case 4:14-cv-01795-CKJ-LAB Document 31 Filed 11/20/14 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

removal, they raise claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, negligence, intentional

infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, and malicious prosecution. 

On June 3, 2014, the government filed the pending motion to dismiss for lack of

jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 15) The

government argues the complaint, on its face, fails to allege sufficient facts to establish

subject matter jurisdiction. The government further argues the FTCA does not provide

jurisdiction because there is no private person analogue for the government’s immigration

activities.

Discussion

A motion to dismiss pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(1) challenges this court’s subject

matter jurisdiction. Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, the party

invoking the jurisdiction of the court has the burden of proof. Thornhill Pub. Co., Inc. v.

General Tel. & Electronics Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). Here, Lopez alleges

jurisdiction pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act.

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671, et seq., “provides

a limited waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States for torts committed by

federal employees acting within the scope of their employment.” Nurse v. United States, 226

F.3d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 2000). The government accepts liability “under circumstances where

the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the

law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). 

Notwithstanding this limited waiver of sovereign immunity, the government argues

this court lacks jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). The statute reads in pertinent

part as follows:

Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of

law (statutory or nonstatutory) . . . no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any

cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action

by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or

execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.

8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(g). 

Case 4:14-cv-01795-CKJ-LAB Document 31 Filed 11/20/14 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

Although the statute explicitly refers to “any cause or claim . . . arising from the

decision . . . to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders,” the

Ninth Circuit has interpreted the statute to preclude jurisdiction only over those claims that

result from the government’s discretionary authority. U.S. v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144,

1155 (9th Cir. 2004). In other words, the statute does not preclude jurisdiction over a purely

legal question. Id.

In this case, Lopez’s claims arise from the government’s decision to remove him to

Mexico. Lopez raises two allegations of error. First, he argues the government’s decision

to deny his request for a waiver was an abuse of discretion. Second, he argues the

government’s decision to remove him while his appeal was still pending was contrary to law.

Lopez’s first argument challenges the government’s discretionary authority. The court

has no jurisdiction over that issue pursuant to 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(g). See, e.g., Guerrero v.

U.S., 2008 WL 2523892, 6 (C.D.Cal. 2008) (dismissing FTCA claims arising out of the

government’s decision to remove the plaintiff while the parties were awaiting a court order

that would determine whether his previous offense could be used as a basis for removal); see

also Sissoko v. Rocha, 509 F.3d 947, 951 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e conclude that the district

court lacked jurisdiction over the Sissoko’s [Bivens] claim because it arises from the decision

or action by the Attorney General to commence removal proceedings.”). His second

argument, however, raises a purely legal question. Accordingly, the court has subject matter

jurisdiction over this issue. 

In his response to the motion, Lopez argues § 1252(g) has no application at all

because it only applies to pending immigration cases citing, among other things, Medina v.

United States, 92 F.Supp.2d 545, 552 (E.D.Va. 2000). In that case, the District Court of the

Eastern District of Virginia concluded § 1252(g) did not divest the court of jurisdiction over

an FTCA action brought “after the Immigration Judge terminated the proceedings against

him.” Medina, 92 F.Supp.2d at 552. 

Medina’s temporal arguments, however, have not been accepted by the Ninth Circuit.

See Pedroza v. Gonzalez, n. 3, 2010 WL 6052381, 6 (S.D.Cal. 2010). And, the statutory

Case 4:14-cv-01795-CKJ-LAB Document 31 Filed 11/20/14 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

notes to § 1252 seem to preclude this argument. See Reno v. American-Arab

Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 477, 119 S.Ct. 936, 940 - 941 (1999)

(“Section 306(c)(1) of IIRIRA directs that a single provision, § 1252(g), shall apply without

limitation to claims arising from all past, pending, or future exclusion, deportation, or

removal proceedings.”) (punctuation modified). Section 1252(g) contains no explicit

temporal limitation, and this court should not infer one. See Pedroza v. Gonzalez, 2010 WL

6052381, 6 (S.D.Cal.2010) (“The statute’s lack of any temporal limiting language indicates

that none was intended.”).

Lopez’s claims must be dismissed pursuant to § 1252(g) in so far as they rest on his

argument that the government’s decision to remove him was an abuse of discretion. The

court does, however, have jurisdiction over his claims in so far as they rest on his argument

that his removal during the pendency of his appeal was contrary to law. Lopez’s complaint,

however, contains no support for that argument. Accordingly, his claims based on this

argument must be dismissed pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6).

“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the claim.” Cook v. Brewer,

637 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2011). The claim must allege a legally cognizable theory of

relief and include factual allegations sufficient to support that theory. Hinds Investments,

L.P. v. Angioli, 654 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2011). 

“All allegations of material fact in the complaint are taken as true and construed in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d

752, 754 -755 (9th Cir. 1994). “However, the court is not required to accept legal conclusions

cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from

the facts alleged.” Id.

To survive the motion to dismiss, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right

to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the

complaint are true even if doubtful in fact.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007) (internal punctuation omitted). “[A] well-pleaded

Case 4:14-cv-01795-CKJ-LAB Document 31 Filed 11/20/14 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is

improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Id. at 556, 1965 (internal

punctuation omitted). 

Here, Lopez argues his removal was illegal because it occurred while his appeal was

still pending. The government, however, explains that there is no right to remain in the

country during the appeals process. Section 1252(b)(8)(C) of Title 8 explicitly states that the

appeals process “does not require the Attorney General to defer removal of the alien.” Lopez

does not identify any statutory or regulatory authority to counter this argument. See Clegg

v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 755 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he court is not required

to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot

reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.”). 

The law does provide a partial remedy for those aliens who wish to remain in the

country while their appeal is being processed. They may petition the executive branch or the

courts for a stay. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 440, 129 S.Ct. 1749, 1764 (2009)

(Alito, J, dissenting) Lopez does not allege that he did that.

What Lopez does allege is that the government’s decision to allow him to return

twenty-six days after his removal is an admission that his removal was contrary to law. The

court does not agree. Lopez was paroled into the country, which permitted him to pursue his

appeal while physically present in this country. See (Doc. 15, p. 2) Subsequently, he applied

for adjustment of status and was granted permanent residency. None of these developments

prove that his removal while his appeal was pending was contrary to law. See, e.g., Nken v.

Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 424, 129 S.Ct. 1749, 1755 (2009) (explaining how the Immigration

and Nationality Act was amended to permit “prompt removal” of aliens even though their

petition for review is pending). Parole, for example, may be granted on humanitarian

grounds completely apart from the merits of the prior removal. See 8 U.S.C. §

1182(d)(5)(A).

 Lopez has not offered a plausible argument supporting his assertion that his removal

was contrary to law. His claims based on this allegation should be dismissed. See, e.g.,

Case 4:14-cv-01795-CKJ-LAB Document 31 Filed 11/20/14 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

Moher v. U.S., 875 F.Supp.2d 739, 756 (W.D.Mich. 2012) (FTCA claim for trespass against

border patrol officers was dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) in part because 8 U.S.C. §

1357(a)(3) authorizes officers to enter private land to patrol for illegal immigration activity.);

Bowman v. Associates Home Equity Service, 2008 WL 906276, 3 (E.D.Cal. 2008) (“In

short, plaintiff’s allegations regarding the purported ‘fiduciary relationship’ are no more than

legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations, and they cannot be supported from

the facts alleged.”); Pesci v. I.R.S., 67 F.Supp.2d 1189, 1193 (D.Nev. 1999) (The plaintiff’s

complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because

under the IRS code “an employer is not liable to an employee for complying with its legal

duty to withhold tax.”).

The court does not reach the government’s alternate argument that the FTCA does not

provide jurisdiction because there is no private person analogue for the government’s

immigration activities.

Recommendation

 The Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, after its independent review of

the record, enter an order GRANTING the government’s motion, filed on June 3, 2014, to

dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. (Doc. 15) 

Lopez maintains his complaint can be amended to state a claim over which this court

does have jurisdiction. For example, he intends to bring a claim arising out of his repeated

detention by immigration agents since he adjusted his status. He should be given an

opportunity to do so. The complaint should be dismissed with leave to amend. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636 (b), any party may serve and file written objections within

14 days of being served with a copy of this report and recommendation. If objections are

not timely filed, the party’s right to de novo review may be waived. The Local Rules permit

the filing of a response to an objection. They do not permit the filing of a reply to a response.

DATED this 20th day of November, 2014.

Case 4:14-cv-01795-CKJ-LAB Document 31 Filed 11/20/14 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

Case 4:14-cv-01795-CKJ-LAB Document 31 Filed 11/20/14 Page 8 of 8