Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00781/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00781-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GUILLERMO E. MENDEZ,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JAMES A. YATES, et al.,

 Defendants.

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1:15-cv-00781-BAM (PC)

SCREENING ORDER DISMISSING 

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Guillermo E. Mendez (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in 

forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint, 

filed on May 22, 2015, is currently before the Court for screening. (Doc. 1). 

Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or 

malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

Case 1:15-cv-00781-BAM Document 8 Filed 11/02/16 Page 1 of 6
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conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 

1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 

(2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge 

unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires 

sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); 

Moss v. United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility 

that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short 

of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks 

omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

Summary of Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff is currently housed at California State Prison, Los Angeles County in Lancaster, 

California. The events in the complaint are alleged to have occurred while Plaintiff was housed 

at Pleasant Valley State Prison. Plaintiff names Warden James A. Yates and California 

Governor Brown as defendants.

Plaintiff alleges as follows: 

I arrived at Pleasant Valley State Prison in Coalinga, Calif on May 23, 2006 to 

Facility A-yard. After 5 year’s I contracted “Valley Fever” from soil inside 

prison, state leader’s, prison official’s knew prior to construction of prison 

environmental impact statement soil analysis state’s contain’s valley fever. 

Unhealthy for human’s if soil’s disturbed. The prison was still built sending 

thousand’s of inmate’s to this prison including myself. I have this deadly disease 

for life, taken medication to control spread of it from my lung’s to other area’s of 

body! This is cruel and unusual treatment, violating my civil right’s. I came to 

prison to do my time not to get a disease from prison property. Nor was I given 

the death penalty. This can happen! I’am also asking court to give me an 

extension form 2-15 to present day. 

(Doc. 1 at p. 3) (unedited text). As relief, plaintiff seeks compensatory damages in the amount of 

$4 million dollars, lifetime medical coverage, funeral expenses upon death, court expenses and 

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punitive damages. Plaintiff also states that he need an extension from 2-15 to the present due to 

exhaustion of remedies with appeals exceeding the statute of limitations. 

Discussion

1. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law]...subjects, or causes to be subjected, 

any citizen of the United States...to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured by the Constitution...shall be liable to the party injured in an 

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between 

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See 

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed. 2d 611 (1978); 

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S. Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed. 2d 561 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held 

that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning 

of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits 

to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Plaintiff has failed to link Defendants Yates and Brown to any constitutional violation. 

Plaintiff does not identify any individual defendant in the allegations of his complaint and he 

does not attribute any specific conduct to the named defendants. If Plaintiff elects to amend his 

complaint, then he must state what each person did or did not do that caused the alleged 

violation(s) of his constitutional rights. 

2. Supervisory Liability

To the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold the Warden and Governor liable based solely upon 

their supervisory roles, he may not do so. Liability may not be imposed on supervisory 

personnel for the actions or omissions of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat 

superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77; Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020–21 

(9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. 

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). “A supervisor may be liable only if (1) he or she is 

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personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a sufficient causal connection 

between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Crowley v. 

Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted); accord 

Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Lacey 

v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). “Under the latter theory, 

supervisory liability exists even without overt personal participation in the offensive act if 

supervisory officials implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of 

constitutional rights and is the moving force of a constitutional violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 

977 (citing Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants Yates and Brown were personally involved in 

any constitutional deprivation. Further, Plaintiff fails to identify any policy sufficient to impose 

liability against Defendants Yates and Brown. There is no indication that either of these officials 

were responsible for building of Pleasant Valley State Prison or for Plaintiff’s placement there in 

violation of any constitutional rights. 

3. Eighth Amendment

To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to bring suit alleging a violation of his Eighth 

Amendment rights due to his placement at a prison in an area where Valley Fever is present, he 

has fails to state a cognizable federal claim. To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in 

violation of the Eight Amendment, prison conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary 

infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s claim does not 

rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the 

prisoner of the ‘minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,’ ” and (2) “the prison official 

‘acted with deliberate indifference in doing so.’ ” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). A 

prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and 

disregards and excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 

(1994).

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Until recently, courts in this district have found that mere confinement in a location 

where Valley Fever is prevalent fails to pose an excessive risk of harm. Jones v. Hartley, No. 

1:13-cv-01590-AWI-GSA-PC, 2015 WL 1276708, *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2015) (“no courts 

have found that exposure to valley fever spores at the level experienced by the community at 

large presents an ‘excessive risk’ to inmate health”); Williams v. CDCR, No. 1:14-cv-01912-JLT 

(PC), 2015 WL 6669816, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2015) (“Unless there is something about a 

prisoner’s conditions of confinement that raise the risk of exposure substantially above the risk 

experienced by the surrounding community, it cannot be said that the prisoner is forcibly and 

knowingly exposed to a risk the society would not tolerate to meet the objective component of a 

claim under the Eighth Amendment.”); Montano v. Adams, No. 1:15-cv-0452 DLB PC, 2016 

WL 310175, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2016) (inmate cannot state a claim under the Eighth 

Amendment based solely on the exposure to and contraction of Valley Fever); Hines v. Yousseff, 

No. 1:13–cv–00357–AWI–JLT, 2015 WL 164215, *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2015) (“Unless there is 

something about a prisoner’s conditions of confinement that raises the risk of exposure 

substantially above the risk experienced by the surrounding communities, it cannot be reasoned 

that the prisoner is involuntarily exposed to a risk that society would not tolerate.”); but c.f. 

Beagle v. Schwarzenegger, 107 F.Supp.3d 1056, 1068 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (finding that mere 

exposure to valley fever is sufficient to state a claim); Jackson v. Davey, No. 1:14-cv-1311-LJOMJS (PC), 2015 WL 3402992, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (“Plaintiff no longer needs to allege 

particular[ ] susceptibility to Valley Fever; mere exposure is sufficient to state a claim.”).

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege facts to indicate that the risk of exposure to Valley Fever at 

Pleasant Valley State Prison is any higher than the surrounding community. “Unless there is 

something about a prisoner’s conditions of confinement that raises the risk of exposure 

substantially above the risk experienced by the surrounding communities, it cannot be reasoned 

that the prisoner is involuntarily exposed to a risk the society would not tolerate.” Hines, 2015 

WL 164215, at *4. Therefore, merely being confined in an area in which Valley Fever spores 

are present does not state a claim under the Eighth Amendment.

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CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. As Plaintiff is proceeding 

pro se, he will be given an opportunity to amend his complaint to cure the identified deficiencies 

to the extent he is able to do so in good faith. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 

2000). Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his 

amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” 

complaints). 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what 

each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678-79, 129 S.Ct. at 1948-49. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations 

must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 555 (citations omitted).

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. 

Lacey, 693 F.3d at 927. Therefore, Plaintiff’s amended complaint must be “complete in itself 

without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220.

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend for failure to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a

first amended complaint; and

3. If Plaintiff fails to file a first amended complaint in compliance with this 

order, this action will be dismissed for failure to obey a court order and for failure to state 

a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 1, 2016 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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