Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00379/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00379-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

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19cv379-LAB (WVG)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES RUTHERFORD,

Plaintiff,

v.

LOS CHARROS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 19cv379-LAB (WVG)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff James Rutherford filed this action February 26, 2019. He afterwards 

dismissed all claims against Defendant Los Charros restaurant, leaving East 

Valley Parkway Mall, LLC as the sole Defendant. He filed an amended complaint 

on April 23 including claims against the Mall only. 

On August 9, he sought entry of default against the Mall. That same day, 

the Court issued an order directing the Clerk not to enter default, and pointing out 

that Rutherford had not served the Mall. Instead, he served the restaurant a total 

of three times (twice with summonses and complaints intended for the Mall). The 

order pointed out that the restaurant’s owner or owners would not likely have 

forwarded the duplicate summons to the Mall, and that the Mall likely had no idea 

it was being sued. The Court ordered him to show cause why this action should 

not be dismissed for failure to serve the Mall. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). The Court 

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pointed out that Rutherford was required to show good cause for his failure to 

serve, and that merely asking for more time to effect service would not amount to 

good cause. Unless he did so, the order cautioned, the Court would dismiss the 

action without prejudice as required by Rule 4(m).

Rutherford has now filed a response (Docket no. 13), which explains his 

failure to serve and asks for an extension of time in which to 1) withdraw his request 

for entry of default; and 2) serve the Mall via the California Secretary of State, as 

provided by Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 416.10(d) and Cal. Corp. Code § 1702(a). 

The response says Rutherford’s process server attempted personal service 

on the Mall’s agent at the correct home address, but asserts that service was 

impossible because the agent’s home had a fence around it and the gate was 

locked. Then, the response says, Rutherford’s counsel told the process server to 

serve the agent again, but “due to a miscommunication,” the process server 

attempted to serve the Mall by delivering the papers to a restaurant employee. 

This, as the Court’s order pointed out, was ineffective. “Before recognizing the 

mistake in service,” Rutherford sought entry of default.

The response does not show good cause for the failure to serve. Many 

people have fences around their houses, and keep their gates locked for security 

or privacy. The response does not explain why this would make service on the 

agent at home impossible. Process servers use a variety of approaches to make 

contact with the people they are attempting to serve, such as ringing a call button

or using an intercom (if one is available); asking neighbors or maintenance workers 

how to get access or when the person will likely be back; leaving notes or papers; 

and waiting outside a residence or returning at different times of day in the hope 

of encountering the person to be served. See, e.g., De Kauwe v. Bergstrom, 2019 

WL 2206202, at *3 (Cal. App. 2. Dist., May 22, 2019);Calvert v. Al Binali, 29 Cal. 

App. 5th 954, 958 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 2018); Carter v. Anderson, 2007 WL 2713833, 

at *4 (Cal. App. 4 Dist., Sept. 19, 2007). 

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The response also does not show reasonable diligence, which would be 

required before Rutherford could use the procedure outlined in Cal. Corp. Code 

§ 1702(a). The process server’s single visit to the agent’s house, followed by two 

visits to the wrong location do not amount to reasonable diligence. Am. Exp. 

Centurion Bank v. Zara, 199 Cal. App. 4th 383, 389 (2011) (“Two or three attempts 

to personally serve a defendant at a proper place ordinarily qualifies as ‘reasonable 

diligence.’”)

The error of serving the restaurant instead of the Mall might have been 

caused initially by an ordinary mix-up. The response does not explain the 

miscommunication, but regardless of how it happened, it is Rutherford’s 

responsibility. See Dale v. ITT Life Ins. Corp., 207 Cal. App. 3d 495, 501–02 (Cal. 

App. 4 Dist. 1989) (holding that a process server hired by a plaintiff is the plaintiff’s 

agent, and the plaintiff is responsible for the process server’s acts). But more 

significantly, Rutherford’s failure to notice the repeatedly defective attempts at 

service resulted in a long delay that amounts to inexcusable neglect. Rutherford 

is charged with notice of the process server’s acts. Id. at 501. But here, he also 

had actual notice in the form of two returns of service that, if he had read them with 

reasonable care, would have made clear that the Mall was not properly served. 

(Docket nos. 4 and 9.) His failure to do so is not excusable, particularly because 

he filed them in the docket and relied on them to seek entry of default against the 

Mall (see Docket no. 11), thereby certifying to the Court that he had read and 

understood them. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2) and (3).

The response does not show good cause for Rutherford’s failure to serve the 

Mall within the time limit set by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). And the alternative method of 

service Rutherford proposes to use would not be adequate, because he has not 

been reasonably diligent. 

This action is therefore DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to 

serve the Mall. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Rutherford’s request to withdraw his 

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request for entry of default is DENIED AS MOOT, because the Court has already 

ruled on that request.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 16, 2019

Hon. Larry Alan Burns

Chief United States District Judge

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