Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02814/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02814-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 29:185 Labor/Mgt. Relations (Contracts)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Charles W. Gribben, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

United Parcel Service, Inc.,

Defendant.

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No. 04-CV-2814-PHX-FJM

ORDER

I

Plaintiff Charles Gribben ("Gribben") is employed by defendant United Parcel

Service, Inc. ("UPS") as a shifter driver. Shifter drivers use vehicles to transfer trailers

among various sites. Some vehicles are air conditioned while others are not. According to

UPS, Gribben was generally assigned to an air conditioned vehicle, but that could not be

guaranteed.

In June 2000, Gribben was diagnosed with cardiomyopathy by his doctor, Dr. Karl

Moon. Gribben testified that due to his condition, he became light-headed, had difficulty

concentrating, difficulty breathing, and had chest pain when undertaking activities in extreme

heat for extended periods of time, and had similar symptoms when lifting weight over 50

pounds. Accordingly, Gribben requested that UPS accommodate him pursuant to the

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1

Gribben moves to strike on hearsay grounds the doctors' reports and UPS letters

denying Gribben's requests for accommodation. Hearsay is a "statement, other than one

made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the

truth of the matter asserted." Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). The evidence is relevant here to show

the reasons that UPS claimed for denying Gribben's request for accommodation. The truth

of the matters asserted is irrelevant. Accordingly, we deny Gribben's motion to strike this

evidence (doc. 72).

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Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") by ensuring him a vehicle with air conditioning.

UPS denied his request citing insufficient medical information.

Between June 2002 and June 2003, it appears that Gribben was suspended from UPS

for medical reasons, but neither party sets forth a clear explanation of the circumstances of

the suspension. During that period, Gribben renewed his request for reasonable

accommodation, and supported it with a letter from Dr. Moon explaining his condition.

Gribben subsequently visited two doctors at the request of UPS, Dr. Peter Vasquez and Dr.

N. S. Prakash. Neither doctor's report suggests a need for accommodation, although Dr.

Vasquez's report recommends further testing. Pursuant to Dr. Prakash's report, UPS

permitted Gribben to return to work "without restrictions"; that is, UPS again denied

Gribben's request for accommodation.1

 DSOF, Ex. M. In November 2002, Gribben filed a

charge alleging ADA violations with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

("EEOC").

Although UPS denied Gribben's request for accommodation, UPS nonetheless

provided Gribben with an air conditioned vehicle for every workday from June 2003 until

March 31, 2004. On March 17, 2004, the EEOC issued a determination on Gribben's charge,

finding reasonable cause to believe that UPS violated the ADA. Gribben submits evidence

to show that at least two UPS managers were aware of the determination by March 31, 2004.

That day, UPS dispatching personnel alerted Gribben that no air conditioned vehicles were

available. Gribben submits evidence to show that one air conditioned vehicle was, however,

available. Gribben refused to work without an air conditioned vehicle and was thereafter

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2

 Although there is no dispute that cardiomyopathy is an impairment, "[m]erely having

an impairment does not make one disabled for purposes of the ADA. Claimants also need

to demonstrate that the impairment [substantially] limits a major life activity." Toyota Motor

Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 195, 122 S. Ct. 681, 690 (2002).

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discharged. UPS contends that Gribben was discharged for gross subordination; Gribben

contends that he was discharged in retaliation for filing the EEOC charge.

Gribben then filed a second charge with the EEOC alleging discrimination and

retaliation, and filed a grievance with UPS. Within a month, Gribben was permitted to return

to his job. Thereafter, the EEOC issued a determination finding reasonable cause to believe

that UPS retaliated against Gribben by terminating his employment.

Gribben then filed this action, claiming that UPS violated the ADA by discriminating

and retaliating against him. The court has before it UPS's motion for summary judgment

(doc. 60), Gribben's opposition (doc. 70), and UPS's reply (doc. 85); Gribben's motions to

strike (docs. 72, 79), UPS's response (doc. 81), and Gribben's reply (doc. 86); UPS's motion

to strike (doc. 85); and a joint motion for an extension of time (doc. 82).

II

The ADA prohibits a "covered entity" from discriminating "against a qualified

individual with a disability because of the disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). UPS moves for

summary judgment on Gribben's discrimination claim, contending that he does not have a

"disability," nor is he a "qualified individual." We conclude that Gribben does not have a

"disability" and therefore we need not consider whether he is a "qualified individual."

A person has a "disability" as defined by the ADA if he "(A) [has] a physical or

mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of [his] major life activities . . . ; (B)

[has] a record of such an impairment; or (C) [is] regarded as having such an impairment."

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).

A

Gribben contends that his impairment,2

 cardiomyopathy, substantially limits his major

life activities of "walking at more than a slow pace or on an incline, running, climbing,

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3

 UPS does not dispute whether these are major life activities, and therefore we

assume, without deciding, that they are.

4

 Gribben contends that his limitation in various major life activities is "verified by

[his] former spouse, Donna Gribben." Response at 7. Donna Gribben testified that when

cleaning up after his dogs, Gribben can be outside for "maybe five to seven minutes" but

"never more than ten minutes." PSOF, Ex. K at 8.

5

 "The Supreme Court has not decided whether the EEOC regulations are reasonable

or are entitled to deference, although in several cases it has assumed that they are." EEOC

v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 306 F.3d 794, 801 n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Toyota Motor

Mfg., 534 U.S. at 194, 122 S. Ct. at 689-90) (both cases relying on the EEOC regulations).

Here, both parties rely on the EEOC regulations, and therefore so do we.

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pulling, pushing, squatting, bending, lifting, breathing, exposure to temperature extremes,

physical exertion, and participation in outdoor activities."3

 Response at 7. In support of this

contention, Gribben testified that he cannot walk outdoors, ride his bike, or play golf during

the summer and that he cannot do minor yard work for more than 20 to 30 minutes in

temperatures over 90 degrees because those activities cause him to have difficulty breathing

and concentrating, chest pain, and light-headedness. PSOF, Ex. A at 7-17; Declaration of

Charles Gribben ¶ 3. Gribben's symptoms are confirmed by Dr. Moon, PSOF, Ex. D at 10,

and his former spouse, Donna Gribben, PSOF, Ex. K at 7-8.4

UPS contends that Gribben's impairment does not "substantially limit" him from

participating in those activities, and therefore, he does not have a "disability." A plaintiff's

impairment substantially limits a major life activity if he is "[u]nable to perform a major life

activity" or "[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which

[he] can perform a particular major life activity" as compared to an average person in the

general population. Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 195-96, 122 S. Ct. 681,

690 (2002) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)).5

 Accordingly, unless the impairment is

substantially limiting "on its face," a plaintiff must submit evidence of the comparative

abilities of an average person in the general population. Lusk v. Ryder Integrated Logistics,

238 F.3d 1237, 1240-41 (10th Cir. 2001). Gribben's condition is not substantially limiting

on its face. Like him, many in the Phoenix area have physical reactions to the summer heat,

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6

 Even if Gribben had submitted compelling evidence with regard to the comparative

heat tolerance of the general population, we would have nonetheless hesitated before

concluding that Gribben's cardiomyopathy substantially limits his major life activities. All

of the doctors that examined Gribben attributed his symptoms in part to weight gain, PSOF,

Ex. D at 11-12, DSOF, Ex. G at 5, DSOF, Ex. L at 3, and therefore not all of Gribben's

limitations can be attributed to his cardiomyopathy.

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are "prisoner[s] in the summer to air conditioning," PSOF, Ex. A at 13, and therefore avoid

walking, riding their bikes, golfing, and doing yard work in the summer.

Gribben, however, failed to submit any evidence as to the abilities of an average

person in the general population to participate in outdoor activities in the Phoenix summer.

It is undoubtedly true that most people have a greater tolerance to heat than Gribben.

However, "substantially" "need[s] to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard

for qualifying as disabled," Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 197, 122 S. Ct. at 691, and

without comparative evidence, we have no means by which to conclude that Gribben's

intolerance is substantial, as opposed to merely moderate. Therefore, Gribben failed to show

that his impairment substantially limited any of these major life activities.6

Gribben also contends that his cardiomyopathy substantially limits him from the major

life activity of working. "To be substantially limited in 'working,' an individual must be

significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs

in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and

abilities." Thornton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 261 F.3d 789, 794-95 (9th Cir. 2001)

(citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). A "class of jobs" means "jobs utilizing similar training,

knowledge, skills or abilities, within [the plaintiff's] geographical area." 29 C.F.R. §

1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B). A "broad range of jobs in various classes" means "jobs not utilizing

similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within [the plaintiff's] geographical area." 29

C.F.R § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(C). Accordingly, "[i]f jobs utilizing an individual's skills (but

perhaps not his or her unique talents) are available, one is not precluded from a substantial

class of jobs. Similarly, if a host of different types of jobs are available, one is not precluded

from a broad range of jobs." Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 492, 119 S. Ct.

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7

 We assume, without deciding, that working is a major life activity. See Toyota

Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 200, 122 S. Ct. at 692.

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2139, 2151 (1999). Therefore, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must

"present specific evidence about relevant labor markets." Thornton, 261 F.3d at 795.

Gribben sets forth a vocational evaluation which states that in the Phoenix

metropolitan area, out of the 1,610,930 jobs in which people are employed in all industries,

Gribben is disqualified from the 251,520 jobs that "require work outdoors, heavy lifting,

and/or exposure to very hot temperatures." PSOF, Ex. H at 6. The evaluation states that

Gribben is therefore disqualified from a "broad range of occupations in our total workforce."

Id. The evaluation is however silent as to the availability of indoor jobs that do not require

heavy lifting for which Gribben is qualified. Without evidence that alternative jobs matching

Gribben's skill set are unavailable, we cannot conclude that Gribben is substantially limited

from the major life activity of working.7

B

A person also has a "disability" if he has a record of a physical or mental impairment

that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). The

ADA therefore covers people who have a history of disability, or who were misclassified as

disabled, "but who remain vulnerable to the fears and stereotypes of their employers."

Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 509 (7th Cir. 1998). Gribben presents no

evidence of a previous condition or misclassification; all of Gribben's evidence relates to his

current impairment. Because Gribben does not show that his impairment substantially limits

one or more of his major life activities, the same evidence cannot show that he has a record

of an impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities.

C

A person is also considered to have a "disability" if he is "regarded" as having an

impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities. 42 U.S.C. §

12102(2). This occurs where an employer "mistakenly believes that a person has a physical

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impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities," or an employer

"mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more

major life activities." Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489, 119 S. Ct. at 2149-50. In both cases, "it is

necessary that [an employer] entertain misperceptions about the individual." Id. Where an

employee claims that his employer regarded his impairment as substantially limiting him

from the major life activity of working, he must show that the employer regarded him as

significantly restricted from being able to perform either a class or a broad range of jobs. See

Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 524, 119 S. Ct. 2133, 2138-39 (1999).

Gribben appears to contend that UPS regarded his impairment as substantially limiting

him from working. Specifically, Gribben contends that UPS must have regarded him as

disabled because it did not permit him to work during his "unpaid medical leave of absence"

from June 2002 to June 2003, and because during that period it required him to be examined

by two doctors. Response at 3, 9-10. Gribben however fails to show that UPS regarded him

as disabled.

Gribben submitted no evidence to show the reason for his leave of absence. All of the

evidence shows that UPS steadfastly denied that Gribben is disabled. UPS required Gribben

to undergo physical examinations because he claimed to be disabled, and because UPS

disagreed, not because UPS believed that he was disabled. However, even if UPS believed

that Gribben was unable to perform his job, Gribben failed to submit any evidence to show

that UPS believed that Gribben was significantly restricted in his ability to perform either a

class or broad range of jobs.

Gribben failed to submit sufficient evidence to show that he has a "disability."

Accordingly, we grant summary judgment for UPS on Gribben's discrimination claim (doc.

60).

III

Gribben also claims that he was discharged in retaliation for filing his charge with the

EEOC in November 2002. It is a violation of the ADA to "discriminate against any

individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by [the

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ADA] or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted or participated in any

manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [the ADA]." 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).

"To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA, an employee must show that:

(1) he or she engaged in a protected activity; (2) suffered an adverse employment action; and

(3) there was a causal link between the two. Pardi v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 389 F.3d 840,

849 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). "If the employee establishes a prima facie case, the

employee will avoid summary judgment unless the employer offers legitimate reasons for the

adverse employment action, whereupon the burden shifts back to the employee to

demonstrate a triable issue of fact as to whether such reasons are pretextual." Id. (citation

omitted).

Gribben engaged in protected activity when he filed a charge with the EEOC.

Gribben suffered adverse employment actions when 1) UPS did not provide him with an air

conditioned vehicle, although it had provided him with one for the previous 8 months, and

when 2) he was discharged. Adverse employment action is broadly defined as any action

"reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in protected activity." Id. at 850

(quoting Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000)). Both of these acts are

reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in protected activity.

There is evidence to support a causal link between the filing of the charge and the

adverse employment actions. A causal link can be inferred when "adverse employment

decisions closely follow complaints of discrimination." Id. However, "[w]hen temporal

proximity between protected activity and allegedly retaliatory conduct is missing, courts may

look to the intervening period for other evidence of retaliatory animus." Krouse v. American

Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 503-04 (3d Cir. 1997). There is no temporal proximity between

the filing of the charge and the adverse employment actions; approximately 16 months had

passed. However, UPS was confronted with Gribben's requests for accommodation many

times during that period. More importantly, Gribben was discharged shortly after at least two

managers at UPS learned that the EEOC issued its determination. PSOF, Ex. C at 76-77;

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8

 UPS submits evidence to show that Jerry Dalzell made the decision to discharge

Gribben, and that he had no knowledge that Gribben filed a charge with the EEOC. At all

events, Gribben submitted evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the

person or persons responsible for discharging Gribben were aware of the EEOC charge and

determination.

9

 Engaging in protected activity does not immunize an employee from discharge for

insubordination unrelated to the protected activity. See Newland v. Dalton, 81 F.3d 904, 906

(9th Cir. 1996); Hottenroth v. Village of Slinger, 388 F.3d 1015, 1031-32 (7th Cir. 2004).

Here, however, the first alleged retaliatory act–denying Gribben an air conditioned

vehicle–led to Gribben's insubordination, and ultimately to his discharge, the second alleged

retaliatory act. Therefore, although Gribben was ostensibly discharged for insubordination,

a jury could reasonably conclude that he was actually discharged in retaliation for filing a

charge with the EEOC.

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Declaration of Rocco J. Arcadi ¶ 5.8

 Taken together, this is sufficient evidence from which

a jury could reasonably conclude that the animus that may have dissipated over the

intervening 16 months surfaced again near the time of the adverse employment actions.

Therefore, Gribben set forth a prima facie case of retaliation.

UPS, however, offers legitimate reasons for the adverse employment actions: no air

conditioned vehicles were available, and Gribben committed gross insubordination by

refusing to work. The burden therefore shifts back to Gribben to show that these reasons are

pretextual.

It is undisputed that for approximately 8 months, an air conditioned vehicle had been

available to Gribben. In contrast to UPS's contention, Gribben submits evidence that an air

conditioned vehicle was available on the date he was discharged. PSOF, Ex. E at 33-35.

Moreover, at least one manager expressed resentment over the EEOC's determination at the

meeting during which Gribben was discharged. Declaration of Rocco J. Arcadi ¶ 5 (Steve

Stevens stated that the EEOC "do[es] not tell us what to do."). This is sufficient evidence

from which a jury could reasonably conclude that UPS's reasons for the adverse employment

actions were pretextual.9

 Accordingly, we deny UPS's motion for summary judgment on

Gribben's retaliation claim (doc. 60).

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IV

Gribben and UPS move to strike various evidentiary materials for lack of clarity,

misstatements of facts, and violations of the Federal Rules of Evidence (docs. 72, 79, 85).

We already considered the objections to evidentiary materials which were relevant to the

conclusions reached herein. We deny as moot all other motions to strike (docs. 72, 79, 85).

V

The parties jointly move to extend to January 27, 2006 the deadlines for UPS to

reply in support of its motion for summary judgment, for Gribben to respond to UPS's

motion to strike, and for Gribben to reply in support of his motion to strike. We grant the

parties' motion to extend the deadlines nunc pro tunc (doc. 82).

VI

IT IS ORDERED GRANTING UPS's motion for summary judgment with regard

to Gribben's discrimination claim, and DENYING UPS's motion for summary judgment with

regard to Gribben's retaliation claim (doc. 60).

IF IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING all motions to strike (docs. 72, 79, 85).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED GRANTING the parties' joint motion for extensions

of time (doc. 82).

DATED this 8th day of March, 2006.

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