Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01466/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01466-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THELMA ANDERSON,

NO. CIV. S-07-1466 LKK/DAD 

Plaintiff,

v.

O R D E R

RODERICK Q. HICKMAN, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

The court is in receipt of defendants’ motion to dismiss,

currently set for hearing on July 11, 2008, as well as plaintiff’s

opposition. The court requests supplemental briefing on the two

following issues:

1. Standing as Personal Representative

Section 377.30 of the California Code of Civil Procedure

states that a survival action “may be commenced by the decedent’s

personal representative or, if none, by the decedent’s successor

in interest.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377.30. The first amended

complaint alleges that plaintiff has petitioned the superior court

to appoint her as special administrator and personal representative

Case 2:07-cv-01466-LKK -DAD Document 28 Filed 06/11/08 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

for the decedent but that the petition is pending. First Am.

Compl. ¶ 19. It would therefore appear that plaintiff’s standing

is contingent upon an event -- the grant of her petition -- that

has not yet occurred, and in fact, may never occur, if the petition

is ultimately denied. Particularly in light of that latter

possibility, it would appear the case should be dismissed without

prejudice, rather than stayed.

2. Standing as Successor-in-Interest

Plaintiff has also alleged standing as the decedent’s

successor-in-interest. Although section 377.30 indicates that one

may commence a survival action as a successor-in-interest when

there is no personal representative, a pending petition for the

administration of the decedent’s estate appears to truncate that

right. California Code of Civil Procedure section 377.32 states

that one who seeks to commence a survival action as a successor-ininterest must file an affidavit stating, among other things, that

“no proceeding is now pending in California for administration of

the decedent’s estate.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 377.32. 

Plaintiff argues that section 377.32 is merely a procedural

requirement that is not binding in federal court. Even if the

submission of an affidavit might be viewed as procedural, its

content is substantive. The requirement that putative successorsin-interest be able to affirm the absence of pending probate

proceedings suggests the existence of a substantive state law rule:

where there is a pending probate petition, no putative successorin-interest may commence suit. See Exarhos v. Exarhos, 159 Cal.

Case 2:07-cv-01466-LKK -DAD Document 28 Filed 06/11/08 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 The Ninth Circuit’s language in Tatum also seems to suggest 1

(albeit obliquely) that a successor-in-interest must comply with

both the substantive requirements in section 377.30 and the

procedural requirements in section 377.32. See Tatum v. City and

County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1093 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006)

(“Where there is no personal representative for the estate, the

decedent's ‘successor in interest’ may prosecute the survival

action if the person purporting to act as successor in interest

satisfies the requirements of California law, which Tatum did here.

See Cal. Civ. P. Code §§ 377.30, 377.32.”); see also Bowoto v.

Chevron Corp., 2007 WL 2349338, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2007)

(interpreting Tatum to require compliance with section 377.32).

3

App. 4th 898, 901-902 (2008) (noting that trial court had dismissed

action where plaintiff sought to commence suit as a successor-ininterest but was barred from doing so because of a pending probate

proceeding).

Further, most federal courts to have confronted the issue have

found that plaintiffs must satisfy the procedural requirements of

section 377.32. See, e.g., Dillard v. Curtis, 2004 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 22926, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2004) (“Although Civil

Procedure Code 377.32 is a rule of California (not federal)

procedure, it seems to set a minimum threshold below which a person

claiming to be a ‘successor in interest’ should not be permitted

to slip.”); Stephens v. Stanislaus County Sheriff, 2007 WL 963277,

at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2007); Robbins v. City of Hanford, 2006

WL 1716220, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Jun. 19, 2006). 

1

Plaintiff shall file a supplemental brief by June 30, 2008.

Defendants may file a supplemental brief by July 3, 2008 or

incorporate their response within their reply brief to the motion

to dismiss. Defendants’ reply brief shall be filed by July 3,

2008.

Case 2:07-cv-01466-LKK -DAD Document 28 Filed 06/11/08 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 11, 2008.

Case 2:07-cv-01466-LKK -DAD Document 28 Filed 06/11/08 Page 4 of 4