Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02384/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02384-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PI L · 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

United StiJ.ff/1 toim {)f ApJJ(:1tis 

·rentl, Circuit 

Al' 2 9 1 91 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

J. WALTER FITZGERALD; 

BETTY M. FITZGERALD; 

PRINTESS K. FITZGERALD; 

JENENCE FITZGERALD, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

UTAH COUNTY; JERIL WILSON; 

LYNN W. DAVIS, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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No. 88-2384 

(D.C. No. C-83-0736W) 

(D. Utah) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before SEYMOUR and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and THEIS, District 

Judge.** 

J. Walter Fitzgerald, Betty M. Fitzgerald, Printess K. 

Fitzgerald, and Jenence Fitzgerald (the Fitzgeralds) brought this 

action pursuant to 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1988) and state law against 

Utah County and its employees and agents asserting claims arising 

out of enforcement of the. County's zoning ordinances. The 

critical facts underlying the action are the Fitzgeralds' failure 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

**Honorable Frank G. Theis, United States Senior District Judge 

for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-2384 Document: 010110105214 Date Filed: 04/29/1991 Page: 1 
to obtain a waiver under a County regulation of otherwise 

applicable zoning requirements, and the publicizing of their 

noncompliance with those ordinances. The Fitzgeralds sold or 

attempted to sell land zoned for agricultural use to buyers who 

believed that they would ultimately be able to use the property 

for residential purposes. The Fitzgeralds alleged that when the 

County refused to approve the waiver and publicized the 

Fitzgeralds' failure to comply with the zoning regulations, buyers 

who had already entered into purchase contracts stopped paying on 

those contracts and potential sales were lost. 

The Fitzgeralds challenged the validity of the Utah County 

ordinances on several grounds. In addition, they contended that 

the zoning regulations constituted a taking of their property in 

violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, claimed that 

defendants' alleged defamatory statements deprived them of their 

property interests in either their realty or realty contracts 

without due process, and asserted a state law claim for slander of 

title based on the filing of a lis pendens. Defendants moved for 

summary judgment. The district court referred the matter to a 

magistrate, who issued a report recommending that summary judgment 

be granted to all defendants except Utah County, deputy County 

attorney Lynn Davis, and Utah County Commissioner Jeril Wilson. 

The report recommended that only two of plaintiffs' claims be 

allowed to go forward: the defamatory-injury-to-property claim 

against all three remaining defendants, and the slander-of-title 

claim against defendants Utah County and Lynn Davis. The district 

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Appellate Case: 88-2384 Document: 010110105214 Date Filed: 04/29/1991 Page: 2 
court accepted the report except for the recommendation relating 

to the slander-of-title claim. The court rejected the 

recommendation that this claim remain in the suit, concluding 

instead that it was barred by the applicable statute of 

limitations. The district court held two evidentiary hearings on 

the remaining defamatory-injury-to-property claim, and then 

granted defendants' motion to dismiss. The Fitzgeralds appeal and 

we affirm. 

I. 

Under Utah County zoning ordinances promulgated pursuant to 

state zoning statutes, a subdivision plan or plat cannot be 

recorded until approved by the county planning commission, and no 

land located within a subdivision can be sold until the plat has 

been recorded. See Utah Code Ann.§ 17-27-21 (1987 replacement); 

Utah County Ordinance 4-3-52 (Addendum to Brief of Appellants, 

doc. B). Under state law, a subdivision is defined as "the 

division of a tract, or lot or parcel of land into three or more 

lots, plats, sites or other divisions of land for the purpose 

... of sale or of building development." Utah Code Ann.§ 

17-27-27. This definition specifically excludes "a bona fide 

division or partition of agricultural land for agricultural 

purposes." Id. Thus, unlike a tract of land that is divided and 

sold for residential purposes, the division of an agricultural 

tract need not be approved and recorded prior to sale. In 

conjunction with the above regulations, Utah County enacted the 

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Appellate Case: 88-2384 Document: 010110105214 Date Filed: 04/29/1991 Page: 3 
zoning ordinance at issue, under which a property owner who wants 

to divide and sell agricultural land without recording a plat must 

obtain a waiver from the County Building Inspector. The waiver 

requires the recordation of deed covenants precluding residential 

or other non-agricultural use of the land. See Utah County 

Ordinance§ 4-3-53 (Addendum to Brief of Appellants, doc. B). 

The Fitzgeralds divided and sold agricultural land without 

recording the plat. They assert on appeal that these divisions 

were to be used as small farmsteads, and therefore recording the 

plat was unnecessary. However, they also failed to obtain the 

required waivers because apparently not all the purchasers were 

willing to execute covenants precluding residential use. The 

record reflects that at least some of the purchasers expected that 

the land would be rezoned to permit residential use in the future. 

The Fitzgeralds first assert that the ordinances are invalid 

and void, and administered unconstitutionally. We have carefully 

reviewed the analysis and authorities addressing these claims in 

the magistrate's report, which the district court adopted. We are 

in substantial agreement with the disposition of these issues as 

set out therein. 

The Fitzgeralds also contend that the ordinances constitute a 

taking of their property without just compensation in violation of 

the Fifth Amendment. The law is clear that such a claim is not 

ripe until all administrative avenues for review of the 

unfavorable zoning decision have been exhausted and state 

procedures for obtaining just compensation have been utilized. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2384 Document: 010110105214 Date Filed: 04/29/1991 Page: 4 
See Williamson Co. Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 

U.S. 172, 186-87 (1985); Landmark Land Co. of Oklahoma, Inc. v. 

Buchanan, 874 F.2d 717, 721 (10th Cir. 1989). Here, state law 

provides an appeal to the board of adjustment for persons 

aggrieved by a decision made in the course of administering or 

enforcing zoning regulations. See Utah Code Ann.§ 17-27-16. The 

Fitzgeralds have not pursued their claims with the board of 

adjustment, nor have they demonstrated that an appeal would be 

futile or that the decision at issue is otherwise final. 

Moreover, and of equal significance, the Fitzgeralds have not 

established that they pursued state procedures for obtaining just 

compensation. Accordingly, their taking claim is premature. 

II. 

The Fitzgeralds also appeal the district court's dismissal of 

their claim alleging that defendants deprived them of their 

property interest without due process by issuing defamatory 

statements. The district court held two hearings to enable the 

Fitzgeralds to present evidence on this claim to raise a fact 

issue in opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment. 

At the second hearing, plaintiffs proffered evidence describing 

the testimony that would be presented at trial by people who 

bought land from plaintiffs believing that the land would be 

rezoned for residential use. These buyers allegedly stopped 

paying on their contracts when they learned that the land would 

not be rezoned. 

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We agree with the district court that this evidence, taken as 

true, does not support a constitutional claim. The Due Process 

Clause mandates the procedures necessary to provide defamed 

persons an opportunity to clear their names by allowing them to 

establish that the defamatory statements are false. See Codd v. 

Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627 (1977) (per curiam). Thus, only when "a 

false and defamatory impression" is created and disseminated is a 

hearing mandated. Id. at 628; Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, 

__ F.2d __ , __ ,No. 85-1758, slip op. at 19-21 (10th Cir. 

March 19, 1991) (en bane). Assuming that a defamatory injury to 

property without due process could under some circumstances state 

a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiffs have failed to 

establish an essential element of such a claim. Plaintiffs' 

proffered evidence, viewed most favorably to them, showed that the 

buyers who stopped paying on their contracts did so because 

defendants' statements led them to believe that their property 

could never legally be used for residential purposes. As the 

district court observed, the statements to this effect attributed 

to defendants were not defamatory because they were true. 

Plaintiffs asserted below and on appeal that the defamatory 

statements included allegations that their land sales were 

illegal, which they vehemently deny. Plaintiffs' own proffered 

evidence, however, shows that their damages were not caused by the 

charges of illegal sales. Instead, their buyers were influenced 

to stop payment on their contracts by statements that residential 

use of the land would never be allowed. Moreover, as set out in 

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Appellate Case: 88-2384 Document: 010110105214 Date Filed: 04/29/1991 Page: 6 
Part I, supra, it appears from the record that plaintiffs' sales 

were in fact illegal. It is undisputed that plaintiffs did not 

obtain the waiver from the County Building Inspector required to 

subdivide and sell agricultural land without recording a plat, nor 

did they record their plat. 

"Any sale or other transfer of land into three or more 

parcels without the owner or agent of the owner first 

having obtained a signed waiver from the Building 

Inspector, or having recorded an approved subdivision 

plat, shall be considered prima facie evidence of the 

illegal subdivision of land and a violation of this 

section and Section 4-3-52 of this ordinance, subject to 

the penalties stated therein." 

Utah County Ordinance§ 4-3-53 (Addendum to Brief of Appellants, 

doc. B). Section 4-3-52 provides that one who sells property 

within an unrecorded and unapproved subdivision is guilty of a 

misdemeanor and subject to civil remedies. See Utah County 

Ordinance§ 4-3-52 (Addendum to Brief of Appellants, doc. B). 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's disposition of 

plaintiffs' claim for defamatory injury to property without due 

process. We do not address the state law claims asserting 

interference with contractual relations because they are raised 

for the first time on appeal. 

III. 

Finally, we affirm the dismissal of the Fitzgeralds' slanderof-title claim, albeit on grounds different from those relied on 

by the district court. This state law cause of action was based 

on a lis pendens covering the property at issue recorded in 

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connection with the filing of a lawsuit by Utah County. The 

lawsuit challenged unrecorded land sales similar to the sales made 

by the Fitzgeralds, although they were not named defendants in 

that suit. 

This claim fails on two equally dispositive grounds. First, 

Utah holds that the recording of a lis pendens is privileged and 

therefore cannot support a claim for slander of title. See Hansen 

v. Kohler, 550 P.2d 186, 189-90 (Utah 1976). 

"[S]ince the effect of a lis pendens is to give 

constructive notice of all the facts apparent on the 

face of the pleadings, the recordation of a notice of 

lis pendens is, in effect, a republication of the 

pleadings. Since the publication of the pleadings is 

absolutely privileged, the republication thereof by 

recording a notice of lis pendens is similarly 

privileged." 

Id. at 190. The instant case is distinguishable from Birch v. 

Fuller, 9 Utah 2d 79, 337 P.2d 964 (1959), upon which the 

Fitzgeralds rely, because in Birch no underlying action was filed. 

Here, as in Hansen, an underlying lawsuit was filed. Although 

plaintiffs argue that Hansen is not controlling because they were 

not named in the suit, we conclude that this fact is not 

significant. The decision in Hansen was based on the Court's 

holding that a lis pendens is privileged because it merely 

republishes the pleadings, which are themselves privileged. The 

lis pendens here thus derives its privilege from the action it 

republishes. In Birch, to the contrary, the lis pendens did not 

republish an underlying privileged pleading. 

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In addition, under Utah law, a slander of title action 

requires proof of special damages "by evidence of a lost sale or 

the loss of some other pecuniary advantage." Bass v. Planned 

Management Serv., 761 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1988). Damages may not 

be presumed. Id. The Fitzgeralds have proffered no evidence of 

the requisite specific monetary loss due to the filing of the lis 

pendens. Accordingly, we affirm the ruling against the 

Fitzgeralds on this cause of action. 

AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court 

Stephanie K. Seymour 

Circuit Judge 

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