Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00639/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00639-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIE B. NORTON, JR., No. CIV.S-05-0639 FCD DAD PS

Plaintiff,

v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

McDONALD HAMBURGER CORP.,

et al.,

Defendants.

 /

This matter is before the court on defendant Thomas

Teague’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary adjudication. 

Kari E. Levine appeared on behalf of defendant Thomas Teague at the

hearing on the motion. James F. Waite appeared on behalf of

defendant McDonald’s Corporation, which has joined in the motion. 

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, appeared on his own behalf. Having

considered all written materials submitted in connection with the

motion, and after hearing oral argument, for the reasons set forth

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below the undersigned will recommend that the motion to dismiss be

granted in part.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the sufficiency of the

complaint. See North Star Int’l v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d

578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). Dismissal of the complaint or of any claim

within it “can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or

the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal

theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th

Cir. 1990). See also Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749

F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984).

In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim, the court accepts as true all material allegations in the

complaint and construes those allegations, as well as the reasonable

inferences that can be drawn from them, in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73

(1984); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). 

In a case where the plaintiff is pro se, the court has an obligation

to construe the pleadings liberally. Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026,

1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)(en banc). However, the court’s liberal

interpretation of a pro se complaint may not supply essential

elements of a claim that are not pled. Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d

469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992); Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska,

673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

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1 In the order transferring this case from the Northern

District of California to this court, United States Magistrate Judge

Joseph C. Spero construed the civil rights cause of action as

alleging conduct falling within the ambit of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which

creates a federal remedy for patrons who have been denied service by

a restaurant on the basis of race.

2 Citing the declaration of Placer County Sheriff’s Department

Deputy Stephanie Novick, and an incident report prepared by Deputy

Novick following the events in question, defendants assert that the

incident actually occurred on August 14, 2003. Nonetheless, whether

the event occurred on August 14 or 16, 2003, is insignificant. Both

dates are more than a year before plaintiff filed his complaint.

3

ANALYSIS

The gravamen of plaintiff’s complaint is that he was

discriminated against on the basis of race when he was accused by

employees of a McDonald’s restaurant in Tahoe City, California of

stealing a soda and denied service. Liberally construed, plaintiff’s

three-page handwritten complaint asserts causes of action for

defamation and violation of his civil rights.1 Defendants seek

dismissal of plaintiff’s defamation cause of action, solely on the

grounds that any such cause of action is barred by the applicable

one-year statute of limitations set forth in California Code of Civil

Procedure § 340(c).

While the complaint contains apparent typographical errors,

taken as a whole it alleges that the conduct complained of occurred

in large part on August 16, 2003.2 Plaintiff did not submit his

complaint for filing until August 18, 2004, more than one year

thereafter. Plaintiff has not advanced any argument in support of

the tolling of the one year statute of limitations. Therefore, the

undersigned will recommend that any defamation cause of action

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3 The court refers to the date of the incident in this manner

due to the apparent dispute as to whether the incident occurred on

August 14 or 16, 2003.

4 The complaint then was processed and stamped “filed” on

September 3, 2004. 

4

arising out of the incident of August, 2003,3 be dismissed as timebarred.

In this regard, the court is not persuaded by plaintiff’s

argument that any such cause of action is timely because he mailed

his complaint to the court on August 13, 2004, prior to the

expiration of the statute of limitations. Even if plaintiff signed

and dated his fee waiver application and civil cover sheet on August

13, 2004, there is no evidence that he actually placed his complaint

in the mail on that day. More significantly, the applicable rule is

that “‘[p]apers and pleadings including the original complaint are

considered filed when they are placed in the possession of the clerk

of the court.'" Cintron v. Union Pac. R. Co., 813 F.2d 917, 920 (9th

Cir. 1987)(quoting C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 1153 (1969)). See also Ordonez v. Johnson, 254 F.3d 814,

816 (9th Cir. 2001)(complaint is filed when placed in actual or

constructive custody of clerk despite any subsequent rejection by

clerk for non-compliance with local rules). Here, the complaint was

stamped “received” by the Clerk of the Court for the Northern

District of California on August 18, 2004,4 which therefore is the

controlling date for statute of limitations purposes. 

Plaintiff also points to the allegation on the first page

of his complaint that he was further verbally “accosted” on or about

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5 There is no allegation of an ongoing conspiracy such that the

remarks of August 15, 2004, might be considered the last overt act

carried out in furtherance of the conspiracy for statute of

limitations purposes. See, e.g., Schessler v. Keck, 125 Cal. App. 2d

827, 832-33, 271 P.2d 588, 592 (1954)(“Where the complaint alleges

that all the allegedly libelous acts were committed pursuant to a

conspiracy formed by the defendants, the statute of limitations does

not commence to run against any of the alleged libelous acts until

commission of the last overt act done in pursuance of the

conspiracy.”). 

6 Plaintiff’s complaint does not detail the content of the

allegedly defamatory remarks uttered on August 15, 2004, and the

undersigned expresses no opinion as to whether those alleged remarks

were in fact defamatory.

5

August 15, 2004, when he returned to the McDonald’s in an attempt to

get address information regarding defendants in order to pursue this

lawsuit. Plaintiff asserts that this subsequent incident, which

occurred just days prior to the filing of his complaint, should

render his defamation claim timely. As explained below, that

assertion is persuasive only in part.

The one year statute of limitations applicable to actions

for defamation “runs from the utterance or publication of the

defamatory matter.” Wiener v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. App. 3d 525,

529, 130 Cal. Rptr. 61, 63 (1976). Any defamatory remarks uttered in

August of 2004 do not save any claim arising out of speech in August

of 2003 from being untimely.5 Rather, any separate defamatory remark

made in 2004 instead gives rise to a separate cause of action.6 See

Schneider v. United Airlines, Inc., 208 Cal. App. 3d 71, 76, 256 Cal.

Rptr. 71, 74 (1989)(a cause of action arises each time defamatory

matter is published); Wiener, 58 Cal. App. 3d at 529, 130 Cal. Rptr.

at 63 (holding that the statute of limitations runs separately for

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different utterances published in different newspapers at different

time). For this reason, the undersigned will recommend that

defendants’ motion to dismiss be granted in part. Plaintiff’s

defamation claim arising from the August, 2003 encounter at

McDonald’s is time-barred. However, to the extent plaintiff’s

defamation claim is based on the alleged defamatory remarks made in

August, 2004, the claim is not time-barred and dismissal is 

inappropriate.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants’

motion to dismiss be granted in part and that the defamation cause of

action arising out of the incident of August, 2003 be dismissed.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the

United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within ten (10) days after

being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may

file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all

parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may

waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See Martinez

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: December 13, 2005.

DAD:th

Ddad1/orders.prose/norton0639.f&r

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