Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00512/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00512-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

U

For the Northern District of California

NITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HARRY OESTREICHER, on behalf of

himself and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

ALIENWARE CORPORATION, and DOES

1–100, inclusive,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

No. C 07-00512 MHP

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Re: Motion to Stay Proceedings and

Compel Arbitration

On December 6, 2006 Plaintiff Harry Oestreicher (“Oestreicher”) brought this action against

defendant Alienware Corporation (“Alienware”) in San Francisco County Superior Court on behalf

of himself and all others similarly situated in forty-nine U.S. states. Oestreicher alleges that

Alienware made misrepresentations and concealed material information in its sale of certain

computers which Alienware knew to be defective. On January 25, 2007 Alienware removed the

action to this court. Alienware now moves to compel arbitration of all claims asserted in

Oestreicher’s complaint and to stay further proceedings pending arbitration. Having considered the

parties’ arguments and for the reasons stated below, the court enters the following memorandum and

order. 

BACKGROUND1

Oestreicher purchased a notebook computer from Alienware, via Alienware’s website, on or

around June 30, 2005. Alienware is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business in

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Miami. In using the Alienware website to shop for and select his purchase, Alienware contends that

Oestreicher necessarily encountered hyperlinks, contained in the footer of each page on the site,

leading to Alienware’s terms and conditions for sale. Lewis Dec. ¶ 7. To place his order, on the

Alienware website’s final checkout page, Oestreicher had to click a “Place Order” button. Id. ¶ 8. 

To the left of this button the following text appeared: “By clicking ‘Place Order,’ you confirm that

you have read and agree to the Customer Terms and Conditions Agreement” (emphasis in

original). By clicking on “Customer Terms and Conditions Agreement,” Oestreicher could access

the text of this agreement. Id., Exh. B. However, orders could be placed whether or not the user had

actually accessed and read the agreement; the page merely required the user to acknowledge he or

she had done so in order to complete the transaction. Oestreicher claims he does not recall accessing

or viewing the Terms and Conditions.

In making his purchase from Alienware, Oestreicher therefore allegedly agreed to

Alienware’s standard terms and conditions for sale agreement. For the purposes of this motion,

Oestreicher does not dispute that the terms of the sale agreement were in accord with those now

before the court. The sale agreement contained the following arbitration clause including a waiver

of the right to pursue class actions:

Binding Arbitration. You and Alienware agree that any claim, dispute, or

controversy, whether in contract, tort, or otherwise, and whether preexisting, present

or future, and including statutory, common law, intentional tort and equitable claims

(“Dispute”) against Alienware . . . arising from, in connection with or relating to this

Agreement, its interpretation, or the breach, termination or validity thereof, the

relationships which result from this Agreement . . ., Alienware’s advertising or any

related purchase SHALL BE RESOLVED EXCLUSIVELY AND FINALLY BY

BINDING ARBITRATION ADMINISTERED BY THE NATIONAL

ARBITRATION FORUM . . . . YOU UNDERSTAND THAT IN THE ABSENCE

OF THIS PROVISION, YOU WOULD HAVE HAD A RIGHT TO LITIGATE

DISPUTES THROUGH A COURT, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE

CLAIMS ON A CLASS-WIDE OR CLASS-ACTION BASIS, AND THAT YOU

HAVE EXPRESSLY AND KNOWINGLY WAIVED THOSE RIGHTS AND

AGREED TO RESOLVE ANY DISPUTES THROUGH BINDING ARBITRATION

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS SECTION.

Lewis Dec., Exh. A, Agreement ¶ 11. The sale agreement also contained the following choice of

law clause: “Governing law. This Agreement and any sales hereunder shall be governed by the

laws of the state of Florida, without regard to conflicts of laws principles, and excluding the United

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Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods.” Lewis Dec., Exh. A ¶ 13 (emphasis in

original).

Oestreicher paid $4,149 for his purchase. Six months later, Oestreicher’s Alienware

notebook overheated and shut down and has not worked since. Complt. ¶ 18. Oestreicher alleges

that Alienware made misrepresentations and concealed material information in its sale of certain

computers which Alienware knew to be defective. See id. ¶¶ 2, 15, 17, 31–36. Oestreicher asserts

six causes of action: (1) unfair, deceptive and unlawful business practices in violation of California’s

Unfair Competition Law, Bus. & Prof. Code sections 17200 et seq., (2) untrue and misleading

advertising in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code sections 17500 et seq., (3) violation of the

California Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code sections 1750 et seq., (4) breach of

express warranties in violation of Cal. Comm. Code section 2313, (5) breach of implied warranties

in violation of Cal. Comm. Code section 2314, and (6) unjust enrichment. Oestreicher filed this case

on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated residents of California and forty-eight other U.S.

states who purchased Alienware notebook computers of the Area 51 product line: models Area-51m

5550, 5700, 5750, 7500 and 7700. 

On February 1, 2007 Alienware brought the present motion to stay proceedings and to

compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause. Alienware argues that the arbitration clause’s

validity, in accordance with the choice of law clause, must be determined under Florida law. On

May 1, 2007, after all briefing related to this motion was complete but before oral argument,

Oestreicher filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). The proposed class as defined in the FAC

is limited to California residents. FAC ¶ 29.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. sections 1–16, requires federal courts to

enforce arbitration agreements and to stay any litigation that contravenes such agreements. 

Arbitration is a matter of contact, and the court cannot require a party to arbitrate a dispute unless

the party has agreed to do so. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363

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U.S. 574, 582 (1960). Accordingly, the court’s role under the FAA is limited to (1) determining

whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) deciding whether the agreement

encompasses the dispute at issue. 9 U.S.C. § 4; Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 719–20

(9th Cir. 1999). 

Despite the “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,” Green Tree Fin. Corp. v.

Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 81 (2000), state law still has a role to play. In interpreting 9 U.S.C. section

2, the Supreme Court has held that “state law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable

if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of

contracts generally.” Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (emphasis in original). 

Therefore, “generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress or unconscionability, may

be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening Section 2.” Doctor’s Assocs.,

Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996). “In making this determination, federal courts may not

address the validity or enforceability of the contract as a whole.” Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int’l,

Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 937 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388

U.S. 395, 401 (1967)).

DISCUSSION

The two-pronged Simula test requires the court to determine, first, if the arbitration clause is

valid, and second, if the instant dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration clause. Because the

parties do not dispute that the instant dispute falls within the scope of the clause, the court directs its

analysis to the validity of the clause.

I. Applicable State Law

To determine the validity of the arbitration clause, it is first necessary to establish the

applicable law. Alienware claims that the choice of law clause of the sale agreement mandates the

application of Florida law for disputes arising out of the agreement itself or out of sales thereunder. 

Oestreicher, on the other hand, contends that the clause’s validity must be determined under

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California law. Federal courts sitting in diversity look to the law of the forum state in making choice

of law determinations. Fields v. Legacy Health Sys., 413 F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 2005). Because

the complaint in the present action was filed in California, California’s choice of law rules apply.

Under California law, the party advocating a contractual choice of law clause bears the

burden of showing that the claim falls within the scope of the choice of law provision. Washington

Mut. Bank, FA v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 4th 906, 916 (2001). “If the trial court finds that the . . .

claims fall within the scope of a choice-of-law clause, it must next evaluate the clause’s

enforceability pursuant to the analytical approach reflected in section 187, subdivision (2) of the

Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws[.]” Id. In Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.

4th 459, 466 (1992), the California Supreme Court paraphrased section 187 as follows:

[T]he proper approach under Restatement section 187, subdivision (2) is for the court

first to determine either: (1) whether the chosen state has a substantial relationship to

the parties or their transaction, or (2) whether there is any other reasonable basis for

the parties’ choice of law. If neither of these tests is met, . . . the court need not

enforce the parties’ choice of law. If, however, either test is met, the court must next

determine whether the chosen state’s law is contrary to a fundamental policy of

California. If there is no such conflict, the court shall enforce the parties’ choice of

law. If, however, there is a fundamental conflict with California law, the court must

then determine whether California has a “materially greater interest than the chosen

state in the determination of the particular issue . . . .” (Rest., § 187, subd. (2).) If

California has a materially greater interest than the chosen state, the choice of law

shall not be enforced, for the obvious reason that in such circumstance we will

decline to enforce a law contrary to this state’s fundamental policy.

Nedlloyd’s analysis has been held to apply to consumer adhesion contracts like the one in dispute

here. Omstead v. Dell, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1023 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (Hamilton, J.) (citing

Washington Mut. Bank, 24 Cal. 4th at 918). 

Contrary to the burden of proof argued by plaintiff, which is actually the burden that applies

in a challenge to a forum selection clause, the burden of proof on choice of law issues is as laid out

in Washington Mut. Bank, which holds thus: “if the proponent of the clause [here Alienware]

demonstrates that the chosen state has a substantial relationship to the parties or their transaction or

that a reasonable basis otherwise exists for the choice of law, the parties’ choice generally will be

enforced unless the other side [here Oestreicher] can establish both that the chosen law is contrary to

a fundamental policy of California and that California has a materially greater interest in the

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determination of the particular issue.” 24 Cal. 4th at 917.2 Oestreicher does not contest that the first

prong of the Nedlloyd test is met—he does not argue that Florida has no substantial relationship to

the parties or their transaction or that there is no reasonable basis for the selection of Florida law. 

The court therefore proceeds to Nedlloyd’s second prong.

A. Fundamental Policy of California

Oestreicher claims that the application of Florida law to the question of whether the class

action waiver is unconscionable would be contrary to California’s fundamental policy against class

action waivers.3 “Courts in California have not hesitated to invalidate class action waivers in the

appropriate circumstances.” Klussman v. Cross Country Bank, 134 Cal. App. 4th 1283, 1293 (2005)

(discussing cases). Although another court in this district has referred to this policy as “a limited

policy against class action waivers,” Omstead, 473 F. Supp. 2d at 1024, California courts have held

that this policy is fundamental in certain contexts. In Klussman, 134 Cal. App. 4th at 1298, the court

held that “Delaware’s approval of class action waivers, especially in the context of a ‘take it or leave

it’ arbitration clause[,] is contrary to fundamental public policy in California.” In Aral v. EarthLink,

Inc., 134 Cal. App. 4th 544, 564 (2005), the court held that a class action waiver in the context of a

suit by California residents seeking recovery pursuant to the UCL implicated a fundamental policy. 

Finally, in America Online, 90 Cal. App. 4th at 18, the court held that “[t]he unavailability of class

action relief in [the context of that case was] sufficient in and by itself” to preclude the enforcement

of a choice of law clause and forum selection clause favoring Virginia law. Accordingly, an analysis

as to whether the class action waiver at issue here implicates a fundamental policy of California

requires an analysis of the specific circumstances of this case. In essence, this reduces to a

consideration of whether the class action waiver would be unenforceable under California law. If

so, California’s fundamental policy is implicated.

The framework for determining the enforcement of class action waivers was set forth in

Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148 (2005). That case involved a class action waiver

in an arbitration agreement between Discover Bank and one of its credit cardholders. Discover

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Bank, 36 Cal. 4th at 152. The plaintiff alleged that Discover Bank represented to its cardholders that

they would not be assessed late payment fees for payments received on the due date, but Discover

Bank actually assessed those fees for payments received after 1:00 p.m. on the due date. Id. The

late charge in question was 29 dollars, leading to potential damages that were small to the individual

but large in the aggregate. Id. at 153–54. In ruling on Discover Bank’s motion to compel arbitration

in accord with Discover Bank’s cardholder agreement, the California Supreme Court held that class

action waivers contained in consumer adhesion contracts are unconscionable when the disputed

sums “involve small amounts of damages” and the complaint alleges that “the party with the

superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of

consumers out of individually small sums of money . . . .” Id. at 162–63. This court must therefore

determine whether these three indicia of unenforceability are met, i.e., (1) whether the arbitration

clause was part of a contract of adhesion, (2) whether disputes implicating the arbitration clause

typically involve small amounts of damages, and (3) whether Alienware is alleged to have carried

out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of customers out of individually small sums of

money.

The first requirement is clearly met. The contract between Alienware and Oestreicher was

presented on a “take it or leave it” basis with no opportunity to negotiate. The second factor,

regarding the amount of damages at issue, is somewhat more complicated. The typical case

involving an unenforceable class action waiver involves essentially negligible sums of money on an

individual basis. See, e.g., id. at 154 ($29); Aral, 134 Cal. App. 4th at 561 (stating that “there may

well be a significant number of California consumers who have suffered losses in the range of $ 40

to $ 50”); America Online, 90 Cal. App. 4th at 5 (complaint alleged improper charges of five to

twenty-two dollars each). Here, Oestreicher paid over four thousand dollars for his computer. In

cases involving comparable sums, other courts have held that class action waivers were enforceable

and did not implicate fundamental California policies. For example, in Provencher v. Dell, Inc., 409

F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1202–4 (C.D. Cal. 2006), the court found that no fundamental policy was

implicated by an arbitration clause barring class actions where the named plaintiff had “spent over

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$1600 for the Dell computer, including more than $250 for Dell’s extended service warranty.” 

Likewise, in Omstead, 473 F. Supp. 2d at 1024, the court held that individual claims of $1,200 to

$1,500 were not “small” for the purposes of the Discover Bank analysis.

However, the California Court of Appeal has squarely rejected the proposition that sums

exceeding $1,000 necessarily fall outside the framework of Discover Bank. As the court explained,

“[w]hile $1,000 is not an insignificant sum, many consumers . . . may not view that amount as

sufficient to warrant individual litigation, and certainly it is not sufficient to obtain legal assistance

in prosecuting the claim.” Cohen v. DIRECTV, Inc., 142 Cal. App. 4th 1442, 1452 (2006) (internal

quotations omitted). Accordingly, “[d]amages that may or may not exceed $1,000 do not take [a]

class action waiver outside a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably

involve small amounts of damages.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). The court in Cohen expressly

rejected the reasoning in Provencher regarding the amount of recovery. Id. at 1455 n.13; see also

Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., ___ F.3d ____, 2007 WL 2069542, at *3 (9th

Cir. 2007) (holding that Provencher has been “expressly disavowed”). Additionally, the holding in

Omstead appears contrary to holding in Cohen. As in Cohen, the amount at issue here is not

insignificant, but also not substantial. Accordingly, the second Discover Bank factor is satisfied.

Turning to the final factor, whether Alienware is accused of a deliberate scheme to cheat a

large amount of customers, the court in Cohen clarified this standard as well. Specifically, the court

held that the question is whether the defendant acted deliberately in order to deprive consumers of

money, regardless of whether the alleged scheme was hidden, secret or fraudulent. Cohen, 142 Cal.

App. 4th at 1453. Here, Oestreicher alleges that Alienware was aware of material defects in its

products, concealed these defects from consumers, and chose to sell defective products rather than

correcting the defects, thereby shifting the financial burden onto its customers and increasing its own

financial position. Complt. ¶¶ 17, 31–32. If proven, this would constitute a deliberate scheme to

cheat consumers.4 Accordingly, the third Discover Bank factor is satisfied.

B. Materially Greater Interest

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The next step in the Nedlloyd test is to determine which state has a materially greater interest

in the litigation. In determining which state has a greater interest, the court considers factors such as

“(a) the place of contracting, (b) the place of negotiation of the contract, (c) the place of

performance, (d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and (e) the domicil[e], residence,

nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties.” Application Group, Inc. v.

Hunter Group, Inc., 61 Cal. App. 4th 881, 903 (1998).

The fact that Oestreicher has reduced the class size from a nation-wide class to a class of

California residents certainly increases California’s interest in the litigation, as “[t]he state where a

party to the contract is domiciled has an obvious interest in the application of its law protecting its

citizens against the unfair use of superior bargaining power.” Klussman, 134 Cal. App. 4th at 1299. 

The fact that the putative class members are California residents and Alienware is a Florida

company favors California, as the governmental interest is stronger in protecting the party with

inferior bargaining power. An additional factor favoring California is the fact that Oestreicher has

brought causes of action pursuant to California consumer protection statutes.

In terms of the circumstances surrounding the contract, “internet or phone purchases from an

out-of-California manufacturer result in ‘sales transpir[ing] outside of California’” under California

law. Omstead, 473 F. Supp. 2d at 1025 (quoting California State Elecs. Ass’n v. Zeos Int’l Ltd., 41

Cal. App. 4th 1270, 1277 (1996)). The place of contracting and the place of performance are

therefore in Florida. However, the subject matter of the contract—the allegedly defective

computer—is located in California, and California has a strong interest in regulating products

shipped into the state. Additionally, Alienware’s argument regarding its desire for the uniform

application of law to its sales of computers across the country does not defeat the compelling

California interests identified by Oestreicher. Klussman, 134 Cal. App. 4th at 1300. In sum,

California has a materially greater interest based on the fact that California residents are invoking

California consumer protection laws to seek recovery for allegedly defective products shipped into

California.

Because Florida law is contrary to California’s fundamental policy, and because California

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has a materially greater interest in the litigation, the court will apply California law to determine

whether the arbitration clause is enforceable.

II. Arbitrability Under California Law

Under California law, a plaintiff must show the presence of both procedural and substantive

unconscionability in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contractual

provision. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 114 (2000). “[T]he

more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is

required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.” Id. As discussed

above, the arbitration provision is unconscionable with respect to the class action waiver. In light of

the fact that the presence of a contract of adhesion is one of the indicia of unenforceability in

Discover Bank, the determination that the provision falls within the Discover Bank framework

satisfies both the procedural and substantive unconscionability requirements. In other words, the

adhesive nature of the contract provides the minimal level of procedural unconscionability to render

a contract unenforceable if the contract also contains a substantively unconscionable class action

waiver. Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 152 Cal. App. 4th 571, 586–88 (2007). The class action

waiver is therefore unconscionable and unenforceable.

Oestreicher further asserts that the agreement’s chosen method of arbitration—arbitration

before the National Arbitration Forum (NAF)—is independently unconscionable.

A. Procedural Unconscionability

“The California Supreme Court has consistently reiterated that the procedural element of an

unconscionable contract generally takes the form of a contract of adhesion.” Id. at 582 (internal

quotations omitted). The California Supreme Court has adopted the following definition of

“contract of adhesion”: “‘a standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of

superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the

contract or reject it.’” Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807, 817 (1981) (quoting Neal v.

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State Farm Ins. Cos., 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 694 (1961)). In the consumer context, California courts

“have routinely found the procedural element [of unconscionability] satisfied where the agreement

containing the challenged provision was a contract of adhesion.” Gatton, 152 Cal. App. 4th at 582. 

There is no genuine dispute that the contract at issue here was one of adhesion, as Oestreicher

clearly had no opportunity to negotiate the terms of the standardized agreement.

In addition to the inquiry as to adhesion, courts look to the presence of surprise in

determining wether a contract is procedurally unconscionable. “Surprise involves the extent to

which the supposedly agreed-upon terms of the bargain are hidden in the prolix printed form drafted

by the party seeking to enforce the disputed terms.” Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 51 Cal. App. 4th 1519,

1532, (1997) (internal quotations omitted). Here, Alienware claims that Oestreicher had repeated

notice of and access to the terms and conditions during the time he spent shopping for and

customizing his computer online, and that he had an opportunity to cancel his purchase within thirty

days. In response, Oestreicher claims that surprise exists because Alienware does not require

consumers to access or review the arbitration agreement to effectuate a purchase. Oestreicher

asserts that Alienware could easily have put a process in place to ensure that customers were

presented with the “best opportunity” to review the terms. Oestreicher cites no legal authority in

support of the assertion that companies are required to ensure that customers actually read contracts

before agreeing to them. The court sees no reason to establish such a rule now, particularly in the

context of high-end products such as personal computers where consumers are expected to shop with

care.

Oestreicher has not established surprise. However, because the contract at issue is a

consumer contract of adhesion, Oestreicher has established “a minimal degree of procedural

unconscionability.” Gatton, 152 Cal. App. 4th at 585. Because Oestreicher has made only the

minimal showing, “[i]f the challenged provision does not have a high degree of substantive

unconscionability, it should be enforced.” Id. As discussed above, the class action waiver

constitutes such a high degree of substantive unconscionability. Accordingly, the court considers

whether the NAF provision is substantively unconscionable.

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B. Substantive Unconscionability

A contract is substantively unconscionable if it produces “overly harsh or one-sided results.” 

Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 114 (internal quotations omitted). California courts require a “modicum

of bilaterality” in an arbitration agreement. Id. at 117. Some degree of non-mutuality is acceptable

so long as the non-mutuality is justified by “business realities.” Id.

Oestreicher asserts that the NAF is an industry-friendly forum that is structurally biased

against consumers. Oestreicher raises four discrete arguments in support of this contention. First,

Oestreicher cites NAF rule 29(B), which limits allowable discovery to an amount “commensurate

with the amount of the Claim . . . .” Because individual claims are relatively small, this rule will

result in a commensurately small amount of allowable discovery, creating a disadvantage to

plaintiffs seeking to prove concealment on the part of a corporate defendant. Second, Oestreicher

cites an advertisement from the NAF identifying the company as “the alternative to the million

dollar lawsuit” and promoting “limited claims” and “limited awards.” Opp. Br., Exh. A. Third,

Oestreicher cites a latter from the NAF Director of Arbitration dated April 16, 1998 warning that

“the ‘class action’ bar” is preparing for litigation arising out of the Year 2000 bug. Id., Exh. B. 

Finally, Oestreicher cites an additional NAF letter from September 1996, stating that arbitration

provisions can minimize lawsuits and avoid large jury verdicts. Id., Exh. C. The court notes that

each of these documents is attached as an exhibit directly to Oestreicher’s opposition brief, rather

than an authenticated exhibit to a sworn declaration. This, coupled with the fact that these

documents are several years old, renders this evidence of little value.

In addition to these particular arguments, the parties spend a great deal of time alternately

condemning and singing the praises of NAF. Not surprisingly, both sides cite a handful of cases in

which courts have determined that the NAF was either an appropriate or inappropriate forum under

particular circumstances. Apart from its categorical assault on the NAF as an allegedly industryfriendly forum, however, Oestreicher makes no specific, compelling arguments showing that the

NAF would be inappropriate in this action. Accordingly, Oestreicher has made only a weak

showing of non-mutuality, and in light of Oestreicher’s minimal showing of procedural

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unconscionability Oestreicher has failed to establish that the NAF provision is unenforceable.

III. Preemption

Alienware argues that, regardless of whether the arbitration clause is enforceable under

California law, the provision must be enforced because the FAA preempts state law on that issue. 

This assertion merits little discussion. As Alienware readily admits, the Ninth Circuit has squarely

held that “[b]ecause unconscionability is a generally applicable contract defense, it may be applied

to invalidate an arbitration agreement without contravening § 2 of the FAA.” Ting, 319 F.3d at

1150 n.15. The Ninth Circuit reached this conclusion based on “well-settled Supreme Court

precedent.” Id. Alienware argues that the framework of Discover Bank relating to class action

waivers was not developed until after Ting was decided. However, unenforceability based on class

action waivers is merely a subspecies of unenforceability based on unconscionability. The fact that

not all class action waivers fit into the Discover Bank framework does not leave the doctrine open to

preemption any more than the fact that not all contracts are unconscionable. Although one court in

this district has identified this issue as a “substantial question of law to be resolved on appeal”

justifying a stay of proceedings, Winig v. Cingular Wireless LLC, No. C-06-4297 MMC, 2006 WL

3201047, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2006) (Chesney, J.), no party to this action has requested a stay

pending appeal on this issue. Accordingly, the court will follow Ninth Circuit and California

precedent and hold that the FAA does not preempt the rule in Discover Bank.

IV. Severability

At the very least, the provision barring class actions cannot be enforced. Oestreicher

additionally requests that the entire arbitration provision be declared unenforceable. Alienware

agrees that this case should not be referred to arbitration if the class action waiver is unenforceable. 

Accordingly, the court does not reach the issue of whether the class action waiver is severable. 

Therefore, the entire arbitration clause is invalid.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Alienware’s motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings is

DENIED.

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 

_______________________________

MARILYN HALL PATEL

United States District Court Judge

Northern District of California

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1. Unless otherwise indicated, all facts are taken from the parties’ briefs.

2. Oestreicher cites America Online v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. App.4th 1, 11 (2001), for the

proposition that in a case such as this the party seeking to enforce a forum selection clause has the

ultimate burden of proof as to enforceability. However, it is not the forum selection clause the

parties have raised in this litigation; it is the choice of law provision. Plaintiff appears to confuse the

two or at least weave them together. Even America Online court treats the two separately, noting

that AOL’s forum selection clause was accompanied by a choice of law provision. The court then

proceeded to do a separate analysis of the choice of law issue. Although that analysis did not follow

the traditional formula laid out in Nedloyd, the court cited to both Nedloyd and Washington Mut.

Bank, and concluded its opinion was consistent with those cases. This court finds that it is proper to

apply the choice of law principles laid down in those cases.

 Additionally, although the agreement contains the extraordinary provision that Florida law shall

govern “without regard to conflicts of laws principles,” Lewis Dec. Exh. A ¶13, the court does not

consider itself boundy by this provision and therefore declines to ignore the legal principles

applicable to this case.

3. Oestreicher raises two additional conclusory arguments related to fundamental policies of

California. First, Oestreicher argues that the provision violates the CLRA’s anti-waiver provisions. 

However, the Ninth Circuit has held that the CLRA is preempted by the FAA in cases such as this

one. Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1147–48 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Provencher, 409 F. Supp. 2d

at 1206 n.13. Second, Oestreicher claims that Florida law is contrary to California’s fundamental

policy regarding unconscionability. Because Oestreicher raises no specific arguments distinguishing

California and Florida law in this regard, the court rejects this argument.

4. Alienware cites language in Omstead, 473 F. Supp. 2d at 1025, in which the court held that the

third Discover Bank factor was satisfied because “[i]t makes no sense to claim that Dell had a

‘deliberate scheme’ to manufacture four computer models that did not work or that Dell would

deliberately sell defective computers—under warranty—to thousands of customers.” The court does

not find this reasoning persuasive. Oestreicher explicitly alleges that Alienware decided to sell

defective computers rather than suffer the costs of delaying the release of its products so that the

defects could be corrected. Complt. ¶ 17. Accordingly, there may have been some financial benefit

in selling defective products to the detriment of consumers.

ENDNOTES

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