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Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 20, 2012 Decided November 16, 2012

No. 10-5432

CONSERVATION FORCE, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

KENNETH LEE SALAZAR, SECRETARY OF INTERIOR,

IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cv-00496)

John J. Jackson III argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellants.

Tamara N. Rountree, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief was

Andrew C. Mergen, Attorney. James C. Kilbourne and Robert

J. Lundman, Attorneys, entered appearances.

Before: ROGERS and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

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ROGERS, Circuit Judge: This appeal is from the denial of a

motion for attorneys fees and costs under the citizen-suit

provision of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), 16 U.S.C.

§ 1540(g)(4). Conservation Force and others (“appellants”)

sued the Secretary of Interior and the Fish and Wildlife Service

(together “FWS”), pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g). They

alleged violations of the ESA by refusing to process applications

for permits to import as hunting trophies Canadian wood bison,

a listed species, for nearly nine years. The FWS denied the

permits more than six months after appellants filed their

complaint. The district court dismissed the permit processing

claims as moot. See Conservation Force v. Salazar, 715 F.

Supp. 2d 99, 100, 105–08 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Conservation Force

I”). Appellants then sought attorneys fees and costs under a

catalyst theory pursuant to the ESA’s provision authorizing the

district court to award fees “whenever . . . appropriate.” 16

U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4).1

 The district court denied the motion,

concluding that Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997),

foreclosed review of appellants’ claims under 16 U.S.C.

§ 1540(g)(1)(C) and thus rendered them ineligible for fees. 

Conservation Force v. Salazar, 753 F. Supp. 2d 29, 31, 34

(D.D.C. 2010) (“Conservation Force II”).2

1

 This court has held that the catalyst theory applies to a

similarly worded provision of the Clean Air Act authorizing courts to

award attorneys fees “whenever . . . appropriate.” Sierra Club v. EPA,

322 F.3d 718, 726 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f)). 

By contrast, the district court noted, although the Administrative

Procedure Act provides for the recovery of attorneys fees under the

Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, recovery is limited to

a “prevailing party.” Conservation Force v. Salazar, 753 F. Supp. 2d

29, 35 (citing Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. West Virginia Dep’t

of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 610 (2001)).

2

 Appellant separately challenged the denial of the permit

applications as arbitrary and capricious, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006),

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On appeal, appellants contend that their claims were

brought, and are reviewable, under 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A)

for alleged “violations” of the ESA or its implementing

regulations, and that the district court thus erred in ruling they

were ineligible to recover fees. For the following reasons, we

affirm.

I.

The ESA generally prohibits the importation of endangered

species, including as hunting trophies. See 16 U.S.C.

§ 1538(a)(1)(A); 50 C.F.R. §17.21(b). The Secretary of Interior

may, however, grant permits to applicants to import endangered

species under limited circumstances, such as “for scientific

purposes or to enhance the propagation or survival of the

affected species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(A). Individuals

seeking to import hunting trophies of endangered species must

apply to the FWS for a permit. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.22. Upon

receiving a completed import permit application, the FWS must

publish the application in the Federal Register and allow thirty

days for public comment. Then, after considering a number of

factors, the FWS “will decide whether or not a permit should be

issued,” id. § 17.22(a)(2). The regulations provide that “[t]he

[FWS] will process all applications as quickly as possible” but

“cannot guarantee final action” within a requested time period. 

Id. § 13.11(c).

The ESA authorizes citizen suits brought

and the district court granted summary judgment in appellants’ favor,

finding the FWS “failed to articulate a satisfactory explanation for its

decision.” Conservation Force v. Salazar, 851 F. Supp. 2d 39, 51

(D.D.C. 2012) (“Conservation Force III”) 

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(A) to enjoin any person, including the United

States and any other governmental instrumentality

or agency . . . who is alleged to be in violation of

any provision of [the ESA] or regulation issued

under the authority thereof; or

. . . 

(C) against the Secretary where there is alleged a

failure of the Secretary to perform any act or duty

under section 1533 of this title which is not

discretionary with the Secretary.

16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A), (C) (emphasis added). 

The Supreme Court clarified the respective scopes of

subsections (A) and (C) of section 1540(g)(1) in Bennett v.

Spear, 520 U.S. at 171–74. Subsection (A) “is a means by

which private parties may enforce the substantive provisions of

the ESA against regulated parties — both private entities and

Government agencies — but is not an alternative avenue for

judicial review of the Secretary’s implementation of the statute.” 

Id. at 173. Subsection (C), on the other hand, “expressly

authorizes suit against the Secretary, but only to compel him to

perform a nondiscretionary duty under § 1533.” Id. The Court 

noted that subsection (A)’s “reference to any ‘violation’ of the

ESA cannot be interpreted to include the Secretary’s

maladministration of the [Act],” and that such maladministration

“claims are not subject to judicial review” under subsection (A). 

Id. at 174. It interpreted subsection (A) to be so limited because

to have done otherwise would have rendered subsection (C)

“superfluous.” Id. at 173. Without this limitation, suits

authorized under subsection (C) would become nothing more

than a subset of suits that litigants could bring under subsection

(A). The Court also interpreted subsection (A) to be so limited

in view of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”); otherwise 

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subsection (A) “would [have] effect[ed] a wholesale abrogation

of the APA’s ‘final agency action’ requirement.” Id. at 174. 

Without the limitation, “[a]ny procedural default, even one that

had not yet resulted in a final disposition of the matter at issue,

would form the basis for a lawsuit.” Id. The Court was “loathe

to produce such an extraordinary regime without the clearest of

statutory direction,” which it concluded was not present in the

ESA. Id. 

The district court ruled that appellants’ permit processing

claims were not properly brought under the ESA’s citizen-suit

provision. “[T]o sue under the ESA’s citizen-suit provision,

plaintiffs must identify a non-discretionary, statutory duty under

[16 U.S.C. §] 1533 to process their applications by a specific

date.” Conservation Force II, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 35. Because

appellants could identify no such duty, their claims were not

subject to judicial review under § 1540(g)(1)(C). Consequently,

appellants were “not eligible for attorneys fees under the ESA

attorneys’ fees provision on those claims.” Id. Appellants

appeal. 

II.

Appellants contend that the district court erred by failing to

address their arguments that their claims arose under 16 U.S.C.

§ 1540(g)(1)(A), and that, despite this error, they are entitled to

attorneys fees and costs under § 1540(g)(4).3

 They point out

that under § 1540(g)(1)(A), a plaintiff can sue any person or

governmental agency upon identifying a violation of either a

3

 The background to this appeal is set forth in Conservation

Force I, 715 F. Supp. 2d 99, and Conservation Force II, 753 F. Supp.

2d 29.

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non-discretionary duty under § 1533 or of other duties under any

provision or regulation of the ESA. Their lawsuit, they

maintain, did not allege that the manner in which the FWS

administered the ESA was unlawful but rather that the FWS did

not perform its duties under the ESA and its regulations at all.

Although this court generally reviews the district court’s

denial of applications for attorneys fees for abuse of discretion,

see, e.g., Brayton v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 641

F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2011), a “district court abuses its

discretion if it did not apply the correct legal standard . . . or if

it misapprehended the underlying substantive law.” Kickapoo

Tribe v. Babbitt, 43 F.3d 1491, 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In such

instances the court must “examine de novo whether the district

court applied the correct legal standard.” Brayton, 641 F.3d at

524 (citing FTC v. H. J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 713 (D.C. Cir.

2011)). Thus, although as appellants correctly maintain, the

precise statutory basis for the district court’s decision is in part

ambiguous, see Conservation Force II, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 34,

this court’s independent review is sufficient to affirm the district

court’s denial of fees. 

Appellants’ contention that they are eligible for attorneys

fees because their permit processing claims arise under

§ 1540(g)(1)(A) fails. Appellants’ position is that the FWS’

alleged failures to abide by various statutory and regulatory

requirements constitute “violations” of the ESA within the

meaning of subsection (A). In the district court they argued that

the FWS violated 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (requiring agencies to

consult with the Secretary to ensure no action they are taking

will adversely affect an endangered or threatened species or its

habitat) and the ESA implementing regulations at 50 C.F.R. §§

13.11(c), 13.21(b), 17.22(a)(2), dealing with issuing permits. 

On appeal appellants also cite 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c) and

§ 1532(3), maintaining that the FWS has violated these

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provisions, which concern the federal policy of conservation and

define words such as “conserve.” In appellants’ view, these

statutory and regulatory provisions impose nondiscretionary

obligations on the FWS to award permits where appropriate, not

sit on them for years and thereby fail to protect endangered

species. 

The statutory provisions appellants cite fall into two groups

— those that trigger certain procedures, such as consultation, 16

U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2), and those that address the goals of the ESA

or definitions related to such goals, id. § 1531(c); id. § 1532(3). 

The cited regulatory provisions involve the requirement that the

FWS adjudicate permits in a timely manner, 50 C.F.R.

§ 13.11(c), grant permit requests when the established criteria

are met, id. § 13.21(b), and consider certain factors when

adjudicating permits, id. § 17.22(a)(2). Even assuming that

appellants have not forfeited contentions related to the

provisions not cited in the district court,4 see Petit v. U.S. Dep’t

of Educ., 675 F.3d 769, 782 (D.C. Cir. 2012), the provisions

appellants cite on appeal do not establish a duty, which, if not

fulfilled, constitutes a “violation” under 16 U.S.C.

§ 1540(g)(1)(A) as the Court interpreted that term in Bennett v.

Spear, 520 U.S. at 173–74. The Court explained that it knew of

“no precedent for applying” the “substantial civil penalties” that

the Secretary may impose pursuant to § 1540(a) “against those

who administer (as opposed to those who are regulated by) a

substantive law. Nor do we think it likely that the statute meant

to subject the Secretary and his officers and employees to

criminal liability under § 1540(b) . . . or . . . § 1540(e)(3).” Id.

Despite the repeated usage of obligatory words such as “shall,”

in 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531(c), 1536(a)(2); 50 C.F.R. §§ 13.21(b),

17.22(a)(2), and “will,” in 50 C.F.R. §§ 13.11(c), 17.22(a)(2),

4

 In the district court, appellants did not refer to violations of

16 U.S.C. §§ 1531(c) and 1532(3). 

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the FWS’ permit processing and other duties are discretionary

with regard to how much time it takes to complete them. As

noted, 50 C.F.R. § 13.11(c) provides that “[t]he [FWS] will

process all applications as quickly as possible. However, we

cannot guarantee final action within the time limit you request.” 

The delay by the FWS in processing appellants’ import

permit applications for wood bison trophies is, therefore, an

instance of agency delay on a matter not subject to firm time

constraints. Although the delay is substantial and unexplained,

it is nonetheless not the type of “violation” that would subject

ESA administrators to criminal or monetary sanctions. See

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. at 173–74. It is, however, the type of

“procedural default” that the Court held plaintiffs cannot

challenge under § 1540(g)(1)(A). Id. at 174. Situations may

exist where in applying Bennett v. Spear a court might have to

wrestle with vexing questions as to whether an agency is

administering the ESA or is being regulated by it,5

 but these

types of questions do not arise here. 

Appellants’ other contentions attempting to limit Bennett v.

Spear lack merit. Their suggestion that the district court limited

its ruling to the Secretary only, much as their attempt to

distinguish Bennett v. Spear on the ground that it limits

§ 1540(g)(1)(A) with regard to the Secretary only and not with

regard to the FWS, border on the frivolous. The Secretary has

delegated authority to the FWS, such that the district court’s

ruling regarding permit processing claims is applicable to the

FWS. See Department of the Interior Departmental Manual, 632

DM 1.5 (1988). The “Spear” in the Bennett v. Spear case

caption refers to a Regional Director of the FWS; and the claim

5 E.g., compare Envtl. Prot. Inf. Cen. v. Simpson Timber Co.,

255 F.3d 1073, 1074–1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 2001), with Bennett v.

Spear, 520 U.S. at 174, 176.

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at issue in Bennett involved a biological opinion issued by the

FWS “as delegate of the Secretary.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.

at 158.

Accordingly, we affirm the denial of appellants’ motion for

attorneys fees and costs pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4).

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