Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00941/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00941-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARNELL DUKES,

Plaintiff,

vs.

K. HARRINGTON, et al., 

Defendants.

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1:12cv00941 DLB PC

ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO 

EITHER FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT OR 

NOTIFY COURT OF WILLINGNESS TO 

PROCEED ONLY ON COGNIZABLE 

CLAIM

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Darnell Dukes (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis 

in this civil rights action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on June 11, 

2012.1 Plaintiff names Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”) Warden K. Harrington, Correctional 

Officer C. Garcia and Inmate Appeals Coordinator E. Borrero as Defendants. 

A. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

 

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Plaintiff consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge on July 2, 2012.

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§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or 

appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are 

not. Id.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or 

other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 

1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); 

Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff’s allegations must link the 

actions or omissions of each named defendant to a violation of his rights; there is no respondeat 

superior liability under section 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons v. Navajo County, 

Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 

(9th Cir. 2009); Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. Plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to 

state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 

F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this 

plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

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B. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at KVSP, where the events at issue occurred.

Plaintiff alleges that in June 2010, while he was housed at California State Prison, Los 

Angeles County (“CSP-LAC”), he received a false Rules Violation Report (“RVR”). The RVR 

resulted in his transfer to KVSP, which Plaintiff contends is a much harsher environment than 

CSP-LAC. 

Plaintiff arrived at KVSP in April 2011. Shortly thereafter, he received an order from the 

Chief Inmate Appeals Office dated June 16, 2011. The order requested that Plaintiff forward a 

copy of his general chrono and classification chrono. To obtain the documents, Plaintiff sent an 

“inmate request for interview” to Defendant Garcia, Plaintiff’s assigned counselor. Plaintiff had 

staff sign and date the request and deliver it to Defendant Garcia. Defendant Garcia did not 

respond or send Plaintiff the documents. Plaintiff therefore filed an inmate grievance against 

him.

Plaintiff alleges that on October 18, 2011, Defendant Garcia came to his cell and yelled, 

“Here’s your shit, don’t fuck with me anymore.” Compl. 6. 

On October 29, 2011, Plaintiff had a rehearing on the June 2010 RVR. The RVR was 

dismissed. Plaintiff informed Defendant Garcia of the program review changes that he was now 

entitled to through an “inmate request for interview” dated November 17, 2011. The form 

indicates that staff hand-delivered it to Defendant Garcia on November 17, 2011. Plaintiff states 

that staff signed and dated the document and delivered it to Defendant Garcia.

On November 28, 2011, Plaintiff filed another inmate grievance against Defendant 

Garcia. Plaintiff believes that he no longer fits the criteria for incarceration at KVSP, and he 

alleges that Defendant Garcia retaliated against him by failing to take Plaintiff to the Institutional 

Classification Committee for program review and potential transfer.

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Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Borrero acted in concert with Defendant Garcia in 

retaliating against Plaintiff by improperly screening out his valid inmate grievance. He also 

alleges that Defendant Harrington acted in concert by failing to act once Plaintiff sent him a 

letter explaining the misconduct of Defendants Garcia and Borrero.

Based on these facts, Plaintiff alleges (1) retaliation in violation of the First Amendment; 

(2) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) cruel and unusual punishment in violation of 

the Eighth Amendment.2

C. ANALYSIS

1. Defendant Harrington

Under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the 

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. When the named defendant 

holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between the defendant and the claimed 

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 

941 (1979). To state a claim for relief under section 1983 for supervisory liability, plaintiff must 

allege some facts indicating that the defendant either: personally participated in the alleged 

deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or 

promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of 

constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 

885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 

1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Here, Plaintiff attempts to allege liability against Defendant Harrington based on a letter 

he wrote to Defendant Harrington. However, simply sending a letter does not support a 

 

2 The Court notes that Plaintiff concedes that he has not appealed his claims to the highest administrative level. 

However, he alleges that Defendant Borrero prevented him from doing so with his incorrect screenings. 

Accordingly, the Court will not dismiss for failure to exhaust at this time. See eg. Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 

823 (9th Cir. 2010) (“improper screening of an inmate's administrative grievances renders administrative remedies 

‘effectively unavailable’ such that exhaustion is not required under the PLRA.”).

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presumption of knowledge. Pursuant to Iqbal, Plaintiff must affirmatively allege that Defendant

Harrington received the letter and knew of its contents. He therefore fails to state any claims

against Defendant Harrington.

2. Retaliation

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to 

petition the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 

(9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. 

Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First 

Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some 

adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that 

such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did 

not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-

68 (9th Cir. 2005); accord Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2012); Brodheim 

v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009). An allegation of retaliation against a prisoner’s 

First Amendment right to file a prison grievance is sufficient to support claim under section 

1983. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Garcia retaliated against him for filing a grievance related 

to his failure to provide requested documents. Specifically, he contends that Defendant Garcia 

refused to take Plaintiff to the Inmate Classification Committee for potential transfer. The Court 

finds that Plaintiff states a First Amendment claim against Defendant Garcia. 

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Borrero retaliated against him by improperly 

screening out an inmate grievance. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Borrero is a good friend of 

Defendant Garcia and “acted in concert” to retaliate against him for his prior grievance against 

Defendant Garcia. Compl. 7. 

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His allegations are too vague, however, to support a finding that Defendant Borrero 

improperly screened his grievance because of Plaintiff’s complaint against Defendant Garcia. 

Other than stating that they acted in concert and are good friends, Plaintiff provides no 

allegations to support a sufficient causal connection. A plaintiff asserting a retaliation claim 

must demonstrate a “but-for” causal nexus between the alleged retaliation and plaintiff's 

protected activity (i.e., filing a legal action). McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 18 (1st Cir. 1979); 

see Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). The prisoner 

must submit evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to establish a link between the exercise of 

constitutional rights and the allegedly retaliatory action. Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806.

Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim for retaliation against Defendant Borrero.

3. Fourteenth Amendment

Plaintiff’s due process claims are based on Defendant Garcia’s alleged knowledge that 

Plaintiff should be placed on the transfer list and his alleged refusal to follow related CDCR 

policy. However, prison inmates do not have a constitutional right to be incarcerated at a 

particular correctional facility or to be transferred from one facility to another. Meachum v. 

Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976); see also Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 244-45 (1983). 

Accordingly, there can be no attached due process rights and Plaintiff fails to state a claim 

against Defendant Garcia under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Plaintiff’s due process claim against Defendant Borrero is based on his alleged 

obstruction of justice by improperly screening Plaintiff’s grievance. Because there is no 

constitutionally protected right to a prison grievance process, the failure to properly process 

Plaintiff’s grievances does not state a claim for denial of due process, Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 

F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); Massey v. 

Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001), or for interference with Plaintiff’s right to seek 

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redress, Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996); Phillips v. Hust , 588 F.3d 652, 655 (9th Cir. 

2009).3 

For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendants Garcia and Borrero 

under the Fourteenth Amendment.

4. Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects 

prisoners not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also from inhumane conditions of 

confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994) and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)) 

(quotation marks omitted). While conditions of confinement may be, and often are, restrictive 

and harsh, they must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain. Morgan, 465 

F.3d at 1045 (citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, conditions 

which are devoid of legitimate penological purpose or contrary to evolving standards of decency 

that mark the progress of a maturing society violate the Eighth Amendment. Morgan, 465 F.3d 

at 1045 (quotation marks and citations omitted); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002); 

Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346. 

Prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate shelter, food, 

clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety, Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citations omitted), but not every injury that a prisoner sustains 

while in prison represents a constitutional violation, Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (quotation marks 

omitted). To maintain an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show that prison officials 

were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to his health or safety. E.g., Farmer, 

511 U.S. at 847; Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 2010); Foster v. Runnels, 

 

3 To the extent Plaintiff may believe the refusal to process his appeals gives rise to a viable claim for denial of 

access to the courts, Plaintiff is incorrect. Such a claim accrues only when an inmate suffers an actual injury, and 

speculation that the inability to pursue an appeal will lead to a future litigation injury is insufficient. Christopher v. 

Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002); Lewis, 528 U.S. at 351; Phillips, 588 F.3d at 655.

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554 F.3d 807, 812-14 (9th Cir. 2009); Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045; Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731; 

Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998).

Plaintiff’s allegations do not give rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. He 

alleges that Defendant Garcia’s and Borrero’s actions exposed him to inhumane conditions of 

confinement, but the conditions that he complains of are normal occurrences of prison life. He 

cites “harsh and dangerous conditions such as the ongoing violence and lock downs,” and while 

Plaintiff may perceive conditions at KVSP to be inhumane, the do not create a substantial risk of 

harm as defined by the Eighth Amendment. Compl. 10.

Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a substantial 

risk of harm to his health or safety and has therefore failed to state a claim against them under 

the Eighth Amendment 

D. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s complaint states a cognizable claim against Defendant Garcia for retaliation in 

violation of the First Amendment. It does not state any other claims against any other 

Defendants. Plaintiff may either (1) proceed on his cognizable claim, identified above, or (2) file 

an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified in this order. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). 

If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, he may not change the nature of this suit by 

adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 

(7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints). Further, Plaintiff is notified that his amended 

complaint supersedes the original complaint, Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 

(9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or 

superseded pleading,” Local Rule 220. 

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If Plaintiff is willing to proceed on his cognizable claim, he may notify the Court in 

writing. The Court will then dismiss Plaintiff’s other claims and Defendants, and provide 

Plaintiff with further instructions regarding service of a summons and the complaint.

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must either:

a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court 

in this order, or

b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended 

complaint and is willing to proceed only on the cognizable claim identified above. 

3. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure 

to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 12, 2013 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE DEAC_Signature-END:

3b142a

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