Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00187/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00187-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

 Plaintiff has attached several exhibits to his Complaint,

but they are not paginated. For convenience, all page numbers in

the Complaint refer to the numbers supplied by the Court’s

electronic filing system.

1 07cv0187 L (RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES EASTER,

Plaintiff,

v.

CDC STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et

al.,

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 07cv0187-L (RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE:

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS

TO DISMISS [DOC. NOS. 18, 25]

AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

TO PROCEED [DOC. NO. 23]

Plaintiff Charles Easter, a state prisoner proceeding pro se

and in forma pauperis, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983 on January 29, 2007 [doc. no. 1]. Easter alleges

that Defendants showed deliberate indifference, wanton, willful and

intentional negligence, and violated his right to freedom from

cruel and unusual punishment by improperly placing him on the same

prison yard where he was previously assaulted by other inmates. 

(Compl. 3, 6.)1

Case 3:07-cv-00187-L-RBB Document 30 Filed 02/29/08 Page 1 of 19
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2

 Defendant Tilton had not yet been served with the Summons

and Complaint when the previous Motion to Dismiss was filed. (See

doc. no. 24.)

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Easter submitted a “Motion to Suppress,” which was filed nunc

pro tunc to April 19, 2007 [doc. no. 11]. On May 4, 2007, the

Court ordered that the incident report filed with the Motion to

Suppress be considered as an exhibit to Plaintiff’s Complaint [doc.

no. 13]. 

On June 11, 2007, Defendants E. Perez, Louie Panichello and

Brian R. Morris filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint [doc. no.

18]. Attached to the Motion was a Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and

Declarations from J. T. Stovall and A. Santiago. Defendants Perez,

Panichello and Morris argue that the action should be dismissed

because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 

(Mot. to Dismiss 1.) In response, Easter submitted a Motion to

Proceed, filed nunc pro tunc to June 21, 2007 [doc. no. 23], which

alleges that he properly followed the appeals process and that the

prison was late in responding to his appeal. (Mot. to Proceed 1-

2.) 

On August 24, 2007, Defendant J. Tilton filed a Motion to

Dismiss the Complaint [doc. no. 25].2 Attached to the Motion was a

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant J.

Tilton’s Motion to Dismiss. Defendant Tilton argues that the

action should be dismissed for three reasons. First, Plaintiff

failed to exhaust administrative remedies. (Tilton’s Mot. to

Dismiss 1.) Second, the Defendant is immune from suit. (Id.) 

Third, Plaintiff cannot maintain an action against Defendant Tilton

under a theory of respondeat superior. (Id.) 

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Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss was

filed October 12, 2007 [doc. no. 26]. Easter addresses three

points. Initially, he asks that Defendant Tilton be dismissed from

the action. (Pl.’s Opp’n 4.) Next, he requests that the action be

dismissed without prejudice so that he can properly exhaust his

administrative remedies. (Id.) Finally, he contests the factual

accuracy of statements made in the Declaration of J. T. Stovall

regarding Easter’s administrative grievances. (Id. at 5.) 

Defendants filed their Reply To Plaintiff’s Opposition to

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on October 27, 2007 [doc. no. 27]. 

Defendants again argue that Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed

pursuant to the unenumerated portions of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b) because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies before filing suit. (Defs.’ Reply 2.) The

Court found Defendants’ Motions suitable for decision without oral

argument pursuant to civil local rule 7.1(d)(1) [doc. no. 28]. 

For the reasons set forth below, the district court should

GRANT Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

Easter was incarcerated in the Richard J. Donovan Correctional

Facility (“Donovan”). (Compl. 1.) On August 27, 2006, while

housed on yard four, he was assaulted by other inmates during a

racial riot. (Pl.’s Opp’n 2; Compl. 7.) Easter was placed on

administrative segregation status. (Compl. 7.) He was released

from administrative segregation on September 29, 2006, and placed

on yard two. (Pl.’s Opp’n 2.) After a “couple of weeks,” he was

returned to yard four. (Id.) On November 14, 2006, Easter was

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stabbed during another racial riot in yard four and taken to Mercy

Hospital for treatment. (Compl. 17-19, 73.)

Plaintiff alleges that he submitted an Inmate/Parolee Appeal

Form ("602 form”) on November 29, 2006. (Pl.’s Opp’n 2.) The 602

form describes both the August 27, 2006, and the November 14, 2006,

incidents and asks for an investigation. (Stovall Decl. Ex. A at

1.) It was stamped as received on February 7, 2007. (Id.) 

On February 9, 2007, Easter submitted a second 602 form

requesting an answer to the form he allegedly submitted November

29, 2006. (Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. B.) This second 602 form was returned,

with a letter from the Donovan appeals coordinator dated February

15, 2007. (Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. C.) The letter informed Plaintiff that

the second inmate appeal was a duplicate of the first, which was

received on February 7, 2007. (Id. at 1.) The letter also stated

that the prison’s response to the original appeal would be due

March 23, 2007. (Id.)

Easter resubmitted the second 602 form on February 21, 2007. 

(Pl.’s Opp’n 3.) It was again returned by the Donovan appeals

coordinator, along with a letter dated March 1, 2007. (Pl.’s Opp’n

Ex. D at 1.) The letter contained the same information as the

February 15 letter, along with the statement, “You are not

authorized to bypass any level of the appeals process.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff then wrote to the Chief of Inmate Appeals on March 6,

2007, asking that the Donovan appeals officer be ordered to respond

to his appeal. (Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. E at 1.)

On April 11, 2007, as a result of his appeal, Easter was

interviewed by Correctional Lieutenant C. P. Franco. (Stovall

Decl. Ex. C at 1.) A written appeal response was signed on April

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17, 2007, indicating that Plaintiff’s appeal had been partially

granted at the first level. (Id. at 1-2.) The “partially granted”

designation was given because Easter had asked for an

investigation, but only an appeal inquiry was warranted. (Stovall

Decl. ¶ 8.) The response also said, “If you wish to appeal the

decision, you must submit your staff complaint appeal through all

levels of appeal review up to, and including, the Director’s Level

of Review. Once a decision has been rendered at the Director’s

Level of Review, your administrative remedies will be considered

exhausted.” (Stovall Decl. Ex. C at 2.)

On April 18, 2007, Easter was transferred to Ironwood State

Prison (“ISP”). (Pl.’s Opp’n 3.) According to the Donovan appeals

coordinator, the first level response to Plaintiff’s 602 form was

“received” by Plaintiff nine days later, on April 27, 2007. 

(Stovall Decl. ¶ 10.) The 602 form attached to Stovall’s

declaration, however, shows that it was “returned” to Easter on

April 27, 2007. (Stovall Decl. Ex. A, at 2.) Easter alleges that

he did not receive it until May 22, 2007. (Pl.’s Opp’n 3.) He

then submitted a second level appeal to the ISP appeals office on

May 25, 2007. (Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. F at 2.) 

On June 6, 2007, the Chief of Inmate Appeals sent Easter a

response to his March 6, 2007, letter and accompanying documents. 

(Id. Ex. E at 5.) The letter indicated that Easter’s 602 form was

being returned because review must be completed through the second

level prior to being submitted for Director’s level review. (Id.) 

It appeared that Plaintiff’s appeal had been rejected or withdrawn

or cancelled. (Id.)

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Easter received a letter from ISP relating to his second level

appeal on August 9, 2007. (Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. F at 2.) The appeal

was returned to him because it should have been submitted directly

to Donovan. (Id.) Easter alleges that he then resubmitted the

appeal to Donovan. (Pl.’s Opp’n 3.) As of the date of Stovall’s

declaration, June 6, 2007, the prison had no record of Plaintiff

submitting his 602 for second level review. (Stovall Decl. ¶ 10). 

Furthermore, as of the date of Santiago’s declaration, June 7,

2007, Plaintiff had not submitted a third level appeal to the

Director after completion of the second level of review. (Santiago

Decl. ¶ 7.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO THE FAILURE TO EXHAUST

A. Motion to Dismiss Unexhausted Claims Pursuant to the 

Unenumerated Portions of Rule 12(b)

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”) states: “No action shall be brought with respect to

prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other

Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a) (West 2003). The

exhaustion requirement applies regardless of the relief sought. 

Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). 

“‘[A]n action is “brought” for purposes of § 1997e(a) when the

complaint is tendered to the district clerk’ . . . .” Vaden v.

Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Ford v.

Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 400 (7th Cir. 2004)). Therefore, prisoners

must “exhaust administrative remedies before submitting any papers

to the federal courts.” Id. at 1048 (emphasis added).

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Section 1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement creates an

affirmative defense. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th

Cir. 2003). “[D]efendants have the burden of raising and proving

the absence of exhaustion.” Id. (footnote omitted). Defendants in

§ 1983 actions properly raise the affirmative defense of failure to

exhaust administrative remedies through an unenumerated motion to

dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). Id. 

Unlike Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a

claim for which relief may be granted, “[i]n deciding a motion to

dismiss for failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies, the court may

look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact.” Id.

at 1119-20 (citing Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s

Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988)). “A court ruling on a

motion to dismiss also may take judicial notice of ‘matters of

public record.’” Hazleton v. Alameida, 358 F. Supp. 2d 926, 928

(C.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668,

688 (9th Cir. 2001)). But “if the district court looks beyond the

pleadings to a factual record in deciding the motion to dismiss for

failure to exhaust[,] . . . the court must assure that [Plaintiff]

has fair notice of his opportunity to develop a record.” Wyatt,

315 F.3d at 1120 n.14. 

“[When] the district court concludes that the prisoner has not

exhausted nonjudicial remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal of

the claim without prejudice.” Id. at 1120 (citing Ritza v. Int’l

Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d at 368 & n.3). A

factual finding that Plaintiff failed to exhaust is reviewed under

the clearly erroneous standard. Id. 

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B. The Administrative Grievance Process

“The California Department of Corrections [CDC] provides a

four-step grievance process for prisoners who seek review of an

administrative decision or perceived mistreatment: an informal

level, a first formal level, a second formal level, and the

Director’s level.” Vaden, 449 F.3d at 1048-49 (citing Brown v.

Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 929-30 (9th Cir. 2005)). The administrative

appeal system can be found in title 15, sections 3084.1, 3084.5,

and 3084.6 of the California Code of Regulations. See Brown v.

Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 929-30 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.1(a), 3084.5(a)-(b), (e)(1)-(2), 3084.6(c)). 

To comply with the CDC’s administrative grievance procedure, an

inmate must bring his grievance at the informal level “within 15

working days of the event or decision being appealed . . . .” Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(c) (2006); see also Brown, 422 F.3d at

929. The inmate must then submit any appeal within fifteen working

days of receiving an unacceptable lower level appeal decision. 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(c). 

C. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants

Where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a civil rights

case, the Court must construe the pleadings liberally and give

Plaintiff the benefit of any doubts. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles

Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule of

liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights

cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). 

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III. PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO EXHAUST

A. Judicial Notice

Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

Administrative Bulletin 05-03 (“Bulletin”), submitted in support of

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. 5 n.2.) 

The Bulletin sets forth the protocol for handling 602 forms

alleging staff misconduct. (Stovall Decl. Ex. B at 1.) 

The Court may take judicial notice of any fact that is “not

subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally

known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2)

capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid.

201(b). “A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a

party and supplied with the necessary information.” Fed. R. Evid.

201(d).

Judicial notice may be taken of records of state agencies and

other undisputed matters of public record. Disabled Rights Action

Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 866 n.1 (9th Cir.

2004) (citing Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th

Cir. 2001)). But the Court should not take judicial notice of

agency records when the facts contained in them are subject to

reasonable dispute. Brown, 422 F.3d at 931 n.7 (quoting City of

Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1224 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004));

Lee, 250 F.3d at 689. Also, a court should only take judicial

notice of facts contained in agency records that bear “sufficient

indicia of reliability . . . .” United States v. Perez-Corona, 295

F.3d 996, 1001 n.4 (9th Cir. 2002). The Court will take judicial

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notice of the Bulletin, which sets forth guidelines for processing

a staff complaint and does not contain any information that is

disputed by either party.

B. Plaintiff’s Objections to Defendants’ Evidence

Plaintiff objects to Stovall’s Declaration on that ground that

it is “based in part on fabrications.” (Pl.’s Opp’n 5.) 

Specifically, Easter disagrees that Stovall received the original

602 form on February 7, 2007. (Id.) Plaintiff also contests the

allegation that he received a first level response from Defendants

on April 27, 2007. (Id. at 6.) In deciding a motion to dismiss

for failure to exhaust nonjudicial remedies, the Court may decide

disputed issues of fact. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119-20. Since these

objections amount to a dispute over issues of fact which may be

decided by the Court, the objections are overruled. The Court will

resolve the disputed issue on the basis of the evidence submitted. 

C. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to

the unenumerated portions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)

because Plaintiff has not properly exhausted his administrative

remedies prior to filing suit. (Mot. to Dismiss 1.) 

“Exhaustion of administrative remedies serves two main

purposes.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, , 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2385

(2006) (citing McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992)). It

first “protects ‘administrative agency authority’” by giving an

agency “‘an opportunity to correct its own mistakes . . . before it

is haled into federal court,’ and it discourages ‘disregard of [the

agency’s] procedures.’” Id. (quoting McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145). 

“Second, exhaustion promotes efficiency. . . . [and] ‘may produce a

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useful record for subsequent judicial consideration.’” Id.

(quoting McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145). These two purposes are best

served when civil rights plaintiffs are forced to properly exhaust

administrative remedies and comply with the deadlines set by the

administrative agency. Id. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 2385-86. 

Before the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Wyatt, some courts

treated motions to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies like motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and assigned the burden of proof to Plaintiff. See

Doe v. Schachter, 804 F. Supp. 53, 57 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (citing

Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730,

733 (9th Cir. 1979)). Now, because the failure to exhaust is an

affirmative defense, it is the defendant’s burden to raise and

prove the absence of exhaustion. Jones v. Bock, U.S. , 127 S.

Ct. 910, 921 (2007); Brown, 422 F.3d at 936. In ruling on

Defendants’ Motion, the Court may “look beyond the pleadings and

decide disputed issues of fact.” Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119-20. 

“[T]he court has a broad discretion as to the method to be used in

resolving the factual dispute.” Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s &

Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d at 369. 

If Defendants make a prima facie showing of a failure to

exhaust, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to present evidence that he

did exhaust administrative remedies. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119; Ming

Ching Jin v. Hense, No. 03cv5282-RECSMSP, 2005 WL 3080969, at *2

(E.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2005). Defendants bear the burden of proof, in

part, because “‘it is considerably easier for a prison

administrator to show a failure to exhaust than it is for a

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prisoner to demonstrate exhaustion.’” Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119

(quoting Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002)). 

Plaintiff filed his civil rights complaint pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 on January 29, 2007 [doc. no. 1]. According to

Donovan prison records, Easter did not submit a 602 form requesting

an investigation into staff misconduct until February 7, 2007. 

(Stovall Decl. ¶¶ 5-6, Ex. A.) Plaintiff claims that he submitted

the 602 form on November 29, 2006, and he has provided the Court

with a copy of a completed 602 form dated November 29, 2006. 

(Pl.’s Opp’n 2; Compl. 7.) But, there is no confirmation that this

form was delivered to the prison administration or completed on the

date shown. It bears no stamps from the prison. (See Compl. 7.) 

Additionally, the 602 form refers to “Attachment 1" which is a

statement of facts dated January 17, 2007. (Id. at 8.) It appears

the 602 form was also accompanied by a memorandum of law dated

December 23, 2006. (Id. at 9-10.) These dates are well after the

alleged submission date of November 29, 2006. 

The 602 form submitted by Defendants with the Motion to

Dismiss contains a stamp showing it was received on February 7,

2007. (Stovall Decl. Ex. A.) The absence of any stamp on the 602

form submitted by Plaintiff in his Complaint is evidence that it

was not submitted to the first level of formal review. Cf. Fed. R.

Evid. 803(7). That and the attachments dated December 23, 2006,

and January 17, 2007, compel the Court to find that February 7,

2007, was the date the appeal was received by the prison. 

Nevertheless, the first level appeal was not rejected as untimely. 

(Stovall Decl. Ex. C at 1.)

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Plaintiff brought an action for purposes of § 1997e(a) when he

tendered his Complaint to the district court clerk on January 29,

2007. See Vaden, 449 F.3d at 1050. Therefore, he did not “exhaust

administrative remedies before submitting any papers to the federal

courts.” Id. at 1048. In fact, it appears Plaintiff brought the

action in federal court prior to initiating any administrative

remedies. 

Easter has failed to rebut Defendants’ evidence that he did

not exhaust the formal review process prior to filing his

Complaint. Moreover, he concedes that he has not exhausted his

available administrative remedies. (Pl.’s Opp’n 4.) For these

reasons, Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed. 

B. Dismissal With or Without Prejudice

The Defendants request that the action be dismissed with

prejudice because failure to file a second level appeal within

fifteen days of the first level response means Easter is now unable

to exhaust his administrative remedies. (Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A.

7.) Easter alleges that he was unable to exhaust his

administrative remedies due to the Defendants’ “gamesmanship” with

his original appeal. (Pl.’s Opp’n 4.) He also alleges that he did

file his second level appeal within fifteen days of receiving his

first level response. (Id. at 3.) Easter requests that the action

be dismissed without prejudice so that he can properly exhaust the

remainder of his administrative remedies. (Id. at 4.)

Existing Ninth Circuit case law directs the district court to

dismiss the Complaint without prejudice. Vaden, 449 F.3d at 1051

(citing Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120). But Vaden v. Summerhill, 449

F.3d 1047, and Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, were decided prior

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to Woodford v. Ngo. Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Woodford

v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, it may no longer be appropriate to dismiss

this Complaint with leave to amend if it is too late for Easter to

properly exhaust administrative remedies. A prisoner would “have

little incentive to comply with the system’s procedural rules

unless noncompliance carries a sanction.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548

U.S. at , 127 S. Ct. at 2388. The Court will consider whether

Easter is in that situation. The factual basis for Plaintiff’s

claim, and the steps he took to exhaust the claim are before the

Court.

 The appeals coordinator at Donovan alleges that Easter

received the first level response on April 27, 2007. (Stovall

Decl. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff had fifteen working days from that date to

file a second level appeal. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §

3084.6(c). The 602 form submitted by the Defendants shows a stamp

of April 27, 2007, as the date the appeal was “returned” to

Plaintiff. (Stovall Decl. Ex. A.) Easter’s 602 form also shows

this stamp. (Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. F.) But Easter had been transferred

to ISP nine days earlier, on April 18, 2007. (Pl.’s Opp’n 3.) 

Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff was transferred to

Ironwood on that date.

Easter represents that he did not receive his first level

response from Donovan until May 22, 2007. (Id.) He then submitted

a second level appeal to ISP on May 25, 2007. (Id. Ex. F.) If

Plaintiff received the response on April 27, 2007, his appeal did

not fall within the required fifteen working days, and he no longer

has time to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(c). But if he received the response on May

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22, 2007, Easter attempted to keep the administrative process alive

when he submitted his second level appeal to ISP three days later. 

The evidence supports Plaintiff’s contention that he did not

receive the first level response until May 22, 2007. 

The prison had twenty working days to respond to the second

level appeal submitted by Easter. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §

3084.6(b)(3) (2006). He did not receive a response until August 9,

2007. (Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. F.) This was well beyond the required

twenty-day response time. The appeal was rejected, not because it

was late, but because Easter should have sent it directly to

Donovan. (Id.) Easter alleges that he resubmitted the appeal to

Donovan in accordance with the August 4, 2007, letter. (Pl.’s

Opp’n 3.)

Although the Defendants filed their Reply to Plaintiff’s

Opposition on October 22, 2007, they have produced no evidence that

Plaintiff’s appeal was rejected as untimely, which would end his

right to appeal further. Indeed, the declaration of A. Santiago,

stating that Easter had not completed the second or third levels of

review, was signed on June 7, 2007, almost two months before

Easter’s claimed August 2007 submission. The Defendants have

failed to meet their burden of showing that Plaintiff can no longer

properly exhaust his administrative remedies. 

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Complaint should be DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff must pursue any administrative

remedies that may still be available to him prior to filing a suit,

and he may file a new action in which he asserts claims that

administrative remedies were properly exhausted. 

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IV. ADDITIONAL GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL RAISED BY DEFENDANT TILTON’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

The Court has concluded that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies prior to filing this action, and his

Complaint should be dismissed. This, by itself, would resolve this

case. Nevertheless, because Defendant Tilton also moves to dismiss

on the grounds that he is immune from suit and that Plaintiff

cannot maintain an action against him on a theory of respondeat

superior, the Court will address these contentions.

A. Absolute Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment grants the states immunity from private

civil suits. U.S. Const. amend. XI; Henry v. County of Shasta, 132

F.3d 512, 517 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended, 137 F.3d 1372 (9th Cir.

1998). This immunity applies to civil rights claims brought under

§ 1983, so an inmate cannot recover damages from the state under §

1983 unless the state waives its immunity. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). A federal court only has

jurisdiction over a suit against a state when the relief sought is

“prospective injunctive relief in order to end a continuing

violation of federal law.” Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019,

1025 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,

517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996)) (internal quotations omitted). 

Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to state officials

sued in their official capacities. “[A] suit against a state

official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the

official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” 

Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471

(1985)). “As such, it is no different from a suit against the

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State itself.” Id. (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-

66 (1985); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658,

690 n.55 (1978)).

The Eleventh Amendment does not bar suit against state

officials sued in their individual capacity. Kentucky v. Graham,

473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (“[T]o establish personal liability in a §

1983 action, it is enough to show that the official, acting under

color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right.”). 

But where a state official is sued in his individual capacity as a

nominal defendant, Eleventh Amendment immunity applies. See

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997). 

“[W]hen the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from

the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and

is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though

individual officials are nominal defendants.” Id. (quoting Ford

Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)). The

application of Eleventh Amendment immunity “is to be determined not

by the mere names of the titular parties but by the essential

nature and effect of the proceeding, as it appears from the entire

record.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237 (1974).

Easter sued J. Tilton, the Secretary of California Department

of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), in his official

capacity and in his individual capacity. (Compl. 2.) Plaintiff’s

claims against Tilton in his official capacity constitute claims

against the State of California, which is absolutely immune from

liability for damages. See Brandon, 469 U.S. at 471. 

While Easter is also suing Defendant Tilton in his individual

capacity, he makes no allegations that Defendant Tilton’s

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individual conduct resulted in constitutional violations. Easter

alleges that the CDCR is “responsible for hiring correctional

officers who put my life in danger. . . .” (Compl. 3.) A state

official is stripped of his Eleventh Amendment immunity only as a

“consequence of his individual conduct.” Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 237. 

Plaintiff makes no allegations that Defendant Tilton had any

personal knowledge of Easter’s situation or that any of Tilton’s

personal actions violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Defendant Tilton cannot be stripped of his Eleventh Amendment

immunity when it appears he is being sued simply because he is the

Secretary of the CDCR. (See Compl. 2.) Plaintiff concedes that

the action against Defendant Tilton should be dismissed. (Pl.’s

Opp’n 4.) For these reasons, Plaintiff is barred from seeking

damages from Tilton in his official or individual capacity. 

B. Respondeat Superior

Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act does not allow a cause of

action based on respondeat superior liability. See Monell, 436

U.S. at 692 (“[T]he fact that Congress did specifically provide

that A’s tort became B’s liability if B ‘caused’ A to subject

another to a tort suggests that Congress did not intend § 1983

liability to attach where such causation was absent.”). State

officials are subject to suit in a personal capacity only if “they

play an affirmative part in the alleged deprivation of

constitutional rights.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 568 (9th

Cir. 1987). 

Plaintiff alleges that “CDC officials or [sic] responsible for

putting me back in the same yard witch [sic] put my life in danger

agian [sic]. . . .” (Compl. 2.) But he does not allege that Tilton

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had any personal knowledge of, or involvement in, the acts that led

to Plaintiff’s stabbing. Easter cannot maintain this action based

on Tilton’s supervisory capacity.

For all of these reasons, Plaintiff’s Complaint against

Defendant Tilton should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

V. CONCLUSION

Because Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies

prior to filing this action, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss should

be GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed should be DENIED. 

The action against Defendants Perez, Panichello and Morris should

be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE in its entirety. The action against

Defendant Tilton should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE in its

entirety. 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before March 17, 2008. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before March 24, 2008.

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: February 29, 2008 _____________________________

 Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Lorenz

All Parties of Record 

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