Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cv-00488/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cv-00488-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALLEN HAMMLER,

Plaintiff,

v.

RALPH DIAZ, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:20-cv-0488 JLT (PC)

ORDER TO ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO 

DENY PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO PROCEED IN 

FORMA PAUPERIS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(g) AND THAT PLAINTIFF BE 

REQUIRED TO PAY FILING FEE IN FULL

(Docs. 1, 2) 

FOURTEEN-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff has filed a complaint asserting constitutional claims against governmental 

employees. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff has not, however, submitted an application to proceed in forma 

pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 or paid the $400.0 filing fee for this action. Instead, he moves 

for leave to file a new case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

1

(Doc. 2.) 

///

1 Plaintiff also references a vexatious litigant pre-filing order issued in Hammler v. Alvarez, 3:18-cv-0326-AJB-WVG 

(S.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2019). Pursuant to the terms of that order, before plaintiff can initiate a civil rights action against a

prison official, as he seeks to do here, he “must seek and obtain leave of the presiding judge of the appropriate Court, 

prior to filing any new actions, against any defendant, in any forum in the State of California....” Id. Under California 

law, a vexatious litigant is a pro se litigant who “has lost at least five pro se lawsuits in the preceding seven years, sued 

the same defendants for the same wrongs after losing, repeatedly filed meritless papers or used frivolous tactical 

devices, or who has already been declared a vexatious litigant for similar reasons.” Wolfe v. George, 486 F.3d 1120, 

1124-25 n.7 (9th Cir. 2007); Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 391 et seq. Leave may be granted only if “it appears that the 

litigation has merit and has not been filed for the purposes of harassment or delay.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 391.7(b). 

The Court reserves consideration of plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the pre-filing order until after he has paid the filing 

fee in this action. 

Case 1:20-cv-00488-DAD-JLT Document 5 Filed 11/10/20 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

I. Three Strikes Provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

Proceedings in forma pauperis are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Section 1915(g) provides 

that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action ... under this section if the prisoner has, on 

3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal 

in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger 

of serious physical injury.”

“This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ provision.” Andrews v. King, 

398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Andrews”). “Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three 

strikes or more cannot proceed IFP [or in forma pauperis].” Id.; see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 

F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Cervantes”) (under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly 

brought unsuccessful suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes rule[.]”). 

The objective of the PLRA is to further “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner 

litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997).

“Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which were 

dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim,” Andrews, 

398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the district court styles such dismissal 

as a denial of the prisoner's application to file the action without prepayment of the full filing fee.” 

O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). Once a prisoner has accumulated three 

strikes, he is prohibited by section 1915(g) from pursuing any other IFP action in federal court 

unless he can show he is facing “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(g); Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051-52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which 

“make[ ] a plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ 

at the time of filing”).

While the PLRA does not require a prisoner to declare that § 1915(g) does not bar his 

request to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “[i]n some instances, the district court docket 

records may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one of the criteria under 

Case 1:20-cv-00488-DAD-JLT Document 5 Filed 11/10/20 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

§ 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id. at 1120. When applying 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), 

however, the court must “conduct a careful evaluation of the order dismissing an action, and other 

relevant information,” before determining that the action “was dismissed because it was frivolous, 

malicious or failed to state a claim,” since “not all unsuccessful cases qualify as a strike under § 

1915(g).” Id. at 1121.

The Ninth Circuit has held that “the phrase ‘fails to state a claim on which relief may be 

granted,’ as used elsewhere in § 1915, ‘parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6).’” Id. (quoting Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)). Andrews

further holds that a case is “frivolous” for purposes of § 1915(g) “if it is of little weight or 

importance” or “ha[s] no basis in law or fact.” 398 F.3d at 1121 (citations omitted); see also Neitzke 

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (“[A] complaint, containing as it does both factual 

allegations and legal conclusions, is frivolous [under 28 U.S.C. § 1915] where it lacks an arguable 

basis in either law or in fact....[The] term ‘frivolous,’ when applied to a complaint, embraces not 

only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation.”). “A case is malicious 

if it was filed with the intention or desire to harm another.” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1121 (quotation 

and citation omitted).

II. Discussion

A. Three Strikes 

A review of the actions filed by plaintiff reveals that plaintiff is subject to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g) and is precluded from proceeding in forma pauperis unless plaintiff was, at the time the 

complaint was filed, under imminent danger of serious physical injury. Court records reflect that 

on at least three prior occasions plaintiff has brought actions while incarcerated that were dismissed 

as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The strikes 

described in these cases all occurred prior to the filing of the present action.

• Hammler v. Kernan, Civil Case No. 3:18-cv-01170-DMS-NLS (S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2018 

Order of dismissal for failure to state a claim and as frivolous) (strike one);

• Hammler v. Hough, Civil Case No. 3:18-cv-01319-LAB-BLM (S.D. Cal. May 24, 2019

Case 1:20-cv-00488-DAD-JLT Document 5 Filed 11/10/20 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Order of dismissal as frivolous and for failure to state a claim) (strike two); and

• Hammler v. Hudson, Civil Case No. 2:16-cv-1153-JAM-EFB-P (E.D. Cal. May 17, 2019 

Order of dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies) (strike three).2

B. Imminent Danger Exception

The Court has reviewed plaintiff’s complaint in this action and finds that it does not meet 

the imminent danger exception. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1053. Plaintiff alleges that since his 

arrival at California State Prison in Corcoran, California in June 2019, plaintiff has been “unable 

to maintain his personal hygiene and precluded from practicing health habits.” Plaintiff contends 

that defendants violate institutional guidelines by refusing to provide him with “clean and sanitary 

hair/facial trimmers clippers.” Instead, plaintiff is only allowed to use a set of hair clippers once a 

month; this set is used by other inmates and is typically dirty. 

Plaintiff also claims that his right to practice his religion is impinged by the defendants’ 

refusal to provide him with use of clean hair clippers “for grooming of the body.” Though

officials offer razors, plaintiff states, without elaboration, that he is unable to use them. Plaintiff 

had requested permission to purchase his own set of clippers from an approved vendor, but this 

request was denied. Plaintiff next contends that defendants refuse to provide weekly clean 

laundry. Though dirty clothes and bed sheets are exchanged weekly, plaintiff alleges that they are 

not returned clean. Lastly, plaintiff claims that officials are not providing extra rations of soap and 

cleaning supplies in the midst of the pandemic.

The availability of the imminent danger exception turns on the conditions a prisoner faced 

at the time the complaint was filed, not at some earlier or later time. Bradford v. Kraus, No. 2:19-

cv-1753 DB, 2020 WL 738554, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2020), report and recommendation 

adopted, No. 2:19-cv-1753-KJM-DB, 2020 WL 731114 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2020) (citing 

Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1053). Plaintiff’s allegations that he has not been provided a set of hair 

clippers for personal use or that his laundry is returned unclean does not satisfy the imminent danger 

exception. Neither does his vague allegation that he has not received extra rations of soap or 

2 See El-Shaddai v. Zamora, No. 13-56104, 2016 WL 4254980 (9th Cir. Aug. 12, 2016) (a case counts as a strike 

under § 1915(g) if failure to exhaust is evident on the face of complaint).

Case 1:20-cv-00488-DAD-JLT Document 5 Filed 11/10/20 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

cleaning supplies. Imminent danger of serious physical injury must be a real, present threat, not 

merely speculative or hypothetical. Speculation that plaintiff may experience serious side effects at 

a later time is insufficient. The “imminent danger” exception is available “for genuine 

emergencies,” where “time is pressing” and “a threat ...is real and proximate.” Lewis v. Sullivan, 

279 F.3d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 2002). “Vague and utterly conclusory assertions” of harm are 

insufficient. White v. Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 1998).

Plaintiff has not provided “specific fact allegations of ongoing serious physical injury, or a 

pattern of misconduct evidencing the likelihood of imminent serious physical injury.” Bradford, 

2020 WL 738554, at *2 (quoting Martin v. Shelton, 319 F.3d 1048, 1050 (8th Cir. 2003). His 

allegations therefore fail to meet the imminent danger exception. Because plaintiff fails to 

demonstrate that he meets the imminent danger exception to the three-strikes bar, this court will 

recommend that plaintiff be required to pay the $400.00 filing fee for this case if he wishes to 

proceed with this case.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to assign a district judge to this case; 

The Court RECOMMENDS that:

1. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), plaintiff be denied leave to proceed in this action in 

forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); and

2. Plaintiff be required to pay the $400.00 filing fee in full within thirty days.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 

fourteen days after the date of service of these Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff may file 

written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate 

Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” 

///

///

///

Case 1:20-cv-00488-DAD-JLT Document 5 Filed 11/10/20 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the 

right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 9, 2020 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:20-cv-00488-DAD-JLT Document 5 Filed 11/10/20 Page 6 of 6