Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01074/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01074-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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28 1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

JAIME EVANS,

NO. 2:07-cv-1074 FCD DAD 

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HARD ROCK CAFÉ INTERNATIONAL

(USA), INC., a corporation;

STEWART GARNETT; and DOES I

through XX, inclusive

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter comes before the court on defendant Hard Rock

Café International’s (“Hard Rock”) motion to dismiss five of

plaintiff Jaime Evans’ (“Evans”) eleven claims for relief

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. For the reasons set forth below,1 defendant’s motion

is DENIED.

///

///

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2 The facts of this case are taken from plaintiffs’

allegations in the complaint. 

Defendant, relying on Van Buskirk v. CNN, 284 F.3d 977 (9th

Cir. 2002), asks the court to consider extrinsic evidence in

support of its Motion. (Def’s. Reply Mot., filed Aug. 17, 2007

(“Reply Mot.”), at 7.) However, in Van Buskrik, neither party

challenged the court’s decision to review the proffered evidence. 

In this case, plaintiff objects to the court’s consideration of

defendant’s records. Therefore, in ruling on defendant’s motion

the court will only consider the allegations set forth in the

complaint. Cf. Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir.

1994) (considering documents “whose authenticity no party

questions” on a motion to dismiss) (overruled on other grounds by

Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir.

2002). 

2

BACKGROUND2

Evans was employed by Hard Rock as a server trainer, rocker

and bartender. (Pls.’ Compl., filed June 5, 2007 (“Compl.”), ¶

16.) Following employment at a separate Hard Rock location,

Evans transferred to Hard Rock’s Sacramento location in February

of 2006. (Id.)

In May of 2006, Evans’ co-worker, defendant Stewart Garnett

(“Garnett”), began to make inappropriate and offensive comments

to Evans and at least one other female employee. (Id. ¶ 17.)

Garnett’s sexually explicit comments escalated to unwanted

touching including, but not limited to, reaching up her skirt and

shorts, spanking her buttocks, and attempting to kiss her on the

lips. (Id. ¶ 18.) 

In late May or early June of 2006, Evans and a female coworker, Aimee Hernandez, met with Hard Rock’s General Manager Jim

Borton (“Borton”) to complain about Garnett. (Id. ¶ 20.) Evans

and Hernandez informed Borton that Garnett’s actions made them

uncomfortable and provided examples of his harassment. (Id.) 

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3

Borton assured Evans and Hernandez he would handle the situation. 

(Id.) 

Hard Rock subsequently held a mandatory employee meeting

addressing workplace sexual harassment. (Id. ¶ 21.) Immediately

following the meeting, Garnett made a sexually explicit remark to

Evans. (Id.) Evans sought out Borton, informing him Garnett was

continuing to harass her. (Id.) Borton stated he would talk to

Garnett again. (Id.)

Following these events, Garnett continued to make unwanted

advances and sexually harass Evans. (Id. ¶ 22.) Evans raised

the issue with Borton, advising him that Garnett’s ongoing

behavior was making her incredibly stressed and uncomfortable. 

(Id. ¶ 23.) Evans told Borton she was not sleeping and vomiting

before work. (Id.) Borton commented that he had already

discussed the issue with Garnett “many times,” but that he would

“fix it.” (Id.)

On July 1, 2006, Evans had an evaluation meeting with Hard

Rock Manager Loren Abraham. (Id. ¶ 24.) During the meeting

Abraham told Evans she was performing well at her job, but that

she needed to be more assertive in her verbal leadership. (Id.) 

Evans responded that her assertiveness had declined in large part

as a response to Garnett’s persistent sexual harassment. (Id.) 

Abraham assured Evans that the situation with Garnett would be

appropriately handled. (Id.) The same day, Garnett was issued

a “Final Written Warning” by Hard Rock. (Id. ¶ 25.) 

Three days later, on July 4, 2006, Garnett came to Hard

Rock, despite not being schedule to work. (Id. ¶ 27.) Garnett

drank at the bar and proceeded to follow both Evans and Hernandez

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around the restaurant while they worked. (Id.) Garnett then

tried to touch and hug both women. (Id.) As a result, Evans

later suffered a panic attack and had to leave for the day. 

(Id.) Evans also advised Hard Rock’s Manager Steve Romero

(“Romero”) she could not work with Garnett any longer. (Id.) 

Romero replied that Evans still needed to work the shifts she was

scheduled. (Id.) Evans arranged for a co-worker to cover her

shifts and did not return to work for several days. (Id.) 

On or about July 9, 2006, Evans was scheduled to work with

Garnett. (Id. ¶ 28.) Evans told Borton she did not want to

work with Garnett, but would for that day. (Id.) She also

expressed frustration that nothing had been done to conclusively

remedy the situation. (Id.) Borton then advised her that

Garnett had signed a letter saying he would be terminated if he

continued to engage in sexually harassing conduct. (Id.) 

Despite Borton’s assurance, Garnett continued to harass

Evans while she worked. (Id. ¶ 29.) On one occasion he arrived

early and sat staring at Evans for forty five minutes. (Id.) On

another occasion, he squirted her with a water bottle. (Id.) On

July 31, 2006, Evans again told Borton she would not work with

Garnett. (Id.) Borton promised to reschedule her shifts so that

they would not coincide with Garnett’s. (Id. ¶ ¶ 30-31.) 

Nonetheless, on August 2, 2006 Evans was scheduled to work with

Garnett. (Id. ¶ 31.) 

From that date on, Evans proceeded to call before her shift

to see whether she was scheduled to work with Garnett. (Id.) If

she was scheduled to work with him, Evans switched shifts with a

co-worker to avoid coming into contact with Garnett. (Id.) 

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5

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff

need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id. 

Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to assume that the

plaintiff “can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the

defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not

been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Calif., Inc. v.

Calif. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 

Moreover, the court “need not assume the truth of legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” United

States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th

Cir. 1986).

Ultimately, the court may not dismiss a complaint in which

the plaintiff has alleged “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007). Only where a plaintiff has not

“nudged [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to

plausible,” is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. “[A] court

may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could

be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent

with the allegations.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.

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506, 514 (2002) (quoting Hudson v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,

73 (1984)). 

In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the court may consider

only the complaint, any exhibits thereto, and matters which may

be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. 

See Mir v. Little Co. Of Mary Hospital, 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th

Cir. 1988); Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. Consumers Union of United

States, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 1998).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges Hard Rock’s conduct resulted

in her emotional distress, loss of employment opportunities and

mental anguish. Specifically, plaintiff brings claims for (1)

hostile work environment under Title VII and FEHA; (2)

retaliation under Title VII and FEHA; (3) failure to prevent

sexual harassment under FEHA; (4) wrongful termination in

violation of public policy; (5) negligent hiring, supervision,

training and retention; (6) negligence; (7) assault; (8) battery;

and (9) negligent infliction of emotional distress. Defendant

moves to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for negligence, negligent

infliction of emotional distress, and negligent hiring,

supervision, training, and retention because it contends such

claims are barred by California’s Workers Compensation Act. 

Defendant also moves to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for assault

and battery on the grounds that she has failed to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. 

A. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendant contends that the exclusive remedy clause of

California’s Workers’ Compensation Act (“WCA”) bars plaintiff’s

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claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”). 

(Mot. at 6.) Plaintiff argues that claims for NIED are not

subject to the exclusive remedy clause of the WCA when it is

premised on an employer’s conduct that violates fundamental

public policy. (Pl.’s Opp’n Mot., filed Aug. 7, 2007 (“Opp’n”),

at 8.)

Where a plaintiff’s emotional distress claim results from a

defendant’s misconduct which exceeds the normal risks of the

employment relationship, a plaintiff’s claim is not preempted by

the WCA. Fretland v. County of Humboldt, 69 Cal. App. 4th 1478,

1492 (1999); see also Cabesuela v. Browning-Ferris Industries of

California, 68 Cal. App. 4th 101, 112-13 (1998) (stating that

plaintiff’s emotional distress claim is not barred by WCA in suit

alleging wrongful termination in violation of public policy). 

Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination and

fundamentally violates determinations of state public policy. 

Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Productions, 38 Cal. 4th 264, 277

(2006). 

Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that defendant knew or

should have known that plaintiff was being subject to sexual

harassment and that their failure to exercise due care in

preventing such harassment caused her emotional distress. 

(Compl. ¶ 89.) As such, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that

her NIED claim is based upon Garnett’s sexual harassment, conduct

that fundamentally violates California public policy and is thus,

beyond the normal risks of the employment relationship. 

Therefore Evans’ NIED claim is not barred by the exclusivity

provision of the WCA.

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Defendant argues that while intentional emotional distress

may fall outside the exclusivity provision of the WCA, a claim

for NIED is barred by the same. (Def’s. Reply Mot., filed Aug.

17, 2007 (“Reply Mot.”), at 3.) However, in Maynard v. City of

San Jose, the Ninth Circuit explicitly held that the plaintiff’s

claims of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional

distress were not preempted by the WCA. Maynard v. City of San

Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1405 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Smith v. Int’l

Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 109 Cal. App. 4th 1637, 1658 (2003)

(holding that plaintiff’s NIED claim was not barred by the WCA

because it was based on his employer’s violation of fundamental

public policies). Defendant argues that the Maynard court’s

holding with was incorrect and alternatively, that such a finding

was merely dicta. The court finds neither of these arguments

persuasive. In Maynard, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the jury’s

verdict for the plaintiff regarding his claim for NIED, finding

that such a claim was not preempted by the WCA because it arose

out of conduct that implicates fundamental public policies. 37

F.3d at 1405-06. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the Maynard

court’s finding does not “border on dicta.” (Reply Mot. at 4). 

As such, no matter how strongly defendant contends it was

incorrectly decided, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Maynard is

binding on this court. Accordingly, Hard Rock’s motion to

dismiss plaintiff’s eleventh claim for NIED is DENIED. 

B. Negligence; Negligent Hiring, Supervision, Training and

Retention

Defendant similarly argues that plaintiff’s claims for

negligence and negligent hiring, supervision, training and

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retention are barred by the exclusivity doctrine of the WCA. 

(Mot. at 4-6.) Plaintiff contends an exception to the

exclusivity rule applies when an employee suffers injury as a

result of discrimination. (Opp’n, at 7.) 

The WCA generally provides the exclusive remedy for an

employee’s work-related injury. 2 WITSUM Workers Compensation

Act § 24 (2005). However, incidents where the “defendant’s

misconduct exceeds the normal risk of the employment

relationship” are excepted from the exclusivity provision. 

Fretland v. County of Humboldt, 459 F. Supp. 2d 959, 1492 (1999)

(citing Livitsanos v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 744, 756

(1992)). As such, claims of negligence are not necessarily

preempted by the WCA’s exclusivity provision. Scott v. Solano

County Health and Social Services, 459 F. Supp. 2d 959, 971 (E.D.

Cal. 2006). “[T]he [WCA] does not bar . . . allegations of a

negligent response to harassment or discrimination claims because

these claims are based on accusations of discrimination, which

‘is not a normal risk of the compensation bargain.’” Id. (citing

Fretland, 69 Cal. App. 4th at 1492); Doerflex-Casner v. Placer

County Dep’t of Pub. Works, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36066, 26-27

(2006); see Maynard, 37 F.3d at 1405 (“Personal injury claims

that implicate fundamental public policy considerations are not

preempted by the Workers Compensation Act.”). 

Plaintiff’s claims for negligence and negligent hiring,

supervision, training and retention are based upon defendant’s

alleged failure to fulfill its duty to prevent sexual harassment,

(Compl. ¶¶ 70, 74), conduct that falls outside the normal risk of

the compensation bargain. Therefore, defendant’s motion to

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dismiss with respect to plaintiff’s seventh and eighth claims for

relief is DENIED. 

C. Assault and Battery

 Finally, defendant argues that it cannot be held

vicariously liable for Garnett’s actions because there is no

nexus between his employment with defendant Hard Rock and the

alleged batteries he inflicted on Evans. (Mot. at 8.) Plaintiff

argues that Garnett’s conduct was, at the very least, reasonably

foreseeable to Hard Rock and thus, Hard Rock should be held

vicariously liable for the torts committed by Garnett. (Opp’n at

9.) 

Vicarious liability is established when an employee acted

within the scope of his employment when he engaged in the

conduct. Farmers Ins. Group v. Santa Clara County, 11 Cal. 4th

992, 997 (1995). Determinations regarding scope of employment

are broadly construed. Id. at 1004. Furthermore, “an employer’s

vicarious liability may extend to willful and malicious torts of

an employee as well as negligence. . . . [A]n employee’s tortious

act may be within the scope of the employment even if it

contravenes an express company rule and confers no benefit to the

employer.” Id. 

An employer may be vicariously liable if the employee’s act

was either required by the employer or incidental to the

employee’s duties. Yamaguchi v. Harsmut, 106 Cal. App. 4th 472,

482 (2003). Alternatively, an employer may be held liable if the

employee’s conduct was reasonably foreseeable to the employer. 

Id.; see also Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem’l Hosp., 12 Cal.

4th 291, 297-99 (1995). Conduct is reasonably foreseeable if the

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incident leading to injury is an ‘outgrowth’ of the employment. 

Id. at 298 (citations omitted). “A sexual tort will not be

considered [as reasonably foreseeable] . . . unless its

motivating emotions were fairly attributable to work related

events or conditions.” Id. at 301. 

Plaintiff alleges that, on numerous occasions, Garnett had

engaged in offensive conduct during the course of her employment

with defendant, plaintiff had reported the conduct to defendant,

and subsequently, such conduct continued. Plaintiff also alleges

that she informed defendant that she could not work with Garnett

and that she arranged for co-workers to cover her shifts to avoid

him. See Yamaguchi, 106 Cal. App. at 482 (noting that evidence

of previous work disputes and threats between co-workers that did

not socialize outside the work environment and threats by one coworker that he would strike plaintiff with a knife could give

rise to the imposition of vicarious liability upon employer for

the subsequent assault with a knife); cf. Lisa M., 12 Cal. 4th at

302 (holding that an employer was not vicariously liable for a

sexual tort of its employee where there was no evidence that the

employee’s conduct was foreseeable to the employer either due to

nature of the work or prior interactions between plaintiff and

employee). Giving the plaintiff every reasonable inference from

the allegations in her complaint, plaintiff has sufficiently

alleged that Garnett’s alleged tortious conduct were casually

attributable to his employment with defendant and an outgrowth of

workplace relationships, conditions and events. Therefore,

defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for assault and

battery are DENIED. 

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 24, 2007

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