Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02008/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02008-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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D.K. Sisto is substituted for his predecessor, Tom Carey, as the warden where the 1

prisoner is incarcerated, pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD MOTEN,

Petitioner, No. 2:05-cv-02008 ALA HC

vs.

D.K. SISTO, Warden , 

1

Respondent. ORDER

 /

Pending before the Court are Edward Moten’s (“Petitioner”) amended application for a

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) filed on February 20, 2007 (doc. 18),

Respondent’s answer (doc. 22), and Petitioner’s traverse (doc. 24). Also, before the Court are

the parties’ briefs filed in response to this Court’s December 19, 2007 order requesting

additional briefing on the applicability of Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2007) to this

matter. For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner’s application is denied.

I

On January 17, 1987, a jury in the Alameda County Superior Court convicted petitioner 

of second degree murder and found that he was personally armed with an automatic pistol and

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 used it in the commission of the crime. He was sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment of 

seventeen years to life.

Petitioner is currently incarcerated in the California State Prison, Solano. He requests

that this Court hold that the state court violated his federal constitutional rights in upholding the

Board of Prison Terms (“BPT”) finding that he was unsuitable for parole release at its hearing on

May 13, 2004.

II

A

During the May 13, 2004 hearing, the BPT summarized the facts of the commitment

offense from the probation report as follows: 

On February 9, 1981, Petitioner, Robert Porter, and Patricia Parsons waited at a rest stop

in a yellow 1977 Oldsmobile automobile for approximately two hours. Shortly after they

arrived, Petitioner left the car. He went to a telephone. When he returned, Petitioner told Porter

he had damaged the telephone so that no one could use it.

Porter then went to the telephone and broke it and threw a piece of it away. Later,

Petitioner told Porter he needed some rope to tie someone up with it.

Petitioner then waited in the restroom for awhile. When he returned to the car, he stated

it was freezing in the restroom. Petitioner retrieved some rope from the trunk of the car. Porter

cut the rope into several pieces.

The three waited in the car while several automobiles came and went. At one point

Petitioner woke Porter up and told him, “This looks like something right here. Let’s check it

out.”

A male witness who was in the back restroom heard two shots. He turned around and

saw Petitioner straddling John Fletcher. Petitioner pointed a gun at the witness, and then turned

away and left the restroom. Another witness reported that after she heard two shots, she saw two

men hurry from the restroom get into a yellow car and drive off.

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When Parsons asked Petitioner and Porter about the sounds she had heard, she was told it

was probably fire crackers. She was instructed not to drive over fifty-five miles per hour and if

they were stopped, she should deny that they had been at the rest area.

A witness asked the victim why he thought he had been shot and whether he had been

robbed. The victim replied: “I don’t know. I don’t know. I’m going to die. I’m going to die.”

The yellow Oldsmobile driven by Ms. Parsons was stopped by Placer County deputy

sheriffs. A nine millimeter Berretta handgun was found in the car. It was the murder weapon. 

Petitioner was found guilty of personally using a firearm during the commission of a homicide.

B

At the beginning of the May 13, 2004 hearing, Petitioner was instructed that “you are not

required to admit your offense nor are you required to discuss the offense.” Petitioner was

represented by counsel at the hearing.

After the presiding commissioner summarized the facts regarding the commitment

offense, he asked Petitioner “did you commit this crime.” Petitioner responded: “I was at the

rest stop at the time of the crime. Although I was found guilty of arming and use. I did not pull

the trigger and kill Mr. Fletcher but I take full responsibility for moral responsibility for it.” 

BPT’s May 13, 2004 proceedings at p. 14.

Petitioner told the BPT that they were at the rest stop because Parsons, Porter’s

girlfriend, was turning tricks in the restroom. Petitioner stated that Parsons had words with a

man in the restroom. Parsons returned to the car and whispered something in Porter’s ear. 

Porter left the car. Petitioner followed him into the restroom a short time later. Petitioner

observed Porter having words with Mr. Fletcher. Porter then removed a pistol from his jacket

and shot the victim twice. Petitioner told the BPT that he reached over Porter as he shot the

victim. Porter then left the restroom while Petitioner grabbed the victim as he slid to the floor. 

Petitioner stated he looked up and saw another man in the restroom. Petitioner left and went

back to the car. Petitioner stated that when he returned to the car, he asked Porter what

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 In finding that Petitioner posed an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released 2

from prison, the BPT discredited Petitioner’s version of the commitment offense. Pursuant to 

§ 2254(e)(1) “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be

correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear

and convincing evidence.” Petitioner failed to rebut the jury’s finding that he murdered the

victim by clear and convincing evidence.

4

happened. Porter stated the victim “disrespected” Parsons. Petitioner told the BPT that the

crime was a “ridiculous” and “senseless” murder. Id. at 17. Petitioner also told the BPT: “I did

not pull the trigger. . . . I did not encourage this.” Id. at 22.2

III

The BPT concluded that Petitioner was unsuitable for parole because he would pose an

unreasonable threat to public safety if released from prison. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ

of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court on November 8, 2004, in which he challenged

the BPT’s denial of a parole release date.

In his state petition, he contended that the BPT deprived him of his federal right to due

process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment by denying him a parole release

date. The California Supreme Court summarily denied his petition on September 21, 2005. 

Petitioner filed a timely application for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) on October 5, 2005. (doc. 1). Subsequently, Petitioner filed an amended

application for habeas corpus relief on February 20, 2007. (doc. 18).

IV

A

Petitioner alleged in his amended Petition that the Board violated his Fourteenth

Amendment due process rights because it (1) relied on the manner in which the underlying crime

was executed; (2) recommended he seek additional therapy; (3) considered and incorporated a

threat assessment authored by a correctional counselor; (4) operated in a manner that was not in

compliance with it governing statute P.C. § 3041(a); (5) denied him an impartial suitability

hearing; (6) failed to adhere to the mandates of P.C. §1170(a)(1); and (7) failed to honor the

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release dates provided to Petitioner by the CDCR.

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to a

state court judgment “shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits” in state court unless the adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

B

Citing Ninth Circuit authority, Petitioner contends in his amended application that this

Court has jurisdiction over this matter because a state prisoner has a liberty interest in being

released on parole under California law that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. In his answer to the application, Respondent maintains that this Court

may not grant Petitioner’s application pursuant to § 2254(d) because the state court’s denial of

habeas corpus relief was not contrary to clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States. Respondent contends that no decision of the United States

Supreme Court has held that a state prisoner has a federally protected interest in release on

parole under California Penal Code §3041. This contention is contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s

decision in Sass v. Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d, 1123, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2006). This

Court must reject Respondent’s contention under compulsion of Ninth Circuit precedent that

provides that “California’s parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on

parole.” Id. at 1127 (citation omitted).

In his response to this Court’s December 19, 2007 Order for supplemental briefing

regarding the applicability if any, of Irons v. Carey, 479 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 2007) to this matter,

Respondent argues that because the Supreme Court has never applied the some evidence test to a

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parole decision, this Court is not required to follow Irons in disposing of this application.

In Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985), the Supreme Court held that

“revocation of good time does not comport with ‘the minimum requirements of procedural due

process,’ unless the findings of the prison disciplinary board are supported by some evidence in

the record.” (Citation omitted). This Court is bound by the Ninth Circuit holding that Hill’s

“some evidence” standard applies to parole release proceedings. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29; See

Irons, 505 F.3d at 851 (“the Supreme Court ha[s] clearly established that a parole board’s

decision deprives a prisoner of due process with respect to this interest if the board’s decision is

not supported by ‘some evidence in the record,’ . . . or is ‘otherwise arbitrary’”).

This Court cannot contravene that holding. See Zuniga v. United Can Co., 812 F.2d 443,

450 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted) (“District courts are, of course, bound by the law of their

own circuit, and ‘are not to resolve splits between circuits no matter how egregiously in error

they may feel their own circuit to be.’”). Therefore, this Court must reject Respondent’s

argument that the some evidence standard does not apply.

In Irons, the Ninth Circuit held that 

where, as here, there is some evidence to support a finding that

“the offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an

exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering” and the

“motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation to

the offense,” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 §2402(c)(1)(D)-(E), we

cannot say that the state court unreasonably applied Hill’s “some

evidence” principle.

Irons, 505 F.3d at 853.

In Irons, the record showed that the BPT relied solely on the commitment offense in determining

that the prisoner was not suitable for release on parole. Id. at 852.

The Ninth Circuit limited its holding in Irons as follows: “All we held in [Sass, 461 F.3d

at 1125 and Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 912 (9th Cir. 2002)] and all we hold today,

therefore, is that, given the particular circumstances of the offenses of these cases, due process

was not violated when these prisoners were deemed unsuitable for parole prior to the expiration

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of their minimum terms.” 505 F.3d at 853-54. In an unusual comment in Irons, the panel

expressed its aspiration that some future court decision will conclude that the BPT has the duty

to grant parole where “there was substantial evidence in the record demonstrating rehabilitation.” 

Id. at 854.

The Court stated:

We hope that the Board will come to recognize that in some cases,

indefinite detention based solely on an inmate’s commitment

offense, regardless of the extent of his rehabilitation, will at some

point violate due process, given the liberty interest in parole that

flows from the relevant California statutes.

Id.

The Irons panel did not cite any authority to support its prognostication that the denial by

the state court of habeas corpus relief, under such circumstances, would be “contrary to, or

involve [] an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States” in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). No presently

binding Ninth Circuit decision has fulfilled the prediction of the Irons’s panel.

In the precedential portion of the Irons decision, the Court held that “we must look to

California law to determine the findings that are necessary to deem a prisoner unsuitable for

parole, and then must review the record in order to determine whether the state court decision

holding that these findings were supported by ‘some evidence.’” Irons, 505 F.3d at 851. A

prisoner’s commitment offense, on its own, may justify parole denial if “the Board can ‘point to

factors beyond the minimum elements of the crime for which the inmate was committed’ that

demonstrate the inmate will, at the time of the suitability hearing, present a danger to society if

released.” Id. at 852 (quoting Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1071 (2005)). 

Based on controlling Ninth Circuit authority, this Court must determine whether some

evidence supported the BPT’s May 13, 2004 decision not to set a release date. Because the

California Supreme Court rejected Petitioner’s allegations of a denial of his right to due process

and equal protection of the law summarily, this court must independently review the record

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before the state court to decide whether its decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States. Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003).

V

The BPT’s May 13, 2004 decision reads as follows:

PRESIDING COMMISSIONER PEREZ: Mr. Moten, the Panel

reviewed all information received from the public and relied on the

following circumstances in concluding that you are not suitable

and would pose an unreasonable risk of society, danger to society

or threat to public safety if released from prison. It is the opinion

of this Panel that the offense was carried out in a calculated

manner, and that the motive for the crime was inexplicable or very

trivial in relationship with the offense, and that based on the

information contained in file it appears that this crime was

committed for the purpose, a calculated purpose of committing a

robbery. According to the, and these conclusions are drawn from

the Statement of Facts wherein the prisoner according to the life

prisoner evaluation report dated April 2003, indicates that on

February 9th, 1981, John Fletcher, age 41, was shot and killed in a

restroom at the Gold Run Rest Stop. It appears that a nine

millimeter Berretta weapon was used in the process of attempting

to rob this individual while he was in the bathroom at that rest

stop. It is the opinion of this Panel that you had the opportunity to

cease from committing this offense and chose not to. It is the

opinion of this Panel that the opportunity was there to call 911 or

call for help and that neither you or any of your crime partner, or

your crime partner chose to do this. And it is also the opinion of

this Panel that if this offense was not carried out for the purpose of

committing robbery then there is no explanation that we can cite

from the record as to why this offense was committed. According

to the record, it appears that you have an escalating pattern of

criminal conduct and behavior, and that’s based on the fact that

you have prior criminal convictions dating back to 1972 in which 

you were convicted fro armed robbery, three counts of

transportation and sales of a controlled substance. In 1976, you

were convicted of burglary second, 1979, again, burglary second,

and then in 1981, you committed the current commitment offense. 

So within that nine-year span, you were convicted of those

offenses and were also placed on probation and convicted or

committed to prison in order to attempt to correct your behavior. 

And based on the information in the file, you failed to profit from

society’s attempts to correct your behavior by incarcerating you,

by putting you on probation, and so forth as previously noted. 

Although you have remained disciplinary-free during the past,

since 1999, according to the file since the last time that you

appeared before the Board, you have incurred three counseling

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chronos for I believe it was for, let me just check here.

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER LEHMAN: Two were grooming

standards and one for failure to report.

PRESIDING COMMISSIONER PEREZ: Two grooming

standards, failure to report. Sir, I need to say what I need to say,

Mr. Moten, and then you can speak to him afterwards. Also,

according to the Board Report, on page four of the Board Report, it

indicates that during the previous appearance before the Board,

you had requested a waiver of the hearing and a three-year denial

which was granted, and that at that time you were, it was

recommended that you become disciplinary free, to upgrade

vocationally, and to participate in self-help and therapy. It’s

apparent from the record that you are doing wonderfully in terms

of upgrading yourself vocationally. However, as I previously

noted, since your last appearance before the Board, you did receive

those three 128(a) counseling chronos. The Hearing Panel also

notes that pursuant to Penal Code Section 3042, the District

Attorney of Placer County, Mr. Garen Horst, is in opposition to

your release to parole. The Panel makes the following findings,

sir, and that is that it is our opinion that you need further therapy in

order to face, discuss, understand, and cope with stress in a

nondestructive manner. It is our opinion, sir, that you are in denial

of this crime, and in denial of the facts, and the reasons why this

crime was committed. That is our opinion. Nevertheless, we want

to take this opportunity to commend you for a variety of things. 

Based on the record, you have not received any 115s since 1999. 

We also want to commend you for having completed academic and

vocational – you’ve received academic and vocational certificates

during your incarceration, and also for having received a number

of laudatory chronos from your supervisors in which they indicate

that you are a very good worker, also for your participation, I

think, is for a total of 15 months in NA, and also for your

involvement in the creation and development of the Anger

Management Program, and also for your participation in various

self-help programs. In a separate decision, the Hearing Panel finds

that it is not reasonable to expect that parole would be granted at a

hearing during the following two years for the reasons that I

previously stated in regards to the fact that the offense was carried

out in a calculated manner and that it appears that this individual

that was killed was killed during the commission of a robbery. 

And if that’s not the case then the motive for this crime is

inexplicable and trivial in that there is nothing to indicate that this

individual posed a threat to yourself in that this was a case of selfdefense. And again, these conclusions are drawn from the

Statement of Facts, wherein the record indicates that John Fletcher,

the victim in this case, was shot two times while he was in a

restroom at the Gun Rest, Gold Run Rest Stop. And as previously

stated, the other reason that we have given you a two-year denial is

because based on a review of the criminal rap sheet you have

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committed an escalating pattern of criminal conduct in that you

have criminal convictions dating back to 1972, and during that

nine-year period from 1972 up until 1982 when you committed the

offense, you had convictions for armed robbery, three counts for

transportation and sales of controlled substance, two separate

convictions for burglary, and then the 1981 murder with a firearm. 

And again, as previously stated, the District Attorney of Placer

County, Garen Horst, is in opposition to your parole. In addition,

the counselor indicates that considering the commitment offense,

prior record, and prison adjustment, this writer believes the

prisoner would pose an unpredictable degree of threat to the public

at this time if released from prison. The Panel recommends, ir,

that you become and remain disciplinary-free, that you upgrade

educationally if it’s available within the institution, that also if the

programs are available that you continue participating in self-help

and therapy programs, and that you cooperate with clinicians in the

future in the completion of another clinical evaluation. We’re

going to request that CDC complete another clinical evaluation

prior to your next appearance before the Board. We’re going to

ask that a number of issues be taken into consideration and

assessed during that evaluation and that would be to, that would

include your violence potential in the community, the significance

of alcohol and drugs as it relates to the commitment offense, the

extent to which you’ve explored the commitment offense and

actually come to terms with the underlying cause, and the need for

further therapy while incarcerated. This concludes this hearing. 

The time is 12:05 p.m.

ATTORNEY RUSSO: For the record, I want on the record that I

was not allowed to confer with my client during the

Commissioner’s statement of ruling.

PRESIDING COMMISSIONER PEREZ: Sir, sir what I would

also like to get on the record is that when I’m in the process of

reading the Decision there’s no reason for you to be conferring

with you client. Theat concludes this hearing. The time is 12:05

p.m.

A

In his traverse, Petitioner contends that “[t]he Board’s reasons, rooted in history, totally

revolve around the commitment offense.” Traverse at p. 7. The record does not support this

mischaracterization of the BPT’s opinion. The BPT concluded that Petitioner was unsuitable for

release on parole because he presented an unreasonable danger to society in view of his

commitment offense, as well as his escalating pattern of criminal conduct and behavior prior to

killing his victim. His prior criminal convictions dated back to 1972. In that year, he was

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convicted of armed robbery and three counts of transportation and sale of a controlled substance. 

In 1976, he was convicted of burglary. In 1979, he was again convicted of burglary. In 1981, he

committed the crime of murder. During that nine year period, he was imprisoned and placed

under probation and parole supervision. He served two prior state prison terms. These prior

attempts by the state to rehabilitate him did not deter him from subsequently committing murder.

The BPT also based its decision on the fact that Petitioner was “in denial of this crime,

and in denial of the facts, and the reasons why this crime was committed.” BPT’s decision at p.

88. Petitioner’s inability to accept responsibility for his conduct that resulted in the death of his

victim clearly supported the BPT’s inference from this evidence that the length of his

imprisonment for murder had not had any effect on his ability to refrain from harming others if

he were released on parole.

B

In Biggs, in affirming the denial of a parole release date, the Ninth Circuit held that

“[California Penal Code] Section 3041(b) allows the gravity of the offense to be considered in

requiring a period of longer incarceration.” Id. 334 F.3d at 916. Thus, Petitioner’s contention

that the BPT cannot base its decision on the commitment offense is contrary to binding

precedent. Section 3041(b) provides that the BPT

shall set a release date unless it determines the gravity of the

offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past

convicted offenses or offenses, is such that consideration of the

public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for

this individual and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at

this meeting.

As noted above, the BPT declined to set a parole release date because it concluded that

“the offense was carried out in a calculated manner, and that the motive for the crime was

inexplicable or very trivial in relationship to the offense, and that based on the information in the

file it appears that this crime was committed for the purpose of a robbery.” The BPT also noted

that “you had the opportunity to cease from committing this offense and chose not to do so.” 

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The BPT also commented that Petitioner had the opportunity “to call for help and neither you or

any of your crime partner (sic), or your crime partner chose to do so.” 

California Code of Regulations § 2402 sets forth the circumstances that tend to show

suitability for the release on parole of persons convicted of murder. It provides as follows:

§2402. Determination of Suitability

(a) General. The panel shall first determine whether the life

prisoner is suitable for release on parole. Regardless of the length

of time served, a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and

denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose

an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.

(b) Information Considered. All relevant, reliable information

available to the panel shall be considered in determined suitability

for parole. Such information shall include the circumstances of the

prisoner’s social history; past and present mental state; past

criminal history, including involvement in other criminal

misconduct which is reliably documented; the base and other

commitment offenses, including behavior before, during and after

the crime; past and present attitude toward the crime; any

conditions of treatment or control, including the use of special

conditions under which the prisoner may safely be released to the

community; and any other information which bears on the

prisoner’s suitability for release,. Circumstances which taken

alone may not firmly establish unsuitability for parole may

contribute to a pattern which results in a finding of unsuitability.

(c) Circumstances Tending to Show Unsuitability. The following

circumstances each tend to indicate unsuitability for release. 

These circumstances are set forth as general guidelines; the

importance attached to any circumstance or combination of

circumstances in a particular case is left to the judgment of the

panel. Circumstances tending to indicate unsuitability include:

(1) Commitment Offense. The prisoner committed the offense in

an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner. The factors to be

considered include:

(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed in the same or

separate incidents.

(B) The offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated

manner, such as an execution-style murder.

(C) The victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the

offense.

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(D) The offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates

an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering.

(E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in

relation to the offense.

(2) Previous Record of Violence. The prisoner on previous

occasions inflicted or attempted to inflict serious injury on a

victim, particularly if the prisoner demonstrated serious assaultive

behavior at an early age.

(3) Unstable Social History. The prisoner has a history of unstable

or tumultuous relationships with others.

(4) Sadistic Sexual Offenses. The prisoner has previously sexually

assaulted another in a manner calculated to inflict unusual pain or

fear upon the victim.

(5) Psychological Factors. The prisoner has a lengthy history of

severe mental problems related to the offense.

(6) Institutional Behavior. The prisoner has engaged in serious

misconduct in prison or jail.

(d) Circumstances Tending to Show Suitability. The following

circumstances each tend to show that the prisoner is suitable for

release. The circumstances are set forth as general guidelines; the

importance attached to any circumstance or combination of

circumstances in a particular case is left to the judgment of the

panel. Circumstances tending to indicate suitability include:

(1) No Juvenile Record. The prisoner does not have a record of

assaulting others as a juvenile or committing crimes with a

potential of personal harm to victims.

(2) Stable Social History. The prisoner has experienced

reasonably stable relationships with others.

(3) Signs of Remorse. The prisoner performed acts which tend to

indicate the presence of remorse, such as attempting to repair the

damage, seeking help for or relieving suffering of the victim, or

indicating that he understands the nature and magnitude of the

offense.

(4) Motivation for Crime. The prisoner committed his crime as the

result of significant stress in his life, especially if the stress has

built over a long period of time.

(5) Battered Woman Syndrome. At the time of the commission of

the crime, the prisoner suffered from Battered Woman Syndrome,

as defined in section 2000(b), and it appears the criminal behavior

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was the result of that victimization.

(6) Lack of Criminal History. The prisoner lacks any significant

history of violent crime.

(7) Age. The prisoner’s present age reduces the probability of

recidivism.

(8) Understanding and Plans for the Future. The prisoner has

made realistic plans for release or has developed marketable skills

that can be put to use upon release.

(9) Institutional Behavior. Institutional activities indicate an

enhanced ability to function within the law upon release.

“[T]he denial of parole may be predicated on a prisoner’s

commitment offense only where the Board can ‘point to factors

beyond the minimum elements of the crime for which the inmate

was committed’ that demonstrate the inmate will, at the time of the

suitability hearing, present a danger to society if released.” 

Irons, 505 F.3d at 852 quoting In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1071 (2005).

The California Supreme Court has defined the elements of second degree murder “as the

unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, but without the additional elements,

such as willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation that would support a conviction of first

degree murder.” People v. Knoller, 41 Cal. 4th 139, 151 (2007). “[M]urder which is perpetrated

by. . . lying in wait . . ., or which is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate. . .

robbery. . . is murder in the first degree.” California Penal Code §189. The evidence at

Petitioner’s trial demonstrated that he and his accomplices were lying in wait for two hours to

rob or murder a person who went to the restroom at a rest stop. This conduct was clearly beyond

the minimum elements required to prove second degree murder. For reasons that do not appear

in the record, the jury found Petitioner guilty of second degree murder, notwithstanding the

evidence of lying in wait and that the homicide was committed during the perpetration of a

robbery. The fact that the jury did not find beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence was

sufficient to support a conviction for first degree murder did not preclude the BPT from

considering such evidence in exercising its discretion to decline to set a parole release date. See

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In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 678-79 (2002).

The BPT found Petitioner unsuitable because of the circumstances described in §

2402(B) (i.e., that the offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner). The

evidence showed that Petitioner and his confederates were lying in wait for their unarmed prey

for two hours. They destroyed a telephone that could have been used to summon an ambulance

to save their victim’s life. Petitioner secured rope to bind his victim. Furthermore, Petitioner

fired a second shot at his helpless victim as a coup de grace to terminate his life. The BPT also

found that the motive for killing an unarmed person in the perpetration of a robbery was

inexplicable or trivial in relation to the offense of murder. In addition, the BPT concluded

Petitioner was unsuitable for parole release because of his escalating pattern of criminal behavior

which included a conviction for armed robbery. During the decade before he committed murder,

he served two prison terms and was on probation. This experience did not serve to rehabilitate

him or deter him from committing murder.

The BPT also considered the factors identified in § 2042 that demonstrated suitability for

parole release and praised him for upgrading himself vocationally, and his academic

achievements, as well as his laudatory chronos from his supervisors for his good work habits. 

The BPT was also troubled by the fact that Petitioner continued to maintain at the hearing

that he was innocent of the commitment offense, notwithstanding the evidence produced at his

trial that he was seen by a witness standing over the victim’s body with a handgun in his hand

immediately after two shots were fired. This evidence was sufficient to persuade a jury beyond a

reasonable doubt that he personally used a firearm to kill his victim with malice aforethought. In

his traverse, Petitioner asserts that 

[t]here is yards of evidence supporting Moten’s version of the

offense that he did not shoot Fletcher, and Porter admitted as much

when he pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter with the use of a

firearm. Petitioner asks the Court to carefully review the

statements in Ground One of the Amended Petition as to the

conduct of the prosecution in this case.

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Petitioner’s Traverse at p. 6

Petitioner’s request that this Court reweigh the evidence of his guilt is contrary to the

Supreme Court’s instruction in Hill. There, the Supreme Court held that the determination

whether there is some evidence to support a prison board’s decision “does not require

examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses or

weighing the evidence.” 472 U.S. at 455. The Supreme Court also stated a prison board’s

decision is not “subject to second-guessing upon review.” Id.

In view of his admitted history of escalating criminal activity prior to murdering the

victim, shortly after being released from prison, and his continued insistence that he is innocent

of his commitment offense, this Court cannot conclude the BPT erred in determining that there is

some evidence his imprisonment has not affected his propensity to endanger society when he is

not behind prison walls under the watchful supervision of armed correctional officers. The

calculated and callous nature of his commitment offense, his escalating criminal conduct after

prior attempts to rehabilitate him by imprisonment, probation and parole, clearly demonstrate

that the BPT did not err in concluding that the unsuitability circumstances for parole release

outweigh his stellar performance in complying with prison programs that did not expose him to

contact with potential victims outside of prison walls.

VI

Petitioner also contends that the “some evidence” standard in determining whether a

prisoner is suitable for release on parole “is not appropriate in the parole context.” Petitioner’s

Traverse at p. 12. As noted above, this argument has been rejected by the Ninth Circuit. It is

also contrary to California case law. See In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 658 (2002).

Petitioner also maintains in his traverse that the “‘some evidence’ standard is far too

deferential to the Board, and routinely results in findings and conclusions arbitrary, capricious

and not supported by the record.” As discussed above, this Court must apply that standard to

parole release decisions under the law of this Circuit.

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VII

A

Petitioner argues that some evidence did not support the BPT’s finding that he needed

additional therapy. In view of Petitioner’s inability to accept responsibility for murdering an

unarmed person, the BPT’s recommendation that therapy might assist him in recognizing that he

will continue to be a threat to the safety of others until he learns how to control his anger and

criminal tendencies seems to this Court to be quite a reasonable inference.

B

Petitioner further contends that the BPT erred in relying on a correctional counselor’s

threat assessment in determining his suitability for release on parole. This argument is contrary

to § 2402(b). That section provides that “[a]ll relevant, reliable information available to the

panel shall be considered in determining suitability for parole.” A correctional counselor’s

opinion regarding an inmate’s ability to control his temper and behavior within prison walls is

quite relevant to the BPT’s determination whether he continues to be a threat to the safety of

others. 

C

Petitioner alleges that the BPT violated his right to a uniform sentence under California

law. He also maintains that the BPT improperly considered the District Attorney’s Office’s

opposition to the setting of a parole release date. In his amended application for a writ of habeas

corpus, Petitioner alleged that he was denied due process because the chair of the BPT was a

former police officer. Each of these claims is based on alleged violations of California law. 

Section 2254(a) limits this Court’ jurisdiction to violations of federal, not state law. See Estelle

v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions). The California Supreme Court

rejected each of Petitioner’s state-law questions. This Court cannot re-examine them.

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Conclusion

The BPT decided not to set a parole release date because it found that the evidence of his

commitment offense and his nine year history of escalating criminal conduct demonstrated that

he continued to pose a risk of danger to society if he were set free. The BPT’s decision is

supported by some evidence that outweighs the suitability factors based on his performance

while imprisoned. Thus, the California Supreme Court’s denial of his state petition for a writ of

habeas corpus was not “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a).

/////

/////

Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that Petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief is

DENIED. The clerk is directed to enter judgment and close the case.

/////

DATED: July 25, 2008

/s/ Arthur L. Alarcón 

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

Sitting by Designation

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