Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_11-cv-00270/USCOURTS-almd-3_11-cv-00270-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

____________________________

ALJAWON DAWYANE MILES *

#255 161

Plaintiff, *

v. * 3:11-CV-270-TMH

(WO)

CHRISTOPHER HILL, *

Defendant. *

____________________________

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated at the Bullock Correctional Facility located in Union

Springs, Alabama, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on April 11, 2011. He complains that

Defendant, Christopher Hill - a state parole and probation officer, improperly confiscated his

personal property in May 2009. Plaintiff requests that criminal charges be lodged against

Defendant Hill be for theft of property and that he be required to reimburse Plaintiff for the

missing property. Upon review of the complaint, the undersigned concludes that dismissal

of this case prior to service of process is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

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I. FACTS

A prisoner who is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis in this court will have his complaint

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screened in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This screening procedure requires

the court to dismiss a prisoner’s civil action prior to service of process if it determines that the complaint is

frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from

a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

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Around mid-morning in May 2009 Plaintiff was a passenger in a car that was exiting

an apartment complex in Phenix City, Alabama. Plaintiff states that Defendant Hill

attempted to flag down the car in which he was riding so he got out of the car and ran into

the woods. Defendant Hill proceeded to confiscate Plaintiff’s personal property from the

vehicle. According to the complaint, during proceedings held before this court on June 3,

2010 in regard to federal criminal charges pending against Plaintiff, Defendant Hill admitted

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under oath that he took Plaintiff’s property out of the car in which he had been a passenger.

Plaintiff contendsthat Defendant Hill, therefore, admitted to violating his Fourth Amendment

rights. (Doc. No. 1.)

II. DISCUSSION

A. Fourth Amendment

Under the facts presented, Plaintiff has no standing to challenge the search and/or

seizure of property from the vehicle in which he was a passenger. Not only was Plaintiff not

the owner of the vehicle in question but he abandoned the car in order to elude Defendant

Hill. See United States v. Harris, 526 F.3d 1334, 1338 (11 Cir. 2008) (a passenger, who

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has no possessory interest in the automobile, does not have a legitimate expectation of

privacy in the interior of the automobile) (citation and quotations omitted); see also United

States v. Edwards, 441 F.2d 749, 751-52 (5 Cir. 1971) (finding defendant had no

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 See United States v. Miles, Criminal Action No. 3:09-CR-132-MEF (M.D. Ala.).

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Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11 Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Decisions of the Fifth

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Circuit rendered before October 1, 1981, are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit).

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expectation of privacy in car he abandoned by fleeing from police on foot); United States v.

Crecni, 940 F.2d 663 (6 Cir. 1991) (table) (unpubl.) (holding that the defendant abandoned

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any expectation of privacy he had in any items found in his car when he fled his car in trying

to elude the police). This claim is, therefore, subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(i). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); see also Denton v.

Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992).

B. Due Process

To the extent Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Hill may be considered an allegation

that the parole officer improperly confiscated his property in violation of his Fourteenth

Amendment due process rights, he is likewise entitled to no relief.

"If the [property] was not returned because of [Defendant’s]

negligence, there has been no unconstitutional deprivation of

property. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662,

88 L.Ed.2d 662 (negligent loss of property does not rise to the

level of a constitutional violation.) If [Defendant] intentionally

refused to return the [property], plaintiff has not alleged a

constitutional violation. In Hudson v. Palmer the Court ruled

that an 'unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a

state employee does not constitute a violation of the Due

Process Clause . . . if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for

the loss is available.' 104 S.Ct. at 3202, 82 L.Ed.2d at 407. It

is essential to [the instant] complaint that it allege that

[Defendant] acted without authorization. If [Defendant] was

acting pursuant to authorization, his actions would be within the

outer perimeter of his duties and would not have violated any

clearly established constitutional right and therefore he would be

immune from suit. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-

48, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1691-92, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Flinn v.

Gordon, 775 F.2d 1551, 1553 (11 Cir.1985). Only if the

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complaint is construed as alleging that [Defendant] was acting

in bad faith outside the scope of his duties can it evade the

doctrine of official immunity.

Rodriguez-Mora v. Baker, 792 F.2d 1524, 1527 (11 Cir. 1986). See also Holloway v.

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Walker, 790 F.2d 1170, 1173-74 (5 Cir. 1986) (finding no breach of federally guaranteed

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constitutional rights, even where a high levelstate employee intentionally engagesin tortuous

conduct, as long as the state system as a whole provides due process of law); Myers v.

Klevenhagen, 97 F.3d 91, 94-95 (5 Cir. 1996) (“the Parratt [v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527

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(1981)]/Hudson [v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984)] doctrine protects the state from liability

for failing to provide a pre-deprivation process in situations where it cannot anticipate the

random and unauthorized actions of its officers.” The complainant bears the burden of

establishing that the state's post-deprivation remedy is inadequate).

The State of Alabama, through its Board of Adjustment, provides a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for Plaintiff to seek redress for the loss of his property. Ala. Code § 41-

9-60 et seq. (1982). In light of this adequate state remedy, Plaintiff's allegation that

Defendant violated his due process rights by improperly confiscating his personal property,

whether such was the result of negligence or an intentional act, lacks an arguable basis in the

law and is, therefore, subject to dismissal under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Neitzke, 490 U.S.319.

C. Criminal Charges

Plaintiff requests that criminal charges be brought against Defendant Hill for theft of

property. As a private citizen, Plaintiff cannot commence criminal proceedings on his own.

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Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (a “private citizen lacks a judicially

cognizable interest in the prosecution or non-prosecution of another.”); Leeke v. Timmerman,

454 U.S. 83 (1981) (same); see also Savage v. Arnold, 403 F. Supp. 172, 174 (E.D. Pa.

1975) (private citizens have no right to institute criminal prosecutions in federal court);

United States v. Panza, 381 F. Supp 1133 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (same). The decision whether to

prosecute a particular case is in the discretion of the prosecutorial authority. United States

v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979); Otero v. United States Attorney General, 832 F.2d

141 (11 Cir. 1987). Such decision is not generally subject to judicial review. Massey v.

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Smith, 555 F.2d 1355, 1356 (8 Cir. 1977). Consequently, Plaintiff’s request to initiate

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criminal charges against the named defendant is subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff's

complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice prior to service of process pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

It is further

ORDERED that on or before May 25, 2011 the parties are DIRECTED to file any

objections to the Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the

findings in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which a party objects. Frivolous,

conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are

advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not

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appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the

Magistrate Judge's report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual

findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain

error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See Stein

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v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11 Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of

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Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981) (en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the

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decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on

September 30, 1981.

Done this 11 day of May 2011.

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/s / Wallace Capel, Jr.

WALLACE CAPEL, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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