Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-05499/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-05499-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:501 Copyright Infringement

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PETER MENZEL,

Plaintiff,

v.

SCHOLASTIC, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 17-cv-05499-EMC 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 

OR CERTIFICATION

Docket No. 139

Scholastic has moved for reconsideration or, in the alternative, for certification for an 

interlocutory appeal. Having considered the parties’ briefs, the Court hereby DENIES

Scholastic’s motion.

With respect to the motion to reconsider, Rotkiske v. Klemm, 205 L. Ed. 2d 291 (2019), is 

not directly on point as it concerns the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and not the Copyright 

Act. Notably, the language used in the FDCPA (concerning the statute of limitations) is different 

from that used in the Copyright Act. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) (in the FDCPA, providing 

that an action “may be brought in any appropriate United States district court without regard to the 

amount in controversy, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from the 

date on which the violation occurs”) (emphasis added), with 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (in the Copyright 

Act, providing that “[n]o civil action shall be maintained . . . unless it is commenced within three 

years after the claim accrued”) (emphasis added).

As for the motion for certification of an interlocutory appeal, the governing statute is 28 

U.S.C. § 1292(b), which provides as follows:

When a district judge . . . shall be of the opinion that such order 

Case 3:17-cv-05499-EMC Document 145 Filed 01/17/20 Page 1 of 3
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United States District Court

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involves a controlling question of law as to which there is 

substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate 

appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate 

termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such 

order.

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 

Here, even if there were a controlling question of law and substantial ground for difference 

of opinion, an immediate appeal will not materially advance the ultimate termination of the 

litigation, particularly given that the instant case is essentially on the eve of trial. See, e.g., Pablo 

v. ServiceMaster Glob. Holdings, Inc., No. C 08-03894 SI, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93638, at *3-4 

(N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2011) (“The parties have expended significant time and resources over the 

past three years litigating this case. The Court has entered orders on several significant motions, 

each of which will be subject to appeal when a final judgment has issued in this case. The trial 

now finally set is not expected to last more than a week. Allowing defendants to file an 

interlocutory appeal with regard to one legal issue (or, according to defendants, two legal issues) 

on the eve of trial will impede, rather than materially advance, the ultimate termination of this 

litigation.”); Corwin v. NYC Bike Share, LLC, No. 14-CV-1285 (SN), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

53812, at *28-29 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2017) (“In this case, it is plain that permitting an interlocutory 

appeal at this juncture, on the very eve of trial, would severely delay the termination of the 

litigation. Such an appeal would lead to the proceedings being stayed, potentially for years, as to 

all parties. On the contrary, proceeding to trial and final judgment would lead to a prompt finding 

as regards to liability and damages as to all the defendants remaining in the case, while preserving 

the City's ability to appeal in the ordinary course on the question of law it identifies in the event 

that it is found liable.”); Stuart v. RadioShack Corp., No. C-07-4499 EMC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

57963, at *12 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2009) (“The additional burden of waiting several months and 

having to complete trial before taking the appeal is not substantial. On the other hand, permitting 

the interlocutory appeal will vacate the trial date and potentially postpone the trial for many 

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United States District Court

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months, thus materially prejudicing the Plaintiffs and disrupting the Court’s calendar.”); cf. Conlin 

v. Sw. Cmty. Coll., No. 2:99cv247-C, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27248, at *8 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 2, 

2001) (“An interlocutory appeal . . . ‘is limited to extraordinary cases where early appellate review 

might avoid protracted and expensive litigation.’”).

This order disposes of Docket No. 139.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 17, 2020

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

Case 3:17-cv-05499-EMC Document 145 Filed 01/17/20 Page 3 of 3