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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 2, 2017*

Decided February 3, 2017

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

No. 15‐1799

LORENA BACEROTT,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

DANIEL SMETTERS, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 12‐cv‐03433

Manish S. Shah,

Judge.

ORDER

After police officers in Bolingbrook, Illinois, used a Taser on Lorena Bacerott and

broke her arm during an arrest, she sued, claiming that two officers had used excessive

force and intentionally inflicted emotional distress and a third had failed to intervene. A

jury found for the defendants. On appeal Bacerott argues that the verdict was against the

weight of the evidence and that the district court erred by not instructing the jury that

                                                 

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately

present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. See FED. R.

APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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the Village of Bolingbrook would indemnify the defendants if they were found liable.

Because Bacerott forfeited the first argument and the district court reasonably declined

the requested instruction, we affirm.

The events that led to Bacerott’s arrest began before dawn on May 4, 2011. The

Bolingbrook Police Department had received two calls reporting that a woman was

pounding on a neighbor’s door. At the scene two officers found Bacerott sitting on a

door stoop. After a brief conversation, one officer told Bacerott to leave the area, and she

returned to her car. The officers then left. Soon after, however, the police department

received another call, this time about a person honking a horn in the same area. Two

officers returned to the scene and found Bacerott sitting in her car in a parking lot. One

officer asked Bacerott to leave her car, but she refused. The officer then told her that she

was under arrest for trespassing and repeated his request. She again refused. The

officers tried to unlock her car using “slim jim” unlocking devices and other entry tools,

but Bacerott thwarted them by manually keeping the door locked. Eventually the

officers wedged open the driver’s side window and sprayed pepper spray towards the

steering wheel. But the pepper spray seemed to have no effect, and Bacerott remained in

her car. One officer eventually broke the passenger‐side window of the car and used his

Taser on Bacerott three times while she was sitting in the car. Two officers then removed

Bacerott from the car and restrained her, breaking her arm in the process.

Before the jury deliberated on Bacerott’s excessive‐force and state‐law claims, the

court held a jury‐instruction conference. Bacerott asked the court to instruct the jury that

the Village of Bolingbrook would indemnify the officers for compensatory damages

should it find in her favor. She argued that the instruction was needed to correct a

statement that the defendants’ attorney made to the jury about damages. He had said

during closing that one of the officers was “sitting here today four years later defending

himself, defending his actions . . . and [Bacerott] wants money from him.” Bacerott’s

counsel had objected to the argument, but the district court overruled the objection. It

told the jurors that they would make their decision based on the evidence and the

instructions. Responding to Bacerott’s request for an instruction, the defendants

countered that the attorney was pointing out only that Bacerott wants a judgment

against the officers, not that they would actually have to pay their own damages or

suffer financially. The district court denied the request for the instruction.

Trial and judgment followed. The jury found for the defendants, and the court

entered judgment on the verdict. Bacerott made no motions, either before or after the

jury’s verdict under FED. R. CIV. P. 50 or after judgment under FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a).

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On appeal, Bacerott argues that she deserves a new trial for two reasons. First, she

contends that she posed no threat to the officers’ safety and never fled, so the verdict in

their favor was against the weight of the evidence. But Bacerott has forfeited this

argument because she ignored the two methods of preserving it. She never moved for

judgment as a matter of law at the close of evidence or after the jury verdict, as Rule 50

requires if she wanted to preserve for appeal a request for a new trial. “[T]his Court has

determined that a party may only pursue on appeal a particular avenue of relief

available under Rule 50(b), namely, the entry of judgment or a new trial, when that party

has complied with the Ruleʹs filing requirements by requesting that particular relief

below.” Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift‐Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 402 (2006) (emphasis in

original); Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Balmoral Racing Club, Inc., 831 F.3d 815, 823 (7th

Cir. 2016). Likewise, Bacerott never moved for a new trial under Rule 59, so she also

forfeited any request for relief through that rule. See Willis v. Lepine, 687 F.3d 826, 836 (7th

Cir. 2012).

Bacerott next argues that she should receive a new trial based on jury‐instruction

error. She contends that the district court erred when it denied her motion to instruct the

jury that the Village would indemnify the officers if liable, but this argument fails as

well. We review the district court’s decision to deny a jury instruction deferentially.

Rapold v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 718 F.3d 602, 609 (7th Cir. 2013); Consumer Prods. Research &

Design, Inc. v. Jensen, 572 F.3d 436, 438 (7th Cir. 2009). We look at the instructions as a

whole and reverse only if the jury was misled about the law and a party was prejudiced.

Rapold, 718 F.3d at 609; Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 924

F.2d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 1991). As Bacerott notes, a “defendant should not be allowed to

plead poverty if his employer or an insurance company is going to pick up the tab.”

Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 37 (7th Cir. 1996). But when the defendant does not plead

poverty, courts should “exclude evidence of indemnification out of a fear that it will

encourage a jury to inflate its damages award because it knows the government—not the

individual defendants—is footing the bill.” Lawson v. Trowbridge, 153 F.3d 368, 379–80

(7th Cir. 1998).   

The proposed instruction was unwarranted. The defendants did not present

evidence or argue about their financial situation. Although defense counsel at closing

said that Bacerott “wants money” from the defendants, counsel did not argue that

defendants could not afford it or would lack indemnification if liable. Because the jury

was not misled about the effect of a judgment, the district court did not act unreasonably

in declining the instruction.   

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We have considered Bacerott’s other arguments and decided that none has merit.

AFFIRMED.

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