Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00813/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00813-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

D. Ryan Jones, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. CV-13-00813-PHX-SRB (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 D. Ryan Jones (Petitioner) has filed a timely Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

raising two grounds for relief. (Doc. 1.) Respondents filed an Answer asserting that 

Petitioner’s first ground for relief lacks merit and that his second ground for relief is 

procedurally barred from federal habeas corpus review. (Doc. 9.) Petitioner has filed a 

reply in opposition. (Docs. 10, 11.) For the reasons below, the Petition should be denied. 

I. Procedural Background 

A. Guilty Plea and Sentencing 

 On May 10, 2011, Petitioner pleaded guilty in Maricopa County Superior Court 

(trial court), case CR2008-166193, to one count each of molestation of a child, attempted 

molestation of a child, and sexual abuse. (Doc. 9, Exs. A, B, D.) All of the counts to 

which Petitioner pleaded guilty were charged as dangerous crimes against children. (Id.) 

During the change of plea hearing, Petitioner acknowledged that he understood that, as 

set out in the plea agreement, the offenses to which he was pleading guilty carried prison 

sentences of ten to twenty-four years, five to fifteen years, and two-and-one-half to 

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seven-and-one-half years, respectively. (Doc. 9, Ex. D at 5-6.) Petitioner also stated he 

understood the sentences could be ordered to run consecutively to each other and that for 

two of the three charges he could be placed on lifetime probation. (Id. at 5–7.) The trial 

court sentenced Petitioner to a term of sixteen years’ imprisonment on the first count, 

molestation of a child, and to lifetime probation on the other two counts, attempted 

molestation of a child and sexual abuse, which were probation-eligible counts. (Doc. 9, 

Ex. E, Ex. F at 48-49.) The trial court also ordered that he register as a sex offender for 

life. (Doc. 9, Ex. E at 4.) 

B. Post-Conviction Proceedings 

 On November 12, 2009, Petitioner initiated state post-conviction proceedings by 

filing a notice of post-conviction relief pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 

32. (Doc. 9, Ex. G.) Post-conviction counsel filed a notice with the court stating that, 

after reviewing the record, he was unable to find any issues for post-conviction review. 

(Doc. 9, Ex. H.) Petitioner then filed a pro se petition alleging that: (1) the trial court had 

improperly enhanced his sentences; (2) his sentences violated double jeopardy; (3) trial 

counsel was constitutionally ineffective; (4) the state presented false evidence at 

sentencing; (5) the trial court erred in weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors at 

sentencing; (6) the trial court sentenced him under a statute lacking a rational basis; 

(7) the sentencing statute was arbitrarily and discriminatorily applied to him; (8) the 

imposition of lifetime probation violated his constitutional rights; (9) the imposition of 

lifetime sex-offender registration violated his constitutional rights; and (10) he was 

convicted under an unconstitutionally vague statute. (Doc. 9, Ex. I.) 

 The trial court denied post-conviction relief. (Doc. 9, Ex. L.) The court noted that 

Rule 32.2(a)(3) precludes post-conviction relief on any claim waived at trial, on appeal, 

or in any previous collateral proceeding. (Id.) Thus, the court found that by pleading 

guilty, Petitioner had “waive[d] all non-jurisdictional defenses and defects occurring 

prior to the plea.” (Id.) The court concluded that eight of Petitioner’s ten claims were 

precluded. The court noted that, while most of Petitioner’s claims related to his 

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sentencing, “all of [those] claims could have been raised and litigated prior to the plea in 

this case.” (Doc. 9, Ex. L at 2.) The court rejected on the merits Petitioner’s remaining 

two claims ─ that trial counsel was ineffective, and that the trial court erred in weighing 

the aggravating and mitigating factors. (Id.) 

 Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 9, 

Ex. M.) The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s finding that Petitioner had waived 

numerous claims by pleading guilty. (Doc. 9, Ex. A.) The court of appeals also affirmed 

the trial court’s rejection of Petitioner’s two other claims on the merits, and affirmed 

Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Id.) Petitioner sought review in the Arizona 

Supreme Court, which denied review on December 12, 2012. (Doc. 9, Ex. N.) 

C. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

 On April 22, 2013, Petitioner filed the pending petition for writ of habeas corpus 

raising two grounds for relief. In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that he was denied his 

Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. In Ground Two, Petitioner 

alleges that he was denied his Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process because his 

sentence was enhanced “without a factual basis.” (Doc. 1 at 6-7.) For the reasons set 

forth below, the Petition should be denied. 

II. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar 

A. Federal Court Review

 Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) 

(“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly 

present’ his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the 

federal nature of the claim”); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (same). “A 

claim has been ‘fairly presented’ if the petitioner has described both the operative facts 

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and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based.” Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 33. A 

“state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must read 

beyond a petition or brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim in 

order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id. at 31-

32. Thus, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes of 

satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper forum, 

. . . (2) through the proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal 

basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(internal citations omitted). 

 The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes 

comity by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged 

violations of a state prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 

(2001); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also 

require federal courts to respect state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s 

claims. See Coleman, 501 at 731 32. Pursuant to these principles, a habeas petitioner’s 

claims may be precluded from federal review in two situations. 

 First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas 

corpus review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but 

returning to state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such 

as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2002). If no state remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, 

but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. 

 Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raised a claim in 

state court, but the state court found the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See 

Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the 

State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claim has deprived the state 

courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. 

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at 731-32. In this situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded if the state court 

opinion relies “on a state-law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the 

federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 

255, 260 (1989). A state procedural ruling is “independent” if the application of the bar 

does not depend on an antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal claim. See Stewart

v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985). A state 

court’s application of the procedural bar is “adequate” if it is “strictly or regularly 

followed.” See Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994). If the state court 

occasionally excuses non-compliance with a procedural rule, that does not render its 

procedural bar inadequate. See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410-12 n.6 (1989). 

“The independent and adequate state ground doctrine ensures that the States’ interest in 

correcting their own mistakes is respected in all federal habeas cases.” Coleman, 501 

U.S. at 732. Although a procedurally barred claim has been exhausted, as a matter of 

comity, the federal court will decline to consider the merits of that claim. See id. at 729-

32. 

 However, because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not 

jurisdiction, federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally 

defaulted claims. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). Generally, a federal court will 

not review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates 

“cause” for the failure to properly exhaust the claim in state court and “prejudice” from 

the alleged constitutional violation, or shows that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” 

would result if the claim were not heard on the merits. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), the court may dismiss plainly meritless 

claims regardless of whether the claim was properly exhausted in state court. See Rhines

v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (holding that a stay is inappropriate in federal court 

to allow claims to be raised in state court if they are subject to dismissal under 

§ 2254(b)(2) as “plainly meritless”). 

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B. Petitioner’s Claims are Not Procedurally Barred

 In Ground One, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Petitioner properly exhausted this claim by presenting it to the appellate court 

on post-conviction review. Accordingly, the Court considers the merits of Ground One 

in Section III. 

 In Ground Two, Petitioner argues that his Due Process rights were violated 

because the trial court did not articulate a factual basis for the “targeting element” of the 

sentencing enhancement under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604.01. (Doc. 1 at 7.) Although 

Petitioner presented this claim in post-conviction proceedings, the trial court cited Rule 

32.2(a)(3) and found that Petitioner’s guilty plea precluded review of his sentencing 

claims because “all of [those] could have been raised and litigated prior to the plea in this 

case.”1

 (Doc. 9, Ex. L at 1-2.) The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that 

“by pleading guilty, [Petitioner] had waived his right to raise” his claims that his sentence 

violated double jeopardy, the application of lifetime probation was unconstitutional, and 

that the application of the sentencing statute was unconstitutional as applied to him.2

 (Id.

at 2.) The court further noted that “as part of his plea agreement, [Petitioner] waived and 

‘g[ave] up any and all motions, defenses, objections, or requests which he . . . ha[d] made 

or raised, or could assert [t]hereafter, to the Court’s entry of judgment against 

him . . . and imposition of a sentence upon him . . . consistent with this agreement.’” 

(Doc. 9, Ex. A; Doc. 1-1 at 6.) 

 Respondents argue that Petitioner’s challenge to his sentences is barred from 

federal habeas review because the state court applied Rule 32.2(a)(3), an adequate and 

independent procedural bar, to deny relief on Petitioner’s sentencing claims. (Doc. 9 at 

 

1

 Rule 32.2(a)(3) provides, in relevant part, that “[a] defendant shall be precluded from relief under this rule based upon any ground . . . [t]hat has been waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). 

2

 The relevant statute in effect at the time Petitioner committed the offenses was 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604.01. It was subsequently amended and renumbered as Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-705. (Doc. 9, Ex. A at 2 n.3.) For ease of reference, the Court cites to § 13-

604.01. 

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5.) See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 (1977) (federal court is barred from 

considering a claim that state court denied on an adequate state law ground independent 

of the merits of the federal claim). Because the government “seeks dismissal based on 

the procedural bar, it . . . bear[s] the burden of demonstrating that the bar is applicable — 

in this case that the state procedural rule has been regularly and consistently applied in 

habeas actions.” Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 2003). Petitioner agrees 

that, in general, Rule 32.2(a)(3) is an adequate and independent state ground. (Doc. 1 at 

28.) However, he argues that Rule 32.2(a)(3) is not consistently and regularly applied to 

preclude a defendant who has pleaded guilty from challenging the legality of his 

sentencing raised in a Rule 32 of-right proceeding.3

 (Doc. 1 at 28.) 

 Because a defendant who pleads guilty in Arizona waives the right to appeal 

directly to an appellate court under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4033(b), Rule 32 is “the only 

means available for exercising the constitutional right to appellate review.” Montgomery 

v. Sheldon, 889 P.2d 614, 616 (Montgomery I) (Ariz. 1995), overruled in part on other

grounds by State v. Smith, 910 P.2d 1, 4 (1996).4

 The Arizona Supreme Court has noted 

that “[i]t is through operation of the rules governing post-conviction relief that our 

constitutional guarantee of appellate review in all cases is effectuated for pleading 

defendants.” Montgomery I, 889 P.2d at 616 (citing Ariz. Const. art. II, § 24; Wilson v. 

Ellis, 859 P.2d 744, 746 (1993)). 

 Arizona courts have found that Rule 32 “encompasses a claim that a sentence was 

not imposed in compliance with the relevant sentencing law, at least for a sentence 

imposed on a pleading defendant.” State v. Cazares, 72 P.3d 355, 356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

2003); see State v. Wood, 2012 WL 4859122, at *1 n.1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2012) 

 

3

 By pleading guilty, Petitioner waived his right to a direct appeal under Arizona law. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4033(B). However, he retained the right to seek review in an “of-right” proceeding pursuant to Rule 32. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 and 32.4. 

4

 Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion (Doc. 11 at 5), Montgomery did not hold that a 

pleading defendant cannot waive the right to direct appeal. Montgomery, 889 P.2d at 61 

n.2 (stating that “we have never held, and we do not hold today, that a pleading defendant cannot waive his right to a direct appeal . . . .”). 

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(noting that “a defendant may claim pursuant to Rule 32 that the factual basis for a guilty 

plea was insufficient as a matter of law”). Arizona courts have also held that “the right to 

be sentenced according to the law is not among the myriad rights pleading defendants 

waive.” Cazares, 72 P.3d 355, 356 (citing Ariz. R. Crim. P. 17.2)). 

 As discussed below, Petitioner has cited several cases in support of his assertion 

that, at the time of his post-conviction proceedings, Rule 32.2(a)(3) was not regularly and 

consistently applied to find a pleading defendant’s claims of sentencing error precluded 

in a Rule 32 of-right proceeding.5

 See Bennett, 322 F.3d at 586 (stating that “[o]nce the 

state has adequately pled the existence of an independent and adequate state procedural 

ground as an affirmative defense, the burden to place that defense in issue shifts to the 

petitioner . . . . Once having done so, however, the ultimate burden is the state’s.”). 

Respondents have not cited controlling precedent to establish that, during the time of 

Petitioner’s post-conviction proceedings, Arizona courts regularly applied Rule 

32.2(a)(3) to bar review of sentencing claims asserted in a pleading defendant’s Rule 32 

of-right proceeding. 

 Petitioner cites State v. Szpyrka, 224 P.3d 206, 207 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010), in which 

the court found that a defendant who pleads guilty and admits the existence of a prior 

conviction can, in a petition for post-conviction relief, attack the sufficiency of the 

evidence used to prove the factual basis of that prior conviction. Id. (citing State v. 

Johnson, 689 P.2d 166, 167 (Ariz. 1984) (reversing court of appeals’ finding that 

admission of prior conviction in plea agreement constitute a waiver of the right to 

challenge the factual basis)). 

 

5

 Petitioner also cites several cases decided before 1992, when a defendant 

pleading guilty could challenge his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. (Doc. 1 at 29 (citing State v. Sullivan, 482 P.2d 861 (Ariz. 1971); State v. Leuck, 481 P.2d 842 

(Ariz. 1971).) After the legislature abolished direct appeals for pleading defendants in Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4033(B), Rule 32 was amended to provide for an “of-right” post- conviction proceeding in the court that rendered the challenged conviction or sentence. Because Rule 32 “of-right” proceedings did not exist until 1992, cases decided before 

1992 are not helpful to the Court’s analysis. 

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 Petitioner also cites Cazares, 72 P.3d at 356, in which a petitioner pleaded guilty 

to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. On post-conviction 

review, he challenged his sentence arguing that the trial court erred in failing to consider 

a statutory mitigating factor under Ariz. Rev. Stat.§ 13-702. The post-conviction court 

found that petitioner’s claim did not appear to fall under any provisions of Rule 32 that 

provide for relief, and alternatively denied relief on the merits of the claim. Id. at 356. 

The court did not discuss or apply Rule 32.2(a)(3)’s waiver provision. On review of that 

decision, the appellate court found that Rule 32 “encompasses a claim that a sentence was 

not imposed in compliance with the relevant sentencing law, at least for a sentence 

imposed on a pleading defendant.” Id. at 356. Thus, the appellate court disagreed with 

the court’s initial finding, but affirmed its ruling on the merits. These cases suggest that 

Rule 32.2(a)(3) has not been consistently and regularly applied to preclude review of a 

pleading defendant’s sentencing claims raised in a Rule 32 of-right proceeding. 

 Respondents have not cited any controlling authority indicating that, at the time of 

Petitioner’s post-conviction proceeding, Arizona court’s consistently and regularly relied 

on a waiver provision in a plea agreement or Rule 32.2(a)(3) to find a pleading 

defendant’s claims of sentencing error precluded from review. See Bennett, 322 F.3d at 

586. Instead, Respondents rely primarily upon State v. Barrera, 2013 WL 3871090 

(Ariz. Ct. App. Jul. 26, 2013), in support of their argument that Rule 32.2(a)(3) precludes 

post-conviction relief on an illegal sentence when defendant waives his right to challenge 

his convictions and sentences in a plea agreement. However, Barrera was subsequently 

withdrawn and “ordered depublished.” Id., withdrawn by State v. Barrera, 314 P.3d 

1277 (Ariz. 2014) (denying petition for review from denial of post-conviction relief and 

ordering that “[t]he Court of Appeals’ Opinion shall not be published pursuant to Rule 

111(g), Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court”). 

 Additionally, the other case Respondents cite, State v. Shrum, 203 P.3d 1175 

(Ariz. 2009), analyzed whether Rule 32.2(a)(3) precluded review of a pleading 

defendant’s challenge to his sentence raised in a second post-conviction proceeding. In 

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Shrum, following his plea of guilty, the defendant filed a notice of post-conviction relief 

under Rule 32. He later voluntarily dismissed that proceeding. Id. at 1177. Several 

years later, the defendant filed a second notice of post-conviction relief challenging his 

sentence. As the court noted, “to avoid the preclusive effect of the dismissal of [his] first 

PCR proceeding,” the defendant argued there had been a “significant change in the law” 

that would probably overturn his sentence. Id. Although Shrum considered whether Rule 

32.2(a)(3) precluded the defendant’s sentencing claim asserted in his second postconviction proceeding, it did not consider whether Rule 32.2(a)(3) would have precluded 

review of the defendant’s sentencing claim if he had raised it in his first post-conviction 

proceeding. Thus, Respondents’ reliance on Shrum is misplaced. 

 Finally, Respondent’s cite State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, 403 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

2007), which did not involve the application of Rule 32.2(a)(3) to bar review of 

sentencing claims raised by a pleading defendant in a Rule 32 of-right proceeding. 

Rather, in Swoopes, the court found that Rule 32.2(a)(3) precluded review of the 

petitioner’s claim that the trial court’s response to a question from the jury deprived him 

of his right to a fair trial because the petitioner had not raised that claim at trial or on 

direct appeal. Id. at 951-53. 

 Because Respondents have not met their burden of establishing that, at the time of 

Petitioner’s post-conviction proceedings, Arizona courts regularly and consistently 

applied Rule 32.2(a)(3) to bar review of sentencing claims asserted by pleading 

defendants in Rule 32 of-right proceedings, the Court will consider the merits of 

Petitioner’s challenges to his sentences in Section III.6

/ / / 

/ / / 

 

6

 The Court decides only that Respondents have not met their burden in this case 

and does not decide that Rule 32.2(a)(3) does not apply to claims of sentencing error raised by a pleading defendant in a Rule 32 “of-right” proceeding. Moreover, the Court’s resolution of the procedural bar issue is inconsequential because, as discussed in Section 

III, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on his challenge to his sentences asserted in Ground Two of his Petition. 

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III. Petitioner’s Claims 

A. Standard of Review 

 If a habeas petition includes a claim that was “adjudicated on the merits in State 

court proceedings,” federal court review is limited by § 2254(d). Under § 2254(d)(1), a 

federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the petitioner shows: (1) that the state 

court’s decision “was contrary to” federal law as clearly established in the holdings of the 

United States Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision, Greene v. Fisher, __ 

U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 38, 43 (2011); or (2) that it “involved an unreasonable application of” 

such law, § 2254(d)(1); or (3) that it “was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts” in light of the record before the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011). This standard is “difficult to meet.” 

Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786. It is also a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state 

court rulings, which demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” 

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

 To determine whether a state court ruling was “contrary to” or involved an 

“unreasonable application” of federal law, courts look exclusively to the holdings of the 

Supreme Court that existed at the time of the state court’s decision. Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 

44. A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a rule of law “that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of 

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Mitchell v.

Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14 (2003) (citations omitted). 

 A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” federal law if the court 

identifies the correct legal rule, but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of a 

particular case. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). “A state court’s 

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.’” 

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Richter, 562 U.S.___, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 

664 (2004)). “[E]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires 

considering the rule’s specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts 

have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determination.” Id. 

When a state court decision is deemed to be “contrary to” or an “unreasonable 

application of” clearly established federal law, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus 

relief unless the erroneous state court ruling also resulted in actual prejudice as defined in 

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052 

n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). “Actual prejudice” means that the constitutional error at issue had a 

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631 (1993). “The Brecht harmless error analysis also applies 

to habeas review of an error with respect to sentencing, in other words the test is whether. 

such error had a ‘substantial and injurious effect’ on the sentence.” Hernandez v. 

LaMarque, 2006 WL 2411441, at *3 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 18, 2006) (citing Calderon v. 

Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 145-57 (1998) (finding sentencing error harmless because even 

if the evidence of three prior convictions was insufficient, petitioner was not prejudiced 

by the court’s consideration of those convictions because it found four other prior 

convictions that would have supported the petitioner's sentence)). 

 However, when a habeas petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel under 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Strickland prejudice standard applies 

and the court does not engage in a separate analysis applying the Brecht standard. See 

Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Jackson v. Calderon, 211 

F.3d 1148, 1154 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that the court “need not conduct harmless 

error review of Strickland violations under Brecht . . . because ‘[t]he; Strickland prejudice 

analysis is complete in itself; there is no place for additional harmless-error review.”)). 

B. Standards to Establish Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

 The controlling Supreme Court precedent on claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, a petitioner 

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must show that counsel’s performance was objectively deficient and that counsel’s 

deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner. Id. at 687. To be deficient, counsel’s 

performance must fall “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. When reviewing counsel’s performance, the court engages a 

strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable 

professional judgment. Id. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that 

every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 

counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689. Review of counsel’s performance is 

extremely limited. Acts or omissions that “might be considered sound trial strategy” do 

not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

 To establish a Sixth Amendment violation, a petitioner must also establish that he 

suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient performance. Id. at 691-92. To show 

prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Id. at 694. See also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 933 (9th Cir. 1998). The 

prejudice component “focuses on the question whether counsel’s deficient performance 

renders the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair.” 

Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). The court need not address both 

Strickland requirements if the petitioner makes an insufficient showing on one. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (explaining that “[i]f it is easier to dispose of an 

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should 

be followed.”); Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “[f]ailure to 

satisfy either prong of the Strickland test obviates the need to consider the other”) (citing 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). 

 “Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never . . . easy.” Richter, 562 U.S.___, 131 

S. Ct. 770, 786 (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S.___, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 

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(2010)). Establishing that a state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable 

under § 2254(d) is even more difficult, because both standards are “highly deferential,” 

and because Strickland’s general standard has a substantial range of reasonable 

applications. Richter, 562 U.S.___, 131 S. Ct. at 788 (citations omitted). The issue under 

§ 2254(d) is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable, but “whether there is any 

reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Richter, 

131 S. Ct. at 788. 

C. Ground One — Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

 In Ground One, Petitioner argues that his court-appointed and retained Knapp

counsel, Brett Turley and Tamara Brooks-Primera, were ineffective at sentencing for 

failing to investigate and present evidence that Petitioner may suffer from Asperger’s 

Syndrome and of Petitioner’s traumatic childhood.7

 (Doc. 1 at 6.) Petitioner presented 

this claim on post-conviction review. The trial found that Petitioner failed to establish a 

colorable claim of ineffective assistance and the appellate court affirmed.8

 (Doc. 9, 

Exs. L, A.) 

 As an initial matter, Petitioner argues that the appellate court did not apply the 

Strickland standard to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Doc. 1 at 16.) 

Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the appellate court recognized and applied the correct, 

controlling legal standard. (Doc. 9, Ex. L.) As discussed below, Petitioner has not 

shown that the state court’s resolution of his claim was contrary to or an unreasonable 

application Strickland, or that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

 1. Asperger’s Syndrome 

 Petitioner asserts that trial counsel were deficient for failing to investigate the 

“likelihood” that Petitioner suffers from Asperger’s Syndrome. (Doc. 1 at 20.) Petitioner 

 

7

 See Knapp v. Hardy, 523 P.2d 1308, 1312 (Ariz. 1974) (permitting retained counsel to associate with the public defender). 

8

 On habeas corpus review, the district court reviews that “last reasoned state 

court opinion.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). Here, the Arizona Court 

of Appeals’ decision is the last reasoned state court opinion. (Doc. 9, Ex. A.) 

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argues that because the court had the discretion to impose a sentence from ten to 

seventeen years, there is a reasonable probability that had counsel presented evidence of 

Asperger’s Syndrome, the sentencing judge would have imposed a shorter term of 

imprisonment. (Doc. 1 at 22.) At sentencing, the court stated that Petitioner had been 

“unusually honest” and “candid,” but stated that he was “not sure how much 

responsibility [Petitioner] truly accept[ed],” or if he “under[stood] the impact of what [he 

had] done” based, in part, on Petitioner’s statements during the sentencing hearing that he 

didn’t “belong in prison,” and that he was a “caring father.” (Doc. 9, Ex. F at 47-48.) 

Petitioner argues that had counsel presented evidence that he suffered from Asperger’s 

Syndrome, it would have cast Petitioner’s post-plea comments that the court found 

troubling in a different light. (Doc. 1 at 23.) Petitioner contends that his post-plea 

comments were “abnormal social displays” that showed a lack of empathy, which is 

typical of someone with Asperger’s Syndrome. (Id. at 23.) 

 Before Petitioner entered the plea agreement, Petitioner’s trial counsel moved for a 

mental competency examination based on, among other things, Petitioner’s “odd” 

statements “about his childhood and his family relationships,” which Petitioner now 

claims are indicative of Asperger’s Syndrome. (Doc. 1, Ex. E.) The trial court ordered 

the examination and two psychologists separately examined Petitioner and concluded that 

he had no discernible mental disease or defect. (Doc. 1, Exs. F, H-I.) Petitioner also took 

a “Mini Mental Status Exam” and received the highest possible score on it (30 out of 30), 

which placed him in the “no apparent impairment” category. (Doc. 1, Ex. H.) During his 

examination with Dr. Margaret Marshall, one of the psychologists who examined him, 

Petitioner stated that there was no possibility of a mental disease or defect on his part. 

(Doc. 1, Ex. H at 2.) 

 On post-conviction review, Petitioner presented a letter from his mother in which 

she stated that she suspected that Petitioner might have Asperger’s Syndrome. (Doc. 9, 

Ex. A.) He did not present any evidence confirming that he had Asperger’s Syndrome 

and, in his Petition, concedes that he cannot conclusively establish that he suffers from 

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Asperger’s Syndrome. (Doc. 1 at 24.) He asserts that the lack of evidence regarding 

Asperger’s Syndrome is attributable to trial counsel’s deficient performance. Although 

the lack of such evidence at sentencing may have been attributable to trial counsel, 

Petitioner has the burden on § 2254 review of establishing that counsel’s performance 

was deficient and he must offer more than speculation in support of his claims. See Jones 

v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 205 (9th Cir. 1995) (“conclusory suggestions that his trial and 

state appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance fall far short of stating a valid 

claim of constitutional violation.”). 

 Even if the Court were to find that counsel were deficient in failing to investigate 

whether Petitioner had Asperger’s Syndrome, Petitioner has not shown that he was 

prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance.9

 Although Petitioner asserts that he might 

have Asperger’s Syndrome, his assertion is speculative and he has not identified the 

evidence counsel would have uncovered had they conducted a further investigation into 

whether Plaintiff had Asperger’s Syndrome. See Hall v. Head, 310 F.3d 683, 704-05 

(11th Cir. 2002) (stating that the court cannot “assume that had [the defendant] 

undergone further examination the possible ‘diagnosis’ . . . .would have been made. 

 

9

 The cases Petitioner cites do not support a different result. In Summerlin v.

Schriro, 427 F.3d 623, 631 (9th Cir. 2005), the court found trial counsel’s failure to 

investigate potential mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of a capital murder case was ineffective assistance. Unlike this case, Summerlin was a capital case in which “a criminal defendant has a constitutionally protected right to provide the jury with mitigating evidence.” Id. at 630. The Summerlin court found that had counsel conducted 

even a minimal investigation, he would have been able to develop testimony about Petitioner’s tortured family history, including that his alcoholic mother beat him and frequently locked him in a room with ammonia fumes, petitioner frequently received electroshock treatments to control his temper, petitioner had a learning disability that left him functionally mentally retarded, and that he had been diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic and treated with anti-psychotic medication. Id. at 631. 

In another capital case, Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995), the court found counsel ineffective for failing to investigate the defendant’s mental health as a mitigating factor in a penalty phase hearing when counsel was on notice that the defendant might be mentally impaired. The court noted that minimal investigation would have uncovered a “storehouse of information chronicling [the defendant’s] miserable life story.” Id. Here, even if counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate whether Petitioner has Asperger’s Syndrome, Petitioner has not shown prejudice because he was not shown what evidence counsel would have uncovered other 

than a letter from his mother speculating that he might have Asperger’s Syndrome. 

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‘Speculation is insufficient to carry the burden of a habeas corpus petitioner as to what 

evidence could have been revealed by further investigation.’”) (quoting Brownlee v. 

Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1060 (11th Cir. 2002)); Beaver v. Thompson, 93 F.3d 1186, 1195 

(4th Cir. 1996) (“an allegation of inadequate investigation does not warrant habeas relief 

absent a proffer of what favorable evidence or testimony would have been produced”); 

Henry v. Ryan, 2009 WL 692356 at *73-74 (D. Ariz. Mar. 17, 2009) (petitioner’s claim 

of ineffective assistance of counsel failed because he did not “identify the mitigating 

information omitted at sentencing”). Accordingly, Petitioner has not established that 

counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate whether he had Asperger’s Syndrome 

and, thus, he was not shown that the state court’s resolution of this claim was contrary to 

or based on an unreasonable application of federal law, or that it was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 2. Evidence of Traumatic Childhood 

 Petitioner also argues that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate 

his family background. He asserts that counsel were put on notice that he had a difficult 

childhood. (Doc. 1, Exs. A, B, C, E.)10 Petitioner argues that the failure to investigate 

his childhood was prejudicial because the sentencing judge indicated that he “wish[ed he] 

had heard a little more about” Petitioner’s difficult childhood. (Doc. 1, Ex. P. at 47-48.) 

Petitioner argues that this statement suggests that, had the sentencing judge heard “a more 

detailed accounting of the evidence, [he] would have weighed its import differently.” 

(Doc. 1 at 22.) 

 Petitioner has not shown that counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate and 

present evidence of his traumatic childhood at sentencing. Petitioner’s allegations do not 

identify the mitigating information counsel would have uncovered had they investigated 

Petitioner’s childhood; Petitioner’s allegations also do not consider the mitigating 

evidence that was before the court at sentencing. See Henry, 2009 WL 692356, at *74 

 

10 These exhibits appear at Doc. 1 at 32-34, Doc. 1 at 35-36, Doc. 1 at 37-38, and 

Doc. 1-1 at 3-5, respectively. 

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(noting that the petitioner failed to identify the omitted mitigating evidence and failed to 

consider that the court had evidence of the petitioner’s childhood and mental health 

before it at sentencing). 

 The presentence report included evidence that Petitioner had been physically and 

verbally abused by his father, that his father sexually molested other children in the 

family, and that Petitioner’s cousin sexually abused him from the age of seven to age 

twelve. (Doc. 1, Ex. N at 2.) The presentence report also indicated that Petitioner had a 

physical attraction to his mother and engaged in inappropriate sexual contact with her 

when he was a teenager. (Doc. 1, Ex. N. at 2.) This evidence was presented to the 

sentencing court and the court noted Petitioner’s difficult childhood at sentencing. 

(Doc. 9, Ex. F at 47-48.) 

 In addition to the presentence report, several individuals who testified on 

Petitioner’s behalf at sentencing mentioned his difficult childhood. (Id. at 21, 24, 28.) 

Although the court indicated that it would have liked to have heard more about 

Petitioner’s childhood (id. at 48), Petitioner has not shown that there was any additional 

mitigation evidence that counsel would have uncovered had counsel further investigated 

Petitioner’s childhood. Petitioner’s conclusory allegations do not warrant habeas corpus 

relief.11 See Beaver, 93 F.3d at 1195. 

 Accordingly, Petitioner has not established that counsel were ineffective for 

failing to investigate his difficult childhood and, thus, he has not shown that the state 

court’s resolution of this claim was contrary to or based on an unreasonable application 

for federal law, or that it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 

11 Respondents argue that because Petitioner’s alleged childhood difficulties ended when he was twelve, his difficult childhood would have been given little weight. (Doc. 9 at 14) (citing State v. Prince, 250 P.3d 1145, 1170 (Ariz. 2011) (traumatic childhood and teenage years correctly given “little weight” as a mitigating factor for a murder committed at age twenty six).) Although the presentence report indicates that Petitioner’s cousin stopped sexually abusing Petitioner when he was twelve, it does not 

indicate when the other childhood difficulties ended. (Doc. 1, Exs. N.) Accordingly, the Court does not rely on this reason in determining whether Petitioner has established ineffective assistance of counsel. 

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D. Ground Two — Sentencing Errors 

 In Ground Two, Petitioner argues that the trial court violated his Due Process 

rights by illegally enhancing his sentences without a factual basis. 12 (Doc. 1 at 7.) 

Petitioner asserts that the court applied the sentencing enhancement in 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604.01 to each count of conviction without first making the required 

finding that Petitioner’s conduct was “focused on, directed against, aimed at, or target[ed] 

a victim under the age of fifteen.” (Id.) Petitioner does not dispute that the victim, his 

ten-year-old daughter, was under fifteen at the time of the incidents giving rise to his 

convictions. (Doc. 1 at 24-26.) Rather, he argues that to activate the sentencing 

enhancement provided in § 13-604.01 something more than the age of the victim must be 

found. (Doc. 1, at 25.) Petitioner asserts that “something more” has been defined by 

Arizona courts as conduct that is focused on, directed against, aimed at, or targets a 

victim under the age of fifteen. 13 (Id.) 

 Petitioner concedes that he waived, in his plea agreement, his right to have a jury 

determine any facts used to enhance his sentence. (Doc. 1 at 26.) However, he argues 

that the trial court failed to make the required “targeting” finding by a preponderance of 

 12 Petitioner also asserts that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to impose enhanced sentences because his guilty plea lacked a factual basis for all essential 

elements of the crime charged. (Doc. 1 at 26.) The cases Petitioner cites are not applicable here because Petitioner does not assert that he was unaware of the elements of 

the crime and he does not claim that he did not admit sufficient facts to support a finding of guilt. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 467, 471 (1969) (“[A] judge must determine that ‘the conduct which the defendant admits constitutes the offense charged.’ . . . Requiring this . . . is designed to ‘protect a defendant who is in the position of pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge but without realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge.’”) (citing Fed. R. Crim.P. 11); Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 349 (1991) (stating that the fact supporting the more serious offense must be “specifically established” on the record). 

13 Because the court of appeals did not adjudicate this claim on the merits, but 

denied relief on a procedural ground, the deferential standard in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply. Rather, the Court reviews Ground Two for constitutional error and, if the 

Court finds such error, considers whether it was harmless under Brecht. See Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121-22 (2007) (holding that “in § 2254 proceedings a court must assess the prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial under the 

‘substantial and injurious effect’ standard set forth in Brecht . . . ; whether or not the state 

or appellate court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness . . . .”); Bains v. 

Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 976 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the Brecht standard applies in all § 2254 cases). 

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the evidence as required by the plea agreement. (Doc. 1 at 26.) He complains that 

because the trial court did not make findings of the facts used to enhance his sentence, his 

rights to Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution were 

violated. 

 In State v. Williams, 854 P.2d 131, 132 (1993). the Arizona Supreme Court held 

that to activate the special sentencing provisions of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604.01, there 

must be a finding that the offense conduct “focused on, directed against, aimed at, or 

targeted a victim under the age of fifteen.” The Supreme Court in Blakely v. Washington

held that “[w]hen a defendant pleads guilty, the State is free to seek judicial sentence 

enhancements so long as the defendant either stipulates to the relevant facts or consents 

to judicial factfinding.” 542 U.S. 296, 310 (2004). Here, Petitioner consented to judicial 

factfinding, but argues that the trial court did not place on the record its factual findings 

as to the enhancement of sentences in violation of the Due Process Clause.14

 Even assuming the trial court committed constitutional error in failing to state on 

the record its factual findings supporting the application of the sentencing provisions in 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604.01, any error is harmless under the Brecht standard and does not 

warrant habeas corpus relief. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638; see also Calderon, 525 U.S. at 

145-57 (the Brecht harmless error analysis applies to habeas review of a sentencing 

error). The test is whether such error had a “substantial and injurious effect” on the 

sentence. Id. (holding that for habeas relief to be granted based on constitutional error in 

capital penalty phase, error must have had substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s 

verdict in the penalty phase). 

 

14 Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claim that the sentencing enhancement was not supported by a factual basis involves a violation of state law and is therefore not 

cognizable in habeas proceedings. (Doc. 9 at 16); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (permitting a federal court to entertain a habeas application only on the claims that petitioner is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States). Respondents claim that Petitioner essentially asserts a “purported violation of Arizona 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.3, which requires a factual basis for guilty pleas.” (Doc. 9 at 16.) To the extent that Petitioner’s claim is based on the court’s failure to comply with Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 17.3 and 26.2, his claims are not cognizable on habeas corpus review. 

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 Here, the record contained sufficient evidence to support, by a preponderance of 

the evidence, factual findings supporting the enhancement of Petitioner’s sentences under 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604.01. The victim was Petitioner’s ten-year-old daughter. (Doc. 1, 

Ex. D at 4, 14.) In recounting the factual bases for his guilty pleas, Petitioner admitted 

that he had intentionally or knowingly molested his daughter by touching her vagina, that 

he had intentionally or knowingly attempted to molest his daughter, and that he had 

intentionally or knowingly touched, fondled, or manipulated his daughter’s breasts. 

(Doc. 9, Ex. D. at 14-15.) The court found that there were “factual bases for each of the 

pleas” and accepted Petitioner’s guilty pleas. (Id. at 16.) Petitioner’s actions, admitted 

during the change of plea hearing, were “focused on, directed against, aimed at, or 

targeted a victim under the age of fifteen.” See Williams, 854 P.2d at 132. 

 Additionally, as the Arizona Supreme Court has observed, “[a]s a practical matter, 

the question of whether the child victim is the target of the defendant’s criminal conduct 

will rarely be an issue given the nature of the crimes listed in A.R.S. § 13-604.01. It is 

impossible to imagine how sexual . . . molestation, sexual conduct, sexual 

abuse . . . could be committed without targeting minors.” Id. at 136-37. In State v.

Sepahi, which Petitioner cites, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the defendant’s 

intent to shoot the victim, who was a minor, was sufficient to constitute a dangerous 

crime against children. 78 P.3d 734, 735 (2003). 

 Considering the facts in the record supporting the enhanced sentences under 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-604.01, the Court finds that any error by the trial court with regard 

to its factfinding at sentencing did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the [sentences].” Larson v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 157, 1064-65 

(9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 1064-65). Accordingly, any error in the trial 

court’s failure to specifically state on the record its factual findings in support of its 

application of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-604.01 is harmless, and Petitioner is not entitled to 

habeas corpus relief based on his challenge to his sentences asserted in Ground Two. 

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E. Evidentiary Hearing 

 Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim that 

counsel was ineffective at sentencing for failing to present evidence regarding 

Petitioner’s traumatic childhood and that he may suffer from Asperger’s Syndrome. 

(Doc. 1 at 17-19.) Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing in this Court. 

 The Supreme Court’s decision in Cullen v. Pinholster, __ U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 

1398 (2011), makes clear that review of § 2254(d) claims “is limited to the record that 

was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” The Supreme Court 

reasoned that the “backward-looking language” of § 2254(d)(1) “requires an examination 

of the state-court decision at the time it was made,” and thus the record under review 

must be “limited to the record in existence at that same time i.e., the record before the 

state court.” Id. at 1398. Accordingly, under Pinholster, Petitioner is not entitled to an 

evidentiary hearing. 

 Further, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted when, as in this case, even 

assuming Petitioner’s allegations are true, he is not entitled to habeas corpus relief 

because he has not shown that counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to 

investigate additional mitigation evidence or that he suffered prejudice as a result of 

counsel’s alleged deficient performance. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 481 

(2007) (district court properly exercised discretion to deny evidentiary hearing when, 

even assuming the truth of all facts sought to be proven at an evidentiary hearing, claim 

failed on merits); West v. Ryan, 608 F.3d 477, 485-90 (9th Cir. 2010) (when defendant 

failed to allege facts that, if found to be true, would establish a colorable claim under 

Strickland, there was “nothing to be determined in an evidentiary hearing” and the district 

court did not abuse its discretion by denying one); Estrada v. Scribner, 512 F.3d 1227, 

1235 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A] federal court must consider whether such a[n] [evidentiary] 

hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s factual allegations, which, if 

true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.”); Jones, 66 F.3d at 205 

(“conclusory suggestions that his trial and appellate state counsel provided ineffective 

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assistance fall far short of stating a valid claim of constitutional violation” and did not 

entitle petitioner to an evidentiary hearing). 

IV. Conclusion 

 Based on the foregoing, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be denied 

and dismissed. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be 

denied and dismissed. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Petitioner has not 

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 4(a)(1), should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The 

parties have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 and 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the District Court’s 

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation without further review. See United States

v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

/ / / 

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 Failure to file timely objections to any factual determination of the Magistrate 

Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of 

fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 24th day of March, 2014. 

Case 2:13-cv-00813-SRB Document 12 Filed 03/24/14 Page 24 of 24