Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02669/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02669-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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1 Bridge also moved for summary adjudication of its

counter-claim for declaratory relief on the same grounds. (Amd.

Counter-Compl., filed July 16, 2003.) 

2 U.S. Patent No. 4,857,716 (“the ‘716 patent”)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

McKESSON INFORMATION

SOLUTIONS, INC.,

NO. CIV. S-02-2669 FCD KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BRIDGE MEDICAL, INC.,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on the parties’ crossmotions for summary adjudication of defendant Bridge’s Medical

Inc.’s (“Bridge”) affirmative defense of invalidity for

obviousness.1 35 U.S.C. § 103. By that defense, Bridge seeks a

finding that the subject patent2 held by plaintiff McKesson

Information Solutions, Inc. (“McKesson”) is invalid as obvious

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3 In its amended answer and counter-claim, Bridge

asserted a defense/counter-claim for invalidity on several bases,

including obviousness, anticipation (35 U.S.C. § 102), and

adequacy of written description (35 U.S.C. § 112). Bridge’s

Section 112 defense was not raised in the instant motions. 

However, its Section 102, anticipation, defense was raised by

McKesson in its cross-motion. In opposition thereto, Bridge

conceded that “its defense of anticipation under [Section 102] is

no longer viable in light of the [court’s] Markman order

[construing the patent’s claim elements].” (Opp’n to McKesson’s

MSJ re: Invalidity, filed July 15, 2005, 1:10-11.) As such,

McKesson is entitled to summary adjudication in its favor on this

defense.

4 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

5 The court notes that footnote 6 in its concurrently

filed order on the parties’ cross-motions for summary

adjudication of Bridge’s affirmative defense of unenforcability

for inequitable conduct, likewise applies here. The court once

again cannot discern the reason for the filing of these motions

where the parties’ disclosed experts maintain such divergent

opinions, and there is no apparent evidentiary basis to exclude

the testimony.

2

over the prior art teaching all of its elements as construed by

the court.3

For the reasons set forth below, both parties’ motions are

DENIED with respect to Bridge’s affirmative defense of invalidity

on the basis of obviousness.4 Triable issues of fact remain

regarding whether the prior art describes each element of the

‘716 invention and whether those of ordinary skill in the art

would be motivated to combine the subject references.5

BACKGROUND

 The facts pertaining specifically to this defense/counterclaim are contained in the parties’ respective experts’

declarations. Rather than describing those opinions here, the

court discusses the experts’ opinions below within the analysis

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section of the order as it is the experts’ conflicting opinions

which preclude an award of summary adjudication to either party.

STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when, based on the record,

no genuine issue exists as to any material fact, and the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find in favor of

the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986). 

When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court

views the evidence through the prism of the evidentiary standard

of proof that would pertain at trial on the merits. Id. at 255. 

Under the patent statutes, a patent enjoys a presumption of

validity (35 U.S.C. § 282) which can be overcome only through

clear and convincing evidence. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr

Laboratories, Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2001). “Thus, a

moving party seeking to invalidate a patent at summary judgment

must submit such clear and convincing evidence of invalidity so

that no reasonable jury could find otherwise.” Id.

Alternatively, a moving party seeking a finding of no invalidity

must show that the nonmoving party, who bears the burden of proof

at trial, failed to produce clear and convincing evidence on an

essential element of a defense upon which a reasonable jury could

invalidate the patent. Id. “In determining whether a genuine

issue of material fact exists, the court views the evidence in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolves all

doubts in its favor.” Id.

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ANALYSIS

A patent is invalid for obviousness when the differences

between the claim and the prior art “are such that the subject

matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the

invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art.” 

35 U.S.C. § 103(a). While typically a defendant, asserting

invalidity, is required to present “clear and convincing

evidence” of obviousness to invalidate a patent under Section

103(a), where the obviousness challenge is based on “a reference

that was not before the examiner [as alleged here by Bridge] . .

. the alleged infringer’s burden may be more easily carried

because of this additional reference.” SIBIA Neurosciences, Inc.

v. Cadus Pharmaceutical Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1355-56 (Fed. Cir.

2000). Ultimately, whether a patent is invalid based on Section

103(a) is for the court to decide as a matter of law. Id. at

1355. However, that legal determination must be based on

underlying factual inquiries, including: “(1) the scope and

content of the prior art; (2) the level of ordinary skill in the

prior art; (3) the differences between the claimed invention and

the prior art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness.” 

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris Inc., 229 F.3d

1120, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

When an obviousness determination relies on the combination

of two or more references, “there must be some suggestion or

motivation to combine the references.” WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int’l

Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The

determination cannot be based on the “hindsight combination of

components selectively culled from the prior art to fit the

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6 Bridge does not dispute that these references are

“prior” art in that they were published or filed more than one

year before the ‘716 patent’s filing date. (Bridge’s Stmt. of

Undisp. Facts [“UF”], filed July 1, 2005, ¶s 43, 76.)

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parameters of the patented invention.” Crown Operations Int’l,

Ltd. v. Solutia Inc., 289 F.3d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 

Rather, “[t]here must be a teaching or suggestion within the

prior art, within the nature of the problem to be solved, or

within the general knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the

field of invention, to look to particular sources, to select

particular elements, and to combine them as combined by the

inventor.” Id. This so-called “motivation to combine” “must be

clear and particular, and it must be supported by actual

evidence.” Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa North America Corp., 299

F.3d 1313, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

1. Content of the Prior Art

Here, Bridge argues that the published proceedings of the

First Annual Symposium on Computer Applications in Medical Care

(the “Symposium Proceedings”) and Motorola Inc.’s U.S. Patent No.

4,731,813 (the “‘813 Patent”) are prior art references6 skilled

artisans at the time of the invention of the ‘716 patent would

have been motivated to combine, and the combination contains each

and every element of claim 1 of the ‘716 patent. These arguments

are supported by the declaration of Bridge’s technical expert,

Dr. Lawrence Fagan (“Fagan”). (Fagan Decl., filed July 1, 2005.)

Regarding the latter argument, that the two references

contain all elements of claim 1 of the ‘716 patent, Fagan finds

that Dr. Martin Rubin’s section of the Symposium Proceedings

entitled “Mechanized Information Transfer in the Medical

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Environment” provides a clear description of the development of

bar code scanning for patient identification and verification. 

(Id. at ¶ 10.) Specifically, it teaches, among other things,

(like the subsequent ‘716 patent): (a) a “system . . . which

unambiguously links the patient, sample, requested tests and

analytical results of the clinical laboratory” and “is equally

applicable to other patient services such as the administration

of blood, drugs and diet”; (b) the “major elements” of this

system provide for the “instant transfer of human and machine

readable alpha numeric information form a source such as a

patient wrist bracelet or badge”; (c) “a hand held wand or a

laser scanner”; (d) attached to a “display data terminal” with

“keyboard” that provides “interactive communication with [sic]

the [remote] computer in the system” is used to check; (e) “the

wrist bracelet bar coded patient identification number against

the bar coded patient identification number . . . affixed to the

requested service[.]” (UF ¶ 46.) The Symposium Proceedings

further discuss advances and uses of microprocessors in medical

devices and the advantages in price, speed, and portability of

microprocessors. (UF ¶ 47.) Additionally, they highlight how

the evolution of the microprocessor allows “the size of circuitry

to shrink,” and allows new smaller computer designs to be used

where the older computers were “possibly too big for portable

instruments.” (UF ¶ 48.) Finally, like the ‘716 patent, the

Symposium Proceedings describe a distributed microcomputer system

for the monitoring, information gathering, patient data

comparison, and alarm system for use with critically ill

patients. (UF ¶ 49.)

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7

Regarding the remaining elements of the ‘716 patent, Fagan

finds that the ‘813 patent teaches the hardware components and

communication features of the patent. (UF ¶s 77-97.) He

describes that among other things, the ‘813 patent teaches a

telephonic system utilizing: (a) “two-way radio [RF]

communications” between a “base station” and “handheld units”;

(b) “the base and portable units each include a duplex

transceiver and antenna which together provide a wireless

communication link between the two units”; (c) a “security

circuit in each unit allows communication with other units only

upon the reception of an address code corresponding to an address

code stored in the unit”; (d) an “ID code or security address, 

. . . unique to that base station unit, is stored” in its

programmable “read only memory (ROM)”; (e) “the address code of

the base unit is entered into the portable unit by encoding

circuitry” when “the portable unit is seated in the base unit

receptacle”; and (f) the “base station unit” is connected by

means of “cable and conventional telephone line connectors” to a

“network” or “master computer[.]” (UF ¶ 78.) Fagan thus

concludes that in combination, the Symposium Proceedings and the

‘813 patent plainly teach every element of claim 1 of the ‘716

patent. (UF ¶ 101 [see Ex. H to Fagan Decl., chart describing how

each element of claim 1 is revealed by these prior art

references]).

Bridge’s showing is rebutted by McKesson’s technical expert,

Dr. Harry V. Bims (“Bims”), who does not agree that the Symposium

Proceedings and the ‘813 patent describe all of the elements of

claim 1 of the ‘716 patent. (Bims Decl., filed July 15, 2005, ¶

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109 [“[I]t is my opinion that numerous claim elements are not

disclosed in the references relied on by Dr. Fagan in his

declaration.”]) For example, according to Dr. Bims, “The ‘813

patent relates to a cordless, portable telephone for use with the

standard telephone network. As such, there is nothing in the

‘813 patent that relates to patient identification or

verification, bar codes, bar code reader means, or a central

programmed system computer used to verify that patient and item

data correspond.” (Id. at ¶ 113; see also ¶s 109-110 [chart

describing each element of claim 1 and Bims’ specific

disagreement with Fagan].) 

This factual dispute between the parties’ experts as to the

“scope and content of the prior art,” alone, prevents an award of

summary adjudication to either party on this issue. Brown &

Williamson Tobacco Corp., 229 F.3d at 1124. While Bridge’s

burden of proof is lessened here because the subject prior art

references were not disclosed to the PTO, Bridge nonetheless, has

not established its case as a matter of law in light of Bims’

rebuttal declaration. Because the evidence, relating to whether

the prior art describes the elements of claim 1 of the ‘716

patent, is “reasonably inferable either way,” the issue cannot be

decided as a matter of law. Paragon Podiatry Laboratory, Inc. v.

KLM Laboratories, Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 

Notwithstanding the above, the court also notes that the

parties’ experts likewise dispute the applicable “level of

ordinary skill in the field” used for making the obviousness

determination. Id. Fagan maintains that a person of ordinary

skill in the art to which the ‘716 patent pertains would have “at

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least a Bachelor of Science in Computer Science or Electrical

Engineering, or the equivalent thereof, and with at least two

years of practical engineering experience (Fagan Decl., filed

July 1, 2005, ¶ 8); whereas, Bims asserts the person of ordinary

skill would have “at least an undergraduate degree in electrical

engineering as well as a background in wireless communications

through either graduate courses or work experience.” (Bims

Decl., ¶ 14.)

Finally, the parties’ experts further dispute whether there

are objective factors of nonobviousness present in this case. 

Evidence that a claimed invention has had commerical success;

been widely licensed; satisfied a long-felt need; provided a

solution to an unsolved problem or was copied by others, may

militate against a finding of obviousness. B.F. Goodrich Co. V.

Aircraft Braking Sys. Corp., 72 F.3d 1577, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 

It is Mckesson’s burden to come forward with any such evidence

and to show “a nexus . . . between the claimed features of the

invention and the objective evidence offered to show nonobviousness.” WMS Gaming, 184 F.3d at 1359. Bridge argues

McKesson has no evidence of these secondary considerations or the

required nexus. According to Fagan, because multiple prior art

references taught point of care bar coding solutions, there is no

basis upon which McKesson can demonstrate a nexus between the

‘716 patent and the commercial success of current bar coding

solutions. (Fagan Decl., ¶s 9-18.) Additionally, although the

‘716 patent was issued some fifteen years ago, it has no

licensing history. Thus, Fagan concludes there is no evidence to

credit the ‘716 invention with solving a continuing problem or

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for any commercial success. (UF ¶ 106.) 

However, through Bims, McKesson offers evidence of “long

felt need and [the] failure of others” to show nonobviousness. 

(Bims Decl., ¶ 130-133.) According to Bims, by 1985, there

existed a strong need for a system that could reduce paper work,

verify patient identification, check for drug incompatiblities,

etc. The ‘716 invention specifically addressed this long felt

need through its novel system of bar codes, portable terminals,

base stations, and a main computer tracking patients, specimens,

and drugs. Additionally, Bims asserts that even the prior art

relied on by Fagan, demonstrates that those in the art, at the

time, were trying to solve these problems but had failed to do

so. For example, the ‘381 patent filed in 1982 by Rubin, an

attendee and presenter at the Symposium Proceedings, attempted

but failed to solve the problem articulated in both Rubin’s

article from the Symposium, relied on by Bridge, and later in the

‘716 patent. Bims concludes: 

Based on the very references relied upon by Dr. Fagan, 

there was a need for a system that could solve the 

problems addressed by the ‘716 patent for at least 

eight (8) years (and more properly decades), yet despite 

as many as 1 in 6 errors in medication administration, 

there was no solution to it and the ‘leaders’ in the 

field had failed to come up with one.

(Id. at ¶ 133.)

Therefore, on these additional bases, the court finds

triable issues of fact remain precluding an award of summary

adjudication on the issue of invalidity for obviousness. 

2. Motivation to Combine

For the same reason as above, summary adjudication is 

inappropriate for the further reason that triable issues of fact

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7 Fagan treats the Symposium Proceedings (which includes

some 373 pages) as one reference, despite the fact that it

contains sections written by different authors representing

lectures given separately. Fagan asserts that because the

articles are all part of the same conference and were published

and indexed together and consecutively numbered, persons of

ordinary skill in the art would treat them as one reference. 

(Fagan Opp’n Decl., filed July 1, 2005, ¶ 20.) As in all other

respects described herein, Bridge’s expert Bims disagrees. (Bims

Decl., ¶s 114, 140.) He argues that the Symposium Proceedings

(involving a collection of more than 70 papers presented by 164

authors from diverse fields) are multiple references, and thus

Bridge is required to demonstrate how a person of ordinary skill

in the art would be motivated to combine the precise articles

(there are 3 of them) relied on by Bridge for its obviousness

combination. 

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exist as to the “motivation to combine” the relevant references. 

According to Fagan, a motivation to combine can be gleaned from

the following: The Symposium Proceedings7 reference work by

Motorola to develop smaller and more portable microcomputers for

use in the hospital environment. (UF ¶ 103.) They specifically

point out several of the common microprocessors at the time,

including the Motorola 6800 chip. (UF ¶ 104.) Fagan contends

this demonstrates the importance and linkage of microprocessors

in medical devices and implicitly points researchers to Motorola

as a leader in microprocessor technology for medical applications

at the time. Fagan thus concludes that a person of ordinary

skill in the art reviewing the Symposium Proceedings would be

motivated to consider the work of Motorola when looking at the

problem the Rubin article was trying to solve. (Id.) In fact,

the work of Rubin and Motorola in their respective fields was

deemed so pertinent to the field of endeavor of the ‘716 patent

that a Rubin patent (U.S. Patent No. 4,473,884) and two of

Motorola’s patents in this area (U.S. Patent No. 4,593,155 to

Hawkins and 4,486,624 to Puhl) were both cited during the ‘716

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prosecution as relevant art. (UF ¶ 105.) 

To the contrary, Bims finds that a person of ordinary skill

in the art would not be motivated to combine these references. 

(Bims Decl., ¶s 115-129.) According to Bims, the simple

reference to “Motorola” as facilitators of microprocessors would

“not suggest to those of ordinary skill in the art the

desirability of combining Motorola’s cordless phone patents with

bar code readers to arrive at the features of the [‘716 patent].” 

(Id. at ¶s 116, 121.) Something more would be required. In

Bims’ opinion, even if there was a growing popularity in the use

of microprocessors in medical instruments, that would not provide

a motivation for a person to look to specific references (e.g.

cordless phones) to select particular elements from them or to

combine them as the inventors did. (Id.) Finally, he disagrees

that a person of ordinary skill in the art would be motivated to

combine the three specific references relied on by Fagan from the

Symposium Proceedings. Bims states:

None of these articles discuss medication errors

at the point of administration nor do they discuss

verifying and identifying a patient and patient

care related items and transmitting that data

wirelessly. Not only do the articles not appear

to disclose the invention from the patent, they

are each unique topics in and of themselves and

do not contain any overlapping topics or

references which may motivate a person of ordinary 

skill in the art to combine them with other 

references.

(Id. at ¶ 126.)

This brief description of some of Fagan’s and Bims’ opinions

sufficiently demonstrates a clear dispute of fact on this issue. 

While their opinions and analysis are more extensive, for

purposes of this order, these disputed issues of material fact

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8 As indicated in footnote 3 above, McKesson’s motion for

summary adjudication of Bridge’s anticipation

defense/counterclaim is GRANTED.

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are sufficient to deny the motions.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the parties’ cross-motions for

summary adjudication of Bridge’s affirmative defense/counterclaim for invalidity on the basis of obviousness are DENIED.8

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 10, 2005.

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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