Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01188/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01188-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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 Ms. Bush filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis along with her TRO request,

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which the Court neglected to rule on at oral argument. That motion is GRANTED.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SARAH E. BUSH, an individual,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 10CV1188-LAB (RBB)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA

PAUPERIS; AND 

ORDER DENYING EX PARTE

APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER

vs.

THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO, et al.,

Defendants.

The Court held an emergency hearing on Plaintiff’s Application for a Temporary

Restraining Order on June 4, 2010 and denied the Application. This Order memorializes the

Court’s findings announced at that hearing. 

Plaintiff Sarah Bush is the organizer of the San Diego Naked Bicycle Ride (the 1

“Ride”), scheduled for June 12, 2010 between 5 and 7 p.m. The date is firm; it’s the same

date other Naked Bicycle Rides are scheduled around the world, all with the purpose of

protesting “petroleum based transportation systems and technology.” (Compl. ¶ 8.) As

Plaintiff describes it, the protest “is comprised of adults who strip naked, paint slogans on

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 Plaintiff filed an Application for Preliminary Injunction, which the Court construes as 2

a TRO request given the time constraints she faces, as well as the fact that the Application

was not noticed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). 

 Subsection (a) also notes that the anti-nudity ordinance is enacted “for the purpose 3

of securing and promoting the public health, morals, and general welfare of all persons in

the City of San Diego.”

See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (Pennsylvania anti-nudity 4

ordinance forbidding complete nudity, in effect requiring dancers in strip clubs to wear

“pasties” and “G-strings,” did not violate First Amendment); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501

U.S. 560 (1991) (Indiana public indecency statute requiring erotic dancers to wear pasties

and G-strings did not violate First Amendment); Triplett Grille, Inc. v. City of Akron, 40 F.3d

129 (6th Cir. 1994) (public indecency ordinance challenged by strip club swept too broadly,

in violation of First Amendment); Nite Moves Entertainment, Inc. v. City of Boise, 153

F.Supp.2d 1198, 1210 (D. Idaho 2001) (public nudity ordinance that would ban anything

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their bodies, and ride bicycles along a 10-mile route between Hillcrest and Downtown San

Diego.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff’s problem is that San Diego has an anti-nudity ordinance which the ride will

undoubtedly violate, and San Diego officials have warned Plaintiff they’ll enforce it on June

12, whether by issuing citations, arresting riders, or otherwise interfering with the ride.

Plaintiff has asked the Court to issue a TRO forbidding the police from taking such actions

on the ground that enforcement of the anti-nudity ordinance would violate her First

Amendment rights.2

The anti-nudity ordinance, in relevant part, says:

Nudity Prohibited. No person over the age of ten years shall be

nude and exposed to public view in or on any public right of way,

public park, public beach or waters adjacent thereto, or other

public land, or in or on any private property open to public view

from any public right of way, public beach, public park, or other

public land.

San Diego Municipal Code § 56.53(c). One of the explicit purposes of the ordinance is to

prevent members of the public from being “unwillingly exposed” to and offended by nudity.

Id. at § 56.53(a). Much of the case law addressing the intersection of nudity prohibitions

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and the First Amendment involves cases in which strip clubs argue that the former violates

the latter. This isn’t that kind of case. In fact, it seems obvious that nudity isn’t so much 4 5

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more revealing than “short shorts and a modest bikini top” violated First Amendment).

 In fact, San Diego’s anti-nudity ordinance carves out an exception for nude dancing 5

in places that are closed to the wandering public’s view: 

The provisions of this section shall not apply to live theatrical performances

performed in a theater, concert hall, or other similar establishment located

on public land. As used in this section, theater, concert hall, or similar

establishment means a building, playhouse, room, hall or other enclosed

space not open to public view from any public right of way but having a stage

upon which movable scenery is located and theatrical, vaudeville, or similar

performances are given and seats so arranged that a body of spectators can

have an unobstructed view of the stage and whose primary function is to give

such performances.

San Diego Municipal Code § 56.53(d). 

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the message that Plaintiff wants to convey as it is a means of amplifying their primary

message, which seems to be, “America is too dependent on oil, to our great ecological

detriment.” Nudity has the potential to amplify that message only because it naturally

amplifies any message by attracting attention and publicity. Plaintiff’s message is otherwise

old hat. 

Bush argues that by riding nude, ride participants are likely to advance the utilitarian

end of calling attention to their cause. Her TRO request identifies the following issues about

which she hopes the ride will stimulate awareness and discussion:

• Fragility of the human body and sanctity of life

• Safety of bicyclists while sharing roads with motorists

• Effects of vehicle emissions on human health and the environment

• Effects of our current transportation system and technology on culture

and the human spirit

• Threat to national security due to dependence on foreign oil

• Beauty and inherent decency of the human body

• Use of public nudity to affect social change

It’s hard to see how all of these fit together, and particularly how nudity and the “inherent

decency of the human body” relate to a normative message of oil independence. Does

nudity, by itself, communicate an intelligible message such that there a First Amendment

right to be naked? The Supreme Court has already weighed in on this question, and has

answered “no”: “Being ‘in a state of nudity’ is not an inherently expressive condition.” City

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 The most plausible connection, which is still thin, is that nudity plays into the theme, 6

captured by a message of oil independence, that people ought to rely less on technological

innovation and more on natural systems to meet their most basic needs in ways that are

ecologically sustainable. 

 Plaintiff must also show: (1) she’s likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 7

preliminary relief; (2) the balance of equities tips in her favor; and (3) the relief she seeks is

in the public interest. Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 374.

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of Erie, 529 U.S. at 289. Here, as in City of Erie, the link between the riders’ nudity and their

message is similarly attenuated.

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To obtain the relief she seeks, Bush must establish that she’s likely to prevail on the

argument that San Diego’s anti-nudity ordinance violates the Constitution. Winter v. Natural 7

Resources Defense Counsel, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 365, 374 (2008) (standard for injunctive relief).

After giving respectful consideration to Plaintiff’s arguments, the Court concludes the

converse is true: it is highly unlikely she will prevail on the merits. For this reason, the Court

DENIES Plaintiff’s request for a TRO. 

Plaintiff argues the ordinance is overbroad, but the overbreadth doctrine is of no help

to her. “Ordinarily, the principal advantage of the overbreadth doctrine for a litigant is that

it enables him to benefit from the statute’s unlawful application to someone else.” Board of

Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 483 (1989). See also Board of Airport

Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987). Here, in contrast, Plaintiff’s

primary concern is that San Diego’s anti-nudity ordinance infringes upon her own protected

speech. In fact, she doesn’t identify anyone else whose arguably legitimate speech may be

threatened by the ordinance.

The real issue Plaintiff’s TRO request presents is what level of scrutiny the Court

should apply in evaluating her First Amendment challenge? To determine that, the Court

initially asks whether the ordinance is related to the suppression of expression. Texas v.

Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989). If it’s not, it need only pass a four-part test from United

States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) for restrictions on symbolic speech. Under O’Brien,

a government regulation is sufficiently justified if: (1) it is within the constitutional power of

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 San Diego’s anti-nudity ordinance prohibits nudity only in places that are truly public 8

(streets, parks, beaches, etc.), as well as on private property that is visible from truly public

places. San Diego Municipal Code § 56.53(c). That is consistent with one of its stated

purposes, namely that nudity may be offensive to people who are “unwillingly exposed” to

it. It also distinguishes this case from Triplett and Nite Moves, both of which found that antinudity ordinances violated the Constitution — and both of which Plaintiff relies on. The

plaintiffs in these cases were strip clubs, and the ordinances at issue were more aggressive

than San Diego’s. For example, the ordinance at issue in Triplett prohibited nudity “in a

public place,” which it defined as “any street, sidewalk, right of way and any public or private

building where the general public is invited.” Triplett, 40 F.3d at 131 (emphasis added). 

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the Government; (2) it furthers an important or substantial government interest; (3) the

government interest is unrelated to the suppression of expression; and (4) the incidental

restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the

furtherance of that interest. Id. at 377. 

No matter what Plaintiff may believe about the incidental effects of the ordinance on

her speech, it isn’t in any way related to suppressing expression. The ordinance merely

prohibits public nudity, and by its terms regulates conduct alone. Nothing in the text

suggests a purpose to suppress speech or any particular message. To the contrary, the

ordinance was enacted “for the purpose of securing and promoting the public health, morals

and general welfare of all persons in the City of San Diego,” as well as to prevent residents

of San Diego from being “unwillingly exposed” to nudity and taking offense to it. San Diego

Municipal Code § 56.63(a). The O’Brien test therefore applies to Plaintiff’s claim that the 8

San Diego ordinance violates her First Amendment rights. 

Plaintiff doesn’t dispute that the City of San Diego had the authority to enact the antinudity ordinance. And, the text of the ordinance explains that one of its several purposes

is to promote public health, morals and general welfare. San Diego Municipal Code §

56.53(a). The Supreme Court has explained that a city’s “efforts to protect public health and

safety are clearly within the city’s police powers.” City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 296. The first

O’Brien factor is satisfied.

O’Brien next requires that there be a substantial government interest supporting the

regulation. The San Diego ordinance identifies two: preventing offense to those unwillingly

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28 It’s worth adding that in both Madsen and Collin there was no dispute that the 9

challenged ordinances actually restricted speech.

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exposed to nudity and promoting the public health, morals, and general welfare. Although

Plaintiff argues that the likelihood of others taking offense can’t be grounds for restricting

speech, citing Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (overturning

injunction restricting speech of antiabortion protestors) and Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197

(7th Cir. 1978) (invalidating ordinance prohibiting dissemination of materials promoting hate),

the ordinance really isn’t directed at expression at all, and therefore doesn’t seek to avoid

offending people with speech. Rather, it seeks to avoid offending people with nudity, which 9

the Supreme Court has held is not speech. City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 289.

 Regardless of whether the Court agrees that protecting citizens from unwanted

exposure to nudity is itself a substantial government interest, public safety surely is. Naked

people can and do draw crowds, some of whom may react to their presence in hostile or

disorderly ways. Crowds also present a public safety hazard in their own right, in that they

distract people’s attention from their immediate surroundings, which is uniquely dangerous

on public streets and rights of way. See, e.g., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y.,

519 U.S. 357, 376 (1997) (recognizing government has a substantial interest in “promoting

the free flow of traffic on streets and sidewalks”); Long Beach Area Peace Network v. City

of Long Beach, 574 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 2009) (recognizing “a somewhat greater

governmental interest in regulating expressive activity on city streets because of the public

safety concerns raised by vehicular traffic”). The intended course for the Naked Bicycle Ride

is along well-traveled streets and through densely areas of the City of San Diego. It is a sure

bet the ride will distract drivers, and distracted drivers present an obvious public safety

concern. Drivers are simply not at liberty to avert their eyes. Finally, the text of the ordinance

specifically mentions public health, and it’s not far-fetched to conclude that objective is

furthered by prohibiting naked throngs of bicyclists from crowding the streets, thereby

enhancing the possibility of accidents. For all these reasons, the Court finds the anti-nudity

//

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 The ordinance defines nude as “devoid of an opaque covering which covers the 10

genitals, pubic hair, buttocks, perineum, anus or anal region of any person, or any portion

of the breast at or below the areola thereof of any female person.” Translation: Even a very

minimal and primitive outfit can satisfy the ordinance. 

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ordinance reasonably furthers an important government interest: safety. It satisfies the

second factor O’Brien factor.

The point was made earlier, but to reiterate, the Court concludes the ordinance

satisfies the third O’Brien factor: It is unrelated to the suppression of expression.

That leaves the last O’Brien factor: whether the anti-nudity ordinance is narrowlytailored to advance the government interests just identified. A government regulation is

narrowly tailored if it “targets and eliminates no more than the exact source of the ‘evil’ it

seeks to remedy.” Russell C. Frisby, et al. v. Sandra C. Schultz, et al., 487 U.S. 474, 485

(1988). The Supreme Court in City of Erie found that an erotic dancer’s message wasn’t

fatally compromised by requiring her to wear pasties and a G-string. A similar conclusion

is warranted here. The minimal clothing ride participants have to wear to comply with San

Diego’s anti-nudity ordinance will not significantly compromise their message that oil and

technological dependence, and the environmental degradation that accompanies them, can

be avoided with a return to more native ways of living. Even Tarzan and Jane could deliver

the riders’ message without running afoul of the ordinance. Because the law is narrowly 10

tailored, it passes the fourth O’Brien test.

In sum, the Court concludes San Diego’s anti-nudity ordinance passes the O’Brien

test, and as a result, Plaintiff isn’t likely to prevail on her claim that the ordinance violates her

rights under the First Amendment. That determination suffices to DENY Plaintiff’s request

for injunctive relief.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 11, 2010

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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