Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04488/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04488-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEPHEN L. WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JESUS A. GARCIA, et al.,

Defendants. ______________________________

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No. C 06-4488 MMC (PR) 

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

(Docket No. 16)

On July 24, 2006, plaintiff, a California prisoner proceeding pro se and currently

incarcerated at Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”), filed the above-titled civil rights action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On December 21, 2006, after reviewing the complaint, the Court

found plaintiff had stated cognizable claims for relief against various employees of Salinas

Valley State Prison (“SVSP”), where plaintiff formerly was housed. In the same order, the

Court directed defendants to file a dispositive motion or, in the alternative, a notice indicating

defendants are of the opinion such a motion is not warranted. 

On April 20, 2007, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to

Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the ground plaintiff had failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies. Plaintiff filed an opposition, and defendants filed a

reply. The Court, having read and considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition

to the motion, rules as follows.

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An “RVR-115" is a “Rules Violation Report.”

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The referenced lawsuit is Williams v. Garcia, No. C 02-3813 MMC (PR). The Court

granted summary judgment in favor of defendants in that action on March 1, 2005.

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

The complaint concerns events that occurred in 2004 at SVSP. Plaintiff alleges that

defendant Garcia, a correctional officer at SVSP, fabricated a CDC-RVR-115 (“RVR”)1

 that

stated plaintiff had threatened him. (Compl. ¶ 46.) According to plaintiff, the claims in the

RVR were made in retaliation for plaintiff’s filing of a civil suit against Garcia in federal

court, and for the purpose of having plaintiff placed in administrative segregation in order to

preclude him from litigating that action effectively.2

 (Compl. ¶¶ 45-46.) Plaintiff alleges he

was placed in administrative segregation because of the RVR and that he remained there for

several months, until a hearing was held and he was found not guilty. (Compl. ¶¶ 36, 49-50.) 

Plaintiff further alleges that before he was placed in administrative segregation

because of the RVR, defendant Donnahoe, another correctional officer at SVSP, moved him

to a small holding cell where he was held for more than three hours and denied food and

water. (Compl. ¶ 78.) Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Goodlett, another correctional

officer at SVSP, failed to investigate plaintiff’s allegations of misconduct by Garcia before

approving, signing and processing the RVR. (Compl. ¶ 79.)

 In its order of the service, the Court found plaintiff’s allegations stated cognizable

claims that defendants: (1) denied him access to the courts, in violation of his First and

Fourteenth Amendment rights; (2) placed him in administrative segregation as a retaliatory

measure, in violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (3) failed to

investigate misconduct by SVSP employees against him, in violation of his Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights; (4) directed subordinate SVSP employees to place him in a

confined holding cell, in violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights; and (5)

approved disciplinary action against him without adequate investigation or procedural

safeguards, and based on fabricated evidence, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment

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If the court looks beyond the pleadings in deciding an unenumerated motion to

dismiss for failure to exhaust, the court must give the prisoner fair notice of his opportunity

to develop a record. Id. at 1120 n.14. Plaintiff was given such notice by this Court in the

Order of Service. 

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rights. (Order of Service, filed Dec. 21, 2006, at 2.) 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Nonexhaustion under § 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense; defendants have the

burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108,

1119 (9th Cir. 2003). A nonexhaustion defense should be raised in an unenumerated Rule

12(b) motion. Id. In deciding such a motion, the district court may look beyond the

pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact. Id. at 1119-20.3

 If the court concludes the

prisoner has not exhausted nonjudicial remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal of the

complaint without prejudice. Id. at 1120.

B. The Exhaustion Requirement

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321

(1996) (“PLRA”) provides: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions

under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison,

or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is mandatory and not left to the discretion of

the district court. Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2382 (2006). Exhaustion is a

prerequisite to all prisoner lawsuits concerning prison life, whether such actions involve

general conditions or particular episodes, whether they allege excessive force or some other

wrong, and even if they seek relief not available in grievance proceedings, such as money

damages. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). 

The State of California provides its prisoners and parolees the right to appeal

administratively “any departmental decision, action, condition or policy perceived by those

individuals as adversely affecting their welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). In

order to exhaust available administrative remedies within this system, a prisoner must

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proceed through several levels of appeal: (1) informal review, (2) first formal written appeal

on a CDC 602 inmate appeal form, (3) second formal level appeal to the institution head or

designee, and (4) third formal level appeal to the Director of the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“Director”). See Barry v Ratelle, 985 F. Supp 1235, 1237

(S.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.5). A final decision from the

Director’s level of review satisfies the exhaustion requirement under § 1997e(a). See id. at

1237-38. 

C. Analysis

Defendants argue plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies concerning his

claims because, as the result of his failure to follow proper appeal procedures, he did not

receive a decision from the Director’s level of review before he filed the instant action. 

In support of their argument, defendants submit a declaration by D. Porter (“Porter”),

a Facility Captain in the Inmate Appeals Branch (“IAB”) at the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation. The IAB keeps an electronic record of each inmate appeal

that has proceeded through the Director’s level of review since 1993. (Decl. D. Porter Supp.

Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (“Porter Decl.”) ¶ 4.) Porter searched the database containing records of

all administrative appeals that have proceeded through the Director’s level of review for

appeals filed by plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 5.) The search revealed that the Director’s level of review

received and denied five inmate appeals from plaintiff between October 2003 and November

2006. (Id. ¶ 6 & Ex. C at AGO-003.) None of those appeals involved plaintiff’s claims

against defendants Garcia, Goodlett and Donnahoe that are the subject of the instant action. 

(Id.) 

The IAB also keeps an electronic record of the appeals that have been “screened out”

at the Director’s level of review due to some procedural deficiency. (Id. ¶ 7.) The record of

screened-out appeals shows that two appeals plaintiff submitted to the Director’s level of

review concerning the claims that are the subject of the instant action were screened out on

June 7, 2005, and October 1, 2005, respectively, because plaintiff had not sought secondlevel review of the claims. (Id. ¶ 8 & Ex. D at AGO-004.)

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The parties’ pleadings and supporting documents set forth the following undisputed

facts concerning the two screened-out appeals. Plaintiff submitted his first-level informal

appeal on October 27, 2004. (Decl. M. Quinn Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (“Quinn Decl.”)

Ex. F at AGO-009.) Review of the appeal at the informal level was bypassed, and the appeal

was denied at the first formal level of review on January 6, 2005. (See id. at AGO-012.) On

March 17, 2005, plaintiff submitted an appeal to the Director’s level of review. (Compl. ¶

58.) In a letter dated June 7, 2005, the Chief of the IAB wrote plaintiff that his Director’slevel appeal was being returned to him because it had not been completed at the second level

of review. (Porter Decl. Ex. A at AGO-001.) On June 10, 2005, plaintiff submitted his

appeal to the second level of review. (Compl. ¶ 60.) On June 30, 2005, the appeal was

screened out and denied at the second level of review because the appeal was untimely. 

(Compl. ¶ 63.)

On August 4, 2005, after being moved to KVSP, plaintiff submitted a second appeal

to the Director’s level of review. (Compl. ¶ 64.) In a letter dated October 1, 2005, the Chief

of the IAB again wrote plaintiff that his Director’s-level appeal was being returned to him

because it had not been completed at the second level of review. (Porter Decl. Ex. B at

AGO-002.) Plaintiff then resubmitted his appeal to the second level of review. (Compl. ¶

66.) On November 9, 2005, the appeal was screened out and denied on the ground it 

previously had been screened out and denied on June 30, 2005. (Compl. ¶ 69.) 

In his opposition to the motion to dismiss, plaintiff concedes he did not exhaust his

administrative remedies, but argues he was unable to do so because prison officials did not

respond to his first-level appeal in a timely manner, (Opp. 8:24-26; 14:17-21); specifically,

he claims he was not notified of the January 6, 2005 first-level decision denying his appeal

until March 16, 2005. (Opp. 5:4-7.) He further claims he could not appeal the first-level

decision because “original copies of attached documentary evidence” were missing when he

received the first-level decision, (Opp. 5:6-7); consequently, he argues, he sought Director’slevel review “as a precautionary measure to ensure a disposition based on impartiality and

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In the Director’s-level appeal, plaintiff explained he was filing his appeal at that level

of review because the first-level response had been issued late, and stated: “To beat the run

around I’m forwarding this appeals (sic) directly to the Director for review.” (Opp. Ex. A.) 

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fairness.” (Opp. 13:18-19.)4 Finally, plaintiff argues he should be allowed to proceed with

his claims because of his good-faith efforts to exhaust his administrative remedies. (Opp.

6:14-15; 8:16-21; 11:21-23.) 

Defendants argue that even if the response to plaintiff’s first-level appeal was late,

plaintiff was not prevented thereby from exhausting his administrative remedies, because the

time for filing a second-level appeal did not begin to run until plaintiff received the first-level

response. Specifically, the applicable regulations provide that an inmate, when appealing a

decision, “must submit the appeal within 15 working days of the event or decision being

appealed, or of receiving an unacceptable lower level appeal decision.” Cal. Code Regs. tit.

15, § 3084.6(c). Consequently, defendants argue, plaintiff was required to submit a secondlevel appeal no later than fifteen days after his receipt, on March 16, 2005, of the

unacceptable first-level decision. Plaintiff, however, instead chose to submit, on March 17,

2005, an appeal to the Director’s-level of review. As a result, by the time plaintiff submitted

a second-level appeal in June 2005, the time for submitting such an appeal, which began

running on March 16, 2005, had passed. 

Defendants further contend that plaintiff’s next argument in opposition to the motion,

that missing documentary evidence prevented him from exhausting his administrative

remedies, is without merit. Rather, defendants argue, plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies not because documents allegedly were missing when the first-level

decision was returned to him, but because he chose to ignore the second level of review and

to proceed directly to the ultimate level.

Lastly, defendants argue, plaintiff’s assertions that he made good-faith efforts to

exhaust his administrative remedies provide insufficient grounds on which to allow his

claims to proceed, because a prisoner may initiate litigation in federal court only after the

administrative process has concluded and the prisoner’s grievances have been left

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unredressed. See Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006). 

The Court finds defendants’ arguments persuasive. The Supreme Court has held the

exhaustion requirement cannot be satisfied “by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally

defective administrative grievance or appeal.” Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2382

(2006). Rather, “proper exhaustion” of available administrative remedies is required. Id. at

2387. “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical

procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing

some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Id. at 2386 (footnote omitted). 

Consequently, it is the prison’s grievance process that defines the boundaries of proper

exhaustion. See Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 923 (2007).

Here, plaintiff’s Director’s-level appeal was procedurally defective because plaintiff

filed it without having first filed a second-level appeal or meeting the one regulatory

exception for bypassing the second level of review. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 §§ 3084.5(c),

3084.7(d)(4)(B) (requiring prisoners to complete second level of review before filing thirdlevel appeal unless appeal concerns involuntary transfer to California Medical Facility or

Atascadero State Hospital). Further, even if the first-level decision was untimely and

missing documentary evidence, as plaintiff alleges, he has not shown such defects prevented

him from filing a timely second-level appeal within fifteen days of his receiving the firstlevel decision. Notably, despite the alleged defects, plaintiff was able to file a Director’slevel appeal the day after he received the first-level decision. As plaintiff made clear both in

his Director’s-level appeal and his opposition herein, he chose to ignore the second level of

review and proceed directly to the Director’s level not by reason of any inability on his part

but rather because of what he perceived to be a lack of impartiality at the lower levels.

The Court also agrees with defendants that plaintiff’s asserted good-faith efforts to

exhaust are not sufficient to allow his claims to proceed. The Supreme Court has made clear

that exhaustion is mandatory and no longer left to the discretion of the district court. See

Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2382. Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff did not exhaust his

administrative remedies before he filed his complaint; consequently, his claims must be

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dismissed. See McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding action

must be dismissed unless prisoner exhausted available administrative remedies before filing

suit).

Accordingly, the Court will grant defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint is hereby

GRANTED. The above-titled action is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to plaintiff’s

refiling his claims after all available administrative remedies have been exhausted.

This order terminates Docket No. 16.

The Clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 16, 2008

_____________________________

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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