Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05451/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05451-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 29, 2000 Decided November 17, 2000

Nos. 98-5428 and 98-5451

Pueblo of Sandia,

Appellee

v.

Bruce Babbitt, in his official capacity

as Secretary of the Interior, et al.,

Appellants

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 94cv02624)

David Lazerwitz, Attorney, United States Department of

Justice, argued the cause for the federal appellants in No. 98-

5451. Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, and Peter

Coppelman, William Lazarus and Marta Hoilman, Attorneys, United States Department of Justice, were on brief.

USCA Case #98-5451 Document #557083 Filed: 11/17/2000 Page 1 of 8
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Thomas R. Bartman argued the cause for Sandia Mountain

Coalition, et al., appellants in No. 98-5428, and the City of

Albuquerque, amicus curiae in No. 98-5451. Robert M.

White was on brief.

Reid Peyton Chambers argued the cause for the appellee.

Donald J. Simon, David C. Mielke and Peter T. Grossi were

on brief. James M. Rosenthal entered an appearance.

Before: Ginsburg, Sentelle and Henderson, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: The County of

Bernalillo, New Mexico and the Sandia Mountain Coalition

(intervenor appellants) appeal the district court's remand

order and grant of summary judgment to the appellee, the

Pueblo of Sandia (Pueblo). The federal appellants, Bruce H.

Babbitt in his official capacity as Secretary of the United

States Department of the Interior (Interior) and Dan Glickman in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States

Department of Agriculture (Agriculture), move to withdraw

their own appeal and to dismiss the intervenor appellants'

appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. For the reasons set

forth below, we grant the federal appellants' motion and hold

that the court lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. s 1291 to

hear the intervenor appellants' appeal.

In the proceedings below, the district court reviewed an

opinion issued by the Solicitor of Interior (Solicitor) denying a

request by the Pueblo for a corrected survey designating the

eastern boundary of its land grant as the "main ridge" of the

Sandia Mountains, located directly east of Albuquerque, New

Mexico. The Pueblo claimed that an 1859 survey commissioned by the government erroneously set the Pueblo's eastern boundary at the base of the Sandia Mountains rather

than along the Mountains' crest line, as allegedly set forth in

the Pueblo's 1748 Spanish land grant confirmed by the United

States Congress in 1858. Interior rejected the Pueblo's

claim, concluding that the original land survey accurately set

the Pueblo's eastern boundary at the foothills of the MounUSCA Case #98-5451 Document #557083 Filed: 11/17/2000 Page 2 of 8
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

tains. The Solicitor reasoned that the King of Spain, who

originally granted the land to the Pueblo, intended to grant a

"formal" pueblo only, not the larger area claimed.1

The Pueblo sued the Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture seeking a judgment designating the main ridge of the

Sandia Mountains as the Pueblo's eastern boundary and

directing the Interior Secretary to correct the 1859 survey.

See Compl. 22-23; Am. Compl. 18. The district court granted motions to intervene filed by a coalition of homeowners in

the affected region and by Bernalillo County. After denying

the federal appellants' motion to dismiss,2 the district court

reviewed Interior's actions under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). It found the circumstances surrounding the

Sandia land grant ambiguous. See Pueblo of Sandia v.

Babbitt, Civ. No. 94-2624, slip op. at 10 (D.D.C. July 18,

1998). In light of the ambiguity, the court held that Interior

should have applied the canon of construction resolving unclear language in favor of Indian claims instead of using the

presumption of survey regularity.3 See id. at 9-11. The

__________

1 A formal pueblo consists of four square leagues of land, the area

within the extension of one league (2.6 miles) measured from the

center of the settlement to the north, south, east and west. See JA

322-23 (Stanley M. Hordes, "History of the Boundaries of the

Pueblo of SandIa, 1748-1860"); cf. Pueblo of Sandia v. Babbitt, Civ.

No. 94-2624, 1996 WL 808067, at *2 n.3 (D.D.C. Dec. 10, 1996).

2 See Pueblo of Sandia, 1996 WL 808067, at *9. The district court

concluded that the APA governed the Pueblo's action, rejecting the

federal appellants' contention that it was time barred by either the

Quiet Title Act or the Indian Claims Commission Act.

3 The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the

canon of construction that resolves ambiguity in any document

related to Indian lands in favor of the Indian claim. See, e.g.,

Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199 (1975) ("The canon of

construction applied over a century and a half by this Court is that

the wording of treaties and statutes ratifying agreements with the

Indians is not to be construed to their prejudice."); County of

Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State, 470 U.S. 226,

247-48 (1985) (court resolves ambiguity in favor of Indian claims).

The canon of survey regularity provides that surveys of the United

court denied the federal appellants' motion for summary

judgment and granted the Pueblo's motion for summary

judgment. See id. at 11. Finding Interior's actions arbitrary

and capricious, the court vacated the Solicitor's Opinion and

remanded the case "to the Interior Department for agency

action consistent with [the court's] Opinion." Id.

The intervenor appellants filed a notice of appeal on August

13, 1998. To protect the government's right to appeal, the

federal appellants filed their notice on September 15, 1998.

This court consolidated the appeals sua sponte and on October 29, 1998 granted the parties' joint motion to hold the

appeals in abeyance pending settlement negotiations. The

Pueblo, the federal appellants, the intervenor appellants, the

Sandia Peak Tram Company (which moved to participate as

amicus curiae in the district court proceedings) and the City

USCA Case #98-5451 Document #557083 Filed: 11/17/2000 Page 3 of 8
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

of Albuquerque (which appeared as amicus curiae in this

court) then entered into negotiations under the auspices of a

private mediator. The intervenors and the City withdrew

from mediation in August 1999. Nevertheless, the continuing

negotiations among the government, the Pueblo and the Tram

Company were successful and resulted in a settlement.4 The

federal appellants then filed a motion to dismiss both appeals.

We deferred ruling on the motion until the case was heard on

the merits. Because this court may not proceed without

appellate jurisdiction, we must address the motion to dismiss

__________

States are presumed correct and in compliance with statutory

requirements. See Nina R. B. Levinson, 1 I.B.L.A. 252, 256 (Feb.

2, 1971).

4 Although the parties agreed to settle the pending litigation and

related matters on the terms set forth in the "Agreement of

Compromise and Settlement," the settlement agreement requires

ratifying legislation to effectuate its terms. See Plaintiff-Appellee

Sandia Pueblo's Response in Support of Federal Appellants' Motions to Dismiss Appeals, for Leave to File a Dispositive Motion

Later than 45 Days after Docketing the Case, and to Defer Briefing

pending Resolution of these Motions, at Appendix A ("Agreement of

Compromise and Settlement"), Pueblo of Sandia v. Babbitt, Nos.

98-5428 & 98-5451 (Apr. 13, 2000).

USCA Case #98-5451 Document #557083 Filed: 11/17/2000 Page 4 of 8
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

before considering the arguments on the merits. Cf. Steel Co.

v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998).

The jurisdiction of the courts of appeals to review district

court actions is limited to "final orders." See 28 U.S.C.

s 1291. Section 1291 "entitles a party to appeal not only

from a district court decision that 'ends the litigation on the

merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but

execute the judgment,' but also from a narrow class of

decisions that do not terminate the litigation, but must, in the

interest of 'achieving a healthy legal system,' nonetheless be

treated as 'final.' " Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct,

511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994) (citations omitted). Because the

district court's decision here does not end the litigation on the

merits, we grant the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

"It is well settled that, as a general rule, a district court

order remanding a case to an agency for significant further

proceedings is not final." In re St. Charles Preservation

Investors, Ltd., 916 F.2d 727, 729 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see

American Hawaii Cruises v. Skinner, 893 F.2d 1400, 1403

(D.C. Cir. 1990). This rule "best serves the interests of

judicial economy and efficiency" because it "avoids the prospect of entertaining two appeals, one from the order of

remand and one from entry of a district court order reviewing

the remanded proceedings." In re St. Charles Preservation

Investors, Ltd., 916 F.2d at 729. Deferring review also leaves

open the possibility that no appeal will be taken in the event

the proceedings on remand satisfy all parties. See id. The

intervenor appellants ask the court to apply a case-specific

approach to the determination of appealability. The United

States Supreme Court, however, has "warned that the issue

of appealability under s 1291 is to be determined for the

entire category to which a claim belongs, without regard to

the chance that the litigation at hand might be speeded, or a

'particular injustice' averted by a prompt appellate court

decision." Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 868 (citation

omitted) (holding that district court's refusal to enforce settlement agreement purporting to shelter party from suit altogether does not qualify for immediate appeal under s 1291);

see Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 439-40

USCA Case #98-5451 Document #557083 Filed: 11/17/2000 Page 5 of 8
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

(1985) (holding that "orders disqualifying counsel in civil

cases, as a class, are not sufficiently separable from the

merits to qualify for interlocutory appeal"). Because the

district court's order comes within the category of a remand

for significant further proceedings, we are without jurisdiction to review it because, as noted, remand orders as a

category are not final. See In re St. Charles Preservation

Investors, Ltd., 916 F.2d at 729.

The intervenor appellants ask this court to consider the

district court's remand order a final decision because the

order left nothing for the agency to do on remand other than

the ministerial act of issuing a corrected boundary. We disagree with their characterization for two reasons.

First, although the Pueblo's complaint sought an order

directing the Interior Secretary to issue a corrected survey,

the district court's order neither entered a "judgment declaring that the 1748 Spanish land grant...identifies and designates the true boundaries" of the Pueblo nor directed Interior

to issue a new survey. Am. Compl. 18. Rather, the court

remanded the case to Interior for further proceedings. The

intervenor appellants' assertion disregards the court's role in

reviewing agency action under the APA. Under the APA, if

the record does not support the agency's decision, then the

court must remand to the agency for additional investigation

or explanation. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470

U.S. 729, 743-44 (1985). "The reviewing court is not entitled

to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed

and to reach its own conclusions based on such an inquiry."

Id. at 744. In the proceedings below, the district court

reviewed Interior's actions, and the Solicitor's in particular,

under the APA. The court first recognized that under the

APA "it may set aside an agency action only where it finds

the action 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or

otherwise not in accordance with law.' " Slip op. at 5 (quoting

5 U.S.C. s 706(2)(A)). The court then reviewed the record,

including its factual component, and determined that Interior's actions were arbitrary and capricious, concluding that the

Solicitor's Opinion "unjustifiably denigrate[d] the Indianfavoring policy and elevate[d] the presumption of survey

USCA Case #98-5451 Document #557083 Filed: 11/17/2000 Page 6 of 8
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

regularity." Slip op. at 8. Although the result on remand

may be the issuance of a corrected survey, that result is not

directed by the court's decision.

Second, while we acknowledge that several courts, including this one, have noted that remand orders may be considered final where a court remands for solely "ministerial"

proceedings, see In re St. Charles Preservation Investors,

Ltd., 916 F.2d at 729; see also Koyo Seiko Co. v. United

States, 95 F.3d 1094, 1096-1097 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding

district court's remand for sole purpose of correcting two

computer programming errors ministerial); Tallahassee

Mem. Regional Med. Ctr. v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 1435, 1443 n.12

(11th Cir. 1987) (finding remand directing agency to pay

plaintiff's medical bills final), here the district court's remand

order contemplates more than the ministerial act of issuing a

corrected survey. On remand, Interior is to reconsider the

facts contained in the nine-volume administrative record under the Indian claim-favoring canon. It must also reconsider

its position that it lacks the legal authority to issue a corrected survey.5 Given the twelve-year period of time since

Interior finished its earlier proceedings and the continuing

interest in the matter, it will have the option of re-opening

the record to solicit additional comments from the public

before conducting its reevaluation. Finally, if Interior does

issue a corrected boundary, it must commission a survey to

determine where the "main ridge" of the Sandia Mountains

lies.

__________

5 The Solicitor maintained that even if the Pueblo established "by

a preponderance of the evidence that the [original survey] was

either fraudulent or grossly erroneous," the Secretary would be

without authority to issue a new patent "unless he found that the

United States never owned the disputed land." JA 1124-1125

(Solicitor's Opinion at 12-13 & n.6). The district court rejected the

Solicitor's reasoning, holding that the Secretary has supervisory

authority over all public lands, including the authority to survey

Indian lands, to correct erroneous land surveys and to correct

patents of conveyances to eliminate errors. See Pueblo of Sandia,

1996 WL 808067, at *7.

USCA Case #98-5451 Document #557083 Filed: 11/17/2000 Page 7 of 8
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

For the foregoing reasons, the federal appellants' motion

both to withdraw their own appeal in 98-5451 and to dismiss

the intervenor appellants' appeal in 98-5428 is granted and

the appeals in both of the consolidated cases are hereby

dismissed.6

So ordered.

__________

6 Because of our conclusion that we lack jurisdiction, we do not

reach the merits of the contention of both sets of appellants that the

district court's review under the APA was improper. See supra note

2. In addition, because the intervenor appellants do not rely on the

collateral order doctrine to support appealability, we need not reach

that issue either.

USCA Case #98-5451 Document #557083 Filed: 11/17/2000 Page 8 of 8