Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01037/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01037-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARLAND AARON JONES,

Plaintiff,

v.

TOLSON, et al.

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:15-cv-01037-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITH 

PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO STATE A 

CLAIM 

 (ECF No. 16)

DISMISSAL COUNTS AS A STRIKE 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

CLERK TO TERMINATE ALL PENDING 

MOTIONS AND CLOSE CASE

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1 & 11.) 

On June 4, 2015, Plaintiff filed his Complaint. (ECF No. 1.) The Court screened 

the Complaint and dismissed it with leave to amend. (ECF No. 12.) Plaintiff’s First

Amended Complaint is now before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 16.) 

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II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has 

raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail “to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted,” or that “seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, 

or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any 

time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim on 

which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

III. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff names as Defendant Correctional Officer Tolson.

Plaintiff alleges essentially the following:

Defendant Tolson publicly called Plaintiff a predator and stalker and documented 

same in his C-File. Defendant Tolson required Plaintiff to “see a psych” and removed 

him from the G-Yard. (ECF No. 16 at 3.) She threatened Plaintiff in an unspecified 

manner and attempted to harm him by taking him off “DDP status.” (ECF No. 16 at 4.) 

She placed him in a single person cell away from other inmates.

Plaintiff titles his claims “Defamation” and “Hate Crime – Hate Speech” and seeks 

therapy, removal of the information from his C-File, a written apology, an order 

prohibiting Defendant from committing retaliatory acts against him in the future, and 

damages. (ECF No. 16 at 3-5.)

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Section 1983

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the ‘deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” 

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 

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Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method 

for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3 (1979)).

To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States was 

violated and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); see also Ketchum v. 

Cnty. of Alameda, 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff 

must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility 

that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as 

true, legal conclusions are not. Id. 

B. Verbal Harassment

“[V]erbal harassment generally does not violate the Eighth Amendment.” Keenan 

v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996) (implying that harassment “calculated to . . . 

cause [the prisoner] psychological damage” might state an Eighth Amendment claim) 

(citing Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987)), amended by 135 

F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 

2004) (explaining that “the Eighth Amendment’s protections do not necessarily extend to 

mere verbal sexual harassment.”). 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Tolson called him a predator and stalker and 

made unspecified threats against him. Plaintiff attaches a “General Chrono” to his First 

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Amended Complaint signed by Defendant Tolson indicating that Plaintiff was seen 

harassing and stalking other inmates and that Plaintiff acknowledged his behavior. (ECF 

No. 16 at 8.) Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant’s statements were unusually harsh 

or that they were made with the intent to cause him psychological damage. Moreover, 

the chrono reflects Defendant took milder action than Plaintiff alleges and that the action 

was consistent with Plaintiff’s behavior.

Plaintiff has not stated an Eighth Amendment claim. Plaintiff was advised of the 

deficiencies in his pleading in the Court’s prior screening order. Plaintiff’s failure to 

correct the deficiencies and the attached chrono contradicting his claim demonstrate his 

inability to do so. Accordingly, he will not be granted leave to amend.

C. Defamation

Under California law, the elements of a defamation claim are: “(a) a publication 

that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural tendency 

to injure or that causes special damage.” Kaufman v. United Health Group Inc., 546 

Fed. Appx. 691, 692 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Taus v. Loftus, 40 Cal. 4th 683, 54 Cal. 

Rptr. 3d 775, 151 P.3d 1185, 1209 (Cal. 2007)). In a § 1983 action, the Plaintiff must 

plead more than an injury to reputation; there must also be an injury to a liberty or 

property interest protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. See Cooper v. Dupnik, 924 F.2d 1520, 1532 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation 

omitted). This is called “defamation-plus.” Herb Hallman Chevrolet, Inc. v. NashHolmes, 169 F.3d 636, 645 (9th Cir. 1999).

“There are two ways to state a cognizable § 1983 claim for defamation-plus: (1) 

allege that the injury to reputation was inflicted in connection with a federally protected 

right; or (2) allege that the injury to reputation caused the denial of a federally protected 

right.” Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Cooper, 924 F.2d at 1532).

As an initial matter, Plaintiff did not raise this claim in his original Complaint, and 

the Court previously advised Plaintiff that amending his Complaint was not for the 

purposes of adding new claims. (ECF No. 12.) That being said, Plaintiff has failed to 

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allege the required elements of a cognizable defamation claim, and based on the chrono

attached to his First Amended Complaint he is unable to do so. 

Plaintiff has not alleged that his reputation was injured in connection with a 

federally protected right or that the damage caused him to be denied a federally 

protected right. Essentially, Plaintiff alleges only that Defendant took action that may 

have cast Plaintiff in a bad light amongst other inmates. Even if the Court accepted 

Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant called him a predator and stalker, based on Plaintiff’s 

own exhibit, it appears that Defendant’s statements are true. According to the chrono, 

on more than one occasion Correctional Officers saw Plaintiff harassing and stalking 

other inmates, Plaintiff acknowledged the conduct, and Plaintiff was to be evaluated for 

“Predatory Behavior.” (ECF No. 16 at 8.) Plaintiff is unable to state a claim for 

defamation based on true statements. 

D. Hate Crime/Speech

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant called him a stalker and predator and stated that 

she would ruin him. 

Plaintiff did not raise this claim in his original Complaint. It is also not clear under 

what statute Plaintiff purports to bring this cause of action. To the extent Plaintiff wishes 

to state a claim under the Federal Hate Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 249(a), courts have 

found that there is no private right of action under the Act. See Turner v. Tierney, 2013 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34925, * 4 (N.D. Cal. March 13, 2013); see also Godfrey v. Ross, 2011 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138366, *13-14 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2011); see also Wiley v. California, 

2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137440, *12-13 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2011). 

Even if there was a private right of action, Plaintiff would need to show that 

Defendant willfully caused him bodily injury based on his “race, color, religion, or national 

origin.” 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1). Plaintiff’s factual allegations do not fall within the realm of 

conduct prohibited by the Act. Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim under the Act.

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E. Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff seeks an order for therapy, removal of the defamatory language from his 

C-File, a written apology, and an order prohibiting Defendant from committing retaliatory 

acts against him in the future. Injunctive relief, whether temporary or permanent, is an 

“extraordinary remedy, never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 

555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he 

is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the 

absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an 

injunction is in the public interest.” Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 

F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). 

Plaintiff has failed to show that he is likely to succeed on the merits or that the 

balance of equities tips in his favor since he has failed to state a cognizable claim. He 

also fails to allege how he would suffer irreparable harm if the relief he seeks is not 

granted or that an injunction is in the public’s interest.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint does not state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted. Plaintiff was advised in the prior screening order of deficiencies in his verbal 

harassment claim and was given the opportunity to correct them. Plaintiff has failed to 

do so, and no useful purpose would be served in allowing yet another opportunity to 

amend. Additionally, Plaintiff cannot state a claim for defamation or hate crime/speech 

based on the facts alleged nor does it appear that there are a set of true facts which 

Plaintiff could allege that would state cognizable claims.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk of Court shall send Plaintiff a copy of his First Amended 

Complaint (ECF No. 16.), filed September 3, 2015;

2. The action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim;

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3. Dismissal shall count as a strike pursuant to the “three strikes” provision 

set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); and

4. The Clerk of Court shall terminate all pending motions and CLOSE this 

case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 14, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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