Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02646/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02646-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

 SUNDAY JOSIAH IBEAGWA

Petitioner, 

vs.

PHILLIP CRAWFORD, Field Office

Director, Immigration and Customs

Enforcement

Respondent. 

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No. CV 06-2646-PHX-SRB (BPV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On November 3, 2006, Sunday Josiah Ibeagwa, (“Petitioner”), currently

confined in the Eloy Detention Center in Eloy, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus by A Person in Federal Custody (“Petition”), pursuant to Title 28,

U.S.C. § 2241. The District Court denied Petitioner's first claim for relief, and ordered

Respondent to answer Ground Two. The Respondent filed an Answer to the Petition

for Habeas Corpus on January 11, 2007, with Exhibits A through P attached. A Reply

was filed by Petitioner on January 25, 2007. 

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, on November 16, 2006, this

matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and

Recommendation. The Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court enter an order

granting Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

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1 All exhibit numbers in this Report and Recommendation are

references to the exhibits attached to Respondent's " Response in

Opposition to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus." 

2 The names and A#'s of the detainees requesting to be

represented by counsel are not discernible from the transcript.

By process of elimination, however, it appears that Petitioner

was one of two unidentified detainees who requested attorneys

at the December 7, 2004 removal proceeding, and thus had their

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Factual and Procedural Background

Petitioner is a citizen and native of Nigeria. (Ex. A.)1

 He entered the United

States at or near Los Angeles, California, on or about July 12, 2000. (Id.) On July 9,

2002, Petitioner's status was adjusted to that of a conditional resident pursuant to

Section 245 of the Immigration and National Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. § 1255. (Id.) 

On December 2, 2003, in the Superior Court of the State of California for the

County of Los Angeles, Petitioner was convicted upon entry of a guilty plea to one

count of Forgery and one count of Grand Theft of Personal Property in violation of

California Penal Code §§ 470(D) and 487(A), respectively. (Ex. C.) On May 5, 2004,

Petitioner was sentenced to one year and four months imprisonment. (Id.) 

On July 9, 2004, Petitioner's conditional resident status was terminated for

failure to file a Form I-751 petition to remove conditions on his conditional resident

status. (Ex. D.) On or about November 24, 2004, the United States served Petitioner

with a Notice to Appear in removal proceedings under section 240 of the INA, charging

Petitioner as subject to removal pursuant to section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA, 8

U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), in that he, at any time after admission, was convicted of an

aggravated felony as defined in section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Act. (Ex. A.) 

Petitioner was one of several detainees who appeared for removal proceedings

on December 7, 2004. (Ex. L, p.1.) Petitioner, having apparently requested to be

represented by an attorney2

, had his removal hearing reset to January 4, 2005. (Id, p.4.)

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hearing reset to January 4, 2005. (Ex. L, p. 3.) 

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Respondent's transcripts reflect that Petitioner did not appear again at a hearing until

March 21, 2005, most likely as a result of transfer of from criminal, to immigration

detention.

On February 1, 2005, Petitioner was served a Notice of Custody Determination,

informing Petitioner that pursuant to section 236 of the INS, and 8 C.F.R. 236, the

reviewing officer had determined that Petitioner was to be detained pending a final

determination by the immigration judge (“IJ”) in his case. (Ex. G.) Petitioner requested

a redetermination of the custody decision by an IJ. 

On March 4, 2005, the United States filed additional charges of

inadmissibility/deportability, charging Petitioner with removal pursuant to §

237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA, having been convicted of a theft offense (including receipt

of stolen property) or burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment is at least

one year, and, pursuant to section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the INA, having been convicted

of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after the date of

admission, and for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed. (Ex. E.)

On March 7, 2005, the IJ considered Petitioner's request for a change in the

custody status of the Petitioner and entered a form order, checking the box that the IJ

had “[n]o Jurisdiction pursuant to 236 of the Act.” (Ex. H.) 

On March 21, 2005, Petitioner appeared in front of an IJ for a removal hearing,

and again requested to be represented by an attorney, and his hearing was continued.

(Ex. L, p.41-42.) On that same date, the United States again filed additional charges

of inadmissibility/deportability pursuant to the termination of Petitioner's conditional

resident status, under section 237(a)(1)(D)(i) of the INA. (Ex. F.)

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Petitioner's removal hearing was continued again on April 13, 2005, as his

attorney was on vacation. (Ex. L, p.48-51.) Petitioner moved to terminate his removal

proceedings, asserting that his criminal conviction was not final for immigration law

purposes, that his conditional resident status had not been properly terminated, and that

he was entitled to seek a waiver pursuant to §§ 212(h) and 216(c)(4) of the INA. (Ex.

J.) 

Petitioner's next appeared at a removal hearing on April 21, 2005, without

counsel. (Ex. L, p.52.) The IJ set the matter for a contested hearing on May 5, 2005.

(Ex. L, p.57.) The IJ found the crime involving moral turpitude charge to be sustained,

as well as the conditional residence termination charge to be sustained. (Id., p.68.)

Petitioner did not contest the charge based on commission of a crime of moral turpitude.

(Id., p. 66-67.) The IJ requested further briefing on the issue of Petitioner's commission

of an aggravated felony and eligibility for a 212(h) waiver. (Ex. L, p. 68-69.) 

Petitioner appeared again on June 1, 2005, without counsel. (Ex. L, p.75.) The

IJ found that Petitioner was still not eligible for a 212(h) waiver, and that Petitioner's

convictions were a crime of moral turpitude, but did not find that the convictions were

aggravated felonies based upon Penuliar v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2005).

On June 3, 2005, Petitioner moved for a second redetermination hearing

claiming changed circumstances, asserting that he was not currently “charged with

removability based on a mandatory detention ground.” (Ex. I.) The IJ denied the

motion, finding that the aggravated felony charge was not sustained, but that the charge

of removability pursuant to § 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the INA for conviction of a crime

involving moral turpitude within five years after admission, and for which a sentence

of imprisonment of at least one year was in fact imposed, subjected Petitioner to

mandatory detention provisions. (Id.) 

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Petitioner's next proceeding was held on July 5, 2005, where he presented

evidence to support his asylum claim. (Ex. L, p. 87.) The IJ postponed the case for

three weeks in order to allow the government to investigate his claim. (Ex. L, p.171.)

After two continuances to allow the government more time to investigate, (Ex.

L, pp. 174-75,176-87 ), the hearing was concluded on October 5, 2005, and a written

decision issued on October 7, 2005 denying Petitioner's application for a 212(h) waiver,

finding Petitioner's application for cancellation of removal pursuant to section 240A(a)

of the INA pretermitted, denying Petitioner's application for Asylum, denying

Petitioner's application for withholding of removal pursuant to section 241(b)(3) of the

INA, and denying Petitioner's request for relief pursuant to the Convention Against

Torture, and ordering Petitioner removed from the United States to Nigeria. (Ex. L, p.

188-193, Ex. M.)

Petitioner filed an appeal and motion challenging the IJ's order, and the Board

of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed the appeal and denied Petitioner's motion.

(Ex. N.) 

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review of Removal Order with the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals on February 16, 2006, and moved for a stay of removal pending

consideration of the petition. (Ex. O.) On that same date, the Ninth Circuit granted

Petitioner an automatic temporary stay of removal under Ninth Circuit General Order

6.4(c)(1)(3). See Ibeagwa v. Gonzales, No. 06-70845. 

On May 17, 2006, Petitioner was served with a letter entitled “Decision to

Continue Detention.” (Ex. P.) The letter informed Petitioner that his custody status had

been reviewed, and that, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(d)(1), the reviewer was unable

to conclude that Petitioner would not be a danger to the community and/or that he

would be able to comply with the requirements of an Order of Supervision. (Id.) The

reviewer noted that, although Petitioner did not have an extensive criminal history, he

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had begun committing criminal offenses soon after he arrived in the United States. (Id.)

On November 3, 2006, the Petitioner filed the instant Petition. 

DISCUSSION

Petitioner's Arguments

Petitioner argues that he has been denied a meaningful custody review for

consideration for release. 

Respondents' Arguments

Respondents argue that the government's decision to continue Petitioner's

decision pending the Ninth Circuit's decision in this case was a proper exercise of its

authority under the INA and corresponding regulations. Respondent further argues that

Petitioner is not subject to release under Tijani, because petitioner is not a lawfully

admitted alien, and has been denied all forms of relief by both the immigration court

and the BIA. Furthermore, Petitioner's detention during proceedings was mandated by

INA § 236(c). 

Jurisdiction

The federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 grants District Courts the

power to issue habeas corpus relief where the petitioner is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Specifically,

the Supreme Court has held that Section 2241 confers jurisdiction upon the federal

courts to hear cases involving statutory and constitutional challenges to both pre- and

post-removal detention of aliens in deportation proceedings. See Demore v. Kim, 123

S.Ct. 1708, 538 U.S. 510 (2003); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491

(2001). 

Mandatory Detention

Petitioner is subject to an administratively final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(47)(B)(defining final order of deportation). Although Petitioner is subject

to an administratively final order of removal, the “removal period” has not yet begun

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because his removal order is currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit and because the

Ninth Circuit has granted Petitioner a stay of his removal. The “removal period” will

not begin for Petitioner until “the date of [Ninth Circuit's] final order.” 8 U.S.C. §

1231(a)(1)(B)(ii). Accordingly, Petitioner's current detention is pursuant to the

pre-removal order detention statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1226, section 236 of the INA, rather

than the post-removal order detention statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1231. See Tijani v. Willis,

430 F.3d 1241, n.7, (9th Cir. 2005); see also Kothandaraghipathy v. DHS, 396

F.Supp.2d 1104, 1106 (D.Ariz. 2005). 

Petitioner admitted that he was subject to removal after having been convicted

of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after the date of

admission and for which a sentence of one year or longer might be imposed. (Ex. L,

p. 66-67.) This admission subjected Petitioner to the mandatory detention provisions

of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which authorizes detention of aliens who have committed certain

crimes including, inter alia, “crimes involving moral turpitude committed within five

years” after the date of admission, and “for which a sentence of one year or longer may

be imposed.” §§ 1226(c)(1)(B), 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). Although the government's charge

of commission of a crime of aggravated assault was never sustained, Petitioner's

admission of a conviction under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) satisfied the conditions of §

1226(c)(1)(B), thus rendering his detention pending a decision on Petitioner's removal

proceedings statutorily permissible. 

Due Process

In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001),

the United States Supreme Court recognized the constitutional implications of

prolonged detention for those subject to a valid order of removal. “Freedom from

imprisonment-from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical

restraint-lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Fifth Amendment's Due Process] Clause

protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. “[G]overnment detention violates that Clause

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3 Petitioner concedes that he is removable as an alien convicted of

a crime involving moral turpitude, and has sought relief from the

BIA and the Ninth Circuit only from the IJ's decision denying

the Petitioner's application for relief from removal. See Ex. N,

n.1, Ex. O, ¶ 2. This distinction is important because the Ninth

Circuit has determined that aliens who have not conceded

deportability may only be mandatorily detained, pursuant to 8

U.S.C. § 1236(c), during an “expedited period”of removal

proceedings. See Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1241-1242 (9th

Cir. 2005). Because Petitioner has conceded deportability,

Tijani does not apply. 

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unless the detention is ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate procedural

protections, or, in certain special and ‘narrow’ non-punitive ‘circumstances,’ where a

special justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness, outweighs the

‘individual's constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.” ’ Id.

(citations omitted).

The Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation

proceedings. Demore v. Kim, 123 S.Ct. 1708, 1717 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S.

292, 306, 113 S.Ct. 1439 (1993)). The Court in Kim, addressing a constitutional

challenge to the mandatory detention provision, held that detention during removal

proceedings is a "constitutionally permissible part of that process." Kim, 123 S.Ct. at

1722. Key to the Court's holding was the "definite termination point" of the

proceedings, roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases, and about five

months in the minority of cases in which the alien chooses to appeal; and the criminal

alien's concession that he or she is deportable3

. Kim, 123 S.Ct. 1720-22. 

Petitioner asserts, in his reply, that the decision to deny him release violates the

Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the Respondent “does not make

decisions concerning alien's custody status in a neutral and impartial manner” and that

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Respondent failed “to provide a neutral decision-maker to review the continued custody

of Petitioner.” 

Respondent's Answer states that Immigration and Customs Enforcement's

(“ICE's”) review of Petitioner's detention (Ex. P.) was conducted pursuant to 8 C.F.R.

§ 241.4(d)(1), which governs continued detention of aliens in custody beyond the

removal period. As discussed above, however, the “removal period” has not yet begun

because his removal order is currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit and because the

Ninth Circuit has granted Petitioner a stay of his removal. Accordingly, Petitioner was

not entitled to review of his custody status under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4. 

Recognizing that Petitioner's detention is properly analyzed under the mandatory

provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), however, does not end the inquiry. The Supreme

Court in Kim held that detention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally

permissible part of that process. The Court distinguished its holding in Kim from its

prior holding in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491 (2001). In Zadvydas,

the Court considered a due process challenge to detention of aliens following a final

order of removal. The Court in Kim found Zadvydas “material different” in two

respects. First, in Zadvydas, the aliens challenging their detention following final

orders of deportation were ones for whom removal was no longer practically attainable,

and thus, the Court found, that the detention there did not serve its immigration purpose

(prevention of fleeing prior to their removal.) Kim, at 527, 1719-20 (citing Zadvydas,

at 690, 121 S.Ct. 2491.) Unlike Zadvydas, the Court in Kim found the statutory

provision at issue serves the purpose of preventing deportable criminal aliens from

fleeing prior to or during their removal proceedings, thus increasing the chance that, if

ordered removed, the aliens will be successfully removed. Kim, at 527-28, 123 S.Ct.

1720. 

Second, the Court found Zadvydas materially different in another respect as well;

the period of detention in Zadvydas was “indefinite” and “potentially permanent.” Kim,

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at 528, 123 S.Ct. 1720. The Court in Kim determined that the detention at stake under

§ 1226(c) lasts roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases in which it is

invoked, and five months in the minority of cases in which the alien chooses to appeal.

Kim v. Demore, 538 U.S. 510, 530, 123 S.Ct. 1708, 1721. 

This case falls squarely into neither Zadvydas nor Kim. District Judge Underhill

of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, astutely summed the

relationship between the holdings in Zadvydas and Kim, and the facts of a similar case:

In short, both Zadvydas and Kim upheld the same fundamental principles.

Both recognized an alien's right to due process in deportation

proceedings, in particular a right to liberty; both recognized Congress's

considerable authority to abrogate that right; and both recognized that

Congress's authority allows it to impose reasonable restraints on liberty

in order to further its goals of securing attendance at removal proceedings

and protecting the community. Zadvydas went on to indicate that, under

section 241(a), a lengthy detention that did not clearly relate to both those

goals would exceed the Constitution's bounds, while Kim held that, under

section 236(c), a short detention that was clearly related to those goals

did not exceed the Constitution's bounds.

...

Though both Zadvydas and Kim are instructive, neither addresses the

question presented by this case, namely, whether [Petitioner's] extremely

lengthy detention under section 236(c) constitutes a permissible

infringement of her constitutionally protected right to liberty.

Fuller v. Gonzales, 2005 WL 818614, 4 -5 (D.Conn.,2005). 

Petitioner asks this Court for immediate release. This Court recognizes that,

ordinarily, detention decisions under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 are not subject to judicial review.

Petitioner's continued detention, without review, has become presumptively

unreasonable. See Zadvydas. Furthermore, review of the decision previously rendered

in this case, demonstrates that Petitioner, although granted a detention review, was not

granted a meaningful review. 

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4 Respondent asserts that Petitioner has been in custody since his

apprehension on February 1, 2005. (Answer, p.7, n.9)

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This case has far exceeded the brief period of detention envisioned by the Court

in Kim for the majority of cases, or even the minority of cases in which the Court

considered the alien might appeal. Petitioner has now been in detention for well over

two years4

. Although Petitioner's case was reviewed, Petitioner has been completely

deprived of all liberty without a hearing before an immigration judge. In fact, Petitioner

has already been held in detention approximately a year longer than he was held for his

underlying criminal conviction. 

This Court has reviewed both the docket of Petitioner's appeal to the Ninth

Circuit court of appeals, as well as the underlying removal proceedings before the IJ

and the BIA. Petitioner's appeal to the Ninth Circuit has been pending since Feb 16,

2006. The case was delayed when the Government filed, then withdrew a motion to

dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and when the Ninth Circuit considered whether the case

should be included in the mediation program, and both parties have moved for some

minor continuances. The case has not yet been fully briefed. See Ibeagwa v. Gonzales,

No. 06-70845. 

Petitioner's proceedings before the IJ and the BIA were delayed when Petitioner

attempted to secure an attorney, when the IJ attempted to ascertain Petitioner's asylum

claim, and when the IJ attempted to have the government investigate Petitioner's asylum

claim, and, rather than informing the IJ that the government was unwilling to do so, the

government repeatedly appeared at removal proceedings without having performed any

investigation. It does not appear from the record that any delay is an attempt on

Petitioner's behalf to delay the proceedings. 

Petitioner's so called custody review did not meet the constitutional standards

procedural due process demands in this case. As expressed by District Judge Underhill,

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continued detentions of this length were not contemplated by the majority in Kim, and

were a cause of concern to the Court in Zadvydas and to Justice Kennedy in his Kim

concurrence. See Fuller, at 6. Accordingly, after a careful review of the file in this

case, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court order Respondents to

release petitioner immediately on reasonable conditions.

Alternatively, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court order

Respondent to provide Petitioner with a hearing within 60 days before an Immigration

Judge with the power to grant him bail unless the government establishes that he is a

flight risk or will be a danger to the community.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

RECOMMENDS that the District Court, after its independent review of the record, enter

an order GRANTING the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Docket #1).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written objections

within 10 days of being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation.

If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are

filed the parties should use the following case number: CV 06-cv-2646-PHX-SRB.

DATED this 9th day of May, 2007.

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