Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01464/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01464-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Regina Pangerl, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Susan Ehrlich, et al.,

Defendants. 

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 CV 06-1464-PHX-MHM

 CV 06-1465-PHX-FJM

 ORDER

Currently before the Court is Plaintiff Regina Pangerl's ("Plaintiff Pangerl") Motion

to Transfer Hellman v. Weisberg, et al., No. CV 06-1465-PHX-FJM, to this Court and

Consolidate for Purposes of Discovery. (Dkt.#26). After reviewing the pleadings, the Court

issues the following Order.

I. Background

A. Pangerl v. Ehrlich, et al.

On June 6, 2006, Plaintiff Pangerl filed the instant action in this Court. ("Pangerl

Action") (Dkt.#1). Plaintiff Pangerl has asserted claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

Defendants Susan Ehrlich and Sheldon Weisberg, judges of the Arizona Court of Appeals,

and claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.,

against Defendant State of Arizona. (Complaint "Compl." ¶2). Plaintiff Pangerl's Complaint

alleges that she is a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and was

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discriminated against based upon her religion while employed as a law clerk at the Arizona

Court of Appeals. (Id. ¶13). Specifically, Plaintiff Pangerl alleges that Judge Susan Ehrlich

"made a series of offensive and discriminatory remarks regarding the Church of Jesus Christ

of Latter-Day Saints and its members" while Plaintiff was employed as her law clerk. (Id.).

According to Plaintiff Pangerl, even after she complained, the discriminatory remarks

continued and she was interrogated about her religious affiliation. (Id. ¶16). In addition,

Plaintiff Pangerl alleges that Judge Ehrlich engaged in "a pattern of retaliatory, unjustified,

and abusive criticisms of [Plaintiff's] job performance." (Id.). After Plaintiff Pangerl

complained of Judge Ehrlich's conduct to the Arizona Commission of Judicial Conduct and

to Chief Judge Sheldon Weisberg, Plaintiff Pangerl was transferred from Judge Ehrlich's

chambers to Chief Judge Weisberg's chambers. (Id.¶¶17-20). After her transfer, Plaintiff

Pangerl alleges that the terms and conditions of her employment deteriorated such as that she

was no longer given regular case assignments. (Id. ¶22). Allegedly, Plaintiff Pangerl

ultimately was intimidated by Chief Judge Weisberg into terminating her employment with

the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Id. ¶23). Plaintiff Pangerl alleges that the conduct of the

Defendants has adversely impacted her health and continues to do so. (Id. ¶32). The Joint

Case Management Plan submitted by the Parties suggests that the events described above

occurred during Plaintiff Pangerl's employment with the Arizona Court of Appeals which

began with her hiring in September of 2004 and concluded sometime in July of 2005.

(Dkt.#16). Plaintiff Pangerl filed her charge of discrimination on November 4, 2005, and

received her right to sue letter from the EEOC on March 9, 2006. (Compl. ¶¶33-34). 

B. Hellman v. Weisberg, et al.

On June 6, 2006, Plaintiff Luz Hellman's ("Plaintiff Hellman"), filed an action in this

District, which was randomly assigned to the Honorable Frederick J. Martone, CV06-1465.

("Hellman Action") (Dkt.#1). Plaintiff Hellman asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against Defendant Sheldon Weisberg and claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964 and the Arizona Civil Rights Act, A.R.S. § 14-161, against the State of Arizona.

(Dkt.#1; Compl. ¶2). Plaintiff Hellman, a judicial assistant at the Arizona Court of Appeals,

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alleges that she was unlawfully retaliated against after providing two internal memorandums,

one of which was authored by Chief Judge Weisberg, to Plaintiff Pangerl. (Id.¶12-19).

These memos were disclosed to the EEOC by Plaintiff Pangerl in support of her EEOC

charges against the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Id. ¶16). The Joint Case Management Plan

submitted by the Parties suggests that the disclosure of the two memos by Plaintiff Hellman

occurred sometime in late November of 2005.(Dkt.#14). Plaintiff Hellman alleges that on

November 30, 2005, she informed Chief Judge Weisberg that she provided the memos to

Plaintiff Pangerl, which allegedly set off a series of retaliatory acts, such as threats of

criminal prosecution, termination and disciplinary reprimands. (Id. ¶¶18-20). Plaintiff

Hellman filed a charge with the EEOC on January 5, 2006, and received her right to sue letter

on March 9, 2006. (Id. ¶¶27-28). 

C. Plaintiff's Motion to Transfer the Hellman Action to this Court

As noted above, both the Pangerl and Hellman Actions were filed in this District on

the same day, June 6, 2006. In the Pangerl Action before this Court, a Rule 16 Conference

was held on October 26, 2006, at which time the applicable deadlines were set. (Dkt.#19).

On December 4, 2006, Judge Martone conducted a Rule 16 Conference in the Hellman

Action and set the appropriate deadlines. (Dkt.#19). On December 13, 2006, Plaintiff

Pangerl filed the instant Motion to transfer the Hellman Action to this Court. (Dkt.#26). The

Motion is now fully briefed and ready for the Court's consideration. 

II. Analysis

A. LRCiv. 42.1(a)(1)

Local Rule 42.1(a)(1) for the District of Arizona provides in pertinent part:

Whenever two or more cases are pending before different Judges and any party

believes that such cases (A) arise from substantially the same transaction or

event; (B) involve substantially the same parties or property; ... (D) calls for

determination of substantially the same questions of law; or (E) for any other

reason would entail substantial duplication of labor if heard by different

Judges, any party may file a motion to transfer the case or cases involved to a

single Judge. 

The standard for transfer is similar to the standard for consolidation under Rule 42(a) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and district courts have broad discretion in determining

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whether to grant such motions. See Investors Research Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Cent. Dist.

of California, 877 F.2d 777 (1989). 

Plaintiff argues that transfer is appropriate because both cases involve a series of

related events, arise under the same statutes, involve many of the same witnesses, and

involve many of the same documents. (Dkt.#26, pp.1-2). Defendants, on the other hand,

object to transferring the Hellman Action before this Court. Defendants contend that a close

analysis of LRCiv 42.1 demonstrates that the stated purposes of transfer are not satisfied by

Plaintiff's request. A review of the relevant factors governing transfer supports the

Defendants' position.

(1) Arise From Substantially the Same Transaction or Event 

As set out in the factual background discussion, above, it does not appear that the

Pangerl and Hellman Actions arise from substantially the same transaction or event. Rather,

the cases appear quite distinguishable. For instance, Plaintiff Pangerl's claims arise out of

alleged discriminatory and retaliatory actions against her during her employment with the

Arizona Court of Appeal beginning in September of 2004 and ending in July of 2005.

Plaintiff Pangerl alleges that Judge Ehrlich discriminated against her based upon her religious

background and that after Plaintiff Pangerl's complaints, she was retaliated against by Judge

Ehrlich and Chief Judge Weisberg. Plaintiff Hellman's Action is factually distinguishable

in that her claims arise out of alleged subsequent unlawful retaliation she incurred after

admitting to the disclosure of the two internal Arizona Court of Appeals memorandums

regarding Plaintiff Pangerl's claims of discrimination. Plaintiff Hellman's disclosure of such

memos occurred in late November of 2005, several months after Plaintiff Pangerl's

employment with the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded. While there is some relation

between the two cases, evidenced by Plaintiff Hellman's alleged disclosure of internal

memorandums in response to the EEOC charge filed by Plaintiff Pangerl, the alleged relevant

acts supporting Plaintiff Pangerl's and Plaintiff Hellman's claims are clearly distinct and do

not arise out of substantially the same transaction or event. Thus, this factor does not favor

transfer of Plaintiff Hellman's case to this Court. 

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(2) Involve Substantially the Same Parties 

A review of both Plaintiff Pangerl's and Plaintiff Hellman's lawsuits reveal that the

Defendants in both actions are substantially the same. For instance, Plaintiff Pangerl has

brought suit against Judge Ehrlich, Chief Judge Weisberg and the State of Arizona. Plaintiff

Hellman has asserted her claims against Chief Judge Weisberg and the State of Arizona.

However, the commonality of Chief Judge Weisberg and the State of Arizona Court to both

Actions is not overly persuasive supporting a transfer of Plaintiff Hellman's case to this

Court. For instance, the Plaintiffs in both cases are distinct. Moreover, the State of Arizona

is named in this suit based upon the alleged actions of the named individual judges. Thus,

it appears that Chief Judge Weisberg is the only named Defendant alleged to have engaged

in specific actionable conduct in both cases. Moreover, as noted above, Chief Judge

Weisberg's alleged actionable conduct in the Pangerl Action took place during the course of

Plaintiff Pangerl's employment which concluded in July of 2005. Conversely, Chief Judge

Weisberg's alleged retaliatory conduct in the Hellman Action commenced no earlier than the

end of November of 2005. In taking these circumstances into account, the Court finds that

this factor does not support Plaintiff's request for transfer. 

(3) Calls for Determination of Substantially the Same Questions of 

 Law

Plaintiff Pangerl has asserted claims of discrimination based upon religion and

retaliation in violation of her civil rights against Judge Ehrlich and Chief Judge Weisberg,

as well as related Title VII claims against the State of Arizona. Plaintiff Hellman alleges

civil rights claims against Chief Judge Weisberg on the basis of retaliation and a related Title

VII claim against the State of Arizona. From a broad perspective, the claims alleged in both

suits are similar, although Plaintiff Hellman, unlike Plaintiff Pangerl, asserts no claim of

discrimination based upon religion. However, in reviewing the specific nature of the

retaliation claims, it is apparent to the Court that the claims and questions of law to be

decided are somewhat distinct. For instance, in Plaintiff Pangerl's case, her claim of

retaliation is based upon retaliatory transfer from Judge Ehrlich's chambers to Chief Judge

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Weisberg's chambers, after she voiced her complaints of discrimination. In addition, Plaintiff

Pangerl argues that the terms and conditions of her employment after her transfer

deteriorated. Conversely, in Plaintiff Hellman's case, her claims of retaliation are based upon

alleged threats of criminal prosecution and termination as well as disciplinary reprimands and

workplace scrutiny. Thus, while both cases involve claims of retaliation, the claims are

based upon different events and circumstances relevant to any determination of actionable

retaliation. The Court finds this factor does not support transfer. 

(4) Substantial Duplication of Labor

Plaintiff Pangerl argues that transfer is appropriate because both cases involve much

of the same discovery and many of the same witnesses. In addition, Plaintiff Pangerl argues

that if transfer is not ordered there is a possibility of inconsistent rulings, such as with respect

to the propriety of a protective order. However, the Court does not find these arguments

persuasive. In reviewing the initial disclosure statements submitted in both cases, it appears

that many of the documents at issue in both cases are substantially distinct. (Plaintiff's

Motion, Dkt.#26, Exhibits D). In the Pangerl Action, the documents identified in

Defendants' initial disclosure bear on Plaintiff' Pangerl's individual employment with the

Arizona Court of Appeals and her charge of discrimination. Conversely, in the Hellman

Action, the identified documents relate to Plaintiff Hellman and her subsequent claim of

retaliation. (Id.). Also, while there does appear to be some overlap of the relevant identified

witnesses in both cases, (Plaintiff's Motion, Dkt.#26, Exhibits C, D), this factor does not

suggest a duplication of resources given the distinguishing set of facts underlying both cases.

 Lastly, the risk of inconsistent rulings is not as significant as Plaintiff Pangerl suggests. For

instance, the only potential inconsistency identified has to do with the propriety of a

protective order over common documents in both cases. Notably, Plaintiff Pangerl identifies

no other such risk of inconsistent rulings, such as on the merits of the two cases. In addition,

the issue over confidentiality over any common documents is in a different posture in both

cases. For instance, in the Hellman Action, Judge Martone recently denied the Defendants'

request to file under seal four specific documents and again upon Defendants' motion for

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It is relevant to note that in the Hellman Action, the Parties apparently agreed to keep

certain disputed documents and communications confidential pending Judge Martone's ruling

on Defendants' motion to seal. No such agreement was reached in the Pangerl Action before

this Court. 

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Plaintiff Pangerl and Plaintiff Hellman are represented by the same counsel.

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reconsideration. (Dkt.#'s 45,53).1

 However, in the instant case, to date, the Parties have

addressed a protective order only as to a broad scope of documents, including documents

generated in response to Plaintiff's allegations of improper treatment, administrative matters

and matters touching on judicial interpretation and rulings. (Dkt.#38). To date, in balancing

the competing interests identified by the Parties and finding a compelling interest to protect

documents that relate or potentially relate to matters involving judicial interpretations and

rulings, this Court has found a protective order appropriate. See Foltz v. State Farm

Automobile Insur. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003). However, the Court has made

clear that Plaintiff Pangerl is free to identify specific documents that may fall outside the

scope of such considerations and bring such matters to the Court. Moreover, the mere fact

that both courts are dealing with issues surrounding the confidentiality of certain common

documents is not sufficient to demonstrate a material duplication of labor justifying transfer.

 As such, given the distinguishing characteristics of both cases, there does not appear to be

a material risk of a substantial duplication of labor if the Hellman Action is not transferred

to this Court. 

(5) Other Relevant Factors

Counsel for Plaintiff Pangerl and Plaintiff Hellman filed the two actions separately

on June 6, 2006.2

 In addition, counsel has waited until after both cases have proceeded

through a Rule 16 conference, at which time both courts instituted the appropriate deadlines.

The Defendants note that at the Rule 16 hearing in front of Judge Martone, Plaintiff's counsel

was questioned by Judge Martone as to the application of qualified immunity to Plaintiff

Hellman's claims. (Defendants' Response, Dkt.#27, Exhibit A, p.17. ll.4-12). A little over

one week later, Plaintiff Pangerl filed the instant Motion to transfer the Hellman Action to

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this Court. Defendants assert that the timing of the Motion to transfer, without any evidence

of any other intervening circumstances, suggests potential forum shopping by Plaintiff

Hellman. Notably, there is currently a motion for summary judgment in the Hellman Action

addressing the issue of qualified immunity filed on December 22, 2006. (Dkt.#24). While

certainly not dispositive of the inquiry, the Court finds that even the appearance of forum

shopping militates against transfer. 

III. Summary

The Court in the exercise of its discretion and in analyzing the relevant factors of

LRCiv. 42.1(a)(1) finds there is an insufficient basis presented in support of transfer. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED denying Plaintiff's Motion to Transfer Hellman v.

Weisberg, et al., No. CV 06-1465-PHX-FJM, to this Court and Consolidate for Purposes of

Discovery. (Dkt.#26). 

DATED this 28th day of February, 2007.

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