Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01002/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01002-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

15CV1002 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD JONES,

Petitioner,

v.

DIRECTOR OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

Case No.: 15CV1002 GPC (BGS)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION TO DENY 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS

[ECF Nos. 1, 57]

Petitioner, Edward Jones (“Petitioner” or “Jones ”), a state prisoner, filed a Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [ECF 1.] 

Following dismissal of Petitioner’s ex post facto claim in partially granting Respondent’s 

Motion to Dismiss, Respondent was ordered to respond to Petitioner’s remaining claims 

for violation of due process and equal protection. (ECF 32 at 20.) Petitioner is not 

challenging his conviction or his sentence in this Petition. Rather, Petitioner claims that 

he is being denied worktime credits he is entitled to pursuant to an order issued on 

February 10, 2014 by a three-judge court in Coleman/Plata v. Brown.

1 Petitioner 

 

1 February 10, 2014 Order issued in Coleman v. Brown, Case No. 2:90-cv-520 LKK DAD 

(PC) and Plata v. Brown, Case No. C01-1351 TEH (hereinafter “Coleman/Plata Order”). 

Case 3:15-cv-01002-GPC-BGS Document 58 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 18
2

15CV1002 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

additionally claims he is erroneously being limited in the worktime credits he can earn 

under California Penal Code § 2933.1 — limiting worktime credits to 15 percent of the 

imposed sentence.

2

 He argues that the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) has incorrectly denied these worktime credits based on 

Petitioner being a violent offender. Respondent has filed an Answer and supporting 

Lodgments. (ECF 38-39; see also ECF 12 (Lodgments in Support of Motion to Dismiss); 

ECF 24 (Supplemental Lodgments in Support of Motion to Dismiss).) Petitioner has 

filed a Traverse and Amendment to Traverse. (ECF 53, 55.) 

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District 

Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of 

the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. After 

consideration of the Petition and attached exhibits, Respondent’s Answer, Petitioner’s 

Traverse and Amendment to Traverse, and all the Lodgments submitted,

3

the Court 

recommends the Petition be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background4

On November 8, 2000, a jury convicted Petitioner of one count of second degree 

robbery, five counts of attempted second degree robbery, and two counts of false 

 

(Lodgment 5.) The requirements of this Order for purposes of Petitioner’s claims is 

discussed more fully in Section II.A.2.

2 All further code section references are to the California Penal Code unless otherwise 

noted. 

3 The state court record in this case is limited because Petitioner is not challenging his 

conviction or sentence, but rather only his designation as a violent offender by CDCR 

and the resulting limitations on his ability to earn worktime credits to reduce his time in 

custody. However, the Court has received and independently reviewed all relevant 

portions of the state court record. Nasby v. McDaniel, 853 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 

2017).

4 The Court’s December 8, 2015 Report and Recommendation on Respondent’s Motion 

to Dismiss and the March 30, 2016 Order Adopting the Report and Recommendation 

Case 3:15-cv-01002-GPC-BGS Document 58 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 18
3

15CV1002 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

imprisonment. (Pet., Ex. K (“Verdict Forms”) [ECF 1 at 93-108]; Lodgment 1 (“Abstract 

of Judgment”).) The jury also found true that petitioner personally used a firearm during 

the commission of each offense. (Verdict Forms [ECF 1 at 93-108.) The trial court 

sentenced petitioner to 37 years in prison. (Abstract of Judgment at 1 [ECF 39-1 at 1].) 

The conviction was upheld on appeal and through state and federal habeas review.

5

As to the claims raised in the current Petition concerning denial of additional 

worktime credits, Petitioner filed a habeas petition with the San Diego County Superior 

Court raising an ex post facto claim that was denied on December 2, 2014. (Lodgments

6-7.) Jones subsequently filed a habeas petition in the state court of appeal raising a 

similar ex post facto claim. (Lodgment 8.) In addition to being denied as procedurally 

barred because it was stale, repetitive, and successive, the Court of Appeal also found

Petitioner failed to state a prima facie case for relief. (Lodgment 9.) More specifically, 

the court found Petitioner was considered a violent offender not because of a change in 

the law applied retroactively (Proposition 21), but because he was convicted of a felony 

with gun use enhancements and § 667.5(c)(8) provided at the time Petitioner committed 

this offense that any felony in which a defendant used a firearm which has been charged 

and proved is a violent felony. (Lodgment 9 at 2.)

Petitioner filed a habeas petition with the state supreme court raising the ex post 

facto claim. (Lodgment 10.) He then submitted an amendment to the petition raising his 

due process and equal protection claims. (Lodgment 11.) The record reflects the 

amendment was received by the California Supreme Court on February 6, 2015. 

 

both provide a very detailed procedural history. The summary below is less detailed 

because the Court, having already considered Respondent’s arguments concerning 

exhaustion and procedural default, focuses on the merits of Petitioner’s due process and 

equal protection claims. 

5 People v. Jones, No. D038250, 2002 WL 3117620 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2002). 

Petitioner’s federal habeas petition challenging his conviction was denied on February 

22, 2008. Jones v. Woodford, Case No. 03CV1463 J (RBB), 2008 WL 505230 (February 

22, 2008). 

Case 3:15-cv-01002-GPC-BGS Document 58 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 18
4

15CV1002 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(Lodgment 12.) The California Supreme Court issued a summary denial on March 11, 

2015. (Lodgment 12.)

Petitioner filed his federal Petition on May 4, 2015 raising an ex post facto claim 

and claims for violation of due process and equal protection. Respondent filed a Motion 

to Dismiss on August 12, 2015. (ECF 11.) It was granted in part and denied in part on 

March 30, 2016. (ECF 32.) Specifically, the Court found Respondent had failed to 

establish the due process and equal protection claims were procedurally barred or 

unexhausted, but dismissed Petitioner’s ex post facto claim. 

II. Standard of Review

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 

applicable to this Petition, a habeas petition will not be granted unless that adjudication: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of 

clearly established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state 

court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “This is a 

‘difficult to meet’ and ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, 

which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’” Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 

(2011) and Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)). 

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal court may grant relief 

only when ‘the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme 

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the 

Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Loher v. Thomas, 825 

F.3d 1103, 1111 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000)). 

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause of § 2254(d)(1), ‘a state-court decision 

involves an unreasonable application of the Supreme Court’s precedent if the state court 

identifies the correct governing legal rule . . . but unreasonably applies it to the facts of 

Case 3:15-cv-01002-GPC-BGS Document 58 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 18
5

15CV1002 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the particular state prisoners case.’” Id. (quoting White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1705 

(2014).¶

Under § 2254(d)(2) “a petitioner may challenge the substance of the state court’s 

finding and attempt to show that those findings were not supported by substantial 

evidence” or “challenge the fact-finding process itself on the ground that it was deficient 

in some material way.” Hibbler v. Benedetti, 693 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2012). 

“Regardless of the type of challenge, ‘the question under AEDPA is not whether a federal 

court believes the state court’s determination was incorrect but whether that 

determination was unreasonable — a substantially higher threshold.” Id. “[W]hen the 

challenge is to the state courts procedure, . . . [the court] must be satisfied that any

appellate court to whom the defect in the state court’s fact-finding process is pointed out 

would be unreasonable in holding that the state courts fact-finding process was 

adequate.’” Id. at 1146-47; see also Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1001 (9th Cir. 

2004) (the federal court “must be convinced that an appellate panel, applying the normal 

standards of appellate review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding is supported 

by the record.”).

Federal courts must “apply AEDPA’s standards to the state court’s last reasoned 

decision on the merits of a petitioner’s claims.” Ayala v. Chappell, 829 F.3d 1081, 1094 

(9th Cir. 2016).6 This includes “[i]n circumstances where no decision from the state 

 

6 Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court will 

generally “look through” to the last reasoned decision and presume it provides the basis 

for the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 

805-06 (1991); see also Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1094 n.1 (2013). 

However, here there is no reasoned decision addressing the due process and equal 

protection claims asserted in the Petition to look through to because each was raised for 

the first time in an amendment to his petition to the California Supreme Court and the 

California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition. The Court notes that 

Respondent did lodge a 2012 petition filed by Petitioner with the California Supreme 

Court that does raise a due process claim, however, that claim, not before the court, 

challenges Petitioner’s sentence, not the denial of time credits and was also summarily 

Case 3:15-cv-01002-GPC-BGS Document 58 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 18
6

15CV1002 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

court articulates its underlying reasoning.” Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 418, 441 (9th 

Cir. 2014). “‘[T]he habeas petitioner’s burden still must be met by showing there was no 

reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.’” Id. (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 

98). “When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has 

denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits 

in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” 

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 99. “In determining whether a petition has met this burden, [the 

court] ‘must determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported 

the state court’s decision;’ and then assess ‘whether it is possible fairminded jurists could 

disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior 

decision of the Supreme Court.’” Murray, 746 F.3d at 441 (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 

102); see also Ayala, 829 F.3d at 1095. “Crucially, this is not a de novo review of the 

constitutional question. Rather, even a strong case for relief does not mean the state 

court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Murray, 746 F.3d at 441 (quoting 

Walker v. Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 939 (9th Cir. 2013)). However, as the analysis below 

reflects, even under de novo review, Petitioner’s claims fail.

III. Analysis

Petitioner argues he is being denied worktime credits because he is erroneously 

considered a violent offender. He claims that because the provision under which he is a 

violent offender, § 667.5(c), was not specifically cited in the Amended Information and

the jury’s verdicts did not cite § 667.5(c), he cannot be considered a violent offender for 

purposes of worktime credits. However, as explained below, Petitioner is a violent 

offender based on his conviction. By law, he is limited to earning 15 percent of worktime 

credits pursuant to § 2933.1 and is ineligible for credits available to “non-violent second 

strike offenders” under the Coleman/Plata Order.

 

denied. (Resp’t Supplemental Lodgments in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, Lodgment 4 [ECF 

24-1].)

Case 3:15-cv-01002-GPC-BGS Document 58 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 18
7

15CV1002 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

A. Worktime Credits for Violent Offenders

1. § 2933.1

Prisoners in California are able to earn worktime credits that may ultimately reduce 

the length of their imposed sentence. See § 2933. However, § 2933.1 provides that 

“[n]otwithstanding any other law, any person who is convicted of a felony offense listed 

in Section 667.5 shall accrue no more than 15 percent of worktime credit.”7 This means a 

“defendant convicted of a violent felony . . . serves at least 85 percent of the sentence 

imposed.” People v. Singleton, 155 Cal. App. 4th 1332, 1337 (2007). It does not 

increase the sentence, it restricts “the ‘discount’ for good conduct credits.” People v. 

Garcia, 121 Cal. App. 4th 271, 277 (2004). 

Section 667.5(c) lists particular offenses that constitute violent felonies. Included 

in this list, at the time Petitioner committed his offense, was “any felony in which the 

defendant uses a firearm which use has been charged and proved as provided in Section 

12022.5, 12022.53, or 12022.55.” § 667.5(c)(8). 

Petitioner was charged with robbery, attempted robbery, and false imprisonment 

— all felonies. (Supplemental Lodgments in Supp. of Motion to Dismiss, Lodgment 4, 

Ex. B, Amended Information (“Amended Information”) at 1-5 [ECF 24-1 at 39-47].)8 

Each count includes a special allegation — § 12022.53(b) as to the robbery and attempted 

robbery counts and § 12022.5(a)(1) as to the false imprisonment counts. (Id. at 1-2 [ECF 

24-1 at 40-41]) Additionally, as to each charge, the Amended Information includes a 

 

7 The Court quotes the version of § 2933.1 in force when Petitioner committed his 

offense. However, the change in the statutory language, specifying subdivision (c), does 

not impact the analysis here.

8 Petitioner submitted a portion of the Amended Information as an exhibit to his Petition, 

but he only included the first four pages. The full Amended Information is attached as 

Exhibit B to Petitioner’s March 29, 2012 petition to the California Supreme Court

submitted as a supplemental lodgment in support of Respondent’s Objections to the 

Report and Recommendation on Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. (ECF 24-1 at 39-47.) 

The Court relies on this complete version. 

Case 3:15-cv-01002-GPC-BGS Document 58 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 18
8

15CV1002 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

further description of the charge and also specifically charges that Petitioner “personally 

used a firearm, to wit: a handgun, within the meaning of PENAL CODE SECTION 

12022.53(b)” as to the robbery and attempted robbery counts and “within the meaning of 

PENAL CODE SECTION 12022.5(a)(1)” as to the false imprisonment counts. (Id. at 2-5 

[ECF 21-1 at 41-44].)

The jury found Petitioner guilty and specifically found “that in the commission of 

the above offense the said defendant did personally use[] a firearm, to wit: a handgun, 

within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.53(b)” as to the robbery and attempted 

robbery counts and “within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.5(a)(1)” as to the 

false imprisonment counts. (Verdict Forms [ECF 1 at 93-108].) 

Petitioner was convicted of a felony listed in § 667.5, specifically, § 667.5(c)(8) a 

“felony in which the defendant uses a firearm which use has been charged and proved as 

provided in Section 12022.5, . . . or 12022.53.” § 667.5(c)(8).9 

2. Coleman/Plata Order

On February 10, 2014, a federal three-judge court issued an order requiring the 

state of California to implement specific measures to reduce the prison population, 

including, “increasing credits prospectively for non-violent second-strike offenders and 

minimum custody inmates.” (Lodgment 5 at 3.) It specifies “[n]on-violent secondstrikers will be eligible to earn good time credits at 33.3% and will be eligible to earn 

milestone credits for completing rehabilitation programs.” (Id.) As explained above, 

Petitioner is a violent offender. He does not qualify for worktime credits afforded to nonviolent offenders.

 

9 The California Court of Appeal and Superior Court both found as much as to 

Petitioner’s robbery conviction in addressing his ex post facto claim. (Lodgment 7 at 3-4; 

Lodgment 9 at 2.) As did this Court in dismissing Petitioner’s ex post facto claim. 

(March 30, 2016 Order at 12.) 

Case 3:15-cv-01002-GPC-BGS Document 58 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 18
9

15CV1002 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

B. Alleged Error of State Law

As a threshold matter, Petitioner is alleging an error in the state’s application of a 

state credit system that allows prisoners to reduce their time in custody subject to 

limitations including, § 2933.1. Whether Petitioner is a violent offender under state law 

for purposes of earning worktime credits provided for under state law to potentially 

reduce his time in state custody is an issue of state law not cognizable on federal habeas 

review. Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding 

determination whether a conviction qualified for sentencing enhancement was question of 

state sentencing law for which federal habeas relief was unavailable). If a potential error 

in state sentencing law is not cognizable on federal habeas review, a question of 

worktime credits to lessen time is custody certainly is not. Federal habeas writs may not 

issue on the basis of a perceived error of a state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 

67-68 (1991) (“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court 

determinations on state-law questions.”) And, a petitioner cannot transform a state law 

issue into a federal one by labeling it a due process or equal protection violation. See 

Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir.1996) (Petitioner “may not, however, 

transform a state-law issue into a federal one merely by asserting a violation of due 

process.”).

Petitioner labels his claims as due process and equal protection violations, however

he is simply asserting that CDCR erred in concluding Petitioner was a violent offender 

limited to earning 15 percent in worktime credits and ineligible to earn 33.3 percent 

credits under the Coleman/Plata Order. But, the court “cannot treat a mere error of state 

law, if one occurred, as a denial of due process; otherwise, every erroneous decision by a 

state court on state law would come here as a federal constitutional question.” Little v. 

Crawford, 449 F.3d 1075, 1083 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2006). Although the Court analyzes the 

issues raised by Petitioner, whether Petitioner is appropriately designated as a violent 

offender under state law for purposes of worktime credits is a state law question for 

Case 3:15-cv-01002-GPC-BGS Document 58 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 18
10

15CV1002 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

which federal habeas relief is unavailable. The Court RECOMMENDS the Petition be 

DENIED on this basis. 

C. Due Process Claim10

To the extent Petitioner’s claim rises to the level of a due process violation, it 

should still be denied. Although not entirely clear, Petition seems to argue that he lacked 

notice that his convictions with the gun enhancements would constitute violent felonies

under § 667.5(c) and the jury was required to specifically find he was subject to § 

667.5(c) for credit limitation purposes. He argues that because § 1192.7(c)(8) also lists a 

felony in which the defendant personally used a firearm, § 667.5(c) had to be listed in the 

charging document and found by a jury to be clear he would be subject to § 2933.1 credit 

limitations applicable to violent offenders.11 Respondent does not address this argument 

other than to call it frivolous. 

“A due process claim is cognizable only if there is a recognized liberty or property 

interest at stake.” McLean v. Crabtree, 173 F.3d 1176, 1184 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting 

Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 462 (9th Cir. 1995)). In general, prisoners have no 

constitutional liberty interest in time credits, but when the state creates a right to such 

credits, due process requires those credits not be taken arbitrarily. Wolff v. McDonnell, 

418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974). As noted above, § 2933 provides for prisoners to earn 

worktime credits at higher percentages than those, like Petitioner, subject to § 2933.1’s 

15 percent limit. Additionally, the Coleman/Plata Order provides for certain prisoners to 

earn 33.3 percent credit. 

 

10 Petitioner’s due process claim and his ex post facto claim are combined his Petition. 

The Court’s analysis addresses only his arguments in support of his due process claim. 

(See March 30, 2016 Order at 12 (in dismissing the ex post facto claim, finding 

“Petitioner Jones was convicted of a violent felony from the start. Accordingly, 

Petitioner cannot show that CDCR’s credit assessment was in any way retrospective.”).) 

11 There is significant overlap in this argument with Petitioner’s equal protection claim.

In particular, Petitioner argues the jury was required to find he was subject to § 667.5(c)

for purposes of limiting worktime credits under his equal protection claim. 

Case 3:15-cv-01002-GPC-BGS Document 58 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 18
11

15CV1002 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Court need not determine whether, in general, § 2933 or the Coleman/Plata

Order creates a liberty interest because, assuming there is a liberty interest in worktime 

credits under the Coleman/Plata Order or § 2933,12 as to Petitioner, he has no liberty 

interest in earning credits beyond 15 percent. To do so would allow Petitioner to point to 

a liberty interest created by § 2933 or the Coleman/Plata Order and ignore the limitation 

imposed by § 2933.1. 

Petitioner is a violent offender under § 2933.1 and subject to the 15 percent limit. 

As previously discussed, he was convicted of offenses listed as a violent offenses under 

§ 667.5(c). Under § 2933.1, those defendants convicted of offenses listed under 

§ 667.5(c) may earn no more than 15 percent worktime credits. He has never had “a 

legitimate claim of entitlement to” anything more that 15 percent worktime credits, if 

that. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) 

(describing what is necessary “to obtain a protectible right” sufficient to require due 

process protections). 

As to Petitioner’s claim the he should not be a violent offender at all, he seems to 

be arguing that in addition to a requirement that facts increasing the maximum sentence

be pled and proven to a jury, as required by Apprendi, facts supporting a worktime credit 

limitation must also be charged and proven. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S 466, 

490 (2000) (“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty 

for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 

proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”). This itself would be a significant extension of law 

 

12 The Ninth Circuit found the version of § 2933 enacted in 1982 “did not create a liberty 

interest in sentence-reducing worktime credits; therefore, it could not serve as a basis for 

a due process claim.” Edward v. Swarthout, 597 Fed. Appx. 914, 915 (9th Cir. 2014)

(citing Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1094-96 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated on 

other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485-87 (1995)). However, § 2933 was 

amended in 2010, and the Ninth Circuit has found “it is not ‘plainly’ apparent that § 2933 

does not create a liberty interest.” Id. at 916 (remanding case in which petition had been 

summarily denied without requiring a response from respondent).

Case 3:15-cv-01002-GPC-BGS Document 58 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

 18
12

15CV1002 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

because the credit limitations imposed are only an opportunity to serve less of the time 

imposed under a valid sentence, not an increase in a sentence. See Garcia, 121 Cal. App. 

4th at 277 (explaining that § 2933.1’s limitation on conduct credits does not increase the 

maximum sentence, rather it is a reduction or discount that does not trigger a jury 

finding). Although a charge and jury finding on the facts supporting the § 2933.1 

worktime credit limitation is certainly not required by Supreme Court precedent, it was 

provided in Petitioner’s case. But, Petitioner goes even further and argues that in 

addition to pleading and proving the facts supporting the application of the worktime 

credit limitation, the code section that implicates the worktime credit limitation must be 

cited in the charging document and in the jury’s verdict. 

No holding from the Supreme Court indicates that due process requires the code 

section that will limit a defendant’s ability to earn worktime credits off a validly imposed 

sentence be cited in the charging document or the jury’s verdict. A defendant has the 

“right to be informed of the nature and cause of the charges made against him so as to 

permit adequate preparation of a defense.” Gautt v. Lewis, 489 F.3d 993, 1002-03 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (noting this Sixth Amendment “guarantee is applicable to the states through 

the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” and citing Cole v. Arkansas, 331 

U.S. 196, 201 (1948)). An information “must state the elements of an offense charged 

with sufficient clarity to apprise a defendant of what he must be prepared to defend 

against.” Id. (quoting Givens v. Housewright, 786 F.2d 1378, 1380 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

Notably, “[a]n explicit citation to the precise statute at issue is best, but a ‘brief factual 

recitation in the information’ can also suffice.” Id. at 1004.

As explained above, the Court’s review is limited to whether the state court’s 

decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established 

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d). The California’s Supreme Court’s denial of Petitioner’s due process claim 

cannot be “contrary to or involve an unreasonable application of clearly established 

Federal law” if there is no precedent requiring what Petitioner demands. Id. The 

Case 3:15-cv-01002-GPC-BGS Document 58 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of

 18
13

15CV1002 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

question here is whether there is “any federal constitutional requirement that a charging 

document specifically cite a sentence-related provision . . . which merely imposed a limit 

on time-credit eligibility in the event that Petitioner was convicted of the charged 

offense.” Sanford v. Scribner, Case No. CV 06-1343-PA(CW), 2011 WL 4020831, at

*12 (C.D. Cal. August 4, 2011) (finding no constitutional requirement). 

“An explicit citation to the precise statute” a defendant is charged with violating 

may not even be necessary if the elements of the offense are sufficiently clear “to apprise 

a defendant of what he must be prepared to defend against.” Gautt v. Lewis, 489 F.3d 

993, 1004 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Givens, 786 F.2d at 1381). Given citation to the code 

for the underlying offense is not even required when the elements are clear, the California 

Supreme Court could have reasonably concluded that citation to the code section 

implicating a credit limitation was not required, particularly when the facts supporting 

that limitation had been charged and found by a jury. Additionally, the court may have 

rejected a requirement to plead the credit-limiting code section because, as a creditlimiting provision, it does not define or alter the conviction or the sentence. See People 

v. Lara, 54 Cal. 4th 896, 904 (2012) (declining to require pleading and proof of facts to 

support credit limitations). Given explicit citation to the statute charged is not even 

required under federal precedent, the Court cannot find the California Supreme Court’s 

rejection of claim that a credit limiting code section must be cited was “opposite to that 

reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or [that] the state court decide[d] 

[the] case differently than the Supreme Court . . . on a set of materially indistinguishable 

facts.” Loher, 825 F.3d at 1111 (explaining standard for contrary to clause in § 

2254(d)(1)). Nor can the Court find the state court’s rejection “was so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Woods, 135 S. Ct. at 1377 

(explaining standard for unreasonable application under § 2254(d)(1)). Nor can the Court 

find Petitioner has identified any unreasonable determination by the state court under 

§ 2254(d)(2). See Hibbler, 693 F.3d at 1146.

Case 3:15-cv-01002-GPC-BGS Document 58 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of

 18
14

15CV1002 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The analysis above applies equally to Petitioner’s claim that he should be afforded 

33.3 percent credit pursuant to the Coleman/Plata Order. “The prisoners contemplated in 

the February 10, 2014 Order in Coleman/Plata as eligible for the 33.3 percent credit 

toward their sentences are ‘non-violent second-strike offenders.’” Perez v. Donovan, 

Case No. , 2016 WL 7974656 at *6 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2016) (citing Coleman/Plata, 

Case No. 2:90-cv-0520-KJM-DB, ECF 5060 at *3). As discussed above, Petitioner is a 

violent offender. There is no due process violation in denying Petitioner worktime 

credits pursuant to the Coleman/Plata Order providing worktime credits for certain nonviolent offenders. 

The Court RECOMMENDS Petitioner’s due process claim be DENIED.

D. Equal Protection Claim

Petitioner argues he was denied equal protection on a similar basis as the due 

process claim. He claims similarly situated inmates have received credits at a higher 

percentage than he has as a violent offender. He also claims other defendants charged 

with personal use of a firearm had a jury determine whether their offense was a violent 

felony. 

To succeed on an “equal protection claim alleging an improper statutory 

classification, [Petitioner] must show that the statute, either on its face or in the manner 

of its enforcement, results in members of a certain group being treated differently from 

other persons based on membership in that group.” McLean, 173 F.3d at 1185. If 

Petitioner “demonstrate[s] that a cognizable class is treated differently, the court must 

analyze [the claim] under the appropriate level of scrutiny” — here, the rational basis 

test. Id. at 1185-86 (explaining “[a] government policy is valid under the rational basis 

test so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest.”). 

Here, Petitioner has not identified a group that is being treated differently than him. 

He submitted two declarations as attachments to his Amendment to Traverse. (ECF 55 at 

3-10.) They purport to be declarations from other prisoners that have been afforded 

Case 3:15-cv-01002-GPC-BGS Document 58 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of

 18
15

15CV1002 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

worktime credit at 33.3 percent under the Coleman/Plata Order.

13 Putting aside issues of 

authentication, neither of these prisoners is similarly situated to Petitioner. Both 

declarations indicate each was earning credits at 20 percent, not the 15 percent Petitioner 

is subject to. Additionally, both declarations identify convictions for burglary as the 

basis for being similarly situated to Petitioner, but under § 667.5(c), at the time of their 

convictions, burglary only qualified under § 667.5(c) if it was “charged and proved that 

another person, other than an accomplice, was present in the residence during the 

commission of the burglary.” § 667(c)(21). Nothing in their declarations indicates that 

they were violent offenders under § 667(c), like Petitioner, and subject to the 15 percent 

limit under § 2933.1. There can be no equal protection violation because Petitioner has 

failed to identify a similarly situated group. 

As to Petitioner’s claim that he was entitled to have § 667.5(c) cited in the 

charging document and cited by the jury because others have had § 1192.7 cited in their 

cases, Petitioner cites three cases where each defendant was found to have personally 

used a firearm within the meaning of § 12022.53(b) or § 12022.5(a) and § 1192.7(c)(8). 

He concludes that because § 1192.7(c)(8) was specified with §§ 12022.53(b) and 

12022.5(a) in the jury’s verdict in those cases, it was a violation of equal protection not to 

specify § 667.5(c) would apply in his case. However, the cases Petitioner relies on do 

not address the situation presented here — a challenge to the imposition of limits on 

worktime credits. The language in the procedural history in these cases that Petitioner 

relies on is a jury finding as to § 1192.7(c), but these cases are dealing with sentencing 

enhancement and the overall length of sentences, not challenges to worktime credits. 

Hicks v. Dexter, 646 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1184 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (considering a challenge to 

a sentence, i.e. whether the trial court properly imposed the upper term); Lopez v. 

Campbell, Case No. CV F 05-481 LJO TAG HC, 2008 WL 4826129 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 

 

13 These are the same declarations Petitioner submitted in support of his amendment to his 

petition to the California Supreme Court. As such, they are part of the state court record.

Case 3:15-cv-01002-GPC-BGS Document 58 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 15 of

 18
16

15CV1002 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2008) (as to claim eight referenced by Petitioner, rejecting challenge to length of sentence 

under Eighth Amendment); Miles v. Olison, 2009 WL 6057205 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 

2009)(petition raising numerous challenges, including a firearms enhancement, but none 

addressing worktime credits). To the extent any of them can be fairly read as requiring 

§ 1192.7(c) to be charged and proven to a jury, an issue none of them address, it was

related to the imposition of each defendant’s sentence, not eligibility for worktime 

credits. In this respect these defendants are not similarly situated to Petitioner.

To the extent Petitioner is challenging violent offenders being treated differently 

than other offenders under § 2933.1 or the Coleman/Plata Order, the claim lacks any 

merit because requiring violent offenders to serve more of their imposed sentence than 

other offenders is rationally related to “greater protection [for] the public from dangerous 

offenders.” Garcia, 121 Cal. App. 4th at 277. 

The Court cannot conclude the California Supreme Court’s rejection of Petitioner’s 

equal protection claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or resulted in a decision that 

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the state court proceeding. It could properly have been rejected for failing to 

identity any similarly situated group.

The Court RECOMMENDS Petitioner’s equal protection claim be DENIED.

E. Procedural Bar and Exhaustion

In Answering the Petition, Respondent again asserts Petitioner’s due process and 

equal protection claims are procedurally barred and unexhausted. However, these 

arguments are duplicative of arguments raised in in the Motion to Dismiss and in 

Objections to the Report and Recommendation that have already been rejected. (March 

30, 2016 Order at 12-19.) Respondent does not identify any distinctions between the 

prior arguments and those raised in responding to the Petition that the Court need 

address, particularly given the claims have no merit, as discussed above. 

Case 3:15-cv-01002-GPC-BGS Document 58 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 16 of

 18
17

15CV1002 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

F. Evidentiary Hearing

AEDPA prescribes the manner in which federal habeas courts must approach the 

factual record and “substantially restricts the district court’s discretion to grant an 

evidentiary hearing.” Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir.1999). “[A] 

determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct,” 

with the petitioner having “the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by 

clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Section 2254(e)(2) limits “the 

discretion of federal habeas courts to take new evidence in an evidentiary hearing.” 

Cullen, 563 U.S. at 185. 

“If a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by a state court, a federal habeas 

petitioner must overcome the limitation of § 2254(d)(1) on the record that was before that 

state court.” Cullen, 563 U.S. at 185(“[E]vidence introduced in federal court has no 

bearing on § 2254(d)(1) review”). If a claim subject to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) does not 

satisfy that statutory requirement, it is “unnecessary to reach the question whether § 

2254(e)(2) would permit a [federal] hearing on th[at] claim.” Id. at 184 (citation 

omitted). “In practical effect, . . . this means that when the state-court record ‘precludes 

habeas relief’ under the limitations of § 2254(d), a district court is ‘not required to hold 

an evidentiary hearing.’” Cullen, 563 U.S. at 183. (citation omitted). Since Cullen, the 

Ninth Circuit has held that a federal habeas court may consider new evidence only on de 

novo review, subject to the limitations of § 2254(e)(2). See Stokley v. Ryan, 659 F.3d 

802, 808 (9th Cir. 2011).

As explained above, Petitioner is not entitled to relief under § 2254(d)(1) and has 

not met any of the exacting requirements for an evidentiary hearing on federal habeas 

review. Additionally, he does not identify any reason an evidentiary hearing would be 

necessary. Accordingly, the Court recommends Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary 

hearing be DENIED.

Case 3:15-cv-01002-GPC-BGS Document 58 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 17 of

 18
18

15CV1002 GPC (BGS)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IV. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION

For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED the Court 

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and (2) 

denying the Petition.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than July 21, 2017, any party to this action may 

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than August 4, 2017.

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Turner v. 

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th 

Cir. 1991).

Petitioner’s Motion Requesting a Status Report is DENIED as moot. (ECF 57.)

Dated: June 30, 2017

Case 3:15-cv-01002-GPC-BGS Document 58 Filed 06/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 18 of

 18