Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01021/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01021-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jorge Enrique Murillo 

Petitioner, 

vs.

James Kimble, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 05-1021-PHX-JWS (ECV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN W. SEDWICK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Pending before the court is Petitioner's pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. #1. 

BACKGROUND

Following a jury trial in Maricopa County Superior Court in 2000, Petitioner was

convicted of one count of sexual assault. Doc. #23, Exh. A-2, A-4. At the sentencing

hearing on May 5, 2000, Petitioner was sentenced to ten years in prison with credit for 204

days of presentence incarceration. Doc. #23, Exh. A-4. Petitioner filed a direct appeal and

on May 10, 2001, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in a memorandum

decision. Doc. #23, Exh. C. The Court explained that Petitioner's one claim, ineffective

assistance of counsel, is more properly raised in a petition for post-conviction relief. Id.

Petitioner did not seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court but did filed a Notice of PostConviction Relief and a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on June 6, 2001. Doc. #23, Exh.

A-6, A-7. The trial court denied the petition on February 28, 2002, after concluding that

Petitioner failed to show any prejudice resulting from the alleged ineffective assistance of

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counsel. Doc. #23, Exh. A-8. Petitioner did not seek review of the trial court's decision in

the Arizona Court of Appeals or the Arizona Supreme Court.

Petitioner filed a second Notice of Post-Conviction Relief on November 10, 2004.

Doc. #23, Exh. A-9. The trial court summarily dismissed the notice on January 11, 2005,

because Petitioner failed to raise the claims on direct appeal or in his first petition for postconviction relief. Doc. #23, Exh. A-10. Petitioner filed a letter on January 18, 2005, which

the trial court treated as a motion for reconsideration and summarily denied. Doc. #23, Exh.

A-11, A-12. Petitioner then filed a "Motion for Denial and Exception to the Return," which

the trial court treated as a second motion for reconsideration and denied. Doc. #23, Exh. A13, A-14. Petitioner did not seek review in the Arizona Court of Appeals or the Arizona

Supreme Court.

On August 15, 2005, Petitioner filed a third Notice of Post-Conviction Relief alleging

a violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Doc. #23, Exh. A-15. The trial

court denied the petition on October 7, 2005, because Blakely does not apply retroactively

to convictions that are final. Doc. #23, Exh. A-16. On November 28, 2005, the trial court

denied Petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Doc. #23, Exh. A-18. On February 9, 2006,

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona Court of Appeals, which is still pending.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this court on April 5, 2005.

Doc. #1. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on June 16,

2006. Doc. #23. On July 12, 2006, Petitioner filed a Response to Respondents' Answer.

Doc. #24.

DISCUSSION

Respondents contend in their answer that the petition should be dismissed because it

was filed after the statute of limitations expired. They argue that even though the statute of

limitations was tolled for a period of time, Petitioner still failed to file a timely petition.

Respondents further argue that even if the court finds that the petition was timely, the claims

are procedurally defaulted. For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that the habeas

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petition was not filed within the statute of limitations period and is therefore untimely. As

a result, the court need not address the procedural default issue. 

 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") imposes a

statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). A state prisoner must file a federal petition within one year from

"the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); see also Lott v.

Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 2002). However, "[t]he time during which a properly

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward" the limitations period.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see also Lott, 304 F.3d at 921. 

In Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief

is filed even though the petition is not filed until later. Isley v. Arizona Department of

Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). An application for post-conviction relief

is also pending during the intervals between a lower court decision and a review by a higher

court. See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Carey v. Saffold,

536 U.S. 214, 223 (2002). However, the time between a first and second application is not

tolled because no application is "pending" during that period. Biggs, 339 F.3d at 1048.

Moreover, filing a new petition for post-conviction relief does not reinitiate a limitations

period that ended before the new petition was filed. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d

820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

Here, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's direct appeal on May 10, 2001.

Under Rule 31.19(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, Petitioner had 30 days

from that date to file a petition for review by the Arizona Supreme Court, which he did not

do. Thus, for statute of limitations purposes, Petitioner's conviction became final on June 9,

2001. However, the statute of limitations was immediately tolled because Petitioner had filed

a notice of and petition for post-conviction relief three days earlier on June 6, 2001. The trial

court denied the petition for post-conviction relief on February 28, 2002, and the 30-day time

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period for Petitioner to seek review in the Arizona Court of Appeals expired on March 30,

2002. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c). Consequently, the statutory tolling period ended and

the statute of limitations period began to run on March 31, 2002. Absent any additional

tolling, the statute of limitations deadline was March 31, 2003. 

Petitioner had nothing pending in the state court until he filed a second notice of postconviction relief on November 10, 2004, more than 19 months after the statute of limitations

deadline. Because the deadline had already passed, Petitioner's second notice of postconviction relief did not further toll, nor did it resurrect, the statute of limitations period.

Similarly, Petitioner's other filings in the state court after the second notice of post-conviction

relief had no effect on the statute of limitations. Therefore, when Petitioner filed his federal

habeas petition in this court on April 5, 2005, more than two years had passed since the

statute of limitations deadline. The petition is therefore untimely.

Lastly, Petitioner offers in his reply an explanation for his failure to file within the

statute of limitations period, presumably in an attempt to claim that equitable tolling should

apply here. "AEDPA's statute of limitations provision is subject to equitable tolling."

Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 2002). However, as a general rule, equitable

tolling is not available in most cases and may be applied only when "extraordinary

circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time."

Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). An attorney's miscalculation of the

limitations period nor his negligence in general constitutes extraordinary circumstances

sufficient to warrant equitable tolling. Miranda .v Castro, 292, F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir.

2002).

Here, Petitioner claims that the lawyer he retained to represent him on appeal in the

state court stopped working on his case without his knowledge. Petitioner claims that he

assumed the lawyer was seeking review of adverse rulings in the state court. Petitioner,

however, presents nothing to show that he retained the lawyer to assist him with his federal

habeas petition or advise him regarding the time limit for filing such a petition. It appears

from the record that the lawyer assisted Petitioner in filing his direct appeal and his first

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petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner offers nothing to show that the lawyer bore any

responsibility for the statute of limitations applicable to a federal habeas petition. Petitioner

has failed to demonstrate that his state appellate lawyer's actions were extraordinary

circumstances beyond Petitioner's control that prevented him from filing a timely petition.

Equitable tolling, therefore, does not apply here and the habeas petition is untimely. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

 That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. #1)

be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a

response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report

and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by

the district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

DATED this 17th day of August, 2006.

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