Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00502/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00502-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

BENJAMIN RAY READY, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:12cv502-WC 

 ) 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ) 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, ) 

) 

 Defendant. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

I. INTRODUCTION

 Plaintiff, Benjamin Ray Ready, applied for disability insurance benefits and 

supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. His 

application was denied at the initial administrative level. Plaintiff then requested and 

received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Following the hearing, 

the ALJ issued a decision in which he found Plaintiff not disabled at any time through the 

date of the decision. The Appeals Council rejected Plaintiff’s request for review of the 

ALJ’s decision. The ALJ’s decision consequently became the final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”).1

 See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 

 

1

 Pursuant to the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. 

No. 103-296, 108 Stat. 1464, the functions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services with 

respect to Social Security matters were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security. 

Case 2:12-cv-00502-WC Document 17 Filed 11/19/13 Page 1 of 10
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129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). The case is now before the court for review under 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), both parties have consented to the conduct of all 

proceedings and entry of a final judgment by the undersigned United States Magistrate 

Judge. Pl.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. 10); Def.’s Consent to Jurisdiction (Doc. 9). 

Based on the court’s review of the record and the briefs of the parties, the court 

AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to disability benefits when 

the person is unable to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to 

result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months. 

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).2

 To make this determination, the Commissioner employs a five-step, sequential 

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2006). 

(1) Is the person presently unemployed? 

(2) Is the person’s impairment severe? 

(3) Does the person’s impairment meet or equal one of the specific 

impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1? [the Listing of 

Impairments] 

 

2

 A “physical or mental impairment” is one resulting from anatomical, physiological, or 

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and 

laboratory diagnostic techniques. 

Case 2:12-cv-00502-WC Document 17 Filed 11/19/13 Page 2 of 10
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(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation? 

(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy? 

An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next 

question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative 

answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of 

“not disabled.” 

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).3

 The burden of proof rests on a claimant through Step 4. See Phillips v. Barnhart, 

357 F.3d 1232, 1237-39 (11th Cir. 2004). A claimant establishes a prima facie case of 

qualifying disability once they have carried the burden of proof from Step 1 through Step 

4. At Step 5, the burden shifts to the Commissioner, who must then show there are a 

significant number of jobs in the national economy the claimant can perform. Id. 

 To perform the fourth and fifth steps, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s 

Residual Functional Capacity (RFC). Id. at 1238-39. RFC is what the claimant is still 

able to do despite his impairments and is based on all relevant medical and other 

evidence. Id. It also can contain both exertional and nonexertional limitations. Id. at 

1242-43. At the fifth step, the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and 

work experience to determine if there are jobs available in the national economy the 

claimant can perform. Id. at 1239. To do this, the ALJ can either use the Medical 

 

3 McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1986), is a supplemental security income case 

(SSI). The same sequence applies to disability insurance benefits. Cases arising under Title II 

are appropriately cited as authority in Title XVI cases. See, e.g., Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 

408 (5th Cir. 1981). 

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Vocational Guidelines4 (grids) or call a vocational expert (VE). Id. at 1239-40. 

 The grids allow the ALJ to consider factors such as age, confinement to sedentary 

or light work, inability to speak English, educational deficiencies, and lack of job 

experience. Each factor can independently limit the number of jobs realistically available 

to an individual. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240. Combinations of these factors yield a 

statutorily-required finding of “Disabled” or “Not Disabled.” Id. 

 The Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. This Court 

must find the Commissioner’s decision conclusive if it is supported by substantial 

evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). 

“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). See also Crawford v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Even if the evidence 

preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings, [a reviewing court] must affirm if the 

decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.”). A reviewing court may not look 

only to those parts of the record which support the decision of the ALJ, but instead must 

view the record in its entirety and take account of evidence which detracts from the 

evidence relied on by the ALJ. Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1986). 

[The court must] . . . scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the 

reasonableness of the [Commissioner’s] . . . factual findings. . . . No 

 

4 See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 2. 

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similar presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner’s] . . . legal 

conclusions, including determination of the proper standards to be applied 

in evaluating claims. 

Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987). 

III. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 

 Plaintiff was 44 years old on the alleged disability onset date and had at least a 

high school education. Tr. 28. Plaintiff had past relevant work experience as an 

electrician and electrician’s helper. Id. Following the administrative hearing, and 

employing the five-step process, the ALJ found Plaintiff “has not engaged in substantial 

gainful activity since September 1, 2008, the alleged onset date.” (Step 1) Tr. 24. At 

Step 2, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffers from the following severe impairments: 

“degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine and degenerative disease of the left 

shoulder.” Id. The ALJ then found that Plaintiff “does not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments 

listed in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.920(d), 416.925 and 

416.926).” Tr. 25. Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “has the [RFC] to perform 

sedentary work” with additional limitations. Tr. 25. The ALJ then concluded that 

Plaintiff was unable to perform past relevant work (Step 4) Tr. 28. At Step 5, the ALJ 

found that, “[c]onsidering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual 

functional capacity,” and after consulting with a VE, “there are jobs that exist in 

significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform.” Tr. 27. The 

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ALJ identified the following occupations as examples: “survey system monitor,” and 

“telemarketer.” Tr. 28. Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not been 

under a disability from the alleged onset date, through the date of the decision. Id.

IV. DISCUSSION 

 Plaintiff’s sole contention is that “the ALJ failed to give appropriate weight and 

consideration to the opinion of [his] treating physician, Dr. Herrick.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 12) 

at 4. Plaintiff argues that Dr. Harrick’s opinion is in contradiction with the RFC. 

Specifically, Dr. Harrick completed a Clinical Assessment of Pain, in which he opined 

that the pain Plaintiff experienced would be distracting to such an extent “as to be 

distracting to adequate performance of daily activities of work.” Tr. 247. Dr. Harrick 

also completed a Physical Capabilities Evaluation in which he opined that Plaintiff would 

likely be absent from work 3 days per month. Tr. 248. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ 

“offered [a] very limited and non-specific rationale” in declining to give Dr. Harrick’s 

opinion controlling weight. Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 12) at 6. 

 Normally an ALJ must give the opinion of a treating physician “substantial or 

considerable weight unless ‘good cause’ is shown to the contrary.” See Phillips, 357 

F.3d at 1240. “‘[G]ood cause’ exists when the: (1) treating physician’s opinion was not 

bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating 

physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical 

records.” Id. at 1240-41. Further, “[t]he ALJ must clearly articulate the reasons for 

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giving less weight to the opinion of a treating physician, and the failure to do so is 

reversible error.” Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997); see also

MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding the ALJ “must 

specify what weight is given to a treating physician’s opinion and any reason for giving it 

no weight”). 

 In this case, the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Harrick’s opinion is not so “cut and dry” as 

an outright rejection or acceptance. The Physical Capabilities Evaluation form, 

completed by Dr. Harrick indicated many limitations to physical functioning. The RFC 

also includes many physical limitations above that of sedentary work. Some of the RFC 

limitations are equal to, or greater than, those found by Dr. Harrick. This is why the ALJ 

stated that he had “considered Dr. Herrick’s opinion and grants his opinion with regards 

to the claimant’s pain little weight as it is based on the claimant’s subjective selfassessments of pain; however, with regards to the claimant’s exertional and nonexertional limitations, the undersigned has given some weight to Dr. Herrick’s opinion in 

determining the claimant’s residual functional capacity assessment.” Tr. 28. Where the 

ALJ rejected Dr. Harrick’s opinion with regard to Plaintiff’s complaints of pain, the ALJ 

articulated his reason for the rejection—because the opinion was based on Plaintiff’s 

subjective complaints of pain, which the ALJ found to be incredible. 

 Plaintiff argues that this basis for rejection is invalid, because “there is no 

evidence in the opinion that would indicate that Dr. Herrick based his opinion on 

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anything other than his own objective, professional opinion.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. 12) at 6. 

However, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the Clinical Assessment of Pain 

was based on anything but Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain. Indeed, while the 

Clinical Assessment of Pain states that activities such as walking, standing, sitting, 

bending, stooping, moving of extremidies, etc. . ., increase the degree of pain experienced 

by such an extent “as to be distracting to adequate performance of daily activities of 

work,” the Physical Capabilities Evaluation states that Plaintiff can lift and/or carry 

20lbs. occasionally and 10lbs frequently, sit 4 hours during an 8-hour work day, stand or 

walk for 2 hours during an 8-hour work day, occasionally push and pull and operate 

motor vehicles. Tr. 247-48. Moreover, Plaintiff testified that he is able to hunt and fish, 

mow the yard, rake leaves, and perform other activities inconsistent with the pain level 

described in the Clinical Assessment of Pain. Finally, Dr. Herrick’s treatment notes and 

the other medical evidence of record, including that of consultative examiner Dr. Colley, 

are inconsistent with the Clinical Assessment of Pain.5

 “Good cause to discount a 

treating physician may arise where a report ‘is not accompanied by objective medical 

evidence or is wholly conclusory.’” Green v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F. App’x 915, 922 

(11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1159 (11th 

Cir. 2004)). Here the report is not accompanied by objective medical evidence of 

 

5

 Dr. Harrick’s treatment notes states that while Plaintiff rated his pain as a 9 out of 10 intensity, 

he also informed the doctor that he was “doing pretty well.” Tr. 27 

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disabling pain, and appears wholly conclusory and based on Plaintiff’s subjective 

complaints of pain, which the ALJ properly discounted. Plaintiff’s argument that the 

ALJ offered only a “very limited and non-specific rationale” for the portions of Dr. 

Herrick’s opinion that were rejected is completely undermined by the ALJ’s opinion. 

 The same is true for the portions of the Physical Capabilities Evaluation by Dr. 

Herrick that the ALJ adopted and rejected. The ALJ announced that he would accord the 

opinion some weight. The RFC and the ALJ’s opinion reflect that the ALJ went beyond 

some of the restrictions in the Physical Capabilities Evaluation. The finding of sedentary 

work with additional limitations necessarily means that the ALJ adopted portions of the 

doctor’s opinions. Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the ALJ’s treatment of the Physical 

Capabilities Evaluation indicate there is no merit to this claim. That is, in this section of 

his brief, Plaintiff simply reargues Dr. Herrick’s findings regarding pain. Even in that 

section, while detailing Plaintiff’s history of back problems, Plaintiff points to Dr. 

Herrick’s statements referring to Plaintiff’s subjective reports of pain to the doctor. 

Those subjective reports are insufficient, especially where Plaintiff’s credibility is in 

question6

 and are inapposite to the objective medial evidence 

 

6

 The court also notes that there is sufficient evidence in support of the ALJ’s credibility 

findings where Plaintiff testified that he left Alfa Acme Electric in 2009 because he was in too 

much pain, when in reality he was let go due to slow business. Tr. 24. In addition, Plaintiff 

initially testified that he could perform a sedentary job with a sit and stand option, but then began 

complaining about poor eyesight and handwriting. Tr. 59. Finally, Plaintiff also testified that he 

went hunting for one or two days at a time, “[b]ut [] couldn’t afford to go all the time.” Tr. 61. 

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 Accordingly, the court finds no error in the ALJ’s rejection of portions of Dr. 

Herrick’s opinion. 

VI. CONCLUSION 

 The court has carefully and independently reviewed the record and concludes that, 

for the reasons given above, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. A 

separate judgment will issue. 

 Done this 19th day of November, 2013. 

 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 WALLACE CAPEL, JR. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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