Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02042/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02042-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

INGRID ANDERSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

No. 2:14-CV-2042-DMC

ORDER

Plaintiff, who was proceeding with retained counsel, brought this action for 

judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g). Pursuant to the written consent of all parties, this case was before the undersigned as 

the presiding judge for all purposes, including entry of final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 

Final judgment was entered on October 29, 2015. Pursuant to stipulation, plaintiff’s counsel has 

previously been awarded $6,858.46 in attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act 

(EAJA). Pending before the court is plaintiff’s counsel’s petition for the award of attorney’s fees 

in the amount of $29,858.46 in fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Plaintiff was provided notice of 

counsel’s motion and has not filed any response thereto.

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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff initiated this action for judicial review of a final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security on September 3, 2014. Plaintiff’s representation was provided 

pursuant to a September 2, 2014, contingent-fee agreement whereby plaintiff agreed to pay 

counsel 25 percent of any past-due benefits awarded by the Commissioner. Pursuant to the 

parties’ stipulation, the matter was remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings. On 

February 2, 2016, pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, plaintiff was awarded $6,858.46 in 

attorney’s fees under the EAJA, payable to plaintiff less any offsets to be determined by the 

government.1 On remand to the agency, the Commissioner granted plaintiff’s application for 

disability benefits and awarded $120,764.00 in past-due benefits. 

II. DISCUSSION

Under the Social Security Act, “[w]henever a court renders a judgment favorable 

to a claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court 

may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in 

excess of 25 percent of the total past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of 

such judgment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). No other fee may be payable or certified for such 

representation except as allowed in this provision. See id. 

A remand constitutes a “favorable judgment” under § 406(b). See Shalala v. 

Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300-01 (1993). While the Ninth Circuit has not directly addressed the 

issue, all other circuits to address the issue have concluded that the district court is authorized to 

award fees under § 406(b) when it remands for further proceedings and, following remand, the 

claimant is awarded past-due benefits. See Garcia v. Astrue, 500 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1243 (C.D. 

Cal. 2007). Limiting § 406(b) awards to cases in which the district court itself awards past-due 

benefits would discourage counsel from requesting a remand where it is appropriate. See Bergen 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 454 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2006). 

 

1 The court is unaware of any offset to the EAJA award. 

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The 25 percent statutory maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement, and the 

court must ensure that the fee actually requested is reasonable. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 

U.S. 789, 808-09 (2002). “Within the 25 percent boundary . . . the attorney for the successful 

claimant must show that the fee sought is reasonable for the services rendered.” Id. at 807. “In 

determining the reasonableness of fees sought, the district court must respect ‘the primacy of 

lawful attorney-client fee arrangements,’ ‘looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then 

testing it for reasonableness.’” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 

Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 793 and 808). 

The Supreme Court has identified five factors that may be considered in 

determining whether a fee award under a contingent-fee agreement is unreasonable and therefore 

subject to reduction by the court. See Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151-52 (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. 

at 808). Those factors are: (1) the character of the representation; (2) the results achieved by the 

representative; (3) whether the attorney engaged in dilatory conduct in order to increase the 

accrued amount of past-due benefits; (4) whether the benefits are large in comparison to the 

amount of time counsel spent on the case; and (5) the attorney’s record of hours worked and 

counsel’s regular hourly billing charge for non-contingent cases. See id.

Finally, an award of fees under § 406(b) is offset by any prior award of attorney’s 

fees granted under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796.

In this case, having considered the factors above, the court finds that plaintiff’s 

counsel’s request for an amount equal to 24.7% of the award of past due benefits, is reasonable

given the fee agreement with plaintiff, the results achieved, the lack of any evidence of dilatory 

conduct designed to increase past-due benefits, and the applicable statutes. 

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III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s counsel’s petition (ECF No. 31) is granted and counsel is 

awarded fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) in the amount of $29,858.46, paid to counsel by the 

Commissioner out of past-due benefits awarded to plaintiff to the extent such benefits have not 

already been paid to plaintiff; and

2. Counsel shall reimburse to plaintiff $6,858.46 previously paid under the 

EAJA.

Dated: January 10, 2020

____________________________________

DENNIS M. COTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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