Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00136/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00136-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Michael Christopher Jensen,

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-13-00136-PHX-ROS

ORDER 

 In January 2013, Petitioner Michael Christopher Jensen filed a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus. (Doc. 1). Jensen filed an amended petition the following month and, 

after numerous extensions, Respondents filed their answer in August 2013. That answer 

argued “Some of Petitioner’s Claims Are Procedurally Barred” and the claims which 

were not procedurally barred failed on their merits. (Doc. 23 at 15, 28). On September 

23, 2015, Magistrate Judge David K. Duncan issued a Report and Recommendation 

(“R&R”) concluding all of Jensen’s claims are procedurally barred. (Doc. 76 at 8). After 

repeated extensions, Jensen filed objections to the R&R asking the Court to “reject the 

R&R in its entirety.” (Doc. 93 at 31). The Court will reject the R&R in large part but the 

petition will still be denied. 

BACKGROUND 

 There is no dispute about the basic factual background of Jensen’s petition. In 

brief, Jensen was indicted on one count of sexual conduct with a minor, one count of 

public sexual indecency to a minor, two counts of molestation of a child, and six counts 

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of sexual exploitation of a minor. (Doc. 20-1 at 4). Jensen proceeded to trial and at trial 

three of the sexual exploitation counts were dismissed but Jensen was convicted of the 

remaining seven counts. On direct appeal, Jensen chose to challenge only his convictions 

on the three sexual exploitation counts. Jensen argued there had been insufficient 

evidence to support those three counts. (Doc. 20-2 at 132). The Arizona Court of 

Appeals disagreed and affirmed the convictions. (Doc. 20-2 at 148). The Arizona 

Supreme Court denied review. 

 After his direct appeal failed, Jensen, through counsel, filed a petition for postconviction relief. (Doc. 20-2 at 149). That petition argued Jensen’s trial counsel had 

provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to: 

(1) meaningfully communicate with him; (2) properly investigate his case; 

(3) interview witnesses; (4) obtain documents; (5) subpoena witnesses until 

the trial was over; (6) file the appropriate motions that are minimally 

necessary to defend a case of the [sic] nature; (7) retain appropriate expert; 

and (8) present other meaningful information to the jury. 

(Doc. 20-2 at 149). Jensen requested an evidentiary hearing to develop these theories. 

(Doc. 20-2 at 170). The court denied Jensen’s petition without holding an evidentiary 

hearing. In doing so, the court stated Jensen’s arguments were “interesting” but he had 

not supported them with evidence. (Doc. 21 at 108). The court concluded the petition 

failed “to include material issues of fact or law which would entitle [Jensen] to a hearing 

or relief, and . . . no purpose would be served by any further proceedings.” (Doc. 21 at 

108). Jensen filed a petition for review with the Arizona Court of Appeals raising the 

same arguments. (Doc. 21 at 88). The appellate court summarily denied review. (Doc. 

21 at 72). Jensen sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court but it, too, denied review. 

(Doc. 21 at 54, 52). Jensen then filed the present petition. 

 There has been substantial confusion regarding the claims Jensen is attempting to 

pursue in his federal petition. The Court previously interpreted the petition as raising 

three claims: one due process claim based on the state post-conviction court failing to 

grant Jensen an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) 

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claims and two claims presenting different IAC theories. (Doc. 11 at 2). In answering 

the petition, Respondents presented a similar view of the claims presented. (Doc. 23 at 

12-13). In particular, Respondents argued there was a claim regarding the denial of an 

evidentiary hearing and various IAC claims. The IAC claims “largely mirror[ed]” the 

IAC claims asserted in Jensen’s state post-conviction proceedings but there were a few 

IAC-related arguments Jensen asserted in his federal petition which he had not raised 

earlier. (Doc. 23 at 14). Respondents also argued the federal petition contained separate 

claims asserting some sort of denial of due process based on trial counsel’s failure to 

make certain arguments. (Doc. 23 at 19). According to Respondents, the evidentiary 

hearing claim, some of the IAC theories, and the due process claim were procedurally 

defaulted. (Doc. 23 at 14). Respondents conceded, however, that some of the IAC 

theories were properly exhausted and had to be reviewed on their merits. (Doc. 23 at 27-

29). Despite Respondents’ concession that some aspects of the petition had been 

exhausted, the R&R concluded otherwise. 

 The R&R began by stating the refusal by the state court to hold an evidentiary 

hearing was a “procedural decision” that could not serve as the basis for federal habeas 

relief. (Doc. 76 at 5). Then, the R&R concluded all of Jensen’s remaining claims were 

procedurally barred. Jensen filed objections to the R&R while Respondents did not. 

ANALYSIS 

I. Standard of Review 

 A district judge “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). A district judge 

must review de novo the portions to which an objection is made but a judge need not 

review the portions to which no objection is made. See Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F. 

Supp. 2d 1219, 1226 (D. Ariz. 2003) (“[D]e novo review of factual and legal issues is 

required if objections are made, but not otherwise.”) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). 

II. Procedural Status of Claims 

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 Before reaching the merits of any of Jensen’s claims, the Court must first 

determine the procedural status of each claim. Jensen’s difficult-to-decipher allegations 

are not subject to obvious classification into discrete claims. The following 

characterization of his claims is based on Jensen’s filings, Respondents’ view of those 

filings, and the Court’s own view of what Jensen is attempting to assert. 

A. Denial of Evidentiary Hearing 

 Jensen’s petition includes a claim that the state post-conviction court’s failure to 

hold an evidentiary hearing violated the “Due Process” and “equal protection” provisions 

of the “5th, 6th and 14th amendments.” (Doc. 8 at 6). Respondents argue Jensen did not 

present this claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 23 at 18). That is correct. The 

fact that Jensen presented this argument to the Arizona Supreme Court was not enough. 

See Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 918 (9th Cir. 2004) (issue must be presented at every 

relevant level of state review). Therefore, Jensen procedurally defaulted this claim. 

B. Actual Innocence or Alibi Witnesses 

 Jensen appears to present two claims involving his innocence and alibi defense. 

Respondents describe these two claims as, first, a claim Jensen was denied his Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel because his attorney did not file a motion involving actual 

innocence and his purported alibi, and second, Jensen was denied due process because his 

alibi defense was not presented. (Doc. 23 at 19). Under these descriptions, these two 

claims are new. That is, Jensen did not present them in state court. While Jensen did 

pursue similar IAC claims, those claims are distinct and will be discussed below. Thus, 

Jensen procedurally defaulted these two claims. 

C. IAC Claims 

 Jensen presents eight ways his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. (Doc. 

8 at 7). These are the same theories he presented in his petition for post-conviction relief. 

The state trial court issued a written decision summarily rejecting all of them. Jensen 

then unsuccessfully sought review by the Arizona Court of Appeals and the Arizona 

Supreme Court. (Doc. 20-2 at 149); (Doc. 21 at 88); (Doc. 21 at 58). In their response to 

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Jensen’s federal petition, Respondents conceded Jensen exhausted these, or substantially 

similar, IAC theories.1

 (Doc. 23 at 28). There is no indication this case is “exceptional” 

such that the Court should, sua sponte, determine these claims are procedurally defaulted. 

See Zapien v. Martel, 805 F.3d 862, 869 n.3 (9th Cir. 2015). Therefore, the Court will 

examine the merits of these claims under the appropriate standard of review. 

III. No Basis to Excuse Procedural Default 

 Jensen has three procedurally defaulted claims and he has not identified any basis 

to excuse their default. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (federal 

review of defaulted claim precluded absent showing of cause and prejudice). 

Importantly, Jensen cannot take advantage of Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), 

regarding what may be viewed as his defaulted IAC claim.2

 Under Martinez, Jensen 

could excuse the procedural default of his IAC claim only by showing his post-conviction 

relief counsel was ineffective and the “underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel 

claim is a substantial one, which is to say . . . the claim has some merit.” Clabourne v. 

Ryan, 745 F.3d 362, 377 (9th Cir. 2014) overruled on other grounds by McKinney v. 

Ryan, 813 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. 2015). But the claim that Jensen’s trial counsel was 

ineffective because he did not file a motion regarding actual innocence or an alibi is not 

meritorious. Given the evidence at trial, the failure to file such a motion did not fall 

below an objective standard of reasonableness. Moreover, Jensen has not established he 

suffered prejudice as a result of his counsel’s failure to file a futile motion. Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Therefore, the defaulted IAC claim, as well as the 

evidentiary hearing claim and due process claim, are procedurally defaulted and do not 

provide a basis for relief. 

 

1

 While Jensen’s filings in state court did reference these theories, there may be grounds to question whether he adequately argued each theory in that his state court 

filings do not always reference federal law in support of his theories. However, given Respondents’ concession on exhaustion, the Court need not address this issue. 

2

 Respondents argue Jensen cannot take advantage of Martinez because Martinez

requires the claim that post-conviction relief counsel was ineffective have been exhausted 

in state court. (Doc. 23 at 21). Under present Ninth Circuit law, that is incorrect. 

Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302, 1320 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). 

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IV. Merits of Claims 

Respondents concede the Court must review the merits of various theories of IAC 

which Jensen properly exhausted. That merits analysis, however, is subject to very strict 

limitations. Under the extremely deferential standard of review, Jensen is not entitled to 

relief. 

 A. Standard of Review and Limitation on Evidence 

Jensen’s exhausted claims are subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Under AEDPA, “[t]he pivotal question is whether the 

state court’s application of the Supreme Court precedent was unreasonable, as opposed to 

merely incorrect or erroneous.” Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 987 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(quotation marks and citations omitted). This is a deferential standard that requires a 

federal court grant relief only where the state court decision was “so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Woods v. Etherton, No. 15-723, 

2016 WL 1278478, at *2 (U.S. Apr. 4, 2016) (citation omitted). 

 For IAC claims, the standard of review gets ratcheted up even more. That is, the 

normal requirement to prevail on an IAC claim is establishing counsel “fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness” and counsel’s performance resulted in prejudice. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 692 (1984). This standard “is a most 

deferential one.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011). When a state court has 

reviewed and rejected IAC claims, federal review of those claims “is doubly deferential 

because counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all 

significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Woods, 2016 

WL 1278478, at *2. Thus, “the question is not whether counsel’s actions were 

reasonable” but “whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied” the 

standard for effective assistance of counsel. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105. Finally, in 

conducting this extremely circumscribed review, the federal court is limited to the 

evidence presented to the state court. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). 

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 B. State Court’s Rulings Were Not Unreasonable 

Jensen’s numerous theories of IAC require a review of the evidence presented at 

trial as well as during post-conviction proceedings. Jensen’s theories, however, are often 

contrary to what happened at trial. For example, Jensen faults his attorney for not 

pursuing an alibi defense regarding certain charges, even though some evidence of his 

purported “alibi” was presented and discussed at trial. (Doc. 23 at 30-31). Jensen also 

faults his attorney for not cross-examining a witness on certain subjects. But that witness 

was cross-examined about some of those subjects. (Doc. 23 at 34). Any failure to crossexamine that witness further can easily be ascribed to trial strategy. 

 Beyond the IAC theories explicitly contradicted by the record, most of the 

remaining IAC theories are either not explained or not supported sufficiently to provide a 

basis for relief. For example, Jensen alleges his attorney failed to “meaningfully 

communicate with him.” But Jensen does not explain this alleged communication 

breakdown or how, but for that breakdown, the result of the trial would have been 

different. Jensen also claims his attorney should have obtained documents before trial or 

called an expert during trial. But the documents would not have exonerated Jensen and 

there is no clear explanation how the failure to call an expert materially affected Jensen’s 

defense. Thus, even if the Court were to assume Jensen’s trial counsel should have 

obtained the documents or called an expert, Jensen has not established he suffered 

prejudice as a result. 

 Finally, the IAC theories which are not directly contradicted by the record, are not 

convincing. Jensen has not established the state court was objectively unreasonable in 

rejecting his various IAC claims. Based on the doubly deferential standard the Court 

must apply, Jensen’s exhausted claims fail. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 76) is REJECTED as 

set forth above. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

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(Doc. 8) is DENIED. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED a certificate of appealability and leave to proceed 

in forma pauperis on appeal are denied because dismissal of some of the petition is 

justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the ruling 

debatable and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right. 

 Dated this 9th day of May, 2016. 

Honorable Roslyn O. Silver

Senior United States District Judge

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