Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-06078/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-06078-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRADLEY MONTREAL HIXON,

Plaintiff, 

 v.

 Correctional Officer J. CRUZEN,

Defendant. /

No. C 07-6078 WHA (PR) 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTIONS, GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS, AND CLOSING CASE

This is a civil rights case filed pro se by a state prisoner. Plaintiff has filed several

motions and defendant has moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust. Plaintiff’s motions will be

denied and the motion to dismiss will be granted.

I. PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Plaintiff has filed several motions for “appointment” of counsel.

There is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. Lassiter v. Dep't of Social

Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). 28 U.S.C. § 1915 confers on a district court only the power to

"request" that counsel represent a litigant who is proceeding in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(1). This does not give the courts the power to make "coercive appointments of

counsel." Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989). In short, the Court

has only the power to ask pro bono counsel to represent plaintiff, not the power to “appoint”

counsel.

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Case 3:07-cv-06078-WHA Document 30 Filed 08/20/08 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Plaintiff is capable of presenting his claims effectively, and the issues at this stage of the

case are not complex. The motions for counsel will be denied. 

II. PLAINTIFF’S OTHER MOTIONS

Plaintiff’s motion for entry of default will be denied because the motion to dismiss was

filed within the time to do so as extended. Plaintiff’s motion to stay the case pending his

transfer will be denied because he has opposed the motion to dismiss and that motion is

dispositive of the case.

III. MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant has moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust. Plaintiff mailed an opposition to

defendant’s counsel, but it did not make it onto the court’s docket. Defendant has, however,

provided a declaration and a copy of the opposition (Decl. Fritz, Exh. A). Plaintiff does not

object that it is not a true copy, so the opposition as provided by defendant will be considered in

ruling on the motion.

Federal law provides that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions

under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or

other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Although once within the discretion of the district court, exhaustion in

prisoner cases covered by § 1997e(a) is now mandatory. Porter v Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524

(2002). All available remedies must now be exhausted; those remedies "need not meet federal

standards, nor must they be 'plain, speedy, and effective.'" Id. (citation omitted). 

 The PLRA's exhaustion requirement cannot be satisfied "by filing an untimely or

otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal." Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S.

Ct. 2378, 2382 (2006). "The text of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) strongly suggests that the PLRA uses

the term 'exhausted' to mean what the term means in administrative law, where exhaustion

means proper exhaustion." Id. at 2387. Therefore, the PLRA exhaustion requirement requires

proper exhaustion. Id. "Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and

other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without

imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings." Id. at 2386 (footnote

Case 3:07-cv-06078-WHA Document 30 Filed 08/20/08 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 As defendant correctly points out, this was only six days after the administrative

appeal was filed, and he could not have expected a reply by then. It appears likely that he

filed the complaint in this court without regard to whether the administrative appeal had been

completed or not.

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omitted). Compliance with prison grievance procedures is all that is required by the PLRA to

"properly exhaust." Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 922-23 (2007). 

The State of California provides its inmates and parolees the right to appeal

administratively "any departmental decision, action, condition or policy perceived by those

individuals as adversely affecting their welfare." Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). It also

provides its inmates the right to file administrative appeals alleging misconduct by correctional

officers. See id. § 3084.1(e). In order to exhaust available administrative remedies within this

system, a prisoner must proceed through several levels of appeal: (1) informal resolution, (2)

formal written appeal on a CDC 602 inmate appeal form, (3) second level appeal to the

institution head or designee, and (4) third level appeal to the Director of the California

Department of Corrections. See id. § 3084.5; Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (S.D.

Cal. 1997). A final decision at the director’s level satisfied the exhaustion requirement under §

1997e(a). Id. at 1237-38. 

Nonexhaustion under § 1997e(a) is an affirmative defense. Wyatt v Terhune, 315 F.3d

1108, 1119 (9th Cir 2003). It should be treated as a matter of abatement and brought in an

“unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion rather than [in] a motion for summary judgment.” Id.

(citations omitted). In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies under § 1997e(a), the court may look beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues

of fact. Id. at 1119-20. If the court concludes that the prisoner has not exhausted California’s

prison administrative process, the proper remedy is dismissal without prejudice. Id. at 1120.

The administrative appeal that plaintiff contends was his attempt to exhaust was filed on

November 27, 2007, and was pending at the first formal level of review on December 3, 2007,

when the complaint in this case was filed (Decl. Frtiz, Exh. A (plaintiff’s opposition to motion

to dismiss) at Exh. A).1

 The administrative appeal was answered on January 11, 2008 (ibid.). 

Plaintiff’s response to the motion to dismiss is that he was prevented from completing his

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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administrative appeal by actions of the guards, but this of course cannot apply to the

administrative appeal that was pending when he filed this complaint (id. at 1 and 2 of

opposition). That is, he simply does not contest that he had not completed exhaustion before

filing, as is required, and his excuse for not doing so is inapplicable given the time frame

involved. See McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002) (action must be

dismissed unless prisoner exhausted available administrative remedies before filing suit, even if

prisoner fully exhausts while suit is pending); Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th

Cir. 2006) (where administrative remedies are not exhausted before the prisoner sends his

complaint to the court it will be dismissed even if exhaustion is completed by the time the

complaint is actually filed). The motion to dismiss will be granted. 

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s motions for appointment of counsel (documents 8, 10 and 20 on the docket),

his motion for default (document number 17), and his motion for stay (document 29) are

DENIED. Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust (document 22) is GRANTED. 

Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction (document 9) is DENIED as moot. The clerk shall

close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 18 , 2008. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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