Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-03171/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-03171-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SREE RAMISETTY,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE WESTERN UNION COMPANY, et 

al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-03171-DMR 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

REMAND WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Re: Dkt. No. 9

Plaintiff Sree Ramisetty filed this employment action in San Francisco Superior Court

against Defendants The Western Union Company (“TWUC”) and her former supervisor, Frederick 

Crosby. Defendants removed the action on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, claiming that there 

is complete diversity between the parties because Crosby was fraudulently joined in the case. 

Notice of Removal, [Docket No. 1] ¶¶19-20. Ramisetty now moves to remand the action. The 

court held a hearing on October 8, 2015. As set forth at the hearing and below, Plaintiff’s motion 

is denied without prejudice.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant may remove to federal court any matter that 

originally could have been filed in federal court. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 

(1987). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and possess subject matter jurisdiction in 

civil cases based only on federal question or diversity jurisdiction. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 

1332. To invoke diversity jurisdiction in an action involving United States citizens, the complaint 

must allege that “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of 

interest and costs, and is between ... citizens of different States....” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). 

Here, Defendants contend, and Ramisetty does not dispute, that the case meets the amount 

in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction. The parties do dispute whether the action is 

Case 4:15-cv-03171-DMR Document 20 Filed 10/16/15 Page 1 of 3
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

between citizens of different states. The Supreme Court has interpreted section 1332(a) to require 

“complete diversity of citizenship”—that is, each of the plaintiffs must be a citizen of a different 

state than each of the defendants. Caterpillar, 519 U.S. at 68; see Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 

236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001).

“Although an action may be removed to federal court only where there is complete 

diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1441(b), one exception to the requirement for 

complete diversity is where a non-diverse defendant has been ‘fraudulently joined.’” Hunter v. 

Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2009). In this circuit, the joinder of a nondiverse defendant is deemed fraudulent when a plaintiff's failure to state a cause of action against 

the resident defendant is obvious according to the applicable state law. Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042-

43. In such cases, the court may ignore the presence of the non-diverse defendant for purposes of 

determining diversity. Morris, 236 F.3d at 1067. There is a strong presumption against fraudulent 

joinder, which means that the court resolves all ambiguity in favor of remand to state court. 

Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042. The removing defendants bear the “heavy burden of proving that the 

joinder of the in-state party was improper.” Allen v. Boeing Co., 784 F.3d 625, 634 (9th Cir. 

2015). The defendants must prove fraudulent joinder by “clear and convincing evidence.” 

Hamilton Materials, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Corp., 494 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Defendants argue that removal is proper because Ramisetty’s failure to state a cause of 

action against Crosby in his individual capacity is obvious according to applicable state law. 

Ramisetty alleges nine causes of action: 1) wrongful termination in violation of public policy

(Lab. Code § 98.6, 232.5, 1102.5); 2) unlawful retaliation (Gov’t Code § 12940 et seq.); 3) failure 

to investigate and prevent discrimination (Gov’t Code § 12940 et seq.); 4) fraud and deceit (Civ. 

Code §§ 1571-1574 and 1709-1710); 5) failure to pay PTO upon termination (Lab. Code §§ 201-

203, 227.3); 6) disability discrimination (Gov’t Code § 12940 et seq.); 7) failure to provide 

reasonable accommodation (Gov’t Code § 12940 et seq.); 8) failure to engage in the interactive 

process (Gov’t Code § 12940 et seq.); and 9) unfair business practices (Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 

17200 et seq.).

As an initial matter, Ramisetty’s complaint does not specify which claims she is bringing 

Case 4:15-cv-03171-DMR Document 20 Filed 10/16/15 Page 2 of 3
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

against Crosby. At the hearing, Plaintiff conceded that the only claims she could potentially bring 

against Crosby in his individual capacity would be for harassment or fraud. Plaintiff further 

conceded that her current complaint does not include a cause of action against Crosby for 

harassment pursuant to Gov’t Code § 12940(j). Although the complaint does contain a cause of 

action for fraud, it does not include specific allegations about the alleged fraud, and does not 

mention Crosby. Plaintiff’s counsel was unable to clearly articulate the contours of a harassment 

or fraud claim against Crosby at the hearing, but believed he could do so if given an opportunity to 

consult the case file and amend the complaint. Defendants did not object to providing Plaintiff 

with an opportunity to amend, and also agreed that the propriety of remand could be appropriately 

reanalyzed based on the amended pleading. 

The court thus granted Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint within 10 days of the hearing

(i.e., by October 19, 2015). The court also ordered that if Plaintiff wishes to file a renewed motion 

to remand based on the amended complaint, she must do so by October 19, 2015. 

Plaintiff’s motion to remand [Docket No. 9.] is denied without prejudice. Plaintiff’s 

request for sanctions is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 16, 2015

______________________________________

Donna M. Ryu

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 4:15-cv-03171-DMR Document 20 Filed 10/16/15 Page 3 of 3