Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01482/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01482-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ALPHONSO DeCARLOS MYLES, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 08-1482 PHX MHM (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

WARDEN PALOSAARI, et al., )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE MARY H. MURGUIA:

Petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on August 11, 2008.

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 9) on November 20, 2008.

Petitioner filed a reply (Docket No. 10) to the answer on

December 22, 2008.

I Procedural background

On June 16, 2003, a man riding a bicycle in Phoenix was

shot multiple times by an unknown assailant; Petitioner was

apprehended nearby that same night and questioned in connection

with the crime. See Answer, Exh. X.

On June 26, 2003, in grand jury proceedings in Maricopa

County in CR2003-016060, a prosecutor presented an investigation

involving an “alleged aggravated assault and misconduct

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involving weapons” regarding the events of June 16, 2003. Id.,

Exh. X. The grand jury voted a true bill against Petitioner for

those crimes. Id., Exh. X. Accordingly, Petitioner was charged

by indictment with one count of aggravated assault and one count

of weapons misconduct. Id., Exh. Y at 2.

On August 8, 2003, a hearing was conducted regarding

Petitioner’s potential acceptance of a plea agreement to the

charges of weapons misconduct and aggravated assault. See

Petition, Attach.; Answer, Exh. X. Petitioner’s counsel at that

time, Mr. Jolly, informed the trial court that Petitioner had

decided not to accept the proffered plea agreement, providing

for a sentence of twelve years imprisonment. See Answer, Exh.

X at 3. Petitioner indicated at the August 8 hearing that he

knew that, if he did not plead guilty in that case at that time,

the state intended to dismiss the original indictment and refile more serious charges against Petitioner. See id., Exh. X

at 3-4. 

The trial court addressed Petitioner directly at that

time, noting a prior conversation between the court and

Petitioner about the plea agreement and stating “it wasn’t a

terribly good plea offer as I recall.” Id., Exh. X at 4. The

trial court also stated: “You probably would done as well if you

pled to the charge without the plea agreement. If they dismiss

and refile it, you are looking at a more serious charge, and

that opportunity will have come and gone.(sic)” Id., Exh. X at

4. Petitioner chose not to plead guilty at that time. Id.,

Exh. X at 4. 

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In an indictment issued by a grand jury on September 5,

2003, in Maricopa County Superior Court docket number CR2003-

020303, Petitioner was again accused of the crimes occurring on

June 16, 2003, i.e., shooting an adult male multiple times while

the man was riding a bicycle on a Phoenix city street. Id.,

Exh. A & Exh. B. The indictment charged Petitioner with one

count of attempted first-degree premeditated murder or, in the

alternative, attempted second-degree murder. Id., Exh. B. The

indictment also charged Petitioner with one count of aggravated

assault. Id., Exh. B. On September 26, 2003, the state alleged

Petitioner had previously been convicted of a felony. Id., Exh.

I at 1. 

On February 9, 2004, a pretrial hearing was conducted

at which Petitioner was offered a plea agreement exposing him to

a term of fifteen years imprisonment. Id., Exh. X. Petitioner

was represented by different counsel, Ms. Hernandez, at that

time. The state trial judge conducting the hearing informed

Petitioner that the jury could be informed he had a prior felony

conviction and that “[a] judge could consider it at the time of

sentencing.” Id., Exh. X at 6. Petitioner stated he was not

interested in the plea agreement and asked to be provided

transcripts of the grand jury proceedings. Id., Exh. X at 9-10.

After conferring with his counsel at the court’s urging,

however, Petitioner asked to think about the plea offer

overnight. Id., Exh. X at 10-13. Petitioner did not accept the

plea offer. 

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Petitioner’s trial lasted for four days. See id., Exh.

H & Exh. I. The victim testified at the trial that Petitioner

was the person who shot him. Id., Exh. I. The state alleged

Petitioner shot the victim at least once and then, after the

victim fell to the ground, Petitioner stood over the victim and

shot him at least one more time. Id., Exh. I. Additionally,

the jury heard testimony that Petitioner was apprehended near

the scene of the crime in a vehicle described by witnesses as

that driven by the shooter, that Petitioner had gunpowder

residue on his hands, and that the gun used to shoot the victim

was located in the car Petitioner was driving when apprehended.

Id., Exh. I. 

On February 24, 2004, the jury returned a verdict

finding Petitioner guilty of attempted first degree murder and

guilty of aggravated assault. Id., Exh. D. The jury also found

the offenses were dangerous. Id., Exh. D.

On April 26, 2004, Petitioner was sentenced to an

aggravated term of 15 years imprisonment pursuant to his

conviction for attempted murder and a concurrent aggravated term

of 10 years imprisonment pursuant to his conviction for

aggravated assault. Id., Exh. E. Petitioner was given credit

for 315 days of presentence incarceration. Id., Exh. E. 

At the sentencing hearing the prosecutor argued for a

harsh sentence citing, inter alia, the fact that Petitioner had

a prior felony conviction for possession of a controlled

substance while also in possession of a firearm. Id., Exh. E at

6. The prosecutor also cited the fact that Petitioner had been

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imprisoned for violating his probation on that conviction. Id.,

Exh. E at 6. The prosecutor also averred Petitioner was a

“prohibited possessor,” and that the original charges against

Petitioner had “included misconduct involving weapons. The

State ended up not refiling those due to just the cost of having

to bring in a California civil rights restoration clerk to come

back to testify his rights hadn’t been restored....” Id., Exh.

E at 7.

Petitioner filed a timely direct appeal of his

convictions and sentences. Id., Exh. F. In his direct appeal

Petitioner asserted he was entitled to re-sentencing because he

was sentenced to an aggravated term of imprisonment based on

factual findings made by the trial court rather than the jury.

Id., Exh. I. In a decision entered May 22, 2005, the Arizona

Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and

sentences. Id., Exh. K. The appellate court concluded

Petitioner’s claim for relief was without merit because

Petitioner’s sentence was aggravated due to a prior conviction.

Id., Exh. K. The appellate court also concluded no reasonable

juror could have failed to find Petitioner’s crime “senseless”

and that the victim of the crime suffered permanent injury and

emotional harm. Id., Exh. K. Accordingly, the Arizona Court of

Appeals concluded, any imposition of an aggravated term of

imprisonment was harmless error. Id., Exh. K.

Petitioner sought review of the Court of Appeals’

decision by the Arizona Supreme Court, which summarily denied

review on October 31, 2005. Id., Exh. N & Exh. O. 

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Petitioner filed a notice of his intent to seek postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure, on May 3, 2004, during the pendency of his direct

appeal. Id., Exh. H. Petitioner moved to dismiss this action

without prejudice on July 1, 2004. Id., Exh. P. On July 5,

2004, the state trial court dismissed the post-conviction

action. Id., Exh. Q. 

After his direct appeal concluded, on January 13, 2006,

Petitioner re-filed his state action for post-conviction relief

pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id.,

Exh. R. Petitioner was appointed counsel for these proceedings.

Id., Exh. S. Due to a conflict, Petitioner’s appointed counsel

was replaced on July 31, 2006. Id., Exh. U. 

On September 5, 2006, Petitioner’s appointed postconviction counsel informed the court that she could find no

meritorious issues to raise on Petitioner’s behalf. Id., Exh.

V. Petitioner filed a pro per petition for post-conviction

relief on April 27, 2007. Id., Exh. X. Petitioner asserted his

convictions and sentences should be reversed because: (1) he was

the victim of prosecutorial vindictiveness; (2) the indictment

was both multiplicitous and duplicitous because there was only

one victim; (3) his trial, appellate, and post-conviction

counsel were all unconstitutionally ineffective; (4) the state

suppressed evidence at trial; (5) the victim gave perjured

testimony at Petitioner’s trial; (6) Petitioner was entitled to

have a jury find each factor used to aggravate his sentence.

Id., Exh. X & Exh. Y.

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1

 Petitioner alleges he sough review of the trial court’s

denial of Rule 32 relief by the Court of Appeals in a petition for

review filed “11/07,” which is not reflected in the docket of the case

provided by Respondents. See Petition; Answer at 13. 

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On August 16, 2007, the Maricopa County Superior Court

denied relief, summarily stating some of Petitioner’s claims

were precluded and that the remaining claims did not state a

colorable claim for relief. Id., Exh. AA. On September 11,

2007, Petitioner sought an extension of the time allowed for

appealing this decision.1 Petitioner filed a motion seeking

resolution of the September 11 motion on January 22, 2008. Id.,

Exh. CC. On February 11, 2008, the state trial court denied

Petitioner’s motion for an extension of the time allowed to seek

review of the trial court’s decision by the state appellate

court. Id., Exh. DD. 

In his federal habeas petition Petitioner alleges he is

entitled to relief because his sentence violates his Sixth

Amendment rights, i.e., his sentence was predicated on facts

found by a judge and not a jury (Ground I). See Docket No. 1.

Petitioner also alleges his Fourteenth Amendment right to due

process of law was violated because the prosecution was

vindictive; Petitioner asserts the indictment was amended to

include more serious charges because he refused to accept a plea

deal (Ground II). Petitioner further contends that his Fifth

Amendment right to be free of double jeopardy was violated

because his crime involved only one victim and because the

indictment was amended to alter the initial charges against him

to more serious charges (Ground III). Petitioner also maintains

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2

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court shall not be granted

unless it appears that--

(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies

available in the courts of the State; or

(B)(i) there is an absence of available State

corrective process; or

(ii) circumstances exist that render such process

ineffective to protect the rights of the

applicant.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2008). 

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he was denied his right to the effective assistance of trial

counsel because counsel did not meet with him and because his

trial and appellate counsel did not assert his right to be free

of a multiplicitous and duplicitous indictment (Ground IV). 

II Relevant law

A. Exhaustion

Absent particular circumstances, the District Court

should not entertain the merits of a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus before the petitioner’s state remedies have been

“exhausted.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) & (c) (2006 & Supp. 2008).2

Although it may deny relief on the merits of an unexhausted

claim, the District Court may not grant federal habeas relief on

the merits of a claim which has not been exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-

30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). 

To properly exhaust a federal habeas claim the

petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule

upon the merits of the constitutional claim by “fairly

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presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose v.

Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, in non-capital

cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court” test of the

exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas petitioner

presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, either on

direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. See

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See

also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (D. Ariz.

2007) (providing a thorough and well-reasoned discussion of what

constitutes the “highest court” in Arizona for purposes of

exhausting a non-capital conviction or sentence).

B. Procedural default

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2008). Because the exhaustion requirement

refers only to remedies still available to the petitioner at the

time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is

satisfied if the petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing

their claim in the state courts. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.

81, 92-93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006); Castille, 489 U.S. at

351, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. If it is clear the habeas petitioner’s

claim is procedurally barred pursuant to state law, the claim is

exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s “procedural default” of

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the claim. See, e.g., Woodford, 548 U.S. at 92-93, 126 S. Ct.

at 2387. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now

barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

state rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060; Tacho v.

Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th Cir. 1988). Procedural

default also occurs when a petitioner did present a claim to the

state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of

the claim because the petitioner failed to follow a state

procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727-

28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-57; Ellis v. Armenakis, 222 F.3d 627, 632

(9th Cir. 2000); Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir.

2002).

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims bar

Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but

procedurally defaulted, any claim not previously fairly

presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in a procedurally

correct manner. See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665

(9th Cir. 2005); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir.

2002). See also Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct.

2578, 2581 (2002) (holding Arizona’s state rules regarding the

waiver and procedural default of claims raised in attacks on

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criminal convictions are adequate and independent state grounds

for affirming a conviction and denying federal habeas relief on

the grounds of a procedural bar); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d

923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1998).

C. Cause and prejudice

Federal habeas relief based on a procedurally defaulted

claim is barred unless the petitioner can demonstrate a

fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur if the Court does

not consider the merits of the claim, or cause and actual

prejudice to excuse their default of the claim. See House v.

Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 535-36, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2076 (2006); Dretke

v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392-93, 124 S. Ct. 1827, 1852 (2004). 

“Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s

procedural default of the claim and “prejudice” is actual harm

resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas

v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). To demonstrate

cause, a petitioner must show the existence of some external

factor which impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s

procedural rules. See Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617

(9th Cir. 1998); Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305

(9th Cir. 1996). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must

show that the alleged constitutional error worked to his actual

and substantial disadvantage, infecting his criminal proceedings

with constitutional violations. See Vickers, 144 F.3d at 617;

Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 1998).

Establishing prejudice requires a petitioner to prove that, “but

for” the alleged constitutional violations, there is a

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reasonable probability he would not have been convicted of the

same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d 1129, 1135-36 (9th

Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 1999).

Although both cause and prejudice must be shown to excuse a

procedural default, the Court need not examine the existence of

prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish cause. See Engle

v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1575 n.43

(1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10. 

Allegedly ineffective assistance of appellate counsel

does not establish cause for the failure to properly exhaust a

habeas claim in the state courts unless the specific Sixth

Amendment claim providing the basis for cause was itself

properly exhausted. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446,

451, 120 S. Ct. 1587, 1591 (2000); Tacho, 862 F.2d at 1381;

Deitz v. Money, 391 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 2004)(“[a]ttorney

error does not constitute cause to excuse a procedural default

unless counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient.”).

See also Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755, 111 S. Ct. at 2567 (“We

reiterate that counsel’s ineffectiveness will constitute cause

only if it is an independent constitutional violation”).

 Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is required if the petitioner demonstrates review of the

merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393, 124 S. Ct.

at 1852; Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316, 115 S. Ct. 851, 861

(1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-86, 106 S. Ct.

2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs

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only when a constitutional violation has probably resulted in

the conviction of one who is factually innocent. See Murray,

477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649; Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979

F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992). 

D. Standard of review with regard to properly exhausted

claims for relief

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law, or one involving an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or

unless the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the state proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 & Supp.

2008); Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2858 (2007);

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74-75, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653

(2006); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390, 125 S. Ct. 2456,

2467-68 (2005); Cook v. Schriro, 516 F.3d 802, 816 (9th Cir.

2008).

United States Supreme Court holdings at the time of the

state court’s decision are the source of “clearly established

federal law” for the purpose of federal habeas review. Williams

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000);

Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1093 (9th Cir. 2005). The

Court must decide whether the United States Supreme Court has

“clearly established” the point of law Petitioner relies upon as

a basis for habeas relief by examining the holdings of the

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Supreme Court, rather than the opinions of the lower courts or

the Supreme Court’s dicta. See Carey, 549 U.S. at 74-75, 127 S.

Ct. at 653. 

Unless United States Supreme Court precedent has

clearly established a rule of law, the writ will not issue based

on a claimed violation of that rule, see Alvarado v. Hill, 252

F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001), because federal courts are

“without the power” to extend the law beyond Supreme Court

precedent. See Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 485 (9th Cir. 2000).

If the United States Supreme Court has not addressed the issue

raised by Petitioner in its holdings, the state court’s

adjudication of the issue cannot be contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.

See Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 2007),

citing Kane v. Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10, 126 S. Ct. 407, 408

(2006). Therefore, if the issue raised by the petitioner “is an

open question in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence,” the Court

may not issue a writ of habeas corpus on the basis that the

state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law

by rejecting the precise claim presented by the petitioner.

Cook, 516 F.3d at 818, quoting Carey, 549 U.S. at 75, 127 S. Ct.

at 654; Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2007),

cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2961 (2008).

When more than one state court has adjudicated a claim,

the Court must analyze the last “reasoned” decision to determine

if the state’s denial of relief on the claim was clearly

contrary to federal law. See Barker, 423 F.3d at 1091-92 & n.3.

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Under AEDPA, a federal court is permitted to

grant habeas relief only if the state court

adjudication “resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). ... If the state

court reaches the merits without providing

reasoning for us to review, however, “we

independently review the record to determine

whether the state court clearly erred in its

application of Supreme Court law.” Brazzel v.

Washington, 491 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2007)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Larson v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 2008).

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When there is no “reasoned” state court decision explaining the

state’s denial of a claim presented in a federal habeas

petition, the District Court must perform an independent review

of the record to ascertain whether the state court’s decision

summarily denying the claim was objectively reasonable. See

Medley v. Runnels, 506 F.3d 857, 863 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2007),

cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1878 (2008); Stenson, 504 F.3d at 890;

Pham v. Terhune, 400 F.3d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 2005). If the

Court determines that the state court’s decision was contrary to

clearly established law, the Court must review whether

Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated, i.e., the

state’s ultimate denial of relief, without the deference to the

state court’s decision that the Anti-Terrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) otherwise requires. See Frantz v.

Hazey, 513 F.3d 1002, 113-15 (9th Cir. 2008). See also Larson

v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 2008).3 With

regard to his entitlement to federal habeas relief, Petitioner

bears the burden of proving his constitutional rights were

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violated. See, e.g., Cook, 516 F.3d at 816.

Additionally, a section 2254 writ of habeas corpus is

available only when there has been a transgression of federal

law binding on state courts. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,

119, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1567 (1982); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d

1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985). Habeas relief may not be premised

on the mere allegation that something in the state court

proceedings was contrary to general notions of fairness; the

United States Constitution must specifically protect against the

alleged unfairness before the petitioner may obtain relief. See

Engle, 456 U.S. at 119, 102 S. Ct. at 1567; Middleton, 768 F.2d

at 1088.

III. Analysis of Petitioner’s claims for relief

A. Petitioner alleges he is entitled to relief because

his sentence violates his Sixth Amendment rights.

Petitioner raised this claim in his direct appeal and

the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded Petitioner was not

entitled to relief on the merits of this claim. Respondents

allow the claim was properly exhausted and contend the Arizona

state court’s decision was not clearly contrary to established

federal law.

Petitioner was convicted of attempted first degree

murder and aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced

Petitioner to an aggravated term of 15 years imprisonment on the

attempted first degree murder conviction and a concurrent

sentence of 10 years imprisonment on the aggravated assault

conviction. Answer, Exh. E. 

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At Petitioner’s sentencing hearing, Petitioner’s

counsel allowed that Petitioner has a prior felony history. The

sentencing court stated:

There are aggravating factors here, the prior

felony convictions, the senselessness of this

crime is an aggravating factor, the facts

that the victim suffered injuries which are

permanent in nature, and the emotional harm

to the victim. I have considered those in my

sentence.

Id., Exh. E at 15–16. 

When rejecting the claim that his sentence was

aggravated based on factors not found by a jury, the Arizona

Court of Appeals noted that, pursuant to state statutes,

Petitioner’s sentence could be aggravated “‘within the range

prescribed under this subsection pursuant to the terms of § 13-

702, subsections B, C, and D.’” Id., Exh. K at 5. The Arizona

Court of Appeals “agree[d] that the jury did not make any

specific findings regarding aggravating factors, and the judge

imposed an aggravated sentence.” Id., Exh. K at 6. However,

the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded the error was harmless

because no reasonable jury could fail to find the aggravating

factors relied upon by the sentencing court when aggravating the

sentence. The Arizona Court of Appeals further found that

Petitioner’s sentence was aggravated by a prior felony

conviction which was “not subject to the rules of Apprendi or

Blakely, meaning it was not error, let alone harmless error, for

the trial court to rely on those convictions as aggravating

factors.” Id., Exh. K at 7. 

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4

Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any

fact that increases the penalty for a crime

beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be

submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt. [] Here, only the existence of

a prior conviction is at issue, and Petitioner

has no federal right to have a jury decide that

question. .... The Constitution permits prior

convictions to be used to enhance a sentence,

without being submitted to a jury, so long as the

convictions were themselves obtained in

proceedings that required the right to a jury

trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488, 120 S. Ct. 2348 [].

There is no suggestion that Petitioner’s []

conviction was obtained without the requisite

procedural safeguards. Thus, we reject

Petitioner’s claim that his sentence violated

Apprendi. Davis v. Woodford, 446 F.3d 957, 963 (9th Cir. 2006).

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The state appellate court’s decision was not clearly

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law.

Petitioner’s sentence was aggravated, inter alia, based on the

fact of his prior conviction. The fact that Petitioner’s

sentence was aggravated by a prior felony conviction, which

expanded the permissible statutory sentencing range, and that he

admitted this conviction, removes Petitioner’s circumstance from

the umbrella of both Apprendi and Blakely.4 See Hughes v.

Harrison, 129 Fed. App. 340, 341 (9th Cir. 2005); Stevenson v.

Lewis, 116 Fed. App. 814, 815 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Apprendi carved

out a “narrow exception” for sentence enhancements based on “the

fact of a prior conviction.”). The Arizona courts have

interpreted Blakely to allow for the imposition of an aggravated

sentence based upon non-Blakely-compliant factors if at least

one aggravating factor is compliant with Blakely. See Arizona

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v. Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578, 115 P.3d 618 (2005); Arizona v.

Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 115 P.3d 601 (2005). The sentencing

in Martinez was upheld upon review by the United States Supreme

Court. See Martinez v. Arizona, 546 U.S. 1044, 126 S. Ct. 762,

(2005).

B. Petitioner also alleges his Fourteenth Amendment

right to due process of law was violated because the prosecution

was vindictive; Petitioner asserts the indictment was amended to

include more serious charges because he refused to accept a plea

deal (Ground II). 

Petitioner raised this issue in his first state action

for post-conviction relief. In a decision issued August 13,

2007, the state trial court summarily concluded the claim was

precluded or not colorable. 

Petitioner did not timely seek review of this decision

by the Arizona Court of Appeals. Therefore, Petitioner failed

to properly exhaust this claim in the state courts by raising to

the state’s “highest court.” 

In reply to Respondents assertion that he procedurally

defaulted some of his federal habeas claims in the state courts,

Petitioner contends he did not properly exhaust his claims

because the Arizona trial court did not grant his properly-filed

motion for an extension of time to appeal the decision denying

Rule 32 relief to the Arizona Court of Appeals. Petitioner also

asserts that his direct appeal contained only a Blakely claim

regarding the validity of his sentence because he accepted the

limitation of his appeal to this single issue as because it was

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the advice of his appointed appellate counsel. 

Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor prejudice

arising from his procedural default of the claim. Neither has

Petitioner established a fundamental miscarriage of justice will

occur if the merits of the claim are not considered. 

Additionally, Petitioner’s claim may be rejected on the

merits because the re-indictment of a defendant after his

rejection of a plea offer, without other evidence of animus, is

not prosecutorial vindictiveness or a violation of due process.

See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364-65, 98 S. Ct. 663,

668-69 (1978); Adamson v. Ricketts, 758 F.2d 441, 448 (9th Cir.

1985), rev’d on other grounds by Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S.

639, 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990). See also Williams v. Bartow, 481

F.3d 492, 501-02 (7th Cir. 2007).

C. Petitioner further contends that his Fifth Amendment

right to be free of double jeopardy was violated because his

crime involved only one victim and because the indictment was

amended to alter the initial charges against him to more serious

charges (Ground III).

Petitioner raised this issue in his first state action

for post-conviction relief. The state trial court summarily

concluded the claim was precluded or not colorable. 

Petitioner did not timely seek review of this decision

by the Arizona Court of Appeals. Therefore, Petitioner failed

to properly exhaust this claim in the state courts by raising to

the state’s “highest court.” Petitioner has not shown cause

for, nor prejudice arising from his procedural default of the

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claim. Additionally, Petitioner has not shown a fundamental

miscarriage of justice in this regard because this claim asserts

Petitioner’s legal, as opposed to factual, innocence of the

crimes of conviction. Accordingly, relief may not be granted on

the merits of the claim.

D. Petitioner asserts that he was denied his right to

the effective assistance of trial, appellate, and postconviction counsel. 

Petitioner raised ineffective assistance of trial and

appellate counsel claims in his state action for post-conviction

relief. The state trial court found the claims were not

colorable, a decision Petitioner did not timely appeal to the

state Court of Appeals. Accordingly, Petitioner procedurally

defaulted this claim in the state courts. 

Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor prejudice

arising from his procedural default of his ineffective

assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims. Petitioner

did not properly exhaust an ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel claim in the state courts and, accordingly, the

assertion that his appellate counsel was ineffective does not

provide cause for Petitioner’s failure to timely raise an

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. 

Additionally, there is no constitutional right to the

effective assistance of post-conviction counsel and,

accordingly, this allegation does not provide cause for

Petitioner’s failure to properly exhaust his ineffective

assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims nor is it a

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claim cognizable on federal habeas review. 

Furthermore, Petitioner has not established that a

fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur if the Court does

not consider the merits of his ineffective assistance of trial

and appellate counsel claims. Petitioner has not shown

constitutional error occurred during his trial, resulting in the

conviction of one who is actually innocent. 

IV Conclusion

Petitioner properly exhausted his Sixth Amendment

sentencing claim by presenting it to the Arizona Court of

Appeals in his direct appeal. However, the state court’s

decision that Petitioner’s federal constitutional rights were

not violated as he asserts was not contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of federal law. Petitioner

procedurally defaulted his other claims in the state courts by

not properly presenting them to the Arizona Court of Appeals in

a procedurally correct manner. Petitioner has not shown cause

for, nor prejudice arising from his procedural default of these

claims and, accordingly, relief may not be granted on the merits

of the claims. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Myles’ Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

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court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 26th day of January, 2009.

 

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