Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02255/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02255-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Marquette Touch'e Myers, Sr.,

Plaintiff,

vs.

G. Casian, M.D.; Tillman; Rojas,

Defendants.

Case No.: 14-cv-02255-WQH-JLB

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION DENYING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS

[ECF No. 9]

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Marquette Touch’e Myers, Sr., proceeding pro se, is a state prisoner 

currently incarcerated at the Substance Abuse Treatment Facility, in Corcoran,

California. Plaintiff filed the operative complaint on September 22, 2014, pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendants G. Casian, a medical doctor, and Correctional 

Officers Tillman and Rojas violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights while he was 

housed at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California.

(ECF No. 1.) First, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Casian failed to renew a previously issued 

medical housing recommendation, or “chrono,” for a lower-bunk on floor level cells 

only. (ECF No. 1.) Second, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Tillman forced Plaintiff to move 

from a floor level cell to an upper-tier cell. (ECF No. 1.) Third, Plaintiff alleges

Defendant Rojas failed to hold onto Plaintiff as Plaintiff experienced a seizure resulting 

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in him falling down the stairs from the upper-tier housing block. (ECF No. 1.) Presently 

before this Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to 

state a claim and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (ECF No. 9-1.)

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District 

Judge William Q. Hayes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1 of 

the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. After a thorough 

review of the Complaint, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff’s Response filed in 

opposition thereto, and Defendants’ Reply, this Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss be DENIED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

A. Plaintiff’s Alleged Medical Restrictions

Plaintiff claims to have a seizure disorder. (ECF No.1 at 3.) Plaintiff contends the 

medical staff at RJD, including Defendant Casian, has acknowledged Plaintiff’s seizure 

disorder in the past. (Id.) Plaintiff claims he received a permanent housing 

accommodation from RJD medical staff in 2010 because of this disorder. (Id.) Plaintiff 

contends his permanent housing accommodation restricted him to be housed in a lowerbunk and lower-tier cell block. (Id.) Additionally, Plaintiff claims that his internal prison 

medical record file reflects both his seizure disorder and permanent housing 

 

1 Plaintiff’s allegations are accepted as true for purposes of assessing Defendants’ motion to dismiss

only.

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accommodation. (Id.) Plaintiff also contends his housing accommodation is annually 

renewed and updated in the internal prison computer system. (Id.) 

B. Defendant Dr. Casian’s Alleged Violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 

Right to Medical Care

Plaintiff claims that on August 30, 2012, he had a routine follow-up medical 

appointment with Defendant Dr. Casian. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he told Defendant Casian 

that Plaintiff’s permanent housing accommodation needed to be renewed and updated in 

the internal prison computer system. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Casian did not 

renew Plaintiff’s housing accommodation or update the internal prison computer system. 

(Id. at 3-4.) 

C. Defendant Tillman’s Alleged Violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 

Right to Prevention of Harm

Plaintiff claims that on October 20, 2012, Defendant Tillman ordered Plaintiff to 

move from a floor-level cell to an upper-tier cell. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff contends he told 

Defendant Tillman that he had a seizure disorder and a permanent housing 

accommodation restricting Plaintiff to a lower-bunk in a floor level cell. (Id.) Plaintiff 

alleges Defendant Tillman responded that if Plaintiff did not move voluntarily, he would 

be subjected to disciplinary action and physically forced to move. (Id.) Additionally, 

Plaintiff contends he asked Defendant Tillman to contact the internal prison medical 

department to confirm Plaintiff’s seizure disorder as well as his permanent housing 

accommodation. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Tillman refused to contact the 

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medical department – saying to Plaintiff, “What for?” – and forced Plaintiff to move to an 

upper-tier cell. (Id.)

D. Defendant Rojas’ Alleged Violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Right 

to Prevention of Harm

Plaintiff, housed in an upper-tier cell allegedly as a result of the aforementioned 

move, claims that on November 9, 2012, Defendant Rojas escorted Plaintiff from that his 

upper-tier cell to a medical appointment. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Rojas 

handcuffed Plaintiff’s hands behind his back before escorting Plaintiff out of his cell. 

(Id.) Plaintiff claims he suffered a grand mal seizure during the escort and fell down the 

stairs as a result. (Id.) Additionally, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Rojas failed to keep 

Plaintiff safe by “not holding on” to Plaintiff and instead “letting go” of him during the 

seizure. (Id.)

E. Plaintiff’s Alleged Injuries

Plaintiff claims he suffered a severe back injury as a result of the aforementioned

fall. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he was given pain medication as well as a shot in the middle 

of his back to stop the swelling. (Id.) Additionally, Plaintiff contends that following this 

fall, he was moved to a floor-level cell and was transported to this cell after the fall using 

a wheelchair. (Id. at 8-9.)

/ / /

/ / /

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

A motion to dismiss may be based on either a “‘lack of a cognizable legal theory’ 

or ‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’” Hinds Inv., 

L.P. v. Angioli, 654 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Johnson v. Riverside 

Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008)). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported 

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555). 

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a 

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 

and common sense.” Id. at 679. The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of 

meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d

962, 971 (9th Cir. 2009). The court does not look at whether the plaintiff will “ultimately 

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prevail but whether the [plaintiff] is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” 

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). With respect to an inmate who proceeds 

pro se, his complaint “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 

drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); see also

Butler v. Long, 752 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 2014).

B. PLRA Requirement to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

If a prisoner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies “is clear on the face of the 

complaint, a defendant may move for dismissal under 12(b)(6).” Albino v. Baca, 747 

F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (PLRA) states prisoners must exhaust 

all available administrative remedies before filing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions in federal 

court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); O’Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 1062 (9th 

Cir. 2007). Exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory. Porter v. Nussle, 534 

U.S. 516, 524 (2002). The exhaustion requirement has no exceptions. Booth v. Churner, 

532 U.S. 731, 741, n.6 (2001). Further, exhaustion of administrative remedies must be 

proper. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006); Harvey v. Jordan, 605 F.3d 681, 683-

84 (9th Cir. 2010). Proper exhaustion means, “a prisoner must complete the 

administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules, 

including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in federal court.” Woodford, 548 

U.S. at 88; Harvey, at 684-86. Finally, “it is the prison’s requirements, and not the 

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PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 

218 (2007). 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Eighth Amendment Claim

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim against 

Defendants Tillman and Rojas because Plaintiff fails to adequately allege that those two 

defendants had sufficiently culpable states of mind. (ECF 9-1 at 4.) Defendants concede 

that Plaintiff adequately alleges a serious medical need and thus sufficiently serious 

deprivation. (Id.) Defendants do not challenge the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s allegations 

of an Eighth Amendment violation as to any defendants other than Defendants Tillman 

and Rojas.

1. Eighth Amendment Two-Prong Test

In order for a prison official to be held liable for alleged unconstitutional 

conditions of confinement, the prisoner must allege facts that satisfy a two-prong test. 

Peralta v. Dillard, 774 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Farmer v. Brennen, 511 

U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). The first prong is an objective prong. To satisfy this prong, the 

deprivation must be “sufficiently serious.” Lemire v. Calif. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726

F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).2 

 

2 As stated above, Defendants only challenge the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s allegations as to the 

subjective mens rea of Defendants Tillman and Rojas, not the objective prong of sufficiently serious 

deprivation.

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The second prong focuses on the subjective knowledge of the prison official. 

Under this subjective prong, the prisoner must show that the prison official acted with 

“deliberate indifference” to excessive risk to the prisoner’s health and safety. Peralta, 

774 F.3d at 1082 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). Specifically, the 

prisoner must show the prison official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to 

prisoner health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. That is, the prisoner must show the 

official was both aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and drew such an inference. Farmer, 511 U.S.at

837; see also Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010).

2. Sufficiency of Allegations of Deliberate Indifference as to Defendants 

Tillman and Rojas

Plaintiff claims that when Defendant Tillman ordered him to move from a bottom 

bunk, floor-level cell to an upper-tier cell, he told Defendant Tillman that he had a 

seizure disorder and a permanent housing accommodation restricting Plaintiff to a lowerbunk in a floor level cell. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff further alleges Defendant Tillman 

responded that if Plaintiff did not move voluntarily, he would be subjected to disciplinary 

action and physically forced to move. (Id.) Additionally, Plaintiff contends he asked 

Defendant Tillman to contact the internal prison medical department to confirm 

Plaintiff’s seizure disorder as well as his permanent housing accommodation. (Id. at 6.) 

Instead of contacting the medical department, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Tillman said, 

“What for?” and forced Plaintiff to move to the upper-tier cell. (Id.)

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Therefore, for purposes of a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff pleads sufficient facts of 

Defendant Tillman’s knowledge of Plaintiff’s seizure condition and the risk to his safety 

of being placed in an upper-tier cell. Further, the allegations of Defendant Tillman’s 

responsibility in moving Plaintiff and his response to Plaintiff’s request that Defendant 

Tillman check with the medical staff raises a plausible inference that Defendant Tillman

had the authority and means to prevent the move to the upper-tier cell and acted with 

deliberate indifference.

As to Defendant Rojas, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Rojas was escorting 

Plaintiff from his cell on the upper-tier to a medical appointment. (ECF No. 1 at 8.) 

Plaintiff alleges that while being escorted by Defendant Rojas, Plaintiff suffered a grand 

mal seizure and fell down the stairs. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that, at that time, 

Plaintiff’s hands were handcuffed behind his back. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendant Rojas failed to hold onto Plaintiff and instead let him go, allowing him to fall 

down the stairs. (Id.) 

For purposes of a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Rojas let 

Plaintiff go when Plaintiff had a grand mal seizure on a flight of stairs with his hands 

cuffed behind his back is sufficient to plead deliberate indifference. Although Plaintiff 

does not allege that Defendant Rojas knew of Plaintiff seizure condition before the 

seizure, he alleges that Defendant Rojas let go of Plaintiff when he seized on the stairs.

/ / / 

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Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff sufficiently pleads the subjective prong of 

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Rojas.

B. Plaintiff’s Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Failure to exhaust under the PLRA is “an affirmative defense the defendant must 

plead and prove.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 216. In the rare event that a failure to exhaust is 

clear on the face of the complaint, a defendant may move for dismissal under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Otherwise, defendants must produce evidence proving 

failure to exhaust in order to carry their burden. As the Ninth Circuit recently explained:

In a few cases, a prisoner’s failure to exhaust may be clear from 

the face of the complaint. However, such cases will be rare

because a plaintiff is not required to say anything about

exhaustion in his complaint. As the Court wrote in Jones,

“failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA,

and . . . inmates are not required to specially plead or

demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.” Id. at 216. But in

those rare cases where a failure to exhaust is clear from the face

of the complaint, a defendant may successfully move to dismiss

under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

Albino, 747 F.3d at 1169.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to 

his conditions of confinement claims against Defendants Casian and Rojas as he did not 

mention them by name in his grievances. (ECF. No 9-1 at 8.) Plaintiff responds with 

evidence that he exhausted his administrative remedies, that he identified Defendant 

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Rojas by name in his grievances,3and that he was excused from identifying Defendant 

Casian by name when he first filed his grievances because he did not know her name.4 

(ECF No. 9-1 at 8-9; ECF No. 14 at 7.)

More importantly, Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that he exhausted his 

administrative remedies. In the operative complaint, Plaintiff marked “Yes” in response 

to the question asking whether Plaintiff “previously sought and exhausted all forms of 

informal or formal relief from the proper administrative officials regarding the acts 

alleged” against Defendants. (ECF No. 1 at 10.) He also attaches to his complaint some 

pages from the grievance process, including pages that advise him that his administrative 

claims have been exhausted. (Id. at 16-25.) 

Based on the record before the Court, this is not one of the rare cases where failure 

to exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint. Therefore, Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss on this basis is denied. 

V. CONCLUSION

This Report and Recommendation to the United States District Judge William Q. 

Hayes, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1 of the United States 

 

3 Plaintiff explains that the copy of the grievance attached to the complaint does not show this fact 

because it was not copied and attached in its entirety. (See ECF No. 14 at 7.) 

4 The regulations contemplate and provide for the situation where an inmate may not have the 

identifying information required. In that situation, the regulations allow the inmate to “provide any 

other available information that would assist the appeals coordinator in making a reasonable attempt to 

identify the [correctional officer] in question.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15 § 3084.2(a)(3).

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District Court for the Southern District of California. For the reasons outlined above, IT 

IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss be DENIED and the 

Court issue an Order approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 10, 2015, any party to this action may 

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than August 17, 2015. The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

raise to objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 

445 (9th Cir. 1998).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 27, 2015

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