Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-00106/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-00106-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Granting Motion to Dismiss

P:\PRO-SE\SJ.JF\HC.06\Russell106_grant-mtd (untimely).wpd 1

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HERBERT RUSSELL, JR.,

Petitioner,

 vs.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA,

Respondent. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. C 06-0106 JF (PR)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION

TO DISMISS

(Docket No. 18)

Petitioner, a California prisoner, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his state conviction. Respondent has moved to

dismiss the petition as untimely. Petitioner has not filed an opposition. 

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was found guilty by a jury in Superior Court for the State of California

in and for the County of Santa Clara of assault with intent to commit rape. The jury

found true two prior strike convictions, and two prior serious felony convictions. 

Petitioner was sentenced to twenty-five years to life consecutive to ten years in state

prison. 

Case 5:06-cv-00106-JF Document 19 Filed 06/26/08 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Granting Motion to Dismiss

P:\PRO-SE\SJ.JF\HC.06\Russell106_grant-mtd (untimely).wpd 2

Petitioner appealed to the state court of appeal which affirmed the judgment in an

unpublished opinion. (Resp’t Mot. Ex. 1.) The California Supreme Court denied review

on January 14, 2004. (Id. Ex. 2.)

Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition on January 10, 2006. While the

instant federal petition was pending in this Court, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in

Santa Clara County Superior Court on April 17, 2006. The state habeas petition was

denied on May 16, 2006. (Id. Ex. 4.) 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) became

law on April 24, 1996, and imposed for the first time a statute of limitation on petitions

for a writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. Petitions filed by prisoners

challenging non-capital state convictions or sentences must be filed within one year of the

latest of the date on which: (1) the judgment became final after the conclusion of direct

review or the time passed for seeking direct review; (2) an impediment to filing an

application created by unconstitutional state action was removed, if such action prevented

petitioner from filing; (3) the constitutional right asserted was recognized by the Supreme

Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactive to

cases on collateral review; or (4) the factual predicate of the claim could have been

discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Time during

which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is

pending is excluded from the one-year time limit. Id. § 2244(d)(2).

A state prisoner with a conviction finalized after April 24, 1996, as in the case of

petitioner, ordinarily must file his federal habeas petition within one year of the date his

process of direct review came to an end. See Calderon v. United States District Court

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds by

Calderon v. United States District Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 

Case 5:06-cv-00106-JF Document 19 Filed 06/26/08 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Granting Motion to Dismiss

P:\PRO-SE\SJ.JF\HC.06\Russell106_grant-mtd (untimely).wpd 3

The one-year period generally will run from “the date on which the judgment became

final by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

“Direct review” includes the period within which a petitioner can file a petition for

a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, whether or not the petitioner

actually files such a petition. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Accordingly, if a petitioner fails to seek a writ of certiorari from the United States

Supreme Court, the AEDPA’s one-year limitations period begins to run on the date the

ninety-day period defined by Supreme Court Rule 13 expires. See Miranda v. Castro,

292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (where petitioner did not file petition for certiorari,

his conviction became final 90 days after the California Supreme Court denied review);

Bowen, 188 F.3d at 1159 (same). As the Eighth Circuit put it: “[T]he running of the

statute of limitations imposed by § 2244(d)(1)(A) is triggered by either (i) the conclusion

of all direct criminal appeals in the state system, followed by either the completion or

denial of certiorari proceedings before the United States Supreme Court; or (ii) if

certiorari was not sought, then by the conclusion of all direct criminal appeals in the state

system followed by the expiration of the time allotted for filing a petition for the writ.” 

Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 348 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1187

(1999). 

Since petitioner did not file a petition for certiorari, his conviction became final

ninety days after the California Supreme Court denied review on January 14, 2004, i.e.,

on April 13, 2004. Absent tolling, petitioner had one year, i.e., until April 13, 2005, to

file a federal habeas petition. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir.

2001) (calculating AEDPA’s one-year limitation period according to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 6(a)). The instant petition was not filed until January 10, 2006, however. 

It is untimely unless the limitation period was tolled for a substantial period of time.

///

///

Case 5:06-cv-00106-JF Document 19 Filed 06/26/08 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Order Granting Motion to Dismiss

P:\PRO-SE\SJ.JF\HC.06\Russell106_grant-mtd (untimely).wpd 4

B. Statutory Tolling

Section 2244(d)(2) tolls the one-year limitation period for the “time during which a

properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect

to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The

circumstances under which a state petition will be deemed “pending” for purposes of §

2244(d)(2) is a question of federal law. Welch v. Carey, 350 F.3d 1079, 1080 (9th Cir.

2003) (en banc). An application for collateral review is “pending” in state court “as long

as the ordinary state collateral review process is ‘in continuance’ – i.e., ‘until the

completion of’ that process.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219-20 (2002). In other

words, until the application has achieved final resolution through the State’s postconviction procedures, by definition it remains “pending.” Id. at 220. In California, this

means that the statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first state habeas petition is

filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge,

as long as the petitioner did not “unreasonably delay” in seeking review. Id. at 221-23. 

Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling because he did not seek collateral

review of his state conviction before filing the instant federal habeas petition. Nor is

Petitioner entitled to tolling for the period of time his state habeas petition was pending

before the state superior court, i.e., from April 17, 2006 to May 16, 2006, because a state

habeas petition filed after AEDPA’s statute of limitation ended cannot toll the limitation

period under § 2244(d)(2). See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir.

2003); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 2244(d)(2) cannot

“revive” the limitation period once it has run (i.e., restart the clock to zero); it can only

serve to pause a clock that has not yet fully run. “Once the limitations period is expired,

collateral petitions can no longer serve to avoid the statute of limitations.” Rashid v.

Kuhlmann, 991 F. Supp. 254, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 

Accordingly, the instant federal petition is untimely.

///

///

Case 5:06-cv-00106-JF Document 19 Filed 06/26/08 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely

(Docket No. 18) is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: JEREMY FOGEL 

United States District Judge

6/23/08

Case 5:06-cv-00106-JF Document 19 Filed 06/26/08 Page 5 of 5