Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06284/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06284-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROSIE BANKS, a minor, by and ) 

through her Guardian Ad Litem, ) 

ROBBIN BANKS, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

vs. )

 )

MODESTO CITY SCHOOLS DISTRICT, )

CITY OF MODESTO, PAULA LETINE, )

JIM PFAFF, JAMES C. ENOCHS, )

JOHN BYRON, MARY JACKSON, DAWN )

MELEAD, RED BALFOUR, MIKE )

HENDERSON, JULIE MYERS, ROY W. )

WASDEN, ERIN URQUHART, & DOES )

1 THROUGH 100, )

 )

Defendants. )

 )

 ) 

No. CV-F-04-6284 REC SMS

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR A

MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT.

(Doc. 12) 

On July 11, 2005, the Court heard Defendants’ motion to

dismiss or, in the alternative, for a more definite statement of

Plaintiff Rosie Banks’ Complaint. At that time, the Court

requested further filing from the parties regarding a settlement

agreement entered into by the parties. That information was

received on July 20, 2005. 

Upon due consideration of the written and oral arguments of

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the parties and the record herein, Defendants’ motions are

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as set forth below.

I. Factual Background

This case centers around the treatment of Plaintiff Rosie

Banks (“Plaintiff”) by school and police officials. At the time

of the alleged events, Plaintiff was thirteen years old and a

student in the Modesto City Schools District (“the District”). 

Plaintiff is mentally disabled; she has been diagnosed with

autism or an “autistic-like condition.” Plaintiff is also

African-American. Although she is learning disabled, Plaintiff

has made progress toward normal functioning on an academic level

and improving her ability to handle new events. 

Plaintiff was a student in the District for several years

before the events at issue occurred. As a disabled student,

Plaintiff, through her parents, requested and received from the

District an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) as required

by the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (“IDEA”). 

Pursuant to the IEP, meetings between Plaintiff, her parents and

District officials were periodically held. Plaintiff was

assessed and was progressing through the public school system in

the District. As part of her IEP, Plaintiff was assigned an aide

while at school. 

In September 2003, Plaintiff began the seventh grade at La

Loma Junior High School in Modesto. Plaintiff’s teacher was

Defendant Paula Lentine and Plaintiff was again assigned an aide,

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Defendant Dawn Melead. The District’s special education

director, Defendant Camille Taylor, was supposed to handle

Plaintiff’s transition to La Loma but failed to perform the

necessary tasks to ensure a smooth transition. 

On or about September 5, 2003, Plaintiff was in a new

classroom and was confronted with new sounds, new students and

some teasing. Plaintiff may have reacted in an aggressive

manner, which is predictable for someone with Plaintiff’s

disability. Defendant Melead did not react properly and

aggravated the situation. She brought Plaintiff to the school

office where she was mishandled by Defendants Red Balfour and

Mike Henderson, the principal and assistant principal, and

others. Defendant Officer Urquhart was also on the scene and

Plaintiff grew more aggressive when confronted by the officer.

Plaintiff alleges that Officer Urquhart had not received

proper training on how to handle persons with disabilities and

that, as a result, Officer Urquhart panicked and pepper-sprayed

Plaintiff in her face. Plaintiff alleges that this force was

excessive given the available options within the use of force

continuum.

Two other incidents occurred during September of 2003. 

During one incident, Defendant Lentine reminded Plaintiff of the

pepper-spray incident, which greatly upset Plaintiff. On

September 25, 2003, Plaintiff was taken from her classroom by

Defendant Balfour and Defendant Julie Myers, the other assistant

principal. Plaintiff begged Defendants Balfour and Myers not to

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see the police and she grew agitated upon seeing Officer

Urquhart. Officer Urquhart proceeded to handcuff Plaintiff,

which in addition to being humiliating, aggravated the situation.

Plaintiff was suspended from school after this incident. On

September 29, 2003, Plaintiff’s mother met with Defendant Mary

Jackson, the District’s SELPA Director, in an emergency IEP for

placement. Defendant Jackson had advised Plaintiff’s parents

that such a placement was necessary for Plaintiff to continue

receiving special education services. Plaintiff’s parents signed

the IEP under duress, having been told that if they did not, no

services would be provided to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff’s parents complained verbally about this action in

September and October of 2003. Plaintiff’s parents subsequently

complained about the District’s conduct in this regard by written

memo. Plaintiff’s parents asserted that Plaintiff was being

treated differently both because she is disabled and because she

is African-American. In October of 2003, Plaintiff’s father

wrote a memo to the District that was sent to the California

Department of Education. This memo detailed Plaintiff’s efforts,

through her parents, to obtain academic records and that those

efforts had been frustrated. Plaintiff’s father also informed

the District that it was out of compliance with the IEP, and a

copy of this notice was sent to the Department of Education. In

sum, Plaintiff’s parents made various complaints to the District

regarding Plaintiff’s treatment and situation through January of

2004. 

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While Plaintiff was a Modesto resident she and her mother

moved to Turlock during a temporary separation of Plaintiff’s

parents. District Defendants attempted to disqualify Plaintiff

as a student in the District based on her residency, despite the

fact that Plaintiff’s father resided in Modesto. Plaintiff

believes these efforts were in retaliation for the complaints

being made by Plaintiff, through her parents. 

District Defendants’ efforts to disqualify Plaintiff as a

student were successful. The District and its superintendent,

Defendant Jim Pfaff, “dropped” Plaintiff as a student and stopped

providing her with special education services as of December 5,

2003. Plaintiff’s parents exercised their due process rights and

filed a motion to allow Plaintiff to remain in the District. 

Plaintiff also demanded that she receive speech education five

days per week, counseling for the trauma she experienced at La

Loma three days per week, private tutoring, medical services and

home schooling.

Plaintiff and the District both filed actions with the

Special Education Hearing Office. On or about March 4, 2004, the

matters settled and a settlement agreement was signed. The terms

of the settlement are confidential, although it did not prohibit

the filing of a tort claim.

II. Procedural History

On September 20, 2004, Plaintiff filed her Complaint, which

alleges seven causes of action. The Complaint specifies that all

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 These are defined as Defendants Wasden, Jackson, Taylor, 1

Enoch and Pfaff. Compl. ¶ 40. 

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individual District Defendants are sued in their individual and

official capacities except for Defendants Wasden and Enochs, who

are specifically sued in only their official capacity. Compl. ¶¶

8, 13, 18.

The first cause of action is a section 1983 claim against

all Defendants and is based on violations of Plaintiff’s rights

under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 

Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants “ratified and condoned the

conduct of the individual defendants” and that the “supervisory

defendants set the official policies, customs, and practices for

the two municipal entities that were the moving force behind

Plaintiff’s constitutional injuries.” Compl. ¶ 37. Plaintiff

alleges that District Defendants retaliated against her for her

complaints about matters of public concern. Plaintiff also

alleges that Defendants failed to properly train, supervise and

otherwise prepare officers employed by the Modesto Police

Department to deal with disabled students such as Plaintiff. 

Compl. ¶ 37.

The second cause of action is a section 1983 claim against

those District Defendants considered “supervisory” and is based 1

on violations of Plaintiff’s rights under the First, Fourth,

Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. It repeats the

allegation in claim one that these defendants ratified the

conduct of other District Defendants and set the official

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policies, customs and practices that were the moving force behind

Plaintiff’s constitutional injuries. Compl. ¶ 40. 

The third cause of action is for violation of the Americans

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq., and

is against the District only. Plaintiff alleges that she is a

qualifying disabled person and that she was excluded from

participation in and denied benefits of the District’s services,

programs or activities. Plaintiff alleges that she was

discriminated against because of her disability or because of

complaints made by Plaintiff’s parents on her behalf.

The fourth cause of action is for violation of the

Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 794 et seq., and is against the

District only. Plaintiff alleges that she is disabled as defined

by the Act and that she was denied the reasonable accommodations

requested. These accommodations would not have required a

fundamental or substantial modification of the District’s

programs or standards. They also would have enabled Plaintiff to

meet the requirements of the District’s programs and would have

prevented Plaintiff’s suspension because the failure of the

District to reasonably accommodate Plaintiff led directly to her

outbursts and subsequent suspension.

The fifth cause of action is for intentional infliction of

emotional distress (“IIED”) and is against the individual

Defendants. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ conduct was

outrageous and caused Plaintiff emotional distress. Plaintiff

seeks punitive damages under this claim, alleging that the

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conduct was oppressive and malicious.

The sixth and seventh causes of action are for violation of

the California Constitution and various state statutes and for

assault and battery. They are against Officer Urquhart and Doe

Defendants only and are not at issue at this time.

The Complaint seeks general and compensatory damages,

punitive damages against the individually-named defendants,

interest, fees and costs. The Complaint also seeks injunctive

relief, as will be discussed infra.

The City of Modesto and Defendants Wasden and Urquhart filed

an answer to the Complaint. These parties have not joined in the

current motion.

District Defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the

alternative, for a more definite statement. Defendant Red

Balfour joined in this motion. See Doc. 23.

III. Legal Standards

A. Motion to Dismiss

Dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is proper

if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2

L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957). In testing the sufficiency of a complaint

against a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, a court must “accept all

material allegations in the complaint as true and construe them

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” North Star Int’l

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v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 580 (9th Cir. 1983). The

Court need not, however, “accept legal conclusions cast in the

form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot

reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult

Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 1994). 

A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law if there is

a lack of a cognizable legal theory or if there are insufficient

facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v.

Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). The

Court must determine whether or not it appears to a certainty

under existing law that no relief can be granted under any set of

facts that might be proved in support of a plaintiff’s claims. 

De La Crux v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 48 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.

denied, 441 U.S. 965, 99 S. Ct. 2416, 60 L. Ed. 2d 1072 (1979).

B. Motion For a More Definite Statement

Rule 12(e) allows for a motion for a more definite statement

if the pleading “is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot

reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(e). Motions for a more definite statement are

disfavored, but are within the Court’s discretion and may be

appropriate in certain situations. “[P]roper pleading under Rule

8 requires a pleading to contain allegations of each element of

the claim. If it does not, and if the deficiency is not so

material that the pleading should be dismissed under Rule

12(b)(6), a more definite statement is appropriate.” 2 Moore’s

Federal Practice, § 12.36[1] (Matthew Bender 3d ed.). However,

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“where the information sought by the moving party is available

and/or properly sought through discovery the motion [for a more

definite statement] should be denied.” Famolare, Inc. v. Edison

Bros. Stores, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 940, 950 (E.D. Cal. 1981).

III. Discussion

A. Fifth & Eighth Amendment Theories

Plaintiff concedes that her section 1983 claims fail to the

extent they are based on violation of her rights under the Fifth

and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution. None of

the District Defendants are federal actors to whom the Fifth

Amendment applies, see Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668,

687 (9th Cir. 1994), and Plaintiff was not arrested or subjected

to cruel and unusual punishment such that the Eighth Amendment

would apply. Id. To the extent claims one and two are based on

the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, they are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE as against all Defendants.

B. Eleventh Amendment & Capacity Issues

1. Claim One As Against the District

Plaintiff concedes that her claims for money damages under

section 1983 against the District are barred by the Eleventh

Amendment. See Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d

248, 251 (9th Cir. 1992). As a state agency, the District is not

a “person” within the meaning of section 1983. Will v. Michigan

Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). 

As the District is not subject to suit under section 1983,

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claim one is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as against the

District. 

2. Claims One and Two For Monetary Damages As Against

District Defendants Sued in Official Capacities

The Eleventh Amendment’s prohibition of money damages

applies both to entities and to individuals who are sued in their

official capacities. See Belanger, 963 F.2d at 251 (9th Cir.

1992); Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092,

1100 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000). To the extent claims one and two seek

monetary damages against the individual District Defendants sued

in their official capacities they are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

3. Claim Five As Against Individual District

Defendants Sued in Official Capacities

District Defendants argue that to the extent Plaintiff’s

fifth claim for relief is against the individual District

Defendants in their official capacities, it must be dismissed

with prejudice. As discussed in the previous section, money

damages are not available against individuals sued in their

official capacity. Under the Ex parte Young exception, suits

seeking prospective injunctive relief against individuals in

their official capacities for violations of federal statutory and

constitutional rights are permitted. Emma C. v. Eastin, 985 F.

Supp. 940, 946 n.8 (N.D. Cal. 1997). The exception does not,

however, apply to suits “seeking relief against state officials

for violations of state law.” Id. at 946. 

Claim five is a state law tort claim. Accordingly, to the

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extent claim five seeks monetary and injunctive relief against

the individual District Defendants sued in their official

capacities, it is prohibited. Claim five is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE as against the individual District Defendants sued in

their official capacities.

C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Regarding Special Education

Allegations

District Defendants argue that to the extent Plaintiff’s

section 1983, ADA and Rehabilitation act claims (one through

four) are based on certain special education allegations, they

must be dismissed because they fall within the Individuals with

Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) and require exhaustion of

administrative remedies, which District Defendants argue is

lacking. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies deprives a

court of subject matter jurisdiction. District Defendants

acknowledge that, to the extent Plaintiff’s claims are based on

physical violations and seek monetary relief, they are not within

the IDEA and do not require exhaustion.

1. The Exhaustion Requirement

A plaintiff is generally not required to exhaust

administrative remedies prior to seeking relief pursuant to the

Rehabilitation Act, see King v. County of Los Angeles, 633 F.2d

876, 879 (9th Cir. 1980), or Title II of the ADA, see Bogovich v.

Sandoval, 189 F.3d 999, 1002 (9th Cir. 1999). An exception to

this general rule is if a plaintiff is “seeking relief that is

also available” under the IDEA. The IDEA specifies that:

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Nothing in this title shall be construed to restrict or

limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available

under the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities

Act of 1990, Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,

or other Federal Laws protecting the rights of children

with disabilities, except that before the filing of a

civil action under such laws seeking relief that is

also available under this part, the procedure under

subsections (f) and (g) shall be exhausted to the same

extent as would be required had the action been brought

under this part.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (emphasis added). 

The purpose of the IDEA is to “ensure that all children with

disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public

education that emphasizes special education and related services

designed to meet their unique needs . . . [and] to ensure that

the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such

children are protected.” Robb v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 40, 308

F.3d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)). 

The IDEA provides procedural protections to this end in that: 

Parents are entitled to (1) examination of all relevant

records pertaining to evaluation and educational

placement of their child; (2) prior written notice

whenever the responsible educational agency proposes,

or refuses, to change the child’s placement; (3) an

opportunity to present complaints concerning any aspect

of the local agency’s provision of a free appropriate

public education; and (4) an opportunity for an

impartial due process hearing with respect to such

complaints.

Id. (citing Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311-12, 98 L. Ed. 2d 686,

108 S. Ct. 592 (1998)). “If a hearing is held by a state agency,

as is the case in California, any party dissatisfied with the

result may file a civil action.” Christopher S. v. Stanislaus

County Office of Educ., 384 F.3d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 2004). 

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 District Defendants have characterized these allegations as 2

separate “claims” and list these allegations as claims 4-10.

Defs.’ Reply at 2. To avoid confusing Plaintiff’s claims with her

causes of action/claims for relief, the court declines to follow

this labeling and will label these “special education allegations.”

Special education allegations one through seven correspond with

Defendants’ “claims” four through ten.

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Money damages are not a remedy available under the IDEA. Witte

v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 1271, 1275 (9th Cir. 1999). 

In Robb, 308 F.3d at 1049, the Ninth Circuit held that “a

plaintiff cannot avoid the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement merely

by limiting a prayer for relief to money damages.” The court

defined “available relief” to mean relief suitable to remedy the

wrong done and it may not necessarily be the relief sought by the

plaintiff. Id. The court stated that the “dispositive question

generally is whether the plaintiff has alleged injuries that

could be redressed to any degree by the IDEA’s administrative

procedures and remedies. If so, exhaustion is required.” Id. at

1050. If the determination of whether a remedy is available

under the IDEA is unclear, exhaustion is required so that

educational agencies are first given a chance to “ascertain and

alleviate the alleged problem.” Id. 

2. Plaintiff’s Special Education Allegations

Plaintiff states seven special education allegations2

regarding the District’s failure to meet her special education

needs: (1) Defendant Taylor did not adequately prepare for

Plaintiff’s transfer to La Loma, Compl. ¶ 20; (2) Plaintiff was

wrongfully deprived of most IEP-mandated services after September

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25, 2003, Compl. ¶ 27; (3) Plaintiff was wrongfully suspended,

Compl. ¶ 24; (4) Plaintiff’s parents were coerced into agreeing

to an improper emergency IEP, Compl. ¶ 24; (5) Plaintiff’s

parents were wrongfully refused access to Plaintiff’s school

records, Compl. ¶ 24; (6) efforts were made to wrongfully

disqualify Plaintiff from special education services based on

Plaintiff’s residency, Compl. ¶¶ 27-28; and (7) Plaintiff’s

special education services were wrongfully terminated on December

5, 2003. Compl. ¶ 28. 

3. Are Plaintiff’s Allegations Within the IDEA?

District Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s special education

allegations fall within the scope of IDEA remedies because they

can be redressed within the scheme of the IDEA. Defendants

assert that special education allegations one, two, three, four,

six and seven constitute complaints that Plaintiff was not

provided with appropriate special education services as required

by the IDEA. Defendants also argue that special education

allegation four, that Plaintiff’s parents were forced to sign an

emergency IEP, is a complaint that Plaintiff’s parents were not

allowed to participate meaningfully in Plaintiff’s special

education needs as provided by the IDEA. Defendants assert that

special education allegation five, that Plaintiff’s parents were

wrongfully refused Plaintiff’s school records, is a violation of

the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g), and can be redressed by the IDEA. 

Plaintiff argues in response that she is seeking remedies

other than those provided for in the IDEA in that her claims for

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injunctive relief relate only to her section 1983 claim and not

to her claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Both

arguments are unavailing. By its terms, section 1514(l) of the

IDEA applies to all federal statutes, including section 1983. 

Additionally, as the court held in Robb, the question is not

whether the remedy sought by Plaintiff is available under the

IDEA, but whether the claims can be redressed under IDEA. 

The Court agrees with Defendants that, with one exception,

Plaintiff’s special education allegations constitute injuries

that can be redressed within the IDEA. See generally, 20 U.S.C.

§ 1414(d) (regarding IEPs); Robb, 308 F.2d at 1049 (stating

procedural safeguards of the IDEA permit parental involvement and

that parents are entitled to review relevant records). Special

education allegations one, two, four, five, six and seven

specifically relate to Plaintiff’s special education program are

within the scope of IDEA remedies. 

The Court is unconvinced, however, that Plaintiff’s special

education allegation four, that she was wrongfully suspended,

falls within the scope of the IDEA. Defendants have cited no

authority for the proposition that a claim of wrongful suspension

is within the scope of IDEA. The wrongful suspension allegation

appears to have little if anything to do with Plaintiff’s rights

as a special education student versus her rights as a student

generally; construing the facts most favorably to the Plaintiff,

special education allegation four is outside the IDEA. 

To the extent the injuries alleged in Plaintiff’s special

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education allegations could have been redressed within the scope

of the IDEA, Plaintiff was required to exhaust her administrative

remedies before bringing a civil action. 

4. Settlement as Exhaustion

Plaintiff asserts that the confidential settlement agreement

between her parents on her behalf and the District Defendants

sufficed to exhaust her administrative remedies. District

Defendants argue that a hearing is required in order for

administrative remedies to be exhausted and that, because there

was a settlement, Plaintiff is not an “aggrieved” party entitled

to appeal. District Defendants also argue that even if the

settlement agreement were sufficient, parties cannot consent to

waive subject matter jurisdiction. 

The Ninth Circuit has not specifically addressed the issue

of whether a settlement agreement may be sufficient for

exhaustion in an IDEA case. Two district courts have reached

differing results. In Woods v. New Jersey Dep’t of Educ., 796 F.

Supp. 767, 776 (D.N.J. 1992), the parties reached a settlement

after the hearing had begun. The settlement agreement was

approved by an ALJ, who stated the settlement was voluntary,

fully disposed of all the issues, and was final and appealable. 

Id. The court stated that it had subject matter jurisdiction

under 20 U.S.C. § 1415 because the plaintiff was “aggrieved by

the findings and decision of the ALJ” in the settlement

agreement. In contrast, in Hamilton v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 993

F. Supp. 884, 890 (D. Ala. 1996), aff’d without opinion, 112 F.3d

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 Although a document outside the pleadings, consideration of 3

the settlement agreement is proper. See Branch v. Tunnel, 14 F.3d

449, 454-55 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that court may consider

documents whose contents are alleged in complaint on motion to

dismiss); Schwarzer, Tashima & Wagstaffe, Cal. Prac. Guide: Fed.

Civ. Pro. Before Trial § 9:85, p 9-21 (The Rutter Group 2005).

 Because 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) requires exhaustion “before the 4

filing of a civil action,” it would be inappropriate to grant leave

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1172 (11th Cir. 1997), the court found that a settlement

agreement was not tantamount to exhaustion. The court stated

that it was unlike the case in Woods because the settlement

agreement was entered into prior to any hearing being conducted

and was not approved by an ALJ.

In order to evaluate what, if any, effect the settlement

agreement in this case might have, the Court requested that the

parties submit a copy of the settlement agreement. The 3

agreement was submitted under seal and it unnecessary to disclose

the contents. As in Hamilton and unlike the case in Woods, the

settlement agreement in this case was not entered into after

hearings had begun and it was not approved of by an ALJ or other

official. Because no hearing was conducted as to Plaintiff’s

IDEA related issues, she is not an aggrieved party under the

statute and her administrative remedies have not been exhausted. 

See also Weber v. Cranston Sch. Comm., 212 F.3d 41, 53 (1st Cir.

2000) (finding that only hearing will exhaust administrative

remedies under IDEA). 

To the extent Plaintiff’s section 1983, ADA and

rehabilitation act claims are based on special education

allegations 1-3 and 5-7, they are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.4

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to amend in the event that Plaintiff subsequently exhausts her

administrative remedies.

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D. Plaintiff’s Remaining Federal Claims

To state a claim under section 1983 a plaintiff must allege

a deprivation of a federal or Constitutional right by a person

acting under color of state law. 18 U.S.C. § 1983. 

1. Substantive Due Process Violation- Claims One & Two

a. Behavior that Shocks the Conscience

District Defendants argue that the facts alleged are

insufficient to support a claim for violation of Plaintiff’s

substantive due process rights as asserted in the first and

second causes of action. District Defendants argue that the

pepper-spray and handcuffing actions in this case do not “shock

the conscience” so as to state a claim for violation of

substantive due process. District Defendants also argue that

even those allegations are sufficient to allege a due process

violation, they are not personally alleged against any of the

District Defendants and Plaintiff’s allegation of conspiracy is

insufficient.

Students have a constitutional right under the Fourteenth

Amendment to be free from violations of bodily integrity,

including “freedom from excessive physical abuse by school

employees.” Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th

Cir. 1997) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674, 51 L.

Ed. 2d 711, 97 S. Ct. 1401 (1977)). Although in Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443, 109 S. Ct. 1865

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(1989), the Supreme Court held that claims of excessive force are

to be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s objective

reasonableness standard, as recently as 2001 the Ninth Circuit

reiterated that claims not involving an arrest or custodial

situation and claims by students asserting the right to be free

of violations of bodily integrity remain within the purview of

the Fourteenth Amendment. Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 882

(9th Cir. 2001). 

The threshold question in a substantive due process claim is

“whether the behavior of the governmental officer is so

egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock to

contemporary conscience.” Id. at 882 n.7 (quoting County of

Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846, 140 L. Ed. 2d 1043, 118

S. Ct. 1708 (1998)).

The facts as alleged by Plaintiff that might, if proven, 

“shock the conscience” are as follows: the use of pepper-spray by

Officer Urquhart; the restraint of Plaintiff in handcuffs, also

by Officer Urquhart; the mishandling of Plaintiff by Defendants

Balfour and Henderson as they removed Plaintiff from her

classroom; the under-training and overreaction of Defendant

Melead, Plaintiff’s aide, to Plaintiff’s reaction to being teased

and in a new environment; the reminding of the pepper-spray

incident by Plaintiff’s teacher; and Defendants Balfour and

Myers’ ignoring of Plaintiff’s pleas not to see the police.

This conduct, at this stage in the litigation, is sufficient

to state a claim for a substantive due process violation. That

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school officials and/or a police officer working with school

officials would use pepper-spray and handcuffs to restrain a

thirteen year old mentally disabled child is shocking. The cases

cited by District Defendants, neither of which is binding

authority, in support of their argument that the behavior

complained of does not shock the conscience are not persuasive at

this point. Defs.’ Mot. at 9 (citing Costello v. Mitchell Pub.

Sch. Dist. 79, 266 F.3d 916, 919 (8th Cir. 2001); Abeyta v. Chama

Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., 77 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 1996)). 

Both were procedurally dissimilar; they involved motions for

summary judgment rather than dismissal. Both cases are also

factually distinguishable; they involved allegations of namecalling by teachers and other generally unprofessional behavior

that did not physically harm the students involved.

Where Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims fail as to this issue

is in the allegation of conspiracy. To state conspiracy

sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead

specific facts to support the existence of the alleged

conspiracy. Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir.

1989); Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621,

626 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that a “mere allegation of

conspiracy without factual specificity is insufficient”). The

Complaint makes the following allegations:

34. Plaintiff is informed and believes that the acts

by the individual defendants, as described above, were

part of an agreement or a concerted course of conduct,

with the goal being to harm or injury the plaintiff.

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35. Plaintiff was injured as a direct result of the

efforts by the individual defendants who acted in

furtherance of the conspiracy or agreement to damage or

injure Plaintiff.

Compl. ¶¶ 34-35. There are no factual allegations in the

Complaint to support the conspiracy allegation; indeed, the most

serious of the actions, the pepper-spray incident, is alleged by

Plaintiff to be the result of Officer Urquhart’s panicking, not

an agreement to harm Plaintiff. Compl. ¶ 22. 

If the allegations not personally alleged against District

Defendants are removed from the above equation, the remaining

allegations do not “shock the contemporary conscience” sufficient

to support a claim of a substantive due process violation. 

b. Failure to Protect

In her opposition Plaintiff puts forth an alternate theory

that is sufficiently pleaded. Section 1983 liability may lie

where there is an affirmative duty to protect on the part of the

defendant in a school abuse case. See Plumeau, 130 F.3d at 438

(upholding summary judgment where plaintiffs failed to show issue

of material fact regarding, inter alia, an “affirmative duty to

protect”); see also Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 699-700 (noting that

duty to protect may arise by virtue of a special relationship). 

Here, Plaintiff argues that District Defendants had a duty to

protect Plaintiff, a mentally disabled minor, from the use of

excessive force by Officer Urquhart because of their special

relationship with Plaintiff. District Defendants did not address

this issue in their reply. Plaintiff’s allegations regarding

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failure to protect are sufficient to state a substantive due

process claim.

In sum, to the extent claims one and two for violation of

Plaintiff’s substantive due process rights rely on the alleged

conspiracy to show behavior that shocks the conscience, the facts

alleged are insufficient and claims one and two are DISMISSED to

that extent. However, to the extent claims one and two are based

on the failure to protect theory, they are sufficient and the

motion to dismiss is DENIED. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend

her complaint to include facts regarding conspiracy and/or

behavior that “shocks the contemporary conscience.” 

2. Procedural Due Process Violation- Claims One & Two

District Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not

sufficiently pleaded a claim for a procedural due process

violation. Plaintiff did not specifically address this in her

opposition and it appears from the Complaint that Plaintiff is

raising a substantive due process claim only. Accordingly, to

the extent claims one and two are based on the violation of

Plaintiff’s procedural due process rights, they are DISMISSED

with leave to amend.

3. Equal Protection 

To state a claim for violation of the equal protection

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a plaintiff must allege that

she was treated differently from other similarly situated

persons. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,

439, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985); Willowbrook v.

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Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 145 L. Ed. 2d 1060, 120 S. Ct. 1073

(allowing for equal protection claim by “‘class of one’ where the

plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated

differently from others similarly situated and there is no

rational basis for the difference in treatment”) . 

The Complaint alleges that “Plaintiff through her parents

complained about the perception that Plaintiff was being treated

differently not only because she is disabled but also because she

is black, or African-American.” Compl. ¶ 24. District

Defendants argue that this assertion is insufficient because it

is based on a “perception” and does not allege “that any of the

actions taken by the Defendants occurred because of racial

animus.” While this allegation may not be as crystalline as

might be desired, given the liberal pleading standards and taking

the facts alleged in the Complaint as true, it can be inferred

from the statements made by Plaintiff’s parents and the facts in

the Complaint as a whole that Plaintiff was treated differently

based on her race and/or status as a disabled student. To the

extent Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims are based on an equal

protection theory, they are sufficient and District Defendants

motion to dismiss on this basis is DENIED.

In sum, District Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

section 1983 claims is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

4. Motion for a More Definite Statement

District Defendants argue that the Complaint is vague and

uncertain and object to Plaintiff’s reference to the first and

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fourteenth amendments “without clarification about which portions

of which Amendments are supposed to apply to which items on her

undifferentiated laundry list of fact allegations.” Defs.’ Reply

at 13. Defendants fail to cite a case in which such pleading was

found to be insufficient and admit that a Plaintiff is not

required to specify a particular legal theory. 

A motion for a more definite statement is inappropriate

here. It cannot be said that Plaintiff’s Complaint is “so vague

or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame

a responsive pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). The allegations

in the Complaint are sufficient to enable a defendant to, at the

very least, discern the general basis for Plaintiff’s claims and

frame a general denial.

E. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

To state a claim for IIED, a plaintiff must allege that “(1)

the defendant engaged in extreme or outrageous conduct with the

intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of

causing, severe emotional distress to the plaintiff; (2) the

plaintiff actually suffered severe or extreme emotional distress;

and (3) the outrageous conduct was the actual and proximate cause

of the emotional distress.” Ross v. Creel Pub. Co., Inc., 100

Cal. App. 4th 736, 744-45 (2002). “Outrageous conduct” is that

which is “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually

tolerated in a civilized community.” Id. at 745.

District Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s factual

allegations do not rise to the level of “extreme and outrageous”

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conduct required to state a claim for IIED, largely due to the

insufficiency of Plaintiff’s conspiracy allegation, discussed

supra. District Defendants do not cite any cases in which IIED

has or has not been sufficiently stated to contrast with

Plaintiff’s allegations.

 Here, Plaintiff’s teacher, Defendant Letine, taunted the

mentally disabled child about a traumatic incident, the use of

the pepper spray, and threatened Plaintiff with its repeated use. 

Other District Defendants threatened Plaintiff with seeing the

police and intentionally brought Plaintiff to Officer Urquhart a

second time despite her pleas not to see the police. 

Even ignoring the fact that Plaintiff was placed in

handcuffs at the hands of Officer Urquhart, at this stage in the

litigation, this sort of conduct, particularly by school

officials who are entrusted with the care of hundreds of

children, is sufficient to state a claim for IIED. Defendants’

motion to dismiss claim five as against the individual District

Defendants in their individual capacities is DENIED.

F. Injunctive Relief

District Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks standing to

seek the injunctive relief delineated in the Complaint. The

Complaint seeks an injunction in the form of an order requiring

Defendants: 1) stop all harassing acts aimed at Plaintiff and

persons affiliated with her; 2) retrain the individually named

defendants regarding the handling of disabled children; 3) cease

using real or implied threats of violence in police work; 4)

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terminate all of the individually named defendants with a history

of similar malfeasance; 5) permit Plaintiff to re-enter the

District and provide reasonable accommodation for her; 6) permit

Plaintiff’s parents reasonable access to their daughter, her

academic records within the District and her teacher and aides;

and 7) end the pattern or practice of retaliation against persons

who complain about the District or is employees. 

Standing to seek injunctive relief under Article III of the

Constitution requires that a party demonstrate an “injury that is

actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. In the

context of injunctive relief, the plaintiff must demonstrate a

real or immediate threat of an irreparable injury.” Hangarter v.

Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1021-22 (9th

Cir. 2004) (quoting Clark v. City of Lakewood, 259 F.3d 996, 1007

(9th Cir. 2001)). In Hangarter, the district court ordered the

defendants to “obey the law refrain from future violations,

including, but not limited to, targeting categories of claims or

claimants, employing biased medical examiners, destroying medical

reports, and withholding from claimants information about their

benefits.” Id. The Ninth Circuit reversed the injunction

because the plaintiff was not threatened by the defendant’s

conduct. Id. 

Here, District Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to

plead facts that support an inference that there are any on-going

violations of her own or her parents’ rights or that there is any

imminent threats of harm. Plaintiff did not respond to this

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argument in her opposition. The Court agrees with District

Defendants. Because Plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive

relief, her claims are DISMISSED with leave to amend to the

extent they seek injunctive relief.

Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims as against the individual

District Defendants in their official capacities rise and fall

with Plaintiff’s ability to seek injunctive relief, as money

damages are not available against those defendants. In her

amended Complaint Plaintiff may include the individual District

Defendants in her section 1983 claim only if she also requests

injunctive relief. 

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED that the motion for a more

definite statement is DENIED and the motion to dismiss is GRANTED

IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows:

To the extent they are based on violations of the Fifth and

Eighth Amendments, Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action

are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to all Defendants.

To the extent they seek injunctive relief, Plaintiff’s

causes of action are DISMISSED with leave to amend as to all

District Defendants.

To the extent they are based on special education

allegations 1-3 and 5-7, Plaintiff’s first, second, third and

fourth causes of action are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to

District Defendants.

As to Defendant District: Plaintiff’s first cause of action

is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

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As to individual District Defendants sued in their official

capacities: to the extent Plaintiff’s first and second causes of

action seek monetary relief they are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

and to the extent Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action

seek injunctive relief and are insufficiently alleged under the

Fourteenth Amendment as set forth above, they are DISMISSED with

leave to amend. 

As to individual District Defendants sued in their

individual capacities: to the extent Plaintiff’s first and second

causes of action are insufficiently alleged under the Fourteenth

Amendment as set forth above, they are DISMISSED with leave to

amend; Defendants’ motion to dismiss the fifth cause of action is

DENIED. To the extent Plaintiff’s first and second causes of

action are based on the First Amendment and the substantive due

process/equal protection components of the Fourteenth Amendment,

District Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED.

FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s amended complaint shall be

filed in 30 business days.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 9, 2005 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

ia40ij UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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