Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-04162/USCOURTS-ca10-15-04162-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 

---

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

DAVID JONES, 

Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

MIDLAND FUNDING; MIDLAND 

CREDIT MANAGEMENT; ENCORE 

CAPITAL GROUP; JOHNSON MARK, 

L.L.C., 

Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 15-4162 

 (D.C. No. 2: 15-CV-00121-DS) 

(D. Utah) 

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before HARTZ, O’BRIEN, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.

 

*

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

submitted without oral argument. 

This order and judgment is an unpublished decision, not binding precedent. 10th 

Cir. R. 32.1(A). Citation to unpublished decisions is not prohibited. Fed. R. App. 32.1. 

It is appropriate as it relates to law of the case, issue preclusion and claim preclusion. 

Unpublished decisions may also be cited for their persuasive value. 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). 

Citation to an order and judgment must be accompanied by an appropriate parenthetical 

notation B (unpublished). Id. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

July 19, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 15-4162 Document: 01019658985 Date Filed: 07/19/2016 Page: 1 
- 2 - 

David Jones appeals from the entry of summary judgment in favor of Midland 

Funding, LLC (Midland).1

 We affirm. 

I. Background 

Jones (allegedly) opened a credit card account with Citibank, N.A., on October 20, 

2004; he used the card to make purchases yet never repaid Citibank.2 On March 28, 

2013, Citibank sold the debt to Midland. At the time of the sale, the account balance was 

$8,465.72. On December 4, 2013, Midland filed suit against Jones in Utah state court to 

recover $8,465.72 plus post-judgment interest. That lawsuit remains pending. 

Jones filed the current lawsuit against Midland alleging violations of the Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p. He alleged it violated §§ 

1692e(2)(A) and 1692f(1) by falsely representing the amount of the debt and seeking to 

collect interest and attorney fees not authorized by the debt agreement. 

Midland filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Relevant here, it 

argued Jones had not demonstrated that it had increased the amount of the debt. It 

presented the affidavit of Aimee Dykes, a Citibank employee, who reviewed Citibank’s 

 

1

 Jones also sued Midland’s parent corporation, an affiliate, and its law firm. For 

simplicity purposes we refer only to Midland. 

Because Jones appears pro se, we have liberally construed his pro se filings, 

stopping short however of serving as his advocate. Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 

n.1 (10th Cir. 2008). 

2

 Jones “does not recall” opening a credit card account with Citibank and denies 

owing any money. (R. Vol. 1 at 41.) He admits though that in late 2007 he received two 

letters from NCO Financial Systems, Inc., referencing the same credit card account 

number and stating he owed $8,163.18 and $8,371.57 ($8,163.18 plus $208.39 in 

interest), respectively. 

Appellate Case: 15-4162 Document: 01019658985 Date Filed: 07/19/2016 Page: 2 
- 3 - 

records. Those records revealed that when Citibank sold the debt on Jones’s account to 

Midland in March 2013, the amount owing was $8,465.72. According to Midland, the 

fact Jones had received collection letters six years earlier (in 2007) indicating a lower 

amount, see supra n.2, did not show that it misrepresented the amount owed. It also 

argued it was not seeking attorney’s fees or prejudgment interest in the state court lawsuit 

even though the credit card agreement and Utah law allowed it to do so. To that end, it 

attached the state court complaint and the credit card agreement. 

Because Midland presented materials outside the complaint, the district judge 

converted its motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Although the judge 

acknowledged that notice must normally be given to the parties before such conversion to 

prevent unfair surprise, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d), he decided no such notice was 

necessary because Jones himself had presented matters outside the pleadings in response 

to the motion. Relying on those materials, the judge concluded Midland was entitled to 

summary judgment because, inter alia, (1) the state court complaint and the 2007 

collection letters all showed Midland was not seeking attorney’s fees; (2) the credit card 

agreement, which Jones himself relied upon in state court to seek arbitration, clearly 

authorized interest; and (3) Dykes’s affidavit stated that when Citibank sold the account 

to Midland, the amount owing was $8,465.72, the exact amount Midland was seeking in 

the state court lawsuit. 

II. Discussion 

Jones argues the judge erred in not providing notice to the parties prior to 

Appellate Case: 15-4162 Document: 01019658985 Date Filed: 07/19/2016 Page: 3 
- 4 - 

converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Even assuming 

conversion was appropriate, he says entry of summary judgment in Midland’s favor was 

not. 

“We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to consider 

evidence beyond the pleadings and convert a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary 

judgment.” Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 654 (10th 

Cir. 2002). We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Id. at 655. Summary 

judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a). 

Jones argues he was prejudiced by the judge’s decision to convert the motion to 

dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Had he known the judge was going to do 

so, he claims he would have responded differently to the motion including filing a Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(d) affidavit seeking additional discovery. But Jones himself filed materials 

outside the pleadings in response to the motion to dismiss and therefore cannot now claim 

conversion was unfair or a surprise. See Arnold v. Air Midwest, Inc., 100 F.3d 857, 859 

n.2 (10th Cir. 1996) (a plaintiff who “submitted material beyond the pleadings in 

opposition to defendants’ motion [to dismiss] . . . is scarcely in a position to claim unfair 

surprise or inequity”); see also Lamb v. Rizzo, 391 F.3d 1133, 1137 n.3 (10th Cir. 2004) 

(“Mr. Lamb does not and cannot claim that the absence of notice prejudiced him. Mr. 

Lamb not only failed to object to the exhibits attached to Mr. Rizzo’s motion to dismiss, 

Appellate Case: 15-4162 Document: 01019658985 Date Filed: 07/19/2016 Page: 4 
- 5 - 

but Mr. Lamb also filed his own exhibits in response.”) (citation omitted). Indeed, he 

acknowledged in his response to the motion that the motion “is in all respects, a Motion 

for Summary Judgment, disguised as a Motion to Dismiss . . . .” (R. Vol. 1 at 86.) He 

also fails to inform us what additional discovery he would have performed or how such 

additional discovery would have made a difference in the outcome. We see no abuse of 

discretion. 

Jones also argues the judge erred in awarding summary judgment to Midland 

because the amount of debt, a material fact, remains disputed. His complaint on appeal is 

narrow. He does not contest the amount of the debt at the time it was purchased by 

Midland3

 and he acknowledges the credit card agreement allows for the collection of 

interest. He complains only that Midland does not know the interest rate and the credit 

card agreement does not specify it. But the FDCPA only prohibits a debt collector from 

collecting interest not authorized by the debt agreement. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1). It 

does not require a debt collector to specify the interest rate; the debt collector need only 

“tell the debtor the bottom line.” See Hahn v. Triumph P’ships LLC, 557 F.3d 755, 757 

(7th Cir. 2009) (stating “a debt collector need not break out principal and interest . . . [s]o 

[the debt collector] could have sent [the debtor] a letter demanding payment of $1,134.55 

without saying where this figure came from”). 

 

3

 Because he does not dispute this issue, Jones’s arguments concerning the 

admissibility of Dykes’s affidavit are irrelevant and we need not address them. Her 

affidavit spoke only to this issue. 

Appellate Case: 15-4162 Document: 01019658985 Date Filed: 07/19/2016 Page: 5 
- 6 - 

AFFIRMED. Jones’s motion for sanctions against Midland and its attorney is 

DENIED. While the district judge granted Jones’s request to proceed on appeal without 

prepaying fees (in forma pauperis), only prepayment is excused. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). Jones is still required to pay all filing ($5.00) and docketing fees ($500.00). 

Payment must be made to the Clerk of the District Court. 

Entered by the Court: 

Terrence L. O’Brien 

United States Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 15-4162 Document: 01019658985 Date Filed: 07/19/2016 Page: 6