Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-03007/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-03007-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 47:227 Telephone Consumer Protection Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

E-Filed 5/4/16

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALAN BRINKER,

Plaintiff,

v.

NORMANDIN'S, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-03007-EJD (HRL)

ORDER ENFORCING PRIOR 

DISCOVERY ORDER

INTERIM ORDER ON MOTION FOR 

SANCTIONS

Re: Dkt. No. 86

On January 22, 2016, the court resolved Discovery Dispute Joint Report 1 (“DDJR 1”) by 

ordering Defendant Normandin’s to produce certain documents by February 20, 2016. Dkt. No. 

73. Plaintiff Alan Brinker (“Brinker”) asserts that Normandin’s failed to produce the documents it 

was ordered to produce; Brinker therefore filed a motion for enforcement of the discovery order 

and for sanctions. Dkt. No. 86. Brinker asks that the court order the production of “the overdue 

documents” within 10 days of the court issuing an enforcement order. Dkt. No. 86 at 5. Brinker 

also requests that Normandin’s be ordered to pay, as sanctions, $20,725 worth of Brinker’s 

attorney fees.

Normandin’s has filed no response to the motion and the deadline for filing a response has 

expired. The lack of opposition persuades the undersigned that Normandin’s has violated the 

court’s order on DDJR 1. Accordingly, the undersigned is persuaded that Normandin’s should be 

ordered to produce the documents at issue in DDJR 1, to do so in the manner previously ordered 

by the court when it resolved DDJR 1, and to complete the production of those documents within 

ten days. See Dkt. No. 73 at 5.

The court sees several deficiencies, however, with Brinker’s attorney-fees request. Brinker 

has the burden to show its requested hourly fee rates are “in line with the prevailing market rate” 

in this district. See Carson v. Billings Police Department, 470 F.3d 889, 891 (9th Cir. 2006) 

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(citation omitted). The declaration of A. Janay Ferguson (“Ferguson”) supports the requested fee 

rates merely by stating that Brinker’s lawyers have used “a variety of factors” to set reasonable 

rates—this provides no details that might permit the court to review whether Brinker’s hourly fee 

rates are in line with the prevailing market rate in this district. See Dkt. No. 87 at 3. The 

undersigned also advises Brinker that ordinarily a litigant must prove the “market rate” with other 

evidence “in addition to” the declaration of an attorney whose own fee rate is at issue. See Blum v. 

Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.11 (1984).

Similarly, Ferguson does not describe who did what, and when, with sufficient specificity.

Attorney fees should be awarded only for time “reasonably expended on the” case. Camacho v. 

Bridgeport Financial, Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Ferguson’s 

declaration summarizes, for each attorney, the set of tasks for which compensation is requested

and the number of hours billed, altogether, for the completion of those tasks. Dkt. No. 87 at 4. 

This summary does not permit the court to review whether a reasonable amount of time was 

devoted to any particular task. Likewise, absent information about when Brinker’s lawyers 

worked on any given task, the court has no meaningful opportunity to review which particular fees 

might be compensable due to being “caused” by a preceding violation of the order on DDJR 1. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). The undersigned also notes, as a final concern, that the stated 

number of hours billed for the work of Adrienne D. McEntee (“McEntee”) is too low to account 

for the $8,872.50 billed for McEntee’s work, Dkt. No. 87 at 4; it seems likely that Ferguson 

intended to report whatever number of billed hours would justify McEntee’s total fees, but the 

undersigned will not act based on a calculation of what Ferguson probably intended to report.

Conclusion

The court vacates the hearing on Brinker’s motion. The undersigned is persuaded, due to 

the lack of opposition, that Normandin’s violated the court’s order on DDJR 1. The court 

therefore orders Normandin’s to produce the documents that it was previously ordered to produce

and to do so in the manner previously ordered. Dkt. No. 73 at 5. The court also orders 

Normandin’s to comply with this order no later than May 14, 2016.

The undersigned, as discussed above, sees several deficiencies in Brinker’s request for 

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sanctions. The court therefore defers its ruling on that portion of the motion and orders Brinker to

file, no later than May 13, 2016, a statement responsive to the court’s concerns. The statement 

shall be supported as necessary by additional declarations. Brinker shall also submit the billing 

records summarized in Ferguson’s declaration. The court, if appropriate, shall set a new hearing 

on the motion after Brinker submits its statement in response to this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 5/4/16

HOWARD R. LLOYD

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 5:14-cv-03007-EJD Document 103 Filed 05/04/16 Page 3 of 3