Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_11-cv-02458/USCOURTS-cand-5_11-cv-02458-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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Case No. 11-CV-2458-LHK

ORDER DENYING CLAIMS 1, 6, AND 7

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DELANEY GERAL MARKS,

Petitioner,

v.

RON DAVIS, Warden, California State 

Prison at San Quentin,

Respondent.

Case No. 11-cv-02458-LHK 

ORDER DENYING CLAIMS 1, 6, AND 7

Re: Dkt. Nos. 62 & 63

In 1994, Petitioner Delaney Geral Marks (“Petitioner”) was convicted of two counts of 

first degree murder with personal use of a firearm, and two counts of attempted premeditated 

murder and infliction of great bodily injury, and sentenced to death. On December 14, 2011, 

Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before this Court. 

On June 25, 2015, this Court issued an Order denying Claims 2, 3, and 5 in Petitioner’s 

federal habeas petition. This Order addresses Claims 1, 6, and 7. For the reasons discussed 

below, Claims 1, 6, and 7 are DENIED.

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background1

On October 17, 1990, Petitioner entered a Taco Bell restaurant in Oakland, California. 

After ordering, he shot employee Mui Luong in the head. Luong survived the shooting but 

remained in a persistent vegetative state. Petitioner then entered the Gourmet Market, not far from 

the Taco Bell. There, he shot John Myers and Peter Baeza. Baeza died at the scene but Myers 

survived. Later that evening, Petitioner and his girlfriend, Robin Menefee, took a cab driven by 

Daniel McDermott. Petitioner shot and killed McDermott. Marks, 31 Cal. 4th at 204–06.

Petitioner was arrested shortly after McDermott was shot. Lansing Lee, a criminalist, 

testified at trial with “virtual absolute certainty” that the bullets that shot Baeza and Myers came

from Petitioner’s gun. Id. at 207. Lee also testified that his analysis “indicated” that the bullet 

that shot McDermott came from Petitioner’s gun and “suggested” that the bullet that injured 

Luong also came from the same source. Id. Eyewitness testimony also identified Petitioner as the 

shooter. Id. at 206–07. Petitioner testified and denied all of the shootings. Id. at 207. The 

defense also presented evidence that Petitioner’s hands did not test positive for gunshot residue. 

Id. at 208. On April 24, 1994, the jury convicted Petitioner of two counts of first degree murder 

with personal use of a firearm, and two counts of attempted premeditated murder with personal 

use of a firearm and infliction of great bodily injury. 

During the penalty phase, the prosecutor presented in aggravation evidence of Petitioner’s 

past violent conduct, including incidents of domestic violence and violent conduct while 

incarcerated. Id. at 208–10. The prosecutor also presented evidence of the effect of the murders 

on the families of the victims. Id. at 210–11. In mitigation, Petitioner testified as to his history of 

 

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 The following facts are taken from the California Supreme Court’s opinion on direct appeal. 

See People v. Marks, 31 Cal. 4th 197, 203–14 (2003). “Factual determinations by state courts are 

presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 

537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). 

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ORDER DENYING CLAIMS 1, 6, AND 7

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seizures. Id. at 212. Other witnesses testified that Petitioner had grown up in a strong family 

environment, and had not engaged in problematic behavior until he was discharged from the army 

and began using drugs. Id. at 212–13. Petitioner’s daughter testified that Petitioner had never hit 

her, and that she saw him regularly when he was not incarcerated. Id. at 213. On May 6, 1994, 

the jury set the penalty for the capital crimes at death. Id. at 203. 

B. Procedural History

On July 24, 2003, the California Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence on 

direct appeal. People v. Marks, 31 Cal. 4th 197 (2003). Petitioner filed a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court, and on March 16, 2005, that Court ordered 

Respondent to show cause in the Alameda County Superior Court why the death sentence should 

not be vacated and Petitioner re-sentenced to life without parole on the ground that he was 

intellectually disabled within the meaning of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), which held 

that intellectually disabled individuals may not be executed. The California Supreme Court 

denied the remaining claims in the petition. 

The Alameda County Superior Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the issue of 

Petitioner’s alleged intellectual disability. On June 13, 2006, the Superior Court denied his 

petition, and found that Petitioner had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is 

intellectually disabled within the meaning of Atkins. On August 14, 2006, Petitioner filed a 

further petition for writ of habeas corpus on the issue of his intellectual disability. The petition 

was denied by the California Supreme Court on December 15, 2010. 

On December 14, 2011, Petitioner filed his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in this 

Court. ECF No. 3. The parties subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment on 

Claims 2, 3, and 5. ECF Nos. 37–38. The claims were denied and summary judgment in favor of 

Respondent granted pursuant to an Order filed on June 25, 2015. ECF No. 52. 

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ORDER DENYING CLAIMS 1, 6, AND 7

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Now before the Court are Claims 1, 6, and 7. Petitioner filed his opening brief on the 

merits as to Claims 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 on December 15, 2015. ECF No. 63. Respondent 

filed his reply to Petitioner’s merits briefing as to these claims on February 12, 2016. ECF No. 65. 

Similarly, Respondent filed his merits briefing as to these claims on December 15, 2015. ECF No. 

62. Petitioner filed his response to Respondent’s merits briefing as to these claims on February 

11, 2016. ECF No. 64. The Court will address Claims 4, 8, 9, 10, and 11 in separate orders.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d))

Because Petitioner filed his original federal habeas petition in 2011, the Anti-Terrorism and 

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) applies to the instant action. See Woodford v. 

Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 210 (2003) (holding that AEDPA applies whenever a federal habeas 

petition is filed after April 24, 1996). Pursuant to AEDPA, a federal court may grant habeas relief 

on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court only if the state court’s adjudication “(1) 

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted 

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

1. Contrary To or Unreasonable Application of Clearly Established Federal 

Law

As to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” prongs 

have separate and distinct meanings. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000) (“Section 

2254(d)(1) defines two categories of cases in which a state prisoner may obtain federal habeas 

relief with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court.”). A state court’s decision is 

“contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to 

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that reached by [the U.S. Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case 

differently than [the U.S. Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 

412–13. A state court’s decision is an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal 

law if “the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle . . . but unreasonably applies 

that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A]n unreasonable application of 

federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 

U.S. 86, 101 (2011). A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit is not unreasonable “so 

long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on [its] correctness.” Id. (quoting Yarborough v. 

Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).

Holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision are the sole 

determinant of clearly established federal law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. Although a district 

court may “look to circuit precedent to ascertain whether [the circuit] has already held that the 

particular point in issue is clearly established by Supreme Court precedent,” Marshall v. Rodgers, 

133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013) (per curiam), “[c]ircuit precedent cannot refine or sharpen a general 

principle of [U.S.] Supreme Court jurisprudence into a specific legal rule,” Lopez v. Smith, 135 S. 

Ct. 1, 4 (2014) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2. Unreasonable Determination of the Facts

In order to find that a state court’s decision was based on “an unreasonable determination 

of the facts,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a federal court “must be convinced that an appellate panel, 

applying the normal standards of appellate review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding 

is supported by the record before the state court,” Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 778 (9th Cir. 

2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] state-court factual determination is not 

unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion 

in the first instance.” Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15 (2013). That said, “where the state courts 

plainly misapprehend or misstate the record in making their findings, and the misapprehension 

goes to a material factual issue that is central to petitioner’s claim, that misapprehension can 

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fatally undermine the fact-finding process, rendering the resulting factual finding unreasonable.” 

Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004).

To determine whether a petitioner is entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) or 

§ 2254(d)(2), a federal court’s review “is limited to the record that was before the state court that 

adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). In the event 

that a federal court “determine[s], considering only the evidence before the state court, that the 

adjudication of a claim on the merits resulted in a decision contrary to or involving an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or that the state court’s decision was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts,” the federal court evaluates the petitioner’s 

claim de novo. Hurles, 752 F.3d at 778. If error is found, habeas relief is warranted if that error 

“had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993). Petitioners “are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial 

error unless they can establish that it resulted in ‘actual prejudice.’” Id. at 637 (quoting United 

States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)).

B. Federal Evidentiary Hearing (28 U.S.C. § 2254(e))

Under Cullen v. Pinholster, habeas review under AEDPA “is limited to the record that was 

before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” 563 U.S. at 180–81. The Ninth 

Circuit has recognized that Pinholster “effectively precludes federal evidentiary hearings” on 

claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 

2013); see also Sully v. Ayers, 725 F.3d 1057, 1075 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Although the Supreme Court 

has declined to decide whether a district court may ever choose to hold an evidentiary hearing 

before it determines that § 2254(d) has been satisfied, an evidentiary hearing is pointless once the 

district court has determined that § 2254(d) precludes habeas relief.”) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Claim 1

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In Claim 1, Petitioner argues that he was involuntarily medicated with medically 

inappropriate drugs and without medical necessity prior to and during his competency and capital 

murder trials. According to Petitioner, the forced medication violated his rights to due process and 

to a fair trial. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134–38 (1992). This claim was rejected on 

the merits by the California Supreme Court in a postcard denial. 

The parties do not dispute that, during his pre-trial incarceration, Petitioner was prescribed 

medication (Mysoline) for seizures. Petitioner does not deny that he sought treatment for seizures. 

(AG022139.) Petitioner also requested a prescription for Vistaril, to counteract symptoms such as 

nausea that he maintained were caused by his seizures. (AG022247–49.) 

Petitioner cannot establish, however, that he was forcibly administered medication in 

violation of clearly established federal law. Absent a substantial showing, the state may not 

involuntarily administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally-ill defendant facing serious criminal 

charges in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 

166, 179 (2003). Here, however, Petitioner willingly took medication that was prescribed for his 

seizure condition. Furthermore, as discussed below, he was not prescribed antipsychotic 

medications. 

The record confirms that Petitioner himself sought treatment for his seizures. 

(AG022139.) The parties stipulated during Petitioner’s competency trial that he had been 

diagnosed with a seizure disorder in 1988. (AG011222–23.) In 1990, physicians at Highland 

Hospital also diagnosed Petitioner as suffering from complex grand mal seizures. (AG011309–

10.) Mysoline is an anticonvulsant, and prescribed to control grand mal and epileptic seizures. 

(AG023104–05.) Vistaril is indicated to treat nausea, and Petitioner himself requested medication 

to control his nausea. (AG022247–49.) There is absolutely no evidence, however, that Petitioner 

was ever administered antipsychotic medications. In addition, there is no evidence that, prior to 

January 22, 1994, Petitioner was ever prescribed medication that he did not request.

Petitioner does allege that on January 21, 1994, the day before his criminal trial, he stated 

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that he no longer wanted to take Mysoline, but that the prescription was renewed the next day and 

that he took Mysoline during the criminal trial. The portions of the record cited by Petitioner, 

however, do not appear to support this claim. Petitioner cites to AG022184 and AG022193, both 

of which are reports of Petitioner’s follow up visits to medical services while incarcerated. 

AG022193 is dated March 2, 1993, not January 21, 1994, and does not indicate that Petitioner did 

not want to take Mysoline. 

AG022184 is dated January 21, 1994. That report, however, does not state that Petitioner 

specifically did not want to take Mysoline or Vistaril. It does state that Petitioner had “[m]any 

physical complaints and doesn’t want Rx.” In addition, the report states that no medication was 

prescribed. (AG022184.) Petitioner also cites to AG023109–10, which is part of Dr. Pablo 

Stewart’s (one of Petitioner’s experts) declaration dated October 21, 2002. Dr. Stewart avers that 

“Mr. Marks’s records reflect his desire not [sic] be medicated in January 1994, but the medication 

was resumed the following day.” The declaration, however, does not cite to any portion of the 

record. 

Assuming that the January 21, 1994 report’s statement that Petitioner had “[m]any 

physical complaints and doesn’t want Rx” was a statement that Petitioner no longer wanted to take 

Mysoline and Vistaril, there is no clear evidence in the record that Petitioner was nonetheless 

prescribed Mysoline and took it during the trial. The January 21, 1994 report states that no 

medication was prescribed. (AG022184.) Again, Petitioner cites to Dr. Stewart’s declaration in 

support of his claim that medication was continued on January 22, 1994, but the declaration does 

not cite to any portion of the record. 

Petitioner also cites to four pages of Physicians’ Orders in support of his claim that 

Petitioner was medicated starting on January 22, 1994. (AG022343–46.) The Court has reviewed 

the Physicians’ Orders, and they do not support Petitioner’s claims. The Physicians’ Orders are 

difficult to read, and in some places the handwriting is illegible and/or impossible to decipher due 

to the faded quality of the photocopies. Neither party has provided a clear copy or transcription. 

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None of the listed dates appear to be January 22, 1994. Primidone (another name for Mysoline) 

was listed on the dates of March 22, 1994 and on an illegible date in February 1994. (AG022343.) 

Disalcid (an anti-inflammatory indicated for pain) was also noted2on at least two days. 

(AG022344.) While the trial was still taking place in February and March 1994, these records do 

not confirm that Petitioner actually took any medication during that time. More importantly, they 

do not indicate that any medication he may have taken was forced upon him in violation of clearly 

established federal law. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 179. 

Petitioner’s medical records do confirm that, numerous times, he refused recommended 

treatment or medication, and he signed releases confirming his refusal. (AG022174, AG023645, 

AG023646.) The presence of these releases tends to suggest that Petitioner did not hesitate to 

inform medical staff when he did not want to accept the recommended treatment. Moreover, the 

releases indicate that the medical staff acknowledged and confirmed his refusal, and did not 

proceed with the recommended treatment. 

In addition, at least some medical records state that Petitioner was not prescribed 

medication during the trial. On February 4, 1994, for example, Petitioner visited a prison medical 

clinic and the notes from that visit state that Petitioner had “[n]o current medication.” 

(AG022183.) Furthermore, notes from a February 18, 1994 visit state “[n]o current prescribed.” 

(AG022182.) Taken in their entirety, the medical records do not support Petitioner’s allegation 

that he was forced to take Mysoline over his stated objections, and thus Petitioner cannot 

demonstrate that the California Supreme Court’s denial of this claim was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence before it. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In 

order to show he is entitled to relief under AEDPA, Petitioner must show that the state court’s 

decision was not only wrong, but unreasonable “beyond any possibility for fair-minded 

disagreement.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786. This Petitioner cannot do. 

 

2

 It is unclear from the notations if the medication was actually prescribed at that time, or referred 

to medication Petitioner had been previously prescribed. 

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Petitioner also argues that he was prescribed inappropriate medication because he did not 

actually have a seizure disorder, and that the inappropriate medication contributed to his inability 

to rationally assist counsel. In support of this argument, Petitioner relies primarily on the 

testimony of Dr. Pablo Stewart, a psychiatrist retained post-conviction. In his declaration, Dr. 

Stewart avers that in his opinion, Petitioner did not have a seizure disorder, and that any beliefs 

held by Petitioner that he had a seizure disorder were “delusional.” Furthermore, Dr. Stewart 

states that Petitioner’s experience of seizures was actually hallucinations and delusional ideation. 

(AG023106–07.) As a result, Dr. Stewart maintains that treatment with a powerful anticonvulsant 

such as Mysoline was inappropriate. (AG023106–07.)

To begin with, the Court notes that Dr. Stewart is neither a neurologist nor a specialist in 

seizure disorders. In addition, Dr. Stewart did not perform a full medical examination of 

Petitioner, but rather conducted a “clinical interview” with Petitioner, years after he had been 

diagnosed with and treated for a seizure disorder. (AG023103.)3 

In contrast to Dr. Stewart’s opinion, substantial evidence in the record supports the 

conclusion that Petitioner suffered from a seizure disorder. The parties stipulated in 1992, during 

pre-trial proceedings, that Petitioner had been diagnosed with a seizure disorder in 1988. 

(AG011222.) In addition, Petitioner was diagnosed by physicians at Highland Hospital in 1990 as 

suffering from seizures; he was subsequently prescribed anticonvulsants. (AG011309–10.) 

Petitioner experienced seizures in jail that were observed by jail staff and other inmates. 

(AG10775, AG010810-811, AG010890-91, AG011030.) 

Moreover, Petitioner’s own medical experts testified that Petitioner had a seizure disorder. 

Dr. Fred Rosenthal, a psychiatrist who testified on Petitioner’s behalf at his competency trial, 

confirmed that Petitioner had a seizure disorder and a “fairly long history of seizures.” 

 

3

 While Dr. Stewart’s declaration does not specify the date of his clinical interview with 

Petitioner, his declaration was executed on October 21, 2002. (AG023110.) Based on Dr. 

Stewart’s statement that he interviewed Petitioner (who was born on August 15, 1956) when 

Petitioner was 45, the interview likely occurred in 2001. 

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(AG010592, AG010596, AG010600.) Dr. Jules Burstein, a defense expert who argued that 

Petitioner was not competent to stand trial, also confirmed that Petitioner had a seizure disorder 

and that he was not malingering. (AG011310–12.) Dr. Karen Gudiksen, a defense witness and 

psychiatrist at the Santa Rita jail, also testified as to Petitioner’s seizures. (AG0108884, 

AG010891, AG011030.) 

Based on this record, Petitioner cannot establish that the state court’s decision denying his 

claim was unreasonable. Given Petitioner’s diagnoses of seizure disorder, his seizures while 

incarcerated, and the testimony of his own experts, it would not have been unreasonable for the 

California Supreme Court to have found that Petitioner was properly diagnosed with, and 

medicated for, a seizure disorder. 

Finally, Petitioner argues that even if he did consent to the medication, he was not properly 

informed about the risks and benefits of the medication. In support of this argument, Petitioner 

relies on Benson v. Terhune, 304 F.3d 874, 884 (9th Cir. 2002), where the Ninth Circuit held that a 

pretrial detainee had a right to “refuse unwanted medical treatment and receive sufficient 

information to exercise those rights intelligently.”

In Benson, the petitioner, a female inmate, had been administered a number of medications 

for a variety of ailments. Id. at 877–78. She consented to the medications, but maintained that she 

had not been properly informed about the risks and benefits of the medication. Id. The Ninth 

Circuit found that the record confirmed that the petitioner had been aware of her right to refuse 

medication, because petitioner utilized this right several times during her detention. Id. at 885. 

Accordingly, the Circuit found that because petitioner was capable of refusing treatment or asking 

for more information, “the jail staff had no affirmative duty to volunteer information about the 

drugs.” 

The same is true here. As this Court has already detailed supra, Petitioner cannot establish 

that he was involuntarily medicated. In addition, like the petitioner in Benson, Petitioner Marks 

refused medical care on multiple occasions. (AG022174, AG023645, AG023646.) Like the 

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petitioner in Benson, who “utilized her capacity to refuse medication on three occasions,” 

Petitioner in the instant case was “clearly aware []he could have objected to medication during 

trial—or asked for information about the nature or dosage of particular drugs.” Benson, 304 F.3d

at 885. The medication that Petitioner took was properly prescribed for a diagnosed seizure 

disorder, and Petitioner cannot establish that he is entitled to relief under Benson. 

Because Petitioner cannot establish that the California Supreme Court’s decision denying 

his claim was contrary to clearly established federal law, involved an unreasonable application of 

clearly established federal law, or resulted in a decision based on an unreasonable determination of 

the facts, Claim 1 must be denied in its entirety. 

B. Claim 6 

In Claim 6, Petitioner contends that, based on the bias and behavior of the trial judge, 

Petitioner was deprived of a fair and neutral trial. The California Supreme Court rejected this 

claim in a postcard denial on collateral review. (AG023690.)

The Due Process Clause guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a fair and impartial 

judge. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). A “biased decisionmaker [is] 

constitutionally unacceptable.” Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). In some cases, the 

proceedings and surrounding circumstances may demonstrate actual bias or an appearance of 

advocacy on the part of the judge, i.e., improper conduct. See Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 

501–04 (1974); Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 741 (9th Cir. 1995) (civil context). 

A trial judge “must be ever mindful of the sensitive role [the court] plays in a jury trial and 

avoid even the appearance of advocacy or partiality.” United States v. Hall, 271 F. App’x 559, 

560 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Harris, 501 F.2d 1, 10 (9th Cir. 1974)). At the same 

time, however, courts have recognized that a trial judge is “more than an umpire.” United States 

v. Laurins, 857 F.2d 529, 537 (9th Cir. 1988). It is generally appropriate for a trial judge to take 

part where necessary to clarify testimony and assist the jury in understanding the evidence. See id. 

A trial judge’s participation oversteps the bounds of propriety and deprives the parties of a fair 

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ORDER DENYING CLAIMS 1, 6, AND 7

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trial only when the record discloses actual bias or leaves the reviewing court with an abiding 

impression that the judge’s remarks and questioning projected to the jury an appearance of 

advocacy or partiality. See, e.g, United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2001); 

United States v. Odachyan, 749 F.3d 798, 802–03 (9th Cir. 2014) (statement by district court at 

sentencing did not reflect such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment 

impossible and therefore does not evidence constitutional error, where it appears that statement 

was in response to arguments made by defendant, was offered to explain why the court was not 

persuaded by arguments and at most reflects a general frustration with the type of argument 

defendant made at sentencing).

“It has long been regarded as normal and proper for a judge to sit in the same case upon 

remand, and to sit in successive trials involving the same defendants.” Liteky v. United States, 510 

U.S. 540, 551 (1994). There is no constitutional fault with assigning post-conviction review 

matters to the original trial judge. See Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1036 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(rejecting claim that trial judge being asked at postconviction proceeding to change his final 

judgment should be disqualified). 

A claim of judicial misconduct by a state judge in the context of federal habeas review 

does not simply require that the federal court determine whether the state judge committed judicial 

misconduct; rather, the question is whether the state judge’s behavior “rendered the trial so 

fundamentally unfair as to violate federal due process under the United States Constitution.” 

Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 

1158 (1996). A state judge’s conduct must be significantly adverse to a defendant before it 

violates constitutional requirements of due process and warrants federal intervention. See Garcia 

v. Warden, Dannemora Corr. Facility, 795 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1986). It is not enough that a federal 

court not approve of a state judge’s conduct. Objectionable as the conduct at issue might be, when 

considered in the context of the trial as a whole it may not be of sufficient gravity to warrant the 

conclusion that fundamental fairness was denied. See Duckett, 67 F.3d at 741 (citations omitted).

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ORDER DENYING CLAIMS 1, 6, AND 7

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Here, Petitioner alleges that the trial court’s bias deprived him of a complete and accurate 

record of the trial proceedings. Specifically, Petitioner maintains that the trial court knew of and 

refused to comply with its obligation to correct any gaps or deficiencies in the record because of

the trial judge’s bias against Petitioner. 

It is not disputed that, during the record correction proceedings in this matter, certain gaps 

in the record were revealed. Marks v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 4th 176, 180, 192–95 (2002) 

(considering various issues relating to verification and settlement of the record). These included 

apparently unrecorded portions of the trial and competency hearing, including unreported 

comments by Petitioner in open court. Id. at 180, 194. California law requires that, in capital 

cases, all conferences and proceedings “be conducted on the record with a court reporter present.” 

Cal Penal Code § 190.9(a)(1). When gaps in the record occur, as they did in Petitioner’s case, “the 

[Judicial Council] rules provide a procedure for filling them in.” Marks, 27 Cal. 4th at 192. 

Essentially, the rules allow the parties to review the record for omissions and submit “settled 

statements” regarding the omitted proceedings for certification by the trial court. Id. at 193–94. 

After engaging in disputed settled statement proceedings, Petitioner filed an appeal relating 

to various issues surrounding record certification to the California Supreme Court, which found 

that the settled statements in Petitioner’s case did not conform to the applicable rules. Id. at 195. 

The California Supreme Court noted that while there is scant judicial authority regarding settled 

statements, compliance is particularly important in capital cases, so as to “avoid[] questions as to 

the sufficiency of the appellate record.” Id. at 195–97. Accordingly, the California Supreme 

Court remanded the matter back to the trial court for “resettlement of the statements on appeal 

relating to the guilt and penalty trials and the Penal Code section 1368 [competency] hearing.” Id. 

at 197. At that point, further proceedings were held, and concluded to the satisfaction of 

Petitioner’s appellate counsel, Richard Power. (AG017978.) 

Petitioner claims that, despite the record correction proceedings that were eventually 

approved by Petitioner’s appellate counsel, the initial gaps in the record, combined with the trial 

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ORDER DENYING CLAIMS 1, 6, AND 7

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court’s deficiencies in the initial settled statement procedures, are indicative of bias against 

Petitioner by the trial court. This claim is without merit. Petitioner can cite to nothing indicating 

that the problems in certifying the record were the result of judicial bias. In addition, Petitioner 

can cite to no clearly established federal law that would support his claim that gaps in the record—

particularly gaps that were later addressed in a process approved and directed by the California 

Supreme Court—indicate judicial bias. Because Petitioner cannot establish that the trial court’s 

behavior “rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate federal due process under the 

United States Constitution,” Duckett, 67 F.3d at 740, this portion of Petitioner’s claim must be 

denied. 

In addition, Petitioner argues that pro-prosecution bias, and/or racial animus caused the 

trial court to deny Petitioner a full and fair hearing on his Atkins claim of inability to be executed 

due to intellectual disability. Specifically, Petitioner maintains that the trial court unreasonably 

rejected the testimony of Drs. Wood, Cowardin and Gur that Petitioner is intellectually disabled 

under Atkins. 

This Court carefully considered Petitioner’s claim that the trial court was unreasonable in 

determining whether Petitioner was intellectually disabled in its Order filed June 25, 2015. ECF 

No. 52. The Court examined the testimony of Drs. Wood, Cowardin and Gur, as well as the 

complete record before the trial court on Petitioner’s Atkins claim, and addressed Petitioner’s 

multiple arguments before concluding that under the highly deferential AEDPA standard, 

Petitioner was unable to show that the trial court’s factual findings or legal conclusions were 

objectively unreasonable under clearly established federal law. 

Here, Petitioner is essentially attempting to re-argue the claim that this Court has already 

considered. Petitioner cites no additional evidence that would establish that the trial court’s 

decision was not objectively unreasonable (see ECF No. 52), but was nonetheless motivated by 

racial animus or pro-prosecution bias. Petitioner’s primary argument is, once again, that the trial 

court’s reasons for not adopting the conclusion of Drs. Wood, Cowardin, and Gur were contrary to 

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ORDER DENYING CLAIMS 1, 6, AND 7

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or unsupported by the record, a claim that this Court has exhaustively reviewed. 

Petitioner again argues that the trial court ought to have accepted the testimony of Drs. 

Wood, Cowardin and Gur, but cannot point to anything specific that tends to establish racial 

animus or pro-prosecution bias. Petitioner cites to “angry and sarcastic” comments by the trial 

court in the record, such as the trial court’s description of the expert testimony as “unreasonable 

and unprofessional” (AG028425), and the trial court’s apparently mistaken comment that one of 

Petitioner’s experts had not reviewed certain testimony (AG028424–25). (Pet’s Opening Brief at 

22.). Petitioner, however, does not cite to any cases where comparable statements regarding 

testimony or witness preparation rise to the level of judicial misconduct that “rendered the trial so 

fundamentally unfair as to violate federal due process under the United States Constitution.” 

Duckett, 67 F.3d at 740. Accordingly, Petitioner cannot establish that either the trial court’s 

comments or its decision regarding Petitioner’s Atkins claims were motivated by racial animus or 

pro-prosecution bias. See, e.g. Lang v. Callahan, 788 F.2d 1416, 1418 (9th Cir. 1986) (illconsidered comments by judge that do not reflect racial prejudice, such as expressions of disgust 

at the brutality of the crime, do not generally violate right to impartial tribunal). 

As the Court has stated supra, the question on federal habeas review is not whether a trial 

court’s conduct might be objectionable. Rather, a showing of judicial bias must include facts 

sufficient to demonstrate actual impropriety or the appearance thereof. Greenway v. Schriro, 653 

F.3d 790, 806 (9th Cir. 2011). This Petitioner cannot do. Because Petitioner cannot establish that 

the California Supreme Court’s decision was objectively unreasonable, Claim 6 must be denied. 

C. Claim 7

In Claim 7, Petitioner contends that the trial court ordered excessive courtroom security, in 

violation of Petitioner’s constitutional rights. The California Supreme Court addressed this claim 

in a reasoned opinion on direct review as follows:

Prior to the start of trial, defense counsel requested that defendant be subject 

to physical restraints in the courtroom. One defense attorney expressed fear that 

defendant might injure him during trial; the other attorney indicated he was 

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ORDER DENYING CLAIMS 1, 6, AND 7

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concerned not with defendant’s injuring him but with defendant’s harming his 

defense by misconduct before the jury. The trial court declined to impose the 

restraints, concluding the record before it failed to establish the “manifest need” 

required by People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282 [], for the restraints. The 

proximity of the witness stand to the jury box prompted the court to revisit the issue 

once defendant was about to testify. The court proposed two alternatives: 

defendant could testify from his position at counsel’s table or he could testify from 

the witness stand with a marshal sitting next to him, facing him. The court recalled 

defendant’s history, which included assaulting an attorney in court and a deputy 

sheriff during this case. After a break, defense counsel indicated that defendant 

wished to testify from the witness chair. The court explained it would position a 

marshal in a chair next to defendant on the raised platform that was parallel to Juror 

No. 7.4 The court recalled defendant’s prior assaultive behavior, his violation of 

court orders, and his being removed from the courtroom for being verbally 

disruptive earlier in the trial. The court noted that the jury box was only four feet 

from where defendant would sit, and it would be “total dereliction of [the court’s] 

responsibility” to have the nearest marshal “some 30 or 40 feet away, who would 

have to go around tables, chairs and other people [to] get to [defendant].”

The court read the following admonition, at the defense’s request: “With 

respect to the position of Deputy Scott, you’ll observe that Deputy Scott is seated 

up next to the jury box. First of all, let me indicate to you that you are not to 

speculate as to the reasons why Deputy Scott is in this position, nor are you to let it 

become part of your deliberations or your conclusions in this case in any way. This 

is a perfectly normal procedure, and you should not draw any adverse [inferences] 

from this of any kind.”

Defendant cites Duran for the proposition that there must be a “manifest 

need” for the placement of the marshal so close to him as he testified. Duran

imposed the manifest need standard for the use of physical restraints. (Duran, 

supra, 16 Cal. 3d at pp. 290-291 [].) Duran expressly distinguished such shackling 

from monitoring by security personnel. “We are not concerned with the use of 

armed guards in the courtroom. Unless they are present in unreasonable numbers, 

such presence need not be justified by the court or the prosecutor.” Duran, at p. 

291, fn. 8 []. The Duran holding encompassed not only the standard positioning of 

officers but also their unusual deployment, as is shown by its citation to People v. 

David (1930) [citations omitted], where a deputy drew up his chair immediately 

behind where the defendant was sitting . . . . The distinction between shackling and 

monitoring is long-standing. The David court distinguished that case’s deployment 

of security personnel with the physical restraints that cause prejudice in People v. 

Harrington (1871) 42 Cal. 165. . . . Harrington was the primary authority on 

 

4

 [Case Footnote 5] It appears that the marshal sat four or five feet from defendant's side (facing 

his ear) next to and slightly behind Juror No. 7.

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ORDER DENYING CLAIMS 1, 6, AND 7

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which Duran relied, and its reasoning indicates that courtroom monitoring by 

security personnel does not necessarily create the prejudice created by shackling. . . 

. The United States Supreme Court has likewise refused to find the “conspicuous, 

or at least noticeable, deployment of security personnel in a courtroom during trial 

[as] the sort of inherently prejudicial practice that, like shackling, should be 

permitted only where justified by an essential state interest. . . .” (Holbrook v. 

Flynn (1986) 475 U.S. 560, 568-569, [].) Holbrook observed, “while shackling and 

prison clothes are unmistakable indications of the need to separate a defendant from 

the community at large, . . . it is entirely possible that jurors will not infer anything 

at all from the presence of the guards. . . . Our society has become inured to the 

presence of armed guards in most public places; they are doubtless taken for 

granted so long as their numbers or weaponry do not suggest particular official 

concern or alarm.” (Id. at p. 569 []). 

We therefore maintain this distinction between shackling and the deployment 

of security personnel, and decline to impose the manifest need standard for the 

deployment of marshals inside the courtroom. [citations omitted]. 

Defendant now claims the trial court should have had him bound by 

restraints not visible to the jury. Defendant never asserted there was less intrusive 

means of securing the courtroom, and his failure to object now bars the instant 

claim that through invisible shackling the court could have achieved the same 

security benefit with less prejudice to defendant. . . . Furthermore, as indicated 

above, physical restraints may well be more distracting and disorienting to a

testifying defendant than a security guard’s presence four or five feet away, next to 

and slightly behind) the jurors. 

Defendant had attacked his own counsel in the courtroom, and his disruptive 

behavior and violations of court orders had led to his removal at one point. The 

court observed the proximity of the witness stand to the jury box, and reasonably 

concluded it would be irresponsible to leave the jury unprotected from a capital 

defendant with a record of violent behavior in the courtroom. Under any standard 

of review, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in securing the courtroom. 

Marks, 31 Cal. 4th at 222–24. 

Petitioner cannot demonstrate that the California Supreme Court’s decision upholding the 

trial court’s decision regarding courtroom security was contrary to or an unreasonable application 

of clearly established U.S. Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g., Kemp v. Ryan, 638 F.3d 1245, 

1261–62 (9th Cir. 2011). A federal court’s review of security arrangements is very limited. 

Ainsworth v. Calderon, 138 F.3d 787, 797 (9th Cir.), amended, 152 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1998). 

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ORDER DENYING CLAIMS 1, 6, AND 7

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The U.S. Supreme Court has also held that the use of security personnel is not inherently 

prejudicial. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 569 (1986) (presence of four uniformed state 

troopers did not unconstitutionally deprive defendant of a fair trial). Rather, the challenged 

practice must be shown to be actually prejudicial before relief may be granted. Id. 

Petitioner cannot demonstrate that the security measures imposed by the trial court resulted 

in any actual prejudice. The Ninth Circuit has found that no actual prejudice was shown to have 

resulted from heightened security measures that included screening all persons who entered the 

courtroom (with use of hand-held metal detection wand, patdowns, and searches of bags and 

purses for weapons), locking the courtroom door, and posting an extra deputy in the courtroom 

and two additional deputies outside the courtroom. Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 521–22 (9th 

Cir. 2011); see also Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 587–89 (9th Cir. 2004) (presence of four 

uniformed marshals and several other “plain-clothed” guards at trial not inherently prejudicial; 

defense counsel’s statements implying extraordinary security measures cannot support a claim that 

the security measures at trial undermined the presumption of innocence). 

Here, the trial court posted a single marshal near Petitioner when he was on the witness 

stand. Marks, 31 Cal. 4th at 222. The marshal’s presence was ordered due to specific security 

concerns that the trial court noted on the record. Id. Moreover, the trial court specifically 

instructed the jury that such a procedure was “normal” and that the jury was not to let it become a 

part of its deliberations or conclusions. Id.; see also Richardson. v. March, 481 U.S. 200, 211 

(1987) (finding that jurors are presumed to follow the instructions given to them). Under such 

circumstances, and given the applicable U.S. Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit law cited supra, 

Petitioner cannot demonstrate that the California Supreme Court’s decision was unreasonable or 

contrary to clearly established federal law. Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 568–68. 

Petitioner also maintains that he was in visible restraints when he entered the courtroom. 

In support of this allegation, Petitioner relies exclusively on the declaration of Anita Clifton, who 

served as a juror at Petitioner’s trial. (AG022535.) Juror Clifton’s declaration was signed in 

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ORDER DENYING CLAIMS 1, 6, AND 7

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2002, and was presumably part of the record before the California Supreme Court, which rendered 

its decision on Petitioner’s direct appeal in 2003. The California Supreme Court, however, did not 

directly address the allegation regarding restraints in Juror Clifton’s declaration, which reads in its 

entirety “[i]t was disturbing to see him walk into court everyday in shackles.” (AG022535.) 

To begin with, Petitioner cannot actually demonstrate that he was physically restrained, 

simply by submitting a single declaration lacking relevant detail. This Court has reviewed Juror 

Clifton’s declaration. No other evidence in the record indicates that Petitioner was ever physically 

restrained in view of the jurors. In fact, as the California Supreme Court’s decision and the trial 

record confirm, the trial court denied the request of Petitioner’s counsel that Petitioner be 

physically restrained while in the courtroom, and specifically found that physical restraints were 

not justified. Marks, 31 Cal. 4th at 222–23. Id. On direct appeal, Petitioner’s counsel essentially 

acknowledged that Petitioner was not restrained, when arguing that less visible security than the 

armed deputy—such as physical restraints—should have been used. (AG018193). 

There are no other declarations from counsel, jurors or others that Petitioner was in 

shackles when he was brought into the courtroom. Juror Clifton’s declaration is silent as to the 

appearance of any shackles, and gives no other details. Given this record, it was not unreasonable 

for the California Supreme Court to determine that Petitioner had not actually been impermissibly 

shackled. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (finding that to prevail under AEDPA, a 

petitioner must show that the state court’s decision was not only wrong, but unreasonable “beyond 

any possibility for fair-minded disagreement”). 

Petitioner has not demonstrated that he was shackled when he entered the courtroom; even 

if he had, he would not be entitled to relief on this claim. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 

prohibit the use of physical restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the 

exercise of its discretion, that restraints are justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial. 

Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005); Rhoden v. Rowland, 172 F.3d 633, 636 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(“Rhoden II”); Spain v. Rushen, 883 F.2d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 1989). Generally, the defendant’s 

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ORDER DENYING CLAIMS 1, 6, AND 7

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right to due process is violated if the trial court fails to make a finding on the record justifying the 

necessity of physical restraints. To assess whether shackles are permitted, a trial court must 

analyze the security risks posed by the defendant and consider less restrictive alternatives before 

permitting a defendant to be restrained. Rhoden II, 172 F.3d at 636. 

If a trial court has impermissibly shackled a defendant, there is no reversible error on 

habeas review unless a federal habeas court determines that what the jurors saw “was so inherently 

prejudicial as to pose an unacceptable threat to defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Holbrook v. 

Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 572 (1986). When a defendant’s shackling was not actually seen by the jury 

in the courtroom, no error results, or, put differently, the error is deemed harmless or not 

prejudicial. Rhoden II, 172 F.3d at 636. To determine whether the imposition of visible physical 

restraints amount to prejudicial error, the reviewing court considers the appearance and visibility 

of the restraining device, the nature of the crime with which the defendant was charged, and the 

strength of the state’s evidence against the defendant. Larson v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057, 1063–

64 (9th Cir. 1057, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Walker v. Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 942 (9th Cir. 2013), is persuasive authority here. In 

Walker, a capital case, the parties stipulated that the petitioner had been visibly shackled during 

both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. Walker, 709 F.3d at 942. The shackles caused 

Walker to visibly limp to and from the witness stand when he testified during the guilt and penalty 

phases. Id. at 929. Moreover, there was no finding by the trial court that restraints were 

necessary. Id.. Despite these undisputed facts regarding the visibility of the shackles and the lack 

of record justification for them, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding of prejudice 

due to shackling, holding that, inter alia, the strong evidence of guilt, combined with the fact that 

the restraints could have indicated custody status as opposed to dangerousness, demonstrated that 

“the state court reasonably could conclude that it was not reasonably probable that the jury would 

have acquitted Walker” absent the restraint. Id. at 930, 943–45. 

Here, the record is even weaker than it was in Walker, where the shackling was undisputed 

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ORDER DENYING CLAIMS 1, 6, AND 7

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and continuous during both the guilt and penalty phases, including when Walker was testifying. 

Id. at 929–30. To begin with, Juror Clifton is silent as to the appearance and visibility of any 

alleged restraining device, which is important in determining prejudice. Id. at 942 (finding that 

“[n]ot all restraints are created equal”). Moreover, when a juror becomes aware of shackles only 

during certain instances, it may suggest a defendant’s “custody status, not a proclivity for 

violence.” Id. Here, Juror Clifton notes only that she saw Petitioner wear some sort of 

unidentified shackles when he walked into court, and does not state that she saw him restrained 

during the trial. Id.; see also Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 593 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding 

that juror’s viewing of handcuffs with a coat draped over the handcuffed hands as the defendant 

went to or from the courtroom was not inherently or presumptively prejudicial). 

In addition, the evidence against Petitioner was substantial, and in such circumstances, the 

verdict was less likely to have been affected by an error such as shackling. Walker, 709 F.3d at 

943. As discussed supra, the criminalist testified with “virtual absolute certainty” that the bullets 

that shot Baeza and Myers came from Petitioner’s gun. Marks, 31 Cal. 4th at 207. In addition, 

ballistics analysis “indicated” that the bullet that shot McDermott came from Petitioner’s gun and 

“suggested” that the bullet that injured Luong came from the same source. Id. Eyewitnesses also 

testified as to the shootings. Id. at 205–06. Additionally, Petitioner was overheard telling another 

defendant that “he was in for three murders” and that the victims had died because “I shot them.” 

Id. at 208. In the face of such evidence of guilt, “it is not reasonably probable that [Petitioner] 

would have obtained a different result had he not been forced to wear the restraint.” Walker, 709 

F.3d at 943. Thus, even assuming that Petitioner had established that he was visibly shackled 

when entering the courtroom, he is unable to establish that he was prejudiced, as the record makes 

clear that the state court could have reasonably concluded that there was no prejudice. Id. at 931, 

942-43. Claim 7 must be denied in its entirety.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Claims 1, 6, and 7 are DENIED. 

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ORDER DENYING CLAIMS 1, 6, AND 7

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 15, 2016

_____________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

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