Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_14-cv-00237/USCOURTS-almd-3_14-cv-00237-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Denial of Overtime Compensation

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

NETTIE CHAMBERS, et al., )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

 )

v. ) CASE NO. 3:14-CV-237-WKW

 ) [WO]

GROOME TRANSPORTATION OF )

ALABAMA, INC., et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court is a Motion to Dismiss Individual Defendants (Doc. # 7), 

filed by Defendants Harold V. Groome, Jr., Harold V. Groome III, and Christopher 

Groome (“individual Defendants”), pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) and (b)(6) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs do not oppose the dismissal of their 

claims against the individual Defendants for alleged violations of the Workers’ 

Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101–09 (“WARN 

Act”), but they contend that they have pleaded sufficient facts to support the 

exercise of personal jurisdiction over the individual Defendants and to state a claim 

for relief against the individual Defendants for violations of the Fair Labor 

Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19. (Doc. # 18, at 1.) After careful 

consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant law, and the Complaint’s 

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allegations, the court finds that the motion to dismiss is due to be granted in part 

and denied in part.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Subject-matter jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and 

venue is not contested. This opinion addresses the court’s personal jurisdiction 

over the individual Defendants.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Rule 12(b)(2)

A Rule 12(b)(2) motion tests the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction 

over a defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). In this case, Plaintiffs bear the 

burden of “establish[ing] a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over a 

nonresident defendant.” Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990). 

The allegations in the Complaint are presumed true because they are

uncontroverted by evidence. See id.

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

When evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must take the facts alleged in the complaint as true 

and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Resnick v. AvMed, 

Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1321–22 (11th Cir. 2012). To survive Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny, 

“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

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claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “[F]acial 

plausibility” exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court 

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

III. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are former employees of Groome Transportation of Alabama, Inc.,

which had contracted with Auburn University to provide shuttle bus services for its 

students. Plaintiffs worked as shuttle bus drivers, transporting students within 

Auburn’s city limits, principally on Auburn University’s campus, beginning prior 

to April 2012 and continuing until July 2013 when Groome Transportation closed 

its area plant. (Compl. ¶ 16.) 

On April 2, 2014, Plaintiffs filed this action against Groome Transportation 

and the individual Defendants. The Complaint contains two counts. In Count 

One, which alleges violations of the FLSA, Plaintiffs contend that from 

approximately April 1, 2012, to November 30, 2012, Groome Transportation did 

not adequately compensate them for hours worked in excess of forty hours per 

week. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (requiring that employees who work in excess of 

forty hours per week be compensated “at a rate not less than one and one-half 

times the regular rate at which he is employed”). Plaintiffs seek unpaid overtime 

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wages in a collective action under the FLSA. In Count Two, Plaintiffs bring a 

claim under the WARN Act, individually and as representatives of a proposed 

class, alleging that Groome Transportation failed to give the minimum sixty-day 

written notice to its employees as required by the WARN Act. Plaintiffs seek all 

relief available under the WARN Act, including sixty days back pay. 

Defendant Groome Transportation responded to the Complaint with a 

motion to compel arbitration. A prior Order denied that motion as to twenty of the 

forty-five Plaintiffs and granted the motion as to twenty-five Plaintiffs. This action 

against Groome Transportation and the individual Defendants for alleged 

violations of the WARN Act and the FLSA proceeds, therefore, as to twenty

Plaintiffs.

1

Pending is the individual Defendants’ motion to dismiss the WARN Act and 

FLSA claims. The individual Defendants invoke Rule 12(b)(2) and (b)(6), and 

Plaintiffs have responded to the arguments.

 

1

Those twenty Plaintiffs are: (1) Nettie Chambers; (2) Kevin Bartlett; (3) Adolphus 

Billingslea; (4) Mattie Brown; (5) Ernest Chappell, Jr.; (6) Lavelle Cox; (7) Tracy Eden; 

(8) Janice Ferrell; (9) Justin Greene; (10) Geraldine Gunn; (11) Jacqueline Hinson; 

(12) LaTwanika Rhodes; (13) Christopher Rogers; (14) Gregory Rowell; (15) James M. Smith; 

(16) Willie Frank Smith; (17) Charles Tate; (18) Lakecia Thomas; (19) Michael Watson; and 

(20) Cassandra Young.

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IV. DISCUSSION

A. The WARN Act

Plaintiffs posit no opposition to the individual Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss the WARN Act claims. Accordingly, the WARN Act claims will be 

dismissed against the individual Defendants.

B. The FLSA

1. Rule 12(b)(2)

The individual Defendants also contend that the Complaint “fails to allege 

sufficient facts to invoke personal jurisdiction over [them].”2 (Doc. # 7, at 3.) A 

personal-jurisdiction challenge in federal court requires a two-part analysis. The 

court first must determine its jurisdiction under the forum state’s long-arm statute; 

second, it must decide whether exercising jurisdiction comports with principles of 

constitutional due process. Alabama’s long-arm statute permits state and federal 

courts in Alabama to exercise personal jurisdiction “to the fullest extent 

constitutionally permissible.” Sloss Indus. Corp. v. Eurisol, 488 F.3d 922, 925 

(11th Cir. 2007) (citing Ala. R. Civ. P. 4.2(b)). Only a single analysis is necessary, 

therefore, because the limits of Alabama’s long-arm jurisdiction are coterminous 

with constitutional due process requirements.

 

2 The Complaint does not identify the residency of the individual Defendants, but in the 

parties’ briefing, there is no disagreement that the individual Defendants do not reside in 

Alabama. (See, e.g., Doc. # 7, at 3 n.1 (“[T]he addresses for service accurately reflect that each 

of the[ individual] Defendants resides in the Commonwealth of Virginia.”).)

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The Due Process Clause requires that (1) a defendant have “minimum 

contacts” with the forum state, and that (2) the court’s exercise of jurisdiction 

conform with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Burnham v. 

Superior Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 618 (1990).

a. Minimum Contacts

Minimum contacts may be established through either general or specific 

jurisdiction. “General jurisdiction” over a defendant arises from the defendant’s 

continuous and systematic contacts with the forum state that are unrelated to the 

suit, while “specific jurisdiction” arises from a defendant’s sporadic or limited 

contacts with the forum state that are at issue in the plaintiff’s cause of action. 

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414–15 nn.8–9 

(1984).

Plaintiffs argue that the Complaint alleges facts demonstrating “personal 

jurisdiction both general and specific” (Doc. # 19, at 12); however, Plaintiffs do 

not point to any facts that establish that the individual Defendants had continuous 

and systematic contact with Alabama. Hence, the analysis focuses only on specific 

jurisdiction. 

“[S]pecific personal jurisdiction is a claim-specific inquiry.” Turner v. 

Regions Bank, 770 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1248 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (Thompson, J.) 

(quoting Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 274 (5th Cir. 2006) 

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(alteration omitted)). Specific jurisdiction requires, first, “some act by which the 

defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within 

the forum . . . , thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws,” and, second, 

that the defendant’s contacts with the forum state relate to the cause of action or 

give rise to it. Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 1220 (11th 

Cir. 2009). Additionally, as a general principle, “jurisdiction over an employee 

does not automatically follow from jurisdiction over the corporation which 

employs him . . . . Each defendant’s contacts with the forum State must be 

assessed individually.” Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 n.13

(1984).

The individual Defendants argue that the “only personal jurisdiction 

averments contained within Plaintiffs’ complaint relate exclusively to Groome 

[Transportation] as a corporate entity” and that the individual Defendants are not 

subject to personal jurisdiction based upon acts taken in their corporate capacity. 

(Doc. # 7, at 3.) The gist of their argument is that in their individual capacities, as 

opposed to their corporate capacities, they have no contacts with Alabama, and, 

thus, personal jurisdiction is lacking. Plaintiffs argue, on the other hand, that the 

facts “directly give rise” to an FLSA claim against the individual Defendants 

because they qualify as employers for purposes of the FLSA and that, by doing 

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business in Alabama, the individual Defendants “purposefully availed themselves 

of conducting activity in Alabama . . . .” (Doc. # 19, at 14.) 

The individual Defendants’ argument invokes Alabama’s fiduciary-shield 

doctrine, which provides that personal jurisdiction “over individual officers or 

employees of a corporation may not be predicated merely upon jurisdiction over 

the corporation itself.” Thames v. Gunter-Dunn, Inc., 373 So. 2d 640, 641–42 

(Ala. 1979); see also Ex parte Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., 78 So. 3d 959, 974

(Ala. 2011) (recognizing Thames as Alabama’s first application of the fiduciaryshield doctrine). As observed in Kohlberg, however, over the years, the Alabama 

Supreme Court “has distinguished Thames on several bases so as to avoid applying 

the fiduciary-shield doctrine” and has made clear that “an individual is not shielded 

from liability simply because his acts were done in furtherance of his employer’s 

interest.” 78 So. 3d at 975 (citation, alterations, and internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (observing that the 

individual defendants’ “status as employees does not somehow insulate them from 

jurisdiction” for their contacts with the forum state). 

The parties cite no controlling authority discussing the fiduciary-shield 

doctrine. Further analysis of the efficacy of the fiduciary-shield doctrine is not 

necessary to resolve the present motion, however, because, in the context of this 

case, there are sufficient facts establishing that personal jurisdiction over the 

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individual Defendants is not “predicated merely upon jurisdiction over the 

corporation itself.” Thames, 373 So. 2d at 641–42. 

Although not cited by either party, a Fifth Circuit opinion is both instructive 

and persuasive. See Donovan v. Grim Hotel Co., 747 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1984). In 

Donovan, the court held that the fiduciary-shield doctrine did not divest the court 

of personal jurisdiction in an FLSA action alleging the direct liability of the

corporate president. The Fifth Circuit explained that the president allegedly 

violated the FLSA, “under which he is statutorily characterized as an employer and 

is personally responsible for defaults . . . .” Id. at 973. The president, “no less than 

the corporations he owned, directed, and controlled, is personally liable for unpaid 

statutory wages to his employees.” Id. “Consequently, his Texas-connected acts 

that produced injurious effects to the Texas-based employees cannot, as a matter of 

law or fact, be regarded as performed solely in his corporate capacity.” Id.

Because the president was personally liable under the FLSA for the alleged 

violations that occurred in Texas, he had sufficient minimum contacts with Texas. 

Id. at 974. 

Based upon Donovan, the fiduciary-shield doctrine does not apply if the 

Complaint’s allegations establish the individual Defendants’ direct liability as an 

employer under the FLSA. If there is direct liability, then the Complaint is not 

seeking to predicate personal jurisdiction over the individual Defendants based 

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solely upon the acts of Groome Transportation. Accordingly, the inquiry into 

personal jurisdiction turns on whether the individual Defendants satisfy the 

definition of an “employer” under the FLSA.

The FLSA broadly defines “employer” to “include[ ] any person acting 

directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee,” 29 

U.S.C. § 203(d), and logically, a “person” includes an “individual,” id. § 203(a); 

see also Reich v. Circle C Invs., Inc., 998 F.2d 324, 329 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he 

FLSA’s definition of employer must be liberally construed to effectuate Congress’

remedial intent.”). Under Eleventh Circuit authority, “a corporate officer with 

operational control of a corporation’s covered enterprise is an employer along with 

the corporation” and is “jointly and severally liable under the FLSA for unpaid 

wages.” Patel v. Wargo, 803 F.2d 632, 637–38 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). Personal liability under the FLSA attaches to an 

officer who is “involved in the day-to-day operation or ha[s] some direct 

responsibility for the supervision of the employee.” Id. at 638; see also Stewart v. 

Sterling Tech. Solutions, LLC, No. 6:10cv630, 2010 WL 4647135, at *2 (M.D. Fla. 

Oct. 12, 2010) (recommending the denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 

where the complaint alleged that the individual defendants had “significant 

ownership interest with operational control of significant aspects” of the corporate 

employer’s “day-to-day functions” (internal quotation marks omitted)), adopted by

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Stewart v. Sterling Tech. Solutions, LLC, No. 6:10cv630, 2010 WL 4646903 (M.D. 

Fla. Nov. 9, 2010).

Tested against the foregoing principles, the Complaint alleges that the 

individual Defendants are “corporate officer[s] of Groome [Transportation] who 

had and ha[ve] operational control over the policies that determined the day-to-day 

functions of Groome [Transportation] and its compensation of employees.” 

(Compl. ¶¶ 7–9.) It further alleges that the individual Defendants have “direct 

responsibility for the pay policies of employees, such as [ ] Plaintiffs.” (Compl. 

¶¶ 7–9.) These allegations, presumed true at this stage of the litigation, premise 

liability against the individual Defendants as corporate officers of Groome 

Transportation based upon their control over the policies affecting the day-to-day 

operation, including the pay scheme, of Groome Transportation employees. The 

allegations are adequate to bring the individual Defendants within Patel’s 

definition of an FLSA employer. 

Based upon the foregoing, the Complaint’s allegations establish that the 

individual Defendants’ activities (i.e., their operational control) expose them to 

personal liability as employers under the FLSA to their Alabama-based employees 

for alleged wage-payment violations. For purposes of the personal-jurisdiction 

analysis, each individual Defendant is deemed to have engaged in acts as an 

employer that caused injury to employees working in Alabama. These allegations 

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establish the minimum contacts necessary to create specific jurisdiction over the 

individual Defendants.

The individual Defendants cannot hide behind the fiduciary-shield doctrine 

to avoid personal jurisdiction when they allegedly engaged in acts that had 

foreseeable consequences in Alabama for which they may be held personally liable 

under the FLSA. The individual Defendants’ argument that minimum contacts are

lacking by application of the fiduciary-shield doctrine is unavailing. Based upon 

the present record and the arguments, Plaintiffs have made a prima facie showing 

of specific jurisdiction.

b. Fair Play and Substantial Justice

Where a plaintiff demonstrates that an out-of-state defendant has 

purposefully established constitutionally sufficient minimum contacts within the 

forum state, the defendant “must make a ‘compelling case’ that the exercise of 

jurisdiction would violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” 

Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Int’l, Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1267 

(11th Cir. 2010). “Relevant factors include the burden on the defendant, the 

forum’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining 

convenient and effective relief and the judicial system’s interest in resolving the 

dispute.” Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d 1280, 1288 (11th Cir. 2008).

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The individual Defendants do not contend that the exercise of jurisdiction 

over them would violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. In 

fact, Defendants do not address this component of the personal-jurisdiction 

inquiry. Because the individual Defendants have not demonstrated any burden 

that outweighs the interests of Alabama, the plaintiffs, and the forum court, they

have not made a compelling case that it would be unfair and unjust to require the 

individual Defendants to defend against Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims in Alabama.

c. Summary

Personal jurisdiction over the individual Defendants comports with the Due 

Process Clause. Plaintiffs’ FLSA suit in Alabama against the individual 

Defendants is constitutionally permissible. Accordingly, the individual 

Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(2) motion is due to be denied.

2. Rule 12(b)(6)

The individual Defendants argue that they are not Plaintiffs’ “employer” 

within the meaning of the FLSA and that, therefore, the Complaint fails to state a 

claim for which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs counter that 

the Complaint’s allegations sufficiently plead the individual Defendants’ corporate 

capacity and control over Plaintiffs’ employment, thus, bringing those Defendants 

within the definition of an FLSA “employer.” 

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The analysis in Part IV.B.1.a. resolves these arguments against the 

individual Defendants. Namely, the court found that the allegations demonstrate 

that the individual Defendants satisfy the Eleventh Circuit’s definition of an FLSA 

employer. Accordingly, the Complaint states a plausible claim for relief against 

the individual Defendants under the FLSA, and the individual Defendants’ Rule 

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is due to be denied. 

V. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss 

Individual Defendants (Doc. # 7), filed by Defendants Harold V. Groome, Jr., 

Harold V. Groome III, and Christopher Groome, is GRANTED in part and 

DENIED in part as follows:

(1) The motion is GRANTED as to the WARN Act claims, and the 

WARN Act claims against the individual Defendants are DISMISSED with 

prejudice; and

(2) the motion is DENIED as to the FLSA claims. 

DONE this 12th day of December, 2014. 

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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