Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05043/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05043-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ABRAHAM VALENTINO,

Plaintiff,

v.

SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC., 

et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-05043-JCS 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE 

TO AMEND

Re: Dkt. No. 22

I. INTRODUCTION

This case arises from a non-judicial foreclosure of residential property. Plaintiff Abraham

Valentino sued in state court, pursuant to the California Homeowner Bill of Rights, to block the 

sale of his home in Tiburon, California. Defendants Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (“SPS”) and 

U.S. Bank National Association, N.A. (“U.S. Bank”) removed the case to this Court based on 

diversity jurisdiction, and now move to dismiss Valentino‟s First Amended Complaint (“FAC,” 

dkt. 18). The Court finds the motion suitable for resolution without oral argument pursuant to 

Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), and vacates the hearing schedule for February 13, 2015. For the 

reasons stated below, Defendants‟ Motion is GRANTED IN PART, and the FAC is DISMISSED 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. If Valentino chooses to file a second amended complaint, he must 

do so no later than March 12, 2015.

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II. BACKGROUND

A. The Homeowner Bill of Rights

This case is based on a purported violation of the protections afforded by the California 

Homeowner Bill of Rights, specifically California Civil Code section 2923.6. That statute

 

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The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge for all 

purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

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attempts to eliminate the practice whereby financial institutions continue to pursue foreclosure 

even while evaluating a borrower‟s loan modification application, commonly known as dual 

tracking. See Jolley v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 213 Cal. App. 4th 872, 904 (2013). The following 

subparts of section 2923.6 are relevant to this action:

(c) If a borrower submits a complete application for a first lien loan 

modification offered by, or through, the borrower‟s mortgage 

servicer, a mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or 

authorized agent shall not record a notice of default or notice of sale, 

or conduct a trustee‟s sale, while the complete first lien loan 

modification application is pending. A mortgage servicer, 

mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record 

a notice of default or notice of sale or conduct a trustee‟s sale until 

any of the following occurs:

(1) The mortgage servicer makes a written determination that 

the borrower is not eligible for a first lien loan modification, 

and any appeal period pursuant to subdivision (d) has 

expired.

(2) The borrower does not accept an offered first lien loan 

modification within 14 days of the offer.

(3) The borrower accepts a written first lien loan 

modification, but defaults on, or otherwise breaches the 

borrower's obligations under, the first lien loan modification.

. . .

(g) In order to minimize the risk of borrowers submitting multiple 

applications for first lien loan modifications for the purpose of 

delay, the mortgage servicer shall not be obligated to evaluate 

applications from borrowers who have already been evaluated or 

afforded a fair opportunity to be evaluated for a first lien loan 

modification prior to January 1, 2013, or who have been evaluated 

or afforded a fair opportunity to be evaluated consistent with the 

requirements of this section, unless there has been a material 

change in the borrower’s financial circumstances since the date of 

the borrower’s previous application and that change is documented 

by the borrower and submitted to the mortgage servicer.

(h) For purposes of this section, an application shall be deemed 

“complete” when a borrower has supplied the mortgage servicer 

with all documents required by the mortgage servicer within the 

reasonable timeframes specified by the mortgage servicer.

Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.6 (emphasis added). The Homeowner Bill of Rights provides a private 

right of action of action for injunctive relief “[i]f a trustee‟s deed upon sale has not been 

recorded,” and for damages if the deed upon sale has been recorded. Id. § 2924.12(a), (b).

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B. Valentino’s Allegations2

Valentino obtained a loan from CMG Mortgage Services, Inc. (“CMG”) in April of 2006, 

and executed a promissory note and a deed of trust secured by the property at issue. FAC ¶ 6. At 

some point thereafter, the note was transferred to U.S. Bank. Id. Valentino later sought to obtain 

a loan modification to lower his interest rate. Id. ¶ 7. He “defaulted on his loan to satisfy the 

lender‟s precondition for modification” and submitted an application for modification. Id. The 

FAC alleges that the application was neither denied nor approved because “the lender or loan 

servicer went out of business, thereby failing to complete the processing of [the] modification 

application.” Id. Valentino‟s original Complaint alleged that this application was denied. NOR 

Ex. A ¶ 8.

On June 30, 2013, Valentino submitted a second modification application, “stating 

materially changed financial circumstances, to wit, reduced income.” FAC ¶ 8. SPS 

acknowledged received of that application by letter dated August 28, 2013. Id. On September 20, 

2014, Valentino received notice that Defendants had set a foreclosure sale date of October 22, 

2014. Id. ¶ 10.

Valentino alleges that the intended foreclosure sale violates the California Homeowners‟ 

Bill of Rights, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2920 et seq., because Valentino‟s loan modification application 

was outstanding at the time that Defendants proceeded with the foreclosure. Id. ¶¶ 13−14. He 

seeks damages and injunctive relief. Id. ¶¶ A−G (prayer for relief).

C. Procedural History

Valentino filed this action in the Superior Court of California for the County of Marin on 

October 17, 2014. See generally Notice of Removal (“NOR,” dkt. 1) Ex. A (Valentino‟s original 

Complaint). He applied for and received a temporary restraining order barring Defendants from 

selling the property. Id. Ex. C at ECF pp. 20−21. Defendants then removed the case to this Court 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, invoking diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. NOR 

at 1−4.

 

2 Valentino‟s factual allegations are taken as true for the purpose of Defendants‟ motion to 

dismiss.

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Defendants moved to dismiss Valentino‟s Complaint, see dkt. 7, and Valentino represented 

in opposition that he could amend the Complaint to address Defendants‟ concerns, see dkt. 16. 

Based on Valentino‟s representations, the Court instructed Valentino to file an amended complaint 

pursuant to Rule 15(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see dkt. 17, and Valentino 

filed his FAC on December 12, 2014. Defendants now move to dismiss the FAC.

D. The Motion to Dismiss and Valentino’s Opposition

Defendants‟ Motion identifies several purported deficiencies in Valentino‟s FAC. First, 

Defendants argue that “although [Valentino] alleges he submitted a loan modification application, 

there is still no allegation that it was complete.” Mot. (dkt. 22) at 7. Because Civil Code section 

2923.6(c) only bars foreclosure sales while a “complete” application is pending, Defendants 

contend that Valentino‟s failure to specifically allege that his application was “complete” renders 

his FAC inadequate. Id.; see also Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.6(h) (defining a “complete” application 

as one which includes “all documents required by the mortgage servicer,” submitted “within the 

reasonable timeframes specified by the mortgage servicer”). Valentino argues in response that the 

it is not incumbent on a plaintiff to show that his application was complete, and that the statutory 

scheme instead creates an affirmative defense if a mortgage service can show that the application 

was not complete. Opp‟n (dkt. 24) at 2. Valentino also argues that his allegations support “the 

clear implication” that the application was complete, and that if his allegations are not sufficient, 

he can further amend his complaint to allege that he submitted a “complete” application. Id. 

Neither party cites any authority for their positions on this issue.

Second, although Valentino alleges that he notified SPS of changed financial 

circumstances, Defendants argue that the specific change that occurred—a reduction in 

Valentino‟s income—was not plausibly material to his ability to qualify for a loan modification. 

Mot. at 7−8; see FAC ¶ 8. Defendants suggest that Valentino would need to show increased

income in order to satisfy the “material change” requirement. See Mot. at 8. Valentino responds 

that a reduced income may be relevant to a borrower‟s ability to obtain a modification, as 

evidenced by the common requirement that borrowers default on their loan before applying for a 

modification. Opp‟n at 2; see also FAC ¶ 7 (alleging that this requirement applied to Valentino‟s 

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loan). In their Reply, Defendants concede that it “seems true” that borrowers with reduced income 

are more likely to seek modifications, but contend that “[w]ithout allegations plausibly showing 

how this worse financial position could potentially qualify him for a loan modification, 

[Valentino] has not sufficiently alleged a „material‟ change.” Reply (dkt. 26) at 2. Again, neither 

party cites any authority for their positions on this issue.

Also on the subject of changed financial circumstances, Defendants argue that although 

Valentino alleges that he notified SPS of his reduced income, he does not allege that he 

documented that change or submitted such documentation to SPS. Mot. at 8. Defendants cite a 

decision of the Southern District of California for the proposition that a “plaintiff must allege facts 

showing that [he or] she not only submitted stated the material change to the services but also 

provided supporting documentation of the change.” Id. (citing Ware v. Bayview Loan Servicing, 

LLC, No. 13-CV-1310 JLS (NLS), 2013 WL 6247236, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2013)). Valentino 

does not respond to this argument. See generally Opp‟n.

Next, Defendants argue that Valentino failed to specify the timing of his changed income, 

and specifically that he failed to allege that a material change occurred after January 1, 2013. Mot. 

at 8. Valentino argues that because “loan applications require current statements of income,” the 

Court can infer that his application described a change occurring after January 1, 2013. Opp‟n at 

2.

Finally, Defendants argue that “there is no allegation that the defendants recorded the 

notice of trustee‟s sale while a loan modification was pending.” Mot. at 8. Defendants contend 

that “this temporal connection” is required by section 2923.6(c). Id. Valentino responds that he

has alleged that he did not receive notice of the foreclosure sale until well after submitting his 

modification application, but that he lacks “first-hand knowledge of the recording date.” Opp‟n at 

3. Defendants argue that whether Valentino had first-hand knowledge of the recording date is 

irrelevant, and that regardless of what Valentino knew at the time, he must show that a complete 

application was pending at the time Defendants recorded the notice of sale. Reply at 2. Neither 

party cites case law in support of their positions.

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III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted 

under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “The 

purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the 

complaint.” N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). Generally, a 

plaintiff‟s burden at the pleading stage is relatively light. Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure states that “[a] pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain . . . a short 

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a). 

In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court analyzes the complaint and 

takes “all allegations of material fact as true and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the 

non-moving party.” Parks Sch. of Bus. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Dismissal may be based on a lack of a cognizable legal theory or on the absence of facts that 

would support a valid theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 

1990). A complaint must “contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material 

elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562 (2007) (citing Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 

1106 (7th Cir. 1984)). “A pleading that offers „labels and conclusions‟ or „a formulaic recitation 

of the elements of a cause of action will not do.‟” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders „naked

assertion[s]‟ devoid of „further factual enhancement.‟” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 

Rather, the claim must be “„plausible on its face,‟” meaning that the plaintiff must plead sufficient 

factual allegations to “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

B. Completeness of Application

Valentino has cited no authority for the proposition that “the use of the word „complete‟ in 

the statute offers an affirmative defense” rather than an element of a plaintiff‟s claim. See Opp‟n 

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at 2. Absent such authority, the Court concludes that it is Valentino‟s burden to adequately plead 

that he submitted a complete application. See, e.g., Penermon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 14-

CV-00065-KAW, 2014 WL 2754596, at *11 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2014) (dismissing a “§ 2923.6 

cause of action with leave to amend to plead that the application was complete”).

 Because the FAC is subject to dismissal for the reasons discussed in the following section 

of this Order, the Court need not determine whether Valentino‟s allegation merely that he 

submitted an application is sufficient to support an inference that the application was complete. 

However, if Valentino chooses to file a second amended complaint, he should include more 

detailed allegations regarding the nature of his application, including an allegation that the 

application was complete, and may wish to consider attaching a copy of the application to his 

complaint.

C. Materiality, Documentation, and Timing of Changed Financial Circumstances

As a starting point, the Court finds no basis to conclude that a reduction in income cannot 

satisfy the “material change” requirement of section 2923.6(g). It is plausible that a borrower‟s 

initial modification request could be rejected because the lender concludes that the borrower is still 

solvent enough to satisfy the original terms, and that the borrower‟s subsequent loss of income 

could alter that conclusion and weigh in favor of approving modification. If the legislature had 

intended that section 2923.6(g) apply only where an applicant can show financial improvement, it 

could have included that requirement in the statute. With no such requirement on the face of the 

statute, and Defendants citing no authority in support of their position, the Court declines to so 

limit the statute‟s protection—at least where there is no indication that the earlier application was 

denied for insufficient income. Whether Valentino‟s loss of income in this case was “material” for 

the purpose of the statute is a question of the merits, not a basis to dismiss his claim at the 

pleading stage.

Although Valentino‟s income reduction may be a material change, that is not all that 

section 2923.6(g) requires. The change must be “documented,” and it must occur “since the date 

of the borrower‟s previous application.” Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.6(g). This Court has previously 

interpreted the latter requirement, in the context of “th[is] statute‟s non-retroactive nature,” to 

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require “that the material change needs to have occurred not only after the borrower‟s previous 

application, but also after January 1, 2013.” Rockridge Trust v. Wells Fargo NA, No. 13-CV01457-JCS, 2014 WL 688124, at *21−22 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2014). Here, Valentino‟s FAC fails 

to allege compliance with either of these requirements, and the Court GRANTS Defendant‟s 

motion to dismiss the FAC on that basis.

With respect to documentation, the Southern District of California held in Ware that the 

statute requires more than mere notice, and that submitting a letter “bereft of any details or 

documentation” does not meet the requirement. Ware, 2013 WL 6247236, at *6. This is 

consistent with the statute itself, which requires that the change in circumstances be 

“documented,” see Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.6(g), and at least one other court has reached the same 

conclusion. See Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, No. EDCV 13-02075 JVS, 2014 WL 

1568857, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2014).

The letter in Ware stated only that the “borrowers‟ financial circumstances have materially 

changed as their income and expenses have changed since they last submitted an application for 

foreclosure alternatives. Specifically, the borrowers‟ routine expenses have increased which is a 

material change of circumstance.” Ware, 2013 WL 6247236, at *6 (quoting the letter, which was 

submitted as an exhibit to the plaintiffs‟ complaint in that case). Here, Valentino similarly alleges 

only that his second application “stat[ed] materially changed financial circumstances, to wit, 

reduced income.” FAC ¶ 8. This allegation is not sufficient to show that he “documented” his 

changed circumstances, see Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.6(g), and Valentino fails to present any 

argument in his Opposition as to why it would be sufficient, see generally Opp‟ n. It may be that 

Valentino‟s application in fact included sufficient documentation, but—if so—he must provide 

more detailed allegations to support that conclusion.

The FAC also fails to allege that Valentino‟s changed circumstances occurred before 

January 1, 2013. In his Opposition, Valentino argues that “[i]nasmuch as loan applications require 

current statements of income—not next year‟s or last year‟s—the court can fairly infer that that 

the reduced income stated in Defendant‟s [sic] 30 June 2014 application occurred after 1 January 

2014.” Opp‟n at 2. Even if the Court can assume that the application required a “current 

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statement of income,” and even setting aside the inconsistency of the Opposition referencing dates 

in 2014 while the FAC alleges that the application was filed in June of 2013, see FAC ¶¶ 8, 15, 

Valentino‟s allegations do not satisfy the statute. The question is not whether Valentino‟s 

application stated his then-current income, it is when the reduction in income occurred. 

Valentino‟s submission of a “current income statement” in June of 2013 (or 2014) showing lower 

income than his first application does not indicate that the reduction occurred after January 1, 

2013, but instead only that his income decreased at some unknown time since his previous 

application—the date of which is not stated in the FAC. In order to state a claim, Valentino must 

allege that the documentation he submitted to Defendants showed that his income materially

decreased after January 1, 2013.

D. Relative Timing of Application and Notice of Trustee’s Sale 

Defendants also argue that the FAC is deficient for failing to allege “that the defendants 

recorded the notice of trustee‟s sale while a loan modification application was pending,” or in 

other words, that Valentino submitted his application before Defendants recorded the notice of 

sale. Mot. at 8 (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.6(c)). Valentino‟s response, that he lacks knowledge 

of the recording date, is not particularly compelling—even assuming that lack of knowledge is 

relevant, Valentino has not explained why he would not have access to publicly recorded 

documents. See Opp‟n at 3. 

Defendants argument nevertheless fails, however, because the “temporal connection” that 

they claim is necessary, see id., appears nowhere in the statute that they cite. Section 2923(c) 

reads, in full, as follows:

(c) If a borrower submits a complete application for a first lien loan 

modification offered by, or through, the borrower‟s mortgage 

servicer, a mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or 

authorized agent shall not record a notice of default or notice of sale, 

or conduct a trustee‟s sale, while the complete first lien loan 

modification application is pending. A mortgage servicer, 

mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record 

a notice of default or notice of sale or conduct a trustee's sale until 

any of the following occurs:

(1) The mortgage servicer makes a written determination that 

the borrower is not eligible for a first lien loan modification, 

and any appeal period pursuant to subdivision (d) has 

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expired.

(2) The borrower does not accept an offered first lien loan 

modification within 14 days of the offer.

(3) The borrower accepts a written first lien loan 

modification, but defaults on, or otherwise breaches the 

borrower's obligations under, the first lien loan modification.

Cal. Civ. Code § 2923(c). Nothing in this provision requires that a modification application be 

submitted before a notice of sale is recorded, and Defendants cite no other authority for such a 

requirement. From the face this provision alone, it appears that a complete modification 

application submitted after the notice of sale could still serve to prevent the lender from 

“conduct[ing] a trustee‟s sale” while the application is pending. See id.

E. Leave to Amend

Defendants argue that Valentino should be denied leave to further amend because he was 

on notice, before filing the FAC, of Defendants‟ arguments in their motion to dismiss the original 

Complaint. Mot. at 9. “Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not appropriate 

unless it is clear . . . that the complaint could not be saved by amendment.” Eminence Capital, 

LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). In this case, where the Court did not 

reach Defendants‟ first motion because Valentino‟s FAC rendered it moot, the Court cannot 

conclude with certainty that Valentino‟s claim cannot be saved by further amendment. The Court 

therefore DENIES Defendants‟ request to dismiss this action with prejudice, and grants Valentino 

leave to file a second amended complaint. If Valentino chooses to do so, the second amended 

complaint must address the deficiencies discussed above.

If the case goes forward, both parties may wish to consider providing the documents at 

issue, to more efficiently determine whether Valentino has a claim as opposed to merely whether 

he has correctly stated one. Documentary submissions at the pleading stage are not uncommon in 

foreclosure cases. See, e.g., Rockridge Trust, 2014 WL 688124, at *2 & n.3 (taking judicial notice 

of documents submitted by the defendants in support of their motion to dismiss); Ware, 2013 WL 

6247236, at *5 (considering application documents attached to the plaintiffs‟ complaint). 

Although a court generally may not consider materials beyond the pleadings under Rule 12(b)(6),

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a “copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all 

purposes,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c), and adequate documentation may help Valentino to overcome 

any further inartful pleading. Further, a court may take judicial notice of matters of public record, 

Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001), and may consider documents 

“whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which 

are not physically attached to the plaintiff‟s pleading,” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (brackets and citation omitted). Defendants may be able to submit documents showing 

Valentino‟s application to be inadequate and dismissal with prejudice to be appropriate.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Valentino‟s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Any further amended complaint must cure the deficiencies noted 

above and must be filed no later than March 12, 2015. If any later stage of this case requires 

briefing, both parties are instructed to cite case law supporting their legal arguments.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 10, 2015

______________________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

Chief Magistrate Judge

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