Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00807/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00807-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

HEATHER SUIT, ERIC SUIT, 

individually and as Guardian 

ad Litem for BRAELYN SUIT, a 

minor,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF FOLSOM, FOLSOM POLICE 

DEPARTMENT, OFFICER KRACHER, 

STEVE CARSON, and DOES 1-100, 

 Defendants.

CIV. NO. 2:16-00807 WBS AC

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION 

TO DISMISS

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs Heather and Eric Suit and their minor 

daughter filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on a car 

accident that resulted from defendant Officer Kracher’s pursuit 

of defendant Steve Carson. Defendants City of Folsom (the 

“City”), Folsom Police Department (the “Department”), and Officer 

Kracher now move to dismiss plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint

(“FAC”) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

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I. Factual and Procedural Background 

On October 26, 2015, Heather Suit was driving her minor 

daughter to school in Folsom, California. (First Am. Compl. 

(“FAC”) ¶ 23 (Docket No. 6).) While they were on the road, 

Officer Kracher engaged in a vehicle pursuit of Carson because he 

suspected Carson of having committed a “non-violent ‘cold’” 

misdemeanor. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 27.) Carson was “driving lawfully” 

before the pursuit and began driving “recklessly” once Officer 

Kracher initiated the stop. (Id. ¶ 26.) During the chase, 

Carson collided with another bystander’s vehicle and subsequently 

collided with plaintiffs’ vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 32, 42.) 

Plaintiffs initiated this action based on the injuries 

they incurred when Carson hit their vehicle. After amending 

their Complaint in response to defendants’ first motion to 

dismiss, plaintiffs allege five claims in their FAC: (1) 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Officer Kracher for violations of 

plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth 

Amendment; (2) Monell claim under § 1983 against the City; (3) 

“supervisorial liability” claim under § 1983 against the City and

the Department; (4) negligence claim against the City, the 

Department, and Carson; and (5) loss of consortium claim by Eric 

Suit against all defendants. The City, the Department, and 

Officer Kracher now move to dismiss plaintiffs’ FAC for failure 

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

II. Analysis

On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court 

must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and draw all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Scheuer v. 

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Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by

Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 

319, 322 (1972). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff 

must plead “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a 

plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his 

entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and 

conclusions . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration in 

original) (citations omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice,” and “the tenet that a court must 

accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is 

inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

“The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. “Where 

a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a 

defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between 

possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A claim has 

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

In general, a court may not consider items outside the 

complaint when deciding a motion to dismiss, but it may consider 

documents of which it can take judicial notice. Tellabs, Inc. v. 

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Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Akhtar v. 

Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). Defendants submitted 

a copy of the Felony Complaint and Felony Abstract of Judgment to 

show that, after his arrest on October 26, 2015, Carson was 

convicted of burglary, vehicle theft, and fleeing or attempting 

to elude a pursuing police officer while driving with a willful 

or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. 

(Docket No. 9-2.) While the court can take judicial notice of 

such records, see United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria 

Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 

1992), the court declines to do so because the criminal charges 

brought against Carson after the incident are not relevant to 

defendants’ motion to dismiss and would not affect the court’s 

decision. 

1. Section 1983 Claims

In relevant part, § 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, 

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State

. . . , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 

citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation 

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 

the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or 

other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. While § 1983 is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, it provides a cause of action against any 

person who, under color of state law, deprives an individual of 

federal constitutional rights or limited federal statutory 

rights. Id.; Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989).

In their initial Complaint, plaintiffs alleged 

violations of their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from 

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unreasonable seizures. Likely recognizing that they could not 

allege a violation of the Fourth Amendment in the absence of an 

intentional seizure, plaintiffs abandoned that theory in their 

FAC and instead allege only substantive due process violations 

under the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally County of 

Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 844 (1998) (holding that an

officer’s collision into a motorcycle on which plaintiff was 

riding did not give rise to a cognizable Fourth Amendment 

violation because, even though the police were in pursuit of the 

motorcycle, a “seizure” requires “a governmental termination of 

freedom of movement through means intentionally applied”).

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

“guarante[es] more than fair process” and extends to “a 

substantive sphere as well, barring certain government actions 

regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement 

them.” Id. at 840. “The touchstone of due process is protection 

of the individual against arbitrary action of government,” Wolff 

v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974), and “only the most 

egregious official conduct can be said to be ‘arbitrary in the 

constitutional sense,’” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846 (quoting Collins 

v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992)). The 

Supreme Court has held that official conduct rises to this level 

only if it “shocks the conscience.” Id.

The standard used to assess whether conduct “shocks the 

conscience” depends on “whether the officers had the opportunity 

for actual deliberation.” Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1138 

(9th Cir. 2008). “Where actual deliberation is practical, then 

an officer’s ‘deliberate indifference’ may suffice to shock the 

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conscience.” Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 

2010). “On the other hand, where a law enforcement officer makes 

a snap judgment because of an escalating situation, his conduct 

may only be found to shock the conscience if he acts with a 

purpose to harm unrelated to legitimate law enforcement 

objectives.” Id.; see also Porter, 546 F.3d at 1139 (“[W]hen an 

officer encounters fast paced circumstances presenting competing 

public safety obligations, the purpose to harm standard must 

apply.”). 

In Lewis, the Court recognized the pressure to act 

quickly when an officer engages in a vehicle chase: “A police 

officer deciding whether to give chase must balance on one hand 

the need to stop a suspect and show that flight from the law is 

no way to freedom, and, on the other, the high-speed threat to 

all those within stopping range, be they suspects, their 

passengers, other drivers, or bystanders.” 523 U.S. at 853. 

Because of the limited opportunity to deliberate, the Court held

in Lewis that “high-speed chases with no intent to harm suspects 

physically or to worsen their legal plight do not give rise to 

liability under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 854. 

Since Lewis, the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument 

that a distinction could be made “between ‘emergency’ and ‘nonemergency’ situations involving high-speed chases aimed at

apprehending a fleeing suspect” and held that “Lewis requires 

[the court] to apply the ‘intent to harm’ standard to all highspeed chases.” Bingue v. Prunchak, 512 F.3d 1169, 1177 (9th Cir. 

2008). “[I]f a police officer is justified in giving chase, that 

justification insulates the officer from constitutional attack, 

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irrespective of who might be harmed or killed as a consequence of 

the chase,” and thus the same standard governs the officer’s 

conduct when an innocent bystander is injured. Onossian v. 

Block, 175 F.3d 1169, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 1999). 

In their FAC, plaintiffs allege only that Officer 

Kracher “continued [the] pursuit with the knowledge and complete 

understanding that [he] had forced Defendant CARSON to injure[] 

one bystander, and with a complete understanding that there was a 

high likely hood [sic] that [his] actions were going to harm 

Defendant CARSON, as well as other innocent bystanders a second 

time.” (FAC ¶ 30.) The FAC also alleges that Officer Kracher 

continued his pursuit “past a point of reckless indifference.” 

(Id. ¶ 32.) Perhaps most telling is plaintiffs’ characterization 

of this case as one involving only negligence in the opening line 

of their opposition brief. (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 1:2-3 (Docket No. 

10) (“This litigation involves the negligence of Defendants, 

wherein a negligent police chase resulted in the injuries and 

damages to Plaintiffs . . . .” ).)

Without the need for much discussion, the Lewis Court 

easily concluded that allegations that the officer acted 

negligently, recklessly and carelessly, grossly negligent, and in 

a conscious disregard of plaintiffs’ rights failed to rise to the 

level of intent or purpose to cause harm. 523 U.S. at 854; 

accord Bingue, 512 F.3d at 1174. Here, the FAC does not even 

allege the legal conclusion that Officer Kracher continued his 

pursuit of Carson with an intent or purpose to cause harm to 

plaintiffs. Although plaintiffs allege Officer Kracher said “he 

was aware the pursuit was dangerous” and “should have called it 

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off,” (FAC ¶ 34), this admission might suggest that Officer 

Kracher continued the chase in a deliberate indifference to the 

risks to bystanders, but cannot give rise to the inference that 

he acted with a purpose to harm those bystanders. 

Even assuming plaintiffs alleged an intent or 

purpose to harm in a conclusory fashion in the FAC, their 

reliance on Rule 9(b) is misplaced. While Rule 9(b) provides 

that “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a 

person’s mind may be alleged generally,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), 

the Supreme Court recognized in Iqbal that such allegations still 

require sufficient factual support. As the Court explained, 

“‘generally’ is a relative term and, “[i]n the context of Rule 9, 

it is to be compared to the particularity requirement applicable 

to fraud or mistake” and “merely excuses a party from pleading [] 

intent under an elevated pleading standard.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

686; see also Biro v. Conde Nast, 807 F.3d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 

2015) (“Iqbal makes clear that, Rule 9(b)’s language 

notwithstanding, Rule 8’s plausibility standard applies to 

pleading intent.”). In the absence of at least a single factual 

allegation giving rise to the reasonable inference that Officer 

Kracher acted with a purpose to harm plaintiffs, they cannot 

allege a cognizable violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Nor do plaintiffs allege any facts giving rise to the 

inference that Officer Kracher’s pursuit of Carson was unrelated 

to a legitimate law enforcement objective. Plaintiffs appear to 

argue that Officer Kracher was not justified in initiating the 

stop because he knew who Carson was and “could have contacted him 

safely at a later time.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 5:21-22.) The FAC 

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alleges, however, that Carson was suspected of a “non-violent 

‘cold’” misdemeanor, and plaintiffs do not cite a single case 

suggesting that Officer Kracher lacked authority to stop Carson. 

Nor are there any allegations that Officer Kracher attempted to 

stop Carson with the intent of initiating a high-speed chase in a 

residential area or had reason to believe that his attempt to 

stop Carson would lead to a high-speed chase. 

Once a suspect flees, the Supreme Court has made 

it clear that the officer has a legitimate law enforcement 

objective in continuing pursuit until the suspect is apprehended. 

See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 385 (2007) (“But wait, says 

respondent: Couldn’t the innocent public equally have been 

protected, and the tragic accident entirely avoided, if the 

police had simply ceased their pursuit? We think the police need 

not have taken that chance and hoped for the best. . . . First of 

all, there would have been no way to convey convincingly to 

respondent that the chase was off, and that he was free to go. . 

. . Second, we are loath to lay down a rule requiring the police 

to allow fleeing suspects to get away whenever they drive so 

recklessly that they put other people’s lives in danger.”); cf.

Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 310 (2015) (“The Court has []

never found the use of deadly force in connection with a 

dangerous car chase to violate the Fourth Amendment . . . .”) 

Nor can blame for Carson’s decision to flee shift to 

Officer Kracher simply because the officer did not cease pursuit

when Carson drove recklessly. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 855 (“[The 

officer] was faced with a course of lawless behavior for which 

the police were not to blame. They had done nothing to cause 

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Willard’s high-speed driving in the first place, nothing to 

excuse his flouting of the commonly understood law enforcement 

authority to control traffic, and nothing (beyond a refusal to 

call off the chase) to encourage him to race through traffic at 

breakneck speed forcing other drivers out of their travel 

lanes.”). 

Because the FAC lacks even a single factual allegation 

from which the court could reasonably infer that Officer Kracher 

acted with a purpose to harm unrelated to a legitimate law 

enforcement objective, plaintiffs fail to allege a cognizable 

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment necessary to sustain a 

§ 1983 claim against Officer Kracher. In the absence of an 

underlying constitutional violation, plaintiffs’ Monell and 

“supervisorial liability”1 claims similarly fail. See Simmons v. 

Navajo County, 609 F.3d 1011, 1021 (9th Cir. 2010); Patel v. 

Maricopa County, 585 Fed. App’x 452, 452 (9th Cir. 2014). 

Accordingly, the court must grant defendants’ motion to dismiss 

all of plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims. 

2. State Law Claims

“[A court] may decline to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . [it] has dismissed all 

claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367(c)(3). Because plaintiffs fail to allege a cognizable 

federal claim and the gravamen of their FAC relies on allegations

of negligence under state law, the court declines to exercise 

 

1 Plaintiffs have not named any individual supervisors as 

defendants in this action and it appears their “supervisorial 

liability” claim is simply another attempt to allege a Monell

claim against the City and the Department. 

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supplemental jurisdiction over their state law claims. See

Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are 

eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered 

under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine--judicial economy, 

convenience, fairness, and comity--will point toward declining to 

exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 

Similarly, because the court has discretion to consider 

sua sponte whether to continue exercising supplemental 

jurisdiction over state law claims even in the absence of a 

motion to dismiss, Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 

1003 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), the court also declines to 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law 

claims against Carson.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to 

dismiss plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint be, and the same 

hereby is, GRANTED and all claims against all defendants are 

dismissed. 

Plaintiffs have twenty days from the date this Order is 

signed to file a Second Amended Complaint, if they can do so 

consistent with this Order. 

Dated: August 8, 2016

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