Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00368/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00368-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 28:1132 E.R.I.S.A.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

LYNN LOWE,

 NO. CIV. S-05-00368 WBS GGH

Plaintiff,

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

v. FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES & COSTS 

UNUM LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF 

AMERICA dba UNUMPROVIDENT; DOES

1 through 100, inclusive,

Defendant .

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Lynn Lowe filed this lawsuit seeking recovery

of disability benefits under an employee welfare benefit plan

established by her employer and insured by defendant Unum Life

Insurance Company of America. The benefit plan is subject to,

and governed by, the provisions of the Employee Retirement Income

Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. In May

2005, the parties stipulated to a stay of this action pending

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defendant’s reassessment of plaintiff’s claim under defendant’s

nation-wide Regulatory Settlement Agreement (RSA). At the

conclusion of the reassessment, defendant reversed its prior

decision and began immediate payment of plaintiff’s

benefits--thereby concluding this action. Plaintiff now moves

for an award of attorney’s fees and costs associated with the

litigation. 

I. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) and “Prevailing Party”

ERISA provides that “[i]n any action under this

subchapter . . . by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, the

court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and

costs of action to either party.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). This

particular section should be read broadly to mean that a plan

participant or beneficiary, if he or she is able to enforce his

or her rights under his plan, “should ordinarily recover an

attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an

award unjust.” Canseco v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 93

F.3d 600, 609-10 (9th Cir. 1996).

Because this action concluded when defendant proceeded

to pay plaintiff under her insurance policy, defendant contends

that plaintiff failed to achieve the status of a “prevailing

party” and therefore cannot be awarded attorney’s fees under §

1132(g)(1). There is no requirement, however, that a party must

be a “prevailing party” to recover attorney’s fees under §

1132(g)(1). See Gibbs v. Gibbs, 210 F.3d 491, 503 (5th Cir.

2000) (concluding that a party need not prevail to be eligible

for an award of attorney’s fees under § 1132(g)(1) because any

language relating to a prevailing party is “conspicuously absent”

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1 Even recent Ninth Circuit decisions favoring

“prevailing party” status nonetheless recognize, at most, only a

modest inclination that such status is indeed a prerequisite to

an award of attorney’s fees under § 1132(g)(1). See, e.g., Hamilton v. Wash. State Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. Pension

Plan, 433 F.3d 1091, 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Under 29 U.S.C. §

1132(g), a court may, in its discretion, award attorney’s fees

and costs to either party; however, attorney’s fees and costs

under § 1132(g) are ordinarily recovered by the prevailing

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although Congress has often used this language in other

fee-shifting statutes); Trs. of the E. States Health & Welfare

Fund v. Crystal Art Corp., No. 00 Civ. 0887 (NRB), 2004 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 8932 at *11 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2004) (“prevailing

party” analysis is not relevant to a fee award under § 1132(g)

because the statute, “by its terms, does not limit fee awards to

prevailing parties” and “does not include the term ‘prevailing

party’”); aff’d., 132 Fed. Appx. 390 (2d Cir. May 27, 2005). 

The Ninth Circuit has not definitively stated whether a

party must “prevail” under § 1132(g)(1) to warrant attorney’s

fees. Compare D’Emanuele v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 904 F.2d

1379, 1383 (9th Cir. 1990) overruled on other grounds by

Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, (1992) (“Unlike the attorney’s

fee provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 . . . ERISA does not limit

attorney’s fees to a ‘prevailing party’”) and Sokol v. Bernstein,

812 F.2d 559, 561 (9th Cir. 1987) (criteria used to determine

whether an ERISA party is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees

under § 1132(g)(1) “do[es] not rely on the prevailing-party

doctrine”) with McElwaine v. US West, Inc., 176 F.3d 1167, 1171

(9th Cir. 1999) (“29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) . . . authorizes

discretionary attorney’s fees to plan participants who prevail in

an ERISA action.”).1 Accordingly, this court will not require

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party”) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, while stating that

awards of attorney’s fees are appropriate for prevailing parties

in ERISA actions, the Ninth Circuit has not foreclosed the

ability of non-prevailing parties to obtain an award of fees.

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that plaintiff demonstrate “prevailing party” status to merit an

award of attorney’s fees.

II. Discretion to Award Attorney’s Fees

The Ninth Circuit has established a five-factor test to

determine whether a court should exercise its discretion to award

attorney’s fees under § 1132(g)(1). The court should consider

(1) the degree of the opposing parties’ culpability or bad faith;

(2) the ability of the opposing parties to satisfy an award of

fees; (3) whether an award of fees against the opposing parties

would deter others from acting under similar circumstances; (4)

whether the parties requesting fees sought to benefit all

participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to resolve a

significant legal question regarding ERISA; and (5) the relative

merits of the parties’ positions. Hummell v. S.E. Rykoff & Co.,

634 F.2d 446, 453 (9th Cir. 1980). “No one of the Hummell

factors, however, is necessarily decisive, and some may not be

pertinent in a given case.” Carpenters S. Cal. Admin. Corp. v.

Russell, 726 F.2d 1410, 1416 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Russell”). The

factors require a balancing of the equities, and the court need

not find that each one supports an award of fees in granting such

relief. Elwain McElwaine v. U.S. West, Inc., 176 F.3d 1167, 1173

(9th Cir.1999).

Here, the court finds no bad faith by defendant. 

Defendant’s conduct toward plaintiff, however, bears many

similarities to the improper practices detailed in the RSA

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report. (Regulatory Settlement Agreement, Sec. A (“Recitals”).) 

Thus, while this court declines to find bad faith, it concludes

that the absence of bad faith does not weigh strongly against

awarding attorney’s fees. See Frei v. Hartford Life Ins. Co.,

No. 05-01191, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34784 at *11 (N.D. Cal. May

23, 2006) (“There has been no finding or showing of bad faith, so

this factor is not decisive and is, at most, neutral.”).

Defendant does not contest that it is capable of

satisfying an award of fees. (Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for

Att’y’s Fees 4.) Therefore, the second factor weighs in favor of

such an award. 

The third factor, the deterrent effect of an award on

other persons in similar circumstances, also weighs in favor of

granting attorney’s fees. Defendant argues that there is no

evidence that an attorney’s fee award in the instant action will

encourage it to further evaluate its claims handling practice. 

(Id.) However, a fee award would likely deter defendant and

other disability benefit plan administrators from misinterpreting

policy language or eligibility, or would at least make them more

careful in their interpretation and application in disability

benefits cases. See Russell, 726 F.2d at 1416 (“If defendant

employers face the prospect of paying attorney’s fees for

successful plaintiffs, they will have added incentive to comply

with ERISA.”). 

The fourth factor similarly weighs in favor of an award

of attorney’s fees. While plaintiff’s motivation in bringing the

claim was rooted in her desire to recover her own benefits,

others subject to policies or denials similar to the one at issue

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in this case will likely benefit.

The final factor, the relative merits of the parties’

positions, also favors a fee award because, as mentioned above,

the result of the litigation-induced reassessment effectively

vindicated plaintiff’s rights to her disability benefits. Thus,

on balance, the Hummell factors confirm that plaintiff is

entitled to a fee award.

III. Amount of Attorney’s Fees

The Ninth Circuit has adopted the hybrid

lodestar/multiplier approach for determining reasonable fees in

an ERISA action. Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d

1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.

424 (1983)). First, a court calculates the “lodestar” amount by

multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the

litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley, 461 U.S. at

433. The party seeking an award must submit evidence supporting

the hours worked and the rates requested--and a district court

should exclude from the lodestar amount hours that are

“excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Id. at 434. 

Second, the court may adjust the award upward or

downward using a “multiplier” based on the Kerr factors:

(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and

difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill

requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the

preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to

acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6)

whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time

limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances,

(8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the

experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys,

(10) the “undesirability” of the case, (11) the nature

and length of the professional relationship with the

client, and (12) awards in similar cases.

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Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 364 n.8 (9th Cir.

1996) (citing Kerr v. Screen Guild Extras, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70

(9th Cir. 1975)). Many of the Kerr factors have been subsumed in

the lodestar approach. Id. (citing Cunningham v. County of Los

Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 487 (9th Cir. 1988)). Moreover, while the

court should consider the factors established by Kerr, it need

not discuss each factor. Sapper v. Lenco Blade, Inc., 704 F.2d

1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 1983). Under federal law, there is a strong

presumption that the lodestar amount is reasonable--only in rare

instances should it be adjusted based on other factors. Morales,

96 F.3d at 363 n.8; Fischer v. SJB-P.D., Inc., 214 F.3d 1115,

1119 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000). 

A. Hours Reasonably Expended

An attorney in an ERISA action may recover fees for

services provided in conjunction with litigation, including costs

prior to filing the complaint. Dishman v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of

Am., 269 F.3d 974, 987 (9th Cir. 2001). In addition, a party can

recover fees for work done by paralegals. Trustees of Const.

Indus. & Laborers Health & Welfare Trust v. Redland Ins. Co., 460

F.3d 1253, 1256-57 (9th Cir. 2006). However, a party may not

recover for services provided in relation to the administrative

proceedings required to exhaust administrative remedies. 

Dishman, 269 F.3d at 987 n.51 (citing Cann v. Carpenters Pension

Trust Fund for N. Cal., 989 F.2d 313, 314 (9th Cir. 1993)).

The party seeking fees bears the burden of submitting evidence to

support their request. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434

(1983).

Plaintiff’s counsel presents an itemized list totaling

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2 Additionally, plaintiff’s counsel billed his client 4.5

hours to prepare this motion for fees and costs. Considering

that the motion is three pages long (which includes his

memorandum of points and authorities as well as his declaration

in support of the motion) and cites a total of three cases, this

billing request is also deemed excessive and will also be reduced

to two hours.

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43.5 hours of attorney work and 49.5 hours by paralegals. 

(Hendricks Decl. Ex. 1.) Defendant challenges the reasonableness

of the amount of time spent on preparing the complaint as well as

a variety of entries that it contends are unwarranted and/or

unreasonably duplicative. (Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for

Att’y’s Fees 6.)

1. Excessive Hours

On August 29, 2004, plaintiff’s counsel billed five (5)

hours to “prepare complaint.” Defendant argues that five hours

is unreasonable and excessive because plaintiff “filed a ‘form’

complaint in State Court, which required only the checking of a

couple of boxes and entry of less than a half dozen lines of

text.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff does not provide further detail

explaining why a form complaint took five hours, nor does

plaintiff object to defendant’s recommendation that preparation

took, at most, two hours. The court agrees that spending five

hours on a form complaint is excessive, and accordingly will

reduce this amount to two hours.2 

2. Duplicative Entries

Defendant draws the court’s attention to two

duplicative entries. On March 26, 2007, two entries of thirty

minutes each are listed for “Electronic Filing.” On September

19, 2007, four entries appear for fifteen minutes each with the

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explanation, “Email from Defense in regarding Attorney Fees.” 

Lastly, on September 20, 2007, two more emails for thirty minutes

each appear with the same explanation, “Email from Defense in

regarding Attorney Fees.” Plaintiff offers no explanation as to

why the duplicative entries appear and does not represent that

different tasks were performed for the entries. Therefore, the

court will only include one charge for each of the three

duplicative entries (reducing the total amount by one hour of

attorney time and thirty minutes of paralegal time).

3. Insufficient Descriptions

Defendant objects to plaintiff’s sixty-one entries for

“monthly file review,” which are billed at fifteen minutes by

counsel and the paralegal. The court agrees with defendant that

these entries are inadequate and fail to memorialize what, if

anything, counsel and his paralegal did each month that they

“reviewed” the file, especially during the two years this case

was stayed. See Wininger v. SI Management L.P., 301 F.3d 1115,

1126 (9th Cir. 2002) (asserting that such brevity “patently

fall[s] short of the requirement” that “[t]he party petitioning

for attorneys’ fees bears the burden of submitting detailed time

records justifying the hours claimed to have been expended”). 

The court will exclude all “monthly file review” entries from the

total fee (reducing the total amount by 7.75 hours of attorney

time and 7.5 hours of paralegal time). 

Plaintiff has six additional entries dealing with

plaintiff’s “review” of the file (e.g., “review and notation of

file;” “review and notation of file regarding records;” “file

review and analysis;” and “review of file”). Again, these

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entries fail to establish what counsel’s purpose was for

reviewing the file and what counsel’s client gained by the

review. Because plaintiff has the burden to sufficiently

document the time spent, the court will not award this time

(reducing the total amount by fifteen minutes of attorney time

and 1.25 hours of paralegal time). 

Plaintiff also has four entries relating to

“paperwork.” Plaintiff does not offer any explanation as to the

relevance of the paperwork and, because many of plaintiff’s

entries deal with matters not related to this case (discussed

below), such entries provide insufficient information. The total

time will be reduced by the 1.5 paralegal hours spent on such

“paperwork.” 

4. Unrelated Matters

Plaintiff has two entries described as “opting in or

out of class.” It does not appear that these entries have

anything to do with this case. The court will not award the

thirty minutes of lawyer time spent on this task. 

Plaintiff also has seven entries regarding client’s

Social Security benefits. While these services may be billable

to the client, defendant contends, and plaintiff does not state

otherwise, that Social Security benefits were not related to

plaintiff’s ERISA claim. The time will be reduced by the 2.25

hours of paralegal time spent on Social Security benefits. 

Similarly, plaintiff has seven entries regarding

communications with Sutter Health, which does not appear to have

any relation to this case. While one entry deals with

substituting Doe 1 for Unumprovident Sales Agent to Sutter Heath,

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the court’s docket does not reveal this motion by plaintiff and

counsel does not contend that this work is related to this case. 

The time will be reduced by the thirty minutes of attorney time

and 2.5 hours of paralegal time spent on this task. 

Plaintiff also lists four entries dealing with

plaintiff’s claim for worker’s compensation benefits, which again

have no apparent relation to this case. The time will be reduced

by the fifteen minutes of attorney time and 1.25 hours of

paralegal time spent on this task. 

5. Unnecessary Charges

Defendant further objects to plaintiff’s entry for

drafting a request for production of documents while this action

was stayed and while no discovery was occurring. Plaintiff does

not provide an explanation for the entry and such a request was

never served on the defendant. The court will deduct the fifteen

minutes of attorney time spent on this task. 

6. Reassessment

In Cann v. Carpenters’ Pension Trust Fund for N. Cal.,

989 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1993), the Ninth Circuit construed §

1132(g)(1) as “limiting the fee award to fees incurred in the

litigation in court.” Id. at 316. The court found that because

the word “action” in its usual legal sense means “a suit brought

in a court; a formal complaint within the jurisdiction of a court

of law,” and “includes all the formal proceedings in a court of

justice attendant upon the demand of a right . . . in such court

. . . .” Black’s Law Dictionary 26 (5th ed. 1983), then Congress

must have selected the word “action” to designate only

proceedings in court, not proceedings such as those employed in

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the RSA reassessment process--even though admittedly necessary

and valuable. Id. (citing Gates v. Columbia-Knickerbocker Trust

Co., 233 F. 359, 362 (9th Cir. 1916)).

Here, defendant correctly asserts that the reassessment

of plaintiff’s claim under the RSA took place while on stay from

actual in-court litigation. Therefore, the entries on 5/06/05,

5/16/05, 9/07/06 (“research on consent decree from State of CA”),

9/15/06 (“updated letter to client with copies of forms to sign

for Unum”), 10/20/06, 1/10/07, 2/01/07, 4/09/07, and 4/11/07,

relating to the reassessment, will be not be considered in

calculation of the award. 

7. Quarter Hour Minimums

Plaintiff’s fee petition also reflects the use of

quarter-hour or fifteen minute minimums for all tasks. “The

Ninth Circuit has affirmed an across the board reduction of

attorney’s fees when services were billed on the quarter hour

without proper specificity.” Smith v. CitiFinancial Retail

Servs, No. 06-2966, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58723 at *8 (N.D. Cal

Aug. 2, 2007) (citing Welch v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 480

F.3d 942, 948-49 (9th Cir. 2007)). This is because the use of

quarter hour minimums can easily lead to billing abuses. See

Welch, 480 F.3d at 949 (“The court found the hours were inflated

because counsel billed a minimum of 15 minutes for numerous phone

calls and e-mails that likely took a fraction of the time. Our

own review of the time sheet confirms that it is replete with

quarter-hour or half-hour charges for the drafting of letters,

telephone calls and intraoffice conferences.”) 

Here, plaintiff’s submitted fee petition includes

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3 In his declaration, Mr. Hendricks states that the

“firm’s paralegals are billed at $75.” However, the itemized

bill charged $100 per hour for the paralegals. The court will

rely on Mr. Hendricks’ declaration as to the paralegals’ billing

rate. 

13

multiple fifteen minute minimums for tasks as menial as receiving

faxes, generating automated emails, engaging in various telephone

calls, etc., without appropriate explanation validating the time

spent on each. Because plaintiff’s record of hours worked is

replete with quarter-hour and half-hour charges for such tasks,

the court finds that an across-the-board reduction of ten percent

(10%) of plaintiff counsel’s requested hours is appropriate. See

id. at 948-49 (affirming an across-the-board reduction of twenty

percent (20%) where quarter-hour billing resulted in inflated

hours).

B. Reasonable Rate

To determine the reasonableness of hourly billing

rates, the court looks to the prevailing market rates in the

relevant community for similar work performed by attorneys of

comparable skill, experience, and reputation. Blum v. Stenson,

465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984); Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796

F.2d 1205, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 1986). Under federal law, the

relevant community is the forum in which the district court sits,

as opposed to where counsel is located. Barjon v. Dalton, 132

F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1997).

Plaintiff seeks a rate of $250 per hour for her

attorney’s work and $75 per hour for paralegal time.3 Defendant

asks this court to lower opposing counsel’s rate to $200 per

hour. Where a plaintiff submits affidavits regarding prevailing

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rates in the community, the Ninth Circuit has implied that

defendants cannot simply disagree with this evidence, but should

“support their arguments with any affidavits or evidence of their

own regarding legal rates in the community.” See United

Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th

Cir. 1990). In this case, however, plaintiff did not offer any

evidence about the prevailing rate in the community. The

defendant, on the other hand, only cited a single case, but

provides no affidavits or persuasive legal authority. Welch v.

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28576, #13

(C.D. Cal. 2004) (finding that a rate of $250.00 per hour was

reasonable for an experienced ERISA attorney) (emphasis added).

The only information plaintiff offered this court is a

statement from plaintiff’s counsel that he has practiced law for

thirteen years and is the Managing Attorney for his firm’s

disability department. He states that he has argued over 1,300

Social Security Disability hearings, filed district court

complaints to overturn Social Security final administrative

determinations, and bills at $250 for his hourly rate. 

Plaintiff’s counsel does not, however, state that he has ever

handled a single ERISA case prior to this one. Further, in the

itemized bill attached, he billed his time at $200.00 per hour,

not the $250.00 he stated in his declaration. The lack of

information about plaintiff’s counsel’s ERISA experience and the

fact that his time was actually billed at $200 per hour persuades

this court that $200 per hour is a reasonable hourly fee for his

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4 Defendant also contends that plaintiff’s counsel had a

contingency fee agreement with plaintiff, and thus requests this

court deny an award that would amount to a “double recovery of

fees.” (Def.’s Mem. in Opp’n. to Pl.’s Mot. for Att’y’s Fees

10:20-24.) However, a district court may not rely on a

contingency agreement to increase or decrease what it determines

to be a reasonable attorney’s fee. Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mut.

Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 2000)

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services.4

C. Costs

In an ERISA action, courts may award “only the types of

‘costs’ allowed by 28 U.S.C. § 1920, and only in the amounts

allowed by section 1920 itself, by 28 U.S.C. § 1821 or by similar

such provisions.” Agredano v. Mutual of Omaha Cos., 75 F.3d 541,

544 (9th Cir. 1996). In his declaration, plaintiff’s counsel

requests costs in the amount of $340.80 for the filing of the

complaint and court motions. (Hendricks Decl. ¶ 3.) Defendant

does not oppose this amount in its opposition, and therefore the

court will award the requested costs. 

IV. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing discussion, attorney’s

fees and litigation expenses are awarded in the following

amounts:

Mr. Hendricks:

43.5 hrs -(16.25) x $200/hr = $5,450.00 +

Paralegal:

49.5 hrs -(16.75) x $75/hr = $2,456.25 -

Ten Percent (10%) Reduction:

$7,906.25 x .10 = $790.63 +

Case 2:05-cv-00368-WBS-GGH Document 31 Filed 12/14/07 Page 15 of 16
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Costs:

 = $340.80

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TOTAL $7,456.42

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for

attorneys’ fees and costs be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED, in

the amount of $7,115.62.

DATED: December 13, 2007

Case 2:05-cv-00368-WBS-GGH Document 31 Filed 12/14/07 Page 16 of 16