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Nature of Suit Code: 136
Nature of Suit: 
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

SUFI NETWORK SERVICES, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellant

______________________ 

2015-5151

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:11-cv-00804-TCW, Judge Thomas C. 

Wheeler. 

______________________ 

Decided: March 29, 2016

______________________ 

FREDERICK W. CLAYBROOK, JR., Crowell & Moring, 

LLP, Washington, DC, for plaintiff-appellee. Also represented by BRIAN TULLY MCLAUGHLIN. 

DOUGLAS T. HOFFMAN, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for defendant-appellant. Also represented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

STEVEN J. GILLINGHAM. 

_____________________ 

Before NEWMAN, LOURIE, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges. 

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2 SUFI NETWORK SERVICES, INC. v. US

TARANTO, Circuit Judge. 

This government contract case returns to us after the 

completion by a contract appeals board of the remand 

proceedings that we ordered in 2014. The board reached 

its final decision in early 2015, and the private contractor 

promptly accepted the decision. When the United States 

challenged its own board’s decision, the Court of Federal 

Claims dismissed the challenge. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

As the parties agree, this case is governed by the 

Wunderlich Act, codified at 41 U.S.C. §§ 321–322 before 

its repeal in 2011. Under a contract with the Air Force, 

SUFI Network Services, Inc. invested money to build and 

to operate telephone systems at certain Air Force bases 

and was to earn returns on that investment for fifteen

years (for each installation) from per-call charges, the 

revenue to be shared with the Air Force. The Air Force 

breached the contract in various ways by allowing contractually prohibited diversions of calls from the SUFI 

phones, depriving SUFI of revenue. See SUFI Network 

Servs., Inc. v. United States, 755 F.3d 1305, 1309–10 (Fed. 

Cir. 2014) (2014 CAFC Decision).

Following the contractually prescribed process for 

dispute resolution, SUFI brought claims against the Air 

Force, and the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals 

(Board or ASBCA) rendered a decision on those claims. 

The Board found breach and awarded roughly $2.8 million (plus interest) on one group of claims and roughly 

$4.6 million (plus interest) on another. See J.A. 3899–

3900. The award on the first group of claims became final

and has not been at issue since then. SUFI was dissatisfied with the Board’s damages determinations on the 

second group of claims, so it sued the United States in the 

Court of Federal Claims to challenge those determinations on numerous grounds, invoking the standards of 

review set by the Wunderlich Act. See S & E Contractors, 

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SUFI NETWORK SERVICES, INC. v. US 3

Inc. v. United States, 406 U.S. 1, 3 n.1 (1972); United 

States v. Anthony Grace & Sons, Inc., 384 U.S. 424, 427 

n.3 (1966); United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 

709, 709 n.1 (1963). The United States filed no counterclaims to challenge any aspect of the Board’s decision, 

including the rulings on breach and damages. 

After the Court of Federal Claims granted SUFI relief, SUFI Network Servs., Inc. v. United States, 108 Fed. 

Cl. 287, 321 (2012) (2012 CFC Decision), the United 

States appealed several of that court’s rulings to this 

court. SUFI cross-appealed to obtain more relief on a few 

points. The United States sought to reinstate a variety of 

Board determinations on damages, but it asked in the 

alternative that this court order a remand for the Board 

to exercise its “wide discretion” in fact-finding if this court 

agreed with SUFI that the Board had committed errors

that prejudiced SUFI. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant, 

The United States at 26, 33–34, 38, SUFI Network Servs., 

Inc. v. United States, 755 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Nos. 

2013-5039, -5040) (2014 U.S. Br.); Reply and Response for 

Defendant-Appellant at 30, SUFI Network Servs., Inc. v. 

United States, 755 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Nos. 2013-

5039, -5040) (2014 U.S. Reply Br.). 

Our 2014 CAFC Decision was governed by the same 

standard of review of the Board’s rulings as governed in 

the Court of Federal Claims. We held that the Court of 

Federal Claims had not properly applied that standard in 

several respects. And, when we applied the proper standard of review to the Board’s rulings, we agreed with a 

number, though not all, of SUFI’s assertions of prejudicial 

error by the Board. We ordered the Court of Federal 

Claims to remand the case to the Board for further proceedings on certain issues bearing on SUFI’s challenges. 

The Board conducted the remand proceedings and 

reached a decision in early 2015. SUFI Network Servs., 

Inc., ASBCA No. 55306, 15-1 BCA ¶ 35,878, J.A. 3899–

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4 SUFI NETWORK SERVICES, INC. v. US

3924, modified on reconsideration, SUFI Network Servs., 

Inc., No. ASBCA 55306, 15-1 BCA ¶ 35,992, J.A. 3925–

3933. The new Board decision, though not giving SUFI 

all it sought on the claims at issue, was much more favorable to SUFI than the earlier Board decision on those 

claims: it awarded roughly $113 million (plus interest)

rather than the original amount of roughly $4.6 million 

(plus interest). Indeed, the new decision was favorable 

enough that SUFI filed in the Court of Federal Claims, in 

the docket of the Wunderlich Act case that had produced 

the remand to the Board, a notice stating that it accepted 

the 2015 Board decision. 

The United States, however, was dissatisfied with its 

own Board’s decision. It filed with the Court of Federal 

Claims, in the same docket, a request for review of the 

new award. The Court of Federal Claims denied the 

request. SUFI Network Servs., Inc. v. United States, 122 

Fed. Cl. 257, 263 (2015) (2015 CFC Decision). 

 The Court of Federal Claims explained that, as relevant here, “[u]nder the Wunderlich Act, only the contractor has the right to appeal from a Board decision.” 2015 

CFC Decision, 122 Fed. Cl. at 259. The basis for that rule 

is the exchange embodied in the contract between SUFI 

and the Air Force, which includes a “standard ‘Disputes’ 

clause” under which SUFI gave up its rights to cease work 

if a dispute arose and both SUFI and the government 

agreed that “ ‘the decision of the Board shall be final and 

conclusive.’” See id. at 261.1 The “trade-off” is the con-

 

1 The 2015 CFC Decision quotes the disputes clause 

included in the April 1996 contract:

 DISPUTES (1979 DEC) 

 a. Except as otherwise provided in this contract, 

any dispute or claim concerning this contract 

which is not disposed of by agreement shall be deCase: 15-5151 Document: 33-2 Page: 4 Filed: 03/29/2016
SUFI NETWORK SERVICES, INC. v. US 5

tractor’s promise to stay on the job and the United States’

commitment “to be bound by board decisions favorable to 

the contractor.” Id. at 262. 

 

cided by the Contracting Officer, who shall state 

his decision in writing and mail or otherwise furnish a copy of it to the Contractor. Within 90 days 

from the date of receipt of such copy, the Contractor may appeal by mailing or otherwise furnishing 

to the Contracting Officer a written appeal addressed to the Armed Services Board of Contract 

Appeals, and the decision of the Board shall be final and conclusive; provided that if no such appeal 

is filed, the decision of the Contracting Officer 

shall be final and conclusive. The Contractor shall 

be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to offer 

evidence in support of any appeal under the

clause. Pending final decision on such a dispute, 

however, the Contractor shall proceed diligently 

with the performance of the contract and in accordance with the decision of the Contracting Officer unless directed to do otherwise by the 

Contracting Officer.

 b. This ‘Disputes’ clause does not preclude consideration of law questions in connection with decisions provided for in paragraph “a” above, 

provided, that nothing in this contract shall be 

construed as making final the decision of any administrative official, representative, or board on a 

question of law. 

2015 CFC Decision, 122 Fed. Cl. at 261; see Jt. App. (2014 

J.A.) at 1537, SUFI Network Servs., Inc. v. United States, 

755 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Nos. 13-5039, -5040) (2001 

version, identical except “90” replaced by “30”).

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6 SUFI NETWORK SERVICES, INC. v. US

The Court of Federal Claims stated that, under clear 

precedents now more than 35 years old, “the United 

States d[oes] not have the right to seek review of an 

adverse board of contract appeals’ decision” where, as 

here, there is no claim of fraud or bad faith on the part of 

the Board and the contractor fully accepts the decision. 

Id. at 261–62; see S & E, 406 U.S. at 8; id. at 20 

(Blackmun, J., with whom Burger, C.J., and Stewart and 

Powell, JJ., join, concurring); Roscoe-Ajax Constr. Co. v. 

United States, 499 F.2d 639, 644–47 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Fischbach & Moore Int’l Corp. v. United States, 617 F.2d 223, 

225–28 (Ct. Cl. 1980).2 The cited cases make clear one 

policy underlying that rule: reducing contract costs to the 

government by avoiding the prospect, for contractors, of 

costly litigation and delay in payment after “the only 

agency empowered to act [has] determined that [the 

contractor] [i]s entitled to payment.” S & E, 406 U.S. at 

8; Roscoe-Ajax, 499 F.2d at 644 n.6; see 2015 CFC Decision, 122 Fed. Cl. at 262. The Court of Claims long ago 

summarized the Wunderlich Act rule: in the absence of 

fraud or bad faith, “the boards [a]re the agencies and [a]re 

also the Federal Government.” Fischbach & Moore, 617 

F.2d at 226. 

Applying those principles, the Court of Federal 

Claims in this case concluded: “The Air Force designated 

the ASBCA as its authorized representative for disputes 

 

2 Roscoe-Ajax recognizes that, even if there is no 

fraud or bad faith, the United States may assert a counterclaim challenging a Board ruling in limited circumstances—where the counterclaim is just one “facet” of a 

single specific dispute that the contractor “is still keeping . . . alive in court.” 499 F.2d at 646. That principle is 

doubly inapplicable here: the United States asserted no 

counterclaims in this case; and in any event the “specific 

dispute is over because the contractor is satisfied.” Id.

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SUFI NETWORK SERVICES, INC. v. US 7

arising under the contract. For purposes of this case, the 

‘United States’ is the ASBCA, not the Department of 

Justice,” 2015 CFC Decision, 122 Fed. Cl. at 262, whose 

duty “‘is to implement [the Board’s] decision and not to 

repudiate it,’” id. (alteration by Court of Federal Claims) 

(quoting S & E, 406 U.S. at 13). And:

SUFI has indicated its satisfaction with the 

Board’s decision. By SUFI’s contract with [the Air 

Force], the Board served as the authorized representative of the United States. The sole responsibility of the Department of Justice is to implement 

the Board’s decision. The fact that the Department of Justice is dissatisfied with the Board’s 

remand decision is immaterial to the Court’s 

analysis. In assessing whether the Board followed 

the remand instructions of the Federal Circuit, it 

is enough to say that the Board obviously did 

what it was told. The Board promptly conducted 

the remand proceedings directed by the Federal 

Circuit. The Government cannot reject the 

Board’s decision, and it has no right to challenge 

the merits of the Board’s remand decision. SUFI’s 

satisfaction with the Board’s remand decision is 

the end of the line.

Id. at 262–63.

The United States appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) to review the final decision of 

the Court of Federal Claims dismissing the case. 

DISCUSSION

SUFI moved to dismiss or for summary affirmance. 

Based on the initial and supplemental briefing submitted 

by the parties, we affirm.

We need not repeat the recitation given just above of 

the legal principles established by the S & E line of precCase: 15-5151 Document: 33-2 Page: 7 Filed: 03/29/2016
8 SUFI NETWORK SERVICES, INC. v. US

edents, including Roscoe-Ajax and Fischbach & Moore. 

Under that body of law, it is clear that the United States 

could not seek review of the new Board decision if that 

decision were the Board’s initial decision and SUFI did 

not challenge it under the Wunderlich Act, as there is no 

alleged fraud or bad faith by the Board. Here, the Board’s 

new decision is not the first Board decision in the case. 

But we have been offered no good reason why that fact

provides a basis for a different conclusion under the S & E 

line of authority. 

The new decision is no less the position of the United 

States just because it is not the initial decision. Under its 

contract with SUFI, embodying an exchange of promises 

defining the dispute-resolution process, the United States 

is bound by the position now articulated by the Board

acting in good faith and without fraud after an extensive 

and vigorously contested process. Holding the United 

States to its Board-determined position is a straightforward application of the long-established S & E line of 

authority and of the Wunderlich Act policy it implements: 

“respect for the parties’ rights to contract and to provide 

for their own remedies.” Anthony Grace & Sons, 384 U.S. 

at 429; see id. at 430 (“[T]he inadequacy or unavailability 

of administrative relief must clearly appear before a party 

is permitted to circumvent his own contractual agreement.”).

The United States suggests that a different conclusion 

is warranted because “the Wunderlich Act was repealed” 

in 2011 and the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 41 U.S.C. 

§§ 7101–7109—which partly replaced the Wunderlich Act

(well before that Act’s final repeal)—“clearly does authorize Government appeal” of adverse Board decisions. Def.-

Appellant’s Resp. to Pl.-Appellee’s Mot. to Dismiss for 

Want of Jurisdiction and Mot. for Summary Affirmance at 

12, ECF No. 18. The conclusion urged does not follow 

from the premises. The repeal of the Wunderlich Act 

certainly means that the legal issues presented here are

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SUFI NETWORK SERVICES, INC. v. US 9

of little if any future significance. But neither the repeal 

of the Act nor the distinct provisions of a different statute

that is inapplicable here (and that co-existed with the 

Wunderlich Act for three decades, starting before Fischbach & Moore was decided) provides any basis for rejecting a straightforward application of the precedents under 

the Wunderlich Act.

The United States makes one other argument to avoid 

being bound by the Board decision. It contends that it 

should be permitted to challenge the contractor-accepted 

Board decision so that the Court of Federal Claims and 

this court may ensure that the Board complied with this 

court’s 2014 mandate. We see no sound basis for that 

contention.

The United States cites no authorities that are on 

point. It cites only decisions from quite different settings 

that make familiar, general points about mandate compliance.3 None of those decisions were rendered in cases 

that arose under the Wunderlich Act or involved a contract disputes clause like the one here. And none address

a mandate-compliance argument in circumstances like 

the ones in this case—where the government took a 

(contract) position that the adverse party challenged in 

court; the challenger secured a remand for the government (Board) to reconsider certain matters decided ad-

 

3 The United States cites the following decisions: 

Banks v. United States, 741 F.3d 1268, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 

2014); Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Education

Society, 97 F.2d 513, 513 (2d Cir. 1938); Briggs v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 334 U.S. 304, 306 (1948); United 

States v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, 236 

U.S. 194, 199 (1915); and Northern Helex Co. v. United 

States, 634 F.2d 557, 560 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (citing General

Atomic Co. v. Felter, 436 U.S. 493, 497 (1978); In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U.S. 247, 255 (1895)).

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10 SUFI NETWORK SERVICES, INC. v. US

versely to the challenger; and on remand the government

(Board) reached a decision that the challenger fully accepted and that, had it been made originally, the government could not challenge in court. 

The argument for a “mandate compliance” exception 

to the clear and long-settled Wunderlich Act doctrine not 

only lacks support in precedent. The argument also is 

contrary to the simple, established basis of that doctrine. 

All of the rights and duties at issue are contract rights 

and duties that are within the broad power of the parties 

to determine by agreement among themselves. That is 

what has now occurred: the United States, through its 

designated representative, i.e., the Board, acting in good 

faith and without fraud, has taken a position on those 

contract matters, and SUFI accepts that position. Under 

these circumstances, the Wunderlich Act line of authorities, applied to the disputes clause at issue, makes binding on the United States the contract position that it has 

taken through its contractually specified decision-maker. 

In any event, even if we were to find a “mandate compliance” exception to the Wunderlich Act doctrine, we 

would not find any violation of this court’s 2014 mandate 

by the 2015 Board decision in this case. We consider the 

scope of our mandate and whether it was violated de 

novo. See Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., 

Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2009). “After our 

mandate issues, the mandate rule forecloses reconsideration of issues implicitly or explicitly decided on appeal. 

For an issue to be implicitly decided, it must be decided by 

necessary implication. Moreover, in interpreting this 

court’s mandate, both the letter and the spirit of the 

mandate must be considered.” TecSec, Inc. v. Int’l Bus. 

Machs. Corp., 731 F.3d 1336, 1341–42 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see 

Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 757 

F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Amado v. Microsoft 

Corp., 517 F.3d 1353, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Engel Indus., 

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SUFI NETWORK SERVICES, INC. v. US 11

Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 166 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 

1999). We find no mandate violation here. 

Nothing in this court’s mandate in 2014—nothing in 

our 2014 CAFC Decision or the specific descriptions of 

what was to be done on remand—altered the longestablished rule that the United States is bound by its 

own Board’s determinations under the disputes clause 

where there is no claim of fraud or bad faith on the part of 

the Board and the contractor accepts those determinations. To permit the United States to challenge the 2015 

Board decision would require that the United States be 

relieved of the obligation to respect its own Board’s decision in these circumstances. This court did not grant the 

United States any such relief.

Moreover, the court in its 2014 decision did not give 

the United States any rights in the Board proceedings, 

substantive or procedural, that the Board did not already 

recognize. Indeed, the United States did not ask for any 

relief against the Board. This court did not restrict the 

Board’s authority to hold the United States to any waivers or forfeitures of arguments, or require the Board to 

consider arguments the United States did not present to 

this court, or forbid the Board to rely on the existing 

record in deciding the remanded questions. Nor did the 

court constrain the Board’s “wide discretion” regarding 

either the weighing of evidence to find facts (2014 U.S. Br. 

26) or the recitation of evidence and contentions when 

explaining its findings of fact. See, e.g., Bowman Transp., 

Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 

(1974) (court upholds “a decision of less than ideal clarity 

if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned”); 

Newhouse v. Nicholson, 497 F.3d 1298, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 

2007) (court presumes that a fact-finder reviews all the 

evidence presented, even evidence not discussed by the 

fact-finder); Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. 

Cir. 2000); Medtronic, Inc. v. Daig Corp., 789 F.2d 903, 

906 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

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12 SUFI NETWORK SERVICES, INC. v. US

Because a mandate is to be construed by considering 

the context, we note that no United States counterclaims 

for relief against the Board were before us in 2014 and

this court’s 2014 rulings as to deficiencies in the Board’s

decisions on several issues all concerned deficiencies 

creating potential prejudice to SUFI. Of course, as to 

those deficiencies, this court agreed with the United 

States that the Court of Federal Claims had erred in 

several respects, e.g., regarding the burden of proof on 

certain aspects of the damages determination and the 

making of factual findings itself rather than remanding to 

the Board. See, e.g., 2014 CAFC Decision, 755 F.3d at 

1311–13, 1319–20, 1321, 1323. But, as to the burden of 

proof, this court recognized that “the Board” itself “did not 

err in placing the burden on SUFI to prove its damages.” 

Id. at 1313. More generally, all of this court’s remand 

directives came in the context of explanations that the 

Board had not given SUFI’s arguments and evidence their 

due. 

Even if we were to read some of this court’s explanations of Board deficiencies as mandates to the Board 

favoring the United States, we would not find that the

Board in 2015 committed a mandate violation. The 

United States points to a passage in this court’s 2014 

decision stating that “the Board failed to consider whether an adverse inference should be drawn against the 

government” concerning damages, citing Bigelow v. RKO 

Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946). 2014 

CAFC Decision, 755 F.3d at 1315. As relevant here, 

however, the most we did was to order the Board to 

consider the adverse-inference question in light of Bigelow. We also noted—what cannot help the United 

States—that “the Air Force failed to maintain [certain 

call] records even though it was on notice of this potential 

contract dispute.” Id. The Board on remand duly considered the question in light of Bigelow. J.A. 3906, 3926–27. 

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SUFI NETWORK SERVICES, INC. v. US 13

The United States also points to the burden-of-proof 

discussion in our 2014 decision. 2014 CAFC Decision, 755 

F.3d at 1312–13. But the Board on remand specifically 

noted that its adverse-inference conclusion “did not dispense with SUFI’s burden of proof of damages,” a burden 

it had recognized even before this court’s 2014 decision. 

J.A. 3927. The Board similarly followed this court’s 

directive to consider the role of “official” calls under the 

contract between SUFI and the Air Force. 2014 CAFC 

Decision, 755 F.3d at 1316. The Board found that SUFI 

was contractually entitled to charge for such calls, and so 

such calls must be included among the compensable calls 

lost to SUFI by the Air Force’s contract-breaching diversion of calls from SUFI phones. J.A. 3905. And the Board 

calculated damages under Count XVI for 15-year terms 

“from the date of completion and acceptance of the telephone system at each site,” 2014 CAFC Decision, 755 F.3d

at 1322. See J.A. 3918–22, 3928. This court in 2014 

mandated nothing about “cut-over” dates, which the 

United States invokes in criticism of the 2015 Board 

decision.4 

The most general sources of the United States’ arguments about a mandate violation are passages in the 

court’s discussion of Counts III and V. On both counts, 

this court found that the Board had inadequately consid-

 

4 The United States made no argument about “cutover” dates in the 2014 appeal. See 2014 U.S. Br. 35–38; 

2014 U.S. Reply Br. 35. When the United States observed 

in passing that there were factual issues about when 

“acceptance” occurred, 2014 U.S. Br. 38, it cited only 2014 

J.A. at 3836. That page comes from the parties’ Joint 

Comments on a draft version of the 2012 CFC Decision; in 

Attachment A of the Joint Comments, the parties gave 

various figures and stated that they agreed regarding the 

Count XVI calculation. 2014 J.A. at 3812 n.1.

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14 SUFI NETWORK SERVICES, INC. v. US

ered SUFI’s evidence that it lost far more profits than the 

Board had initially found. 2014 CAFC Decision, 755 F.3d 

at 1316, 1318. One passage, discussing Count III, concerned whether the higher price of in-room calls on SUFI 

phones might make the number of (improperly available) 

hallway/lobby phone minutes an overestimate of lost 

SUFI minutes. This court said that the Board had not 

attempted to “assess the magnitude of any purchaselimiting effect or, more basically, consider all relevant 

real-world record facts that might affect whether, in this 

context, it might even be the case that, on balance, fewer 

minutes were spent on hallway/lobby calls than would 

have been spent on calls made from guest rooms (in the 

absence of hallway/lobby phones), despite the higher cost 

of in-room [SUFI] calls.” Id. at 1316. Because of that 

deficiency, Count III was “remanded to the Board for 

reconsideration.” Id. Similarly, the court found a deficiency in the Board’s consideration of SUFI’s evidence 

regarding Count V and so “order[ed] a remand to the 

Board for reconsideration of whether SUFI’s evidence 

provided a reasonably certain estimate—a fair and reasonable approximation—of damages from this breach.” 

Id. at 1318.

We have to generalize those passages beyond their 

terms to treat them as mandates running in the United 

States’ favor, but even if we do so, we see no mandate 

violation. The Board in 2015 gave the issues the reconsideration this court ordered, all as part of the overall 

question of whether SUFI proved a reasonable estimate of 

its damages. J.A. 3902–10, 3926–30; see, e.g., J.A. 3906 

(“we hold that one can reasonably determine from the 

x.4619 long distance call data SUFI’s lost revenues attributable to hallway/lobby” phones, “except for Rhein 

Main and Spangdahlem calls”), J.A. 3927 (referring to 

“our [the Board’s] holding that SUFI’s surrogate phone 

X.4619 call data evidence was a reasonable estimate of 

Count III damages and our rejection of the government’s 

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SUFI NETWORK SERVICES, INC. v. US 15

‘real-world record facts’ which do not support its theories 

of discounted damages and revenue comparisons”). The 

United States in this case has relied on this court’s observation that “the amount of damages to award ‘is not an 

exact science, and the methodology of assessing and 

computing damages is committed to the sound discretion 

of the [trier of fact].’” Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls v. Mega Sys., LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 

2003), quoted at 2014 U.S. Reply Br. 30.

The United States’ mandate-violation contention now 

rests ultimately on a criticism of the Board for not sufficiently discussing each of the United States’ specific 

evidentiary arguments. But there is no such requirement 

in this court’s 2014 mandate, and “[w]e presume that a 

fact finder reviews all the evidence presented unless [it] 

explicitly expresses otherwise.” Medtronic, 789 F.2d at 

906; see Newhouse, 497 F.3d at 1302; Gonzales, 218 F.3d 

at 1381. Given how exhaustively the competing inferences from evidence were contested and examined in the 

numerous rounds of this dispute-resolution process, there 

may not be grounds for disturbing the Board decision here 

even under the standards of review applicable outside the 

mandate-compliance context. Regardless, there is no 

mandate violation.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court 

of Federal Claims is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

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