Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00203/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00203-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332nr Diversity-Notice of Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JAMES LINLOR, an individual, and on 

behalf of his minor child A.L., 

Plaintiff,

v. 

THE NATIONAL RIFLE 

ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, 

Defendant.

Case No.: 17cv203-MMA (JMA)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S EX 

PARTE MOTION FOR 

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 

ORDER 

[Doc. No. 13]

Plaintiff James Linlor (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed the instant action 

against Defendant the National Rifle Association of America (“Defendant”) in San Diego 

County Superior Court on December 28, 2016. See Doc. No. 1; Exh. A. Plaintiff alleges 

Defendant violated California Civil Code Section 3344 by addressing and mailing 

membership renewal notices and other marketing material to Plaintiff and his minor 

child. See id. Defendant removed the action to this Court on February 2, 2017. See id. 

On March 31, 2017, Plaintiff filed the pending ex parte motion for a temporary and 

permanent restraining order (“TRO”) against Defense counsel for alleged criminal 

harassment and stalking of Plaintiff’s minor child, pursuant to California Penal Code 

Sections 646.91 and 646.91a. See Doc. No. 13. For the reasons set forth below, the 

Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion. 

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LEGAL STANDARD

In federal court, a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) may be granted upon a 

showing “that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant 

before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). The 

purpose of such an order, as a form of preliminary injunctive relief, is to preserve the 

status quo and prevent irreparable harm “just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, 

and no longer.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 

439 (1974). A request for a TRO is evaluated by the same factors that generally apply to 

a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int’l. Sales Co. v. John D. Brushy & Co., 240 

F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). However, a TRO is an “extraordinary remedy” and is 

“never granted as of right,” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 

(2008). Instead, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that “he is likely to 

succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in 

the public interest.” Id. at 20. Although a plaintiff must satisfy all four of the 

requirements set forth in Winter, this Circuit employs a sliding scale whereby “the 

elements of the preliminary injunction test are balanced, so that a stronger showing of 

one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. 

Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, if the moving party can 

demonstrate the requisite likelihood of irreparable harm and show that an injunction is in 

the public interest, a preliminary injunction may issue so long as there are serious 

questions going to the merits and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the moving 

party’s favor. Id.

Generally, courts must broadly construe pleadings filed by pro se litigants, 

affording pro se plaintiffs any benefit of the doubt. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 

94 (2007); Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks a “temporary and permanent restraining order” preventing Defense 

counsel from contacting or attempting to communicate with Plaintiff’s minor child. See 

Doc. No. 13 at 3. The Court denies Plaintiff’s request for a TRO for two reasons. First, a 

request for a TRO based upon California Penal Code Sections 646.91 and 646.91a is 

properly heard in state court—not in federal court. Section 646.91 expressly provides 

that “[a]n emergency protective order shall include . . . (3) The address of the superior 

court for the district or county in which the protected party resides.” Cal. Penal Code § 

646.91(c)(3) (emphasis added). Moreover, Section 646.91 states that if the protected 

person wishes “to seek continuing protection,” the protected person “will have to apply 

for an order from the court at the address noted [in 646.91(c)(3)].” Cal. Penal Code § 

646.91(c)(4)(A). Further, Plaintiff concedes that this Court is not the proper forum for 

pursuing relief under California’s criminal code. See Doc. No. 13 at 2 (“Plaintiff intends 

to swear out a criminal complaint . . . with San Diego County law enforcement for 

violations of CPC 646.91 and 646.91A upon Plaintiff’s return to California from his 

home state of Nevada.”). As such, Plaintiff’s request for a TRO on this basis is 

inappropriate in federal court. 

Second, based on a thorough reading of Plaintiff’s motion, Plaintiff has not shown 

a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim or raised serious questions going to the 

merits. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. In fact, Plaintiff makes no arguments in his 

application regarding his probability of success on the merits of his claim under 

California Civil Code Section 3344. An injunction is a remedy, not a cause of action 

itself. Thus, injunctive relief is only available upon a finding of liability, or in the case of 

temporary injunctive relief, a showing of a likelihood of success on a claim. See 19 Fed. 

Proc., L. Ed. § 47:1; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Barber, 85 F. Supp. 3d 1308, 1313 (M.D. 

Fla. 2015). Even construing Plaintiff’s motion broadly, Plaintiff fails to establish a 

likelihood of success on the merits of his § 3344 claim. 

/ / / 

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CONCLUSION

The pending TRO does not establish that Plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s ex parte motion for a temporary restraining 

order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 3, 2017

 _____________________________ 

 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 

United States District Judge 

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