Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-18-16140/USCOURTS-ca9-18-16140-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NICOLETTE LEWIS; ALEXIS LEWIS;

MARGRETT LEWIS; JEFFREY LEWIS,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE

COMPANY; LIBERTY INTERNATIONAL

UNDERWRITERS,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 18-16140

D.C. No.

3:18-cv-01138-

WHO

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

William Horsley Orrick, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 5, 2019

San Francisco, California

Filed March 30, 2020

Before: Eugene E. Siler,* Richard R. Clifton,

and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Bybee

* The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

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2 LEWIS V. LIBERTY MUTUAL INS. CO.

SUMMARY**

Forum Selection

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal on the

grounds of forum non conveniens of a diversity insurance

coverage action.

Plaintiffs obtained a $45 million judgment in a products

liability suit brought against EcoSmart, Inc. When EcoSmart

declared bankruptcy, plaintiffs brought this action against

EcoSmart’s insurer for payment on the judgment. The district

court dismissed the suit based on a forum-selection clause in

the insurance policy designating Australian courts as the

exclusive forum.

The panel held that under California law because the

plaintiffs stood in the shoes of EcoSmart, their third-party

creditors’ rights were derivative of the rights and limitations

held by the bankrupt insured, and thus the forum-selection

clause applied. The panel further held that the plaintiffs had

not shown that the clause violated California public policy or

that Australia was an inadequate forum for suit. The panel

rejected plaintiffs’ arguments that Cal. Ins. Code § 11580, or

Cal. Ins. Code § 678.1, precluded litigation in Australia.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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LEWIS V. LIBERTY MUTUAL INS. CO. 3

COUNSEL

Leslie R. Perry (argued) and Deborah S. Bull, Perry Johnson

Anderson Miller & Moskowitz LLP, Santa Rosa, California,

for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Jack DiCanio (argued), Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom

LLP, Palo Alto, California; James R. Carroll, Skadden Arps

Slate Meagher & Flom LLP, Boston, Massachusetts; for

Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

BYBEE, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs Nicolette Lewis and her family (the Lewis

family or the Lewises) were awarded more than $45 million

in a products liability suit brought against EcoSmart, Inc.

(“EcoSmart”). When EcoSmart declared bankruptcy, the

Lewises brought a direct action against EcoSmart’s insurer,

Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (“LMIC”), for payment

on the judgment. LMIC argued that its insurance policy with

EcoSmart had a forum-selection clause designating

Australian courts as the exclusive forum, so the suit must be

dismissed on the grounds of forum non conveniens. The

district court granted LMIC’s motion to dismiss.

We conclude that, because the Lewises stand in the shoes

of EcoSmart, their third-party creditors’ rights are derivative

of the rights and limitations held by the bankrupt insured, and

thus the forum-selection clause applies. We further conclude

that the Lewises have not shown that the clause violates

California public policy or that Australia is an inadequate

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4 LEWIS V. LIBERTY MUTUAL INS. CO.

forum for suit. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the district

court.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are truly tragic. Nicolette Lewis

was severely burned after lighter fluid in a container caught

fire and spewed over her. Nicolette’s twin sister, Alexis, and

parents, Jeffrey and Margrett, also sustained burns and

emotional trauma. The family brought tort claims against

EcoSmart, and its corporate parent, The Fire Company, Pty,

Ltd. (“TFC”), in California state court. TFC, an Australian

company, did not file an answer. The Superior Court of

California for Sonoma County found EcoSmart liable and

awarded damages exceeding $45 million.

While the Lewises’ products-liabilityaction was ongoing,

EcoSmart sought indemnification and the provision of a

defense from LMIC, its insurer. LMIC had provided

insurance policies to EcoSmart and TFC. The insurance

policy in place from April 30, 2013 to April 30, 2014 likely

would have covered the Lewises’ claims (the 2013–14

Policy). But the fire occurred on June 8, 2014. By that point,

a new policy had been issued (the 2014–15 Policy). The

2014–15 Policy, however, significantly reduced the policy

limits and excluded coverage of claims for any product

holding fuel unless it was fitted with a “flame arrester.” The

Lewises’ products-liability claim was based on EcoSmart’s

failure to supply a flame arrester on the product sold to the

Lewis family. Both insurance policies had forum-selection

and choice-of-law clauses designating Australian courts as

the exclusive forum and Australian law as governing. Citing

the 2014–15 Policy, LMIC declined to defend EcoSmart or

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LEWIS V. LIBERTY MUTUAL INS. CO. 5

provide indemnification. EcoSmart then declared

bankruptcy.

The Lewis family sought recovery from LMIC in

California state court, alleging that the 2013–14 Policy

remained in effect for an additional sixty days—which would

have covered the accident—because LMIC had failed to give

EcoSmart adequate notice of the change in the policy, as

required by California insurance law. LMIC removed the

case to federal court and promptly filed a motion to dismiss

the claim on the basis of the forum-selection clause and forum

non conveniens, asserting that under the forum-selection

clause Australia was the exclusive forum for the suit. The

plaintiffs countered that they were not bound by provisions in

a contract to which they were not parties. But LMIC

responded that the Lewis family stood in EcoSmart’s shoes

and, hence, assumed any terms and conditions that would

bind EcoSmart in making a claim under the policy.

The district court found the facts and posture of this case

troubling. Nevertheless, the court concluded that “plaintiffs’

claims for damages are derivative of EcoSmart’s,” meaning

that they “have to stand in EcoSmart’s shoes to recover.” 

Thus, the court felt compelled to honor the forum-selection

clause. The court also determined that the clause was neither

unreasonable nor unjust. Following dismissal on forum non

conveniens grounds, the Lewis family brought this appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the district court’s dismissal “on the basis of

forum non conveniens for an abuse of discretion.” Carijano

v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 643 F.3d 1216, 1224 (9th Cir.

2011). The district court abuses its discretion if it identifies

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6 LEWIS V. LIBERTY MUTUAL INS. CO.

an incorrect legal standard, applies the correct standard

“illogically, implausibly, or in a manner without support in

inferences that may be drawn from facts in the record.” Id.

In the context of forum non conveniens, the district court

abuses its discretion if it “‘strike[es] an unreasonable balance

of relevant factors.’” Id. (quoting Ravelo Monegro v. Rosa,

211 F.3d 509, 511 (9th Cir. 2000)). The validity of a forumselection clause is governed by federal law. Petersen v.

Boeing Co., 715 F.3d 276, 280 (9th Cir. 2013).

III. DISCUSSION

The Lewis family raises three arguments. First, they

contend that, as non-signatories to the insurance policy, they

are not bound by the forum-selection clause. Second, they

argue that, even if the forum-selection clause applies to them,

enforcement of the forum-selection clause would violate

California’s strongly held public policy, as codified in

§§ 678.1 and 11580 of the California Insurance Code. And,

third, the Lewises argue that Australia is an inadequate forum

in which to pursue their claims, and it was an abuse of

discretion for the district court to grant LMIC’s motion to

dismiss.

A. The Forum-Selection Clause Is Binding on the Plaintiffs

At first glance, the Lewises’ claim that they are not bound

by the terms of the insurance policy appears entirely sensible. 

They never had the opportunity to negotiate or assent to the

terms of LMIC’s policy. They are merely tort creditors

looking to recover a judgment. But the Lewises’ argument

collides with a basic premise of California law governing

insurance contracts.

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LEWIS V. LIBERTY MUTUAL INS. CO. 7

Although the Lewises are not insured under the LMIC

policy, they are, as they concede, third-party judgment

creditors of EcoSmart, which was insured under the LMIC

policy. “[I]t is well-settled contract law that the scope of a”

third-party’s rights can be “defined by the contract.” TAAG

Linhas Aereas de Angl. v. Transamerica Airlines, Inc.,

915 F.2d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir. 1990). Under California law,

“the injured third person [bringing a tort claim against an

insurance company] stands in the shoes of the insured tort

feasor” and “gets no greater rights than the tort feasor” would

have if the tort feasor sought indemnification from the

insurance company. Olds v. Gen. Accident Fire & Life

Assurance Corp., 155 P.2d 676, 681 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.

1945), disapproved on other grounds by Barrera v. State

Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 456 P.2d 674 (Cal. 1969). In other

words, “if the tort feasor could not recover, neither can the

injured third person.” Id.; accord Home Indem. Co. of N.Y.

v. Standard Accident Ins. Co. of Detroit, 167 F.2d 919, 930

(9th Cir. 1948) (explaining that any limitations that would

preclude the insured from receiving indemnification “will

likewise bar the injured person from recovering against the

insurer should the judgment in his favor and against the

[in]sured remain unsatisfied” (quotingValladao v. Fireman’s

Fund Indem. Co., 89 P.2d 643, 646 (Cal. 1939))).

More pertinent to this case, California courts have

explained that “a judgment creditor who has prevailed in a

lawsuit against an insured party may bring a direct action

against the insurer subject to the terms and limitations of the

policy.” W. Heritage Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 132 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 209, 216 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (emphasis added). 

And “in a suit by an injured third person against the

tortfeasor’s insurer, the insurer may raise any defense against

the injured person that it could have raised against the

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8 LEWIS V. LIBERTY MUTUAL INS. CO.

insured.” Shapiro v. Republic Indem. Co. of Am., 341 P.2d

289, 290 (Cal. 1959) (emphasis added).

Nevertheless, the Lewis family asserts that California law

precludes application of any contractual provisions against

third parties that are not intended to benefit the specific third

party. They reason that, as plaintiffs, they may choose their

own venue unless LMIC can show that the forum-selection

clause was adopted for their benefit. This turns California

law on its head. In Murphy v. Allstate Insurance Co., the

California Supreme Court explained that a third party creditor

can only enforce the rights of a contract that were specifically

created for the third party. 553 P.2d 584, 588 (Cal. 1976). 

The principle prevents, for example, a judgment creditor from

bringing a direct action against an insurance company for

satisfaction of the judgment against the insured and for

violation of the duty to defend the insured. California courts

have held that the latter claim is for the benefit of the insured

alone and can only be brought by a judgment creditor if it was

received through assignment of the claim. Id. at 589–90; see

Clark v. Cal. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 6–7 (Cal.

Ct. App. 2011); San Diego Hous. Comm’n v. Indus. Indem.

Co., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 103, 121–22 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 

That principle limits what claims the third party can make; it

does not deprive the insurer of any protections it has under

the policy.

Under California law, the provisions of the insurance

contract that bind the insured will also bind a third-party

judgment creditor. As a result, the plaintiffs here are bound

by the terms of the insurance policy—including the forumselection clause—unless California insurance law prevents its

operation or Australia is an inadequate or inconvenient

forum.

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LEWIS V. LIBERTY MUTUAL INS. CO. 9

B. Dismissal for Forum Non Conveniens Was Proper

“[T]he appropriate way to enforce a forum-selection

clause pointing to a state or foreign forum is through the

doctrine of forum non conveniens.” Atl. Marine Constr. Co.

v. U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 60

(2013). In a case in which there is no forum-selection clause,

“a defendant bears the burden of demonstrating an adequate

alternative forum, and that the balance of private and public

interest factors favors dismissal.” Carijano, 643 F.3d at

1224. However, “[w]hen parties agree to a forum-selection

clause, they waive the right to challenge the preselected

forum as inconvenient or less convenient for themselves or

their witnesses, or for their pursuit of the litigation.” Atl.

Marine, 571 U.S. at 64. In a case that can be transferred

within the federal system, “the plaintiff must bear the burden

of showing why the court should not transfer the case to the

forum to which the parties agreed.” Id.; see Yei A. Sun v.

Advanced China Healthcare, Inc., 901 F.3d 1081, 1087–88

(9th Cir. 2018). “[T]he same standards should apply to

motions to dismiss for forum non conveniens in cases

involving valid forum-selection clauses pointing to state or

foreign forums.” Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 66 n.8.

We have held that

a forum-selection clause [is] controlling

unless the plaintiff [makes] a strong showing

that: (1) the clause is invalid due to “fraud or

overreaching,” (2) “enforcement would

contravene a strong public policy of the forum

in which suit is brought, whether declared by

statute or by judicial decision,” or (3) “trial in

the contractual forum will be so gravely

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10 LEWIS V. LIBERTY MUTUAL INS. CO.

difficult and inconvenient that [the plaintiff]

will for all practical purposes be deprived of

his day in court.”

Yei A. Sun, 901 F.3d at 1088 (quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata

Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15, 18 (1972)). The Lewises do

not claim that the forum-selection clause was the product of

fraud or overreaching, but they do argue that (1) enforcement

of the forum-selection clause would contravene California

policy, and (2) Australia is an inadequate and inconvenient

forum for litigation in which they will be deprived of their

day in court.

1. Enforcement of the Forum-Selection Clause Is Not

Foreclosed by California Law

The Lewis family asserts that California law forecloses

operation of the forum-selection clause. When a forumselection clause violates “a strong public policy of the forum

in which suit is brought,” then it “should be held

unenforceable.” M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15. We have

referred to such policies as “unwaivable public rights.” 

Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1292 (9th Cir.

2006) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The

Lewises point to two California provisions—§§ 678.1(d) and

11580 of the California Insurance Code. They contend that

these sections create unwaivable public rights violated by the

forum-selection clause.

California, through § 11580, provides a direct cause of

action against an insurer for anyone who has secured a

judgment for bodily injury against the insured. See Cal. Ins.

Code § 11580(b)(2) (2019). In § 678.1(d), California requires

an insurer to give an insured at least sixty-days’ notice of

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LEWIS V. LIBERTY MUTUAL INS. CO. 11

material changes in the policy; if the insurer fails to do so, the

original policy continues in effect for sixty days. Cal. Ins.

Code § 678.1(d) (2019). The Lewises allege that LMIC

failed to give EcoSmart the requisite notice of the change in

coverage and, accordingly, the 2013–14 Policy continued in

effect for sixty days, which would cover the incident.1 By

contrast, the Lewises claim Australian law provides no such

equivalent protection.2 Plaintiffs therefore conclude that

litigating this case in an Australian forum under Australian

law would preclude their exercise of these non-waivable

statutory rights and, hence, violate California’s public policy.

Beginning with § 11580, we fail to see how litigating this

claim in Australia will contradict the policies undergirding

that statute. States, of course, have “a manifest interest in

providing [their] residents with a forum for reaching

insurance companies who refuse to honor legitimate claims.” 

Haisten v. Grass Valley Med. Reimbursement Fund, Ltd.,

784 F.2d 1392, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986). This interest is

especially strong “with regard to companies that insure

against loss from liability for personal injury, whose actions

implicate the safety of the state’s residents.” Id. To help

ensure recovery,

1 The accident occurred on June 8, 2014, which is less than sixty days

from the expiration of the 2013–14 Policy on April 30, 2014.

2 We have declarations in the record from Australian solicitors in

support of the Lewis family and LMIC. Although a precise understanding

of Australian law is not critical to our judgment here, it appears that

Australian law provides some comparable protection for an insured,

although not as generous as § 678.1. For purposes of this appeal, we will

assume that the Lewises would not prevail on their claims if Australian

law controls which LMIC policy applies.

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12 LEWIS V. LIBERTY MUTUAL INS. CO.

Section 11580 requires every liability policy

issued in California to contain a provision that

whenever judgment is secured against the

insured in an action based upon bodily injury,

death, or property damage, for which the

insurer is liable, then an action may be

brought by the judgment creditor against the

insurer to recover on the judgment.

Sanchez v. Truck Ins. Exch., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 812, 815 (Cal.

Ct. App. 1994).

In § 11580, California has announced that an insurance

policy must allow for some kind of action to seek recovery

when judgment is rendered against the insured. See Cal. Ins.

Code § 11580(b)(2); see also Clark, 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 4

(explaining that “all policies issued in the state must contain”

such a provision and “[i]f the provision is absent from the

policy, the policy will be construed as containing the

provision”). California’s courts are an available forum for

executing judgments against insurance companies. But

nothing in the statute suggests that California has made its

own courts the exclusive jurisdiction for such claims. Rather,

§ 11580 simply provides “that whenever judgment is secured

against the insured . . . based upon bodily injury, death, or

property damage, then an action may be brought against the

insurer.” Cal. Ins. Code § 11580(b)(2) (emphasis added).

We do not read § 11580 to abrogate non-California

forum-selection clauses. Instead, the provision says that a

plaintiff looking to enforce a judgment from a bodily-injury

claim against an insurance company will have some forum to

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LEWIS V. LIBERTY MUTUAL INS. CO. 13

seek judicial recourse.3 Nothing in the statute prevents

setting non-Californian tribunals as designated fora. Indeed,

the statute allows insurance contracts to place conditions on

a right of action. It says, “[A]n action may be brought against

the insurer on the policy and subject to its terms and

limitations.” Cal. Ins. Code § 11580(b)(2) (emphasis added). 

To the extent plaintiffs claim that § 11580 alone mandates

that their claim be heard here, they stretch the statute’s

protection too far. Thus, because the Lewises are not

foreclosed from raising their claim in an Australian court,

their argument that § 11580 precludes litigation in Australia

gains no traction.

Likewise, § 678.1 provides no haven here. Under that

provision, California law requires insurers to give the insured

at least sixty-days’ notice of certain conditions for renewal of

the contract. Cal. Ins. Code § 678.1(c). If the insurer fails to

provide such notice, then the provisions of the terms of the

prior insurance policy remain in effect “for a period of

60 days after the insurer gives the notice.” Id. § 678.1(d). To

obtain coverage under the more generous 2013–14 Policy, the

Lewis family alleges that EcoSmart only received notice of

the significant reductions in coverage seventy-two hours

before the 2013–14 Policy was due to lapse. If true, then the

2013–14 Policy’s provisions would still have been in effect

3

If the effect of an insurance policy were to completely deprive the

plaintiff of recourse to the courts in seeking to recover a judgment, then

the contract would likely contravene § 11580. See Sanchez, 26 Cal. Rptr.

2d at 816, 818 (holding that where the insurer declined to defend the

insured and the insured settled with the plaintiff, § 11580 prevented the

insurer’s reliance on a “no action” clause requiring that any judgment

result from“actual trial”); see also Haisten, 784 F.2d at 1399 (“[T]he state

has a manifest interest in providing its residents with a forum for reaching

insurance companies . . . .” (emphasis added)).

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14 LEWIS V. LIBERTY MUTUAL INS. CO.

at the time of injury by operation of § 678.1(d). But if

Australian law applies to the exclusion of § 678.1, the Lewis

family appears to be out of luck. Thus, they need § 678.1 to

constitute an unwaivable right that is incorporated in the

contract.

However, “an antiwaiver provision [in a state statute] by

itself does not supersede a forum-selection clause.” Yei A.

Sun, 901 F.3d at 1090. Rather, there must be “a statute or

judicial decision that clearly states such a strong public

policy,” precluding enforcement of the forum-selection

clause. Id.; see id. (identifying “the strong federal policy of

enforcing forum-selection clauses”). Nothing on the face of

§ 678.1 indicates that the statute embodies such a strong

policy. See Cal. Ins. Code § 678.1(d). And no reported

California case indicates that § 678.1 qualifies as a strong

policy. Absent such authorities, we will not read § 678.1 to

thwart the forum-selection clause here. Thus, California law

does not prevent operation of an otherwise valid forumselection clause.

2. Australia Is Not an Inadequate or Inconvenient Forum

We now consider the Lewises’ remaining claims that

Australia is an inadequate or inconvenient forum. We

conclude that these arguments fail.

The Lewis family levels several charges against the

Australian forum. Most seriously, they contend that litigating

the case in Australia will mean, in all practical effect, that

they cannot recover. The Lewis family highlights differences

in substantive law between California and Australia. These

differences, they claim, will preclude relief. Recall that there

are two insurance policies at issue here. The 2013–14 Policy

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LEWIS V. LIBERTY MUTUAL INS. CO. 15

would cover the injuries suffered, but the 2014–15 Policy

apparently would not. Although the fire occurred after the

2014–15 Policy went into effect, the Lewises contend that

under California law, the 2013–14 Policy should still control

because LMIC did not provide EcoSmart with sufficient

notice of material changes between the two policies. 

Meanwhile, the Lewises argue that Australian law apparently

would require a court to enforce the 2014–15 Policy. Thus,

the Lewis family fears that because Australian courts are

likely to apply Australian law, they will effectively be

deprived of any remedy.

We have long recognized that “dismissal on grounds of

forum non conveniens may be granted even though the law

applicable in the alternative forum is less favorable to the

plaintiff’s chance of recovery.” Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,

454 U.S. 235, 250 (1981); see Creative Tech., Ltd. v. Aztech

Sys. Pte, Ltd., 61 F.3d 696, 701–02 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A court

may dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds even though

the foreign forum does not provide the same range of

remedies as are available in the home forum.”); Lockman

Found. v. Evangelical All. Mission, 930 F.2d 764, 768–69

(9th Cir. 1991) (affirming that a forum was adequate even

though it would foreclose bringing RICO and Lanham Act

claims). What is critical is not whether a party will be

disadvantaged by the forum-selection clause, but whether the

forum will be adequate: whether “an alternative forum is

available where the defendant is amenable to service of

process and the forum provides ‘some remedy’ for the wrong

at issue.” Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d

1163, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); see Lueck v.

Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 2001)

(explaining that a forum is adequate if it offers some

“practical remedy for the plaintiff’s complained of wrong”). 

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16 LEWIS V. LIBERTY MUTUAL INS. CO.

When there is a forum-selection clause, we “must enforce

[the] forum-selection clause unless the contractually selected

forum affords the plaintiffs no remedies whatsoever. . . . ‘It

is the availability of a remedy that matters, not predictions of

the likelihood of a win on the merits.’” Yei A. Sun, 901 F.3d

at 1092 (quoting Weber v. PACT XPP Techs., AG, 811 F.3d

758, 774 (5th Cir. 2016)). To the extent the Lewis family

asserts inadequacysimply because Australian law maybe less

favorable to them, we must reject their argument.

We further emphasize that the forum may not make any

practical difference here. Both insurance policies include a

choice-of-law clause favoring Australian law. Thus, even if

this case remained in the district court in California, the court

would likely still apply Australian law—leading to the same

result the Lewises see as inevitable if forced to litigate in

Australia. It would be especially inappropriate for us to find

a foreign forum inadequate when a California court might

very well reach the same conclusion based on the choice-oflaw provision. More importantly, we have not heard any

argument that Australian courts would be unwilling to

entertain the Lewises’ argument that California

law—specifically, § 678.1—might apply to an insurance

contract enforceable in California. These are complicated

questions that we are not prepared to answer but that can be

addressed in any litigation brought in Australia. See Piper

Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 251 (“The doctrine of forum non

conveniens . . . is designed in part to help courts avoid

conducting complex exercises in comparative law.”).

The Lewis family also raises a potential collateralestoppel concern. An Australian court, in separate litigation

in 2018 to which the Lewis family was not a party, found that

the injuries did not occur while the 2013–14 Policy was in

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LEWIS V. LIBERTY MUTUAL INS. CO. 17

effect. If this prior judgment would thwart all prospect of

relief, then the Lewis family might have a valid concern. 

Some courts have denied dismissal for forum non conveniens

when it was clear that a domestic forum would allow the case

to proceed, but a foreign forum would bar any prospect of

relief. See, e.g., Chang v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 599 F.3d

728, 736 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding forum-non-conveniens

dismissal was inappropriate because the claim would be

barred by a statute of limitations); Malewicz v. City of

Amsterdam, 517 F. Supp. 2d 322, 340 (D.D.C. 2007)

(denying forum non conveniens dismissal because “Plaintiffs’

claims would be barred in the Dutch courts based on

liberative and acquisitive prescription” doctrines).

However, LMIC’s counsel assured us at oral argument

that the prior judgment will not estop the Lewis family from

raising their claims in Australia and the Lewis family will be

able to bring their claim in an Australian court. Taking LMIC

at its word, we need not be concerned that the Lewis family

will face no practical prospect of relief in Australia. Given

LMIC’s assurances, the Lewis family will be able to raise the

merits of their claims before the Australian court and have

that court consider their claims without impediment.

The Lewis family also says that the Australian court may

not even accept and hear their case. Apparently, under

Australian rules of procedure, they must first request leave of

court to file an action to recover the judgment. But this too

does not appear to impair the Lewises’ ability to air the merits

of their claim. First, plaintiffs have not shown that this is any

more than a formality or that there is any serious risk that the

Australian courts would deny leave to file suit. Second, as a

declaration from one of the Australian solicitors represents,

leave may be refused “if the insurer can prove that it is

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18 LEWIS V. LIBERTY MUTUAL INS. CO.

entitled to deny liability under the contract of insurance.” 

Thus, a denial of leave to proceed with a claim appears to be

tied to the merits of the suit.

Finally, the Lewis family asserts that forum-nonconveniens dismissal was inappropriate because Australia is

a remote and inconvenient forum—stressing the high costs

and great inconvenience to their family of litigating this

matter in Australia. A forum-selection clause can be

invalidated if its enforcement “will be so gravely difficult and

inconvenient that [the plaintiff] will for all practical purposes

be deprived of his day in court.” M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 18. 

While we do not doubt that bringing this claim in Australia

will impose burdens on the Lewis family, we are unable to

conclude that the district court abused its discretion in failing

to refuse dismissal for this reason. Australia has its own

interests in this contract and this dispute because TFC—the

parent of EcoSmart—is an Australian company, and the

insurance policies’ valuations are in Australian dollars. We

must assume that the clause “may have figured centrally in

the parties’ negotiations and may have affected how they set

monetary and other contractual terms; it may, in fact, have

been a critical factor in their agreement to do business

together in the first place.” Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 66. 

Further, LMIC issued the insurance policies to TFC and

EcoSmart in Australia under its Australian trade name. Thus,

even if litigating in Australia will be more costly for the

Lewis family, Australia is not so remote from this insurance

dispute to justify a different outcome.

* * *

As the Lewis family has not demonstrated that they will

be deprived of their day in court if this claim is transferred to

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LEWIS V. LIBERTY MUTUAL INS. CO. 19

Australia, we have no grounds to conclude that Australian

courts are an inadequate forum. Accordingly, the district

court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing this case.

IV. CONCLUSION

Although we sympathize with the Lewis family, we

cannot undo a binding obligation simply because its

application may prolong or exacerbate suffering. The law

compels us to apply the forum-selection clause.

AFFIRMED.

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