Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01374/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01374-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jarrel Shakir, 

Petitioner,

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

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No. CV 07-1374-PHX-ROS (HCE)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s pro se Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (Doc. No. 5) filed under 28 U.S.C. §2254. In accordance with the Rules of Practice

of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and 28 U.S.C. §636(B)(1), this

matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation. The Magistrate

Judge recommends that the District Court, after independent review of the record, deny the

Petition. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Introduction

Prior to the convictions and sentences that are at issue in the instant habeas Petition,

Petitioner committed Theft, a class 6 felony, on July 27, 2001 and was convicted for such on

October 7, 2002 in CR 2001-094414 in Maricopa County Superior Court (hereinafter

“historical prior felony conviction”). (Respondents’ Answer To Amended Petition For Writ

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1

On August 3, 2009, the Court, pursuant to Rule 5(c) of the Rules Governing Section

2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, ordered Respondents to supplement the

record by filing: (1) a complete copy of the transcript of Petitioner’s change of plea

proceeding; (2) a complete copy of the transcript of Petitioner’s sentencing; and (3) a

complete copy of the state appellate court’s June 15, 2006 decision. (Doc. No. 20). On

August 13, 2009, Respondents complied with the Court’s Order by filing their Supplemental

Exhibits to Answer to Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 21).

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of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 9), Exh. A, p. 4 (hereinafter “Answer Exh. __, at p. __”)).

Thereafter, Petitioner was indicted and pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement on July 2,

2003 in CR 2002-080838 to six counts of Armed Robbery, class 2 non-dangerous felonies,

with one historical prior felony conviction. (Answer Exh. A). Petitioner was also indicted and

pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement on July 2, 2003 in CR 2003-030284 to one count

of Armed Robbery, a class 2 non-dangerous felony, with one historical prior felony

conviction. (Id.). It was a term of both plea agreements that Petitioner was convicted of

Theft, a class 6 felony, committed on July 27, 2001 in CR 2001-094414 for which he was

sentenced on October 7, 2001. (Id.). Herein, Petitioner challenges his concurrent sentences

of 18.5 years of imprisonment which were entered upon his pleas of guilty in CR 2002-

080838 and CR 2003-030284.

B. The State Proceeding

1. The Pleas, Convictions, and Sentences

 The State alleged that Petitioner in CR 2002-080838 committed armed robbery on

November 11, 2002 (Count 3); December 3, 2002 (Count 4); December 5, 2002 (Count 5);

December 10, 2002 (Count 6); December 17, 2002 (Count 9); and December 24, 2002

(Count 10), and the trial court informed Petitioner at Petitioner’s change of plea proceeding

that these offenses were “in violation of the statutes set forth in th[e] plea agreement.”

(Respondents’ Supplemental Exhibits to Answer to Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus Exh. J, at p. 77 (hereinafter, “Supp. Answer Exh. __, at p.__”)).1

 The State also

alleged that Petitioner in CR 2002-030284 committed armed robbery on December 23, 2002

and the trial court informed Petitioner at Petitioner’s change of plea proceeding that this

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2

“A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery as

defined in section 13-1902, such person is aided by one or more accomplices actually

present.” A.R.S. §13-1903(A)(2001)(emphasis added).

3

“In this title, unless the context otherwise requires, ‘accomplice’ means a person,...,

who with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of an offense:

1. Solicits or commands another person to commit the offense; or

2. Aids, counsels, agrees to aid or attempts to aid another person in planning or

committing the offense.

3. Provides means or opportunity to another person to commit the offense.” A.R.S.

§13-301(2001).

4

“A person may be guilty of an offense committed by such person’s own conduct or

by the conduct of another for which such person is criminally accountable as provided in this

chapter, or both. In any prosecution, testimony of an accomplice need not be corroborated.”

A.R.S. §13-302(2001).

5

“A. A person is criminally accountable for the conduct of another if:

...

3. The person is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of an offense.

A.R.S. §13-303(A)(3)(2001) (amended 2008).

6

All citations herein to Arizona sentencing statutes are to the statutes in effect at the

time of Petitioner’s conviction.

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offense was “in violation of the statutes set forth in th[e] plea agreement.” (Id. at pp 77, 83).

Although the State did not charge Petitioner with Aggravated Robbery2

, Petitioner’s plea

agreements alleged that the armed robberies in both CRs were committed with an accomplice

in violation of A.R.S. §§13-3013

, 13-3024, 13-3035. (Answer Exh. A). Petitioner and CoDefendant accomplice were “only charged...with either the ones that they admitted to or that

[sic] they were picked out of photo line-ups, even though the police report indicated that

there were two people in the store or sometimes three.” (Supp. Answer Exh. K at p. 12). 

The trial court at Petitioner’s change of plea proceeding explained to Petitioner that

the sentencing range under the plea agreements called for 7 to 21 years of incarceration.

(Supp. Answer Exh. J, at p.70); see also A.R.S. §13-604(I) (2001) (amended 2009).6

 The trial

court advised Petitioner that the court would consider mitigating circumstances such as

Petitioner’s: age, education, emotional or psychological make-up, family support,

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“...if a person is convicted of a felony offense and has one historical prior felony

conviction and if the court finds that at least two substantial aggravating factors listed in §13-

702, subsection C apply, the court may increase the maximum term of imprisonment

otherwise authorized for that offense up to the following maximum terms: 1. Class 2 Felony

23.25 Years”. A.R.S. §13-702.01(C)(1)(2001) (repealed effective 2009) (emphasis added).

“...if a person is convicted of a felony offense and has one historical prior felony

conviction and if the court finds that at lest two substantial mitigating factors listed in §13-

702, subsection D apply, the court may decrease the minimum term of imprisonment

otherwise authorized for that offense down to the following minimum terms: 1. Class 2

Felony 4.5 Years”. A.R.S. §13-702.01(D)(1)(2001) (repealed effective 2009) (emphasis

added).

8

Pursuant to the plea agreements, the allegation that Petitioner was on probation at the

time he committed the offenses and the allegation of the dangerous nature of the offenses

were dismissed. (See Answer Exh. A; Answer Exh. J at pp. 64, 73, 82-83). In light of these

dismissals, Petitioner ultimately pled guilty to non-dangerous repetitive offenses subject to

the sentencing range set forth in A.R.S. §13-604(B) which provided for a presumptive term

of 9.25 years and which could be super-mitigated or super-aggravated. (See Answer Exh.

A; Supp. Answer Exh. J at pp. 64, 77).

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employment, and children that he may support. (Supp. Answer Exh. J at p. 70); as well as

aggravating circumstances such as: emotional trauma suffered by the victims, and “the fact

that you were in the presence of an accomplice,..., when you committed the offenses.”

(Id.)(emphasis added); see A.R.S. §13-702(C)(4)(2001) (amended 2009). Defense counsel

and the State later modified Petitioner’s plea agreement, with Petitioner agreeing, to a supermitigated sentence of 4.5 years of imprisonment and to a super-aggravated sentence of 23.25

years of imprisonment.7

 (Id. at pp. 82-83). In discussing this new range of sentencing with

Petitioner, the trial court also informed Petitioner that “[t]he presumptive sentence as to each

count would be 9.25 years.”8

 (Id. at p.78; see also Id. at p.82).

Petitioner was also advised by the trial court that he was entering into a plea

agreement in CR 2002-080838 wherein he agreed to plead guilty to armed robberies as

alleged in Counts 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, and 10, designated class 2 felonies, with one historical prior.

(Id. at p. 77). Petitioner was also advised by the trial court that he was entering into a plea

agreement in CR 2003-030284 wherein he agreed to plead guilty to one count of armed

robbery, a designated class 2 felony, with one historical prior. (Id.) Petitioner also agreed

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that he was previously convicted of theft, a designated class 6 felony, in Maricopa County

Superior Court in CR 2001-094414. (Id. at p. 82).

Petitioner was provided with copies of the two plea agreements, which were explained

to Petitioner by defense counsel, and he acknowledged that they contained, and he agreed

with, everything written in them. (Id. at pp. 79-80). Moreover, Petitioner signed both

agreements indicating that he had read and understood each. (Id. at p. 80).

At paragraph 10 of both plea agreements, Petitioner placed his initials by the

statement:

I have read and understand the provisions of pages one and two of this

agreement and I have discussed the case and my constitutional rights with my

lawyer. I understand that by pleading guilty, I will be waiving and giving up

my right to a determination of probable cause, to a trial by jury, to confront,

cross-examine, compel the attendance of witnesses, to present evidence in my

behalf, my right to remain silent, my privilege against self-incrimination,

presumption of innocence and right to appeal....

(Answer, Exh. A). At the change of plea proceeding, the trial court ensured that Petitioner

understood his rights:

[THE COURT]: You have an absolute right to keep your pleas of not

guilty and go to trial on all these cases. There’s no

question about that. I don’t want you to do anything to

give up any constitutional rights to go to trial and make

the State prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

***

THE COURT: Sir, by pleading guilty you’re giving up certain important

rights. 

First, you’re giving up your right to keep your

pleas of not guilty and have a trial by jury in each case at

which you would be represented by your attorney....Now,

do you understand all of these rights?

THE DEFENDANT:Yes.

THE COURT: And do you wish to give them up so you can plead

guilty?

THE DEFENDANT:Yes.

(Supp. Answer Exh. J, at pp. 69, 80-81).

After Petitioner pled guilty to the charges set forth in the two plea agreements,

Petitioner’s trial counsel established the factual basis for each of the armed robberies as

having been committed with an accomplice or Co-Defendant. (Id. at pp. 83-84). Petitioner

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agreed with defense counsel’s articulation of the factual basis. (Id. at pp. 84-85). The trial

court found that there was a factual basis as to all the counts to which Petitioner pled guilty.

(Id. at p. 85).

Petitioner was sentenced on October 31, 2003. (Answer Exh. K). The trial court found

that Petitioner was guilty on all counts of armed robbery with one historical prior felony

conviction as alleged in CR 2002-080838 and CR 2003-030284. (Id. pp. 2-3). The trial court

reviewed the files, presentence report and memoranda submitted by Petitioner’s trial counsel

and the State. (Id. at p. 3). The trial court heard from Petitioner’s trial counsel on behalf of

Petitioner. (Id. at pp. 5-9, 12-13). The trial court also heard from Petitioner. (Id. at pp. 10-11);

see Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.10(b). The trial court made findings that

Petitioner was on probation for a prior felony conviction in CR 2001-094414 and that the

armed robberies committed by Petitioner were committed in the presence of or with the

assistance of an accomplice. (Id. at pp. 13-14). The trial court ordered that Petitioner be

incarcerated for one year in CR 2001-094414, the historical prior felony theft conviction for

which Petitioner was also on probation, to run concurrently with sentences of 18.5 years

imposed concurrently in CR 2002-080838 and CR 2003-030284. (Id. at pp. 14-15). The trial

court later went on to explain to Petitioner:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, apparently my client would like to say

something.

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, please. Your Honor, I didn’t mean

mean it. I really didn’t. I really didn’t mean it,

Your Honor. Can I have another chance, please?

THE COURT: I understand what you’re saying, sir, but your

conduct in these cases is outrageous, frankly.

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor –

THE COURT: Let me finish. I’ll let you finish in just a minute.

You went into these places. These people were

doing their jobs at their places, and you and your

buddy went in there, scared the living hell out of

them, and changed their lives because of what you

did.

You did it for monetary gain. You did it

with an accomplice. These are all aggravating

circumstances. Plus you did it when you were on

probation.

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I didn’t have –

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THE COURT: You were placed on probation about 30 days

before that when you committed your first armed

robbery, and the fact that you used a pellet gun or

didn’t really mean to hurt anybody is a factor I’ve

taken into consideration. You could have gotten

more time than you got. That’s why I didn’t give

you the additional time, but the number of

robberies that you committed and the number of

lives that you’ve affected and all these

aggravating circumstances that I’ve pointed out to

you are all the reasons why I’ve done this.

(Id. at pp. 16-17)(emphasis added). 

2. The Post-Conviction-of-Right Proceeding and Appeal

On November 10, 2003 Petitioner, through counsel, filed a Notice of Post Conviction

Relief. (Answer Exh. C). On November 3, 2004 Petitioner filed a Petition For PostConviction Relief alleging that the trial court rather than the jury established the aggravating

factors going to sentencing in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).

(Answer Exh. D). On March 30, 2005 the trial court on Petitioner’s Petition For PostConviction Relief found:

that the defendant is entitled to post-conviction relief because the trial court

itself decided the aggravating factors in his cases rather than submitting them

to a jury for determination as required by the jury trial guarantees of [sic] Sixth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 2, Sections 23 and

24 of the Arizona Constitution and the holding of the United States Supreme

Court in Blakely v. Washington. THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that Arizona’s sentencing statutes

permit a jury trial on aggravating factors

(Answer Exh.G). 

The State filed a Petition For Review with the Arizona Court of Appeals and on June

15, 2006, the Court of Appeals granted review, vacated the trial court’s order of March 30,

2005 which had granted post-conviction relief, and reinstated the original sentences imposed.

(Supp. Answer Exh I). The Court of Appeals recognized that under State v. Martinez, 115

P.3d 618, 625 (2005), “once a single aggravating factor has been properly established in

accordance with Blakely, the sentencing judge may find and consider additional aggravating

factors in its determination of the appropriate sentence to be imposed.” (Id.) The Court of

Appeals went on to hold that: 

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[o]ne of the aggravating factors found by the trial court was the presence of

an accomplice. Shakir specifically pleaded guilty to each offense in part based

on accomplice liability. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-301 to -304 (2001). Because

the presence of an accomplice was established in accordance with Blakely, the

trial court could find and consider other factors in its determination of the

appropriate sentences. 

(Id.)(emphasis added). 

Petitioner did not seek further review.

III. PETITIONER’S FEDERAL PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

On August 20, 2007, Petitioner filed his Amended Petition For Writ of Habeas

Corpus wherein Petitioner raises one ground for relief: That his rights under the Sixth

Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 2 §§ 23 and 24 of the Arizona

Constitution were violated in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 

Respondents concede that Petitioner’s Amended Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus

is both timely and exhausted. (Answer, pp. 3, 9). 

Petitioner filed his “Reply to the State’s Answer to Amended Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus” (Doc. No. 12) (hereinafter “Reply”) on December 10, 2007. 

IV. DISCUSSION

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claim is without merit and, thus, the Amended

Petition should be denied.

A. Standard of Review: Merits

Pursuant to the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (hereinafter "AEDPA"), the Court may grant a writ of habeas corpus only if the state

court proceeding:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),(2). Section 2254(d)(1) applies to challenges to purely legal

questions resolved by the state court and section 2254(d)(2) applies to purely factual

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9

"[T]he only definitive source of clearly established federal law under AEDPA is the

holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court

decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412...While circuit law may be ‘persuasive authority’ for

purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of

Supreme Court law, Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir.1999), only the

Supreme Court's holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be

reasonably applied." Clark, 331 F.3d at 1069 (emphasis in original). See also Holley v.

Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 76-

77 (2006) (“Circuit precedent may not serve to create established federal law on an issue the

Supreme Court has not yet addressed”).

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questions resolved by the state court. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 978 (9th Cir. 2004),

cert. denied 546 U.S. 963 (2005). Therefore, the question whether a state court erred in

applying the law is a different question from whether it erred in determining the facts. Rice

v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 342 (2006). In conducting its review, the federal habeas court

"look[s] to the last reasoned state-court decision." Van Lynn v. Farmon, 347 F.3d 735, 738

(9th Cir. 2003). 

Section 2254(d)(1) consists of two alternative tests, i.e., the "contrary to" test and the

"unreasonable application" test. See Cordova v. Baca, 346 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2003).

Under the first test, the state court's "decision is contrary to clearly established federal law

if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or if it applies the controlling authority

to a case involving facts materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but

nonetheless reaches a different result." Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003)

(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413-414 (2000)). Additionally, a state court's

decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court case law if “the state court 'applies a rule that

contradicts the governing law set forth in' Supreme Court cases."9

 Van Lynn, 347 F.3d at

738 (quoting Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002)). "Whether a state court's interpretation

of federal law is contrary to Supreme Court authority...is a question of federal law as to

which [the federal courts]...owe no deference to the state courts." Cordova, 346 F.3d at 929

(emphasis in original) (distinguishing deference owed under the "contrary to" test of section

(d)(1) with that owed under the "unreasonable application" test).

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Under the second test, "'[a] state court's decision involves an unreasonable application

of federal law if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle...but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.'" Van Lynn, 347 F.3d

at 738 (quoting Clark, 331 F.3d at 1067). Under the "'unreasonable application clause...a

federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly....Rather that application must be objectively

unreasonable.'" Clark, 331 F.3d at 1068 (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003))

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When evaluating whether the state court

decision amounts to an unreasonable application of federal law, "[f]ederal courts owe

substantial deference to state court interpretations of federal law...." Cordova, 346 F.3d at

929. 

Under section 2254(d)(2), which involves purely factual questions resolved by the

state court, "the question on review is whether an appellate panel, applying the normal

standards of appellate review, could reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the

record." Lambert, 393 F.3d at 978; see also Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied 534 U.S. 1038 (2004) ("a federal court may not second-guess a state court's factfinding process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the state court

was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable.") Section (d)(2) "applies most readily to

situations where petitioner challenges the state court's findings based entirely on the state

record. Such a challenge may be based on the claim that the finding is unsupported by

sufficient evidence,...that the process employed by the state court is defective,...or that no

finding was made by the state court at all." Taylor, 366 F.3d at 999 (citations omitted).

When examining the record under section 2254(d)(2), the federal court "must be particularly

deferential to our state court colleagues... [M]ere doubt as to the adequacy of the state court's

findings of fact is insufficient; 'we must be satisfied that any appellate court to whom the

defect [in the state court's fact-finding process] is pointed out would be unreasonable in

holding that the state court's fact-finding process was adequate.'" Lambert, 393 F.3d at 972

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10Under section 2254(e) "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall

be presumed to be correct." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The "AEDPA spells out what this

presumption means: State-court fact-finding may be overturned based on new evidence

presented for the first time in federal court only if such new evidence amounts to clear and

convincing proof that the state-court finding is in error....Significantly, the presumption of

correctness and the clear-and-convincing standard of proof only come into play once the

state-court’s fact-findings survive any intrinsic challenge; they do not apply to a challenge

that is governed by the deference implicit in the ‘unreasonable determination’ standard of

section 2254(d)(2)." Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000.

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(quoting Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000) (emphasis and bracketed text in original). Once the

federal court is satisfied that the state court's fact-finding process was reasonable, or where

the petitioner does not challenge such findings, "the state court's findings are dressed in a

presumption of correctness, which then helps steel them against any challenge based on

extrinsic evidence, i.e., evidence presented for the first time in federal court."10 Taylor, 366

F.3d at 1000. See also 28 U.S.C. section 2254(e). 

Both section 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2) may apply where the petitioner raises issues of mixed

questions of law and fact. Such questions "receive similarly mixed review; the state court's

ultimate conclusion is reviewed under [section] 2254(d)(1), but its underlying factual

findings supporting that conclusion are clothed with all of the deferential protection

ordinarily afforded factual findings under [sections] 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1)." Lambert, 393

F.3d at 978.

B. The Blakely Claim

Petitioner posits but one claim:

[Petitioner] asserts he is entitled to post-conviction relief because there has been a

change in the law that renders the sentencing procedures used in this case

unconstitutional. This is so, because the Court sentenced [Petitioner] to the aggravated

terms of 18.5 years based on factual findings, other than historical prior convictions,

made by the judge sitting alone, without a jury. This violates the right to jury [trial]

guarantees set forth in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art.

2 §§ 23 and 24 of the Arizona Constitution. 

 (Amended Petition (Doc. No. 5, p. 12)). Simply stated, it is Petitioner’s position that the only

aggravating factor that can be considered without a jury finding is a prior felony conviction

but as a condition precedent (1) the trial court herein never verbally established the prior

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11Although Petitioner was sentenced before the Supreme Court decided Blakely,

Blakely applies retroactively herein because Petitioner’s criminal case was not yet final when

the Blakely decision was issued. See Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1033 (9th Cir. 2005)

(citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987); State of Arizona v. Febles, 115 P.3d

629, 635 (Ariz. App. 2005)(“Thus, we conclude that Blakely only applies to cases not yet

final when the opinion was issued.”).

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felony conviction as an aggravating factor; (2) Petitioner did not admit to a prior felony

conviction as an aggravating factor; and (3) a jury did not find a prior felony conviction as

an aggravating factor; and thus, aggravating factors considered by the trial court, i.e., (1) the

presence of an accomplice, (2) danger to society, and (3) Petitioner having been on probation

when the armed robberies were committed, violated Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296

(2004), and were required to be found by a jury. (Reply, pp.34-35 (Doc. No. 12-1, pp. 9-10)).

1. Analysis

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant

the right to a jury. This right continues through the sentencing process, i.e., a defendant has

the right to demand that a jury find the existence of any specific fact that the law makes

essential to his punishment. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301.11

Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime

beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved

beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)(emphasis added). The Supreme Court

explained in Blakely that “the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum

sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or

admitted by the defendant.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303 (citations omitted) (emphasis in

original). 

The Arizona Supreme Court, in applying Blakely and Apprendi to Arizona’s sentencing

scheme, has held that the statutory maximum for purposes of Apprendi and Blakely analysis

is the presumptive sentence established for a defendant’s crime. State v. Brown, 99 P.3d 15,

18 (Ariz. 2004); see also State v. Brown, 129 P.3d 947, 949 (Ariz. 2006). However, nothing

in the history of the right to a jury trial: 

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suggests that it is impermissible for judges to exercise discretion-taking into

consideration various factors relating both to offense and offender-in imposing a

judgment within the range prescribed by statute. We have often noted that judges in

this country have long exercised discretion of this nature in imposing sentence within

statutory limits in the individual case.

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481 (emphasis in original)(citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,

246 (1949)); see also Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 549 (2002) (stating that “[a]fter

the accused is convicted, the judge may impose a sentence within a range provided by statute,

basing it on various facts relating to the defendant and the manner in which the offense was

committed. Though these facts may have a substantial impact on the sentence, they are not

elements, and thus are not subject to the Constitution’s indictment, jury, and proof

requirements.”). In the exercise of this time-honored discretion, a judge may consider

“sentencing factors”, e.g., circumstances “which may be either aggravating or mitigating in

character, that supports a specific sentence within the range authorized by the jury’s finding

that the defendant is guilty of a particular offense.” State v. Martinez, 115 P.3d 618, 621

(Ariz. 2005)(emphasis in original)(citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n. 19); see also United

States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (jury must determine facts that raise a sentencing

ceiling). “Thus, upon the finding of an aggravating factor the ‘statutory maximum’ then

becomes not the presumptive term, but the maximum aggravated sentence allowed by the

relevant sentencing statute.” Kemp v. McWilliams, 2007 WL 128782, *3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 12,

2007).

Under Arizona’s sentencing scheme, the existence of a single aggravating factor exposes

a defendant to an aggravated sentence within the range prescribed by statute. See A.R.S. §13-

702(B) (2001). The singular aggravating factor of a prior conviction is Blakely-exempt from

the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial requirement. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301 (“‘Other than the fact

of a prior conviction,....’”)(quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490); United States v. Thomas, 447

F.3d 1191, 2000 (9th Cir. 2006). Other aggravating factors can be Blakely-compliant, i.e.,

found by a jury or admitted by a defendant. Once a single aggravating factor has been

properly established as either Blakely-exempt or Blakely-compliant, the trial court may find

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and consider additional aggravating factors in its determination of the appropriate sentence

to be imposed within the given statutory sentencing range:

[t]herefore, once...a defendant admits a single aggravating factor, the Sixth Amendment

permits the sentencing judge to find and consider additional factors relevant to the

imposition of a sentence up to the maximum prescribed in that statute.

Martinez, 115 P.3d at 625 (emphasis added); see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481.

a. Applicable Sentencing Scheme

Petitioner’s guilty pleas to non-dangerous repetitive offenses with one historical prior

felony conviction initially subjected Petitioner to a possible minimum sentence of 6 years,

a presumptive sentence of 9.25 years and a maximum sentence of 18.5 years. See A.R.S.

§13-604(B) (2001). “The presumptive term may be mitigated or aggravated within [this

range]...pursuant to the terms of §13-702, subsections B, C, and D.” A.R.S. § 13-604(B)

(2001). The plea agreements entered into by Petitioner allowed the sentencing court to

decrease, i.e., super-mitigate, Petitioner’s sentence to 4.5 years or to increase, i.e. superaggravate, Petitioner’s sentence from “the maximum term of imprisonment otherwise

allowable for that offense...”, i.e., 18.5 years, “up to...23.25 Years.” A.R.S. § 13-

702.01(C)(1), (D) (2001). (See also Answer Exh. A).

In this case, the court did not super-aggravate Petitioner’s sentence under A.R.S. 13-

702.01. Instead, Petitioner’s sentence was aggravated within the range set out in section 13-

604(B). See also A.R.S. § 13-702(C) (2001) (setting out factors relevant to aggravating a

sentence). Specifically, Petitioner’s sentence was increased from the presumptive term of

9.25 years to the maximum term of 18.5 years of imprisonment as provided in 13-604(B). 

b. The Prior Conviction and Probation

Herein, the trial court found as true the aggravating factor that Defendant was previously

convicted of a felony. See A.R.S. §13-702(C)(11) (2001). Petitioner argues that the trial

court did not find nor did Petitioner admit to the Blakely-exempt aggravating factor of a prior

conviction, and therefore, any other factors must be found by a jury. The record is replete

with Petitioner’s admissions to as well as the trial court’s findings of Petitioner’s prior

conviction as well as Petitioner having been on probation when the offenses of conviction

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were committed. At Petitioner’s change of plea proceeding, the trial court explained to

Petitioner:

THE COURT: Mr Shakir, if you have any other questions, I’ll be

happy to try to answer them for you.

THE DEFENDANT: What does repetitive mean? How can that effect me if it

was nondangerous, repetitive?

THE COURT: Repetitive means you committed these offenses with a prior

felony conviction. THE DEFENDANT: That doesn’t mean that I did it more than one time?

THE COURT: No it doesn’t mean that you did these offenses more than

one time. It means you had a prior felony conviction. You

know the case you’re on probation for, that’s the case

they’re referring to. So it makes the new offenses repetitive

offenses because you committed the new offenses while you

were on probation. 

(Supp. Answer Exh. J at p. 75)(emphasis added). The trial court went on to explain to

Petitioner that he was admitting to a prior conviction:

THE COURT: Sir, you’ve entered into a plea agreement in CR 2002-

080838 in which you’ve agreed to plead guilty to Counts 3,

4, 5, 6, 9, and 10, armed robbery, all Class 2 felonies with

one historical prior felony conviction,....These are

nondangerous, repetitive offenses committed in violation of

the statutes set forth in that plea agreement.

In the other case, you’ve agreed to plead guilty to

armed robbery, a Class 2 felony with one historical prior

felony conviction,....This is also a nondangerous, repetitive

offense committed in violation of the statutes set forth in

that plea agreement.

Are these the charges to which you’re pleading guilty?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

(Id. at pp. 77-78)(emphasis added). The trial court queried Petitioner regarding the contents

of the agreements, whether he understood their contents and if he agreed with the terms of

the agreements:

THE COURT: Do you have a copy of your plea agreements there? Okay,

let me give them back to you.

Have you read both pages of each agreement,

Sir?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And has [your attorney] explained the agreements to you?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do they contain everything that you’ve agreed to now?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And do you agree with everything that’s written in them?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you understand them?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

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THE COURT: Did you place your initials next to the paragraphs on pages

1 and 2 of both documents and sign your name at the

bottom of page 2 to indicate that you have read and do

understand both agreements.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

(Id. at pp. 79-80). Paragraph 1, initialed by Petitioner in both plea agreements, states: “He

is in automatic violation of his probation in CR 2002-094414.” (Answer. Exh. A) Paragraph

2, initialed by Petitioner in both plea agreements, states: “While represented by counsel,

Shakir was convicted of Theft, a class 6 felony, Maricopa County CR 2001-094414,

committed 7-27-2001, sentenced 10-7-2002.” (Id.). The trial court informed Petitioner:

THE COURT: All right. Paragraph 2 in both plea agreements provides

that you must be sentenced to the Department of

Corrections. The sentences in these two cases and in CR

2003-030284 – well that’s both cases can be served

concurrently or consecutively, but the sum total for all

sentences shall not be less that 4.5 years or more than

23.25 years in the Department of Corrections.

As to the probation violation case, that shall be served

concurrently with the other two cases in which you’re

pleading guilty today. Restitution shall not exceed $50,000, and you are

stipulating that you were represented by counsel when you

were convicted of theft, a Class 6 felony, in Maricopa

County Superior Court cause number CR 2001-094414,

which offense was committed on July 27th of 2001, for

which you were sentenced on October 7th of 2002.

Moving on to paragraph 3, it provides that the

allegation that you were on probation and that the crimes

are dangerous, those allegations will be dismissed.

Are these your agreements?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: All right. How do you plead, sir, to the charges set forth in

the two plea agreements?

THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.

(Supp. Answer Exh. J at pp.82-83)(emphasis added).

At sentencing, the trial court found as true that Petitioner had a prior felony conviction:

THE COURT: Mr. Shakir, in previous proceedings in CR 2003-030284, a

determination was made that you’re guilty of armed

robbery, a Class 2 felony, with a historical prior felony

conviction, this new offense having been committed on

February – or is that December, Counsel?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: December 23rd. THE COURT: – December 23rd of 2002, and in CR 2002-080838 that

you’re guilty of Counts 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, and 10, armed robbery,

a Class 2 felony, with a historical prior felony

conviction,....These are all nondangerous repetitive offenses

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committed in violation of the statutes set forth in the two

plea agreements.

Based upon those determinations of guilt, it’s the

judgment of the Court that you’re guilty of said offenses

committed in violation of those statutes on those dates.

Also based upon those determinations of guilt, I find

that Mr. Shakir is in violation of his probation in CR 2002-

094414 on the charge of theft, a Class 6 felony. If it was not

previously designated, it is designated a Class 6 felony at

this time. 

(Supp. Answer Exh K at pp. 2-3)(emphasis added). Petitioner’s prior conviction was both

Blakely-exempt, i.e., found to be true by the trial court, as well as admitted to by Petitioner.

The fact that Petitioner was on probation when the offenses of conviction were committed

was Blakely-compliant as admitted to by Petitioner. 

c. Presence of An Accomplice

The presence of an accomplice is an aggravating factor or circumstance for purposes of

sentencing. A.R.S. §13-702(C)(4) (2001). At the change of plea proceeding, the trial court

forewarned Petitioner that the presence of an accomplice would be considered as an

aggravating circumstance.

THE DEFENDANT: How much time would I be doing?

THE COURT: Well, the range, the possible range would be anywhere

from seven to 21 years, and it depends on my consideration

of what are called aggravating and mitigating

circumstances. I would have to consider your age. I would

have to consider your education, any emotional or

psychological difficulties you may have, any family

support, whether or not you’re working, whether or not you

have children, are you supporting a child or children. All

these factors would be something I would consider in

mitigation. In other words, those would be in your favor.

Aggravating circumstances would be the emotional

trauma suffered by the victims in the cases, the fact that you

were in the presence of an accomplice, Mr. Johnson, when

you committed the offenses. Those are aggravating factors. The number of crimes that were committed would be an

aggravating factor. The amount of money taken would be

an aggravating factor.

(Supp. Answer Exh. J at pp. 70-71)(emphasis added). 

Once Petitioner pled guilty to the charges as set forth in the two plea agreements, trial

counsel established the factual bases for the offenses to which Petitioner agreed and

admitted:

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THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Who will establish the factual bases, Counsel?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I will, but I need the pleas. Thank you.

In the 2003 case, we need to make a change in the date. I

just read the indictment, and that happened on December 23rd, 2002. On December 23rd, 2002, in the 1000 block of East

Apache Boulevard, which is in Tempe, Arizona, Mr Shakir,

along with an accomplice, and displaying a gun, robbed Timothy Jenkins of a sum of money believed to be about $151

without Jenkins consent. They took that from him.

On November 11th, 2002, going on to the 2002 case, in

the 1000 block of East Southern, which is also in Maricopa

County, Mr. Shakir, along with a codefendant, and

displaying a weapon, robbed a Walgreens and took a sum

of money from the store clerk. 

On December 3rd of 2002, again in Mesa, Arizona,

which, is in Maricopa County, robbed a Kathy Herrington

at Dolly Madison’s, also while displaying a weapon to

coerce Miss Herrington to surrender money.

As to Count 5, on December 5th of 2002, Mr. Shakir,

again displaying – either he or his codefendant displaying

a weapon, coerced funds from a Derrick Keisel in the 700

block of West University, which is in Maricopa County.

Count 6, on December 10th of 2002, Mr Shakir, along

with a codefendant, in the 1400 block of Southern in

Maricopa County coerced money from a Brian Plummer at

Hollywood Video by displaying a weapon.

On December 17th, 2002, again with a codefendant and

displaying a weapon, coerced funds from a Jessica Hawkins

at Family Dollar Store in the 1000 block of West

Broadway, which is in Maricopa County.

Count 10, on December 24th, 2002, he and his

codefendant, displaying a weapon, robbed a Michael

Farrow at Cigarettes Are Cheaper in the 1000 [sic] East

Main Street, which is in Maricopa County, and I believe

that covers all the charges.

THE COURT: All right, and, Mr Shakir, you heard everything that

[defense counsel] stated; is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: And everything she stated was true and correct; is that

right?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: And all this occurred in Maricopa County, Arizona; is that

correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Is there anything further from the State or any victim input?

[PROSECUTOR]: No, Your Honor. Victim’s rights have been complied with.

THE COURT: All right. Sir, do you have any questions for the attorneys

or me at this time?

THE DEFENDANT: I don’t have any questions.

THE COURT: Okay. On the basis of the record I find that Mr. Shakir

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enters pleas of

guilty to the charges set forth in the plea agreements. I find

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there are factual bases for all of them. The pleas are

accepted and entered of record.

(Id. at pp. 83-85)(emphasis added). At sentencing, the trial court found that the presence of

an accomplice, admitted by Petitioner, was an aggravating circumstance: 

THE COURT: I find that the offenses were committed in the presence of or with

the assistance of an accomplice, and I find that, based upon his

conduct in these armed robberies, that Mr. Shakir has

demonstrated that he is an extreme danger to society and a

danger to reoffend. I find that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the

mitigating circumstances sufficiently to call for aggravated

sentences as to all of the armed robbery counts in the two new

cases.

(Supp. Answer Exh K at p.14)(emphasis added).

On the instant record, the aggravating factor or circumstance that Petitioner committed

six armed robberies with or in the presence of an accomplice was Blakely-compliant, i.e.,

admitted to by Petitioner. 

d. Conclusion

The “statutory maximum” sentence that a trial court may impose is determined “solely on

the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” Blakely, 542

U.S. at 303 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 

In other words, the relevant “statutory maximum” is not the maximum sentence a judge

may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without

any additional findings.

Id. at 303-304 (emphasis in original). Consistent with Apprendi and Blakely, once one or

more aggravating circumstances or factors are established, the Arizona trial court has

discretion to impose any sentence within the authorized statutory sentencing range. Martinez,

115 P.3d at 624.

Further, the state court’s factual findings must be accepted as correct unless the Petitioner

can rebut them with clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1);

Marshall v. Taylor, 395 F.3d 1058, 1062 n. 19 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, in the last-reasoned

decision addressing Petitioner’s Blakely claims, the Arizona Court of Appeals upon Petition

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for Review by the State held that one of the aggravating factors, i.e., the presence of an

accomplice, was established in accordance with Blakely. 

Although not directly addressed by the Arizona Court of Appeals, the record amply

supports that the additional aggravating factor of a prior historical felony conviction given

that the trial court found the Blakely-exempt aggravating factor of a prior conviction. See

A.R.S. §13-702(B),(C)(11) (2001). Petitioner was put on notice by the trial court that he was

pleading guilty to armed robberies as repetitive offenses, i.e., he had a prior felony

conviction. Petitioner agreed that he was pleading guilty to armed robberies with one

historical prior felony conviction. Petitioner informed the trial court, after reading the plea

agreements and consulting with his trial counsel, that he understood and agreed with their

contents, which necessarily includes reference to the historical prior felony conviction for

which he was on probation when the crimes of conviction were committed. Moreover,

Petitioner acknowledged the contents of the plea agreements by initialing pertinent

paragraphs referencing the historical prior felony conviction. Petitioner stipulated that the

historical prior felony conviction was for theft, a class 6 felony, committed on July 27, 2001

and for which he was sentenced on October 7, 2002 in Maricopa County Superior Court

cause number CR 2001-094414. The trial court found Petitioner guilty of armed robberies

with the historical prior felony conviction of CR 2001-094414. Arguably, Petitioner’s

admitted prior conviction, alone, is a sufficient aggravating factor to increase Petitioner’s

sentence from the presumptive 9.25 years to the statutory maximum of 18.5 years of

imprisonment. See Holderman v. Schriro, 2007 WL 3256473, *9 (D.Ariz. Nov. 2, 2007),

appeal docketed, No. 07-17292 (9th Cir. December 17, 2007), (rejecting argument that the

same prior used as a historical prior to increase applicable sentencing range could not be used

as aggravating factor to increase sentence above presumptive level). “[B]ecause exempt

from the Blakely requirement is Apprendi’s exception for prior convictions,” Petitioner’s

Blakely argument fails. Kemp, 2007 WL 128782 at *3. Thus, based upon Petitioner’s

admitted prior felony conviction alone, the trial court was authorized to consider additional

factors relevant to imposition of a sentence within the statutory sentencing range from 9.25

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years to 18.5 years of imprisonment. See Kemp, 2008 WL 128782 at *3; Jernigan v. Tucker,

2007 WL 163079 (D.Ariz. Jan. 18, 2008) (denying habeas petition raising Blakely claim

because “[o]nce one [prior] conviction has been established, the judge is free to impose the

maximum sentence...” within the applicable range); Holderman, 2007 WL 3256473 (same).

More importantly, an examination of the record clearly establishes that the trial court

found the Blakely-compliant aggravating factor of the presence of an accomplice. See A.R.S.

§13-702(B), (C)(4) (2001). Petitioner was put on notice by the trial court that an aggravating

factor the court would consider at sentencing was that Petitioner was in the presence of an

accomplice when he committed the armed robberies. The trial court informed Petitioner that

he was pleading guilty to armed robberies in violation of the statutes set forth in the two plea

agreements. Petitioner informed the trial court, after reading the plea agreements and

consulting with defense counsel, that he understood and agreed with their contents, which

specifically refers to accomplice statutes A.R.S. §§13-301, 13-302, and 13-302. At

Petitioner’s change of plea proceeding, trial counsel set forth the factual bases for each of the

armed robberies committed by Petitioner which included the fact that they were committed

with or in the presence of an accomplice. Petitioner agreed that trial counsel’s description of

the offenses were true and correct. The trial court found that there was a factual basis for the

armed robberies Petitioner pled guilty to having committed. Petitioner’s admission to

having an accomplice rendered such fact Blakely-complaint. Based upon that admitted fact

alone, the trial court was free to consider additional factors relevant to imposition of a

sentence within the statutory sentencing range from 9.25 years to 18.5 years of

imprisonment. See e.g., Kemp, 2007 WL 128782 at *2 (upon the finding of a single

Blakely-complaint or Blakely-exempt aggravating factor, the statutory maximum then

becomes not the presumptive term, but the maximum aggravated sentence allowed by the

relevant sentencing statute); Jernigan, 2007 WL 163079 at *5 (denying habeas relief

because “in Arizona, if a judge increases a sentence above the presumptive, she needs only

to find and use one Blakely allowed factor...”). Further, Respondents correctly point out that

“the Supreme Court has never held that the Sixth Amendment is violated when a defendant

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is given a sentence above the statutory maximum [i.e., the presumptive term in Arizona]

based upon two or more factual findings only one of which was either Blakely-compliant or

Blakely-exempt....” (Answer, p.11).

Consequently, the state appellate court’s decision upholding Petitioner’s sentences was

not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as

determined by the United States Supreme Court. Nor did the state court’s proceeding result

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the evidence presented.

Petitioner’s claim, therefore, lacks merit.

V. RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court deny

Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 5).

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(B), an party may serve and file written objections within ten

days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. If objections are

filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV 07-1374-PHX-ROS. A party

may respond to another party's objections within ten days after being served with a copy

thereof. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the District

Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th

Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003). 

DATED this 17th day of September, 2009.

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