Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_97-cv-01309/USCOURTS-caed-2_97-cv-01309-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM SHELTON, BARBARA No. 2:97-cv-1309-MCE-EFB 

SHELTON, ELLEN SHELTON, a

minor through her guardian

ad litem BARBARA SHELTON; 

and JESSICA SHELTON, a minor

through her guardian ad

litem BARBARA SHELTON,

Plaintiffs,

v. ORDER

COUNTY OF BUTTE, MICK GREY,

DOUG SMITH, DENNIS COOLEY,

KIRK TROSTLER, JEFFERY

HAYES, KAREN TABOR, PERRY

RENIFF, BERNIE LIGHTNER,

EDWARD SZENDREY, TONY

BURDINE, CRAIG GILL, DAVIS

BLAIR, KEITH JOHNSON, o.

BRENT REDELSPERGER, and

DOES 1-50, inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

By Order filed August 27, 2001, Judge Milton S. Schwartz 

denied Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment in this case. 

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Case 2:97-cv-01309-MCE -EFB Document 194 Filed 01/16/07 Page 1 of 6
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2

Now before this Court is a renewed request by Defendants for

summary judgment, made on grounds that the Supreme Court’s recent

decision in Hartman v. Moore, 126 S.Ct. 1695 (2006) has

“drastically shifted” the legal landscape in this matter. 

(Defs.’ Motion, 2:11-12). Defendants’ position is predicated on

the sole contention that Hartman is directly applicable to

Plaintiffs’ remaining claims and changes the validity of Judge

Schwartz’ rationale in denying summary judgment as to those

claims. The Court disagrees, and believes Hartman is

distinguishable on its facts from the present case.

Hartman involved a criminal prosecution against William G.

Moore, Jr., the chief executive of a manufacturer of multiline

optical readers. Moore advocated the use of such readers by the

United States Postal Service. Although multiline readers were

ultimately adopted by the Postal Service, Moore claimed that

Postal Service inspectors who resented his lobbying activities in

favor of the multiline system (as opposed to the single-line

readers the Postal Service initially wanted to employ)

subsequently launched a criminal investigation against him in

retaliation for his lobbying efforts. Moore was indicted as a

result of that investigation and after his eventual acquittal

sued both the prosecutor and the inspectors for retaliating

against him in violation of his First Amendment right to free

speech in voicing criticism of the Postal Service. Id. at 1699-

1700. The Supreme Court found that because there was probable

cause for the investigation allegedly spearheaded by the

inspectors, no claim for retaliatory prosecution could be stated. 

Id. at 1707. 

Case 2:97-cv-01309-MCE -EFB Document 194 Filed 01/16/07 Page 2 of 6
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3

Drawing upon Hartman’s requirement that the lack of probable

cause be established as an element of Moore’s retaliation claim,

Defendants herein argue that because Judge Schwartz found that

probable cause did exist to issue the search warrant for

Plaintiff William Shelton’s home that ultimately resulted in his

arrest and prosecution, no claim for retaliatory prosecution can

be stated.

The facts of this case differ in key respects from those

confronted by the Supreme Court in Hartman, however, and this

Court consequently does not believe that Hartman applies so as to

change Judge Schwartz’ previous conclusions concerning the

propriety of summary judgment.

It is not necessary to recite here at any length the alleged

facts of this matter as thoroughly discussed in Judge Schwartz’

2001 Order. A brief summation will suffice at this juncture as

follows: Mr. Shelton, a correctional officer working for the

Butte County Sheriff’s Department, made several written

complaints of excessive force by deputies against inmates at the

Butte County Jail prior to October 16, 1993. Shelton also filed

a discrimination claim against the County of Butte, which he

settled on December 1, 1994. At about the time Shelton’s

discrimination claim settled, Deputy Sheriff Dennis Cooley began

investigating a possible connection between Shelton and the

disappearance of certain items from the Butte County Historical

Society some three years before, even though no one from the

Historical Society had initiated contact with the Sheriff’s

Department about the missing items in the intervening three year

period. 

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4

In 1995, after Plaintiff made an additional complaint about

beatings at the jail to his supervisor, Sheriff Grey told Shelton

that it was unsafe for him to return to work. Shelton was

subsequently discharged for willful insubordination, although he

was later reinstated and placed on work related disability. The

Sheriff’s Department thereafter expanded its investigation of

Shelton after one Dorothy Van Luvanee claimed that certain

antique items were missing from her home after Shelton worked

there as a handyman.

Based both on the Butte County Historical Society losses and

the items reported missing from Ms. Luvanee, Deputy Sheriff

Dennis Cooley prepared a search warrant for Plaintiff’s two

homes. Plaintiff claims that Sheriff Grey “put out a memo” that

Shelton would be arrested on felony charges even before the

search warrant was executed. Although several items reported

missing by the Historical Society were indeed located at

Shelton’s homes during the course of the search, Plaintiff claims

that the items had been loaned to him for safekeeping (Shelton

had previously worked as a volunteer for the Society) due to

flooding concerns. Plaintiff was prosecuted even though one of

the investigators assigned to the case, Bernie Lightner, had

allegedly been informed that the Society had indeed loaned

certain items to the public.

The case against Plaintiff for receiving stolen property,

second degree commercial burglary, offering false evidence and

grand theft of personal property ultimately went to trial. 

Shelton was acquitted on two counts and the jury failed to agree

on the remaining two counts.

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5

The foregoing discussion makes it clear that this case

involves complicated allegations extending over a period of years

in response to Plaintiff’s purported whistle-blowing activities. 

The course of retaliation claimed to have suffered extends from

adverse employment actions to criminal prosecution, and stems

according to Plaintiff from his complaints against mistreatment

of Butte County Jail inmates that, if true, implicate

constitutional concerns under the Eighth Amendment. Hartman, in

contrast, involved only criticism of certain business decisions

advocated by the Postal Service with respect to the technology

for sorting mail. Moreover, unlike Hartman, here we have

allegations that Butte County Sheriff’s personnel, in addition to

instigating the investigation itself, also solicited others (the

Historical Society and Ms. Luvanee) to file complaints against

Mr. Shelton.

The factual questions raised as to Defendants’ motives for

all this alleged behavior potentially take this case far beyond

the narrow confines confronted by the Supreme Court in Hartman. 

Those unresolved factual issues make this case inappropriate for

disposition on summary judgment for the same reasons identified

by Judge Schwartz in his 2001 Order. Those reasons need not be

further detailed here and are incorporated by reference as if

fully set forth. Plaintiff William Shelton’s claims premised on

violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (for alleged deprivations of his

First and Fourteenth Amendment rights), as well as his claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress, accordingly survive

summary judgment. 

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 Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, 1

this matter was deemed suitable for decision without oral

argument. E.D. Local Rule 78-230(h).

6

In addition, Defendants cannot rely upon the defense of

qualified immunity since, as Judge Schwartz concluded, it would

have been clear to any reasonable officer that retaliation

against Plaintiff for the activities he identifies would be

impermissible.

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendants’ renewed

Motion for Summary Judgment.1

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 16, 2007

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:97-cv-01309-MCE -EFB Document 194 Filed 01/16/07 Page 6 of 6