Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-01605/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-01605-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHELLE MONDRAGON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF FREMONT, et al., 

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-01605-NC 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART 

AND DENYING IN PART 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS; GRANTING LEAVE TO 

AMEND

Re: Dkt. No. 98

This case arises out of the death of 16-year-old Elena Mondragon after being shot by 

City of Fremont police officers. Elena was the passenger in a vehicle driven by a young 

man who was under surveillance by undercover officers. The officers shot into the 

vehicle, including four shots that struck and killed Elena. Defendants the City of Fremont 

and individual police officers move to dismiss claims brought by Elena’s successor-ininterest, her mother Michelle Mondragon. The Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss the 

claim against the City of Fremont under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the Third Amended 

Complaint fails to state sufficient facts to show the City’s Monell liability. The Court finds 

that further amendment would be futile so does not grant leave to amend this claim, and 

therefore DISMISSES the City of Fremont from the case. The Court also GRANTS the 

defendants’ motion as to the plaintiff’s failure to file a successor-in-interest affidavit and 

as to the plaintiff’s error in captioning her Fourteenth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 as brought as successor-in-interest rather than in her individual capacity. The Court 

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GRANTS the plaintiff leave to cure these deficiencies. The Court otherwise DENIES the 

motion to dismiss. 

I. Background

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Michelle Mondragon filed a complaint based on the death of her daughter, 

Elena Mondragon, following a shooting by City of Fremont police officers targeting a man 

named Rico Tiger. Dkt. No. 1. United States District Court Judge Yvonne Gonzalez 

Rogers granted a partial stay in the case because of pending criminal proceedings against 

Rico Tiger related to the shooting. Dkt. No. 41. Judge Gonzalez Rogers referred the case 

to me. Dkt. No. 67. I lifted the partial stay. Dkt. No. 74. Plaintiff filed an amended 

complaint and defendants moved to dismiss. Dkt. Nos. 75, 80, 84, 85. Defendants also 

filed a cross-claim against Rico Tiger. Dkt. No. 81. I granted the defendants’ motion to 

dismiss and granted plaintiff leave to amend the complaint. Dkt. No. 92. Plaintiff filed a 

third amended complaint. Dkt. No. 94. Defendants voluntarily dismissed Rico Tiger as a 

cross-defendant. Dkt. No. 112. 

The third amended complaint brings claims against defendants the City of Fremont 

and its police officers Joel Hernandez, Jeremy Miskella, and Chailan Chahouati.

Plaintiff’s claims are for: (1) violation of the decedent Elena Mondragon’s civil rights 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants Miskella, Hernandez, and Chahouati; (2) 

violation of plaintiff Michelle Mondragon’s civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 

Miskella, Hernandez, and Chahouati; (3) Monell liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 

the City of Fremont; (4) wrongful death against Miskella, Hernandez, and Chahouati; and 

(5) violation of California Civil Code § 52.1, the Bane Act, against Miskella, Hernandez, 

and Chahouati. The defendants’ motion to dismiss the third amended complaint is now 

before the Court. 

B. Facts Alleged in the Third Amended Complaint

On March 14, 2017, 16-year-old Elena Mondragon went swimming at an apartment 

complex in Hayward, California, with her cousin and two friends. Dkt. No. 94, Third 

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Amended Complaint, at ¶¶ 2, 18. Afterward, they all got into a BMW driven by one of the 

friends, Rico Tiger. Id. Elena was seated in the front passenger seat. Id. ¶ 19. 

Unbeknownst to the group, the Southern Alameda County Major Crimes Task Force, 

including officers from the City of Fremont Police Department, had been surveilling Tiger

because he was wanted for multiple robberies. Id. ¶¶ 2, 18. As Tiger began to drive the 

BMW out of the apartment complex parking lot, the car was suddenly cut off by an 

unmarked minivan containing undercover officers in plain clothes including defendant 

Ghailan Chahouati. Id. ¶¶ 3, 19. An unmarked Honda pulled up behind the minivan with 

defendant officers Joel Hernandez and Jeremy Miskella inside. Id. Hernandez and 

Miskella exited the Honda holding AR-15 rifles. Id. None of the officers identified 

themselves as law enforcement. Id. ¶ 19. 

Tiger backed up the BMW a significant distance and loudly revved the engine. Id. 

Officer Chahouati exited the minivan, drawing an AR-15 and pointing it at the BMW. Id. 

Officer Chahouati stepped directly into the BMW’s path. Id. ¶¶ 3, 19. Tiger attempted to 

drive the BMW past the minivan and Honda. Id. ¶ 19. Officers Miskella and Hernandez 

fired a “relentless” “hail of bullets” into the BMW. Id. ¶¶ 3, 20. Elena was struck by the 

bullets four times. Id. She was left in agonizing pain and ultimately died of her wounds. 

Id. At the time of her death, Elena was several weeks pregnant. Id. 

II. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal 

sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). On a 

motion to dismiss, all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the 

light most favorable to the non-movant. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–

38 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court, however, need not accept as true “allegations that are 

merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re 

Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). Although a complaint need 

not allege detailed factual allegations, it must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 

true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

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550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when it “allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). If a court grants a motion to dismiss, leave to amend 

should be granted unless the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of 

other facts. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000).

III. Discussion

A. Successor-In-Interest Affidavit Requirement

Plaintiff Michelle Mondragon brings her first, second, third, and fifth claims (under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California’s Bane Act) as successor-in-interest to her daughter Elena 

Mondragon. TAC ¶¶ 33, 39, 41, 58. Under California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.32, 

a person seeking to commence an action as a successor-in-interest must file an affidavit or 

declaration along with a certified copy of the decedent’s death certificate to demonstrate 

that the plaintiff meets the state’s requirements for bringing a survival action. Moreland v. 

Las Vegas Metro. Police Department, 159 F.3d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, Michelle 

Mondragon has not filed an affidavit or a death certificate. In her opposition to the motion 

to dismiss, Michelle seeks leave to file these materials. Because the Court finds that the 

defendants would not be prejudiced by Michelle filing her successor-in-interest documents 

at this time, the Court GRANTS leave. Michelle must file all materials necessary to show 

compliance with California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.32 by March 24, 2020. 

B. Fourteenth Amendment and Wrongful Death Claims: Issues with Michelle 

Mondragon’s Individual versus Successor-in-Interest Capacities 

Michelle’s second cause of action, for violation of Fourteenth Amendment rights

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is captioned in the TAC as brought as Elena’s successor-in-interest. 

TAC ¶ 39. The TAC titles this claim “Violation of Plaintiff’s 14th Amendment Rights/Right 

to Familial Relationship,” and describes that Michelle was “deprived of her constitutional 

rights to a familial relationship” and that Elena was deprived of her “Fourth and Fourteen 

Amendment[]” rights. TAC ¶ 40. 

Michelle’s fourth cause of action, for wrongful death under California state law, is 

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captioned in the TAC as brought in Michelle’s individual capacity. TAC ¶ 53. However, 

in the original, first amended, and second amended complaints, the wrongful death claim 

was consistently captioned as brought by Michelle on behalf of Elena as her successor-ininterest. Dkt. Nos. 1, 11, 75, 94. 

Defendants seek dismissal of the Fourteenth Amendment claim because Elena 

cannot assert claims for wrongful death or loss of familial relationship. Dkt. No. 98, 

Motion, at 5. And, defendants argue, if Michelle meant to state this claim on her own 

behalf, it is barred by California’s two-year statute of limitations because the shooting took 

place on March 14, 2017 and the TAC was filed on November 13, 2019. Id.; Cal. Code 

Civil Proc. § 355.1. Plaintiff “acknowledges that she improperly titled the heading for her 

14th Amendment claim” and admits that “her title in the heading of the cause of action was 

technically incorrect.” Dkt. No. 104, Opposition, at 9. The Court notes that all four 

complaints filed in this action titled this claim as brought by Michelle on behalf of Elena as 

her successor-in-interest. See Dkt. Nos. 1, 11, 75, 94 (Complaint, First Amended 

Complaint, Second Amended Complaint, and Third Amended Complaint). Thus plaintiff 

made this error four times. Defendants have not raised this issue until the instant motion to 

dismiss. 

Similarly, defendants argue that plaintiff’s wrongful death claim is barred by the 

statute of limitations because plaintiff Michelle Mondragon never brought any claims on 

her own individual behalf until the TAC which was filed more than two years after the 

shooting. Motion at 12. The first three versions of the complaint captioned this claim as a 

successor-in-interest claim, but the TAC now cites Michelle’s individual capacity. 

Defendants cite to Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center, which held that a survivor action cannot 

relate back to a claim brought originally by a decedent to avoid being barred by a statute of 

limitations. 140 Cal. App. 4th 1256, 1277 (2006). However, in Quiroz, the survivor’s 

injuries were only included for the first time in the amended complaint. Id. Here, every 

iteration of plaintiff’s complaint has alleged the same injuries: Michele’s “pecuniary loss 

resulting from the loss of comfort, society, attention, services, and support of her 

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daughter,” as well as “funeral and burial expenses.” Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 52, 53; Dkt. 11 at ¶¶ 53, 

54; Dkt. 75 at ¶¶ 53, 54; Dkt. 94 at ¶¶ 55, 56. It appears that, like with the Fourteenth 

Amendment claim, the caption of this claim was simply mistitled by error, unlike in 

Quiroz where the content of the claim and the injuries alleged changed in substance over 

time. 

Plaintiff requests leave to amend the TAC to instead name Michelle Mondragon in 

her individual capacity rather than in her capacity as Elena’s successor-in-interest for the 

Fourteenth Amendment claim. Plaintiff argues that while this amendment would occur 

outside the statute of limitations, the Court should grant leave under Rule 15(a) and (c) 

because the new claim arises out of the same occurrence as the original claim and thus 

relates back to the date of the original pleading. Opp. at 9–10. Similarly, Plaintiff argues 

that her change in the TAC to name herself individually for the wrongful death claim 

should be acceptable because the claim relates back to its previous iterations where she 

brought the claim on behalf of Elena. Plaintiff also argues that her Government Tort 

Claim Act claim contained accurate allegations and put Defendants on notice, though no 

version of the government tort claim has been filed with this Court.

The Court GRANTS leave under Rule 15 for Plaintiff to correct the title of her 

second claim for violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights, finding that because the 

factual bases for the claim remained identical over time, Defendants were on notice of the 

facts and injuries alleged. For the same reasons, the Court DENIES the motion to dismiss 

the wrongful death claim which was already refashioned in the TAC as brought in 

Michelle’s individual capacity. 

C. Monell Liability

Plaintiff’s third claim is against the City of Fremont under a Monell theory of liability 

for violation of Elena Mondragon’s civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim for 

a municipality’s Monell liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a constitutional 

right was violated as a result of (1) an express municipal policy; (2) a widespread practice 

that constitutes a custom or usage; (3) the decision of a person with final policymaking 

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authority; or (4) inadequate training. Monell v. New York Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 

658 (1978); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988); City of Canton v. 

Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state sufficient facts to show that the 

City of Fremont is liable for Elena’s death under Monell. At times, the TAC alleges that 

the individual defendant officers violated the City of Fremont’s policies in the incident that 

resulted in Elena’s death. TAC ¶ 42. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the officers 

violated the City’s Use of Force policy by shooting at a moving car. Id. Plaintiff also 

alleges that the defendant officers violated the Body Worn Camera policy by not activating 

their cameras. Id. ¶ 43. These are the only two policies explicitly named in the TAC—the 

rest of plaintiff’s allegations for her Monell claim are broad and generic. She alleges that 

the officers’ “failures indicate a lack of supervision and ratification of officer misconduct” 

and that the officers’ conduct “was ratified by [unnamed] City police department 

supervisory officers.” Id. ¶¶ 42, 43, 44. Plaintiff also alleges that the officers were 

inadequately supervised, trained, controlled, and disciplined. Id. ¶ 45. The complaint 

contains vague conclusory statements rather than specific facts. Indeed, Plaintiff admits 

that she “technically . . . did not have the specific details of Defendants’ failed policy at the 

time of her most recent amendment.” Opp. at 12.

Plaintiff argues in her Opposition that she should be held to a lenient pleading 

standard because she had no access to the facts she needed to state this claim before 

discovery. Opp. at 11–12. To support this proposition, she relies on Galbraith v. Cnty. of 

Santa Clara, which states that “a claim of municipality liability under section 1983 is 

sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss even if the claim is based on nothing more than 

a bare allegation that the individual officers’ conduct conformed to official policy, custom 

or practice.” 307 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002). First of all, here, plaintiff actually 

alleges that the individual officers violated the City of Fremont’s policies rather than 

followed them. But more importantly, the standard in Galbraith predates the U.S. 

Supreme Court’s heightened pleading standards set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 

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and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, which this Court must apply. 550 U.S. 544 (2007); 556 U.S. 662 

(2008). And the TAC is not sufficient under Twombly and Iqbal. 

 Plaintiff also cites to Phillips v. City of Fresno, 2013 WL 6243278, at *10 (E.D. Cal. 

Dec. 3, 2013) and Estate of Duran v. Chavez, 2015 WL 8011685, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 

2015) as examples of cases where courts denied motions to dismiss Monell claims where 

defendants had possession of discovery that plaintiffs needed to state detailed factual 

allegations. Opp. at 11–12. However, in both those cases, the plaintiffs stated more 

specific facts than the TAC states here. In Phillips, the operative complaint included 

factual allegations as to the number of inmates in a prison after realignment, data about 

violence in the relevant prison, updates from a class action lawsuit based on similar 

grounds, and quotes from defendants that had appeared in a local newspaper. 2013 WL 

6243278 at *10.1 In Chavez, the plaintiff included facts about specific named supervisors 

and their titles, roles, observations, and actions. 2015 WL 8011685 at *9. The courts in 

those cases noted that the factual allegations were sparse, yet here plaintiff’s TAC contains 

even fewer facts. 

Plaintiff argues in the Opposition that she has obtained discovery to support her 

Monell claim and attaches transcripts from multiple police officers’ depositions to show 

what facts she has learned. Defendants argue that the Court should not consider the 

depositions because the only question before the Court is whether the TAC is adequately 

pleaded. The Court agrees that it should not rely upon the deposition transcripts in 

deciding this motion because they are outside the allegations of the TAC. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b); Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2018) (stating 

that “generally, district courts may not consider material outside the pleadings when 

assessing the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

1 Other courts in this District have rejected plaintiff’s counsel’s reliance on Phillips where 

Monell claims were insufficiently pleaded. See, e.g., Cifuentes v. CMPA, Case No. 17-cv00575-JSC, 2017 WL 2617959, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2017); Wilson v. Town of 

Danville, Case No. 17-cv-00863-DMR, 2017 WL 235545, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 

2017). 

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Procedure.”). But even if the Court did consider the deposition transcripts, plaintiff would

not have saved her Monell claim. The depositions show that, as plaintiff herself states in 

the TAC, the officers’ actions in the shooting incident were inconsistent with the City of 

Fremont’s policies. Opp. at 13. Plaintiff argues that the deposition testimony indicates 

that officers were trained incorrectly and that their training taught them not to follow City 

policies. Id. However, the Court’s review of the deposition transcripts reveals that the 

officers’ testimony about training and policy is limited, somewhat unclear, and still lacks 

sufficient facts to state a Monell claim against the City of Fremont. 

The Court FINDS that the plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to state a 

claim for the City of Fremont’s liability under Monell. The motion to dismiss this claim is 

GRANTED. The Court finds that further amendment of this claim would be futile 

especially given Plaintiff’s three previous opportunities to amend the complaint. Allen v. 

City of Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that the court’s discretion 

to deny leave to amend is “particularly broad where plaintiff has previously amended the 

complaint.”).

This was the only claim brought against defendant the City of Fremont, so the City 

of Fremont is dismissed from the case.

IV. Conclusion

The Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s Monell claim against the 

City of Fremont and finds that further amendment of this claim would be futile. As such, 

the Court DISMISSES the City of Fremont from the case. 

The Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss based on the plaintiff’s failure to file a 

successor-in-interest affidavit and will dismiss all claims brought by Michelle Mondragon 

as Elena Mondragon’s successor-in-interest if no required materials are filed by March 24, 

2020. 

The Court also GRANTS the motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s Fourteenth 

Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the incorrect captioning of the claim 

but GRANTS the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to name Michelle Mondragon in 

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her individual capacity instead of as Elena’s successor-in-interest. If she fails to make this 

amendment by March 24, 2020, the claim will be dismissed. 

The Plaintiff is only granted leave to make the limited amendments detailed in this 

Order and may not make any additional amendments to her claims or add additional parties

without leave of Court. The Court otherwise DENIES the motion to dismiss. Defendants 

do not need to answer the Third Amended Complaint unless Plaintiff provides notice that 

she will not file a Fourth Amended Complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 10, 2020 _____________________________________

NATHANAEL M. COUSINS

United States Magistrate Judge

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