Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01292/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01292-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1 11cv1292 BTM (MDD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONNIE RAY McKINLEY,

CDCR # H-83058 Civil

No. 

11cv1292 BTM (MDD)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, [ECF No. 2]; 

(2) DISMISSING ACTION 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)

vs.

MATTHEW CATES; L.S. McEWEN;

E. BUTLER; E. MERCER,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, a state inmate currently incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison and proceeding

pro se, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, Plaintiff has

filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a party’s failure to pay only if the party is

granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Prisoners granted leave to

proceed IFP however, remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of

whether the action is ultimately dismissed for any reason. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2). 

Case 3:11-cv-01292-BTM-MDD Document 5 Filed 09/19/11 Page 1 of 5
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2 11cv1292 BTM (MDD)

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit which complies with 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(1), and that he has attached a certified copy of his trust account statement pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D.CAL.CIVLR 3.2. Plaintiff’s trust account statement shows that

he has insufficient funds from which to pay an initial partial filing fee.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [ECF No. 2] and

assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 

II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)’s amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 also

obligate the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like

Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or

adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole,

probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.”

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Under these provisions, the Court must sua

sponte dismiss any prisoner civil action and all other IFP complaints, or any portions thereof,

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.

Plaintiff was convicted and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole in 1997.

(See Pl.’s Compl, Ex. 1, Abstract of Judgment dated January 29, 1997.) Plaintiff claims that,

beginning in 1997, prison officials began garnishing his inmate trust account to pay towards his

restitution fine. (See Compl. at 3.) However, Plaintiff claims that he discovered in 2010 that

the CDCR had been “illegally collecting” money from his inmate account because Plaintiff

claims that the “oral pronouncement” of his sentence did not include the restitution fine. (Id.)

Instead, the restitution fine was added later in a minute order by Defendant E. Mercer, Riverside

Superior Court Clerk. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that this minute order is “erroneous.” (Id.) Plaintiff

filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in Riverside Superior Court seeking correction of this

issue. On April 20, 2011, Superior Court Judge Jorge Hernandez denied Plaintiff’s Petition

finding that “[t]he documents supplied in Petitioner’s response” does “demonstrate that some

sentencing and abstract of judgment errors occurred that appear to this court to have been cured.”

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3 11cv1292 BTM (MDD)

(Compl, Ex. 5, In re Donnie McKinney, Cal. Superior Court Case No. RIC10019910, Order

denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus dated Apr. 20, 2011.)

Plaintiff seeks to hold liable the Clerk of Court for the County of Riverside for allegedly

entering a minute order into the Court’s docket which Plaintiff claims was fraudulent. Plaintiff

seeks to sue prison officials for injunctive relief by requesting that this Court order prison

officials to stop taking funds from his trust account and applying them to the allegedly invalid

restitution fine. (See Compl. at 8.)

First, Defendant Mercer, who is alleged to have filed the minute order regarding

restitution, is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity. See Mullis v. United States

Bankruptcy Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Court clerks have absolute quasijudicial immunity from damages for civil rights violations when they perform tasks that are an

integral part of the judicial process.”)

Second, Plaintiff’s Complaint is in essence seeking an Order from this Court directing

the state court to modify its judgment and order. This Court lacks jurisdiction in this matter as

federal courts lack jurisdiction to review or modify state court judgments under the RookerFeldman doctrine. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Company, 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of

Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983). The Rooker-Feldman

doctrine provides that “‘a losing party in state court is barred from seeking what in substance

would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States District Court, based on the

losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.’” Doe v.

Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997,

1005-06 (1994)), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 868 (1999).

Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff is seeking the return of funds that he claims prison

officials have taken unlawfully from his inmate trust account, he has failed to state a claim.

Where an inmate alleges the deprivation of a liberty or property interest caused by the

unauthorized negligent or intentional action of a prison official, the prisoner cannot state a

constitutional claim where the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. See

Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 129-32 (1990); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984).

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The California Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”) provides an adequate post-deprivation state remedy

for the random and unauthorized taking of property. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17

(9th Cir. 1994). Thus, Plaintiff has an adequate state post-deprivation remedy and his claims

relating to the monies garnished from his inmate trust account are not cognizable in this § 1983

action, and must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b)(1).

The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety for failing to state a claim upon

which relief could be granted and for seeking monetary damages against an immune defendant.

The Court finds further amendment would be futile. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d

336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996) (denial of a leave to amend is not an abuse of discretion where further

amendment would be futile); see also Robinson v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 997 F. Supp.

1303, 1308 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“Since plaintiff has not, and cannot, state a claim containing an

arguable basis in law, this action should be dismissed without leave to amend; any amendment

would be futile.”) (citing Newland v. Dalton, 81 F.3d 904, 907 (9th Cir. 1996)).

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2] is

GRANTED. 

2. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee

owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty

percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court

each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Matthew Cate,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502,

Sacramento, California 95814.

/ / /

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without leave to amend for failing to state

a claim upon which relief could be granted and for seeking monetary damages against immune

defendants. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b).

The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment and close the file.

DATED: September 19, 2011

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

Case 3:11-cv-01292-BTM-MDD Document 5 Filed 09/19/11 Page 5 of 5