Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-17-01220/USCOURTS-ca13-17-01220-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 

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NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

THE CHAMBERLAIN GROUP, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

TECHTRONIC INDUSTRIES CO. LTD., 

ET TECHNOLOGY (WUXI) CO. LTD.,

Defendants

TECHTRONIC INDUSTRIES NORTH AMERICA, 

INC., ONE WORLD TECHNOLOGIES, INC., OWT 

INDUSTRIES, INC., RYOBI TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Defendants-Appellants

______________________ 

2016-2713, 2017-1220

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois in No. 1:16-cv-06097, Senior 

Judge Harry D. Leinenweber.

______________________ 

Decided: January 25, 2017

______________________ 

 KATHERINE VIDAL, Fish & Richardson, PC, Redwood 

City, CA, argued for plaintiff-appellee. Also represented 

by BENJAMIN ELACQUA, MICHAEL RUECKHEIM, Houston, 

TX; MARIA ELENA STITELER, Minneapolis, MN.

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2 THE CHAMBERLAIN GRP., INC. v. TECHTRONIC INDUS. CO. LTD. 

JASON C. WHITE, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Chicago, IL, argued for defendants-appellants. Also represented by MICHAEL J. ABERNATHY, SANJAY K. MURTHY, 

NICHOLAS A. RESTAURI; WILLIAM R. PETERSON, NICHOLAUS 

E. FLOYD, Houston, TX; JULIE S. GOLDEMBERG, Philadelphia, PA.

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, TARANTO, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

LOURIE, Circuit Judge. 

Techtronic Industries North America, Inc., One World 

Technologies, Inc., OWT Industries, Inc., and Ryobi 

Technologies, Inc. (collectively, “TTI”) appeal from the 

decision and order of the United States District Court for 

the Northern District of Illinois granting The Chamberlain Group, Inc.’s (“CGI”) motion for a preliminary injunction. See Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Techtronic Indus. Co., 

No. 16 C 6097, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129809 (N.D. Ill. 

Sept. 15, 2016) (“Decision”); Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. 

Techtronic Indus. Co., No. 16 C 6097, ECF No. 111 (N.D. 

Ill. Sept. 20, 2016) (J.A. 19–20). Because the district court 

erred as a matter of law in its claim construction, and 

concluded that CGI is likely to succeed on the merits of its 

infringement claim and that a preliminary injunction 

should therefore be granted on the basis of that incorrect 

construction, we vacate the preliminary injunction. 

BACKGROUND

CGI owns U.S. Patent 7,224,275 (the “’275 patent”), 

which is directed to garage door openers that wirelessly 

transmit status information. CGI entered the garage door 

opener market in 1958. CGI sells its garage door openers 

in several stores, including Home Depot. 

Claim 1 of the ’275 patent is exemplary and reads as 

follows:

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A movable barrier operator comprising: 

a controller having a plurality of potential 

operational status conditions defined, at 

least in part, by a plurality of operating 

states; 

a movable barrier interface that is operably coupled to the controller; 

a wireless status condition data transmitter that is operably coupled to the controller, wherein the wireless status condition 

data transmitter transmits a status condition signal that: 

corresponds to a present operational status condition defined, at 

least in part, by at least two operating states from the plurality of 

operating states; and 

comprises an identifier that is at 

least relatively unique to the movable barrier operator, such that 

the status condition signal substantially uniquely identifies the 

movable barrier operator.

’275 patent col. 8 ll. 5–21 (emphasis added). 

Claims 2 and 5 depend directly from claim 1, and 

claim 3 depends from claim 2. Id. col. 8 ll. 22–27, 30–46. 

Claim 2 recites that the movable barrier “further comprises at least one condition status sensor that is operably 

coupled to the controller.” Id. col. 8 ll. 22–24 (emphasis 

added). Claim 3 recites transmission of “data that corresponds to the at least one condition status sensor.” Id. 

col. 8 ll. 25–27. Claim 5 recites a plurality of operating 

states at least one of which must be included in the movable barrier, including “detecting a likely presence of an 

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obstacle to movement of the movable barrier;” “detecting a 

likely proximal presence of a human;” and “detecting a 

likely proximal presence of a vehicle.” Id. col. 8 ll. 30–46.

TTI manufactures and sells power tools and accessories under the brand name Ryobi. In May 2016, TTI 

began selling the Ryobi GD200 garage door opener (“Ryobi GDO”). TTI sells its Ryobi products, including the 

Ryobi GDO, exclusively through Home Depot. 

In June 2016, CGI sued TTI alleging that the Ryobi 

GDO infringed the ’275 patent,1 and moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court granted the motion

with respect to claims 1 and 5 of the ’275 patent.

The district court found that CGI had shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its infringement claim. The court construed “controller” in 

claim 1 to be a “self-aware [controller], i.e., that it did not 

rely upon any external sensors to obtain the status conditions of the [garage door opener], and which it was able to 

transmit upon request.” Decision, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

129809, at *9. The court stated that, due to differences 

between claims 1 and 2, “[c]laim 1 eschews condition 

sensors in favor of a controller that does not rely on 

external sensors.” Id. at *10. The court further reasoned 

that, during prosecution, “the only way to distinguish the 

’275 patent from the prior art was for the examiner to 

 

1 CGI also alleged infringement of U.S. Patent 

7,635,966 (the “’966 patent”). This case, however, is a 

limited appeal of the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction, and the preliminary injunction does not 

extend to the claims of the ’966 patent. Accordingly, the 

’966 patent is not before us today and will not be discussed. See Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 452 F.3d 

1331, 1333 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

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conclude that the ’275 patent does not rely on external 

sensors.” Id. at *12. 

In construing “controller,” the district court also rejected TTI’s argument that requiring the “controller” to be 

self-aware would render dependent claim 5 inoperable 

because some of its listed operational states require 

external sensors. The court noted that the operational 

states “do appear to require external sensors.” Id. at *10. 

The court, however, rejected TTI’s argument because

CGI’s expert testified that those operational states “might 

through future invention be able to be sensed by the 

controller without external sensors.” Id. at *10–11.

Applying its “self-aware controller” construction, the 

court concluded that “[b]ecause none of the prior art 

suggested by [TTI’s expert] taught the concept of the ‘selfaware’ controller, TTI has not raised a ‘substantial question as to invalidity’” of the ’275 patent. Id. at *12. The 

court did not make findings regarding whether other 

claim limitations were disclosed in the cited prior art.

As for the remaining factors considered in a preliminary injunction analysis, the district court found that CGI 

would suffer irreparable harm based on “clear evidence of 

price erosion caused by the Ryobi product launch”; “basic 

economic reasoning dictat[ing] that [reduced CGI market 

share] should be suspected”; and a “substantial risk” of 

lost profits, including for accessories. Id. at *18–19. The

court also found that the balance of the hardships favored 

CGI and that the public interest factor favored a preliminary injunction. Id. at *20.

Subsequently, the district court issued an order enjoining TTI from “making, using, selling, or offering to sell 

in the United States or importing into the United States 

the Ryobi GD200 garage door opener in a configuration 

that infringes claims 1 and 5 of the ’275 [p]atent under 

the Court’s Memorandum Opinion or products that are 

not colorably different therefrom.” J.A. 20.

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TTI appealed from the grant of the preliminary injunction and moved to stay the preliminary injunction

pending appeal. On November 1, 2016, a motions panel of 

this court denied TTI’s motion. The panel “conclude[d]

that while TTI has demonstrated likelihood of success on 

the merits, it has not established any of the other three

factors, and that given its failure to demonstrate irreparable injury, it has not established that a stay of the 

preliminary injunction pending appeal is warranted 

here.” Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Techtronic Indus. Co., 

No. 16-2713, slip op. at 2 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 1, 2016).

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c) 

in view of §§ 1292(a) and 1295(a)(1).

DISCUSSION

I.

The grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is 

within the sound discretion of the district court, and we 

will not reverse its judgment absent an abuse of that 

discretion. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, 

Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Accordingly,

we will only overturn a decision granting a preliminary 

injunction on appeal if “the court made a clear error of 

judgment in weighing relevant factors or exercised its 

discretion based upon an error of law or clearly erroneous 

factual findings.” Sanofi–Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 

F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Genentech, Inc. 

v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 

1997)). We review the district court’s conclusions of law 

de novo. Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 

357 F.3d 1319, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he 

is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his 

favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” 

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Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20

(2008). The movant must establish both “likelihood of 

success on the merits and irreparable harm” for the court 

to grant a preliminary injunction. Amazon.com, 239 F.3d 

at 1350 (emphasis added).2 Thus, where the accused 

infringer “raises a ‘substantial question’ concerning 

validity, enforceability, or infringement (i.e., asserts a 

defense that [the patentee] cannot show ‘lacks substantial 

merit’) the preliminary injunction should not issue.” 

Genentech, 108 F.3d at 1364. 

II. 

We first consider whether the district court erred in 

its claim construction. We review a district court’s ultimate claim constructions de novo and any underlying 

factual determinations involving extrinsic evidence for 

clear error. Teva Pharm. U.S.A., Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 

S. Ct. 831, 841–42 (2015). Here, because the intrinsic 

record alone determines the proper construction of “controller,” we review the district court’s construction de 

novo. See David Netzer Consulting Eng’r LLC v. Shell Oil 

Co., 824 F.3d 989, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied, No. 

16-713, 2017 WL 69299 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2017); Shire Dev., 

LLC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 787 F.3d 1359, 1364, 1368 

(Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 840–42). 

The words of a claim “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning” as understood by a person 

of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. 

Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 

2005) (en banc). Because that meaning is “often not 

 

2 Although TTI also challenges on appeal the district court’s conclusions regarding irreparable harm, we 

only reach the district court’s analysis of likelihood of 

success on the merits because it is dispositive. See Nat’l 

Steel Car, 357 F.3d at 1325 n.5.

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immediately apparent, and because patentees frequently 

use terms idiosyncratically,” the court looks to the intrinsic record, including “the words of the claims themselves, 

the remainder of the specification, [and] the prosecution 

history,” as well as to extrinsic evidence, when appropriate, to construe a disputed claim term. Id. at 1314, 

1319. The specification “is the single best guide to the 

meaning of a disputed term,” and “is, thus, the primary 

basis for construing the claims.” Id. at 1315 (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, 

“while extrinsic evidence can shed useful light on the 

relevant art, we have explained that it is less significant 

than the intrinsic record in determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.” Id. at 1317 (quotation 

marks omitted); see also id. at 1318 (“We have viewed 

extrinsic evidence in general as less reliable than the 

patent and its prosecution history in determining how to 

read claim terms, for several reasons.”). 

TTI argues that the district court improperly construed “controller” in claim 1 to read a “self-aware controller” limitation into the claims. TTI contends that the 

plain language of the claim is not limited to a “self-aware 

controller” and that the specification supports this conclusion. TTI asserts that the district court’s claim construction rests on a misunderstanding of the relationship 

between dependent and independent claims and a misreading of the prosecution history. TTI argues that the 

district court erred in concluding that, because dependent 

claim 2 has sensors, independent claim 1 cannot have 

sensors. TTI also contends that the district court’s construction renders claim 5 inoperable. 

CGI responds that the district court’s claim construction was correct based on the plain language of claim 1, 

which requires “a controller having a plurality of potential

operational status conditions,” ’275 patent col. 8 ll. 6–7 

(emphasis added), not a controller that can determine 

actual conditions of external sensors. CGI argues that the 

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“potential operational status conditions” are internal

conditions of the controller because the claim terms 

“having” and “potential” refer to operational status conditions of the controller itself. CGI contends that the district court did not find that because claim 2 has sensors, 

claim 1 cannot have sensors. CGI also argues that differences in the signal transmissions recited in claims 1 and 3 

due to claim 3’s dependence on claim 2 support the district court’s construction. CGI further asserts that the 

district court properly rejected TTI’s argument that claim 

5 is inoperable without using external sensors based on 

expert testimony and that we must review the district 

court’s factual findings regarding claim construction 

under the clearly erroneous standard. 

We agree with TTI that the district court incorrectly

construed “controller” to require that the controller be 

“self-aware” and to prohibit the controller from “rely[ing] 

upon any external sensors to obtain status conditions” of 

the movable barrier. Decision, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

129809, at *9. Claim 1 neither recites nor requires a 

“self-aware controller.” The written description of the 

’275 patent makes clear that the controller can obtain the 

operational status conditions through self-awareness or

through externally-developed information, e.g., sensors. 

’275 patent col. 2 ll. 56–64, col. 4 ll. 52–59, col. 6 ll. 33–36. 

The written description of the ’275 patent uses the 

term “self-aware” only once. That usage makes clear that, 

although the controller can be self-aware, it does not need 

to be self-aware. The written description states: 

Depending on the needs of the setting, the controller 11 can be self-aware of such operational status 

conditions (as when, for example, the controller 11 

is aware that it has switched a given ambient 

light fixture on or off) or the controller 11 can be 

provided with externally developed information 

regarding the condition. To effect the latter, it 

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may be desirable in some settings to use one or 

more status condition sensors 14. 

Id. col. 4 ll. 52–59 (emphases added). 

CGI’s arguments regarding the language of claims 1 

and 3 do not compel the district court’s construction. As 

discussed above, the written description contemplates 

both self-aware controllers and controllers that rely on

sensors. Moreover, the written description does not 

support CGI’s assertion that the use of the terms “having” 

and “potential” in claim 1 demonstrate that the claim is 

directed to a self-aware controller. For example, the 

written description explains that, typically, “the controller 

11 will have a plurality of potential operational status 

conditions.” Id. col. 4 ll. 5–6 (emphases added). This 

statement is not limited to self-aware controller embodiments. Similarly, claim 3’s dependence from claim 2, 

rather than claim 1, does not demonstrate that the “controller” of claim 1 must be self-aware. 

We also agree with TTI that the district court erred by 

concluding that “the only reasonable way to reconcile the 

difference between [c]laim 1 and [c]laim 2 is that [c]laim 1 

eschews condition sensors in favor of a controller that does 

not rely on external sensors.” Decision, 2016 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 129809, at *10 (emphasis added). The inclusion of 

a particular limitation in a dependent claim does not 

suggest that the limitation is eschewed by the claim from 

which it depends. See Trs. of Columbia Univ. in City of 

N.Y. v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 

2016) (explaining that “construing the independent claim 

to exclude material covered by the dependent claim would 

be inconsistent”). Rather, it compels the opposite conclusion. If claim 1 precluded the inclusion of sensors, a claim

dependent on it, such as claim 2, could not include sensors. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012) (“A claim in dependent 

form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the 

limitations of the claim to which it refers.”). 

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Additionally, the prosecution history does not support 

the district court’s construction of “controller.” In fact, the 

prosecution history contradicts the district court’s conclusion that “the only way to distinguish the ’275 patent from 

the prior art was for the examiner to conclude that the 

’275 patent does not rely on external sensors.” Decision, 

2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129809, at *12. Although the 

applicant noted during prosecution that a particular piece 

of cited art disclosed a controller “that receives a signal 

from various sensors,” no argument to distinguish the art 

on this basis was made. See J.A. 1187. Moreover, the 

applicant amended a different limitation and argued for 

patentability based on that amendment in the same Reply 

to Office Action. See J.A. 1178, 1190. The prosecution 

history does not support a departure from the plain 

meaning of “controller” evinced by the specification.

In light of our rejection of the district court’s construction of “controller,” we need not, and do not, reach TTI’s 

inoperability argument regarding claim 5. 

Furthermore, we reject CGI’s contention that the district court made any factual findings regarding claim 

construction that we must review for clear error. As we 

have explained, the Supreme “Court did not hold that a 

deferential standard of review is triggered any time a 

district court hears or receives extrinsic evidence.” Shire 

Dev., 787 F.3d at 1368 (citing Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 842). 

Here, we apply the de novo standard of review because 

“there is no indication that the district court made any 

factual findings that underlie its construction[],” id., and 

“the intrinsic record alone determines the proper construction,” David Netzer Consulting Eng’r, 824 F.3d at 

993. See also Shire Dev., 787 F.3d at 1364, 1368 (citing 

Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 840–42). 

III. 

We finally consider whether the district court erred in 

finding that CGI established a likelihood of success on the 

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merits. To satisfy its burden, CGI must show that “in 

light of the presumptions and burdens that will inhere at 

a trial on the merits,” CGI will likely (1) prove that the 

Ryobi GDO infringes the ’275 patent; and (2) withstand 

TTI’s challenges to the validity and enforceability of the 

’275 patent. Sanofi-Synthelabo, 470 F.3d at 1374 (quoting 

Amazon.com, 239 F.3d at 1350). Because TTI only challenges the district court’s finding that it failed to raise a 

substantial question of validity, our analysis is limited to 

that issue.

TTI argues that the preliminary injunction should be 

vacated because CGI did not establish a likelihood of 

success on the merits. TTI contends that the district 

court’s finding of a likelihood of success on the merits was 

based entirely on its erroneous claim construction of 

“controller.” TTI asserts that it raised a substantial 

question of invalidity under both the court’s erroneous 

construction and the correct construction of “controller.”

CGI responds that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction. CGI 

asserts that the district court properly construed “controller” and correctly concluded that TTI did not raise a 

substantial question of invalidity. CGI alleges that it 

presented reasons that the cited art does not invalidate 

the claims to the district court in addition to the lack of a 

“self-aware controller.” CGI contends that this court may 

affirm on the basis of one or more of those reasons even if 

the district court did not address them in its opinion.

We agree with TTI that CGI has not established a 

likelihood of success on the merits. As discussed above, 

the district court incorrectly construed “controller.” That

incorrect construction was the court’s sole basis for determining that TTI had not raised a substantial question 

of invalidity, see Decision, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129809, 

at *12, and, as it was incorrect, we must vacate the grant 

of the preliminary injunction. 

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We decline to reach CGI’s alternative bases for affirmance because they involve factual issues on which the 

district court’s opinion does not contain factual findings. 

See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291–92 

(1982) (“[F]actfinding is the basic responsibility of district 

courts, rather than appellate courts, and . . . the Court of 

Appeals should not have resolved in the first instance this 

factual dispute which had not been considered by the 

District Court.” (alterations in original) (quoting DeMarco 

v. United States, 415 U.S. 449, 450 n.* (1974))); see also

Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 

387 (2008) (“Rather than assess the relevance of the 

evidence itself and conduct its own balancing of its probative value and potential prejudicial effect, the Court of 

Appeals should have allowed the District Court to make 

these determinations in the first instance, explicitly and 

on the record.”). 

Based on the foregoing, on this record, and with the 

proper claim construction, TTI has raised a substantial 

question of invalidity, and CGI has not demonstrated that 

the question lacks substantial merit. Accordingly, the 

district court abused its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction.

CONCLUSION

We have considered CGI’s remaining arguments but 

find them to be unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, 

we vacate the grant of the preliminary injunction and 

remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

VACATED AND REMANDED

COSTS

Costs to TTI.

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