Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00010/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00010-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLARD JAMES HALL,

Petitioner,

v.

F.W. HAWS, Warden

Respondent. 

 

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Case No. 05-CV-0010-WQH(JMA)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION TO

CONDITIONALLY GRANT 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

I. INTRODUCTION

Willard James Hall (hereinafter “Hall”), a state prisoner proceeding

with appointed counsel, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his San Diego Superior Court conviction

in case number SCD148429 for first degree murder with the special

circumstance of murder during the course of a robbery and use of a deadly

weapon. The Court has considered Hall’s First Amended Petition (“FAP”),

Respondent’s Answer and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in

Support of Answer, Hall’s Traverse, and all the supporting documents

submitted by the parties. Based upon the documents and evidence

presented in this case, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court

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recommends that the Amended Petition be conditionally GRANTED as to

Ground One and DENIED as to Ground Two.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following statement of facts is taken from the California Court of

Appeal Opinion, People v. Hall, No. D038857, slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. July

16, 2003). (Lodgment No. 10.) This Court gives deference to state court

findings of fact and presumes them to be correct. Hall may rebut the

presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing evidence. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992)

(holding findings of historical fact, including references properly drawn from

such facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). The facts

as found by the state appellate court are as follows:

Foth was a songwriter-musician who lived in San Francisco and ran a

record store there (Rocket Records). Having grown up in San Diego,

Foth had close friends here, including Grace Ko, Steve Poltz and Ken

Horne. By the late 1990's, Rocket Records’ business began to

decline; Foth began to experience financial problems and by 1999

had started using crack cocaine and “hanging around” with

prostitutes. (All further dates are in 1999 except as otherwise noted.)

After Ko became aware of Foth’s problems, she convinced him to

come to San Diego for a couple of months to stay with her and try to

get his life back in order. In early September, Foth moved into Ko’s

home in Mission Hills; he was depressed and slept a lot.

On the afternoon of Wednesday, September 29, Ko and Foth

drove to the Oceanside home of Louis and Christine Mello. Ko

and Christine went shopping; Foth planned to spend time with

Louis, visit some other friends and then return to Ko’s house to

pick up Horne to join Ko and the Mellos for dinner at a Chevy’s

restaurant in Carmel Mountain Ranch. Ko left the keys to her

car, a black Audi A4, and her cell phone with Foth, as well as

her Visa card so that Foth could put some gasoline in the car.

Foth visited with Louis until sometime between 1:30 and 2:00

p.m. and then drove to Poltz’s apartment. Although Foth

professed that he was not using drugs anymore, Poltz declined

to give Foth any money because he was unconvinced by Foth’s

statements, in part because Foth had spent a night away from

Ko’s home in the first week after his arrival in San Diego and

lied to his friends about where he was. Poltz offered, however,

to pay for Foth to see a therapist he knew to help Foth deal with

his problems. Foth told Poltz that he would think about it, but

was antsy because he wanted to “get laid.” While Foth was

with Poltz, he called a couple of women with whom he had

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been sexually intimate in the past. Foth left Poltz’s apartment

about 5:30 p.m. Foth was wearing faded black Levi’s, a black

T-shirt, Doc Marten wingtip shoes and a cheap plastic watch.

After Foth arrived back at Ko’s house, he spoke on the phone

with Horne, saying that he was going to see another friend to

borrow some money but would be back. Foth had not returned

by the time Horne arrived but had left a note. At 6:50 p.m.

(according to cell phone records), Horne called Ko’s cell phone,

expecting to reach Ko, but Foth answered and told Horne that

he would be back “in a bit.” It sounded like Foth was driving at

the time. After 15 minutes passed, Horne tried the cell phone

again, but got no answer.

Ko and the others waited for Foth to arrive at Chevy’s and, by 7:00

p.m., she became concerned about where Foth was. Ko called her

cell phone number every 10 minutes or so for the rest of the evening

but only got the voice mail. Someone unsuccessfully attempted to

use Foth’s ATM card at 8:56 p.m. and someone used Ko’s cell phone

[at 11:46 p.m.] to call a pager owned by Michael Washington, a friend

of Sherrors’ and Hall’s.

In the late afternoon of September 30, a worker at the Pinery

Tree Farms discovered Foth’s naked body in a brushy area

near a work site on Highland Valley Road and pointed it out to

his manager, Laurence Prindle. Although Prindle had come by

the site several times that day, he had not seen the body

earlier. Prindle called 911. Responding officers determined that

Foth was dead and found a number of items at the scene,

including a shirt, a pair of size eight sneakers, a Seiko

wristwatch with a metal face, a broken fingernail and a pair of

bloodstained white socks. They also found a circular

bloodstain, one foot in diameter and two inches deep, near the

fence and marks on the ground leading from the stain to the

place where they found Foth’s body, suggesting that the body

had been dragged. They also found a shoe print in the soil.

An autopsy showed that Foth, who was six feet, one-half inch

tall and weighed 183 pounds, had bled to death. The body had

approximately 83 stab wounds, many of which were in the

upper chest and neck area, as well as abrasions on the back,

defensive wounds to the right hand and wrist and a blunt force

trauma to the head. It also had streaks of seminal fluid across

the right thigh, an occurrence that is not unusual for a male

homicide victim and that did not necessarily indicate the victim

had been engaged in sex. The body tested negative for the

presence of drugs.

On October 9, Lena Hixon told her close friend, Eric Bazile, that

she had witnessed “something . . . pretty bad” and that two

guys had threatened her life. Bazile and his friend Shahyid told

Hixon to call the police. Hixon refused, so Shahyid made the

call. Hixon left Bazile’s apartment and Shahyid followed her.

The two argued, attracting the attention of the police, and

Shahyid told the officers what Hixon had said. The officers

arrested Hixon, who was carrying a razor blade.

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Hixon falsely told police that she had committed this crime with

two men named Benjamin Wilson and Terrence Smallgreen

and that Smallgreen had lost his watch and left his shirt at the

scene. A few days later, Hixon told Bazile that Sherrors and

Hall were involved in the murder and asked Bazile to notify the

police. Hixon repeated her statements in her subsequent

police interview.

At trial of the charges against Sherrors and Hall, Hixon testified

as follows:

In the late afternoon or early evening of September 29, Foth

approached Hixon near University and Euclid Avenues and

asked if she knew where to buy some rock cocaine. Although

Hixon initially hesitated because she suspected that Foth was

an undercover agent, she ultimately told him she knew where to

get some; they drove in Ko’s Audi to an apartment on

Wightman Street, where Sherrors and Hall were living. At the

time, Sherrors, Hall and Hixon were handling drug sales for

Hixon’s boyfriend, Michael Washington.

When Hixon whistled loudly, Hall and Sherrors came out of the

apartment. Hixon told Sherrors that Foth was looking for

cocaine and Sherrors spoke briefly to Foth, who was still sitting

in the car. Sherrors and Hall got into the vehicle with Foth. 

Sherrors told Hixon they would be right back and the three men

drove off.

After 15 to 20 minutes, Sherrors drove up in the Audi with Hall

sitting in the back seat; Foth did not appear to be with them. 

Sherrors and Hall told Hixon that they had “hooked [Foth] up”

and he was letting them use the car in exchange for drugs, a

practice that is not uncommon for drug dealers. Sherrors told

Hixon to get in the car to go smoke some “weed” and Hixon

complied.

Sherrors initially had difficulty driving with the car’s stick shift

but seemed to have it figured out by the time he got onto the I15 freeway. After awhile, Hixon became concerned because it

was unusual for a dealer to keep a customer’s car for that

period of time; Sherrors responded by explaining that he and

Hall had robbed Foth, but Hixon thought he was kidding.

They continued to drive north until they neared Lake Hodges

and exited the freeway onto a dark street. Sherrors parked the

car in a dirt lot, told Hixon to stay there and said he and Hall

would be right back. The men opened the trunk and Foth

climbed out. Foth was clothed, but he was holding his hands

as if they were tied. Hixon got out of the car and demanded to

know what was happening; Sherrors grabbed her hands,

breaking two of her acrylic fingernails. Sherrors told Hixon to

“shut the f--- up” and threatened to kill her and everybody she

knew.

Sherrors turned back toward Hall and Foth, who were tussling,

and started to stab Foth. Foth did not appear to put up a fight

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but merely said, “Let me die.” Sherrors continued to stab Foth

for several minutes and then walked back to Hixon with the

knife and told her to stab Foth. Hixon initially refused, but

stabbed Foth once after Sherrors insisted they were not going

to just let her walk away; according to her testimony, Hixon

believed that Foth was already dead. Sherrors and Hall stripped

Foth and threw his body into the bushes. Hall put Foth’s clothes

into the trunk and Sherrors, Hall and Hixon got into the Audi. 

Sherrors was wearing a different shirt than he had on earlier.

With Sherrors at the wheel, the threesome got back onto the

freeway and headed southbound. At some point, Sherrors

muttered that he had dropped his watch at the scene. They

drove for about five or 10 minutes and got off the freeway to

stop at an AM PM convenience store/gas station. Hall

purchased some cigarettes at the store and attempted

unsuccessfully to use Foth’s ATM card. (Although Hall had

used the correct PIN number for Foth’s account, the bank had

“frozen” the account six days earlier.) Sherrors and Hall

dropped Hixon off at a liquor store at University and Euclid

Avenues. Sherrors held up a picture of Hixon’s five-year-old

daughter and said, “She’s growing up to be real pretty. I think

you’d like to keep it that way.”

In addition to Hixon’s testimony, the prosecution introduced

evidence of the following:

Sherrors eventually returned to the Wightman Avenue

apartment, wearing his sister’s “old laundry shirt” inside out and

backwards. There were blood marks on the front side of the

shirt (as worn normally) and a significant amount of blood on

Sherrors’ white Fila tennis shoes. Sherrors later left the

apartment with a bag and, when asked where he was going,

responded, “Don’t worry about it.” He was wearing gray Nike

shoes at the time. Sherrors’ sister never saw her shirt again.

Shortly after Sherrors left the apartment, a neighbor called the fire

department because her downstairs unit at the same complex was

filled with smoke that smelled of burnt plastic. She directed the

responding firefighters to the complex’s dumpster area, where they

found a smoldering pile of debris. The firefighters stomped out the

remains of the fire.

Sherrors and Hall kept the car for several days, claiming it

belonged to Hixon’s mother. On October 2, the men saw a

newscast regarding the murder that mentioned the car and,

early the next morning, the car burned in a fire as it sat in a

nearby alley. After the fire was extinguished, police inspected

the car, but did not find any of the defendants’ fingerprints on

the car exterior or any detectable bloodstains in the trunk.

On October 14, police searched the Wightman apartment and

arrested Sherrors, Hall and Jimmie Washington. They took

saliva, blood and other samples from Sherrors, Hall and

Jimmie. They found Foth’s high school class ring in a pair of

Hall’s pants and found Michael Washington’s pager number in

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Sherrors’ pocket. They ultimately re-arrested Hixon, who was

charged with Sherrors and Hall for Foth’s murder.

While Hixon was being held at the Los Colinas Women’s

Detention Center, she spoke several times to inmate Kathrine

Davis about the incident. Hixon told Davis that she had

approached Foth to see if he wanted her services as a

prostitute and that she, Sherrors and Hall had robbed Foth and

killed him. Hixon also told Davis that although she did not

initially realize that Foth was in the trunk of the Audi, she found

that out as the three were driving north. She indicated to Davis

that she stabbed Foth several times and held him down as

Sherrors and Hall stabbed him. Hixon said that “her old man”

had destroyed the shoes she wore on the night of Foth’s

murder and that her clothes from that night were burned in the

car. Hixon was hesitant to testify against Hall, who was an old

friend, and she was also concerned about her safety as a result

of threats Sherrors had made against her.

In November, Michael Washington stored some items at the

house of Mikiisha Perine. Several months’ later, when Perine

was preparing to move, she looked through the items and

found a blue purse containing Hixon’s social security card, Ko’s

Visa and Costco cards, Foth’s ATM card and three of Foth’s

business cards. Perine called Ko, who alerted the police.

Hixon entered into a plea agreement with prosecutors in which

she agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy to sell cocaine and

assault with a deadly weapon and to testify truthfully in these

criminal proceedings against Sherrors and Hall. In accordance

with the agreement, the court sentenced Hixon to 12 years in

prison.

(Lodgment No. 10 at 2-9.) Sherrors and Hall were tried as co-defendants in

San Diego Superior Court Case No. SCD148429. 

Counsel for Sherrors and Hall responded to the prosecution’s

evidence by attacking Hixon’s credibility through evidence that

she was a prostitute and drug user, had changed her story

about the events of the evening in question, had made

statements to Katherine Davis indicating that she had

significant involvement in the murder, had lied in saying that

she never used Ko’s cell phone and had not been in the Audi at

all after Sherrors and Hall dropped her off. Defense counsel

also argued that it was not possible for the events of

September 29 to have happened as Hixon testified.

(Lodgment No. 10 at 9.)

/ /

/ /

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III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 7, 2001, a jury found Hall and Sherrors guilty of first degree

murder while using a deadly weapon and with the special circumstance of

murder during a robbery, in violation of Cal. Penal Code §§ 187,

190.2(a)(17), and 12022(b). (Doc. No. 5 at 2; Doc. No. 55-2 at 1; Lodgment

No. 10 at 9.) On September 28, 2001, the trial court sentenced Hall to life

without the possibility of parole, plus one year. (Id.; Id. at 9-10.)

Hall and Sherrors appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth

Appellate District, Division One. (See Lodgment No. 5 and 6.) On July 16,

2003, the appellate court affirmed the convictions in an unpublished

decision. (Doc. No. 5 at 3; Lodgment No. 10.) Hall and Sherrors thereafter

each filed a Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court. (Id.;

Lodgment No. 11 and 12.) The California Supreme Court denied the

Petitions for Review without comment on October 1, 2003. (Id.; Lodgment

No. 13.) 

On January 3, 2005, Hall, proceeding pro se, filed a federal Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254, challenging his

conviction. (Doc. No. 1.) On March 15, 2005, Hall filed the FAP, claiming

the trial court committed constitutional error by: (1) improperly modifying

California Jury Instruction (“CALJIC”) No. 2.15; (2) improperly modifying

CALJIC No. 8.81.17; and (3) presenting the jury with incomplete verdict

forms. (Doc. No. 5 at 6-9; Doc. No. 53 at 1.) 

On June 15, 2005, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the

grounds that Hall had failed to exhaust state remedies as to his claim

regarding CALJIC No. 8.81.17. (Doc. No. 9; Doc. No. 10.) On August 11,

2005, Hall filed a Motion for Stay and Abeyance, requesting that the court

stay his case so he could present his unexhausted claim in state court.

(Doc. No. 15.) On September 16, 2005, this Court issued a Report and

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Recommendation to the District Court, recommending that the court deny

the Motion for Stay and Abeyance on the grounds that Hall had failed to

demonstrate good cause for failing to exhaust his second claim. (Doc. No.

16.) No objections were filed to the Report and Recommendation, and on

January 24, 2006, the District Court adopted the Report and

Recommendation in its entirety, and informed Hall of his options to either 

“voluntarily dismiss his entire federal petition and return to state court to

exhaust his unexhausted claims,” or “formally abandon his unexhausted

claim and proceed with his exhausted claims.” (Doc. No. 17 at 3-4.) The

court stated that if Hall chose the second option, he had thirty (30) days to

file a pleading entitled “Formal Abandonment of Unexhausted Claim.” (Id.) 

On February 28, 2006, Hall filed an “Application for Extension of Time

to File Motion to Formally Abandon Unexhausted Claim,” indicating his

intention to abandon the unexhausted second claim and proceed with his

remaining exhausted claims. (Doc. No. 18 at 1.) On March 27, 2006, this

Court granted Hall’s request for additional time, and ordered that Hall had

until April 24, 2006, to file his “Formal Abandonment for Unexhausted

Claim.” (Doc. No. 19 at 2-3.) Thereafter, Hall did not file a formal

abandonment of unexhausted claim or any other filing in response.

On May 19, 2006, the District Court issued an Order finding Hall “filed

a mixed Petition, has been given two options, but has failed to proceed

under either option given by [the] Court.” (Doc. No. 20 at 2-3.) The District

Court ordered that Hall’s habeas corpus petition be dismissed “without

prejudice.” (Id. at 4.) 

Meanwhile, on June 20, 2005, Sherrors also filed a federal Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his

conviction. (Case No. 05cv1262-IEG-LSP, Doc. No. 1.) In his petition,

Sherrors asserted the same claim regarding CALJIC No. 2.15 that Hall

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asserted in his petition (Id. at 14) On May 24, 2007, U.S. Magistrate Judge

Leo S. Papas issued a Report and Recommendation recommending the

District Court conditionally grant Sherrors’ petition on the grounds that the

trial court’s use of CALJIC No. 2.15 constituted prejudicial constitutional

error. (Id.) On November 2, 2007, U.S. District Judge Irma E. Gonzalez

adopted the Report and Recommendation, “conditionally granting the writ

unless the State decides to retry [Sherrors] within a reasonable time.” (Id.)

On November 15, 2007, the Respondent in Sherrors’ case appealed Judge

Gonzalez’s decision to the Ninth Circuit (Ninth Circuit Case No. 07-56756).

(Id.)

Thereafter, on May 18, 2009, Hall filed a “Motion to Join the Case of

Co-Defendant,” Hall’s first filing in this case since his request for an

extension of time on February 28, 2006. (Doc. No. 18; Doc. No. 26.) The

District Court treated the filing as a motion to reopen Hall’s habeas corpus

petition and proceed on the exhausted first and third claims for relief. (Doc.

No. 27.) Hall stated that the circumstances of his case “mirror that of

Sherrors from arraignment until they split in federal habeas corpus

petitions...Petitioner [Hall] suffered the exact same damning testimony, the

exact same sentence and their appeals throughout the state courts (laying

the foundation for the federal claims) were and are exactly the same.”

(Doc. No. 26 at 16.) Hall alleged that his due process rights were violated

by the trial court’s use of CALJIC No. 2.15, and requested “relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2254, parallel to that of his co-defendant Sherrors.” (Id. at 15, 18.)

On October 9, 2009, the District Court denied the motion “without

prejudice to refile...once the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issues a

final decision in Sherrors’ habeas case.” (Doc. No. 33 at 6.) The District

Court ordered Respondent “to file in this action and serve on Hall a copy of

any final decision issued by the Ninth Circuit in Sherrors’ habeas case,”

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and stated that “Petitioner [Hall] may refile his motion to reopen this case

no later than sixty (60) days after he is served with a copy of the Ninth

Circuit’s final decision in Sherrors’ habeas case.” (Id.)

On August 31, 2011, Respondent filed in this action and served on

Hall a copy of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sherrors’ case, which affirmed

Judge Gonzalez’s decision granting Sherrors a conditional writ of habeas

corpus on his claim regarding CALJIC No. 2.15. (Doc. No. 39, 39-1 at 9.)

Hall thereafter mailed the District Court a “Motion to Join the Case of CoDefendant” and “Motion to Re-Open Case.” (Doc. No. 41.) In the motion,

Hall stated that after the District Court dismissed Hall’s FAP, Sherrors

“continued to advise Hall via intermittent third-party communications that he

was filing ‘Writs and Motions’ with Hall’s name included as a cosubmission.” (Id. at 3.) Hall stated that “due to the intermittent third-party

communications Hall received from Sherrors, Hall had good faith reason to

believe his interests were included in any outcome of [Sherrors’ case].” (Id.

at 4.) Hall further stated that “throughout the state court [process,] counsel

for both co-defendants used this language of joinder to ensure that both

defendants benefitted from any success throughout their appeals,” and that

“Petitioner [Hall] relied on Sherrors to continue to include his name as a cosubmitter.” (Id.) Hall asserted that “[c]onsidering the Ninth Circuit’s

affirmation of the district court’s reversal of Sherror[s]’[] [conviction], Hall’s

joint conviction is a gross miscarriage of justice.” (Id. at 6.) 

On May 22, 2012, the District Court found “the appointment of

counsel is appropriate in this matter, as a denial of Hall’s motion under

Rule 60(b) may raise significant due process issues.” (Doc. No. 49 at 5.)

On June 22, 2012, Hall, with the assistance of appointed counsel, filed a

supplemental Motion for Relief under Rule 60(b). (Doc. No. 50.) On August

31, 2012, the District Court granted Rule 60(b)(6) relief to Hall, ordering

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Hall’s case to be reopened so the case could proceed on Hall’s exhausted

first and third claims for relief. (Doc. No. 53 at 10.) Respondent filed an

Answer to the FAP on November 15, 2012. (Doc. No. 55.) Hall filed a

Traverse on December 27, 2012. (Doc. No. 61.)

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Scope of Review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope

of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a

district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas

corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Accordingly, a federal habeas corpus petition must

allege a deprivation of a federal right to present a cognizable claim

pursuant to § 2254; a state’s interpretation of its laws or rules provides no

basis for federal habeas corpus relief when no federal constitutional

question arises. Id.; Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991).

The current petition is governed by the Anti-terrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320

(1997). As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) reads:

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court

shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim – 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.

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28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). For the purposes of § 2254(d), a state court

has decided a constitutional claim on the merits “when it has decided the

petitioner’s right to post conviction relief on the basis of the substance of

the constitutional claim advanced, rather than denying the claim on the

basis of a procedural or other rule precluding state court review of the

merits.” Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 (2004). An unexplained

denial of a habeas petition by the California Supreme Court is an

adjudication on the merits of the claims, and is entitled to AEDPA

deference. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 785 (2011). When a state

court issues a decision without separately addressing a federal claim, the

presumption is that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits, though

the presumption is rebuttable “in some limited circumstances.” Johnson v.

Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1096 (2013).

To obtain federal habeas relief, Hall must satisfy either § 2254(d)(1)

or § 2254(d)(2). See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The

Supreme Court interprets § 2254(d)(1) as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite

to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state

court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable

application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; see Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73-76

(2003). State court rulings are given a “highly deferential standard” such

that decisions made by state courts are “given the benefit of the doubt.”

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court,

the Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991). If the dispositive state court

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order does not provide a reasoned decision, federal habeas courts must

conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the

state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d

976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Lockyer, 538 U.S.

at 75-76); Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). 

However, a state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when

resolving a habeas corpus claim. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). 

“[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision

contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” the state court decision will not be

“contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id.

B. Analysis

Hall raises two properly exhausted grounds for relief in his petition. In

Ground One, Hall alleges the trial court erred when it instructed the jury

with a modified version of CALJIC No. 2.15. (Doc. No. 5 at 6.) In Ground

Three, Hall contends the trial court erred in providing the jury with a

defective verdict form. (Id. at 9.)

1. Ground One

Hall alleges he was denied due process of law when the trial court

instructed the jury with a modified version of CALJIC No. 2.15, allowing the

jury to find a guilty verdict on a murder charge based upon a finding of

possession of stolen property. (Doc. No. 5 at 6.) Hall claims this

modification invited the jurors to draw an inference favorable to the

prosecution, thereby misleading the jury as to the prosecution’s burden of

proof. (Id.) 

To the extent Hall claims the jury instructions were incorrect under

state law, his claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review. Estelle, 502

U.S. at 71-72. To merit relief, clearly established Federal law dictates that a

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petitioner must show the instructional error "so infected the entire trial that

the resulting conviction violated due process." Id. at 72 (citing Cupp v.

Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973). The allegedly erroneous instruction

must be considered in the context of the entire trial record and the

instructions as a whole. Id. Further, “it is not sufficient that the instruction is

erroneous; rather the petitioner must establish that there was a reasonable

likelihood that the jury applied the instruction in a way that violated a

constitutional right. Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 1992) (en

banc) (citing Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72). Even if the court determines the

instruction violated a petitioner’s due process rights, a petitioner can only

obtain relief if the unconstitutional instruction resulted in “actual prejudice.”

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993).

The trial court instructed the jury with a modified version of CALJIC

No. 2.15, as follows:

“If you find that a defendant was in possession of recently stolen

property, the fact of that possession is not by itself sufficient to prove

an inference that the defendant is guilty of the crime of murder.

Before guilt may be inferred, there must be corroborating evidence

tending to prove a defendant’s guilt. However, this corroborating

evidence need only be slight and need not by itself be sufficient to

warrant an inference of guilt.

“As corroboration, you may consider the attributes of possession,

time, place and manner; that the defendant had an opportunity to

commit the crime charged; the defendant’s conduct; his false or

contradictory statements, if any; and other statements that may have

been made with reference to the property.”

(Lodgment No. 10 at 10.) Hall contends this instruction lessened the

prosecution’s burden of proof. As mentioned above, the Ninth Circuit

affirmed Judge Gonzalez’s conditional grant of Sherrors’ claim his due

process rights were violated by the use of CALJIC No. 2.15 when he was

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tried jointly with Hall.1 Sherrors v. Woodford, 425 F. Appx. 617, 618-19 (9th

Cir. 2011). 

Hall raised this claim, regarding the impropriety of the use of a

modified version of CALJIC No. 2.15, in his Petition for Review to the

California Supreme Court, which denied the petition without comment.

(Lodgment No. 13.) Accordingly, this court must “look through” to the last

reasoned state court decision to address the claim. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803-

04. In denying Hall’s claim, the state appellate court stated:

Hall contends, and Sherrors joins in the contention, that the trial court

erred in instructing the jury with the modified instruction, arguing that

corroborated evidence that he possessed property recently stolen

from Foth supports only an inference that he committed theft, but

does not permit an inference that he was guilty of murder.

The California Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226 (Prieto) holds that CALJIC No. 2.15 is inapplicable to nontheft offenses, including murder.

(Prieto, at pp. 248-249, citing People v. Barker, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1176.) Although the Attorney General

suggests that the analysis of Prieto does not apply in cases “where the murder is directly and causally related to and

emanating from the same facts as the theft offense and the

only issue is identity,” the unequivocal language of Prieto does

not support such a conclusion. Further, in light of the jury’s

special circumstance robbery-murder finding in Prieto, the opinion cannot be read as holding that the fact the murder

emanates from the same facts as the theft renders its analysis

inapplicable. In accordance with Prieto, we conclude that the court erred in instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 2.15.

(Lodgment No. 10 at 11.) Having found error, the court of appeal next

considered whether the error in using CALJIC No. 2.15 was harmless. (Id.)

1

 Respondent contends the U.S. Supreme Court’s grant of a writ of certiorari in Williams

v. Cavazos, 646 F.3d 626, 635 (9th Cir. 2011), now Johnson, 133 S. Ct. 1088, may cast doubt

on the propriety of the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Sherrors. (Doc. No. 55-2, pp. 1 and 7.)

Johnson, however, does not vitiate the soundness of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sherrors. The issue the Supreme Court considered in Johnson was whether a federal habeas

petitioner’s claim had been adjudicated on the merits by the state court when the state court

denied relief in an explained decision, but did not expressly acknowledge a federal law basis

for the claim. As discussed in more detail in this section, in Sherrors, by contrast, the Ninth

Circuit determined the California Court of Appeal erred in not recognizing the use of CALJIC

2.15 was an error of constitutional magnitude, and that its resulting application of the incorrect

harmless error standard was an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law.

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There are two standards applied by California courts in determining

whether an error is harmless. The standard used to review “nonconstitutional magnitude, trial type errors” requires a reviewing court to

determine whether “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to

the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.”

People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836 (1956). In contrast, the standard

used to review errors of constitutional magnitude under the clearlyestablished federal standard requires a reviewing court to decide whether

the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).

In this case, the court of appeal concluded that the error in instructing

the jury as to the modified CALJIC No. 2.15 did not make it “reasonably

likely the jury would have reached a different result if the court had not

given the instruction.” (Lodgment No. 10 at 11.) Specifically, the appellate

court stated:

The question then becomes whether the error is prejudicial, i.e.,

whether it is reasonably likely the jury would have reached a

different result if the court had not given the instruction. (Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 249.) We answer this question in the negative. CALJIC No. 2.15 specifically instructed the jurors that

they could not infer guilt of murder from the defendants’

possession of recently stolen property absent corroborating

evidence of guilt. The inference of guilt addressed in CALJIC

No. 2.15 is permissive, not mandatory, and thus the jury was

entitled to credit, or reject, the inference based on its evaluation

of the evidence. (People v. Anderson (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 414, 430.) The court also instructed the jury on the elements of

murder, felony murder and the special circumstance of murder

during the commission of a robbery, and told the jurors that the

prosecution had to prove these elements and the special

circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. Most notably, the

jury’s special circumstance finding that the defendants

committed the murder during the commission of a robbery

makes clear that the jury accepted the substance of Hixon’s

testimony regarding the defendants’ involvement in the

incident. Based on the jury’s acceptance of Hixon’s testimony,

there is no reasonable likelihood that it would have rendered a

verdict more favorable to the defendants had the court omitted

this instruction.

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(Lodgment No. 10 at 11-12.) Thus, the court of appeal did not find the error

to be of constitutional magnitude, and accordingly applied the harmless

error standard set forth in Watson. 46 Cal. 2d at 836; see Bains v.Cambra,

204 F.3d 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that, “by applying the Watson

harmless error standard rather than the Chapman standard, [the state

court] impliedly found the [error] was not an error of constitutional

magnitude.”) 

As explained in Sherrors and below, the use of CALJIC No. 2.15 in

Hall and Sherrors’ trial was an error of constitutional magnitude. See

Sherrors, 425 F. Appx. at 619. CALJIC No. 2.15 permits the jury to draw a

permissive inference, meaning the jury could (but was not required to) infer

that Hall killed Foth based on: 1) Hall’s possession of Foth’s ring, plus 2)

“slight” corroborating evidence. Id. A permissive inference is one in which

the jury is allowed, but is not required, to infer a specified conclusion if the

prosecution proves certain predicate facts. Schwendeman v. Wallenstein,

971 F.2d 313, 315-316 (9th Cir. 1992). A permissive inference in jury

instructions is constitutional where “it can be said ‘with substantial

assurance’ that the inferred fact is ‘more likely than not to flow from the

proved fact on which it is made to depend.’” Id. at 316 (citing United States

v. Rubio-Villareal, 967 F.2d 294, 296 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

In People v. Prieto, which was issued after Hall’s and Sherrors’

convictions, but before the California Court of Appeal considered their joint

direct appeal, the California Supreme Court held the use of CALJIC No.

2.15 in nontheft offenses, such as rape or murder, is improper. 30 Cal. 4th

at 248. In that case, the court explained that a suspect’s “knowledge and

conscious possession of [stolen] property” is strong evidence of a theft

offense, logically flowing from possession of stolen goods, though “the

same is not true for nontheft offenses like rape or murder.” Id. at 249 (citing

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Barker, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 1176). Although in Prieto the California

Supreme Court did not discuss the federal due process implications of

using CALJIC 2.15, it observed “‘[p]roof [that] a defendant was in conscious

possession of recently stolen property simply does not lead naturally and

logically to the conclusion the defendant committed’ a rape or murder.” 30

Cal. 4th 226, 249 (2003) (citing People v. Barker, 91 Cal. App. 4th 1166,

1176 (2001)). In Sherrors, the Ninth Circuit adopted this reasoning in

concluding Sherrors’ right to due process was violated when the jury was

instructed it could presume Sherrors murdered Foth based on the fact

Sherrors was found in possession of Foth’s automobile, plus “slight

corroborating evidence,” because the presumed fact does not follow from

the facts established. Sherrors, 425 F. Appx. at 619. Similarly, the inferred

fact here, Foth’s murder, is not more likely than not to flow from Hall’s

possession of Foth’s stolen property, a ring police found in a pair of Hall’s

pants. (Lodgment No. 10 at 8.) Based on Hall’s possession of Foth’s ring,

and in conjunction with Hixon’s inconsistent testimony, the prosecution

asked the jury to infer that Hall murdered Foth. (Id. at 9.) This inference

does not pass constitutional muster, as it cannot be said “with substantial

assurance” that the inferred fact, murder, is “more likely than not to flow

from the proved fact on which it is made to depend,” i.e., finding of Foth’s

ring in Hall’s possession. Accordingly, this Court finds that the use of

CALJIC No. 2.15 in Hall’s murder case was an error of constitutional

magnitude. 

The state appellate court, however, did not find the error to be of

constitutional magnitude, and accordingly applied the harmless error

standard set forth in Watson. See Bains v.Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 971 (9th

Cir. 2000) (finding that, “by applying the Watson harmless error standard

rather than the Chapman standard, [the state court] impliedly found the

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[error] was not an error of constitutional magnitude.”) Thus, although the

court of appeal found error, it “failed to select the appropriate standard in

evaluating the harmlessness” of the error. Id. at 975. 

Due to the appellate court’s erroneous use of the Watson standard,

where the Chapman standard should have been applied due to the

constitutional magnitude of the trial court’s instructional error, the court of

appeal’s decision amounted to an unreasonable application of clearly

established Federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Bains, 204 F.3d at 971;

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. See also, Sherrors, 425 F. Appx. at 619

(finding the California Court of Appeal’s failure to recognize the

instructional error was of constitutional magnitude amounts to an

unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law.) 

Irrespective of whether the state courts have analyzed a

constitutional error for harmlessness under Chapman, federal district courts

on § 2254 habeas review must analyze harmlessness under the standard

set forth in Brecht, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). See Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S.

112, 127 S.Ct. 2321, 2328 (2007) (stating that, “whether or not the state

appellate court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness

under the ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard set forth in

Chapman,” a federal habeas court “must assess the prejudicial impact of

constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial under the ‘substantial and

injurious effect’ standard set forth in” Brecht. 507 U.S. at 637-38; see also

Bains, 204 F.3d at 977 (holding that the federal court “should apply the

Brecht standard when conducting their own independent harmless error

review, regardless of what, if any, type of harmless error review was

conducted by the state courts”). Therefore, the Court must now decide

whether the unconstitutional instruction had a substantial influence on the

conviction, thereby resulting in “actual prejudice.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638-

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38. Under Brecht, actual prejudice exists if the unconstitutional instruction

“had [a] substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury’s verdict.” Id. (citing Kotteakos v.United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776

(1946)).

In determining whether there was a Brecht error, a judge must

consider, “‘Do I, the judge, think that the error substantially influenced the

jury’s decision?’” O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995). If a

federal habeas judge is in “grave doubt” about whether a constitutional trial

error “had [a] substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury’s verdict,” the error is not harmless and the “petitioner must win.”

O’Neal, 513 U.S. at 436, 445.

Here, the Court is in “grave doubt” the error was not harmless. After

reviewing all the evidence presented at trial, the Court cannot say that the

instruction did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict.” As observed in Sherrors, the prosecution’s

case relied overwhelmingly on the testimony of Hixon, an accomplice

whose statements under oath were inconsistent and were contradicted by

objective evidence at trial. Sherrors, 425 F. Appx. at 620. Hixon admitted to

having lied numerous times about the identity of the murderers and the

circumstances of the incident. She first told detectives that the killers were

Ben Wilson and Terrence Smallgreen, then changed her story and reported

that the murderers were actually Hall and Sherrors. (Lodgment No. 3 at 

984, 986-87, 1019, 1021.) She also told detectives Foth approached her for

rock cocaine, but while incarcerated at the Las Colinas Women’s Detention

Center, she told a fellow inmate, Kathrine Davis, that Foth had approached

Hixon for sex. (Id. at 1023, 1024-25.) Hixon testified the shirt found at the

crime scene belonged to Sherrors, but DNA testing eliminated Sherrors,

Hall and Hixon, as the habitual wearer of the shirt. (Id. at 1032-33, 1146-

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47, 1273-75, 1524.) 

Although Hixon initially denied stabbing Foth, after being pressed by

detectives, she changed her story and confessed that she stabbed Foth

one time to placate Sherrors’s demand to do so. (Id. at 965-66, 1120,

1133-37.) When she described the stabbing to Davis, Hixon told her she

used her shirt over the knife to avoid leaving fingerprints. (Id. at 1612-13.)

Davis testified that Hixon told her she was surprised at how the knife felt as

it went into the body. (Id. at 1613.) 

Hixon also testified that she lost her fingernail as a result of Sherrors

squeezing her hands with sufficient force to crack the fingernail when she

exited the car after arriving at the pumpkin patch. (Id. at 970, 1022.) Hixon

told Davis, however, that her she must have lost her fingernail while she

was holding Foth down or helping drag his body. (Id. at 1610-11.) 

Hixon’s testimony was also in direct conflict with other, more

objective evidence presented at trial. She denied ever seeing or using

Foth’s cell phone, but phone records showed that days after the murder,

she used the phone to call one of her customers after she received a page

from him. (Id. at 1036, 1671-86.) Hixon also testified that she never saw,

took, or touched any of Foth’s property, but her fingerprints were found on

some of his belongings and other items from the car he drove. (Id. at 1036,

1567.) Her story was also contradicted by third-party witnesses who

testified they saw Hixon in or around the Audi several times in the days

after the murder. (Id. at 861, 868, 1040,1185-86, 1190.)

Furthermore, according to Hixon’s testimony, the entire incident,

starting from the time Foth approached her, and including when she met up

with Sherrors and Hall, the drive from City Heights to Lake Hodges, Foth’s

stabbing, Foth’s body being hidden, and the drive back down the interstate

to the AM PM, took place in well over an hour and a half. (Id. at 944-77.)

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However, Hixon’s testimony is contradicted by the objective evidence that

Foth’s last cell phone conversation took place at 18:50, and the first failed

attempt to use the ATM card occurred only forty-six (46) minutes later. (Id.

at 227, 231-32, 714-17, 1283.) It is nearly impossible to believe the murder

as she described it could have taken place in that short of a time period.2

 

Given the multiple contradictions in Hixon’s testimony and her

numerous changed stories, the jury could have chosen to disbelieve her

entirely. Other than her testimony, the jury was left with very little to tie Hall

to Foth’s murder. The other evidence tying Hall to Foth was Hall’s

possession of Foth’s high school class ring, which detectives found in a

pair of Hall’s pants. (Id. at 1403-04.) Additionally, several witnesses

testified to seeing Hall in or near the Audi just days after the murder. (Id. at

752, 861, 891-93.) There was no compelling physical evidence. The

evidence found at the scene, such as the bloody shirt, the Gatorade bottle,

the shoe print, and size eight (8) shoes, could not be tied to Hall or his codefendant, Sherrors.3

 (Id. at 431-32, 679-80, 687, 1462, 1521-25.)

Given the equivocal evidence tying Hall to the murder itself, the

2

 The court of appeal was asked to take judicial notice that the distance from 4699

Wightman Street (where, according to Hixon’s testimony, Sherrors and Hall picked up Foth) to

the University Avenue freeway on-ramp to I-15 north is 1.24 miles. The distance from the I-15

University Avenue on-ramp to the Pomerado Road exit is 21.78 miles and it is another .39

miles from the exit to the pumpkin patch where Foth’s body was found. In order to get back to

the freeway from the murder scene, it is another .58 mile (with a stop sign and a traffic light). 

From the on-ramp of I-15 south to the Mira Mesa Boulevard exit is 10.11 miles, and it is

another .43 miles from there to the AM/PM where the attempt was made to use the ATM card. 

This distance also included traffic signals. (See Lodgment No. 7 at 59-60 n.31.) After

considering driving time, there would have been little time left for Hixon to have brought Foth

from the taco shop to the Wightman Street address, to wait for Hall and Sherrors to return after

leaving with Foth (with Foth now in the trunk), and for Hall and Sherrors to stab Foth 83 times,

disrobe him and throw his body over a fence.

3 Both Hall and Sherrors wore size thirteen (13) shoes. (Lodgment No. 3 at 608-09,

616.) Melvin Kong, an expert for the prosecution, originally testified the show print was about

twelve and one-half (12.5) inches long, corresponding to a man’s size twelve (12) to thirteen

and one-half (13.5), but then on cross-examination admitted his notes indicated the length of

the print was actually twenty-eight and one-half (28.5) centimeters, corresponding to a man’s

shoe size of seven (7) to eight and one-half (8.5). (Id. at 612-616.)

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erroneous instruction that permitted the jury to infer his guilt based on his

possession of Foth’s class ring, being seen in the Audi, and slight

corroboration leaves this Court in “grave doubt” about its effect on the

outcome of the trial. See O’Neal, 513 U.S. at 436. While the evidence tying

Hall to the murder was based on questionable testimony, the evidence that

he was in possession of Foth’s class ring was strong. Accordingly, the jury

had strong evidence that Hall was in possession of stolen property (the

ring) and used the victim’s car. Based on these facts, it is difficult to say

that allowing the jury to use the strong evidence of possession of stolen

property to infer murder, with only slight corroboration, did not affect the

jury’s verdict.

Moreover, the instruction defined “slight corroboration” as only “the

attributes of possession, time, place and manner; that the defendant had

an opportunity to commit the crime charged; the defendant’s conduct; his

false or contradictory statements, if any; and other statements that may

have been made with reference to the property.” (Lodgment No. 10 at 10.)

Thus, the jury could have inferred that Hall committed the murder based on

the “time, place and manner” of his possession, that is, based on the fact

that he was found in possession of the ring and was seen near the Audi

days after the murder.

After reviewing Hall’s case, this Court is in “grave doubt” as to

whether the violation of Hall’s due process rights had a substantial and

injurious effect or influence on the jury’s decision. Accordingly, the Court

finds that the error was not harmless, and that Hall’s due process rights

were violated when the trial court instructed the jury under CALJIC No.

2.15. The court of appeal’s denial of this claim was an unreasonable

application of clearly established Federal law. Therefore, Hall is entitled to

relief as to his due process claim. Thus, this Court RECOMMENDS Hall’s

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Petition for Habeas Corpus be GRANTED as to Ground One for the above

stated reasons. 

2. Ground Three

Hall alleges he was also denied due process of law when the trial

court presented the jury with an erroneous verdict form. (Doc. No. 5 at 9.)

Hall claims the felony murder special circumstance verdict form was

defective because it only required the jury to find he committed the murder

during the commission of a robbery, omitting the requisite finding that he

committed the murder to facilitate the robbery. (Id.; Doc. No. 61 at 1-2.)

The special verdict form the trial court gave the jury stated:

“We, the jury in the above entitled case, find the special circumstance

that the murder of STEVEN FOTH was committed by defendant

WILLARD JAMES HALL while the said defendant was engaged in

the commission and attempted commission of the crime of Robbery,

in violation of Penal Code sections 211 or 212.5, within the meaning

of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(17), to be (TRUE) .”

(Lodgment No. 1-2 at 297.)

Hall raised this claim regarding the erroneous verdict form in his

Petition for Review to the California Supreme Court, and it was denied

without comment. (Lodgment No. 13.) Accordingly, this court must “look

through” to the last reasoned state court decision to address the claim, in

this case, the California Court of Appeal. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803-04.

In denying Hall’s claim, the Court of Appeal stated:

Hall contends that the felony murder special circumstance verdict

form was defective because it only required the jury to make a finding

that he committed Foth’s murder during the commission of a robbery,

but omitted the requisite finding that he committed the murder to

advance the commission of the robbery or to facilitate escape

therefrom or avoid detection. Hall argues that this error was

prejudicial because when taken in conjunction with the prosecutor’s

closing argument, the verdict form would convince the jury that there

was no distinction between first degree felony murder and the

felony-murder special circumstance.

In light of the fact that the special verdict form was incomplete

rather than an inaccurate statement of the law, it is not clear

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whether Hall properly preserved this issue for appellate review

as he did not raise any objection to the special verdict form in

the proceedings below. However, even if we reach the merits

of Hall’s argument, we nonetheless reject his contention that

the incompleteness of the special verdict form constitutes

reversible error.

In criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial

court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to

and governing the case. (People v. Roberge (2003) 29 Cal.4th 979, 988.) In accordance with this principle, it certainly is

preferable that the elements of a special circumstance

allegation be completely stated in the special verdict submitted

to the jury, although there is a split of authority on whether the

omission of an enhancement element from the verdict form is

error. (Compare People v. Chevalier (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 507, 513-516; People v. Garcia (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 582, 586.)

Even if we assume, however, that it was error for the court to

give the jury a correct but incomplete special verdict form, any

such error was harmless. (See People v. Wims, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 314 [generally, a judgment may be overturned for

an instructional error relating to special sentencing allegations

only if it is reasonably probable the defendant would have

received a more favorable result in the absence of the error];

compare People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 325-326 [failure to instruct on an element of a non-strike

sentence enhancement provision that increases the penalty for

the underlying crime “beyond the ‘prescribed statutory

 maximum’ “is reversible unless harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt].)

Hall admits the court properly instructed the jury that the special

circumstance allegation required a finding that he committed

the murder to advance the commission of the robbery. He

nonetheless argues that the improper special verdict form-when

coupled with the prosecutor’s passing comment that although

the special circumstance allegation required a finding that the

murder was committed during the robbery, “it’s the same

elements basically” as those required for felony murder-rises to

the level of prejudicial error. However, in light of the propriety

of the court’s instruction regarding the omitted element and its

general admonition that the jury must follow the instructions

rather than counsel’s arguments regarding the applicable law,

we conclude it is not reasonably likely that the jury was misled

by the incomplete special verdict form.

(Lodgment No. 10 at 18-20.)

Hall argues the special verdict form omitted an essential element of

the special circumstance allegation because, per Penal Code §

190.2(a)(17), a jury must find (1) the murder was committed while a

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defendant was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of the

crime of Robbery and (2) the murder was committed in order to carry out or

advance the commission of the crime of Robbery, or to facilitate the escape

therefrom, or to avoid detection. See Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17); see

also CALJIC No. 8.81.17. Petitioner argues the use of the defective verdict

form violated his right to due process, but offers no explanation as to how

the alleged error prejudiced his trial. 

Although the Court of Appeal did not analyze the effect of the alleged

error under Chapman, this Court must review constitutional errors under

Brecht. See Fry, 551 U.S. at 127. As noted in the Court’s discussion of

Ground One, even if the special verdict form violated Hall’s due process

rights, he can only obtain relief if the instruction resulted in “actual

prejudice.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at, 637-38. Hall must establish it was

reasonably likely that the jury applied the instruction in a way that violated

his constitutional rights. Carriger, 971 F.2d at 334 (citing Estelle, 502 U.S.

at 72).The standard for assessing prejudice resulting from the use of an 

allegedly defective verdict form is whether the form “so infected the entire

trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Carriger, 971 F.2d

at 334 (citing Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147). The effect of the form “must be

considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial

record.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (citing Cupp, 414 at 147).

The trial court provided the following jury instruction (CALJIC No.

8.81.17) to the jury:

To find that the special circumstance, referred to in these instructions

as murder in the commission of Robbery is true, it must be proved: 1a. The murder was committed while a defendant was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a Robbery in violation

of Penal Code section 211; and 2. The murder was committed in order to carry out or advance the commission of the crime of Robbery or to facilitate the escape

therefrom or to avoid detection. In other words, the special

circumstance referred to in these instructions is not established if the

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robbery was merely incidental to the commission of the murder.

(Lodgment No. 1-2 at 276.) Here, in looking at the instructions as a whole,

it is clear that the jury did receive the proper instruction as to the second

part of the special circumstance under CALJIC No. 8.81.17, even though it

was not included on the special verdict form. While it is true that the trial

court erred in omitting a necessary portion on the verdict form, Hall has not

shown this error is of constitutional magnitude, and that it infected the

whole trial such that it violated his constitutional rights. See Henderson v.

Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977). (“An omission, or an incomplete

instruction, is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law.”)

Accordingly, the appellate court’s denial of Hall’s claim on these grounds

was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law. Thus, this Court RECOMMENDS Hall’s Petition

for Habeas Corpus be DENIED as to Ground Three for the above stated

reasons.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to the

Honorable William Q. Hayes, United States District Judge assigned to this

case pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

For the reasons outlined above, it is hereby recommended that the

Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and

Recommendation; and (2) directing that Judgment be entered conditionally 

GRANTING the First Amended Petition unless the State decides to retry

Hall within a reasonable time.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than April 9, 2014, any party to this

action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all

parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and

Recommendation.”

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than April 16, 2014.

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified

time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s

order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 25, 2014

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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