Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02808/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02808-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

XIN LIU and HAU REN, 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, Secretary of 

the Department of Homeland 

Security; EMILIO T. GONZALES, 

Director United States 

Immigration Services; CHRISTINA 

POULOS, Acting Center Director, 

United States Citizenship and 

Immigration Services; ROBERT S. 

MUELLER, Director Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, 

 Defendants. 

_____________________________/ 

No. Civ. S-06-2808 RRB EFB 

Memorandum of Opinion

and Order

Plaintiffs, Xin Liu (“Liu”) and Huan Ren (“Ren”) 

(collectively “Plaintiffs”), filed this action seeking to compel 

defendants, Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of 

Homeland Security, Emilion T. Gonzalez, Director of the U.S. 

Citizenship and Immigration Services, Christina Poulos, Acting 

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Director of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 

California Service Center and Robert S. Mueller, III, Director 

of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (collectively 

“Defendants”), to adjudicate their I-485 applications for 

adjustment to permanent resident status. Plaintiffs assert they 

are entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling adjudication of 

their I-485 applications because Defendants have improperly 

delayed in processing such applications. Plaintiffs now move 

for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

§ 56(c). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the 

motion.1

I. BACKGROUND 

 On or about December 16, 2004, Plaintiffs, natives of 

China, filed I-485 applications with the United States 

Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) to adjust their 

immigration status to lawful permanent resident. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 4 

 

1 Inasmuch as the Court concludes the parties have submitted 

memoranda thoroughly discussing the law and evidence in support 

of their positions, it further concludes oral argument is 

neither necessary nor warranted with regard to the instant 

matter. See Mahon v. Credit Bureau of Placer County, Inc., 171 

F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999)(explaining that if the parties 

provided the district court with complete memoranda of the law 

and evidence in support of their positions, ordinarily oral 

argument would not be required). As a result, the oral argument 

presently scheduled for Wednesday, August 22, 2007, at 10:00 

a.m., is hereby VACATED.

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& 9.2 The adjudication of an I-485 application requires three 

background and security checks: a Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (“FBI”) fingerprint check, an Interagency Border 

Inspection System (“IBIS”) check, and an FBI name check. Decl. 

of Wendy S. Clark (“Clark”) ¶¶ 3-4.3

 

 

2 Plaintiffs’ filed their I-485 applications concurrently 

with Liu’s filing of an I-140 Immigrant Petition for Alien 

Worker through her employer, University of California, Davis; it 

was approved by USCIS on July 11, 2005. Compl. at Exhs. 1-3. 

Liu is the direct beneficiary of the I-140 petition filed on her 

behalf by University of California, Davis, who seeks to employ 

her as an assistant professor of computer science. Decl. of 

Monte Herring (“Herring”) ¶ 3. Ren, Liu’s husband, is a 

derivative beneficiary of the same I-140 petition. Decl. of 

Herring ¶ 3. 

3 Defendants have submitted the declaration of Wendy S. 

Clark, the Acting Assistant Director with the USCIS’ California 

Service Center (“CSC”). Decl. of Clark ¶ 1. Ms. Clark attests

that there are various security checks that must be performed - 

in order to enhance national security and ensure the integrity 

of the immigration process - before an application can be 

adjudicated. Decl. of Clark ¶¶ 3-4. The various types of 

checks that must be performed are explained in the “Fact Sheet,” 

attached to Clark’s declaration. Decl. of Clark ¶ 4. The 

checks include: (1) an IBIS name check; (2) an FBI fingerprint 

check; and (3) an FBI name check. Fact Sheet, attached to Decl. 

of Clark. The IBIS system contains records and information from 

over 20 federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies, 

including the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”), FBI, 

Department of State, Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 

Customs and Border Protection and other DHS agencies. Decl. of 

Clark ¶ 4. The FBI records maintained in the name check process 

consist of administrative, applicant, criminal, personnel and 

other files compiled by law enforcement agencies. Decl. of 

Clark ¶ 4. Finally, the FBI fingerprint checks provide 

information relating to criminal background within the United 

States. Decl. of Clark ¶ 4. 

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On June 30, 2006, Plaintiffs made an inquiry to the USCIS 

about the status of their applications and were subsequently 

informed that their applications had yet to be processed due to 

pending background checks. Compl. ¶ 11. To date, Ren’s 

security checks have been completed but Liu’s FBI name check 

remains outstanding. Decl. of Herring ¶¶ 5-6. As such, neither 

application has been adjudicated because Ren’s application 

cannot be completely processed until Liu’s application is 

approved as he is a derivative beneficiary. Decl. of Herring ¶ 

5. Thus, both applications cannot be adjudicated until the FBI 

name check on Liu is completed. Decl. of Herring ¶ 5. 

On December 11, 2006, nearly two years after submitting 

their applications, Plaintiffs filed the instant action seeking 

review of USCIS inaction in the form of improper delay in 

adjudicating their I-485 adjustment of status applications. 

Compl. ¶ 12. Plaintiffs now seek mandamus relief in the form of 

an order requiring Defendants to immediately and properly 

adjudicate their I-485 applications. Compl. ¶ 21. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Legal Standard 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides for summary 

judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 

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any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating 

the absence of a “genuine issue of material fact for trial.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). A 

fact is material if it could affect the outcome of the suit 

under the governing substantive law. Id. at 248. A material 

fact is “genuine,” if the evidence is such that a reasonable 

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. The 

burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish, beyond 

the pleadings, and by his or her own affidavits, or by the 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

“‘When the party moving for summary judgment would bear the 

burden of proof at trial, it must come forward with evidence 

which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence 

went uncontroverted at trial. In such a case, the moving party 

has the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine 

issue of fact on each issue material to its case.’” Miller v. 

Glenn Miller Productions, Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 

2006) (quoting C.A.R. Transportation Brokerage Co., Inc. v. 

Darden Restaurants, Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

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When the moving party meets its burden, the “adverse party may 

not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse 

party’s pleading, but the adverse party’s response, by 

affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 

If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if 

appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

“[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the 

nonmoving party’s evidence is to be believed, and all 

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [that party’s] favor.” 

Miller, 454 F.3d at 988 (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(citing Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)). “But the 

non-moving party must come forward with more than ‘the mere 

existence of a scintilla of evidence.’” Miller, 454 F.3d at 988 

(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). Thus, “‘[w]here the record 

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find 

for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.’” 

Miller, 454 F.3d at 988 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 

Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986.)). 

B. Mandamus and APA Jurisdiction 

 Defendants argue that this court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction to review whether agency inaction has been 

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unreasonable because the pace at which I-485 applications are 

processed is within the discretion of the Attorney General. 

 1. Mandamus Jurisdiction 

 28 U.S.C. § 1361 provides, that “[t]he district courts 

shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of 

mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States 

or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1361. “The common-law writ of mandamus, as codified 

in 28 U.S.C. § 1361 is intended to provide a remedy for a 

plaintiff only if he has exhausted all other avenues of relief 

and only if the defendant owes him a clear nondiscretionary 

duty.” Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616. “A writ of 

mandamus is appropriately issued only when (1) the plaintiff’s 

claim is ‘clear and certain’; (2) the defendant official’s duty 

to act is ministerial, and ‘so plainly prescribed as to be free 

from doubt’; and (3) no other adequate remedy is available.” 

Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting 

Fallini v. Hodel, 783 F.2d 1343, 1345 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

 2. APA Jurisdiction 

 “The APA authorizes suit by ‘[a] person suffering legal 

wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or 

aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant 

statute.’” Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 

U.S. 55, 61 (2004); 5 U.S.C. § 702. “‘[A]gency action’ is 

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defined . . . to include ‘the whole or a part of an agency rule, 

order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial 

thereof, or failure to act.’” Norton, 542 U.S. at 62 (emphasis 

in original). When an agency fails to act, the APA provides 

relief in the form of empowering a court to compel agency action 

unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed. Id. 

 The APA provides relief for a failure to act insofar as it 

empowers a district court to compel an agency to perform a 

ministerial or non-discretionary act, or to act on a matter 

without directing it how to act, so long as the plaintiff has 

asserted a discrete agency action that it is required to take, 

if the agency unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed in 

acting on a duty. Norton, 542 U.S. at 63-65; see 5 U.S.C. 

§ 555(b) (Under the APA, “[w]ith due regard for the convenience 

and necessity of the parties or their representatives and within 

a reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to conclude the 

matters presented to it”). Should an agency not proceed as 

directed by 5 U.S.C. § 555(b), a court may hear a petition for a 

writ of mandamus compelling an agency to perform an “action 

unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 

5 U.S.C. § 706(1).4

 In short, a plaintiff may invoke subject 

 

4 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) provides that a district court “shall 

compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably 

delayed.”

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matter jurisdiction under the APA, if he or she shows that a 

defendant (1) had a nondiscretionary duty to act, and (2) 

unreasonably delayed in acting on that duty. Norton, 542 U.S. 

at 63-65. 

Relief under mandamus and the APA is essentially the same 

when a petitioner seeks to compel an agency to act on a nondiscretionary duty. See Independence Mining Co. v. Babbitt, 105 

F.3d 502, 507 (9th Cir. 1997). 

C. Non-Discretionary Duty 

 The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) authorizes “the 

Attorney General, in his discretion,” to adjust to permanent 

residence status certain aliens who have been admitted into the 

United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).5

 However, as the government 

has conceded in at least two similar actions, see Singh v. 

Still, 470 F.Supp.2d 1064, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2007) and Gelfer v. 

Chertoff, 2007 WL 902382, *2 (N.D. Cal. 2007), while its duty to 

grant an adjusted status is discretionary, its duty to process

I-485 applications under § 1255 is non-discretionary. See also

Aboushaban v. Mueller, 2006 WL 3041086, *2 (N.D. Cal. 2006) 

(holding that the duty to adjudicate a plaintiff’s I-485 

 

5 Section 1255(a) provides that: “[t]he status of an alien 

who was inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States 

. . . may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion 

and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an 

alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence[.]” 8 U.S.C. 

1255(a) (emphasis added).

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application is non-discretionary). The Court is persuaded by 

the reasoning of these cases. 

 As such, the Court concludes that it has subject matter 

jurisdiction to consider whether the Defendants have 

unreasonably delayed in performing their non-discretionary duty 

to adjudicate Plaintiffs I-485 applications. See Wu v.Chertoff, 

et al., 2007 WL 1223858, *3 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that a 

clear and certain right exists to have an immigration status 

adjustment application adjudicated in a reasonable time frame); 

Singh, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1067 (plaintiffs seeking adjustment of 

their legal status have a right, enforceable through a writ of 

mandamus, to have their applications processed within a 

reasonable time”); Gelfer, 2007 WL 902382 at *2 (the government 

has a statutorily prescribed duty to adjudicate a petitioner’s 

immigration status adjustment application ‘within a reasonable 

time’ under 5 U.S.C. § 555(b)).6

 

6

 See also Yu v. Brown, 36 F.Supp.2d 922, 932 (D.N.M. 1999) 

(although no time frame is expressly defined in the INA [with 

respect to the adjudication of applications for a change of 

status to permanent resident], “a contrary position would permit 

[Defendants] to delay indefinitely,” and “Congress could not 

have intended to authorize potentially interminable delays”); 

Gelfer, 2007 WL 902382 at *2 (“[a]llowing the respondents a 

limitless amount of time to adjudicate petitioner's [I-485] 

application would be contrary to the ‘reasonable time’ frame 

mandated under 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) and, ultimately, could negate 

the USCIS’s duty under 8 C.F.R. 245.2(a)(5)”). 

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 Defendants rely on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) to support 

their argument that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 

to review whether agency inaction has been unreasonable. Def.’s 

Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Summary Judgment at 5, n.1.7 Defendants’ 

reliance is misplaced. See Konchitsky v. Chertoff, 2007 WL 

2070325, *3 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (finding that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), 

titled, “Denials of discretionary relief,” does not apply to a 

plaintiff seeking an order compelling adjudication of an I-485 

application because he or she has neither been granted nor 

denied relief, but rather simply denied a decision). Moreover, 

because Defendants have a non-discretionary duty to process I485 applications, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) is not implicated as that 

section only divests jurisdiction of discretionary actions of 

the Attorney General or Secretary of Homeland Security. See id.8

 

7 Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) provides that “[n]otwithstanding 

any other provision of law . . . and regardless of whether the 

judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings, no 

court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any other decision 

or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland 

Security the authority for which is specified under this 

subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or 

the Secretary of Homeland Security, other than the granting of 

[asylum] under section 1158(a) of this title.” 

8

 The court recognizes that there is a split in authority as 

to the discretionary nature of the pacing at which I-485 

applications are processed, and that some courts have adopted 

Defendants position that courts have no authority to intervene 

when an immigration application remains unadjudicated for an 

unreasonable amount of time. See e.g., Safadi v. Howard, 466 F. 

Supp. 2d 696 (E.D. Va. 2006); Zheng v. Reno, 166 F.Supp.2d 875 

(S.D.N.Y. 2001). The court however is unpersuaded by the 

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D. Unreasonable Delay 

 Defendants argue that the delay in processing Plaintiffs’ 

I-485 applications has not been unreasonable because it timely 

initiated investigations into Plaintiffs’ backgrounds and the 

delay in processing such applications has been due to the 

complexity of the security checks, including the time-consuming 

nature of reviewing documents when common names like Liu are 

involved. Defendants also argue that the delay has not been 

unreasonable because any inconvenience suffered by Plaintiffs 

from the delay is outweighed by the importance of completed 

background checks to national security. 

 “In cases where courts have addressed the specific issue of 

whether there has been unreasonable delay in processing an 

immigration status application, courts typically ‘look[ed] to 

the source of the delay--e.g., the complexity of the 

investigation as well as the extent to which the defendant 

participated in delaying the proceeding.’” Singh, 470 F. Supp. 

 

reasoning of these cases. The court finds that the better rule 

permits judicial review of unreasonably delayed petitions, 

because without mandamus relief, USCIS could withhold a decision 

indefinitely in contravention of its non-discretionary duty to 

process such petitions. See Okunev v. Chertoff, 2007 WL 

2023553, *2, n.9 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (noting that there are too 

many important rights associated with permanent resident status 

(e.g., the right to travel abroad freely, the requirement of 

five years of legal permanent status prior to seeking 

naturalization, and the ability to petition to immigrate close 

family members) to allow the speed at which these applications 

are processed to go entirely unchecked). 

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2d at 1068. What constitutes a reasonable time for adjudicating 

an immigration application depends on the facts of each case. 

Yu, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 935; see Yong Tang v. Chertoff, 2007 WL 

1821690,*7 (D. Mass. 2007) (observing that while Congress has 

not been kind enough to provide a clear statutory benchmark by 

which the Court can determine when a delay is unreasonable under 

5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b) or 706(1), this does not render 5 U.S.C. §§ 

555(b) or 706(1) null, nor has it stopped courts from finding 

delays unreasonable in the past). 

 In assessing the reasonableness of agency delay, courts 

consider the following factors: “(1) the time agencies take to 

make decisions must be governed by a rule of reason; (2) where 

Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the 

speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the 

enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for 

this rule of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable in the 

sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human 

health and welfare are at stake; (4) the court should consider 

the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of 

a higher or competing priority; (5) the court should also take 

into account the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced 

by delay; and (6) the court need not find any impropriety 

lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency 

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action is unreasonably delayed.” Yu, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 934 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

 In the instant action, Plaintiffs filed their I-485 

applications on December 16, 2004. As such, their applications 

have been pending for more than two-and-a-half years. The 

applications remain pending due to Liu’s outstanding FBI name 

check. USCIS contends that it cannot process Plaintiffs’ I-485 

applications until the FBI name check clears with a finding of 

“no record.” Decl. of Herring ¶ 5.9

 According to USCIS, FBI 

name check requests are processed chronologically based on the 

request date, and that only certain qualified applications can 

be expedited. Decl. of Clark ¶ 13. Currently, USCIS is 

processing I-485 applications for adjustment of status received 

as recently as March 15, 2007, more than two years after it 

received Plaintiffs’ application. Exh. 1, attached In Support 

of Pl’s Mot. for Summary Judgment. 

 While Congress has not set forth a statutory time limit for 

adjudication of I-485 applications, the USCIS is required to 

conclude the matters presented to it within a reasonable time. 

See 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b), 706(1); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b) (“It 

is the sense of Congress that the processing of an immigration 

benefit application should be completed not later than 180 days 

 

9 Ren’s FBI name check cleared with “no record” on January 6, 

2006. 

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after the initial filing of the application . . .”). 

Additionally, as USCIS concedes, “[f]or most applicants, [it] 

can quickly determine if there are criminal or security related 

issues in the applicant’s background that affect eligibility for 

immigration benefits.” Decl. of Clark ¶ 10. For example, 

results of an IBIS check are “usually available immediately” and 

the FBI generally forwards fingerprint check responses to USCIS 

“within 24-48 hours.” Fact Sheet at 2, attached to Decl. of 

Clark. Also, most FBI name checks are resolved quickly and less 

than one percent remain pending beyond six months. Fact Sheet 

at 2, attached to Decl. of Clark. Cases pending longer than six 

months generally involve “highly sensitive” and “complex” 

information and therefore cannot be resolved quickly. Fact 

Sheet at 2, attached to Decl. of Clark. According to USCIS, 

although most cases proceed forward without incident, due to 

both the sheer volume of security checks conducted and the need 

to ensure that each applicant is thoroughly screened, some 

delays are inevitable. Fact Sheet at 2, attached to Decl. of 

Clark. For instance, some cases are so labor-intensive and 

time-consuming that they can take years to resolve. Fact Sheet 

at 2-3, attached to Decl. of Clark. 

 Although there is no time frame imposed on Defendants to 

process applications, the average times for processing 

applications, and for conducting security checks, are a good 

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indicator of whether a delay is reasonable. See Konchitsky, 

2007 WL 2070325 at *3. Here, the delay is due to the pendency 

of Liu’s FBI name check. Decl. of Herring ¶ 5. Defendants 

attribute the delay in this regard to the large volume of 

applications received and the extensive background checks 

required to process them, especially in cases, like here, where 

a common name like Liu is involved.10

 While Defendants have made general assertions regarding the 

delay, they have failed to point to any specific evidence 

suggesting that: (1) the delay is attributable to Plaintiffs; or 

(2) Plaintiffs’ applications are particularly complex; or (3) 

higher priorities exist necessitating the slow progress in 

Plaintiffs’ case. Moreover, Defendants have not pointed to a 

single action taken to expedite the processing of the FBI name 

check or to any particularized evidence explaining why 

Plaintiffs’ applications require an extended delay of more than 

two-and-a-half years, far beyond the 180 days recommended by 

Congress. See 8 U.S.C. § 1571. Defendants, for instance, have 

not presented evidence showing that the FBI name check revealed 

a match or some other positive (derogatory) information. Nor 

have Defendants shown that this case involves a time-consuming 

 

10 Ms. Clark attests in her declaration that the CSC receives 

approximately 5,000 I-485 applications a month and currently has 

30,000 I-485 applications awaiting adjudication. Decl. of Clark 

¶ 6. 

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and labor-intensive investigation, or that it involves complex, 

highly sensitive information precluding a quick resolution. 

Instead, Defendants have simply made general assertions about 

the delay, including that security checks are complex and can be 

tedious when common names like Liu are involved. The court 

concludes that Defendants explanation is insufficient to render 

the delay experienced by Plaintiffs reasonable. Nor does it 

create a genuine issue of fact as to whether Defendants 

fulfilled their non-discretionary duty to adjudicate Plaintiffs’ 

applications in a reasonable time. 

 Additionally, to the extent that Defendants invoke national 

security as a reason for delay, the court rejects this 

explanation given the length of delay and the fact that 

Plaintiffs have been living and working in the United States 

during the pendency of their applications. See Yong Tang, 2007 

WL 1821690 at *8. Indeed, mere invocation of national security, 

without a particular explanation of how it caused delay, is 

insufficient to justify delay. Konchitsky, 2007 WL 2070325 at 

*5; Okunev, 2007 WL 2023553 at *2. Finally, to the extent that 

Defendants attribute the delay to the volume of applications 

received, the court rejects this explanation because, to hold 

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otherwise, would inequitably shift the costs of an over-taxed 

system onto Plaintiffs.11

 In short, while there is no specific time frame imposed on 

Defendants to process I-485 applications, delay of more than 

two-and-a-half years is unreasonable under the specific 

circumstances because there is no evidence in the record 

demonstrating that the delay is attributable to Plaintiffs nor 

is there any particularized evidence in the record sufficiently 

explaining the reasons for the extended delay. Moreover, this 

unexplained delay is exacerbated by the fact that it has 

occurred in the immigration arena12 and has prejudiced 

Plaintiffs.13 

 

11 See Yong Tang, 2007 WL 1821690 at * 9 (observing that 

defendants cannot escape their statutory duty to adjudicate 

applications within a reasonable time by simply asserting that 

they lack the necessary resources to process the applications. 

A lack of resources is a policy crisis that is not the 

responsibility of Plaintiffs. Therefore, it would be 

inequitable for defendants to shift the costs of an over-taxed 

system onto Plaintiffs); see also Konchitsky, 2007 WL 2070325 at 

*5 (quoting Yu, 36 F.Supp.2d at 934) (“‘[D]elays of a 

significant magnitude, particularly when they occur over 

uncomplicated matters of great importance to the individuals 

involved, may not be justified merely by assertions of 

overwork.’” ) 

12 Because delays in the immigration arena affect human health 

and welfare, they are less tolerable than those that implicate 

only economic interests. See Singh, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 1069. 

13 Delay in processing an I-485 application causes prejudice 

by affecting an immigrant’s: (1) right to apply for citizenship 

– as an application cannot be filed for citizenship until 5 

years after obtainment of permanent resident status; (2) ability 

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 For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that 

Defendants delay in adjudicating Plaintiffs’ I-485 applications 

has been unreasonable as a matter of law. See Konchitsky, 2007 

WL 2070325 at *5-6 (holding that absent a particularized 

explanation justifying the delay, a more than two year delay in 

processing an I-485 application was unreasonable as a matter of 

law); Gelfer, 2007 WL 902382 at *2 (holding that a more than two 

year delay in processing an I-485 application was unreasonable 

as a matter of law where defendants simply asserted that the 

USCIS was awaiting the results of an FBI name check and did not 

point to a single action taken to further the processing of the 

application or reason why the application was particularly 

troublesome); Yong Tang, 2007 WL 1821690 at *7-9 (holding that a 

nearly four-year delay in processing an I-485 application was 

unreasonable where the government made representations that 90% 

of background checks can be completed in approximately 30-60 

days, and that, as of September 30, 2006, the wait time for 

adjustment applications was 7 months); Yu, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 932 

(holding that a two-and-a-half year delay in processing a lawful 

permanent resident status application is on its face an 

unreasonable amount of time to process a routine application and 

requires an explanation). 

 

to petition to immigrate close family members; and (3) ability 

to travel abroad freely. Id. at 1070. 

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 Accordingly, whether pursuant to mandamus or the APA,14

Plaintiffs are entitled to a writ directing USCIS to adjudicate 

their I-485 applications expeditiously.15

III. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS the motion 

for summary judgment. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 2007. 

s/RALPH R. BEISTLINE 

 United States District Judge 

 

14 The Court recognizes that for purposes of mandamus relief 

(although not relief pursuant to the APA), Plaintiffs must also 

demonstrate that they have no other adequate remedy available to 

them. See Singh, 470 F.Supp.2d at 1071. The Court concludes 

that no adequate remedy is available to Plaintiffs. See id. 

(finding that there is no other adequate remedy available to a 

plaintiff awaiting adjudication of an I-485 application other 

than an order compelling the agency to act). 

15 See Singh, 470 F.Supp.2d at 1072 (ordering adjudication of 

plaintiff’s I-485 application “forthwith”); see also Konchitsky, 

2007 WL 2070325 at *6-7 (concluding that it is proper to compel 

USCIS to expeditiously process applications that are delayed due 

to a pending name check but that it is not proper to compel the 

FBI to perform name checks in connection with adjustment of 

status petitions). 

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