Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-05134/USCOURTS-caDC-09-05134-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 12, 2010 Decided February 23, 2010 

No. 09-5134 

LAURA GONZALEZ-VERA AND ALI ABED BEYDOUN, AS 

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF CARMELO 

SORIA ESPINOZA, DECEASED, 

APPELLANTS

v. 

MICHAEL VERNON TOWNLEY, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:07-cv-00995-HHK) 

Sarah Melikian, Student Counsel, argued the cause for 

appellants. On the briefs was Ali A. Beydoun, Supervisory 

Attorney. 

Abby C. Wright, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief was 

Mark B. Stern, Attorney. R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. 

Attorney, entered an appearance. 

Before: HENDERSON and TATEL, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL. 

 TATEL, Circuit Judge: How does one enforce a civil 

judgment against a person protected by the Witness Security 

Program? Congress, it turns out, answered this question in 

18 U.S.C. § 3523. That provision requires the Attorney 

General to determine whether the protected person is making 

“reasonable efforts” to satisfy the judgment and establishes 

procedures for collecting the judgment if the person is failing 

to do so. In this case, the Attorney General found that a 

protected person would make reasonable efforts to pay a 

judgment owed to appellant. Dissatisfied, appellant sought to 

invoke one of section 3523’s enforcement procedures—

appointment of a guardian to help collect the judgment. 

Under these circumstances, the district court held, section 

3523 does not authorize appointment of a guardian. For the 

reasons set forth in this opinion, we agree. 

I. 

 On September 21, 1976, former Chilean ambassador and 

foreign minister Orlando Letelier and his assistant Ronni 

Moffitt were assassinated as they drove to their office in 

Washington, D.C. Michael Vernon Townley, an American 

citizen and agent of Chilean President Augusto Pinochet’s 

intelligence service, Dirección de Intelligencia Nacional, 

admitted his complicity in the killings, testified in the 

criminal proceedings, and pleaded guilty to one count of 

conspiracy to murder a foreign official. United States v. 

Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 629 & n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1980). After 

serving five years in prison, Townley entered the Witness 

Security Program (WSP), commonly known as the Witness 

Protection Program. Through the WSP, the Attorney General 

may relocate and protect witnesses whose safety is at risk. 18 

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U.S.C. § 3521(a)(1). Such protection may include the 

creation of a new identity. Id. § 3521(b)(1)(A). 

 

 In the years following the two assassinations, Townley’s 

involvement in various other crimes came to light. In 

particular, he was linked to the July 1976 torture and murder 

of Carmelo Soria Espinoza (“Soria”), a United Nations 

diplomat then living and working in Chile. In November 

2002, Soria’s widow, Laura Gonzalez-Vera, along with the 

personal representative of Soria’s estate, sued Townley 

seeking damages for Soria’s torture and killing. When 

Townley defaulted, the district court entered a $7 million 

judgment against him. Gonzalez-Vera v. Kissinger, No. 02-

02240, Order for Default Judgment (D.D.C. Nov. 23, 2005).

 

 Gonzalez-Vera then asked the Attorney General to help 

collect the judgment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3523. 

Subsection (a) of that provision states that if a civil judgment 

is entered against a person enrolled in the WSP, “the 

Attorney General shall determine whether the [protected] 

person has made reasonable efforts to comply with the 

judgment” and “shall . . . urge the person to comply with the 

judgment.” In language central to this case, subsection (a) 

states: 

If the Attorney General determines that the person 

has not made reasonable efforts to comply with the 

judgment, the Attorney General may, after 

considering the danger to the person and upon the 

request of the person holding the judgment disclose 

the identity and location of the person to the plaintiff 

entitled to recovery pursuant to the judgment. 

 In response to Gonzalez-Vera’s request, the United States 

Marshals Service informed Townley that unless he took 

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satisfactory steps to comply with the judgment, his identity 

and location could be disclosed pursuant to subsection (a). 

Townley responded with an affidavit describing his present 

assets, debts, income, and financial history. Based on that 

affidavit, the WSP Director, to whom the Attorney General 

has delegated his authority on such issues, determined that “it 

is not unreasonable for [Townley] to pay $75 per week” 

toward the judgment. Letter from Stephen J. T’Kach, 

Director, U.S. Department of Justice Witness Security 

Program, to Jeffery M. Johnson, Dickstein Shapiro LLP (June 

1, 2007). Townley agreed, but according to the Director, 

Gonzalez-Vera rejected the arrangement and so has received 

no payments. Although Gonzalez-Vera has a different view 

of what transpired, this disagreement is irrelevant to the 

statutory question we face here. 

 

 Gonzalez-Vera then sued Townley and the Attorney 

General in the United States District Court for the District of 

Columbia pursuant to section 3523(b)(1), which provides that 

any person who holds a judgment against a WSP participant 

“may, upon a decision by the Attorney General to deny 

disclosure of the current identity and location of such 

protected person, bring an action against the protected person 

in the United States district court.” If the petitioner in fact 

holds a judgment and if the court finds “that the Attorney 

General has declined to disclose to the petitioner the current 

identity and location of the protected person,” then subsection 

(b)(3) requires the court to “appoint a guardian to act on 

behalf of the petitioner.” § 3523(b)(3). The Attorney 

General must then disclose to the guardian the protected 

person’s identity and location. Id. 

 

 The Attorney General moved to dismiss, arguing that 

subsection (b)(1) makes a guardianship proceeding available 

only where the Attorney General determines that the 

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protected person is failing to make reasonable efforts to 

comply but, “after considering the danger to the [protected] 

person,” § 3523(a), nonetheless declines to disclose the 

person’s identity and location. Subsection (b)(1) does not, 

the Attorney General insisted, allow the judgment-holder to 

sue for the appointment of a guardian, where, as here, the 

Attorney General finds that the protected person will make 

reasonable efforts to pay. 

Agreeing with the Attorney General, the district court 

emphasized that “the statute authorizes plaintiffs to bring this 

action only ‘upon a decision by the Attorney General to deny 

disclosure’”—a decision, the district court held, the Attorney 

General had no authority to make “because § 3523(a) does 

not authorize . . . disclosure unless the [Attorney General] 

determines that Townley has not made reasonable efforts to 

comply with the judgment.” Gonzalez-Vera v. Townley, 597 

F. Supp. 2d 98, 102, 101 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting 

§ 3523(b)(1)). Having found that Townley would make 

reasonable efforts, the Attorney General “had no choice, no 

discretion, no decision.” Id. at 102. Because Gonzalez-Vera 

“lack[ed] statutory authorization to bring this suit,” the 

district court dismissed the case. Id. 

 

 Gonzalez-Vera appeals, arguing that the district court 

misinterpreted the statute. We review de novo the district 

court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, see, e.g., Piersall v. 

Winter, 435 F.3d 319, 321 (D.C. Cir. 2006), as well as its 

resolution of this “pure question of statutory interpretation,” 

United States v. Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d 1234, 1237 

(D.C. Cir. 2008); see also Murphy Exploration and Prod. Co. 

v. Dep’t of Interior, 252 F.3d 473, 478–79 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 

(agency’s construction of a statute receives no deference 

where statute grants judicial power to the courts rather than 

administrative power to the agency). 

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II. 

 As noted above, section 3523(b)(1) permits a judgmentholder to sue for the appointment of a guardian “upon a 

decision by the Attorney General to deny disclosure.” 

Because this case turns on the meaning of that phrase and its 

relationship to the process described in subsection (a), we 

think it helpful to begin by quoting the relevant provisions of 

the statute in full: 

(a) If a judgment . . . is entered against [a protected] 

person the Attorney General shall determine 

whether the person has made reasonable efforts 

to comply with the judgment. . . . If the Attorney 

General determines that the person has not made 

reasonable efforts to comply with the judgment, 

the Attorney General may, after considering the 

danger to the person and upon the request of the 

person holding the judgment disclose the 

identity and location of the person to the plaintiff 

entitled to recovery pursuant to the 

judgment. . . . 

(b) (1) Any person who holds a judgment entered by 

a Federal or State court in his or her favor 

against a person provided protection under this 

chapter may, upon a decision by the Attorney 

General to deny disclosure of the current identity 

and location of such protected person, bring an 

action against the protected person in the United 

States district court in the district where the 

person holding the judgment . . . resides. . . . 

(3) Upon a determination (A) that the petitioner 

holds a judgment entered by a Federal or State 

court and (B) that the Attorney General has 

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declined to disclose to the petitioner the current 

identity and location of the protected person 

against whom the judgment was entered, the 

court shall appoint a guardian to act on behalf of 

the petitioner to enforce the judgment. . . . The 

Attorney General shall disclose to the guardian 

the current identity and location of the protected 

person and any other information necessary to 

enable the guardian to carry out his or her duties 

under this subsection. . . . 

18 U.S.C. § 3523. 

 The parties agree that the Attorney General makes a 

“decision . . . to deny disclosure” within the meaning of 

subsection (b)(1) when he (1) finds that the protected person 

is failing to make reasonable efforts to comply with the 

judgment but (2) nonetheless declines to disclose because 

disclosure of the protected person’s identity and location 

would endanger that person. According to Gonzalez-Vera, 

the Attorney General also makes a “decision . . . to deny 

disclosure” where, as here, he determines that the protected 

person is making reasonable efforts to satisfy the judgment, 

and thus does not disclose the protected person’s identity and 

location. In support, Gonzalez-Vera relies on two features of 

section 3523. First, she points out that nothing in subsection 

(a) expressly bars the Attorney General from disclosing the 

protected person’s information if he determines that 

reasonable efforts are being made. In other words, she 

argues, the Attorney General has authority to disclose—and 

thus can make a “decision . . . to deny disclosure”—even 

where he finds that the protected person is making reasonable 

efforts. Second, she emphasizes that subsection (b) nowhere 

references the reasonable-efforts determination required by 

subsection (a), thus demonstrating that these two subsections 

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provide “two independent mechanisms to assist with 

enforcement of an outstanding judgment.” Appellant’s Br. 8. 

Accordingly, she concludes, subsection (b)(1)’s guardianship 

proceeding is available regardless of the outcome of 

subsection (a)’s reasonable-efforts determination. 

 Like the district court, we find Gonzalez-Vera’s position 

inconsistent with the statute’s text. Under subsection (a), the 

Attorney General begins by “determin[ing] whether the 

[protected] person has made reasonable efforts to comply 

with the judgment.” “If” the answer is no, the statute gives 

the Attorney General two choices. He “may” disclose the 

protected person’s identity and location to the judgmentholder or, if doing so would endanger the protected person, 

he “may” decline to disclose, in which case the judgmentholder can invoke subsection (b)(1) and seek appointment of 

a guardian. But where, as here, the Attorney General 

“determines” that the protected person is making reasonable 

efforts, the statute gives him no authority to disclose to the 

judgment-holder. Cf. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Mine 

Safety and Health Admin., 823 F.2d 608, 618 (D.C. Cir. 

1987) (reading 30 U.S.C. § 815(b)(2), which states that the 

agency “may grant . . . [temporary] relief if” one of several 

conditions is met, as authorizing it to grant such relief only if 

one of the delineated conditions is met). In that 

circumstance, the judgment-holder has no authority to initiate 

subsection (b)’s guardianship proceedings because, by its 

terms, subsection (b)(1) is triggered only “upon a decision by 

the Attorney General to deny disclosure”—a decision the 

Attorney General can make only if the protected person is not

making reasonable efforts to satisfy the judgment. 

§ 3523(b)(1) (emphasis added). 

 Nor do we agree with Gonzalez-Vera that “[b]ecause 

Congress explicitly included language addressing reasonable 

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efforts in § 3523(a), the omission of similar language in 

§ 3523(b) demonstrates that Congress purposefully excluded 

a requirement from § 3523(b) that the Attorney General make 

a reasonable efforts determination.” Appellant’s Br. 12. As 

previously noted, subsection (a) provides that if the Attorney 

General finds that a protected person is not making 

reasonable efforts to comply, “the Attorney General may . . . 

disclose the identity and location of the person” to the 

judgment-holder. Subsection (b) repeatedly refers back to 

this language. Specifically, subsection (b)(1) states that the 

judgment holder “may, upon a decision by the [Attorney 

General] to deny disclosure . . . bring an action.” Similarly, 

subsection (b)(3) states that, before appointing a guardian, the 

court must determine that the Attorney General has “declined 

to disclose to the petitioner the current identity and location 

of the protected person.” By using this language consistently 

throughout section 3523, we think it clear that Congress 

intended to make the availability of subsection (b)’s 

guardianship provision dependent upon the Attorney 

General’s subsection (a) decision to deny disclosure. See Am. 

Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, Local 2782 v. Fed. Labor 

Relations Auth., 803 F.2d 737, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“It is a 

generally accepted precept of interpretation that statutes or 

regulations are to be read as a whole, with ‘each part or 

section . . . construed in connection with every other part or 

section.’”) (citation omitted) (ellipsis in original). 

 This result makes sense. Under Gonzalez-Vera’s 

interpretation of subsection (b), guardianship would become 

available in every case in which the protected person’s 

identity and location are not disclosed to the judgmentholder, including cases—like this one—in which the 

Attorney General determines that the protected person is

making reasonable efforts to satisfy the judgment. But given 

the statute’s language and structure, and the risks of 

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disclosing a protected person’s identity and location even to a 

court-appointed guardian, we think it clear that Congress 

intended to make guardianship available only where the 

Attorney General finds that the protected person is failing to 

make reasonable efforts—that is, only where disclosure to a 

guardian is necessary to enforce the judgment. We realize 

this leaves Gonzalez-Vera, though dissatisfied with 

Townley’s efforts to pay, without a remedy in these 

proceedings. As the Attorney General acknowledged at oral 

argument, however, she remains free to seek a fresh 

subsection (a) determination should she have reason to 

believe that Townley’s financial circumstances may have 

changed. 

 Finally, Gonzalez-Vera contends that our interpretation 

of section 3523 presents two avoidable constitutional 

concerns. Citing Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 408, 410 (1792), 

she first argues that by blocking a guardianship proceeding, 

the Attorney General is, in effect, “revis[ing] or overturn[ing] 

a final decision by an Article III court.” Appellant’s Br. 22. 

Second, she argues that, as interpreted by the district court, 

section 3523 violates the Fifth Amendment by depriving her 

of her judgment, as well as the statutory right to a guardian, 

without due process of law. But because Gonzalez-Vera 

advanced neither of these arguments in the district court, she 

may not do so here. See, e.g., Trout v. Sec’y of the Navy, 540 

F.3d 442, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2008). To be sure, as GonzalezVera reminds us, waiver is a discretionary doctrine, but we 

think it clear that no “plain miscarriage of justice” will result 

from our declining to consider these arguments. Hormel v. 

Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 558 (1941). 

 We affirm the district court’s order dismissing the case. 

So ordered. 

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