Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02137/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02137-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Libel,Assault,Slander

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael E. Tennenbaum, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Arizona City Sanitary District; Francis J.

Slavin PC; Francis J. Slavin, Carol J.

Slavin, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-10-2137-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court are the following: (1) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9) filed by

Defendants Francis J. Slavin PC, Francis J. Slavin, and Carol J. Slavin (collectively “Slavin

Defendants”); (2) Motion for Summary Judgment declaring A.R.S. § 12-752 unconstitutional

(Doc. 13) filed by Plaintiff Michael E. Tennenbaum; and (3) Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and

Costs under A.R.S. § 12-752 (Doc. 18) filed by Tennenbaum. For the reasons discussed

below, all three motions are denied. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was the principal of Arizona City Development Corporation (“ACDC”),

which was the developer of a real estate community known as “Arizona City,” located in

Pinal County, Arizona. The City has approximately 4,500 permanent residents. The Arizona

City Sanitary District (“District”), a political subdivision of the State, is governed by and

through a Board of Directors (the “Board”). Pursuant to an Effluent Disposal Agreement

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entered in 1979, the District provides reclaimed water for the irrigation of the community’s

golf course and other community amenities in exchange for the developer’s operation and

maintenance of the community’s public or semi-public facilities, including a golf course,

lake, racquet club, and park. On or about April 7, 1998, ACDC was liquidated and Plaintiff

became the successor to ACDC.

Defendant Francis Slavin, an attorney with the firm Francis J. Slavin PC, is legal

counsel for the District and its Board. The Board consists of five elected members, one of

whom is the Chairman. At the time the present cause of action arose, Mr. William Miller was

the Chairman. Mr. Slavin represented the District in an earlier lawsuit filed by the District

against Arizona City Golf, LLC and AM Golf, LLC in Pinal County challenging the validity

of the 1979 Effluent Disposal Agreement. Apparently, the three majority members of the

Board disagreed with the two minority members regarding the lawsuit. As a result of these

disagreements, two recall elections – taking place in May 2009 and May 2010 – were aimed

at the three-member majority. Slavin also represented the three majority Board members that

were the subject of the recall elections in a lawsuit that was filed in Pinal County in an effort

to stop the May 2010 recall. Neither recall election was successful in displacing the three

Board members. A general election was scheduled for November 2, 2010. 

The present lawsuit arises out of allegedly defamatory statements made by Slavin in

his capacity as legal counsel for the District/Board. Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Slavin drafted

a letter, dated December 30, 2009, which was printed on District letterhead and signed by

Mr. Miller in his capacity as Chairman of the Board. The letter was mailed, with

Defendants’ knowledge, to all customers of the District by including a copy in their monthly

billing statement. Plaintiff alleges that the letter “contains false statements about plaintiff,

and (i) brings plaintiff into disrepute, contempt or ridicule, and/or (ii) impeaches plaintiff’s

honesty, integrity or reputation.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 9). Plaintiff contends that the letter, among other

things, falsely accuses him of profiteering and gouging. (Id. at ¶ 12). The letter was

subsequently published twice by the Arizona City Independent TriValley newspaper on

January 13, 2010 and January 20, 2010. (Doc. 1, Ex. 3, 4). Plaintiff believes that at least one,

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or perhaps both, of the newspaper publications were produced at the direction, advice, and/or

with the knowledge of Slavin. (Doc.1, ¶ 23). Plaintiff further asserts that Slavin, with the

approval and/or at the direction of the Board, made the same or similar statements at an open

forum held at a Board meeting on January 20, 2010. (Id. at ¶ 29). 

Plaintiff commenced this defamation action against the District and the Slavin

Defendants on October 6, 2010, alleging that Defendants are liable for defamation per se.

(Doc. 1). The Slavin Defendants move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-752,

Arizona’s SLAPP (“Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation”) statute. (Doc. 9).

Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of Arizona’s SLAPP statute through a motion for

summary judgment (Doc. 13) and seeks an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to the statute

(Doc. 18). 

DISCUSSION

I. Slavin Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

The Slavin Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s suit on grounds that it constitutes

a SLAPP suit within the meaning of A.R.S. § 12-752. A SLAPP suit is one in which the

plaintiff’s alleged injury results from petitioning or free speech activities by a defendant that

are protected by the federal or state constitution. The first step in evaluating an anti-SLAPP

motion is to determine whether the statements at issue involve an exercise of the right of

petition, as defined by the statute. See § 12-752(A) (“In any legal action that involves a

party’s exercise of the right of petition, the defending party may file a motion to dismiss the

action under this section.” (emphasis added)); see also Zamos v. Stroud, 87 P.3d 802, 806

(Cal. 2004) (in the context of California’s broader statute, the party filing the anti-SLAPP

motion has the initial burden of establishing that the plaintiff’s claim arose from protected

activity). Thus, to qualify for protection under the statute, Slavin’s written or oral statements

must “fall[] within the constitutional protection of free speech,” and (1) “[be] made as part

of . . . [a] recall effort”, § 12-751(1), and/or (2) “[be] made before or submitted to a

legislative or executive body or any other governmental proceeding”, “in connection with

an issue that is under consideration or review” by that body or proceeding, and “for the

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1

 The Court overrules Plaintiff’s evidentiary objection to paragraph 19 of Slavin’s

affidavit on grounds that it lacks foundation, contains inadmissible hearsay and violates the

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purpose of influencing a governmental action, decision or result,” § 12-751(1)(a)-(c). See

Backus v. State, 220 Ariz. 101, 104, 203 P.3d 499, 502 (2009) (Arizona courts apply

“fundamental principles of statutory construction, the cornerstone of which is the rule that

the best and most reliable index of a statute’s meaning is its language and, when the language

is clear and unequivocal, it is determinative of the statute’s construction.” (quoting Deer

Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 97 v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007))

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

A. Recall Effort

Defendants contend that “the ongoing dispute between the Board and the developer

has led to repeated recall efforts,” and “[t]he letter to District customers and the subsequent

informational Board meeting both on their face and as admitted in the Complaint relate to a

matter under consideration before the Board, i.e., possible modification of the

developer/District contract.” (Doc. 9 at 5). Defendants ask the Court to consider Slavin’s

letter and presentation as part of a recall effort because the ongoing dispute between the

Board and the developer, which was the subject of the lawsuit, is what led to the repeated

recall efforts. Nevertheless, neither the content of the letter nor any description afforded of

the content of the presentation support such an inference. The letter makes no mention of

any recall. Rather, the opening line of the letter states: “[t]his letter is intended to clear up

the misconception surrounding the current lawsuit between the Arizona City Sanitary District

and Arizona City Golf.” (Doc. 1, Ex. 1). According to Slavin’s own affidavit, “[t]he letter

was to report to the District’s taxpayers the acts of the Developer which breached the

Developer’s obligations and the District’s position and expectations under the Agreement.

It also was in response to the continued criticism and misinformation being leveled at the

Board by golf course lot owners, organized by the golf course owner in opposition to the

Lawsuit.” (Doc. 9, Ex. E, ¶ 19).1

 Mr. Miller’s admitted testimony further confirms that from

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Best Evidence Rule. (Doc. 15, ¶ 8). Slavin, in his capacity as legal counsel to the

Board/District, drafted the letter. It is reasonable then to assume that he had a sufficient basis

on which to state the letter’s purpose. 

2

 Plaintiff’s evidentiary objection to paragraph 14 of Slavin’s affidavit (Doc. 15, ¶ 5)

is inapposite because the Court only relies on the statement to the extent that it demonstrates

that Slavin’s own description of the presentation fails to make any mention of a recall effort.

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his perspective the purpose of the letter was to “educate” the District’s customers about the

lawsuit. (Doc. 16, Ex. 2 at 137). 

Similarly, with respect to the presentation, Slavin admits that it was the same one

made in 2009 during oral arguments before the Pinal County Superior Court in Arizona City

Sanitary District v. Arizona City Golf, LLC. (Doc. 9, Ex. E, ¶ 14). Slavin states that the

presentation dealt with “the history of the Agreement between the District and [ACDC],

which is the subject of the Lawsuit” and that “[t]he presentation included the sell-off of

various recreational amenities by the Developer, Michael Tennenbaum, and by AM Golf, a

company owned by his sons.” (Doc. 9, Ex. E, ¶¶ 14, 21).2

 To the extent Slavin contends that

the lawsuit between the District and Arizona City Golf concerning the Agreement is what led

to the two recall elections, Defendants have not made an adequate showing that the

statements are entitled to protection as “part of . . . [a] recall effort” pursuant to the statute.

The statements at issue were made in late December 2009, and mid-January 2010.

Three to four months later, on April 16, 2010, the Court of Appeals in Arizona City Sanitary

Dist. v. Olson held that the petitioners who sought a second recall election of the three Board

members were required to pay the costs of the prior unsuccessful May 2009 recall election

before filing a petition for the second recall, which was eventually held on May 18, 2010.

224 Ariz. 330, 334, 230 P.3d 713, 717 (App. 2010). Thus, it is not apparent that any recall

was pending when the statements were made in December 2009 and January 2010. Slavin

presents no evidence that a second recall effort was underway at the time the statements were

made. Even if he did, however, this Court need not decide whether any preparatory work for

a recall that may have been anticipated at the time of the statements satisfies the “recall

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3

 A.R.S. § 16-192(D) provides that “[t]his section applies only to special taxing

districts that are organized pursuant to title 48, chapters 5, 6, 8, 10 and 13 through 16.”

Defendants do not dispute that the District is organized under title 48, chapter 14 of the

Arizona Revised Statutes.

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effort” requirement of the statute.

To assume, as Slavin urges, that the mailed letter and the use of District resources to

make a presentation at a public meeting were part of a recall effort would be to assume that

the statements took place under circumstances that violate provisions of an Arizona statute.

Section 16-192(A) of the Arizona Revised Statutes provides, in relevant part, that “[a] special

taxing district shall not use its personnel, equipment, materials, buildings or other resources

for the purpose of influencing the outcome of an election.”3

 It is undisputed that the letter

was included as part of the monthly invoice mailed to all the Sanitary District’s customers.

(Doc. 9, Ex. E, ¶ 18). Moreover, Slavin does not dispute that he was acting in his capacity

as legal counsel to the Board and District and that he was remunerated for the activities he

undertook in that capacity, including drafting the letter and making the presentation. See Doc.

9 at 3 (“All of his actions at issue in the Complaint were taken as counsel for the

Board/District, with the services paid for by the Board/District.”). Therefore, assuming

arguendo that the Court accepted Defendants’ argument that the letter and/or presentation

were part of a recall effort, this would amount to a concession by Defendants that the District

used its materials and resources to influence the outcome of the May 2010 recall election,

thereby violating A.R.S. § 16-192(A). 

In their Reply, Defendants assert that Plaintiff has overlooked the portion of A.R.S.

§ 16-192 which provides, “[n]othing in this section precludes a special district from reporting

on official actions of the special district’s governing body.” (Doc. 19 at 5). Defendant also

relies on A.R.S. § 48-2011, which delineates the powers of a sanitary district to include the

following: “a sanitary district, acting through its board of directors” may “[s]ue and be sued”

and “[m]anage and conduct the business and affairs of the district, and do all other things

incidental to exercising the powers granted by this article.” Defendants, however, cannot

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have it both ways. Slavin offers no evidence that the District took any official action with

respect to the recall election. Indeed, Mr. Miller’s admitted testimony provides that none of

the other Board members were aware that the letter would be submitted with the bills. (Doc.

16, Ex. 2 at 225). Thus, the mailing was not an “official action” of a governing body or the

management of the District’s affairs “through its board of directors”, as required by the two

statutes Defendants rely on in their Reply. Even assuming the Board took an official position

on the recall election, the statute would still prohibit any official attempt by the Board to

influence the election through the use of District resources. 

The SLAPP statute cannot be invoked by a defendant who uses District resources to

influence an election in violation of A.R.S. § 16-192. Slavin makes no argument that the

prohibition in A.R.S. § 16-192 on the use of a special taxing district’s resources to influence

an election is unconstitutional. If, as Slavin seems to concede, such a prohibition is

appropriate, then the prohibited speech in which Miller and Slavin allegedly engaged does

not “fall[] within the constitutional protection of free speech.” See, e.g., Flatley v. Mauro,

139 P.3d 2, 24 (2006) (holding that activity forming the basis of defendant’s SLAPP motion

was extortion as a matter of law, and therefore not constitutionally protected pursuant to

California’s SLAPP statute); Huntingdon Life Sci., Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty

U.S.A., Inc., 129 Cal. App. 4th 1228, 1246, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 521, 535 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)

(“If the defendant concedes or the evidence conclusively establishes the conduct complained

of was illegal, as a matter of law the defendant cannot make a prima facie showing the action

arises from protected activity within the meaning of [California’s SLAPP statute].”). To

qualify as an “exercise of the right of petition” pursuant to Arizona’s SLAPP statute, the

statement at issue must “fall[] within the constitutional protection of free speech.” § 12-

751(1). Accordingly, if Slavin’s activities violate A.R.S. § 16-192, and that prohibition is

constitutional, it follows that Defendants cannot be protected by the constitutional guarantee

of the right of petition when Slavin’s speech violated that legal prohibition.

B. Statements Before Governmental Body

Defendants further assert that Slavin’s activities qualify as an exercise of the right of

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petition because they were “activit[ies] done before or in connection with any political

subdivision of the state.” (Doc. 9 at 5). Defendants thus argue that the statute has a breadth

which is belied by its narrow statutory language. To qualify as an exercise of the right of

petition, it is not sufficient for the statements at issue to simply “arise[] directly from matters

under consideration by the District”, as Defendants assert. (Doc. 9 at 5). Rather, the statute

requires an oral or written statement that falls within the constitutional protection of free

speech and that is all of the following: (1) “[m]ade before or submitted to a legislative or

executive body or any other governmental proceeding,” (2) “[m]ade in connection with an

issue that is under consideration or review by a legislative or executive body or any other

governmental proceeding,” and (3) “[m]ade for the purpose of influencing a governmental

action, decision or result.” §12-751(1)(a)-(c) (emphasis added). The statute defines

“governmental proceeding” as “any proceeding, other than a judicial proceeding, by an

officer, official or body of this state and any political subdivision of this state, including

boards and commissions, or by an officer, official or body of the federal government.” § 12-

751(2). 

Assuming as Defendants have argued that the letter and presentation were made in

connection with the lawsuit and the possible modification of the agreement between the

developer and the District, an issue which could reasonably be viewed as “under

consideration or review” by the Board, the statements still fail to satisfy the first and third

prongs of the definition. The letter was mailed to all of the District’s customers as part of

their monthly bill. The presentation was made during the “call-to-the-public” segment of the

Board’s regularly scheduled meeting, and, according to Slavin’s affidavit, “almost all” in

attendance were homeowners. (Doc. 9, Ex. E, ¶¶ 21, 22). Indeed, Slavin admits that the

Board had already heard the presentation during an Executive Session of the Board in

December 2009. (Id. at ¶ 17). The statements were not, therefore, made before or submitted

to a legislative, executive or other governmental proceeding. 

Moreover, neither the letter nor the presentation were “made for the purpose of

influencing a governmental action, decision, or result.” It is not disputed that Slavin’s

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4

 In the context of the second step of the analysis, the statute provides that “[a]t the

request of the moving party the court shall make findings whether the lawsuit was brought

to deter or prevent the moving party from exercising constitutional rights and is thereby

brought for an improper purpose, including to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or

needless increase in the cost of litigation.” § 12-752(B). Because the Court does not have the

opportunity to assess the factual and/or legal basis, if any, underlying Slavin’s statements,

speculating about whether Plaintiff’s filing of this lawsuit was motivated by improper

purposes would be futile. 

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statements were made at the direction of the District (i.e. the government) in order to defend

against what it perceived as criticisms for actions it had already taken, not in order to

influence an action, decision or result of the District itself. When the Arizona legislature

adopted the SLAPP statute in 2006, it explicitly declared:

It is in the public interest and it is the purpose of this article to

strike a balance between the rights of persons to file lawsuits for

injury and the constitutional rights of persons of petition, speech

and association, to protect and encourage public participation in

government to the maximum extent allowed by law, to establish

an efficient process for identification and adjudication of

strategic lawsuits against public participation and to provide for

costs and attorney fees. 

A.R.S. § 12-751, Sec. 2(C). When the legislature accomplishes that balancing by specifying

criteria that must be met to invoke the protections of the statute, this Court has no authority

to re-write or re-state the criteria. The statements at issue are not the type for which the

legislature provided protections. Because the statute unambiguously provides that all three

elements of the definition must be met and Defendants have only arguably satisfied one

prong, Slavin’s challenged activities fall beyond the scope of the SLAPP statute’s protection.

The Slavin Defendants have failed to meet their threshold burden of showing that

Plaintiff’s defamation claims are based on protected petitioning activity. Accordingly, their

motion to dismiss pursuant to the SLAPP statute is denied.4

II. Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees Pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-752

Section 12-752(D) of the SLAPP statute provides that “[i]f the court grants the motion

to dismiss, the court shall award the moving party costs and reasonable attorney fees,

including those incurred for the motion.” Alternatively, “[i]f the court finds that a motion to

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5 Varela v. Perez, 2009 WL 4438738, *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 30, 2009) (finding that a

crime victim defendants’ report of criminal activity to the police does not qualify as a

“petition to the government” as that term is used in A.R.S. §12-751). Although mentioned

in Congress Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 17 of Yavapai Cnty. v. Warren, 227 Ariz. 16, __ n.3,

251 P.3d 395, 397 n.3 (App. 2011), the Court of Appeals declined to reach the SLAPP issue

in that case because of resolution of the appeal based on public records law.

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dismiss is frivolous or solely intended to delay, the court shall award costs and reasonable

attorney fees to the prevailing party on the motion.” Plaintiff moves for an award of

attorneys’ fees and costs by asserting that Defendants’ motion to dismiss was frivolous

because the statute does not apply on its face. (Doc. 18). While Defendants have failed to

demonstrate that Slavin’s activities fall within the scope of the statute, the argument was not

frivolous. That Arizona’s SLAPP statute, which was enacted in 2006, has been the subject

of only one unpublished case5

 is a factor the Court may consider in its attorneys’ fee

determination. In Reply, Plaintiff relies on Hollowell v. Va. Marine Res. Comm’n, 691 S.E.2d

500, 510 n.11 (Va. Ct. App. 2010), to argue that Defendant should not be given a “free pass”

simply because the statute has never been addressed in a reported decision. (Doc. 26 at 1–2).

However, the Court looks to the Arizona courts for guidance on determination of attorneys’

fees awards in cases involving issues of first impression. 

In the context of contested contract actions, Arizona courts have determined that

whether a case involves issues of first impression can be a useful factor to consider, although

it need not be determinative. Associated Indem. Corp. v. Warner, 143 Ariz. 567, 570, 694

P.2d 1181, 1184 (1985) (finding that novelty of legal question presented and whether such

claim or defense had previously been adjudicated in this jurisdiction are among the factors

that are useful to consider in determining whether attorneys’ fees should be awarded); Loftus

v. Ariz. State Univ. Pub. Safety Pers. Ret. Sys. Local Bd., __P.3d. __, ¶ 21, 2011 WL

1814234, *6 (App. 2011) (denying attorneys’ fees awards where issue raised was one of first

impression, claim was not without merit, and award of fees could discourage others from

litigating legitimate claims). Accordingly, the Court takes into consideration not only the

fact that the issue raised by Defendants was one of first impression, but also that while

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6

 In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants accuse Plaintiff of bringing his defamation

action “coincidentally, less than a month before the latest recall election, in an obvious effort

to deter Defendants and others from exercising their legitimate First Amendment and

political rights as to the ongoing dispute between the developer and the Board.” (Doc. 9 at

4). In their Reply, Defendants change their position by recognizing that the election, which

was scheduled to take place a few weeks after Plaintiff filed his Complaint, was the

November 2010 general election, not a recall election which would be significant under the

SLAPP statute analysis. Nevertheless, this clear shift in Defendants’ position with respect

to Plaintiff’s intent behind filing the suit is not sufficient to render the entirety of Defendants’

motion frivolous. 

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Defendants’ arguments were not persuasive, they were not wholly unreasonable. The Court

is not persuaded that Defendants’ motion is frivolous6

 or that the sole intent behind the

motion was to delay the pending litigation. In consideration of all of these factors, Plaintiff’s

request for attorneys’ fees is denied. 

III. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

As part of his arguments against Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff challenges

the constitutionality of Arizona’s SLAPP statute through a separately filed motion for

summary judgment. (Doc. 13). Plaintiff argues that the statute is in violation of the “antiabrogation” (article 18, § 6), due process (article 2, § 4), and/or separation of powers (article

3) clauses of the Arizona constitution. Arizona courts follow a longstanding principle of

“avoid[ing] addressing constitutional issues relating to a statute unless absolutely necessary

to resolve a case.” Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 211 Ariz. 386, 403 n.23, 121 P.3d 1256, 1273

n.23 (App. 2005); see also Aitken v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 183 Ariz. 387, 389, 904 P.2d

456, 458 (1995) (“[I]t is well-settled that the constitutionality of a statute will not be

determined in any case, unless such determination is absolutely necessary in order to

determine the merits of the suit in which the constitutionality of such statute has been drawn

in question, and such rule should not be departed from except for strong reason and under

extraordinary circumstances.” (citing Cnty. of Maricopa v. Anderson, 81 Ariz. 339, 341, 306

P.2d 268, 269 (1957))). Having dismissed Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss pursuant to § 12-

752 for failure to establish that the activity at issue is within the scope of Arizona’s SLAPP

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statute, it becomes unnecessary, and therefore inappropriate, for the Court to address the

constitutionality of the statute. See Lee v. Walters, 433 F.3d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding

that a district could should not have considered constitutionality of a state statute where

exclusion order could be reviewed and affirmed without reaching constitutionality). A

determination on the constitutionality of the SLAPP statute would not entitle Plaintiff to

relief beyond that which he may be entitled on his claims. Moreover, neither party has

disclosed any extraordinary circumstances to urge the Court against exercising judicial

restraint to address constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the constitutionality of A.R.S. 12-

752 is denied.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9) is

DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (Doc.18)

is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

13) is DENIED.

DATED this 29th day of July, 2011. 

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