Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-03071/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-03071-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:2651 Medical Care Recovery

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Case No. 5:14-cv-03071-PSG

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND DENYING MOTIONS FOR REMOVAL, 

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United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION 

KENNETH L. CAMPBELL, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

BARACK OBAMA, et al.,

 Defendants. 

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Case No. 5:14-cv-03071-PSG

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO 

DISMISS AND DENYING MOTIONS 

FOR REMOVAL, JOINDER AND 

VACATION AND WITHRDRAWAL 

(Re: Docket Nos. 22, 30, 33, 46, 68, 81)

 

Responding to three motions to dismiss and filing his own motion for removal of state 

administrative proceedings, motion to join a defendant and motion to vacate an order and withdraw 

consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction, Plaintiff Kenneth L. Campbell shares many frustrations 

with the political and legal professions.1

 Because these frustrations are no substitute for persuasive 

 

1

 See Docket No. 87 at 3-4 (citing Cooper v. Swoap, 11 Cal. 3d 856, 872 (1974)): 

 

As a matter of Congressional intent, [P]laintiff submits it is totally illogical and 

unintellig[ible] to suggest that Congress knowingly intended to establish a Benefit Period 

based upon medical condition[s] and at [the] same time implement [a] 100 day irrespective 

of medical condition rule of [coverage] for elderly and disabled adults. Accordingly, the 

position that is maintained by Kaiser together with federal defendants and SALA/Michele 

Schroeder, represents an interpretation of law that is reminiscent of a journey into the 

fictional realms visited by Alice through [the] looking glass. In [the] fanciful world of 

Lewis Carroll, the inhabitants could turn fact into fiction and fiction into fact by mere ipse 

dixit. As Humpty Dumpty scornfully informed Alice, “When I use a word, it means just 

what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.” 

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ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND DENYING MOTIONS FOR REMOVAL, 

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legal arguments, the court must GRANT Defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The court also must DENY Campbell’s three motions, 

largely for improper procedure. The court GRANTS Campbell leave to amend as to Docket Nos. 

22, 30 and 81. 

I. 

Campbell is a resident of Mountain View, California.2 Due to an infected foot and injured 

spine, he was admitted to the hospital and later transferred in and out of various skilled nursing 

facilities.3 As a participant of the Senior Advantage MA Plan (“MA Plan”) offered by Kaiser 

Permanente, Campbell was entitled to skilled nursing coverage for up to 100 days.4

 

On June 25, 2012, while Campbell was still receiving care, Kaiser’s MA organization 

notified Campbell that he had exhausted his Medicare coverage for skilled nursing facilities.5 

After reconsideration by the MA organization and subsequent review by a qualified independent 

 

“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different 

things.” “The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—that’s all.” 

Like Humpty Dumpty, Kaiser and federal defendants confront this Court with the question 

“which is to be master”[—]Defendants or Congress? Defendants[’] position is as 

precarious and untenable as Humpty’s seat on the wall. . . . Secondly, assertions of 

unintelligible statements clearly suggests mental defect and incompetency that warrants the 

Court appointing psychiatrists in the case. 

2 See Docket No. 1 at 6-7. 

3 See id.; Docket No. 81 at 5. 

4 See Docket No. 1 at 7; Docket No. 81 at 5 (“Specifically, the [P]laintiff received SNF services 

from March 9, 2012 to March 11, 2012 (3 days); March 12, 2012 through March 28, 2012 (17 

days); April 4, 2012 through April 10, 2012 (7 days); April 14, 2012 to April 30, 2012 (17 days); 

May 1, 2012 to May 31, 2012 (31 days) and June 1, 2012 through June 25, 2012 (25 days)—

totaling 100 days.”). Campbell’s various stays at the facilities ultimately added up to well over 100 

days. See Docket No. 81 at 7; Docket No. 1 at 9. 

5 See Docket No. 81 at 5. 

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contractor, Campbell again was denied further coverage.6 An administrative law judge affirmed 

the denial.7 Campbell then appealed to the Medicare Appeals Council, which affirmed the ALJ’s 

decision.8

 

Campbell next filed this suit against President Barack Obama, Secretary of Health and 

Human Services Sylvia Burwell, Kaiser Health Foundation/ VA Clacher (“Kaiser”), Los Altos 

Sub-Acute/ J. Alvarez, Santa Clara County Welfare’s Robert Brizuela and Patricia Melenudo, 

Shorebreeze Apartment/ Martha Ray, Senior Adults Legal Assistance/ Michele Schroeder 

(“SALA”) and the State Bar of California/ Director (“the State Bar”).9 Based on Campbell’s 

request in his papers,10 the court dismissed nine Defendants at a hearing on December 6, 2014.11 

Defendants Burwell and Obama, the State Bar, SALA and Kaiser remain. 

II. 

This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.12 The parties further consented to the 

jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(a).13 

 

6 See id. The review process for denied Medicare claims is as follows: first, the MA plan 

participant may request reconsideration by a MA organization; if the decision is affirmed, a followup review by an outside entity is allowed; if the MA participant remains unsatisfied, he may appear 

before an administrative law judge; the ALJ’s decision may be appealed to the Medicare Appeals 

Council pursuant to 42 C.F.R. § 422.608; finally, the MA participant may request judicial review 

of the Council’s decision, pursuant to 42 C.F.R. § 422.612(a)-(b). See Docket No. 81 at 4. 

7 See Docket No. 81 at 5. 

8 See id. 

9 See Docket No. 1 at 3. 

10 See Docket No. 86 at 3. 

11 See Docket No. 104. 

12 See Docket No. 1 at 3. 

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III. 

The court considers each pending motion in turn, beginning with Defendants’ motions to 

dismiss. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) provides that a court may grant a motion to dismiss based on lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction any time.14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides that the plaintiff must 

allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”15 A plaintiff must allege 

facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility” that the defendant acted unlawfully.16 While a 

“heightened fact pleading of specifics” is not required, the plaintiff must still allege facts sufficient 

to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”17 “A pleading that offers ‘labels and 

conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”18 “Nor 

does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual 

enhancement.’”19 In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must accept as true all facts alleged 

in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.20 A court is not 

required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, 

 13 See Docket Nos. 4, 22, 25, 30, 31, 42, 52, 53, 54, 82, 103. 

14 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-mater 

jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). 

15 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 

16 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

17 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544, 555. 

18 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

19 Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 

20 See al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 

2074 (2011). 

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or unreasonable inferences.”21 If the court dismisses a complaint, it must decide whether to grant 

leave to amend. Leave should be granted even if no such request was made, unless the pleadings 

could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.22 

Campbell alleges that (1) the State Bar and SALA violated the Eighth Amendment in 

denying him legal representation and assistance, (2) the State Bar and attorney Karen Goldberg 

conspired to “obstruct justice and due administration of the law,” (3) Burwell violated the Eighth 

Amendment in denying him Medicare for a skilled nursing facility, (4) Obama violated his 

constitutional duty to enforce the Americans with Disabilities Act when Campbell was allegedly 

discriminated against during administrative proceedings and (5) the undersigned, the State Bar, the 

California Supreme Court, the Sixth District Court of Appeals of California and the Santa Clara 

Superior Court conspired to “obstruct justice and the due administration of law. 

 Regarding the State Bar, Campbell does not allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief 

above the speculative level” 23 as he references the State Bar once in his complaint and never in his 

opposition.24 But even if Campbell’s claim rises above speculation, the State Bar is a state 

constitutional entity established by Article VI, Section 9 of the California Constitution.25 The State 

Bar assists the California Supreme Court in administrative matters such as attorney admission and 

discipline, whereas the Court retains the authority to admit, suspend or disbar attorneys.26 Under 

the Eleventh Amendment, a plaintiff may not sue a state or its agencies in federal court without 

 

21 In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). 

22 See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). 

23 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544, 555. 

24 See Docket No. 1 at 2; Docket No. 47. 

25 See In re Rose, 22 Cal. 4th 430, 438 (2000).

26 See In re Attorney Discipline Sys., 19 Cal. 4th 582, 600 (1998). 

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consent.27 Here, the State Bar has not given consent.28 The court therefore does not possess 

subject matter jurisdiction.29 

 Regarding SALA, Campbell alleges only that SALA declined to represent him.30 There is 

no discussion as to how SALA denied Campbell legal representation, nor is it clear such denial 

constitutes a constitutional violation.31 This is insufficient. 

 As for Burwell and Obama, Campbell seeks judicial review of Burwell’s final decision 

denying Medicare coverage for care at a skilled nursing facility32 and argues that in denying him 

Medicare benefits, Obama violated his duty to enforce the ADA.33 Campbell not only fails to state 

a plausible claim against Burwell, but he also has not shown that the court has subject matter 

jurisdiction with regard to his claim against Obama. 

First, Campbell’s claim that Burwell’s final decision is “a death sentence” that constitutes 

cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment is not plausible because the 

Ninth Circuit requires a “formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law” to 

 

27 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). The Ninth Circuit 

firmly holds that the State Bar and its employees enjoy immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 

See Hirsh v. Justices of Supreme Court of State of Cal. et al., 67 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 1995). 

28 See Docket No. 22. 

29 See Miller v. Rykoff–Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1998). 

30 See Docket No. 47 at 3. 

31 See Docket No. 1 at 3, 4; Docket No. 47 at 3, 4. 

32 See Docket No. 81 at 2. The limit and scope of post-hospital extended care services—“extended 

care services furnished to an individual after his transfer from a hospital in which he was an 

inpatient for not less than three consecutive days before his discharge from the hospital”—is set 

forth in section 1395d(a)(2)(A). See also § 1395x(i). Skilled nursing facility services fall under 

this category. See § 1395d(a)(2)(A). 

33 See Docket No. 81 at 2, 5.

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accompany such a claim.34 The Medicare Act explicitly provides that coverage at a skilled nursing 

facility is limited to no more than 100 days during “the spell of illness.”35 Section 405(g) of the 

Medicare Act also states that the findings of the Secretary, “if supported by substantial evidence, 

shall be conclusive.”36 Campbell has alleged no facts to show that Burwell’s decision would be 

equivalent to a death sentence. 

Second, the President enjoys “absolute immunity” from liability predicated on his official 

actions or inactions,37 such as Campbell claims here. 

IV. 

The court turns next to Campbell’s request to remove his state administrative proceedings.38 

He urges removal is proper because “[P]laintiff is a defendant within meaning of [28 U.S.C. § 

1446] because by this removal petition [Plaintiff] is seeking to defend and protect lawful equal 

protection rights under the laws and Constitution of [the] United States.”39 It appears Campbell has 

two appeals, Case Nos. 14,177,163 and 14,170,201, before the California Department of Social 

 

34 In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, 33 F.3d 1060, 1062 (9th Cir. 1994). 

35 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395d(a)(2)(A); Docket No. 81 at 2, 5. Campbell’s Medicare benefits were 

exhausted as of June 25, 2012. See Docket No. 81 at 2, 5. A “spell of illness” begins on the first 

day the patient is hospitalized and ends after a period of 60 consecutive days where the individual 

is not an inpatient at any hospital or skilled nursing facility. See § 1395x(a). 

36 See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

37 See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982). See also Christie v. Obama, Case No. 2:13-

cv-00596-MRH, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67548, at *5-6 (W.D. Penn. May 13, 2013) (citing Baker 

v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). 

38 See Docket No. 33. 

39 See Docket No. 33 at 2 (citing Shamrock Oil v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 104 (1941) (concerning a 

breach of contract claim and whether Congress had originally intended for both plaintiffs and 

defendants to remove their cases under the removal statue)). 

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Services, Administrative Adjudications Division.40 Campbell argues (1) the fact that he could not 

secure representation and the challenges he experiences due to his disabilities violate his due 

process rights and (2) Santa Clara County’s denial of additional hours in caregiver assistance to 

conduct legal research and the Medicare and MediCal policies amount to discrimination and 

harassment, thus violating his equal protection rights.41 

 “Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a 

State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be 

removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district 

and division embracing the place where such action is pending.”42 Generally, only defendants may 

remove actions from the state to the federal courts.43 Plaintiffs who do not fit under a special 

exception may not remove,44 reflecting Congress’ intent that a plaintiff should not be permitted to 

alter the forum it selects to litigate its claims against a particular defendant.45 Campbell’s request 

for removal of his state administrative proceeding therefore is improper. 

 

40 See Docket No. 33 at 3-5. 

41 See id. at 7; Docket No. 33-1 at 18-19. 

42 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 

43 See 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 107.11, 107.15 (Matthew 

Bender 3d ed. 2014); Am. Int’l Underwriters (Philippines), Inc. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 1253, 

1260 (9th Cir. 1988). 

44 See id. 

45 See id.; Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir.1979) (“A federal 

court’s removal jurisdiction derives solely from Congressional authorization and the removal 

statutes are construed strictly against removal.”); Gaus v. Miles, 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(“[D]efendant always bears the burden of establishing removal” and federal jurisdiction must be 

rejected in the first instance if any doubt exists as to removal); Mobile Oil Corp. v. City of Long 

Beach, 772 F.2d 534, 539 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that original federal question jurisdiction is 

unavailable where the cause of action is a creature of state law, unless the federal issue (1) is a 

necessary element of a well-pleaded state law claim for coercive relief, (2) is substantial and (3) 

disputed). The case at issue is similar to State of Nevada v. Culverwell, where the district court 

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V. 

 Campbell also seeks to join Goldberg as a defendant on grounds that she conspired with 

the State Bar, the California Supreme Court, the Sixth District Court of Appeals of California and 

the Santa Clara Superior Court to “obstruct justice and the due administration of law.”46 Pursuant 

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a), a person may be joined as a codefendant if (1) a right to relief is asserted 

by or against them jointly, severally or in the alternative, (2) the right to relief arises out of the 

same transaction or occurrence and (3) any question of law or fact common to all parties joined 

will arise in the action.47 Requirements governing permissive joinders are liberally construed.48 

 Though Campbell seeks “to establish the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth in 

the American way,”49 he spends less than one page explaining that Goldberg should be joined 

because she is “totally incompetent” and “maliciously declared by the State Bar to be an 

attorney.”50 The court is not convinced there is a right to relief, that it occurs out of the same 

transaction or occurrence—Campbell references Campbell v. Goldberg, Case No. 11-8866, in 

which Goldberg allegedly failed to submit a respondent’s brief51—or that any question of law or 

fact common to all parties joined will arise in the action. 

 

denied the defendant’s request for removal because mere invocation of the First and Fourteenth 

Amendments does not confer federal jurisdiction and warrant removal. 890 F. Supp. 933, 937 (D. 

Nev. 1995). 

46 See Docket No. 46 at 4. 

47 See also Grubbs v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 705 (1972). 

48 See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966); League to Save Lake Tahoe v. 

Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 558 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1977). 

49 See Docket No. 46 at 4. 

50 See id. 

51 See Docket No. 22. 

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VI. 

Finally, Campbell seeks to withdraw his consent to the undersigned magistrate judge on 

grounds that the court initially recorded Campbell’s address incorrectly,52 the undersigned engaged 

in “corrupt misconduct,” namely, “unlawful conspiracy to obstruct justice and due administration 

of law” by not appointing Campbell counsel or disclosing that the undersigned is a member of the 

State Bar, an adverse party in the case at issue.53 Campbell previously filed a one-page motion to 

rescind his consent to magistrate jurisdiction, which the court declined without prejudice, and 

which Campbell also seeks to vacate.54 

 First, the court apologizes to Campbell for inconveniences caused by using Campbell’s 

previous apartment number for correspondence. The court has corrected its mistake. 

 Second, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), once a case is referred to a magistrate judge, reference 

can be withdrawn by the district court only “for good cause shown on its own motion, or under 

extraordinary circumstances shown by any party (emphasis added).”55 The Ninth Circuit has held 

that factors for consideration include the timeliness of the request, whether granting the request 

would unduly interfere with or delay the proceedings, increasing the burden and costs to litigants, 

and whether the party’s consent was voluntary.56 

 Membership in the State Bar is not evidence of an extraordinary circumstance that would 

warrant vacating reference to this court. Campbell’s request comes well after he has already 

 

52 See Docket No. 59. 

53 See Docket No. 68 at 3, 6, 7. 

54 See Dockets No. 60, 62. 

55 See Dixon v. Ylst, 990 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1993) (“There is no absolute right, in a civil case, 

to withdraw consent to trial and other proceedings before a magistrate judge.”). 

56 See United States v. Neville, 985 F.2d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). 

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consented and the case has moved beyond the first round of motions to dismiss. The case has not 

proceeded thus far with excessive delay or burden, but would if the court granted Campbell’s 

request. Nor has the court has engaged in corrupt misconduct or unlawful conspiracy to obstruct 

justice and due administration of law. Circumstances here are not extraordinary, and DENYING 

Campbell’s motion with prejudice best serves the interests of justice.57 

VII. 

 Defendants the State Bar, SALA, Burwell and Obama’s motions to dismiss are GRANTED. 

While the court is not confident Campbell will be able to adequately plead claims against the State 

Bar or the President, Ninth Circuit law is clear that leave should be granted liberally.58 Thus leave 

to amend is GRANTED for each Defendant dismissed. As to Campbell’s motions for removal of 

his state administrative proceedings, permissive joinder and withdrawal of consent to the 

jurisdiction of the undersigned, because amendment would be futile, the court DENIES these 

requests with prejudice. 

SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 10, 2014 

 _________________________________ 

 PAUL S. GREWAL 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

 

57 See Docket No. 68 at 1. 

58 See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). 

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