Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-3_04-cv-00291/USCOURTS-ared-3_04-cv-00291-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

JONESBORO DIVISION

CORNELIUS BENNETT, ET AL.

Plaintiffs

VS. 

NUCOR CORPORATION and

NUCOR-YAMATO STEEL

COMPANY 

Defendants

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

NO. 3:04CV00291 SWW

ORDER

Six plaintiffs--Cornelius Bennett, Clifton Lee, Sr., Sylvester Rogers, Ozzie Green, Larry

McBride, and Rodney Washington--bring this employment discrimination case against Nucor

Corporation and Nucor-Yamato Steel Company (collectively “Nucor”) pursuant to Title VII of

the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 

Previously, the Court denied plaintiffs’ motion for class certification (docket entry #123). Now

before the Court is Nucor’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ individual claims

(docket entries #127, #128, #129, #130), plaintiffs’ response (docket entries #144, #145, 146,

#147, #148), and Nucor’s reply (docket entry #149). Also before the Court is Nucor’s motion to

strike plaintiffs’ declarations submitted in opposition to summary judgment (docket entries #150,

#151) and plaintiffs’ response (docket entry #154). After careful consideration, and for the

reasons that follow, Nucor’s motion for summary judgment will be granted in part and denied in

part, and the motion to strike will be denied.

I. Motion to Strike

Nucor moves to strike from the record declarations submitted by plaintiffs in resistance

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to Nucor’s motion for summary judgment. Nucor objects to the declarations on grounds that

they contain hearsay statements, contradict prior deposition testimony, and contain testimony not

based on the declarant’s personal knowledge. Further, Nucor asserts that plaintiffs’ declarations

contain new allegations that are not included in the third amended complaint. Nucor states: 

“Once the Court strikes the contradictory and inadmissible statements . . . only a shell is left. 

Defendants therefore ask this Court to strike those declarations in their entirety.” Docket entry

#150, at 3. Alternatively, Nucor requests that the Court strike only the “numerous inadmissible

and contradictory statements” contained in the declarations. Id. 

The Court has reviewed Nucor’s supporting brief and motion exhibits and finds that most

of the challenged declaration testimony has no relevance to any issue that is pivotal to the

Court’s decision regarding summary judgment. No purpose would be served by assessing the

admissibility of testimony that has no bearing on the dispositive issues before the Court. 

However, the Court will consider Nucor’s arguments in determining whether relevant

declaration testimony meets the requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)

and whether such testimony is consistent with earlier deposition testimony. With this

qualification, Nucor’s motion to strike will be denied. 

II. Motion for Summary Judgment 

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion,” and must identify “those portions of [the record] which it believes

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demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986). If the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party must submit

evidentiary materials that designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In

determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must look at the record and any

inferences to be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 

B. Discussion 

 Plaintiffs are black, current and former employees of Nucor’s steel production plant in

Blytheville, Arkansas. Each plaintiff claims that Nucor denied him promotions based on race,

and each seeks damages for failure to promote under disparate impact and disparate treatment

theories of discrimination. Additionally, each plaintiff claims that Nucor subjected him to a

racially hostile work environment and an assortment of adverse employment actions based on

race, and separate plaintiffs Rogers, Washington, and Lee claim that Nucor retaliated against

them for opposing racial discrimination. Because plaintiffs present similar evidence in support

of their disparate impact and hostile environment claims, the Court will consider those claims

together. 

Disparate Impact

“Disparate impact claims under Title VII challenge ‘employment practices that are

facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one

group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.’” Mems v. City of St. Paul,

Dept. of Fire and Safety Services, 224 F.3d 735, 740 (8th Cir. 2000)(quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. 

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Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993)). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under a

disparate impact theory, a plaintiff must show: “(1) an identifiable, facially-neutral personnel

policy or practice; (2) a disparate effect on members of a protected class; and (3) a causal

connection between the two.” Id. (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977,

994 (1988)). 

In support of their disparate impact claims, plaintiffs charge that Nucor’s overall

selection process for promotions has a disparate impact on black applicants. Nucor asserts that

plaintiffs cannot meet their prima facie burden by attacking Nucor’s overall selection process. 

Normally, a plaintiff must show that each particular challenged employment practice causes a

disparate impact, “except that if the complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the

elements of [the employer’s] decision making process are not capable of separation for analysis,

the decision making process may be analyzed as one employment practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(k)(1)(B)(I). Plaintiffs contend that the elements of Nucor’s selection process cannot be

separated for the purpose of disparate impact analysis. But the undisputed evidence shows

otherwise. Nucor’s production activities at the Blytheville plant are divided among five

departments--the melt shop, the roll mill department, quality assurance, maintenance, and

shipping--and plaintiffs claim that they applied for promotions in the various departments. 

Although Nucor maintains written general policies governing hiring decisions, production

department managers have developed their own departmental hiring procedures with discrete

components. The manager of the maintenance department has developed departmental

procedures for applicant testing and interviews, see docket entry #78, Ex. 1, ¶¶ 12-15; the

shipping department has a two-tiered interview structure between the department manager and

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supervisors; and the melt shop has several positions that require specific training and

examinations. See docket entry #78, Ex. #1, ¶14; Ex. #25, at 185. Policies and practices

regarding attendance, safety, and discipline (factors that affect hiring decisions in all

departments) also vary across production departments. See docket entry #78, Ex.##1-3, 23-24.

Under these circumstances, plaintiffs must identify the specific employment practices

that cause an alleged adverse impact. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777,

2785 (1988)(“Especially in cases where an employer combines subjective criteria with the use of

more rigid standardized rules or tests, the plaintiff is . . . responsible for isolating and identifying

the specific employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical

disparities.”)

Nucor asserts that even if plaintiffs were permitted to attack Nucor’s overall selection 

process, they have failed to show causation. To prove causation in a disparate impact case, “the

plaintiff must offer statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in

question has cause the exclusion of jobs or promotions because of their membership in a

protected group.” Id. at 2789.

Plaintiffs present expert reports by Dr. Edwin L. Bradley, a professional statistician. 

Bradley compared the racial composition of the Blytheville plant’s workforce with the racial

composition of “employment selections” to determine whether Nucor’s overall selection process

had an adverse impact on black applicants, or was otherwise related to race, during the period

from December 1, 1999 through October 2005. See docket entry #71, Ex. 12A, at 2.

Bradley reports that his statistical analysis lead him to conclude that (1) Nucor

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During the relevant time period, non-supervisory job openings in Nucor’s production

departments were posted plant-wide, and employees from all departments were eligible to bid on

open jobs. However, vacancies for supervisor positions were not posted, but were announced

during department meetings. 

2

Plaintiffs claim that Dr. Welch has admitted that Nucor’s selection criteria disfavors

black employees and has a racially disparate impact. See docket entry #71, at 3, docket entry

#147 at 139; docket entry # 147, at 13-139. However, as explained in the Court’s order denying

6

underutilized black employees in supervisory positions,1

 indicating that the process for selecting

supervisors was related to race and adversely impacts black employees, and (2) Nucor’s process

for filling non-supervisory positions in production departments is related to race and adversely

impacts black employees. See id. at 3. 

Nucor asserts, and the Court agrees, that Bradley’s statistical analysis fails to create a

genuine issue for trial with respect to plaintiffs’ disparate impact claims. Bradley failed to

identify a specific employment practice that has a disparate effect on black employees. 

Additionally, in performing his analysis, Bradley assumed that the workforce population he

considered consisted of individuals possessing minimal qualifications for promotion. Because

this is not a case in which it can be assumed that all Nucor employees are equally qualified for

promotion to all positions, Dr. Bradley’s simplistic percentage comparisons lack real meaning. 

Nucor’s expert, Dr. Finis Welch, performed a separate analysis for each department, and

he included controls for characteristics that affect selection decisions such as applicants’ 

disciplinary history, training, and work experience. Dr. Welch’s results showed no statistically

significant differences in selection rates between black and white applicants. See docket entry

#78, Ex. 4, at 11-12. 

Plaintiffs argue that the controls considered by Dr. Welch are “racially tainted” and

should not be considered.2

 In his rebuttal expert report, Dr. Bradley opines that it is

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plaintiff’s motion for class certification, the record does not support this claim. See docket entry

#123, at 16 n.5. 

7

inappropriate to adjust for factors such as training and discipline because they have an adverse

impact on black employees. See docket entry #88, at 3. But like Dr. Bradley’s bottom-line

percentage comparisons that take in Nucor’s overall selection process, his analysis of discipline

and training data ignores common non-discriminatory reasons for alleged disparities. 

In addition to statistical evidence, plaintiffs present anecdotal evidence in support of their

claims. Plaintiffs have worked exclusively in the roll mill department. In separate declarations,

each plaintiff states that the roll mill department is segregated by race in that almost all black

employees work in the roll shop and finishing areas, and almost all white employees work in the

rolling mill or mechanic crew areas. See docket entry #71, Exs. 2-7. Plaintiffs claim that the roll

shop and finishing jobs performed by black employees are “dirtier” and more laborious than the

rolling mill and mechanic crew jobs performed by white employees. Id. Plaintiffs also testify

that Nucor applies discipline, attendance, and safety polices inconsistently and uses the policies

as an excuse to deny promotions to black employees. 

Plaintiffs’ allegations that Nucor denied them opportunities for career advancement by

segregating them from white employees and by subjecting them to disparate treatment in the

areas of training and discipline are, definitively, allegations of disparate treatment, which cannot

be forced into a disparate impact model. In sum, the Court finds that plaintiffs have failed to

come forward with evidence to sustain disparate impact claims. 

Hostile Environment

To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination based on a hostile work

environment, a plaintiff must establish that (1) he is a member of a protected group, (2)

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unwelcome harassment occurred, (3) a causal nexus existed between the harassment and his

protected-group status, and (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of his

employment. See Carter v. Chrysler Corp., 173 F.3d 693, 700 (8th Cir.1999). Additionally, with

regard to claims of coworker harassment, a plaintiff must show that his employer knew or should

have known of the harassment and failed to take appropriate remedial action. See Joens v. John

Morrell & Co. 354 F.3d 938, 940 (8th Cir. 2004). Such proof is not necessary with regard to

claims that supervisors committed harassment. An employer may be vicariously for an

actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate, or successively higher,

authority over the plaintiff. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764-65(1998).

Nucor asserts that no plaintiff has established the fourth element of a prima facie case--

that he endured harassment so severe or pervasive as to affect a term, condition, or privilege of

his employment. “For harassment to affect a condition of employment the conduct must be

severe ‘as it would be viewed objectively by a reasonable person and as it was actually viewed

subjectively by the victim.’” Elmahdi v. Marriott Hotel Services, Inc., 339 F.3d 645, 652 (8th Cir.

2003)(quoting Howard v. Burns Bros., Inc., 149 F.3d 835, 840 (8th Cir.1998)). In determining

whether sufficient evidence of a hostile work environment has been presented, the totality of the

circumstances must be considered, including the frequency and severity of the discriminatory

conduct, whether such conduct was physically threatening or humiliating, as opposed to a mere

offensive utterance, and whether the conduct unreasonably interfered with the employee's work

performance. See Vajdl v. Mesabi Academy of KidsPeace, Inc., 2007 WL 1201867, *3 (8th Cir.

April 25, 2007)(citing Duncan v. General Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928, 884 (8th Cir. 2002)). 

Whether conditions in the workplace establish an actionable hostile environment is a function of

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3

Each plaintiff, with the exception of McBride, attempts to “adopt” the testimony of other

plaintiffs regarding racial harassment by stating as follows: “I have read the description of the

racially hostile work environment at Nucor set forth in the [declarations of other plaintiffs]. I

have experienced and knew about the same racially hostile incidents and environment they

describe. My own experience with such work environment has been very similar to theirs.” 

Docket entry #148, Ex. #40, ¶33; Ex. #42, ¶52; Ex. #43, ¶27; Ex. #44, ¶28; Ex. #45, ¶18. Nucor

9

both the severity and the pervasiveness of racially hostile conduct, “with a high level of severity

compensating for a low level of pervasiveness and vice versa.” Jackson v. Flint Ink North

American Corp. 370 F.3d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 2004), mod. on reh’g on other grounds, 382 F.2d

869 (8th Cir. 2004). 

Plaintiffs’ initial declarations include similar testimony that Nucor sold racially offensive

merchandise in the company store including “do-rags” and bandanas that featured the

confederate flag together with the Nucor company logo. See docket entry #71, Ex. #2, ¶18; Ex.

#3, ¶13; Ex. #4, ¶19; Ex. #5, ¶16; Ex. #6, ¶12; Ex. #7, ¶9. Additionally, each plaintiff includes

the following statement in his second declaration:

The racial hostility and harassment that I experienced, witnessed and knew about

adversely affected the performance of my job by making me self-conscious about my

race and how I was perceived, anxious and full of self doubt about my safety and

capabilities, nervous about operating machinery, upset at the lack of support I was

receiving from co-workers and supervisors, and doubtful of my ability to continue

to do my job effectively in such an intimidating environment. I took all of this worry

home with me and it adversely affected my relationship with friends and family.

This in turn made things even worse at work and adversely [affected] my

performance and willingness to continue seeking promotions and training in an

environment that made such efforts seem futile. 

Docket entry #148, Ex. #40, ¶33; Ex. #41, ¶44; Ex. #42, ¶52; Ex. #43, ¶27; Ex. #44, ¶28; Ex.

#45, ¶18. 

In addition to the foregoing testimony repeated by each plaintiff, plaintiffs’ initial

declarations include testimony regarding their separate experiences,3

 summarized below. 

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asserts that plaintiffs cannot “group together every discriminatory allegation from all six

plaintiffs in order to meet their prima facie case of hostile work environment.” Docket entry

#149, at 4. The Court agrees that plaintiffs cannot show that they were personally aware of each

incident of harassment described by every other plaintiff simply by adding a cursory statement to

their otherwise detailed and lengthy declarations.

4

In support of its motion to strike plaintiffs’ declarations, Nucor argues that Bennett’s

testimony about alleged events that he did not personally witness amounts to inadmissible

hearsay. See docket entry #151, at 10. Nucor asserts that Bennett’s “second-hand accounts”

appear in his second declaration, but the challenged testimony actually appears in Bennett’s first

declaration. More important, alleged instances of racial harassment that Bennett learned

“through the grape vine” during the time that he allegedly experienced a hostile work

environment are admissible and relevant to whether he reasonably perceived a hostile work

environment. See Carter v. Chrysler Corp., 173 F.3d 693, 701 (8th Cir.1999) (permitting a hostile

environment claimant to introduce evidence of offensive men’s room graffiti she learned about

through hearsay during her employ, even though she had never been inside the men’s room).

10

Plaintiff Bennett

• He heard the comment “I like my women like I like my coffee: black and strong”

broadcast over Nucor’s walkie-talkie radio system. 

• He heard the word “nigger” and the term “DAN” (which he states stands for “dumb-ass

nigger”) broadcast over the plant radio system. 

• He saw the words “lazy nigger” written on bathroom walls. 

• He saw confederate flag decals displayed on bathroom walls and on lockers and helmets,

and he saw a large confederate flag hanging from a crane in the shipping department. 

 

• He overheard a white leadman use the term “nigger-rigged.” 

• White employees purchased confederate flag items in the company store through payroll

deductions and wore them throughout the plant. 

• He learned that other black employees had been called “lazy-ass nigger.”4 

• He learned that someone hung a chicken by the neck in a black employee’s work area

with a note warning him to “be careful.” 

• He learned that a white employee wearing a white hood came through the roll mill

department with burning cross. 

Plaintiff Rogers

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Nucor presents Durrell Warren’s deposition testimony regarding Rogers’ claim that

Warren hung a rubber chicken with a noose in his work area. See docket entry #130, Ex. #68, at

95-99. Warren testifies that he hung the chicken with string by its foot, away from Rogers’ work

station. He states that before he hung the chicken, he explained to Rogers’ work crew that he

was using the chicken as an incentive, and he planned to give the “chicken award” to the

employee who “goofed up” that day. Warren states that he removed the chicken after Rogers

complained that it was satanic. 

11

• His coworker, James May, told him that he “needed a noose around his neck.”

• His supervisor, Durrell Warren, hung a rubber chicken with a noose five feet from his

work area.5

• His coworker, Allan Thomas, told him over the plant radio that he “could get a hanging.” 

• He saw a noose hanging from a beam in the finishing department. 

• He saw a dummy hung by the neck in the repair bed area. 

 

• He “repeatedly” saw white workers wearing bandanas, hard hats, and tee-shirts with the

confederate flag, and he was “repeatedly” exposed to racist graffiti in restrooms,

including the letters KKK. 

• He reported “many” incidents of harassment to managers and supervisors, but they did

little or nothing to stop them from recurring.

 Plaintiff Washington

• He saw the confederate flag displayed throughout the plant, and his supervisor, Doug

Stacey, wore a “do-rag” decorated with a confederate flag and Nucor’s logo. 

• He saw racial graffiti on bathroom walls. 

• He heard racial slurs, such as “nigger.” 

• His leadman, Robert Despain, repeatedly referred to him and his co-workers as “lazy-ass

niggers” and “working-class niggers.” 

• Nucor employee Doug Patterson told him that he kept black employees on the cooling

bed because they could handle the heat better than white employees. 

 

• He heard, nearly on a daily basis, racially offensive comments and jokes over the plant

radio, followed by monkey or gorilla noises.

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Lee provided the date of this occurrence, February 1992, in his deposition. See docket

entry #80, Ex. #16, 243-244, 382-383. 

12

• A co-worker, Todd Ellis, referred to Martin Luther King as “Martin Luther Coon.”

Plaintiff Lee

• He has observed white employees display the confederate flag on hard hats and other

equipment. He told his supervisor, Ed Cable, that confederate flag items were being sold

in the company store, and Cable took no action.

• His supervisor repeated a racist joke to him and another black employee. 

• He witnessed two white co-workers, wearing white hoods, march through the roll shop

with a burning cross in February 1992.6 

• He learned from his brother and co-worker, Danny Lee, that in January 2006, a picture of

a gorilla had been left in an employee break area. Additionally, his brother told him that

he found a drawing of a license plate with a picture of a monkey and his name in the

employee break area.

Plaintiff Green

• He heard white employees refer to black employees as “coon,” “big lip,” and “DAN

(dumb-ass nigger).” 

• He saw a chicken hanging from a noose in another black employee’s work station. 

• He heard racial slurs routinely broadcast over the plant radio. 

• He saw “KKK” references and swastikas on bathroom walls, and an offensive poem:

“Black is beautiful. Tan is grand. But white is the color of the big boss man.” 

• He saw confederate flags and items with confederate flag decals widely displayed in the

work area. 

Plaintiff McBride

• He has observed white employees displaying the confederate flag on hard hats and

toolboxes throughout the plant.

• He has observed racial graffiti on bathroom walls, including the letters “KKK.” 

• He learned that a swastika symbol was displayed on a computer screen in the roll mill

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The Court finds that Rogers has presented ample evidence to support his claim. Rogers’

testimony that coworkers threatened him with serious bodily harm, if not death, combined with

his testimony regarding racial graffiti, nooses, and hanging dummies clearly establishes a

submissible hostile environment claim. See Reedy v. Quebecor Printing Eagle, Inc., 333 F.3d

906, 909 (8th Cir. 2003)(finding a submissible hostile environment claim based on evidence of

physically threatening graffiti directed specifically at the plaintiff).

13

department.

• He states that racial slurs are “used without repercussions.” 

• He has observed “that black employees are openly ridiculed over the radio in a way not

done to white employees.” 

The Court finds that plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to withstand summary

judgment on their hostile environment claims.7

 Each plaintiff testifies that he encountered

racially offensive language, graffiti and the confederate flag in a work area where black

employees are segregated from white employees. The Court finds that a reasonable person in

plaintiffs’ shoes would find the environment described by each plaintiff sufficiently hostile and

abusive to affect the terms and conditions of employment. Additionally, each plaintiff testifies

that he subjectively found his work environment hostile and abusive, and the Court credits this

testimony. 

Nucor asserts that even if plaintiffs have come forward with sufficient evidence of an

actionable hostile work environment, it is entitled to summary judgment pursuant to the

affirmative defense set forth in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), and

Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). Pursuant to the Ellerth-Faragher

defense, when no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may avoid liability

by showing (1) that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any harassing

behavior, and (2) that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or

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8

Nucor submits the deposition of Bernice Gray, who has worked as a warehouse clerk at

the Blytheville plant since 1995. See docket entry #80, Ex. #36, at 8. Gray’s duties include

14

corrective opportunities provided by the employer to avoid harm or otherwise. Id.

Many of plaintiffs’ allegations involve co-worker harassment, and the Ellerth-Faragher

affirmative defense applies only to cases of vicarious liability for supervisor harassment. See

Joens v. John Morrell & Co. 354 F.3d 938, 940 (8th Cir. 2004)(explaining that the EllerthFaragher defense applies to harassment committed by supervisors, not coworkers). Although

the defense is potentially applicable to plaintiffs’ allegations involving supervisor harassment,

Nucor provides no evidence that any plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of corrective

opportunities in response to a supervisor’s harassment. 

The principle behind the Ellerth-Faragher defense--that an employer can avoid liability

in situations where it acts promptly to remedy harassment--is inherent in a plaintiff’s burden to

demonstrate (in cases involving coworker harassment) that the employer knew or should have

known of the harassment and failed to take proper remedial action. Nucor does not argue that

plaintiffs are unable to make this showing. However, Nucor does assert that it took corrective

action in the “rare instances” where plaintiffs reported discriminatory behavior. Nucor

contends that Plaintiff Rogers admitted in deposition that Nucor managers disciplined employees

who wore any article of clothing depicting the rebel flag. However, Nucor fails to acknowledge

Rogers’ complete testimony. Although Rogers acknowledged that Nucor disciplined workers for

wearing confederate flag items “since the lawsuit,” he testified: “Before the lawsuit, they didn’t

care nothing about what was going on. They sold it and everything else.” Docket entry #80, Ex.

#15, at 239. According to Nucor, the sale of confederate flag items in the company store was

“a one-time incident that was immediately corrected.”8

 However, Washington testifies that

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buying items for the company store. Id. at 20. She testifies that in the summer of 2001, a white

employee and a black employee “got into it” over a confederate sticker. Id. at 75. According to

Gray, the white employee had a confederate sticker on his hat, and the black employee asked

him to take it off because it offended him. Id. Gray states that she reported the incident to

Nucor’s general manager, Joe Stratman, and he told her “to take the confederate do-rags out of

the store if there was any in there.” Id. at 84. Gray testifies that she had no knowledge that

confederate flag “do-rags” were ever sold in the store, but she acknowledges that she pays “no

attention to what color they are or anything.” Id. at 82. Gray’s testimony lends little support to

Nucor’s position that the sale of confederate items was “a one-time thing.” 

15

Nucor sold confederate flag items in the company store from “at least the 1990's” through late

2003.” See docket entry #71, ¶18. 

In sum, the Court finds that plaintiffs have come forward with evidence of sufficiently

severe or pervasive harassment to create liability under Title VII and that Nucor has failed to

show that it is free from liability pursuant to the Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense. 

Additional Claims

Plaintiff Cornelius Bennett

Plaintiff Bennett, a current Nucor employee, has worked as a roll guide builder in

Nucor’s roll mill department since 1993. Allegations in the third amended complaint under the

heading “Named Plaintiff Cornelius Bennett” state as follows: 

Bennett has been adversely affected by the challenged systemic practices and pattern

of racial discrimination by not being able to learn about or compete for employment

opportunities in traditionally white job classifications, by being required to work in

conditions in which he and other members of his race were demeaned, [and] by being

required to work under discriminatory terms and conditions of employment . . . . 

Docket entry #18, ¶ 28. The pleading also states that Nucor transferred Bennett in March 2003

without his consent, which resulted in a $15,000 per year salary reduction, and that similarly

situated white employees were not subjected to the same treatment. Id. ¶ 29. 

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If Bennett fails to establish a sufficient evidentiary basis for any one element of his

prima facie case, summary judgment is appropriate. See Erenberg v. Methodist Hosp., 357 F.3d

787, 793 (8th Cir.2004) (finding that summary judgment was properly granted where plaintiff

“did not prove a prima facie case of age discrimination, because she failed to show that she was

qualified for the position from which she was discharged”); see also Weber v. American Exp.

Co., 994 F.2d 513, 516 (8th Cir. 1993)(“If the plaintiff fails to establish a factual dispute on each

element of the prima facie case, summary judgment is appropriate.”). 

16

The foregoing allegations indicate that Bennett brings claims for a hostile working

environment (previously addressed), failure to promote, and involuntary transfer. However, in

opposition to summary judgment, Bennett asserts that he also brings a claim for retaliation. The

Court will discuss each claim separately. 

Failure to Promote

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Bennett must show that (1) he was a

member of a protected group; (2) he was qualified and applied for a promotion to an available

position; (3) he was not selected for the position; and (4) a similarly-situated employee who was

not a member of a protected group was selected instead. Allen v. Tobacco Superstore, Inc. 475

F.3d 931, 937 (8th Cir. 2007)(citing Shannon v. Ford Motor Co., 72 F.3d 678, 682 (8th Cir.

1996)). 

Nucor asserts that Bennett is unable establish a prima facie case because he cannot

demonstrate that he applied for a promotion to an available position.9 Bennett concedes that he

never applied for a promotion, but he argues that he is exempt from the application requirement

because Nucor, he alleges, deters black employees from seeking promotions. 

In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), a class

action, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may be excused from the application process

where a pattern or practice of discrimination made submitting an application a vain and futile

Case 3:04-cv-00291-SWW Document 164 Filed 08/13/07 Page 16 of 37
10In Teamsters, the Supreme Court limited recovery to nonapplicants who demonstrated

that they would have applied for a position but for their actual knowledge of unlawful practices.

See International Broth. of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 371 (1977). In his second

declaration, Bennett testified that he would have submitted bids for promotions if he “hadn’t

seen that they were never open to black employees.” Docket entry #148, Ex. #45, ¶8. However,

in an earlier deposition, Bennett testified that he had no knowledge of specific instances where

black employees were denied promotions because of racial discrimination. See docket entry #80,

Ex. 16, at 21-28. 

11The anecdotal evidence in Teamsters brought the “cold numbers convincingly to life.”

International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). For example, a

black employee testified that when he told he manager of his interest in a line driving position,

the manager replied that there would be problems on the road with Caucasian people and that the

company was not “ready for this right now.” Id., at 338 n.19. A Spanish-surnamed employee

testified that when he applied for a line-driver job, he was told: “You’re a Chicano, and as far as

we know, there isn’t a Chicano driver in the system.” Id. 

17

act. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 368. Describing a nonapplicant’s burden as a “difficult task,”

the Court stated: “Resolution of the nonapplicant’s claim . . . requires two distinct

determinations: that he would have applied but for discrimination and that he would have been

discriminatorily rejected had he applied.”10 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 368 n.52. 

In Teamsters, plaintiffs presented overwhelming statistical evidence and over 40 specific

instances in which qualified black and Spanish-surnamed applicants sought promotions and 

either (1) had their requests ignored; (2) received false or misleading information about

requirements, opportunities, and application procedures; or (3) were not considered and hired on

the same basis as white applicants.11 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 338. No similar evidence exists in

this case. The Court finds that Bennett has failed to show that submitting a bid for promotion

would have been a vain and futile act.

Bennett argues that he is exempt from applying for supervisory positions because prior to

2005, Nucor did not post open supervisory positions. The Eighth Circuit has held that a formal

application for a job opening is not required to establish a prima facie case of discrimination if 

Case 3:04-cv-00291-SWW Document 164 Filed 08/13/07 Page 17 of 37
18

the opening was not officially posted or advertised and either (1) the plaintiff had no knowledge

of the job from other sources until it was filled or (2) the employer was aware of the plaintiff’s

interest in the job notwithstanding the plaintiff’s failure to make a formal application. See 

Gentry v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 250 F.3d 646, 652 (8th Cir.2001). Bennett presents no

evidence that either condition is met in this case. The Court finds that Bennett has failed to

make out a prima facie case of discrimination for failure to promote. 

Involuntary Transfer

Nucor’s Batesville plant includes two steel production facilities: NYS1 and NYS2. 

NYS2 is a newer facility, located approximately 150 yards from NYS1. Bennett claims that he

suffered disparate treatment when Nucor reassigned him from NYS2 to NYS1 in March 2003

and did not transfer white employees who were similarly situated to him. See docket entry #18,

¶29. 

To establish a prima facie claim of disparate treatment, Bennett must show that his

transfer amounted to adverse employment action under circumstances that give rise to an

inference of discrimination. See Jacob-Mua v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 517, 521 (8th Cir. 2002).

Nucor asserts that Bennett is unable to make this showing because he suffered no adverse

employment action, and he has no evidence that his transfer was discriminatory.

 “‘[A]n adverse employment action is exhibited by a material employment disadvantage,

such as change in salary, benefits, or responsibilities.’” Id.(quoting LaCroix v. Sears, Roebuck &

Co., 240 F.3d 688, 691 (8th Cir.2001)). It is undisputed that Bennett was classified as a roll

guide builder before and after his transfer, and Nucor has come forward with evidence that his

earnings actually increased after his transfer. See docket entry #130, Ex. 74. However, Bennett

Case 3:04-cv-00291-SWW Document 164 Filed 08/13/07 Page 18 of 37
12Mike Dugan, the manager of the roll mill department, testified that he transferred

Sanders, Bennett, and Clifton Lee from NYS2 to NYS1 in March 2003 in order to provide cross

training for NYS1 employees at NYS2. See docket entry #80, Ex. #24, at 437. Dugan stated:

“We really were concerned about getting some of our [NYS1] employees over to NYS2, and

getting them some experience in NYS2.” Id. Dugan testified that he selected Sanders, Bennett,

and Lee for transfer because they “had some experience in [NYS1] and could “step right in and

do the job.” Id. Dugan permitted Sanders to transfer back to NYS2. Dugan explained, “Well,

[Sanders] had expressed he wanted to go back to NYS2. [Lee] and [Bennett] had not. Larry was

also very good at coming in with different ideas of equipment. And we just felt he would be an

employee that would be good to go back to NYS2.” Id. at 441. 

19

testifies that he had fewer “bonus hours” at NYS1, and the work he performed there was more

strenuous than his work at NYS2. See docket entry #80, Ex. #76, at 76-77; docket entry #148,

Ex. 45, ¶13. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Bennett, the Court finds that a 

genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Bennett’s transfer amounted to an adverse

employment action.

Nucor contends that Bennett cannot show that his transfer occurred under circumstances

giving rise to an inference of discrimination because a white employee, Larry Sanders

(“Sanders”), was also transferred from NYS2 to NYS1. However, it is undisputed that Sanders

requested and was granted a transfer back to NYS2, and Bennett claims that he requested and

was denied a similar transfer.12 The Court finds that Bennett has presented sufficient evidence

to create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of whether his transfer occurred under

circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Accordingly, Bennett’s involuntary

transfer claim remains. 

Retaliation

The third amended complaint contains no allegation that Nucor retaliated against

Bennett. But Bennett now argues that his second declaration, which he filed in response to

Nucor’s motion for summary judgment, shows that Nucor retaliated against him for opposing

Case 3:04-cv-00291-SWW Document 164 Filed 08/13/07 Page 19 of 37
13See docket entry #147, at 142. In response to Nucor’s motion for summary judgment,

each plaintiff submitted a declaration stating that in early to mid 2002, he “began to participate

in meetings and other proceedings with other employees opposing racial discrimination at

Nucor’s Blytheville . . . and Charleston . . . plants.” Docket entry #148, Ex. #40, ¶11; Ex. #41,

¶30; Ex. #42, ¶32; Ex. #43, ¶4; Ex. #44, ¶3; Ex. #45, ¶4. Bennett further testifies that when he

“began” to oppose the pattern of racial discrimination and harassment at Nucor “in 2002-2003"

he was “watched and supervised more closely” and he received a “counseling” on March 13,

2003 for being five minutes late. Docket entry #148, Ex. #45, ¶ 12. Additionally, Bennett

testifies that his transfer to NYS1 in March 2003 was in retaliation for his opposition to racial

discrimination. Id., ¶13.

14“Amendments are allowed when the parties have had actual notice of an unpleaded

issue and have been given an adequate opportunity to cure any surprise resulting from the

change in the pleadings. And, when evidence relating to issues outside the pleadings is

introduced and tried without objection, the parties will be deemed to have acquiesced.” Kim v.

Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1063 (8th Cir. 1997)(citing Nielson v. Armstrong Rubber Co.,

570 F.2d 272, 275 (8th Cir.1978)). 

15Rogers claims that he applied and was rejected for the following job openings:

shipper/loader, posted February 14, 2000; strandtender, posted February 29, 2000; roll guide

builder, posted September 6, 2000; inspection bed tagger, posted September 6, 2000; reheat

furnace stoker, posted March 5, 2001; mill/crane operator, posted June 25, 2001; roll mill

inspector, posted June 27, 2001; reheat furnace stocker, posted December 28, 2001; piler

operator, posted January 17, 2001; inspection bed operator, posted May 31, 2002; repair bed

helper, posted January 7, 2003; piler operator, posted January 22, 2003; hot saw operator, posted

August 7, 2003, saw operator, posted August 7, 2003; shipping table operator, posted September

25, 2003; and piler operator, posted October 7, 2003. Docket entry #148, ¶ 6. 

20

racial discrimination.13 Bennett did not mention retaliation in the third amended complaint, and

he has not requested leave to add a retaliation claim by formal amendment.14 Accordingly, no

issues for trial exist with respect to Bennett’s unpleaded allegations regarding retaliation.

Plaintiff Sylvester Rogers

Sylvester Rogers began working at the Blytheville plant in 1999 as an inspection bed

inspector in the finishing area of the roll mill department. Rogers states that from 2000 to 2003,

he applied for several jobs in various production departments,15 and Nucor rejected his bids

because of his race. Rogers also claims that he received disparate treatment in the area of

Case 3:04-cv-00291-SWW Document 164 Filed 08/13/07 Page 20 of 37
21

training and that Nucor retaliated against him for engaging in activity protected under Title VII. 

See docket entry #18, ¶ 39-42.

Failure to Promote 

Nucor asserts that Rogers’ failure-to-promote claims must fail for failure to establish the

second element of a prima facie case: that he possessed the minimum qualifications for

promotion. At the prima facie stage, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he met the minimum,

objective qualifications for the job at issue. Turner v. Honeywell Federal Mfg. & Technologies,

LLC, 336 F.3d 716, 721 (8th Cir. 2003)(citations omitted). 

Rogers maintains that his own testimony shows in a “detailed and non-conclusory way”

that he was qualified for each position he sought. In his second declaration, Rogers repeatedly

states that his “application and experience . . . made it clear” that he satisfied the qualifications

listed on job postings for positions that he sought and that he would not have applied unless he

had satisfied the posted job qualifications. See docket entry #148, Ex. 42, ¶¶ 9, 10, 12, 14, 18,

20, 24, 27, 29, 31, 35, 37, 40. Additionally, Rogers recites qualifications that appeared on job

postings, and he states that they are the same or similar to the qualifications required to perform

the inspector position he held in the roll mill department. Id. However, Rogers does not provide

a copy of Nucor’s job postings, nor does he state that the qualifications listed in his declaration

include all qualifications that appeared on actual postings for the positions he sought. Further,

Rogers provides no specific factual evidence showing that the skills required to perform his

inspector position were similar to those required for the positions he sought. 

The Court finds Rogers’ conclusory testimony--that he possessed the qualifications for

positions he sought based on his qualifications for the job he held--insufficient to establish a

Case 3:04-cv-00291-SWW Document 164 Filed 08/13/07 Page 21 of 37
22

prima facie case. See Rose-Maston v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 133 F.3d 1104, 1109 (8th

Cir.1998)(conclusory allegations regarding qualifications for position insufficient to establish a

prima facie failure-to-promote claim); see also Mayer v. Nextel West Corp., 318 F.3d 803, 809

(8th Cir.2003)(“Evidence, not contentions, avoids summary judgment.”). 

Nucor argues that even if Rogers could establish a prima facie case of discrimination, it

had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting his bids for promotion: a poor

disciplinary record and work history. Nucor presents records from Rogers’ personnel file,

documenting nine instances in which Rogers incurred disciplinary action for conduct including

failing to inspect materials, insubordination, leaving work without permission, and threatening

other employees. See docket entry #80, Ex. 9. Nucor also presents the affidavits of each

department manager at the Blytheville plant, who testifies that he has the final word on hiring

decisions in his department, and he considers an applicant’s disciplinary and safety records in

making hiring decisions. See docket entry #80, Ex. #1, ¶15; Ex. #2, ¶ 14; Ex. #3, ¶ 26; Ex. #22,

¶ 32; Ex. #23, ¶ 29.

Rogers argues that Nucor has failed to carry its burden to articulate a nondiscriminatory

reason for rejecting his bids for promotion, and the Court agrees. To meet its burden of

production, Nucor must “clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the

reason for the plaintiff’s rejection.” Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,

254-55 (1981). Nucor presents no specific evidence showing that a decisionmaker rejected

Rogers’ bids for promotion based on his poor disciplinary record and work history, and the Court

declines to indulge in speculation. However, for reasons previously stated, the Court finds that

Rogers has failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination based on a failure to promote.

Case 3:04-cv-00291-SWW Document 164 Filed 08/13/07 Page 22 of 37
23

Failure to Train

Rogers alleges in the third amended complaint that Nucor has denied him training

opportunities available to similarly situated white employees. Although Nucor seeks summary

judgment on each claim joined in this case, it makes no mention of Rogers’ claim that he

received disparate treatment in the area of training. Accordingly, Nucor has failed to establish

its right to summary judgment on this claim, and it remains. See Heisler v. Metropolitan

Council, 339 F.3d 622, 631 (“We have repeatedly held that in the Eighth Circuit, a district court

commits reversible error when it grants summary judgment on an issue not raised or discussed

by the parties.”).

Retaliation

Rogers alleges that Nucor retaliated against him for filing a discrimination charge against

Nucor in 2003. Nucor does not address Rogers’ retaliation claim in its initial brief in support of

summary judgment. However, in its reply brief, Nucor states that Rogers cannot pursue his

retaliation claim in this case because he has filed a separate action against Nucor for retaliation. 

On June 28, 2005, Rogers initiated a separate lawsuit, Rogers v. Nucor, 4:05CV933 JLH,

in which he alleges that Nucor retaliated against him by demoting him for his participation in

this case. See 4:05CV933 JLH, docket entry #1. In this case, however, Rogers claims that

Nucor retaliated against him by subjecting him to intense scrutiny and harassment for filing a

discrimination charge in 2003. See docket entry #18, ¶41. Rogers is not precluded from

pursuing these distinct claims in separate proceedings. The Court finds that Nucor has failed to

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to Rogers’ retaliation

claim. Accordingly, the claim remains for trial.

Case 3:04-cv-00291-SWW Document 164 Filed 08/13/07 Page 23 of 37
16The Court is unable to determine from the record the date of Washington’s discharge.

24

Plaintiff Rodney Washington

Rodney Washington worked at the Blytheville plant from June 1993 until his discharge.16

 Washington brings claims for failure to promote, failure to train, and discriminatory and

retaliatory termination. See docket entry #18, ¶¶ 31-34.

Failure to Promote

In July 2002, Washington applied for a promotion to a lubricator position in the

maintenance department. Washington testifies that the job posting stated that applicants’

qualifications would be determined by written test scores, he took the required test, and the test

administrator told him that he had the “highest test scores of all the applicants.” Docket entry

#148, Ex. #40, ¶ 15. Washington states that despite his superior test scores, Nucor awarded the

job to a white applicant, Michael Smith.

Nucor argues that Washington has failed to show that he was qualified for any position to

which he sought promotion. However, Nucor does not dispute that minimum qualifications for

the lubricator position were determined by test scores and that Washington earned a higher score

than other applicants. The Court finds that Washington has offered sufficient evidence to create

a genuine issue of fact as to whether he met the minimum, objective qualifications for the

lubricator position and whether his qualifications were similar to those of Michael Smith. 

Accordingly, Washington has established a prima facie case of discrimination with respect to

Nucor’s failure to promote him to the lubricator position posted in July 2002. 

Nucor has presented evidence that it rejected Washington for the lubricator position for 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. Rick Ramsdell, the maintenance department manager,

Case 3:04-cv-00291-SWW Document 164 Filed 08/13/07 Page 24 of 37
17Ramsdell testifies that the written test administered to applicants is only the first step in

the hiring process, and that applicants who pass the test are scheduled for an interview with a

panel of maintenance department supervisor. Docket entry #80, Ex. 2, ¶¶ 13, 14. After the panel

has completed the interviews, it submits a summary of test scores and interview evaluations to

Ramsdell. Id., ¶ 14. Ramsdell then interviews the best candidates, and makes the final hiring

decision. Id. 

18See docket entry #80, Ex. #37, at 201. In addition to Ramsdell’s deposition testimony,

Nucor has produced Ramsdell’s interview notes, dated November 15, 2002, which state in part,

“wants schedule-family-has own business-would like to go to school-5 yr goal have own

business.” Docket entry #80, Ex. #21.

25

made the final decision to hire Smith.17 Ramsdell states that he personally interviewed

Washington for the lubricator position, and during the interview, Washington told him that his

goal was to own his own business in five years and leave Nucor.18 Ramsdell testifies: 

“[T]hose goals don’t align with out departmental goals . . . because there is a lot of time [and]

money invested in training an individual to move into that department . . . .” Docket entry #80,

Ex. #37, at 201-202. Ramsdell further testifies that Smith showed a great deal of interest in the

lubricator position and, unlike Washington, made an effort to become familiar with the job

through cross-training. Id. at 198-201. 

Because Nucor, through Ramsdell’s testimony, has articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for rejecting Washington’s bid, Washington must present evidence

showing that the proffered reasons are pretext for discrimination. Washington states that he has

testified “that he never said [that his five year goal was to be self-employed], [and] he made clear

in his interview that if he obtained the job . . . he would remain with Nucor permanently . . . .” 

Docket entry #146, at 44-45. The Court has searched the record and is unable to locate such

testimony. Additionally, Washington testified by deposition that he “may have” stated during

his interview with Ramsdell that his long-term goal was to run his own business. See docket

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26

entry #80, Ex. #11, at 115. 

Washington also presents the testimony of Danny Lee, one of the maintenance

supervisors who interviewed applicants for the lubricator position. Lee states that Washington

was the best candidate for the position and that Smith did not perform as well as Washington

during supervisor panel interviews. Docket entry #148, Ex. 46, ¶¶ 2-6. However, Ramsdell does

not contend that Smith out-performed Washington in his initial interview with supervisors. He

only states his determination that Washington’s goals were not aligned with Nucor’s. The Court

finds that Washington has failed to raise a genuine issue for trial as to whether Ramsdell’s stated

reasons for rejecting his bid are pretext for racial discrimination. 

In addition to the lubricator position opening in July 2002, Washington testifies that he

submitted bids and was rejected for promotion to the following non-supervisory jobs: mill

operator, posted May 29, 2001; leadman, posted February 3, 2003; rotary straightener, posted

March 18, 2003; roll turner, posted September 16, 2003; and leadman, posted September 12,

2003. Washington states that Nucor selected white applicants to fill these positions. 

Additionally, Washington testifies that he was interested in supervisory jobs which were never

posted and always awarded to white employees.

Nucor asserts that Washington has failed to present evidence that he was qualified for

any position to which he sought promotion. Washington attempts to establish his qualifications

with his own testimony that Nucor’s job postings for the jobs he sought and the jobs that he

applied for (or would have applied for) required the “same or similar knowledges (sic), skills and

abilities as those required for the jobs he performed at Nucor.” See docket entry #40, ¶¶ 6, 12,

14, 19, 21. He states, “I exhibited and satisfied the same [qualifications] in my own existing job

Case 3:04-cv-00291-SWW Document 164 Filed 08/13/07 Page 26 of 37
27

that were posted for the jobs that I applied for, and I wouldn’t have applied if I had not met the

qualifications.” Id., ¶ 14. The Court finds Washington’s conclusory testimony insufficient to

show that he possessed the minimum qualifications for the positions he sought. Accordingly, no

issues for trial exist with respect to Washington’s failure-to-promote claims.

Failure to Train

In the third amended complaint, Washington alleges that Nucor failed to provide him

“training available to similarly situated white employees.” Docket entry #18, ¶ 31. Nucor does

not address Washington’s claim regarding disparate treatment in the area of training.

Accordingly, this claim remains. 

Discriminatory Discharge

Washington claims that Nucor terminated his employment because of his race. He

testifies: “[On] September 26, 2003 . . . Doug Stacy began to boss me around and treat me like a

boy in the same way Despain had done, telling me that I would have to run the job he had been

assigned . . . because it was harder than my regular job, and he would take over my job . . . .” 

Docket entry #148, Ex. #40, ¶ 29. Washington testifies that because Stacy was his coworker,

not a supervisor, he politely refused to follow his orders. According to Washington, a supervisor

named Glen Ellis (“Ellis”) barged into his work cubicle and “started saying that Stacy was in the

right.” Washington states: 

When I told Ellis that Stacy had treated me like a boy because I was black, he

became even more upset and accusatory . . . but he never said I had done anything

wrong except for not submitting to Stacy when he told me to give him my job. Ellis’

attitude and statements were so belittling that I turned away from him and hit the

window of the door to my cubicle and fell to the floor crying in total frustration. The

whole incident seemed orchestrated to bait and entrap me. It is well known that I

objected to white co-workers, like Despain and Stacy, presuming authority over me

that they didn’t have over white employees.

Case 3:04-cv-00291-SWW Document 164 Filed 08/13/07 Page 27 of 37
28

Id. 

Nucor asserts that it discharged Washington based on workplace violence and destruction

of company property. It is undisputed that Washington hit and broke a window when Ellis

confronted him. Washington states that he did not strike Ellis, he only broke a window, and that

white employees have not been discharged when they actually hit or struck other employees. 

According to Washington, two white employees, Joe Wood and Michael Walker, “were just

suspended and told to attend anger management classes for grabbing, striking and cursing at one

another.” Docket entry #148, Ex. #40, ¶ 31. 

Because Nucor has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its adverse

employment decision, Washington bears the burden to show that the proffered reasons are

pretextual and that discrimination based on race was the real reason for his termination. 

Although instances of disparate treatment can support a claim of pretext, to be probative

evidence of pretext, the misconduct of a more leniently disciplined employee must be of

comparable seriousness. See E.E.O.C. v. Kohler Co. 335 F.3d 766, 775 -776 (8th Cir.

2003)(citations omitted). Here, Washington has failed to come forward with evidence that a

white employee committed the same or similar misconduct as he; physical altercations between

coworkers is not comparable to breaking company property in response to a supervisor’s

reprimand. The Court finds no issues for trial on Washington’s wrongful termination claim. 

Retaliatory Discharge

Washington claims that Nucor terminated his employment in retaliation for his

opposition to racial discrimination. See docket entry #18, ¶ 33. Just as Washington has failed to

show that Nucor’s articulated reason for his termination is pretext for discrimination, he has

Case 3:04-cv-00291-SWW Document 164 Filed 08/13/07 Page 28 of 37
29

failed to show that the articulated reason is pretext for retaliation. Accordingly, no issues for

trial exist on Washington’s retaliatory termination claim. See Putman v. Unity Health System 348

F.3d 732, 737 (8th Cir. 2003)(affirming dismissal of retaliatory termination claim when plaintiff

failed to show that employer’s nondiscriminatory reason for the termination was pretextual). 

Plaintiff Clifton Lee

Clifton Lee began working for Nucor in 1991 as a roll guide builder. He brings

disparate treatment claims for failure to promote, failure to train, and involuntary transfer. Lee

also claims that Nucor retaliated against him by transferring him from NYS2 to NYS1. See

docket entry #18, ¶¶ 35-37. 

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 

Nucor asserts that Lee’s claims brought under Title VII are time-barred because he failed

to file suit within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter. In most cases, to exhaust Title VII's

administrative remedies, an individual must timely file a charge of discrimination and receive a

right-to-sue notice from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). See 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (c), (e). Once an employee receives a right-to-sue letter, he has 90 days in

which to file suit, and the failure to do so bars a claim based upon acts asserted in the underlying

discrimination charge. See Spears v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections and Human Resources, 210

F.3d 850, 852 (8th Cir., 2000). 

Nucor provides a copy of a right-to-sue letter issued to Lee, dated July 1, 2003. Plaintiffs

filed this suit on December 8, 2003, and filed an amended complaint on March 22, 2004, adding

plaintiffs Lee, Green, and McBride. Nucor argues that because Lee failed to join this proceeding

within 90 days of receiving his right-to-sue letter issued on July 1, 2003, his claims are timeCase 3:04-cv-00291-SWW Document 164 Filed 08/13/07 Page 29 of 37
19“If the EEOC gives the individual a right-to-sue letter following the EEOC

investigation, the charge limits the scope of the subsequent civil action because ‘the plaintiff

may [only] seek relief for any discrimination that grows out of or is like or reasonably related to

the substance of the allegations in the administrative charge.’” Cottrill v. MFA, Inc., 443 F.3d

629, 634 (8th Cir.2006)(citation omitted). 

20Nucor does not argue that Lee is unable to show that he was qualified for a promotion. 

30

barred. Lee responds that he received a separate right-to-sue letter on April 28, 2004 and he

timely joined the lawsuit within 90 days. 

The Court has no information regarding the content of Lee’s administrative charges

associated with Lee’s July 1, 2003 and April 28, 2004 right-to-sue letters and, therefore, cannot

determine whether Lee brought suit within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter related to a

discrimination charge that encompasses the claims he pursues in this lawsuit.19 Accordingly,

issues of fact preclude summary judgment on the basis that Lee’s Title VII claims are timebarred. 

Failure to Promote

 Lee alleges that he submitted bids for a rotary straightener position and a cold saw

operator position in March 2003, and both jobs were awarded to white employees. Nucor

contends that Lee’s failure-to-promote claims must fail for a single reason: Nucor never rejected

his bids for a promotion.20 Nucor presents the affidavit of Keith Shelton, who worked for Nucor

as a lead supervisor in the roll mill department between 2000 and 2005. Shelton testifies that

Lee bid on the cold saw operator position in 2003, but he withdrew his bid before a selection

decision was made. See docket entry #130, Ex. #83. 

Nucor claims that Lee also withdrew his bid for the rotary straightener position. By

affidavit, roll mill supervisor Glenn Ellis testifies that he interviewed Lee for the rotary

Case 3:04-cv-00291-SWW Document 164 Filed 08/13/07 Page 30 of 37
31

straightener position in 2003, and Lee “declined to complete the written exam required for the

position.” Docket entry #84, Ex. #84. Ellis states, “After Mr. Lee elected not to take the written

exam, he verbally withdrew himself from consideration for the position.” Id. 

In his second declaration, Lee denies that he withdrew his bids for the cold saw operator

and rotary straightener positions and states that he “went through the entire selection process.” 

Docket entry #148, ¶¶ 7, 10. The Court finds that Lee has presented admissible evidence to

rebut testimony that he withdrew his bids for promotion. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (noting that a court is precluded from making credibility

determinations and weighing evidence when deciding motions for summary judgment). 

Accordingly, the Court finds genuine issues for trial with respect to Lee’s claims that Nucor

rejected his bids for a rotary straighter and cold saw operator.

Failure to Train

Lee alleges that Nucor failed to provide him training available to similarly-situated white

employees. Nucor does not address this claim, and it remains for trial.

Involuntary Transfer to NYS 1

Lee alleges that in March 2003 Nucor transferred him from a second crew leader position

in NYS2 to a roll shop employee position in NYS1. Docket entry #18, ¶ 37. Lee alleges that the

transfer amounted to a demotion and that less senior white employees were not transferred. Id. 

Nucor asserts that Lee cannot show that his transfer amounted to an adverse employment

action because he earned more money after his transfer, and he retained the same job duties. 

However, like Bennett, Lee testifies that he earned fewer bonus hours at NYS1, and his work at

NYS1 was more physically demanding than work he performed at NYS2. He states that the

Case 3:04-cv-00291-SWW Document 164 Filed 08/13/07 Page 31 of 37
21In his second declaration, Green states that he left Nucor in March 2004 when “it

became obvious” that his race and participation in EEOC proceedings left him with no chance of

promotion. Docket entry #148, Ex. #43, ¶ 16.

32

strenuous labor exacerbated a pre-existing medical condition to the point that he was forced take

long-term disability. The Court finds that genuine issues of fact exist as to whether Lee’s

transfer amounted to adverse employment action.

Nucor argues that Lee is unable to show that his transfer occurred under circumstances

that give rise to an inference of discrimination because it also transferred Larry Sanders, a white

employee, from NYS2 to NYS1. For reasons previously stated in connection with Bennett’s

involuntary transfer claim, the Court finds that Lee has come forward with evidence to support a

finding that his transfer occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of

discrimination. Accordingly, Lee’s involuntary transfer claim remains. 

Retaliation

Lee claims that Nucor transferred him to NYS1 in retaliation for participating in activity

protected under Title VII. Nucor does not address this claim, and it remains for trial.

Plaintiff Ozzie Green

Ozzie Green worked at the Blytheville plant from September 1992 until March 2004.21

Green brings disparate treatment claims for failure to promote and failure to train. See docket

entry #18, ¶¶43-44. Although Green does not allege in the third amended complaint that Nucor

retaliated against him for opposing racial discrimination, he makes such allegations in his second

declaration. See docket entry #148, Ex. 41, ¶¶ 30-32. 

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Nucor moves for dismissal of Green’s and McBride’s Title VII claims on the ground that

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these plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Title VII requires claimants to

timely file a discrimination charge with the EEOC before bringing suit in federal court, see

Cottrill v. MFA, Inc., 443 F.3d 629, 634 (8th Cir.2006), and it is undisputed that neither Green

nor McBride filed a discrimination charge. However, Green and McBride assert that they “have

the right to rely on the other EEOC charges filed against Nucor by other plaintiffs alleging

similar racial discrimination on behalf of themselves and other black employees like Rogers,

Washington, Bennett, and the original plaintiffs who filed this case from South Carolina.” 

Docket entry #147, at 139. 

Under the single filing rule, “once a single plaintiff has filed an EEOC charge, other nonfiling plaintiffs may join in the action if they allege facts showing that they were similarly

situated and that their claims arose out of similar discriminatory treatment.” See Winbush v.

State of Iowa By Glenwood State Hosp., 66 F.3d 1471, 1478 (8th Cir. 1995)(citation omitted). 

When these requisite conditions exist, no conciliatory purpose would be served by requiring

separate administrative charges. See id. 

Nucor argues that Green and McBride do not have the benefit of the single filing rule

because the Court denied class certification in this case. However, class certification is not a

prerequisite to application of the single filing rule. The failure to exhaust administrative

remedies is an affirmative defense that Nucor must prove, see Miles v. Bellfontaine Habilitation

Center, 481 F.3d 1106, 1107 (8th Cir. 2007), and Nucor has failed to establish that Green and

McBride are not entitled to application of the single filing rule. Furthermore, in addition to their

claims under Title VII, Green and McBride seek relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which does not

require exhaustion of administrative remedies. 

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Failure to Promote

Green claims that he applied for and was denied a promotion to two inspection bed

operator positions posted on August 22, 2001, a leadman position posted on January 22, 2003,

and a roll guide builder position posted on December 11, 2003. He claims that he was qualified

for promotion to these positions and that Nucor rejected his applications in favor of white

applicants. Green also claims that he was interested in and qualified for promotion to

supervisory jobs that were not posted and were awarded to white employees. 

Nucor asserts that Green’s failure-to-promote claims must be dismissed because he has

failed to come forward with evidence showing that he possessed the minimum qualifications for

any job to which he sought promotion. Green contends that his second declaration submitted in

opposition to summary judgment states his qualifications for the jobs in great detail “based on

each discrete knowledge, skill, or ability that Nucor listed on the job postings for such jobs.” 

Docket entry #146, at 56. 

The Court has reviewed Green’s second declaration and finds that his testimony fails to

establish his qualification for any job to which he sought promotion, or any supervisory position

that he claims to have had an interest. In his declaration, Green states his opinion that his

“application and experience” made it clear that he satisfied the qualifications listed on Nucor’s

job postings. He declares that the jobs he performed at Nucor and elsewhere required the same

skills and abilities as those required for the jobs to which he sought promotion, but he provides

no specific factual evidence to support this assertion. 

Retaliation

Green makes no allegations regarding retaliation in the third amended complaint. 

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22McBride states, correctly, that Nucor’s initial brief in support of summary judgment

makes specific reference to only one of his bids for promotion–his bid for a cold saw operator

position. However, Nucor provided sufficient notice that it seeks summary judgment on each of

McBride’s failure-to-promote claims on the ground that he failed to establish his qualifications

for promotion to any position. Nucor argues that McBride “has failed to identify any evidence to

support a prima facie case of discrimination, [and] the Court should grant summary judgment on

all his claims.” Docket entry #129, at 43. Nucor also argues that conclusory assertions are

insufficient to establish McBride’s qualifications for a particular position. Id. Furthermore,

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However, he argues that his second declaration, submitted in response to Nucor’s motion for

summary judgment, shows that Nucor retaliated against him for opposing racial discrimination. 

Green failed to plead a retaliation claim, and he has not requested leave to add such a claim by

formal amendment. Accordingly, no issues for trial exist with respect to Green’s unpleaded

retaliation allegations.

Failure to Train

Green alleges in the third amended complaint that Nucor discriminated against him by

denying him training available to similarly situated white employees. See docket entry #18, ¶

43. Nucor does not address this claim, and it remains for trial. 

Plaintiff Larry McBride

Larry McBride, a current Nucor employee, brings disparate treatment claims for failure

to promote and failure to train. See docket entry #18, ¶¶ 46-48. Although McBride does not

allege in the third amended complaint that Nucor retaliated against him for opposing racial

discrimination, he makes such allegations in his second declaration. See docket entry #148, Ex.

41, ¶¶ 30-32. 

Failure to Promote

Nucor moves for summary judgment on McBride’s failure-to-promote claims on the

ground that he has failed to establish his qualifications for a particular position.22 McBride

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McBride has addressed his qualifications for each position to which he sought a promotion.

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attempts to make this showing in the same manner as his co-plaintiffs, by offering self-serving

testimony that he possessed the qualifications for promotion to the positions he sought. The

Court finds that McBride’s conclusory testimony fails to show that he possessed the minimum

objective qualifications required for the positions to which he sought promotion. 

Failure to Train

McBride claims that Nucor has subjected him to disparate treatment in the area of crosstraining. Specifically, he alleges that in order to receive cross training for another position, he is

required to train on his days off, but he has observed white employees training during normal

working hours. See docket entry #18, ¶ 46. Nucor asserts that McBride has failed to present 

evidence that he received disparate treatment in the area of cross-training. 

Nucor’s written policy for compensated training states that an employee’s department

manager must approve all compensated training in advance, and all compensated training should

be scheduled during the employee’s own time whenever possible. Docket entry #71, Ex. 24. 

The policy for cross training further states:

Consideration will be given to individuals who have a positive work record,

including but not limited to the following items: current job performance, work

experience, prior training, and attendance and safety record. Consideration will also

be given to your potential

Docket entry #71, Ex. 24. 

In order to prove intentional discrimination based on disparate treatment, McBride must

show that white employees who received favorable treatment were similarly situated to him. See

Philip v. Ford Motor Co. 413 F.3d 766, 768 (8th Cir. 2005)(concluding that plaintiff failed to 

establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination because he did not prove that employees

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similarly situated to him were treated differently). Even assuming that Nucor has permitted

white employees to receive cross-training during their regular shifts and denied McBride the

same opportunity, McBride presents no evidence that he and white employees who received

cross training during their regular shifts were similarly situated in terms of work records and

other considerations that affect whether approval for cross training is granted. Accordingly, the

Court agrees that no genuine issues for trial exist on this claim.

Retaliation

Like Plaintiffs Bennett and Green, McBride failed to assert a retaliation claim in the

complaint, but he presents a declaration in response to Nucor’s summary judgment motion

alleging that Nucor retaliated against him for opposing racial discrimination. McBride has no

claim for relief based on unpleaded allegations. 

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated, Nucor’s motion to strike (docket entry #150) is DENIED, and

Nucor’s motion for summary judgment (docket entry #127) is GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART as stated in this order. The following claims remain for trial: (1) Plaintiffs’ 

hostile environment claims, (2) Plaintiff Bennett’s involuntary transfer claim, (3) Plaintiff

Rogers’ failure-to-train and retaliation claims, (4) Plaintiff Washington’s failure-to-train claim,

(5) Plaintiff Lee’s failure-to-promote, failure-to-train, involuntary transfer, and retaliation

claims, and (6) Plaintiff Green’s failure-to-train claim. A trial date will be set by separate order.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 13TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2007.

/s/Susan Webber Wright

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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