Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-1_20-cv-01148/USCOURTS-cand-1_20-cv-01148-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EUREKA DIVISION

MARIO D. GARDNER,

Plaintiff,

v.

ALEX REILLE, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 20-cv-01148-RMI 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He 

has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and he has consented to the jurisdiction of a 

Magistrate Judge.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims 

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se

pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 

Cir. 1990).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement 

need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it 

rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). Although in order to state a 

claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide 

the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 

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formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do . . . . Factual allegations must 

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. The United States Supreme Court has 

recently explained the “plausible on its face” standard of Twombly: “While legal conclusions can 

provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there 

are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine 

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 

(2009). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) 

that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the 

alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 

487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

Legal Claims 

Plaintiff alleges that he was sexually assaulted, sexually harassed, and physically assaulted 

by several correctional officers.

The treatment a convicted prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is 

confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 

31 (1993). “After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . constitutes 

cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 

312, 319 (1986) (ellipsis in original) (internal quotation and citation omitted). When prison 

officials stand accused of using excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the core 

judicial inquiry is whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore 

discipline, or to maliciously and sadistically cause harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7

(1992); Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21.

Claims arising from sexual assault are distinct from other Eighth Amendment excessive 

force claims. Bearchild v. Cobban, 947 F.3d 1130, 1144 (9th Cir. 2020). “[S]exual assault serves 

no valid penological purpose,” and thus, when an inmate proves that a prison guard committed a 

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sexual assault, there is a presumption that the guard acted maliciously and sadistically for the very 

purpose of causing harm, satisfying the subjective prong of an Eighth Amendment claim. Id.; see 

Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1049 (9th Cir. 2012) (malicious and sadistic intent may be 

presumed because there is no legitimate penological purpose for sexual contact between prisoner 

and guard). “[A]n inmate need not prove that an injury resulted from sexual assault” because “any 

sexual assault is objectively ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind’ and therefore not de 

minimis.” Bearchild, 947 F.3d at 1144 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10); see Wood, 692 F.3d at 

1050-51 (prisoner-plaintiff need not produce evidence of specific psychological or physical harm 

from non-consensual sexual contact). 

“[A] prisoner presents a viable Eighth Amendment claim where he or she proves that a 

prison staff member, acting under color of law and without legitimate penological justification, 

touched the prisoner in a sexual manner or otherwise engaged in sexual conduct for the staff 

member’s own sexual gratification, or for the purpose of humiliating, degrading, or demeaning the 

prisoner.” Bearchild, 947 F.3d at 1144. “[A]ll of the elements of a Section 1983 sexual assault 

claim are established if a prisoner proves that a sexual assault occurred.” Id. at 1145.

There are occasions when legitimate penological concerns require invasive searches, and 

the courts owe prison staff deference because of prisons’ “unique security concerns.” Id. Thus, 

when the assault begins as a legitimate, albeit invasive, penological procedure, the prisoner must 

show that the official’s “conduct exceeded the scope of what was required to satisfy whatever 

institutional concern justified the initiation of the procedure.” Id.

Allegations of verbal harassment and abuse fail to state a claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. See Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 738 (9th Cir. 1997) overruled in part on other 

grounds by Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008); see, e.g., Keenan v. Hall, 83 

F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996), amended 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998) (disrespectful and 

assaultive comments by prison guard not enough to implicate 8th Amendment). Mere verbal 

sexual harassment does not necessarily amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. Austin v. 

Williams, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding summary judgment dismissal of 8th 

Amendment claim where prison guard exposed himself to prisoner in elevated, glass-enclosed 

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control booth for no more than 30-40 seconds). A prisoner therefore must establish that the alleged 

sexual harassment was egregious, pervasive and/or widespread in order to state a claim under the 

Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1525-31 (9th Cir. 1993) (prison 

policy requiring male guards to conduct body searches on female prisoners); Watson v. Jones, 980 

F.2d 1165, 1165-66 (8th Cir. 1992) (correctional officer sexually harassed two inmates on almost 

daily basis for two months by conducting deliberate examination of genitalia and anus).

Plaintiff states that Defendant Reille was performing a clothed body search of Plaintiff and 

inappropriately touched Plaintiff’s buttocks and anal area. Plaintiff was then escorted to a different 

area to receive an X-Ray body scan. Plaintiff had to strip for the X-ray and alleges that Reille 

ogled his body and looked at him with lust in his eyes. Then Reille and Defendants Maldonado 

and Alter made sexual and lewd comments towards Plaintiff while they searched his clothing. 

When Plaintiff was getting dressed, he made a comment to Defendants and then Maldonado 

punched Plaintiff in the stomach, Alter punched plaintiff in the face and upper torso, Reille pushed 

plaintiff to the ground, and then Plaintiff felt multiple punches and hits.

Thereafter, Plaintiff requested to see a doctor, but Defendant Shrag ordered Plaintiff to go 

through the X-Ray machine which was operated by Defendant Maylin. Later, Plaintiff filed inmate 

appeals regarding the assault. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Powers wrote a false incident 

report to justify placing him in Administrative Segregation. Plaintiff states that Defendants 

Powers, Shrag, and Maylin were not present during the assault.

As currently pled, Plaintiff states a claim of excessive force against Defendants Reille, 

Maldonado and Alter. However, Plaintiff’s other allegations fail to state a claim, and thus, the 

complaint is dismissed with leave to amend to provide more information. Plaintiff must provide 

more information regarding the alleged sexual assault with respect to the legal standards set forth 

above. Defendants’ mere verbal harassment fails to state a claim as currently pled. With respect to 

Defendants Shrag, Powers, and Maylin, Plaintiff must further describe their actions and how they 

violated his constitutional rights. Failure to follow prison regulations or procedures fails to state a 

federal claim. Simply that one of these defendants is a supervisor also fails to state a claim. 

Plaintiff must provide more information to proceed against these defendants. 

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CONCLUSION

The complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend in accordance with the standards set 

forth above. The amended complaint must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the date this 

order is filed and must include the caption and civil case number used in this order and the words 

AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an amended complaint completely replaces 

the original complaint, Plaintiff must include in it all the claims he wishes to present. See Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). He may not incorporate material from the original 

complaint by reference. Failure to amend within the designated time will result in the dismissal of 

this case. In an amended complaint, Plaintiff must still include the allegations of excessive force 

that the court has found cognizable. 

Additionally, it is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Therefore, Plaintiff must 

keep the court informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed 

“Notice of Change of Address,” and must comply with the court's orders in a timely fashion. 

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 30, 2020

ROBERT M. ILLMAN

United States Magistrate Judge

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