Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_08-cv-00648/USCOURTS-azd-4_08-cv-00648-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1346 Wrongful Death

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Renato Ariza Dominguez and Maria Clara

Leonor Rivera Cordero, as surviving parents of

decedent, Francisco Javier Dominguez Rivera,

and as successors in interest,

Plaintiffs,

v.

Nicholas William Corbett,

Defendant. 

Renato Ariza Dominguez, individually as the

surviving father of Francisco Javier

Dominguez, and as Successor-in-Interest to the

Estate of Francisco Javier Dominguez Rivera,

Maria Clara Leonor Rivera Cordero,

individually as the surviving Mother of

Francisco Javier Dominguez, and as Successorin-Interest to the Estate of Francisco Javier

Dominguez Rivera,

Plaintiffs,

v.

The United States of America; Nicholas

William Corbett; United States Border Patrol

Agents 1-100; Unknown Named Supervisory

Agents 1-100; U.S. Department of Homeland

Security; U.S. Customs and Border Protection;

United States Border Patrol; U.S. Immigration

and Customs Enforcement Agency; United

States Department of Justice,

Defendants. ______________________________________

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CV 08-648 TUC DCB (BPV)

(Lead)

CIV 09-474 TUC DCB (BPV)

(Consolidated)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

Case 4:08-cv-00648-DCB-BPV Document 36 Filed 08/05/10 Page 1 of 20
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1 Bivens v. Six Unknown named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,

403 U.S. 388 (1971)

2

Pending before the Court is Defendant United States’ Motion to Dismiss and

Motion to Strike Portions of the First Amended Complaint (Doc. 23). Defendant Corbett

joins in both motions. (Doc. 24.) 

The case has been referred to Magistrate Judge Velasco for all pretrial matters

pursuant to Local Civil Rule 72.2. Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for the

District of Arizona.

A hearing on the motions was held on Wednesday, July 28, 2010. 

For reasons which follow, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District

Court GRANT Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Portions of the First Amended Complaint

with leave to amend in part and without leave to amend in part, DENY AS MOOT with

leave to re-urge Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of the First Amended Complaint. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 10, 2008, Plaintiffs filed a claim against Defendant Nicholas Corbett

alleging violations of the United States Constitution and civil rights violations: CV 08-

648 TUD DCB. (“Bivens1

 Complaint”) On August 24, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a federal tort

claim against Defendant Corbett and the United States Government: CV 09-474 TUC

BPV. (“FTCA Complaint”) Both cases involve the use of deadly force against decedent

Francisco Javier Dominguez Rivera (“Dominguez”) by Defendant Corbett on January 12,

2007, when Dominguez was apprehended after illegally crossing the Mexico-United

States border. On September 11, 2009, the District Court consolidated the two suits. 

(Doc. 18.)

Following Defendant United States’ filing of a motion to dismiss and strike

portions of the first complaints, Plaintiffs filed amended complaints in both the Bivens

and federal tort claims action. (Doc. 21 (“Amended Bivens Complaint”) and 22

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(“Amended FTCA Complaint”).) Thereafter, Defendant United States filed a motion to

dismiss and to strike portions of the first amended complaints. (Doc. 23.) Defendant

Nicholas Corbett filed a notice of joinder in the motion to dismiss and motion to strike. 

(Doc. 24.) A response (Doc. 25) and reply (Doc. 26) were filed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Defendants argue that the second claim of the Amended FTCA Complaint, a

negligence claim, should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) Fed.R.Civ.P., because it is conclusory, and devoid of well pled factual

allegations that would support a plausible claim for negligence. 

Defendants argue that the third claim of the Amended FTCA Complaint, for

negligent hiring, retention and supervision, is effectually an untimely Bivens supervision

claim, and should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and for failure to

state a claim, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) Fed.R.Civ.P. 

Defendants argue that the second claim of the Amended Bivens Complaint for

supervisory responsibility should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

because it appears to be brought against potential supervisors in their official capacity and

the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity for constitutional tort claims. 

2. Plaintiffs’ Position

Plaintiffs oppose Defendants’ motion to dismiss, arguing that second claim of the

Amended Complaint, the negligence claim, should not be dismissed because it is pled in

the alternative, and Plaintiffs may allege more than one theory as to how the Defendant is

liable for Plaintiffs’ injuries. 

Defendants argue that the third claim of the Amended FTCA Complaint should not

be dismissed because it raises a claim of actual misconduct, by specific individuals whose

identity is unknown at this time. 

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Defendants argue that the second claim of the Amended Bivens Complaint for

should not be dismissed because Plaintiffs do not contend that the United States is liable

because it possesses certain policies, rather, Plaintiffs contend that unknown individuals

employed by the United States are liable for their own acts that violate decedent and

Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, a proper claim under Bivens. 

B. Discussion

1. Governing Standards

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissal is

appropriate when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(1). When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the district

court may review any evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual

disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction. McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d

558, 560 (9th Cir.1988); See, e.g., Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735, n.4 (1947) (“when a

question of the District Court's jurisdiction is raised ... the court may inquire by affidavits

or otherwise, into the facts as they exist.”). 

“Federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only that power

that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress

pursuant thereto.” Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986)

(citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137, 173-180, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)). “It is to

be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of

establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v.

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). 

As a sovereign, the United States “is immune from suit unless it has expressly

waived such immunity and consented to be sued.” Dunn & Black, P.S. v. United States,

492 F.3d 1084, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 2007)(quoting Gilbert v. DaGrossa, 756 F.2d 1455,

1458 (9th Cir.1985)) A waiver of sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed,

and “[w]here a suit has not been consented to by the United States, dismissal of the action

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is required .... [because] the existence of such consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.”

Id. 492 F.3d at 1088 (quoting Gilbert, supra). “The Supreme Court has ‘frequently held

... that a waiver of sovereign immunity is to be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in

favor of the sovereign.’” Id., 492 F.3d at 1088 (quoting Dep't of the Army v. Blue Fox,

Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 261 (1999)). An action must be dismissed unless plaintiff satisfies the

burden of establishing that its action falls within an unequivocally expressed waiver of

sovereign immunity by Congress. Id. (citing Cunningham v. United States, 786 F.2d

1445, 1446 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

In addition to these jurisdictional issues, a case may be dismissed if it fails to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to

dismiss, the non-conclusory “factual content,” and reasonable inferences from that

content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief. Moss v.

U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct.

1937, 1949 (2009)). The plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that

a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely

consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and

plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. (quoting Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.544, 555 (2007)) (internal citations omitted). When analyzing

a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “[a]ll allegations of material

fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” 

Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1996)(citing Everest & Jennings v.

American Motorists Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 226, 228 (9th Cir. 1994)). In addition, the Court

must assume that all general allegations “embrace whatever specific facts might be

necessary to support them.” Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 521 (9th

Cir. 1994). Although “a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations,”

Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008), the Court will

not assume that the plaintiff can prove facts different from those alleged in the complaint,

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see Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.

519, 526 (1983); Jack Russell Terrier Network of N. Cal. v. Am. Kennel Club, Inc., 407

F.3d 1027, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005). Similarly, legal conclusions couched as factual

allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness, and “conclusory allegations of

law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto

v. F.D.I.C., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). 

C. Second Claim of the Amended FTCA Complaint

1. Factual Allegations

The Second Claim of the Amended FTCA Complaint alleges that Defendant

Corbett “negligently or otherwise wrongfully breached his duty of due care when he

placed himself in a position such as to use excessive deadly force and discharge a firearm

at [Dominguez], resulting in [Dominguez’s] death.” (Doc. 21, ¶ 42.) The complaint

further alleges that Corbett “should have maintained appropriate precautions such as to

not discharge his firearm and cause the death of decedent and Corbett breached these

duties when he negligently or otherwise used excessive deadly force and wrongfully shot

[Dominguez] causing [Dominguez’s] untimely death.” (Id., ¶ 43.) Plaintiffs allege in the

factual allegations supporting this claim that Dominguez had “assumed a kneeling or

prone position” and was “attempting to surrender by kneeling down to the ground” when

Corbett “yelled and/or hit [Dominguez] in the head while approaching [Dominguez] at

close range” and “then shot and killed Francisco (Decedent), execution style, within a

firing range of approximately 3 to 12 inches.” (Id., ¶ 24-25.) The complaint also alleges

that Corbett’s contention that he shot in self defense is “meritless” as evidenced by

witness testimony and existing physical evidence.” (Id., ¶ 28.) 

2. Analysis

Plaintiffs oppose the motion to dismiss, arguing first, as to all arguments raised by

Defendants in support of their motion to dismiss that, having filed an amended complaint

specifically to remedy issues raised by Defendants in the first motion to dismiss,

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Defendants should be estopped from arguing issues that it had the opportunity to move to

strike or dismiss in the first motion to dismiss, but did not do so. (Doc. 25, at 7.) 

Plaintiffs’ failure to cite any authority in support of this argument makes their argument

unpersuasive. Additionally, “the objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction ... may be raised by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at any stage in

the litigation, even after trial and the entry of judgment” and a Rule 12(b)(6) objection

“endures up to, but not beyond trial on the merits.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500,

507 (2006); see also United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002)(“subject-matter

jurisdiction, because it involves a court’s power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or

waived”). Finally, Rule 12(h) states that “a party waives any defense listed in Rule

12(b)(2)-(5) by ... omitting it from a motion in the circumstances described in Rule

12(g)(2).” Notably, however, Rule 12(b)(1) (lack of subject-matter jurisdiction) and

Rule 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted) are omitted from

the waiver provision. Accordingly, Defendants are not estopped from arguing their

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). 

Defendants argue that the second claim of the Amended FTCA Complaint, a

negligence claim, should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) Fed.R.Civ.P., because it is conclusory and devoid of well pled factual allegations

that would support a plausible claim for negligence. (Doc. 23, at 5.)

Plaintiffs argue that the negligence claim is pled in the alternative, and that

Plaintiffs are allowed to allege more than one theory as to how the Defendants are liable

for Plaintiffs’ injuries. Respondents correctly concede that a plaintiff is generally entitled

to plead alternative or multiple theories of recovery on the basis of the same conduct on

the part of the defendant, (Doc. 26, at 3); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d)(2) (“A party may set out

[two] or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in a

single count or defense or in separate ones.”), but reassert that Plaintiffs have not

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2 Because this is an FTCA claim, Plaintiffs are not entitled to a jury on this

factual issue. The essence of the Plaintiffs’ argument is essentially the

same, however, in that the fact-finder, in this case the Court, could make

these findings. 

8

addressed their contention that they have failed to meet the basic pleading requirements,

offering no facts which could support a negligence cause of action. 

Plaintiffs argue that under the pleading standard established in Conley v. Gibson,

355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), the complaint is sufficient if the facts alleged support any

valid claim; i.e., “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of

facts in support of his claim which could entitle him to relief.” Conley, however, was

expressly overruled by the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 554-563 (2007). 

Plaintiffs point out that the theory pled in the complaint is that (1) Corbett owed

Plaintiffs and Dominguez a duty not to negligently cause his firearm to go off, shooting

Dominguez, and killing him; (2) that Corbett breached that duty by negligently firing his

gun at Dominguez; and (3) that his breach was the legal cause of Dominguez’s death and

Plaintiffs’ injuries. (Doc. 25, at 11) Plaintiffs further argue that the “jury may believe that

Corbett was mistaken in his belief about the situation he confronted or that the gun ‘just

went off’ or that he should have waited to see better before shooting or many other

possibilities that constitute negligence.”2

 (Id.) 

A complaint is to contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Rule 8(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. Nonetheless, a complaint must

set forth a set of facts that serves to put defendants on notice as to the nature and basis of

the claim(s). The United States Supreme Court has determined that, in order to survive a

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its facts.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544 (2007). While a complaint need not plead “detailed factual allegations,” the factual

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allegations it does include “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level.” Id. at 1964-65. Indeed, Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) requires a showing that a plaintiff is

entitled to relief “rather than a blanket assertion” of entitlement to relief. Id. at 1965 n. 3.

The complaint “must contain something more ... than ... a statement of facts that merely

creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right to action.” Id. at 1965. The Court also

considers that the Supreme Court has cited Twombly for the traditional proposition that

“[s]pecific facts are not necessary [for a pleading that satisfies Rule 8(a)(2) ]; the

statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds

upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardue, 551 U.S. 89 (2007). More recently, however,

the Supreme Court held that, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must

contain “sufficient factual matter” to state a claim to relief, plausible on its face. Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id., citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

Plaintiffs allege that Corbett should have maintained appropriate precautions such

as to not discharge his firearm, and breached these duties when he negligently or

otherwise used excessive deadly force and wrongfully shot Dominguez. While this is

sufficient to establish what the claim is, it does not provide fair notice of “the grounds

upon which it rests.” Id. The Court is not required to accept as true legal conclusions,

and, thus, a threadbare recital of the element of a cause of action, is insufficient to survive

a motion to dismiss. See Id. The Magistrate Judge finds that the facts alleged by Plaintiff

do not permit the court to “infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” and thus,

the Amended FTCA complaint is lacking in sufficient factual matter to state a claim of

negligence. The Magistrate Judge recommends granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss

as to the second claim of the Amended FTCA Complaint. 

 “Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not appropriate unless it

is clear . . . that the complaint could not be saved by amendment.” Eminence Capital,

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LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). Although dismissal for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction is generally without prejudice, if there is no way a jurisdiction

defect can be cured, dismissal with prejudice is proper, as, for example, when lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction is based on a defendant’s sovereign immunity. See Frigard v.

United States, 862 F.2d 201, 204 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff has failed to show that this

Court has subject matter jurisdiction over any of his claims. 

Plaintiffs claim of negligence in the second claim of the Amended FTCA

complaint could be saved by amendment if Plaintiffs plead sufficient factual matter to

state a claim of negligence. The Magistrate Judge therefore recommends that the District

Court dismiss the second claim in the Amended FTCA Complaint without prejudice. 

D. Third Claim of the Amended FTCA Complaint

1. Factual Allegations

The Third Claim of the Amended FTCA Complaint alleges that Defendant United

States’ employees and/or agencies, and others, had a duty to use appropriate procedures

in the hiring, retention and supervision of Border Patrol agents, including Defendant

Corbett. (Doc. 21 ¶ 47.) Plaintiffs allege that these duties included “making sure that a

Border Patrol Agent who was hired was sufficiently qualified, did not have inappropriate

activities that reflected a propensity for violence and for racial or ethnic hatred” and “an

ongoing duty to monitor its employees and to supervise its employees.” (Id.) Plaintiffs

allege Defendant United States should have known of the ethnic and/or racially motivated

physical altercations that Corbett had been responsible for before and during his

employment as a U.S. Border Patrol Agent (Id., ¶ 48), and did know that Corbett engaged

in aggressive altercations with others and failed to recognize discriminatory behavior on

the part of Corbett. (Id., ¶ 49) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant United States

and its employees and/or agencies knew of Corbett’s vocal expression of his hatred of

blacks and Mexicans, that he had assaulted a neighbor, and had committed acts of

domestic violence on at least three occasions. (Id., ¶ 50.) Plaintiffs allege that by

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consciously and deliberately overlooking Corbett’s misconduct and criminal acts 

Defendant established a tolerated pattern of constitutional violations amongst their

subordinate officers and emboldened Corbett to blatantly violate the constitutional rights

of Dominguez. (Id., ¶ 52.) 

2. Analysis

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are attempting to bring an untimely Bivens

supervision claim through the FTCA, and the third claim of the amended FTCA

complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the United

States has not waived its sovereign immunity for constitutional tort claims. (Doc. 23, at

6-7.) Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim because the third claim

does not contain facts regarding any individual employee, who acting within their scope

of employment, committed a tort against Plaintiffs. Finally, Defendants argue that the

third claim does not set forth facts that permit the Court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct. (Doc. 23, at 7.) 

Plaintiffs oppose Defendants’ motion, asserting that the FTCA allows for a cause

of action against the United States for the tortious and/or negligent acts or omissions of its

agents and/or employees, and the third claim pleads a claim for relief for the tortious

conduct, act or omission, of specific United States employees and/or agents whose true

identify is unknown to Plaintiffs at this time. 

Bivens created a remedy for violations of constitutional rights committed by

federal officials acting in their individual capacities. A Bivens suit against a defendant in

his or her official capacity would merely be another way of pleading an action against the

United States, which is ordinarily barred by sovereign immunity. Nurse v. United States,

226 F.3d 996, 1004 (9th Cir.2000). Plaintiffs clearly allege that Defendant United States

is sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act for their employees’ and agencies’ torts

committed while acting within the course and scope of their employment. (Doc. 21, ¶¶ 

3-8). Thus, the issue is whether or not Plaintiffs’ claim is barred by sovereign immunity. 

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Plaintiffs cite 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) in support of their opposition to Defendants’

motion. Section 1346(b)(1) states in relevant part as follows:

the district courts ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions ... for

money damages ... for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death

caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the

Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be

liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act

or omission occurred.

Id., (Emphasis added). 

The FTCA waives sovereign immunity only under circumstances where a private

person would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the

act or omission occurred. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674. Thus, the FTCA directs us to look to the

law of the state in which the government official committed the tort to determine the

scope of sovereign immunity.

 Claims based directly on a violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, however,

should be dismissed. The FTCA does not apply to direct constitutional violations.

Federal Depoist Insurance Corporation v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1994); Delta

Savings Bank v. United States, 265 F.3d 1017, 1024 (9th Cir.2001); Rhoden v. United

States, 55 F.3d 428, 432 n. 5 (9th Cir.1995) ("A plaintiff cannot bring an FTCA claim

against the United States based solely on conduct that violates the Constitution because

such conduct may violate only federal, and not state, law.") (emphasis in original). 

Plaintiffs cite no authority in support of the right to bring an FTCA claim based directly

on a violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. 

Defendants argued in court that, even if the claim were omitted to delete the

allegation of constitutional violations, it could not be saved because negligent supervision

claims are barred by the discretionary function exception of the FTCA, found at §

2680(a). The discretionary function exception precludes claims against the United States

which are “based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a

discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the

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Government, whether or not the discretion was abused.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). See Nurse

v. United States, 226 F.3d 996 (2000). 

The allegations in the Amended FTCA Complaint, at paragraph 53, state that

Defendants established a custom and practice of condoning and ratifying misconduct and

criminal activity, and tolerating a pattern of constitutional violations. While, typically,

the promulgation of policies and rules is protected by the FTCA's discretionary function

exception, Id., at 1002 (citations omitted), the allegations in Paragraph 53 take the claim

outside the discretionary function exception because Defendants have no discretion to

promulgate such practices and policies. See Id. at 1002. (because the alleged decisions of

the policy-making defendants may have been non-discretionary, dismissal of FTCA

claims based on those decisions must be reversed, suggesting that if acts of policy-making

defendants violate the Constitution, they are not discretionary.) 

As Defendants correctly note, however, the allegations fail to set fort well pled

facts to make a plausible claim as required by Iqbal. The third claim does not contain

facts regarding any individual employee (by either name or description), who, acting

within the scope of their employment, committed a tort against Plaintiff. Additionally,

the claim does not allege facts that permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility

of misconduct.

Accordingly, Plaintiff have failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction of those

portions of the claim alleging negligent hiring, supervision and retention of employees,

because these acts fall under the discretionary function exception of the FTCA. Plaintiffs

may establish subject matter jurisdiction through allegations that Defendants established a

custom and practice of condoning and ratifying misconduct and criminal activity, and

tolerating a pattern of constitutional violations, however, the allegations fail to allege

sufficient factual allegations to state a claim.

This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the portions of Plaintiffs claim

that allege negligent hiring, retention and supervision, which cannot be cured by

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3 The amended Bivens complaint contains two sets of paragraphs numbered

53 to 60. The Court will refer to the first set as ¶ # [a] (pp. 15-17 of the

complaint), and the second set as ¶ # [b]). 

14

amendment. Plaintiffs have, however, alleged grounds for relief that fall outside the

discretionary function exception, and, although Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient

factual matter in support of such a claim, this portion of the claim could be saved through

amendment. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends dismissing with prejudice

the portion of the claim alleging a constitutional tort, and claims of negligent hiring,

supervision and retention, and dismissing without prejudice those portions of the

complaint that allege policy-making defendants promulgated policies and practices

condoning misconduct, criminal activity and constitutional violations. 

E. Second Claim of the Amended Bivens Complaint

1. Factual allegations

Plaintiffs second claim in the amended Bivens complaint for relief for supervisory

responsibility for violations of civil rights under color of law is brought pursuant to

Bivens v. Six Unknown named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 405 U.S. 388

(1971), for violation of Dominguez’s rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth

Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. (Doc. 22, ¶ 60[a]3

.) Plaintiffs allege that

“unknown border patrol supervisory personnel implemented and maintained customs,

policies and/or practices to encourage the use of excessive force by [Corbett] ... and

...intentionally, deliberately, and/or were indifferent to the violation of the constitutional

rights of persons in the same situation as and including the Decedent.” (Id., ¶ 54[b].) 

The complaint further alleges that, on January 12, 2007, the border patrol supervisory

personnel participated in, encouraged, fostered, condoned and ratified the conduct of

Corbett in approaching, assaulting, seizing, and using unlawful deadly force in shooting

and killing Dominguez. (Id., ¶ 54.) The amended Bivens complaint also alleges that

because of their failure to prevent the continuing constitutional violations by their

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subordinates and because of the establishment of policies and failure to adequately train

their subordinates, unknown border patrol supervisory personnel are individually liable

for the constitutional violations committed by Corbett. (Id., ¶ 60[b].) 

2. Analysis

Defendants argue that the doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes a Bivens

action against an officer in his or her official capacity, a federal agency or the United

States. (Doc. 23, at 8.) Defendants assert that although Plaintiffs allege that the claim is

directed toward supervisory personnel in their individual capacities, the allegations make

clear that the intent is to sue them for alleged acts performed in their official capacity. 

(Id.) Defendants observe that Plaintiffs allege that the supervisory personnel were “acting

within the course and scope of their employment with the United States of America” and

makes repeated reference to customs, practices and policies. (Amended Bivens

Complaint, ¶¶ 5, 15, and 18.) 

Plaintiffs oppose the motion to dismiss, arguing that they do not contend the

United States of America is liable because it possesses certain policies, but that the

unknown individuals who are employed by the United States of America are liable for

their own acts that violate one’s constitutional rights, and that here, the unknown

defendants acted in a manner that violated decedents’s and Plaintiffs’ constitutional

rights. Plaintiff argue that, upon identifying those officials responsible, Plaintiffs can

amend the complaint to properly name those officials. 

Though the doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes a Bivens action against an

officer in his or her official capacity, federal officers acting under color of federal law

while performing their duties may be liable under Bivens when their actions exceed the

scope of their legal authority. See Kreines V. United States, 33 F.3d 1105, 1107 (1994). 

Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs fail to state a cognizable claim because the

Supreme Court rejected the proposition of “supervisory liability” under Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009). In Iqbal, the Supreme Court held that, “[b]ecause vicarious

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4

 In al-Kidd, the Ninth Circuit considered the necessity that a complaint include

allegations of a defendant’s personal involvement in a constitutional violation as a

component of a qualified immunity analysis, but noted that the question was also a part of

the substance of Bivens liability.

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liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each

Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated

the Constitution.” Id., 129 S.Ct. at 1948. Direct personal participation, however, is not

necessary to establish liability for a constitutional violation. al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d

949, 965 (2009)4

(citing Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 U.S. 952, 966 (9th Cir.

2004). “Supervisors can be held liable for the actions of their subordinates (1) for setting

in motion a series of acts by others, or knowingly refusing to terminate a series of acts by

others, which they knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict

constitutional injury; (2) for culpable action or inaction in training, supervision, or control

of subordinates; (3) for acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation by subordinates; or

(4) for conduct that shows a ‘reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.’” Id.

at 965 (quoting Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir.1991) (internal

quotation marks omitted)). Any one of these bases will suffice to establish the personal

involvement of the defendant in the constitutional violation. Id. Nonetheless, “bare

assertions regarding an invidious policy are not entitled to the assumption of truth

because they amount to ‘nothing more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

constitutional discrimination claim.’” Id. at 974 (quoting Iqbal at 1951.) In al-Kidd, the

Ninth Circuit found allegations of a complaint plausibly suggested something more than

just bare allegations of improper purpose when it attributed specific statements and

actions to specific individuals, in contrast to the allegations made in Iqbal which

contained no factual allegations detailing statements made by the specific individual. Id.

at 975. Additionally, unlike in Twombly and Iqbal, where the plaintiffs alleged a

conspiracy or discriminatory practice in the most conclusory terms, al-Kidd did not rely

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solely on his assertion that the individual defendant “ordered encouraged, or permitted

‘policies and practices [whereby] individuals have also been impermissibly arrested and

detained as material witnesses.’” Id. 

Because the complaint does not name any individual supervisory officials, it fails

to identify how the actions of individual officials could foreseeably have caused the

violations alleged in the complaint. The current complaint, however, is insufficient to

allege any constitutional violations by named supervisors, none of whom is alleged to

have played a role in Corbett’s January 12, 2007 confrontation with and shooting of

Dominguez. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommends dismissal of this claim.

Defendants argue that the statute of limitations bars the amendment of the

complaint to add any additional defendants. Plaintiffs contend that, even though the true

identity of unknown defendants is unknown to Plaintiffs, when the true identity becomes

known, Plaintiffs will amend to add them as a party and it will relate back, pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(2), to the original complaint thereby satisfying the statue of

limitations. Defendants correctly assert, however, that Rule 15(c)(2) applies only to

actions against the United States or its officers or agencies when sued in their official

capacities. See Delgado-Brunet v. Clark, 93 F.3d 339, 344 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that

notice to government officers who are sued personally cannot be inferred from service on

another government officer). Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge finds that this claim

cannot be cured by amendment and should be dismissed with prejudice.

F. Motion to Strike

Defendants have moved to strike portions of the amended complaints regarding

policies, customs and practice, as impertinent and scandalous, and because of the

possibility that they would create the potential for unfair prejudice against the United

States. (Doc. 23, at 10.) Defendants argue that this Court strike any references to alleged

unconstitutional customs, policies and/or practices from the complaints as they are

“impertinent and scandalous.” (Id.) Additionally, Defendants submit that these claims

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could prejudice the United States by subjecting it to areas of discovery that are not

relevant, and, in the event the Court appoints an advisory jury, it could “give the false

impression that the United States can be held liable in a civil action for its policy.” (Id. at

11.)

Motions to strike may be filed only if authorized by statute or rule, or if it seeks to

strike any part of a filing or submission on the ground that it is prohibited (or not

authorized) by a statute, rule, or court order. LR Civ 7.2(m)(1). Rule 12(f),

FED.R.CIV.P., permits a pleading to be struck, in whole or in part, for advancing “an

insufficient defense or” containing “any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or

scandalous matter.” Such action may be taken either on motion or sua sponte. See

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). 

 A Rule 12(f) movant not only must demonstrate the allegedly offending material

is redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous, or constitutes an insufficient

defense, but must also show how such material will cause prejudice. Mag Instrument,

Inc., v. JS Prod.’s, Inc., 595 F.Supp.2d 1102, 1106 (C.D. Cal. 008) (“Given their

disfavored status, courts often require a showing of prejudice by the moving party before

granting the requested relief.”) (citing Neilson v. Union Bank of Cal., N.A., 290 F.Supp.2d

1101, 1152 (C.D.Cal.2003)). In this instance, the Defendants allege that the clams

“regarding alleged policies, customs and practice should be stricken”as impertinent and

scandalous, and because these claims could prejudice the Untied States by subjecting it to

areas of discovery that are not relevant. 

Because the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court dismiss these

portions of the complaint, the Magistrate Judge also recommends that the District Court

dismiss the motion to strike, with leave to re-urge after the filing of any amended

pleading by Plaintiffs. 

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III. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons stated above, the Magistrate Judge recommends that Defendants’

motion to dismiss (Doc. 23) be GRANTED. 

The Magistrate Judge further recommends that the dismissal be WITHOUT

PREJUDICE as to the second claim of the Amended FTCA Complaint and the portion of

the third claim of the Amended FTCA Complaint that alleges policy-making defendants

promulgated policies and practices condoning misconduct, criminal activity and

constitutional violations. 

The Magistrate Judge recommends the dismissal be WITH PREJUDICE as to the

portion of the third claim of the Amended FTCA Complaint alleging a constitutional tort

as well as claims of negligent hiring, supervision and retention, and the second claim of

the Amended Bivens Complaint in its entirety. 

The Magistrate Judge further recommends that Defendants’ motion to strike (Doc.

23) be DENIED. 

The Magistrate Judge further recommends that Defendants motion to dismiss and

motion to strike portions of the original complaints (Doc. No. 20) be DENIED AS

MOOT. 

Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written

objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and

Recommendation. A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen (14)

days after being served with a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). If objections are filed

the parties should use the following case number: CV 08-0648-TUC-DCB (lead) and

CV 09-474-TUC-DCB (consolidated).

//

//

//

//

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If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the

District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

DATED this 5th day of August, 2010.

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