Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00866/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00866-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TOMMY LEE WILEY, III,

Petitioner,

v.

DEBBIE ASUNCION, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:14-cv-00866 LJO MJS (HC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent, Debbie Asuncion, Warden of 

California State Prison, Los Angeles County, is hereby substituted as the proper named 

respondent pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent

is represented by Mark A. Johnson of the office of the Attorney General.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections 

pursuant to a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Tulare, following 

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his conviction by jury trial on March 11, 2011, for attempted murder, assault by means 

likely to produce great bodily injury, and various enhancements. (Clerk's Tr. at 291-94.) 

On June 3, 2011, Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate term of fourteen (14) 

years to life consecutive to a term of twenty-nine (29) years for the various 

enhancements. (Id.) 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 

District, which affirmed the judgment in part on March 6, 2013. (Lodged Docs. 1-4, 

People v. Wiley, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1667 (Mar. 6, 2013).) The appellate court 

struck an enhancement and ordered two clerical errors corrected, but otherwise affirmed 

the judgment. (Id.) Petitioner did not seek direct review from the California Supreme 

Court.

Petitioner sought collateral review of the conviction in state court in the form of 

several petitions for writs of habeas corpus. Petitioner filed four petitions for a writ of 

habeas corpus with the Tulare County Superior Court. (See Lodged Doc. 5, Tulare 

County Sup Ct. Case Nos. VHC252913, VHC256503, VHC280092, VHC283334.) All 

four petitions were denied. (Id.) On July 29, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus with the Fifth District Court of Appeal. (Lodged Doc. 6.) The petition was 

denied on September 10, 2013. (Id.) Petitioner then filed four petitions for writ of habeas 

corpus with the California Supreme Court. (Lodged Doc. 7.) All the petitions were 

denied. (Id.) Relevant to the instant federal petition is Petitioner’s first petition for writ of 

habeas corpus filed with the California Supreme Court on October 23, 2013 containing 

the claim presented in this federal petition.

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(Id.) 

Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition on June 4, 2014. (Pet., ECF 

No. 1.) Petitioner presents a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the instant 

petition. Petitioner alleges: (1) that there was a speedy trial violation resulting from the 

 

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A review of Petitioners’ state petitions for writ of habeas corpus show that Petitioner had not previously 

presented the claim to the lower state courts in his prior habeas petitions. 

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ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) that counsel was ineffective for failing to 

investigate and object to evidence presented at trial. (Id.) Respondent filed an answer to 

the petition on October 13, 2014. (ECF No. 20.) Petitioner filed a traverse on October 24, 

2014. (ECF No. 21.) The matter stands ready for adjudication.

II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Petitioner Tommy Wiley knew the victim, 19-year-old Rafael Del Real, through 

Wiley’s cousin, Ondre Tucker. (7 RT 296, 314; 8 RT 457.) Wiley had socialized with Del 

Real and Tucker on several prior occasions. (7 RT 297-298, 317.)

Around 3:30-4:00 p.m. on April 26, 2010, Wiley went to Del Real’s house in 

Tulare. (7 RT 274, 289, 296, 320.) They sat in the garage talking and smoking 

marijuana. (7 RT 275, 289, 299.) Before 5:00 p.m. (7 RT 276, 284-285, 300), they went 

for a drive in Wiley’s car (7 RT 300-301). Del Real’s mother witnessed Wiley coming by 

the house and Del Real leaving in Wiley’s car. (7 RT 274-75.) After stopping at a store 

in Pixley to buy “blunts” with which to make marijuana cigarettes, they drove to “the 

country” while talking and smoking. (7 RT 301-302, 322-324.)

After driving for 30-60 minutes, Wiley and Del Real got out of the car to urinate. 

(7 RT 301-303, 326-327.) Del Real heard the “click” of a gun (7 RT 303, 328) and 

looked up to see Wiley walking toward him and pointing a gun at him (7 RT 304-305, 

331). Wiley said, “Come here, fool, come here.” (7 RT 305, 330.) Wiley repeatedly 

pulled the trigger, but the gun misfired. (7 RT 305, 331.)

Del Real ran across the road into an olive orchard, with Wiley close behind him. 

(7 RT 306, 332-333.) When Del Real tripped and fell, the much larger Wiley got on his 

back. (7 RT 307-308, 336-337; 9 RT 523.) As they struggled, the gun went off next to 

Del Real’s left ear, but the bullet missed him. (7 RT 308-309, 338.)

Wiley racked the gun four or five times, ejecting rounds. (7 RT 309- 311, 339-

340.) Then Wiley held Del Real’s head down and began beating him on the head with 

the butt of the gun. (7 RT 311-312, 340.) Del Real lost consciousness. (7 RT 312, 340-

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341.) The attack was not preceded by an argument or any other dispute between them. 

(7 RT 313, 327.)

Sometime in the early evening, a passing motorist saw Del Real and called for 

help. (7 RT 231-232, 234.) Law enforcement and medics arrived at about 7:30-7:45 

p.m. (7 RT 243, 249, 262.)

Del Real suffered skull fractures, had 142 staples put in his head, and required 

surgery to remove a piece of skull from his brain. He was hospitalized for a week. (7 RT 

313.)

Upon investigating the scene of the crime, law enforcement found several live, 

unfired rounds at the scene along with significant amounts of blood. (8 RT 377-97.) 

Investigators also found blood spots on the outside of Wiley’s car, inside the driver’s 

door, on the seat belt, and on the steering wheel. (8 RT 396-97.) DNA tests revealed 

that the blood on the outside of the car, on the seat belt, and on the steering wheel 

belonged to Del Real. (8 RT 453-54.) The blood spots on the inside of the door 

contained a combination of Del Real and Wiley’s blood. (Id.)

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 

2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he 

suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. (Pet.) In 

addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Tulare County Superior Court, 

which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d); 2254(a). 

Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over the instant action. 

B. Legal Standard of Review

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

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Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus 

filed after its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 

114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997). The instant petition was filed after the enactment 

of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by AEDPA provisions. 

Under AEDPA, a person in custody under a judgment of a state court may only be 

granted a writ of habeas corpus for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Williams, 529 U.S. at 375 n. 7. Federal habeas corpus 

relief is available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings if the 

state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

1. Contrary to or an Unreasonable Application of Federal Law

A state court decision is "contrary to" federal law if it "applies a rule that 

contradicts governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases" or "confronts a set of facts 

that [are] materially indistinguishable from [a Supreme Court case] but reaches a 

different result." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 

405-06). "AEDPA does not require state and federal courts to wait for some nearly 

identical factual pattern before a legal rule must be applied . . . The statute recognizes . . 

. that even a general standard may be applied in an unreasonable manner." Panetti v. 

Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The 

"clearly established Federal law" requirement "does not demand more than a ‘principle' 

or ‘general standard.'" Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 839 (2009). For a state 

decision to be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under § 

2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court's prior decisions must provide a governing legal principle 

(or principles) to the issue before the state court. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-

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71 (2003). A state court decision will involve an "unreasonable application of" federal 

law only if it is "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 75-76 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 

409-10); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002). In Harrington v. Richter, the 

Court further stresses that "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from 

an incorrect application of federal law." 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011) (citing Williams, 529 

U.S. at 410) (emphasis in original). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks 

merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the 

correctness of the state court's decision." Id. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 

U.S. 653, 664 (2004)). Further, "[t]he more general the rule, the more leeway courts 

have in reading outcomes in case-by-case determinations." Id.; Renico v. Lett, 130 S. 

Ct. 1855, 1864 (2010). "It is not an unreasonable application of clearly established 

Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been 

squarely established by this Court." Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 

(2009) (quoted by Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786). 

2. Review of State Decisions

"Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, 

later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the claim rest on the same 

grounds." See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). This is referred to as the 

"look through" presumption. Id. at 804; Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1198 

(9th Cir. 2006). Determining whether a state court's decision resulted from an 

unreasonable legal or factual conclusion, "does not require that there be an opinion from 

the state court explaining the state court's reasoning." Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85.

"Where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas 

petitioner's burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the 

state court to deny relief." Id. "This Court now holds and reconfirms that § 2254(d) does 

not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been 

‘adjudicated on the merits.'" Id. 

Richter instructs that whether the state court decision is reasoned and explained, 

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or merely a summary denial, the approach to evaluating unreasonableness under § 

2254(d) is the same: "Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments 

or theories supported or, as here, could have supported, the state court's decision; then 

it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments 

or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court." Id. at 786. 

Thus, "even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion 

was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75). AEDPA "preserves 

authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could 

disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedents." Id.

(emphasis added). To put it yet another way:

As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus relief from a federal 

court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim 

being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there 

was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond 

any possibility for fairminded disagreement.

Id. at 786-87. The Court then explains the rationale for this rule, i.e., "that state courts 

are the principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions." Id. at 

787. It follows from this consideration that § 2254(d) "complements the exhaustion 

requirement and the doctrine of procedural bar to ensure that state proceedings are the 

central process, not just a preliminary step for later federal habeas proceedings." Id.

(citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977)).

3. Prejudicial Impact of Constitutional Error

The prejudicial impact of any constitutional error is assessed by asking whether 

the error had "a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's 

verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 

U.S. 112, 121-22 (2007) (holding that the Brecht standard applies whether or not the 

state court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness). Some constitutional 

errors, however, do not require that the petitioner demonstrate prejudice. See Arizona v. 

Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 

(1984).

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IV. REVIEW OF PETITION

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel was ineffective based counsel’s failure to 

bring Petitioner’s case to trial in a speedy manner, and counsel’s failure to investigate 

and object to inadmissible evidence. The Court will discuss each claim in turn.

B. State Court Decision

The claims were denied in an unreasoned decision by the California Supreme 

Court (Lodged Doc. 7, California Supreme Court Case No. S214184.) Where the last 

state court decision did not address the merits of the petition, the court, under § 2254(d), 

must determine what arguments or theories could have supported, the state court's 

decision and determine whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those 

arguments or theories are inconsistent with Supreme Court law. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 

786. 

C. Legal Standard

The law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is clearly established 

for the purposes of the AEDPA deference standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Canales v. Roe, 151 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 1998). In a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court must consider two factors. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); Lowry 

v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994). First, the petitioner must show that counsel's 

performance was deficient, requiring a showing that counsel made errors so serious that 

he or she was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The petitioner must show that counsel's representation fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness, and must identify counsel's alleged acts 

or omissions that were not the result of reasonable professional judgment considering 

the circumstances. Id. at 688; United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 

(9th Cir. 1995). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance is highly deferential. A court 

indulges a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 

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reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also, Harrington v. 

Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011).

Second, the petitioner must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result ... would have been different."

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Petitioner must show that counsel's errors were “so serious

as to deprive defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at 687. The 

Court must evaluate whether the entire trial was fundamentally unfair or unreliable 

because of counsel's ineffectiveness. Id.; Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d at 1348; United 

States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1456, 1461 (9th Cir. 1994).

A court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before 

examining the prejudice suffered by the petitioner as a result of the alleged deficiencies. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Since the defendant must affirmatively prove prejudice, any 

deficiency that does not result in prejudice must necessarily fail. However, there are 

certain instances which are legally presumed to result in prejudice, e.g., where there has 

been an actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel or where the State has 

interfered with counsel's assistance. Id. at 692; United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S., at 

659, and n. 25 (1984).

As the Supreme Court reaffirmed recently in Harrington v. Richter, meeting the 

standard for ineffective assistance of counsel in federal habeas is extremely difficult:

The pivotal question is whether the state court's application of the 

Strickland standard was unreasonable. This is different from asking 

whether defense counsel's performance fell below Strickland's standard. 

Were that the inquiry, the analysis would be no different than if, for 

example, this Court were adjudicating a Strickland claim on direct review 

of a criminal conviction in a United States district court. Under AEDPA, 

though, it is a necessary premise that the two questions are different. For 

purposes of § 2254(d)(1), "an unreasonable application of federal law is 

different from an incorrect application of federal law." Williams, supra, at 

410, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389. A state court must be granted a 

deference and latitude that are not in operation when the case involves 

review under the Strickland standard itself.

A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes 

federal habeas relief so long as "fairminded jurists could disagree" on the 

correctness of the state court's decision. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 

U.S. 652, 664, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 158 L. Ed. 2d 938 (2004). And as this 

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Court has explained, "[E]valuating whether a rule application was 

unreasonable requires considering the rule's specificity. The more general 

the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-bycase determinations." Ibid. "[I]t is not an unreasonable application of 

clearly established Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a 

specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by this Court." 

Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419, 173 L. Ed. 

2d 251, 261 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 785-86.

"It bears repeating that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state 

court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. at 786. "As amended by AEDPA, § 

2254(d) stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims 

already rejected in state proceedings." Id. "As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus 

from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim 

being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error 

well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 

disagreement." Id. at 786-87.

Accordingly, even if Petitioner presents a strong case of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, this Court may only grant relief if no fairminded jurist could agree on the 

correctness of the state court decision.

D. Analysis

1. Speedy Trial

Petitioner asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a speedy trial 

as requested by Petitioner. Petitioner contends that his trial was delayed nearly a year, 

despite his lack of consent to any continuations. (Pet. at 7-12.) During that time, 

Petitioner’s competency to stand trial was in doubt and he was examined, and a 

competency trial was held on March 14, 2011. 

Petitioner does not challenge his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth 

Amendment. See Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 89 (2009). Even assuming that his 

right to a speedy trial was violated, Petitioner has not shown that counsel’s conduct was 

deficient, or that he was prejudiced by the conduct. As Petitioner acknowledges in his 

petition, it appears that a significant reason for the delay involved concerns regarding 

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Petitioner’s competency. Ensuring that his client was competent to stand trial was

reasonable trial strategy, and in fact essentially mandatory since defense counsel has an

ethical duty to his client and the Court to so ensure. If Petitioner was not competent to 

stand trial and his counsel nevertheless attempted to proceed to trial, trial results likely 

would have been vacated. Continuing trial to allow for expert testing of Petitioner and a 

resulting competency proceeding ensuring Petitioner was capable of standing trial was 

well within the scope of reasonable trial strategy. Petitioner has not shown that counsel’s 

conduct was deficient. 

Moreover, Petitioner has not shown that he was prejudiced by counsel’s conduct. 

He has not presented any argument as to how the trial result would have been different 

had there been no delay. There is no reason to believe that the prosecution would have 

lacked any evidence presented at trial or that Petitioner would have had any new or 

additional defenses to present. 

Petitioner has not met his burden of showing that but for counsel being ineffective, 

there was a "reasonable probability that... the result ... would have been different." 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The prosecution presented strong evidence of Petitioner's 

guilt based on victim’s testimony, and the physical evidence, including blood linking 

Petitioner and his car to the attempted murder. To the extent that the state court could 

have based its decision on the lack of deficient performance or prejudice for the reasons 

stated above, it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or 

theories are inconsistent with Supreme Court law. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786. Petitioner's

first claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit.

2. Failure to Object to Testimonial Out of Court Statements

Petitioner contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 

statements of the state’s criminologist regarding the results of DNA testing as they 

violated Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation of witnesses. At trial 

Detective Meek with the Tulare County Sherriff’s office testified regarding the collection 

of physical evidence from the scene including obtaining blood samples from Petitioner’s 

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car. (8 RT 370-415.) However, defense counsel stipulated to the presentation of the 

DNA report from Mindy Crow, a senior criminologist with the California Department of 

Justice, regarding the results of the DNA testing of the blood samples from Petitioner’s 

car. (Pet. at 41-43.) 

a. Legal Standard

The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 

shall enjoy the right to . . . be confronted with the witnesses against him." The 

Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of testimonial out-of-court statements by 

non-testifying individuals. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. 

Ed. 2d 177 (2004). When the prosecution introduces a forensic report that constitutes a 

testimonial statement, the analyst who produced the report must personally testify. 

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 174 L. Ed. 2d 314 

(2009); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710, 180 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2011). 

Confrontation Clause violations are subject to harmless error analysis under Chapman v. 

California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967). Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 

475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986); United States v. Norwood, 

603 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2010). 

b. Analysis

Petitioner has not shown that counsel’s conduct was deficient or that he was 

prejudiced by that conduct. Counsel stipulated to the results of the DNA report. Petitioner 

has presented no evidence that Mindy Crow was available to testify to the results her 

testing. Had Petitioner shown evidence that Crow was not available, counsel’s conduct 

may have been deficient. However, it is just as possible that, counsel made a strategic 

decision to stipulate to Crow’s testimony in order to minimize its impact. Testimony that 

the victim’s DNA was found on various surfaces of Petitioner’s car was particularly 

harmful evidence against Petitioner. If defense counsel had no way of rebutting or 

challenging the evidence, attempting to lessen the time it took to present such evidence 

to the jury was a reasonable strategy. 

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Even assuming a Crawford error occurred, Petitioner has failed to show that he 

was prejudiced by it. Even without the DNA evidence, there was ample evidence, 

especially eye-witness testimony from the victim, that Petitioner committed the offenses. 

Other eye-witnesses placed Petitioner as the last person to be seen with the victim, and 

the victim testified regarding the facts of the attempted shooting and physical beating he 

suffered at the hands of Petitioner. Petitioner has not met his burden of showing that but 

for counsel being ineffective, there was a "reasonable probability that... the result ... 

would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Even if counsel could have 

prevented the DNA evidence from being admitted, Petitioner likely would have been 

convicted based on the other evidence presented. 

The prosecution presented strong evidence of Petitioner's guilt based on victim’s 

testimony, and the physical evidence (excluding the results of the DNA testing). To the 

extent that the state court could have based its decision on the lack of deficient 

performance or prejudice for the reasons stated above, it is possible fairminded jurists 

could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with Supreme Court 

law. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786. Petitioner's second claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel is without merit.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, it is hereby recommended that the petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus be DENIED with prejudice. 

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned District Judge, 

pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty (30) days after 

being served with the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file written 

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation." Any reply 

to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the 

objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time 

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may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 

834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 20, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-00866-LJO-MJS Document 27 Filed 05/20/16 Page 14 of 14