Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00535/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00535-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EMOVE, INC., a Nevada corporation, and 

U-HAUL INTERNATIONAL INC., a 

Nevada corporation,

Plaintiffs,

v.

HIRE A HELPER LLC, a California 

limited liability company, and MICHAEL 

GLANZ, an individual,

Defendants.

Case No.: 17cv0535-CAB-JLB

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFFS’ 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT [Doc. No. 137]

On April 27, 2018, Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants eMove, Inc. and U-Haul 

International, Inc. (“eMove”) filed a motion for summary judgment (“MSJ”). [Doc. No. 

137.] On May 18, 2018, Defendants/Counter-Claimants Hire A Helper LLC (“HAH”) and 

Michael Glanz (“Glanz”) filed an opposition to the MSJ. [Doc. No. 150.] On May 25, 

2018, Plaintiffs filed a reply to the opposition. [Doc. No. 155.] For the reasons set forth 

below, the motion for summary judgment is DENIED and summary adjudication of Counts 

I, II, and IV are GRANTED IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS.

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 2008, eMove sued HAH for, inter alia, improperly using its registered 

trademarks “Moving Help®” and “Moving Helper®” (the “Trademarks”). [Doc. No. 52 

at 5-6, ¶¶25-26.] The 2008 litigation was ultimately settled and, in 2010, the parties 

entered into a settlement agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”) and dismissed the 

2008 litigation. [Doc. No. 52-3 at 2-3, 5, 7.]

The Settlement Agreement contains the following pertinent provisions:

3. Trademarks. U-Haul is the owner of the Trademarks, and has 

granted a license for the Trademarks to eMove. Respondents1, on their own 

behalf and on behalf of their affiliates, corporations, partnerships, limited 

liability companies, proprietorships, entities and any entity in which any 

Respondent owns any interest in (other than an insubstantial amount of stock 

ownership of an entity that is publicly traded on the NASDAQ, NYSE or 

AMEX stock exchanges), interest in any trusts, interests in any estates, 

spouses, minor children, heirs, employees, agents, assigns and successors 

hereby covenant, stipulate and agree not to use the Trademarks in any 

manner (including any manner that might otherwise be deemed fair use of 

the trademarks “MOVING HELP” and “MOVING HELPER”). 

Respondents shall not allow any Service Provider, affiliate or other party to 

use the phrases “MOVING HELP” or “MOVING HELPER” on any portion 

of any website controlled or operated by Respondents. [Hereinafter referred 

to as the “Trademark provision.”]

4. Respondents’ Acknowledgement of Claimants’2Intellectual 

Property Including the Payment Code. Respondents hereby acknowledge 

Claimants’ proprietary and ownership interest in the Trademarks, copyrights 

in Claimants’ movinghelp.com website, trade secrets, Payment Code and 

Claimants’ other Intellectual Property. Claimants hereby grant Hire a 

Helper a perpetual, fully paid up, noncancellable, world wide, nonexclusive, 

nontransferable, nonsublicenseable license to use Claimants’ trade secrets 

that existed when Glanz was a service provider for eMove and to which 

Glanz had access. Said license is solely for the use of said trade secrets as 

such is currently being used on the hireahelper.com website. Said license 

does not include a license to use the Trademarks or the Payment Code. Said 

license shall become effective as of the Effective Date. Respondents shall 

 

1

“Respondents” are HAH and Glanz.

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“Claimants” are eMove and U-Haul.

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discontinue all use of the Payment Code and Trademarks prior to the 

Effective Date. Said license shall terminate upon the breach of this 

Settlement Agreement by Respondents or upon an attempted assignment, 

sublicense or other transfer of this license by one or both Respondents. 

Respondents shall take reasonable steps to maintain the secrecy of 

Claimants’ trade secrets. Other than the license granted in this Settlement 

Agreement, Respondents have no rights, title or interest in Claimants’ 

Intellectual Property, including the Payment Code and Trademarks. 

Respondents agree not to oppose, challenge, or petition against the use or 

registration of, in any country, in any trademark office, court, administrative 

or other government body Claimants’ Intellectual Property (including the 

Payment Code) or Trademarks (including petitioning to cancel any 

application, registration, or re-registration of the Trademarks). [Hereinafter 

the “Non-Opposition Clause.”]

[Doc. No. 52-3 at 4.]

In February 2017, HAH filed a petition with a private arbitrator (hereinafter 

“the Petition”). [Doc. No. 52-4.] In the Petition, HAH sought a declaration that its 

obligations under the Settlement Agreement relating to the Trademarks are 

unenforceable because the Trademarks are generic. [Doc. No. 52-4 at 6-9, ¶¶ 25-

39.] The Petition also sought declarations that (1) no trade secrets are covered by 

the Settlement Agreement, (2) certain unnamed parties are not bound by the 

Settlement Agreement, and (3) the Non-Opposition Clause is unenforceable. [Id.

at 3-6 ¶¶ 9-24, 9-10 ¶¶ 40-46.]

Plaintiffs now sue Defendants for breach of contract and other claims, 

alleging that the filing of the Petition breached the Non-Opposition Clause. 

Plaintiffs also seek declarations as to the rights and obligations of the parties under 

the Settlement Agreement. Defendants have answered and counter-sued for 

declaratory relief.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 16, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a complaint for declaratory relief and to stay 

arbitration. [Doc. No. 1.] On May 2, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint 

(“FAC”). [Doc. No. 12.] On May 16, 2017, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Count 

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I of the FAC. [Doc. No. 21.] On August 30, 2017, the Court granted the motion to 

dismiss Count I with leave to amend. [Doc. No. 51.] On September 19, 2017, Plaintiffs 

filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). [Doc. No. 52.]

The SAC asserts four causes of action against Defendants: (1) for breach of the 

Settlement Agreement; (2) for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 

during the performance of that Settlement Agreement; (3) for a declaratory judgment 

regarding the use of Plaintiffs’ registered trademarks by Defendants and certain affiliates; 

and (4) for unfair competition. [Doc. No. 52 ¶¶ 57–83.] 

Defendants answered the SAC and filed counterclaims (“Counterclaims”) seeking 

(1) declarations regarding Defendants’ duty under the Settlement Agreement to protect 

Plaintiffs’ trade secrets and other confidential information; (2) declarations regarding the 

impact of the Settlement Agreement on parties who are or may become interested in 

HAH; and (3) a declaration that the final sentence of Paragraph 4 of the Settlement 

Agreement (the “Nonopposition Clause”) is void. [Doc. No. 53 ¶¶ 14–36.]

On October 23, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss all of Defendants’ 

counter-claims and/or to strike Count III of Defendants’ counterclaims. [Doc. No. 56.] 

On December 20, 2017, the motion was denied. [Doc. No. 78.] On November 22, 2017, 

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ SAC. [Doc. No. 63.] On 

March 20, 2018, the motion was denied. [Doc. No. 117.]

LEGAL STANDARD

A party is entitled to summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law.” See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). To 

avoid summary judgment, disputes must be both 1) material, meaning concerning facts 

that are relevant and necessary and that might affect the outcome of the action under 

governing law, and 2) genuine, meaning the evidence must be such that a reasonable jury 

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

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U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g & Contracting Co., 200 F.3d 1223, 

1229 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

The initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact 

falls on the moving party. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-323. If the moving party 

can demonstrate that its opponent has not made a sufficient showing on an essential 

element of his case, the burden shifts to the opposing party to set forth facts showing that 

a genuine issue of disputed fact remains. Id. at 324. When ruling on a summary 

judgment motion, the court must view all inferences drawn from the underlying facts in 

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

DISCUSSION

A. Breach of the Settlement Agreement.

Plaintiffs argue Defendants breached the Settlement Agreement by “filing the 

Petition and continuing to challenge eMove’s Intellectual Property in this litigation.” 

[Doc. No. 137-1 at 14.] As previously noted by this Court, the poignant question (which 

was never addressed in Defendants’ previous motion for summary judgment) is whether 

filing a petition with a private arbitrator, when the Settlement Agreement had no 

arbitration provision, constitutes a petition being brought “in any trademark office, court, 

administrative or other government body.” [Doc. No. 117 at 5.] Plaintiffs address this 

question in a footnote by citing generally to Arizona’s arbitration statutes and to a law 

review article about arbitrations under Arizona law. [Doc. No. 137-1 at 10-11, n. 4.] 

However, regardless of whether Arizona’s arbitration act “conferred power upon duly 

appointed arbitration tribunals to serve as the courts’ adjuncts” [Id.], there was no “duly 

appointed arbitration tribunal” in this case. As Plaintiffs point out, Plaintiffs never 

agreed to an arbitration provision and, in fact, expressly rejected such a provision. [Id.] 

Therefore, by filing the Petition, Defendants were engaging in a fruitless, and perhaps 

incompetent, endeavor to seek clarification of the Settlement Agreement. But they did 

not breach the Settlement Agreement.

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As Plaintiffs acknowledge, whether the filing of the Petition constituted a breach is 

a legal question. [Doc. No. 155 at 2.] A plain reading of the Non-opposition clause 

shows that the filing of the Petition was not a filing “in any trademark office, court, 

administrative or other government body.” Therefore, while the filing of the Petition was 

perhaps annoying to Plaintiffs,

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it was not a breach of the Non-opposition clause.

As for Defendants “continuing to challenge eMove’s Intellectual Property in this 

litigation,” such allegations are not part of the SAC. Moreover, Defendants’ affirmative 

defenses and counter-claims in this case were filed in response to Plaintiffs’ claims, and 

the counter-claims only seek declaratory relief as to the rights and obligations of the 

parties under the Settlement Agreement. See Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. v. Fleer Corp., 

799 F.2d 851, 856 (2nd Cir. 1986)(declaratory relief may be sought to resolve disputes 

regarding the meaning of terms in a contract). While some of the requested declarations 

may be foreclosed by the Settlement Agreement (e.g. because Defendants waived their 

rights to challenge the trademarks – generic or not), the counter-claims for declaratory 

relief in general are not foreclosed. As noted by Defendants, potential litigation over the 

Settlement Agreement was certainly anticipated, as the Settlement Agreement does

contain choice of law, venue, and attorneys’ fees provisions. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ 

motion for summary adjudication of the breach of contract claim (Count I) is DENIED.

In addition, because the question of whether filing the Petition was a breach of the

Settlement Agreement is a legal one, summary adjudication of the Plaintiffs’ breach of 

contract claim (Count I) is GRANTED IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS. See 

Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 56(g); Gospel Missions of America v. City of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 

548, 553 (9th Cir. 2003)(no cross-motion need be filed for entry of summary judgment in 

 

3 Prior to the filing of the Petition, Defendants requested that Plaintiffs agree to various revisions of the 

Settlement Agreement, which Plaintiffs refused. [Doc. No. 137-1 at 12.] Plaintiffs do not argue, rightly 

so, that Defendants breached the Non-Opposition clause by requesting revisions to the Settlement 

Agreement. The Court views the filing of an ineffective Petition as similar to the request for revisions –

annoying to Plaintiffs, but not a breach of the Settlement Agreement.

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favor of the opposing party if there are no factual issues and moving party had notice and 

adequate opportunity to address the issue).4

B. Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.

Under Arizona law, the “implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing” prohibits 

a party from doing anything to prevent other parties to the contract from receiving the 

benefits and entitlements of the agreement. Wells Fargo Bank v. Ariz. Laborers, 

Teamsters & Cement Masons Local No. 395 Pension Trust Fund, 38 P.3d 12, 28 (Ariz. 

2002). An action for breach of the covenant may sound in contract or in tort, but 

sustaining a tort claim requires a plaintiff to allege and prove a “special relationship 

between the parties arising from elements of the public interest, adhesion, of fiduciary 

responsibility.” Id at 29. If a plaintiff attempts to make a bad faith claim in tort, but does 

not allege and prove the necessary special relationship to support a claim for breach of 

the implied covenant in tort, the claim fails. Id. 

Plaintiffs argue that by filing the Petition and continuing to challenge the 

legitimacy of eMove’s Trademarks and Trade Secrets, Defendants are preventing 

Plaintiffs from receiving the benefits of the Settlement Agreement. [Doc. No. 137-1 at 

16.] However, filing the Petition was not a breach of the Settlement Agreement and did 

not, in and of itself, cause Plaintiffs to lose the benefits of the Settlement Agreement. 

Moreover, for the reasons set forth above, the counterclaims for declaratory relief in this 

action merely seek to clarify the rights and obligations of the parties, not prevent them 

from receiving the benefits.5 Finally, Plaintiffs have made no showing of a special 

relationship. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication of the breach of the 

 

4 While the Court previously denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim, 

Defendants did not seek adjudication on the same grounds.

5

Indeed, under Plaintiffs’ logic, any party to a contract who files a claim for declaratory relief as to the 

meaning of a contract term could be said to be seeking to prevent the other party from receiving the 

benefits of the contract.

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covenant claim (Count II) is DENIED; and summary adjudication is GRANTED in 

favor of Defendants on this claim.6

C. Unfair Competition.

In Arizona, the “doctrine of unfair competition is based on principles of equity” 

and “[t]he general purpose of the doctrine is to prevent business conduct ‘contrary to 

honest practice in industrial or commercial matters.’” Fairway Constructors, Inc. v. 

Ahern, 970 P.2d 954, 956 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998)(citations omitted). Plaintiffs argue that 

filing the Petition, and pursuing counter-claims here, are dishonest attempts to renege on 

the Settlement Agreement. However, as set forth above, the filing of the Petition, while 

ineffective, was not dishonest. Moreover, filing counterclaims here for declaratory relief 

as to the rights and obligations of the parties is certainly not an action that is “contrary to 

honest practice.” Id. While Defendants may ultimately be unsuccessful in their counterclaims, that does not make the filing of the counter-claims unfair competition. Therefore, 

Plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication of the unfair competition claim (Count IV) is 

DENIED; and summary adjudication is GRANTED in favor of Defendants on this 

claim.7

D. Count III and Counterclaims I, and II.

Plaintiffs argue they are entitled to summary adjudication of Count III and Counterclaims I and II for declaratory relief. However, at a minimum, there are triable issues of 

fact as to what the parties meant by “trade secrets” and “Claimants’ other Intellectual 

Property.” That being said, the Court reiterates its position that it will not adjudicate 

anything that was the subject of the previous litigation. It will only adjudicate whether 

there was a “meeting of the minds” as to key terms of the Settlement Agreement. 

 

6 While the Court previously denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim, 

Defendants did not seek adjudication on the same grounds.

7 While the Court previously denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim, 

Defendants did not seek adjudication on the same grounds.

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Therefore, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication of Count III and Counter-claims I 

and II is DENIED.

E. Counter-claim III.

This Court previously denied Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication that the 

Non-Opposition Clause was unenforceable because there was no showing of significant 

public injury. [Doc. No. 117 at 6.] Defendants now claim to have such evidence. [Doc. 

No. 150 at 16.] The Court will defer review of this evidence until after it decides related 

Daubert motions on this evidence. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication 

of Counter-claim III is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED, 

and summary adjudication of Counts I, II and IV is GRANTED IN FAVOR OF 

DEFENDANTS. 

This case is now limited to claims and counter-claims for declaratory relief and 

will be set for a bench trial. All further pretrial dates and filings are HEREBY 

VACATED. A status conference will be held on July 10, 2018 at 10:00 a.m. in 

Courtroom 4-C to discuss further proceedings and reset dates. 

Dated: June 29, 2018

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