Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00848/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00848-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

NATHANIEL HEARN, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 08-00848 PHX MHM (MEA)

)

DORA SCHRIRO and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE MARY H. MURGUIA:

On or about April 22, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro se

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 2254. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 12) on August 4, 2008.

Respondents contend the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

over the petition because at the time Petitioner filed this

action he was no longer in custody pursuant to the conviction he

challenges. Respondents also assert the action for habeas

relief may be denied and dismissed because relief on this claim

is procedurally barred and because the claim is without merit.

Petitioner filed a reply to the answer on January 12, 2009. See

Docket No. 18.

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1

 Petitioner has two other section 2254 actions pending in

the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. In

Docket No. 08-252, filed February 7, 2008, Petitioner challenges his

1982 conviction and sentence on one count of sexual assault. A Report

and Recommendation in that matter was filed June 16, 2008, in which

the undersigned recommended that the petition be denied and dismissed

with prejudice. Petitioner’s reply to the answer to his petition in

Docket No. 08-448, in which matter he challenges his convictions on

charges of robbery and unlawful flight, is due February 10, 2009.

-2-

I Procedural History

In the instant habeas petition, Petitioner challenges

his conviction in Maricopa County Superior Court docket number

CR2003-035096.1

On June 19, 2003, in Maricopa County Superior Court

docket number CR2003-035096, Petitioner was charged by an

information with failing to register as a sex offender between

March 31, 2003, and June 9, 2003. See Answer, Exh. W. At a

preliminary hearing conducted July 1, 2003, Petitioner informed

the trial court that he wished to represent himself and the

trial court appointed a public defender to be Petitioner’s

advisory, or “standby” counsel. Id., Exh. Y. 

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the charges stated

in docket number CR2003-035096 on July 14, 2003. Id., Exh. Z at

97 & Exh. CC. Attached to his motion to dismiss the charge of

failing to register as a sex offender were copies of sex

offender registration forms Petitioner had filed pursuant to

Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-3821; the earliest of the

registration forms was dated January of 1987. Id., Exh. CC,

Attach. The motion to dismiss was denied.

Case 2:08-cv-00848-MHM Document 19 Filed 01/27/09 Page 2 of 12
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On December 18, 2003, in Maricopa County Superior Court

docket number CR2003-035096, Petitioner pled guilty to one count

of failure to register as a sex offender in exchange for the

state’s agreement to dismiss an allegation of prior felony

convictions. Id., Exh. KK. 

Petitioner’s guilty plea in CR2003-035096 constituted

a violation of probation imposed on Petitioner as a result of

his conviction in two separate 2002 criminal cases, i.e.,

Maricopa County Superior Court docket numbers CR2002-004244 and

CR2002-14683. Id., Exh. LL. On June 11, 2004, the trial court

revoked Petitioner’s probation in both of the 2002 cases and

sentenced Petitioner to concurrent prison terms of 2.5 years

dating from that date with credit for presentence incarceration

of 487 days. Id., Exh. MM. The presentence incarceration

credit was altered on May 8, 2007, to 660 days in CR2002-004244

and 461 days in CR2002-14683. 

In the 2003 case Petitioner is challenging (CR2003-

35096), also on June 11, 2004, the state trial court denied

Petitioner’s motion to withdraw from the plea agreement and

sentenced Petitioner to the presumptive 2.5 year prison term,

which was ordered to run consecutively to the sentences imposed

in the 2002 cases. Id., Exh. NN. Petitioner was given credit

for 171 days of presentence incarceration, which was amended to

343 days of presentence incarceration on May 8, 2007.

On March 22, 2005, in Maricopa County docket number

CR2004-006251, Petitioner was sentenced to a twelve-year term

of imprisonment and a concurrent six-year term of imprisonment,

Case 2:08-cv-00848-MHM Document 19 Filed 01/27/09 Page 3 of 12
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after being convicted by a jury of robbery and unlawful flight

from a law enforcement vehicle. Id., Exh. WW. Both sentences

were ordered to run consecutively to the sentences imposed in

the 2002 cases and the 2003 case. Id., Exh. WW.

Petitioner represented himself, with the assistance of

appointed advisory counsel, in his 2003 criminal proceedings

from the time of his preliminary hearing. In his federal habeas

petition Petitioner asserts he was denied his right to the

effective assistance of counsel.

II Analysis

A. Respondents contend Petitioner is not “in custody”

as that term is defined by the relevant federal statute

governing jurisdiction over habeas petitions.

Respondents assert Petitioner’s current confinement is

the result of his conviction in CR2004-006251 and not the

conviction challenged in this habeas action, i.e.,

CR2003-035096. Accordingly, they argue, because Petitioner

finished serving the sentence imposed for the challenged

conviction, i.e., CR2003-035096, Petitioner is not “‘in custody’

as necessary to fulfill the jurisdictional requirement for

federal habeas review.” Answer at 2. Respondents allege

Petitioner’s sentence for the challenged conviction “could not

have expired any later than November 20, 2006,” more than

eighteen months before he filed the instant habeas petition in

April of 2008. Id. at 16. Therefore, Respondents argue, relief

is moot because Petitioner has completely served the sentence

resulting from the conviction he seeks to reverse. 

Case 2:08-cv-00848-MHM Document 19 Filed 01/27/09 Page 4 of 12
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The United States District Courts have the power to

grant a writ of habeas corpus only to individuals who are “in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States.” If not actually incarcerated pursuant to

the conviction he seeks to reverse, a habeas petitioner must

establish that he is subject to conditions that “significantly

restrain ... [his] liberty.” Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236,

243, 83 S. Ct. 373, 377 (1963); Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d

707, 717-19 (7th Cir. 2008). When a petitioner is not

incarcerated pursuant to the challenged conviction, the

collateral consequences of the conviction, i.e., consequences

with negligible effects on the petitioner’s physical liberty,

are insufficient to satisfy the “in custody” requirement. See

Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491-92, 109 S. Ct. 1923, 1925-26

(1989); Virsnieks, 521 F.3d at 717-19.

Petitioner contends that, because of his conviction in

CR2003-035096, the challenged conviction before the Court, and

his 1981 conviction for a sexual offense, the prison restricts

his recreation, his visits, and 

many other programs because I refuse to take

sex offender treatment... Even though I have

received an absolute discharge from this

sexual assault charge in 1991 and never

recommitted another sex charge D.O.C. is

still punishing me for this crime and trying

to comply me to testify against myself and

they share information with the county

attorney.

Reply at 2.

Petitioner has not established that he is “in custody”

pursuant to the conviction he seeks to challenge. Any

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limitation on his current incarceration, resulting from a

different conviction, which limitation arises from his prior

conviction, is best described as a collateral consequence of the

prior conviction. Cf. Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180,

1183 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that Washington sexual offender

registration laws do not render registrant “in custody”); Henry

v. Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999) (California);

McNab v. Kok, 170 F.3d 1246, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999) (Oregon);

Leslie v. Randle, 296 F.3d 518, 521-23 (6th Cir. 2002) (Ohio).

Compare Zichko v. Idaho, 24 7 F.3d 1015, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 2001)

(“[A] habeas petitioner is ‘in custody’ for the purposes of

challenging an earlier, expired rape conviction, when he is

incarcerated for failing to comply with a state sex offender

registration law because the earlier rape conviction ‘is a

necessary predicate’ to the failure to register charge.”). 

As argued by Respondents, Petitioner is no longer

incarcerated for failing to comply with the registration

statute; Petitioner is incarcerated for 2004 property crimes

offenses. Accordingly, Petitioner is not suffering the

collateral consequence of either his original sex offense or the

resulting conviction for failing to register as a sex offender.

Because Petitioner cannot show that he was “in custody” on his

2003 conviction for failing to register as a sex offender at the

time he filed the instant Petition, the District Court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction over the petition.

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B. Respondents assert the petition must be denied

because Petitioner waived the right to assert an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim by electing to represent himself in

his criminal proceedings.

The only claim for relief stated in the Petition is

“ineffective assistance of counsel on his counsel while he was

his attorney and the fact [Petitioner] had to choose between

ineffective assistance of counsel or to represent himself.”

Reply at 2.

Respondents assert the claim is procedurally barred for

Petitioner’s failure to properly exhaust the claim in the state

courts. Respondents maintain Petitioner has not shown cause for,

nor prejudice arising from his procedural default of the claim,

and that Petitioner has similarly not established that a

fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur absent a review of

the merits of the claim. Respondents also contend Petitioner

waived any Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel

claim. Additionally, Respondents argue, the claim may be denied

on the merits. 

Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to

dismiss a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for

federal habeas relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An

application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the

merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust

the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2008). The undersigned agrees with

Respondents that Petitioner procedurally defaulted his habeas

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claim in the state courts and that Petitioner has not shown

cause nor prejudice with regard to this default. 

The undersigned also agrees the claim may be denied on

the merits. Petitioner waived any claim that he was denied his

Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel

when he choose to represent himself in his criminal proceedings.

Additionally, to the extent he asserts he was denied any right

to the effective assistance of “standby” counsel, Petitioner has

not asserted the deprivation of a right assured by the United

States Constitution.

In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46, 95 S.

Ct. 2525, 2541 n.46 (1975) the Supreme Court held that a

defendant who elected to represent himself could not then

complain “that the quality of his own defense” deprived him of

his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of

counsel. Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has

never held that a state criminal defendant is constitutionally

entitled to the effective assistance of “standby” or advisory

counsel. See Wilson v. Parker, 515 F.3d 682, 697 (6th Cir.

2008). 

The Sixth Circuit reasoned in Wilson:

Since [the petitioner] waived his right to

counsel, his claim of ineffective assistance

of trial counsel necessarily fails. By

exercising his constitutional right to

present his own defense, a defendant

necessarily waives his constitutional right

to be represented by counsel. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834, 95 S. Ct. 2525. Logically,

a defendant cannot waive his right to counsel

and then complain about the quality of his

own defense. Id. at 834 n.46, 95 S. Ct.

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2525; Gall v. Parker, 231 F.3d 265, 320 (6th

Cir. 2000).

Id., 515 F.3d at 696. 

In a case in which the petitioner alleged he was not

afforded effective assistance of counsel prior to the date the

petitioner chose to represent himself, a claim similar to that

asserted by Petitioner, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

noted: “[The petitioner] makes no free-standing claim

ineffectiveness assistance of counsel, nor could he. Having

failed to show that his decision to represent himself was

involuntary, [the petitioner] cannot claim that he was denied

the effective assistance of counsel at trial.” Williams v.

Stewart, 441 F.3d 1030, 1047 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006).

Although Petitioner contends his choice was to accept

incompetent counsel or to represent himself, the Circuit Courts

of Appeal have uniformly concluded that an indigent criminal

defendant does not have the right to either counsel of his own

choosing or “hybrid” representation. See, e.g., Wilson, 515

F.3d at 696.

The Faretta right and the appointment of

standby counsel inherently conflict which,

taking into account that hybrid

representation is not required,[] supports

the conclusion that there is no right to

standby counsel. Certainly there is no

Supreme Court precedent clearly establishing

such a right. [] When standby counsel is

appointed, the.... Therefore, the inadequacy

of standby counsel’s performance, without the

defendant’s relinquishment of his Faretta

right, cannot give rise to an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim under the Sixth

Amendment. [] [The petitioner] does not

provide, nor could we find, a Supreme Court

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case holding standby counsel in a capital

case should be treated any differently.

Simpson v. Battaglia, 458 F.3d 585, 597 (7th Cir. 2006)

(internal citations omitted). The Seventh Circuit, in addition

to other Circuit Courts of Appeal, have reasoned that, in the

context of criminal proceedings in which the defendant was pro

per, any “deficiencies” in representation were products of the

defendant’s self-representation and do not constitute defective

assistance of counsel. See, e.g., id., 458 F.3d at 598. See

also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8, 104 S. Ct. 944,

944 n.8 (1984) (“[A] defendant who exercises his right to appear

pro se ‘cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own

defense amounted to a denial of effective assistance of

counsel.’”). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has held that,

where counsel was relieved at the defendant’s request prior to

a plea agreement and thereafter served as “standby counsel,” a

habeas petitioner could not state a cognizable claim for denial

of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Tate v. Wood, 963

F.2d 20, 26 (1992).

C. Respondents contend Petitioner’s claim fails on the

merits because his 2003 advisory counsel’s performance was not

deficient for failing to raise the defense that the 1982 plea

agreement did not require Petitioner to register as a sex

offender.

As noted by Respondents, prior to the time appointed

advisory counsel entered an appearance, Petitioner asserted a

defense contradictory to the assertion that he could not be

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convicted of failure to register as a sex offender because his

plea agreement in the sex offense case did not require him to do

so. Additionally, Petitioner has not established that any

alleged deficiency was prejudicial because the argument he

alleges he could not present was presented to, and rejected by,

the state courts in Petitioner’s state actions for postconviction relief. 

III Conclusion

The Court may not exercise jurisdiction over the habeas

petition because Petitioner is not “in custody” pursuant to the

conviction he seeks to challenge. Additionally, Petitioner has

completely finished serving the sentence arising from the

conviction he seeks to challenge and, accordingly, the action is

moot. Furthermore, notwithstanding Petitioner’s procedural

default of his habeas claim, the claim that Petitioner was

denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of

counsel because his advisory counsel failed to facilitate

Petitioner’s assertion of a particular defense may be denied on

the merits of the claim. Petitioner waived any Sixth Amendment

claim regarding his right to the effective assistance of counsel

by pleading guilty. Additionally, Petitioner has not

established that his advisory counsel’s alleged failure to raise

the asserted defense was prejudicial to Petitioner’s conviction.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Hearn’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

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This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 26th day of January, 2009.

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