Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00078/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00078-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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U.S . District Court

 E. D . California 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

)

RAYMOND LOPEZ, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

NORTH KERN STATE PRISON, et al., )

) 

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

1:05 CV 0078 AWI DLB P 

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro per and in forma pauperis with a civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Pending before the Court is plaintiff’s complaint filed January

19, 2005. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 72-302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

"frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2); 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If the court determines that the complaint fails to state a claim, leave to amend

may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. 

Case 1:05-cv-00078-AWI-DLB Document 7 Filed 04/29/05 Page 1 of 6
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Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

A. Plaintiff’s Allegations.

Plaintiff alleges that he arrived at North Kern State Prison in July 2003. Prior to that he was

at Corcoran State Prison where he was receiving medications and treatment for mobility impairments

and degenerative disc syndrome. He alleges that since arriving at North Kern State Prison he has

tried desperately to receive treatment but his doctor, defendant Dr. Rhodes has informed him that

“Sacramento” will not allow him to treat plaintiff because he is at a reception prison.

B. North Kern State Prison as a Defendant. 

Plaintiff is advised that he may not sustain an action against a state prison. The Eleventh

Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought against an unconsenting state. 

Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Co., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991)(citation omitted);

see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1122 (1996); Puerto Rico Aqueduct

Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993); Austin v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 939

F.2d 676, 677 (9th Cir. 1991). The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state agencies as well as

those where the state itself is named as a defendant. See Natural Resources Defense Council v.

California Dep’t of Tranp., 96 F.3d 420, 421 (9th Cir. 1996); Brook, 951 F.2d at 1053; Taylor v.

List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989)(concluding that Nevada Department of Prisons was a state

agency entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community College

Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). Because the North Kern State Prison is a part of the

California Department of Corrections, which is a state agency, it is entitled to Eleventh Amendment

immunity from suit.

C. Medical Care.

A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not constitute cruel and unusual

punishment unless the mistreatment rises to the level of "deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The “deliberate indifference” standard involves

an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms,

“sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501

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U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must act with a “sufficiently culpable state of

mind,” which entails more than mere negligence, but less than conduct undertaken for the very

purpose of causing harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. A prison official does not act in a

deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety.” Id.

In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a prisoner's

civil rights have been abridged, "the indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere

'indifference,' 'negligence,' or 'medical malpractice' will not support this cause of action." Broughton

v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980), citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. “[A]

complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not

state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does

not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle v. Gamble,

429 U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995);

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1050 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs.,

Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997)(en banc). Even gross negligence is insufficient to

establish deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d

1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990). A prisoner’s mere disagreement with diagnosis or treatment does not

support a claim of deliberate indifference. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Deliberate indifference can be manifested by prison guards intentionally denying or delaying

access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed. Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104-05. However, where a prisoner alleges a delay in receiving medical

treatment, the prisoner must allege that the delay led to further injury. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133,

1136 (9th Cir. 1997); Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir.

1985). 

Although neither a physician’s negligence nor a prisoner’s disagreement with a particular

course of treatment states a claim for deliberate indifference, a prison medical staff’s acts or

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omissions will constitute deliberate indifference if staff members knew of and disregarded an

excessive risk to an inmate’s health. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. Prison officials are

deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs when they “interfere with treatment

once prescribed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104-05. The Ninth Circuit has found deliberate

indifference where prison officials “deliberately ignore the express orders of a prisoner’s prior

physician for reasons unrelated to the medical needs of the prisoner.” Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d

1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 1992)(reversing summary judgment where prison officials forced prisoner to

endure a plane flight that resulted in ear injury, in direct contravention of a treating physician’s

previous orders); Ortiz v. City of Imperial, 884 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989)(per

curium)(reversing summary judgment where medical staff knew that pretrial detainee had head

injury, but prescribed contraindicated medications, disregarding evidence of complications to which

they had been specifically alerted by private treating physician); Tolbert v. Eyman, 434 F.2d 625 (9th

Cir. 1970)(finding cognizable claim for deliberate indifference where warden refused to authorize

prisoner’s receipt of medicine that had been previously prescribed by a physician); Cf. McGuckin v.

Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1062 (9th Cir. 1992)(where surgery recommended by prisoner’s prior

physician was severely delayed, court was unable hold doctors liable because prison administrators,

not the doctors, were responsible for scheduling treatment).

 The Courts of other federal Circuits have also found deliberate indifference where prison

officials ignore a previous physician’s treatment plan. White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103 (3rd Cir.

1990)(finding cognizable claim for deliberate indifference where prison officials ignored private

hospital’s treatment orders and refused inmate’s access to prescribed medication); Gill v. Mooney,

824 F.2d 192 (2nd Cir. 1987)(finding cognizable claim where prison officials refused to permit

plaintiff to participate in exercise program prescribed by doctor); Eades v. Thompson, 823 F.2d 1055

(7th Cir. 1987)(finding cognizable claim where prisoner alleged that prison officials made him travel

and carry a heavy box, causing a surgical incision to gape open, in violation of prior medical orders);

Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921 (2nd Cir. 1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 983, cited with approval

by Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 105 n.10 (finding deliberate indifference where prison staff forced

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post-surgical prisoner-patient to walk, ignoring warnings from hospital personnel that inmate should

not be moved); see also Carl T. Drechsler, Annotation, Relief Under Federal Civil Rights Acts to

State Prisoners Complaining of Denial of Medical Care, 28 A.L.R. Fed. 279 (1976)(recognizing that,

on the whole, courts do not condone the practice of prison officials ignoring orders rendered by a

prisoner’s previous physician). 

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding his inability to obtain treatment for his mobility impairments

at North Kern State Prison are insufficient to state a cognizable claim for relief for deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need. He identified a potentially serious medical need but his

allegations regarding Dr. Rhodes failure to provide treatment do not rise to the level of deliberate

indifference. Based on the allegations, it does not appear that Dr. Rhodes is intentionally refusing

treatment to plaintiff. Rather, Dr. Rhodes is unable to provide treatment due to prison policy. These

allegations do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.

In summary, the Court finds it necessary to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. The Court

will grant plaintiff an opportunity to amend to cure the deficiencies of this complaint. Failure to cure

the deficiencies will result in dismissal of this action without leave to amend. 

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions

complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy,

625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named

defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some

affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy,

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the Court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to

make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 

general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d

55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer

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serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint,

each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed; and

2. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an

amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended complaint must bear the docket

number assigned this case and must be labeled "Amended Complaint"; plaintiff must file an original

and two copies of the amended complaint; failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with

this order will result in dismissal of this action for failure to state a claim and failure to comply with

the court’s order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 28, 2005 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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