Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01085/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01085-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TAI EDMUND FRED ABREU,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAVINESS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:15-cv-01085-AWI-JLT (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH 

LEAVE TO AMENDED 

(Doc. 1)

30-DAY DEADLINE

I. Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2); 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). 

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. 

Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred 

elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).

Case 1:15-cv-01085-AWI-JLT Document 13 Filed 10/23/15 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged 

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 

U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A. Summary of Plaintiff=s Complaint

Plaintiff complains of acts that occurred while he was an inmate at the California State 

Prison in Corcoran, California ("CSP-Cor"). Plaintiff names the following Defendants: CSC 

Cavines, C/O Miguel, K. Allen, J.D. Lozano, Sgt. James, Deputy Warden T. Perez, and Does 1-5 

and seeks monetary damages. 

Plaintiff alleges that on April 13, 2013 he was working as a "Linebacker," which involved

him carrying trays of food to the serving line in the chow hall from the kitchen. He alleges that he 

slipped and fell while passing through the doorway between the two rooms. Plaintiff alleges that 

this specific area is slippery as liquids workers regularly spill liquids there and the floor is tile 

without a mat, traction strips, or warning signage. He claims also that prison officials lock up 

cleaning supplies during serving times to prevent contamination of the food. Defendant Caviness 

was present and witnessed Plaintiff's fall and thereafter ordered other staff to clean up the liquid 

where Plaintiff slipped. 

One week later, on April 20, 2013, Plaintiff again slipped in water and oil/grease that had 

been spilled on the floor in that same area, this time injuring his wrist. Plaintiff alleges that this 

second fall should not have happened since the dangerous condition of the floor in that area 

during serving time was known and that Defendants failed to rectify it. 

Defendant C/O Miguel was the custodial staff who supervised all inmates in the area 

where Plaintiff fell and holds the keys to the locked cabinet where cleaning supplies are kept. 

Plaintiff alleges that C/O Miguel "had the keys to the locked cabinet where cleaning supplies are 

kept." (Doc. 1, at p. 8.) 

Defendants K. Allen, J.D. Lozano, Sgt. James, and Deputy Warden Perez apparently are 

involved in the Inmate Grievance (602) process. Plaintiff alleges that they found no proof of a 

hazardous environment despite "years of complaints" and "eye witness testimony of other 

Case 1:15-cv-01085-AWI-JLT Document 13 Filed 10/23/15 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

culinary workers." (Id., at p. 9.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Does 1-3 are unknown persons "involved in the retaliatory action of 

moving Plaintiff from the paid [Linebacker] position to the position in kitchen cleaning crew, 

which is never called to work and therefore is a defacto firing" and that Does 4 & 5 are 

supervisors of Caviness and Miguel (Id.) 

As discussed below, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim, but may be able to amend 

to correct the deficiencies in his pleading and so is being given the applicable standards based on 

his stated claims and leave to file a first amended complaint. 

C. Pleading Requirements

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

"Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 

exceptions," none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 

U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). A complaint must contain "a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). 

"Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and 

the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but A[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim that is 

plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual 

allegations are accepted as true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal. at 678; see also Moss v. U.S. 

Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557. 

While Aplaintiffs [now] face a higher burden of pleadings facts . . . ,@ Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 

580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), the pleadings of pro se prisoners are still construed liberally 

and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Blaisdell v. Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 

2013); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). However, "the liberal pleading 

standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations," Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 

Case 1:15-cv-01085-AWI-JLT Document 13 Filed 10/23/15 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

n.9 (1989), "a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 

of the claim that were not initially pled," Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 

1257 (9th Cir. 1997) quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982), and courts 

are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences, Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 

681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The “sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a 

defendant’s liability” fall short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 

S. Ct. at 1949; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. Plaintiff must identify specific facts supporting the 

existence of substantively plausible claims for relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby, __ U.S. __, __, 

135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014) (per curiam) (citation omitted).

If he chooses to file a first amended complaint, Plaintiff should make it as concise as 

possible. He should merely state which of his constitutional rights he feels were violated by each 

Defendant and its factual basis. 

2. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to 

be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of 

any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . 

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 

other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. ' 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between 

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 

(1976). 

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or 

other federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 

1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); 

Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. “Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely 

provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Crowley v. Nevada ex rel. 

Nevada Sec’y of State, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 

Case 1:15-cv-01085-AWI-JLT Document 13 Filed 10/23/15 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

386, 393-94, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To state a claim, 

Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating the existence of a link, or causal connection, between 

each defendant’s actions or omissions and a violation of his federal rights. Lemire v. California 

Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 

1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that A[a] person >subjects= another to the deprivation of a 

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 

in another=s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.@ Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 

Cir. 1978). Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

Plaintiff must clarify which Defendant(s) he feels are responsible for each violation of his 

constitutional rights and their factual basis as his Complaint must put each Defendant on notice of 

Plaintiff=s claims against him or her. See Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004).

D. Claims for Relief

1. Eighth Amendment 

"The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined 

are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 

114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994) (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993)). Prison officials 

have a duty "to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates, which has been 

interpreted to include a duty to protect prisoners." Labatad v. Corrections Corp. of America, 714 

F.3d 1155, 1160 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832-33; Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 

(9th Cir. 2005)).

To establish a violation of this duty, the prisoner must "show that the officials acted with 

deliberate indifference to threat of serious harm or injury to an inmate." Labatad, at 1160 (citing 

Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002). This involves both objective 

and subjective components.

First, objectively, the alleged deprivation must be "sufficiently serious" and where a 

Case 1:15-cv-01085-AWI-JLT Document 13 Filed 10/23/15 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

failure to prevent harm is alleged, "the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions 

posing a substantial risk of serious harm." Id. at 834, quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 

349, 101 S.Ct. 2392 (1981). At screening, Plaintiff's allegations describing the consistently 

slippery condition of the floor where he twice fell is accepted as posing a substantial risk of 

serious harm.

Second, subjectively, the prison official must "know of and disregard an excessive risk to 

inmate health or safety." Id. at 837; Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir. 

1995). A prison official must "be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and . . . must also draw the inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. 

at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970. Liability may follow only if a prison official "knows that inmates face a 

substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to 

abate it." Id. at 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970. Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim as his allegations 

fail to show that any of the Defendants knew, on April 20, 2013 that the area where Plaintiff 

slipped had been spilled on and was slippery prior to Plaintiff's fall that injured his wrist, and 

failed to take steps to rectify the situation. 

2. Retaliation

Prisoners have a First Amendment right to file grievances against prison officials and to 

be free from retaliation for doing so. Waitson v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-1115 (9th Cir. 

2012); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir.2009). A retaliation claim has five 

elements. Id. at 1114. 

First, the plaintiff must allege that the retaliated-against conduct is protected. Id. The 

filing of an inmate grievance is protected conduct, Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 568 (9th 

Cir. 2005), as are the rights to speech or to petition the government, Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 

527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); 

Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). Second, the plaintiff must show the 

defendant took adverse action against the plaintiff. Rhodes, at 567. Third, the plaintiff must 

allege a causal connection between the adverse action and the protected conduct. Waitson, 668 

F.3d at 1114. Fourth, the plaintiff must allege that the “official’s acts would chill or silence a 

Case 1:15-cv-01085-AWI-JLT Document 13 Filed 10/23/15 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities.” Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568 

(internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Fifth, the plaintiff must allege “that the prison 

authorities’ retaliatory action did not advance legitimate goals of the correctional institution. . . .” 

Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir.1985). 

It bears repeating that while Plaintiff need only allege facts sufficient to support a 

plausible claim for relief, the mere possibility of misconduct is not sufficient, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678-79, and the Court is “not required to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart 

Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

The conduct identified by Plaintiff as retaliatory must have been motivated by his engaging in a 

protected activity, and the conduct must not have reasonably advanced a legitimate penological 

goal. Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1271-72 (citations omitted). Thus, mere allegations that Plaintiff 

engaged in protected activity, without knowledge resulting in animus by a Defendant, is 

insufficient to show that Plaintiff=s protected activity was the motivating factor behind a 

Defendant’s actions.

Thus, Plaintiff's allegations that Does 1-3 "are involved in the retaliatory action of moving 

Plaintiff from the paid position to the position in kitchen cleaning crew, which is never called to 

work and therefore is a defacto [sic] firing" do not state a cognizable retaliation claim. 

3. Inmate Appeals

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants K. Allen, J.D. Lozano, Sgt. James, and Dep. Warden 

Perez "were documented via the Inmate Grievance 602 process" and that "they collectively found 

no proof of a hazardous environment inspite [sic] of years of complaints [Exhibit F] and the eye 

witness testimony of other culinary workers [Exhibit B]." (Doc. 1, at p. 9.) 

"[I]nmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance 

procedure." Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no liberty interest in 

processing of appeals because no entitlement to a specific grievance procedure), citing Mann v. 

Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). A[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right 

only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates.@ Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. 

Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982) accord Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993); see 

Case 1:15-cv-01085-AWI-JLT Document 13 Filed 10/23/15 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

also Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (existence of grievance procedure 

confers no liberty interest on prisoner). AHence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest 

requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the Fourteenth Amendment.@ Azeez v. 

DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. at 10; Spencer v. Moore, 638 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986). 

Actions in reviewing prisoner=s administrative appeal generally cannot serve as the basis 

for liability under a ' 1983 action. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. However, "a plaintiff may state a 

claim against a supervisor for deliberate indifference based upon the supervisor's knowledge of 

and acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct by his or her subordinates." Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 

1202, 1207 (2011). Such knowledge and acquiescence may be shown via the inmate appeals 

process where the supervisor was involved in reviewing Plaintiff's applicable inmate appeal and 

failed to take corrective action so as to allow the violation to continue. However, such 

involvement in processing and/or reviewing an inmate appeal based on one incident is necessarily 

insufficient. 

From Plaintiff's allegations, it cannot be ascertained whether these Defendants were aware 

of the slippery state of the floor in the area where Plaintiff slipped on April 13th, let alone prior to 

his April 20th fall. It is noted that Plaintiff sates that there have been "years of complaints," but 

this is a conclusory allegation which need not be accepted and while Plaintiff references an 

exhibit, which presumably fleshes out the basis for this allegation, it is not attached to the 

Complaint. 

A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 “if there exists either (1) his 

or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection 

between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Hansen v. Black, 

885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.1989). “[A] plaintiff must show the supervisor breached a duty to 

plaintiff which was the proximate cause of the injury. The law clearly allows actions against 

supervisors under section 1983 as long as a sufficient causal connection is present and the 

plaintiff was deprived under color of law of a federally secured right.” Redman v. County of San 

Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991)(internal quotation marks omitted)(abrogated on other 

grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).

Case 1:15-cv-01085-AWI-JLT Document 13 Filed 10/23/15 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

“The requisite causal connection can be established . . . by setting in motion a series of 

acts by others,” id. (alteration in original; internal quotation marks omitted), or by “knowingly 

refus[ing] to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the supervisor] knew or reasonably 

should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury,” Dubner v. City & Cnty. 

of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 968 (9th Cir.2001). “A supervisor can be liable in his individual 

capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his 

subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a 

reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 

1087, 1093 (9th Cir.1998) (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff's allegations fail to show that Defendants K. Allen, J.D. Lozano, Sgt. James, and 

Dep. Warden Perez had knowledge of inmates falling because of spills which made the flooring 

between the kitchen and the serving line slippery prior to Plaintiff's fall on April 20, 2013. 

Indeed, Plaintiff's allegations even fail to show that these Defendants were aware of the fall that 

Plaintiff had on April 13th in the same area. .

Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim against Defendants K. Allen, J.D. Lozano, 

Sgt. James, and Dep Warden Perez.

4. Supervisory Liability

It appears that Plaintiff also may have named some of the Defendants, particularly Does 4 

& 5, because of their supervisory positions. Plaintiff specifically states that Does 4 & 5 are 

supervisory to Caviness and Miguel and they should have known about the hazardous 

environment from the numerous complaints over "years regarding the lack of cleanliness in the 

kitchen." (Doc. 1, at p. 9.)

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their 

employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a 

supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be 

specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 

589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief 

under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, Plaintiff must allege some facts that 

Case 1:15-cv-01085-AWI-JLT Document 13 Filed 10/23/15 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

would support a claim that supervisory defendants either: personally participated in the alleged 

deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or 

promulgated or "implemented a policy so deficient that the policy 'itself is a repudiation of 

constitutional rights' and is 'the moving force of the constitutional violation.'" Hansen v. Black, 

885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 

(9th Cir. 1989). Under section 1983, liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for 

the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. "In 

a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action - where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants - the 

term 'supervisory liability' is a misnomer." Id. 

The Supreme Court has rejected liability on the part of supervisors for “knowledge and 

acquiescence” in subordinates’ wrongful discriminatory acts. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

677 (2009) (“[R]espondent believes a supervisor’s mere knowledge of his subordinate’s 

discriminatory purpose amounts to the supervisor’s violating the Constitution. We reject this 

argument.”) However, “discrete wrongs B for instance, beatings B by lower level Government 

actors . . . if true and if condoned by [supervisors] could be the basis for some inference of 

wrongful intent on [the supervisor’s] part.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 683. Further, the Ninth Circuit 

recently held that where the applicable constitutional standard is deliberate indifference, a 

plaintiff may state a claim for supervisory liability based upon the supervisor’s knowledge of and 

acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct by others. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2011). 

It is under this rubric that the traditional and still valid elements of supervisor liability within the 

Ninth Circuit are properly analyzed. 

It is worth restating that A>bare assertions . . . amount[ing] to nothing more than a 

Aformulaic recitation of the elements@ of a constitutional discrimination claim,= for the purposes of 

ruling on a motion to dismiss [and thus also for screening purposes], are not entitled to an 

assumption of truth.@ Moss, 572 F.3d at 969 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 1951 (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 555)). ASuch allegations are not to be discounted because they are >unrealistic or 

nonsensical,= but rather because they do nothing more than state a legal conclusion B even if that 

conclusion is cast in the form of a factual allegation.@ Id. To this end, allegations simply stating 

Case 1:15-cv-01085-AWI-JLT Document 13 Filed 10/23/15 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

that a given defendant knew of, or was aware of a situation that violated Plaintiff's rights will not 

suffice. Rather, Plaintiff must state specific factual allegations showing the events that give rise 

to a specific defendant having knowledge of the offending condition/situation and thereafter 

failing to rectify it.

Thus, allegations that Does 4 & 5, or any other defendant in a supervisory position, are 

somehow liable because their subordinates violated Plaintiff's rights are not cognizable. Further, 

Plaintiff's allegation that Does 4 & 5 should have known because of numerous complaints 

regarding the cleanliness of the kitchen would not even be sufficient under the notice standards 

discussed above since cleanliness of the kitchen can imply numerous unsanitary conditions that 

would not necessarily include a segment of tile floor that is frequently spilled on that becomes 

slippery and dangerous.

II. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed, with leave to file a first

amended complaint within thirty days. If Plaintiff chooses not to pursue this issue in an action 

under § 1983, he may file a notice of voluntary dismissal of this action in that same time. If 

Plaintiff fails to file either a first amended complaint or a notice of voluntary dismissal, the action 

will be dismissed for his failure to state a claim and will count as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 

If Plaintiff needs an extension of time to comply with this order, Plaintiff shall file a motion 

seeking an extension of time no later than thirty days from the date of service of this order.

Plaintiff must demonstrate in any first amended complaint how the conditions complained 

of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 

227 (9th Cir. 1980). The first amended complaint must allege in specific terms how each named 

defendant is involved. There can be no liability under section 1983 unless there is some 

affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo 

v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. 

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Plaintiff's first amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Such a short and 

plain statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 

Case 1:15-cv-01085-AWI-JLT Document 13 Filed 10/23/15 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) quoting Conley v. 

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Although accepted as true, the "[f]actual allegations must be 

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." Twombly, 550 U.S. 127, 555 

(2007) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff is further advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original, Lacey v. 

Maricopa County, Nos. 09-15806, 09-15703, 2012 WL 3711591, at *1 n.1 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 

2012) (en banc), and must be "complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded 

pleading," Local Rule 220. 

The Court provides Plaintiff with opportunity to amend to cure the deficiencies identified 

by the Court in this order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff 

may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his first amended 

complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no "buckshot" complaints).

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must file a 

first amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this 

order, not to exceed twenty-five pages, excluding exhibits; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure 

to obey a court order and for failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 22, 2015 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:15-cv-01085-AWI-JLT Document 13 Filed 10/23/15 Page 12 of 12