Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_01-cv-01322/USCOURTS-casd-3_01-cv-01322-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HECTOR JUAN AYALA,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 01cv1322-IEG(PCL)

Order Denying Petitioner’s Motion for

Summary Adjudication on Group 6

Claims [Doc. No. 230-1]; Granting

Respondent’s Motion for Summary

Adjudication on Group 6 Claims [Doc.

No. 228-1]

vs.

ROBERT L. AYERS, JR., Warden of the

California State Prison at San Quentin,

Respondent.

Petitioner Hector Juan Ayala and Respondent Steven Ornoski have moved for summary

adjudication on two of Petitioner’s Group 6 claims (Grounds 18 and 27) of his Third Amended

Petition. The parties have filed opposition and reply briefs. 

A hearing was held before Chief Judge Irma E. Gonzalez on October 12, 2007. Tiffany

Salayer appeared on behalf of Petitioner. Steven Oetting of the California Attorney General’s

Office appeared on behalf of Respondent. Upon consideration, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s

motion for summary adjudication and GRANTS Respondent’s motion for summary adjudication

on these Group 6 claims.

OVERVIEW

By an amended information filed on January 20, 1987, Petitioner Hector Juan Ayala

(“Petitioner”) and his brother Ronaldo Medrano Ayala were charged with the murders of Jose Luis

Rositas, Marcos Antonio Zamora and Ernesto Dominguez Mendez. The information alleged that

the murders were committed on or about April 26, 1985, during a robbery attempt where the

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brothers held four men captive in an automobile repair shop. Both men were also charged with the

attempted murder of Pedro Castillo, who was shot during the drug-related robbery attempt, but

who escaped and survived. At trial, the prosecution also presented evidence that a third man, Jose

Moreno, helped in the commission of these crimes. Castillo provided the information to police

that led to the arrests and was the key prosecutorial witness at trial. 

Petitioner was convicted on August 1, 1989, of three counts of first-degree murder in

violation of California Penal Code (“Cal. Penal Code”) § 187, one count of attempted murder in

violation of Cal. Penal Code §§ 664 and 187, and one count of robbery and three counts of

attempted robbery in violation of Cal. Penal Code §§ 664 and 211--each count with findings that

Petitioner used a firearm in the commission of the crimes in violation of Cal. Penal Code 

§ 12022.5. Petitioner was also found guilty of the two special circumstance allegations, multiple

murder under Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(3), and murder in the attempted commission of a robbery

under Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(17)(1). The jury returned a verdict of death for each of the three

murders on August 31, 1989, and the court entered judgment in accordance with the verdict on

November 30, 1989.

Petitioner filed his opening brief on automatic appeal to the California Supreme Court on

April 23, 1998, raising nineteen (19) separate issues. The California Supreme Court denied the

appeal on August 28, 2000. People v. Ayala, 24 Cal.4th 243 (2000). On November 15, 2000, the

state court denied the petition for rehearing. On March 15, 2001, Petitioner filed a writ of

Certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which was denied on May 14, 2001. On May 14,

2001, his judgment became final.

On August 9, 1999, Petitioner filed a habeas petition with the California Supreme Court,

raising three (3) grounds for relief. Petitioner was not granted an evidentiary hearing on those

claims and his petition was summarily denied on August 30, 2000. 

On July 20, 2001, Petitioner filed a request for appointment of counsel to handle his federal

habeas petition. Petitioner filed an initial petition in this Court on May 14, 2002. After filing a

Second Amended Petition on December 13, 2002, Petitioner filed a second state habeas petition in

the California Supreme Court on March 17, 2003. The state petition was filed in order to exhaust

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several unexhausted claims.

Petitioner filed his Third Amended Petition with this Court on December 9, 2004. On

April 11, 2006, the Court denied Petitioner’s request for summary adjudication and/or an

evidentiary hearing regarding Petitioner’s Group 1 Claims (Claims 12 and 13) and granted

Respondent’s motion for summary adjudication of those claims. On October 23, 2006, the Court

denied Petitioner’s request for summary adjudication and/or an evidentiary hearing on the Group

Two Claims (Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 9) and granted Respondent’s motion to dismiss those claims. 

On December 6, 2006, the Court denied Petitioner’s request for summary adjudication and/or an

evidentiary hearing on the Group Three Claims (Claims 6, 7, 8, 10 and 11) and granted

Respondent’s motion to dismiss those claims. On December 19, 2006, the Court denied

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the Order on Group Two Claims (Claim 5). On March

15, 2007, the Court denied Petitioner’s request for summary adjudication and/or an evidentiary

hearing on the Group Four Claims (Claims 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21) and granted

Respondent’s request for summary adjudication on those claims. On July 9, 2007, the Court

denied Petitioner’s request for summary adjudication on the Group Five claims (Claims 22, 23, 24,

and 25) and granted Respondent’s request for summary adjudication on those claims. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review for federal

habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district

court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006) (emphasis added).

In Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997), the United States Supreme Court held that

the new provisions of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)

“generally apply only to cases filed after the Act [AEDPA] became effective.” In capital habeas

actions, cases are typically commenced by the filing of requests for appointment of counsel and

stays of execution of the petitioners’ death sentences. Petitioner filed his request for appointment

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of counsel and stay of execution on April 27, 2001 and filed his petition with this Court on May 6,

2002. The AEDPA became effective on April 24, 1996, when the President signed it into law. 

See id. Accordingly, the AEDPA applies to this case.

Relevant to this case are the changes AEDPA rendered to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d),

which now reads:

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (West 2006). 

A decision is “contrary to” clearly established law if it fails to apply the correct controlling

authority, or if it applied the controlling authority to a case involving facts materially

indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. See

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). A decision

involves an “unreasonable application” of federal law if “the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle . . . but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's

case.” Id.; Bruce v. Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2004).

Even when the federal court undertakes an independent review of the record in the absence

of a reasoned state court decision, the federal court must “still defer to the state court’s ultimate

decision.” Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). If the state court decision does

not furnish any analytical foundation, the review must focus on Supreme Court cases to determine

“whether the state court’s resolution of the case constituted an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law.” Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 2001). Federal courts

also look to Ninth Circuit law for persuasive authority in applying Supreme Court law and to

determine whether a particular state court decision is an “unreasonable application” of Supreme

Court precedent. Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004). 

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Generally, the standard for granting an evidentiary hearing requires Petitioner to make a

showing he is entitled to habeas relief. 

A habeas petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing as a matter

of right on a claim where the facts are disputed if two conditions are

met: (1) where the petitioner’s allegations would, if proved, entitled

him to relief; and (2) the state court trier of fact has not, after a full

and fair hearing, reliably found the relevant facts.

Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 1999); Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1411

(9th Cir. 1998). To properly satisfy the first prong, a petitioner is “required to allege specific facts

which, if true, would entitle him to relief.” Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 934 (9th Cir. 1998).

A petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if the second prong is met through a

showing that:

(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the

state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the

fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full

and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence;

(5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing; or

(6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas

applicant a full and fair hearing.

Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963), overruled in part, Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504

U.S. 1 (1992). When a petitioner is able to establish a colorable claim for relief, did not fail to

develop the facts surrounding his claim, and was never given a state hearing on the claim, the

district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing. Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 670

(9th Cir. 2005), quoting Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1999).

In addition to being entitled an evidentiary hearing as of right when the petitioner presents

colorable allegations and the state court has not reliably found the relevant facts through no fault

of the petitioner, a federal court retains discretionary authority to conduct an evidentiary hearing. 

Townsend, 372 U.S. at 318; Seidle v. Merkle, 146 F.3d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 1998).

The AEDPA further limits a district court’s decision to conduct evidentiary hearings in

§ 2254 proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2); see Ortiz-Sandoval v. Clarke, 323 F.3d 1165,

1171 n.4 (9th Cir. 2003). Section 2254(e) provides as follows:

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State

court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing unless the

applicant shows that:

(A) the claim relies on:

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(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to

cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was

previously unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously

discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by

clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no

reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the

underlying offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (West. 2006).

TEAGUE v. LANE

The United States Supreme Court, addressing perceived inconsistencies in its prior rulings

regarding retroactive application of its decisions, held that “new” constitutional rules of criminal

procedure will not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review unless they fall within two

narrow exceptions. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310-311 (1989). A new rule is one that “breaks

new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government” or one whose

“result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time defendant’s conviction became final.” 

Id. at 301. The two exceptions to the Teague rule are: (1) rules placing certain kinds of private

individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law to prohibit, and (2) procedures implicit in

the concept of ordered liberty without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously

diminished. Id., at 311; Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 305 (1989); Graham v. Collins, 506

U.S. 461, 478 (1993). 

When the state properly argues that a “defendant seeks the benefit of a new rule of

constitutional law, the court must apply Teague v. Lane before considering the merits of the

claim.” Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994). Under Teague, habeas relief is generally

unavailable if it is based “on a rule announced after [a petitioner’s] conviction and sentence

became final.” Id. Therefore, the court must first ascertain the date on which a petitioner’s

conviction became final. Id. The second step in a Teague analysis is to determine whether a state

court considering the contested claim would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude

that the rule petitioner seeks was required by the Constitution at the time his or her conviction

became final. Id. at 389-90. Third, if the court determines that a petitioner is seeking relief under

a new rule, the court must then decide if that rule falls under one of the two exceptions to Teague. 

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Id. at 390. Even if Petitioner does not seek to apply a decision creating a new rule, “it is necessary

to inquire whether granting the relief sought would create a new rule because the prior decision is

applied in a novel setting, thereby extending the precedent.” Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 228

(1992), referencing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414-15 (1990). 

The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s direct appeal on August 28, 2000, and

denied rehearing on November 15, 2000. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on

May 14, 2001, at which time Petitioner’s conviction became final. 

In the Answer to the Third Amended Petition, Respondent asserts that Teague bars this

Court is barred from deciding the merits of Claim 18 and 27. However, in the arguments on Claim

18, Respondent’s assertion of a Teague bar is limited to a generalized contention that “Petitioner

fails to show that the claim does not rest upon a new rule barred under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. at

288.” [Answer to Third Amended Petition (“Ans.”) at 68.] In the cross-motions, Respondent

mounts a detailed argument in support of his contention that Claim 27 is barred by Teague.

As to Claim 18, the Ninth Circuit has articulated its view on the duties placed on the state

to properly raise and plead a claim made under Teague. That court has held:

If a state seriously wishes to press Teague upon us, at a minimum

Teague should be identified as an issue (indeed the first issue) on

appeal, the new rule of constitutional law that falls within its

proscription should be articulated, the reasons why such a rule

would not have been compelled by existing precedent should be

explained with particular reference to the appropriate universe of

precedent, and an argument should be made why the rule contended

for is not within one of Teague’s exceptions. 

Arredondo v. Ortiz, 365 F.3d 778, 781-782 (9th Cir. 2004).

Respondent has not met his burden of properly raising and pleading a Teague bar for Claim

18. Thus, the court’s Teague analysis will only concern Claim 27, for which Teague was properly

pled.

In claim 27, Petitioner asserts his state appellate counsel was denied access to sealed

proceedings, including hearings on discovery requests and subpoenas duces tecum, in violation of

his Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Respondent asserts Claim 27 is barred

because first, “the essence of the claim is an attack upon the state’s post-conviction review

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process,” and second, “Petitioner would require this Court to announce a new rule allowing him a

procedural right to discovery of documents sealed at the time of trial.” (Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss [“Resp. MTD”] at 9.) Petitioner notes that Teague is an affirmative defense, and thus the

burden remains on the Respondent to prove its applicability, adding Claim 27 “relies on wellestablished Constitutional rights to effective assistance of appellate counsel, to a reliable

determination of his capital sentence, and to meaningful appellate review and due process.” 

(Petitioner’s Opposition [“Pet. Opp.”] at 13.) Respondent supports the contention that Petitioner is

advocating the use of a new rule of criminal procedure by noting that “Ninth Circuit law is clear

that ‘[A] petition alleging errors in the state post-conviction review process is not addressable

through habeas corpus proceedings.’ Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26, 26 (9th Cir. 1989) (per

curiam).” (Resp. MTD at 9.)

The Supreme Court has held that a decision is not new if “it has simply applied a wellestablished constitutional principle to govern a case which is closely analogous to those which

have been previously considered in the prior case law.” Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 314

(1989), abrogated on other grounds, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). In the merits

briefing, Petitioner cites to two Supreme Court cases, both of which he attempts to apply to the

facts of his claim. In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), the Supreme Court directed a

trial court to examine confidential files to look for material of assistance to the defendant in that

case. However, notably, the Court ultimately held that trial’s court review of the files was

sufficient and the defendant would not be allowed to view any of the confidential files, stating that

the Confrontation Clause does not establish a constitutionally compelled rule of pre-trial

discovery. Id. at 52-53. 

Petitioner also cites to Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), in which on direct

appeal the Supreme Court allowed a defendant access to surveillance material involving

conversations which either included the petitioner or took place at his residence; the Court’s ruling

specifically noted the material in question did not include anything outside the knowledge of the

defendant. Neither case applied a well-established constitutional privilege “closely analogous” to

the claim set forth by Petitioner. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 314.

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Granting Petitioner a right of access to sealed trial proceedings is not compelled by

existing Supreme Court precedent. Petitioner’s proposed rule indeed “breaks new ground or

imposes a new obligation on the State or the Federal Government,” and therefore the Court’s

remaining inquiry is whether either exception to Teague applies to this “new” rule. Id. at 301. A

rule granting a federal habeas petitioner access to documents sealed at trial does not place private

individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law to prohibit, nor can this rule be

considered of a ‘watershed” nature. Id. at 311; see also Penry, 492 U.S. at 305; Graham, 506 U.S.

at 478. Granting Petitioner relief on this claim, that is, access to the sealed ex parte trial

proceedings, would result in the creation of a new rule of criminal procedure which does not fall

under either of the exceptions to Teague. However, even assuming Claim 27 would not be barred

under Teague, it is without merit for the reasons set forth below.

DISCUSSION OF MERITS OF PETITIONER’S CLAIMS

Claims 18 and 27 involve an allegation regarding the constitutional infirmity of Petitioner’s

conviction and sentence stemming from Brady violations by the prosecution and appellate

counsels’ lack of access to sealed trial proceedings. Petitioner moves for summary adjudication,

or in the alternative, for an evidentiary hearing, on Claims 18 and 27. Respondent moves to

dismiss Claims 18 and 27, on the basis that Claim 18 is conclusory and procedurally barred and

Claim 27 is Teague barred and fails on the merits.

1. Claim 18

Petitioner alleges the “prosecution failed to disclose to Petitioner’s trial counsel material

exculpatory evidence involving Detective Carlos Chacon and witness Meza,” in violation of his

Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (TAP at 52.)

A. California Supreme Court’s opinion

Petitioner raised this claim in his second state habeas petition, and the California Supreme

Court denied it, stating in relevant part:

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied on the merits. Additionally,

the petition is denied as untimely (In re Robbins, (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770; In re Clark

(1993) 5 Cal.4th 750), and successive (In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 788,

fin. [sic] 9; In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 768; In re Horowitz (1949) 33 Cal.2d

534, 546-547.)

Justice Brown would deny the petition solely on the merits. 

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(Second Supplemental Lodgment 2/11/05, Bates 1151.)

Respondent states that “Petitioner’s claim is barred as both untimely and successive. 

Given the conclusory nature of this claim, however, Respondent has found it unnecessary to

demonstrate the regular and consistent application of those state procedural bars.” (Resp. MTD at

3.) Petitioner asserts the state court’s invocation of the procedural bars do not bar merits review of

his claim as they are neither independent of federal law nor are they consistently applied by the

state court. (Pet. Opp. at 4-10.)

In the instant case, the Court declines to render an opinion on the adequacy of state

procedural default rules and instead denies Claim 18 on the merits. Established precedent in this

Circuit dictates that a court’s decision with respect to evaluating procedural default is to be

informed by furthering “the interests of comity, federalism, and judicial efficiency.” Boyd v.

Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 1998). Thus, if deciding the merits of a claim proves to

be less complicated and less time-consuming than adjudicating the issue of procedural default, a

court may exercise discretion to take this course of action in its management of the case. 

Batchelor v. Cupp, 693 F.2d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 1982), quoted by Boyd, 147 F.3d at 1127. This

clearly is the case here. See also Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585 (9th Cir. 2003)(“the

ultimate burden of proving the adequacy of the California state bar is upon the State of California.

. .”).

While acknowledging that it could not grant relief on a claim found to be procedurally

defaulted absent a showing of cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice, the

Court is not prevented from addressing the merits, and in this case denying the claim based on that

merits review. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(b)(2).

B. Discussion

Petitioner alleges “the prosecution withheld material exculpatory evidence with respect to

Detective Chacon’s inducements to Meza to lie about Petitioner’s involvement in the planning of

the robbery/homicides and/or Petitioner’s alleged attempt to kill Castillo, as well as Chacon’s

inducements to other potential or actual witnesses to lie about Petitioner’s involvement in the

crimes at issue.” (TAP at 55.)

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Respondent maintains this claim is “wholly conclusory” and notes that Petitioner does not

even allege what inducements were offered by Chacon to Meza, nor does Petitioner identify who

the other witnesses might be. (Respondent’s Opposition [“Resp. Opp.”] at 4.) Respondent also

contends that because Petitioner’s allegations are based on “facts that were known by and

available to defense counsel prior to trial,” he cannot meet the burden of demonstrating that the

prosecution withheld the evidence, which is necessary to a successful Brady claim. (Id.)

Petitioner bases his allegations on the following facts [taken verbatim from the

Third Amended Petition, citations are to the pre-trial and trial transcripts]:

Detective Carlos Chacon and informant Juan Meza had known one another since

grammar school and Chacon had visited Meza over the years during periods when

Meza was incarcerated. [78 RT 9669.]

On April 26, 1985, within minutes of hearing the initial police broadcasts of a triple

homicide at the body shop and before there had been any investigation, Detective

Chacon claimed that he immediately guessed Petitioner, his brother and Meza were

responsible. [CIV PRT 3624-25; CIX PRT 4326.]

From 1985, when Meza first talked to Chacon about Petitioner’s alleged

involvement in the homicides, to 1987 when Meza first talked to the prosecution,

Chacon had visited Meza in jail at least eight or nine times. [CVIII PRT 3132,

3135-36; 81 RT 10263, 10268, 10272-73, 10279.]

During pretrial hearings, Detective Chacon testified that Meza had not told him

about his own alleged participation in the planning of the robbery/homicides until

1987. [CIX PRT 4324] Nevertheless, as early as 1985, Meza was clearly a source

for Chacon with respect to Petitioner’s alleged involvement in the case [CVIII PRT

4229; 81 RT 10271], and yet Chacon never named him as a source to the

prosecution team until 1987. [CXIV PRT 4993, 5086-88, 5107, 5117; CXVII

5478.]

Detective Chacon was assigned to the SDPD’s gang unit [81 RT 10252] and was

not a member of the homicide team investigating the murders. The prosecution

asserted that the offenses were not gang-related. [LXIII PRT 243-46; LXXII PRT

587.] Despite his reported lack of official connection with this case, Chacon

inserted himself into the investigation by interviewing potential witnesses [see eg.,

LXIV PRT 264, 266, 270] and meeting with Meza over a period of two years

before Meza conveniently revealed to the prosecution his alleged involvement in

the planning of the crimes which bolstered Castillo’s story. [XCVIII PRT 3132,

3135-36.]

The prosecution tried to insulate itself from knowledge about the sources of

Detective Chacon’s information. For example, during the preliminary hearing in

Petitioner’s case, the prosecution placed Castillo in the witness protection program

on the basis of information provided to him by Chacon, but the prosecutor did not

ask Chacon to reveal the source of that information. [CII PRT 3402, 3410.]

During pretrial proceedings, Detective Chacon made it clear that he refused to talk

to defense counsel [V PRT 117] and consistently misled trial court with respect to

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his having fully complied with discovery orders. [Compare id. and XCVIII PRT

3147 with LXIII PRT 71-83 and CII PRT 3485, 3497.] 

The trial court expressed concern with Detective Chacon’s method of interviewing

witnesses because he testified under oath that he chose not to talk to defense

counsel and was reluctant to put anything he learned from his investigations into

writing. [CXXI PRT 5850.]

Detective Chacon’s career tends to reflect poorly on his ability or willingness to

follow police procedures. For example, Detective Chacon allegedly accidentally

shot one of his partners [sic] while cleaning his gun and allegedly accidentally shot

and wounded two of his fellow officers by shooting too early in the course of a

special border patrol operation. On information and belief, Detective Chacon has

acknowledged that these incidents occurred. 

On information and belief, Detective Chacon believes that the ends justify the

means and would make up or do anything to achieve his objective.

On information and belief, Detective Chacon has acknowledged that he was

essentially engaged in a game with trial counsel in which he did not provide

relevant information because they did not ask the “right questions.”

Meza admitted that in 1985 he told his probation officer that he lied about

everything because of his heroin use. [80 RT 10039.]

On information and belief, Meza told other inmates that he had lied about planning

the robbery/homicides with Petitioner and urged them to make up stories of

Petitioner’s involvement in the offenses in order to obtain favorable deals for

themselves.

(TAP at 53-54.)

In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court held “the suppression by the

prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the

evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of

the prosecution.” Id. at 87. The Supreme Court noted that a duty to disclose exists even absent

any specific request from the accused and includes the disclosure of impeachment evidence in

addition to purely exculpatory evidence. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976); see

also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). Evidence is material “if there is a

probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would

have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence

in the outcome.” Id. at 682. Further, the evidence need not be sufficient to affirmatively prove the

defendant innocent; it need only be favorable and material. Gantt v. Roe, 389 F.3d 908, 912 (9th

Cir. 2004).

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The Supreme Court has outlined three necessary components to demonstrate a Brady

violation: “The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory,

or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully

or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-282

(1999); see also Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004).

Any Brady analysis is necessarily predicated on the discovery, after trial, of favorable and

material information that was known to the prosecution and unknown to the defense. See Agurs,

427 U.S. at 103; Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-95 (1972); see also United States v. Dupuy,

760 F.2d 1492, 1501 n.5 (9th Cir. 1985) (“suppression by the government is a necessary element

of a Brady claim. . .”) However, in the instant case, Petitioner has not provided the Court with any

suppressed evidence, nor is there even an indication that such evidence actually exists. Instead,

Petitioner’s claim is based almost entirely on an unsupported assertion that Chacon induced Meza

and others to lie about Petitioner’s involvement in the crimes and to lie about Petitioner’s attempts

to kill Meza, that the prosecution knew of this and suppressed the information from the defense,

and that such evidence may potentially be contained in the sealed documents at issue in Claim 27. 

Petitioner filed the declaration of co-counsel Gisela Caldwell with the second state petition,

which stated in part:

[A] prima facie case was not established until April 4, 2002, when

lead counsel and I received information from co-defendant Ronaldo

Ayala’s federal investigator that a source had spoken to Detective

Chacon sometime around June 1990 and Chacon had insinuated to

the source that he withheld information regarding this case because

defense counsel did not ask the “right questions.” I had spoken to

the source of this information on May 4, 1998 who informed me he

had spoken with Chacon in 1990. However, the source did not

reveal the contents of that conversation and, more importantly, he

stated that he was not aware of Detective Chacon having

“compromised” any witnesses. 

(Bates 1148.)

Other than the declaration containing mention of Chacon’s “insinuation,” Petitioner has

presented mere supposition to buttress his theory that impeachment evidence was actually

withheld by the prosecution. Petitioner’s speculation that the prosecution was in possession of

evidence regarding Chacon and Meza is premised largely on a declaration by prior co-counsel,

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who repeats a conversation a third party had with an unnamed “source” regarding that source’s

purported conversation with Chacon. There is no declaration from the investigator who spoke to

the source, and nothing sworn offered from the actual source of the information. 

Despite this, Petitioner engages in rampant speculation based on Chacon’s statement that

he may have had information if the “right” questions were asked. Petitioner concludes that this

vague statement indicates that Detective Chacon induced Meza and others to lie at trial. These

assertions are without any solid foundation, especially when examined with the later statement in

Ms. Caldwell’s declaration that the source was “not aware of Detective Chacon having

‘compromised’ any witnesses.” (Id.) Despite including this statement in co-counsel’s declaration,

Petitioner concludes that the opposite must be true, that Chacon induced Meza and others to lie

and that the prosecution withheld such information from the defense at trial. These conclusory

allegations cannot serve as a basis for habeas relief. See James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir.

1994) (conclusory allegations that are not supported by specific facts do not merit habeas relief.)

Respondent notes that “the allegations that Petitioner does set forth are based on facts that

were known by and available to the defense prior to trial, as evident by Petitioner’s citation to the

preliminary hearing.” (Resp. MTD at 4.) It is true that a petitioner cannot claim a Brady violation

if he was “aware of the essential facts enabling him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence.

. .” United States v. Brown, 582 F.2d 197, 200 (2nd Cir. 1978); Dupuy, 760 F.2d at 1501 n. 5. 

Petitioner maintains that the “United States Supreme Court has consistently held that it does not

matter, for Brady purposes, whether the defense knew about, or requested the information. The

State must turn over Brady material with or without a request, and even if the defense conceivably

could have procured the evidence independently.” (Pet. Opp. at 4.) 

Petitioner cites to Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) in support of his

contention, but that decision has no connection to Petitioner’s assertion. In Giglio, the Supreme

Court held that a promise made to a witness by a government attorney must be disclosed to the

defense regardless of whether the attorney who tried the case had knowledge of the promise. See

id. The decision makes no mention of whether petitioner had knowledge of the information, and

thus bears little relevance to Petitioner’s argument. Petitioner also cites to United States v.

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Schaffer, 789 U.S. 682 (9th Cir. 1986), in which the Ninth Circuit held that the prosecution

inadequately disclosed evidence when they informed a criminal defendant about the existence of

tapes regarding a government witness but also erroneously told the defendant that the tapes were

of no value to the defense. Id. at 690. Like Giglio, this decision does not support Petitioner’s

assertion.

Ultimately, the relevant inquiry is whether there is any support to Petitioner’s contention

that the prosecution has improperly withheld evidence in violation of Brady. Petitioner does not

present any concrete reason to conclude that Detective Chacon induced Meza or others to testify

falsely, nor does he present any proof that the prosecution suppressed such information from

Petitioner at trial. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. at 794 (“the heart of the holding in Brady is the

prosecution’s suppression of evidence. . .”). 

In sum, this Court cannot say the state court’s denial of this claim was contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or that it was based upon an

unreasonable determination of the facts. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. Therefore, Petitioner does

not merit habeas relief on this claim.

C. Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner asserts that if summary adjudication is not granted, “then in the alternative an

evidentiary hearing should be granted to provide Petitioner with a meaningful opportunity to

develop and present the facts necessary to reveal the illegality of his confinement.” (Petitioner’s

Motion for Summary Adjudication [“Pet. MSA”] at 10.) At the proposed evidentiary hearing,

Petitioner notes that he would expect to call witnesses including Detective Carlos Chacon, Juan

Meza, and a custodian of records for the San Diego District Attorney’s Office. (Pet. Opp. at 19.)

Respondent maintains that Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing, and argues

that “Petitioner apparently proceeds from the mistaken assumption that simply by alleging a

factual question (even if in a conclusory manner), he may avoid a motion for summary

adjudication and proceed to an evidentiary hearing during which he may develop his claim for the

first time.” (Resp. MTD at 5.) Respondent maintains that because Petitioner has failed to properly

develop his claim “in the manner proscribed by state law,” his motion for evidentiary hearing must

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be evaluated under the more stringent standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). (See id.);

People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 (1995).

The Supreme Court has held that “[d]iligence will require in the usual case that the

prisoner, at a minimum, seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in the manner prescribed by

state law.” Williams (Michael) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000). To properly present a claim

in a California state court, a petitioner is required to “state fully and with particularity the facts on

which relief are sought” and “include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence

supporting the claim, including pertinent portions of trial transcripts and affidavits or

declarations.” Duvall, 9 Cal.4th at 474.

In response, Petitioner avers that he made a “documented effort to develop the facts”

during the state court proceedings, including requesting funds for investigation and expert

assistance, requesting authority to obtain subpoenas, requesting discovery, reviewing all available

files and requesting an evidentiary hearing on the claim. (Petitioner’s Reply [“Pet. Reply”] at 5.) 

Petitioner asserts that the request for assistance and a hearing were both denied. (Id.) In addition,

the declaration of Ms. Caldwell indicates that counsel became aware “at an early stage in the

appellate process” counsel became aware of “triggering facts” warranting an investigation into the

Brady claim, but avers that she did not learn of Detective Chacon’s statement until the federal

proceedings were pending. (Bates 1147-48.) Petitioner argues that because there was no lack of

diligence on his part, his motion for an evidentiary hearing should be evaluated without reference

to § 2254(e)(2). (Id.)

The Ninth Circuit has held that when presented with a motion for an evidentiary hearing, a

district court “must determine whether a factual basis exists in the record to support the

petitioner’s claim.” Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1999). Generally, a

petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he or she is able to establish a colorable claim for

relief, did not fail to develop the facts surrounding his or her claim, and was never given a state

hearing on the claim. Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 670 (9th Cir. 2005), quoting Baja,

187 F.3d at 1078. To establish a colorable claim, Petitioner is “required to allege specific facts

which, if true, would entitle him to relief.” Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 934 (9th Cir. 1998).

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In the instant case, Petitioner has not provided the Court with sufficient factual support for

his conclusion that the prosecution has suppressed exculpatory evidence. The Ninth Circuit has

previously noted that a habeas petitioner “is expected to state facts that point to a real possibility of

constitutional error.” Wacht v. Cardwell, 604 F.2d 1245, 1247 (9th Cir. 1979), quoting

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.7 (1977). Petitioner does not merit an evidentiary

hearing based on bald assertions and conclusory allegations, such as have been offered in support

of this claim. See Wacht, 604 F.2d at 1246 (collecting cases); see also Aubut v. Maine, 431 F.2d

688, 689 (1st. Cir. 1970), adopted by Calderon v. United States District Court (Nicolaus), 96 F.3d

1102, 106 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Habeas corpus is not a general form of relief for those who seek to

explore their case in search of its existence.”) 

The Supreme Court has maintained that “[i]f district courts were required to allow federal

habeas applicants to develop even the most insubstantial factual allegations in evidentiary

hearings, district courts would be forced to reopen factual disputes that were conclusively resolved

in the state courts.” Landrigan v. Schriro, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 1933, 1940 (2007). Petitioner

has not presented the Court with facts that could point to a real possibility the prosecution had

possession of information indicating that Chacon or Meza lied about a deal, or lied about

Petitioner soliciting Meza to kill Castillo. Petitioner’s allegations fall far short of the showing

necessary to warrant an evidentiary hearing.

2. Claim 27

Petitioner asserts “state appellate counsel was denied access to certain sealed proceedings,

held pursuant to trial counsels’ discovery requests and from which trial counsel was excluded,” in

violation of his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (TAP at 78.)

A. California Supreme Court and Trial Court Proceedings

The trial court held ex parte proceedings regarding the defense’s subpoenas duces tecum

and discovery requests to the San Diego District Attorney, California Department of Corrections,

San Diego County Sheriff’s Department, United States Drug Enforcement Agency, and San Diego

Police Department, all proceedings taking place outside the presence of the defense and some from

which the prosecution was also excluded. 

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At these proceedings, the trial court first determined the relevance of the requested

materials, and if found relevant, the court then reached the issue of whether the asserted privilege

applied to the materials. The privileges asserted included official information (California

Evidence Code §1040), identity of an informant (California Evidence Code §1041), and the work

product privilege. (Pre-Trial Transcripts [“PRT”] LXIX 562; LXXV, LXXVI 774.) During the

record correction process, appellate counsel requested that the trial court grant them access to

sealed trial proceedings from which the defense had been excluded. (28 Aug. CT 6047.) That

request was denied. (Id. at 6097.) 

Petitioner presented the instant claim as part of a post-trial motion to the California

Supreme Court, again requesting access to these sealed proceedings. (Bates 1552-56.) The

California Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s request. (Id. at 1118.) 

B. Discussion

Petitioner alleges that the trial court erred in failing to disclose sealed documents to trial

counsel and concludes that “it is reasonably probable that the withholding of materials involving

Castillo and Meza significantly impaired, among others, Petitioner’s rights to confrontation and

cross-examination.” (Pet. MSA at 7.) Petitioner explains that “the trial court reviewed, in camera,

numerous files of inmates in county jails and prisons throughout California” and “[s]everal of

these hearings related to the court’s review of prison files of critical witnesses against Petitioner at

the guilt and penalty phases of the trial.” (Pet. Reply at 4.) Petitioner asserts this Court “must not

only review these materials to determine if the trial court erred in failing to disclose the documents

[sic] to Petitioner’s trial counsel, but should also permit Petitioner’s present counsel to review

materials to provide additional guidance to the Court regarding the importance of particular items

to Petitioner.” (Id.)

Respondent maintains that, aside from the Teague bar, Petitioner has failed to show that the

state supreme court’s rejection of the claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law. (Resp. MTD at 8.) Respondent additionally argues that “even if

Petitioner had a right to review the files, he has failed to allege facts demonstrating he suffered

prejudice.” (Id.)

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Notwithstanding the Teague bar, the Court finds Petitioner’s claim also fails on the merits. 

In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s right to

a fair trial and the government’s interest in protecting confidential information were secured by

submitting the records in question to the trial court for an in camera review. In so holding, the

Supreme Court specifically noted that an “advocate’s eye,” that is, review of the documents by

defendant’s attorney rather than in camera by the court, was not necessary to ensure a defendant’s

right to a fair trial. Id. at 60. Significantly, the Court also noted “[d]efense counsel has no

constitutional right to conduct his own search of the States’ files to argue relevance.” Id. at 59.

In Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), the Supreme Court held, on direct

appeal, that an in camera review by the trial court of electronic surveillance material obtained

without probable cause was inadequate considering the complexity of the case and the large

volume of documents. However, in Alderman, the Court distinguished the holding from other

situations involving sealed proceedings, stating “[i]n both the volume of material to be examined

and the complexity and difficulty of the judgments involved, cases involving electronic

surveillance will probably differ markedly from those situations in the criminal law where in

camera procedures have been found acceptable to some extent.” Id., 394 U.S. at 182 fn. 14. 

Finally, Alderman was a Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule case involving the fruits of an

illegal search, and disclosure was limited to conversations that actually included the defendant or

took place on his premises. Id. at 185. At issue here are law enforcement and correctional

department files that the trial court ruled were either not relevant or privileged. Further, the trial

court’s decision to seal these materials was upheld by the state supreme court.

Petitioner also argues that “[a] crucial avenue of cross-examination may be foreclosed by

the denial of access to material that would serve as the basis for this examination.” (Pet. Opp. at

13.) Federal courts are generally reluctant to impose constitutional restraints on evidentiary

rulings made by state trial courts, for instance noting that “[t]he Confrontation Clause guarantees

an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever

way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Delaware v. VanArsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679

(1986), quoting Deleware v. Fenester, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985). 

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Petitioner fails to set forth a factual basis for his belief that access to the sealed materials

would have been of assistance in cross-examination, and has not presented the Court with any

authority that would compel the relief he requests. Petitioner asserts that “the trial court lacked

counsel’s knowledge of incidents [sic] triggering scrutiny of Chacon’s bias against Petitioner and

his brother and Castillo’s and Meza’s incentive to lie and fabricate Petitioner’s involvement in the

crime” and thus “the lack of access to the sealed records involving Castillo, Meza, and Detective

Chacon were particularly damaging in the guilt phase of Petitioner’s trial.” (Pet. Opp. at 15.) 

However, Petitioner presents nothing aside from his own speculation to suggest the documents in

question would have even been favorable to the defense. 

The trial court sealed these materials on a variety of grounds, including relevance and

various privileges (PRT LXIX 562; LXXV, LXXVI 774), and Petitioner has not shown that the

state court’s denial of access to those files was objectively unreasonable. Petitioner has failed to

demonstrate that the refusal of the state court to provide appellate counsel with access to the sealed

proceedings caused Petitioner to receive constitutionally ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The mere fact that appellate

counsel was unable to directly review the documents fails to establish any constitutional violation

that would entitle Petitioner to habeas relief. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 60. 

Ultimately, Petitioner fails to show that the state supreme court’s adjudication of this claim

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. This claim does not merit relief.

C. Evidentiary Hearing

Regarding Claim 27, Petitioner asserts that if summary adjudication is not granted, “then in

the alternative an evidentiary hearing should be granted to provide Petitioner with a meaningful

opportunity to develop and present the facts necessary to reveal the illegality of his confinement.” 

(Pet. MSA at 10.) Petitioner asserts that “at a minimum, the Court should review the sealed

records and compare them with the trial transcripts to determine if any of the information

contained in the sealed records would have changed the outcome of Petitioner’s trial had it been

disclosed or amounted to a Brady violation.” (Pet. Opp. at 15.) Petitioner alternately requests that

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current counsel be allowed to examine the files under orders not to disclose which “would avoid

public access to these materials while allowing Petitioner’s attorney to view these documents or

transcripts with the eye of an advocate, in order to fully protect Petitioner’s constitutional rights.” 

(Pet. Reply at 4.)

In support of this proposition, Petitioner cites to three cases without comment on how they

support his position. (Pet. Reply at 4.) See United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 724 (9th Cir.

1975); United States v. Ordonez, 722 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. De Los Santos,

819 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1987). The Court finds these cases do not support Petitioner’s request in this

matter. All three cited cases were direct appeals that involved a defendant’s request for disclosure

of the identity of an informant, and before this court is a request to review sealed files of a much

greater scope than the identity of one individual. Here, Petitioner is challenging the state court’s

rejection of the trial court’s refusal to allow counsel access to sealed documents. Further, in

Anderson, the Ninth Circuit ultimately rejected defendant’s allegations of error, holding that

discretion rests with the trial judge on whether to allow defense counsel or a defendant to be

present at an in camera hearing regarding an informant, and the trial judge’s decision would be

reversed only if it “constitutes an abuse of discretion or constitutional error.” Id., 509 F.2d at 730. 

In De Los Santos, the Fifth Circuit agreed with Anderson that the exclusion of the defendant and

defense attorney from a pre-trial hearing at which an informant’s identity was revealed did not

violate the Confrontation Clause. Id., 819 F.2d at 97. In Ordonez, the Ninth Circuit granted

disclosure of the informant’s information, holding that the inadequacy of the record made it

impossible to determine if the district court had balanced the interests of the parties according to

the requirements of Rovario v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957). However, Petitioner’s request is

not governed solely by Rovario, in which the Supreme Court held that a trial court must employ a

balancing test between the individual’s right to prepare his defense and the public’s interest in

protecting the flow of information in determining whether the identity of an informant shall be

disclosed to the defense. Id. at 62. These cases do not support Petitioner’s contention that the

denial of access to the sealed files, which contained not only informant files but work product

privileged information, as well as files the trial court deemed not relevant, was a constitutional

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violation.

Petitioner’s assertions that these sealed files may have contained material that may have

been beneficial to him on cross-examination is insufficient to require in camera inspection by this

Court, much less opening the sealed files for examination by counsel for Petitioner. As stated

above, “[h]abeas corpus is not a general form of relief for those who seek to explore their case in

search of its existence.” Aubut, 431 F.2d at 689, adopted by Calderon, 96 F.3d at 1106.

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a colorable, factual basis for his allegations of constitutional

error and Petitioner’s speculations alone cannot stand as a basis for an evidentiary hearing. 

Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Baja, 187 F.3d at 1078. The

claim does not warrant an evidentiary hearing.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 25, 2007

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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