Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02499/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02499-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 05:552 Right to Privacy Act

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Although the Amended Complaint uses the singular "Plaintiff" throughout, including

the caption, the Court assumes, from the context, that all references to "Plaintiff" actually

refer to both Nichols and Babette Santucci. Therefore, the Court will refer to Plaintiffs in the

plural.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Nichols Santucci, Babette Santucci, 

husband and wife, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Unites States State Department,

Defendant. 

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No. CV-04-2499-PHX-SRB

ORDER

This case involves Plaintiffs Nichols and Babette Santucci's attempt to renounce their

United States citizenship. At issue is Defendant United States Department of State's Motion

to Dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (Doc.

25).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs1

 Nichols and Babette Santucci appeared at the United States Consulate in

Nogales, Sonora, Mexico on July 21, 2004 with the intention of voluntarily renouncing their

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Plaintiffs apparently did not attach exhibits to their Amended Complaint. Therefore,

the exhibits referred to by the Court are the Exhibits submitted by Plaintiffs with their

original Complaint.

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United States citizenship. (Pl.'s Am. Compl. ("Compl.") at 3.) Plaintiffs met with Consulate

Officer Veronica Fuentes ("Fuentes") on that date, provided proof of identity and citizenship,

and were instructed to complete an Application for Determination of Citizenship. Plaintiffs

were then given an appointment for July 26, 2004. (Def.'s Ans. to Am. Compl. at 2.) 

Plaintiffs returned to the Consulate on July 26, 2004 where they read aloud the

Statement of Understanding Concerning the Consequences and Ramifications of

Renunciation and then recited and signed the Oath of Renunciation ("Oath"). Plaintiffs

requested, but did not receive, a copy of the Oath signed by Fuentes, who informed Plaintiffs

that she would forward the completed documents to Defendant in Washington, D.C. for final

approval. Fuentes further informed Plaintiffs that they were still considered U.S. citizens

until final approval by Defendant of a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States

("CLN").

Plaintiffs wrote letters to Defendant dated July 28, 2004 requesting that Defendant,

pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a, amend its records "to reflect that a loss of U.S. Citizenship had

occurred" and that Plaintiffs were Stateless Persons, and to issue CLNs to Plaintiffs in

accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1501. (Compl. at 4.) 

On August 24 and September 1, 2004, Fuentes mailed identical letters to each Plaintiff

informing them that Defendant concluded that Plaintiffs "did not in fact intend to relinquish

U.S. citizenship" because Plaintiffs had stated on July 26, 2004 at the Consulate that they

"had no other nationality and that [they] intended to reside in the United States without

appropriate documentation as [aliens] under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)."

(Compl., Ex.2

 6 & 7.) Therefore, Defendant would not issue CLNs in Plaintiffs' names.

Specifically, the letters informed Plaintiffs that:

The Department has adopted a position that the intention to

relinquish U.S. nationality for purposes of section 349(a) of the

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INA does not exist where a renunciant plans or claims a right to

reside in the United States, a right inherent in U.S. nationality,

unless the renunciant demonstrates that residence will be as an

alien properly documented under U.S. law. This decision was

upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia in 1998 in Lozada-Colon vs. the Department of State.

In a letter dated September 8, 2004 responding to Fuentes' denial letter, Plaintiffs claim they

"never once indicated that we intended to reside in the United States let alone do so without

being documented as an alien under the Immigration and Nationality Act," and requested a

review of Defendant's decision in accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(3). (Compl. at 5, Ex.

8.) 

Defendant, in a letter dated September 24, 2004, wrote that at the time Plaintiffs took

the Oath, Plaintiffs told Fuentes that they "had no other citizenship and that if found to have

lost citizenship, [they] were unsure where [they] would reside." (Compl., Ex. 9.) This letter

informed Plaintiffs that Defendant had learned that after taking the Oath, Plaintiffs returned

to the United States, had been residing in the United States since their "purported

renunciation," and had "made no attempt to be documented" as aliens under INA. (Compl.,

Ex. 9.) According to the letter, Defendant concluded that Plaintiffs "did not in fact intend

to relinquish U.S. citizenship when [they] executed the Oath of Renunciation on July 26,

2004." (Compl., Ex. 9.) Therefore, the letter states, Defendant could not approve the CLN

forwarded by the Consulate, and that Defendant considers Plaintiffs to be U.S. citizens.

(Compl., Ex. 9.) 

Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit, claiming this Court has jurisdiction under the

Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(A), and under the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1346(a)(2). Plaintiffs allege that Defendant: (1) violated their right to renounce U.S.

citizenship in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5); (2) violated their rights by failing to

amend Plaintiffs' records and failing to acknowledge receipt of Plaintiffs' request in

accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1501 and 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(2) & (3); and (3) violated its own

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administrative procedure for cases of voluntary renunciation of U.S. citizenship as set forth

in Defendant's Foreign Affairs Manual ("FAM") at 7 FAM 1253 et seq. (Compl. at 5, 6.)

Plaintiffs request that this Court: (1) order Defendant to amend its records to reflect

that Plaintiffs are no longer U.S. citizens and that Plaintiffs are Stateless Persons; (2) order

Defendant to issue CLNs in Plaintiffs' names; (3) issue an order that Defendant is "estopped

forever from any further violation of the right to renounce U.S. Citizenship in accordance

with 15 Stat. 249"; and (4) order Defendant to pay punitive damages to Plaintiffs in

accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4)(A) & (B). (Compl. at 6.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS

Defendant moves to dismiss this Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in

conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1)

jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.

678, 682, 66 S. Ct. 773, 776 (1946) (a decision on whether the complaint states a cause of

action "must be decided after and not before the court has assumed jurisdiction over the

controversy"); Drewien v. Medford Police Dep't, 2004 WL 948347, *1 (D. Or. Apr. 30,

2004) ("[A] motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be

addressed by the court before any other Rule 12 motion to prevent a court without

jurisdiction from prematurely dismissing a case with prejudice.") (citing Ramming v. United

States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001)). 

The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting

jurisdiction. See Indus. Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 1990)

("The party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of proving all jurisdictional facts.") (citing

McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S. Ct. 780, 785 (1936);

Fenton v. Freedman, 748 F.2d 1358, 1359 n.1 (9th Cir. 1984)). In this case, Plaintiffs are

asserting that this Court has jurisdiction to hear their claim. Therefore, Plaintiffs bear the

burden of proving jurisdiction.

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Although Plaintiffs filed suit against an agency of the United States, the suit is in

effect one against the United States. See Balser v. Dep't of Justice, 327 F.3d 903, 906 (9th

Cir. 2003) ("In sovereign immunity analysis, any lawsuit against an agency of the United

States or against an officer of the United States in his or her official capacity is considered

an action against the United States.").

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 Defendant argues Plaintiffs have failed to allege a waiver of sovereign immunity by

the United States.3

 The issue of whether the United States has waived sovereign immunity

for a particular type of suit is a question of subject matter jurisdiction. McCarthy v. United

States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Nye County, Nev., 178 F.3d 1080,

1089 n.12 (9th Cir. 1999). An attack on subject matter jurisdiction is fundamental to a

district court's ability to hear a case. See Toumajian v. Frailey, 135 F.3d 648, 652 (9th Cir.

1998) ("[I]n all actions before a federal court, the necessary and constitutional predicate for

any decision is a determination that the court has jurisdiction–that is the power–to adjudicate

the dispute.") (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)). A

plaintiff may sue the United States "only if Congress has waived sovereign immunity for the

lawsuit," and may bring a claim in federal district court "only if Congress has provided for

jurisdiction there." N. Star Alaska v. United States, 9 F.3d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1993)

(citations omitted). Thus, the burden is on Plaintiffs to show that the United States has

waived its sovereign immunity. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir.

1995) (citation omitted). 

Plaintiffs have suggested three possible bases for this Court's jurisdiction to hear

Plaintiffs' case: (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1331; (2) the Little Tucker Act; and (3) the Privacy Act.

While 28 U.S.C. § 1331 confers subject matter jurisdiction on the district court for actions

that arise under the Constitution and laws of the United States, the statute itself is not a

general waiver of sovereign immunity. Randall v. United States, 95 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir.

1996) (noting that the general federal question statute merely establishes when a subject

matter is within the competence of a federal court to entertain). Therefore, Plaintiffs must

prove the United States has waived its sovereign immunity in another statute.

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The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, governs claims over $10,000. Those claims must

be heard in the Court of Federal Claims, but the grant of jurisdiction under the Tucker Act

and the Little Tucker Act is the same. See Kipperman v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860, 868

(D.C. Cal. 1976).

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A. The Little Tucker Act

Plaintiffs argue that this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2), known

as the Little Tucker Act ("Act"). The Act waives sovereign immunity and provides the

district court concurrent jurisdiction with the United States Court of Federal Claims for

certain actions not exceeding $10,000.4

 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2); N. Star Alaska, 9 F.3d at

1432; Price v. U. S. Gen. Serv. Admin., 894 F.2d 323, 324 (9th Cir. 1990). Specifically, the

Act provides this Court with jurisdiction over a civil action or claim against the United States

"founded either upon the Constitution or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an

executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for

liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2).

Thus, under the Act, a party's claims must either rest upon a contract, "seek the return of

money paid by them to the Government," or establish an entitlement to money damages

under a federal statute that "'can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the

Federal Government for the damage sustained.'" United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400,

96 S. Ct. 948, 954 (1976) (quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1009,

178 Ct. Cl. 599, 607 (1967)). 

The Act provides jurisdiction over awards of damages but not equitable relief such

as injunctive or declaratory relief or mandamus. Richardson v. Morris, 409 U.S. 464, 465,

93 S. Ct. 629, 630-31 (1973) ("[T]he Act has long been construed as authorizing only actions

for money judgments and not suits for equitable relief against the United States."); Lee v.

Thornton, 420 U.S. 139, 140, 95 S. Ct. 853, 854 (1975) ("The Tucker Act empowers district

courts to award damages but not to grant injunctive or declaratory relief.") (citations

omitted); Ben-Shalom v. Sec'y of Army, 807 F.2d 982, 988 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that

Tucker Act does not provide jurisdiction for petitioner's suit for writ of mandamus, an

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Plaintiffs have also requested punitive damages under the Privacy Act. Even if the

Privacy Act authorized punitive damages, which it does not, Plaintiff cannot create subject

matter jurisdiction under the Tucker Act by seeking punitive damages under the Privacy Act.

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equitable proceeding, when petitioner does not also request money damages); Bobula v. U.S.

Dep't of Justice, 970 F.2d 854, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("While limited equitable relief is

sometimes available in Tucker Act suits, the equitable relief must be incidental to and

collateral to a claim for money damages."). 

In this case, Plaintiffs have not stated how the Act applies. The relief requested by

Plaintiffs is equitable in that it requests that this Court: (1) order Defendant to amend its

records to reflect that Plaintiffs are no longer U.S. citizens and that Plaintiffs are Stateless

Persons; (2) order Defendant to issue CLNs to Plaintiffs; and (3) issue an order that

Defendant is "estopped forever from any further violation of the right to renounce U.S.

Citizenship in accordance with 15 Stat. 249."5

 (Compl. at 6.) Plaintiffs have not alleged that

they suffered any actual damages or that they are entitled to damages from Defendant.

Therefore, the Act does not provide this Court with jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claim. 

B. The Privacy Act

Plaintiffs argue that jurisdiction is also founded on the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. §

552a(g)(1)(A), which allows an individual to bring a civil action in the district courts against

an agency that refuses to review or amend an individual's record as requested. While the

Privacy Act does grant district courts jurisdiction in some instances, it is principally a means

for "contest[ing] the accuracy of administrative records," and "does not authorize relitigation

of the substance of agency decisions." Douglas v. Agric. Stabilization & Conservation Serv.,

33 F.3d 784, 785 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Thus, the Privacy Act only "allows for

the amendment of factual or historical errors. It is not . . . a vehicle for amending the

judgments of federal officials or of other parties as those judgments are reflected in records

maintained by federal agencies." Rogers v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 607 F.Supp. 697, 699 (N.D.

Cal. 1985) ("[The Privacy Act] may not be employed as a skeleton key for reopening

consideration of unfavorable federal agency decisions."). 

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Plaintiffs in this case attempt to use the Privacy Act to have the Court order Defendant

to amend its records to reflect that Plaintiffs are no longer U.S. citizens and that Plaintiffs are

Stateless Persons. (Compl. at 6.) These are not factual errors that can be corrected by the

Privacy Act. Both determinations–that Plaintiffs are no longer U.S. citizens and are Stateless

Persons–are judgments by Defendant based upon Plaintiffs' Oath and Defendant's

determination of Plaintiffs' subjective intent at the time they took the Oath. See Vance v.

Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 259, 100 S. Ct. 540, 545 (1980) (noting that expatriation requires

that the citizen not only voluntarily commit an expatriating act prescribed in 8 U.S.C. §

1481(a), but also requires an intent to relinquish citizenship). Plaintiffs clearly disagree with

Defendant's judgment, but the Privacy Act is not the vehicle for reconsideration of

Defendant's decision, and the Privacy Act does not provide this Court jurisdiction over

Plaintiffs' claims. Because this Court is granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction, it need not discuss the merits of Defendant's argument that

Plaintiffs failed to state a claim.

IT IS ORDERED granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 25).

DATED this 21st day of November, 2005.

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