Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02070/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02070-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JAMES CALVIN GAINES, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

C/O BENNETT, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:13-cv-2070 AC P 

ORDER and 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

I. Introduction 

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, currently incarcerated at Valley State Prison, who proceeds pro 

se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action 

proceeds on plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims that defendant correctional officers Bennett and 

Neiman failed to protect plaintiff from an assault by another inmate. 

Presently pending is defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that 

plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See ECF No. 25. Alternatively, 

defendants contend that summary judgment should be granted in their favor on the merits of this 

action. Plaintiff filed a response to defendants’ statement of undisputed facts, ECF No. 26, and 

an opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the question of exhaustion, ECF 

No. 27. Defendants did not file a reply. 

These matters are referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 

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28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302(c). For the reasons that follow, this court 

recommends that defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted on failure-to-exhaust 

grounds, and that this action be dismissed without prejudice. 

II. Allegations of Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint and Declaration 

Pursuant to his verified complaint, plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted by inmate Abel 

Garcia in July 2010 when Garcia was plaintiff’s “cell occupant.” See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1, 4-

5. The complaint alleges that, in June 2010, plaintiff told defendants Bennett and Neimann that 

Garcia was threatening him and “pushing [him] around in an assaultive manner,” and that 

plaintiff was fearful because he “is wheelchair dependent and cannot defend [himself].” Id. at 4. 

Defendants reportedly told plaintiff that they would talk with Garcia and “handle” the matter, and 

instructed plaintiff to return to his cell or they would charge him with a disciplinary violation. 

Nevertheless, plaintiff alleges that, in July 2010, he was “physically assaulted by his celloccupant Abel Garcia in the cell,” requiring plaintiff to make a “man down” distress call to obtain 

the assistance of officers and treatment for his injuries. Id. at 5. 

 Notably, defendants contend, with supporting evidence, that plaintiff was housed with 

inmate Abel Garcia from October 28, 2009 through March 22, 2010, but was housed in June and 

July 2010 with inmate Fidel Reyes. See Dfs. Statement of Undisputed Facts (DSUF), ECF No. 

25-3 at 2 (Proffered Facts Nos. 6 & 7). Plaintiff avers that these facts are “undisputed,” see ECF 

No. 26 at 2-3 (Pl. Response to DSUF Nos. 6 & 7), despite his allegations to the contrary. 

In his responsive verified declaration, plaintiff states that he “wish[es] to point out 

[defendants’] error concerning the identity of the inmate whose assault upon me underlies my 

complaint.” Gaines Decl., ECF No. 27 at 2, ¶ 3. Plaintiff asserts (without providing dates) that 

he was initially housed with inmate Reyes, who assaulted him. Then he was moved to new 

housing with inmate Garcia. Id. ¶ 3. Plaintiff avers that both inmates were young, able-bodied, 

belonged to the same prison gang, and were actively racist toward plaintiff, who is African 

American. Plaintiff alleges that other inmates would walk by their cell and tell Garcia that he 

needed to get “that Nigger” out of his cell. Id. ¶¶ 4, 11. Plaintiff contends that “[m]atters reached 

a head approximately three to four weeks after I moved in with Garcia.” Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiff avers 

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that, for a period of “almost a month,” he spoke with both defendants and requested a move to 

another cell, which was ignored. Id. ¶¶ 5, 10, 15. Plaintiff asserts that defendants were 

nonresponsive because “motivated by a desire to inflict extrajudicial punishment” on plaintiff due 

to the nature of the crimes for which he was convicted. Id. ¶ 8. Plaintiff alleges that defendants 

witnessed Garcia’s hostility toward him, including seeing Garcia slap plaintiff’s food tray to the 

ground. Id. ¶9. Plaintiff avers that, on the morning of the assault, when defendants returned 

plaintiff to his cell, they saw that Garcia was shirtless, standing in the center of the cell, and 

challenging plaintiff, but locked plaintiff in the cell nevertheless. Plaintiff asserts that, “[a]fter a 

short time” and his yells for help, “Bennett and Neimann opened the cell door and said in a very 

casual voice, ‘Man Down?’” Id. ¶ 13. 

In his verified complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendants’ alleged inaction to plaintiff’s 

requests for protection created a “chilling effect on plaintiff’s right to file an appeal about the 

matter.” Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1, 9. Plaintiff further alleges, id. at 6: 

On 3-18-2011, [the Appeals Coordinator] D. Clark refused to 

accept plaintiff’s appeal asserting plaintiff’s appeal was a duplicate 

of a previous appeal. 

Plaintiff submitted a 602 appeal back to the Appeals Coordinator 

seeking a redress of Bennett and Neimann’s refusal to move 

plaintiff . . . D. Clark once again refused plaintiff’s appeal and clear 

explanation as to why the appeal was not a duplicate. This was 5-

23-2011. 

[] D. Clark’s refusal to accept plaintiff’s 602 appeal chilled the 

effect to redress the constitutional violations of Bennett and 

Neimann. 

In addition, in his verified declaration, plaintiff states that “[a]fter this incident [the 

assault], I filed an administrative appeal along with several inmate request[s] that this situation I 

faced be remedied . . . My administrative appeals and inmate request were all deposited into the 

marked collection box. None were ever responded to in any way.” Gaines Decl., ECF No. 27 at 

5, ¶¶16-7. Plaintiff states that he submitted this appeal although he feared retaliation. Id. ¶ 19. 

Plaintiff also alleges generally that, “[w]hile the logging procedure described in 

[defendants’] declarations may occur in an ideal setting, it is not my experience in reality.” Id. 

Plaintiff avers that it is “not unusual” for appeals and inmate requests to go unanswered. Id. ¶ 17. 

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He opines that “20 to 25 percent of such communication[s] seem to just disappear.” Id. On at 

least one occasion, plaintiff witnessed an officer “simply tear” up an appeal. Id. Plaintiff states 

that he also witnessed retaliation by grieved prison officials, particularly in the form of cell 

searches with destruction of property and the transferring of prisoners to other institutions. Id. at 

¶ 20. 

Plaintiff has submitted the putative declaration of inmate Paul E. Fisher, a former 

attorney. See ECF No. 27 at 7-8; see also n.1, infra. Mr. Fisher states that he has been in the 

custody of CDCR since January 2012, and housed at Wasco State Prison, Chuckawalla State 

Prison, and Valley State Prison. He states that he has “assisted many inmates in filing 

administrative appeals during my more than three years incarceration,” and has “also prepared at 

least a dozen on my own behalf.” Id. at 7, ¶¶ 2, 3. Mr. Fisher states that he is “extremely familiar 

with the manner in which such appeals are processed.” Id. ¶ 3. He states that “[i]n every 

institution I have been housed, forms for such appeals are provided and are required to be filled 

out and inserted into a slotted box, provided at many locations throughout the institution.” Id. 

However, Mr. Fisher contends that “[f]ully half of the appeals I have prepared, both for myself 

and those for other inmates have never been responded to in any way. The institution at which 

they were filed never acknowledged receipt or issued any responsive documentation.” Id. ¶ 4. 

Mr. Fisher provides an example from his experience at Wasco State Prison. Id. at 7-8, ¶ 5. Mr. 

Fisher states that he has reviewed the motion for summary judgment in this case and the 

declarations filed in support of defendants, and opines, based on his “personal experience,” that 

“the system described for processing appeals does not exist in reality. Instead, a very high 

percentage of the appeals that I have been involved in have simply not been processed and no 

explanation was ever given.” Id. at 8, ¶ 6. 

III. Legal Standards 

A. Legal Standards for Summary Judgment 

 Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party “shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party “initially bears the burden of 

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proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Nursing Home Pension Fund, Local 144 

v. Oracle Corp. (In re Oracle Corp. Securities Litigation), 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The moving party may accomplish 

this by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, 

electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for 

purposes of the motion only), admission, interrogatory answers, or other materials” or by showing 

that such materials “do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that the 

adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 

(c)(1)(A), (B). 

 When the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, “the moving party need 

only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Oracle 

Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). 

Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, 

against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 

essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the 

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a 

circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district 

court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment ... is satisfied.” Id. at 323. 

 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing 

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita 

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the 

existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials 

of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or 

admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. Moreover, “[a] [p]laintiff’s verified complaint 

may be considered as an affidavit in opposition to summary judgment if it is based on personal 

//// 

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knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 

1132 n.14 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).1

The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that 

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Assoc., 809 

F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, 

Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). 

 In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not 

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual 

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at 

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce 

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U .S. at 587 (citations omitted). 

 In evaluating the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact,” the court 

draws “all reasonable inferences supported by the evidence in favor of the non-moving party.” 

Walls v. Central Costa County Transit Authority, 653 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 

It is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may 

be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244–45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), 

aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing 

 

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 In addition, in considering a dispositive motion or opposition thereto in the case of a pro se 

plaintiff, the court does not require formal authentication of the exhibits attached to plaintiff’s 

verified complaint or opposition. See Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(evidence which could be made admissible at trial may be considered on summary judgment); 

see also Aholelei v. Hawaii Dept. of Public Safety, 220 Fed. Appx. 670, 672 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(district court abused its discretion in not considering plaintiff’s evidence at summary judgment, 

“which consisted primarily of litigation and administrative documents involving another prison 

and letters from other prisoners” which evidence could be made admissible at trial through the 

other inmates’ testimony at trial); see Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 (unpublished Ninth Circuit 

decisions may be cited not for precedent but to indicate how the Court of Appeals may apply 

existing precedent). 

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party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material 

facts. ... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation 

omitted). 

 In applying these rules, district courts must “construe liberally motion papers and 

pleadings filed by pro se inmates and ... avoid applying summary judgment rules strictly.” 

Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010). However, “[if] a party fails to properly 

support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact, as 

required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion 

. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). 

 B. Legal Standards for Exhausting Prisoner Administrative Remedies 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires that prisoners exhaust “such 

administrative remedies as are available” before commencing a suit challenging prison 

conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Regardless of the relief sought, a prisoner must pursue an 

appeal through all levels of a prison’s grievance process as long as some remedy remains 

available. “The obligation to exhaust ‘available’ remedies persists as long as some remedy 

remains ‘available.’ Once that is no longer the case, then there are no ‘remedies . . . available,’ 

and the prisoner need not further pursue the grievance.” Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 935 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (original emphasis) (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)). Hence, “[a]n 

inmate has no obligation to appeal from a grant of relief, or a partial grant that satisfies him, in 

order to exhaust his administrative remedies.” Harvey v. Jordan, 605 F.3d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 

2010). 

The PLRA also requires that prisoners, when grieving their appeal, adhere to CDCR’s 

“critical procedural rules.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 91 (2006). “The level of detail 

necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to 

system and claim to claim, but it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the 

boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). However, as 

recently held by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, if a prisoner fails to comply with procedural 

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requirements in pursuing his appeal, but prison officials address the merits of the appeal 

nevertheless, then the prisoner is deemed to have exhausted his available administrative remedies. 

See Reyes v. Smith, __ F. 3d __, 2016 WL 146118, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 433 (9th Cir. Jan. 12, 

2016) (Case No. 13-17119). 

The Ninth Circuit has laid out the analytical approach to be taken by district courts in 

assessing the merits of a motion for summary judgment based on the alleged failure of a prisoner 

to exhaust his administrative remedies. As set forth in Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th 

Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Scott v. Albino, 135 S. Ct. 403 (2014) (citation and internal 

quotations omitted): 

[T]he defendant’s burden is to prove that there was an available 

administrative remedy, and that the prisoner did not exhaust that 

available remedy. . . . Once the defendant has carried that burden, 

the prisoner has the burden of production. That is, the burden shifts 

to the prisoner to come forward with evidence showing that there is 

something in his particular case that made the existing and 

generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable 

to him. However, . . . the ultimate burden of proof remains with the 

defendant. 

If a court concludes that a prisoner failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies, the 

proper remedy is dismissal without prejudice. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 223-24 (2010); 

Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2005). 

IV. Facts 

 Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are expressly undisputed by the parties or 

found to be undisputed pursuant to this court’s review of the evidence.2

 

1. At all relevant times, plaintiff was incarcerated at High Desert State Prison (HDSP), 

under the authority of California Department of Corrections (CDCR). 

2. At all relevant times, defendants Neimann and Bennett were employed as Correctional 

Officers at HDSP. 

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 See Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts, ECF No. 25-3, and exhibits thereto; and 

Plaintiff’s “Response to Defendant’s Claimed Statement of Undisputed Facts,” ECF No. 26, and 

supporting declarations, ECF No. 27.

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3. Following this court’s screening of plaintiff’s verified complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A, this action proceeds on plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims against 

defendants Neimann and Bennett. See ECF Nos. 1, 6. 

4. Plaintiff alleges that in June 2010 he told both defendants that Garcia, plaintiff’s “cell 

occupant,” was threatening him and that plaintiff feared he would be assaulted by Garcia. 

Plaintiff alleges that in July 2010 he was physically assaulted in his cell by inmate Garcia. 

5. However, according to CDCR’s Strategic Offender Management System (SOMS), 

plaintiff was housed with inmate Garcia from March 21, 2009 to March 22, 2010, and with 

inmate Reyes from March 22, 2010 to October 19, 2010. See Clark Decl., ECF No. 25-5, ¶ 7 and 

Ex. A, ECF No. 25-5 at 8. Hence, according to SOMS, plaintiff’s cellmate in June and July 2010 

was Reyes, not Garcia. Plaintiff does not dispute this information, see ECF No. 26 at 2-3 (Pl. 

Response to DSUF Nos. 6 & 7), despite his allegations to the contrary. 

 6. Plaintiff avers that, after the alleged assault, he submitted an appeal challenging 

defendants’ conduct by placing the completed appeal into a marked collection box, but never 

received a response. 

 7. Plaintiff avers that, thereafter, on March 18, 2011 and May 23, 2011, he again sought 

to submit his appeal, which was rejected both times by the Appeals Coordinator on the ground 

that it duplicated a previous appeal. 

 8. At the request of defendants’ counsel, the Office of the California Attorney General, 

HDSP Appeals Coordinator D. Clark, and CDCR’s Acting Chief of CDCR’s Office of Appeals 

(OOA) (which “receives, reviews and maintains all third level appeals concerning non-medical 

issues”) , M. Voong, conducted searches of CDCR’s electronic database, the Inmate/Parolee 

Appeals Tracking System (IATS), to identify all appeals submitted by plaintiff that challenged his 

conditions of confinement at HDSP. See Clark Decl., ECF No. 25-5, and Voong Decl., ECF No. 

25-4. Any appeal challenging conditions of confinement at HDSP that plaintiff may have 

submitted after transferring to another institution are included in the IATS and in the searches 

conducted by Clark and Voong. Id. ¶ 10. Any appeal challenging the conduct of defendants 

alleged in this action would have been designated a staff complaint. Clark Decl. ¶ 6. 

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 9. The declaration and exhibits of HDSP Appeals Coordinator D. Clark demonstrates that 

plaintiff submitted six non-medical appeals that were exhausted at first or second level review. 

See Clark Decl. ¶ 11, and Exs. C, D, E, F, G, and H. Plaintiff exhausted one of these appeals at 

third level review. See ECF No. 25-5 at 20; Clark Decl., Ex. D. The court has reviewed each of 

these appeals, all of which sought ADA accommodations unrelated to the claims in this action. 

Plaintiff also submitted eleven appeals that were screened out;3 copies of these appeals have not 

been provided to the court. However, none of these seventeen appeals were identified as staff 

complaints. See ECF No. No. 25-5 at 20. 

 10. The declaration and exhibits of OOA Chief Voong demonstrate that plaintiff 

exhausted only two non-medical appeals through third level review; both were exhausted in 2009, 

and neither were staff complaints. Voong Decl. ¶¶ 2, 4 and 8, and Exs. B and C; see also ECF 

No. 25-4 at 5. Plaintiff also submitted three appeals for third level review that were screened out; 

one involved ADA accommodations; a second involved a property matter. The third matter, 

received on January 13, 2011, is the only designated staff complaint. See ECF No. 25-4 at 5. 

Chief Voong states generally that this appeal “was screened out in 2011 because it had been 

inappropriately submitted at the third level of review without being authorized to bypass the 

required lower levels of review. This appeal was never resubmitted at the third level of review.” 

Voong Decl. ¶ 9. 

 11. Plaintiff alleges that he subsequently attempted to submit an appeal related to the 

claims in this lawsuit on March 18, 2011 and May 25, 2011, but the appeal was rejected both 

times by Appeals Coordinator Clark on the ground that it was duplicative of a previously 

submitted appeal. Compl., ECF No. 1 at 6. Defendants contend that, “[h]ad plaintiff submitted 

 

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 “If an inmate submits an appeal that is untimely, lacks critical information, or otherwise does 

not comply with regulations governing the appeal process, the appeal may be cancelled or 

rejected/screened out, meaning it is not accepted for review. A rejected appeal is stamped as 

received by OOA, but then returned to the inmate without rendering a decision, along with a letter 

notifying the inmate of the reason(s) for the rejection, and informing the inmate how to correct 

and resubmit the appeal within statutory deadlines. OOA did not begin retaining copies of 

screened out appeals and related letters until August l, 2014.” Voong Dec. ¶ 6. 

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two appeals in 2011, but they were screened out or rejected for any reason, . . . they nonetheless 

would have been stamped as received by the HDSP Appeals Office, and they would have been 

logged in IATS as staff complaints.” Clark Decl. ¶ 5. 

V. Analysis 

 Defendants bear the burden of demonstrating that plaintiff had an available administrative 

remedy to grieve his claims in this action but did not exhaust that remedy. Albino, 747 F.3d at 

1172. Defendants rely on the declaration of D. Clark to assert that “[a]t all times during the 

relevant period of inmate Gaines’ incarceration at HDSP, through the present, CDCR has had an 

administrative appeal process in place for inmates.” Clark Decl. ¶ 8. Clark has described that 

process in detail, including how prisoners are informed of the process and how it is accessible to 

prisoners. See id. at ¶¶ 8-9. Defendants contend that plaintiff had full access to HDSP’s 

administrative remedy process at all relevant times. See Dfs. Memorandum, ECF No. 25-2 at 7-

8. 

Plaintiff generally asserts that HDSP’s administrative appeal process is, as a practical 

matter, sometimes unavailable to prisoners. However, this general assertion does not demonstrate 

that the process was unavailable to plaintiff. On the contrary, plaintiff avers that after the assault 

he deposited his appeal into a marked collection box, implying that he had timely access to the 

relevant appeal forms and easy access to an appropriate collection box. Plaintiff does not assert 

that he was unaware of the grievance process or that he was prevented from timely submitting his 

appeal. Cf. Albino, 747 F. 3d at 1175-76 (failure of jail officials to inform plaintiff of the 

administrative grievance procedure rendered it unavailable); see also Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 

523, 529 (3rd Cir. 2003) (plaintiff lacked available administrative remedy because prison officials 

refused to provide him with the necessary grievance forms). In the absence of specific allegations 

that plaintiff did not have access to HDSP’s administrative appeal process following his assault, 

the court finds that defendants have met their burden of demonstrating that plaintiff had an 

administrative remedy at HDSP, of which he was aware and which he allegedly initiated. 

The burden now shifts to plaintiff “to come forward with evidence showing that there is 

something in his particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative 

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remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. As explicitly stated in the 

statute, “[t]he PLRA requires that an inmate exhaust only those administrative remedies ‘as are 

available.’” Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 822-23 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 

1997e(a)) (improper screening of grievance “renders administrative remedies ‘effectively 

unavailable’ such that exhaustion is not required under the PLRA”); see also Nunez v. Duncan, 

591 F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Remedies that rational inmates cannot be expected to use 

are not capable of accomplishing their purposes and so are not available,” particularly where 

plaintiff “took reasonable and appropriate steps to exhaust.”); Brown, supra, 422 F.3d at 935 (a 

prisoner’s obligation to exhaust administrative remedies persists only as long as some remedy 

remains available). 

Plaintiff contends that HDSP’s grievance process was effectively unavailable to him to 

exhaust his administrative remedies on his claims in this case. Plaintiff relies only on his sworn 

statements that he timely submitted a relevant appeal but received no response, and that, months 

later, he attempted to submit relevant appeals that were rejected on the ground that they were 

duplicative of a prior appeal. Plaintiff has submitted no evidence in support of these statements. 

The sworn statement of Mr. Fisher is unhelpful because it provides only general allegations about 

the appeals process throughout CDCR. 

The absence of an official record is not itself determinative as to whether an appeal was 

actually submitted. See e.g. McCoy v. Stratton, 2014 WL 6633319, at *8, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

163519, at *20 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2014) (Case No. 2:12-cv-1137 WBS DAD P) (absence of 

official record “shows non-receipt rather than non-submission” (citation omitted)), report and 

recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 273567, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7030 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 

2015). Nevertheless, some supporting evidence appears necessary to sustain plaintiff’s sworn 

statements. See e.g. Cotton v. Cate, 2015 WL 1246114, at *3, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33023, at 

*8-9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2015) (material factual dispute raised by plaintiff’s proffered copy of his 

appeal, of which there was no official record); Cato v. Dumont, 2015 WL 9659978, at *5, 2015 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158114, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2015) (Case No. 1:14-cv-0564 LJO SAB P) 

(same), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Cato v. Silva, 2016 WL 70324, 2016 U.S. 

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Dist. LEXIS 1933 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2016); Felton v. Lopez, 2015 WL 350798, at *12, 2015 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 8102, at *32 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2015) (Case No. 1:12-cv-1066 AWI GSA P) (“The 

court finds Plaintiff’s August 8 query to be credible evidence that Plaintiff placed his first appeal 

in the appeals box sometime between July 20, 2012 and August 8, 2012.”), report and 

recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 1011723, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26476 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 

2015). 

 In the instant case, plaintiff has submitted no corroborating evidence to demonstrate that 

he timely submitted an initial appeal, or to create a material factual dispute on the matter. Nor 

does his sworn statement contain supporting factual detail sufficient to satisfy that burden 

standing alone. Plaintiff does not provide a copy of the appeal or describe its contents, does not 

identify the date he allegedly completed and submitted it, and does not identify which box he 

allegedly deposited it into. Cf. Jones v. Bishop, 2010 WL 4628067, at *6, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

117837, at *16 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2010) (Case No. 2:09-cv-0150 JLQ EFB P) (“There is no 

evidence in the record to support Plaintiff’s bald assertion that he ever timely filed or attempted to 

timely file a grievance/appeal . . . . Although the court must construe the Plaintiff’s materials 

liberally, it is not permissible for the court to sustain a general allegation . . . without any measure 

of evidentiary support in the record.”); Bassett v. Callison, 2010 WL 5393985, at *7, 2010 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 137987, at *18 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2010) (Case No. 2:10-cv-0539 KJN P) 

(“Plaintiff stated, in conclusory fashion, that officials destroyed or lost these appeals . . . . [but] he 

provided no facts or evidence to support this conclusion”); Bull v. Scribner, 2012 WL 5878195, 

at *5, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165840, at *17 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2012) (Case No. 1:05-cv-01255 

LJO GSA P) (“Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that he properly utilized the process available to 

him.”), aff’d sub nom. Bull v. Brown, 616 F. Appx. 289 (9th Cir. 2015); Webb v. Cahlander, 

2015 WL 6531642, at *4, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146352, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2015) (Case 

No. 1:13-cv-01154 DLB P) (“Plaintiff fails to substantiate his claim with evidence in any 

manner.”). 

Nor does plaintiff assert or provide any evidence that he made any informal or formal 

inquiries in an effort to discover why he received no response to his appeal. Cf. Bassett, supra, 

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2010 WL 5393985, at *7, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137987, at *18-9 (“Plaintiff has failed to 

provide specific factual information concerning to whom he gave the appeals, whether he 

submitted follow-up inquiries regarding these appeals, or whether he attempted to resubmit the 

appeal once he allegedly received no response. . . . [I]t is insufficient for plaintiff to simply 

submit a first appeal and then consider it exhausted because he heard nothing further but took no 

further action to inquire or appeal to the next level”.). 

 Despite receiving timely and adequate notice of the necessity to submit evidence in 

opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, see ECF No. 25-1, plaintiff has 

submitted only his “bald assertion” that he timely submitted an appeal but received no response. 

The court finds that this assertion, though competent evidence because sworn under penalty of 

perjury, is insufficient to meet plaintiff’s burden of producing evidence that HDSP’s generally 

available administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to plaintiff in “his particular case.” 

Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. 

 Plaintiff’s further assertions that he later attempted to exhaust his remedies in 2011 does 

not require a different result. Plaintiff alleges that he sought to grieve his claims by submitting 

appeals on March 18, 2011 and May 23, 2011, that were rejected as “duplicative.” See Compl., 

ECF No. 1 at 6. Plaintiff does not provide copies of these appeals. Moreover, defendants have 

submitted evidence indicating that plaintiff submitted only one appeal that was designated a staff 

complaint (and hence could have been related to the allegations in this action), but it was received 

on January 13, 2011. See ECF No. 25-4 at 5. To timely grieve his July 2010 assault, plaintiff 

needed to submit an appeal within fifteen working days thereafter. See Clark Decl. ¶ 9. Neither 

plaintiff nor defendants have identified the date of the alleged assault. However, as defendants 

contend, any appeal grieving this incident filed in March or May 2011 (or January 2011) would 

have been untimely. See Dfs. Memo., ECF No. 25-2 at 9; Clark Decl. ¶ 12 (“It should be noted 

that to the extent inmate Gaines submitted appeals in March and May 2011 that related to 

incidents taking place in June or July 2010, they would have been untimely under both the 2009 

and 2011 regulations.”); see also Clark Decl. ¶¶ 9, 13. 

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evidence demonstrating a material factual dispute whether HDSP’s administrative remedies were 

effectively unavailable to him to exhaust his claims in this action. The absence of any evidence 

on this question underscores the inconsistencies and lack of clear allegations in this case, 

particularly the identity of plaintiff’s cellmate during the relevant period, and the date of the 

alleged assault. 

Accordingly, this court finds that plaintiff failed to comply with the requirement of the 

PLRA that he exhaust his available administrative remedies before commencing this suit. See 42 

U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Therefore, this court recommends that defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment be granted and this action be dismissed without prejudice. 

 VI. Conclusion 

 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is directed 

to randomly assign a district judge to this case. 

 Further, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 25, be granted on failure-toexhaust grounds; and 

2. This action be dismissed without prejudice. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty-one days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: February 3, 2016 

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