Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-16-01140/USCOURTS-ca3-16-01140-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

______

No. 16-1140

______

ANTONIO PEARSON,

 Appellant

v.

PRISON HEALTH SERVICE; SOMERSET COUNTY 

HOSPITAL; MEDICAL DIRECTOR R. MCGRATH; CHCA 

M. VISINAKY; CHCA OVERTON; SYLVIA GIBSON; 

GERALD L. ROZUM; CAPT. PAPUGA; LT. DOYKA; 

SGT. RITTENOUR; ROBERT SOLARCZYK; JOHN DOE1; TAMMY MOWRY; SUSAN BARNHART; DR. PAUL 

NOEL; KAREN OHLER; DR. SAMUEL WATTERMAN; 

MELINDA SULLIVAN; D. TELEGA; DON KLOSS; CRAG 

HOFFMAN; KUMUDA PRADHAN; D. RHODES; 

THOMAS MAGYAR; DENISE THOMAS; D. BEDFORD; 

COI FOUST; LINDA KLINE; RAYMOND J. SOBINA; 

COI HEATH

______

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(W.D. Pa. No. 3-09-cv-00097)

District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson

______

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Argued December 7, 2016

Before: FISHER∗

, KRAUSE and GREENBERG, Circuit 

Judges.

(Filed: March 7, 2017)

Robert J. Ridge

Brandon J. Verdream [ARGUED]

Clark Hill

301 Grant Street

One Oxford Centre, 14th Floor

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Counsel for Appellant

Kemal A. Mericli [ARGUED]

Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania

564 Forbes Avenue

6th Floor, Manor Complex

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Counsel for Department of Corrections Appellees

Kathryn M. Kenyon [ARGUED]

Meyer Unkovic & Scott

535 Smithfield Street

1300 Oliver Building

Pittsburgh, PA 15222

Counsel for Appellee Medical Director McGrath

______

 ∗ Honorable D. Michael Fisher, United States Circuit 

Judge for the Third Circuit, assumed senior status on 

February 1, 2017.

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OPINION OF THE COURT

______

FISHER, Circuit Judge.

Antonio Pearson is a prisoner who suffered from two 

serious medical needs during his incarceration at 

Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution–Somerset (“SCISomerset”). In 2009, he filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

claiming that various prison officials and an independent 

medical contractor were deliberately indifferent to those 

needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In this appeal, 

Pearson challenges the District Court’s order granting 

summary judgment in favor of the five defendants remaining 

in this case. For the reasons set forth below, we will reverse 

the District Court’s order, in part, insofar as it grants 

summary judgment in favor of Nurse David Rhodes. We will, 

however, affirm the District Court’s order in all other 

respects.

I

A

In April 2007, medical officials at SCI-Somerset sent 

Pearson to the hospital twice within the same week to 

undergo surgery. The first was a surgery to remove his 

appendix. The second was a surgery to repair a urethral tear 

caused by the insertion of a catheter during the first surgery. 

The defendants are five individuals who were either aware of

or responded to Pearson’s requests for medical treatment 

before those surgeries. Dr. McGrath is a medical contractor 

who examined Pearson when he complained of bleeding after 

his first surgery. The other four defendants are Department of 

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Corrections employees, including three nurses who examined 

Pearson, and a guard who was informed of Pearson’s

bleeding on the morning of his second surgery.

Events Leading to Surgery for Appendicitis

On April 10, 2007, Pearson began experiencing sharp 

pains in his abdomen and requested an appointment with the

medical unit. At 1:00 p.m., Nurse Denise Thomas examined 

Pearson and noted that his pain intensified with certain 

movements and never fully relieved. Diagnosing him with a 

pulled muscle, she placed him on sick call for the following 

day without ordering additional treatment.

Pearson’s excruciating pain continued and he returned 

to medical at 5:00 p.m. This time, Nurse Linda Kline 

examined him, offered Tylenol or Maalox, and instructed him 

to rest until his sick-call appointment in the morning.

According to Pearson, she told him that his gallbladder was 

failing.

At approximately 11:00 p.m. that night, Pearson told 

the block officer that he was in severe pain and asked him to 

call the medical unit. After speaking with the medical unit, 

the officer returned to Pearson’s cell and told him that Nurse 

David Rhodes would not come to see him because two nurses 

had already examined him, and he was on sick-call for the 

following day. Left in excruciating pain, Pearson screamed 

for several hours until the officer called medical again. This 

time, Nurse Rhodes came to his cell with a wheelchair—but 

Nurse Rhodes was upset, Pearson alleges, and told him that 

he would not be taken to medical unless he placed himself in

the wheelchair. Unable to walk and in pain, Pearson claims

that he was forced to crawl across the floor to the wheelchair. 

Nurse Rhodes took Pearson to the infirmary and

examined him. He checked his vitals and recognized that 

Pearson had possible signs of appendicitis. Because 

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abdominal pain has many causes and Pearson was scheduled 

for a doctor’s examination in the morning, Nurse Rhodes 

thought a period of watchful waiting would be prudent and 

placed Pearson inside an infirmary cell for observation. At 

this time, Nurse Rhodes put an order on Pearson’s chart for 

“nothing by mouth” as a precaution in case he needed surgery 

but did not elevate Pearson’s condition to another medical 

official. J.A. 124, 288-91. Continuing to suffer in pain,

Pearson screamed throughout the night. 

At approximately 10:00 a.m. on April 11, Pearson was 

seen by Dr. Ghatge, who ordered him sent to Somerset 

Hospital for evaluation. Later that day, Pearson was 

diagnosed with appendicitis and a surgeon removed Pearson’s 

inflamed appendix, as well as a gangrenous part of his 

omentum. 

Events Prior to Surgery for Urethral Tear

On April 14, 2007, Pearson returned to the prison with 

an order from his attending surgeon that he be scheduled for a 

follow-up examination in one week. He was examined by a 

prison nurse and prescribed Motrin, physical therapy, and a 

follow-up with a physician’s assistant before being sent back 

to his cell. J.A. 115, 132, 377. 

On April 15, Pearson began experiencing sharp pains 

and felt liquid running down his leg, which he later identified 

as blood flowing from his penis. He requested to be seen by 

medical. According to Pearson, the correctional officer called 

medical, but Nurse Kline instructed the officer that bleeding 

was normal after surgery and that Pearson should just lie 

down on his bunk. She did not examine him.

At this point, Pearson claims that he continued to bleed 

in constant pain until the block officer witnessed it and sent 

him directly to the medical unit. At medical, Pearson 

maintains, Nurse Magyar had him undress in case he needed 

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to go to the hospital and called Dr. McGrath, who was angry 

at being called at home. During that call, Dr. McGrath 

ordered antibiotics as well as an increased intake of fluids. 

J.A. 115-16, 377. He also instructed the nurse to place

Pearson in the infirmary for over-night observation. 

Dr. McGrath examined Pearson at 6:45 a.m. the 

following morning, diagnosed the bleeding as a normal 

consequence of the recent surgery, and sent him back to his 

cell. During the examination, Dr. McGrath collected lab 

work, ordered antibiotics, and scheduled a follow-up 

appointment. J.A. 116-17, 377-78. Later that night, Pearson 

began bleeding again and collected a quarter of a cup of blood 

in a glove to show the extent of it. He then complained about 

the bleeding to Sergeant Rittenour. According to Pearson, 

Rittenour relayed his complaint to Captain Thomas Papuga, 

who ordered Rittenour to discard the blood Pearson collected 

in the glove. But Papuga knew that Pearson was receiving 

medical care—one of the cell block officers contacted 

medical and relayed to Captain Papuga that Pearson was 

unsatisfied with their response. J.A. 324, 385.

At 7:00 a.m. on April 17, Pearson began bleeding

again. He returned to medical where Dr. McGrath observed 

the bleeding and transferred him to the emergency department 

at Somerset Hospital. At the hospital, it was determined that 

Pearson was suffering from a urethral tear caused during his 

prior surgery. Pearson underwent a second surgery to 

cauterize the tear and was returned to SCI-Somerset the same 

day.

B

In 2009, Pearson filed suit, pro se, under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983, alleging that twenty-eight defendants were deliberately 

indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment. Shortly thereafter, the District Court 

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dismissed Pearson’s complaint for failure to state a claim,

and, on October 16, 2009, we vacated that dismissal, holding 

that several of Pearson’s allegations stated a claim for 

deliberate indifference, including his allegations against 

Nurse Thomas, Nurse Kline, Nurse Rhodes, and Dr.

McGrath. Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 348 F. App’x 722, 

725-26 (3d Cir. 2009). At the time, we left open whether the 

other defendants might be able to raise grounds for dismissal 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. at 725.

And we ordered the District Court to allow Pearson to amend 

his complaint before dismissing it. Id. at 726.

On remand, Pearson filed an amended complaint, and 

in 2011, the District Court dismissed the claims against all the 

defendants except Nurse Kline, Nurse Rhodes, Captain 

Papuga, and Dr. McGrath for failure to state a claim. Nine 

months later, the District Court entered summary judgment in 

favor of Dr. McGrath and dismissed Pearson’s actions against 

Nurse Kline, Nurse Rhodes, and Captain Papuga as a sanction

for failure to prosecute. Pearson appealed and this Court 

vacated the dismissal against Nurse Thomas, Nurse Kline, 

Nurse Rhodes, and Captain Papuga as well as the summary 

judgment order in favor of Dr. McGrath. Pearson v. Prison 

Health Serv., 519 F. App’x 79, 82-84 (3d Cir. 2013). Once

again, we remanded this case to the District Court.

During the second remand, counsel was appointed for 

Pearson,1 who requested funds for the retention of a qualified 

medical expert to develop malpractice and informed-consent 

claims against Somerset Hospital and his appendicitis 

surgeon, Dr. Pradham. Those requests were denied, and, in 

 1 Counsel for Pearson is appearing pro bono. We 

express our gratitude to counsel for accepting this matter and 

for the quality of his representation. 

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2015, the Magistrate Judge issued a report and 

recommendation advising that summary judgment be entered

for the five remaining defendants in this case. The District 

Court adopted the report and recommendation and granted 

summary judgment in favor of the appellees. This timely 

appeal followed.

II

The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 

28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 

1291. We exercise plenary review over a district court’s order 

granting summary judgment, applying the same standard as 

the district court. Interstate Outdoor Advert., L.P. v. Zoning 

Bd. of Twp. of Mt. Laurel, 706 F.3d 527, 529-30 (3d Cir. 

2013). To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the 

moving party must demonstrate that “there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To assess

whether the moving party has satisfied this standard, we do 

not engage in credibility determinations, Simpson v. Kay 

Jewelers, Div. of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 643 n.3 (3d Cir. 

1998), and we view the facts and draw all reasonable 

inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Scott 

v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). Material facts are those 

“that could affect the outcome” of the proceeding, and “a 

dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is 

sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for 

the non-moving party.” Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 

181 (3d Cir. 2011). 

III

The Eighth Amendment, through its prohibition on 

cruel and unusual punishment, prohibits the imposition of 

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain contrary to 

contemporary standards of decency.” Helling v. McKinney, 

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509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993). Accordingly, in Estelle v. Gamble, 

429 U.S. 97 (1976), the Supreme Court held that prison 

officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they act 

deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs 

by “intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care 

or interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Id. at 104-

05. In order to sustain this constitutional claim under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983,

2 a plaintiff must make (1) a subjective 

showing that “the defendants were deliberately indifferent to 

[his or her] medical needs” and (2) an objective showing that 

“those needs were serious.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 

197 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 

F.3d 492, 499 (3d Cir. 2002).

In this case, the parties agree that Pearson’s 

appendicitis and urethral tear both constitute serious medical 

needs, and, as we noted the first time this case was appealed, 

we think it beyond question that both medical issues were 

serious. See Pearson, 348 F. App’x at 724; see also Atkinson 

v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 266 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[T]his Court 

has defined a medical need as serious if it has been diagnosed 

by a physician as requiring treatment”); Sherrod v. 

Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirming that “an 

appendix on the verge of rupturing” is a serious medical 

need). Thus, the only question on appeal is whether Pearson 

 2 While Pearson brings this case under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983, the substantive right at issue nonetheless derives from 

the Eighth Amendment. As the Supreme Court has remarked, 

Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a 

method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by 

those parts of the United States Constitution . . . that it 

describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 

(1979).

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has presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable 

jury could find that the defendants were deliberately 

indifferent. 

In its decision below, the District Court granted 

summary judgment on all of Pearson’s Eighth Amendment 

claims. It found that expert testimony was “necessary” for a 

reasonable jury to find that the defendants acted with 

deliberate indifference because Pearson’s “entire claim rests 

on the assertions that his care was inadequate.” J.A. 11. On 

appeal, Pearson argues that the record is sufficient without 

expert testimony to create a genuine issue of material fact as 

to whether Nurse Thomas, Nurse Rhodes, Nurse Kline, 

Captain Papuga, and Dr. McGrath were deliberately 

indifferent. For the reasons stated below, we disagree with the 

District Court’s conclusion that expert testimony was 

necessary in this case. And, because the record is sufficient 

for a reasonable jury to find that Nurse Rhodes acted with 

deliberate indifference to Pearson’s serious medical needs, we 

will reverse the District Court’s order, in part, insofar as it 

grants summary judgment in favor of Nurse Rhodes.

A

To assess whether summary judgment was appropriate, 

we must first consider whether the District Court properly 

held that expert testimony was necessary in this case. If that 

legal conclusion is correct, we can affirm the District Court’s 

decision without further analysis. If not, we must also

consider whether Pearson has offered sufficient evidence for 

a reasonable jury to find in his favor. 

At the outset, we note that in our most recent opinion 

in this case, we observed that it is “not clear that an expert 

opinion is necessary.” Pearson, 519 F. App’x at 82. We also 

note that our prior consideration of when expert testimony is 

required in a deliberate indifference case has only addressed

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when expert testimony is necessary to create a genuine 

dispute that the prisoner’s medical needs are serious. In 

Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1987), we held 

that a district court may properly require expert medical 

opinions when, “[a]s laymen, the jury would not be in a 

position to decide whether any of the conditions described by 

plaintiffs could be classified as ‘serious.’” Id. at 473. In 

Brighthwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2011), we 

reiterated our holding in Boring, clarifying that expert 

testimony “is not necessarily required to establish the 

existence of a serious medical need” and that “[o]ther forms 

of extrinsic proof . . . may suffice in some cases.” Id. at 194 

n.8.

Because the parties agree that Pearson’s medical need 

was serious, this appeal requires us to resolve an issue of first 

impression in this Circuit. We must decide for the first time 

whether and when medical expert testimony may be

necessary to create a triable issue on the subjective prong of a 

deliberate indifference case. In answering this question, three 

principles guide our analysis. The first is that deliberate 

indifference is a subjective state of mind that can, like any 

other form of scienter, be proven through circumstantial 

evidence and witness testimony. See, e.g., Durmer v. 

O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that, when 

“intent becomes critical,” it is “important that the trier of fact 

hear” the defendant’s “testimony in order to assess his 

credibility”); Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1372 (11th 

Cir. 1999) (“[P]laintiffs necessarily must use circumstantial 

evidence to establish subjective mental intent.”); In re 

Kauffman, 675 F.2d 127, 128 (7th Cir. 1981) (“Intent . . . 

must be gleaned from inferences drawn from a course of 

conduct.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

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The second principle is that there is a critical 

distinction “between cases where the complaint alleges a 

complete denial of medical care and those alleging inadequate 

medical treatment.” United States ex. rel. Walker v. Fayette 

Cty., 599 F.2d 573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979). Because “mere 

disagreement as to the proper medical treatment” does not

“support a claim of an eighth amendment violation,” 

Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d. 

Cir. 1987), when medical care is provided, we presume that 

the treatment of a prisoner is proper absent evidence that it

violates professional standards of care. See Brown v. Borough 

of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[I]t is 

well established that as long as a physician exercises 

professional judgment his behavior will not violate a 

prisoner’s constitutional rights”). 

The third and final principle is that the mere receipt of 

inadequate medical care does not itself amount to deliberate 

indifference—the defendant must also act with the requisite 

state of mind when providing that inadequate care. Durmer, 

991 F.2d at 69 n.13 (noting a plaintiff can only proceed to 

trial when there is a genuine issue of fact regarding both the 

adequacy of medical care and the defendant’s intent). This 

observation is critical because it makes clear that there are 

two very distinct subcomponents to the deliberate 

indifference prong of an adequacy of care claim. The first is 

the adequacy of the medical care—an objective inquiry where 

expert testimony could be helpful to the jury. The second is 

the individual defendant’s state of mind—a subjective inquiry 

that can be proven circumstantially without expert testimony. 

Based upon these observations, we think that medical 

expert testimony may be necessary to establish deliberate 

indifference in an adequacy of care claim where, as laymen, 

the jury would not be in a position to determine that the 

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particular treatment or diagnosis fell below a professional 

standard of care. As is the case with evaluating whether the 

prisoner is suffering from a serious medical need, evaluating 

whether medical treatment is adequate presents an objective 

question typically beyond the competence of a non-medical 

professional. Likewise, it makes sense to require a prisoner to 

offer extrinsic proof regarding the quality of medical care in 

adequacy of care cases when, to defeat our presumption that 

the medical care provided to him or her was adequate, the 

prisoner must show that the medical official did not exercise 

professional judgment. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 

U.S. 317, 331 (1986) (holding that when the burden of 

persuasion at trial would be on the nonmoving party, 

“the party moving for summary judgment may satisfy Rule 

56” by demonstrating that “the nonmoving party’s evidence is 

insufficient to establish an essential element of [its] claim”); 

Durmer, 991 F.2d at 67 (“[P]rison authorities are accorded 

considerable latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of 

prisoners.”); Brown, 903 F.2d at 278 (“[A]s long as a 

physician exercises professional judgment his behavior will 

not violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights.”).

Nonetheless, for two reasons, we disagree with the 

District Court’s conclusion that medical expert testimony was 

necessary in this case. First, we believe that conclusion

ignores our decision in Brightwell, where we noted that 

expert testimony “is not necessarily required” where other 

forms of extrinsic proof may suffice. 637 F.3d at 194 n.8. In 

this case, Pearson has not offered any extrinsic proof

regarding the quality of his medical care, and, it may well be

possible that other forms of extrinsic proof (e.g., a training 

manual, photograph, or medical records) could have 

permitted a reasonable jury to find that his medical care was 

inadequate. Accordingly, to the extent we agree with the 

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District Court that a reasonable jury could not find in 

Pearson’s favor on this record, we believe that it is additional 

extrinsic proof, rather than an expert witness specifically, that 

was required for him to survive summary judgment.

Second, we disagree with the District Court’s 

conclusion that additional proof was needed to create a triable 

issue on all, rather than just some, of Pearson’s deliberate 

indifference claims. Certainly, for the reasons just stated, 

extrinsic evidence is needed to create a triable issue on 

Pearson’s adequacy of treatment claims where it would not be 

obvious to a layperson that the defendant breached a 

professional standard of care. However, Pearson also raises

two claims that he was delayed or denied treatment outright 

for a non-medical reason and one adequacy of treatment 

claim where it would be apparent to a layperson that his 

medical treatment violated a professional standard of care. 

For these claims, additional extrinsic proof was not necessary

to survive summary judgment, and we hold that the District 

Court erred in concluding otherwise. 

For Pearson’s claim that Nurse Rhodes forced him to 

crawl to a wheelchair, we believe that Pearson’s sworn 

testimony is sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact that 

Nurse Rhodes acted with deliberate disregard to his medical 

needs. See Bushman v. Halm, 798 F.2d 651, 661 (3d Cir. 

1986) (noting that in “the absence of any contrary medical 

evidence, plaintiff’s sworn testimony must be taken as true 

for purposes of creating a fact issue.”). As noted above, our 

precedent provides that a plaintiff can proceed to trial on an 

adequacy of care claim when there is a genuine issue of fact 

regarding both the adequacy of care and the defendant’s 

intent. Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69 n.13. And we do not think 

additional extrinsic proof is necessary for Pearson to create a 

genuine dispute of fact on either issue for this claim. A

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layperson is capable of concluding that forcing a screaming

patient to crawl to a wheelchair violates professional 

standards of care.

3 And a reasonable jury could find that 

Nurse Rhodes knew Pearson could not walk and deliberately 

failed to assist him for non-medical reasons.

For Pearson’s claims that he was delayed or denied 

medical treatment for a non-medical reason, we also believe 

that requiring additional extrinsic proof would be 

inappropriate given the subjective nature of scienter and our 

case law on deliberate indifference. Again, a delay or denial 

of medical treatment claim must be approached differently 

than an adequacy of care claim. Fayette Cty., 599 F.2d at 575 

n.2. Unlike the deliberate indifference prong of an adequacy 

of care claim (which involves both an objective and 

subjective inquiry), the deliberate indifference prong of a 

delay or denial of medical treatment claim involves only one 

subjective inquiry—since there is no presumption that the 

defendant acted properly, it lacks the objective, propriety of 

medical treatment, prong of an adequacy of care claim. 

 3 Indeed, expert testimony is not admissible, let alone 

required to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether the 

care the prisoner received was adequate, if it was obvious to 

the jury that the care violated professional standards. See, 

e.g., Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp. U.S.A., 350 F.3d 316, 

320-21 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that Rule 702 requires expert 

testimony to “assist the trier of fact” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)); Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note to 

1972 proposed rules (noting that expert testimony is not 

helpful “when the untrained layman would be qualified to 

determine . . . the particular issue without enlightenment from 

those having a specialized understanding of the subject 

involved in the dispute”).

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Absent that objective inquiry, extrinsic proof is not necessary

for the jury to find deliberate indifference in a delay or denial 

of medical treatment claim. All that is needed is for the 

surrounding circumstances to be sufficient to permit a 

reasonable jury to find that the delay or denial was motivated 

by non-medical factors. See, e.g., Durmer, 991 F.2d at 68-69; 

United States v. Michener, 152 F.2d 880, 885 (3d Cir. 1945) 

(“[I]t is for the jury to determine the weight to be given to 

each piece of evidence . . . particularly where the question 

at issue is the credibility of the witness.”). The District Court 

erred in holding otherwise.

In sum, because it is just as difficult for a layperson to 

assess the adequacy of medical care as it is for them to assess 

the seriousness of a medical condition, we hold that medical 

expert testimony may be necessary in some adequacy of care 

cases when the propriety of a particular diagnosis or course of 

treatment would not be apparent to a layperson. Nonetheless, 

we disagree with the District Court’s conclusion that expert 

testimony was necessary in this case because we are not 

satisfied that medical expert testimony would be necessary 

for all of Pearson’s claims, nor are we satisfied that other 

forms of extrinsic proof would not have sufficed.

B

Because the District Court incorrectly held that expert 

testimony was necessary for Pearson to survive summary 

judgment, we must now consider whether the record in this 

case was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact 

as to whether Nurse Thomas, Nurse Rhodes, Nurse Kline, 

Captain Papuga, and Dr. McGrath were deliberately 

indifferent to Pearson’s serious medical needs. As the 

Supreme Court has explained, “deliberate indifference entails 

something more than mere negligence” and is a subjective 

standard that requires the official to both “be aware of facts 

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from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial 

risk of serious harm exists” and to “also draw the inference.” 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-37 (1994). In prior 

cases, we have found deliberate indifference in a variety of 

contexts including where (1) prison authorities deny 

reasonable requests for medical treatment, (2) knowledge of 

the need for medical care is accompanied by the intentional 

refusal to provide it, (3) necessary medical treatment is

delayed for non-medical reasons, and (4) prison authorities 

prevent an inmate from receiving recommended treatment for 

serious medical needs. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 347. Because

each defendant played a different role in regard to Pearson’s 

treatment at SCI Somerset, we will address Pearson’s claims 

against each of them in turn.

1. Claims Against Nurse Thomas

Pearson first claims that the District Court erred when 

granting summary judgment to Nurse Thomas. He argues that 

a reasonably jury could find that she acted with deliberate 

indifference because she did not raise his abdominal pain with 

other staff and offered no medical assistance other than to 

place him on sick call. 

We disagree. First, even if a reasonable jury could find 

that Nurse Thomas was negligent in diagnosing or treating his 

pain, that would not be enough for the jury to find that Nurse 

Thomas acted with deliberate indifference in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment. As the Supreme Court has held, “a 

complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing 

or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of 

medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 

429 U.S. at 106; see also Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 

(3d Cir. 2004) (“Allegations of medical malpractice are not

sufficient to establish a Constitutional violation.”).

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Second, while Pearson claims that Nurse Thomas 

delayed or denied him medical care, it is undisputed that she 

examined him, diagnosed him with a pulled muscle, and 

decided not to elevate his condition based on her opinion that 

it was not severe. Thus, his claim against her is one that she 

inadequately diagnosed and treated his medical condition. As 

we remarked earlier, that distinction is critical—because the 

deliberate indifference standard “affords considerable latitude 

to prison medical authorities in the diagnosis and treatment of 

the medical problems of inmate patients,” we must “disavow 

any attempt to second-guess the propriety or adequacy of 

[their] particular course of treatment” so long as it “remains a 

question of sound professional judgment.” Inmates of 

Allegheny Cty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 

1979) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Brown, 

903 F.2d at 278 (“[I]t is well established that as long as a 

physician exercises professional judgment his behavior will 

not violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights.”); Fayette 

Cty., 599 F.2d at 575 n.2 (“[F]ederal courts are generally 

reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to 

constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

Here, Pearson has offered no circumstantial evidence 

suggesting that Nurse Thomas subjectively appreciated the 

true seriousness of the risk of harm. Nor did he produce 

extrinsic evidence suggesting that Nurse Thomas’s treatment 

decision regarding the symptoms of which she had awareness

was “a substantial departure from accepted professional 

judgment, practice, or standards” such that a reasonable jury 

could conclude that she “actually did not base [her] decision 

on such judgment.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 

(1982). Accordingly, no reasonable jury could find that she

acted with the “obduracy and wantonness” that violates the 

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Eighth Amendment, and we agree with the District Court that 

Nurse Thomas is entitled to summary judgment. Whitley v. 

Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (“It is obduracy and 

wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that 

characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual 

Punishments Clause . . . .”).

2. Claims Against Nurse Kline

For similar reasons, we also agree with the District 

Court that Nurse Kline is entitled to summary judgment. 

Although Pearson argues that a reasonable jury could find 

that she was deliberately indifferent to his appendicitis when 

she told him that his gallbladder was failing but merely 

offered him Tylenol and Maalox, we disagree. Without 

extrinsic evidence showing that a failing gall bladder is 

emergent or necessitates some other response, no layperson

would be able to find that Nurse Kline’s determination that 

Pearson should rest until his examination in the morning was 

“a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, 

practice, or standards.” Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323. Hence no 

reasonable jury could find that this response violated the 

Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Brown, 903 F.2d at 278 (“[I]t is 

well established that as long as a physician exercises 

professional judgment his behavior will not violate a 

prisoner’s constitutional rights.”).

Likewise, while Pearson maintains that a reasonable 

jury could find that Nurse Kline acted with deliberate 

indifference to his urethral tear when she initially declined to 

examine his bleeding on April 15 and then noted a “copious” 

amount of blood, J.A. 126, in his underwear without 

escalating his situation, we believe that the record fails to 

create a triable issue as to whether Nurse Kline acted with 

deliberate indifference. Whether or not Nurse Kline escalated 

Pearson’s condition, it is clear that his condition was elevated 

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to Dr. McGrath once Pearson was taken to the infirmary. 

Nurse Kline cannot be held liable for allowing a different 

nurse to escalate Pearson’s condition, nor can she be held 

liable for following Dr. McGrath’s orders that Pearson remain 

in the infirmary overnight. See Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69 

(noting non-physicians cannot “be considered deliberately 

indifferent simply because they failed to respond directly to 

the medical complaints of a prisoner who was already being 

treated by the prison doctor”).

Finally, even if Nurse Kline refused to examine 

Pearson when the correctional officer first called about his 

bleeding, the circumstances surrounding this refusal are not 

sufficient to create a triable issue as to whether she violated 

the Eighth Amendment. While Pearson points to evidence 

that Nurse Kline delayed her examination because she 

believed that his bleeding was normal after surgery, this 

serves only to reinforce that she failed to immediately 

appreciate the severity of his medical needs. Absent evidence 

that the seriousness of his bleeding was communicated to her 

at that time, a reasonable jury could not conclude she was 

“aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that 

a substantial risk of serious harm existe[d]” and that she “also 

dr[ew] the inference. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. And that 

is only particularly so here—given this lack of 

communication regarding the seriousness of the bleeding, and 

given that Pearson was under the care of Dr. McGrath, who 

had prescribed medicine and physical therapy upon Pearson’s 

return from his appendectomy, Nurse Kline was justified in 

believing that Pearson was not in danger absent instructions 

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from Dr. McGrath or Pearson’s surgeon that bleeding should 

be treated as more than a normal consequence of his surgery.4

 

3. Claims Against Nurse Rhodes

Pearson next argues that a reasonable jury could find 

that Nurse Rhodes acted with deliberate indifference to his 

medical needs because Nurse Rhodes (1) refused to examine 

him in his cell when the block officer first called medical, (2) 

forced him to crawl to the wheelchair to obtain medical 

treatment, and (3) did nothing but order him placed in the 

infirmary overnight despite recognizing signs of appendicitis. 

We agree with Pearson that these claims create a triable issue 

as to whether Nurse Rhodes acted with deliberate indifference 

to his needs. We will therefore reverse the order of the 

District Court, in part, insofar as it grants summary judgment 

in favor of Nurse Rhodes.

 4 In Spruill, we specifically indicated that a nonmedical prison official will not be chargeable with deliberate 

indifference, “absent a reason to believe (or actual 

knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are 

mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner.” 372 F.3d at 236. 

Now confronted with a set of defendants who are not 

physicians but have some amount of medical training, we 

clarify that the same division of labor concerns that underlie 

that rule apply when a nurse knows that a prisoner is under a 

physician’s care and has no reason to believe that the doctor 

is mistreating the prisoner. Given that it is the physician with 

the ultimate authority to diagnose and prescribe treatment for 

the prisoner, a nurse who knows that the prisoner is under a 

physician’s care is certainly “justified in believing that the

prisoner is in capable hands,” id., so long as the nurse has no 

discernable basis to question the physician’s medical 

judgment. 

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Pearson’s claim that Nurse Rhodes failed to examine 

him when he initially requested medical assistance creates a 

triable issue as to whether Nurse Rhodes was deliberately 

indifferent because it raises a claim that Pearson was either 

denied reasonable requests for medical treatment, or 

necessary medical treatment was delayed for non-medical 

reasons. Unlike Nurse Kline, Nurse Rhodes cannot claim that 

Pearson was already being treated by a physician. In addition, 

when Rhodes initially denied medical care, he was confronted 

with a report from a corrections officer that an inmate was 

suffering from excruciating pain—an inmate who had twice 

sought medical assistance earlier in the day, reporting the 

same complaint but with increasing severity.

As Farmer noted, an official may not escape liability by 

“merely refus[ing] to verify underlying facts that he strongly 

suspect[s] to be true, or declin[ing] to confirm strong 

inferences of risk that he strongly suspect[s] to 

exist.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 n.8. Neither is he immunized 

from liability merely because he delays care for an emergent 

condition in reliance on a sick call policy. See Natale v. 

Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583 (3d Cir. 

2003). Because these circumstances may suggest that Nurse

Rhodes engaged in a pattern of deliberately indifferent

conduct in spite of evidence that he was aware that Pearson 

faced a substantial risk of harm, there is a genuine issue of 

fact as to why Nurse Rhodes refused to examine Pearson and 

“we cannot conclude as a matter of law [his] conduct did not 

run afoul of the [Eighth Amendment].” Durmer, 991 F.2d at 

68.

Likewise, Pearson’s claim that he was forced to crawl 

to the wheelchair creates a genuine dispute as to whether 

Nurse Rhodes acted with deliberate indifference. Viewing the 

record in Pearson’s favor, as we must, Nurse Rhodes forced a 

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patient, who had been screaming in pain for several hours, to 

crawl to a wheelchair despite indicating that he was unable to 

walk. We do not believe that additional evidence is required 

for a reasonable jury to conclude that this conduct violates a 

professional standard of care or that such conduct entails the 

obduracy and wantonness that is proscribed by the Eighth 

Amendment. See, e.g., Cummings v. Roberts, 628 F.2d 1065, 

1068 (8th Cir. 1980) (reversing grant of summary judgment 

where the plaintiff claimed that defendants refused to give 

him a wheelchair, forcing him to crawl on the floor). 5

Finally, Pearson’s claim that Nurse Rhodes merely 

ordered observation despite recognizing signs of appendicitis

creates a triable issue as to whether Nurse Rhodes acted with 

deliberate indifference. On its own, this claim might not be 

sufficient to survive summary judgment—because Nurse 

Rhodes examined and diagnosed Pearson in the infirmary, we 

would be confronted with an adequacy of treatment claim that 

lacks extrinsic evidence showing that Nurse Rhodes’ response 

“so deviated from professional standards of care that it 

 5 Rhodes correctly points out that Pearson’s only 

evidence of this event is his own testimony. However, 

counsel for Rhodes conceded at argument that we would be 

compelled to reverse and remand this issue for trial if it did, 

in fact, occur as Pearson describes. See Oral Argument at 

42:38–44:47. We, of course, must credit Pearson’s testimony. 

While we require more than conclusory affidavits to create a 

genuine issue of material fact, MD Mall Assocs., LLC v. CSX 

Transp., Inc., 715 F.3d 479, 485 n.6 (3d Cir. 2013), when

deciding a motion for summary judgment, “the evidence of 

the non-movant is to be believed,” and credibility 

determinations must be left to the jury. Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

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amounted to deliberate indifference.” Allard v. Baldwin, 779 

F.3d 768, 772 (8th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). But that examination did not occur until after Nurse 

Rhodes refused to treat Pearson and allegedly forced him 

crawl to a wheelchair. This pattern of disinterested conduct 

“separates this complaint from ordinary allegations of 

medical malpractice.” White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 109 

(3d Cir. 1990). Indeed, while “one reasonable reading of the 

record in this case” is that Nurse Rhodes ordered observation 

in the infirmary based on his informed medical judgment, 

“we cannot conclude that it is the only one” because, insofar 

as the record suggests that Nurse Rhodes repeatedly ignored 

Pearson’s requests for treatment based on non-medical 

reasons, a reasonable jury could find that Nurse Rhodes also 

had a non-medical motive for leaving Pearson in the 

infirmary overnight. Durmer, 991 F.2d at 67. Accordingly, 

because Nurse Rhodes suspected appendicitis, a condition 

that would have put him on notice that a “substantial risk of 

serious harm exists,” we cannot conclude as a matter of law 

that this observation order did not violate the Eighth 

Amendment. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.6

 6 Nurse Rhodes argued that he was entitled to qualified 

immunity because it was not clearly established at the time of 

these events that an official would be liable for a delay in care 

without expert medical evidence that the inmate suffered 

harm as a result. This fundamentally misunderstands the 

qualified immunity inquiry. Qualified immunity requires us to 

ask whether a reasonable official would have understood, at 

the time of the challenged conduct, that what he or she was 

doing violated an established right. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 

U.S. 731, 741 (2011).That analysis cannot turn on facts that 

could not be known to an official at the time, like whether the 

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4. Claims Against Dr. McGrath

Next, Pearson maintains that Dr. McGrath 

demonstrated a pattern of deliberate indifference to his 

medical needs through three incidents after he returned to the 

prison following his appendix surgery. The first is that Dr. 

McGrath ordered Pearson sent directly back to the general 

population without any observation period in the prison 

infirmary, and without ordering the follow-up prescribed by

Pearson’s surgeon. The second is that Dr. McGrath was angry 

and simply ordered Pearson to be placed in the infirmary 

overnight when Nurse Magyar called him about Pearson’s 

bleeding on April 15. The third is that Dr. McGrath told 

Pearson his bleeding was normal and discharged him back to 

his cell after an examination on April 16.

We agree with the District Court that Dr. McGrath is 

entitled to summary judgment. Whether or not Dr. McGrath

was angry at being called at home on April 15, Pearson does 

not dispute that Dr. McGrath prescribed treatment over the 

phone, ordering observation in the infirmary, antibiotics, and 

 

plaintiff would ultimately be able to produce expert testimony 

that the delay resulted in harm. It was sufficiently clear at the 

time of these events that exposing an inmate to the kind of 

severe and protracted pain and mental anxiety alleged in this 

case could expose an official to Eighth Amendment 

liability. See Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346; White, 897 F.2d at 

111.

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increased intake of fluids. J.A. 115-16, 377.7 Pearson also 

concedes that he was not in immediate danger at the time, and 

that Dr. McGrath examined him at 6:45 a.m. the following 

morning, diagnosing his bleeding as a normal consequence of 

the surgery in addition to collecting lab work and scheduling 

a follow-up appointment. J.A. 116-17, 377-78. Because

medical treatment was provided on both occasions and

Pearson has provided no extrinsic evidence that would permit 

a layperson to conclude that Dr. McGrath’s actions 

constituted “a substantial departure from accepted 

professional judgment, practice, or standards,” a reasonable 

jury could not find that he was deliberately indifferent either 

occasion. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323; see also Pierce, 612 

F.2d at 754 (“Courts will disavow any attempt to secondguess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of 

treatment” so long as it “remains a question of sound 

professional judgment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Taking those claims away, the sole assertion that 

Pearson has against Dr. McGrath is that McGrath was 

deliberately indifferent for sending him back to the general 

prison population without any observation period in the 

prison infirmary and without ordering the lifting restrictions

or follow-up appointment prescribed by Pearson’s surgeon. 

As with Pearson’s other claims against Dr. McGrath, the 

record is not sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that

 7 Pearson points to this call as circumstantial evidence 

of Dr. McGrath’s state of mind that reflects, in combination 

with evidence of the totality of his interactions with Dr. 

McGrath, deliberate indifference. While such circumstantial 

evidence may be relevant to the subjective inquiry, the 

evidence here is still not sufficient for a reasonable jury to 

conclude that he had a sufficiently culpable state of mind.

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Dr. McGrath was deliberately indifferent to his medical 

needs. Since Dr. McGrath ordered pain medication, exercise 

to help with breathing, and a follow-up medical appointment 

upon Pearson’s return to the prison, any complaint that he 

should have ordered additional observation is no more than a 

“mere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment” that 

does not “support a claim of an eighth amendment violation.”

Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346; see J.A. 132. At the same time, 

while prison authorities may be held liable under the Eighth 

Amendment when they “prevent an inmate from receiving 

recommended treatment for serious medical needs,” we 

cannot find that this is such a case. Pierce, 612 F.2d at 762. 

Unlike in our prior interference-with-prescribed treatment 

cases, there is nothing in the record indicating that Dr. 

McGrath refused to allow Pearson to receive the prescribed 

treatment, let alone that Dr. McGrath knew that the lifting 

restriction or the follow-up appointment had been prescribed.

8

Absent such evidence, this claim is merely that Dr. McGrath 

negligently failed to order the prescribed treatment, and, 

because deliberate indifference “entails something more than 

mere negligence,” no reasonable jury could find him liable

for this conduct under the Eighth Amendment. Farmer, 511 

U.S. at 835.

5. Claims Against Captain Papuga

Finally, we agree with the District Court that Captain 

Papuga is entitled to summary judgment. As our precedent

makes clear, “a non-medical prison official” cannot “be 

charge[d] with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement 

of deliberate indifference” when the “prisoner is under the 

 8 In fact, as the follow-up appointment was scheduled 

to take place after the second surgery, it is not the case that 

the prison ever violated the surgeon’s orders.

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care of medical experts” and the official does not have “a 

reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or 

their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner.”

Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236; see also Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69 

(holding that non-physicians cannot “be considered 

deliberately indifferent simply because they failed to respond 

directly to the medical complaints of a prisoner who was 

already being treated by the prison doctor”). Whether or not 

Captain Papuga ordered Sergeant Rittenour to discard 

Pearson’s blood, Pearson was being treated by medical, and

Captain Papuga was only made aware of Pearson’s bleeding 

after the cell block officers contacted medical regarding his 

condition. J.A. 324, 385. Accordingly, since Pearson has 

identified no reason for Captain Papuga to believe that he was 

being mistreated, no reasonable jury could conclude that 

Captain Papuga was deliberately indifferent for failing to

second-guess the medical staff’s appraisal of the situation.

IV

Regretfully, we must comment on one final issue that

has percolated over the course of this litigation. During his 

prior appeal in 2013, Pearson argued that the Magistrate 

Judge and District Judge should recuse themselves because 

they were biased against him. At the time, we were satisfied 

that neither judge would harbor bias on remand, but we did 

express concern with their editorializing on prisoner litigation

when dismissing Pearson’s complaint. Specifically, the 

Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation “criticized 

inmate medical claims in general” and made general 

observations regarding frivolous litigation filed by prisoners 

that had “no apparent bearing on the merits of Pearson’s 

claims.” Pearson, 519 F. App’x at 84.9

 9 The precise language we admonished was: 

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When we remanded this case, we were hopeful that the 

Magistrate Judge and District Judge would cease making 

these kinds of irrelevant, categorical statements for several 

reasons, including that they are unnecessary and might cast 

our judicial system in a bad light by leading an observer to 

question the impartiality of these proceedings. In addition, it

is antithetical to the fair administration of justice to pre-judge 

an entire class of litigants, and we expect courts to conduct, at 

a minimum, a careful assessment of the claims of each party. 

By failing to exhibit such an individualized inquiry, these 

statements disserved the important principle that “justice must 

satisfy the appearance of justice.” Offutt v. United States, 348

U.S. 11, 13 (1954).

Despite our optimism, and despite our admonishment 

of these sorts of categorical statements, this commentary

 

Inmate complaints often result in the naming of 

as many defendants as the inmate can remember 

. . . even though there is no legal claim against 

them in the complaint, no viable legal claim 

within any likely amendment to the complaint, 

and no interest on the part of the inmate in 

following through. They generate large 

litigation expenses which divert resources even 

from the medical care provided to inmates not 

to mention other uses the Commonwealth of 

Pennsylvania and its taxpayers might have for 

the money. This case is a textbook example.

Pearson, 519 F. App’x at 84 (alteration in original) (quoting 

Pearson v. Prison Health Service, No. 09-97, 2011 WL 

4473462, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 2011)).

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continued since we last remanded this case to the District 

Court. While Pearson has not renewed his motion for recusal 

either in the District Court or on appeal, we note that in one

prior opinion, the District Court adopted a report and 

recommendation in which the Magistrate Judge stated: “To 

repeat what I have said before, what is even more perverse is 

that [appointing an expert in prisoner litigation] would be a 

benefit only available to the class of litigants that has 

uniquely demonstrated to Congress that it files an undue 

amount of frivolous and meritless lawsuits.” Pearson v. 

Prison Health Serv., No. 09-97, 2014 WL 2860660, at *4 

(W.D. Pa. June 23, 2014). Likewise, in the report and 

recommendation adopted by the District Court in granting

summary judgment to the appellees, the Magistrate Judge 

made several statements regarding prisoners such as noting 

that “anyone reading the news is familiar with inmates using 

bodily fluids, especially blood, as weapons.” J.A. 459.10

 10 “Although a magistrate is not an Article III judge, ... 

a district court may refer dispositive motions to a magistrate 

for a recommendation so long as ‘the entire process takes

place under the district court's total control and jurisdiction,’ 

and the judge ‘exercise[s] the ultimate authority to issue an 

appropriate order.’” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 153 (1985) 

(citation omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The 

District Court is thus ultimately responsible for the decision,

including for the Magistrate’s report and recommendation if it 

is adopted in its entirety, but magistrate judges play an 

important role in the operation of the federal courts and must 

take care to word their published recommendations 

accordingly. Indeed, it is equally applicable to District Judges 

and Magistrates that “[w]henever a judge’s impartiality 

‘might reasonably be questioned’ in a proceeding, 28 U.S.C. 

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As we noted in Pearson’s prior appeal and will 

reiterate now, Pearson suffered from two serious medical 

conditions, and “it does not appear . . . that he filed this 

lawsuit for recreational purposes or to harass prison 

personnel.” Pearson, 519 F. App’x at 84. It appears he filed 

this suit because he genuinely believes that the prison 

officials acted deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in 

violation of his constitutional rights. Whether or not he 

ultimately prevails, equality before the law is one of the 

founding principles of our government and Pearson deserves 

to have his case treated as carefully and thoughtfully as any 

other litigant’s.

While we remain convinced that the Magistrate Judge 

and District Judge are capable of handling Pearson’s trial 

without any bias, we trust that our message will be heard on 

this third remand and that this editorializing will cease going 

forward.

V

For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 

judgment of the District Court as to Nurse Thomas, Nurse 

Kline, Captain Papuga, and Dr. McGrath, reverse as to Nurse 

Rhodes, and remand for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion.

 

§ 455(a) commands the judge to disqualify himself sua sponte

in that proceeding.” Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 

10 F.3d 155, 162 (3d Cir. 1993). 

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