Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-05353/USCOURTS-caDC-13-05353-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 12, 2014 Decided July 31, 2015

No. 13-5353

ARON DIBACCO AND BARBARA WEBSTER,

APPELLANTS

v.

UNITED STATES ARMY, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:87-cv-03349)

James H. Lesar argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellants. 

Fred Elmore Haynes, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Ronald C. 

Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and

R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, and ROGERS and 

MILLETT, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge MILLETT.

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MILLETT, Circuit Judge: Removing the cloak from the 

cloak-and-dagger business of spying can be a lengthy and 

arduous process. Understandably so, given the competing 

needs to protect national security and to ensure appropriate 

governmental transparency. The 30-year odyssey of this 

Freedom of Information Act case attests to the complex twists 

and turns that the disclosure process can take. 

In 1985, Carl Oglesby filed a request under the Freedom 

of Information Act with six federal agencies, seeking

information on Reinhard Gehlen, a former Nazi general 

through whom the United States engaged in clandestine 

espionage after World War II. Thirty years, an intervening 

Act of Congress, and two appeals later, more than ten 

thousand pages of documents have been released and the 

quest for information has narrowed substantially. With Mr. 

Oglesby’s passing in 2011, his daughter, Aron DiBacco, and 

partner, Barbara Webster, have now taken up Oglesby’s 

cause. In this third appeal, DiBacco and Webster challenge 

the adequacy of the Army’s and CIA’s searches for and 

disclosures of documents, as well as the CIA’s justification 

for withholding certain information on national security

grounds. 

The district court concluded that the Army and CIA have

done what the Freedom of Information Act requires. We 

agree, except that we must remand for the district court to 

address in the first instance DiBacco’s and Webster’s 

challenges to redactions in a batch of records that the Army 

disclosed to them while this appeal was pending.

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I

Statutory Framework

The Freedom of Information Act

Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act 

(“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, to promote the “broad disclosure 

of Government records” by generally requiring federal 

agencies to make their records available to the public on 

request. Department of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 8 (1988)

(internal quotation marks omitted). But Congress also 

“realized that legitimate governmental and private interests 

could be harmed by release of certain types of information.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, FOIA 

“balance[s] the public’s need for access to official information 

with the Government’s need for confidentiality,” Weinberger 

v. Catholic Action of Hawaii, 454 U.S. 139, 144 (1981), by 

exempting nine categories of records from disclosure, see 5 

U.S.C. § 552(b). While those exemptions “must be narrowly 

construed,” Milner v. Department of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 565 

(2011) (internal quotation marks omitted), they still must be 

given “meaningful reach and application,” John Doe Agency 

v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989). 

FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3 are at issue in this case. 

Exemption 1 authorizes the withholding of “matters” that are 

“specifically authorized under criteria established by an 

Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national 

defense or foreign policy” if they “are in fact properly 

classified pursuant to such Executive order.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(b)(1). 

Exemption 3 excludes “matters” that are “specifically 

exempted from disclosure by statute” if that statute “requires 

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that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner 

as to leave no discretion on the issue” or “establishes 

particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types 

of matters to be withheld[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). Courts 

have held that a provision of the National Security Act of 

1947, which calls for the Director of National Intelligence to 

protect “intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized 

disclosure,” 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1), is a valid Exemption 3 

statute. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 167 (1985); accord 

Larson v. Department of State, 565 F.3d 857, 865 (D.C. Cir. 

2009).

Under FOIA, agencies may charge reasonable fees to 

help defray their costs in responding to a FOIA request, but 

they must waive or reduce their fees if disclosure of the 

requested information “is in the public interest because it is 

likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of 

the operations or activities of the government and is not 

primarily in the commercial interest of the requester.” 5 

U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii).

When an agency subject to FOIA receives a request for 

records, it must determine within twenty days whether to 

comply with that request and, once it does, must immediately 

notify the requester of its determination and reasoning. 5 

U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i). Upon receipt of that determination, 

the requester may administratively appeal the agency’s 

decision, and the agency must decide the appeal within twenty 

days. See id. § 552(a)(6)(A)(ii). Exhaustion of that

administrative appeal process is a prerequisite to seeking 

judicial relief, unless the agency has not responded within the 

statutory time limits. See id. § 552(a)(6)(C); Oglesby v. 

Department of Army (Oglesby I), 920 F.2d 57, 61–62 (D.C. 

Cir. 1990).

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Federal district courts have jurisdiction under FOIA “to 

enjoin [an] agency from withholding agency records and to 

order the production of any agency records improperly 

withheld from the complainant.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). In 

a FOIA suit, the burden is “on the agency to sustain its 

action,” and the district court must “determine the matter de 

novo.” Id. 

The Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act

Congress enacted the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act 

(“Disclosure Act”), Pub. L. No. 105-246, 112 Stat. 1859 

(1998) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 note), to spur 

disclosure of millions of pages of government records from 

the World War II era. See Nazi War Crimes & Japanese 

Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, 

Final Report to the United States Congress 1 (April 2007) 

(“Interagency Report”). To that end, the Disclosure Act 

required federal agencies to “locate, identify, inventory, 

recommend for declassification, and make available to the 

public at the National Archives and Records Administration,” 

with few exceptions, any remaining classified records 

concerning war crimes committed by Nazi Germany and its 

allies. Pub. L. No. 105-246, § 2(c)(1). 

The Disclosure Act also directed the President to 

establish the “Nazi War Criminal Records Interagency 

Working Group,” Pub. L. No. 105-246, § 2(b)(1), composed 

of various high-level government officials and three members 

of the public. The Working Group was tasked with 

coordinating agencies’ efforts to fulfill the Disclosure Act’s 

mandate. See Interagency Report, at 1.

1

 Those efforts led to 

 1 This group, as constituted by the President, included 

representatives from the Holocaust Museum, National Archives, 

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the declassification and public release of over 8.5 million 

pages of World War II and post-war records. See Interagency 

Report, at 2. 

Factual and Procedural Background

General Reinhard Gehlen served as Hitler’s senior 

military intelligence officer on the Eastern Front. See 

Oglesby I, 920 F.2d at 60. After the war, Gehlen became an 

intelligence asset for the United States, secretly agreeing to 

operate an extensive spy network in Europe under United 

States command. See id. at 60. Gehlen operated this spy 

network, known as the Gehlen Organization, until 1956, at 

which point it became part of the newly formed intelligence 

service of the Federal Republic of Germany. Gehlen led the 

latter until his retirement in 1968. Interagency Report, at 11, 

13, 30, 48; CIA Biographic Sketch on General Reinhard 

Gehlen, NWC-002652 (declassified and approved for release 

under the Disclosure Act in 2001), J.A. 1084–1085.

Carl Oglesby was a journalist interested in the 

intelligence relationship between the United States and 

Gehlen. His rounds of effort over many years to obtain 

information under FOIA contributed materially to the 

disclosure of the Gehlen Organization’s covert relationship 

with the federal government.

 

Department of State, Department of Defense, FBI, CIA, National 

Security Council, and Department of Justice. Interagency Report, 

at 1. In 2000, Congress renamed this group the “Nazi War Crimes 

and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working 

Group,” and clarified that its disclosure mandate extended to all 

classified records concerning war crimes committed by the 

Japanese Imperial Government. See Japanese Imperial Government 

Disclosure Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-567, Title VIII, 114 Stat. 

2864–2867.

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Round One

 

In 1985, Oglesby submitted FOIA requests seeking 

information on that relationship to six federal agencies: the 

Department of the Army, the Department of State, the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the 

National Archives and Records Administration, and the 

National Security Agency (“NSA”). See DiBacco v. 

Department of Army, 983 F. Supp. 2d 44, 49 (D.D.C. 2013). 

Oglesby specifically sought:

(i) Records of World War II German General 

Reinhard Gehlen and his relationship with any 

United States officials during the period 1944 

through 1956;

(ii) Records of the meetings held at Fort Hunt, 

Virginia, in the summer of 1945 between 

Gehlen and American officials including U.S. 

Army General George V. Strong and Office of 

Strategic Services officer Allen Welsh Dulles;

(iii) Records of U.S. Army “Operation Rusty,” 

carried out in Europe between 1945 and 1948;

(iv) Records of post-war Nazi German 

underground organizations such as Odessa, 

Kamaradenwerk, Bruderschaft, Werewolves, 

and Die Spanne; and

(v) Records of the Office of Strategic Services’

“Operation Sunrise” in 1945.

Complaint ¶¶ 5, 23, 34, 40, 57, 63; J.A. 54 (request to CIA); 

J.A. 79 (request to FBI); J.A. 97 (request to National 

Archives); see also Oglesby v. Department of Army (Oglesby 

II), 79 F.3d 1172, 1175–1176 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Oglesby also 

sought a waiver of search and copying fees from each agency 

under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A). Oglesby I, 920 F.2d at 60.

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The agencies collectively released 384 pages of 

documents (many redacted) in response, invoking various 

FOIA exemptions as a basis for refusing further disclosures. 

See Oglesby I, 920 F.2d at 66–71. The Army, CIA, and 

National Archives also rejected Oglesby’s fee-waiver 

requests. The NSA in due course agreed to waive its fees. Id. 

In 1987, Oglesby filed suit under FOIA in the United 

States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that 

the agencies had performed inadequate searches for 

responsive documents, failed to properly support their

exemption claims, and wrongly refused to waive their fees. 

Oglesby I, 920 F.2d at 61. The district court granted summary 

judgment to the agencies on all issues. Id. 

This court reversed. We first held that only claims 

against one agency—the State Department—were before us, 

because Oglesby had failed to exhaust his claims with the 

other five agencies. We further held that the State 

Department had provided insufficient details about its search 

for documents to support summary judgment. Oglesby I, 920 

F.2d at 71. We vacated and remanded for further proceedings 

on the adequacy of the State Department’s search and for 

Oglesby to exhaust his claims with the other agencies. Id. 

We did not reach Oglesby’s fee-waiver arguments, but

suggested that the Army reconsider its denial of a waiver in 

light of the NSA’s decision to grant one. Oglesby I, 920 F.2d 

at 66 n.11.

Round Two

Several years later, having exhausted his administrative 

remedies with the other five agencies without satisfactory 

resolution, Oglesby returned to district court. See Oglesby II, 

79 F.3d at 1175. Shortly after Oglesby filed his complaint

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seeking further disclosures by all six agencies, the Army and 

CIA granted Oglesby fee waivers, and the Army, CIA, and 

NSA released additional documents. See id. at 1179–1184. 

All six agencies filed affidavits describing their searches for 

documents, and those agencies that had withheld documents 

included Vaughn indices to justify their withholdings. See id. 

at 1176.2

 The district court again granted summary judgment 

for all six agencies. Id. 

We, again, reversed in part. Oglesby II, 79 F.3d at 1175. 

We held that the Army, CIA, and NSA had failed to 

adequately justify their withholdings in their Vaughn indices, 

and that the Army and CIA had failed to establish the 

adequacy of their searches. Id. With respect to all claims 

against the State Department, FBI, and National Archives, we 

affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Id. 

Round Three

While the case against the Army, CIA, and NSA was 

pending on remand, intervening legislation—the 1998 

Disclosure Act—significantly altered the legal landscape. 

That Act led the CIA to revisit its stance toward records 

 2 In a Vaughn index, an agency “indicates in some descriptive way 

which documents the agency is withholding and which FOIA 

exemptions it believes apply.” American Civil Liberties Union v. 

CIA, 710 F.3d 422, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2013). The name comes from 

Vaughn v. Rosen, which first established the process by which an 

agency may discharge its burden to justify withholding information 

under FOIA exemptions. See 484 F.2d 820, 826–828 (D.C. Cir. 

1973). Although agencies frequently rely on Vaughn indices, “[t]he 

materials provided by the agency may take any form so long as they 

give the reviewing court a reasonable basis to evaluate the claim of 

privilege.” American Civil Liberties Union, 710 F.3d at 433 

(quoting Gallant v. NLRB, 26 F.3d 168, 173 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).

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concerning General Gehlen. Previously, because the CIA’s 

relationship with Gehlen had been classified, the agency

issued so-called Glomar responses “neither confirm[ing] nor 

deny[ing] the existence or nonexistence of responsive 

records” to Oglesby’s requests. McNair Decl. ¶¶ 2–4 (Sept. 

20, 2000), J.A. 594–596.

3

 

In the wake of the Disclosure Act, the CIA filed a 

declaration in this case publicly acknowledging its 

relationship with General Gehlen for the first time. See

McNair Decl. ¶¶ 4–10. The declaration explained that, even 

though the United States government did not consider General 

Gehlen to be a Nazi war criminal, the agency’s Disclosure 

Act searches uncovered other Nazi war criminal records that 

revealed the United States’ intelligence relationship with

Gehlen. See id. ¶ 7; Interagency Report, at 48. Rather than 

withhold such information as beyond the purview of the 

Disclosure Act, the agency decided to declassify it.

That declassification, the CIA explained, would “have a 

significant impact upon this case” because the agency could 

now process Oglesby’s FOIA request on Gehlen. McNair 

Decl. ¶¶ 2, 10. A series of status reports followed in which 

the CIA, NSA, and Army laid bare the time-consuming task 

 3 A Glomar response is permitted “only when confirming or 

denying the existence of records would itself ‘cause harm 

cognizable under a[] FOIA exception.’” Roth v. Department of 

Justice, 642 F.3d 1161, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Wolf v. CIA, 

473 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2007)); see also American Civil 

Liberties Union, 710 F.3d at 426 n.1 (“The name [Glomar

response] is derived from the facts of Phillippi v. CIA, in which this 

court addressed the CIA’s refusal to confirm or deny whether it had 

documents relating to Howard Hughes’ ship, the Glomar Explorer, 

which had reputedly been used in an attempt to recover a lost 

Soviet submarine.”) (citing 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).

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in front of them. In one early report, the CIA advised that 

recent searches had turned up “approximately 251 boxes of 

material, and 2,901 folders, with documents that likely 

contain records regarding General Gehlen.” Defendants’ 

Status Report 1–2 (Dec. 11, 2000), J.A. 622–623. 

The CIA proposed consolidating its response to 

Oglesby’s FOIA request with its ongoing efforts under the 

Disclosure Act. Defendants’ Status Report at 2. Estimating 

that it would take a year to complete its Disclosure Act 

process, the CIA asked for two years to finish action on 

Oglesby’s FOIA request because it anticipated finding and 

processing “additional documents that go beyond the scope of 

the [Disclosure] Act[.]” Id. The Army, for its part, joined the 

CIA’s request, advising that it, too, would need to review 

additional materials. Id. at 2–3.

During a status hearing in January 2001, agency counsel

again indicated that the CIA “now has 251 boxes,” each “one 

cubic foot in size” and expected to be “full” “of material 

regarding the Gehlen organization,” totaling “anywhere 

between 251,000 and 775,000 pages[.]” Tr. of Hearing 4:15–

23 (Jan. 9, 2001), J.A. 630.

In a subsequent status report, the agency explained that, 

through extensive search efforts, it had “identified [a] 

potential universe of over 25,000 responsive documents.” 

Defendants’ Status Report 2 (Feb. 5, 2001), J.A. 648. After 

reviewing those documents, the CIA would forward them to 

the National Archives for public release. Id. Once the 

National Archives provided the CIA with a final release copy 

of the documents, the CIA would provide Oglesby with any 

documents responsive to his FOIA request. Id. at 3. The CIA 

reiterated its two-year estimate for the project’s completion. 

Id. at 4.

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After that flurry of activity, the case languished for over a 

decade, with no substantive action by the court, the agencies, 

or Oglesby. Oglesby passed away in September 2011.

Round Four

In December 2011, Oglesby’s daughter, Aron DiBacco, 

and domestic partner, Barbara Webster (collectively, 

“DiBacco”), filed a motion to substitute themselves as 

plaintiffs, which the district court granted. DiBacco, 983 F. 

Supp. 2d at 52. Both the agencies and DiBacco then filed for 

summary judgment. DiBacco also moved to compel 

disclosure of classified declarations referenced in the

agencies’ summary judgment briefing the previous decade. 

The district court granted summary judgment for the 

agencies. As a preliminary matter, the court ruled that the 

Interagency Report (prepared by the Disclosure Act’s 

Interagency Working Group to document its efforts under the 

Act) was a “record” of a “public office” admissible under 

Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8). DiBacco, 983 F. Supp. 2d 

at 54–55. The court also declined to compel disclosure of the 

previously filed classified declarations because it had neither 

reviewed nor relied on them in any proceeding. Id. at 53.

The court next ruled that the CIA had conducted an 

adequate search for documents. DiBacco, 983 F. Supp. 2d at 

55–58. Relying on the Interagency Report and on the CIA’s 

declarations, the court determined that the CIA’s Disclosure 

Act searches were reasonably calculated to locate records 

responsive to Oglesby’s FOIA request. Id. at 56.

The court also upheld the CIA’s withholdings under 

Exemptions 1 and 3. DiBacco, 983 F. Supp. 2d at 58–61. 

With regard to Exemption 1, the court concluded that, 

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contrary to DiBacco’s claim, certain documents were properly 

classified decades ago, with markings required under the 

then-governing Executive Orders. Id. As for Exemption 3, 

the court concluded that the CIA retained the power to 

withhold documents to protect intelligence sources and 

methods under the National Security Act. Id. at 61.

 

Turning to the Army, the district court ruled that its 

search for responsive records was proper. DiBacco, 983 F. 

Supp. 2d at 61–64. While DiBacco argued that the Army had

transferred responsive documents to the National Archives to 

evade its FOIA obligations, the district court ruled that, in 

fact, the transfer facilitated public access to the documents as 

required by the Disclosure Act. Id. at 63–64. The district 

court also rejected DiBacco’s challenge to the Army’s search, 

relying again on the Interagency Report and declarations 

describing the search. Id. at 62–64.

As for the NSA, the district court ruled that it had 

adequately justified its withholding of records. DiBacco, 983 

F. Supp. 2d at 64–66. DiBacco has not challenged that ruling.

II

Analysis

The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 

and 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). We have jurisdiction over the 

district court’s final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Claims Against the Army

DiBacco contends that the Army failed to conduct an 

adequate search for documents. She also maintains that the 

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Army violated FOIA by transferring relevant documents to 

the National Archives. Neither argument succeeds.

The Army’s Search for Records

We review de novo the adequacy of the Army’s search. 

See Valencia-Lucena v. United States Coast Guard, 180 F.3d 

321, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The burden is on the agency to 

demonstrate that it made a “good faith effort to conduct a 

search * * * using methods which can be reasonably expected 

to produce the information requested.” Oglesby I, 920 F.2d at 

68. Courts may rely on a “reasonably detailed affidavit, 

setting forth the search terms and the type of search 

performed, and averring that all files likely to contain 

responsive materials (if such records exist) were searched.” 

Valencia-Lucena, 180 F.3d at 326 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Summary judgment must be denied “if a review of 

the record raises substantial doubt, particularly in view of well 

defined requests and positive indications of overlooked 

materials[.]” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Army relies mainly on its search efforts under the 

Disclosure Act to demonstrate the adequacy of its search for 

documents responsive to Oglesby’s FOIA request. Much of 

that process is described in the Interagency Report that the 

Interagency Working Group submitted to Congress. The 

district court relied on that report in granting summary 

judgment. DiBacco, 983 F. Supp. 2d at 54–55. The court 

also relied on the Army’s declarations—one from Martha 

Wagner Murphy, Chief of the Special Access and FOIA 

Branch at the National Archives, and two from Bradley 

Dorris, Director of the FOIA and Investigative Records Office 

at the United States Army Intelligence and Security 

Command (“INSCOM”). See Murphy Decl. (Dec. 14, 2012), 

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J.A. 689–700; First Dorris Decl. (Nov. 27, 2012), J.A. 701–

702; Second Dorris Decl. (March 20, 2013), J.A. 1050–1052.

According to DiBacco, the district court should not have 

relied on the Interagency Report because it was inadmissible. 

Not so. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8), an exception to the 

hearsay bar, allows as evidence a “record or statement of a 

public office” where, as relevant here, (i) the document “sets 

out the office’s activities,” and (ii) “neither the source of 

information nor other circumstances indicate a lack of 

trustworthiness.” 

The Interagency Report easily fits that bill: It is an 

official document prepared by the Interagency Working 

Group that sets out the Group’s activities, as statutorily 

required by the Disclosure Act. See Pub. L. 105–246, 

§ 2(c)(3) (requiring the Interagency Working Group to 

“submit a report to Congress” describing all Nazi war 

criminal records that it found, “the disposition of such 

records, and the activities of the [Interagency Working 

Group] and agencies under this section”). 

DiBacco, in fact, does not dispute that the Interagency 

Report is a “record” of a “public office” that sets out “the 

office’s activities” within the meaning of Rule 803(8). She 

argues only that the Interagency Report is untrustworthy. But 

all that she points to is a statement in the report indicating that 

the Interagency Working Group “did not seek unanimous 

agreement on a single ‘official’ version of the[]

declassification effort.” Interagency Report, at v.

DiBacco needs to read on. That statement goes on to say 

that that any personal or institutional perspectives from Group 

members would be included in a separate chapter. 

Interagency Report, at v. Nothing in that chapter casts any 

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reasonable doubt on the Report’s account of the agencies’ 

search efforts. See DiBacco, 983 F. Supp. 2d at 54; 

Interagency Report, at 81–101.

The Army’s search effort focused on classified 

intelligence and counterintelligence records maintained by 

INSCOM. See Interagency Report, at 52. Those files 

generally concerned (i) “foreign personnel and 

organizations,” (ii) “intelligence and counterintelligence 

sources,” and (iii) “counterintelligence security 

investigations.” Id. The records consisted of 13,000 reels of 

35mm microfilm (holding approximately 1.3 million files), 

and approximately 460,000 individual paper files. Id. The 

Army created digitized images of the microfilm files, which it 

then searched electronically for responsive information using 

a database containing the names of Nazi officers and other 

individuals connected to Nazi war crimes. Id. at 29, 54. After 

reviewing and declassifying the relevant files under the 

Disclosure Act, the Army turned them over to the National 

Archives. Id. at 54. The Army also conducted a manual 

review of its remaining paper files.

Between 2000 and 2001, the Army transferred over 

20,000 digitized and paper files to the National Archives. 

Interagency Report, at 54. The vast majority of those files 

were fully declassified, although some contained limited 

redactions. Id. The Army undertook further searches using 

additional relevant terms discovered by the Interagency 

Working Group and participating agencies. Id. The Army 

eventually transferred, in 2005, the original 13,000 reels of 

microfilm and a full set of about 1.3 million scanned 

microfilm files to the National Archives. Murphy Decl. 

¶ 12(d); Interagency Report, at 54. The Army did not retain 

any copies of those files. Second Dorris Decl. ¶ 5. 

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Upon receipt, the National Archives “accept[ed] full 

responsibility for administering the files both technically and 

for reference purposes.” Murphy Decl. ¶ 11. As a 

consequence, the National Archives, rather than the Army, 

conducted the most recent searches of those files for records

responsive to Oglesby’s FOIA request. In so doing, the 

National Archives used a variety of keywords to locate 

records concerning or related to General Gehlen. See Murphy 

Decl. ¶¶ 13, 15–16. Also included within the scope of the 

search were common misspellings of various codenames, 

along with pseudonyms and codewords the CIA had 

separately created for Gehlen and the Gehlen Organization. 

See id. ¶¶ 15–16. The search yielded no records regarding 

meetings held at Fort Hunt in the summer of 1945 between 

General Gehlen and high-level United States officials, 

including George Strong or Allen Dulles. But the search did 

locate 2,863 pages of records responsive to other aspects of 

Oglesby’s FOIA request, all but 11 pages of which were fully 

declassified and have since been provided to DiBacco. 

Murphy Decl. ¶ 17–18; Letter from Vincent H. Cohen, Jr., 

Acting United States Attorney for the District of Columbia 

(April 1, 2015); Letter from James H. Lesar, Counsel for 

Appellants (April 8, 2015).

The Army’s declarations from Bradley Dorris at 

INSCOM confirm that the “records most likely responsive to 

the FOIA requests would have been in the Investigative 

Records Repository at INSCOM[,]” which had been 

transferred to the National Archives. First Dorris Decl. ¶ 6. 

To be certain, INSCOM had conducted “an exhaustive 

search” of its hard copy and electronic files, which turned up 

nothing. Id. ¶ 5. In another declaration, Dorris clarified that 

“the records which would be responsive to the FOIA requests 

would have been in the Investigative Records Repository at 

INSCOM,” and that he was “unaware of any other locations 

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of any records related to [Oglesby’s] FOIA request.” Second 

Dorris Decl. ¶ 7. The requested documents, Dorris explained, 

“were intelligence files,” and so “the only location the 

documents would be located would be at INSCOM,” the 

Army’s sole “intelligence records repository.” Id.

DiBacco levels five challenges to the Army’s search, 

which did not produce certain materials she believes exist and 

had hoped to find. But FOIA is not a wishing well; it only 

requires a reasonable search for records an agency actually 

has. 

First, relying on the initial Dorris declaration, DiBacco 

asserts that the Army improperly searched only the locations 

“most likely” to contain responsive documents, while FOIA 

requires it to search all locations “likely” to contain such

documents. DiBacco is correct that “most likely” is not the 

relevant metric. See Oglesby I, 920 F.2d at 68 (“[T]he agency 

cannot limit its search to only one record system if there are 

others that are likely to turn up the information requested.”). 

But the point gains her nothing because Dorris clarified that

the only place containing records “responsive to the FOIA 

requests would have been in the Investigative Records 

Repository at INSCOM,” and that he knew of no other 

locations that might contain responsive records. Second 

Dorris Decl. ¶ 7. That declaration attests that the Army

applied the proper search standard. 

Second, DiBacco argues that the Army’s failure to turn 

up documents on secret meetings at Fort Hunt—documents 

that DiBacco feels certain must exist—demonstrates the 

inadequacy of the Army’s search. We put that losing claim to 

bed twenty-five years ago, see Oglesby I, 920 F.2d at 67 n.13, 

and age has not improved it. Oglesby’s (now DiBacco’s) 

“conviction that the Fort Hunt meeting was of such 

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importance that records must have been created is pure 

speculation,” and “[s]uch hypothetical assertions are 

insufficient to raise a material question of fact with respect to 

the adequacy of the agency’s search.” Id.

DiBacco maintains that this time is different because the 

CIA has disclosed the Gehlen relationship and because “new 

evidence has emerged.” Appellants’ Br. 37. Those are not 

differences of any consequence. That the CIA has now 

acknowledged the Gehlen relationship does nothing to show

that meetings at Fort Hunt ever took place. Moreover, 

DiBacco’s “new evidence”—two Washington Post articles—

establishes only that prisoners were held and interrogated at 

Fort Hunt. The articles do not even hint at secret meetings. 

Absent a more substantial showing, the Army’s “failure to 

turn up a particular document, or mere speculation that as yet 

uncovered documents might exist, does not undermine the 

determination that the agency conducted an adequate search 

for the requested records.” Wilbur v. CIA, 355 F.3d 675, 678 

(D.C. Cir. 2004) (per curiam).

Third, DiBacco assails the adequacy of the Army’s 

search for records conducted before the CIA disclosed its 

relationship with Gehlen. That argument is moot, long since 

overtaken by the comprehensive searches undertaken under 

the Disclosure Act. Those searches have looked further and 

wider than FOIA requires. The declarations from the Army 

and the National Archives describe searches of Army records 

reasonably calculated to discover all documents responsive to 

Oglesby’s request. That additional Army documents were 

found at the National Archives through those efforts further 

substantiates the search’s adequacy. And adequacy—not 

perfection—is the standard that FOIA sets. See Oglesby I, 

920 F.2d at 68. Beyond that, DiBacco provides no reason 

why the Army’s decades-old search would be germane to any 

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remaining material issue, so we need not address that 

question.

Fourth, DiBacco cites a book on General Gehlen, written 

by Mary Ellen Reese, in which the author claimed to have 

filed FOIA requests yielding “well over a thousand 

documents” about Gehlen. Appellants’ Br. 48. That figure, 

DiBacco urges, far exceeds the number of documents the 

Army disclosed in response to Oglesby’s FOIA request. 

Oglesby made that precise argument in Oglesby II, and 

we held that further explication of the Army’s search was 

needed. 79 F.3d at 1185. But a lot has changed in the 

intervening nineteen years. Most relevantly, following 

Oglesby’s success in the second appeal, the Army released

9,000 additional pages of responsive material to Oglesby, 

including thousands of pages related to Gehlen. And the 

Army has since provided 2,863 additional pages of responsive 

documents to DiBacco. DiBacco, for her part, has provided 

no further information on Reese’s request—such as its scope 

or the number of pages received—or any other basis for 

concluding that the Army is holding back documents.

Fifth and finally, DiBacco suggests two additional search 

terms that, in her view, the Army should have used: “GO,” an 

abbreviation for the “Gehlen Organization,” and “PO Box 

1142,” a codename for Fort Hunt. Appellants’ Br. 48–49. 

But it is undisputed that the agencies searched for records 

pertaining to the Gehlen Organization and employed relevant 

codenames. The Army’s burden was to show that its search 

efforts were reasonable and logically organized to uncover 

relevant documents; it need not knock down every search 

design advanced by every requester. See SafeCard Services,

Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“When a 

plaintiff questions the adequacy of the search an agency made 

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21

in order to satisfy its FOIA request, the factual question it 

raises is whether the search was reasonably calculated to 

discover the requested documents, not whether it actually 

uncovered every document extant.”).

The Army’s Transfer of Documents

DiBacco contends that we cannot affirm summary 

judgment for the Army, no matter how thorough its search, 

because its transfer of documents to the National Archives 

under the Disclosure Act casts doubt on its motives. In 

DiBacco’s view, there is a genuine dispute over whether the 

Army transferred documents to avoid disclosing them to 

Oglesby. That argument beggars belief.

FOIA generally obligates covered agencies to disclose 

their records, unless they are exempted. But “possession or 

control is a prerequisite to FOIA disclosure duties[.]” 

Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 

445 U.S. 136, 152 (1980). Accordingly, when an agency does 

not possess or control the records a requester seeks, the 

agency’s non-disclosure does not violate FOIA because it has 

not “withheld” anything. Id. at 150. “[A]n agency has no 

duty to retrieve and release documents it once possessed but 

that it legitimately disposed of prior to the date a FOIA 

request was received.” Chambers v. Department of Interior, 

568 F.3d 998, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting McGehee v. 

CIA, 697 F.2d 1095, 1103 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).

This case, though, is a bit more complicated because the 

Army transferred its documents to the National Archives after 

receiving Oglesby’s FOIA request. The general rule is that an 

agency may not avoid a FOIA request by intentionally ridding 

itself of a requested document. Chambers, 568 F.3d at 1004 

(“[A]n agency is not shielded from liability if it intentionally 

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transfers or destroys a document after it has been requested 

under FOIA[.]”). The critical issue, then, in a dispute over a 

document that an agency no longer has, is the agency’s 

motivation for disposing of or transferring that document. If 

“the agency is no longer in possession of the document, for a 

reason that is not itself suspect,” FOIA does not compel the 

agency “to take further action in order to produce” that 

document. SafeCard, 926 F.2d at 1201 (emphasis added). 

There is no genuine dispute that the Army satisfied that 

standard. To begin with, the Army’s transfer of documents to 

the National Archives was done for a proper and eminently 

sensible reason: to fulfill the Army’s obligations under the 

Disclosure Act to disclose all relevant materials and “make 

them available to the public at the National Archives[.]” Pub. 

L. No. 105-246, § 2(c)(1). That is the antithesis of a suspect 

motive; following the law is exactly what agencies are 

supposed to do. 

Beyond that, the Army, by complying with the 

Disclosure Act, already had to declassify and disclose most of 

the records that DiBacco seeks. Unlike FOIA, the Disclosure 

Act mandated wholesale disclosure by the agency itself, with 

no general exemption for classified information and without 

any request having to be filed or potentially limiting the scope 

of disclosure. Indeed, the whole point of the Disclosure Act 

was to spur federal agencies themselves, regardless of any 

individual request, to declassify and publicly release decadesold classified records that had been kept secret on national 

security and foreign policy grounds. See Interagency Report, 

at 1; Pub. L. No. 105-246, § 3(a) (defining “‘Nazi war 

criminal records’” to “mean[] [certain] classified records or 

portions of records”) (emphasis added); id. § 3(b)(1) 

(requiring the Interagency Working Group to “release in their 

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entirety Nazi war criminal records that are described” in the 

statute, subject to certain exemptions). 

The Army’s transfer thus bears no colorable resemblance 

to FOIA-evasion cases, where an agency tries to thwart 

disclosure by intentionally moving or destroying responsive

documents. See, e.g., Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of 

Commerce, 34 F. Supp. 2d 28, 41 (D.D.C. 1998) (designating 

discovery on whether agency illegally destroyed or discarded 

responsive information); cf. Chambers, 568 F.3d at 1005 

(triable issue of fact on whether agency intentionally 

destroyed records responsive to a Privacy Act request). Quite 

the opposite, as a result of the Disclosure Act’s operation, the 

National Archives has a cache of 1.3 million Army files that it 

thoroughly searched for records responsive to Oglesby’s 

FOIA request, netting an additional 2,863 pages of relevant

Army records. Murphy Decl. ¶¶ 17–18. The agency has 

made those records available for public inspection, and

DiBacco received copies of them while this appeal was 

pending. Id.; Letter from Vincent H. Cohen, Jr., Acting 

United States Attorney for the District of Columbia (April 1, 

2015); Letter from James H. Lesar, Counsel for Appellants 

(April 8, 2015).

DiBacco also attacks the Army’s declarations discussing 

the transfer and search of documents under the Disclosure 

Act. She asserts that a discrepancy in the dates attributed to 

the transfers casts doubt on the declarants’ trustworthiness. 

DiBacco is making a mountain out of a molehill. The 

Army’s declarant, Bradley Dorris, states in one declaration

that the Army transferred all World War II files to the 

National Archives “on or about 26 and 29 September 2000,” 

First Dorris Decl. ¶ 4, while in another he indicates a transfer 

date of “on or about 23 April 2001,” Second Dorris Decl. ¶ 5. 

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The National Archives’ declarant, Martha Murphy, explains

that the transfers were completed in phases, with transfers 

occurring in September 2000, summer 2001, and 2005. 

Murphy Decl. ¶ 12. The first two dates Murphy provides 

coincide with the two dates the Dorris declarations reference, 

which suggests that the Dorris declarations were largely 

accurate but omitted the last date. That is insufficient to 

suggest bad faith or dissembling by Dorris or the Army. 

More to the point, that discrepancy has nothing to do with 

the Army’s motivation for the document transfer. What 

matters is that, under the Disclosure Act, the Army transferred 

all of its potentially responsive files to the National Archives 

and did not retain any copies. The Interagency Report 

confirms as much. See Interagency Report, at 54. DiBacco, 

for her part, is silent as to how publicly available documents 

at the National Archives—copies of which have always been 

offered to her for a fee and which she has now in fact 

received—could plausibly be considered improperly withheld.

Trying another tack, DiBacco argues, for the first time in 

her reply brief, that the Army violated an Executive Order by 

failing to sufficiently declassify information of permanent 

historical value before transferring the documents to the 

National Archives. We do not ordinarily consider arguments 

raised for the first time in a reply brief, and we see no good 

reason for doing so here. See Abdullah v. Obama, 753 F.3d 

193, 199 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

At bottom, DiBacco’s main concern is that the transfer 

allowed the Army to circumvent the fee waiver it granted 

Oglesby nearly three decades ago. But the Army has 

assumed, and accordingly so do we, that Oglesby’s fee waiver 

extends to DiBacco, and, following oral argument, the Army

provided her with free copies of the 2,863 pages of Army 

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records identified as responsive by the National Archives. 

See supra p. 23. The issue is therefore moot.

That, however, is not the last chapter on those recently 

released documents. Some were redacted or indicated that 

pages had been removed, with no accompanying justification 

for that withholding of information. Letter from James H. 

Lesar, at 2–3 & nn.1–2. The National Archives’ declaration 

confirms that some of the documents had redacted 

information that remains classified. Murphy Decl. ¶ 17a 

nn.2–3. We accordingly remand to allow the parties to create 

a record and the district court to decide in the first instance the 

narrow question of whether those withholdings were 

permissible under FOIA. 

Claims Against the CIA

DiBacco levels attacks against the CIA’s search for and 

withholding of responsive records. None has merit.

The CIA’s Search for Records

Like the Army, the CIA maintains that its Disclosure Act 

search efforts were reasonably calculated to locate documents 

responsive to Oglesby’s FOIA request. The CIA filed the 

Interagency Report and four declarations from Martha Lutz, 

Chief of its Litigation Support Unit, detailing those efforts. 

First Lutz Declaration (Dec. 14, 2012), J.A. 709–749; Second 

Lutz Declaration (March 21, 2013), J.A. 1055–1083; Third 

Lutz Declaration (May 10, 2013), J.A. 1121–1126; Fourth 

Lutz Declaration (June 20, 2013), J.A. 1147–1156.

The CIA instructed all of its directorates to search for 

relevant documents, using name and codeword searches. First 

Lutz Decl. ¶¶ 14–15. With respect to documents concerning 

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Gehlen and his organization, the CIA searched for files 

retrievable by name, codewords, aliases, and cryptonyms. Id. 

The CIA’s searches included operational files exempt from 

FOIA.

The CIA initially sought and disclosed records “only if 

they contained either direct information about war crimes or 

information suggesting that there were grounds to believe that 

the subject was involved in war crimes, acts of persecution, or 

looting.” Interagency Report, at 47. That approach led to the 

declassification and release of approximately 50,000 pages of 

documents, many of which were redacted. Id. at 49. 

In 2005, the CIA adopted the Interagency Working 

Group’s broader interpretation of the Disclosure Act, and 

accordingly “[d]eclassif[ied] and release[d] information on 

individuals connected to the Nazis whether war criminals or 

not,” “[d]eclassif[ied] and release[d] operational project files 

where Nazis were involved,” and “[u]ndert[ook] additional 

searches that the [Interagency Working Group] historians or 

CIA thought necessary.” Interagency Report, at 50. As a 

result, the agency narrowed redactions in 47,400 pages of the 

previously released documents, and released over 65,000 new 

pages. Id. Of relevance here, 2,100 of those pages related to 

General Gehlen, and the CIA authorized release of another 

2,100-page Army file concerning Gehlen. First Lutz Decl. 

¶ 13. Continuing its efforts, in May 2012, the CIA provided 

DiBacco’s counsel with seven discs containing all CIA 

records released under the Disclosure Act, with information 

explaining how the records were organized and where records 

relating to Gehlen and the Gehlen Organization’s relationship 

with the United States could be located. Id. ¶ 12.

Those efforts discharged the CIA’s FOIA duty to 

undertake reasonable search efforts. “[A] search need not be 

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perfect, only adequate, and adequacy is measured by the 

reasonableness of the effort in light of the specific request.” 

Meeropol v. Meese, 790 F.2d 942, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The 

Lutz declarations adequately explain the congruence between 

the CIA’s Disclosure Act search and Oglesby’s FOIA request. 

See Second Lutz Decl. ¶¶ 3–4. Lutz identified in detail the 

locations searched within the CIA, expressly noting that the 

search included all directorates and even encompassed 

operational files not subject to FOIA. Id. ¶¶ 6–7. 

DiBacco raises a number of specific challenges to the

adequacy of the CIA’s search, but none holds water.

First, DiBacco’s arguments regarding the absence of

documents concerning secret meetings at Fort Hunt and the 

failure to use her preferred search terms fail here, just as they 

did when leveled against the Army. See supra pp. 18–21.

Second, DiBacco points to a December 2000 status 

report, in which the CIA anticipated locating documents 

potentially responsive to Oglesby’s request that exceeded the 

Disclosure Act’s scope. Lutz explained, however, that the

statement was based on the CIA’s pre-2005 view that the 

Disclosure Act did not encompass records pertaining to 

General Gehlen. Second Lutz Decl. ¶ 4. Five years after 

filing that status report, the CIA adopted a more expansive 

view of the Disclosure Act and, under that standard, it

reviewed, declassified, and disclosed information on all Nazis 

(rather than just war criminals), and undertook additional 

searches that were equivalent to or broader than what FOIA 

requires. Id. As a consequence, “all Gehlen related records 

responsive to Oglesby’s request fell within the scope of [the 

Disclosure Act] and all were released in whole or in part 

under the [Act] and provided to Plaintiffs.” Id.

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Third, DiBacco asserts that there is a discrepancy 

between the number of responsive documents the CIA 

predicted in 2000–2001 that it would disclose and what it 

eventually released. In December 2000 and January 2001, the 

CIA reported finding “approximately 251 boxes of material,

and 2,901 folders” with potentially responsive documents, 

and that, if the boxes were full, they would likely contain a 

total of “anywhere between 251,000 and 775,000 pages” of 

documents. Defendants’ Status Report 1–2, J.A. 622–623; Tr. 

of Hearing 4:15–23, J.A. 630.

DiBacco seizes on the gap between that prediction and 

the roughly 115,000 pages the CIA ultimately released. But 

that differential is no surprise. The CIA based its estimated 

page count in 2000–2001 on the volume of each box—one 

cubic foot—and an assumption that all were full of documents 

responsive to Oglesby’s request. The boxes had not yet been 

searched. That the CIA’s later search turned up less than its

back-of-the-napkin estimate, which was based on figures and 

assumptions untethered to the actual contents of the 

documents, does not impugn the agency’s search.

The CIA’s Exemption Claims

The CIA redacted protected national security information 

from approximately 475 pages of its disclosure, pursuant to 

Exemptions 1 and 3, as detailed in its Vaughn index. See First 

Lutz Decl., Attachment. DiBacco presses global attacks on 

the use of both exemptions. But neither challenge holds up.

“An agency withholding responsive documents from a 

FOIA release bears the burden of proving the applicability of 

claimed exemptions[,]” which it typically does “by affidavit.” 

American Civil Liberties Union v. Department of Defense, 

628 F.3d 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011). We “review the district 

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court’s decision on the adequacy of the agency’s showing de 

novo,” and “must accord substantial weight to an agency’s 

affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of the 

disputed record.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Summary judgment is warranted based on the agency’s 

affidavit if it “describes the justifications for withholding the 

information with specific detail, demonstrates that the 

information withheld logically falls within the claimed 

exemption, and is not contradicted by contrary evidence in the 

record or by evidence of the agency’s bad faith[.]” Id.

FOIA Exemption 1 excludes from the agency’s general 

disclosure obligation national defense or foreign policy

records “properly classified pursuant to [an] Executive 

order[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). In making the Exemption 1 

withholdings in this case, the CIA relied on President 

Clinton’s Executive Order 12958, as amended by President 

Bush, which was in effect at the time the classifications were 

made in 2005–2007. See Second Lutz Decl. ¶ 8 & n.6; Exec.

Order No. 12958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (April 17, 1995), 

amended by Exec. Order No. 13292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 

(March 25, 2003). DiBacco maintains that President Obama’s 

Executive Order currently in effect—Executive Order 

13526—governs. 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009).

The CIA has it right. A district court may allow an 

agency to apply a superseding Executive Order during 

pending FOIA litigation if the agency so requests. Campbell 

v. Department of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 

But “absent [such a request,] the district court may not require 

the agency to apply the new order; instead, the court must 

evaluate the agency’s decision under the executive order in 

force at the time the classification was made.” Id. A court 

will compel an agency to revisit its classifications only if the 

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superseding Executive Order “calls prior classification 

decisions” under the earlier order “into question.” Id.

Nothing in the Obama Executive Order calls the CIA’s 

classification decisions into question. Quite the opposite, the 

Obama Order explicitly defines properly classified 

information to include information classified under prior 

Executive Orders, see Exec. Order 13526, § 6.1(i), and it 

“does not contain any provision that requires an agency to 

reconsider classification decisions in pending FOIA 

litigation,” Campbell, 164 F.3d at 30. To be sure, as DiBacco 

observes, the Obama Order significantly changes the 

automatic declassification process for information that is 

more than fifty years old. See Exec. Order 13526, § 3.3(h)(1). 

But what matters for purposes of reviewing the CIA’s 

classification decisions is that “nothing in the Order requires 

the district court to apply the new standards in a pending 

FOIA action.” Campbell, 164 F.3d at 30.

DiBacco separately argues that the withheld documents

lack markings required to properly classify documents under 

the Clinton/Bush Order. That too is wrong. The documents 

at issue were classified decades ago, with the markings 

required under the then-governing Executive Orders. See 

Fourth Lutz Decl. ¶¶ 8–9 & n.9. That is all the Clinton/Bush 

Order requires. Exec. Order 12958, amended by Exec. Order 

13292, § 1.6(f) (“Information assigned a level of classification 

under this or predecessor orders shall be considered as 

classified at that level of classification despite the omission of 

other required markings.”).

DiBacco also challenges the CIA’s reliance on 

Exemption 3, which generally excludes from disclosure 

matters that are “specifically exempted from disclosure by 

statute.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). The CIA relied on the 

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National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. §§ 3001 et seq., to 

justify withholding information that would reveal intelligence 

sources and methods. See First Lutz Decl. ¶¶ 30–32, 35–51. 

“Exemption 3 differs from other FOIA exemptions in that 

its applicability depends less on the detailed factual contents 

of specific documents; the sole issue for decision is the 

existence of a relevant statute and the inclusion of withheld 

material within the statute’s coverage.” Morley v. CIA, 508 

F.3d 1108, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). The National Security Act provision invoked by the 

CIA provides that “[t]he Director of National Intelligence 

shall protect intelligence sources and methods from 

unauthorized disclosure.” 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1). 

DiBacco does not dispute, nor could she, that Section 

3024(i)(1) is a valid Exemption 3 statute. Sims, 471 U.S. at

167. Nor does DiBacco challenge the CIA’s determination 

that the withheld material contains “intelligence sources and 

methods” within the National Security Act’s coverage. 

Instead, DiBacco focuses on language in that same 

statutory subsection providing that “[t]he Director [of 

National Intelligence] may only delegate a duty or authority 

given the Director under this subsection to the Principal 

Deputy Director of National Intelligence.” 50 U.S.C. 

§ 3024(i)(3). That language was added by the Intelligence 

Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 

108-458, § 102(A)(i)(1), 118 Stat. 3638. Prior to 2004, the 

Director of Central Intelligence bore responsibility for 

protecting intelligence sources and methods, and had the 

authority to invoke the National Security Act to prevent the 

unauthorized disclosure of such information under FOIA. See 

Sims, 471 U.S. at 167. 

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DiBacco argues that the 2004 amendment stripped the 

CIA of that power, at least absent an express authorization 

from the Director of National Intelligence. Although 

DiBacco’s reading of the amended statute is not entirely clear, 

she does concede that the Director of National Intelligence 

may delegate the authority to protect intelligence sources and 

methods to the Director of the CIA. Oral Arg. Rec. 13:20–

13:30. She asserts, however, that the delegation must be done 

on a case-by-case basis and that the absence of such a 

particularized delegation here dooms the CIA’s Exemption 3 

claims. Id. at 13:30–15:50.

DiBacco’s argument misunderstands the governing 

statutory scheme. First, even if the Director of the CIA needs 

authorization to protect intelligence sources and methods 

from unauthorized disclosure, that authorization is already in 

place. Both the President and the Director of National 

Intelligence have provided it. In Executive Order 12333, as 

amended, President Obama ordered the Director of the CIA to 

“[p]rotect intelligence and intelligence sources, methods and 

activities from unauthorized disclosure in accordance with 

guidance from the Director [of National Intelligence].” Exec. 

Order 12333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981), amended 

by Exec. Order 13470, § 1.6(d), 73 Fed. Reg. 45,325, 45,332 

(July 30, 2008). Pursuant to that Executive Order and the 

National Security Act, the Director of National Intelligence 

has issued such guidance, ordering heads of intelligence 

agencies—such as the Director of the CIA—to “[p]rotect 

national intelligence and intelligence sources, methods and 

activities from unauthorized disclosure[.]” Intelligence 

Community Directive 700, at 3 (June 7, 2012), available at 

http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD_700.pdf.

Second, statutory language must always be read “in [its] 

context,” and that context supports the ability of the Director 

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of National Intelligence to delegate to the CIA Director 

subject to the former’s guidance. King v. Burwell, No. 14-

114, slip op. at 15 (U.S. June 25, 2015) (internal quotation 

marks omitted); see Association of Civilian Technicians, Inc. 

v. United States, 603 F.3d 989, 992 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 

(“[W]ords are to be read in the context in which they are used 

and in the broader context of the statutory scheme.”). The 

paragraph that precedes the delegation limitation mandates 

that “the Director of National Intelligence shall establish and 

implement guidelines for the intelligence community”

addressing, among other things, the “[c]lassification of 

information” and “[a]ccess to and dissemination of 

intelligence,” “[c]onsistent with” the Director’s duty to 

protect intelligence sources and methods. 50 U.S.C.

§ 3024(i)(2)(A)–(B). The statute thus expressly envisions the 

National Intelligence Director giving guidance to intelligence 

agencies, which necessarily is guidance for those agencies to 

use. 

The Director of National Intelligence has exercised that 

authority. Intelligence Community Directive 700 establishes 

the intelligence community’s “policy for the protection of 

national intelligence” and provides a “framework” for 

oversight of classified information and “protection of national 

intelligence and intelligence sources, methods, and activities.” 

Intelligence Community Directive 700, at 1. By ordering the

heads of components of the intelligence community to 

“[p]rotect national intelligence and intelligence sources, 

methods and activities from unauthorized disclosure,” id. at 3, 

the Director of National Intelligence exercised his power to 

issue guidelines in a manner “consistent with” his statutory

duty, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(2).

Third, the National Security Act’s structuring of the 

intelligence community likewise confirms the authority of the 

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Director of National Intelligence to provide rules and 

guidance for intelligence agencies to implement on a case-bycase basis. The Act provides that, “[s]ubject to the authority, 

direction, and control of the President,” the Director of 

National Intelligence “serve[s] as head of the intelligence 

community” and “oversee[s] and direct[s] the implementation 

of the National Intelligence Program,” 50 U.S.C. § 3023(b), 

which consists of “all programs, projects, and activities of the 

intelligence community,” id. § 3003(6). The statute thus 

expressly contemplates that the Director of National 

Intelligence, under the President’s direction, will issue general 

directives that control the manner in which the intelligence 

community as a whole carries out its mission. 

Underscoring the point, the provision of the National 

Security Act listing the Director of National Intelligence’s 

“[r]esponsibilities and authorities” is chock full of provisions 

tasking the Director with formulating and issuing guidance to 

govern the intelligence community writ large. 50 U.S.C. 

§ 3024. Notably absent are provisions suggesting that the 

Director must—or even feasibly could—have his fingers 

perpetually in the day-in-and-day-out operations of each and 

every one of the sixteen components of the intelligence 

community.

4

 To the contrary, the National Security Act 

assigns the CIA Director responsibility for the day-to-day 

conduct of the agency’s mission. See 50 U.S.C. § 3036(b)–

(f). 

Finally, we would require far more explicit statutory 

direction before concluding that Congress meant to saddle the 

highest-level official in the intelligence community (other 

 4 See Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Members of 

the IC, http://www.dni.gov/index.php/intelligence-community/

members-of-the-ic (last visited July 24, 2015).

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than the President) with such micromanagement, or meant to 

so ossify the ability of the intelligence community to protect 

its most vital intelligence information. DiBacco’s 

interpretation “overlooks the practical necessities of modern 

intelligence gathering,” and would improperly narrow the 

Director of National Intelligence’s “very broad authority to 

protect all sources of intelligence information from 

disclosure.” Sims, 471 U.S. at 168–169. Nothing in the 2004

amendment to the National Security Act indicates a 

congressional intent to hamstring the Director in that fashion.5

Further, the overall scheme for protecting such sensitive 

information leaves it to the President to dictate the duties (in

addition to those statutorily enumerated) of the Director of 

National Intelligence, and the President and the Director of 

National Intelligence do the same for the Director of the CIA. 

See 50 U.S.C. § 3024(f)(8) (“The Director of National 

Intelligence shall perform such other functions as the 

President may direct.”); id. § 3036(d)(4) (The Director of the 

CIA’s statutory responsibilities include “such other functions 

and duties related to intelligence affecting the national 

security as the President or the Director of National 

Intelligence may direct.”). 

Executive Order 12333, in turn, requires the Director of 

the CIA to protect intelligence sources and methods from 

unauthorized disclosure in accordance with guidance issued 

 5 We have affirmed the CIA’s exercise of the authority to prevent 

unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods

following the 2004 amendment to the National Security Act. See 

American Civil Liberties Union, 628 F.3d at 625–626; Moore v. 

CIA, 666 F.3d 1330, 1331 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Larson, 565 F.3d at 

865. Other courts have done the same. See American Civil 

Liberties Union v. Department of Justice, 681 F.3d 61, 72–75 (2d 

Cir. 2012); Berman v. CIA, 501 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2007).

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by the Director of National Intelligence. Exec. Order 12333, 

amended by Exec. Order 13470, § 1.6(d). The Order also 

requires the Director of National Intelligence to “ensure that 

programs are developed to protect, intelligence sources, 

methods, and activities from unauthorized disclosure.” Id.

§ 1.3(b)(8). Intelligence Community Directive 700 provides 

the guidance contemplated by Executive Order 12333, and 

likewise gives the Director of the CIA the duty to protect 

intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized 

disclosure. The CIA Director’s exercise of that authority 

consistent with the National Intelligence Director’s guidance 

falls naturally within the “other functions and duties related to 

intelligence” that the President or the Director of National 

Intelligence may grant the Director of the CIA under the 

National Security Act. 50 U.S.C. § 3036(d)(4).

Accordingly, when read in context, the statutory 

limitation on delegation on which DiBacco relies, 50 U.S.C. 

§ 3024(i)(3), does not unravel either the President’s or the 

Director of National Intelligence’s authority to assign 

responsibility to intelligence agency heads to protect 

intelligence sources and methods. Instead, the anti-delegation 

provision means that the Director of National Intelligence 

must hold close those critical responsibilities for 

superintending and guiding the work of members of the 

intelligence community. The Director has done that through 

the guidance issued, and DiBacco does not dispute that the 

CIA made its withholding decisions in this case under the 

framework that guidance provides. 

DiBacco’s Motion to Compel

DiBacco makes a glancing challenge to the district 

court’s denial of her motion to compel disclosure of the 

Army’s and CIA’s classified declarations referenced in their

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summary-judgment papers filed nearly two decades ago. 

DiBacco’s argument focuses on when a district court may rely 

upon such declarations to decide FOIA exemption claims. 

See Plaintiffs’ Motion for an Order Compelling Defendants 

Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of the Army 

to Disclose Ex Parte Declarations 4–6 (April 25, 2013), ECF 

No. 249.

But the district court never ruled on the agencies’ earlier 

motion for summary judgment because they withdrew it after 

the 1998 passage of the Disclosure Act. Those declarations 

thus played no role in resolving that summary judgment 

motion, nor did the district court rely on them in deciding any 

other issue. On top of that, the district court concluded that

the unclassified declarations filed in the case were sufficient

to enable DiBacco to oppose, and the court to resolve, the 

agencies’ current motion for summary judgment. DiBacco, 

983 F. Supp. 2d at 53. DiBacco has not challenged that 

conclusion. Nor has she provided any reason to disturb the 

district court’s exercise of its “broad discretion regarding 

whether to conduct in camera review,” let alone to secondguess its refusal to disclose classified declarations that it

appropriately declined to review. Larson, 565 F.3d at 870. 

III

Conclusion

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

to the Army and CIA with respect to (i) the Army’s transfer of 

documents to the National Archives, (ii) both agencies’ 

searches for responsive documents, and (iii) the CIA’s 

withholding of information under Exemptions 1 and 3. Our 

remand is limited to issues arising from the Army’s release to 

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DiBacco during the appeal of responsive but redacted Army 

documents that had been held by the National Archives.

So ordered.

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