Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00912/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00912-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW CALVIN COLEY,

Plaintiff,

vs.

P. BRAZELTON, et al.,

Defendants

Case No. 1:13 cv 00912 LJO GSA PC

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND 

GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO FILE 

AN AMENDED COMPLAINT

AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE

IN THIRTY DAYS

I. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule

302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or 

appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

Case 1:13-cv-00912-BAM Document 30 Filed 10/30/14 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

“Rule 8(a)‟s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 

U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff‟s 

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. However, “the 

liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff‟s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 

490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not 

supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat‟l Credit Union 

Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 

(9th Cir. 1982)).

II. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (CDCR) at the California Medical Facility at Vacaville. Plaintiff brings this 

action against prison officials employed by the CDCR at Pleasant Valley State Prison. The 

events at issue occurred while Plaintiff was housed at Pleasant Valley. Plaintiff names the 

following individual defendant; Warden P. Brazelton; Correctional Officer (C/O F. Martinez; 

C/O De La Cruz; C/O Tucker; Sergeant Santoya; Sergeant Redding; Lt. Dotson; Appeals 

Coordinator Morgan. Plaintiff claims that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his safety 

and retaliated against him when he filed a grievance regarding his safety. 

 Plaintiff is a patient in the correctional clinical case management system (CCCMS) due 

to his mental health condition. On January 13, 2012, Plaintiff arrived at Pleasant Valley State 

Prison (PVSP) and was placed on suicide watch. 

On June 22, 2012, Plaintiff told C/O Martinez that he was feeling suicidal and requested 

that he “call the psychology.” Martinez laughed at Plaintiff and did not seek any assistance. 

Plaintiff told Defendants Delacruz and Tucker that he was feeling suicidal and requested 

psychological assistance. Both officers refused. 

Case 1:13-cv-00912-BAM Document 30 Filed 10/30/14 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

Plaintiff alleges that on June 24, 2012, he had to be hospitalized because of “continuous 

harassing” by C/O Martinez. On June 27, 2012, Plaintiff went to the Program Office and asked 

Sergeant Santoya to “please have Defendant #2 C/O F. Martinez to stop harassing me. M. 

Santoya acting sergeant refuse to do so.” On June 28, 2012, Plaintiff asked Sergeant Redding 

to get C/O Martinez to stop harassing him. Sergeant Redding refused. On July 2, 2012, 

Plaintiff went to the Program Office and asked Lt. Dotson to get Martinez to stop harassing him. 

Plaintiff told Lt. Dotson that Martinez had “pulled a gun on him” for no reason. Dotson told 

Plaintiff that “it was not his C/O that was causing the problem, that it was me that are causing 

and it won‟t do me any good to file any type of paperwork.” Plaintiff alleges that Appeals 

Coordinator J. Morgan intentionally failed to process Plaintiff‟s inmate grievance, “due to 

Plaintiff proving that defendant F. Martinez had writing a false 115 on the Plaintiff, in retaliation 

against Plaintiff for Plaintiff had file a CDCR 602 appeal.” 

A. Failure to Protect

The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to take reasonable measures to 

guarantee the safety of inmates, which has been interpreted to include a duty to protect prisoners. 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994); Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th

Cir. 2005). A prisoner seeking relief for an Eighth Amendment violation must show that the 

officials acted with deliberate indifference to the threat of serious harm or injury to an inmate. 

Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9

th Cir. 2002). “Deliberate indifference” has 

both subjective and objective components. A prison official must “be aware of facts from which 

the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and . . . must also draw 

the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Liability may follow only if a prison official “knows 

that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take 

reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. at 847. 

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege facts from which an inference could be drawn that any of the 

named defendants knew of a specific harm to Plaintiff and disregarded that harm, causing injury 

to Plaintiff. Plaintiff concludes that defendants are liable because they would not order C/O 

Case 1:13-cv-00912-BAM Document 30 Filed 10/30/14 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

Martinez to stop harassing Plaintiff and that officials failed to summon psychological help when 

Plaintiff told them he felt suicidal. Plaintiff does not indicate what, if any, specific information 

Defendants were aware of that indicated that Plaintiff was subjected to a specific risk of harm. 

Plaintiff‟s allegations indicate that he was in the correctional clinical case management system 

and was, presumably, being treated and/or monitored for a mental health condition. There are 

no allegations that Plaintiff actually attempted suicide. The Ninth Circuit has held that inmates 

of opposite gangs placed in a cell with each other, with nothing more, fails to satisfy the Eighth 

Amendment‟s standard that prison official must be aware of a specific risk to an inmate. 

Labatad v. Corrections Corp. of America, 714 F.3d 1155 (9th 2013). The facts alleged suggest 

that although Plaintiff did fear for his safety, there was no specific information that Defendants 

knew from which they could draw an inference that Plaintiff was exposed to a particular risk. 

There are no allegations that any defendant failed to follow suicide watch protocols. 

B. Retaliation

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner‟s First Amendment rights to speech or to 

petition the government may support a 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 5527, 532 (9th

Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 

65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment 

retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action 

against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner‟s protected conduct, and that such action (4) 

chilled the inmate‟s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably 

advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 

2005); accord Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2012); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 

F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Here, although Plaintiff alleges that he did file a grievance, he fails to allege any specific 

conduct that chilled his First Amendment activity. As to Lt. Morgan, he charges that Lt. Morgan 

Case 1:13-cv-00912-BAM Document 30 Filed 10/30/14 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

failed to process Plaintiff‟s appeal. Although a retaliation claim can be stated for retaliatory 

conduct in response to the filing of a grievance, that conduct is distinct from interfering with 

access to the grievance process itself. Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); 

Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993). The prison grievance procedure does not 

confer any substantive rights upon inmates and actions in reviewing appeals cannot serve as a 

basis for liability under section 1983. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495.

As to Defendant Martinez, the Court finds Plaintiff‟s allegation to be vague. Plaintiff 

alleges that Martinez filed a “false 115” in response to Plaintiff filing an inmate grievance. 

Plaintiff does not specify what the disciplinary charge was, and fails to allege facts indicating 

that he was not afforded due process regarding any disciplinary process. A bare allegation of a 

“false 115” is insufficient to state a claim for relief.

C. Supervisory Liability

 Plaintiff attempts to bring claims against certain defendants based upon the supervisory 

position they hold within CDCR. Government officials may not be held liable for the actions of 

their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 673 

(2009). Since a government official cannot be held liable under a theory of vicarious liability for 

section 1983 actions, Plaintiff must plead that the official has violated the Constitution through 

his own individual actions. Id. at 673. In other words, to state a claim for relief under section 

1983, Plaintiff must link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that 

demonstrates a violation of Plaintiff‟s federal rights.

 

Case 1:13-cv-00912-BAM Document 30 Filed 10/30/14 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted 

under color of state law and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution 

or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). “A person 

deprives another of a constitutional right, where that person „does an affirmative act, participates 

in another‟s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which [that person] is legally required to 

do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.‟” Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 

988 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “[T]he 

„requisite causal connection can be established not only by some kind of direct, personal 

participation in the deprivation, but also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which the 

actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.‟” 

Id. (quoting Johnson at 743-44). Plaintiff has not specifically charged each defendant with 

conduct indicating that they knew of and disregarded a serious risk to Plaintiff‟s health, resulting 

in injury to Plaintiff. Plaintiff may not hold defendants liable simply by alleging a serious 

medical condition and then charge defendants with the vague allegation that they neglected his

condition. Plaintiff must allege facts indicating that each defendant was aware of a specific harm 

to Plaintiff, and acted with deliberate indifference to that harm. Plaintiff has failed to do so here. 

The complaint should therefore be dismissed. Plaintiff will, however, be granted leave to file an 

amended complaint.

Plaintiff need not, however, set forth legal arguments in support of his claims. In order to 

hold an individual defendant liable, Plaintiff must name the individual defendant, describe where 

that defendant is employed and in what capacity, and explain how that defendant acted under 

color of state law. Plaintiff should state clearly, in his or her own words, what happened. 

Plaintiff must describe what each defendant, by name, did to violate the particular right described 

by Plaintiff. Plaintiff has failed to do so here.

III. Conclusion and Order

The Court has screened Plaintiff‟s complaint and finds that it does not state any claims 

Upon which relief may be granted under section 1983. The Court will provide Plaintiff with the

Case 1:13-cv-00912-BAM Document 30 Filed 10/30/14 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

opportunity to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this

order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff is cautioned that he

may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended

complaint. George, 507 F.3d at 607 (no “buckshot” complaints).

Plaintiff‟s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what 

each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff‟s constitutional or other federal 

rights, Hydrick, 500 F.3d at 987-88. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must 

be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007) (citations omitted). 

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, 

Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 

567 (9th Cir. 1987), and must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded 

pleading,” Local Rule 15-220. Plaintiff is warned that “[a]ll causes of action alleged in an 

original complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d 

at 567 (citing to London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord

Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff‟s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state a 

claim;

2. The Clerk‟s Office shall send to Plaintiff a complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file 

an amended complaint; 

4. Plaintiff may not add any new, unrelated claims to this action via his amended 

complaint and any attempt to do so will result in an order striking the amended 

complaint; and 

5. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint, the Court will recommend that this 

action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim.

Case 1:13-cv-00912-BAM Document 30 Filed 10/30/14 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 29, 2014 

/s/ Gary S. Austin 

 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

Case 1:13-cv-00912-BAM Document 30 Filed 10/30/14 Page 8 of 8