Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01831/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01831-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 05:552 Freedom of Information Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Daniel Saul Coven, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV-07-1831-PHX-RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

United States Office of )

Personnel Management, )

)

Defendant. ) )

Introduction

Plaintiff pro se, Daniel Saul Coven, “is sole proprietor of

federalgovernmentjobs.us[,] a website that provides job search and

notification services to job seekers.” Co. (doc. 1) at 2. From

roughly July 2005 through June 2007, plaintiff was among those who

requested and received data feed via defendant United States Office

of Personnel Management (“OPM”) regarding all federal job vacancy

announcements. Harrison Decl’n (doc. 39-3) at 5; see also Co.

(doc. 1) at 2. Effective June 30, 2007, however, “OPM directed its

contractor, MGS [Monster Government Solutions] to cease the

compilation of th[at] [job vacancy] 

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data[.]” Harrison Decl’n (doc. 39-3) at 5. 

Shortly thereafter, on July 13, 2007, pursuant to the Freedom

of Information Act, 5. U.S.C. § 552, et seq. (“FOIA”), plaintiff

requested “daily . . . electronic copies of the data contained in

the USAJOBS.gov job vacancy database[,] . . . on an ongoing basis.” 

Doc. 27 at 4. Plaintiff further requested that information on an

expedited basis, with the fee waived, or at least reduced. 

Ultimately, on appeal OPM did grant plaintiff’s request for the job

vacancy records, but it denied his appeal in all other respects. 

In the meantime, plaintiff commenced the present FOIA action

in which three motions are currently pending: (1) OPM’s motion for

summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (doc. 38); (2)

plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment (doc. 44); and (3)

plaintiff’s motion to strike (doc. 56).

Background

To place plaintiff’s July 13th request and OPM’s appeal

decision in context, a brief history of the USAJOBS® web site is

necessary. The declaration of Willie A. Harrison, OPM’s Deputy

Director of the USAJOBS® program, is instructive in that regard. 

OPM “is responsible for maintaining” USAJOBS®, which is “the

Federal government’s official web site for Federal jobs and

employment information.” Harrison Decl’n (doc. 39-3) at 3, 

¶ (13). The USAJOBS® web site had its genesis in 2001 as part of

an effort to “simplif[y] the process of locating and applying for

Federal jobs.” Id. at 4, ¶ (13). OPM contracts with MGS “for the

day-to-day operations and maintenance” of that site. Id. at 3, ¶

(13). 

Prior to the existence of the USAJOBS® website, from about

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July 2004 to June 30, 2007, MGS was directed to compile a data feed

which included all vacancy announcement information submitted by

Federal agencies for the purpose of providing this data feed to the

U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) for the America’s Jobs Bank

[(“AJB”)] program.” Id. at 4, ¶ (14). DOL instituted that program

and web site, among other things, “to distribute federal job

vacancies to State and local unemployment agencies[.]” Id. at 5, ¶

(14). OPM’s contractor, MGS, maintained and updated vacancy

announcement information in an active database for OPM, but “OPM

neither received nor regularly accesse[d] the content of the . . .

database.” Id. “The data feed was primarily established for the

convenience of the [DOL] and other Federal agencies and to provide

an archive of vacancy announcements as required for compliance with

regulatory guidance.” Id. The USAJOBS® web site was the vehicle

for fulfilling OPM’s statutory mandate which, in essence, is to

disseminate information regarding competitive service job

announcements for federal agencies. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 3327 and 3330. 

OPM “made th[at] data feed publicly available to anyone who

requested it when it was being produced.” Harrison Decl’n (doc.

39-3) at 5, ¶ (14). Plaintiff was among the beneficiaries of that

data feed from some time in 2005 until July 2007. Co. (doc. 1) at

2; see also Harrison Decl’n (doc. 39-3) at 5, 

¶ (14).

In January 2007, DOL informed OPM of its intent to shut down

its AJB program. Harrison Decl’n (doc. 39-3) at 5, ¶ (14). DOL

made that decision partially due to the “success and availability

of . . . the USAJOBS® site,” and the resultant savings from 

eliminating the duplication of effort through the AJB site. Id. 

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The following month, February 2007, OPM notified “all known

recipients/users of the [AJB] data feed of the pending

termination[,]” effective June 30, 2007. Id. OPM also “directed

its contractor, MGS, to cease the compilation of th[at] data on a

daily basis . . . [e]ffective 30 June 2007.” Id. MGS complied and

“[t]he feed was terminated and is no longer available.” Id.

“[A]ll relevant vacancy announcement information continues to be

available . . . on the USAJOBS® web site.” Id.

After the decision to terminate the daily data feed through

AJB, on July 13, 2007, plaintiff made a FOIA request of OPM

enumerating 29 separate categories of information which he wanted

from the “electronic copies of the data contained in the

USAJOBS.gov job vacancy database.” Doc. 27 at 4; see also Harrison

Decl’n (doc. 39-3) at 2, ¶ (4). Plaintiff emphasized that he was

“request[ing] daily copies of these files on an ongoing basis.” 

Id. Plaintiff based his request for “expedited service” on the

theory that “these records are time sensitive as most vacancies

hav[e] only a two week application period and because these files

will be used to disseminate the information to the public.” Id.

(emphasis in original). 

In his request, plaintiff opined that “there should be no fees

for providing copies of reasonably sized electronic records,” but

he sought to be advised if “the cost would exceed $1 per day.” Id.

Plaintiff concluded by notifying OPM that he could “receive the

files as is or compressed (.zip or .gz) by electronic mail, web or

through FTP[.]” Id. Likewise, plaintiff advised, “We can provide

an upload server, or can download from a [MGS] or OPM provided

server[.]” Id.

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1

 This emphasis appears to be in the original document, although the court

cannot be certain given the poor quality of this copy.

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On September 10, 2007, OPM responded to that July 13th FOIA

request advising plaintiff, as it had previously, that “due to

security risk issues that could potentially affect the integrity of

the data, OPM shut down data feeds to all requestors [sic], 

. . . on June 30, 2007.” Id. at 5. OPM added that “termination”

of that “data-feed . . . coincided with the permanent closure of”

DOL’s AJB program. Id. OPM further explained that given that

termination, the requested data “is now available only on the

USAJOBS® and StudentJobs® web sites.” Id.1 Because the requested

data “is not offered in any other format; or, from any other

source[,]” OPM informed plaintiff that it had “no records

responsive to [his] request.” Id. OPM concluded its response by

further informing plaintiff of his appeal rights. Id.

Plaintiff immediately responded that same day via e-mail,

indicating that “‘[t]he appeal process was initiated on 8/23/97.’”

Harrison Decl’n (doc. 39-3) at 2, ¶ (6). Although plaintiff

“acknowledged that ‘much of the requested information is contained

in the USAJOBS® website,’” some of it, such as the “‘location codes

. . . and date of last modification’” were not displayed on that

website.” Id. That e-mail was incorrectly addressed. Id.

Therefore, OPM had no record of any aspect of an August 23, 2007,

appeal from plaintiff. Id.

Prior to exhausting his administrative remedies, on

September 25, 2007, plaintiff commenced the present FOIA action. 

Eventually, the court stayed this action pending notification as to

“whether or not plaintiff ha[d] exhausted his administrative

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remedies.” Doc. 24 at 1:22-23. During the administrative appeal

process, due to a “change in [its] policy[,]” Harrison Decl’n (doc.

39-3) at 3, ¶ (10), OPM “decided to provide all available records

requested by Plaintiff.” DSOF (doc. 39) at 2, ¶ 4:4-6. In

particular, “[a]fter reviewing the issues surrounding the

provisions of USAJOBS® data, around October 2007, OPM decided to

revive the availability of a modified version of the previous data

feed.” Id. at 5, ¶ (14). OPM made that decision primarily to

facilitate widespread dissemination of the availability of federal

jobs. 

Due to ongoing concerns as to the “integrity of the

information” though, OPM decided that recipients of the data feed

would be required to “sign a ‘term of use agreement’ limiting their

use and manipulation of the data.” Id. at 6, 

¶ (14). Organizations such as Google, Inc., Microsoft Network and

Yahoo “currently receiv[e] a data feed of USAJOBS® data which MGS

has been compiling since about December 2007.” Id. at 6, ¶ (15). 

Those entities have entered into term of use agreements with OPM. 

Id. 

During the pendency of this action, “plaintiff was made aware

of the availability of the data feed and sent a copy of the terms

of use agreement[.]” Id. Nonetheless, plaintiff has refused to

sign that agreement believing that “it unduly limit[s] his use of

the data.” Id. Despite OPM’s express “willingness to modify the

terms of use agreement in an effort to accommodate plaintiff’s

concerns[,]” he “has not contacted the USAJOBS® office to discuss

[such] modifications[.]” Id.

Eventually OPM granted plaintiff’s appeal to the extent it

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agreed to provide him with the requested job vacancy records, but

it denied his appeal for a fee waiver or reduction, expedited

processing and daily, ongoing copies of those records. See Doc.

39-2 at 1-2. OPM’s rationale for each of these determinations will

be fully discussed herein. Suffice it to say for now that

plaintiff is challenging each of those three adverse

determinations. He is also seeking attorney’s fees and costs. 

Before determining whether either party is entitled to summary

judgment in whole or in part, the court must address plaintiff’s

motion to strike. 

Discussion

I. Motion to Strike

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), plaintiff is seeking to

strike almost all of OPM’s response as it relates to attorney’s

fees and costs. Plaintiff asserts that the court should strike

that portion of OPM’s response (doc. 52, § VI, p. 7:26-9:4) because

it is immaterial and contradicts arguments in OPM’s pending summary

judgment motion. 

OPM counters that even if it is not material to OPM’s own

motion, that particular response argument is material to

“Plaintiff’s own request for attorneys[,] fees and costs.” Resp.

(doc. 61) at 1. Additionally, OPM argues, as explained below, that

plaintiff is improperly relying upon Rule 12(f) as the basis for

his motion to strike. The court agrees that there are both

procedural and substantive reasons for denying this motion to

strike.

Rule 12(f), which is the sole basis for this motion, provides

in relevant part that “[u]pon motion made by a party 

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. . . , the court may order stricken from any pleading any . . .

immaterial, . . . matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) (emphasis added). 

Rule 7, in turn, essentially defines pleadings as complaints and

answers. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a). Therefore, “Rule 12(f) cannot

serve as a procedural vehicle for striking language contained in

motion papers.” Holyoak v. United States, 2009 WL 1456472, at *1

(D.Ariz. May 21, 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has plainly held that “[u]nder

the express language of the rule, only pleadings are subject to

motions to strike.” Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d

880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added). Likewise, LRCiv

7.2(m)(1) prohibits this motion because it does not fall into the

narrow category of motions to strike which that Rule allows. 

The court also denies Plaintiff’s motion to strike on the

merits. In his complaint, one form of relief which plaintiff is

seeking is an award of costs. Co. (doc. 1) at 5, ¶ 2). In his

cross-motion for summary judgment, plaintiff explicitly expands

that request to include attorney’s fees. See Cross-Mot. (doc. 46)

at 10, § VI. Based upon the foregoing, undoubtedly OPM’s response

addressing the issues of attorney’s fees and costs is material. 

Hence, there is no basis for striking that aspect of OPM’s 

response. Accordingly, the court denies plaintiff’s motion to

strike. Denial of this motion is in keeping with the general view

that “such motions are disfavored and infrequently granted.” See

Garcia-Barajas v. Nestle Purina Petcare Co., 2009 WL 2151850, at *2

(E.D.Cal. July 16, 2009) (citation omitted); see also 5C Wright &

A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 

§ 1380 (3d ed. 2004) (same) (citing cases). 

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II. Summary Judgment Motions

A. Governing Legal Standards

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56©, a party is entitled to summary

judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” It is beyond dispute that “[t]he moving party

bears the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of any genuine

issue of material fact.” Horphag Research Ltd. v. Garcia, 475 F.3d

1029, 1035 (9th Cir.2007) (citation omitted). “Once the moving

party meets its initial burden, . . . , the burden shifts to the

nonmoving party to set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided

in Rule 56, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue

for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248,

106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). When assessing the record to determine whether

there is a “genuine issue for trial the court must “view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,

drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor.” Horphag, 475 F.3d

at 1035 (citation omitted). “This is true even though[,]” as

here, “the court is presented with cross-motions for summary

judgment[.]” High Tech Gays v. Defense Ind. Sec. Clearance Office,

895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir.1990) (citation omitted). 

“Although the mandate of FOIA calls for broad disclosure of

Government records, the Act represents a careful balance between

‘public rights and agency obligations designed to foster greater

access to agency records than existed prior to its enactment.’” 

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Laughlin v. C.I.R., 103 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1222 (S.D.Cal. 1999)

(quoting Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 150, 100 S.Ct. 960). Thus,

“[s]ummary judgment for the defendant is appropriate in a FOIA case

‘when the agency proves that it has fully discharged its

obligations under FOIA, after the underlying facts and the

inferences to be drawn from them are construed in the light most

favorable to the FOIA requester.’” Id. (quoting Miller v. U.S.

Dep't of State, 779 F.2d 1378, 1382 (8th Cir. 1985) (other citation

omitted). In determining whether an agency has improperly withheld

records from a complainant, the court must conduct a de novo

review. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (West 2007). “[T]he burden is

on the agency [OPM] to sustain its action.” Id. These principles

guide the court’s consideration of the parties’ respective summary

judgment arguments. 

B. “Ongoing, Daily Disclosure”

The sole jurisdictional basis in plaintiff’s complaint is 

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). That provision of the FOIA “vests

jurisdiction in federal district courts to enjoin an ‘agency from

withholding agency records and to order the production of agency

records improperly withheld from the complainant.’” Kissinger v.

Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 139, 100

S.Ct. 960, 963 (1980) (quoting 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(a)(4)(B)). “Federal jurisdiction” under section 552(a)(4)(B)

“is dependent upon a showing that an agency has (1) ‘improperly’;

(2) ‘withheld’” (3) ‘agency records.’” Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 150,

100 S.Ct. 960. A district court’s “authority to devise remedies

and enjoin agencies can only be invoked, under the jurisdictional

grant conferred by § 552, if the agency has contravened all three

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components of this obligation.” Id. (emphasis added); see also

U.S. Department of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 142, 109

S.Ct. 2841, 106 L.Ed.2d 112 (1989) (“Unless each of these criteria

is met, a district court lacks jurisdiction to devise remedies to

force an agency to comply with the FOIA’s disclosure

requirements.”) As can be seen, the issue of FOIA jurisdiction is

inextricably linked with whether an agency has improperly withheld

its records – a fact the parties herein did not consider. 

Focusing strictly upon the temporal aspect of plaintiff’s

request, OPM contends that he is not entitled “a ‘daily feed’ of

future records pursuant to the FOIA.” Mot. (doc. 40) at 3:21–22

(citations omitted) (emphasis added). Put differently, OPM asserts

that the FOIA does not entitle plaintiff “to obtain records created

after the agency responds to his request.” Id. at 3:20-21

(emphasis added). In light of the foregoing, and the fact that

“during the administrative appeal[,]” OPM “decided . . . to provide

all available records Plaintiff requested in this matter[,]” OPM

argues that summary judgment in its favor is mandated because it

has not improperly withheld any agency record. Id. at 4:5-8. 

OPM does not frame its argument in jurisdictional terms. 

Indeed, at the outset OPM expressly states that it is “not

contest[ing] jurisdiction[.]” Id. at 1 (emphasis added). At the

same time, however, OPM accurately notes that unless it has

improperly withheld an agency record, this court lacks

jurisdiction. See id. Therefore, the court finds that OPM’s

argument that it is entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff

is not entitled to “ongoing, daily copies” is more properly

analyzed in jurisdictional terms. 

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Plaintiff concedes that OPM has “partially granted” his

request by providing “those records current at the time of

processing[.]” Pl. Opp’n (doc. 44) at 1; and Reply (doc. 59) at

2:3-4 (emphasis added). Undoubtedly, OPM’s voluntary provision of

those records deprives this court of jurisdiction over this aspect

of plaintiff’s action. See Beech v. C.I.R., 190 F.Supp.2d 1183,

1187 (D.Ariz. 2001) (citing, inter alia, Carter v. Veterans Admin.,

780 F.2d 1479, 1481 (9th Cir. 1986)) (plaintiff’s FOIA claim mooted

where defendant provided requested records, so court dismissed for

lack of jurisdiction), aff’d, 37 Fed. Appx. 324 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Plaintiff adheres to the view, however, that OPM “has not complied

with FOIA” because it will not provide him with “future records[]”

based upon his initial request. Pl. Opp’n (doc. 44) at 1; and

Reply (doc. 59) at 2:4. Plaintiff posits that by not being

provided with “daily, ongoing copies of [OPM’s] job vacancy

records,” he will “effectively [be] deni[ed] access to job

vacancies that would close before subsequent FOIA request[s] could

be processed.” PSOF (doc. 49) at 3 (emphasis added). Thus, “in

order to eliminate future disagreement[,]” plaintiff seeks “to have

this court find that . . . ongoing, daily disclosure is not a

matter of agency discretion, but a matter of law[.]” Cross-Mot.

(doc. 46) at 7:17-19. Hence, plaintiff argues, he is entitled to

summary judgment on the issue of ongoing, daily disclosure. 

Given the parties’ divergent views as to OPM’s obligation to

provide future records, the issue, as OPM accurately frames it, is

whether the FOIA requires OPM “to provide daily[,] ongoing copies

of the job vacancy announcements.” Resp. (doc. 52) at 1. If OPM

has such an obligation, then admittedly it has not met that

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2 Evidently failing to recognize that Lybarger had been affirmed, OPM

relies only upon the district court’s decision, Lybarger v. Cardwell, 438 F.Supp.

1075 (D.Mass. 1977) (“Lybarger I”), as, in turn, does plaintiff Coven.

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obligation. Thus, OPM would be deemed to have improperly withheld

agency records, and the court would have jurisdiction to grant

summary judgment in plaintiff’s favor on this issue. Conversely,

if OPM does not have any obligation under FOIA to provide ongoing,

daily copies, then its failure to do so does not amount to improper

withholding of agency records. The court, therefore, would lack

jurisdiction over this aspect of plaintiff’s action. 

As OPM points out, agencies are not under an obligation to

continuously update responses to a FOIA request. In Lybarger v.

Cardwell, 577 F.2d 764 (1st Cir. 1978) (“Lybarger II”)2, for

example, the plaintiff nonprofit advocacy organization requested a

variety of government materials and handbooks from the Social

Security Regional Commissioner’s Office. That organization also

requested that it “be placed on a mailing list to receive as a

matter of routine any updated materials.” Id. at 765. The

organization challenged, among other things, the Commissioner’s

“refus[al] to provide [it] with updated materials automatically.” 

Id. at 766. The district court held that the Commissioner did not

violate FOIA by declining “to provide periodic updates and

revisions of th[o]se materials automatically as they [we]re

issued.” Lybarger I, 438 F.Supp. at 1077. 

The First Circuit affirmed because it could not “find any

language in the [FOIA] which imposes such an explicit obligation on

agencies.” Lybarger II, 577 F.2d at 767. Moreover, the

Commissioner “agreed to make updated materials available in

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response to individual [subsequent] requests[;]” and plaintiffs

gave the Court no “basis for believing that the commission w[ould]

not comply with the statutory mandate of the [FOIA] and reply

promptly to such requests.” Id. Thus, because “[t]he Commissioner

is required by law to meet only that specific responsibility[,]”

the First Circuit found that it could not “hold that he [wa]s

required to do more, no matter how efficient or beneficial other

forms of disclosure may be.” Id.; see also Mandel Grunfeld and

Herrick v. United States Customs Service, 709 F.2d 41, 43 (11th

Cir. 1983) (“Nothing in the FOIA can be construed as requiring an

agency to set up a mailing list to automatically disseminate agency

records or information.”) As one court has so succinctly put it,

“‘FOIA creates a right of access to records, not a right to

personal services.’” Smith v. F.B.I., 2008 WL 115350, at *4

(E.D.Cal. 2008) (quoting Sands v. U.S., 1995 WL 552308, at *5

(S.D.Fla. 1995) (other citation omitted)). Indeed, in a different

context, the Supreme Court has recognized “that agencies generally

are not obligated to provide extensive service in fulfilling FOIA

requests.” Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 154, 100 S.Ct. at 970. 

Consistent with the foregoing, in Church of Scientology of

Texas v. I.R.S., 816 F.Supp. 1138 (W.D.Tex. 1993), the court held

that “[d]ocuments generated subsequent to the date specified in the

request are outside the scope of the request and need not be

disclosed.” Id. at 1148. The court soundly reasoned that “[t]he

FOIA does not expressly or implicitly require an agency to locate

documents outside the dates specified in the request.” Id.

“Furthermore, it is unreasonable to expect an agency to locate and

determine the disclosability of documents generated subsequent to

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the date specified in a request.” Id. Finding that “[t]he agency

should only be required to make one thorough search per request[,]”

the court held that “[t]he most logical deadlines [for documents to

satisfy a given request] is the date specified in that request.” 

Id. 

Administratively, that deadline “makes the most sense[,]” the

court found, because “a search would be a never ending process if

the cut-off date for records responsive to the request is a date

other than the date specified in the request.” Id. Furthermore,

requiring the agency to conduct more than one search would be

counter to the “premium” which the FOIA “places . . . on rapidly

processing FOIA requests.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). For all of these reasons, the court opined that

“[i]f the requester desires documents from dates other than those

specified in the request the requester simply has to file another

request.” Id.

This court is fully aware that the issue in Church of

Scientology was what date restrictions an agency may place on a

FOIA request, as opposed to the issue here of whether an agency has

an obligation to provide ongoing daily copies. Nonetheless, the

court finds that rationale applies with equal force in the present

case.

Plaintiff readily concedes the validity of OPM’s position,

i.e., there are “a number of cases ruling against requiring

agencies to automatically provide additional records as they become

available.” Reply (doc. 59) at 10:14-16 (emphasis added). Perhaps

that is why plaintiff does not cite to a single case requiring an

agency to provide a requester with ongoing, daily copies of

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documents prior to the time a FOIA request is made for such

documents. In any event, despite plaintiff’s concession, he

persists in arguing that the court should compel OPM to provide him

with ongoing, daily feed of job vacancy announcements. None of

plaintiff’s proffered reasons for providing daily feed are

convincing however, especially given the complete paucity of

applicable case law. 

Plaintiff’s first tack is to argue that he will sustain

“[i]rreparable injury” if the court denies his “request for

ongoing, daily files[.]” Cross-Mot. (doc. 46) at 7:21. Plaintiff

claims that he has shown irreparable harm because “[n]o other

methods,” besides ongoing, daily files, “can produce complete and

timely disclosure of the job vacancy information.” Id. at 7:21-22. 

According to plaintiff, this is due to the relatively short amount

of time federal job vacancies remain open. 

Irreparable harm or injury is a necessary element of a

preliminary injunction. See, e.g., Independent Living Ctr., So.

Cal. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644, 651 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted) (Among other things, “[t]o

warrant injunctive relief, a plaintiff must establish . . . , that

he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

preliminary relief[.]”) As OPM is quick to point out, however,

plaintiff Coven is not seeking a preliminary injunction. Thus, he

is invoking the wrong legal standard; the existence or nonexistence of irreparable harm is not an issue here. 

Second, plaintiff cites to Morrow v. F.B.I., 2 F.3d 642 (5th

Cir. 1993); Aguilera v. F.B.I., 941 F.Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1996); and

Cleaver v. Kelly, 415 F.Supp. 174 (D.D.C. 1976), which he believes

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establish his “entitle[ment] to ongoing, daily copies of the

requested information.” Cross-Mot. (doc. 46) at 7:15. These

cases are wholly inapposite, however. In the first place, all

three involved requests for expediting processing under FOIA – not

requests for ongoing, daily copies of agency records absent a FOIA

request. Nothing in any of these three cases even remotely

supports plaintiff’s position that OPM must provide ongoing, daily

copies of its records. The court will not broaden the scope of

those holdings to impose an obligation upon OPM which FOIA clearly

does not contemplate. 

Aguilera v. F.B.I., 941 F.Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1996), the only

case plaintiff cites where the court did grant a preliminary

injunction also is readily distinguishable. Aguilera, a state

court criminal defendant, was easily able to establish irreparable

harm by showing that he was facing a 25 year to life prison

sentence if convicted and, that if not expedited, his FOIA request

would not be reached for approximately seven years, “after a

significant portion of his sentence has been served.” Id. at 151-

152. Accordingly, the Aguilera court granted a preliminary

injunction requiring the F.B.I. to expedite the handling of

plaintiff’s FOIA request. Plainly the circumstances of the present

case, OPM’s refusal to provide daily copy of job vacancy

announcements, are a far cry from the irreparable harm which

warranted a preliminary injunction in Aguilera.

Bolstering the finding that OPM is under no obligation to

provide plaintiff with ongoing, daily copies of job vacancy

announcements is the fact that plaintiff has “voluntarily declined

to accept the daily data feed which is available outside the FOIA

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process.” Resp. (doc. 52) at 6:26-27. As Willie A. Harrison,

OPM’s Deputy Director of the USAJOBS® program, explains it:

There are approximately four organizations and

individuals currently receiving data feed of 

USAJOBS®[.] Among the recipients of the data are 

Google, Inc., Microsoft Network and Yahoo (Via RSS

Feeds)[.] Current recipients of the data have entered

into a terms of use agreement with OPM, outlining the

responsibilities of this data feed.

Decl’n of Willie A. Harrison (doc. 39-3) at 6, ¶ (15). 

Significantly, Deputy Director Harrison further explains that:

[w]hile this suit was pending, plaintiff was 

made aware of the availability of the data feed and 

sent a copy of the terms of use agreement, which he 

refused to sign because he felt that it unduly limited

his use of the data. OPM has since indicated its

willingness to modify the terms of use agreement in an

effort to accommodate plaintiff’s concerns. To date,

plaintiff has not contacted the USAJOBS® office to

discuss modification of the agreement.

Id. Thus, because plaintiff’s asserted need for daily feed arises

from his own claimed commercial need, and because he has

voluntarily refused to accept daily feed which is available outside

the FOIA process, the court finds no merit to plaintiff’s argument

that FOIA entitles him to ongoing, daily copies as a matter of law.

Third, the court gives no credence to plaintiff’s assertion

that “unusual circumstances,” supposedly justify an order requiring

OPM to provide him with ongoing, daily copies of job vacancy

announcements. Plaintiff cites to 5 U.S.C. §§ 3327 and 3330 as the

basis for his first claimed “unusual circumstance.” Basically, the

former statute requires OPM to “provide information concerning

opportunities to participate in competitive examinations . . . [to]

be made available to the employment offices of the United States

Employment Services.” 

5 U.S.C. § 3327(a) (West 2007). Among other things, the latter

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statute, section 3330, requires OPM to “establish and keep current

a comprehensive list” of certain types of announcements of vacant

competitive service positions. 5 U.S.C. § 3330 (West 2007). 

Nothing in either of those statutes can fairly be construed as

mandating OPM to provide ongoing, daily copies of job vacancy

announcements as part of its obligations in responding to a FOIA

request. 

Further, the “short time frame” for federal hiring activities

is not an “unusual circumstance” requiring, in plaintiff’s words,

the “more extreme remedy” of ordering OPM to providing ongoing,

daily copies. See Reply (doc. 59) at 10:18 and 20. Plaintiff

claims that he, along with “his customers” will be “significant[ly]

harm[ed]” if OPM is not required to provide him with ongoing, daily

copies. Id. at 10:24. As previously discussed, however, there are

other means outside the FOIA process available to plaintiff and his

customers to obtain this information. Thus, there is nothing about

the “short time frame” of the requested information which convinces

the court to depart from the settled rule that an agency has no

obligation to provide documents generated after a given FOIA

request. 

Lastly, even if, as plaintiff maintains, his request would

demand “almost no effort” by OPM, that is immaterial. See id. at

11:1. OPM’s obligations under the FOIA are not dependent upon how

easy or convenient it is for that agency to provide the requested

information. Moreover, as earlier noted, requiring OPM to provide

information generated after a given FOIA request places an

additional burden upon OPM which FOIA did not intend. 

For the reasons set forth above, the court grants OPM’s

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summary judgment motion to the extent it is based upon plaintiff’s

claimed entitlement to ongoing, daily copies of job vacancy

announcements. Conversely, the court denies plaintiff’s summary

judgment motion based upon that same claim. 

C. Expedited Processing

Another way, according to plaintiff, in which OPM allegedly

violated FOIA is by not providing him with expedited processing

pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(i)(I). That statute requires

agencies to promulgate regulations “providing for expedited

processing of requests for records– . . . in cases in which the

person requesting the records demonstrates a compelling need[.]” 5

U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(i)(I) (West 2007). A “compelling need” in

turn means:

(I) that a failure to obtain requested records

on an expedited basis . . . could reasonably be 

expected to pose an imminent threat to the life or

physical safety of an individual; or

(II) with respect to a request made by a person 

primarily engaged in disseminating information, 

urgency to inform the public concerning actual 

or alleged Federal Government activity.

5 U.S.C. § (a)(6)(E)(v)(I) and (II) (West 2007). OPM argues that

plaintiff cannot demonstrate a “compelling need” within the meaning

of that statute. In particular, OPM reasons that the information

which plaintiff is seeking in his expedited request is “widely

available on the USAJOBS website[,]” as well as being “available on

the daily feed” which OPM provides. Mot. (doc. 40) at 3:13-14. 

Therefore, OPM asserts that it also is entitled to summary judgment

as to plaintiff’s claim that OPM did not expedite his FOIA request. 

Plaintiff counters that he has shown the requisite “compelling

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need” in that he “operates federalgovernmentjobs.us, a website that

distributes job vacancies[,]” and that there is “[a]n urgency to

inform the public” that “job vacancies exist[][.]” Cross-Mot.

(doc. 46) at 2, ¶¶ C(2) and (D). In response to OPM’s argument as

to the availability of the requested information elsewhere,

plaintiff asserts that FOIA does not include an “exemption from

expedited processing because similar information is available on a

government website.” Id. at 3, ¶ E(1). There is no need for the

court to become mired down in the issue of whether plaintiff Coven

has shown compelling need so as to warrant expedited processing. 

The court need not engage in that inquiry because, as more fully

explained below, it does not have jurisdiction to review OPM’s

denial of expedited processing here - a factor both parties fail to

recognize. 

When discussing his claimed “entitle[ment] to [e]xpedited

[p]rocessing[,]” plaintiff explicitly states that “5 USC

552(a)(4)(E)(iii)” is the jurisdictional basis for this claim. 

Cross-Mot. (doc. 46) at 2 (emphasis added). There is no such

statute, however. Additionally, subsections (i) and (ii) of

section 552(a)(4)(E) govern when a complainant may recover

attorney’s fees and costs. Therefore, even if plaintiff intended

to rely upon those particular subsections, they do not provide a

jurisdictional basis for his expedited processing request. 

Moreover, FOIA unequivocally states that “[a] district court

of the United States shall not have jurisdiction to review an

agency denial of expedited processing of a request for records

after the agency has provided a complete response to the request.”

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(iv) (emphasis added). As previously noted, 

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since the filing of this lawsuit, OPM has provided plaintiff with

all of the information in his FOIA request, except for future

records, which the court has found OPM has no statutory obligation

to provide. Thus, because OPM has “provided a complete response”

to plaintiff Coven’s request, id., “this Court no longer has

subject matter jurisdiction over the claim that [OPM] failed to

expedite processing of plaintiff’s request.” See Judicial Watch,

Inc. v. United States Naval Observatory, 160 F.Supp.2d 111, 112

(D.C.C. 2001); see also Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in

Washington v. Dep’t of Justice, 535 F.Supp.2d 157, 160 (D.C.C.

2008) (reasoning, based upon 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(iv), that

because defendant had “completed processing” plaintiff’s request,

“claim for failure to grant expedited processing[]” was “moot”);

and Al-Fayed v. C.I.A., 254 F.3d 300, 301 n.1 (D.C.Cir. 2001)

(citing to § 552(a)(6)(E)(iv), the Court found that the agencies

which had “completed processing plaintiffs’ underlying document

requests[]” were “no longer subject to appeal[]”). Thus, in

conducting, as it must, a de novo review of OPM’s denial of

plaintiff’s request for expedited processing, see Gerstein v.

Central Intelligence Agency, 2006 WL 3462658, at *4 (N.D.Cal. 2006)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), the court has

little difficulty finding that it lacks jurisdiction to entertain

plaintiff’s claim that OPM improperly denied him expedited

processing of his FOIA request. Accordingly, the court grants OPM

summary judgment in this regard as well; and necessarily, denies

plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment on the expedited

processing claim. 

D. Fee Waiver/Reduction

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3 Hereinafter “waiver” shall be read as referring to fee waiver and fee

reduction.

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“Generally, the FOIA requires those who make document requests

to pay for the search and duplication costs for the disclosed

documents.” Center for Medicare Advocacy, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of

Health and Human Services, 577 F.Supp.2d 221, 239 (D.D.C. 2008)

(citing, inter alia, Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 153). There are

certain situations though when costs may be reduced or waived

completely. See id. (citations omitted). OPM construed

plaintiff’s FOIA request and his appeal “that there ‘should be no

fees’ for providing copies of [OPM’s] electronic records,” and that

he “wish[ed] to be notified if the fees exceed $1 per file[]” as a

“request for [such] a waiver or reduction in fees[.]”3 Doc. 39-2 at

1. OPM denied that request solely on the basis that plaintiff did

“not qualify for a waiver or reduction in fees under OPM’s FOIA

regulations because [he] d[id] not fit into the category of an

educational institution, non-commercial scientific institution, or

representative of the news media.” Id. (citing 5 CFR 294.103;

294.109).

“Where, as here, an agency denies a request for a fee waiver

under FOIA, that determination is subject to a de novo standard of

review. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(vii) (West 2007); McClellan

Ecological Seepage Situation v. Carlucci, 835 F.2d 1282, 1284 (9th

Cir. 1987). FOIA limits that review, however, “to the facts and

arguments in the record before the agency.” Center for Biological

Diversity v. Office of Management & Budget, 546 F.Supp.2d 722, 728

(N.D.Cal. 2008) (citations omitted). “This limitation applies to

both the reasons offered by the agency for the denial and to the

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evidence in the record supporting the waiver.” Id. (citing Friends

of the Coast Fork v. United States Dept’ of the Interior, 110 F.3d

53, 55 (9th Cir. 1997)). 

Applying that standard of review here means that this court

“may not consider reasons not offered by the agency [OPM] in the

denial letter.” Western Watersheds Project v. Brown, 318 F.Supp.2d

1036, 1039 (D.Idaho 2004) (citation omitted). In other words,

post-hoc rationalizations are prohibited; OPM “must adhere to the

reasons given at the administrative level[.]” Institute For

Wildlife Protection v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 290 F.Supp.2d

1226, 1228 (D.Or. 2003). “If those reasons are inadequate, and if

the requesters meet their burden then a full fee waiver is in

order.” Friends of the Coast Fork, 110 F.3d at 55. 

This de novo standard has different implications for plaintiff

Coven. His “fee waiver request should be evaluated based on [its]

face and the reasons given by [him] in support of the waiver[.]”

Center for Medicare Advocacy, 577 F.Supp.2d at 241 (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). As a requester plaintiff

Coven, “bear[s] the initial burden of satisfying the statutory and

regulatory standards for a fee waiver[.]” Friends of the Coast

Fork, 110 F.3d at 55 (citation omitted); see also Citizens For

Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 602

F.Supp.2d 121, 125 (D.D.C. 2009) (citation omitted) (“Parties

requesting a fee waiver under FOIA bear the burden of proving their

entitlement to such a fee waiver.”); Center for Medicare Advocacy,

577 F.Supp.2d at 239 (citing, inter alia, McClellan, 835 F.2d at

1284-85) (“burden of satisfying the ‘public interest standard’ is

on” plaintiff); and 5 C.F.R. § 294.109(f)(3) (“In all cases the

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4 Somewhat surprisingly, OPM did not specifically designate which parts

of the record now before this court were part of the administrative record.

Presumably, that administrative record at least encompassed the following: (1)

plaintiff’s July 13, 2007 FOIA request (doc. 27 at 4; (2) OPM’s September 10, 2007

response (doc. 27 at 5); (3) plaintiff’s July 10, 2008 FOIA appeal (doc. 27) at 3;

and (4) OPM’s September 4, 2008 response to that appeal (doc. 39-2) at 1-2.

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burden of proof shall be on the requester to present evidence or

information in support of a request for a waiver or reduction of

fees.”) With this standard of review firmly in mind, the court has

carefully examined the documents before it which evidently

constitute the administrative record here.4

1. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii) Waiver

FOIA sets forth a two prong test for determining whether an

agency is required to waive fees. First, the disclosure must “be

likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the

operations or activities of the government[.]” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(a)(4)(iii) (West 2007); see also McClellan, 835 F.2d at 1284. 

 Second, the disclosure must be “not primarily in the commercial

interest of the requester.” Id.; see also McClellan, 835 F.2d at

1284. Pursuant to FOIA, an agency such as OPM “must promulgate

regulations establishing procedures and guidelines to determine

when such fees should be waived or reduced.” Center for Biological

Diversity, 546 F.Supp.2d at 728 (citing 5 U.S.C. §

552(a)(4)(A)(1)). OPM’s fee waiver regulation mirrors the twoparty statutory test. In accordance with that regulation, OPM

“will furnish documents without any charge, or at a reduced charge,

if disclosure of the information is in the public interest because

it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of

the operations or activities of the Government, and release of the

material is not primarily in the commercial interest of the

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requester.” 5 C.F.R. 

§ 294.109(f)(emphasis added). The court will separately consider

whether plaintiff met his burden before OPM as to each of these

elements. 

a. “Public Understanding”

As to the first prong of the public interest standard, OPM has

promulgated a regulation setting out four criteria for “determining

whether disclosure is in the public interest because it is likely

to contribute significantly to public understanding of the

operations or activities of the Government[.]” See 5 C.F.R. §

294.109(f)(1). Those criteria are: (i) “[t]he subject of the

request[;] (ii) [t]he information value of the information to be

disclosed[;] (iii) [t]he contribution to an understanding of the

subject by the general public likely to result from disclosure[;]

[and] (iv) [t]he significance of the contribution to public

understanding[.]” 5 C.F.R. § 294.109(f)(1)(i)-(iv). 

“[A] requester seeking a fee waiver bears the initial burden

of identifying the public interest to be served.” McClellan, 835

F.2d at 1285 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A

requester must offer more than “conclusory statements of public

interest[.]” Id. at 1286. The request must “explain with

reasonable specificity how disclosure will contribute to public

understanding.” Id. at 1285. When “public interest is asserted

but not identified with reasonable specificity, and circumstances

do not clarify the point of the requests[,] . . . an agency may

infer a lack of substantial public interest[.]” Id. (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Confining itself to the facts and arguments before OPM, as it 

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must, readily persuades the court that plaintiff did not meet his

burden as to public understanding. The subject matter is easily

ascertainable from plaintiff’s request - “electronic copies of the

data contained in the USAJOBS.gov job vacancy database.” Doc. 27

at 4. However, that request does not explain at all, much less

with “reasonable specificity,” how disclosure of that data will

contribute to public understanding for purposes of FOIA’s fee

waiver provision. Plaintiff’s FOIA request does mention that the

requested “files will be used to disseminate the [job vacancy]

information to the public.” Id. At best, this is nothing more

than a “conclusory statement” of public interest which is not

sufficient to meet plaintiff’s burden here. 

Plainly, mere dissemination to the public, without more, does

not show that such disclosure “is likely to contribute

significantly to public understanding of the operations or

activities of the government[.]” See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(iii)

(West 2007). Plaintiff’s appeal is similarly deficient. Further,

given the relative brevity of plaintiff Coven’s FOIA request and

his appeal, “circumstances do not clarify the point of [his]

request[.]” See McClellan, 835 F.2d at 1285 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). Given this lack of proof, the court

finds that plaintiff Coven did not meet his burden as to the first

prong of FOIA’s public interest fee waiver provision - public

understanding.

Three additional factors reinforce this finding. First, in

his cross-motion plaintiff baldly asserts that disclosure of the

requested data “will contribute significantly to the public

understanding of the operations of government hiring[.]” Cross-Mot.

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(doc. 46) at 7, ¶ (E) (3) (citation omitted). Even disregarding

the conclusory, unsubstantiated nature of that statement, plaintiff

could not now rely thereon because a requester cannot, “at the

district court level, cure [his] failure to demonstrate a public

interest before the agency[.]” See Citizens for Responsibility &

Ethics in Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 593 F.Supp.2d at 268

(citing Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Griffin, 811 F.2d 644,

648 (D.C.Cir. 1987)). 

Second, the present case stands in sharp contrast to those

where courts have found the public understanding prong has been

met. Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. U.S.

Dep’t of Justice, 602 F.Supp.2d 121 (D.D.C. 2009), is illustrative. 

There, a non-profit organization requested information regarding a

significant reduction in penalties sought by the Department of

Justice (“DOJ”) in tobacco industry litigation. The court rejected

DOJ’s contention “that the claim was too ‘ephemeral’ to be likely

to contribute to public understanding.” Id. at 125 (citation

omitted). In part, the court reasoned that “given the wellpublicized nature of and interest in the reduction of fees in the

tobacco litigation, 

. . . , the contention that information on th[at] issue would

inform the public understanding is not such a bare allegation as to

warrant rejection by th[e] Court.” Id. at 125-126. Therefore, in

granting the organization’s summary judgment motion on its

entitlement to a fee waiver under FOIA, the court found, inter

alia, that that request was in the public interest. See also

Institute for Wildlife Protection, 290 F.Supp.2d at 1231 (plaintiff

entitled to a fee waiver under the public interest exception where

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in its request and appeal it “stated that the information was of

great public interest because the records concerned endangered

species, [it] cited the public and Congressional interest in recent

reports on [the agency’]s use (or misuse) of science in endangered

species actions, and gave an example of how GIS [Geographic

Information Systems] information would be of interest to the

public[]”). 

Third, as OPM notes, the requested job vacancy announcement

information is available on OPM’s own website, as well as on “other

web sites using the daily data feed.” Resp. (doc. 52) at 5. This

fairly widespread availability further undermines the view that the

requested information “is likely to contribute significantly to

public understanding of the operations or activities of the

government[.]” See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(iii) (West 2007). 

b. “Commercial Interest”

Because plaintiff Coven has not met the first prong of the

public interest exception, the court could end its inquiry here. 

However, for the moment, the court will assume that plaintiff did

satisfy that first prong. Even with that assumption, the result

does not change. As more fully explained below, plaintiff Coven

also is unable to satisfy the second prong of that exception - that

the requested data is not primarily in his commercial interest. 

In his cross-motion, plaintiff enumerates several reasons as

to why he should not be deemed a commercial requester. Plaintiff

stresses that he “is primarily engaged in disseminating federal job

vacancies free of charge.” Cross-Mot. (doc. 46) at 5, ¶ (C)(2). 

Plaintiff states that the “[r]equested records are not intended for

sale or as part of a commercial product or service.” Id. at 5, ¶

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(C)(4). Further attempting to distinguish himself from a

commercial use requester, plaintiff notes that the “[r]ecords will

be used to validate and verify federalgovernmentjobs.us current

existing systems[.]” Id. at 5, ¶ (C)(2)(b). Thus, from

plaintiff’s standpoint, “there is little additional commercial

value[]” to be gained from his having access to these records. See

id. Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff maintains that

“[d]isclosure of the [requested] [i]nformation ‘is Not Primarily in

the Commercial Interest of the Requester.’” Id. at 6, ¶(D)(6)

(emphasis in original). Yet, plaintiff likens his “business model

. . . to free online news media[,]” which “[a]cquir[e] and

publish[] information using advertising to generate revenue.” Id.

at 5, ¶ (C)(2)(a) (emphasis added). In any event, in plaintiff’s

view he is not a commercial requester. Accordingly, he claims that

the OPM erred in finding that he was not entitled to a fee waiver. 

OPM insists, however, that plaintiff will be using the

requested data “for ‘commercial use’ - to support his commercial,

for-profit jobs website.” Resp. (doc. 52) at 5. Therefore, OPM

maintains that as a commercial requester, plaintiff cannot obtain a

fee waiver. Given the limited scope of this court’s review, which

both parties overlook, there is no need to delve into plaintiff’s

argument that he has been “misclassified . . . as [a] ‘Commercial

use requestor [sic]’ and is therefore entitled to reduced or waived

fees.” Cross-Mot. (doc. 46) at 5, ¶ (C). 

Confining itself to the administrative record, as the court

must, it finds that plaintiff did not meet his burden of showing

that he is not a commercial requester. In his July 13th FOIA

request, as noted above, plaintiff’s stated purpose for requesting

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5 Based upon plaintiff’s description of his “business model” as “similar

to free online news media,[a]cquiring and publishing information using advertising

to generate revenue[,]” seemingly there may be a revenue generating component to

his endeavor. See Cross-Mot. (doc. 46) at 5, ¶ (C)(2) a). While perhaps plaintiff

is operating the federalgovernmentjobs.us website for purely altruistic reasons,

it appears that ultimately plaintiff hopes to derive a profit therefrom. 

Moreover, even without charging a fee, the posting of federal job vacancies appears

to be “information . . . relate[d] to commerce, trade, or profit[,]” and hence

“commercial.” See Carlson v. U.S. Postal Service, 504 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir.

2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

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electronic copies of the data contained in the USAJOBS® database

was “to disseminate th[at] information to the public.” Doc. 27 at

4. Beyond that, plaintiff provided OPM with no other information

as to how he intended to use the requested information, or the

context in which he was making that request. Plaintiff’s FOIA

appeal was similarly lacking in detail, stating simply that his

“purpose is to publish these job vacancies[.]” Id. at 3. 

Unlike his cross-motion, plaintiff does not advise OPM that he

will be publishing that information free of charge, so as to

arguably take him outside the realm of a commercial requester.5

Thus, plaintiff did not meet his initial burden of establishing

that he does not have a commercial interest in the requested data. 

Indeed, the scant information in plaintiff’s July 13, 2007 FOIA

request and his subsequent appeal readily explains why OPM did not

assert plaintiff’s status as a commercial requester as a reason for

denying his fee waiver request. Rather, as previously discussed,

OPM denied plaintiff’s request because he did “not fit into the

category of an educational institution, non-commercial scientific

institution, or representative of the news media.” Doc. 39-2 at 1

(citation omitted). 

The present case is markedly different from Center for

Medicare Advocacy, 577 F.Supp.2d 221, where plaintiff noted in its

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fee waiver request that it was “a well-known not-for-profit

organization that educates and advocates on behalf of Medicare

beneficiaries nationwide.” Id. at 242. Based upon that statement

in the administrative record, the court readily concluded that

plaintiff “established that it does not have a commercial interest

in the disclosure of the [requested] information.” Id. As just

explained, neither plaintiff Coven’s initial fee waiver request nor

his appeal included any similar statements as to his status. 

As the foregoing shows, plaintiff Coven did not meet his

threshold burden of establishing that the requested data was not

primarily in his commercial interest. Therefore, plaintiff failed

to meet his burden as to both prongs of FOIA’s public interest fee

waiver exception. Moreover, as outlined below, in its denial of

plaintiff’s appeal as to the fee waiver, OPM’s proffered reason is

adequate. 

2. Adequacy of OPM’s Reasons for Denying Fee Waiver

In arguing for summary judgment on the fee waiver

issue, OPM notes that plaintiff has previously indicated that he

“operates a business (federalgovernmentjobs.us[.]” Mot. (doc. 40)

at 2:15 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). OPM thus

reasons that because plaintiff is “a commercial requester seeking

job vacancy announcements which are widely available at the USAJOBS

website,” he does not qualify for a fee waiver or reduction. Id.

at 2:15-18. In denying plaintiff’s appeal of his fee waiver

request, however, as set forth earlier, OPM’s only proffered reason

was that plaintiff did “not fit into the category of an educational

institution, non-commercial scientific institution, or

representative of the news media.” Doc. 39-2 at 1 (citing 5 CFR

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6 Section 294.103(b)(1) defines an “educational institution” as “any

public or private, preschool, elementary, or secondary school, institution of

undergraduate or graduate higher education, or institution of professional or

vocational education, which operates a program or programs of scholarly or

scientific research.” 5 C.F.R. § 294.103(b)(1). “[N]on-commercial scientific

institution refers to an institution that is not operated on a commercial basis 

. . . , and which is operated solely to conduct scientific or scholarly research,

the results of which are not intended to promote any particular product or

industry.” 5 C.F.R. § 294.103(b)(2). 

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294.103; 294.109). OPM must stand by that reason now and cannot

expand its justification for denying plaintiff’s fee waiver to

include its belief that he is a commercial requester. See Western

Watersheds, 318 F.Supp.2d at 1039. 

In his cross-motion, plaintiff does not mention whether he

qualifies as an “educational institution” or a “non-commercial

scientific institution,” as OPM’s regulations define those terms.6

Perhaps that is because he realizes the futility of such an

argument. Regardless, the court deems plaintiff’s silence as a

concession that he does not qualify under either of those

definitions, and hence is not entitled to a fee waiver or reduction

on those grounds.

Plaintiff readily concedes that he is “not a representative of

the news media[.]” Cross-Mot. (doc. 46) at 5, ¶ III (C)(2)b). 

Despite that concession, offering no rationale whatsoever,

plaintiff asserts that he “meets all the requirement[s] of that

classification under 5 CFR 294.103©.” Id. Plaintiff reasons that

“Federal jobs vacancies are of current interest to the public and

[he] is a person who gathers that information for distribution to

the public.” Reply (doc. 59) at 12:4-6. 

The applicable regulation defines a “representative of the

news media” as “any person actively gathering news for an entity

that is organized and operated to publish, broadcast, or otherwise

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disseminate news to the public.” 5 C.F.R. 

§ 294.103©. Arguably gathering federal job vacancy announcements,

such as plaintiff is attempting to do, could come within that

regulation’s definition of “news” in that such information “would

be of current interest to the public.” See id. Even giving

plaintiff that latitude, however, the court cannot find that he

qualifies as a “representative of the news media” because he has

not shown that he is gathering such information “for an entity that

is organized and operated to publish, broadcast, or otherwise

disseminate news to the public.” See 5 C.F.R. § 294.103©. 

Plaintiff has not suggested, for example, that he is gathering

this information for “television or radio stations broadcasting to

the public at large,” or for “publishers of periodicals who make

their products available for purchase or subscription by the

general public.” See id. Thus, the court has little difficulty

finding that OPM accurately found that plaintiff is not entitled to

a fee waiver because he is not a “representative of the news

media.” OPM also accurately found, as set forth above, that

plaintiff did not qualify for a fee waiver because he does not fall

within the regulatory definition of either a non-commercial

scientific institution or an educational institution. 

In sum, because plaintiff did not meet his threshold burden of

showing entitlement to a fee waiver under 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(a)(4)(A)(vii), and because OPM offered an adequate reason for

denying that request, the court grants summary judgment in OPM’s

favor to the extent it is based upon OPM’s denial of a fee waiver. 

On the other hand, the court denies plaintiff’s cross-motion for

summary judgment on that same issue.

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E. “Excessive” Fees

The only aspect of plaintiff’s appeal which OPM granted was

for “the job vacancy records contained in USAJOBS.” Doc. 39-2 at

2. However, because OPM found that plaintiff was “not eligible for

a fee waiver,” it advised him that he would “be subject to

applicable fees under 5 CFR 294.109.” Id. Very basically, inter

alia, that regulation sets forth rates used to compute fees for

document searching, review and duplication. The rate, for example,

for “[c]omputer time” is the “[a]ctual direct cost[]” to OPM. 5

C.F.R. § 294.109(b). “Actual direct costs[]” also is the

regulatory rate for “[s]upplies and other materials[,]” but the

rate for “[e]mployee time” is “[s]alary rate plus 16% to cover

benefits.” Id. 

By letter dated October 17, 2008, OPM notified plaintiff that

“[t]he labor and machine costs associated with []his request was,

for “initial creation of report[,] . . . “[l]abor & [m]achine time

35 hours @ $250.00 per hour = $8750" and for “[s]ubsequent

reports[,] . . . [l]abor 20 hours @ $250 = $5000.00[.]” Doc. 52-2

at 1 (emphasis omitted). There is no dispute that plaintiff

appealed that fee assessment as “excessive[,]” but his December 16,

2008 appeal is not part of the record before this court. See Doc.

60-2 at 1. 

There is no dispute as well that “[p]laintiff has not paid the

estimate[d]” fees.” Resp. (doc. 52) at 6. Therefore, OPM has “not

yet released any records in response to plaintiff’s request.” 

Reply (doc. 59) at 6:14. In his cross-motion plaintiff takes the

position that the assessed fees are “excessive” in that they are

based on “exaggerated labor requirements and exaggerated hourly

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rates.” Cross-Mot. (doc. 46) at 4, ¶ III (B). Plaintiff outlines

the reasons which he believes support that position, such as

“[e]mployee time[] is to be charged at the hourly salary rate plus

16% to cover benefits, not $250 per hour.” Id. at 4, ¶ III (B)(2)

(footnote added). The first part of this statement is accurate in

that, as noted above, it reflects the rate for “employee time”

found in 

5 C.F.R. § 294.109(b). Plaintiff is overlooking the fact, however,

that the $250 hourly rate, as reported by OPM, reflects “labor and

machine costs[,]” not just “employee time.” See Doc. 60-2 at 1

(emphasis added). Therefore, because OPM did not distinguish

between those types of costs, it does not necessarily follow, as

plaintiff implies, that the labor costs which OPM estimates are

excessive. 

There is a much more fundamental defect in plaintiff’s

argument though. His December 16, 2008 appeal of OPM’s fee

estimate is not before the court. Therefore, it is impossible for

the court, as it must, to evaluate that appeal on its “face and the

reasons given by [plaintiff] in support” of his argument that the

estimated fee is excessive. See Center for Medicare Advocacy, 577

F.Supp.2d at 241 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Not only that, but because that appeal is not part of this record,

the court has no way of knowing the precise relief which plaintiff

sought therein, i.e. fee waiver or fee reduction. 

Plaintiff states in his reply that besides claiming that the

estimated fee was excessive, he claimed that it was “not in

compliance with . . . OPM’s own regulation to charge actual direct

costs and not to charge more than 16% more than the salary of

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employee’s actual salary[.]” Reply (doc. 59) at 2:17-19. 

Purportedly another ground for that appeal was that the assessed

fee was “not similar to the fees charged to other similar

requestors [sic].” Id. at 2:19-20.

The court has no reason to doubt that plaintiff made those

arguments to OPM, but the court cannot ignore the limited scope of

its review; and the fact remains that the appeal itself is not part

of this record. The court simply has no way of knowing, and it

declines to speculate, as “to the facts and arguments in the record

before” OPM. See Center for Biological Diversity, 546 F.Supp.2d at

728 (citations omitted). Simply put, without that appeal the court

is unable to determine whether plaintiff, as the requester, met his 

initial “burden of . . . present[ing] evidence or information in

support or [his] request for [a] . . . reduction of fees[]” because

allegedly those fees are excessive. See 5 C.F.R. § 294.109(f)(3). 

Additionally, plaintiff misconceives the nature of his burden

at this juncture. He maintains that he “has show[n] a significant

amount of evidence that the fee isn’t reasonable.” Reply (doc. 59)

at 13:22-23. He thus reasons that factual issues as to the

“excessive fee assessment” preclude summary judgment in OPM’s favor

on that issue. See id. What plaintiff fails to recognize,

however, is that there is no way for the court to ascertain whether

that purported evidence was before OPM when it denied his appeal on

the fee assessment issue. Plaintiff has not shown, for example, 

that any of the evidence which he is now proffering, such as select

pages from “MGS[’] GSA 2008 Catalog[,]” was presented to OPM as

part of his December 16, 2008 appeal. See id. at 9:7, and exh. 4

thereto. Just like OPM cannot now expand the administrative

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record to include reasons for denial upon which it did not

previously rely, plaintiff cannot expand the scope of that record

to include evidence, facts and arguments which he did not present

to OPM in his December 16, 2008 appeal. Thus, as with the fee

waiver issue, the court necessarily concludes that plaintiff has

not met his burden of demonstrating the excessiveness of the fee

estimate. 

Moreover, OPM’s reasons (which are part of this record) for

disagreeing with plaintiff’s argument that the fee estimate is

excessive are adequate. In denying plaintiff’s December 2008

appeal, OPM explained that the requested information “must be

produced by . . . MGS, OPM’s technology provider for USAJOBS

information.” Id. at 2. Further, OPM explained that “[t]he

assessed fees . . . are based on an estimate from MGS for the

expenditures that OPM will actually incur from MGS in creating the

custom report necessary to provide [plaintiff] with the information

[he] requested.” Id. OPM thus reasoned that “the assessed fees

represent the direct costs of providing services pursuant to 5 CFR

294.109 and are therefore appropriate.” Id. OPM did offer

plaintiff the option of “further confer[ring] with OPM staff to

reformulate [his] request . . . to attempt to meet [his] needs at a

lower cost[.]” Id. Evidently plaintiff did not avail himself of

this opportunity, however, just as he has not contacted OPM

regarding the possibility of a modified term of use agreement. 

Accordingly, the court grants OPM’s motion for summary judgment as

to the estimated fees and denies plaintiff’s cross-motion in that

regard. 

F. “Electronic Format”

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7 According to plaintiff, “FTP” is an acronym for “File Transmission

Protocol[,] a commonly used method to transfer electronic file[s] through the

Internet creating a ‘copy’ in the process.” Cross-Mot. (doc. 46) at 10:25 n.1. 

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In his July 13, 2007, FOIA request, and in his appeal of that

request, plaintiff expressly states that he is seeking “electronic

copies of the data contained in the USAJOBS.gov job vacancy

database.” Doc. 27 at 3 and 4. Plaintiff concluded his FOIA

request stating that he could “receive the files as is or

compressed (.zip or .gz) by electronic mail, web, or through

FTP[.]” Id. at 4. He further indicated that he could “provide an

upload server, or c[ould] download form [MGS] or OPM provided

server[.]” Id.

In his administrative appeal, citing to 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(a)(3)(B), plaintiff noted that the requested “records should

be delivered in the format requested (specifically daily electronic

data files delivered through FTP,7 email, or web) and that OPM has

the responsibility to maintain the records in that format.” Id.

Plaintiff concedes that “[o]ther formats such as the gateway file[]

might be acceptable[,] if they contain all the data elements listed

in [his] request for all vacancies posted to USAJOBS.gov.” Id.

Plaintiff added that in his view, “regardless of data feed

generation issues, OPM would still have the responsibility to

deliver electronic records contained in their database.” Id.

In its response to that appeal, OPM recognized that plaintiff

is “requesting electronic copies of the job vacancy records

contained in USAJOBS[,]” and it granted plaintiff’s appeal in that

“regard[.]” Doc. 39-2 at 1 and 2. OPM’s response does not

indicate the manner of delivery however.

FOIA requires that a government agency such as OPM “provide

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the record in any form or format requested by the person if the

record is readily reproducible by the agency in that form or

format.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(B) (West 2007). OPM indicates that

it can “readily reproduce the information requested and provide it

to Plaintiff in its electronic format[,]” which is what plaintiff

sought in his FOIA request. See Resp. (doc. 52) at 7 (emphasis

added). In light of the foregoing, and the court’s previous ruling

herein that plaintiff is not entitled to daily electronic data

feeds, the court denies as moot the parties’ respective motions for

summary judgment on the issue of electronic format. 

G. Attorney’s Fees and Costs

Plaintiff maintains that if he prevails on any aspect of this

litigation, or, if the court finds that OPM “has had a change of

position and [his] complaint is [not] insubstantial,” he is

entitled to attorney’s fees and “other [l]itigation costs” pursuant

to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i). Cross-Mot. (doc. 46) at 10. That

section provides that “[t]he court may assess against the United

States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs

reasonably incurred in any case under this section in which the

complainant has substantially prevailed.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(a)(4)(E)(i) (West Supp. 2009). Plaintiff Coven fails to take

into account, however, that even if he can establish that he has 

“substantially prevail[ed]” within the meaning of that statute, as

a pro se litigant, he cannot recover attorney’s fees thereunder. 

See Crews v. Internal Revenue, 2000 WL 900800, at *6 (C.D.Cal.

April 26, 2000) (citing Carter v. Veterans Admin., 780 F.2d 1497,

1481 (9th Cir. 1986)) (“A pro se litigant may not recover

attorney’s fees under the FOIA.”). 

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On the other hand, despite plaintiff’s pro se status, in the

court’s discretion, he may be able to obtain an award of costs

under that statute. See id. (citation omitted). The court agrees

with OPM, though that an award of costs, if any, would be premature

at this time in that no judgment has yet been entered in this case.

Plaintiff is advised, however, that if he does decide to pursue his

costs, he will be held to the same standard of “substantially

prevail[ing].” See Laughlin v. I.R.S., 117 F.Supp.2d 997, 1002

(S.D.Cal. 2000) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)). 

For the reasons set forth above, the court grants OPM’s motion

for summary judgment to the extent plaintiff is seeking to recovery

statutory attorney’s fees. Conversely, the court denies

plaintiff’s summary judgment motion in that regard. As to

plaintiff’s claim for costs, the court denies OPM’s summary

judgment motion on that claim. It likewise denies plaintiff’s

motion insofar as he is seeking costs, but it denies his motion

without prejudice to renew.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the court hereby ORDERS that:

(1) the motion for summary judgment by defendant, the United

States Office of Personnel Management (doc. 38) is GRANTED as to

plaintiff’s claims for: (a) “ongoing, daily copies” of USAJOBS® job

vacancy announcements; (b) expedited processing; © denial of a fee

waiver; and (d) attorney’s fees; but DENIED as moot with respect to

plaintiff’s claim for the requested data in electronic format; and

DENIED as to plaintiff’s claim for costs;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 

(2) the motion for summary judgment by plaintiff Daniel Saul

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Coven (doc. 44) is DENIED as to his claims for: (a) “ongoing,

daily” copies of USAJOBS® job vacancy announcements; (b) expedited

processing; © denial of a fee waiver; (d) to have the requested

data provided in electronic format; and 

(e) attorney’s fees; but plaintiff’s claim for costs is DENIED

without prejudice to renew; and

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that:

(3) plaintiff pro se Daniel Saul Coven’s Motion to Strike

. . . 

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(doc. 56) is DENIED. 

DATED this 28th day of September, 2009.

Copies to counsel of record and plaintiff pro se

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