Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-03026/USCOURTS-ca10-95-03026-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

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• 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

CATHERINE ANN BENNE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

FILED 

IJalted States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

JUN 2 0 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Qerk 

No. 95-3026 

v. 

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES 

CORP. and GATEWAY 2000, INC., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 94-1181-PFK) 

Kenneth E. Meiser of Szaferman, Lakind, Blumstein, Watter & Blader, 

P.C., Lawrenceville, New Jersey (Arnold C. Lakind of Szaferman, 

Lakind, Blumstein, Watter & Blader, P.C., Lawrenceville, New 

Jersey, Albert L. Kamas of Render, Kamas & Hammond, Wichita, Kansas 

with him on the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Gerald Sawatzky of Foulston & Seifkin, Wichita, Kansas (Trisha A. 

Thelen and Jeff P. DeGraffenreid of Foulston & Seifkin, Wichita, 

Kansas, James F. Duncan, Katherine J. Rodgers and Kristine S. Focht 

of Watson & Marshall, L.C., Kansas City, Missouri, Josesph A. 

D'Avanzo and Maria J. Morreale of Cerussi and Spring, White Plains, 

New York with him on the brief) for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before ANDERSON, McKAY, and JONES,* Circuit Judges. 

"Honorable Nathaniel R Jones, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 95-3026 Document: 01019279555 Date Filed: 06/20/1996 Page: 1 
JONES, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiff Catherine Benne appeals the entry of summary 

judgment for Defendants International Business Machines (IBM) and 

Gateway 2000 (Gateway) in her diversity personal injury action. 

Concluding that Benne had filed her claims past the period allowed 

by the appropriate state statutes of limitations, the district 

court granted summary judgment for Defendants. For the following 

reasons we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

I. 

From 1979 to 1992, Benne was employed in Kansas as a secretary 

and x-ray technician for an orthopaedic physician, Dr. Ernest 

Schlachter. Between fifty and sixty percent of Benne's time was 

spent typing on either an IBM typewriter keyboard or a Gateway 

computer keyboard. As a result of typing extensively over this 

thirteen year period on keyboards manufactured by IBM and Gateway, 

Benne developed carpal tunnel syndrome and overuse syndrome. 

In 1984 Benne developed numbness, tingling, and swelling in 

her hands. Dr. Schlachter examined Benne and referred her to a 

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specialist. Dr. Schlachter subsequently filed a report with the 

Kansas Division of Workers' Compensation that indicated he was 

retaining Benne as an employee despite knowing that she suffered 

from "overuse syndrome of both arms." Appendix at 157. In 1985, 

Schlachter filed an Employer's Report of Accident with the Kansas 

Division of Workers' Compensation in which he indicated that Benne 

had been injured at work. Id. at 155-56. Schlachter described the 

injury as "bilateral carpal tunnel tendonitis and left entrapment 

neuropathy at the elbow of the ulnar nerve." Id. at 156. The 

report cited the cause of the accident as "repetitive use typing, 

filing, and other office work." Id. at 385. Benne typed this 

report and therefore knew of its contents. 

Benne's symptoms intensified in 1987. Dr. Schlachter 

confirmed that the aggravation of Benne's condition was caused by 

an increase in Benne's typing responsibilities. On November 9, 

1988, the Workers' Compensation Fund was ordered to pay Benne 

because Dr. Schlachter had knowingly retained a handicapped 

employee and, but for her prior injuries, Benne would not have 

suffered permanent impairment. 

Benne alleges that the nature of her injuries changed in 1989. 

As part of a motion for reconsideration of the district court's 

ruling on summary judgment, Dr. Schlachter submitted an affidavit 

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claiming that Benne sustained new and qualitatively different 

injuries on and after December 18, 1989. His conclusions were 

based on "new and qualitatively different symptoms from those 

[Benne] had complained of on or prior to December 18, 1989." 

Appendix at 385. 

In 1992, Benne and thirteen other plaintiffs filed tort 

actions against IBM and Gateway in the Eastern District of New 

York. Benne asserted negligence and products liability claims, 

alleging that negligence in the design of Defendants• keyboards 

caused her repetitive stress injuries. Benne's case was 

consolidated with other repetitive stress injury cases. See In re 

Repetitive Stress Injury Cases, 142 F.R.D. 584 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). 

Subsequently, the Second Circuit reversed the district court and 

deconsolidated the cases. In re Repetitive Stress Injury 

Litigation, 11 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 1993). After the deconsolidation 

order, Defendants moved to transfer Benne's case to the District of 

Kansas, where the injuries arose. The district court granted the 

motion and the case was transferred. 

Defendants moved for summary judgment on the theory that 

Benne's action was barred by the New York statute of limitations. 

Applying the conflicts of law principles of New York, the 

transferor state, the district court determined that to be timely, 

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Benne must have brought her claim in time to satisfy both the New 

York and Kansas statutes of limitations. The district court then 

found that Benne's action was brought outside of the time limit 

permitted by either state's statute. Accordingly, the district 

court entered summary judgment for Defendants. Benne filed a 

motion for reconsideration based upon the submission of new 

affidavits. The district court denied the motion. 

Benne now appeals, raising the following issues regarding the 

district court's grant of summary judgment: ( 1) whether the 

district court erred by applying the New York conflicts of law 

statute; (2) whether the district court erred in finding that 

Benne's action was time barred by the Kansas statute of 

limitations; and (3) whether the district court erred in finding 

that Benne's action was time barred by the New York statute of 

limitations. Benne also appeals the denial of her motion for 

reconsideration, alleging that the district court abused its 

discretion. 

II. 

We review the entry of summary judgment de novo, applying the 

same standard used by the district court. Henderson v. Inter-Chem 

Coal Co., 41 F.3d 567, 569 (lOth Cir. 1996). Summary judgment is 

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proper where the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, 

if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and 

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary 

judgment, the court must examine all evidence in a light most 

favorable to the opposing party. McKenzie v. Mercy Hasp. of 

Independence, Kansas, 854 F.2d 365, 367 (lOth Cir. 1988) 

A. 

We first resolve whether the district court properly used the 

New York statute of limitations, the transferor state, and whether 

Defendants waived the New York statute of limitations as a defense 

to Benne's claims. 

Pursuant to Defendants' request, the district court granted a 

change of venue from the Eastern District of New York to the 

District of Kansas. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404. The rule is settled 

that when a district court grants a venue change pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1404, the transferee court is obligated to apply the law 

of the state in which the transferor court sits. Van Dusen v. 

Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964); see also Ferens v. John Deere 

Co., 494 U.S. 516, 523 (1990). This rule applies whether the 

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plaintiff or the defendant initiates the change in venue. Ferens, 

494 U.S. at 523. 

Benne alleges that despite the Supreme Court's ruling in Van 

Dusen, Defendants are estopped from pleading the statute of 

limitations as a defense, because Defendants argued in the district 

court that the substantive laws of Kansas applied. Benne correctly 

notes that in some instances, defendants may be estopped from 

pleading the statute of limitations. For example, when a plaintiff 

is induced by fraud, misrepresentations, or deception to refrain 

from filing a timely action, a defendant may be estopped to plead 

the statute of limitations as a defense. Simicuski v. Saeli, 377 

N.E.2d 713, 716 (N.Y. 1978). 

Even if the defendants argument's in the New York district 

court for application of Kansas substantive law could require a 

change from New York to Kansas statute of limitations, the doctrine 

of equitable estoppel would be inapplicable here. Benne filed her 

action in New York. At the time she filed her suit, she had notice 

of both the applicable New York and Kansas statutes of limitation. 

Now, she would have the court apply the Kansas statute of 

limitations because of arguments Defendants made before the 

district court. Benne's choice of New York on both the substantive 

tort issues and the accompanying statute of limitations was not in 

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any manner affected by the actions of Defendants. Neither 

Defendant induced her to file her action in New York rather than 

Kansas. All that the Defendants have been able to accomplish is a 

change in venue . For precisely this type of case, the Supreme 

Court has concluded that the substantive laws applicable to the 

case will not change by the Defendants transfer of venue. Benne 

simply has failed to demonstrate how the doctrine of equitable 

estoppel is in any manner designed to grant relief to a plaintiff 

in these circumstances. 

Giving effect to Benne's arguments would squarely contradict 

the reasoning employed by the Supreme Court in Van Dusen and 

Ferens. In Van Dusen, the Supreme Court reasoned that a venue 

transfer initiated by the defendant should not deprive the 

plaintiff of the laws of the forum that the plaintiff had selected. 

Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 635-36. The Court noted that the 

legislative history of § 1404(a) "certainly does not justify the 

rather startling conclusion that one might 'get a change of law as 

a bonus for a change of venue.'" Id. at 636. Allowing a change of 

law to accompany a change of venue, the Court opined, would violate 

the principles of the Erie doctrine. See Erie R.R. Co. v. 

Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Court held it must "ensure that 

the 'accident' of federal diversity jurisdiction does not enable a 

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party to utilize a transfer to achieve a result in federal court 

which could not have been achieved in the courts of the State where 

the action was filed." Id. at 638. 

Furthermore, in Ferens, the Supreme Court held that when a 

plaintiff initiates a change of venue pursuant to section 1404, the 

substantive law of transferor court's state, including statutes of 

limitations, will apply throughout the litigation. Therefore, the 

law of the transferor court must apply, regardless of who initiates 

the change. The rule articulated in the Ferens and Van Dusen 

decisions prevents either party from shopping for better 

limitations law after the case is filed. 

We agree with the district court • s rejection of Greve v. 

Gibraltar Enters., Inc., 85 F. Supp. 410 (D.N.M. 1949), the main 

case on which Benne relies. Like the district court, we question 

its applicability to the present case. Greve, a 1949 decision, 

involved a defendant • s motion for a change of venue from the 

District of New Mexico to the District of Colorado. Since the 

plaintiff originally brought the action in New Mexico, the 

defendant pleaded the New Mexico statute of limitations. The 

district court in Greve was faced with the task of interpreting § 

1404 for the first time. The court suspected that with a transfer 

of venue under § 1404, only the place of trial changed, not the 

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rights of the parties or any of the underlying substantive law. In 

doing so, the district court anticipated the Supreme Court's 

interpretation of § 1404 in Van Dusen and Ferens. However, 

concerned that it may have misinterpreted § 1404, the court ruled 

in the alternative that the defendant had waived application of the 

Colorado statute of limitations. In the hearing on the venue 

transfer motion, the defendant stated in open court that it would 

not frustrate plaintiff's action in the event of a transfer to 

Colorado by pleading the since expired Colorado statute of 

limitations. The district court stated that in the event it had 

misinterpreted§ 1404, it could rely on defendant's promise not to 

plead the more restrictive Colorado statute to ensure that the New 

Mexico statute of limitation would be applied. 

Benne analogizes her case to Greve. She contends that a 

number of assertions made by Defendants before the district court 

amounted to a waiver of the application of the New York statute of 

limitations. For example, Defendants stated in their brief in 

support of their venue transfer motion: 

Clearly, New York substantive law cannot apply to these 

actions. The plaintiffs, their employments, their 

injuries and the witnesses have no connection whatsoever 

to New York. Thus the law governing each plaintiff's 

prima facie case, the availability of defenses, issues of 

contributory negligence and punitive damages vary from 

state to state. 

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Appendix at 253. Benne also points to assertions in two affidavits 

accompanying this motion which state Defendants' understanding that 

the substantive laws of New York did not apply to Benne's action. 

We must discount Benne's reliance on Greve for two reasons. 

First, Greve is factually distinguishable from Benne's case. In 

Greve, the defendants clearly stated that they would not plead the 

Colorado statute of limitations. The court held this was a waiver 

of the defense of the Colorado statute of limitations. In 

contrast, the general assertions made by Defendants in this case 

fall short of an absolute waiver. Furthermore, when Defendants in 

this case argued that Kansas substantive law should apply, the 

record reveals that Defendants were making a conflicts of law 

argument, not an argument over the general applicability of New 

York or Kansas law. Instead of arguing, as Benne would have the 

court believe, that Kansas substantive law and statutes of 

limitation should apply outright, Defendants are arguing that the 

proper application of New York substantive law would eventually 

lead to the application of Kansas substantive law. This argument 

is based upon New York's conflict principles that call for the 

application of another state's substantive law in tort actions 

where the wrong occurs in another state. Cooney v. Osgood Mach., 

Inc., 612 N.E. 2d 277, 281-82 (N.Y. 1993); Schultz v. Boy Scouts of 

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America, Inc., 480 N.E. 2d 679, 682 (N.Y. 1985). Even were a 

defendant permitted to waive the statute of limitations of the 

transferor state in favor of the statute of the transferee state, 

we cannot consider the arguments made by Defendants in this case to 

be such a waiver of New York substantive law. The Defendants in 

this case were clearly arguing that within the framework of the 

laws of the New York, the laws of Kansas would control. 

Second, as the district court noted, the continued validity of 

the court's alternative holding Greve is questionable after the 

Supreme Court's decisions in Van Dusen and Ferens. The law of 

these cases is clear. The transferee court has the obligation to 

apply the law of the transferor state, regardless of the attempts 

of the parties to change which body of substantive law applies to 

their claims. To the extent Greve is inconsistent with this 

doctrine, as announced in Ferens and Van Dusen, it is overruled. 

This is not to say that a defendant can never waive application of 

a statute of limitations in a venue transfer case. As mentioned 

above, if a defendant, either by fraud, deceit, or 

misrepresentation, prevented plaintiff from filing a timely claim 

in the transferor state, then estoppel or waiver of the statute of 

limitations is possible. Further, a defendant may always choose 

not to plead the defense of the statute of limitations, in which 

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case, the limiations perioed would not become an issue. Note, 

however, that this would be a matter strictly involving the 

application of the law of the transferor state, not a matter of the 

defendant's actions causing the court to resort to the statute of 

limitations of the transferee state. 

Ultimately, we find it is curious that Plaintiff Benne, who 

had the opportunity to choose the forum of New York, would now 

argue that the laws of New York should not apply to her claim. 

Benne's peculiar position aside, the holdings of Van Dusen and 

Ferens require us to affirm the district court's application of the 

New York statute of limitations. 

B. 

Having determined that the district court correctly held that 

the New York statute of limitations applied to the transferred 

case, we now turn to whether the district court correctly applied 

the New York statute. 

When applying the New York statute of limitations to an action 

arising outside of the state, the first step is to refer to the 

"borrowing statute." See N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 202 (McKinney, 

1990). The section provides: 

An action based upon a cause of action accruing without 

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the state cannot be commenced after the expiration of the 

time limited by the laws of either the state or the place 

without the state where the cause of action accrued, 

except that where the cause of action accrued in favor of 

a resident of the state the time limited by the laws of 

the state shall apply. 

Id. Therefore, to survive Defendants' motion for summary judgment, 

Benne's claims must have been timely under both the limitations 

periods of New York and Kansas. See An tone v. General Motors 

Corp., Buick Motors Div., 473 N.E. 2d 742, 744 (N.Y. 1984) (where 

non-residents claim accrued outside of New York, his action must be 

timely under both states' limitations periods). 

1. 

The Kansas statute of limitations provides that an action for 

personal injuries must be brought within two years. Kan. Stat. 

Ann. § 60-513 (a) (4). Such a cause of action: 

shall not be deemed to have accrued until the act giving 

rise to the cause of action first causes substantial 

injury or, if the fact of the injury is not reasonably 

ascertainable until sometime after the initial act, then 

the period of limitation shall not commence until the 

fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the 

injured party . 

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(b). The difficulty in Benne's claim lies 

in determining when "the fact of [Benne's] injury" became 

"reasonably ascertainable." Id. The leading Kansas case on fact 

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of injury is Gilger v. Lee Constr. Inc., 820 P.2d 390 (Kan. 1991), 

a Kansas Supreme Court case. In Gilger, the plaintiffs suffered 

numerous health problems caused by an improperly vented furnace. 

The plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought out the cause of their 

ailments for three years before learning that the furnace was 

improperly installed. Plaintiffs investigated a number of avenues 

in their search for the source of their recurring illnesses. They 

had the furnace checked for gas leaks, increased ventilation in the 

room at the direction of an inspector, and removed a bird•s nest 

from the flue. When their health problems did not subside, 

plaintiffs had the furnace inspected twice more. It was not until 

an inspection in 1985 that plaintiffs learned the furnace had been 

improperly installed. The Kansas Supreme Court reversed a motion 

for summary judgment, which had been granted to defendants, holding 

that whether the Gilgers• injuries were reasonably ascertainable 

under the circumstances before 1985 was a question of fact to be 

resolved by a jury. 

Benne claims that Gilger should likewise lead to a reversal of 

the summary judgment in her case because she did not realize that 

the keyboards had been negligently designed until 1992. Benne 

acknowledges that she was injured by 1985 and also admits she knew 

the cause of her injury was excessive typing on Gateway and IBM 

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keyboards. She claims, however, that her injuries were not 

reasonably ascertainable until 1992 because she had no reason to 

believe IBM and Gateway were negligent in their keyboard design 

until 1992. 

Benne argues that her knowledge that the keyboards caused the 

injury would not trigger the statute of limitations until she made 

the inference that a negligent design of the product, and not mere 

overuse of the product, caused her injury. In making this 

argument, Benne relies on Hecht v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 

490 P.2d 649 (Kan. 1971), which was cited by the court in Gilger. 

In Hecht, a plaintiff suffered skin damage from a negligently 

performed radiation treatment. For a while after the injury, the 

plaintiff thought her injuries were merely part of the recovery 

process. Her doctor had informed her she was healing as she 

should. Finally, when her condition did not improve, plaintiff 

sought a second opinion and learned she needed surgery to correct 

her injuries. In denying defendant's motion for summary judgment 

on the statute of limitations issue, the court stated: 

Since the evidence presented, as we see it, is 

inconclusive as to what point in time plaintiff's injury 

could be said to be substantial or reasonably 

ascertainable, we conclude that plaintiff should be 

afforded an opportunity to prove that she neither knew 

nor could reasonably have been expected to know of 

defendant's alleged negligence until the date alleged in 

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her petition [January 1967] . A summary judgment based on 

the premise that plaintiff on March 13, 1966, knew or 

could have reasonably ascertained that she had suffered 

substantial injury result [ing] from alleged acts of 

negligence of defendants necessitated a finding of fact 

which was, we believe, in good faith disputed. 

Gilger, 820 P. 2d at 399-400 (citing Hecht, 490 P. 2d at 649). 

Benne interprets this language as setting forth the rule that 

a plaintiff's knowledge of the cause of her injuries is irrelevant 

until she realizes that the designer of the product may have acted 

negligently. We do not believe that the Kansas Supreme Court 

intended to establish the rule that a plaintiff could be fully 

aware of the cause of her injury, yet wait to bring a claim based 

upon negligent design some indeterminate time later when the 

plaintiff develops the thought that the defendant may have been 

negligent. Rather we believe the rule from Hecht is intended to 

give plaintiffs who suffer from latent or difficult to diagnose 

injuries the same advantages as those plaintiffs whose injuries are 

immediately connectible to their source. 

Benne fails to recognize that no plaintiff ever knows prior to 

her suit whether the defendant is negligent. Whether a defendant 

is negligent is a matter to be resolved by a jury. Until this 

legal determination is made, a plaintiff can only allege negligence 

on the defendant's part. The Kansas law does not give plaintiff an 

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infinite amount of time, after learning the cause of her injuries, 

to ponder whether the equipment injured her because of defendant's 

negligence or because o other reasons. The plaintiff must take 

the initiative within the limitations period to set out to prove 

defendant's negligence. Otherwise, claims would survive for such 

extensive periods of time that the statute of limitations could be 

completely eviscerated. 

Kansas' "fact of injury" standard postpones the running of the 

limitations period until the time the plaintiff is able to 

determine that her injury may be caused by some act of the 

defendant. The court stated in denying the summary judgment motion 

in Gilger, "there are disputed facts as to when the appellants 

realized their health problems were associated with the allegedly 

improperly ventilated furnace." Gilger, 82 P.2d at 400 (emphasis 

added). In Benne's case, there is no disputed fact as to when she 

realized her problems were associated with the keyboards. Benne's 

claim is similar to the claim in Friends Univ. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 

in which the plaintiff tried to bring a claim for an improperly 

installed roof seven years after it began to leak. 608 P.2d 936 

( Kan . 19 8 0 ) . The plaintiffs alleged that they did not realize 

until two years before they brought their claim that the leaks were 

caused by defendant's failure to bond the roofing material to the 

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substructure and therefore they had not reasonably ascertained the 

cause of the leaks. The Supreme Court of Kansas held that 

plaintiffs claims fell outside of the limitations period. In 

commenting on Friends University in Gilger, the court stated: 

"[w]e determined plaintiff's failure to know the exact scientific 

nature of the problem did not toll the commencement of the statute 

of limitations where it was clearly apparent there was a severe 

problem with the roof caused by defective design, materials, or 

workmanship in 1970." Gilger, 820 P.2d at 400 (referencing and 

citing Friends Univ. 608 P.2d at 941). 

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Benne, we 

conclude that she may not have become aware of the possibility that 

Defendants' negligence could have caused her injuries until as late 

as 1992, when she filed suit. Notwithstanding her lack of 

knowledge of the exact scientific nature of her injuries, until 

1989, by as early as 1987, she knew her injury was associated with 

excessive typing on Defendants' keyboards. The statute of 

limitations commenced running at that time. Accordingly, Benne's 

claims should have been brought no later than 1989. We hold that 

the district court correctly concluded that Benne's cause of action 

was barred by the Kansas two-year statute of limitations. 

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2. 

In New York, an action to recover damages for personal 

injuries, including strict product liability, must be commenced 

within three years from the date the cause of action accrues. 

Unlike the Kansas limitations statute, the New York limitations 

period commences on the date of injury. N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 

214 (McKinney 1990); Snyder v. Town Insulation, Inc., 615 N.E.2d 

999, 1000-01 (N.Y. 1993). The injury itself, rather than the 

negligent act by defendant or the discovery of the wrong by 

plaintiff, marks the date of accrual. Piper v. International 

Business Machs., 639 N.Y.2d 623, 624 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (citing 

Kronos, Inc. v. AVX Corp., 612 N.E.2d 289 (1993)). New York courts 

have recently affirmed this rule as it applies to repetitive stress 

injuries such as Benne's. See Piper, 639 N.Y.2d at 624; In reNew 

York County Data Entry Worker Product Liability Litigation, 1994 WL 

900221 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994). In Piper the court held that the 

limitations period commenced to run when the plaintiff first 

experienced symptoms of carpal tunnel syndrome, not when the 

symptoms developed into a diagnosable condition. Piper, 639 N.Y.2d 

at 623. 

The district court found that Benne's injury manifested itself 

in 1985, at the latest, when she was diagnosed with overuse 

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syndrome of both arms, bilateral carpal tunnel tendinitis, and left 

entrapment neuropathy at the elbow of the ulnar nerve. Based upon 

this diagnosis, the district court did not err in holding Benne's 

claim barred by the New York statute of limitations. 

III. 

After the district court entered judgment for Defendants, 

Benne moved for reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 59(e). She claimed that certain aspects of her injuries 

still made her claim timely under the New York statute of 

limitations. We review the district court's denial of this motion 

for abuse of discretion. Webber v. Mefford, 43 F.3d 1340, 1345 

(lOth Cir. 1994). 

An exception to New York's strict statute of limitations 

exists "where a plaintiff, first injured prior to the three year 

statutory period alleges qualitatively different injuries occurring 

within the statutory period." Kuechler v. 805 Middlesex Corp., 866 

F. Supp. 147, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). The plaintiff may sustain 

claims based on the new and distinct injuries. Id. In support of 

her claims, Benne submitted an affidavit stating that the symptoms 

she suffered after December 18, 1989 were new and qualitatively 

different than the symptoms she suffered before that date. Her 

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physician, Dr. Schlachter also submitted an affidavit attesting to 

the same changes in Benne's symptoms. 

A Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider should be granted only "to 

correct manifest errors of law or to present newly discovered 

evidence." Committee for the First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 

1517, 1523 (lOth Cir. 1992) (quoting Hansco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 

F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985, cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1171 (1986)). 

The district court denied Benne's motion, concluding that no 

manifest error of law had been committed in the first decision and 

that the factual statements that Benne submitted were inadmissible 

due to their conclusory nature. Based upon the limited scope 

provided for granting a motion to reconsider, we hold that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Benne's 

motion. 

No manifest error of law was committed because the district 

court followed New York precedents that establish when the 

limitations period commences for a repetitive stress injury suit. 

The district court did not depart from established law. Second, 

the evidence presented by Benne in her affidavits was not newly 

discovered. In the affidavits, Benne and Dr. Schlachter allege the 

nature of Benne's injuries changed on or around December 18, 1989. 

This information could not have been newly discovered when the 

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district court granted summary judgment to the Defendants in 1994. 

IV. 

We therefore hold that the district court neither erred in its 

application of the law nor abused its discretion in denying Benne's 

motion for reconsideration. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM 

the district court's grant of summary judgment for Defendants IBM 

and Gateway, as well as the court's denial of Benne's motion for 

reconsideration. 

23 

Appellate Case: 95-3026 Document: 01019279555 Date Filed: 06/20/1996 Page: 23