Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01073/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01073-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CARLOS RIOS, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

DANIEL PARAMO, et al., 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 14-cv-01073-WQH (DHB) 

ORDER: 

(1) DENYING MOTION FOR 

DEFAULT JUDGMENT (ECF NO. 

89); 

(2) DENYING MOTION FOR 

ORDER RE: SERVICE (ECF NO. 95); 

AND 

(3) DENYING MOTION FOR 

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE (ECF NO. 

97) 

On April 18, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Default Judgment. (ECF No. 89.) 

On June 29, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion Regarding Service. (ECF No. 95.) On July 1, 

2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel. (ECF No. 97.) Having read 

and considered the moving papers, for the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES

Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment; DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Order Regarding 

Service; and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel without prejudice. 

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I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff, a state prisoner incarcerated at the R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility 

(“RJD”), commenced this action on April 28, 2014 by filing a Complaint and motion for 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) On August 14, 2014, the Honorable 

William Q. Hayes granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and, 

following an initial screening of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 

1915A(b), directed the U.S. Marshal to serve the Complaint on Plaintiff’s behalf. (ECF 

No. 5.) 

Plaintiff filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction 

on October 8, 2014. (ECF No. 20.) Defendants filed a Motion for Partial Summary 

Judgment on November 24, 2014, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, arguing 

Plaintiff failed to exhaust all of his administrative remedies prior to filing suit. (ECF No. 

34.) On the same date, Defendants also filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 35.) On September 1, 

2015, Judge Hayes granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ Motion for Partial 

Summary Judgment, granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and 

denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. 

(ECF No. 63.) 

On October 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF 

No. 64.) In the FAC, Plaintiff brings claims against thirteen staff members at RJD, alleging 

they engaged in an ongoing conspiracy to threaten and harass him, in violation of his state 

and federal constitutional rights and privileges, in retaliation for Plaintiff having filed a 

previous civil rights lawsuit in this district and prison grievances. (See id.) Plaintiff asserts 

federal legal claims under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, in addition to a 

claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). (Id. at ¶¶ 54-59.) Plaintiff 

seeks money damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. (Id. at pp. 28-30.) 

On January 15, 2016, Defendants filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 

pursuant to Rule 56, again arguing Plaintiff failed to exhaust all of his administrative 

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remedies prior to filing suit (ECF No. 74), and a Motion to Dismiss the FAC pursuant to 

Rule 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 73). The Court issued a Report and Recommendation to Judge 

Hayes on both motions on July 15, 2016. (ECF No. 98.) This Report and Recommendation 

and related objections are currently pending before Judge Hayes. 

II. ANALYSIS 

A. Motion for Default Judgment 

 On April 18, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Default Judgment pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) and (b). (ECF No. 89.) Plaintiff requests that the Court enter 

default due to Defendants’ failure to plead or otherwise defend, pursuant to Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure 8(d), 11(c), and 12(a)(1), (a)(2), (b), and (f). (Id. at 1.) 

 The entry of default under Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is proper 

“[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead 

or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

55(a). Under Rule 12, Defendants timely served a responsive pleading to Plaintiff’s FAC. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12; see also ECF No. 71. Accordingly, entry of default is improper. 

 Although titled a Motion for Default Judgment, Plaintiff also seeks to strike 

Defendants’ replies in support of their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion 

to Dismiss the FAC as untimely, as well as sanctions under Rule 11. However, Defendants’ 

replies were timely filed. (See ECF Nos. 75, 85, 86.) The replies were due no later than 

March 15, 2016, and were filed on the docket on March 11, 2016, with Certificates of 

Service indicating they were “caused to be mailed in the Office of the Attorney General’s 

internal mail system” to Plaintiff on that date. (See id.) To the extent Plaintiff received 

the replies later than March 15, 2016, he suffered no prejudice as no response to the replies 

was permitted. Accordingly, the Court declines to strike the replies. See Shame on You 

Prods., Inc. v. Elizabeth Banks, 120 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1145-46 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (declining 

to strike late filed replies absent evidence of actual prejudice); Civ. L.R. 5.2. Because the 

filings were timely, and Plaintiff does not assert any other grounds for sanctions under Rule 

11(c), the Court finds sanctions are unwarranted. 

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 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment is DENIED. 

B. Motion For Order Regarding Service 

On June 29, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion requesting an order instructing the Clerk 

to serve any and all further orders or judgments with a Proof of Service and via U.S. 

Certified First Class Mail with return receipt. (ECF No. 95.) Plaintiff argues that 

Defendants are engaged in an ongoing conspiracy to obstruct Plaintiff’s access to the 

courts, and that Defendant Paramo and his subordinates have taken adverse actions against 

Plaintiff in other cases which have resulted in irreparable injury. (Id. at pp. 1-2.) Plaintiff 

contends that irreparable injury is likely in this case absent a court order. (Id. at 2.) 

Upon review of the Motion and docket, the Court finds Plaintiff has not 

demonstrated that irreparable injury is likely to result in this case absent a Court order 

instructing special service. There is no indication that Plaintiff has failed to receive any 

Court order or other filing served in this case.1

 Moreover, in the case Plaintiff cites as an 

example of irreparable injury, Rios v. Paramo, Case No. 15-cv-01331-BAS (RBB) (S.D. 

Cal.) (“Habeas Case”), any alleged injury was reparable. (See Habeas Case, ECF Nos. 31, 

32.) Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s preemptive Motion requesting an order 

for special service. 

C. Motion to Appoint Counsel 

On July 7, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion Requesting the Appointment of Counsel. 

(ECF No. 97.) Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, argues that 

appointment is necessary for the following reasons: (1) he is unable to afford counsel; (2) 

the issues involved in the case are complex; (3) his ability to investigate the facts, conduct 

discovery, and cross-examine witnesses is limited; (4) his case has merit; (5) his ability to 

                                               

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 This is in contrast to another case cited by Plaintiff, Rios v. Paramo, Case No. 

13-cv-02455-WQH (JMA) (S.D. Cal.) (“Rios II”), in which Plaintiff claimed he had not 

received a specific court order. (See Rios II, ECF Nos. 42, 46.) The court therefore 

instructed that particular order, and the order granting the request, be sent via U.S. Certified 

First Class Mail with return receipt. (Id. at ECF No. 46.) 

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understand English is extremely limited and he lacks education; (6) he has a mental illness 

and learning disabilities that would make it difficult for him to represent himself; and (7) 

he has limited access to the law library as an Extended Outpatient Program inmate. (Id.) 

Plaintiff attaches to his Motion a General Chrono placing him on the institution’s Learning 

Disabled list due to a reading disability, psychiatry notes, and prior requests for assistance 

of counsel. (Id. at Exh. 1.) 

Generally, a person has no right to counsel in civil actions. Palmer v. Valdez, 560 

F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009). Districts courts have discretion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(1), to “request” that an attorney represent indigent civil litigants upon a showing 

of exceptional circumstances. Id; see also Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 

1991). “When determining whether ‘exceptional circumstances’ exist, a court must 

consider ‘the likelihood of success on the merits as well as the ability of the petitioner to 

articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Id. 

(quoting Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983)). “Neither of these 

considerations is dispositive and instead must be viewed together.” Id. (citing Wilborn v. 

Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

Plaintiff has litigated this case for over two years without assistance of counsel. In 

that time, Plaintiff has demonstrated a more than sufficient ability to articulate his claims 

and understand the arguments, as demonstrated by his oppositions and objections to 

Defendants’ motions to dismiss and motions for partial summary judgment. (See ECF No. 

41, 46, 57, 62, 82, 83, 100.) Although the legal issues in this case are not complex, the 

number of defendants and claims make prosecuting the case more complicated. However, 

Plaintiff’s filings demonstrate an ability to distinguish between the defendants and to apply 

relevant law to a variety of facts. Moreover, the need for discovery to develop the facts 

does not automatically qualify the issues in the case as complex. See Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 

1331. 

While the Court acknowledges that Plaintiff may suffer from mental illness, Plaintiff 

has not provided the Court with any evidence that his mental illness is causing a current 

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inability to understand court orders or sufficiently articulate his claims, or that his status as 

an Extended Outpatient Program inmate is preventing him from filing timely motions and 

responses. Further, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. 

Although some of his claims may be exhausted and sufficiently pleaded, Plaintiff has not 

yet survived a motion for summary judgment on the merits. See Garcia v. Smith, No. 

10cv1187 AJB(RBB), 2012 WL 2499003, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 27, 2012) (denying motion 

to appoint counsel, finding that although three of the plaintiff’s claims survived a motion 

to dismiss, “it is too early to determine the likelihood of success on the merits,” and 

“[w]ithout more, it is not certain whether any of [the plaintiff’s] causes of action will 

survive summary judgment”). Thus, Plaintiff has not demonstrated the “exceptional 

circumstances” required for the Court to appoint counsel. 

In light of Plaintiff’s demonstrated ability to articulate his claims and failure to 

demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits at this stage, Plaintiff’s Motion for the 

Appointment of Counsel is DENIED without prejudice. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Default 

Judgment (ECF No. 89); DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Order Regarding Service (ECF 

No. 95); and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel without prejudice 

(ECF No. 97). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 11, 2016 

 _________________________ 

 DAVID H. BARTICK 

 United States Magistrate Judge

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