Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-05-36061/USCOURTS-ca9-05-36061-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WEST LINN CORPORATE PARK 

No. 05-36061 L.L.C.,

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.

CV-01-01787-DCA

v.  District of Oregon,

CITY OF WEST LINN; BORIS PIATSKI; Portland

JOHN DOES 1-10,

Defendants-Appellants. 

WEST LINN CORPORATE PARK  No. 05-36062

L.L.C., D.C. No.

Plaintiff-Appellant, CV-01-01787-DCA

v. District of Oregon,

Portland CITY OF WEST LINN; BORIS PIATSKI; 

JOHN DOES 1-10, ORDER

Defendants-Appellees. CERTIFYING

QUESTIONS TO

THE OREGON

SUPREME COURT 

Filed July 28, 2008

Before: Richard C. Tallman and Richard R. Clifton, Circuit

Judges, and Edward R. Korman,* District Judge.

*The Honorable Edward R. Korman, Senior United States District

Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation. 

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COUNSEL

Robert E. Franz, Jr., Esq., Law Office of Robert E. Franz,

Springfield, Oregon, for the City of West Linn. 

Donald Joe Willis, Esq., Schwable, Williamson & Wyatt,

Portland, Oregon, for West Linn Corporate Park, LLC. 

OPINION

West Linn Corporate Park, LLC (WLCP) commenced this

action in the Circuit Court for Clackamas County, Oregon,

against the City of West Linn and other defendants (collectively the City) alleging that the conditions the City placed on

the approval of the development of the West Linn Corporate

Park amounted to an inverse condemnation under the Oregon

Constitution and an uncompensated taking under the Fifth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. The City subsequently removed the matter to the United States District

Court for the District of Oregon where the City asserted counterclaims seeking a maintenance bond from WLCP and other

equitable relief relating to the vacation of a street abutting

WLCP’s property. 

Following a bench trial, the district court entered judgment

in favor of the City on WLCP’s inverse condemnation and

takings claims with respect to off-site improvements WLCP

constructed. The district court also denied the City’s counterclaims and granted judgment in favor of WLCP on WLCP’s

takings and inverse condemnation claim relating to the vacation of the abutting street. Finally, the district court granted

judgment in WLCP’s favor on its First Amendment retaliation

claim. The parties cross appealed, and we consolidated the

two cases for review. 

At their core, the issues presented in this appeal are inextricably intertwined with WLCP’s claims of inverse condemna9348 WEST LINN CORPORATE v. WEST LINN

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tion under Oregon law, and federal law requires us to first

resolve these state-law causes of action before reaching the

merits of the federal takings arguments. See, e.g., Williamson

County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson

City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (at a minimum, a federal takings

claim is not ripe for review unless the State has been given the

opportunity to deny with finality just compensation for an

alleged taking). 

This order certifies to the Supreme Court of Oregon three

dispositive questions of Oregon law to guide our federal takings analysis. First, we ask whether a plaintiff bringing an

inverse condemnation action alleging that a condition of

development amounts to an exaction or a physical taking is

required to exhaust available local remedies as a prerequisite

to bringing his claim in state court. Second, we ask whether

a condition of development that requires a plaintiff to construct off-site public improvements, as opposed to dedicating

an interest in real property such as granting an easement to a

municipal entity, can constitute an exaction or physical taking. Third, we ask whether the vacation of a street approved

by the City Council purporting to act pursuant to Or. Rev.

Stat. § 271.110 is ultra vires where the petition does not comply with the landowner consent provisions of Or. Rev. Stat.

§ 271.080.

I

We provide the following factual background.1 The history

of this case dates back to 1903 when the City of West Linn,

Oregon, recorded the Willamette Tracts subdivision plat. As

part of the subdivision, Greene Street and 13th Street were

1The Supreme Court of Oregon may supplement this statement of facts

with any additional information that it deems important from the certified

record in order to resolve the certified questions. The parties are obviously

free to discuss the factual record in support of their legal positions when

they brief the issues before the Supreme Court of Oregon. 

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dedicated to the City. Greene Street was located on the northern border of the subdivision; 13th Street divided lots four and

five on the plat. A modern day approximation is graphically

depicted below: 

On November 4, 1996, the Willamette Christian Church of

West Linn conveyed lot five on the plat to Randal Sebastian

for $862,553. Sebastian was associated with the Renaissance

Development Corporation, and on November 24, 1997, that

entity submitted to the City a design review application for

what would become the West Linn Corporate Park, owned by

the plaintiff in this case. Ultimately, WLCP obtained lot six

on the plat as well. 

Around the same time, nearby properties in the subdivision

began to develop. On February 10, 1998, the City issued a

final order approving the “Summerlinn Apartments,” a multi9350 WEST LINN CORPORATE v. WEST LINN

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unit residential development owned by Show Timber Company. The apartments would be located to the north of WLCP,

and based on Show Timber’s proposal, traffic to the apartment complex was to be routed thru the intersection of Greene

Street and 13th Street.2

On March 6, 1998, the City approved Renaissance’s design

for the corporate park, albeit with caveats — the approval was

conditioned on the construction and delivery of public

improvements to the City. Those conditions included fourteen

requirements: 

1. The applicant shall conform to all Federal, State

and Local policies and codes unless granted a

written waiver, modification and/or variance by

the appropriate deciding body. 

2. The applicant shall deed or dedicate along the

development’s Blankenship Road frontage, and

construct half street improvements along

Blankenship Road, consistent with the 10th

Street corridor study build-out pavement width

requirements and Chapter 92 of the West Linn

Community Development Code (the requested

sidewalk and planter strip modification is

approved and the City Engineer shall establish

the necessary Blakenship pedestrian crossing

facilities)[.] 

3. The applicant shall improve 13th Street from the

development site to Blankenship Road according to the City Engineer’s requirements (17%

maximum grade as proposed is approved). 

4. The applicant shall petition for vacation of the

Greene Street right-of-way abutting the site. The

2

13th Street later was renamed “Summerlinn Drive.” 

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City shall not authorize occupancy of any buildings on the site until the vacation is approved or

until the Planning Director finds the issue of

Greene Street otherwise resolved. The applicant

shall construct a four-foot wide gravel path

within 20 feet of the existing right of way from

13th Street to the easterly property boundary, or

within an easement or new pedestrian pathway

dedication retained by the City as a condition of

vacation of the right of way. If the right of way

is not vacated, the applicant shall install halfstreet improvements consistent with the Community Development Code or apply for and

receive approval of a variance from the City.

. . . 

5. The applicant shall construct the 10th street corridor improvements required by the City traffic

study currently being developed by the traffic

engineering consultant Kittleson & Associates.

(Minimum improvements for the development

shall be the construction of the two traffic signal

lights and associated improvements at the west

bound I-205 freeway off-ramp & 10th Street and

the 10th Street & Solamo Road/Blankenship

Road intersections, along with a sidewalk on the

west side of 10th St. from the River Falls Shopping Center sidewalk and 8th Avenue). 

6. The applicant shall grant towing and ticketing

enforcement rights on the fire, life and safety

access corridors within the development. 

7. The applicant shall construct the private

parking/driveway isles and fire turnarounds not

to exceed fifteen percent and eight percent

grades respectively, 

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8. The applicant shall provide a complete pedestrian path between: Building ‘A’ and the 13th

street sidewalk, and between Building ‘A’ and

the gravel path conditioned to be built on the

current Greene Street right-of-way. 

9. The applicant shall 1) meet the City’s water

quality requirements by constructing the Storm

Drainage Master Plan regional water quality

facility or if ODOT does not permit [that] project provide an in-lieu of fee to the City allowed

by the City of West Linn Municipal Code . . . ,

2) record with the County an agreement with the

City that requires the property owner to operate

and maintain the private storm detention and

water quality facilities, and provide third party

certification to the City that it is working properly on an annual basis, 3) detain the development’s storm water run-off with private

detention facilities so that 2, 5, 10 and 25-year

post development storm drainage release rate is

equal to the 2, 5, 10, and 25-year predevelopment release rate, 4) extend the 18′′

storm drainage main stub-out located at

Blankenship Road and 13th Street to the proposed private storm system out-fall at the top of

13th Street, and 5) construct the Storm Drainage

Master Plan Project . . . (10th Street culvert

crossing) or construct a 100-year pre-post private storm drainage detention facility for the

development. 

10. The applicant shall 1) finance the review of the

development’s fire and domestic water system

demands with the City’s new Water Master

Plan consultant (Montgomery-Watson) to

establish all necessary off-site and onsite water

improvements required for the development

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(The preliminary analysis of the off-site Master

Plan water transmission main construction

improvements that will be necessary is Phase II

of Willamette Falls Drive water transmission

main), 2 [ ]) perform actual fire flow tests on

the various new private fire hydrants (during an

induced high water demand day) that provide

proof that the fire flow is adequate to meet

each of the buildings fire flow requirements, 3)

obtain written approval from the City Engineer

and the City Fire Marshall that the necessary

fire hydrant flows are available prior to any

building related construction with combustible

materials, 4) record with the County an agreement with the City that requires the property

owner to provide annual certification to the

City’s Fire Department that the private fire system is operating properly. 

11. The applicant shall construct the 13th street

master plan sanitary sewer line if Summerlinn

Apartments has not successfully received

approval for the sanitary sewer inter-basis

transfer and the 13th Street master plan line

elimination by the time this application needs

to complete the 13th Street improvements. 

12. The applicant shall construct all of the development’s required public improvements prior to

receiving any building final inspection and/or

certificates of occupancy. 

13. To assure adequate protection of trees on site,

prior to any site work starting on the property

the following shall be completed: [various conditions] 

. . . 

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14. The applicant shall provide for at least six covered bicycle parking spaces. 

Following the conditional approval, Sebastian together with

Renaissance successfully sought additional investors, formed

WLCP, LLC, and transferred the property to the LLC. The

corporation’s goal, as the name suggests, is to develop and

lease business sites. 

On October 21, 1998, Sebastian on WLCP’s behalf, entered

into a public improvements guarantee (PIG) agreement with

the City, further memorializing the conditions for the proposed development. Among other things, the PIG conditioned

approval on the completion of the improvements by October

15, 1999. The agreement also required WLCP to secure the

completion of the Blankenship and 13th Street improvements

and the Greene Street water line with a $264,000 performance

bond. WLCP complied. 

In February 1998, Kittleson issued to the City the consultant’s 10th Street traffic study findings. In light of the construction of WLCP and the Summerlin Apartments, consultant

Kittleson recommended adding two additional traffic lights in

addition to a sidewalk on the west side of 10th Street. According to the study, “[n]o additional roadway work” would be

required to accommodate the WLCP project. 

The consulting engineer’s study made further findings. For

example, the study estimated that WLCP would be responsible for approximately 5.4 percent of the vehicles entering the

10th Street corridor during afternoon peak hours and 3.3 percent of the vehicles utilizing the I-205 on-ramps during that

same time. These figures, however, assumed full occupancy

of the surrounding properties predicted to be finalized by

2018.

As a result of the traffic study, including its future predictions, the City required WLCP (1) to improve the westbound

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I-205 ramps and the 10th Street intersection; (2) widen the

street; (3) construct additional turn lanes; (4) improve storm

drains; (5) create a bike path; (6) relocate street lighting; (7)

move utilities; and (8) install new curbs. The City imposed

these conditions in addition to the installation of traffic lights

and the sidewalk. 

According to WLCP, the costs of these improvements

totaled $726,225.48. Because the Summerlinn Apartment

project was subject to the same conditions, WLCP and Show

Timber shared the costs. Thus, WLCP paid its half, totaling

$363,112.74. 

As also noted in the conditional approval, WLCP was

required to build Phase II of the City’s Willamette Falls Drive

waterline. WLCP maintains that initially the City represented

that WLCP could build the waterline underneath previouslyengineered transmission lines. The anticipated cost of the

improvement would be that of installing the pipe. However,

the City ultimately required WLCP to build 1400 feet of

waterline through solid rock. Although WLCP shared the cost

with Show Timber, construction through solid rock increased

the total cost. WLCP incurred $172,049 in waterline installation expenses. 

Further, as noted above, WLCP was required to petition to

vacate Greene Street and create a gravel pathway. According

to WLCP, this construction cost it approximately $14,319. In

addition, the City conditioned approval on making improvements to Blankenship Road, constructing waterlines along

Greene and 13th Streets, and making improvements along

13th Street including the sewer and storm system. WLCP

maintains that these improvements cost another $264,970. 

Apparently, the City also demanded that WLCP make cash

payments to it in impact fees, and WLCP paid $182,544 as

“System Development Charges” (SDCs). SDCs represent

what the City considers, and attempts to recapture as, 100 per9356 WEST LINN CORPORATE v. WEST LINN

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cent of costs that result from the impacts of property development. Because the SDCs were more than the cost of the

improvements WLCP delivered to the City, WLCP sought

reimbursement for the overpayments. In lieu of paying cash

to WLCP, as the City had done for Show Timber, the City

provided WLCP with SDC certificates with a face value of

$384,450. 

SDC certificates, however, are not the functional equivalent

of cash. For example, such certificates will only cover up to

50 percent of the SDCs on a future project, may not be

exchanged for cash, and are valid only for ten years. To be

sure, SDC certificates are alienable: developers may sell them

to other developers. But the market for these certificates is

small, and the certificates have limited value. In fact, WLCP

was only able to sell its certificates for $12,251, a seventyfive percent discount.

WLCP did not meet its construction deadline for all of the

public improvements the City required. Nonetheless, WLCP

had lined up tenants to occupy the corporate park. Because

the improvements remained incomplete, the City was unwilling to issue occupancy permits. Ultimately, after negotiations,

WLCP and the City reached a settlement: the City would

issue temporary occupancy permits if WLCP agreed to sign

a release of certain claims relating to the 10th Street improvements (or the 10th Street corridor as the parties refer to it).3

WLCP maintains that the City breached this agreement

when it demanded additional improvements to the 10th Street

corridor and refused to release the bond with which WLCP

secured its performance even though the Oregon Department

of Transportation (ODOT) approved its 10th Street improvements and authorized the release of the bond. 

3We do not recount the terms of the agreement in full detail because

they are not necessary to answer the certified questions. 

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On November 8, 2001, WLCP commenced this action in

the Clackamas County Circuit Court. The City subsequently

removed the action to the United States District Court for the

District of Oregon. In its nine-count amended federal complaint, WLCP alleged that the conditions the City imposed on

the approval of its development worked a taking in violation

of the state and federal Constitutions (counts one and two

(inverse condemnation)); the City was unjustly enriched by

the improvements WLCP constructed (count three); the City

effected a taking of a portion of the intersection at Greene and

13th Street in violation of the state and federal Constitutions

(counts four and five (inverse condemnation)); the City and

co-defendant City Inspector Boris Piatski retaliated against

WLCP in violation of the First Amendment for WLCP’s

speech (counts six and seven); the City violated the Civil

Rights Act under Oregon law by treating WLCP differently

than other similarly situated developers (count eight); and the

conditions the City imposed were in breach of a 1975 annex

agreement (count nine). 

For its part, the City asserted five counterclaims seeking

declaratory and injunctive relief. The City sought an order

compelling WLCP to post a maintenance bond with respect to

disputed improvements should the district court order the

release of the initial bond (counterclaim one); an order compelling WLCP to convey its interests in the Greene Street and

the 13th Street intersection to the City (counterclaim two); a

declaration that the City’s vacation of Greene Street was null

and void (counterclaim three); alternatively, an order rescinding the vacation of Greene Street and requiring the vacation

to occur based on the consent of all property owners involved

(counterclaim four); and an order to abate further action on

the case until the City initiates proceedings to properly vacate

Greene Street in accordance with Oregon law (counterclaim

five). The City also requested that the district court order

WLCP to return the SDC credit certificates in the event damages are awarded. 

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Thereafter, WLCP filed a motion for partial summary judgment, and the City cross-moved for summary judgment as to

all counts. The parties consented to proceedings before United

States Magistrate Judge Donald C. Ashmanskas, and he

issued an order granting summary judgment to the City on

WLCP’s eighth and ninth counts. The magistrate judge otherwise denied the cross-motions and set the matter for a bench

trial. 

The nine-day bench trial commenced on August 30, 2004.

On July 15, 2005, Judge Ashmanskas issued his decision

orally. He granted relief to WLCP on its inverse condemnation claims set forth in counts four and five and on its claim

for unconstitutional retaliation, count six. With respect to the

first and second counts’ claim of inverse condemnation, the

court determined that those counts were unripe for judicial

review because WLCP had not availed itself of local remedies. The magistrate judge also reasoned that to the extent

those counts related to the 10th Street improvements, WLCP

had waived its claims. Finally, the magistrate judge denied

relief on WLCP’s claim of unjust enrichment (count three)

and the City’s five counterclaims. 

WLCP unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration as to the

denial of the inverse condemnation claims, and this timely

appeal followed. WLCP challenges only the denial of the first

two counts on appeal. The City has cross-appealed and challenges the magistrate judge’s denial of its counterclaims as

well as the judgment in favor of WLCP on its claims for

inverse condemnation set forth in counts four and five, and

WLCP’s claim for unlawful retaliation. 

II

A

We are mindful that the decision to accept and answer certified questions is left to the Oregon Supreme Court’s sound

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discretion. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 28.200; Western Helicopter

Servs., Inc. v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp., 811 P.2d 627, 630

(Or. 1991). And the jurisdiction of the Oregon Supreme Court

is only properly invoked when the certified questions satisfy

five statutory criteria. Those criteria require that “(1) [t]he

certification must come from a designated court; (2) the question must be one of law; (3) the applicable law must be Oregon law; (4) the question must be one that ‘may be

determinative of the cause;’ and (5) it must appear to the certifying court that there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of this court or the Oregon Court of Appeals.” Id.; Or.

Rev. Stat. § 28.200. As explained more fully below, because

the three certified questions of law largely dictate the justiciability of this matter, are not clearly answered under the present state of Oregon law, and plainly implicate the

development of local land use law, we believe the better

course of action is to request the Oregon Supreme Court to

answer them in the first instance. 

B

Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to consideration of actual cases and controversies,

and federal courts are not permitted to render advisory opinions. See Rhoades v. Avon Products, Inc. 504 F.3d 1151, 1157

(9th Cir. 2007) (citing Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Wycoff, Co., 344

U.S. 237, 244 (1952)). “Ripeness is more than a mere procedural question; it is determinative of jurisdiction. If a claim is

unripe, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction and the

complaint must be dismissed.” Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v.

City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 502 (9th Cir. 1990). 

In Williamson, the Supreme Court held that a land owner’s

Fifth Amendment takings claim against a local government is

not ripe until the claimant has availed himself of all the

administrative remedies through which the government might

reach a final decision regarding the regulations that effect the

taking, and any state judicial remedies for determining or

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awarding just compensation. See 473 U.S. at 186 (holding that

“[b]ecause respondent has not yet obtained a final decision

regarding the application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations to its property, nor utilized the procedures

Tennessee provides for obtaining just compensation, respondent’s claim is not ripe”). The first condition, which has come

to be known as “prong-one ripeness,” requires a claimant to

utilize available administrative mechanisms, such as seeking

variances from overly-restrictive or confiscatory zoning ordinances, so that a federal court can assess the scope of the regulatory taking. Id. at 190-91. The second condition (“prongtwo ripeness”) is based on the principle that “[t]he Fifth

Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without just compensation.” Id. at 194. Consequently, “if a State provides an adequate procedure for

seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot claim

a violation of the [federal] Just Compensation Clause until it

has used the procedure and been denied just compensation.”

Id. at 195.

C

Although Williamson arose in the context of an alleged regulatory taking, we have held that physical takings or exactions4

employ, if at all, a modified form of the Williamson analysis.

Daniel v. County of Santa Barbara, 288 F.3d 375, 382 (9th

Cir. 2002). In Daniel, we explained that under California law,

the question was not whether a landowner need satisfy prongone ripeness. After all, those considerations are “automatically satisfied at the time of the physical taking” for “[w]here

there has been a physical invasion, the taking occurs at once,

4The term “physical taking,” or a physical intrusion to benefit the public

that the government causes to be placed on private property, generally is

synonymous with an “exaction,” or a condition of development that local

government places on a landowner to dedicate a real interest in the development property for public use. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512

U.S. 374 (1994). 

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and nothing the city can do or say after that point will change

that fact.” Id. Rather, the only pertinent inquiry is prong two.

We emphasized that “as in a regulatory takings case, the property owner must [still] have sought compensation for the

alleged taking through available state procedures.” Id. 

III

A

The availability, applicability, and adequacy of such state

procedures require us to examine Oregon law in this instance.

See id. We therefore turn to the first basis for our certification

order, whether Oregon law requires a landowner alleging a

claim of inverse condemnation arising from conditions of

development seeking exactions to exhaust available remedies

to obtain a final determination from the State that it will pay

no compensation. Stated otherwise, was WLCP’s complaint

filed in the Clackamas County Circuit Court sufficient under

Oregon law to seek a final determination of compensation?

Because the justiciability of WLCP’s takings claims turns on

the Oregon Supreme Court’s answer, this “question of law”

is one that is “determinative of the cause.” Western Helicopter

Servs., Inc., 811 P.2d at 630. 

The Oregon Supreme Court has not had occasion to consider this specific question of exhaustion. Two decisions,

however, one from the Oregon Court of Appeals, and another

from the Land Use Board of Appeals, reach opposite conclusions, highlighting, we feel, the unsettled nature of this aspect

of Oregon law. Compare Nelson v. City of Lake Oswego, 869

P.2d 350 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) with Reeves v. City of Tualatin,

31 Or. LUBA 11, 1996 WL 33118832 (1996). 

In Nelson, plaintiff landowners applied to the city for a permit to build a house. After reviewing the application, the city

determined that, based on a faulty property description, it

would grant the application only after the landowners applied

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for and obtained a lot line adjustment between their property

and the adjoining neighbors. The city approved the landowner’s adjustment, but conditioned it upon the execution of

“nonremonstrance” agreements in which the landowners

agreed not to oppose future street improvements. The city also

required the landowners to convey a fifty-five foot drainage

easement as a condition of approval. The landowners did not

appeal any of the city’s conditions as was permitted under the

city code, and instead filed suit in state court. 

The court of appeals found that all but one of the landowners’ claims were subject to exhaustion of local remedies. The

condition that the landowners convey the drainage easement,

it reasoned, was not. Citing to MacDonald, Sommer & Frates

v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986), the Oregon Court

of Appeals explained that “[t]here is good reason why the

courts have not extended the exhaustion/ripeness requirement

to cases like this one [involving an exaction]: They have nothing to do with its purpose.” Nelson, 869 P.2d at 353. In fact,

the purpose of the ripeness requirement stems from the nature

of a regulatory taking itself: 

It follows from the nature of a regulatory takings

claim that an essential prerequisite to its assertion is

a final and authoritative determination of the type

and intensity of development legally permitted on

the subject property. A court cannot determine

whether a regulation has gone ‘too far’ unless it

knows how far the regulation goes. 

The tests for regulatory takings under the state and

federal constitutions are whether the owner is

deprived of all substantial beneficial or economically

viable use of property. The reason why the

exhaustion/ripeness analysis makes sense in that

context is that, with rare exceptions, no particular

denial of an application for a use can demonstrate

the loss of all economic use. That is so for two reaWEST LINN CORPORATE v. WEST LINN 9363

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sons. First, the fact that one use is impermissible

under the regulations does not necessarily mean that

other economically productive uses are also precluded; and second, until alternative uses are applied

for or alternative means of obtaining permission for

the first use are attempted, there can be no conclusive authoritative determination of what is legally

permitted by the regulations. Therefore, the courts

cannot perform their adjudicative function on a

claim predicated on a single denial, because something more must be decided by the local or other regulatory authority before there can be a demonstrable

loss of all use and, therefore, a taking. 

Id. at 353-54 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

By contrast, in the case of an exaction, such as a drainage

easement, the court of appeals continued, “the condition has

been imposed and the easement has been acquired by the

city.” Id. at 354. As a result, nothing further must occur “at

the local or administrative level in order for the claim to be

susceptible to adjudication; the only question is whether what

has occurred is a taking under the legal test that the condition

must bear a reasonable relationship to the impacts of the use

to which the city has attached it.” Id. (citation omitted).

Indeed, “[t]he facts on both sides of the equation are readily

susceptible to conventional judicial proof, and the adjudication of the facts and of the applicable law is well within the

judicial competence.” Id. The holding in Nelson supports the

proposition that a landowner need not exhaust local remedies

in a physical takings case before bringing his inverse condemnation claim in state court. 

Reeves, a case that postdates Nelson, appears to us to retain

language that would, at least in some instances, require

exhaustion in an exactions case. In that case, the petitioner

sought approval for a fifty-five unit subdivision in the city’s

low density residential planning district. The city approved

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the application, but conditioned it on, among other things,

dedicating a ten-foot right of way, improving up to the center

line a street abutting the property, paving part of that street,

constructing a bicycle lane, and extending a twelve-inch water

line for later expansion by the city. 

In concluding that the petitioner had not exhausted available remedies, the board of appeals distinguished Nelson on

two grounds. First, the board explained, “[i]n Nelson the

applicant could not have anticipated that dedication of an

easement would be required. It was simply imposed as part of

the approval.” Reeves, 1996 WL 33118832, at *4. As a result,

“[e]ven if a variance process had been available, the first time

the applicant would have known of the need to request a variance was after the approval was granted.” Id. Since petitioner

Reeves could have availed himself of such an appeal at the

outset, the board concluded that his failure to avail himself of

that remedy was fatal. 

Second, the board reasoned that at the time of the action,

the easement in Nelson already had been granted. By contrast,

the city had not yet acquired the easement in Reeves. Consequently, in the board’s view, there was still something left to

happen at the local level, such as determining the extent to

which the city would impose the conditions on petitioner

Reeves’s property. 

In this case, it is undisputed that WLCP exhausted no local

remedies that were available before bringing its manifold

claims. If the Oregon Supreme Court holds that a plaintiff

bringing an inverse condemnation claim premised on allegations of overreaching exactions must first do so, then WLCP’s

federal takings claims are not yet ripe for our review and we

will dismiss that portion of WLCP’s appeal. Because this

question of inverse condemnation jurisprudence is unsettled

in Oregon, and because, if clarified definitively by the Oregon

Supreme Court, the answer will have far-reaching effects on

commercial development in Oregon, we have concluded that

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the better course of action is to certify this issue to the Oregon

Supreme Court. 

B

The Oregon Supreme Court similarly has not had occasion

to consider whether conditions of development that require

off-site public improvements, that is, a requirement that a

landowner improve public property — outside of the proposed development site — in which the landowner has no

property interest can amount to an exaction. One case from

the Oregon Court of Appeals of which we are aware squarely

answers that question in the affirmative. See Clark v. City of

Albany, 904 P.2d 185 (Or. Ct. App. 1995). However, a recent

Oregon Court of Appeals decision has cast doubt on the continuing validity of Clark. See Dudek v. Umatilla County, 69

P.3d 751 (Or. Ct. App. 2003). 

In Clark, the city conditioned the approval of a site plan for

a fast food drive-in store on improvements to a nearby street,

the drainage system, and sidewalks, among others. Those

improvements were codified as conditions four and five, and

read as follows: 

4. Prior to issuance of building permits, design

for street improvements for Spicer Road. The

improvements shall be for an ultimate width of 36

feet, and shall extend from a point 150 feet east of

the subject property east property line to the intersection of the Santiam Highway. The design section

shall be sufficient for a minor collector street designation. Make design allowances for a commercial

driveway intersecting Spicer Road at the current

commercial driveway intersection. 

5. Prior to issuance of building permits, provide

financial assurances for or construct improvements

to Spicer Road. Improvements shall consist of a par9366 WEST LINN CORPORATE v. WEST LINN

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tial street, drainage, and minimum seven foot curb

line sidewalk improvements with appropriate transitions to the east and west of the subject property.

Depending on the condition and section of the existing roadway, an overlay may be required on portions

of the roadway not being incorporated into the partial street improvement. 

Id. at 187. 

The city maintained that these exactions were not subject

to the analysis set forth in Dolan, 512 U.S. at 374 (treating

exactions as different from regulatory takings and essentially

the same as a physical taking), because they “[did] not require

a dedication of a property interest to the public or the body

from which the development approval [was sought].” Clark,

904 P.2d at 189. In rejecting that argument, the court of

appeals reasoned: 

[O]n their face, conditions 4 and 5 do impose

exactions that are subject to the Dolan analysis:

They require petitioner, as a prerequisite to developing his property, to make road improvements on and

extending beyond the affected property, and the

improvements are to be available for some public

use. 

We implicitly concluded [that off-site improvements that do not require the dedication or transfer

of property interest do not amount to exactions] in

J.C. Reeves Corp. v. Clackamas County, 131

Or.App. 615, 887 P.2d 360 1994), where we applied

the Dolan test to developmental conditions analogous to conditions 4 and 5 here. 

. . . 

[T]he fact that Dolan itself involved conditions

that required a dedication of property interests does

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not mean that it applies only to conditions of that

kind. This case is not the appropriate one for universal line-drawing because, in our view, there is no relevant and meaningful distinction between conditions

that require conveyances and conditions like the

fourth and fifth ones here. For purposes of takings

analysis, we see little difference between a requirement that a developer convey title to the part of the

property that is to serve a public purpose, and a

requirement that the developer himself make

improvements on the affected and nearby property

and make it available for the same purpose. The fact

that the developer retains title in, or never acquires

title to, the property that he is required to improve

and make available to the public, does not make the

requirement any the less a burden on his use and

interest than corresponding requirements that happen

also to entail memorialization in the deed records. 

Id. (citations omitted).

In Dudek, the court of appeals suggested that Clark was

open to question following the United States Supreme Court’s

decision in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey,

Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999). The Oregon Court of Appeals

explained: 

[O]ur holding in Clark v. City of Albany, regarding the application of Dolan to the imposition of

requirements to make off-site improvements is open

to question following the Supreme Court’s decision

in [Del Monte Dunes]. In that case, the Supreme

Court cautioned against application of the test in

Dolan beyond “the special context of exactions-land

use decisions conditioning approval of development

on the dedication of property to public use.” The

recent federal decisions cited suggest such a condition, to the extent that it requires the expenditure of

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money and not a giving over of a real property interest, might not fall under the same review as a real

property exaction requirement of the sort seen in

Dolan. 

Dudek, 69 P.3d at 758 n.10. 

In this case, it is unclear how Oregon law would classify

the conditions placed on the development of the West Linn

Corporate Park to improve public property off its site. On the

one hand, if the Oregon Supreme Court holds that such conditions can amount to an exaction, then assuming there is no

need for exhaustion, we may proceed to analyze the conditions under the Dolan framework. If, on the other hand, the

Oregon Supreme Court concludes that off-site public

improvements do not amount to exactions, then it is unclear

whether under Oregon law, there is any viable cause of action

for inverse condemnation. As above, this question has potentially broad implications that, if definitively clarified by the

Oregon Supreme Court, would affect local level development

efforts. An answer would be dispositive as to this portion of

the federal appeal. 

C

Finally, no Oregon court of which we are aware has had

occasion to consider the legal effect of a street that was purportedly vacated by the procedures set forth under Oregon

Revised Code § 271.120 but that did not comply with the

landowner consent provisions of Oregon Revised Code

§ 271.080. It is undisputed that the map depicting the portion

to be vacated was in error when the petition was circulated for

approval by affected landowners in the neighborhood. 

As noted, condition of development 4 required WLCP to

“petition for vacation of the Greene Street right-of-way abutting the site. The applicant shall construct a four foot wide

gravel path within 20 feet of the existing right of way from

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13th Street to the easterly property boundary, or within an

easement or new pedestrian pathway dedication retained by

the City as a condition of vacation of the right of way.” This

requirement was further codified in the PIG agreement, which

noted “[t]hese improvements include waterline improvements

on Green[e] Street . . . and the gravel path within the Greene

Street vacation area.” 

In accordance with the City’s demand, Show Timber,

which was subject to the same condition, employed engineers

to draw up a legal description of the proposed vacation of

Greene Street. Thereafter, consent of area property owners

was obtained based on the legal description. The legal

description, however, did not include the intersection of 13th

Street and Greene Street (the disputed intersection). 

The proposed vacation was then submitted to the City.

However, City planner Eric Spir objected to the proposal, and

the City ultimately demanded that Greene Street be vacated in

its entirety. The consulting engineers objected to the City’s

demand because, they reasoned, through traffic on 13th Street

would be blocked as a result.

Show Timber and WLCP acquiesced. A new legal description was prepared that included the disputed intersection. This

second legal description was incorporated into public notices

published for proposes of the vacation and the subsequent

public hearing on the matter. Following the public hearing,

the City Council approved the vacation of Greene Street in its

entirety and passed City Ordinance No. 1439, which codified

the vacation. 

WLCP contends that Ordinance No. 1439 had the full legal

effect of vacating Greene Street, and by operation of law, a

portion of the intersection vested in it free of any interest held

by the City. The City maintains that the ordinance has no

legal effect because it was adopted without the consent of all

necessary landowners. 

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Oregon Revised Code § 271.080(2) requires “the consent

of the owners of all abutting property and of not less than

two-thirds in area of the real property affected thereby” to “be

appended to [the] petition [for vacation], as a part thereof and

as a basis for granting the same[.]” It is undisputed that,

although the first legal description submitted contained the

required landowner consent, the second amended description

that was submitted with the petition did not. 

It is otherwise conceded that the statutory formalities were

followed. The petition was presented to the city recorder,

found to be sufficient, filed, and at least one petitioner was

given notice of when the matter would come before the City

Council. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 271.090. Public notices containing the second legal description were published along with the

date for the public hearing. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 271.110.

Finally, the City Council at a public hearing “hear[d] the petition and any objections [and] . . . determine[d] [that] the consent of the owners of the requisite area ha[d] been obtained,

[t]hat notice ha[d] been duly given and [that] the public interest will [not] be prejudiced by the vacation of such . . . street.”

Or. Rev. Stat. § 271.120. Consequently, the City Council

“m[ade] such determination a matter of record and vacate[d]

such . . . street[.]” Id. It adopted Ordinance 1439.

Thus, the question we confront is whether Ordinance 1439

was an ultra vires act because although the City Council followed procedural formalities in its adoption, the petition presented for its consideration did not fully comply with Oregon

Revised Statute § 271.080. If the Oregon Supreme Court

answers this question in the affirmative, the vacation of

Greene Street is null and void, and we must vacate the district

court’s judgment that an interest in a portion of Greene Street

vested in favor of WLCP, see Or. Rev. Stat. § 271.140, and

the City’s use of the disputed intersection worked a taking. If

the Oregon Supreme Court answers this question in the negative, the district court’s ruling will be affirmed. 

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IV

ORDER

In light of our foregoing discussion, and because the

answers to these questions of Oregon law for which there is

unclear precedent are determinative of the federal cause, see

Or. Rev. Stat. § 28.2000, we respectfully certify to the Oregon

Supreme Court the following questions under Oregon law: 

(1) Must a landowner alleging that a condition of

development amounts to an exaction or physical taking exhaust available local remedies before bringing

his claim of inverse condemnation in an Oregon state

court? 

(2) Can a condition of development that requires

a landowner to improve off-site public property in

which the landowner has no property interest constitute an exaction? 

(3) Under Or. Rev. Stat. § 271.120, is a City

Council’s purported vacation of a street ultra vires

when the petition for vacation does not comply with

the landowner consent provisions of Or. Rev. Stat.

§ 271.120? 

We do not intend, by the phrasing of these questions, to

restrict the Oregon Supreme Court’s consideration of the

issues. The Oregon Supreme Court may, of course, in its discretion reformulate the questions. Broad v. Mannesman Anlagenbau AG, 196 F.3d 1075, 1076 (9th Cir. 1999). 

If the Oregon Supreme Court accepts review of the certified questions, we designate WLCP to file the first brief pursuant to Oregon Rule of Appellate Procedure 12.20. 

The Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to transmit forthwith

to the Oregon Supreme Court, under official seal of the

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United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, a copy

of this order and all briefs and excerpts of record. Or. Rev.

Stat. § 28.215; Or. R. App. P. 12.20. 

Further proceedings in this court on the certified questions

are stayed pending the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision

whether it will accept review and, if so, receipt of the answer

to the certified questions. The case is withdrawn from submission until further order from this court. The panel will resume

control and jurisdiction upon receipt of an answer to the certified questions or upon the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision

to decline to answer the certified questions. When the Oregon

Supreme Court decides whether or not to accept the certified

questions, the parties shall file a joint status report informing

this court of the decision. If the Oregon Supreme Court

accepts the certified questions, the parties shall file a joint status report informing this court when the Oregon Supreme

Court issues its answers. 

It is so ORDERED. 

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