Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_10-cv-08127/USCOURTS-azd-3_10-cv-08127-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). An Alford plea allows a defendant to

plead guilty and consent to imposition of a sentence even though he may continue to

proclaim his innocence. Brownlow v. Groose, 66 F.3d 997, 999 n.2 (1995). 

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Vincent Edward Taylor, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 10-8127-PCT-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Vincent Edward Taylor’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) (Doc. 1). The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and

Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the Petition be denied. For the reasons that

follow, the Court accepts the R&R and denies the Petition. 

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

On October 12, 2000, Petitioner was indicted by a Grand Jury and charged with Child

Molestation, a Class 2 felony under A.R.S. § 13-1410. On June 12, 2002, Petitioner entered

into an Alford1

 plea whereby Petitioner pled guilty to Attempted Kidnapping, a Class 3

felony under A.R.S. § 13-1304. As part of the Alford plea, Petitioner was sentenced to five

years probation commencing after Petitioner finished his then current sentence in La Paz

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County. On June 8, 2007, Petitioner appeared before the court on a petition to revoke his

probation and on August 24, 2007, the court ordered Petitioner’s probation revoked, and

imposed an eight-year, mitigated sentence for attempted kidnapping. 

Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief which was dismissed by the court on

August 7, 2008. On September 29, 2008, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona

Court of Appeals, and on December 8, 2009, the Court of Appeals denied review without

comment. Petitioner then filed the current Petition raising six grounds for relief.

In Ground One, he alleges violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights based on delays in bringing him to trial. In

Ground Two, he alleges violation of his Fifth Amendment

double jeopardy rights. In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges

violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to be present at all

phases of the criminal proceedings. In Ground Four, he alleges

violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to file a postconviction petition. In Ground Five, Petitioner alleges violation

of his Fourteenth Amendment right to receive credit for time

served. In Ground Six, he alleges violations of his Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights to the effective assistance of

counsel. 

(R&R, 3:22–4:6) (internal citations omitted). The Magistrate Judge found that Petitioner’s

claims were unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. (Id., 8:22–23). As a result, the

Magistrate Judge recommends that, under the principles of comity, this court deny the

Petition without reaching the merits of Petitioner’s claims. In his objections to the R&R,

Petitioner claims that he is legally, factually, and actually innocent.

II. Legal Standard

In reviewing a R&R, the Court is not required to conduct “any review at all . . . of any

issue that is not the subject of an objection.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985)

(emphasis added). If there is an objection made, then the Court must review the magistrate

judge’s findings and recommendations de novo. United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d

1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

Petitioner does not object directly to the findings in the R&R. Instead, Petitioner

claims that he is legally, factually, and actually innocent. “Actual innocence” means “factual

innocence.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). The distinction between

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“legal innocence” and “actual innocence” can be shown by the following example from the

Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals: “[Defendant] does not claim that new evidence shows he is

factually innocent of shooting [the victims]. Rather, his claim boils down to asserting that he

is legally innocent because his conduct is justified or mitigated by the doctrines of selfdefense or heat of passion . . . .” Ellis v. Hargett, 302 F.3d 1182, 1186 n.1 (10th Cir. 2002)

(emphasis in original). 

The Supreme Court has held that “a federal court may hear the merits of successive

claims if the failure to hear the claims would constitute a ‘miscarriage of justice.’” Sawyer

v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992). The miscarriage of justice exception is also known as

the “actual innocence” exception. Id. The Supreme Court explained that “the actual

innocence exception also apples to procedurally defaulted claims.” Id. There are two types

of actual innocence claims that a petitioner might bring—procedural and substantive. The

Supreme Court explained the distinction between these two types of innocence claims in

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). The Court stated that “it is important to explain the

difference between Schlup’s claim of actual innocence and the claim of actual innocence

asserted in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993).”

Schlup, 513 U.S. at 313–14. 

The claim brought in Herrera was that the execution of an innocent person would

violate the Eighth Amendment, “even if the proceedings that had resulted in his conviction

and sentence were entirely fair and error free.” Id. Schlup’s claim of innocence, on the other

hand, was “procedural, rather than substantive.” Id. at 314. Schlup’s claims were not “based

on his innocence, but rather on his contention that the ineffectiveness of his counsel . . . and

the withholding of evidence by the prosecution . . . denied him the full panoply of protections

afforded to criminal defendants by the constitution.” Id. “Schlup’s claim of innocence is thus

‘not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner

must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.’” Id.

at 315. 

The Supreme Court went on to explain that because of the type of claim brought by

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Schlup—that his conviction was the result of constitutional violations, and not the result of

an error free trial—“his evidence of innocence need carry less of a burden.” Id. at 316. “The

evidence must establish sufficient doubt about his guilt to justify the conclusion that his

execution would be a miscarriage of justice unless his conviction was the product of a fair

trial.” Id. (emphasis in original). The Court then discussed the difference between two

competing standards. The Supreme Court gave the first standard in Murray v. Carrier, 477

U.S. 478 (1986). This standard required the petitioner to show that “the constitutional error

‘probably’ resulted in the conviction of one who was actually innocent.’” Schlup, 513 U.S.

at 322. The second was a higher standard given in Sawyer v. Whitley, which required the

petitioner to show “by clear and convincing evidence” that no reasonable juror would have

found the petitioner guilty. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 323. The Supreme Court held that the Carrier

“probably” standard was the appropriate standard “when the claimed injustice is that

constitutional error has resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent of the

crime.” Id. at 324. 

In order for the petitioner to meet the Carrier “actual innocence” burden of proof, he

must show a constitutional violation has “probably” resulted in his conviction. Id. at 327.

Therefore, “the petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror

would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Id. This standard requires more than

a showing of prejudice, but is less than Sawyer’s standard of “clear and convincing

evidence.” Id. However, the analysis must always “incorporate the understanding that proof

beyond a reasonable doubt marks the legal boundary between guilt and innocence.” Id. at

328. The court is able to consider all evidence and is not bound “by the rules of admissibility

that would govern at trial.” Id. at 327–328. 

III. Analysis

Petitioner’s objections are divided into three sections: (1) Legal Innocence, (2) Factual

Innocence, and (3) Actual Innocence. The Court will consider the evidence provided under

Petitioner’s claim for “Legal Innocence” because the Court is to consider all available

evidence in determining Petitioner’s claim of actual innocence. Petitioner claims that he is

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legally innocent of the crime of attempted kidnapping because “the state prosecutor stated

to the court that there were problems with their case . . . and that he could not convict the

petitioner as charged by the indictment.” (Doc. 11, 2). However, the indictment to which

petitioner refers was a charge of child molestation, not attempted kidnapping. (Doc. 12, 3).

There was no indictment for the charge of attempted kidnapping. Petitioner stipulated to a

guilty plea under Alford in exchange for having the indictment dismissed. (Id., 5–6). Even

if Petitioner were referring to the attempted kidnapping plea when he referred to the charge

in the indictment, there is no new evidence that Petitioner has brought forward that makes

it more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him. 

Petitioner has likewise provided no new evidence in his claims for “Factual

Innocence” and “Actual Innocence.” Petitioner claims that “[t]here are no supporting facts

to support the crime of attempted kidnap [sic] and, an Alford plea does not allow the state

to charge a person of a crime where no facts can support that crime.” (Doc. 11, 3). However,

as part of the Alford plea, the court found that there was “factual basis for the plea.” (Doc.

7, Ex. C, 2) See Brownlow, 66 F.3d at 999 n.2 (when there is an Alford plea, “the court

accepting the plea must determine that there is ‘strong evidence of actual guilt.’”). Petitioner

has not provided any new evidence that would cast a doubt on the finding made by the court

pursuant to the Alford plea. Therefore, Petitioner has not met the burden of showing that his

conviction was “probably” based on a constitutional error.

As indicated above, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Petitioner’s claims were not

exhausted in state court and procedurally defaulted. Petitioner attempted to overcome this

conclusion by arguing actual, legal, or factual innocence as an exception to the exhaustion

requirement. Thus, Petitioner had to meet his burden of proving one of his theories of

innocence before the Court could consider the merits of his claims. Because Petitioner failed

to meet this burden, the Court finds that Petitioner has not shown an exception to overcome

his procedural default of his claims. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court will accept the recommendation of the R&R that

the Court find Petitioner’s claims defaulted. Thus, the Court will not consider the merits of

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those claims and will deny the Petition. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 10)

is ACCEPTED and ADOPTED;

The Objections to the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 11) are OVERRULED and

the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

DATED this 13th day of April, 2011.

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