Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01983/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01983-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Mike W. Morgan, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of 

Social Security, 

Defendant. 

No. CV12-1983 PHX DGC

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Mike W. Morgan applied for disability insurance benefits and 

supplemental security income on May 13, 2008, claiming to have been disabled as of 

September 15, 2006. Tr. 165. His claim was denied initially on September 18, 2009 

(Tr. 90-93), and upon reconsideration on January 6, 2009 (Tr. 99-101). Plaintiff was 

granted a video teleconference hearing in which he appeared in Phoenix, Arizona, before 

an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) who presided over the hearing from San Jose, 

California, on November 9, 2010. Tr. 25, 42. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not 

disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Tr. 25-37. The ALJ’s decision 

became Defendant’s final decision when the Appeals Council denied review on July 26, 

2012. Tr. 1-3. Plaintiff then commenced this action for judicial review pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Doc. 1. The parties have not requested oral argument. For reasons 

that follow, the Court will affirm Defendant’s decision. 

I. Standard of Review.

Defendant’s decision to deny benefits will be vacated “only if it is not supported 

Case 2:12-cv-01983-DGC Document 21 Filed 08/12/13 Page 1 of 14
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 

880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). “‘Substantial evidence’ means more than a mere scintilla, but 

less than a preponderance, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. In determining whether the decision is 

supported by substantial evidence, the Court must consider the record as a whole, 

weighing both the evidence that supports the decision and the evidence that detracts from 

it. Reddick v. Charter, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). The Court cannot affirm the 

decision “simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Day v. 

Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975); see Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882. 

II. Analysis. 

 For purposes of Social Security benefits determinations, a disability is “the 

inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has 

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1505. Determining whether a claimant is disabled involves a five-step 

evaluation. The claimant bears the burden in steps one through four of showing that 

(1) he is not engaged in a substantial gainful activity, (2) he has a severe medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment, and (3) the impairment meets or equals a 

listed impairment or (4) his residual functional capacity (“RFC”) precludes him from 

performing his past work.1

 If at any step the Commissioner determines that a claimant is 

or is not disabled, the analysis ends; otherwise it proceeds to step five. The 

Commissioner bears the burden at step five of showing that the claimant has the RFC to 

perform other work that exists in substantial numbers in the national economy. 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v) & 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v). 

 The ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 

 1

 RFC is the most a claimant can do in light of the limitations caused by his impairments. See Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir. 1989); 

20 C.F.R. § 416.945 (a); SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996). 

Case 2:12-cv-01983-DGC Document 21 Filed 08/12/13 Page 2 of 14
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

activity since his alleged onset date. Tr. 27. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 

suffered from the following severe impairments: idiopathic sensory peripheral 

polyneuropathy and moderate lumbar degenerative disc disease. Id. The ALJ determined 

at step three that none of these impairments or their combination met or equaled a listed 

impairment. Tr. 33. The ALJ then considered the entire record and determined that 

Plaintiff has the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 

416.967(b) with the following restrictions: stand for no more than two hours in an eighthour workday; no more than occasionally push, pull, balance, climb stairs or ramps, and 

operate foot controls with the lower extremities; never climb ladders, ramps, or scaffolds; 

no more than frequently stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; and avoid moderate exposure to 

environments with unprotected heights and rapidly moving machinery. Tr. 33. At step 

four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled because he was capable of 

performing his past relevant work. Tr. 37. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by improperly weighing medical opinions 

(Doc. 13 at 7-17) and by improperly rejecting his symptom allegations (id. at 17-24). 

Defendant contends the decision is supported by substantial evidence and free from legal 

error. Doc. 15 at 1. 

 A. Medical Opinion Evidence. 

 “The ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 

533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); SSR 96-5p, 

1996 WL 374183, at *2 (July 2, 1996). Regarding the weight that an ALJ should give to 

a particular medical opinion, the Ninth Circuit distinguishes between the opinions of 

treating physicians, examining physicians, and non-examining physicians. See Lester v. 

Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1996). “The ALJ need not accept the opinion of any 

physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and 

inadequately supported by clinical findings.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 

(9th Cir. 2002). The ALJ may reject the opinion of a treating or examining physician by 

making “findings setting forth specific legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on 

Case 2:12-cv-01983-DGC Document 21 Filed 08/12/13 Page 3 of 14
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

substantial evidence in the record.” Id. “The ALJ can meet this burden by setting out a 

detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating 

h[er] interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Id. 

 Opinions of examining or consulting physicians alone may constitute substantial 

evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision when they are consistent with other evidence in 

the record. See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he reports 

of consultative physicians . . . may serve as substantial evidence.”); Morgan v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec. Admin, 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Opinions of a nonexamining, 

testifying medical advisor may serve as substantial evidence when they are supported by 

other evidence in the record and are consistent with it.”); Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957 (“The 

opinions of non-treating or non-examining physicians may . . . serve as substantial 

evidence when the opinions are consistent with independent clinical findings or other 

evidence in the record.”); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f) (stating that the opinions of 

non-examining physicians constitute medical evidence). 

 1. Drs. Jose Pierrend, M.D., and Richard Tapia, M.D.

 Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Pierrend, completed a work-related activities 

assessment in September 2009. Tr. 516. Dr. Tapia, Plaintiff’s other treating physician, 

completed a similar assessment in October 2010. Tr. 697. In their assessments, 

Drs. Pierrend and Tapia both opine that Plaintiff suffers from moderate to moderately 

severe pain and is unable to work fulltime on a regular and consistent basis.2

 Tr. 515-16, 

696-97. Dr. Pierrend opined that in an eight-hour workday, Plaintiff could sit and stand 

for less than one hour, and lift and carry between 10 and 20 pounds. Tr. 696. Dr. Tapia 

opined that in an eight-hour workday, Plaintiff could sit and stand for less than two hours, 

and lift and carry between 10 and 15 pounds. Id. 

 The ALJ gave both treating physicians’ opinions “little weight.” Tr. 36. The ALJ 

 

2

 The Court addresses the opinions of Drs. Pierrend and Tapia together because the ALJ did (Tr. 36) and Plaintiff’s brief does the same (Doc. 13 at 7-14). 

Case 2:12-cv-01983-DGC Document 21 Filed 08/12/13 Page 4 of 14
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

found that the opinions of Drs. Pierrend and Tapia were “too restrictive” and 

“inconsistent” with their own objective findings and the medical findings of other 

medical specialists who found normal neurological processes as well as equal and full 

motor strength. Id. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff met with Dr. Pierrend in 

September 2009, when the medical assessment was completed, but did not follow up with 

Dr. Pierrend again until July 2010. The ALJ therefore “question[ed] the extent of 

[Dr. Pierrend’s] treatment with the claimant.” Id. The ALJ noted that Dr. Tapia’s 

treatment notes show that he treated Plaintiff primarily for hypertension, suggesting that 

“Dr. Tapia might not be in the best position to understand the limitations of the 

claimant’s sensory peripheral neuropathy.” Id. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff visited a 

pain clinic for foot pain, but otherwise did not seek treatment for his alleged impairments 

from December 2009 to September 2010. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff likely would 

have sought “more frequent and substantial treatment” during this time if his restrictions 

had been as severe as suggested by Drs. Pierrend and Tapia. Id. 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not provide clear and convincing reasons to 

discount the opinions and, in discounting the opinions, that the ALJ did not comply with 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. Doc. 13 at 9-13. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff points to 

treatment notes allegedly indicating that his pain is consistent with objective findings (id.

at 8-9 (citing Tr. 290, 359, 362; 429, 512; 520-30, 734; 736-39)), but has not pointed to 

the treatment notes of either Dr. Pierrend or Dr. Tapia, and thus has not shown that the 

ALJ erred in finding their opinions inconsistent with their own objective findings. Id. at 

8-10. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in discounting the opinions of Drs. Pierrend and 

Tapia by “offering a conclusion that the claimant was responding to treatment” (id. at 

11), but that was not a reason the ALJ provided for discounting the opinions. See Tr. 36. 

The ALJ rejected the opinions of Drs. Pierrend and Tapia by providing a lengthy 

evaluation of the medical evidence (Tr. 27-33, 35) and pointing to clinical evidence that 

does not comport with the restrictiveness of their opinions. This does not constitute legal 

error. See Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957. The Court finds that the ALJ provided clear and 

Case 2:12-cv-01983-DGC Document 21 Filed 08/12/13 Page 5 of 14
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

convincing reasons, described above, for discounting the opinions of Drs. Pierrend and 

Tapia. 

 2. Dr. William Allison, Ph.D., Psychology.

 Dr. Allison completed a psychological examination of Plaintiff on September 10, 

2008. Tr. 372. Dr. Allison’s notes from the examination indicate that Plaintiff’s chief 

complaints were “neuropathy and ‘stroke.’” Tr. 373. Plaintiff reported that he drove 32 

miles roundtrip to get to the appointment and that he had no problems driving (Tr. 372), 

reported that he sleeps eight hours a night, that his appetite is good, and that he remains 

interested and motivated (Tr. 373). Dr. Allison noted that Plaintiff exhibited a clear 

sensorium, fluent speech without pressure, logical and goal-directed thinking, appropriate 

affect, euthymic mood, intact judgment, poor insight, and no psychotic symptoms. 

Tr. 375. On the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III (“WAIS-III”), Plaintiff obtained an 

89 full-scale IQ score, which is in the low average range. Tr. 375-76. On the Wechsler 

Memory Scale III (“WMS-III”), Plaintiff obtained memory index scores ranging from 

superior to low average. Tr. 377-78. Dr. Allison diagnosed Plaintiff as being status post 

transient ischemic attack and with a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of 

71.3

 Tr. 379. Based on the evaluation, Dr. Allison noted that Plaintiff “demonstrated no 

loss in cognitive abilities due to his transient ischemic attack.” Id. Additionally, 

Dr. Allison concluded that “[t]here is no indication from the psychological testing or the 

interview today of any cognitive difficulties which would preclude him from working. 

He has no emotional or psychological difficulties that would require treatment.” Id. 

Dr. Allison further opined that Plaintiff did not have a condition that would impose any 

limitation for 12 months. Tr. 380. The ALJ gave “significant weight” to Dr. Allison’s 

 

3

 The GAF scale ranges from 1 to 100 and reflects a person=s overall 

psychological, social, and occupational functioning. See Morgan, 169 F.3d at 598 n.1;

Vargas v. Lambert, 159 F.3d 1161, 1164 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998). A GAF score of 41 to 50 

indicates severe symptoms or severe difficulty in functioning, while a GAF score of 51 to 60 indicates moderate symptoms or moderate difficulty in functioning. See id. 

Case 2:12-cv-01983-DGC Document 21 Filed 08/12/13 Page 6 of 14
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

opinion, finding that the “opinion is consistent with his medical findings as well as [the] 

paucity of psychiatric treatment.” Tr. 36-37. 

 Plaintiff argues that Dr. Allison failed to review Plaintiff’s medical records 

predating his 2007 transient ischemic attack and, “[d]ue to this failure, Dr. Allison was 

precluded from making a comparison with [Plaintiff]’s mental state pre transient 

ischemic attack.” Doc. 13 at 14-15. Plaintiff submits that the “[t]he combined effect of 

the impairments” resulting from his transient ischemic attack “were not addressed or 

factored into Dr. Allison’s conclusions.” Id. at 15. Based on this failure, Plaintiff argues 

that “it was error for the ALJ to interpret the opinion as demonstrating a lack of 

exertional and non-exertional limitation.” Id. 

 Plaintiff’s argument is wholly unpersuasive. Dr. Allison performed a 

psychological evaluation (Tr. 372-82) and, based on that independent evaluation, offered 

an opinion about Plaintiff’s psychological and psychiatric limitations. Dr. Allison did not 

provide a consultative assessment based on other physicians’ treatment notes, and did not 

offer an opinion about Plaintiff’s exertional limitations. Plaintiff concedes that 

“Dr. Allison’s opinion as to whether a psychiatric impairment exists was entitled to 

significant weight.” Doc. 13 at 15. Because this was the only opinion Dr. Allison 

provided, the ALJ’s decision to rely on it in assessing Plaintiff’s psychological and 

psychiatric limitations did not constitute legal error. 

 3. Dr. Teresa Pavese, M.D. 

Dr. Pavese, a state agency medical consultant, reviewed Plaintiff’s medical 

records and completed a physical RFC assessment on August 19, 2008. Tr. 364-71. As 

to Plaintiff’s exertional limitations, the assessment indicates that Plaintiff could 

occasionally lift 20 pounds, frequently lift 10 pounds, sit for about six hours in an eighthour workday, and had a limited ability to push and pull in his lower extremities. 

Tr. 365. The report indicates that Plaintiff has “diminished sensation in both lower 

extremities” and, because of this, “could only occasionally use his legs for feeling, as per 

peddling, etc.” Tr. 366. As to Plaintiff’s postural limitations, the assessment indicates 

Case 2:12-cv-01983-DGC Document 21 Filed 08/12/13 Page 7 of 14
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

that Plaintiff could occasionally climb a ramp or stairs, that he could never climb a 

ladder, rope, or scaffolds, that he could occasionally balance, and that he could frequently 

kneel, crouch and crawl. Id. Dr. Pavese found no manipulative, visual, or 

communicative limitations. Tr. 367-68. As to environmental limitations, Dr. Pavese 

opined that Plaintiff must avoid moderate exposure to hazards like machinery and 

heights, but was otherwise not limited. Tr. 368. 

 Plaintiff submits that Dr. Pavese “did not dispute moderate to moderately severe 

pain” (Doc. 13 at 15) and “found [Plaintiff] to suffer a lack of sleep at night” (id. at 16), 

and that these findings “are not inconsistent with treating physician opinions and 

symptom reporting” (id.). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s failure to discuss Dr. Pavese’s 

opinion of pain and fatigue was error. Id. The Court disagrees. Dr. Pavese assessed 

Plaintiff’s RFC, and, in doing so, reviewed all the evidence in Plaintiff’s file (Tr. 364), 

including evidence indicating that Plaintiff suffers from painful sensory peripheral 

polyneuropathy, has chronic bilateral foot pain, and suffers from obstructive sleep apnea, 

and uses medicines that cause daytime drowsiness. Based on this, Dr. Pavese assessed 

Plaintiff’s RFC. Dr. Pavese did not offer an opinion about Plaintiff’s pain and fatigue; 

she merely reviewed evidence showing that Plaintiff suffered from pain and fatigue.4

 A 

consultative physician’s review and description of evidence is not medical opinion 

evidence. Accordingly, the Court cannot find that the ALJ erred in failing to evaluate the 

portion of Dr. Pavese’s assessment that referred to evidence indicating Plaintiff suffers 

 

4

 Plaintiff cites to the vocational expert’s hearing testimony and argues that “such pain would preclude sustained full time competitive employment.” Doc. 13 at 15 n.5 

(citing Tr. 79, 80). The vocational expert testified that someone with an ability to do work-related physical activities as opined by Dr. Tapia (Tr. 696-97) “would not be able to 

perform any work” (Tr. 80). Dr. Tapia’s assessment indicates that Plaintiff’s moderately severe pain would further limit his ability to sustain fulltime work. Tr. 697. Dr. Pavese’s 

RFC assessment does not indicate that Plaintiff suffers from “moderate to moderately severe pain” (Doc. 13 at 15). Accordingly, the Court cannot find that if the ALJ had 

accorded any weight to the portion of Dr. Pavese’s assessment that summarizes medical 

evidence that the ALJ would have been required to find Plaintiff disabled based on the 

vocational expert’s testimony. 

Case 2:12-cv-01983-DGC Document 21 Filed 08/12/13 Page 8 of 14
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

from pain and fatigue. 

 Although the ALJ’s decision does not refer to Dr. Pavese’s opinion, the ALJ does 

appear to have afforded the opinion some weight because, as Plaintiff submits, “the 

ALJ’s [RFC] assessment is similar to that assessed by Dr. Pavese.” Doc. 19 at 6; 

compare Tr. 33 with Tr. 365-68. Plaintiff argues that evidence in the record does not 

support Dr. Pavese’s opinion because she completed the assessment two years before the 

hearing and did not set forth the records she reviewed.5

 Doc. 19 at 7. Dr. Pavese did not 

specifically indicate which medical records she relied upon in making the RFC 

assessment, but her explanation demonstrates that she relied upon records from 1993 

through 2008. Tr. 365-66. Accordingly, the Court does not agree that Dr. Pavese’s 

opinion is unsupported by record evidence. Plaintiff argues that Dr. Pavese’s opinion is 

inconsistent with other medical evidence because it “is markedly different from all other 

opinions in the file and ignores significant findings from lumbar and cervical spine 

MRIs.” Doc. 19 at 7. Dr. Pavese’s opinion is not consistent with the opinions of 

Drs. Pierrend and Tapia, but the ALJ properly discounted those opinions, and her opinion 

is consistent with the medical evidence summarized by the ALJ. See Tr. 35. Plaintiff 

attempts to discredit Dr. Pavese’s opinion by stating that she is “an ophthalmologist and 

not board certified in any specialty.” Doc. 19 at 7. As a state agency medical consultant, 

the ALJ was obligated to consider Dr. Pavese’s opinion regardless of Plaintiff’s 

allegations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e). Because Dr. Pavese’s opinion is consistent 

with other evidence in the record, and the ALJ’s RFC assessment mirrored her RFC 

assessment, her opinion constitutes substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s RFC 

assessment. See Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957; Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 752. Any error in the 

 

5

 In his reply brief, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in affording any weight to Dr. Pavese’s opinion. Doc. 19 at 7. Although the Court has considered and rejected the argument, the Court notes that it need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a 

reply brief. Lentini v. Cal. Ctr. for Arts, 370 F.3d 837 n.6 (9th Cir. 2004); Gadda v. State 

Bar of Cal., 511 F.3d 933, 937 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Case 2:12-cv-01983-DGC Document 21 Filed 08/12/13 Page 9 of 14
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

ALJ’s failure to refer to Dr. Pavese’s opinion is harmless. See Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 

1038 (“the court will not reverse an ALJ’s decision for harmless error, which exists when 

it is clear from the record that the ALJ’s error was inconsequential to the ultimate 

nondisability determination.” (quotation marks and citations omitted)). 

 B. Plaintiff’s Testimony. 

Plaintiff testified that he lives in a friend’s house with his wife and that friend. 

Tr. 59. Plaintiff stated that he spends his typical day watching television, that he goes 

grocery shopping with his wife for 45 minutes to an hour each week, and that he 

occasionally sees his grandchildren. Tr. 57-59, 71. Plaintiff stated that he has not been 

able to work because he forgets things, has pain and numbness in his feet, pain in his 

lower back, and numbness in his fingers and hands. Tr. 59, 61. Plaintiff described 

having had a stroke in 2005, and stated that after the stroke he suffered from weakness, 

numbness, a generally weaker left side, and memory problems. Tr. 63-64. Plaintiff 

testified that he had a transient ischemic attack – a stroke like incident – in 2007. Tr. 65. 

Plaintiff stated that after the attack he continued to have problems with the left side of his 

body as well as memory and concentration problems. Tr. 65-66. 

 Plaintiff rated his pain as a seven on a scale of one to ten, with ten being “terrible 

pain.” Tr. 60. Plaintiff described having muscle spasms in the tops of his feet, sharp 

pains on the sides of his feet, and numbness and weakness in his feet. Tr. 60-61. 

Plaintiff testified that he sometimes falls because of the loss of feeling in his feet (Tr. 61) 

and that standing too long aggravates his feet pain (Tr. 62). Plaintiff described his back 

pain as “something slipping around,” and stated that the pain is not as bad as his feet pain 

and that it is constant and worsens at night. Tr. 61. Plaintiff testified that bending and 

kneeling aggravates his back pain. Tr. 62. Plaintiff stated that he must sit or lie down 

because of his back pain and that morphine helps to alleviate the pain somewhat. Id. 

Plaintiff described feeling drowsy and lightheaded from the morphine. Tr. 71. Plaintiff 

described having chronic numbness and achiness in his hands, and stated that he 

frequently drops things and has problems grasping because of this ailment. Tr. 63. 

Case 2:12-cv-01983-DGC Document 21 Filed 08/12/13 Page 10 of 14
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Plaintiff stated that his memory problems cause him to forget things, and that he uses task 

lists but still forgets things on his lists. Tr. 66. Plaintiff stated that he has concentration 

problems that make it difficult for him to follow conversations. Id. Plaintiff stated that 

his memory and concentration problems are constant. Tr. 66-67. Plaintiff testified that 

he has high blood pressure that is currently under control with medication. Tr. 67. 

Plaintiff stated that he suffers from chronic kidney disease that causes him to have to go 

to the bathroom more frequently than normal. Id. 

 Plaintiff testified that he can sit for about a half hour before he needs to stand 

because of his feet and back pain. Tr. 68. Plaintiff testified that he can stand for about a 

half hour before he has to sit down because of his pain. Id. Plaintiff stated that he gets 

shortness of breath and that he can walk for about 15 to 20 minutes before his pain 

intensifies. Tr. 69. Plaintiff described having to lie down and elevate his legs about three 

to four times a day. Tr. 70. Plaintiff stated that he has difficulties falling asleep and 

waking up. Tr. 69. Plaintiff testified that he cannot return to his past work fulltime and 

that he cannot perform any work fulltime because he cannot sit or stand for very long. 

Tr. 71-72. 

The ALJ concluded Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, 

and limiting effects of his symptoms were not credible to the extent they are inconsistent 

with the RFC assessment. Tr. 34. In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ evaluated 

Plaintiff’s testimony using the two-step analysis established by the Ninth Circuit. 

See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). Applying the test of Cotton v. 

Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1986), the ALJ first determined that Plaintiff’s 

impairments could reasonably produce the symptoms alleged. Tr. 34. Given this 

conclusion, and because there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ was required to 

present “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for finding Plaintiff not entirely credible. 

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281. This clear and convincing standard “is the most demanding 

required in Social Security cases.” Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 

924 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Case 2:12-cv-01983-DGC Document 21 Filed 08/12/13 Page 11 of 14
- 12 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected his subjective complaints by not 

specifying which statements are not credible and explaining why. Doc. 13 at 19. The 

Court disagrees. The ALJ’s RFC assessment indicates that the ALJ found Plaintiff’s 

statements about his ability to sit and stand not credible. In rejecting that testimony, the 

ALJ first found the objective medical evidence inconsistent and unsupportive of 

Plaintiff’s allegations, and second, the ALJ found Plaintiff not credible due to 

inconsistencies in his testimony and inconsistencies between his testimony and his daily 

activities. 

 As to the first, the ALJ examined the objective evidence of record and made the 

following findings: (1) physical therapy notes showed improved peripheral neuropathy, 

balance, and agility; (2) evaluation notes indicated normal posture and gait with no 

unusual motor movements; (3) a September 2010 physical examination showed no 

edema, full and equal strength, and no neurological deficits; (4) physical examinations 

found normal neurological processes and treatment notes indicated stable processes; 

(5) EEGs, lumbar MRIs and some EMG testing indicated no significant abnormality as to 

muscle atrophy, gait, and motor loss; (6) subsequent clinical findings – including normal 

brain MRI, normal EEG, normal IQ, and normal memory function – confirmed no 

permanent residual impact from Plaintiff’s transient ischemic attack; (7) lab reports 

showed no significant abnormalities of kidney functions; and (8) a psychological 

examination showed a mood disorder that was nondurational and not acute. Tr. 35-36. 

In noting the above, the ALJ found that that “the evidence as a whole does not support 

that [Plaintiff’s] impairments are as severe as alleged.” Tr. 36. Plaintiff does not appear 

to argue that the ALJ improperly rejected his subjective symptom testimony due to a lack 

of supporting objective evidence, but, in any event, the Court finds that the ALJ did not 

err in finding the objective medical evidence inconsistent and not supportive of Plaintiff’s 

pain allegations. See Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 

(9th Cir. 2008) (“Contradiction with the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting 

the claimant’s subjective testimony.”) (citation omitted); Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Case 2:12-cv-01983-DGC Document 21 Filed 08/12/13 Page 12 of 14
- 13 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004) (lack of objective medical evidence 

supporting claimant’s allegations supported ALJ’s finding that claimant was not 

credible). 

 As to the second, the ALJ noted Plaintiff’s testimony about experiencing shortness 

of breath (Tr. 69), and found that this testimony was inconsistent with treatment notes 

indicating that Plaintiff denied shortness of breath. Tr. 36 (citing Tr. 267). The ALJ 

found that Plaintiff’s activities of daily living do not support his allegations of severity 

(Tr. 36), and, as an example, noted that Plaintiff described pain in his feet, but also 

reported driving 16 miles to an appointment and had indicated having no problems with 

driving (id (citing Tr. 372, 188)). The ALJ also found that treatment notes indicating that 

Plaintiff had performed “some physical labor” “suggest[ed] that his back pain was not as 

severe as alleged.” Tr. 36 (citing Tr. 432). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not explain 

what alleged limitation conflicts with what daily activity (Doc. 13 at 19), and specifically 

did “not cite any activity which demonstrates an ability to sustain a full time work pace, 

even at a sedentary level of exertion” (id. at 20). The Court disagrees. The ALJ properly 

considered inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s testimony and inconsistencies between his 

conduct and daily activities in finding his testimony incredible. See Thomas, 278 F.3d at 

958-59; see also Curry v. Astrue, No. 09-CV-2580-PHX-GMS, 2010 WL 3789535, at *6 

(D. Ariz. Sept. 22, 2010); Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680-81 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected his subjective complaints based 

on a finding that he was non-compliant with a prescribed treatment (Doc. 13 at 21-22), 

and that his condition was improving with a successful course of treatment (id. at 22-24). 

The ALJ did note that Plaintiff “refused an EMG of his upper extremities” and “did not 

fill out” a prescription (Tr. 35), but she did not offer this noncompliance as a reason to 

discredit Plaintiff’s testimony. The ALJ referenced the noncompliance in her discussion 

of the objective medical evidence only. Similarly, the ALJ did not discredit Plaintiff’s 

symptom allegations based on a finding that Plaintiff’s condition was improving. The 

ALJ referred to medical notes indicating that Plaintiff was feeling better (Tr. 35 

Case 2:12-cv-01983-DGC Document 21 Filed 08/12/13 Page 13 of 14
- 14 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(citing Tr. 357, 530, 572, 698)) in her summary of medical evidence that did not comport 

with Plaintiff’s complaints. 

 The Court concludes that inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s testimony and 

objective medical evidence, as well as inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s testimony itself, 

provide clear and convincing reasons, based upon substantial evidence, for discounting 

Plaintiff’s credibility. 

 IT IS ORDERED: 

 1. Defendant=s decision denying benefits is affirmed. 

 2. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly. 

 Dated this 12th day of August, 2013. 

Case 2:12-cv-01983-DGC Document 21 Filed 08/12/13 Page 14 of 14