Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01137/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01137-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Edvin Mita, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, 

Respondent.

No. CV-13-01137-PHX-NVW (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Edvin Mita (Petitioner), through counsel, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 raising two grounds for relief. (Doc. 1.) 

Respondents have filed an Answer asserting that Ground One lacks merit and that 

Ground Two is procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas corpus review. 

(Doc. 7.) Petitioner has filed a reply arguing that Ground Two is not procedurally 

defaulted and that he should prevail on the merits of Grounds One and Two. (Doc. 9.) 

For the reasons below, the Petition should be denied. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

A. Charges, Trial, and Sentencing 

 In April 2010, the State of Arizona charged Petitioner with eight counts of sexual 

assault, and related charges of possession of a narcotic drug and drug paraphernalia. 

(Doc. 7, Ex. A.) The charges stemmed from separate incidents, involving three women, 

which were alleged to have occurred on three nights in July and November 2009. (Id.) 

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In each incident, Petitioner allegedly sexually assaulted the women after spending time 

with them in a bar. (Id.) 

 On the government’s pretrial motion, the Maricopa County Superior Court (trial 

court) precluded Petitioner from introducing evidence of victim K.H.’s alleged financial 

difficulties on the ground that the probative value of that evidence was outweighed by the 

danger of prejudice and the potential for confusion. (Doc. 7, Ex. F at 37-41.) The trial 

court, however, did not preclude Petitioner from asking K.H. about specific conversations 

they had regarding her finances. (Id.) During trial, upon consideration of an offer of 

proof from Petitioner and counsel’s arguments, the trial court affirmed its ruling that 

evidence of K.H.’s finances was inadmissible under Arizona Rules of Evidence 402 and 

403. (Doc. 7, Ex. J at 4-12, Ex. Q at 167-181.) 

 In addition, during the discussion of jury instructions, Petitioner objected to the 

instruction regarding the definition of consent. He proposed an instruction to clarify that 

a victim could consent even if impaired by drugs or alcohol. (Doc. 7, Ex. S at 12-20.) 

The trial court denied Petitioner’s request for the additional instruction, but added 

language to clarify that the government had the burden of proving the “without consent” 

element.1

 (Id.) 

 

1

 The trial court instructed the jury on sexual assault as follows: 

The crime of sexual assault requires the State to prove any of the following: The defendant intentionally or knowingly caused another person to have oral contact with his penis 

without the other person’s consent; or the defendant 

intentionally or knowingly penetrated the vulva or anus of 

another person with a part of his body without the other person’s consent. 

Without consent includes but is not limited to any of the following: The victim is coerced by the immediate use or threatened use of force against a person or property; or the victim is incapable of consent by reasons of drugs, alcohol, sleep or any other similar impairment of cognition, and such condition is known or should have reasonably have been known to the defendant. 

(Doc. 7, Ex. T at 15-16.) 

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 On March 24, 2011, a jury found Petitioner guilty of sexual assault of K.H. (Count 

Fourteen), aggravated assault of K.H. (Count Fifteen), possession of a narcotic drug 

(Count Seventeen), and possession of drug paraphernalia (Count Eighteen), and acquitted 

Petitioner on the remaining felony counts. (Doc. 7, Ex. V.) After the jury was dismissed, 

the trial court found Petitioner guilty of the three misdemeanor charges tried to the bench 

(Counts Three, Four, and Sixteen). (Id.) 

 On April 26, 2011, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to consecutive terms of 

imprisonment totaling eleven years on the felony convictions. (Doc. 7, Ex. W.) The trial 

court sentenced Petitioner to time served for the misdemeanor convictions. (Id.) 

B. Direct Appeal 

 Petitioner, through counsel, timely appealed his convictions to the Arizona Court 

of Appeals. (Doc. 7, Ex. X at 5.) In his opening brief in the court of appeals, Petitioner 

raised four grounds for relief arguing that: (1) the trial court committed fundamental error 

by refusing to sever the charges; (2) the trial court erred by failing to sanction the 

government under “Rule 15.7” for its failure to disclose; (3) the trial court erred by 

refusing to allow cross examination of K.H. regarding her request to Petitioner for 

money; and (4) fundamental error occurred based on the trial court’s failure to instruct 

the jury on the mens rea applicable to the “without consent” element of sexual assault. 

(Id. at 19.) On June 12, 2012, the court of appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and 

sentences. (Doc. 7, Ex. AA.) 

 On August 10, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Supreme 

Court. (Doc. 7, Ex. BB.) The petition sought review on only the jury instruction claim. 

(Id.) On January 8, 2013, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review without comment. 

(Doc. 7, Ex. CC.) Petitioner did not initiate post-conviction relief proceedings. (Doc. 1 

at 2.) 

C. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

 On June 5, 2013, Petitioner filed the pending Petition claiming that the trial court 

erred in restricting his cross-examination of K.H. (Ground One), and that the trial court’s 

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jury instructions on sexual assault violated his rights under the Due Process Clause 

(Ground Two). (Doc. 1 at 9-10.) Respondents assert that Ground One, although properly 

before this Court, lacks merit, and that Ground Two is procedurally defaulted and barred 

from habeas corpus review. (Doc. 7.) Petitioner opposes Respondents’ arguments. 

(Doc. 9.) As discussed below, the Petition should be denied. 

II. Ground One — Confrontation Clause 

In Ground One, Petitioner argues that the trial court improperly precluded 

evidence and limited his cross-examination of K.H., one of the alleged victims, in 

violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The parties agree that 

Petitioner properly exhausted his Confrontation Clause claim asserted in Ground One on 

direct appeal. (Docs. 1, 7, 9.) Accordingly, the Court will review that claim under the 

standard of review applicable to claims on § 2254 review. 

 A. Standard of Review for Claims Adjudicated in State Court 

 If a habeas petition includes a claim that was “adjudicated on the merits in State 

court proceedings,” federal court review is limited by § 2254(d). Under § 2254(d)(1), a 

federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the petitioner shows: (1) that the state 

court’s decision “was contrary to” federal law as clearly established in the holdings of the 

United States Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision, Greene v. Fisher, __ 

U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 38, 43 (2011); or (2) that it “involved an unreasonable application of” 

such law, § 2254(d)(1); or (3) that it “was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts” in light of the record before the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011). This standard is “difficult to meet.” 

Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786. It is also a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state 

court rulings, which demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” 

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

 To determine whether a state court ruling was “contrary to” or involved an 

“unreasonable application” of federal law, courts look exclusively to the holdings of the 

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Supreme Court that existed at the time of the state court’s decision. Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 

44. A state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal law if it applies a rule of law “that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases or if it confronts a set of 

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and 

nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” Mitchell v.

Esparza, 540 U.S 12, 14 (2003) (citations omitted). A state court decision is an 

“unreasonable application of” federal law if the court identifies the correct legal rule, but 

unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of a particular case. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 

133, 141 (2005). “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal 

habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state 

court’s decision.’” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 

652, 664 (2004)). 

 “[E]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering 

the rule’s specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching 

outcomes in case-by-case determinations.” Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664. Although a 

criminal defendant has the right to confront the witnesses against him, the trial court 

“retain[s] wide latitude . . . to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based 

on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the 

issues, . . . or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Delaware v. 

Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986); see also Brown v. Ruane, 630 F.3d 62, 72-73 (1st 

Cir. 2011) (concluding that state trial court’s decision to limit cross-examination was 

“entitled to substantial deference under AEDPA” because of the “generality of the right 

[of cross-examination and] the substantial element of judgment required of trial courts in 

excluding defense evidence”). 

 Thus, because the legal rule concerning the scope of cross-examination is a 

general one, the Arizona Court of Appeals’ rejection of Petitioner’s claim is entitled to 

substantial deference under the AEDPA. See Walker v. Litscher, 421 F.3d 549, 557 (7th 

Cir. 2005) (“[R]ulings on Confrontation Clause issues are very fact-specific and involve 

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case-by-case determinations . . . making it difficult to call a state court ruling in this area 

‘objectively unreasonable’ [under AEDPA]”). 

Furthermore, even when a state court decision is deemed to be “contrary to” or an 

“unreasonable application of” clearly established federal law, a petitioner is not entitled 

to habeas corpus relief unless the erroneous state court ruling also resulted in actual 

prejudice as defined in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). See Benn v. 

Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). “Actual prejudice” means that the 

constitutional error at issue had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 631. 

B. The Trial Court’s Rulings Limiting Cross-Examination 

 Before trial, the state filed a motion in limine to preclude Petitioner from 

introducing evidence that K.H. had a default judgment entered against her and had filed 

for bankruptcy. (Doc. 7, Ex. B.) Petitioner objected to the state’s motion, asserting that 

several facts showed that K.H. had a motive to fabricate the allegations against Petitioner, 

including that K.H. thought Petitioner had a lot of money, K.H. researched Petitioner on 

the internet and learned that he had “an LLC,” and K.H. was having “severe financial 

problems.” (Doc. 7, Ex. C at 1-2.) 

 During a hearing on the state’s motion, the trial court asked why K.H.’s financial 

problems were relevant. (Doc. 7, Ex. F at 37.) Petitioner asserted that K.H.’s focus on 

Petitioner’s finances and her own financial problems provided a motive for her to bring 

false allegations against Petitioner. (Id. at 37-41.) Petitioner acknowledged that K.H. 

had not filed a civil suit against him. (Id. at 38.) After further argument from the parties, 

the trial court precluded Petitioner from introducing evidence related to K.H.’s 

bankruptcy, explaining that any probative value was substantially outweighed by the 

danger of prejudice and the potential for confusion of the issues under Arizona Rule of 

Evidence 403. (Id. at 40-41.) The trial court clarified that Petitioner was not precluded 

“from claiming motive on any of the victims’ parts for making . . . an unfounded 

accusation of nonconsensual sex.” (Id.) 

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 Before K.H. testified at trial, Petitioner asked to be allowed to question her about 

whether she had conversations with Petitioner about her financial difficulties, including 

an October 22, 2009 default judgment against her, and a civil lawsuit for “nonpayment 

since October 22, 2006.” (Doc. 7, Ex. J, at 4-10.) Defense counsel argued that K.H. had 

mentioned her financial problems to Petitioner, but he had “refused to assist her [with] 

any of her financial problems and told her so on November 18th and 19th [2009 (the 

alleged dates of the sexual assault)], as well as other times.” (Id. at 6.) Counsel argued 

that Petitioner’s refusal to help K.H. financially provided a motive for her to make false 

sexual-assault allegations against him. (Id. at 6-7, 9.) 

 In response, the state argued that Petitioner’s theory was speculative and 

emphasized that K.H., who allegedly wanted money from Petitioner, had not filed any 

action asserting a financial claim against Petitioner. (Id. at 8.) The state indicated that it 

had no objection to Petitioner asking K.H. if she had ever asked Petitioner for money, but 

argued that Petitioner should not be able to ask K.H. about the details of her personal 

finances. (Id. at 9.) The trial court ruled that Petitioner could question K.H. about any 

conversations with Petitioner about her finances, but that he was precluded from 

introducing specific information about K.H.’s “financial difficulties outside of [the] case” 

because such information would be “collateral, speculative, and an undue waste of 

time . . . .” (Id. at 10-11.) The trial court clarified that if K.H. denied having discussed 

her finances with Petitioner, she could not be impeached with evidence of the default 

judgment or about another civil suit for “nonpayment since October 26, 2009.” (Doc. 7, 

Ex. J at 4-5, 11.) 

 On cross-examination, K.H. stated that she believed Petitioner was “successful,” 

that he had had recently returned from Europe when she first met him, he “dressed very 

well,” he owned two Mercedes Benz vehicles, he had an LLC, he “was treated like a 

VIP,” and he might have access to a private plane. (Doc. 7, Ex. K at 149-52.) K.H. also 

testified that when she first met Petitioner, he made it sound as if he “had a driver.” (Id.

at 150.) K.H., however, denied that she had asked Petitioner for money and stated that 

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she could not recall whether she had discussed her finances with Petitioner. (Id. at 152, 

156-57.) 

 During his testimony, Petitioner stated that on November 19, 2009, the date of the 

alleged sexual assault, K.H. had told him that she had “financial problems.” (Doc. 7, 

Ex. Q at 167.) When the government objected to this line of questioning, the trial court 

excused the jury and allowed Petitioner to make an offer of proof on this subject. (Id. at 

167-68.) Petitioner stated that K.H. told him she was over a “[h]undred plus, thousand” 

in debt, K.H. said she was “stressed out” and “had a couple of lawsuits against 

her,” K.H. repeatedly asked about his “business,” and, although “there was never a direct 

question,” there was “an implication” that K.H. wanted him to give her money. (Id. at 

168-71, 174.) Petitioner also said that he had a phone conversation with K.H. about her 

financial problems on February 7, 2010, and that he had told her he was not going to give 

her any money. (Id. at 172-74.) Petitioner added that he believed K.H. thought he “had 

money.” (Id. at 175.) 

 Petitioner wanted to argue that K.H. fabricated the allegations against him because 

he did not give her money. (Id. at 178.) After hearing argument from counsel, the trial 

court concluded, although bias of a victim is relevant, evidence of K.H.’s financial 

difficulties was inadmissible. (Id. at 175-80.) The trial court noted that K.H.’s and 

Petitioner’s general conversation about money did not “equate to a conversation about 

asking for money.” (Doc. 7, Ex. Q at 176.) The trial court concluded that “the 

implication, speculation that [the accusation of sexual assault] was made because of 

[K.H.’s] financial worries was speculative on both ends, whether she [had financial 

difficulties] at the time [of the alleged sexual assault] and whether there’s not been a 

direct [request for money].” (Doc. 7, Ex. Q at 179-180.) The trial court also noted that 

Petitioner’s theory was particularly speculative considering K.H.’s initial hesitancy to 

pursue criminal charges against Petitioner. (Id. at 179-80.) Accordingly, the trial court 

found evidence of K.H.’s finances inadmissible under Arizona Rules of Evidence 402 

and 403. (Doc. 7, Ex. Q at 180.) 

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C. The Court of Appeals’ Denial of Petitioner’s Claim 

 Petitioner argues that the trial court’s rulings limiting evidence of K.H.’s financial 

issues violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 

(Doc. 1 at 9.) The “main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the 

opponent the opportunity of cross-examination.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 

678 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Cross-examination is the principal 

means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested[, 

allowing the cross-examiner] . . . to delve into the witness’ story to test the witness' 

perceptions and memory . . . [and] to impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness.” Davis v. 

Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974). 

 In general, a trial court violates the Confrontation Clause only when it prevents a 

defendant from examining a particular and relevant topic, such as bias. Hayes v. Ayers, 

632 F.3d 500, 518 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that “the Supreme Court has consistently held 

that a Confrontation Clause violation occurs when a trial judge prohibits any inquiry into 

why a witness may be biased.”); see Davis, 415 U.S. at 316 (“[T]he cross-examiner 

is . . . permitted to delve into the witness’ story to test the witness’ perceptions and 

memory, [and] . . . has traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, the 

witness.”). However, when the trial court permits some inquiry regarding bias, the trial 

court has “wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination. No 

Confrontation Clause violation occurs as long as the jury receives sufficient information 

to appraise the biases and motivations of the witness.” Id. 

 The Supreme Court has emphasized that the right to cross-examination is limited 

to the guarantee of “an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not crossexamination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might 

wish.” Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, 

“trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to 

impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among 

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other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or 

interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Id. 

 On direct appeal in the state court proceedings, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

determined that Petitioner had not shown that the trial court had violated his rights under 

the Confrontation Clause by limiting his cross examination of K.H. Here, in his pending 

habeas petition, Petitioner has not shown that the appellate court’s resolution of his 

Confrontation Clause claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, 

controlling Supreme Court precedent. See Nevada v. Jackson, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 

1990, 1992-94 (2013) (concluding that state court’s ruling barring rape defendant from 

presenting extrinsic evidence of victim’s prior accusations of sexual assault was not an 

unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent when, among other things, the 

proffered evidence had little impeachment value); Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 770 

(2006) (“[W]ell-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its 

probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion 

of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.”); Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 

326-27 (2006) (“[W]e have stated that the Constitution permits judges to exclude 

evidence that is repetitive, only marginally relevant or poses an undue risk of harassment, 

prejudice, or confusion of the issues.”). 

 In concluding that the trial court did not err in precluding evidence of K.H.’s 

financial difficulties, the appellate court cited the controlling Supreme Court precedent 

and explained that any “financial difficulties that [K.H.] might have had at the time of the 

alleged sexual assault had little or no relevance” on the record before the trial court. 

(Doc. 7, Ex. AA at 14-15 (citing Davis, 415 U.S. at 316-18).) The appellate court also 

noted that K.H. “testified she had never asked [Petitioner] for money, a claim [Petitioner] 

did not later dispute.” (Id.) Additionally, Petitioner testified that “the only time he had 

actually told [K.H.] he was not going to give her any money was in February 2010, two 

months after she filed the assault report with police and a month after she agreed to 

prosecute,” and Petitioner’s theory that K.H. “had fabricated the allegations because he 

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refused to give her money was pure conjecture, not supported even by his own proffer 

under oath.” (Id.) The appellate court denied Petitioner’s Confrontation Clause claim, 

ruling that “the [trial] court’s ruling that defense counsel could ask [K.H.] about any 

conversations in which she asked [Petitioner] for money, but could not cross-examine her 

about her specific financial difficulties, was a reasonable limitation for the reasons cited 

by the court: the precluded inquiry involved a collateral issue, its relevance was based on 

speculation, and it would cause an undue waste of time.” (Id. at 15-16.) 

 As Petitioner conceded during his offer of proof, his theory that K.H. wanted him 

to give her money was based on his own inference that the combination of her financial 

difficulties and her curiosity about his source of income suggested that she wanted money 

from him. (Doc. 7, Ex. Q at 168-69.) After his offer of proof, Petitioner argued he had 

consensual sex with K.H. in the morning, and that she did not tell anyone that she had 

been sexually assaulted until later in the day; thus, Petitioner asserted, “something [must 

have] happened to upset” K.H. (Id. at 176.) According to Petitioner’s own testimony, 

however, K.H. did not ask him for money that day. (Id. at 169.) Further, Petitioner 

stated that he did not tell K.H. he would not give her money until several months after 

K.H. had gone to the police. (Id. at 174.) Additionally, Petitioner testified before the 

jury that he and K.H. had parted on “good terms” after he left her apartment on the day of 

the alleged assault. (Id. at 191.) 

 As the court of appeals found, the trial court’s limitation of cross-examination to 

preclude inquiry into K.H.’s personal finances did not violate the Confrontation Clause. 

Petitioner asserted that such information was relevant to his theory that K.H. was 

motivated to fabricate sexual assault charges against him because he had refused to help 

her financially. However, Petitioner’s offer of proof and his own trial testimony 

indicated that K.H. did not directly ask Petitioner for money. Rather Petitioner assumed 

that K.H. wanted money from him based on her discussions of her financial issues and 

her interest in his source of income. Additionally, although Petitioner testified that he 

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told K.H. he would not give her money, he stated that conversation occurred in February 

2010, several months after K.H. had reported the sexual assault to police. 

 The appellate court also reasonably concluded that Petitioner’s theory that K.H. 

fabricated the sexual assault charges because he had refused to give her money was 

speculative. Thus, the trial court did not violate the Confrontation Clause when it 

determined that specific evidence of K.H.’s financial issues — including her bankruptcy, 

a default judgment against her, and a suit against her to collect on an unpaid debt — was 

inadmissible as more prejudicial than probative of any relevant issue. 

 Although the trial court limited the cross-examination of K.H., it permitted 

Petitioner to inquire about his conversations with K.H. about her finances, including 

whether she had asked him for money. (Doc. 7, Ex. K at 61-159, Ex. Q at 180.) The trial 

court permitted some inquiry regarding K.H.’s bias, and thus it had “wide latitude to 

impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination.” Davis, 415 U.S. at 316. The state 

court record reflects that Petitioner had “an opportunity for effective cross-examination,” 

and the Confrontation Clause did not guarantee Petitioner the right to cross examine K.H. 

“to whatever extent” he wished. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679. 

 Because the Arizona Court of Appeals’ denial of Petitioner’s Confrontation Clause 

claim was consistent with Supreme Court precedent, it was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

Furthermore, as discussed above, the state court’s determination is entitled to substantial 

deference because Ground One involves the application of a general legal rule. See 

Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (noting that when a habeas claim 

involves “a general standard, a state court has even more latitude to reasonably 

determine” whether that standard has been violated). 

III. Ground Two — Jury Instructions 

 In Ground Two, Petitioner argues that the trial court’s jury instructions on sexual 

assault violated the “due process clause of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.” 

(Doc. 1 at 11.) Respondents argue that, although Petitioner challenged the jury 

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instructions in the Arizona Court of Appeals, he challenged the instructions on state law 

grounds and did not fairly present to the state court the federal claims asserted in his 

pending habeas petition. (Doc. 7 at 21-22.) As set forth below, the Court finds that 

Petitioner did not fairly present his federal claims to the state court and, therefore, these 

claims are now procedurally barred. 

 A. Limits on Federal Court Review

 Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) 

(“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly 

present’ his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the 

federal nature of the claim”); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (same). 

 “A claim has been “fairly presented” if the petitioner has described both the 

operative facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. Baldwin, 541 

U.S. at 33. A “state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court 

must read beyond a petition or brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal 

claim in order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” 

Id. at 31-32. Thus, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for 

purposes of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the 

proper forum . . . (2) through the proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper 

factual and legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). 

 The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes 

comity by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged 

violations of a state prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 

(2001); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also 

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require federal courts to respect state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s 

claims. See Coleman, 501 at 731 32. Pursuant to these principles, a habeas petitioner’s 

claims may be precluded from federal review in two situations. 

 First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas 

corpus review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but 

returning to state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such 

as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2002). If no state remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, 

but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. 

 Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raised a claim in 

state court, but the state court found the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See 

Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the 

State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claim has deprived the state 

courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. 

at 731-32. In this situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded if the state court 

opinion relies “on a state-law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the 

federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 

255, 260 (1989). 

 A state procedural ruling is “independent” if the application of the bar does not 

depend on an antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal claim. See Stewart v. Smith, 

536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985). A state court’s 

application of the procedural bar is “adequate” if it is “strictly or regularly followed.” 

See Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994). If the state court occasionally 

excuses non-compliance with a procedural rule, that does not render its procedural bar 

inadequate. See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410-12 n.6 (1989). “The independent 

and adequate state ground doctrine ensures that the States’ interest in correcting their own 

mistakes is respected in all federal habeas cases.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. Although a 

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procedurally barred claim has been exhausted, as a matter of comity, the federal court 

will decline to consider the merits of that claim. See id. at 729-32. 

 However, because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not 

jurisdiction, federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally 

defaulted claims. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). Generally, a federal court will 

not review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates 

“cause” for the failure to properly exhaust the claim in state court and “prejudice” from 

the alleged constitutional violation, or shows that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” 

would result if the claim were not heard on the merits. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), the court may dismiss plainly meritless 

claims regardless of whether the claim was properly exhausted in state court. See Rhines

v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (holding that a stay is inappropriate in federal court 

to allow claims to be raised in state court if they are subject to dismissal under 

§ 2254(b)(2) as “plainly meritless”). 

B. Petitioner did not Fairly Present Ground Two to the State Courts 

 In Ground Two, Petitioner argues that the jury instructions on sexual assault 

relieved the government of its burden of proving Petitioner’s mental state regarding the 

alleged victim’s lack of consent and violated the “due process clause of the Fifth, Sixth, 

and Fourteenth Amendments.” (Doc. 1 at 11) On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that 

the trial court committed “fundamental error” by failing to instruct the jury “on the mens 

rea applicable to the ‘without consent’ element of the charged offense of sexual assault.” 

(Doc. 7, Ex. X at 19.) The appellate court denied relief on this claim finding that the jury 

instruction “correctly instructed the jury as to the State’s burden of proof and allowed 

[Petitioner] to argue that he believed the victims consented.” (Id. at 21.) 

 Petitioner did not present his jury instruction claim as a federal claim to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 7, Ex. X at 30-33.) Rather, he raised it as a state law 

claim and the appellate court resolved it solely on the basis of state law. (Doc. 7, Ex. X, 

at 30-33, Ex. AA at 16-22.) Specifically, Petitioner argued that the trial court’s jury 

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instruction on sexual assault constituted fundamental error under the Arizona Court of 

Appeals’ decision in State v. Kemper, 271 P.3d 484 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011).2

 (Doc. 7, 

Ex. X at 30-33.) Petitioner did not cite any federal case law in support of his claim and 

did not mention the Due Process Clause. (Id.); see Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 

998 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that the court “consider[s] [petitioner’s] briefing to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals to determine whether he fairly presented his federal due 

process claim to the Arizona courts.”). Petitioner now argues that because his brief in the 

Arizona Court of Appeals cited Kemper, which in turn cited United States v. Gaudin, 515 

U.S. 506, 51 (1995), and included a parenthetical referring to the Fifth and Sixth 

Amendments, he fairly presented his federal due process claim in the state court.3

 

(Doc. 9 at 16.) 

 Although the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision in Kemper cited a United States 

Supreme Court case, Petitioner did not identify his claim as a federal due process claim, 

he did not cite the Due Process Clause, and he did not make any arguments clearly 

indicating that he was raising a federal due process claim. Petitioner’s single reference to 

a United States Supreme Court case, which was contained in a block quote from the 

Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision in Kemper, was not sufficient to fairly present a 

federal due process claim. 

 “[G]eneral appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal 

protection, and the right to a fair trial” do not constitute a “fair presentation” of a federal 

claim. Castillo, 399 F.3d at 999 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Similarly, a federal claim is not fairly presented to the state court by “rais[ing] a state 

claim that is analogous or closely similar to a federal claim,” without developing “any 

 

2

 Petitioner framed the issue as “[w]hether fundamental error occurred in the 

failure to instruct on the mens rea applicable to the ‘without consent’ element of the 

charged offense of sexual assault.” (Doc. 7, Ex. X at 19.) 

3

 Petitioner’s block quote from Kemper includes the following citation, “See 

United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995) (holding that the Fifth and Sixth Amendment ‘require criminal convictions to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime which he is charged beyond a reasonable doubt’).” (Doc. 7, Ex. X at 31 (quoting Kemper, 271 P.3d 484).) 

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articulated federal legal theory.” Id. at 999, 1002. See also Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 

828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996) (“If a petitioner fails to alert the state court to the fact that he is 

raising a federal constitutional claim, his federal claim is unexhausted regardless of its 

similarity to the issues raised in state court.”). To properly exhaust, the petitioner “must 

have either referenced specific provisions of the federal constitution or cited to federal or 

state cases involving the legal standard for a federal constitutional violation.” Castillo, 

399 F.3d at 999. 

 Here, Petitioner did not directly cite Gaudin, but rather cited Kemper, an Arizona 

Court of Appeals’ decision. Even if Gaudin “squarely addresses the precise federal due 

process issue raised in Ground [Two of the Petition], a single and indirect reference to 

that case, tucked away in a petition otherwise bereft of any indicia a federal constitutional 

issue, cannot be deemed a fair presentation of Petitioner’s federal due process claim to 

the Arizona Court of Appeals.” Smith v. Schriro, 2007 WL 779695, at *7 (D. Ariz. Mar. 

13, 2007) (finding that the petitioner did not properly exhaust federal due process claim 

when he failed to discuss the due process clause in his state filings). “Because exhaustion 

under habeas requires a far more focused presentation of federal constitutional claims,” 

Petitioner did not fairly present the federal due process claim asserted in Ground Two to 

the Arizona Court of Appeals and federal habeas corpus review of that claim is 

procedurally barred. See id.

 Additionally, although Petitioner asserted on direct appeal that his claim of 

instructional error should be reviewed for “fundamental error,” that argument does not 

constitute “fair presentation” of a federal issue.4

 See Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 

 

4

 In his petition for review to the appellate court, Petitioner specifically argued that “[i]t is fundamental error to fail to instruct on the mens rea of defendant concerning the ‘without consent’ element of the crime of sexual assault.” (Doc. 7, Ex. X at 30.) He 

now argues that because he objected to the jury instruction during the settling of jury instructions, the appellate court erred in concluding that Petitioner had not objected to the jury instruction at trial and that the appellate court’s resolution of that claim is not 

entitled to deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 9 at 15-16.) The Court does not 

need to resolve this issue. Whether the appellate court should have reviewed the jury instruction claim under a standard other than fundamental error review does not change the conclusion that Petitioner’s assertion of fundamental error review was not sufficient 

to fairly present a federal due process claim. 

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1044, 1057 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that Arizona’s process of fundamental error review 

does not excuse a petitioner’s failure to present a federal claim); Poland v. Stewart, 117 

F.3d 1094, 1105 (9th Cir. 1997) (same); Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1306 

(9th Cir. 1996) (same); see also Castillo, 399 F.3d at 1003 (stating that “[the petitioner’s] 

mere assertion of fundamental error does not mean he asserted a federal constitutional 

claim [because] claims subject to fundamental error review may consist entirely of 

assertions under Arizona law.”). 

 Consequently, Petitioner did not fairly present his challenge to the sexual assault 

jury instruction asserted in Ground Two as a federal claim in state court. See Anderson v. 

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 (1982) (concluding that a petitioner had not presented a jury 

instruction claim as a federal claim in state court when he had only argued that the claim 

was “erroneous” and cited state law to support his claim). Because Petitioner did not 

present his federal claim due process claim contained in Ground Two to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals, he did not properly exhaust that claim. See Castillo, 399 F.3d at 998 

n.3. As discussed below, it would be futile for Petitioner to return to state court to 

exhaust that claim because Arizona’s procedural rules would bar presentation of that 

claim. Accordingly, Ground Two is technically exhausted and procedurally defaulted. 

See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. 

C. Habeas Corpus Review of Ground Two is Procedurally Barred

 Petitioner did not exhaust available state remedies with respect to his federal due 

process claim raised in Ground Two and a return to state court to present that claim 

would be futile because, under the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, the deadlines 

for Petitioner to seek post-conviction relief or to file a direct appeal have expired. First, 

Rule 32.4(a) requires a defendant to file a notice of post-conviction relief “within ninety 

days of the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the 

order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is later.” Here, the court of appeals 

issued its final order on July 12, 2012 and issued the mandate in the direct appeal on 

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February 7, 2013.5 (Doc. 7, Ex. AA.) Thus, the deadline for filing a notice of postconviction relief expired in 2013. Accordingly, Rule 32.4(a) would bar Petitioner from 

returning to state court to assert his federal due process claim in a post-conviction 

proceeding. Second, under Rule 31.3, the time for filing a direct appeal expires twenty 

days after entry of the judgment and sentence, and the Arizona rules do not provide for 

successive direct appeals. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31. Accordingly, direct appeal is no 

longer available for review of Petitioner’s unexhausted claims. 

 The application of these rules does not depend on an interpretation of federal law; 

these rules are regularly and consistently followed and, therefore, would bar any future 

attempt to exhaust Petitioner’s claims asserted in Ground Two in state court. See 

Stewart, 536 U.S. at 861 (holding that Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure concerning 

preclusion are an adequate and independent procedural bar preventing federal habeas 

relief); Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 577-78 (9th Cir. 1999) (Arizona’s procedural 

rules are “consistently and regularly followed and are adequate to bar federal review.”); 

Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding that 

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2 was an adequate and independent procedural bar). 

 Because Petitioner cannot return to state court to exhaust the federal claim asserted 

in Ground Two, that claim is technically exhausted and barred from federal habeas 

corpus review. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 297-99 (claim was procedurally defaulted where 

it was “clear that collateral relief would be unavailable to [the] petitioner” if he returned 

to the state courts); McKinney v. Ryan, 730 F.3d 903, 914 (9th Cir. 2013) (Arizona 

prisoner’s unexhausted claim was procedurally barred because he would be barred from 

raising it in state court pursuant to Rules 32.2(a) and 32.4); Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987 (“If 

[petitioner] has any unexhausted claims, he has procedurally defaulted them, because he 

is now time-barred under Arizona law from going back to state court.”). Because Ground 

 

5

 The Court obtained the date the mandate issued directly from the Arizona Court of Appeals. Facts contained in public records are considered appropriate subjects of judicial notice. See Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 

1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 2006). 

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Two is procedurally defaulted, it is not subject to federal habeas corpus review unless 

Petitioner establishes a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” or “cause and prejudice” to 

overcome the procedural bar. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749-50; Teague, 489 U.S. at 

297-98. Petitioner does not discuss, and has not established, either basis to excuse the 

procedural default of Ground Two and to allow federal habeas corpus review of that 

claim. (Docs. 1, 9.) 

IV. Conclusion 

 As set forth above, the Petition should be denied because Ground One lacks merit 

and federal habeas corpus review of Ground Two is procedurally barred. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) be 

DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable or because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 4(a)(1), should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The 

parties have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 and 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the District Court’s 

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation without further review. See United States

v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to 

any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a 

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party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered 

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 17th day of June, 2014. 

 

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