Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01407/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01407-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Unless otherwise noted, all docket citations are to the Southern District of

California docket.

06cv1407-IEG (BLM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEE MICHAEL STABEN,

Petitioner,

v.

ROBERT J. HERNANDEZ, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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Case No. 06cv1407-IEG (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to Chief United States

District Judge Irma E. Gonzalez pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local

Civil Rules 72.1(d) and HC.2 of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of California.

On April 6, 2004, Petitioner Lee Michael Staben, a state prisoner

proceeding pro se, filed in the Central District of California a

petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc.

No. 1;1 Central District of California (“CDCA”) Doc. No. 1. In his

petition, Staben challenges then-Governor Gray Davis’ 2003 decision

denying him parole. Id. Respondent filed a Return on August 4, 2004,

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2

 Petitioner and Respondent both submitted numerous exhibits in support of their

pleadings. Many of the exhibits are identical. For ease in citation, this Court will

cite to Respondent’s exhibits unless the relevant exhibit is attached only to

Petitioner’s pleadings. Accordingly, unless otherwise identified, all exhibit

citations reference the exhibits submitted by Respondent. In addition, many of the

exhibits contain numerous identifying numbers. Again, for ease in citation and unless

otherwise noted, this Court will use the consecutive numbering located on the bottom,

2 06cv1407-IEG (BLM)

and Petitioner filed a Traverse on August 11, 2004. CDCA Doc. Nos. 13-

16.

On May 30, 2006, Judge John F. Walter transferred this case to the

Southern District of California. CDCA Doc. No. 20. On July 24, 2006,

the instant case was opened in this District. Doc. No. 1. On August

11, 2006, attorney Marc Elliot Grossman substituted as counsel for

Petitioner. Doc. No. 5. Pursuant to this Court’s order, between August

and November 2006, Petitioner and Respondent filed supplemental briefs

updating the issues and arguments presented in this case. Doc. Nos. 6-

7, 10, 12 and 14.

This Court has considered all of the documents filed in this case

including the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”), the

Return, Respondent’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities (“Resp’t.

Mem.”), the Traverse, Petitioner’s Amended Supplemental Brief (“Pet.

Amend. Supp. Brief”), Respondent’s Supplemental Response (“Resp’t. Supp.

Resp.”), Petitioner’s Response (“Pet. Resp.”), and Petitioner’s Errata

(“Pet. Errata”). For the reasons set forth below, this Court RECOMMENDS

that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted of two counts of second degree murder for

killing Danwya Boyd and her eight month old fetus. Abstract of

Judgment, Exh. B.2 The jury found true the special allegation that

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right-hand side of each page.

3

 In his Petition, Petitioner discusses the decision by the Board of Prison

Terms. The Board of Prison Terms, along with the Youth Authority Board and the

Narcotic Addict Evaluation Authority, is now part of the Board of Parole Hearings.

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,

http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/DivisionsBoards/BOPH/index.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2007).

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Petitioner personally used a firearm. Id. Petitioner was sentenced to

eighteen years-to-life on each count to run concurrently. Sentencing

Transcript, Exh. C. On direct appeal, the court of appeal stayed the

special allegation as to Count 2 so Petitioner’s final sentence was

eighteen years-to-life on Count 1 and fifteen years-to-life on Count 2,

to run concurrently. Exh. B; Court of Appeal Decision, Exh. E.

On December 27, 2001, the Board of Prison Terms3 (“Board”) held

Petitioner’s first parole hearing and found him unsuitable for parole.

December 27, 2001 Board Hearing Transcript, Exh. F at 102-05. In

reaching this determination, the Board stated that the “essential reason

[for the denial] was the time and gravity of the commitment offenses

themselves in which multiple victims were killed.” Id. at 102. 

On December 20, 2002, the Board conducted a second parole hearing

and found Petitioner suitable for parole. December 20, 2002 Board

Hearing Transcript, Exh. G at 149-68. In reaching its decision, the

Board stated that “[t]his is a very unusual decision ... but, frankly,

we believe it is in the interests of justice.” Id. at 149. In support

of its decision, the Board cited Petitioner’s complete lack of criminal

history, his stable social history, the fact that he graduated from high

school and continued his education while in prison, his involvement in

religious and self-help activities while in prison, his lack of

infractions while in prison, his realistic parole plans, his great

family support, and his considerable remorse. Id. at 149-51. The Board

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also considered the prosecuting attorney’s letters, defense counsel’s

letter advocating for parole, and Petitioner’s positive psychological

reports. Id. at 151-56.

On May 19, 2003, Governor Davis reversed the parole grant.

Governor’s Reversal Decision, Exh. H. In the written statement, the

Governor explained his reasons:

Mr. Staben has no prior criminal history. Since the shooting,

he has expressed remorse and accepted responsibility.

Moreover, while in prison, Mr. Staben has earned his

vocational welding and state welding certification and has

established viable parole plans. These are all positive

factors that would support a finding of suitability for

parole. However, I believe they are outweighed by negative

factors demonstrating that Mr. Staben is unsuitable for parole

at this time.

I believe the Board of Prison Terms gave inadequate

consideration to the gravity of the crime. The facts of this

case show extreme indifference to the value of human life and

disregard for human suffering. Mr. Staben armed himself with

a shotgun, grabbed shotgun shells, loaded the gun en route and

he fired into an occupied home at night. Indeed, the

likelihood that someone was inside the trailer was

substantial, given it was nighttime. As such, I believe that

the gravity of this offense alone is an individual negative

factor, such that consideration of the public safety requires

a more lengthy period of incarceration.

Mr. Staben had several clear opportunities to cease, but

instead chose to continue, which is another negative factor I

find individually weighs against parole. He testified that he

sat in the truck and drove around the neighborhood on more

than one instance before returning, approaching the trailer

and firing. At any one of those points, Mr. Staben could have

returned home. He made the choice to fire into a home.

In finding Mr. Staben suitable for parole, the hearing panel

determined that he committed the crime as a result of

significant stress. I disagree. Mr. Goodhue did not pose an

immediate threat to Mr. Staben or his family. Yet Mr. Staben

went to confront Mr. Goodhue, armed. Rather than call police

to investigate the burglary, he decided to engage in vigilante

justice. The theft of his television and his residual anger

from the previous altercation are trivial in comparison with

the loss of two lives which resulted from his attempt at

vengeance.

I have taken into consideration the concerns expressed by Mr.

Staben’s attorney and the prosecuting attorney. However,

although Mr. Staben could have been charged with a variety of

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lesser offenses then [sic] murder, the Court of Appeal found

that second degree murder was the most appropriate instruction

based on the facts. Furthermore, I believe that Mr. Staben’s

conduct demonstrates that he acted with conscious disregard

for life, supporting a finding of implied malice and as such

was convicted and sentenced appropriately.

In finding Mr. Staben suitable for parole, the Board of Prison

Terms found he had enhanced his ability to function within the

law based on his involvement in self-help programming. I

disagree. Mr. Staben has only participated in approximately

14 Alcoholics Anonymous meetings during his 12 years in

prison. His other program participation amounts to a three

and one-half day religious meeting, 120 hours of substance

abuse counseling, and 22 hours with the Hands of Peace

organization. Mr. Staben lacks sufficient self-help and anger

management therapy. In light of the fact that Mr. Staben has

not participated in any direct anger management therapy, I am

concerned about his potential for violence in an unstructured

community setting. Therefore I disagree with the Board of

Prison Term’s finding that Mr. Staben suitable for parole

[sic].

Id. at 172-73.

On August 29, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus in state court challenging Governor Davis’ decision. Exh. L. On

September 29, 2003, the superior court denied the petition by checking

a box stating that “[p]etition is without merit.” Exh. M.

On October 16, 2003, Petitioner filed essentially the same petition

in the court of appeal, which was summarily denied on December 17, 2003.

Exhs. N and O. On December 24, 2003, Petitioner filed a habeas petition

in the California Supreme Court, asserting essentially the same

argument. Exh. P. The California Supreme Court summarily denied the

petition on February 18, 2004. Exh. Q.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Title 28 of the United States Code, section 2254(a), sets forth the

following scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

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a State court only on the ground that he is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The Petition was filed after enactment of the Anti-terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110

Stat. 1214. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by AEDPA:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus

on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court shall not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim—

 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or

 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Summary denials do constitute adjudications on the

merits. Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2002). Where there

is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks

through” to the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991).

A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established

federal law if the state court: (1) “arrives at a conclusion opposite to

that reached” by the Supreme Court on a question of law; or (2)

"confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant

Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to [the Supreme

Court’s].” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000).

A state court’s decision is an “unreasonable application” of

clearly established federal law where the state court “identifies the

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correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's

case." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003). "[A] federal

habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. . .

. Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable." Id.

(emphasis added)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Clearly established federal law "refers to the holdings, as opposed to

the dicta, of [the United States Supreme] Court's decisions." Williams,

529 U.S. at 412.

Finally, habeas relief is also available if the state court's

adjudication of a claim "resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in state court." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A state court’s

decision will not be overturned on factual grounds unless this Court

finds that the state court’s factual determinations were objectively

unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). This

Court will presume that the state court's factual findings are correct,

and Petitioner may overcome that presumption only by clear and

convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

DISCUSSION

Petitioner states nine claims for relief in his federal habeas

petition. Doc. No. 1. However, several of the claims assert the same

argument so this Court will group them together. In summary, Petitioner

asserts that he has a liberty interest in parole and that Governor

Davis’ decision reversing the Board’s parole recommendation violated his

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due process rights. Id. at 11-34. Specifically, Petitioner alleges

that his constitutional rights were violated because the Governor did

not personally review the record, the Governor improperly relied on

unchanging factors (that is, the characteristics of the commitment

offenses), and there was insufficient evidence supporting the Governor’s

decision. Id. at 11-32. Petitioner also alleges that the reviewing

court should use the “clear and convincing evidence” standard of review

rather than the “some evidence” standard in evaluating the Governor’s

reversal of the Board’s parole grant. Id. at 30-32. Finally,

Petitioner asserts that the Governor had a “no-parole” policy which

violates the Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States

Constitution. Id. at 32-34.

Respondent denies Petitioner’s claims and initially argues that

Petitioner’s claims are not exhausted. Resp’t. Mem. at 4-5. Respondent

also argues that Petitioner does not have a liberty interest in parole

release. Id. at 8-11. Respondent continues that even if Petitioner

does have such a liberty interest, he received all of the required due

process, and further, that there is sufficient evidence supporting the

Governor’s decision. Id. at 11-18. Finally, Respondent argues that the

Petition should be denied because Petitioner has failed to demonstrate

that any state court’s decision rejecting his claims was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law, or that the decision was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts presented. Id.

A. Exhaustion

Respondent argues that Petitioner’s due process claims are not

exhausted because in his state court pleadings, Petitioner “relied

primarily on California law and failed to cite the United State’s [sic]

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Constitution as the basis for [his] due process claims.” Resp’t. Mem.

at 5; Resp’t. Supp. Resp. at 4-5. Petitioner counters that the due

process claims were exhausted because his arguments in the state courts

included several citations to federal and state court cases that relied

on federal constitutional analysis and contained repeated references to

the Due Process Clause. Traverse at 2-3.

“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be

granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies

available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). To

satisfy this requirement, a petitioner must have “fairly presented” the

“substance” of his federal habeas claim to the state’s highest court.

Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); see also O'Sullivan v.

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 847-48 (1999) (explaining that petitioners must

present their habeas claims to the state’s highest court, even if that

court's review is discretionary).

In addition, a federal habeas petitioner must provide the state’s

highest court with “a ‘fair opportunity’ to apply controlling legal

principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim.”

Anderson, 459 U.S. at 6. “[I]t is not enough that all the facts

necessary to support the federal claim were before the state courts, or

that a somewhat similar state-law claim was made.” Id. (internal

citation omitted). Instead, “a claim for relief in habeas corpus must

include reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as

well as a statement of the facts that entitle the petitioner to relief.”

Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996). A “naked reference to

‘due process’” in a state court petition is insufficient. Shumway v.

Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000). Neither is the exhaustion

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requirement satisfied by the mere fact that the “due process

ramifications” of an argument might be “self-evident.” Anderson, 459

U.S. at 7.

A review of Petitioner’s state court habeas pleadings reveals that

Petitioner did not clearly state that his arguments were premised on the

United States Constitution or the federal Due Process Clause. See

Resp’t. Exhs. L, N, and P. However, Petitioner did cite several federal

cases and repeatedly asserted that the Governor’s decision violated his

due process rights. Id. (citing Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910 (9th

Cir. 2003); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Construing Petitioner’s pro se pleadings liberally as required by Haines

v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), this Court finds that Petitioner

presented the substance of his due process claims to the California

Supreme Court and alerted that court to the federal nature of his

claims. Accordingly, this Court finds that Petitioner’s due process

claims are exhausted and RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s request to deny

the Petition on this basis be DENIED.

Respondent also alleges Petitioner’s argument that Governor Davis

had a “policy of denying parole which violates the prohibition against

‘ex post facto’ laws” was not presented to the state courts. Resp’t.

Mem. at 5. In his Traverse, Petitioner conceded that he had not

presented this argument to the state court and voluntarily abandoned

this claim. Traverse at 3. Petitioner confirmed the abandonment of

this claim in his supplemental filings in this Court. Pet. Resp. at 1-

2. Accordingly, to the extent it is based on the Ex Post Facto Clause,

this Court RECOMMENDS that Claim 9 of the Petition be DENIED on the

grounds that it was not exhausted and Petitioner abandoned it.

///

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B. Due Process Claims

In several different claims, Petitioner argues that his

constitutional due process rights were violated because the Governor did

not personally review the Board’s decision (Claim 1), there was

insufficient evidence supporting the Governor’s decision (Claims 1-3, 6,

and 8), and the Governor improperly relied on the commitment offense

conduct (Claims 4-5). Respondent submits that the state court’s

decisions rejecting Petitioner’s arguments are decisions on the merits

and are neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law.

The Due Process Clause prohibits the government from depriving an

inmate of a liberty interest without adequate procedural safeguards.

See U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV. Therefore, in analyzing whether an

inmate’s due process rights were violated, courts must look at two

distinct elements: “the first asks whether there exists a liberty or

property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the

second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation

were constitutionally sufficient.” Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490

U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (internal citation omitted); Sass v. Cal. Bd. of

Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 2006); Biggs, 334 F.3d at

913.

1. Liberty Interest

Respondent argues that the Petition should be denied in its

entirety because Petitioner does not have a liberty interest in parole.

Resp’t. Mem. at 8-11; Resp’t. Supp. Resp. at 7-8. In his supplemental

pleading, Respondent acknowledges that the Ninth Circuit has held that

California prisoners do have a liberty interest in parole but argues

that the decision was decided incorrectly. Resp’t. Supp. Resp. at 7 n.

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3.

The United States Supreme Court established in Greenholtz v.

Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), and

Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987), that

while there is no constitutional or inherent right of a

convicted person to be conditionally released before the

expiration of a valid sentence, a state's statutory scheme, if

it uses mandatory language, creates a presumption that parole

release will be granted when or unless certain designated

findings are made, and thereby gives rise to a constitutional

liberty interest.

Biggs, 334 F.3d at 914 (quoting McQuillion, 306 F.3d 895 at 901). The

Ninth Circuit subsequently determined that California’s statutory parole

scheme uses the mandatory language contemplated by Greenholtz and Allen

and thereby “creates in every inmate a cognizable liberty interest in

parole which is protected by the procedural safeguards of the Due

Process Clause.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at 914; McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 903.

Respondent contends that, to the extent that clearly established

federal law may once have held that California prisoners possess a

liberty interest in parole release, two recent cases, Sandin v. Connor,

515 U.S. 472 (1995), and In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (Cal. 2005),

have called that conclusion into doubt. Resp’t. Mem. at 8-11; Resp’t.

Supp. Resp. at 7-8. As a result, Respondent argues that the current

state of clearly established federal law recognizes no such liberty

interest for California prisoners. Id. The Ninth Circuit explicitly

rejected this argument, concluding that “Dannenberg does not explicitly

or implicitly hold that there is no constitutionally protected liberty

interest in parole.” Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128. The court again held that

“California’s parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest

in release on parole . . . [and] this ‘liberty interest is created, not

upon the grant of a parole date, but upon the incarceration of the

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inmate.’” Id. at 1127. Accordingly, this Court finds that Petitioner

does possess a liberty interest in parole and, therefore, RECOMMENDS

that Respondent’s request to deny the Petition on this basis be DENIED.

2. Adequate Procedural Protections

Because Petitioner has a liberty interest in parole, this Court

next must determine whether Petitioner received adequate procedural

protections for his due process rights. The United States Supreme Court

has stated that due process “is flexible and calls for such procedural

protections as the particular situation demands.” Greenholtz, 442 U.S.

at 12 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). A parole

consideration hearing “affords [Petitioner] an opportunity to be heard,

and when parole is denied it informs the inmate in what respects he

falls short of qualifying for parole; this affords the process that is

due under these circumstances. The Constitution does not require more.”

Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16.

Petitioner does not argue that he did not receive adequate

procedural protections. Moreover, a review of Petitioner’s 2002 parole

consideration hearing transcript reveals that the hearing clearly

satisfied and exceeded these minimal procedural due process

requirements. In particular, Petitioner was present at the hearing and

was represented by counsel. Exh. G. Petitioner and his counsel were

given the opportunity to present arguments in favor of a finding of

suitability for parole. Id. at 141-48. Petitioner answered questions

about the commitment offenses, about his personal improvement during his

time in prison, and about his plans for his post-prison future, among

other things. Id. at 113-41. In advising Petitioner of its decision to

grant parole, the Board informed Petitioner of the factors on which it

relied and the future process that would be followed. Id. at 149-68.

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Moreover, the Governor’s decision reversing the parole grant was based

on the same factors considered by the Board, set forth in writing, and

provided specific reasons for the reversal and explanations of the ways

in which the Petitioner fell short of qualifying for parole. This Court

therefore finds that Petitioner’s parole consideration hearing and

gubernatorial review contained adequate procedural protections under the

Due Process Clause.

3. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Petitioner argues that there was insufficient evidence supporting

the Governor’s decision to reverse the Board’s parole grant. Initially,

Petitioner argues that courts should use the clear and convincing

standard in evaluating a Governor’s decision to reverse a parole grant.

Petition at 30; Pet. Amend. Supp. Brief at 21-23. Petitioner also

asserts that the facts stated by the Governor in support of his decision

are not supported by the record. Petition at 13-24, 31-32; Pet. Amend.

Supp. Brief at 2-20. Finally, Petitioner argues that the Governor

improperly emphasized and relied on the unchanging characteristics of

Petitioner’s commitment offenses. Id.; Petition at 26-28; Pet. Amend.

Supp. Brief at 6-21.

Respondent contends that the “some evidence” standard of review is

not clearly established and that, therefore, it can not serve as the

basis for habeas review. Resp’t. Supp. Resp. at 8-9. However, if that

standard is applied, Respondent contends that there was sufficient

evidence in the record to support the Governor’s decision. Id. at 10-

12. Respondent further argues that the Governor did not err by relying

on the facts of the commitment offenses. Id.

a. Standard of Review

In Claim Seven, Petitioner asserts that “[a] Governor’s decision

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reversing a Board parole grant should not be upheld unless a reviewing

court finds either that the grounds it set forth were supported by clear

and convincing evidence that the prisoner is not currently suitable for

parole or that the Board decision being reversed was clearly erroneous.”

Petition at 30; Pet. Amend. Supp. Brief at 21-22. Although Petitioner

concedes that there is no Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court case dictating

that clear and convincing evidence is the correct standard of review,

Petitioner argues that such a decision is required when a liberty

interest exists. Id. (citing Carrillo v. Fabian, 701 N.W.2d 763 (Minn.

2005)). In contrast, Respondent asserts that the Ninth Circuit has held

that the correct standard of review in such cases is “the ‘some

evidence’ standard set forth in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445

(1985),” but contends that because no Supreme Court decision has

required the use of that standard of review, it cannot form the basis

for habeas relief. Resp’t. Mem. at 13; Resp’t. Supp. Brief at 9.

The Ninth Circuit has rejected both arguments. See Sass, 461 F.3d

at 1128-29. The Sass court reiterated that “although Hill involved the

accumulation of good time credits instead of a parole denial, the some

evidence standard applies in both situations because ‘both directly

affect the duration of the prison term.’” Id. at 1128 (quoting Jancsek

v. Or. Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987)). While Sass

did not involve the Governor’s reversal of a parole grant, the court

reasoned that the some evidence standard applies to a parole denial

because both directly affect the duration of the prison term. Id.

Because the Governor’s denial of parole, via the reversal of the parole

grant, also directly affects the duration of the prison term, it also is

subject to review via the some evidence standard. See Martin v.

Marshall, 431 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1044-48 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (applying the

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some evidence standard to the Governor’s decision to reverse a parole

grant); In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 667 (Cal. 2002) (holding

that in California, due process requires that the Governor’s decision

reversing a parole grant must be supported by some evidence in the

record that was before the Board). The Sass court also analyzed

Respondent’s argument and concluded, “[w]e therefore reject the state’s

contention that the some evidence standard is not clearly established in

the parole context.” Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. Accordingly, this Court

finds that the “some evidence” standard is the proper standard to employ

in evaluating the Governor’s decision to reverse the Board’s parole

recommendation and that this standard is clearly established in the

parole context.

Respondent also asserts that the state court decisions denying

Petitioner’s state habeas petitions were reasoned decisions which are

entitled to deference. Resp’t. Supp. Brief at 6. In this case, the

California Supreme Court and California Court of Appeal summarily denied

Petitioner’s petitions. Exhs. O and Q. As such, this Court must “look

through” these decisions to the superior court decision, see Ylst, 501

U.S. at 801-06, which Respondent alleges is the last reasoned decision.

Resp’t. Supp. Brief at 6. As noted above, the superior court judge

merely checked a box and inserted a brief statement that the state

habeas petition was without merit. Exh. M. This does not constitute a

reasoned decision. Where the claim is exhausted but there is no

reasoned decision, federal habeas review is not de novo. See Delgado v.

Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). Rather, the court “must

conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the

state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable.” Sass, 461 F.3d at

1127. Accordingly, this Court will conduct an independent review of the

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record provided to the Governor and will determine whether or not the

state court’s conclusion that there was some evidence supporting the

Governor’s decision was objectively unreasonable.

b. “Some Evidence”

When assessing whether a state parole board’s suitability

determination was supported by “some evidence,” a federal court’s

analysis is framed by the relevant state’s statutes and regulations

governing parole suitability determinations. See Biggs, 334 F.3d at

915. In a California parole proceeding, “[t]he Board must determine

whether a prisoner is presently too dangerous to be deemed suitable for

parole based on the ‘circumstances tending to show unsuitability’ and

the ‘circumstances tending to show suitability’ set forth in Cal. Code

Regs., tit. 15 § 2402(c)-(d).” Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 662-63

(9th Cir. 2007). The delineated circumstances tending to show

unsuitability for parole include the commitment offense, previous record

of violence, unstable social history, psychological factors, and

institutional behavior. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c).

Circumstances tending to indicate suitability for parole include no

juvenile record, stable social history, signs of remorse, motivation for

crime, lack of criminal history, age, understanding and plans for

future, and institutional behavior. See id. at § 2402(d). The listed

circumstances are merely guidelines; “the importance attached to any

circumstance or combination of circumstances in a particular case is

left to the judgment of the panel.” Id. at § 2402(c) and (d). When

reviewing the Board’s parole grant, the Governor is required to consider

those same factors. See Cal. Const. art. V, § 8(b) (“The Governor may

only affirm, modify, or reverse the decision of the parole authority on

the basis of the same factors which the parole authority is required to

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consider.”); Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th at 660 (“the Governor’s decision

must be based upon the same factors that restrict the Board in rendering

its parole decision”).

In the instant case, Governor Davis considered the positive factors

recited by the Board but concluded that Petitioner was unsuitable for

parole because the negative factors outweighed the positive ones. Exh.

H at 172. The negative factors stated by the Governor are (1) the Board

“gave inadequate consideration to the gravity of the crime,” (2)

Petitioner did not commit the crime as the result of significant stress,

and (3) Petitioner had not participated in sufficient anger management

and self-help courses. Id. at 172-73. Petitioner argues that there is

no evidence supporting any of the reasons stated by the Governor for

reversing Petitioner’s parole grant. Petition at 13-26; Pet. Supp.

Brief at 2-21.

“To determine whether the some evidence standard is met ‘does not

require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the

credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the

relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that

could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.’” Sass,

461 F.3d at 1128 (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56). However, “the

evidence underlying the [B]oard’s decision must have some indicia of

reliability.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915. This Court will consider each of

the factors cited by the Governor individually.

(i) The Commitment Offenses

Section 2402(c)(1) authorizes the Board and the Governor to

consider the commitment offense and whether it was committed in an

“especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner” when evaluating a

prisoner’s suitability for parole. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §

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4

 The complete statute provides:

(1) Commitment Offense. The prisoner committed the offense in an

especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner. The factors to be considered

include:

(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed in the same or

separate incidents.

(B) The offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated

manner, such as an execution-style murder.

(C) The victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the

offense.

(D) The offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an

exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering.

(E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in

relation to the offense.

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(1).

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2402(c)(1).4 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit recently confirmed that

[a] prisoner’s commitment offense may constitute a

circumstance tending to show that a prisoner is presently too

dangerous to be found suitable for parole, but the denial of

parole may be predicated on a prisoner’s commitment offense

only where the Board can point to factors beyond the minimum

elements of the crime for which the inmate was committed that

demonstrate the inmate will, at the time of the suitability

hearing, present a danger to society if released. Factors

beyond the minimum elements of the crime include, inter alia, that [t]he offense was carried out in a dispassionate and

calculated manner, that [t]he offense was carried out in a

manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard

for human suffering, and that [t]he motive for the crime is

inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense.

Irons, 479 F.3d at 658 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

In his written reversal, the Governor stated several reasons for

his conclusion: (1) “the facts of the case show extreme indifference to

the value of human life and disregard for human suffering,” (2)

Petitioner “had several clear opportunities to cease, but instead chose

to [commit the crimes,]” (3) the “theft of his television and his

residual anger from the previous altercation are trivial in comparison

with the loss of two lives which resulted from his attempt at

vengeance,” and (4) despite the statements by the involved attorneys,

Petitioner’s “conduct demonstrates that he acted with conscious

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disregard for life, supporting a finding of implied malice and as such

was convicted and sentenced appropriately.” Exh. H.

Petitioner argues that the facts relied upon by the Governor are

inappropriate because they are the minimum facts required for the crime

of second degree murder and, therefore, do not establish that the crimes

were committed in an “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner.”

Petition at 17-19 and 24-26; Pet. Amend. Supp. Brief at 4-6. Petitioner

further argues that the Governor’s reliance on the unchanging facts of

his commitment crimes also violates due process. Petition at 26-28;

Pet. Amend. Supp. Brief at 6-21. Respondent counters that the Governor

properly considered the gravity of the crime and that he did not solely

rely on the unchanging facts of the commitment crimes. Resp’t. Supp.

Resp. at 10-12.

The facts considered by the Governor are set forth in the beginning

of his written decision. See Exh. H at 171-72. They include that when

Petitioner discovered that his television had been stolen, he

immediately decided that his ex-roommate, Wayne Goodhue, had taken it.

Id. at 171. Petitioner was very angry, and rather than calling the

police, Petitioner grabbed a rifle, which he previously had obtained

from a relative for protection, and drove to Goodhue’s trailer. Id.

Petitioner was observed standing near and yelling at the small trailer.

Id. A witness believed that Petitioner received a response from someone

within the trailer. Id. Petitioner then returned to his truck, grabbed

his rifle, and fired one shot into the trailer. Id. Petitioner then

rushed home, quickly told his family that no one was in the trailer, and

hid the murder weapon. Id. at 171-72. Petitioner’s shotgun blast drove

three pellets into Mr. Goodhue, injuring him, and thirteen pellets into

Ms. Boyd, killing her and her fetus. Id. at 171. Based upon these

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facts, the Governor determined that the gravity of the offense dictated

that public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration. Id.

at 172-73.

This Court’s independent review of the record confirms the

existence of the facts relied upon by the Governor. See, e.g.,

Probation Report, Exh. D at 20-24; Exh. E. at 30-34; Exh. F at 56-63;

Exh. G at 113 (incorporating the factual statement from the December 27,

2001 hearing into the December 20, 2002 hearing); Life Prisoner

Evaluation Report, Exh. I at 177-79. While Petitioner denies knowing

that individuals were present in the trailer, there is a witness

statement to the contrary. See Exh. D at 21. Moreover, the facts also

support a finding that, even without Petitioner’s actual knowledge that

the victims were home, Petitioner’s conduct demonstrated an

exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering that undeniably

resulted in the death of two people. Based upon its independent review

of the record, this Court finds that the Governor’s decision on these

factors had the requisite evidentiary support and that these factors

were properly considered by the Governor. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §

2402(c)(1)(A) and (D) (multiple victims and exceptionally callous

disregard for human suffering).

The Governor also relied on the fact that “the theft of

[Petitioner’s] television and his residual anger from the previous

altercation are trivial in comparison to the loss of two lives which

resulted from his attempt at vengeance.” Exh. H at 172. This factor

also was properly considered by the Governor. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15,

§ 2402(c)(1)(E) (the motive for the crime is inexplicable or very

trivial in relation to the offense). Again, an independent review of

the record reveals sufficient evidentiary support for this conclusion.

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In particular, the facts of the commitment offenses support the finding

that the motive for these crimes was the victim’s suspected theft of

Petitioner’s television as part of the ongoing disagreement between

Petitioner and Mr. Goodhue, and that this vengeance motive is trivial in

relation to the deaths of two people. See, e.g., Exh. D at 20-24; Exh.

F at 56-64, 67 (television actually belonged to the victim); Exh. G at

113-17.

Finally, in evaluating the gravity of the commitment offenses, the

Governor emphasized that Petitioner had “several clear opportunities to

cease.” Exh. H at 172. As before, a review of the record provides

evidentiary support for this conclusion. See Exh. D at 21-23; Exh. F at

57, 61-62, 65-66; Exh. G at 115-16; Exh. I at 178. Moreover, while this

factor is not explicitly set forth in section 2402, it may be considered

as part of the evidence supporting the determination that the crime was

committed in a manner which demonstrates exceptionally callous disregard

for human suffering and/or the trivial nature of the motive. Cal. Code

Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(1)(D) and (E).

This Court has conducted an independent review of the record

available to the Board during the 2002 parole hearing and to the

Governor as part of his 2003 review of the parole grant, and has

determined that that record contains the requisite “some evidence”

supporting the Governor’s determination that the commitment offenses

were committed in an especially heinous or atrocious or cruel manner,

including that there were multiple victims and that the motive was very

trivial in relation to the crime. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 456. As such,

this Court finds that the state court’s decision denying Petitioner’s

state habeas petition was not unreasonable.

Petitioner nevertheless contends that the Governor’s exclusive

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5

 “Clearly established federal law” only refers to the holdings, as opposed to

dicta, of United States Supreme Court decisions. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. Although

Ninth Circuit law may be used as “persuasive authority” for certain purposes, Ninth

Circuit holdings without supporting United States Supreme Court precedent are not

binding on the state courts. See Shaw v. Terhune, 380 F.3d 473, 478 (9th Cir. 2004)

(quoting Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154 (9th Cir.2000), overruled on other

grounds by Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (“[W]e may not, of course, reverse

a state court's decision simply because it is inconsistent with a rule established by

a Ninth Circuit case.”) (addition in original)); Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600

(9th Cir. 2000) (“Our cases may be persuasive authority for purposes of determining

whether a particular state court decision is an ‘unreasonable application’ of Supreme

Court law, and also may help us determine what law is ‘clearly established.’”).

Therefore, a line of dicta in a Ninth Circuit case cannot constitute “clearly

established federal law.”

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reliance on the unchanging factors of his commitment offenses

constitutes a due process violation. Petition at 26-32. Pet. Amend.

Supp. Brief at 6-21; Pet. Resp. at 2-7. This argument fails because no

clearly established federal law prohibits the use of “unchanging

factors” in parole suitability determinations.5 See Irons, 479 F.3d at

664-65. In fact, in a series of recent cases, the Ninth Circuit has

rejected habeas challenges to parole denials involving similar

considerations. For example, in Biggs, the Ninth Circuit upheld the

denial of a prisoner’s challenge to the Board’s unsuitability finding

despite his exemplary prison record and strong evidence of

rehabilitation, specifically recognizing that the Board’s decision was

properly based on the immutable factors of the gravity of the offense

and the prisoner’s conduct prior to imprisonment. See Biggs, 334 F.3d

at 916. In so finding, however, the Biggs court cautioned that over

time, should [the prisoner] continue to demonstrate exemplary behavior

and evidence of rehabilitation, denying [that prisoner] a parole date

simply because of the nature of [his] offense and prior conduct would

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6

 The facts of the commitment offense in Irons are, at least in some respects,

similar to the facts of this case. See Irons, 479 F.3d at 660. For instance, Irons

suspected his housemate was stealing from him, and became angry when the other man

denied responsibility for the thefts. Id. During their heated argument, Irons went

to his room, retrieved a gun, fired twelve rounds into his housemate, and stabbed him

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raise serious questions involving [the prisoner’s] liberty interest in

parole.” Id.

Three years later, the Ninth Circuit revisited the issue—and the

Biggs’ court’s cautionary language—in Sass. See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129.

There, the prisoner maintained that the Board’s denial of parole solely

due to immutable behavioral evidence, namely, the gravity of the

commitment offenses in combination with evidence of the prisoner’s preconviction recidivism, violated due process. Id. Although reiterating

Biggs’ warning that the Board’s “continued reliance . . . [on] the

offense and on conduct prior to imprisonment . . . could result in a due

process violation” in the future, the Sass court determined that the

gravity of the offenses of which the prisoner was convicted (second

degree murder, gross vehicular manslaughter, hit and run death, causing

injury while driving under the influence, and felony drunk driving),

combined with his prior offenses, constituted the requisite “some

evidence” to support the Board’s decision to deny parole. Id. (emphasis

in original). As such, the Sass court concluded that the state courts’

decisions upholding the Board’s findings comported with federal law.

Id.

The Ninth Circuit most recently evaluated a habeas petitioner’s

challenge of the Board’s decision denying parole in Irons. See Irons,

479 F.3d at 663-65. Like Petitioner, Irons had no prior criminal record

when he was convicted of second-degree murder in the death of his former

housemate.6 Id. at 660. Also like Petitioner, Irons was deemed

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in the back twice. Id. Irons then wrapped the body in a sleeping bag, procured a car,

and ten days later, disposed of the body in the ocean. Id. Irons later confessed to

the killing and was ultimately sentenced to a prison term of seventeen years-to-life.

Id.

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unsuitable for parole despite having an exemplary prison record,

positive psychological reports, completed numerous vocational and selfhelp courses, solid plans for the future, and the support of the trial

prosecutor. Id. at 660-61. The particular parole denial at issue in

Irons was based on, among other things, the Board’s finding that the

commitment offense was “carried out in an especially cruel and callous

manner” and was prompted by a trivial motive in relation to the offense.

Id. at 661. On habeas review, Irons argued that the Board’s reliance on

this unchanging factor violated his due process rights. Id. at 664.

After a review of its reasoning in Biggs and Sass, the court explained

that Sass precluded it from accepting Irons’ due process argument. Id.

In particular, the court compared the facts of the crimes committed by

Sass and Irons, underlined that the murder in Sass “was less callous and

cruel than the one committed by Irons,” and concluded that because Sass

was found to have been properly denied parole on the basis of his

commitment offense (coupled with his prior convictions), it could not

hold that Irons, who was denied parole on similar grounds, was somehow

deprived of due process. Id. The facts of Petitioner’s murders are

similar to those presented in Sass and Irons and therefore also support

the Governor’s determination that parole was inappropriate at that time.

As in Biggs, Sass and Irons, the petitioner in the instant case

argues that even if there was sufficient evidence to support the parole

reversal, the Governor erred by repeatedly denying him parole based upon

the unchanging characteristics of his commitment offenses. Petition at

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7 In his supplemental pleadings, Petitioner argues that this Court should

consider subsequent parole reviews and the fact that Petitioner now has served more

than the minimum custodial term to which he was sentenced. Pet. Amend. Supp. Brief at

19-21; Pet. Resp. at 2. However, those hearings and decisions are not properly before

this Court; this Court only may consider the evidence presented to and considered by

the Board and the Governor during the 2002 and 2003 review process. See Biggs, 334

F.3d at 913 n.1; Irons, 479 F.3d at 661 n.1.

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25-27; Pet. Amend. Supp. Brief at 6-21; Pet. Resp. at 2-7. However, the

reality is that the parole denial at issue in this case was only

Petitioner’s second parole review, and at the time of the parole

hearing, Petitioner only had served approximately twelve years of the

minimum eighteen year sentence he received.7 As noted above, the Ninth

Circuit has opined that repeated parole denials based upon immutable

facts may violate due process at some point in time, but it has not

found a due process violation where the prisoner has served less than

the minimum sentence imposed. See, e.g., Biggs, 334 F.3d at 912 (Biggs

had served fifteen years of a twenty-five years-to-life sentence at the

time of the challenged parole review); Sass, 461 F.3d at 1125 (Sass had

served eleven and twelve years of a fifteen years-to-life sentence);

Irons, 479 F.3d at 660 (Irons had served sixteen years of a seventeen

years-to-life sentence). Moreover, while the Irons court cautioned that

due process might be violated if prisoners are deemed unsuitable for

parole based solely on their commitment offense or other immutable

factors after the expiration of their minimum terms, see Irons, 479 F.3d

at 665, this concern is not present in the instant case.

In summary, this Court has conducted an independent review of the

record and has determined that the Governor’s finding that Petitioner

was unsuitable for parole is “not so devoid of evidence that the

findings of the [Board] were without support or [were] otherwise

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arbitrary.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 457. In particular, this Court finds

that the record contains the requisite “some evidence” supporting the

Governor’s findings that there were multiple victims, that the offenses

were committed with an exceptionally callous disregard for human

suffering, and that the motive for the crimes was very trivial in

relation to the offense. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(1)(A)

(that multiple victims were attacked), § 2402(c)(1)(D) (that the offense

was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous

disregard for human suffering), § 2402(c)(1)(E) (that the motive for the

crime was very trivial in relation to the offense). The Court also

highlights that the challenged hearing was only Petitioner’s second

parole hearing and Petitioner had not yet served his minimum sentence.

AS such, there was enhanced legal support for the Governor’s reliance

on these factors. Irons, 479 F.3d at 665. Finally, while the Board

reached a different decision after weighing these same factors, this

Court cannot say that there is no evidentiary support for the Governor’s

decision, especially given the relevant case law. 

(ii) Significant Stress

Turning to the second factor cited by the Governor to justify his

decision to deny parole, the parties agree that one factor indicating

suitability for parole is whether the “prisoner committed the crime as

the result of significant stress in his life, especially if the stress

has built over a long period of time.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §

2402(d)(4). Petitioner argues that the facts of the case support the

Board’s determination that he committed the crime as the result of

significant stress. Petition at 15-16. Specifically, Petitioner

emphasizes that the victim was older than he, that the two had a violent

relationship, that the victim had threatened to kill Petitioner and his

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family, and that the victim had burglarized Petitioner’s home in the

week preceding the crime. Id. While these facts support the Board’s

conclusion, they do not negate the Governor’s conclusion. The Governor

found that the crimes were not committed as the result of significant

stress because the victim did not pose an immediate threat to Petitioner

or his family. Indeed, the Governor determined that Petitioner had time

to call the police or take other action after the burglary but chose

instead to engage in vigilante justice. See Exh. H at 172.

An independent review of the record reveals that there is

evidentiary support for the Governor’s conclusion. First, Petitioner

immediately assumed that Goodhue had committed the burglary, which made

him angry, and in that mental state, took his gun to confront Goodhue at

his home rather than calling the police to investigate. Exh. F at 56-

58; Exh. G at 113. Second, despite the fact that there is no evidence

that Goodhue owned or had access to a gun, Petitioner obtained a shotgun

for protection several days prior to the burglary and murder. Exh. F at

59-61. Third, Petitioner testified that when he first arrived at

Goodhue’s trailer, he pounded on the door and windows, then returned to

his truck, drove around the block, and then returned to the trailer, got

his gun out of the truck, loaded it, and fired at the trailer. Id. at

62. A witness also testified that she observed the shooter sitting in

his vehicle and then driving the vehicle before returning to the

trailer. Exh. F at 57-58. These facts support the Governor’s

conclusion that Petitioner’s crime was not committed as a result of the

stress he was feeling, but rather in an attempt to obtain vigilante

justice for the burglary and other injustices he believed Goodhue had

committed, as well as to scare Goodhue. Accordingly, there is the

requisite “some evidence” supporting the Governor’s decision that this

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factor did not weigh in favor of parole suitability and that Petitioner

was not suitable for parole. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 456.

(iii) Sufficient Therapy

The third factor cited by the Governor involves Petitioner’s

alleged failure to participate in sufficient self-help and anger

management therapy. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(d)(9). Petitioner

argues that there are no facts supporting the Governor’s conclusion and

further claims that the anger management course suggested by the

Governor was not available at Petitioner’s penal institution. Pet.

Supp. Brief at 3. Respondent merely counters that the Governor made the

finding and that therefore it was sufficient. Resp’t. Supp. Resp. at

11-12. Respondent does not cite any evidence supporting the Governor’s

conclusion.

Initially, the Governor derides Petitioner for only participating

in fourteen Alcoholic Anonymous (“AA”) meetings over the course of

twelve years in prison. See Exh. H at 173. However, there is no

evidence in the record that alcohol played any part in the commitment

crimes or that Petitioner either has or had a problem with alcohol. In

fact, Petitioner stated that he did not like alcohol, never had a

problem with it, and preferred to attend religious classes rather than

AA meetings because he received more benefit from the religious classes

and the AA meetings tended to involve prisoners discussing the good

times they experienced when drinking. See Exh. G at 126-27; 2001

Psychological Evaluation, Exh. J at 195. Moreover, the Governor’s

summary of Petitioner’s therapy and self-help activities minimizes the

actual efforts identified by Petitioner and evidenced in the record.

See Exh. G at 128-30. The final fact cited by the Governor is that

Petitioner “has not participated in any direct anger management

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therapy.” Exh. H at 173. Petitioner states, without support, that

anger management therapy is not offered at his institution. Pet. Amend.

Supp. Brief at 3. Respondent does not dispute this statement and offers

no evidence that such a course was offered to Petitioner and that he

failed to take it. This Court also could not find any evidence in the

record regarding such a class or Petitioner’s failure to participate in

any recommended or offered self-help courses. See Exh. J at 196-97

(psychologist finds no mental health concerns and makes no

recommendations regarding additional treatment); Exh. F at 73-74 (same);

Exh. G at 132 (same). For all these reasons, this Court finds there is

no evidentiary support for the Governor’s conclusion that Petitioner was

not suitable for parole because he had not participated in sufficient

self-help therapy.

(iv) Summary

This Court has conducted an independent review of the record

presented to the Board in 2002 and Governor in 2003. Based upon it’s

independent review, the Court finds that there is no evidence supporting

the Governor’s conclusion that Petitioner was not suitable for parole

because he had not participated in sufficient self-help and anger

management courses. However, the Court finds that there is the

requisite “some evidence” to support the Governor’s determinations that

Petitioner was not suitable for parole due to the nature of the

commitment offenses and because the crimes were not committed as the

result of significant, long-term stress. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 456.

Each of these conclusions individually is sufficient to satisfy the

requisite “some evidence” standard for denying parole. Id. For the

reasons set forth above, the Court also finds that given the particular

facts of Petitioner’s commitment offenses and the timing of the relevant

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8 These findings also negate Petitioner’s claims that the Governor had a “noparole” policy which violated his constitutional due process rights. As set forth in

the body of this Report and Recommendation, the Court finds that there was the

requisite some evidence supporting the Governor’s decision. So, even if there was such

a policy (and this Court does NOT make such a finding), it was not the reason for the

Governor’s decision in this case. Accordingly, to the extent that Claim 9 asserts an

such an exhausted due process claim, this Court RECOMMENDS that it be DENIED.

31 06cv1407-IEG (BLM)

parole hearing and subsequent review, the Governor’s decision does not

violate due process.8

 These findings mandate a conclusion that the state

court’s denial of Petitioner’s habeas petition was not objectively

unreasonable. Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS that the pending

federal habeas petition be DENIED on this basis.

c. Personal Review by Governor

Petitioner argues that his due process rights were violated because

the Governor did not personally review the parole decision. In

particular, Petitioner asserts that the Board granted parole and then

submitted a secret “executive summary” to the Governor providing a

litany of reasons to overturn the parole grant. Petitioner argues that

because the Board and the Governor are required by state law to consider

the same factors, the described and utilized procedure “makes a mockery

of due process.” Petition at 11-13. Respondent counters that there is

no evidence to support Petitioner’s argument. Resp’t. Supp. Brief at 9

n.4.

As set forth above, the law requires the Governor to consider the

same delineated statutory factors utilized by the Board. See Cal.

Const. art. V, § 8(b); Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th at 660. However, the

law does not require the Governor to give the same weight to each of the

relevant facts; rather, the Board and the Governor must independently

determine the appropriate importance to attach to each circumstance or

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combination of circumstances. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c) and

(d). Contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, gubernatorial review would be

meaningless if the Governor was required to reach the same conclusion as

the Board. Moreover, the Governor’s decision is signed by former

Governor Gray Davis, see Exh. H at 173, and there is no evidence to

support Petitioner’s accusation that Governor Davis did not personally

review the decision. The statute does not require Governor Davis to

personally draft his decisions; the fact that he personally signed the

decision establishes that he personally reviewed the decision. Absent

evidence to the contrary, which Petitioner has not supplied,

Petitioner’s allegations are without merit and this Court RECOMMENDS

that Petitioner’s petition be DENIED on this basis.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

In sum, after conducting an independent review of the record, this

Court finds that Petitioner has failed to present evidence suggesting

that any state court’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d). As such, this Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED and the case dismissed with

prejudice.

For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the

District Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report

and Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment be entered denying

the Petition.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report

must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than May

11, 2007. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and

Recommendation.”

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than June 1,

2007. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within

the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455

(9th Cir. 1998).

 

DATED: April 20, 2007

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

COPY TO: 

HONORABLE IRMA E. GONZALEZ

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

ALL COUNSEL

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