Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01042/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01042-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

---

J. KENT 

v. 

UNITED 

FIL i:A D 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Coart of Ap~lG 

Tent.11 Cir.::ui'; 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

MAY 1 4 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk . 

DANIELS, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

) No. 91-1042 

) (D.C. No. 86-S-145) 

) (D. Colorado) 

STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appel lee. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before BRORBY and MCWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and ALLEY, District 

Judge**· 

on September 11 , 1984, plaintiff, while working in a lumber 

mill, was seriously injured when an end blade on a trimmer saw flew 

off its motor shaft, went through a wire mesh screen, and hit him 

on the legs. Plaintiff's employer was issued a citation by the 

Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") for 

violating 29 C. F.R. § 1910.265(e) (4) (ii)(b), the regulation that 

pertains to the guarding required for end blades on trimmer saws. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except for 

purposes of establishing the doctrines of law of the case, res 

judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3 

** Honorable Wayne E. Alley, United States District Judge for the 

Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 91-1042 Document: 010110249165 Date Filed: 05/14/1992 Page: 1
Plaintiff asserts that the United States is liable for his injuries 

under the Federal Torts Claims Act ( "FTCA") because OSHA was 

negligent in its inspection of the mill on February 4, 1981, and 

that this negligence was the cause in fact of his injuries. See 

generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671, et seq. 

After presentation of plaintiff's case in chief, the trial 

court dismissed his action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

The court reasoned that the United States' was immune from tort 

liability under the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. 

28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). Plaintiff appeals this judgment of dismissal. 

We affirm. 

I. 

Standard Of Review 

The district court's determination that it lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction under the discretionary function exception to 

the FTCA is reviewed de novo. Weiss v. United States, 889 F.2d 937, 

938 (10th Cir. 1989); McMichael v. United States, 856 F.2d 1026, 

1031 {8th Cir.1988); Starrett v. United States, 847 F.2d 539, 541 

{9th Cir.1988). 

II. 

Discretionary Function Exception 

The FTCA authorizes suits to recover for personal injuries 

caused by federal employees in cases "where the United States, if 

a private person, would be liable." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). One 

exception to this waiver of sovereign immunity is the discretionary 

function exception, which precludes liability for "[a]ny claim ... 

2 

Appellate Case: 91-1042 Document: 010110249165 Date Filed: 05/14/1992 Page: 2
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise 

or perform a discretionary function or duty . " 28 u.s.c. § 2680(a). 

The discretionary function exception evidences congressional 

intent to "prevent judicial 'second guessing' of legislative and 

administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and 

political policy through the medium of an action in tort." United 

States v. S . A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense ( "Varig 

Airlines"}. 467 U.S. 797, 814 {1984). The Supreme Court refined 

this concept by stating that "the discretionary function exception 

will not apply when a federal statute, regulation, or policy 

specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to 

follow." Berkovitz by Berkovitz v. United states, 486 U.S. 531, 536 

(1988) (emphasis added); see also Ayala v. Joy Manufacturing Co., 

877 F.2d 846, 848 (10th Cir.1989); accord Weiss v. United States, 

889 F . 2d 937, 938 ( 10th Cir. 1989) . "In sum, the discretionary 

function exception insulates the Government from liability if the 

action challenged in the case involves the permissible exercise of 

policy judgment." Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 538. 

III. 

OSHA•s Safety Regulation 

The statement of congressional findings in the Occupational 

Safety and Health Act clearly indicate that OSHA regulations are 

"grounded in social, economic, and political policy." Varig 

Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814. "Congress finds that personal injuries 

and illnesses arising out of work situations impose a substantial 

burden upon, and are a hindrance to interstate commerce in terms of 

3 

Appellate Case: 91-1042 Document: 010110249165 Date Filed: 05/14/1992 Page: 3
lost production, wage loss, medical expenses, and disability 

compensation payments." 29 u.s.c. § 651. OSHA's regulatory scheme 

is derived from Congress' economic and social policies that insures 

safety in the work place. 

The portion of the OSHA regulation cited by plaintiff provides 

that "[t]he end saws on the trimmer shall be guarded." No kind of 

guard is specified in regulations. 29 C.F.R.§1910.265(e) (4) (ii) (b). 

on February 4, 1981, an OSHA inspector instructed plaintiff's 

employer to remove the existing wood guard from its trimmer saw and 

replace it with a wire mesh guard. After the accident, other OSHA 

inspectors cited plaintiff's employer for violating the same 

regulation. These OSHA inspectors found that the wire mesh guard 

was not in compliance with the regulation at issue here. What 

complies and what does not is obviously left to judgment and 

discretion. 

While the regulation is phrased in mandatory language the 

initial OSHA inspector was exercising discretion when he ordered 

the wood guard replaced by a wire mesh guard. The regulations not 

only omit to delineate which materials are and are not appropriate 

for the guard, but omit to specify the harm the guard is intended 

to deter. Textual references in the regulations suggest that the 

purpose of the guard may have been to protect workers from flying 

debris, nails, or wood chips, and not the eventuality of the blade 

flying off its holder. Determination of the adequacy of any guard 

is in the eye of the indi vidual who inspects the saw. 

4 

Appellate Case: 91-1042 Document: 010110249165 Date Filed: 05/14/1992 Page: 4
The conduct of the OSHA inspector cannot be discretionary 

"unless it involves an element of judgment or choice." Berkovitz, 

486 U.S. at 537. Judgment and choice on the part of the inspector 

is the focus of the analysis, and not the fact that discretion is 

exercised in negligent manner. Barnson v. United States, 816 F.2d 

549, 553 (10th Cir.1987). The OSHA inspector at issue exercised 

just such judgment and choice when he recommended a mesh guard for 

the end saw. His actions were "discretionary regulatory authority 

of the most basic kind." Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 819-20. 

Hence, under the circumstances of this case, we find the United 

States immune from tort liability under the discretionary function 

exception to the FTCA. 

Conclusion 

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district 

court is AFFIRMED. 

5 

Entered by the Court 

WAYNE E. ALLEY 

Appellate Case: 91-1042 Document: 010110249165 Date Filed: 05/14/1992 Page: 5