Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00310/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00310-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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Plaintiffs agreed to dismiss their federal claims against the 1

other Defendants and those claims were dismissed at the hearing on the

motion held on May 29, 2007.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN & CASSANDRA SPRINGER, )

individually and as Guardians Ad )

Litem for their minor children )

CAMERON S. and CHRISTIAN S., )

) 2:06-cv-310-GEB-DAD

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) ORDER

)

COUNTY OF PLACER, THOMAS LIND, )

RHONDA LARSON, DAVID JOHNSON, )

JENNIFER COOK, DEBBIE MORRIS, and )

LISA GRIMALDI, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Defendant Debbie Morris (“Morris”) moves for summary

judgment on Plaintiffs’ federal claims, arguing her qualified immunity

defense shields her from liability for those claims. Plaintiffs 1

oppose Morris’s motion and move to strike portions of Morris’s

declaration submitted in support of her motion and portions of the

statement of undisputed facts referencing that declaration. All

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Defendants request the Court decline to continue exercising

supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims if Morris’s motion

is granted. 

BACKGROUND

 Plaintiffs John and Cassandra Springer, individually and as

guardians ad litem for their minor children Christian S. and Cameron

S., allege that Morris, a Placer County social worker, took Christian,

who was eight years old at the time, into protective custody without a

warrant, in violation of Christian’s fourth amendment right to be free

from a warrantless seizure and the fourteenth amendment familial

association rights of all Plaintiffs. (Pls.’ Compl. ¶ 59; Morris

Decl., Ex. A at 2.) 

On or about January 31, 2005, John Springer pinched the tip

of Christian’s nose with his fingers in the course of disciplining

him. (Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts (“Defs.’ SUF”) ¶¶ 3, 4.) 

On February 1, 2005, Christian’s teacher noticed a discoloration on

Christian’s nose and asked him about the mark. (Id. ¶ 6.) Christian

responded that his father had pinched his nose and that it hurt. (Id.

¶ 7.) Child Protective Services (“CPS”) was contacted concerning the

suspected abuse of Christian and thereafter CPS issued an emergency

response which provided the following reason: 

Child is a special ed student. Child was

suspended from school on Friday, for Monday. He

came back to school today with marks and bruises

on face (nose and chin). Child states his father

was mad at him for getting into trouble at school,

and slapped him in the face, pinched him on the

nose, hit him in the stomach, and spanked him on

the bottom. Child is in school until 2:45 PM. 

ER - Debbie Morris responding.

(Morris Decl., Ex. A, at 1.) As a result of CPS’s determination that

an emergency response was needed to address the situation, Morris

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Plaintiffs move to strike portions of Morris’s declaration and 2

the portions of the statement of undisputed facts referencing that

declaration. However, Plaintiffs do not dispute that these statements

were made to Morris, they dispute only the veracity of the statements

themselves. Since Morris’s state of mind is at issue, these statements

are not admitted for their truth, but rather to show the effect the

statements had on Morris’s state of mind. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c).

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ motion to strike is denied.

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responded to Christian’s school and interviewed Christian. (Id.) 2

Morris spoke with Christian’s teacher, who informed her that

Christian’s parents had said they were at their wit’s end with

Christian; that the father appeared tense and angry; and that the

mother let the father take the lead with Christian. (Defs.’ SUF ¶

20.) 

While interviewing Christian, Morris observed a red mark on

his nose which he stated came from his father pinching him hard. (Id.

¶ 10.) Christian also told Morris that he had been slapped by his

father twice on the left cheek, once on the right cheek, and that his

father had hit him on the “b-u-t-t” three times and it was still sore. 

(Id. ¶¶ 9, 12, 13.) Morris called the Rocklin Police Department and

Officer Jerrold Seawell was dispatched to the school to interview

Christian. (Id. ¶ 21.) After Officer Seawell interviewed Christian,

the officer informed Morris that he was going to the Springer home to

investigate the matter further. (Morris Decl. ¶ 11.) Christian told

Morris he was afraid his dad would hit him again if he found out

Christian had talked to a policeman and that he was afraid to go home

because his father might hurt him. (Defs.’ SUF ¶ 14, 16.) By the

time Morris needed to make the determination regarding whether to

place Christian in protective custody, the school day had ended;

therefore, if Christian was not taken into custody he would ride the

bus home. (Id. ¶ 45.) Morris determined Christian was in imminent

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danger of serious bodily injury. (Morris Decl. in Opp’n to Mot. to

Strike ¶ 1.) Morris then consulted with Placer County Counsel because

the decision to take a child into protective custody must be made by

either County Counsel or a supervisor. (Morris Decl. in Opp’n to Mot.

to Strike ¶ 5.) Morris then took Christian into protective custody. 

(Defs.’ SUF ¶ 38.)

DISCUSSION

I. Motion for Summary Judgment 

Morris asserts she is entitled to qualified immunity on

Christian’s claim that taking him into protective custody violated his

fourth amendment right to be free from a warrantless seizure and all

Plaintiffs’ claim that this violated their fourteenth amendment

familial association rights. (Defs.’ Mot. at 13:25-27.) 

The determination of whether Morris prevails on her motion

“involves the difficult balancing of a family’s right to autonomy

[and/or association] against the state’s interest in protecting [a]

minor child[] from abuse.” Baker v. Racansky, 887 F.2d 183, 187 (9th

Cir. 1989). “[S]ocial workers[] who remove a child from [his or her]

home without a warrant must have reasonable cause to believe that the

child is likely to experience serious bodily harm in the time that

would be required to obtain a warrant.” Rogers v. County of San

Joaquin, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 1531829, at *4 (9th Cir. May 29, 2007). 

“Serious allegations of abuse that have been investigated and

corroborated usually give rise to a ‘reasonable inference of imminent

danger sufficient to justify taking [a] child[] into temporary

custody’ if [he or she] might again be [abused] during the time it

would take to get a warrant.” Id. at *5. 

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Morris was aware of the reason for CPS requiring an

emergency response when she responded. When Morris spoke to

Christian’s teacher, Morris was informed that the teacher suspected

abuse because she observed a mark on Christian’s nose. (Defs.’ SUF ¶

6.) During her investigation of these allegations, Morris personally

observed the mark on Christian’s nose and when Morris questioned

Christian about the mark he responded that his father slapped him in

three times on his face, pinched him on the nose very hard, and

spanked him on the bottom. (Morris Decl. Ex. A, at 1.) In addition,

Christian stated he was afraid to go home because his father might

hurt him when he found out he talked to an officer; Morris knew that

Christian’s father was likely aware that Christian had spoken to an

officer since Officer Seawell told Morris that he was going to go the

Springer home to investigate the matter further; and Morris was told

that Christian’s mother let her husband take the lead with Christian. 

(Id. ¶¶ 14, 16; Morris Decl. ¶ 11.) Christian would have gone

immediately home had Morris not taken Christian into protective

custody, and it would have taken several hours for Morris to obtain a

warrant. (Morris Decl. ¶ 15.) Here, where Morris had corroborated

allegations of child abuse, and was apprised of circumstances that

gave rise to a reasonable inference that Christian would be exposed to

an imminent risk of harm if he was not taken into protective custody,

she had reasonable cause to take Christian into protective custody

without a warrant. See Rogers, 2007 WL 1531829, at *5. For the

stated reasons, Morris’s motion for summary judgment is granted on

Plaintiffs’ federal claims.

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III. State Law Claims

Since all Plaintiffs’ federal claims have been resolved, the

issue is reached whether supplemental jurisdiction should continue

being exercised over Plaintiffs’ state law claims. “[D]istrict courts

may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . .

[if] the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has

original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The “discretion to

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over [Plaintiffs’] state

law claims is triggered by [§ 1367(c)(3), and] is informed by the

Gibbs values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Acri v.

Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)

(citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966)) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “Needless decisions of state law should be

avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the

parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable

law.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. 

Here, the Gibbs factors weigh in favor of dismissing

Plaintiffs’ state law claims. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ state law claims

are dismissed without prejudice as of the date on which this order is

filed. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 9, 2007

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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