Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02152/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02152-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

Linda S. McMahon became the Social Security Commissioner on January 20, 2007. 1

Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Linda S. McMahon has

been substituted for acting Commissioner Jo Anne B. Barnhart as the defendant in this suit.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

JAMIE HUGHES PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 05-2152

LINDA S. MCMAHON, Commissioner 1

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

O R D E R 

Plaintiff, Jamie Hughes, appealed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to this court.

On September 19, 2006, judgment was entered remanding plaintiff's case to the Commissioner

pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 10). Plaintiff now moves for an award

of $5444.40 in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice Act

(hereinafter "EAJA"), requesting compensation for 34.90 attorney hours for work before the

court at an hourly rate of $156.00 and $27.00 in out-of-pocket expenses. (Doc. # 11-1). The

defendant has filed a response, expressing objections to this award. (Doc. # 13). Specifically,

the defendant contends that counsel has failed to establish that the requested hourly rate of

$156.00 per hour is reasonable according to the Consumer Price Index, counsel has requested

time for tasks that could have been performed by support staff, counsel has sought time for

reviewing the file in conjunction with almost every time entry, and counsel has requested

reimbursement for attorney time prior to the date the district court action was filed. 

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for

the government's denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986).

Under Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a

sentence-four judgment reversing the Commissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case

for further proceedings is a prevailing party. After reviewing the record, we find plaintiff is the

prevailing party in this matter. 

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion

of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)

was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, §

3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action.

Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1984).

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In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill required

to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits

resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency

or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler,

588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularlywhen the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand

counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary

of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir. 1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th Cir.

1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in the

absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459 (8th

Cir. 1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an

accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

the work." Id. Where documentation isinadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

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We note that counsel cites a case from the Eastern District of Arkansas in support of 2

her argument that she is entitled to $156.00 per hour. However, as this case was not decided

by this court, it is not binding precedent. We have repeatedly held that counsel is entitled to

an hourly rate of $150.00 upon a showing of an increase in the cost of living. A copy of the

consumer price index should be attached to the motion for attorney’s fees to properly

evidence an increase in the cost of living. 

4

The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,

amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to

$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). 

Plaintiff requests attorney's fees under the EAJA at a rate of $156.00 an hour based on

an increase in the cost of living. Attorney's fees may not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per

hour- the maximum statutory rate under § 2412(d)(2)(A) - unless the court finds that an increase

in the cost of living or a special factor such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys

justifies a higher fee. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The decision to increase the hourly rate is not

automatic and remains at the discretion of the district court. McNulty v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1074

(8th Cir. 1989). In Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1990), the court stated that the

hourly rate may be increased when there is "uncontested proof of an increase in the cost of living

sufficient to justify hourly attorney's fees of more than $75.00 an hour," such as a copy of the

Consumer Price Index. Plaintiff's counsel has not attached a summary of the Consumer Price

Index as an exhibit and has not presented evidence of an increase in the cost of living. Therefore,

the undersigned believes her argument for enhanced fees based on a cost of living increase has

no merit. Accordingly, we find that plaintiff's counsel is entitled to an award at the rate of

$125.00 per hour.

2

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We next address the number of hours plaintiff’s counsel claims she spent working on this

case. Plaintiff's counsel seeks reimbursement for a total of 3.8 hours of attorney work performed

between October 13, 2005, and November 3, 2005. The Complaint was not filed in this court

until November 3, 2005. (Doc. # 1). We note, time spent at the administrative level is not

compensable under the EAJA. See Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 988-89 (8th Cir. 1984).

However, the time submitted on the above referenced dates was clearly in preparation for the

filing of the Complaint with this court. Therefore, we will deduct 1.80 hours. 

Counsel also seeks 0.10 hour on November 10, 2005 (reviewing file stamped copies of

complaint, IFP, and summons), .60 hour on November 30, 2005 (preparation of correspondence

and summons), .10 hour on January 23, 2006 (for reviewing the NEF advising that the transcript

had been filed), .10 hour on January 23, 2006 (reviewing NEF advising Judge Jones no longer

assigned to case), .30 on January 25, 2006 (reviewing NEF of scheduling letter and docketing

calendars), .10 on February 23, 2006 (reviewing NEF when appeal brief filed), and .30 on

November 17, 2006 (letter to client). However, the court finds that these tasks could have been

performed by support staff. Granville House, Inc. v. Department of HEW, 813 F.2d 881, 884

(8th Cir. 1987) (work which could have been completed by support staff is not compensable

under the EAJA). Therefore, these hours are not compensable under the EAJA. Therefore, 1.60

attorney hours must be deducted from the total compensable time sought by counsel.

In addition, plaintiff’s counsel seeks a total of 26.90 hours for the preparation of

plaintiff’s appeal brief. This court concludes that the time submitted on the above referenced

dates, should not have taken an attorney experienced in handling social security cases more than

five or six minutes to review these documents. Bowman v. Secretary of H.H.S., 744 F.Supp 898

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(E.D.Ark. 1989). Therefore we are deducting 11.90 hours from the total number of compensable

hours sought. 

Further, counsel has requested .20 hour for reviewing the notice of availability of the

magistrate, .30 for reviewing the defendant’s answer, and .50 for reviewing the court’s

memorandum opinion and judgement. We find this time to be excessive. Therefore, we will

deduct .40 hour.

Accordingly, we find that counsel is entitled to compensation under the EAJA for: 19.20

(34.90-15.70) hours for attorney’s fees, at the rate of $125.00 per hour and $27.00 in out-ofpocket expenses for a total attorney's fee award of $2427.00. This amount should be paid in

addition to, and not out of, any past due benefits which plaintiff may be awarded in the future.

The parties are reminded that the award herein underthe EAJA will be taken into account

at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent

double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 14th day of February 2007.

/s/ J. Marschewski

HON. JAMES R. MARSCHEWSKI

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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