Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01163/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01163-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OSCAR HERNANDEZ,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 12cv1163-LAB (WMc)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

vs.

EXCELL SECURITY, et al.,

Defendant.

On May 24, 2012, Defendant Harrah’s Rincon Casino & Resort filed a substantial

motion to dismiss this entire action for a variety of reasons, including lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction over Harrah’s, and failure to join an indispensable party. The

hearing date for this motion is July 30, 2012. Under Civil Local Rule 7.1(e)(2), the opposition

was therefore due on July 16, 2012.

Plaintiff, however, has filed no opposition. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(f)(3)(c),

failure to file an opposition when due may constitute consent to the motion's being granted.

The Court so construes Plaintiff's failure to file an opposition.

Harrah’s motion, however, points out a problem. This action was originally filed in

California state court, and removed by Harrah’s. The notice of removal represents that the

Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action because of the presence of a

substantial federal question. Assuming, arguendo, that the motion to dismiss has correctly

pointed out a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, this matter was improperly removed and

- 1 - 12cv1163

Case 3:12-cv-01163-LAB-WMC Document 8 Filed 07/26/12 Page 1 of 2
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

must be remanded, not dismissed. See Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251,

1257 (9 Cir. 1997) (holding that, once federal district court determined it lacked subject th

matter jurisdiction over removed case, it could not dismiss but was required to remand).

The original complaint’s claim, arising from a security firm’s allegedly negligent

handling of an assault in a night club on Harrah’s premises, initially appears to be entirely

a creature of state law, under the well-pleaded complaint rule. However, as the notice of

removal points out, there is an exception to that rule for claims completely preempted by

federal law. Here, a necessary element of the claim is the state of California’s power to

exercise authority over the conduct of a federally-recognized tribe’s enterprise on tribal

lands. See Muhammad v. Comanche Nation Casino, 742 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1276–77

(W.D.Okla., 2010) (claim arising from slip and fall in tribally-owned casino was completely

preempted, and thus removable). 

Although the motion to dismiss argues this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to

adjudicate this claim, it is actually invoking procedural bars. Such bars would prevent this

Court from reaching the merits (assuming no exception applied), but the Court still has

jurisdiction to determine whether the bar exists. See, e.g., Elliott v. White Mtn. Apache Tribal

Ct., 556 F.3d 842, 849 (9 Cir. 2009) (before determining whether exhaustion of tribal court th

remedies is required, federal court must only decide whether tribal court jurisdiction is

plausible).

Because it appears the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action, and

because no party objects to the granting of Harrah’s motion to dismiss, this action is

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, BUT WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. All pending

motions are DISMISSED AS MOOT and pending dates are VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 26, 2012

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

- 2 - 12cv1163

Case 3:12-cv-01163-LAB-WMC Document 8 Filed 07/26/12 Page 2 of 2