Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-07077/USCOURTS-caDC-95-07077-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 6, 1996 Decided August 27, 1996

No. 95-7077

JANE DOE, A MINOR CHILD, BY NEXT FRIEND, LESLIE G. FEIN,

APPELLANT

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(93cv0092)

Richard Seligman argued the cause for appellant, with whom Jonathan S. Zucker was on the briefs.

Donna M. Murasky, Assistant Corporation Counsel, argued the cause for appellees, with whom

Charles F. Ruff, Corporation Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel, DeputyCorporation Counsel, were

on the brief.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, SILBERMAN and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed PER CURIAM.

Separate opinion filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS concurring in part and dissenting in part.

PER CURIAM: Jane Doe, a minor, by her next friend, appeals the dismissal of her complaint

pursuant to FederalRule ofCivilProcedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Doe sued the District

of Columbia government and two of its employees for damages for injuries she allegedly received as

a result of appellees' failure to investigate and protect her from abuse and neglect. She contends that

the district court erred in ruling that (1) she cannot enforce a provision of the federal Child Abuse

Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2) (1994), under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(1994); (2) her claims under District of Columbia law are barred by her failure to provide notice of

her claim pursuant to D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-309 (1995); and (3) her procedural due process claim

failed because she did not have a liberty interest under the District of Columbia Prevention of Child

Abuse and Neglect Act of 1977, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-1351 to -1357 (1994), 6-2102 to-2127

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1 Because Doe's complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim, we take the allegations in

the complaint to be true for purposes of this appeal. Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v.

Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 264 (1991). We also rely on the

neglect case filing and court orders in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, as well as

the § 12-309 letter at issue; in all instances the contents of the documents are undisputed, and

because they are under seal we have protected the identity of the persons involved. 

(1995). We affirm the dismissal of the federal statutory claim and find no merit to Doe's due process

contention. In view of the absence of controlling precedent, we certify to the District of Columbia

Court of Appeals pursuant to D.C.CODEANN. § 11-723 (1995) the issuesrelating to notice of claim

under § 12-309 and accordingly, we reserve decision on the merits of Doe's claim under District of

Columbia law.

I.

According to the complaint and record,1the District of Columbia government determined in

August 1988 that Jane Doe's mother might be unable to house and feed her three minor children, who

were living with her. Because the mother had not paid the rent on her apartment since January 1988,

a social worker in the Department of Human Services (DHS) concluded after a home visit that the

mother and her children were in imminent danger of being evicted and would need counseling and

assistance in resettling. The social worker recommended that the family be referred to the Continuing

Services Branch. Although the mother subsequently was evicted from her apartment, Doe alleges

that "no further efforts were made by the Continuing Service[s] Branch to provide services necessary

to protect [Jane Doe]."

In early January 1989, the mother left the three children in the care of a friend. The mother's

friend lived in a public housing apartment with her four children, her sister, and her sister's three

children; the apartment allegedly was infested with roaches and rodents and had substantial housing

code violations, which endangered Doe's health and safety. On January 20, 1989, the children's

maternal grandmother found two of the children abandoned on her front porch. Unable to care for

them herself, she called the police and DHS placed both children in a shelter care facility. Jane Doe

remained in the care of her mother's friend. Although DHS assigned a social worker to the neglect

case involving all three children, the grandmother's complaints, from late February to early March

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1989, to the social worker and her supervisor about the improper care that Jane Doe was receiving

in the home ofthe mother'sfriend were unavailing; neither the worker nor the supervisor investigated

Jane Doe's living conditions or responded to requests that she be removed from the friend's home.

At the time, Jane Doe was two and one-half years old.

On February 23, 1989, Jane Doe suffered severe burns, causing permanent disfigurement on

more than one-third of her body, from scalding water in a tub in the mother's friend's home. When

the grandmother saw the burns on March 2, 1989, she called an ambulance and Jane Doe was

transported to the Children's Hospital National MedicalCenter. The police interviewed the mother's

friend, who admitted that she had not obtained any medical treatment for Doe's severe injuries, and

arrested her for mayhem, to which she subsequentlypleaded guilty. The following day, March 3, Doe

was placed in the shelter care custody of DHS; a neglect petition, signed by the social worker, was

filed in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, pursuant to D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-

2301(9)(A), (B) & (F), indicating that Jane Doe remained in the legal custody of her mother.

Jane Doe remained in the hospital for more than five months, continuing in the physical

custody of DHS's shelter care program. On August 11, 1989, the Superior Court authorized Doe's

conditionalrelease to her grandmother. On December 11, 1989, the Superior Court found, as a result

of Doe's injuries, that she was an abused and neglected child.

On January 9, 1990, more than 10 months after Doe was injured but less than five months

after she was released from the hospital, counsel representing Doe in the neglect proceedings wrote

a letter to the Mayor ofthe District of Columbia purporting to give notice under D.C. Code § 12-309

of Jane Doe's intent to file the instant lawsuit. The letter adverted to the February 23, 1989, burns

allegedly suffered when the mother's friend submerged Doe in scalding water, and alleged that prior

to suffering her injuries, her grandmother and aunt had asked DHS to remove Doe from the mother's

friend's home because it was an unfit place for children to reside. The letter referred to complaints

made prior to Doe's injuries to the social worker, her supervisor, and the Police Department, and

stated that DHS had breached a special duty owed to Doe by failing to investigate her living

conditions in a timely manner and to take adequate steps to protect her.

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2 Doe originally advanced a similar claim under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare

Act of 1980 (Adoption Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-628, 670-679a (1994), the same statute at issue in

Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992), but withdrew that claim in the district court. 

In May 1991, the Superior Court committed Doe to the care and custody of the District of

Columbia pursuant to D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2320 (1989 & Supp. 1994). Nearly one year later, in

April 1992, the Superior Court appointed a guardian ad litem for Doe to investigate her legal claims.

On January 13, 1993, Doe's guardian filed suit in federal district court, invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and pendent jurisdiction over claims under District of Columbia law.

In the complaint, Doe alleged that if appellees had responded to her grandmother's reports

of abuse and neglect and investigated her case, they would have removed Doe from the home of the

mother's friend before she was injured. Her federal statutory claim rests on the contention that by

receiving federal funding under CAPTA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106h, the District government was

obligated to investigate reports of abuse and neglect promptly, as well as to have procedures,

personnel, and facilities to address effectively child abuse and neglect cases.2 Her District of

Columbia statutory claim was based on the deprivation of "a panoply of rights" conferred by the

District of Columbia Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act of 1977. Doe alleged that the

District government'sfailure to provide adequate staff that wassufficiently trained and supervised to

investigate and to have adequate information systems constituted negligence or gross negligence and

violated not only her statutory rights but also her rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment of the Constitution.

The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). The court ruled that Doe's

federal cause of action was foreclosed by Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992), in which the

Supreme Court held that generalized duties imposed on the states under the Adoption Act created

neither a private right of action nor a right enforceable under § 1983. The district court concluded

that CAPTA likewise imposed only generalized duties and envisioned that the Secretary of Health

and Human Services, not individual beneficiaries, would enforce states' compliance. The district

court also dismissed Doe's procedural due process claim, declining to rely solely on the District of

Columbia Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act as a source of liberty interests for a plaintiff

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3 Doe does not argue that CAPTA contains an implied right of action for private enforcement. 

Cf. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 

4 We need not reach this exception, because we find that CAPTA fails to create the federally

enforceable right asserted by Doe. See Suter, 503 U.S. at 360 n.11. 

who is not in the custody of the District ofColumbia. Finally, the court ruled that Doe's claims under

District of Columbia law were barred by D.C. Code § 12-309. The court concluded that the January

1990 letter from Doe's counsel did not satisfy the statute's mandatory six-month notice requirement

and insufficiently identified the place where Doe was injured. The court further ruled that although

the police reports ofMarch 2 and 3, 1989, collectively described the place where the injuries occurred

and the mother's abandonment of her children, two of whom were in foster care, as well as the

doctor's opinion that Doe's injuries were consistent with intentional burning, the reports did not

provide statutory notice because they failed to identify any conduct that suggested the District

government wasliable. In so ruling, however, the district court acknowledged the "extremely close"

nature of the case and the novel issue of District of Columbia law presented under § 12-309 by Doe's

extremely young age and custodial status.

II.

Doe contends that the district court erred in holding that she cannot enforce, under § 1983,

a provision of CAPTA, 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2) (1994).3 The district court correctly applied the

Supreme Court's reasoning in Suter, 503 U.S. 347, therefore we affirm the dismissal of the federal

statutory claim.

The Supreme Court established in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980), that § 1983 may

be used to enforce violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law. The Court then

established two notable exceptionsto § 1983's application to statutory violations. See Wright v. City

of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987). First, and most important

for the present case, § 1983 may not be used when the statute does not create enforceable rights,

privileges, or immunities. See Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19

(1981). Second, a plaintiff may not sue under § 1983 when it is evident that Congress intended to

foreclose private enforcement.4See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers

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Ass'n, 453 U.S. 13-15 (1981).

Doe's claim fails because the section of CAPTA upon which she relies, § 5106a(b)(2), does

not create an enforceable right. Specifically, § 5106a(b)(2) reads as follows:

(b) Eligibility requirements

In order for a State to qualify for a grant under subsection (a) of this section, such

State shall* * *

(2) provide that upon receipt of a report of known or suspected instances of child

abuse or neglect an investigation shall be initiated promptly to substantiate the

accuracy of the report, and, upon a finding of abuse or neglect, immediate steps shall

be taken to protect the health and welfare of the abused or neglected child and of any

other child under the same care who may be in danger of abuse or neglect.

Doe insiststhat this provision vests in her an enforceable right to "prompt investigation of reports of

abuse or neglect."

However, the Supreme Court's analysis of the Adoption Act in Suter, 503 U.S. 347,

forecloses Doe's argument. The Court held that the Adoption Act, which contains language

remarkably similar to CAPTA, imposed only generalized duties on the states, and thus it created

neither a private right of action nor an enforceable right under § 1983. See Suter, 503 U.S. at 363.

A careful comparison of the two statutes demonstrates that the same conclusion must be reached in

this case.

Like CAPTA, the Adoption Act establishesfederalfunding for states provided that the states

comply with the requirements delineated in the statute. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 672-74, 675(4)(A) (1988

& Supp. I). In many respects, the Adoption Act provides even greater detail than CAPTA, as it

requires states to submit plans to the Secretary of Health and Human Services for approval and

enumerates 16 qualifications that each plan must contain. See Suter, 503 U.S. at 351 (citing 42

U.S.C. § 671 (1988 & Supp. I)). The respondents in Suter based their claim for relief on two key

provisions ofthe Adoption Act. First, they asserted a claim under § 671(a)(15), which requires states

to submit a plan that:

providesthat, in each case, reasonable efforts will be made (A) prior to the placement

of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from

his home, and (B) to make it possible for the child to return to his home....

Second, they based a claim for relief on § 671(a)(9), which closely parallels the CAPTA provision

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5 A state is defined to include the District of Columbia. 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(8) (1994). 

6 Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, Dissent at 7-9, we do not read § 5016a(b)(2) as a

requirement for inclusion in a plan, nor do we read it as an independent directive. Our reading

follows the plain language of the statute. CAPTA does not say that a "state shall" investigate

promptly; it says that a "state shall provide that" investigations shall be initiated. The District has

fulfilled the requirements of CAPTA as it is written. 

at issue in this case. Section 671(a)(9) requires a state plan to:

provid[e] that where any agency of the State has reason to believe that the home or

institution in which a child resides... is unsuitable for the child because of the neglect,

abuse, or exploitation ofsuch child, it shall bring such condition to the attention ofthe

appropriate court or law enforcement agency....

Moreover, § 671(a)(3) requires the state to "provide that the plan shall be in effect in all political

subdivisions of the State, and, if administered by them, be mandatory upon them."

The Supreme Court in Suter framed the relevant question as whether Congress

"unambiguously confer[red] upon the child beneficiaries of the Act a right to enforce" these

provisions of § 671. 503 U.S. at 357 (emphasis added). Despite the mandatory language and the

detailed nature ofthe Adoption Act and its corresponding regulations, the Court held that the statute

failed to create an enforceable right. In so holding, the Court emphasized the necessity of analyzing

"the statutory provisions in detail, in light of the entire legislative enactment, to determine whether

the language in question" established an enforceable right. Id.

Following the Supreme Court's analysis in Suter, we reject Doe's claim to enforce CAPTA

under § 1983. Doe exposes no appreciable difference between the Adoption Act and CAPTA to

permit us to hold otherwise. Like the Adoption Act provisions analyzed in Suter, the CAPTA

provision at issue speaks in mandatory language. But it mandates merely that the state5"provide

that" investigations will occur when reports for abuse are received. One difference, of course, is the

Adoption Act specifically requires states to submit a plan, whereas CAPTA grants states flexibility

in how they choose to "provide that" investigations shall be initiated.6 The District has fulfilled this

condition for funding in enacting the District ofColumbia Prevention ofChild Abuse and Neglect Act

of 1977, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2102(b) & 6-2103(c), which provides, inter alia, that the Child

Family Services Division (CFSD) "shall commence an investigation of all reports alleging neglect

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other than abuse within 24 hours of the receipt of the report" and that the police department shall

"immediately" investigate reports of abused children. Even if Doe can demonstrate that the District

of Columbia law was violated in this particular case, she does not have a cause of action under §

1983. Doe may not enforce the laws of the District of Columbia in federal court under § 1983, just

as the respondents in Suter were not permitted to enforce the provisions contained in Illinois' plan

under the Adoption Act. See Suter, 503 U.S. at 358-59 (noting that Illinois complied with the

funding mandatesin the Adoption Act by submitting a plan with appropriate provisions, but refusing

to allow private individuals to enforce those provisions under § 1983).

Doe asserts that the Supreme Court's decision in Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S.

498 (1990), merits a contrary conclusion. Admittedly, Suter and Wilder both involved statutory

schemes and language of similar character. Yet the Court in Wilder found an enforceable right

whereas the Court in Suter did not. See, e.g., Lampkin v. District of Columbia, 27 F.3d 605, 607

(D.C. Cir.) (recognizing the implicit tension between Suter and Wilder in determining that there is

an enforceable right under the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11301-

11489 (1994)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 578 (1994). The two cases are reconciled, albeit tenuously,

by carefully interpreting the statutes "on [their] own terms." Id. We follow Suter's lead in

distinguishing the language at issue in Suter from the language at issue in Wilder and, in turn,

categorizing the language in the present case. In Suter, the Supreme Court was careful to point out

that the Medicaid legislation at issue in Wilder "set forth in some detail the factors to be considered"

in setting rates. The Court distinguished the Adoption Act, noting that it provided no guidance in

how to measure reasonable efforts. The Court in Suter made this determination despite regulations

promulgated under the Adoption Act which provide a laundry list of services that may be included

in a state's proposal. CAPTA analogously fails to offer a definition of what constitutes a "prompt

investigation." The CAPTA regulations, like those promulgated under the Adoption Act, merely

offer myriad suggestions of what an investigation may include. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14(d),

(f) (1995). Unlike the regulations in Wilder, the CAPTA regulations do not mandate factors that

must be part of an "investigation." See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 519 (noting that "the statute and

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7 Cf. Tony L. By and Through Simpson v. Childers, 71 F.3d 1182, 1189 (6th Cir. 1995)

(construing both Suter and Wilder as binding precedent in the "enforceable right" analysis, but

finding § 5106a(b)(2) of CAPTA more analogous to the statute in Suter than in Wilder, and

therefore finding it deficient under Wilder' s three-part test because it is too vague and amorphous

to be judicially enforced), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1834 (1996). 

8

In particular, Doe relies on provisions of the D.C. Code that place primary responsibility for

an initial investigation into a report of a neglected child with the DHS and set out the purposes of

that investigation, see D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2104 (1989); that authorize the chief of the Child

Protective Services Division of the DHS to "provide or secure any necessary services" pursuant to

an investigation into a report of neglect, D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2124(a) (1989); and that require

the Child Protective Services Division to request the police to remove a child where the

investigation into a report of neglect reveals that "the available services or resources are

insufficient to protect the child and there is insufficient time to petition for removal," D.C. CODE

ANN. § 6-2105(a) (1989). The D.C. Code also requires DHS to "commence an investigation of

all reports alleging neglect other than abuse within 24 hours of ... receipt." D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-

2102 (1989). 

regulation set out factors which a State must consider in adopting its rates") (emphasis added). The

striking parallels to the Adoption Act and its related regulations place this case squarely under the

rationale of Suter and therefore Wilder is distinguishable.7 Our holding today comports with our

decision in Lampkin, 27 F.3d at 607-12, because unlike the McKinneyAct, § 5016a(b)(2) ofCAPTA

does not provide sufficiently specific, mandatory terms requiring states to investigate in a particular

manner or time frame. Lampkin thusmore closelyresembles Wilder, whereas Suter dictatesthe result

in this case. Like the Adoption Act, CAPTA "is at least as plausibly read to impose only a rather

generalized duty on the State...." Suter, 503 U.S. at 363. Section 5106a(b)(2) of CAPTA fails to

unambiguously confer an enforceable right upon its beneficiaries, therefore Doe's claimunder § 1983

was appropriately rejected by the district court.

III.

In her initial brief to this Court, Doe claims that she suffered a deprivation of procedural due

process in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The D.C. Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act

of 1977,8she claims, vested in her an entitlement to "protective services" triggered by the procedures

laid out in the Act and by the DHS's alleged determination that she was in need of such services.

When the DHS failed to follow up on that determination, the argument goes, it deprived her of her

entitlement to protective services, without due process of law. This argument is severely flawed.

It is clearthatstate law which generates a legitimate claimof entitlement can create an interest

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the deprivation of which triggers application of the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Barry v. Barchi,

443 U.S. 55, 64 & n.11 (1979); Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 904 F.2d 719, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1990),

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1083 (1991). It is equally clear, however, that state-created procedures do

not create such an entitlement where none would otherwise exist. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S.

238, 250-51 (1983) ("Process is not an end in itself. Its constitutional purpose is to protect a

substantive interest to which the individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement."); Hewitt v. Helms,

459 U.S. 460, 471 (1983) (noting that the existence of "a careful proceduralstructure" does not give

rise to a protected liberty interest); Griffith v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 842 F.2d 487, 495

(D.C. Cir. 1988). Doe's procedural due process claim will fail, then, unless she can show that the

procedures that the DHS allegedly failed to follow were enacted pursuant to a substantive

constitutional obligation to protect Doe from abuse or neglect. As the Supreme Court made clear

in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989), Doe cannot make

such a showing.

Indeed, Doe's "procedural" due process claimappearsto be little more than a recasting of the

substantive due process claim rejected by the Supreme Court in DeShaney. In DeShaney, a child and

his mother sued a county department of social services and several of its workers for failing to take

action to prevent the abuse of the child by his father. The Supreme Court held that the defendants'

failure to act did not make out a claim, since "a State's failure to protect an individual against private

violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause." 489 U.S. at 197. In an

effort to avoid DeShaney, Doe disclaims reliance on "substantive due process" as such. Rather, she

contends that her claim is based on a statutory entitlement to protective services and is thus not

governed by DeShaney, which explicitly declined to consider whether the relevant child protection

statutes gave the plaintiff there an " "entitlement' which ... enjoy[ed] due process protection." 489

U.S. at 195 n.2. As noted, however, process alone does not give rise to a protected substantive

interest: by codifying procedures for investigating child abuse and neglect reports, D.C. has not

assumed a constitutional obligation to protect children from such abuse and neglect. The fact that

Doe can point to a D.C. statute mandating investigation does not, therefore, convert a meritless

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9 Doe does dispute the adequacy of that remedy insofar as she is barred from pursuing it by

D.C.'s notice-of-claim provision, § 12-309. See infra pp. 16-17. 

substantive due process claim into a fruitful procedural one.

Even if Doe were able to allege an interest the deprivation of which requires due process, she

could not prevail. By framing her claim as one of procedural due process, Doe necessarily presents

the question of what, if any, additional processis due. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,

335 (1976); Beo v. District of Columbia, 44 F.3d 1026, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1995). And in a case such

as this, where the alleged deprivation of liberty or property is not pursuant to an established state

procedure, the existence of an adequate post-deprivationremedyunderstate tort law is allthe process

that is due. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 129-30 (1990); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,

533-34 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537 (1981). Doe does not call into question the

adequacy of her tort remedy under D.C. law,9and so she fails to identify a remedy for the alleged

violation of her procedural rights. That is, for purposes of due process, she has failed "to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).

To support her "procedural" due process claim, Doe relies on Taylor by and Through Walker

v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989). In

Taylor, a foster child sued Georgia state and county officials, alleging violations of both substantive

and procedural due processfor their failure to prevent the abuse the child suffered at the hands of her

foster mother. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim, and the en banc Eleventh

Circuit reversed. With respect to substantive due process, the court in Taylorfound a liberty interest

in "the right to be free fromthe infliction of unnecessary pain ... and the fundamentalright to physical

safety." Id. at 794. By "assuming the responsibility of finding and keeping the child in a safe

environment," the state undertook anobligationto ensure "the continuing safetyofthat environment,"

and failure to meet that obligation violated the child'ssubstantive due processrights. Id. at 795. We

need not consider here whether the substantive due process holding of Taylor was overruled by

DeShaney, or, instead, whether it can be distinguished on the basis of the state's role in placing the

child in a foster home, cf. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982) (holding that a child

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10 Doe by Nelson was a case of child abuse rather than neglect. The statute at issue there

required the county to investigate within 24 hours a report of abuse, and mandated that the

investigation include " "observation or an interview with the child, or both, and, if possible, a visit

to the child's home or usual living quarters and an interview with the child's parents, guardian or

legal custodian.' " 903 F.2d at 501 n.3 (quoting WISC. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(3)(c) (West 1987)); 

compare n.8 supra. The plaintiffs in Doe by Nelson alleged that the county unlawfully failed to

investigate two reports of suspected child abuse and that that failure led to physical and sexual

abuse of the plaintiffs. See 903 F.2d at 500-01. 

confined to a state mental health hospital has a substantive due process interest in reasonably safe

living conditions). For, as noted above, DeShaney squarely bars a due process claim, whether

phrased as "substantive" or "procedural," based solely on the theory that the state knew or should

have known that a child was going to be abused or neglected, and that it failed to prevent that abuse

or neglect.

In Taylor, the Eleventh Circuit also determined that the "comprehensive" Georgia child care

scheme created in the plaintiff child "a legitimate and sufficiently vested claimof entitlement such that

deprivation of that entitlement without due process of law impose[d] on her a grievous loss." 818

F.2d at 798 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)). Emphasizing that the child was

"entitled to be protected in the manner provided by statute," the court held that the Georgia child care

scheme gave rise "to a Roth-type claim." Id. at 800. In so holding, however, the court did not

suggest what, if any, additional process the state should provide prior to depriving the child of her

entitlement to services. See id. at 822 (concurring in part and dissenting in part). Indeed, the

procedural due process holding of the case is fundamentally at odds with the Supreme Court's due

process jurisprudence. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that it is not the deprivation of the

protected interest itself that violates procedural due process; rather, it is the deprivation without due

process of law. See, e.g., Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 472; Parratt, 451 U.S. at 537; Mathews, 424 U.S.

at 349. To the extent Taylor held that one can allege a procedural due process violation without even

suggesting what sort of process is due, we disagree.

The Seventh Circuit has rejected a due process claim very similar to Doe's. See Doe by

Nelson v. Milwaukee, 903 F.2d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 1990).10 Doe by Nelson involved the alleged

failure of social services workers to investigate and protect against abuse, as mandated by statute,

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after learning ofthe possibility of abuse. After noting that DeShaney barred the plaintiffs'substantive

due process claim, see 903 F.2d at 502, the court found their procedural due process claim based on

the procedures mandated by state law "untenable." Id. at 504. The plaintiffs could not assert an

entitlement to the procedures required by state law because " "[p]rocess is not an end in itself,' " but

is rather a means to the end of protecting substantive rights. 903 F.2d at 503 (quoting Olim v.

Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250-51 (1983)). Furthermore, even if the plaintiffs in Doe by Nelson

could assert the existence of an entitlement to protective services, the court there could not fathom

what process, beyond the available state remedy, "could possibly suffice to prevent the wrongful

"deprivation.' " 903 F.2d at 504. Pointing out that "not every violation of state law infringes upon

constitutional rights," the court rightly emphasized that a contrary rule would circumvent the

Supreme Court's holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from ordering state

officials to comply with state law. Id. at 504-05 (citing Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)). The Doe by Nelson court concluded, as we conclude here, that

the proper means by which a plaintiff may seek redressfor an alleged failure to comply with state and

local child protection statutes is an action for damages under state and local law. See 903 F.2d at

505.

Perhaps recognizing the difficulty of asserting a procedural due process claim based on the

DHS'sfailure to follow up on Doe's need for protective services, Doe switches gearsin her reply brief

to this court. Disclaiming interest in any "procedural safeguard ... other than a state tort remedy,"

Doe now seeks to base her due process claim on the applicationor, to be precise, the threatened

applicationofD.C.'s notice-of-claimprovision,see D.C.CODEANN. § 12-309 (1995). That is, Doe

claims that § 12-309 as applied by the District Court "arbitrarily denied [Doe] an opportunity to

remedy the defendants' failure to provide her entitled services." Although we need not reach this

claim in light of our certification to the D.C. Court of Appeals of the question whether § 12-309 bars

Doe's tort claim, we do note that such a claim faces an uphill battle. Even if the D.C. Court of

Appealsfinds Doe'stort claim barred by § 12-309, Doe may not be able to establish that she has been

deprived of a legal claim to redress under D.C. law. Although the Supreme Court has held that a

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legal claim is a type of "property" that the state cannot deprive one of without due process of law,

see Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982), the D.C. Court of Appeals has held

that a failure to satisfy § 12-309 means that no right of action accrues, see Gwinn v. District of

Columbia, 434 A.2d 1376, 1378 (D.C. 1981). Moreover, as emphasized above, a procedural due

process claimrequiresthe plaintiffto identify the processthat is due. Even assuming that barring Doe

under § 12-309 deprives her of a property right under Logan, it is difficult to discern any additional

process that could inure to Doe's benefit. She will have had the opportunity to argue, first in district

court, then in this court, and, finally, in the D.C. Court of Appeals, that § 12-309 does not and should

not bar her claim. And if Doe is ultimately forced to contend that § 12-309 cannot as a constitutional

matter bar her claim regardless of the amount of process she receives, she must contend with the

presumptive constitutional validity of the principled application ofstate procedural and jurisdictional

bars. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 342 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring); Chase

Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314-16 (1945). As the Supreme Court stated in

Logan, "the State certainly accords due process when it terminates a claim for failure to comply with

a reasonable procedural or evidentiary rule." 455 U.S. at 437.

IV.

Turning to Doe's claims under District of Columbia law, we first address a procedural

objection raised by appellees. For the first time on appeal, appellees contend that the district court

lacked jurisdiction over these claims because, having dismissed Doe's federal and constitutional

claims, the district court lacked pendent jurisdiction over the remaining claims. Because appellees'

objection goes only to the prudential factors underlying supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c) (1994), this objection has been waived.

A claim that the court lacks jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution may not be

waived, since the jurisdiction at issue goes to the foundation of the court's power to resolve a case,

and the court is obliged to addressit sua sponte. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S.

534, 541 (1986). By contrast, in the context of supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c), Article

III is satisfied once it is clear that the complaint raises a substantial federal question and that the

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11 Appellees' reliance on Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 475 n.6 (1970), is misplaced. 

The issue is not whether appellees have waived the objection to supplemental jurisdiction by

failing to take a cross-appeal but whether they waived the objection by failing to raise it in the

district court. 

federal and state claims arise from a "common nucleus of operative facts." United Mine Workers v.

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). Appellees do not contest the court's Article III power; rather, they

object to the district court's discretionary exercise ofitsjurisdiction over the District ofColumbia law

claims in Doe's complaint in view of the difficult questions of District of Columbia law that she

presents. The discretionary aspect to supplemental jurisdiction is waivable. Mayor of Philadelphia

v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 627 (1974). Appellees failed to make this objection

in the district court, and in the absence of exceptional circumstances, which appellees do not claim,

the objection comes too late. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976); Roosevelt v. E.I. Du

Pont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416, 419 & n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1992).11 Because appellees have

waived their objection to pendent jurisdiction, we turn to the merits of Doe's claims under District

of Columbia law.

Doe brings an action for negligence, in which appellees' duty of care is based on the District

of Columbia Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act. In Turner v. District of Columbia, 532

A.2d 662, 675 (D.C. 1987), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held under similar

circumstancesthat the District of Columbia Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act could create

a "special duty":

With respect to the District of Columbia ... we hold that when [Child Protective

Services] received a report that the two Roddy children, who were specifically and

individually identified, were being abused by their father, the Child Abuse Prevention

Act created a special relationship between the District and the two children. From

that moment on, the District had a duty to take certain steps prescribed by the Act for

the protection ofthose children. The District's breach of that duty is actionable under

the special duty exception to the general rule [that general duties owed to the public

at large are not enforceable by particular individuals].

A threshold requirement to filing suit, however, is presented by D.C. Code § 12-309, which provides

that:

An action may not be maintained against the District of Columbia for

unliquidated damagesto person or property unless, within six months after the injury

or damage was sustained, the claimant, his agent, or attorney has given notice in

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12 The district court also expressed support for certification. Such action is in accord with

appellees' broader contention that the local courts should be given the initial opportunity to

construe § 12-309 in light of Doe's contentions. By order of October 5, 1995, a motions panel of

this court denied Doe's motion to certify without prejudice to certification if the merits panel later

deemed it necessary. 

writing to the Mayor of the District of Columbia of the approximate time, place,

cause, and circumstances of the injury or damage. A report in writing by the

Metropolitan Police Department, in regular course of duty, is a sufficient notice under

this section.

The district court concluded that the letter sent to the Mayor by Doe's counsel was untimely and that

the police reports failed to provide sufficient notice of the "cause" of Doe's injury.

Doe concedesthat the January 9, 1990, letter to the Mayor from her counsel did not conform

to the literal terms of § 12-309's six-month time limit. Doe makes two arguments for why she

satisfies the condition precedent for suit. First, she maintains that § 12-309 was equitably tolled by

her status as a minor who was in the custody of the District government for a substantial part of the

six-month period immediately following her injury and who had no natural or legal guardian to act

on her behalf. In addition, Doe claims that the District government, through the DHS, had actual

notice of her claim, which should be deemed sufficient. In the alternative, she maintains that the

police reports satisfied the second sentence in § 12-309. Although the District of Columbia Court

of Appeals has often had the occasion to construe the notice requirement of § 12-309, we are

unaware of any case in which the court has confronted the precise issues that Doe presents, and Doe

has moved to certify questions of law to that court.12

A.

The leading decisions of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals most closely on point do

not indicate whether that court would hold that Doe's incapacity excused her non- compliance with

§ 12-309. In Hill v. District of Columbia, 345 A.2d 867 (D.C. 1975), the court rejected an adult's

claim that incapacity excused the tardiness of his § 12-309 letter. Hill was a patient at D.C. General

Hospital, whose condition required that he be sedated and strapped to his bed. As a result of a fire

in the bed on June 8, 1973, he sustained injuries that required that he be hospitalized for another five

months, during which time he received a large quantityofsedatives and had five skin graft operations.

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After his discharge on November 6, 1973, Hill returned to the hospital as an out-patient for physical

therapy for some time thereafter. He obtained counsel in January 1974, and his counsel sent a § 12-

309 letter 46 days after the six-month deadline expired. Assuming that Hill was incapacitated and

unable to give the requisite notice due to the fault of the District of Columbia during his five months'

hospitalization, the court nonetheless rejected his argument that he should be given a reasonable

period of time to file notice once he regained his ability to do so. Id. at 868. In granting summary

judgment to the District government, the court concluded that Hill's allegations were insufficient to

raise a genuine issue as to whether a wrongful act by the hospital made him incapable of providing

notice during the month after he was discharged, in which time the six-month period had not yet

expired. Id. at 869.

In Gwinn v. District of Columbia, 434 A.2d 1376 (D.C. 1981), the court held that § 12-309

was not tolled for infancy. The court noted generally that "[s]ection 12-309 was purely a notice

provision specifically designed to avoid, as applied to the District [government], the pitfalls of the

statute of limitations." Id. at 1378. The court reaffirmed both that § 12-309 is to be strictly

construed because it is a departure from the common law concept ofsovereign immunity, id. (citing

Washington v. District of Columbia, 429 A.2d 1362, 1365 (D.C. 1981) (en banc)), and that "notice

under § 12-309 is a "condition precedent' to filing a suit against the District," such that "unlesstimely

notice is given, no "right of action' or "entitlement to maintain an action' accrues," id. (distinguishing

tolling ofstatutesfor limitations due to infancy, under D.C.CODEANN. § 12-302). At age 11, Gwinn

was injured in a playground accident at a local school, eventually losing all sight in his left eye as a

result. He filed suit nine years later, never having provided written notice to the Mayor. The court

rejected Gwinn's argument that § 12-309 should be tolled during his minority. Id. at 1377. Adverting

to Congress' decision to give District government officials "prompt notice of claims for potentially

large sums ofmoney so that they could: quickly investigate before evidence became lost or witnesses

unavailable; correct hazardous or potentially hazardous conditions; and settle meritorious claims,"

the court acknowledged that the statute gives the District government a " "litigative advantage over

an ordinary civil defendant who may learn of claims against him for unliquidated damages at any time

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within the long statute of limitations period.' " Id. at 1378 (quoting Pitts v. District of Columbia, 391

A.2d 803, 807 (D.C. 1978)).

Of course, neither Hill nor Gwinn is directly analogous to Doe's case. She does not claim

merely that she was incapacitated during her hospitalization for her injuries nor simply that she was

a minor, but rather that she was in the physical and legal custody of the District government for most

of the six-month period until she was conditionally released in the care of her grandmother. The

district court ruled that it "c[ould] not excuse her grandmother's neglect in failing to file a timely §

12-309 notice letter." Both the statute and the case law are silent on the proper course to be followed

when a child's legal guardian has abandoned her, as Doe's mother did. Furthermore, the

grandmother's obligation to send a § 12-309 letter is unclearinasmuch asthe conditionalrelease order

of August 11, 1989, placed Doe in her grandmother's care only after the grandmother received

training at a rehabilitation center in Charlottesville, Virginia. As Doe points out, the Superior Court

did not appoint the grandmother as legal guardian. Further, as the district court noted, it is unclear

whether, under District of Columbia law, Doe's attorney in the neglect proceeding had an ethical

obligation also to protect her tort claims under District of Columbia law. Cf. S.S. v. D.M., 597 A.2d

870, 875-78 (D.C. 1991).

In Hill, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals expressly left open the question "whether

we would construe our statute as providing an additional period for compliance where the fault of

the government makes timely compliance unreasonable or impossible." 345 A.2d at 869 & n.3; see

also Gwinn, 434 A.2d at 1379 n.4 (noting that this question has been "left unanswered"). This court

recognized that the effect of a plaintiff's incapacity under § 12-309 was an open question in Hunter

v. District of Columbia, 943 F.2d 69, 74 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Furthermore, in Hill the District of

Columbia Court of Appeals declared that it did not need to "reach the constitutional due process

questionwhichwould be presented if[Hill's] acknowledged incapacity... had more nearlyapproached

or exceeded the six-month statutory notice period." Id. at 870 n.4.

The court notes also that when Congress enacted § 12-309, it purported to provide for the

District of Columbia the same type of notice statute that existed in most states. In Brown v. United

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13 Compare Maier v. City of Ketchikan, 403 P.2d 34, 37 (Alaska 1965) ("We adopt the view

that failure to file a notice of claim within the time prescribed by the city charter may be excused

because of the disability from which the claim arose and until a reasonable time after the disability

ceases.") overruled on other grounds, Johnson v. City of Fairbanks, 583 P.2d 181 (Alaska 1978); 

City of Colorado Springs v. Colburn, 81 P.2d 397, 398 (Colo. 1938) ("[U]nder proper

circumstances of mental and physical incapacity, giving of notice is excused."); Langevin v. City

of Biddeford, 481 A.2d 495, 498 (Me. 1984) (holding that it would violate due process to apply a

notice-of-claim statute to a 14-year-old minor who was "incapable of complying"); Kunkel v. City

of St. Louis, 163 S.W.2d 1014, 1015 (Mo. 1942) (holding "that physical or mental incapacity

excuses a failure to give the notice" under a notice-of-claim statute) and Ocampo v. City of

Racine, 137 N.W.2d 477, 481 (Wis. 1965) (holding that application of a notice-of-claim statute

would violate due process if "compliance ... is almost impossible and in essence the individual is

given no right of recovery") with Workman v. City of Emporia, 434 P.2d 846, 848-49 (Kan.

1967) (declining to read an exception for inability to comply into notice-of-claim statute) and

Waite v. Orgill, 310 S.W.2d 179, 180 (Tenn. 1958) (same). We also note the highest courts in

six states have struck down notice-of-claim statutes that contain no exceptions as facially

unconstitutional. See Miller v. Boone County Hosp., 394 N.W.2d 776 (Iowa 1986); Reich v.

State Highway Dep't, 194 N.W.2d 700 (Mich. 1972); Turner v. Staggs, 510 P.2d 879, cert.

denied, 414 U.S. 1079 (Nev. 1973); Adamsky v. Buckeye Local School Dist., 653 N.E.2d 212

(Ohio 1995); Hunter v. North Mason High School, 539 P.2d 845 (Wash. 1975) (en banc); 

O'Neil v. City of Parkersburg, 237 S.E.2d 504 (W. Va. 1977); see also Note, Notice of Claim

Provisions: An Equal Protection Perspective, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 417 (1975). Also, numerous

states' statutes contain some sort of means to obtain an exception for inability to comply. See,

e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 911.4 (1995); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-404 (1995); 

N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-222

(1992). 

States, 742 F.2d 1498, 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1073 (1985), this

court observed that in the legislative history to § 12-309, Congress "explicitly analogized to similar

legislation passed in the statesto govern other municipalities." Congress "equated the provision with

laws commonly passed by state governments. The report accompanying the bill pointed out that

"[s]imilar statutes are in effect in 32 States' and sought to justify the length of time allowed for giving

notice by comparing it to the provisionsin effect in "other jurisdictions.' " Id. (quoting H.R.REP. NO.

2010, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1933)). Consequently, the fact that the highest courts in a number of

states with notice statutes have construed their statutes in a divergent manner raises the question of

how the District of Columbia Court of Appeals would apply § 12-309 to Doe's case.13 We express

no view asto how the D.C. Court of Appeals will construe § 12-309 in the context ofthe facts before

us.

B.

Two other related areas of uncertainty exist under § 12-309. Appellees contend that the

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January 1990 letter sent to the Mayor by Doe's attorney failed to satisfy the "place" requirement of

§ 12-309. As we understand their position, the letter was deficient because it did not state that Doe

was injured in her mother's friend's home or provide that address. A recent decision by the District

of Columbia Court of Appeals held that notice was adequate where the date and time of the injury

were slightly inaccurate, reaffirming the court's position that although the time provisions of the

statute must be strictly construed, "greater liberality is appropriate with respect to the content of the

notice." Wharton v. District of Columbia, 666 A.2d 1227, 1230 (D.C. 1995) (citing Washington,

429 A.2d at 1365 n.9). In that case, the date stated in the notice was off by one day and the time was

off by 12 hours, which, the court concluded, amounted to a "minor discrepancy." Id. at 1231. The

court noted that the "statutory purposes focus on fairness to the District, and not on technical

perfection." Id.

Still, the situationpresented byDoe'sletter is different, and the omissions, particularlythe lack

of an address, may not be "minor" when the letter is viewed in isolation. And that is the question.

For it can be argued that the letter contained references to records by which the District could have

learned the place and address where Doe's injuries occurred. Although the District of Columbia

Court of Appeals has declined to go beyond the four corners of the § 12-309 letter or police report

in determining whetherstatutory notice has been given, see Washington, 429 A.2d at 1367; Braxton

v. National Capital Hous. Auth., 396 A.2d 215, 217 (D.C. 1978) (per curiam), it has not addressed

a situation where a minor wasin the District government's care for all except possibly the last 10 days

of the six-month notice period, when the court authorized her release to her grandmother. In

addition, the police reportsindependently provided the address of Doe's mother'sfriend's apartment,

where Doe wasscalded. See Rieser v. District of Columbia, 563 F.2d 462, 476 (D.C. Cir.), vacated,

563 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1977), reinstated in relevant part, 580 F.2d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc).

But the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has approved the view that this court took in Rieser

only to the point of holding that "precedents considering whether a particular police report has

satisfied the notice requirement of Section 309 ... follow a case-by-case approach in an area where

no "bright line' tests are applicable." Pitts, 391 A.2d at 808. Thus, it is unclear whether the

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specification of the "place" of injury in the police reports can supplement the notice-of-claim letter.

Appellees also contend that the police reports did not suffice to meet the notice requirement

of § 12-309 because they omit the critical element of "cause." In order to satisfy § 12-309, "a police

report "must contain information asto time, place, cause and circumstances ofinjury or damage with

at least the same degree of specificity required of a written notice.' " Campbell v. District of

Columbia, 568 A.2d 1076, 1078 (D.C. 1990) (quoting Miller v. Spencer, 330 A.2d 250, 252 (D.C.

1974)). The police reports in Doe's case revealed the location, approximate time of the accident, and

the person who was responsible for placing Doe in the scalding water, and were prepared in the

regular course of duty. However, a police report only sets forth "cause" within the meaning of § 12-

309 "if it recites facts from which it could be reasonably anticipated that a claim against the District

might arise." Pitts, 391 A.2d at 809; see also Washington, 429 A.2d at 1366 (stating that notice

is sufficient if it "described the injuring event with sufficient detail to reveal, in itself, a basis for the

District's potential liability").

The closest cases in Doe's favor are Rieser and Pitts. In Rieser the plaintiff sued on behalf

of a woman who was raped and murdered by a parolee under the supervision of the District

government. The police reports indicated the identity of the victim and the parolee, and the fact that

the parolee was working at the site where the crimes occurred. 563 F.2d at 476-77. In Pitts, the

police report stated that a child had fallen through a guard rail at a public housing project; the report

did not indicate that the railing was damaged or defective. 391 A.2d at 809-10. In both cases, the

courts found § 12-309 was satisfied. Appellees, like the district court, rely on Braxton v. District of

Columbia, 396 A.2d at 217-18, where the police reportssimply stated that unidentified burglars had

broken into an apartment in a public housing complex. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals

held that the police reports did not satisfy § 12-309 because they stated that the door had been pried

open while the plaintiff later sued the District government for negligence in keeping track of the

master key; nothing indicated that the mode of entry had been by a skeleton key possessed by a

housing authority official. Hence, the reports did "not state such cause and circumstances as would

give the District of Columbia notice of a forthcoming claim that careless handling of a master key on

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14 Although § 12-309 protects only the District of Columbia government and not its

employees, Doe has not argued on appeal that the district court erred in applying the notice

requirement to all appellees, and therefore has waived the argument. 

the part of [the housing authority] enabled the burglary to take place." Id.

The district court read Braxton as holding that a police report that suggeststhe responsibility

of an intervening actor will not sufficiently put the District government on notice under § 12-309 of

its potential liability. Although that view is inconsistent with Rieser, Doe'sinterpretation ofthe police

reports requires an expansive reading of § 12-309's "cause" requirement. While the reports do state

that Doe's mother had abandoned her and that two of Doe's siblings were in foster care, from which

one might infer that the District owed a duty of care toward Doe, the reports omit the criticalfact that

Doe's grandmother repeatedly attempted to contact DHS workers about Doe's circumstances. The

district court nonetheless viewed the sufficiency of the notice in the police reports as a very close call.

Uncertain of how the District of Columbia Court of Appeals would decide this question, we include

it in our certified question.

Therefore, because we conclude that "there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the

District of Columbia Court of Appeals," D.C.CODEANN. § 11-723, we certify the question whether

§ 12-309 bars Doe from proceeding with her claims under District of Columbia law against the

District government and two ofits employeesfor negligence, based on the District ofColumbia Child

Abuse and Prevention Act.14

Accordingly, we affirmthe dismissal of the federal cause of action, conclude there is no merit

to Doe's procedural due process contention, and certify the § 12-309 issues to the District of

Columbia Court of Appeals.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Filed August 27, 1996

No. 95-7077

JANE DOE, A MINOR CHILD, BY NEXT FRIEND, LESLIE G. FEIN,

APPELLANT

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V.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

-

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, SILBERMAN and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

CERTIFICATION OF QUESTION OF LAW

by the United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals

pursuant to D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-723

On May 6, 1996, a panel of the United States Court of appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit heard oral argument in Doe v. District of Columbia, et al., No. 95-7077. It appears from the

briefs and oral argumentsthat a question ofstatutory interpretation under D.C.CODEANN. § 12-309

willdetermine the outcome ofthe appealwith respect to Doe's claims under District ofColumbia law.

It further appearsthat the District of Columbia Court of Appeals hasissued no controlling precedent

addressing the determinative questions. Thus, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit is not now positioned to render a secure disposition of the entire cause and,

therefore, on its own motion, consistent with Doe's motion, certifies the determinative question of

law to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

The question of law to be answered is this: Are Jane Doe's claims for negligence, based on

the District of Columbia Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act of 1977, D.C. CODE ANN. §§

2-1351 to -1357, 6-2101 to -2127, against the District of Columbia and two of its employees barred

under D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-309? In addressing this question, the District of Columbia Court of

Appealsshould consider the issues addressed in Part IV of the opinion issued in this case on the date

of the certification.

Per Curiam

For the Court: 

Mark J. Langer, Clerk 

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1

Indeed, Congress has reinforced its intention that federal grant conditions may create

enforceable rights, according to the law in pre-Suter Supreme Court decisions:

By: ________________ 

Deputy Clerk 

ROGERS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: Because the court fails to

give appropriateweight to the mandatorystatutoryrequirementsimposed on the District ofColumbia

as a grant recipient under the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, I respectfully dissent from

Part II of the court's opinion. I concur, however, in Part IV of the court's opinion certifying the

questions under D.C. Code. § 12-309 to the District ofColumbia Court of Appeals. Further, because

the highest courts of appeals of the several states are divided on the question whether a non-claim

statute denies due process and equal protection to persons similarly situated to Doe, I also concur

in Part III of the court's opinion to the extent that it defers decision on the only due process

contention that Doe raises, namely a claim of denial of procedural due process, until this court

receives the certified opinion of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

I.

The SupremeCourt haslong made clear that "ifthere is a state deprivation of a "right'secured

by a federal statute, § 1983 provides a remedial cause of action unless the state actor demonstrates

by express provision or other specific evidence from the statute itself that Congress intended to

foreclose such private enforcement." Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S.

418, 423 (1987). " "We do not lightly conclude that Congress intended to preclude reliance on §

1983 as a remedy' for the deprivation of a federally secured right." Id. at 423-24 (quoting Smith v.

Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012 (1984)). Even in the context of federal grant statutes that provide

funds to states that accept the conditions on those funds, a congressional grant condition is a federal

"right" enforceable under § 1983 unless the condition is "simply a general statement of "findings' "

that "does no more than express a congressional preference for certain kinds of treatment."

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19 (1981). The recent Supreme Court

decision in Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992), does not alter that standard.1Id. at 358 & n.8.

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In an action brought to enforce a provision of this chapter [42 U.S.C. §§

301-1397f], such provision is not to be deemed unenforceable because of its

inclusion in a section of this chapter requiring a State plan or specifying the

required contents of a State plan. This section is not intended to limit or expand

the grounds for determining the availability of private actions to enforce State plan

requirements other than by overturning any such grounds applied in Suter v. Artist

M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992), but not applied in prior Supreme Court decisions

respecting such enforceability; provided, however, that this section is not intended

to alter the holding in Suter v. Artist M. that section 671(a)(15) of this title is not

enforceable in a private right of action.

42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2 (1994); see also id. § 1320a-10 (identical provision); see also H.R. CONF.

REP. NO. 761, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 926 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2901, 3257; 

see generally Note, Congress Overruling the Courts: Legislative Changes to the Scope of

Section 1983, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 411 (1996). However, because the provision on

which Doe relies, 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2), is not part of the Social Security Act, id. §§ 301-

1397f, this statute does not apply directly to Doe's claim. 

2

42 U.S.C. § 5106g(8) (1994). 

In 1988Congress amended theChild AbusePreventionandTreatment Act to establish a grant

program to help to fund state child-abuse programs. Child Abuse Prevention, Adoption, and Family

Services Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-294, § 101, 102 Stat. 102, 110 (codified as amended at 42

U.S.C. §§ 5106a-5106h (1994)). A state (defined as including the District of Columbia2) that wishes

to qualify for the federal funds must meet ten conditions listed in § 5106a(b). First, the state shall

have in effect a State law relating to child abuse and neglect, including

(A) provisions for the reporting of known and suspected instances of

child abuse and neglect; and

(B) provisions for immunity from prosecution under State and local

laws for persons who report instances of child abuse or neglect for

circumstances arising from such reporting.

Id. § 5106a(b)(1). The state must also "demonstrate that there are in effect throughout the State"

such procedures "as may be necessary or appropriate to ensure that the State will deal effectivelywith

child abuse and neglect cases in the State." Id. § 5106a(b)(3). Most of the other grant conditions

require that the "State shall provide" certain child-protective services. Id. § 5106a(b)(2), (4)-(8)

(emphasis added). If a state is not in compliance with the grant conditions in subsection (b), the

Secretary of Health and Human Services may under certain conditions grant a waiver for a limited

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3

In 1992 Congress further specified the conditions in paragraph (b)(4), amended subsection

(a) to limit the purposes for which states could use the federal funds, and added a new subsection

(c) to require the states to submit every four years a plan detailing how the state intends to spend

the federal funds toward the purposes in subsection (a). Child Abuse, Domestic Violence,

Adoption and Family Services Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-295, § 114, 106 Stat. 187, 192-95

(1992). These provisions were not in effect at the time of Doe's injury. 

period. Id. § 5106a(c) (1988), recodified as § 5106a(d) (1994).3 The specific language on which

Doe relies appears in § 5106a(b)(2), which provides that:

In order for a State to qualify for a grant under subsection (a) of this section,

such State shall ...

(2) provide that upon receipt of a report of known or suspected instances of

child abuse or neglect an investigation shall be initiated promptly to substantiate the

accuracy of the report, and, upon a finding of abuse and neglect, immediate steps

shall be taken to protect the health and welfare of the abused or neglected child and

of any other child under the same care who may be in danger of abuse or neglect.

(Emphasis added by Doe.)

A.

The Supreme Court has recognized that § 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of

federal statutes. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1980). Such violations are not cognizable

under § 1983, however, if the statutory provision is a statement of findings that does not rise to the

level of an enforceable right, Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19 (1981),

or if Congress has foreclosed § 1983 enforcement by providing specific enforcement mechanisms in

the statute itself, Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,

19-21 (1981). See Suter, 503 U.S. at 355-56; Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508

(1990); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106-07 (1989); Wright

v. City of Roanoke Redev. &Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987). In Wilder, the Supreme Court

developed a three-part test for determining whether a statute creates an "enforceable right":

Such an inquiry turns on whether the provision in question wasintended to benefit the

putative plaintiff. If so, the provision creates an enforceable right unless it reflects

merely a congressional preference for a certain kind of conduct rather than a binding

obligation on the governmental unit, or unless the interest the plaintiff asserts is too

vague and amorphous such that it is beyond the competence of the judiciary to

enforce.

496 U.S. at 509 (quotations, citations and alterations omitted). Because appellees do not contend

that Congress has either expressly foreclosed private enforcement in the statute or that Congress has

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4 The Court also noted that health care providers had been able to sue in federal court before

enactment of the Boren Amendment and that nothing in the legislative history of the amendment

indicated that Congress intended to deprive health care providers of their right to challenge rates

under § 1983. Id. at 515-19. 

created a remedial scheme sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate an intent to preclude relief

under § 1983, the only question is whether § 5106a(b)(2) creates an enforceable right.

In Wilder itself, the Court considered the private enforceability of the Boren Amendment to

the Medicaid Act, which requires each state that wishes to receive federal financial assistance to

establish a state plan that reimburses health care providers according to ratesthat the state "finds, and

makes assurances satisfactory to the Secretary [of Health and Human Services], are reasonable and

adequate to meet the costswhichmust be incurred byefficientlyand economicallyoperated facilities."

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A). Applying the tripartite standard set forth above, the Court concluded

that the provision was enforceable by a health care provider in a § 1983 action. 496 U.S. at 509-20.

The Court noted the mandatory, rather than precatory, nature of the rate-findings-and-assurances

requirement and that the provision of federal funds is expressly conditioned on state compliance in

fact. Id. at 512. Distinguishing Pennhurst, the Court concluded that the Boren Amendment was "a

congressional command," rather than "a mere suggestion or "nudge.' " Id. at 512 (internal quotation

marks omitted). The Court rejected an interpretation of the Boren Amendment that would have

limited it to requiring the statesto make the rate findings and assurances of reasonable and adequate

rates "without requiring those findingsto be correct." Id. at 514. The Court concluded that "the only

plausible interpretation of the amendment is that by requiring a State to find that its rates are

reasonable and adequate, the statute imposes the concomitant obligation to adopt reasonable and

adequate rates."4Id. at 514-15.

The Wilder Court also rejected the notion that in giving flexibility to the states, the obligation

of reasonable and adequate rates was too "vague and amorphous" to be judicially enforceable. Id.

at 519-20. Critical to the Court's conclusion was the fact that the statute and regulations set forth

specific factors that states must consider in setting reimbursement rates, as well as the fact that the

state's findings were to be based on the objective benchmark of an "efficiently and economically

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5 The Court noted that "when determining methods for calculating rates that are reasonably

related to the costs of an efficient hospital, a State must consider: (1) the unique situation

(financial and otherwise) of a hospital that serves a disproportionate number of low income

patients, (2) the statutory requirement for adequate care in a nursing home, and (3) the special

situation of hospitals providing inpatient care when long-term care at a nursing home would be

sufficient but is unavailable." Id. at 519 n.17 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A)). 

6 Although Suter does not explicitly use the Wilder test, lower courts are in agreement that the

analytical framework of Wilder still applies. See Freestone v. Cowan, 68 F.3d 1141, 1147-48 (9th

Cir. 1995), cert. granted sub nom. Blessing v. Freestone, 116 S. Ct. 1671 (1996); Wood v.

Tompkins, 33 F.3d 600, 605-06 (6th Cir. 1994); Miller v. Whitburn, 10 F.3d 1315, 1319 (7th

Cir. 1993); Arkansas Med. Soc'y v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 524-25 (8th Cir. 1993); Arkansas

Medical Soc., Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 525-27 (1st Cir. 1993); Stowell v. Ives, 976 F.2d 65,

operated facilit[y]," while ensuring "reasonable access" to eligible participants.5Id. at 519 (quoting

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A)). Thus, "[w]hile there may be a range of reasonable rates, there

certainly are some rates outside that range that no State could ever find to be reasonable and adequate

under the Act." Id. at 519-20.

In Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, the Court held that a class of neglected children could not

bring suit under § 1983 to enforce a provision of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of

1980 that required states, in order to receive federal funds, to submit a plan that "provides that, in

each case, reasonable efforts will be made (A) prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to

prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home, and (B) to make it possible for

the child to return to his home." 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15). Unlike the Boren Amendment in Wilder,

the Court construed the adoption statute to require only that the state submit such a plan, not that

the state actually undertake "reasonable efforts." 503 U.S. at 358-60. A requirement "that the State

have a plan approved by the Secretary which contains the 16 listed features," id. at 358, is not

individuallyenforceable, when "[n]o furtherstatutoryguidance isfound asto how "reasonable efforts'

are to be measured," id. at 360. Bearing in mind that " "if Congress intends to impose a condition

on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously,' " id. at 356 (quoting Pennhurst, 451

U.S. at 17), the Court concluded that "the "reasonable efforts' language does not unambiguously

confer an enforceable right upon the Act's beneficiaries," id. at 363.

B.

Turning to Wilder'sthree-part test,6it is uncontested that Doe falls within the class ofintended

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68 (1st Cir. 1992). Moreover, in Lampkin v. District of Columbia, 27 F.3d 605 (D.C. Cir.), cert.

denied, 115 S. Ct. 578 (1994), this circuit applied the Wilder framework, asking whether the

statute was intended to benefit persons like the plaintiffs, id.; whether the statute created

substantively enforceable rights, id. at 610-11; whether the statutory standard was vague and

amorphous, id. at 612; and whether Congress intended to foreclose private enforcement, id. at

611. 

beneficiaries of the statute. The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, by its very name, was

intended to benefit possibly neglected children, such as Doe, and the requirement in § 5106a(b)(2)

that the state promptly initiate an investigation and take immediate steps to protect the child was

presumably intended in part to prevent children from being left with unsuitable caretakers, as Doe

alleges occurred here.

The court concludes that § 5106a(b)(2) fails the second prong of the Wilder test. 496 U.S.

at 509. The court reads the grant condition that the state "provide that ... an investigation shall be

initiated promptly ... and ... immediate steps shall be taken," 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2), as merely a

requirement for inclusion in the state plan, rather than a substantive obligation. Op. at 8-9. Although

the court does not reach the third prong of the Wilder test, the requirements for "prompt[ ]"

investigation of reports of child abuse and for "immediate steps" if abuse is found are not so vague

and amorphousthat theyare not judiciallyenforceable. Respectfully, the court has misapplied Wilder

and hasfailed to follow this court's precedent in Lampkin v. District of Columbia, 27 F.3d 605 (D.C.

Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 578 (1994).

The second prong of the Wilder test asks whether the statutory provision merely indicates a

"congressional preference" or instead exerts "a binding obligation on the governmental unit." 496

U.S. at 509. Doe maintains that, as with the provision at issue in Wilder, § 5106a(b)(2) is cast in

mandatory terms. On the other hand, appellees contend that § 5106a should be read as a unitary

federal-grant provision and rely on the fact that the District of Columbia has complied with its

obligation to submit a plan in conformity with the statutory requirements as a condition of receiving

federal funds.

This court has once before applied the analysis of Wilder and Suter to a federal-grant

provision, in Lampkin v. District of Columbia, 27 F.3d 605 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 578

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7 The statute provided also that "each homeless child shall be provided services comparable to

services offered to other students in the school"; that "[a]ny record ordinarily kept by the school

... of each homeless child or youth shall be maintained"; and that "[e]ach local educational

agency serving homeless children or youth ... shall coordinate with local social services agencies"

and "shall designate a homelessness liaison." 42 U.S.C. § 11432(e)(5)-(8) (emphasis added). 

(1994). In Lampkin, the court construed provisions of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless

Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11301-11489 (1994), concerning the education of homeless children,

id. § 11431-11435 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-382, § 323, 108 Stat. 3518,

3957 (1994). The court particularly noted 42 U.S.C. § 11432(e)(3)-(9), which "provide[d] highly

specific instructionsfor meeting a variety of needs of homeless children and youth." 27 F.3d at 610.

For example, the statute provided that the state "shall" assign a homeless child or youth to a school

that "is in the child's best interest or the youth's best interest," and that in making that determination,

"consideration shall be given to a request by a parent regarding school selection."742 U.S.C. §

11432(e)(3) (emphasis added). The court therefore concluded that, unlike the adoption statute at

issue in Suter, the relevant portions of the McKinney Act "not only inform the State in great detail

on how its plan is to be implemented, they impose obligations that are independent of the plan." 27

F.3d at 611.

Section 5106a(b)(2) ofthe Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act resemblesthe statutes

that in Wilder and Lampkin were found to create enforceable rights. As was true with § 11432(e)(3)

of the McKinney Act and with § 1396(a)(13)(A) of the Boren Amendment, the statute provides a

directive independent ofthe requirementsfor what states must include in their plan. The court misses

the significance of this point entirely. Op. at 9. As opposed to paragraphs (1) and (3) of § 5106a(b),

for example, which simply require the state to "have in effect" a qualifying state law and to

"demonstrate [to the Secretary] that there are in effect" certain state procedures, paragraph (2) states

in unequivocal terms that the state "shall provide" that "an investigation shall be initiated promptly

to substantiate the accuracy of the report" and "immediate steps shall be taken to protect the health

and welfare of the abused or neglected child and of any other child under the same care who may be

in danger of abuse or neglect." 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2). As in Lampkin, "this language [is]

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8 Paragraphs (4) through (8), which similarly require that the state "shall provide" for certain

standards, may also create rights enforceable under § 1983, but Doe does not contend that

appellees violated any of those provisions. 

9 The court's notation that it is applying the plain language of the statute, Op. at 9 n.6,

provides no reason for concluding that the formulation "provide that [certain steps be taken]"

should be synonymous with "provide a plan that requires that certain steps be taken." That the

former is written in the passive voice, by contrast with the designation of "local educational

agencies" in the McKinney Act at issue in Lampkin, simply reflects that Congress left to the states

discretion the choice of the institutional means for carrying out these duties. 

10 The Sixth Circuit has similarly concluded that the "mandatory language [of § 5106a(b)(2)],

as well as its inclusion as a requirement for eligibility, indicates that the requirement is a binding

obligation rather than a congressional preference." Tony L. v. Childers, 71 F.3d 1182, 1189 (6th

Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1834 (1996). The Sixth Circuit also concluded that

paragraphs (1) and (3) more closely resemble the provisions found unenforceable in Suter. Id. at

1188 n.12. 

"mandatory rather than hortatory.' "827 F.3d at 611. In effect, the court reads the "provide that"

language to mean "provide in a plan." Op. at 10-11. The requirement that a state "shall provide that"

certain steps be taken does not suggest that drawing up a plan is sufficient, and the court's reading

would give no effect to the difference in wording between paragraph (2) and paragraph (1), which

refers to the state plan.9 Unlike the adoption statute in Suter, which required only that a state plan

be in effect and that the state undertake "reasonable efforts," 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(3), (15), section

5106a(b)(2) of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act imposes binding obligations on states

that accept the federal grants. The statutory language at issue "is sufficiently clear to put the States

on notice of the obligations they assume when they choose to accept grants made under the Act."10

Lampkin, 27 F.3d at 611.

In addition to the language of § 5106a(b)(2), the regulations accompanying the statute also

clearly notify the states oftheir obligationsifthey accept the federalfunds. 45 C.F.R. §§ 1340.10-.15

(1995). Implementing regulations alone can suffice to unambiguously put states on notice of the

obligations they assume by participating in the federal funding program, thereby creating rights

enforceable under § 1983. See, e.g., Buckley v. City of Redding, 66 F.3d 188, 192 (9th Cir. 1995);

Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548, 551-53 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1099

(1995). At the very least, such regulations can reinforce the notice provided by the statute. See

Suter, 503 U.S. at 361; Lampkin, 27 F.3d at 611. Under the regulations at issue, in order for the

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Secretaryto approve the state's application, the "State mustsatisfyeach ofthe requirementsin section

107(b) of the Act [42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)]." 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14(a). Two regulations in particular

elaborate on the conditions in § 5106a(b)(2):

(d) The State must provide for the prompt initiation of an appropriate

investigation by a child protective agency or other properly constituted authority to

substantiate the accuracy of allreports of known or suspected child abuse or neglect.

This investigation may include the use of reporting hotlines, contact with central

registers, field investigations and interviews, home visits, consultation with other

agencies, medical examinations, psychological and social evaluations, and reviews by

multidisciplinary teams.

(f) If an investigation of a report reveals that the reported child or any other

child under the same care is in need of immediate protection, the State must provide

emergency services to protect the child's health and welfare. These services may

include emergency caretaker or homemaker services; emergency shelter care or

medicalservices; review by a multidisciplinary team; and, if appropriate, criminal or

civil court action to protect the child, to help the parents or guardians in their

responsibilities and, if necessary, to remove the child from a dangerous situation.

45 C.F.R. § 1340.14(d), (f) (emphasis added). Whereas several of the other regulations adopted to

enforce § 5106a(b) are expressly limited to the state's duty to enact a statute or adopt certain

procedures, see 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14(c), (e), (g)-(i), the regulations upon which Doe relies, id. §

1340.14(d), (f), are phrased in mandatory terms that require the state to provide the actual

investigations and protective services. Unlike Suter, where "[t]he regulations promulgated by the

Secretary to enforce the Adoption Act do not evidence a view that § 671(a) places any requirement

for state receipt of federal funds other than the requirement that the State submit a plan to be

approved by the Secretary," 503 U.S. at 361, the regulations accompanying the Child Abuse

Prevention and Treatment Act further notified the states of their substantive obligations.

Moreover, as is clear upon examining the third prong of the Wilder test, which asks whether

the statutoryprovision isso "vague and amorphous" "that it is beyond the competence ofthe judiciary

to enforce," 496 U.S. at 509, section 5106a(b)(2) mandates("such State shall") the manner in which

the investigation is to be initiated ("promptly" "upon receipt of a report"), the purpose of the

investigation to be conducted ("to substantiate the accuracyofthe report"), when stepsmust be taken

upon a finding of abuse or neglect ("immediately"), and the nature of such steps ("to protect the

health and welfare of the abused or neglected child and of any other child under the same care who

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may be in danger of abuse or neglect"). The federal regulations, 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14(d), (f), provide

examples of investigative measures and appropriate emergency responses. With these detailed

substantive standards in statute and regulation, § 5106a(b)(2) resembles the Boren Amendment at

issue in Wilder in that "the statute and regulation set out factors which a State must consider in

adopting its rates." 496 U.S. at 519. By contrast, in Suter the "reasonable efforts" provision of the

Adoption Act was too vague, when "[n]o further statutory guidance is found as to how "reasonable

efforts' are to be measured." 503 U.S. at 360.

As the Supreme Court remarked in Wilder, the fact that the statute "gives the States

substantial discretion ... may affect the standard under which a court reviews[the state's compliance],

but it does not render the amendment unenforceable by a court" under § 1983. 496 U.S. at 519. In

reaching a contrary conclusion in Tony L. v. Childers, 71 F.3d 1182, 1189-90 (6th Cir. 1995), cert.

denied, 116 S. Ct. 1834 (1996), the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that it saw itself in a "quandary"

because the regulations accompanying § 5106a "appear to place this case in between the Supreme

Court's teachings in Wilder and Suter." Id. at 1189. Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit relied on the fact

that the regulations, 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14(d), (f), use the word "may," rather than "shall," such that

the states "retain discretion under CAPTA to disregard the examples provided" therein. 71 F.3d at

1189. In fact, however, the mandates for state compliance are to be found in the statute itself, which

requires "prompt[]" investigations and "immediate" responsive steps, cf. Lampkin, 27 F.3d at 610-11;

the regulatory examples illustrate what action is contemplated for state compliance.

Without attempting to define a single set of specific program requirements, Congress gave

the states leeway, within the statutory mandates, to devise various means by which to comply. In

finding that deaths from child abuse and neglect were staggeringly high, Congress found also that

"child abuse fatalities are not inherently predictable but many are preventable." Child Abuse

Prevention, Adoption and Family Services Act of 1988, § 106(a), 102 Stat. 102, 119. Even though

the precise choice ofmeans of compliance in regard to how investigations willbe conducted and what

emergencies services will be made available is left to the states, 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14(d), (f), the

federal statute sets certain limits on the scope of that discretion and mandates some standards that

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11 In Marisol A. v. Giuliani, No. 95 Civ. 10533 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 1996), the district court

found that a § 1983 action could lie to enforce § 5106a(b)(2). In deciding that the statutory

language was not overly vague, the court noted that it could "look to professional standards to

determine whether ... the protective steps taken were appropriate." 

the states that accept the federal grant cannot avoid.11 Cf. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 515 ("[W]hile

Congress gave States leeway in adopting a method of computing rates ... [,] Congress retained the

underlying requirement of "reasonable and adequate' rates."). For example, a state surely could not

qualify for federal funds if it took, say, twelve months to investigate reports of child abuse or if the

state took no action whatsoever to substantiate the accuracy of the report; in such instances, a §

1983 action would lie. In Lampkin, this circuit held that the provision in the McKinneyAct requiring

states to place homeless children in a school that "is in the child's best interest," 42 U.S.C. §

11432(e)(3) (1988), was not overly vague or amorphous. 27 F.3d at 612. Just as the statute in

Lampkin focuses on protection for an individual homeless child, § 5106a(b)(2) focuses on protection

for an individual child about whom the state has received a report of suspected abuse.

Although the stautory terms "promptly" and "immediate" can have various specific

programmatic meanings, as they well might given the different circumstances faced by the several

states, they alert the states to the type of action that is required, and the regulations provide further

guidance to the states about the type of action that must be taken to comply with the statutory

mandate. Doe seeks to enforce her federal right to have the District undertake a prompt investigation

of her grandmother's reports to the Department of Human Services and the Metropolitan Police

Department about abuse and neglect and, upon determining thatshe was abused or neglected, to have

the District take immediate steps to protect her health and safety. The context in which Congress

acted, given itsspecific findings, lendsfurther definition to the nature of "promptly" and "immediate."

Because it contains mandatory standards, accompanied by regulatory guidance, § 5106a(b)(2) is as

definite than the federal-grant conditions in Wilder and Lampkin, and I conclude that § 5106a(b)(2)

likewise creates judicially enforceable rights.

Accordingly, I would reverse the district court's dismissal ofDoe's § 1983 action for violation

of the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act.

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12 The court's reliance on Doe by Nelson v. Milwaukee, 903 F.2d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 1990),

appears to be misplaced. Op. at 15-16. Doe's claim is based on the District of Columbia's

statute's entitlement to protective services, D.C. Code §§ 6-2104, -2105, -2124, and the facts

stated in her complaint pose none of the imponderables confronting the Seventh Circuit regarding

the beneficiary and the timing of a hearing; it also implicates no Eleventh Amendment concerns. 

Hence, the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that proper redress is to be sought through a damages

action under state and local law, 903 F.2d at 505, does not necessarily apply to Doe. Op. at 16. 

See Taylor by and through Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 799 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc), on

which Doe relies, (holding that state statute gives rise to a procedural due process right, noting

II.

Contrary to the court's discussion in Part III of its opinion, Op. at 11-14, Doe does not

advance a substantive due process claim such as that rejected by the Supreme Court in DeShaney v.

WinnebagoCounty Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989). See Appellant's MainBrief

at 29-30; Reply Brief at 2. Hence, the court's discussion of a substantive due process claim is

dictum. Rather, Doe contends that, as applied to her, D.C. Code § 12-309 violates due process of

law. Her argument is that as a neglected child, she was entitled to services under the District of

Columbia Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act that the District government cannot deprive

her of without due process of law. Cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428-33

(1982) (holding that a cause of action is a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause).

Doe does not suggest, as indeed she could not, that the availability of a tort remedy under District

of Columbia law is insufficient to satisfy procedural due process. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.

527, 538-41 (1981). Instead, she maintains that she has been deprived of procedural due process if,

as the district court ruled, § 12-309 is interpreted to bar the availability of a post-deprivation tort

remedy. Cf. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125-26 (1990) (stating that the "guarantee of fair

procedure" is violated if the "process the State provided" was not "constitutionally adequate"). The

court, curiously, assumes the existence of the very remedy that Doe contends is barred for her

through no fault of her own. Op. at 12-13. Doe maintains that her incapacitygiven her infancy and

hospitalization in the custody of the District governmentwould make application of § 12-309,

which has no provision for infancy or notice on behalf of an infant, to her a violation of due process,

for she would thereby be deprived the benefit of rights under the Child Abuse Protection and

Treatment Act.12

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that the state statute mandated affirmative actions to ensure the well-being of children in foster

care in addition to "procedural guidelines" for decision-making); Tarpeh-Doe v. United States,

904 F.2d 719 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 

13 In a later decision, the Alaska Supreme Court has held that municipal notice-of-claim

provisions are pre-empted by state statute. Johnson v. City of Fairbanks, 583 P.2d 181, 184-87

(Alaska 1978). Such concerns about the relation between states and local governments do not

apply to the District of Columbia. 

The court acknowledges that in view of the decision to certify the § 12-309 issues to the

District of Columbia Court of Appeals, consideration of Doe's procedural due process claim should

be deferred. Op. at 16. Hence, the court's discussion of its construction of Doe's procedural due

process claim is dictum. I agree, however, that because of the possibility that the District of

Columbia court of Appeals may read § 12-309 to allow Doe's claim under District of Columbia law

to go forward, our decision on Doe's procedural due process claim is properly deferred.

III.

I concur in the reference of the issues under D.C. Code § 12-309 to the District of Columbia

Court of Appeals. As the court notes, Op. at 23, there is a split among the highest courts of the

States on the applicability of non-claim statutes to persons in Doe's position as a minor or otherwise

in a state of incapacity, and the fundamental concern arises where a state's statute permits of no

exception for minority or incapacity. The nature of that split bears noting in light of Doe's due

process claim.

For example, in Maier v. City of Ketchikan, 403 P.2d 34 (Alaska 1965),13 the Supreme Court

of Alaska construed a provision of a municipal charter providing that "[t]he city shall not be liable in

damages for injury to person or property by reason of negligence of the city unless, within four

months after such injury occurs, the person damaged or his representative causes a written notice to

be served upon an officer of the city upon whom process may be served." Id. at 35. Maier was

severely injured while holding a metalsurvey rod that came into contact with an electrical power line

owned by the city. His notice of claim was more than a month late, and on appeal he maintained that

his incapacity, which arose out of the injury on which his claim was based, excused his delay in filing

a claim. Id. at 36. The Alaska Supreme Court noted the disagreement among the states on this point,

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with some states prohibiting exceptions where the notice law itself does not excuse the disabled and

other states treating such disability as an excuse. Id. at 37. The Alaska Supreme Court resolved the

issue as follows:

We adopt the view that failure to file a notice of claim within the time

prescribed by the city charter may be excused because of the disability fromwhich the

claimarose and until a reasonable time after the disability ceases. The essential justice

ofsuch a view persuades us to adopt it for thisjurisdiction. If, as appellant contends,

he wasinjured by the negligence ofthe city, it would be basically unfair to deprive him

of recourse to the courts if the injuries suffered prevented him from complying with

the notice requirements of the charter. To permit such a situation to occur would

make it possible for the city to take advantage of and benefit from its own wrong.

This would not be consistent with our traditional conception of fair play and

substantial justice.

Id.

The highest courtsin a number ofstates had taken a similar view. Years before Maier, inCity

of Colorado Springs v. Colburn, 102 Colo. 483, 486, 81 P.2d 397, 398 (1938), the Supreme Court

of Colorado adopted what it "conceive[d] to be the more reasonable and humane rule ... to the effect

that under proper circumstances of mental and physical incapacity, giving of notice is excused." See

also Fritz v. Regents of Univ. of Colorado, 196 Colo. 335, 338-39, 586 P.2d 23, 25-26 (1978) (en

banc). The Supreme Court of Missouri has long held "that physical or mental incapacity excuses a

failure to give the notice" under a statute like § 12-309. Kunkel v. City of St. Louis, 349 Mo. 1121,

1128, 163 S.W.2d 1014, 1015 (1942); see also Randolph v. City of Springfield, 302 Mo. 33, 257

S.W. 449 (1923). Similarly, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has held that application of a

notice-of-claim statute would violate due process if "compliance ... is almost impossible and in

essence the individual is given no right ofrecovery." Ocampo v. City of Racine, 28 Wis. 2d 506, 513,

137 N.W.2d 477, 481 (1965); see also Mannino v. Davenport, 99 Wis. 2d 602, 614-15, 299 N.W.2d

823, 828-29 (1981). More recently, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held in Langevin v. City

of Biddeford, 481 A.2d 495, 498 (Me. 1984), that it would violate due process to apply a

notice-of-claim statute to a 14-year-old minor who was "incapable of complying." Because the

plaintiff's mother refused to bring suit on her son's behalf, the court remanded for a determination of

"whether the plaintiff had access to an attorney, agent or other relative to serve notice for him." Id.

Of course, this court cannot presume to predict whether the District of Columbia Court of

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14 See Miller v. Boone County Hosp., 394 N.W.2d 776 (Iowa 1986); Reich v. State Highway

Dep't, 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972); Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 510 P.2d 879,

cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1079 (1973); Adamsky v. Buckeye Local Sch. Dist., 73 Ohio St. 3d 360,

653 N.E.2d 212 (1995); Hunter v. North Mason High School, 85 Wash. 2d 810, 539 P.2d 845

(1975) (en banc); O'Neil v. City of Parkersburg, 160 W. Va. 694, 237 S.E.2d 504 (1977); see

also Note, Notice of Claim Provisions: An Equal Protection Perspective, 60 CORNELL L. REV.

417 (1975). 

15 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 911.4 (1995); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-404

(1995); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-

222 (1992). 

Appeals would take a similar position in Doe's case. The highest courts in some states have declined

to read an exception for inability to comply into their states' notice-of-claim statutes. See, e.g.,

Workman v. City of Emporia, 200 Kan. 112, 114-17, 434 P.2d 846, 848-49 (1967); Waite v. Orgill,

203 Tenn. 146, 148-50, 310 S.W.2d 179, 180 (1958). On the other hand, the highest courts in six

states have struck down notice-of-claim statutes that contain no exceptions as facially

unconstitutional,14 and most states' statutes contain some sort of means to obtain an exception for

inability to comply.15 Moreover, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has acknowledged that

minors are entitled to special consideration in protecting their legalrights aslitigants notwithstanding

defaults of their next-of-friend or attorney. Godfrey v. Washington, 653 A.2d 371, 373 (D.C. 1995)

(reversing dismissal with prejudice of lead-paint negligence complaint when minor plaintiff's mother

failed to cooperate with discovery). Analogously, the Supreme Court of Wyoming has held that,

because a minor has no capacity to sue and cannot lose his claim because of his parent'sfailure to act,

the notice-of-claims period does not begin to run until the appointment of a guardian ad litem. Dye

v. Fremont County Sch. Dist. No. 2, 820 P.2d 982, 985-86 (Wyo. 1991).

With some highest state courts adopting an approach that is favorable to Doe's contentions,

and others not, with some courts able to rely instead on statutory provisions of exclusion or

exception, given that Congressintended for the District's non-claimstatute to serve the same purpose

as those of the several States, Brown v. United States, 742 F.2d 1498, 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (in

banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1073 (1985) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 2010, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. 2

(1933)), this court is in no position to determine how the District of Columbia Court of Appeals

might decide Doe's § 12-309 claims. Hence, certification pursuant to D.C. Code § 11-723 is

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appropriate.

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