Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00010/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00010-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHELDON DAVIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

J.A. ZAMORA, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-0010 KJN P

ORDER

I. Introduction

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel and in forma pauperis. Plaintiff 

seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local 

Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiff consented to proceed before the 

undersigned for all purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). On May 19, 2015, plaintiff was ordered to 

submit a complete first amended complaint that included his charging allegations. Plaintiff has 

now filed a second amended complaint.

II. Screening Requirement

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

Case 2:15-cv-00010-KJN Document 13 Filed 03/17/16 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an 

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 

Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 

2000) (“[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably 

meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 

1227.

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations 

sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555. However, “[s]pecific 

facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what 

the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 

(2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal quotations marks omitted). 

In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the 

complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the pleading in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other 

grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).

III. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint

In his pleading, plaintiff alleges as follows: Defendants caused or allowed plaintiff to be 

assaulted due to their gross negligence, and then sought to cover up their actions and their liability 

Case 2:15-cv-00010-KJN Document 13 Filed 03/17/16 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

by issuing a false disciplinary report (“RVR”), that they knew to be false, in an effort to shift 

blame to plaintiff, who was the actual victim. Specifically, defendant Yang disregarded a prison 

memo providing that no volunteer inmates were allowed in the kitchen. Yang allegedly permitted 

inmate Clark, who suffers from a mental illness, to volunteer in the kitchen, and Clark allegedly 

attacked plaintiff in the kitchen. Defendants Yang and Stratton allegedly tried to cover up their 

violation of the prison policy by issuing plaintiff a rules violation report (“RVR”) for fighting, 

despite inmate Clark telling defendants Yang and Stratton that Clark attacked plaintiff 

unprovoked. Stratton signed the RVR and omitted the information about Clark. Defendant 

Schultz allegedly covered this up by holding an expedited RVR hearing on November 13, 2013, 

just five days after the RVR issued, and by denying plaintiff the right to call witnesses at the RVR 

hearing, falsifying the written report stating that plaintiff did not call any witnesses, and 

fabricating plaintiff’s statements at the hearing. Further, defendants Zamora and Briggs allegedly 

attempted to stop the appeals process at the final level, seeking to help defendants Yang, Stratton, 

and Schultz cover up the non-volunteer directive. Plaintiff contends that all defendants engaged 

in a conspiracy to cover up the false RVR and the false finding of guilt thereon.

IV. Analysis

A civil rights action is the proper mechanism for a prisoner seeking to challenge the 

conditions of his confinement. Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991). By contrast, 

habeas corpus proceedings are the proper mechanism for a prisoner seeking to challenge the fact 

or duration of his confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). Here, plaintiff 

contends he sustained a prison disciplinary conviction based upon charges that were false, and 

that he was subject to an allegedly fraudulent disciplinary process. Thus, plaintiff’s success in 

this action would necessarily call into question the validity of his prison disciplinary proceeding 

and implicate the duration of his confinement. Accordingly, a writ of habeas corpus is plaintiff’s 

sole remedy in federal court which may be pursued only after exhausting all of his constitutional 

claims by first presenting them to the state’s highest court. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 

U.S. 74, 81-82, 125 S. Ct. 1242 (2005) (“a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior 

invalidation) -- no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of 

Case 2:15-cv-00010-KJN Document 13 Filed 03/17/16 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings) -- if success 

in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.”) 

(emphasis in original); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997) (dismissing a § 1983 action 

seeking declaratory relief and money damages because a successful challenge to the procedures 

used in a prison disciplinary hearing would necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment 

imposed); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (holding that a state prisoner may not 

recover damages under § 1983 for allegedly unconstitutional imprisonment, or for any other harm 

caused by “actions whose unlawfulness would render the imprisonment invalid,” unless he can 

prove that the conviction or other basis for confinement has been reversed on direct appeal, 

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a 

determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus). 

Plaintiff was previously informed of this requirement (ECF No. 5 at 4), but he alleges no facts 

demonstrating that the prison disciplinary conviction has been invalidated through a petition for 

writ of habeas corpus.

For these reasons, plaintiff’s civil rights action must be dismissed without prejudice so 

that plaintiff may first seek habeas relief with respect to the prison disciplinary conviction at 

issue. See Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 1997) (complaint barred where prisoner 

sought damages based on allegations that prison officials relied on false information to find him 

ineligible for parole); Hernandez v. Lozano, 2014 WL 1096937 (E.D. Cal. March 19, 2014) 

(§ 1983 claim that prison officials participated in a cover-up of a fraudulent rules violation charge 

barred because success would necessarily call into question the validity of prison disciplinary 

proceeding).

V. Conclusion

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this civil rights action is

dismissed without prejudice as barred by the holdings of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 

(1994), and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997).

Dated: March 17, 2016

davi0010.56

Case 2:15-cv-00010-KJN Document 13 Filed 03/17/16 Page 4 of 4