Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01073/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01073-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY UDOM,

Detainee No. A023503206,

Civil No. 12cv1073 LAB (MDD)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[ECF No. 2]; 

AND

(2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING 

TO STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

vs.

CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF

AMERICA; K. PERRY; TRICK;

IWUABA,

Defendants.

Anthony Udom (“Plaintiff”), currently detained at the San Diego Correctional Facility

located in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil action. Plaintiff has not

prepaid the $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he has filed a Motion to

Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2].

I.

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

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U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee

only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, “[u]nlike other indigent

litigants, prisoners proceeding IFP must pay the full amount of filing fees in civil actions and

appeals pursuant to the PLRA [Prison Litigation Reform Act].” Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871,

886 (9th Cir. 2002). As defined by the PLRA, a “prisoner” is “any person incarcerated or

detained in any facilitywho is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent

for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release,

or diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). Under this definition, “an alien detained by the

INS pending deportation is not a ‘prisoner’ within the meaning of the PLRA,” because

deportation proceedings are civil, rather than criminal in nature, and an alien detained pending

deportation has not necessarily been “accused of, convicted of, sentenced or adjudicated

delinquent for, a violation of criminal law.” Agyeman, 296 F.3d at 886. Thus, because Plaintiff

claims he was civilly detained pursuant to immigration or deportation proceedings, and not a

“prisoner” as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), the filing fee provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)

do not apply to him. 

Accordingly, the Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s affidavit of assets, just as it would for any

other non-prisoner litigant seeking IFP status, see S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2(d), finds it is sufficient

to show that Plaintiff is unable to pay the fees or post securities required to maintain this action,

and hereby GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF 

No. 2].

II.

SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

Any complaint filed by a person proceeding IFP is subject to sua sponte dismissal by the

Court to the extent it contains claims which are “frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief froma defendant immune fromsuch relief.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)

(holding that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez

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v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits,

but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a

claim.”). “[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true

all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Barren v. Harrington,

152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”).

As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s Complaint violates Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Specifically, Rule 8 provides that in order to state a claim for relief in a pleading it

must contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction” and “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.R.CIV.P.

8(a)(1) & (2). Here, Plaintiff’s entire Complaint is just two pages and contains no factual

allegations. If Plaintiff chooses to file an Amended Complaint, he must comply with Rule 8.

In addition, Plaintiff is in federal custody and seeks to hold purported federal actors liable

for alleged civil rights violations. Thus, while the Court notes that while Plaintiff purportedly

brings this action under § 1983, the Court will liberally construe his claims to arise under Bivens

v. Six Unknown Named Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) because Plaintiff claims

violations of his civil rights by a federal actors. Bivens established that “compensable injury to

a constitutionally protected interest [by federal officials alleged to have acted under color of

federal law] could be vindicated by a suit for damages invoking the general federal question

jurisdiction of the federal courts [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331].” Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.

478, 486 (1978). “Actions under § 1983 and those under Bivens are identical save for the

replacement of a state actor under § 1983 by a federal actor under Bivens.” Van Strum v. Lawn,

940 F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir. 1991).

To state a private cause of action under Bivens, Plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right

secured by the Constitution of the United States was violated, and (2) that the violation was

committed by a federal actor. Id.; Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 624

(9th Cir. 1988). Bivens provides that “federal courts have the inherent authority to award

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damages against federal officials to compensate plaintiffs for violations of their constitutional

rights.” Western Center for Journalism v. Cederquist, 235 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2000). 

However, a Bivens action may only be brought against the responsible federal official in his or

her individual capacity. Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir. 1988). Bivens

does not authorize a suit against the government or its agencies for monetary relief. FDIC v.

Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994); Thomas-Lazear v. FBI, 851 F.2d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1988);

Daly- Murphy, 837 F.2d at 355. 

Nor does Bivens provide a remedy for alleged wrongs committed by a private entity

alleged to have denied Plaintiff’s constitutional rights under color of federal law. Correctional

Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69 (2001) (“‘[T]he purpose of Bivens is to deter the

officer,’ not the agency.”) (quoting Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485); Malesko, 534 U.S. at 66 n.2

(holding that Meyer “forecloses the extension of Bivens to private entities.”). Accordingly,

Plaintiff cannot bring claims of civil rights violations against the Corrections Corporation of

America. 

While not entirely clear, it appears that Plaintiff also seeks to hold Defendants liable for

alleged tort violations. If Plaintiff intends to bring this action pursuant to the Federal Torts

Claim Act (“FTCA”), he fails to name the United States as a Defendant. The Federal Tort

Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680, provides that the sovereign immunity

of the United States is waived for suits resulting from torts “caused by the negligent or wrongful

act or omission of any employee of the Government ... under circumstances where the United

States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place

where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). Thus, Plaintiff’s FTCA claims fail

because the United States is the only proper defendant for an FTCA claim against a federal

employee for actions taken within the scope of their employment. See Ward v. Gordon, 999

F.2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1993).

If Plaintiff is seeking to bring claims under California state law, the Court declines to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these pendent state claims at this time because Plaintiff

cannot identify a violation of federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district court may

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decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if ... the district

court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”); United Mine Workers

of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“if the federal claims are dismissed before trial,

... the state claims should be dismissed as well.”); Acri v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999,

1000 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[O]nce judicial power exists under § 1367(a), retention of supplemental

jurisdiction over state law claims under 1367(c) is discretionary.”)

Accordingly, the Court must DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint for all the reasons set forth

above but will provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to amend his Complaint to correct the

deficiencies of pleading identified by the Court.

III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2] is

GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

2. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(b). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this

Order is filed in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures the deficiencies of

pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without

reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1. Defendants not named and

any claim not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See King v.

Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint

within 45 days, this case shall remain dismissed for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2).

DATED: May 14, 2012

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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