Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-06123/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-06123-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLAUDE BENT,

Plaintiff,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-06123-DMR 

ORDER ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS AND MOTION FOR 

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

Re: Dkt. Nos. 1, 5

Petitioner Claude Bent is a noncitizen from Jamaica who is currently in Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody pending the conclusion of his removal proceedings. On 

September 26, 2019, Bent filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in 

which he asks the court to order his release from custody or to direct the United States Department 

of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) to provide him with an individualized 

custody hearing. [Docket No. 1 (“Petition”).] He also filed a motion for a temporary restraining 

order (“TRO”) seeking to enjoin his continued detention without a custody hearing until the court 

decides his habeas petition. [Docket No. 1-1 (“Mot.”).] The court held a hearing on November 14, 

2019. Following the hearing, the court ordered additional briefing on Bent’s due process claim, 

(Docket No. 16), which the parties filed. [Docket Nos. 17 (“Pet. Supp. Br.”), 18 (“Resp. Supp. 

Br.”).]

Upon reviewing the parties’ briefs and hearing oral argument, the court denies Bent’s 

petition. The motion for a TRO is denied as moot.

I. BACKGROUND

Bent was born in Jamaica and is 58 years old. Petition ¶ 6. He came to the United States as 

a lawful permanent resident at age 18. Id. In 2006, Bent was convicted of voluntary manslaughter 

and attempted murder in California state court. Neither party disputes that the attempted murder 

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conviction involved an adult victim. Bent was sentenced to just over thirteen years for both offenses. 

Id. ¶ 14. Upon serving his term of imprisonment, Bent was immediately detained by ICE. Id. 

A. Removal Proceedings

On July 20, 2016, the DHS commenced removal proceedings, asserting that Bent’s 

attempted murder conviction constituted an aggravated felony as defined under 8 U.S.C. §§ 

1101(a)(43)(A), (U), and therefore subjected him to deportation. Petition ¶ 15. See 8 U.S.C. § 

1226(c)(1)(B) (stating that noncitizens convicted of an aggravated felony are deportable). The 

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) concluded that Bent was removable for committing an aggravated felony. 

Bent appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), where he argued that he was not 

deportable for the attempted murder conviction because California construes that crime more 

broadly than the analogous crime listed in the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1101(a)(43)(A). See Bent v. Barr, 775 Fed. App’x 281, 282-3 (2019). The BIA rejected Bent’s

argument and held that he was removable because “the full range of conduct punishable as ‘murder’ 

under section 187(a) of the California Penal Code corresponds categorically to generic ‘murder’ 

under [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)].” Id. Bent appealed to the Ninth Circuit.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit examined the “categorical approach,” which is used to 

determine whether a state offense is comparable to an aggravated felony as listed in the INA. The 

categorical approach looks to whether “the state statute defining the crime of conviction 

categorically fits within the ‘generic’ federal definition of a corresponding aggravated felony.” 

Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190 (2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Because the relevant offenses “must be viewed in the abstract” based on a purely statutory reading, 

the facts underlying the noncitizen’s actual conviction are irrelevant to the analysis. See id. In 

Bent’s case, the Ninth Circuit determined that the BIA “did not consider whether generic INA 

murder encompasses feticide, which is punishable conduct under California’s murder statute.” Bent, 

775 Fed. App’x at 283. It remanded the case to BIA to consider whether attempted murder under 

the INA includes feticide. Id. BIA issued a decision on November 19, 2019. [Docket No. 19, Ex. 

1.] It found that section 187(a) is more broad than general murder under the INA, but that the statute 

is divisible into two separate offenses, “murder of a human being” and “murder of a fetus.” Id. at 

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6. It also found that “murder of a human being” is a categorical match to generic murder under the 

INA, which may support that Bent is removable based on his conviction for the murder of an adult. 

Id. However, the BIA remanded the issue to the IJ because there were outstanding evidentiary 

issues. Id. The final outcome of Bent’s removability proceedings therefore remains pending.

B. Requests for Bond Hearings

On February 1, 2017, Bent was denied bond. Maldonado Decl. ¶ 9. He requested a new 

bond hearing, which was held on November 29, 2017. Id. ¶ 16. He was again denied bond. In a 

written opinion dated January 5, 2018, the IJ found that “based on the evidence submitted, the 

Department has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that [Bent] poses a danger to the 

community and a flight risk.” Id. at ¶ 17, Ex. 1. In addition, the IJ found that, based in part on 

Petitioner’s final administrative order of removal to Jamaica, “the Department has met its burden to 

prove [Petitioner] would pose a flight risk if released.” Id.

Bent requested another bond hearing on June 26, 2019 based on materially changed 

circumstances. Petition ¶ 19. On June 27, 2019, the IJ denied the request. The IJ issued a 

memorandum decision on August 14, 2019, which explained that Bent’s request for a bond hearing 

was denied for two reasons. Mot., Ex. C. The IJ held that Bent was no longer eligible for a bond 

hearing after the Supreme Court’s decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018), because 

Bent had failed to demonstrate that “the Court has jurisdiction over a subsequent custody 

redetermination hearing.” See id. The IJ also found that Bent “failed to show materially changed 

circumstances that would alter the Court’s previous findings,” and specifically stated that “the 

change in the case’s posture [based on the Ninth Circuit remand] is not a circumstance that would 

materially change the Court’s previous findings that [Petitioner] would pose a danger to society if 

released.” Id.

At this time, Bent remains detained at the Mesa Verde ICE Processing Center. Maldonado 

Decl. ¶ 27.

II. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

A. Administrative Exhaustion

Respondents argue that the court should dismiss Bent’s habeas petition because he has not 

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exhausted his remedies before the BIA. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), a federal district court is 

authorized to grant a writ of habeas corpus when a petitioner is “in custody in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The Ninth Circuit 

“require[s], as a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners exhaust available judicial and 

administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Castro-Cortez v. I.N.S., 239 F.3d 

1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 

U.S. 30 (2006); see also Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that 

a “petitioner must exhaust administrative remedies before raising the constitutional claims in a 

habeas petition when those claims are reviewable by the BIA on appeal”). Courts may require 

prudential exhaustion when:

(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a 

proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of the requirement 

would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and 

(3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own 

mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review.

Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 

815 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted)). However, “even if the three Puga factors weigh in favor 

of prudential exhaustion, a court may waive the prudential exhaustion requirement if ‘administrative 

remedies are inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile 

gesture, irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be 

void.’” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988 (quoting Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(citation and quotation marks omitted)).

In this case, Bent requested another bond hearing on June 26, 2019. The IJ denied the request 

on June 27, 2019 and issued a memorandum decision on August 14, 2019. Petition ¶¶ 19-20; Mot., 

Ex. C. Bent appealed that decision to the BIA in early July 2019.

1

 Bent represents that BIA appeals 

“often take four months or more,” id. ¶ 20, and the associated delays will prevent efficacious relief.

Respondent represents that the appeal is “likely to be decided within a couple of months” and could 

grant the same relief that Bent is requesting here. Opp. at 6. At the hearing, counsel for both parties 

1 Bent’s counsel was unable to identify the exact date at the hearing.

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represented that the BIA decision on Bent’s bond request would likely be decided within six months; 

however, they agreed that there were a “lot of variables” that may shorten or extend that time.

Currently, it has been approximately nine months since Bent filed an appeal regarding the 

denial of his bail. Given that the BIA proceeding has already exceeded both parties’ estimation of 

when a decision could be expected, and that there is nothing before the court that indicates a decision 

will be shortly forthcoming, the court finds that Bent’s administrative remedies have been 

inadequate. Therefore, waiver of prudential exhaustion is appropriate in this case.

B. Entitlement to a Bond Hearing

1. Legal Framework

The INA provides a “complex statutory framework of detention authority” codified at 8 

U.S.C. §§ 1226 and 1231. Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008). Where a 

noncitizen falls within the statutory scheme “can affect whether his detention is mandatory or 

discretionary, as well as the kind of review process available to him if he wishes to contest the 

necessity of his detention.” Id. Section 1226(a) provides the Attorney General with discretionary 

authority to arrest and detain a noncitizen “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed 

from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1057. A noncitizen 

detained pursuant to section 1226(a) can appeal ICE’s initial custody determination to an 

immigration judge, who is authorized to “release the alien, and determine the amount of bond, if 

any, under which the respondent may be released.” 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1); see also 8 C.F.R. § 

1003.19(a) (granting immigration judges jurisdiction to review custody and bond determinations). 

By contrast, section 1226(c) mandates detention for noncitizens who have committed certain 

criminal offenses. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). A noncitizen subject to mandatory detention under section 

1226(c) can only be released for witness protection purposes and if the noncitizen “will not pose a 

danger to the safety of other persons or of property and is likely to appear for any scheduled 

proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2). 

Since 2001, the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have “grappled in piece-meal fashion 

with whether the various immigration detention statutes may authorize indefinite or prolonged 

detention of detainees and, if so, may do so without providing a bond hearing.” Rodriguez v. 

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Hayes (“Rodriguez I”), 591 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010). In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678

(2001), the Supreme Court considered challenges to the prolonged detention of two noncitizens who 

were being held in the post-90-day removal period pursuant to section 1231(a)(6). The government 

had been unable to effectuate their removal because none of the available countries of removal were 

willing to accept them. Id. at 684-86. The Court held that section 1231(a)(6), “read in light of the 

Constitution’s demands, limits an alien’s post-removal period detention to a period reasonably 

necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States,” and “does not permit 

indefinite detention.” Id. at 689. The Court found that “[a] statute permitting indefinite detention 

of an alien would raise a serious constitutional problem,” given the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 

Clause, which “forbids the Government to depriv[e] any person . . . of . . . liberty . . . without due 

process of law.” Id. at 690 (quotation omitted). Relying on the canon of constitutional avoidance, 

the Court held that “once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no 

longer authorized by statute.” Id. at 690, 699. Therefore, after a presumptively reasonable sixmonth period of post-removal period detention under section 1231(a)(6), a noncitizen is entitled to 

release if he or she “provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal 

in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 701, 121 S.Ct. 2491.

In Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the Supreme Court held that mandatory detention 

under section 1226(c) for the “brief period necessary” to complete removal proceedings is 

“constitutionally permissible” under the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court cautioned, 

however, that such detention has “a definite termination point” and typically “lasts roughly a month 

and a half in the vast majority of cases in which it is invoked, and about five months in the minority 

of cases in which the alien chooses to appeal.” Id. at 529–30. Demore accordingly concluded that 

the six-month detention at issue constituted reasonable “temporary” confinement. Id. at 530–31.

Five years after Demore, the Ninth Circuit held that the “prolonged detention” of a 

noncitizen under section 1226(a) “without adequate procedural protections,” such as access to a 

bond hearing before an immigration judge, “would raise serious constitutional concerns.” CasasCastrillon v. Department of Homeland Security, 535 F.3d 942, 950 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Casas”). 

In Casas, a lawful permanent resident who had been detained for nearly seven years under sections 

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1226(c) and 1226(a) sought habeas relief while his petition for review of his removal order was 

pending. Id. at 945-48. Given the constitutional concerns, the Ninth Circuit construed section 

1226(a) to require the government to provide a lawful permanent resident with “a neutral forum in 

which to contest the necessity of his continued detention,” at which the government must establish 

that the individual poses a flight risk or a danger to the community in order to justify continued 

detention. Id. at 949, 951. In Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011), the Ninth Circuit 

clarified that, in bond hearings held under Casas (“Casas hearings”), “the government must prove 

by clear and convincing evidence that an alien is a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify 

denial of bond.” Id. at 1203. 

In 2015, the Ninth Circuit considered the procedural protections available to noncitizens 

detained under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b) and 1226(c). See Rodriguez v. Robbins (“Rodriguez III”), 804 

F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), reversed by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S.Ct. 830 (2018). In Rodriguez 

III, a certified class of noncitizens challenged their prolonged detentions pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 

1225(b), 1226(a), 1226(c), and 1231(a) without the provision of individualized bond hearings.2804 

F.3d at 1065. Following the entry of a preliminary injunction, which was affirmed on appeal, see 

Rodriguez v. Robbins (“Rodriguez II”), 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013), the district court granted 

summary judgment to the class and entered a permanent injunction requiring the government to 

2 Section 1225(b) “applies to ‘applicants for admission’ who are stopped at the border or a port of 

entry, or who are ‘present in the United States’ but ‘ha[ve] not been admitted.’” Rodriguez III, 804 

F.3d at 1081 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)). “The statute provides that asylum seekers ‘shall be 

detained pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such 

a fear, until removed.’” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV)). As to all other such 

applicants for admission, the statute provides for mandatory detention “if the examining 

immigration officer determines that [the individuals] seeking admission [are] not clearly and beyond 

a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

As discussed above, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) “requires that the Attorney General detain any non-citizen 

who is inadmissible or deportable because of his criminal history upon that person’s release from 

imprisonment, pending proceedings to remove him from the United States.” Rodriguez III, 804 

F.3d at 1078, n.8. Detention under section 1226(c) is mandatory and individuals detained under that 

section may be released only if the government deems it “necessary” for witness protection 

purposes. Id. at 1078 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2)).

Section 1226(a) provides that a noncitizen “may be arrested and detained pending a decision on 

whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” Section 1231(a) governs detention of 

noncitizens following issuance of a final removal order.

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provide a bond hearing to any class member subject to detention longer than six months. 804 F.3d 

at 1065. The government was ordered to provide each detainee with a bond hearing by his or her 

195th day of detention, with such hearings occurring automatically after notice. Id. at 1072. The 

district court also required the government to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 

detainee was a flight risk or a danger to the community in order to justify the denial of bond. Id. at 

1071. The district court declined to order other procedural requirements requested by the class. Id. 

The government appealed from the entry of the permanent injunction, and the class cross-appealed 

the district court’s order as to the procedural requirements for bond hearings. Id. at 1072-73.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. In relevant part, the court affirmed 

summary judgment and the entry of the permanent injunction as to the section 1226(c), 1225(b), and 

1226(a) subclasses. Relying on the canon of constitutional avoidance, the court construed sections 

1225(b) and 1226(c) as imposing a six-month time limit on detention, after which the government 

may continue detention only under the authority of section 1226(a). Id. at 1079, 1082. The court

re-affirmed its decision in Casasthat a noncitizen “subjected to prolonged detention under § 1226(a) 

is entitled to a hearing to establish whether continued detention is necessary because he would pose 

a danger to the community or a flight risk upon release.” Id. at 1085 (citing Casas, 535 F.3d at 949-

52). The court thereby affirmed the district court’s permanent injunction requiring the government 

to hold bond hearings every six months for noncitizens detained pursuant to sections 1226(c), 

1225(b), and 1226(a). Id. at 1090. The court also affirmed the requirement that the government 

“prove by clear and convincing evidence that an alien is a flight risk or a danger to the community 

to justify denial of bond at a Casas hearing.” Id. at 1087 (quoting Rodriguez II, 715 F.3d at 1135 

(quoting Singh, 638 F.3d at 1203)).

The Supreme Court reversed Rodriguez III in Jennings. The Court found that the Ninth 

Circuit had misapplied the canon of constitutional avoidance as to sections 1225(b), 1226(c), and 

1226(a), and determined that “its interpretations of the three provisions at issue . . . are implausible.” 

138 S.Ct. at 842. As to section 1225(b), which “applies primarily to aliens seeking entry into the 

United States,” the Court noted that the statute divides applicants into two categories: section 

1225(b)(1) provides that certain noncitizens claiming a credible fear of persecution “shall be 

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detained for further consideration of the application for asylum,” while section 1225(b)(2) provides 

that noncitizens who fall within the scope of that provision “shall be detained for a [removal] 

proceeding.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), 1225(b)(2)(A)). The 

Court found that “[r]ead most naturally, §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) mandate detention of applicants 

for admission until certain proceedings have concluded.” Id. The Court rejected the argument that 

those provisions contain an implicit six-month limit on the length of detention, observing that 

“nothing in the statutory text imposes any limit on the length of detention” or “even hints that those 

provisions restrict detention after six months.” Id. at 842, 843. As to the canon of constitutional 

avoidance, the Court held that “[s]potting a constitutional issue does not give a court the authority 

to rewrite a statute as it pleases . . . [i]nstead, the canon permits a court to ‘choos[e] between 

competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text.’” Id. at 843. The Court concluded that 

sections 1225(b)(1) are 1225(b)(1) are not ambiguous, and that “neither provision can reasonably 

be read to limit detention to six months.” Id. at 843-844 (contrasting section 1225(b), which 

provides that noncitizens “shall be detained” for further proceedings, with section 1231(a)(6), which 

provides that noncitizens “may be detained” after the completion of the removal period).

Similarly, the Court held that section 1226(c), which applies to noncitizens already present 

in the United States, could not plausibly be construed to include an implicit six-month time limit on 

the length of mandatory detention. Id. at 846-47. As to section 1226(a), the Court noted that 

“[f]ederal regulations provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the 

outset of detention.” Id. at 847. The Court held that “[n]othing in § 1226(a)’s text . . . supports the 

imposition” of the procedural protections ordered by the Ninth Circuit—“namely, periodic bond 

hearings every six months in which the Attorney General must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the alien’s continued detention is necessary.” Id.

2. Discussion

Bent argues that he is eligible for a third bond hearing on three grounds: (1) that he is not 

subject to mandatory detention under section 1226(c) because he has raised a “substantial argument” 

against his removability; (2) that he is not subject to mandatory detention under Casas; and (3) that 

even if he is subject to mandatory detention, “due process demands [he] be given the right to a bond 

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hearing to challenge his prolonged detention.” Mot. at 15. The first two arguments are statutory 

while the third is constitutional. 

a. Statutory Arguments

Bent’s first two arguments address whether he is properly classified as subject to mandatory 

detention under section 1226(c). If he is subject to mandatory detention, then he is not statutorily 

eligible for a bond hearing because detention under that section may end prior to the conclusion of 

removal proceedings only under certain conditions that are not at issue in this case. See Jennings, 

138 S. Ct. at 847. If Bent is instead subject to discretionary detention under section 1226(a), then 

he may request a subsequent bond hearing but must show “that [his] circumstances have changed 

materially since the prior bond redetermination.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e). The court need not reach 

the question of whether Bent is subject to discretionary rather than mandatory detention. This is 

because even assuming (without deciding) that Bent is subject to discretionary detention under 

section 1226(a), he has not shown that the IJ erred in denying him a new bond hearing. See Kharis 

v. Sessions, 2018 WL 5809432, *4 (N.D. Cal. November 6, 2018) (stating that a district court has

jurisdiction to review an IJ’s discretionary bond denial only “where that bond denial is challenged 

as legally erroneous or unconstitutional”). 

The record does not contain a written opinion from Bent’s initial bond hearing in February 

2017. In the opinion following Bent’s second bond hearing in November 2017, the IJ denied bond 

on two grounds: that Bent was a danger to society and that he was a flight risk. See Maldonado 

Decl., Ex. 1 at 3-4. The majority of that opinion is dedicated to examining Bent’s criminal history. 

See id. The IJ also found that Bent would pose a flight risk if he were released, given that he was 

(1) under a final administrative order of removal; (2) he did not have a stable address, residence, or 

ties to the community; and (3) he would not be motivated to report to immigration authorities. See 

id. at 4. Bent does not argue that the IJ erred in denying his second bond request. In June 2019, 

Bent requested a third bond hearing solely on the basis that his merits case had been remanded from 

the Ninth Circuit to the BIA. In denying the request, the IJ concluded that Bent is not eligible for a 

bond hearing after Jennings. Mot., Ex. C, at 1. She further concluded that he did not show a material 

change in circumstance since his prior hearing in November 2017. Specifically, she found that “the 

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change in the case’s posture is not a circumstance that would materially change the Court’s previous 

findings that the respondent would pose a danger to society if released.” Id. at 1. 

Bent argues that IJ erred in finding that he was not eligible for a new bond hearing because 

the Ninth Circuit remand of his merits case constitutes a change in material circumstance.

3

 He 

argues that the remand is material to the IJ’s previous finding that he is a flight risk because that 

determination rested in part on the basis that he was under a final order of removal. Reply at 12. 

According to Bent, the change in the case’s procedural posture renders him a lower flight risk since 

he is now more likely to succeed in his removal case and therefore less likely to avoid adjudication. 

See id. However, even if Bent is correct that the remand of his merits case makes him a lower flight 

risk, his argument does not address the IJ’s prior finding that he is a danger to society. Although an 

IJ may weigh a “number of factors in determining whether a [detainee] merits release from bond,” 

In Re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006), the IJ must “first determine[] that the [detainee] 

does not present a danger to the community.” Matter of Urena, 25 I. & N. Dec. 140, 141 (BIA 

2009). “Only if a [detainee] demonstrates that he does not pose a danger to the community should 

an Immigration Judge continue to a determination regarding the extent of flight risk posed by the 

alien.” Id. It follows that, where an IJ finds that a detainee is a danger to the community, the 

detainee must show a change in material circumstance that is relevant to the danger assessment. See 

Diaz Ortiz v. Smith, 384 F. Supp. 3d 140, 144 (D. Mass. 2019) (holding that an IJ’s “finding of 

dangerousness renders irrelevant any complaints [the petitioner] raises about the immigration 

judge’s consideration of his flight risk”). Bent has not articulated any reasons why the status of his 

merits case is material to whether he is a danger to society.

Accordingly, even assuming without deciding that Bent is subject to discretionary detention 

under section 1226(a), the IJ did not err in denying Bent’s request for a bond hearing because he 

3 Bent also argues that the IJ incorrectly determined that he is ineligible for a bond hearing under 

Jennings. According to Bent, that decision was based on the erroneous assumption that he is under 

mandatory detention pursuant to section 1226(c). Since the court assumes for the purposes of this 

order that Bent is subject to discretionary detention under 1226(a), Bent’s argument on that point is 

moot.

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failed to show a material change in circumstance.4 

b. Due Process Arguments

Jennings only entertained statutory challenges to the INA’s detention scheme and remanded 

the question of whether prolonged detention without an individualized bond hearing violates the due 

process clause of the Fifth Amendment. After Jennings, the Ninth Circuit stated its “grave doubts 

that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without any process is constitutional,”

but remanded the issue to the district court. Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 2018). 

Accordingly, there remains “a dearth of guidance regarding the point at which an individual’s 

continued mandatory detention under Section 1226(c) becomes unconstitutional.” Gonzalez v. 

Bonnar, No. 18-cv-05321-JSC, 2019 WL 330906, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2019); see also 

Rodriguez v. Nielsen, No. 18-cv-04187-TSH, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4228, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 

7, 2019) (“[A]s matters stand now, there is no controlling precedent for this Court to follow.”). 

One court in this district has held that detainees are constitutionally entitled to individualized 

bond hearings after six months, at which point their detention has become prolonged. Rodriguez, 

2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4228, at *18. That decision noted that this Circuit’s primary decisions on 

prolonged detention, including Casas, Tijani, and Diouf, “invoked the doctrine of constitutional 

avoidance to imply a statutory right to a bond hearing—a statutory right that does not survive the 

Supreme Court’s holding in Jennings—but their reasoning was constitutional in nature.” Id. 

Rodriguez found that a bright-line six-month rule aligned with the reasoning of these cases as well 

as the Supreme Court’s decisions in Zadvydas and Demore. See id. at *18-19. Other courts have 

held that there is no bright-line rule for the duration at which detention becomes constitutionally 

impermissible. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 2019 WL 330906, at *2. 

Absent controlling authority establishing a bright-line rule for a due process right to receive 

periodic bond hearings, the court finds that it is appropriate to conduct an individualized due process 

analysis under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See Soto v. Sessions, No. 18-cv-02891-

4 Bent argues that the IJ erred by addressing the ultimate merits of a bond hearing rather than merely 

considering whether Bent had demonstrated a change in material circumstance. Mot. at 28-29. The 

court disagrees with Bent’s reading of the August 2019 memorandum and finds that it only 

addressed the materiality of Bent’s changed circumstances.

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EMC, 2018 WL 3619727, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2018) (applying Mathews factors to a habeas 

petitioner’s due process claims); Lopez Reyes v. Bonnar, 362 F. Supp. 3d 762, 775 (N.D. Cal. 2019)

(same); De Paz Sales, No. 19-cv-04148-KAW, 2019 WL 4751894, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2019)

(same); Jimenez, 2020 WL 510347, at *2 (same).

5

 Under Mathews, “[d]ue process is flexible and 

calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” 424 U.S. at 334. The 

three-part Mathews test requires courts to consider “(1) the private interest affected, (2) the 

government’s interest, and (3) the value added by alternative procedural safeguards to what has 

already been provided in the particular situation before the court.” Soto, 2018 WL 3619727, at *3 

(citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35). 

1. Petitioner’s Interest

The first factor is straightforward. Courts have held that there is a strong private interest 

based on the duration of the detention. De Paz Sales, 2019 WL 4751894, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 

2019) (finding a strong private interest where the petitioner “risks continued detention absent a bond 

hearing”). In this case, Bent has been detained for over three years and has not received a bond 

hearing since November 2017. This period of detention leans heavily toward finding a strong 

private interest at stake. Lopez Reyes, 362 F. Supp. 3d at 776 (finding a strong private interest where 

the petitioner had been detained 22 months and received his last bond hearing 16 months prior); cf. 

Soto, 2018 WL 3619727, at *3 (finding that the private interest is “not at its apex in these 

circumstances” because the petitioner had been detained for just over 6 months and had received a 

bond hearing 3 months prior). Respondents do not dispute that Bent has a strong private interest. 

Accordingly, the court finds that the first Mathews factor weighs in Bent’s favor.

2. Government’s Interest

The second factor addresses the government’s interest. Respondents argue that the statutory 

detention framework grants it “broad discretion” to effect removal proceedings, and that this 

authority would be undermined by imposing procedures in excess of those authorized by Congress. 

Resp. Supp. Br. at 3 (“The government’s interest in maintaining the existing procedures for bond 

5 Courts have applied Mathews in evaluating constitutional challenges to both 1226(a) and 1226(c) 

detentions. See Gonzalez, 2019 WL 330906, at *2-3; Jimenez, 2020 WL 510347.

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hearings to ensure that removal orders can be promptly executed is . . . legitimate and significant.”) 

(citing Demore, 538 U.S. at 519). The court recognizes that additional court-ordered procedures 

may disrupt the government’s ability to conduct orderly and timely removal proceedings. See H.R. 

REP. 104-469(I) at 122 (noting procedural barriers that frustrate the removal process). The 

government has therefore articulated an interest in retaining discretion over the grant and denial of 

bond hearings.6 This factor weighs in favor of Respondents.

3. Additional Procedural Safeguards

Bent seeks additional procedural safeguards in the form of a new bond hearing. Pet. Supp. 

Br. at 3. He argues that the value of additional safeguards is high because “a material change in 

circumstances coupled with the passage of time” may entitle a detainee to an additional bond hearing 

as a matter of due process. See Lopez Reyes, 362 F. Supp. 3d at 777. As explained above, the IJ 

did not err in determining that Bent failed to show a change in material circumstance. Bent does 

not argue that the “passage of time” alone requires a third bond hearing, nor does he identify any 

authority to that effect. See id. (“The Court notes that it is not making a finding that the mere passage 

of time requires a second bond hearing.”). 

In sum, Bent has already received two prior bond hearings and has not argued that either 

hearing was statutorily or constitutionally inadequate. He has failed to show a change in 

circumstances that was material to the considerations underlying the initial bond determination. 

Under these circumstances, the added value of a third bond hearing is minimal because there is 

nothing to suggest that he would “benefit as a practical matter in the circumstances of [his] case.” 

Soto, 2018 WL 3619727, at *4.

The court finds that the Mathews factors weigh in favor of Respondents and that Bent is not 

entitled to a third bond hearing as a matter of due process.

//

6 The government also asserts that it has a strong interest in detaining noncitizens who have been 

convicted of serious crimes. This reason is less compelling. The interest at stake is “the ability to 

detain Petitioner without providing him with another bond hearing, not whether the government 

may continue to detain him.” Lopez Reyes, 362 F. Supp. 3d at 777; see also Jimenez, 2020 WL 

510347, at *3 (“Providing a bond hearing would not undercut the government’s asserted interest in 

effecting removal [because] the purpose of a bond hearing is to inquire whether the alien represents 

a flight risk or danger to the community.”). 

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III. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

In his motion for a TRO, Bent seeks the same relief that he requests in his petition; namely, 

an order requiring the government to provide him with a bond hearing or a release from custody. 

His motion for a TRO is therefore denied as moot.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons state above, Bent’s petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 

is denied. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 6, 2020

______________________________________

Donna M. Ryu

United States Magistrate Judge

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