Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00315/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00315-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John P. Baker, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles Ryan; et al., 

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CIV 09-315-TUC-FRZ (GEE)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

On June 3, 2009, John P. Baker, an inmate confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex

in Florence, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to Title 28, United

States Code, Section 2254. [doc. #1] Before the court are the petition, the answer, and a reply.

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this court, this matter was referred to Magistrate

Judge Edmonds for report and recommendation. 

The Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, after its independent review of the

record, enter an order dismissing the petition. It is time-barred.

Summary of the Case

Baker was convicted after a jury trial of “conspiracy, kidnapping, two counts of child

abuse under circumstances likely to cause death or serious physical injury, and eight other

counts of child abuse.” (Respondents’ answer, pp. 2-3.) The state presented evidence that

Baker and his live-in girlfriend, Betty Jo Miller, habitually locked Baker’s 13-year old

granddaughter and 11-year old grandson “in their room for most of the day throughout the year

Case 4:09-cv-00315-FRZ Document 19 Filed 04/01/10 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

without toys, cooling, water, or sanitation facilities.” (Respondents’ answer, Exhibit G, p. 2.)

The children were forced to “lie on their stomachs all day with their hands folded and legs

crossed,” restrained “with sheets and duct tape,” and allowed out of their room “only for meals,

monthly showers, and occasional haircuts . . . .” Id. On April 2, 1999, the trial court sentenced

Baker to a combined sentence of 90.5 years’ imprisonment. Id., p. 3.

Baker filed a timely notice of direct appeal. Id. He argued the trial court erred (1) by

admitting other act evidence, (2) by denying his motion to sever, and (3) by limiting his witness

interview. Id. The court of appeals, however, affirmed his convictions and sentences on

September 14, 2000. Id. Baker filed a timely petition for review, but the Arizona Supreme

Court denied review on February 15, 2001. Id.

Previously, on July 16, 1999, Baker filed his first notice of post-conviction relief. Id.

The proceeding was stayed during the direct appeal. Id. After the conclusion of his direct

appeal, Baker filed a petition pro per. Id. Baker’s counsel filed a second petition on October

1, 2002, raising eight claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Id. The

parties agreed that Baker should be resentenced on the conspiracy conviction and two of the

child abuse convictions. Id., p. 4. 

Baker’s pro per claim that the trial judge should have recused himself was referred to

another judge and denied as precluded. Id. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on July

19, 2004 and August 23, 2004, on Baker’s claim that trial counsel failed to inform him of a plea

offer. Id.

On December 6, 2004, the trial court denied the petition filed by Baker’s counsel finding

some issues to be moot in light of the parties’ re-sentencing agreement. Id., pp. 5-6. The trial

court denied Baker’s pro per petition in orders issued on February 22, 2005 and April 12, 2005.

Id., pp. 6-7.

Baker was resentenced on May 2, 2005 to “consecutive and concurrent prison terms

totaling 86.5 years.” Id., p. 7; Exhibit KK.

On October 28, 2005, Baker filed with the court of appeals a petition for review of the

trial court’s denial of his first petition for post-conviction relief. Id., p. 7.

Case 4:09-cv-00315-FRZ Document 19 Filed 04/01/10 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

On January 10, 2006, Baker filed his second notice of post-conviction relief. Id., p. 8.

He filed his pro per petition on January 19, 2006. Id. The trial court denied the petition on

February 15, 2006. Id. Baker filed with the court of appeals a petition for review on March 9,

2006. Id. 

The court of appeals consolidated Baker’s October 2005 petition and his March 2006

petition and issued a decision denying both petitions on January 25, 2007. Id. Baker filed a

petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court, but the court denied his petition on August

8, 2007. Id.

Previously, on July 20, 2006, Baker filed his third notice of post-conviction relief. Id.,

p. 8. He filed his pro per petition on October 3, 2006. Id. The trial court denied all claims as

precluded on November 1, 2006. Id.; Exhibit QQ. Baker filed with the court of appeals a

petition for review on December 13, 2006, but the court denied relief on February 28, 2007.

Id., pp. 8-9; Exhibit SS. Baker filed a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court, but

the court denied his petition on December 17, 2007. Id., p. 9.

Previously, on July 27, 2007, Baker filed his fourth notice of post-conviction relief. Id.,

p. 8. He filed his pro per petition on September 11, 2007. Id. The trial court denied all claims

as precluded on November 14, 2007. Id.; Exhibit YY. Baker filed with the court of appeals a

petition for review on January 14, 2008, but the court denied relief on September 18, 2008. Id.;

Exhibit AAA. Baker filed a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court, but the court

denied his petition on March 10, 2009. Id., p. 9.

On June 3, 2009, Baker filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

Title 28, United States Code, Section 2254. [doc. #1] Baker raises the following claims: (1a)

trial counsel was ineffective at the plea bargaining stage, at trial, and at sentencing, (1b)

appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to choose meritorious issues, (1c) advisory counsel

was ineffective for “failing to fulfill his responsibilities,” (2) his sentences are cruel and

unusual, (3) the trial judge violated his equal protection rights during trial and at sentencing, (4)

the trial judge and prosecutor denied his right to a fair trial by failing to change venue, failing

to declare a mistrial for juror misconduct, and failing to correct false witness testimony, (5) he

Case 4:09-cv-00315-FRZ Document 19 Filed 04/01/10 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

is actually innocent, (6) there was insufficient evidence of kidnapping, and (7) bail was

excessive. Id. 

The respondents filed an answer arguing, among other things, that the petition is timebarred. Baker filed a reply.

Discussion

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241. A one-year limitation

period applies to persons in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

The statute reads in pertinent part as follows:

 (1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of--

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the

United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing

by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

The limitation period for all of Baker’s claims was triggered on “the date on which the

judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Baker was resentenced on May 2, 2005.

Case 4:09-cv-00315-FRZ Document 19 Filed 04/01/10 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The 20th day, May 22, 2005, is a Sunday. The deadline therefore was extended to the 21st day.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 1.3(a).

- 5 -

He had 20 days to file notice of his direct appeal. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3. His judgment became

final when he failed to do so – May 23, 20051

. 

The limitation period did not immediately commence, however, because Baker’s first

post-conviction relief proceeding was pending at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). This

proceeding tolled the limitation statute until August 8, 2007, when the Arizona Supreme Court

denied his petition for review. Id., p. 8. The limitation period began running the next day and

ended on August 8, 2008. The instant petition was filed on June 3, 2009. It is time-barred.

Baker argues the limitation period was statutory tolled while his third and fourth postconviction relief petitions were pending. He is incorrect. These petitions did not toll the

limitation period because they were untimely. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417,

125 S.Ct. 1807, 1814 (2005) (An untimely petition for post-conviction relief is not “properly

filed” and does not toll the limitation period under § 2244(d)(2).). 

The petitions were untimely because they were filed long after the deadline for filing

notice of post-conviction relief. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4(a) (notice must be filed within 90 days

of the entry of judgment and sentence . . .). The state court did not specifically find the petitions

untimely, but if the state court fails to decide the issue, this court must do so for itself. See

Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 198, 126 S.Ct. 846, 854 (2006) (“[T]he Circuit must itself

examine the delay in each case and determine what the state courts would have held in respect

to timeliness.). 

Baker further argues he is actually innocent and a claim of innocence is not subject to

the limitation period. Unfortunately, a free standing claim to factual innocence is not

cognizable in a habeas proceeding. Coley v. Gonzales, 55 F.3d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1995).

In the alternative, Baker argues he qualifies for the actual innocence gateway that permits

the court to decide the merits of a claim that is otherwise procedurally barred. See Majoy v.

Roe, 296 F.3d 770, 775-77 (9th Cir. 2002). This gateway is available where the petitioner

Case 4:09-cv-00315-FRZ Document 19 Filed 04/01/10 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

presents new evidence of such significance that “it is more likely than not that no reasonable

juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” Sistrunk v. Armenakis, 292

F.3d 669 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. Denied, 537 U.S. 1115 (2003). 

Baker, however, does not present any newly discovered evidence showing he is innocent.

Instead, he argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish his guilt.

According to Baker, “[b]oth victims stated at trial that Petitioner had no part of the offenses.”

(Petition, p. 10.) He asserts he “was not present during most of the time the offenses took

place” and argues he was charged simply because he was the victims’ guardian. Id. 

Baker does not present new evidence that casts significant doubt on his conviction.

Instead, he offers what is better characterized as an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence.

He does not qualify for the actual innocence gateway. See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537,

126 S.Ct. 2064, 2077 (2006) (“[A] gateway claim requires ‘new reliable evidence . . . that was

not presented at trial.’”). 

RECOMMENDATION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review

of the record, enter an order DISMISSING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. [doc. #1]

It is time-barred.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636 (b), any party may serve and file written objections within

14 days of being served with a copy of this report and recommendation. If objections are not

timely filed, they may be deemed waived. 

The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this report and recommendation to the petitioner

and the respondents.

DATED this 1st day of April, 2010.

Case 4:09-cv-00315-FRZ Document 19 Filed 04/01/10 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

Case 4:09-cv-00315-FRZ Document 19 Filed 04/01/10 Page 7 of 7