Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02544/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02544-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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06cv2544

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAULA HILL,

Plaintiff,

v.

RINCON BAND OF LUISENO

INDIANS, et al.

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 06CV2544 JAH(POR)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Now before this Court is Defendant Rincon Band of Luiseno Mission Indians’

(“Defendant”) motion to dismiss Plaintiff Paula Hill’s (“Plaintiff”) first amended complaint

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (b)(6).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed her complaint against Defendants Rincon Band of Luiseno Indians

(“Rincon”), Tuukut Sass and Rob Shafer (collectively “Defendants”) on November 17, 2006.

Rincon’s first motion to dismiss was granted on March 16, 2007. Doc. No. 5. This Court’s

order provided that if the amended complaint fails to establish subject matter jurisdiction, it

will be dismissed with prejudice. 

Plaintiff filed her first amended complaint against Defendants on May 9, 2007 seeking

damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional

distress, and human rights violation under international law. Doc. No. 15. Plaintiff alleges that

Rincon hired her as a water technician in August 2003, and that during the course of her

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employment, she “was the target of offensive, threatening and dangerous conduct by male coworkers.” Amended Complaint. at ¶ 14. The harassing conduct allegedly included making sexual

gestures and advances, urinating on her car tire, spitting and touching Plaintiff, directing

derogatory and lewd comments to Plaintiff, aiming and firing a shotgun at Plaintiff, and

harassing and threatening Plaintiff with phone messages. Id. Plaintiff contends that the

harassing conduct spanned over a period of eighteen months, and included acts on Rincon’s

property, as well as in the county of San Diego. Id. at ¶15.

Plaintiff further alleges that Rincon created and forced Plaintiff to work in a dangerous

environment by requiring her to transport concentrated chlorine in her personal vehicle.

Amended Complaint at ¶ 20. Plaintiff claims that this behavior and environment caused her to

suffer an emotional breakdown, where she could no longer work with Rincon and was forced

to stop working in July 2005, and eventually resigned in October 2005. Id. at ¶ 19. Plaintiff

further asserts that complaints made to her supervisors were ignored, and that Defendant

Shafer, Rincon’s Tribal Administrator, never brought her complaints to the attention of the

tribal council. Id. at ¶ 18.

The relevant new and revised allegations in the first amended complaint are as follows:

9. This action is based upon violations of basic human rights under international law

committed by Rincon and/or its agents, including each defendant, and directed toward

MS. HILL. 

10. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides

federal question jurisdiction in cases arising under the Constitution and laws of

the United States. International human rights law constitutes the law of the

United States, under the established doctrine that customary international law is

a part of the federal common law.

12. RINCON expressly waived its tribal sovereign immunity with respect to

claims resulting from gaming-related activities. MS. HILL’S claims arise from

gaming-related activities. RINCON also has no immunity from claims for

violation of basic human rights under international law. 

Further, Plaintiff deleted Count I for “civil rights violation” under the unconstitutional

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provision of the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981. Plaintiff added Count III

for “Violation of Human Rights Under International Law.” The relevant paragraph states:

35. The conduct of Defendants toward MS. HILL as alleged above violated MS.

HILL’S basic human rights pursuant to fundamental norms of international law,

as established in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights, and other international human rights law sources, and which also

arise under Federal common law. 

On May 29, 2007, Rincon filed a motion to dismiss the first amended complaint. Doc.

No. 17. Plaintiff filed a response on July 23, 2007. Doc. No. 18. Rincon filed a reply on July

30, 2007. Doc. No. 19.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)

“A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may either attack the

allegations of the complaint or may be made as a ‘speaking motion’ attacking the existence of

subject matter jurisdiction in fact.” Thornhill Publishing Co. v. General Tel & Elect., 594 F.2d

730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Subject matter jurisdiction exists

under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity jurisdiction) “where the matter in controversy exceeds the

sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different

states.” 

“Unlike a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a Rule 12(b)(1) motion can attack the substance of a

complaint’s jurisdictional allegations despite their formal sufficiency, and in doing so rely on

affidavits or any other evidence properly before the court.” St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d

199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). Thus, the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the

trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims. Id.

Defendants bring this motion as a “speaking motion” presenting a factual challenge to

subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, this Court may consider extrinsic evidence on whether

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jurisdiction exists and may resolve factual disputes if necessary. Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733.

Because Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction, no presumption

of truthfulness attaches to the allegations of plaintiff’s first amended complaint and the Court

must presume it lacks jurisdiction until plaintiff establishes jurisdiction. Stock West, Inc. v.

Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989).

B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency

of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal of a claim

under this Rule is appropriate only where “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove

no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732. Dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6)

where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,

749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989)

(“Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law.”).

Alternatively, a complaint may be dismissed where it presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails

to plead essential facts under that theory. Robertson, 749 F.2d at 534.

II. Analysis

Rincon seeks to dismiss Plaintiff’s first amended complaint based on: 1) lack of subject

matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); 2) failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(6); and 3) sovereign immunity as a bar to Plaintiff’s claims.

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Rincon asserts that Plaintiff’s first amended complaint fails to provide grounds for this

Court to assert either diversity or federal question jurisdiction in this matter.

1. Diversity Jurisdiction

Rincon first contends that the addition of the new allegations in paragraphs 9, 10, and

35 set forth in full above, do not, as a matter of law, establish subject matter jurisdiction.

Rincon asserts that changing the claim from one for civil rights violation to one for human

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rights violations under international law does not confer subject matter or federal question

jurisdiction in this case. This Court agrees. Plaintiff does not state a cognizable legal theory.

Robertson, 749 F.2d at 533-34. Assuming the facts pled in the amended complaint are

accepted as true, Plaintiff has not provided any legal support that she has stated a viable human

rights violation against the Defendant, which is an Indian Tribe. 

Defendant Rincon, as a federally recognized Indian Tribe, is not a foreign state for

purposes of diversity. Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873

F.2d 1221, 1226 (9th Cir.1989), citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 20, (1831). See

also Barker-Hatch v. Viejas Group Baron Long Capitan Grande Bank of Digueno Mission

Indians of the Viejas Group Reservations, 83 F. Supp 2d 1155, 1156 (S.D. Cal. 2000).

Further, an unincorporated Indian tribe such as Rincon, is not a “citizen” of any state for

purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Am. Vantage Cos. v. Table Mt. Rancheria, 292 F.3d 1091,

1095 (9th Cir. 2002). In Am. Vantage, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the First, Second, Eighth

and Tenth Circuits in finding that “unincorporated Indian tribes cannot sue or be sued in

diversity because they are not citizens of any state.” 292 F.3d at 1095. Accordingly, “‘the

presence of an Indian tribe destroys complete diversity’ because ‘[a]n Indian tribe ... is not

considered to be a citizen of any state.’” Id., citing to Ningret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian

Wetuomuch Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2000). With the presence of Rincon in

this suit, the basis for asserting diversity jurisdiction does not exist. This Court, therefore, finds

that there is no diversity jurisdiction in this case because of lack of diversity of citizenship

between Plaintiff and Defendants.

2. Federal Question

Rincon also asserts that there is no viable federal question upon which to base this

Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Doc. no. 17, at 2-3. Plaintiff was given the opportunity to

amend her complaint by Order of this court on March 16, 2007. Pursuant to that Order, if

Plaintiff failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction for this court, Plaintiff’s complaint will

be “dismissed with prejudice and without any further leave to amend.” 

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The allegations in the amended complaint do not invoke international law or refer to

international relations. Plaintiff added a claim that the Rincon violated Plaintiff’s basic human

rights under fundamental norms of customary international law which arise under Federal

common law. Doc. No. 18, at 3-4. These allegations do not provide an independent basis for

jurisdiction by this Court. Plaintiff provides no authority for her claim that an Indian tribe is

a foreign state for purposes of invoking international law. 

For purposes of foreign relations law, Rincon is not a “state.” See Restatement (Third)

of the Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. §201, comment (e) “Capacity to conduct international

relations.” Indian tribes cannot engage in foreign relations; they lack authority to make treaties

and are subject to federal legislative power. See Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian

Law § 4.02(1) (2005 ed.). Plaintiff’s claim of basic human rights violations under fundamental

norms of international law is vague and provides no specific international law allegedly violated.

See e.g. Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997). 

The fundamental norms of international law that Plaintiff’s alleges have been violated

are those “established in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights, and other international human rights law sources.” Amended Complaint at ¶35. These

claims lack legal authority. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), the Supreme

court held that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not impose obligations as a

matter of international law, does not impose legal obligations as would a treaty or international

agreement, and does not itself “establish the relevant and applicable rule of international law,”

but rather sets forth a “common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations”. . Id.

at 734-735. The Supreme court found that the allegations under the Declaration did not

violate customary international law “so well defined as to support creation of a federal remedy.”

Id.

Similarly, much of the United Nations Charter is aspirational. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan

Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Charter does not speak in terms of

individual rights but rather speaks about obligations on nations. None of the purposes and

principles are intended to be judicially enforceable by individuals. Id.

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This Court reviewed all the cases cited by Plaintiff in support of her arguments relating

to the applicability of fundamental norms of customary international law to this case, and

position that this Court should find the conduct of Rincon violates well-defined norms of

customary international law and justifies a federal remedy. The fatal flaw in Plaintiff’s claims

under “international law” is that Rincon is not a foreign state. 

Each case cited by Plaintiff involves the interests or laws of a foreign sovereign. Since

at least 1831, the Supreme Court has held that Indian tribes are not “foreign nations” or

“foreign states”, but rather “domestic depend nations.” Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17, 19-20;

Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 265 (U.S. 1901). The Ninth Circuit has followed

suit and held that Indian tribes are not “foreign states.” See Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464

F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006); Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055, 1058

(9th Cir. 2004). 

Rincon is not a “state” for purposes of international law. There is no authority cited by

Plaintiff, and this court is not aware of any, that suggests or dictates that Indian tribes should

be treated as foreign nations or foreign states for purposes of applying international human

rights law. This Court therefore finds that international law principles do not apply in this case

involving an employment claim against an Indian tribe. 

B. Waiver of Sovereign Immunity

Plaintiff makes a bare assertion that Rincon has waived its sovereign immunity.

Amended Complaint at ¶12. The law is well established that a waiver of sovereign immunity

must be unequivocal. See Baker v. United States, 817 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1987); Allen, 464

F.3d at 1047. Further, it is well established precedent that claims by former tribal employees

against the Tribe are barred by tribal sovereign immunity. Id. at 1045-47; Pink v. Modoc

Indian Health Project, Inc., 157 F.3d 1185, 1187 (9th Cir. 1998). 

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CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to

dismiss Plaintiff’s first amended complaint with prejudice is GRANTED.

DATED: August 22, 2007

HON. JOHN A. HOUSTON

United States District Judge

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