Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-02524/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-02524-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1132 E.R.I.S.A.: Employee Benefits

---

CASE NO.: 5:14-CV-02524-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS; DENYING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

OLGA GORBACHEVA,

Plaintiff,

v.

ABBOTT LABORATORIES EXTENDED 

DISABILITY PLAN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 5:14-cv-02524-EJD 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR FEES 

AND COSTS; DENYING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR FEES 

AND COSTS

Dkt. Nos. 109, 110

I. INTRODUCTION

This is an action for disability benefits under ERISA. The Court granted summary 

judgment in favor of Defendants and entered judgment accordingly. Presently before the Court 

are competing motions for attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §1132(g)(1), 28 U.S.C. 

§1920 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d). In a renewed motion for fees and costs, 

Plaintiff requests an award of $191,415 (273.45 hours x $700/hour) in attorneys’ fees and 

$1,201.60 in costs incurred to obtain the June 30, 2016 order remanding Plaintiff’s claim to the 

plan administrator and preparing the instant motion.1 Defendants seek $264,570.47 in attorneys’

fees and $9,758.02 in costs. The Court finds it appropriate to take the motions under submission 

 

1

Plaintiff is not seeking compensation for time spent after the remand order.

Case 5:14-cv-02524-EJD Document 119 Filed 05/25/18 Page 1 of 7
CASE NO.: 5:14-CV-02524-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS; DENYING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS

2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

for decision without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). For the reasons set forth 

below, Plaintiff’s motion is granted in part and Defendants’ motion is denied.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initiated this action in June of 2014, naming five defendants and asserting claims 

for benefits under (1) the Abbott Laboratories Extended Disability Plan (“EDP”), (2) the Abbott 

Laboratories Annuity Retirement Plan and (3) Retiree Health Plan. Plaintiff also sought statutory 

penalties. In December 2014, Defendants offered Plaintiff a voluntary remand to the plan 

administrator. Plaintiff was not interested in the offer because it did not include an award of back 

benefits and the exact parameters of the proposed remand were never discussed. 

In May 2015, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Although there was a 

great deal of evidence in the record to support the plan administrator’s decision to deny Plaintiff 

long term benefits, the Court remanded Plaintiff’s claim to the plan administrator to consider a 

Functional Capacity Evaluation (“FCE”) and a favorable Social Security award. The Court 

rejected the remainder of Plaintiff’s arguments. Plaintiff filed her initial motion for fees and costs, 

which the Court denied without prejudice.

On remand, Plaintiff submitted 869 pages of additional medical records to the plan 

administrator; however, none of the records were from the relevant time frame. Nevertheless, the 

plan administrator considered the additional records, as well as the FCE and the Social Security 

award. The plan administrator denied Plaintiff’s claim. The instant action was reopened and in 

February of 2018, the Court issued an order denying Plaintiff’s motion for judgment as a matter of 

law and granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Court concluded that the plan 

administrator did not abuse her discretion in denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability benefits. 

II. STANDARDS

Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1), a court in its discretion may award reasonable 

attorney’s fees and costs of the action to either a plaintiff or defendant in an ERISA case. Estate 

of Shockley v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 130 F.3d 403, 408 (9th Cir. 1997) (“We first disabuse 

Case 5:14-cv-02524-EJD Document 119 Filed 05/25/18 Page 2 of 7
CASE NO.: 5:14-CV-02524-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS; DENYING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS

3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

the district court of the suggestion that we favor one side or the other [plaintiffs or defendants] in 

ERISA fee cases. The statute is clear on its face—the playing field is level.”).

The first step is to determine whether the party seeking fees achieved “some degree of 

success on the merits.” Barnes v. AT&T Pension Benefit Plan-Nonbargained Program, 963 F. 

Supp.2d 950, 960-61 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (citing Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 

242 (2010)). Even if a claimant achieves some degree of success on the merits, a court has 

discretion in deciding whether to award fees. Five factors—known as the Hummell factors—

guide the decision: (1) the degree of the opposing parties’ culpability or bad faith; (2) the ability 

of the opposing parties to satisfy an award of fees; (3) whether an award of fees against the 

opposing parties would deter others from acting under similar circumstances; (4) whether the 

parties requesting fees sought to benefit all participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to 

resolve a significant legal question regarding ERISA; and (5) the relative merits of the parties’

positions. Simonia v. Glendale Nissan/Infiniti Disability Plan, 608 F.3d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2010). No one factor is determinative. Carpenters S. Cal. Admin. Corp. v. Russell, 726 F.2d 

1410, 1416 (9th Cir. 1984). 

If a court determines that a claimant is entitled to an award of fees, the court next analyzes 

the amount of fees that should be awarded. Barnes, 963 F.Supp.2d at 961. Under ERISA, fee 

awards to a prevailing party are calculated using a lodestar analysis, multiplying the number of 

hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433

(1983). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Fees and Costs

Plaintiff achieved some degree of success on the merits by obtaining an order of remand. 

Hardt, 560 U.S. at 256; see also Binaley v. AT&T Umbrella Benefit Plan No. 1, No. 11-4722 

YGR, 2013 WL 5402236, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013) (an order remanding to the plan 

administrator may be sufficient success on the merits for attorneys’ fee purposes); Barnes v. 

Case 5:14-cv-02524-EJD Document 119 Filed 05/25/18 Page 3 of 7
CASE NO.: 5:14-CV-02524-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS; DENYING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS

4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

AT&T Pension Benefit Plan-Nonbargained Program, 963 F. Supp.2d at 962-63. Although 

Plaintiff ultimately was not awarded the disability benefits she sought, the order of remand cannot 

be fairly characterized as merely a “trivial success” or a “purely procedural victor[y]”2under the 

factual circumstances of this case.

Turning next to the Hummell factors, the first factor weighs in favor of awarding fees. 

Defendants are culpable insofar as the administrator failed to consider Plaintiff’s FCE and a 

favorable Social Security decision, and thus failed to conduct a full and fair review of Plaintiff’s 

claims are mandated by ERISA. Second, Defendants have the ability to satisfy an award of fees. 

The third factor weighs against an award of fees. There is no evidence of bad faith and therefore, 

an award of fees is not likely to have a deterrent effect. As to the fourth factor, Plaintiff’s claim 

did not seek to benefit other plan participants. Nor did this litigation resolve any significant legal 

issue. Instead, this case focused on the specific factual circumstances of Plaintiff’s employment 

and alleged physical impairments. The fourth factor weighs against an award of fees. The fifth 

factor weighs in favor of awarding fees incurred in obtaining the order of remand. The majority of 

the Hummell factors are satisfied.

Having determined that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of fees incurred in obtaining the 

order of remand, the next step is to consider whether the requested fees are reasonable. In Barnes, 

the court explained:

In determining the appropriate number of hours to be included in a 

lodestar calculation, the district court should exclude hours that are 

excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. A district court 

then makes a two-part inquiry: First, did the plaintiff fail to prevail 

on claims that were unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded? 

Second, did the plaintiff achieve a level of success that makes the 

hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee 

award? A plaintiff is not eligible to receive attorney’s fees for time 

spent on unsuccessful claims that are unrelated to a plaintiff’s 

successful . . . claim. 

Barnes, 963 F.Supp.2d at 968 (internal citations and punctuation omitted).

 

2 Hardt, 560 U.S. at 255.

Case 5:14-cv-02524-EJD Document 119 Filed 05/25/18 Page 4 of 7
CASE NO.: 5:14-CV-02524-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS; DENYING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS

5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s fees are excessive for several reasons. First, 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s request for fees includes fees incurred after Defendants’ offer 

of a voluntary remand in December of 2014. See Moriarty v. Svec, 233 F.3d 955, 967 (7th Cir. 

2000) (“Substantial settlement offers should be considered by the district court as a factor in 

determining an award of reasonable attorney’s fees, even where Rule 68 does not apply. 

Attorney’s fees accumulated after a party rejects a substantial offer provide minimal benefit to the 

prevailing party, and thus a reasonable attorney’s fee may be less than the lodestar calculation.”) 

(citation omitted)). According to Defendants’ calculations, over $171,000 of the $191,415 

claimed fees could have been avoided if Plaintiff had accepted Defendants’ remand offer. 

Defendants’ argument is unpersuasive because the parties’ discussions did not progress past the 

preliminary stage and the parties never discussed the details of the proposed remand. 

Second, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s fee request is excessive because Plaintiff seeks 

fees at counsel’s current rate of $700 per hour instead of the $550-600 per hour rate that was in 

effect at the time the work was performed (between April 2014 and September 2016). Defendants 

reason that Plaintiff delayed the resolution of the case by rejecting their offer of remand and 

failing to provide medical records in a timely manner. Defendants contend that “Plaintiff’s 

dilatory tactics should not be rewarded through the use of an inflated hourly rate for time worked 

in 2014, 2015, and 2016.” Defendants’ Opposition, p. 16. 

Courts have discretion to apply an hourly rate that is reasonable “in light of the totality of 

the circumstances and the relevant factors, including delay in payment.” James v. AT&T 

Disability Benefits Program, No. 12-6318 WHO, 2014 WL 7272983, at *4 n.5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 

2014). Here, there were delays in the proceedings that justify applying the current hourly rate for 

Plaintiff’s counsel. See Welch v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 947 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(“District courts have the discretion to compensate plaintiff’s attorneys for a delay in payment by 

either applying the attorney’s current rates to all hours billed during the course of the litigation or 

Case 5:14-cv-02524-EJD Document 119 Filed 05/25/18 Page 5 of 7
CASE NO.: 5:14-CV-02524-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS; DENYING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

using the attorneys’ historical rates and adding a prime rate enhancement.”). The primary cause of 

the delays was the voluminous medical records, and not Plaintiff’s conduct.

Third, Defendants contend that counsel’s experience and quality of representation do not 

justify an hourly rate of $700 per hour. The argument is unfounded. The requested $700 per hour 

is fully substantiated by the declarations of Plaintiff’s counsel, James Keenley and Brian Kim, as 

well as attorneys who specialize in ERISA litigation, including Glenn Kantor, Daniel Feinberg, 

Terrence Coleman, Teresa Renaker, Michelle Roberts, Joseph Creitz. 

In the final step, the court considers, among other things, whether the fee claimant 

achieved a level of success that makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for 

making a fee award. In Caplan v. CNA Fin. Corp., 573 F.Supp.2d 1244 (N.D. Cal. 2008), the 

court explained:

The Supreme Court offers two different approaches for setting 

reasonable fees in cases where a plaintiff’s success is limited. Where 

a suit includes separable legal claims, fees may be awarded only for

work on claims that were successful. To do this, a district court may 

attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated. 

However, where multiple claims are difficult to separate because 

they involve a “common core of facts based on related legal 

theories,” such an approach may not be possible. Instead, the court 

may adopt the alternative approach described in Hensley: simply 

reduce the award to account for the limited success. To determine 

the appropriate amount of reduction, the court should not use a

mathematical ratio of winning claims to losing claims. Instead, it 

should compare the significance of the overall relief obtained to all 

the claims and remedies plaintiffs pursued in the litigation.

Id. at 1250-51 (internal citations and punctuation omitted). 

The Court has considered the entire scope of the proceedings. Applying the alternative 

approach in Hensley, the Court finds that Plaintiff did not achieve a level of success to justify a fee 

award of $191,415. Plaintiff sought significant damages in the form of benefits and statutory 

penalties, but was awarded neither. Defendants ultimately prevailed on all claims in this litigation. 

In light of the limited success Plaintiff achieved, the Court finds that a 10% reduction is 

appropriate. 

Case 5:14-cv-02524-EJD Document 119 Filed 05/25/18 Page 6 of 7
CASE NO.: 5:14-CV-02524-EJD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS; DENYING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR FEES AND COSTS

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Lastly, Plaintiff’s request for reimbursement of costs is reasonable. Plaintiff expended 

$1,201.60 to pay for the filing fee, the deposition related costs and copying costs. These expenses 

are routinely incurred in the course of litigating cases of this complexity and length.

B. Defendants’ Motion for Fees and Costs

Defendants seek attorneys’ fees and costs as the prevailing party. Defendants contend that 

Plaintiff’s claims lacked factual and legal support and that Plaintiff’s conduct unnecessarily 

increased the fees and costs incurred in the case. 

Defendants have unquestionably achieved “some degree of success on the merits.” Barnes 

v. AT&T Pension Benefit Plan-Nonbargained Program, 963 F. Supp.2d at 960-61. The majority 

of Hummell factors, however, weigh against an award of fees and costs. First, Plaintiff did not 

engage in culpable or bad faith conduct in pursuing her claims. Second, Plaintiff has no ability to 

satisfy the requested award of fees and costs. At present, Plaintiff’s sole sources of income are her 

Social Security benefits and a modest pension. See Plaintiff’s Declaration, ¶2. Third, an award of 

fees and costs under the circumstances of this case is unlikely to have any deterrent effect. The 

fourth Hummell factor is inapplicable. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s motion for fees and costs is GRANTED in part. Plaintiff is awarded attorneys’

fees in the amount of $172,273.50 and costs in the amount of $1,201.60. Defendants’ motion for 

fees and costs is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 25, 2018

______________________________________

EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge

Case 5:14-cv-02524-EJD Document 119 Filed 05/25/18 Page 7 of 7