Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-01802/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-01802-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ZAHRA SEDAGHATPOUR,

Plaintiff,

 v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA

HIGHWAY PATROL, OFFICER JON

SCHATMEIER, DOE OFFICER ONE,

OFFICER JOHN SOTO, AND DOES 2–20,

Defendant. /

No. C 07-01802 WHA

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO

STRIKE AND VACATING

HEARING

INTRODUCTION

In this civil rights action, plaintiff Zahra Sedaghatpour alleges unreasonable seizure, use

of excessive force, and racial and national origin discrimination by defendants State of

California, California Highway Patrol, Officer Jon Schatmeier, Doe Officer One, Officer John

Soto, and Does 2–20. This order holds that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal claims

against defendants State of California and California Highway Patrol so these claims are

DISMISSED. The state claims remain in effect, however. By agreement, Officer John Soto is

DISMISSED from the case without prejudice and the motion to strike allegations against him is

GRANTED. 

Case 3:07-cv-01802-WHA Document 56 Filed 10/09/07 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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STATEMENT

On September 12, 2006, plaintiff was driving southbound on I-680 in her red Mercedes. 

Defendants pulled her over and engaged in conduct forming the grounds for this civil action

(Amd. Compl. at 4–8). On March 29, 2007, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants State

of California, California Highway Patrol, Officer Jon Schatmeier, Doe Officer One, Doe Officer

Two, and Doe Officer Three, who was later identified as Officer John Soto. In July 2007,

the Court ordered that “[a]ll unserved defendants and any Doe defendants must be formally

identified and served by August 10, 2007.” On August 21, 2007, plaintiff filed an amended

complaint naming Officer John Soto as Doe Officer Three. Her complaint alleged eight causes

of action: (1) violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Officers Schatmeier and Soto and

Doe Officer One; (2) violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants State of California and

California Highway Patrol, and Does 3–20; (3) violation of California Civil Code 52.1 against

all defendants; (4) violation of California Civil Code 51.7 against all defendants;

(5) negligence and personal injuries against all defendants; (6) assault and battery against all

defendants; (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress against all defendants; and

(8) conversion against all defendants (Amd. Compl. at 9–18). 

ANALYSIS

1. LEGAL STANDARD FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS.

A motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6) tests for legal sufficiency of the claims

alleged in the complaint. See Parks Sch. of Business v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484

(9th Cir. 1995). Although materials outside of the pleading should not be considered, a court

may consider all materials properly submitted as part of the complaint, such as exhibits to the

complaint. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555

(9th Cir. 1990). It also may take judicial notice of “matters of public record.” Mack v. South

Bay Beer Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 ( 9th Cir.1986).

Case 3:07-cv-01802-WHA Document 56 Filed 10/09/07 Page 2 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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All material allegations of the complaint are taken as true and construed in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 340

(9th Cir. 1996). As such, a complaint should not be dismissed “unless it appears beyond doubt

that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). “However, conclusory allegations of law

and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim.” Epstein v. Washington Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996). If dismissal is

granted, leave to amend is only denied if it is clear that amendment would be futile and that

deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d

1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). 

2. ARE THE CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

AND CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL BARRED BY THE 

ELEVENTH AMENDMENT?

According to the Eleventh Amendment, “The judicial power of the United States shall

not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of

the United States by citizens of another state.” In the absence of consent, a suit in which a

state or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is barred by the

Eleventh Amendment. Although the Eleventh Amendment does not expressly bar suits against

a state by its own citizens, it has been interpreted to do so. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 465 U.S 89, 100 (1984) (“An unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in

federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another state”). Here, plaintiff seeks

to sue in federal court the State of California and the California Highway Patrol, a California

agency. The State has not consented, so therefore the Eleventh Amendment bars suit on the

basis of the federal claims. This order dismisses the federal claims against the State of

California and the California Highway Patrol without leave to amend and with prejudice. 

Plaintiff’s state claims will remain in the case.

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For the Northern District of California

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3. HAS PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SERVE OFFICER JOHN SOTO?

Service must be made upon defendant within 120 days of filing of the complaint,

otherwise the court has authority to dismiss the action as to that defendant. FRCP 4(m). 

Any dismissal under FRCP 4(m) is without prejudice to plaintiff’s right to re-file. Furthermore,

the Court may dismiss “Doe” defendants who are not identified and served within 120 days after

the case is filed pursuant to FRCP 4(m).

The scheduling order controls the subsequent course of the action unless modified by the

court upon a showing of “good cause.” Zivkovic v. Southern Calif. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080,

1087–88 (9th Cir. 2002). Unless a court order is obtained permitting late filing, motions filed

after the deadlines set in a scheduling order are untimely and may be denied solely on this

ground. Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 608–9 (9th Cir. 1992). 

The original complaint, filed on March 29, 2007, did not name Officer John Soto as a

defendant (i.e., he was a “Doe Officer”). The Court’s July 12 case management order required

that “[a]ll unserved defendants and any Doe defendants must be formally identified and served

by August 10, 2007.” The amended complaint filed on August 21, 2007, included Officer Soto

as a named defendant. The Court’s docket fails to show that Officer Soto has ye6 been served,

and nothing otherwise indicates that he has been served. Here, there was no proper service,

nor has plaintiff abided by the case management order. Plaintiff does not oppose Officer Soto’s

dismissal (Opp. at 2). 

Plaintiff correctly requests that the dismissal be without prejudice. Defendant Officer

Soto’s dismissal shall be without prejudice.

5. MOTION TO STRIKE ALLEGATIONS IN 

PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT.

A. Against Officer John Soto.

A district court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any

redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous. FRCP 12(f). Because Officer Soto is

dismissed from this case, allegations of discrimination and excessive force against him may be

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redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous. All of the alleged conduct by Officer Soto

that is independent of the conduct of the other named plaintiffs is hereby stricken.

B. Against Doe Defendants.

Plaintiff does not oppose defendants’ motion to strike the Doe allegations (Opp. at 2). 

Of course, no such individuals having been brought into the case, there is no occasion for any

dismissal with prejudice.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice regarding the

federal claims against the State of California and the California Highway Patrol is hereby

GRANTED. The state claims against the State of California and the California Highway Patrol,

however, will remain in the case. Defendants’ motion to strike allegations against Officer John

Soto is GRANTED and their motion to dismiss him from the case is GRANTED without prejudice. 

All Doe allegations are stricken. The hearing is therefore VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 9, 2007. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:07-cv-01802-WHA Document 56 Filed 10/09/07 Page 5 of 5