Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-15-01580/USCOURTS-ca2-15-01580-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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15‐1580

Licci et al. v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

______________              

August Term 2015

(Argued: April 18, 2016     Decided: August 24, 2016)

Docket No. 15‐1580

______________

YAAKOV LICCI, a minor, by his father and natural guardian

Elihav Licci and by his mother and natural guardian Yehudit

Licci, et al., ELIHAV LICCI, YEHUDIT LICCI, TZVI HIRSH,

ARKADY GRAIPEL, TATIANA KREMER, YOSEF ZARONA,

TAL SHANI, SHLOMO COHEN, NITZAN GOLDENBERG,

RINA DAHAN, RAPHAEL WEISS, AGAT KLEIN, TATIANA

KOVLEYOV, VALENTINA DEMESH, RIVKA EPON, JOSEPH

MARIA, IMMANUEL PENKER, ESTHER PINTO, AVISHAI

REUVANCE, ELISHEVA ARON, CHAYIM KUMER, SARAH

YEFET, SHOSHANA SAPPIR, RAHMI GUHAD GHANAM, a

minor, by his father and natural guardian Fuad Shchiv Ghanam

and by his mother and natural guardian Suha Shchiv Ghanam,

FUAD SHCHIV GHANAM, individually, SUHA SHCHIV

GHANAM, individually, MAʹAYAN ARDSTEIN, a minor, by

her father and natural guardian, Brian Ardstein, and by her

mother and natural guardian, Keren Ardstein, NOA ARDSTEIN,

a minor, by her father and natural guardian, Brian Ardstein, and

by her mother and natural guardian, Keren Ardstein, NETIYA

Case 15-1580, Document 141-1, 08/24/2016, 1847946, Page1 of 34
YESHUA ARDSTEIN, a minor, by her father and natural

guardian, Brian Ardstein, and by her mother and natural

guardian, Keren Ardstein, ARIEL CHAIM ARDSTEIN, a minor,

by her father and natural guardian, Brian Ardstein, and by her

mother and natural guardian Keren Ardstein, BRIAN

ARDSTEIN, individually, KEREN ARDSTEIN, individually,

MARGALIT RAPPEPORT, a minor, by her mother and natural

guardian, Laurie Rappeport, LAURIE RAPPEPORT,

individually, ORNA MOR, YAIR MOR, MICHAEL FUCHS,

ESQ., MUSHKA KAPLAN, a minor, by her father and natural

guardian Chaim Kaplan, and by her mother and natural

guardian Rivka Kaplan, ARYE LEIB KAPLAN, a minor, by his

father and natural guardian Chaim Kaplan, and by his mother

and natural guardian Rivka Kaplan, MENACHEM KAPLAN, a

minor, by his father and natural guardian Chaim Kaplan, and by

his mother and natural guardian Rivka Kaplan, CHANA

KAPLAN, a minor, by her father and natural guardian Chaim

Kaplan, and by her mother and natural guardian Rivka Kaplan,

EFRAIM LEIB KAPLAN, a minor, by his father and natural

guardian Chaim Kaplan and by his mother and natural guardian

Rivka Kaplan, CHAIM KAPLAN, individually, RIVKA

KAPLAN, individually, ROCHELLE SHALMONI, OZ

SHALMONI, DAVID OCHAYON, YAAKOV MAIMON, MIMI

BITON, MIRIAM JUMAʹA, as personal representative of the

estate of Fadya Jumaʹa, MIRIAM JUMAʹA, individually, SALAH

JUMAʹA, as personal representative of the estate of Samira

Jumaʹa, SALAH JUMAʹA, individually, SAID JUMAʹA,

individually, ABD EL‐RAHMAN JUMAʹA, as personal

representative of the estate of Samira Jumaʹa, ABD EL‐

RAHMAN JUMAʹA, individually, RAHMA ABU‐SHAHIN,

ABDEL GAHNI, as personal representative of the estate of

Soltana Jumaʹa and individually, SHADI SALMAN AZZAM, as

the personal representative of the estate of Manal Camal Azam,

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KANAR SHAʹADI AZZAM, a minor, by his father and natural

guardian, Shadi Salman Azzam, ADEN SHAʹADI AZZAM, a

minor, by his father and natural guardian, Shadi Salman Azzam,

SHADI SALMAN AZZAM, individually, ADINA

MACHASSAN DAGESH, ARKADY SPEKTOR, YORI ZOVREV,

MAURINE GREENBERG, JACOB KATZMACHER, DEBORAH

CHANA KATZMACHER, CHAYA KATZMACHER, MIKIMI

STEINBERG, JARED SAUTER, DANIELLE SAUTER, YAAKOV

ABUTBUL, ABRAHAM NATHAN MOR, a minor, by his father

and natural guardian, Zion Mor, and by his mother and natural

guardian, Revital Mor, BAT ZION MOR, a minor, by her father

and natural guardian, Zion Mor, and by her mother and natural

guardian, Revital Mor, MICHAL MOR, a minor, by her father

and natural guardian, Zion Mor, and by her mother and natural

guardian, Revital Mor, ODED CHANA MOR, a minor, by her

father and natural guardian, Zion Mor, and by her mother and

natural guardian, Revital Mor, ZION MOR, individually,

REVITAL MOR, individually, ADHAM MAHANE

TARRABASHI, JIHAN KAMUD ASLAN, ZOHARA LOUIE

SA’AD, IYAH ZAID GANAM, a minor, by his father and natural

guardian Ziad Shchiv Ghanam, and by his mother and natural

guardian Gourov Tisir Ghanam, ZIAD SHCHIV GHANAM,

individually, GOUROV TISIR GHANAM, individually,

THEODORE GREENBERG, EMILLA SALMAN ASLAN,

       Plaintiffs‐Appellants,

v.

LEBANESE CANADIAN BANK, SAL,

       Defendant‐Appellee,  

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AMERICAN EXPRESS BANK, LTD.,

       Defendant.

______________

Before:

SACK, WESLEY, and LYNCH, Circuit Judges.

______________

Plaintiffs‐Appellants (“Plaintiffs”) are foreign civilians

residing in Israel who were injured or whose family members

were killed in a series of Hezbollah rocket attacks in Israel.  

Plaintiffs brought suit under the Alien Tort Statute against

Defendant‐Appellee Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL (the “bank”),

alleging that the bank facilitated the terrorist rocket attacks by

using a correspondent banking account at a New York bank to

effectuate wire transfers totaling several million dollars on

behalf of Hezbollah.    The United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York (Daniels, J.), granted a motion to

dismiss in favor of the bank based on the presumption against

extraterritorial application of the Alien Tort Statute, see Kiobel v.

Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (“Kiobel II”).  

Though we conclude that Plaintiffs have displaced the

presumption against extraterritoriality, see Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. at

1669, we also conclude that customary international law does

not recognize liability for the bank, a corporation, see Kiobel v.

Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 145 (2d Cir. 2010).  

Accordingly, we AFFIRM IN PART the District Court’s

dismissal.

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2

______________

MEIR KATZ (Robert J. Tolchin, on the brief), The Berkman

Law Office, LLC, Brooklyn, NY, for Plaintiffs‐

Appellants.

JONATHAN D. SIEGFRIED (Douglas W. Mateyaschuk &

Peter J. Couto, on the brief), DLA Piper LLP (US),

New York, NY, for Defendant‐Appellee.

__________

WESLEY, Circuit Judge:

In July and August 2006, Hezbollah carried out a series of

terrorist rocket attacks on civilians in Israel.    Several dozen

United States, Israeli, and Canadian civilians seek to hold  

Defendant‐Appellee Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL (“LCB”), a

Lebanese bank headquartered in Beirut, liable for providing

international financial services to Hezbollah that they claim

facilitated Hezbollah’s attacks that injured them or killed  family

members.    These civilians assert claims against LCB under the

Anti–Terrorism Act and Israeli tort law.1   In addition, some of

the Israeli and Canadian plaintiffs (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)

assert claims under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (the

“ATS”)—these claims are the subject of the present opinion.2  

 

1 An accompanying summary order addresses Plaintiffs’ Anti–

Terrorism Act and Israeli tort law claims.  

2 Four Israeli and Canadian Plaintiffs do not assert Alien Tort Statute

claims against LCB:  Sarah Yefet, Shoshana Sappir, Rochelle Shalmoni,

and Oz Shalmoni.  App. 110.  Except in reviewing procedural history,

in which case the term “Plaintiffs” refers to all plaintiffs in this action,

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3

This case is not new to our Court.  In fact, this appeal is in

its third appearance before us in the last five years.  In our prior

opinions, we determined (with an assist from the New York

Court of Appeals, see Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 20

N.Y.3d 327, 339 (2012) (“Licci III”)) that the District Court had

personal jurisdiction over defendant LCB, and that subjecting

the foreign bank to personal jurisdiction in New York comports

with due process protections provided by the United States

Constitution.  See Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL,

732 F.3d 161, 165 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Licci IV”); Licci v. Lebanese

Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 73–74 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Licci II”).  

This case presents a different question:    Whether the District

Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ ATS claims.  

The District Court dismissed the ATS claims under Kiobel v.

Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (“Kiobel II”),

reasoning that Plaintiffs failed to displace the presumption

against extraterritorial application of the ATS.    Though we

disagree with the District Court’s basis for dismissal, we affirm

because the ATS claims seek to impose corporate liability in

contravention of our decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum

Co., 621 F.3d 111, 145 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Kiobel I”).

   

 

we use the term “Plaintiffs” to refer only to those Israeli and Canadian

Plaintiffs‐Appellants bringing Alien Tort Statute claims against LCB.  

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4

BACKGROUND3

I. Plaintiffs’ Complaint

According to Plaintiffs’ complaint, Hezbollah,4 a terrorist

organization, fired thousands of rockets into northern Israel

between July 12, 2006 and August 14, 2006.    App. 58, 66.  

Plaintiffs or their family members were injured or killed by these

attacks.  See App. 54.

LCB is a Lebanese bank with no branches, offices, or

employees in the United States.  Licci IV, 732 F.3d at 165; Licci II,

673 F.3d at 56.    To effectuate U.S.‐dollar‐denominated

transactions, LCB maintained a correspondent bank account

with defendant American Express Bank Ltd. (“AmEx”) in New

York.5  Licci IV, 732 F.3d at 165; Licci II, 673 F.3d at 56.  Plaintiffs

allege that LCB used this account to conduct dozens of

international wire transfers on behalf of the Shahid (Martyrs)

Foundation (“Shahid”), an entity that maintained bank accounts

with LCB and that Plaintiffs allege to be an “integral part” of

Hezbollah and “part of [its] financial arm.”  App. 65; see also id.

(alleging that the Shahid‐titled bank accounts “belonged to

[Hezbollah] and were under the control of [Hezbollah]”).  These

wire transfers, which totaled several million dollars,

“substantially increased and facilitated [Hezbollah’s] ability to

 

3 The facts set forth below are drawn from the record, Plaintiffs’ First

Amended Complaint (the “complaint”), see App. 48–120, and this

Court’s previous opinions in this case, see Licci IV, 732 F.3d at 165–67;

Licci II, 673 F.3d at 55–59.  We accept as true all non‐conclusory factual

allegations relevant to this decision.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009); see also Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 124.

4 “Hezbollah” may also be spelled “Hizbollah,” as in the complaint, see

App. 58, or “Hizballah,” as in Licci II, 673 F.3d at 54–55.

5 Defendant AmEx is not a party to this appeal.  

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5

plan, to prepare for[,] and to carry out” the rocket attacks that

injured Plaintiffs. App. 66, 86.  Plaintiffs further allege that LCB

carried out the wire transfer services from 2004 until the rocket

attacks began on July 12, 2006, and “subsequently” continued to

carry out those transfers.  App. 66.   

As relevant here, Plaintiffs contend that LCB’s role in

conducting those wire transfers on Shahid’s behalf amounted to

aiding and abetting genocide, war crimes, and crimes against

humanity in violation of international law, and is actionable

under the Alien Tort Statute.   App. 110.   They allege that LCB

had “actual knowledge” that Hezbollah was a violent terrorist

organization, as reflected on official U.S. government lists,6 and

that Shahid was “part of [Hezbollah’s] financial arm.”  App. 88–

90.    They assert that the bank accounts held by LCB “were

owned and controlled by [Hezbollah],” and that the wire

transfers carried out by the bank were “by and at the direction of

[Hezbollah].”  App. 90.  According to Plaintiffs’ complaint, LCB

carried out various wire transfer services between Hezbollah

accounts “via Am[E]x Bank in New York,” and all of the wire

transfers at issue “were carried out in and through the State of

New York.”  App. 66; see also App. 58.   

Plaintiffs contend, moreover, that LCB knew that

Hezbollah required “transfer services in order to operate and in

 

6 “LCB notes that at all relevant times, Shahid itself was not designated

as a terrorist organization on official U.S. government lists. Shahid

was, however, added to the U.S. Treasury Departmentʹs ‘Specially

Designated Nationals’ list in July 2007.”    Licci II, 673 F.3d at 56 n.4.  

Shahid today remains on that list of “individuals, groups, and entities,

such as terrorists . . . that are not country‐specific.”  See generally U.S.

Dep’t of Treasury, Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List

(SDN) 741, https://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/sdnlist.pdf (last

visited Aug. 22, 2016).

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order to plan, to prepare for[,] and to carry out terrorist attacks.”  

App. 89.    They similarly allege that LCB knew that providing

wire transfer services to Hezbollah would enable Hezbollah “to

plan, to prepare for[,] and to carry out terrorist attacks and/or

enhance” its ability to do so, in part because LCB was aware that

the U.S. sanction regime “is and was intended to prevent

[Hezbollah] from conducting banking activities, including wire

transfers, and thereby limit its ability to operate and to carry out

terrorist attacks.”  App. 89.  Plaintiffs allege that LCB, equipped

with this knowledge, “as a matter of official LCB policy,”

“continuously supports and supported [Hezbollah] and its anti‐

Israel program, goals[,] and activities.”  App. 88.  In particular,

Plaintiffs allege that LCB carried out the wire transfers at issue

“with the specific purpose and intention of enabling and

assisting [Hezbollah] [in] carry[ing] out terrorist attacks against

Jewish civilians in Israel,” App. 109, and “to assist and advance

[Hezbollah’s] goal of using terrorism to destroy the State of

Israel.” 7  App. 88.

II. Shaya Declaration  

Plaintiffs submitted an expert declaration from former

Israeli intelligence officer Uzi Shaya (the “Shaya declaration”) in

support of the allegations set forth in their complaint.  App. 125–

28.  Shaya has served in various roles in the Israeli intelligence

 

7 At another point in the complaint, Plaintiffs allege that LCB carried

out the wire transfers at issue “with the specific purpose and intention

of enabling and assisting [Hezbollah] to carry out its goal of physically

exterminating or expelling the Jewish residents of Israel, and its goal of

intentionally and systematically using violence against Jewish civilians

in Israel.”    App. 111.    They further allege that LCB supports

Hezbollah’s “terrorist activities against Jews in Israel” and Hezbollah’s

“goal of using terrorism to coerce, intimidate and influence the Israeli

government and public.”  App. 88.

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services since 1984.  App. 125.  From 2004 to 2008, Shaya served

as the Deputy Chief of the Israeli National Security Council’s

Interagency Unit for Combating Terrorist Financing and

Financing of State Sponsors of Terrorism.  App. 126.  After 2008,

Shaya maintained a working relationship with Israel’s National

Security Council, providing assistance to counterterrorism staff

on the matters he dealt with as Deputy Chief.  App. 126.  In this

capacity, Plaintiffs requested that Shaya “examine documents in

possession of the State of Israel relating to fund[] transfers

carried out by [Hezbollah] via [AmEx and LCB].”    App. 126.  

Shaya stated that, with one exception identified below, “all” of

his testimony was “based upon [his] examination” of these

documents.  App. 126.  

Shaya stated that “[f]or many years,” “including the

period between 2004 and July 12, 2006,” Hezbollah “maintained

bank accounts at various LCB branches,” and that some of the

accounts Hezbollah maintained were “titled to” Shahid.    App.

126–27.    He stated that Shahid was integral to Hezbollah, and

that it “serves as an important component of [Hezbollah’s]

financial apparatus.”    App. 127.    He further specified that

Hezbollah uses Shahid funds to prepare for and carry out “a

wide range of terrorist and other violent activities, including

rocket and missile attacks on Israel.”  App. 127.   

Shaya stated that leading up to and following the July

2006 attacks, Hezbollah made “dozens” of wire transfers from

one Shahid account at LCB in Lebanon, “total[ing] several

million dollars,” and LCB executed the transfers “through

Am[E]x Bank in New York, which acted as LCB’s correspondent

bank for these dollar transfers.”    App. 127.    “In other words,”

Shaya explained, “LCB specifically requested Am[E]x Bank in

New York to carry out all these dollar wire transfers, and

Am[E]x Bank processed all these dollar wire transfers by and

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through its New York branch.”  App. 127.  Shaya further stated

that AmEx knew that it was executing wire transfers on behalf of

Shahid.  App. 128.  In the sole statement not based on his review

of Israel’s documents related to the funds Hezbollah allegedly

transferred through LCB and its correspondent bank, Shaya

declared that, based on his experience in counterterrorism and

familiarity with Hezbollah’s operations, he had “no doubt that

the millions of dollars of wire transfers carried out by Am[E]x

Bank and LCB for [Hezbollah]” significantly enhanced

Hezbollah’s “ability to plan and carry out . . . the rocket attacks”

that injured Plaintiffs.  App. 128.  

III. U.S. Government Actions Against LCB  

The U.S. government has taken two actions that reinforce

many of Plaintiffs’ allegations against LCB.    First, in October

2012, the U.S. government initiated a civil forfeiture action

against LCB properties.    App. 323–95.    In its complaint, the

government asserted that there is “reason to believe that LCB

has been routinely used by drug traffickers and money

launderers,” including at least one “who provides financial

support to [Hezbollah].”  App. 328.8  It also asserted “that there

was reason to believe that LCB managers are complicit in the

 

8 The government’s complaint in its civil forfeiture action against LCB

includes allegations of an elaborate scheme involving used car sales as

proxies for narcotics trafficking and money laundering.    Specifically,

the government alleged that LCB “provided funds, goods, and

services to or for the benefit of [Hezbollah] . . . by causing funds to be

wired from Lebanon to U.S. persons in the United States for purchase

of used cars to be shipped by U.S. persons to West Africa in order to

create a channel for laundering proceeds of narcotics trafficking and

other unlawful activities, [and] to generate fees and commissions to be

paid to [Hezbollah] members and supporters who were involved at

various points in the money laundering scheme.”  App. 340.

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network’s money laundering activities.”    App. 328.    The

government alleged that between approximately January 2007

and 2011, “at least $329 million was transferred by wire from

accounts held in Lebanon at LCB [and various other banks] to

the United States through their correspondent bank accounts

with U.S. financial institutions located in the Southern District of

New York and elsewhere.”  App. 329.

Second, we note that the U.S. Department of Treasury

(“Treasury”) has designated LCB as “a financial institution of

primary money laundering concern.”  Finding That the Lebanese

Canadian Bank SAL Is a Financial Institution of Primary Money

Laundering Concern, 76 Fed. Reg. 9403‐01, 9404 (Feb. 17, 2011).  

In identifying LCB as a potential conduit for money laundering,

Treasury noted that while LCB is based in Lebanon, it

“maintains extensive correspondent accounts with banks

worldwide, including several U.S. financial institutions.”    Id.  

Treasury explained that it identified LCB as a cause for concern

because the government “has information through law

enforcement and other sources indicating that LCB—through

management complicity, failure of internal controls, and lack of

application of prudent banking standards—has been used

extensively by persons associated with . . . money laundering.”  

Id. at 9405.    Treasury also found that Hezbollah—a U.S.

government‐designated foreign terrorist organization—“derived

financial support from the criminal activities” of the network of

drug traffickers and money launderers that rely on LCB, noting

that “LCB managers are complicit in the network’s money

laundering activities.”  Id. at 9404–05; see also App. 327–28, 402,

407.  

II. Procedural History

Because our previous opinions recite much of the

procedural history in this case, Licci IV, 732 F.3d at 165–67; Licci

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II, 673 F.3d at 55–59, we provide a truncated version of events

here.  In July 2008, Plaintiffs initiated this action against LCB and

AmEx in state court; the action was removed to federal court

soon thereafter.    Licci II, 673 F.3d at 57.    In January 2009,

Plaintiffs filed the amended complaint that is at issue on this

appeal.    See id.    Plaintiffs brought five claims against LCB: (1)

commission of international terrorism in violation of the Anti–

Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2333; (2) aiding and abetting

international terrorism in violation of the Anti–Terrorism Act;   

(3) aiding and abetting genocide, war crimes, and crimes against

humanity in violation of international law, under the ATS; (4)

negligence in violation of Israeli Civil Wrongs Ordinance § 35;

and (5) breach of statutory duty in violation of Israeli Civil

Wrongs Ordinance      § 63.  LCB moved to dismiss all five claims

for lack of personal jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) and

for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  Id.

A. Licci I

On March 31, 2010, the District Court granted LCB’s

motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Licci v. Am.

Express Bank Ltd., 704 F. Supp. 2d 403, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Licci

I”).  The District Court correctly noted that a defendant may be

subject to personal jurisdiction in New York under N.Y. C.P.L.R.

§ 302(a)(1) if (1) the defendant “transacted business within the

state; and (2) the claim asserted . . . arise[s] from that business

activity,” id. at 406 (internal quotation marks omitted), but

determined that the allegations in the amended complaint were

insufficient to satisfy either prong, id. at 406–08.   

Although Licci I’s Rule 12(b)(2) dismissal rested entirely

on Plaintiffs’ failure to make a prima facie showing of long‐arm

jurisdiction under New York law, the District Court also offered

its view—without further explanation—that “[t]he exercise of

personal jurisdiction over LCB on the basis alleged by plaintiffs

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would not comport with constitutional principles of due

process.”  Id. at 408. The court did not reach LCB’s alternative

argument that the claims against it should be dismissed for

failure to plead a cause of action under Rule 12(b)(6).  See id.

B. Licci II

In our initial consideration of Plaintiffs’ appeal, we found

the scope and application of the long‐arm statute’s “transaction

of business” and “arising from” tests to be uncertain. We

determined that we could not “confidently say whether the New

York Court of Appeals would conclude that the plaintiffs” have

made a prima facie showing of jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R.

§ 302(a)(1).    Licci II, 673 F.3d at 73.    We therefore certified the

following questions to the New York Court of Appeals:

(1) Does a foreign bank’s maintenance of a

correspondent bank account at a financial

institution in New York, and use of that account to

effect “dozens” of wire transfers on behalf of a

foreign client, constitute a “transact[ion]” of

business in New York within the meaning of N.Y.

C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1)?  

(2) If so, do the plaintiffs’ claims under the Anti–

Terrorism Act, the ATS, or for negligence or breach

of statutory duty in violation of Israeli law, “aris[e]

from” LCB’s transaction of business in New York

within the meaning of N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1)?  

Id. at 74–75 (alterations in original).  

In the time between Licci I and Licci II, our Circuit decided

Kiobel I, in which we held that the ATS does not provide subject

matter jurisdiction for civil actions against corporations for

violations of customary international law.   Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at

145; see Licci II, 673 F.3d at 73.    In Licci II, we predicted that

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should the Supreme Court affirm Kiobel I, and hold that ATS

does not allow for corporate liability, “we will likely be required

to affirm the dismissal of the ATS claims.”  Licci II, 673 F.3d at 73.  

Accordingly, we decided to “await” the decision of the Supreme

Court “as to the ATS claims against LCB,” in addition to the

New York Court of Appeals’ response to our certified questions.   

Id.   

C. Licci III

On March 29, 2012, the New York Court of Appeals

accepted the certified questions.  Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank,

SAL, 18 N.Y.3d 952 (2012).    The Court answered the certified

questions in the affirmative.  Licci III, 20 N.Y.3d at 341.  

D. Licci IV

Following the guidance from the New York Court of

Appeals, we held that (1) Plaintiffs made a prima facie showing

that the District Court had personal jurisdiction over LCB, Licci

IV, 732 F.3d at 168–69, and (2) subjecting LCB, as a foreign bank,

“to personal jurisdiction in New York comports with due

process protections provided by the United States Constitution,”

id. at 165; see also 169–74.    Accordingly, we vacated and

remanded the portion of the District Court’s judgment in Licci I

dismissing claims against defendant LCB for lack of personal

jurisdiction.  Id. at 174.   

In Licci IV, we did not reach the question of whether the

ATS provides subject matter jurisdiction over this case.    We

noted that while the Supreme Court did in fact affirm Kiobel I on

appeal, it did so on different grounds than those upon which we

decided Kiobel I.  Id. (citing Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (deciding

that the presumption against extraterritoriality constrains federal

courts from hearing causes of action under the ATS “seeking

relief for violations of the law of nations occurring outside the

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United States”)).9   We decided, therefore, that because Kiobel II

“did not directly address the question of corporate liability

under the ATS,” and because “the question of subject matter

jurisdiction was not briefed on appeal,” it was best that the

District Court “address this issue in the first instance.”  Id.  

E. Licci V

On remand, the District Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ case

once more.  In relevant part, the District Court held that it lacked

subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ ATS claims under

Kiobel II.  Specifically, the court held that Plaintiffs failed to rebut

the presumption against the extraterritorial application of the

ATS because their complaint’s allegations regarding LCB’s

provision of banking services failed to state a claim for aiding

and abetting another’s violation of the law of nations.  The court

concluded that Plaintiffs failed to allege adequately that LCB

had the required mens rea for aiding and abetting liability,

reasoning that the complaint lacked sufficiently detailed

allegations as to LCB’s intent.  Plaintiffs timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to

state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6), accepting all well‐pleaded factual allegations in the

complaint as true and drawing all inferences in favor of the

plaintiffs.    See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56

 

9 Kiobel I and Kiobel II’s separate grounds for dismissing the plaintiffs’

Alien Tort Statute claims are distinct and, as we have previously

observed, “not logically inconsistent.”  In re Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort

Statute Litig., 808 F.3d 144, 153 (2d Cir. 2015), as amended (Dec. 17, 2015)

(“The two decisions adopted different bases for dismissal for lack of

subject‐matter jurisdiction.   Whatever the tension between them, the

decisions are not logically inconsistent.”).   

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(2007); City of Pontiac Policemenʹs & Firemenʹs Ret. Sys. v. UBS

AG, 752 F.3d 173, 179 (2d Cir. 2014).    Although courts are

generally limited to examining the sufficiency of the pleadings

on a motion to dismiss, on a challenge to a district court’s subject

matter jurisdiction, the court may also resolve disputed

jurisdictional fact issues by reference to evidence outside the

pleadings.  Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 255 n.30

(2d Cir. 2003) (consulting evidence outside the pleadings to

resolve disputed jurisdictional fact issues); see also Cargill Intʹl

S.A. v. M/T Pavel Dybenko, 991 F.2d 1012, 1019 (2d Cir. 1993) (“In

resolving the jurisdictional dispute, the district court must

review the pleadings and any evidence before it, such as

affidavits.”).

I. The Alien Tort Statute

In full, the ATS states: “The district courts shall have

original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,

committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the

United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 1350.  Enacted as part of the Judiciary

Act of 1789, the ATS received little or no judicial attention until

1980, when this Court decided Filártiga v. Peña‐Irala, 630 F.2d 876

(2d Cir. 1980).    The years that followed Filártiga witnessed a

dramatic increase in ATS litigation, as the ATS came to be

viewed as a means to help victims of human rights violations.10    

In its history, the Supreme Court has decided two cases

directly addressing the ATS:    Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S.

 

10 See, e.g., Beth Stephens, Judicial Deference and the Unreasonable Views of

the Bush Administration, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 773, 777 & n.18, 810–11

(2008) (estimating in 2008, that approximately 185 human rights

lawsuits were filed after Filártiga, as compared to 21 total suits before

Filártiga) (citing BETH STEPHENS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN

RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 12–25 (2d ed. 2008)).  

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692 (2004), and Kiobel II.

11  The Supreme Court clarified that the

ATS is a “jurisdictional” statute in the sense that it “address[es]

the power of the courts to entertain cases concerned with a

certain subject.”    Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714.    Though the “statute

provides district courts with jurisdiction to hear certain claims,

[it] does not expressly provide any causes of action.”  Kiobel II,

133 S. Ct. at 1663.  The ATS’s grant of jurisdiction is “best read as

having been enacted on the understanding that the common law

would provide a cause of action for a modest number of

international law violations.”   Id. (alteration and internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724).  

The Plaintiffs here—Israeli and Canadian citizens—assert

a civil tort action, and thus satisfy the first clause of the ATS.  In

determining whether the tort was “committed in violation of the

law of nations or a treaty of the United States,” we look to

Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedent, mindful that there

are “numerous jurisdictional predicates, all of which must be

met before a court may properly assume jurisdiction over an

ATS claim.”  Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 179 (2d Cir.

2014).    These include, “but may not be limited to,” id., the

following:

(1) [T]he complaint pleads a violation of the law of

nations, see Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732; Kadic v. Karadzĭć,

70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995);

 

11 In one other case, Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,

488 U.S. 428 (1989), the Supreme Court briefly discussed the ATS in

the context of foreign state immunity, holding that it did not permit

jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign.

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(2) [T]he presumption against the extraterritorial

application of the ATS, announced by the Supreme

Court in Kiobel [II] does not bar the claim;

(3) [C]ustomary international law recognizes liability

for the defendant, see Kiobel [I],    621 F.3d at 145 ;

and

(4) [T]he theory of liability alleged by plaintiffs (i.e.,

aiding and abetting, conspiracy) is recognized by

customary international law, see Khulumani v.

Barclay National Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 264 (2d Cir.

2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring).

Id. (citation omitted).   

The District Court found that the complaint failed to rebut

the presumption against extraterritoriality.    On appeal, the

parties focus on that inquiry, as well as whether customary

international law recognizes liability for LCB in its capacity as a

corporation.    See Appellants Br. 18–40; Appellees Br. 36–48.  

Nevertheless, we consider all four inquiries, as each “requires an

affirmative determination before a court properly has

jurisdiction over an ATS claim.”  Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 179.  As set

forth below, we conclude that Plaintiffs have satisfied all of the

jurisdictional predicates but one.  Because this Circuit has ruled

that customary international law does not recognize liability for

corporations, see Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 145, we must conclude that

the District Court does not have jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ ATS

claims against LCB, a corporation.  

II. Pleading a Violation of the Law of Nations

The ATS confers jurisdiction over only two varieties of

torts: (1) violations of treaties ratified by the United States and

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(2) violations of the law of nations, i.e., customary international

law.  28 U.S.C. § 1350; see also Flores, 414 F.3d at 247.  “There is no

federal subject‐matter jurisdiction under the [ATS] unless the

complaint adequately pleads a violation of the law of nations (or

treaty of the United States).” Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238; see also

Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 179–81.    “Because the [ATS] requires that

plaintiffs plead a violation of the law of nations at the

jurisdictional threshold, this statute requires a more searching

review of the merits to establish jurisdiction than is required

under the more flexible ‘arising under’ formula of [28 U.S.C.

§] 1331.”  Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238 (other internal quotations marks

omitted).  Therefore, “it is not a sufficient basis for jurisdiction to

plead merely a colorable violation of the law of nations.”    Id.  

This inquiry has a definitive historical dimension, as “federal

courts should not recognize private claims under federal

common law for violations of any international law norm with

less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations

than the historical paradigms familiar when [the ATS] was

enacted.”  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732.  

Plaintiffs assert that Hezbollah’s actions, including “its

attempts to physically exterminate or expel the Jewish residents

of Israel and its intentional and systematic use of violence

against civilians, constitute genocide, crimes against humanity[,]

and war crimes under customary international law, and

therefore constitute violations of ‘the law of nations’ within the

meaning of [the ATS].”  App. 110.  They allege that LCB’s actions

“constitute[] aiding and abetting [Hezbollah’s] acts of genocide,

crimes against humanity[,] and war crimes.”  App. 111.   

Genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes

certainly constitute violations of the law of nations under

customary international law.  See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236 (observing

that a defendant “may be found liable for genocide, war crimes,

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and crimes against humanity” under the ATS); Sosa, 542 U.S. at

762 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)

(describing a “subset” of “universally condemned behavior” for

which “universal jurisdiction exists,” including “torture,

genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes”).  Plaintiffs

have alleged systematic rocket attacks against the Jewish civilian

population in Israel, committed with the intent to exterminate or

expel them from the territory.    These allegations adequately

plead acts of genocide and crimes against humanity.  Therefore,

Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden to assert a cause of action

grounded in actions recognized as violations of the law of

nations.  See Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 181 (finding that “plaintiffs have

satisfied their burden of asserting some causes of actions

grounded in actions recognized as violations of customary

international law” where they asserted that the principal

committed genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity).   

III. Theory of Liability

Plaintiffs assert that the “actions of defendant LCB . . .

constituted aiding and abetting [Hezbollah’s] acts of genocide,

crimes against humanity[,] and war crimes under the law of

nations.”  App. 111 (emphasis added).  Aiding and abetting is a

theory of liability recognized by customary international law.  

Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 260 (Opinion of the Court); see id. at 270

(Katzmann, J., concurring); see also Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 181

(recognizing that, in this Circuit, a plaintiff may plead a theory

of aiding and abetting liability under the ATS).    Accordingly,

Plaintiffs have pleaded a theory of liability over which we have

subject matter jurisdiction.   

IV. Displacing the Presumption against Extraterritoriality

The presumption against extraterritoriality provides that

“when a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial

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application, it has none, and reflects the presumption that

United States law governs domestically but does not rule the

world.”    Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (alteration, citations, and

internal quotation marks omitted).    The presumption typically

applies when a court is discerning “whether an Act of Congress

regulating conduct applies abroad.”  Id.

In Kiobel II, the Supreme Court held that the presumption

against extraterritoriality constrains courts exercising their

power under the ATS.  Id. at 1664–65.  Kiobel II’s extension of the

presumption against extraterritoriality to the ATS in its capacity

as a “strictly jurisdictional” statute was principally based on

foreign policy considerations.  Id. at 1664 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S.

at 713).    The Court observed that the “danger of unwarranted

judicial interference in the conduct of foreign policy is magnified

in the context of the ATS, because the question is not what

Congress has done but instead what courts may do.”    Id.    It

underscored, therefore, “the need for judicial caution in

considering which claims could be brought under the ATS, in

light of foreign policy concerns.”    Id.    The Court was careful,

however, to provide that a plaintiff could “displace” the

presumption:  

[E]ven where the claims touch and concern the

territory of the United States, they must do so with

sufficient force to displace the presumption against

extraterritorial application.  Corporations are often

present in many countries, and it would reach too

far to say that mere corporate presence suffices.

Id. at 1669 (citation omitted).   

To determine whether Plaintiffs have displaced the

presumption against extraterritoriality, we first consider the

threshold inquiry of whether the presumption is “self‐evidently

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20

dispositive” or whether “its application requires further

analysis.”  Morrison v. Natʹl Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266

(2010); see also Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 182.    That is, when a

complaint alleges no contact “between the injuries alleged and

the territory of the United States,” the presumption against

extraterritoriality is not displaced and the inquiry, in all

likelihood, ends there.   Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 182–83; Balintulo v.

Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 189 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding plaintiffs’

claims did not rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality

set forth in Kiobel II “because the plaintiffs have failed to allege

that any relevant conduct occurred in the United States”

(emphasis added)).   

The Kiobel complaint, which contained no averment of

contact between the conduct alleged and U.S. territory, was self‐

evidently dispositive.  See Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. The Kiobel

plaintiffs were Nigerian nationals alleging that certain Dutch,

British, and Nigerian corporations aided and abetted Nigerian

military and police forces in “attack[ing] [plaintiffs’] villages,

beating, raping, killing, and arresting residents and destroying

or looting property” by “among other things, providing the

Nigerian forces with food, transportation, and compensation, as

well as by allowing the Nigerian military to use respondents’

property as a staging ground for attacks.”   Id. at 1662–63.   The

Supreme Court held that because “all the relevant conduct took

place outside the United States,” the plaintiffs’ claims did not

displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.  Id.

at 1669.  

Kiobel is not this case.    Unlike the Kiobel plaintiffs, who

only alleged extraterritorial conduct, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia,

that LCB used its correspondent banking account in New York

to facilitate dozens of international wire transfers for the Shahid,

an entity alleged to be an “integral part” of Hezbollah.  App. 65.  

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Thus, Plaintiffs allege sufficient connections with the United

States to require “further analysis.”    Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 182

(internal quotation mark omitted).    Applying Kiobel II and

Morrison, we have previously set forth exactly what that “further

analysis” entails.    See Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 185–87.    As a

preliminary matter, the court must isolate the “relevant conduct”

in the complaint—here, “the conduct of the defendant . . . that

constitutes aiding and abetting another’s violation of the law of

nations.”  Id.   

In isolating the relevant conduct of the defendant, a court

must evaluate the “territorial events” or “relationships” that

were the “focus” of the ATS.    Id. at 184 (alterations omitted)

(quoting Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266).    Then, in “determining

whether this conduct displaces the presumption, the district

court must engage in a two‐step jurisdictional analysis of this

conduct.”    Id. Step one is a determination of whether the

relevant conduct—i.e., conduct aiding and abetting a violation of

the law of nations—“sufficiently ‘touches and concerns’ the

territory of the United States so as to displace the presumption

against extraterritoriality.”  Id. at 186 (quoting Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct.

at 1669).    Step two is a determination of whether “the same

conduct, upon preliminary examination, states a claim for a

violation of the law of nations or aiding and abetting another’s

violation of the law of nations.”  Id. at 187.   

Applying this framework, the District Court appears to

have found that step one was satisfied; it dismissed the

complaint on its conclusion that Plaintiffs failed to meet the

requirements of step two.    Special App. 9–10.    On appeal, the

parties dispute whether either step is met.  See Appellants Br. 21–

23; Appellee Br. 37–39.  We consider each in turn.   

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A.  Conduct that Touches and Concerns the United States

The “relevant conduct” in the complaint is LCB’s

provision of wire transfers between Hezbollah accounts through

its correspondent bank in New York.    Specifically, Plaintiffs

allege (1) LCB “provided extensive banking services to

[Hezbollah]” that “caused, enabled[,] and facilitated the terrorist

rocket attacks in which the plaintiffs and their decedents were

harmed and killed” and (2) those banking services “were carried

out by LCB in and through the State of New York.”    App. 58

(emphasis added).    Plaintiffs further allege that “between 2004

and July 12, 2006 (and subsequently), [Hezbollah] made and

received dozens of dollar wire transfers . . . totaling several

million dollars,” and that “[a]ll” of those wire transfers “were

made to, from, and/or between” Hezbollah’s bank accounts at

various LCB branches through AmEx in New York.    App. 66.  

Plaintiffs allege that LCB worked “in concert with” AmEx to

carry out the wire transfers, and that AmEx acted “on behalf of”

LCB in carrying out the transfers.    App. 66.    Plaintiffs offer

additional allegations that the New York State Banking

Department investigated LCB’s correspondent bank in New

York when the wire transfers took place, and that the bank

violated various terrorist financing and money laundering laws

in carrying out the transfers.  App. 104–05.   

We have previously concluded that a claim similar to the

Plaintiffs’ sufficiently touched and concerned the United States

to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.  

Specifically, in Mastafa, we considered an ATS claim brought by

five Iraqi nationals against an oil company and a French bank.  

See 770 F.3d at 174.    The Mastafa plaintiffs alleged that the oil

company and the bank aided and abetted the Saddam Hussein

regime in its torture, imprisonment, and execution of the

plaintiffs or their family members “by paying the regime

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kickbacks and other unlawful payments, which enabled the

regime to survive and perpetrate the abuses suffered by

plaintiffs or their husbands.”    Id. at 175.    The allegations

stemmed from the United Nations’ Oil for Food Programme

(“OFP”), a program that “permitted the export of oil from Iraq in

exchange for food, medicine, and other basic civilian necessities

by allowing the purchase of Iraqi oil to proceed through an

escrow account, into which purchasers submitted payments and

from which providers of civilian necessities received payment.”  

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).   In essence, the Mastafa

plaintiffs alleged “that the Saddam Hussein regime—then

subject to United Nations economic sanctions—misused the OFP

in order to elicit income outside the United Nations’ oversight

and fund its regime and to fund its campaign of human rights

abuses against its people.”  Id. (alterations and internal quotation

marks omitted).   

Three of the four allegations in the Mastafa plaintiffs’

complaint came up short.    The allegations were insufficient to

satisfy the touch and concern inquiry because they were either

(1) too tangential to the conduct alleged to aid and abet a

violation of the law of nations or (2) inadequately pleaded.  See

id. at 189–90.  First, we determined that “the fact that the United

Nations is located in New York, and that the OFP’s inception

and administration occurred in New York, [was] irrelevant” to

the touch and concern inquiry, as “[s]uch allegations, by

themselves, are not facts related to defendants at all, let alone

alleged conduct taken by defendants to aid and abet violations

of the law of nations.”  Id. at 190.  Second, we considered the fact

that the oil company is headquartered in the United States to be

“immaterial” because “the relevant inquiry is on conduct

constituting a violation of customary international law or of

aiding and abetting such violations, not on where defendants are

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present.”    Id.    Third, we rejected the plaintiffs’ allegation that

because the defendant oil company is headquartered in the

United States, “its profits reaped from the transactions were

recouped in the United States” as a mere conclusory statement

that “d[id] not satisfy basic pleading requirements.”  Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted).

However, we found that the Mastafa plaintiffs’ fourth

allegation—that the French bank “entered into a Banking

Agreement with the United Nations in New York pursuant to

which it maintained an escrow account in New York City

through which all OFP funds moved, including the illicit

surcharge payments”—sufficiently touched and concerned the

United States to surpass the first step of displacing the

presumption against extraterritoriality.    Id. at 190–91.  

Specifically, the Mastafa plaintiffs alleged that both the bank and

the oil company made “U.S.‐based attempts to skirt the sanctions

regime.”    Id. at 190.    As to the bank, plaintiffs alleged that it

“maintained [an] escrow account in New York City through

which all [relevant] payments were transmitted.”    Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted).   The plaintiffs alleged that the bank

“allowed payments” through the New York City account that

included kickbacks to the Saddam Hussein regime, and that the

bank’s financing arrangements “allowed the oil purchasers to

conceal the true nature of the oil purchase.”    Id. (internal

quotation mark omitted).    As to the oil company, plaintiffs

alleged, inter alia, that it facilitated surcharge payments to the

Hussein regime as part of particular transactions.  Id.  Assessing

this allegation, we concluded that the relevant conduct was

sufficiently “specific and domestic” to (1) be non‐conclusory and

(2) touch and concern the United States.  Id. at 191. We held that

the plaintiffs’ fourth allegation touched and concerned the

United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption

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against extraterritoriality and establish ATS jurisdiction—so long

as it also “satisfie[d] a preliminary determination that such

conduct aided and abetted a violation of the law of nations.”  Id.  

Like the Mastafa plaintiffs’ allegations against the French

bank, Plaintiffs here assert that LCB, a Lebanese Bank, used a

correspondent banking account at a New York bank to facilitate

wire transfers between Hezbollah’s bank accounts in the months

leading up to the rocket attacks. Plaintiffs specifically allege that

LCB carried out the specific “banking services which harmed the

plaintiffs and their decedents . . . in and through the State of New

York.”  App. 58 (emphasis added).  Plaintiffs here have alleged

that LCB engaged in “numerous New York‐based payments and

‘financing arrangements’ conducted exclusively through a New

York bank account.”  See Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 191.  As in Mastafa,

we find these allegations to be both specific and domestic.  See id.  

Plaintiffs’ allegations “touch and concern” the United States with

sufficient force to displace the presumption, so long as such

conduct also meets the second prong of our extraterritoriality

analysis.12

 

12 As the above analysis indicates, the fact that LCB’s correspondent

bank in New York, AmEx, is no longer a party to this appeal, is

immaterial to our conclusion that the allegations against defendant

LCB sufficiently touch and concern the United States.  Plaintiffs’ only

allegations against AmEx that did not also involve LCB’s domestic

contacts include (1) AmEx is headquartered in New York and

incorporated in Connecticut, and (2) AmEx “does extensive business

and holds significant assets in New York.”    App. 57.    Because the

relevant inquiry is whether the defendant’s conduct touches and

concerns the United States, not where the defendant or particular

assets are located, AmEx’s absence as a party does not affect that

inquiry.  See Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 190.  

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B. States a Claim for Violation of the Law of Nations

To displace the presumption against extraterritoriality,

the conduct “which the court has determined sufficiently

‘touches and concerns’ the United States” must also, upon

preliminary examination, state a claim for a violation of the law

of nations or aiding and abetting another’s violation of the law of

nations.   Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 186–87.    “This second step of the

extraterritoriality analysis ensures . . . that ‘the statute’s

jurisdictional reach will match the statute’s underlying

substantive grasp.’”    Id. at 186 (alteration omitted) (quoting

Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring in the

judgment)).    A defendant may be held liable under an aiding

and abetting theory of liability under international law if the

defendant “(1) provide[d] practical assistance to the principal

which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime,

and (2) d[id] so with the purpose of facilitating the commission

of that crime.”   Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy,

Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259 (quoting Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 277

(Katzmann, J., concurring)).    As to the latter requirement, we

have underscored that the mens rea standard for accessorial

liability in ATS actions is “purpose rather than knowledge

alone.” Id.

The District Court here did not address whether Plaintiffs

adequately alleged that LCB provided practical assistance to

LCB that had a substantial effect on the perpetration of the

crime.    It concluded only that Plaintiffs have “insufficiently

allege[d] that the wire transfers aided and abetted a violation of

the law of nations.”    Special App. 9.    The court reasoned that

Plaintiffs failed to surpass its preliminary mens rea determination

because the complaint’s allegations of LCB’s intent are merely

“conclusory.”  Id.  It further noted that the complaint is “devoid

of any factual allegations supporting LCB’s specific intent, in

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executing the wire transfers, to promote or engage in

Hezbollah’s coercive actions against the Israeli government and

public.”  Id.  “Because the [complaint] inadequately pleads that

the wire transfers at issue were made with the intent to aid and

abet the alleged terrorist activities,” it concluded, “Plaintiffs have

not established that there is subject matter jurisdiction under the

ATS.”  Special App. 10.   

The relevant conduct alleged here—i.e., LCB’s alleged act

of carrying out wire transfer services on Hezbollah’s behalf

through the state of New York, see App. 58, 65–66—satisfies a

preliminary determination that such conduct provided practical

assistance to Hezbollah that substantially affected Hezbollah’s

perpetration of the underlying violations of the law of nations.  

Plaintiffs adequately allege that these wire transfer services had

a substantial effect on Hezbollah’s actions insofar as they

“enabled” and “facilitated” terrorist rocket attacks harming or

killing Plaintiffs and their decedents.  App. 54.  Plaintiffs further

allege that LCB’s wire transfers “substantially increased and

facilitated [Hezbollah’s] ability to plan, to prepare for[,] and to

carry out rocket attacks on civilians,” including the rocket

attacks injuring or killing Plaintiffs and their family members.  

App. 86.    In addition, Plaintiffs particularly allege that

“[Hezbollah] planned, made the preparations necessary for and

carried out” the rocket attacks by “utilizing funds” received as

part of the wire transfers.  Id.  Plaintiffs’ allegations are bolstered

by evidence in the record that LCB’s wire transfers “significantly

enhanced [Hezbollah]’s ability to plan and carry out terrorist

and other violent actions, including the rocket attacks in which

[Plaintiffs] were harmed.”  App. 128.  

LCB does not dispute whether Plaintiffs have adequately

shown that it provided practical assistance to Hezbollah that has

had a substantial effect on the perpetration of the underlying

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crimes.   Rather, it argues only that the District Court correctly

held that Plaintiffs have failed to meet the required mens rea for

accessorial liability. We disagree.    Plaintiffs’ complaint,

considered in conjunction with the Shaya declaration and the

government’s actions against LCB, satisfies our preliminary

review of the mens rea requirement for aiding and abetting

violations of the law of nations.  See Presbyterian Church, 582 F.3d

at 259.    In essence, Plaintiffs allege that (1) LCB acted

intentionally, and pursuant to its official policy, in assisting

Hezbollah in carrying out the rocket attacks by carrying out the

wire transfers, and (2) LCB knew that the bank accounts between

which it facilitated transfers were owned and controlled by

Shahid, an integral part of Hezbollah.   

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs allege that “as a matter of

official LCB policy” LCB “continuously supports and supported

[Hezbollah] and its anti‐Israel program, goals[,] and activities.”  

App. 88.  They also allege that LCB had “actual knowledge” that

(1) “[Hezbollah] is a violent terrorist organization [that] carried

out numerous terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians and

American targets and which planned and intended to carry out

additional such terrorist attacks,” App. 88–89; (2) “Shahid is an

integral part of [Hezbollah] and constitutes part of [Hezbollah’s]

financial arm,” App. 90; (3) Hezbollah’s bank accounts at various

LCB branches and the funds therein “were owned and

controlled by [Hezbollah],” Id.; (4) the wire transfers made and

received by Hezbollah leading up to the 2006 rocket attacks

“were being carried out by and at the direction of [Hezbollah],”  

Id.; see also App. 65—66; and (5) Hezbollah “require[d] wire

transfer services . . . in order to plan, to prepare for and to carry

out terrorist attacks.”  App. 89.  Plaintiffs then allege that LCB,

equipped with this actual knowledge, carried out the wire

transfers at issue “with the specific purpose and intention of

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enabling and assisting [Hezbollah] to carry out terrorist attacks

against Jewish civilians in Israel.”    App. 109.    Indeed, the

complaint states that LCB carried out the wire transfers “as a

matter of official LCB policy, in order to assist and advance

[Hezbollah’s] terrorist activities against Jews in Israel, in order to

assist and advance [Hezbollah’s] goal of using terrorism to

destroy the State of Israel and murder or expel its Jewish

inhabitants and in order to assist and advance [Hezbollah’s] goal

of coercing, intimidating and influencing the Israeli government

and public.”  App. 88.   

As set forth above, in determining this disputed

jurisdictional fact, we may also consider evidence in the record

outside the pleadings.  See Flores, 414 F.3d at 255 n.30.  The Shaya

declaration provides context to Plaintiffs’ allegations that LCB

aided and abetted Hezbollah’s alleged violations of the law of

nations.   Specifically, the Shaya declaration states that between

“2004 and July 12, 2006 (and later),” Hezbollah “made dozens of

dollar wire transfers in and out of” a specific account number at

LCB’s headquarters.  App. 127.  Shaya stated that LCB requested

that its correspondent bank in New York carry out the wire

transfers and identified Shahid as the account‐holder, and thus

“there is no question” that Amex Bank knew that it was

executing wire transfers on behalf of Shahid.   App. 127–28.   In

addition, the government forfeiture action against LCB lends

support to Plaintiffs’ allegations.  See App. 323–95.  Specifically,

the government alleged that LCB engaged in activity “intended

to conceal and disguise the true source, nature, ownership, and

control of” proceeds of illegal activities in a scheme that

“benefitted [Hezbollah].”  App. 358.   

We conclude that Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges conduct by

LCB that touched and concerned the United States, and that

the same conduct, upon preliminary examination, states a claim

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for aiding and abetting Hezbollah’s violation of the law of

nations, with sufficient force to displace the presumption against

extraterritoriality.    Accordingly, Plaintiffs have surpassed the

jurisdictional hurdle set forth in Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.  

V. Corporate Liability

Nevertheless, Kiobel I forecloses Plaintiffs’ claims against

LCB.   In Kiobel I, we established that the law of nations, while

imposing civil liability on individuals for torts that qualify under

the ATS, immunizes corporations from liability.    Kiobel I, 621

F.3d at 120.  Specifically, Kiobel I held that “insofar as plaintiffs

bring claims under the ATS against corporations, plaintiffs fail to

allege violations of the law of nations, and plaintiffs’ claims fall

outside the limited jurisdiction provided by the ATS.”    Id.  

Neither party disputes that LCB is a corporation.    Accordingly,

we cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’

ATS claims pursuant to that statute.  

To the extent Plaintiffs submit that Kiobel I was wrongly

decided, we reaffirm Arab Bank’s conclusion—we are not free to

consider that argument.  In re Arab Bank, 808 F.3d at 157.  “[I]t is

axiomatic that a panel of this court is bound by the decisions of

prior panels until such time as they are overruled either by an en

banc panel of our Court or by the Supreme Court.”    See NML

Capital v. Republic of Argentina, 621 F.3d 230, 243 (2d Cir. 2010)

(internal quotation marks omitted); accord In re Arab Bank, 808

F.3d at 157.  Indeed, this Court has previously declined similar

attempts by ATS plaintiffs to overturn Kiobel I.    See In re Arab

Bank, PLC Alien Tort Statute Litig., 822 F.3d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2016)

(denying rehearing en banc).   Accordingly, we faithfully apply

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Kiobel I and affirm the District Court’s dismissal of this case on

that basis.13  

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM IN PART14 the

judgment of the District Court.

 

13 In voting against reconsideration of Kiobel I’s holding that the ATS

does not regulate corporate conduct, four judges of our Court

reasoned that “the population of cases dismissible under Kiobel I is

largely coextensive with those dismissible under Kiobel II.”   In re Arab

Bank, 822 F.3d at 35 (Jacobs, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en

banc) (emphasis added).  The concurring judges concluded that “[t]he

principle of Kiobel I has been largely overtaken, and its importance for

outcomes has been sharply eroded.”  Id. But as is often the case in the

law, no sooner is a certainty expressed than an exception presents

itself.  This case, in which defendants are accused of domestic acts that

aided and abetted torts committed abroad, may illustrate a category of

cases that surpass Kiobel II’s extraterritoriality inquiry but do not

survive Kiobel I’s bar on corporate liability.   At present, how large a

class of cases that may be is difficult to know.

14 This opinion affirms the District Court’s judgment with regard to

Plaintiffs’ ATS claims.  This opinion and the accompanying summary

order, which addresses the balance of Plaintiffs’ claims, combine to

affirm the District Court’s judgment in toto.

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