Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-05383/USCOURTS-caDC-12-05383-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 6, 2014 Decided August 26, 2014

No. 12-5383

SIERRA CLUB, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

SALLY JEWELL, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF 

THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:10-cv-01513)

Daniel P. Selmi argued the cause for appellants. With 

him on the briefs were Aaron S. Isherwood, Peter M. Morgan, 

Andrea C. Ferster, and Elizabeth S. Merritt. Paul W. 

Edmondson entered an appearance.

Judith Rivlin was on the brief for amicus curiae United 

Mine Workers of America in support of appellants. Arthur 

Traynor III entered an appearance.

Katherine J. Barton, Attorney, U.S. Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief 

were Robert G. Dreher, Acting Assistant Attorney General, 

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and David C. Shilton, Attorney. Andrew C. Mergen, 

Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, entered an appearance.

Robert G. McLusky, Blair M. Gardner, and Michael J. 

Schrier were on the brief for amicus curiae West Virginia 

Coal Association, Inc. in support of appellees. 

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, SRINIVASAN, Circuit 

Judge, and SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SRINIVASAN.

Dissenting opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge

SENTELLE.

SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judge: The Battle of Blair 

Mountain is the largest armed labor conflict in our nation’s

history. In late August 1921, after years of tension between 

coal miners and coal companies, more than 5,000 West 

Virginia coal miners began a march to Logan and Mingo 

Counties, West Virginia. They aimed to unionize and liberate 

fellow miners living under martial law. When they reached

Blair Mountain, a 1,600-acre area in Logan County, they 

encountered roughly 3,000 armed men. Those men, mostly 

hired by coal companies, manned a ten-mile defensive line 

across Spruce Fork Ridge, including Blair Mountain. They 

dug trenches, mounted machine guns, and dropped homemade 

bombs. The miners responded with gunfire of their own. The 

Battle endured for several days, causing numerous casualties. 

President Harding sent federal troops to quell the fighting, and 

the coal miners surrendered.

Recently, various environmental and historical 

preservation organizations, recognizing Blair Mountain

Battlefield’s historical significance, have sought to gain 

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protection for the Battlefield from surface coal mining. This 

case arises from their efforts to obtain the Battlefield’s listing

in the National Register of Historic Places. After several 

unsuccessful nominations for its inclusion in the Register, the

Battlefield gained listing in 2009. Its stay in the Register was 

short-lived. Within days, the Keeper of the Register removed 

the Battlefield upon determining that the wishes of area 

property owners had not been accurately captured in the

nomination process. The organizations then brought an action

in federal court challenging the Battlefield’s removal from the 

Register. The district court granted summary judgment 

against them, holding that they lack standing because they fail

to demonstrate the requisite injury, causation, or

redressability. We disagree and conclude that they have 

standing to challenge the Keeper’s decision.

I.

On January 13, 2009, the Deputy West Virginia State 

Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) nominated the 

Battlefield to the Keeper of the National Register of Historic 

Places for inclusion in the Register. Under both federal and 

state law, listing of a place in the Register triggers 

establishment of certain protections, including minimization 

of adverse impacts from surface mining. See 30 C.F.R. 

§ 780.31(a); W. Va. Code R. § 38-2-3.17.c. For a site to be 

listed in the Register, a majority of property owners in the 

area must not object. See 16 U.S.C. § 470a(a)(6); 36 C.F.R. 

§ 60.6(g). If a majority object, the site cannot gain listing. 

See 16 U.S.C. § 470a(a)(6); 36 C.F.R. § 60.6(n), (s). For the 

January 2009 nomination of the Battlefield, the SHPO 

initially determined that a majority of property owners did not 

object to inclusion of the Battlefield in the Register. 

Following that determination, on March 30, 2009, the Keeper 

listed the Battlefield in the Register.

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One week later, the SHPO notified the Keeper that he had 

failed to account for a number of objections to the listing,

which he had received from a law firm representing several 

coal companies. When the SHPO took into consideration the 

additional objections, he found that a majority of landowners 

objected to the Battlefield’s inclusion in the Register. The 

SHPO therefore asked the Keeper to remove the Battlefield 

from the Register. After soliciting and considering 

comments, the Keeper delisted the Battlefield, agreeing that 

there had been prejudicial procedural error in the listing 

process. See 36 C.F.R. § 60.15(a)(4).

The Sierra Club, the Ohio Valley Environmental 

Coalition, and other organizations (collectively, the Coalition)

filed an action in federal district court against the Keeper, the 

Secretary of the Interior, and the Director of the National Park 

Service (collectively, the Interior). The Coalition claimed that 

the Keeper’s decision to delist the Battlefield was arbitrary 

and capricious, and sought vacatur of the decision and 

relisting of the Battlefield as of March 30, 2009. The district 

court granted summary judgment to the Interior, holding that 

the Coalition failed to establish standing to bring the action. 

Sierra Club v. Salazar, 894 F. Supp. 2d 97, 114 (D.D.C. 

2012).

According to the district court, the Coalition could not 

demonstrate any of the three components of standing: injury

in fact, causation, or redressability. With regard to injury in 

fact, the court held that the Coalition failed to show that any 

injury was “actual or imminent.” Id. at 110 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Even though “a considerable 

amount of the Battlefield is . . . currently subject to surface 

mining permits,” there was no actual or imminent injury 

because the coal companies had yet to mine the Battlefield 

under the permits. Id. at 110. The court viewed any claim of 

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future mining to be “purely conjectural,” reasoning that 

certain permits had been in existence for years with no mining

on the Battlefield. Id. at 112. The Coalition also could not 

satisfy causation because its concerns depended on

“speculative predictions about the actions of third parties, the 

coal mining companies.” Id. at 113. Turning to 

redressability, the court acknowledged that federal and West 

Virginia mining law generally prohibited surface mining on 

property listed in the Register. Id. at 114 (citing 30 U.S.C. 

§ 1272(e)(3)). Those prohibitions, however, contained an 

exemption for permits with valid existing rights. Id. 

According to the district court, the coal companies likely had 

valid existing rights because the permits had been “acquired 

prior to the historic district’s inclusion on the National 

Register.” Id. Therefore, the court held, “surface mining

would be permitted on the Blair Mountain Battlefield” even if 

the Keeper relisted the Battlefield. Id.

The Coalition now appeals. We review the district 

court’s decision on standing de novo. See In re Endangered 

Species Act Section 4 Deadline Litig., 704 F.3d 972, 976 

(D.C. Cir. 2013).

II.

To establish standing to sue for purposes of Article III of 

the Constitution, the Coalition must show: (1) “an ‘injury in 

fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or 

imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is 

fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and 

(3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the 

injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Friends of 

the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167,

180-81 (2000) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 

U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). At summary judgment, “the 

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plaintiff . . . must ‘set forth’ . . . ‘specific facts’” supporting 

standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(e)). We conclude that the Coalition has adequately 

demonstrated injury in fact, causation, and redressability.

A.

To demonstrate injury in fact, the Coalition must show 

that the asserted injury to its members is concrete and 

particularized, and is also actual or imminent. The Coalition 

makes both of those showings.

1.

The Supreme Court has recognized that harm to “the 

mere esthetic interests of the plaintiff . . . will suffice” to 

establish a concrete and particularized injury. Summers v. 

Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 494 (2009). In Lujan, for 

instance, the Court explained that, “[o]f course, the desire to 

use or observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic 

purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of 

standing.” 504 U.S. at 562-63. This court has similarly 

understood that “injury in fact can be found when a defendant 

adversely affects a plaintiff’s enjoyment of flora or fauna.” 

Am. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling 

Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334, 337 (D.C. 

Cir. 2003). We explained that a person “may derive great 

pleasure from visiting a certain river; the pleasure may be 

described as an emotional attachment stemming from the 

river’s pristine beauty.” Id. at 337-38 (citing Laidlaw, 528 

U.S. at 182-83); see Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. 

Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc)

(relying on “aesthetic interest in observing animals living 

under humane conditions”).

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Here, similarly, Coalition members who view and enjoy 

the Battlefield’s aesthetic features, or who observe it for 

purposes of studying and appreciating its history, would 

suffer a concrete and particularized injury from the conduct of 

surface mining on the Battlefield. Two individuals each 

explained that “[s]urface mining at Blair Mountain would 

directly and indirectly harm my ability to use, enjoy, and 

appreciate the historic Battlefield and its landscape.” 

Rasmussen Decl. ¶ 10; Ziehl Decl. ¶ 10. Members also 

expressed an interest in preserving the “beautiful mountain 

landscape,” observing that their “ability to visit and enjoy the 

. . . surrounding areas would be adversely impacted by 

keeping Blair Mountain Battlefield off of the National 

Register of Historic Places.” Hendrix Decl. ¶ 14; see also 

Simmons Decl. ¶ 9. Other individuals visit and study the 

Battlefield for educational purposes. See Rasmussen Decl. 

¶¶ 2-6. And one person, whose grandfather fought at the 

Battle of Blair Mountain and who plans to continue visiting 

the site, stated that mining of the Battlefield would “destroy a 

virtually holy place” that he considers “sacred ground.” 

Martin Decl. ¶ 11. Those Coalition members possess

concrete interests in appreciating and studying the aesthetic

features and historical significance of a preserved and intact 

Battlefield. Their interests would be injured if the Battlefield 

were mined.

Amicus West Virginia Coal Association argues that the 

Coalition cannot demonstrate injury in fact because the 

individuals whose interests would be injured by mining of the 

Battlefield own no legal right to enter the Battlefield area. It 

is true that the Battlefield area is privately owned (with the 

majority of property owned by members of the Coal 

Association). It is also true that the Coalition puts forward no 

evidence that its members—although apparently having 

frequently entered the Battlefield area in the past—possess 

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any legal entitlement to set foot on the privately owned 

property. But even assuming those individuals no longer 

possess any ability to enter the Battlefield site itself, there 

would be no need for them to commit a trespass in order to 

experience a cognizable injury. They possess interests in 

observing the landscape from surrounding areas, for instance,

or in enjoying the Battlefield while on public roads. See 

Martin Decl. ¶ 9 (“At least four times I have visited a friend 

across the highway from Blair Mountain . . . and have driven 

across Blair [M]ountain twenty times or more.”). Their 

cognizable interests thus do not depend on any legal right to 

make a physical entry onto the Battlefield. And while the 

Supreme Court in Lujan spoke in terms of a “legally protected 

interest,” 504 U.S. at 560, this court has specifically 

recognized that, when the Lujan “Court used the phrase 

‘legally protected interest’ as an element of injury-in-fact, it

. . . was referring only to a cognizable interest.” Parker v. 

District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 377 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 

aff’d sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 

(2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Lujan therefore

“concluded that plaintiffs had a cognizable interest in 

observing animal species without considering whether the 

plaintiffs had a legal right to do so.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Accordingly, there is no reason that the 

cognizability of aesthetic and associated interests in a 

particular site could turn on owning a legal right to enter or 

view the property. 

This court’s decision in National Wildlife Federation v. 

Hodel, 839 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1988), is illustrative. 

National Wildlife involved a multitude of challenges to 

regulations promulgated under the Surface Mining Control 

and Reclamation Act. One regulation expanded a variance 

from a statutory requirement generally obligating mining 

companies to return mined land to its approximate original 

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contours. Id. at 714-15. In holding that the plaintiffs had 

established standing to challenge the expanded variance, the 

court referenced only one individual’s affidavit. And the 

court pointed specifically (and exclusively) to a portion of her

affidavit “expressing concern over ‘granting [of] any 

variances to allow leaving highwalls on non-steep slopes’ on 

land near her home because ‘[s]uch a variance would 

adversely impact my enjoyment of the natural vistas of these 

hills.’” Id. at 715 (quoting affidavit) (alterations in original). 

The court thus relied solely on impairment of the affiant’s 

ability to enjoy the “natural vistas” of the nearby hills from 

her own home, regardless of the absence (or existence) of any 

legal right on her part to view or make an entry onto the 

nearby hills. Id.; see also Am. Bird Conservancy, Inc. v. FCC, 

516 F.3d 1027, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam) 

(“Petitioners have standing, for members of these 

organizations engage in recreational birdwatching and 

research on birds in the Gulf Coast region.”). As another 

court of appeals has explained, “[i]f an area can be observed 

and enjoyed from adjacent land, plaintiffs need not physically 

enter the affected area to establish an injury in fact.” Cantrell 

v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 681 (9th Cir. 2001). 

That understanding governs here.

2.

The Coalition also satisfies its burden to show that its 

members’ injuries are actual or imminent. Because there is 

no allegation that any mining has already occurred in the 

Battlefield, we deal solely with the question whether the 

asserted injuries qualify as imminent. A plaintiff must show a 

“substantial probability of injury” to establish imminent 

injury. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. EPA, 642 F.3d 

192, 200 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (alterations and internal quotation 

marks omitted); see Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 

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1138, 1147-48, 1150 & n.5 (2013) (observing that injury must 

be “certainly impending” rather than “premised on a 

speculative chain of possibilities,” and noting that “we have 

found standing based on a ‘substantial risk’ that the harm will 

occur”). 

The undisputed facts demonstrate the requisite

“substantial probability” of injury here. First, coal companies 

have mined in the vicinity of the Battlefield under permits that 

encompass the Battlefield. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. 

Office of Surface Mining Reclamation & Enforcement, 620 

F.3d 1227, 1233 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that environmental 

group’s injury “results from [company’s] ability to commence 

mining operations” due to possession of surface mining 

permit). The Coalition directs us to two active permits that 

encompass the Battlefield area: the “Camp Branch” permit 

and the “Bumbo No. 2” permit. The Camp Branch permit 

covers approximately 1,100 acres, including a portion of the 

Battlefield area. At the time of the complaint, the West 

Virginia Department of Environmental Protection—which is 

charged with issuing the permits—classified the Camp 

Branch permit as “active, moving coal,” indicating that 

mining was proceeding under the permit. Additionally, one 

of the organizations in the Coalition prepared a report

addressing the impact of surface mining at Blair Mountain; 

and that report stated, with regard to the Camp Branch permit,

that “[m]ining is roughly 800-1200 meters away from the 

battlefield perimeter” and “is moving eastward toward the 

battlefield.” The Interior has not disputed those conclusions

in the report. Meanwhile, the Bumbo No. 2 permit spans over 

1,500 acres, including 590 acres in the center of the 

Battlefield. The report of the Coalition organization found 

that mining under the Bumbo No. 2 permit has disturbed at 

least 300 acres near the Battlefield, and the Interior also has 

not disputed that conclusion.

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In holding that the Coalition fails to establish imminent 

injury, the district court emphasized that the permits have 

existed for over ten years without any mining in the 

Battlefield to this point. Sierra Club, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 112. 

The coal companies themselves, however, assert an 

expectation that they would mine in the Battlefield under the 

permits. In apparent recognition of the significance of the 

Battlefield site to their mining interests, the companies did not 

act as disinterested bystanders in connection with the 

Battlefield’s nomination for inclusion in the Register. 

Instead, in a letter objecting to the listing of the Battlefield in 

the Register, the coal companies—including the holders of the 

Camp Branch and Bumbo No. 2 permits—explained that they 

“own[] or lease[] minerals, particularly coal, with the 

expectation of developing them in the nomination area.” 

Letter from Blair M. Gardner, Esq., Jackson Kelly PLLC, to

Barbara Wyatt, Keeper (emphasis added). That statement of 

the companies’ own expectations, coupled with their conduct 

of mining operations close to the Battlefield under permits 

encompassing the Battlefield itself, suffices to establish a 

substantial probability of mining in the Battlefield. The 

Coalition therefore adequately demonstrates that its injury is 

“actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” 

Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 180.

B.

The remaining prongs of standing consist of causation 

and redressability. The Coalition must show that its injury is 

“fairly traceable” to the delisting of the Battlefield, and that 

“it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury 

will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 

at 180-81. In this case, those inquiries are “two sides of a 

causation coin.” Dynalantic Corp. v. Dep’t of Def., 115 F.3d 

1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Whether the asserted injuries 

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are fairly traceable to the Keeper’s delisting of the Battlefield 

and whether the injuries are redressable both depend on the 

extent to which inclusion in the Register would afford the 

Battlefield protections from surface mining. We conclude 

that the Coalition meets the causation and redressability

requirements.

The district court believed it likely under West Virginia 

law that surface mining would continue even if the Battlefield 

were relisted. According to the Coalition, however, even if

surface mining could continue upon a relisting of the 

Battlefield, West Virginia law affords additional protections 

to places listed in the Register. The Coalition points to a 

regulation providing that “all adverse impacts [from surface 

mining] must be minimized” for sites included in the Register. 

W. Va. Code R. § 38-2-3-17.c. The Interior’s principal 

response is that the Coalition forfeited that argument by 

failing to raise it in the district court. We disagree. In its 

briefing in the district court addressing the question of

redressability, the Coalition argued that West Virginia mining 

law provided protections to places listed in the Register, 

specifically identifying and quoting from the same regulation 

on which it now relies. See Pls.’ Summ. J. Opp’n & Reply at 

6 (quoting W. Va. Code R. § 38-2-3-17.c). That was more 

than enough to preserve the argument for appeal.

On the merits of the issue, the Interior contends that § 38-

2-3.17.c applies only to initial permit applications but not to 

the permit renewals that generally take place every five years. 

At the time of the initial applications for the Camp Branch 

and Bumbo No. 2 permits, the Battlefield had not been listed 

in the Register. Consequently, the Interior argues, the 

regulation could not affect mining operations under the Camp 

Branch and Bumbo No. 2 permits. We conclude, however, 

that for purposes of demonstrating causation and 

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redressability, there is an adequate possibility that the 

regulation would apply to renewals of those permits and not 

only to the initial applications.

Because “this court’s jurisdiction turns on whether a 

proper interpretation of” West Virginia law “precludes the 

relief” the Coalition desires, the Coalition “need not convince 

this court that its interpretation is correct.” Ark Initiative v. 

Tidwell, 749 F.3d 1071, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 2014). To satisfy 

redressability and causation, the Coalition’s interpretation of 

the minimization requirement instead must be “nonfrivolous.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting United Transp. 

Union-Ill. Legislative Bd. v. STB, 175 F.3d 163, 166 (D.C. 

Cir. 1999)); see also Info. Handling Servs., Inc. v. Def. 

Automated Printing Servs., 338 F.3d 1024, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 

2003) (“[A] plaintiff’s non-frivolous contention regarding the

meaning of a statute must be taken as correct for purposes of 

standing.”). 

The Coalition’s interpretation of West Virginia law meets 

that standard. Although the minimization requirement is not 

located in the “Permit Renewals” subsection of § 38-2-3, a 

permit cannot be renewed if the “terms and conditions of the 

existing permit are not being satisfactorily met.” W. Va. 

Code § 22-3-19(a)(1)(A). And when certain terms and 

conditions “become applicable after the original date of 

permit issuance,” the permittee has “a reasonable period to 

comply with such revised requirements.” Id. According to 

the Coalition, the minimization requirement, which would 

take effect after the listing of the Battlefield in the Register, 

constitutes a “requirement[]” that would “become applicable 

after . . . permit issuance.” The Interior’s response rests on 

interpretations of federal mining regulations, which it 

contends impose a minimization requirement only at the time 

of permit application, not renewal. See 30 C.F.R. § 780.31. 

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Even if that interpretation of federal law is correct, however,

it is not necessarily dispositive of West Virginia law, which 

could impose broader protections. See 30 C.F.R. § 730.11(a)-

(b). We need not resolve the issue for purposes of assessing 

the Coalition’s standing, but need only assess whether the 

Coalition’s argument is non-frivolous. We conclude that it is.

The Interior also argues that the minimization 

requirement would afford no additional protections to the 

Battlefield over those already granted by West Virginia law. 

The Interior relies on § 38-2-3.17.d, under which the West 

Virginia Department of Environmental Protection “may 

require the [permit] applicant to protect historic . . . properties 

. . . through appropriate mitigation and treatment measures.” 

W. Va. Code R. § 38-2-3.17.d. That provision applies both to 

places already listed in the Register and to places (like the 

Battlefield) eligible for future listing. Id. But even assuming 

that “appropriate mitigation and treatment measures” under 

that provision are no less protective than the requirement to 

“minimize” all “adverse impacts” under § 38-2-3.17.c, the 

former protections lie within the discretion of the Department: 

for sites eligible to be listed in the Register, the Department 

“may” elect to “require” mitigation and treatment measures, 

or “may” elect not to do so. W. Va. Code R. § 38-2-3.17.d. 

For sites already listed in the Register, by contrast, the 

obligation under § 38-2-3.17.c to minimize adverse impacts is 

expressed in mandatory terms. The Coalition’s argument that 

§ 38-2-3.17.c affords greater protections than otherwise arise 

under West Virginia law therefore is at least non-frivolous, 

and suffices to establish causation and redressability.

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* * * * *

We reverse the judgment of the district court and remand 

for further proceedings.

So ordered.

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SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting: I would affirm

the grant of summary judgment by the district court. I agree

with that court that the federal courts have no jurisdiction over

this action. My reasoning is not precisely the same as the lower

court. This, of course, presents no problem, as we review a

district court’s grant of a “motion to dismiss for lack of

standing” de novo. Info. Handling Servs., Inc. v. Def. Automated

Printed Servs., Inc., 338 F.3d 1024, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

The majority opinion sets forth the facts and the history of

this matter, and I have no reason to rehash the same here. The

majority also sets forth the requirements for standing:

(1) “an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized

and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;

(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of

the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely

speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable

decision.”

Maj. Op. at 5 (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw

Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000) (quoting Lujan

v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992))). Again,

I have no quarrel with the majority’s recitation of the matters of

principle, but I do conclude that its application of the first

element is too broad. As the Supreme Court has made plain,

“the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion

of a legally protected interest . . . .” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560

(emphasis added). The interest appellants asserted in this case

was their interest in viewing the property of others. I know of

no legal protection for that interest, nor have either the

appellants or the majority made me aware of any.

It is true, as the majority asserts, “that harm to ‘the mere

esthetic interest of the plaintiffs . . . will suffice’ to establish a

concrete and particularized injury.” Maj. Op. at 6 (quoting

Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 494 (2009)). 

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However, this does not establish that the legally protected

aesthetic interest of would-be plaintiffs encompasses the legally

protected right to peer into the property of others. It is true, as

the majority states, that such cases as Animal Legal Def. Fund,

Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc),

and Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528

U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000), may support a generalization that

“injury in fact can be found when a defendant adversely affects

a plaintiff’s enjoyment of flora or fauna,” Maj. Op. at 6 (quoting

Am. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros.

& Barnum & Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334, 337 (D.C. Cir.

2003)). Nonetheless, none of these cases would lead me to

suppose that my neighbor has a legally protected right that I

have invaded when I trim the grass and behead the clovers,

which he enjoys viewing. As the majority recognizes, “the

Coalition [appellants] puts forward no evidence that its members

. . . possess any legal entitlement to set foot on the privately

owned property.” Maj. Op. 8. The majority fails to recognize

that neither have they put forth any evidence of any legal

entitlement to view that property.

As the Supreme Court has made clear, parties invoking

federal jurisdiction bear the burden of establishing an “invasion

of a legally protected interest.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560

(emphasis added). Appellants have offered nothing to establish 1

Nothing in the majority’s reliance on the reformulation of 1

Lujan’s language in Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370

(D.C. Cir. 2007), aff’d in part sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller,

554 U.S. 570 (2008), convinces me to the contrary. The

transformation of “legally protected interests” to “cognizable

interests” effected by the Parker court relies on Claybrook v. Slater,

111 F.3d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1997), which establishes that we need not

explore the merits of a claim in order to determine the claimant’s

standing. It remains the case that “if the plaintiff’s claim has no

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the invasion of any such interest. The dismissal of this action

should be affirmed.

foundation in law, he has no legally protected interest and thus no

standing to sue.” Claybrook, 111 F.3d at 907. 

USCA Case #12-5383 Document #1509259 Filed: 08/26/2014 Page 18 of 18