Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01839/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01839-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ABO OBAIDA HUSSEIN, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 08-01839 PHX DGC (MEA)

)

CHARLES L. RYAN and ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL:

On or about December 18, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro

se petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 2254. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 19) on May 15, 2009.

Petitioner was granted three extensions of the time allowed to

file a reply to the answer to his petition for habeas relief.

On July 30, Petitioner was allowed until September 11, 2009, to

file any traverse to the answer to the petition. Although not

docketed until September 24, 2009, Petitioner’s reply (Docket

No. 27) to the answer to his petition for habeas relief was

mailed September 11, 2009; accordingly, pursuant to the prison

mailbox rule Petitioner’s reply is timely filed. See Houston v.

Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271-72, 108 S. Ct. 2379, 2382-83 (1988);

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Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 2001). 

I Procedural History

An indictment issued by a Maricopa County grand jury

charged Petitioner with four counts of sexual conduct with a

minor. Answer, Exh. A. Petitioner represented himself at his

jury trial. Id., Exh. A. The jury found Petitioner guilty on

the four counts charged in the indictment. Id., Exh. A. The

jury also found the victim was under the age of fifteen at the

time of the crimes. Id., Exh. A. Petitioner was sentenced to

a consecutive mitigated sentence of 13 years imprisonment on

each count of conviction. Id., Exh. A. 

Petitioner took a direct appeal of his convictions and

sentences and was appointed counsel to represent him in his

direct appeal. Id., Exh. A. Petitioner’s appointed counsel

filed a brief averring to the Arizona Court of Appeals that he

could find no legitimate issue to raise on Petitioner’s behalf.

Id., Exh. A. Petitioner did not file a pro se brief in his

direct appeal. Id. at 3.

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s

convictions and sentences in a memorandum decision issued

January 10, 2008. Id., Exh. A. Petitioner then sought

translation assistance from the state Court of Appeals, which

denied the request. Id., Exh. B. Petitioner did not file a

motion for reconsideration of the decision affirming his

convictions and sentences nor did he seek review by the Arizona

Supreme Court. Id. at 3. Accordingly, the Arizona Court of

Appeals issued the mandate affirming Petitioner’s convictions

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and sentences on March 5, 2008. Id., Exh. C.

Petitioner has not filed any action seeking state postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure. The time for doing so has expired.

On October 6, 2008, Petitioner filed the pending action

for federal habeas relief. Petitioner contends his

constitutional rights were violated because he was forced to

choose between self-representation and representation by

incompetent counsel. Petitioner also asserts his Miranda rights

were violated and that evidence was improperly seized in

violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Petitioner also

contends the state trial court made errors which violated his

right to due process of law. Additionally, Petitioner asserts

his convictions must be reversed because he was denied

translation services and access to competent counsel.

II Analysis

Petitioner failed to properly exhaust his claims in the

state courts and he has not shown cause for, nor prejudice

arising from his procedural default of the claims such that the

Court may consider the merits of the claims. 

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of a claim which has been exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-

30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d

1127, 1139 (9th Cir. 2007). To properly exhaust a federal

habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state the

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opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose v.

Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that,

in non-capital cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court”

test of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas

petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals,

either on direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction

relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.

1999). See also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932

(D. Ariz. 2007) (providing a thorough discussion of what

constitutes the “highest court” in Arizona for purposes of

exhausting a habeas claim in the context of a conviction

resulting in a non-capital sentence). 

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2008). Because the exhaustion requirement

refers only to remedies still available to the petitioner at the

time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is

satisfied if the petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing

their claim in the state courts. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.

81, 92-93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006); Castille, 489 U.S. at

351, 109 S. Ct. at 1060; Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1025-26

(9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1033 (2009). If it is

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clear the habeas petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred

pursuant to state law, the claim is exhausted by virtue of the

petitioner’s “procedural default” of the claim. See, e.g.,

Woodford, 548 U.S. at 92-93, 126 S. Ct. at 2387. Procedural

default occurs when a petitioner has never presented a federal

habeas claim in state court and is now barred from doing so by

the state’s procedural rules, including rules regarding waiver

and the preclusion of claims. See Castille, 489 U.S. at 351-52,

109 S. Ct. at 1060; Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th

Cir. 1988).

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims bar

Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but

procedurally defaulted, any claim not previously fairly

presented to the Arizona courts. See Cook, 538 F. 3d at 1025-

26; Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005);

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See also

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581

(2002) (holding Arizona’s state rules regarding the waiver and

procedural default of claims raised in attacks on criminal

convictions are adequate and independent state grounds for

affirming a conviction and denying federal habeas relief on the

grounds of a procedural bar); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923,

931-32 (9th Cir. 1998).

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B. Cause and prejudice

Federal habeas relief based on a procedurally defaulted

claim may be granted if the petitioner can demonstrate cause and

actual prejudice to excuse the petitioner’s default of the

claim. See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 535-36, 126 S. Ct.

2064, 2076 (2006); Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392-93, 124 S.

Ct. 1827, 1852 (2004). 

“Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s

procedural default of the claim and “prejudice” is actual harm

resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. See Cook,

538 F.3d at 1027.

Ordinarily, cause to excuse a default exists

if the petitioner can show that some

objective factor external to the defense

impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the

State’s procedural rule. Examples of

sufficient causes include a showing that the

factual or legal basis for a claim was not

reasonably available to counsel, or that some

interference by officials made compliance

impracticable. Ineffective assistance of

counsel may be cause to excuse a default only

if the procedural default was the result of

an independent constitutional violation. Put

another way, so long as a defendant is

represented by counsel whose performance is

not constitutionally ineffective under the

standard established in Strickland v.

Washington, the federal courts discern no

inequity in requiring him to bear the risk of

attorney error that results in a procedural

default.

Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). See also

Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998); MartinezVillareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996). To

establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that the alleged

constitutional error worked to his actual and substantial

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disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with constitutional

violations. See Vickers, 144 F.3d at 617; Correll v. Stewart,

137 F.3d 1404, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 1998). The petitioner must

prove that, “but for” the alleged constitutional violations,

there is a reasonable probability he would not have been

convicted of the same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d

1129, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136,

1141 (8th Cir. 1999). Although both cause and prejudice must be

shown to excuse a procedural default, the Court need not examine

the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish

cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43, 102 S. Ct.

1558, 1575 n.43 (1982).

C. Fundamental miscarriage of justice

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is required if the petitioner demonstrates review of the

merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393, 124 S. Ct.

at 1852; Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316, 115 S. Ct. 851, 861

(1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-86, 106 S. Ct.

2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs

only when a constitutional violation has probably resulted in

the conviction of one who is factually innocent. See Murray,

477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649; Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979

F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing of factual innocence is

necessary to trigger manifest injustice relief). To satisfy the

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” standard, a petitioner must

establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable

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fact-finder could have found him guilty of the offenses charged.

See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393, 124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v.

Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-43 (9th Cir. 2001).

Petitioner failed to raise any claims in the Arizona

Court of Appeals in his direct appeal. Petitioner did not

pursue any state action for post-conviction relief pursuant to

Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly,

Petitioner has failed to properly exhaust any federal habeas

claims in the state courts. The time allowed for filing a state

action for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure, has now expired. Therefore,

Petitioner’s claims are technically exhausted but procedurally

defaulted. 

In reply to Respondents’ answer to his petition,

Petitioner notes he is a refugee from Sudan, whose language is

Sudanese, and that he has no experience with the United States’

criminal justice system. Petitioner asserts the state trial

court denied his request to “withdraw second counsel.” Docket

No. 27 at 2. Petitioner alleges the state trial judge violated

his constitutional right to due process of law. Petitioner also

contends he was and is wrongfully denied transcripts of his

criminal proceedings.

With regard to his procedural default of his federal

habeas claims, Petitioner contends his appellate counsel was

ineffective and did not review all of the record in Petitioner’s

case. Id. at 3. Petitioner alleges he could not file a pro se

brief in his appeal because he was denied an interpreter and a

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complete transcript of his criminal proceedings. Petitioner

further maintains he could not file a state action pursuant to

Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, because he was

denied full transcripts and the services of an interpreter, and

because he had no knowledge of this avenue of post-conviction

relief. Id. at 6.

Petitioner also argues that his state criminal

proceedings violated his constitutional rights because he was

denied a change of counsel, a speedy trial, a change of advisory

counsel, “full record transcripts”, “access to interpreter,” and

a hearing on his motion for a new trial.

Petitioner has not shown cause and prejudice with

regard to his procedural default of his federal habeas claims in

the state courts. 

As stated supra, to satisfy the “cause and prejudice”

test, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that some

“objective factor external to the defense impeded” his

compliance with Arizona’s procedural rules. House, 547 U.S. at

535-36 126 S. Ct. at 2076; Moorman v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044,

1058 (9th Cir. 2005). Petitioner’s pro se status and ignorance

of the law do not satisfy the cause standard for overcoming his

procedural default of his claims. See, e.g., Hughes v. Idaho

State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986).

Furthermore, Petitioner’s unfamiliarity with the English

language is insufficient to establish cause to excuse his

procedural default because such alleged unfamiliarity is not

external to his defense. See, e.g., Bonilla v. Hurley, 370 F.3d

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494, 498 (6th Cir. 2004).

Allegedly ineffective assistance of counsel does not

establish cause for the failure to properly exhaust a habeas

claim in the state court unless the specific Sixth Amendment

claim alleged to provide the basis for cause was itself properly

exhausted. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451, 120 S.

Ct. 1587, 1591 (2000); Tacho, 862 F.2d at 1381. Additionally,

“[a]ttorney error does not constitute cause to excuse a

procedural default unless counsel’s performance was

constitutionally deficient.” Deitz v. Money, 391 F.3d 804, 809

(6th Cir. 2004). See also Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755, 111 S. Ct.

at 2567 (“We reiterate that counsel’s ineffectiveness will

constitute cause only if it is an independent constitutional

violation”).

Even if Petitioner could show cause for his procedural

default of his claims, Petitioner has not established prejudice

arising from his default of his claims.

Petitioner contends he was denied the effective

assistance of trial counsel. Petitioner alleges his appointed

defense counsel did not investigate his case; inter alia,

Petitioner asserts the victim’s father convinced his daughter to

lie about Petitioner’s guilt because the father seized and

cashed Petitioner’s paycheck. Id. at 16-17. Petitioner

contends he repeatedly told his counsel that the victim and her

parents were manufacturing the allegations against him and that

Petitioner had evidence of these witnesses’ dishonesty. Id. at

20. 

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Petitioner contends both his first and his second

appointed counsel encouraged him to accept a plea agreement

based on the strength of the government’s evidence but

Petitioner refused because he was not guilty. Id. at 17 & 22.

Petitioner contends the trial court erred by refusing to remove

his second counsel when this attorney “pushed” him to accept a

plea agreement. Id. at 22. Petitioner alleges his second

counsel was ineffective for failing to interview the victim’s

parents and the investigating detective. 

The Magistrate Judge has thoroughly reviewed the record

in this matter, including each document submitted by Petitioner

in support of his claims. Petitioner has not established

prejudice arising from the alleged errors of counsel. The

testimony and evidence offered against Petitioner was

comprehensive and the record reveals the trial court’s and

counsels’ extensive efforts to accommodate Petitioner’s concerns

and his language difficulties.

III Conclusion

Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor prejudice

arising from his procedural default of his federal habeas

claims. Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing cause

and prejudice, or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will

occur, if the Court does not consider the merits of his claims

for relief.

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Hussein’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

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of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 26th day of October, 2009.

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