Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_05-cv-00642/USCOURTS-azd-4_05-cv-00642-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:451 Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Diane Kerr-Clemens, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

Arizona Board of Regents, a political entity,

the University of Arizona, Rosi Andrade, in

her official capacity as Project of the Mujer

Sana Project, and the Haven, an Arizona

Corporation, 

Defendants. ______________________________________

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CV 05-642 TUC DCB

ORDER

Plaintiff seeks leave, and is granted leave, to file a Second Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff filed this Complaint on October 27, 2005. Defendants answered in March,

2006. On May 2, 2006, the parties stipulated to Plaintiff's amending her Complaint to add

claims under the American with Disability Act (ADA) because the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) had issued a right-to-sue notice on the ADA claims

subsequent to Plaintiff's filing her Complaint. The First Amended Complaint was filed on

May 11, 2006. Amended Answers were filed by Defendants.

A scheduling conference was held on June 15, 2006, and case management deadlines

were set in the case for discovery to close on April 16, 2007, dispositive motions to be filed

on May 16, 2007, and the due date for the pretrial order was set for June 18, 2007. On

December 5, 2006, the parties stipulated to an extension of deadlines because the

organization representing Plaintiff, Arizona Center for Disability Law, had assigned a new

attorney to the case, and he needed time to familiarize himself with it. The deadlines were

reset for discovery to close on May 31, 2007, and dispositive motions to be filed on June 30,

Case 4:05-cv-00642-DCB Document 107 Filed 02/07/07 Page 1 of 5
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2007. The due date for the pretrial order was inadvertently not reset. It remains June 18,

2007, except that it is subject to being vacated upon the filing of a dispositive motion. 

On January 1, 2007, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Amend First Amended

Complaint. Plaintiff seeks to add a claim of constructive discharge retaliation under the

ADA. Defendants object. Defendants challenge the amendment as futile because it is

subject to dismissal. Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991). Defendants

submit that Plaintiff failed to administratively exhaust this claim with the EEOC because her

EEOC claims charged she was terminated, and she never asserted she had been

constructively discharged or felt compelled to resign. According to the Defendants, Plaintiff

at all times has asserted she was involuntarily terminated. Defendants argue that claims of

"involuntary termination" and "constructive discharge" are legally and factually distinct, and

she could not have been both terminated involuntarily and forced to resign. 

Defendants support their argument as follows:

Plaintiff was required to assert specifically that she had been constructively

discharged in her EEOC Charge because that claim is distinct and not

“reasonably related” to her claim of wrongful termination that she had been

involuntarily fired. Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d

569, 571 (9th Cir. 1973); Gaston v. New York City Dept. of Health Office of

Chief Medical Examiner, 432 F.Supp.2d 321, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating

constructive discharge is a discrete act that must be alleged before the

EEOC); Butler v. Potter, 345 F.Supp. 2d 844, 9853 (E.D. Tenn. 2004)

(stating constructive discharge is a “discrete” act, which must be the subject

of a timely administrative complaint); Snyder v. Saberliner Corp., 101

F.Supp. 2d 1239, 1248-49 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (dismissing claim where an

EEOC charge contains no claim of constructive discharge, and stating court

may not invent an unasserted claim). Plaintiff’s failure to allege any facts in

her multiple Charges to support a claim of constructive discharge under

Title I of the ADA deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear

the claim.

(Objection at 4-5.)

The Court has reviewed the EEOC claims. She asserts that on September 29, 2004

accommodations were removed by Sharon Lashinger, Interim Director of The Haven and

Rosi Andrade, Project Director of Mujer Sana. She was terminated the same day. On

January 6, 2005, she met with Sharon Lashinger and Diane Katz, President of the Board

Case 4:05-cv-00642-DCB Document 107 Filed 02/07/07 Page 2 of 5
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The project was financed by a federal grant through the University of Arizona. 

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of Directors of The Haven, to discuss possible accommodations that would allow her to

return to her job. All were refused, and she was not permitted to return to work.

On September 26, 2006, when she applied for renewal of her behavioral health license,

she described herself as having been unlawfully terminated. (Objections at Ex. A-B.)

The Court has compared the First and Second Amended Complaint. The facts are

the same. Plaintiff alleges that she began working for The Haven in 1992. In 2002, The

Haven sent Plaintiff to Mujer Sana Project1

 as a treatment specialist. In 2003, Plaintiff

was diagnosed with Multiple Sclerosis, which resulted in visual impairment, mobility

impairment, and fine motor skill impairment. From approximately May, 2003, she was

unable to drive or see print that was less than sixteen point font. She has used a

wheelchair for mobility since March, 2004. 

Since May 2003, she required accommodations, which were granted by

Defendants, as follows: Plaintiff's husband performed data entry duties and acted as a

driver for Plaintiff and her clients. In August 2004, Plaintiff went to the Disability

Resources Center at the University of Arizona to explore assistive technology that would

accommodate her eyesight impairment and, subsequently, requested such technology as

an accommodation for her eyesight impairment. On September 29, 2004, Defendants

revoked the existing reasonable accommodations, did not suggest alternative

accommodations, and requested her resignation. She refused to resign and Defendants

"conveyed that Plaintiff was terminated from her position." (First Amended Complaint at

¶ 36.) On October 4, 2004, Plaintiff filed a charge of disability discrimination with the

EEOC. Subsequently, she was asked to meet with Defendants on October 28, 2004, when

she was told that she had not been terminated on September 29, 2004, but that her

disability would not be accommodated and she was "being terminated from both The

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Haven and Mujer Sana." She filed another EEOC claim. Another meeting was held on

January 6, 2005, but reasonable accommodations needed by the Plaintiff were refused.

The difference between the First and Second Amended Complaints is as follows. 

In the First, the Plaintiff charges that the Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff on the

basis of disability . . . by refusing to participate in the accommodation process, failing to

accommodate Plaintiff, terminating Plaintiff, retaliating against her for engaging in

protected activity, and interfering with her in the exercise and enjoyment of her rights . .

.." The Second Amended Complaint adds: ". . . terminating Plaintiff (including, but not

limited to, constructively discharging her), . . .."

The Court finds that Plaintiff's prior description of her claim as "involuntary

termination" fits within the "constructive discharge" language she seeks to add in the

Second Amended Complaint. "Constructive discharge" may be a more legally accurate

description of Plaintiff's claim, depending on the facts of the case. Plaintiff's meaning of

"involuntary termination" should be clear to the Defendants because they know whether

or not they fired the Plaintiff or she quit. This distinction determines whether or not her

claim is for constructive discharge or wrongful termination. Apparently, the parties are

not in agreement as to whether the Defendants terminated her employment or she was

forced to quit. The facts alleged in the complaints could support either, depending on

other facts not yet in the record. 

Defendants do not object to Plaintiff's description of her claim as "involuntary

termination." The Court rejects Defendant's argument that "involuntary termination" is

legally and factually distinct from a claim of constructive discharge in the context of the

facts alleged in this case. The Court finds that the claim is “reasonably related” to her

EEOC claim of wrongful termination that she had been involuntarily fired. Plaintiff has

alleged facts to support a claim of constructive discharge under Title I of the ADA. This

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Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim. The Court rejects Defendants'

objections to the filing of the Second Amended Complaint.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File the Second

Amended Complaint (document 92) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall file the lodged

Second Amended Complaint.

DATED this 7th day of February, 2007.

Case 4:05-cv-00642-DCB Document 107 Filed 02/07/07 Page 5 of 5