Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-06-35068/USCOURTS-ca9-06-35068-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BLACKIE ALVAREZ, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 06-35068

JEAN HILL, Superintendent; MAX D.C. No.

WILLIAMS; MITCH MORROW; J.  CV-04-00884-BR

GILMORE; S. FRANKE; T. OPINION O’CONNOR; SONJA HOYT; T.

ARMSTRONG; S. BABB; CAIN; RIDER,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Anna J. Brown, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 6, 2008—Seattle, Washington

Filed March 13, 2008

Before: Raymond C. Fisher, Ronald M. Gould and

Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Fisher

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COUNSEL

Blackie F. Alvarez, pro se; John B. Schochet (argued), Dorsey

& Whitney LLP, Seattle, Washington, and Michael B. King,

Talmadge Law Group PLLC, Tukwila, Washington, for the

plaintiff-appellant. 

Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Mary H. Williams, Solicitor

General, Michael C. Livingston, Senior Assistant Attorney

General, Rolf C. Moan (argued), Assistant Attorney General,

Office of the Oregon Attorney General, Salem, Oregon, for

the defendants-appellees. 

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James McCurdy, Lindsey Hart Neil & Weigler, LLP, Portland, Oregon, for the amicus curiae ACLU Foundation of

Oregon, Inc. 

OPINION

FISHER, Circuit Judge: 

We revisit in this appeal the longstanding principle that

federal complaints plead claims, not causes of action or statutes or legal theories. Blackie Alvarez (“Alvarez”) brought

suit alleging that prison officials substantially burdened his

religious exercise by denying him various accommodations.

Those officials (“appellees”) now insist that Alvarez’s failure

to specifically plead in his complaint a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000

(“RLUIPA”), see 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, bars his argument

that the district court erred in not analyzing his religious exercise claims under RLUIPA, which establishes a more protective standard than does the First Amendment. They are plainly

incorrect. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and

we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.

BACKGROUND

In June 2004, Alvarez, then an inmate at the Oregon State

River Correctional Institution, filed a pro se complaint seeking redress for violations of the “First [and] Fourteenth

Amendments” on the part of prison officials.1 Alvarez alleged

1Alvarez also claimed that he was deprived of access to legal materials

in violation of Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). We affirm the

district court’s grant of summary judgment as to this claim because Alvarez has not “allege[d] injury, such as inability to file a complaint or defend

against a charge” resulting from deficiencies in access. Jones v. Blanas,

393 F.3d 918, 936 (9th Cir. 2004). Failure to show that a “nonfrivolous

legal claim had been frustrated” is fatal to his Bounds claim. Lewis v.

Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353 & n.4 (1996). 

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that they “ ‘burden[ed] substantially’ . . . his religion” by

denying him the “right to participate and practice the Sweat

Lodge Ceremony and Sacred Pipe Ceremony” and by making

it “difficult if not impossible to communicate with any of his

tribe[’]s religious representatives.” He also alleged that

they forbade him from wearing a headband, consuming

tobacco for ceremonial purposes and participating in group worship.2

 Four months later, Alvarez supplemented his complaint

with a self-styled “Motion in Support of Original Complaint

with Law.” Alvarez asserted there that the district court had

“supplemental jurisdiction” of his free exercise claims under

“Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42

U.S.C.A. § 2000cc,” and other civil rights statutes. 

Appellees thereafter filed for summary judgment in

December 2004. They argued that although the prison’s policies burdened Alvarez’s constitutional free exercise rights,

they were “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests” and consequently satisfied the standard set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Responding directly to

appellees’ reliance on Turner, Alvarez opposed their “conclusory” assertions of the governmental interest in security and

safety, referring to the more stringent “standard set by the

R.L.U.I.P.A. 2000.” He asserted this was so because RLUIPA

“explicitly changed the standard by which restrictions on the

free exercise of religion are to be judged, and clearly applies

in the prison context.” Citing Mayweathers v. Newland, 314

F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1),

Alvarez contended that RLUIPA “restores a higher standard

which requires the state to demonstrate . . . that its regulations

or practices are ‘in furtherance of a compelling government-

[al] interest.’ ” Additionally, he identified RLUIPA as providing a statutory ground for relief apart from the Free Exercise

2

In addition to declaratory and injunctive relief, Alvarez sought a total

of $55,000 in damages, so his subsequent release from custody has not

mooted this action. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 566 n.8 (9th

Cir. 2005). 

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Clause. He explained he was bringing suit under the “Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

(R.L.U.I.P.A.) . . . in relation to . . . substantial burdening and

interference with Sacred Religious Objects and Practices. And

violation of plaintiff’s First Amendment (free exercise).”

(Emphasis added.) Prison officials were “not only violating

plaintiff’s constitutional rights, but the Religious Land Use

and Institutionalized Persons Act.” (Emphasis added.)

The appellees’ reply acknowledged that Alvarez’s “claim

must be analyzed under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.” His “claims of an RLUIPA violation

[were] without merit,” they argued, given the serious “safety

and security” concerns justifying restrictions on religious

practice while an inmate was in disciplinary housing. 

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of

appellees. Citing Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th

Cir. 1997), a religious exercise case litigated before the passage of RLUIPA, the court held that an inmate could prevail

on a free exercise claim only by showing that prison officials

“burdened the practice of [his] religion by preventing him

from engaging in conduct mandated by his religious faith.”

The court found the restrictions on Alvarez’s religious exercise were not a “substantial burden on the practice of his religion.” Furthermore, the court held that insofar as officials had

produced “sufficient evidence” that the restrictions furthered

the “legitimate institutional goals” of maintaining prison

safety and security, they did not “rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed

de novo. Blanford v. Sacramento County, 406 F.3d 1110,

1114 (9th Cir. 2005). “Viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party . . . we must determine

whether the district court correctly applied the relevant subALVAREZ v. HILL 2463

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stantive law and whether there are any genuine issues of

material fact.” Galvin v. Hay, 374 F.3d 739, 745 (9th Cir.

2004). 

I.

[1] We agree with Alvarez’s contention that summary judgment would have been inappropriate on the available record

had RLUIPA’s standard been applied to his religious exercise

claim. Under Turner, which governs inmate free exercise

claims brought under the First Amendment, prison restrictions

will be upheld as long as they are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418

F.3d 989, 997-98 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S.

at 89). By contrast, RLUIPA disallows policies that impose “a

substantial burden on . . . religious exercise” unless the burden “furthers ‘a compelling governmental interest,’ and does

so by ‘the least restrictive means.’ ” Id. at 994 (quoting 42

U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)). 

[2] The district court’s analysis did not take account of

RLUIPA, which “accord[s] religious exercise heightened protection from government-imposed burdens.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714 (2005). In finding that Alvarez’s

religious exercise was not substantially burdened, the district

court required him to show he was prevented from “engaging

in conduct mandated by his religious faith.”

3

 RLUIPA, however, defines “religious exercise” to include “any exercise of

religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system

of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (emphasis

added). Moreover, the district court accepted the govern3As we noted in Shakur v. Schriro, No. 05-16705, ___ F.3d ___, 2008

WL 185496 at *3-4 (9th Cir. Jan. 23, 2008), Freeman’s requirement that

an inmate must show that the prison had burdened “conduct mandated by

his faith” to state a viable free exercise claim under the First Amendment

has been undercut by Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources v.

Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Cf. Freeman, 125 F.3d at 736. 

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ment’s proffered justifications without engaging in the more

searching scrutiny RLUIPA requires. Under RLUIPA, prison

officials bear the burden of establishing that the restriction

challenged is the “least restrictive alternative to achieve” a

compelling governmental interest. See Warsoldier, 418 F.3d

at 998. “[N]o longer can prison officials justify restrictions on

religious exercise by simply citing to the need to maintain

order and security in a prison.” Greene v. Solano County Jail,

No. 06-16957, ___ F.3d ___, 2008 WL 170313 at *6 (9th Cir.

Jan. 22, 2008). They now must demonstrate that they “actually considered and rejected the efficacy of less restrictive

measures before adopting the challenged practice.” Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 999.

II.

[3] Appellees offer no rebuttal to Alvarez’s suggestion that

genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether their

restrictions on his religious exercise were the least restrictive

means of maintaining prison security, and so essentially concede that a RLUIPA claim would have survived summary

judgment. Instead, they assert that Alvarez pled only a First

Amendment claim, because his “complaint [did] not identify

RLUIPA as the basis for a separate claim.” The contention

that his complaint’s omission of a citation to RLUIPA precludes Alvarez from advancing legal arguments based on that

statute is entirely meritless. We hold that Alvarez’s RLUIPA

claim was presented to the district court because his complaint and subsequent filings provided appellees with “fair

notice” of that claim, even though the statute was not cited in

the complaint itself. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127

S. Ct. 1955, 1969 (2007). 

[4] The form complaint used by Alvarez, which was provided by the prison itself, instructed inmates to “[s]tate here

as briefly as possible the facts of your case”; they were “not

[to] give any legal arguments or cite any cases or statutes.”

(Emphasis in original.) In the space for indicating the “civil

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right” underlying his claim, Alvarez wrote that the appellees

had violated his “First [and] Fourteenth Amendment[ ]” rights

by “ ‘burdening substantially’ . . . his religion.” Alvarez then

pled with commendable — even greater than necessary —

particularity how prison officials were doing just that. See

Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and

Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). He further

alleged that prison officials lacked any valid justification for

these restrictions because the proscribed activities involved no

“breach to security procedure.” Because Alvarez’s complaint

contained factual allegations establishing a “plausible” entitlement to relief under RLUIPA, Alvarez satisfied the minimal

notice pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1973 & n.14;

see also Skaff v. Meridien N. Am. Beverly Hills, LLC, 506

F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Rule 8’s concluding admonishment that ‘[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do

substantial justice’ confirms the liberality with which we

should judge whether a complaint gives the defendant sufficient notice . . . .”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f)). This conclusion is bolstered by the “less stringent standards” used to

assess whether a pro se inmate’s complaint places prison officials on notice of the nature of his claims. Jackson v. Carey,

353 F.3d 750, 757 (9th Cir. 2003). 

[5] Appellees’ argument that Alvarez’s complaint failed to

“state a claim” under RLUIPA because he did not cite the

statute misapprehends the function of pleadings in federal

practice. Notice pleading requires the plaintiff to set forth in

his complaint claims for relief, not causes of action, statutes

or legal theories. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “This simplified

notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and

summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and

issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz

v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). A complaint need

not identify the statutory or constitutional source of the claim

raised in order to survive a motion to dismiss. See, e.g.,

Sagana v. Tenorio, 384 F.3d 731, 736-37 (9th Cir. 2004);

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Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004);

Cabrera v. Martin, 973 F.2d 735, 745 (9th Cir. 1992). 

[6] As contemplated by the regime of liberal notice pleading, Alvarez’s subsequent filings refined the factual allegations and legal theories supporting his religious exercise

claims. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 329-30 & n.9

(1989) (recognizing “[r]esponsive pleadings . . . may be necessary for a pro se plaintiff to clarify his legal theories”). His

reference to RLUIPA in his “Motion in Support of Original

Complaint with Law” initially surfaced the statutory basis for

his claim. His opposition to summary judgment described at

length the RLUIPA standard and urged the court to apply it

to the facts alleged in his complaint. Appellees exalt form

over substance by arguing that Alvarez occasionally confused

the relationship between RLUIPA and the First Amendment

and so “effectively state[ed] that [his] citations to RLUIPA

. . . are not to be read” as asserting a “second, independent

cause of action.” There is no suggestion that appellees were

led astray by Alvarez’s failure to appreciate the technical distinctions they now invoke. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1); Davis

v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 237-38 & n.15 (1979). Indeed,

appellees’ reply to Alvarez’s opposition expressly recognized

the applicability of RLUIPA, conclusively establishing that

they had fair notice that a statutory religious exercise claim

also was being presented to the district court. See Lee v. City

of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 682 (9th Cir. 2001).

[7] Moreover, because Alvarez proceeded pro se, the district court was required to “afford [him] the benefit of any

doubt” in ascertaining what claims he “raised in his complaint

and argued to the district court.” Morrison v. Hall, 261 F.3d

896, 899 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct.

2197, 2200 (2007) (per curiam) (noting that complaint “alone

. . . [was] enough to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2),” but that pro se petitioner also “bolstered his claim by making more specific allegations . . . in later filings”). Even when the plaintiff is

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represented by counsel, and counsel initially “misconceived

the proper legal theory of the claim,” summary judgment does

not follow if the plaintiff is entitled “to relief on some other

legal theory” and “requested as much.” Crull v. GEM Ins.

Co., 58 F.3d 1386, 1391 (9th Cir. 1995). 

[8] Finally, we dispose of appellees’ argument that Henderson v. Terhune, 379 F.3d 709 (9th Cir. 2004), precludes a

RLUIPA claim when the complaint cites only the First

Amendment. There, we “express[ed] no opinion about whether” the challenged regulation violated RLUIPA because the

inmate “brought his claim under the First Amendment, not the

RLUIPA.” Id. at 715 n.1. Appellees’ reliance on Henderson

is misplaced, because at no point did the plaintiff there even

assert a RLUIPA claim. See id. at 711-12. Here, Alvarez specifically raised his RLUIPA theory in his post-complaint filings, thereby apprising appellees before summary judgment

that he was claiming relief under both the First Amendment

and RLUIPA. See Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d

1271, 1292-94 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that plaintiffs could

not proceed with different theory of liability after close of discovery when defendant would be prejudiced by inability to

develop newly relevant evidence and defenses). Appellees

had notice of and the opportunity to challenge Alvarez’s

RLUIPA claim. Consequently, that claim was properly before

the district court at summary judgment and the court erred in

not addressing it. 

Appellees’ rigid insistence that RLUIPA claims must be

specifically pled in the plaintiff’s complaint is without support

in our precedent and frankly puzzling in view of the lenience

traditionally afforded pro se pleadings and of RLUIPA’s manifest purpose of protecting “institutionalized persons who are

unable freely to attend to their religious needs.” See Cutter,

544 U.S. at 721. The “simplified pleading standard applies to

all civil actions, with limited exceptions” provided for by rule

or by statute. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513. Accordingly,

we hold that RLUIPA claims need satisfy only the ordinary

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requirements of notice pleading, and that a complaint’s failure

to cite RLUIPA does not preclude the plaintiff from subsequently asserting a claim based on that statute. Under this

pleading standard, it is sufficient that the complaint, alone or

supplemented by any subsequent filings before summary

judgment, provide the defendant fair notice that the plaintiff

is claiming relief under RLUIPA as well as the First Amendment. 

[9] Having concluded that the district court erred in not

addressing Alvarez’s RLUIPA claim, we vacate its grant of

summary judgment as to his religious exercise claims without

reaching his constitutional arguments in support of reversal.

See Anchustegui v. Dep’t of Agric., 257 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th

Cir. 2001). 

This panel shall retain jurisdiction over any subsequent

appeals in this matter. Alvarez shall recover his costs on

appeal. 

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART;

REMANDED.

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