Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_01-cv-00245/USCOURTS-azd-4_01-cv-00245-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jose Chavez and Maria Elena Chavez, 

Plaintiffs,

v. 

United States of America, et. al,

Defendants. ______________________________________

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No. CV 01-245-TUC-FRZ (JM)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

ON MOTION TO DISMISS

Pending before the Court is Defendant United States of America’s Motion to Dismiss

for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction or In the Alternative for Judgement on the Pleadings

[Doc. 126]. For the reasons explained below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the

District Court, after independent review of the record, grant Defendant’s motion. 

I. Factual Allegations

In the amended complaint (“FAC”), Plaintiffs Jose and Maria Chavez, who are of

Hispanic descent, allege that they own and operate a small shuttle service, known as “Chavez

Shuttle.” FAC ¶ 6. The Chavez Shuttle began operations in the Fall of 1995 and shuttled

customers between Sasabe and Tucson, Arizona. FAC ¶¶ 9-12. Plaintiffs allege that since

its inception, the shuttle van has been stopped by roving Border Patrol agents on almost a

daily basis. FAC ¶ 29. Plaintiffs describe a typical stop being initiated by agents activating

their emergency lights, pulling the van over and opening the doors without the consent of the

driver. FAC ¶ 30. The agents, before identifying themselves or presenting identification,

then question the shuttle’s passengers, a process that can last from 5 to 30 minutes. Id. As

is relevant to the instant motion, Plaintiffs contend that the actions of the Border Patrol and

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its agents violate the Fourth Amendment and entitle them to damages and injunctive relief.

FAC ¶¶ 139-146. 

III. Legal Standards

A. Motion to Dismiss Standard

Federal courts may adjudicate only actual cases or controversies. U.S. Const. Art. III,

sec. 2. Absent a true case or controversy, a court is without subject matter jurisdiction over

the matter and Rule 12(b)(1) provides its dismissal. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Under Rule

12(b)(1), subject matter jurisdiction can be challenged in two different ways. Facial attacks

are available where the complaint fails to allege the grounds for federal subject matter

jurisdiction. Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003).

Alternatively, factual attacks or “speaking motions” can be used to attack subject matter

jurisdiction based on extrinsic evidence not contained in the pleadings. Valdez v. United

States, 837 F.Supp. 1065, 1067, aff’d 56 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 1995); Schwarzer, Tashima,

Wagstaffe, Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial § 9:78, at 9-22 (2010). The court may

weigh the evidence and determine the facts to evaluate its ability to hear the case. “[T]he

existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself

the merits of jurisdictional claims.” Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir.

1987). 

B. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Standard

The standard applied on a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is

essentially the same as that applied to Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Judgment on the pleadings is

appropriate when, even if all material facts in the complaint are true, the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir.

2009). However, all inferences reasonably drawn from the facts alleged in the complaint

must be construed against the moving party. Id.

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IV. Discussion

Defendant United States of America contends that the Plaintiffs’ claim for prospective

injunctive relief should be dismissed because Plaintiffs are unable to show that they are in

danger of suffering a real and immediate injury unless the requested relief is granted. At the

Ninth Circuit, the court expressly found that the Plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient in this

regard, finding that “the gravamen of the complaint is an allegation that the roving patrols

have caused injury on numerous occasions and will continue to do so . . . .” Chavez v. United

States of America, No. 05-15458 (9th Cir. March 27, 2007). Nevertheless, the United States

contends that this is no longer the case because their shuttle has not been stopped since 2001,

and based on the observations of Border Patrol agents, they are no longer in business. As

such, the United States contend that any injury they allege is “conjectural and hypothetical.”

Further, the United States argues that reopening the business is not financially feasible due

to the decrease in potential customers. Finally, the reorganization of Border Patrol and the

increase in training and funding “makes it even less likely that the Tucson Station’s policies

and practices in 2009 run afoul of Fourth Amendment law . . . .” 

 In response, Plaintiffs argue that standing is determined at the outset of litigation and,

as such, even if the factors the United States raises were relevant to the availability of

injunctive relief, “such changes could have absolutely no bearing on whether standing

existed at the time the action was initiated.” Next, they allege that any cessation in the

complained of practices came as a result of the filing of this case and not, as the United States

claims, as a result of any change in funding, structure, or policy of the Border Patrol. As to

whether they intend to return to business, Plaintiffs contend that they indeed intend to do so

and that the United States’ analysis of the financial viability of such a move is flawed

because the numbers of persons coming into the United States through Sasabe might increase

if transportation were available. 

Article III standing requires that a party advance an actual case or controversy to

invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts. U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Flast v. Cohen,

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392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968) (“[T]he judicial power of the federal courts is constitutionally

restricted to ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’”). In cases where plaintiffs seek injunctive relief,

the Supreme Court has indicated that standing requires a “credible threat” of recurring injury.

Kolnender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, n. 3 (1983); Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).

To state a claim for equitable relief, in addition to establishing the inadequacy of remedies

at law, a plaintiff must establish “the likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable

injury.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974). This requirement “cannot be met

where there is no showing of any real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will be wronged

again.” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111. Where it is speculative that the plaintiff will be wronged

again, and there is not a sufficient likelihood that the wrong will be similar, Lyons requires

“a finding that this prerequisite of equitable relief has not been fulfilled.” Id.

There is no dispute in the instant case that Plaintiffs have ceased the operation of the

Chavez Shuttle. Thus, the pivotal question in the Court’s evaluation is whether Plaintiffs’

stated intentions of reviving the shuttle service and going back into business is sufficient to

support a finding that they are subject to a real and immediate threat that they will be

wronged again in a manner similar to that alleged in their complaint. Given the

circumstances, the Court finds that they cannot. The undisputed facts show that Plaintiffs

are not conducting business and a string of contingencies would need to be satisfied before

Plaintiffs would be susceptible to future injury. To suffer similar injury, the Plaintiffs here

would need to re-establish their business, begin shuttling passengers in the same area, would

have to be stopped by Border Patrol, and that stop would have to be unsupported under the

Fourth Amendment. That scenario requires contingencies that are not immediate enough to

support a claim for injunctive relief. Simply put, because Plaintiffs no longer operate the

shuttle, their claim for injunctive relief is no longer supported by a credible threat of

immediate injury.

Plaintiffs contend that even if this is the case based on the current facts, standing is

evaluated based on the facts as they existed at the time they filed their complaint. This is

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generally true, but the Ninth Circuit has stated that, “[w]hile standing is determined on the

facts as they existed at the time the complaint was filed, a case becomes moot-and, hence,

non-justiciable- if the requisite personal interest captured by the standing doctrine ceases to

exist at any point during the litigation.” Jacobs v. Clark County School Dist., 526 F.3d 419,

425 (9th Cir. 2008). (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Where events have

occurred that prevent a court from granting effective relief, a claim must be dismissed for

lack of jurisdiction. See GTE Cal. Inc. V. FCC, 39 F.3d 940, 945 (9th Cir. 1994). 

As discussed above, over the long course of this case, events have occurred that would

render the issuance of an injunction a nullity as Plaintiffs are no longer in business and,

therefore, are no longer subject to the type of harassment alleged in their complaint. Without

an ongoing business, Plaintiff do not have a stake in the injunction they originally sought

and, therefore cannot satisfy the redressibility requirement of constitutional standing in

relation to that specific claim.

V. Recommendation

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review

of the record, enter an Order granting Defendant United States of America’s Motion to

Dismiss [Doc. No. 126].

This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court's judgment. 

However, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy

of this recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the District

Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to

the objections. If any objections are filed, this action should be designated case number: CV

01-245-TUC-FRZ. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determination of

the Magistrate

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Judge may be considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of the issues.

See United States v. Reyna-Tapia 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

DATED this 8th day of June, 2010.

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