Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_98-cv-01903/USCOURTS-azd-2_98-cv-01903-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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1 “Dkt.” refers to the documents in this Court’s file. “ROA” refers to the state

court record on appeal (CR-89-0046-AP ). “ME” refers to the minute entries of the state

court. “RT” refers to the state court reporter’s transcript. “Ariz.Sup.Ct.R.” refers to Arizona

Supreme Court’s direct appeal record. “ROA-PCR” refers to the state court record from

Petitioner’s post-conviction relief proceedings (CR-97-0173-PC). Certified copies of the

various state court proceedings were provided to this Court by the Arizona Supreme Court.

(See Dkt. 16.)

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Sean Bernard Runningeagle, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-98-1903-PHX-PGR

DEATH PENALTY CASE

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

AND ORDER

Sean Bernard Runningeagle (Petitioner), a state prisoner under sentence of death,

petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging that

he is imprisoned and sentenced in violation of the United States Constitution. Before the

Court is Petitioner’s Amended Petition, which raised twenty-five claims for habeas relief.

(Dkt. 18.)1

 In previous orders, this Court denied relief for all claims found procedurally

barred. (See Dkt. 90, 108.) This Order addresses the merits of the remaining claims and

Petitioner’s requests for evidentiary development. The Court concludes that Petitioner is not

entitled to habeas relief or to evidentiary development.

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BACKGROUND

The following events, as set forth by the Arizona Supreme Court, resulted in

Petitioner’s conviction and death sentence.

In the early morning of December 6, 1987, Runningeagle, [Corey]

Tilden, and their two friends Orva and Milford Antone, were driving around

Phoenix. Runningeagle wanted parts for his car, so the foursome stopped at the

Davis house, which had a car parked outside. Runningeagle, Tilden and Orva

got out of the car, while Milford remained passed out drunk in the back seat.

Runningeagle used his large hunting knife to remove two carburetors from the

Davis car. Orva put them and an air scoop in the trunk of Runningeagle’s car.

Tilden and Runningeagle also stole a floor jack and tool box. Orva took a

bicycle from the open garage.

Herbert and Jacqueline Williams, an elderly couple, lived next door to

the Davises. Mr. Williams came out of his house and told the young men to

leave or he would call the police. Orva returned to the car, but Runningeagle

and Tilden approached Mr. Williams. Runningeagle concealed his knife by

his side. Tilden carried a large, black flashlight. Runningeagle then began to

tease and scare Mr. Williams with the knife. Mr. Williams retreated and told

Runningeagle to put the knife away. Mrs. Williams then came out of the

house and yelled at them. Tilden confronted Mrs. Williams, argued with her,

and then hit her on the side of the head with the flashlight. Mr. Williams told

them to leave his wife alone, and helped her back into the house.

Runningeagle broke through the Williams’ door with a tire iron,

and he and Tilden barged in.

The noise awakened a neighbor, who heard Mrs. Williams crying and

the words “bring him in” spoken by a tall, young man he saw standing in the

Williams carport. The neighbor called “911,” but by the time the police

arrived, Mr. and Mrs. Williams were dead. Mr. Williams suffered several head

injuries and five stab wounds, three of which were fatal. Mrs. Williams also

suffered several head injuries, one of which fractured her skull and was

possibly fatal, in addition to four stab wounds, three of which were fatal.

The police searched the Williams home. The drawer in which Mrs.

Williams stored her jewelry was open and some jewelry was missing. They

found an empty purse, blood drops and two bloody shoe print patterns. They

discovered Runningeagle’s palm print on the clothes dryer next to the bodies.

Runningeagle discussed the crimes on several occasions before his

arrest. He told his girlfriend that he had been in a fight with two people and

had hit them “full-force.” He showed her his car trunk full of the stolen

property. He showed the hood scoop and carburetors to another friend.

Tilden, too, spoke about the crimes and informed Runningeagle that an

account of the burglary was on the radio and that “they got there an hour after

we left.”

When the defendants were arrested, the police found, among other

things, the Davis air scoop with Runningeagle’s prints on it, two carburetors,

the tool box, Mrs. Williams’ wallet and college pin, a large black flashlight

with Tilden’s prints on it, and the Davis bicycle with Runningeagle’s prints on

the wheel rim. A Phoenix Police Department criminalist matched

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Runningeagle’s shoes with the bloody shoe prints found at the Williams house,

and also found that an inked print of Tilden’s shoes made a pattern similar to

other shoe prints at the house.

Runningeagle, Tilden, and Orva Antone were indicted on two counts

of first degree murder, and one count each of first degree burglary of a

residence, second degree burglary of a residence, third degree burglary of a

car, theft of property valued between $500 and $1000, and theft of property

valued between $250 and $500. Orva Antone pleaded guilty to burglary and

testified for the state at the joint trial.

State v. Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. 59, 61-62, 859 P.2d 169, 171-72, cert. denied, 510 U.S.

1015 (1993).

Petitioner was found guilty on two counts of first degree murder (ROA 51, 52; ME

7/27/88) and sentenced to death. (ROA 290, Special Verdict.) While his direct appeal was

pending he filed, pro se, a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief pursuant to Rule 32 of the

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Dkt. 21, Ex. B & C; ROA 93, 95.) The Arizona

Supreme Court revested jurisdiction in the trial court to resolve the PCR. (Ariz.Sup.Ct.R.

19.) The trial court appointed counsel, who filed a Supplemental PCR and a Second

Supplemental PCR. (Dkt. 21, Ex. D & E; ROA 110, 111.) The trial court summarily denied

post-conviction relief. (Dkt. 21, Ex. F.) Petitioner moved for rehearing, which also was

denied. (Id., Ex. G & H.) Petitioner then sought review in the Arizona Supreme Court.

(Ariz.Sup.Ct.R. 30; ROA-PCR 356.) The Arizona Supreme Court granted review and

consolidated Petitioner’s PCR claims with his direct appeal claims. (Ariz.Sup.Ct.R. 31.) The

Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences and denied postconviction relief. Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. at 59, 859 P.2d at 169. Petitioner moved for

reconsideration (Ariz.Sup.Ct.R. 45), which was denied.

Petitioner, pro se, moved the Arizona Supreme Court to discharge his counsel and

proceed pro se. (Ariz.Sup.Ct.R. 53, 54, 57.) The supreme court granted counsel’s motion

to withdraw and granted Petitioner’s motion to proceed pro se. (Ariz.Sup.Ct.R. 60.) A pro

se writ of certiorari was filed and denied. Runningeagle v. Arizona, 510 U.S. 1015 (1993).

Thereafter, the Arizona Supreme Court issued its mandate and filed in the trial court

a Notice of PCR on Petitioner’s behalf. (Ariz.Sup.Ct.R. 78, 79.) The trial court allowed

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Petitioner to continue to proceed pro se. (ROA-PCR 378.) Petitioner did not comply with

the deadline for filing a second PCR petition, and the trial court summarily dismissed the

post-conviction proceedings. (ROA-PCR 404.)

Next, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court, No. CV94-972-PHX-PGR. The Court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition. The Court

dismissed the amended petition without prejudice, finding that it presented both exhausted

and unexhausted claims and concluding that it was not clear whether state post-conviction

remedies remained available. 

Meanwhile, Petitioner initiated his third PCR proceeding in state court. His third PCR

petition ultimately raised forty claims. (ROA-PCR 417, 447B.) The PCR court summarily

dismissed the petition. (Dkt. 21, Ex. Y.) Petitioner moved for rehearing, which was denied.

(Id., Ex. Z, AA.) Petitioner sought review in the Arizona Supreme Court, which also was

denied. (Id., Ex. BB.)

Petitioner commenced the instant action by moving for appointment of counsel. (Dkt.

1.) The Court appointed counsel and Petitioner filed an Amended Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus. (Dkt. 18.) Respondents filed an Answer limited to the procedural status of

Petitioner’s claims. 

While the procedural status of Petitioner’s claims was under advisement, the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals issued Smith v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2001), calling into

question Arizona’s doctrine of procedural default. This Court deferred its ruling on the

procedural status of Petitioner’s claims pending further review of Smith. (Dkt. 66.) The

United States Supreme Court reversed. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856 (2002) (per curiam).

Contemporaneously, the Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),

which found Arizona’s death penalty sentencing scheme unconstitutional because judges

rather than juries determined the factual existence of the statutory aggravating circumstances

that rendered a defendant eligible for the death penalty. In response, Petitioner moved this

Court for a stay of these habeas proceedings so that he could return to state court and pursue

post-conviction relief based upon Ring. (Dkt. 74.) The Court granted the stay with respect

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to Petitioner’s sentencing claims but denied Petitioner’s request to stay his conviction-related

claims. (Dkt. 79.) 

Subsequently, in an interim Order, the Court ruled on the procedural status of

Petitioner’s conviction-related claims. (Dkt. 90.) In 2004, the United States Supreme Court

held that Ring does not apply retroactively. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004).

Thereafter this Court vacated its stay of the sentencing-related claims, issued an Order

resolving their procedural status, and ordered merits briefing. (Dkts. 102, 108.) Petitioner

submitted briefing and also filed requests for evidentiary development. (Dkt. 115.)

Respondents filed a response, and Petitioner filed a reply. (Dkts. 119, 124.) 

LEGAL STANDARD FOR FEDERAL HABEAS RELIEF

Petitioner filed his amended petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). Therefore, the provisions of the AEDPA govern

consideration of Petitioner’s claims. For properly preserved claims “adjudicated on the

merits” by a state court, the AEDPA established a more rigorous standard for habeas relief.

See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003) (Miller-El I). As the Supreme Court has

explained, the AEDPA’s “‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings’ . .

. demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti,

537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997).

The phrase “adjudicated on the merits” refers to a decision resolving a party’s claim

which is based on the substance of the claim rather than on a procedural or other nonsubstantive ground. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 (9th Cir. 2004). The relevant

state court decision is the last reasoned state decision regarding a claim. Barker v. Fleming,

423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-804

(1991)); Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 664 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Under the AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim

adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless that adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

“The threshold question under AEDPA is whether [petitioner] seeks to apply a rule

of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became final.”

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Therefore, to assess a claim under subsection

(d)(1), the Court must first identify the “clearly established Federal law,” if any, that governs

the sufficiency of the claims on habeas review. “Clearly established” federal law consists

of the holdings of the Supreme Court at the time the petitioner’s state court conviction

became final. Williams, 529 U.S. at 365; see Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649 (2006);

Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). Habeas relief cannot be granted if

the Supreme Court has not “broken sufficient legal ground” on a constitutional principle

advanced by a petitioner, even if lower federal courts have decided the issue. Williams, 529

U.S. at 381; see Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 907 (9th Cir. 2004). Nevertheless, while

only Supreme Court authority is binding, circuit court precedent may be “persuasive” in

determining what law is clearly established and whether a state court applied that law

unreasonably. Clark, 331 F.3d at 1069. 

The Supreme Court has provided guidance in applying each prong of § 2254(d)(1).

The Court has explained that a state court decision is “contrary to” the Supreme Court’s

clearly established precedents if the decision applies a rule that contradicts the governing law

set forth in those precedents, thereby reaching a conclusion opposite to that reached by the

Supreme Court on a matter of law, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but reaches a different result.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06; see Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam). In

characterizing the claims subject to analysis under the “contrary to” prong, the Court has

observed that “a run-of-the-mill state-court decision applying the correct legal rule to the

facts of the prisoner’s case would not fit comfortably within § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘contrary to’

clause.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 406; see Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 974 (9th Cir.

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2004). 

Under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court

may grant relief where a state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the

Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular . . . case” or

“unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context

where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context

where it should apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. In order for a federal court to find a state

court’s application of Supreme Court precedent “unreasonable” under § 2254(d)(1), the

petitioner must show that the state court’s decision was not merely incorrect or erroneous,

but “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409; Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 25.

Under the standard set forth in § 2254(d)(2), habeas relief is available only if the state

court decision was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. Miller-El v.

Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (Miller-El II). A state court decision “based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 340.

In considering a challenge under 2254(d)(2), state court factual determinations are presumed

to be correct, and a petitioner bears the “burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and

convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 240.

As the Ninth Circuit has noted, application of the foregoing standards presents

difficulties when the state court decided the merits of a claim without providing its rationale.

See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160,

1167 (9th Cir. 2002); Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2000). In those

circumstances, a federal court independently reviews the record to assess whether the state

court decision was objectively unreasonable under controlling federal law. Himes, 336 F.3d

at 853; Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167. Although the record is reviewed independently, a federal

court nevertheless defers to the state court’s ultimate decision. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167

(citing Delgado, 223 F.3d at 981-82); see also Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Only when a state

court did not decide the merits of a properly raised claim will the claim be reviewed de novo,

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because in that circumstance “there is no state court decision on [the] issue to which to

accord deference.” Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167; see also, Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012,

1025-26 (9th Cir. 2005); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2003). 

MERITS DISCUSSION

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

In Claims 1(D), 19, and 1(G), Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel at

trial and sentencing. These claims are governed by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984). See Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986, 988 (9th Cir. 1999). To prevail on a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was

deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687. The performance inquiry asks whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering

all the circumstances. Id. at 688-89. “[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is,

the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged

action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Id. at 689. 

 A petitioner must affirmatively prove prejudice by “show[ing] that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “The assessment of prejudice

should proceed on the assumption that the decision-maker is reasonably, conscientiously, and

impartially applying the standards that govern the decision.” Id. at 695. If the state’s case

is weak, there is a greater likelihood of a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial

would have been different. Johnson v. Baldwin, 114 F.3d 835, 839-40 (9th Cir. 1997).

A court need not address both components of the inquiry, or follow any particular

order in assessing deficiency and prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. If it is easier to

dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of prejudice, without evaluating

counsel’s performance, then that course should be taken. Id.

Under the AEDPA, to obtain habeas relief on an ineffective assistance of counsel

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claim, it is not enough for a petitioner to convince a federal habeas court that, in its

independent judgment, the state court applied either prong of Strickland incorrectly. Rather,

the petitioner must show that the state court’s decision was contrary to or involved an

objectively unreasonable application of Strickland. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 697, 699

(2002).

Claim 1(D)

Petitioner argues that his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel was

violated when trial counsel did not join co-defendant Tilden’s motion to sever their trials.

(Dkt. 103 at 9-20.) The Arizona Supreme Court rejected this claim: “Because severance was

not required, counsel’s failure to take a position on the motion to sever was not deficient.”

Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. at 63, 859 P.2d at 173. This decision does not represent an

unreasonable application of Strickland.

Factual Background

During pre-trial proceedings, Tilden moved to sever his trial from Petitioner’s. (ROA

23 (Tilden Record)). Counsel for Petitioner indicated that he took no position on the motion.

(Dkt. 131, RT 5/26/88 at 11-12.) At oral argument on the motion, Tilden contended that his

defense – that he was not present at the crime scene – would be antagonistic to Petitioner’s

defense because it would emphasize the evidence against Petitioner and show the

comparative lack of evidence against Tilden. (Id. at 16.) Tilden’s defense would therefore

lead the jury to disbelieve Petitioner’s insufficient-evidence defense. (Id. at 10.) Tilden also

argued that there would be a “spill over” or “rub off” effect against him due to the greater

amount of evidence against Petitioner. (Id. at 9-12.) Finally, Tilden argued that even with

cautionary instructions the jury would have a difficult time segregating the evidence against

Petitioner and the evidence against him. (Id.)

The trial court denied the motion to sever, concluding that the spillover effect against

Tilden was not disproportionate and that the defenses were not so antagonistic as to be

mutually exclusive. (ME 6/6/88.) 

During trial, Tilden’s defense emphasized the evidence against Petitioner and the lack

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2 In Zafiro, the Supreme Court held that severance is generally required when

there is a “serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the

defendants or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.”

506 U.S. at 539. The Court considered the defendants’ contentions that their defenses were

mutually antagonistic requiring severance. Id. at 540. The Court held that even though the

defendants accused one other of being the guilty party, their defenses were not mutually

antagonistic; rather, the jury reasonably convicted all four defendants. Id.

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of evidence against him. Prior to the cross-examination of Detective Martinsen – the

homicide detective who supervised the processing of evidence – Tilden renewed his motion

to sever. (RT 7/7/88 at 4.) He advised the court that during his cross-examination of

Martinsen, he planned to go back through all the evidence from the murder scene and the

evidence seized at the apartment in order to emphasize the evidence against Petitioner and

the lack of evidence against him. Tilden renewed his argument that the defenses were so

antagonistic to be mutually exclusive. (Id. at 4-6.) Counsel for Petitioner again took no

position on the motion. (Id. at 6.) The trial court denied the motion, repeating that the

defenses were not so antagonistic as to be mutually exclusive. (Id. at 8.)

On direct review of the trial court’s denial of severance, the Arizona Supreme Court

held that Tilden was not prejudiced because even though the evidence against Petitioner was

stronger than the evidence against Tilden, there remained substantial evidence of Tilden’s

guilt. See Runningeagle, 176 Ariz at 68, 859 P.2d at 178. Citing Zafiro v. United States, 506

U.S. 534 (1993), the court held that any risk of prejudice to Tilden was cured by jury

instructions which adequately advised the jury that they were only to consider each

defendant’s conduct based on the evidence that applied to that defendant as if he were being

tried alone.2

 Id. The court further ruled that Tilden’s alibi defense was not antagonistic to

Petitioner’s insufficiency of evidence defense. Id. at 68-69, 859 P.2d at 178-79.

Consequently, the supreme court concluded that since the trial court did not err in denying

Tilden’s motion to sever, Petitioner’s counsel did not render deficient performance by failing

to join the severance motion. Id. at 63, 859 P.2d at 173. 

Discussion

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Petitioner maintains that even though the Arizona Supreme Court correctly identified

Zafiro and Strickland as controlling law, the court unreasonably applied those cases to the

facts of his case in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). (Dkt. 103 at 19.) This Court

disagrees. Petitioner has made no showing that, had counsel joined Tilden’s motion, the trial

court would have severed the proceedings; nor has he demonstrated that he was prejudiced

by a joint trial. See Rastafari v. Anderson, 278 F.3d 673, 689-90 (7th Cir. 2002) (habeas

petitioner not entitled to relief under Strickland because, even if severance had been

appropriate under state law, there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome if

petitioner had been tried separately).

 Generally, if co-defendants have mutually antagonistic defenses, severance may be

necessary. Mutually antagonistic defenses are those which force the jury to disbelieve the

core of one defense in order to believe the core of the other defense. See United States v.

Rashkovski, 301 F.3d 1133, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, a jury’s acceptance of one

party’s defense precludes the acquittal of the other defendant. Id. at 1138. However,

antagonism between defenses or the desire of one defendant to exculpate himself by

inculpating a co-defendant is insufficient to require severance. See United States v.

Throckmorton, 87 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 1996). Similarly, a defendant is not entitled to

severance merely because the evidence against a co-defendant is more damaging than the

evidence against him. See United States v. Martin, 866 F.2d 972, 979 (8th Cir. 1989). 

Based upon Zafiro, the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that Petitioner and Tilden

did not have mutually exclusive defenses: “Tilden claims that he was not guilty because he

was at home on the morning of the murder. Runningeagle argued that the state’s evidence

was insufficient to convict him. The defenses are unrelated. The jury could have believed

both, one, the other or neither. The [trial] court did not err in denying the motion to sever.”

Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. at 69, 859 P.2d at 179. This Court agrees. Because the jury could

have accepted either defense without convicting the other defendant, the defenses in this case

were not mutually antagonistic. 

Petitioner further contends that his right to present a defense was compromised

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because Tilden acted like a second prosecutor by reiterating all of the evidence already

marshaled against Petitioner by the State. (Dkt. 103 at 17.) Prejudice exists if a joint trial

resulted in compromising a specific trial right of one of the defendants. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at

539. However, Petitioner’s right to present a defense was not compromised because he had

the opportunity to challenge the evidence submitted at trial in order to support his defense

of insufficient evidence. 

It was not objectively unreasonable for Petitioner’s counsel not to join Tilden’s

severance motion and Petitioner suffered no prejudice. The Arizona Supreme Court did not

unreasonably apply Strickland when it denied this ineffective assistance claim. Therefore,

Claim 1(D) is without merit.

Claim 19

Petitioner contends that counsel’s performance was deficient because he failed to

move to sever Petitioner’s sentencing proceedings from co-defendant Tilden’s. (Dkt. 115

at 31-40.) Petitioner argues that the joint sentencing proceedings allowed Tilden to

emphasize Petitioner’s guilt and his own lack of culpability; as a result, he was sentenced to

death while Tilden received a life sentence. (Id.) Because the state court did not resolve the

merits of this claim, this Court’s review is de novo. See Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167. 

Legal Standard

The right to effective assistance of counsel applies not just to the guilt phase, but

“with equal force at the penalty phase of a bifurcated capital trial.” Silva v. Woodford, 279

F.3d 825, 836 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Clabourne v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1378 (9th Cir.

1995)). At the penalty phase, because the sentence of death is different in both its severity

and finality, the Eighth Amendment requires that each defendant receive an individualized

sentencing decision. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1976). However, an

individualized sentencing decision does not mean that a defendant is entitled to an individual

penalty phase hearing; it requires only that the sentencing decision is based upon the

character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of the particular offense. See,

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e.g., Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 748 (1990). At the penalty phase, individualized

sentencing requires that the State not limit the discretion of the sentencer, but allow the

sentencer to consider any relevant information offered in mitigation by the defendant. Id.

Factual Background

In order to consider Petitioner’s ineffectiveness argument, the Court reviews the entire

sentencing proceeding, both for Tilden and for Petitioner. At sentencing, Tilden presented

the testimony of psychologist Donald Tatro, who opined that Tilden suffered from a

personality disorder but not an antisocial personality disorder. (RT 11/18/88.) Dr. Tatro

testified that Tilden’s personality disorder was treatable and that he was capable of

rehabilitation. (Id.) Dr. Tatro explained that the rehabilitation prognosis is more difficult for

those manifesting an antisocial personality disorder, because they do not have the same level

of conscience or remorse. (Id.) Following Dr. Tatro’s testimony, Tilden presented a number

of family and friends who testified about his difficult family background, his efforts to

complete his education, and their opinion that the circumstances of the crime were out of

character for him. (RT 11/18/88, 12/9/88.) During closing argument, Tilden argued that his

age – eighteen – was a statutory mitigating factor, and that other mitigating circumstances,

including his difficult family background, personality disorder, love of family, and lingering

doubt about how much Tilden participated in the murders, called for a lenient sentence. (RT

1/13/89.) During closing argument, Tilden focused on his own mitigation; he did not attack

Petitioner by arguing that he had the more prominent role in the crimes. (Id.)

Because Tilden and Petitioner grew up together, counsel for Petitioner took the

opportunity to question Tilden’s witnesses in order to elicit mitigating information

concerning his client. (RT 11/18/88, 12/9/88.) Counsel also brought in family and friends

who testified about Petitioner’s difficult family background and explained that his character

was not consistent with the facts of the crime. 

Following the presentation of aggravation and mitigation evidence, the trial court

scheduled a sentencing hearing. (RT 1/13/89.) At this proceeding, the trial court specifically

noted its constitutional duty to provide for individualized sentencing: “The Court is very

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mindful of the constitutional requirement to individualize and to individually determine all

sentencings. This is particularly true in a capital case. And as required, that I consider all

of the relevant mitigating factors. I will set forth, as I have indicated, my findings separately

as to each defendant, although some will be the same, and I will indicate that and incorporate

that by reference to those findings.” (RT 2/3/89 at 18.) 

Discussion

Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a separate

sentencing proceeding to prevent Tilden from continuing to act like a second prosecutor by

emphasizing Petitioner’s guilt. (Dkt. 115 at 31-40.) However, Petitioner fails to cite any

specific instances of Tilden acting as a second prosecutor during the sentencing proceedings,

and, contrary to Petitioner’s allegations, the record establishes that Tilden’s strategy at

sentencing was to present his own mitigation evidence. (RT 11/18/88, 12/9/88, 1/13/89.)

Specifically, Tilden focused on mitigating evidence regarding his mental health, his age, and

his difficult family background. (Id.) Because Tilden’s counsel did not act as a second

prosecutor at sentencing, Petitioner’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to move for

severance.

Even if Tilden had attempted to shift blame toward Petitioner at sentencing, Petitioner

would not be entitled to relief on this claim. At sentencing, the trial judge was the factfinder

and determined the existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Trial judges are

presumed to know the law and to apply it making their decisions. See Walton v. Arizona, 497

U.S. 639, 653 (1990). This includes filtering out irrelevant evidence presented at sentencing.

Consequently, even if Tilden had attempted to emphasize the evidence against Petitioner and

the relative lack of inculpatory evidence against him, the trial judge, acting as sentencer,

would not consider any irrelevant evidence in determining Petitioner’s appropriate sentence.

See id. 

Furthermore, the trial court specifically discussed its constitutional obligation to

implement individualized sentencing. (RT 2/3/89 at 18.) The court separately considered

the evidence for each defendant, discussing the specific aggravating and mitigating evidence

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presented. (RT 2/3/89.) There is no evidence that the joint sentencing proceeding resulted

in Petitioner being unable to present any evidence that he desired to present. Rather, the

evidence showed that Petitioner benefitted from the joint proceedings because he was able

to use Tilden’s witnesses to present his own mitigation evidence. Therefore, Petitioner was

not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to move for severed sentencing hearings. See Rastafari,

278 F.3d at 690-91 (no evidence that the jury would have balanced factors differently in

separate sentencing proceedings). Moreover, there is no evidence suggesting that the court

would have granted a motion to sever the sentencing proceedings.

Because counsel’s decision not to move for severance at sentencing was neither

deficient nor prejudicial, Claim 19 is without merit.

Claim 1(G)

Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance at trial because counsel

failed to investigate and present a defense asserting that Petitioner did not have the requisite

mental state at the time of the crimes. (Dkt. 103 at 20-23.) This Court’s review is de novo.

See Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167(concluding that if a post-conviction court mistakenly determined

that a claim had been presented on direct appeal and summarily dismissed it in postconviction proceedings based on a rule prohibiting relitigation, habeas court’s review is de

novo). Claim 1-G’s procedural posture is similar to that of Pirtle; review is de novo. 

In Arizona, expert testimony regarding a defendant’s mental disorder short of insanity

is not allowed as an affirmative defense or to negate the mens rea element of a crime. See

State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 541, 931 P.2d 1046, 1051 (1997); see also Clark v. Arizona, 126

S. Ct. 2709 (2006) (upholding the rule established in State v. Mott). “Courts have ‘referred

to the use of expert psychiatric evidence to negate mens rea as a diminished capacity or

diminished responsibility defense.’” Mott, 187 Ariz. at 540, 931 P.2d at 1050. The Arizona

legislature has declined to adopt the defense of diminished capacity. Id.

Here, Petitioner faults counsel for failing to investigate and present evidence of his

mental health at trial. However, short of asserting that Petitioner was insane at the time of

the crimes, such a defense could not have been presented in Arizona. 

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The state of Petitioner’s mental health and the facts of the crime did not support a

defense of insanity and therefore counsel did not render deficient performance in failing to

investigate and present such a defense. At the time of the crime, Petitioner was attending

Scottsdale Community College, taking classes in criminal justice. (RT 11/18/88 at 87-90.)

Results of psychological testing showed that Petitioner’s intelligence quotient was above

average. (ROA 83-A.) The facts of the crime are likewise inconsistent with an insanity

defense. Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. at 61-62, 859 P.2d at 171-72. Petitioner, who was having

carburetor problems with his vehicle, was driving around Phoenix late at night trying to steal

parts for his car. Id. Just prior to the murders, he had used his hunting knife to remove two

carburetors and other parts from a parked vehicle and placed these parts into his car. Id.

When the commotion drew the victims’ attention, Petitioner taunted the elderly couple with

his knife. Id. When they retreated into their home, he broke into the house using a tire iron,

stole some of their belongings, and then murdered them. Id. In summary, because there was

no indication that Petitioner was insane at the time of the crimes, defense counsel did not

render deficient performance in not presenting such a defense at trial.

Petitioner also argues that trial counsel should have further investigated and presented

evidence of intoxication at the time of the crimes as a defense at trial. (Dkt. 103 at 20-23.)

The Court disagrees that this aspect of counsel’s performance constituted ineffective

assistance. 

At the time of Petitioner’s trial, A.R.S. § 13-503 provided that the jury may consider

a defendant’s voluntary intoxication only when the mental state of “intentionally or with the

intent to is a necessary element” of the offense. See State v. Ramos, 133 Ariz. 4, 6, 648 P.2d

119, 121 (1982) (evidence of intoxication allowed to negate the mental state of

“intentionally,” but not the mental state of “knowingly”). Petitioner was charged with first

degree murder; the mental state was alleged alternatively as “intentionally or knowingly.”

(RT 7/27/88 at 10.) Thus, intent was not a necessary element of the first degree murder

charges, and the jury would not have been permitted to consider Petitioner’s intoxication as

a defense. See State v. Schurz, 176 Ariz. 46, 54-55, 859 P.2d 156, 164-165 (1993) (intent is

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not a necessary element of first degree murder where the mental state is alleged alternatively

as “intentionally or knowingly”). Because intoxication was not a viable defense, counsel’s

performance was not ineffective and Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Claim 1(G). 

Claim 2

Petitioner contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by suppressing

evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). (Dkts. 103 at 23-27, 115

at 6-14.) Petitioner alleges that the prosecution improperly withheld information it had

obtained from Manuel Melendez, a jailhouse cell-mate of co-defendant Corey Tilden. (Id.)

Because the prosecution interviewed Melendez, Petitioner contends they must have obtained

material information that was either exculpatory or could have been used as impeachment

in their cross-examination of Orva Antone at trial. (Id.) 

The state court did not actually resolve the merits of this claim. Therefore, this

Court’s review is de novo. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167. 

Legal Standard

Brady requires that the prosecution disclose evidence that is both favorable to the

accused and material either to guilt or to punishment. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,

674 (1985). Impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence is “favorable” and falls

within the Brady rule. Id. at 676. Evidence is “material only if there is a reasonable

probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding

would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 682. In Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435

(1995), the Supreme Court further explained that materiality is evaluated by determining

whether the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a

different light as to undermine confidence in the outcome. See also United States v.

Jernigan, 492 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (“judges must undertake a careful,

balanced evaluation of the nature and strength of both the evidence the defense was

prevented from presenting and the evidence each side presented at trial”) (further citation

omitted). However, the mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have

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helped the defense or might have affected the outcome of the trial or sentence does not

establish materiality in the constitutional sense. See United State v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-

110 (1976). 

Where the defendant is aware of the essential facts enabling him to take advantage of

any potential exculpatory or impeaching evidence, the Government does not commit a Brady

violation by failing to provide the evidence to the defendant. See Raley v. Ylst, 470 F.3d 792,

804 (9th Cir. 2006). Moreover, “[t]here is no constitutional requirement that the prosecution

make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on

a case.” Agurs, 427 U.S. at 109 (further citation omitted); see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,

480 U.S. 39, 59 (1987) (defendant’s right to discover exculpatory or impeachment evidence

does not include the unsupervised authority to search through the government’s files); United

States v. Michaels, 796 F.2d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 1986) (same).

 Factual Background

Petitioner and co-defendants Orva Antone and Corey Tilden were all arrested on

December 19, 1987. (Dkt. 21, Ex. X at 6-7.) Tom Foster was appointed to represent

Petitioner, Roland Steinle and Tom Puklin of the Maricopa County Public Defenders Office

were appointed to represent Corey Tilden, and Richard Gierloff was appointed to represent

Orva Antone. (Id.) Subsequently, Gloria Castillo was appointed as Petitioner’s investigator.

(Id.) On March 7, 1988, Tom Foster was withdrawn as Petitioner’s attorney and Baltazar

Iniguez was appointed to replace him. (Id.) During pre-trial proceedings, Petitioner’s

counsel filed a motion for discovery requesting “all material or information which tends to

mitigate or negate the defendant’s guilt as to the offense charged, or which would tend to

reduce his/her punishment therefore . . . .” (ROA 30.)

During Tilden’s pre-trial incarceration, he was housed in a cell with Manuel

Melendez. (Dkt. 48, Ex. A at 8; Dkt. 21, Ex. X at 7.) Melendez was represented by Randall

Reece, of the Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, and by an outside attorney,

Kenneth Ray. Melendez informed Reece that Tilden had confided with him about the

Williams homicides. (Dkt. 48, Ex. A at 7-10.) Reece, without learning any specific

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information, contacted the prosecution, who interviewed Melendez on more than one

occasion. (Id. at 7-10, 85-88.) In March 1988, Orva Antone entered into a plea agreement

which provided that he would testify about the events of December 6, 1987. (ROA-PCR 73.)

On April 20, 1988, citing a potential conflict of interest, Tilden’ counsel filed a motion

to determine counsel and notified Petitioner’s counsel. (Dkt. 48, Ex. B.) The motion

informed the trial court that the prosecution had been investigating whether Melendez

obtained information from Tilden regarding the Williams homicides. (Id.) The motion

further advised that the trial judge assigned to Melendez’s criminal case, Judge Michael

Ryan, was aware of the potential conflict in the Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office

and had ordered Ray to assume all further responsibilities in representing Melendez. (Id.)

Finally, the motion indicated that the prosecution had advised Tilden that it did not intend

to call Melendez as a witness at trial. (Id.) The trial judge ruled that there was no conflict

of interest necessitating withdrawal by the public defenders representing Tilden because the

prosecution had determined not to call Melendez as a witness. (ME 5/4/88.) Subsequently,

Melendez entered into a plea agreement on his own criminal charges. (Dkt. 48, Ex. A at 4.)

On July 29, 1988, shortly after Petitioner’s and Tilden’s conviction, Judge Ryan

convened a hearing pursuant to Melendez’s motion to withdraw from his plea agreement.

(Dkt. 48, Ex. A.) Melendez testified that the prosecution had visited with him on three

occasions and he had provided them with the information he received from Tilden. (Id. at

6-10.) Melendez further testified that after Antone entered into his plea agreement, he was

informed that the prosecution decided not to call him as a witness. (Id. at 9.)

Despite receiving a copy of the motion to determine counsel from Tilden, Petitioner

never interviewed or obtained information from Melendez regarding his conversations with

Tilden. Petitioner does not know what Tilden confided to Melendez and Petitioner advises

the Court that Melendez is now deceased. (Dkt. 103 at 24.) 

Discussion

The record does not contain any alleged statements that Tilden made to Melendez.

There is a hearing transcript of Melendez testifying that he obtained information from Tilden

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and that he provided this information to the prosecution. (Dkt. 48, Ex. A at 7.) Based on this

record, Respondents contend that Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claim is meritless

because the claim consists solely of speculation that Tilden provided Melendez with

favorable and material information subject to disclosure under Brady. (Dkt. 98 at 20-25.)

Respondents contend that all Petitioner can argue is his own inferences and speculation about

what may have been said. (Dkt. 120 at 11-19.) Citing Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1

(1995), Respondents argue that inferences and speculation about comments Tilden may have

made to the prosecution are insufficient to establish a Brady violation. (Id.) The Court

agrees.

In Wood v. Bartholomew, the petitioner contended that a Brady violation could be

found based upon suppressed polygraph results of witnesses testifying at trial even though

such polygraph evidence was inadmissible under state law. 516 U.S. at 5-6. Petitioner

asserted that if the polygraph evidence had been disclosed, it may have led to the discovery

of admissible exculpatory or impeachment evidence that could have been used in the crossexamination of those witnesses at trial. Id. The Supreme Court rejected this contention,

holding that the polygraph information was not Brady evidence because it was not admissible

and therefore could not have had any effect upon the outcome at trial. Id. at 6. Further, the

Court rejected the contention that the polygraph evidence may have led to the discovery of

admissible evidence. Id. The Court held that a Brady claim founded upon mere speculation

is without merit. Id. at 6. 

Like Bartholomew, Petitioner has not set forth any admissible Brady evidence that

was suppressed by the prosecution. Without identifying and producing such evidence, so

that it can be evaluated in the context of the prosecution’s Brady obligations, Petitioner

cannot meet his burden of showing that the outcome of his trial or sentencing would have

been affected. Petitioner cannot base his Brady claim upon speculation about what Melendez

may have communicated to the prosecution. Consequently, Claim 2 is without merit.

Claim 6

Petitioner alleges that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during trial in violation

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of his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Dkts. 90 at 23-25, 103 at 27-

31.) Specifically, Petitioner complains about two remarks the prosecutor made during his

opening statement. Petitioner contends that the prosecutor made an unconstitutional appeal

to the passion and prejudice of the jury by using the words “horror” and “evil” to describe

Petitioner and the murder scene. (Id.) Petitioner also contends that the prosecution

improperly vouched for the truthfulness of witness Orva Antone. (Id.) 

Legal Standard

The appropriate habeas standard for a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is “the

narrow one of due process, and not the broad exercise of supervisory power.” Darden v.

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). In order to succeed on a claim of prosecutorial

misconduct, a petitioner must prove not only that the prosecutor’s remarks were improper

but that they so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial

of due process. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 645 (1974); see Smith v. Phillips,

455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) (“the touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged

prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor”).

A petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief in the absence of a due process violation even if

the prosecutor’s comments were “undesirable or even universally condemned.” Donnelly,

416 U.S. at 642. 

In evaluating a petitioner’s allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, a court “must

consider the probable effect of the prosecutor’s [comments] on the jury’s ability to judge the

evidence fairly.” United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12 (1985). To make such an

assessment, it is necessary to place the prosecutor’s remarks in context. See Boyde v.

California, 494 U.S. 370, 385 (1990); United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 33-34 (1988);

Williams v. Borg, 139 F.3d 737, 745 (9th Cir. 1998). In Darden, for example, the Supreme

Court assessed the fairness of the petitioner’s trial by considering, among other

circumstances, whether the prosecutor’s comments manipulated or misstated the evidence,

whether the trial court gave a curative instruction, and “the weight of the evidence against

the petitioner.” 477 U.S. at 181-82.

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3 In his briefing, Petitioner attempts to include additional prosecutor misconduct

allegations involving his closing argument. The only exhausted allegations before the Court

are the allegations regarding the prosecutor’s opening statement. (See Dkt. 90 at 23-25.)

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Appeal to Passion and Prejudice:

In his opening statement, the prosecutor described the circumstances surrounding the

murders as follows: 

[The Williams] went out to the kitchen area, started a pot of

coffee, turned the radio on, sat down at the kitchen table. What

happened in the next 10, 15, 20 minutes can only be described

as unspeakable horror. It was evil. What happened in that next

10, 15, 20 minutes ended everything for Jackie and Herbert

Williams. And the cause and the reason that it ended is right

here in the courtroom. The evil is among us.

(RT 6/28/88 at 18.) The trial court sustained defense counsel’s objection, but denied a

mistrial. (Id. at 108-09.)

Petitioner contends that the prosecutor’s inflammatory remarks were aimed at his

character since the word “evil” was not used to describe the events that took place, but used

in reference to him personally.3

 (Dkt. 103 at 28.) Petitioner alleges that the only purpose of

the prosecutorial comment was to inflame the jury and the judge. (Id.)

On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court denied this claim of prosecutorial

misconduct:

Runningeagle argues that the statements were an appeal to passion and

prejudice, entitling him to a new trial. Although the prosecutor’s use of the

words “horror” and “evil” was argument and, thus, objectionable, there was no

appeal to passion or prejudice. The words were merely a characterization of

the evidence. The evidence would show horror. The evidence would show

evil behavior. These were reasonable inferences to be drawn from the

evidence. That inferences were made at the beginning of the case, rather than

at the end of the case where they belonged, does not warrant a new trial. The

court properly denied the motion for mistrial.

Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. at 64, 859 P.2d at 174. This decision does not entitle Petitioner to

habeas relief.

Discussion

Prosecutors may not make comments that are calculated to arouse the passions or

prejudices of the jury. See United States v. Leon-Reyes, 177 F.3d 816, 822 (9th Cir. 1999).

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Therefore, “[a] prosecutor may not urge jurors to convict a criminal defendant in order to

protect community values, preserve civil order, or deter future lawbreaking” because such

comments create a risk that the defendant will be convicted on grounds unrelated to his guilt

or innocence. Id. “On the other hand, a prosecutor may ask the jury to act as a conscience

of the community unless such a request is specifically designed to inflame the jury.” Id. 

Petitioner does not contend that the prosecutor asked the jury to convict him in order

to protect community values, preserve civil order, or deter future lawbreaking. As the

Arizona Supreme Court explained, the comments were objectionable because they were

based upon inferences from evidence yet to be established at trial. Runningeagle, 176 Ariz.

at 64, 859 P.2d at 174.

The Court rejects Petitioner’s claim that the prosecutor’s remarks resulted in a due

process violation. The prosecutor did not manipulate or misstate the evidence. Rather, it is

reasonable to infer that the prosecutor’s comments were a reference to the evil act of murder

rather than a personal attack upon Petitioner’s character. See Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 647

(“court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its

most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will draw that

meaning from the plethora of less damaging interpretations”). Further, the trial court

sustained defense counsel’s objection to the comments (RT 6/28/88 at 18-19) and instructed

the jury not to consider a lawyer’s argument as evidence during its deliberations. (ROA 50.)

Finally, the weight of the evidence against Petitioner was substantial. His palm print and

shoe prints were found at the scene of the crimes. Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. at 61-62, 859

P.2d at 171-72. A co-defendant testified that Petitioner was threatening and taunting Mr. and

Mrs. Williams with his knife, waving it at them as they were retreating toward their house.

Id. The couple was found stabbed to death, lying in their utility room just off the carport area

where Petitioner had broken into their home. Id. Petitioner’s girlfriend testified that shortly

after the murders he told her about being in a fight with two people and hitting them full

force. Id. Subsequently, property belonging to the Williamses and their neighbors was found

in Petitioner’s possession. Id.

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Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court concludes that the state court’s denial of

this prosecutorial misconduct claim was not an objectively unreasonable application of

controlling Supreme Court precedent.

Vouching for Witness:

Petitioner contends that the prosecutor vouched for the truthfulness of the testimony

of Orva Antone. (Dkt. 18 at 60-61.) Specifically, Petitioner contends that because Antone’s

plea agreement contained a provision that required him to testify completely and truthfully,

such vouching violated Petitioner’s constitutional right to due process. (Id.)

In his opening statement the prosecutor commented that:

Mr. Antone was originally charged in this case along with Tilden and

RunningEagle. We will tell you right now, he will testify. He will tell you

what happened that night as he remembers it. Mr. Antone was given a deal.

He has pled to two burglaries in regard to the Davis’ residence, in exchange

for his complete truthful testimony in this case.

RT 6/28/88 at 34. 

The state court did not actually reach the merits of this particular prosecutor

misconduct allegation. Therefore, this Court’s review is de novo. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167.

Discussion

One form of prosecutorial misconduct occurs when a prosecutor vouches for the

credibility of a witness. See Young, 470 U.S. at 18-19; Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339,

359-60 n.15 (1958); United States v. Berger, 295 U.S. 78, 86-88 (1935). “Vouching consists

of placing the prestige of the government behind a witness through personal assurances of

the witness’s veracity, or suggesting that information not presented to the jury supports the

witness’s testimony.” United States v. Necochea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing

United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 533 (9th Cir. 1980)). Vouching constitutes

misconduct because it may lead the jury to convict on the basis of evidence not presented;

it also carries the imprimatur of the government, which may induce the jury to adopt the

government’s judgment rather than its own. See Young, 470 U.S. at 18. 

The Court assumes, without deciding, that during his opening statement the

prosecutor’s comments about the truthfulness of Antone’s testimony constituted improper

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vouching. However, even if the prosecutor’s comments were improper, constitutional error

exists only if the prosecutor’s comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the

resulting conviction a denial of due process. See Thompson v. Borg, 74 F.3d 1571, 1576-77

(9th Cir. 1996) (even assuming improper vouching, vouching did not constitute due process

violation). 

Having evaluated the Darden criteria, the Court concludes that a due process violation

did not occur. See Darden, 477 U.S. at 181-82. First, the prosecutor did not manipulate or

misstate the evidence by referencing the truthfulness provision of the plea agreement. Next,

the trial court instructed the jury not to consider a lawyer’s argument as evidence during their

deliberations. (ROA 50.) Finally, even discounting the testimony of Antone, the weight of

the evidence against Petitioner was substantial. See Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. at 61-62, 859

P.2d at 171-72. The Court concludes that the prosecutor’s comments did not amount to a due

process violation. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief for Claim 6.

Claim 8

Petitioner contends that his death sentence violates the Eighth Amendment because

the state courts did not make a sufficient finding under Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797

(1982). (Dkt. 115 at 15-22.) 

In Enmund, the Supreme Court held that a defendant in a felony murder prosecution

is eligible for the death penalty only if he actually killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill

the victim. 458 U.S. at 797. In Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157-58 (1987), the Court

expanded Enmund’s rule, holding that a felony murder defendant could be sentenced to death

if he was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference

to human life. See also Greenawalt v. Ricketts, 943 F.2d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 1991)

(Enmund satisfied when defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death and was an active

participant in the felonies). 

The jury convicted Petitioner of two counts of first degree murder, as well as other

non-capital counts of burglary and theft. (ROA 51-57.) On direct appeal, Petitioner

contended that the trial court had not made the requisite Enmund finding. Runningeagle, 176

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Ariz. at 64, 859 P.2d at 174. The Arizona Supreme Court rejected this argument:

Enmund is satisfied in this case. It is the substance of the finding rather

than its label which counts. State v. McCall, 160 Ariz. 119, 126, 770 P.2d

1165, 1172 (1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1031, 110 S.Ct. 3289, 111 L.Ed.2d

798 (1990) (finding made in context of rejecting a proffered mitigating factor

satisfies Enmund requirement). Before imposing Runningeagle’s sentence on

the non-capital counts, the trial judge listed as an aggravating circumstance

“[k]illing helpless individuals.” Special Verdict at 10. And, in sentencing

Tilden, the court found that Runningeagle, and not Tilden, did the actual

stabbing. The trial court therefore found Runningeagle in fact killed the

victims, and we agree.

Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. at 64, 859 P.2d at 174. This decision does not entitle Petitioner to

habeas relief.

A state court’s finding that Enmund/Tison is satisfied is sufficient if “after viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact” could

have made the finding beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319

(1979). On habeas review, the provisions of the AEDPA demand an additional level of

deference for state court findings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (petitioner bears the burden

of overcoming by “clear and convincing evidence” the presumption of correctness applicable

to a state court’s factual determinations). “The court must examine the entire course of the

state court proceedings against the defendant in order to determine whether, at some point

in the process, the requisite factual finding as to the defendant’s culpability has been made.”

Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 387-88 (1986), overruled in part on other grounds, Pope

v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 503 n.7 (1987). A state court’s findings regarding Enmund/Tison

are factual determinations which are presumed correct and which Petitioner “bears the heavy

burden of overcoming.” Id.. at 377-78.

Here, the trial court and the Arizona Supreme Court determined that Petitioner

actually committed the Williams murders. Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. at 64, 859 P.2d at 174.

In compliance with Cabana, the state courts made the requisite factual findings regarding

Petitioner’s culpability and these findings are presumed correct. See Cabana, 474 U.S. at

387-88.

To overcome the findings, Petitioner makes general arguments that there was a lack

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of evidence that he murdered the victims and that the evidence only showed that he was

involved in the burglary and theft. (Dkt. 115 at 17-18.) 

Petitioner’s arguments do not satisfy his burden of overcoming the state courts’

factual findings. As Petitioner concedes, his palm print was located on the dryer just over

the bodies of Mr. and Mrs. Williams and his shoe print was positively identified at the

murder scene. (RT 7/19/88 at 15-18, 62-64, 69.) Both Mr. and Mrs. Williams died of

multiple stab wounds. (RT 7/11/88 at 63-69, 73-76, 97.) Petitioner’s knife, which he used

to threaten the couple, was seized from his vehicle and found to be consistent with the

wounds suffered by the victims. (RT 7/12/88 at 57-58, 65-66; 7/11/88 at 89-90.) Such

evidence supports the state courts’ Enmund/Tison finding that Petitioner committed the

murders. Petitioner has not presented clear and convincing evidence to overcome the

presumption of correctness which attaches to the factual determinations made by the trial

court and the Arizona Supreme Court. Therefore, he is not entitled to relief on Claim 8.

Claim 9

Petitioner alleges that his age at the time of the crimes – eighteen – was a statutory

mitigating factor sufficient to call for leniency at sentencing, such that his death sentence

violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment. (Dkt. 18 at 68-69.) Petitioner contends that

the trial court failed to give this mitigating factor proper weight in sentencing him to death

and therefore the trial court’s ruling violates both 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2). (Dkt.

115 at 23.) 

The clearly established Supreme Court law regarding consideration of mitigation

evidence at sentencing is set forth in Lockett v. Ohio and Eddings v. Oklahoma, which hold

that “the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer . . . not be precluded

from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and

any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence

less than death.” Eddings, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. 586, 604

(1978)). While the sentencing court must hear and consider all mitigation evidence, it is free

to determine the weight to accord such evidence. See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114-15; see also

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Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 512 (1995) (“the Constitution does not require a State to

ascribe any specific weight to particular factors, either in aggravation or mitigation, to be

considered by the sentencer”); Williams v. Schriro, 441 F.3d 1030, 1057 (9th Cir. 2006)

(same). Thus, this Court assesses whether the Arizona Supreme Court’s conclusion – that the

trial court considered the proffered mitigation evidence – was contrary to or an unreasonable

application of the principles set forth in Lockett and Eddings and whether Petitioner has met

his burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the state courts made an

objectively unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

state-court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),(d)(2), and(e)(1).

On direct appeal the Arizona Supreme Court denied this claim:

Runningeagle was a day short of his nineteenth birthday when he

murdered Mr. and Mrs. Williams. Although age is a mitigating factor, § 13-

703(G)(5), “[i]n addition to chronological age ... we also look at such factors

as a defendant’s intelligence and past experience to determine whether age is

a mitigating circumstance.” State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 652-54, 832 P.2d

593, 669-70 (1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1084, 113 S.Ct. 1058, 122 L.Ed.2d

364 (1993). Runningeagle is of superior intelligence, and is neither immature

nor younger than his years. He was on felony probation as an adult when he

murdered the Williams. In all events, the extent and duration of his

participation in this cruel and heinous crime minimize age as a mitigating

factor. State v. Gillies, 142 Ariz. 564, 571, 691 P.2d 655, 662 (1984). We find

that the trial court did not err in finding that Runningeagle’s age was not a

mitigating factor sufficient to warrant leniency.

Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. at 66, 859 P.2d at 176. This decision does not entitle Petitioner to

habeas relief.

The state court record demonstrates that both the trial court and the Arizona Supreme

Court expressly considered Petitioner’s age as a statutory mitigating circumstance. Thus, the

state courts met their constitutional obligation and their decision is not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent under § 2254(d)(1). In addition,

Petitioner has not met his burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the state

courts’ factual findings are not supported by the record. The record supports the courts’

findings concerning Petitioner’s chronological age and maturity level. For example, Dr.

Francis Enos performed a psychological evaluation and found that Petitioner had superior

intelligence, that he was in control of his behavior at all times, and that he was not acting

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under any kind of undue influence. (ROA 83.) Dr. Enos concluded that Petitioner’s actions

at the time of the crimes was anti-social, not neurotic or psychotic. (Id.) 

Based on the foregoing, Petitioner is not entitled to relief for Claim 9.

Claim 20

Petitioner challenges the state courts’ conclusion that he committed the murders in an

especially cruel, heinous or depraved manner under A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6). (Dkt. 115 at 40-

47.) Petitioner first argues that Arizona failed to adopt a sufficiently narrow construction of

(F)(6) such that the factor’s application is appropriately directed and limited. Next, Petitioner

contends that there was a lack of evidence to support the application of the (F)(6) aggravating

circumstance to the facts of his case.

In support of its finding of especial cruelty, the Arizona Supreme Court relied upon

the following evidence:

Runningeagle taunted both [elderly] victims with his brutal-looking survival

knife. After the Williams retreated into their home, Runningeagle pursued

them by breaking through the door with a tire iron. One of Mr. Williams’ stab

wounds went through his left forearm, indicating that he was trying to fend off

the attack. Mrs. Williams had a superficial knife wound on her neck consistent

with having a knife pressed to her throat. A neighbor heard Mrs. Williams

crying. Expert testimony established that the Williams lived for three to four

minutes after being stabbed. These facts support the finding that Mr. and Mrs.

Williams suffered, and watched each other suffer, horrible physical and mental

pain before death. The trial court did not err in finding that these murders

were especially cruel.

Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. at 65, 859 P.2d at 175. 

The Arizona Supreme Court cited the following evidence in support of its finding of

a heinous or depraved state of mind. 

Runningeagle contends that even if the victims were helpless and their

killing senseless, as we so find, that is not enough. He argues that a more

substantial factor must be present. While it is true that helplessness and

senselessness may be insufficient in some cases, id. [citing State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 52-53, 659 P.2d 1, 11-12 (1983)], here we have more.

Runningeagle relished the murders. Orva Antone’s testimony that both

defendants laughed as they came back to the car after having murdered the

Williams establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that they enjoyed and relished

the horror they had just inflicted. Runningeagle also bragged to his girlfriend

that he had been in a “good fight.” The trial court did not err in finding that

the murders were committed in an especially heinous or depraved manner.

Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. at 65, 859 P.2d at 175.

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The Arizona Supreme Court’s rulings do not entitle Petitioner to habeas relief. In

Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654-55 (1990), overruled on other grounds, Ring v.

Arizona, 536 U.S. 584(2002), the Supreme Court held that § 13-703(F)(6) was facially

vague. Walton, 497 U.S. at 654. Nevertheless, the Court upheld the factor’s

constitutionality, explaining that the Arizona Supreme Court had construed the terms

heinous, cruel and depraved narrowly enough to guide the discretion of the sentencer. Id. at

655. Therefore, Petitioner’s contention that the (F)(6) factor is unconstitutionally vague is

meritless.

With respect to Petitioner’s contention that the factor was inappropriately applied in

his case, the state courts’ finding of the existence of an aggravating factor is a question of

state law. See Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990). Therefore, federal habeas review

is limited to determining whether the state court’s finding was so arbitrary or capricious as

to constitute an independent due process or Eighth Amendment violation. Id. To assess the

sufficiency of the evidence in support of the factor, the Court applies the “rational factfinder”

standard and asks “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found” the aggravating factor to exist. Id.

at 781 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). “[A] federal habeas court

faced with a record of historical facts which supports conflicting inferences must presume

– even if it does not appear in the record – that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts

in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326.

Further, pursuant to § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual determination

will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the

evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 340.

Under Arizona law, the especially cruel, heinous or depraved factor is satisfied by a

finding of especial cruelty or a finding that the murder is evidenced by especial heinousness

or depravity. See State v. Beaty, 158 Ariz. 232, 242, 762 P.2d 519, 529 (1988). Cruelty is

established when the victim is conscious and suffers physical pain or emotional distress at

the time of the offense. State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 604, 858 P.2d 1152, 1207 (1993) (pain

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4 Even though Petitioner expands the scope of this claim in his briefing, per this

Court’s previous Order (Dkt. 108 at 20-21), Claim 21 is limited to an as applied challenge

to the sufficiency of the evidence of the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance. 

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or distress may be mental or physical). The terms heinous and depraved focus upon a

defendant’s state of mind at the time of the murder as reflected by his words or his actions.

Beaty, 158 Ariz at 242, 762 P.2d at 529. The Arizona Supreme Court evaluates five factors

to determine whether a defendant’s state of mind was heinous or depraved at the time of the

murder: relishing of the murder; infliction of gratuitous violence upon the victim; mutilation

of the victim’s body; senselessness of the crime; and helplessness of the victim. Id. at 242-

43, 762 P.2d at 529-30. 

Based upon the trial record and the facts discussed by the Arizona Supreme Court, this

Court concludes that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the murders were

especially cruel and especially heinous or depraved. In light of such evidence, the state

courts’ determination that the (F)(6) factor was satisfied was not objectively unreasonable.

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on Claim 20.

Claim 21

Petitioner challenges the state courts’ conclusion that the pecuniary gain aggravating

circumstance, A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(5), was satisfied. Petitioner contends that there was

insufficient evidence to show that the murders were committed for pecuniary gain.4

 (Dkt.

115 at 47.) 

A finding that a murder was motivated by pecuniary gain for purposes of § 13-

703(F)(5) must be supported by evidence that pecuniary gain was the impetus, not merely

the result, of the murder. See Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005);

see also State v. Cañez, 202 Ariz. 133, 159, 42 P.3d 564, 590 (2002) (killing the victim and

sole witness of a robbery is powerful circumstantial evidence of an intent to facilitate escape

or hinder detection and providing sufficient evidence that the catalyst for the robbery was

pecuniary gain). 

On direct review of this claim, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected Petitioner’s

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argument that pecuniary gain did not motivate the murders:

But Runningeagle was out to steal that night. He burglarized and stole

from the Davises. The Williams interrupted the Davis burglary in progress. He

killed the Williams to complete the burglary of the Davises. He also killed

them to steal from them. We agree with the trial court that Runningeagle killed

the Williams in expectation of pecuniary gain.

Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. at 65, 859 P.2d at 175. This decision does not entitle Petitioner to

habeas relief.

The evidence showed that Petitioner stole property from the Davises and from the

Williamses. In addition to her fatal stab wounds, Mrs. Williams was also found with a

superficial laceration around her neck, indicating that she had a knife held to her throat at

some point during the altercation. (RT 7/11/88 at 66-67.) Further, the drawer in which she

stored her jewelry was open when the police searched her home. (Id.) The police found Mrs.

Williams’s property in Petitioner’s possession. (See, e.g., RT 12/9/88 at 94-105, 6/29/88 at

64-69, 7/7/88 at 37.) During the attack, Petitioner made no attempt to cover his face or

otherwise conceal his identity from the victims. (RT 7/12/88 at 61-63.) Based upon these

circumstances, a rational fact finder could have determined that Petitioner murdered the

victim in the expectation of pecuniary gain. See, e.g., Williams v. Stewart, 441 F.3d 1030,

1060 (9th Cir. 2006); Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1420 (9th Cir. 1998); Woratzeck v.

Stewart, 97 F.3d 329, 335-36 (9th Cir. 1996); Cañez, 202 Ariz. at 159-60, 42 P.3d at 590-91.

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Petitioner’s Supplemental Traverse Re: Claim 15

Petitioner requests that the Court to reconsider its conclusion that Claim 15, alleging

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, is procedurally barred. Petitioner asserts that new

law, in the form of the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562,

146 P.3d 63 (2006), necessitates reconsideration. The Court disagrees. 

In Bennett, the court ruled that if the same counsel represents a petitioner on direct

appeal and during post-conviction proceedings, then the petitioner, without preclusion, may

file a second post-conviction relief petition in order to claim ineffective assistance of counsel

during direct appeal. In this case, even though the same counsel represented Petitioner for

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both his direct appeal and his initial post-conviction relief petition, Petitioner subsequently

initiated a second post-conviction relief petition. (See Dkt. 90 at 26-27.) During those

proceedings, Petitioner did not allege ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. (Id.)

Thus, Bennett does not apply to this case. The Court therefore denies Petitioner’s request for

reconsideration of the procedural status of Claim 15.

EVIDENTIARY DEVELOPMENT

Petitioner seeks various forms of evidentiary development with respect to his claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel and a Brady violation. The Court considers Petitioner’s

requests pursuant to the following standards.

Discovery

Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides that “[a] judge may,

for good cause, authorize a party to conduct discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, and may limit the extent of discovery.” Rule 6(a), Rules Governing § 2254

Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (emphasis added). Thus, unlike the usual civil litigant in

federal court, a habeas petitioner is not entitled to discovery “as a matter of ordinary course,”

Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997); see Campbell v. Blodgett, 982 F.2d 1356, 1358

(1993), nor should courts allow him to “use federal discovery for fishing expeditions to

investigate mere speculation,” Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal.

(Nicolaus), 98 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064,

1067 (9th Cir. 1999) (habeas corpus is not intended to be used as a fishing expedition for

petitioners to “explore their case in search of its existence”) (quoting Aubut v. State of Maine,

431 F.2d 688, 689 (1st Cir. 1970)). To determine whether a petitioner has established “good

cause” for discovery under Rule 6(a), a habeas court must identify the essential elements of

the petitioner’s substantive claim and evaluate whether “specific allegations before the court

show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to

demonstrate that he is . . . entitled to relief.” Bracy, 520 U.S. at 908-09 (quoting Harris v.

Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969)).

Evidentiary Hearing

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Historically, the district court had considerable discretion to hold an evidentiary

hearing to resolve disputed issues of material fact. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312,

318 (1963), overruled in part by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992), and limited

by § 2254(e)(2); Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 1999); Rule 8, Rules

Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (district court judge shall determine if an

evidentiary hearing is required). That discretion is significantly circumscribed by §

2254(e)(2) of the AEDPA. See Baja, 187 F.3d at 1077-78.

Section 2254 provides that:

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court

proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim

unless the applicant shows that –

(A) the claim relies on – 

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered

 through the exercise of due diligence; and 

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and

convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder

would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has interpreted subsection

(e)(2) as precluding an evidentiary hearing in federal court if the failure to develop a claim’s

factual basis is due to a “lack of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner

or the prisoner’s counsel.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 432 (2000). A hearing is not

barred, however, when a petitioner diligently attempts to develop the factual basis of a claim

in state court and is “thwarted, for example, by the conduct of another or by happenstance

was denied the opportunity to do so.” Id.; see Baja, 187 F.3d at 1078-79 (allowing hearing

when state court denied opportunity to develop factual basis of claim). 

When the factual basis for a particular claim has not been fully developed in state

court, the district court must first determine whether the petitioner was diligent in attempting

to develop the factual record. See Baja, 187 F.3d at 1078 (quoting Cardwell v. Greene, 152

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F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir. 1998)). The diligence assessment is an objective one, requiring a

determination of whether a petitioner “made a reasonable attempt, in light of the information

available at the time, to investigate and pursue claims in state court.” Williams, 529 U.S. at

435. For example, when there is information in the record that would alert a reasonable

attorney to the existence and importance of certain evidence, the attorney fails to develop the

factual record if he does not make reasonable efforts to sufficiently investigate and present

the evidence to the state court. See id. at 438-39, 442; Alley v. Bell, 307 F.3d 380, 390-91

(6th Cir. 2002) (lack of diligence because petitioner knew of and raised the claims in state

court, but failed to investigate all the factual grounds for such claims).

Absent unusual circumstances, diligence requires that a petitioner “at a minimum,

seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in the manner prescribed by state law.” Williams,

529 U.S. at 437; see Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir.) (finding no diligence

because petitioner neither requested an evidentiary hearing in the trial court nor filed a state

habeas petition), amended on denial of reh’g, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). The mere

request for an evidentiary hearing, however, may not be sufficient to establish diligence if

a reasonable person would have taken additional steps. See Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d

733, 758 (5th Cir. 2000) (failed to present affidavits of family members that were easily

obtained without court order and with minimal expense); see also McNair v. Campbell, 416

F.3d 1291, 1299-1300 (11th Cir. 2005) (no development of evidence available through

petitioner, family members, and medical literature, and no appeal of denial of funds and

hearing); Cannon v. Mullin, 383 F.3d 491, 500 (5th Cir. 2004) (lack of diligence if petitioner

does not proffer “evidence that would be readily available if the claim were true.”); Koste v.

Dormire, 345 F.3d 974, 985-86 (8th Cir. 2003) (no effort to develop the record or assert any

facts to support claim).

In sum, if this Court determines that a petitioner has not been diligent in establishing

the factual basis for his claims in state court, then the Court may not conduct a hearing unless

the petitioner satisfies one of § 2254(e)(2)’s narrow exceptions. If, however, the petitioner

has not failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in state court, the Court will then

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proceed to consider whether a hearing is appropriate or required under the criteria set forth

by the Supreme Court in Townsend. 372 U.S. 293; see Baja, 187 F.3d at 1078 (quoting

Cardwell, 152 F.3d at 337); Horton v. Mayle, 408 F.3d 570, 582 n.6 (9th Cir. 2005).

Pursuant to Townsend, a federal district court must hold an evidentiary hearing in a

§ 2254 case when: (1) the facts are in dispute; (2) the petitioner “alleges facts which, if

proved, would entitle him to relief;” and (3) the state court has not “reliably found the

relevant facts” after a “full and fair evidentiary hearing,” at trial or in a collateral proceeding.

Townsend, 372 U.S. at 312-13; cf. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 60 (1985) (upholding the

denial of a hearing when petitioner’s allegations were insufficient to satisfy the governing

legal standard); Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir. 1984) (hearing not required when

claim must be resolved on state court record or claim is based on non-specific conclusory

allegations).

 In any other case in which diligence has been established, the district court judge “has

the power, constrained only by his sound discretion, to receive evidence bearing upon the

applicant’s constitutional claim.” Id. at 318 (noting that if a “habeas applicant was afforded

a full and fair hearing by the state court resulting in reliable findings, [the judge] may, and

ordinarily should, accept the facts as found in the hearing.”).

Expansion of the Record

Rule 7 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases authorizes a federal habeas court

to expand the record to include additional material relevant to the petition. Rule 7 provides:

“The materials that may be required include letters predating the filing of the petition,

documents, exhibits, and answers under oath, to written interrogatories propounded by the

judge. Affidavits may also be submitted and considered as part of the record.” Rule 7(b),

Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. The purpose of Rule 7 “is to enable

the judge to dispose of some habeas petitions not dismissed on the pleadings, without the

time and expense required for an evidentiary hearing.” Advisory Committee Notes, Rule 7,

28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254; see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 81-82 (1977). Any time

expansion of the record is sought, the Court must assess whether the materials submitted are

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relevant to resolution of the petition.

Section 2254(e)(2), as amended by the AEDPA, limits a petitioner’s ability to present

new evidence through a Rule 7 motion to expand the record to the same extent that it limits

the availability of an evidentiary hearing. See Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236,

1241 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying § 2254(e)(2) to expansion of the record when intent is to

bolster the merits of a claim with new evidence) (citing Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649,

652-53 (2004) (per curiam)). Thus, when a petitioner seeks to introduce new affidavits and

other documents never presented in state court, for the purpose of establishing the factual

predicate of a claim, he must either demonstrate diligence in developing the factual basis in

state court or satisfy the requirements of § 2254(e)(2)(A) & (B). However, when a petitioner

seeks to expand the record for other reasons, such as to cure omissions in the state court

record, see Dobbs v. Zant, 506 U.S. 357, 359 (1993) (per curiam), establish cause and

prejudice, or demonstrate diligence, the strictures of § 2254(e)(2) do not apply. See Boyko

v. Parke, 259 F.3d 781, 790 (7th Cir. 2001).

Requests for Evidentiary Development

Claims 1(D), 19, and 1(G)

Petitioner seeks evidentiary development in support of his claims that trial counsel

performed ineffectively at trial and sentencing. First, Petitioner seeks a deposition of the trial

judge and discovery of the judge’s personal files related to her denial of the severance

motion. (Dkt. 15 at 81-82.) Next, Petitioner seeks expansion of the record to include certain

ABA Guidelines and the declaration of his trial investigator regarding trial counsel’s overall

performance. (Id. at 82-87.) Petitioner also seeks expansion regarding a number of

declarations and reports related to potential mitigation information. (Id.) Petitioner seeks

an evidentiary hearing at which Tilden’s trial counsel and co-counsel could offer their

opinions regarding whether the trial judge would have granted severance for Petitioner if he

had joined Tilden’s motion. (Id. at 87-88.) Petitioner also wishes to elicit testimony from

his trial investigator about the performance of trial counsel during pre-trial and trial

proceedings, and from expert witnesses about the standards for effective representation of

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capital defendants at trial and during the investigation of mitigation information. (Id.)

The Court has already determined that the Arizona Supreme Court did not

unreasonably apply Strickland when it denied Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim based

on the failure to join Tilden’s severance motion. See Williams (Michael) v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

420, 444 (2000). This Court’s evaluation of the state court ruling denying severance was

necessarily based on the existing state court record. Evidence not a part of the state court

record regarding the severance denial is irrelevant. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 127 S. Ct.

1933, 1940 (2007) (citing Totten v. Merkle, 137 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 1998) (evidentiary

development is not required if the issues can be resolved by reference to the existing state

court record). 

Furthermore, Petitioner’s requests for discovery, expansion of the record, and

additional witness testimony at an evidentiary hearing seek information that is not relevant.

Regarding evidentiary development, this Court directed Petitioner to describe with specificity

the facts he sought to develop in support of specific claims. (Dkt. 108 at 22.) In response,

Petitioner contended that he needed a deposition of the trial judge and discovery of her

personal files. (Dkt. 115 at 81-82.) It is a firmly established rule that a judge may not be

asked to testify about her mental processes in reaching a judicial decision. See Fayerweather

v. Ritch, 195 U.S. 276, 306-07 (1904) (testimony regarding the mental processes of a judge

involving past decision-making is inadmissible evidence); see also United States v. Morgan,

313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (applying the same rule to the administrative decision-making

process).

Petitioner’s requests to expand his state court record also seek information irrelevant

to the disposition of these claims. (Dkt. 115 at 82-87.) The applicable ABA guidelines are

generalized rules of performance and do not enlighten the Court regarding any specific facts

Petitioner seeks to develop. Similarly, the declaration of Petitioner’s trial investigator

regarding the performance of trial counsel does not develop any fact that is relevant to the

disposition of this claim. 

The declarations from Petitioner’s family and friends are likewise irrelevant. They

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are submitted to support an allegation that trial counsel did not investigate and discover

available mitigation. While Petitioner contends that such facts prove that he was prejudiced

by counsel’s performance at sentencing, he has not shown how the lack of a severed

sentencing proceeding prevented him from presenting this evidence. 

Finally, Petitioner seeks an evidentiary hearing to allow Tilden’s counsel and cocounsel to opine whether the trial judge would have granted severance if he had joined

Tilden’s motion. Speculation about how a judge may have ruled on a issue is not relevant

to this claim. Trial judges are presumed to know and to follow the law. See, e.g., Gretzler

v. Stewart, 112 F.3d 992, 1009 (9th Cir. 1997); Jeffers v. Lewis, 38 F.3d 411, 415 (9th Cir.

1994) (en banc) (same). 

The state court record is sufficient to evaluate these aspects of counsel’s performance.

Petitioner’s requests for evidentiary development of his ineffective assistance claims are

therefore denied.

Claim 2

With respect to his claim of a Brady violation, Petitioner requests discovery of records

related to Manuel Melendez from the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, the Maricopa

County Sheriff’s Office, the Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, the Maricopa

County Jail, and the Phoenix Police Department. (Dkt. 115 at 97-104.) Petitioner also seeks

depositions from various individuals affiliated with the County Attorney’s Office and the

Public Defender’s Office who were connected with Melendez and Tilden. (Id.) Petitioner

requests that he be allowed to reserve his request for an evidentiary hearing pending the

results of discovery. (Id.)

Petitioner also requests expansion of the record to include an affidavit from Kyle

Marie Wesendorf, a consultant to former habeas counsel, Benjamin Sanchez. (Dkt. 115 at

104.) The affidavit would indicate that when Sanchez reviewed the prosecution’s file, there

was a handwritten note from some member of the prosecution wondering, and then perhaps

deciding that Tilden was the killer. (Id.; see also No. CV 94-972-PHX-PGR, Dkt. 76.) 

State Court Proceedings

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5 Although technically not a part of the state court proceedings, in Petitioner’s

prior habeas proceeding, he was provided with counsel, co-counsel, a law clerk, and

investigative resources in order to assist him in preparing an Amended Petition. (See No. CV

94-972-PHX-PGR, Dkts. 10, 14, 30 & 42.) In April 1995, Petitioner filed an Amended

Petition raising thirty-eight claims. (Id., Dkt. 46.) Petitioner included Claim 2 in his

Amended Petition. (Id.) Despite law clerk and investigative resources, Petitioner did not

support this claim with any factual development. (Id.) After filing his Amended Petition,

Petitioner commenced his third state PCR proceeding, which also raised thirty-eight claims.

Subsequently, in 1996, this Court dismissed the habeas action without prejudice, concluding

that it was judicially expedient to allow Petitioner’s third PCR to conclude in state court

before determining whether his habeas claims had been exhausted through those state

proceedings. (Id., Dkt. 90.)

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Prior to his trial, Petitioner received notice that the prosecution had discussions with

Manuel Melendez about information he received from Corey Tilden. (Dkt. 48, Ex. B.)

However, there is no indication in the record that Petitioner attempted to interview Melendez

or obtain any information from him before his death in 1995. (Dkt. 103 at 24.) 

In 1995, Petitioner commenced his third PCR, filing his PCR petition in February

1996. (Dkt. 21, Ex. X.) Petitioner brought Claim 2 as a claim of newly discovered evidence,

alleging that Brady evidence regarding Melendez would probably change his verdict or

sentence. (Dkt. 21, Ex. X at 36.) In support of Claim 2, Petitioner filed the hearing transcript

from Melendez’s motion to withdraw from his plea agreement. (See Dkt. 48, Ex. A; ROAPCR 447, Ex. D.) 

In the PCR petition, Petitioner indicated that further facts in support of Claim 2 would

be presented after discovery, investigation, and use of the court’s subpoena power. (Dkt. 21,

Ex. X at 36.) However, during the proceedings, Petitioner did not present any specific

requests for discovery. Instead, he argued that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing and

that at this hearing he would present additional evidence.5

 (ROA-PCR 444 at 55.) The PCR

Court summarily dismissed the claim without holding an evidentiary hearing. (Dkt. 21, Ex.

Y, AA.)

In his third PCR, Petitioner alleged that there was a note in the prosecution file about

Tilden being the killer and asserted that a supporting affidavit would be filed. (See Dkt. 21,

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Ex. X at 40-41; ROA-PCR 417, Ex. H.) No supporting affidavit was ever filed. Petitioner

did acknowledge that former habeas counsel had reviewed the prosecution file before he filed

his third PCR petition. (Id.) 

Discussion

Petitioner contends that he attempted to develop the factual basis of this claim in state

court during his third PCR proceeding but was denied both the opportunity and the resources

to develop the claim. (Dkt. 115 at 104.) As discussed below, however, it was Petitioner’s

lack of diligence in developing the facts in state court that bars him from further developing

the facts during habeas review.

Diligence required Petitioner to make a reasonable attempt, in light of the information

available at the time, to investigate and factually develop Claim 2 in state court. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Petitioner had notice before his trial that Tilden had provided

information to Melendez about the Williams homicides. If Petitioner had been diligent and

utilized his investigative resources, he could have obtained information from Melendez pretrial; nothing prevented him from doing so. See Raley, 470 F.3d at 804 (because petitioner

knew of the existence of the evidence, he could have obtained the evidence through

discovery). If Petitioner had been diligent, he could have presented any potential Melendez

information at his trial, sentencing, or during one of his first two PCR proceedings. Instead,

Petitioner failed to act diligently and did not present this claim until his third PCR. 

Furthermore, under state law Petitioner is required to file, along with his PCR petition,

affidavits, records, and other evidence supporting his claims. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.5.

Petitioner did attach the Melendez hearing transcript, but the transcript did not factually

develop a Brady claim. (See ROA-PCR 417, Ex. D.) In addition, during the PCR

proceedings, Petitioner did not make a reasonable attempt to develop the factual evidence in

support of his Brady claim by making a specific discovery request or other request for

resources. He relied only on a request for an evidentiary hearing, at which he indicated he

would present additional evidence. (ROA-PCR 444 at 55.)

Petitioner’s lack of diligence does not satisfy the requirements of § 2254(e)(2). The

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Court concludes that Petitioner did not make a reasonable attempt, in light of the information

available at the time, to investigate and pursue Claim 2 in state court. Consequently, §

2254(e)(2) bars additional factual development of Claim 2, either through an evidentiary

hearing or expansion of the record. 

Citing Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004), Petitioner also argues that the prosecutor

suppressed the evidence and therefore he was not at fault for failing to develop the evidence

in state court. (Dkt. 124 at 5-6.) In Banks, the Court held the petitioner not at fault for

failing to develop the factual basis of a Brady claim in state court because the prosecutor had

continually suppressed evidence that one of its main trial witnesses had been a police

informant. Because the prosecution had operated under an open file policy and had informed

petitioner that it had disclosed all Brady evidence, the Court held that petitioner was entitled

to rely on the prosecution’s statements. Banks, 540 U.S. at 692-93.

Although Banks stands for the proposition that under certain conditions a petitioner’s

lack of diligence in state court may be excused due to the actions of the prosecution, the

circumstances of this case are distinguishable. In Banks, the petitioner never knew or had

reason to know that the prosecution had withheld information. In contrast, since before his

trial, Petitioner had known of Melendez’s contact with the prosecution. Thus, Petitioner

cannot be excused from investigating and determining whether Brady evidence was available

for use at his trial, sentencing, or in state post-conviction proceedings. Cf. Jaramillo v.

Stewart, 340 F.3d 877, 882 (9th Cir. 2003) (in the context of a Brady allegation, finding

petitioner diligent in state court even though he did not discover an unknown eye witness to

the incident because petitioner did not know and had no reason to know of the new witness

until he discovered that witness years later).

Petitioner states that he only seeks to discover new evidence supporting the merits of

his claim and reserves the right to later request an evidentiary hearing. A petitioner must

establish good cause to be entitled to discovery in a habeas proceeding. See Rule 6, 28

U.S.C. foll. § 2254. When a petitioner seeks to present new evidence not considered by the

state courts, he must first satisfy§ 2254(e)(2) by showing that he is entitled to an evidentiary

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6 Petitioner may overcome a § 2254(e)(2) bar only if he surmounts the

considerable hurdles of § 2254(e)(2)(A) and (B). That is, Petitioner must show either (1) that

his claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law that was previously unavailable and made

retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court; or (2) an instance where the

facts could not have been discovered through the exercise of diligence, see 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(2)(A)(i) & (ii), plus a “convincing claim of innocence.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 435

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B)).

7 Even if the record were expanded to include the Wesendorf affidavit and the

Court assumed that the alleged prosecutor’s note existed, Petitioner would not be entitled to

relief. Certainly, a prosecutor’s musings about who may have been the ultimate killer of the

Mr. and Mrs. Williams is not substantive evidence; rather, it is irrelevant and inadmissible

evidence. Cf. Arbelaez v. State, 775 So.2d 909, 918 (Fla. 2000) (prosecutor’s notes and

outlines are not public records subject to disclosure).

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hearing or an expansion of the record. See, e.g., Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 839-40

(9th Cir. 2001).6

 If a petitioner only seeks to locate new evidence supporting the merits of

his claim, then he has not established good cause for discovery under Rule 6. See Isaacs v.

Head, 300 F.3d 1232, 1249-50 (11th Cir. 2002) (under the AEDPA, a petitioner does not

establish good cause for discovery if he was not diligent in developing the evidence in state

court and the evidence is subject to the § 2254(e)(2) bar); Boyko, 259 F.3d at 792 (discovery

should not be allowed to augment the merits of a claim unless petitioner was diligent under

§ 2254(e)(2)); Charles v. Baldwin, No. CV 97-380-ST, 1999 WL 694716, *2 (D. Ore. 1999)

(same). A petitioner may not avoid a finding of lack of good cause for discovery by

indicating to the Court that he is reserving the right to subsequently request an evidentiary

hearing. See Charles, 1999 WL 694716, *2. It necessarily follows that if the court cannot

consider new factual development because of the application of § 2254(e)(2), then discovery

is not warranted. Boyko, 259 F.3d at 790.

Finally, regarding the Wesendorf affidavit, Petitioner was not diligent in developing

the factual basis of this evidence in his state court proceedings because even though the

information was obtained prior to litigation of the third PCR petition, Petitioner did not file

the affidavit. (See ROA-PCR 417, Ex. H.) Because Petitioner did not exercise diligence in

state court, § 2254(e)(2) bars the introduction of the affidavit into these habeas proceedings.7

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See Wildman, 261 F.3d at 839-40. Based on the foregoing, Petitioner’s motion for discovery,

expansion of the record, and for an evidentiary hearing on Claim 2 is denied.

CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Petitioner has failed to establish entitlement to habeas relief on

any of his claims. The Court further finds, as set forth above, that Petitioner’s requests for

evidentiary development must be denied. 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Rule 22(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that when an appeal

is taken by a petitioner, the district judge who rendered the judgment “shall” either issue a

certificate of appealability (“COA”) or state the reasons why such a certificate should not

issue. Therefore, in the event that Petitioner appeals, this Court on its own initiative has

evaluated the claims within the petition for suitability for the issuance of a COA. See 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c); Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 864-65 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), a COA may issue only when the petitioner “has

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” With respect to claims

rejected on the merits, a petitioner “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). For procedural rulings, a COA will issue only if

reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a

constitutional right and whether the court’s procedural ruling was correct. Id.

The Court finds that reasonable jurists applying the standard of review set forth in this

Order, could not debate its resolution of the merits of Petitioner’s claims. Further, for the

reasons stated in the Court’s Orders regarding the procedural status of Petitioner’s claims

filed on February 6, 2004 (Dkt. 90) and March 10, 2006 (Dkt. 108), the Court declines to

issue a COA with respect to any claims that were found to be procedurally barred.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (Dkt. 18) is DENIED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk of the Court shall enter

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judgment accordingly.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying a certificate of appealability.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court send a courtesy copy of this

Order to Rachelle M. Resnick, Clerk of the Arizona Supreme Court, 1501 W. Washington,

Phoenix, Arizona 85007-3329.

DATED this 27th day of November, 2007.

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