Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00332/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00332-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TIMOTHY LUCKEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

VISALIA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:13-cv-00332-AWI-SAB

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

RECOMMENDING THAT PLAINTIFF’S 

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT BE 

DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND

ECF NO. 7

and

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

RECOMMENDING THAT PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR REMAND BE DENID

ECF NO. 8

Plaintiff Timothy Luckey (“Plaintiff”) is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this 

action. Plaintiff filed the original complaint in this action on March 8, 2013. (ECF No. 1.) On 

April 9, 2013, the Court screened Plaintiff’s original complaint and dismissed it with leave to 

amend. (ECF No. 4.) On May 8, 2013, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 

5.) On May 16, 2013, the Court screened Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and dismissed it 

with leave to amend. (ECF No. 6.) On June 14, 2013, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended 

Complaint. (ECF No. 7.)

For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Second Amended 

Complaint fails to state any claims upon which relief may be granted. The Court recommends 

Case 1:13-cv-00332-AWI-SAB Document 9 Filed 06/20/13 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint be dismissed without leave to amend.

I.

SCREENING

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must dismiss a case filed by a plaintiff 

proceeding in forma pauperis if the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted. In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, the Court 

uses the same pleading standard used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Under Rule 

8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 

is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not 

require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are ‘merely 

consistent with’ a defendant’s liability . . . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and 

plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, although 

a court must accept as true all factual allegations contained in a complaint, a court need not accept 

a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true. Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555).

II.

PLAINTIFF’S FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff names Visalia Unified School District and Jim Sullivan as defendants in the 

Second Amended Complaint. (Second Am. Compl. 2:3-7.) Plaintiff alleges that his rights under 

Title VII were violated while he was employed at Crestwood Elementary. (Second Am. Compl. 

2:11.) Plaintiff filed a complaint with the EEOC on February 22, 2010. (Second Am. Compl. 

2:13-14.) Plaintiff received a Notice of Right to Sue on December 9, 2012. (Second Am. Compl. 

2:15-17.)

Case 1:13-cv-00332-AWI-SAB Document 9 Filed 06/20/13 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he discriminatory acts that are the basis of this suit are” 

“[t]ermination of [his] employment,” “[d]emotion,” “[d]enied equal pay,” “[d]enied equal work,” 

and “[g]eneral harassment.” (Second Am. Compl. 2:18-24.) Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant’s 

conduct is discriminatory with respect to” “race,” “color,” “national origin,” “sex,” and “age.” 

(Second Am. Compl. 2:27-3:5.)

Plaintiff alleges that he “was being discriminated against by Jim Sullivan, after several 

months of alienation, demotions, changes in [his] work assignments that were all beyond what 

anyone could reasonably expect to be in a usual work environment.” (Second Am. Compl. 3:14-

17.) Plaintiff further alleges that he “was meet[sic] with continuaous[sic] hostility and eventually 

[his] work hours were reduced to .25 hrs. daily and finally I was asked to leave.” (Second Am. 

Compl. 3:18-19.) Plaintiff further alleges that “[w]hen the defendants realized that [Plaintiff] had 

filed a complaint with the EEOC ... they then backtracked and told [him] that [his] reduction on 

work hours was due to budget cuts.” (Second Am. Compl. 3:21-23.)

Plaintiff alleges that he met with Fernie Marroquin, a human resources director, on March 

26, 2010. (Second Am. Compl. 4:16-17.) Marroquin told Plaintiff that he was not being 

dismissed, but was receiving a reprimand “for future behavior due to a collective bargaining 

agreement” from Principal Jim Sullivan. (Second Am. Compl. 4:17-19.) Marroquin further 

stated that, due to budget cuts, Plaintiff would only work .25 hours per day the following year and 

would substitute if needed. (Second Am. Compl. 4:19-22.) Plaintiff accepted these terms. 

(Second Am. Compl. 4:22.)

At this meeting, Plaintiff gave Marroquin a letter stating that Plaintiff was filing a letter 

with the EEOC regarding mistreatment by Jim Sullivan. (Second Am. Compl. 4:24-25.) Plaintiff 

was told not to go to campus or discuss the matter or else he would be disciplined or terminated. 

(Second Am. Compl. 4:27-28.) Marroquin also asked Plaintiff to resign, but Plaintiff refused. 

(Second Am. Compl. 5:2.)

Marroquin then told Plaintiff that, if he resigned, Marroquin would personally escort 

Plaintiff to Crestwood Elementary School and allow Plaintiff to inform the staff and students that 

he resigned and was not terminated. (Second Am. Compl. 5:8-11.) Marroquin reiterated the offer 

Case 1:13-cv-00332-AWI-SAB Document 9 Filed 06/20/13 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

in a letter on April 9, 2010. (Second Am. Compl. 5:12.) Marroquin told Plaintiff that he was 

recommending that Plaintiff be permanently dismissed and that if Plaintiff did not accept the 

offer, there would be board hearings and Plaintiff would ultimately be dismissed. (Second Am. 

Compl. 5:12-17.)

On May 13, 2010, Plaintiff accepted the settlement agreement and agreed to resign. 

(Second Am. Compl. 6:8-9.) However, Marroquin did not allow Plaintiff to say goodbye to the 

students. (Second Am. Compl. 6:11-12.) Plaintiff contends that Marroquin “didn’t keep his end 

of the deal.” (Second Am. Compl. 6:18.)

Plaintiff contends that he was retaliated against for “whistleblowing/discrimination.” 

(Second Am. Compl. 6:24-25.) Plaintiff contends that he was retaliated for “whistleblowing” in 

connection with Defendant Jim Sullivan’s arrival as the new supervisor of Crestwood Elementary 

in August 2008. (Second Am. Compl. 7:22-24.) Plaintiff alleges that Sullivan “expressed his 

dislike for me, he was jealous of the good rapport that [Plaintiff] had with the staff and students 

and very soon after his arrival he took aim at [Plaintiff] to assassinate [his] reputation and 

character.” (Second Am. Compl. 7:27-8:1.) Plaintiff contends that Sullivan made Plaintiff 

perform work outside his job description, attempted to alienate Plaintiff from his co-workers and 

students and, on one occasion, issued a disciplinary notice for questioning a teacher about a 

student. (Second Am. Compl. 7:27-8:16.)

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Retaliation/Title VII Claim

Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint attempts to raise a retaliation 

claim under Title VII. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 

2000e, et seq.), it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee for filing 

complaints about an employer’s unlawful employment practices. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3; Ray v. 

Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000). “To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, 

an employee must show that (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) his employer subjected 

him to an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity 

Case 1:13-cv-00332-AWI-SAB Document 9 Filed 06/20/13 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

and the adverse action.” Ray, 217 F.3d at 1240. 

Cases hold that filing a complaint with the EEOC is a protected activity. See id. at 1240 

n.3. However, in order to constitute a protected activity, the plaintiff’s belief that the employer 

engaged in unlawful employment practices must be objectively reasonable. Moyo v. Gomez, 40 

F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 1994); see also McCarthy v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 819 F. Supp. 2d 

923, 932 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (“employee’s formal or informal complaint regarding unlawful 

employment practices is ‘protected activity,’ and a plaintiff need only show that her belief that an 

unlawful employment practice occurred was ‘reasonable.’”). In the retaliation context:

[an] employee’s statement cannot be ‘opposed to an 

unlawful employment practice’ unless it refers to some

practice by the employer that is allegedly unlawful. It is not 

necessary, however, that the practice be demonstrably 

unlawful; opposition clause protection will be accorded 

whenever the opposition is based upon a ‘reasonable belief’ 

that the employer has engaged in an unlawful employment 

practice.

E.E.O.C. v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 1008, 1013 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Sias v. City 

Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695-96 (9th Cir. 1978)).

Cases outside the Ninth Circuit similarly hold that, in order to constitute a “protected 

activity” under Title VII, Plaintiff must allege that he took action against his employer’s illegal 

discriminatory conduct. See Abuelyaman v. Illinois State University, 667 F.3d 800, 814-815 (7th 

Cir. 2011) (“There is no indication that any action was taken to address a concern of illegal 

discrimination...”); Bennett v. Hofstra University, 842 F. Supp. 2d 489, 500 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“in 

order to constitute a protected activity for purposes of a retaliation claim, the complaint must be 

related to discrimination on a basis prohibited by Title VII.”). As the Court of Appeals for the 

District of Columbia held, “if the practice the employee opposed is not one that could reasonably 

and in good faith be regarded as unlawful under Title VII, [the “engaged in protected activity”] 

element is not satisfied.” McGrath v. Clinton, 666 F.3d 1377, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 2012).

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege facts that plausibly support the conclusion that he engaged in 

protected activity. Plaintiff fails to allege facts that demonstrate that Plaintiff had an objectively 

reasonable basis to believe that his EEOC complaint was related to activity that was illegal under 

Case 1:13-cv-00332-AWI-SAB Document 9 Filed 06/20/13 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Title VII. Plaintiff alleges that he was treated unfairly by Sullivan because Sullivan disliked 

Plaintiff and was jealous of the good rapport Plaintiff had with other staff and students. 

Animosity arising from jealousy over Plaintiff’s good rapport is not a protected classification 

under Title VII. Title VII only prohibits discrimination on the basis of an individual’s race, color, 

religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Discriminatory treatment based upon 

classifications outside those specifically enumerated in Title VII are not actionable under Title 

VII. See Stroud v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 544 F.2d 892, 894 (5th Cir. 1977) (“Title VII does not 

purport to ban all discriminations, but only the specific forms enumerated by statute.”); see also

Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Title VII prohibits employment 

discrimination based on any of its enumerated grounds: race, color, religion, sex, or national 

origin.”).

Plaintiff alleges, in conclusory fashion, that he believes Defendant’s conduct was 

discriminatory with respect to Plaintiff’s race, color, national origin, sex and age. (Second Am. 

Compl. 2:27-3:5.) However, Plaintiff does not allege any facts supporting this conclusion. 

Plaintiff does not even identify his race, color, national origin or age, and Plaintiff’s sex can only 

be inferred from his name. There are no allegations related to these classifications anywhere in 

Plaintiff’s complaint. There is no suggestion of any class-based, invidiously discriminatory 

animus in violation of Title VII anywhere in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiff’s 

conclusory allegation of discrimination based on race, color, national origin, sex and age appears 

to be a direct response to this Court’s prior screening order informing Plaintiff that Title VII does 

not apply to discriminatory treatment based on any other classification. (Order Dismissing Pl.’s 

First Am. Compl., With Leave to File a Second Am. Compl. Within Thirty (30) Days 6:6-13.) 

However, Plaintiff did not add any additional allegations supporting the conclusion that he 

suffered discrimination based on his race, color, national origin, sex or age. Plaintiff’s Second 

Amended Complaint only supports the conclusion that Sullivan disliked Plaintiff out of jealousy. 

As the Court informed Plaintiff previously, this does not implicate Title VII. Plaintiff fails to

/ / /

/ / /

Case 1:13-cv-00332-AWI-SAB Document 9 Filed 06/20/13 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

state a claim for retaliation or any other claim under Title VII.

1

B. Plaintiff’s Remaining Claims

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint does not state any cognizable federal claims. It is 

unclear whether Plaintiff intended to raise any other claims2, but Plaintiff’s Second Amended 

Complaint does allude to state law causes of action such as slander and breach of contract. To the 

extent that Plaintiff intended to raise any state law claims in this action, this Court declines to 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. See Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 

484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988).

C. Dismissal Without Leave to Amend

“[A] district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading 

was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of 

other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations and 

citations omitted). However, leave to amend may be denied if the plaintiff was previously 

informed of the deficiencies in his claims and fails to cure those deficiencies. Chodos v. West 

Publishing Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002).

In this case, the Court previously informed Plaintiff of the deficiencies in his claims. 

Plaintiff was given two opportunities to amend to cure the deficiencies in his claims. The 

additional allegations in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint failed to cure the deficiencies in 

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Title VII 

claims cannot possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts. The undersigned recommends 

that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint be dismissed without leave to amend.

/ / /

 

1

To the extent that Plaintiff intended to raise a claim for discrimination or hostile work environment under Title VII, 

that claim would also fail to state a claim since Plaintiff alleged no facts that he suffered discriminatory treatment 

based on race, color, national origin, sex or age.

2

Notably, in light of the ambiguity in Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court previously ordered Plaintiff to separately 

delineate each of his claims in separate sections with separate headings for each claim, such as “First Claim for Relief 

– Title VII Retaliation,” “Second Claim for Relief – Breach of Contract/Settlement Agreement.” (Order Dismissing 

Pl.’s First Am. Compl., With Leave to File a Second Am. Compl. Within Thirty (30) Days 6:22-7:4.) Plaintiff failed 

to comply with this Court’s order.

Case 1:13-cv-00332-AWI-SAB Document 9 Filed 06/20/13 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

D. Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand

On June 14, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Motion to Remand. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff’s 

notice/motion states that “[t]his motion is made due to lack of federal question in the plaintiff’s 

complaint; lack of parties residing in different states and amount demanded does not exceed 

statutory minimum for filing in district court.” (Notice of Mot. to Remand 1:19-20.)

Remand is a procedure whereby a case in federal court is returned to state court after it has 

been removed from state court to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447. This case was originally 

filed in this Court. The remand procedure does not apply because this case was never in state 

court.

Moreover, Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint clearly raises federal claims giving this 

Court subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. Under 28 U.S.C. 1331, this Court has 

original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under federal law. Title VII is a federal law. 

Accordingly, remand would be improper even Plaintiff requested it in the correct context. The 

Court recommends that Plaintiffs motion for remand be denied.

V.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMEDNATIONS

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Second Amended 

Complaint fails to state any cognizable federal claims. Moreover, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s 

Title VII claims cannot be cured by the allegation of other facts.

Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint be DISMISSED, without leave to amend; 

and

2. Plaintiff’s motion to remand be DENIED.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the district judge assigned to this 

action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court’s Local Rule 304. Within thirty (30) 

days of service of this recommendation, any party may file written objections to these findings 

and recommendations with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district judge 

Case 1:13-cv-00332-AWI-SAB Document 9 Filed 06/20/13 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

will review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to appeal the district judge’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 

1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 20, 2013 _ _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:13-cv-00332-AWI-SAB Document 9 Filed 06/20/13 Page 9 of 9