Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_06-cv-02429/USCOURTS-azd-3_06-cv-02429-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James Oliver,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Mr. Chris Long,

Ms. Sandra Wagner,

Defendants. 

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No. CV-06-2429-PCT-LOA

ORDER

 This matter arises on Defendant Sandra Wagner's and Defendant Chris Long's

Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), FED.R.CIV.P.,

filed on January 3, 2007 and February 13, 2007, respectively. (docket # 12 and # 21) Each

Defendant alleges that they have absolute immunity from lawsuits for acts committed in their

official capacity as judicial officers and immunity under the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S.

Constitution. All parties have expressly consented in writing to magistrate judge jurisdiction

pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). (docket # 8, # 17 and # 22) 

Defendants' requests for oral argument are denied as it would not aid the Court's

decisional process. Mahon v. Credit Bur. of Placer County, Inc., 171 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th

Cir.1999). After review of the subject motions, Plaintiff's Responses in opposition thereto

and Defendant Wagner's Reply, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted against each Defendant and, therefore, the subject motions

will be granted. 

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1

 The pleadings are not clear as to the nature of the Plaintiff's traffic violations. The

Complaint often refers to Plaintiff's driver's license. Arizona Revised Statute ("A.R.S.") §

28-3169(A), formerly A.R.S. § 28-423, requires that licensees have their licenses in their

immediate possession when operating a motor vehicle and that a licensee produce the license

when requested to do so by an officer. A.R.S. § 28-1595(B) provides that if an operator fails

or refuses to exhibit an operator's driver license as required by § 28-3169 or if a driver who

is not licensed and who fails or refuses to provide certain evidence of the driver's identity on

request is guilty of a class 2 misdemeanor. 

Defendant Wagner indicates that the civil traffic citation issued to Plaintiff was for

lack of current vehicle registration in the vehicle. (docket # 21 at 2, 5) A.R.S § 28-2153(A)

provides that "[a] person shall not operate . . . on a highway a motor vehicle . . . unless the

motor vehicle . . . has been registered with the department for the current registration year

or is properly registered for the current registration year by the state or country of which the

owner or lessee is a resident."). Proof of such registration must be carried in the vehicle.

A.R.S. § 28-2158(C). 

Traffic violators may be punished or assessed a civil sanction pursuant to A.R.S. § 28-

121; Taylor v. Sherrill, 169 Ariz. 335, 819 P.2d 921 (Ariz. 1991).

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I. BACKGROUND

On October 12, 2006, Plaintiff filed the pending action alleging violations of his

constitutional rights. (docket # 1) Viewing it with liberality in accordance with Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) ("pro se pleadings are held to less stringent standards

than those prepared by attorneys"), the pro se Complaint, entitled a Violation of Oath of

Office, seeks "to recover damages [for] a violation of [Plaintiff's] Constitutional and Civil

rights by two Magistrates of the STATE OF ARIZONA." (Id. at 1) Defendants are two

municipal magistrates, likely employed by the Arizona Town of Thatcher and the City of

Flagstaff, who adjudicated traffic citations given to Plaintiff while he was operating a motor

vehicle within their Town and City.1

 The Complaint alleges that "[t]his case is about due

process of law and not the use or requirement of a 'driver's license.'" (Id.) (emphasis omitted)

It references Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986 and attaches the following exhibits: (1)

Plaintiff's pro se June 14, 2004 Administrative Notice to the Director of the California

Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") informing him, inter alia, of Plaintiff's unilateral

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2

 No allegation is raised that either, or both, of the Defendants refused a formal request

for in forma pauperis status to appeal either of their judicial decisions. Therefore, the Court

will not address claims not raised in the Complaint.

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"cancellation of any and all contracts and invisible attachments with DMV - STATE OF

CALIFORNIA and the said contract is now, NUNC PRO TUNC, NULLIFIED - VOID"; (2)

a copy of the June 23, 2004 letter to Plaintiff from B.B. Jones, a California DMV employee,

advising Plaintiff that notwithstanding his cancellation of his driver's license and vehicle

registration, Plaintiff is "not reliev[ed] of [his] responsibilities under the law as a vehicle

owner or driver."; (3) a copy of Plaintiff's "Judicial Notice" about which Plaintiff refers in

his Complaint; and (4) various California, Idaho and Montana traffic laws. (Id.; Exhibits

attached thereto) 

Regarding specific allegations of misconduct against the two Defendants, Plaintiff

complains that they "refused to let me speak to the matter of why I canceled all attachments

to my rights and property." (Id. at 1-2 ) Plaintiff asserts that the judicial officers also “acted

the part of a predetermined result,” "did not want to listen to me [and] refused to read the

Judicial Notice I presented to each of them . . . ." (Id. at 2) "Both Magistrates were indignant

to any facts," and "interrupted me on almost every point of law I was stating, and refused to

let me continue with legal points they seemed to detest." (Id.) (emphasis in original) Plaintiff

also claims he is a "homeless person" and could not afford to file an appeal of the traffic

rulings and that he "asked a court clerk to waive the transcript fee" but he was denied.2

 (Id.

at 2-3) Plaintiff infers that he is above all traffic laws because he claims "I am not part of the

'driver's license compact' used in 47 of the 50 States of the United States of America."

 Each Defendant claims absolute immunity from suit pursuant to judicial immunity

case law and the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. (docket # 12 at 2; docket #

21 at 3) Defendants allege an entitlement to judicial immunity because any alleged

malfeasance or misfeasance were "judicial acts" that were not committed in the "clear

absence of all jurisdiction," citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978), Franceschi

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3

 The Court will not address the merits of Defendants' Eleventh Amendment defense

because they have failed to comply with Rule 56, FED.R.CIV.P., and LRCiv 56.1 by

providing to the Court admissible evidence that the Defendants or their employers, which are

not defendants in this lawsuit, are "arm[s] of the state" under Arizona law. Franceschi, 57

F.3d at 831; County of Sonoma v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 222 Cal.App.3d

1133, 1136-37, 272 Cal.Rptr. 297, 298 (Cal.Ct.App.1990) ( municipal courts are part of the

California “hierarchical system of State courts").

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v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828 (9th Cir.1995), and other legal authority.3

 (docket # 21 at 3; docket

12 at 3)

Plaintiff's Response to Defendant Long's Motion initially cites the Eleventh

Amendment and then continues his erroneous belief that he is not subject to state traffic laws

because he is "not under contract to any Motor Vehicles (sic) Department" which "use equity

law against the people that violates the constitutional rights of the people." (docket # 14 at

2) "I canceled all contracts and invisible attachments to my rights and property with the

CALIFORNIA DMV." (Id.) Plaintiff distinguishes Franceschi, supra, on the ground that

"Mr. Franceschi had a suspended license under the contract law and was still subject to the

terms of the contract. [M]y situation is 180 degrees opposite the cited case. I have NO

Cont[r]act and told the officers citing me and the magistrates that would not listen to me."

(Id.)

Responding to Defendant Wagner's Motion in a pleading entitled Objection to

Motion to Dismiss and SCt Opinion on Judicial Immunity, Plaintiff offers similar arguments

that he made in his other written response. He states, "I tried to warn the Judges that there

was no contract I was part of, as that Driver's license is a contract/compact that strips citizens

of Constitutional rights." (docket # 27 at 1) "The magistrates kept telling me to 'stay on

point', or 'you lost me on that'. I made statements of 'no laws of general application' and 'I am

not part of the contract' (CAL DMV §15000, AZ MV §28 ARS 1852 et seq. and 45 other

STATES)." (Id.) He alleges "[t]he magistrates made no comment to my statements and did

not allow me to explain my cancellation of contract with CALIFORNIA. Arizona and 46

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other States have affiliated into one big zone of rights violation." Plaintiff's arguments were

meritless and frivolous when made in the two Arizona municpal courts and they are meritless

and frivolous here.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6),

the district court considers the legal sufficiency of Plaintiff's claims. A complaint should not

be dismissed unless "it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Vignolo v. Miller, 120 F.3d 1075,

1077 (9th Cir. 1997)(citing Parks School of Business v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th

Cir. 1995)). Dismissal for failure to state a claim can be based on either the "lack of a

cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal

theory." Balistren v. Pacifica Police Department, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss "all factual allegations set forth in the complaint are taken

as true and construed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs." Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250

F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The district

court is not required to accept every conclusion asserted in the complaint as true; rather, the

court "will examine whether conclusory allegations follow from the description of facts

alleged by the plaintiff." Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992)(quoting

Brian Clewer, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 674 F.Supp. 782, 785 (C.D. Cal.

1986)). Where a motion to dismiss is granted, a district court should provide leave to amend

unless it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment. Gompper v. VISX,

Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2002).

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III. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS

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4

 Section 1985(3) prohibits two or more persons from conspiring to “depriv[e], either

directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or

of equal privileges and immunities under the laws ....” Title 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). 

5

 Section 1986 provides that:

Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be

done, and mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed,

and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same,

neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable

to the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused by

such wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have

prevented.

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1986. To bring a § 1986 claim, plaintiff must first show a conspiracy in

violation of § 1985(3). Green v. State Bar of Texas, 27 F.3d 1083, 1089 (5th Cir.1994);

Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa, 896 F.2d 1228, 1230 (10th Cir.1990). 

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Plaintiff brings this lawsuit pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1985(3)4

 and

§ 19865

, alleging violations of his constitutional and civil rights. (docket # 1 at 5-6) By their

terms, these statutes do not create any substantive rights. Chapman v. Houston Welfare

Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 616-18 (1979); Great American Federal Savings &

Loan Association v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 372 (1979). Rather, they provide vehicles for

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Alright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994).

Section 1983 allows individuals to recover damages for deprivations of constitutional rights

that occur under color of state law. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled

on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986). To state a claim under

§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of "any rights [] secured by the Constitution or

laws" of the United States and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by

persons acting under the color of state law. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.

42 (1988). The Complaint herein does not allege violations of any specific federal

constitutional amendment but it contends that "[t]his case is about due process of law."

(docket # 1 at 1) 

Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state shall not

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“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const.

amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court interprets this clause to provide both procedural and

substantive due process protections. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990).

Violations of either procedural or substantive due process provide the basis of a § 1983 suit.

McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1555 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc), cert denied, 513 U.S. 1110

(1995). 

Procedural due process generally requires a state provide a person with notice

and an opportunity to be heard before depriving that person of a property or liberty interest.

Warren v. City of Athens, Ohio, 411 F.3d 697, 708 (6th Cir. 2005); Thompson v. Ashe, 250

F.3d 399, 407 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Courts have long recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment

requires that an individual who is deprived of an interest in liberty or property be given

notice and a hearing.”). A procedural due process claim requires a two-part inquiry: whether

the plaintiff was deprived of a protected interest and if so, whether he received the process

that was due. Jordan v. Lake Oswego, 734 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir.1984); Neal v. Shimoda, 131

F.3d 818, 827 (9th Cir.1997); Kritenbrink v. Crawford, 457 F.Supp.2d 1139, 1145 (D. Nev.

2006). “A liberty interest may arise from the Constitution itself, by reason of guarantees

implicit in the word ‘liberty,’ or it may arise from an expectation or interest created by state

laws or policies.” Neal, 131 F.3d at 827(citations omitted).

A driver's license is a property interest protected by the Fourteenth

Amendment's due process clause. Stoianoff v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 107

F.Supp.2d 439, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971)). In Bell v.

Burson, the Supreme Court accorded due process protection to a state driver's license,

observing that “[o]nce licenses are issued . . . their continued possession may become

essential in the pursuit of a livelihood.” However, “the deprivation by state action of a

constitutionally protected interest in 'life, liberty or property' is not in itself unconstitutional;

what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due process of law.”

Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 125. Another district court found that to have a protected property

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right, an individual must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to the property interest; he

cannot merely have a unilateral expectation of this right. In North Carolina ex rel. Kasler v.

Howard, 323 F.Supp.2d 675, 680-681 (W.D.N.C.2003), affirmed by, 78 Fed. Appx. 231 (4th

Cir. 2003) stated:

 In this case, Petitioners do not have a legitimate claim of entitlement to a

drivers license. “A license to operate a motor vehicle is not a natural or

unrestricted right, nor is it a contract or property right in the constitutional

sense. It is a conditional privilege, and the General Assembly has full authority

to prescribe the conditions upon which licenses may be issued and revoked.”

Joyner v. Garrett, 279 N.C. 226, 235, 182 S.E.2d 553, 559 (1971) (emphasis

added). Therefore, Petitioners cannot maintain a claim that Respondent

violated their due process rights by depriving them of property or liberty.

Id. (citing Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).

IV. JUDICIAL IMMUNITY

All judges, including city magistrates, are absolutely immune from § 1983 suits

for damages due to their judicial acts except when they are taken “in the clear absence of all

jurisdiction.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-357 (1978); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075

(9th Cir. 1986). To determine whether specific acts are entitled to absolute immunity

because they are judicial acts, the district court must consider:

(1) Whether the act is a function normally performed by a judge; and

(2) Whether the act is within the expectations of the parties dealing with the

defendant in the capacity of a judge.

Stump, 435 U.S. at 362; Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075-76; Crooks v. Maynard, 913 F.2d 699,

700 (9th Cir. 1990). The Court must construe these factors “generously in favor of the judge

and in light of the policies underlying judicial immunity.” Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1076.

Judicial immunity is recognized because “judges should be at liberty to exercise their

functions with independence and without fear of consequences,” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.

547, 554 (1967), "from vexatious actions prosecuted by disgruntled litigants.” Forrester v.

White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988). 

Judges enjoy absolute immunity even when their actions are erroneous,

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malicious, in excess of judicial authority, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982)

(citing Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57); Peirson, 386 U.S. at 553-54, or for making grave errors

of law or procedure. Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988).

Impatience, however unpleasant, occasional judicial shortness with an attorney or litigant,

even in the presence of the jury, does not warrant a new trial, much less subject the judge to

§ 1983 liability. United States v. Conway, 53 Fed. Appx. 872 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Liteky

v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994) (“[a] judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom

administration-even a stern and short-tempered judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom

administration-remain immune.”)); Ammons v. Baldwin, 705 F.2d 1445, 1446-48 (11th Cir.

1983) (judge entitled to immunity from a claim that he verbally abused and humiliated

plaintiff); Tanner v. Heise, 879 F.2d 572, 577-78 (9th Cir. 1989).

Regardless of the judge’s status in the judicial hierarchy, a judge has absolute

immunity for acts performed in the judge’s official capacity. O’Neill v. City of Lake Oswego,

642 F.2d 367 (9th Cir. 1981) (pro tem municipal judge); Tanner, 879 F.2d at 577-78

(municipal magistrate); Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387, 396 (11th Cir. 1982) (justice of

the peace). 

Judicial “immunity is overcome in only two sets of circumstances. First, a

judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's

judicial capacity. Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken

in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991)

(citations omitted). Sadoski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 126

S.Ct. 2864 (2006); Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 64 (9th Cir.1974) (judge was not

entitled to immunity for using physical force to remove from the courtroom a person who

refused to leave voluntarily).

V. ANALYSIS

Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity from Plaintiff's lawsuit.

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Considering the factors generously in favor of Defendants in light of the policies underlying

judicial immunity, it is clear and undisputed that the Defendant magistrates were acting in

their official judicial capacity in summarily rejecting Plaintiff's frivolous arguments that by

unilaterally "cancel[ing] all contracts and invisible attachments" to California's Department

of Motor Vehicles Plaintiff is entitled to violate Arizona's traffic laws with impunity. This

"defense" to the state traffic citations was specious and nonsensical. Defendants' denials of

Plaintiff's arguments during his municipal trials or Defendants' giving little weight or no

consideration to Plaintiff's meritless pleading entitled Judicial Notice, which fails to cite one

Arizona case, were normal judicial functions. Judges accept or reject legal arguments in their

roles as decision-makers. The undisputed location of each magistrate's actions or inactions

was each magistrate's courtroom. The findings of criminal guilt or civil responsibility were

the direct result of each magistrate acting in his official judicial capacity and were within the

expectations of any reasonable traffic-court litigant.

Each Defendant had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff's traffic

violations. In Arizona, "[t]he jurisdiction of justice of the peace courts and courts inferior to

the superior court is as provided by law." Bruce v. State, 126 Ariz. 271, 272, 614 P.2d 813,

814 (1980) (citing Arizona Constitution Art. 6, § 32, A.R.S. §§ 22-301 and 22-402(B)). The

statutes are clear and straightforward that municipal courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate

lower-level crimes committed within their city or town. A.R.S. § 22-402 provides in relevant

part:

A. In each city or town incorporated under the general laws of this state, there

shall be a municipal court.

B. Every court established pursuant to subsection A, and every court

established in a city incorporated under the provisions of [A.R.S §-281] or

incorporated under the provisions of a special act or charter, has jurisdiction

of all cases arising under the ordinances of the city or town, and has

jurisdiction concurrently with justices of the peace of precincts in which the

city or town is located, of violations of laws of the state committed within the

limits of the city or town. A.R.S. § 22-402(A) and (B) (emphasis added). This statute expressly grants Arizona

municipal courts concurrent jurisdiction with justices of the peace to adjudicate violations

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of certain state laws committed within the city's or town's limits. State ex rel. Baumert v.

Municipal Court of Phoenix, 124 Ariz. 543, 545, 606 P.2d 33, 35 (Az. App. Ct.1979);

Calloway v. City Court of City of Tucson, 129 Ariz. 456, 632 P.2d 266 (Az. App. Ct.1981).

Moreover, A.R.S. § 22-202(E) expressly authorizes justice courts, and therefore municipal

courts, to adjudicate civil traffic violations. A.R.S. § 22-202(E) ("Actions filed in justice

court against persons alleged to have committed civil traffic violations shall be brought in

any precinct in which the violation is alleged to have occurred.") Regardless of whether

Plaintiff was cited for civil or criminal misdemeanor traffic violations, Defendants had

jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff's failure to possess a valid driver's license and/or failure

to possess current motor vehicle registration while operating a motor vehicle within their

Town or City. A.R.S. §§ 28-1595(B) and 2158(C).

Taking as true and construing the Complaint's allegations in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff, Lee v. City of Los Angeles, supra, Defendants are entitled to absolute

immunity. The fact that the Defendants may have been "indignant" to Plainitff, rude or

impatient by "interrupting" Plaintiff during his arguments, and "refused to read" Plaintiff's

frivolous pleading are not grounds for waiver of judicial immunity. Ammons v. Baldwin,

supra; United States v. Conway, supra. While Judicial Canon 3(B)(4) requires a judge to "be

patient, dignified and courteous to litigants . . . with whom the judge deals in an official

capacity," Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct, 17A, A.R.S. Sup.Ct. Rules, the failure to do

so is not a waiver of absolute judicial immunity. In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 62

F.3d 320 (9th Cir.1995) (failing to allow attorney to present rebuttal was not interference

with effective and expeditious administration of business of courts). 

VI. RULE 11 AND OTHER SANCTIONS

Even though pro se litigants do not have the same training as an attorney and

federal courts generally accord pro se litigants some measure of latitude, the Court finds that

this lawsuit was, at least, frivolous. When Plaintiff attempted to "cancel his contracts and

invisible attachments" with California DMV in 2004, Plaintiff received written notice by B.

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B. Jones' letter that such unilateral action was ineffective to relieve him of his legal

responsibilities. "Whether your [driver's license] or vehicle registration are valid or cancelled

or expired will not result in the removal of your name from department records, and will not

relieve you of your responsibilities under the law as a vehicle owner or driver." (docket # 1;

2nd Exhibit at 1) (emphasis added).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, a party filing a pleading must certify

that to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry

reasonable under the circumstances, the pleading is not being presented for any improper

purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless litigation costs, and that

the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a

nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(1)-(2). "[Rule] 11 provides for the imposition of sanctions when a filing

is frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without factual foundation, or is brought for an

improper purpose." Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir.1996);

Rule 11(c). It applies to lawyers as well as pro se litigants. Ryder v. Elliot, 127 Fed. Appx.

960 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Sanctions may also be imposed on pro se litigants where there is evidence of

bad faith due to multiple proceedings which are unreasonable and vexatious. Wages v.

Internal Revenue Service, 915 F.2d 1230, 1235-36 (9th Cir.1990); Stone v. Baum, 409

F.Supp.2d 1164, 1171 (D. Ariz. 2005). "IFP litigants, proceeding at the expense of

taxpayers, need to be deterred from filing frivolous lawsuits as much as litigants who can

afford to pay their own fees and costs." Warren v. Guelker, 29 F.3d 1386, 1388 (9th

Cir.1994). Federal courts also possess inherent power to impose sanctions, “when the losing

party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Aloe Vera of

America, Inc. v. United States, 376 F.3d 960, 964-65 (9th Cir. 2004); Patton v. County of

Kings, 857 F.2d 1379, 1381 (9th Cir.1988).

The Court will not sua sponte impose sanctions or award attorneys' fees against

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 This federal court also likely does have subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's

claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Normandeau v. City of Phoenix, 2005 WL

3940043, *5 (D. Ariz. 2005). “Disappointed state court litigants sometimes attempt to

overturn state court rulings in federal court § 1983 actions.” Id; (citation omitted) “This

endeavor is frequently doomed to failure.” Id. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower

federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to conduct appellate review of state

court proceedings.

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Plaintiff. If either Defendant elects to seek monetary sanctions or an award of reasonable

attorneys' fees against the allegedly "homeless" Plaintiff, either shall timely file a motion or

any such award will be deemed waived by the Court.

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Wagner's and Defendant Long's Motions to

Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) are GRANTED. (docket # 12

and # 21) The Clerk is directed to enter Judgment against Plaintiff and in favor of

Defendants.6

 Leave to amend is not granted because Plaintiff's claims can not be saved by

amendment.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if either or both Defendants elect to seek

monetary sanctions or awards of reasonable attorneys' fees against Plaintiff, either or both

shall file a motion for such award within 15 days of the entry of Judgment or any such

sanction or award will be deemed waived by the Court.

Dated this 11th day of April, 2007.

Case 3:06-cv-02429-LOA Document 33 Filed 04/12/07 Page 13 of 13