Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01428/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01428-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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Two attorneys, Elizabeth Arleo and Shaun Khojayan, represented Plaintiff in the

above matter, and the fees order established hourly rates for both. Order at 4-7.

However, the motion for reconsideration contests only the Court’s finding with regards

to Ms. Arleo’s billing rate, and the Court therefore addresses only this issue.

Nonetheless, the Court notes that in many respects, the reasoning provided in this

08cv1428-JM (BLM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CATHARINE J. TOMOVICH a/k/a

CATHIE J. TOMOVICH,

Plaintiff,

v.

WOLPOFF & ABRAMSON, L.L.P.,

Defendant. 

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Case No. 08cv1428-JM (BLM)

ORDER DENYING EX PARTE MOTION

FOR RECONSIDERATION OF FEES

AWARD AND TERMINATING CASE

[Doc. No. 35]

The underlying action concerns Defendant’s alleged violations of

the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), and California’s

Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Doc. No. 1. The case

settled in April 2009 (Doc. No. 24) and, on August 7, 2009, this Court

granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s

fees. Doc. No. 34 (Order). On August 14, 2009, Plaintiff filed the

instant ex parte motion for reconsideration of one aspect of the Court’s

fees order: the reasonable hourly rate awarded to one of her attorneys,

Elizabeth Arleo.1

 Doc. No. 35 (Pl. Mot.). Defendant opposed Plaintiff’s

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28 order with regards to Ms. Arleo applies equally to Mr. Khojayan. 

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motion. Doc. No. 36 (Opp’n). After reviewing the motion for

reconsideration and opposition, as well as all previously-submitted

evidence and briefing concerning Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees, and for

the reasons given below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration. 

LEGAL STANDARD

In FDCPA actions, the prevailing party may be awarded “reasonable

attorney’s fees as determined by the court.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3).

Attorney’s fees are calculated by the lodestar method, whereby a court

multiplies the number of hours an attorney reasonably spent on the case

by the attorney’s reasonable hourly rate. McGrath v. County of Nevada,

67 F.3d 248, 252 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,

895 (1984)). An attorney’s reasonable hourly rate is determined by

comparing the requested rate with that “prevailing in the community for

similar services of lawyers with reasonably comparable skill, experience

and reputation.” Camacho v. Bridgeport Financial, Inc., 523 F.3d 973,

979 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11. In

determining the reasonableness of fee requests, the Court also may

consider: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and

difficulty of the issues; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal

service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due

to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) time limitations

imposed by the client or the circumstances; (7) the amount involved and

the results obtained; (8) the undesirability of the case; (9) the nature

and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (10)

awards in similar cases. Christensen v. Stevedoring Services of

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America, 557 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Van Gerwen v.

Guarantee Mu. Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000). 

“To inform and assist the court in the exercise of its discretion,

the burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence- in

addition to the attorney’s own affidavits- that the requested rates [are

reasonable].” Id. at 980 (citing Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n.11). However,

“[d]eclarations from the fee applicant do not conclusively establish the

prevailing market rate.” Id. “The party opposing the fee application

has a burden of rebuttal that requires submission of evidence to the

district court challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the ...

facts asserted by the prevailing party ...” Id. at 980 (citing Gates v.

Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397-98 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

The district court has a “great deal of discretion” to determine

the appropriate hourly rate. Gates, 987 F.2d at 1398. Nonetheless, a

court must provide a “concise but clear explanation of its reasons for

the fee award.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). 

DISCUSSION

In her motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff contends that the

Court improperly relied on the simplicity of the underlying case when

calculating both the number of hours awarded to Ms. Arleo and Ms.

Arleo’s hourly rate. Pl. Mot. at 1-3. Plaintiff therefore requests

that the Court increase Ms. Arleo’s reasonable hourly rate for work on

this case from the previously-assessed $300/hour to $350/hour. Id. at

1. In support of the increased rate, Plaintiff again cites findings

made by two courts (which already were distinguished in this Court’s

previous order), but offers no new facts justifying her request. Id.;

Order at 6-7 (discussing other cases). Defendant argues that the fees

order was properly decided, and distinguishes the authority upon which

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Defendant also argues that the rule of civil procedure under which Plaintiff

brings the instant motion, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60, does not apply here, and that Plaintiff

therefore is barred from moving for reconsideration. Opp’n at 2. However, it is

within the Court’s discretion to revisit its own judgments, and the Court elects to do

so here. See Fidelity Federal Bank, FSB v. Durga Ma Corp., 387 F.3d 1021, 1024 (9th

Cir. 2004); Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd. v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 350 (9th Cir.

1999). 

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Plaintiff relies.2 Opp’n at 3-5. 

When determining fee awards, courts may not use the “novelty and

complexity” of the issues to determine both the reasonable hourly rate

and the reasonable number of hours expended on litigation. Van Skike v.

Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 557 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir.

2009) (citing Blum, 465 U.S. at 898-99). Additionally, “the reasonable

hourly rate is generally determined based upon the prevailing hourly

rate in the community, rather than upon the complexity of the issues,

which should be reflected in the reasonable number of hours.” Id. 

Here, the Court found the underlying FDCPA litigation to be noncomplex, and considered this, among several other factors, when reducing

the total hours used in the lodestar calculation. Order at 8-10. The

Court also considered the simplicity of the case, among other factors,

in calculating Ms. Arleo’s hourly rate. Id. at 5-7. Insofar as the

case’s simplicity was used to determine both the number of hours and the

hourly rate, the Court revisits its previous Order. However, after

reviewing the evidence and arguments pertaining to Ms. Arleo’s hourly

rate, the Court still finds $300/hour to be reasonable. 

1. Expert Declarations Regarding Ms. Arleo’s Hourly Rate.

Both parties submitted expert declarations regarding Ms. Arleo’s

hourly rate. In support of her originally-requested rate of $380/hour,

Plaintiff submitted the Hensley Declaration, drafted by a fees expert

for Ms. Arleo’s work in Gonzales v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC,

05cv171-JAH (RBB) (S.D. Cal. January 28, 2005), a class action pending

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in this District. Doc. No. 29-3 Ex. 3 (Hensley Decl.). However, for

the reasons stated in this Court’s previous fees order, the Hensley

Declaration does not pertain to the instant case:

First, Gonzales is a significantly more complicated case;

a years-long class action that proceeded to trial, and

involved a class certification challenge, multiple dispositive

motions, and motions in limine. This case, on the other hand,

is a simple one. It concerns a single plaintiff and a single

defendant, and the action’s factual basis is almost entirely

comprised of five allegedly improper debt-collection letters

and a number of phone calls to Plaintiff. Complaint.

Discovery was straightforward, and Plaintiff took only one

deposition. Arleo Decl. [Doc. No. 29-3] at 4-5. Similarly,

Plaintiff’s claims are not complex, and several of them could

be resolved by answering simple factual questions, i.e., did

Defendant cease certain debt-collection communications after

Plaintiff requested that it do so. Complaint.

Second, Mr. Hensley’s declaration compares Plaintiff’s

attorneys with those of the nation’s largest law firms,

concluding that the attorneys’ hourly rates “would be gauged

by the rates applicable to complex litigation in the top

civil/commercial firms in the San Diego County community.”

Hensley Decl at 5. Most notably, Mr. Hensley justifies

Plaintiff’s attorneys’ hourly rates by comparing them to those

charged in the 2001-08 Enron securities class-action

litigation, prosecuted by Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman &

Robbins LLP. Hensley Decl. at 13-14. Fees charged in that

case, a historic and notoriously complex action, in no way

inform the reasonable hourly rate in this case. Nor does this

case compare to the “complex litigation” undertaken by the

nation’s largest firms. Hensley Decl. at 5. Although the

rates of local attorneys practicing at large firms may help

determine reasonable fees, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently

compare the rates those attorneys would charge in similar

cases, i.e., simple FDCPA litigation. Hensley Decl.

Order at 4-6.

Although this reasoning includes statements regarding the instant

case’s simplicity, it does not constitute impermissible “doublecounting” of the factor. Van Skike, 557 F.3d at 1048 (holding that

courts may not use same factor to adjust both hours claimed and hourly

rate). Rather, the statements demonstrate that (1) the cases with which

Plaintiff attempts to establish Ms. Arleo’s hourly rate do not involve

“similar services,” (i.e., class-actions, trial and/or dispositive

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motion work, and the exhaustive discovery required of complex litigation

versus singly plaintiff with limited discovery and motion work),

Camacho, 523 F.3d at 979, and (2) there is insufficient evidence that

the lawyers with whom Mr. Hensley compares Ms. Arleo are of similar

“skill, experience or reputation,” (id.). That is, the Court cited the

simplicity of the work required in the instant case not as an

independent basis for establishing Ms. Arleo’s hourly rate, but to

distinguish this case from the unusual and complex cases, which require

significant legal work and attorneys with more expertise and specialized

knowledge, relied upon in the Hensley Declaration. The type of legal

work cited and relied upon by Mr. Hensley in determining an appropriate

hourly rate is not similar to the legal work provided by Ms. Arleo in

this case so Mr. Hensley’s recommendation has minimal value in this

case.

Additionally, the Hensley Declaration largely arrives at so-called

comparable rates by reference to the hourly fees charged “firmwide”

(that is, nationally and/or globally, depending on the firm) of

thousands of attorneys of all levels of experience and in all practice

areas of several “large Los Angeles and San Diego law firms.” Hensley

Decl. at 5-7. Ms. Arleo does not work at a large law firm, and the

instant case involves a specific practice area, FDCPA litigation, in a

specific locale, the Southern District of California. See Camacho, 523

F.3d at 979 (for the purpose of establishing hourly rates, the relevant

community generally is the forum in which the district court sits).

Although courts deciding FDCPA fees may look to non-FDCPA litigation for

comparison, id. at 981, the Hensley Declaration does little to compare

the attorneys and duties cited with Ms. Arleo and her work in the

instant case. Again, the Hensley Declaration fails to demonstrate a

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Defendant also submits a Declaration from Greg Olson, stating that Ms. Arleo’s

reasonable rate is $300-$350/hour. Doc. No. 31 Ex. 5 at 7. However, this figure is

based on little more than Mr. Olson’s statements that the case was narrow in scope and

brought by a single plaintiff. Id. As with the Hensley Declaration, this lack of

specificity diminishes the weight the Court gives to the recommendation. 

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similarity between Ms. Arleo’s education and experience and those of the

comparison attorneys so the recommendation has minimal value in this

case. Plaintiff therefore fails to meet her burden to “produce

satisfactory evidence” that the requested rate is reasonable.

Christensen, 557 F.3d at 980.

A declaration submitted by Defendant’s expert, June Coleman, on the

other hand, more specifically addresses rates charged by FDCPA attorneys

in this district. Doc. No. 31-1 (Coleman Decl.). Of particular

relevance is Ms. Coleman’s description of her own experience and hourly

rate. Ms. Coleman has been an attorney since 1999, and during that time

has practiced “regularly and extensively” in the areas of FDCPA and Fair

Credit Reporting Act defense. Coleman Decl. at 2. She also regularly

has lectured and published articles in the area of collection law, and

works for the national trade organization for debt collectors. Id.

During the time the instant case was prosecuted, Ms. Coleman’s hourly

rate for private clients in the Southern District was $195-$250. Id. at

6. Based on her experience, Ms. Coleman opined that Ms. Arleo’s

reasonable hourly rate “would be no more than $300 per hour, and is more

likely $250 per hour.”3 Id. at 7. 

Ms. Arleo also has been an attorney since 1999. Arleo Decl. Ex. 3

at 1. From 1999 to 2005, she worked at Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes &

Lerach, where she represented plaintiffs in securities, labor, and

consumer cases. Id. at 1-2. Since 2005, she has continued to represent

plaintiffs in class actions (id.), and also has prosecuted a number of

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FDCPA cases in this district. See, e.g., Gonzales, 05cv171-JAH (RBB);

Langley v. Check Game Solutions, 05cv2265-W (AJB) (S.D. Cal. December

13, 2005); Mial v. Elite Recovery Services, 06cv1851-DMS (RBB) (S.D.

Cal. September 13, 2006); Bracken et al. v. Eskanos & Adler, P.C. et

al., 06cv2288-H (BLM) (S.D. Cal. October 11, 2006); Doc. No. 29 at 8

(Plaintiff’s motion for fees, stating Ms. Arleo “has extensive

experience prosecuting consumer, FDCPA and other class actions”). There

is no evidence that Ms. Arleo had any FDCPA experience prior to 2005. 

In light of Ms. Coleman’s experience in FDCPA litigation, and the

fact that she has been practicing law for the same number of years as

Ms. Arleo, Ms. Coleman is the best example provided by either party of

an attorney of “similar skill, experience and reputation” to Ms. Arleo

who performs “similar services” to those performed by Ms. Arleo in the

instant case. Camacho, 523 F.3d at 979. As such, her hourly rate is

directly applicable to this case. However, Ms. Coleman, who has

significantly more years of FDCPA experience (nine as compared to five)

and is a lecturer and author in the field, charges $195-$250/hour in the

Southern District. Coleman Decl. at 6. This fact, combined with Ms.

Coleman’s opinion that Ms. Arleo’s reasonable rate is $250-$300/hour,

recommends a much lower rate than the $350/hour requested by Plaintiff.

On the other hand, Ms. Arleo’s previous experience at a well-known

plaintiff’s law firm, and the fact that she took the instant case on a

contingency fee basis and prevailed, recommend a slight increase in her

hourly rate. See Blum, 465 U.S. at 903 (concurrence, Brennan, J.)

(contingency fees may support a higher hourly rate). Therefore, after

weighing these factors, considering the parties’ declarations, and

giving particular weight to Ms. Coleman’s statements, the Court finds

$300/hour to be a reasonable rate for Ms. Arleo in the instant case.

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2. Fees Awarded to Ms. Arleo in Other FDCPA Cases.

In support of her motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff cites two

orders awarding Ms. Arleo $350/hour: Hess v. Ramona Unified School

District, 2008 WL 5281243 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2008) and Langley, 2007 WL

2701345 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2007). Pl. Mot. at 1. Although courts may

look to other fee awards as evidence of an attorney’s market rate, the

Ninth Circuit recently admonished judges to exercise caution when doing

so. Christensen, 557 F.3d at 1054 (warning courts not to engage in the

“tautological, self-referential exercise” of “recast[ing] fee awards

made by previous courts into ‘market’ rates”) (quoting Student Pub.

Interest Research Group of N.J. v. AT & T Bell Laboratories, 842 F.2d

1436, 1446 (3d Cir. 1988)). Thus, although the Court finds these cases

useful, and looks to them to establish a general range for the value of

Ms. Arleo’s services, its holding in the instant case is not controlled

by the previous awards.

Furthermore, the Court already has distinguished the nature of work

performed in Hess and Langley from that performed in the instant case.

Order at 6-7. In addition to the reasons already stated, the Court

notes that Ms. Arleo’s hourly rate was not contested in Langley, and

that the Hess court based its decision in part on the Defendants’

failure to “support their contention that [Ms. Arleo’s] rates are

unreasonably high with any evidence, such as competing declarations.”

Hess, 2008 WL 5281243 at *3; Langley, 2007 WL 2701345 at *4. Here,

Defendant offered substantial evidence contesting Ms. Arleo’s requested

hourly rate, including two expert declarations, thereby further

differentiating the instant case from Hess and Langley. Doc. No. 31;

Mendenhall v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 213 F.3d 464, 472 (9th Cir 2000)

(fee applicant’s initial burden is not high when request is not

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challenged); Camacho, 523 F.3d at 980 (a “wide spectrum of reasonable

hourly rates” may exist “even for work performed by the same attorney”).

3. Other Factors.

Other factors also argue in favor of a reduced hourly rate for Ms.

Arleo. See Christensen, 557 F.3d at 1053 (listing factors a court may

consider when awarding fees). First, Plaintiff does not allege an

ongoing professional relationship with Ms. Arleo such that a higher

hourly rate would be merited. Id. Second, Ms. Arleo had ample time to

prosecute the case, and there is no evidence, such as requests to

continue deadlines, that she struggled under time pressure. Id. Third,

after reviewing Ms. Arleo’s time sheets, the Court does not find that

Ms. Arleo’s work on Plaintiff’s case was so demanding of time that it

precluded her from accepting other employment. Id.; Arleo Decl. Ex. 1

& Doc. No. 33 Ex. 10 (time sheets). Finally, the amount involved was

minimal and the case settled for a small sum. Christensen, 557 F.3d at

1053; Doc. No. 30 (settlement agreement, filed under seal). 

For the reasons provided above, the Court finds a rate of $300/hour

reasonable for Ms. Arleo’s work on the instant case. Plaintiff’s motion

for reconsideration therefore is DENIED. 

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CONCLUSION

Pursuant to this Court’s original order, Defendant paid Plaintiff

$42,725.95 in attorney’s fees and confirmed payment on September 1,

2009. Doc. No. 37. The instant order resolves the only outstanding

issue, and this case is terminated. The Clerk of Court shall close the

file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 22, 2009

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

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