Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-05085/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-05085-55/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:145 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRISKIT, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

REALNETWORKS, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

 /

NO. C 03-05085 WWS

ORDER DENYING

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

In this action, Friskit, Inc. (Friskit) alleges that defendant Real Networks,

Inc., (Real) infringed five of its patents. Friskit’s patents involve an integrated

media search and playback system. Both parties have moved for summary

judgment. For the reasons stated, both motions are denied.

"Summary judgment, in patent as in other cases, is appropriate where there

is no genuine issue of material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law." Hodosh v. Block Drug Co., Inc., 786 F.2d 1136, 1141 (Fed. Cir.

1986). If the moving party meets their initial burden of establishing that there is

no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts, and the nonmoving party

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"must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A court’s

ultimate inquiry is whether the specific facts set forth by the nonmoving party,

coupled with the undisputed facts, are such that a reasonable jury might return a

verdict in its favor. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809

F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1987). The Court, consequently, draws all inferences in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and presumes that the nonmoving

party's evidence is true. Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1289 (9th

Cir. 1987).

I. REAL’S MOTION

A. Automatic Playback

Real contends that Friskit’s patents only cover media playback from search

results with no user intervention required after the search request. It asserts that

the specifications of the patents state that the disclosed invention is a media search

and playback system wherein a user obtains playback of media in response to a

search request without any further manual steps after the search. Real argues that

because none of the accused products (RealPlayer and Rhapsody) play back media

in response to a search without additional manual steps after a search, they do not

infringe.

Friskit responds that its claims cover several embodiments. Some

purportedly cover automatic playback. U.S. Patent No. 6,484,199 col.40 l.6-18

(filed Mar. 22, 2002). Some purportedly embody “substantially automatic

playback” in which, for example, the user selects the desired results of a search for

insertion into a playlist. U.S. Patent No. 6,389,467 col.43 l.26-46 (filed May 2,

2000). The court has heretofore construed “substantially automatic” as “largely,

but not wholly without human intervention.” (Claim Constr. Order 7.) Thus,

infringement cannot be ruled out as a matter of law based on the interpretation of

the claims.

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Nor does the prosecution history of the patents in suit support Real’s

contention. Real cites Friskit’s argument to the PTO in which it described the

prior art as requiring the user to manually select the links in order to get playback

and asserted, “These (prior art) sites do not achieve the functionality of

embodiments of applicant’s invention. For example, according to one

embodiment, a user can sequentially playback audio from multiple network sites

without having to manually select the link to each network site.”

This alleged disclaimer is open to the interpretation that other embodiments

of the invention require manual selection of links for playback. Those

embodiments include automatic playback as well as substantially automatic

playback.

Real also cites the Notice of Allowability which contains a shorthand

description of the search and playback system. It refers to playback “in a

sequential or automatic manner.” Because the claims specifically refer to

“substantial automatic,” this statement cannot be read as precluding all manual

selection. In short the prosecution history is ambiguous at best.

See Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2003)

(stating that the Federal Circuit has “declined to apply the doctrine of prosecution

disclaimer where the alleged disavowal of claim scope is ambiguous”). Thus the

prosecution history does not necessarily preclude infringement by the accused

products.

B. “Substantially Automatic”

Real contends that to the extent “substantially automatic” could be

interpreted to allow manual playback through the construction “largely, but not

wholly without human intervention,” the phrase is indefinite under 35 U.S.C.

§ 112 and the patents invalid under § 112 paragraph 2.

“By finding claims indefinite only if reasonable efforts at claim

construction prove futile, we accord respect to the statutory presumption of patent

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validity.” Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375

(Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding “to increase substantially” not indefinite). Here, there is

no evidence of such futility; this court was able to arrive at the construction of

“substantially automatic” without encountering insuperable obstacles. Further,

there is nothing about the term “substantially” that makes it inherently indefinite. 

See Exxon, 265 F.3d at 1377. The construction of “substantially” adopted in this

case–“largely but not wholly”– conforms to that adopted by the Federal Circuit. 

LNP Eng’g Plastics, Inc. v. Miller Waste Mills, Inc., 275 F.3d 1347, 1354 (Fed.

Cir. 2001). The question is “whether sufficient structure was disclosed in the

specifications based on the understanding of one skilled in the art.” Atmel

Corp. v. Information Storage Services, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 

Real has failed to make such a showing of insufficient disclosure.

Finally, Real contends that the descriptions are deficient for lack of

enablement. It argues that “substantially automatic” could include a wide range of

play back systems. However, “[e]nablement does not require the inventor to

foresee every means of implementing an invention at pains of losing the patent

franchise.” Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1071 (Fed.

Cir. 2005). As the Exxon court observed,

If this case were before an examiner, the examiner might well be justified in demanding that the applicant more clearly define

[substantially automatic] and thereby remove any degree of ambiguity. However, we are faced with an issued patent that enjoys a presumption of validity. In these circumstances, we conclude that a

person of skill in the art would understand the scope of the term . . .

and that the degree of ambiguity injected into the claims by the patentee’s lack of precision is therefore not fatal.

265 F.3d at 1384.

C. Insufficiency of Infringement Contentions

Real contends that while Friskit’s contentions generally state the limitations

that are met in Real’s product, they fail to show what aspects of Real’s products

met these limitations. As such, it argues, Friskit cannot meet its burden of proof

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for infringement. The argument appears to the Court to be a non-sequitur. 

Whether Friskit can meet its burden of proof for infringement in the end depends,

not on the form or content of its contentions, but on the documentary evidence and

witness testimony, including that of experts, adduced at trial and, specifically, a

comparison of the accused product to the properly construed claims.

D. Anticipation

Real renews its motion for summary judgment on the ground that the

RealPlayer’s accused functions were found in the pre-priority date version of

RealJukebox. The Court previously denied the motion, ruling that “discussing the

functionality of the product . . . fails to meet the standard required; the moving

party must show that every claim, and every element of every claim has been

anticipated.” (Order Den. Summ. J. 4.) Real has supported its renewed motion

with a chart (Gupta Decl. Ex. V) showing in three columns the claim language, the

applicable infringement contentions with respect to RealPlayer, and evidence

descriptive of RealJukebox and other asserted prior art.

Real contends that RealJukebox was an integrated system that enabled users

to search for, acquire and playback music and also manage their personal music

collection. Friskit in turn argues that RealJukebox lacked a number of the claimed

elements, such as a search module and a network server module and that it did not

provide any of the control between the network server module and the media

player. These and other disputed issues of material fact preclude entry of

summary judgment. Similarly material facts concerning other claimed prior art

are in dispute.

E. Obviousness

Real contends that to the extent Friskit’s claims are not invalid as

anticipated, they would be invalid as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). A

determination of obviousness is governed by the four factors enunciated in

Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). A district court must make

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In order to infringe Claim 20 of the ‘199 Patent, Rhapsody must also meet the limitations of independent Claim 18, directed to a method for playing back media from a network. See Netword LLC v. Centraal Corp., 242 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

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and apply findings on all four Graham factors before invalidating a patent for

obviousness. Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 662-63 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 

Real has not proposed the requisite findings and the record before the Court is too

fragmentary to enable it to make such findings.

The motion is denied.

II. FRISKIT’S MOTION

Friskit has moved for summary judgment of infringement on three of the

claims in three of the patents in suit. To be entitled to summary judgment on a

claim, Friskit must establish that when the properly construed claim is compared

with Real’s accused product, all of the limitations of that claim are present and

that there are no genuine issues of material fact with respect thereto. See

Transmatic, Inc. v. Gulton Indus., Inc., 53 F.3d 1270, 1277-78 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

A. Friskit’s Contention That Each Element of Claim 20 of the ‘199 Patent is Found in Rhapsody 2.0 and 3.01

Claim 18(a) reads:

receiving a search request from a network enabled device to play

back media that satisfies one or more search criteria;

Friskit maintains that Rhapsody “receives a search request from a user that

satisfies one or more search criteria.” Real agrees but responds that “Rhapsody

does not have ‘search requests . . . to playback media.’” Friskit replies that the

fact that the media are not played in response to the search request has nothing to

do with the elements of the claim. The significance of the “play back” language

in the claim is a disputed issue of material fact.

Claim 18(b) reads:

selecting a plurality of media resources . . . ;

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Friskit maintains that users seeking a specific artist, album or track can use

the Search box in the Discovery area by typing in the search criteria.. Real

responds that Rhapsody does not use media resources; a search in Rhapsody

returns links, not media. Media resources include files; the term has not been

defined to include links. (Claim Constr. Order 7.) Whether Rhapsody infringes

this claim is a disputed issue of material fact. 

Claim 18(c) reads:

Wherein a set of media resources is established based on the plurality

of media resources;

Friskit maintains that the results that are returned by Rhapsody in response

to the search request and that are presented to the user are an established set of

media resources. Real responds that search results do not fall within the definition

of a set of media resources. Moreover, artist samples are a predefined group of

songs not covered by the patent. Disputed issues of material fact remain.

Claim 18(d) reads in relevant part:

Causing one or more media resources . . . to be at least partially

played back sequentially and automatically . . . ;

Friskit maintains that Rhapsody provides a mechanism to play back media

resources sequentially and automatically. Real responds that Rhapsody does not

cause automatic playback of media resources; the user must initiate playback. The

application of the term “automatically” in this context is a disputed issue of

material fact.

Claim 18(e) reads:

Wherein causing one or more media resources in the set of media

resources to be at least partially played back includes determining whether a media resource in the set of media resources is available

for playback before at least partially playback that media resource.

Friskit maintains that the Rhapsody source code’s GetNextTrack provides

that if a track is not valid, the source code proceeds to the a second media

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resource, i.e., the next valid one in the tracklist. Real responds that Friskit’s

expert has not shown that the GetNextTrack determines whether a media resource

is available for play before at least partially playing back the media resource. A

disputed issue of material fact remains.

B. Friskit’s Contention That Each Element of Claim 52 of the ‘648 Patent is Found in RealOne and RealPlayer10

Claim 51(a) reads:

receiving a query from a user of the terminal;

Claim 51(b) reads:

signaling a search request based on the query to one or more network sites;

Friskit maintains that RealOne receives the query submitted by the user and

then allows the user to signal a search request to a network site. Real responds

that the claim requires two distinct requests and Friskit has not shown that

RealPlayer performs these distinct steps. A disputed issue of material fact

remains.

Claim 51(c) reads:

receiving a search result from the one or more network sites, the

search result including a plurality of media resource locators;

Friskit maintains that RealOne Player receives and displays search results. 

Real responds that search results are received and displayed by the embedded

Microsoft Internet Explorer Browser, not RealPlayer; moreover, it states that

RealOnePlayer displays song titles which are not within the definition of media

resource locator. Disputed issues of material fact remain.

Claim 51(d) reads:

signaling at least some of the plurality of media resource locators to a

media player;

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Claim 52 depends on claim 51.

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Friskit maintains that signaling to the media player occurs through the user

clicking. Real responds that this element is not met by the user clicking on links;

the specifications state that it is the search module that signals to the media player. 

A disputed issue of material fact remains.

Claim 51(e) reads:

arranging the at least some of the plurality of media resource locators

for substantially automatic and continuous play back of media

resources located by at least some the plurality of media resource locators.

Friskit maintains that RealOne allows the user to arrange a playlist from the

search results and initiate playback which will play back continuously until the

playlist is finished. Real responds that arranging a play list is a manual process

and is not substantially automatic; moreover Friskit disclaimed this process as

being substantially automatic. A disputed issue of material fact remains.

Claim 52 reads:2

The method of claim 51, wherein the search results each include one

or more of the plurality of media resource locators arranged in an

order of priority designated by a corresponding network site in the plurality of network sites, and wherein arranging the plurality of media resource locators includes at least partially arranging the

plurality of media resource locators according to the priority order designated by each of the corresponding network sites.

Friskit maintains that Real’s documentation shows that search results are

coded so as to return the results in a prioritized order. Real responds that Friskit

has not shown that RealOne arranges the search results in an order of priority

designated by a network site. A disputed issue of material fact remains.

C. Friskit’s Contention that RealOne and RealPlayer Infringe Claim 38 of the ‘275 Patent

Claim 38(a) reads:

a user-interface to receive a user-query;

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Friskit points to the search box on the user interface of RealPlayer. Real

responds that this search box is simply an instance of the Microsoft Internet

Explorer already on a user’s computer. A disputed issue of fact remains.

Claim 38(b) reads:

a search module to send a search request based on the user-query to

one or more network sites, and to receive from the one or more

network sites at least a first search result that references a plurality of media resources, each of the media resources having a corresponding

network site;

Friskit maintains that RealPlayer 10 includes a search module in the form of

a search box and web browser that sends a search request based on the user query

to one or more network sites. Real responds that Friskit has not shown that its

search module uses a data base as required by the Court’s construction, and that

the search queries are issued by a back end server; nor does the browser

communicate search results to a playback component, as required by the

construction. Disputed issues of material fact remain.

Claim 38(c) reads:

a media player configured to access the network sites of at least some

of the media resources referenced in the first search result, and to

control playback of at least some of the media resources referenced in

the first search result, wherein the media player controls playback of the at least some of the media resources to be substantially automatic and sequential.

Friskit maintains that RealPlayer controls playback through the manual

creation of playlists. Real responds that in the course of claim construction,

Friskit has represented that clicking of search results to designate a play list is not

substantially automatic. Disputed issues of material fact remain.

There being disputed issues of material fact, the motion for summary

judgment is denied.

III. FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

1. Trial of this matter is scheduled for two weeks, commencing

Monday, July 9, 2007, at 9:30 a.m.;

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2. A final pretrial conference will be held on Monday, June 25, 2007, at

9:30 a.m.;

3. A status conference will be held on Wednesday March 28, 2007, at

9:30 a.m to consider the following matters:

a. bifurcation to limit the trial to approximately six selected

claims;

b. time limits for plaintiff’s and defendants’ case;

c. limits on numbers of witnesses and exhibits;

d. dates for exchange of experts’ final written direct

testimony;

e. dates for submission of proposed jury instructions; and

f. such other items listed in Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 16(c) as may be appropriate.

IT IS SO ORDERED

DATED: ______________________________

WILLIAM W SCHWARZER

Senior United States District Judge

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