Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05176/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05176-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 5, 1999 Decided October 22, 1999

No. 98-5176

Roy Dale Richardson,

Appellant

v.

United States of America, et al.,

Appellees

Consolidated with

98-5236

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cv01962)

---------

Kimberlee Cleaveland, Student Counsel, argued the cause

as amicus curiae for appellant. On the briefs were Steven H.

Goldblatt, appointed by the court, and Todd Coltman, Nikhil

Singhvi and Olivier Sylvain, Student Counsel.

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Roy Dale Richardson, appearing pro se, was on the briefs

for appellant.

Somesha Ferdinand, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were

David W. Ogden, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey

Axelrad and Mary McElroy Leach, Attorneys, and Wilma A.

Lewis, U.S. Attorney.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Wald and Williams,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.

Edwards, Chief Judge: Roy Richardson brought this action

under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") and Swine Flu

Act for injuries allegedly suffered as a result of his 1976

swine flu vaccination while serving in the United States Air

Force. The District Court dismissed Mr. Richardson's pro se

complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that

his allegation fell within the discretionary function exception

to the FTCA. See 28 U.S.C. s 2680(a) (1994). Subsequently,

the court denied Mr. Richardson's motion for reconsideration

and for leave to amend the complaint.

On the record before us, we find that Mr. Richardson

effectively amended his complaint when he filed a timely

response to the Government's motion to dismiss. The amended complaint easily satisfied liberal pleading requirements,

for it made clear that Mr. Richardson was not seeking

compensation for tortious acts or omissions of military personnel, but, rather, for the vaccine manufacturer's alleged

tortious conduct in producing a defective vaccine. Indeed,

Mr. Richardson specifically cited Hunt v. United States, 636

F.2d 580 (D.C. Cir. 1980), in asserting that his claim was

based on the defective or negligent manufacturing of the

vaccine. Because Mr. Richardson effectively amended his

complaint to state a legitimate claim over which the District

Court had subject matter jurisdiction, we must reverse the

trial court's judgment dismissing his complaint. In light of

this holding, we have no need to reach Mr. Richardson's

argument that the District Court abused its discretion by

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failing to grant him leave to amend his complaint after it was

dismissed.

I. Background

On November 19, 1976, while Roy Dale Richardson was on

active duty with the U.S. Air Force at Tinker Air Force Base,

in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, military personnel ordered him

to be vaccinated with the swine flu vaccine. Richardson

alleges that he suffered a "near toxic allergic reaction" to the

vaccine, causing him to be hospitalized for four days, and that

hospital tests conducted at that time revealed a "mitral valve

leak" and hypertension. See Complaint pp 11, 17, reprinted

in App. to Br. of Amicus Curiae ("App.") 6-7. Mr. Richardson was honorably discharged on May 16, 1977.

Mr. Richardson claims that he did not become aware of the

full extent of his vaccine-caused injuries until April 1995, at

which time he was awarded Veteran's Administration disability compensation. He alleges that his injuries are varied,

including kidney stones, numerous cardiovascular diseases,

and possible leukoplakia. On August 27, 1997, after filing

sundry administrative complaints, Mr. Richardson filed this

complaint pro se in District Court seeking damages and

equitable relief under the FTCA and the Swine Flu Act. In

his initial complaint, he alleged that the United States was

"negligent in this action, because the swine flu vaccine which

was administered to the Plaintiff was double the recommended dose for civilians or other non-military personnel."

Id. p 18, reprinted in App. 8.

On November 12, 1997, the United States moved to dismiss

the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, making

three arguments. First, the United States argued that the

Feres doctrine bars the claims under the FTCA. See Feres v.

United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) (precluding FTCA

liability for the Government for claims based on injuries that

"arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to

[military] service"). Alternatively, the Government argued

that the FTCA's statute of limitations bars Mr. Richardson's

claims. Finally, the United States contended that the claims

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fall within the discretionary function exception to the FTCA,

see 28 U.S.C. s 2680(a), because Mr. Richardson challenged

discretionary policy-based decisions by asserting that the

military negligently administered a double-dose of the vaccine.

On December 9, 1997, Mr. Richardson filed a response to

the Government's motion to dismiss. He asserted that he did

not seek compensation for tortious acts or omissions of military personnel, but for the "vaccine manufacture's [sic] tortious conduct, conduct that, absent the [Swine Flu] Act, would

give rise to a claim assertable directly against the manufacturer." Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 2, reprinted in

App. 38. Mr. Richardson claimed that the vaccine manufacturer would be liable under local law absent the Swine Flu

Act, because it "produced a defective vaccine." See id. at 3,

reprinted in App. 39. Mr. Richardson denied basing his

claim on "any military order" and instead argued that his

claim was based on the defective or negligent manufacturing

of the vaccine. See id. at 3-4, reprinted in App. 39-40 (citing

Hunt, 636 F.2d at 599 (holding that the Feres doctrine does

not apply to Swine Flu Act claims alleging injury from

negligently or defectively manufactured vaccine)). Mr. Richardson also disputed the Government's argument regarding

his compliance with the statute of limitations.

On March 13, 1998, the District Court granted the Government's motion to dismiss on the ground that the discretionary

function exception barred the claim alleged in the original

complaint, but the court dismissed the complaint without

prejudice because the "basis for liability [alleged in the

original pro se complaint] may have been nothing more than a

pleading error." Mem. Op. at 5, reprinted in App. 62. The

District Court noted that, in response to the Government's

motion to dismiss, Mr. Richardson "broadly declares that he

was vaccinated with defective serum, but he does not allege

how the serum was defective other than it was double the

recommended dose." Id. at 4, reprinted in App. 61. The

District Court held that Mr. Richardson could not establish

liability based upon the military's decision to administer

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beyond the recommended dose. See id. at 5, reprinted in

App. 62.

The District Court rejected the Government's argument

regarding the Feres doctrine, noting that dismissal on this

basis would directly conflict with Hunt. See id. at 3, reprinted in App. 60. It also rejected the Government's statute of

limitations argument, concluding that the complaint's allegations must be read in Mr. Richardson's favor as to when he

first discovered the cause of his alleged injuries. See id.

On May 4, 1998, Mr. Richardson moved for an extension of

time to move for leave to file an amended complaint. The

District Court denied the motion on May 6, 1998. On May 7,

1998, Mr. Richardson filed a motion for leave to file an

amended complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), requesting leave to add new claims. The proposed amended complaint filed with this motion indicates that Mr. Richardson

intended to replace his claim based on double-dosing with a

claim based on products liability. See Amended Complaint

pp 20, 21, reprinted in App. 80-81. The District Court denied

the motion on May 13, 1998, stating that Mr. Richardson

must first be granted a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) before he could file a

motion to amend the complaint. Mr. Richardson filed separate notices of appeal from the order dismissing his case and

the order denying his motion for leave to amend. On June

19, 1998, this court consolidated both appeals, and, on February 16, 1999, we appointed amicus curiae to argue in support

of Mr. Richardson.

II. Analysis

No one doubts that Mr. Richardson's original complaint

would properly be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, because of the discretionary function exception. See,

e.g., Hunt, 636 F.2d at 597 n.44 (stating that the "decision of

the military to administer a stronger-than-usual dose" can not

be a basis for liability under the Swine Flu Act). The

question is whether Mr. Richardson fairly amended his comUSCA Case #98-5176 Document #471751 Filed: 10/22/1999 Page 5 of 10
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plaint to add a claim based on products liability and, if so,

whether his claim was thereafter properly dismissed.

The District Court's opinion is open to two reasonable

interpretations. First, the opinion can be read as dismissing

Mr. Richardson's complaint based on his original filing only,

disregarding the apparent change of course intended by Mr.

Richardson in adding a claim based on defective manufacturing. Second, and less likely, the court's opinion can be read

as accepting Mr. Richardson's claim that he was bringing an

action based on products liability and dismissing the complaint nevertheless. In either case, we reverse the District

Court.

A. The District Court's Treatment of Mr. Richardson's Reply to the Motion to Dismiss

On the record at hand, we hold that the District Court

abused its discretion in failing to consider Mr. Richardson's

complaint in light of his reply to the motion to dismiss. See

Anyanwutaku v. Moore, 151 F.3d 1053, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

There are four factors that inform our holding that the

District Court erred in refusing to consider Mr. Richardson's

reply to constitute an amendment to his original complaint.

First, Mr. Richardson proceeded pro se before the District

Court. Courts must construe pro se filings liberally. See,

e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per

curiam) (holding allegations contained in a prisoner's pro se

complaint to less stringent standards than pleadings written

by counsel in reversing a dismissal for failure to state a

claim). This point was recently emphasized in Anyanwutaku,

in which the District Court had dismissed a pro se complaint

sua sponte. See 151 F.3d at 1054. The plaintiff had initially

filed a "confusing" complaint that the District Court dismissed the same day it was filed. See id. After the dismissal, the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration and, subsequently, an " 'addendum' " to the motion. See id. The

District Court denied the motion for reconsideration. See id.

at 1055. This court reversed, reading all of the plaintiff's

filings together to conclude that the District Court abused its

discretion by denying the motion for reconsideration of its

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dismissal of one of the plaintiff's claims. See id. at 1058-59.

While Anyanwutaku involved the construction of a complaint

rather than amendment, here we similarly find that the

District Court should have read all of Mr. Richardson's filings

together before dismissing this case for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. See id. at 1059 ("[W]e think the district court

should have permitted his claim, drafted pro se and based on

legitimate factual allegations, to proceed."); see also Pearson

v. Gatto, 933 F.2d 521, 527 (7th Cir. 1991) (applying Haines to

hold that the District Court should have construed a pro se

plaintiff's letter to judge to be an amended complaint); Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock County, Texas, 929 F.2d 1078, 1081

(5th Cir. 1991) (finding, in an appeal of a Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) dismissal, that the magistrate judge should have

considered a pro se litigant's reply to the defendant's answer

as a motion to amend the complaint).

The second consideration guiding our decision is that, at

the time Mr. Richardson tendered his reply to the defendant's

motion to dismiss, he could have amended his claim as of

right because the defendant had filed no responsive pleading

and Mr. Richardson had never before sought amendment.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (granting leave to amend once as "a

matter of course" at any time before a responsive pleading is

served); Harris v. Secretary, United States Dep't of Veterans

Affairs, 126 F.3d 339, 344-45 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (recognizing

that amendments prior to a responsive pleading shall be

freely given under Rule 15(a)). Moreover, courts freely grant

pro se litigants leave to amend. See Moore v. Agency for

Int'l Dev., 994 F.2d 874, 877 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Leave to

amend a complaint should be freely given in the absence of

undue delay, bad faith, undue prejudice to the opposing party,

repeated failure to cure deficiencies, or futility. See Foman

v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

The third factor that informs our decision is that the

District Court clearly understood that Mr. Richardson both

recognized the need for and attempted to make a change to

his original complaint. In response to the motion to dismiss,

Mr. Richardson denied basing his claim on "any military

order" and instead clearly reframed his claim as one sounding

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in products liability, arguing that his injuries were caused by

the defective or negligent manufacturing of the vaccine. See

Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 3-4, reprinted in App. 39-

40. The District Court recognized this, noting that Mr.

Richardson's response to the motion to dismiss "broadly

declares that he was vaccinated with defective serum, but he

does not allege how the serum was defective other than it was

double the recommended dose." Mem. Op. at 4, reprinted in

App. 61. Furthermore, the District Court itself acknowledged that the jurisdictional defect may simply be a matter of

a "pleading error." Id. at 5, reprinted in App. 62.

Our last consideration is the lack of any evidence of prejudice to the Government if Mr. Richardson were allowed to

amend the complaint. See Moore, 994 F.2d at 877-78 (noting

that a pro se litigant should be permitted to amend his

complaint to meet pleading requirements prior to dismissal so

long as the defendant is not prejudiced). The Government

has made no argument here that it would have been prejudiced if the District Court had granted an amendment to Mr.

Richardson's complaint.

These factors, taken together, convince this court that Mr.

Richardson should be permitted to proceed with his claim.

We do not suggest that a District Court must cull through

every filing of a pro se litigant to preserve a defective

complaint. In this case, however, where, in addition to

proceeding pro se, the plaintiff retained the right to amend

his complaint prior to the dismissal, the plaintiff clearly

intended to add a new claim in his lawsuit, the District Court

apparently understood that the plaintiff both needed to and

wanted to do so, and the defendant would not have been

prejudiced by such amendment, we hold that the District

Court should have considered Mr. Richardson's reply to the

defendant's motion to dismiss to be an amendment to his

complaint.

B. The Adequacy of Mr. Richardson's Amended Complaint

As noted above, the District Court's opinion can be read as

accepting Mr. Richardson's reply to the defendant's motion to

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son made no factual allegation to support his claim except

that the serum was defective for being double the recommended dose. See Mem. Op. at 4, reprinted in App. 61.

Even on this reading, however, we find that the District

Court erred.

Mr. Richardson's amended complaint clearly stated a claim

sufficient to meet the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure's

liberal pleading requirements. Indeed, at oral argument, the

Government's counsel was hard-pressed to contend otherwise.

To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, a plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient

to prove his allegations; rather, a court should only dismiss a

complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if "it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."

Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148

F.3d 1080, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, there is no indication that Mr.

Richardson can prove no set of facts entitling him to relief.

In fact, the forms appended to the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure clearly indicate that Mr. Richardson's complaint

meets liberal pleading requirements. See Fed. R. Civ. P. app.

Form 2(c) (demonstrating requirements for statement of jurisdiction founded upon a particular statute); id. Form 9

(demonstrating requirements for a complaint for negligence).

Moreover, as amicus points out, the complaint in Anyanwutaku was hardly less conclusory than the claim here. See

Reply Br. of Amicus Curiae at 13. In Anyanwutaku, the

claims found by the court to withstand dismissal alleged that

the plaintiff was "arbitrarily and capriciously denied access to

the said [prison] programs through invidious discrimination"

and that the defendants "invidiously discriminated against the

plaintiff based on race or ethnic origin." Anyanwutaku, 151

F.3d at 1058 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks

omitted). These claims allege no more facts than does Mr.

Richardson's claim that he was injured by his exposure to a

defectively produced vaccine. See Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to

Dismiss at 3-4, reprinted in App. 39-40.

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We note, furthermore, that the discretionary function exception to the FTCA does not bar Swine Flu Act claims based

on the acts or omissions of the vaccine's provider. See 42

U.S.C. s 247b(k)(2)(A)(ii) (1976) (revised and deleted 1978)

(making the exceptions in 28 U.S.C. s 2680(a) inapplicable to

actions based upon a program participant's act or omission).

In addition, this circuit has held by implication that claims

against the Government that rely on products liability assertions against vaccine providers are permitted by the Swine

Flu Act. See Hunt, 636 F.2d at 596 n.44, 599 (stating that

the Feres doctrine does not bar claims that would render a

vaccine manufacturer liable under local law on a theory of

strict products liability). Therefore, the District Court's basis

for dismissing Mr. Richardson's original complaint based on

the United States military's negligence does not apply to his

amended claim based upon the vaccine manufacturer's defective production of the vaccine.

We need not consider the propriety of the District Court's

denial of Mr. Richardson's post-dismissal motion for leave to

amend his complaint. Such a motion is typically only granted

where the litigant has first moved to amend or alter the

judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or 60(b). Mr. Richardson did not explicitly invoke either of these rules. Because

we reverse the District Court's decision on other grounds, it

is not necessary to address Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b).

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we reverse the District

Court's decision dismissing Mr. Richardson's complaint for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

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