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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 21, 2010 Decided June 21, 2011 

No. 09-7131 

PATRICK MAHONEY, REVEREND, ET AL., 

APPELLANTS

v. 

JOHN DOE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A POLICE OFFICER,

METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:09-cv-00105) 

 Carly F. Gammill argued the cause for appellants. With 

her on the briefs was James Matthew Henderson Sr.

 Carl J. Schifferle, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney 

General’s Office for the District of Columbia, argued the 

cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Peter J. 

Nickles, Attorney General, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, 

and Donna M. Murasky, Deputy Solicitor General. 

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 Ronald C. Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig 

Lawrence and Marina U. Braswell, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, 

were on the brief for amicus curiae National Park Service in 

support of appellees. 

 Before: HENDERSON, BROWN and KAVANAUGH, Circuit 

Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN. 

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge KAVANAUGH. 

BROWN, Circuit Judge: Section 22-3312.01 of the 

District of Columbia Code prohibits the defacement of public 

and private property. Appellants, Rev. Patrick Mahoney, 

Kaitlin Clare Martinez, the Christian Defense Coalition, 

Cradles of Love, Inc., and Cheryl Conrad (collectively, 

“Mahoney”) claim that prohibition, both on its face and as 

applied, violates their First Amendment right to chalk the 

1600 block of Pennsylvania Avenue (literally, the street in 

front of the White House). The district court concluded 

otherwise. We now affirm. 

I 

On November 24, 2008, Mahoney notified the 

Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) and the 

Department of the Interior (“DOI”) of his intent to carry out a 

sidewalk chalk demonstration in front of the White House. 

The purpose of the demonstration was to protest President 

Obama’s position on abortion, and to protest the anniversary 

of the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 

113 (1973). 

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The MPD responded to Mahoney’s request, asking for 

more information about the number of protestors expected 

and the time the protest would occur. In addition, the MPD 

warned that sidewalk “chalking” in front of the White House 

would constitute defacement of public property in violation of 

the District of Columbia’s Defacement Statute, D.C. Code 

§ 22-3312.01 (“Defacement Statute”).1

 The Defacement 

Statute provides: 

It shall be unlawful for any person or persons 

willfully and wantonly to disfigure, cut, chip, 

or cover, rub with, or otherwise place filth or 

excrement of any kind; to write, mark, or print 

obscene or indecent figures representing 

obscene or objects upon; to write, mark, draw, 

or paint, without the consent of the owner or 

proprietor thereof, or, in the case of public 

property, of the person having charge, custody, 

or control thereof, any word, sign, or figure 

upon: Any property, public or private, 

building, statue, monument, office, public 

passenger vehicle, mass transit equipment or 

facility, dwelling or structure of any kind . . . . 

D.C. Code § 22-3312.01. 

Mahoney responded by demanding the MPD reverse its 

position and provide a “written assurance POST HASTE” 

authorizing his chalking demonstration. In addition, 

 

1

 The National Park Service (“NPS”), which maintains authority 

over the sidewalks abutting the 1600 block of Pennsylvania Avenue 

pursuant to an interagency agreement, also responded to Mahoney’s 

request. The NPS said Mahoney’s demonstration would violate 

NPS regulations prohibiting the defacement of cultural resources. 

See 36 C.F.R. §§ 2.1(a)(6), 2.31(a)(3). 

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Mahoney noted the District of Columbia had previously 

approved similar chalking events across the D.C. metropolitan 

area, including annual youth chalk art contests and a “Chalk 

for Peace” event in the summer of 2005. Three days after 

receiving Mahoney’s letter, the MPD granted Mahoney 

approval to conduct an assembly in front of the White House 

“consisting of no more than 5,000 persons . . . permitted to 

possess signs and banners.” The MPD refused, however, to 

grant Mahoney permission to “use chalk or any other material 

to mark the surfaces of Pennsylvania Ave.” 

On January 16, 2009, Mahoney sued the MPD and the 

District of Columbia (collectively, the “District”). Mahoney 

requested a temporary restraining order and preliminary 

injunction to keep the District from preventing Mahoney’s 

chalking demonstration. The district court held an expedited 

hearing, but denied Mahoney’s request for equitable relief 

without a written opinion. Two days later, Mahoney began 

chalking the street in front of the White House. MPD officers 

asked Mahoney for identification, confiscated his chalk, and 

directed him to stop. Mahoney obliged and the incident 

ended peacefully. The officers did not take Mahoney into 

custody or formally charge him with any offense. 

After his failed chalking demonstration, Mahoney 

amended his complaint, adding John Doe, the unidentified 

MPD officer who prevented Mahoney from chalking on 

January 24, 2009, and asserting six separate causes of action, 

three of which Mahoney pursues on appeal. Mahoney claims 

the Defacement Statute is unconstitutional on its face, is 

unconstitutional as applied to his efforts to chalk the street in 

front of the White House, and violates the Religious Freedom 

Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. The 

District moved to dismiss Mahoney’s amended complaint, or 

in the alternative, for summary judgment. The district court 

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granted the District’s motion. Because it is not “generally 

desirable” to consider a facial First Amendment challenge 

“before it is determined that the statute would be valid as 

applied,” Board of Trustees of State University of New York v. 

Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 484–85 (1989), we begin with Mahoney’s 

as-applied challenge. 

II 

The First Amendment says, “Congress shall make no 

law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the right of the 

people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of 

grievances.” Mahoney claims the First Amendment protects 

his right to chalk the street in front of the White House and 

the District violated this right “[b]y threatening to apply” the 

Defacement Statute to his expressive conduct. Comp. ¶ 170. 

To resolve Mahoney’s claim, we proceed in three steps: first, 

determining whether the First Amendment protects the speech 

at issue, then identifying the nature of the forum, and finally 

assessing whether the District’s justifications for restricting 

Mahoney’s speech “satisfy the requisite standard.” Cornelius 

v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 

(1985). 

A 

This is a somewhat unusual First Amendment case. 

Section 22-3312.01 does not regulate speech; nor does the 

code section directly implicate the content of speech by 

defining the expressive content of the speech (e.g., a terrorist 

threat) as the relevant harm. The Defacement Statute 

criminalizes the conduct of defacing, defiling, or disfiguring 

property by various means—some of which are clearly 

expressive, like painting, drawing, or writing, while others, 

like vandalizing or physically damaging property, are 

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primarily destructive and only secondarily expressive. 

Moreover, because prohibited activities may be permitted 

with the land owner’s consent, the Defacement Statute bears a 

likeness to more conventional licensing schemes. Thus, 

enforcement of the Defacement Statute will not always 

implicate the First Amendment. 

But here, the parties agree the creation of words or 

images through chalk is an expressive act. Because the First 

Amendment “affords protection to symbolic or expressive 

conduct as well as to actual speech,” Mahoney’s proposal 

clearly implicates the First Amendment. Virginia v. Black, 

538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003). The District’s actions, therefore, 

can be analyzed within the usual First Amendment 

framework. The gravamen of this appeal is whether the 

District violated the constitutional guarantee by prohibiting 

Mahoney from placing his chalked message on the street in 

front of the White House. 

B 

“[T]he extent of scrutiny given to a regulation of 

speech—in effect, how we examine the directness with which 

it promotes the government’s goals and the degree to which it 

burdens speech—depends on whether the regulation applies 

in a public or nonpublic forum.” Boardley v. United States 

Dep’t of Interior, 615 F.3d 508, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The 

type of forum—public, designated public, or nonpublic—

determines the extent to which government can control 

speech. See Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. U.S. Postal 

Serv., 417 F.3d 1299, 1305–06 (D.C. Cir. 2005). “Traditional 

public fora are those places which by long tradition or by 

government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate.” 

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. A designated public forum 

consists of “public property which the state has opened for 

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use by the public as a place for expressive activity.” Perry 

Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 

(1983). Lastly, “a nonpublic forum is by contradistinction 

‘public property which is not by tradition or designation a 

forum for public communication.’” Boardley, 615 F.3d at 

514 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46). 

There is little dispute the street in front of the White 

House is a public forum. “‘[P]ublic places’ historically 

associated with the free exercise of expressive activities, such 

as streets, sidewalks, and parks, are considered, without more, 

to be ‘public forums.’” United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 

177 (1983) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Doe, 

968 F.2d 86, 89 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (referring to the area in front 

of the White House—Lafayette Park—as a public forum). 

The District’s ability to restrict expressive conduct in a 

traditional public forum is limited to the enforcement of time, 

place, and manner regulations, provided the restrictions “‘are 

content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant 

government interest, and leave open ample alternative 

channels of communication.’” Grace, 461 U.S. at 177 

(quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45). 

The District argues the 1600 block of Pennsylvania 

Avenue is not a public forum when used as a “writing tablet.” 

We interpret this as an argument that the 1600 block of 

Pennsylvania Avenue is a designated public forum that 

excludes certain media, including chalk. This is an odd 

inversion of the typical forum dispute. Ordinarily, a litigant 

argues the government has “carved out” a public forum from 

an otherwise nonpublic space. See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. 

Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 

393–94 (1993) (finding school property a limited public 

forum); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802–05 (rejecting the 

argument that a charity drive at a government workplace is a 

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public forum inside a non-public forum); Perry Educ. Ass’n, 

460 U.S. at 45 (1983) (rejecting the argument that a school 

district’s internal mail system was a public forum); Lehman v. 

City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 299–300 (1974) (same 

with regard to advertising space on city buses). In this case, 

however, the government proposes to limit a preexisting 

public forum by excising one class of expressive media. 

The Supreme Court focuses on “the access sought by the 

speaker” in defining a limited public forum’s boundaries. 

Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801. But in so doing, the Court takes a 

“tailored approach,” id., “look[ing] to the policy and practice 

of the government,” as well as “the nature of the property and 

its compatibility with expressive activity,” id. at 802. Here, 

the record contains no evidence that the 1600 block of 

Pennsylvania Avenue has ever been designated as anything 

but a public forum. Although the street is no longer open to 

automobiles, it is open to pedestrians. It functions, for all 

practical purposes, as an extension of the abutting sidewalk, a 

space we previously held to be a public forum. See White 

House Vigil for ERA Comm. v. Clark, 746 F.2d 1518, 1526–

27 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Moreover, the distinction the District 

proposes is one without a difference: whether characterized as 

a public forum or a designated public forum, the same legal 

standard applies. See Perry Educ. Ass’n ̧ 460 U.S. at 46. 

In any event, the District conceded the 1600 block of 

Pennsylvania Avenue is a public forum below, Motion to 

Dismiss at 3, Docket 17 (“Defendants agree . . . the 1600 

block of Pennsylvania Avenue is a traditional public 

forum . . . .”), and raises this argument for the first time on 

appeal. See Grant v. U.S. Air Force, 197 F.3d 539, 542 (D.C. 

Cir. 1999) (“‘Absent exceptional circumstances, the court of 

appeals is not a forum in which a litigant can present legal 

theories that it neglected to raise in a timely manner in 

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proceedings below.’”) (quoting Tomasello v. Rubin, 167 F.3d 

612, 618 n. 6 (D.C.Cir.1999)). 

C 

Even under the standard that applies to speech 

restrictions in a traditional public forum, the District insists 

the chalking ban is narrowly tailored to serve a significant 

government interest. We agree. 

First, the Defacement Statute is indisputably content 

neutral. It prohibits certain conduct (i.e. disfiguring, cutting, 

chipping, defacing or defiling), including certain expressive 

conduct (i.e. writing, marking, drawing, or painting), without 

reference to the message the speaker wishes to convey. D.C. 

Code § 22-3312.01. Nor is there any evidence in the record 

the District adopted the Defacement Statute “because of 

[agreement or] disagreement with the message” a speaker 

may convey. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 

642 (1994) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 

781, 791 (1989)). 

Second, the District’s interest in controlling the esthetic 

appearance of the street in front of the White House is 

substantial. In City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for 

Vincent, the Supreme Court upheld a Los Angeles ordinance 

regulating the posting of signs on public light posts. 466 U.S. 

789, 806 (1984). In so doing, the Court stated that 

“municipalities have a weighty, essentially esthetic interest in 

proscribing intrusive and unpleasant formats for expression.” 

Id.; see also, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 

490, 507–08, 510 (1981) (visual clutter); City of Shaker 

Heights, 418 U.S. at 302 (intrusive advertising); Kovacs v. 

Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86 (1949) (loud sound trucks 

broadcasting messages). This is especially true here, where 

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the special nature of the forum serves to heighten esthetic 

concerns. See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna 

Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 650–51 (1981) 

(“Consideration of a forum’s special attributes is relevant to 

the constitutionality of a regulation since the significance of 

the governmental interest must be assessed in light of the 

characteristic nature and function of the particular forum 

involved.”); White House Vigil, 746 F.2d at 1534–37 

(describing the special esthetic considerations relevant to 

restrictions on demonstrations at the White House). 

The Defacement Statute is also sufficiently tailored to 

serve the District’s esthetic interest. It is the tangible 

medium—chalking—that creates the very problem the 

Defacement Statute seeks to remedy. The same was true in 

Taxpayers for Vincent, where the Court noted “the substantive 

evil—visual blight—is not merely a possible by-product of 

[posting signs], but is created by the medium of expression 

itself.” 466 U.S. at 810. Undoubtedly, the Defacement 

Statute encompasses some expressive activity. But “when 

‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same 

course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental 

interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify 

incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.” United 

States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968). It is true, the 

defacement at issue is temporary and can be cured. But the 

same was true in Taxpayers for Vincent. The government can 

proscribe even temporary blight. 466 U.S. at 810. 

Finally, the District’s threatened use of the Defacement 

Statute leaves Mahoney with alternative channels of 

communication. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 655 (holding state fair 

rule, prohibiting sale or distribution on fair grounds of any 

merchandise including printed or written material, did not 

violate First Amendment, as applied to members of a religious 

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sect because the rule did not “unnecessarily limit” the 

members’ right to speak within the fairgrounds). The District 

granted Mahoney approval to conduct an assembly in front of 

the White House, for which he was “permitted to possess 

signs and banners.” Mahoney argues this was inadequate 

because “the only thing [he] couldn’t do was the only thing 

[he] asked to do.” Oral Arg. Tr. 10. But the scope of 

Mahoney’s request cannot define the available “channels of 

communication.” If Mahoney exclusively asked to post signs 

on light posts, he could not do so under Taxpayers for 

Vincent, 466 U.S. at 810. And if Mahoney asked to litter, he 

could not do so under Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160–

62 (1939). Mahoney initially requested permission to conduct 

a “demonstration” consisting of “a variety of verbal and 

visual messages.” The District’s threatened use of the 

Defacement Statute did not curtail Mahoney’s plans. 

Mahoney was free to announce any “verbal” message he 

chose. And, Mahoney could depict visual messages on signs, 

banners, and leaflets. Thus, ample alternative channels of 

communication existed. 

In sum, the Defacement Statute is content neutral, and 

substantially justified by the District’s esthetic interest in 

combating the very problem Mahoney’s proposed chalking 

entails—the defacement of public property. Because the 

District did not curtail Mahoney’s means of expression 

altogether, and allowed him to protest in front of the White 

House in other ways, the Defacement Statute is not 

unconstitutional as applied. 

III 

In addition to his as applied challenge, Mahoney alleges 

the Defacement Statute is facially unconstitutional. “[T]o 

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prevail on a facial attack the plaintiff must demonstrate the 

challenged law either ‘could never be applied in a valid 

manner’ or that even though it may be validly applied to the 

plaintiff and others, it nevertheless is so broad that it ‘may 

inhibit the constitutionally protected speech of third parties.’” 

N.Y. State Club Ass’n. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 11 

(1988) (quoting Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 798). 

A 

We need not linger too long on whether the Defacement 

Statute could ever be applied in a valid manner. As discussed 

above, it is constitutional as applied to Mahoney himself. 

Moreover, Mahoney only argues the Defacement Statute is 

unconstitutional to the extent it applies to public property. 

Oral Arg. Tr. at 25. But the statute applies to public and 

private property alike. D.C. Code § 22-3312.01. And, to the 

extent the Defacement Statute prohibits defacing private 

property, it does not abridge the First Amendment. See Nat’l 

Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 37 F.3d 646, 655 (D.C. 

Cir. 1994) (citing Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 568 

(1972)). Mahoney’s facial challenge thus hinges on whether 

the Defacement Statute is overbroad. See Ashcroft v. Free 

Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002); Initiative and 

Referendum Inst., 417 F.3d at 1314–15. 

B 

Under the overbreadth doctrine, “a person may challenge 

a statute that infringes protected speech even if the statute 

constitutionally might be applied to him.” Ohralik v. Ohio 

State Bar Ass’n., 436 U.S. 447, 462 n.20 (1978). But “the 

scope of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine . . . must 

be carefully tied to the circumstances in which facial 

invalidation of a statute is truly warranted.” New York v. 

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Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 (1982). To prevail, a party must 

show the statute at issue “is ‘substantially’ overbroad, which 

requires the court to find ‘a realistic danger that the statute 

itself will significantly compromise recognized First 

Amendment protections of parties not before the Court.’” 

N.Y. State Club Ass’n., 487 U.S. at 11 (quoting Taxpayers for 

Vincent, 466 U.S. at 801). 

Mahoney argues the Defacement Statute is overbroad 

because it targets “conduct commonly associated with 

expression,” and provides the District with unbridled 

discretion to censor that expression. City of Lakewood v. 

Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 760–61 (1988). But 

Mahoney fails to identify any “significant difference” 

between his facial and as applied challenges. Taypayers for 

Vincent, 466 U.S. at 802. Specifically, Mahoney does not 

argue the Defacement Statute is unconstitutional as-applied to 

any circumstances other than his own. Nor does Mahoney 

argue there is a likelihood of prosecution under the 

Defacement Statute that deters otherwise protected speech. In 

fact, Mahoney cites no prior example of the District’s 

enforcement of the Defacement Statute, constitutional or not. 

And, Mahoney concedes, “the District itself sponsors and 

invites citizens to come and chalk in various locations 

throughout the city,” even closing off a street annually for 

students to chalk. Oral Argument at 6. “The overbreadth 

claimant bears the burden of demonstrating, ‘from the text of 

[the law] and from actual fact,’ that substantial overbreadth 

exists.” Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 122 (2003) (quoting 

N.Y. State Club Ass’n, 487 U.S. at 14). In short, Mahoney’s 

overbreadth challenge fails because he cannot show any 

“realistic danger” the Defacement Statute actually chills 

constitutionally protected speech. N.Y. State Club Ass’n, 487 

U.S. at 11. 

 

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IV 

Next, Mahoney claims the District violated his rights 

under the RFRA because his efforts to chalk the sidewalk in 

front of the White House were religiously motivated. The 

RFRA prohibits the District from “substantially burden[ing] a 

person’s exercise of religion” unless the District 

“demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) 

is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 

governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)–(b); see id.

§ 2000bb-2(1)–(2) (including the District as a “covered 

entity”). 

The district court accepted Mahoney’s allegation that his 

proposed chalking was motivated by a sincere religious belief. 

But the district court rejected Mahoney’s RFRA claim 

because his amended complaint did not establish chalk was 

the exclusive medium through which Mahoney could express 

his religious views. Indeed, the amended complaint alleges 

chalk art is only “part of [Mahoney’s] public prayer vigils, 

demonstrations, protests and rallies.” Complaint ¶ 56. 

Mahoney argues the district court erred by narrowly focusing 

on the medium—not the message. According to Mahoney the 

district court should have exclusively considered (1) whether 

his religious belief was sincere, and (2) whether the District’s 

action substantially burdened “a religious practice” of his. 

Mahoney’s novel two-step legal framework is at odds 

with this court’s precedent. In Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 

F.3d 12 (D.C. Cir. 2001), we explained that “to make 

religious motivation the critical focus is . . . to read out of 

RFRA the condition that only substantial burdens on the 

exercise of religion trigger the compelling interest 

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requirement.” Id. at 17. Henderson instead focused RFRA’s 

“substantial burden” inquiry on the nexus between religious 

practice and religious tenet: whether the regulation at issue 

“force[d plaintiffs] to engage in conduct that their religion 

forbids or . . . prevents them from engaging in conduct their 

religion requires.” Id. at 16. There is an important benefit of 

this latter approach. In adhering to RFRA’s plain text, it 

avoids expanding RFRA’s coverage beyond what Congress 

intended, preventing RFRA claims from being reduced into 

questions of fact, proven by the credibility of the claimant. 

The facts of Henderson are also difficult to distinguish. 

There, we upheld a National Park Service regulation banning 

the sale of message-bearing t-shirts in designated sections of 

the National Mall, against a RFRA challenge brought by a 

group of evangelical Christians. Id. In so doing, we reasoned 

the ban on t-shirt sales was not a substantial burden on the 

exercise of religion because it was “at most a restriction on 

one of a multitude of means” by which the appellants could 

engage in their vocation to spread the gospel. Id. at 17 

(noting appellants could “still distribute t-shirts for free on the 

Mall, or sell them on streets surrounding the Mall”). As in 

Henderson, the District’s threatened use of the Defacement 

Statute prohibits only “one of a multitude of means” of 

conveying Mahoney’s religious message. Mahoney may still 

spread his message through picketing, a public prayer vigil, or 

other similar activities in which he has previously engaged. 

The Defacement Statute does not realistically prevent 

Mahoney from chalking elsewhere, as Mahoney concedes the 

District allowed him to do in the past. 

Mahoney attempts to distinguish Henderson on two 

grounds. First, he argues the Religious Land Use and 

Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) overruled 

Henderson by amending RFRA’s definition of “exercise of 

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religion” to include “any exercise of religion, whether or not 

compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” But, 

as the court explained when it denied the petition for 

rehearing en banc in Henderson, “[RLUIPA] did not alter the 

propriety of inquiring into the importance of a religious 

practice when assessing whether a substantial burden exists.” 

265 F.3d 1072, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Second, Mahoney 

argues the regulation at issue in Henderson was a partial ban, 

prohibiting the “sale” of t-shirts but not their distribution, 

whereas the District’s prohibition on chalking in front of the 

White House is complete. But this argument amounts to 

nothing more than a word game, altering the perceived 

breadth of the government restriction by narrowing the 

pertinent expressive activity at issue. There is nothing in 

Henderson, or in post-Henderson RLUIPA cases, that 

indicates RFRA’s “substantial burden” analysis is subject to 

such manipulation. 

V 

Mahoney claims the Defacement Statute violates the First 

Amendment, both on its face, and as applied to his efforts at 

chalking the street in front of the White House. But Mahoney 

cannot bring a facial challenge because the Defacement 

Statute is constitutional in certain circumstances, and 

Mahoney points to no “realistic danger” that it will otherwise 

be applied in an unconstitutional manner. Nor can we 

distinguish Mahoney’s as-applied claim from the as applied 

challenge rejected by the Supreme Court in Taxpayers for 

Vincent. As a result, the order of the district court dismissing 

this case is 

Affirmed.

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KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge, concurring: 

 I agree with and join the Court’s thorough and wellcrafted opinion in its entirety. As the Court holds, the District 

of Columbia may prohibit defacement of Pennsylvania 

Avenue in front of the White House. The prohibition is a 

reasonable time, place, and manner restriction for purposes of 

First Amendment doctrine. 

I add these few words simply because I do not want the 

fog of First Amendment doctrine to make this case seem 

harder than it is. No one has a First Amendment right to 

deface government property. No one has a First Amendment 

right, for example, to spray-paint the Washington Monument 

or smash the windows of a police car. As Justice Rehnquist 

succinctly said: “One who burns down the factory of a 

company whose products he dislikes can expect his First 

Amendment defense to a consequent arson prosecution to be 

given short shrift by the courts. . . . The same fate would 

doubtless await the First Amendment claim of one prosecuted 

for destruction of government property after he defaced a 

speed limit sign in order to protest the stated speed limit.” 

Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 594 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., 

dissenting on separate point). When, as here, the Government 

applies a restriction on defacement in a content-neutral and 

viewpoint-neutral fashion, there can be no serious First 

Amendment objection. See, e.g., City Council of Los Angeles 

v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 809-10 (1984); 

Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1939). 

USCA Case #09-7131 Document #1314252 Filed: 06/21/2011 Page 17 of 17