Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01487/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01487-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE A. NARANJO,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 11cv1487 WQH (PCL)

ORDER

vs.

TIMOTHY BUSBY, Warden,

Respondent.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 15) of United

States Magistrate Judge Peter C. Lewis, filed on June 6, 2012. 

BACKGROUND

On February 11, 2009, in California Superior Court, County of San Diego, Petitioner

Jose A. Naranjo entered a plea of guilty to: (1) forcible rape in violation of Cal. Penal Code

§ 261(a)(2); (2) sodomy by use of force in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 286(c)(2); (3) assault

in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(1) with an enhancement for personal infliction of great

bodily injury pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 12022.7(a); and (4) making criminal threats in

violation of Cal. Penal Code § 422. (Lodgment 3; Lodgment 11). Pursuant to a plea

agreement, Petitioner agreed to serve a prison term of eighteen years and eight months. Id. 

The judge did not advise Petitioner of any appeal rights that he was waiving or preserving

under the plea agreement.

On March 12, 2009, Petitioner filed an ex parte motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 

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(Lodgment 1 at 38-41). The motion requested that his attorney, Mel Epley, be dismissed from

the case. Id.

On March 13, 2009, the state court dismissed Epley and appointed the Office of the

Alternate Public Defenders to represent Petitioner. (Lodgment 1 at 37). 

On March 17, 2009, Albert Bradley, Petitioner’s new attorney, filed a motion to

withdraw Petitioner’s guilty plea which stated: “[Petitioner] alleges that counsel failed to

adequately communicate with him, failed to provide him with copies of the discovery, and that

the Public Defender simply did not have the time to adequately represent him. Under the

circumstances, the [Petitioner] did not receive adequate representation in such a serious matter.

He should be allowed to withdraw his plea.” (Lodgment 1 at 35-36).

On June 3, 2009, the California Superior Court, County of San Diego held an

evidentiary hearing to consider Petitioner’s motion to withdraw his plea. The Court denied the

motion and sentenced him pursuant to his plea agreement. Petitioner was not advised of any

appeal rights at the time of sentencing. Neither Petitioner nor his counsel filed a direct appeal.

On June 3, 2010, Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition in California Superior Court,

County of San Diego. (Lodgment 4). On July 20, 2010, the court denied the petition. 

(Lodgment 5).

On September 16, 2010, Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition in the California Court

of Appeal. (Lodgment 6). On November 2, 2010, the court denied the petition. (Lodgment

7).

On December 13, 2010, Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition in the Supreme Court

of California. (Lodgment 8). On June 8, 2011, the court summarily denied the petition. 

(Lodgment 9).

On July 1, 2011, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”)

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court, challenging his conviction on the grounds that (1)

he was unduly influenced by counsel to plead guilty; (2) he did not understand the charges to

which he was pleading guilty; (3) the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Withdraw

Guilty Plea; and (4) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed

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to file a notice of appeal. (ECF No. 1). 

On November 30, 2011, Respondent filed an Answer contending that the state courts

reasonably and properly denied each of Petitioner’s claims. (ECF No. 12). On December 5,

2011, Petitioner filed a Traverse. (ECF No. 14). 

On June 6, 2012, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation

recommending that the Petition be denied. (ECF No. 15). 

On July 13, 2012, Petitioner filed objections to the Report and Recommendation. (ECF

No. 19). Petitioner objects to the Report and Recommendation on the grounds that: (1) “[t]he

Magistrate erroneously reject[ed] Petitioner’s claim that it was undue pressure from trial

counsel that induced Petitioner to plead guilty and sign a stack of waivers ...” ; (2) “[t]he

Magistrate err[ed] in speculating that [P]etitioner was fully able to comprehend exactly what

he was intimidated into pleading to by Counsel, or just what the interpreter was actually saying

to Petitioner”; (3) the Magistrate Judge failed to consider “a clause contained in the plea

agreement/contract” that should have permitted Petitioner to change his plea; and, (4) the

“Magistrate mistakenly [found] that Petitioner’s trial Counsel had no duty to file a notice of

Appeal on [Petitioner’s] behalf.” (ECF No. 19).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The duties of the district court in connection with a Report and Recommendation of a

Magistrate Judge are set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1). When a party objects to a Report and Recommendation, “[a] judge of the [district]

court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the [Report and

Recommendation] to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A district court may

“accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the

magistrate judge.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

DISCUSSION

This Court’s review of the Petition is governed by the deferential standard of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) of 1996. Under this standard, a

petition cannot be granted unless the state court decision was “contrary to, or involved an

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unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05 (2000). “[A] federal

habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent

judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. . . . Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted).

I. Claims 1 and 2: Voluntariness of Petitioner’s guilty plea

In his objections to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Petitioner asserts that

“Counsel, rather than putting together a viable defense for Petitioner, instead went to work on

his client’s fears of a 25-year-to-life prison term so as to frighten him to accept, via

psychological arm twisting, the disputed plea agreement.” (ECF No. 19 at 2). In his Petition,

Petitioner asserts: “Mr. Epley presented Petitioner with an ultimatum–take the deal or have a

sham trial in which he would present no evidence on Petitioner’s behalf. In fact, Mr. Epley

told Petitioner that if Petitioner ever wanted to see his kids again he had better take the deal. 

In addition, on several occasions did Mr. Epley state on the record that he was not prepared

to proceed to trial.” (ECF No. 1 at 8). Petitioner asserts that “[t]he only evidence relied on by

respondent, or the Magistrate, as to what was actually done by the interpreter [when Petitioner

entered his guilty plea], is that she directed [Petitioner] where to sign his name on the form....”

(ECF No. 19 at 3). Petitioner asserts that “... nobody ever explained to him what he was

pleading to ... [and] that he submitted a ‘Request for Interview’ once he arrived at the prison

seeking to find out how much time he was sentenced to and also how many strikes he had in

his case. ... Petitioner does not speak, read, or write English.” (ECF No. 1 at 12). Petitioner

contends that “[t]he Magistrate [erred] in speculating that Petitioner was fully able to

comprehend exactly what he was intimidated into pleading to by Counsel, or just what the

interpreter was actually saying to Petitioner.” (ECF No. 19 at 2). Petitioner contends that

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“[u]nder these circumstances, it cannot be said that Petitioner’s plea was made freely or

voluntarily.” (ECF No. 1 at 11). 

The California Court of Appeal stated: 

The change of plea form reflects [that Petitioner] was provided with a sworn

Spanish interpreter, Yolanda Brennan, at the change of plea hearing. Interpreter

Brennen signed the change of plea form stating that she ‘truly translated for the

defendant the entire contents of this form and any attached addendum. ....’ 

[Petitioner] signed the plea form, indicating that he understood the plea and that

he entered it freely and voluntarily. [Petitioner] has not shown his plea was other

than knowing and voluntary, and he received the benefit of his bargain.

(Lodgment 7 at 2). 

The Magistrate Judge stated:

In order for a guilty plea to be valid, the record must reflect that the

defendant made the plea voluntarily, and that the waiver was a knowing and

intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the likely consequences. Brady

v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747-48 (1970). The voluntariness of a plea can

only be determined by considering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding

it, including the sentence that may be imposed pursuant to the plea relative to

that which may have been imposed had the defendant been found guilty after a

trial. See Id. at 749. In addition, voluntariness requires that a defendant has

notice of the nature of the charges of which he or she is accused. Marshall v.

Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 436 (1983). When a defendant is represented by

counsel, it may be appropriate to presume that, even without an express

representation the charge was explained, the defendant's counsel did explain the

charge. Id. (citing Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 (1976)).

A criminal defendant who pleaded guilty on the advice of counsel may

only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing

that the counsel’s advice was not within the range of competence required of

attorneys in criminal cases. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).

Thus, the two-part test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-89

(1984), “applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of

counsel.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985). First, “defendant must show

that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”

under the circumstances. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Second, to demonstrate

prejudice in the context of a guilty plea, petitioner “must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded

guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 57. The

standards under both Strickland and section 2254(d) are highly deferential, and

they become doubly deferential when Strickland and section 2254(d) apply “in

tandem.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct 770, 788 (2011). Thus, the question

is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s

deferential standard. (Id.) (emphasis added). Finally, a habeas petitioner bears

the burden of establishing that a guilty plea was not voluntary and knowing.

Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 2006).

After reviewing the entire record, this Court finds that [Petitioner] did not

receive ineffective assistance of counsel and that the state court reasonably

determined his plea was voluntary.

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During the plea bargaining process, [Petitioner] was provided with a

certified Spanish interpreter, who translated the plea form. (Lodgment 11, at 2.)

The interpreter also assisted him at the plea hearing and the sentencing hearing.

(Lodgments 3 & 10.) [Petitioner] signed the plea form and initialed next to the

following provisions: “I am entering my plea freely and voluntarily, without fear

or threat to me or anyone closely related to me;” and “I declare under penalty of

perjury that I have read, understood, and initialed each item above and any

attached addendum, and everything on the form and any attached addendum is

true and correct.” (Lodgment 3.) He also initialed next to the provision stating,

“I have not been induced to enter this plea by any promise or representation of

any kind, except (State any agreement with the District Attorney.)” (Id.) The

agreement with the District Attorney followed and indicated the counts to which

[Petitioner] was pleading and a dismissal of the balance, as well as a stipulated

sentence of 18 years and eight months. (Lodgment 3, at 1.) In addition,

[Petitioner] initialed next to the factual basis for his plea....

[Petitioner]’s counsel signed the plea form indicating that he had

personally read and explained the entire contents of the form to the defendant.

(Lodgement 3.) The interpreter signed at the bottom of the form indicating that

she had truly translated the entire contents of the form and that [Petitioner]

indicated his understanding of the contents of the form. (Id.) During

[Petitioner]’s change of plea hearing, the judge carefully and thoroughly

questioned [Petitioner] as to his understanding of the consequences of his plea.

(Lodgment 11, at 1). The judge questioned [Petitioner] as to whether anyone had

threatened him in any way or forced him to change his plea. (Id.) [Petitioner]

indicated the his plea was voluntary; that he understood the plea agreement after

it was translated by a certified Spanish language interpreter; and that it was his

signature on the form and his initials by each provision in the form. (Lodgment

11, at 3-4.)

The judge went on to explain that each of the charges to which

[Petitioner] pled constituted a strike and the consequences of those strikes.

(Lodgment 11, at 4.) The judge explained that [Petitioner] would have a lifetime

requirement to register as a sex offender. (Lodgment 11, at 5.) Finally, the judge

questioned [Petitioner] regarding the factual basis of his plea....

Finally, the judge went on to elicit, for a second time, that [Petitioner]

understood the charges to which he was pleading and the factual basis for each

charge. (Lodgment 11, at 8.) ...

As to his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Strickland

standard requires a showing of deficient performance by counsel and that the

result would have been different. Here, [Petitioner] fails on both counts. By

counseling [Petitioner] on the possible consequences of going to trial and on the

nature of the plea agreement, his appointed attorney’s conduct did not fall below

an objectively reasonable standard. [Petitioner] faced a difficult choice, but his

counsel’s recommendation to take the plea, even if voiced in strong terms, did

not amount to coercion or threats. ...

[T]his Court finds that the appellate court did not make a decision that

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States nor one

that resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

(ECF No. 15 at 6-11).

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Guilty pleas are valid if made voluntarily and intelligently. Brady v. United States, 397

U.S. 742, 747 (1970). “A plea is voluntary [and intelligent] only if it is entered by one fully

aware of the direct consequences of his plea....” United States v. Amador-Leal, 276 F.3d 511,

514 (9th Cir.2002); see also Brady, 397 U.S. at 750 (holding that a defendant in a criminal

proceeding must be able to, “with the help of counsel, rationally weigh the advantages of going

to trial against the advantages of pleading guilty”). 

The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that

the California Court of Appeal’s decision, finding that Petitioner voluntarily and knowingly

entered his plea, was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. 

See Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 2006) (“A habeas petitioner bears the

burden of establishing that his guilty plea was not voluntary and knowing”); see also Brady,

397 U.S. at 755 (“[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences ...

must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment),

misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that

are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g.

bribes).”). The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that “[Petitioner’s]

appointed attorney’s conduct did not fall below an objectively reasonable standard” and that

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the California Court of Appeal’s ruling to deny

Petitioner’s first two claims was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court

precedent. (ECF No. 15 at 11-12).

II. Claim 3: Petitioner’s Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea

In his objections to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, Petitioner asserts: 

... [T]here is a clause contained in the [plea agreement] contract that the

Petitioner was in compliance with for the pendency of his sentencing. The

Clause reads as follows: 

(CRUZ WAIVER) NEGOTIATED, ‘DISPOSITION THAT IF PENDING

SENTENCING I AM ARRESTED OR COMMIT ANOTHER CRIME[], OR

WILLFULLY FAIL TO APPEAR FOR MY PROBATION INTERVIEW OR

MY SENTENCING HEARING, THE SENTENCING [PORTION] OF THIS

AGREEMENT WILL BE CANCELLED. I WILL BE SENTENCED

UNCONDITIONALLY, AND I WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO WITHDRAW

MY GUILTY/NO CONTEST PLEA(S).’ 

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(ECF No. 19 at 3). Petitioner contends that “[t]he clause clearly implies that a defendant can

withdraw a guilty plea if he or she abides by the details that the ‘Cruz Waiver’ lays out in the

plea contract.” Id. Petitioner contends that “Petitioner was actually denied the benefit of the

plea contract ...” because Petitioner “did not violate any [of] the conditions in the clause.” Id.

at 3-4.

The Magistrate Judge stated: 

Prior to sentencing, [Petitioner], represented by new counsel, moved the

trial court to withdraw his plea. The court held an evidentiary hearing, during

which [Petitioner] confirmed that his former attorney had explained the

stipulated sentence versus the possibility of 25 years to life if convicted at trial. 

(Lodgment 10, at 10). During the hearing, [Petitioner] did not argue his

innocence, but rather, requested a shorter sentence, “something fair.” (Lodgment

10, at 8). The only evidence [Plaintiff] offered in support of his argument that

his plea was coerced was to say that he was “threatened, influenced, and

terrorized by the prosecution and by my attorney that forced me to sign the

sentencing, the sentence of 18 years, eight months. The only evidence [Plaintiff]

offered to support these purported threats was his attorney’s explanation that he

would face the possibility of life in prison if he did not sign the plea, and his

attorney’s statement that the District Attorney would make only the one offer. 

[Petitioner] did not offer any evidence that he was threatened by anyone. ...

The Court also examined Mr. Epley, the attorney who had represented

[Petitioner] during the plea bargaining process. The judge asked Mr. Epley

whether [Petitioner] had asked him to do things that he had not done; whether

he ever told [Petitioner] that he did not have time to devote to his case; and how

many times and for how long Mr. Epley met with [Petitioner] during the

representation. Mr. Epley testified that he had met with [Petitioner] twice in

prison and twice via video conference and that he had explained the plea

agreement as well as the possible consequences if [Petitioner] were to be

convicted. (Lodgment 10, at 13). He testified that he had been busy on another

matter for two weeks between [Petitioner’s] preliminary hearing and

arraignment and had explained to [Petitioner] that he would not visit him in jail

during that time. (Lodgment 10, at 14-15). Finally, Mr. Epley testified that only

at the time for sentencing, did [Petitioner] ask him to do anything he had not

already done. (Id.) The court then found that [Petitioner] had been adequately

represented and denied his motion to withdraw his plea. The court refused to

credit [Petitioner’s] claims that he had been threatened or inadequately

counseled by his attorney and characterized his state of mind as one of ‘buyer’s

remorse.’ 

The California Court of Appeal determined that [Petitioner] failed to

show that his guilty plea was “other than knowing and voluntary” because he

was provided with a sworn Spanish interpreter who assisted him to review the

contents of the plea form and signed the form indicating she had truly translated

its contents. (Lodgment 7, at 2) The state court also based its findings on the

fact that [Petitioner] signed and initialed the plea form to demonstrate that he

voluntarily and intelligently pleaded guilty and understood the contents of the

plea form. (Id.) ...

[Petitioner] has failed to demonstrate that the California Court of

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Appeal’s ruling was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the

governing law.

(ECF No. 15 at 10-11).

In this case, the Cruz waiver signed by Petitioner did not provide Petitioner with a right

to withdraw his guilty plea. See People v. Vargas, 223 Cal. App. 3d 1107 (1990). If Petitioner

had been arrested for another crime, violated any condition of his release, or failed to appear

to a probation interview or sentencing hearing prior, the Cruz waiver would have foreclosed 

any right that he may have otherwise had to withdraw his plea. Id. On June 3, 2009, at the

evidentiary hearing held prior to Petitioner’s sentencing, the court considered Petitioner’s

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Petitioner testified on his own behalf and, in response to

questions from Bradley, Petitioner stated: “I asked [Epley] for my discovery, and he never

gave it to me. And I didn’t get anything till now that I have a new attorney representing me.” 

(Lodgment 10 at 3). Petitioner testified that he did not enter his guilty plea voluntarily: “I felt

like I had no other option ... [b]ecause [Epley] told me that if I wanted to ever see the light of

day outside again, that I had to sign.” Id. at 4. On direct examination, Epley stated: “My notes

indicate that I saw [Petitioner] personally in the jail two times. ... And twice I had video

conferences with him from our office. ... I told him that [there] was a possibility [of life in

prison] if he was convicted of some of the charges and the allegations attached thereto.” Id.

at 12. Epley stated that he did not threaten Petitioner to accept the plea agreement and that

Petitioner never asked anything of him until the day of sentencing. Id. Bradley did not crossexamine Epley. Id. at 14. The state court judge found that Petitioner’s plea was knowing and

voluntary, stating:

Under the circumstances such as this, good cause for withdrawing a guilty plea

exists when, by clear and convincing evidence, a defendant demonstrates that

his free judgment has been overcome either by mistake, ignorance, or some

other factor, duress, fraud, or inadvertence. The circumstance in this case is one

where this defendant has failed to convince me that any of those factors exist.

(Lodgment 1 at 13-15; Lodgment 2; Lodgment 10). The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge

correctly concluded that the decision of the state court to deny Petitioner’s motion to withdraw

his guilty plea was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court

precedent. 

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III. Claim 4: Ineffective of assistance of counsel for failing to appeal the denial of

Petitioner’s Motion to Withdraw Plea

In his objections to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Petitioner asserts that

the “Magistrate mistakenly finds that Petitioner’s trial Counsel had no duty to file a notice of

Appeal on his Client’s behalf.” (ECF No. 19 at 4). Petitioner contends that “Petitioner did not

waive the right to appeal under the CIRCUMSTANCES under which the instant sentence was

in essense [sic] forced upon him, the filing of his motion to withdraw should be evidence

enough for competent counsel to have filed a very simple Notice of Appeal. Counsel did not

even appeal the denial of the motion itself.” Id. In the Petition filed in this Court, and in both

habeas petitions filed by Petitioner in state court, Petitioner states:

Petitioner, unsure if his attorney had filed a notice of appeal, sought to file one

himself soon after arriving at the Department of Corrections Reception Center

at Donovan State Prison. Petitioner, not having access to the law library (due

to the lock-down status of all reception center inmates), submitted an “Inmate

Request for Interview” on 8-31-09 (see “Inmate Request for Interview”; Exhibit

“E”) seeking information in regards to filing an appeal. Petitioner, being a

layman at the law, and unable to speak or write English, didn’t know what he

needed to do in order to appeal his case; specifically, he did not know that he

needed to seek a Certificate of Probable Cause. In any event, it was defense

counsel[’]s duty to file a Notice of Appeal, or at the very least, explain to

Petitioner what he needed to do to protect his right to challenge the conviction.

(ECF No. 1 at 20-22; Lodgment 4 at 20-21; Lodgment 6 at 20-21).

The California Court of Appeal found that Petitioner’s counsel was not ineffective for

failing to directly appeal the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, stating:

[Petitioner] also contends trial counsel was ineffective because substitute

counsel did not file a notice of appeal so that he could seek review of the

validity of his plea. [Petitioner] waived certain appeal rights as part of his plea. 

In order to obtain appellate review of the validity of the plea, [Petitioner] was

required to file a timely notice of appeal and request and obtain a certificate of

probable cause from the trial court. (Pen. Code, § 1237.5.) An appellate court

may grant constructive filing of a notice of appeal when an incarcerated

defendant reasonably relies on counsel’s representation that counsel will timely

file a notice of appeal on the defendant’s behalf and counsel fails to do so. (In

re Benoit (1973) 10 Cal.3d 72, 86-87.) On this record, [Petitioner] has not

shown he is entitled to constructive filing of the notice of appeal and request for

a certificate of probable cause.

(Lodgment 7 at 2).

The Magistrate Judge stated:

[Petitioner]’s fourth and final ground in the present habeas Petition is that

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his counsel provided ineffective assistance when he failed to file a notice of

appeal. (Doc. 1, at 22-27.) He contends that he did not consent to not filing a

notice of appeal, and therefore, his counsel had the duty to file a notice of appeal

or at least inform him what he needed to do to protect his rights. (Doc. 1, at 22-

23.) [Petitioner] also claims that he contacted his counsel sometime after he was

transferred to a prison to inquire about whether an appeal was filed. (Doc. 1, at

26.) However, the state court determined that [Petitioner] failed to show his trial

counsel was ineffective because he “waived certain appeal rights as part of his

plea.” (Lodgment 7, at 2.) The state court further determined that [Petitioner]

was not entitled to constructive filing of a notice of appeal because he did not

reasonably rely on his counsel’s representation that a notice of appeal would be

timely filed. (Id.)

The Strickland standard applies to a claim that counsel was ineffective

for failing to file a notice of appeal. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477

(2000). In this context, counsel’s performance is potentially deficient if he or she

fails to consult with his or her client about an appeal. Id. at 479. Counsel has the

duty to consult when there is reason to think that “(1) a rational defendant would

want to appeal, or (2) th[e] particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to

counsel that he was interested in appealing.” Id. at 480. In determining counsel’s

duty to consult, it is “highly relevant” to inquire whether the conviction follows

a trial or a guilty plea, whether the plea was entered pursuant to a plea

agreement, whether the defendant was sentenced in accordance with the plea

agreement, and whether the plea agreement waived or reserved the right to

appeal. Id.; U.S. v. Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 2005). To

demonstrate prejudice a defendant is not required to show that he had

meritorious grounds for appeal. Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d at 1196. Rather, it

requires a showing that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different - that he would have appealed had his

lawyer asked. Id. In determining the probability that the defendant would have

appealed, it is important to determine whether there were non-frivolous grounds

for appeal and whether the defendant promptly expressed his desire to appeal.

Id.

[Petitioner]’s attorney did not counsel him about appeal rights after his

sentencing. [Petitioner] nonetheless claims that his counsel had the duty to file

a notice of appeal because he did not convey his desire not to file a notice of

appeal. (Doc. 1, at 22-23.) Although he claims to have contacted his counsel

about four months after his sentencing, he allegedly inquired only about whether

an appeal was filed. (Doc. 1, at 26.) However, because [Petitioner] waived

appeal rights, this failure to consult was not deficient performance by his

attorney. Further, [Petitioner] received the benefit of his bargain when he was

sentenced in accordance with his plea agreement. [Petitioner]’s waiver would

most likely have resulted in a dismissal if he had appealed. As such, he did not

have “non-frivolous” grounds for appeal. Therefore he neither demonstrated to

his counsel that he was interested in appealing, nor was he in the position of a

“rational” defendant who would want to appeal. See Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d

at 1197. This Court finds the California Court of Appeal’s ruling was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the governing law. Therefore,

[Petitioner]’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.

(ECF No. 15 at 12-13).

In Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), the United States Supreme Court held

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that under the performance prong of the Strickland v. Washington1 framework, “counsel ha[s]

a constitutionally imposed duty to consult with the defendant about an appeal when there is

reason to think either (1) that a rational defendant would want to appeal (for example, because

there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular defendant reasonably

demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing.” Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 480. 

The Supreme Court explained that it “employ[ed] the term ‘consult’ to convey a specific

meaning-advising the defendant about the advantages and disadvantages of taking an appeal,

and making a reasonable effort to discover the defendant’s wishes.” Id. at 478. In making this

inquiry, courts must “take into account all the information counsel knew or should have

known.” Id. at 480. A guilty plea is “highly relevant,” although not a dispositive factor, in

deciding whether counsel was duty-bound to advise a defendant about his appellate rights. Id. 

 In cases where the petitioner pleads guilty, the court must “consider such factors as whether

the defendant received the sentence bargained for as part of the plea and whether the plea

expressly reserved or waived some or all appeal rights.” Id. To satisfy Strickland’s prejudice

prong, “a defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s deficient failure to consult with him about an appeal, he would have timely

appealed.” Id. at 484. “[T]he prejudice inquiry ... is not wholly dissimilar from the inquiry

used to determine whether counsel performed deficiently in the first place; specifically, both

may be satisfied if the defendant shows nonfrivolous grounds for appeal.” Id. at 486.

In Lewis v. Johnson, 359 F.3d 646 (3d. Cir. 2004), the Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit applied Flores-Ortega and found ineffective assistance of counsel where an attorney

did not counsel his client about appealing the denial of his application to withdraw a guilty

1

To prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must demonstrate

two things. First, he must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “This requires showing that counsel made errors so

serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed to the defendant by the

Sixth Amendment.” Id. Second, he must show that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced

the defense. Id. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious that they deprived

Petitioner “of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. The standards under both

Strickland and section 2254(d) are highly deferential, and they become “doubly deferential”

when Strickland and section 2254(d) apply “in tandem.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct 770,

788 (2011).

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plea. Lewis, 359 F.3d at 650-51. Lewis pled guilty, was informed of his right to an appeal by

the trial court, and attempted to contact his attorney after his sentencing hearing, but made no

reference to an appeal. Id. at 649. Unable to reach his attorney, Lewis filed a timely pro se

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at 650. A month later, his trial counsel filed a

“bare-boned” and untimely motion to withdraw Lewis's guilty plea. Id. at 660-61. The trial

court did not rule on the pro se motion and summarily denied the motion filed by trial counsel.

Id. at 650, 661. No notice of appeal was filed. Id. Lewis then wrote the Clerk of the Court,

describing his lack of contact with his attorney, and requested an “extension of time, to prepare

my case in the proper order.” Id. at 661. Lewis also wrote the Clerk of the Court to inquire

about the “present state, of any appeal you may have submitted to the court on my behalf, and

who is the lawyer of record.” Id. The court stated:

... Lewis is entitled to federal habeas relief stemming from trial counsel’s failure

to advise him of his right to appeal from the trial court’s denial of his motion to

withdraw the guilty plea. ...

[T]his record compels a finding that trial counsel's conduct was objectively

unreasonable. We can think of no strategic reason to explain why [counsel]

failed to follow-up with Lewis either following the sentencing or after the trial

court denied the motion to withdraw, and the Commonwealth offers none. The

ultimate decision to appeal rests with the defendant.

Id. at 660-661 (citation omitted).

In this case, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, which

states: “... (Appeal Rights) I give up my right to appeal the following: any sentence stipulated

herein.” (Lodgment 3 at 2). Petitioner did not waive his right to appeal his underlying

conviction, i.e. the voluntariness of his guilty plea. The Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that

Bradley’s performance was not deficient is based on an incorrect finding that Petitioner

“waived appeal rights.” (ECF No. 15 at 13). The Court declines to adopt the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge to deny claim four of the Petition. 

The California Court of Appeal correctly acknowledged that Petitioner had a right,

under California law, to directly appeal the denial of his application to withdraw his guilty

plea, despite having waived the right to appeal his sentence. The Court of Appeal stated: “[i]n

order to obtain appellate review of the validity of the plea, [Petitioner] was required to file a

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timely notice of appeal and request and obtain a certificate of probable cause from the trial

court.” (Lodgment 7 at 2) (citing Cal. Penal Code § 1237.5). However, the California Court

of Appeal denied Petitioner’s fourth claim on grounds unrelated to Bradley’s performance,

concluding that Petitioner had failed to follow the procedures set forth in California Penal

Code section 1237.5 and “is not entitled to constructive filing of the notice of appeal and

request for a certificate of probable cause.” Id. The state court failed to address whether

Bradley had a duty to consult with Petitioner. 

Prior to his sentencing, Petitioner filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and a

motion to have his attorney, Epley, dismissed; in those motions, Petitioner alleged that his plea

was not made voluntarily or intelligently as a result of the undue influence of Epley. The

motion to withdraw the plea was denied and Petitioner was sentenced pursuant to the plea

agreement. The state court judge did not advise Petitioner of his appellate rights at his plea

hearing or sentencing hearing. Under the facts of this case, the Court concludes that there was

reason for counsel to think that a rational defendant, in Petitioner’s position, would want to

appeal. See Lewis, 359 F.3d at 660 (“even if [counsel] concluded that any appeal would be

frivolous, he could not disregard the evidence of Lewis's unequivocal desire to challenge his

... guilty plea, and abandon his client at this critical stage in the proceedings”); but see Tanner

v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding Petitioner’s contention that “a rational

defendant in his position would have wished to appeal his conviction [based on the

voluntariness of his plea]” to be frivolous because, under Nevada law, “[Petitioner] would have

had to bring a motion to withdraw his guilty plea or contest the validity of his plea in a postconviction proceeding, rather than asserting this claim on direct appeal.”). The Court

concludes that under the facts of this case, Bradley had a duty to consult with Petitioner

regarding an appeal. See Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 480. (“[C]ounsel ha[s] a constitutionally

imposed duty to consult with the defendant about an appeal when there is reason to think ...

that a rational defendant would want to appeal”); see also Buchanan v. Farwell, 308 F. App'x

103, 107 (9th Cir. 2009) (concluding that the trial court’s instructions were inadequate to

discharge petitioner’s attorney from his duty to consult because “during [petitioner’s] plea

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hearing, the trial court informed [him] of his right to appeal his conviction, but made no

mention of [petitioner’s] right to appeal his sentence”).

In order to determine whether Bradley fulfilled his duty, the Court will require the

parties to file any and all relevant evidence, in the form of declarations and exhibits, as to

whether Bradley consulted with Petitioner about an appeal. The Court declines to adopt the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge to deny Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary

hearing. The Court will review the parties’ filings and determine whether an evidentiary

hearing is necessary to resolve Petitioner’s fourth claim. 

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 15) is

adopted in part, from page 6, line 6 to page 12, line 6. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

is DENIED as to claims 1-3. Petitioner shall file any and all relevant evidence in the form of

declarations and exhibits in support of claim four of the Petition by January 16, 2013. 

Respondent shall file any and all relevant evidence in the form of declarations and exhibits in

opposition to claim four of the Petition by February 13, 2013.2

DATED: November 29, 2012

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

2

In the event Respondent believes it necessary to obtain an order from the Court

deeming Petitioner to have waived his attorney-client privilege, Respondent shall file a motion

with the Court at the appropriate time.

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