Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-00605/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-00605-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN ROSS BEAM, No. 2:11-CV-0605-KJM-CMK-P

Petitioner, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

V.W. KNIPP,

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks to bring a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pending before the court are petitioner’s amended

petition for a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 27), respondent’s answer (Doc. 40), and petitioner’s

reply (Doc. 44).

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

1

Case 2:11-cv-00605-KJM-CMK Document 48 Filed 03/06/14 Page 1 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts1

The state court recited the following facts , and petitioner has not offered any 2

clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that these facts are correct:

The victim was referred to as Jane Doe at trial. Doe worked at a

gas station in Cool. She heard the police were at her mother’s house and

twice left work to see what was going on. Doe’s mother said the police

were looking for defendant. At the house there were two police officers

present and then a SWAT team arrived. 

Back at the gas station, a coworker told Doe that defendant was

looking for her. Defendant phoned Doe, telling her he needed to get out of

town because the police were looking for him. Doe did not agree at first to

help defendant; he phoned her again. 

Doe spoke with her supervisor, F. Pearce, about defendant’s phone

calls. Pearce suggested Doe call the police. Pearce called the police; Doe

and Pearce met the police at a market near the gas station. Doe told the

officers of the residence where defendant could be located. . . . .

At footnote 3, the state court observed:

The police claimed Doe would not tell them were defendant was. 

Defendant was wanted for burglary or possession of stolen property. 

The state court continued its discussion as follows:

. . . They told her they could not arrest someone at another’s residence

without a warrant. 

Doe and Pearce came up with a plan to get defendant arrested; Doe

would pick him up and leave him at a motel. Pearce would follow Doe to

ensure her safety. Pearce gave Doe $60 for the motel room. The police

told Doe this plan was a terrible idea and not to do it. It would not be safe. 

Despite this warning, Doe put the plan in action and picked up

defendant and drove through Georgetown. She drove past the car wash

and saw Pearce’s car waiting. Pearce pulled out and attempted to follow

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), “. . . a determination of a factual issue made 1

by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.” Petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this

presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See id. These facts are, therefore, drawn from

the state court’s opinion(s), lodged in this court. Petitioner may also be referred to as

“defendant.”

These facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal’s decision on direct 2

appeal. Because petitioner only challenged the sufficiency of the evidence as to a conviction for

false imprisonment, the court did not summarize those facts specifically relating to petitioner’s

conviction of forced oral copulation. 

2

Case 2:11-cv-00605-KJM-CMK Document 48 Filed 03/06/14 Page 2 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

them but defendant saw the car and told Doe to speed up. Between

Coloma and Placerville, Pearce lost sight of Doe’s car. Pearce, with her

husband, went to a diner and waited there several hours. 

Defendant directed Doe to drive from Placerville to Cameron Park. 

From there they drove to Auburn. After trying to check into motels that

were too expensive, they went to the Elmwood Motel. Once there, Doe’s

phone rang several times as Pearce was trying to reach her. Doe answered

once, but did not talk long. Defendant got angry about the calls and his

posture changed. Doe was scared and felt trapped; defendant was tense. 

Doe told defendant she needed to leave; she had to get home to her child. 

Defendant responded she was not going anywhere. Defendant told Doe

that he thought the police were looking for him because of Toby Kaiser. 

He said Sheri had probably turned him in because he killed Kaiser, cut off

his hands, and used them in burglaries. . . . 

At footnote 4, the court added:

The police did not investigate this allegation further because it was

outside their jurisdiction. There is no mention of this crime in the

probation report. 

The court continued:

. . . When Doe learned this, her attitude about leaving changed; she was

scared. 

Defendant wanted to get a local newspaper to see why the police

were looking for him, so they went to Doe’s gas station to get one. 

Defendant took the car keys with him when he went into the gas station. 

While he was gone, Doe called a friend, A. Meza. It was a poor

connection and Meza hung up. Doe and defendant returned to the motel. 

Doe again told defendant she needed to go home to her child. 

Defendant was still angry. He grabbed Doe and in certain terms told her

of his sexual intentions. Doe declined. Defendant asked what if he went

away forever and she could not do this. Doe thought he was referring to

his killing Kaiser. Defendant proceeded to sexually assault Doe, despite

her contrary plea. 

Defendant heard the door move and jumped up, saying it was time

to leave. As Doe got dressed, she heard defendant masturbating in the

bathroom. 

They left the motel and went to a gas station. While defendant was

at a pay phone, Doe called Meza again and told him to call the police. 

Defendant got back in the car and announced they were going to Auburn

to get some alcohol. When they stopped at a store, defendant left the keys

in the car. Doe drove off and called 911. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

3

Case 2:11-cv-00605-KJM-CMK Document 48 Filed 03/06/14 Page 3 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

B. Procedural History

Petitioner was convicted of forcible oral copulation and false imprisonment. The

trial court found true allegations that petitioner had a prior serious felony conviction and had

served two prior prison terms. Petitioner was sentenced to 24 years in prison. The conviction

and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal and the California Supreme Court denied direct

review. Petitioner then filed three state court post-conviction actions, all of which were denied. 

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Because this action was filed after April 26, 1996, the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) are presumptively

applicable. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct.

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099 (1998). The AEDPA

does not, however, apply in all circumstances. When it is clear that a state court has not reached

the merits of a petitioner’s claim, because it was not raised in state court or because the court

denied it on procedural grounds, the AEDPA deference scheme does not apply and a federal

habeas court must review the claim de novo. See Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.

2002) (holding that the AEDPA did not apply where Washington Supreme Court refused to reach

petitioner’s claim under its “re-litigation rule”); see also Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1208

(9th Cir. 2002) (holding that, where state court denied petitioner an evidentiary hearing on

perjury claim, AEDPA did not apply because evidence of the perjury was adduced only at the

evidentiary hearing in federal court); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.2001) (reviewing

petition de novo where state court had issued a ruling on the merits of a related claim, but not the

claim alleged by petitioner). When the state court does not reach the merits of a claim, 

“concerns about comity and federalism . . . do not exist.” Pirtle, 313 F. 3d at 1167. 

/ / /

/ / /

4

Case 2:11-cv-00605-KJM-CMK Document 48 Filed 03/06/14 Page 4 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Where AEDPA is applicable, federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is

not available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings unless the state

court’s adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

Under § 2254(d)(1), federal habeas relief is available only where the state court’s decision is

“contrary to” or represents an “unreasonable application of” clearly established law. Under both

standards, “clearly established law” means those holdings of the United States Supreme Court as

of the time of the relevant state court decision. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006)

(citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 412) . “What matters are the holdings of the Supreme Court, not

the holdings of lower federal courts.” Plumlee v. Masto, 512 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2008) (en

banc). Supreme Court precedent is not clearly established law, and therefore federal habeas

relief is unavailable, unless it “squarely addresses” an issue. See Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742,

753-54 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 28 S. Ct. 743, 746 (2008)). 

For federal law to be clearly established, the Supreme Court must provide a “categorical answer”

to the question before the state court. See id.; see also Carey, 549 U.S. at 76-77 (holding that a

state court’s decision that a defendant was not prejudiced by spectators’ conduct at trial was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the Supreme Court’s test for determining prejudice

created by state conduct at trial because the Court had never applied the test to spectators’

conduct). Circuit court precedent may not be used to fill open questions in the Supreme Court’s

holdings. See Carey, 549 U.S. at 74. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

5

Case 2:11-cv-00605-KJM-CMK Document 48 Filed 03/06/14 Page 5 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring, garnering a

majority of the Court), the United States Supreme Court explained these different standards. A

state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent if it is opposite to that reached by

the Supreme Court on the same question of law, or if the state court decides the case differently

than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. See id. at 405. A state

court decision is also “contrary to” established law if it applies a rule which contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases. See id. In sum, the petitioner must demonstrate

that Supreme Court precedent requires a contrary outcome because the state court applied the

wrong legal rules. Thus, a state court decision applying the correct legal rule from Supreme

Court cases to the facts of a particular case is not reviewed under the “contrary to” standard. See

id. at 406. If a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established law, it is reviewed to

determine first whether it resulted in constitutional error. See Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040,

1052 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). If so, the next question is whether such error was structural, in which

case federal habeas relief is warranted. See id. If the error was not structural, the final question

is whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict, or was harmless. See id. 

State court decisions are reviewed under the far more deferential “unreasonable

application of” standard where it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court cases, but

unreasonably applies the rule to the facts of a particular case. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.

510, 520 (2003). While declining to rule on the issue, the Supreme Court in Williams, suggested

that federal habeas relief may be available under this standard where the state court either

unreasonably extends a legal principle to a new context where it should not apply, or

unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply. See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 408-09. The Supreme Court has, however, made it clear that a state court

decision is not an “unreasonable application of” controlling law simply because it is an erroneous

or incorrect application of federal law. See id. at 410; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

75-76 (2003). An “unreasonable application of” controlling law cannot necessarily be found

6

Case 2:11-cv-00605-KJM-CMK Document 48 Filed 03/06/14 Page 6 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

even where the federal habeas court concludes that the state court decision is clearly erroneous. 

See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76. This is because “[t]he gloss of clear error fails to give proper

deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness.” Id. at 75.

As with state court decisions which are “contrary to” established federal law, where a state court

decision is an “unreasonable application of” controlling law, federal habeas relief is nonetheless

unavailable if the error was non-structural and harmless. See Benn, 283 F.3d at 1052 n.6.

The “unreasonable application of” standard also applies where the state court

denies a claim without providing any reasoning whatsoever. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d

848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); Delgado v. Lewis, 233 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). Such decisions

are considered adjudications on the merits and are, therefore, entitled to deference under the

AEDPA. See Green v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081 1089 (9th Cir. 2002); Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982.

The federal habeas court assumes that state court applied the correct law and analyzes whether

the state court’s summary denial was based on an objectively unreasonable application of that

law. See Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; Delgado, 233 F.3d at 982. 

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner raises four claims in his amended petition. First, he argues that trial

counsel was ineffective in the following ways: (1) failing to “inform the trial court of Petitioner’s

desire to testify”; (2) allowing him to appear in court, in view of the jury, wearing bright orange

jail-issue canvas shoes; (3) failing to investigate prior false accusations made by the alleged

victim; (4) failing to introduce a transcript of trial Exhibit 5; (5) failing to raise objections to

testimony from law enforcement officers; and (6) failing to secure expert testimony. Second,

petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated when he appeared in court, in the

presence of the jury, in jail-issue shoes. Third, petitioner argues that appellate counsel was

ineffective for failing to raise all issues on appeal. Fourth, petitioner argues that the evidence

was insufficient to show false imprisonment by violence or menace.

7

Case 2:11-cv-00605-KJM-CMK Document 48 Filed 03/06/14 Page 7 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

A. Due Process Claim

Petitioner claims that his due process rights were violated when he was forced to

wear orange jail-issue canvass shoes during his trial. The court agrees with respondent that,

absent evidence that they jury saw the shoes, petitioner cannot state a claim for habeas relief. See

e.g. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 624 (2005) (holding that the use of visible shackles during

trial offends the constitution). 

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence Claim

When a challenge is brought alleging insufficient evidence, federal habeas corpus

relief is available if it is found that, upon the record of evidence adduced at trial, viewed in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Under Jackson, 3

the court must review the entire record when the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on

habeas. See id. It is the province of the jury to “resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the

evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id. “The

question is not whether we are personally convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. It is whether

rational jurors could reach the conclusion that these jurors reached.” Roehler v. Borg, 945 F.2d

303, 306 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1993). The federal

habeas court determines sufficiency of the evidence in the context of the substantive elements of

the criminal offense, as defined by state law. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16.

/ / /

/ / /

Even though Jackson was decided before AEDPA’s effective date, this expression 3

of the law is valid under AEDPA’s standard of federal habeas corpus review. A state court

decision denying relief in the face of a record establishing that no rational jury could have found

proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt would be either contrary to or an unreasonable

application of the law as outlined in Jackson. Cf. Bruce v. Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 959 (9th Cir.

2004) (denying habeas relief on sufficiency of the evidence claim under AEDPA standard of

review because a rational jury could make the finding at issue). 

8

Case 2:11-cv-00605-KJM-CMK Document 48 Filed 03/06/14 Page 8 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

As to petitioner’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his

conviction for false imprisonment, the state court addressed the claim on direct appeal as

follows:

Defendant contends there is insufficient evidence of menace to

support a conviction of felony false imprisonment. He contends there is

no evidence of an express or implied threat of harm and no evidence that

defendant’s statements about the Kaiser homicide were intended to

restrain Doe. 

The court then outlined California law relating to claims of insufficient evidence and continued

as follows:

False imprisonment is the unlawful violation of the personal liberty

of another. (citation omitted). It is punishable as a felony is “effected by

violence, menace, fraud or deceit.” (citation omitted). Menace is defined

as the threat of harm express or implied by word or deed. (citation

omitted). 

In arguing there is insufficient evidence of menace, defendant

relies on People v. Matian (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 480. In Matian,

defendant sexually assaulted his victim; during the assault he squeezed her

breast hard enough to cause pain, and possibly bruising. Afterwards she

collected her bookbag and prepared to go. Defendant grabbed her arm,

yelled at her not to go and that “‘nothing happened.’” He told her to go

wash her face. The victim then retreated to a chair. Each time she got up

to leave, defendant glared at her and began to rise. She was afraid and did

not want him to touch her so she sat down. (citation omitted). 

The appellate court found insufficient evidence of menace. 

(citation omitted). It noted that cases finding menace fell into two

categories: those where the defendant used a deadly weapon and those

where defendant verbally threatened harm. (citation omitted). The court

found the earlier sexual assaults, coupled with defendant glaring and rising

when the victim tried to leave, did not establish menace. There was no

evidence of a deadly weapon, a verbal threat, or any movement by

defendant suggesting harm. (citation omitted). 

Matian has been criticized by several courts, both for suggesting

menace requires either a weapon or a direct threat and for finding

insufficient evidence of menace on its face. (citations omitted). We agree

with these criticisms; the context may make words or gestures an implied

threat. “When a rational fact finder could conclude that a defendant’s acts

or words expressly or impliedly threatened harm, the fact finder may find

that there is a menace sufficient to make false imprisonment a felony. An

express threat or use of a deadly weapon is not necessary.” (citation

omitted). 

In this case the jury could find an implied threat of harm. When

Doe foolishly picked up defendant, she knew he was wanted by the police. 

The presence of a SWAT team indicated he was dangerous. Whatever

illusion of safety she had evaporated when he made her speed up to lose

9

Case 2:11-cv-00605-KJM-CMK Document 48 Filed 03/06/14 Page 9 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Pearce who was following them. Once at the motel, however, the situation

got worse. Doe’s constantly ringing phone upset defendant; he got tense

and his “posture changed.” When Doe said she needed to go home,

defendant told her she was not going anywhere. Then he told her about

Toby Kaiser, claiming he had killed and mutilated him. 

Defendant contends he was simply trying to make sense of the

numerous phone calls and why the police were looking for him. That is

one explanation; another is that defendant, perhaps now suspicious of Doe,

was reinforcing his command that she not leave by letting her know that he

was capable of extreme violence. Defendant’s words and his changed

demeanor had the effect of restraining Doe. She was frightened; she

testified she feared defendant, did not want “to mess with him,” and

changed her attitude about leaving. Her fear that he would hurt her if she

tried to leave is supported by the above-described circumstances. This

evidence is sufficient to establish menace for felony false imprisonment. 

Because the state court applied the correct federal constitutional principles, the

court reviews to determine whether the state court’s denial of petitioner’s sufficiency-of-theevidence claim was an unreasonable application of clearly established law. The court finds that it

was not. Under California law, felony false imprisonment requires violence, menace, fraud, or

deceit. Menace can be found where there is an implied threat and does not require a direct threat. 

As the state court observed, the facts of the case when viewed most favorably to the prosecution

certainly allowed the jury to find an implied threat of violence. In particular, a reasonable jury

could conclude based on petitioner’s statement to Doe that he murdered Kaiser that petitioner

was impliedly threatening Doe with similar violence if she did stay in the motel room with him. 

While petitioner’s alternative theory that he was trying to make sense of the entire situation may

also be plausible based on the evidence presented, it is for the jury to make this determination. 

As long as the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to reach the conclusion that an implied

threat existed, petitioner’s claim fails. The court finds that the evidence was sufficient in this

case to allow the jury to reach this conclusion. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

10

Case 2:11-cv-00605-KJM-CMK Document 48 Filed 03/06/14 Page 10 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the effective assistance of counsel. The United

States Supreme Court set forth the test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, a petitioner must show that, considering

all the circumstances, counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 

See id. at 688. To this end, petitioner must identify the acts or omissions that are alleged not to

have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. See id. at 690. The federal court must

then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were

outside the wide range of professional competent assistance. See id. In making this

determination, however, there is a strong presumption “that counsel’s conduct was within the

wide range of reasonable assistance, and that he exercised acceptable professional judgment in all

significant decisions made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 

Second, a petitioner must affirmatively prove prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 693. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A

reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.;

see also Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir. 2000). A reviewing court “need not

determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered

by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies . . . If it is easier to dispose of an

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be

followed.” Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

697).

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

11

Case 2:11-cv-00605-KJM-CMK Document 48 Filed 03/06/14 Page 11 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

The Strickland standards also apply to appellate counsel. See Smith v. Robbins,

528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1986); Miller v. Keeney, 882

F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989). However, an indigent defendant “does not have a constitutional

right to compel appointed counsel to press nonfrivolous points requested by the client, if counsel,

as a matter of professional judgment, decides not to present those points.” Jones v. Barnes, 463

U.S. 745, 751 (1983). Counsel “must be allowed to decide what issues are to be pressed.” Id. 

Otherwise, the ability of counsel to present the client’s case in accord with counsel’s professional

evaluation would be “seriously undermined.” Id.; see also Smith v. Stewart, 140 F.3d 1263, 1274

n.4 (9th Cir. 1998) (counsel not required to file “kitchen-sink briefs” because it “is not necessary,

and is not even particularly good appellate advocacy.”) Further, there is, of course, no obligation

to raise meritless arguments on a client’s behalf. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Thus,

counsel is not deficient for failing to raise a weak issue. See Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434. In order to

demonstrate prejudice in this context, petitioner must demonstrate that, but for counsel’s errors,

he probably would have prevailed on appeal. See id. at n.9. 

1. Trial Counsel

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to “inform the

trial court of Petitioner’s desire to testify”; (2) allowing him to appear in court, in view of the jury,

wearing bright orange jail-issue canvas shoes; (3) failing to investigate prior false accusations

made by the alleged victim; (4) failing to introduce a transcript of trial Exhibit 5; (5) failing to

raise objections to testimony from law enforcement officers; and (6) failing to secure expert

testimony. These claims, however, all fail because they are vague and conclusory. 

As to petitioner’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to inform the court

of his desire to testify on his own behalf, the court finds that the claim is conclusory and vague in

that petitioner does not state how he was prejudiced. Petitioner merely states that he had the right

to testify, that counsel failed to inform the court of that right (which, of course, the court knew full

well), and that he did not testify. Petitioner does not, however, inform the court what the

12

Case 2:11-cv-00605-KJM-CMK Document 48 Filed 03/06/14 Page 12 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

substance of his testimony would have been and how that testimony would have had an effect on

the outcome of the trial. 

As to petitioner’s claim that counsel failed to raise any objections regarding the

orange shoes, petitioner has not, as discussed above, alleged that the jury saw the shoes. Unless

the jury saw the shoes, there would have been no reason for counsel to object and the outcome of

the trial could not have been any different. This claim, as with the underlying due process claim,

is simply conclusory absent specific factual allegations as to what the jury saw. 

Turning next to petitioner’s claim that counsel failed to adequately investigate

allegedly false prior kidnaping accusations made by the victim, petitioner supports this claim

with a declaration from Amber Royal. Nothing in this declaration, however, suggests that the

victim made any prior false kidnaping accusations. Thus, as with petitioner’s other ineffective

assistance of counsel claims, petitioner has failed to identify facts which would show that counsel

knew about prior false allegations made by the victim in this case. 

Next, petitioner claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce a

transcript of trial Exhibit 5, an audio recording of petitioner’s interrogation. The trial record

reflects that the recording was played to the jury, admitted into evidence, and replayed at the

jury’s request. Petitioner has not articulated how the jury’s access to a transcript of the audio

recording would have made any difference to the outcome of the trial. 

Next, petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise

objections to testimony from various law enforcement officers. Specifically, according to

petitioner, counsel should have objected to the officers’ testimony that they believed petitioner

was engaged in criminal activity because the officers should have known that he was on parole at

the time. The court cannot see, however, how the officers’ knowledge of his parole status, or

lack thereof, would have rendered the officers’ testimony as to their belief of criminal activity

objectionable. Petitioner simply has not articulated how trial counsel’s performance was

deficient in this regard. 

13

Case 2:11-cv-00605-KJM-CMK Document 48 Filed 03/06/14 Page 13 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Finally, petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to secure

expert evidence to prove that bruising on the victim’s inner thighs were, in fact, “hickeys.” 

Again, petitioner does not articulate how such expert testimony would have made any difference

to the outcome of his trial. Specifically, petitioner has not demonstrated how, had the jury

believed that the bruises were “hickeys,” an acquittal would have been more likely. To the extent

petitioner would argue that the presence of “hickeys” indicates that the victim consented to

sexual contact, such an argument would be without merit because “hickeys” could just have

readily resulted from non-consensual contact. Thus, nothing about the presence of “hickeys”

goes to the issue of consent. 

2. Appellate Counsel

According to petitioner, appellate counsel compounded the ineffective assistance

of trial counsel by failing to raise any of the issues discussed above on appeal. The court cannot,

however, find any basis for relief given that none of the arguments petitioner would have had

appellate counsel raise has any merit. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

14

Case 2:11-cv-00605-KJM-CMK Document 48 Filed 03/06/14 Page 14 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that petitioner’s amended

petition for a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 27) be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of

objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. 

See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 6, 2014

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

15

Case 2:11-cv-00605-KJM-CMK Document 48 Filed 03/06/14 Page 15 of 15