Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-05169/USCOURTS-caDC-03-05169-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 16, 2004 Decided May 14, 2004

No. 03-5169

NATIONAL WRESTLING COACHES ASSOCIATION, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 02cv00072)

Lawrence J. Joseph argued the cause and filed the briefs

for appellants.

Andrew L. Schlafly was on the brief for amici curiae Eagle

Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund and Independent

Women’s Forum in support of reversal. Lawrence J. Joseph

entered an appearance.

Thomas M. Bondy, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #03-5169 Document #822337 Filed: 05/14/2004 Page 1 of 46
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Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Mark B. Stern, Attorney.

Marcia D. Greenberger and Dina R. Lassow were on the

brief for amici curiae National Women’s Law Center, et al. in

support of affirmance.

Before: EDWARDS and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge EDWARDS.

Dissenting opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge WILLIAMS.

EDWARDS, Circuit Judge: Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in

federally funded educational programs and activities. That

prohibition applies to intercollegiate athletics pursuant to

regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1975. Appellee Department of Education (‘‘Department’’) is charged with enforcing these provisions. The Department assesses universities’ compliance

with Title IX and the implementing regulations according to

various enforcement policies, including a three-part test first

issued in 1979 and clarified in 1996.

Appellants are several membership organizations that represent the interests of collegiate men’s wrestling coaches,

athletes, and alumni, who claim to have been injured by the

elimination of men’s varsity wrestling programs at certain

universities. In this action for declaratory and injunctive

relief, appellants challenge only the three-part test enunciated

in the 1979 Policy Interpretation and the 1996 Clarification on

the grounds that they violate the Constitution, Title IX, the

1975 regulations, and the Administrative Procedure Act

(‘‘APA’’). Appellants do not challenge the 1975 regulations or

any other regulations promulgated pursuant to Title IX. The

District Court granted the Department’s motion to dismiss

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, on the grounds that

appellants lack standing under Article III of the Constitution.

The District Court also rejected on the merits appellants’

separate claim under the APA that the Department unlawfulUSCA Case #03-5169 Document #822337 Filed: 05/14/2004 Page 2 of 46
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ly denied their petition for amendment or repeal of the

enforcement policies.

We affirm the decision of the District Court in all respects.

Appellants’ alleged injury results from the independent decisions of federally funded educational institutions that choose

to eliminate or reduce the size of men’s wrestling teams in

order to comply with Title IX. Assuming that this allegation

satisfies Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement, we hold that

appellants nevertheless lack standing because they have

failed to demonstrate how a favorable judicial decision on the

merits of their claims will redress this injury. The Supreme

Court has made it clear that ‘‘when the plaintiff is not himself

the object of the government action or inaction he challenges,

standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily ‘substantially

more difficult’ to establish.’’ Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.

737, 758 (1984)).

In this case, appellants offer nothing but speculation to

substantiate their assertion that a favorable judicial decision

would result in schools altering their independent choices

regarding the restoration or preservation of men’s wrestling

programs. Appellants do not contest the constitutionality of

Title IX, nor do they challenge the 1975 regulations. Therefore, that legal regime, which requires schools to take gender

equity concerns into account when structuring their athletic

programs, would remain in place even if the disputed 1996

Clarification and the 1979 Policy Interpretation were revoked.

And under that legal regime, schools would still have the

discretion to eliminate men’s wrestling programs, as necessary, to comply with the gender equity mandate of Title IX.

A judicial decision striking down the 1996 Clarification and

the 1979 Policy Interpretation would not afford appellants

redress sufficient to support standing.

In the alternative, we hold that, even if they have standing,

appellants’ claims are barred by § 704 of the APA. The

availability of a private cause of action under Title IX directly

against the universities themselves constitutes an adequate

remedy that precludes judicial review under § 704. Finally,

USCA Case #03-5169 Document #822337 Filed: 05/14/2004 Page 3 of 46
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we affirm the District Court’s rejection of appellants’ claim

that the Department unlawfully denied their petition for

repeal or amendment of the enforcement policies. Appellants’ submissions to the Department cannot be construed as

such a petition; and, in any event, the Department’s response

was not improper.

I. BACKGROUND

Enacted in response to evidence of ‘‘massive, persistent

patterns of discrimination against women in the academic

world,’’ 118 CONG. REC. 5,804 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh),

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits

discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded educational programs and activities. See Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, Title IX, §§ 901-907, 86

Stat. 235, 373-75 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et

seq. (2000)). Each federal agency with authority to extend

federal financial assistance to an educational program or

activity is authorized and directed to ensure the recipient’s

compliance with Title IX’s antidiscrimination mandate

through the promulgation of regulations. See 20 U.S.C.

§ 1682. Institutions that fail to comply with Title IX or these

regulations face termination of federal funding, though an

implementing agency must first attempt to secure voluntary

compliance before imposing this ultimate sanction. See id.

Title IX does not require recipients of federal funding to

grant preferential treatment to members of one sex to remedy any disproportion that may exist in the distribution of

resources or benefits between sexes, relative to the gender

composition of the relevant community. See 20 U.S.C.

§ 1681(b). However, the statute permits the consideration of

such an imbalance in enforcement proceedings. See id.

(‘‘[T]his subsection shall not be construed to prevent the

consideration TTT of statistical evidence tending to show that

such an imbalance exists with respect to the participation in,

or receipt of the benefits of, any such program or activity by

the members of one sex.’’).

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In 1974, Congress directed the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (‘‘HEW’’), the Department’s predecessor

agency, to promulgate regulations implementing Title IX in

the area of intercollegiate athletics. See Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 484, 612.

As issued in 1975, these regulations prohibit sex-based discrimination in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club, or

intramural athletic program. See 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(a) (2003)

(subsequently codified at 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (2003)) (‘‘1975

Regulations’’). To that end, the regulations require that

recipients of federal funding provide ‘‘equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes.’’ 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(c); 34

C.F.R. § 106.41(c). The Department determines whether an

institution provides equal athletic opportunities to both sexes

by examining, inter alia, ‘‘[w]hether the selection of sports

and levels of competition effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes.’’ 45 C.F.R.

§ 86.41(c)(1); 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1). These regulations

were recodified without substantial change in 1980, after

HEW’s responsibility for implementing Title IX was transferred to the newly organized Department of Education. See

Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-

88, §§ 301, 505, 93 Stat. 668, 677, 691 (1979) (codified at 20

U.S.C. §§ 3411, 3441, 3505 (2000)); 45 Fed. Reg. 30,802,

30,962 (May 9, 1980).

The dispute in this case concerns a policy interpretation

adopted by HEW in 1979 and clarified by the Department in

1996, which provides further guidance as to how the Department assesses compliance with Title IX and the 1975 Regulations. See 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (Dec. 11, 1979) (‘‘1979 Policy

Interpretation’’). The Policy Interpretation explains that an

institution’s compliance with the ‘‘interests and abilities’’ requirement of subsection (c)(1) of the 1975 Regulations will be

assessed in part pursuant to a three-part test that asks:

(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and female students are provided in

numbers substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments; or

USCA Case #03-5169 Document #822337 Filed: 05/14/2004 Page 5 of 46
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(2) Where the members of one sex have been and

are underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes,

whether the institution can show a history and continuing practice of program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the developing interest and

abilities of the members of that sex; or

(3) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot show a continuing practice of program

expansion such as that cited above, whether it can be

demonstrated that the interests and abilities of the

members of that sex have been fully and effectively

accommodated by the present program.

44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (Dec. 11, 1979) (‘‘Three-Part

Test’’).

In 1996, after notice and a period for comment, the Department issued a clarification to illuminate the Three-Part Test.

The Department’s Office for Civil Rights (‘‘OCR’’) then sent a

‘‘Dear Colleague’’ letter to interested parties explaining that

the 1996 clarification confirmed that institutions may comply

with the Three-Part Test by meeting any one of the three

prongs and that the Three-Part Test is only one of many

factors the Department examines to assess an institution’s

overall compliance with Title IX and the 1975 Regulations.

See Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance: The Three-Part Test (Jan. 16, 1996), transmitted by

Letter from Norma V. Cantu, Assistant Secretary for Civil  ́

Rights, Department of Education (Jan. 16, 1996) (‘‘1996 Clarification’’), reprinted in Joint Appendix (‘‘J.A.’’) 143-59. In

response to inquiries regarding schools’ elimination or capping of men’s sports teams as a method of compliance, the

letter stated:

The rules here are straightforward. An institution

can choose to eliminate or cap teams as a way of

complying with part one of the three-part test.

However, nothing in the Clarification requires that

an institution cap or eliminate participation opportunities for menTTTT Ultimately, Title IX provides

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institutions with flexibility and choice regarding how

they will provide nondiscriminatory participation opportunities.

Id. at 4, J.A. 146.

Appellants, the National Wrestling Coaches Association

(‘‘NWCA’’), the Committee to Save Bucknell Wrestling, the

Marquette Wrestling Club, the Yale Wrestling Association,

and the College Sports Council, are membership organizations representing the interests of collegiate men’s wrestling

coaches, athletes, and alumni. They assert injuries arising

from decisions by educational institutions to eliminate or

reduce the size of men’s wrestling programs to comply with

the Department’s interpretive rules implementing Title IX,

specifically the Three-Part Test.

Appellants do not challenge Title IX itself or the 1975

Regulations. See Pls.’ Mem. Opp’n Mot. Dismiss at 2, reprinted in J.A. 173; Am. Compl. ¶ 66, reprinted in J.A. 31;

Appellants’ Br. at 3, 6; Appellants’ Reply Br. at 1; Oral

Argument Recording at 1:02:03 (Mar. 16, 2004). As they

emphasized throughout their pleadings before the District

Court and in their briefs and oral argument before this court,

appellants’ central premise is that the enforcement policy

embodied in the 1979 Policy Interpretation and the 1996

Clarification – i.e., the Three-Part Test – violates the equal

protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment and exceeds the Department’s statutory authority by requiring the very same intentional discrimination that

Title IX prohibits. Alternatively, appellants claim that the

Department’s policies amount to an abdication of its duty to

enforce Title IX. Appellants further argue that these policy

statements violate the 1975 Regulations by replacing that

regime of ‘‘equal opportunity based on interest,’’ a standard

appellants embrace, with a regime of ‘‘equal participation

based on enrollment,’’ a standard appellants denounce as an

impermissible preference in favor of women.

Appellants also allege several procedural infirmities in the

1979 Policy Interpretation and the 1996 Clarification that

they argue render these interpretive rules invalid under the

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APA and other statutes. Finally, appellants claim that the

Department acted unlawfully by denying without explanation

a petition filed by NWCA for repeal or amendment of the

1979 Policy Interpretation. Appellants base this claim on two

letters NWCA submitted to the Department in October 1995,

during the comment period preceding the 1996 Clarification.

In their amended complaint, appellants sought declaratory

and injunctive relief, asking the District Court to vacate the

1996 Clarification and the Three-Part Test and remand the

rules to the Department with instructions to ‘‘commence

notice-and-comment rulemaking to amend those rules consistent with Title IX, the U.S. Constitution, and [the] Court’s

declaratory relief in this action.’’ Am. Compl. ¶ 99, J.A. 40.

The Department moved to dismiss appellants’ case for,

inter alia, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, on the grounds

that appellants lack standing to pursue these claims. After

that motion was briefed and argued before the District Court,

appellants sought leave to amend their complaint a second

time to add the Secretary of Education and the Assistant

Secretary for Civil Rights as defendants in their official

capacities and to allege that NWCA includes among its

members several unspecified educational institutions. The

District Court denied appellants’ motion to amend and granted the Department’s motion to dismiss, holding that appellants had failed to allege sufficient facts demonstrating their

standing and that nothing in the proffered second amended

complaint would cure this jurisdictional defect. See Nat’l

Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. United States Dep’t of Educ., 263

F. Supp. 2d 82, 104-27 (D.D.C. 2003). The District Court

rejected on its merits appellants’ APA claim regarding the

NWCA petition for repeal or amendment of the 1979 Policy

Interpretation. See id. at 127-28. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standing

Appellants’ attacks in this lawsuit are aimed solely at the

Department’s 1979 Policy Interpretation and the 1996 Clarification. They do not challenge Title IX or the 1975 RegulaUSCA Case #03-5169 Document #822337 Filed: 05/14/2004 Page 8 of 46
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tions. Indeed, a central theory of their argument on the

merits is that the Department’s 1979 and 1996 actions are

unlawful, in part, because they violate the statute and the

1975 Regulations. With this context in mind, it is clear that

appellants have no standing to pursue this challenge, because

they have not demonstrated that their alleged injuries will be

redressed by the requested relief. The direct causes of

appellants’ asserted injuries – loss of collegiate-level wrestling

opportunities for male student-athletes – are the independent

decisions of educational institutions that choose to eliminate

or reduce the size of men’s wrestling teams. Appellants offer

nothing but speculation to substantiate their claim that a

favorable decision from this court will redress their injuries

by altering these schools’ independent decisions. Absent a

showing of redressability, appellants have no standing to

challenge the Department’s enforcement policies, and we have

no jurisdiction to consider their claims.

To satisfy the requirements of Article III standing in a

case challenging government action, a party must allege an

injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the challenged government action, and ‘‘it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely

‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable

decision.’ ’’ Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (quoting Simon v. E.

Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 43 (1976)). Where,

as here, the plaintiff is an association seeking to sue on behalf

of its members, that plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) at

least one of its members would have standing to sue in his

own right, (2) the interests the association seeks to protect

are germane to its purpose, and (3) neither the claim asserted

nor the relief requested requires that an individual member

of the association participate in the lawsuit. See Hunt v.

Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).

Accordingly, appellants must establish that at least one of

their members has suffered a cognizable injury that is fairly

traceable to the Department’s Three-Part Test and likely to

be redressed by a judicial decision declaring the Three-Part

Test to be unlawful and enjoining its use.

Appellants’ principal theory of injury is that the Department’s interpretive rules harm their member coaches, athUSCA Case #03-5169 Document #822337 Filed: 05/14/2004 Page 9 of 46
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letes, and alumni by causing educational institutions to eliminate or reduce the size of men’s wrestling teams. Under

appellants’ view, schools comply with the Three-Part Test not

by offering increased athletic opportunities to female students, but by reducing the opportunities available to male

students. In support of this theory, appellants point to

recent actions by Bucknell, Marquette, and Yale Universities

either eliminating their men’s wrestling teams or demoting

them to non-varsity status. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 50-52, J.A. 27-

28. Appellants contend that these schools took these adverse

actions in order to satisfy the Three-Part Test, which permits

a finding that a school is in compliance with Title IX if, among

other things, it offers athletic opportunities to members of

both sexes in numbers that are substantially proportionate to

the gender composition of the student body as a whole. For

example, appellants assert that a press release accompanying

Bucknell University’s announcement in May 2001 that it

would discontinue its intercollegiate wrestling program

‘‘cite[d] Title IX’s proportionality requirements as Bucknell’s

reason for eliminating the wrestling team.’’ Id. ¶ 50, J.A. 27.

Similarly, appellants allege that after Marquette University

announced the disbanding of its wrestling program in 2001,

the Marquette athletic director made a statement at a dinner

party ‘‘indicat[ing] that Marquette might bring back its wrestling program if the legal requirements changed.’’ Id. ¶ 51,

J.A. 27. Finally, appellants allege that when Yale University

demoted its intercollegiate varsity wrestling team to club

status in 1991 for budgetary reasons, it refused offers of

private funding, and, ‘‘[o]n information and belief, Yale declined to accept the endowment because of Title IX.’’ Id.

¶ 52, J.A. 28.

We review de novo the District Court’s decision as to

standing. See Info. Handling Servs., Inc. v. Def. Automated

Printing Servs., 338 F.3d 1024, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Because the District Court disposed of appellants’ complaint on

a motion to dismiss, we must assume that general factual

allegations in the complaint embrace those specific facts that

are necessary to support the claim. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at

561. Thus, in company with the District Court, we assume

USCA Case #03-5169 Document #822337 Filed: 05/14/2004 Page 10 of 46
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that appellants have stated a cognizable injury-in-fact. Nonetheless, even applying this generous standard of review, we

find that appellants’ factual allegations are insufficient to

establish standing, because appellants have not shown how a

favorable decision vacating the 1979 Policy Interpretation and

the 1996 Clarification would redress their injuries. See

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975).

When a plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the Government’s regulation of a third party that is not before the court,

it becomes ‘‘substantially more difficult’’ to establish standing.

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,

758 (1984)); see also Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,

426 U.S. 26, 41-46 (1976); Freedom Republicans, Inc. v. FEC,

13 F.3d 412, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Because the necessary

elements of causation and redressability in such a case hinge

on the independent choices of the regulated third party, ‘‘it

becomes the burden of the plaintiff to adduce facts showing

that those choices have been or will be made in such manner

as to produce causation and permit redressability of injury.’’

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562. In other words, mere ‘‘unadorned

speculation’’ as to the existence of a relationship between the

challenged government action and the third-party conduct

‘‘will not suffice to invoke the federal judicial power.’’ Simon,

426 U.S. at 44.

In several cases, the Supreme Court has made clear that a

plaintiff’s standing fails where it is purely speculative that a

requested change in government policy will alter the behavior

of regulated third parties that are the direct cause of the

plaintiff’s injuries. In Simon, for example, organizations

representing the interests of low-income persons challenged

an IRS Revenue Ruling that allowed favorable tax treatment

to nonprofit hospitals that offered only emergency-room services to indigents. See Simon, 426 U.S. at 28. The Court

held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because their alleged

injury – denial of access to certain hospital services – was

caused by the regulated hospitals. See id. at 40-46. Even

accepting the plaintiffs’ averment that the IRS’s policy encouraged hospitals to provide fewer services to indigents, id.

at 42 n.23, the Court found it ‘‘speculative whether the

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desired exercise of the court’s remedial powers TTT would

result in the availability to [the plaintiffs] of such services,’’

id. at 43. Rather, ‘‘[s]o far as the complaint shed[ ] light, it

[was] just as plausible that the hospitals to which [the plaintiffs] may apply for service would elect to forego favorable tax

treatment to avoid the undetermined financial drain of an

increase in the level of uncompensated services.’’ Id. Accordingly, the Court found that the plaintiffs’ complaint was

‘‘insufficient even to survive a motion to dismiss.’’ Id. at 45

n.25.

Similarly, in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), the Court

held that parents of Black public school children lacked

standing to challenge IRS tax policies toward racially discriminatory private schools. Id. at 739-40. The Court found it to

be ‘‘entirely speculative TTT whether withdrawal of a tax

exemption from any particular school would lead the school to

change its policies.’’ Id. at 758. And in Warth v. Seldin, 422

U.S. 490 (1975), the Court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs’

complaint that the defendant town’s zoning ordinance effectively excluded persons of low and moderate income from

living there. Assuming that the ordinance contributed, ‘‘perhaps substantially,’’ to the cost of housing in the town, id. at

504, the Court nevertheless found that the plaintiffs failed in

their obligation to allege facts showing that they would have

been able to buy or rent homes in the town if the Court

granted their requested remedy, id. The ‘‘remote possibility,

unsubstantiated by allegations of fact, that their situation TTT

might improve were the court to afford relief,’’ did not suffice

to establish the redressability of the plaintiffs’ injuries. Id. at

507.

More recently, this court held that an independent, multiracial organization of Republicans lacked standing to challenge

the Federal Election Commission’s (‘‘FEC’’) funding of the

Republican National Convention on the grounds that the

Republican Party’s delegate-selection processes discriminated

against minority groups. See Freedom Republicans, 13 F.3d

412. The court found that, although the level of FEC funding

was substantial, the alleged injury was not fairly traceable to

any encouragement by the Government and ‘‘we [could not]

begin to predict’’ the impact of withdrawal of federal funding

USCA Case #03-5169 Document #822337 Filed: 05/14/2004 Page 12 of 46
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on the Party’s decisions as to delegate selection. Id. at 418-

19.

In this case, appellants offer nothing to substantiate their

assertion that a decision from the court vacating the 1979

Policy Interpretation and the 1996 Clarification will redress

their injuries by altering schools’ independent decisions

whether to eliminate or retain their men’s wrestling programs. As the Department emphasized when issuing its 1996

Clarification, nothing in the Three-Part Test requires schools

to eliminate or cap men’s wrestling or any other athletic

program. See 1996 Clarification at 4, J.A. 146. This clarification is consistent with the fact that Bucknell and Marquette maintained their men’s wrestling programs for decades after the adoption of the Three-Part Test.

Appellants do not suggest that any particular school necessarily would forego elimination of a wrestling team or reinstate a previously disbanded program in the absence of these

interpretive rules, except to say that Marquette University

‘‘might bring back its wrestling program if the legal requirements changed.’’ Am Compl. ¶ 51, J.A. 27. Indeed, appellants appear to understand that judicial relief in this case

would not afford the remedy that they seek. At oral argument, counsel for appellants candidly said that, if his clients

prevail, appellants think they may have ‘‘better odds’’ of

retaining their desired wrestling programs. Counsel’s candor

was admirable, but a quest for ill-defined ‘‘better odds’’ is not

close to what is required to satisfy the redressability prong of

Article III.

On the record at hand, appellants fall far short of establishing the requisite likelihood that the educational institutions

whose choices lie at the root of appellants’ alleged injuries will

behave any differently with respect to men’s wrestling if

appellants prevailed on the merits and secured their requested relief. Indeed, in the posture of this case, it is difficult to

imagine how appellants could make such a showing. Even if

appellants prevailed on the merits in their challenge to the

Three-Part Test, Title IX and the 1975 Regulations would

still be in place. Federally funded schools would still be

USCA Case #03-5169 Document #822337 Filed: 05/14/2004 Page 13 of 46
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required to provide athletic opportunities in a manner that

equally accommodated both genders. See 45 C.F.R.

§ 86.41(c); 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c). As a consequence, nothing

but speculation suggests that schools would act any differently than they do with the Three-Part Test in place. Schools

would remain free to eliminate or cap men’s wrestling teams

and may in some circumstances feel compelled to do so to

comply with the statute and the 1975 Regulations. This is

particularly so since Title IX itself permits evidence of disproportion in the distribution of benefits between sexes to be

considered in enforcement proceedings against recipients of

federal funding. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b). Moreover, other

reasons unrelated to the challenged legal requirements may

continue to motivate schools to take such actions. See Bucknell Univ. News Release (May 2, 2001), reprinted in J.A. 573

(explaining that Bucknell’s gender equity plan was not only ‘‘a

matter of federal law,’’ but also ‘‘morally TTT the right thing

to do’’).

Appellants’ request for a judicial order compelling the

Department to undertake notice-and-comment rulemaking to

amend its enforcement policies does not alter this analysis.

The challenged policies – the 1979 Policy Interpretation and

the 1996 Clarification – are interpretive guidelines that the

Department was not obligated to issue in the first place.

Appellants point to no basis for the notion that the Department would be required to replace the challenged policies

with anything new, were the court to invalidate the existing

1979 Policy Interpretation and the 1996 Clarification. And, in

any event, appellants do not even challenge the underlying

1975 Regulations, which, as we have noted, clearly permit

universities to follow some of the practices that appellants

oppose. Accordingly, appellants have failed to establish that

it is likely that a favorable decision from the court on the

merits of their claims would provide any redress for their

alleged injuries.

We recognize that courts occasionally find the elements of

standing to be satisfied in cases challenging government

action on the basis of third-party conduct. These cases fall

into two easily distinguishable categories. First, a federal

court may find that a party has standing to challenge governUSCA Case #03-5169 Document #822337 Filed: 05/14/2004 Page 14 of 46
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ment action that permits or authorizes third-party conduct

that would otherwise be illegal in the absence of the Government’s action. See Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 440-44 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc)

(‘‘ALDF’’); see also Consumer Fed’n of Am. v. FCC, 348 F.3d

1009, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 2003); America’s Cmty. Bankers v.

FDIC, 200 F.3d 822, 827-29 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Tel. & Data

Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 19 F.3d 42, 46-47 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In

ALDF, for example, we upheld a plaintiff’s standing to challenge U.S. Department of Agriculture (‘‘USDA’’) regulations

concerning the treatment of primates by zoos and other

exhibitors of animals. See 154 F.3d 426. The plaintiff in that

case alleged aesthetic injuries that resulted from observing

primates living in allegedly inhumane conditions. See id. at

429-30. Although this injury resulted from the actions of

third parties that chose to maintain their captive primates in

such conditions, we held that the plaintiff had standing to

challenge the USDA regulations. See id. at 438-44. The

plaintiff alleged that the regulations permitted exhibitors to

maintain primates in inhumane conditions, even though such

conduct would have been illegal in the absence of those

regulations. See id. at 438. Accordingly, a favorable decision

would redress the plaintiff’s injury because animal exhibitors

would no longer be able to keep animals in inhumane living

conditions without violating the law. See id. at 443. Causation and redressability thus are satisfied in this category of

cases, because the intervening choices of third parties are not

truly independent of government policy. Moreover, they

could only preclude redress if those third parties took the

extraordinary measure of continuing their injurious conduct

in violation of the law. See id. at 441 (citing Int’l Ladies’

Garment Workers’ Union v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795, 811

(D.C. Cir. 1983)).

These cases would only support appellants’ assertion of

standing if appellants took the position that gender-conscious

elimination of men’s sports teams would be illegal in the

absence of the challenged enforcement policies. Appellants

make no such claim. As we have emphasized, appellants do

not challenge Title IX or the 1975 Regulations; indeed, they

USCA Case #03-5169 Document #822337 Filed: 05/14/2004 Page 15 of 46
16

embrace those regulations, which they characterize as properly requiring schools to provide ‘‘equal opportunity based on

interest.’’ Necessarily, then, they must concede that schools

may make gender-conscious decisions in order to remedy

discrimination and equally accommodate both sexes, in compliance with the statute and regulations. See 45 C.F.R.

§ 86.41(c)(1); 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1). This includes considering ‘‘statistical evidence tending to show that TTT an imbalance exists [between men and women] with respect to the

participation in’’ intercollegiate athletic programs in a school.

See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b). Therefore, even if the Three-Part

Test were vacated, schools would remain free to take gender

into account when designing and funding their athletic programs. The ‘‘causation by authorization’’ theory of this first

category of cases thus lends no support to appellants’ claim of

standing.

Second, some cases have held that plaintiffs have standing

to challenge government action on the basis of injuries caused

by regulated third parties where the record presented substantial evidence of a causal relationship between the government policy and the third-party conduct, leaving little doubt

as to causation and the likelihood of redress. In Tozzi v.

United States Department of Health & Human Services, 271

F.3d 301 (D.C. Cir. 2001), for example, a manufacturer of

medical supplies made of PVC plastic challenged a decision

by the Secretary of Health and Human Services to add the

chemical dioxin to the category of ‘‘known’’ carcinogens. The

manufacturer alleged that the decision harmed its business

reputation and profits, because concern over the dioxin hazards associated with the incineration of PVC plastic deterred

the manufacturer’s customers from purchasing its products.

See id. at 307-08. We held that the manufacturer had

standing. See id. at 308-10. The record left ‘‘little doubt’’

that the Government’s authoritative statement regarding the

carcinogenicity of dioxin was a substantial factor motivating

the decisions of the third parties that were the direct source

of the plaintiff’s injuries. See id. at 308-09. Specifically, the

plaintiff introduced affidavits and other record evidence demonstrating that municipalities and health care organizations

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17

opted to phase out their use of PVC plastic as a direct result

of the Secretary’s decision. See id. Moreover, the court

noted that ‘‘[w]hen the government attaches an inherently

pejorative and damaging term such as ‘carcinogen’ to a

product, the probability of economic harm increases exponentially.’’ Id. at 309. Based on this record evidence, the court

found it ‘‘not at all ‘speculative’ ’’ that the addition of dioxin to

the list of known carcinogens caused municipalities and companies to reduce or end their use of PVC plastic, and that a

decision setting aside the Government’s action likely would

prevent that result. Id. at 309-10.

Similarly, in Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1986),

we held that a film distributor had standing to challenge a

decision by the Government to classify as ‘‘political propaganda’’ certain films that the plaintiff wished to distribute. The

plaintiff alleged that the government action harmed his economic interests, because potential customers would no longer

purchase the films from the plaintiff, thus reducing his company’s profits. Id. at 1308. In support of this claim, the

plaintiff submitted several declarations and affidavits detailing specific instances in which potential customers declined to

take the films because of the classification. See id. The

court found these factual assertions to be sufficient to establish harm that was attributable to the Government’s action.

See id. at 1308-09; see also Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n v.

Nichols, 142 F.3d 449, 457-58 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding that

the petitioner had standing to challenge government action

based on the independent conduct of third parties where

evidence demonstrated that the challenged action ‘‘resulted in

an almost unanimous decision’’ by those third parties to take

action that harmed the petitioner); Competitive Enter. Inst.

v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 901 F.2d 107, 113-18

(D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding ‘‘overwhelming evidence’’ in the

administrative record to support a conclusion that third parties’ decisions were not substantially independent of the challenged government action and that those third parties were

likely to alter their behavior in response to favorable judicial

action).

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Appellants’ reliance in this case on the possibility that their

members may have ‘‘better odds’’ of retaining their desired

wrestling programs plainly falls far short of the mark set by

Tozzi and other such cases. The cases on which appellants

rely require ‘‘formidable evidence’’ of causation, see Freedom

Republicans, 13 F.3d at 418 (distinguishing Women’s Equity

Action League v. Cavazos, 879 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).

With such evidence, the court is easily able to discern redressability. There is no such evidence in this case.

While our discussion thus far has emphasized the lack of

redressability in appellants’ complaint, appellants’ submissions similarly fail to demonstrate that causation is so clear

that redressability inexorably follows. For example, appellants’ amended complaint cited a press release in which

Bucknell University announced the elimination of its men’s

wrestling team – some 22 years after the adoption of the

Three-Part Test – and cited gender proportionality as one

reason for its decision. See Am. Compl. ¶ 50, J.A. 27. That

same press release, however, also cites the absence of league

sponsorship for wrestling, budgetary concerns, and the need

to balance the athletic program with other University priorities as other factors contributing to the decision. See Bucknell Univ. News Release (May 2, 2001), J.A. 573-78.

Appellants also rely on a report issued by the General

Accounting Office (‘‘GAO’’) in March 2001, discussing the

experiences of four-year colleges in adding and discontinuing

men’s and women’s athletic teams between 1981 and 1999.

See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS:

FOUR-YEAR COLLEGES’ EXPERIENCES ADDING AND DISCONTINUING

TEAMS (2001), reprinted in J.A. 366-81. This report does not

advance appellants’ case. First, although the GAO found

evidence that numerous men’s athletic teams were eliminated

over the period covered in the study – 519 teams discontinued

between the 1981-82 and 1998-99 academic years, to be

precise – the GAO also found that even more new men’s

teams were created in that same time-frame (555 men’s teams

between the 1981-82 and 1998-99 years). See id. at 13, J.A.

372. What is more telling, however, is that the GAO’s

discussion of the role that gender equity concerns played in

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schools’ decisions to add or eliminate teams, upon which

appellants rely heavily, is utterly inconclusive as to whether

the Three-Part Test caused the elimination of any men’s

athletic teams. The GAO notes that a majority of surveyed

schools cited ‘‘gender equity considerations’’ as an influential

factor in their decisions to discontinue men’s teams. Id. at

20, J.A. 379. The report does not define ‘‘gender equity

concerns.’’ We do not know, on the basis of this report,

whether these concerns are self-imposed or legally required.

To the extent they reflect legal requirements, we do not know

whether they refer to the Three-Part Test or to Title IX and

the 1975 Regulations, which appellants do not challenge.

Finally, the GAO also found that several other factors also

contributed to schools’ decisions as much or more than ‘‘gender equity considerations,’’ including levels of student interest

and limits on funding and other resources. See id.

Recently, in Crete Carrier Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 363 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2004), operators of five

large-haul truck fleets challenged the Environmental Protection Agency’s refusal to reconsider the 2004 Standard for

nitrous oxide and nonmethane hydrocarbon emissions from

‘‘ ‘heavy heavy-duty’ ’’ diesel engines. Because the trucking

companies failed to show that their injury was fairly traceable

to the 2004 Standard, the court dismissed their petition for

lack of standing under Article III. In reaching this conclusion, the court held:

The Trucking Companies offer only assertions, not

facts, to support their claims about the likely response of engine manufacturers to repeal of the 2004

Standard. That will not do. Speculative and unsupported assumptions regarding the future actions of

third-party market participants are insufficient to

establish Article III standing. Without actual evidence of how engine manufacturers would respond

to relaxation or rescission of the 2004 Standard –

and the Trucking Companies have proffered none –

we can not ‘‘wade into this morass of marketplace

analys[i]s,’’ and emerge with the conclusion the enUSCA Case #03-5169 Document #822337 Filed: 05/14/2004 Page 19 of 46
20

gine manufacturers would revert to producing preOctober 2002 engines.

Id. at 494 (internal citations omitted). Appellants in this case

face the same problem. They have offered nothing but

‘‘unadorned speculation’’ to suggest that the schools covered

by Title IX would change their decisions if appellants were to

prevail in this case.

Tozzi and Block offer no solace for appellants, for causation

in those cases was clear. There is nothing in Tozzi and Block

indicating that the third parties whose conduct injured the

plaintiffs would have had reason to continue their injurious

conduct unaltered in the absence of the challenged government action. In this case, by contrast, the continued vitality

of Title IX itself and the 1975 Regulations means that schools

must continue to take gender equity into account when designing their athletic programs. And appellants have offered

nothing to indicate that the schools will act any differently

than they have in the past regarding decisions to comply with

Title IX.

The case law makes clear that one need not adopt the view

that a challenged government policy is totally ineffectual to

find that the likelihood of redress is too speculative to confer

standing upon a plaintiff. Surely, in Simon, it would not have

been implausible to hypothesize that the potential loss of a

valuable tax exemption might affect hospitals’ decisions regarding treatment of the indigent. Indeed, the Court accepted the plaintiffs’ assertion in that case that the challenged

IRS tax policy encouraged hospitals to provide fewer services

to indigents. See Simon, 426 U.S. at 42 n.23. Similarly, in

Freedom Republicans, it would not have been beyond the

pale to assume that the Republican Party might alter its

convention policies if it faced termination of its substantial

public funding, and the court accordingly acknowledged that

the Party ‘‘would inevitably face a problem if its funding, but

not that of the Democrats, were to be withdrawn.’’ Freedom

Republicans, 13 F.3d at 419. Abstract theory and conjecture

are not enough to support standing, however. The Supreme

Court has repeatedly rejected the notion that a finding of

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21

standing may be based on such ‘‘unadorned speculation.’’

Simon, 426 U.S. at 44.

In sum, appellants’ allegations of causation are far from

persuasive. If causation were the only issue in this case,

appellants’ proffers might be adequate to survive a motion to

dismiss. The problem here is that appellants have failed

completely to satisfy the redressability prong of Article III

standing, for there is nothing to support appellants’ claim that

a favorable ruling would alter the schools’ conduct. To

survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff ‘‘must allege facts from

which it reasonably could be inferred that, absent the [challenged policy], there is a substantial probability that TTT if

the court affords the relief requested, the asserted [injury]

will be removed.’’ Warth, 422 U.S. at 504. Appellants’

attempts to show redressability are based on nothing but

‘‘unadorned speculation.’’

To avoid these difficulties, plaintiffs turn to the ‘‘unequal

footing’’ theory of standing underlying the Supreme Court’s

decisions in Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2422-23

(2003), and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,

210-12 (1995). Under the holdings of these decisions, when a

plaintiff challenges a competitive process, such as university

admissions or contract bidding, on the grounds that discrimination in the process prevents the plaintiff from competing on

equal footing, the plaintiff need not demonstrate that, but for

the discrimination, he would have gained admission to the

university or won the contract. See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2423;

Adarand, 515 U.S. at 211. Rather, a plaintiff obtains redress

in such a case because a favorable court decision eliminates

the discrimination that tainted the process and permits competition on an equal basis.

These ‘‘unequal footing’’ cases are inapposite here. In both

Gratz and Adarand, the challenged policies directly injured

the plaintiffs, without any intervening, third-party decision

maker. Accordingly, these cases do not resolve the difficulties appellants face as a result of the role of third parties in

causing their alleged injuries. In this case, by contrast, it is

purely speculative whether a decision in appellants’ favor

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22

would alter the process by which schools determine whether

to field certain sports teams. Even if the court invalidated

the Department’s Three-Part Test, schools might nevertheless continue to eliminate or cap men’s wrestling teams in

order to comply with Title IX or the 1975 Regulations, or for

some other unrelated reason. Save for their speculation

about ‘‘better odds,’’ appellants would be no better off than

they are under the Department’s current policies.

Appellants’ remaining theory of standing likewise lacks

merit. Appellants claim that the regulations compel their

member coaches and athletic directors to act as ‘‘involuntary

participants’’ in illegal discrimination. An ‘‘involuntary participant,’’ however, has standing only to the extent that the

victims of the alleged discrimination themselves have standing. See Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 152 F.3d

998, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (‘‘[W]here a person is effectively

used by the government to implement a discriminatory

scheme, he may TTT attack that scheme by raising a third

party’s constitutional rights.’’) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted); see also Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1998). As we have

discussed at length, the alleged victims of the alleged discrimination – i.e., the male student-athletes and coaches that

appellants represent – lack standing in their own right. The

‘‘involuntary participant’’ theory cannot confer standing upon

appellants that these student-athletes and coaches do not

independently possess.

As a final matter, the District Court did not abuse its

discretion in denying appellants’ request for leave to amend

their complaint a second time, because none of the allegations

in the proffered second amended complaint supply the missing elements of appellants’ standing. The court of appeals

reviews a district court’s denial of a motion for leave to

amend for abuse of discretion, ‘‘requiring only that the court

base its ruling on a valid ground.’’ James Madison Ltd. v.

Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1996). While leave to

amend ‘‘shall be freely given when justice so requires,’’ FED.

R. CIV. P. 15(a), a district court has discretion to deny a

motion to amend on grounds of futility where the proposed

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pleading would not survive a motion to dismiss, see James

Madison Ltd., 82 F.3d at 1099.

Here, as the District Court found, the proposed amendment would be futile, because none of the allegations in the

second amended complaint suffice to demonstrate appellants’

standing. The inclusion of the Secretary of Education and

the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights as defendants in their

official capacities adds nothing to appellants’ assertion of

standing. The addition of unspecified educational institutions

as members of the NWCA likewise does not alter the analysis. While a federally funded school might, in an appropriate

case, have standing in its own right to challenge the Department’s regulations, appellants’ second amended complaint

does not allege with any specificity how any particular member school has been injured by the regulations. See Second

Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 63-64, reprinted in J.A. 538, 552. Because

the proposed pleading would not survive a motion to dismiss

for lack of standing, the District Court did not abuse its

discretion in denying as futile appellants’ motion for leave to

amend their complaint. See James Madison Ltd., 82 F.3d at

1099.

Appellants have no Article III standing. We therefore

affirm the District Court’s dismissal of appellants’ claims for

lack of jurisdiction.

B. Adequate Remedy

In the alternative, even if appellants had standing to pursue

these claims, the availability of a private cause of action

directly against universities that discriminate in violation of

Title IX constitutes an adequate remedy that bars appellants’

case. Section 704 of the APA subjects to judicial review

‘‘[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency

action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a

court.’’ 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000). In Cannon v. University of

Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), the Supreme Court held that

plaintiffs have a private cause of action for sex discrimination

under Title IX against universities.

Following Cannon, in Washington Legal Foundation v.

Alexander, 984 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1993), this court considered a challenge to the Department’s implementation of Title

USCA Case #03-5169 Document #822337 Filed: 05/14/2004 Page 23 of 46
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VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiffs in that case

asserted an APA cause of action to compel the Department to

enforce Title VI against universities that allegedly offered

certain scholarships only to minority students. See id. at 486.

Applying the Title IX holding of Cannon in the parallel

regime of Title VI, the court held that plaintiffs’ alternative

remedy – proceeding directly against the individual universities – precluded any suit against the Department under the

APA. See id. Under Washington Legal Foundation, appellants’ claims against the Department are plainly barred. See

also Women’s Equity Action League v. Cavazos, 906 F.2d

742, 750-51 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Council of and for the Blind v.

Regan, 709 F.2d 1521, 1531-33 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en banc).

Appellants argue that the Supreme Court’s decision in

Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), alters this result.

We disagree. Sandoval held that private individuals have no

implied cause of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act,

which prohibits only intentional discrimination. See id. at

278-93. In a notably strained argument, appellants claim that

Sandoval effectively eliminates the implied cause of action,

recognized in Cannon, to enforce the prohibition on intentional discrimination that derived from the statute itself.

Appellants thus contend that they no longer have any cause

of action against the universities, and, consequently, there is

no alternate remedy precluding their suit under the APA.

Sandoval does not purport to overrule Cannon’s allowance

of a cause of action to enforce the statutory prohibition

against intentional discrimination under Title IX. Thus, the

cause of action recognized in Cannon remains viable. See id.

at 279-81. That is fatal to appellants’ claims here. In this

case, appellants do not seek to enforce disparate-impact requirements that go further than the facial requirements of

the statute itself, as was the posture in Sandoval. Rather, to

the extent that they view the Three-Part Test as embodying a

disparate-impact requirement, they seek to eliminate that

policy as inconsistent with the statute’s ban on intentional

discrimination. In other words, the only policy appellants

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25

wish to enforce in this case is the prohibition against intentional discrimination and the equal opportunity requirements

found in Title IX and the 1975 Regulations. Sandoval explicitly recognized in its discussion of Cannon that such a cause

of action against the universities remains available to appellants. See id.

5 U.S.C. § 704 says that a cause of action may arise under

the APA for ‘‘[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and

final agency action for which there is no other adequate

remedy in a court.’’ Seeking to avoid the ‘‘adequate remedy’’

limitation of § 704, appellants argue that the Department’s

interpretive policies constitute ‘‘[a]gency action made reviewable by statute.’’ This argument is plainly foreclosed by the

court’s decision in Washington Legal Foundation. See 984

F.2d at 486. Appellants in Washington Legal Foundation

contended that they had an APA cause of action against the

Department of Education because the Government failed to

enforce Title VI against schools that reserved scholarship

funds solely for minority students. The court held that

appellants’ APA cause of action was barred by § 704, because

of the availability of an adequate alternative remedy in the

form of an implied right of action under Title VI. Id. at 486.

In this case, as in Washington Legal Foundation, there is

no legislation pursuant to which agency actions under Title

IX are made reviewable by statute. The reference to agency

actions ‘‘made reviewable by statute’’ in § 704 relates to

statutory provisions other than the APA that govern judicial

review of those actions. When pressed, appellants could

point to no such provisions that apply in this case. Therefore,

even assuming, arguendo, that appellants could demonstrate

standing, the ‘‘adequate remedy’’ provision under § 704 would

still bar their APA claim. See id. at 486.

Appellants next attempt to evade the limitation in § 704 by

advancing assorted non-statutory causes of action, which they

variously characterize as an ultra vires claim, an equitable

claim, or a claim in the style of Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184

(1958). Without delving into their particulars, we find that

these alternatives fail. Even under these theories, appellants

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26

must depend on the waiver of sovereign immunity in § 702 of

the APA, which applies to any suit, whether advanced under

the APA or not. See Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d

1322, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (‘‘The APA’s waiver of sovereign

immunity applies to any suit whether under the APA or

not.’’). However, the waiver of sovereign immunity under

§ 702 is limited by the ‘‘adequate remedy’’ bar of § 704. See

Transohio Sav. Bank v. Dir., Office of Thrift Supervision,

967 F.2d 598, 607 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (‘‘The APA excludes from

its waiver of sovereign immunity TTT claims for which an

adequate remedy is available elsewhere.’’). The availability of

a private cause of action under Title IX directly against the

universities thus bars appellants’ assertion of non-APA causes

of action, because there is no waiver of sovereign immunity

where appellants have an adequate alternative remedy in

court.

Appellants also argue that a suit against a university that

eliminates its men’s wrestling team cannot provide an ‘‘adequate remedy’’ for the alleged unlawfulness of the Department’s enforcement policies. In a suit against a university,

they contend, they would not be able to air their challenges to

the Three-Part Test, particularly their claim that the Department has abdicated its duty to enforce Title IX. Again,

however, appellants cannot escape the import of our holding

in Washington Legal Foundation, which rejected a similar

argument. See 984 F.2d at 486-88. As that case held, even if

the ‘‘adequate remedy’’ limitation were not an obstacle, no

abdication claim is available where appellants do not allege

that the Department has continued to fund an institution

specifically found to be in violation of Title IX. See id. at 487-

88 (distinguishing Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C.

Cir. 1973)); see also Ass’n of Civilian Technicians v. FLRA,

283 F.3d 339, 344 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Here, appellants make no

such allegations.

In any event, the experience in our sister circuits demonstrates that challenges to the lawfulness of the Department’s

policies in fact may be aired in a suit against a university, to

the extent that the defendant university attempts to justify

its actions by reference to those policies. See, e.g., Neal v.

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27

Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 766-73 (9th

Cir. 1999); Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 270-72 (7th Cir.

1994); see also Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 899-901

(1st Cir. 1993). In these and other cases, parties have had

the opportunity to litigate the propriety of the Department’s

Three-Part Test under the Constitution, Title IX, the 1975

Regulations, and principles of administrative law. Our holding today thus does not prevent appellants from obtaining

review of their claims on the merits, when raised in a

judicially reviewable case or controversy.

Appellants finally contend that a suit against a university is

an inadequate alternative because it would not permit them to

obtain a judicial order compelling the Department to initiate a

new rulemaking to replace the Three-Part Test. As we noted

in our discussion of standing, however, the Three-Part Test is

an interpretive guideline that the Department was never

obligated to issue in the first place. Appellants again fail to

point to any authority suggesting that the Department would

be required to develop a new interpretive rule in the event

the court invalidated the Three-Part Test.

Accordingly, we hold that, even if appellants had standing

to challenge the Department’s enforcement policy, their case

would be barred by the ‘‘adequate remedy’’ limitation of

§ 704 of the APA.

C. Petition to Repeal or Amend

Finally, we affirm the decision of the District Court rejecting appellants’ claim that the Department unlawfully denied

NWCA’s petition to amend or repeal the Three-Part Test.

Section 553(e) of the APA requires agencies to give interested

parties the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or

repeal of a rule. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2000). Section 555(e)

further provides that an agency shall give prompt notice and

a brief explanation of the grounds for the denial of such a

petition. See 5 U.S.C. § 555(e). In October 1995, after the

Department solicited comments on its proposed clarification

of the Three-Part Test, appellant NWCA submitted two

letters to the Department expressing its dissatisfaction with

the Three-Part Test. See J.A. 160-66. The letters requested

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28

no specific action, but stated that if the Department did not

‘‘clarify [its policies] in a manner which permits male sports

programs and athletes to survive, [NWCA] will be forced to

seek additional hearings and remedial legislation.’’ Letter

from T.J. Kerr, President, NWCA, to Norma V. Cantu,  ́

Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, Department of Education, at 5 (Oct. 20, 1995), reprinted in J.A. 164. Appellants

contend that these letters constituted a petition for repeal or

amendment of the Three-Part Test and that the 1996 Clarification effectively denied that petition without explanation.

Leaving aside any difficulties as to whether the Three-Part

Test is the type of policy subject to the APA’s petition

requirements, NWCA’s 1995 letters simply cannot be construed as a petition for repeal or amendment. The letters

described problems NWCA perceived in the existing regulatory scheme under Title IX, but requested no particular

action by the Department. We therefore agree with the

Department that it was under no obligation to treat the

letters as a valid petition. Indeed, the District Court noted

that appellants subsequently filed a proper petition that

remained pending before the Department when the District

Court issued its decision, apparently conceding the infirmity

of their previous correspondence. See Nat’l Wrestling

Coaches Ass’n, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 128.

Furthermore, the Department’s 1995 solicitation for comments clearly confined its request to whether the proposed

clarification of the Three-Part Test ‘‘provide[d] the appropriate clarity in areas that have generated questions.’’ See

Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance:

The Three-Part Test, at 1 (Sep. 20, 1995), transmitted by

Letter from Norma V. Cantu, Assistant Secretary for Civil  ́

Rights, Department of Education, reprinted in J.A. 131.

And, as the 1996 Clarification reiterated, the Department did

not intend the 1995-96 proceeding to serve as a forum for

reconsideration of the Three-Part Test. See 1996 Clarification, J.A. 143. In light of the Department’s broad discretion

to manage its docket, see Edison Elec. Inst. v. ICC, 969 F.2d

1221, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1992), and the ‘‘quite limited’’ scope of

our review of an agency’s decision whether to repeal a rule,

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see Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. United States Dep’t of the Interior,

70 F.3d 1345, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1995), it cannot be said that the

Department failed to provide an adequate explanation for its

disposition of NWCA’s 1995 letters.

In sum, appellants did not petition for repeal or amendment of the Three-Part Test pursuant to the Department’s

solicitation of comments on its proposed clarification of the

test. Nor would such a petition have been within the scope of

the 1995-96 proceeding. The proceeding was undertaken by

the Department solely to determine whether the proposed

clarification of the Three-Part Test provided clarity in areas

that had generated questions, not as a forum for reconsideration of the Three-Part Test. Appellants’ subsequent petition

for repeal or amendment of the Three-Part Test is still

pending and thus is not ripe for review in this litigation.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm on the merits the District Court’s rejection of

appellants’ claim that the Department unlawfully denied their

petition to amend or repeal the Three-Part Test. As to their

remaining claims, we hold that appellants lack standing under

Article III. Finally, even assuming, arguendo, that the requirements of Article III standing have been met, appellants’

case would be barred by the ‘‘adequate remedy’’ limitation of

§ 704 of the APA.

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1

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting: The majority

finds that plaintiffs do not have standing to maintain their

suit. Because I believe our precedents require a different

result, I dissent.

* * *

Plaintiffs consist of two types of associations—national

associations of persons (including coaches) with interests in

wrestling or other college sports, and associations of alumni,

student athletes and others committed to advancing wrestling

at specific universities (Bucknell, Marquette and Yale). Their

complaint is that the defendant Department of Education has

unlawfully enforced Title IX of the Education Amendments of

1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688, in a way that has caused a

reduction in opportunities for participation in men’s sports,

especially wrestling. They say that the Department has

pressured colleges to achieve women’s participation in sports

proportional to women’s enrollment, without regard to varying levels of interest or skill. As colleges have competing

demands on their resources, cutting men’s teams is one of the

obvious ways for them to meet the Department’s measure of

proportionality. And cut they have. Plaintiffs cite a report

by the General Accounting Office, ‘‘Intercollegiate Athletics:

Four–Year Colleges’ Experience Adding and Discontinuing

Teams’’ (March 2001) (‘‘GAO Report’’), saying that schools

had cut 519 men’s teams between 1981–82 and 1998–99,

including 171 wrestling teams. GAO Report at 18. Of the

272 responding schools that had cut a men’s team in the

period 1992–93 to 1999–2000 (see id. at 33), 31% cited the

need to meet gender equity goals or requirements. Id. In

the face of these data, the district court found that plaintiffs

had failed to allege facts showing any causal connection

between the Department’s actions and the reduction in plaintiffs’ members’ coaching opportunities, and thus found them

without standing. This was error.

* * *

Plaintiffs point to two documents setting forth the Department’s interpretation of Title IX: ‘‘Title IX of the Education

USCA Case #03-5169 Document #822337 Filed: 05/14/2004 Page 30 of 46
2

Amendments of 1972; a Policy Interpretation; Title IX and

Intercollegiate Athletics,’’ 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (December 11,

1979) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 86) (the ‘‘1979 Policy Interpretation’’), and a statement issued by the Assistant Secretary

for Civil Rights, ‘‘Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics

Policy Guidance: The Three–Part Test’’ (January 16, 1996)

(the ‘‘1996 Clarification’’). The 1979 Interpretation sets forth

what has come to be known as the ‘‘Three–Part Test’’:

a. Compliance will be assessed in any one of the

following ways:

(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and female students are provided in

numbers substantially proportionate to their respective

enrollments; or

(2) Where the members of one sex have been and are

underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, whether the institution can show a history and continuing

practice of program expansion which is demonstrably

responsive to the developing interest and abilities of the

members of that sex; or

(3) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, and the institution

cannot show a history and continuing practice of program

expansion, as described above, whether it can be demonstrated that the interests and abilities of the members of

that sex have been fully and effectively accommodated by

the present program.

1979 Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418. At oral argument government counsel confirmed that, as the context

suggests, ‘‘underrepresented’’ as used in paragraphs (2) and

(3) means simply that women’s sports participation fell below

men’s as a proportion of enrollment. Plaintiffs say that,

especially with the 1996 Clarification, the Department has

made the enrollment proportionality ‘‘prong’’ of the test into a

‘‘safe harbor’’ for compliance, see January 16, 1996 letter of

Norma V. Cantu at 2 (‘‘Cant  ́ u letter’’) (explaining 1996 Clarifi-  ́

cation), and has ruled that it will count ‘‘actual athletes’’—not

unfilled spots on teams—when it assesses the ‘‘proportionality

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3

of participation opportunities,’’ id. at 4. See First Amended

Complaint ¶ ¶ 44–45. The government at no point contends

that the legal provisions that plaintiffs do not challenge—Title

IX itself or the regulations antedating the 1979 Interpretation

or the 1996 Clarification, i.e., the regulations adopted in 1975,

44 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (June 4, 1975) (now codified at 34 C.F.R.

§ 106.41(a) (2003))—either mandate proportionality by reference to enrollment or create a safe harbor based on such

proportionality. (Such a claim would be a merits argument in

any event.)

Incurring Departmental displeasure under the Interpretation and the Clarification is not something an educational

institution would do lightly. The Department is empowered

to cut off all federal funds from non-complying colleges and

universities. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (authorizing each federal

department and agency that extends federal financial assistance to any education program or activity to terminate

funding in order to effectuate the provisions of Title IX); id.

§ 1687 (defining ‘‘program or activity’’ to include ‘‘all the

operations of TTT (2)(A) a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of higher education’’);

45 C.F.R. § 86.2(g) (defining federal financial assistance); see

also 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418–19 (‘‘When a recipient is found in

noncompliance and voluntary compliance attempts are unsuccessful, the formal process leading to termination of Federal

assistance will be begun.’’). That gives the Department

substantial influence over college and university policies: federal support for postsecondary education totaled over $119

billion in 2000, well over 40% of the nearly $278 billion spent

by all postsecondary institutions that year. See National

Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics 2002 at Tables 343–46 and 363.

Plaintiffs claim that in implementing the Interpretation and

the Clarification the Department has ‘‘initiated hundreds of

administrative enforcement actions and investigations’’ and

‘‘negotiated settlements with such institutions that reduced

male participation opportunities.’’ First Amended Complaint

¶ 48. ‘‘As a direct and indirect result of [the Department’s]

unlawful Title IX policies, therefore, institutions have cut (i.e.,

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4

eliminated) hundreds of men’s teams and have capped (i.e.,

arbitrarily limited) hundreds of men’s participation opportunities.’’ Id. They cite the GAO Report’s finding in support.

Id.

As the standing issue arose on a motion to dismiss, the

plaintiffs’ burden is simply to make the requisite allegations.

‘‘At the pleading stage, general factual allegations TTT may

suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we ‘presum[e] that general

allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to

support the claim.’ ’’ Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

555, 561 (1992) (citation omitted). See also Bennett v. Spear,

520 U.S. 154, 171 (1997) (calling burden of allegation at the

pleading stage ‘‘relatively modest’’); Arlington Heights v.

Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 260–61 (1977); Warth

v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). Dismissal for want of

subject matter jurisdiction should occur only if ‘‘ ‘it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’ ’’

Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman–LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338,

343 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

45–46 (1957)). Interestingly, the leading cases in our circuit

finding standing on the basis of third parties’ response to

alleged excessive agency stringency, Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d

1303 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.), and Tozzi v. United States

Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 271 F.3d 301 (D.C. Cir.

2001), discussed below in detail, involved motions for summary judgment; despite the far more demanding standard

appropriate there, we found the requisite causality and redressability.

The plaintiffs are all associations, and there is no question

(nor, so far as appears, any basis for questioning) that they

meet the requirements for associational standing other than

the disputed question of whether the members would have

standing to sue in their own right. Friends of the Earth, Inc.

v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000)

(requiring that the interest advanced be germane to association’s purpose and that neither the claim nor the relief would

need participation of individual members).

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5

Two of the associations represent collegiate coaches. The

National Wrestling Coaches Association represents collegiate

wrestling coaches, and the College Sports Council represents

national collegiate coaches associations for men’s and women’s swimming, men’s and women’s track and field, men’s

wrestling and men’s gymnastics. First Amended Complaint

¶ ¶ 4, 8. The three college-specific associations represent

alumni and student athletes and the complaint alleges that

they have ‘‘participatory and spectator interests’’ in their

respective schools’ wrestling programs. Id. ¶ ¶ 5–7. With

respect to Bucknell, the complaint alleges that the members

of the association include ‘‘underclassmen on Bucknell’s 2001–

02 wrestling team who want to wrestle for Bucknell in the

2002–03, 2003–04, and 2004–05 academic years.’’ Id. ¶ 5; see

also Second Amended Complaint ¶ 5 (naming a specific Bucknell wrestler). While the plaintiffs’ allegations of redressability—discussed below—may be insufficient as to the three

college-specific associations, compare Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. at 564–67, the suit may proceed if any plaintiff has

standing, see, e.g., Community for Creative Non–Violence v.

Pierce, 814 F.2d 663, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1987), as I believe is true

for the coaches seeking to advance their professional and

economic interests.

Of the three familiar requirements for Article III standing—(1) a concrete, actual or imminent injury-in-fact, (2)

causation and (3) redressability, see Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. at 560–61—any dispute over ‘‘injury’’ appears to

completely overlap the issue of causation. Thus the district

court, though finding the complaint defective as to causation

and redressability, also found that ‘‘it is conceivable that

coaches in particular potentially suffer a direct economic

harm through loss of employment if, as plaintiffs allege, the

challenged regulations lead educational institutions to cut

men’s teams.’’ National Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. United

States Dep’t of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82, 106–07 (D.D.C.

2003) (‘‘NWCA’’). The deprecatory phrase ‘‘it is conceivable’’

foreshadows the court’s later decision on the two other requirements, to which I now turn.

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Causation

In finding that the plaintiffs had not met their burden on

causation, see NWCA, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 112–14, the district

court stressed that even in the absence of the Department’s

rules and enforcement policy an educational institution would

have discretion to eliminate men’s teams, id. at 112, 113.

Because of the presence of other factors in the institutions’

decisionmaking—such as resource distribution, competitiveness, and spectator interest—the district court concluded that

‘‘it cannot be held TTT that the Three Part Test and 1996

Clarification TTT so controls [sic] the conduct of third parties

as to confer standing on plaintiffs.’’ Id. at 114 (emphasis

added).

Despite use of the verb ‘‘control,’’ the district court recognized that where an injury turns on a third party’s response

to government regulations, the law requires only that those

regulations have constituted a ‘‘substantial factor’’ in the third

party’s decisionmaking. See Community for Creative Non–

Violence, 814 F.2d at 669. See also Competitive Enter. Inst.

v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 901 F.2d 107,

113 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (requiring ‘‘substantial likelihood of the

alleged causality’’). A factor can obviously play a substantial

role without ‘‘control[ling].’’ Compare Maj. Op. at 19 (rejecting causality because ‘‘other factors’’ contributed to the

schools’ decisions).

The complaint clearly alleges that the Department regulations and policies represented a ‘‘substantial factor’’ in educational institutions’ decisions on the number and composition

of sports teams. Paragraph 48 of the First Amended Complaint says that either as a direct result of the Department’s

enforcement action or in order to avoid becoming the target

of such action, educational institutions ‘‘have limited male

participation opportunities to comply with [the Department’s]

unlawful Title IX policies,’’ and that as a result of these

policies institutions ‘‘have cut (i.e., eliminated) hundreds of

men’s teams and have capped (i.e., arbitrarily limited) hundreds of men’s participation opportunities.’’ The First

Amended Complaint (¶ ¶ 50–52) also specifically alleges that

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7

wrestling teams at Bucknell, Marquette and Yale were eliminated in order to comply with the Department’s Title IX

policies.

This explicit allegation of the institutions’ behavior and the

Department’s causal role is enough to reject the government’s

motion to dismiss under the principles laid out in the cases

cited above—Defenders of Wildlife, Warth v. Seldin and

Empagran. The majority’s repeated insistence that the

plaintiffs ‘‘demonstrate’’ the causal relation has no place in

the inquiry. Compare Maj. Op. at 3, 18.

In fact, however, plaintiffs added more, offering the GAO

Report as support. Summarizing extensive data gathering, it

said that of 272 schools that cut a men’s team, 83 (31%) cited

the need to meet gender equity goals or requirements for

their decision. GAO Report at 18. Among NCAA Division

I–A schools, a clear majority (54%) cited gender equity

considerations as a significant motivating factor in cutting a

men’s team. Id. at 20. The Report also lists changes in the

number of men’s teams between 1981–82 and 1998–99, including: 171 fewer wrestling teams, 56 fewer gymnastics teams,

27 fewer outdoor track teams and 25 fewer swimming teams.

Id. at 13.

The majority notes that more men’s teams were created

than destroyed in the relevant period, see Maj. Op. at 18,

erroneously suggesting that the relevant benchmark is the

starting date. But the question is the effect of the Department’s rules, so the proper benchmark is the expected growth

of men’s teams under a regime that did not demand enrollment proportionality. See Competitive Enter. Inst. v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 956 F.2d 321, 326–27

(D.C. Cir. 1992).

That Bucknell and Marquette did not discard their wrestling teams until after the 1979 Interpretation had been in

effect for ‘‘decades,’’ see Maj. Op. at 13, proves little. The

Department issued the 1996 Clarification to provide schools

with ‘‘specific guidance about the [Department’s] existing

standards,’’ and limited it to a discussion of the Three–Part

Test because questions about that test comprised a majority

USCA Case #03-5169 Document #822337 Filed: 05/14/2004 Page 36 of 46
8

of those asked about Title IX compliance generally. See

Cantu letter at 1. In fact, the rate of drops for male teams,  ́

as a proportion of all drops, visibly accelerated after the

Clarification: In NCAA Division I, for example, male team

drops were 61% of the total in the years 1988–89 to 1995–96,

but grew to 76% in the years 1996–97 to 2001–02. NCAA

Sponsorship and Participation Report (1982–2002) at 177.

While it is true that the GAO Report does not define ‘‘gender

equity considerations,’’ Maj. Op. at 19, the timing is highly

suggestive; in any event, plaintiffs explicitly alleged that the

Department’s interpretation of Title IX caused the cuts, see

First Amended Complaint ¶ ¶ 48, 50–52, and that is all the

law requires at the pleading stage.

Because plaintiffs’ claim belongs to the class where an

agency’s alleged excess stringency is said to have substantially influenced third parties to make decisions injuring plaintiffs, the most obvious parallel cases are this court’s decisions

in Block v. Meese and Tozzi v. United States Department of

Health and Human Services. In these cases the causal role

was considerably less clear than here, yet we found standing.

In Block the Justice Department had classified three films

distributed by the plaintiffs as ‘‘political propaganda’’ under

the Foreign Agents Registration Act, a finding that required

the plaintiffs to make public disclosure of the names of

certain recipients and distributors of the films. 793 F.2d at

1307. Plaintiffs claimed that the publication of customers’

names would affect their profits, and on cross-motions for

summary judgment they submitted Block’s affidavit saying

that ‘‘[a]t least a dozen customers have specifically asked us

not to reveal their names,’’ and an affidavit of a library

association saying that being listed as a purveyor of political

propaganda ‘‘could cause problems for [the association] and

its members.’’ Id. at 1308. Although no customer or potential customer submitted any statement that the prospect of

publication had caused it to refrain from purchase or rental

on account of the agency action, or that it would do so, we

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found standing.1

 We saw the government’s conduct as

‘‘creat[ing] a disincentive’’ for plaintiffs’ potential customers

to acquire the films, damaging plaintiffs’ profits. Id. Assuming that the disincentive worked through a ‘‘false impression,’’

we said that that made no difference. Id. at 1309. None of

the relevant third parties in Block actually said that it had

changed its conduct because of the government’s publication

of customers’ names.

Here we have 171 colleges or universities cutting men’s

wrestling teams and nearly 100 reporting that they cut men’s

teams for reasons of ‘‘gender equity.’’ To be sure, they did

not explicitly tell GAO that it was the Department’s enforcement strategy that suddenly alerted them to the imperatives

of gender equity. But plaintiffs allege such a link, and on a

motion to dismiss that (rather plausible) allegation is enough.

In Tozzi the plaintiffs challenged an agency report that

shifted the chemical dioxin from the category of substances

‘‘reasonably anticipated to be’’ human carcinogens to the

category of ones ‘‘known’’ to be carcinogens. 271 F.3d at 303.

As in Block, the government argued that, even if the plaintiffs

were injured as a result of the change, the plaintiffs’ injury

was not fairly traceable to that decision. Id. at 308. The

government pointed out that the anti-dioxin movement predated the upgrade, and argued that pressure on companies to

reduce the use of dioxin-containing products would continue

whether or not dioxin continued to be listed as a known

human carcinogen. Id.

Despite these arguments, we found sufficient causation,

again on a motion for summary judgment. We noted that

Congress had intended the report to serve as the federal

government’s authoritative statement on the state of carcinogen research; that Oakland, Berkeley and San Francisco

passed anti-dioxin resolutions citing the agency’s preliminary

determination about dioxin; and that a member of the Board

1 This was in contrast to the public classification of the film,

with respect to which plaintiffs submitted a customer affidavit

saying that but for the designation it would have purchased a

specific film. Block, 793 F.2d at 1308.

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10

of Scientific Counselors noted that the report was a very

important document. Id. at 309. On this basis we said we

had ‘‘little doubt’’ ‘‘that the dioxin upgrade will represent a

‘substantial factor’ in the decisions of state and local agencies

to regulate products containing dioxin or of healthcare companies to reduce or end purchases of [these products].’’ Id. ‘‘It

is not too speculative to conclude that the Report will injure

Brevet [a PVC-selling plaintiff] economically, even with the

presence of other causal factors.’’ Id.

Thus we found causation with little direct evidence. The

strongest was perhaps the fact that three cities in the Bay

area had referenced the Report in adopting anti-dioxin resolutions; but these were unaccompanied by any statement that

any purchaser had heeded them, much less that the Report

had ‘‘control[led]’’ those cities’ recommendations or even been

a major inducement to their issuance. We were quite explicit

that third parties’ consideration of other factors did not

prevent a finding that the Report was likely to be a ‘‘substantial factor’’ in anti-dioxin decisions. Id.

In our recent decision in Crete Carrier Corp. v. EPA, 363

F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2004), we found no standing, but we

emphasized the special conditions. Buyers of the tractors for

tractor-trailers argued that a relatively stringent EPA engine

emission standard—the 2004 Standard—would increase

prices of such tractors. Under certain consent decrees, all

significant manufacturers were bound until January 1, 2005 to

produce engines meeting the 2004 Standard. We noted that

but for the consent decrees, finding causation between enforcement of the 2004 Standard and increased prices for

plaintiffs ‘‘would be the work of a minute.’’ Id. at 493.

Because of the consent decrees, however, any price relief for

plaintiffs depended on the manufacturers’ incurring the costs

of reversing their production methods to meet standards less

stringent than the 2004 Standard, even though they would

have almost immediately have to retool again to meet still

more stringent standards taking effect January 1, 2007. On

summary judgment we found that plaintiffs had offered no

evidence to support that scenario. Id. at 494. Plainly Crete

Carrier does not undermine the lesson of Block and Tozzi.

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In rejecting plaintiffs’ claims as ‘‘purely speculative,’’ the

majority makes much of the Supreme Court’s decisions in

Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization,

426 U.S. 26 (1976), Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), and

Warth v. Seldin. But these cases in no way require that we

hold plaintiffs’ claim here to be too speculative; indeed, the

opinions suggest that plaintiffs there lost more for want of

proper pleading than for the theoretically speculative nature

of their claims. In Allen v. Wright, for example, there was no

talk of unduly speculative claims; rather, the plaintiffs simply

failed to make the proper allegations. See 468 U.S. at 758

(‘‘The diminished ability of respondents’ children to receive a

desegregated education would be fairly traceable to unlawful

IRS grants of tax exemptions only if there were enough

racially discriminatory private schools receiving tax exemptions in respondents’ communities for withdrawal of those

exemptions to make an appreciable difference in public school

integration. Respondents have made no such allegation.’’).

And in Warth v. Seldin the Court said, ‘‘Petitioners must

allege facts from which it reasonably could be inferred that,

absent the respondents’ restrictive zoning practices, there is a

substantial probability that they would have been able to

purchase or lease in Penfield and that, if the court affords the

relief requested, the asserted inability of petitioners will be

removed. We find the record devoid of the necessary allegations.’’ 422 U.S. at 504 (citation omitted).

Similarly, in Simon the plaintiffs alleged only that an IRS

Revenue Ruling had ‘‘encouraged’’ hospitals to deny service

to indigents; it left implicit the corollary that plaintiffs’

requested relief would ‘‘discourage’’ hospitals from denying

service. 426 U.S. at 42. Presumably, had the plaintiffs

alleged a direct causal connection between the IRS Revenue

Ruling, hospitals’ decisionmaking and plaintiffs’ access to

hospitals, the Court would not have found plaintiffs’ claims to

be too speculative. Compare Simon, 426 U.S. at 42 (‘‘[I]t

does not follow from the allegation and its corollary that the

denial of access to hospital services in fact results from

petitioners’ new Ruling’’ (emphasis added)), with First

Amended Complaint ¶ 48 (‘‘As a direct and indirect result of

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12

[the Department’s] unlawful Title IX policies, therefore, institutions have cut (i.e., eliminated) hundreds of men’s teams’’

(emphasis added)). As this litigation progresses, the plaintiffs would obviously be obliged to produce evidence to substantiate their claims on summary judgment, and, as to

controverted material issues, at trial. See, e.g., Defenders of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561; Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534

U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (notice pleading standard relies on summary judgment motions to define disputed issues of fact and

dispose of unmeritorious claims); The Freedom Republicans,

Inc. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 13 F.3d 412, 418 (D.C. Cir.

1994) (rejecting plaintiffs’ claims as unduly speculative because plaintiffs had not produced enough evidence on summary judgment). Here the only question is whether the

plaintiffs properly pleaded a causal connection between their

injury and the Department’s regulations, which they have.

Simon, Allen v. Wright and Warth v. Seldin simply instruct

the court to be cautious in making an inferential leap when

plaintiffs have not offered specific allegations spelling out the

requisite steps of the causal chain.

The majority seizes on a phrase of plaintiffs’ counsel at oral

argument—the view that relief would afford ‘‘better odds’’ for

improved retention or restoration of men’s teams, Maj. Op. at

13, 18, and deprecates ‘‘better odds’’ as insufficient or too

speculative, id. at 9. And it observes that plaintiffs do not

claim that any particular school ‘‘necessarily would forego

elimination of a wrestling team TTT in the absence of these

interpretive rules.’’ Id. at 13 (emphasis added). The implication—that what is not certain is too speculative—reflects a

view of the law at odds with our tests. First, the language of

counsel at oral argument is no basis for our evaluation of

causal links. Second, under our ‘‘substantial factor’’ test,

Community for Creative Non–Violence, 814 F.2d at 669, we

require simply ‘‘substantial likelihood of the alleged causality.’’ Competitive Enter. Inst., 901 F.2d at 113. This is a

probabilistic test, not susceptible of ready quantification, but

plainly not requiring certainty.

Here plaintiffs’ allegations indicate high probability. They

directly allege that the Department’s Title IX interpretations

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13

and its enforcement policies, including the threat of withholding federal funds (meaning all forms of federal aid, no matter

how unrelated to college athletics, see 20 U.S.C. § 1682), have

caused educational institutions to cut men’s athletic teams.

Although the context is not summary judgment, they back it

up with the highly suggestive data of the GAO Report. The

strength of the causal inference seems at least as compelling

as what we found sufficient in Block and Tozzi on summary

judgment.

Redressability

Having found that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a causal

connection between their injury and the Department’s regulations, it would be unusual to conclude that plaintiffs’ injuries

cannot be redressed by elimination of the illegal regulations.

Both ‘‘inquiries require an assessment of how third parties

will respond to the agency’s action.’’ Community for Creative Non–Violence, 814 F.2d at 670; see also Allen v. Wright,

468 U.S. at 753 n.19 (‘‘To the extent there is a difference

[between causation and redressability], it is that the former

examines the causal connection between the assertedly unlawful conduct and the alleged injury, whereas the latter examines the causal connection between the alleged injury and the

judicial relief requested.’’). Even where, as here, the plaintiffs’ requested remedy is a new rulemaking, see First

Amended Complaint ¶ 99(B)(iii), we do not assess redressability on the basis of some finely calibrated estimate of what the

new rule will be. ‘‘Where an agency rule causes the injury,

the redressability requirement may be satisfied as well by

vacating the challenged rule and giving the aggrieved party

the opportunity to participate in a new rulemaking the results

of which might be more favorable to it.’’ America’s Cmty.

Bankers v. FDIC, 200 F.3d 822, 828–29 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see

also Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Nichols, 142 F.3d 449, 458

(D.C. Cir. 1998).

Plaintiffs’ redressability pleadings are straightforward.

They ask for an order remanding the current rules to the

Department and requiring a rulemaking to amend them so

that they will require institutions, to the extent that they

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14

make any gender-conscious decisions on athletic opportunities, ‘‘to use interest and ability—not enrollment—as the

relevant population.’’ First Amended Complaint ¶ 99(A)(iii),

(B)(iii). They explicitly allege that grant of the relief requested ‘‘will redress the injuries alleged herein.’’ Id. ¶ 53. Given

the allegation that the Department’s actions were the cause of

the injury, it follows logically that removal of that cause

would supply redress.

The government’s arguments add nothing to what is already implicit in the discussion of causation. Indeed, it

seems to misunderstand what is required of plaintiffs here,

arguing that the plaintiffs must show that different Department regulations would cause a school that has eliminated a

team to reinstitute that team. Appellee’s Brief at 24. While

such an allegation may be necessary for the three collegespecific associations to maintain their claims,2

 the other plaintiff associations need neither to demonstrate nor even allege

such a direct result. They have plainly alleged that the

alleged wrongdoing is ongoing and continues to affect educational institutions’ decisionmaking. See First Amended

Complaint ¶ 48 (the Department’s ‘‘unlawful Title IX policies

directly and indirectly have reduced (and continue to limit)

participation opportunities for male athletes.’’). Under these

circumstances, the redressability requirement is satisfied if

there can be ‘‘a sanction that effectively abates that conduct

and prevents its recurrence.’’ Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 185–86.

2 Although the plaintiffs submitted a press release directly

linking the elimination of Bucknell’s wrestling team to the Department’s Title IX policies and regulations, see Bucknell News Release

(May 2, 2001) (stating that Bucknell cut men’s wrestling team to

attempt to ‘‘keep[ ] women represented in its varsity programs to

the same degree they are represented in the student body’’),

nowhere in the complaint did they allege that a change in the

regulations would cause Bucknell, Marquette or Yale either to

rethink cuts already made or to redress in some other way the

injuries suffered by student athletes and alumni at those schools.

Thus, as to the college-specific associations, it appears that this may

be the rare circumstance where the allegations are sufficient to

establish causation but not redressability.

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Similarly, the government faults the plaintiffs for failing to

allege that any member coaches are employed by educational

institutions that ‘‘have declared any intention now or in the

future to initiate the cutting or capping of athletic teams,’’

Appellee’s Brief at 24, and it suggests that the plaintiffs’

complaint should have listed the schools at which their members coach, id. at 24–25. But under ‘‘notice pleading,’’ a court

on a motion to dismiss must ‘‘presume[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to

support the claim.’’ Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561

(alteration in original); see also Rule 8(a)(2), Fed. R. Civ.

Pro.; Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512; Bennett, 520 U.S. at 168

(‘‘Given petitioners’ allegation TTT it is easy to presume

specific facts under which petitioners will be injured’’). Given

that the plaintiffs have alleged both that they are national

organizations representing coaches in a number of men’s

sports, see First Amended Complaint ¶ ¶ 4, 8, and that they

are suffering ongoing injury due to the Department’s regulations, id. ¶ 48, we must infer that these allegations embrace

the specific facts necessary to support plaintiffs’ claims, i.e.,

that plaintiffs’ member coaches are employed by educational

institutions that would, in the event of a Department retreat,

be either substantially less likely to cut or cap men’s teams in

the future to comply with the Department’s Title IX regulations and policies, or substantially more likely to support

increases in men’s sports opportunities. The proper comparison, of course, is between men’s sports opportunities under

the current regime and men’s sports opportunities under a

future regime in which the Department’s enrollment proportionality requirement has been removed. See Competitive

Enter. Inst. v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 956

F.2d at 326–27. It is of no consequence that the Department

has no obligation to proceed in the future by rulemaking,

compare Maj. Op. at 14, so long as it is substantively barred

from pursuit of enrollment proportionality, in disregard of

varying levels of interest and skill.

* * *

As an alternative holding, the majority finds the plaintiffs’

suit unreviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5

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U.S.C. §§ 701–706, because it believes the plaintiffs may

achieve an adequate remedy by suing individual colleges and

universities directly. See generally id. § 704 (limiting judicial review to ‘‘final agency action for which there is no other

adequate remedy in a court’’). I believe the majority’s reasoning is mistaken here as well.

As the Supreme Court explained in Bowen v. Massachusetts, § 704 is to be read narrowly so as not ‘‘to defeat the

central purpose of providing a broad spectrum of judicial

review of agency action.’’ 487 U.S. 879, 903–04 (1988); see

also Esch v. Yeutter, 876 F.2d 976, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The

adequate remedy question is a practical one: would the

alternative remedy afford the same relief to plaintiffs as suit

under the APA? See, e.g., Women’s Equity Action League v.

Cavazos, 906 F.2d 742, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (looking at

statutory remedies available to plaintiff in judging question of

adequacy); Council of and for the Blind v. Regan, 709 F.2d

1521, 1532 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (comparing remedies available

under APA and the Revenue Sharing Act).

In this case, the remedy sought by plaintiffs is a new

rulemaking by the Department of Education, First Amended

Complaint ¶ 99(B)(iii), one that would eliminate enrollment

proportionality as a ‘‘safe harbor’’ for compliance with Title

IX, id. ¶ 99(A)(iii). The plaintiffs also seek to prohibit the

Department from ‘‘requiring or authorizing institutions to

engage in gender-conscious cutting or capping to meet a

disparate-impact standard.’’ Id. ¶ 99(A)(ii). Although the

plaintiffs may sue individual institutions directly to redress

discrimination proscribed by Title IX, see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), such a suit would not

achieve plaintiffs’ desired remedies. Government coercion

may be illegal even though the induced third-party action is

itself legal. Just as in Tozzi and Block the allegation was

that illegal government stigmatization would induce third

parties to avoid products that they were clearly free to avoid

on their own (dioxin-containing products in one case, specific

films in the other), here government pressure toward enrollment-based ‘‘gender equity’’ may be illegal but private parties’ pursuit of such gender equity perfectly legal. Cf. United

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Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979) (allowing

private parties to adopt an affirmative action plan containing

racial preferences that the Court assumed the government

could not lawfully have required). Because individual suits

against educational institutions would not provide plaintiffs

with an adequate remedy for their injury, § 704 cannot

provide a basis for finding plaintiffs’ claims unreviewable.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons I would reverse the district

court.

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