Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01218/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01218-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MORRIS P. HARMON, JR., ) 

 Petitioner, ) CASE NO. 2:08-cv-1218 BJR 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) ORDER RE: PETITION FOR 

 ) WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND 

WARDEN DERRAL G. ADAMS, ) APPOINTMENT OF LEGAL COUNSEL 

 Respondent. ) 

__________________________________________ 

 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his November 20, 2004 conviction on 

forcible rape (Cal. Penal Code § 261(a)(2)) and kidnapping for the purpose of committing rape (§ 

208(d)). Petitioner had two prior convictions for sex offenses (§ 667.71(a) & (d)) and three prior 

convictions for serious felony offenses (§§ 667 (a)-(i) & 1170.12). On December 20, 2004 

Petitioner was sentenced to state prison for a term of seventy-five years to life on count one, 

fifteen years on the prior convictions, and four years, eight months for failing to register as a 

convicted sex offender. 

 The exhaustion of state court remedies is a prerequisite to the granting of a petition for 

writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement 

by providing the highest state court with a full and fair opportunity to consider all claims before 

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presenting them to the federal court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Middleton v. 

Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986). The state court has 

had an opportunity to rule on the merits when the petitioner has fairly presented the claim to that 

court. The fair presentation requirement is met where the petitioner has described the operative 

facts and legal theory on which his claim is based. Picard, 404 U.S. at 277-78; Weaver v. 

Thompson, 197 F.3d 359, 364 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that a petitioner must present both the 

factual and legal basis for the claim to state court in order to exhaust the claim). Generally, it is 

“not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the state 

courts . . . or that a somewhat similar state-law claim was made.” Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 

4, 6 (1982). Accordingly, “a claim for relief in habeas corpus must include reference to a 

specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts which entitle the 

petitioner to relief.” Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 116 S. Ct. 2074, 2081 (1996). 

 The United States Supreme Court has held that a federal district court may not entertain a 

petition for habeas corpus unless the petitioner has exhausted state remedies with respect to each 

of the claims raised. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). A mixed petition containing both 

exhausted and unexhausted claims generally must be dismissed “leaving the prisoner with the 

choice of returning to state court to exhaust his claims or of amending or resubmitting the habeas 

petition to present only exhausted claims to the district court.” Id. at 510. 

 Petitioner raises five claims in his petition. He argues that he is entitled to federal habeas 

relief because: (1) he was denied effective assistance of counsel; (2) the trial court erroneously 

denied his motion to suppress the DNA evidence presented at trial; (3) his due process rights 

were violated because the trial court failed to give a lesser included offense instruction; (4) the 

trial court improperly imposed the upper term sentence; and (5) the admission of the trial 

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testimony of Sacramento County District Attorney Crime Laboratory criminalist Mark Eastman 

violated his constitutional rights. After reviewing the record in this action, the court finds that 

Petitioner has failed to exhaust state court remedies as to the first and fifth claims. In the first 

claim—ineffective assistance of counsel—Petitioner alleges for the first time that his trial 

counsel had inappropriate contact with a member of the jury and the victim’s mother, 

inappropriately referenced Petitioner’s religious background in front of the jury, made sexual 

advances towards Petitioner and presented himself as a woman at some point during trial. (Trial 

counsel was born a man and presented himself as a man up to the point that he began to dress 

like a woman during trial.) The fifth claim—the admission of criminalist Mark Eastman’s 

testimony at trial—also was not presented in state court. Petitioner claims that he learned at 

some point in 2006 that Mr. Eastman had been fired by the Sacramento County District 

Attorney’s Office for “mishandling DNA cases.” These allegations were never presented in state 

court and are thus unexhausted. 

 Accordingly, Petitioner has three options with which to proceed: (1) the petition may be 

dismissed without prejudice and Petitioner can re-file after exhausting the unexhausted claims;1

(2) Petitioner may amend the petition, dismiss the unexhausted claims, and proceed with only the 

exhausted claims;2 (3) Petitioner may seek to invoke the three-step stay and abeyance procedure 

in which (a) he amends his petition to delete any unexhausted claims, (b) the court stays and 

holds in abeyance the amended, fully exhausted petition, allowing Petitioner the opportunity to 

 1 Petitioner is cautioned that because the AEDPA’s one year statute of limitations has run 

with respect to his claims, a dismissal without prejudice could effectively result in a dismissal 

with prejudice unless equitable tolling applied. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Pliler v. Ford, 542 

U.S. 225, 230 (2004). 

2 Petitioner is similarly cautioned that if he chooses to proceed on an amended petition 

raising only exhausted claims he will risk forfeiting consideration of the unexhausted claims in 

this or any other federal court. Rose, 455 U.S. at 520-21. 

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proceed to state court to exhaust the deleted claims, and (c) Petitioner later amends his petition 

and re-attaches the newly-exhausted claims to the original petition.3 In light of the complexity of 

the legal issues involved, the court has determined that the interests of justice require 

appointment of counsel to assist Petitioner in reaching his decision. See 18 U.S.C. § 

3006A(a)(2)(B); see also Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983). 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. The Federal Defender is appointed to represent Petitioner. 

 2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of the petition and this order 

on David Porter, Assistant Federal Defender. 

 3. Petitioner’s counsel shall contact the Clerk’s Office to make arrangements to 

receive copies of documents in the file. 

 4. Petitioner shall notify the court within ninety days of the date of this order how 

he intends to proceed with this action. 

 5. This matter will be dismissed without prejudice if the court does not receive 

notification from Petitioner within the specified time. 

 

 

3

 Petitioner is further cautioned that he will still have to demonstrate the timeliness of his 

claims. See, e.g., King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that a petitioner may 

amend a new claim into a pending federal habeas petition after the expiration of the limitations 

period only if the new claim shares a “common core of operative facts” with the claims in the 

pending petition). Petitioner may also seek to stay the petition, as is, while he exhausts his 

unexhausted claims in state court. Rhine v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005). However, the 

Supreme Court has stated that this procedure “should be available only in limited 

circumstances.” Id. Specifically, it is appropriate only when (1) good cause exists for a 

petitioner’s failure to exhaust; (2) the petitioner’s unexhausted claims are not “plainly meritless”; 

and (3) there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in “abusive litigation tactics or 

intentional delay.” Id. at 278. 

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Barbara Jacobs Rothstein 

U.S. District Court Judge 

DATED this 16th day of April, 2010. 

 /s/ Barbara Jacobs Rothstein 

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