Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02274/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02274-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10-CV-2274

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE ALFREDO FIGUEROA,

Petitioner,

v.

MELISSA LEA, WARDEN,

Respondent.

 

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. 10-CV-2274 MMA (JMA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

FOR ORDER DENYING IN PART AND

GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO

STAY AND ABEY [DOC. NO. 8]

Presently before the Court is a Motion to Stay Litigation of Federal Habeas

Proceedings Pending Exhaustion filed by Petitioner Jose Alfredo Figueroa (hereinafter

“Petitioner”). [Doc. 8.] Respondent Melissa Lea, Warden (hereinafter “Respondent”),

filed a Response to the motion. [Doc. 13.] For the reasons set forth below, the Court

recommends District Judge Michael M. Anello deny in part and grant in part the motion

to stay and allow Petitioner to withdraw his unexhausted claims.

I. BACKGROUND

On February 1, 2008, Petitioner was convicted in San Diego Superior Court of

four counts of sex offenses committed upon his stepdaugther: (1) forcible rape (Cal.

Penal Code § 261(a)(2)); (2) attempted lewd act with a child 14 or 15 years of age (Cal.

Penal Code § 288(c)(1)); and (3) and (4) lewd act on a child 14 or 15 years of age (Cal.

Case 3:10-cv-02274-MMA-JMA Document 15 Filed 08/12/11 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

“The court selected count 4 as the principal term and imposed the upper term of three

years on that count. The court imposed a consecutive eight-year term on count 1, a

consecutive eight-month term (one-third the middle term of two years) on count 3, and a

consecutive four-month term (one-third the middle term of one year) on count 2.” [Doc. No. 1

at 24.]

2 10-CV-2274

Penal Code § 288(c)(1)). [Doc. No. 1 (Petition) at 1-2.] Petitioner was sentenced to an

aggregate twelve years in state prison.1

 [Doc. No. 1 at 24.]

Petitioner appealed his convictions to the California Court of Appeal, case no.

D052564, raising two claims: (1) juror misconduct and (2) the trial court’s imposition of

aggravated terms on counts one and four violated Petitioner’s right to a jury trial. [Doc.

No. 1 at 18-19.] The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on November 23,

2009. [Doc. No. 1 at 18-19.] Petitioner then sought review in the California Supreme

court for the same two claims. The California Supreme Court, sitting en banc, case no.

S179006, summarily denied the petition on February 3, 2010. [Doc. No. 1 at 17.] 

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court,

which was returned to Petitioner with an accompanying letter dated June 24, 2010 from

the Office of the Clerk stating “the petition is out-of-time.” [Doc. No. 1 at 16.] The

petition was postmarked on June 17, 2010 when the due date was May 4, 2010. [Doc.

No. 1 at 16.] 

On November 3, 2010, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas

corpus, pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”), setting forth eight claims:

(I) Juror misconduct; 

(II) The trial court’s imposition of aggravated terms on counts one and four 

violated Petitioner’s right to a jury trial;

(III) The use of an all-White jury violated Petitioner’s right to a trial by his peers

and a representative cross-section of the community;

(IV) The use of shackles upon Petitioner throughout the trial and during his

testimony in his own defense, without the trial court giving notice for the

reasons he was to be shackled or without instructions on how to have the

shackles removed during trial or testimony violated Petitioner’s right to due

process;

(V) Petitioner was denied the right to the assistance of counsel;

Case 3:10-cv-02274-MMA-JMA Document 15 Filed 08/12/11 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 10-CV-2274

(VI) Petitioner was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel; 

(VII) Petitioner was denied his right to due process by the cumulative errors

imputed to the State of California by the trial court and Petitioner’s

counsel; and 

(VIII) The trial court was without legal jurisdiction over the Petitioner.

[Doc. No. 1 at 6-13.] Petitioner acknowledges Claims 3 through 8 were not raised to the

California Supreme Court prior to filing his federal habeas Petition; however, he

concurrently filed a document entitled, “Motion for Permission to File a Protective

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and to Stay and Abey Federal Habeas Proceedings.” 

[Doc. 1 at 8-13 & Doc. No. 2.] By Order dated November 4, 2010, this Court dismissed

the case without prejudice for Petitioner’s failure to pay the $5 filing fee or qualify to

proceed in forma pauperis. [Doc. No. 3.] Petitioner was advised that to have the case

reopened, he was required to submit the $5 filing fee or adequate proof of his inability to

pay the fee no later than January 3, 2011. [Doc. No. 3 at 1.] On November 29, 2010,

Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, [Doc. No. 5], which

the Court granted on December 13, 2010. [Doc. No. 6.] By Order dated January 13,

2011, the Court set the briefing schedule for Petitioner’s Motion for Stay and Abeyance. 

[Doc. No. 7.] Petitioner filed his brief on the motion on February 16, 2011, again

acknowledging his Petition is “mixed,” meaning it contains both exhausted and

unexhausted claims, and requesting all proceedings in this Court be stayed until he

exhausts Claims 3 through 8 in the state courts. [Doc. No. 8 at 4.] Petitioner attached a

proposed copy of the petition for writ of habeas corpus he intends to file in the state

courts after this Court rules on the instant motion. [Doc. No. 1 at 29, 33-43.] 

Respondent filed a Response to the motion on April 27, 2011. [Doc. No. 13.] Petitioner

did not file a Reply.

II. DISCUSSION

A state prisoner’s federal habeas petition may not be granted if state remedies

are unexhausted. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(b)(1)(A). The exhaustion requirement is

satisfied by providing the state courts with a “fair opportunity” to rule on Petitioner’s

Case 3:10-cv-02274-MMA-JMA Document 15 Filed 08/12/11 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)(1)-(2) states:

(b)(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it

appears that -

(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State;

or

(B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or (ii)

circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of

the applicant.

 (2) An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits,

notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in

the courts of the State.

4 10-CV-2274

constitutional claims. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982). In most instances, a

claim is exhausted once it is presented to a state’s highest court, either on direct appeal

or through state collateral proceedings.2

 See Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376

(9th Cir. 2002). The constitutional claim raised in the federal proceedings must be the

same as that raised in the state proceedings. Id.

Federal courts cannot consider petitions that contain both exhausted and

unexhausted claims, often referred to as “mixed” petitions. See Rose v. Lundy, 455

U.S. 509, 522 (1982) (holding a district court must dismiss a federal habeas petition

containing both unexhausted and exhausted claims). The filing of a mixed petition

renders it subject to dismissal. Id.

There are two methods available to a petitioner who seeks to stay a federal

habeas proceeding while he returns to state court to exhaust his unexhausted claims,

the “stay and abeyance” procedure pursuant to Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78

(2005), and the “withdrawal and abeyance” procedure outlined in Kelly v. Small, 315

F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003). The distinctions between the two procedures are observed in

King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2009). Citing Jackson v. Roe, 425 F. 3d 654 (9th

Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal stated:

As Jackson explained, Rhines allows a district court to stay a mixed

petition, and does not require that unexhausted claims be dismissed while

the petitioner attempts to exhaust them in state court. In contrast, the

three-step procedure outlined in Kelly allows the stay of fully exhausted

Case 3:10-cv-02274-MMA-JMA Document 15 Filed 08/12/11 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 In Jackson, the petitioner had attempted to use the Rhines procedure, so although the

Ninth Circuit expounded on the differences between the procedures, it did not reach the issue

as to whether the Kelly procedure remained available after Rhines. In King, the Ninth Circuit

picked up where Jackson left off, holding the three-step withdrawal and abeyance procedure

outlined in Kelly remained an available option for Petitioners. King, 564 F.3d at 1143.

4

 The three-step procedure Petitioner refers to as the Jackson procedure is the same

three-step procedure as Kelly’s withdrawal and abeyance procedure.

5 10-CV-2274

petitions, requiring that any unexhausted claims be dismissed. Id. at 661. 

King, 564 F.3d at 1139-1140.3

Petitioner seeks to invoke either the Rhines stay and abeyance procedure or the

Kelly withdrawal and abeyance procedure. He states he “has no objection to following

the three-step procedure as stated in Jackson v. Roe, supra, 425 F.3d 658-659,” but

argues “the stay-and-abeyance procedure established in Rhines v. Weber is the

appropriate means to proceed on the instant Petition, rather than the three-step process

[].” [Doc. no. 8 at 14].4

A. Petitioner Should Not Be Granted a Stay and Abeyance under Rhines

Under Rhines, 544 U.S. 269, a district court has discretion to grant a stay and

abeyance of a mixed petition if: (1) "the petitioner had good cause for his failure to

exhaust"; (2) "his unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious"; and (3) "there is no

indication that the petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics." Rhines,

544 U.S. at 278. The Supreme Court made clear in Rhines that because staying a

federal habeas petition frustrates AEDPA's objective of encouraging finality by allowing

a petitioner to delay the resolution of federal proceedings and undermines AEDPA's

goal of streamlining federal habeas proceedings by decreasing a petitioner's incentive

to first exhaust all his claims in state court, "stay and abeyance should be available only

in limited circumstances." Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. As a threshold matter, "[b]ecause

granting a stay effectively excuses a petitioner's failure to present his claims first to the

state courts, stay and abeyance is only appropriate when the district court determines

there was good cause for the petitioner's failure to exhaust his claims first in state

court." Id.

/ /

Case 3:10-cv-02274-MMA-JMA Document 15 Filed 08/12/11 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 10-CV-2274

Petitioner has neither established good cause for his failure to exhaust nor

diligently sought habeas relief in state court, thereby obviating any need, at this time, to

address whether his unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious. Petitioner “filed the

instant Petition early with [this] Court so that he would meet the statutory deadline

established by AEDPA, and have the issue of exhaustion resolved in order to meet the

strict requirements of AEDPA.” [Doc. No. 1 at 14.] He alleges the uncertainty

surrounding the timeliness of filing his state habeas petition requires his early filing in

this Court. Id. at 15. 

Petitioner’s confusion arises from mere unfamiliarity with habeas law, which does

not satisfy good cause under Rhines. See e.g. Kibler v. Walters, 220 F.3d 1151, 1154

(9th Cir. 2000) (finding Petitioner’s lack of knowledge of requirements of state habeas

corpus law insufficient to establish good cause for failure to exhaust due to procedural

default). In addition, by accepting Petitioner’s unfamiliarity with state habeas law as

good cause, nearly any Petitioner who merely claims confusion would satisfy good

cause, undermining the Rhines Court’s recognition that stay and abeyance “should be

available only in limited circumstances.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. 

Furthermore, Petitioner has not established that he has diligently pursued his

state court habeas remedies. To the contrary, Petitioner awaits “this Court’s permission

to file the state petition, and direction from this Court as to which state court the state

petition must be filed in.” [Doc. No. 8, at 30.] His “State petition has been ready to be

filed since the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed with this Court on

November 3, 2010,” but he “has refrained from making a filing before the State court so

that this Court may instruct Petitioner how to properly proceed so that he offends neither

this Court nor the State court so that the needs of each tribunal may be properly met.” 

Id. at 30-31. Petitioner’s reliance on this Court’s direction is misplaced, for this

Court may not advocate on Petitioner’s behalf. See Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231

(2004).

/ /

Case 3:10-cv-02274-MMA-JMA Document 15 Filed 08/12/11 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 10-CV-2274

The application of the Rhines stay and abeyance procedure would frustrate the

AEDPA’s purpose. Petitioner has not followed the clear directive to federal habeas

litigants: “[B]efore you bring any claims to federal court, be sure that you first have

taken each one to state court.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 276-77 (citing Rose, 455 U.S. at

520). Nor has he established good cause for failing to do so. Instead, this is a situation

in which the federal court would be staying the case in order to wait for Petitioner to

initiate his state court proceedings on the unexhausted claims. Granting a stay under

Rhines, would frustrate the AEDPA’s goal of “encouraging finality, by allowing a

petitioner to delay the resolution of the federal proceedings” and would “undermine[]

[the] AEDPA’s goal of streamlining federal habeas proceedings by decreasing a

petitioner’s incentive to exhaust all his claims in state court prior to filing his federal

petition.” Rhines, 566 U.S. at 277. Because Petitioner has not established a basis to

stay the case under Rhines, the Court will evaluate whether he should instead be

permitted to withdraw the unexhausted claims and a stay should be granted pursuant to

Kelly.

B. Petitioner Should Be Permitted to Withdraw and Abey Pursuant to

Kelly

The Kelly "withdrawal and abeyance" procedure, which Petitioner refers to as the

Jackson procedure, is a three-step process that petitioners may, under certain

circumstances, use to cure a mixed petition. The petitioner first voluntarily dismisses all

unexhausted claims from his federal petition and requests the court stay the case. 

Kelly, 315 F.3d at 1070. He then returns to state court and exhausts those claims while

the federal court holds the fully exhausted claims in abeyance. Id. In the final step, he

seeks leave to amend his federal petition to add the newly exhausted claims. Id. at

1070. Unlike the "stay and abeyance" procedure set forth in Rhines, Petitioner need not

establish good cause for his failure to exhaust all his claims prior to filing his federal

habeas petition. King, 564 F.3d at 1140. When he returns to federal court, however, he

must establish a basis to amend his petition to add the newly exhausted claims. Id. 

Case 3:10-cv-02274-MMA-JMA Document 15 Filed 08/12/11 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

 AEDPA applies a one-year statute of limitations to federal habeas corpus petitions. 

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). Thus, a petitioner who wishes to challenge his state court

conviction in federal court via a habeas corpus petition must file within one year of his

conviction becoming final. Although the statute of limitations does not run while a properly filed

state habeas corpus petition is pending, absent some other basis for tolling, the statute of

limitations does run while a federal habeas petition is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see

Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S.

167, 181-82 (2001). 

8 10-CV-2274

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 governs amendments to pleadings in habeas

proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2242; see also Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 655, 659 (2005)

Rule 15(a) states, "[t]he court shall freely give leave [to amend] when justice so

requires." Fed. Rule Civ. P. 15(a)(2). When, under the withdrawal and abeyance

procedure, a petitioner has dismissed unexhausted claims, subsequently exhausted

them in state court, and then seeks to have them added to his petition, he must show

the newly exhausted claims are either timely under the statute of limitations or they

must "relate back" to the claims in the fully-exhausted petition, that is, they must share a

"common core of operative facts" with the previously exhausted claims. King, 564 F.3d

at 1142-43, quoting Mayle, 545 U.S. at 659. As explained in King, due to the AEDPA’s

one year statute of limitations, “demonstrating timeliness will often be problematic” for

petitioners and, therefore, the process is not only cumbersome, but is also risky.5

 King,

564 F.3d at 1140-41. 

Petitioner articulates an understanding of the risks associated with this process

and states he “has no objection to following the three-step procedure.... allowing the

Petitioner to remove Grounds Three through Eight, staying and holding in abeyance the

amended, fully exhausted petition in order to allow the Petitioner to fully exhaust these

claims before the State court, to file a First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

and to reinsert Grounds Three through Eight in the amended petition.” [Doc. No. 13-

14.] Respondent also acknowledges that while Petitioner is not entitled to a stay under

Rhines, the Court can, in this case, properly grant one pursuant to Kelly. [Doc. No. 13,

at 9.] The Court recommends, therefore, that Petitioner be permitted to withdraw

Claims 3 through 8, and his remaining exhausted claims be stayed under Kelly. 

Case 3:10-cv-02274-MMA-JMA Document 15 Filed 08/12/11 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9 10-CV-2274

Petitioner must bear in mind, however, that he will be granted leave to amend his

federal Petition with the newly exhausted claims only if he demonstrates they are timely

or that they relate back to Claims 1 and 2. If he can not demonstrate the claims are

timely or relate back, he will be unable to litigate those claims in this Court. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s motion for

stay and abeyance be DENIED with respect to his request for a stay under Rhines, but

GRANTED with respect to his alternate request to withdraw his unexhausted claims and

stay the remaining claims under Kelly, and that Claims 1 and 2 be held in abeyance to

afford Petitioner an opportunity to exhaust his state judicial remedies with regard to his

unexhausted claims.

This report and recommendation will be submitted to the Honorable Michael M.

Anello, United States District Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). 

Any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before August 31, 2011. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and

Recommendation.” Any reply to the Objections shall be served and filed on or before

September 7, 2011. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 12, 2011

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

Case 3:10-cv-02274-MMA-JMA Document 15 Filed 08/12/11 Page 9 of 9