Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-04959/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-04959-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

RIANA BUFFIN, ET AL., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, ET 

AL., 

Defendants. 

CASE NO. 15-cv-04959-YGR 

ORDER GRANTING PARTIES’ STIPULATED 

REQUEST TO ENTER FEES AGAINST STATE 

OF CALIFORNIA

Re: Dkt. No. 382 

The Court assumes familiarity with the lengthy procedural history of this action. On 

November 22, 2019 (Dkt. No. 382), plaintiffs and defendant the San Francisco Sheriff (“Sheriff”) 

filed a joint Notice of Agreement as to an award to plaintiffs of attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. section 1988, based upon the parties’ agreement that plaintiffs are prevailing parties 

in this litigation. They seek Court approval of their agreement given that the case granted 

injunctive relief to a certified class. The parties stipulated to an award of $1,950,000.00 

encompassing attorneys’ fees and costs, a significant reduction from the lodestar they represent 

plaintiffs accrued in the course of the litigation. The only remaining issue for the Court to decide 

is whether the award of attorneys’ fees should be paid by the State of California. The parties 

contend that, because the Sheriff enforced the Bail Schedule in accordance with state law the 

Sheriff was a state actor and the State is responsible for the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in 

the litigation. 

The Court issued an order on December 3, 2019, inviting the State to submit a brief on its 

position as to the propriety of an order directing the State to pay the attorneys’ fees and permitting 

the parties to respond. (Dkt. No. 383.) Having considered the State’s position statement and the 

responses of the parties, and for the reasons stated herein, the Court ORDERS that the State is 

Case 4:15-cv-04959-YGR Document 393 Filed 03/23/20 Page 1 of 4
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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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required to pay reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to plaintiffs in the amount of $1,950,000.00 

pursuant to section 1988. 

The United States Supreme Court in Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), held that an 

award under section 1988 may be directed against the State even though the State or one of its 

departments was not named as a party when a plaintiff’s suit is “for all practical purposes, 

(brought) against the State itself.” 437 U.S. at 700. While the Eleventh Amendment may bar an 

action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 directly against a state, it does not bar an attorneys’ fee award 

against a state under section 1988 when the defendant’s actions were as an agent of the state. Id. 

Subsequent to Hutto, the Supreme Court has confirmed that Eleventh Amendment 

immunity does not apply to an award of attorneys’ fees ancillary to a grant of prospective relief. 

Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei, 491 U.S. 274, 280 (1989). While liability against a government 

official in their personal capacity or legislative capacity will not permit an award of attorneys’ fees 

to run against the state, where state actors are sued in their official capacity, an award of fees may 

run against the state. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 170–71 (1985) (no state liability for 

fees where official sued in personal capacity is “fully consistent with Hutto”); Supreme Court of 

Virginia v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 736–38 (1980) (“enforcement 

authorities against whom § 1983 judgments have been entered would ordinarily be charged with 

attorney’s fees” but not officials who are immune because they are acting in in their legislative 

capacity). 

Relying on Hutto, the Ninth Circuit has affirmed a district court’s authority to add state 

officials as parties post-judgment in order to compel a state to pay attorneys’ fees to a prevailing 

party under section 1988. Spain v. Mountanos, 690 F.2d 742, 743-45, 746 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Similarly, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have held that a fee award properly may be entered 

against the state alone when both state and county enforcement officials are sued for their actions 

enforcing a challenged state law. Herbst v. Ryan, 90 F.3d 1300, 1302, 1306 (7th Cir. 1996) 

(affirming district court order directing payment by State of Illinois of attorneys’ fees incurred in 

litigation naming two state officials and 102 county district attorneys as defendants); Echols v. 

Parker, 909 F.2d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 1990) (affirming order directing State of Mississippi to pay 

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United States District Court 

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attorney fee award though state was not a party where action of local officials “much like that of a 

county sheriff in enforcing a state law, may more fairly be characterized as the effectuation of the 

policy of the State ... embodied in that statute, for which the citizens of a particular county should 

not bear singular responsibility,” quoting Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391, 404 (5th Cir. 

1980)). 

Early in this litigation, the Court determined the State and the Attorney General must be 

dismissed because they were not proper parties under the Supreme Court’s authority in Ex Parte 

Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). (See Order at Docket No. 55.) As stated in Ex Parte Young, the 

Eleventh Amendment prohibits a civil rights plaintiff from suing the state or its agencies directly 

when seeking to enjoin enforcement of a challenged law, but instead requires such plaintiffs to 

name the officials responsible for enforcement of the challenged law as defendants. See id. at 157 

(in order to qualify for exception from Eleventh Amendment immunity, suit must be against 

official who has “some connection with the enforcement of the act”); Ass'n des Eleveurs de 

Canards et d'Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 943 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Plaintiffs are plainly 

barred by the Eleventh Amendment from suing the State of California in federal court” but not 

from suing Attorney General who directly supervises every district attorney charged enforcement 

of the challenged state law). In its rulings, the Court concluded that the official who acted on 

behalf of the State in enforcing the challenged bail schedule—and thus the proper defendant under 

Ex parte Young—was the Sheriff. (See Dkt. No. 99.) At the same time, the Court dismissed the 

City and County of San Francisco because “[t]he State is the relevant actor when the Sheriff 

detains a person who does not pay bail,” the bail schedule being a product of state law, not an 

alleged “municipal policy or practice for which the County may be held liable.” (id. at 15; see also 

id. at 14 [“The Sheriff is not acting on behalf of the County.”].) In other words, the Court found 

that the Sheriff acts on behalf of the State when enforcing the Superior Court’s bail schedule by 

detaining those who are unable to pay the applicable amount. (Id. at 15.) Thus, the enforcement 

actions challenged here were undertaken by the Sheriff as an agent of the State.1

 

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 On November 23, 2016, the Court granted the Attorney General leave to intervene. The 

Attorney General declined to do so. (Dkt. No. 109.) 

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United States District Court 

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Under Hutto and its progeny, the State of California is liable for the reasonable attorneys’ 

fees incurred by the prevailing parties here in their action against the Sheriff sued for enforcement 

of the State policy embodied in the bail schedule. The State’s response offers no authority or 

analysis to undermine this conclusion. That the State could not be liable on the merits due to 

Eleventh Amendment immunity and Ex Parte Young, and was dismissed by this Court for that 

reason, is of no moment. 

The State’s response raised no objection to the stipulated amount of attorneys’ fees and 

costs agreed upon by plaintiffs and the Sheriff. Therefore, based upon the stipulation of the 

parties, good cause appearing, and in accordance with 42 U.S.C. section 1988, the Court ORDERS

the State of California to pay plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and costs in the total amount of 

$1,950,000.00. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 23, 2020 

 YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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