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Nature of Suit Code: 371
Nature of Suit: Truth in Lending
Cause of Action: 

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Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 24, 2008 Decided May 23, 2008

No. 07-7076

TALMADGE HANCOCK AND OVEDA HANCOCK,

APPELLANTS

v.

HOMEQ SERVICING CORPORATION, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 05cv00307)

Anthony F. Shelley, appointed by the court, argued the cause

and filed the briefs as amicus curiae in support of appellant.

William S. Bach, Talmadge Hancock, and Oveda Hancock

entered appearances. 

Rodney S. Caulkins and William L. Mitchell II argued the

cause for appellees. With them on the brief was Jennifer L.

Sarvadi. Charles E. Gustafson entered an appearance.

USCA Case #07-7076 Document #1117955 Filed: 05/23/2008 Page 1 of 5
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1

 For purposes of this opinion it is unnecessary to distinguish

the roles of the various defendants and we refer to them collectively

as “appellees.”

2

 The court will grant appellees’ motion to file an affidavit

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1653 in order to establish complete diversity

of citizenship and hold that the district court had diversity jurisdiction.

See Draim v. Virtual Geosatellite Holdings, Inc., 522 F.3d 452, 454

n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2008); GEICO v. Fetisoff, 958 F.2d 1137, 1140 (D.C.

Cir. 1992); District of Columbia, ex rel. Am. Combustion, Inc. v.

Transamerica Ins. Co., 797 F.2d 1041, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The

complaint alleges that appellees’ claimed interest in the mortgage loan

was $89,000, Compl. ¶ 72, and thus states an amount in controversy

over $75,000, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

Before: ROGERS and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM: The executors of Carolyn Hancock’s estate

appeal the grant of summary judgment on their complaint

alleging fraud and other illegal acts by appellees1 in connection

with a loan obtained by Carolyn Hancock in 1994. Because the

complaint is barred by the statute of limitations, D.C. Code

§§ 12-301(3), (8),2

 we affirm.

I.

In 1994, Carolyn Hancock borrowed $55,000 from

appellees, pledging as security her house in the District of

Columbia where she lived with her two adult children, the

executors of her estate and appellants here. At the time, she was

seventy-eight years old and retired from her job as a keypunch

operator. She had lived in the house since the 1970s and

managed all of its financial affairs. She continued to make the

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3

 The complaint alleged violations of the D.C. Consumer

Protection Procedures Act, D.C. Code §§ 28-3901 et seq., D.C. Usury

Law, id. §§ 28-3301 et seq., D.C. Money Transmitters Act, id. §§ 26-

1001 et seq., and conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and common

law fraud, as well as related conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and

derivative claims.

monthly payment of $555 on the loan until her death in 1997.

Appellants, who knew few details about the loan, continued

making the monthly payments until 1999 and thereafter filed for

bankruptcy on several occasions in an apparent attempt to stave

off foreclosure on the house. 

In January 1999, appellants obtained copies of loan

documents from the D.C. Recorder of Deeds, including the Deed

of Trust, which indicated that it had been executed by Carolyn

Hancock on October 7, 1994 in Baltimore County, Maryland.

Three years later, in January 2003, appellants found a file that

contained documents indicating that Carolyn Hancock’s

signature and the location of the execution of the Deed of Trust

had been forged. Appellants consulted an attorney and filed suit

against appellees on January 6, 2005. The complaint alleged

various unlawful acts, including that the loan documents

fraudulently indicated that the loan agreement was executed in

Baltimore County, Maryland.3

 The district court granted

appellees’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that the

three-year statute of limitations had begun to run by January

1999. 

II.

The parties agree that the three-year statute of limitations

under D.C. Code §§ 12-301(3), (8), applies, but disagree when

the limitations period commenced. Under the discovery rule in

the District of Columbia, a statute of limitations begins to run

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4

 Our review of the grant of summary judgment is de

novo. See Ikossi v. Dep’t of Navy, 516 F.3d 1037, 1040 (D.C.

Cir. 2008).

from the time the injured party “knows, or with the exercise of

reasonable diligence would have known, of some injury, its

cause-in-fact, and some evidence of wrongdoing.” Diamond v.

Davis, 680 A.2d. 364, 381 (D.C. 1996). Appellants, through

amicus curiae, assert two errors by the district court; neither is

well taken.4

First, relying on Goldman v. Bequai, 19 F.3d 666, 669 (D.C.

Cir. 1994), appellants contend that the district court should have

taken into account the special circumstances of Carolyn

Hancock and appellants, specifically that she was elderly and

unsophisticated in financial matters, and that they lacked

knowledge about the loan transaction at the time of its

consummation. However, consistent with the reasonable person

standard of the D.C. discovery rule, see Hendel v. World Plan

Executive Council, 705 A.2d 656, 661 n.5 (D.C. 1997), the

district court adequately considered these circumstances. The

district court noted Carolyn Hancock’s age, her retirement

status, and the nature of her prior employment, and none of its

findings suggest that Carolyn Hancock was financially

sophisticated. Further, the district court’s findings do not

suggest that appellants were aware of the loan transaction in

1994. 

Second, appellants contend that summary judgment on the

statute of limitations was improper because material facts are in

dispute as to when they had evidence of appellees’ wrongdoing.

Even assuming there was a material issue regarding what loan

documents Carolyn Hancock saw in 1994, no disputed facts

exist with respect to whether appellants were on inquiry notice

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after they obtained loan documents from the D.C. Recorder of

Deeds in January 1999. The difficulty for appellants arises from

their theory of the case. According to the complaint, Carolyn

Hancock never learned to drive and did not have a driver’s

license. Compl. ¶ 18. In 1994, she stayed at home most days

unless appellants took her out and “never left the home unless

accompanied by one of them.” Id. ¶ 19. Further, appellants

“had an implicit understanding [with their mother that she]

would not leave the home for an extended period of time

without telling them, and certainly would not have traveled over

30 miles to borrow $55,000 without letting them know her

whereabouts.” Id. (emphasis added). Having alleged that

Carolyn Hancock would “certainly” not have traveled to

Baltimore to secure such a loan without alerting them, an

allegation that has not been retracted, appellants cannot avoid

the conclusion that loan documents reporting such an event are

evidence of wrongdoing.

Consequently, upon obtaining a copy of the Deed of Trust

in January 1999 that stated Carolyn Hancock had executed the

deed in Baltimore County, Maryland, appellants had “reason to

suspect that the [appellees] did something wrong, even if the full

extent of the wrongdoing [was] not yet known,” Wagner v.

Sellinger, 847 A.2d 1151, 1154 (D.C. 2004). Indeed, the record

indicates that appellants at that time had such suspicions and

were concerned about the propriety of the loan. Although

appellants did not discover physical evidence of forgery until

January 2003, the evidence and suspicion they had in 1999

indicates that they were not reasonably diligent in investigating

and legally challenging the loan. See Diamond, 680 A.2d at

377.

Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment.

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