Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01276/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01276-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALAN WILLIAM STOUT,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-02-1276 FCD JFM P

vs.

A.K. SCRIBNER, Warden,

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 1997 conviction on two

counts of battery with serious bodily injury (Penal Code § 243, subd. (d) - counts one and three),

assault with a deadly weapon or force likely to produce great bodily injury (Penal Code § 245,

subd. (a)(1) - count two), first degree residential burglary (Penal Code § 459 - count four), and

two counts of intimidating a witness by force or threat (Penal Code § 136.1, subd. (c)(1) - counts

five and six). In bifurcated proceedings, the jury also found true allegations that petitioner had

served a prior prison term (Penal Code § 667.5, subd. (b)), and had four prior convictions of

serious or violent felonies under the Three Strikes law (Penal Code § 1170.12). Petitioner claims

that his constitutional rights were violated by ineffective assistance of counsel, failure to

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1

 This action is proceeding on the amended petition filed February 20, 2003.

2

 In his traverse, petitioner raised two new claims, alleging that the trial court erred in its

jury instruction as to what constituted burglary, and the trial court erred in allowing the jury to

use petitioner’s DMV packet as a means of identifying petitioner in adjudicating petitioner’s

prior convictions. (Traverse at vi, 47.) A traverse is not the proper pleading to raise additional

grounds for relief. See Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507-08 (9th Cir.1995). In

general, claims not raised in the petition are not cognizable on appeal. See United States v.

Allen, 157 F.3d 661, 667 (9th Cir.1998) (citing Cacoperdo, 37 F.3d at 507). Thus, this court has

not reviewed these claims. 

3

 The facts are taken from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal for the Third

Appellate District in People v. Stout, No. C031626 (July 26, 2000), a copy of which is attached

as Exhibit A to Respondent’s Answer, filed January 13, 2004.

2

adequately instruct the jury, an erroneous definition of reasonable doubt, imposing a sentence

under the Three Strikes Law where his prior convictions occurred prior to enactment of the Three

Strikes Law, application of the Three Strikes Law violated ex post facto laws, a violation of

petitioner’s previous plea agreements, an erroneous jury admonition, and the dismissal of

petitioner’s Shasta County habeas corpus petition.1 On November 18, 2004, petitioner filed a

traverse.2

FACTS3

The . . . charges against [petitioner] arose from separate

incidents on December 20, 1996, and January 10, 1997. His strikes

resulted from 1991 convictions in Contra Costa County.

A. Count One - December 20, 1996:

The victim, Timothy Woodruff, lived in the small

community of Round Mountain. He had known [petitioner] for

several years. The men had no problems with each other, although

[petitioner] “did a minor assault” on Woodruff some years before. 

Woodruff suffered from a seizure disorder which prevented him

from driving, and seriously affected his memory.

Woodruff testified that on the morning of December 20,

1996, Andy Tomas drove him to Mario Ramirez’s place in

Woodruff’s truck so he could deliver a phone message to Lupe, a

man who lived on the property. Woodruff spoke with Lupe, then

walked back to the passenger side of the truck. When [petitioner]

approached from the driver’s side, Woodruff walked around the

front, saying, “Hi, Al.” He denied provoking or touching

[petitioner]. [Petitioner] called Woodruff a “mother f’r,” and

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began hitting him with his fists. Woodruff put up his arms in

defense, but sustained blows to the arms and face. He tried to run

to the passenger door of the truck, but [petitioner] caught him and

continued the assault. Woodruff fell down, and recalls being

dragged into the truck. On cross-examination, Woodruff

acknowledged he might have had a couple of beers that morning,

but stated he was not drunk. 

Tomas testified that he and [petitioner] were not getting

along at the time of this incident. He drove Woodruff to Ramirez’s

on the afternoon of December 20, not in the morning. Tomas said

Woodruff spoke to Ramirez, not Lupe. At that point, [petitioner]

came out of the house, and yelled something about a truck. 

Without provocation, he started punching Woodruff in the head

and body with his fists. Woodruff raised his arms to protect

himself. [Petitioner] hit Woodruff at least six times, and a few

more times after he was on the ground. According to Tomas,

[petitioner] picked up a splitting maul, and threatened to throw it at

him through the truck window. He said something about Tomas

having called the police on him. Ramirez intervened, and

[petitioner] dropped the maul. When [petitioner] approached

Woodruff a second time, Pam Preece came out of the house. She

picked up the maul to hit [petitioner]. When he turned on her, she

dropped the maul and ran into the house. [Petitioner] then hit

Woodruff a few more times while he was on the ground.

Ramirez gave a different version of the events. [Petitioner]

was leaving Ramirez’s place when Tomas and Woodruff drove up. 

While [petitioner] was talking with Tomas, Woodruff got out of

the truck, approached [petitioner], and pushed him back twice with

his chest. The second time, it looked like Woodruff was going to

fight [petitioner]. [Petitioner] hit Woodruff once in the jaw and

once in the body. Woodruff, who was drunk, fell to the ground.

Tomas drove Woodruff to Hill Country Clinic, then to

Mercy Medical Center. Woodruff suffered fractures of the arm,

wrist, elbow, and two fingers, two black eyes, and three facial

fractures.

The clinic nurse reported the incident to sheriff’s dispatch

around 4:30 p.m. Shasta County Deputy Marian Moore spoke with

Woodruff a little after 5:00 p.m. He had been drinking, and there

was a strong odor of alcohol in the room and on his breath. Clinic

records indicated Woodruff had been drinking all day. Deputy

Moore recalled that Woodruff had reported problems with

[petitioner] on at least two other occasions. Woodruff told her he

had called her department the day before to report he might be in

danger from [petitioner]. He explained he had gone to collect a

debt from Ramirez. [Petitioner] approached Woodruff saying,

“You fucked up my truck,” and began punching and kicking him.

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B. Counts Two Through Six - January 10, 1997:

The victims, Michael Allen and his 10-year-old son Bobby,

were staying with Ron Olson in Round Mountain. Allen had

known [petitioner] for 15 to 20 years, and they had their “ups and

downs.” However, Allen had not seen [petitioner] in over a month. 

Because [petitioner] had attacked some of Allen’s friends and

acquaintances, he thought the same thing might happen to him. 

Allen and Bobby were asleep on couches in the front room,

when Allen heard the back door open in the middle of the night. 

He started to look, but received two blows to the head. 

Allen jumped to his feet, and saw [petitioner] with a steel bar. The

two men struggled while Allen grabbed for the bar. When Allen

yelled for Olson, Bobby woke up and tried to pull [petitioner] off

his father. While Allen was searching for Bobby’s baseball bat,

[petitioner] hit him again with the bar, splitting the back of his

head.

The fight stopped when Allen got hold of the weapon. 

Olson started into the room, but [petitioner] told him to stay where

he was. Figuring the three of them could handle [petitioner], Allen

let him reclaim the steel bar. [Petitioner] put it in his pocket, and

backed toward the front door. He said he attacked Allen because

Allen turned him in for beating up 62-year-old Dace Durby. 

[Petitioner] also claimed Allen was messing with his wife. He

called Allen a “low life,” and spit on him. [Petitioner] warned all

three that if they said anything, or turned him in, he would come

back and kill them. Bobby’s testimony was consistent with his

father’s. 

Allen was treated at Redding Medical Center. He suffered

a fractured bone in his forearm, and lacerations of the face and

back of the head.

Allen explained the Durby incident at trial. In late

November 1996, Allen rode with [petitioner] to Ramirez’s. At

some point, [petitioner] started driving erratically toward Durby’s

place, saying he was going to shoot and stab the old man. Allen

knew there were problems between the two. When the car broke

down, [petitioner] got out and started up Durby’s road on foot. 

Allen was able to restart the car, and drive to a friend’s house. The

friend’s wife called the police. Allen was afraid for Durby because

he had “seen how Al gets radical with people before.” Luckily,

Durby was not home, and nothing happened to him that day.

C. Prior Convictions:

In the 1991 case, [petitioner] pleaded no contest to two

counts of assault with a firearm on a peace officer (§ 245, subd.

(d)(1)), one count of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd.

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(a)(2)), and one count of discharging a firearm in a grossly

negligent manner (§ 246.3). He admitted the personal use of a

firearm with respect to each count. (§ 12022.5.) The assaults

involved three separate victims, two of whom were police officers. 

(People v. Stout, slip op. at 2-6 (hereafter “Opinion.”)

ANALYSIS

I. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at different

result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406

(2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 

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123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”)

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court

reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is

available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

II. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Ineffective assistance of counsel

Petitioner claims he was subject to ineffective assistance of counsel because trial

counsel failed to:

1. object to the admission of evidence to show motive;

2. request to exclude or move to strike; 

3. move for a mistrial when the jury was exposed to the volunteered bad

conduct/character evidence regarding petitioner.

4. request instructions limiting the evidentiary effect of petitioner’s prior bad

conduct.

5. object to the prosecution’s closing argument concerning the Woodruff battery.

6. pursue a substantial defense with respect to the witness intimidation counts

when counsel “ignored a strong argument for reasonable doubt based on an evidentiary conflict,

in favor of an unsupported legal argument that essentially [conceded] guilt.” (Pet.’s P&A at 12.) 

The court will address these claims seriatim.

In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner must

show two things, an unreasonable error and prejudice flowing from that error. First petitioner

must show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s performance fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984). The court must

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determine whether in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside

the wide range of professional competent assistance. Id. at 690. “Review of counsel’s

performance is highly deferential and there is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell

within the wide range of reasonable representation.” United States v. Ferreira-Alameda, 815

F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1986).

Second, petitioner must prove prejudice. Strickland at 693. To demonstrate

prejudice, petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A

reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.

The focus of the prejudice analysis is on “whether counsel’s deficient performance renders the

result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506

U.S. 364, 372 (1993).

1. Admission of evidence to show motive

The trial court held an in limine hearing prior to trial where the prosecutor

explained facts of petitioner’s prior conduct, offered to explain petitioner had a motive for

attacking Michael Allen. (RT 7-8.) Defense counsel objected, stating he felt these facts were

being offered under a theory of bootstrapping and asked if the complaints were so serious why

were charges not filed. (RT 9-10.) Defense further objected that the admission of this negative

information would deprive his client of a fair trial. (RT 10.) After a brief discussion, the trial

court ruled that the testimony was relevant on motivation. (RT 19.) Defense counsel agreed

with the trial court’s analysis (RT 10) and, after the court ruled on the admission of this evidence,

conceded the facts were relevant. (RT 19.) 

Petitioner complains that trial counsel’s concession as to relevance rendered his

representation ineffective and also assails trial counsel’s prejudice argument. However, the

record reflects that trial counsel objected to the admission of the evidence and his objection was

overruled. The state appellate court appropriately applied the Strickland standard set forth above,

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finding petitioner had not demonstrated prejudice by the admission of testimony about the events

that prompted Allen to call the police. (Opinion at 10.) “The uncontradicted evidence shows

[petitioner] entered Ron Olson’s house uninvited in the middle of the night, and began hitting

Allen with a steel bar while he was sleeping. Hence, it is not reasonably probable the result

would have been different had defense counsel persuaded the court to exclude the evidence in

question.” (Opinion at 11.) Based on this record, the court cannot find that the state court’s

ruling was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority.

2. Failure to exclude or move to strike 

Petitioner contends, in conclusory fashion, that he “reviewed the testimony of half

the trial witnesses, citing many additional items that should have been excluded before hand or

stricken afterwards.” (Pet.’s P&A at 11.) Petitioner provides no factual or legal support, and

does not set forth which witness’ testimony he finds objectionable, and fails to show how the

witness’ testimony affected his trial. His conclusory allegations do not warrant relief. See Jones

v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir.

1994) (“It is well-settled that ‘[c]onclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of

specific facts do not warrant habeas relief’”)).

However, petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal where he contended trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to exclude or moving to strike certain bad conduct/character

evidence which witnesses unexpectedly volunteered. The state appellate court found petitioner

had failed to demonstrate Strickland prejudice: 

it is not reasonably probable the jury would have reached a

different result if defense counsel had been successful in striking

the challenged testimony. (Citation omitted.) The evidence

against [petitioner] was overwhelming on all counts. He brutally

attacked Woodruff with his fists and feet, leaving the victim with

fractures of the arm, wrist, elbow, fingers, and face. [Petitioner]

entered Ron Olson’s home uninvited, beat Allen bloody with a

steel bar, and threatened Allen and his son with death if they

reported what had happened.

(Opinion at 14-15.) The state court appropriately applied Supreme Court precedent and did not

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render an opinion that was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court

authority. This claim should also be denied. 

3. Failure to move for a mistrial 

Petitioner further contends, again in conclusory fashion, that he suffered

ineffective assistance of trial counsel when trial counsel failed to move for a mistrial due to the

extent of prejudicial evidence. (Pet.’s P&A at 11.) Petitioner does not identify the evidence he

deems to be prejudicial. Petitioner’s claim is vague and conclusory and should be denied on that

basis. See Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d at 204. Even considered on the merits, petitioner is not

entitled to relief, as he has failed to demonstrate that a motion for mistrial would have been

granted, thus failing the prejudice prong of Strickland. Indeed, the state appellate court found it

was “not reasonably likely that the court would have granted a motion for mistrial, given the

overwhelming evidence of [petitioner’s] guilt.” (Opinion at 16.)

4. Failure to request limiting instruction

Petitioner alleges trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request instructions to

limit the evidentiary effect of petitioner’s prior bad conduct. (Pet.’s P&A at 11, 13.) The

California Court of Appeal denied this claim as follows:

[Petitioner] acknowledges that, in general, the court has no duty to

instruct sua sponte that evidence of prior offenses is admitted for a

limited purpose. [Citations omitted.] He argues that defense

counsel should have requested instructions to limit the jury’s

consideration of the evidence of his prior conduct toward Dace

Durby. Because CALJIC No. 2.50 was “not literally applicable,”

[petitioner] suggests counsel “could have drawn on the principles

and language expressed in CALJIC Nos. 2.90 and 2.50, as well as

Evidence Code section 1101" to formulate a special instruction. 

[Footnote omitted.]

Similar arguments were rejected in People v. Hawkins (1995) 10

Cal.4th 920, 942, disapproved on other grounds in People v.

Blakely (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 89; and People v. Bonilla (1985) 168

Cal.App.3d 201, 206, the courts deferring to defense counsel’s

likely tactical decision to avoid emphasizing the other offenses. 

[Citation omitted.] [Petitioner] attempts to distinguish the present

case by arguing “there could have been no reasonable tactic of deemphasis, where the evidence at issue had been admitted

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throughout the trial; its repetition assured emphasis.” That

[petitioner] might have taken a different approach with the wisdom

of hindsight does not detract from our obligation to apply

deferential scrutiny in the circumstances of this case. We therefore

conclude [petitioner] failed to establish defense counsel provided

ineffective assistance in not requesting a limiting instruction.

(Opinion at 16-18.) Such an application of Strickland was not contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court authority. Moreover, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that had

trial counsel sought such a limiting instruction that his request would have been granted or that

the outcome of the case would have changed. In light of the overwhelming evidence noted

above, it is unlikely the outcome would have changed. Thus, petitioner also fails the prejudice

prong of Strickland. 

5. Prosecution’s closing argument

Petitioner contends his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to

the prosecution’s closing argument concerning the Woodruff battery. Petitioner argues that the

prosecutor improperly disputed petitioner’s self-defense theory by contrasting Woodruff and

petitioner on an “aggressive personality scale.” (Pet.’s P&A at 12.) 

The record reflects the prosecutor argued as follows:

You saw him [Woodruff] on the stand, and your

observations of him over and above what he actually said is there

for you to analyze and use in your determination of analysis of his

testimony.

You saw his mannerisms, his actual apologetic nature. I

mean he apologized about everything. My memory is not good. I

have got this injury to my head. That is his personality. And part

of his personality is probably from drinking. But you put all of that

in the mix, and then try and tell me that he’s the aggressor against

somebody like Al Stout. Doesn’t make sense.

His personality is just not that of an aggressor. You want to

talk about aggressors, I’ll leave it all . . . to the aside for a moment.

(RT 238-39.)

/////

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The state appellate court rejected this claim:

We cannot say the prosecutor’s argument was objectionable

on any ground. The comments regarding Woodruff’s nonaggressive personality were permissible inferences from the record. 

Moreover, the argument was justified in light of Ramirez’s

testimony a drunken Woodruff incited the assault by pushing

[petitioner]. Because no objection was warranted, we conclude

defense counsel was not ineffective.

(Opinion at 18-19.) 

An attorney's failure to make a meritless objection or motion does not constitute

ineffective assistance of counsel. Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1239 n.8 (9th Cir.2000) (citing

Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir.1985)). See also Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434,

1445 (9th Cir.1996) ("the failure to take a futile action can never be deficient performance"). 

Because the prosecutor’s comments were permissible, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing

to object. Thus, the state court’s opinion on this claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court authority. 

6. Failure to pursue a substantial defense

Petitioner alleges trial counsel failed to pursue a substantial defense with respect

to the witness intimidation counts when counsel “ignored a strong argument for reasonable doubt

based on an evidentiary conflict, in favor of an unsupported legal argument that essentially

[conceded] guilt.” (Pet.’s P&A at 12.)

The state court addressed petitioner’s claim as follows:

As we explained, counts five and six charged [petitioner]

with intimidating Michael and Bobby Allen by force or threat in

violation of section 136.1, subdivision (c)(1). [Petitioner] contends

defense counsel’s closing argument on those counts ignored a

substantial defense theory, and effectively conceded guilt, thereby

denying [petitioner] effective assistance of counsel.

Specifically, [petitioner] explains his analysis of the

evidence: “Michael Allen testified to the commission of the

offense charged in counts 5 and 6. But he claimed the threat was

addressed to Bobby and Olson, as well as himself. Olson,

however, heard no threat at all. Bobby recalled receiving a single

threat, but it did not include a warning about reporting the incident. 

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He heard [petitioner] say some words to Michael and to Olson, but

did not recall any threats to them, nor anything addressed to all

three. Interviewed by a defense investigator four months after the

incident, seven months before trial, Bobby did not recall any words

spoken during the incident.” [Petitioner] then argues defense

counsel was ineffective because he missed the opportunity to argue

to the jury that [petitioner] failed to communicate his threat to

Bobby. In addition, [petitioner] notes that by arguing the threat

was “an incidental comment that the [petitioner] is making as he

leaves the area,” defense counsel effectively conceded

[petitioner’s] guilt on both count five and count six. Because the

evidence of a qualifying threat was in conflict, [petitioner] argues it

is reasonably probable that had counsel argued the issues

competently, the jury would not have found him guilty of

intimidation in either count.

We again reject [petitioner’s] attempt to second-guess

defense counsel, and on this silent record defer to counsel’s

assessment of the best approach at the close of trial. [Citation

omitted.] Michael Allen’s account of the assault was clear and

detailed. Eleven-year-old Bobby was emotional when describing

[petitioner’s] threats. Defense counsel could have reasonably

concluded a jury would attribute any inconsistent testimony to

Bobby’s age and emotional state at the time of the assault and at

trial. In these circumstances, it would have been reasonable for

defense counsel to avoid as useless any attempt to emphasize

technical flaws in Bobby’s testimony. That there was little else on

which to base a defense does not mean defense counsel was

ineffective. 

We therefore reject [petitioner’s] claim the result would

have been different had defense counsel delivered a better closing

argument. The claim is based on the questionable premise there

were substantial and unreconcilable conflicts in the evidence

[petitioner] threatened both Michael and Bobby Allen. We

conclude [petitioner] failed to sustain the burden of showing

prejudice as a “‘demonstrable reality.’” (People v. Williams,

supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 937.)

(Opinion at 19-20.) 

At trial, when asked whether petitioner said anything after the fight was over,

Michael Allen testified that petitioner “said that if we said anything, he’d come back and kill us

all.” (RT 82.) Bobby Allen testified that petitioner said “If you don’t stop, I’ll kill you too.” 

(RT 66.) Bobby Allen was visibly upset when describing petitioner’s threat. (RT 65-66.) 

/////

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Ronald Olson, who entered the room after Allen had been injured, testified that petitioner made

no threats to Olson. (RT 153.)

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that had trial counsel honed in on the variance

in testimony between Michael Allen and Bobby Allen that the outcome on these counts would

have been different. The jury could choose to believe Michael Allen’s account of the events. 

After watching Bobby Allen’s emotional testimony, the jury might not be receptive to defense

counsel’s attempt to discredit Bobby Allen’s statement. 

Trial counsel’s failure to highlight this technical difference in testimony did not

fall outside the bounds of reasonably competent professional assistance, nor has petitioner shown

any prejudice therefrom. Thus, this claim should also be denied.

B. Failure to adequately instruct the jury

Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated by the trial court’s

failure to adequately instruct the jury with CALJIC No. 9.12 (Felony Battery) to cross-reference

No. 5.30 (Self-Defense Against Assault) and to apply the proper standard of review. (Pet.’s P&A

at 14.) Petitioner argues that the failure to explain self-defense was not harmless because there

was evidence to support a self-defense theory. (Id. at 15.)

The trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 9.12, but not CALJIC No.

5.30. (RT 278-79; CT 117.) CALJIC No. 9.12 sets forth the elements for the crime of battery

with serious bodily injury and states in pertinent part: 

The application of physical force applied to a person of another is

not unlawful when done in lawful self-defense. The burden is on

the People to prove that the application of force was not in lawful

self-defense.

(RT 279; CT 117.) CALJIC No. 5.30 provides:

It is lawful for a person who is being assaulted to defend himself

from attack if, as a reasonable person, he has grounds for believing

and does believe that bodily injury is about to be inflicted upon

him. In doing so, that person may use all force and means which

he believes to be reasonably necessary and which would appear to

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a reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances, to be

necessary to prevent the injury which appears to be imminent.

(Id.)

The California Court of Appeal found the instructional omission harmless. 

(Answer, Ex. A, at 22-26.) 

The omitted instruction would have informed the jury that

[petitioner] was justified in using “all force and means which [he]

believes to be reasonably necessary and which would appear to a

reasonable person, in the same or similar circumstances, to be

necessary. . . .” The record shows Woodruff suffered serious

injuries as a result of his encounter with [petitioner]. Woodruff’s

physical injuries were consistent with the testimony of Woodruff

and Tomas. Those injuries were inconsistent with Ramirez’s

testimony [petitioner] hit Woodruff only twice after being pushed,

and thus cast doubt on Ramirez’s assertion Woodruff instigated the

conflict. There is strong evidence [petitioner] used excessive and

unreasonable force under the circumstances, regardless of whether

he was in fact provoked by Woodruff’s actions. Thus, it is not

reasonably probable the jury would have accepted [petitioner’s]

self-defense claim, even if they had been instructed in accordance

with CALJIC No. 5.30.

(Opinion at 24.) The state appellate court went on to review the instructional error under

Chapman to determine whether the error had violated petitioner’s constitutional rights. Chapman

v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1966). The state court again found the error to be harmless:

[Petitioner] acknowledges the failure to instruct on CALJIC

No. 5.30 “affects only an ‘aspect of an element’ – here, the

unlawfulness element – as opposed to entirely removing the

element from the jury’s consideration.” “An instruction that omits

a required definition of or misdescribes an element of an offense is

harmless only if ‘it appears “beyond a reasonable doubt that the

error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”’ 

(People v. Harris (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407, 424 . . . , quoting

[Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.]) ‘To say that an error did not

contribute to the verdict is . . . to find that error unimportant in

relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in

question, as revealed in the record.’” (People v. Mayfield (1997)

14 Cal.4th 668, 774, quoting Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391,

403 [114 L.Ed.2d 432, 449] (Yates).) The appellate court must ask

“whether the force of the evidence presumably considered by the

jury in accordance with the instructions [as given] is so

overwhelming as to leave it beyond a reasonable doubt that the

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verdict resting on that evidence would have been the same in the

absence of the [instructional error].” (Yates, supra, 500 U.S. at pp.

403-405 [114 L.Ed.2d at pp. 448-449], disapproved on other

grounds in Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72, fn. 4 [115

L.Ed.2d 385, 399].) 

Here, the jury was instructed “[t]he application of physical

force applied to a person of another is not unlawful when done in

lawful self-defense”, that is, it could consider the question of selfdefense. The error in omitting the further explanation that lawful

self-defense involves “all force and means which [petitioner]

believes to be reasonably necessary and which would appear to a

reasonable person, in the same or similar circumstances, to be

necessary” to prevent imminent injury was “unimportant in relation

to everything else the jury considered” in finding [petitioner] guilty

in count one. (CALJIC No. 5.30 (6th ed. 1996); Yates, supra, 500

U.S. at p. 403 [114 L.Ed.2d at p. 449].) As explained, the jury

considered the evidence [petitioner] acted in self-defense as

described by Ramirez, the different version of the events described

by Woodruff and Tomas, and the serious injuries described by

Woodruff. Taken alone, the severity of the injuries belie any

possibility the jury would have found [petitioner] acted with

reasonable force – even under Ramirez’s version of the

circumstances leading to [petitioner’s] use of force.

(Opinion at 25-26.)

It is well established that a criminal defendant is entitled to adequate instructions

on the defense theory of the case. See Conde v. Henry, 198 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir.2000) (citing

Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705 1989). However, a state trial court's failure to give an

instruction does not alone raise a ground cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceedings. See

Dunckhurst v. Deeds, 859 F.2d 110, 114 (9th Cir.1988). The error must so infect the trial that

the defendant was deprived of the fair trial guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.

Whether a constitutional violation has occurred will depend upon the evidence in the case and

the overall instructions given to the jury. See Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 745 (9th

Cir.1995). After all, due process does not require that an instruction be given unless the evidence

supports it. See Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 (1982); Miller v. Stagner, 757 F.2d 988,

993 (9th Cir.), amended, 768 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986).

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An examination of the record is required to see what was given and what was

refused and whether the given instructions adequately embodied the defendant's theory. See

United States v. Tsinnijinnie, 601 F.2d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 966

(1980). 

Under California law, self-defense negates the mental state element of the crime

of assault, and the prosecution has the burden of disproving self-defense beyond a reasonable

doubt once substantial evidence exists that the defendant used self-defense. People v. Banks, 67

Cal.App.3d 379, 383-384, 137 Cal.Rptr. 652 (1976). Here, defense counsel did not request the

self-defense instruction (CALJIC 5.30). (RT 229-30.) However, the trial court accurately

instructed the jury that the use of force was not unlawful when done in lawful self-defense and

stated that the prosecution must prove that the application of force was not in lawful self-defense. 

(RT 279.) Defense counsel also argued that petitioner acted in self-defense in his closing

argument. (RT 254-55.) 

The state appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision and found that there

was strong evidence petitioner used excessive and unreasonable force under the circumstances,

regardless of whether petitioner was provoked by Woodruff’s actions. In addition, the state

appellate court found Woodruff’s physical injuries were inconsistent with Ramirez’s testimony

that petitioner hit Woodruff only twice after being pushed, casting doubt on Ramirez’s assertion

that Woodruff was the aggressor. Thus there was no substantial evidence to support a finding

that petitioner acted with a reasonable belief that it was necessary to use the force petitioner used

on Woodruff sufficient to justify the giving of a self-defense instruction. 

A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under state law does not state a

claim cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62,

71-72 (1991). Rather, this court must defer to the state court's interpretation of state law. Hicks

v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629 (1988). The appellate court would require substantial evidence that

Woodruff instigated the conflict in such a way as to require a forceful response to instruct the

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jury on self-defense, or, put another way, that Woodruff’s actions justified the responsive actions

of petitioner. From the record, it was not unreasonable for the trial court judge to find that

Woodruff’s injuries were consistent with the testimony of Woodruff and Tomas or that

Woodruff’s injuries were inconsistent with Ramirez’s testimony that petitioner hit Woodruff

only twice after being pushed. It was therefore not unreasonable for the trial court to find the

failure to give CALJIC 5.30 was harmless error. This court must defer to the appellate court's

interpretation of the state law. This claim should be denied.

To the extent that petitioner argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek

a self-defense jury instruction, petitioner’s claim also fails. Given the excessive force petitioner

used against Woodruff, it is unlikely the jury would have found petitioner acted in lawful selfdefense. Thus, petitioner could not demonstrate the prejudice prong under Strickland, supra.

C. Reasonable doubt

Petitioner alleges that the trial court’s reasonable doubt instruction (CALJIC 2.90)

violated his due process rights because it fails to “define the meaning of ‘abiding conviction of

proof beyond a reasonable doubt,’ and to distinguish this standard from that of ‘clear and

convincing evidence.’” (Petition at 6.) This claim was rejected without comment by the

California Court of Appeal. (Answer, Ex. D.)

The Ninth Circuit rejected the same argument in Lisenbee v. Henry, 166 F.3d 997,

999 (9th Cir. 1999). Because the court of appeal’s decision was not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of federal law, petitioner’s third claim should be denied.

D. Three Strikes Law 

In his fourth and fifth claims, petitioner contends that imposing a sentence under

the Three Strikes Law where his prior convictions occurred prior to enactment of the Three

Strikes Law violated his constitutional rights, and that application of the Three Strikes Law

violated Ex Post Facto laws.

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These claims involve essentially an interpretation of state sentencing law. “[I]t is

not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court determinations on state law

questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 67. Habeas corpus relief is unavailable for alleged

errors in the interpretation or application of state sentencing laws by either a state trial or

appellate court, unless the error resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice. Hill v. United

States, 368 U.S. at 428; Hendricks v. Zenon, 993 F.2d 664, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1993). So long as a

state sentence “is not based on any proscribed federal grounds such as being cruel and unusual,

racially or ethnically motivated, or enhanced by indigency, the penalties for violation of state

statutes are matters of state concern.” Makal v. State of Arizona, 544 F.2d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir.

1976). Thus, “[a]bsent a showing of fundamental unfairness, a state court’s misapplication of its

own sentencing laws does not justify federal habeas relief.” Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461,

469 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Applying these principles in federal habeas proceedings, the Ninth Circuit has

specifically refused to consider alleged errors in the application of state sentencing law. See,

e.g., Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1989). Thus, in Miller, the court refused to

examine the state court’s determination that a defendant’s prior conviction was for a “serious

felony” within the meaning of the state statutes governing sentence enhancements. Id. at 1118-

19. The court did not reach the merits of the petitioner’s claim, stating that federal habeas relief

is not available for alleged errors in interpreting and applying state law. Id. (quoting Middleton

v. Cupp, 768 F.2d at 1085).

Petitioner did not raise this claim on direct appeal, but raised it in his state petition

for writ of habeas corpus. The California Court of Appeal denied this claim without comment.

(Answer, Ex. E.) However, numerous courts in the state of California have determined that prior

felony convictions which predate the effective date of the Three Strikes Law are “strikes” within

the meaning of that law. See e.g., Sipe, 36 Cal. App. 4th at 477-479; People v. Moenius, 60 Cal.

App. 4th 820, 827 (1998); Gonzales v. Superior Court, Stanislaus County, 37 Cal. App. 4th 1302,

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1306-1311 (1995); People v. Diaz, 41 Cal. App. 4th 1424, 1428-29 (1996); People v. Green

(1995) 36 Cal. App. 4th 280, 283 (1995). Federal courts are “bound by a state court’s

construction of its own penal statutes.” Aponte v. Gomez, 993 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1993). 

This court must defer to California’s interpretation of the Three Strikes law unless its

interpretation is “untenable or amounts to a subterfuge to avoid federal review of a constitutional

violation.” Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989.) There is no evidence

of that here.

Moreover, to the extent that petitioner has stated a federal constitutional claim, he

is not entitled to relief. The application of a sentencing enhancement based upon a prior

conviction does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause as long as the statute was in effect before

the triggering offense was committed. See United States v. Sorenson, 914 F.2d 173, 174 (9th

Cir.1990); United States v. Ahumada-Avalos, 875 F.2d 681, 683-84 (9th Cir.1989). California’s

Three Strikes law took effect on March 7, 1994, before petitioner committed the principal

offense on December 20, 1996. Further, petitioner has failed to show that the state courts

committed an error resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice. See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S.

20, 27 (1992) (“we have repeatedly upheld recidivism statutes ‘against contentions that they

violate constitutional strictures dealing with double jeopardy, ex post facto laws, cruel and

unusual punishment, due process, equal protection, and privileges and immunities’”) (quoting

Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560 (1967); United States v. Kaluna, 192 F.3d 1188, 1199 (9th

Cir. 1999) (“The Supreme Court and this court uniformly have held that recidivist statutes do not

violate the Ex Post Facto Clause if they are “on the books at the time the [present] offense was

committed.”) (quoting Ahumada-Avalos, 875 F.2d at 683-84 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); Witte

v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 399 (1995) (recidivist statutes do not violate double jeopardy

because the enhanced punishment imposed for the later offense is not viewed as either a new

jeopardy or an additional penalty for the earlier crimes, but is instead a stiffened penalty for the

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latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because it is a repeat offense). 

Accordingly, for all of these reasons, petitioner’s fourth and fifth claims should be denied.

E. Petitioner’s Previous Plea Agreements

Petitioner contends that the state violated his plea agreements rendered in his prior

convictions because the use of his prior convictions to enhance his present sentence meant the

state retroactively increased the term to be imposed, which changed a factor of consideration to

petitioner’s detriment. 

It is well settled that when a guilty plea rests in any significant degree on the

promise or agreement of the prosecutor so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or

consideration for the plea, the promise must be fulfilled. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257

(1971). “Plea agreements are subject to contract-law standards of interpretation.” United States

v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1387 (9th Cir.1986). To determine whether a sentence complies with

the terms of a plea agreement, the court looks to what was reasonably understood by the

defendant when he entered his plea. Id.

However, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his prior plea agreement

contained a promise that his convictions could not be used to enhance a subsequent sentence. 

The record reflects that in his prior 1991 prosecution, petitioner admitted four counts and

received a mitigated sentence of four years. (CT 47-49.) Thus, the state court’s denial of this

claim was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Santobello, supra. Petitioner’s sixth

claim should also be denied. 

F. Erroneous Jury Admonition

Petitioner alleges that his “Sixth Amendment right to [a] fair and impartial jury

was violated by the trial court’s instruction to the jury that they had up to 5:00 maybe later, to

conclude deliberations.” (Pet.’s P&A at 29.) The state appellate court denied this claim without

comment. (Answer, Ex. E.) 

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Whether the comments and conduct of a state trial judge infringe a defendant's

due process right to an impartial jury and fair trial turns upon whether "the trial judge's inquiry

would be likely to coerce certain jurors into relinquishing their views in favor of reaching a

unanimous decision." Locks v. Sumner, 703 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir.1983). See also Jiminez v.

Myers, 40 F.3d 976, 979 -980 (9th Cir. 1993) (same). A reviewing court considers whether the

court's actions and statements were coercive in the totality of the circumstances. See Id. at

406-07 ("the inquiry by the judge must be viewed in light of the context in which it was made,

not in isolation") (citations omitted); United States v. Seawell, 550 F.2d 1159, 1163 (9th

Cir.1977) ("the general test of whether a supplemental jury instruction is in error is to consider all

the circumstances to determine if the instruction was coercive") (citation omitted); Marsh v.

Cupp, 536 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir.1976) (test for jury coercion is " 'whether in its context and

under all the circumstances of this case the statement was coercive' ") (quoting Jenkins v. United

States, 380 U.S. 445 (1965)).

A review of the record reveals that the trial judge did not coerce the jury into

reaching a verdict. On December 12, 1997, after petitioner was found guilty of all counts

charged, the trial court explained that prior conviction allegations were bifurcated for trial. (RT

300.) The court noted it was 4:00 p.m. on Friday, and gave the jury the opportunity to determine

whether it would consider the prior conviction allegations that afternoon or return on the

following Tuesday at 8:00 a.m. to do so. (RT 301.)

It’s 4:00 o’clock. It’s Friday. And I have discussed this with the

attorneys. We’re willing to do it your way. We’re willing to take a

brief recess now and try to finish that up this afternoon. Might take

us, all total, depending on how long you deliberate, up to 5:00

o’clock, or maybe later.

The other choice would be to come back on Tuesday morning,

early in the morning, at 8:00 o’clock, and do it at that time. The

[petitioner], as you can see is not here. I can’t ask him to waive his

right to a jury trial on this issue. It’s a problem you are going to

have to resolve. I can’t do it myself. So can I have a show of

hands as to how many would rather do it this afternoon? Okay. 

That seems to be a vast majority.

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(RT 301.) The jury began deliberations at 4:35 p.m. (CT 96.) The trial court was advised at

5:34 p.m. that afternoon that the jury had reached a verdict. (CT 96.) The jury found the special

allegations to be true. (RT 330.)

The trial judge’s comments were not coercive. The judge gave the jury a choice

as to whether to continue deliberations that day or to begin anew on Tuesday. In addition, the

judge estimated how long he thought it would take, but left open the possibility that the jury

might deliberate longer by stating “up to 5:00 o’clock, or maybe later.” (RT 301.) The jury

actually deliberated until 5:34 p.m. (CT 96.) Moreover, it was not unreasonable for the

deliberation on these special allegations to last an hour, because the prosecution was brief in

establishing petitioner’s priors and defense counsel presented no evidence or argument to the

contrary. (RT 305-18.) 

Thus, the state court’s denial of petitioner’s seventh claim was not an

unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court authority.

G. Dismissal of petitioner’s Shasta County Habeas Corpus Petition

Finally, petitioner contends that the Shasta County Superior Court’s dismissal of

his petition for writ of habeas corpus violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

(Pet.’s P&A at 31.) The Shasta County Superior Court denied petitioner’s habeas petition on

July 19, 2001:

[P]etitioner now presents a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

which the court has reviewed. In this extensive petition there are

seven particularized bases for relief, each of which involves subject

matter which could have been presented at the time of the appeal. 

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is not available to a

defendant regarding contentions that could have been, but were

not[,] raised on an appeal. Nor is it available for further

consideration of claims that were raised and rejected on appeal. (In

re: Waltreus [1965] 62 C.2d 218, 225; In re: Dixon [1953] 41

C.2d 756; In re: Harris [1993] 5C.4th 813).

Accordingly, the petition is denied on its merits.

(Answer, Ex. D (emphasis in original).)

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A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860,

861 (9th Cir. 1994); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v.

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 67-68; Park v.

California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000); Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085. Federal courts are

“bound by a state court’s construction of its own penal statutes.” Aponte v. Gomez, 993 F.2d

705, 707 (9th Cir. 1993). Alleged errors in state post-conviction process are not cognizable in

federal habeas review. Franzen v. Brinkman, 877 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Ortiz v.

Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 939 (9th Cir. 1998); Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1045 (9th Cir.

1997).

Furthermore, “‘state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law,’ and we are

bound by the state's construction except when it appears that its interpretation is an obvious

subterfuge to evade the consideration of a federal issue.” Peltier, 15 F.3d at 862 (quoting

Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975) (construing state court judgment)). There is no

evidence of subterfuge here; therefore, this court must accept the Shasta County Superior Court’s

ruling. Petitioner’s eighth and final claim should also be denied. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that

petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

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that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 3, 2005. 

001

stou1276.157 

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