Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06021/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06021-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

RICHARD PAUL DENISON, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 90-6021 

) 

F'ILED 

Unit.eel States Court of Appeals Tenth Ci:·;-~>it 

AUG 16 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

SWACO GEOLOGRAPH COMPANY, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CIV-88-1762-W} 

John Michael Johnston (David Morse and Jay D. Adkisson with him on 

the brief) of Claro & Johnston, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Howard Janco, Dallas, Texas (Ronald R. Hudson and J. William 

Archibald of Holloway Dobson Hudson & Bachman, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma; Terry A. Hall, Tulsa, Oklahoma on the brief}, for 

Defendant-Appellant. 

BRORBY * and EBEL, circuit Judges, and KANE, Senior District Judge . 

KANE, Senior District Judge. 

* Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., Senior United States District Judge 

for the District of Colorado, sitting by designation. 

Swaco Geolograph Company appeals the district court's denial 

of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new trial, 

or remittitur in an action under the Age Discrimination in 

Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 u.s.c. §§ 621-634. 

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, Richard 

Denison, on his ADEA claim, awarding damages in the amount of 

Appellate Case: 90-6021 Document: 01019731420 Date Filed: 08/16/1991 Page: 1 
$369,005.87. That amount was subsequently reduced to $285,338.24. 

on appeal, swaco argues that its motion should have been granted 

because (1) Denison did not establish a prima facie case of 

discrimination under the ADEA, (2) he did not show that Swaco's 

reasons for terminating him were pretextual or that age was a 

determining factor in his termination, (3) the court erred in its 

evidentiary rulings, (4) the court did not enforce the pretrial 

order, (5) the court improperly submitted the issue of front pay to 

the jury, (6) in combination, the above rulings constituted 

reversible error. We affirm. 

Denison was employed by Dresser Industries, Inc. ("Dresser") 

or one of its affiliates since 1958. He received several 

promotions through 1975, when he was named Area Manager of the MidContinent Division of the swaco Division of Dresser. In the summer 

of 1987, Dresser and Geolograph Pioneer, Inc. ("Geolograph"), a 

competitor of Dresser, began discussions of a possible merger of 

certain operations. on September 1, 1987, the two companies formed 

a joint venture by combining the Swaco Division of Dresser with 

Geolograph. The new company was called the Swaco Geolograph 

Company ("Swaco"). Denison was transferred and became an employee 

of that company. 

Shortly after swaco was formed, corporate officials decided to 

eliminate redundant staff positions. Denison' s equivalent at 

Geolograph was Frank Ludwell. On September 4, 1987, Denison was 

notified of his termination from Swaco, and Ludwell was retained to 

fill Denison's former position. At the time of the termination, 

Denison was 49 years old and Ludwell was 34 years old. Swaco 

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officials testified that Ludwell was chosen over Denison solely on 

the basis of comparative sales figures between the equivalent premerger divisions of swaco and Geolograph. It is undisputed that 

neither Denison nor Ludwell were involved in sales; both worked in 

the service departments of their respective divisions. 

on October 11, 1988, Denison commenced the instant action, 

naming as defendants Dresser, Geolograph and Swaco and alleging 

violations of BRISA, breach of implied employment contract, 

fraudulent misrepresentation and age discrimination under the ADEA. 

All claims except the ADEA claim against swaco were dismissed 

voluntarily or by the court before trial. After a two-day trial, 

the jury reached a verdict in favor of Denison, awarding him 

$18, 588. 65 in back pay, $18, 588. 65 in liquidated damages and 

$331,828.57 in future damages. The latter amount was subsequently 

reduced by the court to $248,160.94 to account for present value. 

swaco then moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new 

trial or remittitur. The court denied the motion, and Swaco now 

appeals. 

In an appeal from the denial of a motion for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict, we "must view the evidence and indulge 

all inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion and 

'"'cannot weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of witnesses 

or substitute [our] judgment for that of the jury. '" ' Lucas v. 

Dover Corp., Norris Div., 857 F.2d 1397, 1400 (10th Cir. 

1988) (citations omitted). Such motions should be sparingly granted 

and are proper "only when 'the evidence points but one way and is 

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susceptible to no reasonable inferences which may sustain the 

position of the party against whom the motion is made.'" Id. 

(citation omitted). We now consider whether error as to the 

following matters required the trial court to grant Swaco's motion 

for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, remittitur or a new 

trial. 

I. Prima Facie Case. 

Swaco's first argument in this appeal is that Denison failed 

to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he did 

not off er direct evidence that his age was considered by those who 

terminated him and instead he relied substantially on 

circumstantial evidence to prove his case. As we noted in Lucas v. 

Dover Corp., Norris Division, the plaintiff in an ADEA case need 

not bring forth direct evidence of his employer's discriminatory 

intent to establish a prima facie case: 

A party may attempt to "meet his burden directly, by 

presenting direct or circumstantial evidence that age was 

a determining factor in his discharge. " Or, more 

typically, a party may rely on the proof scheme 

established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 

792, 802-04, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1824-25, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 

(1973) and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. 

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1093-35, 

67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981) and applicable to ADEA cases. 

Under that proof scheme, to set forth a prima facie case 

of age discrimination, a plaintiff must ordinarily prove 

that "(1) the affected employee was within the protected 

age group; (2) [he) was doing satisfactory work; (3) 

[he] was discharged despite the adequacy of this work; 

and (4) a younger person replaced [him]." 

Id. at 1400 (citations omitted). The McDonnell Douglas proof 

scheme is necessary because in most discrimination cases, whether 

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based on age or other factors, there is rarely direct evidence that 

the employer's motive was discriminatory. See Summers v. 

Communication Channels. Inc., 729 F. Supp. 1234, 1237 (N.D. Ill. 

1990). Therefore, the plaintiff is permitted to use circumstantial 

evidence to show discrimination by establishing the above elements 

of a prima facie case. Id. Contrary to Swaco's suggestion, there 

was no requirement that Denison present direct evidence of 

discrimination to establish a prima facie case. See Merrick v. 

Northern Natural Gas Co., 911 F.2d 426, 429 (10th Cir. 1990) ("The 

plaintiff is not required to come forward with direct evidence of 

discriminatory intent. He is only required to show 'that the 

employer's proffered justification is unworthy of credence.'"); 

Krause v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 910 F.2d 674, 677 (10th Cir. 

1990) (same) . 

Swaco also asserts that Denison did not make out a prima facie 

case because he did not present persuasive evidence that his job 

performance was satisfactory under the second element of McDonnell 

Douglas proof scheme. Swaco acknowledges that Denison offered 

evidence that he had received promotions and pay increases during 

his tenure, was given no warnings about unsatisfactory performance, 

and the divisions he worked for were generally profitable. Swaco 

contends, however, that "plaintiff's evidence was not as probative 

as he claims," because his last promotion was in 1975, he received 

a demotion in 1980 and had several lateral transfers with no 

increase in responsibilities. 

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Swaco's arguments go to the weight of the evidence of 

satisfactory performance, not Denison's initial burden to produce 

such evidence. Clearly, Denison met his burden of production by 

introducing some evidence of good performance. As the court 

observed in Powell v. Syracuse University, 580 F.2d 1150, 1155 (2d 

cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984 (1978), to require the plaintiff 

in an age discrimination case to demonstrate that his performance 

was flawless 

unnecessarily collapses the steps suggested by McDonnell 

Douglas by shifting considerations which are more 

appropriate to the employer's rebuttal phase to the 

earlier requirement that the employee demonstrate 

competence to perform the specified work. This not 

merely of formal consequence, for it has the practical 

effect of requiring the employee to prove not merely that 

he possesses the basic skills necessary for the job, but 

rather that he is the best-qualified candidate for the 

job, under the criteria suggested by the employer. . . . 

[T]his burden is extremely difficult to meet if the 

employer's claim that the employee did not meet some 

unstated level of performance is sufficient to negate the 

employee's offer of proof. 

Thus, the Powell court, and others since, have required the 

plaintiff to show only that "'his performance was of sufficient 

quality to merit continued employment, thereby raising an inference 

that some other factor was involved in the decision to discharge 

him.'" Id. (citing Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F. 2d 1277, 

12 8 3 ( 7th cir . 19 7 7 ) ) ; see also La Montagne v. American 

Convenience Prods., Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1413-14 (7th cir. 

1984) (plaintiff established prima facie case by introducing 

evidence that job performance was generally satisfactory, despite 

other evidence to the contrary). 

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We agree with the Powell court that "proof of competence 

sufficient to make out a prima facie case of discrimination was 

never intended to encompass proof of superiority or flawless 

performance. If an employer is dissatisfied with the performance 

of an employee, he can properly raise the issue in rebuttal of the 

plaintiff's showing." Powell, 580 F.2d at 1155. We conclude that 

Denison made a prima facie showing under the second element of the 

McDonnell Douglas test. 

II. Sufficiency of Evidence of Pretext and that Age was a 

Determining Factor. 

swaco second contention is that Denison failed in his ultimate 

burden to prove that swaco's stated reasons for terminating him 

were pretext and that age was a determining factor in his 

termination. Both parties agree that such evidence is crucial in 

an ADEA case. See Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 

1544, 1547 (10th cir. 1988). The company charges that there was 

insufficient evidence of pretext because Denison simply argued that 

his termination should have been based on seniority, without 

directly challenging swaco' s evidence that it based Denison' s 

termination on sales figures indicating that Denison's division was 

less profitable than the equivalent division at Geolograph. It 

objects to the relevancy of any evidence not going to the validity 

of these sales figures. Relying on Wards Cove Packing Co. v. 

Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), and Garig v. N.L. Industries. Inc., 

671 F. Supp. 1460 (S.D. Tex. 1985), aff'd, 792 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6021 Document: 01019731420 Date Filed: 08/16/1991 Page: 7 
1986) , Swaco notes that a plaintiff cannot prevail in an age 

discrimination case simply by questioning the wisdom of his 

employer's judgment and asserting his expectation of retention 

based on seniority. 

Swaco's reliance on Wards Cove and Garig is misplaced. The 

record does not support the company's characterization that Denison 

attempted to show pretext simply by relying on his view that the 

company should have retained him based on seniority. Instead, 

Denison' s approach was to show, first, that Swaco' s proffered 

explanation for his termination based on comparative sales figures 

was "unworthy of credence" because neither Denison nor his 

replacement was involved in sales, that the figures and personnel 

were not truly comparative and that the company had strong 

financial potential both before and after the merger. Second, he 

introduced evidence indicating that the company considered the 

higher employment cost of older employees in deciding who to 

retain, thereby raising the inference that age was a direct factor 

in the decision to terminate him. 

As we outlined in Lucas v. Dover Corp., one of the methods by 

which an ADEA plaintiff can show discrimination is by discrediting 

the employer's explanation for his termination: 

Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the 

burden shifts to the employer to "show that a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason motivated the decision." The 

plaintiff must then "rebut the employer's showing by 

demonstrating that the proffered justification is a 

pretext." The plaintiff retains throughout the ultimate 

burden of proving that age was a determining factor in 

the challenged decision. 

857 F.2d at 1401 (citing EEOC v. Sperry Corp., 852 F.2d 503, 507 

8 

Appellate Case: 90-6021 Document: 01019731420 Date Filed: 08/16/1991 Page: 8 
(10th Cir. 1988)). That Denison sought to establish that the 

company's reliance on sales data was pretext, rather than directly 

challenging the underlying validity of that data, does not indicate 

error. Denison need not confine his evidence to Swaco's view of 

the case. Taken in the light most favorable to Denison, we 

conclude there was sufficient evidence to establish that age was a 

determining factor in Denison's termination. 

III. Evidentiary Rulings. 

Swaco's third argument is that the district court erred in 

admitting deposition testimony and certain documentary evidence. 

At the outset, we note swaco has failed to preserve a number of its 

evidentiary arguments. Federal appellate rules require that 

"[w]henever an appeal is based on a failure to admit or exclude 

evidence, . the party shall state [in its brief] where in the 

record a proper objection was made to the ruling and whether the 

objection is recorded and ruled upon." 10th Cir. R. 28.2(e); see 

also Fed. R. App. P. 28(e). Swaco has failed to do so in several 

instances. 

More importantly, our independent review of the record shows 

that the company's objections at trial, if any, were often not on 

the same grounds as raised on appeal. Accordingly, where Swaco did 

not object at trial or objected on different ground, we review the 

trial court's evidentiary rulings for plain error only. Quinton v. 

Farmland Indus., Inc., 928 F.2d 335, 337 (10th Cir. 1991); Whiteley 

v. OKC Corp., 719 F.2d 1051, 1057 (10th Cir. 1983). Otherwise, we 

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review the trial court's rulings for an abuse of discretion. See 

Bannister v. Town of Noble, Okla., 812 F.2d 1265, 1271 (10th Cir. 

1987) . 

A. Testimony. 

Swaco first objects to the deposition testimony of Ramona 

Putman, Fred Munzenmier and Smoky Marquez. The company's 

objections at trial were limited to a relevancy objection to the 

Putman and Marquez testimony. We find no objection to Munzenmier' s 

testimony. 

Putman was Dresser's employee benefits manager. She testified 

that Denison would have been entitled to "enhanced benefits" 

pursuant to Dresser policy had he been employed until the age of 

55. Munzenmier was swaco' s expert witness who specialized in 

actuarial science. He testified as to the increased benefits which 

an employee received under Dresser's old pension plan in comparison 

to those under a newer insurance policy in effect in 1986. He 

further noted that certain employees, including Denison, were 

eligible to combine benefits under both the old and new plans to 

equal the enhanced benefits under the old plan. 

employee of the Swaco division of Dresser, 

Marquez, a former 

testified to the 

benefits he received upon retirement. This testimony was used to 

illustrate by way of comparison the difference between what Denison 

actually received upon termination and what he would have received 

had he reached retirement age, as did Marquez. 

Swaco's relevancy objection to the above evidence is without 

merit. Putman, Munzenmier and Marquez's testimony was necessary to 

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establish amount of damages for the lost benefits to which Denison 

would have been entitled had he been retained by the company. The 

company's claim that Denison failed to establish any connection 

between Putman, Munzenmier and Marquez's testimony and his 

dismissal is irrelevant. There was no need for Denison to 

establish such a connection since the evidence went to the issue of 

damages, not liability. We conclude that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying Swaco•s objection to these 

witnesses' deposition testimony on relevancy grounds. 

swaco further contends that portions of Putman's testimony 

went into impermissible subjects and related to Denison's other 

claims that were previously dismissed. Since swaco did not object 

on this basis at trial, we review this issue for plain error only. 

Taken in context, these references were minor, occurred in the 

preliminary portions of Putman's testimony and were not brought to 

the jury's attention. The substantial rights of swaco were not 

affected. See Quinton, 928 F.2d at 337 (plain error is error that 

affects the substantial rights of the parties); Fed. R. Evid. 

103 (d) • Consequently, we conclude that Swaco has not meet its 

burden of establishing plain error.

1 

1 

swaco further claims that the testimony of Joe Dean, an 

actuarial expert, should have been stricken from the record because 

Dean's calculations of lost future wages were based on incorrect 

data. Again, it appears that Swaco did not object to the Dean 

testimony to preserve this argument on appeal. Regardless, it is 

clear that no plain error occurred because the court corrected the 

award for lost future wages after trial to account for future 

value. Swaco was not prejudiced by this testimony. 

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B. Documents 

Swaco also argues that the trial court erred in admitting 

several documents into evidence. It first contests the admission 

of Trial Exhibit 52. Swaco contends that this exhibit was 

inadmissible because it was because it was prepared by a non-party, 

was not properly authenticated, and was hearsay. These arguments 

have no merit. 

Trial Exhibit 52 was a document compiled by the Geolograph 

Company which outlined the savings as a result of the hiring of 

newer employees over those with greater seniority. Although the 

document was prepared by Geolograph, a former co-defendant, and not 

Swaco, Geolograph was one of the participants in the Swaco joint 

venture. Further, Denison established by circumstantial evidence 

that decisionmakers at Swaco had access to the conclusions this 

document contained. Thus, this document was both relevant and 

admissible. With respect to Swaco's objection to Trial Exhibit 

52 on authentication and hearsay grounds, we again observe that 

Swaco' s trial objection was on the grounds of relevance and 

prejudice, and not authentication and hearsay. Nevertheless, we 

review these issues for plain error. 

We disagree with Swaco's contention that Trial Exhibit 52 was 

not properly authenticated. This document was prepared on 

Geolograph letterhead and was provided to Denison during discovery 

by Geolograph, a co-participant in the Swaco joint venture and 

formerly a defendant. Consequently, there was sufficient 

circumstantial evidence to support its authenticity. See, e.g., 

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Snyder v. Whittaker Corp., 839 F.2d 1085, 1089 (5th Cir. 

1988) (authentication upheld where defendant provided documents 

during discovery and never challenged their authenticity); FTC v. 

Hughes, 710 F. Supp. 1520, 1523 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (documents provided 

during discovery, on defendant's letterhead, held authentic under 

Fed. R. Evid. 901(b) (4)); New Orleans Saints v. Griesedieck, 612 

F. supp. 59, 62 (E.D. La. 1985) (interoffice memorandum on company 

letterhead properly admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 803 and 901), 

aff 'd, 790 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1986). We likewise hold that this 

document was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove the 

truth of its contents, but to show Swaco•s motivation during the 

reduction in force. See Fed. R. Evid. 80l(c) (hearsay defined as a 

statement "offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 

2 asserted"). 

swaco also asserts that the court erred in admitting other 

documentary evidence in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 401-403. Rule 

401 defines the term "relevant evidence, and Rule 402 provides that 

relevant evidence is admissible and irrelevant evidence is not. 

Rule 403 limits the admission of relevant evidence when "its 

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 

considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 

presentation of cumulative evidence." The trial court's admission 

2 

swaco additionally argued that it was unfairly surprised by 

the introduction of Trial Exhibit 52. In his answer brief, 

however, Denison notes that this document was identified in the 

pretrial order as Nos. 31 and 32. Faced with this information, 

Swaco now withdraws its objection based on unfair surprise. 

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or exclusion of evidence under these rules is reviewed for an abuse 

of discretion. See Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150, 1156 

(10th Cir. 1990). 

swaco first claims that the admission of Dresser's answers to 

certain interrogatories should not have been permitted under Rule 

403. These answers contained statistical information on the ages 

of persons terminated in a previous reduction in force from Dresser 

and in the reduction in force from swaco at issue in this case. 

swaco argues that this information was "totally irrelevant, 

blatantly prejudicial and had absolutely no probative value." It 

relies on Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), 

and Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988), in which 

the Court placed substantial limitations on the use of statistical 

data in discrimination cases. 

Wards Cove and Watson have little practical application here. 

Wards Cove dealt with the care that a court must exercise in 

permitting the plaintiff to rely substantially on statistics to 

establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on disparate 

impact. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 650-55. Watson held that 

discrimination based on subjective criteria for promotion may be 

analyzed under a disparate impact analysis, and the Court remanded 

that case for consideration of the plaintiff's statistical evidence 

under such a theory. 487 U.S. at 999-100. This is a disparate 

treatment case, not a disparate impact case, and the limitations on 

the probative value of statistical data recognized in Wards Cove 

and Watson are not applicable. 

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We have held that "statistics alone may be used to establish 

a prima facie case of racial discrimination in a disparate 

treatment case." McAlester v. United Air Lines, Inc. , 851 F. 2d 

1249, 1258 (10th Cir. 1988). In such cases, however, a plaintiff 

must show "gross statistical disparities." Hazelwood School Dist. 

v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977). When the plaintiff 

offers other evidence of discriminatory intent, however, "the 

grossness of the disparity need not be as great." See EEOC v. 

Atlas Paper Box Co., 868 F.2d 1487, 1504 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 

110 s. ct. 63 ( 1989) . Moreover, statistical data is plainly 

admissible to show that an employer's proffered reason for 

terminating the plaintiff is purely pretext. See McDonnell 

Douglas, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973); McAlester, 851 F.2d at 1258. 

In this instance, Denison' s case did not "rest solely on 

statistics, but also rest[ed] upon individual instances of 

discriminatory treatment." McAlester, 851 F. 2d at 1258. He 

established a prima facie case without relying on statistical data, 

and his use of Dresser's responses to his interrogatories was 

primarily to show that Swaco's explanation for his termination was 

unworthy of credence, a procedure expressly recognized in McDonnell 

Douglas. Finally, this evidence was merely cumulative. There was 

substantial independent evidence upon which the jury could conclude 

that swaco had intentionally discriminated against Denison because 

of his age. The trial court did not err by admitting the 

interrogatory responses. 

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The company next asserts that evidence going to the financial 

strength of Dresser was unduly prejudicial under Rule 403 because 

Dresser is no longer a party to this case. We disagree. Dresser 

was indirectly a party because it was a participant in the joint 

venture with Geolograph resulting in the creation of Swaco. More 

importantly, Swaco's defense rested on its contention that layoffs 

were necessary to preserve the financial integrity of the joint 

venture. With this defense, Swaco invited Denison's evidence that 

Dresser's financial condition was not as poor as it represented. 

It was permissible, effective rebuttal evidence. See Whiteley v. 

OKC Corp., 719 F.2d at 1055 (otherwise inadmissible evidence of 

financial condition permitted when objecting party "opens the door" 

to such testimony). 

IV. Failure to Enforce the Pretrial Order. 

Swaco's fourth argument is that the district court erred in 

failing to enforce the pretrial order by permitting the 

introduction of evidence not listed therein. We consider the 

following factors in determining whether the district court abused 

its discretion in excluding evidence not specified in the pretrial 

order: 

"(1) the prejudice or surprise in fact of the party 

against whom the excluded witnesses would have testified, 

(2) the ability of that party to cure the prejudice, (3) 

the extent to which waiver of the rule against calling 

unlisted witnesses would disrupt the orderly and 

efficient trial of the case or of other cases in court, 

and (4) bad faith or willfulness in failing to comply 

with the court's order." 

Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784, 797 (10th Cir. 

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1980) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 918 (1981); see 

also Eastridge Dev. Co. v. Halpert Assocs., Inc., 853 F.2d 772, 778 

(10th Cir. 1988). 

Swaco points to error in the introduction of Plaintiff's 

Exhibit 100, a performance evaluation of Frank Ludwell, Denison's 

replacement. Denison responds that he introduced this document on 

rebuttal to show that one witness had not fabricated criticisms of 

Ludwell 's performance during trial because the witness had prepared 

the Ludwell evaluation three years before trial. Accordingly, as 

rebuttal evidence going to issues which Swaco itself raised, Swaco 

was not unfairly surprised by the introduction of the evaluation. 

See Whiteley v. OKC Corp, 719 F.2d at 1055. The court did not 

abuse its discretion in admitting this rebuttal evidence. See 

Coffey v. United states, 333 F.2d 945, 949 (10th Cir. 1964). 

Swaco similarly complains that it had no notice that Denison 

was going to read portions of certain depositions into the record. 

We consider this question for plain error only, since Denison did 

not object on these grounds during trial. Denison read portions of 

the depositions of William Lakey, Ramona Putman and Fred 

Munzenmier, each of whom were listed in the pretrial order as 

Denison and swaco's witnesses, although the order is unclear as to 

whether they were to testify in person or by deposition. 

There is simply no basis for swaco to argue that it was 

unfairly prejudiced by this testimony. It clearly had notice of 

the content of these witnesses' depositions, and counsel was 

instructed during trial to identify the specific lines of their 

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testimony that would be read into the record. swaco then had ample 

opportunity to counter-designate any relevant portions it desired 

during its case-in-chief, or to call the witnesses to testify live, 

as it had previously represented it would do. Under the standards 

of Smith v. Ford Motor Co., the substantial rights of swaco were 

not impacted by this testimony, and no pl~in error occurred. 3 

v. Front Pay. 

swaco's fifth assertion is that the trial court erred in 

submitting the issue of damages for front pay to the jury. Both 

parties agree there is a split among the circuits on whether to 

characterize the calculation of front pay damages as a legal issue, 

for the jury, or an equitable issue, for the court. See generally 

Duke v. Uniroyal Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1421-22 (4th Cir. 1991). The 

trial court below was clearly aware of this dilemma. In an attempt 

to protect the integrity of its judgment on front pay, the court 

held that it would treat front pay damages as an equitable issue 

for its own determination, but that it would submit the issue to 

the jury on an advisory basis. After trial, it then requested 

further briefing on the issue of damages for front pay. In an 

order entered October 5, 1989, the court then reduced the award to 

account for the present value of Denison's lost future pension 

benefits. swaco contends that this procedure violated its right to 

3 The company further argues that Denison should not have 

permitted the reading of Dresser's answers to certain 

interrogatories into the record because they were not listed in the 

pretrial order. our review of the record reveals that these items 

were identified as Nos. 46-51 in the pretrial order. Therefore, 

there was no error in their admission. 

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a fair trial. 

The leading case in this area is Dominic v. Consolidated 

Edison Co. of New York. Inc., 822 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1987). After 

reviewing the legislative history of the ADEA, the court in Dominic 

concluded that front pay damages was an issue for the trial judge's 

equitable discretion. See id. at 1256-57. 

We believe this is a common sense result. There is 

much overlap between the facts relevant to whether an 

award of front pay is appropriate and those relevant to 

the size of the award. For example, both questions turn 

in part on the ease with which the employee will be able 

to find other employment. To divide the fact-finding 

responsibilities in such circumstances would be anomalous 

and would risk inconsistent decisions. A jury might 

conclude that the employee would never find other work 

and award a large sum in front pay, while the judge found 

that he or she would find work immediately and that no 

award was appropriate. Or, a judge might find front pay 

appropriate, but the jury might award only a nominal sum 

based on its belief that the employee could secure 

immediate employment. 

Id. at 1258; accord Duke v. Uniroyal Inc., 928 F.2d at 1422-23; 

Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 616 (1st Cir. 1985); 

Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1100 (8th Cir. 1982); 

Stafford v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 741 F. Supp. 664, 666 (E.D. 

Mich. 1990); Chace v Champion Spark Plug Co., 725 F. Supp. 868, 

871 (D. Md. 1989); Spivak v. Coulter Electronics, Inc., 686 F. 

Supp. 897 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Miller v. Pabst Brewing co., 670 F. 

Supp. 1420 (E.D. Wis. 1987), aff'd, 870 F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1989); 

Ventura v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 571 F. Supp. 48, 51 (N.D. Ill. 

1983) • 

Conversely, by implication or with little discussion, a number 

of other courts have concluded that the trial judge must determine 

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Appellate Case: 90-6021 Document: 01019731420 Date Filed: 08/16/1991 Page: 19 
initially that front pay is appropriate, but that the jury must 

then determine the amount of the award. See, e.g., Hansard v. 

Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co, 865 F.2d 1461, 1470 (5th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 129 (1989); Fite v. First Tenn. 

Prod. Credit Ass'n, 861 F.2d 884, 893 (6th Cir. 1988); Coston v. 

Plitt Theatres. Inc., 831 F.2d 1321, 1333 n. 4 (7th Cir. 1987), 

vacated on other grounds, 486 U.S. 1020 (1988); Blum v. Witco 

Chem. Corp., 829 F.2d 367, 374 n. 4 (3d cir. 1987); Maxfield v. 

Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 796 (3d cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 

U.S. 1057 (1986); Eivins v. Adventist Health Sys./Eastern Middle 

Amer .. Inc., 660 F. Supp. 1255, 1261 (D. Kan. 1987). Although we 

have cited with approval the Dominic case in another context, see 

Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d at 1557, we have yet 

to directly rule on this question. But cf. Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 

894 F.2d 1150, 1157-58 (10th cir. 1990) (affirming trial court's 

postjudgment award of front pay); EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & 

Loan Ass' n, 763 F. 2d 1166, 1168, 1173 (10th Cir.) (remanding to 

trial court for findings to support the court's award of future 

damages instead of reinstatement, and tacitly accepting the court's 

calculation of the amount of those damages), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 

946 (1985). 

Because the cases holding that the calculation of front pay is 

a jury question do so primarily by adhering to earlier precedent 

assuming this was the jury's function, we will follow the more 

reasoned line of authority represented by the Dominic case, which 

considers in detail the legislative history of the ADEA, the nature 

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Appellate Case: 90-6021 Document: 01019731420 Date Filed: 08/16/1991 Page: 20 
of the remedies it provides, and the traditional function of the 

court and the jury. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court 

did not err by holding the calculation of damages was an equitable 

issue, by submitting the issue on an advisory basis to the jury, 

and by reducing the amount of the award on subsequent review. 

VI. Cumulative Error. 

Swaco's final contention in this appeal is that trial court's 

ruling on the above matters, in combination, constitute reversible 

error. Considering our conclusions herein, this argument falls by 

its own weight. 

The district court's judgment denying Swaco' s motion for 

j.n.o.v., new trial or remittitur is AFFIRMED. 

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