Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-05604/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-05604-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MOHAMAD SAFDAR SHEIKH,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ALBERTO GONZALES, Attorney General of

the United States, 

Defendant.

 /

No. C 03-05604 JSW

ORDER RE CROSS-MOTIONS

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Now before the Court is the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Alberto

Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States (“Defendant”) and the cross-motion for

summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Mohamad Safdar Sheikh (“Sheikh”). Both parties move

for summary judgment on Sheikh’s claim that the immigration court improperly rescinded

Sheikh’s legal status. In opposing Sheikh’s motion, Defendant asserted a concern that the Court

does not have jurisdiction to hear this matter. Therefore, the Court will evaluate the threshold

issue of whether jurisdiction exists.

A. No Jurisdiction Exists As Currently Plead

Sheikh argues that this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the Administrative Procedure

Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et. seq. (“APA”), which provides courts with jurisdiction to review “final

agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. The

government has initiated removal proceedings against Sheikh, and the immigration court held a

hearing on these proceedings on September 15, 2005. Neither party disputes that the Ninth 

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Circuit will be able to review the rescission order upon its eventual review of a removal order. 

See Baria v. Reno, 94 F.3d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that where a petitioner faces

deportation based on an underlying order rescinding the petitioner’s legal status “[t]he

interdependency of the two orders requires that the [court’s] power of review extend to the order

rescinding an adjustment of status.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Thus, the key

issue is whether the delay pending the Ninth Circuit’s eventual review means there is “no other

adequate remedy in court” pursuant to Section 704. 

Federal courts are presumptively without jurisdiction over civil cases, and the burden of

establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life

Insurance Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Sheikh has not provided any authority

that supports interpreting the phrase “there is no other adequate remedy in court” to mean a

mere delay in judicial review. To the contrary, courts that have construed this phrase have been

concerned with whether there is a court that has the authority and ability to provide complete

relief. See, e.g. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 901 (1988) (holding district court had

jurisdiction pursuant to § 704 because “the doubtful and limited relief available in the Claims

Court is not an adequate substitute for review.”); Tucson Airport Auth. v. General Dynamics

Corp., 136 F.3d 641, 645 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding there was not an “adequate remedy” in Claims

Court because that court was not authorized to provide equitable relief sought by plaintiff); cf

Sterling v. United States, 749 F.Supp. 1202, 1207-08 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (“The APA precludes

judicial review of a final agency action under its provisions if there is another court available

which provides an adequate remedy to redress the alleged grievance.”). 

The Court is sympathetic to Sheikh’s contention that a delay may extend his alleged loss

of liberty. However, the Court concludes that Sheikh has not demonstrated that there is “no

other adequate remedy in court” where, as here, a court will be able to adjudicate his claim and

has the authority to provide the type of relief sought by the him. Accordingly, the Court

dismisses the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. 

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B. Request for Leave to Amend

Alternatively, Sheikh argues that the Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate this matter

under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 as a habeas petition. Although Sheikh’s complaint does not currently

state a claim for habeas relief, he seeks leave to do so. To bring a petition for writ of habeas

corpus, the a plaintiff must be “in custody.” Miranda v. Reno, 238 F.3d 1156, 1158 (9th Cir.

2001); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (“[t]he writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a

prisoner unless ... [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

United States.”). “[T]he ‘in custody’ requirement is jurisdictional.” Williamson v. Gregoire,

151 F.3d 1180, 1182 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Here, although Sheikh is not currently in detention, he was arrested and then released on

bail. The parties dispute whether being released on bail is sufficient restraint to constitute being

“in custody.” “Habeas corpus jurisdiction has been extended beyond that which the most literal

reading of the statute might require ... to individuals who, though not subject to immediate

physical imprisonment, are subject to restraints not shared by the public generally that

significantly confine and restrain their freedom.” Miranda, 238 F.3d at 1158-59 (citing Jones v.

Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240, 243 (1963), and Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345,

351 (1973)). In Jones, the Supreme Court held that a paroled convict was “in custody” for

purposes of a habeas petition. Jones, 371 U.S. at 243. In Hensley, the Supreme Court held a

person released on his own recognizance was “in custody.” Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351.

At the hearing on the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment, Defendant argued

without any supporting authority that the holdings of Jones and Hensley, which were both

criminal habeas cases, should not be extended to immigration habeas cases. However, the Ninth

Circuit has already rejected Defendant’s argument. See Williams v. INS, 795 F.2d 738, 744 n.3

(9th Cir. 1986) (concluding that Supreme Court’s expansion of “custody” in the criminal

context applies to habeas petitions in the immigration context); see also United States ex rel.

Marcello v. District Director, 634 F.2d 964, 969 n.8 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that immigration

petitioner released on bail or personal recognizance after the commencement of actual, physical

custody would still be “in custody” for purposes of habeas proceedings) (cited with approval in

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Williams, 795 F.2d at 744); Arias v. Rogers, 676 F.2d 1139, 1142 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that

petitioners out on bond by INS were still “in custody” for purposes of habeas corpus). 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that because Sheikh was released on bond, he is “in custody”

for purposes of habeas corpus and thus, grants Sheikh leave to amend his complaint to seek

habeas relief. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 19, 2005 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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