Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-07517/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-07517-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:44 Trademark Infringement

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Case No. 18-CV-07517-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE

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United States District Court

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ALEXANDRIA REAL ESTATE 

EQUITIES, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

RUNLABS (UK) LIMITED, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-CV-07517-LHK 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Re: Dkt. No. 23

Plaintiff Alexandria Real Estate Equities, Inc. brings the instant suit against RUNLABS

(UK) Limited (“RUNLABS UK”), RUNLABS (Ireland) Limited (“RUNLABS Ireland”), and 

Steven Marcus (“Marcus”) (collectively, “Defendants”). The suit primarily concerns Defendants’ 

allegedly illegal use of Plaintiff’s trademark. Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss 

the first amended complaint. ECF No. 23. Having considered the submissions of the parties, the 

relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court hereby GRANTS the motion to dismiss without

prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Factual Background

Plaintiff is a publicly traded real estate trust and “prominent developer and operator of 

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commercial real estate properties to companies in the academic, scientific, medical, 

research/development, and technology fields.” ECF No. 21 (first amended complaint, or “FAC”) 

at ¶ 2. Plaintiff owns a variety a trademark registrations, including for its name “Alexandria,” its 

lighthouse logo, and the phrase “landlord of choice.” Id. at ¶ 25.

Defendant RUNLABS UK is “a private limited company established under the laws of the 

United Kingdom, with its principal place of business . . . [in] London, United Kingdom.” Id. at ¶

5. Defendant RUNLABS Ireland is a “private limited company established under the laws of 

Ireland, with its principal place of business . . . [in] Dublin, Ireland. Id. at ¶ 6. The last defendant, 

Steven Marcus, is a United States citizen residing in London, United Kingdom. Id. at ¶ 7. “Steven 

Marcus is the Founder and CEO of RUNLABS . . . .” Id. Defendant Steven Marcus is related to 

Plaintiff’s founder and chairman, Joel Marcus. Id. at ¶ 20. 

Defendants “advertise collaborative life science and technology campuses incorporating 

turnkey laboratory and office facilities specifically geared for early stage life science and biotech 

companies and entrepreneurs.” Id. at ¶ 3. Thus, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants offer “services 

identical to those [Plaintiff] has marketed and provided to its client tenants for decades.” Id.

However, at this time, RUNLABS UK and RUNLABS Ireland are “newly formed entities that 

have not, to date, operated any laboratory facility or conducted any business beyond promoting 

Defendants’ intended services to attract clients and raise funds.” Id. at ¶ 27.

On or about November 27, 2018, Plaintiff became aware that Defendants were allegedly 

using Plaintiff’s name and trademarks to promote Defendants’ services to a venture capital firm.

Id. at ¶ 28. Specifically, Plaintiff are aware of only one email and an attached presentation sent to 

“three principals based in the Palo Alto and New York offices [of Venrock,] a prominent venture 

capital fund and investor in Alexandria.” Id.; see also ECF No. 1-3 at 1.1 However, “upon 

 

1 Plaintiff included the email and attached presentation as exhibits to Plaintiff’s original complaint 

against Defendants. ECF Nos. 1-2, 1-3. However, Plaintiff neglected to include the email and 

attached presentation as exhibits to the FAC. Nonetheless, the Court may still consider the email 

and presentation attached to the original complaint as part of the Court’s analysis. The “court may 

also consider the prior allegations as part of its ‘context-specific’ inquiry based on its judicial 

experience and common sense to assess whether the Third Amended Complaint plausibly suggests 

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information and belief, Defendants sent many such communications to those in the start-up, life 

sciences, and technology communities in Northern California in order to attract clients and raise 

funds.” Id.

From reviewing the one email and attached presentation sent to Venrock, Plaintiff alleges 

that the email and attached presentation contain unauthorized uses of Plaintiff’s trademarks. Id. at 

¶ 30. Specifically, the email made the following allegedly false or misleading statements:

• “RUNLABS is creating the world’s first and only flexible urban lab platform –

providing critical infrastructure and community to life sciences companies . . . .” 

• “We are currently raising EUR 50 million growth round for groundbreaking life 

science projects in major gateway cities – Paris and London – with a clear plan to 

go global, including the US.”

• “RUNLABS is a revolution in life science, sprung from Alexandria (www.are.com 

– NYSE: ARE), growing the world’s first and only network of flexible labs 

enabling life science breakthroughs”

• “Alexandria [is] on CNBC . . . .”

Id. at ¶ 26. 

Moreover, the attached presentation “is also replete with unauthorized uses of the 

Alexandria Trademarks, false statements regarding RUNLABS’ formation, offering and 

relationship with Alexandria, and statements misleadingly suggesting an affiliation, sponsorship, 

or endorsement of RUNLABS by Alexandria.” Id. at ¶ 35. 

 

an entitlement to relief, as required under Iqbal.” Cole v. Sunnyvale, 2010 WL 532428, at *4 (N.D. 

Cal. Feb. 9, 2010).

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For example, the below slide is from the attached presentation and “features photographs of 

Alexandria properties and unauthorized references to Alexandria and its registered LANDLORD 

OF CHOICE trademark.” Id. at ¶ 36.

Procedural History

On December 13, 2018, Plaintiff initiated suit by filing a complaint. ECF No. 1. On 

January 8. 2019, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. On January 22, 

2019, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”). ECF No. 21. Thus, on January 23, the 

Court denied as moot Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. ECF No. 22.

On January 24, 2019, Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss the FAC. ECF No. 23

(“Mot.”). On February 7, 2019, Plaintiff filed an opposition. ECF No. 30 (“Opp.”). On February 

14, 2019, Defendants filed a reply. ECF No. 31 (“Reply”). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2)

In a motion challenging personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(2), the plaintiff, as the party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court, has the 

burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists. See Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 

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F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004). When the motion to dismiss constitutes a defendant's initial 

response to the complaint, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing that personal 

jurisdiction exists. See Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th 

Cir.1977). While a plaintiff cannot “‘simply rest on the bare allegations of its complaint,’ 

uncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be taken as true [and] [c]onflicts between parties 

over statements contained in affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.” Schwarzenegger, 

374 F.3d at 800 (quoting Amba Mktg. Sys., Inc. v. Jobar Int’l, Inc., 551 F.2d 784, 787 (9th 

Cir.1977), and citing AT&T v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir.1996)).

Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include “a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A complaint 

that fails to meet this standard may be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that Rule 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead “enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, the Court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the 

pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & 

Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).

The Court, however, need not accept as true allegations contradicted by judicially 

noticeable facts, see Schwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000), and it “may look 

beyond the plaintiff’s complaint to matters of public record” without converting the Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion into a motion for summary judgment, Shaw v. Hahn, 56 F.3d 1128, 1129 n.1 (9th Cir. 

1995). Nor must the Court “assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in 

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the form of factual allegations.” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (per 

curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mere “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted 

inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 

(9th Cir. 2004).

Leave to Amend

If the Court determines that a complaint should be dismissed, it must then decide whether

to grant leave to amend. Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend 

“shall be freely given when justice so requires,” bearing in mind “the underlying purpose of Rule 

15 to facilitate decisions on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (alterations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). When dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim, “a district court should grant 

leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the 

pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Id. at 1130 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, leave to amend generally shall be denied only if allowing 

amendment would unduly prejudice the opposing party, cause undue delay, or be futile, or if the 

moving party has acted in bad faith. Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 

(9th Cir. 2008).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff brings 4 causes of action: (1) trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114; (2) 

unfair competition and false designation of origin under 15 U.S.C. § 1125; (3) false advertising 

under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); and (4) unfair competition under California’s Unfair Competition Law 

(“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq. FAC at ¶¶ 55-89. 

As a threshold matter, Defendants argue that they are not subject to this Court’s personal 

jurisdiction. Defendants also argue that each of Plaintiff’s causes of action should be dismissed for 

failure to state a claim. The Court finds the personal jurisdiction argument dispositive, so the 

Court need not address Defendants’ other arguments. The Court first addresses personal 

jurisdiction, then addresses Defendants’ request for judicial notice.

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Personal Jurisdiction

Defendants argue that they are not subject to either general jurisdiction or specific 

jurisdiction because RUNLABS UK and RUNLABS Ireland (“Corporate Defendants”) are 

incorporated and headquartered overseas, and because the corporate Defendants did not 

specifically target California in their communications. Mot. at 12. Defendants also argue that there 

is no general or specific jurisdiction over Steven Marcus (“Marcus”) because Marcus resides in 

London, and Marcus did not target California in his communications. Id. at 13.

Plaintiff does not argue that the Court has general jurisdiction over Defendants. Opp. at 5. 

Rather, Plaintiff only addresses specific jurisdiction and argues that Defendants have sufficient 

minimum contacts with California because Defendants purposefully directed infringing and 

misleading communications into the state; Plaintiff’s claims arise out of Defendants’ contacts with 

California; and exercising jurisdiction over Defendants would not offend traditional notions of fair 

play and substantial justice. Id. at 5-10. 

First, to determine the propriety of asserting personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the 

Court examines whether such jurisdiction is permitted by the applicable state’s long-arm statute 

and comports with the demands of federal due process. Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. 

Bell & Clements, Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2003). California’s long-arm statute, Cal. 

Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10, is coextensive with federal due process requirements, and therefore the 

jurisdictional analyses under state law and federal due process are the same. See Cal. Civ. Proc. 

Code § 410.10 (“[A] court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with 

the Constitution of this state or of the United States.”); Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 

647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011). For a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant 

consistent with due process, that defendant must have “certain minimum contacts” with the 

relevant forum “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair

play and substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting 

Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). In addition, “the defendant’s ‘conduct and 

connection with the forum State’ must be such that the defendant ‘should reasonably anticipate

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being haled into court there.’” Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting 

World-Wide Volkwagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).

A court may exercise either general or specific jurisdiction over a defendant. Ziegler v. 

Indian River Cty., 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1995). General jurisdiction exists where a defendant 

is physically present or where a defendant’s activities in the state are “continuous and systematic” 

such that the contacts approximate physical presence in the forum state. See Schwarzenegger v. 

Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). If general 

jurisdiction is inappropriate, a court may still exercise specific jurisdiction if the defendant’s 

“contacts with the forum give rise to the cause of action before the court.” Doe v. Unocal Corp., 

248 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2001). In ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction, a court may consider “evidence presented in affidavits to assist it in its 

determination.” Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other 

grounds as recognized in Williams v. Yamaha Motor Co., 851 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2017). The 

Court first discusses general jurisdiction, then turns to specific jurisdiction.

1. General Jurisdiction

General jurisdiction exists where a defendant is physically present or where a defendant’s 

activities in the state are “continuous and systematic” such that the contacts approximate physical 

presence in the forum state. See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 801. “General jurisdiction over a 

corporation is appropriate only when the corporation’s contacts with the forum state are so 

constant and pervasive as to render it essentially at home in the state.” Martinez v. Aero 

Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “With respect 

to a corporation, the place of incorporation and principal place of business are paradig[matic] . . . 

bases for general jurisdiction.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The Court first addresses whether the Court may exercise general 

jurisdiction over Corporate Defendants, then over Marcus.

a. General Jurisdiction over Corporate Defendants

Courts have rejected the notion that “general jurisdiction is appropriate whenever a 

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corporation engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business in a state,” 

because “[o]nly in an exceptional case will general jurisdiction be available” other than where a 

business is incorporated or has its principal place of business. Martinez, 764 F.3d at 1070. 

According to the FAC, RUNLABS Ireland is established under Irish law, and has its principal 

place of business in Dublin, Ireland. FAC at ¶ 6. RUNLABS UK is established under the laws of 

the United Kingdom, and has its principal place of business in London, United Kingdom. Id. at ¶

5. There are no allegations that the Corporate Defendants have any ties to California. Neither one 

of the Corporate Defendants is incorporated, or has its principal place of business, in California. 

Indeed, Marcus’ declaration in support of the motion to dismiss discloses that “RUNLABS does 

not conduct business in the US. It has no officers, directors, or employees in the United States, no 

operations in the United States, no offices or property in the United States, no customers in the 

United States, no suppliers in the United States, and no bank accounts in the United States.” ECF 

No. 23-1 (“Marcus Decl.”) at ¶ 7. Therefore, the Corporate Defendants are not subject to the 

Court’s general jurisdiction.

b. General Jurisdiction over Marcus

The Court may exercise general jurisdiction over a defendant who is domiciled in the 

forum state. Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998). Additionally, 

general jurisdiction over a nonresident exists where a defendant has “continuous and systematic” 

contacts with the forum state such that the defendant may be “haled into court in the forum state to 

answer for any of its activities anywhere in the world.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 801. The 

FAC concedes that Marcus resides in London, United Kingdom. Id. at ¶ 7. The FAC does not 

allege that Marcus is physically present in California, nor does it allege that Marcus’ activities in 

California are of a continuous and systematic nature that would support a finding of general 

jurisdiction. Indeed, the FAC is silent as to whether Marcus has any ties to California, other than 

allegedly playing a role in sending the email and presentation to Venrock, the venture capital firm 

with offices in California and New York. Id. at ¶ 28. Accordingly, Marcus is not subject to this 

Court’s general jurisdiction. The Court next turns to specific jurisdiction.

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2. Specific Jurisdiction

For specific personal jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a three-prong test that 

requires the plaintiff to show that: (1) the defendant purposefully directed its activities at residents 

of the forum or purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the forum; (2) the 

plaintiff’s claim arises out of or relates to those activities; and (3) the assertion of personal 

jurisdiction is reasonable and fair. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. It is the plaintiff’s burden to 

plead allegations satisfying the first two prongs. Id. If the plaintiff does so, the burden shifts to the 

defendant to show why the exercise of personal jurisdiction would not be reasonable and fair. Id.

The Court first considers specific jurisdiction over the Corporate Defendants, and then specific 

jurisdiction over Marcus.

a. Specific Jurisdiction over Corporate Defendants

The first prong of the Ninth Circuit’s three-prong test for personal jurisdiction requires that 

the defendant either purposefully directed its activities at residents of the forum or purposefully 

availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the forum. This is because under Ninth Circuit 

law, “we apply different purposeful availment tests to contract and tort cases.” Ziegler v. Indian 

River Cty., 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1995).

Under Ninth Circuit precedents, “the purposeful direction . . . requirement for specific 

jurisdiction is analyzed in intentional tort cases under the . . . test derived from Calder v. Jones . . . 

.” Dole Food Co., 303 F.3d at 1111. As a result, the Ninth Circuit applies the purposeful direction 

test to trademark cases because the Ninth Circuit has found that trademark cases are “akin to a tort 

case.” Delphix Corp. v. Embarcadero Techs., Inc., 749 Fed. App’x 502, 509 (9th Cir. 2018); see 

also, e.g., Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 246 F.3d 675, 675 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(applying purposeful direction analysis to trademark infringement lawsuit); AirWair Int’l Ltd. v. 

Schultz, 73 F. Supp. 3d 1225, 1232-33 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“For trademark infringement actions, the 

Ninth Circuit requires a showing of purposeful direction.”).

Likewise, courts in the Ninth Circuit require a showing of purposeful direction for claims 

brought pursuant to the UCL. See, e.g., Miller v. S&S Hay Co., 2013 WL 3212494, at *2 (E.D. 

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Cal. June 24, 2013) (examining whether defendant “purposefully directs his activities at the 

forum”). 

To establish purposeful direction, a plaintiff must satisfy a 3-prong test from the United 

States Supreme Court’s opinion in Calder v. Jones: (1) the defendant must have committed an 

intentional act; (2) the defendant’s act was expressly aimed at the forum state; and (3) the 

defendant knew the brunt of the harm was likely to be suffered in the forum state. Dole Food Co. 

v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-89 

(1984)). “Failing to sufficiently plead any one of these three elements [from Calder] is fatal to 

Plaintiff’s attempt to show personal jurisdiction.” Rupert v. Bond, 68 F. Supp. 3d 1142, 1163 

(N.D. Cal. 2014) (citing Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1128-29 

(9th Cir. 2010)); see also Michael v. New Century Fin. Servs., 65 F. Supp. 3d 797, 806-07 (N.D. 

Cal. 2014) (“Failing to plead any one of these three elements is fatal to Plaintiff’s attempt to 

exercise jurisdiction.”); McGibney v. Retzlaff, 2015 WL 3807671, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2015) 

(same). Next, the Court analyzes each part of the 3-prong Calder test as applied to Corporate 

Defendants.

i. Intentional Act

In the context of the Calder test, an intentional act is “an external manifestation of the 

actor’s intent to perform an actual, physical act in the real world.” Wash. Shoe Co. v. A-Z Sporting 

Goods, Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 2012); Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 806 (an intentional 

act “refers to an intent to perform an actual, physical act in the real world.”). 

Courts have found that sending an email, which is what took place in the instant case, is an 

intentional act. See, e.g., Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int’l, Inc., 874 F.3d 1064, 1067, 1069 

(9th Cir. 2017) (sending an email newsletter constituted an intentional act); Mireskandari v. 

Mayne, 2016 WL 1165896, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2016) (“Calling and sending an email to 

[plaintiff’s] doctor in California and calling [plaintiff’s] counsel in California are intentional 

acts.”); Rashidi v. Veritiss, LLC, 2016 WL 5219448, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2016) (“Mission 

Essential’s email to Rashidi was intentional.”).

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According to the presentation that was attached to the email sent to Venrock, the venture 

capital firm, the presentation was prepared by RUNLABS Ireland. ECF No. 1-3 at 24. Thus, upon 

reviewing the email and the attached presentation, it appears that RUNLABS UK had nothing to 

do with the communication with Venrock. As described above, RUNLABS Ireland and 

RUNLABS UK are different corporate entities. “The law allows corporations to organize for the 

purpose of isolating liability of related corporate entities. Only in unusual circumstances will the 

law permit a parent corporation to held either directly or indirectly liable for the acts of its 

subsidiary.” Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1234 (N.D. Cal. 2004) 

(internal citation omitted). Even assuming arguendo that one of the RUNLABS corporate entities

is the other’s subsidiary, it “is a general principle of corporate law deeply ingrained in our legal 

system that a corporation is not liable for the acts of its subsidiaries.” United States v. Bestfoods, 

524 U.S. 51, 68 (1998). 

Thus, the Court finds that RUNLABS Ireland has committed an intentional act by sending 

the email and presentation to Venrock principals. However, there is no evidence that RUNLABS 

UK committed an intentional act. As aforementioned, “[f]ailing to sufficiently plead any one of 

these three elements [from Calder] is fatal to Plaintiff’s attempt to show personal jurisdiction.” 

Rupert, 68 F. Supp. 3d at 1163 (citing Brayton Purcell LLP, 606 F.3d at 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2010)); 

see also Michael, 65 F. Supp. 3d at 806-07 (“Failing to plead any one of these three elements is 

fatal to Plaintiff’s attempt to exercise jurisdiction.”); McGibney v. Retzlaff, 2015 WL 3807671, at 

*4 (same).

Therefore, the Court concludes that there is no personal jurisdiction over RUNLABS UK. 

The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss RUNLABS UK from this case for lack of 

personal jurisdiction. Because granting Plaintiff an additional opportunity to amend the complaint 

would not be futile, cause undue delay, or unduly prejudice Defendants, and Plaintiff has not acted 

in bad faith, the Court grants leave to amend. See Leadsinger, Inc., 512 F.3d at 532.

As to RUNLABS Ireland, the Court next discusses the second part of the Calder test: 

whether “the defendant’s act was expressly aimed at the forum state.” Dole Food Co., 303 F.3d at

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1111. 

ii. Express Aiming

“Express aiming is an ill-defined concept that we have taken to mean ‘something more’ 

than ‘a foreign act with foreseeable effects in the forum state.’” Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, 

Ltd., 905 F.3d 565, 577 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat. Inc., 

223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000)). Courts “must look to the defendant’s ‘own contacts’ with 

the forum, not to the defendant’s knowledge of a plaintiff’s connections to a forum.’” Axiom 

Foods, 874 F.3d at 1070 (citing Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 289 (2014)). “‘[R]andom, 

fortuitous, or attenuated contacts’ are insufficient to create the requisite connection to the forum.” 

Mitchell v. Berwyn Partners, Inc., 2018 WL 3328220, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2018) (quoting 

Morrill v. Scott Fin. Corp., 873 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2017)). “Mere injury to a forum resident 

is not a sufficient connection to the forum.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 278. 

In Walden, which the United States Supreme Court decided in 2014, a police officer at the 

airport in Atlanta confiscated money from two Nevada-bound passengers. 571 U.S. at 279-80. The 

United States Supreme Court held that the police officer’s knowledge that his actions would cause 

harm to the plaintiffs in Nevada was not enough for a court in Nevada to exercise personal 

jurisdiction over the police officer. Id. at 289. The United States Supreme Court stressed that 

personal jurisdiction arises out of a defendant’s own contacts with the forum state, not out of a 

plaintiff’s or third party’s contacts with the forum state. Id. at 285. “To be sure, a defendant’s 

contacts with the forum State may be intertwined with his transactions or interactions with the 

plaintiff or other parties. But a defendant’s relationship with a plaintiff or third party, standing 

alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction.” Id. at 286. Although the United States Supreme 

Court explicitly acknowledged that the facts of Walden “d[id] not present the very different 

questions whether and how a defendant’s virtual ‘presence’ and conduct translate into ‘contacts’ 

with a particular State,” id. at 290 n.9, the Ninth Circuit in Axiom Foods applied Walden to 

analyze whether emails sent to recipients in a forum state, without more, conferred personal 

jurisdiction. 

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Axiom Foods involved the distribution of an email newsletter that allegedly violated 

several trademarks to 343 email recipients, 55 of whom had companies in California and 10 of 

whom were physically located in California. The Ninth Circuit first rejected as too attenuated the 

fact that 55 recipients had companies in California, particularly where there was no information 

about the residence of those recipients or the legal or operational relationships between those 

recipients and their companies. 874 F.3d at 1070. Focusing on the 10 recipients who were 

physically located in California, the Ninth Circuit held that “[i]t can hardly be said that California 

was the focal point both of the newsletter and of the harm suffered.” Id. at 1070-71 (internal 

quotation marks and alterations omitted). The Ninth Circuit stressed that sending one newsletter to 

a maximum of 10 recipients located in California, in a market where the defendant had no sales or 

clients, “barely connected [the defendant] to California residents, much less to California itself.” 

Id. at 1071.

Axiom Foods is highly analogous to the instant case. Here, an email that allegedly 

infringed Plaintiff’s trademarks was sent to “three principals based in the Palo Alto and New York 

offices of [Venrock,] a prominent venture capital fund and investor in Alexandria.” FAC at ¶ 28. 

This is akin to Axiom Foods, in which the defendant sent hundreds of emails that allegedly 

violated the Axiom Foods’ plaintiff’s trademarks. 874 F.3d at 1070.

Here, Plaintiff is only aware of one such email that allegedly infringes Plaintiff’s 

trademarks, though Plaintiff alleges that upon information and belief, “Defendants sent many such 

communications to those in the start-up, life sciences, and technology communities in Northern 

California.” FAC at ¶ 28. However, the affidavit of Defendant Steven Marcus states that “[t]he 

communications about which Plaintiff complains were created in and sent from the European 

Union. These targeted investor communications were distributed on an exceptionally limited basis, 

and principally in the European Union.” Marcus Decl. at ¶ 8 (emphasis added). “[F]or purposes of 

personal jurisdiction, we may not assume the truth of allegations in a pleading which are 

contradicted by affidavit.” Alexander v. Circus Circus Enterps., Inc., 972 F.2d 261, 262 (9th Cir. 

1992); see also Mavrix Photo, Inc., 647 F.3d at 1223 (holding that for purposes of personal 

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jurisdiction, “we may not assume the truth of allegations in a pleading which are contradicted by 

affidavit”). Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant sent “many such communications to those in the 

start-up, life sciences, and technology communities in Northern California,” FAC at ¶ 28, is cast 

into doubt by Marcus’ declaration, which disclosed that the emails were sent to an extremely 

limited number of individuals mainly in the European Union, Marcus Decl. at ¶ 8. Therefore, this 

Court need not presume the truth of the allegation that Defendants sent “many” infringing emails 

to Northern Californian recipients. Thus, the only remaining allegation regarding the recipients of 

the purportedly infringing email and attached presentation is that three principals of Venrock, a 

venture capital firm based in Palo Alto and New York, received the email and attached 

presentation. FAC at ¶ 28.

However, under Axiom Foods, the Venrock email fails to establish that RUNLABS Ireland 

expressly aimed its conduct at any Californians, let alone California as the forum state. In Axiom 

Foods, the email communication was sent to fifty-five recipients with companies in California. 

874 F.3d at 1070. Here, the allegedly infringing email was sent to three principals of Venrock, 

which has a presence in both California and New York. As required, the court focuses on “the 

defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who 

reside there.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 285. By that standard, the evidence demonstrates that

RUNLABS Ireland did not create minimum contacts with California. The Court lacks information 

concerning the residence of the three Venrock recipients of the allegedly infringing email, much 

like how in Axiom Foods, the court lacked “information concerning the residence of the 55 

recipients and the legal and operational relationships among the 55 recipients and their respective 

companies.” 874 F.3d at 1070. There is no evidence that the three Venrock principals who 

received the allegedly infringing email are even California residents, as the FAC alleges that 

Venrock has an office in New York. FAC at ¶ 28. So, as Axiom Foods held, “any California 

contacts [defendant] created by sending a single newsletter to 55 recipients of unknown residence 

are too attenuated and isolated to support the exercise of jurisdiction.” 874 F.3d at 1070 (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted). Here, there are even fewer recipients of unknown 

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residence than in Axiom Foods: three recipients, as opposed to fifty-five recipients in Axiom

Foods. 

Moreover, according to Marcus’ Declaration: 

RUNLABS does not conduct business in the US. It has no officers, 

directors, or employees in the United States, no operations in the 

United States, no offices or property in the United States, no customer 

in the United states, no suppliers in the United States, and no bank 

accounts in the United States. It is not registered to do business in 

California, or in any other State. It has no subsidiaries, no parent 

corporation, no owners, and no affiliates in the United States.

Marcus Decl. at ¶ 7. Marcus’ Declaration not distinguish between RUNLABS Ireland and 

RUNLABS UK. Nevertheless, the fact that both RUNLABS entities do not do business in the 

United States is unrebutted. In essence, Marcus confirms that RUNLABS has no business ties to 

the United States. Similarly, in Axiom Foods, the fact that the defendant itself “conducts no 

business in California” supported the Axiom Foods court’s conclusion that it “can hardly be said 

that ‘California [wa]s the focal point both of the [newsletter] and of the harm suffered,’” 874 F.3d 

at 1070 (quoting Walden, 571 U.S. at 287), even though ten of the Axiom Foods email newsletter 

recipients were known to be physically located in California, id. at 1070.

Plaintiff argues that “the record is sufficient to support personal jurisdiction based on 

Defendants’ acts of sending promotional materials touting their business and seeking investment 

within the United States.” Opp. at 7. However, Plaintiff’s argument misses the mark. Per Axiom 

Foods, “the fact that 144 email addresses belong to [plaintiffs’] actual or potential partners, 

customers, or suppliers [does not] compel a different result. The foreseeability of injury in a forum 

is not a sufficient benchmark for exercising personal jurisdiction.” 874 F.3d at 1070.

Plaintiff also cites Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2002), as 

an example of when the Ninth Circuit upheld a finding of personal jurisdiction over foreign 

defendants alleged to have infringed plaintiff’s trademark in the song “Barbie Girl.” However, 

Mattel is highly distinguishable as the Mattel defendant’s contact with California, the forum state, 

was much more extensive than RUNLABS Ireland’s contact with California in the instant case. 

For instance, in Mattel, “Defendants entered into cross-licensing agreements and developed a 

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coordinated plan to distribute the Barbie Girl song in the United States (including California), and 

sent promotional copies of the Barbie Girl single and the Aquarium album to the United States 

(including California).” Id. By contrast, here, one allegedly infringing email was sent to three 

individuals whose residences are unknown; RUNLABS Ireland, not RUNLABS UK, was 

responsible for the allegedly infringing email; no agreements were proposed or entered into; and 

there was no coordinated plan to distribute any of the allegedly infringing materials to a wider 

audience in California. Marcus Decl. at ¶ 8 (“These targeted investor communications were 

distributed on an exceptionally limited basis, and principally in the European Union.”). 

Moreover, Plaintiff also cites Sidco Indus. Inc. v. Wimar Tahoe Corp., 768 F. Supp. 1343, 

1348 (D. Or. 1991), in support of Plaintiff’s position. In Sidco, the court found there was personal 

jurisdiction over a defendant who “sent direct mail brochures to almost every travel agent in the 

State of Oregon.” Id. Specifically, the defendant sent 378 brochures to Oregon travel agents, 

whereas there were approximately 405 Oregon travel agents in total. Id. However, Sidco is 

distinguishable because the Sidco defendant’s contacts with Oregon resulted from sending “direct 

mail brochures to almost every travel agent in the State of Oregon.” Id. In Sidco, defendant 

distributed “[s]ome 40,000 of these brochures” throughout the United States. Id.

By contrast, in the instant case, an exceptionally limited number of emails was sent, 

principally in the European Union. The one specific email Plaintiff cites was sent to three 

principals of Venrock, which has offices in California and New York. It is not known whether 

these three principals are even California residents. These facts stand in sharp contrast to the 378

brochures mailed to travel agents known to be Oregon residents in Sidco. The facts of the instant 

case are more analogous to the Ninth Circuit’s 2017 Axiom case, in which the Ninth Circuit found 

that distribution of an email newsletter to 343 email recipients, 55 of whom had companies in 

California, and 10 of whom were physically located in California, was too tenuous to satisfy the 

express aiming prong of the Calder test.

In sum, because RUNLABS Ireland does not meet the express aiming prong of the Calder

test, under Axiom Foods, the Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over RUNLABS Ireland.

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See, e.g., Axiom Foods, 874 F.3d at 1071 n.6 (“Having decided that [plaintiffs] do not meet their 

burden with respect to the second prong of the purposeful direction test, we need not address the 

last prong.”).

Thus, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss RUNLABS Ireland from this 

case for lack of personal jurisdiction. Because granting Plaintiff an additional opportunity to 

amend the complaint would not be futile, cause undue delay, or unduly prejudice Defendants, and 

Plaintiff has not acted in bad faith, the Court grants leave to amend. See Leadsinger, Inc., 512 F.3d 

at 532.

b. Specific Jurisdiction over Marcus

As mentioned above, to establish purposeful direction, a plaintiff must satisfy a 3-part test 

from the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Calder v. Jones: (1) the defendant must have 

committed an intentional act; (2) the defendant’s act was expressly aimed at the forum state; and 

(3) the defendant knew the brunt of the harm was likely to be suffered in the forum state. Dole 

Food, 303 F.3d at 1111 (citing Calder, 465 U.S. 788-89).

The Court finds that analyzing the second prong of the Calder test—whether the 

defendant’s act was expressly aimed at the forum state—is dispositive, and thus the Court need 

not address any of the other prongs because “[f]ailing to sufficiently plead any one of these three 

elements [from Calder] is fatal to Plaintiff’s attempt to show personal jurisdiction.” Rupert, 68 F. 

Supp. 3d at 1163 (citing Brayton Purcell LLP, 606 F.3d at 1128-29); see also Michael, 65 F. Supp. 

3d at 806-07 (“Failing to plead any one of these three elements is fatal to Plaintiff’s attempt to 

exercise jurisdiction.”); McGibney v. Retzlaff, 2015 WL 3807671, at *4 (same).

i. Express Aiming

The analysis of whether Marcus expressly aimed the emails at California does not differ 

from the Court’s analysis of whether RUNLABS Ireland expressly aimed RUNLABS Ireland’s

conduct at California. Again, Axiom Foods controls the outcome of this Court’s express aiming 

analysis.

Other than pleading that Defendants as a whole (including RUNLABS UK and RUNLABS 

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Ireland) sent an allegedly infringing email to three Venrock principals based in the Palo Alto and 

New York offices, FAC at ¶ 28, the FAC provides no additional detail as to Marcus’ contacts with 

California, the forum state. Thus, for all the same reasons the Court found no personal jurisdiction 

over RUNLABS Ireland, the Court finds that there is no personal jurisdiction over Marcus.

For instance, in Axiom Foods, the email newsletter that allegedly infringed the Axiom 

Foods’ plaintiff’s trademarks was sent to fifty-five recipients with companies in California. 874 

F.3d at 1070. Here, the allegedly infringing email was sent to three principals of Venrock, which 

has a presence in both California and New York. Yet Plaintiff does not even know whether the 

three Venrock principals are residents of California. As Axiom Foods held, “any California 

contacts [defendant] created by sending a single newsletter to 55 recipients of unknown residence 

are too attenuated and isolated to support the exercise of jurisdiction.” 874 F.3d at 1070 (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Here, Plaintiff is only able to cite to one email sent to three Venrock principals as evidence 

of Marcus’ alleged contact with California. Plaintiff hypothesizes that “many such 

communications” were sent to Northern California residents, FAC at ¶ 28, but this is disputed by 

Marcus’ declaration, which states that the email communications “were distributed on an 

exceptionally limited basis, and principally in the European Union,” Marcus Decl. at ¶ 8. “[F]or 

purposes of personal jurisdiction, we may not assume the truth of allegations in a pleading which 

are contradicted by affidavit.” Alexander, 972 F.2d at 262. Thus, the Court does not consider 

Plaintiff’s conjecture that “many such” emails were sent to Northern California residents, FAC at ¶

28, as Marcus’ declaration makes clear that the emails were distributed on an “exceptionally 

limited basis,” Marcus Decl. at ¶ 8. But had even more emails been sent to residents of the 

Northern District of California, the Axiom Foods court held that ten email recipients known to be 

located in California can hardly be said to demonstrate that “‘California [wa]s the focal point both 

of the [email newsletter] and of the harm suffered,’” 874 F.3d at 1070 (quoting Walden, 571 U.S. 

at 287).

Moreover, there are no allegations that Marcus conducts business in California, which is 

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buttressed by Marcus’ Declaration that “RUNLABS does not conduct business in the US.” Marcus 

Decl. at ¶ 7. The Ninth Circuit stressed that sending one newsletter to a maximum of 10 recipients 

known to be located in California, in a market where the defendant had no sales or clients, “barely 

connected [the defendant] to California residents, much less to California itself.” Axiom Foods, 

874 F.3d at 1071. 

In sum, Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of attributing Marcus’ actions to direct 

aiming at California as the forum state. Thus, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss 

Marcus from this case for lack of personal jurisdiction. Because granting Plaintiff an additional 

opportunity to amend the complaint would not be futile, cause undue delay, or unduly prejudice 

Defendants, and Plaintiff has not acted in bad faith, the Court grants leave to amend. See

Leadsinger, Inc., 512 F.3d at 532.

Request for Judicial Notice

Defendants have requested that the Court take judicial notice of Venrock’s responses to

RUNLABS Ireland’s email and presentation. Reply at 2. Defendants’ request for judicial notice is 

DENIED as moot because the Court does not rely on Venrock’s responses in the instant order.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss without 

prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Should Plaintiff elect to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified 

herein, Plaintiff shall do so within 30 days. Failure to file an amended complaint within 30 days or 

failure to cure the deficiencies identified in this Order or in Plaintiff’s brief will result in dismissal 

with prejudice of the claims dismissed in this Order. Plaintiff may not add new causes of actions 

or parties without leave of the Court or stipulation of the parties pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 15.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 1, 2019

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______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

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