Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00785/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00785-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ping Ping Zhou, 

Petitioner,

vs.

Katrina Kane, et al., 

Respondents.

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No. CV 07-0785-PHX-DGC (ECV)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON

TEMPORARY STAY OF REMOVAL

The Court has entered a Temporary Stay of Removal enjoining Petitioner’s removal

from the United States until Friday, June 29, 2007. Dkt. #19. This Memorandum explains

the Court’s reasoning for that decision.

I. Background.

Petitioner is a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China who entered the

United States on August 11, 2003. Upon her arrival, Petitioner was apprehended by

immigration officials and placed in detention. On December 2, 2003, an immigration judge

denied Petitioner’s application for asylum and entered an order for her removal from the

United States as an unlawful arriving alien. Petitioner did not appeal from the immigration

judge’s decision. On June 16, 2004, following a “Post Order Custody Review,” Petitioner

was granted release under an order of supervision pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3).

On March 29, 2006, Petitioner married a United States citizen and they now have a

United States citizen child. On April 10, 2006, Petitioner’s husband filed a Form I-130

Relative Immigrant Visa Petition on Petitioner’s behalf. On July 14, 2006, the United States

Customs and Immigration Services (CIS) approved the I-130 petition. Petitioner thereafter

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requested that the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) join her in a motion to

reopen her removal proceedings to allow her to apply to adjust her status. In November

2006, ICE declined Petitioner’s request.

On March 21, 2007, Petitioner was served with a Notice of Revocation of Release and

taken into ICE custody. On April 4, 2007, Petitioner submitted a Request for Parole for

Consideration of Adjustment of Status. On May 17, 2007, Petitioner filed a Form I-485

Application for Adjustment of Status with CIS. Petitioner avers that her requests for parole

and for adjustment of status are still pending.

On April 14, 2007, Petitioner initiated this action by filing a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (Dkt. #1) and a Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. #2) seeking a stay

of removal pending a determination on the merits of her underlying Petition. On April 16,

2007, the Court denied Petitioner’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction because she had failed

to demonstrate that her removal was imminent. The Court, however, required Respondents

to file a Notice of Intent to Remove if they intended to remove Petitioner prior to the

disposition of her Petition. The Court also required Respondents to answer the Petition.

Respondents’ subsequent Motion for Enlargement of Time (Dkt. #12) has been granted (Dkt.

#14) and Respondents’ answer to the Petition is due on June 1, 2007.

On May 18, 2007, Respondents filed a Notice of Intent to Remove (Dkt. #15)

indicating that they planned to remove Petitioner from the United States on May 24, 2007.

On May 16, 2007, Petitioner filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Dkt. #16)

seeking a stay of removal. On May 23, 2007, Respondents filed a Response in Opposition

to Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Dkt. #18) and, on the same day, the

Court heard oral argument on Petitioner’s Motion.

On May 24, 2007, the Court granted Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining

Order and enjoined Petitioner’s removal from the United States until Friday, June 29, 2007.

The Court also set a briefing schedule on Petitioner’s application for a preliminary

injunction. The parties’ briefs should address, among other matters, the issues raised in this

Memorandum.

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II. Jurisdiction.

Respondents argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain Petitioner’s underlying

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Respondents first argue that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5)

deprives the Court of jurisdiction because it provides that the “sole and exclusive means for

judicial review of an order of removal” is a petition for review in the court of appeals. But

Petitioner is not seeking review of an order of removal. Rather, she argues that it would

violate her due process rights to deport her from the United States before her application for

adjustment of status has been adjudicated. Because Petitioner’s claim does not seek “review

of an order of removal,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) does not bar this habeas corpus action.

A more difficult issue is presented by Respondents’ argument that the Court lacks

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g):

Exclusive Jurisdiction. - Except as provided in this section and

notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory),

including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas

corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, no court shall have

jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from

the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings,

adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this Act.

The Supreme Court has held that § 1252(g) “applies only to three discrete actions that the

Attorney General may take; [his] ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate

cases, or execute removal orders.’” Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee,

525 U.S. 472, 482 (1999) (emphasis in original). Section 1252(g) “was directed against a

particular evil: attempts to impose judicial constraints upon prosecutorial discretion.” Id. at

485 n.9. 

The Ninth Circuit has narrowly construed § 1252(g). Kwai Fun Wong v. United

States, 373 F.3d 952, 964 (9th Cir. 2004). “[T]he reference to executing removal orders

appearing in § 1252(g) should be interpreted narrowly, and not as referring to the underlying

merits of the removal decision.” Id. (citing Maharaj v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 963, 965 (9th Cir.

2002)) (internal quotations omitted). For this reason, § 1252(g) does not bar “all claims

relating in any way to deportation proceedings.” Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc. v. INS, 232 F.3d

1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Rather, § 1252(g) is limited to the discretionary

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exercise of removal power and does not apply to purely legal questions that do not challenge

the Attorney General’s discretion. United States v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144, 1155 (9th Cir.

2004).

Construing the statute narrowly, the Ninth Circuit has held that § 1252(g) does not

divest courts of jurisdiction to hear certain constitutional challenges to immigration and

deportation policies and procedures. See Catholic Soc. Servs., 232 F.3d at 1150 (§ 1252(g)

did not prevent the district court from granting a preliminary injunction in a class action

challenging advance parole policy); Sulit v. Schiltgen, 213 F.3d 449 (9th Cir. 2000) (section

1252(g) did not prevent due process claims relating to seizure of green cards and failure to

notify aliens of requirement that they surrender for deportation); Barahona-Gomez v. Reno,

167 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 1999) (district court had jurisdiction to grant a stay of

deportation to a class of aliens to allow them to challenge certain INS regulations); Walters

v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 1998) (district court had jurisdiction to grant injunctive

relief to a class of aliens challenging certain deportation procedures on due process grounds).

The Ninth Circuit has flatly rejected the argument that a district court lacks “jurisdiction to

order any relief that interfered with [the Government’s] attempt to execute deportation

orders[.]” Barahona-Gomez, 167 F.3d at 1234 (citing Walters, 145 F.3d at 1052). 

Here, Petitioner does not challenge the Attorney General’s exercise of discretion – she

does not argue that the decision to execute her removal order was an abuse of discretion. She

instead makes the legal argument that her removal would violate her constitutional and

statutory rights. Even though the REAL ID Act of 2005 stripped courts of jurisdiction to

consider habeas corpus petitions that challenge certain aspects of the Attorney General’s

discretionary authority, a court may still decide habeas claims that involve a constitutional

or statutory challenge to immigration proceedings. See, e.g., Madu v. United States Attorney

General, 470 F.3d 1362, 1367 (11th Cir. 2006). 

For these reasons, Petitioner’s habeas corpus claim seems to fall outside the reach of

§ 1252(g) and the Court therefore exercised jurisdiction to grant the temporary restraining

order. The Court recognizes, however, that § 1252(g) is worded broadly, and this

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preliminary determination is not intended to preclude the parties from further addressing this

issue in the briefing called for in the Court’s temporary restraining order. 

In any event, because the Court retains jurisdiction to decide whether it has

jurisdiction, see Lopez-Molina v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1206, 1208 (9th Cir. 2004), the lack of

a final answer on the issue does not preclude the entry of an order maintaining the status quo

until additional briefing can be reviewed.

III. Temporary Stay of Removal.

A. Standard.

The standard for a stay of removal is the same as the standard for a preliminary

injunction. Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Abbassi v. INS, 143

F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Maharaj v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir.

2002) (applying the same standard to motions for stay of removal pending appeal from a

decision denying an alien’s habeas petition). A party seeking a stay of removal must

demonstrate “‘either (1) a probability of success on the merits and the possibility of

irreparable injury, or (2) that serious legal questions are raised and the balance of hardship

tips sharply in [its] favor.’” Andreiu, 253 F.3d at 483 (quoting Abbassi, 143 F.3d at 514).

“‘These standards represent the outer extremes of a continuum, with the relative hardships

to the parties providing the critical element in determining at what point on the continuum

a stay pending review is justified.’” Andreiu, 253 F.3d at 483 (quoting Abbassi, 143 F.3d at

514).

B. Balance of Hardships.

Respondents concede that Petitioner “presents a sympathetic case and no doubt would

have hardships were she removed from the United States.” Dkt. #18 at 10. But they assert

that Petitioner is not entitled to a stay of removal because the harm she would suffer as a

consequence of her removal is not irreparable. They argue that if she is removed, Petitioner

would be eligible to apply for an immigrant visa through Consular Officer processing in

China.

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1

 The regulations were identical, but § 245.1 applied to agencies within the DHS,

whereas § 1245.1 applied to the immigration courts and the BIA. The regulations provided:

(c) . . . The following categories of aliens are ineligible to apply for

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The possibility that Petitioner might be eligible to return to the United States at some

uncertain date in the future does not obviate the irreparable harm Petitioner would suffer if

she were removed. Even if the Court assumes that Petitioner could some day return to the

United States from China (a fact that is not certain), Petitioner’s separation from her husband

and young child for many months or, more likely, years, would cause her substantial and

irreparable harm. Counsel for Petitioner also informed the Court during the hearing that

Petitioner is pregnant. Giving birth while separated from her husband and child would

impose additional hardship. Respondents, by contrast, will suffer little or no hardship if

Petitioner’s removal is delayed. The Court therefore finds that the balance of hardships tips

sharply in Petitioner’s favor. Accordingly, if there is a serious question on the merits, a stay

of removal should be granted.

C. Serious Question on the Merits.

Petitioner claims that she has a right to apply for an adjustment of her status and that

it would violate her due process rights to deport her before her application is adjudicated.

Specifically, she argues that an Interoffice Memorandum issued by the CIS on January 12,

2007, grants her the right to apply for an adjustment of status. The Court finds that the issue

of Petitioner’s right to apply to adjust her status raises a serious question, but that the right,

if it exists, arises not from the CIS Interoffice Memorandum, but from 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).

The CIS issued the Interoffice Memorandum to revise its Adjudicator’s Field Manual

in order to account for an interim rule issued by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

on May 12, 2006. The Interim Rule was enacted in response to Bona v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d

663 (9th Cir. 2005), and other cases which invalidated the regulations – 8 C.F.R. §§

245.1(c)(8), 1245.1(c)(8) – that prohibited arriving aliens who have been placed in removal

from seeking an adjustment of their status.1

 71 Fed. Reg. 27585 (May 12, 2006).

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adjustment of their status to that of a lawful permanent resident alien under

section 245 of the Act[, 8 U.S.C. § 1255]:

. . . .

(8) Any arriving alien who is in removal proceedings pursuant to section

235(b)(1) or section 240 of the Act . . . .

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The petitioner in Bona was an arriving alien who had been paroled into the United

States in 1991. Later that same year, her husband became a naturalized citizen. After her

husband’s naturalization, Bona applied to adjust her status. The former Immigration and

Naturalization Service denied Bona’s application for adjustment and revoked her parole.

Years later, Bona was placed in removal proceedings where she made a new application to

adjust her status. The immigration judge found that Bona was removable. He also denied

her application for adjustment because, as an arriving alien in removal proceedings, she was

ineligible for such relief under the regulations.

On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Bona argued that the regulations prohibiting arriving

aliens from applying to adjust their status in removal proceedings are in direct conflict with

8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that the regulations “directly conflict[]

with 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), which allows any alien who has been ‘inspected and admitted or

paroled’ into the country to apply for adjustment of status.” Bona, 425 F.3d at 668

(emphasis in original). The Ninth Circuit explained that in enacting 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)

Congress “made the clear policy choice that [paroled inadmissible aliens] should be eligible

to apply for adjustment of status.” Bona, 425 F.3d at 669. 

By entirely excluding a category of aliens from the ability to apply for

adjustment, who by statute are eligible to apply for such relief, the regulation

goes beyond simply regulating the manner in which such applications shall be

made or the discretionary decision to grant such relief. Rather, the regulation

strips statutory eligibility for such relief in any form from this entire category

of aliens once they are placed in removal proceedings. The statute provides for

no such restriction . . . .

 Although Congress delegated to the Attorney General the discretionary

authority to grant or deny an application for an adjustment of status, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1255(a), Congress did not delegate to the Attorney General the discretion to

choose who was eligible to apply for such relief. Thus, . . . Congress has

spoken to the precise issue of who is eligible to apply for adjustment of status

and . . . 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(c)(8) is directly contrary to this Congressional

determination.

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Id. at 670-71.

On May 12, 2006, the Attorney General, noting that there was an inter-circuit conflict

on the validity of the regulations, determined to resolve the controversy by repealing 8 C.F.R.

§§ 245.1(c)(8) and 1245.1(c)(8) in an interim rule. 71 Fed. Reg. 27585. The Attorney

General’s interim rule also amended the regulations to clarify which departmental component

has jurisdiction to adjudicate adjustment of status applications made by paroled arriving

aliens who have been placed in removal proceedings. Id. The Interoffice Memorandum

issued by the CIS on January 12, 2007 does not alter the regulatory landscape with respect

to an arriving alien’s eligibility to apply for adjustment of status. The Interoffice

Memorandum merely explains that 8 C.F.R. §§ 245.1(c)(8) and 1245.1(c)(8) have been

repealed and provides guidance about which departmental component has jurisdiction to

adjudicate adjustment of status applications. Thus, nothing in either the interim rule or the

Interoffice Memorandum altered the rule announced in Bona: under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) an

arriving alien who has been paroled into the United States is eligible to apply for an

adjustment of status notwithstanding the commencement of removal proceedings.

If Petitioner is an arriving alien who has been paroled into the United States, she has

a statutory right under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) to apply for an adjustment of her status. See Bona

425 F.3d at 670-71. Thus, Petitioner’s claim that her due process rights would be violated

by her removal from the United States before she can exercise her right to seek that relief

presents a serious question. Respondents object on the ground that Petitioner has no due

process liberty interest in obtaining adjustment of her status because adjustment of status is

purely discretionary. It is true that Petitioner has no constitutional right to obtain an

adjustment of status, but Petitioner is not asking the Court to adjust her status. Rather, she

argues that she has the right to a ruling on her eligibility for discretionary relief. 

Traditionally, the courts recognized a distinction between eligibility for

discretionary relief, on the one hand, and the favorable exercise, on the other

hand. Eligibility that was “governed by specific statutory standards” provided

“a right to a ruling on an applicant’s eligibility,” even though the actual

granting of relief was “not a matter of right under any circumstances, but

rather is in all cases a matter of grace.” Thus, even though the actual

suspension of deportation authorized by § 19(c) of the Immigration Act of

1917 was a matter of grace, in United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy,

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347 U.S. 260, we held that a deportable alien had a right to challenge the

Executive’s failure to exercise the discretion authorized by the law.

INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 307-08 (2001) (quoting Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 353-354

(1956)). As in St. Cyr, this Court’s “exercise of . . . habeas corpus jurisdiction to answer a

pure question of law . . . is entirely consistent with the exercise of such jurisdiction in

Accardi.” St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 308.

The parties have not adequately briefed the question of whether Petitioner qualifies

under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) as an arriving alien who has been paroled into the United States.

But the Court need not resolve that question now. It is sufficient for present purposes that

Petitioner has raised serious questions on the merits of her claim.

IV. Conclusion.

The balance of hardships tips sharply in Petitioner’s favor and she has raised a serious

question on the merits of her claim. Petitioner has therefore satisfied the requirements for

a temporary restraining order as provided in the Court’s Temporary Stay of Removal

(Dkt. #13). The parties’ briefs on Petitioner’s application for a preliminary injunction should

address, among other matters, the issues raised in this Memorandum.

DATED this 29th day of May, 2007.

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