Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_19-cv-00063/USCOURTS-ared-5_19-cv-00063-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

PINE BLUFF DIVISION 

DEVERICK SCOTT PLAINTIFF 

ADC #131042 

v. 5:19-cv-00063-DPM-JJV 

GIBSON, Warden, DEFENDANTS 

Varner Unit, et al. 

 PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INSTRUCTIONS 

The following recommended disposition has been sent to Chief United States Judge D.P. 

Marshall Jr. Any party may serve and file written objections to this recommendation. Objections 

should be specific and should include the factual or legal basis for the objection. If the objection 

is to a factual finding, specifically identify that finding and the evidence that supports your 

objection. An original and one copy of your objections must be received in the office of the United 

States District Court Clerk no later than fourteen (14) days from the date of the findings and 

recommendations. The copy will be furnished to the opposing party. Failure to file timely 

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 

 If you are objecting to the recommendation and also desire to submit new, different, or 

additional evidence, and to have a hearing for this purpose before the District Judge, you must, at 

the same time that you file your written objections, include the following: 

 1. Why the record made before the Magistrate Judge is inadequate. 

 2. Why the evidence proffered at the hearing (if such a hearing is granted) was not 

offered at the hearing before the Magistrate Judge. 

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 3. The details of any testimony desired to be introduced at the new hearing in the 

form of an offer of proof, and a copy, or the original, of any documentary or other nontestimonial evidence desired to be introduced at the new hearing. 

 From this submission, the District Judge will determine the necessity for an additional 

evidentiary hearing. Mail your objections and “Statement of Necessity” to: 

Clerk, United States District Court 

Eastern District of Arkansas 

600 West Capitol Avenue, Suite A149 

Little Rock, AR 72201-3325 

DISPOSITION 

I. INTRODUCTION 

 On February 11, 2019, Deverick Scott (“Plaintiff”) sued multiple Arkansas Department of 

Corrections (“ADC”) officials alleging violations of his rights under the First Amendment and the 

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) that allegedly occurred during 

his incarceration at the ADC’s Varner Unit, as well as alleging retaliation. (Doc. No. 2.) 

Specifically, Plaintiff, whose religion is “One God,” or “G,” alleged his rights were violated in 

three ways: (A) denial of a Ramadan meal; (B) denial of Ramadan feast; and (C) denial of religious 

texts. (Id.) His retaliation claim is related to the denial of religious texts. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks 

injunctive relief as well as damages. (Id.) 

 Defendants have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. Nos. 47-49.) Plaintiff has 

responded (Doc. Nos. 50-53) and Defendants have replied (Doc. No. 57); this matter is now ripe 

for a decision. After careful review, and for the following reasons, I find Defendants’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment should be GRANTED and this case DISMISSED. 

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II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 

 Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper “if 

the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party asserting that a fact cannot be or 

is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by citing to particular parts of materials in the 

record, “including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or 

declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, 

interrogatory answers, or other materials[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).

 When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in a 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Naucke v. City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 927 (8th 

Cir. 2002). The nonmoving party may not rely on allegations or denials, but must demonstrate the 

existence of specific facts that create a genuine issue for trial. Mann v. Yarnell, 497 F.3d 822, 825 

(8th Cir. 2007). The nonmoving party’s allegations must be supported by sufficient probative 

evidence that would permit a finding in his favor on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or 

fantasy. Id. (citations omitted). A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a 

reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party; a fact is material if its resolution affects the 

outcome of the case. Othman v. City of Country Club Hills, 671 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 2012). 

Disputes that are not genuine or that are about facts that are not material will not preclude summary 

judgment. Sitzes v. City of West Memphis, Ark., 606 F.3d 461, 465 (8th Cir. 2010). 

III. ANALYSIS 

 For the reasons set out below, summary judgment should be entered in Defendants’ favor 

and Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed. 

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 A. Official Capacity Damages Claims Barred by Eleventh Amendment 

Plaintiff sued Defendants in both their personal and official capacities and seeks damages, 

among other relief. (Doc. No. 2 at 8-9.) His official capacity claims for damages are barred 

pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 

58, 71 (1989) (a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the 

official but rather a suit against the official’s office and, as such, is no different from a suit against 

the state itself, which is barred by the Eleventh Amendment unless the state has waived its 

immunity); Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 493-94 (8th Cir. 1991) (the State of Arkansas has not 

waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity). Further, Arkansas has not waived immunity for 

claims brought under § 1983 and RLUIPA’s language does not effect a waiver of a state’s 

sovereign immunity. Murphy v. Arkansas, 127 F.3d 750, 754 (8th Cir. 1997); Sossamon v. Texas, 

563 U.S. 277, 285-86, 293 (2011); Van Wyhe v. Reisch, 581 F.3d 639 (8th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, 

I recommend Plaintiff’s official capacity damages claims be dismissed. 

B. Individual Capacity RLUIPA Claims 

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that because Title IX 

was enacted under the Spending Clause, “Title IX will not support an action against [a school 

official] in her individual capacity.” Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 171 F.3d 607, 610-11 (8th 

Cir.1999). This is the same rationale for rejecting individual liability under RLUIPA adopted by 

the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182 

(4th Cir. 2009) and the Seventh Circuit in Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 885-89 (7th Cir. 2009) 

(abrogated on other grounds Jones v. Carter, 915 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2019)). The Court of Appeals 

for the Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment where the district court dismissed a plaintiff’s 

RLUIPA damages claims against ADC officials. Heikkila v. Kelley, 776 Fed. Appx. 927, 928 (8th 

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2019) (per curiam) (citing Haight v. Thompson, 763 F.3d 554, 570 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Every circuit 

to consider the question, whether before Sossamon or after, has held that RLUIPA does not permit 

money damages against state prison officials, even when the lawsuit targets the defendants in their 

individual capacities.”)). Considering Sossamon and the above-cited cases, I find Plaintiff is not 

entitled to damages against Defendants in their individual capacities under RLUIPA and 

recommend those claims be dismissed. 

 C. Qualified Immunity 

Defendants seek qualified immunity. (Doc. No. 48 at 9-10.) Qualified immunity protects 

officials who acted in an objectively reasonable manner and shields a government official from 

liability when his or her conduct does not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional 

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 

(1982). Qualified immunity is a question of law, not a question of fact. McClendon v. Story 

County Sheriff's Office, 403 F.3d 510, 515 (8th Cir. 2005). Thus, issues concerning qualified 

immunity are appropriately resolved on summary judgment. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 

511, 526 (1985) (the privilege is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; 

and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to 

trial.”). 

To determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, courts generally 

consider two questions: (1) whether the facts alleged or shown, construed in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff, establish a violation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) whether 

that right was so clearly established that a reasonable official would have known that his or her 

actions were unlawful. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009); see also Saucier v. Katz, 

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533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).1

 A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity only if no reasonable 

fact finder could answer both questions in the affirmative. Nelson, 583 F.3d at 528. 

D. Plaintiff’s Remaining Claims: Personal Capacity Damages Claims Under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Injunctive Relief Under § 1983 and RLUIPA 

As discussed above, Plaintiff sought damages and injunctive relief. Plaintiff’s remaining 

damages claim lies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his First Amendment rights. 

1. First Amendment and RLUIPA Claims

 Inmates retain their First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. Cruz v. Beto, 405 

U.S. 319, 322 (1972). Limitations, however, may be placed on the exercise of those rights based 

on the needs of the penal system. Constitutional claims that would otherwise receive strict scrutiny 

analysis are evaluated under a lesser standard in the context of a prison setting. Turner v. Safley, 

482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987). Under Turner, a prison regulation may restrict a prisoner's 

constitutional rights if it is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner, 482 

U.S. at 89. 

 Turner sets out four factors courts should consider when evaluating freedom of exercise 

claims: (1) whether there is a valid rational connection between the prison regulation and the 

government interest justifying it; (2) whether alternative means are available to the inmate to 

exercise the right; (3) whether an accommodation would have a significant ripple effect on guards, 

other inmates, and prison resources; and (4) whether there is an alternative that fully 

accommodates the prisoner at de minimis cost to valid penological interests. Id. at 89-91. 

                                                            

1 Courts are “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of 

the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the 

particular case at hand.” Nelson v. Correctional Medical Services, 583 F.3d 522, 528 (8th Cir. 

2009) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236). 

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 In analyzing a free exercise claim, a court must “consider first the threshold issue of 

whether the challenged governmental action infringes upon a sincerely held religious belief and 

then apply the Turner factors to determine if the regulation restricting the religious practice is 

reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives.” Gladson v. Iowa Dep’t. of Corrections, 

551 F.3d 825, 831-32 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted). 

 Under RLUIPA, Congress established a statutory free exercise claim with a higher standard 

of review than that which applies to constitutional claims. The statute provides inmates with the 

following protection: 

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a 

person residing in or confined to an institution, . . . even if the burden results from 

a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition 

of the burden on that person- 

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 

governmental interest. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2). Section 3 of RLUIPA protects inmate religious exercise in this 

manner when “the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal 

financial assistance.” Id. at § 2000cc-1(b)(1). RLUIPA defines “religious exercise” to include 

“any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 

Id. at § 2000cc-5(7)(A). A substantial burden 

significantly inhibit[s] or constrain[s] conduct or expression that manifests some 

central tenet of a person’s individual religious beliefs; must meaningfully curtail a 

person’s ability to express adherence to his or her faith; or must deny a person 

reasonable opportunities to engage in those activities that are fundamental to a 

person’s religion. 

Patel v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 515 F.3d 807, 813 (8th Cir. 2008). 

 

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a. Ramadan Meal 

Plaintiff observes Ramadan as part of his religion. He had been added to the “Ramadan 

list” confirming his observation of Ramadan. (Doc. No. 51 at 12.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants 

Trent Smith and Briana Boatner1 did not provide him a Ramdan tray on May 21, 2018 “[o]ut of 

retaliatory, evil, discriminatory motives.” (Doc. No. 2 at 4.) 

On May 21, 2018, Defendant Smith was passing out Ramadan meals to inmates near 

Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 47-2 at 1-2.) According to Defendant Smith, for unknown reasons Plaintiff’s 

name was not on the list on May 21, 2018. (Id. at 3.) Despite Plaintiff’s requests for a meal, 

Defendant Smith did not provide Plaintiff a Ramadan meal that day because Plaintiff’s name did 

not appear on the list. (Id. at 2-3.) Plaintiff denies that his name was missing from the meal list 

that day. (Doc. No. 49 at 3, ¶¶21, 22; Doc. No. 53 at 2, ¶¶21, 22.) Instead, Plaintiff asserts 

Defendant Smith intentionally withheld Plaintiff’s meal because a few days earlier Plaintiff 

punched Defendant Smith in the head. (Doc. No. 53 at 2, ¶¶22; Doc. No. 51 at 66.) In support of 

his position, Plaintiff included the disciplinary form on which Defendant Smith charged Plaintiff 

with rules violations as a result of punch. (Doc. No. 51 at 66.) 

Even if a violation of Plaintiff’s rights occurred, courts that have considered whether one 

missed meal resulted in a substantial burden have found repeatedly that it did not. See, among 

others, Barnes v. Daviess County Detention Center, No. 4:18-cv-P97-JHM, 2018 WL 5258628 

(W.D. Ky. Oct. 22, 2018); Blake v. Cooper, No. 10-CV-6036-SJ-FJG, 2013 WL 523710 (W.D. 

Mo. Feb. 12, 2013) (denial of dates to break fast before evening prayer not substantial burden); 

                                                            

1

 The Clerk of the Court is directed to change Defendant Boatner’s name on the docket to Briana 

Boatner. (Doc. No. 35.) The Clerk of the Court is further directed to substitute Defendant 

Boatner for Defendant Bolden, as Plaintiff originally misnamed the Defendant. (Doc. No. 31; 

Doc. No. 35.) 

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Maynard v. Hale, No. 3:11-CV-1233, 2012 WL 3401095 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 14, 2012); Crump v. 

Best, No. 10-13787, 2012 WL 1056806 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2012); Griffith v. Hofmann, No. 2:05-

CV-126, 2008 WL 4682690 (D. Vt. Oct. 21, 2008); but see, for example, Alamiin v. Beasley, 2008 

WL 2371869 (W.D. Ok. June 6, 2008) (summary judgment denied where plaintiff complained of 

being forced to accept certain food on his tray, received a disciplinary in connection with his 

complaints, and spent 30 days in isolation as a result). Accordingly, I find Defendants Smith and 

Boatner—to the extent Plaintiff stated anything more than a negligence claim against her—are 

entitled to qualified immunity in connection with the missed Ramadan meal on May 21, 2018. 

 b. Post-Ramadan Feast 

Plaintiff alleges Defendants Seam Treas,2

 John Pollett,3 and Dexter McDonnell4 provided 

him a regular meal tray instead of a Ramadan feast tray on November 6, 2018, thereby violating 

his rights under the First Amendment and RLUIPA. 

 On November 7, 2018, Defendant McDonnell notified Deputy Warden Byers that “we 

were short last night on several trays from the Islamic Function.” (Doc. No. 47-3 at 1.) Defendant 

McDonnell further requested that “the attached list of inmates receive two trays on Veterans Day.” 

(Id.) Plaintiff’s name was on the list because he did not get a feast tray. (Id. at 2.) Defendant 

McDonnell’s request was approved. (Id. at 3.) 

Plaintiff contests that there was a shortage of meals and instead maintains “they just skip 

over us . . . .” (Doc. No. 53 at 2, ¶ 29.) Regardless of why Plaintiff did not receive a feast tray, 

                                                            

2 The Clerk of the Court is directed to change Defendant Treas’s name on the docket to Seam 

Treas. (Doc. No. 14.) 

3

 The Clerk of the Court is directed to change Defendant Pollett’s name on the docket to John 

Pollett. (Id.) 

4 The Clerk of the Court is directed to change Defendant McDonnell’s name on the docket to 

Dexter McDonnell. (Id.)

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Plaintiff’s deposition testimony establishes the omission was not a substantial burden. Plaintiff 

testified that the feast is not about eating certain food. (Doc. No. 47-1 at 12.) Rather, according 

to Plaintiff, “[t]he feast is just a celebration . . . . a celebration of being at peace.” (Id.) Plaintiff 

acknowledged receiving a regular tray that day, but not a feast tray. (Id. at 14.) He further 

acknowledged that November 6, 2018, was the only instance on which he did not receive a 

Ramadan feast and he has been observing Ramadan since 2006. (Id. at 8, 17.) Plaintiff did not 

establish how, when no specific food was required or typical for the feast, the lack of a feast tray 

prevented him from “a celebration of being at peace.” Under these circumstances, I find no 

substantial burden. Defendants Trease, Pollett, and McDonnell are entitled to qualified immunity. 

c. Religious Texts: Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies 

 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires an inmate to exhaust available prison 

administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Jones v. 

Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 202 (2007); Jones v. Norris, 310 F.3d 610, 612 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). 

Exhaustion under the PLRA is mandatory. Jones, 549 U.S. at 211. “[T]o properly exhaust 

administrative remedies prisoners must ‘complete the administrative review process in accordance 

with the applicable procedural rules,’ rules that are defined not by the PLRA, but by the prison 

grievance process itself.” Id. at 218 (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006)). 

Compliance with a prison’s grievance procedures is, therefore, all that is required by the PLRA to 

properly exhaust. Id. Thus, the question as to whether an inmate has properly exhausted 

administrative remedies will depend on the specifics of that particular prison’s grievance policy. 

See id. If a prisoner plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies before filing suit, 

his complaint must be dismissed. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(a). 

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 ADC Administrative Directive 14-22 governs inmates receipt of publications from 

recognized commercial, religious or charitable outlets. (Doc. No. 47-6 at 1.) Pursuant to the 

Directive, the Warden/Center Supervisor designates a staff to review incoming publications. (Id. 

at 2.) Publications may be rejected for multiple reasons. (Id. at 2-3.) Publications recommended 

for rejection are referred to the Warden/Center Supervisor for final decision; the Warden must 

approve or reject the publication within 30 days of receipt. (Id. at 3.) If the Warden rejects the 

publication, “the inmate must be notified, in writing, or any decision to reject and the basis for 

rejections of the publication. The inmate is also notified of appeal procedures and options for 

disposing of the publication.” (Id.) While the rejection of a publication is not a grievable matter, 

an inmate has the right to appeal the decision to reject a publication to the Central Office “within 

10 days of the receipt of written notification of the Warden/Center Supervisor’s decision to reject 

the publication.” (Id. at 4.) 

 Varner Unit Policy 16.1.10 set out the Unit’s policies and procedures regarding inmate 

mail. (Doc. No. 47-7.) Pursuant to Varner Unit policy, “[a]ny item of correspondence containing 

any contraband will be rejected,” as well material that presents a clear and present danger to the 

security of the Unit. (Id. at 2.) 

 Plaintiff ordered two texts he asserts are religious texts—From N****s to Gods Part One

and The Science of Self: Man, God, and the Mathematical Language of Nature—from a third party; 

the two publications were shipped together in one package.5

 (Doc. No. 47-8.) Plaintiff alleges 

                                                            

5

 In the “Statement of Facts” section of his Complaint, Plaintiff points out that Defendant Allen 

and the Varner Super Max Publication Review Committee denied him several non-nude 

magazines. (Doc. No. 2 at 3.) Because Plaintiff does not include mention of the magazines in the 

“Legal Claims” section of his Complaint, I interpret his reference to the magazines as background 

information in connection with his retaliation claim against Defendant Allen. 

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Defendant Virginia Allen6

 and the Publication Review Committee’s denial violated his rights 

under the First Amendment and RLUIPA by denying him the books. (Id. at 7.) 

 On July 23, 2018, Plaintiff acknowledged receiving the Publication Review Committee’s 

decision to deny his publication From N****s To Gods Part One. (Doc. No. 47-9.) Plaintiff was 

given the option to appeal, but instead he elected to have the publication mailed to a third party. 

(Id.) Plaintiff acknowledges he did not appeal the denial, but argues he exhausted his 

administrative remedies through the grievance procedure. (Doc. No. 53 at 3-4, ¶¶54-55; Doc. No. 

51 at 39-40.) The denial, however, was not a grievable matter; rather, the applicable administrative 

remedy was set out in Administrative Directive 14-22. (Doc. No. 47-6 at 4.) 

 Because Plaintiff did not appeal the final decision of the Publication Review Committee, 

he did not exhaust all available administrative remedies and his claims must be dismissed. See, 

for example, Pinder v. McDowell, No. 5:14-CV-359-JM-BD, 2018 WL 2225273 (E.D. Ark. April 

18, 2018) (adopted at 2018 WL 2223328) (E.D. Ark. May 15, 2018)); Colten v. Hobbs, No. 5:12-

CV-263-KGB-JTK, 2014 WL 1309069 at *4 (E.D. Ark. 2014) (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 

81, 85 (2006)). And pursuant to policy, if one publication shipped together in a package with other 

publications is denied, then all publications in the package are denied. (Doc. No. 47-5 at 5; Doc. 

No. 47-7.) 

 d. Religious Texts: Varner Unit Policy 16.1.10 

 Defendants’ qualified immunity argument in connection with the denial of Plaintiff’s books 

does not address Varner Unit Policy 16.1.10 separately, but as a part of denial of both books 

                                                            

6

 The Clerk of the Court is directed to change Defendant Allen’s name on the docket to Virginia 

Allen. 

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Plaintiff ordered. Because Defendants raised qualified immunity on the issue, including Policy 

16.1.10, I can fairly address the issue. 

 As mentioned above, Varner Unit Policy 16.1.10 set out the Unit’s policies and procedures 

regarding inmate mail. (Doc. No. 47-7.) Pursuant to Varner Unit policy, “[a]ny item of 

correspondence containing any contraband will be rejected,” as well material that presents a clear 

and present danger to the security of the Unit. (Id. at 2.) 

 Plaintiff asserts Policy 16.1.10 and the denial of one book because it was packaged with 

another, rejected book violates his right to free exercise and access to mail, as well as his rights 

under RLUIPA. (Doc. No 2 at 7.) He also asserts his grievance regarding the book Science of Self

was non-grievable, but he did not receive a decision from the Publication Review Committee 

denying the book—in other words, as I read Plaintiff’s argument, there was no grievance procedure 

available to him. (Doc. No. 2; Doc. No. 52 at 6, ¶6.) 

 Even if Plaintiff had no available administrative remedies, his challenge of Policy 16.1.10 

would fail. As mentioned above, Defendants seek qualified immunity. The Court is not aware of 

any clearly established right pursuant to which Defendants would have known that denying both 

books in a shipment because one book was prohibited violated Plaintiff’s rights. Rather, this Court 

has found qualified immunity applies in connection with similar claims. See Jones v. Hobbs, case 

no. 5:08-cv-00233-SWW, 2012 WL 1066476 (E.D. Ark. March 19, 2012); 2012 at 2012 WL 

1066339 (recommendation adopted); aff’d. Jones v. Hobbs, No. 12-2002 (8th Cir. January 22, 

2013) (per curiam). Because no clearly established right existed, Defendants are entitled to 

qualified immunity regarding denial of The Science of Self pursuant to Policy 16.1.10. 

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2. Retaliation 

 Plaintiff alleges Defendant Allen retaliated against him for using the grievance procedure 

by denying his books. (Doc. No. 2 at 57.) To succeed on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must 

prove: (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) the retaliation he suffered as a result would chill a 

person of ordinary firmness from engaging in that activity; and (3) retaliation was a motivating 

factor for the adverse action. Waters v. Madson, 921 F.3d 725, 741-42 (8th Cir. 2019). 

 Here, Plaintiff acknowledged that the word “N****s to the average eye, you know, that 

would be racist.” (Doc. No. 47-1 at 28.) Further, Plaintiff identified Defendant Allen as the 

Mailroom Supervisor at the Varner Supermax Unit. (Doc. No. 2 at 57.) During his deposition, 

Plaintiff testified that Defendant Allen does not make the final decision to reject a book, the 

Publication Review Committee does. (Doc. No. 47-1 at 21.) “Yeah, I’m saying she the first step 

of the – it’s a process. She the first step of the process in the mail room to reject the book.” (Doc. 

No. 47-1 at 80.) Plaintiff was also asked: 

Question: What if [Defendant Allen] doesn’t know if she should reject or 

accept, one way or the other? 

Plaintiff I – I mean, it – she – she take it on her own what she feel like you – 

you supposed to have. So that’s her job; she the mail room 

supervisor. 

Question: Do you think she’s just trying to make the best judgment call that 

she can? 

Plaintiff: Again, that – I guess – I guess – I guess you could say that. 

(Doc. No. 47-1 at 32.) 

 Plaintiff has the burden of proving that an “actual motivating factor for the adverse action” 

was retaliation. Griggs v. Norris, 297 Fed. Appx. 553, 555 (8th Cir. 2008). The record here does 

not support that conclusion. Plaintiff filed an earlier grievance against Defendant Allen, but 

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Plaintiff admitted even the title of the denied book appears racist. Plaintiff admits that 

“[p]ermitting inmates to possess publications that contain racially inflammatory materials 

interferes with the goals of the prevention of violence . . . .” (Doc. No. 49 at 8, ¶56; Doc. No. 53 

at 4, ¶56.) Further, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim rests on the denial of his books. His grievance 

reveals he complained that “Virginia Allen and the Varner Unit Publication Committee” retaliated 

against him. (Doc. No. 51 at 39.) His deposition testimony also reads as if Defendant Allen is a 

spoke in the wheel that crushed his rights. These claims are more akin to a conspiracy claim, and 

Plaintiff has not come forward with any evidence that could establish a meeting of the minds. 

Plaintiff concedes he is “just speculating” as to why his book was denied. (Doc. No. 47-1 at 28.) 

I find Plaintiff failed to meet his burden on his retaliation claim. 

 Rather than urge no violation occurred, Defendants argue that even assuming Defendant 

Allen and Defendant Gibson7

 violated Plaintiff’s rights, they are entitled to qualified immunity 

because no right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.8 (Doc. No. 48 at 23.) 

If a violation did occur, I agree under the facts of this case that Defendant Allen (and Defendant 

Gibson to the extent Plaintiff included him in his retaliation claim) are entitled to qualified 

immunity. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 IT IS, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDED that: 

 1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 47) be GRANTED. 

                                                            

7

 The Clerk of the Court is directed to change Defendant Gibson’s name on the docket to James 

Gibson. (Doc. No. 14.) 

8 In support of their argument, Defendants cite Jones v. Shabazz, which found no RLUIPA 

violation by a publications committee for withholding From N****s to Gods on the basis that it 

was secular and inflammatory. Case No.: H-06-119, 2007 WL 2873042 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2007). 

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 2. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants be DISMISSED with prejudice. 

 3. The Court certify, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an in forma pauperis 

appeal from any Order adopting these recommendations and accompanying Judgment would not 

be taken in good faith. 

 DATED this 23rd day of March 2020. 

 _________________________________ 

 JOE J. VOLPE 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRSTE JUDGE 

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