Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-02240/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-02240-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:1383 Review of HHS Decision

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

LINDSEY TAYLOR HOPE,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Defendant.

Case No.5:13-cv-02240-HRL 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEY'S FEES

Re: Dkt. No. 31

Lindsey Taylor Hope filed this action, seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s 

decision denying her application for Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Social 

Security Act. In these federal court proceedings, she has been represented by attorneys Cynthia 

Starkey and Linda Ziskin.

The parties stipulated to remand the matter. On March 20, 2014, the court entered that 

stipulation as an order and issued a judgment to that effect that same day. (Dkts. 27, 28).

The parties subsequently filed a stipulation that plaintiff’s counsel be awarded $4,800.00 in 

attorney’s fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. The court 

entered an order approving that stipulation. (Dkt. 30).

On remand, the Commissioner calculated past-due benefits of $34,436.00. (Dkt. 31-3 at 

ECF p. 3). Pursuant to a contingent fee agreement between Hope and Starkey, fees for an appeal 

to federal court would be either 25% of Hope’s past-due benefits (i.e., $8,609.00) or the amount of 

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EAJA fees awarded to her counsel (i.e., $4,800.00), whichever sum was greater. (Dkt. 31-2 at 

ECF p. 1).1

Hope’s counsel now moves for a fee award of 25% of plaintiff’s past-due benefits, less the 

EAJA fees previously awarded---for a total award of $3,809.00. The Commissioner filed a 

statement taking no position as to the reasonableness of the requested fee, but noting several 

factors for the court’s consideration pertaining to service of the papers on Hope and authentication 

of the exhibits submitted by Hope’s counsel. This court issued an interim order directing 

plaintiff’s counsel to submit declaration(s) attesting to service of the motion and all supporting 

papers on Hope and sufficiently authenticating the exhibits submitted in support of the motion. 

(Dkt. 34).

Ziskin has filed a declaration pursuant to the court’s interim order. In it, she states that she 

believes all motion papers were served on plaintiff at the time the motion was filed. Nevertheless, 

counsel avers that another copy of the papers was mailed to Hope on September 7, 2016 and that 

those papers were delivered by the Post Office on September 9, 2016. (Dkt. 35, Ziskin Decl. ¶ 1). 

The court has not received any response or objection from Hope.

The matter is now deemed submitted and is suitable for determination without oral 

argument. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons stated below, the motion for fees is granted.

Title XVI of the Social Security Act provides that attorney’s fees may be awarded to a 

successful claimant’s lawyer for his representation in court. 42 U.S.C. § 1383(d)(2). The present

motion is based on 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), which governs fee awards in cases concerning claims for 

disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. Nevertheless, Title XVI “incorporates 

§ 406(b) by reference and applies in largely the same manner.” Mellon v. Astrue, No. C06-0638 

EMC, 2008 WL 512720 at *1 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 25, 2008) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1383(d)(2)).

The court must review counsel’s request for fees “as an independent check” to ensure that 

the contingency fee agreement will “yield reasonable results in particular cases.” Gisbrecht v. 

 

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In that same agreement, Hope also agreed that Starkey could employ or associate another 

attorney as co-counsel and that any such attorney could be designated to act as Hope’s 

representative in this matter. (Id.).

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Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). In determining a reasonable fee award, the district court 

“must respect ‘the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee agreements,’” by “‘looking first to the 

contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness.’” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 

1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. 789 at 793, 808). A fee based on a 

contingent-fee agreement is unreasonable and subject to reduction “if the attorney provided 

substandard representation or engaged in dilatory conduct in order to increase the accrued amount 

of past-due benefits, or if the ‘benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent 

on the case.’” Id. (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808). “The attorney bears the burden of 

establishing that the fee sought is reasonable.” Id. Additionally, a fee award is offset by any 

award of EAJA fees. Thus, “the claimant’s attorney must refun[d] to the claimant the amount of 

the smaller fee.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796 (citation omitted).

The court finds that the amount of fees sought is reasonable. The fee agreement between 

Hope and her counsel is within the statutory ceiling set by the Social Security Act. As discussed 

above, the Commissioner agreed that this matter should be remanded, and on remand Hope was 

awarded past-due benefits. Hope’s counsel spent a total of 31 hours on this matter, yielding an 

hourly rate of $277.71 based on the full 25% award of $8,609.00. (Dkt. 31-2 at ECF p. 2; Dkt. 33-

1; Dkt. 35). Plaintiff’s attorneys point out that the hourly rate is even lower (i.e., $122.87) based 

on the actual $3,809.00 being requested---a rate that they represent is below the approved Ninth 

Circuit hourly rate of approximately $190 for EAJA fees. Although plaintiff requested a number 

of extensions for briefing deadlines, there is no indication that counsel provided substandard 

representation or engaged in dilatory conduct in order to increase the accrued amount of past-due 

benefits. The court concludes that the requested fees are reasonable and do not constitute a 

windfall.

Based on the foregoing, the motion for attorney’s fees is GRANTED. The Commissioner 

is directed to certify fees in the amount of $8,609.00 payable to the following: Cynthia G. 

Starkey, Law Offices of Cynthia G. Starkey, 1153 Saratoga Avenue, San Jose, CA 95129. Hope’s 

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counsel is ordered to refund the previously awarded EAJA fees, in the amount of $4,800.00, to

Hope.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 7, 2016

HOWARD R. LLOYD

United States Magistrate Judge

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5:13-cv-02240-HRL Notice has been electronically mailed to:

Alex Gene Tse alex.tse@usdoj.gov, kathy.terry@usdoj.gov, USACAN.SSA@usdoj.gov

April A. Alongi april.alongi@ssa.gov, sf.ogc.ndca@ssa.gov

Cynthia Gail Starkey cynthia@cynthiastarkey.com, loretta@cynthiastarkey.com

Jacob Mikow jacob.mikow@ssa.gov, april.alongi@ssa.gov, sf.ogc.ndca@ssa.gov

Linda Susan Ziskin ziskinlaw@comcast.net, linda@ziskinlawoffice.com

Case 5:13-cv-02240-HRL Document 36 Filed 10/07/16 Page 5 of 5