Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00412/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00412-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Tort/Non-Motor Vehicle

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1

The parties’ requests for oral argument are denied because oral argument will not aid

the Court’s decision. See Mahon v. Credit Bur. of Placer County, Inc., 171 F.3d 1197, 1200

(9th Cir. 1999).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Club Vista Financial Services, LLC, a

Nevada limited liability company; Club

Vista Holdings, Inc., a Nevada limited

liability company, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Maslon Edelman Borman & Brand, LLP,

a Minnesota limited liability partnership, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 10-0412-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, to Transfer

Venue filed by Defendant Maslon, Edelman, Borman & Brand, LLP (“Maslon”). (Dkt. #13.)

For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the Motion.1

BACKGROUND

In 2006 and 2007, Plaintiffs Club Vista Financial Services LLC and Club Vista

Holdings, Incorporated (collectively “Club Vista” or “Plaintiffs”) retained legal services from

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2

 Maslon claims that it represented Scott Financial Corporation (“SFC”) and not Club

Vista. Club Vista alleges that it was represented by Maslon. For purpose of resolving the

present motion, Maslon does not seek dismissal on the assertion that it did not represent

Plaintiffs.

3

Maslon also to moves to dismiss based on Arizona Revised Statute § 12-2602. This

Statute specifies that if a claim against a licensed professional is asserted in a civil action, the

claimant shall certify whether or not expert testimony is necessary to prove the standard of

care. If expert testimony is necessary, the claimant shall serve a preliminary expert opinion

affidavit with the initial disclosures that are required by Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure

26.1. Following Arizona law as closely as possible under the circumstances, the disclosure

is not due until forty days after Maslon files its Answer. Given that Maslon has not yet filed

an answer, §12-2602(B) is not a basis for dismissing the case. 

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Maslon. Specifically, the Maslon law firm was hired by Plaintiffs, or Plaintiff’s agent,2

 to

prepare documents and advise them on a loan transaction related to the development of

commercial properties in Maricopa County, Arizona. The loan was secured by Arizona real

estate, and guaranteed by Arizona residents. In preparing the documentation, including

personal guaranties to be signed by four Arizona guarantors, Maslon allegedly disregarded

Arizona Revised Statute § 25-124, which requires personal guaranties to be co-signed by the

guarantors’ spouses. Under Arizona law, guaranties that are not signed by the guarantor’s

spouse cannot be satisfied the with assets of the marital community. Shortly after the

guaranties were signed and the loans were funded, the project went into default. Club Vista

has since foreclosed on the properties and filed a deficiency action against the guarantors,

but because the loan documents were not signed by each of the guarantors, Club Vista was

unable to recover from the guarantors’ marital communities. 

On January 29, 2010, Plaintiffs brought this action alleging that Maslon committed

legal malpractice because the law firm failed to get the signature of the guarantors’ spouses.

Maslon now moves to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction and venue, or in the

alternative to transfer venue.3

/ / / 

/ / / 

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LEGAL STANDARD

When the parties dispute whether personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant is

proper, “the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction exists.” Rio Props. Inc.

v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1019 (9th Cir. 2002). This is so even though the

defendant is the moving party on a 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss. Id. In the absence of an

evidentiary hearing, however, the plaintiff need only make “a prima facie showing of

jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to dismiss.” Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon &

Recordon, 575 F.3d 981, 985 (9th Cir. 2009). In considering the motion, a court may

“assume the truth of allegations in a pleading” to the extent that such allegations are not

“contradicted by affidavit.” See Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assoc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1284

(1977) (citing Taylor v. Portland Paramount Corp., 383 F.2d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 1967)); see

also Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1019 (observing that only “uncontroverted allegations in [the]

complaint must be taken as true”). Where there are “conflicts between the facts contained in

the parties’ affidavits,” depositions, and other discovery materials, those conflicts “must be

resolved in [the] plaintiff’s favor.” Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Sedgwick Assoc. Risks, Ltd., 796

F.2d 299, 301 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal quotations omitted). In cases where a plaintiff

survives the motion to dismiss under a prima facie burden of proof, the plaintiff still must

prove the jurisdictional facts by a preponderance of the evidence at a preliminary hearing or

at trial. Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 1285 n. 2.

To establish that personal jurisdiction over Maslon is proper, Plaintiffs must

demonstrate that (1) Arizona’s long arm statute confers jurisdiction over Maslon; and (2) that

“the exercise of jurisdiction comports with the constitutional principles of Due Process.” See

Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1019 (citation omitted). Because Arizona’slong-arm statute extends

jurisdiction “to the maximum extent permitted by the . . . Constitution of the United States,”

theCourt’s personal jurisdiction inquiry largely collapsesinto an analysis of due process. See

Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a); Davis v. Metro Prods., Inc., 885 F.2d 515, 520 (9th Cir. 1989);

Williams v. Lakeview Co., 199 Ariz. 1, 5, 13 P.3d 280, 282 (2000). 

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DISCUSSION

I. The Court Has Personal Jurisdiction Over Maslon.

Under the Due Process Clause, a defendant must have sufficient “minimum contacts”

with the forum state so that subjecting the defendant to its jurisdiction will not “offend

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326

U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under this standard, “the

defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State [must be] such that he [or she]

should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.

v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). In accord with the Due Process Clause, the

“minimum contacts” standard may be satisfied in two ways. First, a court may exercise

general jurisdiction when the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are “continuous and

systematic.” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 (1984).

Second, a court may exercise specific jurisdiction if a defendant “has purposefully directed

his activities at residents of the forum . . . and the litigation results from alleged injuries that

arise out of or relate to those activities.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472,

(1985) (internal quotation omitted). “In addition to establishing the requisite contacts, the

assertion ofjurisdictionmust be found reasonable.” In re Phenylpropanolamine Prods. Liab.

Litig., 344 F. Supp.2d 686, 690 (W.D. Wash. 2003).

A. General Jurisdiction

 The Court does not have general jurisdiction over Maslon because the firm lacks

continuous and systematic contacts with the State of Arizona. To establish general

jurisdiction, plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that the defendant’s contacts with the forum

state are sufficiently “substantial or continuous or systematic” so that the defendant could be

sued in the forum for any reason, even one unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the

state. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414. “The level of contacts required to show general

jurisdiction is quite high.” Williams, 199 Ariz. At 3 ¶ 6, 13 P.3d at 282. General jurisdiction

“requires that the defendant’s contacts be the sort that approximate physical presence.”

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Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing

Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1331 (9th Cir. 1984)). 

Maslon’s office is located in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and none of its partners live or

practice law in the State of Arizona. Penny R. Heaberlin, the attorney who provided services

to Plaintiffs, has practiced at Maslon’s Minnesota office since 1994. Neither she nor any

other Maslon partner owns or leases any real estate, personal property, or holds any banking

or brokerage accounts in Arizona. Neither Ms. Heaberlin nor any other Maslon partner has

an Arizona driver’s license.

Plaintiffs allege that the Maslon firm has provided legal representation to the plaintiffs

and their related business entities in at least nine separate Arizona transactions, including the

three transactions that are the subject of this lawsuit. Plaintiffs also allege that Maslon made

many contacts with the borrowers and their counsel in the state of Arizona before, during,

and after the closing of the loan transactions at issue here. These contacts, however, are not

sufficiently continuous and substantial to give rise to general jurisdiction in Arizona.

B. Specific Jurisdiction

A court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a defendant when the cause of action

arises directly from the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. See Sher v. Johnson, 911

F.2d 1357, 1361 (1990). The Ninth Circuit employs a three-part test to determine whether

the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are sufficient to subject it to specific

jurisdiction:

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or

consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform

some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of

conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and

protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates

to the defendant’s forum related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction

must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.

Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004). “The plaintiff

bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs of the test. . . . If the plaintiff fails to

satisfy either of these prongs, personal jurisdiction is not established in the forum state.” Id.

at 802. “On the other hand, if the plaintiff succeeds in satisfying both of the first two prongs,

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the burden then shifts to the defendant to ‘present a compelling case’ that the exercise of

jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Menken v. Emm, 503 F.3d 1050, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007),

(citing Schwarzenegger 374 F.3d at 802). 

1. Purposeful Availment

In the context of cases that sound primarily in tort, the first prong of the test is

satisfied where the only contact a non-resident defendant had with the forum state was “the

‘purposeful direction’ of a foreign act having effect in the forum state.” Haisten v. Grass

Valley Medical Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1986), (citing

Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984)). This “‘effects’ test requires that the defendant

allegedly have (1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3)

causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Dole Food

Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Maslon purposefully structured a business loan between Club Vista and third parties

for the acquisition of real property in Arizona. That loan was to be guaranteed by the

principles of the debtors, who are Arizona residents. According to Plaintiffs, Maslon made

several contacts with the guarantors of that loan and their counsel in the state of Arizona

before, during, and after the closing of the real estate transactions. More importantly, Maslon

prepared guarantees to be signed by the guarantors. These guarantees were intended to bind

the guarantors and allow Plaintiffs to recover against the guarantors’ assets in case the

debtors defaulted on the loan. 

By drafting guarantees that purported to bind Arizona residents, Maslon committed

an intentional act expressly aimed at Arizona. Because the guarantees are allegedly

ineffective, Plaintiffs in this case are damaged due to the lack of Defendant’s compliance

with the mandates of Arizona law. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et

L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1207 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that purposeful availment

“may be established even if ‘the bulk of the harm’ occurs outside of the forum”); Brayton,

575 F.3d at 988 (finding that purposeful availment “is satisfied when the defendant’s

intentional act has ‘foreseeable effects’ in the forum”). 

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A recent decision from the District of Columbia illustrates this point. See Arm.

Genocide Museum and Mem’l, Inc. v. Cafesjian Family Found., Inc., 607 F.Supp 2d 185, 187

(D. DC. 2009). In that case, as in this one, a defendant who provided legal advice regarding

a real estate transaction moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court held,

The Court has little difficulty concluding that an attorney who represents a

client in connection with the acquisition of real property in the district of

Columbia can reasonably be expected to face a breach of fiduciary duty claim

in the District of Columbia where the claim involves the same properties that

were the focus of the representation.

Id. at 189. 

2. Forum-Related Contact

Under the second prong of the personal jurisdiction analysis, the plaintiff’s claim must

be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities. In

determining whether Club Vista’s claims arise out of Maslon’s forum-related conduct, “the

Ninth Circuit follows [a] ‘but for’ test.” Myers v. Bennett Law Offices, 238 F.3d 1068, 1075

(9th Cir. 2001). The “arising out of” requirement is met if, but for the contacts between the

defendant and the forum state, the cause of action would not have arisen. See Terracom v.

Valley Nat’l Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 561 (9th Cir. 1995). In Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, the

Ninth Circuit reasoned that: 

The ‘but for’ test is consistent with the basic function of the ‘arising out of’

requirement—it preserves the essential distinction between general and

specific jurisdiction. Under this test, a defendant cannot be haled into court for

activities unrelated to the cause of action in the absence of a showing of

substantial and continuous contacts sufficient to establish general jurisdiction.

. . . The ‘but for’ test preserves the requirement that there be some nexus

between the cause of action and the defendant’s activities in the forum.

897 F.2d 377, 385 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 

The “but for” test is in this case is met. Assuming the truth of Club Vista’s allegations,

Plaintiffs were injured by Maslon’s inability to properly advise and draft documents in

connection with the real estate transactions in the Phoenix area. But for Maslon’s negligence

in applying the Arizona statute, it appears that Club Vista would be able to recover from the

guarantors. 

/ / / 

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3. Reasonableness

Maslon fails to carry its burden of showing that jurisdiction is unreasonable. See

Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d at 1210. The Court looks to the following seven factors when making

this determination: 

(1) the extent of the defendants’ purposeful interjection into the forum state’s

affairs; (2) the burden on the defendant of defending in the forum; (3) the

extent of the conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant’s state; (4) the

forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial

resolution of the controversy; (6) the importance of the forum to the plaintiff’s

interest in convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of an

alternative forum. 

Menken, 503 F.3d at 1060 (citation omitted).

Maslon purposely represented clients in Arizona transactions. And while Maslon’s

burden of litigating in Arizona maybe somewhat substantial, it may not be appreciably

greater than Club Vista’s burden. Similarly, Arizona has an interest in exercising jurisdiction

over those who purport to provide legal services to clients that need advice concerning

Arizona law. And while only some of the witnesses are located in Arizona, and there is

another available forum, “the mere existence of an alternative forum cannot possibly satisfy

[Maslon’s] burden to present a compelling case that jurisdiction is unreasonable.” Myers v.

Bennet Law Offices, 238 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Panavision Int’l, L.P. v.

Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998)). The Court, therefore, finds that the factors

as a whole weigh in favor of reasonableness.

II. Venue is Proper in Arizona.

An action in federal court on diversity jurisdiction may be brought in any venue that

meets the criteria of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). That Statute provides:

A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded solely on diversity of citizenship

may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in (1) a judicial

district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state,

(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions

giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of the property that is the

subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant

is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, if there

is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. 

28 U.S.C. §1391(a)

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4

The Jacobson and Fisher courts articulated this language in the context of a dispute

regarding choice of law, rather than venue. See 201 F. Supp.2d at 99; 18 F.3d at 1120.

Nonetheless, the Court finds that rationale appropriate for determining venue in this case. 

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The first and third provisions are not available in this case because Maslon does not

reside in Arizona and because there is at least one other district—the District of

Minnesota–in which this action could be brought. Similarly, because property is not at issue

in this case, the second prong of the second provision does not apply. Nevertheless, pursuant

to §1391(a)(2), venue is proper in Arizona because a substantial part of the events or

omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in Arizona. To determine substantiality, the Court

looks to “the entire sequence of events underlying the claim[s] and focus[es] on the

defendant’s (rather than the plaintiff’s) actions.” Lee v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 525 F.Supp.2d

1238, 1241 (D. Haw. 2007) (citing Uffner v. LaReunion Francaise, S.A., 244 F.3d 38, 42 (1st

Cir. 2001)). “[F]or venue to be proper, significant events or omissions material to the

plaintiff’s claim must have occurred in the district in question, even if other material events

occurred elsewhere.” Gulf Ins. Co. v. Glasbrenner, 417 F.3d 353, 357 (2d Cir. 2005). 

According to Maslon, the alleged legal malpractice occurred in Minnesota and this

is where venue should lie. Under the specific facts of this case, however, the place “where

allegedly negligent attorneys performed their legal work structuring a transaction” (i.e.,

Minnesota) “ha[s] little relationship to” the location of the “alleged legal malpractice.” See

Jacobsen v. Oliver, 201 F. Supp.2d 93, 99 (D. D.C. 2002) (citing David B. Lilly Co. v.

Fisher, 18 F.3d 1112, 1120 (3d Cir. 1994)).4

 The Court must also look to the purpose of the

relationship between the law firm and the client. Here, the parties purpose was to

consummate a real estate loan in Arizona that was purportedly guaranteed by Arizona

residents. The documents pertained to Arizona law, were purportedly inadequately signed

by Arizona guarantors, had to do with real estate in Arizona, and were recorded in the

Arizona recorder’s office. Venue therefore is proper in Arizona. 

/ / / 

/ / / 

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III. The First Filed Rule Does Not Apply. 

Under the “first to file rule,” a district court has the discretion to transfer, stay, or

dismiss an action in the interests of efficiency and judicial economy if the case involves the

same parties and issues as an earlier filed action in a different district. See Cedars-Sinai Med.

Ctr. v. Shalala, 125 F.3d 765, 768 (9th Cir. 1997). “[W]hile no precise rule has evolved, the

general principle is to avoid duplicative litigation . . . and to promote judicial efficiency.”

Barapind v. Reno, 225 F.3d 1100, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations and quotation marks

omitted) (alteration in original). The rule is “designed to avoid placing an unnecessary

burden on the federal judiciary, and to avoid the embarrassment of conflicting judgments.”

Church of Scientology of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 611 F.2d 738, 750 (9th Cir. 1979)

(citation omitted). In addition, the rule “should not be disregarded lightly.” Alltrade, Inc. v.

Uniweld Prods., Inc., 946 F.2d 622, 625 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations and quotation marks

omitted). 

While no precise rule exists, courts generally look to three factors to determine

whether the first to file rule applies: (1) the chronology of the two actions; (2) the similarity

of the parties; and (3) the similarity of the issues. See Z-Line Designs, Inc. v. Bell’O Int’l

LLC, 218 F.R.D. 663, 655 (N.D. Cal. 2003). In addressing these factors, the parties and the

issues need not be identical. See, e.g., Biotronik, Inc. V. Guidant Sales Corp., 2009 WL

1838322 at *2 (D. Or. June 22, 2009) (“The parties and issues need not be exactly identical;

there may be additional parties and the issues need only be ‘substantially similar.’”) (quoting

Barapind v. Reno, 225 F.3d 1100, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000) (issues need not be identical)); Gen.

Prods. Mach. Shop, Inc. v. Systematic Inc., 2006 WL 2051737, at *1 (D. Idaho July 20,

2006) (“The parties in the two actions need not be identical for the purposes of the first-tofile rule, but there must be similarity or substantial overlap.”).

Maslon invokes the first to file rule in this case because a related action, Bank of

Oklahoma, N.A. v. Scott Financial Corporation, et al. No. 1:09-CV-00030, is pending in the

District of North Dakota. Maslon, however, does not establish that the elements of the first

to file rule are met. A review of the North Dakota action suggests that the parties and the

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issues in this case are not substantially similar. The North Dakota action pertains to Maslon’s

alleged malpractice with respect to real estate transactions in Nevada. The instant case

pertains to malpractice involving Arizona real estate and guarantees. The North Dakota

lawsuit involves several additional parties that are not present in the instant litigation. Most

importantly, while Club Vista Financial Services and Maslon are both parties in the North

Dakota case, Club Vista Holdings, Inc. is not. Accordingly, the first to file rule does not

apply. 

IV. Venue Will Not Be Transferred to Minnesota or North Dakota. 

Even where venue is proper, a court may transfer a civil action to another district “for

the convenience of parties and witnesses [and] in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

In determining whether transfer is appropriate, the district court has discretion “to adjudicate

motions for transfer according to an ‘individualized, case-by-case consideration of

convenience and fairness.’” Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc. 211 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir.

2000). In Jones, the Ninth Circuit provided the following list of non-exclusive factors that

a district court should consider: 

(1) the location where the relevant agreements were negotiated and executed;

(2) the state that is most familiar with the governing law; (3) the plaintiffs

choice of forum; (4) the respective parties’ contacts with the forum; (5) the

contacts relating to the plaintiff’s cause of action in the chosen forum (6) the

differences in the costs of litigation in the two forums; (7) the availability of

compulsory process to compel attendance of unwilling non-party witnesses;

and (8) the ease of access to sources of proof.

Id. at 498–99. Maslon has the burden of demonstrating that transfer is appropriate. See Piper

Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255–256 (1981) (holding that the moving party has the

burden of proving that the convenience to the parties and witnesses and the interest of justice

weighs heavily in favor of the transfer).

A. Location Where the Agreements were Negotiated and Executed

The parties do not dispute that Maslon physically prepared the underlying transactions

in Minnesota. However, the documents were signed, and recorded in Arizona. This factor,

therefore, does not weigh heavily in either party’s favor. 

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B. The State That is Most Familiar with the Governing Law

A court sitting in diversity applies the choice of law rules of the forum state. Lange

v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 1988). Arizona has adopted the

principles in the Restatement (Second of Conflict of Laws § 145) to determine the applicable

law for multi-state torts. Bates v. Superior Court, 156 Ariz. 46, 48–49, 749 P. 2d 1367,

1370–71(1988). “Section 145 provides that courts are to resolve tort issues under the law of

the state having the most significant relationship to both the occurrence and the parties with

respect to any particular question.” Id. The underlying claim in this case involves the

preparation of documents for an Arizona loan transaction secured by Arizona real estate and

guaranteed by Arizona residents. This factor, therefore, weighs in favor of keeping the case

in Arizona. 

C. The Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum

Next, there is generally “a strong presumption in favor of the plaintiff’s choice of

forum.” Norex Petroleum, Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 416 F.3d 146, 154 (2d Cir. 2005).

“[U]nless the balance is strongly in the favor of the defendant, the plaintiff[s’] choice of

forum should rarely be disturbed.” Id. at 154. The weight afforded to this factor, however,

is substantially reduced when the plaintiff does not reside in the venue. Williams v. Bowman,

157 F. Supp.2d 1103, 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2001). Because Club Vista does not reside in Arizona,

this factor only weighs slightly in its favor. 

D. The Respective Parties’ Contacts with the Forum & the Contacts Relating

to the Plaintiffs’ Cause of Action in the Forum

Arizona has little connection to the parties. None of the parties are residents of

Arizona. Plaintiffs are both Nevada companies, and Maslon is a Minnesota partnership. It is

safe to assume that the majority of injury Club Vista suffered would have been suffered in

its home state of Nevada. The only contact the parties have with Arizona is through the cause

of action, the Arizona real estate from which the malpractice and negligence of the

defendants stems. Accordingly, this factor does not weigh in favor of, or against, transfer.

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E. Contacts relating to the plaintiff’s cause of action in the chosen forum

Substantial events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claim occurred in Arizona. The crux of the

complaint is that Maslon failed to have Arizona guarantors properly sign guarantees for real

property in Arizona. Accordingly, this factor weighs heavily in favor of jurisdiction in

Arizona. 

F. Differences in Cost

Maslon does not present any facts indicating that there will be a substantial increase

in costs if this case is tried in Arizona rather than some other forum. This factor, therefore,

does not weigh in favor of transfer. 

G. Availability of Compulsory Process

Likewise, Maslon does not present any facts indicating that there are non-parties that

will not be subject to compulsory process in Arizona. This factor, therefore, does not weigh

in favor of transfer. 

H. The Ease of Access to Sources of Proof

 “To demonstrate inconvenience of witnesses, the moving party must identify relevant

witnesses, state their location and describe their testimony and its relevance.” Williams, 157

F. Supp.2d at 1108. Plaintiffs contend that the location of witnesses, including the four

personal guarantors, should be a compelling factor in maintaining the suit in Arizona.

Maslon, on the other hand, contends that there are many witnesses located in Minnesota, and

other documents and sources of proof are located within that forum. But, to the extent that

relevant sources of proof are located in Minnesota, Maslon has not adequately identified

relevant witnesses, or described their testimony. Therefore, while it appears that relevant

sources of proof are located in both Arizona and Minnesota, Maslon’s failure to identify its

witnesses requires the Court to weigh this factor in favor of litigating this action in Arizona.

I. Summary of Factors

Maslon has not met its burden of proving that any of the relevant Ninth Circuit factors

weigh in favor of transferring this case to North Dakota or Minnesota. See Jones, 211 F.3d

at 498. While litigation in Arizona may be somewhat burdensome to Maslon, this fact alone

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does not weigh heavily in favor of transfer. See Piper Aircraft Co. 454 U.S. at 255–256.

Considering the facts as a whole, as briefed by the parties, the relevant factors weigh in favor

of litigating this case in the District of Arizona. 

CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have met their burden of presenting prima facie

evidence that jurisdiction over Maslon exists. Maslon is subject to personal jurisdiction in

Arizona based on its practice of law involving Arizona transactions. Venue is appropriate in

Arizona, and Maslon’s motion to transfer venue is denied. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

(1) Defendant Maslon’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and

venue (Dkt # 13) is DENIED;

(2) Defendant’s Motion Transfer Venue to the District of North Dakota (Dkt.

# 13) is DENIED.

DATED this 2nd day of June, 2010.

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