Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03868/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03868-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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1

 The Honorable James M. Moody, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Arkansas. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-3868

___________

Robert Harrison, *

*

Plaintiff – Appellant, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the 

United Auto Group, * Eastern District of Arkansas.

Steven Landers, Sr., and *

Dwight Everett, *

*

Defendants – Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: February 15, 2007

Filed: July 12, 2007

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, GRUENDER, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

Robert E. Harrison, an African-American, sued United Auto Group, Inc.,

Steven Landers, Sr., and Dwight Everett (“United”) for race discrimination under 42

U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court1

granted United judgment as a matter of law. Harrison appeals. Having jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

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I.

Landers, president of United’s operations in Arkansas, called Harrison about

becoming general manager of a car dealership in Fayetteville. Harrison had worked

for Landers, but when called was sales manager at a competing dealership. Landers

said the base compensation would be $50,000 to $70,000 a year (in addition to

commissions). According to Harrison, he asked if this compensation was comparable

to what other general managers were being paid. Landers never responded. Harrison

agreed to drive to Fayetteville, look at the dealership, and contact Landers afterward.

Landers testified he thought Harrison was qualified to be general manager of a small

dealership like Fayetteville. Landers said he sought out Harrison for the Fayetteville

position because Harrison had a college degree, and the clientele at that dealership is

more knowledgeable about the product. 

After touring the dealership, Harrison contacted Landers and spoke favorably

about the position. Landers told Harrison about another general manager position

available at a United dealership in Memphis. Harrison testified that Landers asked

him to look at the store in Memphis, as it might be a better fit because more minorities

live in Memphis. The human resources director for United testified that Landers told

her that Harrison was a perfect candidate for either Fayetteville or Memphis.

After visiting Memphis, Harrison called Landers and again asked about

compensation. Landers said that it was the same in Memphis as in Fayetteville.

Harrison also spoke with a friend who worked for United, telling him he was surprised

by the Fayetteville offer as he thought it would be more. The friend called Landers

and told him Harrison was offended by the offer. Landers testified he did not pursue

Harrison after the phone call because he was offended by Harrison’s comment and

believed Harrison had declined the offer. Landers considered the amount offered a

good base salary for a small dealership, as the current manager made $120,000 for

managing two stores. After Landers talked to Harrison’s friend, neither Landers nor

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Harrison contacted each other again. No formal offers of employment were ever made

to Harrison.

Harrison alleges that United discriminated against him by failing to hire him as

general manager at Fayetteville and for management positions that arose later. At the

close of plaintiff’s evidence, the district court granted United judgment as a matter of

law, finding Harrison failed to meet his burden of showing discrimination. Harrison

argues the district court applied the incorrect burden of proof and erred in requiring

him to prove racial animus.

II.

This court reviews de novo a district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of

law, using the same standards as the district court. Anderson v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 357

F.3d 806, 809 (8th Cir. 2004). Judgment as a matter of law may be granted when “a

party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary

basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). This court

views all facts in the light most favorable to Harrison and does not weigh evidence or

make credibility determinations. See Anderson, 357 F.3d at 809. 

For a prima facie case of discriminatory failure to hire, Harrison must prove:

(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he applied and was qualified for a job for

which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) he was rejected; and, (4) after he was

rejected, United continued to seek applicants with Harrison’s qualifications. See

Caviness v. Nucor-Yamato Steel Co., 105 F.3d 1216, 1223 (8th Cir. 1997). Harrison

contends that the district court erred in not applying the principle that a plaintiff’s

burden at the prima facie stage is less onerous where the employer’s hiring criteria are

subjective. See Lyoch v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 139 F.3d 612, 615 (8th Cir. 1998)

(a plaintiff has a lighter burden for a prima facie case of failure to promote when the

criteria are subjective). United admits that general-manager openings were not posted

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or advertised and that Landers and Everett relied on their own instincts in making

hiring decisions. The subjectivity of hiring criteria is, however, relevant only to

rejections based on requirement (2), qualification for the position. See id.; see

generally Turner v. Honeywell Fed. Manufacturing & Technologies, LLC, 336 F.3d

716, 720-21 (8th Cir. 2003); McCullough v. Real Foods, Inc., 140 F.3d 1123, 1128-

29 (8th Cir. 1998). In this case, there is no dispute that Harrison was qualified. 

The district court’s main view of the case was that Harrison did not present

sufficient evidence of requirement (3), rejection. The district court stated, “I think Mr.

Harrison either – if he didn’t turn down the offer, at least he made it plain that he

would not accept an offer in the salary range that Mr. Lander’s contemplated.” It is

undisputed that communications between Harrison and United simply ended. 

 

Harrison asserts that the district court erred in finding that he had to show racial

animus, instead of intentional discrimination. At trial, the district court found that

Harrison had not met his burden of “showing some kind of racial animus.” Harrison

contends that a person who acts with no racial animus can still be held liable for

intentional discrimination, citing Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 669

(1987) and Ferrill v. The Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 473 (11th Cir. 1999). 

Harrison’s semantic attack is beside the point. The district court explained that

after consideration of the McDonnell-Douglas framework, Harrison “still has the

burden of showing that race was a motivating factor.” The district court thus follows

the cases that use the words “racial animus” to describe the evidence of discrimination

because of race. Arnold v. Nursing and Rehab. Ctr. at Good Shepherd, 471 F.3d

843, 847 (8th Cir. 2006); Williams v. Saint Luke’s-Shawnee Mission Health Sys.,

Inc., 276 F.3d 1057, 1059 (8th Cir. 2002); Bell v. Southwestern Bell Wireless, Inc.,

19 Fed. Appx. 453, 454 (8th Cir. 2001); Clearwater v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 166, 231

F.3d 1122, 1127 (8th Cir. 2000). In the total context of the district court’s ruling, the

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district judge applied the correct test: whether United refused to hire Harrison because

of his race. See 42 U.S.C. 2002e-2(a)(1). 

Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate depending on a number of factors,

including “the strength of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, the probative value of the

proof that the employer’s explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports

the employer’s case and that properly may be considered on a motion for judgment

as a matter of law.” Tatum v. City of Berkeley, 408 F.3d 543, 549 (8th Cir. 2005),

quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148-49 (2000).

“The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally

discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Bogren v.

Minnesota, 236 F.3d 399, 404 (8th Cir. 2000), quoting Texas Dep’t of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).

To show racial motivation, Harrison emphasizes Landers’s statement that

Memphis might be a better fit for him as more minorities lived there. Harrison, on

appeal, makes no complaint about a Memphis position. Harrison fails to connect

Landers’s comment about Memphis with Harrison’s rejection of the Fayetteville

position. 

Harrison also attacks the amount offered to him as a general manager’s salary.

Harrison thus attempts to base a discriminatory failure-to-hire claim on a

discriminatory salary-offer claim in order to use the salary offer as evidence of both

intentional discrimination and pretext. Harrison asserts that he refused to work for

less than other general managers. He presented evidence that a white general manager

of two stores in Fayetteville had a base salary of $120,000 – which, in fact, indicates

that the salary offer was not discriminatory. At trial, while listing total salaries –

including commissions – of other general managers, Harrison introduced no other

evidence of base salaries for comparable dealerships, and thus failed to show a

discriminatory salary offer. 

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As a discriminatory failure-to-hire case, Harrison’s admission that he rejected

the offer is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason not to hire him. The district court

correctly noted that it “almost defies reason that either Mr. Everett or Mr Landers

would go out of their way to recruit [Harrison] for these positions with the idea in

mind that they were going to discriminate against him.” It is undisputed that Landers

recruited Harrison, and Harrison rejected the offer. 

 

In response to the motion for judgment as a matter of law, Harrison was

required to demonstrate a “legally sufficient evidentiary basis” for a reasonable jury

to find that he was subjected to intentional discrimination. Fed R. Civ. P. 50(a); see

also Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148-49. The district court correctly found that Harrison

failed to meet the burden of showing race was the reason he was not hired.

III.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

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