Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_01-cv-01463/USCOURTS-azd-2_01-cv-01463-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1/ The Original Complaint named the following plaintiffs: Veronica Arnold, Tonya

Arrington, Anthony Dorset, Vince Edwards, Barrington Folks, Jim Lee, Jesus Sagrero, Raul

Salazar, Greg Stephen, Jason Thiel and Frank Vilas. (docket # 1) Subsequently, Plaintiffs'

counsel advised the Court that Tonya Arrington and Jason Thiel died and that Barrington Folkes

has been deported and no longer wishes to pursue this litigation. The Court, therefore, granted

Plaintiffs leave to file an Amended Complaint to include the appropriate named Plaintiffs.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Veronica Arnold, on behalf of herself and

all other persons similarly situated, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Arizona Department of Public Safety

("DPS"), et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-01-1463-PHX-LOA

ORDER

This matter arises on Plaintiffs' Motion for Approval of Proposed Settlement

Agreement. The Court has conducted a preliminary hearing, notified the class of the Agreement,

and conducted a final fairness hearing. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the

Settlement Agreement is fair, adequate and reasonable and, therefore, will approve the

Settlement Agreement. 

BACKGROUND

On August 6, 2001, eleven named Plaintiffs brought this action against the

Arizona Department of Public Safety ("DPS") and several individual defendants including the

Governor of Arizona, the Director of DPS, and several DPS patrol officers.1/

 (docket # 1) The

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(docket # 78 at 15) In accordance with the Court's Order, Plaintiffs filed an Amended

Complaint which includes the proper Plaintiffs. (docket # 81) The Amended Complaint

contains no substantive changes. 

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named Plaintiffs include African-American and Hispanic individuals who were stopped,

detained, and searched by DPS officers and drug-detection dogs while traveling on the interstate

highways in northern Arizona. (Id. at 11-12)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants maintain a policy, pattern, and practice of

targeting Hispanic and African-American drivers in conducting traffic stops, detentions, and

searches. This practice is commonly referred to as "racial profiling." Plaintiffs define racial

profiling "as the reliance on race, skin color, and/or ethnicity as an indication of criminality,

reasonable suspicion or probable cause, except when part of a description of a suspect, and said

description is timely, reliable and geographically relevant." (docket # 58 at 7) The named

Plaintiffs allege that racial profiling occurred while they were traveling on interstate highways

I-17 and I-40 in Coconino County, Arizona. (docket # 81 at 17) Plaintiffs allege that racial

profiling stems from a federally funded drug interdiction program sponsored by the United

States Drug Enforcement Agency known as "Operation Pipeline." (docket # 1 at 17-18)

Plaintiffs assert violations of their constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 C.F.R. §

42.101, et seq. (Id. at 11) Defendants deny any racial profiling by DPS officers and assert that

Plaintiffs' constitutional rights have not been violated. (docket # 18)

Plaintiffs' suit is based in large part on a statistical study performed by one of

Plaintiffs' expert witnesses, Dr. Frederic I. Solop, Director of the Social Research Laboratory

at Northern Arizona University, in connection with ongoing criminal litigation in Coconino

County. Dr. Solop's study is based on documents memorializing traffic stops during 2000

which were produced pursuant to a discovery order by the Coconino County Superior Court in

the State criminal litigation. During 2002, it was discovered that DPS had either lost or

destroyed certain documents regarding traffic stops and vehicle searches. Based on the absence

of the DPS stop and search data, which was critical to Plaintiffs' case, on April 14, 2003, the

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District Court dismissed Plaintiffs' Complaint with leave to re-file if Plaintiffs discovered

additional evidence of racial profiling by DPS. The district court dismissed the action before

determining whether to certify a Plaintiffs class.

 Plaintiffs appealed. While on appeal, the parties agreed to participate in mediation

conducted by Stephen Liacouris of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Mediation Program.

Mediation began on September 24, 2003 and continued until the parties reached a settlement

of the issues raised in Plaintiffs' complaint in January of 2005. After the parties reached an

agreement, they filed a stipulation with the Ninth Circuit to dismiss the pending appeal without

prejudice to its reinstatement, so that jurisdiction could be re-vested in the District Court and

the matter could be remanded for approval of the settlement. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the

appeal without prejudice and remanded this matter for review and approval of the settlement

agreement. Thereafter, all parties expressly consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c). (docket # 61) After resolving the novel question of whether a magistrate

judge has jurisdiction to preside over a class action (docket # 67), Arnold v. Arizona

Department of Public Service, 233 F.R.D. 537 (D. Ariz. 2005), Plaintiffs moved for certification

of a Plaintiffs Class pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2) and approval of the Settlement

Agreement

PROPOSED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

In summary, the proposed Settlement Agreement contains the following terms:

Prohibition of Racial Profiling and Racial Discrimination: DPS will maintain

its present policy that the intentional practice of racial profiling is unlawful. DPS will not

tolerate the racial or ethnic profiling of any group and prohibits any policy, procedure or

practice that constitutes profiling any person based on race, skin color, and/or ethnicity for the

purpose of traffic stops or investigation. On or before the effective date of the Settlement

Agreement, DPS will implement General Order 4.2.30 which defines racial profiling and

prohibits its officers from using race, skin color, or ethnicity in developing reasonable suspicion

or probable cause for a vehicle stop. (docket # 58, Exh. 1 at 7)

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Modification of Traffic Stop Procedures: An officer shall not detain a vehicle

or its occupants for investigative purposes for longer than is reasonably necessary to accomplish

the purpose of the traffic stop unless reasonable suspicion or probable cause of criminal activity

exists. An officer shall not detain a vehicle or its occupants for the sole purpose of allowing

time for the arrival or use of a drug-detection canine unless reasonable suspicion or probable

cause of criminal activity exists. (docket # 58, Exh. 1 at 8)

Limitation on Consent Searches: Before conducting a consent search of a

vehicle during a traffic stop, an officer shall obtain written consent-to-search the vehicle and

provide a copy of the consent form to the owner or driver of the vehicle. DPS officers shall not

have the discretion to decline to use a written consent to search form because the officer deems

the use of forms to be inconvenient or time-consuming, or because the officer does not have the

form available. (Id. at 8) 

Videotaping of Traffic Stops: DPS will adopt procedures which will provide that

all traffic stops and vehicle searches will be videotaped using in-car videotape systems. The

systems shall have both video and audio components, will be activated once a traffic stop has

begun, and are to remain in operation throughout the duration of the traffic stop. DPS will make

good faith efforts to install the vehicle-based systems in all patrol vehicles as soon as is

reasonably possible. Until all patrol cars have vehicle-based video systems, DPS will prioritize

its assignment of new equipment where the greatest number of traffic stops and vehicle searches

occur. (Id. at 9-10)

Training: DPS will train all of its sworn officers regarding the terms of the

Settlement Agreement. DPS will also train every DPS officer in a racial profiling curriculum

agreed to by the parties, and DPS will provide Plaintiffs' representative with documentation

showing that this requirement of the Settlement Agreement has been fulfilled. (Exh.1 to docket

# 58 at 10 and Racial Profiling Training Outline thereto)

Data Collection: DPS will collect and make available data the parties agreed is

meaningful regarding DPS' contacts with the motoring public for a period of three years from

the date the Settlement Agreement becomes effective, viz. the date upon which the Clerk enters

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the dismissal of this case. This data will be automated and will be made available to Plaintiffs'

representative, the American Civil Liberties Union of Arizona, on a semi-annual basis at no

cost. DPS will provide the data for all traffic stops and vehicle searches, which are conducted

by DPS, during that three-year time period. Thereafter, the stop and search data will continue

to be available to the public pursuant to Title 39, Chapter 1, Article 2 of the Arizona Revised

Statutes. (Id. at 10-13)

Implementation and Compliance with Settlement Agreement: The Assistant

Director, Agency Support Division, will oversee and be responsible for DPS' implementation

of the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 

Verification: Plaintiffs' counsel may call face-to-face meetings with DPS to

discuss DPS' efforts to implement the terms of the Settlement Agreement on a bi-annual basis.

Counsel will also have access to policy manuals, training materials, and the automated data

regarding its officers' contacts with motorists. (Id.)

Mediation: The parties agree to make a good faith effort to resolve any disputes

by direct negotiation. (Id. at 18)

Citizens' Advisory Board: The Governor will create and appoint a nine-member

"Citizens' Traffic Stop Advisory Board" which will review DPS' practices, policies, and

procedures relating to racial profiling, traffic stops, traffic stop data collection, and vehicle

searches. (Id. at 16-17)

Plaintiffs' Claims: The Agreement shall extend to all claims of the named

Plaintiffs, and to the injunctive and declaratory claims of the Plaintiff class. As of the effective

date of the Agreement, all damages claims of the named Plaintiffs shall be dismissed with

prejudice. The Settlement Agreement has no impact on, or prejudicial effect as to, the damages

claims of unnamed individual class members. (Id. at 5)

Future Lawsuits: Plaintiffs agree that as long as DPS complies with the

Settlement Agreement, neither they nor their representative, while the agreement is in effect,

will initiate or participate in any new suit or action against DPS seeking relief as to the policies

and practices complained of in the Complaint and/or which are covered by this Agreement,

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except that unnamed individual class members may pursue damage claims. (docket # 58, Exh.

1 at 6) 

No Admissions: Defendants do not admit any violations of state or federal law

or admit any wrongdoing. Likewise, the Agreement shall not be deemed an admission by

Plaintiffs that no wrongdoing was engaged in by Defendants or that Defendants complied with

applicable federal or state law. (Id. at 4) 

Attorneys' Fees and Costs: In full settlement of all claims for attorneys' fees,

DPS will pay $139,589.78 denominated in the Settlement Agreement as attorneys' fees and

costs. (Id.)

Dismissal: This litigation will be terminated by a dismissal with prejudice by

Stipulated Order of Dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(1)(2). (docket # 58, Exh. 1 at 21)

Duration of Agreement: The Agreement shall terminate three years after the

effective date thereof. (Id., Exh. 1 at 6) 

PROCEDURE FOR REVIEW OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) provides that the "court must approve any

settlement . . . of the claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class." A district court reviewing

a proposed settlement agreement in a class action engages in a three-step process: (1) conduct

a preliminary hearing, (2) notify the class, and (3) conduct a fairness hearing. In re Jiffy Lube

Securities Litigation, 927 F.2d 155, 158 (4th Cir. 1991). Thereafter, the court approves or rejects

the settlement agreement. Because settlement was reached in this case before certification of

the class, during the preliminary hearing, the Court determined whether to certify the class and

preliminarily approved the Settlement Agreement. Staton v. Boeing Company, 327 F.3d 938,

952 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court will discuss the three-step process followed in this case below.

I. Preliminary Hearing and Class Certification

The Court conducted a preliminary hearing on February 8, 2006 to determine

whether to certify the class and preliminarily approve the Settlement Agreement. After

consideration of the relevant pleadings and the arguments of counsel, the Court certified

Plaintiffs' class and preliminarily approved the Settlement Agreement. Specifically, the Court

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2/ The Court will not reiterate its analysis of the class certification issue in this order.

Rather, the Court incorporates by reference its February 24, 2006 Order. (docket # 78) 

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found that Plaintiffs satisfied the requirements for certifying a class pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.

23(b)(2) and 23(a).2/

 The Court found that the proposed class satisfied the four prerequisites

set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a): (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3)

typicality, and (4) adequacy of representation. Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019

(9th Cir. 1998). (docket # 78 at 3-8) The Court also found that Plaintiffs satisfied the

requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2) that "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to

act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive

relief with respect to the class as a whole." (Id. at 8) Accordingly, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.

23(b)(2) the Court certified the following class for purposes of settling all claims for relief in

Plaintiffs' Complaint:

All non-Caucasian persons who have been or will be stopped, detained and/or

searched by an officer or officers of the Arizona Department of Public Safety

("DPS") while traveling in a vehicle on a street or highway within Arizona 

between January 1, 1997, and the date which is three calendar years after 

the effective date of the Settlement Agreement filed with the Court on April 12,

2005. 

(docket # 78 at 14)

At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the Court appointed Lee B. Phillips,

Daniel Pochoda, and Reginald T. Shuford as class counsel pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(g).

(docket # 78) The Court also preliminarily approved the Settlement Agreement subject to a

final fairness hearing. (Id. 78 at 14); In re Jiffy Lube Sec. Litig., 927 F.2d at158. The Court

determined that the proposed Settlement Agreement seemed fair on its face and worth

submitting to the class members for their consideration. Managing Class Action Litigation,

Barbara J. Rothstein & Thomas E. Willging (2005), at 17. 

II. Notice to Class Members 

Following the preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement and certification

of the class, the Court ordered the parties to submit to the Court a proposed notice to be given

to the class members including the form of the notice to the media pursuant to which the notice

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would be disseminated. (docket # 79) The Court noted Rule 23(e)'s requirement that the

district court "direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound

by a proposed settlement . . . ." (docket # 79 at 1) 

The parties submitted a proposed form of notice which the Court approved on

March 27, 2006. (docket # 84) The notice describes the essential terms of the Settlement

Agreement, provides information regarding attorneys' fees, indicates the time and place of the

hearing to consider approval of the Settlement Agreement, prominently displays the address and

phone number of counsel and the procedure for making inquires or objections regarding the

Settlement Agreement. (docket # 79, # 84 and # 92)

Although the Court approved the content of the notice, in a subsequent order, the

Court found that the parties' proposal for publishing the notice was inadequate to reach the

following communities: Arizona's Indian tribes; Arizona's African-American, Arab-American,

and Asian-American residents; Arizona's Spanish-speaking-only residents, and the Western and

Eastern portions of the District of Arizona. (docket # 85) The Court, therefore, expanded the

list of media outlets through which notice would be disseminated to ensure that the notice would

reasonably reach the foregoing groups of individuals. (Id.) The Court's March 28, 2006 Order

contains an extensive list of media outlets that would publish or otherwise disseminate the

notice. (docket # 85) The Court will not reiterate that list, or the form of notice, here. Rather,

the Court incorporates by reference its March 27, 2006 and March 28, 2006 Orders. (docket #

84 and # 85) 

After the parties reached an agreement regarding the cost of notice, on May 5,

2006, the Court ordered that the notice be disseminated via the outlets listed in its March 28,

2006 Order. (docket # 88) On July 21, 2006, the parties confirmed that the notice had been

disseminated in accordance with the Court's Order. (docket # 92) No objections have been

filed to the proposed Settlement Agreement and the July 14, 2006 deadline for filing objections

has passed. Additionally, no class members attended the fairness hearing conducted on July 28,

2006. 

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3/ The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA") addresses federal diversity and

removal jurisdiction over multi-state class actions, procedures for settlement and related issues.

The CAFA was enacted on February 18, 2005, nearly four years after this case was commenced

on August 6, 2001. 

There is no dispute that the terms of the CAFA do not apply retroactively to this case.

Section 9 of CAFA, 109 Pub.L. 2, 5 (stating that the "amendments made by this Act shall apply

to any civil litigation commenced on or after the date of enactment of this Act.").

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III. Fairness Hearing

On July 28, 2006 at 2:00 p.m., the Court conducted a final fairness hearing in

open court. Various counsel and party representatives attended the hearing. No class members

appeared; no objections to the Settlement Agreement were expressed. After consideration of

the proposed Settlement Agreement, the record in this matter, including the written arguments

of counsel, the Court finds that the Settlement Agreement is "fair, reasonable, and adequate,"

and therefore, the Court approves the Settlement Agreement as discussed below. 

IV. Final Review of Settlement Agreement

A. Summary of Terms of Proposed Settlement Agreement

 As previously discussed, the Settlement Agreement's terms: (1) prohibit DPS from

engaging in racial profiling and racial discrimination in conducting traffic stops and

investigation; (2) limit the length of traffic stops; (3) require written consent to conduct a search

of a vehicle; (4) require DPS to adopt procedures for videotaping traffic stops; (5) require DPS

to train its officers regarding the terms of the Settlement Agreement; (6) permit Plaintiffs'

counsel to request meetings with DPS to monitor the implementation of the Settlement

Agreement; (7) require the Governor to create a Citizens' Traffic Stop Advisory Board to review

DPS' practices regarding traffic stops; (8) provide that the named Plaintiffs release their claims

for monetary damages but that the unnamed Plaintiffs may seek such damages; (9) provide that

DPS will pay $139,589.78 as attorneys' fees and costs to Plaintiffs' counsel. (Exhibit to docket

# 58) 

B. Legal Standard for Approving Settlement Agreement3/

In the context of a class action, "the extraordinary amount of judicial and private

resources consumed by massive class action litigation elevates the general policy of

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encouraging settlements to 'an overriding public interest.'" Austin v. Pennsylvania Department

of Corrections, 876 F.Supp. 1437, 1455 (E.D.Pa. 1995)(quoting Cotton v. Hinton 559 F.2d

1326, 1331 (5th Cir. 1977)). Due to their representative nature, class actions are susceptible to

abuse by named plaintiffs or their counsel. Id. To protect against improper conduct, Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) provides that "[t]he court must approve any settlement . . . of the

claims . . . of a certified class." Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e)(1)(A). 

Specifically, Rule 23(e) provides, in pertinent part, that:

(1)(A) The court must approve any settlement, voluntary dismissal, or 

compromise of the claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class.

(B) The court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who

would be bound by a proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise.

(C) The court may approve a settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise 

that would bind class members only after a hearing and on finding that the 

settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise is fair, reasonable, and adequate.

(2) The parties seeking approval of the settlement, voluntary dismissal, or

compromise under Rule 23(e)(1) must file a statement identifying any agreement

made in connection with the proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal, or 

compromise.

 * * *

(4)(A) Any class member may object to a proposed settlement, voluntary 

dismissal, or compromise that requires court approval under Rule 23(e)(1)(A).

Fed.R.Civ.P.23(e). The parties have previously filed "a statement identifying any agreement

made in connection with the proposed settlement." Id. Namely, the parties filed the proposed

Settlement Agreement which the Court preliminarily approved. Additionally, as discussed

above, the Court directed "notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be

bound by [the] proposed settlement . . . ." Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e)(1)(B). The Court invited

objections from class members and conducted a fairness hearing to consider whether the

Settlement Agreement is "fair, reasonable, and adequate." Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e)(1)(C). Below,

the Court will discuss its findings that the proposed Settlement Agreement satisfies that

standard. 

C. Whether Settlement Agreement is "Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate"

In determining whether the proposed agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate,

the district court must consider the settlement as a whole, rather than individual provisions, for

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overall fairness. Staton v. Boeing Company, 327 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2003)(citing Hanlon

v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998)). In making this determination, a court

may consider the following factors:

the strength of the plaintiff's case; the risk, expense, complexity, and 

likely duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining class action

throughout trial; the amount offered in settlement; the extent of discovery

completed, and the stage of the proceedings; the experience and views

of counsel; the presence of a governmental participant; and the reaction 

of the class members to the proposed settlement.

Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2003)(quoting Linney v. Cellular Alaska Partnership,

151 F.3d 1234, 1242 (9th Cir. 1998)). A district court, however, need not only consider those

factors which are relevant to the case before it "[b]ecause the settlement evaluation factors are

non-exclusive." Churchill Village, L.L.C. v. General Electric, 361 F.3d 566, 576 n. 7 (9th Cir.

2004). The district court must consider the relevant factors but need not "reach any ultimate

conclusions on the contested issues of law and fact which underlie the merits of the dispute, for

it is the very uncertainty of the outcome of litigation and avoidance of wasteful and expensive

litigation that induce consensual settlements." Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n., 688

F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982); Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026. The Court will discuss the relevant

factors in determining whether to approve the Settlement Agreement. 

1. Risk and Expense of Further Litigation

The likelihood and expense of continued litigation weighs in favor of approving

the Settlement Agreement. The parties have advised the Court that if the Settlement Agreement

is not approved, they will continue litigating this matter before the Ninth Circuit. If this matter

were reversed at the appellate level and remanded, the parties agree that this matter would

involve numerous depositions, additional discovery, dispositive motions, and possibly a trial.

In view of the number of named Plaintiffs, the enormous size of the proposed class, the

significant cost of continued litigation, and the inordinate delay that has already occurred in this

matter, the mandates of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 heavily favor approval of the

Settlement Agreement. Fed.R.Civ.P. 1 (encouraging the "just, speedy, and inexpensive

determination of every action.") Additionally, the "compromise of complex litigation is

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encouraged by the courts and favored by public policy." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A.,

Inc., 396 F.3d 96 (2nd Cir. 2005).

2. The Amount Offered in the Settlement Agreement

 Plaintiffs' purpose in bringing this action was to obtain injunctive relief to prevent

the continuation of DPS's alleged racial profiling during routine traffic stops on Arizona

highways. The Court finds that the terms of the Settlement Agreement resolve Plaintiffs' claims

and provide Plaintiffs with the relief sought. 

Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Defendants offer Plaintiffs a

substantial benefit through the commitment of resources to implement terms of the Settlement

Agreement which are designed to further the goal of prohibiting racial profiling by DPS in

Arizona and to involve citizens in the oversight of DPS. Implementing the terms of the

Settlement Agreement will require an ongoing commitment of Defendants' resources to

programs designed to eradicate racial profiling. The entire class will benefit from Defendants'

dedication of resources to the implementation of the terms of the Settlement Agreement

pursuant to which Defendants agree to take the following action: prohibit racial profiling, equip

DPS vehicles with videotaping equipment; limit consent searches; collect data regarding traffic

stops and convert that data to an automated format accessible to Plaintiffs at no cost; train DPS

officers regarding the terms of the Settlement Agreement, including the prohibition of racial

profiling; and create a Citizens' Advisory Board. In summary, pursuant to the Settlement

Agreement, Defendants agree to dedicate human and financial resources to ensure that racial

profiling does not occur on Arizona highways which is the relief that Plaintiffs sought in filing

this action. 

3. Extent of Discovery Completed

This matter has been litigated since 2001 and the parties have engaged in

extensive discovery. The parties have reviewed thousands of traffic stops and vehicle searches

conducted by DPS in 1999-2002 and over 500,000 stops conducted by DPS in 2003. (docket

# 59 at 18 n. 5) This matter was on appeal and in mediation from 2003 until January of 2005.

The procedural posture of this case supports approving the Settlement Agreement. The parties

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have spent a significant amount of time considering the issues and facts in this case and are in

a position to determine whether settlement is a viable alternative. As discussed in more detail

below, counsel for both Plaintiffs and Defendants have sufficient skill and experience to litigate

this class action and evaluate the propriety of the Settlement Agreement. (docket # 68)

4. The Experience and Views of Counsel

Another relevant factor is the experience of counsel who determined that

settlement was appropriate in this matter. Lee B. Phillips, Daniel Pochoda, and Reginald T.

Shuford are class counsel in this case. Each of these attorneys has considerable experience in

the applicable area of the law and in handling similar actions. 

Lee Phillips has 22 years of experience in civil rights law and has been involved

in racial profiling issues in Arizona for over six years. (docket # 68 at 5-6, 8-9) In 1999-2001,

he identified and investigated potential claims in this action in conjunction with the American

Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"). (Id.) Additionally, Mr. Phillips has worked as a specialist

in criminal law and his practice consisted largely of defending individuals arrested by DPS for

illegal transportation of drugs on Arizona highways. (Id.) Mr. Phillips' work successfully led

to the Arizona Supreme Court's decision in Jones, et al. v. Sterling, 210 Ariz. 308, 110 P.3d

1271 (Az. 2005) where the Arizona Supreme Court decided, among others, that a selective

enforcement claim can provide a constitutional defense to a criminal charge in the context of

a traffic stop and vehicle search. (Id. at 6) 

Mr. Phillips was also lead counsel in Manybeads v. United States, 209 F.2d 1164

(9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 966 (2001), a class action filed on behalf of Navajo

individuals who objected to being relocated by the federal government. The Ninth Circuit

directed the parties to participate in its mediation program. (docket # 68 at 9) After several

years of mediation, the parties reached an agreement which Congress approved in 1996. (Id.)

Thus, Mr. Phillips has previous experience with the Ninth Circuit's mediation program in which

the parties participated in this case. Mr. Phillips has also worked on several other class actions

lawsuits set forth in detail in a previously filed memorandum. (docket # 68 at 9) 

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Reginald Shuford is an attorney for the ACLU's national office. (docket # 68 at

7) He has worked on civil rights litigation including a high-profile highway patrol racial

profiling case entitled Maryland State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Maryland State

Police, 72 F.Supp.2d 560 (D.Md. 1999). Mr. Shuford has also litigated cases involving racial

profiling of airline passengers and racially selective law enforcement. (docket # 68 at 7)

Finally, he has been published on the topic of racial profiling. Anyway You Slice It: Why

Racial Profiling is Wrong, St. Louis University Law Review, Fall 2000. 

Daniel Pochoda is an attorney for the ACLU of Arizona. He has litigated civil

rights and racial discrimination matters in federal court since he began working for the Civil

Rights Division of the United States Department of Justice, 1967- 1969. (docket # 68 at 7) Mr.

Pochoda was class counsel in Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d

12, 15-19 (2nd Cir. 1971), which resulted in a significant ruling that the voluntary cessation of

torture and brutality toward prisoners does not obviate the need for injunctive relief. He has

served as a special master in the United States District Court, District of Arizona in three class

action cases involving constitutional issues: Casey v. Lewis, CV-90-00054-PHX-RGS and CV91-1808-PHX-RGS; Gluth v. Arizona Department of Corrections, CV-84-1626-PHX-PGR; and

Hook v. Arizona, CV-73-97-PHX-SMM. Recently, Mr. Pochoda won a racial profiling case

in Oziwo v. Town of Paradise Valley, CV-03-1793-PHX-MHM. He has also taught

constitutional law and litigation and trial advocacy on the law faculties of New York University

School of Law, the City University of New York School of Law, and Santa Clara University

Law School. (docket # 68 at 8) 

The Court finds that Plaintiffs' counsel in this matter have significant knowledge

and experience to appropriately assess the legal and factual issues in this matter and determine

whether the Settlement Agreement herein serves the interests of the class members. 

5. Reaction of Class Members 

As previously discussed, sufficient and reasonable notice was given to the class

members regarding the proposed Settlement Agreement. The notice included specific

instructions regarding objecting and/or attending the July 28, 2006 Fairness Hearing. The notice

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was disseminated via numerous media outlets in English and Spanish. (docket # 85) The notice

fairly apprized the class members of the terms of the Settlement Agreement and the class

members' options. Although sufficient notice of the proposed Settlement Agreement was

published in numerous media outlets throughout the District of Arizona including to many of

Arizona's Native American tribes and organizations dedicated to eliminating unlawful

discrimination, not a single class member filed an objection or attended the Fairness Hearing.

The absence of any objections suggests that the class members are unopposed to terms of the

Settlement Agreement. The absence of objections weighs in favor of approving the Settlement

Agreement. 

6. Absence of Evidence of Collusion

Another factor to consider in determining whether to approve the Settlement

Agreement is whether there is evidence of collusion among the parties. Ficalora v. Lockheed

Cal. Co., 751 F.2d 995, 997 ( 9th Cir. 1985) (stating that "[b]efore approving a class action

settlement, the district court must reach a reasoned judgment that the proposed agreement is not

the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion among, the negotiating parties. . . .")

There is no evidence of collusion in this case. The settlement negotiations were

conducted at arms length. Counsel participated in settlement discussions which were facilitated

by a neutral Ninth Circuit mediator, the parties exchanged draft settlement proposals, and

arrived at a final agreement. (docket # 59) The record reflects that the parties litigated this

matter for several years before reaching settlement with the assistance of a mediator. The

parties, including counsel for Plaintiffs, DPS, the Attorney General's Office, and the Governor's

Office, spent over a year discussing the issues in this case and negotiating the Settlement

Agreement. Additionally, as previously discussed, Plaintiffs' counsel conducted extensive

discovery in the related State criminal cases which provided evidence of traffic stops and

vehicle searches by DPS and claims of racial profiling. 

Additionally, pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, counsel for Plaintiffs will

receive $139,589.78 in attorneys' fees and costs based on a reduced hourly rate for fees incurred

up to May 13, 2004. (docket # 59 at 15-16) Plaintiffs' counsel have agreed to forego payment

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for legal services after that date if the Settlement Agreement is approved. Plaintiffs' counsel

have been vigorously pursuing this action since, at least, August of 2001 when this matter was

filed. They have participated in mediation and are committed to continuing with this litigation

if the Settlement Agreement is rejected. In view of the reduced fees and the significant amount

of time expended by Plaintiffs counsel since 2001, it is clear that Plaintiffs' counsel are not

pursuing this litigation for personal financial gain. 

In summary, there is no evidence of collusion, fraud, or overreaching that would

weigh against approving the Settlement Agreement. The arms-length negotiation of the

Settlement Agreement favors approval of that agreement. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 396 F.3d at

116-117 (stating that "a presumption of fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness may attach to

a class settlement reached in arms-length negotiations between experienced, capable counsel

after meaningful discovery.") (citations omitted).

7. Attorneys' Fees 

The Settlement Agreement provides for the payment of reasonable fees and costs

to Plaintiffs' counsel. Generally, attorneys' fees provisions included in settlement agreements

are subject to the determination of whether the agreement is "fair, adequate, and reasonable."

Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e). The assumption in scrutinizing a class action settlement agreement is that

the class members have an interest in assuring that the fees to be paid class counsel are not

unreasonably high. Staton, 327 F.3d at 964. "If fees are unreasonably high, the likelihood is that

defendant obtained a economically beneficial concession with regard to the merits provisions,

in the form of a lower monetary payments to the class members or less injunctive relief for the

class than could otherwise be obtained." Id. Thus, the "'[district] court must exercise its inherent

authority to assure that the amount and mode of payment of attorneys' fees are fair and proper.'"

Id. at 964 (quoting Zucker v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 192 F.3d 1323, 1328-29 (9th Cir.

1999)). The district court should determine whether the attorneys fees provided for in the

Agreement will compensate counsel sufficiently for the reasonable value of services. Lindy

Bros. Builders, Inc. of Philadelphia v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d

161, 167 (3rd Cir. 1973). The Ninth Circuit has instructed that because the amount of fees is

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often open to dispute and because the parties are compromising to avoid further disputes, the

district court need not inquire into the reasonableness of fees with the same level of scrutiny as

when the amount of fees is litigated. Staton, 327 F.3d at 966. The district court, however, must

conduct some inquiry into the hours expended and the billing rate. 

Here, Defendants have agreed to pay Plaintiffs' counsel $139,589.78 for attorneys'

fees and costs. To facilitate the Settlement Agreement, Plaintiffs' counsel agreed to substantially

reduce their hourly rate and to waive any claim for fees and costs after May 10, 2004, even

though a significant amount of attorney time and costs were incurred after that date. 

Counsel for Plaintiffs have expended over 508 hours pursuing this litigation from

March 15, 2001, when work on this case began, to May 10, 2004. (docket # 93, ¶ 5) At the rate

of $250 per hour, which the Court finds to be a reasonable hourly rate for the experience of

class counsel and this kind of challenging litigation, Plaintiffs have incurred fees through May

10, 2004 of $127,162.50 (508.65 hours x $250 per hour). (Id.) Class counsel have also

expended law clerk fees of $16,050 (214 hours x $75 per hour) and incurred costs and expenses

of $46,993.06. (Id.) Thus, total fees and costs through May 10, 2004 incurred were $190,205.56.

Nothing in the record suggests that the number of hours or hourly rates are unreasonable.

Rather, the opposite is true. Moreover, class counsel have vigorously litigated this matter since

May 10, 2004 on a pro bono basis and have expended significant time on this case since it was

remanded back to the district court on February 10, 2005. Counsel agreed to a reduction of their

hourly rate and to a substantial reduction of the number of hours for which they are

compensated in order to facilitate the resolution of this matter. Considering all the time class

counsel expended in this case to date, Mr. Phillips estimates that class counsel are actually being

compensated at the effective rate of $100 per hour for their legal work in this case. (Id. at ¶ 7)

The Court finds that amount of fees of $139,589.78 awarded Plaintiffs' counsel is fair,

reasonable and proper. Zucker, 192 F.3d at 1328-29. 

SUMMARY

In conclusion, the Court finds that the Settlement Agreement is fair, adequate and

reasonable. The terms of the Settlement Agreement address Plaintiffs' grievances set forth in

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the Complaint — allegations of racial profiling by DPS in performing traffic stops — by

requiring Defendants to implement and maintain programs that support the prohibition of racial

profiling by DPS officers and to put in place tools to facilitate the monitoring of those programs

by Plaintiffs and the public. There is no evidence of collusion among the parties or that counsel

brought this action solely for personal financial gain. Rather, Plaintiffs' counsel have sacrificed

the potential for earning a greater award of attorneys' fees and costs in the interest of settling

this matter for the benefit of the class members. After a thorough review of the record in this

matter, all the relevant factors for a district court to consider in approving a class action

settlement and the absence of any objections to the Settlement Agreement, the Court approves

the Settlement Agreement. 

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Approval of Settlement Agreement

(docket # 58) is GRANTED. 

DATED this 31st day of July, 2006.

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