Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03152/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03152-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

N. CHARLES PODARAS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF MENLO PARK, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-03152-SI 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 

MOTIONS TO DISMISS WITHOUT 

LEAVE TO AMEND

Re: Dkt. Nos. 42, 44, 62, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 

102, 120

Now before the Court are motions to dismiss the first amended complaint filed by all 

defendants.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the motions to dismiss without 

leave to amend.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff N. Charles Podaras, acting in pro per and in forma pauperis, filed the original 

complaint in this case on July 11, 2014. The complaint named six defendants: the City of Menlo 

Park; Menlo Park Police Officer Claudio Ruiz; Menlo Park Technical Services Manager Susie 

Eldred (retired); the Office of the Clerk of the Superior Court of San Mateo County; San Mateo 

County Superior Court Legal Exhibit Technician Jorge Melendrez; and San Mateo County 

Superior Court Services Manager Janice Antonini. 

On November 21, 2014, defendants Menlo Park and Officer Ruiz moved to dismiss the 

 

1

 The motions were scheduled for a hearing on April 24, 2015 and May 15, 2015. The motion set 

for May 15, 2015, filed by defendant Bruttig, has been fully briefed. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 

7-1(b), the Court determines that all of the motions are suitable for resolution without oral 

argument. 

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complaint.2 On November 24, 2014, plaintiff filed the first amended complaint (“FAC”). The 

FAC is 154 pages, contains 397 paragraphs of factual allegations, and alleges 32 causes of action. 

The FAC names the same six defendants as the original complaint, as well as 19 more: Menlo 

Park Police Officer Burke Bruttig; Menlo Park Property Officer Nancy Gable; Menlo Park 

Records Officer Deborah Calvillo; Menlo Park Revenue and Claims Management Coordinator 

John McGirr; San Mateo County Superior Court Executive Officer/Clerk John Fitton; San Mateo 

County District Attorney Office; San Mateo County District Attorney James Fox; San Mateo 

County District Attorney Steve Wagstaffe; San Mateo County Deputy District Attorney Brian 

Donnellan; San Mateo County Deputy District Attorney Morris Maya; San Mateo County Deputy 

District Attorney Brian Raft3; County of San Mateo; Superior Court of California, County of San 

Mateo; Judicial Council of California; State Bar of California Office of Chief Trial Counsel; State 

Bar of California; Las Lomitas School District; Las Lomitas School District employee Dennis 

Hatfield; Linda Bleich, a witness at plaintiff's 2005 criminal trial, and who is appearing pro se; 

and Janet Davis, another witness at plaintiff's 2005 criminal trial, and who is also appearing pro 

se. The FAC also names Does 1-75. All named defendants have moved to dismiss the FAC 

and/or joined in motions filed by other defendants. 

I. 2009 Lawsuit

This lawsuit is related to a 2009 lawsuit that plaintiff, then represented by counsel, filed 

against the Menlo Park Police Department, Menlo Park Police Officer Burke Bruttig, and San 

Mateo County District Attorney Brian Donnellan. Podaras v. City of Menlo Park, et al., C 09-

4199 SI (N.D. Cal.) (“2009 Lawsuit”). Plaintiff refers to the 2009 Lawsuit beginning in paragraph 

64 of the FAC and refers to the defendants in that action as the “CIV 09-4199 Defendants.”

The 2009 Lawsuit sought damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of plaintiff's

constitutional rights. The claims alleged in the 2009 Lawsuit arose out of plaintiff's December 15, 

 

2

 At the time defendants filed the motion, defendant Eldred, who had retired, had not been served 

with the complaint. The Menlo Park defendants' motion requested that Eldred be dismissed on the 

same grounds that applied to the City of Menlo Park and Officer Ruiz.

3

 The FAC erroneously sued Mr. Raft as George Raft. The parties filed a stipulation clarifying 

that plaintiff intended to sue Brian Raft, and that Raft joins in the motion to dismiss. Dkt. 31.

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2005 criminal convictions on two misdemeanor charges under Cal. Penal Code §§ 243.2(a) and 

245(a)(1), for battery on school property and assault. The 2009 Lawsuit alleged that in November 

2004, plaintiff’s dog Emerson was attacked and injured by Las Lomitas School District employee 

Dennis Hatfield at the La Entrada School in Menlo Park, California. C 09-4199 SI Compl. ¶ 1. 

Plaintiff alleged that in defense of himself and Emerson, when Hatfield refused to stop "torturing"

Emerson, plaintiff pushed Hatfield and was able to free Emerson. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. Plaintiff alleged 

that Hatfield falsely accused him of assault, and that Officer Bruttig created false police reports

and inaccurate and incomplete witness statements regarding the incident. Id. ¶¶ 23-25. 

The 2009 Lawsuit alleged that Officer Bruttig recorded an on-scene interview with 

Hatfield, and that this microcassette recording corroborated plaintiff's version of events. Id. ¶¶ 21, 

23. The 2009 Lawsuit also alleged that Officer Bruttig arrested plaintiff and recorded an interview 

of plaintiff at the police station. Id. ¶ 22. The 2009 Lawsuit alleged that although the San Mateo 

District Attorney’s Office had evidence that exculpated plaintiff, including Hatfield's recorded 

statement and contemporaneous 911 recordings, the office nevertheless charged plaintiff on 

December 21, 2004, with violations of Penal Code Section 243.3(a) and 245(a)(1). The 2009 

Lawsuit alleged that plaintiff's defense attorney requested that the City produce the tape recordings

of Officer Bruttig's interviews of Hatfield and plaintiff, as well as the 911 recordings, and that the 

City delayed in producing the recordings and/or produced altered or edited recordings. Id. ¶¶ 26-

27. Plaintiff alleged that he was tried in the San Mateo County Superior Court and found guilty by 

a jury on both misdemeanor counts on December 16, 2005, and that he was convicted based on 

false and incomplete evidence. Id. ¶¶ 29-31.

Plaintiff appealed, and on September 11, 2006, the Appellate Division of the San Mateo 

Superior Court reversed plaintiff’s convictions on the ground that the jury was not given a selfdefense instruction. Plaintiff was not retried, and the charges were dismissed on November 9, 

2006. The 2009 Lawsuit alleged that Menlo Park, Officer Bruttig and District Attorney Donnellan

conspired to fabricate and cover up evidence that led to plaintiff’s criminal convictions, and 

alleged two claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of his right to a fair 

trial, and (2) malicious prosecution.

In an order filed December 28, 2009, this Court dismissed the 2009 Lawsuit with prejudice 

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on statute of limitations grounds. The parties agreed, and the Court found, that the claims alleged 

in the 2009 Lawsuit accrued at the latest on November 9, 2006, when the criminal charges against 

plaintiff were dropped. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489-90 (1994) (a § 1983 “cause of 

action for damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until 

the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.”) (footnote omitted). The Court held that the 

applicable statute of limitations was two years, and thus that plaintiff's claims were untimely. 

Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989); Cal. 

Civ. Proc. Code section 335.1; Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004).

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal and denied a petition for rehearing en banc, and 

the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Dkt. 27, 28, 33 in C 09-4199 SI. 

II. This lawsuit

In this lawsuit, the FAC alleges that defendants have engaged in a 10 year “conspiracy” 

starting with the 2004 strangling of the dog Emerson, and continuing with police and prosecutorial 

misconduct through plaintiff's criminal trial and post-trial legal proceedings. The FAC alleges that 

the defendants connected to the 2005 criminal proceedings (Las Lomitas School District employee 

Hatfield, the City of Menlo Park, Menlo Park Police Officer Bruttig, Las Lomitas School District, 

prosecution witnesses Janet Davis and Linda Bleich, San Mateo County District Attorney Fox, 

San Mateo County Deputy District Attorney Donnellan, the County of San Mateo, and the San 

Mateo District Attorneys' Office) engaged in malicious prosecution and conspired to deprive 

plaintiff of his right to a fair trial by, inter alia, falsifying and withholding evidence, committing 

perjury, and making misrepresentations to the state trial and appellate courts. FAC ¶¶ 62-134.

The FAC also alleges that during the appeal of this Court's dismissal of the 2009 Lawsuit, 

"Mr. Podaras was subjected to actions by County of San Mateo, City of Menlo Park, and Officer 

Bruttig, which appeared to be possibly obstructive or punitive, and perhaps retaliatory, in nature." 

Id. ¶ 163. Specifically, the FAC alleges that on March 3, 2011, the Ninth Circuit calendared Mr. 

Podaras's appeal for oral argument on April 12, 2011, and that "only days" after the scheduling 

was announced, the County of San Mateo "initiated processing of a Jury Duty Summons for Mr. 

Podaras, demanding his service directly on the calendared Ninth Circuit date of 2011 April 12." 

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Id. ¶ 164. 4 

The FAC alleges that the conspiracy continued after plaintiff's 2005 criminal convictions 

were reversed. The FAC alleges that on November 7, 2008, plaintiff petitioned the Superior Court 

for the County of San Mateo for a Finding of Factual Innocence. Id. ¶ 135. The FAC alleges that 

"[i]n opposition to Mr. Podaras's Petition, [the] San Mateo County District Attorney['s] Office 

continued a pattern of intentional and consistent factual misrepresentation," and that the District 

Attorney's opposition to the Petition omitted relevant information and included incomplete 

information. Id. ¶ 137. The FAC alleges that the opposition also presented content from the 

microcassette tape recorded by Officer Bruttig. Id. ¶ 139. The FAC states that the Petition for a 

Finding of Factual Innocence was denied. Id. ¶ 140.

The FAC also alleges that on October 8, 2009, plaintiff filed an ethics complaint with the 

State Bar of California Office of Chief Trial Counsel ("OCTC"). Id. ¶ 151. The State Bar 

complaint "reported a course and pattern of unethical actions by attorneys Brian Donnellan [the 

Deputy District Attorney who prosecuted plaintiff's 2005 criminal case] and Janet Davis [a witness 

for the prosecution in the 2005 criminal case, and an attorney], which had caused Mr. Podaras to 

be convicted of crimes he did not commit." Id. The FAC alleges that plaintiff's complaint was 

"summarily dismissed," and that "in responding to Mr. Podaras's State Bar Complaint, OCTC 

ignored . . . clear evidence of misconduct." Id. ¶ 156. The FAC alleges that the "OCTC and 

OCTC attorneys violated their ethical and professional obligations, acting in furtherance of 

conspiracy while effectively covering for undeniable attorney misconduct by prosecutor Brian 

Donnellan and prosecution purported witness Janet Davis." Id. ¶ 158.

The FAC contains a number of allegations regarding the handling and ultimate destruction 

of the original microcassette recording made by Officer Bruttig of his 2004 on-scene interview 

with Hatfield. The FAC alleges that in October 2012, plaintiff's original criminal trial defense 

counsel received a notice stating that the criminal trial exhibits, including the microcassette tape of 

Hatfield's interview, were subject to possible destruction. Id. ¶ 167. The FAC alleges that 

plaintiff filed a number of motions, declarations and other documents in state court regarding the 

 

4

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finding that plaintiff's appeal was suitable for decision without oral argument.

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disposition of the trial exhibits, including motions for reconsideration of Superior Court orders 

directing the Clerk to "dispose of/destroy" trial exhibits, ex parte motions for stays, and petitions 

for writs of prohibition with the state appellate courts. Id. ¶¶ 215-226.5 The FAC alleges that the 

appellate court ordered that plaintiff was to be provided with accurate reproductions of the trial 

exhibits, including the microcassette. Id. ¶ 226. The FAC alleges that plaintiff received 

reproductions from the Superior Court: plaintiff "was informed by Court Services Manager Janice 

Antonini that she had signed and executed certification of accuracy on 2013 April 18. However 

when the reproductions and certifications of accuracy were eventually transferred to Mr. Podaras, 

with those certifications of accuracy affixed to the front of sealed envelopes containing the 

reproductions, the certifications bore a date of 2013 April 19." Id. ¶ 232. 

With regard to the microcassette recording, the FAC alleges,

Ms. Antonini further represented that the microcassette tape had 

been duplicated using "court equipment . . . [t]he duplications were 

then listened to verify accuracy and validity." This claim was 

logically inconsistent with and contrary to the 2005 representations 

of Deputy District Attorney Brian Donnellan, made to both Mr. 

Podaras's original criminal trial defense counsel and the Superior 

Court trial judge. At that time, when the microcassette tape had 

already been withheld from Mr. Podaras's counsel and was being 

used in malicious prosecution of Mr. Podaras, Mr. Donnellan 

claimed that the tape would only play audibly on Officer Bruttig's 

portable microcassette machine.

Id. ¶ 234. The FAC alleges that "[t]he 2013 microcassette duplication provided to Mr. Podaras 

was in significant part unintelligible." Id. ¶ 236. 

The FAC alleges that “[d]ue to non-performance by Office of the Clerk of the Superior 

Court of San Mateo County in providing the ordered duplications of audio exhibits, including the 

microcassette tape, Mr. Podaras on 2013 April 22 Monday filed a 2013 Motion for Order to Show 

Cause why Office of the Clerk of the Superior Court of San Mateo County did not comply with 

Superior Court’s 2013 April 03 orders for duplication and reproduction of exhibits . . . .” Id. 

¶ 240.6 Plaintiff requested a hearing on the motion for an order to show cause. 

 

5

 Plaintiff's filings in state court included, for example, motions requesting that the Superior Court 

permit plaintiff's photographer access to the exhibits "in order to make a statute-permitted pictorial 

record of trial exhibits before their imminent possible destruction." Id. ¶ 218. 

6

 The FAC alleges that the Clerk’s “non-performance” included the failure to provide the exhibits 

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[The] Office of the Clerk of the Superior Court of San Mateo 

County calendared an appearance for 2013 May 29 Wednesday at 

9:00 am. One day before the hearing, the scheduled time was 

shifted from 9:00 am to 9:01 am. Mr. Podaras received no 

clarification for this scheduling modification, and remains unclear if 

the change may be tied to expiration of some defined period, such as 

an unknown limitations period, at 9:00 am on 2013 May 29. 

Id. ¶ 241. 

The Superior Court held a hearing on May 29, 2013. Id. ¶ 242. The FAC alleges that at 

the hearing, “Superior Court Judge Novak issued an order specifically directing only that the 

microcassette tape be returned to Menlo Park Police Department no later than 2013 May 31. The 

microcassette tape would then be available to Mr. Podaras through Menlo Park Police 

Department.” Id. ¶ 247. Plaintiff alleges that Judge Novak’s order “did not include instruction to 

destroy the microcassette tape,” but that the “Office of the Clerk of the Superior Court of San 

Mateo County authored and released a 2013 May 29 Notice document ‘Clerk of the Court’s 

Notice of Order and Delivery’ . . . [that] misrepresents the content of the specified 2013 May 29 

Superior Court Order, incorrectly stating in significant part that the ‘listed court exhibits (are) to 

be delivered to Menlo Park Police department for destruction/disposition.’” Id. ¶¶ 249, 252; see 

also Dkt. 45-5 (the May 29, 2013 Notice).7 The Office of the Clerk then turned the microcassette 

over to the Menlo Park Police Department, and the Department destroyed the tape. Id. ¶ 254. 

Plaintiff alleges that the Court’s order allowing for the destruction of the tape has deprived him of 

the ability to “clean up” the “antecedent effects from the wrongful conviction” in 2005. Id. ¶ 11.

Plaintiff also alleges that in early 2013 he discovered an exhibit in his criminal court file 

from a 2005 civil case in which plaintiff, then represented by counsel,8sued defendant Davis, 

Podaras v. Davis, (San Mateo County Superior Court Case No.: CIV 450799). Plaintiff states that 

the presence of the civil exhibit in his criminal case file is unexplained, and also alleges that the 

exhibit suggests “fraud on the court” involving Davis, Officer Bruttig, and the judge who presided 

 

“by the time limit for performance” set forth in the Superior Court’s orders. Id. ¶ 238.

7

 The Court GRANTS defendants’ requests for judicial notice of various pleadings and court 

documents from plaintiff’s other lawsuits.

8

 The FAC states that plaintiff was represented by a lawyer in the civil case against defendant 

Davis, and the docket in that case shows that plaintiff was represented and that Davis appeared in 

pro per. The Court sua sponte takes judicial notice of the docket of that civil action, Podaras v. 

Davis, (San Mateo County Superior Court Case No.: CIV 450799), found at 

www.sanmateocourt.org. 

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over the civil case. Id. ¶¶ 180, 194, 197. The FAC identifies the exhibit at issue as exhibit three to 

a request for judicial notice filed by Davis on Friday, January 6, 2006, in connection with her 

demurrer to plaintiff's complaint. Id. ¶¶ 197-198. The FAC alleges that Davis’ demurrer to his 

complaint was granted with leave to amend, and that rather than amending his complaint he 

voluntarily dismissed his complaint against Davis. Id. ¶ 194. 

Although plaintiff does not attach a copy of the exhibit, the FAC alleges that the exhibit is 

a “two-page record presenting a thread of internal email communication of the Menlo Park Police 

Department” regarding forwarding documents related to plaintiff’s criminal case to Davis for use 

in the civil case. Id. ¶¶ 190, 206. According to the FAC, one of the emails in the exhibit 

“indicates ‘One of the prosecutions (sic) witnesses is named Janet Davis. The civil suit judge told 

Davis she needs to show him a copy of Podaras’s booking sheet . . . (t)he judge also wants to see 

copies of the photos . . . so he cam (sic) dismiss this nuisance lawsuit.’” Id. ¶ 203 (ellipses and 

“sic” in FAC). The FAC alleges that on January 6, 2006, the same day the exhibit was filed, the 

Superior Court judge issued a tentative ruling “refusing to judicially notice much extrinsic 

evidence which had been improperly requested by Ms. Davis,” and also tentatively sustaining the 

demurrer. Id. ¶ 191. The Superior Court held a hearing on the demurrer the following Monday, 

January 9, 2006, and the judge adopted the tentative ruling and sustained the demurrer. Id. ¶ 198. 

The FAC alleges that plaintiff “has no recollection of previously seeing or being made 

aware of this thread of internal email communication of the Menlo Park Police Department” 

before discovering the exhibit in the criminal file on January 2013, and that plaintiff’s lawyer in 

that civil case has “confirmed that he has no recollection of ever seeing or being made away of this 

thread of internal email communication of the Menlo Park Police Department.” Id. ¶¶ 201, 204. 

The publicly-available docket of the civil action shows that Davis filed a demurrer and two 

requests for judicial notice on December 8, 2005, and a “request for judicial notice item 3” on 

January 6, 2006. Podaras v. Davis, (San Mateo County Superior Court Case No.: CIV 450799) 

(docket found at www.sanmateocourt.org). The minutes for the January 9, 2006 hearing, which 

are contained in the docket, state that the Superior Court clarified its tentative ruling upon request 

of plaintiff’s counsel, that the court adopted its tentative ruling, and that “The request for judicial 

notice of the amended complaint in People v. Podaras as well as the court docket in that case is 

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granted. The request for judicial notice is denied as to all other matters, namely items 1, 2C, 2D, 

3, 4 and 5.” Id.

Finally, the FAC alleges what plaintiff considers to be misrepresentations made to a local 

newspaper by the San Mateo County District Attorney Steve Wagstaffe and Menlo Park Revenue 

and Claims Manager John McGirr. The FAC alleges,

The misleading statements, factual misrepresentations and false 

statements of fact reported by the newspaper on 2013 December 19 

oddly included (regarding Mr. Podaras's conviction) "Podaras 

appealed the decision to the DA's appeals board, which overturned

the conviction" . . . "The appeals board is an internal department in 

the DA's office that reviews cases upon request after a conviction. 

A month later, the DA's office dropped all of the charges against 

Podaras."

Id. ¶ 278. Plaintiff alleges that this statement was incorrect because his convictions were 

overturned by the appellate court, not the DA's appeals board. Id. ¶ 279. The fact also alleges that 

"[a] false statement of fact, attributed to Mr. Wagstaffe, accused Mr. Podaras of a crime." Id. ¶

276. The FAC does not specify this false statement of fact.

Plaintiff lists thirty-two separate causes of action in the FAC, and lists the named parties 

for each cause of action. The FAC does not allege or identify the specific facts in support of each 

claim, and instead the complaint alleges "For each Cause of Action, Plaintiff realleges each and 

every paragraph in this complaint as set forth in full in each Cause of Action" FAC at p. 147. The 

first cause of action is typical:

First Cause of Action: Violation of 42 USC Section 1983 resulting 

from Conspiracy to deprive Mr. Podaras of his First Amendment 

right to petition for redress of grievances, including where 

applicable through violation of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002/Title 

VIII, 18 USC 73 section 1519.

[Against Defendants: all Defendants] 

Id. The first eleven causes of action seek relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violations of the First, 

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the "Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002/Title VIII, 18 USC 73 

section 1519." The remaining state law causes action, causes of action twelve through thirty-two, 

include claims for negligence, recklessness, emotional distress, breach of duties, breach of civil 

rights, defamation, abuse of process, and other state law claims.

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LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint 

if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This “facial plausibility” standard 

requires the plaintiff to allege facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant 

has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While courts do not require 

“heightened fact pleading of specifics,” a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to 

relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570.

In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the 

court must assume that the plaintiff’s allegations are true and must draw all reasonable inferences 

in the plaintiff’s favor. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). 

However, the court is not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, 

unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 

F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008).

If the Court dismisses the complaint, it must then decide whether to grant leave to amend. 

The Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly held that ‘a district court should grant leave to amend even if no 

request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly 

be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)).

DISCUSSION

All defendants have moved to dismiss the FAC on numerous grounds. The Court granted 

plaintiff leave to file a consolidated opposition, and also granted plaintiff several extensions of 

time to file the opposition. On March 23, 2015, plaintiff filed a consolidated opposition to all of 

the motions to dismiss that were then pending. On April 2, 2015, defendant Bruttig filed a motion 

to dismiss the FAC, and on April 16, 2015, plaintiff filed an opposition to that motion. As 

discussed below, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to state a claim under federal law. The 

Court further finds that based upon the record before this Court, which includes the 2009 Lawsuit 

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as well as the original complaint in this case and plaintiff's oppositions to defendants' motions, the 

Court concludes that leave to amend would be futile. The Court declines supplemental jurisdiction 

over all of the state law causes of action.

The FAC suffers from numerous pervasive defects. As a general matter, the Court finds 

that the allegations of the FAC are conclusory, speculative, and often lacking factual specificity, 

and that the FAC does not meet the pleading standards set forth in Iqbal and Twombly.

9

 

Evaluating the various allegations to determine whether plaintiff has stated a claim has proved a 

time-consuming task due to the FAC's great length and the manner in which it is organized. The 

Court finds that all of the federal claims are subject to dismissal against all of the defendants on 

numerous, alternative grounds. The pages which follow address what appear to be plaintiff's 

primary contentions. 

I. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims arising out of plaintiff's 2004 arrest, criminal prosecution,

and the 2005 criminal convictions

Defendants contend that to the extent plaintiff’s claims arise out of his 2004 arrest, 

criminal prosecution, and the 2005 criminal convictions that were later reversed, those claims are 

barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff's oppositions to defendants' motions confirm that 

plaintiff seeks to litigate, inter alia, claims that all of the defendants connected to his 2004 arrest 

and criminal prosecution engaged in misconduct. For example, plaintiff's opposition asserts that 

defendant Hatfield made misrepresentations to the police and presented perjured testimony at 

plaintiff's criminal trial, that the City of Menlo Park employees "participated in the initial false 

accusation against Mr. Podaras, the arrest, surreptitious recording, and holding of Mr. Podaras, the 

revising of official government files to include altered witness and 'victim' statements, the ignoring 

and withholding of exculpatory evidence during the investigation and prior to trial," and that 

defendant Bruttig "engaged in wrongful arrest, offered false reports, withheld exculpatory 

evidence," and engaged in other misconduct. Consolidated Opp'n at 6 (Dkt. 107)

 

9

 For example, plaintiff's allegations that various defendants conspired to have plaintiff 

summoned for jury duty on the same date as the Ninth Circuit's scheduled oral argument 

(subsequently vacated) on plaintiff's appeal is speculative and lacks any factual basis. Similarly, 

plaintiff's allegations related to the rescheduling of a hearing from 9:00 am to 9:01 am are 

speculative and not plausible.

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For all of the reasons set forth in the Court's order dismissing the 2009 Lawsuit, the Court 

finds that these claims are barred by the statute of limitations. These claims accrued at the latest 

on November 9, 2006 when the criminal charges against plaintiff were dropped. See Heck v. 

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489-90 (1994) (a § 1983 “cause of action for damages attributable to an 

unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been 

invalidated.”) (footnote omitted). Section 1983 does not contain its own limitations period. The 

appropriate period is that of the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury torts. See 

Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 

1999); Elliott v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 1994). In California, the general 

residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions is the two-year period set forth at 

California Civil Procedure Code § 335.1 and is the applicable statute in § 1983 actions. See 

Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Silva v. Crain, 169 F.3d 608,

610 (9th Cir. 1999) (limitations period for filing § 1983 action in California governed by residual 

limitations period for personal injury actions in California, which was then one year and was 

codified in Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340(3)); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 (current codification of 

residual limitations period, which is now two years; enacted in 2002). Thus, the limitations period 

on these claims expired in November 2008, well before this lawsuit was filed.

II. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims related to Petition for Factual Innocence

To the extent that plaintiff seeks to challenge the state court's denial of his Petition for 

Factual Innocence, those claims are barred because federal district courts, as courts of original 

jurisdiction, may not review the final determinations of state courts. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. 

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923) 

(district courts may not exercise appellate jurisdiction over state courts); Doe & Assoc. Law 

Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 2001); Olson Farms, Inc. v. Barbosa, 134 

F.3d 933, 936 (9th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, [i]f claims raised 

in the federal court action are “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s decision such that 

the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling or require the district court to 

interpret the application of state laws or procedural rules, then the federal complaint must be 

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dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16 & 485).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars an action in which a party essentially asks the federal 

court to review the state court’s decision and afford that party the same remedy he was denied in 

state court. Id. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies even when the state court judgment is not 

issued by the highest state court, see Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 893 n.3 

(9th Cir. 1986), and when federal constitutional issues are at stake, see Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 

287, 291-92 (9th Cir. 1995); Mullins v. Oregon, 57 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1995). The FAC does 

not state whether plaintiff appealed the denial of his petition for a Finding of Factual Innocence. 

However, to the extent plaintiff claims that the petition should have been granted, he should have 

pursued that relief through the state courts, not a § 1983 action in this court.10

III. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims related to microcassette

Plaintiff alleges that the destruction of the microcassette has prevented him from "clearing 

up the antecedent effects of the wrongful convictions." To the extent that plaintiff's claims 

regarding the microcassette relate to his claims that he was wrongfully convicted, those claims are 

barred by the statute of limitations for the reasons set forth above.

Defendants also argue that to the extent plaintiff challenges any other aspect of the 

handling of the microcassette recording, plaintiff has failed to state a claim. Defendants' papers set 

forth in great detail the relevant provisions of the California Penal Code relating to the handling 

and disposition of trial exhibits, and those provisions do not confer a right upon plaintiff to 

possession of the original trial exhibits. See generally California Penal Code §§ 1417.1, 1417.5. 

Plaintiff alleges that he received copies of the trial exhibits, including a reproduction of the 

microcassette. Plaintiff has not alleged the deprivation of any federal rights with regard to the 

handling or disposition of the microcassette. Further, to the extent plaintiff claims that the state 

courts improperly ruled on his various motions related to the trial exhibits and the microcassette in 

particular, those claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Similarly, to the extent that 

 

10

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proceedings discussed in the FAC, those claims are barred by Rooker-Feldman.

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plaintiff alleges that certain Menlo Park defendants improperly destroyed the microcassette, those 

claims are not plausible in light of the fact that the Superior Court Clerk's Notice explicitly 

provided for the "destruction" of the exhibits.

IV. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims related to plaintiff's 2005 civil case against Janet Davis

Plaintiff alleges that in 2013 he discovered an exhibit from his 2005 civil case against 

defendant Davis in his criminal case file, and that this exhibit "suggests" that Davis, Bruttig, and 

the judge who presided over the 2005 civil case may have engaged in misconduct and a "fraud on 

the court."

The Court finds that plaintiff has failed to state a claim. Although plaintiff alleges that he 

has no recollection of seeing this exhibit, and that his lawyer has "confirmed" to him that the 

lawyer also has no recollection of seeing this exhibit, the FAC alleges – and the publicly available 

court docket shows – that the exhibit was filed on January 6, 2006. Thus, regardless of whether 

plaintiff and his lawyer actually reviewed the exhibit, the exhibit was filed in the court record and 

plaintiff and his lawyer are charged with constructive notice of that fact. Further, the minutes of 

the January 9, 2006 hearing state that the judge denied Davis's request for judicial notice of that 

exhibit, thus providing further notice to plaintiff and his lawyer of the existence of Exhibit 3. As 

such, any claim plaintiff has regarding a "fraud on the court" arising from this exhibit is timebarred. 

Equally as important, the allegations of a "fraud on the court" are not plausible. Plaintiff 

alleges that Davis sought judicial notice of an exhibit that, according to plaintiff, demonstrates on 

its face misconduct by Davis, Bruttig and the judge. "Most fraud on the court cases involve a 

scheme by one party to hide a key fact from the court and the opposing party." U.S. v. Estate of 

Stonehill, 660 F.3d 415, 444 (9th Cir. 2011) ("In order to show fraud on the court, Taxpayers must

demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, an effort by the government to prevent the judicial 

process from functioning 'in the usual manner.'”). Here, plaintiff does not allege that Davis or 

Bruttig sought to hide key facts from the court or from plaintiff, but rather the opposite: that Davis 

sought judicial notice of the very exhibit that supposedly shows improper conduct.

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V. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against State Bar defendants

Plaintiff alleges that he complained to the State Bar that Deputy District Attorney 

Donnellan committed misconduct while prosecuting plaintiff’s criminal case, and that Janet Davis, 

a witness at the criminal trial who is also an attorney, also committed misconduct. FAC ¶¶ 151-

162. The FAC alleges that when the State Bar declined to bring disciplinary charges against 

Donnellan and Davis, plaintiff filed a Verified Accusation Against Attorneys with the Supreme 

Court of California. Id. ¶ 158. The FAC alleges that “it is reasonable to conclude and therefore 

allege that in furtherance of conspiracy, the OCTC dismissal of Mr. Podaras’s State Bar 

Complaint was made as an element of an endeavor to improperly influence then-active 

proceedings pertaining Mr. Podaras’s 2009 CV 09-4199-SI 42 U.S.C. section 1983 Complaint; 

and/or in endeavor at that time to mislead this Court and/or United States Court of Appeals for the 

Ninth Circuit.” FAC ¶ 160. The FAC also alleges that plaintiff was denied information about 

when and where former San Mateo Assistant District Attorney James Fox was sworn in as a Board 

of Trustee member. Id. ¶¶ 292-296. 

The Court concludes that plaintiff’s federal claims against the State Bar are barred as a 

matter of law. “[O]rders of a state court relating to the admission, discipline, and disbarment of 

members of its bar may be reviewed only by the Supreme Court of the United States on certiorari 

to the state court, and not by means of an original action in a lower federal court.” MacKay v. 

Nesbett, 412 F.2d 846, 846 (9th Cir. 1969); Mothershed v. Justices of Supreme Court, 410 F.3d 

602, 606 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a plaintiff’s claims that that 

defendants failed to properly apply state bar rules to the plaintiff’s disciplinary action). Thus,

plaintiff’s claims against the State Bar regarding the dismissal of his complaints against Donnellan 

and Davis are precluded. In addition, plaintiff’s allegation that the OCTC’s dismissals were part 

of a conspiracy to influence this Court or the Ninth Circuit is conclusory, speculative and lacking 

any factual basis. Finally, plaintiff’s allegation that the State Bar did not provide him with 

information regarding James Fox does not state a claim because plaintiff fails to allege the 

deprivation of a federal right.

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VI. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims related to Sarbanes-Oxley Act

Plaintiff may not bring a claim for alleged violations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See In re 

Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litigation, 549 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2008).

VII. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims related to alleged defamation

It is unclear whether plaintiff brings any federal claims related to allegedly defamatory 

statements made by defendants Wagstaffe and McGirr. To the extent plaintiff does bring such a 

§ 1983 claim, plaintiff has failed to state a claim. The FAC does not specifically identify any 

allegedly defamatory statements except that defendant Wagstaffe allegedly said that plaintiff's 

convictions were overturned by the DA's appeals board rather than by the state appellate court. 

This allegation does not allege the deprivation of a federal right. 

CONCLUSION

The Court finds that leave to amend would be futile because plaintiff cannot cure the 

deficiencies identified in this order. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motions to 

dismiss this action without leave to amend. All other pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 30, 2015 ________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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