Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02125/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02125-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:0201fl FLSA: Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)

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5cv2125 JLS (KSC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FERNANDO RUIZ, individually and on 

behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

AFFINITY LOGISTICS 

CORPORATION,

Defendant.

Case No.: 5cv2125 JLS (KSC)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

RE-TAX COSTS

(ECF No. 282)

Presently before the Court is plaintiff Fernando Ruiz’s (Plaintiff) Motion to Re-Tax 

Costs. (ECF No. 263.) Although defendant Affinity Logistics Corporation (Defendant) 

did not submit any opposition briefing to the instant Motion, Defendant previously objected 

to Plaintiff’s bill of costs submitted to the Clerk of this Court. (Opp’n to Bill of Costs, ECF 

No. 243.) The Court vacated the hearing and took this matter under submission pursuant 

to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). 

The parties have been litigating this case for more than a decade. The Court held a 

bench trial and, applying Georgia law, concluded Plaintiff and the delivery drivers were 

independent contractors. (Mem. Order, ECF No. 186.) Plaintiff appealed and won, with 

the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversing this Court on choice of law grounds. 

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Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics Corp., 667 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 2012). On remand, the Court 

applied California law and again concluded that Plaintiff and the putative class were 

independent contractors. (Mem. Order, ECF No. 216.) The Ninth Circuit again reversed, 

concluding Plaintiff and the delivery drivers were employees. Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics 

Corp., 754 F.3d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014). The Ninth Circuit’s Mandate in the latter 

appeal issued on December 15, 2014, and was docketed in this matter on January 12, 2015. 

(Mandate, ECF No. 245, at 1.)1 The mandate “[t]axed costs against appellee [Defendant] 

in the amount of $562.20.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff submitted a Bill of Costs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 on 

December 22, 2014, (ECF Nos. 240 & 241), to which Defendant objected, arguing Plaintiff 

was not yet a “prevailing party” for purposes of Rule 54 because the issue of whether 

Plaintiff was an employee or independent contractor was not “a stand-alone claim,” but

instead was a legal predicate necessary for Plaintiff to pursue his substantive claims, 

(Opp’n to Bill of Costs, ECF No. 243, at 3). The Clerk of this Court agreed with Defendant 

and denied Plaintiff’s request as premature. (Clerk’s Order, ECF No. 259.) Plaintiff now 

objects to the Clerk’s Order and Moves to Re-Tax costs. (Mot., ECF No. 263.) 

Rule 54(d)(1) provides, “Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order 

provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the prevailing 

party.” Plaintiff’s Motion turns on whether he is a “prevailing party.” 

Plaintiff seeks costs related to his appeal and to the litigating the question of whether 

he and the other delivery drivers were employees or independent contractors. Defendant’s 

argument that “[n]either the Ninth Circuit nor this Court has issued a Rule 54 judgment or 

decree from which Plaintiff could seek costs,” (Opp’n to Bill of Costs, ECF No. 243, at 3), 

is unconvincing. Rule 54(a) defines “judgment” as “a decree and any order from which an 

appeal lies.” Obviously, an appeal lay from the Court’s Memorandum Order finding for 

 

1 Page number citations to docketed materials refer to the CM/ECF page number electronically stamped 

at the top of each document. 

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Defendant, as evidenced by the fact that Plaintiff successfully appealed that decision. 

Additionally, the Ninth Circuit’s Mandate entered the “judgment” of that court, and that 

judgment, in accord with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39(a)(3), awarded costs to 

Plaintiff. 

The rationale of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s opinion in Furman v. 

Cirrito, 782 F.2d 353, 355–56 (2d Cir. 1986), is persuasive here. As the Second Circuit, 

which had been reversed by the Supreme Court, noted, “[i]t is often sound policy, of course, 

to wait until a controversy is finally decided on the merits before awarding costs, and to 

then determine who is the ‘prevailing party[,’] instead of judging that issue piecemeal at 

each stage of the litigation.” Id. However, the court concluded that the grounds upon 

which the Supreme Court had reversed it involved a discrete issue with important 

consequences for other cases—in particular, consequences for other RICO cases. Id. In 

the conclusion to its order, the Second Circuit reasoned:

Whether or not appellants ultimately prevail on the merits of their claim, the 

case has created a significant legal principle, and their action should not have

been prematurely dismissed. Hence, we conclude that at this stage of the 

litigation, appellants are the prevailing party and just as the district court 

would be required to award them costs after a reversal by this Court, it follows 

that appellants are entitled to costs in this Court after a Supreme Court reversal

of our order.

Id. at 356; see also Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting in the context 

of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 that a “litigant need not prevail on every issue, or even on the ‘central 

issue’ in the case, to be considered the prevailing party”).

Likewise, the Court here concludes that, for this stage of the litigation, Plaintiff is a 

prevailing party and is entitled to costs. The protracted litigation so far has involved a 

significant amount of motion practice, a bench trial, and two appeals in which the Ninth 

Circuit held in favor of Plaintiff resulting in published opinions. The appeals presented a 

discrete issue with important consequences for other cases. If there could be any question 

from the opinions themselves—which is doubtful—The Ninth Circuit Mandate makes 

clear that under the Rule 39, the Rule of Appellate Procedure analogous to Rule 54, that 

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Plaintiff was the winner on appeal on the matters litigated to that point. Lastly, at this 

juncture, Defendant has not filed any opposition to this Motion. Accordingly, the Court 

finds that Plaintiff is a prevailing party.

Civil Local Rule 54.1(b)(2)(a) & (3)(a) provide that trial and deposition transcripts 

are taxable. Likewise, fees for service of process, exemplifications and copies of papers, 

and certain translator costs are taxable. L.R. 54.1(b)(1), (4), & (6). Defendant does not 

contest the validity of the amounts and categories of costs Plaintiff seeks. 

Thus, the Court re-taxes the following costs: 

1. $885.00 for fees of the clerk;

2. $220.75 for fees for service of summons and subpoena;

3. $10,531.50 for fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts 

necessarily obtained for use in the case;

4. $600.08 for fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any 

materials where the copies were necessarily obtained for use in the case; and

5. $838.39 for compensation of interpreters and costs of special interpretation 

services under 28 U.S.C. § 1828.

The Court therefore SUSTAINS Plaintiff’s objections to the Clerk’s Order, (ECF 

No. 259), and GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion, (ECF No. 263). The costs taxed in favor of 

Plaintiff total $13,075.72. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 27, 2016

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