Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_12-cv-02273/USCOURTS-alnd-2_12-cv-02273-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SHEILA ANN LAWSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.

2:12-cv-2273-AKK

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Sheila Ann Lawson (“Lawson”) brings this action pursuant to Section

205(g) of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking review of

the final adverse decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

(“SSA”). This court finds that the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision -

which has become the decision of the Commissioner - is supported by substantial

evidence. Therefore, for the reasons elaborated herein, the court will affirm the

decision denying benefits.

I. Procedural History

Lawson filed an application for Supplemental Security Income on July 15,

2009, alleging a disability onset date of September 28, 2007, due to anxiety and

fibromyalgia. (R. 21, 125). After the SSA denied Lawson’s claim, she requested a

hearing before an ALJ. (R. 73-74). The ALJ subsequently denied Lawson’s claim,

FILED

 2014 Jun-17 AM 08:34

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:12-cv-02273-AKK Document 11 Filed 06/17/14 Page 1 of 11
(R. 18-28), which became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals

Council refused to grant review. (R. 1-6). Lawson then filed this action for judicial

review pursuant to § 205(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Doc. 1.

II. Standard of Review

 The only issues before this court are whether the record contains substantial

evidence to sustain the ALJ’s decision, See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Walden v. Schweiker,

672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982), and whether the ALJ applied the correct legal

standards, see Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988); Chester v. Bowen,

792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) mandates that the

Commissioner’s “factual findings are conclusive if supported by ‘substantial

evidence.’” Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). The district

court may not reconsider the facts, reevaluate the evidence, or substitute its judgment

for that of the Commissioner; instead, it must review the final decision as a whole and

determine if the decision is “reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.” See

id. (citing Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)). 

Substantial evidence falls somewhere between a scintilla and a preponderance of

evidence; “[i]t is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.” Martin, 849 F.2d at 1529 (quoting Bloodsworth,

703 F.2d at 1239) (other citations omitted). If supported by substantial evidence, the

court must affirm the Commissioner’s factual findings even if the preponderance of

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the evidence is against the Commissioner’s findings. See Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529. 

While the court acknowledges that judicial review of the ALJ’s findings is limited in

scope, it notes that the review “does not yield automatic affirmance.” Lamb, 847 F.2d

at 701.

III. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must show “the inability to engage

in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or

mental impairments which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or

can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42

U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 416(i). A physical or mental impairment is “an

impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological

abnormalities which are demonstrated by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).

Determination of disability under the Act requires a five step analysis. 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f). Specifically, the Commissioner must determine in

sequence:

(1) whether the claimant is currently unemployed;

(2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment;

(3) whether the impairment meets or equals one listed by the Secretary;

(4) whether the claimant is unable to perform his or her past work; and

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(5) whether the claimant is unable to perform any work in the national

economy.

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). “An affirmative answer

to any of the above questions leads either to the next question, or, on steps three and

five, to a finding of disability. A negative answer to any question, other than step

three, leads to a determination of ‘not disabled.’” Id. at 1030 (citing 20 C.F.R. §

416.920(a)-(f)). “Once a finding is made that a claimant cannot return to prior work

the burden shifts to the Secretary to show other work the claimant can do.” Foote v.

Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).

IV. The ALJ’s Decision

In performing the five step analysis, the ALJ initially determined that Lawson

had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 15, 2009, and, therefore, met

Step One. (R. 23). Next, the ALJ found that Lawson satisfied Step Two because she

suffered from the severe impairments of “Osteoarthritis, Depression, [and]

Agoraphobia Without Panic” Id. The ALJ then proceeded to the next step and found

that Lawson failed to satisfy Step Three because she “does not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed

impairments.” (R. 24). Although the ALJ answered Step Three in the negative,

consistent with the law, see McDaniel, 800 F.2d at 1030, the ALJ proceeded to Step

Four where he determined that Lawson

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has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in

20 CFR 416.967(b) except claimant must never be required to climb a

ladder, rope or scaffold and should only frequently be required to climb

a ramp or stairs, balance, crouch, stoop, kneel, crawl, reach overhead or

otherwise, gross handle or use her fine finger or feel sensation with her

non-dominant left arm, meaning no more than five hours of an eight

hour workday. The claimant should never be exposed to dangerous

equipment or products. It should also be taken into consideration that

the claimant has a moderate limitation in her ability to work with

supervisors, co-workers and the public in interpersonal interaction and

discussion. She is only able to stay on task for two hours and can only

maintain attention to simple, repetitive tasks for two hours at a time. 

She is also moderately limited in her ability to understand, remember

and carry out simple instructions, respond appropriately to work

pressures and adapt to changes in routine work settings.

(R. 25). Lastly, in Step Five, the ALJ considered Lawson’s age, education, work

experience, and RFC and determined “there are jobs that exist in significant numbers 1

in the national economy that [Lawson] can perform.” (R. 27). Therefore, the ALJ

found that Lawson “has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security

Act, since July 15, 2009, the date the application was filed.” (R. 28).

V. Analysis

The court now turns to Lawson’s contentions that the ALJ failed to (1)

properly consider the opinions of medical sources; (2) support his RFC assessment

with a medical source opinion; (3) adequately specify the degree of mental limitations

in his RFC assessment; and (4) consider all of Lawson’s impairments. See doc. 9 at

5-10. The court addresses each contention in turn.

 As of the date of the ALJ’s decision, Lawson was 51 years old and the ALJ

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found she had no past relevant work. (R. 27).

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A. The ALJ properly considered the opinions of medical sources.

Lawson contends the ALJ erred because he did not “report the clinical findings

or even mention the consultative evaluation . . . when neurologist Dr. Victor Sung

found diffuse points of tenderness in her muscles” and “diagnosed diffuse

osteoarthritis of the knee, back and shoulders.” Doc. 9 at 5. Contrary to Lawson’s

contention, although the ALJ did not refer to Dr. Sung by name, he in fact discussed

her examination: “With regard to Claimant’s osteoarthritis, there is documented medical

evidence of osteoarthritic changes in her shoulder and knee joints and the residual

functional capacity finding (RFC) has taken these joint problems into consideration (Exhibit

5F).” Consistent with this statement, the ALJ found Lawson had the severe 2

impairment of osteoarthritis, and included related restrictions in his RFC assessment. 

(R. 35, 25). Therefore, Lawson’s contention is unavailing.

Lawson asserts also that the ALJ improperly relied on the physical RFC

assessment completed by a nonmedical single decision maker (SDM). Doc. 9 at 6-7. 

However, nowhere in his decision does the ALJ mention the SDM’s RFC, or indicate

that he relied upon it to assess Lawson’s RFC. To the contrary, the ALJ discussed

other medical evidence of record, and stated that his physical RFC findings were

“supported by the available medical evidence showing osteoarthritic changes in

[Lawson’s] shoulder and knee joints.” (R. 26). Significantly, the ALJ’s RFC finding

 Exhibit 5F is Dr. Sung’s consultative evaluation.

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included limitations in reaching, handling, and fingering, whereas the SDM indicated

no limitations in those areas. (R. 25, 344). Because there is no evidence that the ALJ

relied on the opinion of the SDM, Lawson’s contention is without merit.

Finally, Lawson suggests the ALJ gave little weight to the opinion of

Lawson’s consultative examiner, Dr. Jack Zaremba, because he was hired by

Lawson’s attorney. Doc. 9 at 6. In making this contention, Lawson ignores that the

absence of a treating relationship is a significant factor in assessing the weight, if any,

the ALJ should give to Dr. Zaremba’s opinions. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2)

(“Generally, we give more weight to opinions from your treating sources . . . .”). In

other words, the retention of Dr. Zaremba by Lawson’s counsel is precisely why the

ALJ observed that “since [Dr. Zaremba] was hired by [Lawson’s] attorney, there is no

longitudinal treatment history.” (R. 26). Moreover, the ALJ also gave little weight to

Dr. Zaremba’s opinions because he was “the only physician in the record who gave

the claimant a definitive diagnosis of fibromyalgia or who classified [Lawson’s]

mental status as ‘severe and debilitating.’” (R. 26). Consequently, the ALJ found

that Dr. Zaremba’s “opinions are not consistent with the other physicians in the

record.” See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(4) (ALJ must consider whether the doctor’s

opinion is consistent with the record as a whole in assessing its weight); Bloodworth

v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1240 (11th Cir. 1983) (ALJ “may reject the opinion of any

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physician when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion.”). Therefore, the ALJ

properly considered Dr. Zarmeba’s opinions and reasonably rejected them.

B. The ALJ was not required to support his RFC assessment with a medical

source opinion.

Lawson next contends the ALJ had no RFC from a medical source to rely on

in assessing Lawson’s physical RFC. Doc. 9 at 7. However, Lawson overlooks that

the regulations and the law of this circuit do not impose such a requirement. Rather,

the pertinent regulation provides that opinions on issues reserved to the

Commissioner, such as a claimant’s RFC, are not medical opinions:

Opinions on some issues, such as the examples that follow, are not

medical opinions, . . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the

Commissioner because they are administrative findings that are

dispositive of a case; i.e., that would direct the determination or decision

of disability.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d). One of the specifically reserved examples is a

claimant’s RFC:

Although we consider opinions from medical sources on issues such as .

. . your residual functional capacity . . . the final responsibility for

deciding these issues is reserved to the Commissioner.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2). Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit has

recognized that “the task of determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity and

ability to work is within the province of the ALJ, not of doctors.” Robinson v. Astrue,

365 F. App’x 993, 999 (11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished). It has also found an ALJ’s

RFC finding can be supported by substantial evidence even without a medical source

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statement in the record. See Green v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F. App’x 915, 922-23

(11th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (rejected the claimant’s argument “that without [the

physician’s] opinion, there [was] nothing in the record” to support the ALJ’s RFC

assessment). 

Here, the ALJ properly relied on the report of Dr. Sung, and other evidence to

assess Lawson’s RFC. Because there was sufficient medical evidence to allow the

ALJ to assess Lawson’s physical RFC and determine whether she was disabled, the

record was complete. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(e). Consequently, no medical source

opinion or other additional development was required, and the ALJ committed no

reversible error.

C. The ALJ adequately specified the degree of Lawson’s mental limitations in his

RFC assessment.

Next, relying on the ALJ’s use of the term “moderate” in describing Lawson’s

mental restrictions, which Lawson argues is “applicable only to a consideration of

mental impairments under the PRT [Psychiatric Review Technique],” Lawson asserts

that the ALJ’s RFC finding was “not specific enough to translate to quantifiable

vocational restrictions in terms of frequency or extent.” Doc. 9 at 9. But Lawson

overlooks that the ALJ explained to the VE that when using “moderate in nonexertional matters,” he was using “the Agency definition of a slight, slight limitation

in the area, but the individual’s still able to function satisfactorily.” (R. 55). 

Significantly, in responding to the ALJ’s hypothetical question, the VE explained that

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“[m]oderate limitations . . . may impact work, but they would not prevent work in and

of themselves.” (R. 56). In addition, Lawson’s counsel had the opportunity to

question the VE as to the meaning of moderate, but failed to do so. Ultimately,

Lawson has not shown that “moderate” has no meaning in the context used by the

ALJ, and it is clear the VE understood the ALJ’s intended meaning. Consequently

Lawson’s contention is without merit, and the ALJ committed no reversible error in

using “moderate” to describe Lawson’s limitations. 

Lawson also makes the related argument that 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(c) requires a

more detailed analysis than the PRT. However, a review of the ALJ’s mental RFC

findings shows that he assessed Lawson’s abilities in areas listed in that regulation,

namely “understanding, remembering, and carrying out instructions, and in

responding appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and work pressures in a work

setting.” Id. Consequently, the ALJ provided the detailed analysis required when

assessing RFC.

D. The ALJ did not err in failing to consider all of Lawson’s impairments.

Finally, Lawson contends that the ALJ failed to consider Lawson’s complete

medical history, which “includ[ed] hypertension, bilateral ankle pain, calluses on

soles bilaterally, hyperlipidemia, hypothyroidism, status left post [sic] foot fracture in

December 2007 in a boot until March 2008, anemia, fatigue, hepatic cyst, [and]

cervical lymphadenopathy.” Doc. 9 at 9 (citations to record omitted). Unfortunately,

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Lawson failed to identify any limitations caused by these medical conditions either at

the time of her application for disability, (R. 125), or at her ALJ hearing. (R. 42-59). 

Therefore, the ALJ was under no obligation to investigate or consider limitations

caused by those conditions. Street v. Barnhart, 133 F. App’x 621, 627 (11th Cir.

2005) (unpublished) (observing that an ALJ is not required to investigate allegations

“not presented at the time of the application for benefits and not offered at the hearing

as a basis for disability”) (quoting Pena v. Chater, 76 F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir. 1996)). 

Because Lawson fails to point to any limitations caused by these conditions, and did

not allege any restrictions from them at the administrative level, the ALJ committed

no error in failing to discuss the conditions in his decision.

VI. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the ALJ’s determination that

Lawson is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence, and that the ALJ applied

proper legal standards in reaching this determination. Therefore, the Commissioner’s

final decision is AFFIRMED. A separate order in accordance with the memorandum

of decision will be entered.

DONE this 17th day of June, 2014.

________________________________

 ABDUL K. KALLON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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