Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00325/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00325-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC WILTON BURTON,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 08cv0325-LAB (POR)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORTS

AND RECOMMENDATIONS

[Doc Nos. 168 & 173]

vs.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary of

California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation,

Respondent.

Petitioner Eric Wilton Burton, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a First

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, on June 20,

2008. (Doc. No. 21.) 

On February 9, 2010, Respondent Matthew Cate, Secretary of the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, moved to dismiss the Petition on the ground

that Burton failed to exhaust his available state court remedies with respect to Ground 3;

Ground 3 alleges a “failure of prosecution to disclose material exculpatory evidence

(suppression)” in violation of Burton’s rights to due process and equal protection. Burton

opposed the motion to dismiss, contending he fairly presented and therefore exhausted

Ground 3 in the California Supreme Court. (Doc. No. 153.) 

//

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On April 1, 2010, Burton filed what the Court construes as a motion to amend his

Petition. (Doc. No. 156.) Cate then filed an opposition, which was followed by Burton’s reply.

(Doc. Nos. 166, 170.) 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and in accordance with Local Rule 72.1(d), both motions

were referred to Magistrate Judge Louisa S. Porter for a Report and Recommendation

(R&R). In the R&Rs, filed June 30, 2010 and July 14, 2010, respectively, Judge Porter

recommended that Cate’s motion to dismiss and Burton’s motion to amend be denied. (Doc.

Nos. 168, 173.) The Court agrees with Judge Porter and ADOPTS both R&Rs.

I. Legal Standard

Because Burton is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his pleadings liberally

and affords him the benefit of any doubt. See Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d

621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). Of course, “[p]ro se litigants must follow the same rules of

procedure that govern other litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987).

When reviewing an R&R, “[t]he district judge must determine de novo any part of

the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to. The district judge

may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or

return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). In

other words, “the district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and

recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

II. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss FAP

On July 29, 2005, a jury convicted Burton of willful and premeditated attempted

murder, discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, and assault with a semi-automatic

firearm. In Ground 3 of his Petition, Burton contends that a “failure of prosecution to

disclose material exculpatory evidence” – specifically, the failure to disclose evidence

about a witness whom Burton discovered was a bailiff from the court – resulted in a

violation of his right to due process and equal protection. (Doc. No. 21 at 8.) Cate argues

that Burton’s Petition should be dismissed because when he presented Ground 3 to the

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California Supreme Court, he failed to exhaust the claim by not fully describing the

operative facts surrounding it. 

Cate has filed no objection to the R&R, which is a strong sign that it is sound. The

Court finds that the R&R thoroughly and correctly considered this issue, and agrees that

Ground 3 is technically exhausted. When a habeas petitioner has defaulted his federal

claims in state court, as Burton has, “he meets the technical requirements for exhaustion;

there are no state remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.” Cassett v.Stewart, 406 F.3d

614, 621 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991)).

Because Ground 3 is now time-barred in state court, Burton has satisfied the technical

requirement for exhaustion with respect to it. Cate’s motion to dismiss is therefore

DENIED.

III. Petitioner’s Motion To Amend First Amended Petition

In his motion to amend, Burton contends that in light of the Supreme Court’s 2009

decision in Arizona v. Gant, __U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1710, the search of his vehicle while

he was handcuffed in a patrol car was unreasonable and violated his Fourth Amendment

rights. (Doc. 156 at 2-3.) In Gant, the Supreme Court held that police may search a

vehicle incident to arrest without a warrant only if the arrestee is “within reaching

distance” of the searched part of his vehicle at the time of the arrest or if “it is reasonable

to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.” Id. at 1723-24.

Presumably, Burton wants the opportunity to prove that neither circumstance existed

during his arrest. 

However, it is well settled that when a state provides a full and fair opportunity to

litigate a Fourth Amendment claim, “the Constitution does not require that a state

prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in

an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at trial.” Stone v. Powell, 428

U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976). Since the record shows that Burton received a full and fair

hearing on his Fourth Amendment claim, it is not cognizable under federal habeas

review. (Lodgment 1 at 61-64, 84-90; Lodgment 2 at 33-41, 93-106.)

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Even if Burton’s Fourth Amendment claim were cognizable under federal habeas

review, Gant does not apply here. For a new rule to be made retroactive to cases on

collateral review, the Supreme Court must hold it to be retroactive. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S.

656, 663 (2001). Since in Gant the Supreme Court did not hold that any newly declared

constitutional law regarding reasonable searches was to be applied retroactively, it

cannot be so applied here. 

Further, as outlined in the R&R, the factors which guide a court in deciding

whether to grant leave to amend weigh against Burton. (Doc. No 173 at 2-3.) Accordingly,

Burton’s motion to amend his first amended petition is DENIED.

IV. Conclusion

The Court ADOPTS both R&Rs. Respondent’s motion to dismiss Burton’s FAP is

DENIED, and the Petitioner’s motion to amend his Petition is DENIED.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 22, 2010

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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