Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-35397/USCOURTS-ca9-14-35397-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LORRAINE BATES; CHARLES 

EHRMAN BATES; EILEEN 

BURKE; JACI EVANS, as 

Successor Personal 

Representative for the Estate 

of Thomas Marier; and 

DALLA FRANCIS, as Personal 

Representative for the Estate 

of George Alexander,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

BANKERS LIFE AND 

CASUALTY COMPANY, an 

Illinois insurance company; 

CNO FINANCIAL GROUP,

INC., a Delaware corporation,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-35397

D.C. No.

3:13-cv-00580-PK

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Paul J. Papak II, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 4, 2016

Portland, Oregon

Filed February 24, 2017

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2 BATES V. BANKERS LIFE & CAS. CO.

Before: Richard R. Clifton, Mary H. Murguia,

and Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam Opinion

SUMMARY*

Jurisdiction / Class Certification

The panel dismissed the appeal, in part, for lack of 

jurisdiction to review the order striking class allegations in 

an action alleging claims under Oregon’s financial abuse 

statute, Oregon Revised Statute § 124.110.

The panel held that a decision to grant a motion to strike 

class allegations was not a final judgment. The panel, 

therefore, rejected plaintiffs’ asserted appellate jurisdiction 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291 because they require a final judgment. The panel 

held that 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 23(f) were the only proper avenues for appealing 

a motion to strike class allegations. Because plaintiffs did 

not use either of those procedural avenues, the panel 

concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear their challenge 

to the order striking their class allegations.

 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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BATES V. BANKERS LIFE & CAS. CO. 3

COUNSEL

Rachele R. Selvig (argued) and Christopher L. Cauble,

Cauble & Cauble LLP, Grants Pass, Oregon; Michael L. 

Williams and Leslie W. O’Leary, Williams O’Leary LLC, 

Portland, Oregon; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Adam J. Kaiser (argued), Jeffrey J. Amato, and Matthew A. 

Stark, Winston & Strawn LLP, New York, New York; Ilan 

Wurman, Winston & Strawn LLP, Washington, D.C.; Vicki 

L. Smith, Lane Powell PC, Portland, Oregon; for 

Defendants-Appellants.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiffs appeal the district court’s orders striking their 

class allegations and dismissing their claims under Oregon’s 

financial abuse statute, Oregon Revised Statute § 124.110. 

We dismiss the appeal in part because we lack jurisdiction 

to review the order striking the class allegations. As to the 

proper interpretation of Oregon Revised Statute § 124.110, 

we certify this question to the Oregon Supreme Court in an 

order filed concurrently with this opinion.

I.

Plaintiffs are elderly Oregonians or their successors who 

purchased long-term healthcare insurance policies sold by 

Bankers Life and Casualty Company and its parent 

company, CNO Financial Group, Inc. (“Bankers”). These 

policies are designed to provide health services for elderly 

people who can no longer care for themselves and are 

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4 BATES V. BANKERS LIFE & CAS. CO.

intended to cover expenses for in-home care providers, 

assisted living facilities, and nursing homes. Plaintiffs allege 

that Bankers collected premium payments and, without good 

cause, delayed and denied insurance benefits to which 

putative class members were entitled under their policies.

In their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs asserted 

claims for breach of contract, intentional misconduct, fraud, 

and violations of Oregon’s financial abuse statute. They also 

sought certification for three separate classes: 

(1) Oregonians whose claims have been mishandled through 

delay and nonpayment of claims; (2) family members and 

representatives who have incurred expenses while 

attempting to obtain benefits; and (3) policyholders who 

have not yet made claims. Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(2), 12(b)(6), and 23(d), Bankers moved to 

dismiss many of Plaintiffs’ claims and to strike Plaintiffs’ 

class allegations. Plaintiffs’ breach-of-contract claims 

against Bankers, which were not the subject of any of the 

motions, remain before the district court.

On January 27, 2014, the district court dismissed, inter 

alia, Plaintiffs’ financial abuse claims and granted Bankers’ 

motion to strike the class allegations. The court concluded 

that the class allegations of mishandled insurance claims 

“require case-by-case analysis of the operative facts.” Bates 

v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 993 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1339–43 

(D. Or. 2014). The court found that even with class 

discovery Plaintiffs would not be able to satisfy either the 

typicality requirement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

23(a)(3) or any of the subdivisions under Rule 23(b) to 

maintain a class action. Id. at 1342–43.

On April 30, 2014, the district court granted Plaintiffs’ 

unopposed motion for entry of final judgment pursuant to 

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BATES V. BANKERS LIFE & CAS. CO. 5

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and stayed the 

proceedings pending the outcome of this appeal. The court 

concluded that the decision to strike Plaintiffs’ class 

allegations was “final” as the term is used in Rule 54(b) and 

did not raise the risk of piecemeal litigation. Finding no just 

reason for delay, the district court entered final judgment so 

that Plaintiffs could appeal the decision to strike the class 

allegations. On May 7, 2014, Plaintiffs appealed, arguing 

that the district court improperly dismissed their class 

allegations without permitting class discovery.

II.

Plaintiffs assert appellate jurisdiction under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 54(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1 Bankers 

counters that our court lacks jurisdiction because an order 

granting a motion to strike class allegations, like an order 

denying class certification, is not a final judgment. Because 

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

23(f) are the only proper avenues for appealing a motion to 

strike class allegations, we lack jurisdiction to hear 

Plaintiffs’ challenge to the order striking their class 

allegations.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we have jurisdiction over “final 

decisions” of the district courts. A judgment is generally 

final and appealable under § 1291 when it “ends the 

litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do 

but execute the judgment.” Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 

 

1 Plaintiffs also argue that Bankers waived this jurisdictional

challenge by failing to raise it before the district court. A lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, however, even on appeal. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 

562 U.S. 428, 434–435 (2011).

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6 BATES V. BANKERS LIFE & CAS. CO.

1039, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 

324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 54(b), a district court “may direct entry of a final 

judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or 

parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no 

just reason for delay.” District courts, however, do not have 

the discretion under Rule 54(b) to convert a non-final 

judgment into a final judgment. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. 

v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 437 (1956) (“The District Court 

cannot, in the exercise of its discretion [under Rule 54(b)], 

treat as ‘final’ that which is not ‘final’ within the meaning of 

[28 U.S.C.] § 1291.”).

A decision to grant a motion to strike class allegations, 

which is the “functional equivalent of denying a motion to 

certify a case as a class action,” is not a final judgment. In 

re Bemis Co., 279 F.3d 419, 421 (7th Cir. 2002); see also 

United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 388–90 

(1977) (using the terms interchangeably). As the Supreme 

Court recognized, “[a]n order refusing to certify, or 

decertifying, a class does not of its own force terminate the 

entire litigation because the plaintiff is free to proceed on his 

individual claim.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 

463, 467 (1978). Such decisions are thus “inherently 

interlocutory” in nature. Id. at 470; see also Chevron USA 

Inc. v. Sch. Bd. Vermilion Par., 294 F.3d 716, 720 (5th Cir. 

2002) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction an appeal, under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291 and Rule 54(b), from an order refusing to 

certify a class action); Minority Police Officers Ass’n of S. 

Bend v. City of South Bend, 721 F.2d 197, 201 (7th Cir. 

1983) (same).

There are only two procedural avenues for appealing an 

order striking class allegations made under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 23: (1) asking the district court to certify an 

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BATES V. BANKERS LIFE & CAS. CO. 7

order for interlocutory review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1292(b); or (2) filing a petition for permission to appeal 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). See Plata 

v. Davis, 329 F.3d 1101, 1107–08 (9th Cir. 2003); Kamm v. 

Cal. City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205, 206 (9th Cir. 1975). 

Section 1292(b) allows appeal of an interlocutory decision if 

the district court states in writing that “such order involves a 

controlling question of law . . . and that an immediate appeal 

from the order may materially advance the ultimate 

termination of the litigation.” The court of appeals may then, 

in its discretion, permit an appeal of the order if the 

application is made within ten days. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) allows appeal from an 

order granting or denying class certification “if a petition for 

permission to appeal is filed with the circuit clerk within 14 

days after the order is entered.” Plaintiffs did not use either 

of these procedural avenues, and we therefore lack 

jurisdiction to hear their challenge to the order striking their 

class allegations.

Appeal DISMISSED in part for lack of jurisdiction.

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