Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02140/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02140-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIE HABCHI,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 13cv2140 BTM(DHB)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT

v.

WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK FA

(WAMU), CALIFORNIA

RECONVEYANCE CO, JP MORGAN

CHASE BANK, NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION and DOES 1 THROUGH

100, INCLUSIVE,

Defendants.

Defendants JPMorgan ChaseBank, N.A. (“Chase”), as acquirer of certain

assets and liabilities of Washington Mutual Bank from the Federal Deposit

Insurance Corporation as Receiver for Washington MutualBank, and California

Reconveyance Company (“CRC”) have filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s First

Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim. For the reasons discussed

below, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED. 

I. BACKGROUND

On or about September 7, 2007, Plaintiff Marie Habchi (“Plaintiff”)

obtained a loan from Washington Mutual Bank (“WaMu”) in the amount of

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$1,466,500.00. The loan was secured by a Deed of Trust (Defendants’

Request for Judicial Notice (RJN), Ex. 1) on the property located at 17577

Rancho Del Rio, Rancho Santa Fe, CA 92067 (“Property). The Deed of Trust

identifies Washington Mutual as the lender and beneficiary and CRC as the

trustee. 

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In September 2008, pursuant to a Purchase and Assumption Agreement

(RJN, Ex. 2.), Chase acquired certain assets and liabilities of WaMu from the

FDIC acting as receiver for WaMu, including WaMu’s interest in Plaintiff’s loan.

Notices of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust were

recorded by CRC on March 15, 2010 and April 13, 2010. (Ex. B to FAC) 

Notices of Trustee’s Sale were recorded by CRC on July 16, 2010, December

20, 2010, February 11, 2013, and July 30, 2013. (RJN, Exs. 4-7.)

On August 13, 2013, Plaintiff filed her Complaint in the Superior Court of

California. On September 12, 2013, Defendants removed the action.

In an order filed on December 27, 2013, the Court granted Defendants’

motion to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim. However, the Court

granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. On January 14, 2014,

Plaintiff filed her FAC.

 

II. STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

should be granted only where a plaintiff's complaint lacks a "cognizable legal

theory" or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v.

Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). When reviewing a

motion to dismiss, the allegations of material fact in plaintiff’s complaint are

taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See

In the FAC, Plaintiff additionally alleges that on or about September 7, 2007, 1

Plaintiff also entered into a second consumer credit transaction with Washington Mutual FSB

secured in second position in the amount of $209,500. (FAC ¶ 29.) 

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Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Although detailed factual allegations are not required, factual allegations “must

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “A plaintiff’s obligation to prove the

‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will

not do.” Id. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer

more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but

it has not show[n] that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 565

U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Only a complaint that

states a plausible claim for relief will survive a motion to dismiss. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss the FAC in its entirety for failure to state a

claim. The Court agrees that dismissal is warranted.

The FAC asserts the identical claims as the original complaint: (1)

wrongful foreclosure/violation of the California Homeowner Bill of Rights

(“CHBR”); (2) negligence; (3) unlawful and unfair acts and practices (Cal. Bus.

& Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.); (4) violation of Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15

U.S.C. § 1602, et seq.; (5) violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.5; and (6)

declaratory relief. Although the FAC is longer than the original complaint,

Plaintiff has not added substantive allegations that remedy the defects

identified in the Court’s prior order [Doc. No. 9]. For the most part, the new

allegations consist of conclusory claims regarding how Defendants have

breached their duties and violated laws. Because Plaintiff has not remedied 2

In Plaintiff’s § 17200 claim, Plaintiff adds allegations that Defendants violated Cal. 2

Civ. Code 2923.53 and 2923.6. However, these additional statutory citations do not

strengthen Plaintiff’s claim. There is no private right of action to sue under section 2923.53,

which was repealed by its own terms as of January 1, 2011. See Vuki v. Superior Court, 189

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the deficiencies pointed out by the Court, Plaintiff’s claims fail to state a claim

for the same reasons as set forth in the Court’s prior order.

Plaintiff did not file an opposition to Defendants’ motion. Therefore, the

Court has no basis to conclude that Plaintiff can allege additional facts that can

salvage her claims. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s FAC without

leave to amend.

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons discussed above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the FAC

is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s FAC is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim. The

Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 24, 2014

BARRY TED MOSKOWITZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

Cal. App. 4th 791, 798-99 (2010). Section 2923.6(a) applies only to servicers and parties

in a loan pool. Pantoja v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1188 (N.D.

Cal. 2009). To the extent Plaintiff means to allege “dual tracking” under § 2923.6(c), the

court addressed Plaintiff’s claim of dual tracking in its prior order. In its prior order, the Court

cited to Cal. Civ. Code § 2924.18(b), which contains the same language as 2924.6(c), but

applies to “small volume” servicers. Under either § 2924.6(c) or 2924.18(b), the servicer is

prohibited from recording a notice of default or notice of trustee’s sale while a complete

application for a first lien loan modification is pending. As explained in the Court’s prior

order, Plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing that she submitted a complete application

for a first lien modification and that Defendants recorded a notice of default or notice of

trustee’s sale while the application was pending. Plaintiff’s allegation that between

December, 2007 and the present, she “unsuccessfully submitted multiple loan modification

requests” (FAC ¶ 59) does not reveal whether Plaintiff actually submitted a complete

application and if so, whether the application was denied or was pending when a notice of

default or notice of sale was recorded. 

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