Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-02242/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-02242-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRANDON LA’SHAUN TAYLOR,

Plaintiff,

v.

AMADOR COUNTY PUBLIC 

DEFENDER’S OFFICE, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:19-CV-2242-KJM-DMC-P

ORDER

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1).

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 

means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 

1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 

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complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 

rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege 

with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 

claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 

impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague 

and conclusory.

In this case, plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) the Amador County 

Public Defender’s Office; and (2) the Amador County Conflict Defender’s Office. See ECF No. 

1. According to plaintiff:

On July 8th I was a defendant in the Amador County Superior 

Court and denied public counsel. Specifically, at arraignment a 

representative from the Amador County Public Defender’s Office 

approached me and told me I would not be presented with a public 

defender because the Public Defender’s Office were [sic] notified by an 

unknown source that I can afford my own attorney. She then said that it 

was obviously a conflict and she’ll tell the judge. The judge then granted 

me a conflict defender but [] two days later the conflict defender told me 

they were getting off the case because a source also told them I can afford 

my own attorney. I am a state prisoner with no means to pay for an 

attorney. . . . This is a direct violating of my civil rights. 

Id. at 3-4.

Plaintiff seeks money damages for “psychological trauma” and an order directing Amador 

County to appoint him counsel. See id. 

When a state prisoner challenges the legality of his custody and the relief he seeks 

is a determination that he is entitled to an earlier or immediate release, such a challenge is not 

cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the prisoner’s sole federal remedy is a petition for a writ 

of habeas corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see also Neal v. Shimoda, 

131 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 1997); Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 

1995) (per curiam). Thus, where a § 1983 action seeking monetary damages or declaratory relief 

alleges constitutional violations which would necessarily imply the invalidity of the prisoner’s 

underlying conviction or sentence, or the result of a prison disciplinary hearing resulting in 

imposition of a sanction affecting the overall length of confinement, such a claim is not 

cognizable under § 1983 unless the conviction or sentence has first been invalidated on appeal, by 

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habeas petition, or through some similar proceeding. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483-

84 (1994) (concluding that § 1983 claim not cognizable because allegations were akin to 

malicious prosecution action which includes as an element a finding that the criminal proceeding 

was concluded in plaintiff’s favor); Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(concluding that § 1983 claim not cognizable because allegations of procedural defects were an 

attempt to challenge substantive result in parole hearing); cf. Neal, 131 F.3d at 824 (concluding 

that § 1983 claim was cognizable because challenge was to conditions for parole eligibility and 

not to any particular parole determination); cf. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005) 

(concluding that § 1983 action seeking changes in procedures for determining when an inmate is 

eligible for parole consideration not barred because changed procedures would hasten future 

parole consideration and not affect any earlier parole determination under the prior procedures).

In this case, plaintiff’s complaint sounds in habeas in that he is raising a Sixth 

Amendment right-to-counsel claim that, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of 

any conviction arising out of criminal proceedings in the Amador County Superior Court. If 

plaintiff has been convicted, and if that conviction has not been set aside or otherwise invalidated, 

then the current civil rights action would be barred under Heck. Plaintiff, however, does not 

allege facts to allow the court to determine whether plaintiff has been convicted and, if so, 

whether that conviction has been overturned or set aside. For this reason, plaintiff will be 

provided an opportunity to amend the complaint to allege additional facts in this regard.

Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 

amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire 

action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is 

informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See

Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to 

amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended 

complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if 

plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make 

plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be 

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complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the 

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 

each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 

between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 

164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the 

time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 

1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply 

with Rule 8 may, in the court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). 

See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and

2. Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of 

service of this order.

Dated: June 4, 2020

____________________________________

DENNIS M. COTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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