Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-03529/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-03529-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 850
Nature of Suit: Securities, Commodities, Exchange
Cause of Action: 15:78m(a) Securities Exchange Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Deutsche Bank’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED. See Fed. R. Evid. 201.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LOUISIANA PACIFIC CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MONEY MARKET 1 INSTITUTIONAL

INVESTMENT DEALER, ET AL.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 09-03529 JSW

AMENDED ORDER DENYING

MOTION TO TRANSFER

Now before this Court is the motion filed by Defendant Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.

(“Deutsche Bank”) to transfer venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Having carefully

reviewed the parties’ papers, considered their arguments and the relevant authority, and good

cause appearing, the Court hereby DENIES Deutsche Bank’s motion to transfer.1

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Louisiana Pacific Corporation (“LP”) originally brought this auction rate

securities action against Deutsche Bank and Money Market 1 Institutional Investment Dealer

(“MM1”), as well as Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith

Incorporated (collectively, “Merrill Lynch Defendants”). On December 8, 2009, the Judicial

Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred LP’s claims against the Merrill Lynch Defendants

to the Southern District of New York. Deutsche Bank now seeks to transfer LP’s remaining

claims against it and MM1 to the Southern District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1404(a).

Case 3:09-cv-03529-JSW Document 88 Filed 03/22/10 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The Court will address additional facts as required in the analysis. 

ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Transfer Venue.

Deutsche Bank seeks to have the Court transfer this action to the Southern District of

New York. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a district court may transfer a civil action to any

district where the case could have been filed originally for the convenience of the parties and

witnesses and in the interest of justice. An action “might have been brought” in a court that: (1)

is able to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants, (2) has subject matter jurisdiction

over the claim, and (3) would be a proper venue. See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343-44

(1960). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that the action should be transferred. 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 279 (9th Cir. 1979).

Deutsche Bank contends that venue is proper because the Southern District of New York

has general jurisdiction over both it and MM1. Due process requires that a defendant have

“minimum contacts with the forum state such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction does not

offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Decker Coal Co. v.

Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing International Shoe Co. v.

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). If the defendant has “substantial” or “continuous and

systematic” contacts with the forum state, the defendant is subject to general jurisdiction. Id.

(quoting Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Associates, 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir.

1977)). The standard for establishing general jurisdiction is “fairly high” and “requires that the

defendant’s contacts be of the sort that approximate physical presence in the state.” Bancroft &

Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000). 

The Court considers several factors when determining general jurisdiction, including

“whether the defendant makes sales, solicits or engages in business in the state, serves the

state’s markets, designates an agent for service of process, holds a license, or is incorporated

there.” Id. “It is the nature and extent of the contacts that determines whether they are

‘substantial’ or ‘continuous and systematic.’” Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d

1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2006). “Longevity, continuity, volume, economic impact, physical

Case 3:09-cv-03529-JSW Document 88 Filed 03/22/10 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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presence, and integration into the state’s regulatory or economic markets are among the indicia

of such a presence.” Id. 

For venue purposes, the Southern District of New York does not have general

jurisdiction over MM1 because MM1 does not have continuous and systematic contacts there. 

To support its argument that venue is proper in the New York, Deutsche Bank relies solely on

the fact that for a period of four years, one of MM1’s five employees worked in New York. 

Deutsche Bank provides no evidence regarding what this employee actually did in New York or

how much business MMI conducted in New York. Nor does Deutsche Bank address whether

MMI designated an agent for service of process in New York or held a license there. 

Courts have found corporations with significantly more contacts in a state to lack

general jurisdiction. See Cubbage v. Merchent, 744 F.2d 665, 667-68 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding

no general jurisdiction in California over defendant hospital with 16 of its 87 employees and 26

percent of its patients were residents of California and where defendant advertised in telephone

directory distributed in California, applied for and was issued California Medi-Cal numbers for

its doctors, and received reimbursement from California for patients covered under the MediCal program); Golden Valley Grape Juice and Wine v. Centrisys Corp., 2009 WL 4828743, *3

(E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2009) (finding no general jurisdiction in California where defendant sold

products in California, had a sales office and an agent for service of process in California, and

shipped goods directly to sales office in California); Krauss Craft, Inc. v. Ross Recreational

Equip. Co., 2009 WL 367521, *3-4 (D.Or. Feb. 12, 2009) (finding no jurisdiction in Oregon

where defendant secured business licenses in two Oregon communities, obtained Oregon

workers compensation insurance through an Oregon based company, advertised for Oregon

customers listing an Oregon address and telephone number, had offices in both Eugene and

Portland at different times, was registered to do business in Oregon and listed an Oregon

registered agent).

In support of its position that the Southern District of New York may exercise general

jurisdiction over MM1, Deutsche Bank relies on an out of district case from the Eastern District

of Michigan. See Dorsey v. American Golf Corp., 98 F. Supp. 2d 812 (E.D. Mich. 2000). In

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 In its reply brief, Deutsche Bank cites Livingston v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 294

F. Supp. 676, 681 (D.N.J. 1968) for the proposition that the “transacting business” provision

of section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act has even a broader meaning than the venue

provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1391. However, after the court in Livingston noted that some courts

had found that “transacting business” was a less exacting standard than the “doing business”

or “minimum contacts” standard, the found that such line of cases was made invalid a

subsequent Supreme Court case. Id. at 681-82. The holding of Livingston is that “the

‘transacting business’ standard of Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act is co-extensive

with the ‘minimum contacts’ test.” Therefore, Deutsche Bank’s reliance on Livigston is

misplaced.

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Dorsey, the court found general jurisdiction over a defendant corporation that managed seven

golf courses in Michigan, maintained an unspecified number of employees in Michigan, and

was the managing partner of a Michigan corporation. Id. at 815. Without much analysis, the

court found that such activities demonstrated that the defendant corporation conducted a

continuous and systematic part of its general business in Michigan. Id. The Court finds that

Dorsey is not persuasive. Moreover, even to the extent the Court were to consider Dorsey, the

defendant’s activities in Michigan in that case were more substantial than MM1’s activities in

New York. Therefore, MM1’s contacts are not sufficient for Deutsche Bank to meet its burden

of demonstrating that venue is proper in the Southern District of New York based on general

jurisdiction.2 Because the Court finds that Deutsche Bank fails to demonstrate the threshold

requirement that this action could have been brought in the Southern District of New York, the

Court DENIES Deutsche Bank’s motion to transfer.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Deutsche Bank’s motion to transfer

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 22, 2010 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:09-cv-03529-JSW Document 88 Filed 03/22/10 Page 4 of 4