Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00428/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00428-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Christopher R. Arbuckle, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Fizer, et al.,

Respondents. 

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No. CV 07-0428-PHX-MHM (ECV)

ORDER

 On January 3, 2007, Plaintiff filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Dkt. #1). The matter was referred to United States

Magistrate Judge Edward C. Voss, who issued a Report and Recommendation on May 15,

2008, recommending that the Court deny and dismiss with prejudice the Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus with prejudice. (Dkt. #11). Plaintiff filed written Objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation on May 28, 2008. (Dkt. #12).

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court must review de novo the legal analysis in a Magistrate Judge’s

Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). In addition, a district court

must review de novo the factual analysis in the Report and Recommendation for those

facts to which objections are filed. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (“A judge of the court

shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed

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findings or recommendations to which objection is made.”). “Failure to object to a

magistrate judge's recommendation waives all objections to the judge's findings of fact.” 

Jones v. Wood, 207 F.3d 557, 562 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2000).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion Requirement

To have a meritorious federal writ of habeas corpus, a state prisoner must first

exhaust his remedies in the state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) & (c); Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir.

1991). To properly exhaust a federal habeas claim, a petitioner must afford the state an

opportunity to rule on the merits of the petitioner’s claims by “fairly presenting” the

claims to the state’s highest court in a procedurally correct manner. See O’Sullivan v.

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999). In essence, to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a

petitioner “must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional

issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate review

process.” Id. at 845; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).

In Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of

Appeals by properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or through

appropriate post-conviction relief. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.

1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). Petitioner need only exhaust

one of these avenues of relief before bringing a habeas petition in federal court. Castillo v.

McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d

1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative

facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. Bland v. Cal. Dep’t of

Corrections, 20 F.3d 1469, 1472-73 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Schell

v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d

895, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2001). “Our rule is that a state prisoner has not ‘fairly presented’

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(and thus exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to

that court that those claims were based on federal law.” Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666,

668 (9th Cir. 2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Fundamentally, “if a petitioner fails to alert the state court to the fact that he is raising a

federal constitutional claim, his federal claim is unexhausted regardless of its similarity to

the issues raised in state court.” Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Petitioner asserts four grounds for habeas relief in the instant Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus: (1) that he was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial when the trial

court denied his request to sever the counts against him that involved different victims; (2)

that his privilege against self-incrimination was violated when the prosecution used letters

he wrote while in jail against him at trial; (3) that his rights under the Fourth Amendment

were violated because the search warrant was executed earlier than the time allowed under

Arizona law; (4) that his rights under the Sixth and Fifteenth Amendments were violated

when a prior conviction from 1995 was used to enhance his sentence. (Dkt. #1). 

As Magistrate Judge Voss points out, Petitioner failed to properly exhaust grounds

one, two, and four of his federal habeas petition in state court. Although Petitioner raised

similar claims on direct appeal in state court (Dkt. #7, Exhibit O), he failed to raise them

as violations of the U.S. Constitution. Contra Lyons, 232 F.3d at 666 (petitioner must

specifically indicate to the state court that his claims are based on federal law). As such,

grounds one, two, and four of Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus were not

properly exhausted, regardless of their similarity to the claims raised in state court. 

Johnson, 88 F.3d at 830. However, Petitioner did properly exhausted his Fourth

Amendment claim (ground three of the petition) by fairly presenting the claim in state

court as a violation of Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights. (Dkt. #7, Exhibit O).

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B. Procedural Default

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If a petition contains claims that were never fairly presented in state court, then the

federal court must determine whether any state remedies remain available to the petitioner. 

See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268-70

(1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring). If remedies are still available in state court, then the

federal court may dismiss the petition without prejudice pending the exhaustion of the

state remedies. Rose, 455 U.S. at 520. However, if the court finds that the petitioner

would have no state remedy were he to return to state court, then his claims are considered

procedurally defaulted. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989); Sandgathe v.

Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 2002). 

A petitioner who has procedurally defaulted his state claims may not raise the

claims in a federal habeas petition unless the petitioner can demonstrate a miscarriage of

justice, show cause and prejudice, or show actual innocence that would excuse the default. 

See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51; Ellis v. Armenakis, 222 F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citing Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994)). The standard for “cause and

prejudice” is one of discretion; it is intended to be flexible and yielding to exceptional

circumstances only. See Hughes v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909

(9th Cir. 1986). Although both cause and prejudice must be shown to excuse a procedural

default, the Court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to

establish cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43 (1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at

1123 n. 10. However, failure to establish cause may be excused “in an extraordinary case,

where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is

actually innocent.” See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). 

In the instant case, grounds one, two, and four of the Petition for Write of Habeas

Corpus were not properly exhausted. See Johnson, 88 F.3d at 830. In addition, Petitioner

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The time has passed for Petitioner to seek post-conviction relief in state court under Rule

32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. In addition, Petitioner has not shown that any

exceptions under Rule 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) or (h) apply to him. 

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would no longer have a remedy if he returned to the state court.1

 As a result, Petitioner’s

claims are considered procedurally defaulted. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 298-99; Sandgathe,

314 F.3d at 376. However, Petitioner has presented no evidence in either his Petition or

Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation that demonstrate a

miscarriage of justice, cause and prejudice, or actual innocence. As such, the Court cannot

consider Petitioner’s unexhausted and procedurally defaulted claims; the Court must deny

grounds one, two, and four of the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

C. Fourth Amendment Claim

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a

federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief with respect to “any claim that was adjudicated

on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the State court decision was (1) contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the

U.S. Supreme Court, or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000) (O’Connor, J., delivering the opinion of the Court

as to the AEDPA standard of review). 

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established precedent if (1) “the

state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court]

cases,” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable

from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from

[its] precedent.” Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06. Indeed, “[a] state court’s decision can

involve an ‘unreasonable application’ of federal law if it either (1) correctly identifies the

governing rule but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively

unreasonable, or (2) extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new

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context in a way that is objectively unreasonable.” Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132,

1142 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, a state court’s application of federal law must be more than

incorrect or erroneous, it must be objectively unreasonable. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.

63, 75 (2003). Furthermore, “[w]hen applying these standards, the federal court should

review the ‘last reasoned decision’ by a state court . . . .” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d

1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Here, Petitioner alleges that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because

the warrant at issue was served at 6:28 a.m., two minutes before the time allowed under

Arizona law. Petitioner properly exhausted this claim; he raised the same claim in his

direct appeal in state court, arguing that Arizona law requires search warrants to be served

during the daytime, and that service of the warrant at 6:28 a.m. violated this requirement. 

(Dkt. #7, Exhibit O). 

However, the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment

claim after finding that the state trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined

that the search complied with Arizona’s daytime warrant statute. (Dkt. #7, Exhibit R at

24-26). The Court of Appeals held that the record supports the factual findings made by

the trial court regarding the search time. (Id. at 26). Petitioner has not presented evidence

in either his Petition or his Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation that demonstrate that the Arizona Court of Appeals’s decision is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law or based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts. Further, Petitioner did not submit a reply to

Respondents’ Answer to Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. As such,

Petitioner has not attempted to satisfy the legal standard for habeas relief under AEDPA. 

The Court agrees with the Report and Recommendation and finds that Petitioner has

submitted no basis for relief on his Fourth Amendment claim; Petitioner’s claim is without

merit and must be denied.

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Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED overruling Petitioner’s Objections to the Magistrate

Judge’s Report and Recommendation. (Dkt. #12). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED adopting the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation in its entirety as the Order of the Court. (Dkt. #11). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

is denied and dismissed with prejudice. (Dkt. #1).

 DATED this 29th day of September, 2008.

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