Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02032/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02032-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10cv2032 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TOMMY LEE,

Petitioner,

v.

LELAND McEWEN, Warden,

Respondent.

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No. 10-2032-WQH(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

On September 28, 2010, Petitioner Tommy Lee (hereafter

“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus (hereafter “Petition”) pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §2254 challenging his San Diego Superior Court conviction in

case number SCD150605.

 Respondent Leland McEwen (hereafter “Respondent”) filed an

Answer to the Petition. Petitioner filed a Traverse to the Respondent’s Answer. The Court, having reviewed the Petition, the Answer,

the Traverse, and the documents lodged therewith, find that

Petitioner is not entitled to the relief requested and RECOMMENDS

that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED.

Case 3:10-cv-02032-WQH-WVG Document 11 Filed 06/21/11 Page 1 of 20
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10cv2032 2

I

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 5, 2000, in the San Diego Superior Court, Petitioner

was convicted by a jury of one count of Second Degree Murder [Cal.

Penal Code §187(a)], one count of Evading an Officer, Causing Death

[Cal. Veh. Code §2800.3], one count of Driving Under the Influence

of Drugs Causing Injury [Cal. Veh. Code §23153(a)], personally

inflicting great bodily injury upon the victim [Cal. Penal Code

§12022.7(a)], and one count of Unlawful Driving a Vehicle [Cal. Veh.

Code § 10851(a)]. 

On June 5, 2000, Petitioner was sentenced to 36 years, 4

months, to life imprisonment. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 1B). On

December 10, 2001, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the

judgment in an unpublished decision. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5A

at 1).

On November 28, 2005, the San Diego Superior Court granted

Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, reversing

Petitioner’s conviction for Second-Degree Murder based on the

decision in People v. Howard, 34 Cal. 4th 1129 (2005). Petitioner’s

case was remanded to set possible dates for re-trial on the murder

charge and/or re-sentencing on Petitioner’s remaining convictions.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 2 at 2).

On January 22, 2007, Petitioner was re-tried. Again, he was

convicted by a jury of one count of Second Degree Murder [Cal. Penal

Code §187(a)]. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 3). On April 3, 2007,

Petitioner was sentenced to 15 years to life imprisonment on the

Second-Degree Murder charge. The Superior Court confirmed the prior

sentence given on all other counts and Petitioner was sentenced to

Case 3:10-cv-02032-WQH-WVG Document 11 Filed 06/21/11 Page 2 of 20
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10cv2032 3

a total of 21 years, 4 months, to life imprisonment. (Respondent’s

Lodgment No. 4 at 1-2).

On July 1, 2008, Petitioner appealed the judgment based on the

ground that the trial court committed reversible error when it found

that Leonard Loehr (hereafter “Loehr”) was unavailable as a witness

based on Loehr’s fear of testifying at Petitioner’s second trial. 

On April 17, 2009, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the

judgment in an unpublished decision, concluding that the trial court

acted within its discretion when it ruled that Loehr was an

unavailable witness. The court rejected Petitioner’s claim that his

Right to Confrontation was violated. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5B

at 7).

In May 2009, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the

California Supreme Court raising the same claim that he raised in the

California Court of Appeal. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 6A). On July

8, 2009, the California Supreme Court denied the Petition for Review.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 6B).

On September 28, 2010, Petitioner filed the Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus that is now pending in this Court. On January 11,

2011, Respondent filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus. On February 7, 2011, Petitioner filed a Traverse to Respondent’s Answer.

II

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts that follow are taken substantially from the

California Court of Appeal’s unpublished opinion in People v. Lee,

No. D052388 and the record in that case. (Respondent’s Lodgment No.

5B).

Case 3:10-cv-02032-WQH-WVG Document 11 Filed 06/21/11 Page 3 of 20
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10cv2032 4

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and

presumes them to be correct, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1). See

Park v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (questions of historical

fact, including inferences properly drawn from such facts, are

entitled to a statutory presumption of correctness); Sumner v. Mata,

449 U.S. 539, 545-47 (1981) (deference is owed to findings of both

state trial and appellate courts); Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520,

524-26 (9th Cir. 1990) (factual findings of both state trial and

state appellate courts are entitled to a presumption of correctness

on federal habeas corpus review).

A. COMMITMENT OFFENSES

On January 30, 2000, San Diego County Sheriff’s Deputies

pursued Petitioner, who was driving a stolen vehicle. Petitioner’s

vehicle reached speeds of 70 to 90 miles per hour. He drove through

red lights. About seven miles from where the chase began, Petitioner’s vehicle ran a red light and collided with a silver vehicle.

Leonila Guerrero, a passenger in the silver vehicle was ejected and

crushed by the vehicle when it rolled on top of her. Leonila Guerrero

died from her injuries. Petitioner and his passenger, Loehr, were

arrested. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5B at 1-2).

Subsequent to the arrest, Petitioner admitted to being the

driver of the vehicle and that he was fleeing from the deputies

because he knew the vehicle he was driving was stolen and he did not

want to be caught.

(Id. at 2). 

In a pre-trial statement, Loehr admitted to officers that he

and Petitioner ingested methamphetamine before driving the stolen

vehicle. Loehr also told officers that Petitioner decided to flee

Case 3:10-cv-02032-WQH-WVG Document 11 Filed 06/21/11 Page 4 of 20
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10cv2032 5

from, and planned to evade, the officers. Petitioner and Loehr were

aware that the light was red before going through the intersection,

immediately before the collision. (Id. at 2). 

B. PETITIONER’S FIRST TRIAL

At Petitioner’s first trial, Loehr testified that at that

time, he was serving a prison sentence for auto theft and received

immunity in exchange for testifying against Petitioner. 

Loehr testified that he and Petitioner stole vehicles and

drove around until they were spotted by deputies. Petitioner was

driving the car and sped away when the deputies attempted to stop

them. (Id. at 3).

C. PETITIONER’S SECOND TRIAL

At the time of Petitioner’s second trial, Loehr was serving

a prison sentence in Arizona. Loehr refused to testify at Petitioner’s second trial for fear of being labeled a “snitch” in prison.

Loehr was afraid that fellow prisons might retaliate against him by

stabbing him upon his return to the Arizona prison. (Id. at 3).

The trial court appointed counsel for Loehr, and when Loehr

still refused to testify, the trial court tentatively ruled that

Loehr was an unavailable witness under California Evidence Code §

240. (Id. at 3-4). Petitioner did not object to the tentative ruling.

Then, the trial court spoke with Loehr outside of the jury’s

presence. With Loehr’s counsel present, the trial court informed

Loehr that he could be held in contempt for refusing to testify.

Loehr indicated that he understood but continued to refuse to answer

any questions asked of him. The court held Loehr in contempt of its

order to testify, and ordered that he be held by the Sheriff. The

court ruled that Loehr was unavailable as a witness under California

Case 3:10-cv-02032-WQH-WVG Document 11 Filed 06/21/11 Page 5 of 20
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10cv2032 6

Evidence Code § 240 and that his testimony from Petitioner’s first

trial could be introduced by the prosecution. (Id. at 4). Petitioner

did not object to this ruling.

Before Loehr’s testimony was read to the jury, the court

explained that Loehr was unavailable as a witness and that the jury

was to evaluate his testimony as read, the same as any other witness.

The testimony was then read to the jury and the jury returned its

verdict. The court dismissed Loehr’s contempt citation and ordered

him released to the District Attorney’s office to be transported back

to prison in Arizona. (Id. at 4)

III

GROUND FOR RELIEF

Petitioner raises one ground for relief. Specifically,

Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his Sixth

 Amendment Right to Confrontation when it permitted the former

testimony of Loehr to be read into the record during Petitioner’s

second trial. He asserts that the court’s ruling finding Loehr

unavailable as a witness was constitutionally infirm.

 IV

 STANDARD OF REVIEW

In order for federal subject matter jurisdiction over a petition

for writ of habeas corpus to lie, the petition must allege that the

petitioner is in custody in violation of the Constitution or the laws

or treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a).

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”) applies to habeas corpus petitions filed after 1996. The

current petition was filed on September 28, 2010, and is therefore

governed by the AEDPA. To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner

must satisfy either §2254(d)(1) or §2254(d)(2). See Williams v.

Case 3:10-cv-02032-WQH-WVG Document 11 Filed 06/21/11 Page 6 of 20
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10cv2032 7

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The Supreme Court interprets

§2254(d)(1) and (2) as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a

conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on

a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than this Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable

application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts

of the prisoner’s case.

Williams,529 U.S. at 412-13.

A state court’s decision may be found to be “contrary to”

clearly established Supreme Court precedent (1) “if the state court

applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the

Court’s] cases” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts

that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court

and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court’s]

precedent.” Id. at 405-06; Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72-75

(2003). A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application”

of clearly established federal law, “if the state court identifies

the correct governing legal rule from this Court’s cases but

unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state

prisoner’s case,” or, “if the state court either unreasonably extends

a legal principle from our precedent to a new context where it should

not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new

context where it should apply.” Williams, 539 U.S. at 407; Andrade,

538 U.S. at 76.

In Williams, the United States Supreme Court stated that

“clearly established Federal law” in 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) “refers

to the holdings,” as opposed to the dicta of this Court’s decisions

as of the time of the relevant state court decision. Williams, 529

U.S. at 412. When there is no clearly established federal law on an

Case 3:10-cv-02032-WQH-WVG Document 11 Filed 06/21/11 Page 7 of 20
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10cv2032 8

issue, a state court cannot be said to have unreasonably applied the

law as to that issue. Casey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006);

Holley v.Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2009).

A state court must apply legal principles established

by a [United States] Supreme Court decision when the

case ‘falls squarely within’ those principles, but not

in the cases where there is a ‘structural difference’

between the prior precedent and the case at issue, or

when the prior precedent requires ‘tailoring or

modification’ to apply to the new situation...We

conclude that when a [United States] Supreme Court

decision does not ‘squarely address’ the issue in the

case, or establish a legal principle that ‘clearly

extends’ to a new context to the extent required by

the [United States] Supreme Court, it cannot be said,

under the AEDPA, there is ‘clearly established’

Supreme Court precedent addressing the issue before

us, and so we must defer to the state court’s decision.

Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 753-754 (9th Cir.

2009)

When there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest

court, the Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate court

decision. Ylst v. Nunnmeaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-806 (1991). If the

dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its

reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review

of the record to determine whether that state court’s decision is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir.

2000)(overruled in part by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 74-77).

 V

 PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO RELIEF

Petitioner claims that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated

under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), when Loehr was

determined to be “unavailable” pursuant to California Evidence Code

§ 240 (hereafter “§ 240"). He claims that there was a constitutionally improper showing of witness unavailability at his second trial.

Petitioner asserts that it was improper to find Loehr unavailable at

Case 3:10-cv-02032-WQH-WVG Document 11 Filed 06/21/11 Page 8 of 20
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1/ Section 240 states in pertinent part:

(a)... “unavailable as a witness” means that the declarant is any of

the following:

...

(6) Persistent in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter

of the declarant’s statement despite having been found in contempt

for refusal to testify.

(continued)

10cv2032 9

his second trial because there was little explanation that Loehr’s

fear of testifying had a reasonable factual basis, and that the trial

court failed to take reasonable and available steps to procure

Loehr’s testimony. Therefore, Petitioner contends that the trial

court erroneously found Loehr to be an unavailable witness and

erroneously introduced Loehr’s prior sworn testimony in lieu of live

testimony. Additionally, Petitioner argues that the state court

ruling unreasonably applied federal law.

Respondent argues (1) that Petitioner’s failure to lodge a

contemporaneous objection during his second trial is an independent

and adequate state procedural bar, and he is therefore barred from

raising his objection for the first time in his Petition now before

the Court, (2) the admission of Loehr’s sworn testimony at Petitioner’s second trial did not violate Petitioner’s confrontation

rights pursuant to Crawford, and (3) if the state court did err by

admitting Loehr’s testimony, the error was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt. 

A. THERE IS NO UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION THAT

 SQUARELY ADDRESSES THE ISSUE IN THIS CASE

At the time Petitioner’s claim was decided in the state courts,

there was no United States Supreme Court decision that specifically

addressed whether a witness should be found unavailable due to fear

of inmate retaliation. The Court of Appeal analyzed the issue

pursuant to California law and reasonably determined that a witness

is unavailable pursuant to § 2401/

 when the fear of inmate retaliation

Case 3:10-cv-02032-WQH-WVG Document 11 Filed 06/21/11 Page 9 of 20
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Federal Rule of Evidence 804 states in pertinent part:

(a) “Unavailability of a witness” includes situations in which the

declarant–

...

(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of

the declarant’s statement despite an order of the court to do so...

...

(b) The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the

declarant is unavailable as a witness:

...

(1) Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or

a different proceeding... if the party against whom the testimony is

now offered... had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the

testimony by direct, cross or redirect examination.

The Court notes that § 240(a)(6) and Federal Rule of Evidence

804(a)(2) are substantially the same. 

10cv2032 10

prevents a witness from testifying. Regardless of Loehr’s reason for

his refusal to testify, the fact remains that he persisted in his

refusal to testify even after the trial court warned him of the

consequences. Accordingly, under § 240(a)(6), Loehr was an “unavailable witness.”

Petitioner does not offer any Supreme Court authority that

applies to this case or that would extend to the issue he presents

in his Petition. Nor has the Court found any such authority.

Therefore, since there is no clearly established Supreme Court

decision on this issue, the California Court of Appeal cannot be said

to have unreasonably applied the law as to the issue presented in the

Petition. Carey, 549 U.S. at 74, Holley, 568 F.3d at 1098. As a

result, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s claim be DENIED.

B. PETITIONER’S FAILURE TO OBJECT IN STATE COURT CREATED A

 PROCEDURAL BAR FOR FEDERAL COURT REVIEW

Respondent argues that since the state court ruled that

Petitioner’s claim was barred from appellate review for lack of

contemporaneous objection at his second trial, an independent and

adequate state procedural bar exists as to Petitioner’s claim, and

Case 3:10-cv-02032-WQH-WVG Document 11 Filed 06/21/11 Page 10 of 20
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10cv2032 11

review by this Court is barred. Petitioner disagrees, arguing that

his claim is not barred from review in this Court.

There is a “presumption that when the California Supreme Court’s

last unexplained order did not reach the merits, the bar of procedural default [from the last actual state opinion]... has not been

overcome.” Ylst, 501 U.S. at 806. 

In this case, the procedural bar at issue is California’s

“contemporaneous objection” rule. The last state court opinion

discussing Petitioner’s claim is the opinion of the California Court

of Appeal, which concluded that Petitioner’s claims should have been

raised at trial, thus invoking the procedural bar:

We conclude the issue regarding the basis of Loehr’s

fears could and should have been raised at

trial...[B]efore jury selection, Loehr’s unwillingness

to testify was known to the court, appellant, and all

counsel... At each stage, defense counsel was present

and could have requested further factual inquiry.

Nothing in the procedural posture of the case prevented defense counsel from requesting an additional

factual foundation for Loehr’s fears. The matter was

not “fully litigated” such that an objection would

have been useless. In any event, we conclude the

record and case law support the trial judge’s finding

Loehr was unavailable due to his fear of inmate

retaliation.

 (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5B at 5-6). 

Therefore, a presumption exists that the lack of a contemporaneous objection at Petitioner’s second trial created a bar to federal

review.

“Under Section 353 of California’s Evidence Code...[California’s

contemporaneous objection rule]... evidence is admissible unless

there is an objection, the grounds for the objection are clearly

expressed, and the objection is made at the time the evidence is

introduced...[This] rule is consistently applied when a party has

failed to make any objection to the admission of evidence.” Melendez

Case 3:10-cv-02032-WQH-WVG Document 11 Filed 06/21/11 Page 11 of 20
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10cv2032 12

v. Pliler, 288 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002)(citation omitted); see

also Garrison v. McCarthy, 653 F.2d 374, 377 (9th Cir. 1981).

Moreover, “federal habeas review of [Petitioner’s] claims is

barred unless the [petitioner] can demonstrate cause for the default

and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal

law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result

in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 750 (1991); see Ylst, 501 U.S. at 806, citing Murray v.

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986); see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.

72 (1977)(the burden is on petitioner to show cause and prejudice),

Keyes v. Yarbrough, 181 Fed.Appx. 655 (9th Cir. 2006)(petitioner’s

federal habeas review of his Confrontation Clause claim is procedurally barred after he failed to contemporaneously object in a

California state trial court); Moya v. Sullivan, 2010 WL 1023940, at

*7 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 

In this case, Petitioner did not object to Loehr’s prior

testimony being read into evidence at his second trial at any time

before, during, or after, his second trial, including immediately

before Loehr’s testimony was read into evidence. (Respondent’s

Lodgments Nos. 7-10). Therefore, Petitioner’s claim is barred in this

Court unless he can demonstrate there is cause and prejudice, or that

a failure to consider his claims will result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

“The existence for cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the [petitioner] can show that some objective

factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply

with the state’s procedural rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at

488; See Garrison, 653 F.3d at 378.

Case 3:10-cv-02032-WQH-WVG Document 11 Filed 06/21/11 Page 12 of 20
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10cv2032 13

Petitioner has not introduced any evidence to support or suggest

any external factors inhibiting him (or his attorney) from objecting

to the introduction of Loehr’s testimony during his second trial.

Furthermore, the Court of Appeal noted that “[n]othing in the

procedural posture of the case prevented defense counsel from

requesting additional factual foundation for Loehr’s fears.”

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5B at 5). Therefore, Petitioner has not

established cause and the Court need not determine whether Petitioner

was prejudiced by the procedural default. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S.

467, 502 (1991). The Court must next determine whether Petitioner

would suffer a “miscarriage of justice,” should the procedural bar

stand.

“To qualify for the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception

to the procedural default rule...[Petitioner] must show that a

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction when

he was actually innocent of the offense.” See Briseno v. Walker, 2010

WL 3430402 at *10 (E.D. Cal. 2010) quoting Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d

1000, 1028 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Murray, 477 U.S. at 496).

Petitioner has not asserted that a failure to consider his

claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice, nor has

he suggested his innocence, or provided any evidence in support of

his innocence with regard to the offenses in question. See Briseno,

2010 WL 3430402 at *9. Therefore, Petitioner has not established the

requisite cause and prejudice, nor has he clearly defined any

miscarriage of justice. Therefore, he is procedurally barred from

seeking habeas corpus relief in this Court. As a result, the Court

RECOMMENDS Petitioner’s claim be DENIED.

Case 3:10-cv-02032-WQH-WVG Document 11 Filed 06/21/11 Page 13 of 20
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10cv2032 14

C. LOEHR WAS CORRECTLY FOUND TO BE AN UNAVAILABLE WITNESS;

 PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION WAS NOT VIOLATED

Petitioner argues that the showing of Loehr’s unavailability

because of his fear of inmate retaliation was constitutionally

improper under Crawford v. Washington because (1)there was an

insufficient factual basis supporting Loehr’s fear of testifying, and

(2) the state court should have used every means available to compel

Loehr’s testimony at Petitioner’s second trial. 

Respondent urges that the state court’s decision rejecting

Petitioner’s Confrontation Clause violation claim was not contrary

to the holding in Crawford and that Loehr was correctly found to be

an unavailable witness based on fear, pursuant to People v. Rojas,

15 Cal.3d 540 (1975). Petitioner responded that Rojas is factually

distinguishable from the instant case.

Crawford sets forth the requirements for introducing testimonial

evidence from an unavailable witness: “Testimonial statements of

witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where the

declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had the

prior opportunity to cross-examine.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.

35, 59 (2004). “Where testimonial evidence is at issue,... the Sixth

Amendment demands... unavailability and a prior opportunity for

cross-examination... ‘(T)estimonial’... applies at a minimum to prior

testimony... at a formal trial.” Id., at 68; Leavitt v. Arave, 383

F.3d 809, 830 (9th Cir. 2004).

There is no dispute that Loehr’s statements were testimonial

and that Petitioner had the opportunity to cross examine Loehr at his

first trial. (Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5B at 7). Moreover, Petitioner had the same motivation to cross-examine Loehr at his first

trial that he did at his second trial.

Case 3:10-cv-02032-WQH-WVG Document 11 Filed 06/21/11 Page 14 of 20
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10cv2032 15

Federal courts have held that under these circumstances,

finding a witness to be unavailable is proper. Williams v. Nelson,

435 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1971); U.S. v. Mobley, 421 F. F2d 345, 350-

351 (5th Cir. 1970); Mason v. U.S., 408 F2d 903 (10th Cir. 1969).

The California Court of Appeal found that Loehr was correctly

determined to be unavailable, pursuant to People v. Rojas, supra:

In any event, we conclude the record and case law

support the trial judge’s finding Loehr was

unavailable due to his fear of inmate retaliation. As

the parties recognize, the leading case is People v.

Rojas (1975) 15 Cal.3d 540. There, the court held a

witness’s refusal to testify for fear of being labeled

a snitch and having retaliatory acts performed created

a mental condition that provided a sufficient basis

for finding the witness unavailable pursuant to

[California] Evidence Code section 240. As the court

in Rojas noted: “No [sufficient] reason appears to us

why the former testimony of a witness who is present

in court but refuses to testify because he is in fear

of his safety or that of his family should not be used

when that of a witness, who claims privilege or who is

absent from the hearing and his attendance cannot be

compelled or procured, can be used.” (People v. Rojas,

supra, 15 Cal.3d at p.551, fn. omitted.)

The result here is the same. Loehr testified and was

cross-examined in the first trial. He was in prison in

another state facing a lengthy prison term. He told

the court and counsel he feared for his safety in his

particular prison environment, something he would be

personally able to understand and express. There was

no further fact-specific testimony pertaining to

individual threats or actions by others. As appellant

notes, there are cases that point out such existing

facts. These cases however do not set forth specificity requirements. Indeed People v. Quaintance (1978)

86 Cal.App.3d 594, holds a sufficient factual basis

for a witness’s fear of testifying if the witness who

is incarcerated can express that fear based on observations within his surroundings. (Id. at 600.). That

is what occurred here.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5B at 6).

“The state bears the burden of establishing the predicate of

unavailability for the admission of a hearsay statement.” Cole v.

Tansy, 926 F.2d 955, 957 (10th Cir. 1991)(citations omitted). “The

lengths to which the state must go to produce a witness is a question

Case 3:10-cv-02032-WQH-WVG Document 11 Filed 06/21/11 Page 15 of 20
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10cv2032 16

of reasonableness.” Cole, 926 F.2d at 957, citing California v.

Green, 399 U.S. 149, 189 (1970).

In general, “[w]hether [a witness] testified in a manner that

is consistent or inconsistent with his [prior testimony]... or simply

refused to answer, nothing in the Confrontation Clause prohibit[s]

the state from also relying on [the witness’s] prior testimony to

prove its case.” Green, 399 U.S. at 167-68 (1970)(emphasis added).

Petitioner’s case is factually indistinguishable from People v.

Rojas, supra. In Rojas, the court held that a witness’ “refusal to

testify on the grounds of fear for the safety of his person and that

of his family rendered him unavailable as a witness within the

meaning of Section 240, subdivision (a)(3)[of the California Evidence

Code]” as a mental infirmity. Rojas, 15 Cal.3d at 552. 

The same is true in Petitioner’s case. Loehr’s fear of testifying arose from his fear of being labeled a “snitch” and his fear of

suffering retaliation in prison after testifying against Petitioner.

Regardless of being held in contempt of court, Loehr continued to

refuse to testify and his prior testimony was read into evidence

pursuant to § 240.

A small number of federal courts have addressed the issue

presented here, reasoning that fear of testifying is sufficient to

declare a witness unavailable to testify, although to date, the issue

has not been fully explored by any federal court. See Mendoza v.

Sisto, 2008 WL 2025144, at *10-*11 (E.D.Cal. 2008) (witness deemed

unavailable pursuant to § 240 due to fear for his and his family’s

safety); Jennings v. Maynard, 946 F.2d 1502, 1505 (10th Cir. 1996)

(witness deemed unavailable due to threats made to witness and his

family); U.S. v. Thomas, 2000 WL 236481 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (witness

Case 3:10-cv-02032-WQH-WVG Document 11 Filed 06/21/11 Page 16 of 20
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10cv2032 17

deemed unavailable due to fear for his life; prior trial testimony

is admitted without an order to testify).

Here, Petitioner challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting the trial court’s determination that Loehr’s fear was

justified. Further, he asserts that the trial court should have taken

further steps to compel Loehr’s testimony. 

However, the Court of Appeal stated:

[Petitioner] suggests the court could have held Loehr

on a misdemeanor contempt charge and continued the

trial until Loehr agreed to testify. However, as

[Petitioner] acknowledges, Loehr was already in

custody. It is unlikely the threat of custody would

have had much effect... [t]here is no suggestion

defense counsel wanted a delay of trial, and the trial

court could not, on its own, compel such a result....

[w]e conclude the trial court acted within its

discretion when it ruled Loehr was an unavailable

witness.(Respondent’s Lodgement No. 5B at 7).

This Court agrees with the Court of Appeal. There does not

appear to be anything short of holding Loehr in contempt of court to

have had him testify at Petitioner’s second trial. As the Court of

Appeal recognized, Loehr was already in custody serving a long prison

sentence. Practically and logically, substituting the custody

attendant with contempt for the custody of a prison sentence was

unlikely to produce the desired result: Loehr’s testimony. Therefore,

to hold him in contempt of court and jailing him until he agreed to

testify, would have been futile.

Further, since there is no United States Supreme Court

decision on the issue raised by Petitioner, and a paucity of federal

cases discussing the issue, the Court can not find that the trial

court at Petitioner’s second trial should have sought more evidence

to justify its finding that Loehr was unavailable. Therefore, the

Court concludes that the Court of Appeal correctly determined that

Loehr was unavailable to testify at Petitioner’s second trial due to

Case 3:10-cv-02032-WQH-WVG Document 11 Filed 06/21/11 Page 17 of 20
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10cv2032 18

fear of inmate retaliation. As a result, Petitioner’s Right of

Confrontation was not violated. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS

Petitioner’s claim be DENIED.

D. IF THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING LOEHR’S TESTIMONY, 

 THE ERROR WAS HARMLESS

Respondent argues that even if the Court finds that the trial

court erred by admitting Loehr’s earlier sworn testimony at Petitioner’s second trial, (which it does not), Petitioner is not

entitled to federal habeas corpus relief because the alleged error,

if any, was harmless. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619. Petitioner

incorrectly applies Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) to his

claims and contends that the constitutional error was not harmless

as to the issue of implied malice.

Although Petitioner is correct that the Chapman harmless error

test generally applies to constitutional errors, the analysis differs

for habeas corpus relief. See Ocampo v. Vail, __F.3d__, 2011 WL

2275798 at *14 fn. 17 (9th Cir. 2011); Whelchel v. Washington, 232

F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2000).

“A Confrontation Clause analysis is subject to harmless error

analysis... [and] [i]n the context of habeas petitions, the standard

of review is whether a given error has substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Ocampo,

supra, at *14; Whelchel, 232 F.3d at 1205-1206 (citations omitted);

see also Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 468 (9th Cir. 2000); Brecht

v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. at 637.

“If a habeas court is left with a grave doubt about whether

constitutional error substantially influenced the verdict, then the

error was not harmless.” Slovik v. Yates, 556 F.3d 747, 755 (9th Cir.

2009) citing Parle v. Runnels, 387 F.3d 1030, 1044 (9th Cir. 2004).

Case 3:10-cv-02032-WQH-WVG Document 11 Filed 06/21/11 Page 18 of 20
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10cv2032 19

“In making this inquiry, the court must review the record to

determine what effect the error had or reasonably may be taken to

have had upon the jury’s decision.” Slovik, 556 F.3d at 755 (citations omitted). The court should use factors in its inquiry such as

the importance of the witness’ testimony to the prosecution’s case,

the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting

the testimony of the witness on material points, and the overall

strength of the prosecution’s case. Slovik, 556 F.3d at 755.

In this case, the California Court of Appeal found:

[T]he testimony of the officers who observed appellant’s driving and saw the accident established the

prosecution’s case against [Petitioner]. Even assuming

the trial court erred in failing to take additional

steps to compel Loehr’s testimony, the error was

harmless ... Sheriff’s deputies who engaged in the

approximately six-mile chase watched as [Petitioner]

ignored traffic laws and drove at speeds reaching 70

to 90 miles per hour, through red lights, and without

regard for the safety of others. They saw his car

smash into the victim’s car at approximately 50 miles

an hour. An accident reconstruction expert corroborated the officer’s testimony. Appellant admitted

driving. He admitted attempting to evade the police.

These facts substantiate [Petitioner] acted with

malice. [Petitioner] cannot show he would have received a more favorable verdict if Loehr’s testimony

was not read to the jury... Moreover, the facts

support the jury’s conclusion that, beyond a reasonable doubt, [Petitioner] acted with implied malice.

(Respondent’s Lodgment No. 5B at 7-8)(citations omitted).

The Court agrees with the Court of Appeal. While Loehr’s incourt testimony may have been helpful (only if Loehr was willing to

recant the testimony he gave at Petitioner’s first trial, and there

was no guarantee that would have happened), Sheriff’s deputies also

witnessed Petitioner’s conduct that caused the accident. An accident

reconstructionist corroborated how the accident occurred. The ample

evidence offered by the prosecution support the jury’s conclusion

that Petitioner acted with implied malice. Therefore, the absence of

Loehr’s in-court testimony did not cause a fundamental difference in

Case 3:10-cv-02032-WQH-WVG Document 11 Filed 06/21/11 Page 19 of 20
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

 10

 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10cv2032 20

the result of the case. Therefore, any error in excusing Loehr’s

testimony as an unavailable witness was harmless error. As a result,

this Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s claim be DENIED.

 VI

 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, the

undersigned Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus be DENIED with prejudice.

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than July 21, 2011, any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than August

4, 2011. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 21, 2011

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

Case 3:10-cv-02032-WQH-WVG Document 11 Filed 06/21/11 Page 20 of 20