Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00293/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00293-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1391 Personal Injury

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WAYNE DOUGLAS SMITH,

No. CIV S-07-0293 LKK DAD PS

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER AND FURTHER

BRITISH PETROLEUM OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

AMERICA, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Defendant Mobile Storage Group, Inc. (“MSG”), sued as The Storage Group.Com

aka The Mobile Storage Group, has moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. Plaintiff has filed opposition to the motion.

This case came before the court on May 25, 2007, for hearing of a motion to

dismiss filed by defendants British Petroleum of America, BP West Coast Products LLC, Joel E.

Buckentin, and John Lieuinger. In findings and recommendations filed on May 29, 2007, the

undersigned has recommended that the motion be granted and this action be dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction as to plaintiff’s constitutional claims and for failure to state a RICO claim upon

which relief may be granted. Having reviewed defendant MSG’s pending motion and plaintiff’s

opposition, the undersigned finds additional oral argument unnecessary. The motion set for

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hearing on June 29, 2007 will be submitted upon the record and briefs on file, and the hearing

will be vacated. See Local Rule 78-230(h). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned will

recommend that defendant MSG’s motion to dismiss be granted.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 13, 2007, plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint seeking

damages for injuries he suffered in a slip-and-fall accident at work. The complaint asserts

jurisdiction under (1) several provisions of the United States Constitution, which plaintiff

describes as “codified within purview of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, et seq.”; (2) “the R.I.C.O. Statutes”;

and (3) the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case was referred to the undersigned

pursuant to Local Rule 72-302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

Plaintiff requested waivers of service of summons from all defendants. 

Defendants British Petroleum of America, BP West Coast Products LLC, Joel E. Buckentin, and

John Lieuinger waived service of summons and filed their motion to dismiss on April 13, 2007,

within 60 days after the date specified on their waivers. Defendant MSG waived service of

summons and filed a motion to dismiss on May 29, 2007, within 60 days after the date specified

on its waiver.

PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges that he was injured in a slip and fall accident that occurred in

February 2005 while he was employed as a customer service agent at a service station in Auburn,

California. Plaintiff suffered three fractured ribs and a lower back injury that required major

reconstructive surgery. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Buckentin, a CEO, offered plaintiff cash

and gas cards if he would agree not to file a workers’ compensation claim. Plaintiff did not

accept the offer and filed a workers’ compensation claim. His workers’ compensation

proceedings are ongoing. Plaintiff was laid off in 2006. Plaintiff prays for at least $310,752.00

in compensatory damages as well as $5,000,000.00 in punitive damages, $388,440.00 for loss of

future income, and costs of suit.

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DEFENDANT MSG’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant MSG seeks dismissal of the complaint without leave to amend on the

ground that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking or the pleading fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.

Defendant contends that plaintiff fails to allege, and cannot amend his complaint

to allege, proper subject matter jurisdiction. First, with regard to plaintiff’s § 1983 claim,

defendant points out that plaintiff cannot allege that defendant MSG’s actions constitute a

deprivation of civil rights under color of state law, as MSG is a private corporation and not a

public entity. Second, with regard to plaintiff’s RICO claim, defendant argues that plaintiff has

alleged, at best, a claim for bodily injury, but personal injury damages are specifically excluded

under the RICO statutes and damages are available only for injury to business and property.

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cause of action upon

which relief can be granted because plaintiff has not and cannot set forth sufficient facts to

support a claim under § 1983 or the RICO statutes. In particular, defendant notes that the

complaint alleges no facts indicating that MSG acted in any improper manner that would

constitute or cause a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1961.

Defendant also argues that plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim because the

complaint is completely barred by the statute of limitations. This argument is premised on the

following facts: (1) plaintiff’s injury occurred on February 14, 2005; (2) all claims alleged by

plaintiff, including his civil rights claims, his RICO claims, and any state tort claims, are subject

to California’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury; and (3) plaintiff’s complaint

was filed on March 27, 2007, more than two years after February 14, 2005. 

In opposition to defendant MSG’s motion, plaintiff states that he has not alleged

any RICO violations against defendant MSG and admits that he has no basis for alleging any

such violation at this time. (Pl.’s Opp’n to Def’t MSG’s Mot. to Dismiss at 5.) Plaintiff’s

opposition is silent with regard to his § 1983 claim and contains no response to defendant MSG’s

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statute-of-limitations argument. Plaintiff’s primary argument is that he should be granted leave

to file an amended complaint alleging new claims.

In support of his contention that amendment should be permitted, plaintiff offers

two arguments. The first argument is titled “Expansion of Premises Liability.” Although

plaintiff initially appears to recognize that premises liability is a concept related to the tort of

negligence, he cites 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189, Title III of the Americans With Disabilities Act

(ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), 29 U.S.C. § 626, and 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). Plaintiff asserts

that he has suffered unspecified harm under “the E.E.O.C. Statutes” and states that he has

contacted the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Plaintiff contends that

he should be allowed to amend his complaint to show that this court has jurisdiction over a

premises liability claim based on the federal statutes he has cited. (Id. at 3-5.)

Plaintiff’s second argument in favor of amendment is titled “Implied Claims

Under the Constitution.” Plaintiff cites Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), asserts that there is a substantial question of federal law in his

case, and argues that federal question jurisdiction is “inherent” in his claim because “The

Unknown Authority Under Color of Law Failed to enforce the Statutes on the Date of Injury.” 

Plaintiff contends that he should be allowed to amend his complaint to allege a Bivens claim or

the court should hold this case in abeyance until “The (E.E.O.C./ADA) Gives it’s [sic] Findings

and recommendations.” (Id. at 4-5.)

LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a party to raise the defense, by

motion, that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of a claim. “A motion to dismiss

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may either attack the allegations of the complaint or may be

made as a ‘speaking motion’ attacking the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact.” 

Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. General Tel. & Electronics, 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). When a

Rule 12(b)(1) motion attacks the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, no presumption

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of truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s allegations. Id. “[T]he district court is not restricted to the

face of the pleadings, but may review any evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve

factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction.” McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d

558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988). The burden of proof on such a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is on the party

asserting jurisdiction. Thornhill Publ’g Co., 594 F.2d at 733.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the court is required to dismiss an in forma

pauperis case at any time if the allegation of poverty is untrue or if the action is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against

an immune defendant. A claim is frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in

fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901

F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must

allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, U.S. , , 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007).

In considering whether a complaint states a cognizable claim, the court accepts as

true the material allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Hospital Bldg.

Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242,

1245 (9th Cir. 1989). The court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable

inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618,

624 (9th Cir. 1981). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by

lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff concedes that he has not alleged a RICO claim against defendant MSG,

and he admits that he has no factual basis for alleging such a claim against this defendant.

Withe regard to plaintiff’s constitutional claims, the undersigned has explained in

the findings and recommendations filed in this case on May 29, 2007, that federal question

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jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is lacking here because causes of action do not arise

directly under the United States Constitution and plaintiff cannot bring his constitutional claims

pursuant to § 1983 in the absence of defendants who acted under color of state law. Plaintiff

now argues that his constitutional claims can be brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown

Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Plaintiff is mistaken. Bivens provides redress

for damages sustained when federal officials violate provisions of the United States Constitution. 

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 390 & 397

(1971). Bivens actions are “the judicially crafted counterpart to section 1983, enabl[ing] victims

of federal misconduct to sue the individual federal wrongdoers responsible for the transgression

of their rights.” Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1341 (9th Cir. 1986). See also Van

Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Actions under § 1983 and those under

Bivens are identical save for the replacement of a state actor under § 1983 by a federal actor

under Bivens.”). The defendants in this case are not federal officials, and plaintiff cannot

predicate jurisdiction on Bivens.

In the absence of any present basis for federal jurisdiction as to defendant MSG,

the undersigned finds that defendant MSG’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint should be

granted. In the May 29, 2007 findings and recommendations, the undersigned determined that it

would be futile to grant plaintiff leave to amend because the defects of his § 1983 and RICO

claims cannot be cured by amendment. In his objections to those findings and recommendations,

and in his opposition to defendant MSG’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff now urges the court to

grant him leave to amend his complaint to allege his constitutional claims under Bivens and to

allege wholly new claims under the Americans With Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s proposed Bivens claims are frivolous. 

Plaintiff’s proposed new statutory claims appear to be frivolous as to defendant MSG because

MSG was neither plaintiff’s employer nor an entity operating public accommodations or services

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at the time of plaintiff’s injury. The premises liability claim suggested by plaintiff is a state tort

claim that would not give this court jurisdiction over plaintiff’s complaint. As to defendant

MSG, the undersigned will therefore recommend that plaintiff’s claims be dismissed without

leave to amend because plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he can allege facts that would

state any claim against defendant MSG.

As to the remaining defendants, plaintiff’s complaint alleges no facts that would

support the proposed new statutory claims against defendants British Petroleum of America, BP

West Coast Products LLC, Joel E. Buckentin, and John Lieuinger. The undersigned finds that

plaintiff has failed to demonstrate, in his objections to the May 29, 2007 findings and

recommendations or in his opposition to defendant MSG’s motion to dismiss, that he can allege

facts that would support the proposed new claims against defendants British Petroleum of

America, BP West Coast Products LLC, Joel E. Buckentin, and John Lieuinger. Moreover,

plaintiff is presently pursuing administrative remedies with regard to such claims. In the absence

of jurisdiction over plaintiff’s current claims, the undersigned finds no basis for staying this

action. As previously recommended, this action should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as to

plaintiff’s constitutional claims and for failure to state a RICO claim upon which relief may be

granted.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Mobile Storage Group,

Inc.’s May 29, 2007 motion to dismiss is taken under submission upon the record and briefs on

file, and the motion is dropped from the court’s June 29, 2007 calendar;

IT IS RECOMMENDED that:

1. The motion to dismiss filed by defendant Mobile Storage Group, Inc. on May

29, 2007 be granted; and

2. Plaintiff’s claims against defendant Mobile Storage Group, Inc. be dismissed

for lack of jurisdiction as to plaintiff’s constitutional claims and for failure to state a RICO claim

upon which relief may be granted.

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within ten (10)

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and shall serve a copy on all other parties. A document containing

objections should be titled “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” 

Any reply to objections shall be filed and served within ten (10) days after the objections are

served. No reply to a reply is authorized. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may, under certain circumstances, waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 21, 2007.

DAD:kw

Ddad1\orders.prose\smith0293.mtd2.f&r

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