Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06170/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06170-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Respondent submits that Petitioner named the Kern County Superior Court as the Respondent in this case. On 1

the front page of the amended petition, Petitioner does name the Kern County Superior Court as Respondent; however, on

the form petition, Petitioner names Warden Sullivan as the Respondent. Thus, to the extent Petitioner has named the Kern

County Superior Court as Respondent, Warden Sullivan is substituted as Respondent. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL CARRILLO ORNELAS, CASE NO. CV-F-04-6170 DLB HC

Petitioner, ORDER REGARDING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.

[Doc. 25]

W. J. SULLIVAN, Warden, 

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have consented to the jurisdiction 1

of the United States Magistrate Judge.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted in the Kern County Superior Court of residential burglary, receiving

stolen property, and possession of burglary tools having previously been convicted of two serious

felonies. His conviction was affirmed by the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. 

(2/14/05 Lodged Doc. 1.) 

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which was denied on

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July 28, 2004.

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on August 26, 2004. Petitioner

filed an amended petition on December 8, 2004. 

On February 11, 2005, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition. 

On April 21, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in case number

S133188 in the California Supreme Court which presents the exact grounds presented in the

amended petition. 

On April 29, 2005, the Court denied Respondent’s motion to dismiss as it addressed the first,

not amended, petition. 

On May 13, 2005, Petitioner filed a motion to stay the case pending exhaustion at the state

court level. On May 31, 2005, the Court issued an order to show cause why Petitioner’s request for a

stay should be granted in light of Rhines v. Weber, 125 S.Ct. 1528 (2005). Petitioner filed a

response on June 22, 2005. On July 12, 2005, the Court denied Petitioner’s request. 

On October 20, 2005, Respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss. Petitioner did not file

an opposition. 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition

if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is

not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 5 of the Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases state that “an alleged failure to exhaust state remedies may be raised

by the attorney general, thus avoiding the necessity of a formal answer as to that ground.” The Ninth

Circuit has referred to a respondent’s motion to dismiss on the ground that the petitioner failed to

exhaust state remedies as a request for the Court to dismiss under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (1991); White v. Lewis, 874

F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982). 

Based on the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases and case law, the Court will review Respondent’s

motion for dismissal pursuant to its authority under Rule 4.

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B. Exhaustion of State Remedies

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct. 1198,

1203 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9 Cir. 1988). th

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9 Cir. th

1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair opportunity to

hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's factual and legal

basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995) (legal basis); Kenney v.

Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). Additionally, the petitioner

must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. Duncan,

513 U.S. at 365-66, 115 S.Ct. at 888; Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). For th

example, if a petitioner wishes to claim that the trial court violated his due process rights “he must

say so, not only in federal court but in state court.” Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366, 115 S.Ct. at 888. A

general appeal to a constitutional guarantee is insufficient to present the "substance" of such a federal

claim to a state court. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7, 103 S.Ct. 276 (1982) (Exhaustion

requirement not satisfied circumstance that the "due process ramifications" of an argument might be

"self-evident."); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63, 116 S.Ct. 1074 (1996) (“a claim for relief

in habeas corpus must include reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a

statement of the facts which entitle the petitioner to relief.”).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

(9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9 Cir.1999); th

Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). In Duncan, the United States Supreme Court th

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reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion 

of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the 

state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct 

alleged violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner 

wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only 

in federal court, but in state court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus 

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to 

that court that those claims were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 

223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in 

Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the 

claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the

underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations

that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 

195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 

(9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to 

the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the 

state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the 

violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). 

In the amended petition, Petitioner contends that the trial court misinstructed the jury and his

trial counsel was ineffective. As Respondent submits, Petitioner presented two claims to the

California Supreme Court: instructional error regarding CALJIC 2.15 and ineffective assistance of

counsel in failing to request a pinpoint jury instruction. (Court Doc. 14, Attachment No. 2.) As just

stated, in his amended petition, Petitioner presents his instructional error claim and presents, as

Ground Two, seven new claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Amd. Pet. at 7.) The claims in

Ground Two are presently before the California Supreme Court in case number S133188. (10/20/05

Lodged Doc. 4.) 

The claims in Ground Two, therefore, have not been exhausted within the meaning of 28

U.S.C. § 2254. The exhaustion requirement applicable to federal habeas petitions is not satisfied if

there is a pending post-conviction proceeding in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c); Sherwood

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v. Tomkins, 716 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that when an appeal of a state criminal

conviction is pending, a would-be habeas petitioner must await the outcome of his appeal before his

state remedies are exhausted.) 

CONCLUSION

In sum, the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus is a mixed petition containing both

exhausted and unexhausted claims. The Court must dismiss a mixed petition without prejudice to

give Petitioner an opportunity to exhaust the claims if he can do so. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 521-22;

Gordon, 107 F.3d at 760. However, Petitioner must be provided with an opportunity to withdraw the

unexhausted claims and go forward with the exhausted claims. Jefferson v. Budge, 419 F.3d 1013

(9 Cir.2005); Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 574 (9th Cir.2000) (“district courts must provide th

habeas litigants with the opportunity to amend their mixed petitions by striking unexhausted claims

as an alternative to suffering dismissal”). 

Petitioner may, at his option, move to withdraw the unexhausted claims within thirty (30)

days of the date of service of this order and proceed with only the exhausted claims. Guizar v.

Estelle, 843 F.2d 371, 372 (9 Cir. 1988). If petitioner fails to withdraw the unexhausted claims th

within the thirty (30) day time frame, the entire petition will be dismissed so Petitioner can return to

state court to exhaust the remainder of his claims before filing a new federal petition. Rose, 455 U.S.

at 520; Guizar v. Estelle, 843 F.2d at 372. This dismissal will not bar Petitioner from returning to

federal court after exhausting available state remedies. See Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d

583, 586 (9 Cir.1995). However, this does not mean that Petitioner will not be subject to the one

th

year statute of limitations imposed by Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). In most cases, the one year period

starts to run on the date the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s direct review. See id. 

Although the limitations period tolls while a properly filed request for collateral review is pending in

state court, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), it does not toll for the time an application is pending in federal

court. Duncan v. Walker, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 531 U.S. 991 (2001). 

ORDER

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Petitioner shall inform

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the Court of his intent to either dismiss the entire petition or withdraw the

unexhausted claims; and

2. Failure to comply with this order will result in the action being dismissed, without

prejudice, for failure to exhaust the state court remedies and failure to comply with a

court order. Local Rule 11-110. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 5, 2005 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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