Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-03209/USCOURTS-cand-3_08-cv-03209-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MALIK ALI MUHAMMAD

Plaintiff,

 vs.

J. RUBIA, Captain, et al., 

Defendants.

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. C 08-3209 JSW (PR)

ORDER REOPENING

CASE AND DISMISSING

CASE FOR FAILURE TO

STATE A CLAIM FOR

RELIEF

(Docket No. 17)

Plaintiff, a prisoner of the State of California currently incarcerated at California

Rehabilitation Center in Norco, California, filed a pro se civil rights complaint under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that during the course of his prior incarceration at San

Quentin State Prison, prison officials conspired with private individuals to wrongly

accuse Plaintiff of a serious rules violation, of which he was ultimately found not

guilty. He seeks injunctive relief and damages. 

 The Court initially reviewed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and

dismissed it as barred by the applicable statute of limitations (docket no. 15). 

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 59(e) (docket no. 17). In the motion, Plaintiff asserts that this Court

erroneously determined that Plaintiff had been released from prison and, therefore, the

complaint should not have been dismissed, as Plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of

tolling for two years, based on his incarceration. Based on the Court’s mistake,

Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED and the Clerk is directed to reopen the instant matter

Case 3:08-cv-03209-JSW Document 25 Filed 03/29/10 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

(docket no. 17). The Court now reviews the pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and

dismisses it for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which

prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify

any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a

defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se

pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d

696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential

elements: (1) that a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the

United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a

person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Legal Claims

Plaintiff here claims that in December, 2004, private individuals at Citibank

conspired with prison officials Rodesillas, Rubia and Tyler to deny him his rights in

connection with a disciplinary proceeding that alleged that he had violated an order of

protection of the victim of his criminal case by sending a letter to her employer in

violation of the criminal court’s protective order. In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges

that he was issued a disciplinary serious rules violation report on December 28, 2004

after prison authorities contacted the victim to advise her of his pending release and

learned from her that Plaintiff had contacted her employer and violated an order. 

Plaintiff alleges that the disciplinary hearing was held on January 7, 2005, after which

he was found “not guilty” of the alleged disciplinary violation.

Case 3:08-cv-03209-JSW Document 25 Filed 03/29/10 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

Interests protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from two sources--the

Due Process Clause itself and laws of the states. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215,

223-27 (1976). Changes in conditions so severe as to affect the sentence imposed in an

unexpected manner implicate the Due Process Clause itself, whether or not they are

authorized by state law. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). 

Deprivations authorized by state law that are less severe or more closely related to the

expected terms of confinement may also amount to deprivations of a procedurally

protected liberty interest, provided that (1) state statutes or regulations narrowly restrict

the power of prison officials to impose the deprivation, i.e., give the inmate a kind of

right to avoid it, and (2) the liberty in question is one of "real substance." See id. at

477-87.

Prisoners retain their right to due process subject to the restrictions imposed by

the nature of the penal system. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). 

Thus although prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution

and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply,

where serious rules violations are alleged and the sanctions to be applied implicate

state statutes or regulations which narrowly restrict the power of prison officials to

impose the sanctions and the sanctions are severe, the Due Process Clause requires

certain minimum procedural protections. See id. at 556-57, 571-72 n.19. The

placement of a California prisoner in isolation or segregation, or the assessment of

good-time credits against him, as a result of disciplinary proceedings, for example, is

subject to Wolff's procedural protections if (1) state statutes or regulations narrowly

restrict the power of prison officials to impose the deprivation, and (2) the liberty in

question is one of "real substance." See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 477-87. 

California's regulations concerning discipline provide explicit standards that

narrowly fetter official discretion. Under California Code of Regulations title 15,

Case 3:08-cv-03209-JSW Document 25 Filed 03/29/10 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

section 3320(l), officials must find that a preponderance of the evidence substantiates

the charge before guilt may be found and punishment assessed. Absent such a finding

the inmate may not be placed in isolation nor segregation, nor assessed good-time

credits. See also Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3320(a) (requiring notice); id. § 3320(b)

(requiring hearing). Because a prisoner may not be disciplined unless explicit

substantive and procedural requirements are met, the disciplinary standards and

procedures meet the "narrowly restrict" prong of the Sandin test. See Walker v.

Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1419 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding Nevada regulations, which are

similar to California's, create liberty interest). 

Allegations by a prisoner that he was denied due process in conjunction with a

disciplinary proceeding do not present a constitutionally cognizable claim, however,

unless the deprivation suffered is one of "real substance" as defined in Sandin. "Real

substance" will generally be limited to freedom from (1) restraint that imposes

"atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life," id. at 484, or (2) state action that "will inevitably affect the duration of [a]

sentence," id. at 487. In determining whether a restraint is an “atypical and significant

hardship,” Sandin suggests that courts should consider whether the challenged

condition mirrored the conditions imposed on inmates in administrative segregation

and protective custody, and thus comported with the prison’s discretionary authority;

the duration of the condition; the degree of restraint imposed; and whether the

discipline will invariably affect the duration of the prisoner's sentence. See Serrano v.

Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 861

(9th Cir. 2003). Here, the Court notes that Plaintiff was found not guilty of the

disciplinary rules violation and, as a result, did not suffer a deprivation of a protected

liberty interest. Therefore, his complaint fails to state a claim for relief for violation of

his due process rights.

Case 3:08-cv-03209-JSW Document 25 Filed 03/29/10 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Court further notes that a prisoner has no constitutionally guaranteed

immunity from being falsely or wrongly accused of conduct which may result in the

deprivation of a protected liberty interest. Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th

Cir. 1989); Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1986). As long as a

prisoner is afforded procedural due process in the disciplinary hearing, allegations of a

fabricated charge fail to state a claim under § 1983. Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137,

1140-41 (7th Cir. 1984). 

While Plaintiff makes passing reference to violations of his right to access the

courts and equal protection rights, the complaint fails to set forth any non-conclusory

allegations in support of such claims. As such, the complaint is dismissed for failure to

state a claim for relief.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the above-titled action is hereby DISMISSED

without prejudice to Plaintiff pursuing his state law claims in the state courts. The

Clerk shall close the file and enter judgment in this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 29, 2010 JEFFREY S. WHITE

 United States District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

Case 3:08-cv-03209-JSW Document 25 Filed 03/29/10 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MALIK ALI MUHAMMAD,

Plaintiff,

 v.

J. RUIBIA et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV08-03209 JSW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on March 29, 2010, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing

said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Malik Ali Muhammad

California Rehabilitation Center 402-27L

V-37398

P.O. Box 3535

Norco, CA 92860

Dated: March 29, 2010

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Jennifer Ottolini, Deputy Clerk

Case 3:08-cv-03209-JSW Document 25 Filed 03/29/10 Page 6 of 6