Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00123/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00123-24/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-(Citizenship)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRIAN N. HALL; JEAN M. HALL,

Plaintiffs,

v.

NORTH AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL

SERVICES, INC., etc., et al.,

Defendants.

 

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1:06-cv-0123 OWW SMS

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR, IN

THE ALTERNATIVE, REMITTITUR

Before the Court is the Motion of Defendant North American

Industrial Services, Inc. (“NAIS”) for New Trial or, in the

Alternative, Remittitur following a 15 day jury trial in which

Plaintiff Brian Hall was awarded total damages of $27,264,746.20

and Jean Hall, his wife, was awarded $250,000.00 for loss of

society. The jury allocated fault among the parties, 75% to

NAIS, 20% to AES Mendota LLP, Plaintiff’s employer, and 5% to

Plaintiff, Brian Hall. After calculating offsets and deductions,

judgment was entered December 12, 2007, for Brian Hall in the

amount of $20,018,811.00, as follows:

Past wage loss (reduced by 5%) - $190,867.00

Future wage loss (reduced by 5%) - $1,887,847.00

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Past medical bills (actual by stipulation) $1,085,961.00

Future medical bills (reduced by 5%) - $2,123,800.00

Less offset for workers’ 

compensation benefits of 21.7736% 

(calculated by total of economic 

damages as a percent of total damages) - $269,664.94

Past non-economic damages (reduced 

to 75%) - $11,250,000.00

Future non-economic damages (reduced 

to 75%) - $3,750,000.00

Judgment was entered for Jean Hall on her loss of society

claim, reduced to 75%, in the amount of $187,500.00. 1

Defendant NAIS advances two primary contentions: (1) the

award of past non-economic damages is excessive and against the

clear weight of the evidence; (2) the jury’s apportionment of

responsibility among the parties is against the clear weight of

the evidence. 

Defendant seeks a new trial or, alternatively, a conditional

new trial subject to Plaintiff’s acceptance of a substantial

remittitur of past non-economic damages and a reasonable

reassessment of the jury’s apportionment of fault. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) states, “A new trial

may be granted . . . in an action in which there has been a trial

by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have

heretofore been granted in actions at law in the Courts of the

United States. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1). Rule 59 does not

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specify the grounds on which a new trial may be granted. Zhang

v. Am. Gen. Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Rather, the Court is “bound by those grounds that have

historically recognized.” Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d

724, 729 (9th Cir. 2007). Historically recognized grounds

include, but are not limited to, claims “that the verdict is

against the weight of the evidence, that the damages are

excessive, or that, for other reasons, the trial was not fair to

the party moving. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243,

251 (1940); Passatino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., 212

F.3d 493, 510, n.15 (9th Cir. 2000) (the trial court may grant a

new trial only if the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of

the evidence, is based upon false or perjurious evidence, or to

prevent a miscarriage of justice). Shimko v. Guenther, 505 F.3d

987, 993 (9th Cir. 2007). The stated ground for excessive noneconomic damages is that the awards are against the clear weight

of the evidence. No other damage awards are challenged. 

Rule 59(a) establishes a different standard of review for

bench trials than for jury trials; Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc.,

surpa, at p. 729, n.4, after a jury trial, a district court has

“the duty . . . [upon a Rule 59 motion] to weigh the evidence as

[the Court] saw it, and to set aside the verdict of the jury,

even though supported by substantial evidence, where, in [the

Court’s] conscientious opinion, the verdict is contrary to the

clear weight of the evidence. Murphy v. City of Long Beach, 914

F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1990), quoted in Molski, 481 F.3d at p.

729. In general, a Court should grant a new trial only when it

“is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has

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been committed.” Landess Constr. Co., Inc. v. Royal Bank of

Canada, 833 F.2d 1365, 1372 (9th Cir. 1987). A District Court

may not grant a new trial simply because it would have arrived at

a different verdict. Silver Sage Partners, Ltd. v. City of

Desert Hot Springs, 251 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 2001). 

When reviewing an excessive damages claim, a district court,

after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the

prevailing party, concludes that a damage award is excessive, it

must grant a new trial on damages unless the prevailing party

accepts a remittitur which the Court considers justified. Fenner

v. Dependable Trucking Co., Inc., 716 F.2d 598, 603 (9th Cir.

1983). The district court may grant a new trial on damages even

though substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict. Oltz v.

St. Peter’s Community Hospital, 851 F.2d 1440, 1452 (9th Cir.

1988). The standard to be applied by the trial court in

remitting a judgment is to the maximum amount sustainable by

proof. D. & S. Redi-Mix v. Sierra Redi-Mix & Contracting Co.,

692 F.2d 1245, 1249 (9th Cir. 1982). This rule prevents the

Court’s substitution of its judgment for that of the jury. 

Bonura v. CSEA Land Service, Inc., 505 F.2d 665, 669 (5th Cir.

1974); see also, Informatica Corp. v. Business Objects Data

Integration, Inc., 2007 WL 2344962 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 

In the Ninth Circuit, in reviewing a jury’s damages award,

the district court must uphold the jury’s “finding of the amount

of damages unless the amount is ‘grossly excessive or monstrous,’

clearly not supported by the evidence, or ‘only based on

speculation or guesswork.’” Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743

F.2d 1282, 1297 (9th Cir. 1984); Lambert v. Ackerly, 180 F.3d

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997, 1011 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1116

(2000). Objective evidence to support emotional distress awards

required by other Circuits is not the law of the Ninth Circuit,

which holds that damages for emotional distress are subjective,

may be based on testimony alone, appropriate inference from

circumstances, or by reference to an injured party’s conduct and

the observations of others. Zhang v. American Gen. Seafoods,

Inc., supra, at p. 1040 (discussing cases). 

Reference to the Third Circuit authority discussed by the

parties is unnecessary in view of the clearly established

standards for review of damage awards in diversity cases in this

Circuit and under California law. 

ANALYSIS OF EXCESSIVE NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES CLAIM

A. THE BUELL-WILSON CASE

The most recent ruling of the California Courts on excessive

non-economic damages, applicable in this diversity case, is the

March 10, 2008, decision of the California Court of Appeal,

Fourth Appellate District, in a case cited by Plaintiff, BuellWilson v. Ford Motor Co., on remand from the California Supreme

Court, after a grant of certiorari and vacatur of the damage

awards, 2008 WL 625016 (Appeal Nos. D045154, D45579) (“Buell”). 

On remand, the California Court of Appeals: (1) reduced a noneconomic damages award originally in the sum of $105,000,000.00;

reduced by the trial court to $65,393,996.00, further reduced on

remand to $18,000,000.00; (2) reduced an award of punitive

damages originally $246,000,000.00, reduced to $75,000,000.00 by

the trial court, and further reduced on remand to $55,000,000.00;

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and (3) affirmed reduction by the trial court of an award of a

husband’s loss of consortium from $13,000,000.00 to

$5,000,000.00. The reductions were made subject to Plaintiff’s

acceptance of a remittitur on the grounds that the non-economic

damages were excessive under California law as the product of

“passion or prejudice.” 

B. THE BUELL DECISION

Buell is instructive and helpful to evaluate the attack on

the jury’s award of $20,000,000.00 in non-economic damages. In

the Buell case, the Plaintiff suffered various injuries in a Ford

Explorer roll-over caused by a collapsing roof, which fractured

and severed the Plaintiff’s spine at the T12 level where the

thoracic and lumbar regions meet and crushed her spinal sac and

leaked spinal fluid. Plaintiff will never recover the sensation

or function below the level of the injury. She suffered facial

injuries, fractured ribs, a cut spleen that caused internal

bleeding, a fractured leg and torn PCL and ACL ligaments in both

knees, causing bilateral knee dislocations. In addition to

vertebral fractures, the spinal sac was damaged causing leaking

of cerebral spinal fluid and portions of the spinal cord and

nerve root were pulverized. Doctors inserted metal screws and

rods into her back to stabilize her upper body. After almost two

weeks, she was transferred to a rehabilitation center where she

spent another two and one-half months. 

The Plaintiff’s resulting paraplegia ended her active life,

forced her to re-learn, painfully, basic aspects of daily living,

some of which she will never regain. She lives in constant and

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severe pain that will increase over time. She has no sensation

from the waist down, except phantom pain (a constant burning

sensation below her ribs). Above her waist, she suffers constant

pain, feels painful pressure on her ribs from the rods in her

back, and has intermittent spasms of stabbing pain. 

Medication can provide temporary relief, but the strong

medication needed has serious side effects. It causes her to

lose alertness, makes it impossible to drive, interferes with her

ability to communicate socially, makes her unsteady in her

wheelchair; she runs the risk of becoming addicted to medication;

there is a constant conflict between efforts to reduce her pain

and the debilitating side effects of the medicine itself. 

The spinal injury caused a total loss of bladder and bowel

control. She must now catheterize herself multiple times daily. 

Her feces must be manually extracted. In addition to the

emotional pain and humiliation from losing control of her bodily

functions, she suffers recurring urinary tract infections, which

expose her to a potential fatal kidney disease. She is allergic

to commonly prescribed medications including sulpha and

penicillin, and her chronic use of antibiotics to fight

infections has caused resistance to other drugs. 

Plaintiff suffers severe bruising which takes months to heal

due to diminished circulation in her lower body. Her feet swell

and are susceptible to cracking and bleeding. The constant

grinding of her shoulder joints from wheeling her wheelchair has

caused shoulder problems, which will worsen over time. She

suffers disfigurement with one leg smaller than the other and

large surgical scars across her back.

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Before the accident Plaintiff was an active, athletic

outdoors woman, with a black belt in Martial Arts. She often

camped and hiked with her family, backpacked with Girl and Boy

Scouts, helped with the San Diego tracking team, and did projects

at Missions Trails Regional Park. She and her husband took

dancing lessons, traveled and took walks. 

She no longer can engage in any of the active lifestyle she

once enjoyed, including swimming, skiing, snow boarding, dancing

back packing, and walking. She was finishing her Masters Degree

in education and was about to start a second career as a teacher. 

These plans have been indefinitely delayed and it is unclear

whether they are now possible. 

Plaintiff is unable to visit all the rooms in her home,

including her own bedroom, because they are inaccessible to her. 

She and her husband must sleep in their laundry room. She has

changed from a giving, enthusiastic, independent person who took

joy in aiding others, to being dependent on others for almost

every aspect of her life. Her husband and children are now her

caregivers. 

Plaintiff no longer shares the physical relationship she had

prior to the accident. Instead, her husband is now her caregiver

and must assist her with the most personal of care, including

showering and catheterizing her. He assists in transferring her

in and out of her wheelchair and worries that she may fall if she

tries to transfer on her own. Several times per night, he wakes

to turn his wife over in bed so that she will not get bed sores. 

Her husband has had to decrease his work schedule as an

attorney to assist his wife during the day and accompany her to

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medical appointments and therapy. He performs the household work

his wife can no longer do. The couple spend most of their time

trying to accomplish the mundane chores of daily life. Every day

her husband shares the Plaintiff’s constant pain, frustration and

anxiety in living with her injuries. 

The Buell jury deliberated five days: found 9 to 3 the

Explorer had stability design defects that were a substantial

factor in causing the injuries; found 11 to 1 that there was a

crash-worthiness design defect in the roof and that this defect

was also a substantial factor in causing the injuries; as to the

auto dealer: found 10 to 2 that the dealer failed to warn

Plaintiffs of the stability defect; found in favor of Ford on

failure to warn of the stability defect; found 10 to 2 that both

Ford and the dealer failed to warn Plaintiffs of the crashworthiness defect. 

The Buell jury awarded Plaintiff $573,348.00 for past

economic loss, $4,032,656.00 for future economic loss,

$6,000,000.00 for past non-economic loss, and $99,000,000.00 for

future non-economic loss. Her husband was awarded $13,000,000.00

for loss of consortium. The jury awarded $246,000,000.00 in

punitive damages against Ford. 

The original Trial Court decision addressing Ford’s motion

for new trial found excessive the compensatory damages awarded,

but did not find the jury rendered its verdict due to passion or

prejudice. The Court conditionally granted a new trial unless

Plaintiff’s consented to a reduction of compensatory damages to

$70,000,000.00, reduced the husband’s loss of consortium award

from $13,000,000.00 to $5,000,000.00, and reduced the punitive

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damages award to $75,000,000.00. Subtracting the jury’s award of

economic damages in the amount of $4,606,004.00, the Court’s

remittitur left Plaintiff with a net $65,393,996.00 award of noneconomic damages. 

Certiorari was granted by the California Supreme Court,

which vacated the decision and remanded to the Court of Appeals

for further review of the damages awards. The Court of Appeals

on remand found both the non-economic damages award of

approximately $65,000,000.00 to Plaintiff and the $75,000,000.00

award of punitive damages, as remitted by the Court, were still

excessive as a matter of law, the result of passion and

prejudice, and that substantial evidence in the case supported

further reductions of the total non-economic damages award to

$18,000,000.00 and the punitive damages award to $55,000,000.00. 

The Court of Appeal did not find that Mrs. Buell-Wilson’s noneconomic damages award violated due process principles. 

C. LAW RE EXCESSIVE NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES

The grant or denial of a motion for new trial in a diversity

case is governed by Federal law. Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co.,

429 U.S. 648, 649 (1977) (“the proper role of the trial and

appellate courts in the Federal system in reviewing the size of

jury verdicts, is . . . a matter of Federal law”). 

In this case, NAIS contends the jury’s $15,000,000.00 award

for past non-economic damages for 26 months until date of the

trial is excessive and against the clear weight of the evidence. 

NAIS does not specifically address the $5,000,000.00 award of

future non-economic damages. NAIS complains the jury’s

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apportionment of responsibility is also against the clear weight

of the evidence. Economics Laboratory, Inc. v. Donnolo, 612 F.2d

405, 410 (9th Cir. 1979). However, “courts sitting in diversity

may look to state decisions for general guidance.” 11 Charles

Allen Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice

& Procedure: Civil 2d § 2802 (2d Ed. 1995), at p. 45. 

D. NATURE OF BRIAN HALL’S INJURIES

A review of the evidence shows the very substantial nature

of Brian Hall’s injuries. He suffered catastrophic burns. Sixty

to sixty-five percent of his body was burned and twenty percent

more was used in grafting, meaning 85% of his body has been

involved in the burn injuries and healing. 

Mr. Hall was hospitalized many times for a total of 8 1/2

months in the first 26 months following the burn injury. He

nearly died in his first hospitalization and was on a respirator;

had spontaneous rupture of his bowel; required five laparotomies. 

Mr. Hall was transferred to Harbor View Medical Center in

Seattle, Washington, for rehabilitation and more surgery. He

returned to Fresno and was hospitalized in September 2006 to

reverse his illiostomy. 

Mr. Hall then underwent a series of surgeries by a plastic

surgeon, Dr. Randy Galli. After the first plastic surgery in

February 2007, Mr. Hall suffered a reversal requiring him to be

re-hospitalized. 

Plaintiff next had major hernia surgery at Community

Regional Medical Center in April, 2007. This was followed by

surgeries on his hands during the summer and fall of 2007. 

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Mr. Hall has had 27 surgeries so far. More surgeries are

scheduled for his right hand and further surgeries may be

required for his neck and nose. 

Mr. Hall has suffered extreme pain. He has neurogenic pain

in his legs; easy fatigueability; inability to run or walk

distances; disfigurement to his face, hands and torso; permanent

losses of his skin. He will suffer cosmetic losses to his hands. 

Five doctors testified at trial to Plaintiff’s extreme

emotional distress, anxiety, and psychological suffering. 

Photographs were received in evidence that depict his extensive

burns, and the changes to his face, hands, and torso, resulting

from the burns and the surgeries that have followed. Mr. and

Mrs. Hall testified about the impact of his burns on his social,

familial, and vocational life. Plaintiff suffers inability to

sleep. His wife has become his caregiver. Mr. Hall’s past

undisputed, paid medical bills total $1,085,961.00. The jury

found a larger amount to be the reasonable value of his past

medical care. Mr. Hall was 41 years of age at the time of the

accident. He has a 35 year life expectancy. 

E. PLAINTIFF’S ECONOMIC DAMAGES.

In addition to $1,085,961.00 in stipulated past medical

expenses, the jury found that it is reasonably certain Mr. Hall

will require $2,123,800.00, after 5% reduction, in future medical

expenses at present value. The jury found lost earnings in the

past of $200,913.00; Mr. Hall will not return to work. The jury

awarded lost future earnings in the present value of

$1,886,847.00. The total jury award for Mr. Hall’s economic

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damages before reductions and offsets was $7,264,746.20,

reflecting the amount of past medical bills submitted, which was

reduced by agreement, post-judgment, to $1,085,961.00. This

represents a net recovery ratio of economic to non-economic

damages of 1:3.6, after reductions required by law reduce total

economic damages to $5,018,810.06. Mrs. Hall’s damage award is

not challenged. 

F. THE DEFENSE RE: NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES

In closing argument, Plaintiff’s counsel asked the jury to

award $20,000,000.00 to $40,000,000.00 for total damages. The

defense chose not to discuss damages in argument, opting for an

all-or-nothing non-liability defense verdict, or 100% comparative

fault allocation to others than NAIS. 

The non-economic damages instructions, Nos. 38 and 39,

specified that Plaintiff could recover compensation for physical

pain, mental suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, disfigurement,

physical impairment, inconvenience, grief, anxiety, humiliation,

and emotional distress. There is no dispute, as Defendant

acknowledges, that, as a result of the catastrophic burn

injuries, Plaintiff has endured great pain and suffering from the

accident. Non-economic damages do not consist of only emotional

distress and pain and suffering. They include invasion of a

person’s bodily integrity (i.e., the fact of the injury itself),

disfigurement, disability, impaired enjoyment of life,

susceptibility to future harm or injury, and shortened life

expectancy. All of these harms were established by the evidence. 

The non-economic damages suffered by Mr. Hall were substantial,

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permanent, and support a very significant award. His

disfigurement is visible and not fully correctable. In the first

two years, he experienced ongoing pain and uncertainty about his

ability to function in the future. He faces more surgery and his

pain, although reduced, continues into the future. 

In Buell, the Court of Appeal found $65,000,000.00 in noneconomic damages was, despite the overwhelmingly debilitating and

disabling nature of Plaintiff’s injuries, disproportionate to

those injuries so as to “raise a strong presumption that it is

based on prejudice or passion.” Saari v. Jongordan Corp. (1992)

5 Cal.App.4th 797, 807. The Buell Court found that over a 33-

year life span, even accepting her catastrophic injuries, noneconomic damages of approximately $1,868,399.00 per year was an

“extremely high amount.” Ford’s argument that a $1,000,000.00

award, working out to $28,571.00 per year, and only $78.00 per

day, was rejected because it did not fairly and justly compensate

the Plaintiff. Here, the $15,000,000.00 award of past noneconomic damages for the 26 month period until the trial,

calculates to $19,000.00 per day or $6,928,406.40 per year. The

future non-economic damages of $5,000,000.00 over a 35.2 year

life span, results in an annual award of $142,857.00. 

G. DEFENDANTS’ NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES CONTENTIONS

Defendants argue strenuously that Mr. Hall’s testimony shows

that over the past two years, his pain has diminished; his

marriage has improved; he has regained considerable function with

his hands, is ambulating successfully, and performs a variety of

activities. In November of 2006, Mr. Hall reported to a defense

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physician that, on a scale of 1 to 10, his pain is at best a 2,

usually a 3-4, and at worst a 5. Plaintiff can dress himself and

can cook. He can walk about a mile every day. He does household

chores. He uses an elliptical machine for exercise. He uses the

Internet on a computer. He has been driving for more than a

year. He drives the children to school 3 or 4 days a week, and

drove, alone, to and from Alameda, California, more than 300

miles, to participate in training exercises with the U.S. Naval

Reserve. Mr. Hall attended Naval Reserve Training exercises

every month between June and September of 2007. However, it is

questionable whether his active Reserve status will continue. 

Mr. Hall believes he has coped well emotionally with his

accident. He has not given up. He does not have nightmares or

flashbacks of the accident, except when he hears a helicopter. 

He has no fear of fire. He hopes to return to work someday. He

agrees marriage counseling has been helpful and his marriage is

improving. He has a very good relationship with his children. 

The Plaintiff’s wife, Jean Hall, recognizes he has made

significant progress since the accident. He drives himself to

his doctors’ appointments. Plaintiff can cook, wash dishes, do

laundry and maintain the pool. Mrs. Hall describes the Plaintiff

as highly intelligent, very motivated, and very optimistic. She

stated he has “a very good outlook on life.” Since the accident,

Mr. Hall has gained confidence and is doing more things that

interest him. 

The defense refers to the Plaintiff’s treating physicians

who testified that he has made improvement and good recovery over

the past two years. Dr. Dominic, his burn surgeon, characterized

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as “remarkable” the manner in which Plaintiff and his wife have

dealt with his injuries. Dr. Dominic testified Plaintiff has

done as well as he has seen any patient do with these types of

injuries. Dr. Dominic also noted Plaintiff is resilient, has

good cognitive abilities, and has not manifested signs of posttraumatic stress disorder. Plaintiff’s illiostomy was

successfully reversed. Plaintiff’s hand functions have improved. 

Dr. Galli testified that the surgeries to date on Plaintiff’s

hands have been successful. 

Dr. Teague observed that since he first saw Plaintiff in

November 2006, Plaintiff has become heavily involved in ham radio

operations; developed some long-term relationships with these

activities; was “more animated;” was “able to see his life is not

over;” displays more energy; has a better affect and was “doing

more enjoyable things.” By early 2007 Plaintiff was beginning

“to feel more like his old self.” Dr. Teague opined that

Plaintiff was “on top of the world” in June of 2007, when he

began to train with the U.S. Naval Reserve in Alameda. Plaintiff

was “very well received” and felt “valued” by his fellow Naval

Reservists. There is some uncertainty about whether Plaintiff

can continue drilling in the active Naval Reserve. 

Dr. Teague finds that Plaintiff is tough and resilient; will

do everything possible to improve his situation, and that the

Halls’ marital troubles were “abating” in large part because of

their “very successful” counseling with Dr. Judith Knapp. 

Defendants dispute Dr. Epperson’s observation (the only one)

that Plaintiff has exhibited signs of anoxic brain injury. Any

stress associated with the lawsuit, which was identified by

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Plaintiff’s marital counselor, Dr. Knapp, is not compensable. 

Ortega v. Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th

1023, 1060-61. All mental health professionals evaluating the

marital relationship between Plaintiff and his wife agreed that

marital problems pre-existed the accident, particularly in 2001

and 2002; divorce had been discussed; the couple had a strained

relationship before the accident and Plaintiff’s wife said on

more than one occasion that she planned to divorce him. Both

Plaintiff and his wife testified their marriage has improved. 

Defendant argues that the weight of the evidence at trial

demonstrates significant improvement in Plaintiff’s physical

condition and mental outlook; that the marriage has “ups and

downs,” but has been improving. Defendant acknowledges Plaintiff

has endured a great deal of pain and suffering from the accident,

but asserts that $15,000,000.00 for pain and suffering during the

two year and two month period from the accident until trial is

“outrageous.” 

H. THE LAW RE: SIZE OF THE AWARD

“The amount of damages is a fact question, first committed

to the discretion of the jury and next, to the discretion of the

trial judge on a motion for new trial.” “They see and hear the

witnesses frequently . . . see the injury and the impairment that

has resulted therefrom . . . .” Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit

Lines (1961) 56 Cal.2d 498, 506-507. The trial court’s

determination is subject to the “more demanding test of weighing

existing evidence.” Buell *14; citing Fortman v. Hemco, Inc.

(1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 241, 259. 

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Under California law, there are no fixed or absolute

standards in reviewing a non-economic damage award at the

appellate level. The Appellate Court has a duty to uphold the

jury and trial judge whenever possible. Buell *15. The amount

to be awarded is ‘a matter on which there legitimately may be a

wide difference of opinion’ [citation]. Injuries are seldom

identical in the amount of pain and suffering involved in similar

physical injuries varies widely. These factors must be

considered. Seffert, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 508. 

The fact that an award may set a precedent by its size does

not in and of itself render it suspect. The determination of the

jury can only be assessed by examination of the particular

circumstances involved. Rodriguez v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.

(1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 626, 654-55. 

“A reviewing court should not assume to substitute its

appraisal for that of a jury of the amount of damages for

physical pain and mental suffering sustained by a party where

trial by jury was had as a matter of right, but in a case where

it appears that a verdict is so grossly disproportionate to any

reasonable limit of compensation warranted by the facts as to

shock the sense of justice and raises at once a strong

presumption that it is based on prejudice or passion rather than

sober judgment,” [citations] the court should intervene. The

Appellate Court may reverse the judgment and remand the case for

a new trial either on all the issues or on the issue of damages

alone, [citations], or it may, in the interests of justice and

with the consent of the party against whom the modification is

made, modify the judgment as to the amount of damages, and affirm

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it as modified [citations].” Deevy v. Tassi (1942) 21 Cal.2d

109, 120-21. 

I. COMPARISON WITH OTHER AWARDS

Defendants argue: “A District Court should evaluate whether

damages are excessive ‘by comparing the sum to other awards in

similar cases within the jurisdiction.’” Shaw v. United States,

741 F.2d 1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 1984). Shaw is a Federal tort

claims case in which the amount and excessiveness of damages is

controlled by the State law of the State where the tort occurred. 

Id. at p. 1205. The second case cited by Defendant, Power v.

Union Pac. R. Co., 655 F.2d 1380, 1388 (9th Cir. 1981), is a

diversity case, that in addressing the issue of excessive damages

applied state law without any discussion about choice of law. 

The Ninth Circuit in Power observed that the Defendant claimed

and the Appeals Court’s research confirmed, that no Court in

Washington state had awarded a figure remotely approaching

$400,000.00 for the loss of love and companionship, which the

District Judge awarded, as the trier of fact. 

Plaintiff has not argued that State law should not be

referenced in comparing verdicts from comparable cases. In

Seffert, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 508, the California Supreme Court

reviewed California law: “While the Appellate Court should

consider the amounts awarded in prior cases for similar injuries,

obviously, each case must be decided on its own facts and

circumstances. Judgments awarding damages in other cases

reversed on appeal as excessive, do not in and of themselves

mandate reversal. The vast variety of, and disparity between,

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awards in other cases demonstrate that injuries can seldom be

measured on the same scale. For a reviewing Court to upset a

jury’s factual determination on the basis of what other juries

awarded to other Plaintiffs for other injuries in other cases

based upon different evidence constitutes a serious invasion into

the realm of fact finding. See Buell-Wilson, at p. 34, citing,

Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43, 65, n.12. 

Buell specifically observed a verdict is not excessive as a

matter of law simply because it exceeds the amount awarded in

other cases. 

There, Ford cited five reported California decisions where

non-economic damages for reportedly similar injuries ranged from

$1,000,000.00 to $8,400,000.00. However, in only two of the

cited cases were the damages claimed to be excessive and in both

cases, the damage awards were upheld. Buell, p. 35. The Buell

court’s review of all the cases cited showed a range between

$1,000,000.00 and $66,000,000.00 in compensatory damages awards

based on substantial differences in the facts of each case. 

Ultimately, Buell held the decision must be based on the unique

evidence in the case before the court. 

Here, Defendants cite unpublished cases involving burn

injuries where past non-economic damages range from

$1,200,000.00; $3,000,000.00; $1,000,000.00; $2,500,000.00;

$2,000,000.00; $312,000.00; and additional burn cases reporting

only total verdicts, without separate breakout of non-economic

damages, involving awards of $3,738,995.00; $11,272,238.00;

$3,115,622.00; $6,650,000.00; and $13,924,000.00 to one Plaintiff

and $12,402,000.00 to the other Plaintiff. Defendant argues that

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these cases awarded non-economic damages in the range of

$1,000,000.00 to $3,000,000.00, making the disputed

$15,000,000.00 for past economic damages for 2.2 years “clearly

excessive.” 

By contrast, Plaintiff compares the ratios in the comparison

cases provided by Defendant that show economic to non-economic

damages as: 1:1, 1:5(-), 1:16(+), 1:3(+), 1:5(+), 5:1 (a ten

year old case), 1:14(+), 1:13.6(+); 1:20.5(+), 1:4.7(-), and

1:12.6(+). Plaintiff’s ratio is 1:3.6 in this case.

From this number-crunching, the Plaintiffs note that of the

11 cases, the highest amount for past medical expenses was

$700,000.00, slightly more than one-half of Brian Hall’s past

medical expenses. Ultimately, Plaintiff has cited Buell, before

the non-economic damages were reduced from $65,000,000.00 to

$18,000,000.00, to meet the range of a multiple of three to four

times the economic damages (specials). In this case, the

economic damages net of workers’ compensation offset, are

$5,509,662.00. A three to four times ratio, not requested by

Plaintiff’s counsel, would put non-economic damages in the range

of $15,500,000.00 to $22,000,000.00. Plaintiffs argue that in

none of the comparison cases cited by Defendant, was an award of

non-economic damages found excessive. 

Other than the gross amount awarded by the jury for noneconomic damages, other evidence should be considered to decide

whether the award was motivated by passion or prejudice. Here,

the jury awarded in the low end of the range suggested by

Plaintiff’s argument for total damages in the case ($7,000,000.00

above the $20,000,000.00 low end). The jury did not award the

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full amount of future medical expenses requested. The jury

awarded only $250,000 to Mrs. Hall for loss of consortium, all of

which reflects considered and deliberate decision-making on the

value of her claim and a recognition of prior problems in the

marital relationship unrelated to the burn injuries. Plaintiffs’

counsel’s argument to the jury was that the award should consider

past and future physical pain, mental suffering, loss of

enjoyment of life, disfigurement, loss of quality of life, the

mental upset associated with future surgeries. Counsel did not

suggest a multiple to be applied to the special (compensatory)

damages to be awarded. 

As in Buell, defense counsel here did not discuss the amount

of damages in closing argument. As he admits, defense counsel

requested an all-or-nothing liability defense verdict or a

finding of 100% contributory fault. In Buell, where the jury

originally awarded 23 times more non-economic than economic

damages and more than 7.6 to 5.6 times specials for total damages

in the range that Plaintiff’s counsel there argued was “fair,

just and reasonable.” The initially remitted amount of

$65,000,000.00, was still a 1:14 ratio of economic to noneconomic damages. The size of the original award provided

compelling evidence that the jury ignored what the Plaintiffs’

counsel believed was fair and reasonable, i.e., $13,800,000.00

(1:3) to $18,400,000.00 (1:4), constituting awards which arose

from passion or prejudice and were to punish Ford. In Buell, the

husband’s loss of consortium award of $13,000,000.00 was three

times the amount counsel had requested in argument. The fact

that the jury’s awards far exceeded and had no relation to the

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amounts requested by counsel suggested the jury did not act as a

fair and neutral trier of fact in fixing the amounts of damages. 

Considering the totality of the record here, including but

not limited to the nature and extent of Mr. Hall’s injuries, his

testimony, the testimony of lay and expert witnesses on damages,

both Plaintiffs’ and defense’s, the amount of the economic and

total damage awards, all inferences that can be drawn from the

evidence, and comparable awards in comparable cases, an objective

review of the record reveals non-economic award for

$15,000,000.00 past non-economic damages for 26 months was

grossly excessive if not monstrous. Whether the award resulted

from passion or prejudice is a closer question. The corporate

persona of NAIS, a large out-of-state energy conglomerate pitted

against an extremely likeable local Plaintiff raises the

likelihood that the very large verdict (the largest in the

history of the Eastern District of California), was the result of

such unlawful considerations. As in Buell, here the non-economic

damage award, totaling $20,000,000.00, far exceeds any noneconomic damages award previously upheld by a California court. 

The Buell Court referred to the remitted $18,000,000.00 noneconomic damage award as proportionate to the Plaintiff’s

substantial injuries and proportionate to the economic damages

award. Citing, Duarte v. Zachariah (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1652,

1665. 

Although it is a very difficult comparison to make, it

cannot be said in this case that Mr. Hall’s catastrophic injuries

are more severe than the horrendous injuries suffered and bleak

future faced by the Plaintiff in the Buell case. 

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J. REMITTITUR

The Court has authority, if non-economic damages are against

the clear weight of the evidence or determined to be a product of

passion or prejudice, to issue a remittitur, rather than an

outright grant of a new trial on all issues. Deevy v. Tassi

(1942) 21 Cal.2d 109, 120-21. When a district court, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prevailing party, concludes that a damage award is excessive, it

must grant a new trial on damages unless the prevailing party

accepts a remittitur which the court considers justified. Fenner

v. Dependable Trucking Co., Inc., 716 F.2d 598, 603 (9th Cir.

1983). 

“A new trial is not required even when there is an excessive

damages award resulting from passion and prejudice, unless there

is also evidence that passion and prejudice affected the

liability finding.” Witec Co., Ltd. v. Liu, 403 F.3d 645, 655

(9th Cir. 2005). In such a case, remittitur is an appropriate

method of reducing excessive verdicts, although the court still

retains the option of vacating the judgment and ordering a new

trial. Witec at p. 655, citing, Seymour v. Summa Vista Cinema,

Inc., 809 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Here, based on the totality of the evidence, severity of the

injuries and applying a 1:3 to 1:4 ratio for economic to noneconomic damages, the non-economic damages should be remitted to

$13,333,333.00, what nets to an award of $10,000,000.00 for noneconomic damages after the 23% reductions, allocated

$6,000,000.00 to past economic damages and $4,000,000.00 to

future non-economic damages in fair and just compensation for

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Plaintiff. 

No other valid basis for new trial exists as is discussed in

the following section concerning the allocation of fault. 

Defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on strict

liability, the only other remotely colorable issue raised postrial, has been rejected on the merits. Based on comparable

awards, the full extent of Plaintiff’s injuries, his past

suffering, convalescence, and progress, the $20,000,000.00 noneconomic damage award is excessive and against the clear weight

of the evidence. The court is firmly convinced the jury’s award

is a mistake. It is just to remit the award of past and future

non-economic damages to a net of $10,000,000.00. All other

aspects of the judgment entered on the jury’s verdict shall

remain in effect, conditioned on Plaintiff’s acceptance of this

reduced amount. If Brian Hall does not agree to the reduced

amount of past and future non-economic damages, that net total

award will be reversed and remanded for a new trial, solely on

the issue of the amount of past and future non-economic damages. 

K. NO FEDERAL DUE PROCESS ISSUE

The award and amount of compensatory damages do not raise a

federal due process issue, because they are distinguished from

punitive damages as not punitive. Non-economic damages are not a

punishment, to deter conduct, but rather compensation to make a

Plaintiff whole. As a result of a Defendant’s conduct: “‘[O]nce

the cause and existence of damages have been . . . established

[with reasonable certainty], recovery will not be denied because

the damages are difficult of ascertainment . . . . The law only

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requires that the best evidence be adduced of which the nature of

the case is capable[,] and the defendant whose wrongful act gave

rise to the injury, will not be heard to complain that the amount

thereof cannot be determined with mathematical precision.’” Buell

at p. 44; citing, Dallman Co. v. Southern Heater Co. (1968) 262

Cal.App.2d 582, 594; Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters (1946)

29 Cal.2d 34, 46 (placing the risk of uncertainty in fixing

damages on the wrongdoer). 

Buell recognized that nothing is better settled than the

principle that in actions for torts, where no precise rule of law

fixes the recoverable damages, the jury’s peculiar function is to

determine the amount. Buell specifically held that an excessive

non-economic damages award, as distinguished from punitive

damages, does not raise a federal due process issue: “We are

loath to usurp this core function of the jury by relying on

quasi-mathematical formulas to assess the amount of damages that

may be awarded, simply because non-economic damages are not

readily quantifiable.” 

The risk that juries would use compensatory damages to

punish instead of compensate does not require imposing due

process limitations on such awards, where the jury is instructed

that it must not let bias, sympathy or prejudice influence their

decision. Buell at p. 45. Here, the jury was instructed that it

must use its collective judgment to decide a reasonable amount

based on the evidence and common sense. Moreover, any award for

future damages had to be proved with reasonable certainty that

the harm would be suffered in the future. By categorizing each

type of harm for which recovery could be awarded, the jury was

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given guidance to avoid their making a compensatory damage award

to punish the defendant. 

Where a jury’s award of non-economic damages is challenged

as excessive, the judge must review the evidence and has the

discretion to issue a remittitur when there is substantial

conflict in the evidence regarding the extent of damages. Buell

at p. 45; citing Hughes v. Hearst Publications, Inc. (1947) 79

Cal.App.2d 703, 705. This rule provides a further check against

excessive awards of non-economic damages. Although more recent

cases recognize that awards for emotional distress in some

instances have a punitive element; Buell at p. 45, citing, Gober

v. Ralph’s Grocery Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 204, 223; there is

no error where the award is within the range for similar cases

and is proportionate to the Plaintiff’s substantial injuries and

economic loss. Buell concluded it is not necessary to impose

federal due process principles to limit non-economic damage

awards, because: (1) the Supreme Court in State Farm Mut. Auto.

Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) imposed due

process limits on punitive damage awards as they are similar to

criminal penalties, without protections afforded Defendants in

criminal proceedings, while non-economic damages are designed to

compensate, not punish; (2) in civil cases Defendants have

adequate notice of potential awards; and (3) the review accorded

damage awards by trial and Appellate Courts ensures there is no

punitive element in non-economic damage awards. In this case, a

$20,000,000.00 non-economic damages award, almost four times

economic damages, has punitive effect. 

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L. ALLOCATION OF COMPARATIVE FAULT - REVIEW STANDARD

Defendant argues that the jury’s apportionment of

responsibility among Plaintiff, his employer AES Mendota LP

(“AES”), and Defendant NAIS, the blaster, is against the clear

weight of the evidence and mistaken. The allocation of fault is

a matter subject to review on a motion for new trial. See

generally, Kalland v. North American Van Lines, 716 F.2d 570,

573-74 (9th Cir. 1983); Newby v. F/V Kristen Gail, 937 F.2d 1439,

1442-43 (9th Cir. 1991) (reviewing allocation of fault in

admiralty case under the doctrine of comparative negligence); see

also, Trinidad Corp. v. SS Keiyoh Maru, 845 F.2d 818, 822 (9th

Cir. 1988) (recognizing apportionment of fault in admiralty cases

under comparative negligence principles is subject to review). 

Under California law, a Court may not use a remittitur to

apportion liability; rather it must grant a new trial if the

apportionment of fault is not supported by the weight of the

evidence. Schelbauer v. Butler Mfg. Co. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 442,

452-55. 

There is no verbal formula or unerring litmus test to

apportion fault for a particular case. Landes Constr. Co.,

infra, at p. 1377. The trial court, in ruling on such a motion,

has “the duty . . . to weigh the evidence as [the Court] saw it,

and to set aside the verdict of the jury, even though supported

by substantial evidence where, in [the Court’s] conscientious

opinion, the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the

evidence.” Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th

Cir. 2007) (the judge can weigh the evidence and assess the

credibility of witnesses, and need not view the evidence from the

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perspective most favorable to the prevailing party); Shimko v.

Guenther, 505 F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 2007). “Substantial

evidence is such relevant evidence as reasonable minds might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion even if it is possible

to draw two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence. Landes

Constr. Co., at p. 1371. 

“A decent respect for the collective wisdom of the jury and

for the function entrusted to it in our system, suggests that in

most cases the Judge should accept the findings of the jury. 

Doubts about the correctness of a verdict are not sufficient

grounds for a new trial. Landes at p. 1371-72. If, having given

full respect to the jury’s findings, the Judge on the entire

evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a

mistake has been committed, it is to be expected that a new trial

will be granted. Landes Constr. Co. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 833

F.2d 1365, 1372 (9th Cir. 1987) (the trial judge does not sit to

approve miscarriages of justice). 

M. ALLOCATION OF FAULT

The jury allocated fault 75% to Defendant NAIS, 20% to the

employer AES, and 5% to the Plaintiff, Brian Hall. Defendant

argues that AES’s responsibility is at lest equal to, if not

greater than, that of NAIS. Defendant argues that Plaintiff was

appointed safety director, although he lacked prior safety

experience or training. Mr. Wrighthouse, Plaintiff’s supervisor,

suggested that the decision to make Plaintiff safety director was

a bad idea. Mr. Wrighthouse testified that Plaintiff had “fallen

behind” in his safety management responsibilities. Plaintiff’s

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expert, Clair Austin, opined that Plaintiff was not qualified to

be safety director as the AES Mendota cogeneration plant. 

Defendant complains that although AES required its own

employees to fight small fires at the plant, AES employees were

not trained in firefighting. Plaintiff’s expert opined that to

engage in firefighting, a firm must: (1) form a firefighting

brigade; (2) train employees in firefighting; and (3) provide

employees with firefighting protective equipment. 

Ms. Austin further opined that the employer shared

responsibility for managing the safety of the deslagging

operation with AES. The jury was so instructed that safety

regulations, laws, and industry customs or practices applied

equally to the employer and NAIS. Jury Instructions No. 24, 25. 

Defendant points to the Austin opinion that both the

employer and NAIS were responsible for adequate pre-blast

planning. Plaintiff’s fire expert, Joe Romig, opined that the

grating over the chute near the mid-level cyclone door did not

function properly on the day of the accident. NAIS blaster,

Shawn Sicard, warned AES employees in a pre-blast safety meeting

that plywood surrounding the cyclone’s mid-level door would

ignite after the blast. The plywood was not removed, nor did Mr.

Sicard object or refuse to proceed with the explosive deslagging

job. 

AES did not prepare a Job Safety Analysis for the deslagging

operation on the day of the accident. This was a breach of its

duty of care to competently manage its cogeneration plant.

Defendant criticizes AES’s post-blast fire suppression

efforts. AES prohibited NAIS from fighting any fires on the

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premises. The only persons who participated in fire suppression

efforts were untrained AES employees. Ms. Austin opined that AES

should have contacted the Fire Department to handle large fires

and recognized AES prohibited NAIS from fighting fires on site

and prohibited its own employees from fighting fires, except

small fires. It is undisputed that AES employee, Mark Holbrook,

sent away the Fresno County Fire Department fire engine that

arrived shortly after the initial fires on the tower. 

The Defendant further relies on its fire expert, Kimball

Clark, who testified that as a power plant operator, AES could

have controlled the air-fuel ratio in the boiler and could have

determined whether there was a build-up of unburned fuel in the

cyclone. AES should have advised the blaster about unburned fuel

in the cyclone. Although Defendant claims AES should have

advised about the risks associated with any unburned fuel

condition, NAIS, as a blaster, and Mr. Sicard, who was specially

licensed for explosive deslagging, should have been aware of and

addressed these risks. Nor does the Defendant acknowledge that

with its experience in deslagging, NAIS should have been aware of

all of the risks associated with explosive deslagging, including

the risk of fireballs from unburned fuel. 

Mr. Clark opined that the second fireball that burned the

Plaintiff was caused by unburned fuel that ignited and burned

after deslagging opened an air passage which facilitated

ignition. The ignition was, in Clark’s opinion, caused in part

by AES’s personnel spraying water through the cyclone door into

the boiler. Defendant argues strenuously that the apportionment

of fault between NAIS and the employer should be equal. 

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N. FAULT OF PLAINTIFF

Defendant argues for a greater allocation of fault to

Plaintiff based on his lack of qualifications to serve as safety

director at the plant. Plaintiff was responsible for compliance

with OSHA regulations and AES safety procedures in managing the

plant’s safety program. Mr. Hall testified he had some

misgivings about assuming the safety director job and felt he was

not qualified. Mr. Hall nonetheless studied and expended

substantial work effort to gain qualifications as safety

director. 

Mr. Hall admitted that he had trained other AES employees in

the use of appropriate protective equipment, that his shortsleeve synthetic fabric shirt was flammable; and he should not

have been fighting fires on the day of the accident. 

The evidence did not establish that Mr. Hall planned to

fight any fires on the date of the accident. He voluntarily

ascended the tower to watch the blast. Mr. Hall was curious and

felt some responsibility, as safety director, to be present on

the tower during the blast. Mr. Hall conceded it was a voluntary

choice on his part, that he was not required to be there. 

Plaintiff’s blasting expert, Rod Hall, opined that Plaintiff

exercised poor judgment in wearing a polyester shirt and for

standing one level above the mid-level cyclone during blasting

operations. Rod Hall was impeached by his deposition testimony. 

NAIS and Mr. Sicard did nothing to prevent Plaintiff, or any

other AES employee, from being present on the tower in the blast

area and did not order Plaintiff or any AES employee to leave the

tower during blasting and its expected aftermath. 

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O. PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE RE: FAULT ALLOCATION

Plaintiff notes that NAIS was a licensed blaster, not AES. 

NAIS had extensive experience with explosive deglagging of

boilers. Shawn Sicard’s blaster’s license included the specialty

of boiler deslagging. AES had no experience conducting blasting

operations. The only AES deslagging experience was to use a pole

to loosen slag deposits in cyclones. 

NAIS had experience with blasting inside cyclones that

included outflow of lava lasting thirty minutes to an hour after

the explosion. NAIS had specific knowledge that blasting was

regulated by Federal, State and local laws, because it is

inherently dangerous and an ultrahazardous activity. California

law (Title 8, California Code of Regulations; Jury Instruction

No. 25), governing blasting requires a licensed blaster to be

“competent,” which includes having the ability to identify all

hazards and to take prompt corrective measures to eliminate such

hazards. A licensed blaster is subject to minimum safety

standards which include: (1) establishing a blast area; (2)

putting in place a system of signals to ensure the exclusion of

everyone not needed and authorized from the zone of danger. Jury

Instructions No. 25 and 26. The evidence supports a jury finding

that the entire tower was the zone of danger.

The NAIS operating manual required strict adherence by NAIS

personnel to all legal requirements governing blasting. Mr.

Sicard, who was not called as a witness at trial, came to the

site without any pre-preparation for the AES job. There is no

evidence that he formulated any plan nor that he identified or

acted to eliminate hazards to persons and property that were

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likely to be encountered at the AES deslagging operation. 

There is no evidence that Mr. Sicard investigated the

condition of the cyclone or the amount of slag and other

accumulation in the boiler. Although Mr. Sicard warned AES that

plywood would burn and that AES should be aware of that risk, Mr.

Sicard took no steps to reduce or minimize the risk of burning

plywood, nor did he direct AES to do so. All parties knew the

plywood was on the surface platform to keep the slag from

overflowing. NAIS used a one page form referred to as a Job

Situs Analysis with brief handwritten additions. NAIS inquired

if AES was prepared to handle hot slag. After an AES

representative told Mr. Sicard that AES expected the slag to fall

through the grizzly and downchute, no further attention was

focused on slag overflow. 

On the date of the explosive deslagging, Mr. Sicard

proceeded without a minimum five person crew, required by

industry custom and practice and NAIS’s own policy. NAIS sent

only two employees who accompanied Mr. Sicard, one of whom was

dispatched off-site during the blast. The NAIS people were not

in PPE clothing. NAIS did not instruct AES employees to wear PPE

clothing or to have PPE equipment for firefighting. No

representative of NAIS or AES possessed any tools or other

equipment for and made no preparations for firefighting. 

State law requires the blaster to establish a blast area. 

Jury Instruction No. 25. NAIS’ manual required establishment of

a blast area for boiler deslagging. Placement of barricade tape

was adjusted by NAIS beyond the NAIS manual’s minimum area of one

level above and one level below the blast level. The lower limit

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of the tape was extended to the bottom of the stairwell. No tape

was placed above, and as Plaintiff argues, this effectively made

the whole stairwell within the blast area. It follows that NAIS

should have kept everyone off the tower during the blasting

operations, which were expected to last at least an hour or more. 

Plaintiff notes that the video in evidence taken September 23,

shows the fireball engulfed the entire cyclone structure and

tower. 

NAIS did not order AES people to stay off the stairwell

(blast site). Evidence shows that AES personnel, including

Plaintiff, remained on the tower stairs and moved freely before,

during and after the blast. Dave Sampson, the AES control room

operator, had nothing else to do and was curious to watch the

blast and positioned himself on the tower. Plaintiff, as safety

manager, decided it would be a good idea to familiarize himself

with blasting, a potentially hazardous activity new to the plant,

and also positioned himself on the tower stairs, one level above

the mid-level cyclone from which the blast emanated. 

California law provides that a blaster is prohibited from

bringing more explosives than necessary to complete the job. 

NAIS personnel came on the structure with 15 explosive sticks,

evidencing the expectation that additional blasting would occur

after the first blast. The law also provides that the blaster is

not to permit any explosives to be positioned where they could

come in contact with the blast, yet the blasting sticks and caps

were left on the tower during and after the blast. From all

these facts, and Plaintiff’s expert opinions, the jury had

substantial evidence to find that NAIS and Mr. Sicard ran a

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sloppy operation, failed to control the blast area, and enhanced,

rather than reduced, the hazards of blasting on September 23, all

of which caused Plaintiff’s burns. 

After the first blast was set off by NAIS, a fireball

engulfed the structure. Plant property, including the plywood on

the mid-level platform, caught fire. The grizzly was plugged up,

exacerbating the build-up and free flow of molten slag on the

service platform and over its edges. 

At that time, under the law, NAIS, through Mr. Sicard, was

in charge of and had responsibility for the blast area, the whole

tower. NAIS had only two other employees present. Neither was

prepared to nor had any apparent means of engaging in

firefighting. Mr. Sicard issued no orders or directions to

anyone present at the blast site at any time during or after the

blasting operations. 

Mr. Sicard and one of his assistants initially, briefly

assisted AES’s emergency firefighting, and then moved to safety

before the second fireball. 

In the same manner consistent with NAIS’s prior experience

in its explosive deslagging at a Woodland cyclone, molten slag

continued flowing from the mid-level cyclone for over thirty

minutes following the blast. AES continued with efforts to stop

heat and fire damage to the plant. NAIS stood by and observed,

without comment, warning, or taking any action. 

During the aftermath of the first blast, with application of

water through hoses to the mid-level cyclone door, a second large

fireball engulfed the structure and burned Plaintiff and others

on the tower. The call for emergency assistance for Plaintiff

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was made 61 minutes following the recorded time of the original

blast. NAIS’ contention that the second fireball was a separate,

unrelated event, not causally connected to the first blast, is 

belied by NAIS’s expectation that the first blast would continue

to produce molten slag (lava) and that additional measures,

including more blasting, might be required to successfully

complete deslagging. NAIS knew deslagging could continue for

thirty minutes to an hour. NAIS knew that it was legally

responsible for the blast area and abdicated its responsibility

to reduce and contain the known hazards of blasting. 

Neither Mr. Sicard, the licensed blaster on site, or Mr.

McConihay, the NAIS safety officer, were called by Defendants as

trial witnesses. NAIS did not address the issues of its

responsibilities for the blasting operation under the law in the

presence of the jury at trial, nor its planning, management,

implementation, and safety measures, including management of the

blast site. Instead, as argued by Plaintiff, NAIS in effect,

abandoned the blast area to AES and blamed AES and the Plaintiff

100% for the second fireball and Plaintiff’s injury. 

A separate finding was made by the jury as to strict

liability, which permits liability without the express breaches

of duty and failure to adhere to legal and/or industry standards

for safety measures required in explosive deslagging operations. 

P. JUSTIFICATION FOR FAULT ALLOCATIONS

Plaintiff rejoins that as safety director, Plaintiff had no

capability to assess, to formulate, or to pre-approve the plan of

a licensed blaster for boiler deslagging that is why NAIS was

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hired and paid. Under the California Labor Code and a relevant

OSHA safety order, in employing the services of a licensed

blaster, it is not the Plaintiff who was qualified as a

“competent person” to supervise the blaster, but rather, the

blaster must be the competent person who supervises the blasting

operation. No legal authority was offered by NAIS that AES’s

safety director had any responsibility to direct, pre-approve, or

control a licensed blaster or the explosive deslagging

operations.

When Mr. Sicard saw that AES was unprepared to engage in

firefighting activities, that plywood was on and surrounding the

platform, and that AES safety policy prescribed that AES maintain

“control” over the blast site, Mr. Sicard and NAIS, reasonably,

should have objected and advised AES that it was NAIS’s legal

responsibility under the law to operate and control the blast

site and to provide and implement a plan for safe blasting

operation. NAIS should have reasonably known that AES’s “policy”

of asserting control over the blast site would prevent NAIS from

discharging its statutory responsibilities. Substantial evidence

supported a jury finding that NAIS, under the conditions proved

by the evidence, should not have proceeded with any blasting

operation at the AES Mendota plant until a prudent and lawful

blasting plan was in place and NAIS resolved the issue that it

was required to control the blast site during blasting

operations, including the approximately thirty minutes to one

hour that the effects of blasting continue, while the blaster

remained on site. Dr. Austin, Plaintiff’s safety expert,

testified that the risk of the AES Mendota plant explosive

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deslagging job was simply too great and that NAIS should not have

permitted blasting to go forward. 

Defendants’ argument that AES and Mr. Hall were not trained

in firefighting and not prepared to engage in firefighting

activities does not change the allocation of fault. Here,

neither AES nor Plaintiff had any background or experience to

know whether and to what extent firefighting activities would be

required. No AES employee testified that AES expected to engage

in firefighting, had the equipment to engage in the full range of

firefighting that explosive deslagging required, or that

Plaintiff in any way recognized the need for or was prepared to

engage in firefighting activities. Because the need for

firefighting was occasioned by the blast during NAIS’s blasting

operations, it was the responsibility of NAIS to anticipate, plan

for, control, and effectively deal with the need for

firefighting. The evidence fully supports the jury’s finding

that NAIS had the predominant share of fault for not doing so. 

Plaintiff’s blasting expert, Rod Hall, testified that his

firm does not do “hot work” (blasting) because of the great risk

associated with explosive deslagging. Mr. Hall opined that Mr.

Sicard failed to secure the area, violated the fifty foot radius

rule for blasting, by permitting Plaintiff’s presence one level

above the mid-level cyclone door, and further testified that

contract blasting is recognized as an ultrahazardous occupation

within the blasting industry. 

Rod Hall further opined that a five person crew was

necessary for this job, not one blaster with two assistants as

NAIS provided. He further opined that Mr. Sicard, the blaster,

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as supervisor in charge, exhibited poor judgment and failed to

keep everyone at the site out of harm’s way. 

Plaintiff’s expert, Joe Romig, Ph.D., opined that a

deslagging operation demands the highest standard of care from

those in charge. For the reasons stated above, NAIS’s breaches

of duty were unquestionably the predominant and efficient cause

of Plaintiff’s injuries, as found by the jury.

The evidence showed that the AES grating and chute did not

work properly. The “grizzly” or grating was to prevent access to

the down-chute by a person or sizeable object. The grating

apparently was plugged and/or undersized and did not function

effectively to remove molten slag as it exited the mid-level

cyclone. Defendant offered the possibility that the grating was

not correctly designed for use in explosive deslagging, the jury

did not accept the argument or assign fault to the absent grating

and down-chute designer. Moreover, there is no causative

connection between obstruction of the molten slag and the second

fireball that engulfed and injured Plaintiff. No evidence was

adduced that igniting of unburned fuel was in any way caused by

the exit rate or volume of molten slag from the mid-level

cyclone.

The circumstances of the plywood are the same. Mr. Sicard

warned about the plywood then did nothing about it; i.e., did not

demand that it be removed or condition NAIS going forward with

blasting on AES’s removal of the plywood. Further, there is no

explanation how removal of the plywood would have prevented the

ignition of unburned slag inside the boiler, or would have

avoided the second fireball that engulfed the Plaintiff. 

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Defendant criticized AES for not preparing a Job Site

Analysis for the day of the accident, however, AES had a Job Site

Analysis prepared a month earlier for deslagging at the Mendota

plant. In view of AES’s interaction with NAIS in the pre-blast

safety meeting and NAIS’s failure to call off the explosive

deslagging until it could assure that a safe blasting plan could

be implemented, there is an absence of proof that the lack of a

JSA by AES caused the second fireball and Plaintiff’s injuries. 

This was a jury issue. 

As to the subject of firefighting, Plaintiff points to the

NAIS County permit to operate as a blaster, which specified its

responsibility for firefighting. Armed with active knowledge

that AES purported to assert control over the blast site, and

firefighting during “the blasting,” operation which would

continue at least an hour in duration, NAIS should not have

proceeded with the job. Nor did NAIS offer any explanation why

it should not have insisted that the Fire Department be notified

or that there be a stand-by competent firefighting force in

place. NAIS had only two assistants present with Mr. Sicard;

none of whom were prepared for firefighting. When the Fire

Department did respond to the scene, at the time it was sent away

by the AES representative who testified it did not appear there

was a need for the County Fire Department to engage in fire

suppression efforts; NAIS’s blaster was on-site, observed the

existing conditions and said nothing. Particularly, Mr. Sicard

failed to object and failed to request that the Fire Department

remain on site. 

As to unburned fuel in the cyclone, the evidence is

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unrebutted that NAIS, knowing of that specific risk, did no

advance investigation, made no inquiry into or evaluation of what

the condition of the cyclone was, or whether the cyclone

contained unburned fuel. Nor did any NAIS witness address this

issue at trial. Only the argument of counsel was presented,

inviting the jury to speculate that it was AES’s responsibility

to evaluate and accommodate the risk of unburned fuel. 

Q. ALLOCATION OF FAULT TO BRIAN HALL

Defendant has argued that Brian Hall should have

substantially greater fault than 5% because he accepted the

position of Safety Director, wore a polyester shirt the day of

the accident, and had inadequate firefighting gear on site. No

evidence was adduced that any Safety Director for AES has ever

been trained in or was knowledgeable about explosive deslagging

and blasting operations. Rather, the evidence was that AES has

always hired a licensed blaster to perform explosive deslagging

in accordance with law. No evidence was adduced that the Safety

Director at the AES Mendota plant had any role in prior

deslagging blasting operations for, under the law, that

responsibility lies with the licensed blaster, NAIS. 

Other than argument, there was no evidence of custom,

practice, AES rule or policy that Safety Directors were to dress

in fire protective equipment or to engage in firefighting, other

than “small fires” during explosive deslagging. There is no

evidence that Plaintiff, as Safety Director, was to have or

legally could have had any role whatsoever in the NAIS explosive

deslagging operation. In view of the size, intensity, and

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duration of the second fireball, the evidence does not support a

finding that Plaintiff’s burns on his hands, arms, and face,

could have been less severe if he had worn PPE clothing. 

Based on the totality of the evidence of the allocation of

fault respectively applied to the explosive deslagging, NAIS

(75%), AES (20%), Plaintiff (5%) is not against the clear weight

of the evidence, nor does it support the conclusion that the jury

was clearly mistaken in its allocation of comparative fault. 

CONCLUSION

As the standards for new trial have long existed, the trial

judge, in ruling on such a motion, must consider all the evidence

and must be mindful of and pay respect to the role and function

of the jury. The Court believes in the jury system and the work

of the jury in this case. The jurors were sincere, attentive and

conscientious. They worked diligently for three days in reaching

their verdicts after almost 20 days of trial. The case was tried

by attorneys of the highest competence, who collectively

possessed well over 100 years of experience as trial lawyers and

all of whom did outstanding work in their presentations and trial

of the case. The case could not have been better tried. In the

final analysis, on the allocation of fault, Defendant made

informed, strategic choices: (1) not to call as trial witness,

Mr. Sicard, the blaster, or McConihay, Director of Safety

Operations for NAIS; (2) to deny any liability whatsoever; (3) to

attempt to shift 100% fault to AES and Mr. Hall; (4) not to

specifically address a licensed blaster’s statutory duties to

pre-plan, to establish a blast area, to control, and to ensure

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the overall safety of its blasting operation and the blast site,

and (5) to not discuss damages or offer the jury bases to

minimize any damages awarded. This resulted in an absence of

damage control. 

Defendant accepted no responsibility whatsoever for any of

its actions or inactions throughout the blasting operation. A

similar all or nothing approach was taken with respect to

damages. The Defendant chose not to discuss damages, not to

offer the jury alternate theories, or describe how Plaintiff’s

damage claims should be minimized, except portions of future

medical expenses, and to argue Plaintiff’s damage claims were 

over-reaching and outrageous. Rather, Defendant assumed the risk

of Plaintiffs being awarded damages as requested by their

counsel, by failing to make any mention of or to analyze

Plaintiff’s damage claims, except to denigrate the amount sought

by Plaintiff as absurd or ridiculous. These were informed,

strategic choices. Defendant is bound by them. 

For all the reasons stated in this decision, there is no

reason to reallocate fault. The Court cannot do a better job

than the jury did. 

As to damages, Buell is very helpful and instructive. The

Court has found no reported or unreported cases awarding noneconomic damages of $20,000,000.00 for comparable burn injuries,

where a victim has made the progress toward partial recovery,

that Plaintiff has achieved or who faces a similar future as does

Plaintiff. The jury’s allocation of past non-economic damages is

not supported by the clear weight of evidence and/or is a

mistake. Undoubtedly, the jury recognized that the most severe

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pain, agony, the greatest dislocation, uncertainty about the

future, and Plaintiff’s greatest struggles to survive and

progress were in the two years and two months following the

accident. However, the Plaintiff has a 35-year life expectancy

and faces many physical and mental challenges. It is hard to

understand an allocation of 80% of total non-economic damage to a

time period reflecting approximately 6% of the Plaintiff’s life

span. 

Although comparable cases are not determinative, the Court

in ruling on a new trial motion is instructed by applicable law

to consider comparable cases and to be mindful of the State

damages law. The most recent expression on remand from the

California Supreme Court of the California Courts is Buell,

where, the Court of Appeal in a case with injuries even more

catastrophic and irreversible from which no recovery will ever

occur, than suffered in this case, reduced a $105,000,000.00 noneconomic damage award to $18,000,000.00. The final remittitur in

Buell was approximately 72% of the reduced $65,000,000.00 noneconomic damages award and approximately 82.2% of the original

$105,000,000.00 non-economic damages award. Here, the remittitur

is to one-third of the original non-economic damages award

consistent with Mr. Hall’s circumstances. 

The Court is mindful that in Buell, to find the requisite

passion or prejudice motivation for the verdict, the Appeals

Court seized on the jury award which greatly exceeded the three

to four times specials requested by Plaintiff’s counsel in

argument to the jury. Here, the jury was asked by Plaintiff’s

counsel to make a total award of $20,000,000.00 to

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$40,000,000.00. The award was within the gross range, requested

by counsel. However, as demonstrated by the jury’s verdict, the

total net economic damages after reductions and off-sets, amount

to $5,018,810.06. Allowing an economic to non-economic damage

ratio of almost 1:3, well within the range of all reported

verdicts, a non-economic damage award of $13,333,333.00, reduced

by 25% for comparative fault, to $10,000,000.00, $6,000,000.00,

of which is allocated to past non-economic loss and $4,000,000.00

of which is allocated to future economic loss assures that the

non-economic damage award is reasonable, just, not the result of

passion or prejudice and negates any punishment of NAIS in this

case, and is supported by the clear weight of the evidence. 

For all these reasons a remittitur is GRANTED as follows:

Plaintiff, Brian Hall, shall recover from NAIS, as and for past

wage loss (reduced by 5%) $190,867.00; future wage loss (reduced

by 5%) $1,887,847.00; past medical bills (reduced by 5%),

$1,085,961.00, future medical bills (reduced by 5%)

$2,123,800.00; less off-set for workers’ compensation benefits of

21.7736% calculated by total of economic damages as a percent of

total damages ($269,664.94); past non-economic damages (reduced

to 75%) of $6,000,000.00; future non-economic damages (reduced to

75%) of $4,000,000.00. This means that the total award of noneconomic damages is $10,000,000.00 to which is added

$5,018,810.06 of total damages of $15,018,810.06 for Brian Hall. 

With these exceptions, Brian Hall’s judgment remains intact.

Jean Hall’s judgment remains intact. 

In the event that Plaintiff fails to accept the remittitur

within twenty days following the date of service of this

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Memorandum Decision and Order by the Clerk, a new trial shall be

held on the sole issue of the amount of past and future noneconomic damages. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 21, 2008 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

emm0d6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:06-cv-00123-OWW -SMS Document 264 Filed 03/21/08 Page 47 of 47