Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02369/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02369-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANERAE V. BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v.

P. MARTINEZ et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:13-cv-2369 DAD P

ORDER AND

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action seeking relief under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the court on a motion to dismiss brought on behalf of 

defendant Martinez. Plaintiff has filed an opposition to the motion, and defendant has filed a 

reply. Plaintiff has also filed an unauthorized response to defendant’s reply, which this court – in 

the interest of justice – has reviewed and considered.

For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned finds that plaintiff’s complaint fails to 

state a cognizable claim for relief against defendant Martinez. Accordingly, the undersigned will 

recommend that defendant Martinez’s motion to dismiss be granted, and defendant Martinez be 

dismissed from this action.

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is proceeding on his original complaint against defendants Martinez, Harkness, 

Fish, Angulo, Kirch, Plainer, Perez, and Foulk.1 In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that in July 

2011, defendant Martinez openly displayed an interest in plaintiff and his cellmate inmate 

O’Reilly. According to plaintiff, he is a “public interest case inmate” because he is a former 

recording artist known as “X-Raided.” Plaintiff alleges that defendant Martinez attempted to 

establish familiarity with him and inmate O’Reilly and eventually developed an inappropriate onagain off-again relationship of a sexual nature with inmate O’Reilly. (Compl. at 3 & 5.)

Plaintiff alleges that he introduced inmate O’Reilly to a female associate of his, and the 

two began corresponding. According to plaintiff, defendant Martinez became jealous and 

approached Investigative Services Unit (“ISU”) Officer Wheeler and told him that inmate 

O’Reilly implied that he would pay her $12,000.00 to smuggle two iphones into the institution –

one for him and one for plaintiff. ISU Officer Wheeler met with ISU Officer defendant Harkness, 

at which time they opened an investigation and devised a plan to intercept the money and 

contraband phones before they entered the institution. (Compl. at 5-6.) 

On January 27, 2012, defendant Harkness completed his investigation into the matter. 

ISU staff escorted plaintiff and inmate O’Reilly to the program office, read them their Miranda

rights, and placed them in administrative segregation. On February 8, 2012, defendant Fish 

issued plaintiff a Rules Violation Report (“RVR”), authored by defendant Harkness, charging 

plaintiff with the prison disciplinary offense of “Conspiracy to Bribe a Peace Officer.” Plaintiff 

alleges that the report falsely stated that he wanted defendant Martinez to bring him two iphones 

with attachable microphones. (Compl. at 15-18, Ex. A(3).) 

On March 2, 2012, plaintiff appeared before Senior Hearing Officer defendant Angulo. 

Plaintiff requested defendant Martinez appear as a witness at the hearing, but defendant Fish told 

 

1 Defendants Harkness, Fish, Kirch, Plainer, Perez, and Foulk are represented by separate 

counsel in this action. Defendant Angulo is also represented by separate counsel. Counsel for 

defendants Harkness, Fish, Kirch, Plainer, Perez, and Foulk and counsel for defendant Angulo 

have filed separate motions to dismiss on behalf of their clients. The court will address all three 

pending motions to dismiss in this action in separate findings and recommendations.

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defendant Angulo that plaintiff had rescinded that request. Plaintiff said that he had done no such 

thing, but defendant Angulo explained that defendant Martinez was not available and her absence 

would not prejudice the hearing in any event. Plaintiff also attempted to give defendant Angulo a 

written statement, but she refused it and purportedly told plaintiff “It doesn’t matter. I’m going to 

find you guilty anyway.” (Compl. at 23-24, Ex. D.) 

Prison officials found both plaintiff and inmate O’Reilly guilty of the conspiracy charge. 

On March 21, 2012, defendant Perez ordered inmate O’Reilly’s RVR reissued and reheard 

because defendant Angulo had stipulated to witness testimony that was inconsistent with the 

witness’s incident report. Defendant Kirch and defendant Plainer reviewed plaintiff’s RVR and 

upheld plaintiff’s guilty finding. On April 12, 2012, plaintiff received a six-month SHU term. 

Plaintiff administratively appealed his guilty finding and pointed to defendant Perez’s memo to 

defendant Kirch ordering a reissuing and rehearing of inmate O’Reilly’s RVR. In plaintiff’s 

view, the only difference between him and inmate O’Reilly was their skin color and plaintiff’s 

status as a recording artist. On May 24, 2012, defendant Foulk denied plaintiff’s inmate appeal at 

the second level of review. On September 24, 2012, prison officials granted plaintiff relief at the 

third level of review and ordered his RVR reissued and reheard. On November 20, 2012, Senior 

Hearing Officer Sisson found plaintiff not guilty of the disciplinary violation and dismissed the 

RVR. Ultimately, plaintiff served two months in the SHU. (Compl. at 24-31, Exs. E-I, L, N.) 

On May 23, 2012, Steven Leese, a Special Agent from Internal Affairs, interviewed 

plaintiff and stated he was investigating allegations of staff misconduct against defendant 

Martinez. Plaintiff explained the entire course of events that had taken place with respect to his 

RVR. Special Agent Leese informed him that both Internal Affairs and the Office of the 

Inspector General were investigating defendant Martinez. According to plaintiff, as a result of 

that investigation, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation no longer employs 

defendant Martinez. (Compl. at 31.)

At screening, the court found that liberally construed plaintiff’s complaint appeared to 

state a cognizable claim against defendants under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause 

and Equal Protection Clause. (Doc. No. 12)

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ANALYSIS

I. Motion Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

tests the sufficiency of the complaint. North Star Int’l v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 

581 (9th Cir. 1983). Dismissal of the complaint, or any claim within it, “can be based on the lack 

of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal 

theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). See also

Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). In order to survive 

dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of 

the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to 

relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

In determining whether a pleading states a claim, the court accepts as true all material 

allegations in the complaint and construes those allegations, as well as the reasonable inferences 

that can be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & 

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 

(1976); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). In the context of a motion to 

dismiss, the court also resolves doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 

411, 421 (1969). However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable

inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 

(9th Cir. 1981).

In general, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by 

lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The court has an obligation to construe 

such pleadings liberally. Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). 

However, the court’s liberal interpretation of a pro se complaint may not supply essential 

elements of the claim that were not pled. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992).

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II. Discussion

In the pending motion to dismiss, counsel for defendant Martinez argues that plaintiff has 

failed to plead sufficient facts to state a cognizable claim for relief under the Fourteenth 

Amendment Due Process Clause or Equal Protection Clause. (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. No. 

18) at 8-13.) Upon further review of plaintiff’s complaint, and for the reasons set forth below, the

court finds that argument to be persuasive. 

As to plaintiff’s due process claim against defendant Martinez, courts in the Ninth Circuit 

have consistently held that submission of false disciplinary reports against a prisoner does not 

implicate a liberty interest and therefore, does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation 

under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Willis v. Beard, No. 2:14-cv-0573 AC P, 2015 WL 

2095296 at *2 n.1 (E.D. Cal. May 5, 2015) (“Plaintiff’s allegation that a false report was 

submitted against him does not implicate any protected liberty interest.”); Dorava v. Gonzalez, 

No. EDCV 13-2282 AB(JC), 2015 WL 1757147 at *7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2015) (“plaintiff’s 

allegations that defendants . . . wrote a ‘false’ RVR . . .do not plausibly state a constitutional 

violation.”); Morales v. Sherwood, No. 1:13-cv-01582 AWI GSA PC, 2015 WL 1821128 at *7 

(E.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2015) (“The falsification of a disciplinary report does not state a standalone 

constitutional claim.”); Monroe v. Heinlen, No. CV 14-03202 SJO (DFM), 2014 WL 2931172 at 

*5 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2014) (“to the extent Plaintiff seeks to allege a violation of his due process 

rights on the basis of a falsified RVR, such allegations do not state a claim.”); Shallowhorn v. 

Gonzalez, No. 1:11-cv-00305 GBC (PC), 2012 WL 1551342 at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2012) 

(dismissing with prejudice plaintiff’s due process claim to the extent that he attempted to allege a 

liberty interest regarding submission of false reports against him), aff’d 514 Fed. Appx. 660, 2013 

WL 1189422 (9th Cir. Mar. 25, 2013); Draper v. Rosario, No. CIV S-10-0032 KJM EFB P, 2012 

WL 787576 at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2012) (recommending dismissal of a due process claim 

based on defendant’s allegedly false report, which led to plaintiff being found guilty and having 

to serve a seven-month term in the SHU), adopted by 2012 WL 1130683 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 

2012); Muhammad v. Rubia, No. C 08-3209 JSW (PR), 2010 WL 1260425 at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 

29, 2010) (“a prisoner has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly 

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accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest.”), aff’d 453 

Fed. Appx. 751, 2011 WL 4842546 (9th Cir. 2011).

In this case, plaintiff claims that defendant Martinez violated his right to due process by 

falsely accusing him of conspiring with inmate O’Reilly to bribe her to smuggle two iphones into 

the prison. Plaintiff’s case is indistinguishable from those cases cited above, which make clear

that the Due Process Clause does not guarantee that prisoners will be free from false disciplinary 

accusations. See Shallowhorn, 2012 WL 1551342 at *3. Accordingly, the undersigned will 

recommend that plaintiff’s due process claim against defendant Martinez be dismissed for failure 

to state a cognizable claim for relief. 

Where, as here, it is clear that the complaint suffers from pleading deficiencies that cannot 

be cured by amendment, dismissal without leave to amend is appropriate. See Chaset v. 

Fleer/Skybox Int’l, 300 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (there is no need to prolong the litigation 

by permitting further amendment where the “basic flaw” in the underlying facts as alleged cannot 

be cured by amendment); Lipton v. Pathogenesis Corp., 284 F.3d 1027, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(“Because any amendment would be futile, there was no need to prolong the litigation by 

permitting further amendment.”). 

Turning now to plaintiff’s equal protection claim, plaintiff has clarified in his opposition 

papers that he did not intend to assert a claim against defendant Martinez for discriminating 

against him on the basis of his race. (Pl.’s Response to Def.’s Reply at 4.) Accordingly, the court 

will recommend that any equal protection claim against defendant Martinez be dismissed. 

Finally, the undersigned notes that plaintiff has argued in his opposition papers that his 

complaint states a cognizable claim against defendant Martinez for retaliation and contends that 

she submitted false disciplinary reports against him because he had written a letter to his wife and 

had complained to ISU staff about defendant Martinez’s inappropriate conduct with inmate 

O’Reilly and other inmates. Plaintiff is advised that an opposition to a motion to dismiss is not an 

appropriate place to raise and/or argue new claims. See Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., 151 

F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The ‘new’ allegations contained in the inmates’ opposition 

motion, however, are irrelevant for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes.”). When this court screened 

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plaintiff’s complaint, it found that it appeared to state a cognizable claim against defendants under 

the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause. (Doc. No. 12) 

Plaintiff did not file a motion for reconsideration of that order nor did he move to amend his 

complaint at that time. 

Moreover, the court has reviewed plaintiff’s complaint in connection with defendant’s 

pending motion to dismiss, and he has not set forth any non-conclusory allegations in support of a 

First Amendment retaliation claim. See Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir.

2000) (a retaliation claim cannot rest on the logical fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc, literally, 

“after this, therefore because of this.”). The chronology of events in this case also makes a 

retaliation claim such as that suggested by plaintiff to be rather implausible. In particular, 

according to plaintiff’s complaint, defendant Martinez approached ISU Officer Wheeler and first 

implicated plaintiff and inmate O’Reilly in the alleged bribery scheme back in August 2011. 

(Compl. at 5-6.) Defendant Martinez also told defendant Harkness about the alleged bribery 

scheme on October 1, 2011. (Id. at 8.) As a result of these conversations, prison officials devised 

an ongoing plan to intercept the money and contraband phones before they entered the institution, 

which ultimately led to plaintiff and inmate O’Reilly receiving the RVRs for “Conspiracy to 

Bribe a Peace Officer.” (Id. at 6.) In this regard, it is clear that any retaliatory accusations and 

conduct as suggested by plaintiff in his opposition to the pending motion to dismiss would have

started well before plaintiff wrote any letter to his wife in January 2012, or discussed defendant 

Martinez’s alleged misconduct with Officer Harkness after Harkness had opened the investigation

into the alleged bribery scheme. (Compl. at 5-6; Pl’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 5-6.) 

Plaintiff also makes clear in the allegations of his complaint that defendant Martinez had 

approached Officer Wheeler in a “jealous fit” because inmate O’Reilly had recently visited with 

plaintiff’s female associate and not as a result of any purportedly protected conduct that plaintiff

had engaged in. (Id. at 5.)

In sum, for all of the foregoing reasons, the undersigned will recommend that defendant 

Martinez’s motion to dismiss be granted and that defendant Martinez be dismissed from this 

action.

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CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to randomly assign a 

United States District Judge to this action.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendant Martinez’s motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 18) be granted; and

2. Defendant Martinez be dismissed from this action.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be filed and served within seven days after service of the objections. The parties

are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal 

the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: August 7, 2015

DAD:9

brow2369.57martinez

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