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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 16 1991 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

LEONARDO Q. HERNANDEZ, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

GARY RAYL; ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE 

STATE OF KANSAS, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

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ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-3378 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 89-3170) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Leonardo Q. Hernandez, Pro se. 

JaLynn Copp, Assistant Attorney General, Topeka, Kansas for the 

Appellees. 

Before SEYMOUR, EBEL, Circuit Judges, and BABCOCK,** District 

Judge. 

**Honorable Lewis T. Babcock, District 

District Court for the District of 

designation. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

Judge, United States 

Colorado, sitting by 

Appellate Case: 90-3378 Document: 01019293524 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 1 
Petitioner, Leonardo Q. Hernandez, appeals from an order of 

the district court denying his petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 1 Hernandez has also 

moved to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal and for a certificate 

of probable cause. 

In 1978, Hernandez was convicted of first degree murder and 

sentenced to life imprisonment. That judgment was affirmed on 

direct appeal. See State v. Hernandez, 607 P.2d 452 (Kan. 1980). 

Hernandez first raised the issue addressed here in a 

post-conviction motion for relief. Relief was denied on the 

grounds of procedural default and on the merits. Because the 

state court denied Hernandez's motion on the alternative ground 

that Hernandez's failure to raise his post-conviction relief issue 

on direct appeal could not be excused as an exceptional 

circumstance thus permitting him to raise the issue for the first 

time in a post-conviction relief proceeding, the issue of 

procedural default may be available to respondents as a defense. 

Respondents did not raise this defense either below or on appeal. 

"Therefore, we will deem the defense waived and will proceed to 

consider the petition on the merits." Bailey v. Cowley, 914 F.2d 

1438, 1439 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

In his petition in federal district court, Hernandez alleged 

that the trial court gave the jury an unconstitutional instruction 

1 After exam1n1ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-3378 Document: 01019293524 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 2 
which shifted the burden of proving the element of intent to the 

defense. The district court agreed, but found the error harmless. 

Upon review, while we agree the instruction, as given, was 

unconstitutional, we do not find the error harmless and we 

reverse. 

The instruction Hernandez challenged read: 

There 

the natural 

acts. This 

by evidence 

is a presumption that a person intends all 

and probable consequences of his voluntary 

presumption is overcome if you are persuaded 

that the contrary is true. 

Rec. I, Doc. 57. 

In Myrick v. Maschner, 799 F.2d 642 (lOth Cir. 1986), we held 

that this instruction "unconstitutionally shifted the burden of 

proving intent to the accused, resulting in a denial of due 

process." Id. at 645 (citing Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 

(1979)). 2 Therefore, we agree with the district court that the 

trial court erred in giving this instruction. 

Having found error in the tendering of the . instruction, we must determine whether the error was 

harmless under the circumstances of this case. The 

standard by which we undertake this last step in our 

review is very strict. Because we deal with an error of 

constitutional dimensions, we may only allow the 

conviction to stand if we find beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the error was harmless. "If the 'record 

accommodates a construction of events that supports a 

guilty verdict, but it does not compel such a 

construction,' then reversal is necessary." Thus at 

this stage of the analysis we must determine de novo 

whether the evidence before the jury that the defendant 

2 Whether Sandstrom applies retroactively is not an issue here 

because Sandstrom was decided before the Kansas Supreme Court 

decided Hernandez's direct appeal. See Wiley v. Ray!, 767 F.2d 

679, 681 n.l (lOth Cir. 1985). 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-3378 Document: 01019293524 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 3 
[intended to commit 

would necessarily 

reasonable doubt, 

instruction. 

murder] was so compelling the jury 

find [defendant] guilty beyond a 

even without the [erroneous] 

United States v. de Francisco-Lopez, ____ F.2d ____ , No. 90-4019, 

slip op. at 15-16 (lOth Cir. filed July 17, 1991)(citations 

omitted)(emphasis added). 

The district court held the error harmless because (1) 

Hernandez asserted a defense of self-defense "thus minimizing the 

importance of the intent instruction," District Court Memorandum 

and Order at 2-3 (citing to Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 

87 (1983)); (2) the evidence against Hernandez was significant; 

and (3) the jury was properly instructed that the burden was upon 

the state to prove guilt, not upon Hernandez to prove his 

innocence and, therefore, "the improper instruction did not have 

meaningful effect on the deliberations of the jury." District 

Court Memorandum and Order at 2-3. We examine these holdings 

seriatim. 

A defendant's assertion of self-defense does not necessarily 

admit intent to commit murder. In Johnson, the Court held that in 

presenting such a defense, "a defendant may in some cases admit 

that the act" was intentional. 460 U.S. at 87 (emphasis added). 

We find no such admission here. Indeed, the defense argued 

Hernandez did not intend to kill the victim. 

The district court also held that significant evidence of 

intent was presented at trial. In examining this holding, we must 

"make a judgment about the significance of the presumption to 

reasonable jurors, when measured against the other evidence 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-3378 Document: 01019293524 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 4 
considered by those jurors independently of the presumption." 

Yates v. Evatt, 111 s. Ct. 1884, 1893 (1991). We first look at 

what evidence presented to the jury tended to prove or disprove 

the presumption of intent. Id. Next, we weigh the probative 

force of that evidence against the probative force of the 

presumption standing alone. Id. 

The evidence showed Hernandez shot and killed a fellow patron 

of a club in Wichita, Kansas. The two had had prior altercations 

including one two years previously when Hernandez had been beaten 

severely enough to require medical attention. The two men argued 

at the club the night of the murder. 

Less than an hour after the argument, Hernandez went to the 

table where the victim was sitting and fired four shots at him. 

Two shots to the victim's head and chest were fatal, the other 

two, one of which struck the victim in the arm and one of which 

grazed the victim's arm, were not. Hernandez was restrained by 

another patron, Perez. The evidence was unclear whether Hernandez 

was restrained after only two shots had been fired or after all 

four shots had been fired. The bartender/co-owner testified he 

thought only one shot had been fired prior to the one which hit 

him in the ankle, apparently after grazing the victim's arm. 

Testimony was presented that after the shooting Hernandez 

stated: "I did it. I shot him." Tr. at 397. He also stated two 

or three times "I been waiting for a long time to do this." Id. 

at 465. Hernandez responded to questions from another patron as 

to why he had shot the victim by saying: "Because he broke my 

teeth." Id. at 332. 

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Appellate Case: 90-3378 Document: 01019293524 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 5 
The defense attempted to discredit this testimony by 

eliciting the information that one witness was currently on 

probation following her conviction for forgery. The defense also 

pointed out in closing argument that the victim's wife and Mr. 

Perez did not corroborate any of the statements attributed to 

Hernandez after the shooting. 

The defense presented testimony from an investigating 

detective that the two nonlethal shots appeared to have been aimed 

shots because they were close together. This testimony supported 

the defense's theory that "the two nonlethal shots were the first 

shots fired; further, that the two lethal shots were fired while 

Perez was struggling with defendant, and that the fatal shots were 

fired when defendant did not have complete control of the gun." 

Hernandez, 607 P.2d at 457. Therefore, the defense concluded, 

Hernandez did not intend to kill the victim. 

Another defense witness who overheard the altercation between 

Hernandez and the victim in the bar that night, testified that the 

victim had been "bothering" Hernandez. The victim hit Hernandez 

twice in the face with his hand and kicked him once in the 

stomach. He also testified that the victim told Hernandez to "go 

out right now. If you no go now, I'll wait for you outside and 

I'll kill you." Tr. at 655. The defense thus contended that 

Hernandez acted in self-defense because he was afraid the victim 

would again beat him or kill him. 

After weighing the probative force of this evidence against 

the probative force of the presumption standing alone, we cannot 

say the jury "actually rested its verdict on evidence establishing 

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Appellate Case: 90-3378 Document: 01019293524 Date Filed: 09/16/1991 Page: 6 
the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt, independently of the 

presumption." Yates, 111 s. Ct. at 1893. If the defense's theory 

of the events is correct, Hernandez may have intended only to 

wound the victim. Obviously, he may have intended murder. The 

evidence is not so strong, however, that we can say Hernandez's 

intent to kill was established beyond a reasonable doubt 

independently of the unconstitutional instruction. 

Finally, the district court held that the jury instructions, 

as a whole, cured any error because the jury was instructed that 

the state bore the burden of proving guilt. In reviewing this 

factor, we look at the instructions and apply "that customary 

presumption that jurors follow instructions." Id. The jury was 

properly instructed regarding the state's burden of guilt. The 

government, however, appears to have attempted to meet its burden, 

at least in part, by means of the unconstitutional instruction. 

Further, "[b]ecause a mandatory rebuttable presumption no doubt 

eases the jury's task, '"there is no reason to believe the jury 

would have deliberately undertaken the more difficult task" of 

evaluating the evidence of intent.'" Wiley, 767 F.2d at 683 

(quoting Johnson, 460 u.s. at 85 (quoting Sandstrom, 442 u.s. at 

526 n.13)). Although some evidence was presented rebutting the 

presumption, we cannot confidently say the jury's verdict did not 

rest on the presumption as well as the evidence. Yates 111 s. Ct. 

at 1195. Therefore, we cannot say the jury instructions as a 

whole cured the problem. 

The record, while it may support the jury's guilty verdict, 

does not compel such a result absent consideration of the 

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unconstitutional jury instruction. "The burden-shifting jury 

instruction[] found to have been erroneous in this case may not be 

excused as harmless error." Id., at 1197. 

Hernandez's motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal and 

for a certificate of probable cause is GRANTED. The judgment of 

the United States District Court for the District of Kansas is 

REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED with directions to grant the 

writ if the state court does not retry Hernandez within a 

reasonable period of time. 

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