Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05117/USCOURTS-caDC-11-05117-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 9, 2012 Decided May 18, 2012

No. 11-5117

JORGE PONCE,

APPELLANT

v.

JAMES H. BILLINGTON, LIBRARIAN, UNITED STATES LIBRARY 

OF CONGRESS,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:08-cv-01028)

Michael J. Kator argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellant. Kerrie D. Riggs entered an appearance.

Yuval Rubinstein and Melvin Radowitz were on the brief 

as amici curiae AARP, et al., in support of appellant.

Michelle Lo, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause 

for appellee. With her on the brief were Ronald C. Machen, 

Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. 

Attorney.

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Before: TATEL and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and 

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: Following trial, a jury rejected 

appellant’s claim that the Library of Congress violated Title 

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when it selected someone 

else for an open position. Now seeking a new trial, appellant 

argues that the district court erred by instructing the jury that 

he had to prove that unlawful discrimination was the “sole 

reason” for his non selection. Although we agree that “sole 

reason” is not the correct standard, the jury instructions 

themselves corrected any error by defining “sole reason” as

“but-for” causation. Recognizing, however, that our recent 

Title VII employment discrimination cases have caused some 

confusion, we take this opportunity to clarify the requirements 

the statute places upon plaintiffs and the courts.

I.

Appellant Jorge Ponce, a Cuban American male, applied 

for a position as Director of the Library of Congress’s Office 

of Workplace Diversity but was passed over in favor of 

Deborah Hayes, an African American female. Although 

Hayes received the highest interview scores out of the sixteen 

finalists for the position, she lacked some credentials that 

Ponce possessed, such as a master’s degree in Library Science 

and experience working as a librarian. After exhausting his 

administrative remedies, Ponce filed suit in the United States 

District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the 

Library had discriminated against him on the bases of race,

sex, and national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.

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Before empaneling the jury, the district court shared its 

proposed jury instructions with the parties. In relevant part, 

the instructions read:

Mr. Ponce bears the ultimate burden proving 

intentional discrimination in violation of Title VII. 

The Library is not required to prove that it did not 

intentionally discriminate. In order to carry this 

burden of proof, Mr. Ponce must prove that illegal 

discrimination on the basis of race and/or national 

origin and/or sex was the sole reason for his non 

selection. That is he must prove that but for his race 

and or but for his national origin and or but for his 

sex, he would have been hired by the Library. 

Trial Tr. at 34 (Sept. 30, 2010). Explaining the instruction, the 

district court observed that “the but for language of course 

comes right out of recent Supreme Court decisions,” and that 

“the solely language comes out of” this court’s decision in 

Ginger v. District of Columbia, 527 F.3d 1340 (D.C. Cir. 

2008); Trial Tr. at 2 (Sept. 27, 2010). The district court 

nonetheless expressed confusion about our case law, stating 

that she hoped the losing party would appeal the jury 

instructions “because the Circuit totally needs to straighten it 

out.” Pretrial Tr. at 4 (Sept. 15, 2010).

Ponce objected to the instructions, urging the court to

strike the “sole reason” language. Ponce also asked the court 

to use the “because of” causation language codified in Title 

VII instead of “but for.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (“It shall 

be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to 

discriminate against any individual . . . because of such 

individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]”

(emphasis added)). Ponce’s lawyer then engaged in the 

following exchange with the district court:

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MR. KATOR: [W]e have been saying all along that it 

was because of. So I think that the answer would be 

let’s just use the phrase [“]because of[”] because that’s 

what’s in the statute. If we do that, then we avoid it.

THE COURT: The Supreme Court has recently told us 

that because of means but for. So I’m going to stick in, 

let me stick with but for sure.

MR. KATOR: There’s nothing wrong with that 

certainly, Your Honor. But again, just because if we 

don’t know we can’t go wrong with the statutory 

definition, that much we know. Congress has said 

because of.

THE COURT: I think I’m going to go with the way 

I’ve modified it.

Trial Tr. at 5-6 (Sept. 27, 2010). Following trial, the jury 

returned with a verdict in favor of the Library.

On appeal, Ponce contends that the wording of the jury 

instructions constitutes reversible error. He also argues that 

the district court erred by refusing to admit into evidence an 

administrative recommendation that the Library find that

Ponce “was the subject of unlawful discrimination.” Ponce v. 

Billington, Personnel Appeals Board Report 32, No. 08-1028, 

ECF No. 43-4.

II.

We begin our analysis of the jury instruction issue with a 

little black-letter law. Title VII provides that “[a]ll personnel 

actions affecting employees or applicants for employment” in 

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the federal government “shall be made free from any 

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national 

origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). It is well-established that 

this provision “legislated for federal employees essentially the 

same guarantees against . . . discrimination that previously it 

had afforded private employees.” Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 

983, 988 & n.43 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also Hackley v. 

Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108, 142 n.138 (D.C. Cir. 1975) 

(“Congress had the broader purpose of equalizing the 

essential characteristic of private sector and federal employee 

Title VII suits[.]”). Thus, the general provisions of Title VII

apply with equal force in both private and federal-sector 

cases.

Title VII provides two separate ways for plaintiffs to

establish liability. First, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) bars 

discrimination “because of . . . [an] individual’s race, color, 

religion, sex, or national origin.” (emphasis added). A

plaintiff can establish liability under this section by proving

that a protected characteristic was a but-for cause of the 

adverse employment action. See McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 

1129, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1985), abrogated on other grounds by

Stevens v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 500 U.S. 1 (1991). We have 

described this causation standard as “the ‘single-motive’ or 

‘pretext’ theory of discrimination.” Fogg v. Gonzales, 492 

F.3d 447, 451 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Because direct evidence of an 

employer’s discriminatory motives is often elusive, a plaintiff

typically establishes but-for causation using the familiar

pretext framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp.

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under the McDonnell Douglas

framework, discrimination claims proceed in three steps: (1) 

the plaintiff must prove a prima facie case of discrimination; 

(2) if the plaintiff does so, then the burden shifts to the 

defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory 

reason for the action in question; and (3) if the defendant 

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meets that burden, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s 

proffered reasons were “not its true reasons, but were a

pretext for discrimination.” Wiley v. Glassman, 511 F.3d 151, 

155 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). See also Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 

F.3d 490, 493–94 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (providing that when, as is 

typical, “the employer asserts a legitimate, non-discriminatory 

reason” for an adverse employment action, the prima facie 

case “drops out of the picture,” and a plaintiff must simply 

prove “that the employer’s asserted non-discriminatory reason 

was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally 

discriminated against the employee on the basis of race, color, 

religion, sex, or national origin”) (quotation marks and 

citation omitted)).

In addition to the but-for standard, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(m) provides that “an unlawful employment practice is 

established when . . . race, color, religion, sex, or national 

origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice.”

(emphasis added). Authorizing what is known as a “mixedmotive” case, this provision allows a plaintiff unable to 

establish that a protected characteristic was the but-for cause 

of an adverse employment action to prevail by showing that 

unlawful discrimination was “a factor motivating the adverse 

action.” Ginger, 527 F.3d at 1345. As with but-for causation, 

a plaintiff can use evidence of pretext and the McDonnell 

Douglas framework to prove a mixed-motive case. See Fogg, 

492 F.3d at 451 n.*. Importantly, however, relief in a mixedmotive case is limited to “declaratory relief,” certain

“injunctive relief,” and certain fees and costs if the defendant 

“demonstrates that [it] would have taken the same action in 

the absence of the impermissible motivating factor.” 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). By contrast, a plaintiff who 

establishes but-for causation may recover damages, as well as

declaratory and injunctive relief. See Fogg, 492 F.3d at 451.

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And logically so. After all, if unlawful discrimination is the 

but-for cause of an adverse employment action, it is 

necessarily “a motivating factor” as well.

Even though we have described but-for and mixedmotive cases as “alternative ways of establishing liability,” id. 

at 453, a plaintiff may proceed under both theories 

simultaneously. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 

228 (1989)—the Supreme Court decision Title VII’s mixedmotive provision was intended to codify—the Court held:

[n]othing in this opinion should be taken to suggest 

that a case must be correctly labeled as either a 

“pretext” case or a “mixed-motives” case from the 

beginning in the District Court; indeed, we expect that 

plaintiffs often will allege, in the alternative, that their 

cases are both. Discovery will often be necessary 

before the plaintiff can know whether both legitimate 

and illegitimate considerations played a part in the 

decision against her.

Id. at 247 n.12 (plurality opinion). Thus, the Supreme Court 

has clarified that a plaintiff need not expressly allege in the

complaint that the action is either a “pretext” or a “mixedmotives” case since the plaintiff may need discovery to 

correctly categorize his claim. Moreover, a plaintiff may 

ultimately decide to proceed under both theories of liability.

Although a plaintiff need not plead a precise theory of 

causation in the complaint, at some point he must place the 

employer and court on notice as to the theory or theories 

under which he intends to proceed. In Ginger, for example, 

we held that a group of plaintiffs was required to argue that 

race was a “motivating factor” if it wished the court to 

consider a mixed-motive theory when ruling on a summary 

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judgment motion. 527 F.3d at 1345. For the same reason, a 

plaintiff who wants the court to deliver a mixed-motive jury

instruction must expressly request one at the proper stage of 

litigation. There are, of course, risks to pursuing a mixedmotive claim. A jury given both a mixed-motive and a but-for

instruction may, after weighing the evidence, decide to split 

the baby and determine that although discrimination was a 

“motivating factor,” the employer “would have taken the 

same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating 

factor.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). In such a scenario, the 

remedy would be limited to declaratory and certain injunctive 

relief (not including “admission, reinstatement, hiring, [or] 

promotion”). Id. By contrast, a plaintiff who proceeds solely 

under a but-for theory gives the jury an all-or-nothing choice: 

either find for the plaintiff, in which case the remedy would 

include monetary damages, as well as injunctive and 

declaratory relief; or find against the plaintiff, in which case 

the plaintiff would receive nothing.

The key issue in this case is whether the district court, 

attempting to instruct the jury on the but-for theory of 

liability, abused its discretion when it explained that “Ponce 

must prove that illegal discrimination . . . was the sole reason 

for his non selection.” Trial Tr. at 34 (Sept. 30, 2010) 

(emphasis added). Czekalski v. LaHood, 589 F.3d 449, 453 

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[T]he choice of language to be used in a 

[jury] instruction . . . is reviewed only for abuse of 

discretion.”)(internal quotation marks omitted). As an initial 

matter, we agree with Ponce that “sole” and but-for cause are

very different. In the context of this case, for example, the

jury might have determined that Hayes was hired—and thus 

Ponce rejected—because of two relevant but-for causes, both 

of which were necessary to her selection: (1) her stellar 

interview, for which she was ranked the highest among the 

candidates, and (2) her race. In such a situation, a jury 

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properly instructed as to but-for causation would find for the 

plaintiff, whereas a jury taking a “sole cause” instruction 

literally would find for the Library. Recognizing this concept, 

the Supreme Court expressly held in McDonald v. Santa Fe 

Trail Transportation Co. that nothing in Title VII requires a 

plaintiff to “show that he would have in any event been 

rejected or discharged solely on the basis of” a protected 

characteristic. 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976) (emphasis 

added). Instead, “no more is required to be shown than that [a 

protected characteristic] was a ‘but for’ cause.” Id.

It is true that our own Title VII cases have said that a 

plaintiff may prevail in a motivating-factor (mixed-motive) 

case without showing that unlawful discrimination was “the 

sole or but-for motive for the employment action.” See Fogg, 

492 F.3d at 451 (quoting Porter v. Natsios, 414 F.3d 13, 19 

(D.C. Cir. 2005)). This merely means that a “motivating 

factor” may be less significant than either a sole or but-for 

cause. But we never said—nor could we given McDonald—

that a plaintiff in a but-for case must show that an adverse 

employment action occurred solely because of a protected 

characteristic. Indeed, in Porter v. Natsios, our first decision

to have used the “sole or but-for motive” language, we cited 

the Supreme Court’s Price Waterhouse decision, explaining 

that Price Waterhouse “recogni[zed] that the statutory phrase 

‘because of’ does not mean ‘solely because of.’ ” Porter, 414 

F.3d at 18 (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241); see 

also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241 n.7 (noting that 

Congress “specifically rejected an amendment that would 

have placed ‘solely’ in front of the words ‘because of’” in 

Title VII). Then, in Ginger we used “sole motive” as 

shorthand for but-for cause, suggesting that in a “singlemotive case,” a plaintiff “argues race (or another prohibited 

criterion) was the sole reason for an adverse employment 

action.” 527 F.3d at 1345. Understandably, then, the district 

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court here read Ginger as requiring that the jury instruction 

include “sole reason.” We thus take this opportunity to 

clarify: nothing in Title VII requires a plaintiff to show that 

illegal discrimination was the sole cause of an adverse 

employment action. And mindful that “our words from loose 

using have lost their edge,” Ernest Hemingway, Death in the 

Afternoon 63 (Scribner Classics 1999) (1932), we hereby 

banish the word “sole” from our Title VII lexicon.

This brings us to the jury instruction in this case. Had the 

district court stopped at the end of the second sentence—

Ponce “must prove that illegal discrimination . . . was the sole 

reason for his non selection”—we might well have reversed. 

But caught between our language in Ginger and the Supreme 

Court’s repudiation of a “sole cause” standard, the district 

court sought to harmonize binding case law by defining “sole 

reason” as “but for” cause. Specifically, immediately 

following the “sole reason” language, the district court added

the following definition: “[t]hat is he must prove that but for 

his race and or but for his national origin and or but for his 

sex, he would have been hired by the Library.” Trial Tr. at 34 

(Sept. 30, 2010). Given this clear definition of “sole reason,”

the instructions fairly and adequately conveyed the law to the 

jury. We therefore see nothing in the jury instructions that

constitutes an abuse of discretion.

Nor did the district court err by failing to give a mixedmotive instruction. Ponce argued his case only under a but-for 

theory of liability. In his colloquy with the district court, 

Ponce’s lawyer expressly confirmed that “we have been 

saying all along that it was because of,” and further stated 

“[t]here’s nothing wrong with that certainly,” when the 

district court noted that “because of means but for.” Trial Tr. 

at 5 (Sept. 27, 2010). Moreover, although Ponce contended at 

oral argument before this court that he had submitted a 

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proposed mixed-motive instruction to the district court, his 

filings belie that assertion. Responding to the district court’s 

request that the parties submit “proposed alternative 

language” to its jury instructions, Ponce submitted a red line

version of the district court’s instructions with the “sole 

reason” language crossed out. Had the district court accepted 

this suggestion, the jury would have received a clear but-for 

instruction. Nowhere in the record do we find any indication 

that Ponce proposed a mixed-motive instruction. 

III.

We can easily dispose of Ponce’s other argument: that the 

district court erred when it excluded a portion of a report by 

the Personnel Appeals Board of the Government 

Accountability Office (PAB). After Ponce filed an 

administrative complaint alleging discrimination, the Library

delegated investigation of that complaint to PAB. See Ponce 

v. Billington, Personnel Appeals Board Report 1, No. 08-

1028, ECF No. 43-4 (explaining that because Ponce’s 

“complaint concerned the selection of the Library official 

responsible for processing discrimination complaints, the 

Library entered into an Interagency Agreement” with GAO to 

process and investigate the complaint). PAB ultimately 

recommended that the Library determine Ponce “was the 

subject of unlawful discrimination,” id. at 32—a 

recommendation the Library rejected. 

Prior to trial, Ponce moved to have the entire PAB report 

admitted as evidence. Although the district court admitted the 

“Factual Background” section of the report, it excluded the 

remaining portions—including the recommended finding of 

discrimination—because the analysis was “extraordinarily 

weak” and “shouldn’t be before the jury.” Pretrial Tr. at 6. 

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Ponce urges us to hold that recommendations of 

administrative bodies, like PAB, are per se admissible. But

along with at least seven of our sister circuits, we think it best 

to leave the admissibility of administrative reports in this 

context to the discretion of the trial court. See Jamie Goetz, 

Comment, Whose Opinion Really Matters? Admitting EEOC 

Reasonable Cause Determinations as Evidence of 

Discrimination, 76 U. Cin. L. Rev. 995, 1000 n.38 (2008) 

(citing cases). As the Seventh Circuit explained: “A rule of 

per se admissibility . . . would clearly undercut the district 

court’s function as an independent fact-finder.” Tulloss v. 

Near N. Montessori Sch., Inc., 776 F.2d 150, 154 (7th Cir. 

1985).

Nor does Ponce point to anything in the record to suggest 

that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the 

PAB’s conclusion. Quite to the contrary, the district court 

determined that the administrative recommendation and its 

analysis were “extraordinarily weak.” Pretrial Tr. at 6. The 

district court therefore determined that the recommendation 

was “inadmissible as unduly prejudicial per Federal Rule of 

Evidence 403.” Minute Order, Ponce v. Billington, No. 08-

1028 (Sept. 24, 2010). This seems right to us.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the jury verdict in 

favor of the Library.

So ordered.

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