Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00024/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00024-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARCELINO CALDERON SILVA,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-01-0024 LKK EFB P

vs.

ROSANNE CAMPBELL, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging

civil rights violations. Currently under consideration is defendants’ motion for summary

judgment.

 The case proceeds on the April 19, 2001, first amended complaint which alleges that

defendant Acuna placed packets of heroin in plaintiff’s cell, thereby subjecting him to

disciplinary sanctions, including placement in administrative segregation. Plaintiff alleges that

Acuna put the packets in his cell in retaliation for plaintiff having filed grievances. The

complaint also alleges that defendant Campbell refused to release plaintiff from administrative

segregation in retaliation for plaintiff having filed grievances. As explained below, plaintiff has

failed to present evidence sufficient to show a genuine issue of material fact and defendants’

motion must be granted.

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I. Facts

At all times relevant to this action, plaintiff was a prisoner confined at Folsom State

Prison (“FSP”). Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Stmt. of Undisp. Facts in Supp. Thereof (“SUF”) 1. 

It appears from the record that defendant Campbell was the Acting Warden and defendant O.

Acuna was the Facility Captain of Unit I, but neither Campbell nor Acuna submit declarations

explaining their positions at the prison during the relevant time period. Pl.’s Opp’n, Exs. B, C, at

unnumbered p. 11. 

It further appears from the record that plaintiff is not timid about filing grievances. On

August 27, 1999, he filed one, designated Log # FSP 099-791, alleging that an unidentified

counselor violated prison regulations by waiting more than 10 work days to respond to another

grievance plaintiff had filed and by not completing a declaration necessary for plaintiff to

proceed in forma pauperis in judicial proceedings. SUF 16; Defs.’ Memo. of P. & A. in Supp. of

Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Ex.”) H at unnumbered p. 1. On December 20, 1999, plaintiff filed

another grievance, designated Log # FSP 00-0051, in which he alleged that a guard failed to

process his legal mail. SUF 16. On March 12, 2000, plaintiff filed yet another grievance,

designated Log. No. 00-073, complaining that he had been having difficulties receiving

envelopes and writing paper. Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. E. Defendant Campbell signed the reviewer’s

action partially to grant the appeal on the second formal level of review. Id. At deposition,

plaintiff admitted that he did not identify or mention Acuna as a reviewing officer in these

grievances. SUF 16.

Plaintiff also helped other prisoners challenge prison policy and rules. Relevant here is

the seismic retrofit project at FSP, which generated a great deal of airborne debris. Pl.’s Opp’n,

Ex. A. In response to this condition, prisoners - contrary to prison policy - covered openings

from their cells to the tiers. For a time, prison officials permitted this practice. However, on

April 14, 2000, defendant Acuna directed guards to remove all “sheets, plastic, card board,

privacy screens, curtains, etc.,” that prisoners had put up in an attempt to shield themselves from

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 Plaintiff himself did not file the grievance. He simply prepared it for the other inmate.

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airborne particles. Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. B; SUF 17. Plaintiff submits a copy of a grievance that he

drafted for a fellow prisoner.1 Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. C, unnumbered p. 1. The grievance complained

about Acuna’s directive, asserting that it violated the prisoner’s rights and would expose him to

harmful substances. Id. It is unclear whether plaintiff or a different prisoner copied and

distributed this grievance to other prisoners. Defs.’ Memo. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. for

Summ. J., Ex. A (“Defs.’ Ex.”)(Excerpts of plaintiff’s deposition)(hereafter “Pl.’s Dep.”), at 31,

44. However, it is undisputed that using the grievance plaintiff had drafted as a template, about

250 prisoners (in addition to the prisoner plaintiff originally helped), filed this grievance

complaining about Acuna’s directive. Pl.’s Dep., at 31, 44; SUF 17. Plaintiff did not sign any of

these grievances or submit one on his own behalf. SUF 18; Pl.’s Dep., at 18. Defendant Acuna

signed the first formal level response denying the April 20, 2000, appeal that plaintiff had

prepared. Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. C, unnumbered p. 7.

On July 13, 2000, guards searched various cells on the tier where plaintiff was housed. 

SUF 2. The record reveals no connection between this search and the seismic retrofit activities. 

During the search, a guard, S. Novikoff, found three packets of a suspicious substance tucked

into a bible in the cell plaintiff shared with a fellow prisoner. SUF 2; Pl.’s Dep., at 45; Defs.’

Memo. of P. & A., Ex. B, at 1 (Rules Violation Report of 7/13/00). The bible was written in

Spanish, which plaintiff and his cellmate both read and spoke. Defs.’ Ex. G, at unnumbered p. 2. 

It was found in what prison officials deemed to be a “common area,” in the bottom bunk on a

pillow. Defs.’ Ex. B, at 1; Defs.’ Ex. G, at unnumbered p. 2. Based on field testing, prison

officials tentatively determined that the substance was heroin. Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. G, at p. 2. That

the drug was contained in three separate packets suggested to prison officials that it was intended

for sale, as opposed to personal use. SUF 2. Consequently, a rules violation report was filed

charging plaintiff with the distribution of narcotics. Id. Officials charged his cellmate with the

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2

 California’s prison regulatory scheme provides for the placement in administrative

segregation a prisoner who is suspected of violating prison rules. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, 

§ 3335(a) (“When an inmate’s presence in an institution’s general inmate population presents an

immediate threat to the safety of the inmate or others, endangers institution security or

jeopardizes the integrity of an investigation of an alleged serious misconduct or criminal activity,

the inmate shall be immediately removed from the general population and be placed in

administrative segregation.”); 

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same infraction. Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. I, at 2. A July 31, 2000, laboratory report confirmed that the

substance was heroin. Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. J.

Prison officials then placed plaintiff in administrative segregation pending a hearing on

the charge.2 SUF 3. Prison officials also referred the cases of both plaintiff and his cell-mate to

the District Attorney’s Office for possible criminal prosecution. SUF 5; Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. I, at 2. 

Pursuant to prison regulations, on July 24, 2000, plaintiff waived his right to a timely prison

disciplinary hearing, pending the District Attorney’s decision whether to pursue criminal

charges. SUF 4; Defs.’ Ex. B, at unnumbered p. 1; see Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3320(b). Every

30 days from July 2000 through January 2001, plaintiff appeared before the Institutional

Classification Committee for review of his placement in administrative segregation. SUF 6. At

each appearance, the committee found that the placement was appropriate because the

allegations in the rules violation report were serious. Id. 

For some reason not clear in the record, the disciplinary hearing was held before the

District Attorney decided whether to file criminal charges. Thus, on January 10, 2001, a

disciplinary hearing was held on the allegations in the rules violation report. Defs.’ Ex. G, at

unnumbered p. 1-2. Plaintiff was found guilty of distribution of narcotics, as was his cellmate.

SUF 9; Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. I, at 2. As a result, plaintiff lost 180 days of credit and various

privileges, such as visits, and was required to undergo drug testing and to participate in a

substance abuse program. Defs.’ Ex. G, at unnumbered p. 2. The findings specifically noted

that plaintiff and his cellmate, who had been charged with the same offense, were equally

responsible for the heroin found in the cell. Defs.’ Ex. G, at unnumbered p. 2; Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. I. 

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Plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed to the Director’s Level of Review. Pl.’s Dep., at 49. The

matter was submitted to a CSR to approve a six-month SHU term. Defs.’ Ex. C. Plaintiff was

released from administrative segregation. SUF 7. Ultimately, on March 9, 2001, the District

Attorney notified prison officials that plaintiff would not be charged with any crime. SUF 8;

Defs.’ Ex. B, at unnumbered p. 1.

 On August 9, 2001, the CSR to whom plaintiff’s disciplinary conviction had been

referred refused to approve the recommended penalties for two reasons. First, the evidence was

insufficient to sustain a finding of trafficking in heroin. In particular, the CSR found that “all

that’s been proven is that inmate (i.e., Silva) and his cell mate were found to be in possession of

3 bindles that later proved positive for heroin that may or may not have been for personal

consumption.” Defs.’ Ex. C. Second, the charge was made before lab testing verified that the

substance was heroin. Id. The field test was insufficient to make the charges. Id. Thus, the

CSR directed that the rules violation report be reissued and reheard, and prohibited the forfeiture

of time credits. Id. However, prison officials did not do so promptly. It was not until another

CSR reviewed plaintiff’s file after he applied for a job in 2004 that the charge of possession of

heroin was reheard in April of 2004. SUF 10; Pl.’s Dep., at 49. Plaintiff was found guilty of this

lesser offense. SUF 10. At deposition, plaintiff testified that Acuna knew that plaintiff was not

guilty of the drug charges. Pl.’s Dep., at 46. 

Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the state court challenging the

disciplinary conviction and seeking the restoration of his time credits and an order directing that

it be expunged. SUF 11. However, as noted above, once the charge was reduced to possession

of heroin, the credits were restored. Pl.’s Dep., at 52. 

Plaintiff denies ever having been involved in drug activities in prison. Pl.’s Dep., at 46.

Defendants submit no evidence that plaintiff ever used or distributed drugs in prison. Plaintiff

was not in his cell at the time of the search. Pl.’s Dep., at 46-47. According to plaintiff’s

deposition testimony the bible containing the drugs was close to the cell bars near the tray

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opening, which suggested to plaintiff that someone tossed it in. Pl.’s Dep., at 47. 

Despite the events involving the heroin, plaintiff continues to file administrative

grievances. SUF 12. He also continues to assist other prisoners with their grievances and legal

work. Pl.’s Dep., at 67. This was the case both at FSP after the heroin charge and at California

State Prison, Solano, to which plaintiff subsequently was transferred. Pl.’s Dep., at 68. 

 At deposition, plaintiff conceded that he did not file any grievances directly accusing

defendant Acuna of misconduct. SUF 14. He also conceded that he has no direct evidence that

Acuna placed the heroin in his cell in order to frame him on drug charges. SUF 13. Plaintiff

believes that Acuna knew plaintiff filed grievances. SUF 20. But plaintiff admits he has no

direct evidence that Acuna knew plaintiff filed grievances, or knew that plaintiff drafted the

template that multiplied into 251 grievances against Acuna. He also admitted that he has no

direct evidence that Campbell knew that he filed grievances or had any intent to retaliate against

him. SUF 22, 23. He did testify, however, that both Campbell and Acuna knew of plaintiff’s

grievances because both had to respond to them. Pl.’s Dep., at 53, 57. Plaintiff also speculated

at deposition that other prisoners may have informed Campbell and Acuna that plaintiff drafted

the original of the 251 grievances about Acuna’s handling of the retrofit project. Pl.’s Dep., at

58. He testified that before July 13, 2000, he did not himself file any administrative appeals

complaining about defendant Acuna or defendant Campbell. Pl.’s Dep., at 34. Plaintiff helped

other prisoners file grievances before July 13, 2000, but he did not keep track of how many. 

Pl.’s Dep., at 43-44. 

Plaintiff testified that Campbell’s position on the classification committees that reviewed

his administrative segregation placement, and her authority to release him from administrative

segregation, and her failure to so release him, in combination evidences a motive to retaliate

against him. Pl.’s Dep., at 58. Defendants’ evidence shows that Campbell was on some of these

committees, but not all of them. Defs.’ Ex. E.

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II. Standards on Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists “no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district

court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of

“the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact.

Summary judgment avoids unnecessary trials in cases with no genuinely disputed

material facts. See Northwest Motorcycle Ass’n v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468,

1471 (9th Cir. 1994). At issue is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to

require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter

of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). Thus, Rule 56 serves to

screen the latter cases from those which actually require resolution of genuine disputes over

material facts; e.g., issues that can only be determined through presentation of testimony at trial

such as the credibility of conflicting testimony over facts that make a difference in the outcome. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).

Focus on where the burden of proof lies as to the issue in question is crucial to summary

judgment procedures. “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the

‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Indeed,

summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,

against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See

id. at 322. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as whatever

is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set

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 A verified complaint may be used as an affidavit in opposition to the motion. 

Schroeder v McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 (9th Cir. 1995); McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196,

197-98 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).

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forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the opposing party must establish that

a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To overcome summary judgment, the opposing

party must demonstrate a factual dispute that is both material, i.e. it affects the outcome of the

claim under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986);

T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and

genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party. See Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987). In this

regard, “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s

case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. In attempting to

establish the existence of a factual dispute that is genuine, the opposing party may not rely upon

the allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in

the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the

dispute exists.3

 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. It is sufficient that

“the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631.

Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the

proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 amendments). However, the

opposing party must demonstrate with adequate evidence a genuine issue for trial. 

Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 1989). The opposing party must do

so with evidence upon which a fair-minded jury "could return a verdict for [him] on the evidence

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presented." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 252. If the evidence presented

could not support a judgment in the opposing party’s favor, there is no genuine issue. Id.;

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323.

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at

255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be

drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Nevertheless, inferences

are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual

predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F.

Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to

demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken as a whole could

not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

On June 15, 2004, the court advised plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a motion

pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d

952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999), and Klingele v.

Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).

III. Analysis

"As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only

disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will

properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Here, plaintiff

sues under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 on the ground that defendants retaliated against him for

exercising his First Amendment rights. To prove retaliation, plaintiff must show by a

preponderance of the evidence that the defendant took some adverse action against plaintiff and

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that this action was motivated by plaintiff’s exercise of a First Amendment right and served no

legitimate penological purpose. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2003);

Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). Institutional order and

discipline are legitimate penological goals. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Plaintiff must also prove a causal connection between the exercise of constitutional rights and

the allegedly retaliatory action. See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). The

parties agree that plaintiff’s filing grievances constitutes the exercise of a First Amendment right. 

See Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283 (9th Cir. 2003).

Plaintiff claims that defendants Campbell and Acuna arranged for three packets of heroin

to be placed in his cell in retaliation for plaintiff’s having filed grievances. Both defendants

argue that there is no evidence to support the allegation, and further that there is no genuine issue

about whether they knew of plaintiff’s grievances. 

A. Defendant Acuna

It is undisputed that plaintiff filed grievances before July 13, 2000, the day his cell was

searched. It also is undisputed that he drafted the initial grievance about Acuna’s directive to

remove coverings from cell openings, which became the template for 251 grievances against

Acuna. It is reasonable to infer that 251 grievances, if filed at or around the same time, would

clog the administrative appeals system and become annoying. However, there is no evidence at

all that Acuna was aware of the fact, or even suspected, that plaintiff drafted the template for

these grievances. Plaintiff admits that he has no direct evidence to support such a finding. 

Although the undisputed evidence shows that he regularly assisted other prisoners, he does not

submit any evidence that Acuna knew this. He does not even submit evidence that he had a

reputation amongst prison officials for assisting his fellow prisoners, and that Acuna knew of

this reputation. Thus, plaintiff fails to establish a genuine issue about whether the flood of

grievances about Acuna motivated Acuna to retaliate against plaintiff.

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Furthermore, plaintiff’s August 27, 1999, December 20, 1999, or March 12, 2000

grievances do not provide a basis for finding that Acuna intended to retaliate against plaintiff. 

Plaintiff did not mention Acuna in these grievances, and there is no evidence that Acuna

participated in the review of them. Plaintiff’s assertion that Acuna must have known about them

because he was a supervisor is simply speculation and asks the court to infer too much. There is

no evidence that Acuna’s job tasks included keeping track of prisoners’ grievances. It is

implausible that as Facility Captain, Acuna knew of each and every grievance the prisoners on

his unit filed. To the contrary, under the regulations tracking grievances is the job of the

Appeals Coordinator. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.3(a). Plaintiff fails to establish a genuine

issue about whether his August 27, 1999, December 20, 1999, or March 12, 2000, grievances

caused Acuna to retaliate against him.

While the failure to establish the element addressed above renders all other factual

disputes immaterial, the court also addresses the element of an adverse action; i.e., specifically

the allegation that defendants planted heroin in his cell. Plaintiff asserts that never before the

incident with the bible was he involved with drug activity in prison. Defendants do not directly

dispute this assertion. The evidence also suggests that prison officials impermissibly filed

disciplinary charges based on a field test of the substance instead of waiting for the lab test

results. Furthermore, they found him guilty of trafficking and, on administrative appeal, it was

determined that the evidence did not support a finding of trafficking. When directed to re-issue

and re-hear the matter based on these defects, the matter was delayed years before taking any

action to do so. These flaws do not place defendants in the most positive light. However, there

is no evidence whatsoever that Acuna placed the heroin in plaintiff’s cell or directed anyone else

to do so. Plaintiff’s extravagant accusation is wholly unsupported by the record. Thus, there is

no genuine dispute about whether Acuna took any adverse action against plaintiff.

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With respect to Acuna, then, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of

material fact with respect to two elements of his claim and Acuna is entitled to summary

judgment. 

B. Defendant Campbell

As noted, plaintiff claims that defendant Campbell recommended holding him in

administrative segregation for months before his January 2001, disciplinary hearing. Campbell

contends that there is no genuine issue about whether she intended to retaliate. Plaintiff asserts

that defendant Campbell knew that he drafted the complaint about Acuna, which, as explained

above, became a template for a flood of grievances. He asserts that other prisoners must have

informed her. However, he offers no evidence that other prisoners informed her of this fact. As

noted above, there is no evidence that plaintiff had among prison officials a reputation for filing

grievances, or that if he did Campbell knew of it. Thus, plaintiff’s having drafted the grievance

about Acuna cannot serve as a basis for finding that Campbell intended to retaliate against

plaintiff.

Initially, Campbell asserted that she did not know about the grievances plaintiff

submitted on his own behalf. However, plaintiff submitted evidence that she signed the decision

partially granting relief on the second level of review of his March 12, 2000, appeal. In her reply

to plaintiff’s opposition, Campbell concedes that she signed that decision. Campbell does not

submit a declaration denying an intent to retaliate or explaining the basis of her decisions about

plaintiff’s placement, but plaintiff concedes that he has no direct evidence that Campbell

intended to retaliate against him. Moreover, the fact that she signed a decision partially granting

one of plaintiff’s grievance does not raise an inference that she later recommenced plaintiff be

housed in administrative segregation in retaliation. Indeed, there is no evidence to show that she

was motivated by anything other than the fact that three packets of heroin had been found in

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4

 Moreover, plaintiff’s cellmate also was charged with the offense, which makes it less

likely that plaintiff was the target of prison officials’ retaliation.

5

 See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3335 (providing for periodic review of a prisoner’s

placement in administrative segregation).

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plaintiff’s cell.4

Even if plaintiff were to demonstrate a prima facie showing of retaliatory motivation, the

defendant can prevail on summary judgment with undisputed evidence of a legitimate

penological purpose for the adverse action. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.

Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-86 (1977) (after plaintiff satisfies his burden of showing that the

defendant's conduct was motivated by his exercise of a constitutional right, the burden shifts to

the defendant to establish that the decision would have been no different even in the absence of

the protected conduct). It is undisputed that plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation

after the substance found in plaintiff’s cell tested positive for a controlled substance. It is also

undisputed that from July through January, classification committees decided to keep plaintiff in

administrative segregation pending a disciplinary hearing on the trafficking charges. It was

plaintiff’s decision to postpone the administrative hearing until the District Attorney decided

whether to pursue criminal charges. The classification committees’ reports show that their

decisions were based on the seriousness of the administrative charges and that they believed

plaintiff was a threat to the safety and security of the prison. Although Campbell was on four of

the five later committees, she was not a member of the committee that initially decided to hold

plaintiff in administrative segregation. Defs’ Ex. E, at unnumbered p. 1, 2, 4-7. Campbell has

clearly demonstrated a legitimate penological reason to hold plaintiff in administrative

segregation until the matter was sorted out. By the time she was approving his retention there,

lab tests, as opposed to the field tests, had demonstrated that the substance was heroin. Nothing

submitted by plaintiff establishes that Campbell should have abandoned routine prison security

practices in this matter.5

 Neither has plaintiff shown and basis for this court not to defer to

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 Similarly, the court need not address defendants’ revived argument that plaintiff’s

claims are not cognizable based on Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). The argument

was rejected in the December 21, 2006, order denying defendants’ motion for judgment on the

pleadings. In light of the analysis above, the court does not reach the suggestion that the earlier

ruling be reconsidered.

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prison administrators’ decisions with regard to security and safety. See Turner v. Safley, 482

U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987) (observing that, “running a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking

that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly

within the province of” the state legislative and executive branches); see also, Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 n. 14 (1981) (“a prison’s internal security is peculiarly a matter

normally left to the discretion of prison administrators”); Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328,

331 (9th Cir. 1988) (federal district courts must give great deference to prison officials’

assessments of security and safety concerns in a correctional setting).

Plaintiff fails to submit evidence upon which a reasonable jury could rely to conclude

that Campbell’s decisions here were motivated by retaliation and the speculation that plaintiff

offers is insufficient to withstand summary judgment. Thus, Campbell’s motion must be

granted.

IV. Qualified Immunity

Because the court resolves the summary judgment motion relating to the merits in favor

of defendants, there is no reason to enquire further into an asserted defense of qualified

immunity. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S.Ct. 2588, 2608 (2007).6

V. Conclusion

Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that defendants’ June 23, 2006, motion for

summary judgment be granted and that judgment be entered in their favor.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days after

being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections

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with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: September 8, 2008.

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