Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01426/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01426-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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MH 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Eric Kevin Pesqueira, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Charles Ryan, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 15-1426-PHX-DGC (ESW) 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Eric Kevin Pesqueira, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison 

Complex-Lewis, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

(Doc. 1) and paid the required filing and administrative fees. The Court will dismiss 

Defendants Ryan, Pratt, McKamey, Corizon, Sedlar, Reece, and Does I-IV. Plaintiff will 

be given 30 days to file a response containing additional information regarding the 

Defendant identified in the Complaint as “John Doe Nurse.” 

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 

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 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. 

 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

II. Complaint 

 In his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts two claims of constitutionally deficient medical 

care arising out of injuries he sustained while playing basketball in the Special 

Management Unit I (“SMU I”) at ASPC-Florence. He names as Defendants Charles 

Ryan, the Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections (“ADOC”); Richard Pratt, 

the Division Director of Health Services; Corizon Health, a contracted Health Care 

Provider; Arlene McKamey, a Health Care Provider; Nurse Sedlar, a Nurse at SMU I; Dr. 

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Edward Reece, a hand surgeon contracted by ADOC; “John Doe Nurse,” a Nurse at SMU 

I; and John/Jane Does I-IV, who are identified as medical staff at ASPC-Eyman. He 

seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages. 

 In Count One, Plaintiff alleges that he fell while playing basketball at SMU I on 

September 25, 2013. As a result of the fall, his right hand was “severely injured[,] 

displaying extreme swelling, extreme dark bruising[,] loss of mobilit[y,] and a bone 

loosely shifting in the metacarpals.” Over the course of the next several weeks, Plaintiff 

brought his injury to the attention of several nurses, both verbally and in written health 

needs request forms (“HNRs”). He requested medical care from Defendant Sedlar and 

was told by Sedlar that “the provider wasn’t in,” “the provider wouldn’t talk to her (that 

day),” and he was “on the list for x-rays.” According to Plaintiff, he was never placed on 

an emergency line, and his records showed that he was not seen by a provider until 

“much later.” Another nurse (“Doe #1”) told Plaintiff that “she was letting Sedlar take 

care of it” and failed to put Plaintiff on the emergency line, in violation of prison policy. 

John Doe Nurse “straight out told [Plaintiff] that he would have to wait for [his] HNR to 

be answered.” John Doe Nurse would not call Plaintiff in or provide any ice or pain 

management “despite being aware of the severity” of Plaintiff’s injury. Plaintiff showed 

his hand to other unidentified nurses, but still was not “called to medical.”1

 Plaintiff 

submitted an HNR on October 4, 2013, that “describ[ed] the . . . injuries,” and Doe #2 

responded by stating that Plaintiff would be placed on “NL.” “At no time” was Plaintiff 

provided pain management. 

 On October 17, 2013, Plaintiff received x-rays that revealed he had broken his 

fourth and fifth metacarpals. He was sent to a physician for treatment on November 4, 

2013, but by that time “it was too late for him to receive the necessary surgical fix[].” On 

December 16, 2013, it was discovered that Plaintiff could no longer fully extend the 

 

1

 Count One also includes an allegation against Nurse Salas. Plaintiff’s allegation against Salas is not addressed herein, however, as Salas was not identified as a 

Defendant. 

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fingers he had broken. According to the Complaint, if Plaintiff had received timely 

treatment, he would have “been treated much differently with the expectation of a better 

outcome.” Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Reece would not operate on his 

fingers unless he also performed surgery on Plaintiff’s wrist. According to Plaintiff, 

Reece “has an interest in minimizing surgical procedures due to the contract in place” 

with ADOC. 

 Plaintiff claims that Defendant Ryan is responsible for “establishing, monitoring[,] 

and enforcing overall operations, policies[, and] practices of ADOC,” and Defendant 

Pratt “is responsible . . . for establishing monitoring[,] and enforcing system-wide health 

care policies and practices.” Plaintiff also claims that Corizon failed to properly train its 

Nurses and attributes part of the delay in treatment to a staff shortage. As a result of 

Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff claims, he suffered “extreme physical pain,” and incurred 

permanent damage to his fingers. 

 Plaintiff’s allegations in Count Two “involve the same exact incident” and are 

“identical [to] those in Count [One]” except insofar as they address the injury to his wrist, 

rather than his hand. According to the Complaint, when Plaintiff fell on September 25, 

2013, he suffered significant damage to his wrist that led to a “permanent inability to 

extend or fully bend” it. In addition, he experienced “unrelenting significant” pain. 

Plaintiff alleges that “[A]DOC failed to provide pain management deliberately,” and even 

when he “did receive a provider who was working to find a treatment plan,” ADOC 

“denied her first requested medication without offering a specific alternative.” 

III. Failure to State a Claim

 To prevail in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) acts by the defendants 

(2) under color of state law (3) deprived him of federal rights, privileges or immunities 

and (4) caused him damage. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (quoting Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Idaho Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 

1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994)). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific 

injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must allege an 

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affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 

423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). 

 Not every claim by a prisoner relating to inadequate medical treatment states a 

violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. To state a § 1983 medical claim, a 

plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with “deliberate indifference to serious 

medical needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A plaintiff must show (1) a “serious medical need” 

by demonstrating that failure to treat the condition could result in further significant 

injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and (2) the defendant’s response 

was deliberately indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quotations omitted). 

 “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 

1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must 

both know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; “the official must both be 

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 

harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 

837 (1994). Deliberate indifference in the medical context may be shown by a 

purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and 

harm caused by the indifference. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may 

also be shown when a prison official intentionally denies, delays, or interferes with 

medical treatment or by the way prison doctors respond to the prisoner’s medical needs. 

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05; Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

 Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary 

due care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “Neither negligence nor 

gross negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” Clement v. California Dep’t of 

Corr., 220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 

622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or 

“medical malpractice” do not support a claim under § 1983). “A difference of opinion 

does not amount to deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff’s] serious medical needs.” 

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Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). A mere delay in medical care, 

without more, is insufficient to state a claim against prison officials for deliberate 

indifference. See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 

(9th Cir. 1985). The indifference must be substantial. The action must rise to a level of 

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. 

A. Defendants Ryan, Pratt, and McKamey 

 As noted above, a § 1983 plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury as 

a result of specific conduct of a defendant and show an affirmative link between the 

injury and the conduct of that defendant. See Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371-72, 377. There is no 

respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and, therefore, a defendant’s position as the 

supervisor of persons who allegedly violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights does not 

impose liability. Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 

(1978); Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 1992); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 

1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and 

§ 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the 

official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. 

 Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant Ryan, Pratt, and McKamey personally 

participated in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, were aware of a 

deprivation and failed to act, or formed policies that resulted in Plaintiff’s injuries. 

Instead, Plaintiff appears to be asserting claims against these Defendants based solely 

upon their supervisory positions within ADOC—a theory of liability that is not 

cognizable under § 1983. Accordingly, Ryan, Pratt, and McKamey will be dismissed 

without prejudice. 

B. Corizon 

 To state a claim under § 1983 against a private entity performing a traditional 

public function, such as providing meals or medical care to prisoners, a plaintiff must 

allege facts to support that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of a policy, 

decision, or custom promulgated or endorsed by the private entity. See Tsao v. Desert 

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Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2012); Buckner v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 452 

(11th Cir. 1997). A plaintiff must allege the specific policy or custom and how it violated 

his constitutional rights. A private entity is not liable simply because it employed 

individuals who allegedly violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Tsao, 698 F.3d 

at 1139. 

 As a privately owned corporation that provides medical care to state inmates under 

contract with the state, Corizon may be considered a “person” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. However, while Plaintiff alleges that Corizon “failed to properly train [its] 

nurses,” he does not identify an express policy that was established or endorsed by 

Corizon, and the facts he alleges concerning delays in treatment are not sufficient to 

create an inference that such a policy exists. Indeed, the Complaint does not contain any 

allegations regarding Corizon’s purported failure to train its staff other than Plaintiff’s 

characterization of that training as inadequate. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a 

claim against Corizon, and it will be dismissed without prejudice. 

 C. Defendants Sedlar, Reece, and Does I-IV 

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Sedlar, Reece, and Does I-IV are not 

sufficient to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Although Plaintiff alleges that 

he asked Defendant Sedlar and “several nurses” if he could be seen by a doctor, it is 

unclear from the Complaint whether these Defendants recognized that Plaintiff had a 

serious medical need. In addition, Plaintiff has failed to indicate that he made each of 

these Defendants aware of the lengthy delays that he was experiencing in connection with 

his requests for treatment. 

 Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Reece are similarly deficient, as they do 

not demonstrate a deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical need. On the contrary, it 

is clear from the allegations in Count One that Reece evinced a willingness to treat 

Plaintiff. And, absent additional facts, Plaintiff’s claim that Reece was unwilling to 

perform surgery on Plaintiff’s hand without performing surgery on his wrist does not 

support a claim of deliberately indifferent conduct. There are many reasons a doctor 

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might elect to forego a surgical procedure under such circumstances. For instance, it is 

entirely possible that the risks associated with surgery would outweigh the potential 

benefit of a procedure performed on the hand alone. Plaintiff’s claim that Reece refused 

to perform the surgery on his hand because he “ha[d] an interest in minimizing surgical 

procedures” is not only conclusory, but it is also inconsistent with his allegation that 

Reece would not operate on Plaintiff’s hand unless he also operated on his wrist. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for constitutionally inadequate medical 

care against Defendants Sedlar, Reece, and Does I-IV, and these Defendants will be 

dismissed without prejudice. 

IV. Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required

 Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated an Eighth Amendment claim against 

Defendant John Doe Nurse. However, while Plaintiff has alleged his claim with enough 

specificity to require an answer from this individual, the Court will not direct that service 

be made on John Doe Nurse at this time. Generally, the use of anonymous-type 

appellations to identify defendants is not favored. Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure requires a plaintiff to include the names of the parties in the action. And, 

as a practical matter, it is impossible in most instances for the United States Marshal or 

his designee to serve a summons and complaint on an anonymous defendant. 

 Plaintiff has not explained why he has not supplied the name of John Doe Nurse, 

and it is unclear why Plaintiff was unable to identify this Defendant. Nevertheless, the 

Court will not dismiss the Complaint at this time. See Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 

1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (where identity of alleged defendants is unknown prior to 

filing of complaint, plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify 

the unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities 

or that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds). The Court will give Plaintiff 

30 days to respond to this Order in a written pleading entitled “Response.” Plaintiff’s 

Response must include either (1) the name of the Defendant identified as “John Doe 

Nurse” or (2) an explanation of what Plaintiff has done to try to learn this Defendant’s 

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name, a description of what discovery Plaintiff would undertake to learn his name, and 

the identity of at least one person who could be served with discovery. If Plaintiff fails to 

timely file his Response, this case will be dismissed without prejudice and without further 

notice. 

V. Warnings

A. Address Changes

 Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with 

Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion 

for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in 

dismissal of this action. 

B. Copies

 Because Plaintiff is currently confined in an Arizona Department of Corrections 

unit subject to General Order 14-17, Plaintiff is not required to submit an additional copy 

of every filing for use by the Court, as would ordinarily be required by Local Rule of 

Civil Procedure 5.4. If Plaintiff is transferred to a unit other than one subject to General 

Order 14-17, he will be notified of the requirements regarding copies for the Court that 

are required for inmates whose cases are not subject to General Order 14-17. 

C. Possible Dismissal

 If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including 

these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action 

for failure to comply with any order of the Court). 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) Defendants Ryan, Pratt, McKamey, Corizon, Sedlar, Reece, and Does I-IV 

are dismissed without prejudice. 

 (2) Within 30 days of the date of this Order, Plaintiff must file a Response to 

this Order that includes either (1) the name of the Defendant identified as “John Doe 

Nurse” or (2) an explanation of what Plaintiff has done to try to learn these Defendants’ 

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names, a description of what discovery Plaintiff would undertake to learn his name, and 

the identity of at least one person who could be served with discovery. 

 (3) If Plaintiff fails to file a Response within 30 days, the Clerk of Court must 

enter a judgment of dismissal of this action without prejudice and without further notice 

to Plaintiff. 

 Dated this 18th day of September, 2015. 

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