Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-00359/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-00359-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID G. LEWIS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CRAIG FRANKLIN et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C-03-0359 MMC

ORDER GRANTING CRAIG FRANKLIN’S

AND JOSE REYNOSO’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING

STANLEY WALKER’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT; VACATING

HEARING

(Docket Nos. 81, 91)

Before the Court are two motions for summary judgment: (1) a motion filed

November 30, 2006 by defendants Craig Franklin (“Franklin”) and Jose Reynoso

(“Reynoso”), and (2) a motion filed December 1, 2006 by defendant Stanley Walker

(“Walker”). Plaintiff David G. Lewis (“Lewis”) has filed a consolidated opposition, to which

separate replies have been filed. Having considered the papers filed in support of and in

opposition to the motions, the Court finds the matter appropriate for decision without oral

argument, see Civil L.R. 7-1(b), hereby VACATES the January 5, 2007 hearing, and rules

as follows.

BACKGROUND

The instant action arises out of an asserted conspiracy to persuade a witness to give

false testimony at Lewis’s criminal trial, which act assertedly caused Lewis’s wrongful 

conviction.

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2

On June 20, 1994, Lewis, while employed by the California Department of

Corrections (“CDC”) at Pelican Bay State Prison (“Pelican Bay”), shot and wounded inmate

Harry Long (“Long”) while Long was engaged in an altercation with another inmate, Tommy

Willis (“Willis”). (See Lewis Decl. ¶ 2; see also U.S. v. Lewis, 368 F.3d 1102, 1104 (9th Cir.

2004). On August 2, 1994, the California Department of Corrections (“CDC”) Shooting

Review Board issued a report, concluding that Lewis acted within departmental policy and

that the shooting was justifiable. (See Reynoso Decl. Ex. A. at AGO-0874, AGO-0875.)

In the late 1990s, a federal investigation was launched to investigate officer

misconduct at Pelican Bay, including the above-referenced shooting incident involving

Lewis and Long. (See Donald Decl. Ex. F (Walker Dep.) at 45:4-46:23, 54:9-55:12, 60:15-

61:4.) Walker, an FBI special agent, participated in the investigation. (See id. at 46:6-18,

54:14-.55:24; Saltiel Reply Decl. Ex. 2 (Walker Decl.) ¶ 1.) Franklin, a CDC internal affairs

officer, and Reynoso, a CDC investigator, were assigned to assist in the investigation. 

(See Donald Decl. Ex. G (Franklin Dep.) at 62:14-6, 68:7-13, 117:8-15; Ex. H (Reynoso

Dep.) at 70:2-71:12; Reynoso Decl. ¶ 2.) The results of the investigation were presented to

a prosecutor who authorized further investigation of the Lewis shooting incident. (See

Donald Decl. Ex. G (Franklin Dep.) at 127:18-128:8.)

Thereafter, in 1999, Lewis was indicted on two counts arising out of the shooting of

Long: deprivation of rights under color of law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242, and use of a

firearm in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). See United

States v. Lewis, 368 F.3d at 1104. At trial, Long was asked if he recalled seeing whether

Willis had a weapon at the time of the shooting, and Long responded, “No, I did not.” (See

Request For Judicial Notice (“RJN”) Ex. A at 275:2-3.) On cross-examination, Long

testified that although he had stated on direct examination that Willis did not have a

weapon, he “didn’t know for sure if he had a weapon” because he “didn’t know if there

wasn’t one in his pocket[.]” (See id. at 292:5-19.) Long then was asked if he had told CDC

investigators that Willis had attacked him “with a razor and that there was blood all over the

place”; Long responded that he “never said it[.]” (See id. at 292:20-293:5.)

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3

On February 14, 2000, a jury convicted Lewis on both counts. (See RJN Ex. B

(CR-99-0186 docket) at Docket No. 83-84.) In 2002, after Lewis had been incarcerated for

fifteen months, (see Lewis Decl. ¶ 3), Lewis’s conviction was overturned on appeal, see

United States v. Lewis, 27 Fed. Appx. 768 (9th Cir. 2002). A new trial was conducted and

Lewis was acquitted on both counts. (See RJN Ex. B (CR-99-0186 docket) at Docket No.

363.)

In July 1998, Long filed a civil rights lawsuit against Lewis and other CDC personnel,

seeking damages as a result of the shooting. (See RJN Ex. E (First Amended Complaint in

Long v. Gomez, C-98-2679); see also C-98-2679, Docket No. 1.) In that action, Long

alleged that the fight between himself and Willis “did not involve the use of any weapons.” 

(See RJN Ex. E ¶ 15.) On August 21, 2001, Long was deposed in connection with his civil

case, and testified that Walker or “the other guy” associated with the Lewis prosecution told

him to testify at trial that he could not remember whether Willis had a razor blade, stating

words to the effect of “If they ask you the question about the razor blade just tell them you

don’t recall or you don’t remember.” (See Donald Decl. Ex. A at 165:4-21.) 

On September 12, 2006, at his deposition in the instant action, Long testified that

during a meeting in the federal building with Walker, Franklin, Reynoso, and a United

States Attorney, he was told either by Walker or the attorney: “You don’t have to say

anything about that razor.” (See Donald Decl. Ex. I (Long Dep.) at 37:17-38:17, 53:1-8.) 

Long further testified, “I believe the reason why they told me that is because he said, if you

say something about the razor, then the attorneys for Mr. Lewis could say, well, maybe I

did see something [sic] shiny object or something and that’s why he shot.” (See id. at

38:18-22.)

In his complaint, Lewis alleges that the above-referenced instructions were given to

Long by one or more of defendants Franklin, Reynoso, and Walker and that all defendants

acquiesced in the instructions. (See Compl. ¶ 14.) Lewis further alleges that Long was

“wrongfully coerced and intimidated into concealing information and giving false testimony

due to the Defendants Franklin’s and Reynoso’s status as State Correctional Officers,

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Defendant Walker’s status as an agent of the [FBI], and Long’s status as an inmate.” (See

id. ¶ 15.) Additionally, Lewis alleges, Long’s false testimony with respect to the lack of a

weapon “created a false impression with the jury in [Lewis’s] criminal trial as to the nature

and extent of the altercation, . . . since it was [Lewis’s] position that . . . Long appeared

enraged, out of control and intent on inflicting great bodily injury on the other inmate,

conduct that would have been consistent with . . . Long’s observation of a razor blade in the

other Inmate’s hand.” (See Compl. ¶ 16.) Lewis alleges that Long’s assertedly false

testimony resulted in Lewis’s wrongful conviction and incarceration. (See id.)

Lewis asserts the following causes of action: (1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a

claim that Franklin and Reynoso violated Lewis’s rights to liberty and due process under

the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by coercing Long

into giving false testimony; (2) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a claim that Walker violated

Lewis’s rights to liberty and due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by

coercing Long into giving false testimony; (3) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2), a claim that

Franklin, Reynoso, and Walker conspired to coerce Long into giving false testimony,

thereby depriving Lewis of his rights to liberty and due process under the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments; (4) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1986, a claim that Franklin, Reynoso

and Walker failed to prevent the above-referenced conspiracy; and (5) pursuant to state

law, a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against Franklin, Reynoso and

Walker based on all of the above allegations.

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment as

to “all or any part” of a claim “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b), (c). Material facts are those that

may affect the outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that “a

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5

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” See id. The Court may not

weigh the evidence. See id. at 255. Rather, the nonmoving party’s evidence must be

believed and “all justifiable inferences must be drawn in [the nonmovant’s] favor.” See

United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1542 (9th Cir. 1989)

(en banc) (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255).

The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the

basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions,

interrogatory answers, admissions and affidavits, if any, that it contends demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323 (1986). Where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving

party’s burden is discharged when it shows the court there is an absence of evidence to

support the nonmoving party’s case. See id. at 325.

 Where the moving party “bears the burden of proof at trial, he must come forward

with evidence which would entitle him to a directed verdict if the evidence went

uncontroverted at trial.” See Houghton v. South, 965 F.2d 1532, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992)

(citations omitted); see also Fontenot v. Upjohn, 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986)

(holding when plaintiff moves for summary judgment on an issue upon which he bears the

burden of proof, “he must establish beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of

the claim . . . to warrant judgment in his favor.”) (emphasis in original).

A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment “may not rest

upon the mere allegations or denials of [that] party’s pleading, but . . . must set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see

also Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250. The opposing party need not show the issue will be

resolved conclusively in its favor. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248-49. All that is

necessary is submission of sufficient evidence to create a material factual dispute, thereby

requiring a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions at trial. See id.

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1

 Lewis has submitted numerous objections to defendants’ evidence. To the extent

the Court has relied on any evidence to which Lewis has objected, the objection has been

overruled.

2

 Absolute prosecutorial immunity also bars conspiracy claims, such as the instant

claims asserted under § 1985 and § 1986. See, e.g., Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 F.3d

1139, 1148 (2nd Cir. 1995) (internal quotation and citation omitted) (“[W]hen the underlying

activity at issue is covered by absolute immunity, the plaintiff derives no benefit from

alleging a conspiracy.”); Snelling v. Westhoff, 972 F.2d 199, 200 (8th Cir. 1992)

(dismissing, on the basis of absolute prosecutorial immunity, claims against prosecutor for

conspiracy to present false testimony in violation of §§ 1983, 1985(2), and 1986).

6

DISCUSSION1

A. Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity

Defendants contend that even assuming, arguendo, they told Long not to testify that

Willis had a razor blade, defendants nonetheless are entitled to absolute prosecutorial

immunity for any acts taken in preparing a witness for trial.

In Imbler v. Pachtman, the United States Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of a

§ 1983 action against a state prosecuting attorney, wherein the plaintiff alleged the

prosecutor intentionally allowed a witness to give false testimony during a criminal trial and

was responsible for the suppression of other evidence at trial. See Imbler v. Pachtman,

424 U.S. 409, 410, 416 (1976). The Supreme Court held that “in initiating a prosecution

and in presenting the State’s case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages

under § 1983,” see id. at 431, and, in particular, that a prosecutor’s absolute immunity

extends to claims of willful use of perjured testimony and willful suppression of exculpatory

information, see id. n. 34; see also Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 489-90, 492 (1991)

(holding prosecutor absolutely immune from § 1983 damages suit based on presentation of

“misleading” testimony at probable cause hearing for search warrant; noting “prosecutors

and other lawyers were absolutely immune from damages liability at common law . . . for

eliciting false and defamatory testimony from witnesses”); Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627,

635 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding prosecutor entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 suit

based on allegation that prosecutor coached witness to testify falsely at criminal trial).2

A prosecutor is not subject to absolute immunity for every act he may commit,

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however. “A prosecutor’s administrative duties and those investigatory functions that do

not relate to an advocate’s preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial

proceedings are not entitled to absolute immunity.” See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S.

259, 273-74 (1993) (holding prosecutor not protected by absolute immunity for fabrication

of evidence during preliminary investigation of crime because “[a] prosecutor neither is, nor

should consider himself to be, an advocate before he has probable cause to have anyone

arrested.”); see also Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 638-41 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding

prosecutor and investigator not entitled to absolute immunity for encouraging witness,

during meetings prior to bail hearing and more than month prior to preliminary hearing, to

fabricate testimony). The Supreme Court has explained that although “[a]lmost any action

by a prosecutor, including his or her direct participation in purely investigative activity, could

be said to be in some way related to the ultimate decision whether to prosecute,” the Court

has “never indicated that absolute immunity is that expansive.” See Burns, 500 U.S. at

493, 496 (holding prosecutor not entitled to absolute immunity for giving legal advice to

police during investigative phase of criminal case). “[T]he official seeking absolute immunity

bears the burden of showing that such immunity is justified for the function in question.” 

See Burns, 500 U.S. at 486.

In determining whether a defendant is entitled to absolute immunity, courts must

apply a “functional approach,” which “looks to the nature of the function performed, not the

identity of the actor who performed it.” See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 269 (internal quotations

and citations omitted). Consequently, absolute prosecutorial immunity has been extended

to persons working with prosecutors, including investigators, when they perform functions

that, if performed by a prosecutor, would entitle a prosecutor to absolute immunity. See,

e.g., KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding “an investigator gathering

evidence, a month after an indictment is filed, to prepare the prosecutor for trial is engaged

in an advocacy function intimately associated with the judicial process, and is entitled to the

same immunity that would be afforded a prosecutor”). The relevant question is whether the

defendants, at the time of the conduct in question, were “engaged in an advocacy-related

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3

 The record reflects that Austin was an Assistant United States Attorney who

represented the government at Lewis’s first criminal trial. (See, e.g., RJN Ex. A at 1.) 

Austin recalls meeting with Long before trial in preparation for Long’s trial testimony, but

has little recollection of the meeting. (See Saltiel Decl. Ex. 9 (Austin Dep.) at 37:8-13, 65:2-

67:12.)

4

 Long was still serving his sentence at the time of trial, (see RJN Ex. A at 263:17-

21), and was brought to court pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum. 

5

 Long testified: “There was a meeting one time that took me out the federal building

into the federal building holding cell into a conference room like this here, but it was littler

one than this. And it was F.B.I. – Mr. Stan Walker – was sitting in front of me, Joe Reynoso

standing right here (indicating), Craig Franklin was sitting over there, and the U.S.

Department – the U.S. attorney that – that was fighting – fighting the case standing over

there. [¶] And I told – and they said, ‘Well, Mr. Long wants to know why are you not saying

anything about this razor in this courtroom – going – in the courtroom.’ [¶] And I believe – I

don’t remember it was Stan Walker or either the U.S. Department of Justice that – I guess

it’s the D.A., I guess. And they said, You don’t have to say anything about that razor. . . .

So they said don’t say anything about the razor, don’t want any – he says that no one ain’t

8

function intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process . . . or whether

they were engaged in police-type investigative work.” See Genzler, 410 F.3d at 638

(internal quotation and citation omitted).

Here, all of the evidence relating to the asserted meeting at which one or more of

the defendants purportedly coerced Long into giving false testimony demonstrates that the

meeting in question was conducted with the prosecuting attorney immediately prior to, or

during, Lewis’s trial. In a declaration filed in 2003 in the Lewis criminal action, Walker

attests that he was present during a witness preparation session with Long and Roy Austin

(“Austin”),3

 which was held “[p]rior to trial” and “in the morning before court began” in “one

of the Marshal’s holding cells on the 20th floor of the Federal Building.”4

 (See Saltiel Reply

Decl. Ex. 2 (Walker Decl.) ¶ 4.) Walker attests that he heard Long ask Austin what he

should say about a weapon if he was asked at trial, and that Austin told Long that he could

say that he did not know. (See id. ¶ 6.) Walker’s deposition testimony in the instant action

is consistent with his prior declaration. (See Saltiel Decl. Ex. 8 (Walker Dep.) at 140:11-

147:8.) Long likewise testified, at his September 12, 2006 deposition in the instant action,

that the above-referenced meeting occurred in the federal building for the purpose of

discussing his trial testimony.5 (See Donald Decl. Ex. I (Long Dep.) at 37:25-38:25, 53:1-

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saying anything about it; so just leave it alone[.]” (See Donald Decl. Ex. I (Long Dep.) at

37:25-38:25.) Long further testified: “I believe what they told me was if Mr. Lewis’ attorneys

or anyone in that court asks you about the razor blade, tell them that there wasn’t one or it

didn’t have anything to do with the incident, something to that effect.” (See id. at 53:1-5.) 

6

 Long testified: “Mr. Stan Walker, and the – I believe the prosecuting attorney told

me the same thing: ‘We are going to go in there. They are going to ask you a bunch of

questions. Don’t mention the razor blade.’” (See Henderson Decl. Ex. 9 (Long Dep.) at

134:22-25.) Long further testified: “The only thing the FBI attorneys and all them people,

the Internal Affairs, everybody told me, ‘Do not mention anything about the razor. If they

ask you something like that – something like that, we don’t need to bring it in right now,’ or

something. ‘We’ll bring it in later on down the line,’ or something, he said. A lot of these

things they asked me were not on the record. It was little rooms off to the side or

something like that there.” (See id. at 135:23-136:6.)

7

 Lewis contends Franklin, Reynoso and Walker are not entitled to prosecutorial

immunity because they were not employed by the prosecutor. Lewis cites no authority

holding an employment relationship with the prosecutor is a prerequisite to prosecutorial

immunity, however. Indeed, as noted, the Supreme Court has held that in determining

entitlement to immunity, the Court “looks to the nature of the function performed, not the

identity of the actor who performed it.” See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 269.

9

5.) Long’s August 21, 2001 deposition testimony in his civil case is consistent with the

deposition testimony he gave in the instant case. (See Henderson Decl. Ex. 9 (Long Dep.)

at 134:6-138:17, 166:5-16.)6

 

Because the evidence is undisputed that the above-referenced meeting was

conducted with the prosecuting United States Attorney to discuss Long’s then-upcoming

trial testimony, any attempt by defendants to influence Long’s testimony was “relate[d] to

an advocate’s preparation for . . . judicial proceedings.” See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273; 

Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 (holding allegation that prosecutor willfully used perjured testimony

at trial was activity “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” to

which “the reasons for absolute immunity apply with full force”). Consequently, the Court

finds Franklin, Reynoso, and Walker are entitled to absolute immunity from liability with

respect to Lewis’s federal causes of action. See id.; see also Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d

627, 635 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding prosecutor entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 suit

based on allegation that prosecutor coached witness to testify falsely at criminal trial); KRL

v. Moore, 384 F.3d at 1113 (holding investigator entitled to protection of absolute immunity

for gathering evidence, after filing of indictment, to prepare prosecutor for trial).7

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8

 In light of this ruling, the Court does not reach defendants’ additional arguments

that Franklin and Reynoso are entitled to qualified immunity or that Walker is entitled to

absolute witness immunity.

10

Accordingly, the Court will GRANT the motions for summary judgment with respect

to the federal claims against Franklin, Reynoso, and Walker, on the ground they are

entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity.8

B. Collateral Estoppel

Defendants additionally argue that Lewis is collaterally estopped from arguing that

defendants improperly coerced Long’s trial testimony because Lewis litigated the issue

during his criminal trial and the issue was decided against him. 

On February 5, 2003, Lewis moved to dismiss the criminal charges against him on

the ground that the government engaged in misconduct prior to and during his initial

criminal trial by, inter alia, instructing Long to falsify his testimony. (See Saltiel Decl. Ex. 5

at 16-24.) In particular, Lewis argued that “[i]f Long is telling the truth – i.e., he saw Willis

with a knife, he planned to reveal that on the stand, and the government ordered him

not to – . . . the proper sanction is dismissal, for absent the government’s misconduct,

Lewis would have been acquitted at his first trial.” (See id. at 17:24-18:1.) On April 9,

2003, the Court denied the motion. (See Saltiel Decl. Ex. 6.) Lewis filed an interlocutory

appeal, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the record did “not suggest prosecutorial

misconduct, and Lewis [did] not merit relief on these grounds.” See United States v. Lewis,

368 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2004).

“Where a federal court has decided the earlier case, federal law controls the

collateral estoppel analysis.” McQuillion v. Schwarzenegger, 369 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir.

2004). Under federal law, “(1) the issue at stake must be identical to the one alleged in the

prior litigation; (2) the issue must have been actually litigated [by the party against whom

preclusion is asserted]; and (3) the determination of the issue in the prior litigation must

have been a critical and necessary part of the judgment in the earlier action.” See id.

(alteration in original). Thus, “[u]nder collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an issue

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 In light of the above rulings, the Court does not reach defendants’ other arguments

in support of summary judgment.

11

of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue

in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case.” Allen v. McCurry,

449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). In particular, collateral estoppel principles may bar a § 1983 action

as a result of issues litigated in prior criminal proceedings. See id. at 91, 105.

Here, the identical issue previously litigated by Lewis in the criminal action

constitutes the basis of the instant action. As noted, Lewis argued in the criminal action

that the government engaged in misconduct by instructing Long to falsify his testimony at

Lewis’ criminal trial and that, in the absence of such conduct, Lewis would have been

acquitted. The same issue underlies all of Lewis’s claims in the instant action. (See

Compl. ¶ 15-16.) Lewis’s argument that the issue presented in the criminal case is different

from the issue presented in the instant case because “the issue here is the suppression of

evidence from the jury, not [from] defense counsel,” (see Opp. at 17), is unpersuasive.

Additionally, the issue of the government’s asserted coercion of false testimony by

Long was “actually litigated” by Lewis in the criminal action, and the court’s determination of

the issue was necessary to the judgment; the Ninth Circuit expressly affirmed the district

court’s denial of Lewis’s motion in the criminal action on the ground that the record “does

not suggest prosecutorial misconduct.” See United States v. Lewis, 368 F.3d at 1107.

Lewis argues that collateral estoppel does not apply because defendants sued in

their individual capacity are not in privity with the government and, thus, the criminal action

and the instant civil action do not involve the same parties. Again, Lewis’s argument is

unpersuasive. The United States Supreme Court has held that a litigant who was not a

party to the prior action may use collateral estoppel offensively “against the party who lost

on the decided issue in the first case.” See Allen, 449 U.S. at 95 (citation omitted).

Accordingly, the Court finds Lewis is collaterally estopped from bringing the instant

action, because the issues raised in the instant action were previously litigated by Lewis

and decided against him in his criminal case.9

 Consequently, the Court will GRANT

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defendants’ motions for summary judgment for this additional reason as well.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above,

1. Franklin’s and Reynoso’s motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED.

2. Walker’s motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 3, 2007 MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:03-cv-00359-MMC Document 125 Filed 01/03/07 Page 12 of 12