Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01057/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01057-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 8:1105(a) Aliens: Habeas Corpus to Release INS Detainee

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LOURDES GARCIA-GARCIA, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

)

 )

1:07-CV-01057 OWW SMS HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS 

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner is being detained by the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)

of the Department of Homeland Security following entry of an order of removal from the United

States. Petitioner is proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2241. Petitioner is represented in this action by Martin R. Guajardo, Esq. In the petition filed on July

21, 2007, Petitioner claims Respondent has unlawfully restrained her of her liberty in violation of the

Immigration and Nationality Act and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United

States Constitution. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico who is currently being detained at the Kern

County Lerdo Detention Facility. See Petition at ¶¶ 1, 5. On April 6, 2006, Petitioner was ordered

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deported to Mexico by an Immigration Judge. See Petition at ¶8. Petitioner pursued an appeal to the

Board of Immigration Appeals, but the appeal was dismissed on December 26, 2006. See Petition at

¶8. Petitioner then sought relief by filing a petition for review with the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals. Garcia-Garcia, et al., v. Mukasey, docket no. 07-70323. Petitioner also requested a stay of

removal which was granted and went into effect on January 25, 2007. Id. 

On January 30, 2007, Petitioner was taken into custody by ICE. See Petition at ¶9. On

April 30, 2007, ICE conducted a post-order custody review, whereupon Petitioner was informed she

would remain in custody. See Petition at ¶17. Petitioner has been in custody since then. Id. 

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction.

Habeas corpus relief is appropriate when a person “is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c). Habeas corpus

proceedings pursuant to § 2241 remain available as a forum for statutory and constitutional

challenges to the authority of the Attorney General to order detention of an alien; in such a

proceeding, the petitioner is not seeking review of the Attorney General’s exercise of discretion, but

rather is challenging the extent of the authority to detain under the statute, which is not a matter of

discretion. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001); Magana Pizano v. Immigration and

Naturalization Service, 200 F.3d 603, 608-09 (9th Cir. 1999); Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069,

1075 (9 Cir.2006). The REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 109-13, Div. B., 119 Stat. 231 does not th

divest the Court of jurisdiction because the Act was “not intended to ‘preclude habeas review over

challenges to detention that are independent of challenges to removal orders.’” Hernandez v.

Gonzales, 424 F.3d 43 (9 Cir.2005), quoting H.R. Cong. Rep. No. 109-72, at 2873 (May 3, 2005). th

As Petitioner is challenging her continued detention, not the order of removal, the Court has subject

matter jurisdiction over this action.

With respect to jurisdiction over the person, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) provides that writs of

habeas corpus may be granted by the district courts “within their respective jurisdictions.” A writ of

habeas corpus operates not upon the prisoner, but upon the prisoner’s custodian. Braden v. 30th

Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 494-495 (1973). A petitioner filing a petition for

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writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 must file the petition in the judicial district of the

petitioner's custodian. Brown v. United States, 610 F.2d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 1990). It is sufficient if

the custodian is within the territorial jurisdiction of the court at the time the petition is filed; transfer

of the petitioner thereafter does not defeat personal jurisdiction that has once been properly

established. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 193 (1948), overruled on other grounds in Braden v. 30th

Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. at 193, citing Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 305 (1944);

Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353, 354 (9 Cir. 1990). th

Review of the petition shows that Petitioner is detained in the Kern County Lerdo Detention

Facility located in Bakersfield, California. Bakersfield is within the territorial jurisdiction of this

Court. 

II. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies before seeking relief from the federal courts is

required where Congress specifically mandates it; however, when Congress has not clearly required

exhaustion, the necessity of exhaustion is entrusted to sound judicial discretion. McCarthy v.

Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992) (holding exhaustion of a prison grievance procedure unnecessary

before a federal prisoner brought a Bivens action seeking only monetary damages, superseded by

statutory amendment as noted in Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738 (2001)). Even if exhaustion is

not mandated, judicially fashioned principles of exhaustion should be consistent with congressional

intent and the applicable statutory scheme. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. at 144. 

Petitioner has fully exhausted her administrative remedies. She has appealed to the Board of

Immigration Appeals, the highest administrative level. 

III. Authority to Detain Petitioner.

The parties contest which regulatory scheme governs Petitioner’s current detention.

Respondent contends Petitioner is subject to a final order of removal and is therefore subject to the

detention and removal provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). Petitioner argues she is not subject to a

final order of removal because her petition for review is currently pending before the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals; thus, she is being detained pursuant to the pre-removal order detention statute set

forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1226. Petitioner’s argument is correct.

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Title 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1) provides generally that except as otherwise provided in that

section, when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the

United States within a period of ninety days, the “removal period.” Section 1231(a)(2) provides that

“[d]uring the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.” However, in

§ 1231(a)(1)(B), the statute states the removal period does not begin to run until the date of a

reviewing court’s final order “[i]f the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay

of the removal of the alien.” Here, Petitioner has filed a petition for review in the Ninth Circuit Court

of Appeals, and the Ninth Circuit has ordered a stay of removal. For this reason, as Petitioner

correctly argues, the removal period has not yet commenced. The removal period cannot therefore be

suspended under § 1231(a)(1)(C) as Respondent argues, since it has not yet commenced. 

Petitioner’s detention therefore is controlled by 8 U.S.C. § 1226. Section 1226(a) states “an

alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to removed from the

United States.” As stated by Petitioner, §§ 1226 (a) & (c) divide aliens in two separate categories, 

those who have committed crimes as set forth in § 1226(c) and all others. If Petitioner is

“inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 1182(a)(2) of this title,”

“is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii),

(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title,” “is deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(I) of this title on the

basis of an offense for which the alien has been sentence to a term of imprisonment of at least 1

year,” or “is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable under section

1227(a)(4)(B),” then the Attorney General must take her into custody. As noted by Petitioner, it is

arguable that she could be subject to mandatory detention pursuant to § 1226(c)(1)(B), because she is

deportable for having committed two prior acts of moral turpitude, to wit, petty theft. However,

§ 1226(c)(1)(B) does not apply to her for another reason. 

The mandatory custody provisions did not take effect until after the “Transition Period

Custody Rules” took effect on October 8, 1998. See Section 303(b)(2) of Illegal Immigration Reform

and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546,

3009-586 (“IIRIRA”) (The provisions of section 236(c) of the Act “shall apply to individuals

released after” October 8, 1998, the date on which the Transition Period Custody Rules expired.). If

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an alien was released from custody prior to that date, the alien could not be subject to mandatory

custody pursuant to the provisions in § 1226(c). See Matter of West, 2000 WL 1612317, 22 I. & N.

Dec. 1405 (BIA 2000) (“[O]nly aliens released after the expiration of the Transition Rules are

subject to the mandatory detention provisions of section 236(c) of the Act [8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)].”);

Matter of Adeniji, 1999 WL 1100900, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1102 (BIA 1999). In this case, Petitioner

sustained her petty theft convictions in 1985 and 1993 and was released before the Transition Rules

expired. Accordingly, she cannot be mandatorily detained pursuant to § 1226(c). 

Petitioner is therefore detained pursuant to § 1226(a). Section 1226(a) grants the Attorney

General discretion to determine whether an alien should be arrested and detained, or released on

bond or otherwise, pending removal proceedings. In this case, it was determined that Petitioner

would be detained without bond pending her removal from the country. With respect to judicial

review of this decision, section 1226(e) provides:

The Attorney General's discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section shall

not be subject to review. No court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney

General under this section regarding the detention or release of any alien or the grant,

revocation, or denial of bond or parole.

Therefore, from this statute it appears that the Attorney General’s decision to detain

Petitioner without granting release on bond is a “discretionary judgment” that is not reviewable by

this Court. In Demore v. Kim, the Supreme Court ruled that the Government could require that, as is

the case here, an alien be detained for the brief period necessary for her removal proceedings,

without providing an individualized determination as to whether she presents a flight risk, and thus

the detention of the alien, pursuant to the no-bail provision of the INA, does not violate her due

process rights under the Fifth Amendment. 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 

Petitioner, however, contends that her detention is indefinite in nature and therefore violates

her constitutional rights. In Zadvydas v. Davis, in order to avoid serious doubts as to the

constitutionality of § 1231(a)(6), the Court interpreted it not to permit indefinite detention, but rather

to limit an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about the

alien’s removal from the United States. Id. at 688-89. The Court determined that aliens who had

been ordered removed had a liberty interest in being released subject to supervision which was

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strong enough to raise a serious question as to whether, irrespective of the procedures used, the

Constitution permits detention that is indefinite and potentially permanent. Id. at 696. Once removal

is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by the statute. Id. at

699. The authority of the government to detain is thus coextensive with the reasonable likelihood of

removal, and the question of the extent of that authority is for the federal judiciary to decide in

proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Id. In order to further uniform administration in the

federal courts and to limit the frequency with which courts would be faced with difficult judgments

regarding matters which are the subject of executive expertise, the Court adopted six months as a

period within which detention is presumptively reasonable. Id. at 701. The Court instructed:

After this [six]-month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe 

that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable 

future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that 

showing. And for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior postremoval confinement grows, what counts as the “reasonably foreseeable 

future” conversely would have to shrink. This [six]-month presumption, of 

course, does not mean that every alien not removed must be released after six 

months. To the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has been 

determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably 

foreseeable future.

Id.

In Nadarajah v. Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit concluded that, consistent with Zadvydas, the

general immigration statutes do not authorize the Attorney General to incarcerate detainees for an

indefinite period. 443 F.3d 1069, 1078 (9 Cir.2006). Rather, the same presumptively reasonable th

six-month period applies, and “once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no

significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond

with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id., quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. 

Applying these concepts to this case, it cannot be concluded that there is no significant

likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. First, Petitioner has been detained for 10

months at this point. This is longer than the presumptively reasonable six-month period but far

shorter than the nearly five-year detention in Nadarajah, 443 F.3d at 1080, or the two year and eight

month delay in Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1242 (9 Cir.2005). Petitioner has already been th

found removable by the IJ, and the reason Petitioner is still being detained is not due to the Attorney

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General’s delay but due to her appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Petitioner, as a native and citizen of

Mexico, would promptly be removed if not for her petition to the Ninth Circuit. As stated by the

Seventh Circuit in an analogous case:

An alien in Parra's position can withdraw his defense of the removal proceeding and return to

his native land, thus ending his detention immediately. He has the keys in his pocket. A

criminal alien who insists on postponing the inevitable has no constitutional right to remain

at large during the ensuing delay, and the United States has a powerful interest in maintaining

the detention in order to ensure that removal actually occurs. 

Parra v. Perryman, 172 F.3d 954, 958 (7 Cir.1999) th

This is also the case here. Petitioner complains she is being detained for an indefinite period,

but the period is not indefinite. As in Parra, she has the keys to release in her pocket and can be

returned to Mexico without delay should she choose. In addition, as the parties have stated, the

petition for review is currently pending before the Ninth Circuit. See Garcia-Garcia, et al., v.

Mukasey, docket no. 07-70323. Although the Government’s response to Petitioner’s brief was

initially due on November 23, 2007, the Government requested an extension of time. Id. The

Government’s request for additional time went unopposed by Petitioner and was granted by the

Ninth Circuit on November 16, 2007. Id. The response is currently due on January 22, 2008, with an

optional reply by Petitioner due fourteen days later. Id. 

In light of these facts, Petitioner has not demonstrated that there is no significant likelihood

of removal in the foreseeable future, and her detention is not indefinite. The petition should be

denied, because Petitioner’s current detention is lawful and authorized by statute. 

RECOMMENDATION

The Court hereby RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED 

and the Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the Honorable Oliver W. Wanger,

United States District Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-

304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California.

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the

Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to objections, if any, must be filed

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within ten (10) court days after service of the objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate

Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 3, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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