Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01579/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01579-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\WQH\11cv1579-grt IFP & dsm.wpd, 81511 1 11cv1579 WQH (JMA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARTHUR RAY DEERE, SR,

CDCR #F-94040,

Civil No. 11cv1579 WQH (JMA)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, IMPOSING NO INITIAL PARTIAL

FILING FEE, GARNISHING $350.00

BALANCE FROM PRISONER’S

TRUST ACCOUNT [ECF No. 2];

AND

(2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A

CLAIM PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2) AND 1915A(b)

vs.

EDMUND G. BROWN, Governor of

California; MATTHEW CATES, Secretary

of California Dep’t of Corrections and

Rehabilitation; BRIAN OLIVER, CEO of

Global Tell Link;

Defendants.

Arthur Ray Deere, Jr. (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Calipatria

State Prison located in Calipatria, California, and proceeding pro se, has submitted a civil action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Additionally, Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma

Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2].

/ / /

Case 3:11-cv-01579-WQH-JMA Document 4 Filed 08/15/11 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\WQH\11cv1579-grt IFP & dsm.wpd, 81511 2 11cv1579 WQH (JMA)

I.

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP [ECF No. 2]

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United

States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee

only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, prisoners granted leave to

proceed IFP remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether their

action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d

844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a

prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account

statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately

preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113,

1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court must assess an initial

payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or

(b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater,

unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The

institution having custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20%

of the preceding month’s income, in any month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and

forward those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(2).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has no available funds from which to pay filing fees at this

time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited

from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that

the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor,

281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing

dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds

Case 3:11-cv-01579-WQH-JMA Document 4 Filed 08/15/11 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\WQH\11cv1579-grt IFP & dsm.wpd, 81511 3 11cv1579 WQH (JMA)

available to him when payment is ordered.”). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion

to Proceed IFP [ECF No. 2] and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

However, the entire $350 balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded

to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1).

II.

INITIAL SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1)

Notwithstanding IFP status or the payment of any partial filing fees, the Court must

subject each civil action commenced pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to mandatory screening

and order the sua sponte dismissal of any case it finds “frivolous, malicious, failing to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune

from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir.

2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not

only permits but requires” the court to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that

fails to state a claim). 

Before its amendment by the PLRA, former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte

dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. However, as

amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) mandates that the court reviewing an action filed pursuant to

the IFP provisions of section 1915 make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing

the U.S. Marshal to effect service pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3). See Calhoun, 254 F.3d at

845; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127; see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir.

1997) (stating that sua sponte screening pursuant to § 1915 should occur “before service of

process is made on the opposing parties”).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194

(noting that § 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”);

Case 3:11-cv-01579-WQH-JMA Document 4 Filed 08/15/11 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\WQH\11cv1579-grt IFP & dsm.wpd, 81511 4 11cv1579 WQH (JMA)

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1121. In addition, the Court has a duty to liberally construe a pro se’s

pleadings, see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988),

which is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261

(9th Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, however, the

court may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board

of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person

acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived

the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the

United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122

(2004); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

A. Eighth Amendment Claims

Plaintiff claims that his Eighth Amendment rights have been violated due to

overcrowding at Calipatria State Prison. However, these claims are subject to sua sponte

dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) because they appear to be duplicative of claims

brought in another action Plaintiff is already litigating. Plaintiff’s Complaint contains identical

claims that are found in Deere v. Calipatria State Prison Medical Staff, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil

Case No. 11cv0506 JLS (POR). A court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both

within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to

matters at issue.” United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971

F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). 

A prisoner’s complaint is considered frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) if it

“merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims.” Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103,

1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (construing former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)) (citations and internal

quotations omitted). Because Plaintiff has already litigated the same claims presented in the

instant action in Deere v. Calipatria State Prison Medical Staff, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No.

11cv0506 JLS (POR), the Court hereby DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims from

this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) without leave to amend. See Cato, 70 F.3d at

Case 3:11-cv-01579-WQH-JMA Document 4 Filed 08/15/11 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\WQH\11cv1579-grt IFP & dsm.wpd, 81511 5 11cv1579 WQH (JMA)

1105 n.2; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446 n.1.

B. Claims against Private Parties

Plaintiff also seeks to hold liable the CEO of a telephone company because he claims that

he has been unable to call his mother since he has been incarcerated. However, Plaintiff fails

to allege any actions on the part of Defendant Oliver which were taken “under color of state

law.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Private parties do not generally act

under color of state law; thus, “purely private conduct, no matter how wrongful, is not within

the protective orbit of section 1983.” Ouzts v. Maryland Nat’l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 550 (9th

Cir. 1974); see also Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991). While a plaintiff

may seek to hold a private actor liable under section 1983, he must allege facts that show some

“state involvement which directly or indirectly promoted the challenged conduct.” Ouzts, 505

F.2d at 553; West v. Atkins, 457 U.S. 42, 49, 54 (1988); Johnson v. Knowles, 113 F.3d 1114,

1118-1120 (9th Cir. 1997). In other words, Plaintiff must show that the private actor’s conduct

is “fairly attributable” to the government. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982); see

also Vincent v. Trend Western Technical Corp., 828 F.2d 563, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to show that this Defendant

acted on behalf of, or in any way attributable to, the state. Thus, without more, Plaintiff’s

allegations against this Defendant fails to satisfy the first prong of a § 1983 claim. See Haygood,

769 F.2d at 1354.

C. Respondeat Superior claims

Plaintiff names CDCR Matthew Cates and Governor Jerry Brown as Defendants in this

matter but fails to set forth any factual allegations with regard to these Defendants in the body

of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Thus, it appears that Plaintiff seeks to hold these Defendants liable in

their supervisory capacity. However, there is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993). Instead, “[t]he inquiry into

causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual

defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer

v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71

Case 3:11-cv-01579-WQH-JMA Document 4 Filed 08/15/11 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\WQH\11cv1579-grt IFP & dsm.wpd, 81511 6 11cv1579 WQH (JMA)

(1976)). In order to avoid the respondeat superior bar, Plaintiff must allege personal acts by each

individual Defendant which have a direct causal connection to the constitutional violation at

issue. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Supervisory prison officials may only be held liable for the allegedly unconstitutional

violations of a subordinate if Plaintiff sets forth allegations which show: (1) how or to what

extent they personally participated in or directed a subordinate’s actions, and (2) in either acting

or failing to act, they were an actual and proximate cause of the deprivation of Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). As currently pleaded,

however, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to set forth facts which might be liberally construed to

support an individualized constitutional claim against Defendants Cates or Brown.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a section 1983 claim

upon which relief may be granted, and is therefore subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). The Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to amend

his pleading to cure the defects set forth above. Plaintiff is warned that if his amended complaint

fails to address the deficiencies of pleading noted above, it may be dismissed with prejudice and

without leave to amend. 

III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [ECF No. 2] is

GRANTED. 

2. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or his

designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the filing fee

owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty

percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court

each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

Case 3:11-cv-01579-WQH-JMA Document 4 Filed 08/15/11 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

K:\COMMON\EVERYONE\_EFILE-PROSE\WQH\11cv1579-grt IFP & dsm.wpd, 81511 7 11cv1579 WQH (JMA)

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Matthew Cate,

Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S Street, Suite 502,

Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave

from the date this Order is “Filed” in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all

the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in

itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. Defendants

not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been

waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, it may be dismissed without

further leave to amend and may hereafter be counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996). 

5. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a form § 1983 complaint to Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 15, 2011

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

Case 3:11-cv-01579-WQH-JMA Document 4 Filed 08/15/11 Page 7 of 7