Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01623/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01623-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: Americans with Disabilities Act

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1 06cv1623 BTM(BLM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SORANUN BOOPPANON,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06cv1623 BTM(BLM)

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

DISMISS AND MOTION FOR LEAVE

TO AMEND AND STAYING CASE

PENDING TRIBAL EXHAUSTION

vs.

HARRAH’S RINCON CASINO &

RESORT, HARRAH’S

ENTERTAINMENT, INC., JANET

MANKINS, AND DOES 1 THROUGH 30,

INCLUSIVE,

Defendants.

Specially appearing Defendants Harrah’s Rincon Casino & Resort, Harrah’s

Entertainment, Inc., and Janet Mankins have filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(1), (2), (6), and (7). Plaintiff Soranun Booppanon has filed a motion for leave to file

an amended complaint naming additional defendants, Harrah’s Operating Company, Inc. and

HCAL Corporation. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are

DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint

is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and this action is STAYED to allow Plaintiff to exhaust

tribal remedies.

I. BACKGROUND

Harrah’s Rincon Casino & Resort (the “Casino”) is located on the reservation of the

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Rincon San Luiseno Band of Mission Indians, a federally-recognized sovereign Indian tribe

(the “Tribe”). Pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”), 25 U.S.C. §

2710(d)(1), the gaming operations were authorized by a tribal ordinance and a Tribal-State

Gaming Compact with the State of California.

On May 25, 2001, the Tribe and HCAL Corporation entered into a Management

Agreement. (Pl.’s Exh. 4.) According to the terms of the agreement, HCAL corporation has

the “exclusive authority to conduct and direct all business and affairs in connection with the

day-to-day operation, management and maintenance” of the Casino. (Management

Agreement, ¶ 4.1.)

Plaintiff claims that on August 13, 2005, she was denied services at the Casino’s spa

facility after she disclosed that she was Hepatitis B positive. Plaintiff alleges that she had a

scheduled appointment for a therapeutic deep tissue massage. (Complaint, ¶ 13.) Upon

arrival, she was asked to complete a health questionnaire form. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Plaintiff

disclosed her Hepatitis B status. (Id.) Shortly after she turned in the form, Plaintiff alleges

that she was confronted by Defendant Mankins who identified herself as the spa manager

and told Plaintiff that according to the Casino’s policy, individuals infected with Hepatitis B

were not permitted to receive massage services. (Id. at ¶ 16.) 

Plaintiff was then escorted into the back area to the sauna room. (Complaint, ¶ 16.)

Five minutes later, another Harrah’s employee told Plaintiff that she was not permitted to use

the sauna room and that any further questions should be directed to Mankins. (Id. at ¶ 17.)

Plaintiff was then escorted to the public reception area, where Mankins allegedly informed

Plaintiff that she was not permitted to use any of the spa facilities and would have to obtain

a doctor’s note if she wished to be eligible to utilize any of the spa services. (Id. at ¶¶ 18-19.)

Mankins then allegedly publicly announced that Plaintiff had Hepatitis B and made other

comments to the effect that Plaintiff was infected with the HIV virus and/or had AIDS. (Id.

at 21.) 

Plaintiff has sued “Harrah’s Rincon Casino & Resort,” Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. and

Mankins. Plaintiff asserts the following claims: (1) violation of the Americans with Disabilities

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Act (“ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.; (2) violation of California Civil Code § 51, et seq.; (3)

negligence; (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (5) intentional infliction of emotional

distress; (6) negligent hiring, training and retention (against the Harrah defendants only); (7)

defamation; (8) violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.; (9) declaratory relief; and

(10) injunctive relief. 

II. DISCUSSION

Defendants make a number of arguments in their motions to dismiss, including the

argument that the Tribe should be afforded the opportunity to determine whether this civil

dispute falls within the Tribe’s jurisdiction. The Court agrees that tribal exhaustion is

required, but chooses to stay the case instead of dismissing it. 

When there is a “colorable question” whether a tribal court has subject matter

jurisdiction over a civil action, federal courts will stay or dismiss the action and “permit a tribal

court to determine in the first instance whether it has the power to exercise subject-matter

jurisdiction” over the dispute. Stock West Corp. v. Taylor, 964 F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1992).

Exhaustion is required as a matter of comity, not as a jurisdictional prerequisite. Iowa Mut.

Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 n. 8 (1987). The fact that there is no tribal action

pending does not defeat the tribal exhaustion requirement. Sharber v. Spirit Mountain

Gaming, Inc., 343 F.3d 974, 976 (9th Cir. 2003).

The Court believes there is a “colorable question” regarding tribal jurisdiction. “In

general, ‘the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of

nonmembers of the tribe.’” Smith v. Salish Kootenai College, 434 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir.

2006) (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981)). However, there are two

exceptions to this general rule. As explained by the Supreme Court, “Indian tribes retain

inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their

reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands”: (1) “[a] tribe may regulate, through taxation,

licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships

with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other

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arrangements”; and (2) “[a] tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority

over the conduct of non-Indians on fee land within its reservation when that conduct

threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the

health or welfare of the tribe.” Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66.

This case arguably falls within the first exception. “The power to exercise tribal civil

authority over non-Indians derives not only from the tribe’s inherent powers necessary to selfgovernment and territorial management, but also from the power to exclude nonmembers

from tribal land.” Salish, 434 F.3d at 1139 (quoting Babbitt Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Indian Tribe,

710 F.2d 587, 592 (9th Cir. 1983)). “If the power to exclude implies the power to regulate

those who enter tribal lands, the jurisdiction that results is a consequence of the deliberate

actions of those who would enter tribal lands to engage in commerce with the Indians.” Id.

Where tribes possess authority to regulate the activities of nonmembers, “[c]ivil jurisdiction

over [disputes arising out of] such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts.” Strate v.

A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997) (quoting Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 18). 

It can be plausibly argued that nonmembers who enter onto the Rincon reservation

to enjoy the goods or services of the Casino are entering into a commercial relationship with

the Tribe and that any disputes arising out of that relationship are subject to tribal court

jurisdiction. Plaintiff takes the position that HCAL alone manages the casino and that her

dispute with HCAL does not involve the Tribe in anyway. However, the evidence suggests

otherwise.

The Casino operations are intertwined with Tribal welfare. The creation and operation

of the Casino was designed to promote “tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and

strong tribal governmen[t].” 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1). Although the day-to-day operations are

run by HCAL Corporation, the Tribe owns the Casino and is ultimately responsible for

managing the Casino’s operations. (Tribal-State Gaming Compact (Def.’s Exh. B), § 6.2.)

A Tribal Gaming Agency is responsible for conducting on-site gaming regulation and control

and for ensuring that, inter alia, the gaming operation complies with “standards no less

stringent than federal laws and state laws forbidding employers generally from discriminating

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. . . in the Gaming Facility on the basis of . . . . disability . . . .” (Tribal-State Gaming

Compact, §§ 7.1, 10.2(g).) 

Therefore, there is a question as to whether this action arises out of a commercial

relationship between Plaintiff and the Tribe, and the Court stays its hand until after the

Rincon Tribal Court has a “full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction.” Strate, 520 U.S.

at 451. The fact that both Plaintiff and Defendants are nonmembers does not require a

different result. See, e.g., Stock West, 964 F.2d at 920 (holding that district court properly

abstained from exercising its diversity jurisdiction in suit brought by a non-tribal corporation

against non-member reservation attorney for malpractice and misrepresentation in an opinion

letter to secure loan for construction of sawmill to be built and managed by corporation on

tribal land); Marathon Oil Co. v. Johnston, 2004 WL 4960751 (D. Wyo. June 1, 2004)

(requiring tribal exhaustion where nonmember individual sued non-tribal company for injury

individual sustained on company’s lease site on Indian reservation); Petrogulf Corp. v. Arco

Oil & Gas Co., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (D. Colo. 2000) (requiring exhaustion of tribal remedies

where nonmember owner of working interest in gas field sued nonmember lessee of

adjoining tribal land for mineral trespass and misrepresentations to state commission). 

When a court finds that tribal exhaustion is required, the court can stay or dismiss the

action, although it is error to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Sharber, 343 F.3d

at 976. If dismissal may result in the running of the applicable statute of limitations, the court

should stay the action instead of dismissing it. Id. To ensure that Plaintiff does not

encounter any problems with the statute of limitations, the Court will stay the action instead

of dismissing it. 

Because the Court abstains from exercising its jurisdiction over the case at this time,

the Court denies Defendants’ motions to dismiss and Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend

without prejudice.

III. CONCLUSION

 For the reasons discussed above, Defendants’ motions to dismiss [8,9] and Plaintiff’s

motion for leave to amend [11] are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Court hereby

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STAYS this action to allow Plaintiff to exhaust tribal remedies. The Court will hold a status

conference on April 11, 2007 at 4:00 p.m. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 23, 2007

Hon. Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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