Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01155/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01155-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ta Yoat Ni,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-13-1155-PHX-PGR (JFM)

Report & Recommendation 

on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at San 

Luis, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

on June 7, 2013 (Doc. 1). On December 12, 2013 Respondents filed their Response 

(Doc. 8). Petitioner has not replied

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Upon discovering that his wife was continuing an affair, Petitioner stabbed her, 

killing her. (Exhibit B, Mem.Dec. 11/10/05 at 4.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. #, are 

referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.”) Petitioner, a native of Burma, was indicted for first 

degree murder and proceeded to trial, but a mistrial was called during jury selection. A 

new trial was held, and Petitioner was found guilty of the lesser included offense of 

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second degree murder. (Id. at 5.) Petitioner was sentenced to an aggravated term of 

twenty-two years in prison. (Id. at 6.)

B. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal, asserting his sentence was improperly aggravated. 

The argument was rejected by the Arizona Court of Appeals, and his conviction and 

sentence were affirmed. (Exhibit B, Mem. Dec. 11/10/05 at 10.) Petitioner sought 

review by the Arizona Supreme Court, which was summarily denied on May 8, 2006. 

(Exhibit D, Order 5/8/06; Petition, Doc. 1, Exhibits at Pet.Rev.)

Petitioner did not file a petition for writ of certiorari. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 3.) 

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Twenty-nine days later, on June 6, 2006, Petitioner filed a Notice of PostConviction Relief (Exhibit E). Counsel was appointed, and ultimately filed a notice of 

inability to find an issue for relief (Exhibit F). Petitioner then filed a pro per Petition 

(Exhibit G), arguing: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to challenge 

mischaracterization of the fatal wound as being to the victim’s heart; (2) denial of his 

Sixth Amendment right to a jury on the aggravating factors, which was not knowingly 

waived due to inaccurate interpretations; and (3) denial of due process and right to 

counsel by forcing Petitioner to choose between proceeding to the sentencing phase 

before the jury with unprepared counsel, or waiving his right to a jury on aggravating 

factors. On August 30, 2007, the PCR court found the first and third claims without 

merit, and the second claim waived by failure to raise it on direct appeal. (Exhibit H, 

M.E. 8/30/07.) Petitioner did not seek further review. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 5.)

Some 38 months later, on November 11, 2010, Petitioner wrote a letter to the 

PCR court inquiring whether a hearing had been scheduled on his PCR petition. (Exhibit 

SA-A.) On December 8, 2010, the PCR court mailed a copy of the decision to 

Petitioner. (Supp. Reply, Exhibit C, Envelope.) 

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Petitioner then filed a “Motion of Notice of Reconsideration”, arguing that he did 

not receive notice of the denial of his first PCR petition until December 12, 2010, and 

that his letters to the judge had gone unanswered because the judge had retired. The 

motion sought an extension of time to file a motion for “reconsideration” [rehearing].

(Supp. Reply, Doc. 11, Exhibit D, “Motion of Notice of Reconsideration.”) 

On January 20, 2011, Petitioner filed his “Motion of Reconsideration” (Exhibit I)

arguing his waiver of a jury on aggravating factors was not voluntary and intelligent, his 

sentence was in violation of Apprendi and Blakely, counsel was ineffective, and his 

sentence was improper and based on unconstitutional statutes.

On August 21, 2012, the PCR court denied the “Motion of Notice of 

Reconsideration filed by the Defendant pro per on January 3, 2011.” (Exhibit J, M.E. 

8/21/12.) The court observed that the original PCR judge “is retired from the Superior 

Court.” (Id.) 

Respondents’ Answer characterized this ruling as a denial of the motion for 

reconsideration. (Answer, Doc, 8 at 7.) Petitioner’s Petition characterized it as a ruling 

on both the Motion of Notice of Reconsideration and the Motion for Reconsideration. 

(Petition, Doc. 1 at 4-5.) As discussed more fully hereinafter, the undersigned finds it to 

have only been a ruling on the “Motion of Notice of Reconsideration,” and that no ruling 

issued on the “Motion for Reconsideration.”

Petitioner references his “Notice of Motion for Reconsideration” and his “Motion 

of Reconsideration” as his second and third PCR petitions. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 4-5.) He 

asserts he did not seek review on either. (Id. at 5.) As discussed more fully hereinafter, 

the undersigned finds these to have been unsuccessful attempts to continue consideration 

of Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding.

Petitioner did not seek further review on his PCR proceedings.

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition – Over nine months later, Petitioner commenced the current case by 

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filing his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on June 7, 

2013 (Doc. 1). Petitioner’s Petition asserts the following four grounds for relief:

1. denial of effective assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment 

rights. 

2. his Sixth Amendment rights were violated where he did not knowingly waive the 

right to have jurors determine the existence of aggravating factors

3. his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated where he had to 

choose between trial by jury and the right to the effective assistance of counsel. 

4. his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated where aggravating 

factors were not found by the jury or admitted by him.

Petitioner argues that any untimeliness should be excused because of his diligence 

despite the fact that he did not receive notice of the denial of his PCR petition and 

because his “many” letters to the PCR judge went answered because of the judge’s 

retirement.

Response - On December 12, 2013, Respondents filed and served their Response 

(“Limited Answer”) (Doc. 8). Respondents argue that the Petition is untimely, and 

Petitioner’s state remedies on his claims are procedurally defaulted.

Reply – The Court’s Service Order required that any reply be filed “within 30 

days from the date of service of the answer.” (Order 10/30/13, Doc. 3 at 3.) That time 

passed and no reply was filed.

Supplements – In an Order filed January 29, 2014, the undersigned notified the 

parties of a tentative conclusion that the limitations period had been tolled throughout 

Petitioner’s PCR proceedings, including the interregnum between the dismissal and the 

motions for reconsideration, and observed that Petitioners second claim, which 

Respondents argue was procedurally barred as waived by failure to raise it on direct 

appeal, might have been subject to Arizona’s requirement for a personal waiver, and thus 

the application of the procedural bar may not have been an “adequate” state ground. The 

parties were given an opportunity to supplement their briefs and the record to address 

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those issues.

Supplemental Answer - On February 19, 2014, Respondents filed their 

Supplemental Answer (Doc. 10), arguing that the Court’s tentative conclusion on the 

statute of limitations was in error, and would result in indefinite tolling from any postconviction proceeding. With regard to procedural default, Respondents argue that 

Petitioner had the burden of showing that the state’s procedural ground was inadequate, 

and that the Arizona courts had not yet ruled whether a personal waiver was required for 

the type of claim asserted in Ground Two but that this Court could not revisit the 

correctness of the state PCR court’s application of the rule.

Supplemental Reply – On March 13, 2014, Petitioner filed his Supplemental 

Reply (Doc. 11). Petitioner argues that his time to seek reconsideration in his PCR 

proceeding did not begin to run until he received the PCR court’s decision. 

Alternatively, Petitioner argues he is entitled to equitable tolling due to his lack of notice 

of the decision. Petitioner contends that he was diligent in pursuing his rights in the face 

of lack of such notice, and that he does not control the distribution of such notices. 

Petitioner further argues that a personal waiver of his claim in Ground Two is required 

under Arizona law, and that he did not make a voluntary waiver due to the trial court’s 

insistence on proceeding to sentencing despite counsel’s protests that he was not 

prepared to proceed, and the trial court failed to conduct a hearing to insure it was 

knowing and voluntary. Petitioner similarly argues that his claims of ineffective 

assistance require a personal waiver of the right to counsel. 

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. TIMELINESS

1. One Year Limitations Period

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. As part of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-

year statute of limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 

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28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and sentences rendered by state courts. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitions filed beyond the one year limitations period are barred and 

must be dismissed. Id.

2. Commencement of Limitations Period

The one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions generally begins to run on 

"the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the 

expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).1 

Here, Petitioner’s direct appeal remained pending through May 8, 2006, when the 

Arizona Supreme Court denied his Petition for Review. (Exhibit D, Order 5/8/06.) 

It is well established in the Ninth Circuit that for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244, 

“direct review" includes the period within which a petitioner can file a petition for a writ 

of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, whether or not the petitioner actually 

files such a petition. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158 (9th Cir.1999). The rules of 

the Supreme Court of the United States, requires that a petition for a writ of certiorari be 

filed “within 90 days after entry of the order denying discretionary review.” U.S.S.Ct. R. 

13(1). Accordingly, because Petitioner did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari, his 

conviction became final on Monday, August 7, 2006, 90 days after the Arizona Supreme 

Court denied review.

Therefore, Petitioner’s one year began running on August 8, 2006, and without 

any tolling expired on August 7, 2007, making his June 7, 2013 Petition almost six years 

delinquent.

/ /

/ /

 

1

Later commencement times can result from a state created impediment, newly 

recognized constitutional rights, and newly discovered factual predicates for claims. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). Petitioner proffers no argument that any of these apply. 

Petitioner’s arguments about the delays in receiving notice of the denial of his PCR 

petition do not relate to new discoveries of claims, just to the rejection of them by the 

state courts.

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3. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Tolling from First PCR Proceeding - Petitioner’s PCR proceeding was 

commenced no earlier than May 29, 2006, when he dated his Notice of Post-Conviction 

Relief (Exhibit E). At that time, Petitioner’s one year had not yet begun to run. That 

proceeding remained pending until August 30, 2007, when the PCR court denied his 

petition.2 (Exhibit H, M.E. 8/30/07.)

Thereafter, Petitioner had fifteen days to seek rehearing. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.9(a). Petitioner did not seek rehearing within that time period, nor did he seek review 

by the Arizona Court of Appeals.

Petitioner did, years after the decision, file his Motion of Notice of 

Reconsideration (Supp. Reply, Exhibit D) and Motion for Reconsideration (Exhibit I). 

Respondents argue this Court should ignore the motion for reconsideration as an 

untimely second petition, citing inter alia Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir.

2003), for the proposition that a state application filed after the expiration of the federal 

limitations period does not restart the period. (Answer, Doc, 8 at 9, n. 4.) Here, 

however, the Motion for Reconsideration was not a second PCR proceeding (despite 

Petitioner’s description of it as such in his Petition). Rather, it was an attempted 

continuation of his only PCR proceeding, the one that commenced in May, 2006, before 

his one year began to run.

Respondents argue that there was nothing “pending” in the state courts in the 

interregnum between the dismissal and the delinquent motion for reconsideration, citing 

Melancon v. Kaylo, 259 F.3d 401, 407 (5th Cir. 2001) and Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 

 

2

The Minute Entry was dated August 30, 2007, but was marked as “Electronically 

Filed” on August 31, 2007. Because the additional day would not alter this Court’s 

analysis, the date of the hearing and ruling, August 30, 2007 is used as the date of the 

decision.

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192 (2006), and thus no tolling applied during that three year period. (Supp. Ans. Doc. 

10 at 4.) 

Indeed, in Melancon, the Fifth Circuit concluded that an untimely request for 

appellate review was a new proceeding, not the continuation of an existing one, 

regardless whether or not the state court found the request untimely, or addressed it 

solely on its merits. However, the Fifth Circuit observed in a subsequent case, Currie v. 

Matesanz, 281 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2002), that the Ninth Circuit had taken a different 

approach in Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2001). “The Ninth Circuit has 

taken a different approach, holding that whenever a state appellate court reaches the 

merits of an untimely appeal, the original application for post-conviction relief will be 

deemed to have been pending from the date it first was filed in the trial court.” Currie, 

281 F.3d at 269, n. 10. 

In Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002), on appeal from Saffold v. Newland, the 

Supreme Court evaluated the Ninth Circuit’s approach, noting the uniqueness of the facts 

based upon California’s indeterminate (“unreasonable delay”) deadline for appeals in 

PCR proceedings. The Court held that if the appeal were ultimately deemed timely 

(because the delay was not unreasonable), then tolling would apply in the interregnum. 

The Court observed, however, that the basis upon which the state court denied the 

delayed appeal was not conclusive on the issue. “A court will sometimes address the 

merits of a claim that it believes was presented in an untimely way: for instance, where 

the merits present no difficult issue; where the court wants to give a reviewing court 

alternative grounds for decision; or where the court wishes to show a prisoner (who may 

not have a lawyer) that it was not merely a procedural technicality that precluded him 

from obtaining relief.” Carey, 536 U.S. at 225-26. On the other hand, if the state court 

“had clearly ruled” that the application was untimely, “that would be the end of the 

matter, regardless of whether it also addressed the merits of the claim, or whether its 

timeliness ruling was ‘entangled’ with the merits.” Id. at 226.

In Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006), the Court revisited the issue in a case 

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where a California petitioner had waited three years before seeking review by the 

California Supreme Court, which then issued an order summarily denying the appeal 

without explanation. The Ninth Circuit had relied upon its rule in the procedural default 

realm that a summary decision was deemed to be on the merits. The Evans court 

concluded that the Ninth Circuit could not apply such a rule of thumb, and was required, 

with our without a merits determination by the state court, to decide whether the 

application was timely. Thus, “without a clear indication that a particular request for 

appellate review was timely or untimely, the Circuit must itself examine the delay in 

each case and determine what the state courts would have held in respect to timeliness.” 

546 U.S. at 198. 

Here, of course, unlike California, Arizona has a facially determinate 15 day 

timeline for motions for reconsideration. As observed hereinabove, however, that time 

limit is neither absolute nor jurisdictional but is subject to exceptions which can render a 

motion for reconsideration filed after the 15 days nonetheless timely. Thus, this Court

must ascertain whether the Arizona court “clearly ruled” that Petitioner’s “Motion for 

Reconsideration” was untimely. And, if no ruling was made, this Court must determine

whether, under the circumstances, the motion was timely or untimely.

Respondents protest that permitting an untimely motion for rehearing to toll the 

statute of limitations during the time between the denial and the motion must be based on 

reasoning under which “no statutory tolling period would ever end.” (Supplemental 

Answer, Doc. 10 at 5, note 2.) The reasoning applied here is not so broad. Rather, the 

question is not whether an untimely motion extends the tolling (it does not), but whether 

the motion was untimely. If it was timely under Arizona law, then tolling of the federal 

habeas limitations period applies, regardless whether it was filed within the general 15 

day time limit, or years or even decades later but nonetheless timely under Arizona’s 

exceptions to its timeliness rule. In Carrie, California raised the same spectre, only 

based on it’s wholly indeterminate time limits under its “original writ” system. The 

Supreme Court responded: “California remains free, through legislative or judicial 

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action, to adjust its ‘original writ’ system accordingly.” Carrie, 536 U.S. at 225. 

Similarly here, it is Arizona which establishes its rules for when a motion for rehearing is 

timely. The federal courts merely apply those rules as they find them.

No Tolling from Untimely Motion – Here, the timeliness of Petitioner’s motion 

for rehearing has already been decided by the Arizona court. 

Upon initial review, and in accordance with argument by Respondents, the 

undersigned viewed the PCR court’s August 21, 2012 summary ruling (Exhibit J) as a 

rejection of Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. In such light, there appeared the 

potential that the motion could have been deemed timely under Arizona’s exceptions to 

its time limits, and that it had been rejected on its merits. Consequently, the parties were 

directed to provide further briefing. (Order 1/29/14, Doc. 9.) 

On closer examination, however, it is apparent that the PCR court was not ruling 

on the Motion for Reconsideration, but on the earlier filed “Motion of Notice of 

Reconsideration.” The PCR court explicitly so stated. (Exhibit J at 1.) That motion was 

not Petitioner’s motion for rehearing on the denial of the PCR petition, but a motion to 

file a delayed motion for rehearing. Petitioner’s substantive argument, in effect his 

motion for rehearing, was presented only in the later “Motion for Reconsideration.”

Because the request to seek a delayed rehearing was denied, the PCR court never 

considered and never ruled on the actual motion for rehearing, the “Motion for 

Reconsideration,” which its August 20, 2012 ruling had effectively deemed to be barred 

as untimely. Because the motion for rehearing (“Motion for Reconsideration”) was 

determined by the Arizona Court to be untimely, it did not serve to leave Petitioner’s 

first PCR proceeding “pending” beyond the PCR Court’s denial of the petition.

Motion for Reconsideration Not Timely – Even if this Court could rethink the 

PCR court’s rejection of the attempted motion for rehearing as untimely, this Court could 

not find Petitioner’s motion to have met the requirements under Arizona law.

Petitioner argues that under Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-4326 and 13-4329 it is his 

receipt of the court’s decision which commences the running of the fifteen day 

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limitation. He alleges he did not receive the PCR Court’s ruling until December 12, 

2010. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 11.) But Petitioner is inconsistent in the date he contends he 

received the ruling. In his Affidavit filed with his Motion of Notice of Reconsideration, 

he avowed that he received it on “12-09-10.” (Supp. Reply, Doc. 11, Exhibit D, 

Affidavit at 2.) In his Supplemental Reply he argues he received it “on or about 

December 8th, 2010.” (Doc. 11 at 6.) 

Moreover, Arizona cases say it is the mailing not the receipt of the ruling which 

governs the time for action after a ruling in a PCR proceeding. State v. Savage, 117 

Ariz. 535, 536, 573 P.2d 1288, 1289 (1978). Indeed, section 13-4329, the statutory 

counterpart to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.9, requires that a motion for 

rehearing be filed “within fifteen days after the ruling of the court.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 

13-4329(A). No mention is made in §13-4239 or Rule 32.9(a) of delivery or receipt of 

the ruling, and the Arizona procedure of counting from mailing of the order is a construct 

of court rulings attempt to apply the rule, finding it a reasonable way to effectuate the 

timeline where decisions may be rendered from chambers without the parties knowledge. 

But see Zuniga, at 106, 786 P.2d at 957, n.2 (noting that notice is often received in court 

and not deciding effect of such notice); and State v. Whitman - - P.3d - - - (April 9, 2014) 

(time for appeal runs from oral pronouncement of sentence not issuance of written 

sentence). 

The Arizona courts have further adopted a rebuttable presumption that the mailing 

occurs on the same date the ruling is filed. State v. Byers, 126 Ariz. 139, 141, 613 P.2d 

299, 301 (App.1980) overruled on other grounds by State v. Pope, 130 Ariz. 253, 256, 

635 P.2d 846, 849 (1981). Petitioner proffers nothing to show that the decision was not 

mailed to him or his PCR counsel in 2007. He simply argues he did not personally 

receive it.

Even if Petitioner could show that the PCR court’s ruling was not mailed to him 

or his counsel in 2007, his motion for rehearing would still have been untimely. 

Petitioner has contended the ruling was eventually mailed to him on December 3, 2010. 

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(Supp. Reply, Doc. 11, Exhibit D, Motion of Notice of Reconsideration at 2.) The copy 

of the envelope supplied by Petitioner with his Supplemental Reply includes a postage 

machine stamp with an apparent date of “December 08, 2010.” (Doc. 11 at Exhibit C.) 

On close inspection, however, it appears that the numeral “8” may have been marked 

over by pen or pencil. On the copy of the envelope filed by Plaintiff with his Motion of 

Notice of Reconsideration, the postage mark is almost invisible, and is entirely illegible. 

(Petition, Doc. 1, Exhibits, “Motion of Notice of Reconsideration,” Affidavit, Exhibit 2; 

Supp. Reply, Doc. 11, Exhibit D, Affidavit, Exhibit 2.) The undersigned finds 

Petitioner’s own statements to be the most reliable reflection of the mailing date, and 

thus finds that the ruling was mailed on December 3, 2010.3

Assuming Petitioner’s time to move for rehearing began to run on that date, then 

his fifteen days would have expired on Monday, December 20, 2010. However, because 

the ruling was sent by mail, Petitioner would be entitled to an additional five days 

pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.3(a). Cf. State v. Savage, 117 Ariz. 535, 536, 573 P.2d 

1288, 1289 (1978) (additional time for service by mail applies to petitions for review in 

PCR proceedings); and State v. Zuniga, 163 Ariz. 105, 786 P.2d 956 (1990) (extending 

rule to appeals). As such, his time to seek reconsideration would have in any event 

expired on Monday, December 27, 2010, some 24 days before his “Motion for 

Reconsideration” was filed on January 20, 2011, and seven days before his “Motion of 

Notice of Reconsideration” was filed, on January 3, 2011.

The undersigned notes that for purposes of calculating tolling under § 2244(d), 

the federal prisoner “mailbox rule” applies. 

Under the “mailbox rule,” a pro se prisoner's filing of a state 

habeas petition is deemed filed at the moment the prisoner delivers 

it to prison authorities for forwarding to the clerk of the court. Thus, 

to benefit from the mailbox rule, a prisoner must meet two 

requirements. First, the prisoner must be proceeding without 

assistance of counsel. Second, the prisoner must deliver the petition 

 

3 Because of intervening weekends, adopting the December 8, 2010 date would 

ultimately make only one day’s difference, making the ultimate due date December 28, 

2010. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.3(a) (computation of time). That one day would not alter 

this Court’s analysis.

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to prison authorities for forwarding to the court within the 

limitations period. 

Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, however, Petitioner proffers 

nothing to show that he would benefit from the application of this rule. 

It is true that the “Motion of Notice of Reconsideration” includes a Certification 

of Service indicating that Petitioner served the motion by mailing it on December 15, 

2010. (Supp. Reply, Doc. 11, Exhibit D at 5.) However, that certification does not 

reflect whether the mailing was by delivery to prison authorities. Even if it were 

assumed that was the manner of mailing, the Affidavit appended to the motion reflects 

that it was not executed until December 20, 2010. (Id., Affidavit at 2.) Moreover, the 

attached Exhibit 3 is an ADOC Inmate Letter by Petitioner dated December 19, 2010. 

(Id., Affidavit, Exhibit 3.) As a result, the certificate of service showing mailing on 

December 15, 2010 is demonstrably unreliable.

Moreover, that filing was not a motion for rehearing, but rather a request to 

extend the time for filing such a motion. Petitioner’s actual motion for rehearing was not 

filed until January 20, 2011. It includes a Certificate of Service dated January 7, 2011, 

eleven days after the deadline. However, it similarly includes an attached Affidavit with 

a later date (January 14, 2011), indicating the Certificate of Service is unreliable. 

In sum, even if this Court would reject the PCR court’s timeliness ruling, 

Petitioner has failed to show that his motion for rehearing was actually timely.

Conclusion re First PCR Proceeding – Based on the foregoing, the undersigned 

concludes that Petitioner’s one year was statutorily tolled by reason of the first PCR 

proceeding from its inception only until August 30, 2007, when the PCR court denied the 

PCR petition. Without further tolling, the limitations period would have expired on 

August 30, 2008.

No Tolling from subsequent PCR Proceeding – To the extent that this Court 

could construe Petitioner’s belated Motion for Reconsideration as a subsequent postconviction application, that still would not result in further tolling. This is so for two 

reasons.

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First, if a post-conviction application is untimely, it cannot be deemed a “properly 

filed application,” and does not result in any statutory tolling of the habeas limitations 

period. Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 7 (2007). The Arizona PCR court ruled the motion 

for rehearing untimely by denying the “Motion of Notice of Reconsideration.”

Second, once the statute has run, a subsequent post-conviction or collateral relief 

filing does not reset the running of the one year statute. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 

482 (9th Cir. 2001); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Petitioner’s one year had expired in 2008. Thus, his filings in 2011 had no effect on the 

statute of limitations. 

Summary re Statutory Tolling – Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner was 

entitled to statutory tolling only until August 30, 2007, giving him one year thereafter, 

until August 30, 2008, to file his federal habeas petition. Thus, the instant Petition, filed 

no earlier than June 5, 2013, was almost five years delinquent.

4. Equitable Tolling

"Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is 

available in our circuit, but only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's 

control make it impossible to file a petition on time' and ‘the extraordinary circumstances 

were the cause of his untimeliness.'" Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 

2003). 

To receive equitable tolling, [t]he petitioner must establish two 

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 

that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. The 

petitioner must additionally show that the extraordinary 

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness, and that the 

extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it impossible to file a petition 

on time.

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] 

is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’ ” Miranda v. Castro,292 F.3d 1063, 

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.).

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Petitioner bears the burden of proof on the existence of cause for equitable tolling. Pace 

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th

Cir. 2006) (“Our precedent permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations 

on habeas petitions, but the petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling 

is appropriate.”).

Petitioner argues that his petition should be deemed timely because he “exercised 

due diligence seeking final adjudication of the state post-conviction remedies” and was 

“not notified of the superior court’s denial of relief from Defendant’s pro per petition for 

post-conviction relief until December 12, 2010.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 11.) The 

undersigned assumes, for purposes of this part of the report and recommendation, the 

truthfulness of Petitioner’s assertions of belated discovery of the PCR decision in 2010 

and that Petitioner acted diligently prior thereto to press his claims in the state courts.

4

 

Even with those assumptions, under Pace v. DiGulielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005) Petitioner

must still be denied the equitable tolling necessary to make his federal petition timely. 

Even if it is assumed that Petitioner acted promptly to file his state motion for 

reconsideration, he did not act promptly to file his federal habeas petition. In Pace, the 

Supreme Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that he should be granted statutory 

tolling for an untimely state petition because of the need to exhaust state remedies. 

Finally, petitioner challenges the fairness of our interpretation. He 

claims that a “petitioner trying in good faith to exhaust state 

remedies may litigate in state court for years only to find out at the 

end that he was never ‘properly filed,’ ” and thus that his federal 

habeas petition is time barred. A prisoner seeking state 

postconviction relief might avoid this predicament, however, by 

filing a “protective” petition in federal court and asking the federal 

court to stay and abey the federal habeas proceedings until state 

remedies are exhausted.

Pace, 544 U.S. at 416 (citations omitted). While this portion of Pace dealt with statutory 

 

4

 The undersigned does note, however, that the PCR court’s ruling did not come only in 

written form, but had been rendered on the record with at least Petitioner’s counsel 

present. (See Exhibit H, M.E. 8/30/07.) Further, Petitioner’s filings after discovery of 

the denial were explicitly directed at establishing the exhaustion of his state remedies. 

This gives at least an appearance that the much delayed seeking of a rehearing resulted 

from a recent discovery of the need to exhaust state remedies and not a recent discovery 

of the denial of relief by the PCR court.

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tolling, the same reasoning precludes equitable tolling. Here, Petitioner offers no reason 

he could not have employed the same procedure – filing his federal petition and then 

seeking to stay his petition until resolution of his efforts to exhaust his state remedies –

so as to promptly file his federal habeas petition after discovering the denial of his PCR 

petition.

Second, the Court in Pace observed that the petitioner “sat on [his claims] for five 

more months after his [state post-conviction] proceedings became final before deciding 

to seek relief in federal court.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 419. The Ninth Circuit has observed 

that ordinarily, thirty days after elimination of a roadblock should be sufficient for a 

habeas petitioner to file his federal habeas petition. See Guillory v. Roe, 329 F.3d 1015, 

1018, n.1 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, Petitioner delayed almost ten months after his efforts to 

file a motion for reconsideration were spurned (from August 21, 2012 until June 7, 

2013), before filing his federal habeas petition. Petitioner proffers no explanation for 

this extended delay. 

Under these circumstances, even assuming that Petitioner was diligent in 

discovering the denial of state PCR petition, Petitioner has failed to show that he was 

diligent in pursuing his rights after his discovery of such denial.

5. Actual Innocence

To avoid a miscarriage of justice, the habeas statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1) does not preclude “a court from entertaining an untimely first federal habeas 

petition raising a convincing claim of actual innocence.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 

S.Ct. 1924, 1935 (2013). To invoke this exception to the statute of limitations, a 

petitioner “’must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 

convicted him in the light of the new evidence.’” Id. at 1935 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 

513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). This exception, referred to as the “Schlup gateway,” applies 

“only when a petition presents ‘evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have 

confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was 

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free of nonharmless constitutional error.’ ” Id. at 1936 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 

316). 

Petitioner makes no such claim of actual innocence in this proceeding.

6. Summary re Statute of Limitations

Taking into account the available statutory tolling, Petitioner’s one year habeas 

limitations period commenced running on August 8, 2006, and expired on August 30, 

2007, making his June 7, 2013 Petition almost 7 years delinquent. Petitioner has shown 

no basis for additional statutory tolling, and no basis for equitable tolling or actual 

innocence to avoid the effects of his delay. Consequently, the Petition must be dismissed 

with prejudice.

B. OTHER DEFENSES

Respondents also assert that Petitioner has procedurally defaulted on his state 

remedies on his claims. Because the undersigned finds the petition plainly barred under 

the statute of limitations, this other defense is not reached.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

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Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. To the extent that 

Petitioner’s claims are rejected on such grounds, under the reasoning set forth herein, 

the undersigned finds that “jurists of reason” would not “find it debatable whether the 

district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Accordingly, to the extent that the 

Court adopts this Report & Recommendation as to the Petition, a certificate of 

appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus, filed June 7, 2013 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the reasoning of this 

Report and Recommendation is adopted, a Certificate of Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

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Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007).

Dated: April 14, 2014

13-1155r RR 14 01 24 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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