Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_13-cv-00582/USCOURTS-almd-1_13-cv-00582-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 20:1400 Civil Rights of Handicapped Child

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

J.S.R., a minor, by his Mother, )

Susan Tarter Childs, as his Next )

Friend, and SUSAN TARTER )

CHILDS, )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

 )

v. ) CASE NO. 1:13-CV-582-WKW

 ) [WO]

DALE COUNTY BOARD )

OF EDUCATION, )

 )

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This action arises under various federal statutes including the Individuals 

with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq., Title II of the 

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131, § 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of 

the Fourteenth Amendment. The suit follows an administrative due process 

hearing held pursuant to the IDEA and Alabama law.

Before the court are cross-motions for summary judgment, (Docs. # 25, 27),

which have been briefed fully, (Docs. # 26, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 40, 41, 42, 

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43, 44, 45).1 2 3 Defendant moves in the alternative for a judgment on the 

pleadings. Upon consideration of the parties’ arguments, the evidence, including 

the administrative record, and relevant law, the court finds that Plaintiffs’ motion 

for summary judgment is due to be granted on Count I, Defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment is due to be granted with respect to any discrimination or 

retaliation claim related to J.S.R.’s exclusion from baseball (Counts II and III) and 

to Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim asserted as part of Count IV. The crossmotions for summary judgment are due to be denied in all other respects.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court exercises subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1331 and 1343. Personal jurisdiction and venue are uncontested.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Summary Judgment

To succeed on summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate “that there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [he] is entitled to judgment as a 

 

1 With the court’s leave, Defendant substituted a replacement brief (Doc. # 40) for the

original summary judgment brief (Doc. # 28).

2

Plaintiffs designate their motion as a motion for partial summary judgment even though

they request summary judgment on all of her claims. The motion is partial in that they seek a 

ruling that Plaintiffs are entitled under the IDEA for their attorney’s fees, but Plaintiffs do not yet 

seek a specific sum for fees.

3 Any citation to document numbers assigned by CM/ECF are to the page numbers 

created by CM/ECF. Where record citations lack a reference to CM/ECF document numbers, 

the citations are to the page numbers provided on the documents as they were prepared 

originally.

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matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must view the evidence and the 

inferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. JeanBaptiste v. Gutierrez, 627 F.3d 816, 820 (11th Cir. 2010).

The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion.” Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). This responsibility includes 

identifying the portions of the record illustrating the absence of a genuine dispute 

of material fact. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Or, the movant can assert, 

without citing the record, that the nonmoving party “cannot produce admissible 

evidence to support” a material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). If the movant 

meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish – with 

evidence beyond the pleadings – that a genuine dispute material to each of its 

claims for relief exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. A genuine dispute of material 

fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence allowing a reasonable fact 

finder to return a verdict in its favor. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 

F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001).4

 

4 Defendant has set out the standard of review for judicial review of an administrative 

hearing officer’s decision under the IDEA. (Doc. # 40, at 21–23.) See also Loren F. ex rel. 

Fisher v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 349 F.3d 1309, 1313–14 (11th Cir. 2003) (describing the 

federal court’s standard of review of an IDEA case after an administrative decision is rendered). 

However, neither party – particularly Defendant – challenges the outcome of the administrative 

decision. (See Def.’s Brief, Doc. # 40, at 22–23 (“The [c]ourt’s independent review of the 

administrative record will show that [the] decision is clearly supported by the law and the factual 

evidence in the administrative record.”).) The only IDEA issue before the court is in Count I, 

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B. Judgment on the Pleadings

“Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when there are no material facts 

in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2008). “All 

facts alleged in the complaint must be accepted as true and viewed in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id.5

III. BACKGROUND

As a preface to the facts supporting Plaintiffs’ claims, the court begins with 

an explanation of the federal statutes affording special education and related 

services, accommodations, and procedural protections to disabled students.

A. Relevant Statutes

1. The IDEA

Originally enacted in 1970 as the Education of the Handicapped Act 

(“EHA”) Congress passed the IDEA “to ensure that all children with disabilities 

have available to them a free appropriate public education [(“FAPE”)] that 

 

which is Plaintiffs’ claim for attorney’s fees as prevailing parties in the administrative due 

process hearing. The parties dispute whether Plaintiffs are in fact prevailing parties, but this is a 

legal question that can be decided in accordance with Rule 56. In the absence of a challenge to 

the propriety of the hearing officer’s decision, the IDEA standard of review offered by 

Defendant will not be used.

5 Defendant offers no explanation for why a judgment on the pleadings would be 

appropriate.

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emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique 

needs.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). The IDEA defines a FAPE as 

special education and related services that – (A) have been provided at 

public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without 

charge; (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency;

(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary 

school education in the State involved; and (D) are provided in 

conformity with [a disabled student’s] individualized education 

program [(“IEP”)]. . . .

Id. at § 1401(9). The IDEA contains “an affirmative obligation of every [local]

public school system to identify students who might be disabled and evaluate those 

students to determine whether they are indeed eligible.” N.G. v. D.C., 556 

F. Supp. 2d 11, 16 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A)). This 

obligation is known as “Child Find,” and a local school system’s “[f]ailure to 

locate and evaluate a potentially disabled child constitutes a denial of FAPE.” Id. 

A state must evaluate a child for a disability under the IDEA upon the request of 

the child’s parent. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(B). 

A child with a disability is one “with intellectual disabilities, hearing 

impairments (including deafness), speech or language impairments, visual 

impairments (including blindness), serious emotional disturbance . . . , orthopedic 

impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific 

learning disabilities” “who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related 

services.” Id. at § 1401(3) (emphasis added). Once a child is determined to have a 

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disability, and his parent consents to the provision of special education services,

local educational agencies are obligated by the IDEA to reevaluate him when it is 

determined that a reevaluation is warranted or the child’s parent or teacher asks for 

reevaluation. Id. at § 1414(a)(2)(A). Subject to a few exceptions, reevaluations 

should not occur more often than annually but at least every three years. Id.

at § 1414(a)(2)(B). 

The local school system must develop an IEP for each child with a disability

covered by the IDEA. “The IEP is a comprehensive document developed by a 

team of parents, teachers, and other school administrators outlining the goals of the 

child, and the special education and related services needed to meet those goals. 

M.T.V. v. DeKalb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 1153, 1157 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing 20 

U.S.C. § 1414(d)).

States are required by the IDEA to “establish and maintain procedures in 

accordance with [the IDEA] to ensure that children with disabilities and their 

parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of a 

[FAPE].” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a). The requisite safeguards include the provision of

[a]n opportunity for any party to present a complaint – (A) with 

respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or 

educational placement of the child, or the provision of [FAPE] to such 

child; and (B) which sets forth an alleged violation that occurred not 

more than [two] years before the date the parent or public agency 

knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the 

basis of the complaint . . . .

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Id. at § 1415(b)(6). Generally, where the local school system is unable to resolve a 

complaint, the complainant is entitled to “an impartial due process hearing . . . 

conducted by the State educational agency.” Id. at § 1415(f)(1)(A).

In Alabama, the aggrieved parent files a complaint with the State 

Department of Education and requests an impartial due process hearing. The State 

Superintendent of Education appoints a qualified hearing officer to conduct the 

hearing. See generally Ala. Admin. Code r. 290-8-9-.08. The hearing is 

conducted by an impartial hearing officer with knowledge of the IDEA who is not 

involved in the child’s education. 20 U.S.C. at § 1415(f)(3)(A). The impartial 

hearing officer is required to render a decision as to whether the child received a 

FAPE, and he or she may find that a child did not receive a FAPE “only if the 

[local school system’s] procedural inadequacies – (I) impeded the child’s right to a 

[FAPE]; (II) significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to participate in the 

decisionmaking process regarding the provision of [FAPE] to the parents’ child; or

(III) caused a deprivation of educational benefits.” Id. at § 1415(f)(3)(E). A party 

aggrieved by the hearing officer’s decision may bring a civil action in state or 

federal court. Id. at § 1415(i)(2)(A). Further, a prevailing party may initiate an 

action in federal district court to recoup his or her reasonable attorney’s fees. Id.

at § 1415(i)(3)(A)–(C).

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2. Section 504

All children with disabilities under the IDEA, as well as some children who 

are ineligible for special education under the IDEA, are also protected by § 504 of 

the Rehabilitation Act. Section 504 is thus broader than the IDEA in its coverage 

of students with disabilities. It is distinguishable from the IDEA in that it

“provide[s] relief from discrimination while the IDEA provides relief from 

inappropriate educational placement decisions, regardless of discrimination.” 

Hornstine v. Twp. of Moorestown, 263 F. Supp. 2d 887, 901 (D.N.J. 2003); see 

also 2 Ronna Greff Schneider, Education Law § 6:15 (“In contrast with the 

affirmative obligation for a [FAPE] under the IDEA, § 504 is phrased negatively, 

prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability.”). “[I]n the special education 

context,” § 504 prohibits a school district from “exclud[ing], deny[ing] benefits to, 

or discriminat[ing] against any student solely on the basis of his or her disability.”

Jennifer B. v. Chilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 891 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1321 (M.D. Ala. 

2012) (internal citation omitted). The U.S. Department of Education has 

promulgated regulations under § 504. See 34 C.F.R. § 104.1. “[These federal] 

regulations clarify that a school district has an affirmative duty to identify, locate, 

and evaluate all children with disabilities in order to ensure that they receive a 

FAPE.” Kimble v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 925 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1181 (D. 

Colo. 2013) (citing 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.32–104.35)). “[T]he provision of an 

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appropriate education is the provision of regular or special education and related 

aids and services that (i) are designed to meet individual educational needs of 

handicapped persons as adequately as the needs of nonhandicapped persons are 

met. . . .” 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b)(1)

At the request of a parent or a school official (usually a classroom teacher), a

school district should evaluate a student to determine whether his physical or 

mental impairments substantially limit his ability to learn and participate in a 

classroom environment. See 34 C.F.R. § 104.35(a) (requiring evaluation of “any 

person who, because of handicap, needs or is believed to need special education or 

related services”). A student is “handicapped” if he or she “(i) has a physical or 

mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities, (ii) 

has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an 

impairment.” 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(1). If the child is determined to be handicapped 

and in need of special education and related services, the school district must

provide reasonable accommodations to assist the child. The school district must 

also make “periodic reevaluations of students who have been provided special 

education and related services.” 34 C.F.R. § 104.35(d).

To make reasonable accommodations, the school district does not have to 

fundamentally or substantially alter its programs. Mark H. v. Hamamoto, 620 F.3d 

1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2010). Moreover, the school district does not have to provide 

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“potential-maximizing education” for the child – just “reasonable accommodations 

that give [him] the same access to the benefits of a public education as all other 

students.” J.D. v. Pawlet Sch. Dist., 224 F.3d 60, 71 (2d Cir. 2000). The school 

system must conduct an “individualized analysis” of the child’s circumstances to 

determine what accommodations might offer the child equal and “meaningful 

access” to the benefit of public education available to non-disabled students. Mark 

H., 620 F.3d at 1098.

The accommodations to be provided are typically documented by the school

in a § 504 Plan, sometimes called a Personal Education Plan (“PEP”), which is 

devised by a team of people that normally includes the child’s teachers, school 

principal, and parent(s). See 34 C.F.R. § 104.35(c)(3) (requiring that the school 

“ensure that the [child’s] placement decision is made by a group of persons . . .

knowledgeable about the child). School officials review and make adjustments to

a student’s § 504 plans annually. “An IEP is sufficient to satisfy the [FAPE] 

requirement under Section 504, but a [§] 504 plan [or PEP] will not necessarily 

satisfy the same requirement under the IDEA.” K.D. v. Starr, 55 F. Supp. 3d 782,

785 n.3 (D. Md. 2014).

Finally, the Department of Education’s regulations for § 504 include 

“procedural safeguards.” 34 C.F.R. § 104.36. School districts must “establish and 

implement . . . a system of procedural safeguards that includes notice, an 

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opportunity for the parents or guardian of the person to examine relevant records, 

an impartial hearing with opportunity for participation by the person’s parents or 

guardian and representation by counsel, and a review procedure.” Id. A district’s 

compliance with the IDEA’s similar procedural safeguards meets that requirement. 

Id.

B. Facts

1. J.S.R.’s Experience in Dale County Schools

Since first grade, Plaintiff J.S.R. has been enrolled in the Dale County 

Schools. He has repeated the first and fourth grades and is therefore two years

older than his classmates.6 The alleged ADA and § 504 violations at issue in this 

case occurred during his time as a student at G. W. Long School in Ariton, 

 

6

The following table displays the dates that J.S.R. was in each grade level and the time 

that Defendant was providing J.S.R. with special education and related services or 

accommodations pursuant to § 504 or the IDEA.

First Grade 2003–04 academic year

First Grade (R) 2004–05 academic year

Second Grade 2005-06 academic year

Third Grade 2006–07 academic year

Fourth Grade 2007–08 academic year

Fourth Grade (R) 2008–09 academic year

Fifth Grade 2009–10 academic year (PEP implemented)

Sixth Grade 2010–11 academic year (PEP continued)

Seventh Grade 2011–12 academic year (PEP continued)

Eighth Grade 2012–13 academic year (IEP implemented in January 2013)

Ninth Grade 2013–14 academic year (IEP continued)

Tenth Grade 2014–15 academic year (IEP continued)

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Alabama during his seventh- and eighth- grade academic school years.

7

 Plaintiffs’

administrative due process complaint was filed in October 2012 during J.S.R.’s 

eighth-grade year. The due process complaint raised the ADA, § 504, and civil 

rights claims under § 1983 now before this court. Plaintiffs filed this suit in 

August 2013 at the beginning of his ninth-grade year.8 J.S.R. has recently finished

tenth grade and, by the court’s calculation, is approaching his eighteenth birthday

if he has not already turned eighteen.

J.S.R. was evaluated for special education services in second grade (2007) 

and during his second year in fourth grade (2009), but he did not qualify under the 

discrepancy model method that Defendant used for classifying children as learning 

 

7

Plaintiffs aver that they are “well aware of the [two-]year statute of limitations” and 

assert that they “did not request relief beyond the statute of limitations. To the contrary, [Ms. 

Childs] testified that she and J.R.S. [sic] were satisfied with J.S.R.’s teachers during his [fifth-] 

and sixth-] grade years.” (Doc. # 44, at 8.) Plaintiffs reference the IDEA’s statute of limitations, 

see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6), but neither party addresses that Alabama’s two-year statute of 

limitations for personal injury claims applies to Plaintiffs’ discrimination claims under the ADA 

and § 504. Everett v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 138 F.3d 1407, 1409–10 (11th Cir. 1998); Horsley 

v. Univ. of Ala., 564 F. App’x 1006, 1008 (11th Cir. 2014). At the pretrial conference held on 

May 15, 2015, Plaintiffs assented to this statute of limitations and say they only discuss 

Defendant’s actions going back to J.S.R.’s elementary school years in order to provide context 

for Defendant’s actions in later years. Counsel also expressed her belief that IDEA, ADA, 

and/or § 504 violations have been ongoing through the tenth grade, but there is no dispute that 

events following J.S.R.’s eighth-grade year have not been administratively exhausted.

8 Although Plaintiffs discuss circumstances that have arisen or persisted during J.S.R.’s 

ninth- (2013–14) and tenth-grade (2014–15) academic school years, these facts are not in the 

operative pleading which has not been amended since October 2013. (See Am. Compl.) 

Additionally, Plaintiffs’ complaints against Defendant arising since the completion of the due 

process proceedings may not be considered until he and Ms. Childs exhaust their administrative 

remedies.

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disabled and eligible for special education services.

9

 Defendant placed J.S.R. 

under a personal education plan (“PEP”), pursuant to § 504, during his fifth-grade 

year at the prompting of his fifth-grade teacher. (See Def.’s Ex. I (Doc. # 27-9).) 

The PEP provided, among other things, that: J.S.R. be seated in an area free from 

distraction; that J.S.R. be given time to clean his desk and locker and to organize 

his materials each day; that J.S.R.’s worksheets be visibly clear and adequately 

spaced; that J.S.R. not be required to copy from the board, if possible; that J.S.R be 

assigned a reduced amount of school work; that J.S.R. be told the purpose of each 

lesson and what he would be expected to do; that J.S.R. be given one direction at a 

time; that J.S.R. not be called upon to read orally in class; that J.S.R. be given tests 

orally when needed; that J.S.R. not be penalized for spelling errors in non-spelling 

related academic assignments; and that J.S.R. be offered a substitute assignment in 

lieu of a test as needed. These were common accommodation strategies that 

Defendant’s employees believed would help J.S.R.

 

9 This method of evaluation requires the district to determine whether there is a sixteen 

point or greater discrepancy between what a student presumably can do, based on his IQ scores, 

and what he is actually doing, based on his achievement tests. (Doc. # 30, at 117.) According to 

the testimony of Mia Jones, a Dale County Schools psychometrist, the school system has 

“always used” that model for assessing learning disabilities in students. (Doc. # 30, at 118.) Dr. 

Michael Passler, who later tested J.S.R. and diagnosed his learning disabilities, testified that “the 

discrepancy model has been under question” for some time “because it misses so many” students 

with learning disabilities. (Doc. # 30, at 1132.) Other methods of diagnosing learning 

disabilities include what Dr. Passler called “response to instruction” and “strengths and 

weaknesses.” (Doc. # 30, at 1133.) He also testified that, to his knowledge, the State of 

Alabama has always made exceptions for “clinical judgment” when a student appears to have a 

learning disability but does not qualify under the severe discrepancy model. (Doc. # 30, 

at 1133.) Plaintiffs say that Defendant should have used another method to diagnose J.S.R.’s 

learning disability.

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With the assistance of his fifth and sixth grade teachers who followed the 

PEP, it is undisputed that J.S.R. did well academically. The PEP remained in place

when J.S.R. moved to seventh grade. At this point, Plaintiffs say that the PEP was 

just a “sham” that was “inappropriate” for J.S.R. and did not, in theory or practice, 

accommodate his individual needs or provide him with a FAPE. (Doc. # 26, 

at 19.) Defendant’s failure to accommodate J.S.R. was most evident in J.S.R.’s 

math class performance. Although he was not identified to receive special 

education services, J.S.R. was removed from his seventh-grade math class and 

placed on the computer-based I-learn math program under the supervision of a 

special education teacher, Dana Barron, working at a first-grade math level. 

J.S.R.’s PEP was modified to include the I-learn math program as one of his 

accommodations. Defendant passed J.S.R. from seventh to eighth grade even 

though he failed most of his seventh-grade classes. During J.S.R.’s seventh-grade 

school year, Ms. Childs had J.S.R. evaluated by a neuropsychologist, Dr. Passler,

at her own expense. Dr. Passler determined that J.S.R. had a learning disability 

and that J.S.R. needed special education services.

On October 10, 2012, Ms. Childs filed a due process hearing complaint with 

the Alabama Department of Education. In November 2013, J.S.R. was referred for 

special education eligibility and services. On January 8, 2013, Defendant officially 

determined that J.S.R. was eligible for special education and related services, 

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identified J.S.R. as having “specific learning disability,” and provided J.S.R. with

an IEP. (See Def.’s Exs. Y & Z (Docs. # 27-26, 27-27).)10 Ms. Childs complains 

that the IEP failed to include (1) a provision that J.S.R. be removed from his math 

class for thirty minutes each day for special education or (2) any provision 

concerning J.S.R.’s involvement in school sports. Plaintiffs contend that J.S.R. 

needs to be allowed to play on the school baseball team for his social development

and as a motivator to J.S.R. to apply himself academically.

11 J.S.R. continues to 

receive special education services under the IEP.

2. Administrative Due Process Decision

In response to the due process complaint, Steve P. Morton, Jr., the stateappointed impartial hearing officer, held a hearing spanning six nonconsecutive

days in January, February, and April 2013. On June 13, 2013, Hearing Officer 

Morton rendered a fifty-two page decision substantially in favor of J.S.R. (Doc. 

# 27-1 (“Admin. Decision”).) Nevertheless, Defendant disputes that Plaintiffs 

were “prevailing parties” in the IDEA administrative proceedings.

 

10 Since the administrative due process hearing, Plaintiffs represent that J.S.R. has also 

been diagnosed with a panic disorder, and Defendant is allegedly aware of the diagnosis. For 

purposes of the time period at issue in this suit, J.S.R.’s disability was his learning disability.

11 For different reasons, J.S.R. was not permitted to play baseball in seventh or eighth 

grade. In seventh grade, J.S.R. had been suspended from school for bringing brass knuckles to 

campus, and his suspension coincided with the day of team tryouts. In eighth grade, J.S.R.’s 

grades were so poor that he was ineligible to play on the team. In ninth grade, J.S.R. tried out for 

and made the varsity team, but the coach moved him to the junior varsity team. By tenth grade, 

J.S.R. was too old to play on the junior varsity team, and he did not make the varsity team, so he 

did not play at all last season. Plaintiffs contend that J.S.R.’s exclusion from baseball has been 

in retaliation for his complaints against Defendant.

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Hearing Officer Morton declined to consider Plaintiffs’ claims raised under 

§ 504, the ADA, the No Child Left Behind Act, or 42 U.S.C. § 1983, citing his 

lack of jurisdiction over non-IDEA claims. (Admin. Decision, at 9–10.) He also 

declined to consider issues that were not timely or properly raised in the due 

process complaint. (Admin. Decision, at 10–11.) Hearing Officer Morton

enunciated the following “general” issues that were properly before him:

1) Was J denied a [FAPE], due to [Defendant’s] failure to 

properly identify, locate, and evaluate J pursuant to Child Find?

2) Whether . . . J is due reimbursement for the cost of an 

independent Neuropsychological Exam secured by [Ms. Childs’s] 

from Dr. Michael Passler (incorporating two testing dates, October 23, 

2012 & October 31, 2012)?

3) Was J denied a FAPE due to [Defendant’s] failure to 

properly develop and implement the [IEP] and did [Defendant] 

discriminate against J?

(Admin. Decision, at 11.)12

As to the first issue, Hearing Officer Morton concluded that Defendant 

failed in its duty under Child Find, but he found that the evidence did not support 

Ms. Child’s contention that Defendant should have identified J.S.R. as of October 

12, 2010, two years prior to her filing the due process complaint. Instead, the 

 

12 Included within these main issues, the hearing officer noted “component” issues 

including whether the two-year statute of limitation in IDEA was due to be adjusted because Ms. 

Childs had been prevented from requesting a due process hearing, whether J.S.R. was prevented 

from playing baseball, and whether that violated his right to FAPE, and if J.S.R. has been denied 

a FAPE due to a violation of Child Find, how long the denial of a FAPE lasted. (Admin. 

Decision, at 11–12.)

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hearing officer ruled that the evidence “support[ed] the conclusion that as of 

November 29, 2011, the District had sufficient information that should have 

triggered notice . . . .” (Admin. Decision, at 35.) The evidence supporting this 

conclusion included the letter from Ms. Childs to the district on November 29, 

2011, raising her concerns about a lack of proper adjustments to J.S.R.’s § 504 

plan based on his developmental and learning disorders, in addition to what the

District knew about J.S.R. (e.g., that he had repeated two grades), J.S.R.’s very 

poor academic performance from the outset of seventh grade, identified behavioral 

concerns, and the timing of the § 504 review. (Admin. Decision, at 30–31.) 

Hearing Officer Morton found that the special education coordinator for Dale 

County Schools, Beverly Lampkin, did not deny that communication continued to 

flow from Ms. Childs from “late 2011 through the fall of 2012.” (Admin. 

Decision, at 33.) Ultimately, Hearing Officer Morton determined that Defendant 

denied a FAPE to J.S.R. for roughly one year from November 29, 2011 until 

November 11, 2012, when J.S.R. was referred and identified for special education 

services. (Admin. Decision, at 36.)

As to the second issue, Hearing Officer Morton found that Defendant was 

obligated to pay the costs incurred by Ms. Childs in 2012 to have J.S.R. 

independently tested by Dr. Passler. (Admin. Decision, at 42.)

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Finally, on the third question, Hearing Officer Morton determined that J.S.R. 

was denied a FAPE to the extent that he was not provided with an IEP from 

roughly December 1, 2011, through January 10, 2013. (Admin. Decision, at 44.) 

However, Hearing Officer Morton concluded that J.S.R.’s exclusion from 

participation in baseball in seventh or eighth grade did not constitute 

discrimination.13

As compensatory educational relief for J.S.R., Hearing Officer Morton

ordered Defendant to furnish services through the Learning Center to recover at 

least two and up to three semesters of one-on-one services in math. Hearing 

Officer Morton further ordered that Defendant continue with the responsibility to 

pay for at least one year of counseling for J.S.R. with the counselor with whom the 

family already had an established relationship.

C. Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed this suit on August 14, 2013, and amended their complaint on 

October 30, 2013. None of the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint relates to 

events or circumstances arising during J.S.R.’s ninth- or tenth-grade years, and as 

stated previously, the court proceeds on the assumption that J.S.R.’s seventh- and 

 

13 Mr. Morton concluded that the consequences of J.S.R.’s own behavior that led to a 

brief suspension caused him to be unable to try out for baseball in seventh grade, and that the 

application of the Alabama High School Athletic Association’s standards, over which Mr. 

Morton had no authority, later precluded J.S.R.’s participation on account of his poor grades. 

(Admin. Decision, at 44–45.)

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eighth-grade years are the subject of Plaintiffs’ claims. The Amended Complaint 

sets out four counts.

Count I: Plaintiffs were required to retain legal counsel, Bobbie S. Crook 

and Michael P. Lasseter, to assist with the administrative claim. Plaintiffs have

incurred attorney’s fees in excess of $100,942 and expenses totaling $4,630, for 

which they seek reimbursement through this action as prevailing parties under the 

IDEA.

Counts II and III: Plaintiffs sue Defendant for intentional discrimination and 

retaliation against J.S.R. on the basis of his disabilities and for violations of Title II 

of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and § 504 of the Rehabilitation 

Act. Plaintiffs’ discrimination claims are based upon Defendant’s deprivation of 

reasonable, individualized accommodations for J.S.R, Defendant’s failure to 

provide a FAPE, and Defendant’s exclusion of J.S.R. from sports. The Amended 

Complaint is non-specific about the retaliation J.S.R. allegedly suffered.

14

Count IV: Plaintiffs sue Defendant pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 

allegedly violating J.S.R.’s constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment 

to substantive and procedural due process and equal protection. 

 

14 Plaintiffs allege in their briefing (but not their pleading) that Defendant has retaliated 

by (1) not permitting J.S.R. to play baseball during his tenth-grade year (i.e., the most recent 

academic school year), (2) not providing counseling to J.S.R., and (3) filing truancy petitions 

against J.S.R. for tardies and absences that were excused by his doctor. (Doc. # 26, at 26.) 

These grievances concerning Defendant’s provision of counselling and its acquiescence to 

truancy proceedings appear to have been resolved during mediation.

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Concerning Counts II, III, and IV, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant has 

subjected J.S.R. to humiliation, embarrassment, and degradation due to his 

disabilities, denied him access to sports, and caused him to suffer permanent 

educational and social setbacks. Plaintiffs request that this court award J.S.R. 

extensive declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. (Am. Compl. at 12–14.) 

There has been little discovery in this case; the parties rely primarily on the 

evidence submitted during the administrative proceeding. The parties have filed 

cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs request summary judgment on 

each of their claims. Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims 

under the ADA, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and § 1983. Defendant does not

seek summary judgment on Count I, but Defendant does oppose Plaintiffs’ motion 

for summary judgment on Count I.

The court held a pretrial conference on May 15, 2015, at which time the 

parties agreed to mediate, at a minimum, Defendant’s obligations to J.S.R. going 

forward until J.S.R.’s projected graduation in 2017. Following their mediation, the 

parties reported that they “resolved all of [Plaintiffs’] non-monetary claims.” 

(Doc. # 59.) The parties’ Memorandum of Mediated Settlement Agreement 

represents that what remains in contention is Plaintiffs’ claim of $10,000.00 in 

compensatory damages due to J.S.R. for the claims alleged in Counts II, III, and 

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IV, and their claim for an unspecified amount of attorney’s fees and costs. (Doc. 

# 59-2, at 1.)

IV. DISCUSSION15

A. Award of Attorney’s Fees Under IDEA (Count I)

In their motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs request a judgment as a 

matter of law on the issue of their entitlement to attorney’s fees under the IDEA

(Count I). Defendant has not moved for judgment as a matter of law on Count I, 

but it opposes Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.

The IDEA provides that “[i]n any action or proceeding brought under this 

section, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of 

the costs . . . to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability.” 20 

U.S.C. § 1415 (i)(3)(B). Consequently, “parents may bring an independent claim 

for attorney’s fees in a district court after their child prevails” in a state 

administrative hearing. Matthew V. ex rel. Craig V. v. DeKalb Cnty. Sch. Sys., 244 

F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1335 (N.D. Ga. 2003); see also Robert v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 

279 F. App’x 798, 800 (11th Cir. 2008).

“[T]o succeed on such a claim, [the plaintiff] must satisfy two elements: 

that there was a dispute between her and the school authority, and that she was the 

 

15 Defendant objects generally that Plaintiffs fail to support their summary judgment 

arguments with any relevant case law or record citations in their summary judgment brief. (Doc. 

# 41, at 12, 15.) The objection is noted, but Plaintiffs’ grounds for summary judgment on 

Count I are sufficiently stated and Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on Counts II, III, 

and IV is due to be denied.

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prevailing party in the dispute.” Doucet v. Chilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 65 

F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1254 (M.D. Ala. 1999). The IDEA does not define “prevailing 

party,” so federal courts have borrowed from precedents interpreting other federal 

fee-shifting statutes. Hence, an IDEA plaintiff is a prevailing party if she 

“receive[d] at least some relief on the merits of her claim,” id. at 1256 (citation and 

alteration omitted), and so long as that relief was afforded in the form of a 

judgment, consent decree, or similar court-ordered change in the parties’ legal 

relationship, Robert, 279 F. App’x at 801. See also Buckhannon Bd. & Care 

Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001).

16

Defendant protests that Plaintiffs cite little to no case law in support of their 

motion for summary judgment on Count I. Plaintiffs, have however, made clear 

that they seek fees per the IDEA and have identified the portion of the IDEA under 

which they claim entitlement to relief. Further, they have identified the relief 

J.S.R. was granted on the merits of the due process complaint.

Defendant contrasts the extensive relief sought by J.S.R. in the due process 

complaint with the actual relief awarded by the hearing officer and argues that 

Defendant was actually the prevailing party. Defendant asserts that the relief 

provided to J.S.R. was on “very limited issues.” (Doc. # 41, at 10.) Defendants 

 

16 The term “court-ordered” in this opinion or any similar IDEA precedent encompasses 

relief ordered by a non-judicial, administrative hearing officer. See Abraham v. D.C., 338 

F. Supp. 2d 113, 120 (D.D.C. 2004).

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contend that J.S.R. cannot be considered the prevailing party if he only won a 

“minor, inconsequential victory.” (Doc. # 41, at 10 (citing Canup v. ChipmanUnion, Inc., 123 F.3d 1440, 1443 (11th Cir. 1997)).) Defendants offer as examples 

various case precedents where fees were denied to IDEA plaintiffs who achieved

very slight success or who enjoyed only a Pyrrhic victory. (See Doc. # 41, at 11.)

Yet the relief awarded by the hearing officer cannot be characterized as 

slight or hollow. Hearing Officer Morton found that J.S.R. had been denied a 

FAPE for one year, awarded his mother reimbursement for her expense of

independently obtaining neuropsychological testing that Defendant should have 

provided, and required Defendant to pay for at least one year of third-party 

remedial math education services and counseling for J.S.R. Under the logic of 

Defendant’s argument, Plaintiffs should be penalized now for asking for more due 

process relief than J.S.R. ultimately received. But that argument fails. The fact 

that J.S.R. requested more relief than was granted does not render his victory 

inconsequential. Further, what Hearing Officer Morton awarded was not de 

minimis relief. His ruling satisfies the legal requirement that J.S.R. obtain at least 

some of the relief sought, by virtue of a ruling that altered his legal relationship 

with Defendant. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604. The court concludes that 

Plaintiffs are entitled, as a matter of law, to an award of attorney’s fees for the 

prosecution of the due process complaint for IDEA relief.

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The only issue remaining is the amount of attorney’s fees due to Plaintiffs’ 

counsel. Plaintiffs allege that as of June 24, 2013, counsel had incurred $100,942 

in fees and $4,630 in costs. (Am. Compl. at ¶ 40; see also Docs. # 34-2; 34-3; 35 

at 1–13.) Plaintiffs have requested an opportunity to prove the reasonableness of 

their fee request. (Doc. # 26, at 16.) Plaintiffs will be allowed to update and 

resubmit their fee request, and Defendant will be given the opportunity to object to 

the reasonableness of the sum of fees sought.

B. Relief Under the ADA and § 504 (Counts II and III)

1. Standard for Evaluating ADA and § 504 Claims

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified 

individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be 

excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 

discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 

assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The ADA very similarly states that “no qualified 

individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from 

participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of 

a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12132.

The ADA contemplates that the same remedies available under the 

Rehabilitation Act are applicable to ADA Title II disability discrimination claims. 

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42 U.S.C. § 12133. “The remedial scheme for a non-employment discrimination 

claim under the Rehab Act . . . is found in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964.” Taylor v. Altoona Area Sch. Dist., 737 F. Supp. 2d 474, 487 (W.D. Pa. 

2010) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2)). Because “[d]iscrimination claims under the 

Rehabilitation Act are governed by the same standards used in ADA cases,”

“[c]ases decided under the Rehabilitation Act are precedent for cases under the 

ADA, and vice-versa.” Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1305, 1305 n.2 (11th Cir.

2000). It is therefore proper to consider Plaintiffs’ discrimination claims under the 

ADA and § 504 together, applying the same standards.

As stated in the parties’ Memorandum of Mediated Settlement Agreement, 

Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages. “[C]ompensatory damages are precluded 

in cases of unintentional discrimination, but are permissible on a showing of 

intentional discrimination.” Wood v. President & Trs. of Spring Hill Coll. in City 

of Mobile, 978 F.2d 1214, 1219–20 (11th Cir. 1992) (addressing § 504 claim); 

W.C. ex rel. Sue C. v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1363 (N.D. Ga. 

2005) (same); see also J.D.P. v. Cherokee Cnty., Ga. Sch. Dist., 735 F. Supp. 2d 

1348, 1364 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (extending principle to ADA claims). In the Eleventh 

Circuit, intentional discrimination claims under § 504 are subject to a standard of 

deliberate indifference, which requires the plaintiff to prove that “the defendant 

knew that harm to a federal protected right was substantially likely and that the 

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defendant failed to act on that likelihood.” Ms. H. v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of 

Educ., 784 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1262 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (Albritton, J.) (quoting T.W. 

ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cnty., Fla., 610 F.3d 588, 604 (11th Cir.

2010)). The parties’ primary dispute is whether Defendant discriminated against 

J.S.R. because of his disability. Hence, the focus of the discussion will be on this 

issue.

2. Alleged Discrimination

a. Plaintiffs’ Contentions

Plaintiffs claim that Defendant violated the ADA by denying J.S.R. 

“reasonable accommodations” necessary to ensure that J.S.R. was provided the 

same educational opportunity that Defendant provides for non-disabled students. 

(Doc. # 26, at 19.) Plaintiffs do not assert definitively what reasonable 

accommodations and services should have been provided during J.S.R.’s seventhand eighth-grade years.

17

 Plaintiffs contend that Defendant may have tried to 

provide accommodations for J.S.R., but the accommodations “were not developed 

to help [him]” in particular. (Doc. # 43, at 5.)

Plaintiffs contend that Defendant violated § 504 by failing to provide J.S.R. 

with a FAPE, i.e., “regular or special education and related aids and services that 

 

17 Plaintiffs assert that Defendant should now provide J.S.R. with “further individualized 

instruction from the Learning Center and more appropriate counseling.” (Doc. # 26, at 20.) That

demand appears to have been met by Defendant to Plaintiffs’ satisfaction at the parties’ 

mediation. (See Doc. # 59-1.) That demand does not answer the question what reasonable 

accommodations and services should have been provided to J.S.R. in seventh and eighth grades.

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. . . are designed to meet individual educational needs of handicapped persons as 

adequately as the needs of nonhandicapped persons are met.” (Doc. # 26, at 22 

(citing 34 C.F.R. § 104.33) (emphasis added).) While Defendant provided some 

aid or service to J.S.R., Plaintiffs aver that the aids or services were not designed to 

meet J.S.R.’s individual needs. (Doc. # 43, at 8.) Plaintiffs reiterate that 

Defendant refused to properly evaluate J.S.R. for special education eligibility. 

“When [Defendant] did provide services” to J.S.R., Plaintiffs claim that 

“[Defendant] violated all the rules and regulations” made applicable by § 504. 

(Doc. # 26, at 24 (emphasis added).) In spite of the accusation that Defendant 

offended all rules, Plaintiffs focus almost entirely on one § 504 infraction: J.S.R.’s 

removal from his math class in seventh grade in contravention of § 504’s 

requirement that students be accommodated and supported so as to participate in 

the general education curriculum.18 See 34 C.F.R. § 104.34(a).

 

18 Plaintiffs admit that J.S.R.’s removal from seventh-grade math class could have been 

technically appropriate if J.S.R. had been under an IDEA IEP, but there was no IEP in place 

during J.S.R.’s seventh-grade year. (Doc. # 26, at 25 n.8.) J.S.R. was under a PEP at the time. 

Under the § 504 regulations, a school must try to educate handicapped and nonhandicapped 

students in the same setting “to the maximum extent appropriate to the needs of the handicapped 

person” by using “supplementary aids and services.” 34 C.F.R. § 104.34(a).

Defendant accuses Plaintiffs of “continually switch[ing] gears,” alleging that removal 

from grade-level math classes amounted to discrimination while demanding removal from gradelevel math instruction. (Doc. # 41, at 19.) Defendant ignores that J.S.R. should not have been 

treated as a special education student without and prior to his official diagnosis and designation 

for special education.

In Ms. H., the court found that there is no private right of action for a violation of a 

regulation promulgated in support of § 504, but reasoned that a school district’s ignorance of

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Plaintiffs maintain that Defendant acted in bad faith and with reckless 

disregard for J.S.R.’s rights inasmuch as Defendant’s personnel did not know 

Defendant’s obligations to disabled students under federal law. Plaintiffs assert 

that Defendant’s § 504 coordinator and special education director did not know 

that a student could be identified for special education services apart from 

identification by the discrepancy model and did not know that a special education 

student’s curriculum could be modified. (Doc. # 40, at 12–13.) Additionally, 

during the pretrial conference, Plaintiffs represented that the special education 

coordinator did not know that the law required that J.S.R. continue to receive the 

same services after the due process complaint was filed in eighth grade, and that 

Defendant violated this requirement by changing J.S.R.’s counselor.19 Plaintiffs 

claim these failures to know and follow special education law constituted “gross 

misjudgment” on the part of Defendant’s employees.

b. Defendant’s Contentions

With respect to Plaintiffs’ ADA discrimination claim, Defendant asserts that 

accommodations were made for J.S.R., and that the accommodations that were 

 

“the regulations that the Department of Education has ordered it to follow to ensure proper 

treatment of disabled students . . . may show that the school district is deliberately indifferent to 

the needs of disabled students.” 784 F. Supp. 2d at 1265. The court will give the same weight to 

any evidence of Defendant’s violation of a Department of Education regulation in this case.

19 During the pretrial conference, Plaintiffs’ lawyer referred to this requirement as “stay 

put.” There is no mention of a violation of “stay put” or any reference to a change of counselor 

in Plaintiffs’ briefing.

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implemented on J.S.R.’s behalf are the same as the accommodation suggested by 

J.S.R.’s neuropsychologist, Dr. Passler – a fact that Plaintiffs dispute. (Doc. # 41, 

at 13.) Defendant says it “implemented . . . environmental, organizational, 

assignment, curriculum, presentation, and evaluational accommodations” for 

J.S.R., as well as recommendations from J.S.R.’s counselor. (Doc. # 40, at 30–31 

(citing J.S.R.’s PEP for the 2009–2010 and 2010–2011 academic years (Doc. # 27-

9) and due process hearing testimony of two of J.S.R.’s teachers (Docs. # 27-10, 

27-11).) Defendant argues that Ms. Childs expected Defendant to ensure J.S.R.’s 

optimal academic success when she should have only expected reasonable 

accommodations for him.

Assuming arguendo that it failed to provide accommodations and services as 

alleged, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have no evidence of causation that the 

missing accommodations and services contributed to or caused J.S.R.’s academic 

failure. (Doc. # 41, at 15 (citing Brown v. Dist. 299– Chicago Pub. Sch., 762 

F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1085 (N.D. Ill. 2010)).) In Brown, the court granted the 

defendant’s motion for summary judgment, refusing the plaintiffs’ request to infer 

that, if the school had fully complied with an IEP, then the plaintiff would have 

passed his classes. The court explained that the plaintiff failed to present evidence 

of causation, such as the plaintiff’s performance with the assistance of a special 

education teacher as compared to his performance without assistance, or 

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performance on tests where accommodations were provided versus performance on 

tests without accommodations. Id. Defendant contends that Plaintiffs likewise fail 

to present evidence to support their claim that Defendant was the cause of J.S.R.’s 

academic failure.

With respect to Plaintiffs’ § 504 discrimination claim, Defendant suggests 

again that causation is lacking, and goes further by arguing that its evidence at the 

due process hearing credibly suggested that J.S.R.’s poor academic performance 

was due in part to J.S.R.’s lack of effort and his passive approach to learning that 

has been fostered by his family. (Doc. # 41, at 17–18 (citing Schnelting v. St. Clair 

R-XIII Sch. Dist., No. 4:10-CV-01240-JAR, 2011 WL 5913483, at *10 (E.D. Mo. 

Nov. 28, 2011)).)

Lastly, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs cannot prove the requisite element of

intentional discrimination to support a claim for compensatory damages under 

either the ADA or § 504.20 Section 504 claims arising in the context of public 

education are sometimes resolved at summary judgment on the intentional 

discrimination element because a plaintiff must show “something more than an 

 

20 The court pauses to note what has not been disputed in the summary judgment briefing. 

Defendant has not denied that J.S.R. is (1) a person with a disability (2) who is otherwise 

qualified to participate in (3) a program receiving federal financial assistance. See Ms. H, 784 

F. Supp. 2d at 1261 (enumerating the elements of a § 504 claim). Similarly, Defendant has not 

contested that it is a public entity or that J.S.R. is a “qualified individual with a disability,” as 

required to support a claim under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Defendant disputes that it 

has denied benefits or services to J.S.R. or otherwise subjected J.S.R. to discrimination because 

of his disability.

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IDEA violation for failure to provide a FAPE.” W.C., 407 F. Supp. 2d at 1363–64; 

Ms. H., 784 F. Supp. 2d at 1262 (“[Section] 504 claims necessarily require more 

than IDEA violations.”). The plaintiff “must . . . demonstrate some bad faith or 

gross misjudgment by the school or that he was discriminated against solely 

because of his disability.” W.C., 407 F. Supp. 2d at 1364. Courts have thus said 

that a school district’s “mere negligence” is insufficient to support a claim for 

compensatory damages. D.A. v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 289 F.R.D. 614, 

622 (D. Idaho 2013) (citing Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1139 (9th 

Cir. 2001)); see also Monahan v. Nebraksa., 687 F.2d 1164, 1170 (8th Cir. 1982)

(“We do not read [§] 504 as creating general tort liability for educational 

malpractice.”). If the school officials “have exercised professional judgment in 

such a way as not to depart grossly from accepted standards among educational 

professionals, the school system is not liable under § 504” or the ADA. Ms. H., 

784 F. Supp. 2d at 1263 (quoting Monahan, 687 F.2d at 1171).

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ allegations that it acted with deliberate 

indifference or bad faith toward J.S.R. are conclusory and unsubstantiated by the 

evidence. Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs can show, at most, that Defendant’s 

agents, in the exercise of their professional judgment, made “faulty or incorrect . . . 

evaluations and educational placements,” but that such mistakes are legally 

insufficient to constitute intentional discrimination. (Doc. # 40, at 48.)

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3. Findings

Proving a school district’s deliberate indifference, bad faith, or gross 

misjudgment is a high standard that can be difficult for a plaintiff to meet, but the 

court may not weigh the evidence at summary judgment.21 Consequently, district 

courts have allowed special education cases arising under § 504 and/or the ADA to 

proceed to trial where the court could not decide the question of intentional 

discrimination as a matter of law.

For example, in D.A., the court found the plaintiff’s evidence that the 

defendant provided inadequate testing to a student was sufficient reason to deny 

the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, notwithstanding the defendant’s 

evidence of its efforts to provide accommodations to the plaintiff. 289 F.R.D. 

at 623. Similarly, in Ms. H., the plaintiff presented probative evidence that the 

defendant “simply ignored [the student] by failing to conduct tests or assessments, 

and by failing to significantly update [the student’s] § 504 plans despite [the 

student’s] poor grades.” 784 F. Supp. 2d at 1268. And in BD v. DeBuono, 130 

F. Supp. 2d 401, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), the court denied a school district’s motion 

for summary judgment where plaintiffs showed that educators knew that the 

 

21 “In practice, cross motions for summary judgment may be probative of the 

nonexistence of a factual dispute, but this procedural posture does not automatically empower 

the court to dispense with the determination whether questions of material fact exist.” Ga. State 

Conference of NAACP v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 775 F.3d 1336, 1345 (11th Cir. 2015)

(internal citation, alteration, and quotations omitted). In this case, the cross motions are not 

probative of the nonexistence of a factual dispute.

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quantity of therapy provided to students was inadequate but nonetheless persisted 

in providing that level of therapy.

In view of the evidence and in keeping with the obligation to view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the court concludes 

that a jury should decide whether Defendant discriminated against J.S.R. because 

of his disability. Additionally, the court finds that Defendant’s lack of causation 

defense should also be presented to a jury. The parties’ cross-motions for 

summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ ADA and § 504 discrimination claims (Counts II 

and III) are therefore due to be denied, with one exception discussed below.

4. Baseball Discrimination and Retaliation

Plaintiffs assert that Defendant discriminated against J.S.R. in violation of 

§ 504 and the ADA by excluding J.S.R. from participation in extracurricular 

sports. Plaintiffs posit that, if J.S.R.’s academic needs had been addressed properly 

by Defendant, his grades would not have suffered; ergo, he would have been 

eligible to play sports during the eighth grade.

Defendant contends that J.S.R. was not discriminated against on the basis of 

his disability. Defendant contends that it provided J.S.R. an equal opportunity to 

participate because: (1) Defendant fairly applied a system-wide rule that prevented 

J.S.R. from trying out for baseball in seventh grade while he was suspended from 

school for bringing brass knuckles to school; and (2) Defendant offered reasonable 

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34

accommodations to assist J.S.R. in achieving the passing grades required by the 

Alabama High School Athletic Association to be eligible to play sports in eighth 

grade. (Doc. # 40, at 39–40; see also Doc. # 40, at 27 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 104.37, 

which requires a school to “provide . . . extracurricular services and activities in 

such manner as is necessary to afford handicapped students an equal opportunity 

for participation in such services and activities”) (emphasis added)).) The court 

notes that Defendant’s position is consistent with Hearing Officer Morton’s 

findings of no discrimination during the IDEA due process proceedings, (see

Admin. Decision, at 44–45), and Plaintiffs have not appealed that decision. 

Plaintiffs also assert that Defendant violated the anti-retaliation provisions of 

§ 504 by not permitting J.S.R. to play baseball in tenth grade, by not providing 

unspecified counseling, and by pursuing truancy issues in juvenile court for 

absences that were due to his disability and excused by a doctor. As discussed in a 

separate memorandum opinion and order on Defendant’s motion to strike, these 

factual predicates for a retaliation claim have not been administratively exhausted 

and were not pleaded in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. 

For these reasons, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the 

ADA and § 504 discrimination claims relating to baseball and on any retaliation 

claim relating to baseball.

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C. Relief Under § 1983 (Count IV)

Defendant contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ 

§ 1983 claim that Defendant violated J.S.R.’s constitutional rights to substantive 

and procedural due process and equal protection. Defendant argues simply that

“[§] 1983 actions for denial of rights conferred by the IDEA are barred because the 

IDEA’s comprehensive enforcement scheme provides the sole remedy for statutory 

violations.” K.A. ex rel. F.A. v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 741 F.3d 1195, 1210 (11th 

Cir. 2013). Defendant’s motion is well-taken to the extent that Plaintiffs attempt to 

raise constitutional claims rooted in Defendant’s failure to comply with the 

requirements of the IDEA and to the extent that Plaintiffs are claiming that J.S.R. 

was denied equal protection when he did not receive the FAPE that Defendant 

provided to non-disabled students. See id.; see also Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 

992, 1010 (1984), superseded in part by statute, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4) (holding 

that the EHA was the exclusive route by which the plaintiffs could assert an equal 

protection claim concerning the right to a FAPE). 

However, K.A. did not hold that the constitutional claims can never 

accompany IDEA claims. Rather, the court qualified its holding in K.A. as 

follows: “Were there some right at issue conferred by the Constitution or other 

federal laws and not by the IDEA, we would be presented with a different 

question.” 741 F.3d at 1210 (emphasis added). For example, in Manecke v. 

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School Board of Pinellas County, Fla., 762 F.2d 912 (11th Cir. 1985), the Eleventh 

Circuit held that an action could be brought under § 1983 where a school board

deprived a disabled child of her right to due process by effectively denying her 

access to the impartial due process hearing required by the IDEA. Id. at 918–21.22

Ms. Childs does not deny that when she finally requested a due process 

hearing, she received one. She appears to be alleging instead that Defendant’s 

mishandling of J.S.R.’s special education situation and its provision of inaccurate 

information about its ability to serve and accommodate J.S.R. caused her to delay

her formal request for due process proceedings. (See Am. Compl. at ¶ 56.) It is 

still not clear from Plaintiffs’ submissions how those facts constitute a procedural

due process deprivation.

At the pretrial conference, the court pressed Plaintiffs’ counsel for an 

explanation of the nature of the substantive and procedural due process claims. 

Counsel responded that J.S.R. was not afforded a complete and full due process 

hearing on the ADA and § 504 claims because the hearing officer declined to hear 

those claims. There appears to be no question that the hearing officer was correct 

that he lacked jurisdiction over any claim arising under the ADA or § 504. Even if 

the hearing officer should have entertained the claims in 2013, Plaintiff has not 

 

22 However, “[t]he [Manecke] court explicitly cautioned that the holding was narrowly 

limited to the facts of that case and should not be broadly construed to hold that § 1983 may be 

employed whenever a procedural deprivation occurs in the context of [what is now] known as 

the IDEA.” Sch. Bd. of Manatee Cnty., Fla. v. L.H. ex rel. D.H., 666 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1296 

(M.D. Fla. 2009).

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explained why Defendant, a co-participant in the proceedings, should be 

responsible for the alleged error of a state-appointed hearing officer.

Plaintiffs’ counsel further explained at the pretrial conference that J.S.R. was 

denied his substantive due process right to participate in his education and in

school sports. But Plaintiffs have omitted – and perhaps just take for granted – any 

legal explanation of the basis of J.S.R.’s substantive due process rights to 

participate in either his education or in baseball.

In view of the incompleteness of the parties’ arguments concerning the 

§ 1983 claims, the court declines to grant either party’s motion for summary 

judgment with respect to Plaintiffs’ due process claims. Defendant has not met its 

burden of showing why it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Likewise, 

Plaintiffs also have failed to provide the court with a legal basis to support their 

motion for summary judgment on Count IV. The cross-motions for summary 

judgment are therefore due to be denied with respect to Plaintiffs’ substantive and 

procedural due process claims. However, Defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment on Count IV is due to be granted on the basis of the Eleventh Circuit’s 

holding in K.A., which advises that there can be no equal protection claim for 

denial of a FAPE or any other violation of the IDEA that is redressable by the 

IDEA.

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V. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing discussion, it is ORDERED that:

(1) Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART and 

DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED with respect to Count I. It is

DENIED with respect to Counts II, III, and IV.

(2) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART 

and DENIED IN PART. Defendant’s motion is GRANTED with respect to the 

equal protection claim asserted in Count IV. Defendant’s motion is GRANTED 

with respect to any ADA or § 504 discrimination or retaliation claim arising from 

J.S.R.’s exclusion from playing baseball. Defendant’s motion is DENIED with 

respect to Counts I, II, III, and the remainder of Count IV.

(3) Defendant’s alternative motion for judgment on the pleadings is 

DENIED.

On or before October 26, 2015, Plaintiffs shall submit their request for 

attorney’s fees owed for the administrative due process hearing. Defendant may 

file any objections to Plaintiffs’ fee request on or before November 9, 2015. The 

parties shall consider the IDEA’s statutory standards for fee awards and related 

costs. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C)–(G).

DONE this 28th day of September, 2015.

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins

 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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