Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_18-cv-08360/USCOURTS-azd-3_18-cv-08360-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Alejandro S Estrada,

Petitioner, 

vs.

David Shinn, et al.,

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CV 18-08360-PCT-MTL (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE MICHAEL T. LIBURDI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT:

On December 26, 2018, Petitioner Alejandro S. Estrada, who is confined in the

Arizona State Prison Complex, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). Respondents filed an Answer (Doc. 12), and Petitioner filed a

Reply (Doc. 15).

BACKGROUND

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner was convicted in Coconino County Superior

Court, case #CR 2008-0671, of sexual conduct with a minor and was sentenced to a 25-year

term of imprisonment on February 19, 2010. (Exhs. B, C, E.)

On April 8, 2010, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief (“PCR”). (Exh. G.)

In his PCR petition filed on November 4, 2010, Petitioner alleged: (1) his plea was

involuntary because he was not told he had a right to a jury to determine the aggravating

factors; (2) his sentence was unconstitutional because the trial court based its decision on

facts that Petitioner did not understand and the jury should have decided the aggravating

Case 3:18-cv-08360-MTL Document 17 Filed 12/23/19 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

factors under Blakely v. Washington; and (3) his trial counsel was ineffective. (Exhs. H, I.)

The trial court summarily denied Petitioner’s PCR petition on April 22, 2011. (Exh. J.)

Petitioner did not file a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals.

Instead, over five years later, Petitioner filed a second PCR notice on September 12,

2016. (Exh. K.) In his petition, Petitioner raised the following claims: (1) his attorney was

ineffective for failing to explain Blakely v. Washington before he was sentenced; (2) his

attorney was ineffective for failing to move to have the victim submit a mental competency

assessment; (3) his 25-year prison term was a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights; (4)

he had a right to effective counsel; (5) his attorney was ineffective for failing to present

mitigating evidence of his drug and alcohol addiction, mental health records, physical

records, work records, counseling records, and socioeconomic records; (6) his attorney was

ineffective for failing to ask the court for a mental and physical report of the victim to

determine the harm done to her; (7) he had a constitutional right to have his plea agreement

amended so he would not be subject to a greater sentence; and (8) he had a right to set up a

trust account for the victim to pay for counseling and education. (Exh. K.)

The court denied the second PCR petition on May 1, 2017, explaining:

The Defendant filed a Pro-Se Rule 32 Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on

December 13, 2016. Previously, the Defendant filed for post-conviction relief

pursuant to Rule 32 on November 9, 2010. The Defendant argued then, much

as he does now, that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to explain

to him the effect of Blakely v. Washington when entering into a plea

agreement, failed to have the victim submit to a mental competency hearing,

failed to effectively assist the Defendant, failed to present mitigating evidence

at his sentencing, failed to have his plea modified to allow the Defendant a

lesser sentence, and failed to have the prosecutor set up a trust account for the

victim’s counseling.

The Defendant also argued that the sentencing Judge abused her discretion in

sentencing the Defendant to 25 years in the Department of Corrections. This

is not a proper argument for a Rule 32 Petition. Further, the plea was stipulated

to by the parties.

With respect to the other arguments made by the Defendant, this Court finds

no colorable claim.

(Exh. N.)

Case 3:18-cv-08360-MTL Document 17 Filed 12/23/19 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s order. (Exh. O.) The

court summarily denied the motion. (Exh. P.) According to the record, Petitioner did not file

a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals.

The record reflects that Petitioner filed a third PCR notice and petition on November

12, 2017. (Exhs. Q, R.) Petitioner argued (1) that his sentence was illegal and

unconstitutional because it was aggravated under a “void and obsolete statute,” A.R.S. §

13–604.01; (2) that the trial court had no subject-matter jurisdiction to impose his aggravated

sentence under A.R.S. § 13–604.01; (3) that his PCR counsel was ineffective for failing to

present a trial IAC claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for “colluding” with the

prosecutor and court to sentence him under an invalid statute, A.R.S. § 13–604.01; and (4)

newly discovered facts, significant change in the law, cause and prejudice, and fundamental

miscarriage of justice. (Exhs. R, S.)

On April 18, 2018, the court denied Petitioner’s petition, stating, “[t]he Defendant

alleged in 2011 that his plea was not voluntary or intelligent that his sentence was

unconstitutional and that his trial counsel was ineffective. Those same issues are alleged in

the latest petition, with additional claims. The claims are not only untimely, they are also

precluded under Rules 32.2(a)(2) and 32.(4).” (Exh. U.)

Thereafter, the record reflects that Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona

Court of Appeals, based on the trial court’s denial of his third PCR petition. (Exhs. V, W.)

The appellate court summarily denied relief, finding Petitioner did not establish that the trial

court abused its discretion by denying his PCR petition. (Exh. X.)

In his habeas petition, Petitioner raises three grounds for relief. In Ground One,

Petitioner alleges a violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. In Ground Two, he

alleges the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to impose a sentence pursuant to a

non-existent statute in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. In Ground Three,

Petitioner alleges that he received the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

\\\

Case 3:18-cv-08360-MTL Document 17 Filed 12/23/19 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

DISCUSSION

In their Answer, Respondents contend that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely

and, as such, must be denied and dismissed.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) imposes a

statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,

if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme

Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

An “of-right” petition for post-conviction review under Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32, which is available to criminal defendants who plead guilty, is a form of “direct

review” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). See Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d

710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007). Therefore, the judgment of conviction becomes final upon the

conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding, or upon the expiration of the time for seeking

such review. See id.

Additionally, “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Lott

v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). A post-conviction petition is “clearly pending

after it is filed with a state court, but before that court grants or denies the petition.” Chavis

v. Lemarque, 382 F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 2004). A state petition that is not filed, however,

within the state’s required time limit is not “properly filed” and, therefore, the petitioner is

Case 3:18-cv-08360-MTL Document 17 Filed 12/23/19 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

not entitled to statutory tolling. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005). “When

a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for

purposes of § 2244(d)(2).” Id. at 414.

In Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief

is filed even though the petition is not filed until later. See Isley v. Arizona Department of

Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). An application for post-conviction relief

is also pending during the intervals between a lower court decision and a review by a higher

court. See Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Carey v. Saffold, 536

U.S. 214, 223 (2002)). However, the time between a first and second application for postconviction relief is not tolled because no application is “pending” during that period. See id.

Moreover, filing a new petition for post-conviction relief does not reinitiate a limitations

period that ended before the new petition was filed. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d

820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

The statute of limitations under the AEDPA is subject to equitable tolling in

appropriate cases. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645-46 (2010). However, for

equitable tolling to apply, a petitioner must show “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights

diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way’” and prevented

him from filing a timely petition. Id. at 2562 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418).

The Court finds that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is untimely. On

February 19, 2010, the trial court sentenced Petitioner pursuant to the terms set forth in the

plea agreement. By pleading guilty, Petitioner waived his right to a direct appeal, and had 90

days to file an “of-right” petition for post-conviction relief under Rule 32 of the Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure. Petitioner filed his timely PCR petition on April 8, 2010, and

the trial court summarily denied the petition on April 22, 2011. Petitioner then had 30 days

to file a petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals – which he failed to do.

Thus, Petitioner’s case became final and the statute of limitations began running on

May 22, 2011. Petitioner was required to initiate habeas proceedings on or before May 22,

2012. Petitioner filed his habeas petition on December 26, 2018. Absent any tolling, his

Case 3:18-cv-08360-MTL Document 17 Filed 12/23/19 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

habeas petition untimely. See United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000)

(federal habeas petition submitted one day late was properly dismissed as untimely under

AEDPA, noting that a “missed” deadline “is not grounds for equitable tolling”); Hartz v.

United States, 419 Fed.Appx. 782, 783 (9th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (affirming dismissal

of federal habeas petition where petitioner “simply missed the statute of limitations deadline

by one day”).

Petitioner’s commencement of his second and third successive PCR proceedings on

September 12, 2016 and November 12, 2017, respectively, did not toll the limitations period.

The proceedings were filed after the limitations period had expired, and, therefore, did not

toll the limitations period. See Ferguson, 321 F.3d at 823 (“[S]ection 2244(d) does not permit

the re-initiation of the [federal 1-year] limitations period that has ended before the state

petition was filed.”). Furthermore, it appears that these PCR proceedings were successive and

untimely and, as such, were not “properly filed.” See Pace, 544 U.S. at 413-14.

The Ninth Circuit recognizes that the AEDPA’s limitations period may be equitably

tolled because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. See Calderon v. United

States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other

grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998).

Tolling is appropriate when “‘extraordinary circumstances’ beyond a [petitioner’s] control

make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Id.; see Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule”) (citations omitted). “When

external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a

timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must

establish two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Petitioner must also

establish a “causal connection” between the extraordinary circumstance and his failure to file

Case 3:18-cv-08360-MTL Document 17 Filed 12/23/19 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

a timely petition. See Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir.

2007).

Petitioner attempts to explain his untimeliness by summarily stating the following:

The untimeliness of the petition is caused by: 1) ineffective assistance of trial

counsel []; 2) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel []; 3) significant

change in the law or a new rule of constitutional law; 4) newly discovered

material fact [].

In addition “cause and prejudice” and “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

excused any procedural default.

Furthermore, the state court reached the merit of Estrada’s claims and denied

him relief.

(Doc. 1.) Moreover, in his reply, Petitioner addresses the merits of his claims and responds

to Respondents’ argument that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted.

The Court finds that Petitioner’s conclusory, one-sentence excuses for his

untimeliness fail to demonstrate that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. Indeed, Petitioner provides nothing to explain

why he failed to file a petition for review to the Arizona Court of Appeals after the denial of

his first PCR petition; waited over five years to file his successive, untimely second PCR

petition; waited almost four months before filing his third untimely PCR petition; and then

filed his habeas petition over six years too late.

Furthermore, a petitioner’s pro se status, indigence, limited legal resources, ignorance

of the law, or lack of representation during the applicable filing period do not constitute

extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling. See, e.g., Rasberry v. Garcia, 448

F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not,

by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”).

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to any tolling and his habeas petition is

untimely.

\\\

\\\

\\\

Case 3:18-cv-08360-MTL Document 17 Filed 12/23/19 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

CONCLUSION

Having determined that Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely, the Court will

recommend that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed

with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of

Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections

to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result

in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without further

review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure

timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order

or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 23rd day of December, 2019.

Case 3:18-cv-08360-MTL Document 17 Filed 12/23/19 Page 8 of 8