Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01462/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01462-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 06cv1462

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS STRAUB,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06cv1462 BTM (AJB)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT [Doc. #7] AND

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT [Doc. #13]

vs.

LINDA S. McMAHON, Commissioner of

Social Security,

Defendant.

On July 19, 2006, Plaintiff Thomas Straub filed a complaint against Defendant Jo

Anne B. Barnhart, then Commissioner of Social Security, seeking that Defendant’s decision

to deny Plaintiff disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act be set aside and

that Plaintiff be allowed to receive such benefits or, alternatively, that this Court remand the

case to Defendant for a new hearing. On November 30, 2006, Plaintiff filed a motion for

summary judgment and, on January 29, 2007, Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary

judgment.

For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion, and GRANTS

Defendant’s motion.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social

Security Act on December 20, 2004. His application was denied initially and on

Case 3:06-cv-01462-BTM-AJB Document 14 Filed 07/30/07 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Merriam Webster’s Medical Dictionary defines “radiculopathy” as: “any pathological

condition of the nerve roots.” (Available online at http://www.merriam-webster.com/medical, last visited June 25, 2007).

2 06cv1462

reconsideration. Plaintiff then filed a request for an administrative hearing, which was held

on February 8, 2006. In a decision dated April 20, 2006, the Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”) issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s request for benefits under Title II. The ALJ found

that Plaintiff retained the residual capacity to perform the full range of light level work and

“was not under a ‘disability,’ as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time prior to

December 31, 2000, his date last insured.” (Decision of ALJ at 6; Administrative Record

(“AR”) at 16.) Plaintiff then requested a review by the Appeals Council, which was denied.

Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed the instant complaint.

II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

Plaintiff alleges disability based upon back injury, poor eyesight due to macular

degeneration, and depression. As there is absolutely no evidence that Plaintiff’s poor

eyesight or depression began before his date last insured (December 31, 2000), this Court

considers the only relevant inquiry to concern Plaintiff’s allegedly disabling back injury.

In August of 1990, Plaintiff saw Dr. Thomas Ducker complaining of pain. (AR at 108.)

In an August 21, 1990 letter from Dr. Ducker to Dr. Charles Kinzer, Dr. Ducker reported

Plaintiff’s symptoms:

For 6 weeks now, [Plaintiff] has had pain in the right buttock, going down the

right leg into the calf. This is associated with marked weakness in plantar

flexion. He cannot walk on his toes. He has numbness in a S1 distribution

on the lateral aspect of his foot. The right ankle reflex is absent. All of this

with a persistent straight leg raising sign, in spite of being seen by a

chiropractor, treated with anti-inflammatory medications, and being on pain

medications.

Before this right sciatica occurred, he did notice some tightness in his back,

but no significant radiculopathy. The radiculopathy has persisted and the

weakness is profound.1

(Id.) Dr. Ducker diagnosed “classic S1 lumbrosacral radiculopathy” and stated that “the CT

scan clearly shows the L5, S1 disk herniation on the right sided nerve root. There is no doubt

about the diagnosis and what is wrong.” (Id.) The doctor recommended surgery if the

Case 3:06-cv-01462-BTM-AJB Document 14 Filed 07/30/07 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 06cv1462

problem persisted and noted:

I think his chances of getting a strong leg without surgery are slim. But I had

to tell him in all honesty that our patients with or without surgery some 10

years later may have a poor joint at that level because of the loss of the

intervertebral disk and cushion.

(Id. at 108-109.) On September 6, 1990, Plaintiff underwent a successful lumbosacral

laminotomy, with the removal of herniated disc L5-S1. (Id. at 171, 177.)

In March, 1993, Plaintiff saw Dr. Ducker again with back pain. In a March 3, 1993

letter to Dr. Barbara Furlow, Dr. Ducker stated:

Mr. Straub definitely, over the last three weeks, has had an episode of left

sided cervical radiculopathy with pain and weakness. The weakness has

involved the biceps and brachial radialis and is associated with C6 root

symptoms.

When the pain is marked, there is neck spasms, with compression onto the

brachial plexus where he gets numbness on the ulnar side of both upper

extremities.

(Id. At 166.) Dr. Ducker stated that a CT scan had been performed which “confirmed the

disease at C5-6.” (Id.) Dr. Ducker also noted “subtle changes above and below that [on the

spine] at 4-5 and 6-7,” but he did “not think they were bad enough to worry about.” (Id.) In

response to these injuries, Dr. Ducker prescribed a soft cervical collar for Plaintiff to use over

the following few weeks, and noted that he thought “the problem [would] resolve itself without

surgical intervention,” but that “if [Plaintiff’s] course [was] not one of improvement, we will try

to figure out whether or not it should be treated surgically.” (Id.) Dr. Ducker followed up this

letter with another on March 9, 1993, which reiterated:

I met with the radiologist to go over Mr. Straub’s films. He certainly does

have a bad C5-6 joint with associated spinal stenosis.

If the problem does not clear with medical therapy, then I think he is a good

candidate for anterior cervical C5-6 diskectomy, decompression, grafting,

and fusion. He clearly has a bad joint which accounts for the

symptomatology. He would do better not having that joint if it is going to

continue to plague him and irritate the spinal nerves and spinal cord.

(Id. at 167.) No record of any treatment for Plaintiff’s ailments from March 1993 through the

date last insured was presented.

Case 3:06-cv-01462-BTM-AJB Document 14 Filed 07/30/07 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 06cv1462

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Commissioner’s denial of benefits may be set aside if it is based on legal error

or is not supported by substantial evidence. Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th

Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. Id.

Substantial evidence is “relevant evidence which, considering the record as a whole, a

reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Flaten v. Secretary

of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995).

IV. DISCUSSION

In his motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff contends that: (1) the ALJ erred in failing

to develop the record by not ordering a consultive examination; (2) the ALJ should have used

the testimony of a medical expert to determine Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity prior to

the date last insured; and (3) the ALJ should have used the testimony of a vocational expert

in determining Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity. As discussed below, the Court finds

that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not based on legal

error.

To begin, the ALJ did not order a consultative examination (“CE”) because, as he

indicated at the start of the administrative hearing, a CE would not help Plaintiff’s case

because it would reflect the current state of affairs, many years after the date last insured.

(AR at 183.) Plaintiff’s attorney explicitly agreed with this determination, stating “[t]hat’s

correct.” (Id.) Thus, Plaintiff waived this issue. Even if a waiver would not be applicable, the

Court finds no reason to upset the ALJ’s determination on this issue. Plaintiff’s attorney even

acknowledged at the hearing that there was a “big gap” in Plaintiff’s medical records prior to

the date last insured, and that this was a “problem.” (AR at 182.) However, a CE performed

in 2006 would not have remedied the glaring problem of inadequate records of Plaintiff’s

alleged disability prior to 2001.

Second, the ALJ was not required to call a medical expert to aid in determining the

onset date of Plaintiff’s disability because the ALJ did not find that Plaintiff had proven that

Case 3:06-cv-01462-BTM-AJB Document 14 Filed 07/30/07 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 06cv1462

he is disabled. The case cited by Plaintiff, Armstrong v. Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration, 160 F.3d 587 (9th Cir. 1998), stands for the proposition that an ALJ has a duty

to assist a claimant in creating a complete record by calling a medical expert to assist in

determining the onset date “where a record is ambiguous as to the onset date of disability.”

160 F.3d at 590. However, in this case, the ALJ did not find that Plaintiff ever became

disabled, as he concluded that Plaintiff currently “retains the . . . residual functional capacity

to perform the full range of light level work.” (AR at 13.) Accordingly, there would be no

reason to employ a medical expert to help determine an onset date for a non-existent

disability. See Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 255 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Because the ALJ found

that [claimant] could have returned to his prior work and was not disabled, the judge needed

no medical expert to determine the onset date of the alleged disability.”).

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in not taking the testimony of a vocational

expert because the grids were not properly applicable to a determination of Plaintiff’s residual

functional capacity. Plaintiff argues that, “[i]f plaintiff is limited to light work activity with a sitstand option, or other non-exertional limitations, vocational testimony would . . . be necessary

to determine whether plaintiff could engage in substantial gainful activity.” (Pl.’s Mem. at 8.)

However, the ALJ specifically found that Plaintiff was able to perform the “full range” of light

level work, and this Court sees no reason to disturb that finding, as it is supported by

substantial evidence. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s condition presents no special limitations which

are not embodied in the grids and would require particularized vocational testimony.

V. CONCLUSION

The ALJ applied the proper law and his decision was supported by substantial

evidence. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and

GRANTS Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

//

//

Case 3:06-cv-01462-BTM-AJB Document 14 Filed 07/30/07 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6 06cv1462

The Clerk shall enter final judgment affirming the ALJ’s denial of disability insurance

benefits.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 30, 2007

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

Case 3:06-cv-01462-BTM-AJB Document 14 Filed 07/30/07 Page 6 of 6