Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-04053/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-04053-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARVESTER J. JOHNSON, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

RON HARRIS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-04053-WHO (PR) 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS; ORDER 

DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND

Dkt. No. 30

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Larvester Johnson alleges that staff at Maguire Correctional Facility violated his 

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Defendants move to dismiss the third amended

complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Johnson cannot state an Eighth 

Amendment claim because he was a pretrial detainee during the events in question. And while the 

Third Amended Complaint shows that Johnson disagreed with the medical staff at Maguire’s 

assessment that he was a suicide risk, that disagreement does not give rise to a claim of deliberate 

indifference—to the contrary, the allegations show that the staff met with and assessed him 

regularly, and if anything was over-protective of him. Accordingly, defendants’ motion is

GRANTED. The third amended complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. If Johnson 

wishes to file an amended complaint he must do so on or before April 19, 2019. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) should be granted if 

the complaint does not proffer “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when 

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Dismissal is appropriate also when pleadings show a “lack of 

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cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). Pro se 

pleadings must be liberally construed. Id. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff 

must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the 

United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting 

under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

B. Background

Johnson was booked into the Maguire Correctional Facility on May 29, 2017. Defendant 

Harris, a member of Maguire’s mental health treatment team, conducted the standard inmate 

intake interview with Johnson which included a suicide risk assessment. (Third Am. Compl. 

(TAC), Dkt. No. 22 at 3). Although Johnson alleges that during this screening he did not show 

any signs of suicide risk, defendants found Johnson at a severe risk of committing suicide and 

required him to wear a suicide prevent outfit (Ferguson gown). (TAC, Dkt. No. 22 at 3-4.) 

Johnson alleges that defendants’ assessment resulted from the fact that he had gone to John 

George psychiatric facility in the past and did not have the support of family or friends. (Id. at 4.) 

The staff at Maguire assessed him as a suicide risk and recorded that he was suffering from bipolar 

disorder and schizophrenia, was not taking his psychiatric medications, had a prior suicide

attempt, made statements of hopelessness about his life, and presented as tearful and hopeless. 

(Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 38 at 16.) The staff made near daily assessments and reports 

on his mental health and evaluated him as being at severe suicide risk for several days. (TAC, 

Dkt. No. 22 at 4-5.) By June 5, 2017, he had been downgraded to a moderate suicide risk, was 

returned to the general population with his normal clothes, and was no longer required to wear the 

Ferguson gown. (Id. at 6.) 

At some point between June 5 and July 24, 2017, an incident occurred that resulted in 

Johnson being placed back in the Ferguson gown and moved to segregated housing; he remained

listed as a suicide risk. (Id.) He met with defendant Alvarez, a psychologist, on July 24, 2017 for 

an assessment. She informed him that he would need to continue wearing the Ferguson gown and 

that she took various factors into account to assess when he would no longer be considered a 

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suicide risk, such as his personal history and adjustment in jail. (TAC, Dkt. No. 22 at 6.)

Thereafter, Johnson was evaluated every 90 days to determine if he remained a suicide 

risk. (Id. at 7.) At his October 23, 2017 assessment, Johnson was still presenting some suicidal 

risk, and it was noted that he was not in compliance with his medication and mental health 

treatment plan. (Id.) He was encouraged to take his medications and follow jail policies. (Id.) 

When Johnson requested that defendant Alvarez no longer conduct his assessments because he 

believed she had lied in her reports in order to keep him listed as a suicide risk, his request was 

honored and his subsequent assessment was conducted by a different doctor. (Id. at 8-9.) 

Johnson was assessed as no longer being a suicide risk on January 23, 2018, and no longer 

had to wear the Ferguson gown. (Id.) 

C. Legal Claims 

Johnson alleges that Maguire staff violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

i. Eighth Amendment

Johnson alleges defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by deciding he was at 

risk of committing suicide and therefore making him wear a Ferguson gown. This claim will be 

dismissed because during the entire time period at issue, Johnson was a pretrial detainee. As a 

pretrial detainee Johnson was not protected under the Eighth Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 

U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979) (a pretrial detainee is protected under the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment, not under the Eighth Amendment). Accordingly, the Eighth Amendment 

claim is DISMISSED with prejudice. 

ii. Fourteenth Amendment

Johnson alleges that defendants violated his due process rights by incorrectly concluding 

that he was at risk of committing suicide and making him wear a Ferguson gown. He alleges that

he never showed signs of any suicidal risk behavior when he was booked in the jail but that

defendants did not allow him to wear his regular clothing despite his repeated requests, did not

give him the medical records and copies of grievances that he requested, and that one defendant 

lied in her assessments of his mental health to keep him classified as a suicide risk when he was 

not at risk. (TAC, Dkt. No. 22 at 4, 6-10.) 

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Liberally construed, Johnson’s allegations do not state a due process claim under the 

Fourteenth Amendment. To state a claim for failing to address his medical needs, Johnson would 

have to show that defendants acted with deliberate indifference. See Simmons v. Navajo County, 

Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017-18 (9th Cir. 2010) (claims under the Fourteenth Amendment that 

correction facility officials violated pretrial detainee’s constitutional rights by failing to address 

medical needs are analyzed under a deliberate indifference standard). A plaintiff must show that 

“the official was (a) subjectively aware of the serious medical need and (b) failed adequately to 

respond.” Id. at 1018 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Mere disagreement with 

defendant’s medical judgment is insufficient to state a claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F. 3d 

330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[A] plaintiff’s showing of nothing more than a difference of medical 

opinion as to the need to pursue one course of treatment over another [i]s insufficient, as a matter 

of law, to establish deliberate indifference.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The allegations fail to state any facts that could conceivably show defendants failed to 

adequately respond to Johnson’s medical needs. To the contrary, the defendants met with him 

periodically to assess his mental health, devised a medication and mental health treatment plan, 

and had him wear the Ferguson gown for the length of time that they felt was necessary for his 

own safety. If anything, Johnson’s allegations show that defendants were overly cautious in 

ensuring that they protected his well-being by keeping him in the Ferguson gown until they were 

certain that he was not at risk of committing suicide. 

To the extent that Johnson’s allegations could be construed as a procedural due process 

claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, that claim also fails. A court presented with a procedural 

due process claim by a pretrial detainee should first ask if the alleged deprivation amounts to 

punishment and therefore implicates the Due Process Clause itself; if so, the court then must 

determine what process is due. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537-38 (1979). Here, 

Johnson alleges no facts that would show that defendants expressed an intent to punish him by 

making him wear the Ferguson gown, not does he allege that he suffered any harm from their 

actions. Moreover, there is an appropriate alternative purpose for the gown — to prevent selfharm. 

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Johnson’s allegations do not state a plausible claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Accordingly, this claim is DISMISSED, with leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. (Dkt. No. 30). The Eighth Amendment 

claim is DISMISSED with prejudice. Johnson’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim is 

DISMISSED with leave to amend. 

If Johnson chooses to file an amended complaint, it must be filed on or before April 19, 

2019. The amended complaint must include the caption and civil case number used in this order 

(17-cv-04053-WHO (PR)) and the words FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. 

Because an amended complaint completely replaces the previous complaint, Johnson must include 

in his fourth amended complaint all the claims he wishes to present and all the defendants he 

wishes to sue. See Ferdick v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). He may not 

incorporate material from the prior complaint by reference. Failure to file an amended 

complaint in accordance with this order will result in dismissal of all the claims in the 

complaint. 

Johnson’s “Motion to be Reheard,” which the Court construes as a motion to reconsider 

the Court’s order denying appointment of counsel, is DENIED. (Dkt. No. 40.) This case does not 

present factual or legal issues that are so complex as to present “exceptional circumstances” that 

warrant the appointment of counsel. See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1236 (9th Cir. 

1984). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 12, 2019

_________________________

WILLIAM H. ORRICK

United States District Judge

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