Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02090/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-02090-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 11cv2090–IEG (BGS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MYKAL S. RYAN,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 11-cv-2090 – IEG (BGS)

ORDER DENYING WITHOUT

PREJUDICE MOTION TO DISMISS

[Doc. No. 2].

vs.

DAVID R. RUBY, individually; DOES 1

through 20, inclusive,

Defendants.

This is an action alleging defamation and improper disclosure of private information. 

Currently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Having considered the parties’ arguments, and for the reasons

set forth below, the Court DENIES the motion WITHOUT PREJUDICE. [Doc No. 2.]

BACKGROUND

Defendant David R. Ruby is the Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee for Plaintiff Mykal S. Ryan’s

bankruptcy proceeding, which has been pending in the Eastern District of Virginia since July 16,

2008. (Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Ex. 1 [Doc. No. 5].)

Plaintiff commenced the instant action against Defendant on July 14, 2011. [Doc. No. 1.] 

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated and continues to violate California Civil

Code § 46 by making numerous defamatory statements. (Compl. ¶ 1.) According to Plaintiff,

Defendant told others that Plaintiff stole more than a million dollars from Plaintiff’s nephew’s

Case 3:11-cv-02090-IEG-BGS Document 12 Filed 10/27/11 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 In his reply, Defendant contends the Court should grant the motion to dismiss because

Plaintiff’s opposition runs afoul of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Civil Local Rules in

that: (1) Plaintiff failed to properly effect service; (2) Plaintiff’s opposition was untimely; (3)

Plaintiff’s opposition does not contain a brief and complete summary of the points raised; (4)

Plaintiff’s opposition does not contain a table of contents or a table of authorities cited; and (5)

Plaintiff’s opposition exceeds the applicable page limit. Although the Court undoubtedly has the

discretion to grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss for such violations, see, e.g., Civ. L.R. 7.1(f)(3)(c),

the Court declines to do so in this case. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the opposition was only several

days late, and Defendant was notified of its filing via the CM/ECF.

- 2 - 11cv2090–IEG (BGS)

trust, that he stole money from his mother, that he stole money and property from his nephew, and

that he stole property in his house. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant violated

Plaintiff’s privacy rights under the California Constitution and the Federal Privacy Act by

informing others of Plaintiff’s Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) disability, without

authorization, and by making materially false statements that Plaintiff is mentally disturbed and

mentally deficient. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 5-6.) According to Plaintiff, these actions also violate the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because they interfered with Plaintiff’s right to

obtain employment. (Id. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff alleges that as a result of Defendant’s actions, Plaintiff lost

his employment as an aerospace engineer as well as his Top Secret security clearance. (Id. ¶¶ 3,

16-17.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s actions constitute disability discrimination in

violation of the Americans with Disability Act (“ADA”). (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff lists forty four

individuals to whom Defendant allegedly made the above defamatory statements and improper

disclosures. (Id. ¶ 9.)

Defendant filed the present motion on September 15, 2011. Plaintiff filed a late opposition

on October 13, 2011.1

 Defendant filed a reply on October 17, 2011. The Court finds the motion

suitable for disposition without oral argument pursuant to the Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1).

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests

the legal sufficiency of the pleadings. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “To

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949

(2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “The plausibility standard is

not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a

Case 3:11-cv-02090-IEG-BGS Document 12 Filed 10/27/11 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 “The Barton doctrine takes its name from Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126 (1881), in which

the Supreme Court ruled that the common law barred suits against receivers in courts other than the

court charged with the administration of the estate. Id. at 127. The Supreme Court held in Barton

that, before suit is brought against such a receiver, leave of the court by which the trustee was

appointed must be obtained.” In re Crown Vantage, Inc., 421 F.3d 963, 969 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005).

- 3 - 11cv2090–IEG (BGS)

defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a

defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of “entitlement

to relief.”’” Id. (internal citation omitted). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable

legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri

v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must “accept all factual allegations in the

complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 

Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). The court, however, need not accept “legal

conclusions” as true. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Thus, “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. It is also improper for the court to assume

that plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v.

Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). On the other hand, “[w]hen there are

well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether

they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.

DISCUSSION

In this case, Defendant contends the Court should dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims because

the allegedly defamatory statements and disclosures were made in Defendant’s official capacity.

I. The Barton doctrine

First, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed because it violates the

Barton doctrine.2

 Under the Barton doctrine, “a party must first obtain leave of the bankruptcy

court before it initiates an action in another forum against a bankruptcy trustee or other officer

appointed by the bankruptcy court for acts done in the officer’s official capacity.” In re Crown

Vantage, Inc., 421 F.3d 963, 970 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing cases). Part of the rationale underlying the

Barton doctrine is that the court appointing the receiver has in rem subject matter jurisdiction over

the receivership property. Id. at 970. Accordingly, allowing the unauthorized suit to proceed

Case 3:11-cv-02090-IEG-BGS Document 12 Filed 10/27/11 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 11cv2090–IEG (BGS)

“would [be] an usurpation of the powers and duties which belong[] exclusively to another court.” 

Barton, 104 U.S. at 136. The Barton doctrine applies in bankruptcy to the same extent as in other

proceedings involving receivers. See In re Crown Vantage, 421 F.3d at 971.

Defendant, however, failed to show that the actions challenged in this case were done in

Defendant’s “official capacity.” See id. at 970. Under Rule 12(b)(6), “[t]he defendant bears the

burden of showing no claim has been stated.” Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169,

178 (3d Cir. 2000). In this case, Defendant merely alleges in a conclusory manner that “[a]s set

forth in defendant’s disclosure to the [United States Bankruptcy Court (“USBC”)] for the Eastern

District of Virginia, defendant’s only actions concerning plaintiff herein have been taken in

defendant’s official capacity as Chapter 7 trustee.” (Mem. of P.&A. ISO Def. Motion to Dismiss,

at 1 [Doc. No. 2-1].) In doing so, Defendant cites to his disclosure to the USBC for the Eastern

District of Virginia, which states: “The Trustee represents that he has taken no action whatsoever

relating to the Debtor and/or this bankruptcy case other than in an official capacity as Chapter 7

trustee and that he has not acted outside the scope of his authority in any respect.” (RJN, Ex. 2,¶

6.) Notably, Defendant fails to cite to any document that would corroborate this assertion. 

Because Defendant failed to do more than assert in a conclusory manner that the actions were

taken in his “official capacity,” he failed to meet his burden of showing that the complaint should

be dismissed for violation of the Barton doctrine. See Gould Elecs., 220 F.3d at 178.

To the extent Defendant contends that Plaintiff failed to allege in his complaint that the

actions were not taken in an “official capacity,” the Court rejects that argument. This is not one of

the elements of Plaintiff’s cause of action that Plaintiff had to allege in his complaint. Rather, as

the moving party, Defendant had the burden of showing that no claim has been stated due to the

applicability of some defense. See id. In any event, at least based on the documents presently

before the Court, Plaintiff’s complaint appears to rebut Defendant’s allegations by stating that the

allegedly defamatory statements and improper disclosures were made in California and not

Virginia, where the bankruptcy case is pending, and that they were made without Plaintiff’s

authorization. (See Compl. ¶¶ 3, 6, 9, 22.) Moreover, in his opposition to Defendant’s motion to

dismiss, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s defamatory statements were “fully outside the

authorized duties and responsibilities of the Chapter 7 trustee position” and were not made in

Case 3:11-cv-02090-IEG-BGS Document 12 Filed 10/27/11 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 Defendant asserts that the bankruptcy court already determined that “there was nothing in

plaintiff’s allegations that would warrant defendant’s removal or resignation as the Chapter 7

bankruptcy trustee.” (Mem. of P.&A. ISO Def. Motion to Dismiss, at 4; see also RJN, Ex. 1. Doc.

No. 750.) The fact that the bankruptcy court determined that the trustee need not be removed or

resign, however, does not resolve the issues before this Court–whether the statements were actually

uttered and whether they were made in Defendant’s official capacity.

- 5 - 11cv2090–IEG (BGS)

Defendant’s official capacity. (Pl. Opp, at 10 [Doc. No. 9]; see also id. at 33.)

II. Quasi-judicial immunity

Second, Defendant contends that as a court-appointed Chapter 7 trustee, he is entitled to

quasi-judicial immunity. “Bankruptcy trustees are entitled to broad immunity from suit when

acting within the scope of their authority and pursuant to court order.” Bennett v. Williams, 892

F.2d 822, 823 (9th Cir. 1989). Before immunity attaches, however, certain conditions must be

satisfied: (1) the trustee must obtain court approval and give notice to the debtor of the proposed

action; (2) the trustee’s disclosure must be candid; and (3) the act must be within the trustee’s

official duties. See id. (citations omitted). Notably, misrepresentations or any other malfeasance

by the trustee are not protected, and the trustee may be personally liable. See, e.g., New Alaska

Dev’t Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298, 1304-05 (9th Cir. 1989) (a receiver was not entitled to

broad immunity for alleged slander because such action “was not a function intimately connected

with his receivership duties”); In re Cochise College Park, Inc., 703 F.2d 1339, 1359-60 (9th Cir.

1983) (trustee’s fraudulent and negligent misrepresentations may be actionable if they were

“uttered either in bad faith or without reasonable grounds for belief in [their] truth”).

In this case, Plaintiff alleges Defendant defamed him and improperly disclosed private

information about him. In the absence of any other evidence, it cannot be presumed that such

actions were authorized by the bankruptcy court.3

 See New Alaska, 869 F.2d at 1304-05 & n.9. 

Moreover, taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the above statements were “uttered either in bad

faith or without reasonable grounds for belief in [their] truth,” In re Cochise College Park, 703

F.2d at 1359. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 8 (“Mr. Ruby’s violation of my privacy and disability

discrimination and defamation were done to prevent me from obtaining employment and were

done in a manner that was intentional, willful and malicious manner [sic] so as to place me in a

false light and to harm my reputation and to harm me physically.”).) Because Defendant failed to

provide anything except the conclusory assertion that the challenged statements were made in his

Case 3:11-cv-02090-IEG-BGS Document 12 Filed 10/27/11 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 A Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (“SLAPP”) is a civil action “in which the

plaintiff’s alleged injury results from petitioning or free speech activities by a defendant that are

protected by the federal or state constitutions.” Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 317 F.3d 1097, 1109 (9th

Cir. 2003). “California’s anti-SLAPP statute was ‘enacted to allow early dismissal of meritless first

amendment cases aimed at chilling expression through costly, time-consuming litigation.’” Id.

(citations omitted). Specifically, the statute allows a defendant to move to strike a plaintiff’s cause

of action if that cause of action “aris[es] from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s

right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in

connection with a public issue.” See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1).

- 6 - 11cv2090–IEG (BGS)

official capacity, he failed to demonstrated that he is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.

III. California Civil Code § 47

Defendant next contends that Plaintiff’s claim under California Civil Code § 46 fails

because Defendant’s statements were privileged. Section 46 provides a cause of action for

slander, which it defines as “a false and unprivileged publication, orally uttered,” that, inter alia,

“[c]harges any person with crime,” “[t]ends directly to injure him in respect to his office,

profession, trade or business,” or “ by natural consequence, causes actual damage.” Cal. Civ.

Code § 46. Section 47, however, makes privileged any publication or broadcast made “[i]n the

proper discharge of an official duty” or, subject to certain exceptions, “[i]n any (1) legislative

proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, [or] (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law.” 

Id. § 47(a)-(b).

As already noted, Defendant failed to demonstrate that the statements challenged in this

case were made in his official capacity or were otherwise authorized. Accordingly, Defendant

failed to demonstrate that his statements were privileged under Section 47(a).

IV. Anti-SLAPP motion

Finally, in passing, Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s complaint should be stricken under

§ 425.16(b) of the California Code of Civil Procedure because Plaintiff’s action arises from

Defendant’s protected conduct as the Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee. An anti-SLAPP motion to

strike4

 requires a two-step inquiry. First, the defendant must make an initial prima facie showing

that the plaintiff’s suit arises from the defendant’s protected activity—i.e, an act in furtherance of

the defendant’s rights of petition or free speech. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 317 F.3d 1097, 1110

(9th Cir. 2003). In this case, Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion fails at the first step. “[T]he critical

point is whether the plaintiff’s cause of action itself was based on an act in furtherance of the

Case 3:11-cv-02090-IEG-BGS Document 12 Filed 10/27/11 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 - 11cv2090–IEG (BGS)

defendant’s right of petition or free speech.” City of Cotati v. Cashman, 29 Cal. 4th 69, 78 (2002). 

As already noted, Defendant failed to demonstrate that the challenged statements in this case were

made in his official capacity. Because Defendant cannot show that Plaintiff’s action is based on

Defendant’s protected conduct as the Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee, the anti-SLAPP motion fails.

CONCLUSION

Defendant failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that the challenged statements in this

case were made in his official capacity. As such, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Defendant’s motion to dismiss on all grounds.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: October 27, 2011 ________________________________

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

Case 3:11-cv-02090-IEG-BGS Document 12 Filed 10/27/11 Page 7 of 7