Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03286/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03286-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TODD ASHKER and DANNY TROXELL,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 05-03286 CW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS'

MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO FILE

A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

AND TO HAVE SECOND AMENDED

COMPLAINT DEEMED TO BE

SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT

(Docket Nos. 94 and 155)

AND ORDER REGARDING

BRIEFING SCHEDULE

On August 11, 2005, Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this

action. On January 30, 2006, the parties stipulated to allow

Plaintiffs leave to file a first amended complaint (FAC). (Docket

Nos. 21 and 22). On August 30, 2006, Defendants filed a motion to

dismiss. (Docket No. 75). On November 13, 2006, Plaintiffs moved

for leave to file a second amended complaint (SAC) in which they

sought to add two defendants and two causes of action. (Docket No.

94). On June 14, 2007, the Court issued an Order Granting in Part

and Denying in Part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs'

Motion for Leave to File a SAC (June 14, 2007 Order). (Docket No.

140). The Court denied without prejudice Defendants' motion to

dismiss based on the statute of limitations because Defendants had

not had an opportunity to address the arguments regarding

continuing violations or equitable tolling that Plaintiffs had

raised in their supplemental opposition. Also, in the June 14,

Case 4:05-cv-03286-CW Document 180 Filed 12/26/07 Page 1 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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2007 Order, the Court denied Plaintiffs' request for leave to add

two defendants and ordered Defendants to file any opposition to

Plaintiffs' motion to add two causes of action and to address in

the opposition any statute of limitations issue regarding

Plaintiffs' due process claim arising from Defendants' Aryan

Brotherhood (AB) gang validation procedure. On July 13, 2007,

Defendants filed their opposition. Also on July 13, 2007,

Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to have the Court deem their

SAC a supplemental complaint. (Docket No. 155). On September 7,

2007, Defendants' attorney filed a letter in which he stated that

he believed that filing an opposition to Plaintiffs' motion to deem

their SAC a supplemental complaint would be premature until the

Court ruled on Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file the SAC. 

(Docket No. 169). Having considered all the papers filed by the

parties, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' request to file a SAC and

DENIES as moot Plaintiffs' motion to deem their SAC a supplemental

complaint.

BACKGROUND

In their FAC, Plaintiffs alleged the following seven causes of

action: (1) violation of their First Amendment right of freedom to

associate arising from being housed in the Secured Housing Unit

(SHU) for allegedly associating with the AB gang; (2) violation of

their First Amendment right of freedom of speech arising from the

denial of certain magazines; (3) violation of their Fifth Amendment

freedom against self-incrimination arising from the debriefing

requirement imposed by the California Department of Correction and

Rehabilitation (CDCR) and of their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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right to procedural and substantive due process of law arising from

their inability to get released from the SHU; (4) violation of the

Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, also

arising from the debriefing requirement; (5) violation of the Ex

Post Facto clause of the United States Constitution for retention

in the SHU on indeterminate status based upon gang association,

violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment due

to their SHU status and lack of access to prison programs which

prevent them from being granted parole, and violation of the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because of different

treatment of white SHU inmates; (6) negligence; and (7) an

intentional tort.

In their motion to dismiss, Defendants sought to dismiss

Plaintiffs' first, third, fourth and fifth causes of action based

upon Plaintiffs' failure to satisfy the administrative exhaustion

requirement. The Court dismissed all causes of action for failure

to exhaust with the exception of the following: (1) the second

cause of action for a First Amendment violation premised on

Defendants' failure to allow Plaintiffs access to certain

magazines; (2) due process claim based on Defendants' procedure for

determining whether Plaintiffs are active or inactive gang members;

(3) the sixth cause of action for negligence; and (4) the seventh

cause of action for an intentional tort. See June 14, 2007 Order

at 24. The Court found that Plaintiffs' due process claim was

exhausted because Ashker's appeals numbered 01-2335 and 04-2600 and

Troxell's appeal numbered 88-1657 addressing CDCR's procedures for

establishing gang validation and inactive gang status had been

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exhausted.

On September 20, 2007, in an Order Granting in Part and

Denying in Part Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration (Docket No.

169), the Court held that Ashker's claims for prospective

injunctive relief against the Board of Prison Hearings (BPH) based

on violations of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution and

violation of Ashker's liberty interests in parole were exhausted

and could go forward. See September 20, 2007 Order at 8.

In the motion for leave to file an SAC, Plaintiffs seek to add

two claims: (1) a First Amendment claim based on the theory that

the policy requiring prisoners to become informants in order to be

released from the SHU violates their constitutional right not to

speak; and (2) an Eighth Amendment claim based on the theory that

prolonged isolation in the SHU adversely affects Plaintiffs' mental

health.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that leave of

the court allowing a party to amend its pleading "shall be freely

given when justice so requires." Leave to amend lies within the

sound discretion of the trial court, which discretion "must be

guided by the underlying purpose of Rule 15--to facilitate

decisions on the merits rather than on the pleadings or

technicalities." United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th

Cir. 1981). Thus, Rule 15's policy of favoring amendments to

pleadings should be applied with "extreme liberality." Id.; see

also DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir.

1987). 

Case 4:05-cv-03286-CW Document 180 Filed 12/26/07 Page 4 of 12
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Four factors are relevant to whether a motion for leave to

amend should be denied: undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive,

futility of amendment, and prejudice to the opposing party. See

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). However, these factors

are not of equal weight; specifically, delay alone is an

insufficient ground for denying leave to amend. Webb, 655 F.2d at

980. Futility of amendment, by contrast, can alone justify the

denial of a motion for leave to amend. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d

815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995). A proposed amendment is futile "if no

set of facts can be proved under the amendment to the pleadings

that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense." 

Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988). 

In other words, if the proposed amended complaint cannot withstand

a motion to dismiss, it should be denied as futile. Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Supplemental Claims

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' two supplemental claims are

futile because they are based on the same facts as Plaintiffs'

third and fourth causes of action which the Court previously

dismissed for lack of exhaustion. 

It appears that Plaintiffs' new First Amendment claim, the

violation of their claimed right to keep silent, is based upon

facts similar to those alleged in their original claims for

violation of their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination

and of their procedural and substantive due process rights arising

from their continued retention in the SHU. In the June 14, 2007

Order, the Court dismissed these claims for failure to exhaust. 

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See June 14, 2007 Order at 17-18. It appears that the new Eighth

Amendment claim is based upon facts similar to those alleged in

Plaintiffs' original Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual

punishment arising from the debriefing requirement and the abovementioned due process claims. In the June 14, 2007 Order, the

Court dismissed Plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claim as well as the

due process claims for lack of exhaustion. See June 14, 2007 Order

at 18-19. Plaintiffs do not show that their two new claims have

been exhausted. In fact, in their reply brief, Plaintiffs explain

that research on mental illness as a result of long-term isolation

in the SHU is only recent and thus, they were not aware of this

claim until recently. See Reply at 3-4. Therefore, it would be

futile to add these claim because they would be dismissed for lack

of exhaustion; Plaintiffs' motion to file supplemental claims is

DENIED. Plaintiffs' motion to deem the SAC a supplemental

complaint is DENIED as moot.

II. Statute of Limitations Defense to Due Process Claims

 Arising From AB Gang Validation Procedures

In the June 14, 2007 Order, the Court denied without prejudice

Defendants' motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds but

allowed Defendants to address the issue in their opposition to

Plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint. See June 14, 2007 Order

at 25. In their supplemental opposition to Defendants' motion to

dismiss, Plaintiffs had argued that their claims based on AB gang

validation are not barred by the statute of limitations and even if

they were, equitable tolling or the doctrine of continuing

violations would apply.

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The applicable statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is the

forum State's statute of limitations for personal injury actions. 

Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004). The forum

State's law on equitable tolling is also applied to § 1983 claims. 

Id. Effective January 1, 2003, California's statute of limitations

for personal injury actions was increased from one to two years. 

Id. (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340(3)). Because Plaintiffs'

complaint was filed on August 11, 2005, the two-year limitations

period applies to their § 1983 claims. California law also

provides for the tolling of the statute of limitations for two

years based on the disability of imprisonment. Id. (citing Cal.

Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a)). Therefore, claims based on events

that occurred since August 11, 2001 are timely.

Defendants concede that under California law, Plaintiffs had

four years to bring § 1983 claims and thus, Ashker's due process

claim challenging the procedures that were used to determine his

inactive gang status and his indeterminate SHU status, based on

exhausted appeals 01-2335 and 04-2600, are not barred by the

statute of limitations. However, Defendants argue that Troxell's

similar due process claim, which was exhausted in appeal 88-1657,

is barred by the statute of limitations because it is based on

events that occurred prior to August 11, 2001.

Plaintiffs argue that Troxell's claim is timely due to the

application of equitable tolling. Under California's equitable

tolling doctrine, "a plaintiff's pursuit of a remedy in another

forum equitably tolls the limitations period if the plaintiff's

actions satisfy these factors: (1) timely notice to the defendants

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in filing the first claim; (2) lack of prejudice to the defendants

in gathering evidence for the second claim; and (3) good faith and

reasonable conduct in filing the second claim." Cervantes v. City

of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1993). The doctrine

"focuses on the effect of the prior claim in warning the defendants

in the subsequent claim of the need to prepare a defense." Id.

Whether the two claims are similar is relevant to the second

factor: prejudice to the defendant. Id.

Although Plaintiffs argue that Troxell's appeal 88-1657 tolled

the statute so that his claim is timely, they do not provide the

time period during which Troxell's administrative appeal was

pending. And even if Troxell's 1988 appeal tolled the statute of

limitations, the appeal could not have been pending long enough to

overcome the fact that the complaint was filed in 2005, seventeen

years after Troxell filed his appeal in 1988. Therefore, equitable

tolling does not remedy the statute of limitations bar.

Plaintiffs also argue that Troxell's claim is timely because

it is based on a continuing violation. Before 2002, a plaintiff

could invoke the continuing violation doctrine by showing a series

of related acts, one or more of which fell within the limitations

period, or a systemic policy or practice of discrimination before

and during the limitations period. See Gutowsky v. County of

Placer, 108 F.3d 256, 259 (9th Cir. 1997). However, in Nat'l R.R.

Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002), the Supreme

Court invalidated the related acts method of showing a continuing

violation, reasoning that discrete discriminatory acts are not

actionable if time-barred, even if they are related to acts alleged

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1

Although these statements are made in Plaintiffs' reply brief

and not in their complaint, the Court will not require Plaintiffs

to refile an amended complaint to include the appropriate

allegations, but will construe the complaint as if it contained

these allegations. 

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in timely filed charges. However, the Supreme Court did not

invalidate the continuing violation theory premised on a systemic

policy or practice of discrimination adversely affecting the

plaintiff within the limitations period. Carpinteria Valley Farms

v. Santa Barbara, 344 F.3d 822, 829 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003). 

In their reply brief, Plaintiffs state, "From 1988 to 1999,

Defendants' policy of confining prisoners classified as gang

members/associates to indefinite SHU terms until they snitched,

paroled, or died, was an [unconstitutional] policy. And at some

point in time Defendants began to arbitrarily enforce this policy

by keeping certain inmates on indefinite SHU status, while allowing

tens of thousands of others to be on general population status. 

. . . And Plaintiffs have been subject to a defacto, indefinite

(SHU) status. . ." Reply at 10-11. This is sufficient to invoke

the continuing violations doctrine.1 

Citing Grimes v. City and County of San Francisco, 951 F.2d

236, 238-39 (9th Cir. 1991), Defendants argue that the continuing

violation doctrine doesn't apply because a mere continuing impact

from past violations is not actionable. Grimes, however, is

distinguishable from the facts here. In Grimes, the past violation

consisted of the discrete act of termination from employment. The

continuing violations doctrine does not apply to employment

termination claims because termination is one discrete act, even if

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it is based upon discrimination and even if its effects are not

felt for years later. Id. In this case, Troxell was held in the

SHU, allegedly based upon an unconstitutional policy. If true,

this allegation would mean that Troxell was kept in the SHU, not as

the result of one discrete act, but as the result of a series of

actions taken by Defendants over time, from the time that Troxell

filed his appeal in 1988 to the time he filed the instant

complaint. Thus, the continuing violations doctrine might apply. 

Defendants' motion to dismiss Troxell's due process claim based

upon statute of limitations grounds is DENIED without prejudice to

re-filing it with their motion for summary judgment. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a

SAC and motion to deem the SAC a supplemental complaint are DENIED. 

Defendants' motion to dismiss, based on the statute of limitations,

Plaintiffs' due process claims arising from Defendants' AB

validation procedure is DENIED. The claims remaining in this case

are (1) violation of Plaintiffs' First Amendment right of freedom

of speech arising from the prohibition of certain magazines; 

(2) violation of Plaintiffs' procedural and substantive due process

rights arising from Defendants' AB gang validation procedures; 

(3) Ashker's claim for injunctive relief based on due process

violations in parole procedures and lack of access to prison

programs; (4) negligence; and (5) intentional tort.

In an effort to adjudicate the remaining claims more quickly,

the Court issues the following briefing schedule. All dispositive

motions must be filed no later than two months from the date of

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this order. Opposition briefs are due one month thereafter. 

Replies are due two weeks thereafter. Because this case is over

two years old and Plaintiffs have already amended their complaint,

Plaintiffs may not file any additional motions to amend or

supplement their complaint. Any new claims must be filed in a new

complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 12/26/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ASHKER ET AL et al,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SCHWARZENEGGER ET AL et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV05-03286 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on December 26, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located

in the Clerk's office.

Danny Troxell B-76578

Pelican Bay State Prison

P.O. Box 7500, C-8-101

Crescent City, CA 95531

J. Randall Andrada

Andrada & Associates

Professional Corporation

180 Grand Avenue

Suite 225

Oakland, CA 94612

Todd Ashker C-58191

Pelican Bay State Prison

P.O. Box 7500, D1-119

Crescent City, CA 95531

Dated: December 26, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:05-cv-03286-CW Document 180 Filed 12/26/07 Page 12 of 12