Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00158/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00158-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EQUAL ACCESS ASSOCIATION SUING

ON BEHALF OF ROY DAVIS GASH, and

ROY DAVIS GASH, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 07CV158 WQH (LSP)

ORDER DECLINING

SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

OVER PLAINTIFF’S STATE LAW

vs. CLAIMS

PFS, LLC dba McDONALD’S; THE CASSU

INVESTMENT GROUP, LTD; and DOES 1-

10,

Defendants.

HAYES, Judge:

Pending before the Court is Defendant PFS, LLC’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law

claims. (Doc. # 12). On May 5, 2007, Defendant Cassu Investment Group Ltd. joined the motion.

(Doc. # 15). 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 25, 2007, Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this matter, asserting federal Americans

with Disabilities Act (ADA) claims as well as California state law claims pursuant to the California

Civil Code and the Unruh Act, against Defendants PFS, LLC dba McDonald’s (PFS) and the Cassu

Investment Group, Ltd. (Doc. # 1). After the Court granted several joint motions to extend the time

for PFS to answer, PFS moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims on April 11, 2007. (Doc. # 12).

On April 16, 2007, Defendant Cassu Investment Group Ltd. answered the Complaint and asserted

Case 3:07-cv-00158-WQH-LSP Document 19 Filed 06/04/07 Page 1 of 5
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affirmative defenses. (Doc. # 13). On May 5, 2007, Cassu Investment Group Ltd. joined PFS’s

motion to dismiss. (Doc. # 15). 

ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Roy Davis Gash suffers from numerous physical, neurological, cardiovascular, and

musculoskeletal impairments which impair his ability to walk. Complaint, ¶¶ 12, 27. At times,

Plaintiff’s physical impairments necessitate his use of a wheelchair. Compl., ¶¶ 12, 27. 

In October of 2006, Plaintiff patronized Defendant PFS’s McDonald’s restaurant located at

6326 Mission Gorge Road, San Diego, CA. Compl., ¶¶ 4, 13. During the visit, Plaintiff was unable

to use or had difficulty using disabled parking spaces, curb ramps, exterior paths of travel, entrances,

exits, and patio dining facilities at the restaurant. Compl., ¶ 13. The access barriers which Plaintiff

encountered at the restaurant denied Plaintiff full and equal access to Defendants’ goods, services,

facilities, and accommodations. Compl., ¶ 26. Knowledge of the restaurant’s access barriers deters

Plaintiff from returning to the restaurant. Compl., ¶ 19. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts

shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action

within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III

of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). “A state law claim is part of the same case

or controversy when it shares a ‘common nucleus of operative fact’ with the federal claims . . . .”

Bahrampour v. Lampert, 356 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2004). A district court may decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim if:

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the

district court has original jurisdiction, 

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining

jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. §1367(c); see also Cross v. Pacific Coast Plaza Investments, L.P., No. 06 CV 2543 JM

(RBB), 2007 WL 951772, *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2007). In deciding whether to exercise supplemental

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jurisdiction, a court must consider the underlying objective of “most sensibly accommodating the

values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Executive Software North America, Inc. v.

USDC for the Cent. Dist. of Calif., 24 F.3d 1545, 1557 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal quotations omitted).

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s state law claims because the state law claims substantially predominate over the federal

ADA claim and recent events render application and interpretation of the state law claims novel,

complex, and unsettled. In support, Defendants cite the California Court of Appeal’s decision in

Gunther v. Lin, 144 Cal. App. 4th 223 (2006), and note that Gunther rejected the Court of Appeal for

the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of state disability law in Lentini v. Calif. Center for the Arts, 370

F.3d 837, 840 (2004). 

Plaintiff disagrees with Defendant’s contention that the state law claims present novel or

complex issues of state law, and contends that there are no compelling reasons for declining

supplemental jurisdiction. Plaintiff further contends that it would be more convenient to litigate the

state law claims in a single forum with the federal claim. Plaintiff asks the Court to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

The Complaint includes one federal claim and two state law claims pursuant to the Unruh Act

and the California Civil Code. The underlying factual allegations are the same for all of Plaintiff’s

claims, and therefore Plaintiff’s state law claims share the requisite “common nucleus of operative

facts” with the federal claim to allow this Court to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law

claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. See Organization for the Advancement of Minorities with

Disabilities v. Brick Oven Restaurant, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1128 (S.D. Cal. 2005).

I. The Unruh Act & California Civil Code § 52

Whether the Unruh Act and CAL. CIV. CODE § 52 require proof of intentional discrimination

to obtain statutory minimum damages is a question which has divided state and federal courts. The

California Supreme Court first addressed the question in Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 40 Cal. 3d 24, 33

fn. 12 (1985), noting in a footnote that the Unruh Act did not require proof of discriminatory intent.

However, six years later the issue squarely presented itself again in Harris v. Capital Growth

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Investors, 52 Cal. 3d 1142, 172-73 (1991), where after reviewing the statute in detail, the California

Supreme Court held that “a plaintiff seeking to establish a case under the Unruh Act must plead and

prove intentional discrimination in public accommodations . . . .” While Harris resolved the issue for

a short time, the California State Legislature promptly amended CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 in 1992, and

added a provision which provides that a defendant violates the Unruh Act whenever it violates the

ADA. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(f). The amendment raised the question whether CAL. CIV. CODE § 52's

damages provision, as read in conjunction with CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(f), still required proof of

intentional discrimination. 

In 2004, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the 1992 Unruh Act amendments

superseded Harris, and held that where a defendant violates the ADA, damages can be awarded under

the Unruh Act regardless of whether a Plaintiff can prove intentional discrimination. Lentini v. Calif.

Center for the Arts, 370 F.3d 837, 846-47 (9th Cir. 2004). In 2006, however, the California Court of

Appeal noted that Harris was still viable, rejected Lentini as an improper interpretation of California

law, and held that CAL. CIV. CODE § 52's damages provision required proof of intentional

discrimination. Gunther, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 252-57. Since Gunther, at least one federal court has

followed Lentini and disregarded Gunther, see Wilson v. Haria and Gogri Corp., No. CIV.S-05-1239

LKK/DAD, 2007 WL 851744, *6-11 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2007), and other courts have noted the

unsettled nature of the Unruh Act’s damages provision and declined to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over state Unruh Act and DPA claims. See e.g. Cross v. Pacific Coast Plaza Investments,

L.P., No. 06 CV 2543 JM (RBB), 2007 WL 951772, *4-5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2007). 

This Court concludes that Plaintiff’s state law claims are more appropriately resolved by state

courts in light of Gunther and the current state of California state disability law. At this point in time,

the Unruh Act’s remedial provisions present novel and complex matters of state law that are “better

left to the California courts” for interpretation and decision. Cross, No. 06 CV 2543 JM (RBB), 2007

WL 951772, *5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2007); citing Brick Oven Restaurant, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1130.

Furthermore, the Court concludes that interests of comity have become more compelling as courts

“struggle to resolve what is at the moment an irreconcilable tension between the ADA and the Unruh

Act.” Cross, No. 06 CV 2543 JM (RBB), 2007 WL 951772, *5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2007). Though the

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Court has the power to retain jurisdiction over the state law claims, the Court concludes that,“on

balance . . . the novelty and complexity of the state law is such that comity supports the granting” of

the motion to dismiss the state law claims. Cross, No. 06 CV 2543 JM (RBB), 2007 WL 951772, *5-6

(S.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2007).

Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Docs. # 12, 15) Plaintiff’s state law claims is granted without

prejudice to the Plaintiff refiling those claims in state court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 4, 2007

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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