Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02796/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02796-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EARL CHILDS,

CDCR #F-14068,

Plaintiff,

vs.

D. PARAMO; CARIE COREL; LT. P. 

COVELLO; JESSE JUAREZ; E. FRIJAS; 

L. GARNICA; V. SOSA; C. ODELL; 

LADONNA MUNOZ; M. VOONG; S. 

GATES; UDDIN MESKATH,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-02796-GPC-MDD

ORDER :

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a); 

AND

(2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

Earl Childs (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and while housed at the Kern Valley 

State Prison (KVSP”) has filed a civil rights action entitled “Order to Show Cause for a 

Preliminary Injunction and a Temporary Restraining Order.” See ECF No. 1. On 

February 19, 2019, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis” 

(“IFP”). See ECF No. 5.

/ / / 

/ / /

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II. Motion to proceed IFP

In order to institute a civil action, Plaintiff must pay a filing fee of $400.1 See 28 

U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite his failure to prepay the entire fee only 

if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews, 493 

F.3d at 1051; Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, because 

he is a prisoner, even if he is granted leave to proceed IFP, Plaintiff remains obligated to 

pay the entire filing fee in “increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 

136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), 

and regardless of whether his action is dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); 

Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

 

1

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. 

June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 

IFP. Id.

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In support of his most recent IFP Motion, Plaintiff submits a Prison Certificate 

issued by an Account Specialist at KVSP, as well as copies of his CDCR Inmate 

Statement Report attesting to his trust account activity and balances for the 6-month 

period preceding the filing of his Complaint. See ECF No. 5 at 4-7; 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. These statements show 

Plaintiff carried a $93.50 average monthly balance and had $42.50 in average monthly 

deposits to his account. See ECF No. 5 at 4-7. Thus, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 5) and assesses his initial partial filing fee to be $18.70

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The remaining balance of the $350 total fee owed in 

this case must be collected by the agency having custody of the prisoner and forwarded to 

the Clerk of the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

II. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Williams v. King, __ F.3d __, 2017 WL 5180205, at *2 (9th Cir. 

Nov. 9, 2017) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)) (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 

1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). A complaint is “frivolous” if it 

“lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 

(1989).

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“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009).

B. Plaintiff’s allegations

Plaintiff offers very few factual allegations in his Complaint. He claims that the 

Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) is “stonewalling and depriving (him) 

of his due process rights.” Compl. at 2. He further claims that the RJD officials are 

“circumventing the 602 process and not following CDCR rules.” Id. Plaintiff also 

suggests, but it is not entirely clear, that RJD officials retaliated against Plaintiff “by not 

letting Plaintiff go to the prison law library.” Id. at 3. He further claims that RJD 

officials have “obstructed” his access to the courts and have not provided “fair due 

process in disciplinary hearings.” Id.

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Plaintiff also claims that RJD officials should not “have moved Plaintiff” to KVSP 

because he is “asthmatic and has a greater risk of contracting ‘valley fever’” due to his 

“weakened immune system which makes Plaintiff more susceptible to the disease.” Id. at 

4. 

C. Grievance procedure

Plaintiff is claiming that RJD officials “circumventing” the administrative 

grievance process and “not answering” his appeals. See Compl. at 2-3. However, a

prison official’s allegedly improper processing of an inmate’s grievances or appeals, 

without more, cannot serve as a basis for section 1983 liability. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 

334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (prisoners do not have a “separate constitutional 

entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure.”) (citation omitted); Mann v. Adams, 

855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (due process not violated simply because defendant 

fails properly to process grievances submitted for consideration); see also Todd v. 

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 615 Fed. Appx. 415, 415 (9th 

Cir. 2015) (district court properly dismissed claim based on improper “processing and 

handling of [...] prison grievances,” since prisoners have no “constitutional entitlement to 

a specific prison grievance procedure”) (citing Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860) (quotation 

marks omitted); Shallowhorn v. Molina, 572 Fed. Appx. 545, 547 (9th Cir. 2014) (district 

court properly dismissed section 1983 claims against defendants who “were only 

involved in the appeals process”) (citing Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860); Daniels v. Aguilera, 

No. 2:16-CV-00996-JAM-CKD P, 2018 WL 558658, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2018), 

report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Daniels v. Aguillera, No. 2:16-CV-00996-

JAM-CKD P, 2018 WL 1763311 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2018) (“Because there is no right to 

any particular grievance process, it is impossible for due process to have been violated by 

ignoring or failing to properly process prison grievances.”).

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For these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations against 

Defendants insufficient to state any plausible due process claim upon which § 1983 relief 

may be granted. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680-84 (citations omitted).

D. Access to Courts claim

Plaintiff also alleges that he has had a “lack of access to courts, lawyer, law library, 

legal mail, legal property, etc.”2

 See Compl. at 3. Prisoners have a constitutional right to 

access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). The right is limited to the 

filing of direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil rights actions. Id. at 354. 

Claims for denial of access to the courts may arise from the frustration or hindrance of “a 

litigating opportunity yet to be gained” (forward-looking access claim) or from the loss of 

a suit that cannot now be tried (backward-looking claim). Christopher v. Harbury, 536 

U.S. 403, 412-15 (2002); see also Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 

2011) (differentiating “between two types of access to court claims: those involving 

prisoners’ right to affirmative assistance and those involving prisoners’ rights to litigate 

without active interference.”).

However, Plaintiff must allege “actual injury” as the threshold requirement to any 

access to courts claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-53; Silva, 658 F.3d at 1104. An “actual 

injury” is “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the 

inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348; see also 

Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 936 (9th Cir. 2004) (defining actual injury as the 

“inability to file a complaint or defend against a charge”). The failure to allege an actual 

injury is “fatal.” Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1155 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Failure to 

show that a ‘non-frivolous legal claim had been frustrated’ is fatal.”) (quoting Lewis, 518 

U.S. at 353 & n.4). 

 

2 It is not clear if Plaintiff is alleging these actions took place at RJD or his current place of confinement, 

KVSP. If these actions took place in KVSP, venue is not proper in the Southern District of California 

but rather venue would be proper in the Eastern District of California.

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In addition, Plaintiff must allege the loss of a “non-frivolous” or “arguable” 

underlying claim. Harbury, 536 U.S. at 413-14. The nature and description of the 

underlying claim must be set forth in the pleading “as if it were being independently 

pursued.” Id. at 417. Finally, Plaintiff must specifically allege the “remedy that may be 

awarded as recompense but not otherwise available in some suit that may yet be 

brought.” Id. at 415.

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege the actual injury required to state an access to 

courts claim. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-53; Silva, 658 F.3d at 1104. Thus, the Court 

finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to include any “factual matter” to show how or why 

any of the individual Defendant in this case caused him to suffer any “actual prejudice” 

“such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim,” with respect to any 

case. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348; Jones, 393 F.3d at 936; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to show that any 

Defendant caused him to suffer any “actual injury” with respect to any non-frivolous 

direct criminal appeal, habeas petition, or civil rights action he may have filed, see Lewis, 

518 U.S. at 354, the Court finds Plaintiff’s access to courts claims must be dismissed for 

failing to state a plausible claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), § 1915A(b)(1); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

E. Housing claims

Plaintiff also claims that Defendants were wrong to transfer him to KVSP. See

Comp. at 4. However, Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to be housed in the 

institution of his choice. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983); McKune v. 

Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 39 (2002) (“It is well settled that the decision where to house inmates 

is at the core of prison administrators’ expertise.”) If Plaintiff has claims relating to the 

conditions of his confinement while housed at KVSP, he would have to bring those 

claims in a separate action in the Eastern District of California. See 28 U.S.C. § 84(b) 

(Kern County is located in the Eastern District of California).

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F. Personal Causation

Finally, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint requires sua sponte dismissal 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(1) and § 1915A(b)(1) to the extent it seeks relief 

under § 1983 against any of the named Defendants. “To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, the plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a right secured by the 

Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) that the alleged violation 

was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Campbell v. Washington 

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 671 F.3d 837, 842 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011), citing Ketchum v. Alameda 

Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987). The Complaint contains no factual 

allegations describing what Defendants did, or failed to do. 

“The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and 

responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have 

caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988), 

citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976); Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 

460 (9th Cir. 1986); Estate of Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 

1999) (“Causation is, of course, a required element of a § 1983 claim.”) A person 

deprives another “of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does 

an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act 

which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff 

complains].” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Plaintiff has not 

stated a claim against any of the named Defendants because he has failed to allege facts 

regarding what actions were taken or not taken by the Defendants which caused the 

alleged constitutional violations. 

E. Leave to Amend

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s entire Complaint is dismissed for failing to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted. Because he is proceeding pro se, however, the Court 

having now provided him with “notice of the deficiencies in his complaint,” will also 

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grant Plaintiff an opportunity to amend. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)).

III. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, the Court:

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 5).

2. ORDERS the Acting Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect 

from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by collecting 

monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the 

preceding month’s income and forwarding them to the Clerk of the Court each time the 

amount in his account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL 

PAYMENTS MUST BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Ralph 

Diaz, Acting Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, P.O. 

Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) for failing to state a claim 

upon which § 1983 relief can granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 

1915A(b)(1).

5. GRANTS Plaintiff thirty (30) days leave from the date of this Order in 

which to file an Amended Complaint that cures the deficiencies of pleading described 

above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to 

his original complaint. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard 

Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading 

supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an 

amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

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Should Plaintiff elect not to proceed by filing an Amended Complaint within 30 

days, the Court will enter a final Order of dismissal of this civil action for failure to state 

a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1), and for failure to 

prosecute in compliance with a Court Order requiring amendment. See Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to prosecute 

permitted if plaintiff fails to respond to a court’s order requiring amendment of 

complaint); Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not 

take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the 

dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”).

6. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail Plaintiff a civil rights form complaint 

for his use in amending.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 22, 2019

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