Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-04185/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-04185-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:2301 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

E-Filed 1/5/2016

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TUSCANY INVESTMENTS LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

WINNEBAGO INDUSTRIES, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 13-cv-04185-HRL 

ORDER ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE

Re: Dkt. Nos. 183, 201, 202

Tuscany Investments, LLC (“Tuscany”) sues Winnebago Industries (“Winnebago”) and 

Lippert Components, Inc. (“Lippert”) for violations of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and 

related breach-of-warranty claims. Tuscany bases its claims on the purchase of an allegedly 

defective Itasca motorhome. 

The court held a third pretrial conference with the parties on January 4, 2016, and the court 

ruled on two motions in limine during that conference. This order memorializes the court’s 

rulings on those motions. Tuscany also agreed to the relief requested in one of Winnebago’s other 

motions, and the court now memorializes that agreement by ruling in favor of Winnebago on that 

motion.

The court does not at this time rule on the final pending motion in limine. Dkt. No. 203.

Tuscany’s Third Motion In Limine

Daimler Trucks North America, LLC (“Daimler”) used to be a defendant and crossdefendant in this case, but it settled the claims against it. Tuscany moved the court to prohibit 

references to either the fact that Daimler used to be a party or the fact that Daimler settled the 

claims against it. Dkt. No. 183. Tuscany argued that these facts have no probative value and that 

Tuscany would be prejudiced if the jury heard them. Tuscany elaborated at the pretrial conference 

that it feared the jury would hear the word “settled” and would conclude that Tuscany has already 

Case 5:13-cv-04185-HRL Document 219 Filed 01/05/16 Page 1 of 3
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

been compensated for all of its claims.

The court denied the motion for three reasons: (1) it seems unlikely that a reasonable, 

thoughtful juror would conclude that a settlement with one defendant resulted in full compensation 

for claims against other defendants; (2) prejudice suffered by reference to the settlement would not 

be unfair because Tuscany imposed any such prejudice on itself with its decision to settle those 

claims; and (3) the jury is likely to be misled or confused by the absence of Daimler if the parties 

are prohibited from explaining that absence.

Winnebago’s Fifth Motion In Limine

Winnebago agrees that Michael Shinn (“Shinn”), the owner of Tuscany, may provide 

testimony about the value of the motorhome. Winnebago moved the court, however, to prohibit 

Shinn from explaining the reasoning behind his value testimony. Dkt. No. 201. Winnebago 

argued that any testimony which provides an explanation for Shinn’s value testimony would be an 

impermissible expert opinion. Winnebago primarily supported its argument with a case from the 

Third Circuit, Lightning Lube, Inc., v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153 (1993), but that case actually held

that it is both necessary and appropriate to support lay value testimony with a foundational 

explanation, id. at 1175 (discussing Federal Rule of Evidence 701).

Tuscany opposed the motion. Tuscany’s counsel argued that the expected substance of 

Shinn’s testimony would be permissible lay testimony based on personal knowledge: Shinn

believes the motorhome is worth a certain amount of money, and Shinn bases that opinion on his 

personal experiences with owning, using, and selling a previous motorhome that worked better 

than his current motorhome. 

The court denied Winnebago’s motion because Shinn’s expected testimony, as described 

by Tuscany’s counsel, would be permissible lay testimony based on personal knowledge.

Winnebago’s Sixth Motion In Limine

Winnebago’s sixth motion in limine moves the court to prohibit references to defects that 

first arose after Winnebago’s express warranty expired. Dkt. No. 202. The parties discussed this 

motion at the pretrial conference, and Tuscany eventually agreed that any defects Tuscany did not

report during the warranty period would be “off-limits” and would not be mentioned at trial. The 

Case 5:13-cv-04185-HRL Document 219 Filed 01/05/16 Page 2 of 3
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court now grants Winnebago’s motion in order to memorialize Tuscany’s agreement. This ruling 

does not prejudice Tuscany’s ability to discuss the effects of any lingering defects that Tuscany 

timely reported.

Conclusion

The court denied the motion to prohibit Shinn from explaining the basis for his value 

testimony because the expected foundational testimony described by Tuscany’s counsel would be 

permissible lay testimony. The court denied the motion to prohibit references to Daimler’s status 

as a former defendant because: (1) the risk of prejudice to Tuscany is low, (2) any such prejudice 

would be the fair result of Tuscany’s own actions, and (3) the jury is likely to be confused or 

misled unless the parties are permitted to describe Daimler’s role in this case. Finally, Tuscany 

agreed at the pretrial conference that defects would be “off-limits” at trial if Tuscany did not raise 

them during the warranty period, and the court now grants Winnebago’s sixth motion in limine to 

memorialize that agreement.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 1/5/2016

HOWARD R. LLOYD

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 5:13-cv-04185-HRL Document 219 Filed 01/05/16 Page 3 of 3