Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_10-cv-08105/USCOURTS-azd-3_10-cv-08105-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

RONALD COOKE and JINJER COOKE,

husband and wife; 

Plaintiffs,

THE STATE OF ARIZONA ex rel. TERRY GODDARD, the Attorney

General; THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION

OF THE ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF

LAW, 

Plaintiff/Intervenor, 

vs.

TOWN OF COLORADO CITY,

ARIZONA; CITY OF HILDALE, UTAH;

HILDALE-COLORADO CITY

UTILITIES; TWIN CITY WATER

AUTHORITY, a Utah non-profit

corporation; TWIN CITY POWER; JOHN

and/or JANE DOES I-XX; XYZ

ENTITIES/CORPORATIONS I-XX, 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-10-8105-PCT-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendants Hildale-Colorado City Utilities’, Twin City

Power’s, and City of Hildale’s Motion to Stay (Doc. 60), filed on March 16, 2011. Plaintiffs

Ronald Cooke and Jinjer Cooke filed an Opposition to Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 75) on

April 4, 2011, as did Plaintiff-Intervenors State of Arizona and The Civil Rights Division of

the Arizona Department of Law (Doc. 76). Defendants filed their Reply on April 14, 2011

Case 3:10-cv-08105-JAT Document 89 Filed 05/16/11 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

(Doc. 79). The Court, having considered all parties’ briefs, denies Defendants’ Motion to

Stay.

I. Background.

On June 25, 2010, Plaintiffs Ronald Cooke and Jinjer Cooke filed their First Amended

Complaint (“FAC”) alleging that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1983 and 1985, 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq., which is the Federal Fair Housing Act

(“FHA”), and A.R.S. § 41-1491.19, which is the Arizona Fair Housing Act (“AFHA”).

(Doc. 3). Plaintiffs’ FAC states that all Defendant entities are, and have been, “operated and

controlled by members of the FLDS religion, . . . which seeks to exclude non-members of

FLDS from . . . Colorado City, Arizona, and Hildale, Utah.” (Id., ¶ 13). Plaintiffs further

allege that Defendants engaged in disability discrimination and religious discrimination

against Plaintiffs by delaying their electricity and sewer services for months and by denying

them access to running water for over two years. (Id., ¶¶ 14-16, 48, 49, & 51; Doc. 61, ¶¶

1-2).

The FAC alleges that Plaintiff Ronald Cooke is “permanently and severely disabled

as the result of having been hit by a large truck while performing road construction.” (Doc.

3, ¶ 11). The FAC further alleges that Ronald Cooke’s disabilities necessitate his access to

running water and electricity for his care. (Id.).

Ronald Cooke was a member of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter

Day Saints (“FLDS”) until age 18 or 19, when he “left the FLDS religion . . . and moved to

Phoenix, Arizona[] to work in construction.” (Id., ¶ 10). Plaintiff Jinjer Cooke was never

a member of the FLDS Church. (Id., ¶ 12).

The United Effort Plan Trust (“UEP”) owns the land on which the Cookes live. (Doc.

61, ¶¶ 32-41). Members of the FLDS established the UEP “to hold and manage all real estate

and improvements consecrated by FLDS adherents.” (Id., ¶ 36) The stated purpose of the

UEP is “to provide for Church members, according to their wants and needs, insofar as their

wants are just.” (Id. ¶ 41). 

In 2005, “the Utah Attorney General (“Utah AG”) brought an action for breach of

Case 3:10-cv-08105-JAT Document 89 Filed 05/16/11 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

trust against the UEP Trustees” in the Utah state court. Id. ¶ 42). The Utah AG sought to

immediately suspend the “authority and power of the current trustees pending a final decision

of the Court on their removal,” and the appointment of an interim special fiduciary to

preserve the assets of the Trust. (Id., ¶ 43) (citation omitted). On May 27, 2005, The Utah

state court granted a temporary order that required the removal of the Trust’s trustees and the

appointment of Bruce Wisan as acting Special Fiduciary. (Id. ¶¶ 44-45).

On December 13, 2005, the Utah state court determined that the Trust should be

reformed in a way that “create[d] a clear division between” its secular and religious portions

(Id., ¶ 49-50). In the wake of the Trust’s reformation, the court greatly expanded Bruce

Wisan’s authority as Special Fiduciary. (Id., ¶ 52). His responsibilities included “identifying

beneficiaries of the UEP Trust, determining these beneficiaries’ ‘just wants and needs,’ and

providing homes to these beneficiaries in a ‘religiously neutral way’.” (Id., ¶¶ 53-55).

Subsequently, the FLDS brought an action against Bruce Wisan and others in the U.S.

District Court for the District of Utah, in which the FLDS claimed that the reformation of the

UEP violated their First Amendment rights. (Id., ¶ 56). The district court agreed with the

FLDS and, on February 25, 2011, that court issued a preliminary injunction based on the its

finding that the state court’s order to reform the UEP violated the Establishment Clause of

the First Amendment. (Id., ¶ 59-60). 

As a result of this procedural background, the parties dispute whether the Cookes

rightfully occupy the property where they currently reside. (Id., ¶¶ 78-87). According to

Defendants, in finding the reformed Trust unconstitutional, the Utah district court held that

“any and all actions Bruce Wisan has taken following [the] reformation of the UEP Trust on

December 13, 2005 are unconstitutional because they violated the first amendment.” (Id.,

14:26-15:1). Defendants claim that Bruce Wisan therefore lacked authority to grant a lease

to the Cookes and the lease is null and void. (Id., 15:1-5). Defendants acknowledge that the

Utah district court did not determine the property interests of those who entered into lease

agreements with the UEP while Bruce Wisan served as Special Fiduciary. (Doc. 74, 4:18-

19). 

Case 3:10-cv-08105-JAT Document 89 Filed 05/16/11 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 As will be discussed more below, this declaratory action was filed in the district of

Arizona and is currently pending before Judge Campbell.

- 4 -

Further, according to Defendants, the previous tenant, Robert Black, “believes himself

the rightful occupant of the Subject Property” that the UEP assigned to the Cookes. (Id., ¶

84). Defendant Colorado City filed a declaratory action in another court requesting that the

court determine the rightful occupant of the property in question.1

 (Id., 15:13-17). 

II. Analysis and Conclusion.

In this case, oral argument added some clarity that the written briefs failed to provide.

Initially, the amount of ink spilled about the Utah action and volume of attachments from the

Utah action, led the Court to believe that Defendants were concerned over the potential

conflict of the Utah federal court litigation before Judge Bensen; but that is not the case.

Instead, following oral argument, it now appears Defendants’ argument hinges on an Arizona

case.

It is true that buried in various corners of the briefs are references to “the declaratory

action” or even “newly filed UEP case.” Indeed in Defendants’ Memorandum in Support

of Motion to Stay (Doc. 61) there is this sentence: “Such is the case here with the Complaint

for Declaratory Judgment, Case No. CV2010-020375.” This obscure sentence buried among

rhetoric about Judge Bensen’s case, coupled with references to a declaratory action by

counsel during oral argument, prompted the Court to inquire where this declaratory action

is pending. For the first time it was made clear that it was filed March 11, 2011 — six days

before Defendants filed the Motion to Stay — in Arizona. In fact, that case bears the number

CV 1l-8037-PCT-DGC, a clear tipoff that it is a case pending in the District of Arizona. It

was further disclosed that CV2010-020375 was an erroneous designation and no tip off

whatsoever.

This Court previously granted Defendants’ Motion to Stay Current Discovery

Requests pending disposition on the instant Motion to Stay. (Doc. 77). The Court having

now clarified the parties’ positions, the remaining issue is whether to stay this case until the

Case 3:10-cv-08105-JAT Document 89 Filed 05/16/11 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

resolution of the declaratory action pending before Judge Campbell.

The Court has now examined the CV 11-8037-PCT-DGC matter and that examination

leaves the Court unpersuaded that a stay is appropriate. First, Judge Campbell’s case is much

newer than this case. Second, if Defendants theorize it may someday be decided that Black

is the rightful owner and therefore Cookes are not, Black is not a party to the declaratory

action pending in the CV 11-8037-PCT-DGC matter. Neither are the Cookes, for that matter.

Thus, it is not certain that the declaratory action will be binding on either of them. However,

this Court need not resolve this issue because one other point of clarity emerged at the time

of argument: it appears that counsel do not strenuously dispute the proposition that certain

of the Plaintiffs’ claims would survive even if it is ultimately determined that the Cookes

were not legally entitled to possession.

Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that the events that gave rise to this action occurred when

the Cookes occupied the property under a legally executed occupancy agreement and,

therefore, their right to bring suit is not dependent upon an after-the-fact determination of the

property’s rightful occupants. (Doc. 70, 3:20-27). Thus, the issue here is whether Plaintiffs

may bring suit regardless of an after-the-fact determination of their right to occupy the

property. If Plaintiffs’ are correct, and the determination of rightful occupancy currently

pending in another court does not bear on their right to bring their civil rights action, then the

Court should deny Defendants’ Motion to Stay. 

To bring an action the Cookes’ must have standing. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,

750-51 (1984). Standing to bring suit requires three elements: (1) that the plaintiff suffered

an injury in fact, which is an actual or imminent violation of a particular legally protected

interest; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3)

“it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by

a favorable decision’.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992)

(internal citations omitted). 

Here Plaintiffs claim that the Cookes’ civil rights were violated because Defendants

discriminated against them based on their religion and physical disabilities in violation of

Case 3:10-cv-08105-JAT Document 89 Filed 05/16/11 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

the Federal Fair Housing Act, the Arizona Fair Housing Act, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and

1985. Plaintiffs further claim that Defendants’ alleged discrimination caused the Cookes to

experience two winters and over two years living in a “cramped, cold travel trailer, relying

on a propane fuel generator and no sewer service” and to being forced to haul culinary water

every other day to care for Mr. Cookes’ disabilities. (Doc. 3, ¶¶ 50-54). Plaintiffs claim

these hardships resulted in “economic damages, severe emotional distress and loss of

enjoyment.” (Id.). If the Cookes prevail on these claims, they would be entitled to redress

for their injuries. 

The events that gave rise to this action occurred when the Cookes had at least a

colorable claim to the property on which they still reside. See Cameron v. U.S., 148 U.S.

301, 308 (1893), Wright v. Mattison, 59 U.S. 50, 56 (1855). Their occupancy agreement was

executed when Bruce Wisan was the legal administrator of the UEP and was charged with

the authority to assign the Trust’s land to its beneficiaries. Until the Utah District Court held

that the Trust’s reformation violated the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause, all parties

involved in the instant case had reason to rely on the validity of the Cookes’ lease agreement

with the UEP. Defendants point out that “unless or until it is overturned,” the Utah district

court’s ruling on the reformed Trust’s constitutionality is “firm and applicable.” (Doc. 74,

4:15-16) (emphasis added). Likewise, the Utah state court’s ruling that required the

reformation of the UEP, and the appointment of Bruce Wisan as Special Fiduciary, was firm

and applicable until held unconstitutional in the Utah. district court. Therefore, from May

27, 2005, when the Utah state court issued a temporary restraining order and appointed Bruce

Wisan to act as the UEP’s Special Fiduciary, until February 24, 2011, when the Utah district

court determined the Trust’s reformation unconstitutional, Bruce Wisan was the lawful

administrator of the UEP.

The Utah district court chose not to resolve the issue of whether the UEP’s lease

agreements, executed under Bruce Wisan’s administration of the Trust, are currently or

retroactively invalid. Neither the Court’s independent research nor the parties’ respective

briefs offer any authority suggesting that the Cookes’ standing to bring the instant action

Case 3:10-cv-08105-JAT Document 89 Filed 05/16/11 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

ceases in the event that either their lease is found invalid after the fact or that Robert Black

is determined the rightful occupant. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ statement that the Cookes maintain

a colorable claim to occupancy went unchallenged by Defendants. It also bears mentioning

that, at the time that Defendants refused the Cookes’ request for a water connection,

Defendants never claimed that their refusal was due to a question of rightful occupancy.

Thus, the Cookes have standing to bring this action. 

Moreover, as mentioned above, at oral argument, Defendants did not seriously dispute

that the Cookes may recover damages for the period they had a presumptively valid lease to

be on the property even if that lease is later invalidated. Thus, the result of the declaratory

action likely will effect only the rights of the parties going forward. As a result, because the

declaratory action would not likely resolve all issues in this case, regardless of how that case

is decided, the Court will not stay this case pending the resolution of Judge Campbell’s case.

As a final note, the briefing in this matter was ponderous, caused a needless

expenditure of judicial resources and was mostly unhelpful. The Court is willing to assume

the parties each understood what the other was claiming, but to a busy Court it failed to add

any clarity to the issues, and was bereft of the virtue of brevity. In the future, the parties are

cautioned that if the Court can not quickly ascertain what relief is sought in a motion, the

Court will summarily deny the motion.

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants Hildale-Colorado City Utilities’, Twin City

Power’s, and City of Hildale’s Motion to Stay (Doc. 60) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ temporarily granted stay of

discovery (Doc. 77) is lifted.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:10-cv-08105-JAT Document 89 Filed 05/16/11 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the event either party makes a claim for

attorney fees in this matter, none of the time expended on briefing the motion to stay or oral

argument on the motion to stay shall be claimed. 

DATED this 16th day of May, 2011.

Case 3:10-cv-08105-JAT Document 89 Filed 05/16/11 Page 8 of 8