Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00801/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00801-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Anthony Tyrone Campbell Sr. is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Plaintiff filed the instant complaint on May 27, 2014.

I.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that “seeks 

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 

ANTHONY TYRONE CAMPBELL, SR.

 Plaintiff,

v.

JEFFREY BEARD, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.:1:14-cv-00801-LJO-SAB (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND, FOR FAILURE TO STATE 

A COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR RELIEF

[ECF No. 1]

Case 1:14-cv-00801-DAD-SAB Document 11 Filed 08/28/14 Page 1 of 7
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“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 

do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-677; Simmons v. Navajo County, 

Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-1021 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are still entitled to have their pleadings 

liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, but the pleading standard is now 

higher, Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted), and to survive 

screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow 

the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely 

consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

II.

COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff names Jeffrey Beard, J. A. Zamora, P. D. Brazelton, J. Buckley, R. Fisher Jr., D. B. 

Allen, J. Morgan, J. Herrera, C. Nevarez, J. Mendez, D. Aguinaga, D. Cardenas, T. Ramos, M. 

Barajas, and A. Salas, as Defendants in the complaint.

Plaintiff contends prison officials used excessive force that was malicious and sadistic 

resulting in Plaintiff suffering a concussion. Prison officials conspired to obstruct false evidence to 

allege that Plaintiff committed a battery on a peace officer causing serious injury. The senior hearing 

officer denied Plaintiff the right to present eyewitness testimony and other evidence to attest his 

innocence. The hearing officer falsely noted in the findings, “witnesses were not requested.” The 

finding of guilt was based on the mere allegation of prison guards, and there was no profound 

evidence presented to substantiate the charge. Supervisory officials failed to remedy the wrong.

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III.

DISCUSSIONS

A. Linkage 

Under section 1983, Plaintiff must link the named defendants to the participation in the 

violation at issue. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676-77, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1948-49 (2009); Simmons 

v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 

1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Liability may not 

be imposed under a theory of respondeat superior, and there must exist some causal connection 

between the conduct of each named defendant and the violation at issue. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; 

Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Moss v. U.S. 

Secret Service, 711 F.3d 941, 967-68 (9th Cir. 2013); Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 915-

16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011). 

B. Supervisory Liability

Supervisory personnel may not be held liable under section 1983 for the actions of subordinate 

employees based on respondeat superior, or vicarious liability. Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 

977 (9th Cir. 2013); accord Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 

(9th Cir. 2013); Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 711 F.3d 941, 967-68 (9th Cir. 2013); Lacey v. Maricopa 

County, 693 F.3d 896, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). “A supervisor may be liable only if (1) he or 

she is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a sufficient causal 

connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Crowley, 734 

F.3d at 977 (citing Snow, 681 F.3d at 989) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Lemire, 726 

F.3d at 1074-75; Lacey, 693 F.3d at 915-16. “Under the latter theory, supervisory liability exists even 

without overt personal participation in the offensive act if supervisory officials implement a policy so 

deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force of a 

constitutional violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977 (citing Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th 

Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

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Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of any allegations supporting the existence of a supervisory 

liability claim against the supervisory officials. The only basis for such a claim would be respondeat 

superior, which is precluded under section 1983. 

C. Official Capacity

Plaintiff sues Defendants in their individual and official capacity. When suing state actors in 

their official capacity, plaintiffs are essentially suing the state. Holley v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 599 F.3d 

1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010). State officials sued in their official capacity for damages are not persons 

for purposes of § 1983. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for 

damages against Defendants in their official capacity must be dismissed. 

D. Excessive Force

The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 

Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5, 112 S.Ct. 995 (1992) 

(citations omitted). For claims arising out of the use of excessive physical force, the issue is “whether 

force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and 

sadistically to cause harm.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37, 130 S.Ct. 1175, 1178 (2010) (per 

curiam) (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7) (internal quotation marks omitted); Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 

F.3d 1021, 1028 (9th Cir. 2013). The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is 

contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency, Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (quotation 

marks and citation omitted), and although de minimis uses of force do not violate the Constitution, the 

malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always violates contemporary standards of decency, 

regardless of whether or not significant injury is evident, Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37-8, 130 S.Ct. at 1178 

(citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10) (quotation marks omitted); Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th 

Cir. 2002). 

Although Plaintiff contends that prison officials used excessive force, Plaintiff fails to provide 

any facts regarding the circumstances surrounding the use of force. As such, the Court is unable to 

determine whether it is plausible that the alleged use of force, whatever that may be, was done “in a 

good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” 

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Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable excessive force claim under 

the Eighth Amendment. 

E. Due Process

The Due Process Clause protects Plaintiff against the deprivation of liberty without the 

procedural protections to which he is entitled under the law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221, 

125 S.Ct. 2384 (2005). To state a claim, Plaintiff must first identify the interest at stake. Wilkinson, 

545 U.S. at 221. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from state law. Id. 

The Due Process Clause does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in avoiding more adverse 

conditions of confinement, and under state law, the existence of a liberty interest created by prison 

regulations is determined by focusing on the nature of the condition of confinement at issue. Id. at 

221-23 (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995)) (quotation marks 

omitted). Liberty interests created by prison regulations are generally limited to freedom from 

restraint which imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary 

incidents of prison life. Id. at 221(citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484) (quotation marks omitted); Myron 

v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 2007). 

As a general rule, a challenge in federal court to the fact of conviction or the length of 

confinement must be raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). Where, as here, “success in a . . . [section] 1983 damages 

action would implicitly question the validity of conviction or duration of sentence, the litigant must 

first achieve favorable termination of his available state, or federal habeas, opportunities to challenge 

the underlying conviction or sentence.” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751, 124 S.Ct. 1303, 

1304 (2004) (citing to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994)); Edwards v. Balisok, 

520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997) (applying Heck to a prison disciplinary hearing where good-time credits 

were affected). Because the punishment imposed at the disciplinary hearing affects the duration of 

plaintiff’s sentence, plaintiff’s due process claim is barred until such time as plaintiff invalidates the 

result of the disciplinary hearing. 

It is unclear from the complaint whether Plaintiff lost good time credits as a result of the rules 

violation for battery on a peace officer. If Plaintiff lost good time credits then the length of sentence 

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may be affected, and such a claim is barred unless and until Plaintiff first invalidates the results of the 

disciplinary action. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 

487). Accordingly, the Court cannot determine whether Plaintiff states a cognizable due process 

claim. 

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days. Noll v. 

Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by 

adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 

2007) (no “buckshot” complaints). 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what each 

named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal rights. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678. “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties 

and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a 

constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). Although accepted as 

true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . 

. . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). 

Finally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 

114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), and must be 

“complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading,” Local Rule 220. “All 

causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are 

waived.” King, 814 F.2d at 567 (citing to London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 

1981)); accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474.

 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Plaintiff’s complaint, filed May 27, 2014, is dismissed for failure to state a claim;

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3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file an 

amended complaint; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, this action 

will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 27, 2014 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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