Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-07229/USCOURTS-caDC-97-07229-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 8, 1998 Decided November 13, 1998

No. 97-7229

Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority

Professional Firefighters Local 3217,

International Association of Firefighters,

AFL-CIO-CLC,

Appellant

v.

Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia

(97cv00930)

---------

Anton G. Hajjar argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs was Ruth E. Peters.

Peter W. Tredick argued the cause for appellee. With him

on the brief were Emily M. Yinger and N. Thomas Connally.

Before: Silberman, Henderson, and Randolph, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Silberman.

Separate concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge

Henderson.

Silberman, Circuit Judge: The Metropolitan Washington

Airports Authority Professional Firefighters Association, Local 3217 appeals from a district court order dismissing the

union's claim that the Authority's refusal to bargain over the

installation of video surveillance breached the lease under

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which the airports are governed. Because the district court

lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the unfair labor practice

claim, we affirm the dismissal.

I.

The Metropolitan Washington Airports Act of 1986 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.A. ss 49101-49112 (West Supp.

1998)) authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to transfer

responsibility for the operation of the Reagan National and

Dulles airports from the Federal Aviation Administration to

the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, a regional

entity created for that purpose by the Virginia General

Assembly and the District of Columbia City Council. The

transfer of control, which took effect in 1987, was achieved by

means of a 50-year lease between the Secretary of Transportation as lessor and the Authority as lessee. Jurisdiction is

conferred on the district courts of the United States to

compel the Authority to comply with the terms of this lease.

49 U.S.C.A. s 49104(c).

The Act obligates the Authority to "continue all collective

bargaining rights enjoyed by employees [of the Airports]

before June 7, 1987 [the date the lease took effect]." Id. at

s 49104(a)(6)(D). Accordingly, in the lease, the Authority

promised to "adopt and maintain an employment code" to

assure that those collective bargaining rights would continue

to be protected. Lease of the Metropolitan Airports Between the United States of America and the Metropolitan

Washington Airports Authority, Art. 14.B. Using the regulatory powers conferred upon it jointly by the legislative authority of Virginia and the District of Columbia, the Authority, after notice and comment, adopted a Labor Code. The

Code, which was subsequently ratified by the Virginia legislature, provides that allegations of unfair labor practices "shall

be submitted" to an Unfair Labor Practices Panel, whose

"power in this regard shall be exclusive," and that the findings of the Panel "shall be conclusive and binding" unless a

petition for relief is timely filed with the appropriate Virginia

Circuit Court. The Code also gives the Virginia courts

jurisdiction to hear a complaining party's petition for enforcement of the Panel's decision.

After the Reagan National Airport fire station suffered

recurring incidents of theft and damage to Authority property

and equipment, the Authority's Police Department placed a

video surveillance camera in the equipment bay of the fire

station as part of its investigation of the incidents. Shortly

after the installation several firefighters discovered the hidden camera, and the union filed an unfair labor practice

charge alleging that the Authority had violated ss 2.12(1)(a)

and (e) of the Code (containing standard language requiring

bargaining in good faith) by installing and using the video

camera without first bargaining with the union over the

implementation of the video surveillance. The union did not

claim that the Authority's decision to conduct covert surveillance violated the Code, but, relying on our decision in

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American Federation of Government Employees v. FLRA,

702 F.2d 1183, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (interpreting the Federal

Service Labor-Management Relations Act, 5 U.S.C. ss 7101-

7135 (Supp. III 1979)), contended that bargaining over the

implementation of that decision was mandatory. The charge

was submitted to the Unfair Labor Practices Panel as prescribed by the Code s 2.13(1). The Panel rejected the Authority's contention that because the surveillance was conducted pursuant to a criminal investigation bargaining over

implementation was not required, and found the Authority in

violation of the Code. The Authority told the union that it

planned to file a petition for relief from the Panel's decision in

the Virginia courts pursuant to s 2.13(4) of the Code, but

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before it could do so, the union filed suit in the District Court

for the District of Columbia seeking to enforce the Panel's

decision. The next day the Authority brougt its petition for

review in the Virginia Circuit Court.1 The union then amended its complaint in district court to include a claim that the

refusal to bargain over the impact and implementation of the

surveillance constituted a violation of the lease.

The district court dismissed the union's complaint, but the

basis its decision is unclear. The court obliquely explained

that because the dispute was over the Panel's findings and

not over the fairness of the procedures by which the Panel

reached its conclusions, the Code's scheme for review in the

Virginia courts applied in this case. However, the court also

suggested-even if it did not explicitly say--that it had jurisdiction and was merely abstaining in favor of the ongoing

state court proceeding.

II.

Both parties agree at least in theory that under the Authority's statutory and regulatory regime, jurisdiction is

granted to the federal courts for certain issues and to the

Virginia courts for others. The parties disagree, however, on

which jurisdictional category is implicated in this case. The

union submits that the Act requires the Authority to "continue all collective bargaining rights enjoyed" (emphasis added)

by its employees before the lease took effect and contends

that had this dispute arisen while the firefighters were still

federal employees, the Authority would have been required

under our American Federation of Government Employees

case to bargain over the impact and implementation of the

surveillance. The union reasons, therefore, that the jurisdictional provision in the Act entitles it to have its claim heard in

__________

1 The Virginia Circuit Court subsequently granted summary

judgment for the Authority, reversing the Panel's decision. Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority Professional Firefighters Association Local

3217, Chancery No. 97-0712 (Va. Cir. Apr. 2, 1998).

the federal courts--and that the federal courts should apply

the FSLMRA to the dispute.

The union relies on Metropolitan Washington Airports

Authority Professional Fire Fighters Association Local 3217

v. United States, 959 F.2d 297, 307 (D.C. Cir. 1992), in

which--while noting that "the question whether jurisdiction

over unfair labor practice matters properly lies in Virginia

courts [was] not yet ripe for decision" in that case--we

recognized the difficulty of the question and commented that

"it is unclear whether there are any circumstances under

which this clause [giving jurisdiction to Virginia courts] would

have any effect." Accordingly, the union argues that the

district court improperly abstained from exercising federal

jurisdiction. The Authority counters that, pursuant to the

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Code, jurisdiction to review the Panel's decisions lies in the

Virginia courts, and the district court properly dismissed the

claim for lack of jurisdiction. In any event, the Authority

argues that res judicata bars the federal action. The Authority adds that even assuming that the district court could

assert jurisdiction over this claim, it properly abstained.

It is important to emphasize that the union does not

challenge the validity of the Code, nor does it claim that the

provision of the Code granting jurisdiction to Virginia courts

to review the Panel's disposition of unfair labor practice

claims is unlawful. Rather, the union argues that it can elect

to go to federal court, and gain the benefit of federal government labor relations law, simply by alleging that the unfair

labor practice complained of--the refusal to bargain over

video surveillance--is itself a violation of the lease. The

union implies that its interest in vindicating the federally

protected collective bargaining rights which existed at the

time the lease took effect would be undermined if the Virginia

courts alone were allowed to review the Panel's adjudications

of unfair labor practice claims. The union alternatively argues that even if the Virginia court has "initial" jurisdiction to

review the Panel's decisions, the union should have two bites

at the apple--it should be able first to petition a Virginia

court for review under the Code, and, if it loses, it should

then have recourse to federal court to argue that the same

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unfair labor practice would violate the FSLMRA and therefore that the lease is violated.

Unfortunately, neither the parties nor the district court

came to grips with the nub of the underlying issue here: how

to delineate the boundaries of the two jurisdictional provisions. Although the interrelationship between federal and

Virginia jurisdiction and substantive law under the Act is

certainly peculiar, and more than a little puzzling, we think

the key to determining the proper boundary between these

provisions is to examine the structure and purpose of the Act.

Congress' stated purpose in transferring control over the

airports to the Authority was to "achieve local control, management, operation, and development" of the airports. 49

U.S.C.A. s 49102(a). But the Act does not simply turn the

airports over to Virginia or the District of Columbia, rather it

establishes a regime under which the Authority balances the

"continuing but limited [federal] interest" in the airports, id.

at s 49101(3), with the "growing local interest," id. at

s 49101(7). This balance is reflected in the Authority's jurisdictional provisions.

Prior to the creation of the Authority, airport employees

were federal employees whose collective bargaining rights

were adjudicated under federal law. See Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority Professional Fire Fighters Assoc.,

959 F.2d at 298. The statutory guarantee of the airport

employees' continuing "collective bargaining rights" certainly

imposes some federal limitation on the formulation, and perhaps the implementation, of the Code. But in creating the

Airports Authority, Congress expressly transferred the management and operation of the airports--including employment matters--from the federal to the state/local level. 49

U.S.C.A. ss 49101(7); 49102(a). Congress provided that the

continuing federal interest would be vindicated through "a

lease mechanism which provides for local control and operation." Id. at s 49101(10). We can generally assume that the

Authority's obligation to continue the employees' collective

bargaining rights is discharged through the Code and its

implementation.

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We think the federal/local balance implicit in the Act is best

honored by allocating to Virginia courts jurisdiction to review

challenges to the application of the Code and to federal

district courts jurisdiction over facial challenges to the Code

(as violations of the lease). Here, because the union brings

an unfair labor practice claim, which involves an interpretation of the Code, it is an as-applied challenge and jurisdiction

lies in the Virginia courts, not in federal court. If the union

had argued that the Code on its face violated the lease in

some manner, then the federal district court would have had

jurisdiction.

Perhaps a case might arise where a decision of the Virginia

courts is claimed to so undermine the framework of collective

bargaining as to be, in effect, a betrayal of the Code; the

union might argue that to challenge that decision is to raise a

de facto facial challenge to the Code as a violation of the

lease, allowing for federal court jurisdiction. We rather

doubt whether that argument would succeed, since it might

be thought equivalent to asking an inferior federal court to

review the judgment of a state court. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983)

(citing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415, 416

(1923)) (holding that 28 U.S.C. s 1257 grants appellate jurisdiction over judicial decisions of state courts only to the

United States Supreme Court and not to inferior federal

courts).2 In any event, the union makes no such assertion

__________

2 There would be no claim preclusion in such a situation, because

in the unique statutory scheme here, the federal claim of a violation

of the lease would not be analytically the same legal issue as a claim

of a misapplication of the Code and so could not be raised in the

Virginia courts. See Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of

Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984) ("A federal court must give to a statecourt judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that

judgment under the law of the state in which the judgment was

rendered."). Under Virginia law, a final judgment on the merits in

a prior action is conclusive only as to questions actually decided as

well as to matters the parties might have litigated. Kemp v.

Miller, 186 S.E. 99, 103-04 (1936) (citations omitted) (cited in

Guerrero v. Katzen, 774 F.2d 506, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).

here. It simply seeks the benefit of the same decision on a

rather controversial question of labor relations law as it would

have received had the Authority never been created and had

the union's members remained federal employees. That it

cannot gain simply by arguing that the Authority violated the

lease. For the foregoing reasons, the district court's dismissal of the union's claim is affirmed.

So ordered.

__________

We note, however, that relitigation of the underlying facts may be

barred under the doctrine of issue preclusion. See Marrese v.

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American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 382

(1985) (citing Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 467

(1982)) (observing that a federal court applies state rules of issue

preclusion to determine whether a matter actually litigated in state

court may be relitigated in a subsequent federal proceeding).

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Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge, concurring:

The holding in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 118

S. Ct. 1003, 1012-16 (1998), compels me to concur on the

jurisdictional ground set forth in the majority opinion. I

note, however, that the Union's sole surviving claim is plainly

res judicata.

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