Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-1_20-cv-01896/USCOURTS-cand-1_20-cv-01896-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EUREKA DIVISION

VICTOR MELESIO LOZADA,

Plaintiff,

v.

SANTA ROSA POLICE DEPARTMENT, 

et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 20-cv-01896-RMI 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND

Plaintiff, a detainee, filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has 

been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (dkt. 5) and has consented to the jurisdiction of a 

Magistrate Judge (dkt. 4). 

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims 

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se

pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 

Cir. 1990).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Specific facts are not necessary; the statement 

need only “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it 

rests.’”” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). Although in order to state 

a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide 

the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 

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formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be 

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. The United States Supreme Court has 

recently explained the “plausible on its face” standard of Twombly: “While legal conclusions can 

provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there 

are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine 

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 

(2009). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) 

that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the 

alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 

487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

Legal Claims 

Plaintiff alleges that he was improperly arrested and the arresting police officer falsified 

information, and he seeks monetary damages. A claim of unlawful arrest is cognizable under § 

1983 for violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure 

if the complaint alleges that the arrest was without probable cause or other justification. See 

Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-558 (1967); Yousefian v. City of Glendale, 779 F.3d 1010, 1014 

n.1. (9th Cir. 2015) (absence of probable cause is essential element of § 1983 false arrest claim). 

And a claim of unlawful detention/imprisonment is cognizable under § 1983 for violation of the 

Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process if the arrest was without probable cause or 

other justification and the defendant knew or should have known that plaintiff was entitled to 

release. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142-145 (1979); Lee v. County of Los Angeles, 250 

F.3d 668, 684-85 (9th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff stated due process claim where police allegedly 

arrested plaintiff’s son without probable cause, detained him without verifying that he was the 

person for whom police had an arrest warrant, despite his obvious mental incapacity, and detained 

him for one day before extradition hearing, which led to his incarceration in another state for two 

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years); but cf. Gant v. County of Los Angeles, 772 F.3d 608, 619, 621-22 (9th Cir. 2014) (because 

plaintiff did not inform defendants of his mistaken identity and because he received a prompt 

hearing, his due process claim based on unlawful post-arrest detention failed).

In order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, 

or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence 

invalid, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed 

on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to 

make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas 

corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-487 (1994). A claim for damages bearing that 

relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 

1983. Id. at 487.

In Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393 (2007), the Court held that the “Heck rule for 

deferred accrual is called into play only when there exists ‘a conviction or sentence that has not 

been . . . invalidated,’ that is to say, an ‘outstanding criminal judgment.’” Id. at 391-93 (quoting 

Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87). The Heck rule delays accrual only if there is an existing conviction on 

the date the statute of limitations begins to run, which in the case of wrongful arrest or wrongful 

imprisonment claims is when the plaintiff's confinement is no longer without legal process, but 

rather becomes a confinement pursuant to legal process – that is, for example, when he or she is 

bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges. Id. at 389-90. The Court stated that the 

contention that “an action which would impugn an anticipated future conviction cannot be brought 

until that conviction occurs and is set aside” goes “well beyond Heck” and rejected it. Id. at 393 

(italics in original). Although the Court was only considering when the statute of limitations began 

running on a false arrest/false imprisonment claim, the discussion quoted suggests that Heck does 

not apply if there is no extant conviction – for instance, if plaintiff has only been arrested or 

charged.

If a plaintiff files a § 1983 false arrest claim before he or she is convicted, or files any other 

claim related to rulings that likely will be made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial, it is 

within the power of the district court, and accords with common practice, to stay the civil action 

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until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended. Id. at 393-94. If the plaintiff is 

then convicted, and if the stayed civil suit would impugn that conviction, Heck requires dismissal; 

otherwise, the case may proceed. Id. at 394.

Local governments are “persons” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where official 

policy or custom causes a constitutional tort, see Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 

690 (1978); however, a city or county may not be held vicariously liable for the unconstitutional 

acts of its employees under the theory of respondeat superior. See Board of Cty. Comm'rs. of 

Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. To impose municipal 

liability under § 1983 for a violation of constitutional rights resulting from governmental inaction 

or omission, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that he possessed a constitutional right of which he or she 

was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate 

indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights; and (4) that the policy is the moving force 

behind the constitutional violation.” Oviatt By and Through Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 

1474 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff states that he was improperly arrested on November 12, 2019, after the arresting 

officer falsified information so Plaintiff would be charged with a felony. He argues that the initial 

allegations involved theft, but he was charged with robbery. Plaintiff is currently in custody. 

Plaintiff cannot obtain money damages unless the charges were dropped, or the conviction has 

been expunged. If the prosecution is ongoing, this case must be stayed until the criminal case is 

finished. The complaint is dismissed with leave to amend to provide more information about the 

status of the criminal case and if plaintiff is in custody related to this arrest.

Plaintiff also names the Santa Rosa Police Department as defendant. The court assumes 

that Plaintiff wishes to name Sonoma County as defendant. To properly plead a claim under 

Monell, it is insufficient to allege simply that a policy, custom, or practice exists that caused the 

constitutional violations. AE v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636-37 (9th Cir. 2012). Pursuant 

to the more stringent pleading requirements set forth in Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 670, and Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 553-56, a plaintiff suing a municipal entity must allege sufficient facts regarding the 

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specific nature of the alleged policy, custom or practice to allow the defendant to effectively 

defend itself, and these facts must plausibly suggest that plaintiff is entitled to relief. AE, 666 F.3d 

at 636-37 (citing Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216, which summarized new pleading standards derived from 

Iqbal, Twombly and related Supreme Court decisions). In an amended complaint, Plaintiff should 

provide more information if he seeks to present a Monell claim. He must also add Sonoma County 

as defendant. 

CONCLUSION

The complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend in accordance with the standards set 

forth above. The amended complaint must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the date this 

order is filed and must include the caption and civil case number used in this order and the words 

AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an amended complaint completely replaces 

the original complaint, Plaintiff must include in it all the claims he wishes to present. See Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). He may not incorporate material from the original 

complaint by reference. Failure to amend within the designated time will result in the dismissal of 

this case.

It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the court informed 

of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed “Notice of Change of 

Address,” and must comply with the court's orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do so may result 

in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 17, 2020

ROBERT M. ILLMAN

United States Magistrate Judge

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