Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00749/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00749-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1 08cv0749

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JIMMIE STEPHEN,

CDCR #C-56483,

Civil No. 08-0749 BTM (AJB)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) DENYING MOTIONS TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF

COUNSEL AS BARRED BY 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 

[Doc. No. 3, 13] 

AND

(2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

REQUEST FOR IMMINENT

DANGER EXCEPTION

[Doc. Nos. 5, 10]

vs.

BRAVO, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, Jimmie Stephen, a state inmate currently incarcerated at California Men’s

Colony (“CMC”) in San Luis Obispo, California, and proceeding pro se, initiated this civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on April 23, 2008. Plaintiff’s original Complaint named

only two Defendants, Bravo, a Guard at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”), and

Dr. Hoxie, a prison dentist [Doc. No. 1]. 

Because Plaintiff did not pay the filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) or file a

Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), the Court

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ordered him to show cause why his case should not be dismissed by either: (1) prepaying the

$350 filing fee, or (2) submitting a Motion to Proceed IFP by June 25, 2008. See May 12, 2008

Order to Show Cause (“OSC”) [Doc. No. 2] at 2.

On May 22, 2008, Plaintiff submitted a Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 3], which was

quickly followed by his Response to the Court’s OSC [Doc. No. 5], on May 27, 2008. In his

Response, as well as in the Complaint itself, Plaintiff specifically requests the Court grant him

an “imminent danger exception” to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)–a subsection of the IFP statute known

as the “three strikes” rule. 

On July 1, 2008, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) re-naming the

original two Defendants and adding claims against thirty-two other California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) officials assigned to both RJD and CMC [Doc. No.

6]. On October 3, 2008, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel [Doc. No. 13].

I.

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Section 1915 of Title 28 of the United States Code allows certain litigants to pursue civil

litigation IFP, that is, without the full prepayment of fees or costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2).

Subsection (e)(1) further permits the district court, once IFP has been granted, to exercise its

discretion to ‘request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel,’” Solis v.

County of Los Angeles, 514 F.3d 946, 958 (9th Cir. 2008), but only upon a showing of

“exceptional circumstances.” Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). 

 However, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to preclude

the privilege to proceed IFP:

. . . if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while

incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal

in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds

that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger

of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ provision.”

Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (hereafter “Andrews”). “Pursuant to

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 The Ninth Circuit has held that section 1915(g) does not violate a prisoner’s right to access

to the courts, due process or equal protection; nor does it violate separation of powers principles or

operate as an ex post facto law. Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1179-82 (9th Cir. 1999); see also

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1123 (noting constitutionality of § 1915(g), but recognizing that “serious

constitutional concerns would arise if § 1915(g) were applied to preclude those prisoners who had filed

actions that were not ‘frivolous, malicious, or fail[ing] to state a claim’ from proceeding IFP.”). 

3 08cv0749

§ 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” Id.; see also Andrews v.

Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter “Cervantes”) (under the PLRA,

“[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful suits may entirely be barred from IFP

status under the three strikes rule[.]”). The objective of the PLRA is to further “the

congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers,

128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). 

“‘Strikes’ are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which

were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim.”

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (citation omitted). Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes,

he is prohibited by section 1915(g) from pursuing any other IFP action in federal court unless

he can show he is facing “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g);

Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051-52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[]

a plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the

time of filing.”).1

While the PLRA does not require a prisoner to declare that § 1915(g) does not bar his

request to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “[i]n some instances, the district court docket

records may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one of the criteria under

§ 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id. at 1120. When applying 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g),

however, the court must “conduct a careful evaluation of the order dismissing an action, and

other relevant information,” before determining that the action “was dismissed because it was

frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim,” since “not all unsuccessful cases qualify as a

strike under § 1915(g).” Id. at 1121.

The Ninth Circuit has held that “the phrase ‘fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted,’ as used elsewhere in § 1915, ‘parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

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12(b)(6).’” Id. (quoting Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)). Andrews

further holds that a case is “frivolous” for purposes of § 1915(g) “if it is of little weight or

importance” or “ha[s] no basis in law or fact.” 398 F.3d at 1121 (citations omitted); see also

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (“[A] complaint, containing as it does both factual

allegations and legal conclusions, is frivolous [under 28 U.S.C. § 1915] where it lacks an

arguable basis in either law or in fact .... [The] term ‘frivolous,’ when applied to a complaint,

embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation.”). “A

case is malicious if it was filed with the intention or desire to harm another.” Andrews, 398 F.3d

at 1121 (quotation and citation omitted).

II.

PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR “IMMINENT DANGER EXCEPTION”

As required by section 1915(g), the Court has reviewed the allegations in both Plaintiff’s

original as well as his Amended Complaint, and concludes that neither makes “plausible

allegation[s]” to suggest Plaintiff “faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time

of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). 

In his original Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that RJD Guard Bravo and Dr. Hoxie “fail[ed]

to provide [him with] adequate medical care” since 2005. (Compl. at 1.) Specifically, Plaintiff

claimed Defendants failed to provide him with a partial dental plate with “deliberate

indifference” and “reckless disregard,” and that his transfer from RJD to CMC on March 27,

2007, and unidentified “false charges” leveled against him show an “ongoing pattern of

misconduct” and retaliation dating back to 1995. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff also attached to his

Complaint three exhibits comprised of memoranda, email, medical records, his administrative

grievances and appeal responses, as well as a copy of the Northern District of California’s

opinion in Pratt v. Rowland, 769 F. Supp. 1128 (N.D. Cal. 1991). (Id. at 4-35.)

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff repeats his dental care claims against Dr. Hoxie

(FAC at 4), and adds similar dental and medical care claims against Defendants Millard, Lee,

Antique, Frmseal, Marshal, Hernandez, Ramos, and Bromerich. (Id. at 4-6, 8, 9, 12, 17).

Plaintiff also claims: Correctional Officer Bravo “assaulted” him on September 26, 2006 (id.

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at 2); Defendants McCurty, Armenta, Fernandez, Lira and Simon “participated” in Bravo’s

assault and destroyed Plaintiff’s “legal documents” and prescription eyeglasses on the same day,

(id. at 2-3, 20); Defendants Belton, Clarke, Hernandez, Armoskus, Cowan, McMahan, Palencia,

Pittman, Soriano, Sanchez, and Espinoza conspired and retaliated against him by filing “false

charges” which resulted in his segregation in August 2005, November 2005 and

September 2006 (id. at 3, 12-13, 16, 20, 24); inmate appeals officials Cota, Contreras, Munoz,

Grannis and Woodford refused to timely or adequately respond to various administrative

appeals Plaintiff filed from 2004 through 2007 (id. at 10-11, 14-15); Defendants Hernandez,

Togafu, Brown, Kadiwala and Ritter exposed him to the tuberculosis “germ” in 2003 through

a “contaminated ventilation system,” “poor sanitation,” overcrowding and by denying him other

“basic human needs” (id. at 3, 18-19, 22); and various other officials have engaged in an “pattern

of misconduct,” involving retaliatory transfers, the destruction of his personal property,

interference with legal mail, and other assorted acts of bias and recrimination spanning the years

of 2003 through 2007. (Id. at 1-3, 12-24.)

 In addition to the allegation in both Complaints, Plaintiff’s Response to this Court’s OSC

specifically requests an “imminent danger exception” under § 1915(g) [Doc. No. 5]. Plaintiff’s

Response repeats the allegations of inadequate dental attention and a “pattern of misconduct”

dating from 1995 through 2007 involving withheld and “destroy[ed] legal newsletter[s],” other

“legal documents” and “civil rights materials,” confiscated personal property including a “hot

pot,” TV, radio, and headphones, and “willful” segregation, “attacks” and “set-ups” in retaliation

for his “filing lawsuits[]s and grievances” since 1995. (Pl.’s Response to OSC [Doc. No. 5] at

2-4 & Exs. 1-4.) However, neither the allegations of past acts of official wrongdoing in

Plaintiff’s pleadings dating back as far as 1995, nor the alleged acts of “ongoing” violations

asserted in Plaintiff’s Complaint, Amended Complaint or in his Response to this Court’s OSC,

are sufficient to show the “imminent danger of serious physical injury” required to overcome

§ 1915(g)’s bar. Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1053 (“[T]he availability of the exception turns on

conditions a prisoner 

faced at the time the complaint was filed, not at some earlier or later time.”) (emphasis added).

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Therefore, Plaintiff may be barred from proceeding IFP in this action if he has on three

prior occasions had civil actions or appeals dismissed as frivolous, malicious or for failing to

state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

III.

APPLICATION OF 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

A court “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the

federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias v.

Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d

801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens

Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, the Court takes judicial notice

that Jimmie Stephen, CDCR #C-56483, has had six prior prisoner civil actions dismissed on the

grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. See Stephen v. Lacy, C.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 93-5032 WMB (Aug. 23, 1993 Order

denying Motion to Proceed IFP and Dismissing Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)

[Doc. No. 3]), aff’d, 48 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1995) (unpub.) (strike one); Stephen v. Zulfacur, et

al. S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 93-1943 R (RBB) (April 19, 1994 Order and Judgment Dismissing

case for “failing to state an injury for which relief can be granted” [Doc. Nos. 15, 16]) (strike

two); Stephen v. Hernandez, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 06-0171 L (WMC) (Oct. 11, 2006

Order Dismissing Third Amended Complaint without leave to amend for failing to state a claim

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) [Doc. No. 38]) (strike three); Stephen v.

Shelar, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 06-1054 LAB (WMc) (Aug. 31, 2006 Order Dismissing

Complaint sua sponte for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and

1915A(b) [Doc. No. 8]; and May 10, 2007 Order and Judgment Dismissing Action for Failing

to Amend [Doc. No. 16] (strike four)); Stephen v. Marshal, C.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 07-05337-

UA-SH (Oct. 4, 2007 Order denying IFP and dismissing complaint as “legally and/or factually

patently frivolous” [Doc. No. 4]) (strike five); and, most recently Stephen v. IRS, S.D. Cal. Civil

Case No. 07-2112 LAB (BLM) (Dec. 4, 2007 Order Denying Motion to Proceed IFP as barred

/ / /

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by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and Dismissing Action as legally frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1) [Doc. No. 3]) (strike six).

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated more than three

“strikes” pursuant to § 1915(g), and he fails to make a “plausible allegation” that he faced 

imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed his original Complaint, he is not

entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP in this action. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055;

Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1180 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) “does not prevent all prisoners

from accessing the courts; it only precludes prisoners with a history of abusing the legal system

from continuing to abuse it while enjoying IFP status”); see also Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d

1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[C]ourt permission to proceed IFP is itself a matter of privilege and

not right.”).

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s Motions to Proceed

IFP and for Appointment of Counsel, as well as his request for an imminent danger exception

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) [Doc. Nos. 3, 5, 13]. However, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff

forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order to pay the full $350 civil filing fee.

If Plaintiff does not pay the full $350 civil filing fee within 45 days, the Court shall

dismiss this action without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 3, 2008

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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