Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05215/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05215-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

)

DAVID BROWN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF )

 CORRECTIONS, et al., )

) 

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

CV F- 04- 5215 REC DLB P 

FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATION RE

DISMISSAL OF ACTION FOR

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983. On October 22, 2004, this Court entered an order dismissing the

complaint for failure to state a claim and granting plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. The

order was returned to the Court with notice that the CDC number on file with the court was

incorrect. The Court reserved the Order. Plaintiff requested an extension of time and on March 18,

2005, plaintiff filed a response to the Order dismissing his complaint. In his response, plaintiff states

that he is attempting to obtain counsel to represent him in this action. To the extent plaintiff seeks

appointment of counsel by this Court, by separate order, the Court denies this request. Plaintiff also

states that he elects to stand by his original complaint and does not wish to file an amended

complaint. Accordingly, the Court now issues a recommendation to dismiss the complaint for

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failure to state a claim.

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

"frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2); 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a claim, leave to amend

may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

In the instant case, plaintiff brings action against the California Department of Corrections

(“CDC”); CDC Director Edward Alameida; Warden Allen Scribner; the following CDC doctors: Dr.

Klarich, Dr. Bhatt, Dr. Hasadsri, Dr. Friedman, Dr. Viravathana, Dr. Thirakomen, Dr. Kim; and

Correctional Officer Miranda. Plaintiff alleges that defendants have denied him a wheelchair and

appropriate institutional placement and housing in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act;

committed deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, resulting in further significant injury

in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; violated his right to privacy with regard to

his medical diagnosis and treatment resulting in embarrassment, humiliation and emotional distress;

retaliated against him for filing and pursuing administrative remedies; committed medical

malpractice; and conspired to injure plaintiff and to deprive him of his constitutional rights.

Plaintiff alleges that he is substantially impaired in his ability to walk, see and work as a

result of multiple serious medical conditions and injuries. On April 6, 1992, plaintiff was classified

as permanently disabled and unable to work due to significant degenerative intervertible spinal disk

disease. This record was placed in plaintiff’s prison medical file.

Plaintiff alleges that he was the victim of an attempted murder on February 8, 2001 and

thereafter was transferred to the Medical Center at UC Davis. Plaintiff was transferred back to

California State Prison at Sacramento on February 12, 2001 and was transferred to California State

Prison Corcoran in July 2001. On March 29, 2002, plaintiff alleges that defendant Dr. Hasadsri

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denied plaintiff’s CDC 1824 request for a wheelchair, which was approved by Dr. Bhatt.

Plaintiff further alleges that on June 5, 2002 he was seen by Dr. Viravathana for back and

neck pain and Dr. Viravathana did not assess plaintiff’s vital signs or conduct a physical

examination. Plaintiff alleges that defendant prescribed and ordered medications without informing

plaintiff or advising of the potential risks or side effects.

On August 7, 2002, plaintiff was seen by Dr. Friedman for back and neck pain. Plaintiff

alleges that Dr. Friedman recommended “trigger point” injections, antidepressants and antiinflamatory drugs despite plaintiff’s history of heart disease, hypertension and a brain tumor. 

Plaintiff alleges that on September 3, 2002, defendant Miranda escorted him to the medical

clinic and while he was in the examination room with defendant Dr. Thirakomen, defendant Miranda

and other inmates were seated outside the examination room where they could clearly hear the

discussion. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Miranda participated in and allowed other inmates to

make derogatory comments about plaintiff’s medical condition. 

Plaintiff alleges that on February 24, 2003, he was seen by defendant Dr. Kim for complaints

of severe pain. Plaintiff alleges Dr. Kim laughed at his complaints, conducted a cursory examination

and discounted his condition. Plaintiff alleges that on April 25, 2003, he again saw Dr. Kim with

complaints of frequent urination and severe pain in his groin area. Plaintiff alleges Dr. Kim failed to

order laboratory tests to determine plaintiff’s prostrate specific antigen level and failed to make any

attempt to rule out kidney stones despite plaintiff’s having informed him of a history of passing

kidney stones. Plaintiff alleges that on May 1, 2003, he again saw Dr. Kim and gave him a large

kidney stone that he had passed that morning. Plaintiff alleges Dr. Kim expressed disbelief that the

stone had actually come from plaintiff’s body but that he would submit it for testing. Plaintiff asserts

Dr. Kim refused to answer questions and was “very rude and abrupt . . . “

Plaintiff alleges that on June 4, 2003, Dr. Kim completed and signed an Inmate/Parolee

Disability Verification in which he improperly stated plaintiff had no verifiable disability

I. ADA Claim

Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act

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(ADA) by failing to provide him a wheelchair and failing accommodate his disabilities in his

institutional housing. Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act provides that:

No qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such

disability, be excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of

the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected

to discrimination by any such entity.

42 U.S.C. § 12132. Because Title II of the ADA was modeled after § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

of 1973, “[t]here is no significant difference in analysis of the rights and obligations created by the

ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.” Zukle v. Regents of the University of California, 166 F.3d 1041,

1045, n. 11 (9th Cir. 1999). To establish a claim under the ADA and RA, plaintiff must demonstrate

that (1) he is a person with a disability; (2) that he is otherwise qualified; and that the defendants’

actions either (3) excluded his participation or denied him the benefits of a service, program, or

activity; or (4) otherwise subjected him to discrimination on the basis of his physical handicap. See

Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 477, 455 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The term “public entity” is defined under Title II as any state or local government or any

department, agency, or other instrumentality of state or local government. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A),

(B). Individuals are not proper defendants under Title II of the ADA. Walker v. Snyder, 213 F.3d

344, 346 (7th Cir. 2000); Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1005 n.8 (8th Cir. 1999);

Montez v. Romer, 32 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1240-41 (D. Colo. 1999) (finding that individual liability

does not exist under the ADA); see also Butler v. City of Prairie Village, 172 F.3d 736, 744 (10th Cir.

1999); Mason v. Stallings, 82 F.3d 1007, 1009 (11th Cir. 1996); Gallo v. Bd. of Regents of the

University of California, 916 F. Supp. 1005, 1009 (S.D. Cal. 1995). In the instant case, plaintiff sues

the individual defendants in their official and individual capacities. Because plaintiff cannot

maintain an action against individuals under Title II of the ADA, the ADA claims against defendants

in their individual capacities must be dismissed. 

II. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs 

Plaintiff asserts that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.

A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment

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unless the mistreatment rises to the level of "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The “deliberate indifference” standard involves an

objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms,

“sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501

U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must act with a “sufficiently culpable state of

mind,” which entails more than mere negligence, but less than conduct undertaken for the very

purpose of causing harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. A prison official does not act in a

deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety.” Id.

In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a prisoner's

civil rights have been abridged, "the indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere

'indifference,' 'negligence,' or 'medical malpractice' will not support this cause of action." Broughton

v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980), citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. “[A]

complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not

state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does

not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle v. Gamble,

429 U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995);

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1050 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs.,

Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997)(en banc). Even gross negligence is insufficient to

establish deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d

1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990). A prisoner’s mere disagreement with diagnosis or treatment does not

support a claim of deliberate indifference. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Deliberate indifference can be manifested by prison guards intentionally denying or delaying

access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed. Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104-05. However, where a prisoner alleges a delay in receiving medical

treatment, the prisoner must allege that the delay led to further injury. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133,

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1136 (9th Cir. 1997); Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir.

1985). 

In the instant case, plaintiff does not state a claim against any named defendant for deliberate

indifference to medical needs. Although plaintiff alleges that defendants did not provide adequate

medical care, the allegations do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. Plaintiff’s

disagreement with the doctors recommended treatment does not constitute deliberate indifference. 

See Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff alleges that on June 5, 2002, he

was seen by Dr. Viravathana, the specialist in neurology who prescribed two forms of insulin for

plaintiff. On August 7, 2002, plaintiff was seen by Dr. Friedman who recommended “trigger point”

injections, antidepressants and anti-inflamatory drops. On September 3, 2002, plaintiff was seen by

Dr. Thirakomen. On February 24, 2003, April 25, 2003 and May 1, 2003 plaintiff was seen by Dr.

Kim. Although plaintiff disagrees with the course of treatment provided by these doctors, these

allegations do not indicate a deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s medical needs, but rather, indicate

that plaintiff’s health issues were addressed by prison staff. Therefore, the complaint fails to state an

Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs against any of the named

defendants.

To the extent plaintiff claims that his administrative appeals were improperly denied by

defendant Bhatt and “CDC inmate appeals branch staff on behalf of the Director of CDC, defendant

Alameida . . .” These claims also fail. Prisoners have no constitutional right to an inmate grievance

system. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983). Thus, the non-existence of, or the failure

of prison officials to properly implement an administrative appeals process within the prison system

does not raise constitutional concerns. Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993); Flick

v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1991). "[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it

does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates.” Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495 (citing Azeez v.

DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982); see also Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1988). “Hence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural

protections envisioned by the Fourteenth Amendment." Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. at 10;

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The right to privacy has been found to fall under the protection of the Due Process Clause and/or the Fourth Amendment,

which protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 n.23 (1977); Norman-Bloodsaw v.

Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998); Roe v. Sherry, 91 F.3d 1270, 1274 (9th Cir. 1996); Doe v. Attorney

General of the United States, 941 F.2d 780, 795 (9th Cir. 1991). Because plaintiff has alleged no facts that implicate the Fourth

Amendment, the court construes plaintiff’s claim to be one brought pursuant to the Due Process Clause.

U.S . District Court

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Spencer v. Moore, 638 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986). Specifically, failure to process a

grievance does not state a constitutional violation. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. Thus, a prison

official’s involvement and actions in reviewing prisoner’s administrative appeal cannot serve as the

basis for liability under a § 1983 action. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. 

III. Violation of Medical Privacy

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of life, liberty, or property

without due process of law.1 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). “While the Supreme

Court has expressed uncertainty regarding the precise bounds of the constitutional ‘zone of privacy,’

its existence is firmly established.” In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 1999). “The

constitutionally protected privacy interest in avoiding the disclosure of personal matters clearly

encompasses medical information and its confidentiality,” Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley

Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998), and “information regarding an individual’s HIV-status or

AIDS diagnosis . . . fall[s] with the ambit of the privacy protection afforded medical information.” 

Doe v. Attorney General of the United States, 941 F.2d 780, 796 (9th Cir. 1991).

Section 1983 “contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a

violation of the underlying constitutional right.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986);

Maddox v. City of Los Angeles, 792 F.2d 1408, 1414 (9th Cir. 1986). Depending on the right, mere

negligence may or may not be enough to state a claim under section 1983. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330;

Maddox, 792 F.2d at 1413. The protections of the Due Process Clause are not “triggered by lack of

due care by prison officials.” Daniels, 474 U.S. at 333; Maddox, 792 F.2d at 1413. Thus, although

some constitutional provisions may be violated by mere lack of care, negligent conduct does not

state a claim under section 1983 for violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 334; Maddox, 792 F.2d at 1413.

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The conduct of correctional officer Miranda and Dr. Thirakomen described by plaintiff as 

“the failure to provide for and ensure plaintiff’s medical privacy . . .” was negligent conduct at most

and does not state a claim under section 1983. Moreover, mere verbal harassment or abuse is not

sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830

F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, plaintiff’s allegations of suffering “extreme

embarrassment, humiliation, and emotional and mental distress” also do not state a claim under

section 1983. 

IV. Retaliation

Plaintiff asserts that he was subjected to intentional deprivation of necessary and appropriate

medical care in retaliation for filing and pursuing administrative remedies relevant to his medical

care. Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner's First Amendment rights to speech or to petition

the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir.

1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989). To establish a prima

facie case, plaintiff must allege and show that defendants acted to retaliate for his exercise of a

protected activity, and defendants' actions did not serve a legitimate penological purpose. See

Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir.

1995). A plaintiff asserting a retaliation claim must demonstrate a "but-for" causal nexus between

the alleged retaliation and plaintiff's protected activity (i.e., filing a legal action). McDonald v. Hall,

610 F.2d 16, 18 (1st Cir. 1979); see Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.

274 (1977). The prisoner must submit evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to establish a link

between the exercise of constitutional rights and the allegedly retaliatory action. Pratt, 65 F.3d at

806. 

In the instant case, plaintiff has alleged no facts to indicate that he was denied necessary and

appropriate medical care. Although plaintiff alleges that he filed several inmate appeal concerning

medical treatment, he has failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that he was denied medical

care. As discussed above, plaintiff’s allegations reveal the opposite. Plaintiff’s disagreement with

the course of treatment he was given does not state a claim for retaliation, or for deliberate

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indifference. 

V. State Law Medical Malpractice

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), in any civil action in which the district court has original

jurisdiction, the district court “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims in the action

within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III,”

except as provided in subsections (b) and (c). “[O]nce judicial power exists under § 1367(a), retention

of supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under 1367(c) is discretionary.” Acri v. Varian

Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997). “The district court may decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . . the district court has dismissed all

claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The Supreme Court has

cautioned that “if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . . the state claims should be dismissed

as well.” United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 

Although the court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, plaintiff must

first have a cognizable claim under federal law. In the event that plaintiff is able to allege a cognizable

federal claim and wishes to pursue a state law claim as well, plaintiff is informed that the California Tort

Claims Act requires that tort claims against a public entities or its employees be presented to the State

Board of Control no more than six months after the cause of action accrues. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 905.2,

945.4, 950-950.6. To state a tort claim against a public employee, the plaintiff must allege compliance

with the Tort Claims Act. Mangold v. California Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir.

1995) (citing Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 193 CalRptr. 760, 762 (Cal.App.

1983)); McQuoid v. Rubin, No. S-97-0325 MLS PAN, 1997 WL 1037884, *4 (E.D. Cal. 1997).

VI. Supervisory Liability 

To the extent that plaintiff wishes to impose liability on defendant Alameida, the Director of

CDCandWarden Scribner, plaintiff is informed that supervisory personnel such as defendantsAlameida

and Scribner are generally not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory

of respondeatsuperior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal

link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v.

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Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.

denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To show a prima facie case of supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege

facts indicating that supervisory defendants either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of

constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or

"implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is

‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’" Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)

(internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal

pleading standards are broad, some facts must be alleged to support claims under Section 1983. See

Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 

VI. Conclusion

In summary, the Court RECOMMENDS that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety for

failure to state a claim. Plaintiff has advised that he does not wish to file an amended complaint and

therefore the Court recommends that this action be dismissed in its entirety.

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, the parties may file written

objections with the Court. The document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations." The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 3, 2005 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3c0hj8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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