Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02358/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02358-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FERDINAND REYNOLDS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA PAROLD BOARD, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2: 15-cv-2358 KJM KJN P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel, with a civil rights action pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On January 28, 2016, the court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint with leave to 

amend. (ECF No. 13.) Pending before the court is plaintiff’s amended complaint, containing two 

claims for relief. (ECF No. 16.) For the reasons discussed herein, the undersigned recommends 

that this action be dismissed.

Claim One

In the first claim for relief, plaintiff, who is African American, alleges that the Board of 

Parole Hearings (“BPH”) includes no African American members. Plaintiff alleges that the BPH 

denies parole to inmates based on their race and shows favoritism toward certain white prisoners 

whose crimes are far more serious than those committed by African American prisoners. Plaintiff 

raised the same claim in his original complaint. In the January 28, 2016 order, the undersigned 

dismissed this claim for the reasons stated herein:

Case 2:15-cv-02358-KJM-KJN Document 20 Filed 08/19/16 Page 1 of 6
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The only named defendant appears to be Jennifer Shaffer, identified 

by plaintiff as the “CEO-California Parole Board.” Plaintiff, who is 

African American, alleges that the State Parole Board includes no 

African American members even though 60% of the inmates who 

appear before the Parole Board are African American. Plaintiff 

alleges that the Parole Board denies parole to inmates based on their 

race and shows favoritism toward certain white prisoners whose 

crimes are far more serious than those committed by African 

American prisoners. By way of example, plaintiff cites James and 

Richard Schoenfeld, who are white, who were granted parole 

despite “committing the most barbaric, heinous, despicable and 

unforgiveable crimes ever committed in the history of the 

California Criminal Justice System!” Plaintiff alleges that James 

and Richard Schoenfeld kidnapped 26 school children riding a 

school bus, buried them and their bus driver underground, and left 

them to die if they did not receive a $5 million dollar ransom. No 

one died during this incident. The Schoenfelds spent 35 and 38 

years, respectively, incarcerated in state prison. 

Plaintiff alleges that on May 7, 2015, he (plaintiff) was found 

unsuitable for parole even though he met the criteria for being a low 

risk prisoner who did not pose a threat to public safety. Plaintiff 

alleges that he was found unsuitable based on his refusal to plead 

guilty to committing 8 armed robberies and 1 kidnap/robbery. 

Plaintiff alleges that he has now served 7 years beyond his 

minimum eligible parole date. 

As relief, plaintiff requests that the California Parole Board become 

integrated with 50% African Americans members from inner cities 

who do not have law enforcement backgrounds.

The undersigned construes the complaint to raise an equal 

protection claim. A plaintiff raising an equal protection claim in 

the parole context must demonstrate that he was treated differently 

from other similarly situated prisoners and that the Parole Board 

lacked a rational basis for its decision. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 

U.S. 263, 269–70 (1973); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 835 

(9th Cir.1991).

Plaintiff appears to argue that he is similarly situated to James and 

Richard Schoenfeld, who were granted parole. However, plaintiff 

has not demonstrated that he is actually similarly situated to the 

Schoenfelds. Plaintiff does not allege for how long he has been 

incarcerated. Plaintiff also provides no information regarding the 

circumstances of the offenses for which he was convicted. Plaintiff 

provides no information from which the undersigned may compare 

his record to that of the Schoenfelds. For these reasons, the 

undersigned finds that plaintiff has failed to state a potentially 

colorable Equal Protection claim. Accordingly, plaintiff’s 

complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. 

(ECF No. 13 at 3-4.)

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In the amended complaint, plaintiff again compares his own case to that of the 

Schoenfelds. Plaintiff clarifies that on or around 1984, he was convicted of California Penal 

Code section 209 (kidnapping for ransom) and eight counts of robbery. Plaintiff was sentenced to 

twenty-five years for the robbery convictions and seven years to life for the kidnapping 

conviction. Plaintiff alleges that he has been incarcerated in prison for the past thirty-two years.

In the amended complaint, plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts from which the 

undersigned may compare his record to that of the Shoenfelds. While plaintiff has clarified the 

length of his incarceration, he has not described the circumstances of his offenses. Plaintiff has 

also provided no information regarding his own prison record, and the prison record of the 

Schoenfelds, which is relevant to his Equal Protection claim.

Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim is based on a superficial comparison of his case to the 

Shoenfelds’ cases. This superficial comparison does not state a potentially colorable Equal 

Protection claim. Because it does not appear that plaintiff can cure these pleading defects, the 

undersigned recommends that this claim be dismissed.

Claim Two

In his second claim, plaintiff alleges that on or around December 15, 2008, Marsy’s Law 

came into effect. Marsy’s Law significantly increased the amount of time allowable between a 

prisoner's denial of parole and the prisoner's next parole hearing. Plaintiff alleges that in In Re 

Rutherford, a class action filed in state court, the BPH agreed to apply the rules that existed prior 

to the enactment of Marsy’s Law to all parole suitability hearings that were due to be held prior to 

the implementation of Marsy’s Law, but were either postponed or delayed for some reason that 

was not the prisoner’s fault.

Plaintiff alleges that his initial parole suitability hearing, held March 11, 2009, was 

miscalculated to occur after the implementation of Marsy’s Law. Plaintiff alleges that following 

his initial parole suitability hearing, the BPH wrongly applied Marsy’s law and found plaintiff 

unsuitable for parole for fifteen years. Plaintiff alleges that in 2015, the BPH realized that it had 

wrongly applied Marsy’s law in calculating the date of his first subsequent suitability hearing. 

The BPH then recalculated the date of his first subsequent parole suitability hearing for five 

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years. 

Attached as an exhibit to the amended complaint is a memorandum dated February 24, 

2015, apparently prepared by the BPH, modifying the date of plaintiff’s first subsequent parole 

hearing from fifteen years to five years, pursuant to Rutherford. This memorandum states that 

plaintiff’s first subsequent parole suitability hearing was to be scheduled on the next available 

calendar. The undersigned observes that in the original complaint, plaintiff alleges that his first 

subsequent parole suitability hearing was held in May 2015, following which he was found 

unsuitable for parole for ten years. (See ECF No. 5 at 5.) 

Plaintiff goes on to argue that the BPH misapplied Rutherford when it calculated his first 

subsequent suitability hearing to be due in five years. Plaintiff argues that, pursuant to the 

agreement in Rutherford, subsequent parole hearings for non-murder cases were to be modified to 

one to two years. Pursuant to the agreement in Rutherford, subsequent parole hearings for 

murders cases were to be modified to one to five years. Plaintiff argues that his modified five 

year denial violated Rutherford because plaintiff was not convicted of murder. 

In summary, plaintiff is alleging that following his delayed initial parole suitability 

hearing in 2009, he should have received his first subsequent suitability hearing in one to two 

year, rather than six years later in 2015. 

At the outset, the undersigned finds that plaintiff’s claims challenging the delay in his first 

subsequent suitability hearing are properly brought in this civil rights action. A finding in 

plaintiff’s favor would not necessarily result in plaintiff’s “speedier release.” See Skinner v. 

Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 525 (2011) (“Where the prisoner’s claim would ‘not necessarily spell 

speedier release,’ however, suit may be brought under § 1983.”)

To state a potentially colorable due process claim based on the alleged delay, plaintiff 

must allege that the delay was prejudicial. See Fausia v. Dexter, 2008 WL 3891134 at *5 (C.D. 

Cal. 2008) (in habeas action, petitioner alleging that delay in suitability hearing violated his right 

to due process must demonstrate prejudice); citing United States v. Santana, 526 F.3d 1257, 1260 

(9th Cir. 2008); Meador v. Knowles, 990 F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 1993); Camacho v. White, 918 

F.2d 74, 79 (9th Cir. 1990); Hopper v. United States Parole Comm'n, 702 F.2d 842, 845 (9th Cir.

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1983); Biggs v. California, 2006 WL 2621057, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Sept.12, 2006); William v. 

Board of Prison Terms, 2006 WL 463128, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Feb.24, 2006), adopted, 2006 WL 

845594 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2006). 

Assuming that the BPH unreasonably delayed in recalculating the date of plaintiff’s first 

subsequent suitability hearing, and that the BPH should have ordered this hearing to be held in 

one to two years rather than five years, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he suffered any 

prejudice as a result of these delays. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he would have been 

released sooner from prison, as he is still incarcerated. As discussed above, following his first 

subsequent suitability hearing in May 2015, plaintiff was found ineligible for parole for ten years. 

Plaintiff has also pled no facts suggesting that the delay affected the May 2015 decision by the 

BPH finding plaintiff unsuitable for parole. Moreover, 

[e]ven if, at some future hearing, the BPH were to find [plaintiff] 

suitable for parole, [plaintiff’s] ultimate release date would not be 

fixed by reference to the hearing date, but rather would be a product 

of the BPH's discretion, taking into account the “matrix” of 

suggested base terms set forth in state prison regulations, 

circumstances in aggravation and mitigation, and adjustments for 

enhancements or other offenses, and reduced by any postconviction 

credit awarded by the BPH. See Cal.Code Regs., tit. 15, §§ 2403-

2411.

Fausia v. Dexter, 2008 WL 3891134 at *5.

Based on these circumstances, plaintiff has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by 

the delay in his receipt of his first subsequent parole suitability hearing. Accordingly, this claim 

should be dismissed. 

To the extent plaintiff alleges that the delay in his receipt of his first subsequent parole 

hearing violated state law, the undersigned recommends that the court decline to exercise 

jurisdiction over this state law claim as no federal claims remain. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 

Accordingly, IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections 

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

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“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that 

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: August 19, 2016

Rey2358.56

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