Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_90-cv-00520/USCOURTS-caed-2_90-cv-00520-1357/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

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17 Defendants have moved to stay this court’s June 25, 2024 and June 27, 2024 orders, ECF 

18 Nos. 8291, 8299, requiring defendants to deposit fines into the Court’s Registry and certain 

19 defendants to certify monthly that they have reviewed defendants’ monthly mental health staffing 

20 vacancy report and “include a summary of the steps they have taken in the preceding month to 

21 address mental health understaffing in the CDCR prisons.” June 25, 2024 Order at 72, ECF No. 

22 8291. Plaintiffs oppose the motion, ECF Nos. 8320, 8334, and defendants have replied, ECF 

23 Nos. 8324, 8336. The court denies the motion, as explained below. 

24 I. BACKGROUND 

25 On June 25, 2024, this court found three defendants in contempt of court for 

26 noncompliance with this court’s October 10, 2017 order requiring remediation of ongoing mental 

27 health understaffing in the prisons of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 

28 (CDCR). The three defendants are CDCR Secretary Jeff Macomber, Undersecretary for Health 

RALPH COLEMAN, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

GAVIN NEWSOM, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 90-0520 KJM DB 

ORDER 

Case 2:90-cv-00520-KJM-SCR Document 8339 Filed 07/24/24 Page 1 of 13
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Care Services for CDCR Diana Toche, D.D.S., and Deputy Director of the Statewide Mental 

Health Program for CDCR Amar Mehta, M.D. See generally June 25, 2024 Order, ECF No. 

8291. The court also ordered defendants to deposit into the Court’s Registry one hundred eleven 

million nine hundred thirty-nine thousand two hundred forty-four dollars ($111,939,244.00) 

within thirty days from the date the order was filed and thereafter to deposit additional 

accumulated fines on a monthly basis. Id. at 72. The court clarified that the requirements of the 

October 10, 2017 order apply to all defendants in this action, including the other three named 

defendants, California Governor Gavin Newsom, Director of California Department of State 

Hospitals (DSH) Stephanie Clendenin, and Director of the California Department of Finance Joe 

Stephenshaw. The court required these defendants to “forthwith and continuing until further

order of the court take all steps within their respective authority to enable CDCR to come into 

complete compliance with the staffing ratios in [CDCR]’s 2009 Staffing Plan and the maximum 

ten percent vacancy rate required by the court’s June 13, 2002 order.” Id. The court required 

defendants Newsom, Clendenin, and Stephenshaw to certify monthly that they have reviewed 

defendants’ monthly mental health staffing vacancy report and “include a summary of the steps 

they have taken in the preceding month to address mental health understaffing in the CDCR 

prisons.” Id.

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 Within hours on the same day the court issued its order, June 25, 2024, defendants 

filed a notice of appeal from the order. ECF No. 8293. 

On June 27, 2024, the court granted defendants’ request for clarification of aspects of the 

June 25, 2024 order and to extend the time for filing of monthly deposits and the required 

certifications to “ten days from the filing of each monthly staffing report.” June 27, 2024 Order, 

ECF No. 8299. On June 28, 2024, defendants filed an amended notice of appeal, adding the 

23 June 27, 2024 order to their appeal. ECF No. 8302. 

24 ///// 

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 The six named defendants in this action are all successor defendants under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 25. As the court has explained, “the contempt findings reflect the failure of 

CDCR defendants in these roles to comply with the court’s orders over many years.” July 12, 

2024 Order at 1 n.1, ECF No. 8330. Similarly, defendants Newsom, Clendenin, and Stephenshaw 

also carry the obligations imposed on their predecessors by this court’s orders. 

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Defendants filed the pending motion to stay, ECF No. 8311-1, on July 2, 2024. See July 

2, 2024 Minute Order, ECF No. 8313. That same day, the court set a briefing schedule on the 

motion to stay and deferred ruling on certain alternative requests in the motion. Id. On July 5, 

2024, the parties filed a stipulation and proposed order for modification and stay of the June 25, 

2024 and June 27, 2024 orders. ECF No. 8319. On July 8, 2024, the court set a status conference 

for July 10, 2024 to discuss the July 5, 2024 stipulation and extended the deadline for defendants 

to deposit fines that accumulated by May 2024 to July 12, 2024. July 8, 2024 Minute Order, ECF 

No. 8321. On the same day, defendants filed the first set of required monthly certifications 

following the June 2024 monthly vacancy report. ECF No. 8322. The United States Court of 

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit temporarily stayed the latter monthly certification requirement until 

July 12, 2024, shortly after this court already had extended the deadline. ECF No. 8323. 

The court held the status conference to review the parties’ stipulation on July 10, 2024. 

ECF No. 8326. On July 12, 2024, taking account of its discussion with the parties, the court 

further extended the deadline for deposit of the fines accumulated by May 2024 to July 26, 2024 

and also signaled that going forward defendant Clendenin would be relieved of her obligation to 

file the certifications and summaries required by the June 25, 2024 order. July 12, 2024 Minute 

Order, ECF No. 8328. Also on July 12, 2024, the court issued an order approving the parties’ 

stipulation in part and otherwise disapproving the stipulation. Specifically, the court set a further 

briefing schedule on defendants’ motion to stay, confirmed the extended deadline for deposit of 

the fines that accumulated by May 2024, exempted Director Clendenin from the certification 

requirement, approved the parties’ agreement to replace defendant Newsom’s monthly 

certification requirement with that of a senior official in his office, and approved the parties’ 

agreement that the certification requirement would remain in place unless or until stayed by this 

court. July 12, 2024 Order, ECF No. 8329. 

On July 15, 2024 and July 17, 2024, the parties filed the briefing required by the July 12, 

26 2024 order. ECF No. 8334 (Plaintiffs’ Opposition), ECF No. 8336 (Defendants’ Reply). 

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1 II. BRIEFING OF THE PARTIES

2 A. Defendants’ Motion

3 In support of their motion to stay, defendants contend they have a “substantial case for 

4 relief on the merits” of their challenge to the court’s contempt findings. They contend: 

5  The record shows “that both before and after the evidentiary hearing, Defendants

6 have taken all reasonable steps to ameliorate the staffing issues CDCR faces”;

7  The court “did not address unrebutted evidence in the record that documentation

8 and other requirements imposed by this case have contributed to the staffing

9 challenges,” which is relevant to “assessing the reasonableness of Defendants’

10 actions”;

11  “[C]hanging worker expectations and nationwide staffing shortages ... currently

12 make staffing to the required . . . fill rate impossible within Defendants’ legal

13 authority” and therefore fines are “unnecessary” to coerce compliance;

14  Because the fines will not have the desired coercive effect, the court is punishing

15 defendants;

16  Defendants’ decision to conform their conduct to state law, rather than requesting

17 waivers of state law to allow compliance with the Eighth Amendment, is neither

18 unreasonable nor “a suitable basis for contempt”;

19  Defendants have “pursued all avenues within their legal authority, and the scope

20 and pace of developing and implementing those efforts are reasonable within the

21 context of this litigation and the complex system that is CDCR’s mental health

22 system”;

23  The certification should be stayed because defendants are unaware of any federal

24 court that has ordered a Governor to provide this type of certification; and

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1  The certification order “arguably requires” the Governor and other state officials to

2 disclose privileged information.

ECF No. 8311-1 at 8-10.2 3 

4 Defendants also contend they will suffer “irreparable harm” in the absence of a stay. They 

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• The certification requirement “intrudes on state sovereignty and the separation of

powers between the executive and judicial branches,” particularly as it applies to

the Governor and “directs how he should use his time and requires [him] to waive

executive and deliberative process privileges”; and

• Requiring the deposit and expenditure of fines “may negatively impact the State’s

11 ability to provide necessary services to its citizens.”

12 Id. at 11. Defendants rely on the foregoing to contend the balance of equities and the public 

13 interest weigh in their favor. Id. Defendants also contend the court is “circumvent[ing] the 

14 [state’s] legislative process” by “commandeering State tax dollars” and “unilaterally deciding” 

15 how the fines should be spent. Id. at 11-12. Defendants contend that “[b]ecause the contempt 

16 proceedings were held without a jury, and because the Court – with Article III life tenure – is 

17 insulated from the political process, the public interest cuts in favor of having the Court’s orders 

affecting hundreds of millions of dollars in tax revenue stayed pending review.” Id.

3 18 Defendants 

19 also ask the court to stay the supersedeas bond requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. 

20 62(b). Id. at 12-14. 

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 Citations to page numbers in documents filed in the Court’s Electronic Case Filing 

(ECF) system are to the page numbers assigned by ECF and located in the upper right hand 

corner of each page. 

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 Defendants did not request a jury for the contempt proceedings, though they stated they 

did not “waive their right to criminal procedural protections including that any contempt be tried 

to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” ECF No. 7961 at 12 n.2. Defendants’ bald 

assertion that the fines will not coerce their compliance does not convert the fines to punitive 

fines requiring criminal procedural protections; defendants’ argument here is grounded in their 

continued assertion that compliance with the staffing orders cannot be achieved given the current 

national shortages among mental health professionals hiring. The court has rejected this 

impossibility defense. See ECF No. 8291 at 63-64. 

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1 B. Plaintiffs’ Opposition 

2 Plaintiffs oppose defendants’ stay request as to the certification requirements, contending: 

3  The “asserted harm” to state sovereignty and separation of powers asserted by

4 defendants “is not irreparable as a matter of law”;

5  Defendants’ assertion that the court’s certification requirement requires disclosure

6 of privileged information is speculative and not supported by the record; and

7  Unless and until the court were to require disclosure of privileged information,

8 “Defendants will not suffer any actual harm.”

9 ECF No. 8334 at 3-6. Plaintiffs also dispute defendants’ contention that the certification 

10 requirement is “unprecedented,” pointing to several court orders requiring defendants to certify 

11 other relevant matters in this action. Id. at 9-10. Plaintiffs contend the court’s order is “entirely 

12 reasonable” because it fills “gaping holes in the record regarding what all available reasonable 

13 steps actually are” and that the order is, as the court explained, “necessary to sharpen the focus 

14 and magnify defendants’ sense of urgency to finally achieve a lasting remedy for chronic mental 

15 health understaffing in the state’s prison system.” Id. at 10 (quoting ECF No. 8291 at 65). 

16 Similarly, plaintiffs oppose the request to stay payment of fines, relying on the “bedrock 

17 principle that ‘monetary injury is not normally considered irreparable.’” Id. at 6 (quoting Doe #1 

18 v. Trump, 957 F.3d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 2020)). Plaintiffs also contend defendants have provided

19 no evidence to support their assertion that payment of the fines “may negatively impact the

20 State’s ability to provide necessary services,” id. at 6 (quoting ECF No. 8311-1 at 11). Plaintiffs

21 argue the fines “are calculated based on the amounts already appropriated for mental health

22 staffing but not spent due to Defendants’ non-compliance with the required staffing levels” and

23 they point to information provided by defendants that the California Legislature provided for

24 payment of the fines in the 2024 Budget Act. Id.

25 Plaintiffs argue defendants are “extraordinarily unlikely” to prevail on the merits of their 

26 appeal because it is undisputed that defendants have not complied with sufficiently definite and 

27 specific orders of this court. Id. at 7. Plaintiffs contend defendants will not be able to show the 

28 ///// 

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1 court abused its discretion in concluding that compliance with the staffing order is possible and 

2 that defendants have not taken all reasonable steps to comply. Id. at 7-8. 

3 Plaintiffs contend the harm asserted by defendants is “far outweighed” by the harm to the 

4 plaintiff class caused by ongoing mental health understaffing. Id. at 11. Plaintiffs also contend 

5 defendants’ assertion that the public interest lies with avoiding payment of the fines is without 

6 merit particularly where, as here, the state Legislature has already allocated the funds to pay the 

7 fines. Id. at 12. Plaintiffs further contend defendants have not even addressed the public interest 

8 that lies with fulfillment of their constitutional obligations to the plaintiff class and that “[t]he 

9 public indisputably has a strong interest in judicial enforcement of Constitutional rights.” Id. 

10 Plaintiffs “do not oppose Defendants’ request to waive the bond requirement.” Id. 

11 C. Defendants’ Reply

12 Defendants reiterate in summary fashion the main arguments in their motion. ECF No. 

13 8336 at 2-6. Defendants also contend plaintiffs “do not face any immediate harm” because 

14 defendants will keep working on filling staffing vacancies and that “[t]he public interest is best 

15 advanced by ensuring public funds are spent in a way that has been approved by the State 

16 democratically elected legislature rather than by the court.” Id. at 5-6. 

17 III. LEGAL STANDARDS

18 “A request for a stay pending appeal is committed to the exercise of judicial discretion.”

19 Doe # 1 v. Trump, 957 F.3d 1050, 1058 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Virginian Ry. Co. v. United States, 

20 272 U.S. 658, 672 (1926)). The court considers four factors in weighing whether to stay its 

21 orders pending appeal: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is 

22 likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; 

23 (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the

24 proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009)

25 (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)). “The first two factors . . . are the most

26 critical.” Id. at 434. The court reaches the third and fourth factors “only ‘[o]nce an applicant

27 satisfies the first two factors.’” Al Otro Lado v. Wolf, 952 F.3d 999, 1007 (9th Cir.

28 2020) (quoting Nken, 556 U.S. at 434-35). Moreover, if the moving party does not make “a

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1 certain threshold showing regarding irreparable harm . . . then a stay may not issue, regardless of 

2 the [moving party]’s proof regarding the other stay factors.” Doe #1, 957 F.3d at 1058 (quoting 

3 Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)). The threshold showing 

4 required is that “irreparable injury is likely to occur during the period before the appeal is 

5 decided.” Id. at 1059. 

6 IV. DISCUSSION

7 A. Irreparable Harm

8 Defendants assert the following as allegedly irreparable harms they will suffer if the court 

9 does not stay its orders: (1) intrusion “on state sovereignty and the separation of powers between 

10 the executive and judicial branches” including by requiring waiver of available privileges; and 

11 (2) court-ordered spending to increase mental health staffing “is necessarily money that the State

12 cannot spend on other priorities” that it may not be able to recoup if defendants are successful in

13 their appeal. ECF No. 8311-1 at 11. Neither constitutes cognizable irreparable harm.

14 1. Intrusion on State Sovereignty and Separation of Powers Between

15 Executive and Judicial Branches

16 Defendants contend the certification requirement “intrudes on state sovereignty and the 

17 separation of powers between the executive and judicial branches . . . especially . . . as this 

18 portion of the order is applied to the Governor insofar as it directs how [the Governor] should use 

19 his time and requires [him] to waive executive and deliberative process privileges by disclosing 

the steps taken to address staffing.” ECF No. 8311-1 at 11.4 20 Defendants provide no authority to 

21 support their sweeping and conclusory assertion that the court’s certification requirement intrudes 

22 on state sovereignty and the separation of powers between the executive and judicial branches of 

23 government, and the court has located none. 

24 The court’s order decidedly does not require defendants to waive privileges to which they 

25 are otherwise lawfully entitled. It requires only that defendants certify they are staying informed 

26 of fundamental data points relevant to achievement of the required staffing remedy – steps they 

4

 It is unclear from defendants’ motion whether they also seek a stay of the certification 

requirement as it applies to defendant Stephenshaw. Defendants did not previously request that 

he be relieved of the certification obligation. 

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1 are obligated to take as defendants in this action – and to summarize steps they have taken to 

2 advance the remedy. Defendants have already filed one set of certifications without invoking any 

3 privilege, demonstrating compliance with the court’s order does not require them to waive 

4 available privileges. 

5 To the extent the required summary of steps taken during the preceding month would give 

6 rise to one or more claims of privilege, the court’s orders do not prevent defendants from 

7 asserting those privileges. Defendants’ assertion that “[u]nder the Court’s June 25 and 27, 2024 

8 orders, the state officials may be forced to choose between waiving applicable privileges or being 

9 held in contempt for failing to comply with the certification requirement” is hyperbolic and 

10 speculative at best. The standards applicable to assertion of the deliberative process privilege 

11 were thoroughly discussed by Magistrate Judge Moulds in several orders he issued during the 

12 three-judge court proceedings in this action and in the Plata class action in the Northern District 

of California.5 13 See generally Sept. 10, 2008 Order; see also Sept. 12, 2008 Order, ECF No. 3028 

14 (three judge court order denying motion for reconsideration of September 10, 2008 order). Now, 

15 as then, the deliberative process privilege is not properly invoked by the kind of blanket and 

16 sweeping assertions defendants make in their motion to stay. 

17 Defendants have not shown that the court’s June 25, 2024 and June 27, 2024 orders 

18 require waiver of privileges otherwise available to them. Absent this showing, defendants have 

19 not and cannot demonstrate they face irreparable harm from the certification requirement. 

20 2. Deposit of Fines 

21 Defendants also argue they are threatened with irreparable harm by the court’s orders 

22 requiring them to deposit accumulated fines in light of the “foreshadow[ed] additional orders that 

23 will direct how the fines collected shall be spent,” because these additional orders “may 

24 negatively impact the State’s ability to provide necessary services to its citizens.” ECF No. 8311-

25 1 at 11. Defendants’ assertion does not meet the “threshold showing” of irreparable harm 

26 ///// 

5

 Now known as Plata v. Newsom, Case No. C01-1351 JST (N.D. Cal.). 

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1 required to support issuance of a stay, namely, that “irreparable injury is likely to occur during the 

2 period before the appeal is decided.” Doe # 1, 957 F.3d at 1059. 

3 First, defendants assert only that the court’s orders “may” have a negative impact on the 

4 provision of State services, not that the orders are “likely” to have that impact or that such 

5 speculative impacts would occur before their appeal is resolved. 

6 Second, defendants concede the California Legislature has “accounted for the fines in the 

7 recently-enacted 2024 Budget Act” through the following provision in the legislation signed by 

8 the Governor: 

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10 Upon order of the Department of Finance, the Controller shall issue payment to the 

11 United States District Court for the Eastern District of California for any fines 

12 related to staffing vacancies ordered in Coleman v. Newsom. Payment shall be made 

13 from the General Fund. The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation shall 

14 provide quarterly reports to the Joint Legislative Budget Committee on any fines 

15 paid to the court pursuant to this provision. Senate Bill No. 108, sec. 201 (2024) 

16 ECF No. 8311-1 at 13 (quoting Provision 13 of Item 5225-002-0001 of Section 2.00 of the 

17 Budget Act of 2024). 

18 Finally, the court has made clear that, pending its separate consideration of appointment of 

19 a temporary receiver, the accumulated fines will be spent “to remedy the ongoing mental health 

20 understaffing in the CDCR units covered by the 2009 Staffing Plan” and that proposals for 

21 expenditures of fines will come from the parties, supervised by the Special Master. July 12, 2004 

22 Order at 15, ECF No. 8330. Defendants’ suggestion that the court intends to arrogate to itself 

23 sole decision-making regarding expenditure of the funds generated through accumulated fines, 

24 ruling by fiat, is a gross mischaracterization. And fundamentally, defendants cannot dispute they 

25 are required to remedy the ongoing constitutional violation or that they must expend state funds to 

26 do so. 

27 3. Conclusion—Irreparable Harm 

28 For the reasons discussed above, defendants have not made an adequate showing of 

29 irreparable harm to support their motion to stay. 

30 ///// 

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B. Likelihood of Success on Merits of Appeal

Because defendants have not made the requisite threshold showing of irreparable harm, the court 

“may not issue” the requested stay. Doe #1, 957 F.3d at 1058 (quoting Leiva-Perez, 

640 F.3d at 965). In an abundance of caution, the court exercises its discretion to review the 

second “most critical” factor, Nken, 556 U.S. at 434, and finds defendants have failed to make the

required “strong” showing they are likely to succeed on the merits of their appeal.

There is no dispute the court’s October 10, 2017 order “is sufficiently specific and definite 

8 as to its terms to support enforcement.” ECF No. 8291 at 5. There is no dispute defendants have 

9 not “actually complied in full with the October 10, 2017 order.” Id. Defendants simply have not 

10 made any showing that the court abused its discretion in finding them in civil contempt or that 

11 there are “clear errors” in the court’s factual findings, let alone the “strong” showing that is 

12 required. Cf. F.T.C. v. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir. 1999). Defendants’ 

13 attempt to recast their impossibility defense in arguing that the fines imposed will have no 

14 coercive effect, see ECF No. 8335 at 5, does not show the court’s rejection of that impossibility 

15 defense was erroneous Defendants’ reliance on the Special Master’s finding twenty-five years 

16 ago that “there are no clear . . . solutions to the defendants’ vacancies problem,” ECF No. 8336 at 

17 5 (quoting ECF No. 1032), certainly does not show compliance with the court’s order is 

18 impossible today and continues to ignore several options available to them. See, e.g., ECF No. 

19 5711 at 25-26 (clustering of class members), 27 (higher salaries, population reduction). 

20 Defendants have not made a sufficient showing they are likely to succeed on the merits of 

21 their appeal to support their motion to stay. 

22 C. Substantial Injury/Public Interest

23 Defendants have not made a sufficient showing of irreparable harm or likelihood of 

24 success on the merits to support their motion to stay. Accordingly, the court does not reach the 

25 remaining factors. See Al Otro Lado, 952 F.3d at 1007 (quoting Nken at 434-35). 

26 D. Conclusion—Stay Pending Appeal

27 For all the foregoing reasons, defendants’ July 2, 2024 motion to stay is DENIED. 

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1 V. SUPERSEDEAS BOND 

2 Defendants ask the court to waive the supersedeas bond requirement of Federal Rule of 

3 Civil Procedure 62(b). ECF No. 8311-1 at 12. Plaintiffs do not oppose this request in the event 

4 the court stays its order. ECF No. 8320 at 10. 

5 “Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 62([b]), an appellant may obtain a stay as a matter of right by 

6 posting a bond acceptable to the court.” Matter of Combined Metals Reduction Co., 557 F.2d 

7 179, 193 (9th Cir. 1977). Where, as here, the party seeking a stay does not post a supersedeas 

8 bond and instead requests waiver of the bond requirement, the decision whether to grant or deny a 

9 stay is “a matter strictly within the judge’s discretion.” Id.; see also Am. Civ. Liberties Union of 

10 Nev. v. Masto, 670 F.3d 1046, 1066 (9th Cir. 2012) (same). 

11 “A party seeking a departure from the normal requirement of a full security supersedeas 

12 bond bears the burden of showing reasons for such a departure.” Lewis v. Cty. of San Diego, No. 

13 13-CV-02818-H-JMA, 2018 WL 1071704, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2018) (citations omitted). 

14 Courts consider several factors, including “(1) the complexity of the collection process; (2) the 

15 amount of time required to obtain a judgment after it is affirmed on appeal; (3) the degree of 

16 confidence that the district court has in the availability of funds to pay the judgment; (4) whether 

17 the defendant’s ability to pay the judgment is so plain that the cost of a bond would be a waste of 

18 money; and (5) whether the defendant is in such a precarious financial situation that the 

19 requirement to post a bond would place other creditors of the defendant in an insecure position.” 

20 Hardesty v. Sacramento Metro. Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., No. 10-02414, 2019 WL 2715616, at *4 

21 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2019) (quoting Lewis, 2018 WL 1071704, at *2). 

22 Defendants contend they “can promptly pay the full amount of the contempt fine once the 

23 appeal is resolved,” pointing to language in the recently signed Budget Act of 2024, which 

24 requires the Controller of the State of California to issue payment of “any fines related to staffing 

25 vacancies ordered” in this case “[u]pon order of the Department of Finance.” ECF No. 8311-1 at 

26 13 (quoting Provision 13 of Item 5225-002-0001 of Section 2.00 of the Budget Act of 2024). 

27 Defendants also contend federal law precludes the state from filing bankruptcy, so “[a] bond 

28 pending appeal is therefore unnecessary because there is no risk the State could declare 

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1 bankruptcy to evade or reduce its obligation, and the cost of obtaining a bond would further 

2 deplete already scarce State resources.” Id. at 13-14. 

3 It is unclear whether these factors and arguments are relevant, as the court has already 

4 determined defendants are not entitled to a stay under the traditional four-factor test described in 

5 Nken, 556 U.S. at 426. Because defendants have requested a waiver of the supersedeas bond 

6 instead of posting one, as noted, the question of the propriety of a stay is “strictly within [this 

7 court]’s discretion.” Matter of Combined Metals Reduction Co., 557 F.2d at 193. Where, as here, 

8 defendants have not made the showing required by Nken, it is not at all clear the court can 

9 exercise its discretion to waive the supersedeas bond requirement, because in that circumstance 

10 defendants would in effect have obtained an unsecured stay without showing any likelihood of 

11 irreparable harm or success on the merits, contrary to Nken. The court need not dwell on this 

12 issue, however, as defendants have not presented sufficient evidence that the fines will be paid 

13 notwithstanding “scarce State resources” to give this court the required “degree of confidence” 

14 necessary to support waiver of the bond requirement, nor have they presented any evidence of 

15 their costs associated with obtaining a bond. Plaintiffs’ non-opposition to the waiver is 

16 conditioned on the court otherwise deciding to grant a stay; for the reasons explained in this 

17 order, under a straightforward traditional analysis the motion for stay is without merit. 

18 For all these reasons, the court declines to waive the supersedeas bond requirement. This 

19 part of defendants’ motion is DENIED without prejudice to its renewal for approval of a 

20 supersedeas bond in a particular amount with full justification, but without any further delays. 

21 Any renewal of the motion is of course subject to full compliance with Federal Rule of Civil 

22 Procedure 11. 

23 VI. CONCLUSION 

24 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants’ July 2, 2024 

25 motion to stay and for waiver of supersedeas bond, ECF No. 8311-1, is DENIED. 

26 DATED: July 24, 2024. 

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