Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_06-cv-00667/USCOURTS-alsd-2_06-cv-00667-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federa

---

1 Petitioner is in the actual and present physical custody of David O. Streiff,

Warden of the Perry County Correctional Center in Uniontown, Alabama. See Rumsfeld v.

Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 447, 124 S.Ct. 2711, 2724, 159 L.Ed.2d 513 (2004) (“Whenever a § 2241

habeas petitioner seeks to challenge his present physical custody within the United States, he

should name his warden as respondent and file the petition in the district of confinement.”).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

JOEL BECKFORD, :

Petitioner, :

vs. : CA 06-0667-WS-C

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND :

SECURITY, et al.,

:

Respondents.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 Joel Beckford, a native and citizen of Jamaica ordered removed from

the United States and presently being detained by the United States

Department of Homeland Security, has petitioned this Court for habeas relief

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.1

 This matter has been referred to the

undersigned for entry of a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.1(c). It is recommended that the instant

petition be dismissed, without prejudice to being filed at a later date, because

Beckford has prematurely filed the present attack upon his post-removalCase 2:06-cv-00667-WS-C Document 15 Filed 02/07/07 Page 1 of 15
2

period detention.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Beckford is a native and citizen of Jamaica who entered the

United States on August 6, 1984 as a lawful permanent resident. (Doc. 12,

Exhibit A to Declaration of Dennis E. Rau, Jr.)

2. The Department of Homeland Security placed Beckford into

removal proceedings by the issuance of a Notice to Appear dated August 8,

2005. (Id.) Petitioner was notified that his history of drug-related convictions

made him deportable. (See id.)

3. On October 6, 2005, Immigration Judge John B. Reid ordered

Beckford removed from the United States and returned to his native Jamaica.

(Doc. 12, Exhibit B to Rau declar.) 

4. Beckford timely appealed the Immigration Judge’s October 6,

2005 decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals. (Doc. 12, Exhibit C to

Rau declar.) On March 7, 2006, the Board of Immigration Appeals issued its

decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s determination and dismissing the

appeal. (Id.)

The respondent is a native and citizen of Jamaica who

was found removable by the Immigration Judge on the

aggravated felony and controlled substance charges. The

charges against the respondent stemmed from three criminal

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3

convictions in New York: (1) criminal sale of marijuana in the

4th degree, entered against the respondent on October 9, 1999,

(2) criminal possession of marijuana in the 5th degree, entered

on February 7, 2000, and (3) criminal sale of marijuana in the

4th degree, entered against the respondent on June 13, 2000. See

N.Y. Penal §§ 221.10, 221.40 (West 2000). All three crimes

were prosecuted as state misdemeanors against the respondent.

The respondent has challenged the findings and order of

the Immigration Judge. We note that the respondent indicated in

his Notice of Appeal (“NOA”) that a separate written brief or

statement would be filed, but none has been filed to date. Cf. 8

C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E) (2006). However, we take from the

respondent’s NOA that he contends the Immigration Judge

erroneously found him removable as an aggravated felon, which

would statutorily bar him from cancellation of removal for

permanent residents. See section 240A(a) of the Immigration

and Nationality Act (“Act”), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). Specifically,

the respondent argues that he is not removable as an aggravated

felon because he was only convicted of misdemeanor controlled

substance offenses, none of which contains a drug trafficking

element, and none of which “requires remuneration.” We

observe at the outset that section 221.40 criminalizes the “sale”

of marijuana, while specifically excepting those sales covered

under section 221.35 of the New York Penal Code. Section

221.35, however, only punishes those sales of marijuana in a

weight of under two grams, and without any consideration for

such a sale. Therefore, a person could be convicted under

section 221.40 for a sale of marijuana in an amount greater than

two grams, without consideration. That would render the

respondent’s convictions punishable as mere “possession”

offenses under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §

844(a), rather than as explicitly “trafficking” offenses.

Regardless of whether the respondent’s multiple

convictions were for “sales” or merely possession offenses, we

affirm the Immigration Judge’s decision finding the respondent

removable as charged, but on different grounds. The

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Immigration Judge noted that the respondent’s multiple

misdemeanor drug convictions could result in a conviction for

an aggravated felony since 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) provides that a

second or subsequent drug possession offense is punishable at

a felony level if the second or subsequent offense is committed

after a prior drug conviction has become final (I.J. at 8-9). See

also United States v. Simpson, 319 F.3d 81, 85-86 (2d Cir.

2002).

The problem with the Immigration Judge’s reliance on

United States v. Simpson, supra, is that that case did not

repudiate that circuit’s bifurcated approach to the interpretation

of the term “drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c)

of title 18)” in the immigration and criminal law contexts as

regards the classification of State drug offenses (at issue here).

In the former arena, the Second Circuit has held (see Aguirre v.

INS, 79 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 1996)), that it will follow the Board’s

original “hypothetical felony” approach, announced in Matter of

Davis, 20 I&N Dec. 536 (BIA 1992), in which a State drug

offense is a “drug trafficking crime,” and hence an aggravated

felony, only if the drug offense would be punishable as a felony

under federal law. Notably, the two other circuits that adhere to

the Second Circuit’s bifurcated approach, the Third and the

Ninth, have each held that a second or subsequent drug

possession offense is not punishable as a federal felony (and

thus is not a “drug trafficking crime” aggravated felony), albeit

for different reasons. The Second Circuit has not yet opined on

this question in the immigration context, but given the results in

the two sister circuits that follow its approach, it appears at least

possible, if not indeed likely, that the Second Circuit would

reach a similar conclusion. On the other hand, for criminal law

purposes the Second Circuit follows the approach taken by the

majority of circuits (see, collecting the cases, United States v.

Palacios-Suarez, 418 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2005), aligning itself

with the minority), and the one we have lately indicated we

would follow in the absence of contrary controlling precedent,

see Matter of Yanez, 23 I&N Dec. 390 (BIA 2002) (overruling

Matter of Davis, supra), in which a State drug offense is deemed

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a “drug trafficking crime” and therefore an aggravated felony if

it is punished as a felony under either State or federal law. See

United States v. Pornes-Garcia, 171 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 1999).

None of the respondent’s convictions was a state felony; all are

misdemeanors. Nevertheless, the courts that follow this

approach appear uniformly to treat a second or subsequent drug

possession offense as a federal felony given the enhanced

punishment provisions in 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) alluded to earlier.

See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez-Villalobos, 412 F.3d 572 (5th

Cir. 2005); Amaral v. INS, 977 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1992). This also

accords, as the Immigration Judge noted, with how the Second

Circuit itself, in the criminal context, has interpreted the term

“drug trafficking crime.” United States v. Simpson, supra. In

Matter of Elgendi, 23 I&N Dec. 515 (BIA 2002), in which the

alien had twice been convicted of misdemeanor drug possession

in violation of New York law, we reviewed then existing Second

Circuit law and essentially found that the latter (criminal law)

approach was the favored approach in the Second Circuit, that

that circuit was not likely any longer to follow the hypothetical

felony approach in the immigration context, and that, applying

the court’s criminal law approach, the alien there had not been

convicted of an aggravated felony. However, in footnote 7 of its

Simpson opinion, the Second Circuit expressly “offer[ed] no

comment on whether such convictions constitute ‘aggravated

felonies’ for any purpose other than” criminal law. Thus, United

States v. Simpson offers no guidance or resolution regarding the

issue, on which we also opined in Matter of Elgendi, as to

whether the Second Circuit’s bifurcated approach has been

abandoned in favor of the majority approach followed by the

Board in Matter of Yanez and by the Second Circuit itself in the

criminal law sphere. This question could be crucial in light of

the differing results, as to the scenario presented in this case

with respect to multiple State drug possession convictions,

reached by circuits that adhere to one approach or the other.

A further complication arises because of intervening

Supreme Court decisions that plainly signal that the bifurcated

approach followed in three circuits as to the construction of the

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2 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) provides that “[t]he term ‘aggravated felony’ means . .

. illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21), including a

6

same term “drug trafficking crime” is likely impermissible. See

Clark v. Martinez, 125 S.Ct. 716, 722-723, 727 (2005) (refusing

to countenance varying interpretations of the indefinite detention

provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) based on the admissibility of

the alien because such variability “would be to invent a statute

rather than interpret one” and “would establish within our

jurisprudence, beyond the power of Congress to remedy, the

dangerous principle that judges can give the same statutory text

different meanings in different cases”); see also Leocal v.

Ashcroft, 125 S.Ct. 377, 384 n.8 (2004) (explaining that, if a

statute has criminal applications, “the rule of lenity applies” to

the Court’s interpretation of the statute even in immigration

cases “[b]ecause we must interpret the statute consistently,

whether we encounter its application in a criminal or

noncriminal context”).

These cases make plain that, at some point, the three

circuits, including the Second, that have followed the bifurcated

approach to interpreting the term “drug trafficking crime” will

need to decide which of the two approaches to adopt, both for

immigration and criminal law purposes. But nothing in the

Supreme Court’s decisions portends which interpretation those

courts of appeals will choose.

In the end, we reach the same conclusion as the

Immigration Judge because we find, in the wake of the Supreme

Court’s Clark v. Martinez and Leocal v. Ashcroft rulings, there

is effectively no way for us authoritatively to determine which

approach that court will follow in the immigration context.

Therefore, our decision in Matter of Yanez, supra, dictates that

we adopt the approach taken in the majority of circuits, and the

one applied by the Second Circuit in United States v. Simpson,

supra, that treats the respondent’s second drug offense as a

federal felony and hence a “drug trafficking crime” and

aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(B).2

Case 2:06-cv-00667-WS-C Document 15 Filed 02/07/07 Page 6 of 15
drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18)[.]”

7

The respondent’s NOA makes no argument beyond his

contesting that he is not removable as an alien convicted of an

aggravated felony. Therefore, we will not address any other

portions of the Immigration Judge’s decision, as we do not find

any error raised by the respondent for us to consider.

Accordingly, the Immigration Judge’s decision is affirmed, and

the respondent’s appeal is dismissed.

(Id. (internal footnotes omitted; footnote added)) 

5. Beckford filed a petition for review of agency action and

concurrently therewith applied for a stay of removal in the Second Circuit

Court of Appeals on April 6, 2006. (Doc. 13, Exhibit B; Exhibit E to Rau

declar. (“You currently have a Petition for Review and Stay of Removal

pending with 2nd circuit.”))

6. On June 20, 2006, the U.S. Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (“ICE”) arm of the Department of Homeland Security decided

to continue Beckford’s detention following a file review. (Doc. 12, Exhibit E

to Rau declar. (“Due to your extensive criminal record, ICE considers you a

threat to the community. Your total disregard for authority demonstrates a

significant likelihood that you would fail to abide by conditions set forth if

released from custody. Based on these factors, ICE deems you a flight risk.”))

7. Beckford filed his petition seeking habeas corpus relief, pursuant

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to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, in this Court on October 13, 2006. (Doc. 1, at 1

(“[P]etitioner contends that his continued and prolonged detention is not only

unnecessary, but is unconstitutional in light of the edicts and decrees of the

United States Supreme Court. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690

(2001). Holding that . . . {‘Detention is permitted only for the amount of time

necessary to bring about an alien’s removal, this time has been reasonably

presumed to be six months’.}”))

8. On November 8, 2006, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals

entered an order stipulated to by the parties withdrawing the appeal. (Doc. 13,

Exhibit B (“‘ . . .The above captioned petition for review is hereby withdrawn

without costs or attorneys fees and without prejudice to reinstatement by either

party upon written notice filed with the Clerk of this Court and rec’d by the

AUSA by the earlier of (i) 30 days after the issuance by the Supreme Court of

a decision in Lopez or (ii) March 20, 2007 . . . .’ For the Court, by LG, Staff

Counsel.”))

9. On December 19, 2006, Beckford filed a Notice For

Reinstatement of Petition for Review in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.

(Doc. 13, Exhibit A) The Second Circuit entered a reinstatement order on

January 3, 2007. (Doc. 13, Exhibit B) 

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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 2498,

150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001), the Supreme Court determined that “§ 2241 habeas

corpus proceedings remain available as a forum for statutory and constitutional

challenges to post-removal-period detention.” 

2. In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that the post-removalperiod detention statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1231, “read in light of the Constitution’s

demands, limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period

reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United

States. It does not permit indefinite detention.” 533 U.S. at 689, 121 S.Ct. at

2498. 

3. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 reads, in relevant part, as follows:

(a) Detention, release, and removal of aliens ordered

removed

(1) Removal period

(A) In general

Except as otherwise provided in this section, when

an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall

remove the alien from the United States within a period

of 90 days (in this section referred to as the “removal

period”).

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(B) Beginning of period

 The removal period begins on the latest of the

following:

(i) The date the order of removal

becomes administratively final.

(ii) If the removal order is judicially

reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the

removal of the alien, the date of the court’s final

order.

(iii) If the alien is detained or confined

(except under an immigration process), the date

the alien is released from detention or

confinement.

(C) Suspension of period

The removal period shall be extended beyond a

period of 90 days and the alien may remain in detention

during such extended period if the alien fails or refuses

to make timely application in good faith for travel or

other documents necessary to the alien’s departure or

conspires or acts to prevent the alien’s removal subject to

an order of removal.

(2) Detention

During the removal period, the Attorney General

shall detain the alien. Under no circumstances during the

removal period shall the Attorney General release an

alien who has been found inadmissible under section

1182(a)(2) or 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable

under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title.

Id. (emphasis supplied). The Supreme Court in Zadvydas concluded that six

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months represents a presumptively reasonable period of time to detain a

removable alien awaiting deportation pursuant to the provisions of this statute.

533 U.S. at 701, 121 S.Ct. at 2505 (“While an argument can be made for

confining any presumption to 90 days, we doubt that when Congress shortened

the removal period to 90 days in 1996 it believed that all reasonably

foreseeable removals could be accomplished in that time. We do have reason

to believe, however, that Congress previously doubted the constitutionality of

detention for more than six months. . . . Consequently, for the sake of uniform

administration in the federal courts, we recognize that period. After this 6-

month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no

significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the

Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. And

for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior postremoval

confinement grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’

conversely would have to shrink. This 6-month presumption, of course, does

not mean that every alien not removed must be released after six months. To

the contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined

that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable

future.”); see Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002)

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(“Although not expressly stated, the Supreme Court appears to view the sixmonth period to include the 90-day removal period plus 90 days thereafter.”).

4. In Akinwale, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the six-month

detention period recognized by the Supreme Court “must have expired” at the

time a petitioner’s § 2241 petition is filed “in order to state a claim under

Zadvydas.” 287 F.3d at 1052; see also id. (“[I]n order to state a claim under

Zadvydas the alien not only must show post-removal order detention in excess

of six months but also must provide evidence of a good reason to believe that

there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable

future.”). The Akinwale court also indicated that the running of the six-month

detention period can be interrupted or tolled by the alien moving for a stay of

deportation/removal and any subsequent action of the appropriate circuit court

in granting such motion. See id., n.4 (“Akinwale was taken into custody on

November 17, 1999, and interrupted the running of time under Zadvydas by

moving on December 3, 1999, for a stay of deportation in his prior appeal to

this Court. The stay was granted on January 10, 2000. . . . Akinwale

subsequently filed the § 2241 petition in this case on March 21, 2000. Thus,

Akinwale, unlike the aliens in Zadvydas, chose to simultaneously challenge

issues related to his removal order and his post-removal period detention. . .

Case 2:06-cv-00667-WS-C Document 15 Filed 02/07/07 Page 12 of 15
3 While petitioner may attempt to argue that the six-month clock began to tick

again on November 8, 2006 when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals entered a stipulated order

withdrawing his appeal, certainly the time was again tolled, if it ever stopped being tolled, when

Beckford filed his notice for reinstatement of petition for review on December 19, 2006. (See

Doc. 13, Exhibit A, at 2 (“NOTICE is hereby given that: 1. Pursuant to the Stipulation and

Order of the Court dated November 8, 2006, the captioned Petition for Review is to be reinstated

by the Clerk of the Court and a new scheduling order issued herein; 2. That the stay of removal

previously granted by the Court shall remain in effect pending the decision of the Court on

the petition.”)) At best, therefore, two and one-half months of the 6-month period has expired in

this case.

13

. Therefore, Akinwale did not have even an unencumbered month of detention

prior to filing his § 2241 petition, let alone the requisite six months.”).

5. In this case, Beckford has filed his § 2241 petition prematurely.

Though petitioner’s filing date in the instant action, October 13, 2006 (Doc.

1), came more than six months after the date upon which his removal became

administratively final (see Doc. 12, Exhibit C to Rau declar., March 7, 2006

Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals), he interrupted the running of

the time under Zadvydas by moving, on April 6, 2006, for a stay of

deportation. Therefore, in accordance with Zadvydas and Akinwale, Beckford

has had only a one month period of detention prior to the filing of his § 2241

petition that can be counted toward the six-month post-removal-period

detention recognized as presumptively reasonable by the Supreme Court.3

 In

other words, the six-month period has not yet expired; thus, petitioner has not

stated a claim for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and Zadvydas.

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CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the undersigned recommends that this Court dismiss,

without prejudice, Joel Beckford’s habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2241. Beckford’s petition has been prematurely filed under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231. The dismissal is without prejudice to petitioner’s ability to file a new

§ 2241 petition in the future when he is able to state a claim under Zadvydas.

The attached sheet contains important information regarding objections

to the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

DONE this the 6th day of February, 2007.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AND

RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION, AND

FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

l. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it must,

within ten days of the date of service of this document, file specific written objections with

the Clerk of this court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district

judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual

findings of the Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d

736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B, 1982)(en

banc). The procedure for challenging the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate

Judge is set out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate judge in

a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A),

by filing a ‘Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation’

within ten days after being served with a copy of the recommendation,

unless a different time is established by order. The statement of objection

shall specify those portions of the recommendation to which objection is

made and the basis for the objection. The objecting party shall submit to

the district judge, at the time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the

party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s recommendation should be

reviewed de novo and a different disposition made. It is insufficient to

submit only a copy of the original brief submitted to the magistrate judge,

although a copy of the original brief may be submitted or referred to and

incorporated into the brief in support of the objection. Failure to submit a

brief in support of the objection may be deemed an abandonment of the

objection. 

A magistrate judge's recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court of Appeals;

only the district judge's order or judgment can be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable Where Proceedings Tape Recorded). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915 and FED.R.CIV.P. 72(b), the Magistrate Judge finds that the tapes and original

records in this case are adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to object to this

recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial

determination that transcription is necessary is required before the United States will pay the

cost of the transcript.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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