Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-02080/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-02080-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID CECIL TUGGLE,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-00-2080 DFL JFM P

vs.

ROSANNE CAMPBELL, Warden, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 1995 conviction on

charges of possession of methamphetamine, Health & Safety Code § 11377(a), and the trial court

found true special allegations that petitioner had suffered five prior strike convictions within the

meaning of California’s Three Strikes Law, Penal Code § 667(b)-(i) and 1170.12), and that

petitioner had served two prior prison terms, Cal. Penal Code § 667.5. Petitioner was initially

sentenced to 27 years to life, but after remand, the sentence was set at 25 years to life. 

Petitioner claims that his constitutional rights were violated by (1) ineffective

assistance of his first trial counsel, Connie Owens; (2) ineffective assistance of his second trial

counsel, Paul Comiskey; (3) & (4) the prosecution failed to disclose favorable evidence to the

defense; (5) prosecutorial misconduct; (6) denial of his right to compulsory process; (7) the

sentencing court abused its discretion when it considered information the original sentencing

judge had redacted; (8) trial court erred by failing to provide petitioner with a court trial on his

prior convictions; (9) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; (10) fundamentally unfair trial

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 The statement of facts is taken from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal for

the Third Appellate District in People v. Tuggle, No. C022401 (February 25, 1997), a copy of

which is appended as Exhibit 3 to Respondent’s Answer, filed March 7, 2001.

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and sentencing due to cumulative errors; (11) petitioner’s sentence violated the prohibition

against a bill of attainder; (12) application of Three Strikes Law to petitioner was violation of ex

post facto clause; (13) petitioner’s sentence and the $10,000 fine were cruel and unusual

punishment; (14) petitioner’s sentence was excessive and disproportionate to the crime; (15)

petitioner’s prior strike conviction was unconstitutional; and (16) the failure of the state court to

properly apply the Three Strikes Law to petitioner violated his equal protection and due process

rights.

FACTS1

Officer Smith saw [petitioner] speeding on the freeway and

stopped him for the traffic violation. After obtaining [petitioner’s]

license and registration, Smith asked if he was on probation or

parole; [petitioner] responded that he was on parole. Smith then

asked [petitioner] to step out of the van, and they walked back to

Smith’s patrol car as it was not safe to stand at the roadside near

the traffic.

Smith inquired whether [petitioner] had any weapons. [Petitioner]

replied that he “had something he shouldn’t have.” Believing

[petitioner] had a weapon, Smith conducted a pat down search,

found a set of “brass knuckles” in [petitioner’s] back pocket, and

arrested him.

Following the arrest, Smith searched [petitioner] and found a

baggie containing .11 grams of methamphetamine in [petitioner’s]

watch pocket. Smith estimated that perhaps two minutes elapsed

from the time he stopped the van until [petitioner] was arrested.

[Petitioner] suffered five prior serious felony convictions in 1986,

including two counts of rape (§ 261 subd. (a)(2)), two counts of

oral copulation with a person under the age of 14 (§ 288a, subd.

(c)), and one count of penetration of a genital or anal opening with

a foreign object (§ 289, subd. (a)). These offenses involved two

different girls at two different times. [Petitioner] served a separate

prison term for rape in 1986 and for receiving stolen property

(§ 496) in 1992.

(People v. Tuggle, slip op. at 2-8.)

 

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ANALYSIS

I. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at different

result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406

(2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”)

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court

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reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is

available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

II. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

The standards applicable to petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim

were established by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984). In

order to prevail on the claim petitioner must show (1) an unreasonable error by counsel and (2)

prejudice flowing from that error. To satisfy the first prong, petitioner must show that,

considering all the circumstances, counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness. The court must determine whether in light of all the circumstances, the

identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. 

Id. at 690. “Review of counsel’s performance is highly deferential and there is a strong

presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable representation.” 

United States v. Ferreira-Alameda, 815 F.2d 1251, 1253 (9th Cir. 1986).

To meet the prejudice prong, petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient

to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. The focus of the prejudice analysis is on “whether

counsel’s deficient performance renders the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding

fundamentally unfair.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993).

/////

(1) First trial counsel

Petitioner contends his first trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue

discovery of the “missing first 15 minutes of the police dispatch recording beginning at 1330 on

November 7, 1994.” (Pet. at 3.) Petitioner argues (in his third claim) that the officer discovered

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petitioner was a parolee by running petitioner’s license plate and then fabricated a traffic

violation in order to justify the unreasonable stop, detention and subsequent search and seizure. 

(Pet. at 5.) Petitioner contends that if his counsel had obtained that tape, the evidence against

him would have been suppressed and he would not have been convicted.

The last reasoned state court decision on this claim was the September 16, 1998

decision of the Sacramento County Superior and Municipal Court. (Answer, Ex. 12.) That court

found that petitioner had failed to demonstrate that the contents of the missing tape recording of

the 15 minute conversation between Officer Smith and dispatch would be exculpatory. (Id. at 1.)

Even if petitioner were correct, that Officer Smith had another motive for making the traffic stop,

the state court found this was not constitutionally impermissible. Whren v. United States, 517

U.S. 806 (1996). While applying the Strickland standard, the state court found that this missing

tape would not have changed the outcome of the search and seizure motion because “Officer

Smith was justified in making a pretextual stop, as he observed petitioner speeding and that was

a proper ground on which to effectuate the stop.” (Answer, Ex. 12, at 2.) 

Despite petitioner’s arguments to the contrary, Whren is applicable here. The

actual motivations of the individual officers for making the stop of the car are irrelevant since

"[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis."

Whren, 517 U.S. at 813. Whren also relied on United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973),

for the proposition that "a traffic-violation arrest . . . [will] not be rendered invalid by the fact that

it was 'a mere pretext for a narcotics search.' " 517 U.S., at 812-813.

Because the missing tape recording would not have changed the outcome of the

suppression hearing, petitioner cannot demonstrate the prejudice prong of Strickland, and the

court need not address the first prong. The state courts’ rulings on this claim were not contrary to

nor an unreasonable application of federal law not based on an unreasonable interpretation of the

facts. Petitioner’s first claim should be denied.

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(2) Retained trial counsel

Petitioner raises nine separate claims of ineffective assistance of retained trial

counsel. The first four claims relate to the missing dispatch tape referenced above. First,

petitioner claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure the production of the missing

tape. Second, petitioner claims counsel was ineffective for failing to present the missing tape at

the motion to suppress hearing. Third, petitioner alleges counsel was ineffective for failing to

file additional motions regarding the loss or destruction of the missing tape. Fourth, petitioner

alleges trial counsel was ineffective by preventing effective review of his Fourth Amendment

claim regarding the tape by failing to provide appellate counsel with all of petitioner’s evidence.

These four claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were raised and rejected in a

petition filed in the California Supreme Court, which was denied in an order that contained no

statement of reasons for the decision. In this circumstance, an independent review of the record

is required “to determine whether the state court clearly erred in its application of controlling

federal law.” Delgado, 223 F.3d at 982; Wilcox, 241 F.3d at 1245.

Even assuming petitioner’s first four ineffective assistance of retained counsel

claims were true, petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice from any of these four claims. As

noted above, this evidence would not have made a difference in terms of the admission of the

methamphetamine under Whren, supra. Petitioner’s first three claims against retained trial

counsel fail for the same reason his first claim against his first trial counsel failed. (See Section

(1) at 5-6 above.) Petitioner cannot demonstrate that had his retained trial counsel taken the

actions suggested by petitioner’s first three claims, the outcome of his trial would have been

different. A lawyer need not file a motion that he knows to be meritless on the facts and the law. 

See Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir.1999); Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1001 (1994) (failure to file suppression motion not ineffective

assistance where counsel investigated filing motion and no reasonable possibility evidence would 

/////

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have been suppressed); see also Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir.1996), cert. denied,

519 U.S. 1142 (1997) (failure to take futile action can never be deficient performance).

As to petitioner’s fourth claim, the court notes that petitioner failed to demonstrate

that retained trial counsel possessed the missing tape. In the Sacramento Superior Court’s

December 7, 1998 order denying petitioner’s motion to direct trial counsel to provide petitioner

with certain trial evidence, the judge stated that petitioner failed to demonstrate trial counsel ever

had the missing tape and noted that petitioner failed to make a proper showing that the tape ever

existed at all. (Answer, Ex. 17.) The Superior Court judge also noted that petitioner declared in

his habeas petition that the prosecution had not turned the tape over to trial counsel and that

retained trial counsel had stated he had not received the tape. (Id.) In petitioner’s traverse,

petitioner recounts retained trial counsel’s statements to the trial court at the suppression hearing

that trial counsel had “asked for those [tapes] a number of times, and was told by the District

Attorney’s office that there was never any tapes or records of any dispatches” (Traverse at 26), so

he was “personally satisfied that there weren’t.” (Id.) This confirms that retained trial counsel

did not have the missing tape in his possession, and thus could not be ineffective for failing to

turn over evidence he did not have.

Moreover, even if trial counsel had possession of evidence he failed to turn over,

there is no evidence that counsel would have had a meritorious Fourth Amendment claim. See

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986) (in order to prevail on such a claim,

petitioner must show a “good Fourth Amendment claim” and that he was denied a fair trial by the

“gross incompetence” of counsel.) As noted above, even if the Officer’s subjective intent was to

pull over petitioner because petitioner was on parole, the Officer’s statement that he saw

petitioner speeding and pulled petitioner over for speeding was a proper ground on which to

effectuate the stop. Thus, petitioner cannot demonstrate that had trial counsel turned over the

missing tape to appellate counsel, his appeal would have been granted. Petitioner’s fourth claim

must also fail. 

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 People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497, 504-05, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789,

791-92 (1996). 

8

Thus, petitioner’s four claims of ineffective assistance of retained trial counsel

should be denied.

Petitioner next claims his retained trial counsel was ineffective for failing to either

object to or dispute alleged false evidence presented at sentencing in the probation officer’s

report. The Sacramento Superior Court’s September 16, 1998 order rejected this claim, finding

that petitioner could not establish prejudice under Strickland. (Answer, Ex. 12, at 2-3.) 

[E]ven if deficient performance were shown, . . . petitioner fails to

establish prejudice. As the probation report indicates, petitioner

has a lengthy criminal history, including numerous prior sex

offenses, and petitioner was on parole at the time of the current

offense. Petitioner’s 25-years-to-life sentence was mandatory

under the “Three Strikes” law, and it would have taken a striking

of at least four of his “strike priors” for the sentence to have been

any different. Petitioner simply fails to show that, despite his

criminal history and the fact that he was on parole at the time of

this offense, it would have been an abuse of discretion not to strike

at least four priors, had the specific details of the San Joaquin

priors not been given in the probation report. Thus, again,

petitioner fails to meet the Strickland standard for prejudice.

(Answer, Ex. 12, at 3.) 

The state court properly applied Strickland; thus its ruling on this claim was not

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law not based on an unreasonable

interpretation of the facts. Petitioner’s fifth claim of ineffective assistance of retained trial

counsel should be denied.

Petitioner’s sixth claim of ineffective assistance of retained trial counsel is that

trial counsel failed to allow adequate time for petitioner to review the probation officer’s report

before sentencing. The state court again found petitioner had not demonstrated prejudice under

 Strickland. (Answer, Ex. 12, at 4.) In addition, the state court noted that petitioner had another

chance to address these issues at the Romero2 remand, which petitioner did. (Id.) 

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Petitioner has failed to explain how additional time to review the probation

officer’s report before sentencing would have changed the outcome of sentencing. Thus,

petitioner has failed to meet the prejudice prong of Strickland and this claim should also be

denied. 

In his seventh claim, petitioner contends retained trial counsel failed to object or

defend petitioner against an excessive restitution fine. The California Court of Appeal denied

this claim, finding that petitioner had not met his burden under Strickland.

The record is silent on counsel’s motivation, and we cannot

determine whether failure to challenge the restitution fine was the

result of inadequate representation. Because it is conceivable that

[petitioner], who was employed at the time he committed the

crime, may have had resources to pay all or a portion of the fine,

and since counsel may have recognized [petitioner] has the ability

to earn wages in prison which could be applied toward its payment,

[petitioner] is not entitled to reversal of the fine in this appeal. 

[Citation omitted.]

(Opinion at 6.) 

Moreover, the court noted that the trial court was required to impose a restitution

fine when a defendant is convicted of a felony. (Opinion at 5.) The Sacramento County Superior

Court agreed with the appellate court’s finding, adding that petitioner had “failed to set forth any

rationale for his claim of the restitution being excessive, and fail[ed] to show how the amount of

restitution ordered would have been different had counsel objected.” (Answer, Ex. 12, at 4.) 

The state courts properly applied Strickland; thus its ruling on this claim was not

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law not based on an unreasonable

interpretation of the facts. Petitioner’s seventh claim of ineffective assistance of retained trial

counsel should be denied.

Petitioner’s eighth claim of ineffective assistance of retained trial counsel is that

counsel failed to review and prepare for sentencing after the first remand from the Court of

Appeal. The Sacramento County Superior Court addressed this claim as follows:

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[P]etitioner has attached documents as exhibits, setting forth what

he thought should have been argued and presented at the 1997

Romero remand. Much of this material, however, was already

included in the original probation report, which was available . . .

at the Romero remand: (1) petitioner’s age, (2) the nature of

petitioner’s current crime, being possession of methamphetamine,

(3) petitioner’s criminal history, (4) petitioner’s drug/alcohol

history, (5) petitioner’s joining the Navy, (6) petitioner’s parole in

1993 and the fact that he did not test positive for drugs until

November 1994, and (7) petitioner’s then-current employment as a

truck driver. Petitioner’s claim that matters stricken from the

record in the San Joaquin County case were impermissibly

included in the probation report are unfounded, as discussed above. 

Further, at the Romero remand, the parties referred to the hearing

that had been held at the original sentencing, at which defense

counsel presented three witnesses to attest to petitioner’s good

character and to his drug/alcohol addiction, as well as petitioner’s

own testimony asking for leniency, in hopes of convincing the

Court to sentence him to a misdemeanor instead of a felony for the

“wobbler” offense of which he had been convicted. The additional

material presented in the petition, in this regard, would at most

have been cumulative, had it been presented at the Romero remand

hearing. 

. . .

Because petitioner fails to set forth any material that counsel could

have, but did not, present to the court at the Romero remand that

would have made any difference in the outcome of the

resentencing, this . . . ineffective assistance of counsel [claim] must

also fail for failure to state a prima facie case under Strickland.

(Answer, Ex. 12, at 4-5.) 

“[P]ronouncement of sentence on a foundation ‘extensively and materially false . .

. renders the proceeding lacking in due process.’” Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395 (9th

Cir. 1989)(quoting Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948). In order to demonstrate a due

process violation, petitioner must show “1) that the challenged information is materially false or

unreliable [citation omitted]; and 2) that the sentencing judge relied, at least in part, on this

information [citation omitted].” Oxborrow, 877 F.2d at 1400. “Where the court does not rely on

the challenged information, the sentence will be affirmed regardless of the accuracy of the

challenged information.” Oxborrow, 877 F.2d at 1400 (Citations omitted.).

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 Petitioner does not claim that the trial court erred by depriving him of counsel at this resentencing hearing. 

11

Here, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that material information was false or

that the trial judge relied on that false information. Moreover, petitioner has failed to show that

the outcome would have changed had this allegedly false information been removed from the

record. A review of the record reflects that the trial judge was adamant about refusing to exercise

his discretion to strike any of petitioner’s prior convictions as strikes imposed under the Three

Strikes Law. (Pl.’s Ex. 1-H, at 1080-94.) The trial judge acknowledged that the sentence

imposed was harsh, but found petitioner’s prior convictions were for violent offenses. (Id. at

1086.) Thus, petitioner has again failed to meet the prejudice prong of Strickland, and his eighth

claim of ineffective assistance of retained trial counsel should be denied.

In his ninth and final claim of ineffective assistance of retained counsel, petitioner

alleges counsel was ineffective for failing to appear at petitioner’s re-sentencing following the

second remand from the state Court of Appeal.3 (Pet. at 4.) On this claim, petitioner cannot

demonstrate prejudice under Strickland. 

On June 16, 1998, the California Court of Appeal vacated the order imposing two

1-year terms for the two prior prison term enhancements and remanded the case to the trial court

to permit the court to exercise its discretion whether to strike the punishment imposed for either

or both of the enhancements and, if necessary, to reimpose petitioner’s sentence. (Answer, Ex. 6,

at 7-8.) On July 31, 1998, petitioner returned to state court for re-sentencing pursuant to the June

16 remittitur. (Pl.’s Ex. I-H, at 1089.) The record reflects that petitioner’s retained trial counsel

was tied up in Department 1 arguing a homicide three strikes Romero hearing. (Id. at 1093.) 

The trial judge also noted that petitioner had been represented by other counsel on appeal. (Id. at

1089.) After waiting for trial counsel who did not appear, the trial judge noted that petitioner had

made a Marsden motion and told petitioner he could fire trial counsel if he wanted. (Id.) The

trial judge went on to state that since he would be exercising discretion in petitioner’s favor with

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regard to the two one-year prior prison sentence enhancements, petitioner could proceed on his

own. (Id. at 1090.) The trial judge then exercised his discretion and did not impose the two

additional one-year terms. (Id.) 

Based on that result, petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice under Strickland. 

Petitioner cannot demonstrate that if he had benefit of counsel at the re-sentencing hearing, the

outcome would have been better. The second remand was for the limited purpose of deciding

whether to reimpose sentence on the two one-year enhancements for petitioner’s prior prison

terms, and the trial judge chose not to reimpose that sentence. Thus, petitioner’s ninth claim of

ineffective assistance of retained trial counsel must also fail.

B. Failure to Disclose Favorable Evidence

In his third claim, petitioner contends the prosecution failed to disclose evidence

favorable to the defense. Respondent argues this claim is barred by the doctrine of procedural

default because petitioner failed to raise it on direct appeal. In re Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756 (1953). 

Because petitioner could have raised this claim on appeal but did not, and this claim does not fit

within any of the exceptions set forth in Dixon, this claim is procedurally barred from

consideration on habeas review.

The Sacramento County Superior Court went on to find that even if it could reach

the merits of this claim, the claim would be rejected because petitioner failed to demonstrate that

the missing tape recording of Officer Smith and dispatch would be exculpatory. (Answer, Ex.

12, at 1.) 

Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d

215 (1963), prosecutors have a duty to disclose exculpatory

material on their own, without a request by the defendant. Brady

material includes evidence that would help to impeach a

prosecution witness. See United States v. Brumel-Alvarez, 991

F.2d 1452, 1461 (9th Cir.1992). However, a defendant must also

show that “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence

been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would

have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 668,

105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985).

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Randolph v. People of the State of California, F.3d , 2004 WL 1852899, slip op. at 11 (9th

Cir. Aug. 19, 2004). “Brady does not require a prosecutor to turn over files reflecting leads and

ongoing investigations where no exonerating or impeaching evidence has turned up.” Downs v.

Hoyt, 232 F.3d 1031, 1037 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing, inter alia, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,

109 (1976)). Moreover, “a constitutional error occurs, and the conviction must be reversed, only

if the evidence is material in the sense that its suppression undermines confidence in the outcome

of the trial.” Bagley, at 678; see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999) (“[T]here is

never a real Brady violation unless the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable

probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict.”)

As noted above, the state court found that this missing tape would not have

changed the outcome of the search and seizure motion because “Officer Smith was justified in

making a pretextual stop, as he observed petitioner speeding and that was a proper ground on

which to effectuate the stop.” (Answer, Ex. 12, at 2, citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806

(1996). Because this evidence would not have been exculpatory, it was not misconduct for the

prosecutor to fail to disclose the missing tape. Petitioner’s third claim should be denied.

C. Prosecutor’s Failure to Disclose Discovery

In his fourth claim, petitioner again argues that the prosecutor’s failure to produce

the missing tape denied him due process by depriving him of a meritorious defense. (Pet. at 5.) 

However, as noted above, because this evidence was not exculpatory in nature, this claim must

also fail.

D. Prosecutorial Misconduct

In his fifth claim, petitioner claims he suffered prosecutorial misconduct by the

presentation of “false” evidence. Petitioner cites three instances in support of his prosecutorial

misconduct claim:

1. At the August 7, 1995, hearing on petitioner’s motion to suppress, during the

prosecution’s cross-examination of petitioner, the prosecution asked petitioner whether he had

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4

 Petitioner sets forth the disputed facts in his seventh claim: “The false facts actually in

question are: (1) ‘the victim was forcibly pulled into the defendant’s vehicle,’ and ‘using a piece

of glass as a weapon threatened the victim with death.’” (Petition at (5)(g).) Petitioner claims

these “false facts” were stricken from the 1986 Probation Report at sentencing. Id. (citing

Clerk’s Supplemental Transcript on Appeal, #C022401 (January 24, 1996)(augmented), at 28-37;

41-80; see also petitioner’s Ex. 2E, at 78-85.) A copy of the probation report, with the

handwritten redactions is appended as Exhibit 21 to the Petition. 

14

been convicted of one count of oral copulation with a person under fourteen years of age with

force. (Pet., Ex. 1D, at 47.) Petitioner correctly answered no. Petitioner had previously been

convicted of oral copulation, and later admitted to prior convictions for rape and dissuading a

witness.

2. At petitioner’s sentencing hearing following trial, the prosecutor reminded the

trial judge that petitioner had committed several prior sexually violent crimes including two

counts of oral copulation with minors. (Pet., Ex. 1F, at 63.) The prosecutor stated these crimes

occurred in 1986, but the crimes actually occurred in 1984, which resulted in petitioner’s later

conviction of the crimes in 1986.

3. Petitioner’s third example also involves sentencing. Petitioner had objections

to the Probation Officer’s 1986 report, which he raised at sentencing on the original offenses in

1986. Petitioner’s objections concerned inaccurate factual information relating to petitioner’s

convictions arising from the rape and oral copulation of then 16 year old Noelle and petitioner’s

attempt to dissuade her from being a witness which directly followed the sexual assault.4 The

/////

trial judge made minor additions and deletions to the report to comport the Probation Report to

the facts adduced at trial. 

However, when the instant action was tried, the judge was presented with the

unedited version of the Probation Report. 

Petitioner claims these instances, taken together with the allegedly missing tape

discussed above, amount to prosecutorial misconduct

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The California Supreme Court denied this claim without comment. 

Success on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct requires a showing that the

conduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due

process. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987). The conduct must be examined to determine

“whether, considered in the context of the entire trial, that conduct appears likely to have affected

the jury's discharge of its duty to judge the evidence fairly.” United States v. Simtob, 901 F.2d

799, 806 (9th Cir. 1990). Generally, if an error of constitutional magnitude is determined, a

harmless error analysis ensues. Error is considered harmless if the court, after reviewing the

entire trial record, decides that the alleged error did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury's verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993). 

Error is deemed harmless unless it “is of such a character that its natural effect is to prejudice a

litigant's substantial rights.” Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 760-761 (1946). 

In the instant case, none of the instances cited by petitioner took place before the

jury. Thus, petitioner has not demonstrated that these instances, even accumulated, affected the

jury’s discharge of its duty to judge the evidence fairly. Accordingly, the state court’s rejection

of petitioner’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, the foregoing principles. Petitioner’s third claim for relief should be denied.

E. Denial of Compulsory Process

Petitioner alleges in his sixth claim that he was denied his right to compulsory

process. Petitioner bases this claim on the alleged missing portion of the audiotape which he

again claims would prove the officer fabricated his reason for stopping petitioner’s car. 

The Sixth Amendment compulsory process clause "does not by its terms grant to a

criminal defendant the right to secure the attendance and testimony of any and all witnesses: it

guarantees him compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." United States v.

Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982) (Valenzuela-Bernal ) (internal quotations omitted,

emphasis in original). As discussed above, there is no showing by petitioner that he was

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5

 Petitioner again raises prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel

arguments surrounding these issues. These arguments are addressed in their respective sections

herein. 

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deprived of testimony or evidence that would have been "relevant and material [and] vital" to his

defense. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 867 (emphasis in original). The actual motivation of

Officer Smith for making the stop of petitioner’s car was irrelevant because his "[s]ubjective

intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis." Whren, 517

U.S. at 813. In addition, Officer Smith testified that he had no prior knowledge of petitioner’s

parole status until after he stopped petitioner’s car and asked petitioner. (Answer, Ex. 16, at 6.) 

Thus, petitioner cannot demonstrate the allegedly missing audiotape, even if it existed, was

material to his defense, and his Sixth Amendment compulsory process claim fails.

F. Abuse of Discretion

In his seventh claim, petitioner contends the initial sentencing court abused its

discretion when it considered false statements made by the prosecution and that the subsequent

sentencing court abused its discretion when it considered information the original sentencing

judge had redacted from the probation report.5

Although a sentencing judge has broad discretion to hear a variety of evidence

normally inadmissible during trial, pronouncement of sentence on a foundation "extensively and

materially false . . . renders the proceeding lacking in due process." Townsend v. Burke, 334

U.S. 736, 741 (1948). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has developed a two prong test which

criminal defendants must meet to show a due process violation. The defendant must show 1) that

the challenged information is materially false or unreliable. Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d

1339, 1359 (9th Cir.1978) (en banc); and 2) that the sentencing judge relied, at least in part, on

this information. Id. at 1359; United States v. Rachels, 820 F.2d 325, 328 (9th Cir.1987) (per

curiam). "Where the court does not rely on the challenged information, the sentence will be

affirmed regardless of the accuracy of the challenged information." Rachels, 820 F.2d at 328

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(citing United States v. Gonzales, 765 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1068

(1986)). If the sentencing court states on the record that it excluded certain information from

consideration when making the sentencing decision, the reviewing court must take such

statements at face value. Gonzales, 765 F.2d at 1397.

As discussed in the prosecutorial misconduct section above, the prosecution asked

petitioner whether he had been convicted of one count of oral copulation with a person under

fourteen years of age with force, and petitioner correctly answered no. And, at petitioner’s

sentencing hearing following trial, the prosecutor reminded the trial judge that petitioner had

committed several prior sexually violent crimes including two counts of oral copulation with

minors. (Pet., Ex. 1F, at 63.) The prosecutor stated these crimes occurred in 1986, but the

crimes actually occurred in 1984. 

Although the prosecutor made these incorrect statements to the sentencing judge,

petitioner has provided no evidence that the trial judge relied on them in reaching his decision on

sentencing. The sentencing judge had the probation report which accurately reflected the date

and penal code sections denoting petitioner’s prior convictions. (Petition, Ex. 21 at 1.) 

Insofar as the redactions from the probation report, petitioner has not

demonstrated that the subsequent sentencing judge relied on the previously redacted portions of

the probation report to find that his prior convictions for oral copulation and rape were

sufficiently violent to justify a three strikes sentence. The unredacted portions of the probation

report offer sufficient facts to support a finding of violence; however, the nature of the offenses

alone is sufficient to qualify the offense as violent under the three strikes law. Thus, the

sentencing judge was not required to rely on the redacted facts, even had petitioner demonstrated

the judge had so relied. 

In light of the above, this court cannot find that the judges abused their discretion,

and this claim should also be denied.

/////

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G. Prior Convictions

Petitioner contends in his eighth claim that the trial court denied him due process

by failing to advise petitioner, prior to court trial on his prior convictions, of his right to

subpoena witnesses, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, to present evidence in his own

behalf, and/or to remain silent. (Petition at (5)(h), citing Ex. 1E, at 58-60.) Petitioner cites

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) in support of this claim. 

However, Boykin sets forth the requirements for plea-advisements by counsel;

that is, federal due process requires that a guilty plea be knowing and voluntary, that the

defendant must have “a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence.”

Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243-44. Here, petitioner did not admit to his prior convictions, but

stipulated to have his prior convictions submitted to the trial judge for decision. Thus, Boykin is

not applicable here. Thus, petitioner’s eighth claim should be denied.

H. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

In his ninth claim, petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 

To demonstrate ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, petitioner must

demonstrate: (1) that his counsel was objectively unreasonable in failing to find arguable issues

to appeal; and (2) a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's unreasonable failure to find

such issues, he would have prevailed on his appeal. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000). 

I. Cumulative Errors

In his tenth claim, petitioner alleges he had a fundamentally unfair trial and

sentencing due to cumulative errors. 

“[T]he Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one.” 

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986). Indeed, “there can be no such thing as an

error-free, perfect trial.” United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-09 (1983). However,

“prejudice may result from the cumulative impact of multiple deficiencies.” Cooper v.

Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1333 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979). 

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While individual errors looked at separately may not rise to the level of constitutional error, the

cumulative effect of such errors may so prejudice the defendant’s right to a fair trial that reversal

is warranted. See United States v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193, 200-01 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.

denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981); see also United States v. Nadler, 698 F.2d 995, 1002 (9th Cir.

1983).

Petitioner argues that all of the alleged violations combined to render his trial

fundamentally unfair, in violation of his federal due process rights. For the reasons set forth

above, this court has not found constitutional errors in petitioner’s state trial proceedings. Thus

there is nothing to accumulate as error. This claim should also fail.

J. Bill of Attainder

In his eleventh claim, petitioner contends his sentence violated the prohibition

against a bill of attainder. A bill of attainder involves a statute imposing punishment without the

benefit of trial. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977)). Three

requirements must be met to establish a violation of the bill of attainder clause: it must single

out an identifiable group, inflict punishment, and dispense with a judicial trial. Id., at 468;

Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 847 (1984). 

These three elements are not present in the Three Strikes Law. For example, the

Three Strikes Law does not dispense with a judicial trial. Petitioner was entitled to and did have

a jury trial on his underlying prior convictions. In addition, in order to be counted as a strike,

prior convictions must be proven by a jury, or by the court, if the criminal defendant waives jury

trial. Here, petitioner waived his right to a jury trial on his prior convictions, and submitted the

issue of his prior convictions to the trial judge. Thus, petitioner was not deprived of a judicial

trial, and the application of the Three Strikes Law to his sentence was not a bill of attainder. This

claim should also be denied. 

K. Three Strikes Law

a. Ex Post Facto

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In his twelfth claim, petitioner alleges application of the Three

Strikes Law to his sentence was a violation of the ex post facto clause.

Petitioner’s twelfth claim is without merit. “[R]ecidivist statutes do not violate

the Ex Post Facto Clause if they are ‘on the books at the time the [present] offense was

committed.’” United States v. Kaluna, 192 F.3d 1188, 1199 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting United

States v. Ahumada-Avalos, 875 F.2d 681, 683-84 (9th Cir.1989) (per curiam)), cert. denied, 120

S.Ct. 1561 (U.S. 2000). California’s three strikes law was enacted in 1982, and amended in

1986, 1989, and 1994. Petitioner’s present offense was committed in 1994. Petitioner’s twelfth

claim for relief is without merit.

b. Cruel and Unusual Punishment & Excessive and Disproportionate

Sentence

Petitioner contends in his thirteenth claim that his sentence and the $10,000 fine

were cruel and unusual punishment and in his fourteenth claim that his sentence was excessive

and disproportionate to the crime. Petitioner contends that his sentence of 25 years in prison

amounts to cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. 

Petitioner was sentenced pursuant to California’s three-strikes law, which requires

enhanced penalties for certain repeat offenders. See California Penal Code §§ 667, 1170.12. 

Petitioner was convicted of possession of a controlled substance by a jury verdict on August 9,

1995. (Petition at 1.) The trial court found true special allegations that petitioner had suffered

five prior strike convictions within the meaning of the three-strikes law (Penal Code §§ 667(b)-

(i) and 1170.12) and that petitioner had served two prior prison terms (Penal Code § 667.5). 

(Answer at 2.) The trial court initially sentenced petitioner to 27 years to life, but that was later

reduced to 25 years to life. (Answer at 2.) Petitioner also was ordered to pay a fine of $10,000. 

In Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003), the United States Supreme Court

made clear that, in the context of an Eighth Amendment challenge to a prison sentence, the “only

relevant clearly established law amenable to the ‘contrary to’ or ‘unreasonable application of’

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6

 A “wobbler” is an offense that can be punished as either a misdemeanor or a felony

under applicable law. See Ferreira v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir. 2004).

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framework is the gross disproportionality principle, the precise contours of which are unclear,

applicable only in the ‘exceedingly rare’ and ‘extreme’ case.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 73 (citing

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983);

and Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980)). The Andrade Court concluded that two

consecutive 25-years-to- life sentences with the possibility of parole, imposed under California's

three-strikes law following two petty theft convictions with priors, did not amount to cruel and

unusual punishment. Id. at 77; see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (holding that a

sentence of 25 years to life imposed for felony grand theft under California's three-strikes law did

not violate the Eighth Amendment). “Outside the context of capital punishment, successful

challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.” Rummel,

445 U.S. at 272.

In Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2004), the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held, post-Andrade, that a three strike sentence of twenty-five years

to life in prison for a third shoplifting offense, a “wobbler” under state law6, constituted cruel and

unusual punishment. In Rios v. Garcia, 390 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2004), the court of appeals

distinguished Ramirez, finding that the petitioner in Rios had a “lengthy criminal history,” had

“been incarcerated several times,” and because the strikes used to enhance the petitioner’s

sentence had “involved the threat of violence.” Id. at 1086.

Like the petitioners in Rios and Ramirez, in the instant case petitioner’s

commitment offense, possession of methamphetamine, is also a “wobbler” under California law.

See Ferreira v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d at 1051. The record reflects that petitioner’s criminal history,

including the strikes that support his sentence, is more similar to the petition in Rios than the

petitioner in Ramirez. Petitioner has a lengthy criminal history including numerous prior sex

offenses, and petitioner was on parole at the time of the current offense. (Answer, Ex. 21.) As

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noted in the state court’s decision issued February 25, 1997, 

the trial court recognized it had discretion to reduce the crime to a

misdemeanor but rejected [petitioner’s] claims of rehabilitation and

found his history of criminal activity did not justify the reduction. 

In light of [petitioner’s] multiple prior convictions and admitted

substance abuse, the court reasonably could conclude that the

community’s protection is best served by a felony sentence. 

Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to

reduce the offense to a misdemeanor.

(Answer, Ex. 3.)

Moreover, petitioner’s sentence of 25 years to life with prior serious felony

convictions does not give rise to an inference of gross disproportionality because courts have

upheld longer sentences for repeat offenders who committed non-violent offenses. See, e.g.,

Rummel, 445 U.S. at 284-85 (upholding life sentence of recidivist convicted of fraudulent use of

credit card for $80, passing forged check for $28.36 and obtaining $120.75 under false

pretenses); United States v. Carr, 56 F.3d 38, 39 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding sentence of 22 years

upon conviction for sale of 66.92 grams of cocaine base with enhancement for two previous

convictions for minor drug sales); Bland, 961 F.2d at 128-29 (upholding sentence of life without

parole for being felon in possession of firearm and having a career criminal history). 

It appears to this court that petitioner’s commitment offense was a very minor

offense. However, as noted above, the circumstances under which a prison sentence violates the

Eighth Amendment are “exceedingly rare.” Given the legal authority that binds this court,

petitioner’s criminal history precludes a finding that his sentence violates the Eighth

Amendment. 

For the foregoing reasons, the court will recommend that petitioner’s thirteenth

and fourteenth claims for relief be denied. 

/////

/////

/////

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7

 Although the Supreme Court acknowledged that they previously “left open the

possibility that relief might be appropriate in rare circumstances,” Lackawanna at 397 citing

Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374 (2001), the instant case does not present such a

circumstance. Lackawanna carved out an exception for those cases where there was a failure to

appoint counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Lackawanna 532 U.S. at 404. Petitioner’s

case does not fall within that exception because he had counsel during his 1986 trial. He doesn’t

meet the other exception either. Id. at 405 (claim of actual innocence).

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c. Prior Strike Conviction Unconstitutional

In his fifteenth claim, petitioner contends his prior strike

conviction was unconstitutional. However, the Supreme Court has held that relief is generally

unavailable to a state prisoner through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus when the prisoner

challenges his current sentence on the ground it was enhanced based on an allegedly

unconstitutional prior conviction for which the petitioner is no longer in custody. Lackawanna

County District Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394 (2001). Here, petitioner attempts to challenge his

1986 conviction of rape, oral copulation and witness intimidation, claiming it was

unconstitutional. Petitioner’s claim can be read as asserting a challenge to the 1995 conviction as

enhanced by the allegedly invalid prior conviction, thus satisfying the “in custody” requirement

for federal habeas jurisdiction. Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 493-94 (1989)(per curiam). 

However, because petitioner’s prior conviction is “no longer open to direct or collateral attack in

its own right because [petitioner] failed to pursue those remedies while they were available or

because the [petitioner] did so unsuccessfully, the conviction may be regarded as conclusively

valid.” Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 403.7 Thus, this claim should also be denied. 

d. Equal Protection and Due Process Violations

Petitioner alleges that the failure of the state court to properly apply the Three

Strikes Law to petitioner violated his equal protection rights. Petitioner argues that the

prosecution violated petitioner’s rights by failing to offer petitioner a plea bargain, and that

petitioner’s equal protection rights were violated because other prosecuting attorneys throughout

the state routinely offer plea bargains to other similarly situated defendants. 

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8

 “There must be an allegation of invidiousness or illegitimacy in the statutory scheme

before a cognizable [equal protection] claim arises.” McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 835

(9th Cir. 1991). Federal courts employ a strong presumption that governmental classifications do

not violate the equal protection clause unless they burden a suspect class or a fundamental

interest. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). 

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The question in this federal habeas corpus proceeding is not whether the state

appellate court was correct in its determination; this court is bound by California’s interpretation

of its state law. See McSherry v. Block, 880 F.2d 1049, 1052 (9th Cir. 1989). Rather, this court

must decide whether the state court’s decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law. 

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “commands that no

State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is 

essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of

Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). The conscious exercise of some

selectivity by state prosecuting authorities in the application of a recidivist statute is not, in itself,

a violation of equal protection absent selection deliberately based upon unjustifiable standards

such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962);

see also United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 761 (1997) (“Such discretion is an integral

feature of the criminal justice system, and is appropriate, so long as it is not based upon improper

factors.”); United States v. Wicks,132 F.3d 383, 389-90 (7th Cir. 1997). 8

Here, petitioner’s argument is not founded on any disparate treatment based on the

statute but, rather, on the decision by individual prosecutors as to how and when to invoke the

provisions of California’s Three Strikes law, i.e. by offering plea bargains to some criminal

defendants, but failing to offer one to petitioner. This does not amount to a violation of

petitioner’s constitutional rights. In petitioner’s case, the record does not support the notion that

the prosecutor violated the law or applied an improper classification in charging petitioner as he

did. Therefore, petitioner did not receive unequal or unfair treatment based on the varying

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implementation policies of the district attorneys in the state of California. Petitioner has failed to

demonstrate that his prosecution under the Three Strikes law was based on unjustifiable

standards or that California applies the law unevenly in a systematic manner. 

Moreover, it is well-established that criminal defendants have no constitutional

right to a plea bargain. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977); King v. Brown, 8 F.3d

1403, 1408 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Anderson, 993 F.2d 1435, 1439 (9th Cir. 1993); see

also Cal. Penal Code § 1192.5 (providing for court’s withdrawal of its approval of a plea prior to

sentencing with the defendant being given the opportunity to then withdraw plea). Accordingly,

petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that

petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 8, 2005. 

001

tugg2080.157

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