Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-05247/USCOURTS-caDC-94-05247-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 14, 1995 Decided January 2, 1996

No. 94-5247

COMPUTER PROFESSIONALS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY,

APPELLEE

v.

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE,

APPELLANT

-

Consolidated with No. 94-5381

-

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 93cv00231)

John P. Schnitker, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, with whom Frank W. Hunger,

Assistant Attorney General, Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, and Leonard Schaitman,

Attorney, United States Department of Justice, were on the briefs, argued the cause for appellant.

John D. Bates, R. Craig Lawrence, Claire M. Whitaker, and Susan A. Nellor, Assistant United States

Attorneys, entered appearances for appellant.

David L. Sobel, with whom Marc Rotenberg was on the briefs, argued the cause for appellee.

Before BUCKLEY, WILLIAMS, and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BUCKLEY.

BUCKLEY, Circuit Judge: On November 12, 1992, the Washington Post carried a story

suggesting that the United States Secret Service might have been involved in the breakup of a

meeting of young "computer hackers" at a Virginia shopping mall. Shortly thereafter, appellee

Computer Professionalsfor SocialResponsibilityfiled a FreedomofInformationActrequest inwhich

it asked the Secret Service for copies of all records relating to the incident. The Service released

copies of various newspaper clippings but declined to disclose any other documents on the basisthat

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they were exempt from disclosure under provisions of the Act that protect certain categories of

information that is compiled for law enforcement purposes. In the meantime, Computer Professionals

had filed this action seeking disclosure in district court.

While the district court confirmed that the records were related to an ongoing criminal

investigation, it held that the Secret Service had failed to establish that any of them fell within

Exemptions 7(C) and (D) of the Act, which protect, respectively, the privacy of individuals and the

identity of, and information provided by, confidential sources. The court, however, permitted the

Service to withhold records whose release would interfere with its law enforcement proceedings.

Having inspected the materials submitted to the district court by the Service, including those

submitted with its motion for reconsideration, we conclude that the Service properly invoked

Exemption 7(D) with respect to one source that provided information under an expectation that it

would remain confidential, but that the district court properlyfound that it had failed to establish such

an expectation as to its other sources. We also find that the court erred in ruling that the privacy

interests of the individuals named in the Service's records were not protected by Exemption 7(C).

I. BACKGROUND

On November 6, 1992, a group of young people gathered in the food court of the Pentagon

City Mall in Arlington, Virginia, for the monthly meeting of the "2600 Club." The Club was named

after the 2600 Magazine, a journal devoted to computer and telecommunications topics which, in

turn, was named for the hertz frequency that once enabled telephone "hackers" to use a whistle

instead of coins to make long distance calls. According to the newspaper account, at some point

during the meeting, members of the mall security staff approached these individuals, asked for

identifications, compiled a list of names, confiscated some bags containing computer books and

printouts, and asked them to leave. The article also stated that "at least one agent from the Secret

Service" was on the scene.

Four dayslater, appellee Computer Professionalsfor SocialResponsibility ("CPSR")sent the

Secret Service a request, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552

(1995), asking for copies of all Secret Service records "related to the breakup of a meeting of

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individuals affiliated with "2600 Magazine' at the Pentagon City Mall in Arlington Virginia on

November 6, 1992." Joint Appendix ("J.A.") at 31. CPSR said that it was "particularly interested

in information concerning the involvement of the Secret Service in the detention of the individuals

and the confiscation of their property." Id. Treating the letter as a third-party request, the Secret

Service stated, in response, that "without properly notarized releases, this office can neither confirm

nor deny the existence of investigatory information pertaining to the individuals." J.A. at 34. CPSR

replied that "the request does notseek information identifying particular individuals. Rather, we seek

the disclosure ofinformation concerning the Secret Service'sinvolvement in an incident that has been

widely publicized in [the] media...." J.A. at 35. The Secret Service thereupon began to process the

request, and so notified CPSR.

In searching its records, the Secret Service found several newspaper articles describing the

breakup of the meeting, as well as two agency records. According to the Service's Freedom of

Information and Privacy Acts Officer, these records were provided "by a confidential source, and

each consists solely of information identifying individuals." Declaration of Agent Melvin E. Laska,

reprinted in J.A. at 21-30 ("Laska Declaration"). On March 5, 1993, one month after CPSR filed

this action to compel release of the records, the Secret Service provided CPSR with the newspaper

clippings but notified it that the two records were being withheld pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 7(A),

7(C), and 7(D). These exemptions apply to

records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent

that [their] production ... (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with

enforcement proceedings, ... (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an

unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, [or] (D) could reasonably be expected to

disclose the identity of a confidential source ... [or] information furnished by a

confidential source.

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A), (C) & (D).

In April 1993, both parties submitted motions for summary judgment. In support of its

motion, CPSR presented an affidavit stating that eight of the individuals detained at the mall had

authorized the release of any records relating to them. For its part, the Secret Service relied on the

declaration of Melvin E. Laska, which affirmed that the information in question had been received

from a confidentialsource in the course of a criminal investigation conducted under the authority of

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18 U.S.C. §§ 1029 ("Fraud and related activity in connection with access devices") and 1030 ("Fraud

and related activity in connection with computers") and explained itsreasonsfor withholding the two

documents. As the Service later revealed, the investigation had been initiated after a private company

reported that it had been the victim of long distance telephone fraud.

Before the district court ruled on the motions, the Supreme Court issued its decision in

Department of Justice v. Landano, 113 S. Ct. 2014 (1993), in which it held that the Government is

not entitled to a presumption that all sources supplying information to law enforcement agencies in

the course of criminal investigations are confidentialsources within the meaning of FOIA Exemption

7(D). Id. at 2021-23. The Secret Service then submitted two additional affidavits. In one of these,

Agent Laska stated that, after further review ofthe FOIA request, he learned ofsix additionalrecords

that were responsive to CPSR's request. Supplemental Declaration of Melvin E. Laska, reprinted

in J.A. at 50. He claimed that these were also exempt under FOIA because they were provided by

a confidentialsource orsources and identified possible suspects and witnessesin an ongoing criminal

investigation.

The second affidavit was provided by the agent in charge of the Service's Washington Field

Office. Declaration of William F. Burch, reprinted in J.A. at 68-77 ("Burch Declaration"). This

affidavit was offered to establish that the documents met the criteria for confidential treatment set

forth in Landano. Agent Burch stated that he had contacted the source of these records and that it

had "reiterated" its original understanding that the information provided the Secret Service would not

be revealed. The agent further explained that the additional materials contained information about

a second source that had since provided the Secret Service with information relating to the underlying

criminal investigation.

Following an in camera review of a sealed document provided by Agent Burch, the district

court granted CPSR's motion as to Exemptions 7(C) and 7(D). Computer Professionals for Social

Responsibility v. United States Secret Service, Civ. No. 93-0231-LFO, slip op. (July 1, 1994) ("July

1 mem. op."). Although the court confirmed that the records had been "compiled for law

enforcement purposes" and thus satisfied the threshold requirement for application of Exemption 7,

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id. at 3, it concluded that the release ofthe materials would not constitute a threat to anyone's privacy

interest. Id. at 4. It also found the source's reiteration of its expectation of confidentiality to be an

inadequate "post hoc rationalization" and would not satisfy the requirements of Landano. Id. at 5.

Finally, the court granted the Service's motion, in limited respects, with regard to Exemption 7(A).

Id. at 5-7.

On July 18, 1994, the Secret Service filed a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Service supported its motion with a second in camera

declaration, which was submitted by Agent Laska's successor, Agent James O'Neill ("second in

camera submission"). Because the motion was not served on CPSR's counsel until July 25, which

was beyond the ten statutory days required by the Rule, the court denied it as untimely in a

memorandum opinion issued on August 7, 1994 ("Aug. 7 mem. op."). The court also refused the

Government's request that it treat the motion as having been filed under Rule 60(b). Id. at 5.

The Secret Service appealsthe orders denying both its motion for summary judgment and its

motion for reconsideration. Because the Secret Service's investigation was brought to a conclusion

in the interval between the issuance of the district court's orders and the hearing of this appeal, the

Service no longer invokes Exemption 7(A), which protects information whose disclosure "could

reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A).

II. DISCUSSION

We review orders granting summary judgment de novo. "In the FOIA context this requires

that we ascertain whether the agency has sustained its burden of demonstrating that the documents

requested are ... exempt fromdisclosure under the FOIA." Gallant v. NLRB, 26 F.3d 168, 171 (D.C.

Cir. 1994).

On appeal, the Secret Service asserts that contrary to the district court's analysis of Landano

and Exemption 7(D), it had submitted adequate evidence of an implied expectation of confidentiality;

that the district court also erred in its analysis of Exemption 7(C) by discounting the privacy interests

at stake and by failing to examine the public interest side of the balance; and that the court abused

its discretion in denying itsmotion for reconsideration. Because information submitted by the Service

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with its motion for reconsideration is critical to our analysis of its Exemption 7(D) claim, we first

address the agency's contention that its motion should have been granted.

A. Motion for Reconsideration

The Secret Service acknowledgesthat its motion for reconsideration had not been served on

the plaintiff within the ten days required by Rule 59(e), but it maintains that the district court should

have treated the motion as having been filed under Rule 60(b). This the court declined to do because

the Service had failed to point to an intervening change in, or obvious error of, law that would have

warranted rehearing under Rule 60(b)(1) and because it could not find the extraordinary

circumstances that might have brought the motion within Rule 60(b)(6). Aug. 7 mem. op. at 5.

Rule 60(b) provides, in relevant part, that

[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party ... from a

final judgment, order, or proceeding for ... (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or

excusable neglect; ... or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of

the judgment.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). An untimely motion under Rule 59(e) may be considered as a motion under

Rule 60(b) if it states grounds for relief under the latter rule. Butler v. Pearson, 636 F.2d 527, 529

(D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing 6A Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 59.04(7) (2d ed. 1979)); Mares v. Busby, 34

F.3d 533, 535 (7thCir. 1994). The district court read the Service's motion as essentially alleging that

its summary judgment order made substantive errors of law. We have previously declined to decide

whether errors in legal reasoning may be corrected by Rule 60(b)(1) motions. Center for Nuclear

Responsibility, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 781 F.2d 935, 939-40 (D.C. Cir.

1986). We do not address that issue here because we find that the motion may properly be

considered under Rule 60(b)(6).

We have noted that

the district judge, who is in the best position to discern and assess all the facts, is

vested with a large measure of discretion in deciding whether to grant a Rule 60(b)

motion, and the district court's grant or denial of relief under Rule 60(b), unless

rooted in an error of law, may be reversed only for abuse of discretion.

Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 841 F.2d 1133, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1988). We have also

recognized that under Rule 60(b)(6) "relief should be only sparingly used." Good Luck Nursing

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Home, Inc. v. Harris, 636 F.2d 572, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1980). It applies only to extraordinary

circumstances. Cf. Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199 (1950). Nevertheless, we have

stated:

When a party timely presents a previously undisclosed fact so central to the litigation

that it shows the initial judgment to have been manifestly unjust, reconsideration

under rule 60(b)(6) is proper even though the original failure to present that

information was inexcusable.

Good Luck Nursing Home, 636 F.2d at 577. In this case, the previously undisclosed evidence

confirms that one source had indeed provided information under an expectation of confidentiality.

Thus it was "central to the litigation"; and if the court had taken it into consideration, the new

evidence would have affected the outcome.

It is true, of course, that "a party that ... has not presented known facts helpful to its cause

when it had the chance cannot ordinarily avail itself[of] rule 60(b) after an adverse judgment has been

handed down." Id. This case, however, is not the ordinary one. To the contrary, it involves not only

the interests of the Secret Service, but that of a third party whose identity and information are

expressly protected by FOIA. Furthermore, the new information was submitted to the district court

just eighteen days after the court had issued its decisionconsiderably less than the three-month

delay found acceptable in Good Luck Nursing Homeand did no more than demonstrate the

accuracy of a representation that the court had dismissed as a "post hoc rationalization." While it is

true that a district court enjoys significant discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a Rule

60(b) motion, given the unusual circumstances of this case and its effect on the interests of a third

party, we believe it wasincumbent on the court to examine the second in camera submission in order

to determine whether its ruling on the Exemption 7(D) issue had been based on a correct

understanding of the underlying facts. We are confident that had it done so, it would have taken the

necessary corrective action.

In the interest ofjudicial economy, and because we revieworders granting summaryjudgment

de novo, we will not remand the case to enable the district court to make this determination. Instead,

we will take the new evidence into account as we review the Government's claims under Exemptions

7(C) and (D).

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B. FOIA Exemption 7(C)

Exemption 7(C) protectsrecords or information compiled for law enforcement purposesthat

"could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(b)(7)(C). In determining whether material falls within this provision, "a court must balance the

public interest in disclosure against the interest Congress intended the Exemption to protect."

Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 776 (1989).

In Stern v. FBI, 737 F.2d 84, 91-92 (D.C. Cir. 1984), we stated that before a court decides whether

information falls within Exemption 7(C), it must first identify both the privacy interests that are at

stake and the public interest in disclosure. "Having identified the competing interests in [a] case, we

must balance them." Id. at 92.

We have stated that "Exemption 7(C) takes particular note of the strong interest of

individuals, whether they be suspects, witnesses, or investigators, in not being associated

unwarrantedlywith alleged criminal activity." Dunkelberger v. Department of Justice, 906 F.2d 779,

781 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). That interest extends to

persons who are not the subjects of the investigation [but who] may nonetheless have

their privacy invaded by having their identities and information about them revealed

in connection with the investigation.

Burge v. Eastburn, 934 F.2d 577, 579 (5th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted) (withholding statements by

relatives of murder victim). Accord McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1255 (3d Cir. 1993)

("interviewees and witnesses also have a substantial privacy interest because disclosure may result

in embarrassment and harassment").

The Secret Service's records contain the names of informants, witnesses, and potential

suspects who are relevant to its criminal investigation, which clearly fall within the scope of

Exemption 7(C). CPSR maintains, however, that the records also contain information relating to

individuals who attended the meeting of the 2600 Club; and it argues that the exemption does not

authorize the Service to withhold this information because, in its view, no stigma could attach to

persons who "were engaged in wholly lawful activity and were peaceably assembled in a public

place." Brief for Appellee at 27. We disagree. Even if we were to assume that the Service's records

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contain such information and even if those individuals were not suspects, their public identification

with a meeting that had reportedly attracted the attention of law enforcement officials would subject

them to a degree of interest that would impinge upon their privacy. We conclude, then, that

Exemption 7(C) permits the Service to withhold the names and identifying information of persons

appearing in its records so long as their privacy interest in not being connected in any way with a

criminalinvestigation outweighsthe public interest indisclosure. That privacy interest, however, may

be waived. Therefore, if the Service's records contain information relating to any one of the eight

individuals who provided CPSR with waivers oftheir privacy rights, it must disclose that information

so long as it was not provided by a confidential source and therefore protected from disclosure by

Exemption 7(D) and so long as it is redacted to protect the interests of individuals who have not

waived their rights.

This brings usto the next step in the balancing process, which isto identify the public interest

that is to be served by the disclosure of the information sought by CPSR. The Supreme Court has

stated that FOIA is focused "on the citizens' right to be informed about what their government is up

to." Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 773 (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, we

determine the public interest "by taking into account "the nature of the requested document and its

relationship to the basic purpose ofthe FreedomofInformationAct to open agencyaction to the light

of public scrutiny.' " Dunkelberger, 906 F.2d at 781 (quoting Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at

772).

CPSR asserts that information about the Secret Service's involvement in breaking up the

meeting willshed light on the agency's performance of its duties and suggeststhat the Secret Service

has engaged in illegal conduct. Yet when

governmental misconduct is alleged as the justification for disclosure, the public

interest isinsubstantial unlessthe requester putsforward compelling evidence that the

agency denying the FOIA request is engaged in illegal activity and shows that the

information sought is necessary in order to confirm or refute that evidence.

Davis v. Department of Justice, 968 F.2d 1276, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks

omitted). "A mere desire to review how an agency is doing its job, coupled with allegations that it

is not, does not create a public interest sufficient to override the privacy interests protected by

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Exemption 7(C)." McCutchen v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 30 F.3d 183, 188 (D.C.

Cir. 1994). CPSR has offered no evidence that the Secret Service has engaged in illegal activity.

Thus, while we have identified significant privacy interests that would be compromised by

disclosing the names of individuals appearing in the requested records, we can find no public interest

that would be served by their disclosure. This being the case, "[w]e need not linger over the balance;

something ... outweighs nothing every time." National Ass'n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Horner,

879 F.2d 873, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Accordingly, we conclude the Secret Service was justified in

refusing to disclose the names and identifying information contained in the records ofitsinvestigation

except in the case of individuals, if any, who have waived their rights under FOIA and who are

identified in information provided by other than a confidential source. We also hold that the Secret

Service may withhold the name ofthe company that reported the computer fraud because, even if not

itself protected, its disclosure might permit the identification of the corporate officer who reported

the crime to the Service.

C. FOIA Exemption 7(D)

FOIA Exemption 7(D) protectsrecords or information compiled bycriminallaw enforcement

authorities in the course of criminal investigations if their release could reasonably be expected to

disclose the identity of, as well as information provided by, a confidential source. See 5 U.S.C. §

552(b)(7)(D).

Untilrecently, this circuit (and six others) presumed "that information obtained by an agency

during the course of a criminal investigation has been procured pursuant to an assurance of

confidentiality." Parker v. Department of Justice, 934 F.2d 375, 378 (D.C. Cir. 1991). During the

pendency of this litigation, however, the Supreme Court ruled that

the Government is not entitled to a presumption that a source is confidential within

the meaning of Exemption 7(D) whenever the source provides information to [an

agency] in the course of a criminal investigation.

Department of Justice v. Landano, 113 S. Ct. 2014, 2024 (1993). Nevertheless, the Court stated that

when certain circumstances characteristically support an inference of confidentiality,

the Government ... should be able to claim ... Exemption 7(D) without detailing the

circumstances surrounding a particular interview.

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Id. at 2022. Thus, "[t]here may well be ... generic circumstances in which an implied assurance of

confidentiality fairly can be inferred." Id. at 2023.

We note at the outset that more than one source of information is involved here. Our

inspection of the Secret Service's in camera submissions reveals four sources: the private company

that informed the Service that it had been the victimoflong-distance telephone tollfraud, two sources

that the Service questioned in the course of its investigation, and the source referred to in the Burch

Declaration. Although the Secret Service makes a general claim that all the information in its records

was provided under an expectation of confidentiality, it only sought to confirm that expectation with

respect to the information provided by the fourth source.

In support of its generic claim, the Secret Service argues that its general practice establishes

an implied assurance of confidentiality. It points, first, to the fact that it routinely receives

information with the understanding that the source's cooperation will not be revealed to the public.

Second, when it becomes necessary for it to make confidential information public in the prosecution

of a case, the Service routinely protects the source through such measures as the issuance of a

subpoena for the information in order to disguise the fact that it had previously been volunteered.

Finally, the Service argues that cases involving computer crimes pose the same potential for

retaliation or harassment that the Supreme Court, in Landano, cited as examples of the "generic

circumstances" (e.g., gang-related murders) that could support an inference of confidentiality. See

113 S. Ct. at 2023.

With respect to the Service'sfirst two arguments, we make the following observations. While

the SupremeCourt, in Landano, acknowledged that "certain circumstances characteristicallysupport

an inference of confidentiality," id. at 2022, the manner in which an agency "routinely" handles

information is not sufficient to establish an implied assurance of confidentiality as to any particular

source. The key is

not whether the requested document is of the type that the agency usually treats as

confidential, but whether the particular source spoke with an understanding that the

communication would remain confidential.

Id. at 2019 (emphasis in original). Because the Service acknowledged that its sources had not been

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advised of its routine practices, such practices do not support an inference of confidentiality.

Furthermore, the Service offered no evidence that a fear ofretaliationbyhackersissufficiently

widespread to justifyan inference thatsources ofinformation relating to computer crimes expect their

identities and the information they provide to be kept confidential. Under the circumstances, we

cannot fault the district court'srefusalto accept the Service'ssuggestion that such sources are entitled

to the generic presumption of confidentiality that the Supreme Court appears willing to extend to

sources of information concerning gang-related crimes. See Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2023.

The Secret Service, however, was able to establish in its second in camera submission that

one ofitssources had in fact submitted information in the expectation that he would not be identified.

This was the source that was described, in the Burch Declaration, as having "reiterated [its] original

position and understanding that the fact that it had provided certain information to the Secret Service

would not be revealed." J.A. at 75. Because the record contained no evidence of a prior iteration

of this understanding, we can understand why the district court found it hard to assign any clear

meaning to the assertion. July 1 mem. op. at 5. The second in camera submission, however, contains

an affidavit in which the source confirms that "it was [its] understanding and belief that the

information and materials provided, as well as[its] identity, would remain strictly confidential," along

with new evidence that bears out the essential accuracy of Agent Burch's representation,

notwithstanding his unfortunate use of the word "reiterated."

Based on the above, we conclude that the district court correctlyfound that the Secret Service

had failed to establish that its sources were entitled to a generic inference of confidentiality under

Exemption 7(D). In its second in camera submission, however, the Service was able to confirm that

one of itssourcesfell within itsscope. Accordingly, we hold that the Service may invoke Exemption

7(D) with respect to that source alone.

III. CONCLUSION

We find that onlyone ofthe Secret Service'ssources qualifies as confidentialunderExemption

7(D) of the Freedom of Information Act. We hold, however, that Exemption 7(C) protects the

privacy of all individuals who can be identified in the records of the Service's telephone fraud

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investigation because there is no public interest that would be advanced by their disclosure. Finally,

because the Secret Service hasterminated itsinvestigation, it must disclose all information that it has

withheld pursuant to Exemption 7(A) that is not protected by other exemptions of the Act. Thus,

the district court's decision is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for

further action pursuant to this opinion.

It is so ordered.

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