Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-03088/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-03088-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Daniel J. DeRienzo,

Plaintiff,

v.

Yavapai County, et al.,

Defendants.

NO. CIV-05-3088-PCT-SMM

ORDER

On October 4, 2005, Plaintiff filed a Complaint initiating this lawsuit. (Dkt. 1.) 

On December 5, 2005, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim. 

(Dkt. 7.) On July 10, 2006, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Rule 8

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but granted Plaintiff leave to amend. (Dkt. 14.) 

In its order dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice, the Court ruled that

Plaintiff was permitted to file an amended complaint no later than August 11, 2006. (Id.

at 2.) More than ninety (90) days have elapsed since the Court issued its Order

dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with leave to amend and Plaintiff has failed to file an

amended complaint.

Plaintiff has the general duty to prosecute this case. Fidelity Philadelphia Trust

Co. v. Pioche Mines Consolidated, Inc., 587 F.2d 27, 29 (9th Cir. 1978). In this regard,

it is the duty of a plaintiff to comply with court orders in a timely fashion. Here,

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Plaintiff’s failure to file an amended complaint more than sixty (60) days after the Courtordered deadline has elapsed constitutes failure to prosecute. See Dkt. 14.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), in relevant part, provides, “[f]or failure of

the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant

may move for dismissal of an action or any claim against the defendant.” See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 41(b). Although the language indicates that Rule 41(b) is applicable upon motion

by the defendant, “courts may dismiss under Rule 41(b) sua sponte, at least under certain

circumstances.” Hells Canyon Preservation Council v. United States Forest Service, 403

F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Olsen v. Mapes, 333 F.3d 1199, 1204 n. 3 (10th

Cir. 2003)). “District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and in the

exercise of that power they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate,

dismissal of a case.” Bautista v. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 2000);

Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992); Thompson v. Housing

Authority of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986).

In the Ninth Circuit, a court may dismiss an action with prejudice based on a

party’s failure to prosecute an action or failure to obey a court order. See, e.g., Ghazali

v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal for noncompliance with Local

Rule); In re Eisen, 31 F.3d 1447, 1451-55 (9th Cir. 1994) (dismissal for lack of

prosecution); Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260-61 (dismissal for failure to comply with court

order). Moreover, involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b) may be proper where a

plaintiff, given the opportunity to amend, does nothing. Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191

F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999); Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th

Cir. 2004). Where a plaintiff is given “the opportunity to amend or be dismissed [and

does] nothing [,]. . . resources continue to be consumed by a case sitting idly on the

court’s docket.” Edwards, 356 F.3d at 1065.

In determining whether to dismiss an action for lack of prosecution or failure to

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obey a court order district courts must consider several factors, including: “(1) the

public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its

docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring

disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives.” 

Yourish, 191 F.3d at 990. The Ninth Circuit “may affirm a dismissal where at least four

factors support dismissal, . . . or where at least three factors ‘strongly’ support

dismissal.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Here, the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation and the Court’s

need to manage its docket support dismissal where, following a finding of failure to

properly state a claim, Plaintiff was provided an opportunity to amend but has failed to

amend more than sixty (60) days after the allotted time. See Dkt. 14. Indeed, as in

Yourish, “Plaintiff[]’s noncompliance [here] has caused the action to come to a complete

halt, thereby allowing Plaintiff[] to control the pace of the docket rather than the Court.” 

Yourish, 191 F.3d at 990. Moreover, “the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of

litigation always favors dismissal.” Id. The second factor also weighs in favor of

dismissal because the Court’s docket is one of the five heaviest in the nation and there is

little utility in maintaining a case that is not being prosecuted.

Although the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits weighs

against dismissal, Plaintiff’s counsel in the present case has not moved to enlarge time

for filing an amended complaint or otherwise notified the Court or opposing counsel of

the reasons why an amended complaint has not been filed more than sixty (60) days after

the Court-ordered date has expired. With respect to the third factor, the Court finds that

the Defendants would be prejudiced by the need for further litigation of this matter due

to Plaintiff’s non-responsiveness. Any further extension will only serve to increase the

likelihood that evidence in support of the defense will be lost due to the passage of time,

and will unreasonably delay the progress of the action, thereby prejudicing Defendants,

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who are entitled to a prompt resolution of the allegations against them. See Pagtalunan

v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Unnecessary delay inherently increases

the risk that witnesses’ memories will fade and evidence will become stale.”); see also

Yourish, 191 F.3d at 991 (“unreasonable delay” may constitute prejudice to defendant).

 The fifth factor also weighs in favor of dismissal. With respect to the availability

of less drastic alternatives, there is no sanction the Court could impose that would

compel Plaintiff to participate in the litigation. 

In sum, four of the five factors weigh in favor of dismissal. Accordingly, the

Court finds that the need to manage its docket, the public interest in speedy resolution of

cases, the apparent prejudice to Defendants, and the lack of less drastic alternatives to

dismissal outweigh the policy of concluding suits on the merits. See Yourish, 191 F.3d

at 990-91; Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642-43; Bautista, 216 F.3d at 841. Thus, dismissal of

the present case under Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute and failure to obey the Court’s

Order (dkt. 14) is appropriate.

 Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of

Defendants and against Plaintiffs and close this case.

DATED this 20th day of October, 2006.

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