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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

CLARA M. SIMMONS, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

. _ _ .!., 

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JUL O 7 1992 

ROBP~T L. HOECK33 

Clerk 

) No. 91-3080 

v. ) 

) 

SECURITY BENEFIT GROUP, INC., ) 

ROGER VIOLA, BARBARA RANKIN, ) 

and GLENDA OVERSTREET, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

(D.C. No. 87-CV-4225) 

( D. Kan.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before BALDOCK and SETH, Circuit Judges, and BRIMMER, District 

Judge**· 

Appellant Clara Simmons brought this suit against her 

employer, Security Benefit Group ("SBG"), and her supervisors, 

Barbara Rankin, Roger Viola, and Glenda Overstreet, alleging 

violations of 42 u.s.c. S 2000e and 42 u.s.c. S 1981 . Appellant 

also asserted a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment 

Act, 29 u.s.c. SS 621-634 ("ADEA"), and pendent state claims. The 

district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

**Honorable Clarence A. Brimmer, Chief Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Wyoming, sitting by designation. 

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on all federal causes of action and dismissed the pendent state 

claims. 

During oral argument to this court Appellant's attorney 

expressly withdrew from the appeal all issues except the 

retaliation claims under Title VII. Appellant asserts that the 

retaliation is attributable to this suit and claims she filed with 

the Kansas Commission on Civil Rights ("KCCC"). In response to 

the claims the KCCC found no probable cause . 

Appellant, a black woman with a high school education, began 

work at SBG as a clerk in the mail room in 1967. Over the twentyyear period that Appellant was employed by SBG she moved up 

through several positions including mail service clerk, Xerox 

operator, lobby receptionist, "SMC" transfer clerk, withdrawal/ 

redemption clerk, secretarial assistant - mutual funds, and 

technical assistant. At the time Appellant was fired she held the 

position of Blue Sky compliance coordinator. 

The events giving rise to this lawsuit extend back as far as 

1974 but became aggravated in 1984 when Appellant was transferred 

to the SBG legal department in an attempt to reso lve some of 

Appellant's complaints of disparate treatment by prior 

supervisors. It is necessary to describe the e v ents in some 

detail. Soon after Clara Simmons' arrival in the legal 

department, Appellee Roger Viola was appointed Chief Counsel for 

SBG and, thus, became Appellant's supervisor. Problems between 

Viola and Simmons arose immediately. A conversation took place in 

which Viola stated (allegedly in response to a statement by 

Simmons that she expected Viola to be as prejudiced toward her as 

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her other supervisors had been) that he had a good friend who was 

a black woman who took care of his child and that he considered 

the woman to be a part of his family. This incident was included 

in a complaint by Appellant to the KCCR . 

Viola's only written evaluation of Simmons described her as 

"competent" and she was granted a raise . Simmons disagreed with 

her evaluation and filed a written response in which she stated 

she should have been rated "commendable" instead of "competent. " 

In February of 1985, Appellee Barbara Rankin joined the SBG 

legal department and became Appellant's supervisor. In April of 

1985, a part-time employee was hired to help reduce the workload 

in the legal department . Simmons requested that she be made 

supervisor over the new employee . Rankin refused because there 

were only two other employees under Rankin ' s supervision and 

adding an additional supervisory level in such a small group 

seemed pointless. This incident also was included in one of 

Simmons ' later KCCR complaints. 

Appellant's mid-year evaluation was performed by Rankin. 

Again, Appellant was evaluat ed as "competent " but she was notified 

of possible problems regarding efficiency. She was also told that 

she was visiting too much on the telephone and with coworkers. 

In the fall of 1985, Appellee, Glenda Overstreet, was hired 

to fill a vacancy in the SBG legal department. Overstreet, a 

black female who met all of the published job qualifications, 

filled a job that Appellant had applied for and been denied. This 

incident also was the subject of a later KCCR complaint by 

Simmons. 

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Appellant was evaluated in February of 1986 by Rankin and 

again was rated as "competent." Simmons refused to sign the 

evaluation and filed a detailed written response to the evaluation 

with SBG's equal employment opportunity officer in which she 

stated that she was being treated unfairly by her supervisor and 

that she was being subjected to a double standard of treatment. 

On May 28, 1986, Viola wrote a memorandum to the SBG Human 

Resources Department requesting that Simmons be transferred out of 

the legal department. Viola's request was denied. 

In June of 1986, Rankin recommended to Viola that Overstreet 

be made supervisor over the two state compliance coordinator 

positions, including Appellant's position. Rankin's 

recommendation was made in part because Rankin felt that she could 

no longer effectively supervise Appellant. Appellant objected to 

Overstreet's appointment as her supervisor on the grounds that the 

change was in reality a new position and that the position should 

have been posted according to company policy. SBG characterized 

the change as a "job enhancement" and refused to post the 

position. Simmons filed a grievance which the company refused to 

process for the stated reason that Appellant's general claims of 

disparate treatment were already the subject of previous KCCR 

complaints. SBG's position was that the company grievance 

procedure should be used to resolve disputes before any outside 

legal or administrative remedies were resorted to. 

Appellant's relationship with her supervisor, Overstreet, was 

no better than her relationship with previous supervisors. 

Appellant insisted on communicating through formal memoranda 

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despite Overstreet's repeated statements that such formality was 

not necessary. As part of her supervisory duties, Overstreet 

attempted to counsel Appellant about her negative attitude and 

unwillingness to work as part of the compliance team. 

By May of 1987, the situation between Appellant and her 

supervisors in the legal department had begun to deteriorate 

rapidly. Overstreet had a meeting with Appellant where she 

informed Appellant of the seriousness of the situation regarding 

Appellant's negative attitude . Overstreet also discussed with 

Appellant her continued "threats" to have a KCCR representative 

present when discussing personnel matters, her continuing to write 

formal memoranda to her supervisor instead of attempting to 

communicate orally, Simmons' belief that all decisions made by SBG 

legal department personnel were intended to discriminate against 

her, her sighing and rolling her eyes when given assignments by 

Overstreet and her attitude toward supervision generally. 

According to Overstreet ' s deposition, Appellant became 

increasingly difficult to supervise. Overstreet stated that it 

"became a circus" to ask Appellant for any assistance or 

information . Simmons contends that she cooperated fully with 

Overstreet and diligently performed the tasks assigned to her. 

In June of 1987, Simmons ' attorney wrote formal demand 

letters to SBG, as well as Viola, Rankin, and Overstreet 

individually, asserting that Appellant was being harassed and 

subjected to disparate and retaliatory treatment. Specifically, 

the letters stated that Simmons was subjected to unauthorized 

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evaluations and selective enforcement of the rules, and that she 

was denied use of the company grievance procedure. 

On June 23, 1987, Viola counseled Simmons about problems 

involving the possible unauthorized use of sick leave, lack of 

willingness to communicate verbally with her supervisor, a 

negative attitude toward her supervisor, and repeated demands to 

speak with KCCR representatives or her attorney when requested by 

her supervisor to perform work-related functions. 

On August 18, 1987, Simmons filed this lawsuit while 

employed. The following week Appellant missed a day of work due 

to illness. After she was asked to bring a note from her doctor 

describing the illness, Appellant submitted the note with the 

words "Submitted under protest" written on it. When Overstreet 

asked Appellant about the note, Appellant repeatedly told 

Overstreet to speak with Appellant's attorney. 

On September 2, 1987, Viola wrote a memorandum to the VicePresident for Human Resources requesting that Appellant be 

transferred or terminated immediately. In his memorandum, Viola 

described the unrest in the department caused by Appellant and 

stated that Overstreet had now refused to work with Appellant any 

longer. Viola also stated that if something were not done, 

Overstreet might leave. 

Simmons, confronted with the possibility of being 

transferred, told the Human Resources Department that she did not 

want to be transferred from her job in the legal department. 

Appellant was terminated on September 18, 1987. 

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On appeal Appellant urges only the district court's grant of 

summary judgment on the retaliation claim as error. The other 

claims or causes were dropped, as mentioned. She contends the 

district court erred in holding that a reasonable jury could not 

find that SBG retaliated against her for filing civil rights 

claims. "In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we utilize the 

same standard that the district court employs." Merrick v. 

Northern Natural Gas Co., 911 F.2d 426, 429 (10th Cir.) . Summary 

judgment is proper if, viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party, there are no genuine issues of 

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. Russillo v . Scarborough, 935 F.2d 1167, 1170 (10th 

Cir.). 

This retaliation claim comes within the general procedure for 

Title VII suits set out in McDonell Douglas Corp . v. Green, 411 

U.S. 792, and Texas Dept . of Community Affairs v . Burdine, 450 

U.S. 248. See Burrus v. United Tel. Co. of Kan . , Inc . , 683 F.2d 

339, 343 (10th Cir.). Thus, to establish a prima facie case of 

retaliation, we held in Burrus that a plaintiff must show: 

"(l) she engaged in protected opposition 

to Title VII discrimination or participated in 

a Title VII proceeding; 

"(2) she was disadvantaged by an action 

of her employer subsequent to or 

contemporaneously with such opposition or 

participation; and 

"(3) there is a causal connection between 

the protected activity and the adverse 

employment action." 

683 F.2d at 343. Once a prima facie case has been established the 

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burden shifts to the defendant to come forward with a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. If 

the defendant produces evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 

reason for the employment action, the burden shifts back to the 

plaintiff to show that the articulated reason is a pretext for 

discrimination. 

One of Appellant's claims of retaliation sterns from the fact 

that she was fired only a few weeks after filing this action. A 

causal connection between protected activity and adverse 

employment action may be shown by circumstances that justify an 

inference of retaliatory motive, such as a close temporal 

relationship between the protected conduct and the adverse action. 

Burrus, 683 F.2d at 343. Appellant has met her burden of showing 

a prima facie case of retaliation on this point. 

The facts are uncontroverted that serious tensions within the 

SBG legal department were escalating during Appellant's tenure. 

Appellant had numerous disagreements with her supervisors and 

discord within the department was making it difficult for the 

employees to function efficiently. 

The issue becomes whether Appellant has presented enough 

evidence to convince a reasonable trier of fact that Appellees' 

stated reasons for termination were a pretext for discrimination. 

It is undisputed on the record before us that Appellant 

experienced problems with her supervisors for many years prior to 

her discharge. Evaluations by Appellant's superiors consistently 

noted problems with Appellant's attitude and particularly her 

attitude toward supervision. Appellant also fails to controvert 

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Appellees' evidence that tensions between Appellant and other 

members of the SBG legal department had risen to a point where it 

was interfering with the day-to-day operations of the department. 

As Appellee Overstreet put it, supervising Appellant became a 

"circus." 

As mentioned above, the only significant evidence Appellant 

relies on to support her claim of retaliation is the close 

temporal relationship between Appellant's filing of this lawsuit 

and her termination. After examining the extensive record of the 

events over the years we find that the date of Appellant's 

discharge and its close proximity to her filing of this lawsuit 

are completely fortuitous. Appellant has not come forth with 

sufficient evidence to show that Appellees' stated reasons for her 

termination were a pretext for discrimination. Thus, we must hold 

that Appellant has not presented sufficient evidence to create a 

genuine issue of material fact as to whether SBG's stated reasons 

for termination were pretextual. 

Appellant also points to other incidents during her 

employment with SBG that she claims are retaliatory. First, 

Appellant claims that a memorandum written by Appellee Viola on 

May 28, 1986 creates a fact issue as to whether Appellant was 

retaliated against. In the May 28 memorandum, Viola requests 

Appellant's immediate transfer from the SBG legal department. 

Appellant argues that because the memorandum mentions that she had 

already filed four discrimination claims with the KCCR it is 

evidence of discriminatory intent. We disagree. The reference to 

the KCCR complaints was an attempt to put the request for Simmons' 

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transfer in context. The portion of the letter referring to the 

KCCR complaints gives some of the background for Appellant's 

dissatisfaction. The reasons listed for the requested transfer do 

not include the civil rights complaints; rather, the letter cites 

problems with Appellant's attitude in general, the disruptive 

nature of her conduct in a small department, and her unwillingness 

to be supervised. The letter goes on to request that Appellant be 

transferred so that "[s]he will then have a chance anew to 

establish a positive and productive relationship with a new 

supervisor." (Appellant's App. at 327.) When the May 28 letter 

is read in its entirety, it is clear that it does not raise an 

inference of retaliation. 

We also note that with regard to Viola's May 28 letter no 

action was taken to transfer Appellant out of the legal 

department. One of the elements of a prima facie case of 

retaliation is that the employee be disadvantaged by some act of 

the employer. Appellant has pointed to no act related to the 

letter to show that she was disadvantaged in any way. 

We have also examined the record as to other incidents or 

events which Appellant urges as evidence of retaliation or 

discrimination. These include the initial employment of Glenda 

Overstreet and then later a change in Glenda Overstreet's duties 

to include the supervision of Appellant. Again, it is apparent 

that these events did not constitute sufficient evidence to create 

an issue of material fact. 

Appellant also asserts that SBG denied her access to the 

company grievance procedure in retaliation for her filing a civil 

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rights claim. When Appellee, Overstreet, was appointed as 

Appellant's supervisor, Appellant filed a company grievance 

regarding the change. SBG refused to process the grievance on the 

grounds that Appellant's general allegations of disparate and 

discriminatory treatment were the subjects of previously filed 

KCCR complaints and that the purpose of the SBG grievance 

procedure was to address complaints before any outside legal or 

administrative actions were taken. There is no evidence that 

other employees were treated differently with respect to the 

grievance procedure or that the stated policy was in retaliation 

for Appellant's civil rights complaints. Thus, Appellant has 

produced no evidence to convince a reasonable trier of fact that 

SBG's stated reasons for denying her access to the company 

grievance procedure were pretextual. 

The judgment of the District Court for the District of Kansas 

is AFFIRMED . 

Entered for the Court 

Oliver Seth 

Circuit Judge 

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