Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00850/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00850-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

MARK J. HANSEN, MONICA S.

HANSEN, BERNIE L. HANSEN,

KELLY A. HANSEN, CARL J.

BARTALDO, DONALD R. LANCASTER,

CONSTANCE A. LANCASTER, SHASTA

GENERAL ENGINEERING, INC., a

California Corporation,

NO. CIV. S-02-0850 FCD GGH

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ARTHUR SCHUBERT, JOYCE BARAL,

BERNIE RENTERIA, R. GARCIA,

GREG A. ZIEGLER, VINCENT

ZAMBRANA, STEPHANIE McCALL,

SHON HILL, CRAIG BURSON, K.R.

ERICSON,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on defendants’ Arthur

Schubert, Greg A. Ziegler, Vincent Zambrana, Stephanie McCall,

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1 Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed defendants Joyce

Baral, Bernie Renteria, R. Garcia, Shon Hill, K.R. Ericson. See

Docket Nos. 85, 87-88. 

2 Any further references to a “Rule” or “Rules” are to

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.

3 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

See E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

4 For the purposes of this motion, the court recounts

plaintiffs’ version of the facts, unless otherwise noted. (See

Pls.’ Separate Stmt. of Disp. & Undisp. Facts (“SDF”), filed Aug.

15, 2006).

Plaintiffs object to various pieces of evidence that

defendants present in support of their motion. However, said

evidence is immaterial to the court’s analysis of the summary

judgment motion.

Defendants object to plaintiffs’ late filing of various

declarations and an amended separate statement of disputed and

undisputed facts. To the extent that such filings include

evidence that was referred to, but inadvertently omitted from the

original filings, the court considers such evidence. However, to

the extent plaintiffs present new evidence in such filings, after

this motion was submitted and without leave of court, the court

does not consider such evidence. 

2

and Craig Burson’s (“defendants”)1 motion for summary judgment,

or, in the alternative, summary adjudication pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 56.2 For the reasons set forth below,3

defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part. 

BACKGROUND4

This case arises out of a search of plaintiffs’ residence

and business pursuant to a search warrant pertaining to

allegations of tax evasion against plaintiffs. Plaintiffs assert

various violations of their constitutional rights based upon the

issuance and execution of the search warrant. 

Defendant Schubert was a criminal investigator with the

California Department of Employment Development (“EDD”). (SDF at

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3

2, ¶ 1). On August 9, 2000, Schubert received a call from a

confidential informant (“CI”), reporting what he believed to be

an illegal tax evasion payroll scheme involving Shasta General

Engineering, Inc. (“SGE”). (SDF at 2, ¶ 4). According to the

informant, SGE was issuing two checks to each employee, one for

wages and one for purported equipment rental. (SDF at 2, ¶ 5). 

Based upon his training and experience, Schubert believed that

the scheme, if true, was suspicious and warranted further

investigation. (SDF at 2, ¶ 6). 

Schubert conducted background checks on the informant,

including a criminal history and DMV records check. (SDF at 3,

¶ 7). He discovered that the informant was a local businessman

with no prior criminal history and no investigations or charges

pending. (SDF at 3, ¶ 7). He also suspected, and later

confirmed, that the CI was a business competitor of SGE who was

paying more for workers’ compensation insurance than SGE because

of SGE’s payment allocations. (See Statement of Probable Cause

in Supp. of Search Warrant (“Affidavit”), Ex. A to Decl. of

Arthur Schubert in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“Schubert Decl.”),

filed July 31, 2006, at 4-5). 

On April 20, 2001, at least six California Highway Patrol

(“CHP”) officers, several investigators from the Employment

Development Department (“EDD”), employees of the Franchise tax

board, and at least two deputy district attorneys entered and

searched the Hansen residence, the premises of Shasta General

Engineering, Inc. (“SGE”), and, later that morning, the Lancaster

residence. (SDF at 9, ¶ 1). The search was executed pursuant to

a search warrant pertaining to allegations of tax evasion against

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plaintiffs. (See SDF at 4, ¶¶ 11-13). The CHP officers

approached with guns drawn. (SDF at 9, ¶ 2). Plaintiff Monica

Hansen, who was the manager of SGE and ran the company from her

residence, was the first to see the CHP officers. (SDF at 9, ¶

3). The officers entered the main Hansen residence. (SDF at 9,

¶ 6). The officers then approached plaintiff Bernie Hansen’s

room and called out to him. (SDF at 10, ¶ 8). Bernie Hansen did

not respond because he was asleep. (SDF at 10, ¶ 8). The

officers kicked the door in, dragged him out of bed, and

handcuffed him. (SDF at 10, ¶ 9). They pushed him up against

his entertainment center and placed a shotgun against the back of

his neck. (SDF at 10, ¶ 9). Bernie Hansen remained in handcuffs

for at least an hour. (SDF at 11, ¶ 16).

Plaintiffs Kelly Hansen and Carl J. (“CJ”) Bartaldo lived in

an apartment in a detached section of the Hansen residence. (SDF

at 10, ¶ 10). Kelly Hansen woke up to loud noises and banging on

her apartment door. (SDF at 10, ¶ 10). As she came to the door,

it was pushed in toward her, and she raised her hand to stop the

door from hitting her. (SDF at 10, ¶ 10). Defendant Zambrana

pulled her through the doorway, and ripped her top, leaving her

breast exposed. (SDF at 10, ¶ 10). Despite repeated requests,

Kelly Hansen was not allowed to change her top for several hours. 

(SDF at 11, ¶ 18-19).

Plaintiffs Monica Hansen, Kelly Hansen, Bernie Hansen, and

CJ Bartaldo were eventually gathered together and ordered to sit

at the dining room table. (Decl. Of Bernie Hansen (“B. Hansen

Decl.”), filed Aug. 15, 2006, ¶ 3). No one ever informed them

that they were free to leave, with the exception of Monica

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5 Plaintiffs assert that defendants’ motion does not

challenge their Supplement Complaint, filed March 8, 2005, or any

of their state claims set forth in their Second Amended

Complaint, filed September 16, 2002. The Supplemental Complaint

added factual allegations and the § 1983 claim against defendants

for retaliating against plaintiffs for filing this suit. 

Plaintiffs’ state law claims set forth in the Second Amended

Complaint were dismissed with prejudice by this court’s

Memorandum and Order, filed November 4, 2002. As such, the only

remaining claims in this action are plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims. 

(continued...)

5

Hansen, who was told after several hours that she was free to

leave. (SDF at 11, ¶ 15). Plaintiffs were also prevented from

taking telephone calls during the execution of the search

warrant. (SDF at 11, ¶ 20). 

In executing the search warrant, the officers searched

through the Hansens’ home, looking though mail, looking in the

freezer, going though photo albums, going through drawers,

looking under mattresses, and disturbing a crematory urn. (SDF

at 11, ¶ 21). The officers removed sixty-three boxes of evidence

from the Hansen residence. (SDF at 12, ¶ 28).

That same day, CHP and EDD officers also searched the

Lancaster residence, where only plaintiff Constance Lancaster was

home. (SDF at 11, ¶ 24). Constance Lancaster was asked to sit

at the dining room table. (Pls.’ Supplemental Responses to

Defs.’ Interrogatories, Ex. 14 to Decl. of Michael S. Sorgen

(“Sorgen Decl.”), filed Aug. 15, 2006, at 18). When she needed

to use the restroom, she was escorted by the police officer. 

(Id. at 19). The officers searched various parts of her home,

including her underwear drawer. (Id. at 19-21). 

Plaintiffs assert claims for relief for violations of their

federal civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.5 Specifically,

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5(...continued)

Defendants’ motion does not address plaintiffs’ claims

for retaliation under § 1983. Therefore, the court does not

address the merits of this claim. 

6 In their opposition, plaintiffs also argue that the

warrant “was so vastly overbroad that it violated plaintiffs’

rights.” (Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“Opp’n”),

filed Aug. 15, 2006, at 17). Plaintiffs neither asserted this

claim in their Second Amended Complaint nor in their Supplemental

Complaint. Further, plaintiffs did not seek leave to amend their

complaint to add such a claim. As such, the court will not

address the merits of this claim. 

6

plaintiffs assert that (1) there was insufficient probable cause

to support the issuance of a search warrant; (2) plaintiffs were

unlawfully seized during the search; (3) the officers exceeded

the scope of the search warrant; (4) the officers used excessive

force in executing the warrant; and (5) defendants retaliated

against them for filing this action.6 

STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

157 (1970).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis of its motion, and

identifying those portions of "the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any," which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a

dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

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7

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. at 324. Indeed,

summary judgment should be entered against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322. In such a

circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the

standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule

56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-289 (1968). In attempting to establish the existence of

this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of

specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible

discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute

exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact

that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986),

and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that 

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,

Id. at 251-52.

/////

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8

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue

of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to

resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” 

First Nat’l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in

order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Rule 56(e) advisory

committee's note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule

56(c); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir.

1982). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, and

all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed

before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Nevertheless, inferences are not

drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation

to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be

drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224,

1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S. Ct. at 1356.

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9

ANALYSIS

I. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in part that “[e]very person who,

under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected,

any citizen . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be

liable to the party injured . . . .” Section 1983 confers no

substantive rights itself, but rather, “provides remedies for

deprivations of rights established elsewhere.” City of Oklahoma

City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985).

A. Probable Cause Sufficient to Obtain a Search Warrant

Plaintiffs’ bring a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

based upon their allegations that no probable cause existed for

issuance of the search warrant. Specifically, plaintiffs assert

that defendant Schubert (1) failed to establish the reliability

of the confidential informant; (2) failed to bring forth

information that corroborates the allegations of illegal activity

by the confidential informant; and (3) failed to disclose

material facts in his statement of probable cause in support of

the search warrant.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,

applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,

prohibits searches and arrests without probable cause. Beck v.

Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 90-91 (1964); McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 F.2d 1005,

1007-08 (9th Cir. 1984). “The long-prevailing standard of

probable cause protects ‘citizens from rash and unreasonable

interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime.’”

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Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (quoting Brinegar

v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)). However, in

reviewing the sufficiency of an affidavit in support of a search

warrant, the Supreme Court has “repeatedly said that after-thefact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should

not take the form of de novo review. A magistrate’s

determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by

reviewing courts. A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing

courts toward warrants is inconsistent with the Fourth

Amendment’s strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to

a warrant . . . .” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983)

(internal quotations and citations omitted). The Supreme Court

has further explained:

The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a

practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the

circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him,

including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of

persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair

probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will

be found in a particular place. And the duty of a

reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate

had a “substantial basis for concluding” that probable

cause existed.

Id. at 238-39 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271

(1960)). “Probable cause requires only a probability or

substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of

such activity . . . innocent behavior frequently will provide the

basis for a showing of probable cause.” Id. at 245; see also

Dawson v. City of Seattle, 435 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th Cir. 2006)

(reviewing a judge’s finding of probable cause for the issuance

of a search warrant for “clear error”); United States v. Meek,

366 F.3d 705, 712 (9th Cir. 2004) (according “great deference” to

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the issuing judge’s findings). In this context, probable cause

exists if “the evidence, considered by the magistrate, viewed as

a whole, would permit a reasonable person to believe that a

search . . . had a fair probability of revealing evidence.” 

Dawson, 435 F.3d at 1062.

Plaintiffs contend that the affidavit supporting the search

warrant did not establish the reliability of the confidential

informant because (1) as a competitor of SGE, the informant may

have had a financial motive for initiating an investigation of

SGE; (2) the affidavit did not contain sufficient underlying

circumstances upon which the informant based his beliefs; and (3)

additional information in the affidavit did not corroborate the

allegations of illegal activity. Defendants concede that

assessing the reliability of hearsay information is one piece of

evaluating whether “probable cause” exists for the issuance of a

warrant. However, defendants correctly point out that there is

no particular test for reliability. Rather, where “an

unquestionably honest citizen comes forward with a report of

criminal activity – which if fabricated would subject him to

criminal liability” – the Supreme Court has found rigorous

scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge unnecessary. Gates, 462

U.S. at 238. “Even if we entertain some doubt as to an

informant’s motives, his explicit and detailed description of

alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was

observed firsthand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might

otherwise be the case.” Id. at 234. “It is enough, for purposes

of assessing probable cause, that corroboration through other

sources of information reduced the chances of a reckless or

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prevaricating tale, thus providing a substantial basis for

crediting the hearsay.” Id. at 244-45 (internal quotations and

citation omitted).

In this case, the citizen informant told defendant Schubert

that he personally had been employed by SGE and plaintiffs from

1996 through 1999. (See Affidavit ¶ 26). The informant was a

former supervisor at SGE. (Affidavit ¶ 14). The informant

personally had received two pay checks each week from SGE which

he explained were his wages divided in half. (Affidavit ¶ 14). 

He explained that the first check was for half his regular wages,

and that the second check was for also for earnings, but

“disguised as a reimbursement to the employee for the rental of

non-existent tools and equipment.” (Affidavit ¶ 14). The

informant further stated that he had friends who still worked for

SGE and believed that the company was still engaged in the same

practice. (Affidavit ¶ 22).

Defendants point to other factors indicating the reliability

of the information received. Schubert spoke to the informant on

several different occasions, both in person and by telephone;

this was not a one-time anonymous tip. (See Affidavit ¶¶ 13, 14,

22, 26). The information provided to defendant Schubert was

personally observed and known to the informant. (See Affidavit

¶¶ 14, 22, 26). The informant provided valid identification

(although he did not want his name disclosed because of safety

concerns). (Affidavit ¶ 14). Schubert conducted a CLETS

criminal background check and a DMV records check on the

informant and determined that he was a local business man with no

prior criminal history and no investigations or charges pending. 

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(Affidavit ¶ 14). The informant also reduced his allegations to

writing and signed them under penalty of perjury thereby

subjecting himself to criminal penalties if he was lying.

(Affidavit ¶ 26).

In addition, defendant Schubert confirmed much of the

information provided by the informant through independent

sources. He conducted public records searches and verified the

corporate status of SGE, the identities of the principals and the

locations of its various business operations. (See Affidavit ¶

13). Everything he found confirmed the information provided by

the informant. The informant also provided the locations of

current SGE field operations. (See Affidavit ¶ 14). Defendant

Schubert went to those locations and personally observed that SGE

crews were, in fact, at those sites. (See Affidavit ¶ 15).

Schubert’s observations not only confirmed that the informant was

correct as to SGE’s business operations, but also that his

information was current.

At the locations of current SGE field operations, defendant

Schubert personally observed that trucks and other equipment in

the field bore “Shasta General Engineering” signs. (Affidavit ¶

15). He observed that when crew members needed equipment, they

went to the “Shasta General Engineering” trucks to obtain it. 

(Affidavit ¶ 15). Thus, it appeared to Schubert that the

employees were using tools and equipment provided by SGE, not

their own tools such that they would be entitled to a separate

check from SGE for “equipment rental.” (Affidavit ¶ 15).

Plaintiffs claim that the company name on the side of trucks

provides no basis for inferring the ownership of the vehicle or

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the equipment contained therein. However, a reasonable person

could fairly infer such ownership. Likewise, from observing

employees going to the SGE trucks to get tools and equipment, a

reasonable person could fairly infer that the tools kept in the

SGE trucks belonged to SGE. It was not necessary that Schubert

be correct nor that his opinions and conclusions be accurate

“more likely than not.” See Dawson, 435 F.3d at 1062. A “fair

probability” was all that was required. Id.

Likewise, Schubert did not merely rely on the informant or

his own opinions regarding the legality of the payroll scheme.

Schubert also consulted with Special Agent (“SA”) Baral from the

California Franchise Tax Board. (Affidavit ¶¶ 28-33). SA Baral

was a sworn peace officer and tax auditor. (Affidavit ¶ 27;

Schubert Decl. ¶ 11). She had substantial experience in

investigating suspected tax fraud and tax evasion cases. 

(Affidavit ¶ 29). SA Baral provided copies of SGE’s corporate

tax returns and supporting documents that had been signed and

submitted by plaintiff Monica Hansen. (Affidavit ¶ 30). SA

Baral expressed her opinion to Schubert that if SGE was involved

in the payroll scheme as suspected, then Mark and Monica Hansen,

as well as their accountant Mitch Isner, would have been guilty

of felony tax fraud and willfully aiding or assisting in the

preparation of fraudulent returns. (Affidavit ¶ 31).

For these reasons, the “totality of the circumstances,”

which included information from the informant, evidence Schubert

independently derived from his own investigation and the opinions

he obtained from legal experts, there was a “substantial basis”

for the judge’s determination that “probable cause” existed to

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7 To the extent that plaintiffs assert that Schubert (1)

failed to disclose that the informant was believed to be a

business competitor who had some motive to try to harm their

business; (2) failed to disclose that the information provided by

the informant was hearsay from friends who still worked at SGE;

and (3) failed to disclose that he excluded 16 prior employees

from his analysis of whether employees leaving SGE doubled their

reportable wages, such facts were disclosed in the affidavit. 

(Affidavit ¶¶ 13, 22, 25). 

15

issue a search warrant so that the matter could be investigated

further. 

However, plaintiffs argue that defendant Schubert should

have also included in his affidavit (1) a statement that the law

allowed allocation of employee payment between wages and employee

business expenses; (2) that he failed to speak Jennifer Stuhr, an

auditor for the EDD; and (3) that he never actually spoke to SGE

employees or ex-employees.7 Plaintiffs assert that these

omissions amount to judicial deception. 

“It is clearly established that judicial deception may not

be employed to obtain a search warrant.” Franks v. Delaware, 438

U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978). To support a § 1983 claim for judicial

deception, a plaintiff must show that the defendant deliberately

or recklessly made false statements or omissions that were

material to the finding of probable cause. Galbraith v. County

of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002); Hervey v.

Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 788-89 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that to

survive summary judgment plaintiff “must make a substantial

showing of deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the

truth and establish that, but for the dishonesty, the challenged

action would not have occurred”) (quotations and citations

omitted). The court determines the materiality of the alleged

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false statements or omissions. Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014,

1024 (9th Cir. 2002).

The court finds that the alleged omissions in this case were

not material to the issuance of the search warrant. As to

plaintiffs’ first contention that Schubert omitted that an

employer could legally allocate employee payment between wages

and business expenses, the affidavit makes clear that it was not

the legitimate implementation of such a payment scheme that was

at issue. Rather, the affidavit of probable cause relates to

probable cause of whether SGE’s used such allocation where there

were no business expenses in an effort to evade paying workers’

compensation insurance premiums. The affidavit sets forth that

the CI told Schubert that SGE was issuing two pay checks per

week, one for half the earned wages and one for the rental of

non-existent tools and equipment. (Affidavit ¶ 14). Therefore,

a statement that the legitimate use of such payment allocation is

legal is irrelevant to the circumstances set forth in the

affidavit. 

Plaintiffs also contend that Schubert should have disclosed

that he did not consult with Stuhr, the auditor for the EDD. 

However, defendant Schubert consulted with Special Agent Baral of

the California Franchise Board, who advised him that if SGE paid

employees for personal service, but disguised it as equipment

rental, such actions would be in violation of the California

Revenue and Tax Codes. (Affidavit ¶ 31). Plaintiffs assert that

the omission of the failure to consult with Stuhr was material

because Stuhr stated in her deposition that such a payment scheme

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8 None of the deposition testimony included by plaintiffs

includes such a statement. Further, Stuhr testified in her

deposition that after a review of the records, she came to the

conclusion that the Hansens underpaid their taxes. (Dep. of

Jennifer Stuhr (“Stuhr Dep.”), Ex. 7 to Sorgen Decl). However,

as set forth, infra, even if Stuhr made this statement, it is

irrelevant to the issuance of the search warrant. 

9 Plaintiffs citation to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in

Butler is unavailing due to the factual differences between that

case and the one at hand. In Butler, the investigator failed to

inform the magistrate judge that he did not complete his search

because he never searched the database for plaintiff’s full name

or the correct name of his company, both of which he had access

to at the time he submitted the affidavit. 281 F.2d at 1025. 

The investigator failed to inform the magistrate judge that the

taxes may have actually been paid. Id. Further, the Ninth

Circuit also noted in its analysis that the Idaho state appellate

court had overruled the state court magistrate judge’s finding of

probable cause, which had necessarily influences the district

court’s analysis of the sufficiency of the warrant. Id. at 26.

None of the factors in Butler are present in this case. 

There is no evidence that defendant Schubert failed to conduct an

adequate investigation prior to submitting his affidavit of

probable cause. Likewise, in this case, the judge’s

determination of probable cause has not been overturned. 

(continued...)

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is not illegal.8 However, as set forth above, the legality of a

legitimate payment allocation between payment for services and

equipment rental was not at issue in the affidavit; rather, at

issue was whether there was probable cause that SGE was evading

taxes by paying employees for non-existent equipment rental. 

Defendant Schubert did not affirmatively misrepresent or imply in

his affidavit that he did not consult with an auditor for the

EDD. Further, he stated in his affidavit that he consulted with

a Special Agent with the California Franchise Board, who rendered

an opinion based in part upon SGE’s corporation income tax

returns for tax years 1997, 1998, and 1999. Therefore, any

failure to disclose that Schubert did not speak to an EDD auditor

was irrelevant to the issuance of the search warrant.9 

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9(...continued)

Therefore, plaintiffs’ citation to Butler is not persuasive. 

10 There is no dispute that defendant Schubert was the

only defendant who was personally involved in the preliminary

investigation up to the point when the warrant was actually

obtained. Therefore, none of the other defendants can be held

liable for acts occurring prior to the issuance of the warrant. 

18

Finally, plaintiffs contend that defendant Schubert should

have specifically disclosed in his affidavit that he did not

actually speak to SGE employees or ex-employees, other than the

confidential informant. In his affidavit, defendant Schubert set

forth a detailed account of his investigation. He also set forth

a detailed account of his conversations with the confidential

informant, who was a former employee of SGE. A review of the

affidavit and the investigation by Schubert as described therein 

makes clear that Schubert did not speak to SGE employees or exemployees, other than the CI. The failure to explicitly state

that Schubert did not do so does not render the affidavit in any

way misleading. Therefore, this omission was immaterial to the

issuance of the search warrant.

Because under the totality of the circumstances there was a

substantial basis for the judge’s determination that probable

cause existed to issue a search warrant, and because any

omissions in the affidavit were immaterial to the issuance of the

search warrant, defendants’10 motion for summary judgment

regarding plaintiffs’ claim that no probable cause existed for

issuance of the search warrant is GRANTED. 

B. Unlawful Seizure During the Search

Plaintiffs claim that their Fourth Amendment rights were

violated when they were unlawfully seized during the execution of

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11 Plaintiff Monica Hansen also asserts for the first time

in plaintiffs’ opposition that she twice asked for an attorney

and was told that she did not have a right to an attorney nor did

she need an attorney. The “right to counsel attaches only at or

after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been

initiated against him.” Kirby v. Illinois, 231 F.3d 663, 688

(1977). To the extent that plaintiff is attempting to assert a

claim based upon the failure to be afforded counsel after the

request for one during a custodial interrogation, such a claim

would be cognizable under the Fifth Amendment. See Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). However, no such claim was

alleged in any of plaintiffs’ filed amended or supplemental

complaints. 

Plaintiffs also contend that Kelly Hansen was forbidden

from changing her ripped shirt for two hours and that Bernie

Hansen was forced to remain in handcuffs for at least an hour. 

The court will address these assertions below in its discussion

of plaintiffs’ claims for excessive force. 

19

the search warrant. Specifically, plaintiffs assert that (1) the

officers displayed their weapons and touched plaintiffs in order

to move them to the living room; (2) Monica Hansen, Kelly Hansen,

and Bernie Hansen were all forced to remain at the living room

table for several hours and they were not told that they were

free to leave; (3) Connie Lancaster was told that she had to

remain in the living room; (4) Connie Lancaster was escorted to

the bathroom; and (5) Monica Hansen was not allowed to answer the

telephone during the entire period of the search.11

A person has been “seized” with the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment “only when, by means of physical force or a show of

authority, his freedom of movement is restrained.” United States

v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). However, it has long

been established that police officers executing a search warrant

may detain the occupants of the building or place to be searched. 

See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) (“[F]or Fourth

Amendment purposes, we hold that a warrant to search for

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contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it

the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises

while a proper search is conducted.”); Dawson, 435 F.3d at 1065

(applying the doctrine of Summers “to all searches upon probable

cause, not just searches for contraband”); Ganwich v. Knapp, 319

F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding detention of

business’s employees in search of business). The United States

Supreme Court has held that “[a]n officer’s authority to detain

incident to a search is categorical; it does not depend on the

“quantum of proof justifying detention of the extent of the

intrusion to be imposed by the seizure.” Muehler v. Mena, 544

U.S. 93, 98 (2005) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit has

interpreted the Supreme Court’s language “to mean that the

duration of a detention may be coextensive with the period of a

search, and require no further justification.” Dawson, 435 F.3d

at 1066. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that detention of a

building’s occupants during a search furthers at least three law

enforcement interests: (1) “detention prevents a suspect from

fleeing before the police discover contraband;” (2) “detention

minimizes the risk that an officer or an occupant might be harmed

during the search;” and (3) “detention often expedites a search.” 

Id. (citations omitted). However, the police do not have

“unfettered authority to detain a building’s occupants in any way

they see fit;” the officer must conduct the detention in a

reasonable manner. Id. (citing Muehler, 544 U.S. 93). 

Accepting plaintiffs’ assertion that they were not told they

were free to leave as true, the officers executing the warrant

had the categorical right to detain plaintiffs for the entire

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12 The officers discovered an unregistered automatic

assault rifle in Kelly Hansen’s room as a result of the search. 

(Defs.’ Reply to SDF (“RUF”), filed Aug. 25, 2006, at 10, ¶ 6). 

The officers also located several other weapons during their

search of the home. (RUF at 10, ¶ 7). 

13 Plaintiffs deny this statement, but cite to no evidence

supporting their denial.

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duration of the search. In this case, defendants present

undisputed evidence that the officers executing the warrant had

information that the Hansens had multiple registered weapons,12

that Mark Hansen had previously resisted arrest, and that there

were dogs kept on the premises. (ROSS at 9, ¶ 1).13 As such,

the law enforcement interests in safely and effectively

conducting the search of the Hansen premises for evidence of tax

evasion justified the detention of plaintiffs during the search. 

See Dawson, 435 F.3d at 1066 (finding that detention of building

tenants was reasonable where, inter alia, the owner of the

boardinghouses was associated with a man who had a violent

criminal history). For these same reasons, it was reasonable for

the police to enter the premises aggressively and drawing their

sidearms, as was indicated by plaintiffs’ testimony, would not

render the detention unreasonable. See id. at 1068 (holding that

entering aggressively and drawing sidearms did not render the

detention unreasonable where the police had reason to believe

that an associate of the building owner might violently resist

the inspection team or their police escorts). Further, it was

not unreasonable for the officers to keep plaintiffs at the

dining room table or the living room couch for the duration of

the search in order to facilitate the inspection and its

completion. See id. These precautions prevented any of the

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plaintiffs from fleeing in the event that incriminating evidence

was found and minimized the risk of harm to officers by ensuring

that none of the employees were able to obtain a weapon. See

Ganwich, 319 F.3d at 1120.

Plaintiff Constance Lancaster claims that she was

unreasonably seized because she had to remain in the living room

and because she was escorted when she had to use the bathroom. 

As set forth above, these precautions were not unreasonable

because they served the important law enforcement interests of 

preventing plaintiff from fleeing in the event that incriminating

evidence was found, preventing plaintiff from destroying

evidence, and preventing plaintiff from obtaining a weapon. 

Further, defendants present evidence that the officers brought

plaintiff both water and coffee, and that she perceived them to

be concerned about her because they kept asking her if she was

okay. (Dep. of Constance Lancaster (“Lancaster Dep.”), Ex. B to

Decl. of Stephen J. Egan in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., filed

July 31, 2006, 48:23-49:8).

Plaintiff Monica Hansen, citing the Ninth Circuit’s decision

in Ganwich, also contends that her rights were violated because

she was not allowed to use the telephone during the search. 319

F.3d 1115. In Ganwich, the Ninth Circuit restated the rule that

“officers may prevent temporary detainees from using a telephone

only so long as that restriction is ‘carefully tailored to its

underlying justification.’” Id. at 1123 (quoting Florida v.

Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)). The court determined that it

was unreasonable for officers searching a business to tell

employees that they could not use a phone more than an hour after

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the premises had been secured. Id. In that case, there was no

threat that the employees would use the phone to warn others or

to destroy evidence. Id. The officers had already released some

of the employees, and therefore, if others were going to be

warned, the inability to use the telephone was not going to

prevent such communication. Id. Finally, the court noted that

the interest in preventing plaintiffs from making a phone call

was outweighed by plaintiffs’ stronger interests in contacting

relatives because certain plaintiffs needed to arrange for the

care of their children or to explain their apparent

disappearance. Id.

The facts of this case present circumstances that were not

present in Ganwich. Mark Hansen was one of the primary persons

under investigation. He was not at the home and his whereabouts

were unknown. Officers were concerned that the Hansen family

members would try to contact him so that he could flee, destroy

evidence and/or attempt to harm the officers. Officers were

already aware that Mark Hansen was known to have weapons and had

previously resisted arrest. Further, the confidential informant

had provided information that Mark Hansen was a “hot head” who

had been in several physical fights with employees and others. 

(Schubert Decl. ¶ 35). Therefore, it was reasonable for the

officers to prevent the Hansens from using the phone during the

duration of the search. Further, in this case, plaintiffs have

presented no countervailing interests such as the need to arrange

for childcare or to explain an absence to a relative, as was

persuasive in Ganwich.

/////

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14 Plaintiffs alleged in their Complaint that defendants

exceeded the scope of the search warrant by searching Kelly

Hansen’s C.J. Bartaldo’s cars, which were not authorized by the

search warrant. Although raised by defendants in their motion

for summary judgment, plaintiffs do not address this claim in

their opposition. The court interprets this silence as nonopposition to defendants’ motion on these grounds. Furthermore,

both Hansen and Bartaldo signed consent forms to search the cars,

although they assert that they were coerced into doing so with

the threat of seizure. (SDF at 5, ¶¶ 4-5). However, neither

plaintiff can identify which defendant, if any, searched their

vehicles. As such, defendants’ motion regarding this claim is

GRANTED. 

Plaintiffs also assert that the officers performed an

oral cavity search on Bernie Hansen. The court will address this

assertion in its discussion of plaintiffs’ excessive force

claims.

24

 For the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs have failed to

demonstrate any triable issues of material fact in support of

their claims that they were subjected to an unlawful seizure

during the search. Therefore, defendants’ motion for summary

judgment regarding plaintiffs’ claim that they were unlawfully

seized is GRANTED. 

C. Scope of the Search Warrant

Plaintiffs argue that there are triable issues of fact

regarding whether the search violated their Fourth Amendment

rights because it exceeded the scope of the warrant. 

Specifically, plaintiffs contend that officers unreasonably

searched in several locations which could not plausibly hold

evidence related to the crime of tax evasion, such as a crematory

urn, a medicine cabinet, the freezer, under mattresses, in

drawers, the mail, and photo albums.14 

It is well-established that the Fourth Amendment prevents

“general, exploratory searches and indiscriminate rummaging

through a person’s belongings.” United States v. Mann, 389 F.3d

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15 To the extent that plaintiffs assert that officers took

ashes from the crematory urn, such seizure would likely exceed

the scope of the warrant. However, plaintiffs do not identify

any defendant as the individual who took the ashes, nor do they

assert which agency the individual worked for.

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869, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). However, the search warrant need only

be reasonably specific, rather than elaborately detailed. Id.

(quoting United States v. Rude, 88 F.3d 1538, 1551 (9th Cir.

1996)). In this case, the search warrant authorized the seizure

of business documents, including paper documents and electronic

storage devices, such as magnetic tapes or CDs. These types of

items are small, portable, and very easy to hide in drawers,

boxes, containers such as an urn, medicine cabinets, or in the

freezer. Therefore, it was reasonable for the officers to infer

that the evidence they were authorized to seize could be found in

any of the places defendants searched.15 See United States v.

Williams, 687 F.2d 290, 293 (9th Cir. 1982) (upholding the search

of a lunch box because it was reasonable to infer that evidence

of marijuana cultivation, including documents, would be found in

the lunch box). 

Plaintiffs contend that the officers were searching for

drugs, not documents, because when Mark Hansen asked the court

clerk for a copy of the Hansen v. EDD warrant, he was given a

search warrant relating to a search for methamphetamine with a

similar number. Plaintiffs also assert that defendant Schubert

said that he expected officers to find large amounts of drugs and

cash at the residence during the search. However, it is

irrelevant to this action whether the court clerk gave Mark

Hansen a copy of the wrong search warrant. Further, assuming

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that defendant Schubert made such a statement, it is also

irrelevant whether defendant Schubert expected to find drugs or

cash. Defendants were reasonable in performing their search for

evidence of tax evasion. As such, defendants’ motion for summary

judgment regarding plaintiffs’ claim that the search exceeded the

scope of the search warrant is GRANTED. 

D. Excessive Force in Execution of the Search Warrant

Plaintiffs Kelly Hansen and Bernie Hansen argue that

defendants violated their constitutional rights by using

excessive force against them during the execution of the search

warrant. Whether law enforcement officials used excessive force

in the course of making an arrest is properly analyzed under the

Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard. Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). 

Determining whether the force used to effect a

particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth

Amendment requires a careful balancing of ‘the nature

and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth

Amendment interests’ against the countervailing

governmental interests at stake.

Id. at 396 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)). 

The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be evaluated

from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene. Id. 

A proper application of the reasonableness inquiry

requires careful attention to the facts and

circumstances of each particular case, including the

severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect

poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers

or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest

or attempting to evade arrest by flight. 

Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2002)

(internal quotations omitted); see also McKenzie v. Lamb, 738

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F.2d 1005, 1011 (9th Cir. 1984) (the determination requires the

analysis of factors such as “the requirements for the officers’

safety, the motivation for the arrest, and the extent of the

injury inflicted”).

Defendants argue that the level of force used by officers

while executing the warrant was reasonable under the

circumstances. Defendants also argue that even if the force was

in some way excessive, the officers are protected from liability

under the doctrine of qualified immunity. The doctrine of

qualified immunity protects from suit government officers who do

not knowingly violate the law. Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d

1420, 1438 (9th Cir. 1994). Qualified immunity is a generous

standard designed to protect “all but the plainly incompetent or

those who knowingly violate the law.” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S.

478, 495 (1991) (citation omitted). A law officer can establish

qualified immunity by demonstrating (1) that the law governing

the officer’s conduct was not clearly established at the time of

the challenged actions, or (2) that under the clearly established

law, an officer could reasonably have believed that the alleged

conduct was lawful. See Katz v. United States, 194 F.3d 962, 967

(9th Cir. 1999); Mendoza v. Block, 27 F.3d 1357, 1360 (9th Cir.

1994); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)

(observing that police officers “are shielded from liability for

civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known”).

The question of immunity generally is not one for the jury. 

Qualified immunity “‘is an immunity from suit rather than a mere

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defense to liability’ . . . . [Therefore,] [i]mmunity ordinarily

should be decided by the court long before trial.” Hunter v.

Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991) (citation omitted). However, if

a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the

circumstances under which the officer acted, then the court

should make the determination after the facts have been developed

at trial. Act Up!\Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th

Cir. 1993). 

The initial inquiry that the court must make to determine

whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity is whether,

“[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the

injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated

a constitutional right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201

(2001) (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)). The

next inquiry is whether the constitutional right was clearly

established. Id. This inquiry must be taken in the light of the

specific context of the case. The contours of the right must be

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand

that what he is doing violates that right. Id. However, this

does not mean that an official action is protected by qualified

immunity unless the very action in question has previously been

held unlawful, but, rather, in light of pre-existing law, the

unlawfulness must be apparent. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739

(2002) (internal citations omitted). The salient question is

whether the law at the time of the disputed conduct gave

defendants “fair warning that their alleged treatment of

plaintiffs was unconstitutional.” See id. at 741. There must

exist a clearly established rule so that “it would be clear to a

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reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation

he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205-06. 

1. Kelly Hansen

Plaintiff Kelly Hansen asserts that she was sleeping in her

room, in a detached section of the Hansen residence where she

lived with her fiancé CJ Bartaldo, when she heard loud noises,

including someone banging on her door. (RUF ¶ 10). She went to

the front door and tried to open it, but it was slammed forward

toward her. (Dep. of Kelly Hansen (“K. Hansen Dep.”), Ex. 10 to

Sorgen Decl., 49:3-5). Plaintiff threw up her hands because she

thought it was going to hit her face. (Id. at 50:13-15). She

asserts that defendant Zambrana grabbed her by the front of her

tank top and jerked her through the door opening. (Id. at 50:20-

51-5). In doing so, defendant Zambrana’s hand grabbed her breast

at the same time and ripped plaintiff’s tank top. (Id. at 51:5-

11). Plaintiff’s left breast was exposed. (Id. at 51:12-15). 

Plaintiff was pushed up against the wall with several guns

pointed at her for two minutes. (Id. at 53:22-54:3). Plaintiff

did not realize that defendants were police officers for

approximately fifteen minutes when she noticed that there were

black and white cars on the property. (Id. at 54:21-55:3). 

Plaintiff asked Sergeant Ericson if she could change her shirt

because her breast remained exposed. (Id. at 85:3-9). Plaintiff

also asked defendant Zambrana, defendant McCall, and defendant

Schubert if she could change her shirt in order to cover herself. 

(Id. at 85:17-22; 86:18-20; 124:11-20). Plaintiff was not

allowed to change her shirt for several hours, after she had

answered defendant Schubert’s questions. (Id. at 123:24-124:20). 

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As set forth above, plaintiff Kelly Hansen has presented

evidence that she was attempting to open the doors to the

officers and comply with the search when she was grabbed from her

apartment, her top was ripped such that her breast was exposed,

and guns were pointed at her. Then, for several hours, including

the time period when she was questioned by defendant Schubert,

plaintiff was not allowed to change her shirt in order to cover

herself. As such, there are triable issues of fact regarding

whether defendants used excessive force against plaintiff Kelly

Hansen and whether her detention for several hours with her

breast exposed was unreasonable.

Defendants contend that they are entitled to qualified

immunity. However, assuming that plaintiff’s version of the

facts is true, at the time of the search, the law was

sufficiently clearly established to place a reasonable law

officer on notice that using this type of force against an

individual who was complying with a search and the failure to

allow her to cover her exposed breast for several hours while she

was detained is unlawful. See McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 F.2d 1005,

1010 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the use of weapons,

restraining individuals by force, handcuffing, throwing

individuals against the ground, and failing to identify as law

enforcement is a violation of the Fourth Amendment where the

arrested individuals did not resist arrest); Summers, 452 U.S.

701-02 (holding that in order for the conditions of detention

during the execution of a search warrant to be reasonable, the

governmental interest must outweigh the intrusion); Franklin v.

Foxworth, 31 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1994) (“A detention

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conducted in connection with a search may be unreasonable if it

is unnecessarily . . . degrading.”). Thus, defendants had “fair

warning that their alleged treatment of plaintiff was

unconstitutional.” Hope, 536 U.S. at 741. Because there are

triable issues of fact as to whether the force used against

plaintiff Kelly Hansen and the conditions of her subsequent

detention were unreasonable, and because defendants had notice

that their alleged conduct was unconstitutional, the court cannot

find that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity at this

stage of the litigation. 

Therefore, because plaintiff Kelly Hansen has presented

evidence demonstrating a triable issue of material fact regarding

the reasonableness of the seizure, defendants Zambrana, McCall,

and Schubert’s motion for summary judgment in regards to this

claim is DENIED. However, because plaintiff Kelly Hansen

presents no evidence regarding defendant Ziegler’s or defendant

Burson’s action relating to this claim, defendant Ziegler’s and

defendant Burson’s motion for summary judgment regarding this

claim is GRANTED.

2. Bernie Hansen

Plaintiff Bernie Hansen asserts that he was awakened by his

locked bedroom door being kicked off the hinges. (Dep. of Bernie

Hansen (“B. Hansen Dep.”), Ex. 10 to Sorgen Decl., 48:17-22). 

Defendants Ziegler, Burson, and another officer entered the room,

carrying assault weapons and wearing a bullet proof vest. (Id.

at 51:2-22). Plaintiff was still laying down in bed, under the

covers, and the defendant Ziegler dragged him out of bed by the

right arm. (Id. 53:4-24). Defendant Ziegler then dragged him to

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the entertainment center and pinned him up against it while he

and the other officers were holding him. (Id. at 54:1-3). 

Plaintiff’s chin was pushed into the wood and a single barrel

shotgun was pushed up against his head. (Id. at 55:10-21). 

Defendant Ziegler handcuffed his hands in the back. (Id. at

58:1-5). Plaintiff contends that he did not say anything during

this period of time. (Id. at 58:8-10). Plaintiff also contends

that he did not swallow anything. (Id. at 58:15-16). 

Nevertheless, defendant Ziegler searched his mouth. (Id. at

65:3-4). Further, defendant McCall told Ziegler to search

plaintiff’s mouth again. (Id. at 65:10-19). Plaintiff was

forced to remain in handcuffs for at least an hour. (Id. at

73:18-23).

As set forth above, plaintiff Bernie Hansen has presented

evidence that he was sleeping when defendants kicked in his door,

dragged him out of bed, pinned him up against the entertainment

center with a shot gun, handcuffed him, and performed an oral

search. Plaintiff was then kept in handcuffs for over an hour. 

Plaintiff’s evidence also demonstrates that Bernie Hansen was not

resisting the officers, was not speaking to the officers, and had

not swallowed anything. As such, there are triable issues of

fact regarding whether defendants used excessive force against

plaintiff Bernie Hansen and whether his detention for at least an

hour in handcuffs was unreasonable.

Defendants contend that they are entitled to qualified

immunity because the law applicable to these circumstances was

not clearly established at the time of the search. In regards to

the use of handcuffs during the detention, defendants are

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correct. At the time of the search, it was not clearly

established in the Ninth Circuit, that handcuffing a person and

detaining him in handcuffs during a search for evidence would

violate his Fourth Amendment rights. See Meredith v. Erath, 342

F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003). It was not until 2003 that the

Ninth Circuit clarified that this conduct, absent justifiable

circumstances, constituted a Fourth Amendment violation. Id. 

However, assuming that plaintiff’s version of the facts is true,

at the time of the search, the law was sufficiently clearly

established to place a reasonable law officer on notice that

using this type of force against an individual who was complying

with a search is unlawful. See McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 F.2d 1005,

1010 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the use of weapons,

restraining individuals by force, handcuffing, throwing

individuals against the ground, and failing to identify as law

enforcement is a violation of the Fourth Amendment where the

arrested individuals did not resist arrest). Therefore,

defendants had “fair warning that their alleged treatment of

plaintiff was unconstitutional.” Hope, 536 U.S. at 741. Because

there are triable issues of fact as to whether the force used

against plaintiff Bernie Hansen was unreasonable, and because

defendants had notice that their alleged conduct was

unconstitutional, the court cannot find that defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the litigation in

regards to the force used in defendants’ execution of the search

warrant. 

Therefore, because plaintiff Bernie Hansen has presented

evidence demonstrating a triable issue of material fact regarding

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16 Plaintiffs’ basis for claiming damages for SGE’s

business losses is that the warrant was so vastly overbroad that

it violated plaintiffs’ rights. Plaintiffs did not allege a

claim on this basis in any of their filed complaints, and

therefore, the court will not consider this argument.

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the reasonableness of the force used, defendants Zeigler, Burson,

and McCall’s motion for summary judgment in regards to this claim

is DENIED. However, because plaintiff Bernie Hansen presents no

evidence regarding defendant Zambrana’s or defendant Schubert’s

action relating to this claim, defendant Zambrana’s and defendant

Schubert’s motion for summary judgment regarding this claim is

GRANTED.

II. Damages 

Plaintiffs assert that they have suffered damages for lost

income and future profits arising from violations of the Fourth

Amendment. Specifically, plaintiffs assert that they suffered

losses to their business and to their business reputations as a

result of the search and seizure. However, as set forth above,

only plaintiffs Bernie Hansen and Kelly Hansen have presented

triable issues of fact regarding claims for violations of the

Fourth Amendment.16 There is no connection between the claims

for excessive force and the claimed damages for lost income and

future profits. Therefore, defendants’ motion for summary

judgment regarding plaintiffs’ claim for lost income and future

profits is GRANTED.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part. Plaintiffs Bernie Hansen and Kelly

Hansen have demonstrated triable issues of fact in regards to

their claims for excessive force and unreasonable search and

seizure in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights against

defendants. However, plaintiffs have failed to raise triable

issues of material fact in order to withstand summary judgment

with respect to all other asserted claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 28, 2006

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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