Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-02480/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-02480-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEON E. MORRIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

PETERSEN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 12-cv-02480-WHO (PR) 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Dkt. No. 25

INTRODUCTION

Defendants move to revoke plaintiff Leon Morris’s in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status 

and dismiss this federal civil rights action because he has filed at least three prior lawsuits 

that were dismissed because they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim. Not 

all of the cases listed by defendants count as strikes, but at least three do. Accordingly, 

defendants’ motion is GRANTED, Morris’s IFP status is REVOKED, and the action is 

DISMISSED without prejudice to Morris filing a new action accompanied by full payment 

for the filing fee of $400.00. 

DISCUSSION

Defendants assert that Morris has filed at least six prisoner lawsuits and appeals that 

were dismissed on grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim 

for relief. According to defendants, these prior suits justify the revocation of Morris’s IFP 

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status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 1

A prisoner may not bring a civil action IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 “if the prisoner 

has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an 

action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is 

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the 

prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” Id. § 1915(g). Section 

1915(g) requires that this Court consider prisoner actions dismissed before, as well as 

after, the statute’s 1996 enactment. Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1311–12 (9th Cir. 

1997).

For purposes of a dismissal that may be counted under § 1915(g), the phrase “fails 

to state a claim on which relief may be granted” parallels the language of Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and carries the same interpretation, the word “frivolous” refers to 

a case that is “of little weight or importance: having no basis in law or fact,” and the word 

“malicious” refers to a case “filed with the ‘intention or desire to harm another.’” Andrews 

v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Only cases within one of 

these three categories can be counted as strikes for § 1915(g) purposes. See id. Dismissal 

of an action under § 1915(g) should only occur when, “after careful evaluation of the order 

dismissing an [earlier] action, and other relevant information, the district court determines 

that the action was dismissed because it was frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim.” 

Id. 

Andrews requires that the prisoner be given notice of the potential applicability of 

§ 1915(g), by either the district court or the defendants, but also requires the prisoner to 

bear the ultimate burden of persuasion that § 1915(g) does not bar IFP status for him. Id. 

A dismissal under § 1915(g) means that a prisoner cannot proceed with his action as a 

pauper under § 1915(g), but he still may pursue his claims if he pays the full filing fee at 

the outset of the action.

 

1 Defendants note that Morris has filed close to three dozen prisoner lawsuits and appeals in 

federal courts while incarcerated. Dkt. No. 25, p.3.

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Defendants have given Morris notice that the following dismissals may be counted 

as dismissals for purposes of § 1915(g): (1) Morris v. Duncan, et al., No. 02-00928 MJJ 

(N.D. Cal. May 3, 2002) (civil rights action dismissed at screening for failure to state a 

claim); (2) Morris v. Silvers, No. 98-01381 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 14, 1998) (civil rights action 

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); (3) Morris v. Lushia, et al., No. 00-

55330 (9th Cir. Mar. 27, 2000) (appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); (4) Morris v. 

Lushia, et al., No. 00-56600 (9th Cir. Apr. 16, 2001) (appeal dismissed for failure to pay 

filing fee); (5) Morris v. Woodford, et al., No. 06-15869 (9th Cir. Jun. 11, 2007) (appeal 

dismissed and judgment of district court summarily affirmed on the merits); and (6) Morris 

v. Woodford, et al., No. 08-15956 (9th Cir. Aug. 13, 2008) (appeal dismissed for failure to 

pay filing fee). Morris does not address any of these cases specifically in his Opposition. 

(Docket No. 29.) I will evaluate each of them. 

The first action, Morris v. Duncan, et al., No. 02-0928, is a strike. (MTD, RJN, 

Ex. A.) The action was dismissed for failure to state a claim, a de facto Rule 12(b)(6) 

dismissal that is the sort of dismissal encompassed by § 1915(g). See Moore v. Maricopa 

County Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 894 (9th Cir. (2011) (“we conclude that Congress 

intended for the three-strikes rule to count 12(b)(6) dismissals”). A judge in this District 

previously counted Duncan as a strike (e.g., Morris v. Woodford, No. 07-4198 MJJ), as has

another judge in the Eastern District (e.g., Morris v. Daly, No. 2:12-cv-02845 LKK JFM 

(PC)). 

The second action, Morris v. Silvers, No. 98-01381, is not a strike. The district 

court action was dismissed on Younger abstention2and ripeness grounds, that is, a 

dismissal based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which is a de facto 12(b)(1) 

dismissal. (MTD, RJN, Ex. B.) Such a dismissal does not qualify as a strike for purposes 

of § 1915(g). Moore, 657 F.3d at 894; Thompson v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 492 F.3d 

428, 437 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“in enacting section 1915(g), Congress chose to mirror the 

 

2

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) directs that under certain circumstances federal 

courts should abstain from interfering with on-going state judicial proceedings. 

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language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), not 12(b)(1)”). The Ninth Circuit 

has specifically rejected the Eastern District’s determination that Silvers is a strike. Morris 

v. Nangalama, et al., No. 13-17058 (9th Cir. Feb. 11, 2014), Docket No. 7. 

The third action, Morris v. Lushia, No. 00-55330, is likely not a strike either. The 

appeal was dismissed on grounds of jurisdiction because the district court’s order was not 

final or appealable. (MTD, RJN, Ex. C.) The Ninth Circuit has declined to hold that 

appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction count as strikes. Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1120-21. 

The fourth action, Morris v. Lushia, et al., No. C 00-56600, an appeal, is a strike. 

The district court certified that the appeal was not taken in good faith. (MTD, Ex. D at 4.) 

The Ninth Circuit agreed, required Morris to pay the full filing fee, and then dismissed the 

appeal when he failed to do so. (Id.) An appeal dismissed because the appellate court 

relied on a district court’s findings that the appeal was not taken in good faith counts as a 

strike. “Not in good faith” is equivalent to a finding of “frivolous” within the meaning of § 

1915. Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Gardner v. Pogue, 

558 F.2d 548, 551 (9th Cir.1977). 

The fifth action, Morris v. Woodford, et al., No. 06-15869, an appeal, is a strike. 

The appeal was “terminated on the merits after submission without oral hearing” and 

without any appearance or filings by appellees. (MTD, Ex. E at 3.) Such a summary 

disposal on the merits without briefing or oral argument indicates that the appeal was 

“frivolous” in the sense that it was “of little weight or importance” and “having no basis in 

law or fact.” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1121. 

The sixth action, Morris v. Woodford, et al., No. 08-15956, an appeal, is likely not a 

strike. The district court denied Morris’s IFP application under § 1915(g), and then 

dismissed the action because he failed to show that prior actions were not strikes. The 

Ninth Circuit denied Morris’s IFP application, ordered him to pay the full filing fee and to 

“show cause why the judgment challenged in this appeal should not be summarily 

affirmed.” (MTD, Ex. F at 2.) Morris failed to pay the filing fee, and the appeal was 

consequently dismissed. (Id. at 1.) 

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In most cases, those circumstances would indicate that the appeal is a strike. In this 

case, they may not. The district and appellate courts relied on Morris v. Silvers, No. 98-

1381, and Morris v. Lushia, No. 00-55330, cases that this Court has determined are not 

strikes. Because this Court does not think that either of those cases are strikes, it is 

disinclined to see Woodford, No. 08-15956, as a strike. 

Instead of challenging any specific strike, Morris alleges that because other courts 

(including this one) have allowed him to proceed IFP, he should be allowed to proceed as a 

pauper in the instant action.3 (Opp. at 1.) He cites three federal cases, none of which aid 

him here. In the first, Morris v. Evans, et al., No. 10-4010

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(first assigned to Judge Susan 

Illston and later assigned to me), Morris was granted IFP status despite allegations that he 

had three strikes. A review of the order, however, shows that Judge Illston considered 

only three actions, all of which this Court considered above (Duncan, Silvers, and Lushia, 

No. 00-55330). The other actions defendants raise here were not considered. 

In the second, Morris v. Daly, No. 12-02845 LKK JFM (E.D. Cal. Jul. 2, 2013), 

Morris was allowed to proceed IFP despite allegations that he had three strikes. That court 

considered the same three actions mentioned above, all of which this Court considered. It 

did not consider the other actions defendants raise here. 

In the third, Morris v. Nangalama, cited above, the Ninth Circuit rejected the 

Eastern District’s determination and allowed Morris to proceed IFP because the Eastern 

District court relied on Silvers, which, as discussed above, is not a strike. 

In sum, of the six cases cited by defendants, the Court finds that Morris has three 

strikes within the meaning of § 1915(g). Those strikes are (1) Morris v. Duncan, et al., 

No. 02-0928, (2) Morris v. Lushia, et al., No. C 00-56600, and (3) Morris v. Woodford, et 

 

3 Morris omits that other courts, including this one, have either revoked his IFP status or 

rejected his pauper applications. (MTD at 9.) 

4 Morris mistakenly gives the case number as 10-1040. (Opp. at 1.) 

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al., No. C 06-15869.5 

Morris therefore may proceed IFP only if he is seeking relief from a danger of 

serious physical injury which is “imminent” at the time of filing. Andrews, 398 F.3d at 

1052–53. Morris has not alleged, much less shown, that he falls under the imminent 

danger exception. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, defendants’ motion (Docket No. 25) is GRANTED, the 

order granting IFP status to Morris (Docket No. 4) is VACATED, and his IFP status is 

REVOKED. The Court finds that, pursuant to Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1121, Morris has been 

given notice of the potential applicability of § 1915(g) by defendants in their motion 

requesting the Court to revoke his IFP status. Morris has failed to meet his burden of 

showing that § 1915(g) does not bar IFP status for him. Therefore, a dismissal under 

§ 1915(g) is proper because Morris has had an opportunity to be heard on the matter before 

dismissing the action. See id. at 1120. Accordingly, this action is DISMISSED without 

prejudice to Morris filing a new paid complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

The Clerk shall terminate Docket No. 25, enter judgment in favor of defendants, 

and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 13, 2015

_________________________

WILLIAM H. ORRICK

United States District Judge

 

5 Defendants contend that this Court should revoke Morris’s IFP status because the Eastern 

District has denied or revoked Morris IFP status in four cases not discussed above. (MTD 

at 9.) This Court will not rely on the Eastern District’s determinations. In those cases, the 

district court relied on a prior order of this Court, Morris v. Woodford, No. 07-4198 MJJ. 

Woodford was based in part on Silvers and Lushia, No. 00-55330, two cases this Court has 

determined are not strikes. 

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