Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00301/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00301-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 371
Nature of Suit: Truth in Lending
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BABETTE BERIONES, an individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

IMH ASSETS CORP., INDENTURE 

TRUSTEE; DEUTSCHE BANK 

NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, 

OWNER TRUSTEE; WILMINGTON 

TRUST COMPANY AS TRUSTEE FOR 

SECURITIZED TRUST IMPAC CMB; 

IMPAC FUNDING CORPORATION; 

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC 

REGISTRATION SYSTEM, AKA 

“MERS”; BANK OF AMERICA; JAMES 

LOWELL ANTHONY, LLC; 

ANTHONY PETER VASILAS AKA 

RAYMOND JOSEPH VASILAS; JESSIE 

MENZEL; MTC FINANCIAL INC. dba 

TRUSTEE CORP; AND DOES 2 THRU 

100,

Defendants.

Case No.: 19cv301-CAB-NLS

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND 

REMANDING CASE

[Doc. Nos. 6, 8, 13, 14, 16, 32]

Plaintiff Babette Beriones, appearing pro se, filed this action in state court, and 

Defendant MTC Financial, Inc. (“MTC”) removed it here based on federal question 

jurisdiction arising out of Plaintiff’s claims under the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) and 

Homeowners Equity Protection Act (“HOEPA”), and the Real Estate Settlement 

Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2605. [Doc. No. 1.] In five separate motions to 

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dismiss, each of the defendants now move to dismiss the entire operative first amended 

complaint (“FAC”) for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff has opposed the motions,

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and the 

Court deems them suitable for submission without oral argument. As discussed below, the 

federal claims are dismissed, and this case is remanded to state court.

I. Legal Standards

The familiar standards on a motion to dismiss apply here. To survive a motion to 

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Thus, 

the Court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the 

pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire 

& Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). On the other hand, the Court is 

“not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Nor is the Court “required to accept as 

true allegations that contradict exhibits attached to the Complaint or matters properly 

subject to judicial notice, or allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions

of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 

(9th Cir. 2010). “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory 

factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive 

of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted).

II. Requests for Judicial Notice

Four of the five motions to dismiss are accompanied by requests for judicial notice 

[Doc. Nos. 8-2, 13-2, 14-2, and 16-2]. The requests each seek notice of many of the same 

documents which generally fall into two categories: (1) property records for real property 

 

1 Plaintiff’s request for a one-day extension [Doc. No. 32] is GRANTED.

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located at 7505 Solano Street, Carlsbad, California 92009 (the “Property”) including the 

Deed of Trust for Plaintiff’s loan, foreclosure related notices and documents, and deeds 

reflecting subsequent conveyances of the Property through foreclosure to Defendant James 

Lowell Anthony, LLC (“JLA”) and the current owners; and (2) state court filings related 

to a 2015 lawsuit filed by Beriones against JLA and others who are not parties here for 

wrongful eviction, and to an unlawful detainer action filed by JLA against Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff did not oppose these requests and requests judicial notice of some of the same 

documents with her opposition briefs. [Doc. No. 28.] Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 

201(b), “[t]he court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute 

because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can 

be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned.” Fed. R.Evid. 201. Public property records are the proper subject of judicial 

notice. See Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 866 

n.1 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Farber v. JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A., No. 12-CV-2367-GPCBGS, 2014 WL 68380, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014) (“Federal courts routinely take judicial 

notice of facts contained in publicly recorded documents, including Deeds of Trust, 

because they are matters of public record, and are not reasonably in dispute.”). Courts may 

also take judicial notice of relevant court records. See United States ex rel. Robinson 

Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[W]e ‘may 

take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial 

system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” (citation omitted)). 

Accordingly, the parties’ requests for judicial notice are granted.

III. Background

A. The Defendants

Plaintiffs’ claims all arise out of a 2004 loan secured by a deed of trust on the 

Property, and the subsequent foreclosure on the Property. The defendants generally fall 

into five categories, commensurate with the five separate motions to dismiss that have been 

filed:

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1. The entities involved in the foreclosure on the Property: Bank of America, N.A. 

(“BofA”); Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”); and 

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. as Indenture Trustee Under Indenture Relating 

to IMH Assets Corp. Collateralized Asset-Back Bonds, Series 2004-4 (“Deutsche 

Bank” and together with BofA and MERS, the “Bank Defendants”)2;

2. The foreclosure trustee: MTC Financial Inc. d/b/a Trustee Corps (“MTC” or the 

“Foreclosure Trustee”);

3. The entities alleged to be the original lender: IMH Assets Corp. (“IMH”) and 

Impac Funding Corporation (“Impac”);

4. The entity that purchased the Property from Deutsche Bank after the foreclosure 

sale: James Lowell Anthony, LLC (“JLA” or the “Purchaser”); and,

5. The individuals who purchased the Property from JLA and currently own the 

Property: Anthony Vasilas and Jessie Menzel (the “Current Owners”).

B. The Loan

On or around March 8, 2004, Plaintiff obtained a loan in the principal amount of 

$452,000 secured by a Deed of Trust on the Property. [Doc. No. 8-3.] The Deed of Trust 

identifies Plaintiff as the borrower, Decision One Mortgage Company, LLC as the lender, 

Diversified Title Insurance Company as the trustee, and MERS as nominee for the lender 

and the beneficiary. [Id.] On August 13, 2012, MERS assigned the Deed of Trust to 

Deutsche Bank. [Doc. No. 8-4.] 

C. The Foreclosure

A decade after the loan, on April 28, 2014, MTC filed with the San Diego County 

Recorder a notice of default and election to sell under the Deed of Trust. [Doc. No. 8-6.] 

On November 14, 2014, MTC filed with the County Recorder a Notice of Trustee’s Sale 

indicating a sale date of December 16, 2014. [Doc. No. 8-8.] According to the Trustee’s 

 

2 According to Deutsche Bank, it was erroneously identified as “Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, 

Owner Trustee; Wilmington Trust Company as Trustee for Securitized Trust Impac CMB” in the FAC.

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Deed Upon Sale filed with the County Recorder’s office, the Property was sold to Deutsche 

Bank at a public auction on December 16, 2014 for $753,267.51. [Doc. No. 8-9.]

D. The Subsequent Conveyances of the Property and Related 

Litigation

On March 26, 2015, Deutsche Bank conveyed the Property by grant deed to JLA. 

[Doc. No. 8-10.] On August 6, 2015, JLA filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against 

in San Diego County Superior Court against Beriones. [Doc. No. 14-2 at 44-46.] On 

August 28, 2015, Beriones filed a state court complaint against JLA and others who are not 

parties here. [Id. at 58-79.] Beriones’s complaint asserted causes of action for: (1) lack of 

standing/wrongful eviction; (2) abuse of legal process; (3) fraud in the concealment; (4) 

intentional infliction of emotional distress; (5) slander of title; (6) cancellation of 

instruments; and (7) declaratory relief. [Id.] The state court dismissed Beriones’s

complaint without leave to amend on December 3, 2015. [Id. at 174-75.] On February 3, 

2016, JLA conveyed the Property by grant deed to the Current Owners. [Doc. No. 8-11.]

Meanwhile, JLA’s unlawful detainer action bounced back and forth between the trial 

court and the appellate division. The trial court originally entered judgment for JLA. [Id.

at 145-46.] The appellate division reversed and remanded, directing the trial court to enter 

judgment in favor of Beriones. [Id. at 177-79.] On remand the trial court entered a 

judgment in favor of Beriones for $6,600 in restitution from JLA and the other plaintiffs in 

the unlawful detainer action. [Id. at 183-85.] The trial court’s February 10, 2017, order 

also stated:

The evidence showed that Deutsche Bank foreclosed on the subject property 

after defendants failed to make several mortgage payments on the property in 

2014-2015. Plaintiff [JLA] then bought the property on March 26, 2015 from 

Deutsche Bank at an on line auction, paying consideration for same to 

Deutsche Bank. Plaintiff then served defendants with a Notice to Quit on July 

30, 2015. Defendants [Beriones and a co-defendant] remained in possession 

of the property. On September 11, 2015 a Writ of Possession of Real Property 

was issued on the subject property, and defendants left the property, pursuant 

to the Writ, shortly thereafter.

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Defendants’ request that title to the subject property be restored to them is 

respectfully denied. There was insufficient evidence presented at the hearing 

showing defendants possess valid title to, or a valid ownership interest in the 

subject property. Plaintiff is the second owner post foreclosure, having 

bought the property from [Deutsche Bank], post-foreclosure, at an on-line 

auction. There was no evidence presented showing Deutsche Bank’s 

foreclosure on the property for nonpayment of mortgage payments by 

plaintiffs was improper.

[Id. at 183-85; Doc. No. 28 at 41-43.] Beriones appealed, and the appellate division 

affirmed the trial court’s order on May 22, 2018. [Doc. No. 14-2 at 188-94.]

E. This Lawsuit

On December 17, 2018, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in San Diego County Superior 

Court, and one week later, she filed the FAC. The FAC asserts ten causes of action against 

all Defendants: (1) lack of standing/wrongful foreclosure; (2) fraud in the concealment; (3) 

fraud in the inducement; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (5) slander of title; 

(6) quiet title; (7) declaratory relief; (8) violation of TILA and HOEPA; (9) violation of 

RESPA; and (10) rescission. On February 12, 2019, MTC removed the lawsuit to this 

court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction resulting from the eighth and ninth claims 

for TILA and RESPA violations. All defendants now move, in five separate motions, to 

dismiss the FAC in its entirety.

IV. Discussion

Defendants removed this case to federal court on the basis of federal question 

jurisdiction due to the TILA and RESPA claims. There is no diversity jurisdiction because 

Plaintiff and several Defendants are citizens of California. As discussed below, the federal 

claims are time-barred. Having dismissed those claims, the Court declines supplemental 

jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and remands this case to state court.

A. Violation of TILA and HOEPA

TILA was enacted “to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the 

consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him 

and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and 

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unfair credit billing and credit card practices.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 1601(a). The Homeowners 

Equity Protection Act (“HOEPA”) “is an amendment of TILA, and therefore is governed 

by the same remedial scheme and statutes of limitations as TILA.” Hamilton v. Bank of 

Blue Valley, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1179 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (citation omitted). “Any request 

for damages under TILA or HOEPA is subject to a one-year statute of limitations (15 

U.S.C. § 1640(e)) and a claim for rescission is subject to a three-year statute of limitations 

(15 U.S.C. § 1635(f)). A TILA or HOEPA violation occurs at the time the loan documents 

are signed.” Casas v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., No. 5:12-CV-01742-EJD, 2012 WL 

5877641, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2012) (citing Meyer v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 342 

F.3d 899, 902 (9th Cir. 2003)). With respect to a claim for damages under TILA, “the 

doctrine of equitable tolling may, in the appropriate circumstances, suspend the limitations 

period until the borrower discovers or had reasonable opportunity to discover the fraud or 

nondisclosures that form the basis of the TILA action.” King v. State of Cal., 784 F.2d 

910, 915 (9th Cir. 1986). “Equitable tolling does not apply to rescission claims under 

TILA.” In re Brewster, No. 5:13-CV-505-ODW, 2013 WL 4833707, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 

9, 2013). “Even if a lender never makes the required disclosures, the ‘right of rescission 

shall expire three years after the date of consummation of the transaction or upon the sale 

of the property, whichever comes first.’” Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 135 

S. Ct. 790, 792 (2015) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f)).

Here, Claim Eight of the FAC appears to seek damages for a TILA violation, and 

Claim Ten appears to seek rescission as a result of a TILA violation. Plaintiff, however,

entered into the loan here in 2004, and did not file this lawsuit until 2018, more than a 

decade after the statute of limitations expired for either claim. Further, the FAC contains 

no allegations supporting any tolling of her TILA damages claim, and “[m]ere allegations 

of TILA violations do not toll the statute . . . .” In re Brewster, 2013 WL 4833707, at *2. 

In her opposition briefs, Plaintiff offers no facts or argument as to why tolling should apply, 

and considering the passage of time since foreclosure of the Property (let alone since the 

loan itself), and Plaintiff’s extensive litigiousness following foreclosure, nothing could 

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have prevented Plaintiff from, at some point over the past decade and a half, “comparing 

her loan contract and the initial disclosures with TILA’s statutory and regulatory 

requirements.” Id. (citing Hubbard v. Fidelity Fed. Bank, 91 F.3d 75, 79 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

Accordingly, this claim is time-barred.

B. Violation of RESPA

“Any claim under RESPA is subject to a one- or three-year statute of limitations, 

depending on the violation, running from the occurrence of the alleged violation.” Agraz 

v. Golden Empire Mortg., Inc., No. CV 16-7088 PA (ASX), 2016 WL 10931430, at *4 

(C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2016), aff’d, 707 F. App’x 916 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 2614). 

Plaintiff’s RESPA claim arises out of her original loan transaction and subsequent 

securitization of the loan. Thus, considering that the foreclosure occurred four years before 

Plaintiff filed her complaint here, this claim has long-since expired. Further, for the same 

reasons discussed above with respect to the TILA claims, there are no facts suggesting that 

any equitable tolling should apply. At a bare minimum, Plaintiff was on notice to 

investigate any possible RESPA claim upon receipt of the notice of default in 2014. 

Accordingly, this claim is time-barred as well.

C. Supplemental Jurisdiction

Having dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims, the Court’s “decision of whether to 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims ‘is purely 

discretionary.’” Couture v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 11-CV-1096-IEG (CAB), 2011 

WL 3489955, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2011) (quoting Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 

556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009)); see also Holt v. First Franklin Fin. Corp., No. C 10-5929 SBA, 

2011 WL 4595195, *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2011) (“When the federal claims that served as 

the basis for jurisdiction are eliminated, either through dismissal by the court or by a 

plaintiff amending his or her complaint, federal courts may decline to assert supplemental 

jurisdiction over the remaining state law causes of action.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)).

Here, because the Court is dismissing the only federal claims at the outset of the 

litigation, it is more appropriate to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state law 

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claims than to wade into the plainly state law issues at the heart of this case. See CarnegieMellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (holding that “when the federal-law 

claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, 

the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing the case without 

prejudice”); see also Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A 

district court ‘may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction’ if it ‘has dismissed all 

claims over which it has original jurisdiction.’”) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)).

V. Disposition

As discussed above, the motions to dismiss are GRANTED IN PART with respect 

to Plaintiff’s TILA and RESPA claims because those claims are time-barred. The Eighth 

and Ninth causes of action in their entirety, and the Tenth cause of action to the extent it is 

premised on a TILA violation, are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Because the Court 

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, this case 

is REMANDED to state court.

It is SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 16, 2019

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