Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00838/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00838-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HOPE KRAUSS, aka DEONTE 

KRAUSS, individually and on 

behalf of all those similarly 

situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

WAL-MART, INC., a Delaware 

corporation; WAL-MART 

ASSOCIATES, INC., a Delaware 

corporation; and DOES 1 

through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-00838-JAM-DB

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Hope Krauss (“Plaintiff”) filed this putative 

class action against her former employer, Defendants Walmart, 

Inc. and Wal-Mart Associate, Inc. (collectively “Walmart” or 

“Defendants”), for violating California’s labor laws. Notice of 

Removal, ECF No. 1. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), ECF No. 10, alleging 

Plaintiff failed to properly state her claims. Mot. to Dismiss 

FAC (“FAC MTD”), ECF No. 14. The Court granted the motion 

without prejudice and granted Plaintiff leave to amend her 

complaint. November 19, 2019 Order (“Order”), ECF No. 20. 

Case 2:19-cv-00838-JAM-DB Document 29 Filed 04/15/20 Page 1 of 22
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Plaintiff filed her Second Amended Complaint shortly 

thereafter. Second Amended Compl. (“SAC”), ECF No. 21. 

Currently before this Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for failing to cure its 

prior deficiencies. Mot. to Dismiss (“Mot.”), ECF No. 24. 

Plaintiff opposes this Motion. Opp’n, ECF No. 25.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART 

and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion. 1

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Parties are familiar with Plaintiff’s allegations and 

they will not be repeated in detail here. In short, Plaintiff 

alleges Walmart: (1) required her to work off the clock, and 

during meal and rest breaks without compensation; (2) 

inaccurately recorded the amount of time she worked; (3) refused 

to compensate her for overtime hours; (4) failed to reimburse her 

for necessary business-related expenses; (5) and generally 

withheld funds she was entitled to upon her termination. SAC 

¶¶ 4-9.

II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short 

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2). Courts must 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for February 25, 2020.

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dismiss a suit if the plaintiff fails to “state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). To 

defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must 

“plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 

(2007). This plausibility standard requires “factual content 

that allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “At this stage, the Court 

“must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a 

complaint.” Id. But it need not “accept as true a legal 

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. 

B. Analysis

1. Meal and Rest Break Claims

Employers cannot require employees to work during meal and 

rest breaks. Id. at § 226.7(b). Moreover, an employer shall 

pay an additional hour of pay for each workday a meal period or 

rest break is not provided. Id. 

The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s meal period and 

rest claims because they “[fell] short of plausibility.” Order 

at 6. Relying on its previous decision in Chavez v. RSCR 

California, Inc., the Court explained: “failing to describe what 

an employer actually told plaintiff or did to interfere with 

meal periods and rest breaks, results in allegations that are 

‘factually lacking and border on wholly conclusory.’” Id.

(quoting Chavez, No. 2:18-CV-03137-JAM-AC, 2019 WL 1367812 at *3 

(E.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2019)). It then found Plaintiff’s 

allegations “factually lacking,” because she failed to

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(1) “describe what [Walmart] actually told [her] or did to 

interfere with meal periods and rest breaks,” and (2) did “not 

sufficiently allege that she worked a shift long enough to 

trigger meal or rest periods obligations.” Id. at 5-6. 

Defendants again seek to dismiss Plaintiff’s meal period and 

rest breaks, arguing they are still factually lacking. Mot. at 

9. The Court agrees. 

In its Order, the Court stated that “[a]t a minimum” 

Plaintiff needed to demonstrate she was entitled to “the 

required meal period[s] or rest breaks.” Order at 6. Plaintiff 

followed the Court’s instructions in her SAC and alleged she

worked hours long enough to trigger the required meal or rest 

periods. SAC ¶¶ 23,28. As to the meal periods claim, she 

alleged that “despite working shifts of more than five (5) 

hours, Plaintiff was unable to take timely duty-free, and 

uninterrupted meal breaks. . . .” Id. ¶ 23. Likewise, in her 

rest breaks claim, she added “on more than one occasion, 

Plaintiff worked a shift of at least three and one-half (3.5) 

hours without being able to take a timely, duty-free, and 

uninterrupted rest break.” Id. ¶ 28. 

Plaintiff’s amended claims, however, stop there and are 

still insufficient because she fails to “describe what [Walmart] 

actually told [her]” to deter her meal and rest breaks. Id. at 

5 (citing Chavez, 2019 WL 1367812, at *3). 

Plaintiff maintains she has adequately pled these two

claims because “California courts have found similar allegations 

to be sufficient at the pleading stage.” Opp’n at 5. But the 

cases Plaintiff relies on are distinguishable. In Varsam v. 

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Laboratory Corp. of America, the plaintiff alleged she was 

unable to take breaks because her employer did not schedule them 

at all. 120 F. Supp. 3d 1173, 1178-79 (S.D. Cal. 2015). The 

court found such conclusory allegations are sufficient when “an 

employer makes it difficult . . . or undermines a formal policy 

of providing meal and rest periods.” Id. In Ambriz v. Coca 

Cola Co., a different court came to the same conclusion when the 

plaintiff alleged the employer had a policy of never providing 

breaks. No. 13-cv-03539, 2013 WL 5947010 at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 

5, 2013). But here, Plaintiff does not allege Walmart never 

provided breaks. 

Plaintiff’s reliance on these cases is misplaced. In fact, 

in Ambriz the court explained that when an employer allegedly 

pressured an employee not to take breaks, instead of never 

providing breaks, the plaintiff must “plead the nature of the 

pressure tactics.” Id. (citing Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 

No. 08-cv-5221, 2013 WL 1701581, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 

2013)). Here Plaintiff has failed to identify any similar

“pressure tactics” engaged in by Walmart. The Court therefore 

DISMISSES Plaintiff’s meal and rest break claims WITH PREJUDICE. 

2. Minimum Wage and Overtime Claims

The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s minimum wage and 

overtime claims because her FAC only included “generalized 

allegations” in support of these claims. Order at 7. 

Specifically, the Court found Plaintiff had not met the minimum 

requirement of alleging “she had worked more than forty hours in 

a given workweek without overtime [and minimum wage] 

compensation.” Id. Because the claims failed for that reason 

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alone, the Court did not address Defendants’ other arguments. 

Id. Defendants now seek dismissal of these two claims on the 

grounds not previously addressed by the Court.

The Parties arguments regarding the minimum wage and 

overtime claims are contained in the same section of the briefs;

however, because the Court finds different standards apply to 

each claim, it will address each claim separately. 

a. Minimum Wage

California state law requires an employer to pay employees 

the minimum wage for all hours worked. See Cal. Lab. Code 

§ 1197. “[A]n employee receiving less than the legal minimum 

wage” can recover “the unpaid balance of the full amount of this 

minimum wage.” Id. at § 1194. 

In Morelli v. Corizon Health, defendant allegedly did not 

pay plaintiffs minimum wage, because they “remained under 

[d]efendant’s control” during meal and rest breaks. No. 18-cv1395, 2018 WL 6201950, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2018). The 

court dismissed plaintiffs’ claim because they failed to 

factually allege “how [they] remained under [d]efendant’s 

control during break periods.” Id. (emphasis added). Without 

such factual allegations, Plaintiffs allegations were conclusory 

and “could not form the basis of an adequately pled claim for 

the failure to pay minimum wage.” Id. Stated another way, the

court determined “[plaintiff’s] allegations [] merely track[ed]

the statutory language of the Labor Code.” Id. 

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s minimum wage claim is likewise 

devoid of any factual allegation showing how she remained under 

their control during breaks. Order at 11. Plaintiff does not

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however allege she was under Defendants’ control at all during 

breaks. See SAC ¶¶ 33-34. Her allegation thus fails to even 

track the “statutory language of the Labor Code.” Morelli, 2018 

WL 6201950, at *4.

Plaintiff argues she need not provide facts alleging she 

remained under Defendants control. Opp’n at 6. She contends it 

is enough to allege Defendants “refuse[d] to allow employees to 

work overtime while making it difficult for employees to 

complete their work within their scheduled shifts.” Id. (citing 

Varsam, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 1177-1178). But, as Defendants point 

out, Varsam is distinguishable because the plaintiff alleged 

more than that defendant simply “‘discouraged’ her and putative 

class members from clocking overtime.” Reply at 2-3 (citing 

Varsam, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 1178)). The plaintiff also alleged 

defendant “failed to schedule a sufficient number of [patient 

technicians].” Varsam, 120 F. Supp 3d at 1178. The court thus 

declined to dismiss plaintiffs’ minimum wage and overtime claims 

because that additional allegation made it “plausible” her 

employer prevented her from “[taking] breaks and undermine[d] a 

formal policy of providing meal and rest periods.” Id. In the 

instant case, unlike the Plaintiff’s allegations found 

sufficient in Varsam, Plaintiff does not allege Walmart was

short staffed. Plaintiff has once again failed to “plead enough 

facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The Court DISMISSES 

Plaintiff’s minimum wage claim WITH PREJUDICE.

b. Overtime 

Employers must pay overtime for work exceeding eight hours 

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in one workday and forty hours in any workweek. See Cal. Lab. 

Code § 510. Employees receiving less than the “legal overtime” 

can likewise recover under Section 1194. Id. at § 1194. 

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s overtime claim should be 

dismissed because she “still [does] not provide[] any specific 

details regarding the nature of her alleged ‘off the clock’ work 

. . . and why she felt she had no choice but to secretly work 

off the clock.” Mot. at 11. They further contend “if 

[Plaintiff] is alleging that she was secretly working off the 

clock . . . her allegation fails as a matter of law.” Id. at 

11-12 (citing White v. Starbucks Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 

1085 (N.D. Cal. 2007)). Defendants argue that to prevail on her 

off-the-clock claim, Plaintiff must prove Walmart “had actual or 

constructive knowledge of [her] alleged off-the-clock work.” 

White, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1083. However, as Plaintiff points out,

proving whether Walmart had knowledge of her off-the-clock work 

is irrelevant. Opp’n at 7. Unlike in White, before the Court

is a motion to dismiss, not a motion for summary judgment. Id. 

At this stage, the Court is only concerned with whether 

Plaintiff’s claims are plausible. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

Nevertheless, Defendants are correct that Plaintiff’s 

overtime claim allegations are conclusory. As the Court stated 

in its Order, Plaintiff need not “approximate the number of 

hours worked without compensation.” Order at 7 (quoting 

Landers, 771 F.3d at 646). But “she must allege, at a minimum, 

that she worked more than forty hours in a given workweek 

without overtime compensation.” Id. (quoting Landers, 771 F.3d 

at 644-46). In interpreting the parameters within this range, 

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courts “have offered varying and possibly inconsistent standards 

for stating [these claims].” Morelli, 2018 WL 6201950, at *4

(quoting Sanchez v. Ritz Carlton, No. 15-cv-3484 PSG (PJWx), 

2015 WL 50009659, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2015)). Despite 

these inconsistent standards, it is clear “there must be 

something beyond conclusory allegations that ties the alleged 

[L]abor [C]ode violation to [Plaintiff] such as allegations 

about [her] schedule[] to substantiate [she] worked [overtime]

shifts that would trigger overtime pay[.]” Id. 

Plaintiff amended her claim in an attempt to meet the bare 

minimum pleading requirements. She now alleges working at least 

“on more than one occasion . . . more than eight (8) hours in a 

given workday . . . and more than forty (40) hours in a given 

workweek without being paid overtime compensation.” Compl. 

¶ 39. But Plaintiff’s amendments stop there. There is no 

allegation that “ties” the alleged overtime violation together 

with the statute to make her claim plausible. Morelli, 2018 WL 

6201950, at *4. Plaintiff’s amended overtime claim still lacks 

key facts and specific detail necessary to support this claim. 

The Court therefore DISMISSES Plaintiff’s overtime claim WITH 

PREJUDICE.

3. Wage Statement Claim

California Labor Code Section 226 itemizes nine categories 

of information that must be included in a wage statement. See

Cal. Lab. Code § 226. If an employee suffers injury by an 

employer’s knowing and intentional failure to provide such 

information, she is entitled to recover damages and reasonable 

attorney’s fees. Id. 

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The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s wage statement 

claim in part because it was a “generic allegation [that] merely 

restate[d] the requirements of Labor Code Section 226(a).” 

Order at 9. Defendants argue Plaintiff once again merely 

restates the statute requirements, without explaining “how her 

wage statement supposedly violates the code.” Mot. at 12. 

Plaintiff contends her claim is properly pled. Opp’n at 8. 

In the SAC, Plaintiff still includes the allegation the 

Court found to be a mere restatement of Section 226(a) 

requirements. See SAC ¶ 50. However, Plaintiff also provides

three factual allegations elaborating on that generic 

allegation. See SAC ¶¶ 51-53. Defendants argue these are not 

new allegations. Reply at 3. Rather, they contend Plaintiff 

merely copied paragraphs from the fact section of her FAC and 

placed them in her amended Wage Statement claim. Id. But 

whether Plaintiff repurposed allegations is irrelevant. What 

matters is whether such repurposing has transformed her previous 

implausible claim into one that is “plausible on its face.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. (2007). The Court will address 

Plaintiff’s three factual allegations in turn.

a. Overtime Incentive Program

First, Plaintiff alleges her payment for an overtime 

incentive program was “a lump sum without setting forth the 

corresponding hours worked or hourly rate.” SAC ¶ 51. This 

allegedly prevented her from “determin[ing] the formula 

Defendant had used to calculate the [overtime incentive payment] 

from her wage statement alone.” Id. Plaintiff argues such a 

hindrance is a “wage statement violation” under Section 

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226(a)(9). Id. Indeed, the statute requires employers to 

provide “semimonthly or at the time of each payment of wages,” 

“all applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period and 

the corresponding number of hours worked at each hourly rate by 

the employee.” Cal. Lab. Code § 226(a)(9). 

But Defendants argue this allegation cannot support a 

Section 226(a) violation because it was for “a prior pay 

period.” Mot. at 13. They maintain “Section 226(a) only 

requires the wage statement to show the ‘applicable hourly rates 

in effect during each pay period.’” Id. (quoting Cal. Lab. Code 

§ 226(a)). Plaintiff argues the statute requires wages for the 

period in which the compensation is actually paid. Opp’n at 9-

10 (citing Mitchell v. Corelogic, Inc., No. SACV172274DOCDFMX,

2019 WL 7172978, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2019)). 

In Mitchell, the court determined “[Section 226(a)] does 

not provide an exception for incentives that were earned in a 

different pay period.” 2019 WL 7172978, at *5. Instead, “the 

statute requires the applicable rates to be noted when they are 

in effect,” which is “when the wages are actually paid.” Id. 

The court further explained “because [d]efendant is paying 

[p]laintiffs an incentive for work done in a prior period, 

[d]efendant is in essence revising the prior period’s wage 

statement which would otherwise have had to conform with 

[Section]226(a)(9).” Id. It thus concluded the Section

“applies to the wage statement for payments made during the pay 

period even if work was done before the pay period.” Id. 

While Mitchell is not binding authority, the Court is 

persuaded by its reasoning. Moreover, Defendants did not 

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present any authority to the contrary. The Court therefore 

adopts Mitchell’s reasoning: Section 226(a)(9) required

Defendants to identify the hourly rates for the rates of 

Plaintiff’s overtime incentive payment, even though the work was 

done before the pay period. 

b. Statement of Final Pay

Second, Plaintiff alleges “her ‘Statement of Final Pay’ did 

not include pay period start and end dates, and consequently, 

[she] could not determine the formula for calculating her final 

pay from her wage statement alone.” SAC ¶ 53. Indeed, Section 

226(a) requires employers to provide “the inclusive dates of the 

period for which the employee is paid.” Cal. Lab. Code. 

§ 226(a)(6). 

However, Defendants dispute the law requires them “to 

provide anything more than ‘an ordinary wage statement.’” Reply 

at 3 (citing Cal. Lab. Code § 226(a)). Yet the Statute does not 

delineate an employer must only provide an “ordinary wage 

statement” as Defendants contend. See Id. In fact, the term 

“ordinary wage statement” is nowhere to be found in the 

statute’s text. See Id. Instead, Section 226(a) explicitly 

states an employer must provide the nine categories of 

information either “semimonthly or at the time of each payment 

of wages.” See Id. (emphasis added). Accepting Plaintiff’s 

allegation as true, it is clear the “Statement of Final Pay” was 

a payment of “all wages earned through the date of termination.” 

SAC ¶ 53. Defendants were thus required under Section 226(a)(6) 

to include pay period start or end dates. Cal. Lab. Code 

§ 226(a)(6). 

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c. Wrong Employer

Lastly, Plaintiff argues her wage statements list the wrong 

employer in violation of Labor Code Section 226(a)(8). SAC 

¶ 52. Section 226(a)(8) requires an employer to list “the name 

and address of the legal entity that is the employer.” Cal. 

Lab. Code § 226(a)(8). 

In her SAC, Plaintiff alleges the wage statement listed 

“Wal-Mart Associates, Inc.” instead of the name of her actual 

employer “Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.” Id. But in her Opposition, 

Plaintiff claims this allegation was a typo. Opp’n at 10-11. 

Instead, she supposedly meant to state it was the absence of 

“‘Walmart, Inc.”—not of “Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.”— from her wage 

statements that constitutes a violation. Id. 

Defendants argue this clarification “misses the point” 

because Plaintiff “explicitly alleges Walmart Associates, Inc. 

is her employer.” Reply at 3 (citing SAC ¶ 3). Indeed, in 

paragraph 3 of her Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges 

she was “a former employee of DEFENDANTS.” SAC ¶ 3. Plaintiff 

defines “DEFENDANTS” as “WALMART, INC.” and “WAL-MART 

ASSOCIATES, INC.” SAC ¶¶ 13-14. But this alone is insufficient 

to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim.

Mays v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. addressed this exact 

question: whether listing “Wal-Mart Associates, Inc.” prevented 

plaintiff from identifying her employer. 354 F. Supp. 3d 1136, 

1142-1144 (C.D. Cal. 2019). In reaching its conclusion, the 

Mays court examined a Ninth Circuit decision that addressed a 

similar question. Id. at 1143-1144 (examining Elliot v. 

Spherion Pac. Work, LLC, 368 F. App'x 761, 764 (9th Cir. 2010)). 

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In Elliot, the Ninth Circuit found listing an employer as 

“Spherion Pacific Work, LLC” instead of the employer’s legal 

name, “Spherion Pacific Workforce, LLC,” was such a “slightly 

truncated name, it did not violate Section 226.” Id. But in 

Mays, the court interpreted this holding to find the opposite 

conclusion. 354 F. Supp. 3d at 1144. The court found listing 

“Wal-Mart Associates, Inc.,” instead of “Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.”

was more than a slightly truncated name. Id. However, it only 

found this was “confusing and unintelligible” because the 

plaintiff had provided “at least some evidence that multiple 

legal entities” were using the same initial “Walmart” in their 

company titles. Id. Here, Plaintiff has provided no such 

evidence. Unlike the plaintiff in May, “Plaintiff has [not] 

alleged sufficient facts to show Walmart did not list the ‘legal 

entity’ of [her] employer.” Id. 

d. Conclusion

The Court finds Plaintiff has properly alleged a wage 

statement violation under Labor Code Sections 226(a)(6) and (9), 

but not under Section 226(a)(8). The Court therefore DENIES 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Wage Statement claim 

as it pertains to those two Sections. 

4. Unreimbursed Business Expenses Claim

Employers must indemnify employees for all necessary 

expenditures or losses incurred in direct consequence of the 

discharge of an employee’s duties or in obedience to the 

directions of the employer. See Cal. Lab. Code § 2802(a). 

Plaintiff seeks reimbursement for two incurred expenses: 

(1) a cell-phone app utilized for work communication, and 

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(2) work boots for working in walk-in freezers. SAC ¶ 58. The 

Court previously dismissed this claim because Plaintiff had 

“fail[ed] to explain whether the cell-phone app required a fee 

to download, let alone whether Walmart even knew that she 

downloaded [the] app or purchased [the] boots.” Order at 11. 

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s claim fails for the same reasons. 

Mot. at 14-15. The Court agrees as to the work boot allegation 

but finds Plaintiff has properly pled the claim as to her phone 

app allegation. 

a. Phone App

In its Order, the Court found Plaintiff’s cell phone app

allegation was insufficiently pled partly because she failed to 

allege it required a fee to download. Order at 11. Plaintiff 

still does not allege this. See SAC ¶ 58. In fact, she 

maintains such an allegation is not necessary. Opp’n at 12. 

Plaintiff supports this argument with a case that was absent in 

her opposition to the first motion to dismiss. See Opp’n at 12 

(citing Cochran v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., 228 Cal. App. 4th

1137, 1140 (2014)). Defendants do not reply to this argument. 

See Reply at 3-4. 

In Cochran, an employee filed a putative class action 

against his employer on behalf of customer service managers that 

were not reimbursed for expenses pertaining to the work-related 

use of their personal cell phones. 228 Cal. App. 4th 1140. The 

court found Section 2802 required employer’s to “always” 

reimburse an employee “for the reasonable expense of the 

mandatory use of a personal cell phone.” Id. at 1144. Here, 

Plaintiff alleges because she was required to use her cell phone 

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in order to communicate with Defendants through that app, she is 

likewise entitled to reimbursement under Section 2802. Opp’n at 

12 (quoting SAC ¶ 58). The Court agrees. 

In interpreting state law, federal courts must consider 

intermediate state appellate court decisions, “unless it is 

convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the 

state would decide otherwise . . . .” West v. American Tel. & 

Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940). As such, although Cochran

involved class certification and not a motion to dismiss, the 

Court must consider its decision. Especially since Defendant 

provides no other persuasive case to the contrary. 

The Court previously found this allegation also failed 

because Plaintiff did not provide a “single instance when such a 

cost was actually incurred and not reimbursed.” Order at 11. 

In light of Cochran, the Court no longer finds Plaintiff needs 

to allege such an instance. The Court therefore now finds 

Plaintiff has properly plead the reimbursement claim as to her 

phone app allegation.

b. Work Boots

In its Order, the Court also found Plaintiff’s 

reimbursement claim failed as to her work boots allegation. 

Order at 10-11. Specifically, the Court found it failed because

Plaintiff did not allege “Walmart even knew that she . . . 

purchased these boots” or that there was at least a single 

instance in which Walmart did not reimburse her for the boots. 

Id. at 11. Yet instead of rectifying her claim by adding those 

allegations, Plaintiff simply chose to add the cost of the 

boots: $14. SAC ¶ 58. 

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This new fact does not correct the deficiencies the Court 

highlighted in its Order. For example, Plaintiff still fails to 

show Walmart knew she purchased the boots. Plaintiff argues

such an allegation “can be reasonably inferred” because “an 

employee would need to purchase special shoes for working in the 

intemperate environment of a freezer.” Opp’n at 12. But the 

case she relies on to support this contention holds otherwise. 

Id. at 11 (citing Tan v. GrubHub, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 3d 998, 

1005 (N.D. Cal. 2016)). In Tan, the court stated “Section 2802 

claims are sufficiently pled where the complaint identifies the 

particular expenses that were not reimbursed and affirmatively 

alleges that the expenses were part of the plaintiff’s job 

duties.” Tan, 171 F. Supp. at 1005. Yet, in the instant case,

Plaintiff fails to affirmatively allege the boots were required 

as part of her job duties, even when she cites that specific 

rule in her brief. See Opp’n at 11. 

In Tan, the plaintiff did not need an affirmative 

allegation because it was obviously inferred “an app-based 

delivery service requires a vehicle and a phone and thus 

expenses related to each.” 171 F. Supp. at 1005. As Defendants 

point out, Plaintiff’s job duties do not reasonably infer she 

required work boots. Reply at 4. Plaintiff was “a produce 

associates whose duties included ‘maintaining the sales floor, 

stocking merchandise, data entry, assisting customers, and 

general manual labor throughout the store.’” Id. Based on this 

description, the need for work boots is not an obvious 

inference. Plaintiff therefore needed to affirmatively allege 

the boots “were necessary to discharge [her] duties.” 171 F. 

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Supp. at 1005. Without such an affirmative allegation, 

Plaintiff’s reimbursement claim as to the work boots fails.

c. Conclusion

The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 

unreimbursed business expenses claim only to the extent it is 

predicated on her cellphone app allegation. 

5. Derivative Claims

Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under Labor 

Code Section 203, the UCL, and PAGA. The Court will discuss 

each claim in turn. 

a. Section 203 Claim (Fifth Cause of Action)

Section 203 provides an employee may recover wages in the 

form of a penalty, if an employer fails to pay them upon 

termination. Cal. Lab. Code § 203. In her fifth cause of 

action, Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed to pay her wages in 

accordance with Sections 201 and 202, which in turn violates 

Section 203. SAC ¶¶ 43-45. Sections 201 and 202, require an 

employer to pay an employee all “wages earned and unpaid” within 

72 hours of termination. Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201-202. 

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s Section 203 claim fails 

because her underlying claims fail. Mot. at 15. While 

Plaintiff does not specify, it is presumed this cause of action 

is predicated on her overtime and minimum wage claims. See SAC 

¶ 43 (“DEFENDANTS have willfully failed to pay accrued wages and 

other compensation to PLAINTIFF”). Because those claims fail, 

this cause of action fails as well. The Court DISMISSES the 

fifth cause of action WITH PREJUDICE. 

///

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b. UCL Claim

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s UCL claim fails because all 

the underlying claims must be dismissed. Mot. at 15. As 

explained above, some of the claims upon which the UCL claim is 

predicated are adequately pled. Specifically, the Court finds

that in the SAC Plaintiff has properly pled the underlying

claims alleging “[Defendants] failure to . . . furnish accurate 

itemized wage statements . . . and indemnify [Plaintiff] for 

necessary expenditures.” SAC ¶ 61. Accordingly, the Court 

DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s UCL claim to 

the extent it is predicated on wage statement and 

indemnification violations. 

c. PAGA Claim

As set forth above, Plaintiff has properly pled two of the 

underlying claims upon which her PAGA claim is based on: wage 

statement and indemnification claims. SAC ¶ 68. The Court 

therefore turns to Defendants’ argument that the PAGA claim

should be dismissed under PAGA’s exhaustion requirement. Mot. 

at 16. 

California Labor Code Section 2699.3 requires an “aggrieved 

employee or representative” to give written notice to the Labor 

and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) by online filing and 

to the employer by certified mail, prior to commencing a civil 

suit. Cal. Lab. Code. § 2699.3. The written notice must 

include “the specific provisions of [the Labor Codes] alleged to 

have been violated, including facts and theories to support the 

alleged violation.” Id. This notice requirement “is evaluated 

according to a different standard than the allegations in a 

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complaint.” Lyter v. Cambridge Sierra Holdings, LLC, No. 

CV173435MWFAGRX, 2017 WL 8186044, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 

2017). The Ninth Circuit has specified “a string of legal 

conclusions with no factual allegations or theories of liability 

to support them” is insufficient to provide proper notice to 

either the LWDA or to an employer. Alcantar v. Hobart Service, 

800 F.3d 1047, 1057 (9th Cir. 2015). 

Defendants argue it is “impossible to assess” whether 

Plaintiff even met these notice requirements because she has 

“failed to either attach a copy of the PAGA notice letter or 

substantively plead compliance by supplying the details of her 

[letter].” Mot. at 17. Indeed, Plaintiff has not attached a 

copy of her PAGA notice letter. Instead she alleges the 

following:

Pursuant to California Labor Code § 2699.3, [Plaintiff] 

gave written notice on August 31, 2018 by online filing 

to the [LWDA] and by certified mail to [Walmart, Inc.] 

of the specific provisions of the California Labor Code 

and IWC Wage Orders alleged to have been violated, 

including the facts and theories to support the alleged 

violations. 

SAC ¶ 68. Plaintiff argues this alone is sufficient proof she 

has satisfied the notice requirement. Opp’n at 14. She relies 

on Lyter, to argue Defendants’ are “improperly bootstrapping the 

LWDA’s administrative standard to this Court’s pleading standard” 

despite their distinct differences. Id. (citing Lyter, 2017 WL 

8186044, at *7). But in Lyter, the plaintiff actually attached 

the notice letter. 2017 WL 8186044, at *7. The Court was thus 

able to determine the sufficiency of the facts and theories, and 

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ultimately allowed the PAGA claim to proceed. Id. Here, the 

Court is unable to make the same determination. 

In Varsam, the plaintiff also did not attach the notice 

letter and provided a similar bare-bones allegation in her 

complaint. 120 F. Supp. 3d 1173. The plaintiff merely alleged 

“[prior] to the commencement of [her] action, [she] properly 

complied with the exhaustion requirements of the LWDA.” Id. 

Because the plaintiff’s allegation did not state the facts and 

theories she provided to LWDA, the court found the allegation was 

a “legal conclusion, insufficient to support a claim.” Id. 

Here, Plaintiff’s claim suffers from these same shortcomings. 

Yet she attempts to argue this pleading requirement is a mere 

suggestion, because the Varsam court used the word “should” to 

modify “include,” instead of the word “must.” Opp’n at 14. 

While creative, Plaintiff’s textualist argument does not succeed 

in gaslighting the Court. 

Without including the facts and theories Plaintiff provided 

to LWDA in her complaint, the Court cannot “independently 

conclude that [she] has satisfied the requirements of the statute 

as a matter of law.” Kemp v. International Business Machines 

Corp., No. C-09-4638 MHP, 2010 WL 4698490, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 

8, 2010)(similarly dismissing plaintiff’s PAGA claims for 

“insufficiently ple[ading] compliance with PAGA’s administrative 

requirements”). The Court therefore DISMISSES Plaintiff’s PAGA 

claims WITH PREJUDICE.

6. Amendment

Plaintiff contends she is entitled to leave to amend unless 

it is clear the pleading cannot be cured by the allegation of 

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additional facts. Opp. at 15 (citing Cook v. Perkiss and Liehe, 

Inc. v. Northern Cal. Collection Serv., Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 

(9th Cir. 1990)). As Defendants point out, Plaintiff has had 

three chances to amend her complaint and has failed to rectify 

most of the deficiencies the Court pointed out in its November 

2019 Order. Mot. at 7. Specifically, the Court finds Plaintiff 

has failed to cure her First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and 

Ninth Causes of Action. The Court finds further amendment of 

these claims would be futile and unduly prejudicial to Defendants 

since she has had multiple opportunities to properly state her 

claims. See Lesnik v. Eisenmann SE, 374 F. Supp. 3d 923, 950 

(N.D. Cal. 2019). Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend is

therefore denied. 

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS in part 

and DENIES in part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as follows:

1. GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s First, Second, Third, Fourth, 

Fifth, and Ninth Causes of Action, which are dismissed with 

prejudice; and

2. DENIED (with limitations) as to Plaintiff’s Sixth, 

Seventh, and Eight Causes of Action. 

3. Defendants shall file their Answer to the remaining 

claims in the SAC within twenty days of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 14, 2020

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