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Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 9, 2011 Decided July 20, 2012

No. 11-5069

BASSEM YOUSSEF,

APPELLANT

v.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:03-cv-01551)

Stephen M. Kohn argued the cause for appellant. With 

him on the briefs were David K. Colapinto and Richard R. 

Renner.

Stephanie R. Marcus, Attorney, U.S. Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief 

were Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Ronald C. 

Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Marleigh D. Dover, Attorney. 

Robert M. Loeb, Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge, and WILLIAMS and 

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH.

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GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: Bassem Youssef, an Egyptianborn American citizen, claims that his employer, the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, discriminated against him on the 

basis of his national origin after the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001, by not placing him in a substantive 

position dealing with counterterrorism and instead 

transferring him to a job for which he was dramatically 

overqualified. He also claims that the FBI retaliated against 

him when he filed a complaint and spoke to his superiors 

about his predicament. The district court granted summary 

judgment against his discrimination claim, but allowed his 

retaliation claim to be tried by a jury. The jury returned a 

verdict against Youssef, and the district court denied his 

motion for a new trial. We affirm the district court’s refusal to 

grant a new trial, but reverse its judgment against Youssef’s 

discrimination claim and remand for further proceedings. 

I

This case has a complex factual and procedural 

background; we recount only the details necessary to our 

decision. See Youssef v. FBI, 541 F. Supp. 2d 121, 128

(D.D.C. 2008). Youssef was born in Egypt and immigrated to 

the United States in 1972, when he was thirteen years old. A 

native Arabic speaker, Youssef has worked for the FBI since

1988. In the first eight years of his career, Youssef worked on 

a variety of counterterrorism investigations and received high 

praise from his supervisors. In 1996, he was promoted to the 

position of Legal Attaché in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where he 

served as a liaison to local law enforcement authorities and 

helped improve relations between the FBI and its Saudi 

counterpart, the Mahabith. As he had before, Youssef once 

again received excellent performance reviews. In July 2000, 

he returned to the United States and was detailed by the FBI 

to the National Counterintelligence Center of the CIA

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(NACIC), where, as Chief of the Executive Secretariat Office,

he coordinated the activities of a number of multi-agency 

groups supporting the counterintelligence community. 

In February 2001, President George W. Bush dismantled

the NACIC and created a new organization to take its place:

the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX). Because 

Youssef’s position at the NACIC no longer existed, the FBI 

detailed him to a temporary position at the NCIX where he 

was responsible for assessing how disclosure of national 

security information harmed the government’s 

counterintelligence capacity. Youssef remained at the NCIX 

until March 2002, when he was transferred to a temporary 

position in DocEx, a new program within the 

Counterterrorism Division of the FBI charged with the 

processing and review of written materials recovered in 

Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Youssef asserts his work in DocEx primarily required 

him to “‘bag and tag’ evidence at an offsite facility,” and his 

“responsibilities were limited to sitting at a desk sifting 

through piles of potentially worthless paper in the hope that 

some intelligence value could be gleaned.” Appellant’s Br. 

58; see also Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 184 (describing one of Youssef’s

main tasks at DocEx as “cataloging [documents], i.e. as [in] 

putting an identifying number or serial number on a document 

before storing the document as original evidence”). The FBI 

disputes that his duties at DocEx consisted of menial 

responsibilities and describes his work instead as identifying

and analyzing information contained in captured documents 

that related to the threat of future terrorist attacks against the 

United States. Appellee’s Br. 36.

Youssef believes that in the aftermath of the attacks of 

September 11th the FBI should have put his experience and 

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language skills to use in a critical counterterrorism position. 

Instead, he was moved to his position at DocEx based on

rumors that he had refused to carry out orders while in Saudi 

Arabia because of his Muslim faith and that he had worn 

“traditional Arabic head-gear.” Youssef, 541 F. Supp. 2d at

131-32. If such rumors circulated, which the FBI disputes, 

they were untrue: Youssef is a Coptic Christian and the story

of the garb was about a different FBI agent with a “similarsounding” name. Id.

On June 28, 2002, Youssef met with his Member of 

Congress, Frank Wolf, and FBI Director Robert Mueller in

the congressman’s office. Youssef explained that he was 

“uniquely qualified” to help the FBI, but that he was being 

kept from more important responsibilities at the Bureau 

because of his national origin. Id. at 133. On July 10, 2002, 

Youssef filed a complaint with the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Id. In August 2002, he 

applied for and received a promotion to be the Unit Chief of 

DocEx, where he remained until he made a lateral move in 

November 2004 to become the Unit Chief of the 

Communications Analysis Unit, a sister unit of DocEx that

focuses on electronic records.

1

 1 We received no briefing on Youssef’s duties as Unit Chief of 

the Communications Analysis Unit because he did not argue that 

his transfer there was discriminatory or retaliatory. See Youssef, 541 

F. Supp. 2d at 133 n.12. 

Id. On January 9, 2003, the 

EEOC sent Youssef a letter stating that it would investigate 

his complaint further. Id. On July 18, 2003, having received 

no final decision on his complaint from the EEOC, Youssef 

sued in federal district court, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f), 

alleging that the FBI had discriminated against him by failing 

to give him substantive counterterrorism work and instead 

assigning him for seven months to a job in DocEx that was 

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well below his expertise and grade level. Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 94-

98.

While in the Communications Analysis Unit, Youssef 

twice asked permission to take several weeks leave to 

participate in inspections of FBI offices. The inspections are 

performed by senior FBI special agents who “monitor [the 

office’s] compliance with the Bureau’s policies, procedures, 

and administrative requirements.” Youssef, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 

135. Participating in these exercises is required to become 

“inspection certified,” which can be helpful in “obtaining 

future promotions.” Youssef v. FBI, 762 F. Supp. 2d 76, 78-80

(D.D.C. 2011). Youssef’s requests were denied. Youssef 

amended his complaint to allege that these denials were

retaliation for his EEO filing, taking his grievances to 

Director Mueller, and other protected activity such as 

attending witness depositions in his discrimination case. Id. at 

79.

In 2008, the district court entered summary judgment 

against his discrimination claim, concluding that Youssef had 

shown only that he was not permitted to “perform the work he 

desired,” which falls short of a claim that he suffered 

materially adverse action at work.2

 2 The district court also entered summary judgment against 

Youssef on other discrimination claims, which are not relevant to 

this appeal. Youssef, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 133-35.

Youssef, 541 F. Supp. 2d 

at 164. His retaliation claim was tried to a jury. Youssef, 762 

F. Supp. 2d at 78. On September 27, 2010, the jury returned a 

special verdict, finding that Youssef had failed to show that 

the FBI’s denial of leave to participate in the inspections was 

a materially adverse action. The district court later denied 

Youssef’s motion for a new trial. Id. at 79. Youssef now

appeals the summary judgment against his discrimination 

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claim and the denial of his motion for a new trial. We take 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II

Title VII provides, in relevant part, that all personnel 

actions affecting employees of the federal government “shall 

be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, 

religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). To 

allege a prima facie case, a plaintiff must show that he “is a 

member of a protected class,” that he “suffered an adverse 

employment action,” and that “the unfavorable action gives 

rise to an inference of discrimination.” Stella v. Mineta, 284 

F.3d 135, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Brown v. Brody, 199 

F.3d 446, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). There is no dispute that as an Egyptian-born 

American citizen, Youssef is a member of a protected class. 

The controversy is whether he suffered a materially adverse 

employment action from which discrimination can reasonably 

be inferred. We review the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to Youssef. See McCready v. Nicholson, 465 F.3d 1, 

7 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

When a Title VII plaintiff rests a claim of materially 

adverse action on a transfer that does not involve loss of pay 

or benefits, a court must determine if there were “materially 

adverse consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or 

privileges of her employment or her future employment 

opportunities such that a reasonable trier of fact could 

conclude that the plaintiff has suffered objectively tangible 

harm.” Brown, 199 F.3d at 457. We have previously 

held that “reassignment with significantly different 

responsibilities . . . generally indicates an adverse action,” 

Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 902 (D.C. Cir. 2006)

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(quoting Forkkio v. Powell, 306 F.3d 1127, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 

2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted), and Youssef 

alleged that such a reassignment occurred. In his complaint, 

Youssef alleged that his position in DocEx “[did] not utilize 

[his] skills and expertise” and that “his primary duty was to 

tag and process evidence at an offsite facility” located in the 

basement of a Virginia warehouse, Pl.’s First Am. 

Compl. ¶ 98; Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 8, at 18. He also 

claimed that one of his co-workers at DocEx was a Grade 

Level 11 non-agent (four levels below his), Pl.’s Aff. ¶ 118,

May 12, 2006, and that his supervisors were grade levels 

below him, “a situation [he] had never encountered 

throughout [his] entire Bureau career,” id. Unlike the two 

positions he held prior to his transfer, at DocEx he supervised 

no one. Appellant’s Reply Br. 14. We conclude that a 

reasonable juror could find that Youssef “experience[d] an 

extraordinary reduction in responsibilities” constituting 

materially adverse action under Title VII. Holcomb, 433 F.3d 

at 902.3

The FBI argues that placing Youssef at DocEx could not 

have been a materially adverse action because he was 

 3 The FBI and Youssef disagree over whether the relevant 

baseline for comparison was his detail to the NACIC or his 

temporary position at the NCIX. We need not resolve that issue 

because a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Youssef’s 

transfer from NCIX to DocEx constituted materially adverse action. 

At NCIX he supervised an agent and – unlike DocEx – did not 

report to agents whose grade levels were below his. See Appellant’s 

Reply Br. 26. There is also no evidence that he did the same work 

as a GS-11 non-agent at NCIX; indeed, the FBI described 

Youssef’s position there as “high profile,” Def.’s Mot. For Summ. 

J. ¶ 18. And Youssef claims that, as a result of his placement in 

DocEx, he could not successfully compete for positions outside the 

Unit. See Appellant’s Reply Br. 26. 

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subsequently promoted to Unit Chief. Appellees’ Br. 35, 39. 

But making the best of a bad situation should not be held 

against a claimant, and seeking a promotion within DocEx 

does not mean that Youssef forfeited his Title VII claim. Even 

if the position of Unit Chief was a match for Youssef’s skill 

and experience, on which we express no opinion, his 

promotion cannot retroactively immunize his transfer to 

substandard work for seven months.

4

We next consider whether Youssef’s showing “gives rise 

to an inference of discrimination.” Stella, 284 F.3d at 145. In 

making this determination, we use the McDonnell Douglas 

factors. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). Once a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of

discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that 

“the adverse employment actions were taken for a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 

509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993) (quoting Tax Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs 

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Before the district court and us, the FBI has 

trained its argument on the nature of the position to which 

Youssef was transferred, not the reason for which he was

transferred. Although the FBI mentioned a potential 

justification for the move, see Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. 12-14

(stating that DocEx’s supervisor “had identified a need for an 

agent with CT experience who could not only read a 

 4 Much of the briefing concerned whether the FBI’s failure to 

place Youssef in a suitable counterterrorism position after 

September 11, 2001, by itself qualified as materially adverse action. 

However, because we conclude that Youssef has credibly alleged 

that his placement in DocEx constituted materially adverse action, 

we need not consider whether the FBI’s failure to place him 

elsewhere (including, as he argues, failure to promote him in the 

intelligence build-up following September 11), if taken alone, did 

so as well. 

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document before its translation, but also understand the 

potential investigative significance of the information 

contained therein”), the district court had no need to consider

whether the explanation was pretextual, having already

concluded that the transfer was not materially adverse, see 

Youssef, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 164-65, and so it did not examine 

Youssef’s proffered evidence of discriminatory motive. See 

Appellant’s Br. 22-25 (discussing false rumors about 

Youssef’s disloyalty “arising from [his] national origin” that 

allegedly led to his placement in DocEx). Because the district 

court did not reach this fact-intensive issue, and the parties 

did not fully brief it to us, we remand for further examination 

of the FBI’s reason for the transfer.

III

The jury entered a special verdict finding that Youssef 

“had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

denial of permission to participate in inspections of FBI 

offices was a materially adverse action.” Youssef, 762 F. 

Supp. 2d at 79. In other words, the jury found that the FBI’s 

refusal to give Youssef time off had not hampered his career 

even though he claimed that participating in these inspections 

was needed for future promotions. Youssef argues that the 

district court abused its discretion by entering the jury’s 

verdict and denying his motion for a new trial. We disagree.

“The jury verdict stands ‘unless the evidence and all 

reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are so onesided that reasonable men and women could not disagree on 

the verdict.’” Czekalski v. LaHood, 589 F.3d 449, 456 (D.C. 

Cir. 2009) (quoting Curry v. District of Columbia, 195 F.3d 

654, 658-59 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). Here, there is much evidence 

to support the jury’s finding. Witnesses testified that these 

inspections typically occur twice a month. Missing two

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inspections was not a major setback for Youssef because there 

were many more he could attend. See Youssef, 762 F. Supp. 

2d at 81. The jury also heard testimony that inspection 

certification was just one of many prerequisites for 

promotion, and Youssef had not completed all of them. A

slight delay in inspection certification would not significantly

diminish his opportunities for promotion. Id. 81-82. The FBI 

also introduced evidence that Youssef could have submitted 

paperwork that would have required his supervisors to allow

him leave to complete the inspection, but that he had never 

pursued that alternative. Id. at 82. Furthermore, “denials of 

requests to attend inspections would not harm an agent’s 

reputation because a denial was usually due to a conflict with 

work schedules.” Id. Lastly, the record showed that “the FBI 

planned to arrange for Youssef to go on another inspection 

some time after his first requests were denied.” Id. Given this 

evidence, a reasonable juror could have found that the denial 

of leave was not a materially adverse action.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 

court denying Youssef’s claim that his transfer to DocEx 

violated Title VII is reversed and remanded, and the district 

court’s order denying his motion for a new trial is affirmed. 

So ordered.

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