Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01118/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01118-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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28 This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT SYLVESTER HEATLEY, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

JAMES E. TILTON, Secretary, et al., )

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Respondents. )

 )

1:07-CV-01118 OWW SMS HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

BACKGROUND1

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Fresno, following his conviction by jury

trial on September 15, 2004, of first degree murder, robbery, burglary, and use of a deadly weapon.

Petitioner was sentenced to serve an in determinate prison term of life without the possibility of

parole.

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U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 2

Petitioner thereafter appealed the conviction. On February 7, 2006, the California Court of

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District (hereinafter “5 DCA”) affirmed the conviction. Petitioner then filed th

a petition for review with the California Supreme Court and review was denied on an unspecified

date.

Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Fresno County Superior Court,

and the petition was denied on May 21, 2007. Petitioner subsequently filed a habeas petition with the

5 DCA and that petition, according to Petitioner, remains pending before the 5 DCA. th th

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 5 of the Rules

Governing § 2254 Cases state that “an alleged failure to exhaust state remedies may be raised by the

attorney general, thus avoiding the necessity of a formal answer as to that ground.” The Advisory

Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus,

either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to dismiss, or after an

answer to the petition has been filed. See Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9 Cir.2001). th

B. Exhaustion of State Remedies

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158,

1163 (9 Cir. 1988). th

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88

F.3d 828, 829 (9 Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full th

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U.S. District Court

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and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the

claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504

U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). 

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

(9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9 Cir.1999); th

Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). In Duncan, the United States Supreme Court th

reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion 

of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the 

state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct 

alleged violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner 

wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only 

in federal court, but in state court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus 

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to 

that court that those claims were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 

223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in 

Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the 

claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the

underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations

that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 

195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 

(9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to 

the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the 

state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the 

violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). 

In the petition before the Court, Petitioner raises three grounds for relief. Petitioner states the

first two grounds were raised on direct appeal and denied by the California Supreme Court.

However, Ground Three has only been presented to the 5 DCA where the petition remains pending. th

Therefore, Ground Three is not exhausted.

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A dismissal for failure to exhaust is not a dismissal on the merits, and Petitioner will not be barred from returning

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to federal court after Petitioner exhausts available state remedies by 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)’s prohibition on filing second

petitions. See In re Turner, 101 F.3d 1323 (9 Cir. 1996). However, the Supreme Court has held that: th

[I]n the habeas corpus context it would be appropriate for an order dismissing a mixed 

petition to instruct an applicant that upon his return to federal court he is to bring only 

exhausted claims. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 41(a) and (b). Once the petitioner is made 

aware of the exhaustion requirement, no reason exists for him not to exhaust all potential 

claims before returning to federal court. The failure to comply with an order of the court 

is grounds for dismissal with prejudice. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 41(b).

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 489 (2000). Therefore, Petitioner is forewarned that in the event he returns to federal court

and files a mixed petition of exhausted and unexhausted claims, the petition may be dismissed with prejudice.

U.S. District Court

 E. D. California cd 4

The instant petition is a mixed petition containing exhausted and unexhausted claims. The

Court must dismiss a mixed petition without prejudice to give Petitioner an opportunity to exhaust

the claim if he can do so. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 521-22. However, Petitioner will be provided with

an opportunity to withdraw the unexhausted claim and go forward with the exhausted claim. 

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be

DISMISSED without prejudice. This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United 2

States District Court Judge assigned to the case pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern

District of California. 

Petitioner may, at his option, move to withdraw the unexhausted claim within thirty (30) days

of the date of service of this Recommendation and proceed with only the exhausted claims. If

Petitioner fails to withdraw the unexhausted claim within the thirty (30) day time frame, the

Recommendation will be submitted to the District Judge for dismissal of the petition so Petitioner

can return to state court to exhaust his unexhausted claim. Rose, 455 U.S. at 520. This dismissal will

not bar Petitioner from returning to federal court after exhausting available state remedies. However,

this does not mean that Petitioner will not be subject to the one year statute of limitations imposed by

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Although the limitations period is tolled while a properly filed request for

collateral review is pending in state court, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), it does not toll for the time an

application is pending in federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 531 U.S. 991 (2001). 

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U.S. District Court

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Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy of this Findings and Recommendation,

any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a

document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” 

Replies to the Objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if

served by mail) after service of the Objections. Provided Petitioner does not move to withdraw the

unexhausted claim, the Finding and Recommendation will be submitted to the District Court for

review of the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9 Cir. 1991). th

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 16, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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