Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-06508/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-06508-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

BARNES FAMILY COMPANY, INC., et 

al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

JOSEPH DAVID GRANADE, 

Defendant. 

Case No.18-cv-06508-EDL 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 

DEFAULT JUDGMENT 

Re: Dkt. No. 16 

 Plaintiffs Barnes Family Company, Inc. d/b/a Platinum Chevrolet (“Platinum Chevrolet”) 

and Foreign Automotive d/b/a Manly Honda (“Manly Honda” and, together, “Plaintiffs”) move 

for default judgment against Defendant Joseph Granade, Sr. a/k/a David Granade d/b/a Granade 

Motor Cars (“Defendant”). The Court lacks full consent from the parties, so it issues this Report 

and Recommendation. For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends GRANTING 

Plaintiffs’ motion and entering default judgment for Platinum Chevrolet in the amount of 

$286,940 and for Manly Honda in the amount of $297,740, which includes attorney’s fees and 

costs as adjusted. The Court directs the Clerk to reassign this case to a District Judge. 

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 

 For purposes of deciding this motion, the Court accepts all of the factual allegations of 

Plaintiffs’ complaint as true, with the exception of the allegations relating to damages. Plaintiffs 

are two separate car dealerships operating in Sonoma County, California. Compl., ¶ 1. Defendant 

is the sole proprietor of the Granade Motor Cars dealership located in Texas. Id., ¶ 2. 

 In August 2017, Defendant contacted Platinum Chevrolet about purchasing several used 

vehicles that were in Platinum Chevrolet’s used car inventory. Id., ¶ 14. Ultimately, Defendant 

decided to purchase five vehicles (the “Vehicles”) for a total agreed purchase price of $94,100. Id. 

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The sales were made between August 22, 2017 and September 19, 2017. Id., ¶ 16. Following 

common practice among dealerships in the used car industry, Defendant picked up the Vehicles at 

Platinum Chevrolet without paying for the Vehicles at that time, based on the standard practice 

and representation that Defendant would pay for the Vehicles after delivery. Id., ¶ 17. The 

practice is that title paperwork is not delivered to the purchasing dealership until payment is made. 

Id., ¶ 18. Defendant never paid Platinum Chevrolet for the Vehicles and, as a result, Platinum 

Chevrolet never finalized, filed with the California Department of Motor Vehicles, or delivered 

the title documents to Defendant. Id., ¶¶ 19-20. Subsequently, Defendant made no response to 

multiple requests for payment from Platinum Chevrolet. Id., ¶ 21. 

 After taking possession of the Vehicles from Platinum Chevrolet and despite not having 

title to them, Defendant offered the Vehicles for sale to Manly Honda. Id., ¶ 22. Manly Honda 

agreed to purchase the Vehicles and paid $97,700 to Defendant for them. Id., ¶ 23. Defendant 

was unable to deliver title to Manly Honda for the Vehicles. Id., ¶ 24. 

 Both Plaintiffs have demanded restitution from Defendant, but Defendant has ignored their 

demands. Id., ¶ 25. 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 Plaintiffs filed suit on October 24, 2018, raising the following claims: (1) conversion; (2) 

trespass to chattels; (3) unjust enrichment; (4) breach of contract; (5) fraud and deceit; (6) 

intentional fraud; and (7) theft. Plaintiffs served Defendant on December 10, 2018 by leaving 

copies of the complaint, summons, and other initial case documents with Defendant’s son and coresident at an address in Bulverde, Texas. Plaintiff also mailed these documents to Defendant’s 

Bulverde, Texas address on December 11, 2018. 

 Defendant did not respond to the complaint after being served. At Plaintiffs’ request, the 

clerk of court entered default against Defendant on January 31, 2019. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD 

After entry of a default by the clerk, a court may grant a default judgment. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 55. “The district court’s decision whether to enter a default judgment is a discretionary 

one.” Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). As a preliminary matter, the court 

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must determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the action and personal jurisdiction 

over the defendant. See In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999). In addition, “the Court 

must assess the adequacy of the service of process on the party against whom default judgment is 

requested.” Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. Vuong Tran, 2013 WL 1832563, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 

2013). If the Court determines that service was sufficient, it should consider whether the 

following factors support the entry of default judgment: 

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of 

plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) 

the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute 

concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to 

excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. 

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). 

 In considering the above factors, the Court takes all factual allegations in Plaintiff’s 

complaint as true, except for those relating to damages. See TeleVideo Systems, Inc. v. 

Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987). Relief granted under a default judgment is 

limited by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c), in that the judgment “shall not be different in 

kind of exceed in amount that prayed for in the [complaint].” PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 

F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 

IV. DISCUSSION 

A. Jurisdiction 

 Before entering a default judgment, a court has “an affirmative duty to look into its 

jurisdiction” over the subject matter of the action and the parties involved. Tuli, 172 F.3d at 712. 

Plaintiffs assert that the Court has diversity jurisdiction over this case and personal jurisdiction 

over Defendant. 

 District courts have original jurisdiction over all civil actions where the amount in 

controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and there is complete diversity of 

citizenship between the opposing parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. 

Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373-74 (1978). The amount in controversy is an estimate of the total 

amount in dispute, not a prospective assessment of the defendant’s liability. See Lewis v. Verizon 

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Commc’ns, Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 400 (9th Cir. 2000). 

 Here, Plaintiffs allege that they suffered damages of nearly $200,000. They also allege 

that both Plaintiffs are residents of California and that Defendant is a resident of Texas and/or 

Colorado. Compl., ¶¶ 1-2, 9. After filing the complaint, Plaintiffs learned through records from 

the Comal County Clerk in New Braunfels, Texas, that Defendant’s business is located in Spring 

Branch, Texas, and Defendant’s home address is in Bulverde, Texas. Crowell Decl., ¶ 2, Exs. AB. Thus, the parties are diverse and Plaintiffs have established that the Court has subject matter 

jurisdiction over this case. 

 The Court also has specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Personal jurisdiction is 

determined by the applicable state personal jurisdiction statute and constitutional principles of due 

process. See Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1286 (9th Cir. 1977). 

California’s long-arm statute is coextensive with a federal due process analysis, and thus the 

jurisdictional analyses under California law and federal law are the same. Fred Martin Motors, 

374 F.3d at 801. Under federal law, “[f]or a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a 

nonresident defendant, that defendant must have at least ‘minimum contacts’ with the relevant 

forum such that the exercise of jurisdiction ‘does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 

substantial justice.” Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). A 

court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if the defendant’s contacts 

with the forum give rise to the cause of action before the court. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 

915, 923 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-3 (1958)). Here, Plaintiffs 

allege that Defendant took the initiative to contact Plaintiffs, both of whom are located in Sonoma 

County, California, to buy and sell the Vehicles. Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of this forum-directed 

conduct and the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant. 

B. Procedural Requirements 

 Before a court may consider whether to enter default judgment, it must be satisfied that the 

procedural prerequisites, including adequate service of process, have been met. See, e.g., 

PepsiCo, Inc. v. California Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Further, a 

court may not enter a default judgment against an unrepresented minor, an incompetent person, or 

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a person in military service. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2); 50 U.S.C. App. § 521(b)(1). 

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 provides that service of the summons and complaint 

may be effected on an individual within the United States by either following state law where the 

district court is located or by using the following methods: (1) delivering a copy of the summons 

and of the complaint to the individual personally; (2) leaving a copy of each at the individual’s 

dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there; or 

(3) delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of 

process. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1)-(2). 

 Plaintiffs researched Defendant’s company Granade Motor Cars and identified the business 

address for the company as well as Defendant’s home address. Crowell Decl., ¶ 2. A process 

server attempted to deliver the summons and the complaint at Granade Motor Cars’ business 

address, but the location contained a fenced property with an empty lot and vacant buildings. Id., 

¶ 3; Dkt. No. 7 (certificate of service). After that, the process server made substitute service by 

leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at Defendant’s home with Defendant’s son and coresident, Dylan Granade, who is a relator in Texas. Crowell Decl., ¶¶ 4,6; Dkt. No. 7. In 

accordance with California law, Plaintiffs also mailed a copy of the summons and complaint to 

Defendant’s home address. Crowell Decl., ¶ 4; Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.20(b). There are no 

facts to indicate that Defendant is an unrepresented minor, incompetent person, or a person in the 

military. 

 Thus, Plaintiffs have fulfilled the procedural requirements for obtaining default judgment 

against Defendant. 

C. Eitel Factors 

1. Prejudice to Plaintiffs 

 The first Eitel factor is whether Plaintiffs will suffer prejudice if default judgment is not 

entered. Without default judgment, Plaintiffs will be without a remedy for Defendant’s alleged 

conversion, breach of contract, and theft. See PepsiCo., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177 (“Potential 

prejudice to Plaintiffs favor granting a default judgment. If Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment 

is not granted, Plaintiffs will likely be without other recourse for recovery.”); Juno Therapeutics, 

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2018 WL 2021483, at *4 (“Because Plaintiffs have no recourse for injunction if default judgment 

is not entered, this factor weighs in favor of default judgment.”). This factor weighs in favor of 

granting Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment. 

2. Merits and Sufficiency of the Complaint 

 Under the second and third Eitel factors, the court considers the merits and sufficiency of 

Plaintiffs’ complaint, specifically whether Plaintiffs’ complaint “state[s] a claim on which [it] may 

recover.” Pepsico, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1175; Chanel, Inc. v. Hsiao Yin Fu, 2017 WL 1079544, at 

*3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2017) (“Generally, courts consider the merits of plaintiff’s substantive 

claims and the sufficiency of the complaint together.”). 

 Although Plaintiffs’ complaint raises seven separate claims, Plaintiffs only move for 

default judgment on three of those claims: conversion, breach of contract, and theft. “When an 

action presents one or more claim for relief . . . , the court may direct entry of a final judgment as 

to one or more, but fewer than all, claims . . . only if the court expressly determines that there is no 

just reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Here, given Defendant’s lack of participation in this 

litigation and the sufficiency of the conversion, breach of contract, and theft claims, there is no 

just reason to delay entry of final judgment as to those three claims. Of course, Plaintiffs may find 

it most efficient to dismiss their remaining claims. 

a. Conversion 

 “Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the property of another.” Lee v. 

Hanley, 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1240 (2015) (quoting Welco Elecs., Inc. v. Mora, 223 Cal.App.4th 202, 

208 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014)). The elements of the claim are: (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or right to 

possession of the property; (2) the defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of 

property rights, interfering with the plaintiff’s possession; and (3) damages. Id.; see also PCO, 

Inc. v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, LLP, 150 Cal.App.4th 384, 395 

(Cal. Ct. App. 2007). Money can only be the subject of a cause of action for conversion if there is 

“a specific, identifiable sum involved, such as where an agent accepts a sum of money to be paid 

to another and fails to make the payment.” PCO, 150 Cal. Ct. App. At 395. 

 The complaint sufficiently states a claim against Defendant for conversion of the property 

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of both Plaintiffs. As to Platinum Chevrolet, the complaint alleges that the five Vehicles were in 

Platinum Chevrolet’s used car inventory and that Defendant agreed to purchase them from 

Platinum Chevrolet. However, Defendant took possession of the Vehicles from Platinum 

Chevrolet on the representation that he would subsequently pay for them at the agreed-upon price 

of $94,100, but then failed to do so. Defendant has never paid the $94,100 purchase price or 

returned the Vehicles. These allegations satisfy the three elements of a conversion claim. 

 With respect to Manly Honda, the complaint alleges that Defendant purported to sell the 

Vehicles to Manly Honda for $97,700. Although Defendant delivered physical possession of the 

Vehicles in exchange for the $97,700 purchase price, Defendant never received title to the 

Vehicles from Platinum Chevrolet and, thus, was unable to deliver title to the Vehicles to Manly 

Honda. As a result, Manly Honda paid $97,700 to Defendant for Vehicles it is unable to sell, 

thereby wrongfully interfering with Manly Honda’s property rights to and possession of this 

specific, identifiable sum of money. These allegations also satisfy the elements of a conversion 

claim. 

 Plaintiffs provided declarations from Todd Barnes, the president of Platinum Chevrolet, 

and Jeffrey Dantzler, the general manager of Manly Honda, establishing that the total purchase 

price for the Vehicles was $94,100 and $97,700, respectively. 

b. Breach of Contract 

 A breach of contract under California law requires the plaintiff to prove: (1) the existence 

of a contract; (2) the plaintiff’s performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance; (3) the 

defendant’s breach; and (4) the resulting damage to the plaintiff. Richman v. Hartley, 224 

Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 437c and Aguilar v. 

Atlantic Richfield Co., 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (2001)). 

 The same facts that form the basis of Plaintiffs’ conversion claims also support their 

breach of contract claims against Defendant. For each Plaintiff, Defendant entered into a contract 

to buy or sell the Vehicles for a set sum. Barnes Decl., ¶¶ 4-7, Ex. A (copies of purchase 

documents); Dantzler Decl., ¶¶ (copies of purchase documents and checks). Plaintiffs fulfilled 

their obligations under the agreements, either to deliver the Vehicles or pay for their purchase. 

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Plaintiffs allege that Defendant breached the agreements by failing to pay Platinum Chevrolet and 

delivering Vehicles to without title and ownership. 

c. Theft 

 The third claim on which Plaintiffs move for default judgment is their theft claim. 

California law creates a private right of action for recovery of treble damages, costs, and 

attorney’s fees for any person who has been injured by criminal theft as defined by statute. 

Section 496(a) of the Penal Code provides: 

Every person who buys or receives any property that has been stolen 

or that has been obtained in any manner constituting theft or 

extortion, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, or who 

conceals, sells, withholds, or aids in concealing, selling, or 

withholding any property from the owner, knowing the property to be 

so stolen or obtained, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county 

jail for not more than one year, or imprisonment pursuant to 

subdivision (h) of Section 1170. However, if the value of the property 

does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950), the offense shall be 

a misdemeanor, punishable only by imprisonment in a county jail not 

exceeding one year, if such person has no prior convictions for an 

offense specified in clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) 

of subdivision (e) of Section 667 or for an offense requiring 

registration pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290. 

Cal. Pen. Code § 496(a) (emphasis added). “Any person who has been injured by a violation of 

subdivision (a) . . . may bring an action for three times the amount of actual damages, if any, 

sustained by the plaintiff, costs of suit, and reasonable attorney’s fees.” Id., § 496(c). Theft is 

defined as: 

Every person who shall feloniously steal, take, carry, lead, or drive 

away the personal property of another, or who shall fraudulently 

appropriate property which has been entrusted to him or her, or who 

shall knowingly and designedly, by any false or fraudulent 

representation or pretense, defraud any other person of money, labor 

or real or personal property, or who causes or procures others to report 

falsely of his or her wealth or mercantile character and by thus 

imposing upon any person, obtains credit and thereby fraudulently 

gets or obtains possession of money, or property or obtains the labor 

or service of another, is guilty of theft. 

Cal. Pen. Code § 484(a). 

 Each Plaintiff seeks three times their damages plus an equal share of attorney’s fees and 

costs. The complaint alleges that Defendant knowingly misrepresented to Platinum Chevrolet that 

he would pay $94,100 for the Vehicles in exchange for taking possession of the vehicles and that 

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Defendant knowingly misrepresented to Manly Honda that he had and could convey ownership 

and title to the Vehicles in exchange for the agreed purchase price of $97,700, and that both 

Plaintiffs relied upon these intentionally false representations in completing the purchase and sale 

transactions with Defendant. Compl., ¶¶ 54-56. These allegations satisfy the standard § 484(a) 

for theft by “knowingly and designedly, by any false or fraudulent representation or pretense, 

defraud any other person of money, labor or real or personal property.” According to these 

allegations of the complaint, Defendant is a person who “buys or receives any property that has 

been stolen or that has been obtained in any manner constituting theft or extortion, knowing the 

property to be so stolen or obtained.” Cal. Pen. Code § 496(a). These allegations also constitute 

acts by Defendant that include “sell[ing] . . . knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained.” 

Id. The complaint also alleges that Plaintiffs are “person[s] who ha[ve] been injured by a violation 

of subdivision (a)” of § 496. 

 Based on these factual allegations, Plaintiffs are entitled to treble damages, attorney’s fees, 

and costs under § 496. See Bell v. Feibush, 212 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1044-48 (2013). Since Bell, 

some California state courts have declined to apply § 496(c) in the context of a commercial 

contract dispute, a real estate dispute, a car repair dispute, and an employment dispute over unpaid 

commissions and other compensation. See Kayne v. Mense, 2016 WL 1178671, at *5 (Cal. Ct. 

App. March 25, 2016); Nguyen v. Fuke, 2017 WL 2839540, at *4-5 (Cal. Ct. App. July 3, 2017); 

Younan v. Ibrahim, 2017 WL 2962800, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. July 12, 2017); Lacagnina v. 

Comprehend Systems, Inc., 25 Cal.App.5th 955, 969-72 (2018). However, as in Bell, Defendant 

here is alleged to have not only promised to pay Platinum Chevrolet for the Vehicles knowing he 

would not do so, but then shortly thereafter sold the Vehicles to Manly Honda even though he 

knew that he did not have title to them. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant purchased the 

Vehicles from Platinum Chevrolet without any intention of paying for the Vehicles. Compl., ¶ 55. 

Plaintiffs also allege, as in Bell, that they have asked Defendant to make restitution and that 

Defendant has not done so. In contrast to the cases cited above that have rejected application of § 

496(c) in civil cases, Plaintiffs’ allegations sound in fraud, rather than simply appearing to be a 

commercial transaction gone awry, thereby making the civil remedies of § 496 available. 

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Platinum Chevrolet’s treble damages are $282,300 and Manly Honda’s treble damages are 

$293,100. 

 For their fees and costs, Plaintiffs provide declarations from their attorneys that they have 

billed 38 hours so far and expect to bill 3 more hours in conjunction with the hearing on this 

motion. At an hourly rate of $220, attorney’s fees would be $9,020. Crowell Decl., ¶ 11. 

However, Plaintiffs’ counsel did not appear for the hearing on their motion, so the Court subtracts 

$660, representing 3 hours of time, from that total and only recommends award $8,360 in 

attorney’s fees. Plaintiffs have also incurred total costs of $920 (a $400 filing fee and $520 to 

investigate and serve Defendant). Id. Each Plaintiff seeks to recover half of the total attorney’s 

fees and costs, which would be $4,640. These fees and costs are reasonable. 

 Thus, the Court concludes that Platinum Chevrolet is entitled to default judgment in the 

amount of $286,940 and Manly Honda would obtain default judgment in the amount of $297,740. 

3. Amount of Money at Stake 

 Under the fourth Eitel factor, the court should consider “the amount of money at stake in 

relation to the seriousness of Defendant’s conduct.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1176. A large 

amount of claimed damages weighs against an entry of default judgment. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. 

To determine if an amount is reasonable, the court considers the plaintiff’s “declarations, 

calculations, and other documentation of damages.” Truong Giang Corp. v. Twinstar Tea Corp., 

2007 WL 1545173, at *12 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2007). Considering the serious misconduct alleged 

in the complaint, the amount of money at stake – either approximately $192,000 for damages 

alone or approximately $585,000 for trebled damages – is not an excessive or unreasonable 

amount of money. This factor weighs in favor of granting default judgment. 

4. Likelihood of Dispute over Material Facts 

 The fifth Eitel factor asks the court to consider the likelihood of a dispute regarding the 

material facts. Where a defendant “has not appeared at all . . . the absence of the possibility of a 

dispute concerning material facts is often easier to infer.” Solaria Corp. v. T.S. Energie e Risorse, 

S.R.I., 2014 WL 7205114, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2014) (citing Ploom, Inc. v. Iploom, LLC, 

2014 WL 1942218, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2014)). “[T]here is little possibility of dispute 

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concerning material facts because (1) based on the entry of default, the Court accepts all 

allegations in Plaintiff[s’] Complaint as true and (2) Defendant has not made any effort to 

challenge the Complaint or otherwise appear in this case.” W. Reserve Life Assur. Co. of Ohio v. 

Canul, 2012 WL 844589, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2012). Accordingly, this factor weighs in 

favor of default judgment. 

5. Excusable Neglect 

 The sixth Eitel factor asks the court to consider whether a defendant’s default resulted from 

excusable neglect. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. “Where a defendant ‘[was] properly served with the 

Complaint, the notice of entry of default, as well as the papers in support of the instant motion,’ 

this factor favors entry of default judgment.” Pearson v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, 2016 WL 

5496268, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2016) (quoting Shanghai Automation Instrument Co. Ltd. v. 

Kuei, 194 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2001)). Defendant was properly served and has still 

not appeared in this case. Accordingly, there is no evidence of excusable neglect. 

6. Policy Favoring Decision on the Merits 

 Although courts prefer to issue judgments on the merits, a defendant’s failure to answer a 

complaint “makes a decision on the merits impractical, if not impossible.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 

2d at 1177. Termination of a case before hearing the merits is allowed when a defendant fails to 

defend an action. Id. This factor is at least neutral or weighs in favor of entering default judgment 

against Defendant. 

 In conclusion, all of the Eitel factors taken together weigh in favor of entering default 

judgment against Defendant. 

V. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons discussed above, the Court recommends GRANTING Plaintiffs’ motion 

and entering default judgment for Platinum Chevrolet in the amount of $286,940 and for Manly 

Honda in the amount of $297,740 since there is no just reason for delay. Since Plaintiffs’ motion 

only sought default judgment on three of their seven claims, the case survives as to the remaining 

four claims, unless Plaintiffs dismiss them. 

Any party may serve and file specific written objections to this recommendation within 

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(b); Civil Local Rule 72-3. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the 

right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 15, 2019 

 

ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE 

United States Magistrate Judge 

Case 4:18-cv-06508-HSG Document 20 Filed 05/15/19 Page 12 of 12