Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02136/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02136-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 20:1401 Education: Handicapped Child Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

J.R., a minor, by and through

his parents W.R. and N.R.,

and W.R. and N.R., individually,

NO. CIV. S-06-2136 LKK/GGH

Plaintiffs,

v. O R D E R

SYLVAN UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT,

STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT

OF EDUCATION in its supervisory

capacity, the CALIFORNIA OFFICE

OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, and

DR. JOHN HALVERSON, in his

official capacity as superintendent

for SYLVAN UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendants.

 /

Pending before the court is plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration of the court’s October 11, 2006 order denying

plaintiff’s motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. The court

decides the matter based on the papers and without oral argument.

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Case 2:06-cv-02136-LKK -GGH Document 43 Filed 11/27/06 Page 1 of 8
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I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, J.R., a minor, brings suit under the Individuals

with Disabilities in Education Improvement Act (“IDEA”), the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and related state law

grounds. Plaintiff names several defendants, including the Sylvan

Union School District (“District”). 

Plaintiff is autistic and requires special education. 

In June of 2006, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that the

Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) proposed by the District was

appropriate. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the IEP approved

of by the ALJ violates the IDEA, ADA and related state laws.

Plaintiff also maintains that the ALJ failed to comply with

procedural safeguards set forth in the IDEA.

Plaintiff sought a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) to

enjoin the District from implementing the decision of the ALJ.

Rather than repeat the somewhat complicated facts of the case, the

court incorporates by reference the facts set forth in its October

11, 2006 Order.

The court denied the motion for a TRO. See October 11, 2006

Order. The court determined that plaintiff was seeking mandatory

relief and that therefore a heightened standard applied. In light

of this standard, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to set

forth sufficient allegations to suggest that he would suffer

irreparable serious harm. 

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II.

STANDARDS FOR MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION 

“Under the ‘law of the case’ doctrine a court is generally

precluded from reconsidering an issue that has already been decided

by the same court, or a higher court in the identical case.” United

States v. Alexander, 106 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997)(citing

Thomas v. Bible, 983 F.2d 153, 154 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,

508 U.S. 951 (1993)). Although motions to reconsider are directed

to the sound discretion of the court, see Kern-Tulare Water Dist.

v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D. Cal. 1986),

aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 824 F.2d 514 (9th

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988), considerations of

judicial economy weigh heavily in the process. Thus, Local Rule

78-230(k) requires that a party seeking reconsideration of a

district court's order must brief the “new or different facts or

circumstances...which... were not shown upon such prior motion, or

what other grounds exist for the motion.” Generally speaking,

before reconsideration may be granted there must be a change in the

controlling law or facts, the need to correct a clear error, or the

need to prevent manifest injustice. See Alexander, 106 F.3d at 876.

Motions to reconsider are not vehicles permitting the

unsuccessful party to “rehash” arguments previously presented. See

Costello v. United States Government, 765 F.Supp. 1003, 1009 (C.D.

Cal. 1991). Nor is a motion to reconsider justified on the basis

of new evidence available prior to the court's ruling. See Fay

Corp. v. BAT Holdings One, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 307, 309 (W.D.

Case 2:06-cv-02136-LKK -GGH Document 43 Filed 11/27/06 Page 3 of 8
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The “stay-put provision” in the IDEA states: “[D]uring the 1

pendency of any proceeding conducted pursuant to this section,

unless the State or local agency and the parents otherwise agree,

the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement

of such child.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j).

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Wash.1987), aff'd, 896 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1990). Finally, “after

thoughts” or “shifting of ground” do not constitute an appropriate

basis for reconsideration. See id. These relatively restrictive

standards “reflect [ ] district courts' concern for preserving

dwindling resources and promoting judicial efficiency.” Costello,

765 F. Supp. at 1009.

III.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that the court committed clear error when it

characterized plaintiff’s motion for a TRO as a motion for

mandatory relief. Rather, the court should have viewed plaintiff’s

motion as a request for a “stay put” injunction pursuant to the

IDEA. See Pl.’s Mot. for Recon. at 2 & 8. Plaintiff also argues 1

that a recent Eleventh Circuit case sets forth the proper

procedural requirements for a stay put order.

The court denies plaintiff’s motion on a very straight forward

basis: Plaintiff’s argument that the court should have entered a

“stay put” order is being raised for the first time in his motion

for reconsideration. Plaintiff’s motion for a TRO was not a

request for a stay put order pursuant to the IDEA. In fact, it was

just the opposite. Plaintiff’s initial motion for a TRO

specifically stated that a “stay put [order] is not available here

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to protect Plaintiff.” Pl.’s Mot. for TRO at 18. In plaintiff’s

motion for a TRO, he explained: 

Neither the IDEIA nor any other law does provides for such a

mechanism during an appeal of the administrative hearing

decision. Here, due to the absence of any legal remedy,

Plaintiff seeks the equivalent of a "stay put" order

maintaining his placement in a general education classroom

with ABA/DTT services, as provided for in the last agreed

upon IEP while he appeals the decision of the administrative

law judge. 

Pl.’s Mot. for TRO at 14. Put directly, plaintiff specifically

stated that he was not seeking a stay put order (because it was not

applicable to him) and that therefore, he needed the protection of

a TRO. Now, in his motion for reconsideration, plaintiff asserts

for the first time that, in fact, he was seeking a stay put order

and that the court erred in failing to apply the standards for a

stay put order. 

It is well established that a district court may “decline to

consider an issue raised for the first time in a motion for

reconsideration.” Novato Fire Protection Dist. v. United States,

181 F.3d 1135, 1142 n. 6 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Rosenfeld v.

United States Dept. of Justice, 57 F.3d 803, 811 (9th Cir. 1995)

(district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to

consider argument raised for first time on reconsideration without

a good excuse). 

In the pending motion for reconsideration, plaintiff is

attempting to advance a legal theory that was not advanced in his

initial motion for a TRO. Plaintiff’s motion for a TRO advanced

the theory that the stay put provision did not apply to him and

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that therefore, the “extraordinary relief” of a TRO was “necessary

as Plaintiff has no where else to turn.” Pl.’s Req. for TRO at 14.

Plaintiff now argues that the stay put provision does in fact apply

to him and that the court erred in failing to analyze the motion

for a TRO as a request for a stay put order. 

New and shifting legal theories are not grounds for granting

a motion for reconsideration. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. City of

Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 2001) (district court did not

abuse its discretion in disregarding legal arguments made for first

time on a motion to amend). Plaintiff may not, therefore, use a

motion for reconsideration as a vehicle to advance his new legal

theory that the stay put provision applies to him. 

Plaintiff also argues that the court was in error when it

concluded that plaintiff sought mandatory relief. This argument

is equally unavailing. At oral argument, the court specifically

asked plaintiff’s counsel whether the relief sought constituted

mandatory relief. After some discussion, plaintiff’s counsel

answered in the affirmative. See Hearing Transcript at 3:7-9.

Indeed, at no point during oral argument did plaintiff’s counsel

advance the theory that plaintiff was in fact seeking a stay put

order and that therefore a separate standard applied. 

Finally, plaintiff avers that a recent Eleventh Circuit case,

CP v. Leon County School Bd. Florida, 466 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir.

2006), constitutes a “change in law.” The court need not remind

plaintiff that motions for reconsideration may be granted when

there is a change in controlling law. See Alexander, 106 F.3d at

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876 (emphasis added). Here, the Eleventh Circuit case is not

controlling. More importantly, the case offers no new insight into

the issues raised in plaintiff’s motion for a TRO. The Eleventh

Circuit case focuses exclusively on the procedural requirements for

a stay put order. As previously discussed, plaintiff may not use

a motion for reconsideration to advance his new legal theory that

he is, in fact, entitled to a stay put order. Given that the court

is not allowing plaintiff to advance this new legal theory, the

Eleventh Circuit case is not relevant. 

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration is DENIED. The hearing set for December 1, 2006

is hereby VACATED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: November 27, 2006.

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