Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-07073/USCOURTS-caDC-99-07073-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued En Banc September 27, 2000

Decided March 2, 2001

No. 99-7073

Jimmy L. Duncan,

Appellee

v.

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 95cv02360)

Bruce P. Heppen argued the cause for the appellant.

Cheryl C. Burke, Robert J. Kniaz and Mark F. Sullivan were

on brief.

Sally Dunaway and Melvin Radowitz were on brief for

amici curiae American Association of Retired Persons and

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National Employment Lawyers Association. Paula A.

Brantner entered an appearance.

Ann Elizabeth Reesman was on brief for amicus curiae

Equal Employment Advisory Council.

Bruce M. Bender argued the cause for the appellee. Suzanne L. Lawrence entered an appearance.

Bill Lann Lee, then Assistant Attorney General, Jessica D.

Silver and Thomas E. Chandler, Attorneys, United States

Department of Justice, Philip B. Sklover, Associate General

Counsel, and Barbara L. Sloan, Attorney, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, were on brief for amici curiae United States of America and The Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge; Silberman,* Williams,

Ginsburg, Sentelle, Henderson, Randolph, Rogers, Tatel

and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge Randolph, with

whom Circuit Judges Williams and Sentelle join.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge Tatel.

Dissenting opinion filed by Chief Judge Edwards.

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: Appellant

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA)

challenges the district court's denial of its post-trial motion

for judgment as a matter of law in this discrimination action

brought by appellee Jimmy Duncan under the Americans

with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. ss 12101 et seq., (ADA).

Because Duncan offered no significantly probative evidence

below of the number and types of positions available in his

local job market so as to demonstrate that his back impairment substantially limits his ability to work, we hold that he

__________

* Judge Silberman took senior status on November 1, 2000 but

continues to participate as a member of this en banc court pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. s 46(c)(2).

failed to establish he was "disabled" under the ADA. The

district court therefore erred in denying WMATA's motion.

Duncan worked at WMATA for seven years. He began his

career there as a custodian in May 1986 and became an

Automated Fare Collector (AFC) parts runner in November

1991. In December 1992 Duncan was involuntarily transferred to the Elevator/Escalator branch [ELES] where he

was again employed as a parts runner. As a custodian,

Duncan was required to lift between 75 and 100 pounds, as an

AFC parts runner only about 30 pounds and as an ELES

parts runner over 100 pounds. On December 19, 1992, his

third night in ELES, Duncan, who had suffered a series of

back injuries between 1989 and 1992, reinjured his back. As

a result he was unable to continue in his heavy lifting ELES

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job. Duncan's supervisor informed him no light lifting jobs

were then available and Duncan was placed briefly on sick

leave and then on leave without pay. He twice applied for a

vacant AFC parts runner position, in March and July 1993,

but without success.

In August 1993 Duncan received a letter from his supervisor instructing him to meet with WMATA's Associate Medical

Director, Dr. Mary O'Donnell, and to take with him all of his

relevant medical records, including a statement from his

treating physician. Duncan consulted his treating physician

who referred him to a neurologist. Because the neurologist

was out of town, Duncan was unable to obtain a statement

from him before his August 19, 1993 meeting with O'Donnell.

At the meeting O'Donnell told Duncan he would probably be

discharged, apparently because he had failed to produce

documentation of his current condition. Duncan was discharged in October 1993. In February 1994 he took a parttime light lifting position with Hertz Corporation.

On December 22, 1994 Duncan filed suit in the district

court alleging WMATA violated the ADA by discharging him

on account of a disability and by failing to reasonably accommodate his disability. After a five-day trial the jury returned

a verdict on May 27, 1997, finding WMATA violated the ADA

as alleged and awarding Duncan compensatory damages of

$125,000 on his wrongful termination claim and $125,000 on

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his reasonable accommodation claim. WMATA filed a posttrial motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively,

for a new trial. The district court denied the motion in a

memorandum opinion and order filed March 26, 1998. In

subsequent orders the court awarded Duncan reinstatement

with back pay, attorney's fees and costs and pre-trial interest.

On appeal WMATA challenges the denial of its post-trial

motion and the various awards.

"This court reviews de novo the trial court's denial of a

motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative,

for a new trial." Curry v. District of Columbia, 195 F.3d 654,

658-59 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing Swanks v. WMATA, 179 F.3d

929, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). We will not disturb a jury verdict

"unless the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be

drawn therefrom are so one-sided that reasonable men and

women could not disagree on the verdict." Id. at 659 (quoting Smith v. Washington Sheraton Corp., 135 F.3d 779, 782

(D.C. Cir. 1998)). Evidence supporting the verdict, however,

must be "more than merely colorable; it must be significantly

probative." Id. (quoting Smith, 135 F.3d at 782). Applying

this standard, we conclude Duncan failed to produce significantly probative evidence that he was "disabled" under the

ADA and that the verdict and awards below must therefore

be vacated.

In an ADA case with no direct evidence of discrimination

and where the defendant denies that its decisions were motivated by the plaintiff's disability, this court applies the familiar burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Marshall v. Federal

Express Corp., 130 F.3d 1095, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Under

the McDonnell Douglas framework an ADA plaintiff must

prove that "he had a disability within the meaning of the

ADA, that he was 'qualified' for the position with or without a

reasonable accommodation, and that he suffered an adverse

employment action because of his disability." Swanks v.

WMATA, 179 F.3d 929, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The ADA

defines a "disability" as "a physical or mental impairment

that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual." 42 U.S.C. s 12102(2)(A). ThroughUSCA Case #99-7073 Document #579751 Filed: 03/02/2001 Page 4 of 27
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out this litigation, Duncan has maintained that his degenerative disc disease, which limits his lifting to no more than 20

pounds, fits this definition because it is a physical impairment

that limits his major life activity of "working." WMATA

responds that Duncan failed to establish at trial that his back

condition in fact "substantially limits" his ability to work.1

We agree.

In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999),

the United States Supreme Court provided guidance on the

meaning of the phrase "substantially limits":

The ADA does not define "substantially limits," but

"substantially" suggests "considerable" or "specified to a

large degree." ...

When the major life activity under consideration is

that of working, the statutory phrase "substantially limits" requires, at a minimum, that plaintiffs allege they

are unable to work in a broad class of jobs.... To be

substantially limited in the major life activity of working,

then, one must be precluded from more than one type of

job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice. If jobs

utilizing an individual's skills (but perhaps not his or her

unique talents) are available, one is not precluded from a

substantial class of jobs. Similarly, if a host of different

types of jobs are available, one is not precluded from a

broad range of jobs.

527 U.S. at 491-92 (citation omitted). This passage makes

clear that whether an impairment substantially limits the

major life activity of working depends primarily on the avail-

__________

1 WMATA concedes that Duncan has a physical impairment and,

until its en banc brief, did not dispute that working is a"major life

activity" under the ADA. In light of our holding that Duncan did

not demonstrate his impairment substantially limits his work activity, we need not and do not consider WMATA's belated assertion in

its supplemental en banc briefs that working is not a major life

activity but we assume arguendo that it is. Cf. Sutton v. United

Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 492 (1999) (making same assumption,

while noting that "there may be some conceptual difficulty in

defining 'major life activities' to include work").

ability of jobs for which the impaired person qualifies. The

Supreme Court further instructed that this is "an individualized inquiry," id. at 483 (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.

624 (1998)), and that courts should consider such factors as

"the geographical area to which the individual has reasonable

access and 'the number and types of jobs utilizing similar

training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within the geographical

area, from which the individual is also disqualified,' " id. at

491-92 (citing & quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App.

s 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(A), (B)2). In sum, to establish substantial

limitation of working activity under the ADA, a plaintiff must

allege and prove that in his particular circumstances, taking

into account the appropriate factors, his impairment prevents

him from performing a "substantial class" or "broad range" of

jobs otherwise available to him.

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Duncan asserts he sufficiently demonstrated substantial

limitation through expert medical testimony that his back

condition and lifting restriction are permanent and through

evidence of his age, limited skills, education and experience

and of his inability to find comparable employment after his

discharge. The cited evidence tells us little or nothing,

however, about the number and types of jobs in the Washington, D.C. area for which Duncan is qualified and which are

therefore available to him. There may be numerous local

positions that do not require heavy or medium lifting--such

as the AFC parts runner position at WMATA for which

Duncan twice applied after his injury and for which he

acknowledges in his complaint he was qualified. See Amended Complaint at 3, 4 (filed March 6, 1996). Or there may be

very few such jobs. The jury was left in the dark with no

significantly probative evidence addressing the factors set out

in Sutton.3 Duncan points to his own testimony that he made

"inquiries" about or applied for truck driving jobs but that

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2 The Sutton Court declined to resolve whether deference is owed

to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ADA regulations, 527 U.S. at 480, but quoted this regulation's factors approvingly, id. at 491-92.

3 We note that social security disability cases have found lifting

restrictions not to constitute a disability. See, e.g., Cruze v. Chater,

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they all required heavy lifting.4 This sparse anecdotal evidence, however, cannot support the required jury finding that

Duncan was substantially limited in his ability to find work

because his impairment disqualified him from a substantial

class or broad range of jobs in the Washington area. At most

Duncan's testimony shows that he was not qualified for the

particular kind of job--truck driver--for which he chose to

apply. It tells us nothing about whether he was qualified for

the many other jobs in the Washington metropolitan employment pool. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492 ("To be substantially

limited in the major life activity of working, then, one must be

precluded from more than one type of job, a specialized job,

or a particular job of choice."). Without evidence of the

number and kinds of jobs available to Duncan the jury had no

basis to find he was disqualified from a substantial class or

broad range of them. Because Duncan failed to offer evidence demonstrating he was substantially impaired in working, the jury's liability verdict cannot stand.

In concluding that Duncan failed to meet his evidentiary

burden, we hold that the ADA requires a plaintiff in Duncan's

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85 F.3d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1996) (affirming denial of benefits to

claimant who "possessed the residual functional capacity to perform

the physical exertional and nonexertional requirements of work

except for lifting and carrying of more than 20 pounds occasionally

or 10 pounds frequently" and who, according to a vocational expert,

therefore "could still perform work as a light cleaner, office helper

or messenger, or mail clerk," which positions "exist in significant

numbers in the national economy"); Lee v. Sullivan, 988 F.2d 789,

792 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming denial of benefits to claimant based on

vocational testimony that person "with a tenth grade education,

average to borderline intellect, and depression who can perform

sedentary work with an option for alternate sitting and standing ...

could be a cashier in a convenience store, a security guard, and a

parking lot attendant" and that "there were approximately 1,400 of

these positions in the greater Milwaukee metropolitan area which

has a work force of 750,000").

4 Duncan testified he could not remember "any other types of

jobs or specifics about any types of jobs that [he] applied for."

Joint App. 136-38.

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position to produce some evidence of the number and types of

jobs in the local employment market in order to show he is

disqualified from a substantial class or broad range of such

jobs; that is, the total number of such jobs that remain

available to the plaintiff in such a class or range in the

relevant market must be sufficiently low that he is effectively

precluded from working in the class or range. See Sutton,

527 U.S. at 491-92. The approach we adopt is consistent with

most other circuits'. See Santiago Clemente v. Executive

Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 25, 32-33 (1st Cir. 2000) (concluding

former flight attendant failed to show temporary hearing loss

was disability under ADA because she offered "no evidence of

how many jobs call for this ability, or that she was precluded

from any class of jobs"); Webb v. Clyde L. Choate Mental

Health & Dev. Ctr., 230 F.3d 991, 997 (7th Cir. 2000) (upholding summary judgment against psychologist suffering from

severe asthma, osteoporosis, and a weakened immune system

because he "ha[d] not presented evidence that his condition

prevents him from performing a class of jobs"); Taylor v.

Nimock's Oil Co., 214 F.3d 957, 961 (8th Cir. 2000) (concluding former cashier with 40 hour week and 10 pound carry

limit did not establish disability because she "presented no

evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact about

whether she could perform a class of jobs with her restrictions") (citing Berg v. Norand Corp., 169 F.3d 1140, 1145 (8th

Cir. 1999); Helfter v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 115 F.3d 613,

617-18 (8th Cir. 1997)); Colwell v. Suffolk County Police

Dep't, 158 F.3d 635, 645 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Without specific

evidence about 'the kinds of jobs from which [an] impaired

individual is disqualified,' the jury could not perform the

careful analysis that is necessary to determine that [a plaintiff] was substantially limited in his ability to work.") (quoting

Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718, 723 (2d Cir.

1994)); Snow v. Ridgeview Med. Ctr., 128 F.3d 1201, 1207

(8th Cir. 1997) (holding "general lifting restriction imposed by

a physician, without more, is insufficient to constitute a

disability within the meaning of the ADA" with regard to

major life activity of working); see also Williams v. Channel

Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir. 1996)

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("hold[ing], as a matter of law, that a twenty-five pound lifting

limitation--particularly when compared to an average person's abilities--does not constitute a significant restriction on

one's ability to lift, work, or perform any other major life

activity"); Ray v. Glidden Co., 85 F.3d 227, 229 (5th Cir.

1996) ("[I]nability to perform heavy lifting does not render a

person substantially limited in the major activities of lifting or

working."); McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., U.S.A., Inc., 110

F.3d 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding woman with carpal

tunnel syndrome and 20-pound lifting not disabled because

"at best, her evidence supports a conclusion that her impairment disqualifies her from only the narrow range of assembly

line manufacturing jobs that require repetitive motion or

frequent lifting of more than ten pounds"). But see Wellington v. Lyon County Sch. Dist., 187 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir.

1999) (holding evidence that impairment disqualified plaintiff

from "metal fabrication, welding, ... heavy activities, carpentry, ... the use of a variety of tools to do maintenance and

repairs, et cetera" coupled with his anecdotal testimony he

had to quit one plumbing job because he was "in too much

pain to even continue" raised triable issue of fact on disability); cf. Burns v. Coca-Cola Enters., Inc., 222 F.3d 247 (6th

Cir. 2000) (upholding determination plaintiff was disabled

because of district court's finding impairment "precluded him

from performing at least 50% of the jobs that he was qualified

to perform given his educational background and experience"

where finding was apparently based solely on 23-pound lifting

limit and limited education and work experience); Mullins v.

Crowell, 228 F.3d 1305, 1314 n.18 (11th Cir. 2000) ("[E]xpert

vocational evidence, although instructive, is not necessary to

establish that a person is substantially limited in the major

life activity of working. Furthermore, a plaintiff could testify

from his or her own extensive job search whether other jobs

that he or she could perform were available in the geographical area."). Further, the evidentiary burden we place on

plaintiffs is not onerous. They need not necessarily produce

expert vocational testimony, although such evidence might be

very persuasive. In the proper case simple government job

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statistics may suffice.5 We leave it to counsel in future ADA

cases to explore the various forms such evidence may take.

Here we hold only that Duncan failed to produce any sort of

significantly probative evidence on the subject.

For the preceding reasons, we reverse the district court's

denial of WMATA's motion for judgment as a matter of law.

We further vacate the judgment on the jury verdict entered

May 29, 1997 and the district court's post-trial orders awarding reinstatement, back pay, attorney's fees and costs and

prejudgment interest.

So ordered.

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5 Such statistics are readily available on the worldwide web. For

example, a number of different reports on job requirements in

specific local labor markets are available at low cost from the

website www.occustats.com.

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Randolph, Circuit Judge, with whom Circuit Judges

Williams and Sentelle join, concurring: I agree with Judge

Henderson's opinion for the court. Although I also agree

that the court should not decide whether working is a "major

life activity" within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. s 12102(2), see maj. op. at 5

n.1, I think we should recognize the difficulties the issue

presents.

The Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527

U.S. 471, 492 (1999), also avoided deciding the question by

"[a]ssuming without deciding that working is a major life

activity...." The Court's statement indicates that it thought

the question was an open one. Before Sutton this was far

from certain. School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480

U.S. 273 (1987), a case arising under s 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. s 794, stated in dicta that a person could

be considered a handicapped individual if the person suffered

from a physical impairment such as cosmetic disfigurement.

Even though this sort of impairment "might not diminish a

person's physical or mental capacities," it "could nevertheless

substantially limit that person's ability to work as a result of

the negative reactions of others to the impairment." 480 U.S.

at 283. To support its point, the Court cited regulations

implementing the Rehabilitation Act, which listed "working"

as a major life activity. Id. at 283 n.10.

A section of the ADA provides that "nothing in this chapter

shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973

... or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to

such titles." 42 U.S.C. s 12201(a). On the basis of this

section, Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 632 (1998), held that

the Court must "construe the ADA to grant at least as much

protection as provided by the regulations implementing the

Rehabilitation Act."

There may be ways of explaining the apparent inconsistency between Sutton on the one hand, and Bragdon and Arline

on the other. Sutton, for instance, referred to EEOC regulations suggesting that "working be viewed as a residual life

activity, considered, as a last resort, only '[i]f an individual is

not substantially limited with respect to any other major life

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activity.' " 527 U.S. at 492 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 29

C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. s 1630.2(j) (1998)). Sutton also identified "a conceptual difficulty": if a person claims to be excluded from work because of his impairment, it is circular for him

to answer--when asked the nature of his impairment--"exclusion from work." Id.

Another set of problems stems from these circumstances:

to make "working" a major life activity is to create a residual

category, one that matters only if the individual is not suffering from some serious physical or mental impairment. (If the

individual is so suffering there is no need to consider working

as a separate category. See Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch.

Dist., 174 F.3d 142, 152 (3d Cir. 1999); McAlindin v. County

of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1233 (9th Cir. 1999).) When

"working" is used in this way, the existence of a disability will

necessarily turn on factors other than the individual's physical

characteristics or medical condition. To illustrate, suppose

there is an economic downturn and unemployment is high.

Then more people will be found to be disabled as compared

with a period when the gross domestic product is growing and

unemployment is low. Why? Because the less likely it is

that a person can find work the more likely that he is

substantially limited in the major life activity of working--

that in other words he suffers from a disability. See Sutton,

527 U.S. at 491. One must wonder whether people considered disabled in a poor economy can become not disabled if

the economy turns around and more jobs become available.

One must wonder as well how this can be squared with the

ADA's express purpose of supplying "clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against

individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. s 12101(b) (italics

added). Geographic disparity also cannot be avoided. Take

two identical individuals with identical impairments working

for the same company. One works in a sparsely populated

rural area, the other in a large metropolis. The individual in

the rural area would wind up being classified as disabled

under the ADA more readily than the person in the major

metropolitan area where more jobs are available.

From the employer's point of view, the standards will

hardly appear "clear," 42 U.S.C. s 12101(b). When "working" is the allegedly impaired major life activity, how is the

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employer to determine whether the employee is disabled (and

thus entitled to a reasonable accommodation)? The employer

certainly cannot tell just by looking at the employee, or by

consulting medical records, or by insisting upon a physical

examination. Disability will depend on the job market, on

whether there are jobs in some undefined region "utilizing an

individual's skills (but perhaps not his or her unique talents),"

Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492, jobs for which the employee is

qualified. Exactly how the employer is to make that determination is far from certain. Suppose the employer does not

acquire the information. Could the employer still be found to

have discriminated "because of" a disability, as the ADA

requires for liability, if the employer does not know the

employee's job prospects? See 42 U.S.C. s 12112(a).

The problems just mentioned, and others, need to be

considered before we decide whether to join the two other

circuits which, after Sutton, treat "working" as a major life

activity under the ADA. See Bartlett v. New York State Bd.

of Law Exam'rs, 226 F.3d 69, 80 (2d Cir. 2000); EEOC v. R.J.

Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645, 654 (5th Cir. 1999).

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Tatel, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I agree that the verdict in Duncan's favor cannot stand. I

write separately to explain my view of the precise nature of

the burden that Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S.

471 (1999), places on ADA plaintiffs.

Sutton describes the standard for proving that an impairment " 'substantially limits' ... the major life activity of

working":

When the major life activity under consideration is

that of working, the statutory phrase "substantially limits" requires, at a minimum, that plaintiffs allege they

are unable to work in a broad class of jobs. Reflecting

this requirement, the EEOC uses a specialized definition

of the term "substantially limits" when referring to the

major life activity of working:

"significantly restricted in the ability to perform either

a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various

classes as compared to the average person having

comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability

to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a

substantial limitation in the major life activity of working." 29 C.F.R. s 1630.2(j)(3)(i).

... To be substantially limited in the major life activity

of working, then, one must be precluded from more than

one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of

choice. If jobs utilizing an individual's skills (but perhaps not his or her unique talents) are available, one is

not precluded from a substantial class of jobs. Similarly,

if a host of different types of jobs are available, one is not

precluded from a broad range of jobs.

527 U.S. at 491-92. This passage gives plaintiffs attempting

to prove disability on the basis of a substantial limitation in

the major life activity of working a choice: they may demonstrate that their impairment excludes them from "either a

class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes." As

the penultimate sentence explains, plaintiffs attempting to

prove exclusion from a "class of jobs" must show that their

impairment disqualifies them from jobs utilizing their skills.

In Sutton, for example, the Supreme Court said that airline

pilots who have impairments that preclude them from working as global pilots but who can nonetheless hold "a number

of other positions utilizing [their] skills, such as regional pilot

and pilot instructor" cannot claim to be substantially limited

in the major life activity of working. Id. at 493. According

to the final sentence in the Sutton passage, plaintiffs attempting to prove exclusion from a "broad range of jobs"--the

second of the two options--must show that there is not a

"host" of different types of jobs available to them. As an

example of a person who might claim to be precluded from a

broad range of jobs, the EEOC Interpretive Guidance describes an individual who "has an allergy to a substance found

in most high rise office buildings, but seldom found elsewhere, that makes breathing extremely difficult." 29 C.F.R.

pt. 1630, App. s 1630.2(j). Of course, after Sutton, such a

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person would also have to show that jobs not in high rise

buildings are unavailable, leaving some doubt as to whether

plaintiffs would any longer attempt to make such a claim.

Duncan claimed only exclusion from a class of jobs. To

prove his case, Duncan thus needed to show that the class of

jobs from which he alleged preclusion was "broad" or "substantial," and not limited to jobs utilizing his "unique talents."

Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491-92. Presenting evidence of his back

injury and lack of formal training or education, he proved

only his inability to handle jobs requiring heavy lifting. As I

read Sutton, he also had to show that he could not handle the

broader class of jobs requiring manual labor, of which heavy

lifting is but a subclass.

Duncan could have satisfied his burden of proof by producing specific evidence either that he applied unsuccessfully for

non-lifting manual labor jobs (thus demonstrating that he was

unqualified for those jobs for some other reason) or that most

manual labor jobs require heavy lifting. He failed to do

either, testifying only as follows:

Q: When you were on unemployment did you make any

inquiries with any employers that had vacancies for truck

driver positions to determine if you could do the job?

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A: Yes. I would--I would check the vacancies--I mean

the unemployment, and I would call places, and jobs that

I thought I could do I would ask them what the job

entailed, and if it was to the point where I know I

wouldn't be able to do a lot of lifting I wouldn't--I

wouldn't inquire no more about it.

Q: Did any of the truck ... driving types of jobs that

you applied for, did they require heavy lifting?

A: Yeah, most all of them basically.

...

Q: Mr. Duncan, in addition to truck driving positions

that you may have made some inquiries about, do you

recall any other types of jobs or specifics about any types

of jobs that you applied for during that period of unemployment?

A: I can't remember.

[J.A. 137-38]. Absent more "significantly probative" evidence, see Smith v. Washington Sheraton Corp., 135 F.3d

779, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1998), no reasonable jury could have

concluded that Duncan was unable to perform manual labor,

i.e., that he was excluded from a substantial class of jobs.

From his testimony, the jury could have concluded that all

truck driving jobs require heavy lifting, but the record contains nothing from which the jury could have concluded that

other manual labor jobs likewise require heavy lifting.

While I thus agree that the verdict in Duncan's favor

cannot stand, I think it important to emphasize that although

Sutton requires Duncan to have proven an inability to perform manual labor, it does not also require him to have shown

an inability to qualify for non-manual labor jobs in the area in

which he lives. Sutton would require such evidence of plaintiffs seeking to prove disability based on exclusion from a

"broad range of jobs," but that requirement does not apply to

plaintiffs like Duncan who seek to prove disability on the

basis of exclusion from a "class of jobs." 527 U.S. at 492.

Requiring such proof of plaintiffs like Duncan, moreover,

would convert the ADA inquiry from asking whether plaintiffs are precluded from classes of jobs to whether, as in the

Social Security disability benefits context, they are unable to

work at all. See 42 U.S.C. s 423(d)(1)(A) (defining "disability" under the Social Security Act as "inability to engage in

any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment") (emphasis added). Consider a surgeon claiming to be disabled under the

ADA because a physical or mental impairment precludes him

from a class of jobs. Like the airline pilot plaintiffs in

Sutton, although it would not be enough for the surgeon to

show that he could no longer perform surgery--he would

need to show that he was unable to practice medicine at all--

nothing in Sutton requires that he demonstrate the absence

of a "host" of non-medical jobs that he could handle, such as

office administration, food service, or maintenance. 527 U.S.

at 492. In other words, the surgeon could establish disability

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under the ADA by showing only that, as Sutton puts it, "jobs

utilizing [his] skills (but perhaps not his ... unique talents)"

were unavailable. Id.

So too Duncan. He need not have demonstrated preclusion

from non-manual labor jobs; proving exclusion from the class

of jobs requiring manual labor would have been enough.

Because he failed to show even this, I concur.

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Edwards, Chief Judge, dissenting: Congress passed the

Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") because, "historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals

with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms

of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue

to be a serious and pervasive social problem." 42 U.S.C.

s 12101 (a)(2)(1994). The ADA was enacted "to provide a

clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination

of discrimination against individuals with disabilities," and "to

provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities."

42 U.S.C. s 12101(b)(1) & (2)(1994).

The ADA generally provides that

no covered [employer] shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability

of such individual in regard to job application procedures,

the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.

42 U.S.C. s 12112 (a)(1994). A "qualified individual with a

disability" includes persons "with a disability who, with or

without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential

functions of the employment position that such individual

holds or desires." 42 U.S.C. s 12111(8)(1994). And "reasonable accommodation[s]" include "job restructuring, part-time

or modified work schedules, [and] reassignment to a vacant

position." 42 U.S.C. s 12111(9)(1994).

In light of the general purposes and standards enunciated

in the ADA, appellate review of this case should have been a

simple matter. The plaintiff/appellee, Jimmy Duncan, was in

a job that everyone--including his attending physician, doctors retained by WMATA, and his supervisors--knew that he

could not perform because of his physical disability. He

presented medical evidence of his physical disability to

WMATA. When a WMATA job opened up that he could

perform, parts runner in Automated Fare Collection, he

applied to be transferred to the position. He had held the

parts runner job previously; he was indisputably qualified to

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perform the job; and the work required was within his

current physical ability. He also had seniority among the

competing candidates. He was denied the job, however, for

no reason. Under the ADA, WMATA should have offered

the parts runner job to Duncan, as a reasonable accommodation to his existing disability.

During oral argument before the court, WMATA's counsel

was asked to address the following hypothetical:

Assume an employee is disabled because, due to a freak

accident, one of his legs is amputated. As a result of this

disability, the employee is unable to perform his job with

WMATA. Subsequently, there is a job opening at

WMATA in a position that the disabled employee previously has held and is currently capable of performing

(because it requires no appreciable standing or walking).

The amputee requests a transfer to the job. Is WMATA

required to accommodate the disabled employee?

WMATA's counsel conceded that, under the ADA, the employer would be obliged to accommodate the disabled employee by offering him the job. Duncan's request merited an

equivalent response.

The problem in this case is that, under the ADA, a disability is defined as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of

[an] individual." 42 U.S.C. s 12102 (2)(A) (1994) (emphasis

added). Congress has delegated to the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") the responsibility for issuing regulations to enforce the proscription against discrimination in employment under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. s 12116

(1994). In assuming this responsibility, the EEOC has promulgated regulations providing that "major life activities"

include

caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking,

seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.

29 C.F.R. s 1630.2(i) (1999). It is fairly easy to determine

whether a person is disabled due to a physical impairment

that substantially limits his ability to walk. The same cannot

be said about physical impairments (beyond, say, walking,

seeing, hearing, speaking, and breathing) that substantially

limit a person's ability to work. Thus, the EEOC has explained that the substantial limitation inquiry with respect to

"working" entails an inability to work in a class of jobs or a

broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the

average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities. 29 C.F.R. s 1630.2(j)(3)(i).

The disabled employee in the aforecited hypothetical is

covered by the major life activity of "walking," so he need

only show that his walking is substantially impaired in order

to pursue a claim under the ADA. Duncan's ADA claim,

however, rests on the major life activity of "working," so he

faces a tougher burden. This disparate burden is hard to

fathom. Both men are physically impaired and their impairUSCA Case #99-7073 Document #579751 Filed: 03/02/2001 Page 19 of 27
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ments limit their abilities to work; and both men easily can

be accommodated. Nonetheless, Duncan is forced to show

that he is unable to work in a broad class of jobs or a broad

range of jobs in various classes in order to claim relief,

whereas the hypothetical employee need only show an inability to perform a single job. Given the purposes of the ADA

and the similarities in the two situations, it is difficult to find

a meaningful difference between the hypothetical employee

and Duncan. Both the hypothetical employee and Duncan

should be accommodated because of their disabilities.

As the majority and separate opinions make clear, however,

"working" is a disfavored basis upon which to rest a definition

of major life activities. Indeed, even the Supreme Court,

albeit in dicta, has questioned whether "working" should be

considered a major life activity. See Sutton v. United Air

Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 492 (1999). There are undoubtedly

some conceptual difficulties in viewing work as a major life

activity. For example, an expansive view of work as a major

life activity might allow a person to claim a disability and

discrimination under the ADA if he/she is allegedly denied

work for a physical impairment, such as cosmetic disfigurement, which does not rise to the level of an underlying

handicap. In this sense, "work" is arguably over-inclusive

when viewed as a major life activity, at least when considered

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in conjunction with the principal purposes of the ADA. Nevertheless, it is hard to believe that Congress intended to deny

a claimant like Duncan--a truly disabled person, who has

undisputed job limitations due to his physical impairment and

can easily be accommodated (much the same as with the

hypothetical employee)--redress under the ADA because his

claim rests on "work" as a "major life activity."

The result reached by the majority in this case invariably

will make "work" impermissibly under-inclusive when viewed

as a major life activity, in a way that appears to defy

Congress' mandate in enacting the ADA. The Supreme

Court may have some doubts about work as a major life

activity, but the Court has not declared the EEOC's regulation unlawful. Unless and until this happens, claimants like

Duncan are entitled to full protection of the statute. In

short, as long as working is a major life activity, an employer's responsibility to offer a reasonable accommodation to a

disabled employee like Duncan should be taken seriously.

I. Analysis

Quite apart from the foregoing analytical problems raised

by this case, I respectfully dissent from the judgment of the

majority because this is a case that no judge should take from

a jury. The jury considered the evidence presented by

Duncan and WMATA; there were no erroneous instructions

given to the jury; and the jury weighed the evidence and

found in favor of the plaintiff. In nullifying the jury verdict,

the majority has impermissibly encroached on the jury's

important fact-finding function, which is something that neither a trial judge, see Tri County Industries, Inc. v. District

of Columbia, 200 F.3d 836, 840, 842-43 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert.

granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3774 (U.S. Sept. 26, 2000) (No. 99-1953),

nor an appellate panel, see Boodoo v. Cary, 21 F.3d 1157, 1161

(D.C. Cir. 1994), is permitted to do.

The majority opinion is especially suspect, because the

judgment is based on a re-weighing of the evidence that was

before the jury. The case that Duncan presented to the jury

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was adequate to survive a judgment as a matter of law, so

there is no basis for this court to second-guess the jury. And

it is somewhat unnerving to notice that this court showed

unbridled solicitude for the jury's role when considering a

highly debatable claim in Tri County Industries (in which the

city of Washington, D.C., was required to pay $5 million on a

jury verdict) and now see that same solicitude missing here in

a case involving a claim under the ADA.

A. Standard of Review

In considering whether to take a verdict away from a jury

and grant a judgment as a matter of law, a court may not

substitute its judgment for the jury's judgment in factual

determinations. See Boodoo, 21 F.3d at 1161 (D.C. Cir.

1994). As the Court recently reiterated, "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of

legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not

those of a judge." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,

Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2110 (2000) (quoting Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).

Whether a judge is inclined in favor of one possible interpretation of the evidence, over another plausible interpretation of the evidence, is of no moment. This court may enter a

judgment as a matter of law only when the evidence presented at trial admits of a single inevitable interpretation. "It is

long settled that 'the jury's verdict will withstand challenge

unless the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be

drawn therefrom are so one-sided that reasonable men and

women could not disagree on the verdict.' " Swanks v.

Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 179 F.3d 929, 933

(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1061 (1999) (quoting Scott v.

District of Columbia, 101 F.3d 748, 753 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).

This high threshold has not been met in this case. Based on

the evidence presented at trial, the jury reasonably determined that Duncan's physical impairment substantially limited him in the major life activity of working. Despite the

clear prohibition that a court must not replace a jury as trier

of fact, WMATA's case turns on asking this court to re-weigh

the evidence. At the very opening of his oral argument,

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WMATA's counsel urged this court to weigh the medical

reports and physicians' testimony offered at trial so as to find

that Duncan was able to perform medium lifting. The argument was one that simply asked this court to make findings of

fact against the plaintiff, something that we have no authority

to do. Indeed, much of WMATA's argument to this court

was presented as if the judges on the appellate bench were in

a jury box. As the following analysis indicates, there is no

basis here to take this case from the jury.

B. Disability under the ADA

As noted above, under the ADA, a disability is "a physical

or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of

the major life activities of [an] individual." 42 U.S.C. s 12102

(2)(A) (1994). And EEOC regulations provide that "work" is

a major life activity. 29 C.F.R. s 1630.2(i) (1999). Unless

and until the Supreme Court decides otherwise, working

remains a major life activity under the ADA. See Mullins v.

Cromwell, 228 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000); Sinkler v.

Midwest Property Management, Ltd., 209 F.3d 678, 684 n.1

(7th Cir. 2000); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v.

R.J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645, 654-55 (5th Cir. 1999).

EEOC regulations explain that a physical impairment substantially limits an individual's ability to work when the

individual is

significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a

class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as

compared to the average person having comparable

training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a

single, particular job does not constitute a substantial

limitation in the major life activity of working.

29 C.F.R. s 1630.2(j)(3)(i). In addition, the following factors

may be considered in assessing whether a physical impairment substantially limits a person's ability to work:

(A) The geographical area to which the individual has

reasonable access;

(B) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types

of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or

abilities, within that geographical area, from which the

individual is also disqualified because of the impairment

(class of jobs); and/or

(C) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types

of other jobs not utilizing similar training, knowledge,

skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from

which the individual is also disqualified because of the

impairment (broad range of jobs in various classes).

Id. s 1630.2(j)(3)(ii).

There is no magical legal standard for measuring substantial limitation. Clearly, the inability to perform lifting does

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not automatically constitute an impairment that substantially

limits a person's ability to work. See, e.g., Thompson v. Holy

Family Hosp., 121 F.3d 537, 539 (9th Cir.1997) (holding nurse

who was restricted in her ability to lift but was able to work

in other nursing jobs was not substantially limited). However, the inability to participate in significant lifting, taken in

the context of an individualized analysis, may substantially

limit an individual's ability to work. In evaluating substantial

limitation, a jury must engage in a context-dependent assessment of the plaintiff's personal characteristics, education,

work history, and the available job market in order to assess

whether the plaintiff is excluded from a class of jobs or a

broad range of jobs across classes. See, e.g., Wellington v.

Lyon County Sch. Dist., 187 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 1999)

(finding issue of material fact exists regarding disability

where plaintiff's education was limited to a high school degree

and some trade school training, his work experience was

limited to manufacturing, construction, heavy maintenance

and plumbing, and no evidence was presented that jobs were

available in the job market for a person with comparable

abilities); Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 172 F.3d 1, 11-12

(1st Cir. 1999) (rejecting judgment as a matter of law against

plaintiff where plaintiff had only a high school education and

a work history of heavy physical labor, and physician testified

plaintiff was precluded from a lot of jobs); Mondzelewski v.

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Pathmark Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d 778, 784 (3d Cir. 1998)

(explaining that "an individual's training, skills, and abilities

are taken into account in determining whether the individual

is substantially limited in the major life activity of working");

Webb v. Garelick Mfg. Co., 94 F.3d 484, 487 (8th Cir. 1996)

(explaining "[a] person's expertise, background, and job expectations are relevant factors in defining the class of jobs

used to determine whether an individual is disabled"); Cochrum v. Old Ben Coal Co., 102 F.3d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 1996)

(noting "[t]he physical restrictions Cochrum's physician

placed upon him--no overhead work, heavy lifting, or pulling

and pushing out from his body--might apply to a broad range

of jobs, and are more than job specific").

In this case, the jury was presented with evidence of

Duncan's personal characteristics, education, work history,

and the available job market in order to assess whether he

was excluded from a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs

across classes. It does not matter that WMATA disputed

some of what Duncan offered; what matters is that there was

evidence in the record supporting Duncan's claim. I agree

with my colleagues that Duncan did not present the strongest

case possible. However, I believe that there was enough

before the jury to justify its verdict in his favor.

C. The jury reasonably determined that Duncan was substantially limited in the major life activity of working

There is no serious doubt that Duncan was physically

impaired. Dr. Harvey N. Mininberg, an orthopedic surgeon,

diagnosed Duncan with degenerative disc disease. See Trial

Transcript at 18 (May 20, 1997). After he was injured while

working for WMATA, Dr. Mininberg authorized Duncan to

return to work, with the restriction that Duncan not lift more

than approximately 20 pounds. See id. at 25. Dr. Najmaldin

O. Karim, a neurosurgeon, confirmed both the diagnosis and

the lifting restriction. See id. at 122, 127. Duncan alleged

that this physical impairment substantially limited him in the

major life activity of working. Specifically, Duncan claimed

that as a result of his physical impairment, he was precluded

from the classes of jobs that included medium, heavy, and

very heavy lifting.

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There was sufficient evidence in the record for a reasonable

jury to determine that, based on Duncan's education, training,

work history, and efforts to find another job, Duncan's physical impairment substantially limited his ability to work. Duncan never received a high school diploma or completed his

GED. He went to trade school for a year and a half, but

never finished the training. He had no other formal training

or education. He had no computer training. He had no

clerical or office skills. He could barely type. See Trial

Transcript at 127-28 (May 19, 1997).

Duncan was employed in heavy labor jobs throughout his

working life. Before working for WMATA, he worked in

furniture factories, in a box company, in a glass company, in

construction, and in a company that provided the physical

settings for functions and meetings. He was a physical

laborer. Every one of his jobs involved significant lifting.

After Duncan injured his back while working for WMATA

and WMATA terminated him, Duncan sought jobs that were

of a light duty nature. Duncan testified that during the nine

months he was receiving unemployment compensation, he

looked for jobs that were not strenuous. See id. at 129.

With his back injury, Duncan knew he could not perform the

kinds of work he had performed previously. He testified that

he could not go back and work as a laborer in construction, or

as a packer at a glass company or furniture company, as he

had before. See id. at 136.

Duncan testified that, in order to receive unemployment

compensation, he was required to submit applications in

search of other employment. See id. at 129. Although he

could not recall the specific jobs for which he applied, Duncan

testified that during his nine months on unemployment he

would check the unemployment listings, and call jobs he

thought he could do. He would ask prospective employers

what the jobs entailed. If the description of a job included

significant lifting that he knew he could not do, he would not

inquire further. See id. at 130.

Although he wanted to work full time, Duncan was not able

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time job with Hertz, moving cars after customers dropped

them off. He accepted the job even though it paid $5.75 an

hour, approximately one-third what he earned working for

WMATA. See id. at 135.

As noted above, Duncan should have been offered the parts

runner job when it became available. He had performed the

job in the past; he was fully qualified and physically able to

perform the work; and he had seniority among the competing

candidates. WMATA never offered an adequate explanation

for its failure to accommodate Duncan, despite knowing of his

disability and having a position available for him to perform.

Indeed, the only excuses offered by WMATA were that

Duncan never furnished medical evidence to support his

disability and that Duncan never really sought an accommodation. The jury obviously rejected each of these claims;

and, based on the record before us, it is easy to understand

this, for WMATA's claims are patently specious.

II. Conclusion

Based on the evidence presented at trial, the jury reasonably determined that Duncan's physical disability substantially limited him in the major life activity of working. The jury

verdict should stand and the judgment of the District Court

should be affirmed.

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