Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_14-cv-00450/USCOURTS-ared-5_14-cv-00450-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

PINE BLUFF DIVISION 

EUGENE THOMAS, III PETITIONER 

ADC #149889 

V. NO. 5:14cv00450-JM-JTR 

WENDY KELLEY, Director, 

Arkansas Department of Correction RESPONDENT 

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION 

INSTRUCTIONS 

The following Recommended Disposition (“Recommendation”) has been 

sent to United States District Judge James Moody, Jr. You may file written 

objections to all or part of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections 

must: (1) specifically explain the factual and/or legal basis for your objection; and 

(2) be received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14) days of this 

Recommendation. By not objecting, you may waive the right to appeal questions 

of fact. 

I. Background 

Pending before the Court is a pro se § 2254 Petition for a Writ of Habeas 

Corpus, along with a supporting Brief, filed by Petitioner, Eugene Thomas, III 

(“Thomas”), a prisoner in the Arkansas Department of Correction. Doc. 2 & 3. 

Respondent has filed a Response to the Petition, Doc. 9, and Thomas has filed a 

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Reply, Doc. 11. Thus, the issues are fully joined and ripe for resolution. 

Before addressing the merits of this habeas action, the Court will review the 

relevant procedural history of Thomas’s underlying state court conviction. 

In April 2011, a jury in Ashley County, Arkansas convicted Thomas of 

aggravated robbery and commercial burglary, and sentenced him to twenty years. 

Doc. 9-2 at 61-62. 

Thomas appealed his conviction to the Arkansas Court of Appeals where he 

argued, through counsel,1

 that the trial court erred by: (1) refusing to give a jury 

instruction on the lesser-included offense of attempt to commit aggravated 

robbery; (2) admitting evidence during sentencing of his participation in a prior 

robbery; and (3) denying his motion for mistrial based on the prosecutor’s remark 

during closing argument. 

On September 12, 2012, the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed both 

convictions. Thomas v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 466, 422 S.W.3d 217, 218 

(“Thomas I”). 

On November 30, 2012, Thomas filed a pro se petition for post-conviction 

relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37. Thomas raised numerous ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims arising from his attorney’s actions and inactions at trial and on 

 

1

 Thomas was represented by the same appointed counsel, Joseph Mazzanti, at trial and 

on direct appeal. Doc. 2 at 15. 

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direct appeal. These claims included his attorney: (1) failing to formulate a trial 

strategy; (2) failing to adequately voir dire the jury; (3) making statements during 

opening and closing that stripped Thomas of the presumption of innocence in 

violation of his 5th Amendment rights; (4) failing to present arguments, on appeal, 

which adequately explained how the trial court had erred in refusing to grant a 

mistrial due to the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument; (5) failing to 

obtain a jury instruction on the “corpus delicti rule”; (6) failing to appeal the trial 

court’s denial of him motion for directed verdict based on the State’s failure to 

prove his intent to commit theft, an essential element of aggravated robbery; and 

(7) failing to argue, during closing argument, that the State had failed to prove 

Thomas’s intent. Rule 37 Tr. at 15-24.

2

 

On March 13, 2013, the Chicot County Circuit Court entered an Order 

denying Rule 37 relief. Rule 37 Tr. at 26-31. In this Order, the trial court noted 

that: 

The evidence of guilty [sic] in this case is overwhelming. Not only 

did petitioner give a full confession to the police but there were two 

witnesses who testified to his action and activities while in the store. 

Id. at 30. 

 

2

 The Record from Thomas’s direct appeal and Rule 37 Petition comprises four volumes. 

Doc. 15. The Rule 37 proceeding comprises one volume and will be referred to as “Rule 37 Tr. 

at ___.” The other three volumes contain the record of his state court conviction and will be 

referred to as “Trial Tr. at __.” 

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Thomas appealed the denial of Rule 37 relief to the Arkansas Supreme 

Court, which affirmed. Thomas v. State, Ark. Sup. Ct. No. CR-13-842 (June 19, 

2014) (per curiam) (Doc. 9-9) (“Thomas II”).3

In his habeas Petition, Thomas makes the following claims: (1) the evidence 

at trial was insufficient to support his convictions;4

 (2) his appointed counsel was 

ineffective, at trial and on appeal, regarding the criminal intent and the “corpus 

delicti rule”;5

 (3) his appointed counsel was ineffective for conceding his guilt at 

trial and for a lack of strategy;6

 (4) the prosecution committed misconduct during 

the sentencing phase and his appointed counsel was ineffective in appealing this 

issue;7

 and (5) other cumulative errors denied him his Sixth Amendment right to a 

fair and impartial trial.8

 Doc. 2. 

Respondent argues that Thomas’s ineffective assistance claims, which were 

 

3

 This was the Arkansas Supreme Court’s Substituted Opinion on Denial of Rehearing, 

entered after Thomas alleged an error of fact because the court had mistakenly stated that he 

entered a guilty plea in its initial opinion. See Doc. 9-6 (initial per curiam filed on May 8, 2014). 

4 This claim is asserted in Ground 2 of Thomas’s Petition. Doc. 2 at 5. 

5

 These claims are asserted in Grounds 1, 3, 4, 5, of Thomas’s Petition. Doc. 2 at 5, 7, 8. 

6

 These claims are asserted in Grounds 6, 7 and 10 of Thomas’s Petition. Doc. 2 at 9, 14. 

7

 These claims are asserted in Ground 8 and 9 of Thomas’s Petition. Doc. 2 at 12, 13. 

8

 This assertion is made in his supporting brief. Doc. 3 at 26-27 (asking the Court to 

consider whether the enumerated errors resulted in cumulative error). 

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resolved adversely to him in state court, fail on the merits and that his insufficiency 

of the evidence claim is procedurally defaulted. Doc. 9. 

For the reasons discussed below, this Court recommends that Thomas’s 

habeas Petition be denied, and the case dismissed, with prejudice. 

II. Analysis of Thomas’s Habeas Claims9

A. Insufficiency of Evidence Claim 

Thomas argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions 

for aggravated robbery and commercial burglary.10 See e.g., Doc. 2 at 5-7; Doc. 3 

 

9

 The standard of review this Court must apply to Thomas’ habeas claims is an onerous 

one. A federal court will not grant habeas relief unless a state court's decision “was contrary to, 

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law” or “was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)- (2). A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly 

established federal law if it reaches a conclusion opposite that of the United States Supreme 

Court on a question of law, or reaches a decision contrary to the United States Supreme Court on 

materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). A state court 

decision involves an “unreasonable application” of federal law when it identifies the correct legal 

rule, but unreasonably applies it to the facts. Id. at 407. “A state court's application of clearly 

established federal law must be objectively unreasonable, not merely incorrect, to warrant the 

granting of a writ of habeas corpus.” Jackson v. Norris, 651 F.3d 923, 925 (8th Cir. 2011). 

Finally, the state court’s findings of fact are presumptively correct, and the habeas 

petitioner has “the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing 

evidence.” Stenhouse v. Hobbs, 631 F.3d 888, 891 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(e)(1)). 

10 While this argument does not relate specifically to Thomas’s commercial burglary 

charge, Thomas contends that he was only eligible for this second charge based on the 

underlying aggravated robbery charge. As a result, he contends that the alleged insufficiency of 

the evidence supporting the aggravated robbery charges spilled over to taint his conviction for 

commercial burglary. The theory of this argument is contrary to Arkansas law. Thomas’s intent 

to commit any felony would supply the criminal intent necessary for the burglary conviction. See

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-39-201(b) (commercial burglary is committed if a person “enters or remains 

unlawfully in a commercial occupiable structure of another with the purpose of committing 

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at 11-23; Doc. 11 at 12. As part of this argument, Thomas also contends that his 

attorney was ineffective for failing to appeal the trial court’s denial of the directed 

verdict motions, based on the insufficiency of the evidence proving his “intent to 

commit theft,” one of the statutory requirements of the offense of aggravated 

robbery. See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-12-103 and 5-12-102. See Meadows v. State, 

2012 Ark. 57, at 5, 386 S.W.3d 470, 474 (“we treat a motion for directed verdict as 

a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence”). 

Claims challenging the sufficiency of the trial evidence “face a high bar in 

federal habeas proceedings.” Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2062 (2012). 

“[I]t is the responsibility of the jury - not the [reviewing] court - to decide what 

conclusions should be drawn from evidence admitted at trial.” Id. Evidence is 

sufficient to support a conviction whenever, “after viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found 

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 2064 

(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Circumstantial evidence 

is “just as probative as any other type of evidence.” Garrison v. Burt, 637 F.3d 

 

therein any offense punishable by imprisonment.”) 

Thus, even if Thomas had not been charged with aggravated robbery, the facts would 

have supported him being charged and convicted of commercial burglary. Furthermore, as will 

be explained later, as a matter of law there is no basis for setting aside the aggravated robbery 

conviction. Accordingly, the Court need not address any further Thomas’s derivative argument 

that there was also insufficient evidence to support his commercial burglary conviction. 

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849, 855 (8th Cir.2011); see Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) 

(circumstantial evidence is “intrinsically no different from testimonial evidence,” 

and “[i]f the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, we can require no 

more”). 

Although the Arkansas Supreme Court refused to address the sufficiency of 

the evidence in rejecting Thomas’s Rule 37 petition, it is clear the claim fails on 

the merits because the evidence at trial was constitutionally sufficient to support 

the jury’s finding of guilt. The Arkansas Supreme Court summarized the facts of 

the case as follows: 

At trial, Whitney Bridges and Nicky Waltman, employees of a 

Dollar General Store, testified that a man, wearing a black-and-white 

shirt and a red hat, came into the store shortly before closing time and 

walked to the back of the store toward a storeroom that was closed to 

the public. A second man was seated in a van outside. Waltman 

testified that she and Bridges walked through the store before locking 

the door but did not see the man. Bridges testified that after the door 

was locked, the man appeared from the back of the store with a black 

bandana over his face and a silver-and-black gun in his hand. The 

man and Bridges ran toward the front of the store where both fell 

down while Waltman unlocked the door and fled. The man pointed 

the gun at Bridges, and Bridges testified that he shouted at Waltman 

to stop. Waltman, who testified that the man yelled for her to stop or 

he would shoot, continued to run and called 911. After Waltman ran 

away, the man left the store, and Waltman heard the screech of tires as 

the van drove away. There was video surveillance equipment in 

operation at the store that recorded the incident, and a tape taken from 

those cameras was shown to the jury. 

A police officer testified that, in the course of the investigation 

into the crime, he came upon a van that matched the description of the 

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one seen at the store. Appellant [Thomas] was in the van with his 

brother, Dewayne Spearman. A search of Spearman’s house in 

Mississippi produced a red hat, a black bandana, and a silver-andblack gun. A black-and-white shirt was seized in a search of 

appellant’s mother’s house. When informed of the items seized in the 

searches, appellant admitted in a recorded interview with police that it 

was his idea to rob the store and that he was the man who went inside 

with the gun while Spearman remained in the van. Appellant said in 

the interview that he became nervous and left without taking anything 

from the store. 

It was appellant’s defense that he made a mistake but admitted 

it promptly when apprehended, showed remorse for the crimes, 

willingly returned to Arkansas from Mississippi when arrested, and 

that the State did not prove all the elements of the offenses for which 

he was charged. After the State rested its case, counsel was allowed 

to question appellant out of the hearing of the jury and on the record 

as to whether he was in agreement with the strategy to demonstrate 

that his conduct did not constitute commercial burglary or aggravated 

robbery and whether he wished to testify in the guilt phase. Appellant 

said at the time that he did not agree with the State’s position that he 

had aimed the gun at the woman lying on the floor with intent to use 

force but that he did not wish to testify. Counsel asked for a directed 

verdict as to both charges for failure to prove the elements of the 

offenses and also requested a jury instruction on the lesser-included 

offense of attempted aggravated robbery. 

Thomas II, supra at 4-6. 

Such a sufficiency of the evidence challenge can only be considered in a 

federal habeas action if it rises to the level of violating the defendant’s due process 

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The legal standard for analyzing such a 

due process claim is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 

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essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 

443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). After carefully reviewing the record, this Court 

concludes that a rational jury could have found Thomas guilty of the charged 

offenses, especially since he confessed to police that: (1) “it was his idea to rob the 

store”; and (2) he entered the store with a gun. Trial T. at 164-166. Given those 

admissions, it is difficult to fathom how any rational jury could not have found 

Thomas guilty. 

Because he ultimately left the store, without actually taking any money or 

merchandise, Thomas argues that he cannot be deemed to have possessed the 

“intent to commit theft.” This argument is misguided and finds no support in the 

law. After entering the store armed with a gun, Thomas may have changed his 

mind about following through with the crime or simply panicked and left the store 

without taking anything. These facts might be relevant at the sentencing stage but 

they in no way mitigate his “intent to commit theft,” as proven by his admission to 

police that, when he entered the store with a gun, he planned to rob it. 

Finally, as explained more fully below, Thomas’s challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence is nothing more than a challenge to Arkansas’s 

interpretation of the criminal intent requirement for aggravated robbery and the 

corpus delicti doctrine. Thomas may not transform a state law issue into a federal 

due process issue simply by asserting the evidence was constitutionally insufficient 

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to support his conviction. See, e.g. Curtis v. Montgomery, 552 F.3d 578, 581-582 

(7th Cir. 2009) (rejecting petitioner’s argument that evidence was insufficient to 

sustain his conviction for aggravated stalking because petitioner was “really taking 

issue with the state court’s interpretation of state law” which was an impermissible 

attempt “to use a petition for writ of habeas corpus to press his preferred 

interpretation of Illinois law.”) The role of federal habeas courts is narrowly 

limited “to [a] review [of] state criminal proceedings for compliance with federal 

constitutional mandates.” Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 

394, 403 (2001). See also Ford v. Norris, 364 F.3d 916, 919 (8th Cir. 2004) (“As 

the supreme judicial authority of the state, [the Arkansas Supreme Court] decides 

what state law is, an issue which cannot itself be reviewed in a federal habeas 

proceeding.”). 

Thomas’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 

convictions for aggravated robbery and commercial burglary fail on the merits. 

Accordingly, the Court need not address Respondent’s argument that Thomas 

procedurally defaulted his sufficiency of the evidence claim. See, e.g., Lambrix v. 

Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997) (explaining that “[j]udicial economy might 

counsel” bypassing a procedural-default question if the merits “were easily 

resolvable against the habeas petitioner”); Trussell v. Bowersox, 447 F3d 588 (8th 

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Cir. 2006) (addressing merits, bypassing limitations and procedural default 

analysis, in the interest of judicial economy). 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims 

In Thomas’s Rule 37 appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court properly applied 

the ineffective-assistance standard established by the Court in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)11 and concluded that Thomas failed to present 

any evidence that his counsel was ineffective either at trial or on appeal. Thomas 

II, supra at 2-3. 

Because some of Thomas’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims overlap, 

the Court has organized and analyzed those overlapping claims together. 

1. Ineffective Assistance Claims Related to Intent and 

Corpus Delicti Rule12 

Thomas contends that his counsel was ineffective at trial and on direct 

appeal for failing to argue that the State failed to prove that he had the requisite 

intent to commit aggravated robbery. Doc. 3 at 6. Thomas also contends that his 

counsel was ineffective at trial and on direct appeal for failing to argue that the 

 

11 Under Strickland, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Thomas 

must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and 

that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have been different. 

12 These claims are asserted in Grounds 1, 3, 4 and 5 of Thomas’s Petition. Doc. 2. 

Although the essential elements of “intent” and the “corpus delicti rule’ are independent 

issues, Thomas erroneously discusses them together at times as if they were one concept. See,

e.g., doc. 3 at 6 (stating that the intent requirement is “also called the ‘Corpus Delicti Rule.”). 

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State failed to corroborate Thomas’s confession with other evidence proving that 

he had the requisite criminal intent. As a matter of law, both of these arguments 

are without merit. 

Arkansas Code Ann. § 5-12-203 provides that a person commits aggravated 

robbery if: 

[He] commits robbery as defined in § 5-12-102, and the person: 

(1) Is armed with a deadly weapon; 

(2) Represents by word or conduct that he or she is armed with a deadly 

weapon; or 

(3) Inflicts or attempts to inflict death or serious injury upon another 

person.” 

Under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-12-102(a), a person commits “robbery” if, “with the 

purpose of committing a felony or misdemeanor theft . . ., the person employs or 

threatens to immediately employ physical force upon another person.” 

“Purposely” is defined as acting with the “conscious object to engage in the 

conduct.” See Ark.Code Ann. § 5-2-202(1). Therefore, to convict Thomas of 

aggravated robbery, the State had to prove that: (1) it was his “conscious object” 

to commit a felony theft, i.e., he acted “purposefully” by “threaten[ing] to 

immediately employ physical force upon another person” during the commission 

of a robbery; and (2) he was armed with a “deadly weapon,” a gun, when he 

entered the store. Thomas admitted to police that his conscious plan was to rob the 

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store when he entered it with a gun in his hand. The facts contained in this 

admission squarely satisfy all of the essential statutory elements of the crime of 

aggravated robbery. While Thomas suggests that he may have “changed his mind” 

about going forward with the crime, this in no way negated his criminal intent. 

See Ragland v. State, 71 Ark. 65, 70 S.W. 1039 (1902) (burglary charge sustained 

by evidence of breaking and entry with intent to commit the specific felony 

charged even though defendant was frightened off before carrying out his intent). 

 Thomas also contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to argue 

the lack of any corroborating evidence to support his out-of-court confession. Doc. 

3 at pp. 7-8, 10-11. In support of this argument, Thomas cites what is sometimes 

referred to as the “corpus delicti rule,” which is codified in Ark. Code Ann. § 16-

89-111(d). The language in that statute provides that a defendant’s out-of-court 

confession, standing alone support, is not sufficient to support a conviction unless 

it is: “(1) Accompanied with other proof that the offense was committed; or (2) 

Supported by substantial independent evidence that would tend to establish the 

trustworthiness of the confession.” Id. In construing that statute, however, the 

Arkansas Supreme Court has made it clear that corroboration of a confession does 

not require the State to connect the defendant to the criminal act through 

independent evidence; rather, the State need only show that the offense occurred.” 

Meadows v. State, 2012 Ark. 57 at 7, 386 S.W.3d 470, 475-76. 

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Thomas appears to be under the mistaken impression that Arkansas law 

required the State to produce independent evidence to corroborate his confession. 

Consistent with the Court’s holding in Meadows, the State in this case produced 

ample evidence, independent of his confession, that he committed the charged 

offense. 

Disregarding Thomas’s pre-trial confession, the State introduced substantial 

that he: (1) snuck into the Crossett Dollar General store with a gun; (2) hid in the 

back of the store; (3) waited until the store was closed; and (4) emerged with his 

gun drawn and a bandana covering his face, and confronted two store employees. 

Thus, the jury was entitled to conclude, even without Thomas’s pre-trial 

confession, that the charged crimes occurred and that Thomas was the person who 

committed them. 

Even if Thomas’s trial and appellate counsel had made all of the arguments 

Thomas now advances, based on his alleged lack of criminal intent and the corpus 

delicti rule, those arguments would have failed as a matter of law. Accordingly, 

those ineffective assistance of counsel arguments are without legal merit and 

provide no basis for habeas relief. 

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2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Related to Alleged 

Concession of Thomas’s Guilt and Lack of Trial 

Strategy13 

Thomas complains that, starting with his attorney’s opening argument, he 

conceded that Thomas was guilty of “a crime.” As a result, he contends that his 

attorney’s “trial strategy” was to admit Thomas’s guilt and “plea for mercy,” 

something that Thomas believes rises to the level of “ a constructive denial of 

counsel.” Doc. 2 at 11-12. 

During opening statement, Thomas’s attorney laid out the following defense 

strategy: 

 Now, I’m not going to stand before you here today and tell you 

that my client is completely innocent, that he didn’t do anything 

wrong, and that you should find him not guilty. 

 The fact is, my client made mistakes, particularly in this case. 

And I think you’ll see in the evidence presented here today that almost 

from the very beginning when he was arrested my client admitted that 

he did wrong. I think you’ll hear testimony about the remorse that he 

showed when he was talking to the police officer . . . how cooperative 

he was . . . 

. . . 

 Now, having said all that, whether he’s actually guilty of what 

he’s charged with, that’s going to be for you to determine. That’s 

your role. I want you to remember that the burden of proof rests with 

the prosecution. . . . And that means each and every element of the 

crime. 

Tr. T. at 124-15. In essence, this defense strategy asked the jury to consider 

 

13 These claims are asserted as Grounds 6, 7 and 10 of Thomas’s Petition. Doc. 3. 

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convicting Thomas of lesser included offenses, rather than “what he’s charged 

with” – commercial burglary and aggravated robbery. Given how few facts 

Thomas’s attorney had to work with, this would seem to be the only viable defense 

strategy available to Thomas. 

In Thomas’s Rule 37 appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court considered and 

rejected this ineffective assistance of counsel argument: 

. . . Moreover, considering the totality of the evidence, including the 

witnesses’ testimony, the video tape, the items seized in the searches, and 

appellant’s statement to the police, it cannot be said that counsel failed to 

formulate any kind of strategy to counter the overwhelming evidence of 

appellant’s participation in the offenses. It is clear from the record lodged 

on direct appeal that counsel made a concerted effort to establish that 

appellant was not guilty of commercial burglary and aggravated robbery but 

of a lesser offense. 

Doc. 9 at 9. 

 Thomas’s counsel faced a formidable task at trial. Apart from Thomas’s 

own post-arrest confession, the two employees who were in the store testified that 

that, when they saw Thomas, they fled, with Thomas in hot pursuit holding a gun. 

Trial Tr. at 132-133, 139-140, 142. After the State rested and the jury was 

excused, Thomas’s attorney discussed with him, on the record, his trial strategy 

and whether Thomas disagreed with it: 

[Defense counsel]: Eugene [Thomas], the State has rested. It’s now 

our chance to put on evidence. We don’t have any other witnesses 

than you. 

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 . . . 

Now, in my argument in my opening statement and what I’ve 

tried to argue is that, and our strategy here today, is to try to convince 

the jury that while you may be guilty of a crime, we’re asking them to 

impose not the maximum sentence, but something less. That would 

be an argument to be made in the sentencing phase of the trial. 

Knowing that, I’m not sure if it would serve any purpose for 

you to testify at this point in the trial. And therefore, when the jury is 

called in it’s my intent to announce to the Court that the defense rests. 

Having heard all that, is there anything that you disagree with 

or do you insist on testifying in the guilt phase or are you wanting to 

follow my advice? 

[no response] 

[Defense counsel]: I mean is there anything you would want to testify 

to that was brought out in the testimony so far that you just 

completely disagree with? 

[Thomas]: Well, the video in fact where he said I had aimed a 

weapon to the lady that down in the floor with the intent to try to use 

force, I disagree with that. 

[Defense counsel]: Yeah. Well, you understand that’s an argument 

that I made and I’ve made a record here. 

[Thomas]: Okay. 

[Defense counsel]: The jury can see for themselves whether or not 

you aimed the weapon, and I will certainly make mention of that in 

my closing argument. 

[Thomas]: Okay. 

[Defense counsel:] But again, in the end the decision is yours and I 

have to know for the record whether or not you want to testify. 

[Thomas]: We’ll leave it at that. 

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Trial Tr. at 190-192. This colloquy between Thomas and his trial counsel makes it 

clear that Thomas was aware of his attorney’s trial strategy and that he appeared to 

endorse it. 

 In rejecting this ineffective assistance of counsel argument in Thomas’s Rule 

37 appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court made a reasonable application of 

Strickland. Accordingly, Thomas’s attempt to reassert that ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim as a basis for federal habeas relief is without merit and should be 

denied. Holder v. United States, 721 F.3d 979, 989 (8th Cir. 2013) (where 

evidence of petitioner’s involvement in the robbery was overwhelming, his 

attorney’s “decision to concede the physical elements of second-degree murder and 

to argue that his client lacked the mens rea necessary for a capital-murder 

conviction was not constitutionally deficient”); Lingar v. Bowersox, 176 F.3d 453, 

458-59 (8th Cir. 1999) (applying Strickland in denying habeas relief because “the 

decision to concede guilt of the lesser charge of second-degree murder was a 

reasonable tactical retreat rather than a complete surrender”). 

3. Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct and Related 

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim 

 

Thomas argues that his conviction was tainted by prosecutorial misconduct 

during the sentencing phase of his trial and that his counsel was ineffective for 

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failing to obtain relief based on this alleged misconduct. According to Thomas, the 

prosecutor in his rebuttal closing argument, made during the sentencing phase of 

his trial, engaged in the following misconduct: (1) he referred to Thomas’s failure 

to testify, violating his Fifth Amendment rights; and (2) he misrepresented to the 

jury that Thomas had committed another aggravated robbery, which was only a 

“pending charge” at that time of his trial in Ashley County. Doc. 2 at 13. 

(a) Prosecutor’s comment on Thomas’s failure to 

testify 

During his rebuttal argument, in the sentencing phase of Thomas’s trial, the 

prosecutor made the following remarks, in direct response to earlier arguments 

asserted by Thomas’s attorney: 

 I find it interesting that [Thomas's counsel] could get up here and say 

that a person who has committed two aggravated robberies whether he 

was the driver in one or not, deserves the minimum. I find it 

interesting that you say, well, he cooperated, therefore he deserves the 

minimum particularly where he didn't admit his guilt to you today. We 

spent the whole day here finding him guilty. That's what we've been 

doing. 

Thomas I, at 7, 422 S.W.3d at 221. 

Importantly, in arguing for a reduced sentence, Thomas’s attorney pointed 

Thomas had “fully cooperated” and urged the jury to give Thomas the minimum 

sentence of ten years, rather than the forty year maximum. Trial Tr. at 293-294. 

This invited the prosecutor, in his rebuttal argument, to point out to the jury that 

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Thomas’s so-called “cooperation” with law enforcement fell short of him 

admitting to the jury that he was guilty of the charged offenses. After the 

prosecutor made those remarks, Thomas’s attorney moved for a mistrial on the 

ground the prosecutor had commented on Thomas’s decision not to testify, in 

violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. The trial court denied the motion for 

mistrial but admonished the jury: “I’m going to ask you to disregard the statement 

made by the prosecution when it made the statement to the effect that the 

defendant did not admit to his guilt. And it is the statement of the defense that is a 

violation of the rules.” Trial Tr. at 307. 

Thomas’s counsel argued, on direct appeal, that the trial court erred in 

denying his motion for a mistrial. In rejecting this argument, the Arkansas Court 

of Appeals found that “any prejudice suffered by Thomas by the denial of the 

motion for mistrial was cured by the admonition” requested by defense counsel 

and given to the jury. Thomas I, at 7-8, 422 S.W.3d at 220-221. The issue was 

not specifically addressed in Thomas II. 

Thomas fails to cite any federal law supporting the proposition that such 

remarks by a prosecutor violate a criminal defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights, an 

essential element necessary to make the claim cognizable in a § 2254 habeas 

action. Additionally, there is no indication that the Arkansas courts, on either 

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direct appeal or Rule 37 review, considered the possibility that such statements by 

the prosecutor violated federal law. See, e.g., Ford v. Norris, 364 F.3d 916, 919 

(8th Cir. 2004) (denying habeas relief because “no federal challenge to the 

prosecution’s statement” was properly before the court). 

This Court’s review of federal law confirms that the challenged statement by 

the prosecutor did not rise to the level of violating Thomas’s Fifth Amendment 

rights. A prosecutor may not directly comment on a defendant's failure to testify. 

Griffen v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). Here, the prosecutor’s remarks, at 

most, were an indirect comment on Thomas not testifying. In Graham v. Dormire, 

212 F.3d 437, 439 (8th Cir. 2000), the court held that such indirect comments only 

constitute a constitutional violation “if they manifest the prosecutor's intent to call 

attention to a defendant's failure to testify or would be naturally and necessarily 

taken by a jury as a comment on the defendant's failure to testify.” In order to 

warrant habeas corpus relief, such comments “must be so inappropriate as to make 

the trial fundamentally unfair.” Rousan v. Roper, 436 F.3d 951, 960 (8th Cir.2006); 

see also Harris v. Bowersox, 184 F.3d 744, 752 (8th Cir.1999). Finally, there must 

be a “reasonable probability” that the error affected the jury's verdict and that, 

without the error, the jury's verdict would have been different. Id. 

Here, the prosecutor’s comments were made in direct response to arguments 

by Thomas’s counsel, who invited the prosecutor to make those comments. 

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Sheridan v. State, 313 Ark. 23, 44, 852 S.W.2d 772, 783 (1993) (rejecting direct 

appeal argument that prosecutor’s remark “was an invited comment made in 

response to the closing argument of defense counsel”). Additionally, the 

comments were neither: (1) made intentionally to call attention to Thomas’s 

failure to testify; nor (2) so inappropriate as to render the trial unfair, especially in 

light of the trial court’s admonition to the jury to ignore those remarks by the 

prosecutor. Finally, Thomas does not argue that these passing comments impacted 

the jury’s sentencing verdict. 

For all of these reasons, the Court concludes that Thomas is not entitled to 

habeas relief on this stand-alone prosecutorial misconduct claim or his related 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 

(b) The Prosecutor’s Comment on Thomas’s 

Commission of a Second Aggravated Robbery, 

For Which He Had Not Been Convicted 

 Thomas claims that the prosecutor’s passing reference to his involvement in 

a “second aggravated robbery” was prosecutorial misconduct because the charge, 

although pending, had not been resolved.14 Doc. 2 at 13. On direct appeal, 

Thomas’s attorney raised a broad objection to the admission of evidence during the 

 

14 As indicated earlier, this comment by the prosecutor was also made during rebuttal 

closing argument, in the sentencing phase of Thomas’s trial. 

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sentencing phase, 15 but did not specifically object to the prosecutor’s remark about 

the second aggravated robbery. Id. The Arkansas Court of Appeals rejected this 

argument and held that it was “of no consequence that Thomas has not yet been 

convicted of the Lake Village robbery.” Thomas I, at 6, 422 S.W.3d at 220-21 

(citing Brown v. State, 2010 Ark. 420, at 14, 378 S.W.3d 66, 74) (rejecting 

argument that trial court erred in admitting evidence of an alleged sexual assault 

that occurred thirty-four years prior and for which he was never charged or 

convicted; holding that evidence of prior assault in Brown’s sentencing for his 

sexual-assault conviction was relevant and its admission was not an abuse of 

discretion)). 

Thomas does not assert a federal constitutional basis for his challenge to the 

prosecutor’s reference to his pending aggravated robbery charge in Chicot County, 

and this Court is unaware of any law that would make that claim cognizable in a § 

2254 habeas action. Rather, this claim relates solely to an alleged error of state 

law which cannot provide a basis for federal habeas relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 

U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (“federal habeas relief does not lie for errors of state law.”) 

Additionally, the particular issue relates to a state court evidentiary ruling. 

 

15 Thomas’s counsel argued that, during the sentencing phase of his trial, the court erred 

in allowing testimony from a captain from the Lake Village Police Department who testified 

about Thomas’s involvement in an aggravated robbery that took in Lake Village approximately 

eight days before Thomas’s involvement in the aggravated robbery in Crossett. Trial Tr. 254-

257. Lake Village is in Chicot County, which is contiguous to Ashley County. 

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Middleton v. Roper, 498 F.3d 812, 820 (8th Cir. 2007) (claim of error not 

cognizable when petitioner challenged admission of evidence because no 

constitutional violation). Finally, in light of the admitted and unchallenged 

evidence that Thomas participated in the Lake Village robbery, it is impossible to 

see how Thomas could have suffered any prejudice due to the prosecutor’s passing 

reference to the robbery during his closing argument.16 

4. Thomas’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim 

Based On “Cumulative Error” 

Finally, Thomas argues that the cumulative effect of the preceding errors 

deprived him of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

“Strickland does not authorize a cumulative inquiry of counsel’s performance.” 

Shelton v. Mapes, 821 F.3d 941, 950 (8th Cir. 2016) (omitting other citations); see 

also Middleton v. Roper, 455 F.3d 838, 851 (8th Cir. 2006) (“cumulative error 

does not call for habeas relief, as each habeas claim must stand or fall on its own”) 

(citing cases). 

Accordingly, Thomas’s final ineffective assistance of counsel claim, based 

on “cumulative error,” is without merit. 

 

 

16 According to the Arkansas Department of Correction website, Thomas was later 

convicted of aggravated robbery in connection with the charges in Chicot County. 

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III. Conclusion 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT: 

1. Petitioner Eugene Thomas, III’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Petition for a Writ 

of Habeas Corpus, Doc. 2, be DENIED with prejudice; and 

2. A Certificate of Appealability be DENIED, see 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c)(1)-(2); Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in United States District 

Courts. 

DATED this 26th day of September, 2016. 

 ___________________________________ 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 

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