Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01552/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01552-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Fair Labor Standards

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jayce Bryant,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Tristate Logistics of Arizona LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-19-01552-PHX-SMB

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Defendants Tristate Logistics of Nevada, LLC, C&A 

Holdings, LLC, and The Bon Air Trust’s Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 18, “Mot.”). Plaintiff 

Jayce Bryant responded, (Doc. 22, “Resp.”), and Defendants replied, (Doc. 23, “Reply”). 

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint against them1 with prejudice under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Mot. at 1.) The Court has considered the 

pleadings and issues the following Order.

2

BACKGROUND3

Plaintiff Jayce Bryant “brings this action against Defendants for their unlawful 

failure to pay overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act [(“FLSA”)].” (Doc. 1, 

“Compl.” ¶ 2.) While employed full-time by Defendants between March 2016 and July 

1 As noted by the moving Defendants, the other defendants: (1) Tristate Logistics of 

Arizona, LLC; (2) Tristate Logistics, LLC; and (3) Carlos Jorge, are not parties to this 

Motion. (Doc. 18 at 1 n.1; Doc. 23 at 1 n.1.)

2 Defendants requested oral argument, but the Court finds that the issues presented in the 

Motion can be appropriately resolved without hearing. See LRCiv 7.2(f).

3 The Court accepts the Complaint’s well-plead allegations as true for purposes here. 

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2016,4(id. ¶ 14), “[Plaintiff] was paid approximately $96 per day, regardless of the number 

of hours he worked for Defendants,” “to perform automobile parts delivery-related duties, 

which generally consisted of . . . transporting and delivering automobile parts,” (id. ¶¶ 15-

16). In other words, although Plaintiff “worked approximately between forty-eight (48)

and sixty (60) hours per week,” (id. ¶ 73), he “was never paid any overtime premium 

whatsoever for time spent working in excess of 40 hours per week,” (id. ¶ 78), but instead 

“paid on a daily, flat rate basis,” (id. ¶ 79).

Because he was not paid at least one and one-half times the regular rate at which he 

was employed for hours in excess of 40 hours per work week, Plaintiff claims Defendants 

violated the FLSA. (Id. ¶¶ 128-135.) More specifically, his Complaint alleges one count 

under section 207 of the FLSA against (1) Tristate Logistics of Arizona, LLC; (2) Tristate 

Logistics, LLC; (3) Carlos Jorge and Jane Doe Jorge; (4) Tristate Logistics of Nevada, 

LLC; (5) C&A Holdings, LLC; and (6) The Bon Air Trust. (Id.) The latter three Defendants 

now move under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety against them. (Mot. 

at 1.)

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, a complaint must meet 

the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a “short 

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” so that the 

defendant has “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 

41, 47 (1957)). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) “can be based on the lack of a cognizable 

legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). A complaint that 

sets forth a cognizable legal theory will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient

factual matter, which, if accepted as true, states a claim to relief that is “plausible on its 

4 The Complaint alleges Plaintiff worked as a “courier/warehouse worker,” which 

consisted of “work . . . akin to a specialty job on the production line,” beginning around 

April 1, 2016. (Compl. ¶¶ 61, 69.)

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face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 

Facial plausibility exists if the pleader sets forth “factual content that allows the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.” Id. Plausibility does not equal “probability,” but requires “more 

than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. “Where a complaint 

pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent’ with a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the 

line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 557).

DISCUSSION

As a preliminary matter, Defendants do not dispute whether the Complaint sets forth 

allegations showing that the FLSA applies to Plaintiff.

5

Instead, at issue is whether the 

Complaint adequately alleges Defendants, but not all defendants, were Plaintiff’s 

“employers,” as required by the FLSA. (Mot. at 2, 5-8; Reply at 2-7.)

I. “Employer” Liability Under the FLSA

The FLSA only imposes liability on “employers.” Bonnette v. Cal. Health and 

Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1468 (9th Cir. 1983), disapproved on other grounds by, 

Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). As the statutory 

definition provides, an “employer” “includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the 

interest of an employer in relation to an employee . . . .” 29 U.S.C. §203(d). The term “is 

not limited by the common law concept of ‘employer,’ and is to be given an expansive 

interpretation in order to effectuate the FLSA’s broad remedial purposes.” Bonnette, 704 

F.2d at 1469 (citation omitted). Notably, “an employer-employee relationship . . . does not 

depend on ‘isolated factors but rather upon the circumstances of the whole activity.’” 

5 Specifically, they do not contest whether Plaintiff is an employee allegedly “engaged in 

commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or . . . employed in an enterprise

engaged in commerce.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (emphasis added). This analysis is apart 

from whether Defendants are Plaintiff’s “employers” under the FLSA. See Chao v. A-One 

Med. Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 908, 917 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Whether two companies constitute 

a single enterprise for FLSA coverage and whether they are liable as joint employers under 

§ 207 are technically separate issues.”).

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Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1469 (quoting Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 

730 (1947)). “The touchstone is economic reality.” Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1469 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). As a guide in making this determination, the Ninth 

Circuit looks to four factors: “whether the alleged employer (1) had the power to hire and 

fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions 

of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment, and (4) maintained

employment records.” Id. at 1470. “[T]his is not a mechanical determination, . . . and it 

will not be applied blindly.” Id. Rather, “[t]he ultimate determination must be based ‘upon 

the circumstances of the whole activity.’” Id. (quoting Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 730).

The Complaint generally alleges Plaintiff was an employee of “Defendants” and 

“Defendants were and continue to be ‘employers’ as defined by FLSA.” (Compl. ¶¶ 47, 

48.) It also alleges that “Defendants were joint employers under the FLSA and 29 C.F.R. 

§ 791.2(b) and employed Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶ 56.) In explaining these employer-employee 

relationships, the Complaint alleges (1) “Defendants . . . directed and exercised control 

over Plaintiff’s . . . work and wages at all relevant times,” (id. ¶¶ 49, 102); (2) “Defendants

controlled [Plaintiff’s] schedule,” (id. ¶ 67); (3) “Defendants had the right to hire and fire 

. . . Plaintiff,” (id. ¶ 69.b.); (4) “Plaintiff . . . used Defendants’ equipment and wore 

company uniforms,” (id. ¶ 66); and (5) “Plaintiff . . . [was] subject to Tristate Logistics’ 

supervisory and disciplinary authority . . . and required to follow rules guidelines set by 

Tristate Logistics; and [was] trained by Defendants with regard to policy and procedure,” 

(id. ¶ 62).

As it specifically relates to Tristate Logistics of Nevada, LLC, C&A Holdings, LLC, 

and The Bon Air Trust, the Complaint alleges “[each] is an employer,” (id. ¶¶ 27, 35, 39), 

and “[each] was at all relevant times Plaintiff’s . . . Employer as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 

203(d),” (id. ¶¶ 25, 33, 37). It further alleges “[Tristate Logistics of Nevada, LLC and C&A 

Holdings, LLC] had the authority to hire and fire employees, supervised and controlled 

work schedules or the conditions of employment, determined the rate and method of 

payment, and maintained employment records in connection with Plaintiff’s . . . 

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employment with Defendants.” (Id. ¶¶ 28, 36.) There are no additional allegations further 

exploring these relationships.

With the above allegations in mind, Defendants argue that “Plaintiff has failed to 

make factual allegations against any of [them] that could plausibly give rise to employer 

status.” (Mot. at 2.) Instead of setting forth factual allegations, as they explain, “[t]he only 

allegations individually asserted against [them] are broad and conclusory statements.” (Id.) 

In response, Plaintiff claims the Complaint contains “sufficient facts against all Defendants 

to put them fairly on notice of the claims against them.” (Resp. at 3.) In particular, he argues 

the Complaint “allege[s] that each named Defendant is his employer under the FLSA.” (Id.

at 5 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 21, 25, 31, 33, 37, 41)). Without identifying how any single 

Defendant was his employer, he recites the Bonnette factors almost verbatim in his 

response, but without any elucidation, and points to the Complaint where they are similarly 

listed. (See Resp. at 5 (citing ¶¶ 24, 28, 32, 36, 42)). He also claims that alleging his dates 

of employment, job title, rate of pay, and facts concerning his duties and responsibilities 

while working for “Defendants” is sufficient. (Resp. at 5.)

After accepting as true all allegations that are not legal conclusions and considering 

the FLSA’s expansive definition of “employer,” the Complaint fails to allege that the 

movants employed Plaintiff. Contra Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 

(“[W]e ‘are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’” 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). As illustrated above, there are no specific factual 

allegations outlining any employer-employee relationship between Plaintiff and each

Defendant. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“While legal conclusions can provide the framework of 

a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”). Instead of explaining his 

employment relationship with each Defendant, Plaintiff only baldly concludes one exists

between him and “Defendants” as a group. In claiming otherwise, Plaintiff relies heavily 

on the ruling in Kidner v. Moonshine Group LLC, et al., 2:14-cv-2362-SMM, Doc. 35 (D. 

Ariz. January 22, 2016). However, Kidner is distinguishable and does not stand for the 

proposition that merely reciting the Bonnette factors is enough to survive a motion to 

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dismiss. Id. To the contrary, there were enough factual allegations in Kidner to identify

employer-employee relationships between Moonshine Group, LLC., Union Group LLC,

and the individual plaintiffs. Id. at *4. These factual allegations made clear that all 

defendants owned and operated the Draft House where plaintiffs worked. Id. at *4-5. 

Because of these factual allegations, one could reasonably conclude, as the court found,

that they were each plaintiff’s “employers” under the FLSA. The same cannot be said in 

this case. Plaintiff’s Complaint provides no factual allegations supporting the conclusory 

allegations that Defendants Tristate Logistics of Nevada, LLC, C&A Holdings, LLC, and 

The Bon Air Trust were Plaintiff’s “employers.”

Simply reciting the Bonnette factors, as Plaintiff does here, is not enough under Rule 

8. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Relatedly, merely alleging an entity is an employer under the 

FLSA, as Plaintiff also does here, is also not enough. Id. Using the collective “Defendants” 

is similarly inadequate. See Adams v. U.S. Airways, Inc., No. CIV-10-1088-PHX-DKD, 

2011 WL 644089, at * 2 (D. Ariz. Feb. 11, 2011). While alleging employment dates, a job 

title, pay rate, and daily responsibilities while working for an employer may be adequate, 

the Complaint blankly alleges each of these things against “Defendants” as a group and 

fails to set forth any specific factual allegations concerning each Defendant. (See Compl. 

¶¶ 14-16, 61.) Accordingly, the Court finds insufficient factual allegations showing each 

of the moving Defendants was Plaintiff’s “employer.”

II. “Joint Employer” Liability Under the FLSA

As a general matter, “[i]f an individual is working for more than one company at a 

time, it is necessary to determine whether the individual’s employers should be treated 

separately or jointly for purposes of determining employers’ responsibilities under the 

FLSA.” Chao v. A-One Med. Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 908, 916 (9th Cir. 2003). While the 

FLSA does not define “joint employers,” the Department of Labor has promulgated 

regulations to guide the courts.

6 See 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a) (1961). The regulations provide

6 While the DOL recently updated this section on March 16, 2020, the new language does 

not impact this Court’s decision and both parties refer to the former language. See generally 

29 C.F.R. § 791.2 (2020).

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in part that:

Where the employee performs work which simultaneously benefits two or 

more employers, or works for two or more employers at different times 

during the workweek, a joint employment relationship generally will be 

considered to exist in situation such as:

(1) Where there is an arrangement between employers to share the 

employee’s services, as, for example, two interchange

employees; or 

(2) Where one employer is acting directly or indirectly in the 

interest of the other employer (or employers) in relation to the 

employee; or 

(3) Where the employers are not completely dissociated with 

respect to the employment of a particular employee and may 

be deemed to share control of the employee, directly or 

indirectly, by reason of the fact that one employer controls, is 

controlled by, or is under control with the other employer. 

29 C.F.R. § 791.2(b)(1961) (footnotes omitted); see also Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1469; Chao, 

346 F.3d at 917-18. The last example “tells us that joint employment will generally be 

considered to exist when 1) employers are not ‘completely dissociated’ with respect to the 

employment of the individuals and 2) where one employer is controlled by another or the 

employers are under common control.” Chao, 346 F.3d at 918; 29 U.S.C. § 791.2(a) (1961)

(“A determination of whether the employment by the employers is to be considered joint 

employment or separate and distinct employment for purposes of the [FLSA] depends upon 

all the facts and the particular case.”).

Both parties dispute whether Defendants should be treated as joint employers under 

the FLSA. Defendants argue that “Plaintiff’s only attachment of liability for [them] is 

through joint employer allegations,” (Reply at 3), and the “Complaint fails to make any 

specific factual allegations targeted at [them] giving rise to joint employer status.” (Reply

at 7.) On the other hand, Plaintiff claims he “properly alleges a horizontal joint employment 

relationship between Plaintiff and the Defendants,” (id. at 5), because of one allegation in 

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his Complaint, which reads:

At all relevant times, all Defendants were horizontal joint 

employers of Plaintiff and the Collective Members. At all 

relevant times: (1) Defendants were not completely dissociated 

with respect to the employment of Plaintiff and the Collective 

Members; and (2) Defendants were under common control. In 

any event, at all relevant times, Defendants were joint 

employers under the FLSA and 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(b) and 

employed Plaintiff and the Collective Members.”

(Compl. ¶ 56.)

This language in the Complaint is directly imported from Chao, but Plaintiff has 

substituted “employer” with “Defendants” and “individuals” with “Plaintiff and the 

Collective Members” in his Complaint. See Chao, 346 F.3d at 918. Even ignoring the fact 

that the Complaint fails to allege that any Defendant is Plaintiff's employer, the Court 

would need specific factual allegations, not a recitation of the DOL regulations, concerning 

whether any of the Defendants should be treated as Plaintiff’s “joint employers” under the 

FLSA. See Chao, 346 F.3d at 918.

III. Leave to Amend

Plaintiff does not request leave to amend his Complaint. However, in accordance 

with the well-settled law in this Circuit, because “it is not ‘absolutely clear’ that [Plaintiff] 

could not cure [the Complaint’s] deficiencies by amendment,” the Court will give him the 

opportunity to do so. See Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 767 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations 

omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (“leave to amend should be “freely” given “when justice 

so requires[]”). Plaintiff’s amended complaint must address the deficiencies identified 

above. Plaintiff’s amended complaint should follow the form detailed in Local Rule 7.1.

Within thirty (30) days from the date of entry of this Order, Plaintiff may submit

an amended complaint. Plaintiff must clearly designate on the face of the document that

it is the “First Amended Complaint.” If Plaintiff decides to file an amended complaint, he

is reminded that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, see Lacey v. 

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Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012), and it must be complete in itself and “must 

not incorporate by reference any part of the preceding pleading, including exhibits,” 

L.R.Civ 15.1.

CONCLUSION

The Complaint fails to set forth specific factual allegations that Defendants Tristate 

Logistics of Nevada, LLC, C&A Holdings, LLC, and The Bon Air Trust were Plaintiff’s 

“employers” or “joint employers” as it relates to the FLSA. Instead of doing so, the 

Complaint merely alleges conclusory and unsupported legal findings, which is insufficient 

under Rule 8. Therefore, the Complaint is dismissed as it relates to these Defendants with 

leave to amend. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED GRANTING Defendants Tristate Logistics of Nevada, LLC, 

C&A Holdings, LLC, and The Bon Air Trust’s Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 18). The 

Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend under Rule 12(b)(6) as it relates to these three 

Defendants only;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff may file a First Amended Complaint 

within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. If a First Amended Complaint is not filed 

within thirty (30) days, the case will proceed against the remaining defendants only. 

Dated this 18th day of March, 2020.

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