Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-05751/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-05751-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KARRIEM B. SHAHEED,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONAL 

HEALTH CARE SERVICES, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 13-cv-05751-VC 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING 

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY

INJUNCTIVE ORDER

Re: Dkt. Nos. 37, 48

Plaintiff Karriem B. Shaheed, a state inmate, filed this pro se civil rights complaint under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Dr. Denise Reyes, Dr. Elena Tootell, Nurse N. Podolsky, Nurse J. 

De La Cruz, Janet Lewis and Andrew Deems were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical 

needs by denying him proper care for his injured ankle. The defendants have filed a motion for 

summary judgment, which is fully briefed. Shaheed filed a motion for “emergency temporary 

injunctive order,” which the defendants oppose. For the reasons explained below, the defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment is granted and Shaheed’s motion for injunctive relief is denied. 1

BACKGROUND

I. Undisputed Facts

On February 8, 2012, Shaheed injured his left ankle while playing basketball. Shaheed 

Dec., ¶ 1; Reyes Dec., ¶ 3. On February 12, 2012, X-rays of Shaheed’s ankle were taken. Id. 

 

1

In his original complaint, Shaheed also asserted this claim against the California Correctional 

Health Care Services (“CCHCS”) and Dr. Steve Millimond, an employee at Shared Imaging. 

Shaheed did not name the CCHCS in his amended complaint; therefore any claim asserted against 

the CCHCS is dismissed. Millimond is unserved because he is no longer an employee of Shared 

Imaging and has left no forwarding address. See Dkt. No. 18. The only allegation against him is 

that he performed a CT scan instead of the MRI that was ordered by Shaheed’s primary care 

physician. See Am. Comp. at 8. However, the evidence shows that Millimond performed an 

MRI, as ordered. See Reyes Dec., Ex. A at 21. Therefore, the claim against Millimond is 

dismissed. The defendants also move to dismiss the claim against Andrew Deems, in his official 

capacity. This is denied as moot; the amended complaint appears to assert a claim against Deems 

only in his individual capacity. 

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The results showed evidence of old fractures and a possible chronic ligament injury. Id. On May 

2, 2012, Shaheed was seen by his primary care physician, Dr. John Cranshaw, who noted 

Shaheed’s ankle pain and X-ray results showing an old healed fracture, but nothing more 

significant. Cranshaw’s opinion was that Shaheed suffered from a significant sprain and needed a 

“fracture walker.” Id., Ex. A at 9. Cranshaw noted that Shaheed was quite concerned about his 

ankle and, after an extensive discussion, Cranshaw agreed to refer Shaheed to orthopedics for a 

second opinion. Id.; Shaheed Dec., ¶ 3. Cranshaw’s referral to orthopedics was denied by Chief 

Medical Officer Elena Tootell because Shaheed had not yet tried a splint or physical therapy to 

alleviate his ankle pain. Reyes Dec.,¶ 4, Ex. A at 11-12. 

On May 29, 2012, Cranshaw referred Shaheed to physical therapy. Id. ¶ 5, Ex. A at 13; 

Shaheed Dec., ¶ 4. Robert Spriggs, Shaheed’s physical therapist, noted the slow improvement of 

Shaheed’s ankle pain and that his healing time would probably be fourteen to sixteen months. Id.; 

Reyes Dec., ¶ 4, Ex. A at 15. On August 3, 2012, Cranshaw examined Shaheed and submitted 

another referral to orthopedics, which was approved. On August 7, 2012, Shaheed saw Dr. Lyon, 

an orthopedic consultant. Id. ¶ 6, Ex. A at 16-20; Shaheed Dec., ¶ 6. Lyon ordered an MRI scan 

of Shaheed’s left ankle. The MRI showed that Shaheed had a subtle bone bruise and mild joint 

effusion (swelling) and no fracture. Reyes Dec., ¶ 7, Ex. A at 21-22; Shaheed Dec., ¶ 8.

On October 4, 2012, Shaheed saw his new primary care physician, Dr. A. Pachynki, who 

noted that Shaheed had “bothersome ankle pain” and scheduled a cortisone injection to relieve the 

pain. On October 18, 2012, Lyon administered the cortisone injection and also recommended that 

Shaheed be seen by a foot and ankle specialist at the University of San Francisco (“UCSF”). Id. at 

¶ 9; Reyes Dec., ¶ 9, Ex. A at 25-28. On December 19, 2012, Shaheed had a consultation with 

Dr. Olsen, UCSF foot and ankle specialist, who diagnosed Shaheed as suffering from 

osteoarthritis, a degenerative bone disease. She administered a second cortisone injection to 

relieve pain. Olsen noted that surgery is more reliable in patients that have relief from a cortisone 

injection and, because Shaheed reported no pain relief from the injection, he would not benefit 

from surgery. Id. at ¶ 10, Ex. A at 29-36; Reyes Dec., ¶ 10.

On February 14, 2013, upon the referral of Pachynki, Shaheed’s ankle was X-rayed to 

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reassess the possibility of a fracture. The results did not show evidence of a fracture. Reyes Dec., 

¶ 11, Ex. A at 44. On March 13, 2013, upon the referral of Pachynki, Shaheed received a second 

MRI of his left ankle. Unlike the previous MRI, this scan showed subcortical edema in the distal 

tibia and lateral aspect of the talar dome suspicious for developing osteochondral lesions and a tear 

of the anterior talofibular ligament. Shaheed Dec., ¶ 13; Reyes Dec., ¶ 12, Ex. A at 48. On 

March 19, 2014, Pachynki reviewed the results with Shaheed. Shaheed Dec., ¶ 13. She noted that 

Shaheed had no change in pain level and he was ambulating with no apparent distress. Reyes 

Dec., ¶ 13, Ex. A at 50.

On March 21 and April 11, 2013, Shaheed saw his physical therapist, who noted that 

Shaheed reported pain improvement following the cortisone injections at UCSF. He suggested 

that the pain improvement and the MRI findings might prompt the UCSF specialist to reconsider 

surgical intervention. Id. at ¶ 14, Ex. A at 51-52; Shaheed Dec., ¶ 14. 

On April 22, 2013, Shaheed had a follow-up appointment with Olson at UCSF. Olson 

discussed with Shaheed surgical and non-surgical treatment options. Olson explained that 

arthroscopic microfracture surgery would help deliver blood to the injured area but, after the 

surgery, Shaheed would be unable to bear weight on the ankle for at least four to six weeks. 

Reyes Dec. ¶ 15, Ex. A at 53-58; Shaheed Dec., ¶ 15. After this discussion, Shaheed and Olsen 

agreed that ankle surgery would be the best option and the next visit would be for the actual 

surgery. Id.; Reyes Dec., Ex. A at 58.

On May 7, 2013, Dr. Reyes saw Shaheed for his follow up appointment after the surgery 

consultation with Olson. Id. at ¶ 16; Shaheed Dec., ¶ 16. This was the first and only time Reyes 

saw Shaheed. Reyes Dec., ¶ 16, Ex. A at 59-61. 

II. Disputed Facts

The following is Shaheed’s testimony regarding his May 7, 2013 office visit with Reyes. 

Reyes informed Shaheed that, after surgery on his left ankle, he would not be able to bear weight 

on the ankle for six to eight weeks. Shaheed Dec., ¶ 16. Shaheed expressed concern about 

walking up stairs and discussed getting a lower bunk before surgery. Id. Reyes explained that he 

did not fit the criteria for a lower bunk. Id. She explained that, after surgery, he would pass 

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through the triage and treatment area, which would provide any particular housing 

accommodations he would need. Id. He wanted to know more about the housing 

accommodations, but Reyes then became angry and mean. Id. Shaheed then stated that he agreed 

“with her terms” for surgery. Id. However, Reyes was not comfortable with Shaheed’s answer 

and delayed his surgery. Id. Shaheed told Reyes that he would speak to his counselor about a 

transfer because he “could not get treatment here.” Id. Reyes said she would see Shaheed in one 

month, but Shaheed never saw her again. Id. On June 13, 2013, Shaheed filed an administrative 

grievance about Reyes’ alleged decision to deny him medical treatment. Id. ¶ 17.

On January 15, 2015, Shaheed saw Olson at UCSF to discuss ankle surgery. Olson said 

that, because of the long delay, Shaheed would need four different kinds of surgery, each taking 

six to eight months of rehabilitation. Id. ¶ 28.2

The following is Reyes’ testimony about the May 7, 2013 office visit. During the visit, 

Shaheed expressed concerns about postoperative accommodations and management. Reyes Dec., 

¶ 17. Reyes had a hard time understanding Shaheed 

because he was vague and would not tell me exactly what he was 

asking for. I gathered that he was concerned about being on a floor 

higher than ground level because Dr. Olson told him that he could 

not bear weight for at least four to six weeks after surgery. I agreed 

with Mr. Shaheed that there was a possibility of postoperative risks 

due to his institutionalization. He will have limited physical therapy 

opportunity and might be presented with difficulty being able to be 

completely non-weight bearing. I informed him that after surgery, 

he would pass through the Triage and Treatment Area (“TTA”) 

where he could talk to a doctor about housing accommodations 

appropriate for his recovery. I explained that he would need to be 

housed in the Outpatient Housing Unit (“OHU”) postoperatively if 

he were to be designated as strictly non-weight bearing and that he 

might need some postoperative time in the OHU. He was not 

willing to do this. I explained that if he was not willing to at least 

consider OHU as a possibility, then I would not feel comfortable 

referring him for the surgery. 

 

2

The defendants object to Shaheed’s statements about his present medical condition on the ground 

that, without the medical records, they are inadmissible hearsay. The objection is overruled; the

statements are not admitted to show that Shaheed now needs four different surgeries for his ankle, 

but to show that, in general, the condition of the ankle is worsening. Furthermore, the defendants 

could have provided Dr. Olson’s report to refute Shaheed’s account of the visit, but they did not. 

But as discussed below, even with this evidence, no reasonable jury could conclude that Reyes 

was deliberately indifferent to Shaheed’s serious medical needs. 

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Id., Ex. A at 59-61. 

When Shaheed said he would talk to his counselor about being transferred to another 

prison, Reyes stated that he did not meet the criteria for a medical transfer but, based on his 

concerns, “he might want to hold off on surgery until he transferred to the next institution.” Id. 

¶ 18. She suggested that they meet again in June or July 2013 after he talked to his counselor. Id.

Shaheed then became disgruntled and angry and raised his voice, so Reyes was “forced to end the 

visit.” Id. Reyes states that she did not deny Shaheed’s request for surgery, but deferred the 

decision based on his concerns. Id. ¶ 19. Reyes did not believe there was any rush or urgency for 

the surgery because it was an elective procedure. Id. She states that Shaheed’s medical record, 

which indicated that he tolerated night pain and he did not refill his Tylenol prescription, indicated 

an acceptable risk for delaying surgery. Id. 

Presently, Shaheed’s medical concerns are being attended by physicians Dr. Espinosa, Dr. 

Lee, Dr. Rivero and Dr. Beatty. Id. ¶ 20. Shaheed also was seen by podiatrist, Dr. Griffith. On 

March 3, 2014, he was seen again at UCSF by Olson, who noted that Shaheed’s gait was normal, 

he had good alignment and he was in no acute distress. Olson discussed injections and 

medications to alleviate pain and scheduled another MRI to determine which injuries could be 

treated with surgery. Id.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is only proper where the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits show 

there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome 

of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material 

fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party. Id. 

The court will grant summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing 

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that 

party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 

(1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the record that 

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demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden then shifts to the 

nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings, and by his own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a 

genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324. 

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must review the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 

1999). The court’s function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility 

determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material fact. T.W. Elec. 

Serv. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

DISCUSSION

I. Claim Against Dr. Reyes

Shaheed argues that Reyes delayed and denied surgery for his injured left ankle, which 

caused increasing pain and a deteriorating left ankle. 

To establish an Eighth Amendment violation based on the failure to attend to medical 

needs, a prisoner must allege both (1) a serious medical need and (2) deliberate indifference to that 

need by prison officials. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled 

on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A 

serious medical need exists where “failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further 

significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 

1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012). A prison official exhibits deliberate indifference when he knows of 

and disregards a substantial risk of serious harm to inmate health. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 

825, 837 (1994). The prison official must not only “be aware of facts from which the inference 

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but he “must also draw the 

inference.” Id. If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the 

official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk. Gibson v. County 

of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). Instead, deliberate indifference involves a 

purposeful act or failure to act. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. Deliberate indifference may be 

shown when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it 

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may be shown in the way in which they provide medical care. Id. at 1062. 

The defendants do not dispute that Shaheed’s injured left ankle is a serious medical issue. 

Instead, they argue that the evidence fails to show that Reyes, or any defendant, was deliberately 

indifferent in treating his ankle. A review of the evidence shows that the parties agree on 

everything except what occurred at Shaheed’s May 7, 2013 appointment with Reyes. It appears 

that there was miscommunication between Shaheed and Reyes about whether Shaheed agreed to 

be housed in the OHU after surgery. According to Reyes, she postponed Shaheed’s surgery 

because she thought he did not want to be housed in OHU. According to Shaheed, he did agree to 

being housed in OHU and he interpreted Reyes’ postponement of his surgery as a denial of 

treatment for his surgery. However, in his 602 appeal, although Shaheed stated that Reyes denied 

him treatment, he also indicated that she put off his surgery for a month. Opp., Ex. H at 1. 

Therefore, even though Shaheed claims that Reyes denied him treatment, he recognized that she 

denied him treatment for only one month. On this motion for summary judgment, Shaheed’s 

version of events is taken to be true and it will be assumed that Reyes temporarily denied the 

surgery. However, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Shaheed, no reasonable jury 

could conclude that Reyes did so with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. 

Shaheed saw Reyes only one time, on May 7, 2013. After the May 7 appointment, at 

which Reyes temporarily denied Shaheed’s ankle surgery, Shaheed did not make another 

appointment with her to discuss the surgery further or make an appointment to discuss the surgery 

with a new doctor. Instead, he filed an administrative 602 grievance against Reyes. Therefore, 

Reyes did not have an opportunity to meet with Shaheed to further discuss plans for surgery and 

his postoperative care. Reyes’ one-time temporary denial does not amount to deliberate 

indifference because Shaheed’s medical record stated that he was tolerating pain, his alignment 

was good and the surgery was elective. Shaheed does not dispute these facts. Based on this 

evidence, Reyes was not aware of facts from which she could infer that there was a substantial risk 

of harm from temporarily denying ankle surgery. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (deliberate 

indifference requires prison official to draw inference that a substantial risk of harm exists);

Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1188 (even if prison official should have been aware of risk of harm, but was 

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not, he was not deliberately indifferent). 

Nor is Shaheed’s evidence that his ankle is now worse sufficient to raise a dispute of 

material fact that Reyes was deliberately indifferent when she temporarily denied the surgery, 

because the relevant question is whether she was aware, at the time of the visit, that his ankle was 

likely to become worse if his surgery was delayed a month. There is no evidence to support such 

a conclusion. 

Summary judgment is therefore granted for Dr. Reyes on the Eighth Amendment 

deliberate indifference claim.

II. Claim Against Other Defendants

Shaheed claims the other defendants were deliberately indifferent because they denied his 

administrative grievances about Dr. Reyes' failure to treat him. 

Although actions in reviewing and denying inmate appeals cannot serve as a sole basis for 

liability under § 1983, Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 

F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988), a plaintiff may establish liability on the part of defendants involved 

in the administrative grievance process by proving that his appeal put the defendants on notice that 

he had a serious medical need that was not being met, and their denial, therefore, constituted 

deliberate indifference to his medical need. See Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 

2006) (prisoner’s letter to administrator alerting him to constitutional violation sufficient to 

generate genuine issue of material fact as to whether administrator was aware of violation). 

The defendants’ denial of Shaheed's grievances regarding Reyes’ treatment cannot 

constitute deliberate indifference because, as discussed above, her one-time temporary denial of 

surgery was not constitutionally deficient. Furthermore, the first level response to Shaheed’s 602 

grievance shows that De La Cruz, a named defendant, merely interviewed Shaheed about his claim 

against Reyes and presented an accurate medical history of his ankle injury and Reyes’

interactions with Shaheed. The reviewer encouraged Shaheed “to discuss your medical issues at 

your next follow up visit.” Opp, Ex. I. Podolsky, another named defendant, signed the decision. 

The decision did not misrepresent Shaheed’s medical history or the result of Shaheed’s 

visit with Reyes. Based on Shaheed’s medical record, it appeared that his surgery would be 

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approved if he agreed to postoperative housing in the OHU. Reyes’ assumption, if mistaken, that 

Shaheed had not agreed to stay in the OHU after surgery could have been remedied by Shaheed

communicating to her or to another primary care provider that, if medically necessary, he would

stay in the OHU after surgery. 

Shaheed has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that that either De La Cruz,

Podolsky or the other defendants who reviewed and denied Shaheed’s further appeals of Reyes’ 

decision was aware that Shaheed’s need for surgery would not be met. 

Accordingly, summary judgment is granted to all defendants on this claim.

III. Motion for Emergency Injunctive Relief

Shaheed moves for an order requiring Dr. Beatty, Shaheed’s current primary care provider, 

to renew a lower bunk bed and lower tier accommodation for Shaheed’s injured ankle. Shaheed

alleges that Dr. Beatty refused to issue the accommodation in retaliation for his filing this lawsuit.

To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show: (1) a likelihood of 

success on the merits; (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm to the moving party in the absence of 

preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in the moving party’s favor; and (4) that an 

injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 

(2008). The moving party bears the burden of meeting all prongs of the Winter test. Alliance for 

the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). The decision of whether to 

grant or deny a preliminary injunction is a matter of the district court’s discretion. Grand Canyon 

Skywalk Devel., LLC v. ‘Sa’ Nyu Wa Inc., 715 F.3d 1196, 1200 n.1 (9th Cir. 2013).

Because Shaheed has not succeeded on the merits of his claim, the motion for injunctive 

relief is denied. The motion is also denied because Dr. Beatty is not a defendant in this lawsuit 

and a retaliation claim was not asserted in this lawsuit. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted. Dkt. No. 37.

2. The claims against CCHCS and Millimond are dismissed. 

3. Shaheed’s motion for emergency injunctive relief is denied. Dkt. No. 48.

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4. The Clerk of the Court shall enter a separate judgment, terminate all pending motions 

and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 15, 2015

______________________________________

VINCE CHHABRIA

United States District Judge

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KARRIEM B. SHAHEED,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONAL 

HEALTH CARE SERVICES, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 13-cv-05751-VC 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on June 15, 2015, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing 

said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by 

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery 

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Karriem B. Shaheed ID: H-65017

San Quentin State Prison 1 West Block 67 Low

San Quentin, CA 94974 

Dated: June 15, 2015

Richard W. Wieking

Clerk, United States District Court

By:________________________

Kristen Melen, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable VINCE CHHABRIA

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