Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-02078/USCOURTS-cand-3_12-cv-02078-25/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL HOA,

Plaintiff,

v.

RICHARD RILEY, et al.,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

No. C-12-2078 EMC

ORDER GRANTING CROSSDEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

(Docket No. 146)

David F. Lopez, T. Gregory Stagnito, Bridge Transport, and Stag Leasing Inc. (collectively

“Cross-Defendants”) have moved to dismiss Richard Riley, Raymond Matteucci, David Moore,

Ronald Chan, Tammy Foss, Thomas Alioto, and George Moon’s (collectively “Cross-Claimants”)

cross-complaint for equitable indemnity, contribution and declaratory relief. Cross-Claimants

sought equitable indemnity and contribution from Cross-Defendants in the event they are held liable

to Plaintiff Paul Hoa for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Cross-Defendants argue that there is no

federal right to indemnification or contribution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and thus Cross-Claimants

have failed to state a claim under federal law. Cross-Defendants further contend that

Cross-Claimants cannot bring claims for equitable indemnity or contribution under state law. The

Court GRANTS Cross-Defendants’ motion to dismiss, because Cross-Claimants may not seek

indemnity and contribution under Section 1983, and any such rights under state law would be

inconsistent with the goals of Section 1983. 

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I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

For purposes of resolving the present motion, the Court assumes certain facts in the

Complaint, which are incorporated by reference into the Cross-Complaint, to be true. See Docket

No. 138 at ¶ 5. On July 27, 2011, a truck carrying food supplies to San Quentin State Prison

(“Prison”) and driven by Cross-Defendant Lopez, injured the Plaintiff, Paul Hoa, a prisoner who

assisted commercial vehicles coming into the Prison as part of the Prison work program. The truck

trapped and crushed Mr. Hoa as it backed up a loading ramp. The Cross-Claimants are employed by

the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and, for the most part, either directly or

indirectly supervised Plaintiff’s work, work area, and/or working conditions. Docket No. 109

(“TAC”) at ¶¶ 32-47. 

Plaintiff sued Cross-Defendants, alleging claims relating to their ownership or operation of

the truck involved in the incident. Cross-Defendant Lopez was an employee of Cross-Defendant

Stagnito and drove the trailer truck that backed into the Plaintiff. TAC at ¶ 48. Cross-Defendant

Stagnito is an individual doing business under the name Bridge Transport. Id. at ¶ 49. Mr. Hoa

named Cross-Defendants Stag Leasing and Bridge Transport based on Mr. Hoa’s belief that they are

shell corporations of Cross-Defendant Stagnito. Id. at ¶ 52.

Plaintiff sued the Cross-Claimants (the prison supervisors), alleging that they are liable under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for (1) deliberate indifference and (2) cruel and unusual punishment in violation of

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. Plaintiff’s claims against the Cross-Claimants arise from the

alleged unsafe procedures, failure to train, and hazardous work area in the warehouse, along with

related violations of the CDCR’s Department’s Operating Manual. As to the Cross-Defendants (the

truck owners or operators) Plaintiff has alleged state tort claims of (1) negligence, (2) negligent

supervision, and (3) negligent training. Plaintiff has alleged that Cross-Claimants and CrossDefendants are jointly and severally liable for his injuries. TAC at ¶ 54. 

In June of 2014, Cross-Claimants filed a cross-complaint for equitable indemnification,

contribution, and declaratory relief against Cross-Defendants. Docket No. 138. Cross-Claimants’

declaratory relief claim seeks a judicial declaration that Cross-Defendants are obligated to indemnify

Cross-Claimants or contribute to a judgment against Cross-Claimants. Cross-Claimants argue that,

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1

 Cross-Defendants’ request for judicial notice of a Notice of Lien served by California State

Compensation Insurance Fund is granted. “The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject

to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial

jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot

reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). In this case, the Notice of Lien was served on all

parties in this action. Moreover the request for judicial notice is unopposed and no party questions

the document’s accuracy.

3

if they are ultimately found liable, their liability only arose by reason of Cross-Defendants’ active

and primary negligence. Docket No. 138 at ¶¶ 9, 13.

The State Compensation Insurance Fund served a notice of lien (“Notice of Lien”) on the

parties in this action on October 31, 2012, which reflected that just under $900,000 in workers’

compensation benefits had been provided to Mr. Hoa as of the date of the Notice of Lien.1 After the

hearing on the instant motion, the State Compensation Insurance Fund filed an updated Notice of

Lien, which is a part of the case file. The updated Notice of Lien shows that, as of September 18,

2014, the State Compensation Insurance Fund provided approximately $2.1 million in workers’

compensation benefits to Plaintiff. Docket No. 154. 

Cross-Defendants filed this motion to dismiss on August 4, 2014, arguing that, as a matter of

law, (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not permit claims for indemnification and/or contribution and (2) any

state law claims for indemnification or contribution are precluded by the California Workers

Compensation Act. See Docket No. 146. Cross-Defendants further raised, and the Court received

supplemental briefing on, the issue of whether federal law precludes the cross-claims.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a pleading

based on a failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A motion to dismiss based on

Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged. See Parks v. Sch. Of Bus.

Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). “A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law

for one of two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts under a

cognizable legal claim.” Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984)

(citation omitted). In considering such a motion, a court must take all allegations of material fact

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and construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, although “conclusory

allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.” 

Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). While “a complaint need not contain

detailed factual allegations . . . it must plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Id. (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 556 (2007). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability

requirement,’ but it asks for more than sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

A right to contribution among joint tortfeasors did not exist at common law. Nw. Airlines,

Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 451 U.S. 77, 86 (1981). Most states have allowed

a right to contribution either by statute or judicial decision. Id. However, “federal courts, unlike

their state counterparts, are courts of limited jurisdiction that have not been vested with open-ended

lawmaking powers.” Id. at 95. A federal right to contribution can therefore arise in only two ways: 

“first, through the affirmative creation of a right of action by Congress, either expressly or by clear

implication; or, second, through the power of federal courts to fashion a federal common law of

contribution.” Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 638 (1981). The latter

route is limited: there is no federal general common law, and the instances where courts have

fashioned federal common law “are few and restricted.” Id. (citing Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S.

647, 651 (1963)). Federal common law arises in two categories: (1) where a federal rule of decision

is “necessary to protect uniquely federal interests,” and (2) where Congress has empowered courts to

develop substantive law. Id. (citations omitted). 

Although Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries addressed the right to contribution,

indemnity and contribution are closely related; in a sense, “indemnity is only an extreme form of

contribution.” Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 1951). Thus, the analytical

framework for determining the right of contribution has been extended to the right of indemnity. 

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Mortgages, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Nev. (Las Vegas), 934 F.2d 209, 212 n.3 (9th Cir.

1991). 

The Ninth Circuit has concluded that ‘[t]here is no federal right to indemnification provided

in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Allen v. City of Los Angeles, 92 F.3d 842, 845 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996) overruled

on other grounds Acri v. Varian Ass’ns, Inc., 114 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 1997). Allen arose from a

Section 1983 lawsuit that Rodney King filed against the City of Los Angeles and city police officers

regarding certain officers’ use of unreasonable force. The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by

holding that there was no right to indemnification under Section 1983. Allen cited with approval

Banks v. City of Emeryville, 109 F.R.D. 535 (N.D. Cal 1985). Banks involved similar claims to the

claims at issue here. In Banks, the plaintiffs’ decedent burned to death while in the custody of the

city jail. 109 F.R.D. at 537. Ms. Banks’s body was found on a mattress that had disintegrated in the

fire. Plaintiffs brought an action against the city under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The city filed a

third-party complaint against parties involved in the manufacture, distribution, or sale of the

mattress, alleging that the mattress was defective. Id. at 537-38. The city sought indemnification or

contribution. Id. Banks held that Section 1983 does not provide for indemnification. Id. Noting the

absence of clear authority on the issue, Banks reasoned that “[t]he Supreme Court made it clear that

courts are not free to read a cause of action for indemnity into statutes where no statutory basis

exists for such a claim.” Id. (discussing Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. 77). Where there was “no

provision of § 1983, nor any legislative history, to support [third-party plaintiff’s] assertion that §

1983 provides for a right of contribution or indemnity,” then “any claims for indemnification against

third-party defendants based directly upon § 1983 are impermissible.” Banks, 109 F.R.D. at 539. 

Other district courts in the Ninth Circuit, following Allen and Banks, have likewise

concluded there is no right of contribution or indemnification under Section 1983. See Anselmo v.

Mull, No. 2:12-1422 WBS, 2012 WL 4863661, at *8 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Allen and concluding

Section 1983 does not provide for a federal right to contribution or indemnity); AE v. Portillo, No.

09-2204 LJO, 2011 WL 3740829, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2011) (“any claims for indemnification

against the third party defendants based directly upon § 1983 are impermissible”); DeGroff v. Las

Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, No. 2:11-CV-02007-KJD, 2013 WL 1405848, at *2 (D. Nev. Apr. 5,

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2 Miller was decided two days after Northwest Airlines and around one month before Texas

Industries. 

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2013) (“The Ninth Circuit has unequivocally held that there is no federal right to indemnification

provided in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (citation omitted)). Courts in other jurisdictions have reached the

same conclusion. See Katka v. Mills, 422 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1308-09 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (noting “most

cases decided since Northwest Airlines have held that there is no right to contribution under § 1983”

and collecting cases).

Cross-Claimants urge the Court to reject the cases from the Ninth Circuit, including Allen. 

Docket No. 151 at 3. They argue that “Allen does not discuss this issue in any depth” and contend

that therefore the Court should rely on Miller v. Apartments & Homes of New Jersey, Inc., 646 F.2d

101 (3d Cir. 1981), and its progeny. Miller found a right of contribution as a matter of federal

common law. Miller, 646 F.2d at 108. However, while the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Allen on this

issue was brief, its holding is binding in this Court. Moreover, Miller has been called into question

by numerous courts, because it was decided without the guidance of Northwest Airlines and Texas

Industries.

2

 See Bank v. City of Philadelphia, 991 F. Supp. 2d 523, 538 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (noting

district courts have questioned Miller’s precedential value, “[b]ecause Miller relied on Glus, and

Glus was subsequently vacated.”); see also Kohn v. Sch. Dist. of City of Harrisburg, No.

1:11-CV-109, 2012 WL 3560822, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2012) (concluding that “Miller does not

survive Texas Industries,” which implicitly overruled Miller); Diaz-Ferrante v. Rendell, No.

95-5430, 1998 WL 195683, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 1998) (“Shortly after Miller was decided, the

United States Supreme Court held that other federal laws did not implicitly create a federal right to

contribution[;] . . . the viability of a contribution claim in a § 1983 action is thus dubious.”). 

Under current Ninth Circuit law, there is no right of indemnification under Section 1983. 

This Court, in line with other district courts, finds that Section 1983 also does not provide the related

right of contribution. Section 1983 has not created such rights expressly or by implication, and no

right of contribution or right of indemnification arises under the “few and restricted” areas of federal

common law.

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C. 42 U.S.C. § 1988

Cross-Claimants also argue that under Section 1988 this Court should look to state law to

determine whether a state law right of indemnification or contribution may be recognized under

Section 1983. Section 1988 provides that where federal law is 

deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable

remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law,

as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of

the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil

or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not

inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United

States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the

trial and disposition of the cause . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1988(a). The purpose of Section 1988 is “to complement the various acts which do

create federal causes of action for the violation of federal civil rights.” Moor v. Alameda Cnty., 411

U.S. 693, 702 (1973). In this way, Section 1988 “recognizes that in certain areas ‘federal law is

unsuited or insufficient “to furnish suitable remedies”’; federal law simply does not ‘cover every

issue that may arise in the context of a federal civil rights action.’” Robertson v. Wegmann, 436

U.S. 584, 588 (1978) (citing Moor, 411 U.S. at 703). In other words, “the ultimate rule adopted

under § 1988 is a federal rule responsive to the need whenever a federal right is impaired.” Id.

(citation omitted). Analysis of whether a state law applies through Section 1988 requires

consideration of Section 1983’s policies. Id. at 590-92. Those policies include “compensation of

persons injured by deprivation of federal rights and prevention of abuses of power by those acting

under color of state law.” Id. at 590-91.

In Robertson, the Supreme Court applied Section 1988 to conclude that a Section 1983

action abated under the survival laws of Louisiana. Robertson, 436 U.S. at 590-91. Robertson,

however, cautioned that the decision should be read narrowly and was “limited to situations in

which no claim is made that state law generally is inhospitable to survival of § 1983 actions and in

which the particular application of state survivorship law, while it may cause abatement of the

action, has no independent adverse effect on the policies underlying § 1983.” Id. at 594.

Some courts have interpreted Section 1988 as requiring application of state law on

contribution. For example, the court in Kohn, which rejected Miller and concluded there is no

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statutory right of contribution, determined that Section 1988 permitted borrowing Pennsylvania law

on contribution. Kohn, 2012 WL 3560822, at *5. In Kohn, Pennsylvania’s Uniform Contribution

Among Joint Tortfeasors Act allowed contribution between joint tortfeasors; the court therefore

allowed those claims to proceed pursuant to Section 1988. Id. 

On the other hand, other courts have concluded that Section 1988 does not permit borrowing

state law on contribution, because doing so “would conflict with the policies underlying § 1983.” 

Hurley v. Horizon Project, Inc., No. CV 08-2009-1365, 2009 WL 5511205, at *5 (D. Or. Dec. 3,

2009). The conflict would arise, because a right of contribution would not serve Section 1983’s

policies of compensation and deterrence. Id. As a result, “permitting a right to contribution in this

context may weaken one of the primary purposes of Section 1983.” Crews v. Cnty. of Nassau, 612

F. Supp. 2d 199, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); see Mason v. City of New York, 949 F. Supp. 1068, 1079

(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Permitting a right to contribution [by borrowing from New York law under

Section 1988], however, would weaken Section 1983’s deterrent value.”); Koch v. Mirza, 869 F.

Supp. 1031, 1041 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (“[C]ommon law or statutory indemnity and contribution

principles serve different interests than the constitutional values sought to be vindicated in a § 1983

action.”).

In Moor, the Supreme Court concluded that Section 1988 did not authorize the application of

the California Tort Claims Act under which a county could be held vicariously liable for the acts of

its deputies and sheriff, to Section 1983. Moor, 411 U.S. at 709-10. Moor explained that Section

1988 did not “authorize the wholesale importation into federal law of state causes of action—not

even one purportedly designed for the protection of federal civil rights.” Id. at 703-04. Section

1988 prescribes what law to apply to federal civil rights claims; it does not “authorize the federal

courts to borrow entire causes of action from state law.” Id. at 701-04. State law could not be used

to assert vicarious liability against a county in light of Congress’s deliberate refusal to impose such

liability. Id. at 709-10.

For the reasons stated above, interpreting Section 1988 as importing a state law right to

contribution or indemnification into Section 1983 would conflict with the policies underlying

Section 1983 and contravene the guidance in Moor. See Hurley, 2009 WL 5511205, at *5 n.6

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(citing Moor, 411 U.S. at 703-04; Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation: Claims and

Defenses § 16.15[C] at 16–250 (4th ed. 2003)). “[T]he Ninth Circuit has never found that [Section

1988] provides a right to seek contribution.” De Groff, 2013 WL 1405848, at *3. Absent a contrary

directive from the Ninth Circuit, this Court finds the decision in Hurley, Crews, Mason, and Koch

persuasive. 

This Court concludes that Section 1988 does not permit borrowing state law on contribution

or indemnification.

D. State Law

In this case, the parties do not dispute that the applicable state law provides a right of

contribution or indemnification. Under California law, “[i]ndemnity either imposes the entire loss

on one of two or more tortfeasors or apportions it on the basis of comparative fault.” Coca-Cola

Bottling Co. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 11 Cal. App. 4th 1372, 1378 (1992). “[A] defendant may pursue a

comparative equitable indemnity claim against other tortfeasors either (1) by filing a

cross-complaint in the original tort action or (2) by filing a separate indemnity action after paying

more than its proportionate share of the damages through the satisfaction of a judgment or through a

payment in settlement.” Henry v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 4th 440, 449 (2008) (citation

omitted). Alternatively, where there is no right of indemnity, and “[w]here a money judgment has

been rendered jointly against two or more defendants in a tort action there shall be a right of

contribution among them.” Cal. CCP § 875; see also Cal. Civ. C. § 1432 (“Except as provided in

Section 877 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a party to a joint, or joint and several obligation, who

satisfies more than his share of the claim against all, may require a proportionate contribution from

all the parties joined with him.”). Such right of contribution “shall be administered in accordance

with the principles of equity.” Id. A defendant cannot recover under a theory of both

indemnification and contribution; where there is a right of indemnity, there is no right of

contribution. Coca-Cola, 11 Cal. App. 4th at 1378; see also Cal. CCP § 875(f). 

The parties disagree regarding (1) whether California’s Workers Compensation Act

precludes the cross-claims; and (2) whether state law may provide any right of contribution or

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indemnity or whether such right would conflict with the purposes of Section 1983 and thus be preempted. 

1. The Workers Compensation Act

In their briefs, Cross-Defendants argue that, unlike the cross-claimants in Banks, in this case,

Cross-Claimants are precluded from bringing claims against Cross-Defendants due to the California

Workers Compensation Act (“the Act”). Under California Law, Mr. Hoa was covered by the Act. 

See Cal. Lab. C. § 3370 (“Each inmate of a state penal or correctional institution shall be entitled to

workers’ compensation benefits provided by this division for injury arising out of and in the course

of assigned employment. . . .”). The incident leading to Mr. Hoa’s injuries was within the scope of

the Act, because Mr. Hoa was “performing service growing out of and incidental to his . . .

employment and [was] acting within the course of his employment.” Cal. Lab. C. § 3600. 

Cross-Defendants argue that the Act provides the exclusive remedies for all work-related injuries,

and therefore bars the cross-claims of the Cross-Claimant co-employees. 

The Act reflects a “compensation bargain” between an employer and her employee. Privette

v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 4th 689, 697 (1993), as modified on denial of reh’g (Sept. 16, 1993). 

Broadly speaking the terms of the bargain are as follows:

The employer assumes liability for industrial personal injury

or death without regard to fault in exchange for limitations in

the amount of that liability. The employee is afforded

relatively swift and certain payment of benefits to cure or

relieve the effects of industrial injury without having to

prove fault but, in exchange, gives up the wider range of

damages potentially available in tort. 

Id. (citations omitted). “By this means society as a whole is relieved of the burden of caring for the

injured workman and his family, and the burden is placed upon the industry.” Moyer v. Workmen’s

Comp. Appeals Bd., 10 Cal. 3d 222, 233 (1973). To effect this compensation bargain, “when the

conditions of compensation exist, recovery under the workers’ compensation scheme is the

exclusive remedy against an employer for injury or death of an employee.” Privette, 5 Cal. 4th at

697 (citation omitted). This exclusivity rule safeguards the compensation bargain by limiting the

liability as to the employer. Id. Correspondingly, California Labor Code Section 3600(a) provides:

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Liability for the compensation provided by this division, in lieu of any

other liability whatsoever to any person except as otherwise

specifically provided in Sections 3602, 3706, and 4558, shall without

regard to negligence, exist against an employer for any injury

sustained by his or her employees arising out of and in the course of

employment and for the death of any employee if the injury

proximately causes death . . . .

Id. (emphasis added). Thus, for example, if a third party pays damages for a covered employee’s

injuries, “the Act’s limitations on employer liability preclude the third party from obtaining

equitable indemnity from the employer.” Privette, 5 Cal. 4th at 698; see also Cal. Lab. C. § 3864

(“[T]he employer shall have no liability to reimburse or hold such third person harmless on such

judgment or settlement in absence of a written agreement so to do executed prior to the injury.”). To

permit otherwise would circumvent the limit on employer liability and threaten the bargain

embodied in the Act. 

Nevertheless, the exclusivity rule is not absolute, even as to the employer. The “workers’

compensation exclusivity rule does not apply to an injury resulting from conduct in violation of a

fundamental public policy.” Singh v. Southland Stone, U.S.A., Inc., 186 Cal. App. 4th 338, 368,

(2010). In other words, where claims implicate fundamental public policy considerations, they are

“not preempted by the Workers’ Compensation Act.” Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396,

1405 (9th Cir. 1994), as amended (Nov. 22, 1994) (discussing retaliation claims). In general, a

“public policy is fundamental if it has a basis in constitutional or statutory provisions,” such as

public policy prohibiting an employer’s retaliation for an employee’s participation in the

investigation of discriminatory practices. Id. This is so, because actions in violation of public

policy “cannot under any reasonable viewpoint be considered a normal part of the employment

relationship.” Huffman v. Interstate Brands Companies, 121 Cal. App. 4th 679, 695 (2004) (citation

omitted).

a. Third-Party Tortfeasors

Nor does the exclusivity rule “preclude the employee from suing anyone else [i.e., other than

the employer] whose conduct was a proximate cause of the injury.” Privette, 5 Cal. 4th at 697

(1993). Under the Act, an employee’s claim for compensation as to his or her employer does not

affect his right to sue “any person other than the employer” for damages proximately resulting from

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 The general principles of comparative liability and apportionment were modified by the

California electorate by Proposition 51. “Proposition 51 retains the joint liability of all tortfeasors,

regardless of their respective shares of fault, with respect to all objectively provable expenses and

monetary losses, but the more intangible and subjective categories of damage are limited to a rule of

strict proportionate liability.” Henry, 160 Cal. App. 4th at 450. Thus, “[i]n any action for personal

injury, property damage, or wrongful death, based upon principles of comparative fault, the liability

of each defendant for non-economic damages shall be several only and shall not be joint.” Cal. Civ.

C. § 1431.2(a).

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his injury or death. Cal. Lab. C. § 3852. In other words, “a plaintiff who recovers workers’

compensation from an employer can pursue common law tort actions against third parties for

independent acts of negligence.” Waste Mgmt. Inc. v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 4th 105, 109

(2004). Under this rule, a plaintiff may even sue “the parent company of the plaintiff’s employer, as

long as there are independent acts of negligence.” Id. at 110. 

Nevertheless, the injured employee should not receive a double recovery, i.e., one recovery

from the employer and one from a negligent third-party tortfeasor. Among other things, principles

of comparative negligence guide apportionment of liability between the employer and a third-party

tortfeasor.3

 See Associated Constr. & Eng’g Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 22 Cal. 3d 829,

846-47 (1978). If the employer is concurrently negligent, the third-party tortfeasor can seek set-off

from the compensation benefits paid. See Roe v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., 12 Cal. 3d 884,

889 (1974), holding modified on other grounds by Associated Constr. (“[T]he inhibition against

double recovery is designed to allow the third party a [p]ro tanto reduction of a liability which he

shares with a concurrently negligent employer.”). Correspondingly, an employer who pays out

benefits may bring a cause of action against a third-party tortfeasor to recover compensation

payments as well as other emoluments paid, such as salary and wages. Cal. Lab. C. § 3852. 

Consistent with application of comparative fault, the employer can recover such compensation

payments from the third-party tortfeasor “only to the extent the employer’s liability in workers’

compensation exceeds its share of responsibility for the employee’s full tort damages.” Associated

Constr., 22 Cal. 3d at 847. 

b. Co-Employee Liability

To prevent backdoor circumvention of the exclusivity provisions in the Act, in 1959, the

California Legislature enacted California Labor Code Section 3601, which provides immunity to coCase 3:12-cv-02078-EMC Document 162 Filed 01/26/15 Page 12 of 20
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4

 Consistent with these principles, the Cross-Claimant co-employee prison supervisors do not

challenge Mr. Hoa’s right to bring a cause of action against them. Indeed, the Cross-Claimants seek

contribution and indemnity from the Cross-Defendants only in the event the Cross-Claimants are

found liable. See Docket No. 138 at ¶¶ 8, 9, 13, 16. 

5

 For this reason the Court also rejects the separate argument, alluded to briefly in CrossDefendants’ reply, that it would be inequitable to permit recovery under the Cross-Complaint,

because Cross-Claimants would profit at the expense of Cross-Defendants. The case cited by CrossDefendants involved a claim for indemnity where the settlement by the party seeking indemnity was

paid by an insurance carrier. Here, the Cross-Defendants have not shown that any settlement or

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employees and “severely limit[ed] a preexisting right to freely sue a fellow employee for damages.” 

Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Serv., Inc., 26 Cal. 4th 995, 1002 (2001). Co-employee immunity was

deemed necessary, because if injured employees were able to sue their co-employees for actions

those co-employees took in the scope of their employment, the application of respondeat superior

could expose the employer to liability, undermining the exclusivity provisions of the Act. Id. Thus,

“a co[-]employee is immune from suit to the extent necessary to prevent an end-run against the

employer under the exclusivity rule.” Id. This immunity, however, only extends to co-employees

“acting within the scope of employment,” reflecting the intent to extend such immunity only to

“respondeat superior situations.” Id. Consequently, there are statutory exceptions that permit a

civil suit against a co-employee where an “employee proximately causes another employee’s injury

or death by a willful and unprovoked physical act of aggression or by intoxication.” Id. (citing Cal.

Lab. C. § 3601, subds. (a)(1); (a)(2)). 

In this case, Mr. Hoa’s claims against his “co-employee” prison supervisors are not

precluded by the Act, because he sued his co-employees under Section 1983. “[T]o the extent

workers’ compensation precludes recovery for other causes of action, it does not preclude recovery

for claims involving ‘substantive rather than procedural constitutional rights.’” Jensen v. City of

Oxnard, 145 F.3d 1078, 1084 n.3 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Smith v. Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1419-20

(9th Cir. 1987)). As discussed, supra, substantive constitutional rights implicate fundamental public

policy. Violations of such rights fall outside the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule. The

Section 1983 claims that Mr. Hoa has brought against Cross-Claimants involve such substantive

constitutional rights. Jensen, 145 F.3d at 1084 n.3. Thus, the Act does not preempt Mr. Hoa’s

Section 1983 claims4

 and does not provide the co-employee prison supervisors with immunity. Id.5 

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judgment was paid or would be paid by an insurance carrier as to the Section 1983 claims alleged

against Cross-Claimants. Cf. Miller v. Ellis, 103 Cal. App. 4th 373, 382 (2002) (determining that

permitting a cotortfeasor who paid nothing in settlement “to obtain ‘reimbursement’ from [another]

for sums he never paid himself would result in unjust enrichment.”).

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c. No Workers Compensation Preclusion

What is not at issue in this case is any claim Mr. Hoa may have against his employer – either

direct or indirect. The CDCR and Prison were dismissed as defendants. See Docket No. 29. This

matters, because the Act and the cases that Cross-Defendants cite concern limitation on the liability

of an employer. See State v. Superior Court (Glovsky), 60 Cal. App. 4th 659 (1997); E.B. Wills Co.

v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. App. 3d 650 (1976). The Act demands fixed liability as to the employer,

because the defined liability of the employer is a core term of the Act’s compensation bargain. See

Schlick v. Comco Mgmt., Inc., 196 Cal. App. 3d 974, 978 (Ct. App. 1987) (“The workers

compensation system imposes upon the employer the responsibility to pay benefits without regard to

fault; at the same time, the employer is assured of a fixed and ascertainable liability and relieved of

the prospect of large damage verdicts.” (citation omitted)). But those cases are inapposite here. 

The trucking-related Cross-Defendants cannot rely on the Act for dismissal of the

cross-claims brought against them by the Section 1983 Defendants (i.e., Cross-Claimants). The

cross-claims are not precluded by the Act because those claims do not upset or circumvent the

compensation bargain struck between Mr. Hoa and his employer for several reasons. First, Mr.

Hoa’s underlying claims against the Cross-Claimant prison supervisors are not barred by the Act; as

discussed above, constitutional claims under Section 1983 are not barred by workers compensation. 

Jensen, 145 F.3d at 1084 n.3. Hence, the underlying claims on which the cross-claims are

predicated are outside the Act. Second, Cross-Defendants are not a party to the compensation

bargain. The Act specifically allows suits against third parties such as third-party tortfeasors. Cal.

Lab. C. § 3852. Suing third-party tortfeasors such as Cross-Defendants does not threaten to

undermine the prescribed and limited liability of the employer under the Act, especially where the

underlying claims are outside the Act. Nor do the respective claims and cross-claims of Mr. Hoa

and Cross-Claimants against Cross-Defendants offend any prohibition on double-recovery;

principles of comparative negligence and equity will govern any set-off between workers’

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compensation benefits paid by the employer’s insurer and any judgment against Cross-Defendants. 

See Associated Constr., 22 Cal. 3d at 846-47. 

Thus, Cross-Claimants’ cross-claims for contribution or indemnity are not barred by the Act. 

The Act does not limit the liability of Cross-Claimants or Cross-Defendants in this case. See

Coca-Cola, 11 Cal. App. 4th at 1378; Cal. Civ. Proc. C. § 875; cf. Mize v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.

Co., 46 Cal. App. 3d 436 (1975) (concluding that where workers’ compensation is not the exclusive

remedy and judgment is rendered against two joint tortfeasors, one of which was the employer,

contribution is allowed).

2. Applicability of State Law

At oral argument Cross-Defendants raised an argument not presented in their papers. In 

Mortgages, 934 F.2d 209, the Ninth Circuit held that where neither the False Claims Act (“FCA”)

nor federal common law provided a right to indemnity or contribution, there was no right to assert

state counterclaims that, if successful, would effectively provide a backdoor right to indemnity or

contribution under the FCA. Id. at 213. Cross-Defendants argue that, applying Mortgages, state law

should not allow a right to indemnity or contribution where Section 1988 has been interpreted as not

authorizing such a right under federal law. In effect, for the reasons why Section 1988 does not

authorize a right of contribution or indemnification – such a right undermines the policy of Section

1983 – state law claims should be preempted. 

Because Cross-Defendants’ argument regarding preemption was raised for the first time at

oral argument, the Court ordered supplemental briefing to allow the parties to develop their positions

more fully. See Docket No. 155. The Court has considered the parties’ arguments and supplemental

briefing and concludes that importing state law of indemnification and contribution would be

impermissible under Section 1988 and inconsistent with the purposes of Section 1983; the state law

right to contribution or indemnification is thus preempted by Section 1983. 

First, Section 1988 prescribes when a state law may be imported into a Section 1983. Nw.

Airlines, 451 U.S. at 97 n.38; see also Mortgages, 934 F.2d at 212. Whether such state law applies

in a case where Section 1983 supplies the rule of decision is solely a federal question, and that

question here is governed by Section 1988 and not by, e.g., state statutory or common law. Cf.

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Anderson v. Local Union No. 3, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 582 F. Supp. 627, 629 (S.D.N.Y.) aff’d

sub nom. Anderson v. Local Union No. 3, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO, 751 F.2d 546 (2d

Cir. 1984) (“The question of whether contribution and indemnity are available under [Title VII of]

the federal civil rights laws should be governed by federal law.”); Don King Prods./Kingvision v.

Ferreira, 950 F. Supp. 286, 288-89 (E.D. Cal. 1996), aff’d sub nom. Doherty v. Wireless Broad. Sys.

of Sacramento, Inc., 151 F.3d 1129 (9th Cir. 1998) (analyzing right to indemnity as to Cable

Communications Policy Act of 1984 under federal law and right to indemnity as to claims against

cross-claimant for conversion and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage

under state law); Gilmore v. List & Clark Const. Co., 866 F. Supp. 1310, 1313 (D. Kan. 1994)

(“[S]tate law creating a right of indemnity or contribution is inapplicable where the defendant’s

liability, for which indemnity or contribution is sought, arises solely from Title VII.”); In re Olympia

Brewing Co. Sec. Litig., 674 F. Supp. 597, 608 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (analyzing availability of indemnity

and contribution for liability under federal securities law and RICO claims under federal law;

analyzing availability of indemnity and contribution as to damages paid out with respect to state law

claims under state law). As discussed above, Section 1988 does not allow for the importation of an

express or implied right of contribution or indemnification under state law into Section 1983 suits. 

As governing federal law, Section 1988 disposed of this issue. 

Second, even if the applicability of state law on contribution and indemnification were not

governed exclusively by Section 1988, such state law is subject to implied preemption under the

doctrine of obstacle preemption. There are three types of preemption: express, field, and conflict

preemption. See Air Conditioning & Refrigeration Inst. v. Energy Res. Conservation & Dev.

Comm’n, 410 F.3d 492, 495 (9th Cir. 2005). The different types of preemption are not rigidly

divided. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 n. 6 (2000). Conflict

preemption will apply, for example, to claims that range from where “it is impossible for a private

party to comply with both state and federal law” to where “under the circumstances of a particular

case, the challenged state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full

purposes and objectives of Congress.” Id. at 372-73 (citations omitted). Whether state law presents

such an obstacle is determined through “examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its

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purpose and intended effects.” Id. If the state law frustrates the operation of the federal act or

deprives the act’s provisions of their natural effect, “the state law must yield to the regulation of

Congress.” Id. at 373 (citations omitted).

For the reasons discussed above, the rights of contribution and indemnification conflict with

Section 1983’s goal of deterrence. “Counterclaims for indemnification or contribution by definition

only have the effect of offsetting liability.” U.S. ex rel. Madden v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 4 F.3d

827, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1993). It would not enhance compensation for the Section 1983 plaintiff and

instead would weaken Section 1983’s deterrent value. Hurley, 2009 WL 5511705 at *5; Mason, 949

F. Supp. at 1079. The instant case well illustrates how the right of contribution conflicts with the

policies of Section 1983. The Complaint herein alleges that Cross-Claimants were deliberately

indifferent to, among other things, unsafe conditions of confinement and the need for basic

precautions to avoid substantial risk of severe injury. Complaint ¶¶ 165-221. Allowing a right of

contribution or indemnification in a case like this would allow a deliberately indifferent defendant to

offset his liability by shifting it onto a merely negligent tortfeasor. The possibility of such liabilityshifting conflicts with the aim of deterrence. See Hepburn, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 759. Moreover,

indemnification and contribution claims arise out of equitable considerations. See Nw. Airlines, 451

U.S. at 88; see also Cal. CCP § 875; Am. Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 584 (1978). In a Section 1983

case like this one, those equitable concerns are diminished, because the “level of culpability

necessary for § 1983 liability reduces the need to equitably distribute damages among tortfeasors.” 

Hepburn, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 759. As the Supreme Court has commented, “partial immunities

inconsistent with § 1983 must yield to the federal right.” Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 142 (1988).

Cross-Claimants correctly argue that a state law contribution or indemnity claim is not

inconsistent with Section 1983’s goal of compensation, because the rule against double recovery of

damages prohibits a plaintiff from recovering more than his actual losses. Docket No. 158 at 4-5

(discussing dicta in Sanders v. Cnty. of Santa Cruz, No. 5:13-CV-03205-EJD, 2014 WL 4773992, at

*8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2014)). In this case, however, Plaintiff alleges that Cross-Claimants and

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6

 In this case, Cross-Claimants’ and Cross-Defendants’ liability, if any, would be joint and

several, because the alleged injury is indivisible. The Cross-Complaint incorporates by reference

the Complaint’s allegation that the Defendants are liable on a joint and several basis. See Complaint

¶ 54. In turn, the Complaint alleges that the concurrent negligence of all Defendants caused Mr.

Hoa an indivisible injury. Hazle v. Crofoot, 727 F.3d 983, 995 (9th Cir. 2013) (injury “was clearly

indivisible” where the concurrent actions of all defendants were necessary cause the harm).

This is not the sort of case where one defendant broke the plaintiff’s arm and then an

hour later, in an unrelated incident, a second defendant broke the plaintiff’s leg. Here

the injuries were indivisible; all of the defendants, acting concurrently, [are alleged to

have] proximately caused [Mr. Hoa’s injuries]. Had any one of the defendants

exercised due care, none of the injuries would have occurred. Consequently, each

defendant is liable for all of the damages stemming from the collision.

Rudelson v. United States, 602 F.2d 1326, 1332 (9th Cir. 1979). The Cross-Claimants’ and CrossDefendants’ liability would be determined on a joint and several basis. Cross-Claimants do not

dispute that the harm at issue is a “single, indivisible injury.” See Docket No. 158, Supp. Brief at 5. 

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Cross-Defendants are liable to him on a joint and several basis. Joint and several liability6

 provides

a plaintiff flexibility to recover up to the full extent of his injuries against any concurrently culpable

defendant, which matters, if, for example, a defendant turns out to be “impecunious or otherwise

immune from suit.” Rudelson, 602 F.2d at 1332 (quoting Am. Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 587). The

amount of damages owed by each defendant to the plaintiff (or risk of double-recovery) is not

enhanced or reduced by the availability of a right to contribution or indemnification. 

The conclusion that state claims are preempted here is supported by the Ninth Circuit’s

decision in Mortgages. In Mortgages, a mortgage lending company accepted mortgage applications

for loans that were insured by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. The loans

defaulted, causing millions of dollars in losses to the insurer. After reaching a settlement with the

government, Mortgages, Inc. filed a complaint under the FCA on the basis of allegedly false and

misleading statements in the loan applications. The government proceeded with the action, and

Mortgages remained as qui tam plaintiff. The FCA defendants (the borrowers and related parties)

filed third-party complaints alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair

dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, negligence, negligent misrepresentation and conspiracy. 

Pursuant to each of their state law claims, the FCA defendants sought indemnification and/or

contribution from Mortgages against any recovery or judgment in favor of the United States. 934

F.2d at 211. Mortgages’s motion to dismiss the third-party complaints was denied. Mortgages filed

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a writ of mandamus after the denial of its motion to dismiss the third-party complaints. Id., n.1. The

Ninth Circuit granted Mortgages’s petition for mandamus, and remanded the case with instructions

that the district court vacate its order requiring Mortgages to answer the third-party complaints. 

The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by determining that the FCA does not include an express

or implied right to contribution or indemnification. Id. at 213. Mortgages reasoned that Congress

did not intend to create a right to contribution or indemnification under the FCA, because the “FCA

is in no way intended to ameliorate the liability of wrongdoers by providing defendants with a

remedy against a qui tam plaintiff with ‘unclean hands.’” Id. The Ninth Circuit also declined to

formulate a right of contribution or indemnification under federal common law in light of (1) the

express and comprehensive procedures and provisions for enforcement within the FCA and (2) the

lack of implication of federal interests. Id. Mortgages explained that such rights of action would

serve only private interests and would punish relators. Permitting contribution and indemnification

would discourage relators from bringing an action, impeding the purpose of the FCA. Id. The Ninth

Circuit went on to hold that “[b]ecause there is no basis in the FCA or federal common law to

provide a right to contribution or indemnity in a FCA action, we conclude that there can be no right

to assert state law counterclaims that, if prevailed on, would end in the same result.” Id. at 214. In

other words, the Ninth Circuit found that there was no right to assert state law counterclaims that, if

prevailed on, would effectively result in a right to contribution or indemnity in an FCA action,

impeding the purpose of the FCA. 

Although the case for preemption was particularly strong in Mortgages, because the thirdparty claim there would disincentivize the qui tam plaintiff and threaten to directly undermine the

FCA enforcement mechanism, rights of contribution and indemnification likewise conflict with

Section 1983’s policy and thus stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full

purpose and objectives of Congress. 

Cross-Claimants’ reliance on Banks which permitted state law claims is not persuasive. 

Banks was decided before Mortgages and does not consider or discuss whether rights of contribution

or indemnification are consistent with the goals of Section 1983. The Court declines to follow the

portion of Banks that concludes that a claim of contribution or indemnification based on a third

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party’s liability under state law constitutes a claim for indemnification “based on state law claims,

rather then on § 1983 directly.” Banks, 109 F.R.D. at 539 (permitting impleader of state law

claims); see also Sanders, 2014 WL 4773992, at *8 (relying on Banks).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Cross-Defendants’ motion to dismiss the cross claim is

GRANTED. The Cross-Claimants may not seek contribution or indemnity based on Section 1983. 

State law cross-claims for contribution or indemnity are not precluded by the exclusivity rule of the

Workers Compensation Act, but are precluded where, as here, federal law supplies the rule of

decision as to the Cross-Claimants and preempts such state claims. The motion to dismiss is

therefore GRANTED. 

This order disposes of Docket No. 146.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 26, 2015

_________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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