Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00750/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00750-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Louis Alfred Adams, Jr.,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et. al,

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-08-750-PHX-ROS (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

(docket # 1) Respondents have filed an Answer (docket # 11) to which Petitioner has not

replied and the deadline has passed. (see docket # 5) 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On October 28, 2004, the State of Arizona charged Petitioner, in case number CR

2004-130264-001, with one count of armed robbery, one count of theft of means on

transportation, one count of unlawful flight from a law enforcement vehicle, and one count

of possession or use of marijuana. (Respondents’ Exh. B) 

On November 15, 2004, the State of Arizona charged Petitioner, in case number CR

2004-048287-001, with one count of armed robbery and one count of attempted armed

robbery. (Respondents’ Exh. A) Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the cases were

subsequently consolidated. (Respondents’ Exh. E)

On December 15, 2004, the Maricopa County Superior Court permitted the Public

Defender’s Office to withdraw and appointed contract attorney, David Lockhart, to represent

Case 2:08-cv-00750-ROS Document 12 Filed 11/10/08 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The Honorable Jeffrey A. Hotham presided. 

- 2 -

Petitioner. (Respondents’ Exh. C, 12/15/04 minute entry) On May 23, 2005, the State court

denied Petitioner’s motion to dismiss counsel. That same day, the State court granted

Petitioner’s separate motion to proceed pro per, finding that Petitioner had “knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily waived counsel.” (Respondents’ Exh. D, 7/5/05 minute entry) 

The court appointed David Lockhart as advisory counsel to assist Petitioner. (Id.) 

On July 5, 2005, pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner pled guilty to the following

charges: Count 1, armed robbery; Count 2, attempted armed robbery; Count 3, armed

robbery; Count 4, theft of means of transportation; Count 5, unlawful flight from a law

enforcement vehicle; and Count 6, possession or use of marijuana. (Id.) The trial judge1

found that Petitioner knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently pled guilty. (Id.)

On August 5, 2005, the trial court imposed the following concurrent sentences: Count

1, armed robbery, 15 years; Count 2, attempted armed robbery, 7.5 years; Count 3 armed

robbery, 19 years; Count 4, theft of means of transportation, 3.5 years; Count 5, unlawful

flight from a law enforcement vehicle, 1.5 years; and Count 6, possession or use of

marijuana, 1 year. (Respondents’ Exh. F, 8/5/05 minute entry) The trial court also revoked

Petitioner’s probation in a different case, CR 2004-15348, and sentenced him to time served. 

(Respondents’ Exh. G, 8/5/05 minute entry)

A. Post-Conviction Proceeding

On September 7, 2005, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief pursuant to

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32. (Respondents’ Exh. H) The trial court appointed counsel who filed a

notice, advising the court he had reviewed the record and found no colorable claim for relief. 

(Respondents’ Exh. I) Petitioner filed a pro se petition for relief on May 12, 2006. 

(Respondents’ Exh. J) On December 20, 2006, the trial court summarily dismissed the 

petition finding that Petitioner had not raised any colorable claims. (Respondents’ Exh. K) 

The trial court specifically found Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

Case 2:08-cv-00750-ROS Document 12 Filed 11/10/08 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 3 -

lacked merit and noted that Petitioner failed to show either that counsel’s performance was

deficient or that counsel’s performance resulted in prejudice. (Respondents’ Exh. K) 

Petitioner did not seek appellate review of the trial court’s order of dismissal. (Respondents’

Exh. L) 

B. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 18, 2008, Petitioner filed the pending Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,

asserting that his constitutional rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments

were violated by ineffective of counsel in connection with his guilty plea and the trial

court’s denial of his motion to appoint alternative counsel. (docket # 1 at 7) Petitioner also

alleges that prison officials have failed to protect him from threats to his safety. (Id.) The

Court previously dismissed Petitioner’s allegations based on prison officials’ failure to

protect him as not cognizable in a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2254. 

(docket # 5) Accordingly, only Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is before

the Court. Respondents assert that the Petition is untimely. Respondents alternatively assert

that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted and lack merit. Petitioner has not filed a

reply.

II. Statute of Limitations

On April 24, 1996, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”)

went into effect drastically altering the time limit imposed on state prisoners filing habeas

corpus petitions in federal court. The AEDPA established a one-year period in which to file

a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Because

Petitioner filed his Petition after the effective date of the AEDPA, it governs this action. 

The statute of limitations is a threshold issue the Court must resolve before reaching other

procedural issues or the merits of Petitioner’s claims. White v. Klitzkie, 283 F.3d 920, 921-

22 (9th Cir. 2002).

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) provides, in pertinent part, that:

Case 2:08-cv-00750-ROS Document 12 Filed 11/10/08 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 provides: “Any person who pled guilty or no

contest . . . shall have the right to file a post-conviction relief proceeding, and this proceeding

shall be known as a Rule 32 of-right proceeding.” Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

- 4 -

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for

a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from

the latest of-

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Respondents assert that the Petition is time-barred. 

A. Application of § 2244(d)(1)(A) 

By pleading guilty, Petitioner waived his right to a direct appeal, but retained the

right to seek review in an “of-right” proceeding under Rule 32. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.2

 In

Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit considered whether

Arizona’s Rule 32 of-right proceeding is direct or collateral review under the ADEPA. 

Summers held that an “‘of-right proceeding,’available under Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32 to criminal defendants who plead guilty [or no contest], is a form of ‘direct

review’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).” Id. at 711. The Summers court

explained that “[b]ecause a Rule 32 of-right proceeding is a form of direct review, AEDPA’s

one-year statute of limitations does not begin to run until the conclusion of the Rule 32 ofright proceeding and review of that proceeding, or until the expiration of the time for

seeking such proceeding or review.” Id.

Pursuant to Summers, because Petitioner pled guilty, his conviction became final

upon “the conclusion of the Rule 32 of-right proceeding and review of that proceeding, or

the expiration of the time for seeking such proceeding or review.” Summers, 418 F.3d at

711. Here, Petitioner entered his plea and was sentenced on August 5, 2005. Pursuant to

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4, Petitioner had ninety days from the entry of judgment and sentence

within which to file a notice of Rule-32 review. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1, 32.4(a) stating that

Case 2:08-cv-00750-ROS Document 12 Filed 11/10/08 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 5 -

“[i]n a Rule 32 of-right proceeding the notice must be filed within ninety days after the entry

of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the final order or

mandate by the appellate court in the petitioner’s first petition for post-conviction relief

proceeding.”) 

Petitioner filed a notice of Rule 32 relief within the 90-day time period. The trial

court dismissed that proceeding on December 22, 2006 and Petitioner did not seek further

review. Because Petitioner did not seek appellate review within 30 days, his judgment

became final on the date the 30-day deadline for seeking appellate review expired, on

January 21, 2007. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.9(c); Summers, 481 F.3d at 711. 

Because Petitioner’s conviction became final on January 21, 2007, the AEPDA

limitations period commenced the following day, on January 22, 2007, and expired on

January 22, 2008. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitioner did not file his § 2254 Petition until

April 18, 2008. (docket # 1) Thus, absent tolling, Petitioner’s Petition is untimely.

B. Tolling the Limitations Period

1. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA one-year limitations period is tolled during the time that a “properly

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

Statutory tolling does not apply. Petitioner only filed a Rule 32 of-right proceeding

and did not file a subsequent petition for post-conviction relief. Because statutory tolling is

unavailable, the pending Petition should be dismissed as untimely unless equitable tolling

applies. 

2. Equitable Tolling

Respondents assert that equitable tolling is not available because that remedy “does

not survive” the Supreme Court’s decision in Bowles v. Russell,____U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct.

2360 (2007). (docket # 11 at 5-8) Respondents alternatively argue that, even if equitable

tolling is available, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. (docket # 11 at 8-10) 

Case 2:08-cv-00750-ROS Document 12 Filed 11/10/08 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 6 -

 Respondents argue that in view of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bowles v.

Russell, ___ U.S. ___ , 127 S.Ct. 2360 (2007), the AEDPA statute of limitations is

jurisdictional and not subject to equitable tolling. In Bowles, Supreme Court held that the

timely filing of an appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement. Id. at 2366. The

Bowles Court reasoned that because federal statutes set forth time limits on filing a notice of

appeal and reopening the appeal period, Congress intended to preclude a federal court from

exercising jurisdiction over otherwise legitimate cases after a ceratin period of time had

elapsed after final judgment. Id.

Similar to the federal statutes at issue in Bowles, the AEDPA establishes time limits

on when a petitioner may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C.§ 2244(d)(1). 

On two occasions, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari on the issue of whether these

limits are jurisdictional. See, David v. Hall, 540 U.S. 815 (2003); Flanders v. Graves, 537

U.S. 1236 (2003). The Supreme Court has noted that it has never squarely addressed

whether equitable tolling applies to the AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Lawrence v.

Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1079, 1085 (2007). Accordingly, whether the AEDPA is

subject to equitable tolling remains an open question. However, a recent decision in the

District of Arizona followed the Second Circuit in holding that Bowles does not apply to the

AEDPA. Hernandez v. Arpaio, CV-07-1712-PHX-DGC, 2008 WL 370900, * 2 (D.Ariz.,

Feb. 11, 2008) (citing Diaz v. Kelly, No. 1-2687-RR, 2008 WL 199846, * 3) (2d Cir., Jan.

25, 2008). Although this Court is inclined to follow Hernandez and hold that Bowles does

not apply to the AEDPA, the Court need not resolve that issue because even assuming

equitable tolling remains viable after Bowles, as Respondents alternatively argue, Petitioner

does not satisfy the requirements for such tolling. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that the AEDPA’s limitations period may be equitably

tolled because it is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional bar. Calderon v. United States

Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled, in part, on other grounds

by, Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Case 2:08-cv-00750-ROS Document 12 Filed 11/10/08 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 7 -

The Supreme Court has avoided deciding whether the AEDPA’s statute of limitations

may be equitably tolled. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). However,

because the parties in Pace argued that it could, the Court assumed that equitable tolling

applies and observed that a petitioner seeking equitable tolling must show: “(1) that he has

been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. 

Petitioner does not specifically assert any basis for equitable tolling. (docket # 1 at

6) However, he generally asserts that he lacks legal knowledge, legal assistance, and access

to a law library. (Id.) Petitioner’s lack of familiarity with the law and lack of legal

assistance do not constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to toll the limitations

period. Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of

equitable tolling because neither the district court’s failure to advise the petitioner of the

right to amend his petition to include unexhausted claims nor petitioner’s inability to

correctly calculate the limitations period were extraordinary circumstances warranting

equitable tolling); Ballesteros v. Schriro, CV-06-675-EHC (MEA), 2007 WL 666927

(D.Ariz., February 26, 2007) (noting that a petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law,

lack of representation during the applicable filing period, and temporary incapacity do not

constitute extraordinary circumstances) (citing Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 170, 714-15 (5th

Cir. 1999); Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that petitioner’s

misunderstanding of state’s “rules, statutes, and the time period set forth therein do not

justify equitable tolling.”). “[I]t is well established that ‘ignorance of the law, even for an

incarcerated pro se petitioner, generally does not excuse prompt filing.’” Marsh v. Soares,

223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (9th Cir.

1999)). See also, Hughes v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir.

1986) (finding that a pro se prisoner’s illiteracy was not sufficient to satisfy the standard of

an objective, external factor amounting to “cause” for purposes of avoiding the procedural

bar on his habeas claim). 

Case 2:08-cv-00750-ROS Document 12 Filed 11/10/08 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 8 -

Likewise, Petitioner’s status as a prison inmate does not constitute an extraordinary

circumstance beyond his control warranting the tolling of the one-year limitations period. 

Marsh, 223 F.3d at 1220. The ordinary difficulties inherent in prison life do not constitute

extraordinary circumstances sufficient to toll the AEDPA limitations period. Shannon v.

Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that “[e]ach of the cases in which

equitable tolling has been applied have involved wrongful conduct, either by state officials

or occasionally, by the petitioner’s counsel.”). 

Finally, Petitioner’s conclusory statement that he lacks access to a law library does

not constitute an extraordinary circumstances for purposes of equitable tolling. Atkins v.

Harris, 1999 WL 13719, * 2 (N.D.Cal., Jan. 7, 1999) (“lockdowns, restricted library access

and transfers do not constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to equitably toll the

[AEDPA] statute of limitations. Prisoners familiar with the routine restrictions of prison life

must take such matters into account when calculating when to file a federal [habeas] petition

[petitioner’s] alleged lack of legal sophistication also does not excuse the delay.”) 

In summary, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that he diligently pursued his

rights and that an “extraordinary circumstance” prevented him from filing a timely petition. 

Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Accordingly, there is no basis for equitably tolling the AEDPA

statute of limitations and the Petition should be dismissed as untimely.

III. Summary

Because Petitioner’s habeas petition is untimely under the ADEPA and equitable

tolling is not justified, the Court does not address Respondents’ contention that Petitioner’s

claims are procedurally defaulted or otherwise lack merit.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (docket # 1) be DENIED. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Case 2:08-cv-00750-ROS Document 12 Filed 11/10/08 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 9 -

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court=s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1); Rules

72, 6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within

which to file a response to the objections. 

Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party=s right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge=s

recommendation. See, Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 10th day of November, 2008.

Case 2:08-cv-00750-ROS Document 12 Filed 11/10/08 Page 9 of 9