Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-02470/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-02470-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT WOODS,

Plaintiff,

v.

G. MARQUEZ, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-02470-EMC 

ORDER OF SERVICE

Docket No. 1

I. INTRODUCTION

Robert Woods, a prisoner at the California State Prison - Corcoran, filed this pro se civil 

rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His complaint is now before the court for review under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A. 

II. BACKGROUND

The complaint alleges the following about events that occurred in May 2015 at Salinas 

Valley State Prison: 

Due to prison overcrowding, Salinas Valley officials were re-housing some inmates. 

Officials devised a scheme to house security threat group (STG) inmates with non-STG inmates in 

hopes that one of them would object and thereby earn a trip to administrative segregation. 

In April 2015, Mr. Woods was single-celled. In an effort to thwart any effort to house him 

in an unfavorable situation, he found a compatible potential cellmate and asked his housing officer 

to be housed with this inmate. Staff did not implement Mr. Woods’ request. 

On May 14, 2015, correctional officer (C/O) Marquez said Mr. Woods was going to be 

housed with an inmate Mr. Woods did not know. Mr. Woods asked about his earlier request to be 

housed with the compatible potential cellmate. This inquiry irritated C/O Marquez, who asked if 

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Mr. Woods was refusing the ordered move. Mr. Woods said he was not refusing but wanted a 

compatible cellmate; Mr. Woods asked to speak to a supervisor, which further irritated C/O 

Marquez. C/O Marquez took Mr. Woods to a program office and made him wait outside while 

C/O Marquez went inside. About 20 minutes later C/O Marquez and C/O Cardona came out of 

the office. They grabbed Mr. Woods and slammed him against a wall, yelling “here’s your fucken 

rights,” and then dragged him into the program office where they slammed him into a steel cage

and dislocated his shoulder. Docket No. 1 at 7 (error in source). Correctional lieutenant Celaya 

and C/O Correa supervised the use of force on Mr. Woods. They also told Mr. Woods that it was 

the “direct result of plaintiff not following instructions to cell up with who they tell him to cell up 

with and next time plaintiff will think twice about complying with their orders.” Id. at 8. 

Lieutenant Celaya and C/O Correa declined to obtain immediate medical attention for Mr. Woods 

and told him he could get medical attention in administrative segregation.

III. DISCUSSION

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner 

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any 

claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. at § 1915A(b). 

Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 

696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the 

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 

U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain on a prisoner amounts to cruel and unusual 

punishment prohibited by the Eight Amendment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). 

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the 

Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied 

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in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause 

harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). Liberally construed, the complaint states a 

cognizable claim against defendants Marquez, Cardona, Celaya and Correa for the use of 

excessive force on Mr. Woods. Although defendants Celaya and Correa are not alleged to have 

personally applied force to Mr. Woods, they are alleged to have directed and supervised the use of 

force, and that allegation is sufficient to state a claim against them. See generally Keates v. Koile, 

883 F.3d 1228, 1243 (9th Cir. 2018) (claim that supervisory official “knew of unconstitutional 

conditions and ‘culpable actions of his subordinates’ but failed to act amounts to ‘acquiescence in 

the unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates’ and is ‘sufficient to state a claim of supervisory 

liability’”); Robins v. Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1442 (9th Cir. 1995) (prison official’s failure to 

intervene to prevent 8th Amendment violation may be basis for liability). 

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic 

elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) 

because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's 

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). 

The complaint alleges that the defendants used excessive force on Mr. Woods to retaliate against 

him for questioning why he was not allowed to have his chosen potential compatible cellmate 

rather than accept a cellmate of correctional staff’s choosing. Liberally construed, the complaint 

states a cognizable claim against defendants Marquez, Cardona, Celaya and Correa for retaliation 

against Mr. Woods. 

Deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth 

Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 

97, 104 (1976); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004). To establish an Eighth 

Amendment claim on a condition of confinement, such as medical care, a prisoner-plaintiff must 

show: (1) an objectively, sufficiently serious, deprivation, and (2) the official was, subjectively, 

deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s health or safety. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 

834 (1994). Liberally construed, the complaint states a cognizable claim against defendants 

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Celaya and Correa for failing to timely obtain medical assistance for Mr. Woods, who complained 

of pain and requested medical care after suffering a separated shoulder due to the use of excessive 

force on him. 

IV. CONCLUSION

1. The complaint, liberally construed, states cognizable § 1983 claims against C/O G. 

Marquez, C/O R. Cardona, C/O R. Correa, and correctional lieutenant J. Celaya. 

2. The Clerk shall issue a summons and the United States Marshal shall serve, without 

prepayment of fees, the summons, a copy of the complaint, and a copy of all the documents in the 

case file upon the following defendants who allegedly worked at Salinas Valley State Prison:

- correctional officer G. Marquez 

- correctional officer R. Cardona

- correctional officer R. Correa

- correctional lieutenant J. Celaya

3. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the following briefing schedule for 

dispositive motions is set:

a. No later than December 13, 2019, Defendants must file and serve a motion 

for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. If Defendants are of the opinion that this case 

cannot be resolved by summary judgment, Defendants must so inform the Court prior to the date 

the motion is due. If Defendants file a motion for summary judgment, Defendants must provide to 

Plaintiff a new Rand notice regarding summary judgment procedures at the time they file such a 

motion. See Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 2012). 

 b. Plaintiff's opposition to the summary judgment or other dispositive motion 

must be filed with the Court and served upon Defendants no later than January 10, 2020. Plaintiff 

must bear in mind the notice and warning regarding summary judgment provided later in this order 

as he prepares his opposition to any motion for summary judgment. 

c. If Defendants wish to file a reply brief, the reply brief must be filed and 

served no later than January 24, 2020.

4. Plaintiff is provided the following notices and warnings about the procedures for 

motions for summary judgment:

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The defendants may make a motion for summary judgment by 

which they seek to have your case dismissed. A motion for 

summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure will, if granted, end your case. . . . Rule 56 tells you what 

you must do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. 

Generally, summary judgment must be granted when there is no 

genuine issue of material fact -- that is, if there is no real dispute 

about any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party 

who asked for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing 

makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by 

declarations (or other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on 

what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in 

declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or 

authenticated documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict 

the facts shown in the defendants' declarations and documents and 

show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do 

not submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if 

appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is 

granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. Rand 

v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998). 

If Defendants file a motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, 

they are seeking to have the case dismissed. As with other defense summary judgment motions, if 

a motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies is granted, 

Plaintiff's case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. 

5. All communications by Plaintiff with the Court must be served on Defendants’ 

counsel by mailing a true copy of the document to Defendant’s counsel. The Court may disregard 

any document which a party files but fails to send a copy of to his opponent. Until a defendant’s 

counsel has been designated, Plaintiff may mail a true copy of the document directly to the 

defendant, but once a defendant is represented by counsel, all documents must be mailed to 

counsel rather than directly to the party. 

6. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local Rule 16 is required 

before the parties may conduct discovery.

7. Plaintiff is responsible for prosecuting this case. Plaintiff must promptly keep the 

Court informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court's orders in a timely 

fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Plaintiff must file a notice of change of address in every 

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pending case every time he is moved to a new facility.

8. Plaintiff is cautioned that he must include the case name and case number for this 

case on any document he submits to the Court for consideration in this case.

9. Plaintiff must file a completed in forma pauperis application or pay the full 

$400.00 filing fee no later than October 31, 2019. Failure to do so will result in the dismissal of 

this action.

10. Plaintiff is requested to write more neatly in future filings. The handwriting on the 

complaint is difficult to read. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 20, 2019

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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