Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-07127/USCOURTS-caDC-11-07127-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 25, 2012 Decided April 5, 2013

No. 11-7127

MAGLOIRE K. PLACIDE AYISSI-ETOH,

APPELLANT

v.

FANNIE MAE, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:10-cv-01259)

Magloire K. Ayissi-Etoh, pro se, argued the cause and 

filed the briefs for appellant. 

Damien G. Stewart argued the cause for appellees. With 

him on the brief was Madonna A. McGwin.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, and GRIFFITH and 

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge KAVANAUGH.

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PER CURIAM: Placide Ayissi-Etoh worked at Fannie 

Mae. He is African-American. When Ayissi-Etoh was

promoted but denied a salary increase, he was allegedly told 

by his Fannie Mae manager: “For a young black man smart 

like you, we are happy to have your expertise; I think I’m 

already paying you a lot of money.” On another occasion, a 

Fannie Mae Vice President allegedly shouted at Ayissi-Etoh

to “get out of my office nigger.” After Ayissi-Etoh filed a 

discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission, his Fannie Mae supervisor 

allegedly gave him a choice: drop the racial discrimination 

claim or be fired. Shortly thereafter, Ayissi-Etoh was 

terminated. 

In the District Court, Ayissi-Etoh alleged that Fannie Mae

violated federal anti-discrimination laws by (i) denying him a 

salary increase for discriminatory reasons, (ii) maintaining a 

racially hostile work environment, and (iii) retaliating against 

him for filing a discrimination complaint. He also filed a 

D.C. law claim for defamation. The District Court granted 

Fannie Mae summary judgment on each count. 

At the summary judgment stage, we must view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to Ayissi-Etoh, the 

non-moving party. Analyzing the record in that light, we 

conclude that a reasonable jury could find that Fannie Mae 

unlawfully discriminated against, harassed, and retaliated 

against Ayissi-Etoh. Ayissi-Etoh is thus entitled to a trial on 

those claims. Therefore, we reverse the District Court’s grant 

of summary judgment on all of Ayissi-Etoh’s federal 

anti-discrimination claims. 

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I

In the spring of 2008, Fannie Mae hired Placide 

Ayissi-Etoh – an African-American man – as a Senior 

Financial Modeler in its Internal Audit Department. 

Ayissi-Etoh analyzed the models that Fannie Mae used to 

assess the value of its assets. 

After working at Fannie Mae for about three months, 

Ayissi-Etoh applied for and received a promotion to 

“Modeling Team Lead,” a new leadership position created 

when Fannie Mae restructured its Internal Audit Department. 

There were a total of 12 new Team Lead positions established 

within the Internal Audit Department. After the Team Leads 

were selected, 11 of the 12 Leads were given significant salary 

increases. Ayissi-Etoh was the lone Team Lead who did not 

receive a raise. Karla Kucerkova – a white employee who

applied for Modeling Team Lead but lost out to Ayissi-Etoh –

received a salary increase even though she did not obtain one 

of the Team Lead positions. 

Soon after Ayissi-Etoh stepped into the role of Team 

Lead, he and his manager, Sanda Pesut, began arguing on a 

regular basis. Pesut criticized Ayissi-Etoh for several 

“performance shortcomings,” and Ayissi-Etoh complained 

that he was still being assigned staff-level work despite his 

promotion. Ayissi-Etoh claims that Pesut treated him poorly 

because he had obtained the Modeling Team Lead position 

over Pesut’s choice for the promotion, Kucerkova. 

In the fall of 2008, upon instruction from Human 

Resources, Pesut began writing reports to document 

Ayissi-Etoh’s perceived weaknesses. In one evaluation, 

Pesut criticized what she saw as Ayissi-Etoh’s lack of 

independent analysis. Pesut noted that, in Ayissi-Etoh’s 

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description of why certain audit procedures were utilized, the 

“explanations used were exactly the same as” the explanations 

submitted by Fannie Mae’s customer through email. For his 

part, Ayissi-Etoh perceived the evaluation as an accusation of 

plagiarism. 

Concerned by both the negative reviews and his lack of a 

raise, Ayissi-Etoh met with Jacqueline Wagner, the Chief 

Audit Executive, several times during October 2008. 

According to Ayissi-Etoh, when he asked why he hadn’t 

received a raise, Wagner – who is white – replied: “For a 

young black man smart like you, we are happy to have your 

expertise; I think I’m already paying you a lot of money.” 

Wagner denies making this comment. 

In early 2009, Thomas Cooper – who is white – became 

Fannie Mae’s Vice President of Internal Audit. He thus 

presided over the Modeling Team at the time that the tensions 

between Pesut and Ayissi-Etoh escalated. 

On March 19, 2009, Ayissi-Etoh met with Cooper to 

discuss the fact that he was still performing staff-level work

despite being a Team Lead. The meeting quickly became 

heated. At the end of the meeting, Ayissi-Etoh claims that 

Cooper yelled, “Get out of my office nigger.” Cooper denies 

making this remark. 

After leaving Cooper’s office, Ayissi-Etoh apparently

became ill. He emailed Pesut that he was “not feeling well 

right now” and asked to go home. Later that day, 

Ayissi-Etoh saw a doctor. The doctor diagnosed Ayissi-Etoh

with anxiety disorder and prescribed medication. 

The next day, Ayissi-Etoh emailed Fannie Mae’s CEO 

about the incident. He also filed a discrimination complaint 

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against Cooper with the company’s Compliance and Ethics 

Department. Ayissi-Etoh’s complaint against Cooper was 

consolidated with his previously filed complaints against 

Wagner and Pesut. 

Fannie Mae hired an external firm to handle the 

investigation. The investigation lasted about three months. 

During that time, Ayissi-Etoh was required to continue 

working under Cooper. 

Fannie Mae’s outside investigators found it “highly 

likely” that Cooper had in fact uttered a “highly offensive 

racial slur” when confronting Ayissi-Etoh. As a result of that 

finding, Fannie Mae immediately terminated Cooper. 

In the summer of 2009, Ayissi-Etoh filed discrimination 

claims with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 

He alleged race discrimination in his pay and racial

harassment. 

On September 22, 2009, Ayissi-Etoh claims that Pesut 

gave him a choice between dropping his claims with the 

EEOC and being fired. Pesut denies this. Three weeks later, 

Fannie Mae fired Ayissi-Etoh. Ayissi-Etoh then added a 

retaliation claim to his EEOC complaint.

Ayissi-Etoh subsequently filed this suit in the District 

Court. As relevant here, Ayissi-Etoh advanced four claims. 

He alleged (i) that Fannie Mae and Wagner denied him a 

salary increase because of his race; (ii) that Fannie Mae 

subjected him to a racially hostile work environment; (iii) that 

Fannie Mae fired him in retaliation for his filing 

discrimination claims with the EEOC; and (iv) that Pesut 

defamed Ayissi-Etoh when she accused him of plagiarism. 

The District Court granted Fannie Mae’s motion for summary 

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judgment. See Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 883 F. Supp. 2d 17 

(D.D.C. 2011). Ayissi-Etoh contends that the District Court 

erred in granting summary judgment against him. 

II

We review motions for summary judgment de novo and 

consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

non-moving party – here, Ayissi-Etoh. See United States v. 

Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962); Stewart v. St. 

Elizabeths Hospital, 589 F.3d 1305, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 

A

Ayissi-Etoh claims that he was denied a raise because of 

his race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 

Section 1981 prohibits private employers from 

intentionally discriminating on the basis of race with respect 

to the “benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions” of 

employment. 42 U.S.C. § 1981; see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 

U.S. 160, 170 (1976). In Section 1981 and Title VII cases, 

courts use the same framework for determining whether 

unlawful discrimination occurred. See generally ROTHSTEIN 

ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.40 (4th ed. 2009); see also U.S. 

Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 

(1983); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 

(1973).

1

 

 1 Title VII and Section 1981 differ in certain respects. See 

generally ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.40 (4th ed. 

2009); Danielle Tarantolo, From Employment to Contract: Section 

1981 and Antidiscrimination Law for the Independent Contractor 

Workforce, 116 YALE L.J. 170, 193-95 (2006). For example, 

Section 1981 covers discrimination on the basis of race, whereas 

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For purposes of summary judgment, the operative 

question under Section 1981 – as under the Title VII 

anti-discrimination framework – is whether “the employee 

produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that 

. . . the employer intentionally discriminated against the 

employee on the basis of race.” Brady v. Office of the 

Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008). In 

some employment discrimination cases, there is no direct 

evidence of discriminatory intent – that is, no “statement that 

itself shows racial or gender bias in the [employment] 

decision.” Vatel v. Alliance of Auto. Manufacturers, 627 

F.3d 1245, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Those cases sometimes

can be resolved on summary judgment. But when the 

plaintiff offers direct evidence of discriminatory intent, that 

evidence will “generally entitle a plaintiff to a jury trial.” Id.

Here, Ayissi-Etoh claims that Wagner explicitly denied 

him a raise because of his race. According to Ayissi-Etoh, 

Wagner said: “For a young black man smart like you, we are 

happy to have your expertise; I think I’m already paying you a 

lot of money.” To be sure, Wagner denies making this 

statement. But when the issue comes down to a credibility 

contest of this kind, we cannot resolve the dispute at the 

summary judgment stage against the non-moving party. And 

the “young black man” statement alone is direct evidence that 

in this case entitles Ayissi-Etoh to a jury trial. See id.; 

 

Title VII covers discrimination on the basis of race, gender, 

pregnancy, national origin, and religion. Compare 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1981, with 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-2(a)-(b). And Section 

1981 covers only intentional disparate-treatment discrimination, 

whereas Title VII allows plaintiffs to bring disparate-impact suits 

when a facially neutral policy has a disproportionate impact on a 

protected class. See General Building Contractors Assn., Inc. v. 

Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 387-88 (1982). 

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Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002) 

(plaintiff may prevail at trial when he “is able to produce

direct evidence of discrimination”).

We therefore reverse the grant of summary judgment on 

the Section 1981 race discrimination claim. 

B

Ayissi-Etoh next contends that Fannie Mae maintained a 

racially hostile work environment in violation of 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1981. To support this claim, Ayissi-Etoh cites, among 

other things, Cooper’s use of an offensive racial epithet while 

yelling at Ayissi-Etoh; Fannie Mae’s delay in subsequently 

separating Ayissi-Etoh and Cooper from having to work 

together; and Wagner’s racially explicit statements to 

Ayissi-Etoh about the salary, which we described above. 

To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, a 

plaintiff must first show that he or she was subjected to 

“discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult” that is 

“sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the 

victim’s employment and create an abusive working 

environment.” Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 

21 (1993) (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 

U.S. 57, 65, 67 (1986)).

In evaluating a hostile work environment claim, the court 

“looks to the totality of the circumstances, including the 

frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, its 

offensiveness, and whether it interferes with an employee’s 

work performance.” Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 

1201 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 

524 U.S. 775, 787-88 (1998)).

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We conclude that a reasonable jury could find Cooper 

and Wagner’s behavior sufficiently severe or pervasive as to 

create a hostile work environment. To begin with, Cooper 

(allegedly) used a deeply offensive racial epithet when yelling 

at Ayissi-Etoh to get out of the office. As other courts have 

observed, “perhaps no single act can more quickly alter the 

conditions of employment” than “the use of an 

unambiguously racial epithet such as ‘nigger’ by a 

supervisor.” Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Insurance

Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 1993) (internal quotations 

omitted). This single incident might well have been 

sufficient to establish a hostile work environment. But there 

was still more here. The incident was preceded by Wagner’s 

“young black man” statement that, as we have already held, 

was sufficient to support Ayissi-Etoh’s claim that Fannie Mae 

intentionally denied him a raise on the basis of race. 

Moreover, this incident was followed by Ayissi-Etoh

allegedly having to continue working with Cooper for nearly 

three months, until Cooper was ultimately fired. Medical 

records allegedly demonstrate that forcing Ayissi-Etoh to 

continue working with Cooper made Ayissi-Etoh ill and 

caused him to miss work on at least one occasion. 

To establish a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff

must pass one additional hurdle: To establish liability when

a plaintiff is harassed by his or her co-workers, the plaintiff 

must prove that the employer was at least negligent in not 

preventing or correcting the harassment. See Faragher, 524 

U.S. at 789. When, as here, the plaintiff is harassed by 

supervisors with “immediate (or successively higher) 

authority,” the supervisors are treated as the employer’s 

proxy. Id. at 807. In that circumstance, the employer is 

vicariously liable for a supervisor’s actions, except when no 

tangible adverse employment action has been taken and the 

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employer proves an affirmative defense: (i) that it exercised 

reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct the hostile

behavior, and (ii) that the employee unreasonably failed to 

take advantage of the employer’s preventive or corrective 

opportunities. See id.; Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 

524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).2

Here, there is no dispute that Cooper and Wagner were 

Ayissi-Etoh’s supervisors. Therefore, Fannie Mae would be 

vicariously liable based on their alleged comments, save for 

any affirmative defense. Fannie Mae suggests that it may be

entitled to the affirmative defense because it promptly 

corrected Cooper’s behavior by firing him three months after 

the incident. But a reasonable jury could find that 

three-month delay was not “prompt.” Moreover, Fannie Mae 

makes no attempt to argue that Ayissi-Etoh unreasonably 

failed to take advantage of its complaint system – which is an 

additional necessary component of the affirmative defense. 

Indeed, Ayissi-Etoh filed a complaint with Fannie Mae’s 

Compliance and Ethics Department the day after the incident 

in Cooper’s office. At the summary judgment stage, 

Ayissi-Etoh has thus provided sufficient evidence for a 

reasonable jury to find Fannie Mae liable. 

We therefore reverse the grant of summary judgment on 

the hostile work environment claim. 

 2 Some courts continue to cite the test articulated by the 

Eleventh Circuit in Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 

(11th Cir. 1982). That case required an employee in a case where 

the employee was harassed by a supervisor to prove that the 

employer “knew or should have known of the harassment in 

question and failed to take prompt remedial action.” Id. That is no 

longer the test after Faragher. 

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C

Ayissi-Etoh also alleges that Fannie Mae fired him in 

retaliation for his filing of EEOC complaints. He brings the 

retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 

To establish a retaliation claim under Section 1981, a 

plaintiff must show that he engaged in protected activity –

such as filing an EEOC complaint – and that his employer 

took an adverse employment action against him because of 

that activity. See Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 901-02 

(D.C. Cir. 2006). 

In his affidavit, Ayissi-Etoh offers direct evidence of 

retaliation: He claims that Pesut gave him a choice between 

dropping his claims with the EEOC and being fired. Pesut 

denies making that statement. On summary judgment,

however, we cannot resolve this credibility contest. 

Because Ayissi-Etoh’s account could lead a reasonable 

jury to return a verdict in his favor on the retaliation claim, we 

reverse the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on 

that claim. 

D

Finally, Ayissi-Etoh claims that Fannie Mae is liable 

under D.C. law for defamation because its employee Pesut

accused Ayissi-Etoh of plagiarism. 

To meet the requirements for defamation under D.C. law, 

a plaintiff must prove (i) that he was the subject of a false and 

defamatory statement; (ii) that the statement was published to 

a third party; (iii) that publishing the statement was at least 

negligent; and (iv) that the plaintiff suffered either actual or 

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legal harm. See Crowley v. North American 

Telecommunications Association, 691 A.2d 1169, 1173 n.2 

(D.C. 1997). 

Ayissi-Etoh’s defamation claim fails because Pesut’s 

statements were not false. In both her evaluation and her 

subsequent emails, Pesut noted that the explanations 

Ayissi-Etoh used in his audit review were “exactly the same 

as” the “customer’s response” to one of Ayissi-Etoh’s

questions. Ayissi-Etoh’s final audit review indisputably

contains language identical to the customer’s response. 

Because Pesut simply stated the truth – that part of 

Ayissi-Etoh’s audit review directly incorporated responses 

from a customer’s email – the defamation claim fails.

We therefore affirm the District Court’s grant of 

summary judgment on Ayissi-Etoh’s D.C. law defamation 

claim. 

* * *

We reverse the District Court’s grant of summary 

judgment with respect to the race discrimination, hostile work 

environment, and retaliation claims. We affirm the District 

Court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to 

Ayissi-Etoh’s D.C. law defamation claim. 

So ordered. 

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KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge, concurring: I join the 

Court’s opinion and write separately to underscore an

important point about Ayissi-Etoh’s hostile work environment 

claim. 

The briefing and argument in this case focused on a

significant question: Can one isolated yet severe incident of 

discriminatory conduct establish a hostile work environment

under federal anti-discrimination laws? Fannie Mae has 

argued that a “singular comment” – even one as severe as the 

Fannie Mae Vice President’s alleged statement to Ayissi-Etoh,

“Get out of my office nigger” – is “insufficient to establish an 

actionable hostile work environment.” Fannie Mae Br. 47. In 

my view, Fannie Mae is wrong on the law and wrong on the 

application of the law to the alleged facts of this case. The 

alleged statement by the Fannie Mae Vice President to AyissiEtoh by itself would establish a hostile work environment for 

purposes of federal anti-discrimination laws. 

To be sure, as Fannie Mae notes, cases in which a single 

incident can create a hostile work environment are rare. See, 

e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 

(1998) (“isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not 

amount to” a hostile work environment); Stewart v. Evans, 

275 F.3d 1126, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“Except in extreme 

circumstances, courts have refused to hold that one incident is 

so severe to constitute a hostile work environment. Even a 

few isolated incidents of offensive conduct do not amount to 

actionable harassment.”) (citation omitted); Freedman v. MCI 

Telecommunications Corp., 255 F.3d 840, 848-49 (D.C. Cir. 

2001) (single incident of “religious slander” does not create a 

hostile work environment). 

But saying that a single incident of workplace conduct 

rarely can create a hostile work environment is different from 

saying that a single incident never can create a hostile work 

environment. The test set forth by the Supreme Court is 

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whether the alleged conduct is “sufficiently severe or

pervasive” – written in the disjunctive – not whether the 

conduct is “sufficiently severe and pervasive.” A single, 

sufficiently severe incident, then, may suffice to create a 

hostile work environment. See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, 

SECTION 15: RACE AND COLOR DISCRIMINATION 37 (2006) (“a 

single, extremely serious incident of harassment may be 

sufficient to constitute a Title VII violation”); see also id.

(“The more severe the harassment, the less pervasive it needs 

to be, and vice versa.”). 

Courts and commentators alike agree that a single 

physical act – such as a physical assault – can create a hostile 

work environment. See, e.g., Turnbull v. Topeka State 

Hospital, 255 F.3d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir. 2001) (case 

concerning sexual assault where court stated: “Because 

frequency is merely one factor in the analysis, an isolated 

incident may suffice if the conduct is severe and 

threatening.”); Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 534 (7th Cir. 

1999) (“ ‘extremely serious’ acts of harassment” like physical 

assault may be severe and need not also be pervasive) 

(quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 

(1998)); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir.

1995) (“even a single incident of sexual assault sufficiently 

alters the conditions of the victim’s employment and clearly 

creates an abusive work environment for purposes of Title VII

liability”), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington 

Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); 3 LEX K.

LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 46.05[3][b] (2d ed. 

2012) (“a single incident of physical assault against a coworker that is motivated by anti-female animus can qualify as 

severe enough to constitute an alteration of the co-worker’s 

conditions of employment”). 

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As several courts have recognized, moreover, a single 

verbal (or visual) incident can likewise be sufficiently severe 

to justify a finding of a hostile work environment. See, e.g., 

Reedy v. Quebecor Printing Eagle, Inc., 333 F.3d 906, 909

(8th Cir. 2003) (racially hostile graffiti that amounted to death 

threat qualifies as “severe”); Richardson v. N.Y. State Dept. of 

Correctional Service, 180 F.3d 426, 437 (2d Cir. 1999) (case 

involving the use of several racial epithets and insults where 

court stated: “even a single episode of harassment, if severe 

enough, can establish a hostile work environment”),

abrogated on other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe 

Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006); cf. Jackson v. 

Flint Ink North American Corp., 370 F.3d 791, 795 (8th Cir. 

2004) (“Even a single instance of workplace graffiti” 

involving a burning cross, “if sufficiently severe, can go a 

long way toward making out a Title VII claim”), rev’d on 

reh’g on other grounds, 382 F.3d 869 (8th Cir. 2004). 

It may be difficult to fully catalogue the various verbal 

insults and epithets that by themselves could create a hostile 

work environment. And there may be close cases at the 

margins. But, in my view, being called the n-word by a 

supervisor – as Ayissi-Etoh alleges happened to him –

suffices by itself to establish a racially hostile work 

environment. That epithet has been labeled, variously, a term 

that “sums up . . . all the bitter years of insult and struggle in 

America,” LANGSTON HUGHES, THE BIG SEA 269 (2d ed. 

1993) (1940), “pure anathema to African-Americans,” 

Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 185 (4th Cir. 

2001), and “probably the most offensive word in English,” 

RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 894 (2d 

rev. ed. 2000). See generally ALEX HALEY, ROOTS (1976);

HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960). Other courts 

have explained that “perhaps no single act can more quickly 

alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive 

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working environment than the use of . . . ‘nigger’ by a 

supervisor in the presence of his subordinates.” Spriggs, 242 

F.3d at 185. No other word in the English language so 

powerfully or instantly calls to mind our country’s long and 

brutal struggle to overcome racism and discrimination against 

African-Americans. 

In short, the case law demonstrates that a single, 

sufficiently severe incident may create a hostile work 

environment actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or Title VII. 

Here, as I see it, the alleged statement by the Fannie Mae Vice 

President to Ayissi-Etoh itself would establish a hostile work 

environment. With that understanding, I join the Court’s 

opinion. 

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