Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04437/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04437-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROSALETY BARNETT, et al.,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA, et

al.,

Defendant.

NO. C-04-4437-TEH 

 NO. C-04-5365-TEH

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO

STRIKE AND FOR PARTIAL

SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 

DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION

FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE, AND

SETTING FURTHER CASE

MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

This matter came before the Court on January 8, 2007, on Plaintiff’s Motion for Class

Certification, and Defendant’s Motions to Strike Putative Felony Arrest Plaintiffs from the

Class Definition, or in the Alternative for Partial Summary Judgment. 

This case arises out of Defendant Contra Costa County’s now-discontinued policy of

performing strip searches and visual body cavity searches on all persons arrested and housed

prior to arraignment. For the reasons set out below, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ original 

Complaint, filed in 2004, was brought solely on behalf of misdemeanor arrestees, and does

not toll the statute of limitations for persons arrested on felony charges. Accordingly,

Plaintiffs’ efforts to include felony arrestees in the putative class long after the statute has run

must fail. Named plaintiff Peter Morganelli, who was strip searched after a felony arrest, is

not a member of the class, and his own claims are time barred. The Court therefore

GRANTS Defendants’ Motion To Strike Putative Felony Arrest Plaintiffs From the Class

Definition, and further GRANTS Defendants’ Motion For Partial Summary Judgment as to

sole felony arrestee plaintiff, Peter Morganelli. Because no class representative remains, the

Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion For Class Certification without prejudice.

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Rosalety Barnett was arrested on a misdemeanor offense on March 1, 2004. 

After her arrest, she was taken to the Contra Costa County Jail in Martinez, where officers

subjected her to a visual body cavity search. She filed a group government tort claim on

August 9, 2004, alleging that she and others arrested on “minor crimes” were strip searched

pursuant to a County policy. The claim was denied.

On October 20, 2004, Barnett filed a class action complaint against Contra Costa

County and Sheriff Warren Rupf (“the County”) alleging that the County had an

unconstitutional policy of strip searching arrestees without reasonable suspicion that they

were carrying or hiding weapons or contraband. The Complaint was brought on behalf of

all persons who ... were arrested and subjected to a pre-arraignment strip and/or visual

body cavity search at the CONTRA COSTA County Jail without defendants first

having, and recording in writing, a reasonable suspicion that the search would be

productive of contraband or weapons.

Complaint, ¶ 22. The Complaint alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. It also alleged a count under California’s Unruh Act and California Penal

Code § 4030 (which governs strip searches of “prearraignment detainees arrested for

infraction or misdemeanor offenses,” § 4030(b)), on behalf of “plaintiffs and all persons

similarly situated.” Complaint, ¶ 36. The Complaint attached Barnett’s group tort claim. 

Complaint ¶ 14, Exh. A. 

Discovery revealed that before June 1, 2003, the County had a blanket policy of

indiscriminately strip searching all arrestees slated for housing prior to arraignment. After

June 1, 2003, however, the County had a written policy requiring that all strip searches be

based on reasonable suspicion, and setting out procedures for documenting that suspicion

before strip searches were performed. 

Newly aware that Barnett herself (arrested in 2004) was not searched pursuant to the

blanket policy, Plaintiffs sought to amend the Complaint to add a new plaintiff who had been

strip searched under the blanket policy. In July, 2005, Plaintiffs moved to amend the

Complaint to add Peter Morganelli, who was strip searched on December 3, 2002. Plaintiffs

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represented that Morganelli, who had been arrested for drunk driving, was a member of the

original class of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend Class Action Complaint, filed July

19, 2005, at 3:23-24. The Court granted leave to amend, and the Amended Complaint was

filed on August 11, 2005. 

Defendants moved to dismiss Morganelli’s claims. They argued that his state law

claims were barred by his failure to comply with California’s Tort Claims Act. Plaintiffs,

without admitting that Morganelli had no claims under Cal. Penal Code § 4030 because he

was arrested for felony DUI, did not oppose this portion of the motion. 

In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants also argued Morganelli’s § 1983 claim was

time-barred. Plaintiffs countered that Morganelli was “undisputably a member of the class

on whose behalf the action was originally filed,” because he was a “person arrested in Contra

Costa County for minor crimes not involving drugs, weapons, or violence” and strip searched

under a blanket strip search policy. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, filed

September 26, 2005, at 1. Relying solely on the pleadings and Plaintiffs’ representation that

Morganelli was a member of the putative class, the Court found that the statute of limitations

was tolled by the filing of the original class action Complaint under American Pipe &

Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974). Order, October 31, 2005, at 3-4.

Plaintiffs moved for class certification in June, 2006. With Peter Morganelli as the

sole class representative, they sought certification of a class consisting of

“All persons, since October 20, 2002, and continuing until Defendants’ prior custom

and policy was brought into compliance with the law on June 1, 2003, or such other

more recent date when the policy was implemented, who were arrested on any charge

(including felonies) not involving weapons, controlled substances, or felony violence,

and who were subjected to a uniform and indiscriminate (blanket) strip/visual body

cavity search(es) by defendants before arraignment at the Contra Costa County Jails

without any individualized reasonable suspicion that they were concealing

contraband. This class may include arrestees who were subjected to subsequent

blanket strip searches before arraignment after the initial strip search, without any

reasonable individualized suspicion that they had subsequently acquired and hidden

contraband on their persons.” 

(Emphasis in original). 

With their opposition to the class certification motion, the Defendants moved to strike

the felony arrest plaintiffs from the class definition in Plaintiffs’ motion for class

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certification, or, in the alternative, for partial summary judgment on all claims asserted on

behalf of the putative felony arrest plaintiffs.

DISCUSSION

I. The Complaint Did Not Include Felony Arrestees

Read as a whole, the class action Complaint filed on October 20, 2004 was brought on

behalf of only misdemeanor arrestees. 

The language of the Complaint’s class definition does not distinguish between persons

arrested for misdemeanors and felonies. The Complaint was brought on behalf of 

all persons who ... were arrested and subjected to a pre-arraignment strip and/or visual

body cavity search at the CONTRA COSTA County Jail without defendants first

having, and recording in writing, a reasonable suspicion that the search would be

productive of contraband or weapons.

Complaint, ¶ 22. The Complaint alleges that the searches complained of were performed

“without regard to the nature of the alleged offense for which plaintiff, and all those similarly

situated, had been arrested ....” Id. ¶ 20. 

If this were the only relevant language in the Complaint, an expansive reading of the

class definition might be warranted. It is not. The Complaint also states that each member of

the class has a claim under Cal. Penal Code § 4030, which provides (with some exceptions)

that strip searches of persons arrested for infractions and misdemeanors must be supported

by reasonable suspicion. (Third Cause of Action, Complaint ¶ 36, alleging violation of 

§ 4030 “on behalf of Plaintiffs and all persons similarly situated” and seeking damages under

§ 4030(p) on their behalf). The Complaint alleges that legal questions under § 4030 are

“common to the class,” Complaint ¶ 25 (emphasis added). It seeks damages for the entire

class under the California statute. Id., Prayer for Relief ¶ 6. Moreover, the Complaint

alleges that the searches were performed “without regard to whether or not plaintiff, or those

she represents, was eligible for cite and release under Penal Code § 853.6,” a statute

involving citations for misdemeanors. 

The language of the complaint must be construed as a whole. Kasishke v. Keppler,

158 F.2d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1947). The Complaint asserts a claim applicable only to

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 Plaintiffs’ objection to the Court’s consideration of statements in Plaintiffs’ own briefs is

OVERRULED.

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misdemeanor arrestees on behalf of every class member. Misdemeanor arrestees are not a

subset of the class; they are the class. 

Moreover, in various briefs before this Court, Plaintiffs have characterized their

claims as involving individuals arrested on “minor charges” or for “minor offenses.” See,

e.g., Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint, filed July 19, 2005, at 2 (plaintiff brought class

action “on behalf of herself and all other persons arrested in Contra Costa County for minor

crimes not involving drugs, violence, or weapons...”); Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to

Dismiss, filed September 26, 2005, at 1 (“minor offense not involving drugs, weapons, or

violence”). Statements in briefs can be treated as judicial admissions that bind a party. 

Gospel Missions of America v. City of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 548, 557 (9th Cir. 2003).1

Moreover, defendants rely particularly on representations that a plaintiff is not suing on a

particular claim. See, e.g., Sarro v. City of Sacramento, 78 F.Supp.2d 1057, 1061 (E.D.Cal.

1999) and cases cited therein. Plaintiffs are bound to their characterization of the case as one

involving persons arrested for “minor crimes” or “minor offenses” not involving drugs,

weapons, or violence. 

In the context of this case, “minor crimes” or “minor offenses” do not include

felonies. Defendants argue that “minor offense” is a term of art that excludes felonies. See,

e.g., Kennedy v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 901 F.2d 702, 716 n.8 (9th Cir. 1990)

(distinguishing “felonies” and “minor offenses” in the strip search context), Thompson v.

County of Cook, 428 F.Supp.2d 807, 812 (N.D.Ill., 2006)(equating “minor offenses” with

“misdemeanor or traffic offenses”). Plaintiffs counter that in strip search jurisprudence, the

Court’s constitutional inquiry turns on the nature of the crime charged, rather than the

felony/misdemeanor distinction, see Kennedy, 901 F.2d at 714-16; see also Murcia v. County

of Orange, 226 F.Supp.2d 489, 495 (S.D.N.Y.,2002), citing Kennedy, 901 F.2d at 714, so

plaintiffs’ phrase “minor offense not involving drugs, weapons, or violence” should be

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viewed as shorthand that could include a class of cases potentially including both felonies

and misdemeanors. 

Defendants have the better argument. While there are some cases which use the word

“minor” to refer to felonies, see, e.g., Rodriguez-Herrera v. I.N.S., 52 F.3d 238, 239 (9th Cir.

1995)(class C felony referred to as “minor offense”), far more distinguish between “minor

offenses” and “felonies.” Moreover, the Court is swayed by the fact that Kennedy itself uses

the terms as if they were mutually exclusive. See, Kennedy, 901 F.2d at 714-716. Plaintiffs

cannot ask the Court to look to the reasoning of Kennedy, but to overlook its explicit use of

the very terms at issue. In the context of this litigation, “minor offense” means a

misdemeanor or lesser offense. 

Finally, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(f) instructs the Court to construe the Complaint so “as to

do substantial justice.” Although this Rule ordinarily requires the Court to construe

pleadings liberally, that is not the case if a liberal construction would prejudice the defendant

because the pleading failed to give the defendant notice of what was being alleged. See, e.g.,

Lundy v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., 34 F.3d 1173, 1186 (3rd Cir. 1994), quoting 5 Charles

A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1286, at 558-59 (2d ed.

1990) (“[A]n inadvertent mistake in a pleading will not be held against the pleader if another

party has not been misled by the mistake or otherwise prejudiced.”). The phrase “substantial

justice” must be given “a practical meaning. ...[T]his does not mean, on the one hand, that the

plaintiff may by pleading, mislead, entrap, surprise or prejudice his adversary, nor on the

other that a party should be permitted to weave a net of artificial refinements and subtle

technicalities in which to catch an unwary litigant.” Cherry v. Dealers Transport Co., 64

F.Supp. 682, 683 (D. Mo. 1946).

 Here, there are several factors which, although not themselves determinative,

convince the Court that its narrower reading is not only correct but necessary to do

substantial justice. First, counsel for Plaintiffs have brought other strip-search cases which

distinguished between felony and misdemeanor arrestees. For example, in Bull v. City and

County of San Francisco, United States District Court for the Northern District of California

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Case No. C-03-1840, plaintiffs (represented by Plaintiffs’ counsel in this case) sought

certification of a subclass of felony and misdemeanor arrestees for federal strip search

claims, and a subclass of misdemeanor arrestees for claims under Penal Code § 4030; Judge

Breyer granted the motion months before the Complaint in this action was filed. 

See Memorandum and Order, filed June 10, 2004, at 8, 12. Plaintiffs were capable of clearly

alleging a class that included felony arrestees who did not have claims under Penal Code 

§ 4030 but did not do so. 

Second, when Plaintiffs sought information on persons arrested on “charges not

involving drugs, weapons, or violence,” Defendants objected that the phrase “not involving

drugs, weapons, or violence” was vague and ambiguous. The phrase had been used in

several contexts: in Interrogatory No. 2, in “charges not involving drugs, weapons, or

violence,” in Interrogatory No. 3, “misdemeanors, infractions, or minor offenses not

involving drugs, weapons, or violence,” and in Interrogatory No. 4, “crimes not involving

drugs, weapons, or violence.” In their motion to compel discovery responses, Plaintiffs

argued the meaning was clear, specifically referring to Penal Code § 4030:

Penal Code § 4030, the California law regulating how and when counties can conduct

strip searches, specifically refers to persons arrested on charges “involving weapons,

controlled substances, or violence.” Cal. Penal Code § 4030(f) and (g). ... Thus, it is

impossible to believe that defendants find these terms so vague and ambiguous as to

render unanswerable and objectionable the discovery requests in which they are

contained.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery Responses, July 25, 2005, at 9. In other words,

Plaintiffs referred the Defendants to a California statute on misdemeanor arrestees to clarify

what “charges not involving drugs, weapons or violence” meant. Defendants ultimately

responded to the interrogatories by compiling lists of arrestees which eliminated felony

arrests entirely. See Declaration of Lt. Jacqueline Rubin in Support of Opposition to Motion

for Class Certification, ¶¶ 3-7 (Rubin prepared response to Interrrogatory No. 3 by

eliminating felonies); Declaration of Lt. Jacqueline Rubin in Support of Reply to Plaintiffs’

Opposition to Motion to Strike or for Partial Summary Judgment ¶¶ 2-3 (Rubin prepared

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 Plaintiffs objected to and moved to strike Lt. Rubin’s reply declaration on the

grounds that it was irrelevant, contained inadmissible hearsay, and was improperly filed with

the Reply brief rather than in support of the motion itself. The motion to strike is DENIED. 

The Court is considering Ms. Rubin’s testimony about her own understanding and statements

not for the truth the matter, but to show Defendants’ understanding of the claims involved,

and they are relevant to the issue of what reading of the Complaint would serve substantial

justice. While the declaration was filed with Defendants’ Reply, the Court finds that the

testimony relating to the County’s understanding of the scope of the class is offered in

rebuttal to Plaintiff’s Opposition to the motion. Moreover, Plaintiffs responded with their

own subsequently filed declarations. See Declaration of Mark E. Merin in Support of Reply

to Opposition to Plaintiffs' Evidentiary Motion to Strike Affidavits as Untimely Filed, filed

December 22, 2007. The Court is not considering Ms. Rubin’s account of Mr. Merin’s

statements.

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 The Amended Complaint only explicitly added Morganelli’s claims, and did not

purport to add the claims of some additional class or subclass of felony arrestees. 

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response to Interrogatory No. 2 by eliminating felonies).2 Defendants were not on notice

that felonies were included in the claims.

It is clear to the Court from the timing of events in this litigation that Plaintiffs are

trying to sweep felony arrestees into the class at this late date to make the class fit the

proposed class representative, rather than vice versa. The case was originally filed on behalf

of only misdemeanor arrestees. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Strike Putative Felony

Arrest Plaintiffs From The Class Definition is GRANTED.

II. Plaintiff Morganelli’s Claims Are Time-Barred

Plaintiff Morganelli’s claims, added to this case with the Amended Complaint filed

August 11, 2005, are time-barred.3 

The County issued a written strip-search policy on June 1, 2003. Defendants argue

that the challenged “blanket” strip-search policy ended on that day, and the statute of

limitations for any challenge to the blanket strip search policy began to run at that time. 

Plaintiffs acknowledge that the new written strip search policy was issued on June 1,

2003, but contend that the statute should run from the date the policy was actually

implemented, and the Court should deny partial summary judgment because Defendants

failed “to present any proof of the actual termination date of the blanket policy.” 

At the same time, however, Plaintiffs affirmatively argue that the blanket policy ended

on June 1, 2003 in support of their own motion for class certification. In the context of

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arguing Morganelli is an adequate class representative, Plaintiffs alleged that all plaintiffs’

state law claims were time-barred because the blanket strip search policy was discontinued

on June 1, 2003: 

Defendants discontinued the blanket strip search policy on or about June 1, 2003; a

tort claim to preserve state law claims for strip searches under the blanket policy had

to be filed by January 1, 2004, and, if this deadline was not met, an application for

relief from failure to file had to be made within one year, that is, by June 1, 2004. A

tort claim was filed on behalf of the class by plaintiff Rosalety Barnett on August 9,

2004, but it was too late to protect the class’ state law claims for strip searches under

the discontinued blanket policy. 

Plaintiffs’ Reply to Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification,

Docket No. 71, at 10:8-16 (citations omitted, emphasis in original).

Plaintiffs cannot have it both ways. If the statute of limitations started to run for the

state law claims on June 1, 2003, when the policy was discontinued, it started to run on the

same date for the Fourth Amendment claims.

The statute of limitations for Morganelli’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is two years. 

Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 1725 (2005). 

The statute therefore ran on May 31, 2005. 

Morganelli’s claims were added several months later, on August 11, 2005. If

Morganelli were a member of the class as alleged in the Complaint, the statute of limitations

on his claims would be tolled from the time the Complaint was filed to the time class

certification is denied. American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554

(1974); Catholic Social Services v. I.N.S., 232 F.3d 1139, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2000). But

because Morganelli is not a member of the class, the tolling doctrine does not apply. Nor do

his claims relate back under In re Syntex Corp. Securities Litigation, 95 F.3d 922, 935 (9th

Cir. 1996), because the original Complaint did not give Defendants notice of the claims of

felony arrestees. His claims are therefore time-barred. 

Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to the sole

felony arrest plaintiff in the case, Peter Morganelli.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set out above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Strike

Putative Felony Arrest Plaintiffs From The Class Definition, and GRANTS Defendants’

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to plaintiff Morganelli. Because no proposed class

representative remains, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification without

prejudice. 

A further case management conference in both Case No. C-04-4437 and Case No. C04-5365 is set for March 19, 2007, at 1:30 p.m. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 24, 2007 

THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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