Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-08128/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-08128-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

JACK WHITESIDE,

Petitioner, 

vs.

DORA SCHRIRO, et al.,

Respondents. 

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No. CV 07-8128-PHX-MHM (JCG)

ORDER

Petitioner Jack Whiteside, pro se, filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on November 30, 2007. (Dkt. # 1). The matter was

referred to United States Magistrate Judge Jennifer C. Guerin, who issued a Report and

Recommendation on July 15, 2008, recommending that the Court deny Mr. Whiteside’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus as untimely. (Dkt. #21). Petitioner filed an objection

to the Report and Recommendation on July 24, 2008. (Dkt. #22). Petitioner also filed a

Notice of Supplemental Citation. (Dkt. #23).

I. BACKGROUND

The facts in this case, as related by the Magistrate Judge, are undisputed. On

January 28, 1992, Petitioner was convicted by jury verdict in the Coconino County

Superior Court on one count of child molestation and sentenced to an aggravated term of

30 years’ imprisonment. (Petition, Ex. A). The Court of Appeals reversed Petitioner’s

conviction and the sentence imposed, finding that the Superior Court improperly admitted

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prior bad acts evidence involving child molestation; the Order and Mandate was issued,

and the record returned to the Clerk of the Superior Court, on October 6, 1993. (Id). 

As a result, the State filed a “Motion to Set Trial and Order” based on the Court of

Appeals’ decision; it was granted by the Superior Court on October 20, 1993. (Id., Ex.

D). Although he filed motions to dismiss based on alleged violations of double jeopardy

and the right to a speedy trial, those motions were denied and Petitioner was again

convicted by jury on one count of child molestation; he was sentenced to an aggravated

term of 31 years’ imprisonment on May 22, 1995. (Answer, Ex. B). Petitioner appealed

his second conviction, arguing that the trial court improperly denied his motions to

dismiss (Answer, Ex. C); the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence on

April 30, 1996, and the Arizona Supreme Court then denied review on December 6, 1996. 

(Answer, Ex. G; Petition, Ex. E).

Petitioner’s appellate counsel filed a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to

Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure (“Rule 32 Petition”) on February 20,

1997, asserting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Petition, Ex. G; Answer, Ex.

Q). The Petition was supplemented on June 15, 1997, and the trial court permitted

Petitioner to file a supplemental reply on September 17, 1997. (Id.). The trial court

subsequently denied Petitioner’s Rule 32 Petition on January 20, 1998 (Answer, Ex. I);

the Arizona Court of Appeals denied Petitioner’s petition for review on July 9, 1999 (Id.,

Ex. P & S); the Arizona Supreme Court denied the petition on May 23, 2000 (Petition,

Ex. G). 

In addition, on January 22, 1998, while his Rule 32 Petition was pending before

the Court of Appeals, Petitioner filed a pro se “Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus” in

the Navajo County Superior Court (“State Habeas Petition”); it was amended on February

2, 1999. (Answer, Ex. J). Petitioner argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over

his second trial because the Arizona Court of Appeals’ October 6, 1993 Order and

Mandate only reversed Petitioner’s original conviction and did not remand the matter

back to the trial court. (Answer, Ex. Y). The Navajo County Superior Court held a

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hearing on Petitioner’s State Habeas Petition and concluded that Petitioner was properly

incarcerated. (Id., Ex. K). The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed on October 20, 1998. 

(Id., Ex. O).

Represented by counsel, Petitioner filed a second state habeas petition in Pinal

County Superior Court on May 25, 2001, one year and two days after the Arizona

Supreme Court denied review of Petitioner’s first Rule 32 Petition. (Answer, Ex. T). On

June 15, 2001, the trial court construed the second state habeas petition as a second Rule

32 Petition and transferred the matter to the Coconino County Superior Court. (Id., Ex.

Y). Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied on July 23, 2001 (Id., Ex.

HH); however, the Coconino County Superior Court had already dismissed Petitioner’s

Second Rule 32 Petition (Id., Ex. GG). Because Petitioner filed a “Notice of Ruling,”

stating that he was going to file a special action challenging the denial of his Motion for

Reconsideration, the Coconino County Superior Court withdrew its July 5, 2001 decision

(and reaffirmed the decision on October 19, 2004). (Id., Ex. JJ & TT). Both the Arizona

Court of Appeals and the Arizona Supreme Court declined to accept jurisdiction over the

special action. (Answer, Ex. NN; Petition, Ex. I).

While pursuing his various state court petitions, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus in this Court on June 20, 2001. (Answer, Ex. AA). The Petition was

dismissed without prejudice on October 11, 2001 in light of the state court proceedings

pending in the Pinal and Coconino County Superior Courts. (Id., Ex. FF; Petition Ex. H).

Petitioner filed a pro se “Writ of Statutory Special Action and Writ of Habeas

Corpus” directly with the Arizona Supreme Court on September 2, 2002. (Petition, Ex.

J). The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on October 2, 2002, finding that Petitioner

had abused the judicial process; the Court ordered the Clerk of the Court to not accept any

further noncompliant motions filed by Petitioner. (Id.).

On August 14, 2004, Petitioner filed another Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in

Pinal County Superior Court , which the Court construed as a third Rule 32 Petition and

transferred to Coconino County Superior Court. (Answer, Ex. SS). The Superior Court

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denied the Petition on December 17, 2004, finding that the issues raised in the Petition

had already been ruled on by the court in considering Petitioner’s previous Rule 32

Petition. (Petition, Ex. K).

On November 7, 2005, Petitioner filed a second pro se “Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus” in the Arizona Supreme Court, which the Arizona Supreme Court Clerk

rejected pursuant to the Supreme Court’s October 2, 2002 order. (Petition, Ex. L).

Petitioner filed another Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Pinal County

Superior Court on February 23, 2006. (Answer, Ex. II). The Petition was eventually

transferred to the Coconino County Superior Court, where the Court construed it as a

fourth Rule 32 Petition for post-conviction relief and dismissed on the grounds that

Petitioner’s claims had already been litigated in his previous petitions and were without

merit. (Id.).

The instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed in this Court on

November 30, 2007. (Dkt. #1). The Petition asserts four claims: (1) Petitioner’s second

trial violated due process because the Arizona Court of Appeals never remanded after

reversing his first conviction; (2) Petition was denied effective assistance of trial counsel;

(3) Petition was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel; (4) Petitioner’s second

trial constituted structural error. (Dkt. #21, pp.6-7).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court must review de novo the legal analysis in a Magistrate Judge’s

Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). A district court must also

review de novo the factual analysis in the Report and Recommendation for those facts to

which objections are filed. See id. (“A judge of the court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made.”); see also United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). “Failure to object to a magistrate judge’s

recommendation waives all objections to the judge’s findings of fact.” Jones v. Wood,

207 F.3d 557, 562 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2000).

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III. DISCUSSION

As Magistrate Judge Guerin set forth in her Report and Recommendation, federal

petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners are governed by a one-year

statute of limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). For purposes of this action, the

statute of limitations began to run from the date on which Petitioner’s judgment became

final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking review. 

Id.; (Dkt. #21, p.7). That date was March 10, 1997, 90 days after the Arizona Supreme

Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review of the trial court’s dismissal of his direct

appeal on December 6, 1996. (Dkt. #21, pp. 2-3, 7); see Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157

(9th Cir. 1999) (statute of limitations does not begin to run until close of ninety-day

period within which petitioner could have filed a petition for writ of certiorari from the

United States Supreme Court). 

However, when a properly filed state post-conviction relief request is pending, the

proscribed one-year statute of limitations may be tolled. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Here,

Petitioner filed his first Rule 32 Petition on February 20, 1997. As such, the one-year

statute of limitations was tolled until May 23, 2000, when the Arizona Supreme Court

denied review of Petitioner’s first Rule 32 Petition. The statutory period then ran for one

year, from May 24, 2000 to May 24, 2001. (Dkt. #21, p.8). 

Petitioner’s subsequent Rule 32 Petitions do not affect the limitations period as

they were filed after the close of the statutory period on May 24, 2001. (Dkt. #21, p.8). 

In addition, because Petitioner’s subsequent Rule 32 Petitions were improperly filed as

state habeas petitions, they did not constitute “proper use of state court procedures” for

post-conviction review under Arizona law, and thus did not have a tolling effect until they

were designated as Rule 32 petitions. Id.; see Ninvo V. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th

Cir. 1999) (“[T]he AEDPA statute of limitations is tolled for ‘all of the time during which

a state prisoner is attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust

state court remedies with regard to a particular post-conviction application.’”) (quoting

Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir. 1999)) (emphasis added). 

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Petitioner did not file the instant federal habeas petition until November 30, 2007,

more than six years after the statute of limitations period expired. Thus, as the Magistrate

Judge correctly concluded, the petition is untimely. (Dkt. #21, p.8).

Petitioner raises one objection, arguing that the limitations period remains open

because the Arizona Court of Appeal’s October 6, 1993 reversal of his original conviction

never became final. (Dkt. #22). Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeal’s October 6,

1993 Order and Mandate “technically remains in effect,” and so the trial court lacked

jurisdiction to preside over Petitioner’s second trial and conviction, because the Mandate

only required reversal of Petitioner’s 1992 conviction but did not remand the matter to the

trial court for a new trial. (Id., p.5). Thus, Petitioner contends that the limitations period

under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) never began to run because the Court of Appeals’ October

6, 1993 judgement never became final.

First, Magistrate Judge Guerin already addressed this issue in her Report and

Recommendation, stating that Petitioner’s argument was “without merit” because

“Petitioner’s federal Petition must be limited to constitutional violations related to the

current sentence by which Petitioner is held in custody – in this case, his second trial and

second conviction.” (Dkt. #21, p.9) (emphasis in original). As such, the statute of

limitations is calculated from the date that the second judgment against Petitioner became

final. (Id.). Further, “[r]egardless of whether a constitutional error occurred in relation to

Petitioner’s first conviction and sentence, that conviction and sentence was nullified by

the Court of Appeals’ October 6, 1993 decision and Petitioner is not in custody pursuant

to that judgment.” (Id.).

Second, in support of his objection, Petitioner cites primarily to Owen v. Shores,

24 Ariz. App. 250, 253 (1975) and Brock v. Weston, 31 F.3d 887, 890 (9th Cir. 1994). In

addition, Petitioner contends that “extraordinary circumstances dictate that filing was

delayed by actions of the state and its procedural requirements specific to this case, which

are beyond Petitioner’s control.” (Id., p.9). But Owen and Brock are inapposite. See

Owen, 24 Ariz. App. at 254 (finding that cause of action for malicious prosecution does

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not accrue until underlying prosecution terminated in favor of defendant, accomplished

by issuance of appellate court mandate reversing defendant’s conviction); Brock, 31 F.3d

at (holding that petitioner could challenge expired conviction that was “necessary

predicate” to subsequent civil commitment under Washington’s Sexually Violent

Predators Act). Petitioner also quotes from Lowery v. Young, 887 F.2d 1309, 1312 (7th

Cir. 1989), in which the Seventh Circuit found that a constitutional challenge to an

enhanced sentence requires a showing that there is a “positive and demonstrable nexus”

between petitioner’s prior conviction and his current custody. However, that case is also

inapplicable; this case does not involve a challenge to an enhanced sentence. Those

citations might derive from the fact that Petitioner appears to argue that his current

custody is based on his prior, reversed conviction since he argues that his second trial and

conviction is invalid because the Court of Appeals’ 1993 Mandate was never fully

enforced. Regardless, the Court fails to see how that excuses Petitioner’s untimeliness in

bringing the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Lastly, Petitioner states that “extraordinary circumstances dictate that filing was

delayed by actions of the State and its procedural requirements specific to this case,

which are beyond Petitioner’s control.” (Dkt. #22, p.9). However, Petitioner makes no

attempt to explain why he believes that the State’s procedural requirements caused a sixyear delay in his filing of the instant federal Petition. Nonetheless, Petitioner has

consistently filed actions challenging his second conviction in state court, as well as an

initial Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court; he has also been intermittently

represented by counsel (and was represented toward the end of the limitations period as

his counsel at that time filed a habeas petition in state court on May 25, 2001). 

Importantly, miscalculation of the limitations period does not constitute extraordinary

circumstances sufficient to warrant equitable tolling. See generally, Miranda v. Castro,

292 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing case law on equitable tolling and

attorney error and miscalculation). The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s report

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and finds that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is untimely and equitable

tolling is not available in this case.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation. (Dkt. #21).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus is DENIED. (Dkt. #1).

IT IS FURTHERED ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to enter

judgment accordingly.

DATED this 9th day of January, 2009.

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