Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01776/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01776-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Michael Slowik, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Frank Moreno; Marshall Bliss; C. Smith; 

Cathy S. Grant; and DOES 1-10, 

Defendants.

No. CV-12-01776-PHX-NVW

ORDER 

 Before the Court is the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary 

Judgment (Doc. 39), Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. 42), and the Reply (Doc. 47). For the 

following reasons, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted. 

I. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party carries its burden of 

demonstrating that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that it is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 322 (1986). A material fact is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under 

the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factual 

issue is genuine if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for 

the nonmoving party.” Id. 

 Once the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56, the party opposing 

summary judgment must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 

trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The fact are “viewed in the light most favorable to the 

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nonmoving party only if there is a genuine dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 

U.S. 372, 380 (2007). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier 

of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita 

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

II. FACTS 

 Plaintiff Michael Slowik was incarcerated at Federal Correctional Institution 

(“FCI”) Phoenix where he was assigned the job of electrician in the Facilities 

Department. (DSOF ¶¶ 3-5). Slowik was assigned the job of electrician because he held 

himself out has having experience splicing powered cable wires. (Doc. 40, Exb. 6). 

Before taking the job, Slowik signed a form acknowledging that he participated in a 

prison training which covered various safety topics pertinent to his position, but he claims 

he was told to sign the form without actually participating in any orientation. (Doc. 40, 

Exb. 6). 

 Slowik was initially assigned the job of Grade Four Electrician but quickly worked 

his way up to Grade One, the top level in the prison. (DSOF ¶ 4). As a Grade One 

Electrician, he worked on electrical problems in the kitchen affecting the dishwasher, 

ovens, steam kettle, and helped install new ovens under the oversight of the Electrical 

Foreman. (DSOF ¶ 5). His job duties included assisting the lead electrician in installing 

and repairing electrical wiring, fixtures, and equipment. (Doc. 40, Exb. 6). Slowik also 

served as the emergency electrician on-call during weekends. (Doc. 40, Exb. 6). 

 Defendant Fred Moreno is a Facilities Manager at FCI Phoenix and has 

supervisory responsibility for the Facilities Department and for all repairs performed at 

FCI Phoenix. (DSOF ¶ 1). Defendant Marshall Bliss is now retired, but worked at FCI 

Phoenix as a Maintenance Foreman whose duties included maintaining the food service 

equipment. (DSOF ¶ 2). 

 On Saturday September, 25, 2010, Slowik advised Moreno that he had attempted 

to reset circuit breakers in the kitchen area of food services but they would not reset. 

(Doc. 40, Exb. 6). Moreno told Slowik that Victor Martinez, the institution’s electrician, 

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would address the problem the following day. (DSOF ¶ 7). Maritinez was not available 

the next day and after Bliss approached Slowik about the broken electric panel, Slowik 

offered to see if he could figure out what was wrong. (Doc. 40, Exb. 6). Bliss escorted 

Slowik and another inmate to the power source behind the building. (DSOF ¶ 9). The 

main power feed to the electrical panel was shut off, and Slowik located two blown fuses. 

(DSOF ¶ 10). Slowik then returned to the food service area and took the front cover off 

the electrical panel to check for a short. (DSOF ¶ 12). Slowik found no shorts and 

turned off all the breakers. (DSOF ¶ 12). 

 Bliss then escorted the inmates back to the power source behind the building 

where Slowik replaced the blown fuses and turned the unit back on. (Doc. 40, Exb. 6). 

The group then returned to the kitchen so Slowik could flip the circuit breakers back on 

one at a time. (Doc. 40, Exb. 6). As Slowik flipped the last breaker, it flashed due to a 

ground short that Slowik had missed. (Doc. 40, Exb. 1). Later reports suggest Slowik 

forgot to put the cover back over the flash panel in the kitchens, but Slowik stated that 

mistake was not what caused the accident and that the explosion might have been much 

worse if the cover had been on. (Doc. 40, Exb. 6). 

 The explosion injured Slowik, the other inmate, and Officer Bliss. (Doc. 40-7, Pg. 

58). When asked to describe the incident, Slowik said, “There’s no way that anybody – it 

– it was just – there’s no way that could have prevented from happening the way it 

happened.” (Doc. 40, Exb. 6). The two injured inmates were immediately taken to the 

institution’s Health Services Department for medical treatment and were later transferred 

to a local hospital. (DSOF ¶ 20). Slowik was then transferred to Maricopa County Burn 

Center. (DSOF ¶ 21). He returned to FCI Phoenix on October 13, 2010. (DSOF ¶ 20). 

 After returning to the prison, Slowik filed an administrative grievance, claiming he 

was forced to work on a high voltage electric panel by Officer Bliss and was not properly 

instructed on the job he was assigned to perform. (DSOF ¶ 22). He was awarded a 

monthly sum of $58.65, based on a 7% impairment to his whole body under the Inmate 

Accident Compensation Act. (DSOF ¶ 29). Slowik believed his monthly sum should 

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have included more money to account for the overtime he worked before he was injured 

and that Officer Moreno lowered the award to spite him. (Doc. 40, Exb. 6). Slowik 

appealed his award but lost. (DSOF ¶ 29). 

 Slowik then filed this action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal 

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging that Defendants Frank Moreno and 

Marshal Bliss, among others, violated his constitutional rights when he suffered injuries 

from a work-related incident while incarcerated at FCI Phoenix. (Doc. 16 ¶¶ 40-50). He 

alleges violations of his Fifth Amendment right to due process and Eighth Amendment 

right to be free from serious risk of harm because he was injured while being forced to 

work on “energized circuits.” (Id. at ¶ ¶ 42-45). Slowik also alleges two named 

defendants, who have been dismissed from this action, and other John Doe defendants 

violated his Eighth Amendment rights when they chained, shackled and handcuffed him 

to his hospital bed after he was injured. (Id. at ¶¶ 51-58). Finally, Slowik alleges that 

Defendant Moreno violated his First and Fifth Amendment rights, depriving him of his 

freedom of speech and retaliating against him for filing an administrative grievance. (Id. 

at ¶¶ 59-66). 

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 

A. Bivens Claims against Federal Defendants 

 Victims whose constitutional rights are infringed on by a federal officer, 

employee, or agent have a right to recover damages against that officer, “despite the 

absence of any statute conferring such a right.” Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 

(1980). That right extends to federal prisoners, who may bring an action against a federal 

prison employee under Bivens. See Agyeman v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 

1104 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that to the extent the plaintiff “sought recovery from 

individual employees of the Corrections corporation, the case had to be brought as a 

Bivens action”) (citations omitted). “The basis of a Bivens action is some illegal or 

inappropriate conduct on the part of a federal official or agent that violates a clearly 

established constitutional right.” Balser v. Dep’t. of Justice, 327 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 

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2003). 

1. Violation of Fifth and Eighth Amendment Rights by Defendants 

 Moreno and Bliss 

Plaintiff argues his Fifth and Eighth Amendment right to be “free from serious 

injury or harm or risk of serious harm” were violated when he was ordered to work on 

and repair an energized high-voltage circuit. (Doc. 16, ¶¶ 41-45). The rights Plaintiff 

asserts are not lodged in the Fifth Amendment and are more accurately pled as violations 

of the Eighth Amendment. To prevail on a claim challenging prison conditions under the 

Eighth Amendment, Plaintiff must prove that his injury was caused by an officer’s 

“deliberate indifference.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297, 302 (1991).1

 Deliberate 

indifference “requires more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or 

safety,” but “less than acts or omissions [done] for the very purpose of causing harm or 

with knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) 

(internal citations and quotations omitted). A prison official cannot be liable 

under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of 

confinement unless the official knows of and disregards and excessive risk 

to inmate health and safety; the official must both be aware of facts from 

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 

exists, and he must also draw the inference. 

Id. at 837. 

 Slowik claims he suffered extensive burns because he was forced to work on a 

high-voltage circuit he was not qualified to repair. To survive this Motion for Summary 

Judgment, he must show there is at least a question of fact as to whether Defendants Bliss 

and Moreno acted with “deliberate indifference” to his health and safety when assigning 

him to work on the circuit. To support his case, Slowik asserts that the Defendants 

should have known forcing him to work on the circuit posed a serious risk to his health 

 

1

 Because “[a]ctions under § 1983 and those under Bivens are the same save for 

the replacement of a state actor under § 1983 by a federal actor under Bivens,” cases 

discussing § 1983 clams apply to Bivens claims. Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409 

(9th Cir. 1991). 

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and safety because both Defendants were aware that he had never properly trained as an 

electrician in the prison, only served as an assistant to the head electrician, and was not 

permitted to work on energized circuits. (PSOF ¶¶ C-H).2

 

 Slowik was assigned to the electric shop in the prison because he worked as a 

cable splicer on powered cables before he was incarcerated. (Doc. 40, Exb. 6). Once he 

was established in the electric shop, he quickly worked his way up to the highest level of 

electrician, where his job duties included installing and repairing wiring, electrical 

fixtures, apparatus and control equipment, and checking for compliance with the National 

Electrical Code. (DSOF ¶ 5). Slowik’s deposition demonstrates a working knowledge of 

the duties outlined above. (Doc. 40, Exb. 6). It also demonstrates that he understood the 

necessary safety measures when repairing a power source like the one that injured him. 

(Doc. 40, Exb. 6) (demonstrating basic knowledge of lock-out/tag-out procedures, 

National Electrical Code, and electrical repairs). 

 Although Slowik repeatedly asserts he was injured while working on an energized, 

high-voltage circuit, his deposition verifies that the power was actually off while he was 

working on the circuit and exhibits submitted by Defendant show the circuit was actually 

a low-voltage one. (Doc. 40, Exb. 6; DSOF ¶¶ 23-24). Additionally, nothing suggests 

the Defendants had any reason to know that replacing the circuit breakers would place 

Slowik at substantial risk of serious harm. Slowik’s own deposition demonstrates how 

his words, actions, and position as a Grade One Electrician would have reasonably led the 

Defendants to believe he was capable of handling the task assigned to him. (Doc. 40, 

Exb. 6). That the Defendants did not anticipate any harm to Slowik is further evidenced 

by Defendant Bliss standing so close to Slowik at the time of the explosion that he also 

suffered burns. 

 

2

 Plaintiff disputes many of the Defendants’ facts in his Statement of Facts and his 

unsigned affidavit. Many of these conflicts are resolved by Plaintiff’s deposition. When Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts and affidavit conflict with his deposition, the facts assumed true on this Motion for Summary Judgment are drawn from his deposition. See Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that a party cannot create an issue of fact by submitting an affidavit that contradicts prior deposition testimony). 

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 The incident appears to have occurred from a ground short in the circuit. No 

similar event had ever occurred in the prison before. Assigning an inmate to a job that 

terminates in an unpredictable accident does not demonstrate the deliberate indifference 

necessary to succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300 

(noting that, “for instance, that if a prison boiler malfunctions accidentally during a cold 

winter, an inmate would have no basis for an Eighth Amendment claim, even if he suffers 

objectively significant harm”). Although Slowik’s injuries were unfortunate, they were 

not inflicted by the officers’ deliberate indifference. 

 The Defendants have carried their burden of proving there is no material question 

of fact regarding whether they knew of, and then disregarded, a serious risk to Slowik’s 

health and safety. Summary judgment will be granted to Defendants Bliss and Moreno 

on this count. 

2. Violation of Eighth Amendment Rights by Smith, Grant, & John Does 

Because Defendants Smith and Grant were dismissed from this action on March 

22, 2013, (Doc. 24), this count proceeds against only John Doe defendants. Although the 

use of John Doe defendants is usually disfavored, a plaintiff must be given a chance to 

identify John Doe defendants through discovery. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 

642-43 (9th Cir. 1980). Slowik claims the John Doe defendants named in his second 

count are “retired and/or avoiding service” and that the named defendants have been 

unwilling to provide any means of locating the John Doe defendants. (Doc. 42). 

 But Slowik has been given ample opportunity to conduct discovery in this action. 

He has received the Defendants’ Initial and Supplemental Disclosure Statements, two sets 

of responses to his interrogatories and request for admissions, and chosen not to depose 

Defendants Bliss or Moreno. (Docs. 27-28, 34-36). Additionally, Slowik has made no 

allegations that the John Doe defendants remain unidentified because the named 

defendants’ responses to his discovery requests were deficient. Slowik has been given a 

sufficient opportunity to identify the unnamed defendants. Accordingly, the John Doe 

defendants are dismissed from this action. It follows that the second count is also 

dismissed, as all defendants named in it have been dropped as parities to this action. 

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3. First Amendment Retaliation Against Defendant Moreno 

Slowik contends that that Officers Smith, Grant, Moreno, and John Does retaliated 

against him for pursuing an administrative remedy for his injuries. (Doc. 16). Smith, 

Grant, and the John Does, however, have been dismissed from this action, leaving Officer 

Moreno as the only remaining defendant under this count. Accordingly, only Officer 

Moreno’s actions can be considered when deciding whether Slowik’s First Amendment 

rights were violated. 

 Inmates have a First Amendment right to file prison grievances and may file a 

claim if a public officer retaliates against them for exercising that right. Rhodes v. 

Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2004). For a claim for First Amendment 

retaliation, a prisoner must show: (1) that a state actor took an adverse action against the 

inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoners’ protected conduct, and that such action (4) 

chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not 

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Id. at 568. 

 Slowik contends Officer Moreno attempted to quash or chill his right to file a 

prison grievance. (Doc. 16). He asserts that Moreno issued him a disciplinary write-up 

stating that he had failed to put the cover on the electrical panel when it blew up. (Doc. 

40, Exb. 6). This write-up, however, was signed nearly five months after Slowik had 

filed his administrative claim and was titled “Injury – Lost – Time Follow Up.” (Doc. 

40, Exb. 1). The document verifies that Slowik’s injuries were the result of a workrelated incident and is not disciplinary in nature. (Doc. 40, Exb. 1). 

 Slowik also contends that when he applied for a subsidy to make up for lost wages 

in prison due to injuries, Officer Moreno told him he would make sure he didn’t have to 

pay Slowik any more money than he had to. (Doc. 40, Exb. 6). Slowik was upset 

because his monetary award did not include additional funds to account for the overtime 

he was used to working and believes the lowered compensation was due to Officer 

Moreno’s actions. (Doc. 40, Exb. 6). He appealed his monetary award within the prison 

and lost. (DSOF ¶ 28). 

 Neither of the above allegations support a First Amendment retaliation claim. The 

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first, an incident report, could not be construed as an adverse action and had no impact on 

Slowik’s right or ability to file an administrative appeal. As for the second, although 

Moreno’s alleged words may have been negative, Slowik still received the compensation 

he was entitled to. He may have hoped to be granted extra, but the failure of the 

committee to award him more than he was entitled to based on his ordinary wages does 

not constitute an adverse action. Slowik was also able to appeal the initial decision, 

showing that Moreno’s actions did not chill the exercise of his First Amendment rights. 

 Slowik alleges additional instances of retaliation under this count, but none were 

perpetrated by Moreno. He admits that Officer Moreno was not present at the time he 

felt ridiculed in the hospital by prison guards, (Doc. 40, Exb. 6), and the incident report 

he contends was filed purely to harass him was signed by Officer Bliss, not Moreno. 

(Doc. 40, Exb. 8). Because Slowik has alleged no way to attribute the actions to Officer 

Moreno, they are not considered under this count. Accordingly, Defendant Moreno has 

carried his burden of showing there is no material question of fact surrounding whether 

his actions chilled Slowik’s legitimate exercise of his First Amendment rights. Summary 

judgment will be granted for Officer Moreno on this count. 

4. Administrative Exhaustion of Claims Defendant Moreno

 The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires that a prisoner filing a 

Bivens action exhaust all available administrative remedies prior to filing a civil action in 

federal court. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997). This 

exhaustion requirement applies to all civil suits filed by prisoners about any aspect of 

prison life, regardless of the remedies sought. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 

(2001). It is undisputed that Slowik did not mention Officer Moreno in any of his 

requests for administrative remedies. (DSOF ¶ 30, PSOF ¶ 30). But “exhaustion [under 

the PLRA] is not per se inadequate simply because an individual later sued was not 

named in the [administrative] grievances.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007). 

Because summary judgment will be granted for Defendants on the merits of this action, 

we do not decide whether Slowik has properly exhausted his administrative remedies 

with respect to Officer Moreno. 

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B. Other Issues Raised 

 Slowik claims the Defendants’ deposition excerpts are not admissible because a 

copy of the reporter’s certification was filed after the Motion for Summary Judgment was 

filed. Slowik misinterprets Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(f)(1). Rule 30(f)(1) only 

requires the certificate to accompany the final copy of a deposition. Nothing in the rule 

requires the deposition to be certified at the time a motion is filed. Furthermore, not only 

does Slowik rely on the same depositions he claims are inadmissible, the delay in 

certification was because Slowik failed to appear to review and sign the deposition in a 

timely manner. (Doc. 41-1). Defendants properly submitted the reporter’s certification 

as soon as it was available, and Slowik has not demonstrated that he was in any way 

prejudiced by this delay. 

 Slowik also claims that the Defendants’ exhibits and declarations are not properly 

authenticated. (Doc. 42). All of the Defendants’ documents were either properly signed 

under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, as permitted by Federal Rule of 

Evidence 901(b)(10), authenticated by Slowik is his deposition, authenticated in the 

Defendants’ depositions, or provided to the Defendants by Slowik. (Doc. 27). 

Accordingly, Slowik’s objections to the Defendants’ exhibits and declarations are 

unfounded. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment (Doc. 39) is granted. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk enter judgment in favor of the 

Defendants and against Plaintiff and that Plaintiff take nothing. The Clerk shall terminate 

this case.

 Dated this 5th day of December, 2013. 

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