Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_04-cv-00694/USCOURTS-almd-3_04-cv-00694-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, EASTERN DIVISION

DEBRA MCCONNELL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 

) 2:04cv694-T

WESTPOINT STEVENS, ) (WO)

INC., )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION

Relying on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42

U.S.C.A. §§ 1981a, 2000e through 2000e-17, plaintiff Debra

McConnell brings this lawsuit claiming that her former

employer, defendant Westpoint Stevens, Inc., terminated her

employment in retaliation for complaining about the sexual

harassment of another employee. Relying on Alabama law,

McConnell also claims that Westpoint Stevens negligently and

wantonly failed to supervise and train adequately, and

negligently or wantonly retained, her direct supervisor.

The court’s jurisdiction is proper under 42 U.S.C.A.

§ 2000e-5(f) (Title VII) and 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331 (federal

Case 3:04-cv-00694-MHT-DRB Document 31 Filed 09/06/05 Page 1 of 27
2

question), 1343 (civil rights), and 1367 (supplemental).

This case is now before the court on Westpoint Stevens’s

motion for summary judgment, which, for the reasons

discussed below, will be granted.

I. SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under Rule 56, the party seeking

summary judgment must first inform the court of the basis

for the motion, and the burden then shifts to the non-moving

party to demonstrate why summary judgment would not be

proper. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.

Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986); see also Fitzpatrick v. City of

Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115-17 (11th Cir. 1993) (discussing

burden-shifting under Rule 56). The non-moving party must

Case 3:04-cv-00694-MHT-DRB Document 31 Filed 09/06/05 Page 2 of 27
3

affirmatively set forth specific facts showing a genuine

issue for trial and may not rest upon the mere allegations

or denials in the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

The court’s role at the summary-judgment stage is not to

weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter,

but rather to determine only whether a genuine issue exists

for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986). In doing so, the court

must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor

of that party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts, as presented in the light most favorable to

McConnell, are as follows. 

Westpoint Stevens is a manufacturer and marketer of bed

and bath home fashions. McConnell is a registered nurse in

the States of Alabama and Georgia and worked as an

Case 3:04-cv-00694-MHT-DRB Document 31 Filed 09/06/05 Page 3 of 27
1. Plaintiff’s response to motion for summary judgment

(Doc. No. 16), pp. 1-2. 

2. Id.

3. Id.

4. Id.

5. Id.

4

occupational health nurse at Westpoint Stevens’s Fairfax

Fabrication, Finishing, and Distribution Centers in Valley,

Alabama, from 1990 until she was terminated on October 29,

2003.1

 Her duties included conducting hearing, audio,

pulmonary, and vision testing; doing physical examinations

of employees; following worker’s compensation cases; and

assisting human resources.2

 In addition, she supervised two

nurses and an occupational health technician.3

At the time she was terminated, McConnell was under the

direct supervision of Human Resources Manager Kim Williams

and Plant Manager Chad Butts.4

 Williams was supervised by

Butts as well as by Woodrow “Woody” Sluss, Westpoint

Stevens’s Divisional Director of Human Resources for Bed and

Bath Products South division.5

 Butts was supervised by Tommy

Case 3:04-cv-00694-MHT-DRB Document 31 Filed 09/06/05 Page 4 of 27
6. Id.

7. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No.

10), Ex. 1, p. 95. 

5

Bledsoe, General Manager for Westpoint Stevens’s Bath

Products South division.6

 

In July 2003, McConnell learned that Djuna Black, one of

the two nurses under her supervision, planned to resign.

She met with Williams and Butts about the impending

resignation, and Butts told her to “start looking around,

interviewing.”7

 McConnell also mentioned Black’s impending

resignation to Bledsoe in passing. McConnell recounts the

conversation in the following way:

“I was standing outside the clinic in a

little lobby that you had before you

walked into the clinic. [Bledsoe] had to

cut through there ... and he was walking

by. And he said how are you doing. I

said okay. ... And I said did you know we

were losing a nurse. And he stopped and

turned around and said no, who? And I

said [Black]. I said she has put in a

notice and we’re looking for a nurse

because we have a lot of testing to do.

... And he said well, we could move

somebody down here to help from one of the

other clinics. And I said, oh, okay. He

Case 3:04-cv-00694-MHT-DRB Document 31 Filed 09/06/05 Page 5 of 27
8. Id. at 121.

9. Id. at 121. Bledsoe’s recollection of the

conversation is markedly different. He recalls telling

McConnell: “I would likely fill the pending vacancy by

internally transferring another WestPoint Stevens employee

into the nurse position. ... I made it clear to Ms.

McConnell that she was not to proceed with hiring someone to

fill the nurse position.” Id., Ex. 2, p. 2.

6

said we will keep the testing up. Don’t

worry about it.”8

McConnell interpreted Bledsoe’s comments to simply mean that

he would send over some temporary assistance from another

facility if it became necessary to help the clinic keep up

with its occupational testing duties; she did not understand

him to mean that she should refrain from hiring a

replacement for Black.9

The ensuing facts surrounding McConnell’s search for a

suitable nursing applicant are somewhat lengthy and

complicated. Suffice it to say, however, that ,based on her

interactions with Butts, Williams, and Bledsoe, McConnell

believed that she had been given the authority to hire a

nurse to replace Black. She conducted a search for a

replacement nurse for several months and ultimately offered

Case 3:04-cv-00694-MHT-DRB Document 31 Filed 09/06/05 Page 6 of 27
10. Id., Ex. 1, p. 148.

11. Id. at 158.

12. Plaintiff’s response to motion for summary judgment

(Doc. No. 16), Ex. 18, p. 97.

7

the job to a suitable applicant, Theresa Chestnut. Chestnut

accepted the offer. Shortly thereafter, it became apparent

to McConnell that she had misunderstood Bledsoe during their

brief conversation about Black’s resignation and had hired

Chestnut without Bledsoe’s blessing.10 Although she

apologized to Bledsoe and was able successfully to rectify

the situation (Chestnut ultimately withdrew her

application), McConnell was subsequently terminated on

October 29, 2003, for committing “gross insubordination” by

disobeying Bledsoe’s orders.11 The parties do not dispute

that, although McConnell was informed of her termination by

Butts and Williams, the decision to terminate her was made

by Bledsoe and Sluss, who was asked by Bledsoe to conduct an

investigation into the matter.12

McConnell claims that she was terminated not for

offering a job to Chestnut, but rather in retaliation for

Case 3:04-cv-00694-MHT-DRB Document 31 Filed 09/06/05 Page 7 of 27
13. Plaintiff’s response to motion for summary judgment

(Doc. No. 16), p. 3. McConnell also stated in her

deposition that at some point after she was fired, Davidson

complained to her about Abney “touching” her. However,

McConnell never complained to management about Davidson’s

specific allegations regarding Abney, because she did not

know about them until after she was terminated. Defendant’s

motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 10), Ex. 1, p. 218-19.

8

previously complaining to Butts and Williams about the

sexual harassment of another employee. 

Approximately six to eight weeks before she was fired,

McConnell came to believe that another female employee,

Angela Michelle Davidson, was being sexually harassed by her

female supervisor, Terry Edmonson.13 Although McConnell

believed the harassment was primarily coming from Edmonson,

she also believed that Leroy Abney, a male supervisor, was

contributing to the harassment at the direction of Edmonson.

McConnell first learned of Davidson’s problems with Edmonson

when she received a phone call from Black (the nurse whose

resignation later prompted the extension of a job offer to

Chestnut), informing her that Davidson had come to the

clinic at the plant in an agitated state and was upset and

Case 3:04-cv-00694-MHT-DRB Document 31 Filed 09/06/05 Page 8 of 27
14. Id. at 193.

15. Id. at 193-94. McConnell states that, during this

conversation with the doctor, Davidson “didn’t go into a lot

of details. She just told him she had a new department head

who didn’t like her, and was harassing her.” Id. at 195.

16. Id. at 193.

17. Id. at 194.

9

crying.14 Black told McConnell that Davidson’s blood

pressure was high and that she had sent Davidson to see a

doctor. Concerned, McConnell joined Davidson at the

doctor’s office and observed Davidson telling the doctor

that she “had a lot of stress at work,” and “had a new

department head who didn’t like her and there were a lot of

problems going on.”15 McConnell watched the doctor prescribe

some medication for Davidson and listened as he instructed

her to take some time off of work.16 After leaving the

doctor’s office, Davidson told McConnell, “I can’t go on

much longer like this. ... I feel like I’m being harassed.

I feel like I’m being lied on. ... I feel like [Edmonson and

Abney] are trying to get my job.”17 McConnell told Davidson

that she would discuss the harassment with Williams and

Case 3:04-cv-00694-MHT-DRB Document 31 Filed 09/06/05 Page 9 of 27
18. McConnell made it clear both in her deposition

testimony as well as to Williams that the reason she

suspected Edmonson was “harassing” Davidson was “because of

this Dennis Brooks.” Id. at 206. McConnell stated that

“[Edmonson] didn’t like [Davidson] because of Dennis” and

that “[Edmonson] felt like Dennis kind of liked [Davidson].”

McConnell stated she thought that Edmonson felt threatened

by Davidson. Id. at 207-08. McConnell does not indicate

whether she came to the conclusion that Brooks was the

reason Edmonson was harassing Davidson based on her own

personal observations or on what Davidson told her. 

19. Id. at 195.

10

inform him of the doctor’s orders that Davidson take time

off of work to recover from her apparent emotional distress.

Shortly thereafter, McConnell went to Williams and told

him that Edmonson did not like Davidson. She suggested to

Williams that Edmonson’s negative feelings toward Davidson

stemmed from the fact that Edmonson had once had an intimate

relationship with a former male employee named Dennis

Brooks. Edmonson, McConnell surmised, was jealous of women

such as Davidson, with whom Brooks was friendly during his

tenure at Westpoint Stevens.18 McConnell asked Williams,

“[W]hat are you going to do about that?”19 Williams

Case 3:04-cv-00694-MHT-DRB Document 31 Filed 09/06/05 Page 10 of 27
20. Id. 

21. Id. at 209.

22. Id. 

23. Id. at 210.

11

responded by smiling and saying that Davidson and Edmonson

“just need to forget about that and get on with their job.”20

McConnell again spoke with Davidson about the alleged

harassment when Davidson came to the clinic for her “return

to work” physical after her time off. At that time,

Davidson stated that she was “very nervous about going back

out there.”21 She told McConnell that Edmonson and Abney

often reprimanded her for dressing suggestively, and said

she felt like Edmonson “was after her” and “would eventually

get enough on her to fire her.”22 McConnell told Davidson to

do the best job she could do, and that, if the alleged

harassment continued, to raise her complaints to Williams.23

In addition to what Davidson told her, McConnell

personally observed Edmonson’s interactions with Davidson on

several occasions. On one occasion, McConnell called

Case 3:04-cv-00694-MHT-DRB Document 31 Filed 09/06/05 Page 11 of 27
24. Id. at 201-04. 

25. Id. at 213.

26. Id. at 213-14.

12

Davidson into the clinic to ask her a question about a

previously sustained injury. While Davidson was talking

with McConnell, Edmonson appeared in the doorway looking

angry, and asked Davidson what she was doing in the clinic.

McConnell told Edmonson that it would only take a minute,

and partially closed the door. Davidson then remarked to

McConnell, “I’ve got to get back to my job. She stays on

me.”24 In addition, whenever McConnell made rounds on the

floor of the factory in the morning and approached Davidson

to greet her, Edmonson would stare at Davidson and start to

walk over to her, as if to reprimand her.25 McConnell

observed that Edmonson’s staring made Davidson

“uncomfortable.”26

McConnell did not think much of these incidents at the

time, but later realized ,in hindsight, that, “[I]f that is

sexual harassment, if a female can harass another female and

Case 3:04-cv-00694-MHT-DRB Document 31 Filed 09/06/05 Page 12 of 27
27. Id. at 205.

28. The following exchange occurred at McConnell’s

deposition:

“Q: Even to this day you haven’t formed a

solid opinion in your mind as to whether

that harassment was sexual harassment or

just harassment, because she, [Davidson],

and Terry Edmonson didn’t get along?

“A: I formed an opinion in my mind, but I

don’t know if what I think goes along with

the federal—

“Q: Definition?

“A: Yes. Definition of sexual harassment.

... I feel like if you’ve got someone who

is over someone else and they can direct

their operations and what kind of--whether

they are employed or not, and there is a

guy in between and this person is letting

(continued...)

13

it be classified sexual harassment, then [Edmonson] is

sexually harassing her.”27 McConnell admits that, although

she was personally convinced that Edmonson was harassing

Davidson because she was “jealous” of her, her understanding

of whether Edmonson’s behavior satisfied the legal

definition of sexual harassment was, and remains, unclear to

her.28

Case 3:04-cv-00694-MHT-DRB Document 31 Filed 09/06/05 Page 13 of 27
28. (...continued)

that bother them in their direction of the

person, then in my mind that is sexual

harassment. But I don’t know if it fits

the federal definition.

:Q: Okay. That’s the only way that in

your opinion Edmonson sexually harassed

Davidson?

“A: Yes. I think she was jealous of

[Davidson].”

Id. at 227-28.

14

In addition to speaking to Williams about the alleged

harassment shortly after the incident with Davidson in the

doctor’s office, McConnell complained about Davidson’s

situation to Butts in late August 2003. She told him that

Davidson felt like she was being harassed, and warned Butts

that Davidson was considering filing a complaint with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). McConnell

told Butts that she thought the matter should be handled

internally, and that “if [the EEOC) were to question me, I

would have to tell the truth and have to tell them how I

Case 3:04-cv-00694-MHT-DRB Document 31 Filed 09/06/05 Page 14 of 27
29. Id. at 224.

30. Id. at 226. Butts’s account of this conversation

is different. He claims that McConnell simply told him that

there was some “tension” between Davidson and Edmonson, but

denies that McConnell told him anything about Davidson’s

plans to file an EEOC complaint, or about her plans to

support Davidson if she did file a complaint. Id., Ex. 4,

p. 3.

31. Id., Ex. 1, p. 222.

32. On that occasion, McConnell says she told Bledsoe,

“[Y]ou do have one real problem out there, Terry Edmonson.

She is harassing a few of the females because of Dennis

Brooks. Do you remember him[?]” Bledsoe responded, “yeah,

it’s always something.” Id., Ex. 1, p. 222. Bledsoe does

not recall this conversation. Id., Ex. 2, p. 3. 

15

felt. And I said I felt like Terry harassed her.”29 Butts

responded to McConnell by saying that “no employee is going

to tell me how to run my floor.”30 

McConnell never specifically complained to either Sluss

or Bledsoe about Edmonson’s alleged harassment of Davidson.31

McConnell did mention Edmonson’s harassing behavior to

Bledsoe in passing, but did not specifically mention

Davidson’s name.32 At the time they decided to terminate

McConnell, neither Sluss nor Bledsoe knew about McConnell’s

Case 3:04-cv-00694-MHT-DRB Document 31 Filed 09/06/05 Page 15 of 27
33. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No.

10), Exs. 3 & 4. McConnell does not present any evidence to

the contrary. At her deposition, she stated, “I feel like

[Butts] probably related to [Bledsoe] what I said about

[Davidson] was going to file a claim with EEOC,” but

admitted that she had no basis, other than her “gut

feeling,” that this was the case. Id., Ex. 1, pp. 237-38.

34. Davidson complained to Sluss and Bledsoe as early

as July 18, 2003, Plaintiff’s response to motion for summary

judgment (Doc. No. 16), p. 4, and filled out an internal

complaint form on September 2, 2003. Id., Ex. 7. On

September 5, 2003, Davidson met with Butts, Williams,

Bledsoe, and Sluss, and, on the same day, met with Butts,

Williams, Edmonson, and Abney to discuss her complaints of

sexual harassment. Id. On September 23, 2003, she met with

Westpoint Stevens’s Vice-President for Human Resources, Foy

Fisher. Id. On October 6, 2003, Davidson met with Sluss

and Fisher to discuss a disciplinary write-up she received

from Edmonson for disruptive behavior. During that meeting,

she was told that the write-up “would stand.” Id., p. 5.

35. Id., Ex. 9.

16

complaints to Butts and Williams regarding Edmonson’s

alleged harassment of Davidson.33

Davidson herself complained about Edmonson’s behavior to

Butts, Williams, Bledsoe, and Sluss.34 She ultimately filed

an EEOC complaint on October 16, 2003.35 In her complaint,

Davidson does not mention McConnell’s name and does not

indicate that another employee made complaints to management

Case 3:04-cv-00694-MHT-DRB Document 31 Filed 09/06/05 Page 16 of 27
36. Id.

37. Id., Ex. 10.

17

on her behalf.36 A copy of Davidson’s complaint was

forwarded to Sluss by the EEOC on October 23, 2003, six days

before McConnell was terminated.37

III. DISCUSSION

A. Retaliatory Discharge Claim

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating

against an employee “because [s]he has opposed any practice

made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or

because [s]he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or

participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,

or hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e3(a). McConnell asserts that WestPoint Stevens terminated

her in retaliation for opposing Edmonson’s alleged sexual

harassment of Davidson.

In order to establish a prima-facie case of retaliation

under Title VII, McConnell must show that (1) she engaged in

Case 3:04-cv-00694-MHT-DRB Document 31 Filed 09/06/05 Page 17 of 27
18

statutorily protected expression; (2) she suffered an

adverse-employment action; and (3) a causal connection

exists between the two events. Little v. United Techs.,

Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 959 (11th Cir. 1997).

WestPoint Stevens admits that it subjected McConnell to an

adverse-employment action by terminating her. At issue,

then, are the two remaining elements: (1) whether McConnell

engaged in statutorily protected expression when she

complained about Edmonson’s behavior toward Davidson; and,

if so, (2) whether there is a causal link between her

complaints and her termination.

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a

plaintiff engages in statutorily protected expression if

“[s]he shows that [s]he had a good faith, reasonable belief

that the employer was engaged in unlawful employment

practices.” Little, 103 F.3d at 960. This standard has

both a subjective and an objective component. In other

words, 

“A plaintiff must not only show that he

subjectively (that is, in good faith)

Case 3:04-cv-00694-MHT-DRB Document 31 Filed 09/06/05 Page 18 of 27
38. In her deposition, McConnell was clear that she

thought Edmonson was harassing Davidson because she was

jealous of the attention Dennis Brooks paid to Davidson.

She further stated,

“I feel like if you’ve got someone who is

over someone else and they can direct

their operations and what kind of —

whether they are employed or not, and

there is a guy in between and this person

is letting that bother them in their

direction of the person, then in my mind

that is sexual harassment. But I don’t

know if it fits the federal definition.”

 Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 10), Ex.

(continued...)

19

believed that his employer was engaged in

unlawful employment practices, but also

that his belief was objectively reasonable

in light of the facts and record

presented. It thus is not enough for a

plaintiff to allege that his belief in

this regard was honest and bona fide; the

allegations and record must also indicate

that the belief, though perhaps mistaken,

was objectively reasonable.”

Id. (emphasis in original). Although McConnell expressed

some doubt as to whether the conduct she complained of

qualifies as sexual harassment under the federal definition,

it is clear that she subjectively believed that Edmonson was

sexually harassing Davidson.38 Thus, the real issue is

Case 3:04-cv-00694-MHT-DRB Document 31 Filed 09/06/05 Page 19 of 27
38. (...continued)

1, pp. 227-28.

20

whether her belief was objectively reasonable. 

The objective reasonableness of an employee’s belief

that her employer has engaged in an unlawful employment

practice “must be measured against existing substantive

law.” Clover v. Total System Services, Inc. 176 F.3d 1346,

1351 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Harper v. Blockbuster

Entertainment Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1388, n. 2 (11th Cir.

1998) (failure to charge the employee who opposes an

employment practice with substantive knowledge of the law

“would eviscerate the objective component of our

reasonableness inquiry”)). Therefore, in order to determine

whether McConnell’s belief that Davidson was being sexually

harassed was objectively reasonable, the court must consider

whether the harassment complained of by McConnell satisfies

the elements of a prima-facie sexual harassment claim under

Title VII. 

The Supreme Court has held that Title VII is not “a

general civility code”; nor does it “prohibit all verbal or

Case 3:04-cv-00694-MHT-DRB Document 31 Filed 09/06/05 Page 20 of 27
21

physical harassment in the workplace.” Oncale v. Sundowner

Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80, 118 S.Ct. 998,

1002 (1998). Rather, it is “directed only at discrimination

because of sex.” Id. Thus, in order to establish a hostile

environment claim premised on sexual harassment, a plaintiff

must demonstrate, among other things, that the harassment

was based on her sex. Gupta v. Florida Board of Regents,

212 F.3d 571, 582-83 (11th Cir. 2000). 

The Eleventh Circuit has specifically held that

“personal animosity is not the equivalent of sex

discrimination. ... The plaintiff cannot turn a personal

feud into a sex discrimination case.” McCollum v. Bolger,

794 F.2d 602, 610 (11th Cir. 1986). For example, in Succar

v. Dade County School Board, 229 F.3d 1343, 1345 (11th Cir.

2000), the Eleventh Circuit held that a plaintiff who was

physically harassed and embarrassed by a co-worker after

their intimate relationship dissolved failed to establish

that his sex was the underlying reason for the harassment he

allegedly suffered. Similarly, in Pipkins v. City of Temple

Case 3:04-cv-00694-MHT-DRB Document 31 Filed 09/06/05 Page 21 of 27
22

Terrace, Fla., 267 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 2001), the plaintiff

complained of harassment by both a male superior with whom

she had had a failed extramarital relationship, as well as

by her direct supervisor, a female who was friends with the

male supervisor’s wife and was aware of the affair. The

court held that the harassment by both supervisors was at

best motivated by personal animosity and did not constitute

sex-based harassment under the meaning of Title VII. Id. at

1200-01. As the appellate court explained:

“[T]he consensual nature of the

relationship between [plaintiff] and Klein

and any resulting feelings of enmity

determinative. Most of the actions of

which [plaintiff] complains were committed

by her immediate supervisor, Lewis-Begin,

rather than by Klein. [plaintiff] claims,

despite offering no evidence in this

regard, that Lewis-Begin was motivated by

her friendship with Klein's wife to

criticize [plaintiff]'s job performance.

Such a motivation, however, would be

attributable to personal animosity and

would not meet the Title VII requirement

that the alteration of terms and

conditions of employment be ‘because of

... sex.’” 

Id. at 1200.

Case 3:04-cv-00694-MHT-DRB Document 31 Filed 09/06/05 Page 22 of 27
39. Plaintiff’s response to summary judgment motion

(Doc. No. 16), p. 26.

23

Like the harassment in Succar and Pipkins, Edmonson’s

alleged harassment of Davidson, the root of which was

apparently an intimate relationship between Edmonson and

another former co-worker, Dennis Brooks, does not constitute

sex-based harassment under Title VII; nor does it even come

close. McConnell contends that her belief that Edmonson was

sexually harassing Davidson was objectively reasonable

because Edmonson “disliked women” and her behavior made

Davidson feel “uncomfortable.”39 However, even viewed in the

light most favorable to McConnell, the evidence clearly

indicates that Edmonson’s behavior toward Davidson was based

on personal animosity, if anything, and not sex. 

McConnell herself believed that Edmonson was harassing

Davidson not because Davidson was a woman, but because she

personally disliked Davidson and was jealous because

Davidson was friendly with Dennis Brooks, with whom Edmonson

had once had an intimate relationship. McConnell does not

argue that Edmonson “disliked women across the board”;

Case 3:04-cv-00694-MHT-DRB Document 31 Filed 09/06/05 Page 23 of 27
40. Id. at 207.

41. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No.

10), Ex. 1, p. 193-94.

24

rather, she specifically stated in her deposition testimony

that Edmonson only “disliked women that Dennis [Brooks] ...

used to stop and talk to.”40 Furthermore, there is no

other evidence in the record that indicates that Edmonson

targeted Davidson because of her sex. Significantly,

Davidson herself never described Edmonson’s harassment in

sex-based terms; rather, she told the doctor and McConnell

that she “had a new department head who didn’t like her,”

and later told McConnell, “I feel like I’m being lied on ...

I feel like [Edmonson and Abney] are trying to get my job.”41

Although Edmonson reprimanded Davidson several times for

wearing tight or suggestive clothing, there is no evidence

in the record to indicate that these reprimands were sexbased either.

In addition, there is no evidence indicating that any of

the alleged harassment personally observed by McConnell was

based on Davidson’s sex; McConnell recounts that, on several

Case 3:04-cv-00694-MHT-DRB Document 31 Filed 09/06/05 Page 24 of 27
42. Id. at 213-14.

25

occasions, she simply saw Edmonson “staring” at Davidson

looking “mad” and “[as] if looks could kill” and making her

“uncomfortable.”42 All of this, as previously noted, appears

to have been related to Edmonson’s personal dislike for

Davidson, rather than Davidson’s gender.

Because McConnell’s belief that Davidson was being

sexually harassed by Edmonson was not objectively

reasonable, she has failed to establish that she engaged in

statutorily protected expression as required by Title VII.

Thus, she cannot establish a prima-facie case of

retaliation, and the court need not reach the issue of

whether a causal connection exists between her complaints to

management about Edmonson’s treatment of Davidson and her

subsequent termination; summary judgment on this claim is

due to be granted.

B. State-Law Claims 

28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(c)(3) provides that a “district court

Case 3:04-cv-00694-MHT-DRB Document 31 Filed 09/06/05 Page 25 of 27
43. Section 1367(d) provides for at least a 30-day

tolling of any applicable statute of limitations so as to

allow a plaintiff to refile its claim in state court. The

section states:

“The period of limitations for any claim

asserted under subsection (a), and for any

other claim in the same action that is

voluntarily dismissed at the same time as

or after the dismissal of the claim under

subsection (a), shall be tolled while the

(continued...)

26

may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a

claim if ... the district court has dismissed all claims

over which it has original jurisdiction.” Because summary

judgment is due to be granted on McConnell’s federal claim,

the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over her state-law claims for negligent and wanton retention

and failure to supervise and train. Accordingly, these

claims will be dismissed, albeit without prejudice. See

United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-

727, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139 (1966); L.S.T., Inc. v. Crow, 49

F.3d 679, 685 (11th Cir. 1995). The court’s dismissal of

this state-law claims should not work to McConnell’s

disadvantage.43

Case 3:04-cv-00694-MHT-DRB Document 31 Filed 09/06/05 Page 26 of 27
43. (...continued)

claim is pending and for a period of 30

days after it is dismissed unless State

law provides for a longer tolling period.”

27

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that

WestPoint Stevens’s summary-judgment motion is due to be

granted on McConnell’s Title VII retaliatory discharge claim

and that McConnell’s state-law claims are due to be

dismissed without prejudice.

An appropriate judgment will be entered. 

DONE, this the 6th day of September, 2005.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:04-cv-00694-MHT-DRB Document 31 Filed 09/06/05 Page 27 of 27