Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-04021/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-04021-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY PAUL JONES, SR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROBERT A. HOREL; et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 07-4021 SI (pr)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

INTRODUCTION

Gregory Paul Jones, an inmate at Pelican Bay State Prison, has filed a pro se civil rights

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He filed a complaint, a first amended complaint and an amended

complaint before the court did the initial review. The most recent pleading is the amended

complaint that accompanied the motion to amend filed on November 9, 2007. The court grants

the motion to amend, and considers the amended complaint received on November 9, 2007, as

the operative pleading. The court now reviews the amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§1915A. 

BACKGROUND

Prisoners in California Department of Corrections facilities are subject to a classification

process that attempts to "take into consideration the inmate's needs, interests and desires, his/her

behavior and placement score in keeping with the department and institution's/facility's program

and security missions and public safety." Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3375(b). The process

assigns numeric values for various factors (such as the commitment offense, prior criminal 

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activity, in-prison disciplinary history, age, and gang affiliation), and the inmate is assigned to

a facility based on his classification score, generally with a higher score resulting in placement

in a more restrictive facility. 

In this action, Jones complains that prison officials wrongfully altered his classification

points and changed the nature of a disciplinary offense (from an attempted battery to an assault

on staff) in order to deem him a program failure. During a classification committee meeting on

June 20, 2006, Jones was served with a risk assessment score sheet dated June 12, 2006, in

which he had been deemed a program failure. He complains that he did not have the opportunity

to prepare and defend against the charges or score changes because he didn't receive advance

notice of the risk assessment score sheet. As a result of his score change, he was moved from

the programmers' yard and sent to another yard with privilege group "C" non-programmers. See

Amended Complaint, pp. 5, 6. Jones complained about the classification score; the score was

recalculated but he was still deemed a non-programmer. 

Jones alleges that property officer Turner denied him the proper documents needed to file

a civil rights action, and that caused him to file "this late claim." Amended Complaint, p. 6. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standards For Initial Review

A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss

any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,

or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. at

1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that

a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins,

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487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. No Due Process Violation In The Allegedly Incorrect Classification

A prisoner has no federal due process right to a particular classification score. Interests

protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from two sources--the Due Process Clause itself

and laws of the states. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). Changes in

conditions so severe as to affect the sentence imposed in an unexpected manner implicate the

Due Process Clause itself, whether or not they are authorized by state law. See Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Changes in conditions relating to classification and

reclassification do not implicate the Due Process Clause itself. See Hernandez v. Johnston, 833

F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Moody v. Dagget, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976)) (no

constitutional right to particular classification). Deprivations authorized by state law that are

less severe or more closely related to the expected terms of confinement may also amount to

deprivations of a procedurally protected liberty interest, provided that (1) state statutes or

regulations narrowly restrict the power of prison officials to impose the deprivation, i.e. give the

inmate a kind of right to avoid it, and (2) the liberty in question is one of "real substance." See

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 477-87. Although California has created a regulatory scheme from which

a protected liberty interest in classification and custody designation might arise, the liberty in

question is not protected by the Due Process Clause because the deprivation of a correct

classification or custody designation cannot be characterized as one of "real substance," i.e., it

does not impose "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life," Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, or "inevitably affect the duration of [a]

sentence," id. at 487. 

The complaint fails to state a claim for a due process violation because the allegedly

incorrect classification score did not implicate a liberty interest of real substance. The result of

the allegedly incorrect classification score was that Jones was moved from the programmers'

yard to the non-programmers' yard and apparently had a decrease in the level of privileges he

received. A yard and privilege level change do not amount to an atypical and significant

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hardship on an inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. And the change in

privilege group does not inevitably affect the duration of Jones' sentence. The due process claim

is dismissed.

C. No Due Process Claim Based On Denial Of Inmate Appeals

The failure to grant an inmate's appeal in the prison administrative appeal system does

not amount to a due process violation. There is no federal constitutional right to a prison

administrative appeal or grievance system for California inmates. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d

639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996). The denial

of an inmate appeal is not so severe a change in condition as to implicate the Due Process Clause

itself and the State of California has not created a protected interest in an administrative appeal

system in its prison. California Code of Regulations, title 15 sections 1073 and 3084 grant

prisoners in the county jails and state prisons a purely procedural right: the right to have a prison

appeal. The regulations simply require the establishment of a procedural structure for reviewing

prisoner complaints and set forth no substantive standards; instead, they provide for flexible

appeal time limits, see Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6, and, at most, that "no reprisal shall be

taken against an inmate or parolee for filing an appeal," id. § 3084.1(d). A provision that merely

provides procedural requirements, even if mandatory, cannot form the basis of a constitutionally

cognizable liberty interest. See Smith v. Noonan, 992 F.2d 987, 989 (9th Cir. 1993); see also

Antonelli, 81 F.3d at 1430 (prison grievance procedure is procedural right that does not give rise

to protected liberty interest requiring procedural protections of Due Process Clause). 

Jones had no federal constitutional right to a properly functioning appeal system. An

incorrect decision on an administrative appeal or failure to process the appeal in a particular way

therefore did not amount to a violation of his right to due process. The claims concerning the

handling of the administrative appeals are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted.

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D. No Claim For Denial Of Access To The Courts

A constitutional right of access to the courts exists, but to plead a claim for any violation

of the right of access to the courts, the prisoner must plead that there was an inadequacy in the

prison's legal access program that caused him an actual injury. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.

343, 350-51 (1996). To show an actual injury, the prisoner must show that the inadequacy

hindered him in presenting a non-frivolous claim concerning his conviction or conditions of

confinement. See id. at 355. Examples of impermissible hindrances include: a prisoner whose

complaint was dismissed for failure to satisfy some technical requirement which, because of

deficiencies in the prison's legal assistance facilities, he could not have known; and a prisoner

who had "suffered arguably actionable harm" that he wished to bring to the attention of the

court, but was so stymied by the inadequacies of the prison's services that he was unable even

to file a complaint. See id. at 351. Mere delay in filing papers would not be enough, for

example, if they were nevertheless timely filed or accepted and considered by the court. See

Hudson v. Robinson, 678 F.2d 462, 466 (3d Cir. 1982).

Jones alleges that a property officer denied him the necessary documents to file his §

1983 action and as a result it has been filed late. There was no federal constitutional violation

on the facts alleged. At most, there was a delay in filing this action. This court has not rejected

the complaint as untimely; therefore, any alleged delay caused no actual injury to Jones.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff's motion to amend is GRANTED. (Docket # 4.) The court has considered the

amended complaint received on November 9, 2007 as the operative pleading. 

The amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Leave

to further amend will not be granted because it would be futile. This action is dismissed. The

clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 16, 2008 _______________________

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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