Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00877/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00877-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: Americans with Disabilities Act

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Former Rule 56(f) is now Rule 56(d). 1

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SANDI RUSH,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 10cv877 BEN (WMC)

ORDER:

• GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

• GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[Doc. Nos. 12, 16.]

vs.

HIGHGROVE RESTAURANT, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and Plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment

are before the Court. (Doc. Nos. 12, 16.) Numerous briefs have been filed by the parties both before

and after Plaintiff’s request for a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) continuance. For the reasons 1

set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part each parties’ motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a paraplegic who is unable to walk or stand and requires the use of a wheelchair.

Plaintiff alleges that she visited Denny’s #7041 in Oceanside on April 13, 2010 and encountered

numerous barriers preventing her from enjoying the goods and services of the restaurant. Plaintiff

asserts claims for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and related state law

claims.

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Before discovery in the case had commenced, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment

asserting that the violations alleged in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) had either been

fixed or that the violations never existed. (Doc. No. 12.) Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendants’

motion and her own cross motion for summary judgment. (Doc. Nos. ¶¶ 15-16.) The Court then

granted Plaintiff’s request for a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) continuance to allow Plaintiff

to obtain necessary discovery. (Doc. Nos. 21.) The parties then filed additional oppositions and

replies to the motions. (Doc. Nos. 25, 31, 32, 36, 37, 38.) 

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment should be granted when “the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R.

CIV. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue

of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). If the moving party

meets this burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to set forth specific facts showing

that a genuine issue remains for trial. Id. at 256-57. 

A moving party can meet its initial burden by “produc[ing] evidence negating an essential

element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or [by] show[ing] that the nonmoving party

does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at

trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Co., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). If the

moving party meets this burden of production, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to

“produce enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 1103 (citing Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). Evidence raises a genuine issue “if the evidence is

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

248. In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, the Court must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 852

(9th Cir. 1998). 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is based on the correction of all actual ADA

violations. Defendants argue that all ADA violations have been corrected and Plaintiff’s ADA

claim and the supplemental state law claims should be dismissed. Plaintiff acknowledges that

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most of the violations she encountered have been corrected, but disputes others and attempts to

raise new violations identified by an expert, but not included in Plaintiff’s FAC. 

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on her ADA claim based on the accessible parking

spaces’ access aisles and van-accessible signage as well as her state law claim under the Unruh

Civil Rights Act for the violations encountered on April 13, 2010. 

The potential mootness of Plaintiff’s ADA claim implicates two issues: (1) whether

Plaintiff has standing to pursue her ADA claim and (2) whether the case should be dismissed if all

the ADA violations set forth in the FAC have been corrected. As discussed below, Plaintiff has

standing to pursue her ADA claim and Defendants have not established that all the ADA violations

set forth in the FAC have been corrected. The Court also finds that Plaintiff is entitled to summary

judgment on her ADA claim with regard to the parking lot access aisles and her claim under the

Unruh Civil Rights Act. Additionally, neither party is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

ADA claim.

I. ADA Claim

A. Plaintiff’s Standing

“[T]o invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts, a disabled individual claiming

discrimination must satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III by demonstrating his

standing to sue at each stage of the litigation.” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d

939, 946 (9th Cir. 2011). But, “the ‘Supreme Court has instructed [courts] to take a broad view of

constitutional standing in civil rights cases, especially where, as under the ADA, private

enforcement suits are the primary method of obtaining compliance with the Act.’” Id. (quoting

Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008)).

To establish her standing, Plaintiff “must demonstrate that [she] suffered an injury-in-fact,

that the injury is traceable to [Defendants’] actions, and that the injury can be redressed by a

favorable decision. In addition, to establish standing to pursue injunctive relief, which is the only

relief available to private plaintiffs under the ADA, [she] must demonstrate a real and immediate

threat of repeated injury in the future.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). As the

party invoking the Court’s jurisdiction, Plaintiff “bears the burden of establishing these elements.”

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Plaintiff’s declaration outlines the numerous violations she personally encountered at the 2

restaurant on April 13, 2010 and how they relate to her disability. Cf. Oliver v. Ralph’s Grocery Co.,

__ F.3d __, 2011 WL 3607014, at *3 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Chapman, 631 F.3d at 955).

In addition to Plaintiff’s declaration identifying the violations she encountered, Defendants 3

acknowledge numerous ADA violations that were corrected after Plaintiff’s visit to the location.

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Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). 

Defendants appropriately do not challenge the injury-in-fact or causation elements, but 2

rather, Defendants argue the redressability element cannot be met because Defendants have

corrected the ADA violations. Plaintiff certainly had standing when she filed suit, but “a disabled

3

individual claiming discrimination must satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III

by demonstrating [her] standing to sue at each stage of the litigation.” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 946

(citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). At the summary judgment stage, Plaintiff “must set forth by

affidavit or other evidence specific facts, which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will

be taken to be true.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

For purposes of evaluating Plaintiff’s standing, the Court must consider not just the

evidence in support of Plaintiff’s initial allegations, but also evidence of additional violations

identified through discovery. Doran, 524 F.3d at 1044-47 (finding that in evaluating a plaintiff’s

standing, the Court must consider all barriers related to a plaintiff’s disability, “including those

identified in [a plaintiff’s] expert site inspections.”). Plaintiff has put forth evidence, her expert

report and her own declaration, of ADA violations at Defendants’ location. Taking this evidence

to be true, the Court finds that Plaintiff has Article III standing. 

B. ADA Violations

“The ADA was enacted ‘to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards

addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.’” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 944

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2)). In addition to prohibiting obviously exclusionary conduct, “the

ADA proscribes more subtle forms of discrimination—such as difficult-to-navigate restrooms and

hard-to-open doors—that interfere with disabled individuals’ ‘full and equal enjoyment’ of places

of public accommodation.” Id. at 945 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)). 

///

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“In the case of newly constructed facilities, [like the one at issue here], compliance with the

ADA’s antidiscrimination mandate requires that facilities be ‘readily accessible to and usable by

individuals with disabilities.’” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 945 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1)). This

standard requires compliance with the Attorney General’s standards for accessible design, detailed

standards known as the ADA Accessibility Guidelines (“ADAAG”). Antoninetti v. Chipotle

Mexican Grill, Inc., 643 F.3d 1165, 1171 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 28 C.F.R. 36.406(a)); see also

Chapman, 631 F.3d at 945. Failure to comply with the ADAAG “constitutes prohibited

‘discrimination for purposes of’ the Disabilities Act.” Antoninetti, 643 F.3d at 1171 (quoting 42

U.S.C. § 12183(a)); see also Chapman, 631 F.3d at 945 (“The ADAAG provides the objective

contours of the standard that architectural features must not impede disabled individuals’ full and

equal enjoyment of accommodations.”). 

1. ADA Claim is Limited to Allegations in the FAC

The Court only considers the violations alleged in Plaintiff’s FAC. Oliver, 2011 WL

3607014, at *5 (finding that “for purposes of Rule 8, a plaintiff must identify the barriers that

constitute the grounds for a claim of discrimination under the ADA in the complaint itself; a

defendant is not deemed to have fair notice of barriers identified elsewhere”); see also Pickern v.

Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., 457 F.3d 963, 968-69 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming district court’s finding

that Plaintiff failed to comply with the notice requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

8(a)(2) — fair notice of the Plaintiff’s claims and the grounds upon which it rests — for ADA

violations raised for the first time in opposition to summary judgment). Doran v. 7-Eleven does

not require a different conclusion. Oliver, 2011 WL 3607014, at *5 (explaining that Doran, 524

F.3d at 1047, only addressed standing and did not address compliance with Rule 8). As discussed

above, Plaintiff has standing with regard to these new violations, but they are absent from the FAC

and Plaintiff never sought leave to file an amended complaint. Additionally, the Court notes that

the new violations identified were subsequently corrected. 

2. ADA Violations

Plaintiff’s FAC alleges seventeen violations of the ADA. All but two of these violations

have been corrected. An ADA claim becomes moot once the defendant corrects the violation

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Although Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ addition of a U-shaped handle to the accessible 4

stall is not in conformance with the California Building Code, Plaintiff concedes that the addition

brings Defendants into compliance with the ADA on this issue.

Plaintiff’s allegation that the location of a disabled parking space required users to pass behind 5

vehicles was withdrawn under the threat of Rule 11 sanctions.

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because “[d]amages are not recoverable under Title III of the ADA — only injunctive relief is

available for violations of Title III.” Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s ADA claim can only proceed if there is a genuine issue of material fact

concerning a continuing ADA violation or if Plaintiff establishes a continuing violation.

Plaintiff concedes that all entrance violations identified in the FAC were corrected except

for the waste receptacle obstructing the entrance door clearance. Plaintiff does not claim that the

concrete waste receptacle is still obstructing the entrance door clearance, but rather, Plaintiff

claims that it is movable. However, following Plaintiff’s allegation that the concrete receptacle

could be moved to again obstruct the entrance clearance, Defendants removed it entirely. Plaintiff

also concedes that all violations related to the restroom, identified in the FAC, were corrected

except for the covering of water pipes under the sink. However, Defendants have since submitted 4

evidence that the pipes are covered and acknowledged the need to continually check for

compliance.

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on these violations because the violations

have been remedied and the ADA only provides for injunctive relief. Wander, 304 F.3d at 858. 

However, Plaintiff’s FAC also identifies violations in the accessible parking that have not been

corrected. Plaintiff claims that the van accessible signage and the slope in the access aisles for the

accessible parking violate the ADA. 

5

a. Access Aisle Slope

As to the slope of the access aisles for the parking spaces, Plaintiff is entitled to summary

judgment on this issue. ADAAG 4.6.3 specifically requires “[p]arking spaces and access aisles

shall be level with the surface slope not exceeding 1:50 (2%) in all directions.” 

///

///

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Defendants rely exclusively on their expert report on this issue. Defendants’ expert agrees

that the parking access aisles do not comply with current requirements because the flare sides of

the ramps exceed the 2% maximum slope for access aisles and are within the access aisles. (Defs.’

Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 2.) However, he goes on to claim that the access aisles need not comply

with current requirements because the ramps encroachment into the access aisles was acceptable in

1997, when the building was constructed, and “it would not be ‘readily achievable’ to demonlish

the existing access aisle ramps and sidewalk in front of the disabled parking spaces to create

current standard path of travel and ramping to and from the parking area.” (Id.) He also claims

that the existing ramps “are readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities.” (Id.) 

Putting aside whether this assessment is factually accurate, there are at least two issues of law that

undermine this position. 

First, whether compliance with the ADAAG is “readily achievable” has no application in

this case. 

In enacting the ADA, Congress adopted two distinct systems for regulating building

accessibility: one to apply to existing facilities (those designed and constructed for

occupancy before January 26, 1993) and another to apply to later-constructed

facilities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12183(a)(1) and 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). The grandfathered

facilities must remove barriers to accessibility only to the extent that such removal

is ‘readily achievable.’

Long v. Coast Resort, Inc., 267 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). Because the

parties agree this is not a grandfathered facility, the readily achievable standard does not apply. 

Facilities constructed after 1993, like the one at issue here, are subject to an entirely different

standard. See id. New constructions must “be ‘readily accessible and usable by individuals with

disabilities’” and the only statutory defense for non-compliance with this standard is structural

impracticability. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1)). The readily achievable standard

Defendants claim to have complied with is “a much less stringent standard” than the structural

impracticability that actually applies. See Molski v. Foley Estates Vineyard & Winery, LLC, 531

F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008) (Fernandez, F., concurring and dissenting) (explaining the

significance of the different standards). “Full compliance will be considered structurally

impracticable only in those rare circumstances when the unique characteristics of terrain prevent

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Because the parties have not addressed the propriety of injunctive relief, the only relief 6

available for a violation of the ADA, or how injunctive relief might best be imposed for this particular

violation, the Court reserves any judgment with regard to injunctive relief. 

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the incorporation of accessibility features.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.401(c); ADAAG 4.1.1(5)(a). 

Defendants did not plead structural impracticability as an affirmative defense and have not put

forth any evidence that bringing the parking access aisles into compliance with ADAAG 4.6.3

would be structurally impracticable. 

Second, Defendants’ assertion that the facility is readily accessible to and usable by those

with disabilities, while acknowledging the lack of compliance with ADAAG 4.6.3 is problematic. 

A facility is not “readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities” if it does not

comply with the ADAAG. Antoninetti, 643 F.3d at 1171 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 36.406(a)). Failure to

comply with the ADAAG “constitutes prohibited ‘discrimination for the purposes of’ the

Disabilities Act.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)). 

Defendants’ expert acknowledges that the parking access aisles do not comply with

ADAAG 4.6.3 and, as discussed above, Defendants have not put forth any evidence of structural

impracticability as required for a new construction. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to summary

judgment on this portion of her ADA claim.6

b. Van Accessible Signage

As to the van accessible signage, neither party is entitled to summary judgment on this

issue. Plaintiff’s FAC alleges the van accessible signage is incorrect. Defendants’ initial expert

report indicated that the violation was remedied by the addition of minimum fine and tow away

signs. Defendants do not claim to have added a “Van-Accessible” sign. Plaintiff’s expert report,

completed after Defendants added the new signage indicates that van accessible signage is missing

in violation of ADAAG 4.6.4. ADAAG 4.6.4 requires that “[s]paces complying with 4.1.2(5)(b)

shall have an additional sign ‘Van-Accessible’ mounted below the symbol of accessibility.” 

Defendants’ follow-up expert Declaration, completed after Plaintiff’s, indicates “[t]he signage

posted at the ‘Van Accessible’ parking space is in full compliance with the ADA.” (Defs.’ Opp’n

to Pl.’s Supplement to Cross Mot. for Summ. J., Decl. of Phillip Kaplan.) But, the expert makes

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As to Plaintiff’s claim that a violation of the California Manual of Uniform Traffic Control 7

Devices (“MUTCD”) constitutes a violation of the ADA, the Court does not find the argument

persuasive, and the same argument has recently been rejected by the Ninth Circuit. Oliver, 2011 WL

3607014, at *6. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim may not proceed on this basis.

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this assertion in reliance on his prior report that includes a picture of the signage lacking a VanAccessible sign, acknowledges the ADAAG requires two separate signs, and admits Defendants

only have one sign. (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 2.) The expert goes on to claim that

Defendants have met the intent of the ADA because all the required language is there. (Id.)

It does not appear that all the required language is present based on the photos provided by

Defendants’ expert. His initial report, which he relies on in his follow-up report, includes a picture

showing an accessibility sign, a minimum fine sign, and a tow sign. “Van Accessible” is not

visible on any of the signs. The Court is perplexed how the expert can claim that all the required

language is there when the language specifically required by ADAAG 4.6.4, “Van Accessible,” is

lacking. Additionally, even if the language were present, the ADAAG requires two signs and 7

Defendants admit that they only have one. This lack of compliance with the dictates of the

ADAAG cannot be ignored in reliance on the intent of the ADA because “‘obedience to the spirit

of the ADA’ does not excuse noncompliance with the ADAAG’s requirements. The ADAAG’s

requirements are as precise as they are thorough, and the difference between compliance and

noncompliance with the standard of full and equal enjoyment established by the ADA is often a

matter of inches.” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 945-46 (relying on Long, 267 F.3d at 923); see also

Chapman, 631 F.3d. at 947 (finding any violation of the ADAAG that relates to a plaintiff’s

disability is discrimination under the ADA). 

Despite the lack of a proper sign as required by ADAAG 4.6.4, Plaintiff has not established

that she is entitled to summary judgment on this issue because the ADAAG only requires the

addition of the “Van Accessible” sign for parking spaces complying with 4.1.2(5)(b). ADAAG

4.1.2(5)(b) only requires “[o]ne in every eight accessible spaces, but not less than one, . . . shall be

designated ‘van accessible’ as required by 4.6.4.” It is not clear from the record that this particular

space must be a van accessible space that requires designation as van accessible under ADAAG

4.6.4. 

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Additionally, the Court notes that Plaintiff encountered other ADA violations on her April 13, 8

2010 visit that have since been corrected.

The Court does not address Plaintiff’s suggestion that the Court impose the entire $4,000 on 9

Defendant Hom as the landlord because Defendants have not addressed this issue.

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Genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff with

regard to the van accessible signage. Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on her ADA claim

with regard to the slope of the parking lot access aisles. Defendants are entitled to summary

judgment with regard to the corrected violations outlined above.

II. State Law Claim

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on her claim under California’s Unruh Act,

California Civil Code § 51. A violation of the ADA also constitutes a violation of § 51. CAL. CIV.

CODE § 51(f) (“A violation of the right of any individual under the Americans with Disabilities Act

of 1990 shall also constitute a violation of this section.”); see also Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481

F.3d 724, 731 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Any violation of the ADA necessarily constitutes a violation of the

Unruh Act.”). Section 51(f) provides “disabled Californians injured by violations of the ADA with

the remedies provided by section 52.” Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 46 Cal. 4th 661, 665 (2009). As

discussed above, Defendants violated the ADA. Because Plaintiff has established an ADA

violation, she has also established a violation of the Unruh Act.8

Unlike the ADA, however, the Unruh Act provides for monetary damages for violations. 

M.J. Cable, 481 F.3d at 731. Section 52 provides that a party “is liable for each and every offense

for the actual damages . . . but in no case less than four thousand dollars ($4,000).” Munson, 46

Cal. 4th at 667 (quoting § 52(a)). Plaintiff “need not prove she suffered actual damages to recover

the independent statutory damages of $4,000.” M.J. Cable, 481 F.3d at 731 (citing Botosan v. Paul

McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 835 (9th Cir. 2000)). Here, Plaintiff only seeks the $4,000 statutory

minimum. Because Plaintiff has established that she encountered ADA violations on April 13,

2010, including those subsequently corrected, the Court finds that she is entitled to the minimum

$4,000 in statutory damages under the Unruh Act.9

///

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28 The Court’s denial of Defendants’ request for attorney’s fees does not preclude Defendants 10

from seeking a reduction in any attorney’s fee award Plaintiff might eventually seek.

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III. Attorney’s Fees

Defendants request attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the Court’s inherent

powers, based primarily on the assertion that Plaintiff improperly pursued this litigation after

Defendants’ claimed to have corrected all ADA violations. However, as discussed above,

Defendants did not correct all ADA violations and Plaintiff did not pursue this litigation recklessly

or in bad faith. United States v. Blodgett, 709 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1983) (requiring “a finding

that counsel acted recklessly or in bad faith” to impose sanctions under § 1927 and a finding of

conduct tantamount to bad faith to impose sanctions under the Court’s inherent powers).

Defendants’ request for attorney’s fees is DENIED. 

10

CONCLUSION

The parties’ motions for summary judgment are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part

as discussed above. Defendants’ request for attorney’s fees is DENIED.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 12, 2011

Hon. Roger T. Benitez

United States District Judge

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