Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-00962/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-00962-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NATHANIEL P. BLALOCK, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. 

PATRICK COVELLO, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:21-CV-0962-DMC-P

ORDER

 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s original complaint, ECF No. 1. 

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 

means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 

1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 

complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 

Case 2:21-cv-00962-TLN-DMC Document 11 Filed 10/19/22 Page 1 of 9
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege with 

at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, 

vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for 

the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague and 

conclusory. 

I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

 Plaintiff is a prisoner currently housed at the Mule Creek State Prison, located in 

Ione, California. See ECF. No. 1. Plaintiff brings suit against the following defendants: (1) 

Patrick Covello, Warden; and (2) Sierra Roberts, Registered Nurse. Id. Plaintiff alleges the 

violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when he refused to take a COVID-19 

test, but subsequently was placed on quarantine, and when prison officials allowed potentially 

infected inmates to be moved from cell to cell. Id. at 3-4. 

 In his first claim, Plaintiff states that Defendant Covello directed his subordinates 

to suspend the rights and privileges of inmates upon refusal of a COVID-19 test. Id. at 3. Plaintiff 

references a policy, implemented on July 28, 2020, that the California Department of Corrections 

and Rehabilitation (CDCR) may allow inmates to refuse COVID-19 tests without retaliation. Id.

Plaintiff filed a Health Care Grievance on an unspecified date but received a response on January 

13, 2021. Id. at 8. The response stated the following in relevant parts: 

According to quarantine policy, on or around July of 2020, there are 

multiple reasons for quarantining a building and/or close contacts. This 

can include, but is not limited to, direct exposure to someone who has 

tested positive for COVID-19 or someone who shows symptoms of 

influenza-like-illness (ILI), overnight stay in the hospital, or Emergency 

room visit. 

* * * 

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and 

California Correctional Health Care Services (CCHS) have protocols in 

place that follow recommendations for quarantines set forth by the Centers 

for Disease Control and Prevention, Interim Guidance on Management of 

Coronavirus Disease in Correctional Detention Facilities. This guidance 

is specific for correctional facilities and detention centers during the 

outbreak of COVID-19 to ensure continuation of essential public services 

and protection of the health and safety of incarcerated and detained 

Case 2:21-cv-00962-TLN-DMC Document 11 Filed 10/19/22 Page 2 of 9
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

persons. 

Id. at 9.

 The response letter references no policy that allows an inmate to refuse a COVID19 test without retaliation. The only pertinent part regarding Plaintiff’s claim states, “If a patient 

refuse testing for release, continue quarantine for another seven days before release. Re-offer 

testing, if the patient ultimately agrees to the test, and the results are negative, they may be 

released before the seven days are up.” Id. at 9. Because Plaintiff refused a COVID-19 test, he 

was placed on quarantine from October 27, 2020, until January 27, 2021. Id. at 4. During this 

time, a sign was placed on Plaintiff’s door: 

FAILURE TO TEST

Medical Quarantine Required

CELL A-206 

Compliance with future testing protocols will allow removal from 

quarantine. 

No yard access, no dayroom access, no phone access. Showers 

every 72 hours. 

Cell door shall remain locked while other inmates are on dayroom. 

Testing is essential to return to phase 2. 

 

Id. at 11. 

 Plaintiff claims that, while in quarantine, he was denied any form of contact with

his family, yard access, work, medical treatment, and proper hygiene. Id. at 4. Plaintiff’s rights 

and privileges were restored when he voluntarily consented to a COVID-19 test on February 16, 

2021. Id. at 3. Plaintiff alleges violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights because he was 

denied deprived various liberties during quarantine without due process. Id. at 4. 

In his second claim, Plaintiff further alleges that “Administration” has moved 

potentially infected COVID-19 inmates from cell to cell and building to building, thus exposing 

many inmates to COVID-19. Id. Plaintiff claims that he was impacted by these alleged poor 

protocols because he was placed on quarantine. Id. During his quarantine, Plaintiff states that he 

was denied phone access, clean linen, or cleaning products. Id. Plaintiff was very apprehensive 

Case 2:21-cv-00962-TLN-DMC Document 11 Filed 10/19/22 Page 3 of 9
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

during his quarantine and heavily considered his worth as a human being. Id. The facts are 

unclear if Plaintiff received a false positive result, displayed symptoms of COVID-19, or had 

been in direct exposure to an inmate that tested positive for COVID-19. Plaintiff alleges the 

violation of his Eighth Amendment rights because he felt that his life was endangered, especially 

given that he had pre-existing medical conditions. Id. at 4. 

Plaintiff is seeking an injunction that prevents the transfer of inmates without 

proper compensation. Id. at 6. Plaintiff is also seeking compensation of $250,000 for the 

reckless endangerment and deliberate indifference for the quality of his life. Id.

II. DISCUSSION

 In his first claim, Plaintiff alleges a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due 

process rights by Defendant Covello, the prison warden, when Plaintiff was placed in quarantine 

for refusing a COVID-19 test. In his second claim, Plaintiff alleges a violation of his Eighth 

Amendment rights when prison officials allowed potentially infected inmates to be moved 

throughout the prison, thereby creating a risk to Plaintiff’s health. Each substantive claim is 

addressed below. In addition, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s failure to allege any facts showing a 

causal link between Defendant Roberts, a prison nurse, and any constitutional violation. 

A. Causal Link

 While Plaintiff names Roberts as a defendant to this action in the caption and list 

of defendants, he does not include any specific factual allegations as to this defendant in either of 

his two claims. 

 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual 

connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See

Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A 

person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of 

§ 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform 

an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 

Case 2:21-cv-00962-TLN-DMC Document 11 Filed 10/19/22 Page 4 of 9
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5

concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See

Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth 

specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional 

deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). 

 Because there is a possibility that the failure to include factual allegations 

regarding Defendant Roberts was due to an oversight, and given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the 

Court will grant Plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint. If Plaintiff elects to do so, he 

should keep the principles outlined above in mind in drafting his amended pleading. 

B. Analysis of Substantive Claims 

 1. Due Process 

 The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of life, liberty, or 

property without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to 

state a claim of deprivation of due process, a plaintiff must allege the existence of a liberty or 

property interest for which the protection is sought. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 

(1977); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). Liberty interests can arise both from 

the Constitution and from state law. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983); Meachum 

v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-27 (1976); Smith v. Sumner, 994 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1993). In 

determining whether the Constitution itself protects a liberty interest, the Court should consider 

whether the practice in question “. . . is within the normal limits or range of custody which the 

conviction has authorized the State to impose.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557-58; Smith, 994 F.2d at 

1405. Applying this standard, the Supreme Court has concluded that the Constitution itself 

provides no liberty interest in good-time credits, see Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557; in remaining in the 

general population, see Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485-86 (1995); in not losing privileges, 

see Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 323 (1976); in staying at a particular institution, see

Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225-27; or in remaining in a prison in a particular state, see Olim v. 

Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245-47 (1983). 

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:21-cv-00962-TLN-DMC Document 11 Filed 10/19/22 Page 5 of 9
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6

 In determining whether state law confers a liberty interest, the Supreme Court has 

adopted an approach in which the existence of a liberty interest is determined by focusing on the 

nature of the deprivation. See Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 481-84 (1995). In doing so, the 

Supreme Court has held that state law creates a liberty interest deserving of protection only where 

the deprivation in question: (1) restrains the inmate’s freedom in a manner not expected from the 

sentence; and (2) “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the 

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 483-84. 

 Applying the foregoing, the Court concludes that Plaintiff fails to state a 

cognizable due process claim, under either the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 

or state law. As to the Due Process Clause, Plaintiff does not have any protected liberty interest 

in remaining in the general population or having access to privileges. Thus, Plaintiff’s placement 

in quarantine away from the general population during which he lost various privileges does not 

implicate Plaintiff’s due process rights. As to state law, the Court finds that placement in 

quarantine is akin to placement in administrative segregation and, thus, did not restrain Plaintiff’s 

liberty in a manner inconsistent with his incarceration. The Court also finds that, while somewhat 

atypical given the circumstances of the pandemic, Plaintiff’s brief placement in quarantine did not 

create a significant hardship. 

 Finally, because Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to implicate his due 

process rights, Defendant Covello cannot be liable for implementation of the quarantine policy. 

Recognizing that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and that due process claims are necessarily 

somewhat complex factually, the Court will grant Plaintiff an opportunity to amend. 

 2. Eighth Amendment 

 In his second claim, Plaintiff alleges that his health was put at risk when the 

“Administration” allowed potentially infected inmates to be moved about the prison. 

 The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the 

prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel 

and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 

511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts 

Case 2:21-cv-00962-TLN-DMC Document 11 Filed 10/19/22 Page 6 of 9
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

7

of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 

(1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. 

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with 

“food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 

801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when 

two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such 

that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2) 

subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of 

inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison 

official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. 

 Under these principles, prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to 

protect inmates from harm. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 1982); 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. Liability exists only when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, 

the prisoner was incarcerated under conditions presenting a substantial risk of serious harm; and 

(2) subjectively, prison officials knew of and disregarded the risk. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

The very obviousness of the risk may suffice to establish the knowledge element. See Wallis v. 

Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1995). Prison officials are not liable, however, if evidence 

is presented that they lacked knowledge of a safety risk. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. The 

knowledge element does not require that the plaintiff prove that prison officials know for a 

certainty that the inmate’s safety is in danger, but it requires proof of more than a mere suspicion 

of danger. See Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). Finally, the plaintiff must 

show that prison officials disregarded a risk. Thus, where prison officials actually knew of a 

substantial risk, they are not liable if they took reasonable steps to respond to the risk, even if 

harm ultimately was not averted. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. 

 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim is, as currently framed, 

too vague and speculative to proceed. First, Plaintiff has not alleged that he was incarcerated 

under conditions creating a substantial risk to his health. To the contrary, Plaintiff alleges that he 

was placed in quarantine where he was separated and thus protected from infection. Second, 

Case 2:21-cv-00962-TLN-DMC Document 11 Filed 10/19/22 Page 7 of 9
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

8

Plaintiff has not alleged facts to show that prison officials were aware of an actual risk and 

disregarded it. Again, according to Plaintiff, he was placed in quarantine. This shows that prison 

officials took the risk of infection seriously and acted accordingly. Finally, Plaintiff states the 

risk to his safety came from potentially infected inmates. In other words, Plaintiff alleges nothing 

more than a mere suspicion of danger. 

 The facts alleged do not establish either the subjective or objective elements of an 

Eighth Amendment claim. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend. If Plaintiff elects 

to do so, he should keep in mind the principles above relating to the requirement to allege facts to 

show a causal link. As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s second claim against unnamed 

“Administration” officials fails to do so, even assuming Plaintiff otherwise pleaded sufficient 

facts to establish the subjective and objective elements of his claim.

III. CONCLUSION

 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 

amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire 

action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is 

informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See

Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to 

amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended 

complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if 

Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make 

Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be 

complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 

 As has been explained above, if Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff 

must demonstrate how the conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must 

allege in specific terms how each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some 

affirmative link or connection between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See

Case 2:21-cv-00962-TLN-DMC Document 11 Filed 10/19/22 Page 8 of 9
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

9

May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 

Cir. 1978). 

 Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the 

time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 

1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply 

with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). 

See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and

 2. Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of 

service of this order.

Dated: October 18, 2022 

____________________________________ 

DENNIS M. COTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:21-cv-00962-TLN-DMC Document 11 Filed 10/19/22 Page 9 of 9