Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01566/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01566-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 

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NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

GLOBAL TRAFFIC TECHNOLOGIES LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

RODNEY K. MORGAN, KM ENTERPRISES, INC.,

Defendants-Appellants

STC, INC.,

Defendant-Appellant

______________________ 

2014-1537, 2014-1566

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

District of Minnesota in No. 0:10-cv-04110-ADM-JJG, 

Judge Ann D. Montgomery.

______________________ 

Decided: June 4, 2015

______________________ 

CHAD DROWN, Faegre Baker Daniels LLP, Minneapolis, MN, argued for plaintiff-appellee. Also represented 

by JAMES W. PORADEK, TIMOTHY E. GRIMSRUD, LAUREN J.

FRANK, TIMOTHY M. SULLIVAN, EVA BETH STENSVAD. 

LOUIS W. TOMPROS, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and 

Dorr LLP, Boston, MA, argued for all defendantsCase: 14-1566 Document: 13-2 Page: 1 Filed: 06/04/2015
2 GLOBAL TRAFFIC TECHNOLOGIES v. MORGAN

appellants. Defendant-appellant STC, Inc. also represented by ANANT KUMAR SARASWAT; ROBERT ANTHONY 

ARCAMONA, Washington, DC.

JANA YOCOM RINE, Jana Yocom, P.C., Mount Vernon, 

IL, for defendants-appellants Rodney K. Morgan, KM 

Enterprises, Inc. 

______________________ 

Before DYK, O’MALLEY, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge.

Global Traffic Technologies, LLC (“GTT”) asserted

U.S. Patent No. 5,539,398 (“the ’398 patent”) against 

Rodney Morgan, KM Enterprises, Inc., and STC, Inc. 

(collectively, “Appellants”)1 in the United States District 

Court for the District of Minnesota. At trial, the jury 

found that Appellants willfully infringed, inter alia, 

method claims 16 and 17 of the ’398 patent, awarding 

$5,052,118 in damages. Because Appellants claim construction arguments regarding the method claims are 

waived, we affirm the finding of infringement and decline 

to address Appellants’ claim construction arguments for 

the remaining system claims. We also reverse the district 

court’s imposition of enhanced damages under § 284, but 

affirm its conclusions regarding the sufficiency of GTT’s 

marking, the admission of GTT’s damages expert’s testimony, and Morgan’s personal liability. Accordingly, we 

affirm-in-part, reverse-in-part, and remand. 

1 Although KM Enterprises, Inc. (“KME”) and Morgan, the sole shareholder of KME, filed separate appellate 

briefs, we treat Appellants collectively except where 

noted. 

 

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I. BACKGROUND

A. The ’398 Patent

The ’398 patent asserted that there was a need to 

preempt the normal traffic signal programming for emergency vehicles—e.g., fire trucks and ambulances. The 

’398 patent explained that preemption would allow those

vehicles to get to an emergency more quickly and safely. 

The ’398 patent discussed that the prior art systems for 

preempting traffic signals were based on optical emitters 

or radio transmitters. According to the patent, these prior 

art systems were inadequate because they required a lineof-sight with the signal controller or suffered from 

range/location inaccuracies. 

To solve these alleged deficiencies, the ’398 patent 

purported to provide a traffic control preemption system 

for emergency vehicles that used data from a global 

positioning system (“GPS”). In the disclosed invention, 

each vehicle was equipped with a GPS receiver and a 

processor module to generate “navigational vehicle data, 

such as position, heading and velocity.” ’398 patent col. 3 

ll. 51–53. Each intersection was equipped with a module 

that received the navigational vehicle data, determined if 

the vehicle was approaching that intersection, and decided whether to preempt the normal traffic signal programming. 

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Figure 1 is illustrative:

’398 patent Fig. 1. In Figure 1, the disclosed preemption 

system included a vehicle module 100 and an intersection 

module 200. The vehicle module 100 included the GPS 

receiver, which received the GPS information from a GPS 

system 5. The vehicle module 100 processed the GPS 

data and transmitted it “via transmitter 80 and antenna 

101 to the intersection module 200.” ’398 patent col. 5 l. 

24–25. The intersection module 200 received the data via 

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receiver antenna 210. The intersection module 200 then 

processed the vehicle data, and determined whether the 

vehicle was “within one of the allowed approaches to that 

intersection.” ’398 patent col. 5 ll. 47–48. If the vehicle 

was “within” one of those allowed approaches, the intersection controller 320 would adjust the traffic signal 

programming appropriately to allow the emergency 

vehicle to pass through the intersection. 

 Claim 16 is representative of the method claims on 

appeal: 

16. A traffic control preemption method which 

uses data received from a global positioning system (GPS) to determine whether a vehicle, having 

an associated vehicle path, is allowed to preempt 

traffic signals at an intersection comprising the 

steps of:

(a) receiving GPS signals;

(b) processing the GPS signals on-board the vehicle so as to generate vehicle data;

(c) transmitting the vehicle data;

(d) providing a map of allowed approaches, wherein the map of allowed approaches comprises a plurality of preprogrammed allowed positions 

proximate to the intersection;

(e) comparing the vehicle data with the map of allowed approaches;

(f) determining based on a comparing step (e), 

whether the vehicle is within one of the allowed 

approaches; and

(g) allowing the vehicle to preempt the traffic signals associated with the intersection if the vehicle 

is within one of the allowed approaches.

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’398 patent col. 10 ll. 43–63 (emphasis added). The italicized term is at issue in the present appeal. 

B. The Procedural History

STC, Inc. (“STC”) partnered with KME, Morgan’s 

company, to manufacture and distribute the EMTRAC 

GPS traffic preemption system (“EMTRAC”).2 STC was 

responsible for manufacturing EMTRAC, and KME and 

Morgan were responsible for marketing and selling the 

system. On September 30, 2010, GTT sued Morgan in the 

United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, 

alleging that EMTRAC infringed the ’398 patent. On 

April 28, 2011, GTT amended its complaint to include 

Morgan’s company, KME. GTT filed a separate complaint 

against STC on December 22, 2011, again alleging that 

EMTRAC infringed the ’398 patent. The district court 

consolidated the two actions in response to a stipulated 

motion. 

Prior to trial, the district court construed the disputed 

claim terms—including “map of allowed approaches,” 

which was given its plain meaning. Global Traffic Techs. 

LLC v. Emtrac Sys. Inc., No. 0:10-cv-4110, 2012 WL 

2884846, at *5 (D. Minn. July 13, 2012) (“Claim Construction Order”). On September 20, 2013, the jury returned a 

verdict finding that KME, Morgan, and STC willfully 

infringed, inter alia, method claims 16 and 17.3 The jury 

2 EMTRAC is a traffic preemption system that uses 

GPS receivers on emergency vehicles to determine the 

vehicles’ positions.

3 Because Appellants do not separately challenge 

dependent claim 17, we will only address independent 

method claim 16 on appeal. The jury also found infringement of certain system claims in the ’398 patent. 

On appeal, Appellants challenge the construction of claim 

 

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awarded GTT $5,052,118 in damages for the infringement. The district court denied all of Appellants’ posttrial motions for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”), 

finding that: (1) GTT adequately proved infringement of 

the method claims for the jury to find infringement, (2) 

Appellants’ infringement was willful, (3) the testimony of 

GTT’s damages expert was properly admitted, and (4) the 

jury properly found Morgan personally liable for infringement. Global Traffic Techs. LLC v. Emtrac Sys. 

Inc., No. 0:10-cv-4110, 2014 WL 1663420 (D. Minn. Apr. 

25, 2013) (“JMOL Order”). The district court also awarded GTT $2,526,059 in enhanced damages under § 284

(50% of the total damages award), $923,965 in prejudgment interest, and $1,384.14 per day in postjudgment interest. 

Appellants timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012). 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Claim 16

STC recognizes that, our analysis of claim 16 is potentially dispositive of its challenge to the jury’s infringement 

verdict. See Oral Arg. at 0:09, Global Traffic Techs. LLC 

v. Morgan, 2014-1537, available at

http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?/fl=20

14-1537.mp3 (“There are many issues raised in this 

appeal, but I would like to start with one that is case 

dispositive, and that is the construction of ‘map of allowed 

approaches.’”). Specifically, if we affirm the district 

court’s construction of “map of allowed approaches,” 

because STC has asserted no other viable grounds upon 

which to attack the jury’s verdict of infringement with 

respect to claim 16, that verdict will stand. And, because 

terms in these system claims, but, as explained infra, we 

need not reach these constructions.

 

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the method and system claims are allegedly infringed by 

the same products and conduct, STC does not contend 

that the number of claims infringed impacts the damages 

award, making an analysis of claim 1 and its claim terms 

unnecessary. 

In its claim construction order, the district court 

found that “map of allowed approaches”—the only disputed term in claim 16—should be given its “plain meaning.” 

Claim Construction Order, 2012 WL 2884846, at *5. In 

explaining its ruling, and the dispute between the parties

it was resolving, the district court expressly refused to 

include two specific limitations in this claim term: a 

geographical or “location-specific” one and one it characterized as redundant. Id. STC had urged that the term 

include a reference to the fact that the map be a “preprogrammed” map and that the court expressly inform the 

jury that “said map” is to be “stored at the intersection” 

“where the traffic signal that is to be preempted is located.” Id. The district court rejected both suggestions. 

While the court agreed that the map referenced in claim 

16 must be preprogrammed, the court found that fact to 

be expressly stated elsewhere in the claim, making its use 

as a modifier of map redundant. Id. The court also found, 

for reasons it had explained when assessing similar 

requests by STC for intersection-specific location limitations to be read into other claim terms in the ’389 patent, 

that no location-specific limitation should be read into 

map of allowed approaches. Id. Because, in the absence

of STC’s requests for these specific limitations, the court 

found no other dispute between the parties regarding the 

meaning of this claim term, it afforded the phrase its 

plain meaning. Importantly, STC neither sought reconsideration of the court’s order as to this term nor explained at any time before trial that the court 

misunderstood the points it was urging with respect to 

the phrase “map of allowed approaches.” The case proceeded to trial and, after the jury returned its verdict 

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finding infringement of claim 16, the district court rejected STC’s motion for JMOL, explaining that GTT presented evidence that the EMTRAC system performed each of 

the claimed steps, as the trial court had construed them. 

JMOL Order, 2014 WL 1663420, at *2–3. 

On appeal, STC argues that the district court misconstrued “map of allowed approaches,” and that there was 

insufficient evidence for the jury to find direct and indirect infringement of claim 16 under its proposed construction. 

i. Claim Construction: “map of allowed approaches”

Claim construction is a matter of law, which we review de novo, but we review any underlying factual 

findings by the district court for clear error. Teva Pharm. 

USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 837–38 (2015). 

Generally, claim terms should be given their ordinary and 

customary meaning from the perspective of a person 

having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the effective 

date of the patent application. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 

F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). To ascertain the scope and meaning of the asserted claims, we 

look to the words of the claims themselves, the specification, the prosecution history, and any relevant extrinsic 

evidence. Id. at 1315–17. This inquiry, at times, begins 

and ends with the intrinsic evidence. In fact, the specification is the single best guide to the meaning of the claim 

terms; it is often dispositive. Id. at 1318 (“[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction 

analysis. Usually, it is dispositive . . . .” (internal citations omitted)).

On appeal, STC argues that the district court should 

have construed the term “map of allowed approaches” as a 

“preprogrammed map of routes to the intersection where 

the traffic signal that is to be preempted is located, said 

map being stored at the intersection.” STC’s Br. 43

(emphasis added by STC). According to STC, the fundaCase: 14-1566 Document: 13-2 Page: 9 Filed: 06/04/2015
10 GLOBAL TRAFFIC TECHNOLOGIES v. MORGAN

mental dispute between the parties as to this limitation is 

“whether an ‘approach’ can encompass a fixed area (like a 

rectangle on a map), or whether it requires movement 

(like a route).” Id. STC contends that the claims, specification, and figures make clear that the “allowed approaches” limitation requires measurement of movement 

along a path or route toward the intersection and do not 

encompass static detection zones. More specifically, STC

contends that the map of allowed approaches must be 

created from data tracking vehicle movement along a 

path using multiple data points along that path. STC’s

Br. 44.

GTT responds that STC waived this argument because it never argued before the district court that the 

“allowed approaches” required movement toward an 

intersection. GTT contends that the specification and 

claim language makes clear that the “map of allowed 

approaches” can take any shape, including rectangular 

detection zones. 

We agree with GTT that STC waived this argument 

by failing to raise it to the district court. See Singleton v. 

Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976) (“It is a general rule, of 

course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an 

issue not passed upon below.”). Although STC did argue 

that “map of allowed approaches” should mean “preprogrammed map of routes to the intersection where the 

traffic signal to be preempted is located, said map being 

stored at the intersection,” its argument to the district 

court was that the map must be stored at the intersection; 

it never argued that a “route” required movement or a 

particular form of data point tracking. Joint Appendix 

(“J.A.”) 5173–74.

In its claim construction brief, for example, while STC

referenced the concept of a map of “paths,” it only argued 

that the intrinsic evidence required that the “map of 

allowed approaches” (i.e., of its referenced paths) be 

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located at the intersection. J.A. 5173–74; see also J.A. 

5124 (arguing the same in the joint claim construction 

statement). At the Markman hearing, moreover, STC 

confirmed to the court that the main dispute was over the 

physical location of the “map of allowed approaches.” See 

Global Traffic Techs., LLC v. Emtrac Sys., Inc., No. 0:10-

cv-4110 (D. Minn. May 30, 2012), ECF No. 110, at 39:12–

22 (“With regard to ‘map of allowed approaches,’ . . . our 

point in connection with this hearing, is that there is a 

specific, definable geographical location with regard to the 

location and the intersection which is separate from that 

geographical location which is definable with respect to 

the vehicle.”). GTT explained to the trial court that “the 

big dispute seems to be, what [STC’s] main infringement 

argument seems to be, is that they store the maps of 

allowed approaches in the—physically in the vehicle 

computer unit as opposed to physically at the intersection, 

and our position is that none of these claims require a 

physical location limitation.” Id. at 11:11–16. STC not 

only did not dispute that characterization, it debated it 

head on. Id. at 32:2–5 (“The 200 series of numbers within 

the patent refer to the intersection module. The mapping 

means is physically there. The patent doesn’t describe 

anything else, so that’s the only way to construe that 

language.”); see also id. at 39:23–25 (“Figures 1, 2 and 3 of 

the patent support [STC’s] claim construction that ‘map of 

allowed approaches’ has this physical element where it is 

within the intersection module.”). Indeed, at the Markman hearing, GTT even characterized the allowed approaches as “rectangles,” and STC never objected to that 

characterization. Id. at 7:6–9 (“In the slide here, the 

rectangle’s showing one of the allowed approaches to the 

intersection and its determining that this police car’s in 

the allowed approach using this GPS technology.”).

In its claim construction order, the district court rejected STC’s “locational limitation” argument in finding 

that “map of allowed approaches” should be given its 

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plain meaning, but did not address whether the term 

required movement. See Claim Construction Order, 2012 

WL 2884846, at *5. As noted, following the claim construction order, STC never argued that the district court 

failed to address what they now claim is a fundamental 

dispute between the parties as to whether the “map of 

allowed approaches” requires movement or non-static

directionality. See STC’s Br. 43–47; Oral Arg. at 1:40. 

Tellingly, although STC requested construction of other 

claim terms after the Markman order, it never made its 

directionality argument before the district court. As a 

result we find STC’s proposed construction of “map of 

allowed approaches” waived.4 

Accordingly, we reject STC’s argument that “map of 

allowed approaches” should be limited to a map of 

“movement along a path (toward the intersection).” STC’s 

Br. 46. 

ii. Infringement

Because infringement was tried to a jury, we review 

the jury’s finding of infringement for substantial evidence. 

i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 849 (Fed. 

Cir. 2010). It is sufficient for us to discuss indirect infringement. There is no substantial challenge on appeal 

to the sufficiency of the evidence to show the required 

underlying direct infringement—here, that Appellants’

customers performed the steps of claim 16. As to the 

other elements of indirect infringement, the challenges on 

appeal fail based on meritlessness, waiver, or both.

4 Although STC argued at oral argument that it 

presented evidence at trial regarding the difference 

between the EMTRAC system and the system disclosed in 

the ’398 patent, those arguments were directed at noninfringement, not claim construction. Oral Arg. at 6:07.

 

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Putting to one side Morgan’s argument about the alleged need for corporate veil-piercing, which we discuss 

below, appellants Morgan and KME argue only that they 

cannot be liable for indirect infringement unless they 

themselves directly infringed. That is incorrect. They can 

be liable for inducing or contributing to the direct infringement of their customers. Moreover, KME did not 

preserve a sufficiency challenge to indirect infringement 

through the required JMOL motions in the district court.

STC, for its part, contends that GTT failed to present

sufficient evidence that it proceeded with the knowledge 

respecting the patent that is required to establish indirect 

infringement. GTT argues that STC waived these arguments by failing to present them in the required JMOL 

motions in the district court. We agree.

Although STC challenged the jury’s finding of infringement of claim 16, it only argued that there was 

insufficient evidence that the EMTRAC system performed 

every claimed step. JMOL Order, 2014 WL 1663420, at 

*2–3. The district court properly rejected this argument 

and STC does not appeal this conclusion. We, therefore, 

agree with GTT that STC waived its new indirect infringement arguments made on appeal. Singleton, 428 

U.S. at 120. 

In addition to waiving these new arguments, they are 

without merit. GTT presented ample evidence that all 

accused infringers had affirmative knowledge of the ’398 

patent, had no reasonable non-infringement defense for 

claim 16 (see Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 

No. 13-896, 2015 WL 2456617 (Sup. Ct. May 26, 2015)), 

and indeed willfully blinded themselves to their infringement of at least claim 16, and the jury was free to credit 

that evidence. See, e.g., J.A. 1734 (“we chose not to read 

it”); J.A. 1779:18–1780:15 (explaining that Morgan and 

STC had knowledge of the ’398 patent when they started 

developing updates to the EMTRAC system). Because 

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Appellants do not challenge the jury instruction, affirming indirect infringement alone is sufficient to uphold the 

jury’s verdict. Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 

1201, 1222 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that a general verdict 

will not be set aside if there is sufficient evidence to 

support any of the alternative factual theories so long as 

there is no dispute over the legal propriety of the jury 

instruction).5 

B. Enhanced Damages Under Section 284

The district court concluded that GTT was entitled to 

enhanced damages because it had proven successfully 

that Appellants willfully infringed the patent. The district court explained that Appellants’ actions were objectively unreasonable because “an objectively reasonable 

person, with knowledge that a patent exists in the field in 

which the potential infringers wish to compete would not 

ignore the patent, but would investigate whether its 

design would infringe.” JMOL Order, 2014 WL 1663420, 

at *13. As the district court noted, moreover, the jury 

found that GTT proved by clear and convincing evidence 

that Appellants actually knew or should have known that 

their actions constituted an unjustifiably high risk of 

infringement. As a result, the district court awarded GTT

enhanced damages under § 284 in the amount of 

$2,526,059 (50% of the total damages award). 

5 GTT also presented evidence that Appellants

themselves performed the patented method by testing and 

supporting the EMTRAC system. See, e.g., J.A. 1693:23–

1694:2 (testifying that Appellants would make the 

EMTRAC systems, test it, and then ship it to customers). 

Because we uphold the jury’s finding of infringement 

based on indirect infringement, however, we need not 

decide whether the evidence of direct infringement is 

sufficient to maintain the entirety of the damages award. 

See Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1222. 

 

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Section 284 states in relevant part that “the court 

may increase the damages up to three times the amount 

found or assessed.” A patentee must show that he is 

entitled to enhanced damages by showing that the infringer willfully infringed. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 

F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc). Seagate sets out a 

two-part test for proving willfulness where the patentee

must show that: (1) “the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent,” and (2) the “objectivelydefined risk (determined by the record developed in the 

infringement proceeding) was either known or so obvious 

that it should have been known to the accused infringer.” 

Id. at 1371. The first question is for the court; the second 

is for the jury. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. 

Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 

We review the first prong de novo and the second prong 

for substantial evidence. SSL Servs., LLC v. Citrix Sys., 

Inc., 769 F.3d 1073, 1090–91 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

On appeal, Appellants challenge the district court’s 

analysis of the first prong. We conclude that the district 

court applied the wrong standard in its analysis of that

prong. The district court found that there was ample 

evidence in the record that Appellants knew of the patent 

and determined that “an objectively reasonable person, 

with knowledge that a patent exists in the field in which 

the potential infringers wish to compete would not ignore 

the patent, but would investigate whether its design 

would infringe.” JMOL Order, 2014 WL 1663420, at *13. 

The infringer’s knowledge of the patent is irrelevant to 

the first Seagate prong, however. See Seagate, 497 F.3d 

at 1371 (“The state of mind of the accused infringer is not 

relevant to this objective inquiry.”). Instead, the district 

court should have considered whether Appellants acted 

“despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions 

constituted infringement of a valid patent.” Seagate, 497 

F.3d at 1371. This requires analysis of all of the infringCase: 14-1566 Document: 13-2 Page: 15 Filed: 06/04/2015
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er’s non-infringement and invalidity defenses, even if 

those defenses were developed for litigation. See Halo 

Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1382 (Fed. 

Cir. 2014) (“The court properly considered the totality of 

the record evidence, including the obviousness defense 

that Pulse developed during the litigation, to determine 

whether there was an objectively-defined risk of infringement of a valid patent.”). 

In this case, the district court found that Appellants

“had good-faith invalidity defenses once litigation began.” 

JMOL Order, 2014 WL 1663420, at *14. We agree. 

Because Appellants’ defenses during litigation were 

objectively reasonable, GTT failed to prove the first prong 

of our willfulness test. See Halo, 769 F.3d at 1382. As a 

result, we reverse the district court’s award of enhanced 

damages under § 284.

C. Marking

GTT makes and sells the Opticom GPS System (“the 

Opticom system”). There is no dispute that the Opticom 

system embodies at least one claim of the ’398 patent. 

GTT argued that Appellants received constructive notice 

of the ’398 patent because, although GTT did not mark 

the physical components in the system, it did mark the 

packaging in which the Opticom system was sold. The 

district court instructed the jury to determine whether 

marking the packaging was sufficient to meet GTT’s 

marking requirement under § 287. The jury found that 

GTT adequately marked Opticom and, based on that 

conclusion, awarded damages from the date Appellants

started selling the EMTRAC system, rather than the date 

on which GTT filed this lawsuit. The district court upheld 

the jury’s finding in response to Appellants’ motion for 

JMOL.

On appeal, Appellants argue that GTT failed to comply with the marking statute because it marked the 

packaging of its patented products rather than the indiCase: 14-1566 Document: 13-2 Page: 16 Filed: 06/04/2015
GLOBAL TRAFFIC TECHNOLOGIES v. MORGAN 17

vidual products themselves, even though there was sufficient physical space on the components of the Opticom 

system for marking. In essence, Appellants ask us to hold

as a matter of law that, if there is physical space on any 

component of a patented system, the patentee must mark 

that component to comply with the marking statute. 

Section 287(a) states in relevant part:

Patentees . . . may give notice to the public that 

[any patented article] is patented, either by fixing 

thereon the word “patent” or the abbreviation 

“pat.” together with the number of the patent . . .

or when, from the character of the article, this can 

not be done, by fixing to it, or to the package 

wherein one or more of them is contained, a label 

containing a like notice. 

35 U.S.C. § 287(a). As the statute states, marking of “any 

patented article” is necessary if, “from the character of the 

article,” it can be marked. Id. In this case, the “patented 

article” is a system such that the “character of the article” 

is defined by more than the physical surfaces on its component parts. Id. Because the purpose of the marking 

statute is to provide constructive notice to the public,

moreover, we apply a rule of reason analysis in determining when “substantial compliance may be found to satisfy 

the [marking] statute.” Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 

1098, 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 

As noted, the marking statute requires an analysis of 

the “character of the article.” 35 U.S.C. § 287(a). Certainly, the physical size of the article may be one factor in 

considering whether the article itself must be marked

rather than the packaging. See Sessions v. Romandka, 

145 U.S. 29, 49–50 (1896) (considering the patentee’s 

ability to stamp the patented screws with a legible mark

based on the size of the screws). The physical size of the 

patented article, however, is not the only thing that 

defines the “character of the article.” 35 U.S.C. § 287(a). 

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There may be many other aspects of a patented article 

that can affect whether marking the article provides 

sufficient constructive notice to the public. See Maxwell, 

86 F.3d at 1111. Because we do not pretend to know all of 

the possible types, characteristics, or components of 

patented—and yet to be patented—machines and systems, we cannot construct a bright line rule regarding 

what aspects to consider in determining whether marking 

the packaging amounts to “substantial compliance.” Id. 

One example is a multi-component system that embodies 

a patent. In this example, marking the individual components of the system may not have the desired notice effect 

of providing public notice because such markings may 

mislead the public into believing that the marked components themselves are patented, as opposed to the entire 

multi-component system. As another example, patented 

articles may be immediately installed out of the public 

view once unpackaged. Again, in this example, the public 

may be better notified with marking on the packaging, as 

opposed to the article itself. 

We use these examples to show that the physical size 

of the article is not the only aspect of the “character of the 

article” that may be considered. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a). 

Because there may be many factors that affect the character of a patented article, we hold that, when a patentee 

marks the packaging rather than the article, the district 

court should evaluate the specific character of the article 

at issue. See Sessions, 145 U.S. at 50 (“[S]omething must 

be left to the judgment of the patentee, who appears in 

this case to have complied with the alternative provision 

of the act, in affixing a label to the packages in which the 

[patented articles] were shipped and sold.”). This factual 

inquiry regarding the character of the patented article, 

moreover, may be submitted to a jury, as the district court 

did here. 

In this case, there was substantial evidence for the 

jury to find that GTT substantially complied with § 287 by 

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GLOBAL TRAFFIC TECHNOLOGIES v. MORGAN 19

marking the Opticom packaging. Appellants presented 

evidence that their patented product was an entire system that contained multiple components that were separated once unpackaged. J.A. 1980:9–16 (“My 

understanding is the thought around the packaging is 

that the, again, this is a system. It’s all the components 

functioning together. The only time the system is really 

together is when it is shipped from the manufacturer. So 

that’s the only time that all the components are together.”). Appellants’ expert also testified that some of the 

components are not in the public view once installed and 

that other companies had marked the product in the same 

way, that the marking used reflected industry custom. 

See J.A. 1980:24–1981:9 (“And then when they are installed, in many cases, the face selector, for example, is 

installed inside of a traffic control cabinet. That cabinet 

is locked. It’s out of public view. The mast arm radio that 

you saw earlier is mounted on top of a mast arm or a pole 

that the signal lights are hanging on. It’s mounted up on 

top of that. That’s high up and out of public view. The 

vehicle components as well, one component could be in the 

trunk of a police car, a bus, for example. The component 

could be in an equipment cabinet, again locked, excuse 

me, out of the public view.”); J.A. 1979:10–19 (testifying 

that 3M marked Opticom the same way before GTT 

acquired the technology). Based on these factors, it was 

reasonable for the jury to conclude that marking the 

packaging of Opticom—the only time when all of the 

components that made up the patented system were 

together and in full view of the public—adequately served 

the purpose of providing constructive notice to the public 

that the entire Opticom system was patented. 

For the foregoing reasons, we uphold the jury’s finding that GTT complied with the marking statute.

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20 GLOBAL TRAFFIC TECHNOLOGIES v. MORGAN

D. GTT’s Expert’s Testimony

The district court found that it properly allowed testimony by GTT’s damages expert at trial. We review the 

admission of expert testimony under the law of the regional circuit—here, the Eighth Circuit. Ericsson, 773 

F.3d at 1225. The Eighth Circuit reviews the admission 

of expert testimony for abuse of discretion. Bonner v. ISP 

Techs., Inc., 259 F.3d 924, 928 (8th Cir. 2001). 

On appeal, Appellants argue that the district court 

breached its gatekeeping obligation under Daubert v. 

Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), 

by failing to exclude GTT’s damages expert’s trial testimony. Appellants contend that GTT’s expert failed to 

consider price elasticity in his testimony at trial, providing no economic evidence to support his theory. That is 

not so: GTT’s expert did testify to price inelasticity at 

trial. See J.A. 2100, 2102. As GTT points out, moreover, 

GTT’s expert’s testimony was based on the analysis in his 

expert report, which elaborated on price elasticity. Appellants do not argue that GTT’s expert departed from the 

methodology described in his report, or that the methodology in his report was improper. Appellants had the 

opportunity to cross-examine GTT’s expert and could have 

asked him about price elasticity at trial.

We, therefore, affirm the district court’s denial of Appellants’ motion for JMOL regarding the exclusion of 

GTT’s damages expert’s testimony.

E. Personal Liability of Morgan

The district court denied Morgan’s motion for JMOL 

that he was not personally liable for infringement. We 

review a district court’s denial of JMOL under the law of 

the regional circuit. Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing 

Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The Eighth 

Circuit reviews a district court’s grant or denial of JMOL 

de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. 

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GLOBAL TRAFFIC TECHNOLOGIES v. MORGAN 21

Synergetics, Inc. v. Hurst, 477 F.3d 949, 956 (8th Cir. 

2007). To grant a motion for JMOL, we must find that 

“there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis to support 

a jury verdict in the non-moving party’s favor.” Id. (citing 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1)).

On appeal, Morgan argues that GTT never alleged 

that Morgan was individually liable as an infringer, only 

that Morgan was liable as the sole shareholder and director of KME. Morgan also contends that, as KME’s corporate officer, he cannot be found personally liable for 

infringement absent a finding that the corporate veil 

should be pierced. GTT responds that it explicitly pled 

that Morgan was personally liable in its amended complaint and throughout the course of litigation. GTT 

insists that there was ample evidence that Morgan personally induced infringement under § 271(b). 

We agree with GTT that it adequately alleged that 

Morgan was individually liable as an infringer, starting 

with the complaint and continuing through trial. We also 

agree with GTT that the jury had a sufficient basis to find 

that Morgan personally induced infringement based on

his own actions, and was therefore directly liable. Accordingly, there was no need to pierce the corporate veil to 

find Morgan derivatively liable for KME’s infringement. 

As we explained in Wordtech Systems, Inc. v. Integrated 

Networks Solutions, Inc., 609 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2010), 

“‘corporate officers who actively assist with their corporation’s infringement may be personally liable for inducing 

infringement regardless of whether the circumstances are 

such that a court should disregard the corporate entity 

and pierce the corporate veil.’” 609 F.3d at 1316 (quoting 

Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 

544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). In this case, GTT presented 

substantial evidence to indicate that Morgan personally

induced customers to perform the patented method in 

claim 16 of the ’398 patent. See, e.g., J.A. 1757:20–

1760:20 (testifying that he personally helped cities use the 

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22 GLOBAL TRAFFIC TECHNOLOGIES v. MORGAN

EMTRAC system and got his “hands dirty every day, 

installing, testing, repairing and developing” the 

EMTRAC GPS product). The jury reasonably found that 

Morgan is personally liable for his own actions that 

constituted induced infringement under § 271(b), without 

piercing the corporate veil. See Wordtech, 609 F.3d at 

1316; see also United States v. Trek Leather, Inc., 767 F.3d 

1288, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“[A] person who 

personally commits a wrongful act is not relieved of 

liability because the person was acting for another.”).

Furthermore, GTT made it clear that it was only alleging induced infringement against Morgan and all of its 

evidence of Morgan’s involvement was focused on proving 

induced infringement. See J.A. 1015:2–4 (“[We are] 

pursuing individual liability for Rodney Morgan only 

under an inducement theory under Section 271.”); J.A. 

1757:18 (“And, now, we’re talking about indirect infringement.”). Furthermore, Morgan does not challenge 

the district court’s jury instruction on appeal.6

6 In Wordtech, this court stated that “the ‘corporate 

veil’ shields a company’s officers from personal liability 

for direct infringement that the officers commit in the 

name of the corporation, unless the corporation is the 

officers’ ‘alter ego.’” 609 F.3d at 1313. We do not believe 

this statement represents a departure from the traditional rule that a person is personally liable for his own 

tortious actions, even if committed as a corporate officer. 

See Trek Leather, 767 F.3d at 1299 (“It is longstanding 

agency law that an agent who actually commits a tort is 

generally liable for the tort along with the principal, even 

though the agent was acting for the principal. That rule 

applies, in particular, when a corporate officer is acting 

for the corporation.” (citations omitted)). Instead, we 

interpret Wordtech as reinforcing the rule that a corporate officer—or perhaps only a corporate owner, see 

 

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GLOBAL TRAFFIC TECHNOLOGIES v. MORGAN 23

Accordingly, we affirm the infringement verdict 

against Morgan and in favor of GTT. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the jury’s finding 

of infringement of the asserted method claims of the ’398 

patent—claims 16 and 17—but reverse the district court’s 

imposition of enhanced damages under § 284. We also 

affirm the jury’s finding that GTT complied with the 

marking statute, the district court’s findings that GTT’s 

damages expert’s testimony was properly admitted, and 

the infringement verdict against Morgan. We remand for 

the district court to enter judgment consistent with this 

opinion.

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART, 

REMANDED

Wordtech, 609 F.3d at 1313 n.2—cannot be found derivatively liable for the corporation’s infringement without 

piercing the corporate veil. See, e.g., Manville, 917 F.2d 

at 552 (“For Butterworth and DiSimone, officers of Paramount, to be personally liable for Paramount’s infringement under section 271(a), there must be evidence to 

justify piercing the corporate veil.” (emphasis added)); 

Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 

1565, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“To determine whether 

corporate officers are personally liable for the direct 

infringement of the corporation under § 271(a) requires 

invocation of those general principles relating to piercing 

the corporate veil.” (emphasis added)). Because GTT only 

argues that Morgan induced infringement in this case, 

however, we need not reach this issue.

 

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