Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_08-cv-00098/USCOURTS-azd-4_08-cv-00098-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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WO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Timothy Coleman, 

Plaintiff,

v.

City of Tucson, a body politic,

Defendants. 

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CV 08-98 TUC DCB

ORDER

The Court grants in part and denies in part the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. The

Defendant shall file its Answer, and a case management scheduling conference shall be set

accordingly. 

Introduction

Timothy Coleman (“Plaintiff”) was an employee of the City of Tucson

(“Defendant”) from December 2, 1991 to January 25, 2007. During his employment,

Plaintiff was diagnosed with various medical and psychological conditions that resulted in

extended absences from work. Plaintiff informed Defendant that he was disabled. As a

result of his disability, Plaintiff was incapable of meeting the demands of his position, and

he sought reasonable accommodations. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant failed to provide

these accommodations and that he suffered adverse employment actions because of his

disability, including being forced to take medical retirement.

Plaintiff filed his Complaint on February 5, 2008, alleging discriminatory

employment practices. Plaintiff seeks relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the

Arizona Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and right of privacy provisions under the Health

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Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. He also claims that Defendant retaliated

against him when he complained that he was being discriminated against based on his

disability. Plaintiff seeks money damages, injunctive and other equitable relief.

The Defendant asks the Court to dismiss the case, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), because

the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Standard of Review

The Supreme Court has explained that to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted, “factual allegations must be enough to raise

a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the

complaint are true even if doubtful in fact.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955,

1965 (2007) (citations and internal quotations omitted). “While a complaint attacked by a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s

obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id.

at 1964 (citations and internal quotations omitted). “[O]nce a claim has been stated

adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations

in the complaint.” Id. at 1968 (abrogating a literal reading of Conley: “A complaint should

not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”)

Under Rule 12(b)(6), all factual allegations are taken as true and construed in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Iolab Corp. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 15 F.3d 1500,

1504 (9th Cir.1994), and all reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of that party as

well. Jacobsen v. Hughes Aircraft, 105 F.3d 1288, 1296 (9th Cir.1997). Dismissal is

appropriate if the facts alleged do not state a claim that is “plausible on its own face.”

Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1973. Plaintiff must allege facts which plausibly support his claims;

it is not enough if the facts are merely consistent with his claims. Id. at 1959. The Supreme

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Court has found this reflects Rule 8(a)(2)’s threshold requirement that the “plain statement”

possess enough heft to “sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id.

Discussion

I. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Claim

Plaintiff has set forth sufficient facts to support a prima facie claim of discrimination

under the ADA, and the motion to dismiss is denied. To qualify for relief under the ADA,

plaintiff must show that: (1) he is a disabled person within the meaning of the statute; (2) he

is qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform essential functions of the

job he holds or seeks; and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action because of his

disability. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq. Defendant does not dispute that the Plaintiff has a

disability.

A. Qualified, with or without Reasonable Accommodation

A disabled person is “qualified,” for ADA purposes, if the individual can perform the

essential functions of an employment position, with or without reasonable accommodation.

42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). “Essential functions” refer to the “fundamental job duties of the

employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires.” It does not “include

the marginal functions of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). A job function may be

considered “essential” for various reasons. See id. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i)-(iii). The statute provides

that “consideration shall be given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of the job

are essential...” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 

Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that he is “qualified.” Hutton v. Elf Atochem

North America, Inc., 273 F.3d 884, 892 (9th Cir.2001). This is a two part inquiry; Plaintiff

must show either that he can perform the job's essential functions without reasonable

accommodation, or that he can do so with reasonable accommodation. See Kaplan v. City of

North Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1231 (9th Cir.2003). In the latter instance, the plaintiff

must allege the existence of a reasonable accommodation that would permit him to perform

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the essential functions of his position. U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401, 122 S.Ct.

1516 (2002). If the suggested accommodation is reasonable on its face, the burden shifts to

the defendant to show that it is unreasonable on the facts presented. Id. at 402. 

A reasonable accommodation may include job restructuring, part-time or modified

work schedules, and reassignment. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). The ADA does not require an

employer to modify an essential function of an existing position in order to accommodate a

disabled employee. Martin v. Kansas, 190 F.3d 1120, 1133 (10th Cir.2001) overruled on

other grounds, Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373-74 (2001).

While an employer need not create a new position for a disabled employee, the employer

must consider the employee for a vacant position for which he is qualified. This mandatory

reassignment of disabled employees as a reasonable accommodation only applies under the

following limited circumstance: 1) the employee becomes unable to perform the essential

function of the job even with reasonable accommodations and 2) there exists, or soon will

be, a vacant position which the employee is qualified to perform. Ransom v. Ariz. Bd. of

Regents, 983 F.Supp. 895, 902 (D.Ariz.1997). 

Plaintiff alleged the following facts. Plaintiff’s position often required him to work

6 to 7 days per week for as much as 70 hours per week. (Complaint at 5, ¶43). Plaintiff

supervised six people. Plaintiff informed Defendant that he was disabled as early as 2003.

(Complaint at 4, ¶28). On January 12 and April 2, 2006, the Defendant reclassified his

position, increasing his responsibilities, which resulted in “unattainable expectations,”

causing Plaintiff mental anguish and stress. (Complaint at 6, ¶44-45). 

On or about July 28, 2006, Plaintiff met with the Department of Human Resources,

and it was recommended and agreed that Plaintiff would apply for and receive from

Defendant an ADA Accommodation. (Complaint at 8, ¶70-71). On or about August 5, 2006,

Defendant received an ADA Reasonable Accommodation Request Form from Plaintiff in

which he attached the Health Care Certification from Dr. Westin. (Complaint at 10, ¶86).

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Plaintiff requested that Defendant transfer him to another position to relieve him from

working as a supervisor as an accommodation for his disability. (Complaint at 10, ¶85). 

Dr. Westin recommended that Plaintiff work no more than 40 hours per week, that his

projects be limited to no more than three projects running simultaneously and that he be

allowed to vary his work day. (Complaint at 10, ¶88). Dr. Westin also stated that Plaintiff

should not be required to supervise others. (Complaint at 10, ¶89). Dr. Westin further opined

that Plaintiff was “substantially limited in thinking/concentrating, learning and interacting

with others.” He had a “low ability to concentrate, remember, or follow through resulting

in tasks not being completed or started; Plaintiff’s depression and limitations made learning

difficult. (Complaint at 9, ¶81-83).

Plaintiff did not want to consider medical retirement. (Complaint at 8, ¶68). Plaintiff

was waiting to be placed in a position which accommodated his disability. (Complaint at 11,

¶103). Defendant required Plaintiff to interview for such positions, (Complaint at 11, ¶104),

and he was not reassigned to a new position. (Complaint at 12, ¶107). 

Defendant submits the Plaintiff admitted he was “totally disabled” when he took

disability retirement and, thereby, admitted he was not qualified for employment. Defendant

argues that it was not required to provide Plaintiff a new position under the ADA, and it

accommodated him by allowing him to apply and interview for a new position.

The disputed material fact of whether or not Plaintiff was “totally disabled” does not

warrant dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failing to state a claim.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive the motion to dismiss, the Plaintiff only needs to allege

sufficient facts creating a genuine issue as to whether he was qualified for employment, with

or without a reasonable accommodation. He has alleged facts to support his claim that he

was qualified for employment with an accommodation. 

In a case where the employee is unable to perform the essential functions of his

current job, but is qualified for an alternative position, reassignment is warranted as a

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reasonable accommodation. Plaintiff claimed he was unable to perform his position,

requested reassignment, alternative employment assignments were available, but Defendant

did not reassign him to such a position. Instead, the Defendant only allowed him to

interview for positions of accommodation, which did not result in a reassignment. 

The key question is whether Plaintiff was qualified to perform the essential functions

of such a reassignment. While Plaintiff fails to provide insight as to the specific duties of the

new positions he sought, or specifically allege that the open positions accommodated his

disability, the Defendant’s challenge also lacks the same specificity. 

The Defendant could not work in excess of 40 hours per week, not supervise others,

and not have more than three ongoing projects at a time. His ability to learn new things was

limited. On its face, a request to accomodate these limitations seems reasonable. It is

undisputed that the Defendant was aware of these limitations and allowed him to interview

for available positions of employment. This is enough to support his claim that he was

qualified for reassignment to open positions of employment. If not, he would not have been

interviewed for them. It is undisputed that he was not reassigned to any of the positions.

Plaintiff has stated a claim that the Defendant failed to accommodate his disability by not

reassigning him to another position.

The Court rejects the Defendant’s argument that it accommodated the Plaintiff’s

disability by allowing him to interview for available positions. This Court will follow

Ransom v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 983 F.Supp. 895 (D.Ariz.1997), where the court held that an

employer may be required to assign a disabled employee to a new position under certain

circumstances. The court in Ransom held that an employer’s policy to make reassignments

through competitive hiring prevents the reassignment of employees with disabilities to vacant

positions for which they are qualified and discriminates against qualified individuals with

disabilities. Like the court in Ransom, this court believes such an accommodation policy

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results in no accommodation at all. Id. at 902 (citing Wood v. County of Alameda, 1995 WL

705139 *14 ((N.D. Cal. 1995). 

Defendant relies on U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) to argue that

it was not legally required to change its rules or give the Plaintiff a preference over more

qualified applicants in order to provide a reasonable accommodation. (Motion at 8-9.)

Barnett dealt with circumstances where an accommodation conflicts with seniority rules.

Ordinarily, this will be an unreasonable accommodation, Barnett, 535 U.S. at 403-404,

because of the importance of seniority to employee-management relations, id. at 401-405.

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that an employee is still entitled to present evidence

of special circumstances that makes the exception to the seniority rule reasonable under

particular facts, id. at 405-406. The employee might show, for example, that the employer

has retained the right to change the system unilaterally, exercised the right fairly frequently,

thereby reducing employee expectation that the system would be followed and making the

requested accommodation reasonable. Id. at 405. Alternatively, the system might contain

exceptions that would make one further exception for a disability accommodation reasonable.

Id. Barnett does not support the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss; there is no evidence the

Plaintiff was denied accommodation because of a seniority system.

B. Adverse Employment Action

Under the ADA, Plaintiff must show that he suffered an adverse employment action

because of his disability. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 et seq. Plaintiff alleges that he was “forced”

into disability retirement. In support of this assertion, Plaintiff has alleged the following: (1)

On July 28, 2006 Plaintiff’s doctor provided Defendant with Health Provider Certification

stating Plaintiff’s impairment as Major Depression that was most likely permanent; (2)

around this same time, Defendant was considering reasonable accommodations for Plaintiff;

(3) no accommodation was provided; (4) Plaintiff was told his medical leave exceeded

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FMLA allowances and he was subject to termination; (5) Plaintiff had no choice but to take

medical retirement. 

Defendant argues it only informed the Plaintiff he was about to exceed the permitted

amount of medical leave. From February 2006 to February 2007, the Plaintiff worked on a

part-time basis for approximately one week in May. Defendant argues that it is not prohibited

from terminating an employee who has exhausted his leave under the Family Medical Leave

Act (FMLA) and that receiving disability retirement benefits is not adverse to the employee’s

interests.

Here, however, it was adverse. Plaintiff alleges he was on medical leave because he

was unable to perform the essential functions of his job, he was awaiting reassignment to

another position as a reasonable accommodation for his disability, Defendant’s failure to

reassign him to an open position had the direct result of forcing him to take additional

medical leave. Consequently, the employer’s action/inaction caused the FMLA clock to

continue running, allowing the employer to then, upon expiration of the FMLA leave,

terminate the employee, or use the threat of looming termination as leverage to “encourage”

his disability retirement. 

Assuming all facts alleged in the Complaint are true, Plaintiff suffered an adverse

action as a result of his disability: Defendant’s failure to reassign Plaintiff forced him to use

his FMLA leave and be subject to termination. The avenue he chose post-termination was

disability retirement. The adverse action was his “constructive discharge,” not his disability

retirement. Plaintiff alleges facts to support a prima facie claim of discrimination under the

ADA. The motion to dismiss the ADA claim is denied.

II. Arizona Civil rights Act (ACRA)

ACRA is modeled after and virtually identical to the ADA. Fallar v. Compuware

Corporation, 202 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1081 n. 9 (Ariz. 2002). Frequently, courts combine the

analysis of the two statutes. Id., see also, Kyles v. Contractors/Engineers Supply, Inc., 190

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Ariz. 403, 405 (Ariz. App.1997) (explaining that employment discrimination claims under

state law follow Federal Title VII precedent). 

It is an unlawful employment practice for any employer to discriminate against any

individual because of the individual's disability, if the disabled individual is qualified; it is

unlawful to fail or refuse to reasonably accommodate the individual's disability. A.R.S. § 41-

1401 et. seq. A "Reasonable accommodation" may include job restructuring, part-time or

modified work schedules, or reassignment to a vacant position. Id. 

An employer may be required to assign a disabled employee to a new position under

certain circumstances. Ransom v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 983 F.Supp. 895 (D.Ariz.1997)

(holding Defendants' policy that reassignments must be made through competitive hiring

prevents the reassignment of employees with disabilities to vacant positions for which they

are qualified and discriminates against qualified individuals with disabilities, in violation of

the ACRA.). Because Plaintiff’s Complaint survives under the ADA, it survives under

ACRA.

III. Retaliation claim

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA, an employee must show

the following: 1) he engaged in a protected activity; 2) suffered an adverse employment

action; and 3) there was a causal link between the two. Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d

1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000)

(holding the same in respect to Title VII employment law cases). The EEOC has interpreted

“adverse employment action” to mean “any adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory

motive and is reasonably likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in

protected activity.” Id. (citing EEOC Compliance Manual Section 8, “Retaliation,” ¶ 8008

(1998)).

Plaintiff has alleged two acts in support of his claim that Defendant retaliated against

him for engaging in a protected activity. He has alleged that his complaints of discrimination

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1

The Court rejects Defendant’s argument that the only actionable events that occurred

in the 300 day time frame prior to the filing of Plaintiff’s EEOC claim are limited to his one

week of part time work in May, 2006 because he was on medical leave the remainder of time.

(Reply at 2-3.) As early as 2003, Plaintiff informed Defendant that he was disabled due to

depression, and by August and October 2006, his disability diagnosis was changed to

Atypical Bipolar Disorder. In January and April of 2006, the Defendant reclassified his

position over Plaintiff’s objections that the job was too stressful and burdensome. In April,

Plaintiff requested three alternative accommodations, including return to his position with

fewer hours and responsibilities or reassignment to a new position with fewer hours and

responsibilities. 

In March, Plaintiff had been placed on medical leave because of back surgery, but he

was released to return to work on a part-time basis in April, which he did for one week in

May. When Plaintiff was unable to perform his job on a part-time basis, he was again placed

on medical leave. On June 7, 2006, he was released from medical leave related to his back

surgery to return to work full duty. Thereafter, Plaintiff was on medical leave related to his

Atypical Bipolar Disorder because Defendant did not reassign him to a position

accommodating his disability. Instead of providing an accommodation, in January, 2007, the

Defendant informed him that his FMLA was exhausted and he would be terminated. Plaintiff

took disability retirement and filed his EEOC claim. (Complaint at 19-133.)

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and requests for reasonable accommodation were followed by two “reclassifications” of his

position with increased burdens and responsibilities and refusal to reassign him to another

position, which forced him to take disability retirement. Defendant argues the

reclassifications did not create additional burdens and responsibilities because Plaintiff was

already performing these duties. It merely reflected the work he was actually performing.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff engaged in the protected activity of informing the

Defendant that he was disabled and that he had disability related limitations that prevented

him from performing essential functions of his job. Thereafter, Defendant reclassified his

position, which solidified his inability to perform the tasks and responsibilities and made

reassignment to a new position his only means of accommodation. Defendant then refused

to reassign him to a new position until his medical leave expired under the FMLA, causing

him to be subject to termination and forcing him to take disability retirement. Plaintiff

alleges a prima facie case of retaliation.1

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The first reclassification of Plaintiff’s position was prior to April, but the second

reclassification was in April and Defendant’s failure to accommodate the Plaintiff extended

throughout the 300 days prior to the filing of the EEOC claim. The Complaint states a

jurisdictional basis for Plaintiff’s claims.

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IV. 42 U.S.C. §1983

Title 42 section 1983 of the United States Code (§1983) provides a cause of action for

the deprivation of any rights, privileges secured by the Constitution and laws; it allows the

injured party to bring a proceeding for relief from the opposing party. Plaintiff rests this

claim on Defendant’s alleged ADA violations. Defendant argues that because the ADA

provides a comprehensive enforcement mechanism, it precludes any corollary action based

on §1983, when it is based on the same facts. (Motion at 15 (citing Americans with

Disabilities Practice and Compliance Manual, 7:49; see also: Thompson v. City of Arlington,

Tex., 838 F. Supp. 1137, 1149 (N.E. Tex., 1993)).

Plaintiff’s § 1983 is dismissed, but not for the reason stated by the Defendant. To

impose liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 upon Defendant City of Tucson, Plaintiff must

demonstrate the existence of a particular official city policy or established custom and that

the policy or custom caused him to be subjected to a deprivation of a constitutional right.

Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 829-30 (1985) (Justice Brennan, concurring); See

also, Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 694 (1978);

Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1984).

Plaintiff makes no allegations in the Complaint regarding a particular policy or custom

of the City of Tucson. The Defendant, however, in its Reply suggests that it followed

standard personnel procedures. (Reply at 6.) As alleged in the Complaint, the City of

Tucson is not a proper Defendant under § 1983, and count 5 is dismissed without prejudice

to it being added should the evidence, upon development, support it.

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V. Other Claims: HIPAA and Title II

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant invaded his privacy by not properly securing his

medical information in violation of Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act

(HIPAA) and the ADA. HIPAA itself provides no private right of action. Webb v. Smart

Document Solutions, LLC., 499 F.3d 1078, 1081 (Cal.2007). To the extent that Defendant

violated ADA regulations, such evidence may be relevant to prove Plaintiff’s ADA claim.

Dismissal of Plaintiff’s HIPAA claim does not reflect this Court’s position regarding

discovery or admissibility of evidence that Defendant violated ADA regulations related to

Plaintiff’s right of privacy in his medical records.

Title II of the ADA does not apply to employment discrimination. Zimmerman v.

Oregon Dept. of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cr. 1999).

Conclusion

The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims under Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §

1983, and HIPAA.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (document 9) is

GRANTED in part as to counts 2, 5 and 6 and DENIED in all other parts.

DATED this 4th day of December, 2008.

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