Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01868/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01868-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JUDITH A. BRACAMONTE, No. 2:06-cv-01868-MCE-GGH

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

THE PROBATION DEPARTMENT OF

THE COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO,

VERNE L. SPEIRS, CHIEF; SHAWN

AYALA, ASSISTANT PROBATION

DIVISION CHIEF; SUSAN

VANQUILL, RETIRED

ANNUITANT/PROBATION OFFICER;

SHELLY FISCHER, PROBATION

OFFICER; MORGAN WARD,

SUPERVISOR, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

UNIT, DOES 1 THROUGH 10

INCLUSIVE,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Judith A. Bracamonte (“Plaintiff”) seeks relief under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of her due process rights. Pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, Defendants move for

summary judgment claiming, inter alia, that Plaintiff is not a

real party in interest and lacks standing to bring this action. 

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 The Court notes that Plaintiff disputes use of the term 1

“not renewed” rather than her preferred term “revoked.” This

dispute is not material and does not affect the disposition of

this case. 

2

BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed. Beginning in 1999,

Plaintiff was employed by Warm Winds, Inc. (“Warm Winds”), a

501(c)(3) non-profit California corporation. In late 2001,

Plaintiff became Warm Winds’ executive director. Plaintiff has

no interest or ownership in Warm Winds, other than an employment

interest. 

Under Plaintiff’s direction, Warm Winds ran a certified

batterer’s treatment program (“BTP”), pursuant to California

Penal Code § 1203.097 et seq. To receive referrals from the

California Department of Corrections and the Sacramento County

Probation Department (“Probation Department”), Warm Winds was

required to remain on the Probation Department’s certified BTP

provider list, which it did for several years. However, in 2006,

Warm Winds’ BTP certification was either not renewed or was

revoked. 

1

California Penal Code § 1203.098 mandates educational

requirements which must be met by facilitators, such as

Plaintiff, employed in certified BTP facilities. Plaintiff never

received any documentation from the Probation Department

indicating that she was “certified” as a facilitator. 

Furthermore, Plaintiff never received any subsequent

documentation from the Probation Department indicating that any

hypothetical certification she may have had was revoked. 

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 Plaintiff now seeks relief from this Court under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for the denial of her procedural due process rights,

claiming that Defendants’ revocation of or failure to renew Warm

Winds’ BTP certificate also resulted in the loss of her

individual certification without due process of law. 

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). One of the

principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually

unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323 (quoting Rule 56(c)). 

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden

then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine

issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-87 (1986);

First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968).

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4

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party must tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must demonstrate that

the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that

the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52

(1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of Western Pulp and Paper

Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). Stated another way,

“before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary

question for the judge, not whether there is literally no

evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could

properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it,

upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

251 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442, 448, 20

L.Ed. 867 (1872)). As the Supreme Court explained, “[w]hen the

moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its

opponent must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts...Where the record

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find

for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87.

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5

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the

opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences

that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be

drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is

the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate

from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985),

aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

ANALYSIS

“An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party

in interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(1). A real party in

interest is one “to whom the relevant substantive law grants a

cause of action.” U-Haul Inter., Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d

1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Additionally, “[i]n every federal case, the party bringing

the suit must establish standing to prosecute the action.” Elk

Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004). 

Standing consists of two parts: 1) Article III standing,

enforcing the case-or-controversy requirement; and 2) prudential

standing. Id. Article III standing requires that Plaintiff

prove she has suffered an “injury in fact” that this Court has

the power to redress. Id. at 12. Prudential standing prohibits

an individual from litigating another person’s rights. Id.

(quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). 

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6

“A shareholder lacks standing to bring a section 1983 action

on behalf of the corporation in which he owns shares.” Soranno’s

Gasco, Inc., v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1318 (9th Cir. 1989)

(citing Erlich v. Glasner, 418 F.2d 226, 228 (9th Cir. 1969)). 

Nor is it “sufficient for the plaintiff to assert a personal

economic injury resulting from a wrong to the corporation.” Id.

(citing Shell Petroleum, N.V. v. Graves, 709 F.2d 593, 595 (9th

Cir. 1983)). “However, a shareholder does have standing where he

or she has been injured directly and independently of the

corporation.” Id.

Plaintiff is not a “real party in interest.” The

substantive law governs only the BTP itself, in this case Warm

Winds, and only addresses program, not individual, approval. See

Cal. Pen. Code § 1203.097 et seq. Examination of the statutory

language employed in § 1203.097(c) makes this abundantly clear: 

(c) the court or the probation department shall refer

defendants only to batterer's programs that follow

standards outlined in paragraph (1)....The probation

department shall design and implement an approval and

renewal process for batterer's programs.... 

....

(2) the court shall refer persons only to

batterer's programs that have been approved by the

probation department pursuant to paragraph (5). 

.... 

(3) No program, regardless of its source of

funding, shall be approved unless it meets all of

the following standards. . 

.... 

(5) The probation department shall have the sole

authority to approve a batterer's program for

probation. The program shall be required to obtain

only one approval but shall renew that approval

annually. 

....

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(C) The probation department has the sole

authority to approve the issuance, denial,

suspension, or revocation of approval and to

cease new enrollments or referrals to a

batterer's program under this section. The

probation department shall review information

relative to a program's performance or

failure to adhere to standards, or both. 

Cal. Penal Code § 1203.097(c)(5)(c).

Cal. Penal Code § 1203.97(c) (emphasis added)

Plaintiff has no interest in Warm Winds or in Warm Winds’

BTP certification. Plaintiff has submitted no proof that she was

individually certified as a BTP or as a BTP facilitator and

nothing in any of the above code sections contradicts this

finding. Furthermore, the training prescribed by the Penal Code

does not bestow on Plaintiff any individual certification or give

her any interest in Warm Winds’ certification under California

law. Instead, Penal Code § 1203.098(a) refers only to training

requirements a facilitator like Plaintiff must satisfy before

being eligible to work as a facilitator in a battered treatment

program. The statute states in pertinent part as follows: 

(a) Unless otherwise provided, a person who works as a

facilitator in a batterers' intervention program that

provides programs for batterers pursuant to subdivision

of Section 1203.097 shall complete [specified training]

requirements before being eligible to work as a

facilitator in a batterers’ intervention program. 

Nowhere does § 1203.098(a) suggest that satisfying the training

requirements for a facilitator confers an individualized

certification akin to that contemplated for a qualified

batterer’s treatment program as a whole.

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8

 Moreover, even if Plaintiff did have an interest in Warm

Winds, and consequently could qualify as a real party in interest

(which she does not), Plaintiff still lacks standing to invoke an

individual complaint against the Probation Department because,

under the law, she did not suffer any direct, individual injury

as a result of the Probation Department’s failure to renew Warm

Winds’ certification. See Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. at 1310. By

arguing that she was personally de-certified when Warm Winds

certification was not renewed, Plaintiff attempts to create the

requisite legal injury. However, she cannot avoid the fact that

the substantive law does provides only for program certification. 

Therefore, Plaintiff never obtained individual certification and

could never have had such certification revoked. She suffered no

cognizable independent injury that this Court has the power to

redress. 

Plaintiff has not, nor can she, cite to any cases supporting

the proposition that somehow her “understanding” that she was

certified is relevant to or changes this analysis. To the

contrary, in an attempt to create more than “some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts,” she relies only on her own

understanding, and the similar understanding of third-parties,

that she was personally certified. Her reliance is misplaced.

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 The Court need not address whether Plaintiff would have 2

standing to bring an individual claim for violation of her due

process rights if she had been certified and had lost that

certification as a result of Defendants’ acts. Since Plaintiff

has not presented any evidence that she was ever certified and

since she relies solely on her subjective understanding that her

facilitator training resulted in certification, that question is

not currently before the Court. 

 In her Opposition, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ 3

filing of this Motion is sanctionable under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 11. 

Pl.’s Opp’n, 2:21-3:5. The Court’s disposition of this case 

makes clear that Plaintiff’s incendiary accusation is both

meritless and unsubstantiated. 

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Regardless of Plaintiff’s understanding, her alleged injury

is incapable of redress. Plaintiff seeks damages and an

injunction reinstating her certification. However, no damages

may be awarded for the revocation of something that never

existed, nor can Defendants be forced to reinstate an imaginary

certification. No rational trier of fact could find that

Plaintiff has standing to bring this claim. 

Plaintiff is not a real party in interest under the

governing law. She lacks standing because she has not suffered

any direct and independent injury that this Court has the power

to redress. Defendants’ request for judgment as a matter of law

is therefore well-taken.2

CONCLUSION

Because the Court finds that Plaintiff is not a real party

in interest and lacks standing to bring this action, Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 

3

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 4

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefing. E.D.

Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

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The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of

Defendants and close the file.4

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 11, 2008

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

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