Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_08-cv-00645/USCOURTS-ared-4_08-cv-00645-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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1

Doc. Nos. 30 and 33, respectively.

2

Doc. No. 44.

3

Unless otherwise noted, the facts in the Background section are taken from Defendant’s

Statement of Material Facts and Plaintiff’s Response to those facts. Doc. Nos. 23 and 32,

respectively. 

4

Doc. No. 23, Exhibit 1.

5

42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.

6

Doc. No. 1.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

WESTERN DIVISION

SONYA HALL PLAINTIFF

v. 4:08CV00645-WRW

ST. JOHN MISSIONARY BAPTIST CHURCH DEFENDANT

ORDER

Pending are Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 22) and Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. No. 25). Plaintiff has responded,1

 and Defendant has replied.2 For the reasons set

out below, Defendant’s Motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND3

In March, 1999, Defendant, a Baptist Church, hired Plaintiff as an executive assistant to

the pastor.4 On January 22, 2007, Defendant demoted Plaintiff to secretary. Defendant

terminated Plaintiff’s employment on March 19, 2007. Plaintiff alleges Defendant terminated her

employment in violation of Title VII5 of the Civil Rights Act.6

An employee who believes her employer violated Title VII may file with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) a Charge Information Form, which is an

Case 4:08-cv-00645-BRW Document 45 Filed 02/23/10 Page 1 of 15
7

Doc. No. 39.

8

Holloway v. Lockhart, 813 F.2d 874 (8th Cir. 1987); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 

9

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).

10Inland Oil & Transport Co. v. United States, 600 F.2d 725, 727 (8th Cir. 1979).

2

intake questionnaire, as well as a Form 5 Charge of Discrimination, which is the official form for

alleging violations. 

Plaintiff filed her EEOC Charge Information Form, or intake questionnaire, on 

September 17, 2007.7 Plaintiff filed her EEOC Form 5 Charge of Discrimination on October 2,

2007. In both documents, Plaintiff alleges that she was discriminated against on the basis of sex

and religion. Plaintiff did not allege retaliation. Plaintiff received an EEOC Notice of Right to

Sue letter dated April 28, 2008. Plaintiff filed suit on July 30, 2008, alleging that Defendant

discriminated against her based on gender and religion, and retaliated against her based on her

religious practices.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact, so

that the dispute may be decided on purely legal grounds.8

 The Supreme Court has established

guidelines to assist trial courts in determining whether this standard has been met:

The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the

need for a trial -- whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that

properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be

resolved in favor of either party.9

 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has cautioned that summary judgment is an 

extreme remedy that should be granted only when the movant has established a right to the

judgment beyond controversy.10 Nevertheless, summary judgment promotes judicial economy

Case 4:08-cv-00645-BRW Document 45 Filed 02/23/10 Page 2 of 15
11Id. at 728.

12Id. at 727-28.

13Counts v. MK-Ferguson Co., 862 F.2d 1338, 1339 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting City of Mt.

Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., 838 F.2d 268, 273-74 (8th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted)). 

14Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

1542 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). “A charge under this section shall be filed within one

hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred . . . .” Id. 

3

by preventing trial when no genuine issue of fact remains.11 I must view the facts in the light

most favorable to the party opposing the motion.12 The Eighth Circuit has also set out the burden

of the parties in connection with a summary judgment motion:

[T]he burden on the party moving for summary judgment is only to demonstrate,

i.e.,“[to point] out to the District Court,” that the record does not disclose a genuine

dispute on a material fact. It is enough for the movant to bring up the fact that the

record does not contain such an issue and to identify that part of the record which

bears out his assertion. Once this is done, his burden is discharged, and, if the record

in fact bears out the claim that no genuine dispute exists on any material fact, it is

then the respondent’s burden to set forth affirmative evidence, specific facts,

showing that there is a genuine dispute on that issue. If the respondent fails to carry

that burden, summary judgment should be granted.13

Only disputes over facts that may affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will

properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.14 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Timeliness

A charge alleging a violation of Title VII must be filed within 180 days after the alleged

unlawful employment practice occurred.15 The type of employment practices that qualify as

discrete (separate) unlawful employment actions are set out in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 . 

The United States Supreme Court has found that “[t]here is simply no indication that the

term ‘practice’ converts related discrete acts into a single unlawful practice for the purposes of

Case 4:08-cv-00645-BRW Document 45 Filed 02/23/10 Page 3 of 15
16Id. at 111.

17Id.

18Id. at 113; Betz v. Chertoff, 578 F.3d 929 (8th Cir. 2009).

19Amtrak v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,110 (2002).

20Doc. No. 39.

4

timely filing.”16 Further, the Supreme Court has “repeatedly interpreted ‘practice’ to apply to a

discrete act . . . even when it has a connection with other acts.”17 A complainant, then, must file a

separate charge in connection with each alleged discrete discriminatory act. A discrete

discriminatory act is not actionable if time-barred.18 An unlawful employment practice occurs on

the day that it happens.19

1. Demotion

In her EEOC Charge Information, filed on September 17, 2007, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant unlawfully demoted her on January 22, 2007. 20 A demotion based on gender or

religious discrimination is a discrete unlawful employment practice. With respect to her

demotion, Plaintiff’s Charge Information Form was filed well after the 180-day filing period. So,

Plaintiff’s claim with respect to demotion is time-barred. Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment is granted in connection with Plaintiff’s demotion claim.

2. Termination

On March 19, 2007, Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment. Plaintiff had 180 days

from March 19, 2007 -- that is, until Saturday, September 15, 2007 -- to file a charge. Holidays

and weekends are counted in the calculation of the filing deadline, but, when the deadline falls

on a weekend or holiday, the complainant has until the next business day to file. Plaintiff filed

her EEOC Charge Information on September 17, 2007, the first business day after September 15,

Case 4:08-cv-00645-BRW Document 45 Filed 02/23/10 Page 4 of 15
21Shempert v. Harwick Chemical Corp., 151 F.3d 793, 796 (8th Cir. 1998).

22535 U.S. 106 (2002).

23Id. at 109.

24Id.

25Id.

26Id.

5

2007. Plaintiff’s Form 5 Charge of Discrimination was not filed until October 2, 2007, more than

180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice. Plaintiff’s Form 5 Charge of

Discrimination was filed after the 180-day deadline. Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred unless

Plaintiff’s Form 5 Charge of Discrimination relates back to the date of the filing of her Charge

Information Form.

In Shempert v. Harwick Chemical Corporation, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals

focused on Title VII’s requirement that a charge be made under oath and found that an unsigned,

unverified intake questionnaire did not satisfy the statutory requirement for an administrative

charge.21

Four years later, the United States Supreme Court decided Edelman v. Lynchburg

College.

22 In that case, Lynchburg College denied Edelman academic tenure.23 Within the filing

period, Edelman faxed to the EEOC a letter alleging that Lynchburg discriminated against him

based on gender, national origin, and religion.24 Edelman did not make an oath or affirmation in

the letter.25 Edelman’s later-submitted EEOC Form 5 Charge of Discrimination, which was

verified by oath or affirmation, was received by the EEOC 13 days after the expiration of the

statutory filing period.26 The district court and Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that

Case 4:08-cv-00645-BRW Document 45 Filed 02/23/10 Page 5 of 15
27Id. at 111.

28Edelman, 535 U.S. at 112.

29Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 300 F.3d 400 (4th Cir. 2002).

30Under 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a), a charge should contain the full name, address, and

telephone number of the person making the charge; the full name and address of the person

against whom the charge is made; a clear, concise statement of facts, including dates,

constituting the alleged lawful practice; the approximate number of employees of the employer;

and disclosure if proceedings have been commenced before a state or local agency. 

 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a).

6

Edelman’s initial letter to the EEOC did not constitute a charge to which Edelman’s Form 5

Charge of Discrimination could relate back, and that his claims were time-barred.27

In its analysis in Edelman, the Supreme Court noted that “charge” is not defined in the

statutes, but that the statutes require that a charge be verified and filed within the given period.28

Edelman argued that, for purposes of the filing period, a regulation -- 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) --

defined a charge as a written statement precise enough to identify the parties and describe the

action complained of, and allowed a charge to be amended to cure technical defects or

omissions. Edelman pointed out that under § 1601.12(b), a perfected charge would relate back to

the date on which the original charge was filed. The Supreme Court agreed, and remanded the

case to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to consider whether Edelman’s letter to the EEOC

met § 1601.12(b)’s relation-back requirements. On remand, the Fourth Circuit found

that the letter met the relation-back requirements.29

Apparently, Edelman overruled Shempert to the extent that, under Shempert, an

unverified intake questionnaire could not constitute a charge. Edelman apparently instructs

courts to consider whether a writing includes the type of information that should be in a Form 5

Charge of Discrimination,30 and, if so, whether a perfected charge relates back.

Case 4:08-cv-00645-BRW Document 45 Filed 02/23/10 Page 6 of 15
31Doc. Nos. 24, 44.

32This decision is consistent with other district court decisions. See, e.g., Barzanty v.

Verizon Pa., Inc., No. 06-879, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 95273 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2007); Fox v.

Thermoform Plastics, Inc., No. 06-4507, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 60395 (D. Minn. Aug. 16, 2007);

Gibbs v. Am. Sch. For the Deaf, No. 3:05CV563(MRK), 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3203 (D. Conn.

Jan. 19, 2006); Nesemeier v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., No. 03-1971(RMU), 2004 U.S.

Dist. Lexis 18496 (D.D.C. Sept. 10, 2004); and Sifferman v. Bd. of Regents, 250 F. Supp. 2d

1139 (E.D. Mo. 2003). But see, Hewett v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Sciences, No. 4:08CV04166,

2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 24705 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 13, 2009) (“The case law in the Eighth Circuit

clearly establishes that Intake Questionnaires ‘do not satisfy the statutory requirement for an

administrative charge.’”) (citing Shempert v. Harwick Chemical Corp., 151 F.3d 793, 796 (8th

Cir. 1998).

7

Defendant argues that, under Shempert, Plaintiff’s claim is time-barred.31 Neither party

cites Edelman. I find, however, that Edelman controls. Under Edelman, courts analyze the

contents of a writing to determine whether the writing falls under § 1601.12(b) for relation-back

purposes. 

Plaintiff’s Charge Information Form contains her name, address, and telephone number.

The Form includes Defendant’s name and address, and the approximate number of individuals

employed by Defendant. The Form includes a description of the alleged unlawful practices,

along with dates. Plaintiff declared under penalty of perjury that the information in the Form is

true and correct. Plaintiff’s Charge Information Form meets § 1601.12(b)’s relation back

requirements.32 Plaintiff’s October 2, 2007, Form 5 EEOC Charge of Discrimination relates back

to her EEOC Charge of Information Form. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim

was filed with the EEOC in a timely manner, and summary judgment is denied with respect to

this claim.

B. Outrage

Case 4:08-cv-00645-BRW Document 45 Filed 02/23/10 Page 7 of 15
33Doc. No. 25.

34Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).

35Marlar v. Daniel, 368 Ark. 505, 509-10 (2007).

36Crawford County v. Jones, 365 Ark. 585, 597 (2006).

37Harris v. Arkansas Book Co., 287 Ark. 353, 356 (1986).

38365 Ark. 585 (2006).

8

Defendant asserts Plaintiff’s outrage claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim

on which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).33 Defendant

attaches excerpts from Plaintiff’s deposition to its Motion. If a 12(b)(6) motion presents matters

outside of the pleadings, the Court must treat the motion as a motion for summary judgment.34

The summary judgment standard was set out above.

To establish a claim for outrage, a plaintiff must demonstrate each of the following

elements: 

(1) the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or knew or should have know that

emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) the conduct was ‘extreme

and outrageous,’ was ‘beyond all possible bounds of decency,’ and was ‘utterly

intolerable in a civilized community’; (3) the actions of the defendant were the cause

of the plaintiff’s distress; and (4) the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was

so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.35

The Arkansas Supreme Court “takes a strict view in recognizing an outrage claim, particularly in

the context of employment relationships.”36

With respect to the tort of outrage, how an employee’s termination of employment is

accomplished could create liability for an employer.37 In Crawford County v. Jones,

38 the

Arkansas Supreme Court noted that it had held that a plaintiff met the standard for proving

Case 4:08-cv-00645-BRW Document 45 Filed 02/23/10 Page 8 of 15
39Id. at 597-98.

40283 Ark. 399 (1984).

41Tandy, 283 Ark. at 405.

42Id. at 406.

43Id. at 405.

44Id.

45Id. at 406.

46Crawford County v. Jones, 365 Ark. 585, 598 (2006).

9

outrage in only one employment termination case:39 Tandy Corp. v. Bone.

40 In Tandy, when

Tandy Corporation thought that an employee -- Bone -- might be stealing money or merchandise,

Bone’s supervisor and two security officers came to the store and questioned Bone at thirtyminute intervals throughout the day.41

Bone suffered from a personality disorder “that made him more susceptible to stress and

fear than someone who did not have the personality disorder,” and had been taking a tranquilizer

prescribed by his psychiatrist for three years before the incident.42 Bone alleged that the security

officers cursed him, threatened him, and did not allow him to take his prescribed medication

after he had asked to at least three times.43 When Bone was taken to another location for a

polygraph test, he hyperventilated.44 After a failed attempt to return to work the following day,

Bone was hospitalized for a week.45 The Arkansas Supreme Court “emphasized the fact that the

employer had notice of Bone’s condition [as] the only basis for a jury question on the issue of

outrage.”46

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges only that on or about March 19, 2007, Plaintiff was

discharged from her position because of her religious practices, and that Defendant’s actions

Case 4:08-cv-00645-BRW Document 45 Filed 02/23/10 Page 9 of 15
47Doc. No. 1.

48Doc. No. 36.

49Id.

50Id.

51See Doc. No. 26.

52Doc. No. 24, Exhibit 4.

10

were motivated by a desire to inflict emotional distress on Plaintiff.47 Plaintiff’s description of

the manner in which the termination of her employment was carried out is consistent with

Defendant’s termination letter. 

In this case, the termination of Plaintiff’s employment was carried out as follows: on

March 19, 2007, Defendant informed Plaintiff that her employment was terminated because she

attended services at another church and because “people do not like [her].”48 Plaintiff was asked

to leave Defendant’s premises immediately, and to return on March 23, 2007, between 9:00 a.m.

and noon, to collect her personal items.49 Plaintiff, however, gathered her personal items before

she left Defendant’s premises on March 19.50

Based on Plaintiff’s description of the manner in which her termination occurred, I find

that Plaintiff cannot prove the second element of the tort of outrage -- that Defendant’s conduct

was extreme and outrageous, was beyond all possible bounds of decency, and was utterly

intolerable in a civilized community. Further, Plaintiff’s description of the emotional distress she

sustained does not appear so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.51

When asked at her deposition to describe the extreme mental anguish she suffered,

Plaintiff responded that she “took a lot of hurt,” and that being terminated from her job took a

toll on her financially.52 Plaintiff testified that “[i]t was just a lot of mental stress all around

Case 4:08-cv-00645-BRW Document 45 Filed 02/23/10 Page 10 of 15
53Id.

54Id.

55Id.

56Doc. No. 25.

57Doc. No. 33.

58Schaaf v. Residential Funding Corp., 517 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 2008). 

59Crumpley-Patterson v. Trinity Lutheran Hosp., 388 F.3d 588, 590 (8th Cir. 2004). 

11

having to deal with it,” and that “[i]t was a struggle to keep things going to take care of my

son.”53 Plaintiff never saw a doctor, and never took any medication in connection with her

emotional distress.54 Plaintiff stated that she needed God, and went directly to him for help,

rather than to a doctor.55 While Plaintiff was obviously distraught about the loss of her job, the

emotional distress she suffered was not so extreme as contemplated by the tort of outrage.

Accordingly, summary judgment in connection with Plaintiff’s outrage claim granted on this

point.

C. Disparate Treatment based on Religion

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim should be dismissed under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.56 Plaintiff disagrees.57

1. Standard of Review

In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court “accept[s] as true all of the factual

allegations contained in the complaint, and review[s] the complaint to determine whether its

allegations show that the pleader is entitled to relief.”58 All reasonable inferences from the

complaint must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.59 A motion to dismiss should not be

granted merely because the complaint “does not state with precision all elements that give rise to

Case 4:08-cv-00645-BRW Document 45 Filed 02/23/10 Page 11 of 15
60Schmedding v. Tnemec Co. Inc., 187 F.3d 862, 864 (8th Cir. 1999).

61Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)).

62Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007). 

63Id. at 555 (citations omitted).

64Id. at 570. 

65Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1940 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007) .

66Doc. No. 1. 

12

a legal basis for recovery.”60 A complaint need only contain “‘a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”61 “[O]nce a claim has been stated

adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the

complaint.”62 “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need

detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment]

to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of

a cause of action will not do.”63

Under the Twombly “plausibility standard,” the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint must

be evaluated to determine whether they contain facts sufficient to “nudge[] [his] claims across

the line from conceivable to plausible.”64 A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face.65

2. Plaintiff’s Claim

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that “Plaintiff was discharged from her position for her

religious practices.”66 Plaintiff’s Complaint also alleges that “Defendant’s treatment of Plaintiff

Case 4:08-cv-00645-BRW Document 45 Filed 02/23/10 Page 12 of 15
67Id. 

68Manson v. Little Rock Newspapers, Inc., 200 F.3d 1172, 1173 (8th Cir. 2000). See also

Marshall v. Church of the Larger Fellowship, No. 4:06CV001634JLH/JTR, 2007 U.S. Dist.

Lexis 15459 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 17, 2007) (Plaintiffs, who sued a private church, failed to state a

viable First Amendment claim.).

6942 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(f)(1).

70Id.

13

was motivated by her sex, female, and in retaliation for her exercise of her First Amendment

right to practice religion.”67

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Fist Amendment allegations fail to state a claim on

which relief can be granted because Defendant is a private entity, and the First Amendment does

not apply to the actions of private entities. I agree. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held

that where “the defendant is a private entity, not a governmental entity” the defendant is

incapable of violating a plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.68

It is clear from the language of the First Amendment that it does not apply to the actions

of private entities, but to laws made by Congress. It appears, however, that the thrust of

Plaintiff’s Complaint is not that Defendant violated her First Amendment rights, but that

Defendant unlawfully terminated her employment because of, and in retaliation for, Plaintiff’s

exercise of her First Amendment rights in connection with her religious practices. 

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges retaliation, but Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge Information Form

and EEOC Form 5 Charge of Discrimination do not. A Title VII Plaintiff must exhaust

administrative remedies before bringing suit in federal court.69 A plaintiff may file a civil action

only after the EEOC issues a right-to-sue letter following the investigation of a charge.70 When

the EEOC issues a right-to-sue letter, the scope of the civil action is limited to grievances in the

Case 4:08-cv-00645-BRW Document 45 Filed 02/23/10 Page 13 of 15
71Nichols v. American Nat’l Ins. Co., 154 F.3d 875, 886 (8th Cir. 1998).

72Kells v. Sinclair Buick-GMC Truck, Inc., 210 F.3d 827, 836 (8th Cir. 2000); Williams v.

Little Rock Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 223 (8th Cir. 1994).

73Doc. No. 22.

14

charge.71 Permitting claims that are outside of the EEOC charge would undermine the EEOC’s

investigatory and conciliatory role, and deprive the charged party of notice.72

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is granted. If Plaintiff’s

Complaint does allege that Defendant violated her First Amendment rights, then Defendant’s

Motion to dismiss that claim is granted, as well. 

Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant terminated her employment because of her religious

practices -- that she attended services at another church in addition to services offered by

Defendant -- states a claim that is plausible on its face, especially considering that Defendant’s

letter terminating Plaintiff’s employment refers to Plaintiff’s “obvious divided loyalty.”73

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s religious discrimination claim is denied. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law above, Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 22) is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s unlawful demotion claim, but

is otherwise DENIED. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 25) is GRANTED as to

Plaintiff’s outrage claim, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim -- and Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim, if

there is one -- but is DENIED in connection with Plaintiff’s termination based on religious

discrimination claim.

This case is set for trial on March 9, 2010. Based on this Order, the issues that remain for

trial are whether Defendant unlawfully terminated Plaintiff’s employment based on Plaintiff’s

Case 4:08-cv-00645-BRW Document 45 Filed 02/23/10 Page 14 of 15
15

gender or religious practices. The parties are directed to submit agreed-upon jury instructions, to

the extent possible, by 5:00 p.m., Thursday, February 25, 2010.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 23rd day of February, 2010.

 /s/Wm. R. Wilson, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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