Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01777/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01777-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Eastern District of California 

Nyles Lawayne Watson,

Plaintiff, No. Civ. S 02-1777 DFL PAN P

vs. Findings and Recommendations

State of California, et al.,

Defendants.

-oOoPlaintiff is a state prisoner without counsel litigating a

civil rights action against prison officials.

The case proceeds on the January 14, 2003, third amended

complaint against defendants Pliler, Johnson, Wai and Kofoed.

Plaintiff claims that while confined at California State

Prison Sacramento (CSP--Sacramento) he was injured when a staple

gun fell on his wrist. He claims defendant Dr. Johnson

misdiagnosed the injury for many months, defendant Nurse Wai

repeatedly rejected plaintiff’s requests to see a doctor and

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defendant Warden Pliler knew of the injury and gross negligence

of her medical staff and failed to remedy them. Plaintiff claims

that at California State Prison Solano (CSP--Solano)defendant Dr.

Kofoed eventually operated on the wrist but failed to prescribe

physical therapy and that as a result plaintiff lost some of the

mobility in his wrist.

Wai, Pliler and Kofoed moved February 23, 2005, for summary

judgment. Plaintiff opposed. 

Standard on Summary Judgment

A party may move, without or without supporting affidavits,

for a summary judgment and the judgment sought shall be rendered

forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)-(c). 

An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the opposing party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). A fact is

“material” if it affects the right to recover under applicable

substantive law. Id. The moving party must submit evidence that

establishes the existence of an element essential to that party’s

case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion and

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identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any’” that the moving party believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 

Id., at 323. If the movant does not bear the burden of proof on

an issue, the movant need only point to the absence of evidence

to support the opponent’s burden. To avoid summary judgment on

an issue upon which the opponent bears the burden of proof, the

opponent must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits,

or by the “‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id., at 324. The opponent’s

affirmative evidence must be sufficiently probative that a jury

reasonably could decide the issue in favor of the opponent. 

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Inc. v. Zenith Radio

Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986). When the conduct alleged

is implausible, stronger evidence than otherwise required must be

presented to defeat summary judgment. Id., at 587.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) provides that “supporting and opposing

affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth

such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show

affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the

matters stated therein.” Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has

held that the opponent need not produce evidence in a form that

would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Rather, the questions are (1) whether

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the evidence could be submitted in admissible form and (2) “if

reduced to admissible evidence” would it be sufficient to carry

the party’s burden at trial. Id., at 327. Thus, in Fraser v.

Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2003), objection to the opposing

party’s reliance upon her diary upon the ground it was hearsay

was overruled because the party could testify to all the relevant

portions from personal knowledge or read it into evidence as

recorded recollection.

A verified complaint based on personal knowledge setting

forth specific facts admissible in evidence is treated as an

affidavit. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 1995);

McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1987). A verified

motion based on personal knowledge in opposition to a summary

judgment motion setting forth facts that would be admissible in

evidence also functions as an affidavit. Johnson v. Meltzer, 134

F.,3d 1393 (9th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918 (9th

Cir. 2004). Defects in opposing affidavits may be waived if no

motion to strike or other objection is made. Scharf v. United

States Attorney General, 597 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1979)

(incompetent medical evidence).

Undisputed Facts

November 16, 2000, at CSP--Sacramento, plaintiff injured his

left wrist when a staple gun fell on it. Defendant Wai, a nurse,

examined the wrist and determined it was bruised and swollen but

that plaintiff could bend and move it. Wai prescribed ice, an

ace bandage, Motrin, and told plaintiff to return to the clinic

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as needed. 

November 29, 2000, plaintiff returned to the medical clinic

with complaints his left wrist hurt and requested an x-ray. 

Defendant Dr. Johnson examined him and diagnosed wrist trauma a

few weeks prior. Dr. Johnson noted in the medical file that it

was “OK to wait” on any further treatment. Plaintiff received

pain medication.

Plaintiff transferred from CSP--Sacramento December 14,

2000, to attend court in San Joaquin County. He was confined at

the county jail until July 2, 2001, when he returned to CSP--

Sacramento. Jail medical staff informed plaintiff June 21, 2001,

he had a benign ganglion cyst on his left wrist. 

August 7, 2001, plaintiff was scheduled to see a doctor for

treatment. August 8, 2001, Ibuprofen was prescribed for 30 days. 

August 22, 2001, plaintiff submitted a grievance complaining

about his medical treatment at CSP--Sacramento and requested an

investigation by the warden.

August 31, 2001, Dr. Penner examined plaintiff at CSP--

Sacramento for complaints of wrist pain. Dr. Penner noted mild

swelling but no inflammation. He considered rupturing the

ganglion cyst but concluded surgical intervention was not

required and prescribed pain medication.

September 5, 2001, plaintiff again saw a doctor, complaining

of the ganglion cyst on his wrist. 

September 14, 2001, plaintiff again saw a doctor who noted

the cyst was slowly increasing in size. The doctor diagnosed a

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ganglion cyst and aspirated it by inserting a needle and drawing

out fluid. 

September 25, 2001, an x-ray and surgical consultation were

ordered.

October 2, 2001, plaintiff was transferred to CSP--Solano.

He continued to complain of pain and a lump in his left wrist. 

At CSP--Solano Dr. Kofoed, an orthopedic surgeon, first

examined plaintiff in November 2001. Dr. Kofoed diagnosed a

ganglion cyst which other physicians had been treating

conservatively. Kofoed performed the surgery April 23, 2002. 

Afterward, Dr. Kofoed gave plaintiff a brace to immobilize the

wrist and ordered a 29-day “lay-in” to allow the wound to heal

and plaintiff to recover from surgery. Kofoed specifically

considered the risk of harm from physical therapy and decided

against it. 

Analysis

“The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain upon

incarcerated individuals under color of law constitutes a

violation of the Eighth Amendment . . .” McGuckin v. Smith, 974

F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991). A violation of the Eighth

Amendment occurs when prison officials deliberately are

indifferent to a prisoner’s medical needs. Id. The threshold

for a medical claim under the Eighth Amendment is extremely high:

A prison official acts with “deliberate indifference .

. . only if [he] knows of and disregards an excessive

risk to inmate health and safety.” Gibson v. County of

Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Under 

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this standard, the prison official must not only “be

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but

that person “must also draw the inference.” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “If a [prison

official] should have been aware of the risk, but was

not, then the [official] has not violated the Eighth

Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.” Gibson, 290

F.3d at 1188 (citation omitted). This “subjective

approach” focuses only “on what a defendant’s mental

attitude actually was.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839. 

“Mere negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical

condition, without more, does not violate a prisoner’s

Eighth Amendment rights. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059

(alteration and citation omitted).

Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (footnote

omitted). 

A "serious" medical need exists if the failure to treat a

prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury

or the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Id. (citing

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A prisoner has a

"serious" need for medical treatment if she has an injury that a

reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of

comment or treatment, a medical condition that significantly

affects her daily activities, or chronic and substantial pain.

Id. at 1059-60 (citing Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1337-

41 (9th Cir.1990)).

Delay in medical treatment amounts to deliberate

indifference if (1) it seriously affected the plaintiff’s medical

condition and (2) defendants were aware the delay would cause

serious harm. Shapley v. Nevada Board of State Prison

Commissioners, 766 F.2d 404, 408 (9th Cir. 1985).

In seeking summary judgment, Dr. Kofoed, Nurse Wai and

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Warden Pliler submit evidence that a ganglion cyst is not a

medical condition requiring urgent care, nor is it serious or

life-threatening. Dr. Kofoed submits evidence that physical

therapy is not medically appropriate following surgery to remove

a ganglion cyst. 

In opposition, plaintiff submits evidence he still was

wearing a wrist brace on March 22, 2005. Plaintiff testified at

his deposition that he continues to suffer pain and decreased

mobility in his wrist and he is substantially restricted in his

ability to lift objects. 

The court assumes without deciding the ganglion cyst on

plaintiff’s left wrist amounted to a serious medical condition. 

Even so, plaintiff has established negligence, at most, in

treatment for his medical needs. “Mere negligence in diagnosing

or treating a medical condition, without more, does not violate a

prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights.” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059

(alteration and citation omitted). Plaintiff submits nothing but

his lay opinion that treatment for his ganglion cyst was

inappropriate. Dr. Kofoed performed surgery but did not

prescribe physical therapy because he believed it was not

medically appropriate. Neither Nurse Wai nor Dr. Kofoed were

deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs. 

When plaintiff left CSP--Sacramento in December 2001, his

condition was unremarkable. Between July 2 and November 2001,

plaintiff received regular care for the wrist including pain

medicine, aspiration, and referral to an orthopedic specialist.

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Only nine months transpired between the time officials at CSP--

Sacramento knew the cyst had developed and surgically removal. 

There is nothing to support a conclusion plaintiff’s condition

was aggravated by this nine-month delay. 

Warden Pliler declares she was not at CSP--Sacramento from

January through August of 2002 and first learned of plaintiff’s

claims in the course of this litigation. Plaintiff offers

nothing to controvert this or otherwise establish Warden Pliler

somehow participated in the claimed violation of his

constitutional rights. 

Based on the foregoing, the court hereby recommends

defendants’ February 23, 2005, motion be granted and summary

judgment be entered for defendants Wai, Pliler and Kofoed.

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l), these

findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case. Written objections may be

filed within 20 days of service of these findings and

recommendations. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district

judge may accept, reject, or modify these findings and

recommendations in whole or in part.

Dated: August 11, 2005. 

 /s/ Peter A. Nowinski 

 PETER A. NOWINSKI

 Magistrate Judge

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