Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01380/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01380-40/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE H. ROBINSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

D. ADAMS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:08-cv-01380-AWI-BAM PC

ORDER DENYINGPLAINTIFF’S MOTIONFOR

RECUSAL OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

(ECF No. 150.) 

Plaintiff George H. Robinson (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On September 10, 2012, Plaintiff filed a motion for

recusal of the Magistrate Judge and District Court Judge. (ECF No. 150.) Plaintiff brings this 1

motion on the grounds that the Court refuses to make Defendants follow case law, court rules, and

orders. (Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal 1, ECF No. 150.)

The standard for recusal is “[w]hether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts

would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” United States v.

McTiernan, 695 F.3d 882, 891 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450,

1453 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam)). There is a subjective and an objective component to be

considered in deciding a motion for recusal. “Under the objective standard, a judge must recuse in

any case where ‘his impartialitymight reasonably be questioned.’ This is a fact-specific inquiry that

should be guided by the circumstances of the specific claim.” United States v. Spangle, 626 F.3d

The District Court Judge shall address the motion for his recusal by separate order.

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488, 495 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 913 (9th Cir. 2008)). In

considering the subjective component, the judge must “determine whether he can be truly impartial

when trying the case.” Spangle, 626 F.3d at 495 (quoting Holland 519 F.3d at 915). 

“Parties cannot attack a judge’s impartiality on the basis of information and beliefs acquired

while acting in his or her judicial capacity.” McTiernan, 695 F.3d at 892 (quoting United States v.

Rrias-Ramirez, 670 F.2d 849, 853 n.6 (9th Cir. 1982). In this action, Plaintiff is alleging the source

of the judicial bias or prejudice are the orders issued in response to his motions filed in this action. 

“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partialitymotion.” Liteky

v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). 

This action was transferred to the undersigned on October 17, 2012. (ECF No. 126.) To the

extent that Plaintiff complains about the order deciding his motion to compel, that order was issued

by the prior Magistrate Judge and the undersigned did not make the rulings to which Plaintiff

objects. However, this Court did issue the protective order and denied Plaintiff’s two motions for

sanctions. 

In the context of prison litigation, courts recognize the security concerns implicated by

producing confidential security documents to inmates in the course of litigation. See Corona v.

Knowles, No. 1:08-cv-00237, 2012 WL 2328228, at *2 (E.D.Cal. June 19, 2012) (ordering

production of documents subject to attorney’s/expert’s only protective order); Orr v. Hernandez, No.

2:08-cv-00472-JLQ, 2012 WL 761355, at *2 (E.D.Cal. Mar. 7, 2012) (releasing documents with

confidential information redacted); Williams v. Williams, No. 4:07-cv-04464-CW (LB), 2011 WL

863500, at *4 (N.D.Cal. March 10, 2011) (issuing protective order); Furnace v. Evans, 3:06-cv04229- MMC, 2009 WL 193755, at 3 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 23, 2009) (refusing to order production to pro

se inmate due to security concerns); Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. S-90-0520-LKK JFM, No.

C01-1351 TEH, 2008 WL 2545072, at *3 (E.D.Cal. June 20, 2008) (expanding protective order for

documents implicating security of the prison). A reasonable person would not determine that

ordering documents that implicate the security of the prison produced to an inmate subject to a

protective order implicated the judge’s impartiality. McTiernan, 695 F.3d at 891. 

Further, in denying the motions for sanctions, the Court considered the arguments of the

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parties and found the conduct of Defendants did not justify the imposition of sanctions. “Opinions

formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current

proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they “display a

deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky, 510 U.S.

at 555; Pesnell v. Arsenault, 543 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 2008). 

The undersigned’s actions in this case do not support disqualification. The actions taken

were an appropriate response to the filings and do not reflect a deep-seated antagonism toward

Plaintiff, nor favoritism toward Defendants. They do not reflect animosity, partiality, or an inability

to render a fair judgment in the instant action. Further, the undersigned can be impartial in deciding

this action. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion that the undersigned recuse

herself from this action, filed September 10, 2012, is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 21, 2012 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe 

10c20k UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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