Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00019/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-00019-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Richard and Maria Shupe, 

 Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

Bank of America, National Association, 

 Defendant. 

CV 13-019-TUC-JR 

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

 

 Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs Richard and Maria Shupe’s 

Motion to Amend Complaint (Doc. 80). Defendant Bank of America, National 

Association (“BANA”) filed a response (Doc. 91). The Plaintiffs did not reply. As 

the decision on this motion is dispositive to the claims the Plaintiffs propose to add 

by amendment, the motion will be addressed by Report and Recommendation. For 

the reasons explained below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District 

Court, after conducting an independent review of the record, deny the motion. 

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I. Background 

The Court’s jurisdiction over this action arises from the Telephone Consumer 

Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227. See Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, 

LLC, -- U.S. --, 132 S.Ct. 740 (2012). In the original complaint, in addition to claims 

made under the TCPA, the Plaintiffs alleged claims for invasion of privacy, 

harassment, intentional infliction of emotional and physical distress, and claimed that 

the Defendant violated A.R.S. § 44-1282, which prohibits certain intrastate 

telemarketing solicitations (Doc. 1). The complaint specifically alleged that the 

Defendant ignored the Plaintiffs’ notices not to call their residential telephone 

number by using predictive dialing systems to call them on more than 50 occasions. 

On March 4, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed a notice that they were withdrawing 

their claims for harassment and intentional infliction of emotional and physical 

distress (Doc. 19). 

In its entirety, the motion to amend now before the Court states: 

Come now the Plaintiffs in the above entitled action and seek leave of 

the court to amend their complaint. The Plaintiffs amended complaint 

differs in that it adds the claim of Negligence; revised content of 

complaint; and changes the prayer for relief. 

Motion, p. 1. However, the lodged proposed Amended Complaint (Doc. 81) includes 

not only a new claim of negligence and an amended prayer for relief, but also alleges 

the previously withdrawn claim for harassment. 

 . . . . 

 . . . . 

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II. Discussion 

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), when it does not qualify to amend a 

pleading as a matter of course, “a party may amend its pleading only with the 

opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely give 

leave when justice so requires.” “Five factors are taken into account to assess the 

propriety of a motion for leave to amend: bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the 

opposing party, futility of amendment, and whether the plaintiff has previously 

amended the complaint.” Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004). 

“Not all of the factors merit equal weight. As this circuit and others have held, it is 

the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party that carries the greatest weight.” 

Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Three of the five factors to be considered require little analysis. The 

Plaintiffs have not previously amended the complaint and the Defendant does not 

argue that the Plaintiffs are acting in bad faith or that the proposed amendment is 

futile. Thus, those three factors support the proposed amendment. However, the 

Court agrees with the Defendants that the remaining factors, undue delay and 

prejudice, require denial of leave to amend. 

A. Undue Delay 

 “Relevant to evaluating the delay issue is whether the moving party knew or 

should have known the facts and theories raised by the amendment in the original 

pleading.” Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations 

omitted). Here, the Plaintiffs have offered nothing to support a finding that the 

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proposed amendments are based on facts or theories that were previously unknown. 

As quoted above, the motion merely requests leave to amend and notes the proposed 

additions. The Plaintiffs do not indicate what motivated them to now seek to add the 

claim of negligence. Moreover, as the Defendant points out, the Plaintiffs agreed that 

any proposed amendments to the complaint would be submitted by July 30, 2013 

(Doc. 23). More than nine months have passed since that agreed upon deadline, and 

the Plaintiffs have offered no explanation for their delay. As such, this factor 

supports denial of the motion for leave to amend. 

B. Prejudice 

 The Ninth Circuit has held that prejudice may effectively be established by 

demonstrating that a motion to amend was made after the cutoff date for such 

motions, or when discovery had closed or was about to close. See, e.g., Zivkovic v. 

Southern Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming denial of 

plaintiff's motion for leave to amend where proposed amendment would have added 

additional causes of action which would have required further discovery and 

discovery was set to close five days after motion to amend was filed); Solomon v. 

North Am. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 151 F.3d 1132, 1139 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming the 

denial of leave to amend where the motion was made “on the eve of the discovery 

deadline” and “[a]llowing the motion would have required re-opening discovery, thus 

delaying the proceedings”). 

 After a number of extensions, the parties in this action are less than one month 

from the discovery deadline and the Defendant has conducted the depositions of the 

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Plaintiffs. Allowing for an unexplained and unjustified amendment of the complaint 

at this juncture would likely require another extension of the discovery deadline, 

duplicate discovery efforts and further delay an already much-delayed case. The 

prejudice the Defendant would face at this late stage of the case from having to 

conduct discovery on a new claim and on a claim that was previously withdrawn 

weigh heavily against granting leave. This consideration, particularly when coupled 

with the Plaintiffs’ unexplained delay, supports the denial of the motion. 

III. Recommendation

 Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District 

Court, after its independent review, deny Plaintiffs Richard and Maria Shupe’s 

Motion to Amend Complaint (Doc. 80). 

 The parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the District 

Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a 

response to the objections. Replies shall not be filed without first obtaining leave to 

do so from the District Court. If any objections are filed, this action should be 

designated case number: CV 13-019-TUC-JGZ. Failure to timely file objections to 

any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a 

 . . . . 

 . . . . 

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waiver of a party’s right to de novo consideration of the issues. See United States v. 

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

 Dated this 15th day of May, 2014. 

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