Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00706/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00706-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 560
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Civil Detainee - Conditions of Confinement
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

At the time this action was filed, Plaintiff Gregory Ell Shehee was a civil detainee proceeding 

pro se in a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Individuals detained pursuant to California 

Welfare and Institutions Code § 6600 et seq. are civil detainees and are not prisoners within the 

meaning of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Now pending before the Court is Plaintiff‟s second amended complaint, filed July 8, 2015. 

(ECF No. 30.) 

I.

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that 

“seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B). 

GREGORY ELL SHEHEE,

 Plaintiff,

v.

K. TRUMBLY, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:14-cv-00706-AWI-SAB (PC)

ORDER DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO FILE A 

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT OR INFORM 

COURT OF HIS INTENT TO PROCEED ON ONE 

OF THE CLAIMS FOUND TO BE COGNIZABLE

[ECF No. 30]

Case 1:14-cv-00706-DAD-SAB Document 31 Filed 11/03/15 Page 1 of 7
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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 

do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-677; Simmons v. Navajo County, 

Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-1021 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are still entitled to have their pleadings 

liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor, but the pleading standard is now 

higher, Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted), and to survive 

screening, Plaintiff‟s claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow 

the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are „merely 

consistent with‟ a defendant‟s liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

Although certain portions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) are not applicable to 

Plaintiff as a civil detainee, section 1915(e)(2)(B) applies to all persons proceeding in forma pauperis. 

See Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001). 

II.

ALLEGATIONS OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff raises two separate and unrelated incidents in which he claims he was subjected to 

excessive force by staff. The first incident allegedly took place on January 16, 2009, when two 

individuals Defendant Cosby and several other officers used excessive force on Plaintiff despite the 

fact that Plaintiff was not involved in a fight involving two other individuals. Plaintiff contends 

specifically that Psych Tech Ryan Homel stated loudly that Plaintiff was not involved he just had eye 

surgery, yet Defendant Cosby and fourteen other officers pulled Plaintiff to the ground in a chock 

hold. Defendant Cosby deliberately put his knee in Plaintiff‟s spine as Plaintiff was already on the 

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ground. Plaintiff felt the pop crusting of his spine. Psych Tech Ryan was calling for the officers to 

stop, but Defendant Cosby put both his hands around his head and neck. 

Plaintiff claims on this same date, Defendant S. Valley, Psych Tech, failed to protect and 

intervene during the assault of Plaintiff by Defendant Cosby. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Valley 

stood in the medication room and witnessed the assault by Defendant Cosby and the other officers. 

Plaintiff contends that Defendant Audrey King failed to protect him. Plaintiff claims that on January 

17, 2009, Defendant King told Plaintiff that “[b]ecause of officer Cosby and the other officers jumping 

on you for no valid reason and crushing your spine, and hitting you in your righ[t]-side ribs when you 

sue you will be the richest patient ever in this hospital.” (2nd Amd. Compl. at 10.) 

The second incident allegedly took place on January 31, 2011, when Defendant Redding and 

sixteen other officers used excessive force on Plaintiff while he was inside his cell. Defendant 

Sergeant Blanco allowed the excessive force to take place and failed to intervene to protect Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff contends that Defendants Jack Carter, K. Trumbly, and D. Waggoner failed to 

intervene and protect Plaintiff from the harm on January 16, 2009, and January 31, 2011. 

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Excessive Force/Failure to Intervene

The Eighth Amendment‟s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment only protects 

convicted prisoners. Bell v. Wollish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 

n. 10 (1989). On the other hand, civil detainees are entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protections. 

See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001) (“[D]ue process requires that the conditions and 

duration of confinement under the [civil confinement act] bear some reasonable relation to the purpose 

for which persons are committed.”); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 933 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Civil status 

means civil status, with all the Fourteenth Amendment rights that accompany it.”) A civil detainee is 

entitled to “more considerate treatment” than his criminally detained counterparts. Jones, 393 F.3d at 

932 (quoting Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321-322.) 

In the context of pretrial detainees, the Fourteenth Amendment requires that pretrial detainees 

not be subject to conditions that amount to punishment. Bell, 441 U.S. at 536. “At a bare minimum 

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... an individual detained under civil process-like an individual accused but not convicted of a crimecannot be subject to conditions that “amount to punishment.” Jones, 393 F.3d at 932 (quoting Bell, 

441 U.S. at 536). Thus, “when a SVPA detainee is confined to conditions identical to, or similar to, or 

more restrictive than, those in which his criminal counterparts are held, [the Court] presume[s] that the 

detainee is being subjected to punishment. Id. (quotations omitted). Although Bell involved a claim 

by a pretrial detainee rather than a civilly committed individual such as Plaintiff, the difference is 

immaterial for purposes of analysis. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321 (applying Bell to a claim by a 

civilly committed plaintiff); Davis v. Wessel, 792 F.3d 793, 800 (7th Cir. 2015) 

In Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct. 2466 (2015), the Supreme Court recently stated that the 

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires only that Plaintiff show “that the force 

purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 2473. The 

determination of whether the force was objectively unreasonable depends upon the fact and 

circumstances of each individual case. Id. “A court must make this determination from the 

prospective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with 

the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. The court must also consider “legitimate interests that stem from 

[the government‟s] need to manage the facility in which the individual is detained,‟ appropriately 

deferring to „policies and practices that in the judgment‟ of jail officials „are needed to preserve 

internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.‟” Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 

U.S. at 540). 

“[P]olice officers have a duty to intervene when their fellow officers violate the constitutional 

rights of a suspect or other citizen.” United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1447 n.25 (9th Cir. 1994), 

rev‟d on other grounds, 518 U.S. 81 (1996). Thus, the failure to intervene can support an excessive 

force claim where the bystanders had a realistic opportunity to intervene but failed to do so. Lolli v. 

County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 418 (9th Cir. 2003); Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289 (9th 

Cir. 2000); Robbins v. Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1442 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Montley v. Parks, 383 

F.3d 1058, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004) (neither officers who participated in the harassing search nor officers 

who failed to intervene and stop the harassing search were entitled to qualified immunity). 

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Plaintiff‟s allegation that he was subjected to excessive force on January 16, 2009, by 

Defendant Cosby and Defendant S. Valley failed to intervene and protect Plaintiff from the force is 

sufficient to state a cognizable claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Likewise Plaintiff‟s allegation that he was subjected to excessive force on January 31, 2011, by 

Defendant Redding and Defendant Sergeant Blanco failed to intervene and protect Plaintiff from the 

force is sufficient to state a cognizable claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

However, Plaintiff‟s allegations fail to give rise to a cognizable claim against any of the other 

named Defendants. Out of an abundance of caution, the Court will grant Plaintiff the opportunity to 

file a third amended complaint to cure the failure to state a cognizable claim against any other 

defendants, if he feels that he can do so. 

B. Joinder of Multiple Claims and Defendants Under Rules 18 and 20

Plaintiff is raising two separate claims based on different events against different defendants. 

Plaintiff may not bring unrelated claims against unrelated parties in a single action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

18(a), 20(a)(2); Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2011); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 

607 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff may bring a claim against multiple defendants so long as (1) the claim 

arises out of the same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions and occurrences, and (2) 

there are common questions of law or fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2); Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 

1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1997); Desert Empire Bank v. Insurance Co. of North America, 623 F.2d 1371, 

1375 (9th Cir. 1980). Only if the defendants are properly joined under Rule 20(a) will the Court 

review the other claims to determine if they may be joined under Rule 18(a), which permits the joinder 

of multiple claims against the same party. 

Plaintiff may not assert multiple claims against unrelated defendants in this action. That the 

defendants work at the same facility and the claims involve the same type of action (excessive force) 

is not sufficient to support joinder of claims. In filing an amended complaint, Plaintiff must choose 

which claim he wishes to pursue in this action. If Plaintiff fails to do so, the Court will determine 

which claims proceed and which will be dismissed. Visendi v. Bank of America, N.A., 733 F.3d 863, 

870-871 (9th Cir. 2013). 

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In this case, although Plaintiff states a cognizable claim for relief against Defendants Cosby 

and Valley relating to the January 16, 2009, and against Defendants Redding and Blanco relating to 

the January 31, 2011, incident, Plaintiff‟s claims are not properly joined, and Plaintiff may not proceed 

on both cognizable claims in the same action. Accordingly, the Court will grant Plaintiff the 

opportunity to amend the complaint to cure the defect. Plaintiff must determine which claims he 

wants to pursue in this action. Plaintiff is cautioned that if his amended complaint fails to comply with 

Rule 18(a), the Court will choose which claims will proceed and will dismiss out all unrelated claims, 

without prejudice. Visendi v. Bank of America, N.A., 733 F.3d 863, 870-871 (9th Cir. 2013). 

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff‟s complaint fails to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 18 and 20. As 

noted above, the Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to file an amended complaint to cure 

the identified deficiencies or notify the Court of his intent to proceed on one of the claims found to be 

cognizable. As previously stated, Plaintiff must determine which claims he wants to pursue in this 

action and if Plaintiff files a third amended complaint and in violation of Rules 18 and 20, the Court 

will determine which claim(s) shall proceed in this action. Accordingly, within thirty (30) days from 

the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall notify the Court in writing which claim he wishes to 

proceed with in this action or file a third amended complaint. 

 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall notify the 

Court as to which claim he wishes to proceed with in this action or file a third amended 

complaint; and

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2. Failure to comply with this order will result in dismissal of the action for failure to 

comply with a court order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 2, 2015 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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