Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02009/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02009-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Fraud

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOCELYN OVERHOLT, an 

individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

CARMAX AUTO SUPERSTORES 

CALIFORNIA, LLC, a Virginia 

Limited Liability Company,

Defendant.

No. 2:13-cv-02009-GEB-AC 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

CarMax Auto Superstores California, LLC (―CarMax‖) 

seeks summary judgment on all claims in this lawsuit. Plaintiff 

alleges a state fraud claim and claims under California‘s 

Consumers Legal Remedies Act (―CLRA‖) and Business & Professions 

Code sections 17200, et seq., (―UCL‖).

I. LEGAL STANDARD

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial 

burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of 

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 

(1986). Summary judgment ―evidence must be viewed in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all reasonable 

inferences must be drawn in favor of that party.‖ Sec. & Exch. 

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Comm‘n v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 

Johnson v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 251 F.3d 1222, 

1227 (9th Cir. 2001)).

Further, Local Rule 260(b) prescribes:

Any party opposing a motion for summary 

judgment . . . [must] reproduce the itemized 

facts in the [moving party‘s] Statement of 

Undisputed Facts and admit those facts that 

are undisputed and deny those that are 

disputed, including with each denial a 

citation to the particular portions of 

any . . . affidavit, deposition, 

interrogatory answer, admission, or other 

document relied upon in support of that 

denial.

If the nonmovant does not ―specifically . . . 

[controvert duly supported] facts identified in the [movant‘s] 

statement of undisputed facts,‖ the nonmovant ―is deemed to have 

admitted the validity of the facts contained in the [movant‘s] 

statement.‖ Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 527 (2006).

II. STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS

The following facts are either admitted or are ―deemed‖ 

uncontroverted since Plaintiff has not controverted them with 

specific facts as required by Local Rule 260(b).

CarMax is a national retailer of used vehicles. (Def. 

SUF ¶ 2, ECF No. 26-1.) On December 31, 2011, Plaintiff purchased 

a used 2010 Jeep Liberty (the ―Jeep‖) from CarMax. (Id. ¶ 4.) 

Plaintiff signed a prior use disclosure form before she purchased 

the Jeep, which disclosed: ―I/We acknowledge the above vehicle‘s 

prior use at the time of delivery as: RENTAL[.] This vehicle was 

used as a rental car before being purchased by CarMax.‖ (Id. ¶¶ 

11-12.)

CarMax maintains a vehicle certification program known 

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as the Certified Quality Inspection, (―CQI‖). (Id. ¶ 16.) 

Plaintiff‘s Jeep has undergone and passed a CQI. (Id.) 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Fraud

Plaintiff alleges in her fraud claim that CarMax 

intentionally misrepresented that her Jeep was certified, but she 

has not supported this allegation with objective facts. 

―[A] cause of action for fraud in California [requires 

evidence of a] . . . misrepresentation (false representation, 

concealment, or nondisclosure).‖ Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 

691 F.3d 1152, 1163 (9th Cir. 2009). 

CarMax asserts its statement that Plaintiff‘s Jeep was 

certified does not constitute a misrepresentation since the Jeep 

had ―undergone and passed a certification inspection.‖ (Ex. 21 

(―Collins Decl.‖) ¶¶ 5, 6 ECF No. 23-4.) CarMax supports this 

assertion with the declaration of the Operations Manager 

(―Collins‖) for the CarMax store where Plaintiff purchased her 

Jeep. Collins declares that by looking at the Vehicle Repair 

Order History for Plaintiff‘s Jeep, he was able to determine it 

went through and passed the Certified Quality Inspection (―CQI‖) 

process. (Id. ¶¶ 15-16, Ex. 4 ―Vehicle Repair Order History‖, ECF 

No. 23-3.)

Plaintiff objects to the admissibility of the Collins 

declaration under Federal Rules of Evidence (―FRE‖) Rules 601 

(lack of competency), 701 (lack of personal knowledge) and 801

(hearsay). (Pl.‘s Obj. Evi. Submitted by Def. in MSJ, ECF No. 

28.) 

CarMax responds that ―Collins has set proper foundation 

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for his declaration testimony. . . . [since he] is the Operations 

Manager. . . [at] the location at which plaintiff purchased the 

vehicle‖ and the documents he reviewed fall within the business 

records exception to the hearsay rule. (Def. Resp. Objections 

Lodged In Opp‘n To MSJ 3:15-4:1; 4:7-21, ECF No. 30-5.)

Collins declares: 

I am an employee of defendant CarMax. . . . I 

have personal knowledge of the matters herein 

and give this declaration on that basis. I am 

the Operations Manager for CarMax in 

Roseville, California. I have over three (3) 

years of experience at CarMax, including work 

in operations, and have been in the role of 

Operations Manager for over two (2) years. In 

December 2011, I was the Reconditioning 

Production Manager at the Irvine CarMax. I 

became the Operations Manager of the 

Roseville CarMax in May 2012. I make this 

declaration of my own personal knowledge and 

if called as a witness before a Court or 

other tribunal I could and would competently 

testify as is set forth herein. 

. . . . 

The[] [Vehicle Order Repair Histories and 

Certified Quality Inspection Certificates] 

are . . . kept and maintained by CarMax in 

the ordinary course of business and [are] 

relied upon by CarMax in its ordinary course 

of business for accuracy and reliability. 

These documents are all created at the time 

of the transaction, including purchases and 

repairs, by CarMax personnel in the ordinary 

course of their duties. The documents are 

stored by CarMax in electronic form as 

scanned documents in a CarMax database. These 

documents, . . . are all genuine copies of, 

or genuine printouts of, information held in 

CarMax computers systems and/or hard files. I 

personally reviewed these documents on the 

CarMax information system and/or hard files 

regarding this transaction or in hardcopy. 

I have reviewed [the Vehicle Order Repair 

History and Certified Quality Inspection 

Certificate]. . . regarding the used 2010 

Jeep Liberty (―the Jeep‖) that is the subject 

of this lawsuit. CarMax relies upon these 

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records in the ordinary course of its 

business in order to conduct its business, 

including documenting repairs made to a 

particular vehicle such as this one. From 

these records, I can detail the sale and 

repair history of the Jeep with CarMax.

(Collins Decl. ¶¶ 1, 3-4.)

CarMax has shown that Collins is familiar with CarMax‘s

policies and procedures regarding document creation and retention 

and is competent to testify about the procedures CarMax used to 

create Vehicle Repair Order Histories. Therefore, Plaintiff‘s 

evidentiary objections are overruled and the Jeep‘s Repair Order 

History is admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6). 

Collins also declares: 

CarMax opened a repair order (No. 625811) on 

the Jeep on December 20, 2011. This was 

opened at the Roseville CarMax store (Store 

No. 7147), where CarMax does some of its presale preparation work in this region before 

presenting the vehicle to customers. . . . 

The first entry is ―Concern 1, Description: 

USED VEHICLE CQI INSPECTION.‖ This is the 

―Certified Quality Inspection.‖ Again, this 

refers to CarMax‘s 125+ point ―Certified 

Quality Inspection‖ (―CQI‖) that covers all 

the major vehicle systems and equipment. 

The vehicle Repair Order History indicates 

that the Jeep went through and passed the 

CQI. . . process, with CarMax‘s repair 

records noting that CarMax had completed a 

presale oil change/filter, a smog test, and 

some exterior body work and touch-up 

painting. The Jeep was taken on two test 

drives as part of the CQI. . . 

The Jeep then had a ―FQC Inspection‖—a ―Final 

Quality Control‖ as part of the CQI. . . . 

(Collins Decl. ¶¶ 13-16.)

CarMax‘s evidence shows that it prevails on this 

portion of its motion.

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B. CLRA and UCL 

Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that CarMax violated 

the CLRA and UCL as follows: 

[1] Failing to provide an inspection report 

for the vehicle at any time that complies 

with California law; [2] Using the terms 

 ̳Certified,‘  ̳Certify,‘ and/or similar terms 

in the promotion, sales and advertising of 

the vehicle despite failing to provide a 

completed inspection report indicating all 

the components inspected prior to sale; [3] 

On information and belief, destroying the 

CQI/VQI Checklist after the CQI/VQI 

inspection took place in violation of 13 

C.C.R. 272.00 and 13 C.C.R. 272.02; [4] 

Selling a vehicle as  ̳Certified‘ that is in 

need of substantial repair; [5] Actively 

concealing and suppressing the results of the 

vehicle inspection when it has a duty to 

disclose those results; [6] and Failing to 

disclose the prior rental status of the 

vehicle. 

(Compl. ¶¶ 40, 50, ECF No. 1-1.)

CarMax argues it should be granted summary judgment on 

Plaintiff‘s CLRA and UCL claims that are premised on her 

allegation that she never received the Jeep‘s vehicle inspection 

report and CQI checklist, contending that this alleged failure 

did not cause Plaintiff any damage or injury.

Plaintiff responds that there is no requirement for her 

to have suffered damages to bring these claims, and that in any 

event she suffered ―economic injury‖ as a result of CarMax‘s 

alleged conduct since ―she would not have purchased the vehicle 

if it had not been certified.‖ (Opp‘n 13:3-4; 13:21; 16:1-3.)

A CLRA action requires Plaintiff to demonstrate ―some 

kind of damage‖ as a result of the unlawful practice. Meyer v. 

Sprint Spect., 45 Cal. 4th 634, 641 (2009) (emphasis added). The 

UCL also requires ―a loss or deprivation of money or property 

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sufficient to qualify as injury.‖ Kwikset Corp. v. Superior 

Court, 51 Cal. 4th 310, 322 (2011). 

Section 11713.18(a)(6) of the California Vehicle Code 

―requires a dealer to provide the buyer with a completed 

inspection report prior to sale, but the absence of a report does 

not actually bear on whether the inspection occurred.‖ ChulickPerez v. CarMax Auto Superstores Cal., LLC, No. 2:13-cv-2329-TLNDAD, 2014 WL 6819710, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2014). 

Plaintiff‘s assertion that she ―would not have 

purchased the Jeep if it had not been certified,‖ does not 

demonstrate that CarMax caused her harm since her claims ―ha[ve] 

no bearing whatsoever on whether the underlying inspection[s] 

actually happened.‖ Stelzer v. CarMax Auto Superstores Cal., LLC, 

No. 13-cv01788-LAB-JMB, 2013 WL 6815029, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 

20, 2013); see also Sigala v. CarMax Auto Superstores, LLC, No. 

1:14-cv-01451-SAB, 2014 WL 5823099, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 

2014) (―the lack of [a]. . . CQI report or checklist [has]. . .

not [been shown to] invalidate the certification of the 

vehicle.‖).

Since the Jeep was actually certified, CarMax‘s summary 

judgment motion on these claims is granted.

CarMax also seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff‘s CLRA 

and UCL claims that allege CarMax ―fail[ed] to disclose the prior 

rental status of the [Jeep]‖ as required by 13 CCR § 260.02,

since ―[P]laintiff concede[d] that CarMax disclosed‖ that the 

Jeep had previously been used as a rental vehicle in the prior 

use disclosure form she signed. (Mot. 6:24-25, ECF No. 23-1.)

California Code of Regulations 13 CCR § 260.02 

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prescribes: ―Former . . . rental vehicles . . . shall be clearly 

identified as such if the previous status is known to the 

seller.‖

Plaintiff disputes the uncontroverted facts 

establishing that she signed and acknowledged the Jeep‘s prior

use ―as a rental car before [it was] purchased by CarMax,‖ (Def. 

SUF ¶¶ 11-12), with her declaration in which she declares: she 

―felt the woman in the business office [who helped her with the 

paperwork] was flipping through the paperwork very quickly and it 

felt like a  ̳blur.‘‖ (Rosner Decl. Ex. 10 (―Overholt Decl.‖) ¶ 5, 

ECF No. 29-1; (Ex. 12 (―Prior Use Disclosure‖), ECF No. 23-3.)

However, Plaintiff‘s conclusory assertion concerning 

her feeling does not support drawing a reasonable inference that 

what she ―felt‖ is grounded in objective fact as required under 

the summary judgment standard. See Cermetek, Inc. v. Butler 

Avpak, Inc., 573 F.2d 1370, 1376-77 (9th Cir. 1978) (indicating 

that facts preceded by the preambles ―understanding,‖ ―belief,‖ 

or on ―information and belief,‖ are not sufficient to create a 

genuine issue of fact absent specific facts justifying the stated 

conclusion); Superior Offshore Intern., Inc. v. Bristow Grp.

Inc., No. 1:09-CV-00438-LDD, 2011 WL 2516522, at *9 (D. Del. June 

23, 2011) (―Plaintiff has not introduced evidence of legal 

significance suggesting that Tuttle‘s feelings and beliefs are 

reasonable, accurate, or grounded in objective fact.‖); Carlson 

v. Arnot–Ogden Mem'l Hosp., 918 F.2d 411, 416 (3d Cir. 1990) 

(stating a witness's ―purely subjective impression without any 

factual support amounts to nothing of legal significance and is 

insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.‖). 

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Therefore, Plaintiff‘s unexplained subjective feelings are 

insufficient to controvert Plaintiff‘s signed acknowledgement 

that she understood the Jeep was a prior rental vehicle before 

she purchased it. See generally Bauer v. Jackson, 15 Cal. App. 3d 

358, 370 (1971) (―Ordinarily when a person with capacity of 

reading and understanding an instrument signs it, [s]he may not, 

in the absence of fraud, imposition or excusable neglect, avoid 

its terms on the ground that [s]he failed to read it before 

signing it.‖). This portion of CarMax‘s motion is granted.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the above stated reasons, CarMax‘s motion for 

summary judgment is GRANTED; judgment shall be entered in favor 

of Defendant and this action shall be closed.

Dated: January 27, 2015

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