Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_99-cv-01427/USCOURTS-azd-2_99-cv-01427-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: Civil Miscellaneous Case

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James L. Gagan, )

)

Plaintiff/Judgment )

Creditor, ) No. CIV 99-1427 PHX RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

Victor E. Sharer and James )

A. Monroe, et al., )

)

Defendants. ) )

This matter is before the court on defendant James A. Monroe's

motion for leave to file interlocutory appeals and motion to stay a

General Writ of Execution during the pendency of those appeals, if

permitted. Mot. (doc. # 324). The motion has been fully briefed. 

Resp. (doc. # 335); Reply (doc. # 336). Having carefully

considered the arguments raised, the court now rules.

I. DISCUSSION

Monroe has requested certification for interlocutory appeal of

the court's orders of July 26, 2005 (doc. # 241) and October 17,

2006 (doc. # 321) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The relevant

Case 2:99-cv-01427-RCB Document 337 Filed 11/06/06 Page 1 of 9
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facts are set forth in great detail in the court's recent order of

October 17, 2006. See Order (doc. # 321) at 2-8. Plaintiff argues

that defendant's request for certification is untimely, and, in any

event, not warranted under the standards for certification. Resp.

(doc. # 335) at 3-5, 8-10. The court considers each argument in

turn.

A. Timeliness

Although there is no explicit time limit within which a party

must request certification for an interlocutory appeal, see 28

U.S.C. § 1292(b), many courts have held that an unreasonable and

unexplained delay in seeking certification is sufficient cause for

denying the request. Scholl v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 58, 60

(2005) ("Unreasonable delay constitutes sufficient cause to deny a

motion [for certification] . . . ."); Weir v. Propst, 915 F.2d 283,

285-87 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.) (declining jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) due to defendants' "gratuitous and protracted"

delay of five months in seeking certification); In re Buspirone

Patent & Antitrust Litig., 210 F.R.D. 43, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)

(denying request or certification due to "inexcusable or, at best,

unexplained delay" of three months); Ferraro v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't

of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 978, 979-80 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)

(denying request for certification due to plaintiff's unjustified

delay of two and a half months); see also 3-28 Moore's Federal

Practice & Procedure § 28.11 (3d ed. 2001) ("[I]f a party takes an

excessive delay in seeking an amendment, the district court may

deny a motion to amend."). The Seventh Circuit has held that a

delay of two months in seeking certification constitutes sufficient

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grounds to refuse permission for an interlocutory appeal, and has

cautioned that district judges should not grant "inexcusably

dilatory request[s]" for certification. Richardson Elecs., Ltd. v.

Panache Broad. of Pa., Inc., 202 F.3d 957, 958 (7th Cir. 2000)

(Posner, C.J.) (citing Weir, 915 F.2d at 287).

While the Ninth Circuit has not expressed its view with regard

to the timeliness of an initial request for certification, it has

aligned itself with the Seventh Circuit on a very similar question

dealing with requests for recertification. On that issue, the

Ninth Circuit, like the Seventh Circuit, has held that an appellant

may not circumvent the ten-day jurisdictional time limit of 28

U.S.C. § 1292(b) by seeking recertification of "an order that was

previously certified for appeal but from which the appellant failed

to timely petition to appeal." See In re Benny, 812 F.2d 1133,

1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Nuclear Eng'g Co. v. Scott, 660 F.2d

241, 247 (7th Cir. 1981)). In such cases, jurisdiction over the

appeal may be refused if it would fail to serve the purposes of 28

U.S.C. § 1292(b) by promoting judicial efficiency. Id.

In his reply, defendant describes the Ninth Circuit's approach

as being "at substantial variance with the rather strict approach"

of the Seventh Circuit in Weir. Reply (doc. # 336) at 4. Not so. 

If defendant takes a moment to think about this argument, he will

realize that what he is effectively saying is that the Seventh

Circuit is issuing inconsistent opinions. Surely, if the Seventh

Circuit's decision in Weir was going to be perceived as being "at

substantial variance" with its earlier decision in Nuclear

Engineering, Judge Posner would not have let any inconsistency slip

through. As it happens, we know that the cases are consistent with

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one another, largely because the court cites Nuclear Engineering

and In re Benny as authority in support of its holding in Weir. 

See Weir, 915 F.2d at 286 ("Cases such as Nuclear Engineering and

Benny may be thought to stand for the proposition that reasonable

simultaneity of the certification with the order certified is

required."). In light of the foregoing, the court finds the

Seventh Circuit approach articulated in Weir and Richardson

Electronics to be particularly persuasive, and looks with scrutiny

on "inexcusably dilatory request[s]" for certification.

In the present case, defendant has waited nearly fifteen

months until requesting certification of the Court's July 26, 2005

order (doc. # 241) for interlocutory appeal. Rather than explain

this remarkable delay, defendant maintains that his request for

certification was timely. See Reply (doc. # 336) at 2-4. Perhaps

time is relative, but there are objective standards of timeliness

adhered to by most federal litigants, and the court cannot alter

the spacetime continuum to accommodate defendant's notion of

timeliness. If a delay of two months is "inexcusably dilatory,"

see Richardson Elecs., Ltd., 202 F.3d at 958, then defendant's

unexplained delay of fifteen months cannot be tolerated.

Forced by defendant's silence on the issue, the court will

look to the record to understand the reasons, if any, for his delay

in requesting certification of the July 26, 2005 order (doc. # 241)

for interlocutory appeal. Instead of seeking "an immediate

appeal," see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), defendant waited nearly one month

after the issuance of the order to file a motion to stay (doc. #

247), which the court denied on November 10, 2005. See Order (doc.

# 260). Thereafter, defendant allowed over ten months to pass, and

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waited for a Writ of General Execution to issue (doc. # 290) and

reissue (doc. # 306) without ever seeking certification. Instead,

defendant filed an expedited motion to quash (doc. ## 313, 315)

rehashing an argument which this court has rejected at least twice

before. See Order (doc. # 321) at 2. Not only is there no

justification for defendant's delay in requesting certification,

but it is evident from the history of this case that defendant is

not as concerned with judicial efficiency as he professes to be. 

Defendant's request for certification of the court's July 26, 2005

order (doc. # 241) will therefore be denied as untimely.

B. Standards for Certification

The decision to grant or deny a request for certification is

left to the sound discretion of the district court. Arthur Young &

Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 549 F.2d 686, 698 (9th Cir. 1977). 

Interlocutory review is appropriate if the court concludes that its

order "involves a controlling question of law as to which there is

substantial ground for difference of opinion and . . . an immediate

appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate

termination of the litigation . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); In re

Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1982). In

the present case, defendant has not demonstrated that interlocutory

review is appropriate for either of the orders (doc. ## 241, 321)

sought to be appealed.

1. July 26, 2005 Order

Even if defendant had timely requested certification of the

July 26, 2005 order (doc. # 241), the request would be denied,

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because an interlocutory appeal at this juncture would

significantly hinder rather than "materially advance the ultimate

termination of the litigation." See U.S.C. § 1292(b); see also

Resp. (doc. # 335) at 2. Moreover, the issue that defendant seeks

to appeal-- whether collection efforts constitute an "action"

sufficient to renew a judgment under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-1611,

see Mot. (doc. # 324) at 2-- is an issue of first impression, which

scarcely presents "a substantial ground for difference of opinion." 

See Flor v. BOT Fin. Corp. (In re Flor), 79 F.3d 281, 284 (2d Cir.

1996) (noting "that the mere presence of a disputed issue that is a

question of first impression, standing alone, is insufficient to

demonstrate a substantial ground for difference of opinion."); FDIC

v. First Nat'l Bank, 604 F. Supp. 616, 622 (E.D. Wis. 1985) ("[T]he

apparent lack of clear authority on private rights of action under

the numerous federal banking laws invoked by the plaintiff suggests

that any difference of opinion on this issue might prove more

spurious than real.").

Defendant claims that there is "substantial ground for

difference of opinion," because the Court of Appeal of Florida has

held that collection efforts do not constitute "actions on a

judgment" under Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11. See Mot. (doc. # 324) at

4 (citing Burshan v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 805 So. 2d 835 (Ct.

App. Fla. 2001)). Defendant claims that this Florida statute,

which sets forth the limitation periods for various types of

lawsuits, is "nearly identical" to the judgment renewal statute at

issue in this case, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-1611. Mot. (doc. # 324)

at 4. Apart from the fact that the statutes both contain some of

the same words, e.g., "action," the court perceives no meaningful

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similarity. The statutes serve different purposes, and, in the

context of a statute of limitations, it is not surprising that the

Florida court would narrowly interpret the word "action" as

referring to a lawsuit.

Simply put, defendant has not shown any reason why the court's

July 26, 2005 (doc. # 241) should be certified for interlocutory

appeal. The request for certification of that order will therefore

be denied as being untimely as well as unwarranted under the

standards for certification.

2. October 17, 2006 Order

The court is similarly unconvinced that the standards of

certification have been met with respect to its October 17, 2006

order (doc. # 321) rejecting defendant's arguments based on the

Rooker-Feldman and preclusion doctrines. As it is, the case is on

the verge of finality. If an interlocutory appeal is taken now and

the Rooker-Feldman and preclusion doctrines found inapplicable, the

ultimate termination of the litigation would be delayed by several

months only to return the case to where it is today. Defendant's

willingness to wager limited judicial resources on appeals of

questionable merit does not demonstrate any concern for judicial

efficiency. Rather than materially advancing the resolution of

this case, an interlocutory appeal would have the effect of

needlessly protracting the case and increasing the cost of this

litigation for the parties and for the court. 

More importantly, there is not a substantial ground for a

difference of opinion as to the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman

and preclusion doctrines under the facts of this case. These are

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essentially arguments that defendant has driven around the course a

number of times before, albeit in subtly different forms, without

success. With regard to Rooker-Feldman, the court's October 17,

2006 order relied heavily on the Ninth Circuit's guidance on the

"inextricably intertwined" test, see Maldanado v. Harris, 370 F.3d

945, 950 (9th Cir. 2004), and explained why the present action does

not constitute a "de facto appeal" of the state court decision. 

See Order (doc. # 321) at 10-15. With regard to collateral

estoppel, the court has explained time and time again, but most

explicitly in its October 17, 2006 order, that the issue of a

judgment's enforceability is not the "same," "precisely the same,"

or "identical" to the issue of whether a judgment lien was timely

renewed. Id. at 15-19. Defendant has not shown any likelihood of

substantial differences of opinion on these questions. For these

reasons, the Court concludes that an interlocutory appeal of the

Court's October 17, 2006 order (doc. # 321) would not be

appropriate in this case. 

Finally, because no order has been certified for immediate

appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and defendant Monroe's previously

filed appeals (doc. ## 245, 264) have recently been dismissed under

Fed. R. App. P. 42(b), see Mandate (doc. # 325), defendant has no

appeals pending. Accordingly, his motion to stay the Writ of

General Execution pending appeals will be denied.

II. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing analysis,

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IT IS ORDERED that defendant James A. Monroe's motion for

leave to file interlocutory appeals (doc. # 324) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant James A. Monroe's motion

to stay (doc. # 324) is DENIED.

DATED this 6th day of November, 2006.

Copies to counsel of record

Case 2:99-cv-01427-RCB Document 337 Filed 11/06/06 Page 9 of 9