Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01058/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01058-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ADAM ORTIZ,

Petitioner,

v.

RAYMOND MADDEN, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No.: 18cv1058 LAB (MDD)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION RE: (1) 

DENIAL OF HABEAS CORPUS 

PETITION; and (2) DENIAL OF 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Adam Ortiz, a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition” or “Pet.”), challenges the loss 

of custody credits resulting from a prison disciplinary hearing.1 Ortiz also asks for an 

evidentiary hearing. (Traverse, ECF No. 18 at 4.) The Court has read and considered the 

Petition, [ECF No. 1], the Answer and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support 

 

1 Because Ortiz is serving a determinate sentence, (see Pet., ECF No. 1), the reinstatement of his 

forfeited custody credits would necessarily shorten the length of his confinement, and this Court has 

habeas jurisdiction over his claims. See Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 931 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) 

(holding that a state prisoner’s federal claims relating to imprisonment lie at “the core of habeas corpus” 

and are subject to the provisions of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) if 

they would “necessarily lead to immediate or speedier release,” or else they challenge “any other aspect 

of prison life” and are subject to the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act and “must be 

brought, if at all, under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983.”) 

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of the Answer [ECF No. 15], the Traverse [ECF No. 18], the lodgments and other 

documents filed in this case, and the legal arguments presented by both parties.2 For the 

reasons discussed below, the Court recommends the petition be DENIED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be 

correct; Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and 

convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (West 2006); see also Parle v. Fraley, 

506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including inferences 

properly drawn from these facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). 

The state appellate recounted the facts as follows:

While Adam Ortiz was incarcerated at a prison in Imperial County, a 

correctional officer searched the cell Ortiz shared with another inmate and 

found among Ortiz’s belongings a clear plastic container that contained what 

the officer believed were two inmate-manufactured weapons, each of which

consisted of a narrow metal cylinder that was sharpened at one end and 

attached to a plastic handle at the other. The correctional officer took four 

photographs of the weapons. Ortiz was issued a rules violation report for 

possession of a deadly weapon. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit, 15, § 3006, subd. 

(a).)

Before the disciplinary hearing, an investigative employee relayed 

written questions from Ortiz to the correctional officer about whether he 

found the inmate-manufactured weapons in a plastic container, whether he 

confiscated the container as evidence, whether he photographed the other 

items in the container, and whether the weapons were assembled in the 

container. The correctional officer responded he did not state the weapons 

were found in a clear plastic container, he did not recall whether he 

confiscated the container as evidence, he did not photograph the other items 

in the container, and the components of the weapons were inside the 

container ready for assembly.

At the disciplinary hearing, Ortiz pled not guilty. He admitted the 

items were his, but denied they were weapons, and claimed he used them to 

 

2 Page numbers for docketed materials cited in this Report and Recommendation refer to those imprinted 

by the court’s electronic case filing system

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remove screws from wall sockets and a television and “to get into the wall” 

where he had hidden a cell phone. Based on the rules violation report, the 

photographs of the weapons, the correctional officers’ answers to Ortiz’s 

written questions, and Ortiz’s statements at the hearing, the disciplinary 

hearing officer found Ortiz guilty and assessed a forfeiture of 360 days of 

conduct credits.

(Lodgment No. 5, ECF No. 17-5 at 1-2.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

After being found guilty of a rules violation, Ortiz administratively appealed his 

conviction through the California Department of Corrections and was denied relief. (Pet., 

ECF No. 1 at 33-72.) Ortiz filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the 

results of his disciplinary hearing in the Imperial County Superior Court. (Lodgment 

Nos. 3, ECF Nos. 17-3.) The superior court denied the petition in a written, unpublished 

opinion. (Lodgment No. 4, ECF No. 17-4.) Ortiz then filed a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus in the California Court of Appeal, which denied the petition in a written, 

unpublished opinion. (Lodgment No. 2, 5, ECF No. 17-2, 17-5.) Ortiz thereafter filed a 

petition in the California Supreme Court, which denied the petition without citation of 

authority. (Lodgment Nos. 6-7, ECF Nos. 17-6–17-7.) 

Ortiz filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the 

United States District Court for the Central District of California on May 14, 2018. (ECF 

No. 1.) On May 25, 2018, the case was transferred to this Court. (ECF No. 4.) 

Respondent filed an Answer on October 10, 2018. (ECF No. 15.) Ortiz filed a Traverse 

on November 5, 2018. (ECF No. 18.)

IV. DISCUSSION

Ortiz contends his prison disciplinary decision violated his due process rights 

because there were conflicts between what the corrections officer who searched his cell 

wrote in his report and the officer’s responses to Ortiz’s written questions. In addition, 

Ortiz claims the hearing officer did not consider his explanation that the alleged weapon 

/ / /

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found in his cell was actually used to access a cell phone Ortiz had hidden in his cell. 

(Pet., ECF No. 1 at 17-19.) 

A. Standard of Review

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). 

Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted with respect to any claim 

adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless that adjudication: (1) resulted in a 

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). In deciding a state prisoner’s 

habeas petition, a federal court is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with the 

state court’s determination; rather, the court applies an extraordinarily deferential review, 

inquiring only whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. See

Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th 

Cir. 2004).

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state 

court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or 

if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may grant 

relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the state court correctly identified 

the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applied 

those decisions to the facts of a particular case. Id. Additionally, the “unreasonable 

application” clause requires that the state court decision be more than incorrect or 

erroneous; to warrant habeas relief, the state court’s application of clearly established 

federal law must be “objectively unreasonable.” See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 

(2003). The Court may also grant relief if the state court’s decision was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 

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Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court 

“looks through” to the last reasoned state court decision and presumes it provides the 

basis for the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S.

797, 805-06 (1991). If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its 

reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to 

determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76); accord Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). Clearly established federal law, for 

purposes of § 2254(d), means “the governing principle or principles set forth by the 

Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72.

B. Analysis

Ortiz contends his federal due process rights to a fair hearing were violated when 

the hearing officer found him guilty despite conflicts between statements made by the 

correctional officer in his report and his answers to questions posed to him by Ortiz. 

(Pet., ECF No. 1 at 18-19.) Specifically, Ortiz claims that the hearing officer “did not 

consider the significant conflicts to determine if the allege[d] weapons were actually 

assembled when they were discovered and/or if c/o J. Ramirez assembled them himself” 

before taking photographs of them. (Id. at 19.) Ortiz also claims the hearing officer did 

not consider the conflict between c/o J. Ramiriez’s report, in which he stated he found the 

weapons in a clear plastic container, and his testimony at the disciplinary hearing when 

he denied finding the weapons inside the plastic container. (Id. at 18.) Ortiz also argues 

that the hearing was unfair because the hearing officer “failed to consider [Ortiz’s] 

explanation of the contraband’s intended use but instead relied on [Ortiz’s] past conduct 

to establish a guilty finding.” (Id. at 18.) Respondent contends the state court’s 

resolution of Ortiz’s due process claims was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. (Answer, ECF No. 15.) 

/ / /

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After exhausting his administrative remedies, Ortiz raised his claims in a petition 

for review filed in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 6, ECF No. 17-6.) The 

California Supreme Court denied the petition without citation of authority, and thus this 

Court must “look through” to the state appellate court’s opinion to determine whether the 

denial of Ortiz’s claims were contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Supreme Court law or was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. The state appellate court wrote:

Ortiz is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. “[D]ue process in this 

context requires only that there be some evidence to support the findings 

made in the disciplinary hearing.” (Superintendent v. Hill (1985) 472 U.S. 

445, 457, italics added; accord, In re Zepeda (2006) 141 Cal. App. 4th 1493, 

1498.) The report of the correctional officer that he found in Ortiz’s prison 

cell two sharpened metal cylinders and plastic handles that obviously could 

be assembled into stabbing devices, the photographs of those items, and 

Ortiz’s admission the items were his, constitute “some evidence” that he 

violated the prison regulation forbidding inmates to “possess or have under 

their control or constructive possession any weapons.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 

15, § 3006, subd. (a).) Neither the discrepancy in the correctional officer’s 

statements about whether he found the items inside a plastic container nor 

Ortiz’s statements he used those items not as weapons but as screwdrivers 

“change the analysis under Hill. Hill emphasizes that the reviewing court is 

not to engage in an ‘examination of the entire record’ or ‘weighing of the 

[conflicting] evidence.’’ [Citation.] Rather the narrow role assigned to the 

reviewing court is solely to determine whether there is ‘any evidence in the 

record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.’ 

[Citation.] Here, there is such evidence, even if, as [Ortiz] contends, there is 

other evidence that supports his assertion of innocence.” (In re Zepeda, 

supra, at p. 1500.) The violation of which Ortiz was found guilty subjected 

him to a forfeiture of up to 360 days of conduct credits. (Cal. Code Regs., 

tit. 15, § 3323, subd. (b)(8).) He has established no due process violation.

The petition is denied.

(Lodgment No. 5, ECF No. 17-5 at 2.)

In Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985), the United States Supreme Court 

held that in the context of the revocation of good time credits, “the requirements of due 

process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary 

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board to revoke good time credits. This standard is met if ‘there was some evidence from 

which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced . . . .’” Hill, 472 

U.S. at 455, quoting United States ex. Rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 

U.S. 103, 104 (1927); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (holding 

that federal due process requires procedural protections before a prisoner can be deprived 

of a state-created liberty interest in good time custody credits). Even a single piece of 

evidence may be sufficient to meet the Hill standard, provided it has “sufficient indicia of 

reliability.” Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003). In Ortiz’s case, there 

was, at a minimum, “some evidence” to support the disciplinary hearing’s findings and 

the loss of custody credits.

The following evidence was presented at the disciplinary hearing. On December

30 2016, C/O J. Ramirez, together with C/O J. Barnett, conducted a search of Ortiz’s cell. 

(Pet., ECF No. 1 at 49.) Ramirez wrote in his report of the search that he “discovered a 

clear plastic container with two (2) inmate manufactured weapons in it easily accessible 

to both inmates . . . .” (Id.) Ramirez took four photographs of the weapons. (Id.; see 

also id. at 31.) Ramirez reported that one weapon was “made of round metal measuring 

approximately 4” in length, and approximately 1/2” in width,” and the other was “2 3/4”

in length and 1/2” in width . . . .” (Pet., ECF No. 1 at 49.) 

Ortiz offered the following statement at the hearing: “I’m not going to deny it 

wasn’t my shit but it was not a weapon because it was not used for that. There was a 

cellphone in the wall and that’s what I used to get into the wall.” (Id. at 40.) When 

questioned by the hearing officer, Ortiz explained the items were used to “open screws on 

TVs and whatever,” and “to open the wall socket” where a cell phone was hidden. (Id.) 

When asked, Ortiz also stated the plastic and metal pieces did not fit together “without 

force.” (Id.)

Ortiz was permitted to submit written questions to Ramirez. Ortiz asked Ramirez 

whether he had stated in his report that the alleged weapons were found in a clear plastic 

container, and Ramirez responded, “No.” (Id. at 41.) Ramirez did not recall whether he 

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had placed the plastic container into evidence along with the suspected weapons, and 

answered “no” when asked whether he had taken pictures of other items that were inside 

the plastic container. (Id.) Ramirez also confirmed that the pieces of the alleged 

weapons “were inside the plastic container ready to be assembled together.” (Id.) At the 

conclusion of the hearing, the Senior Hearing Officer concluded that Ortiz was guilty of 

possession of a deadly weapon. (Id. at 44.)

Given the evidence presented at the hearing, the Senior Hearing Officer’s finding 

was supported by “some evidence.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 456. Ortiz contends the hearing 

violated his federal due process rights because Ramirez gave conflicting accounts of how 

the alleged weapons were stored when he found them and the Senior Hearing Officer did 

not properly credit his claim that the items found in his cell were not weapons. (Pet., 

ECF No. 1 at 17-19.) In its review of Ortiz’s disciplinary hearing, however, this Court is 

not permitted to “make its own assessment of the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the 

evidence.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 457; Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1987). 

“Ascertaining whether [the some evidence] standard is satisfied does not require 

examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, 

or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any 

evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary 

board.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56. Here, the evidence provided by C/O Ramirez was 

sufficient to satisfy the “some evidence” standard.

“The fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Due Process Clause does not require 

courts to set aside decisions of prison administrators that have some basis in fact.” Id. at 

456. The state court’s denial of Ortiz’s claims was neither contrary to, nor an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Yarborough, 540 

U.S. at 4. Nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254. Ortiz is not entitled to relief.

/ / /

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C. Request for an Evidentiary Hearing

Oritz asks for an evidentiary hearing in his case. (Traverse, ECF No. 18 at 4.) 

Evidentiary hearings in § 2254 cases are governed by AEDPA, which “substantially 

restricts the district court’s discretion to grant an evidentiary hearing.” Baja v. 

Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999). The provisions of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(2) control this decision:

(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State 

court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the 

claim unless the applicant shows that --

(A) the claim relies on --

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on 

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously 

unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously 

discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and 

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by 

clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable 

factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(2) (West 2006).

In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, the court must first determine 

whether a factual basis exists in the record to decide Petitioner’s claims. Insyxiengmay v. 

Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 669 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Baja, 187 F.3d at 1078). Where the 

issues raised by the Petitioner can be resolved by reference to the state court record, no 

evidentiary hearing is required. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 183 (2011). If not, 

the court must “ascertain whether the petitioner has “failed to develop the factual basis of 

a claim in State court.” Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 670, quoting Baja, 187 F.3d at 1078 

(internal quotation marks omitted). A failure to develop the factual basis of a claim in 

state court implies some “lack of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the 

prisoner or the prisoner’s counsel.” See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 432 (2000). 

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The Supreme Court has said that “[d]iligence will require in the usual case that the 

prisoner, at a minimum, seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in the manner 

prescribed by state law.” Id. at 437. As discussed above, Ortiz’s claims can be resolved 

by reference to the state court record. Moreover, Ortiz did not seek an evidentiary 

hearing in state court. (Lodgment Nos. 2-3, ECF Nos. 17-2, 17-3.)

Further, the Supreme Court in Pinholster held that where habeas claims have been 

decided on their merits in state court, a federal court’s review must be confined to the 

record that was before the state court. 563 U.S. at 181-82. Ortiz can only proceed to 

develop additional evidence in federal court if either § 2254(d)(1) or (d)(2) are first 

satisfied. See Sully v. Ayers, 725 F.3d 1057, 1075 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating that “an 

evidentiary hearing is pointless once the district court has determined that § 2254(d) 

precludes habeas relief[]” (citing Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 203 n.20)). For all the reasons 

discussed above, Ortiz is not entitled to federal habeas relief pursuant to § 2254(d)(1) or 

(d)(2). Accordingly, the Court recommends Ortiz’s request for an evidentiary hearing be

DENIED.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District 

Judge Larry Alan Burns under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the 

United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an order: (1) approving 

and adopting this Report and Recommendation, (2) DENYING Petitioner’s request for 

an evidentiary hearing, and (3) directing that Judgment be entered DENYING the 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than December 31, 2018, any party to this action 

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than January 7, 2019. The parties are advised 

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that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th 

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 17, 2018

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