Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-00586/USCOURTS-caed-1_22-cv-00586-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 28:794 Rehabilitation Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SYLVIA AHN,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE GEO GROUP, INC., et al.

Defendants.

Case No. 1:22-cv-00586-CDB

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR LEAVE

TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

(Doc. 35)

ORDER DENYING AS MOOT 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS

(Docs. 21, 32)

ORDER RESETTING SCHEDULING 

CONFERENCE

Before this Court is Plaintiff Sylvia Ahn’s (“Plaintiff”) motion to file a second amended 

complaint (Doc. 36), the responses (Docs. 40-41) of Defendants United States Immigration & 

Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and Geo Group, Inc. (“Geo Group”), and Plaintiff’s reply (Doc. 

43). For the reasons explained herein, Plaintiff’s motion to file a second amended complaint shall 

be granted.1

/ / /

1 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge and 

this action has been assigned to Magistrate Judge Christopher D. Baker for all purposes. (Docs. 

37-39).

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Background

On May 17, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint for compensatory and punitive damages 

against Defendants Geo Group, ICE, and the City of McFarland. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff asserted 

eight causes of actions against Defendants. Id. at 10-29. That same day, Plaintiff submitted an 

administrative claim to ICE under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). (Docs. 35 at 3, 35-2).

On June 9, 2022, Geo Group filed a motion to dismiss counts seven and eight of 

Plaintiff’s complaint. (Doc. 16). On June 23, 2022, Plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal 

of the City of McFarland without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

41(a)(1)(A)(i). (Doc. 17). That same day, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint against 

Defendants Geo Group and ICE. (Doc. 18). Plaintiff asserted seven causes of actions solely 

against Geo Group and a claim of Disability Discrimination-Violation of the Rehabilitation Act 

against Geo Group and ICE. Id. at 11-31.

On July 12, 2022, Geo Group filed a motion to dismiss counts seven and eight of 

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint. (Doc. 21). The Court denied as moot Geo Group’s June 9, 

2022, motion to dismiss in light of the filing of a first amended complaint and amended motion to 

dismiss on July 15, 2022. (Doc. 22). On July 26, 2022, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Geo 

Group’s motion to dismiss and Geo Group filed a reply on August 5, 2022. (Docs. 23-24). Geo

Group and Plaintiff filed notices of supplemental authority on August 10 and 17, 2022. (Docs. 

26-27).

On October 11, 2022, ICE denied Plaintiff’s administrative claim under the FTCA. 

(Docs. 35 at 3, 35-3). On March 3, 2023, ICE filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim against 

ICE under the Rehabilitation Act. (Doc. 32). ICE argues the claim should be dismissed because 

(1) Plaintiff has not properly served the United States; (2) the federal government is immune from 

Rehabilitation Act claims, (3) Plaintiff has not stated a plausible claim for violation of the 

Rehabilitation Act, and (4) she has not demonstrated standing to bring the Rehabilitation Act 

claim individually. Id.

On March 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. 

(Doc. 35). Plaintiff seeks to amend her complaint to (1) add six state law tort claims that ICE 

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denied administratively, and (2) to add the United States of America as a new defendant. (Docs. 

35, 35-1). 

On March 30, 2023, ICE filed a response to Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend. (Doc. 

40). ICE did not “categorically object to the Court’s granting leave” but noted dismissal of ICE 

and any related federal defendants remained appropriate due to failure of service and lack of any 

good cause explaining the failure. Id. at 1-2. ICE also argued Plaintiff’s proposed amended 

complaint still asserted an improper Rehabilitation Act claim against it. Id. ICE asked the Court 

if Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend was granted, it be provided 45 days to file a response to 

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint. Id. at 2-3. On March 31, 2023, Geo Group filed a 

response to Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend adopting and supporting the response filed by 

ICE and reasserting its positions and defense as set forth in its motion to dismiss. (Doc. 41).

On April 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed a reply to ICE’s and Geo Group’s responses. (Doc. 43). 

Plaintiff argues the federal defendants, ICE and the United States, should not be dismissed. Id. at 

3. Specifically, Plaintiff argues the claims against the federal defendants all arise under the 

FTCA. Id. Plaintiff contends “[b]ecause these are newly ripe claims that could not have been 

pleaded or served before, Plaintiff should be allowed to amend her complaint to add such claims 

and parties.” Id. Next, Plaintiff avers its second amended complaint does not bring a 

Rehabilitation Act claim against ICE. Id. at 5. Lastly, Plaintiff notes it has no objection to ICE’s 

requested extension to file an answer to her second amended complaint. Id. at 5-6.

Legal Standard

Twenty-one days after a responsive pleading or a motion to dismiss is filed, a plaintiff

may amend the complaint only by leave of the court or by written consent of the adverse party. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). “Rule 15(a) is very liberal” and a court should freely give leave to amend 

when “justice so requires.” AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951

(9th Cir. 2006); see Chodos v. W. Publ. Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (“it is generally 

our policy to permit amendment with ‘extreme liberality’”) (citing Morongo Band of Mission 

Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir.1990)). Granting or denying leave to amend a 

complaint under Rule 15 is within the discretion of the court. Swanson v. United States Forest 

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Service, 87 F.3d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1996). “In exercising this discretion, a court must be guided 

by the underlying purpose of Rule 15 to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the 

pleadings or technicalities.” United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir, 1981); Chudacoff 

v. Univ. Med. Ctr., 649 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 2011) (“refusing Chudacoff leave to amend a 

technical pleading error, albeit one he should have noticed earlier, would run contrary to Rule 

15(a)’s intent.”).

A court ordinarily considers five factors to assess whether to grant leave to amend: “(1) 

bad faith; (2) undue delay; (3) prejudice to the opposing party; (4) futility of amendment; and (5) 

whether the plaintiff has previously amended his complaint.” Nunes v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 805, 

808 (9th Cir. 2004). The factors are not weighed equally. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 

(9th Cir. 1995); see Atkins v. Astrue, 2011 WL 1335607, at *3 (N.D. Cal. April 7, 2011) (the five 

factors “need not all be considered in each case”). Undue delay, “by itself...is insufficient to 

justify denying a motion to amend.” Bowles v. Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 1999). On the 

other hand, futility of amendment and prejudice to the opposing party can, by themselves, justify 

the denial of a motion for leave to amend. Bonin, 59 F.3d at 845; see Eminence Capital, LLC v. 

Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (the consideration of prejudice to the opposing 

party carries the greatest weight).

In conducting this five-factor analysis, the court generally grants all inferences in favor of 

permitting amendment. Griggs v. Pace Am. Group, Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Moreover, the court must be mindful that, for each of these factors, the party opposing 

amendment has the burden of showing that amendment is not warranted. DCD Programs, Ltd. v. 

Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Discussion

The Court addresses the relevant Nunes factors below:

1. Bad faith

A motion to amend is made in bad faith where there is “evidence in the record which 

would indicate a wrongful motive” on the part of the litigant requesting leave to amend. DCD 

Programs, 833 F.2d at 187; Wizards of the Coast LLC v. Cryptozoic Entm’t LLC, 309 F.R.D. 645, 

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651 (W.D. Wash. 2015) (“In the context of a motion for leave to amend, ‘bad faith’ means acting 

with intent to deceive, harass, mislead, delay, or disrupt.”) (citing Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 

F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2006)).

In the case at bar, there is little “evidence in the record which would indicate a wrongful 

motive” on Plaintiff’s behalf in requesting leave to amend. DCD Programs, 833 F.2d at 187. 

Plaintiff justifies her request for leave to amend by representing to the Court that all of her new 

claims could not have been successfully raised in her first amended complaint as, at that time, 

they had not been exhausted. (Doc. 43 at 4) (citing Valadez-Lopez v. Chertoff, 656 F.3d 851, 856 

(9th Cir. 2011)). Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of amendment. 

2. Undue delay

By itself, undue delay is insufficient to prevent the Court from granting leave to amend 

pleadings. Howey v. United States, 481 F.2d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 1973); DCD Programs, Ltd., 

833 F.2d at 186. In combination with other factors, delay may be sufficient to deny amendment. 

Webb, 655 F.2d at 979-80. To determine undue delay, a court shall consider if “the moving party 

knew or should have known the facts and theories raised by the amendment in the original 

pleading.” Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). 

The mere fact that a party fails to offer a reason for not moving to amend earlier does not in itself 

constitute an adequate basis for denying leave to amend. Howey, 481 F.2d at 1190-91. Whether 

there has been “undue delay” should be considered in the context of (1) the length of the delay 

measured from the time the moving party obtained relevant facts; (2) whether discovery has 

closed; and (3) proximity to the trial date. Texaco, Inc. v. Ponsoldt, 939 F.2d 794, 798-99 (9th 

Cir. 1991).

The Court finds no undue delay that would support denying leave to amend. Plaintiff 

claims a second amended complaint is necessary as her FTCA claims had not yet been exhausted 

when she filed the first amended complaint. (Doc. 35). On October 11, 2022, Plaintiff exhausted 

her administrative claims under the FTCA. Id. at 3. Then, Plaintiff waited over five months to 

amend her complaint. Plaintiff has failed to address why she delayed for months to present her

exhausted claims under the FTCA to this Court. See generally (Docs. 35, 43). However, as a 

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scheduling conference has not been held (Docs. 8, 25, 30, 34), discovery deadlines and a trial date 

have not been set, and Defendants demonstrate no irreparable prejudice they might suffer were 

leave to amend granted, the Court finds Plaintiff’s delay was not improper. Thus, this factor 

weighs in favor of amendment. Cf. Komie v. Buehler Corp., 449 F.2d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 1971) 

(affirming denial of leave to amend where tardiness of the motion prejudiced the opposing party).

3. Futility of amendment

A court may deny leave to amend if the proposed amendment is futile or would be subject 

to dismissal. Carrico v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 656 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2011). An 

amendment is futile if the complaint clearly could not be saved by amendment. United States v. 

Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011). However, denial of leave to amend on 

futility grounds is “rare.” Zurich Am. Ins. Co. of Illinois v. VForce Inc., No. 2:18-cv-02066-TLNCKD, 2020 WL 2732046, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 26, 2020) (citing Netbula, LLC v. Distinct Corp., 

212 F.R.D. 534, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2003)). “Ordinarily, ‘courts will defer consideration of 

challenges to the merits of a proposed amended pleading until after leave to amend is granted and 

the amended pleading is filed.”’ Id.

Here, ICE argues Plaintiff’s second amended complaint attempts to assert a Rehabilitation 

Act claim against it. See (Doc. 40 at 2) (“Although the heading to plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act 

claim says it is against GEO Group, she still asserts that ‘ICE discriminated against Mr. Ahn 

because of his disability’ and refers to ‘ICE’ or “Defendants” in allegations pertaining to Count 

Two.”). In contrast, Plaintiff purports she has raised a Rehabilitation Act claim only against GEO 

Group. (Doc. 43 at 5). 

The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s proposed second amended complaint and understands

ICE’s confusion as to Plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim. Plaintiff alleges within her proposed 

second amended complaint that ICE violated the Rehabilitation Act. (Doc. 35-1 at ¶¶ 113-14). In 

fact, a side-by-side comparison of Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (that raised a Rehabilitation 

Act claim against ICE) and the proposed second amended complaint shows that Plaintiff 

primarily changed the heading and not the substance of her second count. (Docs. 18 at ¶¶ 79-101, 

35-1 at ¶¶ 94-115). Therefore, the Court will require Plaintiff to submit a second amended 

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complaint that unambiguously removes ICE from Plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim. 

Defendants present no other arguments to deny Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend on the basis 

of futility. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of amendment.

4. Prejudice to the opposing party

The most critical factor in determining whether to grant leave to amend is prejudice to the 

opposing party. Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052. The burden of showing prejudice is on the 

party opposing an amendment to the complaint. DCD Programs, Ltd., 833 F.2d at 187. There is 

a presumption in favor of granting leave to amend where prejudice is not shown under Rule 15(a). 

Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052.

ICE’s argument that granting leave to amend will cause prejudice is predicated largely on 

its claim it should be dismissed due to Plaintiff’s failure to effectuate service. (Doc. 40 at 2). 

Although Plaintiff does not explain the reasons for failing to effect service, she suggests she 

purposefully delayed service so that she could complete administrative exhaustion of certain 

claims first. (Doc. 43 at p. 3). Delaying service based on the prospect of amending a complaint 

ordinarily does not constitute good cause to extend the time for service under Rule 4(m). See Wei 

v. State of Hawaii, 763 F.2d 370, 371-72 (9th Cir. 1985). However, the Court has discretion to 

permit an extension of time even absent a party’s showing of “good cause” for the extension. 

Specifically, the 1993 Advisory Committee Notes state that Rule 4(m) “authorizes the court to 

relieve a plaintiff of the consequences [of a dismissal] even if there is no good cause shown.”

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), any dismissal for failure to timely effect 

service would be limited to dismissal without prejudice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Thus, were the 

Court to grant ICE dismissal as it has requested, Plaintiff in all likelihood would re-add ICE to a 

new lawsuit that, for the sake of economy and prudence, likely would be consolidated with the 

prior (current), pending action. Valdez-Lopez, 656 F.3d at 856. Thus, dismissal on such grounds 

at this junction would not be an efficient use of resources for either the parties or this Court. 

Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of granting leave to amend.

/ / /

/ / /

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5. Prior amendments

The Court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is “particularly broad” where a party has

previously amended the pleading. Allen v. Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Here, the amendment sought will be the second amendment to the pleadings. Thus, this factor 

does not weigh against granting leave to amend. Storz Mgmt. Co. v. Carey, No. 2:18-CV-00068-

TLN-DB, 2021 WL 848768, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2021) (concluding single prior amendment 

as a matter of course did not outweigh the other Rule 15 factors that weighed in favor of granting 

leave to amend). 

Conclusion and Order

Based on the foregoing, the Nunez factors set forth by the Ninth Circuit weigh in favor of 

allowing Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint. Therefore, the Court exercises its 

discretion to grant Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. Swanson, 87 

F.3d at 343. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint (Doc. 35) is GRANTED;

2. Within five days of entry of this Order, Plaintiff shall file a second amended complaint

electronically as a standalone docket entry in this case. Plaintiff’s second amended

complaint shall correct the deficiency identified in count two and addressed in the Court’s

opinion above (supra p. 6);

3. Upon its filing, the second amended complaint shall become the operative complaint in

this action;

4. Plaintiff shall have thirty days from the entry of this order to effectuate service upon

Defendants United States of America and United States Immigration & Customs

Enforcement;

5. Defendants shall have 45 days to file their responses to the second amended complaint

following service thereof;

6. The scheduling conference set for June 26, 2023, at 9:30 a.m. before the undersigned, shall

be continued to July 24, 2023, at 9:00 a.m.; and

/ / /

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7. Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Docs. 21, 32) are DENIED AS MOOT.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 17, 2023 ___________________ _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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