Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_07-cv-00432/USCOURTS-azd-4_07-cv-00432-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 28:7422 Appeal from Administrative Decision

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

GEORGE R. MOLITORIS,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, 

Commissioner of the Social 

Security Administration,

Defendant. 

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No. CIV 07-432-TUC-CKJ 

ORDER

On February 19, 2009, Magistrate Judge Hector C. Estrada issued a Report and

Recommendation [Doc. # 13] in which he recommended that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

Case for Lack of Jurisdiction [Doc. # 8] be denied and this matter be remanded to the

Commissioner for further proceedings with regard to Plaintiff’s 2005 claim. On March 5,

2009, Defendant filed Objections to the Report and Recommendation [Doc. # 14]. On March

9, 2009, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike and Response to Defendant’s Objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation [Doc. # 15].

Procedural Background

Plaintiff George Molitoris ("Molitoris") protectively filed an application for Social

Security Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) on June 19, 2003. He asserted that his onset

of disability was April 1, 2001. Molitoris’ date of last insured was June 30, 2003. Molitoris’

application was denied on August 15, 2003, and, upon reconsideration, on December 3, 2003.

Case 4:07-cv-00432-CKJ Document 17 Filed 05/08/09 Page 1 of 8
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In March of 2004, Molitoris requested a hearing before the Administrative Law Judge (“the

ALJ”). On June 4, 2004, the ALJ dismissed Molitoris’ Request for Hearing because it was

untimely. Molitoris did not appeal this dismissal.

On April 7, 2005, Molitoris applied for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”)

benefits alleging inability to work since April 1, 2001. Molitoris’ claim was allowed on

January 15, 2006. Molitoris requested a hearing to review the onset date. The ALJ

dismissed Molitoris’ request for a hearing and determined that the final determination on

Molitoris’ prior application would not be reopened based on the doctrine of res judicata. The

Social Security Appeals Council denied Molitoris’ request for review.

On August 28, 2007, Molitoris filed his Complaint in this matter. Molitoris asserts

that the ALJ and the Appeals Council erred in finding that Molitoris cannot reopen the

determination made on a prior application. 

On November 26, 2007, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to FRCP

12(c)(1) [Doc. # 8]. Defendant argues that this Court has no jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §

405(g) to review any action of the Commissioner unless there has been a final decision made

after a hearing. Defendant further argues that the Commissioner’s decision not to reopen a

prior claim is not reviewable absent a legitimate constitutional challenge. Because a final

decision after a hearing was not issued and Molitoris has not claimed a legitimate

constitutional challenge, Defendant argues this matter must be dismissed.

Molitoris filed his response on January 27, 2008. Molitoris argues that the ALJ has

de facto reopened the case and, therefore, res judicata is waived. Molitoris further argues

that this Court can determine as a threshhold whether res judicata is proper in this case.

Molitoris also argues that this case poses a constitutional issue because the government failed

in its duty to inquire by violating three of its own rulings. Molitoris also argues that remand

is required as a matter of law because new material evidence that relates to the period on or

before the date of the ALJ’s decision is presented in this case. 

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The Court notes, however, that the Commissioner’s Response to the Motion to Strike

was not timely filed; the Court will not consider the Response.

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Motion to Strike 

Plaintiff requests this Court to strike Defendant’s objections as untimely. Defendant

filed his Objections on March 5, 2009. As the magistrate judge advised the parties, written

objections to the Report and Recommendation were to be filed within ten days after being

served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). Because

weekends are not counted in computing a deadline, Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(2), and three days are

added for service, Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b)(2)(E), Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d), and 8 Fed.Proc., L.Ed. §

20:208 (2008), objections to the Report and Recommendation were to be filed on or before

March 10, 2009. The Court finds Defendant’s objection was timely filed; the Motion to

Strike will be denied.1

Report and Recommendation – Motion to Dismiss

The Magistrate Judge determined that the Commissioner’s decision not to reopen a

claim for social security benefits is discretionary and not considered a final decision within

the meaning of section 405(g). Krumpelman v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1982).

Indeed, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is the exclusive means for judicial review of the Commissioner’s

determinations regarding disability insurance benefits. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749,

857 (1975). Neither party has objected to this determination.

The Magistrate Judge also determined that the Commissioner may dismiss a request

for hearing if the ALJ decides that res judicata applies. 20 C.F.R. § 404.957(c)(1). The

Commissioner, however, may decide to reopen a final binding decision within four years of

the initial determination if there is good cause to do so. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.987-404.989. The

Magistrate Judge determined that a “clear reading of the ALJ’s decision shows that no defacto reopening occurred in this case.” Report and Recommendation, p. 9. The Magistrate

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Judge also determined that district courts “have no jurisdiction to review a refusal to re-open

a claim for disability benefits or a determination that such claim is res judicata.” Report and

Recommendation, p. 10, citing Krumpelman, 767 F.2d at 588. Neither party has objected to

these determinations.

The Magistrate Judge also determined that the Ninth Circuit recognizes that res

judicata is to be “applied less rigidly to administrative proceedings than to judicial

proceedings.” Report and Recommendation, p. 10, citing Chavez v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 691,

693 (9th Cir. 1988). The Magistrate Judge then determined, pursuant to Thompson v.

Schweiker, 665 F.2dd 936 (9th Cir. 1982), that where the record is inadequate to support the

findings of the ALJ, application of res judicata constitutes a denial of due process. Report

and Recommendation, p. 11. The Magistrate Judge determined that “it is unclear on this

record how the ALJ could have determined that Plaintiff’s 2005 application involved the

‘same facts and . . . the same issues which were decided in the final binding determination

dated August 18, 2003, made on the prior application.’” Report and Recommendation, p. 13.

Defendant objects to these determinations. Molitoris asserts, however, that the Magistrate

Judge was correct in determining that res judicata does not apply because Molitoris’

condition has materially changed since resolution of the earlier claim. Molitoris also asserts

that Defendant makes arguments that should have been raised and brought to the attention

of the magistrate long ago.

As to Molitoris’ claim that Defendant is making arguments that should have been

raised long ago, the Court notes that Defendant did argue that the Court did not have subject

matter jurisdiction in the Motion to Dismiss. Indeed, Defendant argued that the

Commissioner’s decision not to reopen a prior claim is not reviewable absent a legitimate

constitutional challenge. Moreover, lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any

time. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). Further, a district court can raise the issue on its own

accord. Id. Federal courts are always “under an independent obligation to examine their own

jurisdiction,” FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d

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The Court notes, however, that the Commissioner’s assertion that the magistrate

judge’s agreement with Plaintiff is incredible is disingenuous considering that some of the

Commissioner’s specific arguments relating to subject matter jurisdiction were first raised

in his Objections.

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Indeed, the Thompson court discussed the ALJ’s actions in failing to fully develop

the record where the claimant was not represented by counsel.

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603 (1990), and a federal court may not entertain an action over which it has no jurisdiction.

See Insurance Corp. Of Ireland, Ltd. v. Campagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,

701, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982); see also Magana v. Commonwealth of N.

Mariana Islands, 107 F.3d 1436, 1443 (9th Cir. 1997). The Court finds Defendant has not

waived its arguments challenging subject matter jurisdiction.2

The Magistrate Judge determined that, where the record is inadequate to support the

findings of the ALJ, application of res judicata constitutes a denial of due process. Report

and Recommendation, p. 11. The Magistrate Judge determined that “it is unclear on this

record how the ALJ could have determined that Plaintiff’s 2005 application involved the

‘same facts and . . . the same issues which were decided in the final binding determination

dated August 18, 2003, made on the prior application.” Id. at 13. However, the inadequate

record in Thompson was the record before the ALJ, not the reviewing court.3

 Moreover, the

Thompson court specifically stated that its decision did not “involve the issue, discussed in

Davis v. Schweiker, decided [on the same day], of whether a claimant whose application is

barred by res judicata is entitled to a review of the Secretary’s refusal to reopen the case.”

665 F.2d at 941. Rather, once “a decision becomes administratively final, the Secretary’s

decision to reopen a claim is purely discretionary. These discretionary decisions are not

‘final’ decisions within the meaning of § 405(g).” Davis v. Schweiker, 665 F.2d 934 (9th Cir.

1982).

The Court, therefore, does not have jurisdiction of this matter absent a colorable

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Although Molitoris did not object to the magistrate judge’s failure to address this

claim, the Court finds it appropriate, in its independent review, to address this claim.

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To receive DIB pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 423(a)(1), a person must be insured, be under

retirement age, have filled out an application for DIB, and be under a disability. To be

entitled to SSI under 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(1), a person must be disabled, and the income and

resources of the individual must be below a specific level. However, the definition of

“disability” is virtually identical for a DIB consideration as it is for an SSI consideration. See

Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 955 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1993).

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constitutional clam.4

 Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit

has held that a colorable constitutional claim of a due process violation “implicates a due

process right either to a meaningful opportunity to be heard or to seek reconsideration of an

adverse benefits determination.” Udd v. Massanari, 245 F.3d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 2001),

citing Evans v. Chater, 110 F.3d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1997). In Udd, the claimant had

alleged that his mental impairment prevented him from understanding the order of

termination and complying with regulations to request a timely review of the decision; in

Evans, the claimant alleged that he was mentally impaired and was not represented by

counsel at the time of the denial. See generally, 4 Soc. Sec. Law & Prac. § 55:21 (2009)

(discussing when constitutional issue is present when Commissioner has denied a petition

to reopen a claim).

Molitoris argues that the failure to reopen an earlier application without a hearing and

the failure to conduct an adequate inquiry constitutes a due process violation. In his

Response to the Motion to Dismiss, Molitoris asserts that the ALJ should have reopened his

first DIB claim in consideration of his first SSI claim.5

 Molitoris has not disputed the

Commissioner’s assertion that “the earliest month for which [he can receive benefits] is the

month following the month [he] filed the application.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.335. According to

Molitoris’ Response to the Motion to Dismiss, he filed an application for SSI benefits

alleging inability to work since April 1, 2001, on April 7, 2005. The Social Security

Administration determined that Molitoris was disabled as of April 20, 2005. Under 20

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The Court notes that Molitoris’ Complaint indicates that Molitoris brought this action

for DIB benefits – the Complaint does not mention his claim for SSI benefits. However,

Molitoris states that he is “not appealing the administrative denial of 2003, but rather the

January 15, 2006 decision finding no disability prior to the DLI of June 30, 2003.” Response

to Motion to Dismiss, p. 2.

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C.F.R. § 416.335, therefore, Molitoris cannot receive benefits prior to May 2005. Molitoris’

assertion that he is not seeking review of the denial of the DIB claim, but merely requesting

the onset date of the SSI claim be considered fails to acknowledge that the only way

Molitoris can receive the relief he requests is to review the original claims.6

 Molitoris’ onset

date does not change the fact that, pursuant to regulation, Molitoris cannot receive SSI

benefits prior to May 2005. Indeed, Molitoris’ claims that the SSA failed to follow its own

regulations regarding the onset date and the durational aspect of disability completely ignores

the fact that, under 20 C.F.R. § 416.335, such inquiries are not appropriate. Similarly,

Molitoris’ new evidence is not “material,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.989(a)(1) under 20 C.F.R. §

416.335. Where Molitoris has specifically stated that he is not appealing the “administrative

denial of [his] 2003 application and [is] not asking for back pay for that period” but is

challenging “the decision of the ALJ in [his] 2006 decision not to accept the DLI as [his]

onset of disability[,] Response to Motion to Dismiss, p. 8, Molitoris’ efforts to couch his

claim as a colorable constitutional claim must fail. 

The Court finds it does not have subject matter jurisdiction of this matter and

dismissal is appropriate.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:

1. The Report and Recommendation [Doc. # 13] is ADOPTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART.

2. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Case for Lack of Jurisdiction [Doc. # 8] is

GRANTED.

3. This matter is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

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4. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and shall then close its file in this

matter.

DATED this 7th day of May, 2009.

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